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 THE EVIDENCE 
 IN THE CASE 
 
 A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the 
 
 War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic 
 
 Records of England, Germany, Russia, 
 
 France, Austria, Italy and Belgium. 
 
 BY 
 
 JAMES M. BECK, LL.D. 
 
 Late Assistant Attorney-General of the U. S. 
 Author of "The War and Humanity." 
 
 With an Introduction by 
 HON. JOSEPH H. CHOATE 
 
 Late U. S. Ambassador to Great Britain 
 
 ' 'Did these bones cost no more the breeding but to play at loggats 
 with 'em ? Mine ache, to think on 't. 
 
 Hamlet — Act V., So. 1. 
 
 Revised Edition, with Additional Material 
 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 GROSSET & DUNLAP 
 
 PUBLISHERS 
 
 Published by Arrangement with G. P. Putnam's Sons
 
 Copyright, 1914. by 
 JAMES M. BECK 
 
 Copyright, 1915, by 
 JAMES M. BECK 
 
 {For Revised Edition) 
 
 Thirteejith Impression 
 
 < <' I ■ . ■ Hy J/>Mes M. Blck 
 The Evidence in the Case. The War and Humanity 
 
 This edition is issued under arrangement with the publishers, 
 G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and Lxdndon
 
 3 
 
 5/1 
 
 /3 388e 
 
 TO 
 
 ALBERT, OF BELGIUM 
 "Every Inch a King" 
 
 Justum, et tenacem propositi virum 
 Non civium ardor prava jubentium, 
 Non vultus instantis tyranni, 
 
 Mente quatit solida, neque Auster 
 
 Dux inquicti turbidus Adrian, 
 
 Nee fulminantis magna manus Jovis. 
 
 Si f ractus .'Uabatur orbis, 
 
 Impavidum ferient ruina;. 
 
 Horace^
 
 
 rj Publishers* Note 
 
 -J 
 
 ri 
 
 The volume T^e Evidence in the Case is based upon an article 
 by the Hon. James M. Beck, which came into print in the 
 ^ " New York Times " of October 25th. The article in question 
 V made so deep an impression with thinking citizens on both 
 sides of the Atlantic that it has been translated into a number 
 of European languages, and some 400,000 copies have been sold 
 in England alone. 
 
 In making this acknowledgment, which is due for the courtesy 
 "^ of "The Times" in permitting an article prepared for its 
 columns to be utilized as the basis for the book, it is in order 
 for the publishers to explain to the readers that the material 
 in the article has itself been rewritten and amplified, while the 
 book contains, in addition to this original paper, a number of 
 further chapters comprising together more than six times the 
 material of the first article. 
 
 The present book is an independent work, and is deserving 
 of consideration on the part of all citizens who are interested 
 in securing authoritative information on the issues of the great 
 European contest. 
 
 New York, Dacember 12, 1914
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 BY THE HON. JOSEPH H. CHOATE, FORMER AMERICAN 
 AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN^ 
 
 For five months now all people who read at all 
 have been reading about the horrible war that is 
 devastating Europe and shedding the best blood 
 of the people of five great nations. In fact, they 
 have had no time to read anything else, and every- 
 thing that is published about it is seized upon with 
 great avidity. No wonder, then, that Mr. James 
 M. Beck's book. The Evidence in the Case, pub- 
 lished by G. P. Putnam's Sons, which has grown 
 out of the article by him contributed to the New 
 York Times Sunday Magazine, has been warmly 
 welcomed both here and in England as a valuable 
 addition to the literature of the day. 
 
 An able and clear-headed lawyer and advocate, 
 he presents the matter in the unique form of a legal 
 argument, based upon an analysis of the diplomatic 
 records submitted by England, Germany, Russia, 
 France, and Belgium, as "A Case in the Supreme 
 
 ' Reprinted, by permission, from the N. Y. Twies. 
 
 V
 
 vi Introduction 
 
 Court of Civilization," and the conclusions to be 
 deduced as to the moral responsibility for the war. 
 
 The whole argument is founded upon the idea 
 that there is such a thing as a public conscience of 
 the world, which must and will necessarily pass 
 final judgment upon the conduct of the parties 
 concerned in this infernal struggle. Many times 
 in the course of the book he refers emphatically to 
 that "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" 
 to which Jefferson appealed in our Declaration of 
 Independence as the final arbiter upon our conduct 
 in throwing off the British yoke and declaring our 
 right to be an independent nation. That this 
 "public opinion of the world" is the final tribunal 
 upon all great international contests is illustrated 
 by the fact that all mankind, including Great 
 Britain herself, has long ago adjudged that our 
 great Declaration was not only just, but necessary 
 for the progress of mankind. 
 
 It is evident from his brief preface that Mr. 
 Beck is a sincere admirer of historic Germany, 
 and on the eve of the war he was at Weimar, after 
 a brief visit to a little village near Erfurt, where 
 one of his ancestors was born, who had migrated 
 at an early date to Pennsylvania, a Commonwealth 
 whose founder had made a treaty with the Indians 
 which, so far from being treated as a "mere scrap
 
 Introduction vii 
 
 of paper," was never broken. Like many Ameri- 
 cans, Mr. Beck is of mixed ancestry, being in part 
 English and in part Swiss-German. He has there- 
 fore viewed the great question objectively, and 
 without any racial prejudice. 
 
 A careful study of the diplomatic correspondence 
 that preceded the outbreak of the war had con- 
 vinced Mr. Beck that Germany was chiefly re- 
 sponsible for it, and he proceeds con amove to 
 demonstrate the truth of this conviction by the 
 most earnest and forceful presentation of the case. 
 
 Forensic lawyers in the cases they present are 
 about half the time on the wrong side, or what 
 proves by the final judgment to have been the 
 wrong side, but it is always easy to tell from the 
 manner of presentation whether they themselves 
 are thoroughly convinced of the justice of the side 
 which they advocate. It is evident that Mr. Beck 
 did not undertake to convince "the Supreme Court 
 of Civilization" until he was himself thoroughly 
 persuaded of the justice of his cause, that the 
 invasion of Belgium by Germany was not only a 
 gross breach of existing treaties, but was in viola- 
 tion of settled international law, and a crime 
 against humanity never to be forgotten, a crime 
 which converted that peaceful and prosperous 
 coimtry into a human slaughterhouse, reeking
 
 viii Introduction 
 
 with the blood of four great nations. How any 
 intelligent lawyer could have come to any other 
 conclusion it is not easy to imagine, since Germany 
 confessed its crime while in the very act of com- 
 mitting it, for on the very day that the German 
 troops crossed the Belgian frontier and hostihties 
 began, the Imperial Chancellor at the great 
 session of the Reichstag on August 4th declared, 
 to use his own words : 
 
 Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occu- 
 pied Luxemburg, and have possibly already entered 
 on Belgian soil. That is a breach of international 
 law. . . . We were jorced to ignore the rightful pro- 
 tests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium, 
 and the injustice — I speak openly — the injustice we 
 thereby commit, we will try to make good as soon as our 
 military aims have been attained. Anybody who is 
 threatened as we are threatened and is fighting for 
 his highest possessions can have only one thought — 
 how he is to hack his way through. 
 
 Thank God, their military aims have not yet 
 been attained, and from present appearances are 
 not likely to be, but, as Mr. Beck believes, Ger- 
 many will still be held by the judgment of mankind 
 to make good the damage done. 
 
 In reviewing the diplomatic correspondence 
 published by Germany that preceded the out-
 
 Introduction ix 
 
 break of the war, Mr. Beck lays great stress, and 
 we think justly, upon the obvious suppression of 
 evidence by Germany, in omitting substantially all 
 the important correspondence on vital points that 
 passed between Germany and Austria, and the 
 suppression of important evidence in judicial 
 proceedings always carries irresistible weight 
 against the party guilty of it. While England and 
 France and Russia were pressing Germany to 
 influence and control Austria in the interests of 
 peace, not a word is disclosed of what, if anything, 
 the German Foreign Office said to Austria toward 
 that end. To quote IMr. Beck's own words : 
 
 Among the twenty-seven communications ap- 
 pended to the German White Paper, it is most signi- 
 ficant that not a single communication is given of 
 the many which passed from the Foreign Office of 
 Berlin to that of Vienna, and only two which passed 
 from the German Ambassador in Vienna to the 
 German Chancellor, and the purpose of this sup- 
 pression is even more clearly indicated by the 
 complete failure of Austria to submit any of its 
 diplomatic records to the scrutiny of a candid world. 
 
 Notwithstanding the disavowal given by the 
 German Ambassador at Petrograd to the Rus- 
 sian Ivlinister of Foreign Affairs, that the Ger- 
 man Government had no knowledge of the text
 
 X Introduction 
 
 of the Austrian note before it was handed in, 
 and did not exercise any influence on its contents, 
 Mr. Beck establishes clearly by the admissions of 
 the German Foreign Office itself that it was con- 
 sulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum, and 
 that it not only approved of its course, but literally 
 gave to Austria carte blanche to proceed. And the 
 German Ambassador to the United States for- 
 mally admitted in an article in The Independent 
 of September 7, 19 14, that "Germany had ap- 
 proved in advance the Austrian ultimatum to 
 Servia." 
 
 This brutal ultimatum by a great nation of fifty 
 millions of people, making impossible demands 
 ^. , against a little one of four millions which had itself 
 just emerged from two conflicts and was still suffer- 
 ing from exhaustion — an ultimatum which set all 
 the nations of Europe in agitation — is proved to 
 have been jointly concocted by the two members of 
 the Triple Alliance, Germany and Austria. But 
 the third member of that Alliance, Italy, found it 
 to be an act of aggression on their part which 
 brought on the war, and that the terms of the 
 Triple Alliance, therefore, did not bind her to take 
 any part. 
 
 The peace parleys which passed between the 
 several nations involved are carefully reviewed by
 
 Introduction xi 
 
 Mr. Beck, who concludes, as we think justly, that 
 up to the 28th of July, when the German Imperial 
 Chancellor sent for the English Ambassador and 
 announced the refusal of his Government to accept 
 the conference of the Powers proposed by Sir 
 Edward Grey, every proposal to preserve peace 
 had come from the Triple Entente, and that every 
 such proposal had met with an uncompromising 
 negative from Austria, and either that or obstruc- 
 tive quibbles from Germany. 
 
 At this point, the sudden return of the Kaiser to 
 Berlin from his annual hohday in Norway, which 
 his own Foreign Office regretted as a step taken on 
 his Majesty's own initiative and which they feared 
 might cause speculation and excitement, and his 
 personal intervention from, that time until his 
 troops invaded Luxemburg and he made his abrupt 
 demand upon the Belgian Government for per- 
 mission to cross its territory are reviewed with 
 great force and effect by Mr. Beck, with the con- 
 clusion on his part that the Kaiser, who by a timely 
 word to Austria might have prevented all the 
 terrible trouble that followed, was the supremely 
 guilty party, and that such will be the verdict of 
 history. 
 
 Mr. Beck's review of the case of Belgium is 
 extremely interesting, and his conclusion that
 
 xii Introduction 
 
 England, France, Russia, and Belgium can await 
 with confidence the world's final verdict that their 
 quarrel was just, rests safely upon the plea of 
 "Guilty" by Germany, a conclusion which seems 
 to have been already plainly declared by most of 
 the civilized nations of the world. 
 
 We think that Mr. Beck's opinion that England 
 and France were taken unawares and were wholly 
 unprepared for war is a little too strongly expressed. 
 France, certainly, had been making ready for war 
 with Germany ever since the great conflict of 1870 
 had resulted in her loss of Alsace and Lorraine, and 
 had had a fixed and unalterable determination to 
 get them back when she could, although it is evi- 
 dent that she did not expect her opportunity to 
 come just when and as it did. That Great Britain 
 had no present expectation of immediate war with 
 Germany is clearly obvious. That she had long 
 been apprehending the danger of it in the indefinite 
 future is very clear, but that Sir Edward Grey and 
 the Government and the people that he represented 
 did all that they possibly could to prevent the war 
 seems to be clearly established. 
 
 Mr. Beck's book is so extremely interesting 
 from beginning to end that it is difficult when once 
 begun to lay it down and break off the reading, and 
 we shall not be surprised to hear, not only that it
 
 Introduction xiii 
 
 has had an immense sale in England and America, 
 but that its translation into the languages of the 
 other nations of Europe has been demanded. 
 
 Joseph H. Choate. 
 
 New York, January lo, 1915.
 
 FOREWORD 
 
 On the eve of the Great War I sat one 
 evening in the reading room of the Hotel Erb- 
 prinz in classic Weimar. I had spent ten happy- 
 days in Thuringia, and had visited with deep 
 interest a little village near Erfurt, where one 
 of my forbears was bom. I had seen Jena, 
 from whose historic university this paternal an- 
 cestor had gone as a missionary to North America 
 in the middle of the eighteenth century. This 
 simple-minded German pietist had cherished the 
 apparent delusion that even the uncivilized 
 Indians of the American wilderness might be 
 taught — the Bemhardis and Treitschkes to the 
 contrary notwithstanding — that to increase the 
 political power of a nation by the deliberate and 
 highly systematized destruction of its neighbors 
 was not the truest political ideal, even of an 
 Indian tribe. 
 
 This missionary had gone most fittingly to the 
 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, where its enlight- 
 ened founder had already given a demonstration of 
 the truth that a treaty of peace, even though not
 
 xvi Foreword 
 
 formally expressed in a "scrap of paper, '* might be 
 kept by white men and so-called savages with 
 scrupulous fidelity for at least three quarters of a 
 century, for even the cynical Voltaire said in sin- 
 cerest admiration that the compact between William 
 Penn and the Indians was the only treaty which 
 was never reduced to parchment, nor ratified by 
 an oath and yet was never broken. When Penn, 
 the great apostle of peace, died in England, a dis- 
 appointed, ruined, and heart-broken man, and the 
 news reached the Indians in their wigwams along 
 the banks of the Delaware, they had for him, 
 whom they called the "white Truth Teller" so 
 deep a sense of gratitude that they sent to his 
 widow a sympathetic gift of valuable skins, in 
 memory of the "man of unbroken friendship 
 and inviolate treaties. " 
 
 These reflections in a time of broken friendships 
 and violated treaties are not calculated to fill the 
 man of the twentieth century with any justifiable 
 pride. 
 
 My mind, however, as I spent the quiet evening 
 in the historic inn of Thackeray's Pumpernickel, 
 did not revert to these far distant associations but 
 was full of other thoughts suggested by the most 
 interesting section of Germany, through which it 
 had been m}^ privilege to pass.
 
 Foreword xvii 
 
 I had visited Eisenach and reverentially stood 
 within the room where the great master of music, 
 John Sebastian Bach, had first seen the light of 
 day, and as I saw the walls that he loved and which 
 are forever hallowed because they once sheltered 
 this divine genius, the question occurred to me 
 whether he may not have done more for Ger- 
 many with his immortal harmonies, which are the 
 foundation of all modem music, than all the 
 Treitschkes, and Bemhardis, with their gospel of 
 racial hatred, pseudo-patriotism, and imperial 
 aggrandizement. 
 
 I had climbed the slopes of the Wartburg and 
 from Luther's room had gazed with delight upon 
 the lovely Thuringian forests. Quite apart from 
 any ecclesiastical considerations that room seemed 
 to suggest historic Germany in its best estate. 
 It recalled that scene of undying interest at the 
 Diet of Worms, when the peaceful adherence 
 to an ideal was shown to be mightier than the 
 power of the greatest empire since the fall of 
 Rome. The monk of Wittenburg, standing alone 
 in the presence of the great Emperor, Charles 
 the Fifth, and the representatives of the most 
 powerful religious organization that the world 
 has ever known, with his simple, "Hier stehe 
 ich; ich kann nicht ajidcrs," represented the
 
 xviii Foreword 
 
 truest soul and highest ideal of the nobler 
 Germany. 
 
 These and other glorious memories, suggested 
 by Eisenach, Frankfort, Erfurt, Weimar, Jena, 
 and Leipzig, made this pilgrimage of intense in- 
 terest, and almost the only discord was the sight 
 of the Leipzig Voelkerschlacht Denkmal, probably 
 the largest, and certainly the ugliest monument 
 in all the world. It has but one justification, in 
 that it commemorates war, and no monument ever 
 more fully symbolized by its own colossal cru- 
 dity the moral ugliness of that most ghastly phe- 
 nomenon of human life. Let us pray that in the 
 event of final victory Prussia will not commission 
 the architects of the Leipzig monument, or the 
 imperial designer of the Sieges-Allee to rebuild that 
 Gothic masterpiece, the Rheims Cathedral. That 
 day in Leipzig an Alsatian cartoonist, Hansi, had 
 been sentenced to one year's imprisonment for a 
 harmless cartoon in a book for children, in which 
 the most supersensitive should have found occa- 
 sion for nothing, except a passing smile. 
 
 On the library table of the Erbprinz, I found a 
 large book, which proved to be a Bismarck 
 memorial volume. It contained hundreds of 
 pictures glorifying and almost deifying the Iron 
 Chancellor. One particularly arrested my atten-
 
 Foreword xix 
 
 tion . It was the familiar picture of the negotiation s 
 for peace between Bismarck and Jules Favre in 
 the terrible winter of 1871. The French states- 
 man has sunk into a chair in abject despair, 
 struck speechless by the demands of the conqueror. 
 Bismarck stands triumphant and his proud bear- 
 ing and arrogant manner fail to suggest any such 
 magnanimous courtesy as that with which Grant 
 accepted the sword of Lee at Appomattox. The 
 picture breathed the very spirit of " Vce victis.^* 
 Had a French artist painted this picture, I could 
 understand it, for it would serve effectively to 
 stimulate undying hatred in the French heart. 
 It seemed strange that a German artist should 
 treat a subject, calling for a spirit of most delicate 
 courtesy, in a manner which represented Prussian 
 militarism in its most arrogant form. 
 
 This unworthy picture reminded me of a later 
 scene in the Reichstag, in which the Iron Chancel- 
 lor, after reviewing with complacency the profit- 
 able results of Germany's dcHberately provoked 
 wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, 
 added the pious ejaculation : 
 
 Wir Deutsche Jiirchten Gott sonst nichts in der Welt. 
 (We Germans fear God but nothing else in the world.) 
 
 It is not necessary to impeach the sincerity of
 
 XX Foreword 
 
 « 
 
 this pious glorification of the successful results of 
 land grabbing. The mind in moments of exal- 
 tation plays strange tricks with the soul. Bis- 
 marck may have dissembled on occasion but he 
 was never a hypocrite. It is the spirit which 
 inspired this boastful and arrogant speech, which 
 has so powerfully stimulated Prussian Junkerism, 
 to which I wish to refer. 
 
 Had an American uttered these words we would 
 have treated the boast as a vulgar exhibition of 
 provincial "spread-eagleism," such as character- 
 ized certain classes in this country before the Civil 
 War, and which Charles Dickens somewhat over- 
 caricatured in Martin Chuzzlewit, but in the mouth 
 of Bismarck, with his cynical indifference to moral 
 considerations in questions of statecraft, this piece 
 of rhetorical spread double-eagleism, manifests the 
 spirit of the Prussian military caste since its too 
 easy triumph over France in 1 870-1 871, a triimiph, 
 which may yet prove the greatest calamity 
 that ever befell Germany, not only in the seeds 
 of hatred which it sowed, of which there is now a 
 harvest of blood past precedent, but also in the 
 development of an arrogant pride which has pro- 
 foundly affected to its prejudice the noble Germany 
 of Luther, Bach, Beethoven, Goethe, Schiller, Kant, 
 Humboldt, and Lessing.
 
 Foreword xxi 
 
 To say that Germany "fears" nothing save 
 God is contradicted by its whole diplomatic his- 
 tory of the last half century. In this it is not 
 peculiar. The curse of modern statecraft is the 
 largely unreasoning fear which all nations have 
 of their neighbors. England has feared Germany 
 only less than Germany has feared England and 
 this nervous apprehension has bred jealousy, 
 hatred, suspicion, until to-day all civilized nations 
 are reaping a harvest horrible beyond expression. 
 
 The whole history of Germany since 1870 has 
 shown a constant, and at times an unreasoning 
 fear, first of France, then of the Slav, and latterly 
 and in its most acute form, of England. I do not 
 mean that Germany has been or is now animated 
 by any spirit of craven cowardice. There has not 
 been in recorded history a braver nation, and 
 the daimtless courage with which, even at this 
 hour, thousands of Germans are going with patri- 
 otic songs on their lips to "their graves as to 
 their beds," is worthy of all admiration. 
 
 The whole statecraft of Germany for over forty 
 years has been inspired by an exaggerated appre- 
 hension of the intentions of its great neighbors. 
 This fear followed swiftly upon the triumph of 
 1 87 1, for Germany early showed its apprehension 
 that France might recover its militar>^ strength.
 
 xxii Foreword 
 
 When that fallen but indomitable foe again strug- 
 gled to its feet in 1875, the Prussian military 
 caste planned to give the stricken gladiator the 
 coup de grace and was only prevented by the in- 
 tervention of England and Russia. Later this 
 acute and neurotic apprehension took the form 
 of a hatred and fear of Russia, and this not- 
 withstanding the fact that the Kaiser had in 
 the Russo-Japanese War exalted the Czar as the 
 "champion of Christianity" and the "representa- 
 tive of the white race" in the Far East. 
 
 When the psychology of the present conflict 
 is considered by future historians, this neu- 
 ropathic feature of Germany's foreign policy 
 will be regarded as a contributing element of first 
 importance. 
 
 Latterly the Furor Teutonicus was especially 
 directed against England, and although it was 
 obvious to the dispassionate observer in neutral 
 countries that no nation was making less prepar- 
 ations or was in point of fact so illy prepared 
 for a conflict as England, nevertheless Germany, 
 with a completeness of preparation such as the 
 world has never witnessed, was constantly indulg- 
 ing in a very hysteria of fear at the imaginary 
 designs of England upon Germany's standing as a 
 world power.
 
 Foreword xxiii 
 
 Luther's famous saying, already quoted, and 
 Bismarck's blustering speech to the Reichstag 
 measure the difference between the Germany of 
 the Reformation and the Prussia of to-day. 
 
 I refuse to believe that this Bismarckian attitude 
 is that of the German people. If a censored press 
 permitted them to know the real truth with respect 
 to the present crisis, that people, still sound in 
 heart and steadfast in soul, would repudiate 
 a policy of duplicity, cunning, and arrogance, 
 which has precipitated their great nation into 
 an abyss of disaster. The normal German is an 
 admirable citizen, quiet, peaceable, thrifty, in- 
 dustrious, faithful, efficient, and affectionate to 
 the verge of sentimentality. He, and not the 
 Junker, has made Germany the most efficient po- 
 litical State in the world. If to his genius for 
 organization could be added the individualism of 
 the American, the resultant product would be 
 incomparable. A combination of the German 
 fortiter in re with the American suamter in modo 
 would make the most efficient repubHc in the 
 world. 
 
 The Germany of Luther, that still survives and 
 will survive when " Junkerism" is a dismal memory 
 of the past, believes that "the supreme wisdom, 
 the paramount vitality, is an abiding honesty, the
 
 xxiv Foreword 
 
 doing of right, because right is right, in scorn of 
 consequence." 
 
 That the German people have rallied with en- 
 thusiastic unanimity to the flag in this great crisis, 
 I do not question. This is, in part, due to the 
 fact that the truth has never yet been disclosed to 
 them, and is not hkely to be until the war is over. 
 They have been taught that in a time of profound 
 peace England, France, and Russia deliberately 
 initiated a war of aggression to destroy the com- 
 mercial power of Germany. The documents 
 hereinafter analyzed will show how utterly 
 baseless this fiction is. Even if the truth were 
 known, no one can blame the German, who now 
 rallies to his flag with such superhuman devo- 
 tion, for whether the cause of his country is just 
 or unjust, its prestige, and perhaps its very ex- 
 istence, is at stake, and there should be for the 
 rank and file of the German people only a feeling 
 of profound pity and deep admiration. Edmund 
 Burke once said, "We must pardon something to 
 the spirit of Hberty." We can paraphrase it and 
 say in this crisis, "We must pardon something to 
 the spirit of patriotism." The whole-hearted de- 
 votion of this great nation to its flag is worthy of 
 the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Thor 
 did not wield his thunder hammer with greater
 
 Foreword xxv 
 
 eftect than these descendants of the race of Wotan. 
 If the ethical question depended upon relative 
 bravery, who could decide between the German, 
 "faithtul unto death"; the English soldier, stand- 
 ing like a stone wall against fearful odds, the 
 French or Russian not less brave or resolute, and 
 the Belgian, now as in Caesar's time the "bravest of 
 all the tribes of Gaul." 
 
 No consideration, either of sympathy, admira- 
 tion, or pity, can in any manner affect the deter- 
 mination of the great ethical question as to the 
 moral responsibility for the present crime against 
 civilization. That must be determined by the 
 facts as they have been developed, and the nations 
 and individuals who are responsible for this 
 world-wide catastrophe must be held to a strict 
 accountability. The truth of history inexorably 
 demands this. 
 
 To determine where this moral responsibility 
 lies is the purpose of these pages. 
 
 In determining this question Posterity will dis- 
 tinguish between the military caste, headed by the 
 Kaiser and the Crown Prince, which precipitated 
 this great calamity, and the German people. 
 
 The very secrecy of the plot against the peace 
 of the world and the failure to disclose to the 
 German nation the diplomatic communications
 
 ijocvi Foreword 
 
 hereinafter quoted, strongly suggest that this 
 detestable war is not merely a crime against civili- 
 zation, but also against the deceived and misled 
 German people. They have a vision and are 
 essentially progressive and peace-loving in their 
 national characteristics, while the ideals of their 
 military caste are those of the dark ages. 
 
 One day the German people will know the full 
 truth and then there will be a dreadful reckoning 
 for those who have plunged a noble nation into 
 this unfathomable gulf of suffering. 
 
 Though the mills of God grind slowly, 
 Yet they grind exceeding small, 
 
 Though with patience He stands waiting, 
 With exactness grinds He all. 
 
 Or to put this ancient Greek proverb in its 
 German form: 
 *'Cottes Milhle geht langsam aher die mahltfein.'* 
 
 James M. Beck. 
 New York, November 30, 1914.
 
 Zhc Mitnesses 
 
 ENGLAND 
 HIS MAJESTY, KING GEORGE V. 
 
 Mr. Asquith Premier. 
 
 Mr. Beaumont Councilor of Embassy at 
 
 Constantinople. 
 
 Sir F. Bertie Ambassador at Paris. 
 
 Sir G. Buchanan Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg. 
 
 Sir M. De Bunsen Ambassador at Vienna. 
 
 Sir E. Goschen Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey Foreign Secretary. 
 
 Sir a. Johnstone Minister at Luxemburg. 
 
 Sir Arthur Nicholson Under Secretary for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Sir R. Rood Ambassador to Italy. 
 
 Sir H. Rumbold Councilor of Embassy at 
 
 Berlin. 
 
 Sir F. Villiers Minister to Belgium. 
 
 GERMANY 
 
 HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR WILLIAM II. 
 
 Herr von Below (Saleske ') Minister to Belgium. 
 
 Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg Chancellor. 
 
 Herr von Buch Minister at Luxemburg. 
 
 I Herr von Below Saleske is referred to ic\ despatches as Herr von Below. 
 xxvii
 
 ;-:viii The Witnesses 
 
 Herr von Heeringen Minister of War. 
 
 Herr von Jagow Secretary of State. 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky Ambassador at London. 
 
 Herr von Mueller Minister at The Hague. 
 
 Count Pourtales Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg. 
 
 Baron von Schoen Ambassador at Paris. 
 
 Herr von Zimmermann Under Secretary of State. 
 
 Herr von Tschirschky Ambassador at Vienna. 
 
 FRANCE 
 
 PRESIDENT RAYMOND POINCARE 
 
 M. Viviani Premier of France. 
 
 M. Berthelot Of the French Ministry for 
 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 M. Paul Cambon Ambassador to England. 
 
 M. Klobukowski Minister to Belgium. 
 
 M. De Margerie Of the French Diplomatic 
 
 Service. 
 
 M. Jules Cambon Ambassador to Germany. 
 
 RUSSIA 
 HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR NICHOLAS II. 
 
 M. Sazonof Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Count Benckendorff Ambassador at London. 
 
 M. Bronewsky Charge d'Affaires at Berlin. 
 
 M. De Etter Councilor of Embassy at 
 
 London. 
 
 M. IsvoLSKY Ambassador to France. 
 
 Prince Kudachef Councilor of Embassy at 
 
 Vienna. 
 
 M. Salviati Consul General at Fiume. 
 
 M. Schebeko Ambassador to Austria. 
 
 M. Sevastopoulo Charg6 d'Affaires at Paris.
 
 The Witnesses xxix 
 
 M. Strandtman Charge d'Affaires at Bel- 
 grade. 
 
 M. SucHOMLiNOF Minister for War. 
 
 M. De Swerbeew Ambassador to Germany. 
 
 BELGIUM 
 
 HIS MAJESTY, KING ALBERT 
 
 M. Davignon Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Baron von der Elst . .Secretary General to Minis- 
 try of Foreign Affairs. 
 Count Errembault de Dudzeele . . Minister at Vienna. 
 
 Baron Fallon Minister at The Hague. 
 
 Baron Grenier Minister at Madrid. 
 
 Baron Guillaume Minister at Paris. 
 
 Count de Lalaing Minister at London. 
 
 SERVIA 
 
 HIS MAJESTY, KING PETER 
 
 M. Pachitch Premier and Minister of 
 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 M. Boschkovitch Minister at London. 
 
 Dr. Patchou Minister of Finance. 
 
 AUSTRIA 
 
 HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH 
 
 Count Berchtold Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Count Clary und Aldringen Minister at Brussels. 
 
 Baron Giesl von Gieslingen Minister at Belgrade. 
 
 Baron Macchio Councilor of Austrian Min- 
 istry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Count Mensdorff Ambassador to England. 
 
 Count Szapary Ambassador to Russia.
 
 XXX The Witnesses 
 
 ITALY 
 
 HIS MAJESTY, KING VICTOR EMMANUEL IIL 
 
 Marquis di San Giuliano Minister of Foreign Affairs.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGC 
 
 Introduction ...... v 
 
 Foreword . . . . . . . xv 
 
 The Witnesses xxvii 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 The Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 Existence of the Court — The conscience of mankind — The 
 philosophy of Bernhardi — The recrudescence of Mach- 
 iavellism — Treitschke and Bernhardi's doctrine — Re- 
 cent utterances of the Kaiser, Crown Prince, and 
 representative officials — George Bernard Shaw's de- 
 fense — Concrete illustration of Bernhardiism . . I 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 The Record in the Case 
 
 The issues stated — Proximate and underlying causes — A 
 war of diplomats — The masses not parties to the war — 
 The official defenses — The English White Paper — 
 The German White Paper — The Russian Orange Paper 
 — The Belgian Gray Paper — Austria and Italy still 
 silent — Obligation of these nations to disclose facts . l8 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 The Suppressed Evidence 
 
 No apparent suppression by England, Russia, and Belgium 
 — Suppression by Germany of vital documents — 
 Suppression by Austria of entire record — Significance 
 of such suppression ...... 27 
 
 x:ixi
 
 xxxii Contents 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 Germany's Responsibility for the Austrian 
 Ultimatum 
 
 PAG3 
 
 Silence which preceded ultimatum — Europe's ignorance of 
 impending developments — Duty to civilization — 
 Germany's prior knowledge of ultimatum — Its dis- 
 claimer to Russia, France, and England of any respon- 
 sibility — Contradictory admission in its official defense 
 — Further confirmation in Germany's simultaneous 
 threat to the Powers — Further confirmation in its con- 
 fidential notice to States of Germany to prepare for 
 eventualities ........ 31 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 The Austrian Ultimatum to Servia 
 
 Extreme brutality of ultimatum — Limited time given to 
 Servia and Europe for consideration — Ultimatum and 
 Servia's reply contrasted in parallel columns — Relative 
 size of two nations — Germany's intimations to Servia — 
 Brutality of ultimatum shown by analogy — Disclaimer 
 of intention to take territory valueless ... 47 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 The Peace Parleys 
 
 Possibility of peace not embarrassed by popular clamor — 
 Difficulties of peaceful solution not insuperable — 
 Policy of Germany and Austria — Russia's and Eng- 
 land's request for time — Germany's refusal to co- 
 operate — Germany's and Austria's excuses for refusal 
 to give extension of time — Berchtold's absence from 
 Vienna — Austria's alleged disclaimer of territorial 
 expansion — Sazonof's conference with English and 
 French Ambassadors — Their conciliatory counsel to
 
 Contents xxxiii 
 
 Servia — Servia's pacific reply to ultimatum — Austria, 
 without considering Servian reply, declares war — 
 England proposes suspension of hostilities for peace 
 parleys — Germany refuses — Its specious reasons — 
 Germany's untenable position as to localization of 
 conflict — England's proposal for a conference — Ger- 
 many's refusal — Austria declines all intervention, 
 refusing to discuss Servian note — Germany supports 
 her with a quibble as to name of conference — Russia 
 proposes further discussion on basis of Servian note — 
 Russia then again proposes European conference — 
 Austria and Germany decline ..... 6l 
 
 CHAPTER VII' 
 The Attitude of France 
 
 The French Yellow Book — Its editors and contents— 
 M. Jules Cambon — The weakness oi German dip- 
 lomacy — Cambon's experience and merits — iutcrview 
 between the German Kaiser and the King of Belgium 
 — The Kaiser's change of attitude — The influence of 
 the Moroccan crisis — The condition of the German 
 people in 1913 — The suppression of news in Austria — 
 Attitude of the military party — Servia's warning to 
 Austria — Germany's knowledge of the Austrian ulti- 
 matum before its issuance — Italy's ignorance of the 
 Austrian ultimatum — Significance of the fact — Ger- 
 many's reasons for concealing its intentions from Italy 
 — The policy of secrecy — Prince Lichnowsky's anxiety 
 — Cambon's interview with von Jagow — The methods 
 of deception — Sazonof's frank offer — Germany's at- 
 tempt to influence France — Cambon's dramatic in- 
 terview with von Jagow — His plea " In the name of 
 humanity " — The difl'erent attitudes of the two groups 
 of powers ........ 102
 
 xxxiv Contents 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Kaiser's return to Berlin — His inconsistent record and 
 complex personality — German Foreign Office depre- 
 cates his return — Its many blunders — The Kaiser takes 
 the helm — He telegraphs the Czar — The Czar's reply — 
 The ICaiser's second telegram — His untenable position 
 — The Czar's explanation of military preparations and 
 pledge that no provocative action would be taken by 
 Russia — King George's telegram proposing temporary 
 occupation by Austria of Belgrade pending further peace 
 negotiations — The Kaiser's reply — The Kaiser's tele- 
 gram to the Czar demanding Russian discontinuance of 
 military preparations — His insistence upon unilateral 
 conditions — Germany's preparations for war — Its ofiFer 
 to England to insure its neutrality — England's reply — 
 Russia's offer to stop conditionally military prepara- 
 tions — England requests Germany to suggest any peace 
 formula — Austria expresses willingness to discuss with 
 Russia Servian note — Motives of Austria for this re- 
 versal of policy — The Kaiser sends ultimatum to Russia 
 — The Czar's last appeal — The Kaiser's reply — 
 Russia's 'lability to recall mobilization — England's 
 last efforts for peace — Germany declares war — The 
 Czar's telegram to King George .... 138 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 The Case of Belgium 
 
 riie verdict of history not affected by result of war — 
 Belgium at outbreak of war — The Treaty of 1839 — 
 Its affirmation by Bismarck — France's action in 1871 — 
 Reaffirmation by Germany of Belgian neutrality ia 
 1911-1914 — The Hague Peace Conference of 1907 — 
 England asks Germany's and France's intentions with 
 respect to Belgium's neutrality — France replies — 
 Germany's refusal to reply — Germany's second offer to 
 England — Germany's ultimatum to Belgium — Bel-
 
 Contents xxxv 
 
 giura's reply — France's offer of five army corps — 
 Belgium refuses aid — Germany's declaration of war 
 against Belgium — The German Chancellor's explana- 
 tion in the Reichstag — The Belgian King appeals to 
 England — England's ultimatum to Germany — The 
 "scrap of paper" incident — England declares war 
 against Germany — The apologies for Germany's action 
 discussed — Belgium's rights independent of Treaty of 
 1839 or The Hague Convention — Germany's allegation 
 that France had violated Belgium's neutrality an 
 afterthought — Von Mach's plea for the suspension of 
 judgment — The Brussels documents discussed — The 
 negotiations I.ctween England and Belgium — The Ger- 
 man Chancellor's belated explanation of the " Scrap 
 of paper " phrase — Invasion of Belgium a recrudes- 
 cence of Machiavellism — The great blunder of Ger- 
 many's diplomats and soldiers .... 196 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 The Judgment of the World 
 
 The completeness of the evidence — The force of public 
 opinion — The judgment of neutral States — The United 
 States as a moral arbiter — ^A summary of the probable 
 verdict of history . ...... 246 
 
 Epilogue 252
 
 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION 
 
 Let us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, 
 1914, there had existed, as let us pray will one day 
 exist, a Supreme Court of Civilization, before 
 which the sovereign nations could litigate their 
 differences without resort to the iniquitous arbi- 
 trament of arms and that each of the contend- 
 ing nations had a sufficient leaven of Christianity 
 or shall we say common-place, every-day morality, 
 to have its grievances adjudged not by the ethics 
 of the cannon, but by the eternal criterion of 
 justice. 
 
 What would be the judgment of that august 
 tribunal? 
 
 It may be suggested that the question is aca- 
 demic, as no such Supreme Court exists or is likely 
 to exist within the life of any living man. 
 
 I
 
 2 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Casuists of the Bemhardi school of moral phil- 
 osophy will further suggest that to discuss the 
 ethical merits of the war is to start with a false 
 premise that such a thing as international mor- 
 ality exists, and that when once the conven- 
 tionalities of civilization are laid aside the 
 leading nations commence and make war in a 
 manner that differs only in degree and not in kind 
 from the methods of Frederick the Great and 
 Napoleon, and that these in turn only differed in 
 degree from those of Alaric and Attila. According 
 to this theory, the only law of nations is that 
 ascribed by the poet to Rob Roy : 
 
 "The good old rule 
 Sufficeth them, the simple plan 
 That they should take who have the power, 
 And they should keep who can." 
 
 Does the Twentieth Century only differ from its 
 predecessors in having a thin veneering of hypoc- 
 risy, or has there developed in the progress of civil- 
 ization an international morality, by which, even 
 though imperfectly, the moral conduct of nations 
 is judged? 
 
 The answer can be an unqualified affirmative. 
 With the age of the printing press, the steamship, 
 the railroad, and the telegraph there has developed 
 a conscience oj mankind.
 
 The Supreme Court of Civilization 3 
 
 When the founders of the American Republic 
 severed the tie which bound them to Great Britain, 
 they stated that " a decent respect to the opinions 
 of manki^id requires that they should declare the 
 causes which impel them to the separation," 
 
 The Declaration assumed that there was a 
 rule of right and wrong that regulated the inter- 
 course of nations as well as individuals; it be- 
 lieved that there was a great human conscience, 
 which rises higher than the selfish interests and 
 prejudices of nations and races, and which approves 
 justice and condemns injustice. It felt that this 
 approval is more to be desired than national ad- 
 vantage. It constituted mankind a judge between 
 contending nations and lest its judgment should 
 temporarily err it established posterity as a court 
 of last resort. It placed the tie of humanity 
 rbove that of nationality. It proclaimed the 
 solidarity of mankind. 
 
 In the years that have intervened since this 
 noble Declaration, the world has so far progressed 
 towards an enhghtened sense of justice that a 
 "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" has 
 proved an efficient power in regulating peacefully 
 and justly the intercourse of nations. Each nation 
 does at least in some measure fear to-da}' the 
 disapproval of civilization. The time gives this
 
 4 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 proof in the eager desire of Germany to-day — 
 despite its policy of "blood and iron" — to gain 
 the sympathetic approval of the American peo- 
 ple, not with the remotest hope of any practical 
 cooperation but to avoid that state of moral iso- 
 lation, in which the land of Luther now finds itself. 
 
 The Supreme Court of Civilization does exist. 
 It consists of cosmopolitan men in every country, 
 who put aside racial and national prejudices and 
 determine the right and wrong of every issue 
 between nations by that slowly forming system 
 of international moraUty which is the conscience 
 of mankind. 
 
 To a certain class of German statesmen and 
 philosophers this Court of Public Opinion is a 
 visionary abstraction. A group of distinguished 
 German soldiers, professors, statesmen, and even 
 doctors of divinity, pretending to speak in behalf 
 of the German nation, have consciously or un- 
 consciously attempted to revive in the twentieth 
 century the cynical poHtical morality of the 
 sixteenth. 
 
 As Symonds, the historian of the Renaissance, 
 says in his Age of the Despots, Machiavelli was the 
 first in modern times to formulate a theory of 
 government in which the interests of the ruler 
 are alone regarded, which assumes
 
 The Supreme Court of Civilization 5 
 
 a separation between statecraft and morality, 
 which recognizes force and fraud among the legiti- 
 mate means of attaining high political ends, which 
 makes success alone the test of conduct and which 
 presupposes the corruption, baseness, and venality 
 of mankind at large. 
 
 Even the age of Cesare Borgia revolted against 
 this philosophy and the name of Machiavelli 
 became a b^^word. "Am I a Machiavel?" says 
 the host in The Merry Wives of Windsor, and 
 the implication of this question indirectly mani- 
 fests the revolt of the seventeenth century against 
 the sinister philosophy of the great Florentine. 
 
 Nothing can be more amazing than that not 
 only leading militarists of Germany but many of its 
 foremost philosophers and teachers have become so 
 intoxicated with the dream of Pan-Germanism 
 that in the utmost sincerity they have espoused 
 and with a certain pride proclaimed the vicious 
 principles of JMachiavelli in all their moral nudity. 
 There is an emotional and mystical element in 
 the advanced German thinker, which makes him 
 capable of accepting in full sincerity intellectual 
 and moral absurdities of which the more ^obust 
 common sense of other nations would be incapable. 
 The advanced German doctrinaire is the "wises•^ 
 fool in Christendom." The depth of his learning
 
 6 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 is generally in the inverse ratio to the shallowness 
 of his common sense. 
 
 Nothing better demonstrates this than the 
 present negation by advanced and doubtless sin- 
 cere German thinkers of the very foundations of 
 pubHc morality and indeed of civilization. They 
 have been led with Nietzsche to revile the Beati- 
 tudes and exalt the supremacy of cruelty over 
 mercy. Indeed Treitschke in his lectures on 
 Politik, which have become the gospel of Junker- 
 dom, avowedly based his gospel of force upon the 
 teaching of Machiavelli, for he points out that 
 it was Machiavelli who first clearly saw that the 
 State is power {der Staat ist Macht). Therefore 
 "to care for this power is the highest moral duty 
 of the State" and "of all political weaknesses that 
 of feebleness is the most abominable and despicable ; 
 it is the sin against the holy spirit of politics." 
 He therefore holds that the State as the ultimate 
 good "cannot bind its will for the future over 
 against other States," and that international 
 treaties are therefore only obligator}^ "for such 
 time as the State may find to be convenient." 
 
 To enforce the will of the nation contrary to its 
 own solemn promises and to increase its might, 
 war is the appointed means. Both Treitschke and 
 Moltke conceived it as "an ordinance set by God"
 
 The Supreme Court of Civilization 7 
 
 and "one of the two highest functions" of the 
 State. The doctrine is carried to the blasphemous 
 conclusion that war is an ordinance of a just and 
 merciful God; that, to quote Bemhardi, "it is a 
 biological necessity" and that "the living God will 
 see to it that war shall always recur as a terrible 
 medicine for humanity." Therefore "might is at 
 once the supreme right and the dispute as to what 
 is right is decided by the arbitrament of war," 
 v.'hich gives a "biologically just decision," 
 
 This means that the 42 centimeter howitzer is 
 more moral than a gun of smaller caliber and that 
 the justice of God depends upon the superiority 
 cf Krupp to other ordnance manufacturers. 
 
 Treitschke tells us, and the statement is quoted 
 by Bemhardi with approval, that "the end all 
 and be all of a state is power, and he who is 
 not man enough to look this truth in the face 
 should not meddle with politics." To this 
 Bemhardi adds that the State's highest moral duty 
 is to increase its power and in so doing ''the State 
 is the sole judge oj the morality of its own action. 
 It is in fact above morality or, in other words 
 whatever is necessary is moral." 
 
 Again we learn that the State must not allow 
 any conventional sympathies to distract it from 
 its object and that "conditions may arise which
 
 8 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 are more powerful than the most honorable 
 intentions. " 
 
 All efforts directed towards the abolition of war 
 are denominated as not only "foolish but ab- 
 solutely immoral." To indicate that in this 
 prosecution of war for the increase of dominion, 
 chivalry would be a weakness and magnanimity a 
 crime, we are finally told that "the State is a law 
 unto itself" and that "weak nations have not the 
 same right to live as powerful and vigorous 
 nations. ' ' Even as to weak nations, we are further 
 advised that the powerful and vigorous nation — 
 which alone apparently has the right to live — 
 must not wait for some act of aggression or legiti- 
 mate casus belli, but that it is justified in de- 
 liberately provoking a war, and that the happiest 
 results have always followed such "deliberately 
 provoked wars," for "the prospects of success are 
 the greatest when the moment for declaring war 
 can be selected to suit the political and military 
 situation. " 
 
 As the weak nations have no moral right to live 
 it becomes important to remember that in the 
 economy of Prussian Junkerdom there is only one 
 strong race — his own. " Wir sind die Weltrasse.^* 
 The ultimate goal is the super-nation, and the 
 premise upon which the whole policy is based is
 
 The Supreme Court of Civilization 9 
 
 that Germany is predestined to be that super- 
 nation. Bemhardi beheves — and his beUef is but 
 the reflex of the oft-repeated boast of the Kaiser — 
 that history presents no other possibility. " For 
 us there are two alternatives and no third — 
 world power or ruin " {Weltmacht oder Nieder- 
 gang). To assimilate Germany to ancient Rome 
 the Kaiser on occasion reminds himself of Cctsar 
 and affects to reign, not by the will of the people, 
 but by divine right. No living monarch has said 
 or done more to revive this mediceval fetich. To 
 his soldiers he has recently said : "You think each 
 day of your Emperor. Do not forget God. " 
 What magnanimity! 
 
 At the outbreak of the present war he again 
 illustrated his spirit of fanatical absolutism, 
 which at times inspires him, by saying to his 
 army: 
 
 Remember that the German people are the chosen 
 of God. On me, as German Emperor, the spirit 
 of God has descended. I am His weapon; His 
 sword; His Vicegerent. Woe to the disobedient! 
 Death to cowards and unbelievers ! 
 
 The modem world has had nothing like this 
 since Mahomet and, accepted literally, it claims 
 for the Kaiser the divine attributes attributed to 
 the Caesars. Even the Caesars, in baser and more
 
 10 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 primitive times, found posing as a divine superman 
 somewhat difficult and disconcerting. Shakespeare 
 subtly suggests this when he makes his Caesar talk 
 like a god and act with the vacillation of a child. 
 
 When the war was precipitated as the natural 
 result of such abhorrent teachings, the worid at 
 large knew little either of Treitschke or Bemhardi. 
 Thoughtful men of other nations did know that 
 the successful political immoralities of Frederick the 
 Great had profoimdly affected the policies of the 
 Prussian Court to this day. The German poet, 
 FreiHgrath, once said that "Germany is Ham- 
 let," bu:t no analogy is less justified. There is 
 nothing in the supersensitive, introspective, and 
 amiable dreamer of Elsinore to suggest the Prussia 
 of to-day, which Bebel has called * ' Siegesbetrunken. ' ' 
 (Victory-dnmk.) 
 
 Since the beginning of the present war, the world 
 has become familiar with these abhorrent teachings 
 and as a result of a general revolt against this 
 recrudescence of Borgiaism attempts have been 
 made by the apologists for Prussia, especially in 
 the United States, to suggest that neither Treitsch- 
 ke nor Bemhardi fairly reflect the political 
 philosophy of official Germany. • Treitschke's in- 
 fluence as an historian and lecturer could not well 
 be denied but attempts have been made to im-
 
 The Supreme Court of Civilization ii 
 
 press America that Bemhardi has no standing 
 to speak for his country and that the importance 
 of his teachings should therefore be minimized. 
 
 Apart from the wide popularity of Bemhardi's 
 writings in Germany, the German Government 
 has never repudiated Bemhardi's conclusions or 
 disclaimed responsibility therefor. While pos- 
 sibly not an officially authorized spokesman, yet 
 he is as truly a representative thinker in the 
 German military system as Admiral Mahan was 
 in the Navy of the United States. Of the 
 acceptance by Prussia of Bemhardi's teachings 
 there is one irrefutable proof. It is Belgium. The 
 destruction of that unoffending country is the full 
 harvest of this twentieth-century Machiavellism. 
 
 A few recent utterances from a representative 
 physician, a prominent journalist, and a distin- 
 guished retired officer of the German Army may 
 be quoted as showing how completely infatuated a 
 certain class of German thinkers has become with 
 the gospel of force for the purpose of attaining 
 world power. 
 
 Thus a Dr. Fuchs, in a book on the subject of 
 preparedness for war, says: 
 
 Therefore the German claim of the day must be : 
 The family to the front. The State has to follow 
 at first in the school, then in foreign politics. Edu-
 
 12 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 cation to hate. Education to the estimation of hatred. 
 Organization of hatred. Education to the desire Jor 
 hatred. Let us abolish unripe and false shame 
 before brutality and fanaticism. We must not hesi- 
 tate to announce: To us is given faith, hope, and 
 hatred, but hatred is the greatest among them. 
 
 Maximilian Harden, one of the most influential 
 German journalists, says: 
 
 Let us drop our miserable attempts to excuse 
 Germany's action. Not against our will and as a 
 nation taken by surprise did we hurl ourselves into 
 this gigantic venture. We ivilled it. We had to 
 will it. We do not stand before the judgment seat 
 of Europe. We acknowledge no such jurisdiction. 
 Our might shall create a new law in Europe. It is 
 Germany that strikes. When she has conquered 
 new domains for her genius then the priesthoods 
 of all the gods will praise the God of War. 
 
 Still more striking and morally repellent was the 
 very recent statement by Major-General von Dis- 
 furth, in an article contributed by him to the 
 Hamburger Nachrichten, which so completely illus- 
 trates Bemhardiism in its last extreme of avowed 
 brutality that it justifies quotation in extenso. 
 
 No object whatever is served by taking any notice 
 of the accusations of barbarity leveled against 
 Germany by our foreign critics. Frankly, we are 
 and must be barbarians, if by these we understand
 
 The Supreme Court of Civilization 13 
 
 those who ivage ivar relentlessly and to the uttermost 
 degree. . . . 
 
 We ozve no explanations to any one. There is 
 nothing for us to justify and nothing to explain away. 
 Every act of whatever nature committed hy our troops 
 for the purpose of discouraging, defeating, and destroy- 
 ing our enemies is a brave act and a good deed, and is 
 fully justified. . . . Germany stands as the supreme 
 arbiter of her own methods, which in the time of war 
 must be dictated to the world. . . . 
 
 They call us barbarians. What of it? We scorn 
 them and their abuse. For my part I hope that in 
 this war we have merited the title of barbarians. Let 
 neutral peoples and our enemies cease their empty 
 chatter, which may well be compared to the twitter 
 of birds. Let them cease their talk of the Cathedral 
 at Rheims and of all the churches and all the castles 
 in France which have shared its fate. These 
 things do not interest us. Our troops must achieve 
 victory. What else matters? 
 
 These hysterical vaporings of advanced Junkers 
 no more make a case against the German people 
 t,han the tailors of Tooley Street had authority to 
 speak for England, but they do represent the 
 spirit of the ruling caste, to which unhappily the 
 German people have committed their destiny. 
 It would not be difficult to quote both the Kai- 
 ser and the Crown Prince, who on more than 
 one occasion have manifested their enthusiastic 
 adherence to the gospel of brute force. The world
 
 14 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 is not likely to forget the Crown Prince's congratu- 
 lations to the brutal military martinet of the 
 Zabem incident, and still less the shameful fact 
 that when the Kaiser sent his punitive expedition 
 to China, he who once stood within sight of 
 the Mount of Olives and preached a sermon 
 breathing the spirit of Christian humility, said to 
 his soldiers: 
 
 When you encounter the enemy you will de- 
 feat him. No quarter shall be given, no prisoners 
 shall be taken. Let all who fall into your hajids be 
 at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years 
 ago under the leadership of Etzel (Attila), gained a 
 reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical 
 tradition, so may the name of Germany become known 
 in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will 
 ever again even dare to look askance at a German. 
 
 And this campaign of extermination — worthy 
 of a savage Indian chief — was planned for the 
 most pacific and unaggressive race, the Chinese, 
 for it is sadly true that the one nation which 
 has more than any other been inspired for two 
 thousand years by the spirit of "peace on 
 earth" is the hermit nation, into which until the 
 nineteenth century the light of Christianity never 
 shone. 
 
 In a recent article, George Bernhard Shaw, 
 the Voltaire of the twentieth century, with the
 
 The Supreme Court of Civilization 15 
 
 intellectual brilliancy and moral shallowness of 
 the great cynic, attempts to justify Bemhardiism 
 by resort to the unconvincing ^^et tu quoque'* 
 argument. He contends that England also has 
 had its "Bemhardis," and refers to a few books 
 which he affects to think bear out his argument. 
 That these books show that there have been ad- 
 vocates of militarism in England is undoubtedly 
 true. The present war illustrates that there was 
 need of such literature, for a nation which faced so 
 great a trial as the present, with a standing army 
 that was pitiful in comparison with that of Ger- 
 many and without any involuntary service law, 
 certainly had need of some literary stimulus to 
 self-preparation. No one quarrels with Bemhardi 
 in his discussions of the problems of war as such. 
 It is only when the soldier ceases to be a strategist 
 and becomes a moralist that the average man with 
 conventional ideas of morality revolts against Bem- 
 hardiism. The books to which Mr. Shaw refers can 
 be searched in vain for any passages parallel to 
 those which have been quoted from Treitschke, 
 Bemhardi, and other German writers. The bril- 
 liant but erratic George Bernard Shaw cannot find 
 in all English literature any such Machiavelliisms 
 as those of Treitschke and Bemhardi. 
 
 Shaw's whole defense of Germany, betrays his
 
 i6 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 characteristic desire to be clever and audacious 
 without regard to nice considerations of truth. 
 Much as we may admire his intellectual badinage 
 under other circumstances, it may be questioned 
 whether in this supreme tragedy of the world it 
 was fitting for Shaw to daub himself anew with his 
 familiar vermilion and play the intellectual clown. 
 
 It was either courage of an extraordinary but 
 unenviable character or else crass stupidity that 
 led Bemhardi to submit to the civilization of 
 the present day such a debasing gospel, for if his 
 brain had not been hopelessly obfuscated by his 
 Pan-Germanic imperialism, he would have seen 
 that not only would this philosophy do his country 
 infinitely more harm than a whole park of artillery 
 but would inevitably carry his memory down to 
 a wondering posterity, like Machiavelli, detestable 
 but, unlike Machiavelli, ridiculous. 
 
 Machiavelli gave to his Prince a literary finish 
 that placed his treatise among the classics, while 
 Bemhardi has gained recognition chiefly because 
 his book is a moral anachronism. 
 
 One concrete illustration from Bemhardi clearly 
 shows that the sentences above quoted are 
 truly representative of his philosophy, and not 
 unfair excerpts. In explaining that it is the duty 
 of every nation to increase its power and territory
 
 The Supreme Court of Civilization 17 
 
 without regard for the rights of others, he alludes 
 to the fact that England committed the "ww/>ar- 
 donable blunder from her point of view of not 
 supporting the Southern States in the American 
 War of Secession, " and thus forever severing in 
 twain the American Republic. In this striking 
 illustration of applied Bernhardiism, there is no 
 sutrgestion a3 to the moral side of such interven- 
 tion. Nothing is said with respect to the moral 
 question of slavery, or of the obligations of 
 England to a friendly Power. Nothing as to 
 how the best hopes of humanity would have 
 been shattered if the American Republic — that 
 ''pillar of cloud by day and pillar of fire by night" 
 to struggling humanity — had been brought to 
 cureless ruin. All these considerations are com- 
 pletely disregarded, and all Bemhardi can see in 
 the situation, as it presented itself to England 
 in 1 86 1, was its opportunity, by a cowardly stab 
 in the back, to remove forever from its path a great 
 and growing nation. 
 
 Poor Bcrnhardi ! He thought to serve his royal 
 master. He has simply damned him. As Mach- 
 iavcUi, as the eulogist of the Medicis, simply em- 
 phasized their moral nudity, so Bernhardi has 
 shown the world the inner significance of this 
 crude revival of Csesarism.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE RECORD IN THE CASE 
 
 All morally sane men in this twentieth century 
 are agreed that war abstractly is an evil thing, — - 
 perhaps the greatest of all indecencies, — and that 
 while it may be one of the offenses which must 
 come, "woe to that man (or nation) by whom the 
 offense cometh!" 
 
 They are of one mind in regarding this present 
 war as a great crime — perhaps the greatest crime — 
 against civilization, and the only questions which 
 invite discussion are : 
 
 Which of the two contending groups of Powers 
 is morally responsible? 
 
 Was Austria justified in declaring war against 
 Servia? 
 
 Was Germany justified in declaring war against 
 Russia and France? 
 
 Was Germany justified in declaring war against 
 Belgium? 
 
 Was England justified in declaring war against 
 
 Germany? 
 
 S8
 
 The Record in the Case 19 
 
 Primarily and perhaps exclusively these ethical 
 questions turn upon the issues developed by the 
 communications which passed between the various 
 chancelleries of Europe in the last week of July, 
 for it is the amazing feature of this greatest of wars 
 that it was precipitated by the ruling classes 
 and, assuming that all the diplomats sincerely 
 desired a peaceful solution of the questions raised 
 by the Austrian iiltimatum (which is by no 
 means clear) the war is the result of ineffe ctive 
 diplomacy.^ 
 
 I quite appreciate the distinction between the 
 immediate causes of a war and the anterior or 
 underlying causes. The fundamental cause of the 
 Franco-German War of 1870 was not the incident 
 at Ems nor even the question of the Spanish 
 succession. These were but the precipitating 
 pretexts or, as a lawyer would express it, the 
 "proximate causes." The underlying cause was 
 unquestionably the rivalry between Prussia and 
 France for political supremacy in Europe. 
 
 Behind the Austrian ultimatum to Servia were 
 also great questions of State policy, not easily 
 determinable upon any tangible ethical principle, 
 and which involved the hegemony of Europe. 
 Germany's domination of Europe had been es- 
 tablished when by the rattling of its saber it
 
 20 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 compelled Russia in 1908 to permit Austria to 
 disturb the then existing status in the Balkans by 
 the forcible annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina, and behind the Austrian-Servian question 
 of 1 9 14, arising out of the murder of the Crown 
 Prince of Austria at Serajevo, was the determina- 
 tion of Germany and Austria to reassert that 
 dominant position by compelling Russia to submit 
 to a further humiliation of a Slav State. 
 
 The present problem is to inquire how far Ger- 
 many and her ally selected a just pretext to test 
 this question of mastery. 
 
 The pretext was the work of diplomatists. It 
 was not the case of a nation rising upon some great 
 cause which appealed to popular imagination. 
 The acts of the statesmen in that last fateful 
 week of July, 19 14, were not the mere echo of the 
 popular will. 
 
 The issues were framed by the statesmen and 
 diplomats of Europe and whatever efforts were 
 made to preserve the peace and whatever ob- 
 structive tactics were interposed were__nQt ^ the 
 acts of any_of_the nations now in arms but^ those 
 of asrnall coterie of men who, Jn the secrecy 
 of their respective cabinet-^, made their moves and 
 countermoves upon Jhe chessboard of nations. 
 
 The future of Europe in that last week of July
 
 The Record in the Case 21 
 
 was in the hands of a small group of men, number- 
 ing not over fifty, and what they did was never 
 known to their respective nations in any detail 
 until after the fell Rubicon had been crossed and a 
 world war had been precipitated. 
 
 If all of these men had sincerely desired to work 
 for peace, there would not have been any war. 
 
 So swiftly did events move that the masses of the 
 people had time neither to think nor to act. The 
 suddenness of the crisis marks it as a species of 
 "midsummer madness," a very "witches' sab- 
 bath" of diplomatic demagoguery. 
 
 In a peaceful summer, when the nations now 
 struggling to exterminate each other were fraterniz- 
 ing in the holiday centers of Europe, an issue was 
 suddenly precipitated, made the subject of com- 
 munications between the various chancelleries, and 
 almost in the twinkling of an eye Europe found 
 itself wrapped in a universal flame. The appall- 
 ing toll of death suggests the inquiry of Hamlet; 
 " Did these bones cost no more the breeding, but 
 to play at loggats with 'em?" and if the di- 
 plomatic "loggats" of 1914 were ineffectively 
 played, some one must accept the responsibility 
 for such failure. 
 
 This sense of responsibility against the dread 
 Day of Accounting has resulted in a disposition
 
 22 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 beyond past experience to justify the quarrel 
 by placing before the world the diplomatic 
 record. 
 
 The English Government commenced shortly 
 after the outbreak of hostilities by publishing the 
 so-called White Paper, consisting of a statement 
 by the British Government and i6o diplomatic 
 documents as an appendix. This was preceded 
 by Sir Edward Grey's masterly speech in Parli- 
 ament. That speech and all his actions in this 
 fateful crisis may rank him in future history with 
 the younger Pitt. 
 
 On August 4th, the German Chancellor for the 
 first time explained to the representatives of his 
 nation assembled in the Reichstag the causes of 
 the war, then already commenced, and there was 
 distributed among the members a statement of 
 the German Foreign Office, accompanied by 
 27 Exhibits in the form of diplomatic com- 
 munications, which have been erroneously called 
 the German White Paper and which sets forth 
 Germany's defense to the world. 
 
 Shortly thereafter Russia, casting aside all the 
 traditional secrecy of Muscovite diplomacy, sub- 
 mitted to a candid world its acts and deeds in the 
 form of the so-called Russian Orange Paper, with 
 79 appended documents, and this was followed
 
 The Record in the Case 23 
 
 later by the publication by Belgium of the so- 
 called Belgian Gray Paper. 
 
 Late in November France published its Yellow 
 Book, the most comprehensive of these diplomatic 
 records. Of the two groups of powers, therefore, only 
 Austria and Italy have failed to disclose their dip- 
 lomatic correspondence to the scrutiny of the world. 
 
 The former, as the originator of the controversy, 
 should give as a matter of "decent respect to the 
 opinions of mankind" its justification, if any, for 
 what it did. So far, it has only given its idtimatum 
 to Servia and Servia's reply. 
 
 Italy, as a nation that has elected to remain 
 neutral, is not under the same moral obligation to 
 disclose the secrets of its Foreign Office, and while 
 it remains on friendly terms with all the Powers it 
 probably feels some delicacy in disclosing con- 
 fidential commimications, but as the whole world 
 is vitally interested in determining the justice of 
 the quarrel and as it is wholly probable that the 
 archives of the Italian Foreign Office would throw 
 an illuminating searchlight upon the moral issues 
 involved, Italy, in a spirit of loyalty to civilization, 
 should without further delay disclose the documen- 
 tary evidence in its possession. 
 
 While it is to be regretted that the full diplomatic 
 record is not made up, yet as we have the most
 
 24 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 substantial part of the record in the communica- 
 tions which passed in those fateful days between 
 Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, there is 
 sufficient before the court to justify a judgment, 
 especially as there is reason to believe that the 
 documents as yet withheld would only confirm 
 the conclusions which the record already given 
 to the world irresistibly suggests. 
 
 Thus we can reasonably assume that the Italian 
 documentary evidence would fairly justify the 
 conclusion that the war was on the part of Ger- 
 many and Austria a war of aggression, for Italy, 
 by its refusal to act with its associates of the Tri- 
 ple Alliance, has in the most significant manner 
 thus adjudged it. 
 
 I Under the terms of the Triple Alliance, Italy had 
 obligated itself to support Germany and Austria 
 in any purely defensive war, and if therefore the 
 communications, which undoubtedly passed be- 
 tween Vienna and Berlin on the one hand, and 
 Rome on the other, justified the conclusion that 
 Germany and Austria had been assailed by Russia, 
 England, and France or either of them, then we 
 must assume that Italy would have respected its 
 obligation, especially as it would thus relieve Italy 
 from any possible charge of treachery to two al- 
 lies, whose support and protection it had enjoyed
 
 The Record in the Case 25 
 
 from the time that the Triple Alliance was first 
 made. ) 
 
 Wh^n Italy decided that it was imder no ob- 
 ligation to support its allies, it effectually af- 
 firmed the fact that they had commenced a war 
 of aggression, and until the contrary is shown, we 
 must therefore assume that the archives of the 
 Foreign Office at Rome would merely confirm 
 the conclusions hereinafter set forth as to the 
 moral responsibility for the war. 
 
 Similarly upon considerations that are familiar 
 to all who have had any experience in the judicial 
 investigation of truth, it must be assumed that 
 if Austria had in its secret archives any docu- 
 mentary evidence that would justify it in its 
 pretension that it had been unjustly assailed by one 
 or more of the Powers with which it is now at war, 
 it would have published such documents to the 
 world in its own exculpation. The moral respon- 
 sibility for this war is too great for any nation 
 to accept it unnecessarily. Least of all could 
 Austria — which on the face of the record com- 
 menced the controversy by its ultimatum to 
 Servia — leave anything undone to acquit itself 
 at the bar of public opinion of any responsibility 
 for the great crime that is now drenching Europe 
 with blood. The time is past when an}^ nation
 
 26 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 can ignore the opinions of mankind or needlessly 
 outrage its conscience. Germany has recognized 
 this in publishing its defense and exhibiting a part 
 of its documentary proof, and if its ally, Austria, 
 continues to withhold from the knowledge of the 
 world the documents in its possession, there can 
 be but one conclusion as to its guilt. 
 
 Upon the record thus made up in the Supreme 
 Court of Civilization, that tribunal need no more 
 hesitate to proceed to judgment than would an or- 
 dinary court hesitate to enter a decree because one 
 of the litigants has deliberately suppressed docu- 
 ments known to be in its possession. It does not 
 lie in the mouth of such a litigant to ask the court 
 to suspend judgment or withhold its sentence until 
 the full record is made up, when the incompleteness 
 of that record is due to its own deliberate sup- 
 pression of vital documentary proofs.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE 
 
 The official defenses of England, Russia, France, 
 and Belgium do not apparently show any failure on 
 the part of either to submit any essential diplo- 
 matic document in their possession. They have 
 respectively made certain contentions as to the 
 proposals that they made to maintain the peace of 
 the world, and in every instance have supported 
 these contentions by putting into evidence the 
 letters and communications in which such proposals 
 were expressed. 
 
 When the German White Paper is exam- 
 ined it discloses on its very face the suppres- 
 ion of documents of vital importance. The 
 fact that communications passed between Ber- 
 lin and Vienna, the text of which has never been 
 disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture. Germany 
 asserts as part of its defense that it faithfully ex- 
 ercised its mediatory influence on Austria, but 
 not only is such influence not disclosed by any 
 practical results, such as we would expect in 
 
 27
 
 28 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 view of her dominating relations with Austria, 
 but the text of these vital communications is still 
 kept in the secret archives of Berlin and Vienna. 
 Germany has carefully selected a part of her dip- 
 lomatic records for publication but withheld others. 
 Austria has withheld all. 
 
 Thus in the official apology for Germany it is 
 stated that, in spite of the refusal of Austria to 
 accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to treat 
 the Servian reply "as a basis for further conversa- 
 tions, " 
 
 we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts 
 to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any 
 possible compromise consistent with the dignity 
 of the Monarchy.^ 
 
 This would be more convincing if the German 
 Foreign Office had added the text of the advice 
 which it thus gave Vienna. 
 
 A like significant omission will be found when 
 the same official defense states that on July 29th 
 the German Govemmicnt advised Austria "to 
 begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof. " But 
 here again the text is not found among the docu- 
 ments which the German Foreign Office has given 
 to the world. The communications, which passed 
 
 ' German White Paper.
 
 The Suppressed Evidence 29 
 
 between that office and its ambassadors in St. 
 Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given in 
 extenso, but among the twenty-seven communica- 
 tions appended to the German White Paper it is 
 most significant that not a single communication is 
 given of the manywhich passed from the Foreign Office 
 of Berlin to that of Vienna and only two which 
 passed from the German Ambassador in Vienna to 
 the German Chancellor. While the Kaiser has fa- 
 vored the world with his messages to the Czar 
 and King George, he has wholly failed to give us 
 any message that he sent in those critical days to 
 the Austrian Emperor or the King of Italy. We 
 shall have occasion to refer hereafter to the fre- 
 quent failure to produce documents, the existence 
 of which is admitted by the exhibits w^hich Ger- 
 many appended to its White Paper. 
 
 This cannot be an accident. The German For- 
 eign Office has seen fit to throw the veil of secrecy 
 over the lext of its communications to Vienna, al- 
 though professing to give the purport of a few of 
 them. The purpose of this suppression is even 
 more clearly indicated by the complete failure of 
 Austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to 
 the scrutiny of a candid world. Until Germany 
 and Austria are willing to put the most im- 
 portant documents in their possession in evidence,
 
 30 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 they must not be surprised that the World, re- 
 membering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dis- 
 patch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian War, 
 will be incredulous as to the sincerity of their pacific 
 protestations. 
 
 ADDENDUM 
 
 The Austrian Red Book, published more than six months after 
 the declaration of war, simply emphasizes the policy of suppres- 
 sion of vital documents, which we have already discussed. Of 
 its 69 documentary exhibits, there is not one which passed directly 
 between the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna. The text of the com- 
 munications, in which Germany claims to have exercised a 
 mediatory and conciliatory influence with its ally, is still withheld. 
 Not a single document is produced which was sent between July the 
 6lh and July the 21st, the period when the great coup was secretly 
 planned by Berlin and Vienna. 
 
 In the Red Book we find eight communications from Count 
 Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin and four replies 
 from that official, but not a letter or telegram passing between 
 Berchtold and von Bethmann-Hollweg or between the German 
 and Austrian Kaisers. The Austrian Red Book gives additional 
 evidence that at the eleventh hour, and shortly before Germany 
 issued its ultimatum to Russia, Austria did finally agree to discuss 
 the Servian question with Russia; but the information, which 
 Germany presumably gave to its ally cf its intention to send the 
 ultimatum to Russia, is carefully withheld. Notwithstanding this 
 suppression of vital documents, the diplomatic papers of Germany 
 and Austria, now partially given to the world, disclose an un- 
 mistakable purpose, amounting to an open confession, that they 
 intended to force their will upon Europe, even though this course 
 involved the most stupendous war in the history of mankind. 
 
 March i, 1915.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 Germany's responsibility for the Austrian 
 ultimatum 
 
 On June 28, 19 14, the Austrian Crown Prince 
 ivas murdered at Serajevo. For neariy a month 
 thereafter there was no public statement by Aus- 
 tria of its intentions, with the exception of a few 
 semi-inspired dispatches to the effect that it would 
 act with the greatest moderation and self-restraint. 
 A careful examination made of the files of two 
 leading American newspapers, each having a sep- 
 arate news service, from June 28, 1914, to July 23, 
 19 14, has failed to disclose a single dispatch from 
 Vienna which gave any intimation as to the drastic 
 action which Austria was about to take. 
 
 The French Premier, Viviani, in his speech to 
 the French Senate, and House of Deputies, on 
 August 4, 1914, after referring to the fact that 
 France, Russia, and Great Britain had cooperated 
 in advising Servia to make any reasonable con- 
 cession to Austria, added : 
 
 31
 
 32 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 This advice was all the more valuable in view of 
 the fact that Austria-Hungary's demands had been 
 inadequately foreshadowed to the governments 
 of the Triple Entente, to whom during the three 
 preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian Government 
 had repeatedly given assurance that its demands 
 would be extremely moderate. 
 
 The movements of the leading statesmen and 
 rulers of the Triple Entente clearly show that they, 
 as well as the rest of the world, had been lulled into 
 false security either by the silence of Austria, or, 
 as Viviani avers, by its deliberate suggestion that 
 its treatment of the Serajevo incident would be 
 conciliatory, pacific, and moderate. 
 
 Thus, on July 20th, the Russian Ambassador, 
 obviously anticipating no crisis, left Vienna on a 
 fortnight's leave of absence. The President of the 
 French Republic and its Premier were far distant 
 from Paris. Pachitch, the Servia.n Premier, was 
 absent from Belgrade, when the ultimatum was 
 issued. 
 
 The testimony of the British Ambassador to 
 Vienna is to the same effect. He reports to Sir 
 Edward Grey : 
 
 The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d of July of 
 the note to Servia was preceded by a period of 
 absolute silence at the Ballplatz.
 
 Germany and the Austrian Ultimatum 33 
 
 He proceeds to say that with the exception of the 
 German Ambassador at Vienna (note the signifi- 
 cance of the exception) not a single member of the 
 Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian 
 ultimatum and that the French Ambassador, when 
 he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on July 23d 
 (the day of its issuance), was not only kept in 
 ignorance that the ultimatum had actually been 
 issued, but was given the impression that its 
 tone would be moderate. Even the Italian Am- 
 bassador was not taken into Count Berchtold's 
 confidence. ^ 
 
 The Servian Government had formally dis- 
 claimed any responsibility for the assassination and 
 had pledged itself to punish any Servian citizen 
 implicated therein. No word came from Vienna 
 excepting the semi-official intimations as to its 
 moderate and conciliatory course, and after the 
 funeral of the Archduke, the world, then en- 
 joying its summer holiday, had almost forgotten 
 the Serajevo incident. The whole tragic occur- 
 rence simply surv'ived in the sympathy which all 
 felt with Austria in its new trouble, and especially 
 with its aged monarch, who, like King Lear, was 
 "as full of grief as age, wretched in both." 
 
 ' Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated 
 September I, 1914.
 
 34 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Never was it even hinted that Germany and Aus- 
 tria were about to apply in a time of peace a 
 match to the powder magazine of Europe. 
 
 Can it be questioned that loyalty to the highest 
 interests of civilization required that Germany 
 and Austria, when they determined to make the 
 murder of the Archduke by an irresponsible 
 assassin the pretext for bringing up for final de- 
 cision the long-standing troubles between Austria 
 and Servia, should have given all the European 
 nations some intimation of their intention, so that 
 their confreres in the family of nations could co- 
 operate to adjust this trouble, as they had adjusted 
 far more difficult questions after the close of the 
 Balko-Turkish War? 
 
 Whatever the issue of the present conflict, 
 it will always be to the lasting discredit of 
 Germany and Austria that they were false to 
 this great duty, and that they precipitated the 
 greatest of all wars in a manner so underhanded 
 as to suggest a trap. They knew, as no one else 
 knew, in those quiet mid-summer days of July, 
 that civilization was about to be suddenly and 
 most cruelly torpedoed. The submarine was Ger- 
 many and the torpedo, Austria, and the work was 
 most effectually done. 
 
 This ignorance of the leading European states-
 
 Germany and the Austrian Ultimatum 35 
 
 men (other than those of Germany and Austria) 
 as to what was impending is strikingly shown 
 by the first letter in the English White Paper 
 from Sir Edward Grey to Sir H, Rumbold, dated 
 July 20, 1914. When this letter was written it is 
 altogether probable that Austria's arrogant and 
 unreasonable ultimatum had already been framed 
 and approved in Vienna and Berlin, and yet Sir 
 Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great 
 and friendly country, had so little knowledge of 
 Austria's policy that he 
 
 asked the German Ambassador to-day (July 20th) 
 if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna. 
 He replied that he had not, but Austria was cer- 
 tainly going to take some step. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German 
 Ambassador that he had learned that Count 
 Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister, 
 
 in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, 
 had deprecated the suggestion that the situation 
 was grave, but had said that it should be cleared 
 up. 
 
 The German Minister then replied that it would 
 be desirable "if Russia could act as a mediator 
 with regard to Servia, " so that the first suggestion 
 of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came 
 from the German Ambassador in London. Sir
 
 36 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Edward Grey then adds that he told the German 
 Ambassador that he 
 
 assumed that the Austrian Government would not 
 do anything until they had first disclosed to the 
 public their case against Servia, founded presum- 
 ably upon what they had discovered at the trial, 
 
 and the German Ambassador assented to this 
 assumption. ^ 
 
 Either the German Ambassador was then deceiv- 
 ing Sir Edward Grey, or the submarine torpedo 
 was being prepared with such secrecy that even 
 the German Ambassador in England did not know 
 what was then in progress. 
 
 The interesting and important question here 
 suggests itself whether Germany had knowledge of 
 and approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum. 
 If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburg gave to the Russian 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs an express assurance 
 that 
 
 tJie German Government had no knowledge of the 
 text of the Austrian note before it was handed in and 
 had not exercised any injlnence on its contents. It 
 is a mistake to attribute to Germany a threatening 
 attitude.^ 
 
 ^ English White Paper, No. I. 
 - Russian Orange Paper-, No. i8.
 
 Germany and the Austrian Ultimatum 37 
 
 This statement is inherently improbable. Aus- 
 tria was the weaker of the two allies, and it was 
 Germany's saber that it was rattling in the face 
 of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have 
 proceeded to extreme measures, which it was 
 recognized from the first would antagonize Russia, 
 imless it had the support of Germany, and there 
 is a probabilit}', amounting to a moral certainty, 
 that it would not have committed itself and 
 Germany to the possibility of a European war 
 Mathout first consulting Germany. 
 
 Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. 
 de Bunsen, the English Ambassador in Vienna, 
 who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had "private 
 information that the German Ambassador (at 
 Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum 
 to Servia before it was dispatched, and telegraphed 
 it to the German Emperor, " and that the German 
 Ambassador himself "indorses every line of it."^ 
 As he does not disclose the source of his "private 
 information," this testimony would not by itself 
 be convincing, but when we examine Germany's 
 official defense in the German White Paper, we find 
 that the German Foreign Office admits that it was con- 
 sulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum aftd not 
 
 * English White Paper, No. 95, 
 
 ^7 3^r
 
 38 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 only approved of Austria's course but literally gave 
 that country a carte blanche to proceed. 
 
 This point seems so important in determining 
 the sincerity of Germany's attitude and pacific 
 protestations that we quote in extenso. After re- 
 ferring to the previous friction between Austria 
 and Servia, the German White Paper says: 
 
 In view of these circumstances Austria had to 
 admit that it would not be consistent either with 
 the dignity or self-preservation of the Monarchy 
 to look on longer at the operations on the other 
 side of the border without taking action. The 
 Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of its 
 view of the situation and asked our opinion in the 
 matter. We were able to assure our Ally most heartily 
 of our agreemefit with her view of the situation and 
 to assure her that any action that she might consider 
 it necessary to take in order to put an end to the move- 
 ment in Servia directed against the existence of the 
 Austro-Hungarian Monarchy woidd receive our 
 approval. We were fully aware in this connection 
 that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary 
 against Servia would bring Russia into the question 
 and might draw us into a war in accordance with 
 our duties as an Ally 
 
 Sir M. de Bimsen's credible testimony is further 
 confirmed by the fact that the British Ambassador 
 at Berlin in his letter of July 22d, to Sir Edward 
 Grey, states that on the preceding night (July 21st)
 
 Germany and the Austrian Ultimatum 39 
 
 he had met the German Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Affairs, and an allusion was made to a 
 possible action by Austria. 
 
 His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this 
 step on Austria's part would have been made ere 
 this. He insisted that the question at issue was 
 one for settlement between Servia and Austria 
 alone, and that there should be no interference from 
 outside in the discussions between those two coun- 
 tries. 
 
 He^ adds ttiat while he had regarded it as in- 
 advisable that his country should approach 
 Austria in the matter, he had 
 
 on several occasions, in conversation with the 
 Servian Minister, emphasized the extreme import- 
 ance that Austro- Servian relations should be put 
 on a proper footing. ^ 
 
 Here we have the first statement of Germany's 
 position in the matter, a position which subsequent 
 events showed to be entirely untenable, but to 
 which it tenaciously adhered to the very end, 
 and which did much to precipitate the war. 
 Forgetful of the solidarity of European civiliza- 
 tion, and the fact that by policy and diplomatic 
 intercourse continuing through many centuries 
 a united European State exists, even though its 
 
 ' English White Paper, No. 2 ' Von Jagow.
 
 40 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 organization be as yet inchoate, he took the 
 ground that Austria shoiild be permitted to proceed 
 to aggressive measures against Servia without 
 interference from any other Power, even th ough, 
 as was inevitable, the humiliation of Servia_would_ 
 destroy t he status of the B alkan States and 
 threatenthe European balaiice of power, ,TheJn- 
 consistency between German/s claimjhatjt cotHcf 
 
 £i^^_AHSiS^--2i-£^l-A^^^^^^° proceed against 
 Servia and agree to support its action with the 
 sword of Germany, and the other cont ention that 
 neither Ru ssi_a,jLQr any: European Statejiad. any 
 right to interfere_onJbdmJf_of^ S^ 
 It was the greatest blunder of Germany's many 
 blunders in this Tragedy of Errors. 
 
 No space need be taken in convincing any rea- 
 sonable man that this Austrian ultimatum to 
 Servia was brutal in its tone and imreasonable in 
 its demands. It would be difficult to recall 
 a more offensive document, and its iniquity was 
 enhanced by the short shriving time which it 
 gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty^ 
 eightjho^rs to answer wheth er it would compro-_ 
 mise i ts^, so vereignty, and virtually admit its 
 complicity in a crime_which it had steadily dis-^ 
 avowed. T he other European nations had little 
 more than a day to consider what could be done
 
 Germany and the Austrian Ultimakim 41 
 
 to preserve the peace of Europe before that 
 peace was fatally compromised.^ 
 
 Further confirmation that the German Foreign 
 Office did have advance knowledge of at least the 
 substance of the ultimatum is shown by the fact 
 that on the day the ultimatum w as-issued the 
 Chancellor o f the German ^mpire instructed its 
 Amb assadors_in _ Paris^ London, and St . Peters- 
 burg to advise the English, French, and Russian 
 _^ governments that 
 
 the acts as well as the demands of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government cannot but be looked 
 upon as justified.* 
 
 How coidd Germany thus indorse the "de- 
 mands" if it did not know the substance of the 
 ultimatum? Xs itprobable that _Germany_ would 
 ^ve ^venjn ajnatterjof-l^ gravest importance 
 a blanket endorsement of Austria's demands, un- 
 less the German Government had first been fully 
 advised as to their nature? 
 
 The hour when these instructions were sent is 
 not given, so that it does not follow that these 
 significant instructions were necessarily prior to 
 the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 p.m. 
 
 ' English White Paper, No. 5; Russian Orange Piper, No. 3. 
 "German White Paper, Annex i B,
 
 42 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Nevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the 
 other capitals of Europe until the following day, 
 as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, 
 it seems improbable that the German Foreign 
 Office would have issued this very carefully pre- 
 pared and formal warning to the other Powers 
 on July the 23d unless it had full knowledge not 
 only of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum 
 but also of the substance thereof. 
 
 While it may be that Germany, while indorsing 
 in blank the policy Ol Austria, purposely refrained 
 from examining the text of the communication, 
 so that it could thereafter claim that it was not 
 responsible for Austria's action — a policy which 
 would not lessen the discreditable character of this 
 iniquitous conspiracy against the peace of Europe, 
 ■ — yet the more reasonable assumption is that the 
 simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at 
 Belgrade and Germany's warning to the Powers 
 was the resiilt of a concerted action and had a 
 common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning 
 along the ordinary inferences of human life, would 
 question this conclusion. 
 
 The communication from the German Foreign 
 Office last referred to anticipates that Servia "will 
 refuse to comply with these demands" — why, if 
 they were justified? — and Germany suggests tc
 
 Germany and the Austrian Ultimatum 43 
 
 France, England, and Russia that if, as a result 
 of such noncompliance, Austria has "recourse to 
 military measures," that "the choice of means 
 must be left to it." 
 
 The German Ambassadors in the three capitals 
 were instructed 
 
 to lay particular stress on the view that the above 
 question is one, the settlement of which devolves 
 solely upon Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one 
 which the Powers should earnestly strive to confine 
 to the two countries concerned, 
 
 and the instruction added that Germany strongly 
 desired 
 
 that the dispute be localized, since any intervention 
 of another Power, on account of the various alliance 
 obligations, would bring conseqicences impossible to 
 measure. 
 
 This is one of the most significant documents 
 in the whole correspondence. If the German For- 
 eign Office were as ignorant as its Ambassador at 
 London affected to be of the Austrian policy and 
 ultimatum, and if Germany were not then instiga- 
 ting and supporting Austria in its perilous course, 
 why should the German Chancellor have served 
 this threatening notice upon England, France, and 
 Russia, that Austria ''must'' be left free to make
 
 44 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 war upon Servia, and that any attempt to inter- 
 vene in behalf of the weaker nation would "bring 
 consequences impossible to measure"?' 
 
 A still more important piece of evidence is the 
 carefully prepared confidential commimication, 
 which the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Feder- 
 ated Governments of Germany shortly after the 
 Servian reply was given. 
 
 In this confidential communication, which was 
 nothing less than a call to arms to the entire 
 German Empire, and which probably intended 
 to convey the intimation that without formal 
 mobilization the constituent states of Germany 
 should begin to prepare for eventualities, Von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg recognized the possibility that 
 Russia might feel it a duty "to take the part of 
 Servia in her dispute with Austria-Htmgary." 
 Why, again, if Austria's case was so clearly justi- 
 fied? 
 
 The Imperial Chancellor added that 
 
 if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia 
 in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it, 
 
 but added that if Russia did this it would in effect 
 challenge the integrity of the Austro-Hungariaa 
 
 » German White Paper, Annex i B.
 
 Germany and the Austrian Ultimatum 45 
 
 Monarchy, and that Russia would therefore 
 alone 
 
 bear the responsibility if a European war arises 
 from the Austro-Servian question, which all the 
 rest of the great European Powers wish to localize. 
 
 In this significant confidential communication 
 the German Chancellor declares the strong interest 
 which Germany had in the punishment of Servia 
 by Austria. He says, " our closest interests therefore 
 summon us to the side oj Austria-Hungary,^^ and 
 he adds that 
 
 if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, 
 owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to 
 our duty as an Ally, we should have to support the 
 neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the 
 German Empire. ' 
 
 It staggers ordinary credulity to believe that 
 this portentous warning to the constituents of the 
 German Empire to prepare for "the D gx^' should 
 not have been written with advance knowledge of 
 the Austrian idtimatum, which had only been issued 
 on July 23d and only reached the other capitals of 
 Europe on July 24th. The subsequent naive dis- 
 claimer by the German Foreign Office of any ex- 
 pectation that Austria's attack upon Servia could 
 
 'German White Paper, Annex 2.
 
 46 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 possibly have any interest to other European Pow' 
 ers is haidly consistent with its assertion that 
 Germany's "closest interests" were involved in the 
 question, or the portentous warnings to the States 
 of the Empire to prepare for eventualities. 
 
 The German Ambassador to the United States 
 who attempted early in the controversy and with 
 disastrous results, to allay the rising storm of in- 
 dignation in that country, formally admitted in 
 an article in the Independent of September 7, 19 14, 
 that Germany ** did approve in advance the Austrian 
 ultimatum to Servia^ 
 
 Why then was Germany guilty of duplicity in 
 disclaiming, concurrently with its issuance, any 
 such responsibility? The answer is obvious. This 
 was necessar y to,support_its contentiQaJ:liat_the 
 quarrel between Austria ajid_Seryia was purely 
 'Moc57' 
 
 Note. — In Chapter VII it will appear from the French Yelloiv 
 Book that the Prime Minister of Bavaria had knowledge of t!.3 
 Austrian ultimatum before its delivery in Belgrade.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA 
 
 To convince any reasonable man that this 
 Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its 
 tone and unreasonable in its demands, and that 
 the reply of Servia was as complete an acqui- 
 escence as Servia could make without a fatal 
 compromise of its sovereignty^ and self-respect, it 
 is only necessary to print in parallel columns 
 the demands of Austria and the reply of Servia. 
 
 AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM 
 TO SERVIA 
 
 "To achieve this end the 
 Imperial and Royal Govern- 
 ment sees itself compelled to 
 demand from the Royal Ser- 
 vian Government a formal 
 assurance that it condemns this 
 dangerous propaganda against 
 the Monarchy; in other words, 
 the whole series of tenden- 
 cies, the ultimate aim of which 
 is to detach from the Monarchy 
 territories belonging to it, and 
 that it undertakes to suppress 
 
 THE SERVIAN REPLY 
 
 "The Royal Government 
 has received the notification of 
 the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment of the loth inst., and is 
 convinced that its answer will 
 remove every misunderstand- 
 ing that threatens to disturb 
 the pleasant neighborly rela- 
 tions between the Austro- 
 Hungarian INIonarchy and the 
 Servian Kingdom. 
 
 "The Royal Government is 
 certain that in dealing with 
 the great neighboring mon- 
 
 47
 
 48 
 
 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 by every means this criminal 
 and terrorist propaganda. 
 
 "In order to give a formal 
 character to this undertaking 
 the Royal Servian Government 
 shall publish on the front page 
 of its 'Official Journal' of the 
 26 th July, the following 
 declaration : 
 
 '"The Royal Government 
 of Servia condemns the propa- 
 ganda directed against Austria- 
 Hungary — i.e., the general ten- 
 dency of which the final aim 
 is to detach from the Austro- 
 Hungarian Monarchy terri- 
 tories belonging to it, and it 
 sincerely deplores the fatal 
 consequence of these criminal 
 proceedings. 
 
 '"The Royal Government 
 regrets that Servian officers 
 and functionaries participated 
 in the above-mentioned pro- 
 paganda, and thus compro- 
 mised the good neighborly 
 relations to which the Royal 
 Government was solemnly 
 pledged by its declaration of 
 the 31st March, 1909. 
 
 "'The Royal Government, 
 which disapproves and repu- 
 diates all idea of interfering 
 or attempting to interfere with 
 the destinies of the inhabitants 
 of any part whatsoever of 
 Austria-Hungary, considers it 
 its duty formally to warn 
 officers and functionaries, and 
 the whole population of the 
 
 archy these protests have 
 under no pretexts been re- 
 newed which formerly were 
 made both in the Skupshtina 
 and in explanations and nego- 
 tiations of responsible repre- 
 sentatives of the State, and 
 which, through the declaration 
 of the Servian Government of 
 March 18, 1909, were settled; 
 furthermore, that since that 
 time none of the various 
 successive Governments of the 
 kingdom, nor any of its officers, 
 has made an attempt to change 
 the political and legal condi- 
 tions set up in Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina. The Royal 
 Government is certain that the 
 Austro-Hungarian Government 
 has made no representations of 
 any kind along this line except 
 in the case of a textbook con- 
 cerning which the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government re- 
 ceived an entirely satis- 
 factory reply. _Scrvia, during 
 the Balkan crisis, gave evidence 
 In numerous cases of her pacific 
 and temperate policies, and it 
 will be thanks to Servia alone 
 and the sacrifices that she 
 alone made in the interest of 
 European peace if that peace 
 continue. 
 
 "The Royal Government 
 cannot be held responsible for 
 utterances of a private char- 
 acter such as newspaper articles 
 and the peaceful work of so-
 
 The Ultimatum to Servia 
 
 49 
 
 kingdom, that henceforward it 
 will proceed with the utmost 
 rigor against persons who may 
 be guilty of such machinations, 
 which it will use all its efforts 
 to anticipate and suppress.' 
 
 " This declaration shall simul- 
 taneously be communicated to 
 the Royal Army as an order 
 of the day by His Majesty 
 the King and shall be published 
 in the 'Official Bulletin' of the 
 Army. 
 
 cieties, utterances which are 
 quite ordinary in almost all 
 countries, and which are not 
 generally under State control, 
 especially since the Royal 
 Government, in the solution 
 of a great number of questions 
 that came up between Servia 
 and Austria-Hungary, showed 
 much consideration as a result 
 of which most of these ques- 
 tions were settled in the best 
 interests of the progress of the 
 two neighboring countries. 
 
 "The Royal Government 
 was therefore painfully sur- 
 prised to hear the contention 
 that Servian subjects had taken 
 part in the preparations for the 
 murder committed in Serajevo. 
 It had hoped to be invited to 
 cooperate in the investigations 
 following this crime, and was 
 prepared, in order to prove the 
 entire correctness of its acts, 
 to proceed against all persons 
 concerning whom it had re- 
 ceived information. 
 
 "In conformity with the 
 wish of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government, the Royal Gov- 
 ernment is prepared to turn 
 over to the court, regardless of 
 station or rank, any Serv^ian 
 subject concerning whose par- 
 ticipation in the crime at 
 Serajevo proofs may be gi\-en 
 to it. The Government 
 pledges itself especially to 
 publish on the first page of the
 
 50 
 
 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 "The Royal Servian Gov- 
 ernment further undertakes: 
 
 "l. To suppress any pub- 
 lication which incites to hatred 
 and contempt of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Monarchy and the 
 general tendency of which is 
 directed against its territorial 
 integrity; 
 
 official organ of July 26th the 
 following declaration: 
 
 "'The Royal Servian Gov- 
 ernment condemns every pro- 
 paganda that may be directed 
 against Austria- Hungary; that 
 is to say, all efforts designed 
 ultimately to sever territory 
 from the Austro-Hungarian 
 Monarchy, and it regrets sin- 
 cerely the sad consequences of 
 these criminal machinations.' 
 
 "The Royal Government 
 regrets that, in accordance 
 with advices from the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government, cer- 
 tain Servian officers and func- 
 tionaries are taking an active 
 part in the present propaganda, 
 and that they have thereby 
 jeopardized the pleasant neigh- 
 borly relations to the main- 
 tenance of which the Royal 
 Government was formally 
 pledged by the declaration of 
 March 31, 1909. 
 
 "The Government (what 
 follows here is similar to the 
 text demanded). 
 
 "The Royal Government 
 further pledges itself : 
 
 "i. To introduce a provi- 
 sion in the press law on the 
 occasion of the next regular 
 session of the Skupshtina, 
 according to which instigations 
 to hatred and contempt of the 
 Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,
 
 The Ultimatum to Servia 
 
 51 
 
 "2. To dissolve immediate- 
 ly the society styled Narodna 
 Odbrana, to confiscate all its 
 means of propaganda, and to 
 proceed in the same manner 
 against other societies and 
 their branches in Servia which 
 engage in propaganda against 
 the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
 archy. The Royal Govern- 
 ment shall take the necessary 
 measures to prevent the socie- 
 ties dissolved from continuing 
 their activity under another 
 name and form; 
 
 "3. To eliminate without 
 delay from public instruction 
 in Servia, both as regards the 
 teaching body and also as re- 
 gards the methods of instruc- 
 tion, everything that serves, 
 or might serve, to foment the 
 propaganda against Austria- 
 Hungary; 
 
 as well as any publication 
 directed in general against the 
 territorial integrity of Austria- 
 Hungary, shall be punished 
 severely. 
 
 "The Government pledges 
 itself, on the occasion of the 
 coming revision of the Con- 
 stitution, to add to Article 
 XXII. a clause permitting the 
 confiscation of publications, 
 the confiscation of which, 
 under the present ArticleXXII. 
 of the Constitution, would be 
 impossible. 
 
 "2. The Government pos- 
 sesses no proof — and the Note 
 of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
 ernment provides it with none 
 — that the ' Narodna Odbrana' 
 Society and other similar asso- 
 ciations have up to the present 
 committed any criminal acts 
 through any of their members. 
 Nevertheless, the Royal Gov- 
 ernment will accept the de- 
 mand of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government and dissolve the 
 Narodna Odbrana Society, as 
 well as all societies that may 
 work against Austria-Hungary. 
 
 "3. The Royal Servian 
 Government agrees to elimi- 
 nate forthwith from public 
 education in Servia everything 
 that might help the propaganda 
 against Austria-Hungar>', pro- 
 vided that the Austro-Hungar- 
 ian Government gives it actual 
 proof of this propaganda.
 
 52 
 
 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 "4. To remove from the 
 military service, and from the 
 administration in general, all 
 officers and functionaries 
 guilty of propaganda against 
 the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
 archy whose names and deeds 
 the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment reserves to itself the 
 right of communicating to the 
 Royal Government ; 
 
 "5. To accept the collabo- 
 ration in Servia of representa- 
 tives of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government in the suppression 
 of the subversive movement 
 directed against the territorial 
 integrity of the Monarchy; 
 
 "6. To take Judicial pro- 
 ceedings against accessories to 
 the plot of the 28th June who 
 are on Servian territory. Dele- 
 gates of the Austro-Hungarian 
 
 "4. The Royal Govern- 
 ment is also ready to discharge 
 from military and civil service 
 such officers — provided it is 
 proved against them by legal 
 investigation — who have im- 
 plicated themselves in acts 
 directed against the territorial 
 integrity of the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Monarchy; the Govern- 
 ment expects that, for the 
 purpose of instituting pro- 
 ceedings, the Austro-Hunga- 
 rian Government will impart 
 the names of these officers and 
 employes and the acts of which 
 they are accused. 
 
 "5, The Royal Servian 
 Government must confess that 
 it is not quite clear as to the 
 sense and scope of the desire of 
 the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment to the effect that tlie 
 Royal Sci-vian Government 
 bind itself to allow the co- 
 operation within its territory 
 of representatives of the Aus- 
 tro-Hungarian Government, 
 but it nevertheless declares 
 itself willing to permit such 
 cooperation as might be in 
 conformity with international 
 law and criminal procedure, as 
 well as with friendly neighborly 
 relations. 
 
 "6. The Royal Govern- 
 :-ient naturally holds itself 
 bound to institute an investiga- 
 tion against all such persons 
 as were concerned in the plot
 
 The Ultimatum to Servia 
 
 53 
 
 Government will take part 
 in the investigation relating 
 thereto; 
 
 "7. To proceed without 
 delay to the arrest of Major 
 Voija Tankositch and of the in- 
 dividual named Milan Cigano- 
 vitch, a Servian State employ^, 
 who have been compromised by 
 the results of the magisterial 
 enquiry at Serajevo; 
 
 of June I5th-28th, or are 
 supposed to have been con- 
 cerned in it, and are on Servian 
 soil. As to the cooperation of 
 special delegates of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government in this 
 investigation, the Servian 
 Government cannot accept 
 such cooperation, since this 
 would be a violation of the 
 laws and criminal procedure. 
 However, in individual cases, 
 information as to the progress 
 of the investigation might be 
 given to the Austro-Hungarian 
 delegates. 
 
 " 7. On the very evening on 
 which your Note arrived the 
 Royal Government caused the 
 arrest of Major Voislar Tan- 
 kosic. But, regarding Milan 
 Ciganovic, who is a subject of 
 the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
 archy, and who was employed 
 until June 15th (as candidate) 
 in the Department of Railroads 
 it has not been possible to 
 arrest this man up till now, 
 for which rciison a warrant 
 has been issued against 
 him. 
 
 "The Austro-Hungarian 
 Government is requested, in 
 order that the investigation 
 may be made as soon as possi- 
 ble, to make known in the 
 specified form what grounds of 
 suspicion exist, and the proofs 
 of guilt collected at the in- 
 vestigation in Serajevo.
 
 54 
 
 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 " 8. To prevent by effective 
 measures the cooperation of 
 the Servian authorities in the 
 illicit traffic in arms and explo- 
 sives across the frontier, to 
 dismiss and punish severely the 
 officials of the frontier service 
 at Schabatz and Loznica guilty 
 of having assisted the perpe- 
 trators of the Serajevo crime 
 by facilitating their passage 
 across the frontier; 
 
 "9. To furnish the Im- 
 perial and Royal Government 
 with explanations regarding 
 the unjustifiable utterances of 
 high Servian officials, both in 
 Servia and abroad, who, not- 
 withstanding their official posi- 
 tion, did not hesitate after the 
 crime of the 28th June to ex- 
 press themselves in interviews 
 in terms of hostility to the 
 Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment; and finally, 
 
 "10. To notify the Im- 
 perial and Royal Government 
 without delay of the execution 
 of the measures comprised 
 under the preceding heads. 
 
 "The Austro-Hungarian 
 
 Government expects the reply 
 
 "8. The Servian Govern- 
 ment will increase the severity 
 and scope of its measures 
 against the smuggling of arms 
 and explosives. 
 
 "It goes without saying that 
 it will at once start an investi- 
 gation and mete out severe 
 punishment to the frontier 
 officials of the Sabac-Loznica 
 line who failed in their duty 
 and allowed those responsible 
 for the crime to cross the 
 frontier. 
 
 "9. The Royal Govern- 
 ment is willing to give explana- 
 tions of the statements made in 
 interviews by its officials in 
 Servia and foreign countries 
 after the crime, and which, 
 according to the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Government, were anti- 
 Austrian, as soon as the said 
 Government indicates where 
 these statements were made, 
 and provides proofs that such 
 statements were actually made 
 by the said officials. The 
 Royal Government will itself 
 take steps to collect the neces- 
 sary proofs and means of 
 transmission for this purpose. 
 
 "10. The Royal Govern- 
 ment will, in so far as this has 
 not already occurred in this 
 Note, inform the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Government of the 
 taking of the measures con- 
 cerning the foregoing mat- 
 ters, as soon as such measures
 
 The Ultimatum to Servia 55 
 
 of the Royal Government at have been ordered and carried 
 
 the latest by six o'clock on Sat- out. 
 
 urday evening, the 25th July." "The Royal Servian Govern- 
 
 ment is of the opinion that it 
 is mutually advantageous not 
 to hinder the settlement of this 
 question, and therefore, in case 
 the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
 , emment should not consider 
 itself satisfied with this answer, 
 it is ready as always to accept 
 a peaceful solution, either by 
 referring the decision of this 
 question to the international 
 tribunal at The Hague, or by 
 leaving it to the great Powers 
 who cooperated in the prepara- 
 tion of the explanation given 
 by the Servian Government on 
 the i7th-3ist March, 1909." 
 
 It increases the ineffaceable discredit of this 
 brutal ultimatum when we consider the relative 
 size of the two nations. Austria has a population 
 of over 50,000,000 and Servia about 4,000,000. 
 Moreover, Servia had just emerged from two ter- 
 rible conflicts, from which it was still bleeding to 
 exhaustion. Austria's ultimatum was that of a Go- 
 liath to David, and, up to the hour that this book 
 goes to press, the result has not been different from 
 that famous conflict. 
 
 Germany itself had already given to Servia an 
 intimation of its intended fate. It had anticipated 
 the Austrian ultimatum by some pointed sugges-
 
 56 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 tions to Servia on its own account, for in the 
 letter already quoted from Sir M. de Bunsen to 
 Sir Edward Grey, we learn that the German 
 Secretary of State told the British Ambassador 
 before the ultimatum was issued that he 
 
 on several occasions, in conversation with the 
 Servian Minister, emphasized the extreme import- 
 ance that Austro-Servian relations should be put 
 on a proper footing. ^ 
 
 This pointed intimation from Germany, thus 
 preceding the formal ultimatum from Austria, 
 naturally gave Servia a quick appreciation that 
 within the short space allowed by the ultimatum, 
 it must either acquiesce in grossly unreasonable 
 demands or perish as an independent nation. 
 
 To appreciate fully the brutality of this ulti- 
 matum let us imagine a precise analogy. 
 
 The relations of France and Germany — leav- 
 ing aside the important difference of relative size 
 — are not unlike the relations that existed be- 
 tween Servia and Austria. In 1908, Austria had 
 forcibly annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, both 
 of them Slav coimtries, and when Servia had 
 emerged from the Balkan-Turkish War with signal 
 credit to itself, it was again Austria that had 
 
 ' In English White Paper, No. 2.
 
 The Ultimatum to Servia 57 
 
 intervened and deprived it of the fruit of its 
 victories by denying it access to the sea. 
 
 Similariy, by the Treaty of Frankfort, Germany 
 had forcibly annexed Alsace and Lorraine from 
 France. As there existed in Servia voluntary 
 organizations of men, which ceaselessly agitated 
 for the recovery of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so 
 in France similar patriotic organizations have for 
 the last forty years continuously agitated for a 
 war which would lead to the ultimate recovery of 
 Alsace and Lorraine. The statue of Strassburg in 
 the Place de la Concorde has been covered with 
 the emblems of mourning from the time that Bis- 
 marck wrung from Jules Favre the cession of the 
 Rhine territory. If Austria's grievance against 
 Servia were just, Germany has an equal and 
 similar grievance against France. 
 
 Under these circumstances let us suppose that 
 on the occasion of the visit of the German Crown 
 Prince to Strassburg, that an Alsatian citizen of 
 German nationality, having strong French sym- 
 pathies, had assassinated the Crown Prince, and 
 that France had formally disclaimed any com- 
 plicity in the assassination and expressed its 
 sympathy and regret. 
 
 Mutatis mutandis, let us suppose that Germany 
 had thereupon issued to France the same ultima-
 
 58 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 turn that Austria issued to Servia, requiring France 
 to acknowledge moral responsibility for a crime, 
 which it steadily disavowed. The ultimatum to 
 France in that event would have included a per- 
 emptory demand that the government of France, 
 a proud and self-respecting country, should pub- 
 lish in the Official Journal, and communicate as 
 an "order of the day" to the army of France, a 
 statement that the French Government formally 
 denounced all attempts to recover Alsace and 
 Lorraine; that it regretted the participation of 
 French officers in the murder of the German Crown 
 Prince ; that it engaged to suppress in the Press of 
 France any expressions of hatred or contempt for 
 Germany; that it would dissolve all patriotic 
 societies that have for their object the recovery 
 of the "lost provinces"; that it would eliminate 
 from the public schools of France all instruction 
 which served to foment feeling against Germany; 
 that it would remove from its army all officers who 
 had joined in the agitation against Germany; 
 that it would accept in the courts of France the 
 participation of German officials in determining 
 who were guilty, either of the Strassburg murder 
 or of the propaganda for the recovery of Alsace 
 and Lorraine; that it would further proceed to 
 arrest and punish certain French officers, whom the
 
 The Ultimatum to Servia 59 
 
 German Government charged with participating 
 in the offensive propaganda, and that it would 
 furnish the German Government with full explana- 
 tions and information in reference to its execution 
 of these peremptory demands. 
 
 Let us suppose that such an ultimatum having 
 been sent, that France had been given forty- 
 eight hours to comply with conditions which were 
 obviously fatal to its self-respect and forever 
 destructive of its prestige as a great Power. 
 
 Can it be questioned what the reply of France 
 or the judgment of the world would be in such a 
 quarrel? 
 
 Every fair-minded man would say without hesi- 
 tation that such an idtimatum woidd be an unprece- 
 dented outrage upon the fine proprieties of civilized 
 life. 
 
 The only difference between the two cases is the 
 fact that in the case of Germany and France the 
 power issuing the ultimatum would be less than 
 double the size of that nation which it sought to 
 coerce, while in the case of Austria and Ser\'ia, 
 the aggressor was twelve times as powerful as the 
 power whose moral prestige and political indepen- 
 dence it sought to destroy. 
 
 In view of the nature of these demands, the 
 assurance which Austria subsequently gave Russia,
 
 6o The Evidence in the Case 
 
 that she would do nothing to lessen the territory of 
 Servia, goes for nothing. From the standpoint 
 of Servia, it would have been far better to lose 
 a part of its territory and keep its indepen- 
 dence and self-respect as to the remainder, than to 
 retain all its existing land area, and by submitting 
 to the ultimatum become virtually a vassal state 
 of Austria. Certainly if Servia had acquiesced 
 fully in Austria's demands without any qualifica- 
 tion or reservation (as for the sake of peace it 
 almost did), then Austria would have enjoyed a 
 moral protectorate over all of Servia's territory, 
 and its ultimate fate might have been that of Bos- 
 nia and Herzegovina, which Austria first governed 
 as a protectorate, and later forcibly annexed.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE PEACE PARLEYS 
 
 The issuance of the Austrian ultimatum precipi- 
 tated a grave crisis. // did not, however, present 
 any insoluble problem. Peace could and should have 
 been preserved. Its preservation is always possi- 
 ble when nations, which may be involved in a 
 controversy, are inspired by a reasonably pacific 
 purpose. Only when the masses of the people are 
 inflamed with a passionate desire for war, and in a 
 time of popular hysteria responsible statesmen are 
 helplessly borne along the turgid flow of events 
 as bubbles are carried by the swift ciurent of a 
 swollen river, is peace a visionary dream. 
 
 It is the peculiarity of the present crisis that 
 no such popular hysteria existed. No popular de- 
 mand for war developed until after it was virtually 
 precipitated. Even then large classes of working- 
 men, both in Germany and France, protested. 
 
 The peoples of the various countries had scant 
 knowledge of the issues which had been raised 
 by their diplomats and had little, if any, interest 
 
 6i
 
 62 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 in the Servian trouble. The chief exception to this 
 was in Austria, where unquestionably popular feel- 
 ing had been powerfully excited by the murder 
 of the Archduke and where there had been, es- 
 pecially in Vienna, popular manifestations in favor 
 of war. In Russia also there was not unnaturally 
 a strong undercurrent of popular sympathy for 
 Servia. 
 
 The writer was in the Engadine at the time 
 referred to, and cosmopolitan St. Moritz, although 
 a little place, was, in its heterogeneous population, 
 Europe in microcosmic form. There the average 
 man continued to enjoy his midsummer holiday 
 and refused to believe that so great a catastrophe 
 was imminent until the last two fateful days in 
 July. The citizens of all nations continued to 
 fraternize, and were one in amazement that a war 
 could be precipitated on causes in which the 
 average man took so slight an interest. 
 
 Unembarrassed by any popular clamor, this war 
 could have been prevented, and the important 
 question presents itself to the Supreme Court of 
 Civilization as to the moral responsibility for the 
 failure of the negotiations. 
 
 Which of the two groups of powers sincerely 
 worked for peace and which obstructed those 
 efforts?
 
 The Peace Parleys 63 
 
 In reaching its conclusion our imaginary Court 
 would pay little attention to mere professions of a 
 desire for peace. A nation, like an individual, 
 can covertly stab the peace of another while 
 saying, "Art thou in health, my brother?" and 
 even the peace of civilization can be betrayed by a 
 Judas-kiss. Professions of peace belong to the 
 cant of diplomacy and have always characterized 
 the most bellicose of nations. 
 
 No war in modem times has been begun without 
 the aggressor pretending that his nation wished 
 nothing but peace, and invoking divine aid for its 
 murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of 
 Lady Teazle on a noted occasion, when Sir Joseph 
 Surface talked much of "honor," it might be as 
 well in such instances to leave the name of God 
 out of the question. 
 
 The writer will so far anticipate the conclusions, 
 which he thinks these records indisputably show, 
 as to suggest the respective attitudes of the differ- 
 ent groups of diplomats and statesmen as revealed 
 by these papers. If the reader will realize fully 
 the policy which from the first animated Germany 
 and Austria, then the documents hereinafter quoted 
 will acquire new significance. 
 
 Germany and Austria had determined to impose 
 their will upon Servia, even though it involved
 
 64 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 a European war. From the outset they clearly 
 recognized such a possibiHty and were willing to 
 accept the responsibility. 
 
 The object to be gained was something more 
 than a neutralization of the pro-Slav propaganda. 
 It was to subject Servia to such severe punitive 
 measures that thereafter her independence of 
 will and moral sovereignty would be largely im- 
 paired, if not altogether destroyed. To do this 
 it was not enough to have Servia take measures 
 to prevent pro-Slav agitation within her borders. 
 Austria neither wanted nor expected the accept- 
 ance of her impossible ultimatum. 
 
 It planned to submit such an ultimatum as 
 Servia could not possibly accept and, to make 
 this result doubly sure, it was thought desirable to 
 give not only Servia but Europe the minimum 
 time to take any preventive meastires. Giving to 
 Servia only forty-eight hours within which to reach 
 a decision and to Europe barely twenty-four hours 
 to protect the peace of the world, it was thought 
 that Servia would do one of two things, either of 
 which would be of incalculable importance to 
 Germany and Austria. 
 
 If Servia accepted the ultimatum for lack of 
 time to consider it, then its self-respect was hope- 
 lessly compromised and its independence largely
 
 The Peace Parleys 65 
 
 destroyed. Thenceforth she would be, at least 
 morally, a mere vassal of Austria. 
 
 If, however, Servia declined to accept the 
 ultimatum, then war would immediately begin 
 and Servia would be, as was thought, speedily 
 subjected to punitive measures of such a drastic 
 character that the same result would be attained. 
 
 From the commencement, both Germany and 
 Austria recognized the possibility that Russia 
 might intervene to protect Servia. To prevent 
 this it was important that Russia and her allies of 
 the Triple Entente should be given as little time as 
 possible to consider their action, and it was thought 
 that this would probably lead to Russia's acqui- 
 escence in the punishment of Servia and, if so, 
 France and England, having no direct interest in 
 Servia, would also undoubtedly acquiesce. 
 
 If, however, slow-moving Russia, instead of 
 acquiescing, as she did in 1908 in the case of 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, should take up the 
 gauntlet which Germany and Austria had thrown 
 down, theii it was all important to Germany and 
 Austria that Russia should seem to be the aggressor. 
 
 For this there were two substantial reasons: 
 the one was Italy and the other was England. 
 Germany and Austria desired the cooperation 
 of Italy and could not claim it as of right under
 
 66 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 the terms of the Triple Alliance, unless they were 
 attacked. Upon the other hand, if England 
 believed that Russia and France had declared war 
 upon Germany and Austria, there was little proba- 
 bility of her intervention. For these reasons 
 it was important that Germany and Austria should 
 impress_botjh_England and Italy that their pur- 
 poses were sincerely pacific and that on the other 
 hand they should so clearly provoke Russia and 
 France that those nations would declare war. 
 
 If the reader will keep this Janus-faced policy 
 steadily in mind, he will understand the apparent 
 inconsistencies in the diplomatic representations 
 of the German Foreign Office. He will under- 
 stand why Germany and Austria, while at times 
 flouting Russia in the most flagrant manner and 
 refusing her the common courtesies of diplomatic 
 intercourse, were at the same time giving to 
 England the most emphatic assurance of pacific 
 intentions. 
 
 With this preliminary statement, let the 
 record speak for itself. We have seen that the 
 first great, and as events proved, fatal obstacle to 
 peace which Germany interposed was practically 
 contemporaneous with the issuance of the ulti- 
 matum. Germany did not wait for any efforts 
 at conciliation. On the contrary, it attempted
 
 The Peace Parleys 67 
 
 to bar effectually all such efforts by serving 
 notice upon France, England, and Russia almost 
 simultaneously with the issuance of the Austrian 
 ultimatum, 
 
 that the acts as well as the demands of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government cannot but be looked upon 
 as justified ; 
 
 and the communication concluded: 
 
 We strongly desire that the dispute be localized, 
 since any intervention of any Power on account of 
 the various alliance obligations would bring conse- 
 quences impossible to measure. ^ 
 
 This had only one meaning. Austria was to be 
 left to discipline Servia at will, or there would 
 be war. Germany did not even wait for any sug- 
 gestion of intervention, whether conciliatory or 
 otherwise, but sought to interpose to any plan 
 of peace, short of complete submission, an in- 
 superable barrier by this threat of war. With 
 this pointed threat to Europe, the next move was 
 that of Russia, and it may be remarked that 
 throughout the entire negotiations Russian dip- 
 lomacy was more than equal to that of Germany. 
 
 Russia contented itself in the first instance 
 by stating on the morning of July 24th, that 
 
 ' German White Paper, Annex, i B.
 
 68 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro- 
 Servian conflict. This attitude could not surprise 
 any one, for Russia's interest in the Balkans was 
 well known and its legitimate concern in the 
 future of any Slav state was, as Sir Edward 
 Grey had said in Parliament in March, 1913, 
 "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the 
 past." 
 
 With this simple statement of its legitimate 
 interest in a matter affecting the balance of power 
 in Europe, Russia , instead of issuing an ultimatum 
 or declaring war, as Germany and Austria may 
 have hoped, joined with England in asking for a 
 reasonable extension__oLtirne_for all the Powers "to 
 concert for the preservation of peace. On "July 
 24th, the very day that the Austrian ultimatum 
 had reached St. Petersburg, the Russian For- 
 eign Minister transmitted to the Austrian Gov- 
 ernment through its Charge in Vienna the following 
 communication : 
 
 The communication of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government to the Powers the day after the pre- 
 sentation of the ultimatum to Belgrade leaves to the 
 Powers a delay entirely insufficient to undertake any 
 useful steps whatever for the straightening out of the 
 complications that have arisen. To prevent the 
 incalculable consequences, equally disastrous for all 
 the Powers, which can follow the method of action
 
 The Peace Parleys 69 
 
 of the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems 
 indispensable to us that above all the delay given 
 to Servia to reply should be extended. Austria- 
 Hungary, declaring herself disposed to inform the 
 Powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the 
 Imperial and Royal Government bases its accusations, 
 should at least give them also the time to take note of 
 them {de s'en rendre compte). In this case, if the 
 Powers should convince themselves of the well- 
 groundedness of certain of the Austrian demands 
 they would find themselves in a position to send to the 
 Servian Government consequential advice. A refusal 
 to extend the terms of the ultimatum would deprive 
 of all value the step taken by the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government in regard to the Powers and would 
 be in contradiction with the very bases of inter- 
 national relations. ' 
 
 Could any court question the justice of this 
 contention? The peace of the world was at stake. 
 Time only was asked to see what could be done to 
 preserve that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances 
 to the uttermost. 
 
 Germany had only to intimate to Austria that 
 "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind," 
 as w^ell as common courtesy to great and friendly 
 nations, required that sufficient time be given not 
 only to Servia, but to the other nations, to concert 
 for the common good, especially as the period was 
 one of mid-summer dullness, and many of the 
 
 ' Russian Orange Paper, No. 4.
 
 70 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 leading rulers and statesmen were absent from 
 their respective capitals. 
 
 If Germany made any communication to Aus- 
 tria in the interests of peace the text has yet to 
 be disclosed to the world. A word from Berlin 
 to Vienna would have given the additional time 
 which, with sincerely pacific intentions, might 
 have resulted in the preservation of peace. Ger- 
 many, so far as the record discloses, never spoke 
 that word. 
 
 England had already anticipated the request of 
 Russia that a reasonable time should be given to 
 all interested parties. When the Austrian Minister 
 in London handed the ultimatum to Sir Edward 
 Grey on July the 24th, the following conversation 
 took place, which speaks for itself : 
 
 In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency 
 I (Sir Edward Grey) remarked that it seemed to 
 me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and 
 such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at 
 this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the 
 Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting 
 Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with 
 Austria, as was but n2iturQX,hjjJLnJJJi&-S£i7MJiMSLl^h£l:d 
 never be/ore jeen one State address to another i nde- 
 pendent State a docurnent'of so formidable a character. 
 Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation 
 might never have arisen if Servia had held out a 
 hand after the murder of the Archduke. Servia had,
 
 The Peace Parleys 71 
 
 however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though 
 some weeks had aheady elapsed since the murder; 
 a time limit, said his Excel lency, was essential, 
 owing to the procrastinatio rLcm Servia's parti " 
 
 I said that if Servia had procrastinated in reply- 
 ing a time limit could have been introduced later; 
 hilt, as things 71010 stood, the terms of the Servian reply 
 had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content 
 to limit herself to a demajid for a reply within a limit 
 cf forty -eight hours from its presentation. 
 
 Unfortunately both Russia and England's re- 
 quests for time were refused, on the plea that 
 tJiey had reached the Austrian Foreign Minis- 
 ter too late, although it has never yet been ex- 
 plained why, even if Count Berchtold were unable 
 to take up the requests before the expiration of 
 the ultimatum, the matter might not have been 
 reopened for a few days by a corresponding exten- 
 sion of the time limit. 
 
 In the absence of some explanation, which as 
 yet remains to be made, the absence of the 
 Austrian Premier from Vienna at the time inter- 
 vening betw^een the issuance of the uUimatuni and 
 the expiration of the time limit seems like an ex- 
 traordinarily petty piece of diplomatic finesse. He 
 had without any warning to the great Powers of 
 Europe, launched a thunderbolt, and if there ever 
 was a time when a pacific foreign minister should
 
 72 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 have been at his post and open to suggestions of 
 peace, it was in those two critical days. And yet, 
 after issuing the ultimatum, he immediately takes 
 himself beyond reach of personal parleys by going 
 to Ischl, and this was taken by the German Foreign 
 Office as a convenient excuse for an anticipated 
 failure to extend this courtesy to Russia and Eng- 
 land. Upon this we have the testimony of the 
 English Ambassador at Berlin, who in his report 
 to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th, says: 
 
 [The German] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
 says that on receipt of a telegram at ten o'clock this 
 morning from German Ambassador at London, he 
 immediately instructed German Ambassador at 
 Vienna to pass on to the Austrian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs your suggestion, for an extension of 
 time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. 
 Unfortunately it appeared from the press that Count 
 Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State 
 thought that in these circumstances there would be 
 delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. 
 Secretary of State said that he did not know what 
 Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he 
 admitted quite freely that A ustro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that 
 they meant to take military action. He also admitted 
 that Servian Government could not swallow certain 
 oj the Austro-Hungarian demands. . . . 
 
 A like excuse is found in a conversation with the
 
 The Peace Parleys 73 
 
 Russian Charg6 at Berlin, in which Bethmann- 
 Hollweg expressed the fear "that in consequence 
 of the absence of Berchtold at Ischl^ and seeing 
 the lack of time, his (Bethmann-Hollweg's tele- 
 grams suggesting delay) will remain without 
 result." 
 
 These conversations are most illuminating. They 
 refer to instructions to the German Ambassador 
 in Vienna, which are not found in the German 
 White Paper, although they would have thrown 
 a searchlight upon the sincerity, with which 
 Germany "passed on" the most important request 
 of England and Russia for a Httle time to save the 
 peace of Europe, and it strongly suggests the possi- 
 bility that Count Berchtold's most inopportune 
 absence in Ischl was to be the excuse for the gross 
 discourtesy of refusing to give any extension of 
 time. 
 
 Kudachef, the Russian Charge at Vienna, did 
 not content himself with submitting the request to 
 the Acting Foreign Minister (Baron Macchio) but 
 to deprive Austria of the flimsy excuse of Berch- 
 told's absence at Ischl, the Russian Charge went 
 over the head of the Austrian Acting Foreign 
 Minister and telegraphed the request for time to 
 Count Berchtold at Ischl. Let the record tell for 
 
 ' Russian OrangePaper, No. 14.
 
 74 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 itself how this most reasonable request was made 
 and refused. 
 
 The Russian Charge sent on July 25th the 
 two following telegrams to the Russian Foreign 
 Minister: 
 
 Count Berchtold is at Ischl. Seeing the im- 
 possibility of arriving there in time, I have tele- 
 graphed him our proposal to extend the delay of the 
 ultimatum, and I have repeated it verbally to Baron 
 Macchio. This latter promised me to communicate 
 it in time to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but 
 added that he could predict with assurance a categorical 
 refusal. ' 
 
 Sequel to my telegram of to-day. Have just 
 received from Macchio the negative reply of the 
 Austro-Hungarian Government to our proposal to 
 prolong the delay of the note. ^ 
 
 It is evident from the Russian Orange Paper 
 that that country had no illusions as to the possi- 
 bility of a peaceful outcome. Germany has 
 contended that on July the 24th, before Count 
 Berchtold made his inopportune visit to Ischl, 
 he sent for the Russian Charge at Vienna and 
 assured him that the punitive measiu-es which 
 Austria had determined to take against Servia 
 
 ^ Russian Orange Paper, No. 1 1. 
 "Russian Orange Paper, No. 12.
 
 The Peace Parleys 75 
 
 at all costs would not involve any territorial 
 acquisitions. 
 
 Of this interview the chief evidence comes in- 
 directly from two sources, which are not entirely 
 in accord. 
 
 In a telegram from the German Ambassador 
 at Vienna to the German Chancellor, dated July 
 24th, it is said : 
 
 Count Berchtold to-day summoned the Russian 
 Charge d'Afifaires in order to explain to him in 
 detail and in friendly terms the position of Austria 
 regarding Servia. After going over the historical 
 developments of the last few years, he laid stress 
 on the statement that the monarchy did not wish to 
 appear against Servia in the role of a conqueror. 
 He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no 
 territory, that the step was merely a definitive 
 measure against Servian machinations ; that Austria- 
 Hungary felt herself obliged to exact guarantees for 
 the future friendly behavior of Servia toward the 
 monarchy; that he had no intention of bringing 
 about a shifting of the balance of power in the 
 Balkans. The Charge dAffaires, who as yet had 
 no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the 
 explanations of the Minister ad referendum adding 
 that he would immediately transmit them to 
 Sazonof . ^ 
 
 In a report of the same interview from the 
 
 » German White Paper, No. 3.
 
 76 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 English Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward 
 Grey, it is said : 
 
 Russian Chargd d'Affaires was received this 
 morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said 
 to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian 
 note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible 
 of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both 
 unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister 
 was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless 
 Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m. 
 to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Mon- 
 archy felt that its very existence was at stake; 
 and that the step taken had caused great satis- 
 faction throughout the country. He did not think 
 that objections to what had been done could be 
 raised by any power. 
 
 It will be noted that in the report of the English 
 Ambassador there is no suggestion of any dis- 
 claimer of an intention to take Servian territory. 
 
 In the Russian Orange Paper, we find no report 
 from its representative at Vienna of any such in- 
 terview and Austria has never produced any docu- 
 ment or memorandum either of such an interview 
 or of such a concession to Russia. It is probable 
 that such a concession was made, as Germany 
 contends, and if so, Russian diplomacy was far too 
 keen to be led upon a false trail by this empty 
 
 ' English White Papers, No. 7.
 
 The Peace Parleys 77 
 
 promise and as the evidences multiplied that 
 Austria would not consider either an extension 
 of time or any modification of its terms and that 
 Germany was acting in complete accord and co- 
 operated with her Ally, the probability of war was 
 unmistakable. 
 
 Sazonof at once sent for the English and French 
 Ambassadors, and the substance of the conference 
 is embodied in the telegram from the British 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey, 
 dated July 24th, which throws a strong light upon 
 the double effort of Russia and France to preserve 
 the peace and also as an obvious necessity to 
 prepare for the more probable issue of war: 
 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's 
 conduct was both provocative and immoral; she 
 would never have taken such action unless Germany 
 had first been consulted ; some of her demands were 
 quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that his 
 Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim 
 their solidarity with Russia and France. 
 
 The French Ambassador gave me to understand 
 that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed 
 by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, be- 
 sides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic 
 negotiations. 
 
 I said that I would telegraph a full report to you 
 of what their Excellencies had just said to mc. I 
 could not, of course, speak in the name ot his
 
 78 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no 
 reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from 
 his Majesty's Government that would entail an 
 unconditional engagement on their part to support 
 Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British 
 interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of 
 that country would never be sanctioned by British 
 public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that 
 we must not forget that the general European ques- 
 tion was involved, the Servian question being but 
 a part of the former, and that Great Britain could 
 not afford to efface herself from the problems now 
 at issue. 
 
 In reply to these remarks I observed that I 
 gathered from what he said that his Excellency was 
 suggesting that Great Britain should join in making 
 a communication to Austria to the effect that active 
 intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia 
 could not be tolerated. But, supposing Austria 
 nevertheless proceeded to embark on military 
 measures against Servia in spite of our representa- 
 tions, was it the intention of the Russian Govern- 
 ment forthwith to declare war on Austria? 
 
 M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that 
 Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be 
 carried out; but a council of ministers was being 
 held this afternoon to consider the whole question. 
 A further council would beheld, probably to-morrow, 
 at which the Emperor would preside, when a deci- 
 sion would be come to. . . . 
 
 Had England then followed the sagacious sug- 
 gestion of Sazonof, would war have been averted?
 
 The Peace Parleys 79 
 
 Possibly, perhaps probably. Germany's princi- 
 pal fear was the intervention of England. In view 
 of its supremacy on the seas this was natural. 
 It was England's intimation in the Moroccan 
 crisis of 191 1, made in Lloyd George's Mansion 
 House speech, which at that time induced Ger- 
 many to reverse the engines. Might not the 
 same intimation in 1914 have had a like effect upon 
 the mad counsels of Potsdam? The answer can 
 only be a matter of conjecture. It depends largely 
 upon how deep-seated the purpose of Germany 
 may have been to provoke a European war at a 
 time when Russia, France, or England were not 
 fully prepared. 
 
 It does not follow that if Sazonof was right, 
 Sir Edward Grey was necessarily wrong in declin- 
 ing to align England definitely with Russia and 
 France at that stage. He was the servant of a 
 democratic nation and could not ignore the public 
 opinion of his country as freely as the Russian 
 Foreign Minister. To take such a course, it 
 would have been necessary for Grey to submit 
 the matter to Parliament, and while with a 
 large liberal majority his policy might have 
 been endorsed, yet it would have been after 
 such an acrimonious discussion and such vehe- 
 ment protests that England would have stood
 
 8o The Evidence in the Case 
 
 before the world "as a house divided against 
 itself." 
 
 Both Sazonof and Sir Edward Grey from their 
 respective standpoints were right. Neither made 
 a single false step in the great controversy. 
 
 As a result of this interview, Russia, England, 
 and France, after the request for time had been 
 abruptly refused, next proceeded in the interests 
 of peace to persuade Servia to make as conciliatory 
 a reply to the impossible ultimatum as was possi- 
 ble without a fatal compromise of her political in- 
 dependence. 
 
 While the lack of time prevented France and 
 Russia from making any formal communication 
 to Servia on the question, yet Sazonof had a 
 conference with the Servian Minister and dis- 
 cussed the wisdom of avoiding an attack on 
 Belgrade by having the Servian forces with- 
 drawn to the interior and then appealing to the 
 Powers, and Russia thereupon made the broad 
 and magnanimous suggestion that if Servia should 
 appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready 
 to stand aside and leave the question in tJie hands of 
 England, France, Germany, and Italy. 
 
 This interview, as reported by the British Am- 
 bassador at St. Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey, 
 dated July 25th, is as follows:
 
 The Peace Parleys 8i 
 
 I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morn- 
 ing, and communicated to his Excellency the sub- 
 stance of your telegram of to-day to Paris, and this 
 afternoon, I discussed with him the communication 
 which the French Ambassador suggested should be 
 made to the Servian Government, as recorded in 
 your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade. . . . 
 
 The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia 
 was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to 
 punish those proved to be guilty, but that no indepen- 
 dent State could be expected to accept the political 
 demands which had been put forward. The 
 IMinister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conver- 
 sation which he had with the Servian Minister 
 yesterday, that in the event of the Austrians 
 attacking Servia, the Servian Government would 
 abandon Belgrade and withdraw their forces into 
 the interior, while they would at the same time 
 appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency 
 was in favor of their making this appeal. He 
 would like to see the question placed on an inter- 
 national footing, as the obligations taken by Servia 
 in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian 
 ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the 
 Powers. 
 
 If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia 
 would he quite ready to stand aside and leave the 
 question in the hands of England, France, Germany, 
 and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that 
 Servia might propose to submit the question to 
 arbitration. 
 
 Pursuant to this policy of conciliat'.on Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey in direct communication with the
 
 82 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Servian Minister at London, Mr. Crackenthorpe, 
 the British Ambassador at Belgrade, in direct 
 communication with the Servian Foreign Ministry, 
 and Sazonof in interviews with the Servian Minis- 
 ter at St. Petersburg, all brought direct influence 
 upon Servia to make a concihatory reply. 
 
 Thus Sir Edward Grey instructed Cracken- 
 thorpe : 
 
 Servia ought to promise that if it is proved that 
 Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, 
 were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at 
 Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfac- 
 tion. She certainly ought to express concern and 
 regret. For the rest, Servian Government must 
 reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in 
 Servian interests. 
 
 It is impossible to say whether military action 
 by Austria when time limit expires can be averted 
 by anything but unconditional acceptance of her 
 demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding 
 an absolute refusal and replying favorably to as 
 many points as the time limit allows. . . . 
 
 I have urged upon the German Ambassador that 
 Austria should not precipitate military action.^ 
 
 In response to these suggestions, Mr. Cracken- 
 thorpe communicated Sir Edward Grey's pacific 
 suggestions to the Servian Minister and received 
 
 ' English White Paper, No. 12.
 
 The Peace Parleys 83 
 
 the following reply, as reported in Crackenthorpe's 
 report to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th. 
 
 The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their 
 reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the 
 Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it 
 will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian 
 demands in as large a measure as is possible. . . . 
 
 The Servian Government consider that, unless the 
 Austrian Government want war at any cost, they 
 cannot but be content with the full satisfaction 
 offered in the Servian reply, ' 
 
 These pacific suggestions to Servia met with 
 complete success, and as a result that country on 
 July 25th, and before the expiration of the ultima- 
 tum, made a reply to Austria which astonished the 
 world with its spirit of conciliation and for a short 
 time gave rise to optimistic hopes of peace. 
 
 At some sacrifice of its self-respect as a sovereign 
 State, it accepted substantially the demands of 
 Austria, with a few minor reservations, which it 
 expressed its willingness to refer either to arbitra- 
 tion at The Hague Tribunal or to a conference of 
 the Powers.^ 
 
 Neither Germany nor Austria seriously con- 
 tended that the reply was not on its face a 
 substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian 
 
 ' English White Paper, No. 21. 
 ' English While Paper, No. 39.
 
 84 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 demands. They contented themselves with im- 
 peaching the sincerity of the assurances, calHng 
 the concessions "shams." Unless Austria, in 
 asking assurances from Servia, were content to 
 accept them as made in good faith and allow their 
 sincerity to be determined by future deeds, why 
 should the ultimatum, calling for such assurances, 
 have been made? If Germany and Austria had 
 accepted Servia's reply as sufficient, and Servia 
 had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises 
 in the utmost good faith, there would have 
 been little sympathy for Servia, and no general 
 war. Russia and England pledged their influ- 
 ence to compel Servia, if necessary, to meet fully 
 any reasonable demand of Austria. The prin- 
 cipal outstanding question, which Servia agreed 
 to arbitrate or leave to the Powers, was the 
 participation of Austrian officials in the Servian 
 courts. This did not present a difficult problem. 
 Austria's professed desire for an impartial in- 
 vestigation could have been easily attained by 
 having the Powers appoint a commission of neutral 
 jurists to make such investigation. 
 
 In any event, Austria could have accepted the 
 very substantial concessions of Servia and without 
 prejudice to its rights proceeded to The Hague 
 Tribunal or to a concert of the Powers as to the
 
 The Peace Parleys 85 
 
 few and comparatively simple open points. When 
 one recalls the infinite treasure of property and life, 
 which would thus have been saved the world, had 
 Germany and Austria accepted this reasonable and 
 pacific course, one can only exclaim, ''But oh, the 
 pity of it!'' 
 
 It is significant that while the entire official 
 German press gave ample space to the Austrian 
 ultimatum and rejoiced in Austria's energetic at- 
 titude, it withheld from the German people any 
 adequate information as to the conciliatory nature 
 of the Servian reply, for the Russian Charge at 
 Berlin telegraphed to Sazonof: 
 
 The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of 
 the Servian response which was communicated to 
 it. Up to this moment this note has not appeared 
 in extenso in any of local journals, which ac- 
 cording to all the evidence do not wish to give it a 
 place in their columns, understanding the calming 
 effect which this publication would produce upon 
 the German readers.^ 
 
 Instead of getting the truth, the Berlin populace 
 proceeded to make riotous demonstrations against 
 the Russian and Servian Embassies. 
 
 The time limit on the ultimatum expired on 
 July the 25th at six o'clock in the evening. 
 
 ' Russian Orange Paper, No. 46.
 
 86 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 There is no more significant and at the same 
 time discreditable feature of an infinitely discredit- 
 able chapter in history than that the Austrian 
 Government, without giving the Servian answer the 
 consideration even of a single hour, immediately 
 severed all diplomatic intercourse with Belgrade 
 and at 6.30 p.m. the Minister of Austria 
 
 informed the Servian Government by note that, not 
 having received within the delay fixed a satisfactory 
 response, he is leaving Belgrade with the whole 
 personnel of the legation. 
 
 On the same night Austria ordered the mobil- 
 ization of a considerable part of its army. 
 
 Notwithstanding these rebuffs, England, France, 
 and Russia continued to labor for peace, and made 
 further pacific suggestions, all of which fell upon 
 deaf ears. 
 
 On July 25th, Sir Edward Grey proposed that 
 the four Powers (England, France, Italy, and 
 Germany) should unite 
 
 in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments 
 not to cross the frontier and to give time for the four 
 Powers, acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg, to 
 try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt 
 this view I feel strongly that France and ourselves 
 should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly 
 cooperate. ' 
 
 ' English White Paper, Nos. 24 and 25.
 
 The Peace Parleys 87 
 
 To this reasonable request the German Chan- 
 cellor replied : 
 
 The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey be- 
 tween the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian con- 
 flict is quite correct. We wish as little as England 
 to mix in the first, and, first and last, we take the 
 ground that this question must be localized by the 
 abstention of all the Powers from intervention in it. 
 It is therefore our earnest hope that Russia will 
 refrain from any active intervention, conscious of 
 her responsibility and of the seriousness of the 
 situation. If an Austro-Russian dispute should 
 arise, we are ready, with the reservation of our 
 known duties as Allies, to cooperate with the other 
 great Powers in mediation between Russia and 
 Austria. ^ 
 
 This distinction is hard to grasp. It' attempts 
 to measure the difference between tweedledum 
 and tweedledee, Russia's current difference with 
 Austria concerned the attempt of the latter to 
 crush Servia without interference. Russia claimed 
 such right of intervention. Germany would not 
 interfere in the former matter, but would abstractly 
 but not concretely mediate between Russia and 
 Austria in the latter. Mediate about what? To 
 refuse to mediate over the Servian question was to 
 refuse to mediate at all. For all practical purposes 
 the two things were indistinguishable. 
 
 ' German White Paper, Exhibit 13.
 
 88 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 All that Germany did on July 25th, so far as the 
 record discloses, was to "pass on" England's and 
 Russia's requests for more time, but subsequent 
 events indicate that it was "passed on" without 
 any indorsement, for is it credible that Austria 
 would have ignored its ally's request for more 
 time if it had ever been made? Here again we 
 note with disappointment the absence from the 
 record of Germany's message to Austria, "passing 
 on" the reasonable request for an extension of 
 time. The result indicates that the request re- 
 ceived, if any endorsement, the "faint praise" 
 which is said to "damn." 
 
 Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon 
 so slight a pretext? A little time, a few days, 
 even a few hours, might have sufficed to preserve 
 the world from present horrors, but no time 
 could be granted. A snap judgment was to be 
 taken by these pettifogging diplomats. The peace 
 of the world was to be torpedoed by submarine 
 diplomacy. The Austrian Government could wait 
 nearly three months to try the assassin, who ad- 
 mittedly slew the Austrian Archduke, but could not 
 wait even a few hours before condemning Servia 
 to political death. It could not grant Russia any 
 time to consider a matter gravely affecting its 
 interests, even if the peace of Europe and the
 
 The Peace Parleys 89 
 
 happiness of the world depended on it. It would 
 be difficult to find in recorded history a greater 
 discourtesy to a friendly Power, for Austria was 
 not at war with Russia. 
 
 Defeated in their effort to get an extension of 
 time, England, France, and Russia made further 
 attempts to preserve peace by temporarily arrest- 
 ing military proceedings until further efforts to- 
 ward conciliation could be made. Sir Edward Grey 
 proposed to Germany, France, Russia, and Italy 
 that they should unite in asking Austria and Servia 
 not to cross the frontier "until we had had time 
 to try and arrange matters between them," but 
 the German Ambassador read Sir Edward Grey 
 a telegram that he had received from the German 
 Foreign Office saying 
 
 that his Government had not known beforehand, 
 and had had no more than other Powers to do with 
 the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but 
 that once she had launched that note, Austria could 
 not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky said, however, 
 that if what I contemplated was mediation be- 
 tween Austria and Russia, Austria might be able 
 with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as 
 personally favorable to this suggestion. 
 
 It will be noted that Germany thus gave to 
 England, as it had already given to Russia and
 
 90 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 France in the most unequivocal terms, a disclaimer 
 of any responsibility for the Austrian ultimatum, 
 but we have already seen that when the German 
 Foreign Office prepared its statement for the Ger- 
 man nation, which was circulated in the Reichs- 
 tag on August 4th, Germany confessed the 
 insincerity of these assurances by admitting that 
 before the ultimatum was issued the Austrian 
 Government had advised the German Foreign 
 Office of its intentions and asked its opinion and 
 that 
 
 we were able to assure our ally most heartily of our 
 agreement with her view of the situation and to 
 assure her that any action that she might consider 
 it necessary to take . . . would receive our ap- 
 proval. 
 
 Here again it is to be noted that the telegram, 
 which the German Foreign Office sent to Prince 
 Lichnowsky, and which that diplomat simply read 
 to Sir Edward Grey, is not set forth in the exhibits 
 to the German White Paper. 
 
 As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the 
 record discloses, sought in any way to influence 
 Austria to make this or any concession until after 
 the Kaiser's return from Norway and then only, 
 if we accept the assurances of its Foreign Office 
 which are not supported by official documents.
 
 The Peace Parleys 91 
 
 Its attitude was shown by the declaration of its 
 Ambassador at Paris to the French Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs, which, while again disclaiming that 
 Germany had countenanced the Austrian ulti- 
 matum, yet added that Germany "approved" its 
 point of view, 
 
 and that certainly, the arrow once sent, Germany 
 could not allow herself to be guided except by her 
 duty as ally. ^ 
 
 This seemed to be the fatal error of Germany, 
 that its duties to civilization were so slight that 
 it shoidd support its ally, Austria, whether the 
 latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, 
 and it carried it out with fatal consistency. To 
 support its ally in actual war without respect to 
 the justice of the quarrel may be defensible, but 
 to support it in a time of peace in an iniquitous de- 
 mand and a policy of gross discourtesy to friendly 
 States offends every sense of international morality. 
 
 On the following day Russia proposed to Austria 
 that they should enter into an exchange of private 
 views, with the object of an alteration in common 
 of some clauses of the Austrian ultimatum. To 
 this Austria never even replied. 
 
 The Russian Minister communicated this sug- 
 
 ' Russian Orange Paper, No. 19.
 
 92 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 gestion to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 and expressed the hope that he would "find it 
 possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal," 
 but this did not accord with German poh'cy, for 
 on that day the German Ambassador in Paris 
 called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 and submitted the following formal declaration : 
 
 "Austria has declared to Russia that she does not 
 seek territorial acquisitions, and that she does not 
 threaten the integrity of Servia. Her only object 
 is to insure her own tranquillity. Consequently it 
 rests with Russia to avoid war. Germany feels 
 herself at one with France in her keen desire to pre- 
 serve the peace, and strongly hopes that France will 
 use her influence at St. Petersburg in the direction 
 of moderation." The [French] Minister observed that 
 Germany could on her side take similar steps at Vienna, 
 especially in view of the conciliatory spirit which 
 Servia had shown. The Ambassador answered that 
 that was not possible, in view of the resolution taken 
 not to interfere in the Austro-Servian con fact. There- 
 ■ upon the Minister asked if the four Powers — Eng- 
 land, Germany, Italy, and France — were not able 
 to take steps at St. Petersburg and Vienna, since 
 the affair reduced itself in essentials to a conflict 
 between Russia and Austria. The Ambassador 
 pleaded the absence of instructions. Finally, the 
 Minister refused to adhere to the German proposal. ^ 
 
 This significant interview states the consistent 
 
 ' Russian Omnge Paper, No. 28.
 
 The Peace Parleys 93 
 
 attitude of Germany. The burden is put upon 
 France to induce its ally to desist from any inter- 
 vention and thus give Austria a free hand, while 
 Germany emphatically declines to promote the 
 same pacific object by suggesting to Austria a 
 more conciliatory course. 
 
 On the same day England asked France, Italy, 
 and Germany to meet in London for an immediate 
 conference to preserve the peace of Europe, and 
 to this fruitful suggestion, which might have 
 saved that peace, the German Secretary of State, 
 after conferring with the British Ambassador at 
 Berlin, replied that the conference 
 
 would practically amount to a court of arbitration 
 and could not, in his opinion, be called together 
 except at the request of Austria and Russia. He 
 could not, therefore, fall in with your [Sir Edward 
 Grey's] suggestion, desirous though he was to co- 
 operate for the maintenance of peace. I [Sir E. 
 Goschen] said I was sure that your idea had nothing 
 to do with arbitration, but meant that representa- 
 tives of the four nations not directly interested 
 should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a 
 dangerous situation. He [Von Jagow] maintained, 
 however, that such a conference as you proposed 
 was not practicable.^ 
 
 Germany's refusal to have Servia's case sub- 
 
 * English While Paper. No. 43.
 
 94 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 mitted to the Powers even for their consideration 
 is the more striking when it is recalled that on the 
 same day the German Ambassador at London 
 quoted the German Secretary of State as saying 
 
 that there were some things in the Austrian note 
 that Servia could hardly be expected to accept, 
 
 thus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, 
 at least in part, unjust. Sir Edward Grey then 
 called the German Ambassador's attention to the 
 fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply 
 of Servia and marched into that country 
 
 it meant that she was determined to crush Servia 
 at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that 
 might be involved. 
 
 He added that the Servian reply 
 
 should at least be treated as a basis for discussion 
 and pause, 
 
 and asked that the German Government should 
 urge this at Vienna but, as we have already seen, 
 the German Secretary of State had already replied 
 that such a conference "was not practicable, " and 
 that it "would practically amount to a court of 
 arbitration," and could not, in his opinion, be 
 called together "except at the request of Austria 
 and Russia."' 
 
 ' English White Paper, No. 46.
 
 The Peace Parleys 95 
 
 That this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. 
 Germany already knew that Austria would not ask 
 for such a conference, for Austria had already re- 
 fused Russia's request for an extension of time and 
 had actually commenced its military operations. 
 
 Germany's attitude is again clearly indicated by 
 the letter of the Russian Minister in Germany to 
 the Russian Foreign Office in which he states that 
 on July 27th he called at the German Foreign Office 
 and asked it, 
 
 to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to 
 take up this line of conciliation. Von Jagow replied 
 that he could not advise Austria to yield/ 
 
 Why not? Russia and its allies had advised 
 Servia to yield and Servia had conceded nearly 
 every claim. Why could not the German Foreign 
 Office advise Vienna to meet conciliation by con- 
 ciliation, if its desire for peace were sincere? 
 
 Before this interview took place, the French 
 Ambassador had called at the German Foreign 
 Office on a similar errand and urged the English 
 suggestion that action should at once be taken 
 by England, Germany, Russia, and France at St. 
 Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that Austria 
 and Servia 
 
 » Russian Orange Paper, No. 38.
 
 96 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 shoiild abstain from any act which might aggravate 
 the situation at the present hour. 
 
 By this was meant that there should be, pending 
 further parleys, no invasion of Servia by Austria 
 and none of Austria by Russia. To this the 
 German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical 
 refusal. 
 
 On the same day the Russian Ambassador at 
 Vienna had "a long and earnest conversation" 
 with the Austrian Under-Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope 
 that 
 
 something would be done before Servia was actually 
 invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would 
 now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken 
 place on the Danube, in which the Servians had 
 been aggressors. 
 
 The Russian Ambassador then said that his 
 country would do all it could to keep the Servians 
 quiet, "and even to fall back before an Austrian 
 advance in order to gain time. " 
 
 He urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. 
 Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to 
 continue discussions with the Russian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs,
 
 The Peace Parleys 97 
 
 who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all 
 that could be fairly asked of her as an independent 
 Power. 
 
 The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was 
 that it would be submitted to the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs.^ 
 
 On the same day the German Ambassador at 
 Paris called upon the French Foreign Office and 
 "strongly insisted on the exclusion of all possibility 
 of mediation or a conference'' '; and yet contem- 
 poraneously the Imperial German Chancellor w^as 
 advising London that he had 
 
 started the efforts towards mediation in Vienna, 
 immediately in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, 
 and had further communicated to the Austrian 
 Foreign Minister the wish of the Russian Foreign 
 Minister for a direct talk in Vienna. 
 
 What hypocrisy! In the formal German de- 
 fense, the German Foreign Office, after stating its 
 conviction 
 
 that an act of mediation could not take into con- 
 sideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was 
 purely an Austro-Hungarian affair, 
 
 claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir 
 
 ' English While Paper, No. 56. 
 =» Russian Orange Paper, No. 34.
 
 98 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Edward Grey's further suggestion to Vienna, in 
 which Austro- Hungary was urged 
 
 either to agree to accept the Servian answer as 
 sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further 
 conversations ; 
 
 but the Austro-Hungarian Government — playing 
 the role of the wicked partner of the combination 
 — "in full appreciation of our mediatory activity" 
 (so says the German White Paper with sardonic 
 humor), replied to this proposition that, coming 
 after the opening of hostilities, ''it was too 
 late:' 
 
 Can it be fairly questioned that if Germany had 
 done something more than merely "transmit" 
 these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria would 
 have complied with the suggestions of its powerful 
 ally or that Austria would have suspended its 
 military operations if Germany had given any 
 intimation of such a wish? 
 
 On the following day, July 28th, the door was 
 further closed on any possibility of compromise, 
 when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 
 said, quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be 
 accepted on the basis of the Servian note; that war 
 would be declared to-day, and that the well-known 
 pacific character of the Emperor, as well as, he 
 might add, his own. might be accepted as a guar-
 
 The Peace Parleys 99 
 
 antee that the war was both just and inevitable; 
 that this was a matter that must be settled directly 
 between the two parties immediately concerned. 
 
 To this arrogant and unreasonable contention 
 that Europe must accept the guarantee of the 
 Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness 
 of Austria's quarrel, the British Ambassador 
 suggested "the larger aspect of the question," 
 namely, the peace of Europe, and to this "larger 
 aspect, " which should have given any reasonable 
 official some ground for pause, the Austrian Foreign 
 Minister replied that he 
 
 had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought 
 not to oppose operations like those impending, 
 which did not aim at territorial aggrandizement, 
 and which could no longer be postponed. ^ 
 
 The private conversations between Russia and 
 Austria having thus failed, Russia returned to the 
 proposition of a European conference to preserve 
 its peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28th 
 had a further conference with Berchtold and again 
 earnestly pleaded for peace on the basis of friendly 
 relations not only between Austria and Servia but 
 between Austria and Russia. The conversation in 
 the light of present developments is so significant 
 that it bears quotation in extenso: 
 
 » English White Paper, No. 62.
 
 100 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 I pointed out to him in the most friendly terms 
 how much it was desirable to find a solution which, 
 while consolidating the good relations between Aus- 
 tria-Hungary and Russia, should give to the Aus- 
 tro-Hungarian Monarchy serious guarantees for its 
 future relations with Servia. 
 
 I called the attention of Count Berchtold to all 
 the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be 
 brought about by an armed conflict between Austria- 
 Hungary and Servia. 
 
 Count Berchtold replied that he understood 
 perfectly well the seriousness of the situation and the 
 advantages of a frank explanation with the Cabinet 
 of St. Petersburg. He told me that on the other hand 
 the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had only 
 reluctantly decided upon the energetic measures which 
 it had taken against Servia, could now neither with- 
 draw nor enter upon any discussion of the terms of the 
 Austro-Hungarian note. 
 
 Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become 
 so acute and that public opinion had been excited 
 to such a degree that the Government, even if it 
 desired, could no longer consent to it, all the less, 
 he said to me, because the very reply of Servia gave 
 proof of the lack of sincerity in its promises for the 
 future. 
 
 On the same day, July 28th, the German Im- 
 perial Chancellor sent for the English Ambassador 
 and excused his failure to accept the proposed 
 conference of the neutral Powers, on the ground 
 that he did not think it would be effective.
 
 The Peace Parleys loi 
 
 because such a conference would, in his opinion, 
 have the appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting 
 of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment 
 upon the two remaining Powers. 
 
 After engaging in this narrow and insincere 
 quibble, and, being reminded of Servia's con- 
 ciliatory reply, 
 
 his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss 
 the Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, 
 and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with 
 Servia was a purely Austrian concern, with which 
 Russia had nothing to do.^ 
 
 At this stage of the controversy it will be noted 
 that every proposal to preserve peace had come 
 from the Triple Entente and that every such pro- 
 posal had met with an uncompromising negative 
 from Austria, and either that or obstructive 
 quibbles from Germany. 
 
 ' English While Paper, No. 71.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE 
 
 Before proceeding to record the second and 
 final stage in the peace parleys, in which the Ger- 
 man Kaiser became the protagonist, it is desirable 
 to interpolate the additional data, which the French 
 Yellow Book has given to the world since the pre- 
 ceding chapter was written and the first editions 
 of this book were printed. This can be done with 
 little sacrifice to the chronological sequence of this 
 narrative. 
 
 The evidence of the Yellow Book is fuller in 
 scope and greater in detail than the other govern- 
 mental publications, and while largely cumulative in 
 its character, it serves to bring into a sharper light 
 certain phases of this extraordinary controversy. 
 
 It has been prepared with great care by M. 
 Jules Cambon, who was the French Ambas- 
 sador at Berlin during the controversy, and 
 MM. de Margerie and Berthelot, experienced 
 and influential diplomats in the French Ministry 
 of Foreign Affairs. It consists of i6o documents,
 
 The Attitude of France 103 
 
 classified into seven chapters, each dealing with 
 different periods of time in the great controversy. 
 The delay in its presentation is somewhat com- 
 pensated by the exceptional fullness of the data 
 which is thus submitted to the scrutiny of a 
 candid world. 
 
 The French Yellow Book confirms the impres- 
 sion that France was most fortunate in having 
 entrusted its interests at the difficult post of 
 Berlin in this great crisis to so distinguished and 
 experienced a diplomat as M. Jules Cambon. 
 
 Throughout the whole controversy the impartial 
 reader is deeply impressed with the fact, which the 
 more candid apologists for Germany are themselves 
 disposed to admit, that Germany's chief weakness 
 lay in its incapable diplomatic representatives. 
 An interesting subject for conjecture suggests 
 itself as to what would have happened if Prince 
 Bismarck had been at the helm at this critical 
 juncture. His guiding principles of statecraft 
 with reference to foreign relations were to isolate 
 the enemy, make him the apparent aggressor, 
 and then crush him as effectually and speedily as 
 possible. He never would have initiated this war. 
 His nature was that of the fox as well as the lion. 
 
 In the years that have succeeded his dis- 
 missal, a certain dry rot, due to the tendency of
 
 104 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 the Prussian Government to distribute its diplo- 
 matic offices among highborn but incompetent 
 Junkers, — ime petite gentilhommerie paiivre ct 
 stupide, as Bismarck once described them — had 
 affected the efficiency of German diplomacy. 
 Feebly attempting to walk in the steps of the Iron 
 Chancellor, they wittingly or unwittingly re- 
 versed Bismarck's pohcy by almost isolating 
 Germany, consolidating its enemies, and then 
 proceeding to attack them simultaneously. This 
 may have been magnificent courage, but it was 
 not wise statecraft. The might of the German 
 sabre was supposed to offset these blundering dis- 
 ciples of Machiavelli. 
 
 Russia, England, and France were more fortu- 
 nate and of their representatives few, if any, shone 
 with greater intellectual distinction or moral 
 courage than M. Jules Cambon. This distin- 
 guished diplomat had had axceptional experience 
 in representing his country in various capitals of 
 the world, and the author, who enjoyed the honor 
 of his acquaintance, when he was accredited to 
 Washington, already knew, what the documents 
 in the French Yellow Book so clearly reveal, that 
 Cambon was a diplomat of great intellectual 
 ability. With acute sagacity he grasped the sig- 
 nificance of the fateful events, in which he was a
 
 The Attitude of France 105 
 
 participant. To his calm and well-poised in- 
 tellectuality he added a moral force, resulting 
 from the clear integrity of his purpose and the 
 broad humanity of his aims. 
 
 On more than one occasion he spoke "in the 
 name of humanity," and in his constant attempt 
 to convince the German Foreign Office as to its 
 clear duty to civilization to preserve the peace 
 of the world, he became the representative, not 
 merely of France, but of civilization itself. 
 
 In this great diplomatic controversy, one of 
 the greatest in the history of the world, the three 
 representatives, who stand out with the greatest 
 intellectual and moral distinction, are Sazonof, 
 Grey, and Cambon. 
 
 The first displayed the greatest sagacity in 
 divining from the very outset the real purposes 
 of Germany and Austria and in checkmating the 
 diplomatic moves, which sought to make Russia 
 apparently the aggressor. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey's chief merit lay in his un- 
 wearying but ineffectual efforts to bring about a 
 peaceful solution of the problem and also in the 
 absolute candor — so unusual in diplomacy — with 
 which he dealt on the one hand with the efforts 
 of Russia and France to align England on their 
 side at the beginning of the quarrel, and on the
 
 io6 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 other, to continue friendly negotiations with 
 Germany and Austria, without in any respect 
 unfairly misleading them as to England's possible 
 ultimate action. 
 
 The French Ambassador will justly receive the 
 approval of posterity for the high courage and 
 moral earnestness with which he pressed upon 
 the German Foreign Office the inevitable conse- 
 quences of its acts. 
 
 The first chapter of the French Yellow Book 
 consists largely of communications written from 
 Berlin by M. Jules Cambon in the year 191 3. 
 Its most interesting document is his report 
 from Berlin under date November 22, 1913, as 
 to a conversation between the Kaiser and the 
 King of Belgium, with reference to a change in the 
 pacific attitude, which Cambon had previously 
 imputed to the Kaiser, 
 
 To the world at large this statement would be 
 more convincing if the source of the information 
 had been disclosed. Those who know M. Jules 
 Cambon, however, will have a reasonable confi- 
 dence that when he states that he received the 
 record of this conversation "from an absolutely 
 sure source," more than usual credence can be 
 given to the statement. Reading between the 
 lines, the implication is not unreasonable that the
 
 The Attitude of France 107 
 
 source of Cambon's authority was King Albert 
 himself, but this rests only on a plausible con- 
 jecture. 
 
 The fact that so trained an observer as the 
 French Ambassador had seen in the Kaiser a 
 marked change as early as 19 13 is significant, 
 and history may justify Cambon in his shrewd 
 conjecture that "the impatience of the soldiers," 
 meaning thereby the German General Staff, and 
 the growing popularity of his chauvinistic son, 
 the Crown Prince, had appreciably modified the 
 pacific attitude of the Kaiser, which had served 
 the cause of peace so well in the Moroccan crisis. 
 Cambon's recital of the incident in question, 
 written on November 22, 1913, justifies quotation 
 in extenso. 
 
 I have received from an absolutely sure source a 
 record of a conversation which is reported between 
 the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the 
 presence of the Chief of the General Staff, General 
 von jMoltke, a fortnight ago — a conversation which 
 would appear greatly to have struck King Albert. 
 I am in no way surprised by the impression created, 
 which corresponds with that made on me some time 
 ago. Hostility against us is becoming more marked, 
 and the Emperor has ceased to be a partisan of 
 peace. The German Emperor's interlocutor thought 
 up to the present, as did everybody, that William II.,
 
 io8 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 whose personal influence has been exerted in 
 many critical circumstances in favor of the 
 maintenance of peace, was still in the same state 
 of mind. This time, it appears, he found him com- 
 pletely changed. The German Emperor is no 
 longer in his eyes the champion of peace against 
 the bellicose tendencies of certain German parties. 
 WilHam II. has been brought to think that war 
 with France is inevitable, and that it will have 
 to come one day or the other. The Emperor, 
 it need hardly be said, believes in the crushing 
 superiority of the German army and in its assured 
 success. 
 
 General von Moltke spoke in exactly the same 
 sense as his sovereign. He also declared that war 
 was necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself 
 still more certain of success. "For," said he to 
 the King, "this time we must put an end to it" 
 (cette jois il jaut en finir), "and your Majesty can 
 hardly doubt the irresistible enthusiasm which 
 on that day will carry away the whole German 
 people." 
 
 The King of the Belgians protested that to inter- 
 pret the intentions of the French Government in 
 this manner was to travesty them, and to allow 
 oneself to be misled as to the feelings of the French 
 nation by the manifestations of a few hotheads, or 
 of conscienceless intriguers. 
 
 The Emperor and his Chief of General Staff none 
 the less persisted in their point of view. 
 
 During this conversation the Emperor, moreover, 
 appeared overwrought, and irritable. As the years 
 begin to weigh upon William II. the family tradi- 
 tions, the retrograde feelings of the Court, and, above
 
 The Attitude of France 109 
 
 all, the impatience of the soldiers, arc gaining more 
 ascendency over his mind. Perhaps he may feel 
 I know not what kind of jealousy of the popularity 
 acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the 
 Pan-Germans, and perhaps he may find that the 
 position of the Empire in the world is not commen- 
 surate with its power. Perhaps, also, the reply of 
 France to the last increase in the German army, the 
 object of which was to place Germanic superiority 
 beyond question, may count for something in these 
 bitternesses, for whatever one may say it is felt 
 here that the Germans cannot do much more. One 
 may ask what lay behind the conversation. The 
 Emperor and his Chief of General Staff may have 
 intended to impress the King of the Belgians, and 
 to lead him not to resist in case a conflict with us 
 should arise ^ . . . 
 
 This picture of the Kaiser is interesting and 
 significant. 
 
 Germany's loss of prestige in the INIoroccan 
 controversy, due to the Kaiser's unwillingness 
 to precipitate a w^ar at that time and his some- 
 what diminished popularity with his people, not 
 only accentuated the desire of his military cama- 
 rilla to find another pretext for a war, but may 
 have modified the Kaiser's resistance to this belli- 
 cose policy. Until that time he had been quite 
 content to play the part of Caesar. It may be 
 questioned whether he had previously a real desire 
 
 ' French Yellow Book, No. 6.
 
 no The Evidence in the Case 
 
 to he a C£esar. To describe himself meta- 
 phorically as "clad in shining armor" and to 
 shake the "mailed fist" was his constant pose. 
 "And so he played his part." As long as the 
 world was content to take this imperial fustian 
 in a Pickwickian sense, the imperial impresario 
 found the same enjoyment as when he staged 
 Sardanapalus on the boards of the Berlin 
 Theater. 
 
 The Kaiser was destined to stage a greater 
 spectacle than the burning of a Babylonian pal- 
 ace. His crowning achievement was to apply the 
 torch to civilization itself. 
 
 Prior to 19 13 neither his wishes nor plans car- 
 ried him further than the congenial art of imperial 
 posing. Behind his natural preference for peace 
 was ever the lurking fear that a disastrous war 
 might cost him his throne. The experience of 
 Napoleon the Third was quite too recent to be 
 ignored. 
 
 In the Moroccan controversy, the imwillingness 
 of France to assent to all demands and the resolute 
 purpose of England to support its ally, presented 
 a crisis, which could not be met with rhetorical 
 phrases, and the Kaiser found himself confronted 
 with a situation, in which a very considerable 
 number of thoughtful and influential Germans
 
 The Attitude of France iii 
 
 favored an immediate appeal to arms, and as to 
 which only his word was wanted to precipitate 
 hostilities in 191 1. 
 
 The Kaiser at that time failed to meet the 
 expectations of those who had expected a more 
 warlike attitude from the knight "clad in shining 
 armor," and the expression "William the Peace- 
 ful" was bandied about with increasing contempt 
 by the war party in Germany, whose passions the 
 Crown Prince — not unwilling to push his royal 
 father prematurely from the pedestal of popular- 
 ity — was assiduously fanning. 
 
 While the fact cannot yet be regarded as estab- 
 lished, the writer believes that the future may 
 indubitably show that the Kaiser did have full 
 knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum in advance 
 of its issuance and gave his consent to the policy 
 of that coup in the hope that it would somewhat 
 restore his diminished prestige. He probably 
 followed this policy in the confident expectation 
 that Russia would yield, as it had yielded in 1908 
 in the Bosnian incident, and when he discovered 
 in Norway that Russia, while willing to maintain 
 peace upon any reasonable terms, was not disposed 
 to surrender all its legitimate interests in the Ser- 
 vian question, he, as will be more fully narrated 
 in the next chapter, hurried back to Berlin and for
 
 112 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 a time attempted to reverse the policy and bring 
 about a peaceful adjustment. 
 
 Unfortunately this attempt came too late. His 
 military camarilla had determined upon war. 
 Preparations were then being feverishly made, 
 and the German and Austrian chancelleries were 
 steadily and deliberately shutting the door upon 
 any possibility of peace. 
 
 To withdraw under these circumstances from 
 an untenable position meant a substantial im- 
 pairment of his already diminished prestige. A 
 Washington would have saved the situation, but 
 the Kaiser was not a Washington. 
 
 Another most illuminating feature of this chap- 
 ter of the Yellow Book is a report from the French 
 Embassy in Berlin to its Foreign Office on the 
 public opinion of Germany in the summer of 1913, 
 as disclosed by the reports of the French consular 
 representatives in Germany. It gives an extra- 
 ordinary analysis of conditions in Germany prior 
 to the war, and it describes in great fullness the 
 many causes which were contributory to the crea- 
 tion of a powerful war party in Germany. As it 
 is not in strictness a part of the diplomatic record, 
 it is not embodied in the text ol this book, but its 
 value as an acute analysis of conditions in Germany 
 — made before the passions of the war had clouded
 
 The Attitude of France 113 
 
 the judgment — will repay the reader's careful 
 consideration. 
 
 The second chapter of the French Yellow Book 
 deals with the events which took place between 
 the murder of the Archduke and the Austrian 
 ultimatum and presents new and cumulative 
 evidence of substantial value. 
 
 The French Consul General at Budapest, In 
 a report to his Foreign Ofhce under date July 
 II, 1914, after showing that the Hungarian 
 Premier, Count Tisza, had refused to dis- 
 close, even to the Hungarian Chamber, the 
 results of the judicial inquiry into the Serajevo 
 murder and the decision taken by the Austrian 
 Cabinet, proceeds to show how the suppression 
 of the news in Austria was a part of the scheme 
 to make the ultimatum to Servia so abrupt and 
 speedy that no course would be open to Servia 
 and Europe other than an immediate and uncon- 
 ditional surrender. 
 
 Everything is for peace in the newspapers, but the 
 mass of the public believes in war and fears it. . . . 
 The Government, whether it be seriously desirous 
 of peace, or whether it be preparing a coup, is now 
 doing everything it can to allay this anxiety. That 
 is why the tone of the Government newspapers has 
 been lowered first, by one note and then by two, 
 until now it has become almost optimistic. But
 
 114 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 the Government newspapers themselves have care- 
 fully spread the alarm. Their optimism to order 
 is really without an echo. The nervousness of the 
 Bourse, a barometer one cannot neglect, is a sure 
 proof of that. Stocks, without exception, have 
 fallen to improbably low prices. The Hungarian 
 four per cent, was yesterday quoted at 79.95, a 
 price which has never been quoted since the first 
 issue. * 
 
 Simultaneously a very different note was sound- 
 ed by the organ of the military party in Vienna. 
 The Militdrische Rundschau, a few days before the 
 ultimatum to Servia, said: 
 
 "The moment is still favorable for us. If we do 
 not decide upon war, the war we shall have to 
 make in two or three years at the latest will be 
 begun in circumstances much less propitious; now 
 the initiative belongs to us. Russia is not ready, 
 the moral factors are for us, might as well as right. 
 Since some day we shall have to accept the struggle, 
 let us provoke it at once."^ 
 
 Before the Austrian ultimatum was issued there 
 had been some preliminary informal negotiations 
 between Austria and Servia and the latter had 
 expressed its willingness to give to Austria the 
 most ample reparation "provided that she did not 
 demand judiciary cooperation," and the Servian 
 
 ' French Yellow Book, No. 11. ^ Ibid.. No. 12.
 
 The Attitude of France 115 
 
 Minister at Berlin warned "the German Govern- 
 ment that it would be dangerous to endeavor by 
 this inquiry {i. e., by the participation of Austrian 
 officials in the courts of Servia) to damage the 
 prestige of Servia."^ 
 
 It thus appears that Austria and Germany had 
 warning in advance of the issuance of the ulti- 
 matum that if this humiliating demand were 
 included it would meet with refusal. Their inten- 
 tion to precipitate this war or impose their \\\\\ 
 upon Europe may therefore be measured by the 
 fact that, with full knowledge that that particular 
 demand would not be accepted, it was made a 
 leading feature of the ultimatum, and finall}^ 
 became the principal outstanding difference after 
 Servia had accepted substantially all the other 
 demands of Austria. This was reported by Cam- 
 bon to his Foreign Office two days before the 
 ultimatum was issued and at that time Germany 
 was fully advised as to the one demand, which 
 Servia could not in justice to its sovereignty accept. 
 In the same letter, Cambon advises his Foreign 
 Office that Germany had already issued the "pre- 
 liminary warning of mobilization, which places 
 Germany in a sort of garde-d-vous during periods 
 of tension."* 
 
 ' French Yellow Book, No. 15. 'Ibid., No. 15.
 
 ii6 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 A further corroboration of Germany's knowledge 
 of the Austrian uhimatum before its issuance is 
 found in a report of the French Minister at Mu- 
 nich to the French Foreign Office, written on the 
 day when the Austrian ultimatum was issued, 
 and a full day before it reached any capital except 
 Berlin and Belgrade. He writes: 
 
 The Bavarian Press appears to believe that a 
 peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian incident is 
 not only possible but even probable. Official circles, 
 on the contrary, for some time past, have displayed 
 with more or less sincerity positive pessimism. 
 
 The Prime Minister notably said to me to-day 
 that the Austrian note, of which he had cognizance, 
 was in his opinion drawn np in terms acceptable to 
 Servia, but that the present situatiofi appeared to him 
 none the less to be very grave. ^ 
 
 As it is unlikely that the Austrian Govern- 
 ment would have dealt directly with the Bavarian 
 Government without similar communications to 
 the German Foreign Office, it follows as a strong 
 probability that the German Foreign Office and 
 probably each of the constituent States of Ger- 
 many knew on July the 23d that Austria in- 
 tended to demand that which Servia had previously 
 indicated its unalterable determination to refuse. 
 Under these circumstances the repeated and in- 
 
 ' French Yellow Book, No. 21.
 
 The Attitude of France 117 
 
 sistent assurances that the German Foreign Office 
 gave to England, France, and Russia that it ''had 
 no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before 
 it was handed in and had not exercised any influ- 
 ence on its contents '^ presents a policy of deception 
 unworthy of a great nation or of the twentieth 
 century. 
 
 It regarded this policy of submarine diplomacy 
 as necessary, not only to throw the other nations off 
 their guard while Germany was arming, but also 
 to support its contention that the quarrel between 
 Servia and Austria was a local quarrel. If it 
 appeared that Germany had instigated Austria 
 in its course, it could not have supported its 
 first contention that the quarrel was a local one 
 and it could not reasonably dispute the right of 
 Russia to intervene. For this purpose the fable 
 was invented. It deceived no one. 
 
 The French Yellow Book discloses another even 
 more amazing feature of this policy of deception, 
 for it shows on the authority of the Italian Foreign 
 Minister that Germany and Austria did not 
 even take their own ally into their confidence. 
 The significance of this fact cannot be over- 
 estimated. Nothing in the whole record more 
 clearly demonstrates the purpose of the German 
 
 ' Ante, p. 36.
 
 ii8 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 and Austrian diplomats to set a trap for the 
 rest of Europe. 
 
 Under the terms of the Triple Alliance it was 
 the duty of each member to submit to its associates 
 all matters which might involve the possibility of 
 joint cooperation. Even if this had not been 
 written in the very terms of the Alliance, it would 
 follow as a necessary impHcation, for when each 
 member obligated itself to cooperate with its 
 allies in any attack upon either of them, but not 
 in an}' aggressive war, it necessarily followed that 
 each ally had the right to the fullest information 
 as to any controversy which might involve such 
 action, so that it might determine whether it fell 
 within the terms of the obligation. 
 
 Neither the German nor the Austrian Foreign 
 Office have ever submitted any documentary proof 
 that they discharged this obHgation to their ally 
 and it may be added they have never pretended 
 that they did so. 
 
 If further proof were needed, we find in the 
 French Yellow Book a report from the French 
 Minister at Rome to his Foreign Office, -under 
 date July the 27th, reporting a conversation be- 
 tween the French Minister and the Italian Foreign 
 Minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano, on that 
 day, in which the latter spoke of the
 
 The Attitude of France 119 
 
 contents of the Austrian note, and assured me 
 that he had had no previous knowledge of them 
 whatever. 
 
 He was well aware that the note was to be vigor- 
 ous and energetic in character, but he had no idea 
 that it could take such a form. I asked him if it 
 was true, as is stated in certain newspapers, that 
 in this connection he had expressed in Vienna ap- 
 proval of Austrian action, and had given the assur- 
 ance that Italy would ftdfill her duties as an ally 
 towards Austria. He replied, "In no way have we 
 been consulted; we have been told nothing whatever. 
 We have therefore had no reason to make any 
 communication of this nature in Vienna." ^ 
 
 The reason for this secrecy is not far to seek. 
 Almost a year before the Archduke's death, Aus- 
 tria had sounded Italy as to its willingness to 
 acquiesce or participate in a war by Austria 
 against Servia, and Italy had refused. For this 
 reason and also because an Austrian war against 
 Servia was not to the interests of Italy, Aus- 
 tria and Germany both recognized, without even 
 consulting their ally, that they could not count 
 upon its cooperation in such a war. To submit 
 their proposed action to Italy was to invite 
 a deliberate expression of disapproval, and this 
 would make it more difficult for them to de- 
 mand its cooperation, if they could carry out 
 
 'French Yellow Book, No. 72.
 
 120 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 their policy of so flouting Russia as to compel it 
 to initiate an aggressive war, as they clearly 
 hoped to do. 
 
 There was, however, another and very practical 
 reason for this failure to consult their ally. We 
 have seen that the whole policy of the Austrian 
 ultimatum was founded upon secrecy. The plan 
 was to give to Europe no possible intimation of 
 the intended action until it was accompHshed and 
 then to give to Europe only twenty-four hours 
 within which to deliberate or act. If as a matter 
 of courtesy Austria and Germany submitted to 
 their ally their proposed course of action, Italy, 
 being wholly opposed to any such unprovoked 
 attack upon Servia, might find a way, either by 
 open and public protest or by dropping a confiden- 
 tial intimation, to advise the other countries as 
 to what was in preparation. This would defeat 
 the principal purpose of Germany and Austria, 
 to force a quick decision and to prepare for 
 eventuahties before any other country could make 
 ready. Germany and Austria therefore wholly 
 ignored their ally and pursued their stealthy policy 
 to its discreditable end. 
 
 When their diplomatic communications are dis- 
 closed in full, this feature of their policy may dis- 
 close some significant admissions.
 
 The Attitude of France 121 
 
 We have already seen {ante, p. 35) that when 
 on July the 20th, three days before the Austrian 
 ultimatum was issued, Sir Edward Grey asked 
 Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in 
 London, as to what news he had from Vienna 
 with reference to the intentions of his country, 
 Prince Lichnowsky affected to be ignorant. But 
 it appears from a letter, which M. Paul Cambon^ 
 wrote to his Foreign Office on July the 24th, 19 14, 
 that Prince Lichnowsky had returned to London 
 from Berlin about a month before and had "dis- 
 played pessimistic views as to the relations between 
 St. Petersburg and Berlin." Cambon adds that 
 the English Foreign Office and his other diplomatic 
 colleagues had all been struck "by the anxious 
 appearance of Prince Lichnowsky since his return 
 from Berlin."^ 
 
 So designedly w^as the Austrian ultimatum 
 withheld from the chancelleries of Europe, other 
 than Vienna and Berlin, that on the day following 
 its issuance at Belgrade, the only information 
 which M. Jules Cambon had of its issuance 
 were the extracts in the press, and he thereupon 
 saw the German Secretary of State and asked 
 him whether such an ultimatum had been sent. 
 
 ' The French Ambassador at London, 
 2 French Yellow Book, No. ^2,
 
 122 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Herr von Jagow replied affirmatively, adding that 
 the note was energetic, and that he approved it, 
 the Servian Government having long since exhausted 
 Austrian patience. He considers, moreover, that 
 for Austria the question is one of a domestic nature, 
 and he hopes that it will be localized. I then said 
 to him that, not having received any instructions, 
 I only wished to have with him an entirely personal 
 exchange of views. I then asked him if the Berlin 
 Cabinet had really been in complete ignorance of 
 the Austrian claims before they were communicated 
 to Belgrade, and as he replied that this was so, I 
 expressed my surprise that he should thus undertake 
 to support pretensions, the limit and nature of 
 which he ignored. 
 
 "It is only," said Herr von Jagow, interrupting 
 me, "because we are talking personally between 
 ourselves that I allow you to say that to me." 
 
 "Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates 
 himself Servia will probably be given over to inter- 
 nal troubles. That will open the door to fresh pos- 
 sibilities, and do you know where Vienna will lead 
 you?" I added that the language of the German 
 Press was not that of a people who were indifferent 
 and foreign to the affair, but told of active support. 
 Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time 
 given to Servia in which to yield would make a bad 
 impression upon Europe. 
 
 Herr von Jagow replied that he expected "un 
 pen d'emotion," on the part of Servia's friends, but 
 that he counted upon their giving Servia good 
 advice. 
 
 "I do not doubt," I then said, "that Russia will 
 make an effort in Belgrade to bring the Cabinet to
 
 The Attitude of France 123 
 
 make what concessions are acceptable, but if you 
 ask something of one, why not ask it of the other ? 
 And if it be expected that advice will be given in 
 Belgrade, is it not legitimate to expect that on the 
 other hand advice will also be tendered to Vienna? " 
 The Secretary of State allowed himself to say 
 that that would depend on circumstances, but, re- 
 covering himself immediately, declared that the 
 matter must be localized. He asked me if really 
 I considered the situation serious. "Assuredly," 
 I replied, "for, if what is going on has been pondered 
 over, I do not understand v/hy people have cut 
 their bridges behind them."^ 
 
 The Yellow Book throws further light upon the 
 extraordinarily petty finesse, with which the chan- 
 celleries of Berlin and Vienna attempted to take 
 a snap judgment upon the rest of Europe. We 
 learn from Exhibit No. 55 that Count Berchtold 
 had given to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, 
 prior to the issuance of the ultimatum, an express 
 assurance "that the claims against Servia would 
 be thoroughly acceptable," and that upon this 
 assurance Coimt Schebeko had left Vienna on a 
 leave of absence. During his absence and at a 
 time when the President of the French Republic, 
 the French Premier, and its Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs were far distant from Paris and on the 
 high seas, the ultimatum was issued, and, as we 
 
 ^French Yellow Book, No. 30.
 
 124 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 have seen, Count Berchtold immediately betook 
 himself to Ischl and remained there until the ex- 
 piration of the brief time limit in the ultimatum. 
 
 The same policy was pursued with reference to 
 other Ambassadors, for when France instructed 
 its representative in Vienna "to call the attention 
 of the Austrian Government to the anxiety aroused 
 in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassa- 
 dor that the tone of the Austrian note and the 
 demands formulated by it permitted one to coimt 
 upon a pacific denouement."* 
 
 In the same communication, in which this infor- 
 mation is embodied, we gain the important infor- 
 mation that "in the Vienna Diplomatic Corps 
 the German Ambassador recommends violent 
 resolutions whilst declaring ostensibly that the 
 Imperial Chancellery is not wholly in agreement 
 with him on this point." 
 
 Pursuant to the same ostrich policy, the Ger- 
 man Secretary of State, as we have previously 
 seen {ante, pp. 71-75), gave to both the French and 
 English Ambassadors the absence of Count Berch- 
 told at Ischl as an excuse for the failure of Ger- 
 many to get any extension of the time limit, and 
 not only did he assure them repeatedly and in 
 the most unequivocal way that the German 
 
 ' French Yellow Book, No. 20.
 
 The Attitude of France 125 
 
 Foreign Office had no knowledge of, or responsi- 
 bility for, the Austrian ultimatum, but when on 
 July the 25th the Russian Charge requested a 
 personal appointment with von Jagow in order 
 to present his country's request for such an exten- 
 sion, the German Secretary of State only gave 
 "him an appointment at the end of the afternoon, 
 that is to say, at the moment when the ultimatum 
 will expire,' and in view of this illusory appoint- 
 ment the Russian Charge (M. Broniowski) 
 
 sent, with all speed, a written note to the Secretary 
 of State, in which he pointed out that the delay of 
 the communication made by Austria to the Powers 
 rendered the effect of the communication illusory, 
 since it did not give the Powers time to become 
 acquainted with the facts alleged before the ex- 
 piry of the ultimatum. He insisted very urgently 
 on the necessity of extending it, if one had not in 
 view the creation of a great crisis.^ 
 
 Thus in Berlin and Vienna by concerted action 
 the representatives of England, France, and Russia 
 were evaded until the time limit for Servia had 
 expired. 
 
 Contrast with this petty finesse the spirit 
 with which Sazonof attempted to reach an agree- 
 ment with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Peters- 
 
 » French Yellow Book, No. 42.
 
 126 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 burg on July 26th, as set forth in the report of 
 the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, under 
 that date. He says: 
 
 The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with 
 praiseworthy perseverance to seek means to bring 
 about a peaceful solution. "I shall show myself 
 ready to negotiate up to the last instant," he said 
 to me. 
 
 It is in this spirit that he has asked Count Szapdry ^ 
 to come and see him for a "frank and loyal expla- 
 nation." In his presence M. Sazonof discussed the 
 Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, 
 showing clearly the insulting character of the differ- 
 ent clauses. "The intention which inspired this 
 document," he said, "is legitimate if you pursue 
 no other aim but the protection of your territory 
 against the agitation of Servian anarchists, but the 
 step to which you have had recourse is not defens- 
 ible." He concluded, "Take back your ultimatum, 
 modif}?- its form, and I will guarantee the result."^ 
 
 Upon one phase of Germany's foreign policy 
 in this crisis the French Yellow Book naturally 
 throws more light than the other publications. I 
 refer to the attempt of Germany to coerce France 
 into a position of neutrality, or possibly to secure 
 from it some definition of its attitude, which would 
 compromise its relations with Russia. The Yel- 
 
 ' The Austrian Ambassador. 
 * French Yellow Book, No. 54.
 
 The Attitude of France 127 
 
 low Book charges that the German Ambassador, 
 imder the pretext of securing an authorized state- 
 ment to the press to allay public excitement, thus 
 attempted to compromise France. The docu- 
 ments go far to suggest this possibility but are 
 not wholly convincing. 
 
 The German Ambassador on July the 24th, the 
 very day that the ultimatum reached the chancel- 
 leries of Europe, and on the day when von Jagow 
 untruthfully claimed that it had first reached Ber- 
 lin, called upon the French Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs and read to him a formal note, of which 
 he was unwilling to leave a copy, although he char- 
 acterized it as a note of importance. 
 
 It may be here noted that on more than one 
 occasion in this diplomatic crisis the German 
 representatives were unwilling to leave a copy of 
 the diplomatic messages which they orally com- 
 municated. 
 
 In his memorandum the French Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs says : 
 
 The German Ambassador especially directed my 
 attention to the last two paragraphs of his note 
 before he read it. He indicated that in them lay 
 the chief point. I took note of the actual text, 
 which is as follows: "The German Government 
 considers that the present question is a matter to 
 be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary
 
 128 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 and Servia, and that the Powers have the greatest 
 interest in restricting it to the two interested parties. 
 The German Government ardently desires the 
 localization of the conflict, since by the natural 
 play of alliances any intervention by another Power 
 would have incalculable consequences." 
 
 I remarked to the German Ambassador that just 
 as it appeared to be legitimate to call for the punish- 
 ment of all those concerned in the crime of Serajevo, 
 on the other hand it seemed difficult to require 
 measures which could not be accepted, having re- 
 gard to the dignity and sovereignty of Servia; the 
 Servian Government, even if it was willing to sub- 
 mit to them, would risk being carried away by a 
 revolution. 
 
 I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen^ that his 
 note only took into account two hypotheses: that 
 of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative 
 attitude on the part of Servia. The third hypothesis 
 (which would leave the door open for an arrange- 
 ment) should also be taken into consideration; that 
 of Servia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once 
 to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the 
 accompHces and full guarantees for the suppression 
 of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were 
 compatible with her sovereignty and dignity. 
 
 I added that if within these limits the satisfaction 
 desired by Austria could be admitted, the means of 
 obtaining it could be examined; if Servia gave obvi- 
 ous proof of goodwill it could not be thought that 
 Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation. 
 
 Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for 
 
 «The German Ambassador.
 
 The Attitude of France 129 
 
 third party Powers, who coiild not either morally 
 or sentimentally cease to take interest in Servia, to 
 take an attitude which was in accord with the 
 wishes of Germany to localize the dispute. 
 
 Herr von Schoen recognized the justice of these 
 considerations and vaguely stated that hope was 
 always possible. When I asked him if we should 
 give to the Austrian note the character of a simple 
 mise en demeure, which permitted a discussion, or 
 an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had 
 no views. ^ 
 
 On the following day the German Ambassador 
 again called at the French Foreign OfKce and 
 protested against an article, which had appeared 
 in a Paris newspaper and w^hich had characterized 
 his communication of the preceding day as the 
 "German menace." The German Ambassador 
 again gave an unequivocal assurance 
 
 that there was no agreement between Austria and 
 Germany over the Austrian note, of which the 
 Germayi Government was ignorant, although the 
 German Government had subsequently approved 
 it on receiving communication of it at the same 
 time as the other Powers.^ 
 
 The hardihood of this statement, in view of the 
 fact that on the preceding day, simultaneously 
 with the service of the ultimatum, the threatening 
 
 ' French Yellow Book, No. 28. ' Ibid. No. 36.
 
 130 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 demand had been delivered by Germany to the 
 leading European chancelleries that the quarrel 
 between Austria and Servia must be locaHzed, 
 is apparent. Baron von Schoen, the German 
 Ambassador, then denied that his suggestion of 
 "incalculable consequences," if the dispute were 
 not localized, was a "menace." This statement, 
 repeated by German diplomats in other capitals^ 
 approaches the ludicrous. The first military 
 power of Europe formally advises other nations 
 that unless they v^aive their legitimate claims and 
 interests, "incalculable consequences" will follow, 
 and it is gravely suggested that this is not a 
 "menace." 
 
 On the following day Baron von Schoen made 
 two visits at the French Foreign Office and assured 
 the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that 
 
 Germany was on the side of France in the ardent de- 
 sire for the maintenance of peace, and she earnestly 
 hoped that France would use her influence in a 
 soothing manner in St. Petersburg. 
 
 I replied to this suggestion that Russia was 
 moderate, that she had committed no act throwing 
 doubt upon her moderation, and that we were in 
 agreement with her in seeking for a peaceful solution 
 of the struggle. It therefore appeared to me that in 
 counterpart Germany should act in Vienna, where 
 the efficacy of her action was sure, with a view to
 
 The Attitude of France 131 
 
 avoiding military operations tending to the occupa- 
 tion of Servia. 
 
 The Ambassador having pointed out to me that 
 that was irreconcilable with the position adopted 
 by Germany, "that the question only concerned 
 Austria and Servia," I said to him that mediation 
 in Vienna and St. Petersburg might be made by the 
 four Powers who were less directly interested in the 
 matter. 
 
 Baron von Schoen then sheltered himself behind 
 his lack of instructions on this point, and I told him 
 that in these circumstances I did not feel able to 
 act in St. Petersburg alone. 
 
 Our conversation concluded with the renewed 
 assurance by the Ambassador as to the peaceful 
 intentions of Germany, who, he declared, was with 
 France on this point. ^ 
 
 The incident now followed, w^hich suggested to 
 the French Foreign office a subtle attempt of 
 Germany to compromise the relations of France 
 with Russia by imputing disloyalty to the former. 
 On his second visit a few hours later, Baron von 
 Schoen desired the French Foreign Office to give 
 to the public a statement with reference to the 
 preceding interview, and suggested the following, 
 which he dictated to the French official: 
 
 "The German Ambassador and the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs had a further interview in the course 
 of the afternoon, during which they examined, in 
 
 ^ French Yellow Book, No. 56.
 
 132 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 the most friendly spirit and with a feeling of pacific 
 solidarity, the means which might he employed for 
 the maintenance of general peace.'' 
 
 The Acting Political Director at once replied: 
 "Then, in your mind, everything is settled, and 
 you give us the assurance that Austria accepts the 
 Servian note, or will be willing to converse with the 
 Powers with regard to it?" 
 
 The Ambassador appeared to be taken aback, 
 and made a vigorous denial. It was therefore 
 pointed out to him that if nothing had changed in 
 the negative attitude of Germany, the terms of the 
 suggested "note to the Press" were excessive, and 
 likely to give French opinion a false feeling of 
 security by creating illusions as to the actual situ- 
 ation, the dangers of which were but too evident. ^ 
 
 It is not surprising that the French Foreign 
 Office looked askance at these German suggestions 
 of "pacific solidarity" with France, which con- 
 trasted so strangely with Germany's refusal to 
 work for peace and its sinister menaces to other 
 countries. France's suspicion that Baron von 
 Schoen was thus attempting to compromise its 
 loyalty in the eyes of Russia cannot be said to be 
 without some foundation, although it is as reason- 
 able to assume that these professions of the Ger- 
 man Ambassador were only an incident to the 
 general plan of lulling France and its allies into 
 
 'French Yellow Book, No. 57.
 
 The Attitude of France 133 
 
 a false sense of security. Here again the full 
 truth can only be ascertained when Germany is 
 willing to submit to the scrutiny of the world the 
 records of its Foreign Office. 
 
 On July 26th, IM. Jules Cambon had an inter- 
 view with the German Secretary of State and 
 earnestly supported Sir Edward Grey's suggestion 
 that a conference be called in which England, 
 France, Germany, and Italy should participate 
 for the preservation of peace. This interview is 
 at once so dramatic, and almost prophetic, that 
 it justifies quotation in extenso: 
 
 To Cambon's proposition, von Jagow replied, as 
 he did to the British Ambassador, that he could not 
 accept a proposal to charge the Italian, French, and 
 German Ambassadors with the task of seeking, 
 with Sir Edward Grey, a means of solving the 
 present difficulties, for that would be to establish a 
 regular conference to deal with the affairs of Austria 
 and Russia. I replied to Herr von Jagow that I 
 regretted his response, but that the great object, 
 which Sir Edward Grey had in view, was above a 
 question of form, and what was important was the 
 association of England and France with Germany 
 and Italy in laboring for peace; that this associa- 
 tion could show itself in common action in St. Peters- 
 burg and Vienna; that he had frequently expressed 
 to me his regret at seeing the two groups of alliances 
 always opposed to each other in Europe, and that 
 here he had an opportunity of proving that there
 
 134 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 was a European spirit, by showing four Powers 
 belonging to the two groups acting in common 
 agreement to prevent a struggle. Herr von Jagow 
 evaded the matter by saying that Germany had 
 her engagements with Austria. / pointed out that 
 the relations of Germany with Vienna were no more 
 close than those of France with Russia, and that it 
 was he himself who raised the question of the two 
 opposed groups of alliances. 
 
 The Secretary of State then said that he did not 
 refuse to act with a view to avoiding an Austro- 
 Russian conflict, but that he could not intervene 
 in the Austro-Servian conflict. "One is the con- 
 sequence of the other," I said, "and it would be 
 well to prevent the creation of any new state of 
 affairs calculated to bring about the intervention of 
 Russia." 
 
 As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that 
 he was obliged to observe his engagements with 
 regard to Austria, / asked him if he had pledged 
 himself to follow Austria everywhere blindfold, and 
 if he had made himself acquainted with the Servian 
 reply to Austria, which had been handed to him 
 that morning by the Servian Charge d'affaires. 
 "7 have not yet had time'' he said. "I regret it," I 
 replied. "You will see that except on points of 
 detail Servia has yielded completely. It would 
 seem, however, that since Austria has obtained the 
 satisfaction, which your support procured her, you 
 might to-day advise her to be content, or to examine 
 with Servia the terms of the Servian reply." 
 
 As Herr von Jagow did not answer me clearly, 
 I asked him if Germ.any wanted war. He protested 
 energetically, saying that he knew that that was
 
 r The Attitude of France 135 
 
 ■my idea but that it was completely incorrect. 
 * *'You must then," I replied, "act in consequence. 
 When yon read the Servian reply, weigh the terms with 
 your conscience, I beg you in the name of humanity, 
 and do not personally assume a portion of the respon- 
 sibility jor the catastrophe, whose preparation you 
 are allowing.'' Herr von Jagow protested again, 
 adding that he was ready to join England and 
 France in any common effort, but that some form 
 must be found for this intervention which he could 
 accept and that the Cabinets should agree among 
 themselves upon the matter. "Moreover," he 
 added, "direct conversations between Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg are begun and are proceeding. I 
 expect much good of them, and I have hope."' 
 
 In his solemn injunction to von Jagow "^'w the 
 name of humanity'' to weigh the terms in his con- 
 science, Cambon struck a loftier note than any 
 of the diplomatic disputants. Macaulay has 
 said that the "French mind has always been the 
 interpreter between national ideas and those of 
 universal mankind," and at least since the French 
 Revolution the tribute has been deserved. 
 
 He, who carefully and dispassionately reads the 
 diplomatic correspondence which preceded the 
 war, must be impressed with the different point of 
 view of the two groups of disputants. Both the 
 written and oral communications of the German 
 
 'French Yellow Book, No. 74.
 
 136 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 and Austrian representatives failed to suggest at 
 any time a note other than one of selfish national- 
 ism. We search in vain for the most distant rec- 
 ognition of the fact that the world at large had any 
 legitimate interest in the controversy. The insis- 
 tent note, which Austria sounded, was that its in- 
 terests required its punitive action against Servia, 
 even though the peace of the world were thereby 
 sacrificed, and that of Germany repeated with 
 equal insistence that its "closest interests" sum- 
 moned it to the side of Austria. 
 
 In marked contrast to this spirit of national 
 selfishness is the repeated admonition of Sir 
 Edward Grey that the whole question should 
 be considered in its "larger aspects," thereby 
 meaning the peace and welfare of Europe; while 
 the Czar, with evident sincerity, suggested to 
 the Kaiser that "with the aid of God it must be 
 possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the 
 shedding of blood," and proposed a reference of 
 the question to the Hague. Similarly the appeal 
 of Jules Cambon to von Jagow, "in the name of 
 humanity" was more than the ordinary exchange 
 of diplomatic views. Von Jagow's conception of 
 his duty is shown by the fact that he had taken 
 a position involving "incalculable consequences" 
 without even reading the Servian reply.
 
 The Attitude of France 137 
 
 Cambon approved himself a worthy "yoke 
 fellow in equity" with Sir Edward Grey, and no 
 loftier tone was sounded by any participant in 
 this great controversy, unless we except Goschen's 
 solemn statement to von Bethmann-Hollweg in 
 the equally dramatic interview, which succeeded 
 the rupture of relations between England and 
 Germany, when Goschen stated that "it was so 
 to speak a matter of life and death for the honor 
 of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn 
 engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's 
 neutrality if attacked," and added, "that fear of 
 consequences could hardly be regarded as an 
 excuse for breaking solemn promises."
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE INTERVENTION OF THE KAISER 
 
 The Kaiser now appears upon the scene with a 
 fatal result to the peace of Europe. One fact in 
 this controversy is too clear for dispute. When 
 peace proposals were still under consideration and 
 some slight progress had been made by the 
 eleventh -hoiu: consent of Austria on July 31 to 
 discuss with Russia the merits of the Servian 
 question, the Kaiser — like Brennus with his vcb 
 victis — threw his sword into the trembling scales 
 and definitely turned the balance against the 
 peace of the world. 
 
 Was it a reluctant Caesar who thus crossed the 
 Rubicon, at whose fateful margin he had stood at 
 other crises of his peaceful reign without destroying 
 that peace? 
 
 Our information is still too meager to justify a 
 satisfactory answer at this time. Not only are 
 the premises in dispute, but the inferences from 
 admitted premises are too conflicting. 
 
 At the time the Austrian Archduke was mur- 
 138
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 139 
 
 dei-ed the Kaiser was in Berlin, and he at once 
 showed an intense interest in the event and in all 
 that it portended. It was officially announced 
 that he planned to attend the funeral in Vienna, 
 but later the world was advised that he had 
 suffered a "chill," which would prevent such 
 attendance. Perhaps it w^as a diplomatic chill. 
 He then left for Norway, where he remained in 
 the enjoyment of his annual holiday until the 
 evening of July 26th, when he suddenly returned 
 to his Capitol. 
 
 Evidently his return was imexpected, for we 
 Icam from a telegram from Sir H. Rumbold to 
 Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26th, that, 
 
 the Emperor returned suddenly to-night and [the 
 German] Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs says that the Foreign Office regrets this 
 step which was taken on His Majesty's own initia- 
 tive. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return 
 may cause speculation and excitement. 
 
 As the refusal of Austria to accept the Servian 
 reply and its severance of all diplomatic relations 
 with that country had already thrown the entire 
 world into a state of feverish anxiety, it is difficult 
 to understand why the German Foreign Office 
 should have felt that the very natural return of the 
 Kaiser to his Capitol at one of the greatest crises
 
 140 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 in the history of his country and of the world should 
 be regarded as giving rise to "speculation and ex- 
 citement," especially as the President of the 
 French RepubHc was hastening back to Paris. 
 
 The Under-Secretary of State's deprecation of 
 the Kaiser's return suggests the possibility that 
 the German Foreign Office, which had already 
 made substantial progress in precipitating the 
 crisis, did not wish the Kaiser's return for fear 
 that he might again exert, as in the Moroccan 
 crisis, his great influence in the interests of peace. 
 It felt that it had the matter well in hand, but 
 never before did a foreign office blunder so fla- 
 grantly and with such disastrous results. From 
 beginning to end every anticipation that the 
 German Chancellor had was falsified by events. 
 This discreditable and blundering chapter of Ger- 
 man diplomacy is enough to make the bones of 
 the sagacious Bismarck turn in his grave. 
 
 As appears from Sir M. de Bunsen's dispatch 
 to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26th, it was the 
 confident belief of the German diplomats that 
 " Russia will keep quiet during the chastisement of 
 Servia," and that "France too was not at all in a 
 position for facing the war. " ' 
 
 When the full history of this imbroglio is written, 
 
 ' English White Paper, No. 32.
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 141 
 
 it will probably be found that the extensive labor 
 troubles in St. Petersburg, the military unpre- 
 paredness of Russia and France, and the political 
 schism in England, then verging to civil war, had 
 deeply impressed both Vienna and Berlin that the 
 dual alliance could impose its will upon Europe 
 with reference to Servia without any serious risk 
 of a European war. 
 
 While for these reasons Germany and Austria 
 may not have regarded such a war or the inter- 
 vention of England therein as probable, yet the 
 dual alliance recognized from the outset such a 
 possibility. The uncertainty as to the Kaiser's 
 attitude with respect to such a war may there- 
 fore explain the "regret," with which the German 
 Foreign Office witnessed his sudden and iminvited 
 return. 
 
 On his return the diplomatic negotiations, which 
 had commenced with an allegro con brio, for a 
 time changed under the baton of the Imperial 
 Conductor into a more peaceful andante, until the 
 Kaiser made one of his characteristically sudden 
 changes of purpose and precipitated the war by 
 an arrogant ultimatum to Russia, which that 
 country could not possibly accept without a fatal 
 sacrifice of its self-respect and prestige as a nation. 
 
 If it be true — and the future may demonstrate
 
 142 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 it — that this war was planned by Germany at 
 least as far back as the Moroccan crisis, then the 
 Kaiser's responsibility for the commencement of 
 the quarrel cannot be doubted. It is inconceiv- 
 able that the German Foreign Office could pursue 
 for three years the policy of precipitating a Euro- 
 pean war without the knowledge and consent of 
 the "Over War Lord." 
 
 When full data are accessible as to the importa- 
 tions by Germany in advance of the war, as to its 
 withdrawal of foreign credits and placing of 
 foreign loans, its sales of stocks by influential 
 investors, and its importations on the eve of the 
 war of horses and foodstuffs, a strong circumstan- 
 tial case may be developed of a deliberate purpose 
 to retrieve the Moroccan fiasco by an audacious 
 coup which would determine the mastery of Eu- 
 rope. The levy in 19 13 of an extraordinary'- tax 
 upon capital, which virtually confiscated the earn- 
 ings of the German people for military purposes, 
 adds much support to this contention. According 
 to Giolitti, the former Italian Premier, Austria 
 sounded Italy in August, 1913, as to its willingness 
 to participate in a war against Servia. ^ 
 
 The inferences to be drawTi from the Kaiser's 
 personality are somewhat conflicting. Like all 
 
 'Giolitti Speech, Italian Chamber, Dec. 5, I9I4'
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 143 
 
 self-centered and highly neurotic personalities, his 
 nature is essentially a dual one. This does not 
 mean that he is in any sense a hypocrite, for one 
 of the engaging features of his attractive person- 
 ality has been the candor and sincerity which 
 have marked nearly all his public acts. He has, 
 shown himself to be a man of opposite moods, and 
 conflicting purposes, having almost as many 
 public poses as he has costumes, and a strong 
 desire to play as many varied roles as possible on 
 the stage of the world. Like Bottom in the 
 Midsummer Night's Dream, he would play all 
 parts from the "roaring lion" to the shrinking 
 Thisbe. 
 
 The ruler who sent a sympathetic message to 
 Kruger as an insult to England is he who shortly 
 thereafter gratuitously submitted to Queen Vic- 
 toria military plans for the subjugation of the 
 Boers. 
 
 The ruler, who sent the PantJier to Agadir, later 
 restrained his country from declaring war against 
 England, when Lloyd George threw down the 
 gauntlet in his Mansion House speech in the 
 Moroccan crisis. 
 
 As preacher, the Kaiser exalted within sight of 
 the Mount of Olives the precepts of Christian 
 humility, and yet advised his soldiers, on their
 
 144 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 departiire to China, to "take no prisoners and give 
 no quarter." The most affable and democratic 
 monarch on occasion will in another mood assume 
 the outworn toggery of mediaeval absolutism. A 
 democratic business monarch, and as such the 
 advance agent of German prosperity, he yet 
 shocks the common sense and awakens the ridicule 
 of the world by posing as a combination of Cassar 
 and Mahomet. 
 
 The avowed champion of Christianity, who has 
 preached with the fervor of Peter the Hermit 
 against the Yellow Race, he has nevertheless, since 
 this war began, instigated the Sultan of Turkey to 
 proclaim in the Moslem world a "holy war " against 
 his Christian enemies. 
 
 Pacific and bellicose by turns the monarch, who 
 throughout his whole reign has hitherto kept the 
 peace of the world, has yet on slight pretext given 
 utterance to the most warlike and incendiary 
 statements. 
 
 How is it possible to draw any inference from 
 such a personality, of whom it could be said, as 
 Sydney Smith once said of Lord John Russell, that 
 
 there is nothing he would not undertake. I believe 
 he would perform an operation for stone, build St. 
 Peter's, assume (with or without ten minutes' no- 
 tice) the command of the Channel Fleet, and no one
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 145 
 
 would discover from his manner that the patient had 
 died, that St. Peter's had tumbled down, and that 
 the Channel Fleet had been knocked to atoms. 
 
 We should therefore dismiss all inferences sug- 
 gested by his complex personality and should judge 
 him by what he did from the time that he suddenly 
 arrived in Berlin on July 26th, until the issuance 
 by his direct order of the fatal ultimatum to 
 Russia, 
 
 Before proceeding to analyze the very interest- 
 ing and dramatic correspondence, which passed 
 between the nders of Germany, England, and 
 Russia — doubly interesting because of the family 
 relationship and the unusual personal and cousinly 
 intimacy of these dispatches — it is well to inquire 
 what the Kaiser could have done that would have 
 immediately avoided the crisis and saved the 
 situation. So far as the published record goes, 
 he did not send a single telegram in the interests 
 of peace to his illustrious ally, the Emperor 
 Francis Joseph. 
 
 Let us suppose that he had sent the following: 
 
 I have just returned to Berlin and find Europe 
 on the verge of war. I sympathize entirely with 
 you and your country in its demands upon Servia. 
 I agree with you that the Servian repl}^ is not satis- 
 factory. In accordance with the obligations of our
 
 146 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 alliance, I shall in any event support with the full 
 power of the German sword the cause of Austria. 
 Servia has by its reply admitted its responsibility 
 for the murder of the Archduke and has unreserv- 
 edly accepted certain of your demands, and as to 
 others has agreed to submit them either to The 
 Hague Tribunal for arbitration, or to a concert of 
 Powers. You will decide whether Austria is satis- 
 fied to accept either of these suggestions, but as 
 England, France, and Russia have asked that time 
 be granted to consider a peaceful and satisfactory 
 solution of the difficulty, and as the questions 
 reserved by Servia can be used as the basis for 
 further discussion without prejudice to the rights 
 of Austria, and as it is to the interest of every 
 country and the entire world that its peace should 
 not be broken unnecessarily, I shall be gratified if 
 you can agree that a reasonable time shall be granted 
 as a matter of courtesy to Russia, England, and 
 France, in order that it may be determined upon 
 due consideration whether it is not possible to 
 preserve peace without sacrificing in any respect the 
 legitimate demands of Austria, which have my full 
 sympathy and support. 
 
 WiLHELM. 
 
 Would the Austrian Emperor, himself a noble- 
 minded and peace-loving monarch, have refused 
 this reasonable request? A little time, a Httle 
 patience and some forbearance for the rights of 
 other States and the youth of Europe need not 
 have perished. Again, "the pity of it."
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 147 
 
 In its place the following correspondence took 
 place between the Kaiser on the one hand and the 
 Czar and King George on the other. It is so 
 dramatic that it justifies quotation m extenso.. 
 
 On the night of July 28th, the Kaiser sent the 
 following dispatch to the Czar: 
 
 I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the 
 impression which is caused by the action of Austria- 
 Hungary against Servia. The unscrupiilous agita- 
 tion which has been going on for years in Servia 
 has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke 
 Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit 
 which made the Servians murder their own King 
 and his consort still dominates that country. 
 Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, 
 You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a 
 common interest to insist that all those who are 
 responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer 
 their deserved punishment. 
 
 On the other hand I by no means overlook the 
 difficulty encountered by You and Yoirr Govern- 
 ment to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of 
 the cordial friendship which has joined us both for 
 a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire 
 influence to mduce Austria-Hungary to obtain a 
 frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. 
 I hope confidently that You will support me in my 
 efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet 
 arise. ^ 
 
 ■ Gemian While Paper, No. 20. The Capitals to the pronouns 
 follow the original correspondence.
 
 148 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 This telegram rings true, and fairly suggests a 
 pacific attitude on the part of the Kaiser when he 
 first took the helm on his return from Norway. 
 Its weakness lies in the fact that the record, as 
 presented by the German Government, does not 
 disclose any communication which he sent to his 
 Austrian ally in the interests of peace. We have 
 the frequent assurances of the Kaiser to the Czar 
 that he was exerting all his influence to induce his 
 ally to come to a satisfactory understanding with 
 Russia, but neither over the signature of the Kaiser 
 nor over that of his Foreign Minister does the record 
 show a single communication addressed to Vienna in 
 the interests of peace. 
 
 The Czar did not fail to appreciate this, and his 
 reply to the Kaiser rings quite as true and suggests 
 the crux of the whole problem. It reads: 
 
 I am glad that You are back in Germany. In 
 this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. 
 An ignominious war has been declared against a 
 weak country, and in Russia the indignation, which I 
 fully share, is tremendous. I fear that very soon I 
 shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon 
 me and that I shall be forced to take measures 
 which will lead to war. To prevent such a calamity 
 as a European war would be, I urge You in the 
 name of our old friendship to do all in Your power to 
 restrain Your ally from going too far.^ 
 ' German White Paper, No. 21.
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 149 
 
 Who can deny the force of the sentence thus 
 itaUcized? It was Austria which was the provoca- 
 tive factor. It was then bombarding Belgrade 
 and endeavoring to cross the Danube into Servia. 
 It had declared war, and brusquely refused even 
 to discuss the question with Russia. It was 
 mobiHzing its army, and making every effort to 
 make a speedy subjugation of Servia. If peace 
 was to be preserved, the pressure must begin with 
 Austria. If any question remained for peace par- 
 leys, the status quo must be preserved. Russia 
 could not permit Austria to destroy Servia first and 
 then discuss its justice. 
 
 Thereupon the Kaiser telegraphed the Czar as 
 follows : 
 
 I have received Your telegram and I share Your 
 desire for the conservation of peace. However I 
 cannot — as I told You in my first telegram — 
 consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an "ig- 
 nominious war." Austria-Hungary knows from 
 experience that the promises of Servia as long as 
 they arc merely on paper are entirely unreliable. 
 
 According to my opinion the action of Austria- 
 Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive 
 full guaranty that the promises of Servia are effec- 
 tively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am 
 strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian 
 Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no terri- 
 torial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore
 
 150 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to 
 remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war with- 
 out drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has 
 ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is 
 possible and desirable between Your Government 
 and Vienna, an understanding which — as I have 
 already telegraphed You — my Government en- 
 deavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally 
 military measures by Russia, which might be 
 construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would 
 accelerate a calamity which both of us desire 
 to avoid and would undermine my position as 
 mediator which — upon Your appeal to my friendship 
 and aid — I willingly accepted.^ 
 
 The Kaiser's fatal error lies in the concluding 
 paragraph of this telegram, in claiming that Russia 
 should not take any military measures pending the 
 Kaiser's mediation, although Austria should be left 
 free not merely to make such preparations against 
 Russia, but to pursue its aggressive war then already 
 commenced against Servia. If the belligerents were 
 expected to desist from military preparations, 
 should not the obligation be reciprocal? 
 
 Later that night the Kaiser again telegraphed 
 the Czar: 
 
 My Ambassador has instructions to direct the 
 attention of Your Government to the dangers and 
 serious consequences of a mobilization; I have told 
 ' German White Paper, No. ."?. See note, pnst., p. 189.
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 151 
 
 You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hun- 
 gary has mobilized only against Servia, and only a 
 part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be tiie 
 case according to Your advice and that of Your 
 Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, 
 the part of the mediator, with which You have 
 entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I 
 have accepted upon Your express desire, is threat- 
 ened if not made impossible. The entire weight of 
 decision now rests upon Your shoulders. You have 
 to bear the responsibility for war or peace. ^ 
 
 To which the Czar replied as follows : 
 
 I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. 
 I am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary 
 aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The military 
 measures now taking form were decided upon five 
 days ago, and for the reason of defense against the 
 preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart 
 that these measures will not influence in any 
 manner Your position as mediator which I appraise 
 very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon 
 Austria so that an understanding can he arrived at 
 with us.^ 
 
 Later the Czar again telegraphed the Kaiser: 
 
 I thank You cordially for Your mediation which 
 permits the hope that everything may yet end 
 peaceably. It is technically impossible to discon- 
 tinue our military preparations which have been 
 
 ' German White Paper, No. 23. 
 * German White Paper, No. 23 A.
 
 152 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is 
 far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations 
 between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will 
 undertake no provocative action. I give You my 
 solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith 
 in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of 
 Your m.ediation in Vienna for the welfare of our 
 countries and the peace of Europe. 
 
 What more could the Kaiser reasonably ask? 
 Here was an assurance from the ruler of a great 
 nation, and his royal cousin, that on his " solemn 
 word" no provocative action would be taken by 
 Russia "as long as the negotiations betw^een Austria 
 and Servia continue" and this notwithstanding the 
 fact that Austria had flouted and ignored Russia, 
 had declared war against Servia and was then 
 endeavoring to subjugate it quickly by bombarding 
 its capital and invading its territory with superior 
 forces. 
 
 It is true that the Czar did not order demobihza- 
 tion, and apart from his unquestioned right to 
 prepare for eventualities in the event of the failure 
 of the peace parleys, the Kaiser himself recognized 
 in a later telegram that in the case of Germany 
 when mobilization had once been started it could 
 not be immediately arrested. 
 
 Simultaneously King George had telegraphed 
 the Kaiser through Prince Henry as follows:
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 153 
 
 Thanks for Your telegram; so pleased to hear of 
 William's efforts to concert with Nicky to maintain 
 peace. Indeed I am earnestly desirous that such 
 an irreparable disaster as a European war should 
 be averted. My Government is doing its utmost 
 suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further 
 military preparations if Austria will consent to be 
 satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neigh- 
 boring Servian territory as a hostage for satis- 
 factory settlement of her demands ; other countries 
 meanwhile suspending their war preparations. 
 Trust William will use his great influence to induce 
 Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that 
 Germany and England are working together to 
 prevent what would be an international catastrophe. 
 Pray assure William I am doing and shall continue 
 to do all that lies in my power to preserve peace of 
 Europe.* 
 
 The fairness of this proposal can hardly be 
 disputed. It conceded to Austria the right to 
 occupy the capital of Servia and hold it as a 
 hostage for a satisfactory adjustment of her 
 demands and even to continue her military 
 preparations, while all other nations, including 
 Russia, were to suspend their military preparations. 
 As the Kaiser precipitated the war because Russia 
 would not cease its preparations for eventualities, 
 King George's proposal, upon which neither the 
 
 ' Second German White Paper.
 
 154 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Kaiser nor his government ever acted, fully met 
 his demands. 
 
 To this the Kaiser replied on July 31st: 
 
 Many thanks for kind telegram. Your proposals 
 coincide with My ideas and with the statements I 
 got this night from Vienna which I have had 
 forwarded to London. I just received news from 
 Chancellor that official notification has just reached 
 him that this night Nicky has ordered the mobiliza- 
 tion of his whole army and fleet. He has not even 
 awaited the results of the mediation I am working at, 
 and left Me without any news. I am off for Berlin 
 to take measures for ensuring safety of My eastern 
 frontiers where strong Russian troops are already 
 posted.' 
 
 On its face this reply seems not unreasonable, 
 but it must not be forgotten that Austria con- 
 tinued not only to bombard Belgrade but to 
 mobilize its armies against Russia as well as Servia. 
 Russia agreed to stop all military preparations, if 
 Austria would consent to discuss the Servian 
 question with a view to peace. Austria until the 
 eleventh hour — when it was too late — refused even 
 to discuss the Servian question and never offered 
 either to demobilize or to cease its attack upon 
 Servia. Germany upheld her in this unwarrant- 
 able course. 
 
 ' Second German White Paper.
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 155 
 
 Wliile in principle the Kaiser agreed with the 
 King as to the method of adjustment, there is 
 nothing in the record to indicate that the Kaiser 
 ever made any suggestion to his ally that it should 
 stop its operations against Servia after capturing 
 Belgrade, and await the adjustment of the ques- 
 tions through diplomatic channels. 
 
 Thereupon King George sent a brief telegram, 
 stating that he had sent an urgent telegram to the 
 Czar urging this course. Later on July 31st the 
 Kaiser sent the following telegram to the Czar: 
 
 Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your 
 request for my aid I have engaged in mediation 
 between Your Government and the Government of 
 Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking 
 place, Your troops were being mobilized against my 
 ally, Austria-Hungary, whe^eb3^ as I have already 
 communicated to You, my mediation has become 
 almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued 
 it, and now I receive reliable news that serious 
 preparations for war are going on on my eastern 
 frontier. The responsibility for the security of my 
 country forces me to measures of defense. I have 
 gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my 
 efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. 
 It is not I who bear the responsibility for the mis- 
 fortune which now threatens the entire civilized 
 world. It rests in Your hand to avert it. No one 
 threatens the honor and peace of Russia wlich 
 might well have awaited the success of mv media-
 
 156 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 tion. The friendship for You and Your country, 
 bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his death- 
 bed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood 
 faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, 
 especially during its last war. The peace of Europe 
 can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to 
 discontinue those military preparations which menace 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary . 
 
 In this fair-spoken message we unhappily find 
 no suggestion that Austria would stop its mobil- 
 ization, or its mihtary operations against Ser- 
 via. The untenable position of the Kaiser, to 
 which he adhered wdth fatal consistency to the 
 end, was that Austria should be given the full 
 right to mobiHze against Russia as w^ell as Servia, 
 and that his ally should even be permitted to 
 press its aggressive operations against Servia by 
 taking possession of its capital and holding it as 
 a ransom. In the meantime Russia should not 
 make any military preparations, either to move 
 effectually against Austria in the event of the 
 failure of negotiations, or even to defend itself. 
 
 The Kaiser's suggestion did not even carry 
 with it the implication that Germany would stop 
 the military preparations that it was then carry- 
 ing on in feverish haste, so that the contention 
 of the Kaiser, however plausibly it was veiled 
 in his telegram, was that Germany and Austria
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 157 
 
 should have full freedom to prepare for war against 
 Russia, while Russia was to tie its hands and await 
 the outcome of further parleys, with Austrian cannon 
 bombarding Belgrade. 
 
 In this correspondence the Kaiser displayed 
 his recognized ability as a writer and speaker, for 
 in this rapid-fire exchange of telegrams the Kaiser 
 was easily the better controversialist. 
 
 He assumed the role of a disinterested party, 
 who, at the request of a litigant, agrees to become an 
 impartial mediator. He was neither. The Czar 
 had not asked him to be a mediator, although in 
 the later telegrams the Russian monarch accepted 
 that term. The Czar in his first telegram had 
 asked the Kaiser as a party to the quarrel "to 
 restrain your ally from going too f ar. " The Kaiser, 
 having adroitly accepted a very different role, 
 promptly shifts the responsibility upon the Czar 
 of embarrassing the so-called "mediation." This 
 enabled him to assume the attitude of "injured 
 innocence" and very skillfully he played that part. 
 
 This at least is clear that in this correspondence 
 the Kaiser was either guilty of insincerity or he 
 betrayed a fatal incapacity to grasp the essentials 
 of the quarrel. I prefer the latter construction of 
 his conduct. Against the bellicose efforts of his 
 Foreign Office and his General Staff, I believe that
 
 158 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 for dynastic reasons he strove for a time to adjust 
 the difficulty, but his egomania and his Hfe-long 
 habit of personal absolutism blinded him to the 
 fact that he was taking an untenable, indeed an 
 impossible, position, in contending that Russia 
 should effectually tie its hands while Germany and 
 Austria should be left free to prepare for eventu- 
 alities. Had there been a breathing spell and 
 the Kaiser had had more time for reflection, pos- 
 sibly the unreasonableness of his contention would 
 have suggested itself, but he found on his sudden 
 return from Norway that his country, through the 
 fatuous folly of its miHtary party, was almost 
 irrevocably committed to war. Probably he did 
 not dare to reverse openly and formally its policy. 
 His popularity had already suffered in the Moroc- 
 can crisis. This consideration and the histrionic 
 side to his complex personality betrayed him into 
 his untenable and fatal position. 
 
 The Kaiser has hitherto been regarded as a man 
 of exceptional ability. Time and the issue of this 
 war will tell. The verdict of history may be to the 
 contrary. The world for a time may easily con- 
 fuse restless energy and habitual meddling with 
 real ability, but its final verdict will go far deeper. 
 Since the Kaiser dropped his sagacious pilot, 
 Germany's real position in the world has steadily
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 159 
 
 weakened. Then it was the first power in Europe 
 with its rivals disunited. The Kaiser has united 
 his enemies with "hoops of steel," driven Russia 
 and England into a close alliance, forced Italy- 
 out of the Triple Alliance, and as the only com- 
 pensation for these disastrous results, he has gained 
 the doubtful cooperation of moribund Turkey, 
 of which he is likely to say before many months 
 are over: "Who shall deliver me from the body 
 of this death?" 
 
 In the meantime, Germany was not idle in its 
 preparations for eventualities. 
 
 The Kaiser and his counsellors were alread}^ 
 definitely planning for the war, and were taking 
 steps to alienate England from her Allies and 
 secure her neutrality. To insure this, the German 
 Chancellor, having visited the Kaiser at Pots- 
 dam, sent for the British Ambassador, and made 
 the following significant ofTer: 
 
 ^ I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. 
 His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam. 
 
 He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia 
 a European conflagration might, he feared, become 
 inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as 
 Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to 
 maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the 
 following strong bid for British neutrality. He said 
 that it was clear, so far a« he was able to judge the 
 ' Sir E. Goschen.
 
 i6o The Evidence in the Case 
 
 main principle which governed British policy, that 
 Great Britain would never stand by and allow 
 France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. 
 That, however, was not the object at which Germany 
 aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain 
 were certain, every assurance would be given to the 
 British Government that the Imperial Government 
 aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense 
 of France, should they prove victorious in any war 
 that might ensue. 
 
 I questioned his Excellency about the French 
 colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a 
 similar undertaking in that respect. As regards 
 Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so 
 long as Germany's adversaries respected the in- 
 tegrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany 
 was ready to give his Majesty's Government an 
 assurance that she would do likewise. It depended 
 upon the action of France what operations Germany 
 might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when 
 the war was over Belgian integrity would be 
 respected if she had not sided against Germany. 
 
 His Excellency ended by saying that ever since 
 he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had 
 been, as you were aware, to bring about an under- 
 standing with England; he trusted that these 
 assurances might form the basis of that understand- 
 ing which he so much desired. He had in mind a 
 general neutrality agreement between England and 
 Germany, though it was, of course, at the present 
 moment too early to discuss details, and an assur- 
 ance of British neutrality in the conflict which the 
 present crisis might possibly produce, would enable 
 him to look forward to a realization of his desire.
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser i6i 
 
 In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought 
 his request would appeal to you, I said that I did 
 not think it probable that at this stage of events 
 you would care to bind yourself to any course of 
 action and that I was of opinion that you would 
 desire to retain full liberty. * 
 
 While the German Foreign Office was thus 
 endeavoring to keep England neutral, its army 
 was on the move against France. This does not 
 rest upon vague allegation, but upon the detailed 
 specifications in a communication from the French 
 Foreign Office, which the French Ambassador in 
 London submitted to Sir Edward Grey on July 
 31st. Its significance is apparent when it is re- 
 membered that simultaneously the Kaiser was in- 
 voking the Czar to demobilize his armies, and cease 
 military preparations. 
 
 The German army had its advance posts on our 
 frontiers yesterday (Friday). German patrols 
 twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance 
 posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilometers 
 from the frontier. The local population is protest- 
 ing against being thus abandoned to the attack 
 of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes 
 to make it clear to public opinion and to the British 
 Government that in no case will France be the 
 aggressor. The whole i6th Corps from Metz, 
 reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and 
 
 « English White Paper, No. S^;.
 
 i62 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the 
 Luxemburg side. The 15th Army Corps from Strass- 
 burg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants 
 of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of 
 being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists 
 have been called back to Germany by tens of thou- 
 sands. This is the last stage before mobilization, 
 whereas we have not called out a single reservist. 
 
 As you see, Germany has done it. / would add 
 that all my information goes to show that the German 
 preparations began on Saturday, the very day on 
 which the Austrian note was handed in.'^ 
 
 In reply to the suggestion of the German Chan- 
 cellor as to the neutrahty of England, Sir Edward 
 Grey advised the English Ambassador on July 30th, 
 as follows : 
 
 His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment 
 entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should 
 bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. 
 
 What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand 
 by while French colonies are taken and France is 
 beaten so long as Germany does not take French 
 territory as distinct from the colonies. 
 
 From the material point of view such a proposal 
 is unacceptable, for France, without further terri- 
 tory in Europe being taken from her, could be so 
 crushed as to lose her position as a great Power, 
 and become subordinate to Germ.an policy. 
 
 Altogether apart from that, it would be a dis- 
 grace for us to make this bargain with Germany at 
 
 'English White Paper, No. 105. "Auitrian" obvious! v 
 means " Servian. "
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 163 
 
 the expense of France, a disgrace from which the 
 good name of this country would never recover. 
 
 The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain 
 away whatever obligations or interest we have as 
 regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not 
 entertain that bargain either. 
 
 Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine 
 whether the prospect of a future general neutrality 
 agreement between England and Germany offered 
 positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for 
 tying our hands now. We must preserve our full 
 freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to 
 require in any such unfavorable and regrettable 
 development of the present crisis as the Chancellor 
 contemplates. 
 
 You should speak to the Chancellor in the above 
 sense, and add most earnestly that one way of 
 maintaining good relations between England and 
 German}'- is that they should continue to work 
 together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we 
 succeed in this object, the mutual relations of 
 Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto 
 improved and strengthened. For that object His 
 Majesty's Government will work in that way with 
 all sincerity and good-will. 
 
 And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can 
 be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my 
 own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement, to 
 which Germany could be a party, by which she could be 
 assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be 
 pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, 
 and ourselves, jointly or separately. 
 
 This letter will give Sir Edward Grey lasting
 
 1 64 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 glory in the history of civilization. Its chivalrous 
 fairness to France needs no comment, but its most 
 significant feature is the concluding portion, in 
 which the English Foreign Minister suggested to 
 Germany that if peace could be preserved, Eng- 
 land stood ready to join with Germany in an 
 alliance which would have insured all the great 
 European nations against any aggressive war on 
 the part of either of them. 
 
 It was, in fact, the "United States of Europe" 
 in embryo. It was the one solution possible for 
 these long-continued European wars — essentially 
 civil wars — namely an alliance by the six great 
 Powers, — a merger of the Triple Alliance and the 
 Triple Entente, — whereby any aggressive act on 
 the part of any one of them w^ould be prevented by 
 the others. What an infinite pity that the im- 
 prudent act of the Kaiser, and the mad folly of his 
 advisers probably made a fair trial of this most 
 hopeful plan for the unification of Europe an im- 
 possibility for another century! 
 
 In order that Germany should have no excuse 
 whatever to declare war on account of Russia's 
 preparations, the Russian Foreign Minister saw 
 the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 
 30th, and then offered on behalf of Russia to stop 
 all military preparations, provided that Austiia
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 165 
 
 would simply recognize as an abstract principle 
 that the Servian question had assumed the char- 
 acter of a question of European interest. As this 
 proposal fully met the demands of the Kaiser 
 with respect to the cessation by Russia of military 
 preparations, the conversation as reported by 
 the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Sir 
 Edward Grey on July 30th deserves quotation 
 in extenso: 
 
 French Ambassador and I visited Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency 
 said that German Ambassador had told him yes- 
 terday afternoon that German Government were 
 willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be 
 respected by Austria. To this he had replied that 
 this might be so, but nevertheless Servia would 
 become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar 
 circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian 
 vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if 
 she were to tolerate such a state of affairs. 
 
 M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in 
 possession of Russian Government, that Germany 
 was making military and naval preparations against 
 Russia — more particularly in the direction of the 
 Gulf of Finland. 
 
 German Ambassador had a second interview 
 with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 a.m., when 
 former completely broke down on seeing that war 
 was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to 
 make some suggestion which he could telegraph to
 
 i66 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 German Government as a last hope. M, Sazonof 
 accordingly drew up and handed to German Am- 
 bassador a formula in French, of which the follow- 
 ing is a translation : 
 
 "// Austria, recognizing that her conflict with 
 Servia has assumed character of questiojz of European 
 interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her 
 idtimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty 
 of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military prepara- 
 tions.'" 
 
 Later in the day, at the suggestion of Sir Edward 
 Grey, the Russian Foreign Minister still further 
 modified in the interests of peace the proposition 
 upon which Russia was willing to cease all military 
 preparations. 
 
 If Austria consents to stay the march of her 
 armies upon Servian territory, and if, recognizing 
 that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the 
 character of a question of European interest, she 
 admits that the great Powers examine the reparation 
 wliich Servia could accord to the Government of 
 Austria-Hungary without injury to her rigJits as a 
 sovereign State and to her independence — Russia 
 undertakes to maintain her expectant attitude. 
 
 It will be noted that this formula implied that 
 Servia owed some reparation to Austria, and it did 
 not bind Austria to accept the judgment of the 
 Powers as to the character of such reparation. 
 
 It simply conceded to the Powers the oppor-
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 167 
 
 tunity to "examine " — not the original controversy 
 between Austria and Servia — but what reparation 
 could be made without a compromise of sover- 
 eignty and independence. Austria did not bind 
 itself to do anything except to stay the advance of 
 her army into Servia, while Russia agreed to 
 desist from further preparations or mobilization. 
 
 Could the offer have been more liberal? In face 
 of this assurance, how can the Kaiser or Germany 
 reasonably contend that it was the mobilization 
 of the Russian army which precipitated the war. 
 
 In the meantime Sir Edward Grey was working 
 tirelessly to suggest some peace formula, upon 
 which the Powers could agree. His suggestions 
 for a conference of the four leading Powers of 
 Europe, other than Russia and Austria, had been 
 negatived by Germany on the frivolous pretext 
 that such a conference was "too formal a method, " 
 quite ignoring the fact that its very formality 
 would have necessarily given a "cooling time" to 
 the would-be belligerents. Thereupon Sir Edward 
 Grey urged that, 
 
 the German Government should stiggest any method 
 by which the influence of the four Powers could be used 
 together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. 
 France agreed. Italy agreed. The whole idea of 
 mediation or mediating influence was ready to be
 
 i68 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 put into operation by any method that Germany 
 could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, 
 mediation was ready to come into operation by any 
 method that Germany thought possible if only 
 Germany would "press the button'' in the interests 
 of peace. ^ 
 
 Later in the day Sir Edward again repeated his 
 suggestion to the German Ambassador in London 
 and urged that Germany should, 
 
 propose some method by which the four Powers 
 should be able to work together to keep the peace of 
 Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian 
 Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded 
 it as a condition that the military operations against 
 Servia should be suspended, as otherwise a media- 
 tion would only drag on matters a7id give Austria 
 time to crush Servia. It was of course too late for 
 all military operations against Servia to be sus- 
 pended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian 
 forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of 
 some Servian territory. But even then it might 
 be possible to bring some mediation into existence, 
 if Austria, while saying that she must hold the 
 occupied territory until she had complete satisfac- 
 tion from Servia, stated that she would not advance 
 further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate 
 between her and Russia. 
 
 The only reply that England received to this 
 reiterated request that Germany take the lead in 
 
 ' English White Paper, No. 84.
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 169 
 
 suggesting some acceptable peace formula was set 
 forth in a dispatch from Sir E. Goschen from Berlin 
 to Sir Edward Grey : 
 
 I was informed last night that they (the German 
 Foreign Office) had not had time to send an answer 
 yet. To-day, in reply to an inquiry from the French 
 Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government 
 had proposed any course of action, the [German] 
 Secretary of State said that he felt that time would be 
 saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that 
 he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what 
 would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been 
 returned. 
 
 The Chancellor told me last night that he was 
 "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that 
 he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in 
 urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been 
 precipitated rather than otherwise.^ 
 
 The Court of PubHc Opinion unfortunately is 
 not favored in the German White Paper with the 
 text of its communication on this subject to Vienna, 
 nor is it given any specifications as to the manner 
 in which the German Chancellor "pressed the 
 button." 
 
 What the world knows without doctunentary 
 proof is that Austria continued its military prep- 
 arations and operations and that Russia then 
 ordered a general mobihzation. The only assur- 
 
 ' See English White Paper, No. 84.
 
 1 70 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 ance which Russia received from Austria as a 
 result of the alleged "pressing of the button" is 
 set forth in the following dispatch from the 
 Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Sazonof , dated 
 July 31st: 
 
 In spite of the general mobilization I continue 
 to exchange views with Count Berchtold and his 
 collaborators. All insist on the absence of aggres- 
 sive intentions on the part of Austria against Russia 
 and of ambitions of conquest in regard to Servia, 
 htit all equally insist on the necessity for Austria oj 
 pursuing to the very end the action begun and of giving 
 to Servia a serious lesson which would constitute a 
 certain guarantee for the future. 
 
 This was in effect a flat refusal of all mediatory 
 or otherwise pacific suggestions, for the right of 
 Austria to crush Servia by giving it "a serious 
 lesson" — what such a lesson is let Lou vain, Liege, 
 and Rheims witness ! — was the crux of the whole 
 question. 
 
 Concurrently Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed 
 to Sir Edward Grey that Germany had declared 
 that day the "Kriegsgefahr" and that the German 
 Chancellor had expressed the opinion that "all 
 hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis" was at 
 an end. The British Ambassador then asked the 
 Chancellor, —
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 171 
 
 whether he could not still put pressure on the 
 authorities at Vienna to do something in the general 
 interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves 
 disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. 
 He replied that last night he had begged Austria 
 to reply to your last proposal, and that he had 
 received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the 
 Emperor this morning in the matter/ 
 
 Here again the world is not favored with the 
 text of the message, in which the Chancellor 
 "begged Austria to reply," nor with that of the 
 Austrian Foreign Minister's reply. 
 
 While these events were happening in Berlin 
 and London, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna 
 advised Sazonof "that Austria has determined 
 not to yield to the intervention of the powers 
 and that she is moving troops against Russia as 
 well as Servia."^ 
 
 Russia thereupon, on July 31, ordered a general 
 mobilization of her army. 
 
 Concurrently with these interviews, the English 
 Ambassador in Vienna had a conversation with 
 the Austrian Under-Secretary'- of State and 
 
 called his attention to the fact that during the 
 discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London 
 Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Gov- 
 
 »English While Paper, No. 1 12. ^English While Paper, No. 1 13.
 
 172 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 ernment had stood behind Servia, and that a 
 compromise between the views of Russia and 
 Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier 
 line. Although he ' spoke in a conciliatory tone, and 
 did not regard the situation as desperate, / could not 
 get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise 
 in the present case. Count Forgach is going this 
 afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I 
 have informed of the above conversation.* 
 
 Nothwithstanding all these discouragements 
 and rebuffs, Sir Edward Grey, that unwearying 
 friend of peace, still continued to make a last 
 attempt to preserve peace by instructing the 
 British Ambassador in Berlin to sound the German 
 Foreign Office, as he would sound the Russian 
 Foreign Office, 
 
 whether it would be possible for the four disin- 
 terested Powers to offer to Austria that they would 
 undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction 
 of her demands on Servia, provided that they did 
 not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity 
 of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, 
 Austria has already declared her willingness to 
 respect them. Russia might be informed by the 
 four Powers that they would undertake to prevent 
 Austrian demands from going the length of impair- 
 ing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers 
 would of course suspend further military operations 
 or preparations. 
 
 'The Austrian Under-Secretary of State. 
 'English While Paper, No. 1 1 8.
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 173 
 
 He further instructed Sir Edward Goschen to 
 advise the German Foreign Office that he, Sir 
 Edward Grey, had that morning proposed to the 
 German Ambassador in London, 
 
 that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put 
 forward, which made it clear that Germany and 
 Austria were striving to preserve European peace, 
 and that Russia and France wotild be unreasonable 
 if they rejected it, / would support it at St. Peters- 
 burg and Paris, and go the length of saying that, if 
 Russia and France would not accept it, his Majesty's 
 Government would have nothing more to do with the 
 consequences ; that, otherwise, I told the German 
 Ambassador that if France became involved we 
 should be drawn in.^ 
 
 What, then, was the position when the last fatal 
 step was taken? The Czar had pledged his per- 
 sonal honor that no provocative action should 
 be taken by Russia, while peace parleys were in 
 progress, and the Russian Foreign Minister had 
 agreed to cease all military preparations, provided 
 that Austria would recognize that the question of 
 Servia had become one of European interest, and 
 that its sovereignty would be respected. 
 
 On July 31st, Austria for the first time in the 
 negotiations agreed to discuss with the Russian 
 Government the merits of the Servian note. Until 
 
 » English White Paper, No. iii.
 
 174 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 this eleventh hour Austria had consistently con- 
 tended that her difficulty with Servia was her own 
 question, in which Russia had no right to intervene, 
 and which it would not under any circumstances 
 even discuss with Russia. For this reason it had 
 refused any time for discussion, abruptly declared 
 war against Servia, commenced its military opera- 
 tions, and repeatedly declined to discuss even the 
 few questions left open in the Servian reply as a 
 basis for further peace parleys. 
 
 As recently as July 30th, the Austrian Govern- 
 ment had declined or refused any "direct exchange 
 of views with the Russian Government." 
 
 But late on July 31st, a so-called "conversation" 
 took place at Vienna between Count Berchtold 
 and the Russian Ambassador, and as a result, 
 the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg was 
 instructed to "converse" with the Russian Minis- 
 ter for Foreign Affairs. This important concession 
 of Austria was conveyed to Sazonof by the Austrian 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who expressed 
 
 the readiness of his Government to discuss the 
 substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. 
 M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction 
 and said it was desirable that the discussions should 
 take place in London with the participation of the 
 Great Powers.
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 175 
 
 M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government 
 would assume the direction of these discussions. 
 The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. 
 It would be very important that Austria should 
 meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military 
 action on Servian territory.^ 
 
 // is important to note that Austria's change oj 
 heart preceded hy some hours the Kaiser's ultimatum 
 to Russia. The former took place some time 
 during the day on July 31st. The latter was sent 
 to St. Petersburg on the midnight of that day. 
 It must also be noted that while Austria thus 
 agreed at the eleventh hour to "discuss the sub- 
 stance of the ultimatum," it did not offer to sus- 
 pend military preparations or operations and this 
 obviously deprived the concession of its chief 
 value. ^ 
 
 The cause and purpose of Austria's partial 
 reversal of its policy at present writing can be 
 only a matter of conjecture. When Austria pub- 
 lishes its correspondence with Germany, we may 
 know the truth. 
 
 Two theories are equally plausible : 
 
 Austria may have taken alarm at the steadfast 
 purpose of Russia to champion the cause of Servia 
 with the sword. If so, its qualified reversal of its 
 
 'English White Paper, No. 133. 'See Addendum, p. 191-2.
 
 176 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 bellicose attitude may have induced the war party 
 at Berlin to precipitate the war by the ultimatum 
 to Russia. In that event, Germany's mad poHcy 
 of war at any cost is even more iniquitous. ' 
 
 The supposition is equally plausible that Austria 
 had been advised from Berlin that that night Ger- 
 many would end all efforts to preserve the peace of 
 Europe by an ultimatum to Russia, which would 
 make war inevitable. The case of Germany and 
 Austria at the bar of the world would be made 
 morally stronger if, at the outbreak of hostilities, 
 the attitude of Austria had become more concilia- 
 tory. This would make more plausible their 
 contention that the mobilization of Russia and 
 not Austria's flat rejection of all peace overtures 
 had precipitated the conflict. 
 
 This much is certain that the Kaiser, with full 
 knowledge that Austria had consented to renew its 
 conferences with Russia, and that a ray of light had 
 broken through the lowering war clouds, either on 
 his own initiative or yielding to the importunities 
 of his military camarilla, directed the issuance of 
 the ultimatum to Russia and thus blasted the last 
 hope of peace. 
 
 On midnight of July 31st, the German Chan- 
 cellor sent the following telegram to the German 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburg: 
 
 ^See Addendum, p. 190, et seq.
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 177 
 
 In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, 
 and although we ourselves have up to the present 
 moment taken no measures for mobilization, Russia 
 has mobilized her entire army and navy; in other 
 words, mobilized against us also. By these Russian 
 measures we have been obliged, for the safeguarding 
 of the Empire, to announce that danger of war 
 threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization. 
 Mobilization, however, must follow unless Russia 
 ceases within twelve hours all warlike measures 
 against us and Austria-Hungary and gives us defi- 
 nite assurance thereof. Kindly communicate this 
 at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of its communi- 
 cation to him. 
 
 At midnight the fateful message was delivered. 
 As Sazonof reports the interview : 
 
 At midnight the Ambassador of Germany de- 
 clared to me, by order of his Government, that if 
 within twelve hours, that is at midday of Saturday, 
 we did not commence demobilization, not only in 
 regard to Germany but also in regard to Austria, the 
 German Government would be forced to give the 
 order of mobilization. To my question if this was 
 war the Ambassador replied in the negative, but 
 added that we were very near it. 
 
 It will be noted by the italicized portion that 
 Germany did not restrict its demand that Russia 
 cease its preparations against Germany, but it 
 should also desist from any preparations to defend
 
 178 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 itself or assert its rights against Austria, although 
 Austria had made no offer to suspend either its 
 preparations for war or recall its general mobiliza- 
 tion order. 
 
 The twelve hours elapsed and Russia, stand- 
 ing upon its dignity as a sovereign nation of 
 equal standing with Germany, declined to answer 
 this unreasonable and most arrogant demand, 
 which under the circumstances was equivalent to 
 a declaration of war. 
 
 Simultaneously a like telegram was sent to the 
 Ambassador at Paris, requiring the French Govern- 
 ment to state in eighteen hours whether it would 
 remain neutral in the event of a Russian-German 
 war. 
 
 The reasons given for this double ultimatum 
 are as disingenuous as the whole course of German 
 diplomacy in this matter. The statement that 
 Germany had pursued any mediatory negotiations 
 was as untrue as its statement that it had taken 
 no measures for mobilization. Equally disingenu- 
 ous was the statement with respect to the Kriegs- 
 gefahr (state of martial law), for when that was 
 declared on July 31st, the railroad, telegraph, and 
 other similar public utilities were immediately 
 taken over by Germany and the movement of 
 troops to the frontier began.
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 179 
 
 After the fateful ultimatum had thus been given 
 by Germany to Russia, the British Ambassador, 
 pursuant to the instructions of his home office, 
 saw the German Secretary of State on July 31st, 
 and urged him 
 
 most earnestly to accept your [Sir Edward Grey's] 
 proposal and make another effort to prevent the 
 terrible catastrophe of a European war. 
 
 He [von Jagow] expressed himself very sympa- 
 thetically toward your proposal, and appreciated 
 your continued efforts to maintain peace hut said 
 it was impossible for the Imperial Government to con- 
 sider any proposal until they had received an answer 
 from Russia to their communication of to-day; this 
 communication, which he admitted had the form 
 of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could 
 inform the Imperial Government within twelve 
 hours that she would immediately countermand her 
 mobilization against Germany and Austria, Ger- 
 many would be obliged on her side to mobilize at 
 once. 
 
 I asked his Excellency why they had made their 
 demand even more difficult for Russia to accept 
 by asking them to demobilize in the south as well. 
 He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia 
 from saying that all her mobilization was only 
 directed against Austria.' 
 
 The German Secretary of State also stated to 
 
 * English White Paper, No. 121.
 
 i8o The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Sir E. Goschen that both the Emperor William 
 and the German Foreign Office 
 
 had even up till last night been urging Austria to 
 show willingness to continue discussions, and tele- 
 graphic and telephonic communications from 
 Vienna had been of a promising nature, but Russia's 
 mobilization had spoiled everything. 
 
 Here again it must be noted that the telegraphic 
 communications from Vienna have not yet been 
 published by the Austrian Government, nor by the 
 German Foreign Office in its official defense. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey's last attempt to preserve 
 peace was on August ist, when he telegraphed to 
 Sir E. Goschen : 
 
 I still believe that it might be possible to secure 
 peace if only a little respite in time can be gained 
 before any great power begins war. 
 
 The Russian Government has communicated to 
 me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia 
 and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of 
 mediation which is not open to the objections raised 
 in regard to the formula which Russia originally 
 suggested. 
 
 Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Aus- 
 tria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope 
 that the German Government may be able to make 
 use of the Russian communications referred to 
 above in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser i8i 
 
 Government are carefully abstaining from any act 
 which may precipitate matters.^ 
 
 At that time the twelve-hour ultimatum to 
 Russia had already expired, but the British Am- 
 bassador saw the German Secretary of State on 
 August 1st, and, after submitting to him the sub- 
 stance of Sir Edward Grey's telegram last quoted, 
 
 spent a long time arguing with him that the chief 
 dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that 
 Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. //, 
 therefore, Austria and Russia were, as was evident, 
 ready to disctiss matters and Germany did not desire 
 war on her axon account, it seemed to me only logical 
 that Germany should hold her hand and continue to 
 work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State 
 for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to 
 discuss was the result of German influence at 
 Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against 
 Germany, all would have been well. But Russia, 
 by abstaining from answering Germany's demand 
 that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to 
 mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobiliza- 
 tion did not necessarily imply war, and that she 
 could perfectly well remain mobilized for months 
 without making war. This ivas not the case with 
 Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the 
 numbers, and the safety of the German Empire for- 
 bade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring 
 tip masses of troops from all parts of her wide do- 
 
 ' English While Paper, No. 131.
 
 i82 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 minions. The situation now was that, though the 
 Imperial Government had allowed her several hours 
 beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no 
 answer. Germany had, therefore, ordered mobiliza- 
 tion, and the German representative at St. Peters- 
 burg had been instructed within a certain time to 
 inform the Russian Government that the Imperial 
 Government must regard their refusal to answer 
 as creating a state of war.^ 
 
 It will thus be seen that although Germany was 
 urged to the very last to await the result of the 
 conferences, which had just commenced with some 
 slight promise of success between Austria and Rus- 
 sia, it nevertheless elected to declare war against 
 Russia and thus blast beyond possible recall any 
 possibility of peace. Its justification for this 
 course, as stated in the interview with the German 
 Secretary of State last quoted, was that it did not 
 propose to forego its advantage of speed as against 
 the advantage of Russia's numerical superiority. 
 For this there might be some justification, if 
 Russia had shown an unyielding and bellicose 
 attitude, but apart from the fact that Russia had 
 consistently worked in the interests of peace, 
 Germany had the express assurance of the Czar 
 that no provocative action would be taken while 
 peace conferences continued. To disregard these 
 
 'English While Paper, No. 138.
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 183 
 
 assurances and thus destroy the pacific efforts of 
 other nations, in order not to lose a tactical advan- 
 tage, was the clearest disloyalty to civilization. 
 In any aspect, Germany could have fully kept its 
 advantage of speed by inducing its ally to suspend 
 its aggressive operations against Servia, for in that 
 event Russia had expressly obligated itself to 
 suspend all military preparations. 
 
 As the final document in this shameful chapter 
 of diplomacy, there need only be added the tele-, 
 gram, sent by the German Chancellor to his Am- 
 bassador at St. Petersburg on August i, 1914, 
 in which war was declared by Germany against 
 Russia on the ground that while Germany and 
 Austria should be left free to pursue their aggres- 
 sive military preparations, Russia should, on the 
 peremptory demand of another nation, cease the 
 mobilization of its armies even for self-defense. 
 It reads: 
 
 The Imperial Government has endeavored from 
 the opening of the crisis to lead it to a pacific solu- 
 tion. In accordance with a desire which had been 
 expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of 
 Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany in 
 accord with England had applied himself to filling 
 a mediatory role with the Cabinets of Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting 
 the result of this, proceeded to the complete
 
 184 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 mobilization of her forces on land and sea. As a 
 consequence of this threatening measure, motived 
 by no military "presage'' on the part of Germany, 
 the German Empire found itself in face of a grave 
 and imminent danger. If the Imperial Govern- 
 ment had failed to safeguard herself against this 
 peril it would have compromised the safety and the 
 very existence of Germany. Consequently the 
 German Government saw itself forced to address 
 to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of 
 all the Russias, an insistence on the cessation of the 
 said military acts. Russia, having refused to 
 accede to (not having thought it should reply to), 
 this demand, and having manifested by this refusal 
 (this attitude) that its action was directed against 
 Germany, I have the honor to make known to 
 your Excellency the following : 
 
 His Majesty the Emperor, My August Sovereign, 
 in the name of the Empire, taking up the challenge, 
 considers himself in a state of war with Russia. 
 
 The feverish haste, with which this fatal step 
 was taken, is shown by the fact that the German 
 Ambassador could not even wait to state whether 
 Russia had refused to answer or answered nega- 
 tively. This war — thus begun in such mad haste^ 
 is likely to be repented of at leisure. 
 
 A few hours before this rash and most iniquitous 
 declaration was made the Czar made his last appeal 
 for peace. With equal solemnity and pathos he 
 telegraphed the Kaiser:
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 185 
 
 I have received your telegram. I comprehend that 
 you are forced to mobilize, hut I should like to have 
 from you the same guaranty which I have given you, 
 viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we 
 shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two 
 countries and the universal peace which is so dear to 
 our hearts. With the aid of God it must he possible 
 to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding 
 of blood. I expect with fidl confidence your urgent 
 reply. 
 
 This touching and magnanimous message does 
 infinite credit to the Czar. Had the Kaiser been 
 as pacific, had he been inspired by the same en- 
 Hghtened spirit in the interests of peace, had 
 he been as truly mindful of the God of na- 
 tions, whom the Czar thus invoked, it would 
 have been possible to prevent the "shedding of 
 blood," which has now swept away after only 
 three months of war the very flower of the youth 
 of Europe. 
 
 To this the Kaiser replied : 
 
 I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown 
 yesterday to Your Government the way through 
 which alo7ie war may yet be averted. Although I 
 asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from 
 my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of 
 Your Government. I therefore have been forced 
 to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear and 
 unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole
 
 i86 The Plvidence in the Case 
 
 way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this 
 reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon 
 the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most 
 earnestly that You, without delay, order Your 
 troops to commit, under no circumstances, the 
 slightest violation of our frontiers. 
 
 In this is no spirit of compromise; only the 
 repeated insistence of the unreasonable and in 
 its consequences iniquitous demand that Russia 
 should by demobilizing make itself "naked to its 
 enemies," while Germany and Austria, without 
 making any real concession in the direction of peace, 
 should be permitted to arm both for offense and 
 defense. 
 
 There were practical reasons which made the 
 Kaiser's demand unreasonable. Mobilization 
 is a highly developed and complicated piece 
 of governmental machinery, and even where 
 transportation facilities are of the best, as in 
 Germany and France, the mobiHzation ordinarily 
 takes about two weeks to complete. In Russia, 
 with limited means of transportation, it was im- 
 possible to recall immediately a mobilization order 
 that had gone forward to the remotest comers 
 of the great Empire. The record shows that 
 the Kaiser himself recognized this fact, for in a 
 telegram which he sent on August 1st to King
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 187 
 
 George, with respect to the possible neutralization 
 of England, the Kaiser said: 
 
 I just received the communication from Your 
 Government offering French neutraHty under the 
 guarantee of Great Britain. Added to this offer 
 was the inquiry whether under these conditions 
 Germany would refrain from attacking France. 
 On technical growids My mobilization, which had 
 already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed 
 against two fronts east and west as prepared; this 
 cannot be countermanded because, I am sorry, Your 
 telegram came so late. But if France offers Me 
 neutrality which must be guaranteed by the British 
 fleet and army, I shall of course refrain from attack- 
 ing France and employ My troops elsewhere. I 
 hope that France will not become nervous. The 
 troops on My frontier are in the act of being stopped 
 by telegraph and telephone from crossing into 
 France. ^ 
 
 If it were impossible for the Kaiser, with all the 
 exceptional facilities of the German Empire, to 
 arrest his mobilization for "technical" reasons, it 
 was infinitely more difficult for the Czar to arrest 
 immediately his military preparations. The de- 
 mand of Germany was not that Russia should 
 simply cancel the mobilization order. It was that 
 
 ' No such offer had been made. The Kaiser's error was due to 
 a misunderstanding, which had arisen quite honestly between Sir 
 Edward Grey and the German Ambassador in London. King 
 George promptly corrected this misapprehension of the Kaiser. 
 
 See also Addendum, p. 192.
 
 i88 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Russia should "cease within twelve hours all 
 warHke measures," and it demanded a physical 
 impossibility. 
 
 In any event, mobilization does not necessarily 
 mean aggression, but simply preparation, as the 
 Czar had so clearly pointed out to the Kaiser in 
 the telegram already quoted. It is the right of 
 a sovereign State and by no code of ethics 
 a casus belli. Germany's demand that Russia 
 should not arm to defend itself, when its prestige 
 as a great European power was at stake and when 
 Austria was pushing her aggressive preparations, 
 treated Russia as an inferior, almost a vassal, State. 
 Its rejection must have been recognized by the 
 Kaiser and his advisers as inevitable, and, on the 
 theory that a man intends the natural consequences 
 of his acts, it must be assumed that the Kaiser in 
 this mad demand at that time desired and in- 
 tended war, however pacific his purposes may 
 have been when he first took the helm. 
 
 Such will be his awful responsibility "to the last 
 syllable of recorded time." 
 
 How well prepared Germany was, the sequel 
 developed only too surely . On the following day — 
 August 2d — its troops invaded Luxemburg and 
 an abrupt demand was made upon Belgium 
 for permission to cross its territory.
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 189 
 
 Upon the declaration of war, the Czar tele- 
 graphed to King George of England as follows : 
 
 "In this solemn hour, I wish to assure you once 
 more I have done all in my power to avert war." 
 
 Such ivill be the verdict of history. 
 
 ADDENDUM 
 
 I 
 
 THE SUPPRESSED TELEGRAM FROM THE CZAR 
 
 It is a curious and suggestive fact that the German Foreign 
 Office in publishing the correspondence between the Kaiser and 
 the Czar omitted one of the most important telegrams. 
 
 The Russian Government on January 31, 1915, therefore, 
 made public the following telegram which the Czar sent to the 
 Kaiser on July 29, 19 14: 
 
 " Thanks for your conciliatory and friendly telegram. 
 Inasmuch as the official message presented to-day by 
 your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a 
 very different tone, I beg you to explain this diver- 
 gency. It would be right to give over the Austro- 
 Servian problem to The Hague Conference. I trust in 
 your wisdom and friendship." 
 
 The German Foreign Office has since explained that they re- 
 garded this telegram as too " unimportant " for publication. 
 Comment is unnecessary. 
 
 It thus appears that the Czar at the beginning of his cor- 
 respondence with the Kaiser suggested that the whole dispute 
 be submitted to The Hague Tribunal for adjustment. Serv^ia 
 had already made the same suggestion. 
 
 As the world owes the first Hague Convention to the Czar's 
 initiative, it can justly be said to his lasting credit that he at 
 least was loyal to the pacific ideal of that great convention of 
 the nations.
 
 190 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 II 
 
 THE AUSTRIAN OFFER OF JULY 31, 1914 
 
 The author has noted (ante, p. 175) that as the belated offer of 
 Austria on July the 3 ist " to discuss [with Russia] the substance of 
 the Austrian ultimatum to Servia " did not offer to suspend mili- 
 tary preparations or operations, the concession was more nominal 
 than real. The Austrian Red Book converts this inference into a 
 certainty, and makes clear that Austria's pretended change of 
 policy was only diplomatic finesse, as it contained no substantial 
 modification of its uncompromising attitude. 
 
 Russia had proposed on July the 30th (ajite, p. 166) that "if 
 Austria consents to stay the march of her armies upon Servian 
 territory" and further agreed that the question of "the repara- 
 tion which Servia could accord to the Government of Austria- 
 Hungary" could be examined by the Great Powers, Russia woul(\ 
 suspend her military' preparations. As the underlying question 
 was whether Austria should be permitted to subjugate Servia 
 without interference, it was vital that that subjugation should not 
 proceed pending an examination by all interested powers into its 
 justice and ultimate ends. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey had previously requested Germany on July 
 the 28th "to use its influence" with the Austrian Government 
 "to the effect that the latter either consider the reply from Bel- 
 grade satisfactory or else accept it as a basis for discussion between 
 the Cabinets." The German Foreign Office then instructed the 
 German Ambassador at Vienna "to submit the British proposal 
 to the Vienna Cabinet for its consideration" (Austrian Red Book, 
 No. 43). As a result of this suggestion. Count Berchtold on 
 July the 29th (Austrian Red Book, No. 44) again shut the door 
 upon any compromise by the contention that Austria 
 
 " no longer is in a position to meet the Servian reply in 
 the spirit of the British suggestions, since at the time 
 when the German request was presented here, a state 
 of war already existed between the Dual Monarchy and 
 Servia, and thus the Servian reply had been superseded by 
 events. ' '
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 191 
 
 The only counter-suggestion which Austria then made was as 
 follows: 
 
 "Should the British Cabinet be prepared to exert its 
 influence upon the Russian Government for the mainten- 
 ance of peace among the Great Powers, and for a local- 
 ization of the war, which had been forced upon us by the 
 Servian agitation of many years' standing, such efforts 
 would meet with the Imperial and Rcyal Government's 
 appreciation." (Austrian Red Book, No. 44.) 
 
 On July 31st the German Ambassador at Vienna, acting on 
 instructions (which instructions are again not disclosed in the 
 German While Book) informed Count Berchtold " of a conversation 
 between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky," in the course 
 of which the British Secretary of State declared to the German 
 Ambassador that Russia felt unable " to treat directly with 
 Austria-Hungary and therefore requested Great Britain to resume 
 her mediation" and that "as a condition of this mediation, how- 
 ever, the Russian Government stipulates the suspension of 
 hostilities in the meanwhile." (Austrian Red Book, No. 51.) 
 
 Thereupon Count Berchtold made the eleventh hour offer 
 in question by instructing the Austrian Ambassador at St. 
 Petersburg 
 
 " to express our readiness to consider Sir Edward Grey's 
 proposition to mediate between us and Servia despite 
 the changes brought about in the situation by Russia's 
 mobilization. Our acceptance, however, is subject to the 
 condition that our military action against Servia shall never- 
 theless proceed atid that the British Cabinet shall induce the 
 Russian Government to stop the mobilization directed against 
 us. It is understood that in this case we would at once cancel 
 our defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which 
 had been forced upon us by Russia's mobilization." (Aus- 
 trian Red Book, No. 51.) 
 
 This suggestion was fatally objectionable in that it required 
 Russia to suspend its preparations to defend its interests while 
 permitting Austria to proceed with the subjuga*:ion of Servia.
 
 192 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 As the "bone of contention" was this subjugation of Servia, this 
 belated and ostensibly conciliatory proposal of Austria amounted 
 to an absurdity. In that classic of nonsense, Alice in Wonder- 
 land, the unreasonable and violent Queen announced in the trial 
 of the Knave the similar procedure of "sentence first, verdict 
 afterwards," and Austria's final proposal was essentially a like 
 folly, for, stripped of diplomatic pretense, it amounted to this, 
 that Austria, while tying Russia's hands, should proceed not 
 merely to sentence but even to execute Servia and subse- 
 quently discuss the justice of its action when it had become 
 irremediable. 
 
 The possible theory which we suggested {ante, p. 175), that 
 Austria at the eleventh hour may have experienced a change 
 of heart and had adopted a more conciliatory course, is apparently 
 untenable. 
 
 Ill 
 
 THE INVASION OF FRANCE ON AUGUST isx 
 
 It has been Germany's contention that not only did the 
 mobilization of Russia cause the war, but that its eastern 
 and western frontiers were violated by Russian and French 
 soldiers at a time when Germany's intentions were sincerely 
 pacific. 
 
 At 7 P.M. on July the 31st, Germany had given France until 
 I P.M. of the following day to declare whether it would remain 
 neutral in the event of a Russian-German war, and at that hour 
 Viviani advised the German Ambassador that France " would do 
 that which her interests dictated." (German While Paper ^ 
 No. 27.) Notwithstanding France's virtual refusal to meet the 
 demand of Germany, the latter did not declare war on France 
 on that day, and this is the more significant as it immediately 
 djclared war on Russia. The German Ajnbassador remained 
 ir. Pari.4 until Ausu:;1: the 3d, and only then demanded his 
 passports when his position in the French Capitol had become 
 untenable. 
 
 In the meantime Germany was awaiting some act of aggres- 
 sion on the part of France, that would enable it under the terms 
 of the Triple Alliance to demand as of right the cooperation of
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 193 
 
 Italy, while France, determined for this and other reasons net 
 to be the aggressor, had withdrawn its troops ten kilometers 
 from the frontier and refused to take any oflfensiv^e step either 
 before or after the expiration of the ultimatum. 
 
 The confidential telegram of the Kaiser to King George sug- 
 gests the possibility that on August the ist, about the time that 
 the eighteen-hour ultimatum had expired, Germany was ready 
 and intended to commence an immediate invasion of France, for 
 on that day the Kaiser telegraphs to King George: 
 
 "/ hope that France will not become nervous. The 
 troops on my Jro7itier are in the act of being stopped by 
 telegraph and telephone from crossing into France." 
 (Ante, p. 187.) 
 
 The exact hour when the Kaiser sent the King this message 
 is conjectural. We know from the German White Paper that 
 at II A.M. on that day Sir Edward Grey inquired of Prince 
 Lichnowsky over the telephone whether Germany was "in a 
 position to declare that we would not attack France in a war 
 between Germany and Russia in case France should remain 
 neutral." 
 
 This message prompted the Kaiser's telegram to King George. 
 How soon thereafter the Kaiser sent his telegram we do not knov/, 
 but as the impossibility of France's neutrality was recognized in 
 Berlin on receipt of Lichnowsky's telegram by 5 p.m. on that day, 
 it is altogether probable that the Kaiser's telegram was sent 
 between those hours. 
 
 If the telegram in question is now analyzed and the fair natural 
 import is given to the Kaiser's language, it would seem that the 
 invasion of France, either before or in anj' event simultaneously 
 with the expiration of the eighteen-hour ultimatum, had been 
 determined upon by the Kaiser and his military staff, for the 
 Kaiser's intimation that he has "stopped by telegraph and 
 telephone [his army] from crossing into France" fairly implies 
 that previous orders had been given to commence such in- 
 vasion and that these orders had been hurriedly recalled in 
 the most expeditious way, upon the supposed intimation of 
 Sir Edward Grey that England might guarantee the neutrality 
 of France.
 
 194 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Under these circumstances, with the German Ambassador 
 still at Paris and ostensibly preserving friendly relations, it is 
 evident that the invasion was either to precede or to follow 
 immediately upon the severance of diplomatic relations. This 
 in itself may not be indefensible under international law, but 
 it throws a searchlight upon the contention of Germany that 
 its intentions were pacific and that it had been surprised by a 
 sudden and treacherous attack on the part of Russia, France, and 
 England. 
 
 The difficulty, however, is to reconcile this apparent intention 
 of the Kaiser's military staff to invade France on August the 
 1st and the action of his Foreign Office in failing to make any 
 declaration of war against France and in retaining its Ambassador 
 at Paris and permitting the French Ambassador to remain at 
 Berlin. The diplomatic records abundantly show that this 
 latter policy of the German Foreign Office was followed in 
 the hope that France would become the aggressor, but its 
 inconsistency with the policy of the War Office implied in the 
 Kaiser's telegram is obvious. 
 
 Possibly the Kaiser's soldiers and diplomats were not working 
 in complete harmony. It may be true that the many blunders 
 of German diplomats were in part due to the reckless im- 
 petuosity of the War Office and it is possible that some of von 
 Bethmann-Hollwcg's and von Jagow's diplomatic blunders are 
 more properly attributable to the Kaiser and IMoltke. 
 
 It is also possible that the natural inference from the Kaiser's 
 language above quoted is misleading and that the telegram to 
 King George did not mean to imply that any orders for an inva- 
 sion had been cancelled but simply that the army leaders on the 
 Western frontier had been cautioned not to cross the frontier 
 until further orders. 
 
 Another possible theory is that the Kaiser for political reasons 
 may have exaggerated the extent of his concession, and magnified 
 the urgency of the situation to induce prompt and favorable 
 action by Great Britain. 
 
 But the readiness of Germany to strike a quick and fatal blow 
 at Paris cannot be gainsaid and strangely contrasts with the 
 "injured innocence" protestations that it was treacherously 
 surprised by an unexpected attack. Always with Prussia, 
 " the readiness is all."
 
 The Intervention of the Kaiser 195 
 
 IV 
 THE USE OF THE WORD " ENGLAND " 
 
 In making these scattered addenda, I take this occasion to 
 make the amende honorable to some of my readers, who since 
 the first editions of this book appeared have taken exception to 
 my use of the word " England " and " English," where obviously 
 " Great Britain " and " British " were meant. These critics, are 
 technically correct, but I hope that they will acquit me of any 
 intention of ignoring any part of the British Empire in using a 
 term, which by common and immemorial usage has been 
 applied throughout the world as synonymous with the great 
 Empire. I should deeply regret it, if any other intention were 
 imputed to me, for in the magnificent struggle which Great 
 Britain has made for the highest ideals of civilization and the 
 basic rights of humanity, no one now or hereafter can ever 
 ignore the heroic part which has been played by Scotland, 
 Ireland, Canada, and the over-sea dominions. 
 
 May I not plead that the word "England," has to common 
 intent a broader as well as a more restricted meaning and that 
 when the poet, the historian or — as in my case — the student 
 uses the word "England" in reference to a world-wide contro- 
 versy, no one is likely to misapprehend his meaning. Such use 
 is certainly as common and as generally understood as that of 
 the word "American" as applied to a citizen of the United 
 States, although in both cases the characterization is not strictly 
 accurate. To my critics in Scotland and Ireland who have made 
 this criticism of my book, I can only say: 
 
 " Let my disclaiming from a purposed e\41 
 Free me so far in your most generous thoughts, 
 That I have shot mine arrow o'er the house, 
 And hurt my brother."
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE CASE OF BELGIUM 
 
 The callous disregard by Germany of the rights 
 of Belgium is one of the most shocking exhibitions 
 of political iniquity in the history of the world. 
 
 That it has had its parallel in other and less 
 civilized ages may be freely admitted, but until 
 German scientists, philosophers, educators, and 
 even doctors of divinity attempted to justify this 
 wanton outrage, it had been hoped that mankind 
 had made some progress since the times of 
 Wallenstein and Tilly. 
 
 The verdict of Civilization in this respect will be 
 little affected by the ultimate result of the war, for 
 even if Germany should emerge from this titanic 
 conflict as victor, and become, as it would then 
 undoubtedly become, the first power in the world, 
 it would none the less be a figure for the "time 
 of scorn to point his slow unmoving finger at." 
 To the eulogists of Alexander the Great, Seneca 
 was wont to say, "Yes, but he murdered Callis- 
 thenes," and to the eulogists of victorious Ger- 
 
 196
 
 The Case ot Belgium i97 
 
 many, if indeed it shall prove victorious, the wise 
 and just of all future ages will say, "Yes, but it 
 devastated Belgium." 
 
 The fact that many distinguished and un- 
 doubtedly sincere partisans of Germany have 
 attempted to justify this atrocious rape, suggests 
 a problem of psychology rather than of logic 
 or ethics. It strongly illustrates a too familiar 
 phenomenon that great intellectual and moral 
 astigmatism is generally incident to any passion- 
 ate crisis in human history. It shows how pitifully 
 unstable the human intellect is when a great man 
 like Dr. Haeckel, a scholar and historian like Dr. 
 von Mach, or a doctor of divinity like Dr. Dry- 
 ander, can be so warped with the passions of the 
 hour as to ignore the clearest considerations of 
 political morality. 
 
 At the outbreak of the present war Belgium had 
 taken no part whatever in the controversy and 
 was apparently on friendly relations with all the 
 Powers. It had no interest whatever in the Servian 
 question. A thrifty, prosperous people, inhabit- 
 ing the most densely populated country of Europe, 
 and resting secure in the solemn promises, not 
 merely of Germany, but of the leading European 
 nations that its neutrality should be respected, it 
 calmly pursued the even tenor of its way, and
 
 198 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 was as unmindful of the disaster, which was so 
 suddenly to befall it, as the people of Pompeii 
 were on the morning of the great eruption when 
 they thronged the theatre in the pursuit of plea- 
 sure and disregarded the ominous curling of the 
 smoke from the crater of Vesuvius. 
 
 On April 19, 1839, Belgium and Holland signed 
 a treaty which provided that "Belgium forms an 
 independent state of perpetual neutrality." To 
 insure that neutrality, Prussia, France, Great 
 Britain, Austria, and Russia on the same date 
 signed a treaty, by which it was provided that 
 these nations jointly "became the guarantors" of 
 such "perpetual neutrality." 
 
 In his recent article on the war, George 
 Bernard Shaw, who is inimitable as a farceur but 
 not quite convincing as a jurist, says: 
 
 As all treaties are valid only rebus sic stantibus, 
 and the state of things which existed at the date of 
 the Treaty of London (1839) had changed so much 
 since then . . . that in 1870 Gladstone could not 
 depend on it, and resorted to a special temporary 
 treaty not now in force, the technical validity of the 
 1839 treaty is extremely doubtful. 
 
 Unfortunately for this contention, the Treaty 
 of 1870, to which Mr. Shaw refers, provided fof
 
 The Case of Belgium 199 
 
 its own expiration after twelve months and then 
 added : 
 
 And on the expiration of that time the indepen- 
 dence and neutrahty of Belgium will, so far as the 
 high contracting parties are respectively concerned, 
 continue to rest as heretofore on the ist Article of 
 the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839. 
 
 Much has been made by Mr. Shaw and others 
 of an excerpt from a speech of Mr. Gladstone in 
 1870. In that speech, Mr. Gladstone, as an 
 abstract proposition, declined to accept the broad 
 statement that under all circumstances the obliga- 
 tions of a treaty might continue, but there is noth- 
 ing to justify the belief that Mr. Gladstone in any 
 respect questioned either the value or the validity 
 of the Treaty of 1839 with respect to Belgium. 
 
 Those who invoke the authority of Gladstone 
 should remember that he also said : 
 
 We have an interest in the independence of 
 Belgium which is wider than that which we may 
 have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It 
 is found in the answer to the question whether, 
 under the circumstances of the case, this country, 
 endowed as it is with influence and power, would 
 quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of 
 the direst crime that ever stained the pages of 
 history, and thus become participators in the sin.
 
 200 The Evidence in- the Case 
 
 These words of the great statesman read as a 
 prophecy. 
 
 While these treaties were simply declaratory of 
 the rights, which Belgium independently enjoyed 
 as a sovereign nation, yet this solemn guarantee 
 of the great Powers of Europe was so effective that 
 even in 1870, when France and Germany were 
 locked in vital conflict, and the question arose 
 whether Prussia would disregard her treaty obliga- 
 tion, the Iron Chancellor, who ordinarily did not 
 permit moral considerations to warp his political 
 policies, wTOte to the Belgian minister in Berlin 
 on July 22, 1870: 
 
 In confirmation of my verbal assurance, I have 
 the honor to give in writing a declaration, which, in 
 view of the treaties in force, is quite superfluous, 
 that the Confederation of the North and its allies 
 (Germany) will respect the neutrality of Belgium 
 on the understanding of course that it is respected 
 by the other belligerent. 
 
 At that time, Belgium had so fine a sense of 
 honor, that although it was not inconsistent with 
 the principles of international law, yet in order to 
 discharge her obligations of neutrality in the spirit 
 as well as the letter, she restricted the clear legal 
 right of her people to supply arms and ammunition
 
 The Case of Belgium 201 
 
 to the combatants, thus construing the treaty to 
 her own disadvantage. 
 
 It can be added to the credit of both France and 
 Prussia that in their great struggle of 1870-71, 
 each scrupulously respected that neutrality, and 
 France carried out her obligations to such an 
 extreme that although Napoleon and his army 
 could have at one time escaped from Sedan into 
 Belgium, and renewed the attack and possibly — ■ 
 although not probably — saved France, if they had 
 seen fit to violate that neutrality, rather than 
 break the word of France the Emperor Napoleon 
 and his army consented to the crowning humiliation 
 of Sedan. 
 
 In the year 191 1, in the course of a discussion in 
 Belgium in respect to the fortifications at Flush- 
 ing, certain Dutch newspapers asserted that in the 
 event of a Franco-German war, the neutrality of 
 Belgium would be violated by Germany. It was 
 then suggested that if a declaration were made to 
 the contrary in the Reichstag, that such a decla- 
 ration, "would be calculated to appease public 
 opinion and to calm its suspicions." 
 
 This situation was communicated to the present 
 German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-HoUweg, who 
 instructed the German Ambassador at Brussels to 
 assure the Belgian Foreign Minister,
 
 202 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 that he was most appreciative of the sentiment 
 which had inspired our [Belgium's] action. He 
 declared that Germany had no intention of violating 
 our neutrality, but he considered that by making a 
 declaration publicly, Germany would weaken her 
 military preparation with respect to France, and 
 being reassured in the northern quarter would 
 direct her forces to the eastern quarter.^ 
 
 Germany's recognition of the continuing obliga- 
 tion of this treaty was also shown when the ques- 
 tion of Belgium's neutrality was suggested at a 
 debate in the Reichstag on April 29, 1913. In the 
 course of that debate a member of the Social 
 Democratic Party said : 
 
 In Belgium the approach of a Franco-German war 
 is viewed with apprehension, because it is feared 
 that Germany will not respect Belgian neutrality.' 
 
 Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs, repHed: "The neutrality of Belgium is 
 determined by international conventions, and 
 Germany is resolved to respect these conventions." 
 
 This declaration did not satisfy another member 
 of the Social Democratic Party. Herr von Jagow 
 observed that he had nothing to add to the clear 
 statement which he had uttered with reference to 
 the relations between Germany and Belgium. 
 
 In reply to further interrogations from a member 
 of the Social Democratic Party, Herr von Heeringen, 
 
 ' Belgian Gray Book, enclosure No. 12. 
 ■ Idem.
 
 The Case of Belgium 203 
 
 Minister of War, stated: "Belgium does not play 
 any part in the justification of the German scheme 
 of military reorganization; the scheme is justified 
 by the position of matters in the East. Germany 
 will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality 
 is guaranteed by international treaties." 
 
 A member of the same party, having again referred 
 to Belgium, Herr von Jagow again pointed out that 
 his declaration regarding Belgium was sufficiently 
 clear. ^ 
 
 On July 31, 1914, the Belgian Foreign Minister, 
 in a conversation with Herr von Below, the Ger- 
 man Minister at Brussels, asked him whether he 
 knew of the assurance which, as above stated, had 
 been given by Von Bethmann-Hollweg through 
 the German Ambassador at Brussels to the Govern- 
 ment at Belgium in 191 1, and Herr von Below 
 replied that he did, and added, "that he was 
 certain that the sentiments to which expression 
 was given at that time had not changed." 
 
 Thus on July 31, 1914, Germany, through its 
 accredited representative at Brussels, repeated the 
 assurances contained in the treaty of 1839, as 
 reaffirmed in 1870, and again reaffirmed in 191 1 
 and 1913. 
 
 Germany's moral obligation had an additional 
 express confirmation. 
 
 ' Belgian Gray Book, No. 12.
 
 204 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 The second International Peace Conference was 
 held at The Hague in 1907. There were present 
 the representatives of forty-four nations, thus mak- 
 ing as near an approach to the poet's dream of the 
 "federation of the world" and the "parliament of 
 man" as has yet been possible in the slow progress 
 of mankind. 
 
 That convention agreed upon a certain declara- 
 tion of principles, and among the signatures 
 appended to the document was the representative 
 of His Majesty, the German Emperor. 
 
 They agreed upon certain principles of interna- 
 tional morality, most of them simply declaratory 
 of the uncodified international law then existing, 
 and these were subsequently ratified by formal 
 treaties of the respective governments, including 
 Germany, which were deposited in the archives of 
 The Hague. While this treaty as an express 
 covenant was not binding, unless all belligerents 
 signed it, yet, it recognized an existing moral ob- 
 ligation. The Hague Peace Conference proceeded 
 to define the rights of neutral powers, and in so 
 doing simply reaffirmed the existing international 
 law. 
 
 The pertinent parts of this great compact, with 
 reference to the sanctity of neutral territory, are as 
 follows:
 
 The Case of Belgium 205 
 
 CONVENTION V 
 
 CHAPTER I— ••THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF 
 NEUTRAL POWERS 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of 
 either munitions of war or supplies across the territory 
 of a neutral Power. 
 
 ARTICLE X. 
 
 The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, 
 attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as 
 a hostile act. 
 
 Notwithstanding these assurances, it had been 
 from time to time intimated by German military- 
 writers, and notably by Bemhardi, that Germany 
 would, in the event of a future war, make a quick 
 and possibly a fatal blow at the heart of France 
 by invading Belgium upon the first declaration of 
 hostilities, and it was probably these intimations 
 that led the Belgian Government on July 24, 19 14, 
 to consider: 
 
 Whether in the existing circumstances, it would 
 not be proper to address to the Powers, who had 
 guaranteed Belgium's independence and its neutral- 
 ity, a communication for the purpose of confirming 
 to them its resolution to carry out the international
 
 2o6 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 duties which are imposed upon it by treaties in the 
 event of war breaking out on the Belgian frontiers. 
 
 Confiding in the good faith of France and Ger- 
 many, the Belgian Government concluded that 
 any such declaration was premature. 
 
 On August 2, 1 914, the war having already 
 broken out, the Belgian Foreign Minister took oc- 
 casion to tell the German Ambassador that France 
 had reaffirmed its intention to respect the neu- 
 trality of Belgium, and Herr von Below, the 
 German Ambassador, after thanking Davignon 
 for his information, added that up to the present 
 he had not been 
 
 instructed to make us any official communication, 
 but we were aware of his personal opinion respecting 
 the security with which we had the right to regard 
 our eastern neighbors. I [Davignon] replied at 
 once that all we knew of the intentions of the latter, 
 intentions set forth in many former interviews, did 
 not allow us to doubt their [Germany's] perfectly 
 correct attitude toward Belgium. 
 
 It thus appears that as late as August 2, 1914, 
 Germany had not given to Belgium any intimation 
 as to its intention, and, what is more important, it 
 had not either on that day or previously made any 
 charge that Belgium had in any way violated its 
 obligations of neutrality, or that France had committed 
 any overt act in violation thereof.
 
 The Case of Belgium 207 
 
 On July 31, 1914, England, not unreasonably 
 apprehensive as to the sincerity of Germany's oft- 
 repeated protestations of good faith, directed the 
 English Ambassadors at Paris and Berlin to ask 
 the respective governments of those countries 
 "whether each is prepared to respect the neu- 
 trality of Belgium, provided it is violated by no 
 other Power." 
 
 This question was commimicated by Sir Edward 
 Grey to the Belgian Government, with the addition 
 that he (Sir Edward Grey) asked that "the 
 Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost 
 of her power her neutrality which I desire, and 
 expect other Powers to uphold and observe." 
 
 Pursuant to these instructions, the English 
 Ambassador to Paris, on the night of July 31 , 19 14, 
 called upon Viviani, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 and on the same night received a reply which is 
 reported by Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, as 
 follows : 
 
 French Government is resolved to respect the 
 neutrality of Belgium, and it would be only in the 
 event of some other Power violating that neutrality 
 that France might find herself under the necessity, 
 in order to assure defense of her own security, to act 
 otherwise. This assurance has been given several 
 times. The President of the Republic spoke of it 
 to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister
 
 2oS The Evidence in the Case 
 
 to Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assur- 
 ance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 to-day. ^ 
 
 Confirming this, the French Minister at Brussels, 
 on August 1st, made to the Belgian Foreign Minis- 
 ter the following declaration : 
 
 I am authorized to declare that in the event of 
 an international conflict, the government of the 
 Republic will, as it has always declared, respect 
 the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neu- 
 trality not being respected by another Power, the 
 French Government, in order to insure its own 
 defense, might be led to modify its attitude. * 
 
 On July 31, 1914, the English Ambassador at 
 Berlin saw the German Secretary of State, and 
 submitted Sir Edward Grey's pointed interroga- 
 tion, and the only reply that was given was that 
 "he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor 
 before he could possibly answer, " and the German 
 Secretary of State very significantly added that 
 for strategic reasons it was "very doubtful whether 
 they would return any answer at all." 
 
 Goschen also submitted the matter to the Ger- 
 man Chancellor, who also evaded the question by 
 stating that "Germany would in any case desire 
 
 'English While Paper, No. 125. 
 ' Belgian Cray Paper, No. 15.
 
 The Case of Belgium 209 
 
 to know the reply returned to you [the English 
 Ambassador] by the French Government." 
 
 That these were mere evasions the events on the 
 following day demonstrated. 
 
 On August 1st, Sir Edward Grey saw the German 
 Ambassador in London, and the following signifi- 
 cant conversation took place: 
 
 I told the German Ambassador to-day that the 
 reply of the German Government with regard to 
 the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very 
 great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium 
 affected feeling in this country. If Germany 
 could see her way to give the same assurance as 
 that which had been given by France it would 
 materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension 
 here. On the other hand, if there were a violation 
 of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant, 
 while the other respected it, it would be extremely 
 difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. 
 I said that we had been discussing this question at 
 a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell 
 him this I gave him a memorandum of it. 
 
 He asked me whether, if Germany gave a 
 promise net to violate Belgian neutrality, we 
 would engage to remain neutral. 
 
 I replied that I could not say that; our hands 
 were still free, and we were considering what our 
 attitude should be. All I could say was that our 
 attitude would be determined largely by public 
 opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium 
 would appeal very strongly to public opinion here.
 
 210 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 I did not think that we could give a promise of 
 ncutraHty on that condition alone. ' 
 
 On the following day, August 2d, the German 
 Minister at Brussels handed to the Belgian Foreign 
 Office the following "highly confidential" docu- 
 ment. After stating that "the German Govern- 
 ment has received reliable information, according 
 to which the French forces intend to march on the 
 Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur, " and after 
 suggesting a "fear that Belgium, in spite of its best 
 will, will be in no position to repulse such a largely 
 developed French march without aid," the docu- 
 ment adds: 
 
 It is an imperative duty for the preservation of 
 Germany to forestall this attack of the enemy. 
 The German Government would feel keen regret 
 if Belgium should regard as an act of hostility 
 against herself the fact that the measures of the 
 enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to 
 violate Belgian territory.^ 
 
 Some hours later, at 1.30 a.m. on August 3d, 
 the German Minister aroused the Belgian Secre- 
 tary General for the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 from his slumbers and, 
 
 asked to see Baron von der Elst. He told him that 
 he was instructed by his Government to inform us 
 
 * English While Vaper, No. 123. ' Belgian Gray Book, No. 20.
 
 The Case of Belgium 211 
 
 that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that 
 a patrol of French cavalry, violating international 
 law, seeing that war was not declared, had crossed 
 the frontier. 
 
 The Secretary General asked Herr von Below 
 where these events had taken place; in Germany, 
 he was answered. Baron von der Elst observed 
 that in that case he could not understand the 
 object of his communication. Herr von Below said 
 that these acts, contrary to international law, were 
 of a nature to make one expect that other acts con- 
 trary to international law would he perpetrated hy 
 France. ' 
 
 As to these last communications, it should be 
 noted that the German Government, neither then 
 nor at any subsequent time, ever disclosed to the 
 world the "reliable information," which it claimed 
 to have of the intentions of the French Govern- 
 ment, and the event shows beyond a possibility of 
 contradiction that at that time France was un- 
 prepared to make any invasion of Belgium or even 
 to defend its own north-eastern frontier. 
 
 It should further be noted that the alleged 
 aggressive acts of France, which were made the 
 excuse for the invasion of Belgium, according to 
 the statement of the German Ambassador himself, 
 did not take place i7i Belgium but in Germany. 
 
 ' Belgian Gray Paper, No. 21.
 
 212 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 On August 3d, at 7 o'clock in the morning, 
 Belgium served upon the German Ambassador 
 at Brussels the following reply to the German 
 ultimatum, which, after quoting the substance of 
 the German demand, continued: 
 
 This note caused profound and painful surprise 
 to the King's Government. 
 
 The intentions which it attributed to France 
 are in contradiction with the express declarations 
 which were made to us on the ist August in the 
 name of the Government of the Republic. 
 
 Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a 
 violation of Belgian neutrality were to be com- 
 mitted by France, Belgium would fulfill all her 
 international duties, and her army would offer the 
 most vigorous opposition to the invader. 
 
 The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties 
 of 1870, establish the independence and the neu- 
 trality of Belgium under the guarantee of the 
 Powers, and particularly of the Government of His 
 Majesty the King of Prussia. 
 
 Belgium has always been faithful to her inter- 
 national obligations; she has fulfilled her duties 
 in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has neglected 
 no effort to maintain her neutrality or to make it 
 respected. 
 
 The attempt against her independence, with which 
 the German Government threatens her, would 
 constitute a flagrant violation of international law. 
 No strategic interest justifies the violation of that 
 law.
 
 The Case of Belgium 213 
 
 The Belgian Government would, by accepting the 
 propositions which are notified to her, sacrifice the 
 honor of the nation while at the same time betraying 
 her duties toward Europe. 
 
 Conscious of the part Belgium has played for 
 more than eighty years in the civilization of the 
 world, she refuses to believe that her independence 
 can be preserved only at the expense of the viola- 
 tion of her neutrality. 
 
 If this hope were disappointed the Belgian 
 Government has firmly resolved to repulse by 
 every means in her power any attack upon her 
 rights. 
 
 In the records of diplomacy there are few 
 nobler documents than this, Belgium then knew 
 that she was facing possible annihilation. Every 
 material interest suggested acquiescence in the 
 peremptory demands of her powerful neighbor. 
 In the belief that then so generally prevailed, but 
 which recent events have somewhat modified, the 
 success of Germany seemed probable, and if so, 
 Belgium, by facilitating the triumph of Germany, 
 would be in a position to participate in the spoils 
 of the victory. 
 
 If Belgium had regarded her honor as lightly as 
 Germany and felt that the matter of self-preser- 
 vation would excuse any moral dereliction, she 
 would have imitated the exam.ple of Luxemburg, 
 also invaded, and permitted free passage to the
 
 214 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 German army without essential loss of her ma- 
 terial prosperity', but with a fatal sacrifice to her 
 national honor. 
 
 Even under these conditions Belgium evidently 
 entertained a hope that Germany at the last 
 moment would not, in view of its promises and the 
 protest of Belgium, commit this foul outrage. 
 
 The military attache of the French Government, 
 being apprised of Germany's virtual declaration 
 of war, offered "the support of five French army 
 corps to the Belgian Government," and in reply 
 Belgium, still jealously regardful of her obliga- 
 tion of neutrality, replied : 
 
 We are sincerely grateful to the French Govern- 
 ment for offering eventual support. In the actual 
 circumstances, however, we do not propose to 
 appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. The Belgian 
 Government will decide later on the action which 
 they think it necessary to take. 
 
 As in Caesar's time, the Belgas, of all the tribes 
 of Gaul, are in truth "the bravest." 
 
 Later in the evening, the King of Belgium met 
 his Ministers, and the offer of France was com- 
 mimicated to them, and again the Belgian Govern- 
 ment, still reposing some confidence in the Punic 
 faith of Prussia, decided not to appeal to the
 
 The Case of Belgium 215 
 
 guaranteeing Powers, or to avail itself of the offers 
 of France. 
 
 On the following morning at 6 o'clock the 
 German Minister handed this formal declaration of 
 war to the Belgian Government: 
 
 I have been instructed, and have the honor to 
 inform your Excellency, that in consequence of the 
 Government of His Majesty the King having de- 
 cHned the well-intentioned proposals submitted to 
 them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, 
 deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out — • 
 if necessary by force of arms — the measures of 
 security which have been set forth as indispensable 
 in view of the French menaces. 
 
 Here again, no active violation of Belgium's 
 neutrality by France is alleged, only "French 
 menaces." 
 
 The conjecture is plausible that in the case of 
 the Prussian General Staff, it was their "own hard 
 dealings" which thus taught them to "suspect 
 the thoughts of others." 
 
 On that day the German troops crossed the 
 Belgian frontier and hostilities began. 
 
 On the same day, at the great session of the 
 Reichstag, when the Imperial Chancellor at- 
 tempted to justify to the world the hostile acts of 
 Germany, and especially the invasion of Belgium,
 
 2i6 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 the pretended defense was thus bluntly stated by 
 the German Premier: 
 
 We are now in a state of necessity and necessity 
 knows no law. Our troups have occupied Luxem- 
 burg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. 
 Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of inter- 
 national law. It is true that the French Govern- 
 ment has declared at Brussels that France is willing 
 to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as 
 her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that 
 France stood ready for invasion. France could 
 wait, hut we could not wait. A French movement 
 upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have 
 been disastrous. So we were compelled to override 
 the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian 
 Governments. The wrong — / speak openly — that 
 we are committing we will endeavor to make good as 
 soon as our military goal has been reached. Any- 
 body who is threatened, as we are threatened, and is 
 fighting for his highest possessions, can only have 
 one thought — how he is to hack his way through. 
 
 It will be noted that on this occasion, when 
 above all other occasions it was not only the duty, 
 but to the highest interests of Germany, to give 
 to the world any substantial reason for violating 
 the neutrality of Belgium, the defense of Ger- 
 many is rested upon the ground of self-interest, 
 — euphemistically called "necessity," — and upon 
 none other.
 
 The Case of Belgium 217 
 
 While Von Bethmann-HoUweg's statement 
 does state that "France held herself in readiness to 
 invade Belgium," there was no intimation that 
 France had done so, or had any immediate inten- 
 tion of doing so. On the contrary, it was added, 
 *^ France could wait, we {Germany) could not.'' If 
 Belgium had forfeited its rights by undue favors 
 to France or England, why did the Chancellor char- 
 acterize its protest as "just" ? 
 
 How Germany fulfilled the promise of its 
 Chancellor, to "make good" the admitted wrong 
 which it did Belgium, subsequent events have 
 shown. 
 
 It may be questioned whether, since the Thirty 
 Years' War, any country has been subjected to 
 such general devastating horrors. So little effort 
 has been taken by the conqueror to lessen the 
 inevitable suffering, that fines have been levied 
 upon this impoverished people, which would be 
 oppressive even in a period of prosperity. It 
 is announced from Holland, as this book goes to 
 press, that Germany has imposed upon this war- 
 desolated country a fine of $7,000,000 per month 
 and an especial fine of $75,000,000, for its 
 "violation of neutrality." 
 
 Were this episode not a tragedy, the sardonic 
 humor, which caused the German General Staff
 
 2i8 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 to impose this monstrous fine upon Belgium for 
 its "violation of neutrality," would have the 
 tragi-comical aspects of Bedlam. It recalls the 
 fable of the wolf who complained that the lamb 
 was muddying the stream and when the lamb 
 politely called the wolf's attention to the fact 
 that it stood lower down on the river side than the 
 wolf, the latter announced its intention to devour 
 the lamb in any event. Such is probably the 
 intention of Prussia. If it prevail Belgium as 
 an independent State will cease to exist and 
 it will be mourned as Poland is. Like Poland, it 
 may have a resurrection. 
 
 The war having thus commenced between 
 Germany and Belgium, the brave ruler of the 
 latter country — "every inch a King" — addressed 
 to the King of England the following appeal : 
 
 Remembering the numerous proofs of your 
 Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, 
 and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and 
 the proof of friendship you have just given us again, 
 I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic inter- 
 vention of your Majesty's Government to safe- 
 guard the integrity of Belgium. ^ 
 
 In reply to that appeal, which no chivalrous 
 nation could have disregarded, Sir Edward Grey 
 
 ' Belgian Gray Po,^er, No. 25.
 
 The Case of Belgium 219 
 
 immediately, on August 4th, advised the British 
 Ambassador in Berlin as follows: 
 
 We hear that Germany has addressed a note to 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that 
 German Government will be compelled to carry 
 out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures 
 considered indispensable. 
 
 We are also informed that Belgian territory has 
 been violated at Gemmenich. 
 
 In these circumstances, and in view of the fact 
 that Germany declined to give the same assurance 
 respecting Belgium as France gave last week in 
 reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin 
 and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask 
 that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of 
 this morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. 
 If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, 
 and to say that his Majesty's Government feel 
 bound to take all steps in their power to uphold 
 the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a 
 treaty to which Germany is as much a party as 
 ourselves.^ 
 
 Thereupon Sir Edward Goschen, the British 
 Ambassador in Berlin, called upon the Secretary of 
 State and stated in the name of His Majesty's 
 Government that unless the Imperial Government 
 
 could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night 
 that they would proceed no further with their 
 
 ' English WhiU Paper. ISi^. 159.
 
 220 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 violation of the Belgian frontier and step their 
 advance, I had been instructed to demand my pass- 
 ports and inform the Imperial Government that His 
 Majesty's Government would have to take all 
 steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of 
 Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which 
 Germany was as much a party as themselves. 
 
 Herr von Jagow repHed that to his great regret 
 he could give no other answer than that which he 
 had given me earlier in the day, namely, that 
 the safety of the Empire rendered it absolute- 
 ly necessary that the Imperial troops should ad- 
 vance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency 
 a written summary of your telegram and, pointing 
 out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time 
 when His Majesty's Government would expect an 
 answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible 
 consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were 
 not possible even at the last moment that their 
 answer should be reconsidered. He replied that 
 if the time given were even twenty-four hours or 
 more, his answer must be the same. I said that 
 in that case I should have to demand my passports. 
 This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. . . . 
 
 I then said that I should like to go and see the 
 Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I 
 should have an opportunity of seeing him. He 
 begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very 
 agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, 
 which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said 
 that the step taken by His Majesty's Government 
 was terrible to a degree; just for a word — "neutra- 
 lity, " a word which in war time had so often been 
 disregarded — just for a scrap of paper Great Britain
 
 The Case of Belgium 221 
 
 was going to make war on a kindred nation who de- 
 sired nothing better than to be friends with her. All 
 his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless 
 by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, 
 as I knew, he had devoted himself since his acces- 
 sion to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. 
 What we had done was unthinkable; it was like 
 striking a man from behind while he was fighting 
 for his life against two assailants. He held Great 
 Brica^n responsible for all the terrible events that 
 might happen. I protested strongly against that 
 statement, and said that, in the same way as he and 
 Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for 
 strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death 
 to Germany to advance through Belgium and vio- 
 late the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to 
 understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life 
 and death'' for the honor of Great Britain that she 
 should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost 
 to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That 
 solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what 
 confidence could any one have in engagements 
 given by Great Britain in the future? The 
 Chancellor said, "But at what price will that com- 
 pact have been kept. Has the British Government 
 thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as 
 plainly as I could that fear of consequences could 
 hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn 
 engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so 
 evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so 
 little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from 
 adding fuel to the flame by further argument. . . ' 
 
 'British White Paper, No. i6o.
 
 222 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Here again it is most significant, in view of the 
 subsequent clumsily framed defense by Geiman 
 apologists, to note that the German Secretary of 
 State, Herr von Jagow, and his superior, the Ger- 
 man Chancellor, did not pretend to suggest that 
 the invasion of Belgium was due to any overt act 
 of France. 
 
 With even greater frankness Von Jagow stated 
 the real purpose, which was, "to advance into 
 France by the quickest and easiest way," and to 
 "avoid the more Southern route," which, "in 
 view of the paucity of roads and the strength of 
 the fortresses," would have entailed "great loss 
 of time." 
 
 The damning conclusion as to the guilt of Ger- 
 many, which irresistibly follows from these ad- 
 mitted facts, is sought to be overborne by a 
 pamphlet entitled " The Truth about Germany,'" and 
 subscribed to by a number of distinguished Ger- 
 mans, who are in turn vouched for in America by 
 Professor John W. Burgess of Columbia College. 
 He tells us that they are the "salt of the earth," 
 and "among the greatest thinkers, moraHsts, 
 and philanthropists of the age." To over- 
 bear the doubter with the v/eight of such 
 authority we are told that this defense has the 
 support of the great theologian, Hamack, the
 
 The Case of Belgium 223 
 
 sound and accomplished political scientist and 
 economist, Von Schmoller, the distinguished philo- 
 logian, Von Wilamowitz, the well-known historian, 
 Lamprecht, the profound statesman, Von Posadow- 
 sky, the brilliant diplomatist. Von Biilow, the 
 great financier, Von G winner, the great promoter of 
 trade and commerce, Ballin, the great inventor, 
 Siemens, the brilliant preacher of the Gospel, 
 Dryander, and the indispensable Director in the 
 Ministry of Education, Schmidt. (The adjectives 
 are those of Professor Burgess.) 
 
 The average American, as indeed the average 
 citizen of any country, when his natural passions 
 are not unduly aroused, is apt to take a very 
 prosaic and dispassionate view of such matters, 
 and when he has reached his conclusion based 
 upon everyday, commonplace morality, he is not 
 apt to be shaken even by an imposing array 
 of names, fortified by an enthusiastic excess of 
 grandiloquent adjectives. The aristocracy of 
 brains has no monopoly of truth, which is often 
 best grasped by the democracy of common sense. 
 
 The defense of these notable representatives 
 of German thought seems to be based upon the 
 wholly unsupported assertion that "England and 
 France were resolved not to respect the neutrality 
 of Belgium."
 
 224 The Evidence in the Case 
 They say: 
 
 It would have been a crime against the German 
 people if the German General Staff had not antici- 
 pated this intention. The inalienable right of 
 self-defense gives the individual, whose very exist- 
 ence is at stake, the moral liberty to resort to 
 weapons which would be forbidden except in times 
 of peril. As Belgium would, nevertheless, not 
 acquiesce in a friendly neutrality, which would 
 permit the unobstructed passage of German troops 
 through small portions of her territory, although 
 her integrity was guaranteed, the German General 
 Staff was obliged to force the passage in order to 
 avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the 
 most unfavorable ground. 
 
 In other words, it seemed preferable to the 
 German General Staff that it should fight in 
 France rather than in Germany, and for this 
 reason Belgium must be ruined. 
 
 Notwithstanding this and similar propositions, 
 which are so abhorrent in their political immorality, 
 it is yet gravely suggested by Dr. Dernberg and 
 others that Bemhardi's philosophy does not reflect 
 the true thought of the Prussian ruling classes. 
 Here are representative theologians, economists, 
 historians, statesmen, diplomatists, financiers, in- 
 ventors, and educators, who, in invoking the sup- 
 port of the educated classes in the United States,
 
 The Case of Belgium 225 
 
 deliberately subscribe to a proposition at which 
 even Machiavclli might have gagged. 
 
 We are further told that "the German troops, 
 with their iron discipline will respect the personal 
 property and liberty of the individual in Belgium 
 just as they did in France in 1870," and these 
 scientists, philosophers, and doctors of divinity 
 add that "Belgium would have been wise, if it 
 had permitted the passage of the German troops," 
 for the Belgian people ^' would have fared well from 
 the business point of view, for the army would have 
 proved a good customer and paid well. " 
 
 To this defense we are led in the last analy- 
 sis, that Belgium should have preferred cash 
 to her honor, just as the German General Staff 
 preferred dishonor to the sacrifice of an immediate 
 military advantage. 
 
 The possibilities of moral casuistry have been 
 severely tested in the attempt of these apologists 
 for Germany to defend the forcible invasion of 
 Belgium. 
 
 The ethical question has been made quite un- 
 necessarily to pivot upon the express contractual 
 obligations of England, Germany, and France 
 with respect to the neutrality of Belgium. The 
 indictment of Germany has been placed upon the 
 sound but too narrow ground that by the Treaty
 
 226 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 of 1839, and The Hague Convention of 1907, 
 Germany had obligated itself by a solemn pledge 
 to respect the neutrality both of Luxemburg and 
 Belgium. 
 
 If, however, there had been no Hague Conven- 
 tion and no Treaty of 1839, and if Germany. 
 England, and France had never entered into re- 
 ciprocal obligations in the event of war to respect 
 Belgium's neutrality, nevertheless upon the broad- 
 est considerations of international law the invasion 
 without its consent would be without any justifica- 
 tion whatever. 
 
 It is a fundamental axiom of international law 
 that each nation is the sole and exclusive judge 
 of the conditions under which it will permit an 
 alien to cross its frontiers. Its territory is sacro- 
 sanct. No nation may invade the territory of 
 another without its consent. To do so by com- 
 pulsion is an act of war. Each nation's land is its 
 castle of asylum and defense. This fundamental 
 right of Belgium should not be confused or ob- 
 scured by balancing the subordinate equities be- 
 tween France, Germany, and England with respect 
 to their formal treaty obligations. 
 
 Belgium's case has thus been weakened in the 
 forum of public opinion by too insistent reference 
 to the special treaties. The right of Belgium and
 
 The Case of Belgium 227 
 
 of its citizens as individuals, to be secure in their 
 possessions rests upon the sure foundation of 
 inalienable right and is guarded by the immutable 
 principle of moral law, "Thou shalt not steal." 
 It was well said by Alexander Hamilton : 
 
 The sacred rights of man are not to be searched 
 for in old parchments and musty records ; they are 
 written as with a sunbeam in the whole volume of 
 human nature by the hand of Divinity itself and 
 can never be erased by mortal power. 
 
 This truth can be illustrated by an imaginary 
 instance. Let us suppose that the armies of the 
 Kaiser had made the progress which they so 
 confidently anticipated, and had not simply cap- 
 tured Paris, but had also invaded England, and 
 that, in an attempt to crush the British Empire, 
 the German General Staff planned an inva- 
 sion of Canada. Let us further suppose that 
 Germany thereupon served upon the United States 
 such an arrogant demand as it made upon Bel- 
 gium, requiring the United States to permit it to 
 land an army in New York, with the accompany- 
 ing assurance that neither its territory nor in- 
 dependence would be injured, and that Germany 
 would generously reimburse it for any damage. 
 
 Let us further suppose — and it is not a very 
 fanciful supposition — that the United States
 
 228 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 would reply to the German demand that under no 
 circumstances should a German force be landed in 
 New York or its territory be used as a base of 
 hostile operations against Canada. To carry out 
 the analogy in all its details, let us then suppose 
 that the German fleet should land an army in the 
 city of New York, arrest its Mayor, and check 
 the first attempt of its outraged inhabitants to 
 defend the city by demolishing the Cathedral, the 
 Metropolitan Art Gallery, the City Hall and other 
 structures, and shooting down remorselessly large 
 numbers of citizens, because a few non-com- 
 batants had not accepted the invasion with due 
 humility. 
 
 Although Germany had not entered into any 
 treaty to respect the territory of the United 
 States, no one would seriously contend that Ger- 
 many would be justified in such an invasion. 
 
 The alleged invalidation of the treaty of 1839 
 being thus unimportant, Dr. Dernburg and Pro- 
 fessor von Mach fall back upon the only remain- 
 ing defense, that France had already violated the 
 neutrality of Belgium with the latter's consent. 
 Of this there is no evidence whatever. We have, on 
 the contrar}% the express assurance, which France 
 gave on the eve of the German invasion both 
 to Belgium and England, that it would not violate
 
 The Case of Belgium 229 
 
 the rights of Belgium, and in addition we have 
 the significant fact that when Belgium was 
 invaded, and it was vitally necessary that the 
 French Army should go with all possible speed 
 to its relief and thus stop the invasion and 
 save France itself from invasion, it was ten days 
 before France could send any adequate support. 
 Unhappily it was then too late. 
 
 If it were true that France intended to invade 
 Belgium, then of all the blunders that the German 
 Foreign Ofhce has made, the greatest was that it 
 did not permit France to carry out this step, for 
 it would have palliated the action of Germany in 
 meeting such violation by a similar invasion, and 
 it would thus have been an immeasurable gain for 
 Germany and a greater injury to France. 
 
 Germany's greatest weakness to-day is its 
 moral isolation. It stands condemned by the 
 judgment of the civiHzed world. No physical 
 power it can exercise can compensate for this loss 
 of moral power. Even success will be too dearly 
 bought at such a price. There are things which 
 succeed better than success. Truth is one of them. 
 
 Under the plea of necessity, which means Ger- 
 many's desire to minimize its losses of life, Germany 
 has turned Belgium into a shambles, trampled 
 a peaceful nation under foot and almost crushed its
 
 230 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 soul beneath the iron tread of its mighty armies. 
 
 Almost wounded unto death, and for a time 
 prostrate under the heel of the conqueror, 
 the honor of Belgium shines unsullied by any 
 selfish interests, personal dishonor, or lack of 
 courage. 
 
 It is claimed that there were officers of the French 
 Army in Liege and Namur before the war broke 
 out. Neither names nor dates have been given, 
 and the allegation might be fairly dismissed be- 
 cause of the very vagueness of the charge. But 
 even if it were true, international law does not 
 forbid the officers of one nation serving with the 
 armies of another. German officers have for many 
 years been thus employed in Turkey and engaged 
 in training and developing the Turkish Army, but 
 no one has ever contended that the employment 
 by that country of German military officers was 
 a violation of neutrality, or gave rise to a casus 
 belli. 
 
 It is wholly probable that there were some 
 German officers in Belgium before the war com- 
 menced, and if not. there were certainly hundreds 
 of spies, of whose pernicious activities the Belgian 
 people were to learn later to their infinite sorrow, 
 but because Germany employed an elaborate 
 system of espionage in Belgium, it could not
 
 The Case of Belgium 231 
 
 justify France in invading its territory without its 
 permission. 
 
 To a lawyer, who has had experience in the 
 judicial ascertainment of truth, there is one con- 
 sideration that justifies him in disposing of all these 
 vague allegations with respect to French activities 
 in Belgium on the eve of the war, and that is that 
 Germany has not only failed to give any testimony 
 in support of the charges, but it never suggested this 
 defense until the judgment of the civilized world 
 had branded it with an ineffaceable stain. 
 
 Professor von Mach, a former educator of Har- 
 vard University and an apologist for Germany, 
 feels this poverty of evidence and has rather 
 naively suggested an adjournment of the case. He 
 says: 
 
 Did French officers remain in Liege or in any 
 other Belgian fortress after hostilities had begun, 
 and did France plan to go through Belgium? Ger- 
 many has officially made both claims. The first 
 can easily be substantiated by The Supreme Court 
 of Civilization by an investigation of the prisoners 
 of war taken in Belgium. Until an impartial 
 investigation becomes possible no further proof 
 than the claim made by the German Government 
 can be produced. 
 
 As the French officers taken in Belgium are 
 presumably in German detention camps, it would
 
 232 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 seem that Germany should first substantiate it3 
 defense by names, dates, and places, although even 
 then the mere capture of French officers in Bel- 
 gium after the invasion had begun does not 
 necessarily indicate that they were in Belgium 
 before the invasion. 
 
 Dr. von Mach adds in the reply, which he made 
 in the New York Times to an article contributed 
 by the writer to that journal: 
 
 // is impossible to say here exactly what these proofs 
 are which Germany possesses, and which for military 
 reasons it has not yet been able to divulge. . . . This 
 is an important question, and the answer must be 
 left to The Supreme Court of Civilization. The 
 weight of the evidence would seem to point to a 
 justification of Germany. Yet no friend of Ger- 
 many can find fault with those who would wish to 
 defer a verdict until such time when Germany can 
 present her complete proof to the world, and this 
 may be when the war is over. 
 
 This naive suggestion, that the vital question of 
 fact should be postponed, and in the meantime 
 judgment should be entered for Germany, is 
 refreshing in its novelty. Its only parallel was 
 the contention of the celebrated Dr. Cook, who 
 contended that the world should accept his claim 
 as to the discovery of the North Pole and await 
 the proofs later.
 
 The Case of Belgium 233 
 
 Professor von Mach, in his book, " What Germany 
 Wants,'' further explains this dilatory defense and 
 amplifies it in a manner that is certainly unusual 
 in an historian. He recognizes that the speech of 
 the German Chancellor in the Reichstag on August 
 4th, in which Von Bethmann-HoUweg admitted 
 that the action of Germany in invading Belgium 
 was wrong and only justified it on the ground of 
 self-preservation, was a virtual plea of guilty by 
 Prussia of the crime, of which it stands indicted 
 at the bar of the civilized world. 
 
 Germany's scholarly apologist, as amicus curicBj 
 then suggests that in criminal procedure, when 
 a defendant pleads guilty, the Court often re- 
 fuses to accept his plea, enters a plea of not guilty 
 for him, and assigns counsel to defend the case. 
 He therefore suggests that the Chancellor's plea 
 of guilty should be disregarded and the Court 
 should assign counsel. 
 
 One difficulty with the analogy is that courts 
 do not ordinarily refuse to accept a plea of 
 guilty. On the contrary, they accept it almost 
 invariably, for why try the guilt of a man when he 
 himself in the most formal way acknow^ledges it? 
 
 The only instance in which a court does show 
 such consideration to a prisoner is when the de- 
 fendant is both poor and ignorant. Then, and
 
 234 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 only then, with a fine regard for human right, is 
 the procedure suggested by Prof, von Mach 
 followed. 
 
 To this humiliating position, Professor von 
 Mach as amicus curice consigns his great nation. 
 For myself, as one who admires Germany and be- 
 lieves it to be much greater and truer than its 
 ruling caste or its over-zealous apologists, I refuse 
 to accept the justification of such an absurd and 
 degrading analogy. 
 
 The bltmt acknowledgment of the German 
 Chancellor in the Reichstag, already quoted, is 
 infinitely preferable to the disingenuous defenses 
 of Germany's ardent but sophistical apologists. 
 Fully recognizing the import of his words, Von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, addressing the representa- 
 tives of the German nation, put aside with admir- 
 able candor all these sophistical artifices and 
 rested the defense of Germany upon the single 
 contention that Germany was beset by powerful 
 enemies and that it was a matter of necessity for 
 her to perpetrate this "wrong" and in this manner 
 to "hack her way through." 
 
 This defense is not even a plea of confession and 
 avoidance. It is a plea of "Guilty" at the bar of 
 the world. It has one merit. It does not add tc 
 the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy.
 
 The Case of Belgium 235 
 
 After the civilized world had condemned the 
 invasion of Belgium with an unprecedented ap- 
 proach to unanimity, the German Chancellor 
 rather tardily discovered that public opinion was 
 still a vital force in the world and that the strategic 
 results of the occupation of Belgium had not 
 compensated for the moral injury. For this reason 
 he framed five months after this crime against 
 civilization a belated defense, which proved so 
 unconvincing that the Bemhardi plea of military 
 necessity is clearly preferable, as at least having 
 the merit of candor. 
 
 After proclaiming to the w^orld that the German 
 Foreign Office had discovered in Brussels certain 
 secret documents, which disclosed the fact that 
 the neutrality of Belgium at the time of the in- 
 vasion was a sham and after the civilized world had 
 refused to accept this bald and unsupported 
 assertion, as it had also refused to accept the 
 spurious evidence of a well-known Arctic explorer, 
 the German Foreign Office in December, 19 14 
 published its alleged proofs. 
 
 The first purported to be a report of the Chief 
 of the Belgian General Staff to the Minister of 
 War and reported his conversations in 1906 with 
 a military attache of the British Legation in 
 Brussels.
 
 236 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 The second purported to be a report of similar 
 conversations in 191 2 between the same officials. 
 
 In an authorized statement, published on Janu- 
 ary 27, 191 5, Sir Edward Grey states that there 
 is no record of either of these negotiations in the 
 English Foreign Office or the War Office; but this 
 fact is not in itself conclusive and as there is no 
 evidence that the documents were forged, their 
 genuineness should be assumed in the absence of 
 some more specific denial. 
 
 The documents, however, do not appreciably 
 advance the cause of Germany, for they disclose 
 on their face that the conversations were not 
 binding on the Governments of England or Bel- 
 gium but were simply an informal exchange of 
 view between the officials, and what is far more to 
 the purpose, the whole of the first conversation of 
 April 10, 1906, was expressly based upon the 
 statement thet ''the etitry of the English into 
 Belgium would take place only after the violation of 
 our neutrality by Germany. " 
 
 The second document also shows that the Bel- 
 gian Chief of Staff expressly stated that any in- 
 vasion of Belgium by England, made to repel a 
 prior German invasion, could not take place with- 
 out the express consent of Belgium, to be given 
 when the occasion arose, and it is further evident
 
 The Case of Belgium 237 
 
 that the statement of the English military attache 
 — clearly a subordinate official to define the foreign 
 policy of a great Empire — expressly predicated his 
 assumption, that England might disembark troops 
 in Belgium, upon the statement that its object 
 would be to repel a German invasion of Belgian 
 territory. 
 
 If it be asked why England and Belgium were 
 thus in 1906 and 191 2 considering the contingency 
 of a German invasion of Belgium and the method 
 of effectually repelling it, the reply is obvious that 
 such invasion, in the event of a war between Ger- 
 many and France, was a commonplace of German 
 military strategists. Of this purpose they miade 
 little, if any, concealment. The construction by 
 Germany of numerous strategic railway lines on 
 the Belgian frontier, which were out of proportion 
 to the economic necessity of the territory, gave to 
 Europe some indication of Germany's purpose and 
 there could have been little doubt as to such 
 intention, if Germany had not, through its Foreign 
 Office, given, as previously shown, repeated and 
 continuous assurances to Belgium that such was 
 not its intention. 
 
 The German Chancellor — whose stupendous 
 blunders of speech and action in this crisis will be 
 the marvel of posterity — has further attempted to
 
 238 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 correct his record by two equally disingenuous 
 defenses. Speaking to the Reichstag on December 
 2, 1914, he said: 
 
 When on the 4th of August I referred to the 
 wrong which we were doing in marching through 
 Belgium, it was not yet known for certain whether 
 the Brussels Government in the hour of need would 
 not decide after all to spare the country and to 
 retire to Antwerp under protest. You remember 
 that, after the occupation of Li^gc, at the request of 
 our army leaders I repeated the offer to the Belgian 
 Government. For military reasons it was absolute- 
 ly imperative that at the time, about the 4th of 
 Augoist, the possibility for such a development 
 shoiild be kept open. Even then the guilt of the 
 Belgian Goveryiment was apparent from many a sign, 
 although I had not yet any positive documentary 
 proofs at my disposal. 
 
 This is much too vague to excuse a great crime. 
 The guilt of Belgium is said to be "apparent from 
 many a sign," but what these signs are the Char.- 
 cellor still fails to state. He admits that they were 
 not documentary in character. If the guilt of 
 Belgium had been so apparent to the Chancellor 
 on August the 4th, when he made his confession of 
 wrong doing in the Reichstag, then it is incredible 
 that he would have made such an admission. 
 
 As to the overt acts of France, all that the Chan- 
 cellor said in his speech of December 2 was "that
 
 The Case of Belgium 239 
 
 France's plan of campaign was known to us and 
 that it compelled us for reasons of self-preserva- 
 tion to march through Belgium." But it is again 
 significant that, speaking nearly five months after 
 his first public utterance on the subject and with a 
 full knowledge that the world had visited its 
 destructive condemnation upon Germany for its 
 wanton attack upon Belgium, the Chancellor can 
 still give no specific allegation of any overt act by 
 France which justified the i?ivasion. All that is 
 suggested is a supposed "plan of campaign. " 
 
 Following this unconvincing and plainly disin- 
 genuous speech, the Chancellor proceeded in an 
 authorized newspaper interview on January 25, 
 191 5 to state that his now famous — or infamous 
 — remark about "the scrap of paper" had been 
 misunderstood. 
 
 After stating that he felt a painful "surprise to 
 learn that my phrase, 'a scrap of paper,' should 
 have caused such an unfavorable impression on 
 the United States," he proceeds to explain that 
 in his now historic interview with the British 
 Ambassador, 
 
 he (von Bethmann-Hollweg) had spoken of the 
 treaty not as a "scrap of paper" for Germany, but 
 as an instrument which had become obsolete through 
 Belgium's forfeiture of its neutrality and that Great
 
 240 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Britain had quite other reasons for entering into the 
 war, compared with which the neutrality treaty 
 appeared to have only the value of a scrap of paper. 
 
 Let the reader here pause to note the twofold 
 character of this defense. 
 
 It suggests that Germany's guaranty of Bel- 
 gium's neutrality had become for Germany "a 
 scrap of paper" because of Belgium's alleged 
 forfeiture of its rights as a neutral nation, al- 
 though at the time referred to the German Chan- 
 cellor had not only asked the permission of Belgium 
 to cross its territory but immediately before his 
 interview with the British Ambassador he had 
 publicly testified in his speech in the Reichstag 
 to the justice of Belgium's protest. 
 
 The other and inconsistent suggestion is that, 
 without respect to Belgium's rights under the 
 treaty of 1839, the violation of its territory by 
 Germany was not the cause of England's interven- 
 tion ; but obviously this hardly explains the German 
 Chancellor's contemptuous reference to the long 
 standing and oft repeated guaranty of Belgium's 
 neutrality as merely a "scrap of paper. " 
 
 Having thus somewhat vaguely suggested a 
 twofold defense, the Chancellor, without impeach- 
 ing the accuracy of Goschen's report of the inter- 
 view, then proceeded to state that the conversation
 
 The Case of Belgium 241 
 
 in question took place immediately after his 
 speech in the Reichstag, in which, as stated, 
 he had admitted the justice of Belgium's protest 
 against the violation of its territory, and he adds 
 that, 
 
 when I spoke, I already had certam indications but 
 no absolute proof upon which to base a public ac- 
 cusation that Belgium long before had abandoned 
 its neutrality in its relations with England. Never- 
 theless I took Germany's responsibilities toward the 
 neutral States so seriously that I spoke frankly of 
 the wrong committed by Germany. 
 
 If the German Chancellor is truthful in his state- 
 ment that on August the 4th, when he spoke in 
 the Reichstag and an hour later had his conversa- 
 tion with Goschen, he had "certain indications" 
 that Belgium had forfeited its rights as an indepen- 
 dent nation by hostile acts, then the German Chan- 
 cellor took such a serious view of " Germany's 
 responsibilities" that, without any necessity or 
 justification, he indicted his country at the b:.r 
 of the whole world of a flagrant wrong. If he 
 could not at that time justify the act of the 
 German General Staff, he should at least have 
 been silent, but, according to his incredible state- 
 ment, although he had these "certain indications"
 
 242 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 and thus knew that Germany, in invading Belgium, 
 was simply attacking an already hostile country, 
 he deliberately explains, not only to his nation 
 but to the whole world, that such invasion was a 
 wrong and had no justification in international 
 law. How can any reasonable man, whose eyes 
 are not blinded with the passions of the hour, 
 accept this explanation? 
 
 It is even more remarkable that immediately 
 following the session of the Reichstag, when he 
 had his interview with Goschen, the German 
 Chancellor never suggested in his own defense or 
 that of his country, that he had "certain indica- 
 tions," which justified the action that day taken, 
 although he then knew that, unless he could justify 
 it, England would immediately join the already 
 powerful foes of Germany. 
 
 The reader need only reread Goschen' s report 
 of that interview (an/e, p. 214) to know how dis- 
 ingenuous this belated explanation is. With the 
 whole world ringing with the infamous phrase, the 
 German Chancellor, after five months of reflection, 
 can only make this pitiful defense. Its acceptance 
 subjects even the most credulous to a severe strain. 
 It exhausts the limit of gullibility. 
 
 The defense wholly ignores the fact that the 
 Chancellor had previously sought to bribe Eng-
 
 The Case of Belgium 243 
 
 land to condone in advance the invasion of Bel- 
 gium by Germany, and that Germany had also 
 coerced Luxemburg into a passive acquiescence in a 
 similar invasion, and there is as yet no pretense 
 that Luxemburg had failed in its obhgation of 
 neutrality. 
 
 Should the judgment of the civilized world 
 turn from the terrible fate of Belgium and con- 
 sider the wrong that was done to Luxemburg, 
 then the German Chancellor may, unless better 
 advised, frame further maladroit excuses with 
 reference to that country. 
 
 All these explanations, as senseless as they are 
 false, and savoring more of the tone of a crim- 
 inal court then that of an imperial chancellery, 
 should shock those who admire historic Germany. 
 They are unworthy of so great a nation. Bis- 
 marck would never have stooped to such pitiful 
 and transparent deception. The blunt candor of 
 Maximilian Harden, which we have already 
 quoted on page 12, is infinite^ preferable and the 
 position of Germany at the bar of the civilized 
 world will improve, when its maladroit Chancellor 
 has the courage and the candor to say, as Harden 
 did, that all this was done because Germany 
 regarded it as for its vital interests and because 
 " we willed it. "
 
 244 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest 
 veneering of barbarism ; unless the law of the world 
 is in fact only the ethics of the rifle and the con- 
 science of the cannon; unless mankind, after 
 imcounted centuries, has made no real advance in 
 political morality beyond that of the cave dweller, 
 then this answer of Germany cannot satisfy the 
 "decent respect to the opinions of mankind." 
 It is the negation of all that civilization stands for. 
 
 Belgium has been crucified in the face of the 
 world. Its innocence of any offense, until it was 
 attacked, is too clear for argimient. Its voluntary 
 immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of 
 neutrality will "plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, 
 against the deep damnation of its taking off." 
 
 It may be questioned whether, since the fall of 
 Poland, Civilization has been stirred to more pro- 
 found pity and intense indignation than by this 
 wanton outrage. Pity, radiating to the utmost 
 comers of the world by the "sightless couriers of 
 the air, " 
 
 "Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye 
 That tears shall drown the wind." 
 
 Was it also, as with Macbeth, a case of 
 
 "Vaulting ambition which o'erleaps itself 
 And falls on the other" ?
 
 The Case of Belgium 245 
 
 Time will tell. 
 
 Had Germany not invaded Belgium, it is an even 
 chance that England wotild not have intervened, 
 at least at the beginning of the war. 
 
 Germany could have detached a relatively 
 small part of its army to defend its highly fortified 
 Western frontier, and leaving France to wasce its 
 strength on frontal attacks on that almost im- 
 pregnable line of defense, Germany with the bulk of 
 its army and that of Austria could have made a 
 swift drive at Russia. 
 
 Is it not possible that that course would have 
 yielded better results than the fiasco, which 
 followed the fruitless drive at Paris? 
 
 If Germany succeeds, it will claim that "noth- 
 ing succeeds like success," and to the disciples of 
 Treitschke and Bernhardi this will be a sufficing 
 answer. 
 
 If it fail, posterity will be at a loss to determine 
 which blundered the worst, the German Foreign 
 Office or its General Staff, its diplomats or its 
 generals.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 THE JUDGMENT OF THE WORLD 
 
 The record has now been laid before the reader 
 in all its essential details. The witnesses for the 
 different countries have taken the stand and we 
 have their respective contentions in their own 
 words. Czar, Emperor, and King, as well as 
 Prime Minister, Chancellor, and Ambassador, have 
 testified as to the fateful events, which preceded 
 the outbreak of the war, with a fullness of detail, 
 to which history presents few parallels. The 
 evidence which Germany and Austria have sup- 
 pressed does not prevent the determination of 
 the issue. 
 
 It is a great tribute to the force of public opinion 
 and a clear recognition that the conscience of man- 
 kind does exist as something more than a visionary 
 abstraction, that the secrets of diplomacy have 
 been laid bare by most of the contending nations, 
 and that there is an earnest desire on the part of 
 all of them to justify their conduct respectively 
 
 at the bar of the civilized world. 
 
 246 ,
 
 The Judgment of the World 247 
 
 Even more impressive to the sincere friends of 
 peace is the significant fact that concurrently with 
 the most amazing display of physical force that 
 the world has ever known has come a direct appeal 
 by the belligerent nations to the neutral States, 
 and especially to the United States, not for practi- 
 cal co-operation in the hostilities but for moral 
 sympathy. 
 
 All past wars are insignificant in dimensions in 
 comparison with this. The standing army of the 
 Roman Empire, according to the estimate of 
 Gibbon, did not exceed 400,000, and guarded 
 that mighty Empire from the Euphrates to the 
 Thames. The grand army of Napoleon, which was 
 supposed to mark the maximum of human effort 
 in the art of war and with which he crossed a 
 century ago the Niemen, did not exceed 700,000. 
 To-day at least fifteen millions of men are engaged 
 in a titanic struggle, with implements of destruc- 
 tion, to which all past devices in the science of 
 destruction are insignificant. 
 
 Apparently, therefore, the ideals of the pacificist 
 are little better than a rainbow, a rainbow of 
 promise, perhaps, but still a rainbow, formed by 
 the rays of God's justice shining through the tears 
 of human pity. 
 
 But when, in contrast to this amazing display of
 
 248 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 physical power, there is contrasted an equally 
 unprecedented desire on the part of the contending 
 nations to justify their case at the bar of public 
 opinion and to gain the moral sympathy of the 
 neutral States, then it is seen that the "decent 
 respect to the opinions of mankind" is still a 
 mighty factor in human affairs, and the question as 
 to the judgment of the world, upon the moral 
 issues raised by this great controversy, becomes not 
 merely of academic but of great practical interest. 
 
 What that judgment will be it is not difficult 
 to determine, for the evidence in the case can 
 admit of but one conclusion. It may be, as Mr. 
 George Bernard Shaw says, that in the contending 
 nations, the ears are too greatly deafened by the 
 roar of the cannon and the eyes too blinded by the 
 smoke of battle, to reach a dispassionate conclu- 
 sion. But in the neutral States of the world, and 
 especially in thatgreatest of all the neutral Powers, 
 the United States of America, a judgment has 
 been pronounced that is unmistakable. 
 
 The great Republic is more free than any other 
 nation to reach a just conclusion "without fear, 
 favor, or affection." Without alliances with any 
 Power and with no practical interest in the Euro- 
 pean balance of power, itself composed of men 
 Df all the contending nations, it can, above every
 
 The Judgment of the World 249 
 
 other people, proceed to judgment, "with malice 
 toward none and with charity for all." 
 
 It is a tribute to its unique position among the 
 nations of the world that from the beginning of the 
 war each of the contending Powers has invoked 
 its judgment. The Kaiser, the President of the 
 French Republic, and the King of Belgium have 
 each in an especial way sought its moral support, 
 while to the other nations the question of the 
 attitude of the United States has been one of 
 practical and recognized importance. 
 
 If the United States is thus a moral arbiter in the 
 greatest war of history, its judgment is now, and 
 may hereafter increasingly become, a potential 
 factor of great significance. 
 
 The nature of that judgment is already apparent 
 to all men. The people of the United States, 
 numbering nearly one hundred milhons, have 
 reached, with an amazing approach to unanimity, 
 certain clear and definite conclusions. 
 
 These conclusions maybe summarized as follows: 
 
 I. That Germany and Austria in a time of 
 profound peace secretly concerted to impose their 
 will upon Europe in a matter affecting the balance 
 of power. Whether in so doing they intended to 
 precipitate a European war to determine the 
 hegemony of Europe is not satisfactorily established,
 
 250 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 although their whole course of conduct suggests 
 this as a possibility. They made war almost in- 
 evitable by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was 
 grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any 
 grievance that Austria may have had, and (b) in 
 giving to Scrvia and Europe insufficient time to 
 consider the rights and obligations of all interested 
 nations. 
 
 2 . That Germany had at all times the power to 
 induce Austria to preserve a reasonable and con- 
 ciliatory course, but at no time effectively exerted 
 its influence. On the contrary, it certainly 
 abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its 
 unreasonable course. 
 
 3. That England, France, Italy, and Russia 
 throughout the diplomatic controversy sincerely 
 worked for peace, and in this spirit not only 
 overlooked the original misconduct of Austria but 
 made every reasonable concession in the hope of 
 preserving peace. 
 
 4. That Austria, having mobilized its army, 
 Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its 
 forces. Such act of mobilization is the right of 
 any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian 
 armies did not cross the border or take any aggres- 
 sive action, no other nation had any just right to 
 complain, each having the same right to make 
 similar preparations. 
 
 5. That Germany, in abruptly declaring war 
 against Russia for failure to demobilize, when the 
 other Powers had offered to make any reasonable 
 concession and peace parleys were still in progress, 
 precipitated the war. 
 
 6. That the invasion of Belgium by Germany was
 
 The Judgment of the World 251 
 
 without any provocation and in violation of Bel- 
 gium's inherent rights as a sovereign State. The 
 sanctity of its territory does not depend exclusively 
 upon the Treaty of 1839 or The Hague Convention, 
 but upon fundamental and axiomatic principles 
 of international law. These treaties were simply 
 declaratory of Belgium's rights as a sovereign 
 nation and simply reaffirmed by a special covenant 
 the duty of Germany and the other Powers to 
 respect the neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 7. England was justified in its declaration of 
 war upon Germany, not only because of its direct 
 interests in the neutrality of Belgium, but also 
 because of the ethical duty of the strong nations 
 to protect the weak upon adequate occasion 
 from indefensible wrong. Apart from this general 
 ethical justification, England was, under the 
 Treaty of 1839, under an especial obHgation to 
 defend the neutrality of Belgium, and had it failed 
 to respect that obligation it would have broken its 
 solemn covenant. 
 
 If they are "thrice armed" who have their 
 ^'quarrel just," then England, France, Russia, and 
 Belgium can await with confidence, not merely 
 the immediate issue of the titanic conflict, but 
 also the equally important judgment of history.
 
 EPILOGUE 
 
 On the evening of July 31, 1914, the author 
 reached Basle. The rapid progress of events, 
 narrated in this volume, suggested the wisdom of 
 continuing the journey to Paris that night, but as 
 I wanted to see the tomb of Erasmus in the Basle 
 Cathedral I determined to break my long journey 
 from St. Moritz. 
 
 It seemed a fitting time to make a pilgrimage to 
 the last resting-place of the great humanist phil- 
 osopher of Rotterdam and Louvain, for in that 
 prodigious upheaval of the sixteenth century, 
 which has passed into histor}^ as the Reformation, 
 Erasmus was the one noble spirit who looked 
 with a tolerant and philosophical mind upon 
 both parties to the great controversy. He suf- 
 fered the fate of the conservative in a radical 
 time, and as the great storm convulsed Europe the 
 author of the Praise of Folly probably said on more 
 than one occasion : " A plague o' both your houses." 
 Nearly four centuries have passed since he joined 
 the "silent majority." between whom is no quarrel- 
 ing, and the desolated Louvain, which he loved, is 
 
 252
 
 Epilogue 253 
 
 to-day in its ruins a standing witness that immeas- 
 urable folly still rules the darkened counsels of men. 
 
 As I reached Basle and saw the spires of the 
 Cathedral rising above the Rhine, it seemed to me 
 that the great convulsion, which was then rock- 
 ing all Europe with seismic violence, was the great- 
 est since that of the French Revolution and might 
 have as lasting results as the great schism of the 
 sixteenth century. 
 
 I was not fated to see the tomb, for when I 
 reached my hotel the facilities of civilization had 
 broken down so abruptly that if I did not wish to 
 be interned in Switzerland I must leave early on 
 the following morning for Paris. Transportation 
 had almost entirely collapsed, communication was 
 difficult, and credit itself was so strained that 
 "mine host" of the Three Kings was disposed 
 to look askance even at gold. 
 
 Our journey took us to France by way of Delle. 
 Twenty-four hours after we passed that frontier 
 town, German soldiers entered and blew out the 
 brains of a French custom-house officer, thus the 
 first victim in the greatest war that the world has 
 ever known. 
 
 As we joiimeyed from Basle to Paris on that 
 last day of July the fair fields of France never 
 looked more beautiful. In the gleaming summer
 
 254 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 sun they made a new "field of the cloth of gold,'* 
 and the hayricks looked like the aureate tents of 
 a mighty army. It was harvest time, but already 
 the laborers had deserted their fields which, al- 
 though "white unto the harvest," seemed bereft of 
 the tillers. Some had left the bounty of nature to 
 join in the harvest of death. From the high pas- 
 ture lands of the Alps the herdsmen at the ringing 
 of the village church bells had left their herds and 
 before night had fallen were on their way to the 
 front. 
 
 At Belfort the station was crowded with French 
 troops and an elderly French couple came into our 
 compartment. The eyes of the wife were red with 
 weeping, while the man sank into his seat and with 
 his head upon his breast gazed moodily into va- 
 cancy. They had just parted with their son, who 
 had joined the colors. I stood for a time with this 
 French gentleman in the corridor of the train, 
 but as he could not speak English or German and 
 I could not speak French, it was impossible for us 
 to communicate the intense and tragical thoughts 
 that were passing through our minds. Suddenly 
 he pointed to the smiling harvest fields, by which 
 we passed so swiftly, and said ''Perdu! perdu!" 
 This word of tragical import could have been 
 applied to all civilization as well.
 
 Epilogue 255 
 
 The night of our arrival in Paris I fully expected 
 to see a half a million Frenchmen parading the 
 streets and enthusiastically cheering for war and 
 crying, as in 1870, "a Beriin!" I was to witness 
 an extraordinary transformation of a great nation. 
 An unusual silence brooded over the city. A few 
 hundred people paraded the chief avenues, crying 
 "down with war!", while a separate crowd of 
 equal size sang the national hymn. With these 
 exceptions there was no cheering or enthusiasm, 
 such as I would have expected from my precon- 
 ceived idea of French excitability. Men spoke in 
 undertones, with a quiet but subdued intensity of 
 feeling rather than with frenzied enthusiasm. 
 
 With a devotion that was extraordinary and a 
 pathetically brave submission to a possible fate, 
 they seemed to be sternly resolved to die to the 
 last man, if necessary, in defense of their noble 
 nation. Although I subsequently saw in the 
 thrilling days of mobilization many thousands 
 of soldiers pass through the railroad stations on 
 their way to the front, I never heard the rumble 
 of a drum or saw the waving of regimental colors. 
 
 No sacrifice seemed to be too great, whether 
 it was asked of man, woman, or child. The spirit 
 of materialism for the time being vanished. The 
 newspapers shrunk to a single sheet and all com-
 
 256. The Hvidence in the Case 
 
 mercial advertisements disappeared. Theaters, 
 art galleries, museums, libraries, closed their doors. 
 Upon some streets nearly every shop was closed, 
 with the simple but eloquent placard "Gone to join 
 the colors." The French people neither exulted, 
 boasted, nor complained. The only querulous 
 element was a small minority of the large body of 
 American tourists, so suddenly caught in a terrific 
 storm of human passions, who seemed to feel that 
 this Red Sea of blood should part until they could 
 walk dry-shod to the shore of safety. 
 
 In Germany similar scenes were enacted and a 
 like spirit of courage and self-sacrifice was shown. 
 
 It is a reflection upon civilization that two na- 
 tions, each so brave, heroic, and self-sacrificing, 
 should, without their consent and by the miserable 
 and iniquitous folly of scheming statesmen and 
 diplomats, be plunged into a war, of which no man 
 can see the end and which has already swept away 
 the flower of their manhood. 
 
 One great lesson of this conflict may be that no 
 aggressive war ought to be initiated unless the 
 policy of that war is first submitted to the masses 
 of the people, upon whom the burdens in the last 
 analysis fall and who must pay the dreadful penalty 
 with their treasure and their lives. 
 
 If the policy of this war had been submitted by
 
 Epilogue 257 
 
 a referendum to the Austrian and German peoples 
 with a full statement of the facts of the Servian 
 controversy, would they not have rejected a 
 form of arbitrament, which creates but does not 
 settle questions, convinces no one, and only sows 
 the seeds of greater hatred for future and richer 
 harvests of death? If the be-ribboned diplomats 
 and decorated generals of the General Staffs at 
 Berlin and Vienna had been without power to 
 precipitate this war, unless they themselves were 
 willing to occupy the trenches on the firing line, 
 this war might never have been. 
 
 Nearly five months have passed since that sum- 
 mer day, when I passed through smiling harvest 
 fields from the mountains to the Seine. The 
 trenches, in which innumerable brave men are 
 writing with their blood the records of their states- 
 men's follies, are filled with snow. The blackest 
 Christmas Eve within the memory of living man 
 has come and gone, perhaps the blackest, since in 
 the stillness of the night there fell upon the wonder- 
 ing ears of the shepherds the gracious refrain of 
 "Peace on earth, good will among men. " On that 
 night devout German soldiers sang in their trenches 
 in Flanders and along the Vistula the hymn of 
 
 Christmas Eve, "Stille Nacht, heilige Nacht.** 
 17
 
 258 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 Was this unconscious mockery, an expression 
 of invincible faith, or a reversion from habit to the 
 gentler associations of childhood? The spirit of 
 Christmas was not wholly dead, for it is narrated 
 that these brave men in English and German 
 trenches on this saddest of Christmas Eves de- 
 clared for a few hours of their own volition a 
 Christmas truce. 
 
 ' Some say that ever 'gainst that season comes 
 Wherein our Saviour's birth is celebrated 
 The bird of dawning singeth all night long, 
 And then, they say, no spirit dare stir abroad, 
 The nights are wholesome, then no planets strike, 
 So hallowed and so gracious is the time. " 
 
 There is not between the men in one trench and 
 those in another, each seeking the speediest oppor- 
 tunity to kill the other, any personal quarrel. On 
 occasion they even fraternize, only to resume 
 the work of mutual extermination. They would 
 not have quarreled, if the Berchtolds, the von 
 Bethmann-Hollwegs, and the von Jagows had 
 had sufficient loyalty to civilization to submit 
 any possible grievance, which either had, to the 
 judgment of Europe. 
 
 A spectacle more ghastly than this "far-flung 
 battle line" has never been witnessed since the
 
 Epilogue 259 
 
 world began, for these soldiers in gray or khaki 
 are not savages but are beings of an advanced 
 civilization. Their fighting can have in method 
 none of the old-time chivalry, such as was wit- 
 nessed at Fontenoy when the French commander 
 courteously invited his English rival to fire first. 
 The present is a chemical, mechanical war, than 
 which no circle in Dante's Inferno is more horribly 
 repellent. 
 
 When was better justified the terrible but beau- 
 tiful imagery in Milton's poem of The Nativity, when 
 he says of Nature: 
 
 " Only with speeches fair 
 She woos the gentle air 
 
 To hide her guilty front with innocent snow, 
 And on her naked shame 
 Pollute with sinful blame 
 The saintly veil of maiden white to throw; 
 Confounded that her Maker's eyes 
 Should look so near upon her foul deformities/ 
 
 The snow cannot hide the horrors of the present 
 conflict. Even night, in other wars more merciful, 
 no longer throws its sable mantle of mercy over 
 the dying and the dead. By the use of powerful 
 searchlights the work of destruction continues. 
 As though the surface of the earth were no longer 
 sufficient for this malignant exercise of the genius
 
 26o The Evidence in the Case 
 
 of man, the heavens above and the waters under 
 the earth have become at length the battlefields 
 of the nations. Even from the infinite azure falls 
 
 " . . . . a ghastly dew 
 
 From the nations' airy navies, grappling in the 
 central blue. " 
 
 Can all history afford a parallel in malignity to 
 the submarine, which, having sunk one vessel 
 with all its human lives, calmly awaits, with its 
 periscope projecting above the water like the ma- 
 lignant eye of a devil fish, the arrival of rescuing 
 ships to sink them also? 
 
 Was the gracious refrain of "Peace on earth, 
 good will among men," merely a mockery of man's 
 hope, making of his civilization a mere mirage? 
 Will 
 
 " CcPsar's spirit ranging for revenge 
 With Ate from his side come hot from Hell ' ' — 
 forever crucify afresh and put to an open shame 
 the gentle Galilean? 
 
 The angelic song of Bethlehem was neither the 
 statement of a fact nor even a prophecy. In its 
 true translation it was the statement of a pro- 
 found moral truth, upon which in the last analysis 
 the pacification of humanity must depend. The 
 great promise was "Peace on earth to men of good 
 wilir
 
 Epilogue 261 
 
 Peace to the pacific, that was the great message. 
 For all others the great Teacher had but one pre- 
 diction and that was "the distress of nations, 
 . . . men's hearts failing them for fear. " Until 
 civilization can grasp the truth that there can be 
 no peace until there is among all nations a spirit 
 of conciliation and a common desire of justice, 
 the cause of peace can be little more than a 
 beautiful dream. Hague conventions, inter- 
 national tribunals, and agreements to arbitrate, 
 while minimizing the causes of war and affording 
 the machinery for the pacific adjustment of justici- 
 able questions, will yet prove altogether inertec- 
 tual, irrespective of the size of the parchment, 
 the imposing character of the seals, or the length 
 of the red tape, unless the nations which execute 
 them have sufficient loyalty to civilization to ask 
 only that which seems just and to submit any dis- 
 putable question to the pacific adjustment of an 
 impartial tribunal. 
 
 I appreciate that some questions are not justici- 
 able and cannot be arbitrated. The historic 
 movements of races, like those of glaciers, cannot 
 be stopped by mortal hands, and yet even these 
 slow-moving masses of ice are stayed by an In- 
 visible Hand and melt at length into gentle and 
 fructifying streams. To create the universal state
 
 262 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 and to develop a spirit of paramount loyalty to it 
 affords the only solution of this seemingly in- 
 soluble problem. 
 
 History affords no more striking illustration of 
 this fact than the present war. Each of the con- 
 tending nations was pledged to peace. All of 
 the greater ones were signatories to the Hague 
 Convention, but as the chain can never be stronger 
 than its weakest link, the pacific efforts of England, 
 France, and Russia to adjust a purely' justiciable 
 question by negotiation and mediation wholly 
 failed because Austria and Germany had deter- 
 mined to test the mastery of Europe by an 
 appeal to the sword. The fundamental cause of 
 the conflict was their lack of loyalty to civilization, 
 due to a misguided and perverted spirit of excessive 
 nationalism. 
 
 Until with the slow-moving progress of mankind 
 the greater unit of the Universal State can be cre- 
 ated, it should be the common and equal concern 
 of all nations, not merely to defeat this primitive 
 appeal to brute force but to make impossible the 
 recurrence of such an iniquitous reversion to bar- 
 barism. To do this, while any nation unjustly 
 appeals to force, force is unhappily necessary, but 
 there would be few occasions to repel force by 
 force if there were surficient solidarity in mankind
 
 Epilogue 263 
 
 to make it the common concern of the civilized 
 world to suppress promptly and ejfifectually any 
 disturber of its peace. 
 
 If the present wanton attack upon the very 
 foundations of civilization had been regarded as 
 the common concern of all nations, it would never 
 have taken place and might never occur again. 
 To prevent such recurrence, thoughtful men of all 
 nations should cooperate, so that when the present 
 titanic struggle is over, an earnest and universal 
 effort can be made to create such a compact be- 
 tween the civilized nations as will insure coopera- 
 tive effort when any nation attempts to apply the 
 torch of war to the stately edifice of civilization. 
 May not this great war prove the supreme travail 
 of humanity, whereof this nobler era will be 
 born? 
 
 It should be the especial duty of the United 
 States to lead in this onward movement. It has 
 been in no small measure the liberator of mankind. 
 Let it now be its pacificator ! Can it do so in any 
 better spirit than that voiced by one of the 
 noblest of its Presidents at the close of another 
 gigantic conflict, of which he was to be the last and 
 greatest martyr, when he said: 
 
 With malice toward none, with charity for all, 
 with firmness in the right as God gives us to see
 
 264 The Evidence in the Case 
 
 the right, let us strive to finish the work we are in; 
 to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him 
 who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow 
 and orphan; and to do all which may achieve and 
 cherish a just and lasting peace.
 
 INDEX 
 
 Albert, King of the Belgians, 
 conversation of, with Kaiser, 
 107 ff.; appeal of, to Eng- 
 land, 218 
 
 Attila, Kaiser's reference to, 
 quoted, 14 
 
 Austria, given carte blanche, x ; 
 refuses peace proposals, xi; 
 underlying causes of her 
 ultimatum to Servia, 19 ff.; 
 annexes Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina, 20; keeps secret 
 diplomatic correspondence, 
 23; Crown Prince of, assas- 
 sinated, 20, 31; silence of, 
 proves guilt, 25, 26; refuses 
 England's propositions, 28; 
 Germany's communications 
 to, withheld from public, 2S, 
 29; Red Book of, analyzed, 
 30; attitude of, false, 34; 
 ignorance of ultimatum of, 
 among diplomatic corps, 33 ; 
 insists situation will "be 
 cleared up," 35; of neces- 
 sity supported by Germany 
 before ultimatum, 36, 37; 
 would not have sent ultima- 
 tum without Germany's 
 backing, 36 ff . ; ultimatum of, 
 examined and characterized, 
 40, 41 ; ultimatum of, to Ser- 
 via quoted in full, 47 el seq.; 
 population of, 55; Austria- 
 Servian relations, 56; 
 promises to respect Servian 
 
 265 
 
 territory, 59, 60; effect of 
 ultimatum of, 61 ; attitude of, 
 towards Servia's reply, 83, 
 84; most discreditable action 
 of, 86; mobilizes, 86; not 
 urged by Germany to con- 
 sider peace proposals, 88; 
 does not reply to Russian 
 proposal, 91; claims Servia 
 to be aggressor in first 
 skirmish, 96; refuses dis- 
 cussion of Servian note, 98; 
 again refuses Russia's pleas 
 for peace, 99, 100; suppres- 
 sion of news in, 113; offered 
 reparation b}- Servia, 114; 
 knew that Servia would 
 refuse demand of "judiciary 
 co-operation," 115; sounds 
 Italy regarding war on Ser- 
 via, 119; ultimatum design- 
 edly withheld from powers, 
 121; petty finesse of, 123; 
 ultimatum issued when 
 foreign diplomats were out 
 of the way, 123, 124; avoids 
 foreign diplomats, 125; be- 
 lieves its interests require 
 punishment of Servia, 136; 
 national selfishness, 136; 
 bombards Belgrade, 149; in- 
 sists upon pursuing action 
 against Servia, 170; at 
 last agrees to discuss 
 Servian note with Russia, 
 1 73 ; causes of partial reversal 
 of policy, 175 ff.; offer of 
 July 31, 1914, 190 et scq.;
 
 266 
 
 Index 
 
 Austria — Continued 
 
 offer to discuss ultimatum 
 merely nominal, 190; refuses 
 Russia's stipulation con- 
 cerning mediation, i9i;coun- 
 ter suggestions of, to British 
 Government, 191; proposal 
 of, absurd, 192; signs "neu- 
 trality of Belgium" treaty, 
 198; suppression of evidence 
 by, useless, 246; conclusions 
 concerning actions of, 249 
 et seq.; see Berchtold, Sza- 
 pdry, Triple Alliance 
 
 B 
 
 Balkans, existing status of , up- 
 
 set 20 
 
 Balko-Turkish War, 34 
 
 Ballin, 223 
 
 Beck, James M., ancestry of, 
 vii 
 
 Belgium, invasion of, a crime, 
 vii; German demand on, xi; 
 the proof of Germany's 
 belief in von Bcrnhardi, 1 1 ; 
 publishes Gray Paper, 23; 
 Germany's disregard of 
 rights of, 196 ff. ; took no 
 part in preliminary war 
 controversy, 197; held no 
 interest in Servian question, 
 197; treaty of neutrality 
 signed, 198; restricts sale of 
 munitions of war in 1870, 
 200; Bismarck's letter to, 
 200; feared invasion by 
 Germany, 201 ; Germany 
 professes intention of re- 
 specting neutrality of, 201 ff.; 
 government fears German 
 invasion, 205, 206; requests 
 further assurance of Ger- 
 many's intentions to respect 
 neutrality, 206; reassured by 
 France, 208; adxiscd by 
 Germany of intended in- 
 vasion, 210; reply of, to 
 
 German ultimatum, 212; 
 hopes that Germany would 
 respect neutrality, 213, 214; 
 offered military support by 
 France, 214; refuses French 
 aid, 214; fined by Germany, 
 217,218; compared to Poland, 
 218; appeal of, to England, 
 218; effect of German in- 
 vasion, 229, 230; French 
 officers in, 230; German 
 officers and spies in, 230; 
 Germany claims neutrality 
 of, a sham, 235; anticipating 
 German invasion, 236 ff. ; 
 German railroads on frontier 
 of, 237; "guilt of," 238; con- 
 clusions concerning actions 
 of, 249 et seq.\ see Albert, 
 Davignon, Von der Elst 
 
 Berchtold, Count, removes 
 himself beyond reach of 
 personal parleys, 70, 71; 
 conversation of, with Rus- 
 sian Ambassador, 99, 100; 
 assures Russia that "claim 
 against Servia would be 
 acceptable," 123; contends 
 that British suggestions for 
 peace came too late, 190; 
 offer of, concerning media- 
 tion, 191; see Austria 
 
 Bernhardi, doctrines of, xviii 
 opinions of, on war quoted, 
 7 ff.; influence of, 10, 11; 
 indictment of, 15, 16; failure 
 of, 17; opinion of, concerning 
 England's attitude to Amer- 
 ica during Civil War, 17; 
 205 
 
 Bertheld, M., prepares Yellow 
 Book, 102 
 
 Bertie, Sir F., 207 
 
 Bethmann-Hollwcg, Dr. von, 
 quoted, viii; message of, to 
 Federated Governments of 
 Germany quoted, 44, 45; 
 blunders of, 194; declares 
 Germany will respect Bel-
 
 Index 
 
 267 
 
 Bethmann-Hollwep;, Dr. — Con. 
 gianneutrality,202 ;attcmpts 
 to justify Germany's actions 
 toward Belgium, 215, 216; 
 "scrap of paper" speech 
 quoted, 220, 221; speech of, 
 concerning invasion of Bel- 
 gium, 238; discusses "scrap 
 of paper" remark, 239 fl.; 
 see Germany 
 
 Bismarck, and militarism, xix 
 lY. ; attitude of, during peace 
 negotiations, xix; and 
 "spread eaglcism," xix, xx; 
 respects neutrality of Bel- 
 gium, 200; 103 
 
 Bosnia annexed by Austria, 20 
 
 Brussels, secret documents in, 
 235 
 
 Bunsen, Sir M. de, report 
 of, to Sir Edward Grey 
 regarding ignorance of 
 Diplomatic Corps concern- 
 ing Austria's ultimatum, 32, 
 33; quoted regarding Ger- 
 many's knowledge of Aus- 
 trian ultimatum, 37 
 
 Burgess, Prof. John W., sup- 
 ports Germany, 222 
 
 Cambon, Jules, prepares Yel- 
 low Book, 1 02 ; an estimate of 
 his abilities, 104, 105; advises 
 France of Germany's early 
 mobilization, 120; inter- 
 views Von Jagow on Austrian 
 ultimatum, 121 £F. ; urges 
 peace conference, 133; see 
 France 
 
 Cook, Dr., Germany compared 
 to, 232 
 
 Crackenthorpe, Mr., British 
 Ambassador at Belgrade, 
 instructions to, 82 fT. 
 
 Crown Prince of Germany, the, 
 an adherent of brute force, 
 13 
 
 Czar, "the champion of Chris- 
 tianity," xxii; despatch to, 
 from Kaiser regarding mur- 
 der of Archduke, 147; reply 
 of, to Kaiser, 148; reply to 
 third message of Kaiser, 151 ; 
 last message of, to Kaiser, 
 184, 185; telegram of, to 
 King George, 189; telegram 
 of, to Kaiser, suppressed by 
 German Foreign Oiiice, 189; 
 "not guilty," 189 
 
 D 
 
 Davignon, M., conversation 
 of, with Von Below quoted, 
 206 
 
 "Decent respect to the opin- 
 ions of mankind," vi 
 
 Declaration of Independence 
 cited, 3 
 
 Dernberg, Dr., 224; claims 
 France violated Belgian neu- 
 trality, 228 
 
 Disfurth, Major-General von, 
 on Germany's war policy, 
 quoted, 12, 13 
 
 Dryander, Dr., 197, 223 
 
 E 
 
 England, anticipation of war 
 in, xii; fear of, for Germany, 
 xxi; has also had its "Bem- 
 hardis," 15; Bernhardi's 
 opinion of attitude during 
 Civil War, 17; publishes 
 White Paper, 22; testimony 
 of British Ambassador at 
 Vienna cited. 32, 33; prob- 
 ability of inter\'ention of, 
 66; requests time, 70, 71; 
 assured of French and 
 Russian alliance, 77; refuses 
 to align definitely with 
 Russia and France, 79; sug- 
 gests peace conference in 
 London, 93; assures Ger-
 
 268 
 
 Index 
 
 England — Continued 
 
 many of her desire for 
 peace, 153; requested to act 
 as mediator, 191; reason for 
 use of word instead of 
 "Great Britain," 195; signs 
 "neutrality of Belgium" 
 treaty, 198; inquires as to 
 German and French inten- 
 tions toward Belgium, 207; 
 requests Belgium to main- 
 tain her neutrality, 207; 
 questions Germany as to 
 intentions concerning Bel- 
 gium, 208; ultimatum of, to 
 Germany, 218; reply of, to 
 Belgian appeal, 219; antici- 
 pating German invasion of 
 Belgium, 236 flf.; entered 
 war because of invasion of 
 Belgium, 245; conclusions 
 concerning actions of, 249 
 et seq.; see Bertie, Bunsen, 
 George, King, Goschen, 
 Grey, Triple Entente 
 
 France, preparation in, for war, 
 xii; fear of Germany for, 
 xxi; publishes Yellow Bonk, 
 23; French Premier quoted 
 on Austrian Servian troubles, 
 31, 32; relations of, with 
 Germany, 56; assures Russia 
 and England of her support, 
 77; refuses Germany's re- 
 quest to influence Russia, 92 ; 
 urges Germany to join 
 Powers in preventing inva- 
 sion of Servia, 95; assured 
 that Germany wishes peace, 
 131; suspicion of, toward 
 Germany, 132 ; supports Eng- 
 land's request for confer- 
 ence, 133; declaration of war 
 on, delayed, 192; ultimatum 
 to, 192; invasion of, 192 
 et seq.; reason of, for not 
 
 assummg aggressive, 193; 
 invasion of, to follow im- 
 mediately or to precede 
 severance of diplomatic re- 
 lations, 194; signs "neu- 
 trality of Belgium" treaty, 
 198; respects Belgium neu- 
 trality, 200; reaffirms inten- 
 tion of respecting Belgian 
 neutrality, 206; reply of, to 
 England's query regarding 
 Belgian neutrality, 207; de- 
 clares to Belgium intention 
 of respecting neutrality, 208; 
 cited by Germany as cause 
 for violation of Belgian neu- 
 trality, 210, 211; offers mili- 
 tary support to Belgium, 
 214; "overt acts of," 238, 
 239; first death in war, 253; 
 attitude of people in, 254 ff. ; 
 see Bcrthclut, Cambon, Tri- 
 ple Entente, V'iviani 
 Franco-German War, cause of, 
 
 19 
 Frederick the Great, 2; effect 
 
 of, on Germany today, 10 
 Fuchs, Dr., on hatred, quoted, 
 
 1 1 ; on prci)aredness for war, 
 
 quoted, 1 1 
 Furor Tctitonictts directed 
 
 against England, xxii 
 
 George, King of England, 
 message of, to Kaiser, 153; 
 telegram of, to Czar, 155; 
 message to, from Kaiser 
 regarding neutrality of 
 France, 187 
 
 Germany, confesses its crime, 
 viii; suppression of evidence 
 by, ix; gives Austria carte 
 blanche, x; refuses to accept 
 peace proposals, xi; invades 
 Luxemburg, xi; "fears God 
 Init nothing else," xix ff.; 
 attitude of, toward rest of
 
 Index 
 
 269 
 
 Germany — Continued 
 
 world, xix et seq.; foreign 
 policy of, xxii; real attitude 
 of people, xxiii; German 
 people misled, xxvi; en- 
 deavors to gain approval of 
 America, 4; espouses visions 
 of Maehiavelli, 5 fif. ; attitude 
 of, toward war, 6 flf. ; avowed 
 attitude of, towards world, 
 6 et seq.; doctrine of, 11 et 
 seq.; war policies of, shown 
 by quotations, 11 et seq.; 
 spirit of the ruling classes, 
 13; domination of Europe 
 established, 19, 20; attitude 
 of, on the Balkans, 19 et seq.; 
 publishes White Paper, 22; 
 suppression of facts by, 27; 
 communications of, to Aus- 
 tria withheld from White 
 Paper, 28, 29; advance 
 knowledge of Austria's ulti- 
 matum, 32 et seq.; only 
 power to know of Austria's 
 ultimatum, 33; attitude of, 
 false, 34; Ambassador to 
 England suggests Russia as 
 "mediator with regard to 
 Servia," 35; Ambassador to 
 England denies knowledge 
 of Austria's actions, 35; dis- 
 claims knowledge of Aus- 
 tria's ultimatum, 36; guilty 
 of duplicity regarding Aus- 
 tria's ultimatum, 36; unques- 
 tionably had previous knowl- 
 edge of x\ustria's ultimatum, 
 37; sincerity of attitude 
 examined, 38 ff.; pacific 
 protestations of, insincere, 
 38; first statement of Ger- 
 many's position regarding 
 Austro-Servian problem, 39 
 ff.; greatest diplomatic blun- 
 der, 39, 40; further proof of 
 her knowledge of Austrian 
 ultimatum, 41 ; supports Aus- 
 tria, 41 ; anticipates Servia's 
 
 refusal, 42; instructions to 
 Ambassador, 43 ; Ambassa- 
 dor to U. S. admits ad- 
 vance knowledge of Austrian 
 ultimatum, 46; takes steps 
 to allay indignation of U. S., 
 46; warnings of, to Servia, 
 56; relations of, with France, 
 56; reason for actions of, 65 
 ff. ; fails to move for peace, 
 69, 70; excuses for not grant- 
 ing time extension, 71 flf.; 
 refuses Russia's request for 
 time extension, 73 ff . ; fear of, 
 for England's, 79; principal 
 fear of, 79; attitude of, to- 
 ward Servia's reply, 83, 84; 
 witliholds from people ade- 
 quate information on Servia's 
 reply, 85; reply to England's 
 further requests for time, 
 87; disclaims any responsi- 
 bility for Austrian ultima- 
 tum, 89, 90; willing to have 
 England mediate between 
 Austria and Russia, 89; 
 states that Austria cannot 
 draw liack in Servian matter, 
 89; fatal policy of, 91; de- 
 clares Russia responsible for 
 war, 92; requests France to 
 influence Russia, 92; refuses 
 to attend peace conference 
 in London, 93; refuses Rus- 
 sia's request to urge con- 
 ciliation in Austria, 95; re- 
 fuses France's request to 
 prevent invasion of Servia, 
 96; insists on "exclusion of 
 all possibility of mediation," 
 97; claims efforts for media- 
 tion came too late, 98; ex- 
 cuse of, for not assenting to 
 peace conference, 100, loi; 
 incapable diplomats of, 103; 
 attitude of people toward 
 Kaiser, 109 ff. ; knew that 
 Servia would refuse demand 
 of "judiciary cooperation,"
 
 270 
 
 Index 
 
 Germany — Continued 
 
 115; further proof of Ger- 
 many's advance knowledge 
 of Austria's ultimatum, 116; 
 petty finesse of, 123; excuse 
 of, for not getting extension 
 of time, 124; avoids foreign 
 diplomats, 125; diplomats 
 reluctant to leave copies of 
 notes, 127 ff.; Ambassador 
 to France denies agreement 
 with Austria over note to 
 Servia, 129; assures France 
 that she is for peace, 130; 
 refuses France's request for 
 peace conference, 133; "clos- 
 est interests" of, 136; na- 
 tional selfishness, 136 ; be- 
 lieves Russia will keep out, 
 140; believes France "in no 
 position for war," 140; 
 belief of, regarding war 
 preparedness and action of 
 other nations, 140, 141; 
 ultimatum to Russia, 114; 
 preparedness for war, 142; 
 assured of no provocative 
 action on part of Russia, 
 152; offer of, to England, 
 159 ff.; advances upon 
 France, 161; French report 
 of army movements, 161, 
 162; evades England's re- 
 quest for peace suggestion, 
 169; declaration of war by, 
 quoted, 183, 184; proof of 
 preparedness of, 188, 189; 
 declares war on Russia, 192; 
 ultimatum of, to France, 192 ; 
 delays declaration of war 
 upon France, 192; awaits 
 French act of aggression, 
 192; Ambassador leaves 
 Paris, 192; ready for inva- 
 sion of France, 193; pacific 
 intentions of, false, 193, 194; 
 inconsistency in policies of, 
 194; diplomats and army not 
 in harmony, 194; disregard 
 
 of, for rights of Belgium, 196; 
 respected neutrality of Bel- 
 gium in 1870, 200; pro- 
 fesses intention of respect- 
 ing Belgian neutrality, 201 
 S..; recognizes obligations of 
 neutrality treaty, 202; For- 
 eign Office suppresses tele- 
 gram of Czar, 189; places 
 responsibility for war upon 
 Russia, 192; evades Eng- 
 land's question concerning 
 Belgian neutrality, 208; in- 
 sists she is forced to invade 
 Belgium, 210; declares 
 France will invade Belgium, 
 210; excuses of, for invasion 
 of Belgium, 210 fl.; declares 
 war upon Belgium, 215; in- 
 vades Belgium, ^15; invasion 
 of Belgium considered and 
 analyzed, 217 If.; imposes 
 fines u])on Belgium, 217 ff.; 
 reply of, to English ultima- 
 tum, 220; declares necessity 
 forces invasion of Belgium, 
 220; defense of, for invasion 
 of Belgium, 224; moral isola- 
 tion of, 229; compared to Dr. 
 Cook, 232; plea of guilty, 
 233 ff. ; claims discovery of 
 secret documents in Brussels, 
 235; strategic railrr^ads of, 
 237; campaign wliich should 
 have been followed, 245; 
 suppression of evidence by, 
 useless, 246; conclusic ns 
 concerning actions of, 249 
 et seq.; attitude of people in, 
 256; see Kaiser, Lichnow- 
 sky, Prussia, Triple Alliance, 
 von Below, Bcthmann-HoU- 
 weg, von Heeringen, von 
 Jagow, von Schoen 
 Gladstone did not rely on "neu- 
 trality of Belgium" treaty, 
 198; speech of, concerning 
 Belgium, quoted, 199 ; speech 
 of, cited by Shaw, 199
 
 Index 
 
 271 
 
 Goschen, Sir E., on Germany's 
 position in Austro-Servian 
 trouble, quoted, 39 ; report of, 
 regarding England's request 
 for time, 72 ; conversation of, 
 with Von Jagow preceding 
 England's declaration of war, 
 220 fif.; instructions to, 
 August 4th, 219 
 
 Gray Paper (Belgium), Bel- 
 gium publishes, 23; quoted, 
 202, 208, 210, 211, 21S 
 
 Great Britain, see England 
 
 Grey, Sir Edward, compared to 
 Pitt, 22; conversation of, 
 with German Ambassador 
 regarding Austro-Servian 
 trouble, 35 ff. ; advised that 
 Germany had knowledge of 
 Austrian ultimatum, 37; re- 
 port to, from British Am- 
 bassador at Berhn, July 22d, 
 38, 39; 28; did not anticipate 
 Austrian ultimatum; de- 
 ceived by Germany, 36; con- 
 versation of, with Austrian 
 Minister, quoted, 70, 71; 
 restrictions binding actions 
 of, 79, 80; instructions of, to 
 British Ambassador at Bel- 
 grade, 82; further plea for 
 time, 86; fiu-ther proposals 
 of, for peace, 89; suggests 
 peace conference of Powers 
 in London, 93 ; chief merit of, 
 105; report of, by France, 
 of German army movements, 
 161, 162; replies to Germany 
 on neutrality of England, 
 162; that Germany suggest 
 means of preventing Austro- 
 Servian war, 167; continues 
 his efforts for peace, 172, 173; 
 last attempt of, to preserve 
 peace, 180, 181; conversa- 
 tion of, cited by Germany, 
 191; inquiry of, concerning 
 results of England's neu- 
 trality, 193 ; conversations of, 
 
 with German Ambassador 
 concerning Belgian neutral- 
 ity, 209; instructions to 
 British Ambassador at Ber- 
 lin, August 4th, 219; refutes 
 statement concerning secret 
 documents, 236; see Bunsen; 
 England; George, King; 
 Goschen 
 
 H 
 
 Haeckel, Ernst, 197 
 
 Hague Tribunal, due to Czar's 
 initiative, 1S9; Russia desires 
 Austro-Servian problem re- 
 ferred to, 189; actions taken 
 by, in 1907, 204 ff.; 226; 251 
 
 Hamburger Nachtrichten, quot- 
 ed, 12, 13 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, quoted, 
 227 
 
 Harden, Maximilian, on Ger- 
 many's war policies, quoted, 
 12; 243 
 
 Harnack, 222 
 
 Herzegovina annexed by Aus- 
 tria, 20 
 
 I 
 
 Italy, not bound by Triple 
 Alliance, x; attitude of, 23 
 flf. ; as affected by Triple 
 Alliance, 24; attitude of, 24, 
 25; German messages to, sup- 
 pressed, 29; told that situa- 
 tion would "be cleared up," 
 35; cooperation of, depend- 
 ent upon Russia's actions, 
 65; not advised of intended 
 actions of Germany and 
 Austria, 117; previously 
 sounded by Austria, 119; 
 Germany schemes to acquire 
 support of, 191, 192; see 
 San Giuliano 
 
 JefTerson, Thomas, quoted, vi 
 Junkerdom, see Prussia
 
 272 
 
 Index 
 
 K 
 
 Kaiser, returns to Berlin from 
 Norway, xi; extols the Czar, 
 xxii ; sj)irit of absolutism of, 9 ; 
 "divine right" of, 9; quoted, 
 9; fanatic absolutism of, 9; 
 an adherent of brute force, 
 13; "China speech" of, 
 quoted, 14; "Hun" speech, 
 quoted, 14; Cambon 1913 
 report concerning, 107; posi- 
 tion of, 109 et scq.; attitude 
 and actions of, in early 
 part of trouble, 138 ct seq.; 
 ultimatum of, to Russia, 141 ; 
 responsibility of, for war, 
 141, 142; character of, 1 42 
 ff.; does not act in interests 
 of peace, 145 ff.; despatch of, 
 to Czar regarding murder 
 of Archduke, quoted, 147; 
 second message to Czar, 149; 
 fatal error of, 150; third 
 message to Czar, 151; reply 
 of, to King George, 154; 
 message of, to Czar regard- 
 ing Russia's mobilization, 
 155; estimate and discussion 
 of actions of, 157; preparing 
 for war, 159; taking steps to 
 alienate England from Allies, 
 159 fl. ; issues ultimatum to 
 Russia, 176; reply of, to last 
 message of Czar, 185, 186; 
 message of, to England re- 
 garding neutrality of France, 
 187; "awful responsibility 
 of," 1 88; telegram of, to King 
 George, quoted, 193; reason 
 of, for telegram to King 
 George, 193; telegram of, 
 analyzed, 193; blunders of, 
 194; see Germany 
 Kudachcf, Prince, action of, 
 regarding time extension, 73 
 
 Lamprecht, 223 
 
 Lichnowsky, Prince, affects 
 ignorance, 121; conversation 
 with, cited, 191; query to, 
 regarding results of Eng- 
 land's neutrality, 193; ccn- 
 versation of, with Sir Edward 
 Grey concerning Belgian 
 neutrality, 209; 89, 90; see 
 Germany 
 Li^ge, French officers at, 230 
 Luxemburg, invaded, xi; wrong 
 done to, 243 
 
 M 
 
 Machiavclli, vicious principles 
 
 of, 4; Bemhardi compared 
 
 to, 16 
 Mahan, Admiral, li 
 Margerie, M. de, prepares 
 
 Yellow Book, 102 
 Militdrische Rtindschau,qaoted, 
 
 114 
 Moltke, von, opinion of, cited, 
 
 6, 7 
 I\iorocco controversy, 109 ff. 
 
 N 
 
 Namur, French officers at, 230 
 Napoleon III., honor of, 201 
 Newspapers, American, lack of 
 
 Austrian dispatches to, 
 
 before war, 31 
 Nietzsche, 6 
 
 O 
 
 Orange Paper (Russia), Russia 
 publishes, 22; quoted re- 
 garding Germany's knowl- 
 edge of Austrian ultimatum, 
 36; quoted, 36, 68, 69, 73, 74. 
 H5-91.92, 95. 97 
 
 Pachitch, Servian Premier, ab- 
 sent from Belgrade, 32
 
 Index 
 
 273 
 
 Penn, William, treaty of, com- 
 pared to the "scrap of 
 l)apor," xvi 
 
 Poland, compared to Belgium, 
 218 
 
 Prussia, Prussian Junkerdom, 
 8 ff.; signs "neutrality of 
 Belgium," treaty, 198 
 
 R 
 
 Red Book, analyzed, 30; dis- 
 closes true Austrian policy, 
 190; quoted, 190, 191 
 
 Reichstag, debate in, quoted, 
 201; 202; 240, 241 
 
 Rumbold, Sir IL, letter to, 
 quoted in White Paper, 35 
 
 Russia, intimidated by Ger- 
 many, 20; forced to submit 
 in Balkans, 20; publishes 
 Orange Paper, 22; suggested 
 by Germany as mediator 
 between Austria and Servia, 
 35; assured of Germany's 
 ignorance of Austrian ulti- 
 matum, 36; assured that 
 Austria will not seize Servian 
 territory, 59, 60; possibility 
 of intervention of, 65; atti- 
 tude of, 67 ff. ; message of, 
 to Austria, quoted, 68, 69; 
 request for time refused, 71; 
 assured that Austria con- 
 templates no acquisition of 
 Servian territory, 74, 75; 
 confers with France and 
 England, 77; suggestions of, 
 to avoid conflict, 77, 78; 
 willing to leave Austro-Ser- 
 vian trouble in hands of the 
 Powers, 80, 81; proposal of, 
 to Austria, 91; requests 
 Germany to urge concilia- 
 tion with Austria, 95; 
 promises its services in keep- 
 ing Servia quiet, 96; again 
 p"oposcs peace conference, 
 99; assured that Austria's 
 
 claims would be acceptable, 
 123; charge put off until too 
 late, 125; ultimatum of Ger- 
 many to, 141 ; assures Ger- 
 many of no provocative 
 action upon her part, 152; 
 offers to stop all military 
 preparations, 164 ff.; orders 
 general mobilization, 171; 
 refuses to reply to Ger- 
 many's ultimatum, 178; sug- 
 gests referring Austro-Ser- 
 vian problem to Hague, 189; 
 "not guilty," 189; offer of, 
 to suspend military prepara- 
 tions, 190; cannot treat 
 direct with Austria, 191; 
 requests England to act as 
 mediator, 191 ; stipulates sus- 
 pension of hostilities during 
 mediation, 191; signs "neu- 
 trality of Belgium" treaty, 
 198; see Czar; Kudachcf; 
 Sazonof; see also Triple 
 Entente 
 Russo-Japanese war, xxii 
 
 San Giuliano, Marquis di, 
 Italian Foreign IVIinister, 
 quoted, 119 
 
 Sazonof, suggestion of, to 
 avoid conflict, 77, 78; good 
 work of, 105; message of, to 
 Austria regarding ultimatum, 
 126; 28 
 
 Schmidt, 223 
 
 "Scrap of Paper," vi; xvi; 
 Bethmann - Hollweg's re- 
 mark, quoted, 220, 221; dis- 
 cusses his remark, 239 ff.; 
 defense for, use of phrase, 
 239 ff; "Secret Documents," 
 contents of supposed, 235 ff. 
 
 Sedan, battle of, result of Bel- 
 gium neutrality, 201 
 
 Serajevo, murder of Crown 
 Prince of Austria at, 20 ; 31
 
 274 
 
 Index 
 
 Servia, ultimatum to, 19; ad- 
 vised by France, Russia, and 
 Great Britain, 31; formally 
 disclaims responsibility for 
 murder of Archduke, 33; pro- 
 bable effect of humiliation of, 
 40; refusal of Austrian de- 
 mands anticipated, 42 ; reply 
 to Austrian ultimatum 
 quoted in full, 47 ^^ieg.; popu- 
 lation of, 55; warned by Ger- 
 many, 56; Austro-Servian re- 
 lations, 56; result of acquies- 
 cence to Austria, 60; re- 
 quested by Triple Entente to 
 make conciliatory reply, 80; 
 reply of, in accord with 
 requests of Trij^le Entente, 
 83; offers Austria ample rep- 
 aration, 114; subjugation of, 
 the "bone of contention," 
 192 
 
 Shaw, George Bernard, opin- 
 ions of, cited, 14, 15; defense 
 of Germany, 14 ff. ; quoted 
 regarding "neutrality of Bel- 
 gium" treaty, 198; quoted, 
 248 
 
 Siemens, 223 
 
 Slav, the, fear of Germany for, 
 xxi 
 
 Symonds, John Addington, 
 quoted, 4, 5 
 
 Szdpiry, Count, 126 
 
 Tisza, Count, refuses to dis- 
 close results of judicial in- 
 quiry into murder of Arch- 
 duke, 113 
 
 Treitschke, doctrines of, xvii; 
 Polilik, cited, 6; doctrines of, 
 based on Machiavelli, 6; 
 influence of, 10 
 
 Treaty of 1870, 198 ff. 
 
 Treaty of 1839, 198 ff.; 225:251 
 
 Triple Alliance, x; as affecting 
 Italy, 24; terms of, 24; 192; 
 see Austria, Germany, Italy 
 
 Triple Entente, proposes peace, 
 xi; lulled into false security, 
 32 ff.; movements and re- 
 ports of leading statesmen of, 
 just previous to declaration 
 of war, 32 ff. ; ignorant of 
 Austria's ultimatum, 33, 
 65; still labors for peace, 86; 
 see also, France, Great Bri- 
 tain, Russia 
 
 Turkey, German officers in, 
 230 
 
 U 
 
 United States, supposititious 
 invasion of, by Germany, 
 225 ff. ; position of, 248 ff. 
 
 Viviani, Premier, quoted re- 
 garding Austro - Servian 
 trouble, 31, 32; reply of, to 
 Germany, 192; reply of, to 
 England's query regarding 
 Belgian neutrality, 207; see 
 France 
 
 Voltaire, quoted, xvi 
 
 Von Below, declares Germany 
 will respect Belgian neu- 
 trality, 203; 206; see Ger- 
 many 
 
 Von Bulow, 223 
 
 Von dcr Elst, Baron, 210, 211; 
 see Belgium 
 
 Von Gwinner, 223 
 
 Von Heeringcn, declares Bel- 
 gian neutrality will be re- 
 spected, 203; 5eg Germany 
 
 Von Jagow, Ilerr, conversation 
 of, cited, 38, 39; representa- 
 tions of, on Germany's posi- 
 tion in Austro-Servian mat- 
 ter, 39; refuses to attend 
 peace conference in London,
 
 Index 
 
 275 
 
 Von Jagow, Herr — Continued 
 93; on Austrian ultimatum, 
 quoted, 94; conversations of, 
 with Cambon, 122 ff.; re- 
 fuses peace conference, 133; 
 blunders of, 194; declares 
 Germany will respect Belgian 
 neutrality,202 ; conversations 
 with Sir Edward Goschen 
 preceding England's declara- 
 tion of war, 219 ff.; states 
 real purpose of Germany's 
 invasion of Belgium, 222; 
 see Germany 
 
 Von Mach, claims France 
 violated Belgian neutrality, 
 228; on French officers in 
 Belgium, quoted, 231, 232; 
 What Germany Wants, 233; 
 arguments of, in defense of 
 Germany, 233 ff.; 197 
 
 Von Moltke, General, blunders 
 of, 194 
 
 Von Posadowsky, 223 
 
 Von Schmoller, 223 
 
 Von Schoen, Baron, assures 
 France that Germany is for 
 peace, 130; makes public 
 statement through French 
 Foreign Office, 131 ff. 
 
 Von Wilamowitz, 223 
 
 W 
 What Germany Wants, cited, 
 233 
 
 White Paper (English), pub- 
 lished, 22; analyzed, 27 ff. ; 
 quoted, 34 ff.; 36; 37; 38; 
 39;4i;56;76;82, 83; 86;93; 
 94; 97; 99; 159 ff.; 167, 168, 
 169; 207, 208; 209; 219 et 
 seq.; see England 
 
 White Paper (German), pub- 
 lished, 22; suppression of 
 facts in, 27 ff.; suppresses 
 instructions to Ambassador, 
 191; quoted, 28; 38; 41; 43, 
 44; 45; 67; 75; 87; 147; 
 149 ff.; ix; 192; 193; see 
 Germany 
 
 Yellow Book (France), pub- 
 lished, 23; additional data in, 
 102 ff.; contents of first 
 chapter of, 106 ff.; throws 
 light on petty finesse of 
 Germany and Austria, 123; 
 cited, 46; quoted, 107 ff.; 
 second chapter of, 113 et seq. ; 
 quoted, 113, 114, 115; 116, 
 117; 122, 123; 125; 129; 133 
 ff.; see France 
 
 Zabem incident, the, attitude 
 of Crown Prince toward, 14
 
 MYRTLE REED'S NOVELS 
 
 May b0 dad wherever books are seld. Ask for (Srotset & Dunlap'c list 
 
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 LAVENDER AND OLD LACE. 
 
 A charming story of a quaint comer of 
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 modem parallel. The story centers round 
 the coming of love to the young people on 
 the staff of a newspaper— and it is one of the 
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 delicate fancy, of tenderness, of delightful 
 humor and spoDtanietj. 
 
 A SPINNER IN THE SUN . 
 
 Miss Myrtle Reed may always be depended upon to write a story 
 in which poetry, charm, tenderness and humor are combined into a 
 clever and entertaining book. Her characters are delightful and she 
 always displays a quaint humor of expression and a quiet feeling of 
 pathos which give a touch of active realism to all her writings. In 
 "A Spinner in the Sun" she tells an old-fashioned love story, of a 
 veiled lady who lives in solitude and whose features her neighbors 
 have never seen. There is a mystery at the heart of the book that 
 throws over it the glamour of romance, 
 
 THE MASTER'S VIOLIN, 
 
 A love story in a musical atmosphere. A picturesque, old Ger- 
 man virtuoso is the reverent possessor of a genuine "Cremona." He 
 consents to take for his pupil a handsome youth who proves to have 
 an aptitude for technique, but not the soul of an artist. The youth 
 has led the happy, careless life of a modem, well-to-do young Amer- 
 ican and he cannot, with his meagre past, express the love, the passion 
 and the tragedies of life and all its happy phases as can the master 
 who has lived life in all its fulness. But a girl comes into his life — a 
 beautiful bit of human driftwood that his aunt had taken into her 
 heart and home, ana through his passionate love for her, he learns 
 the lessons that life has to give — and his soul awakes. 
 
 Founded on a fact that all artists realize. 
 
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 THE LIGHT OF WESTERN STARS 
 
 Colored frontispiece by W. Herbert Dunton. 
 
 Most of the action of this story takes place near the turbulent 
 Mexican border of the present day. A New York society girl buys 
 a ranch which becomes the center of frontier warfare. Her loyal 
 cowboys defend her property from bandits, and her superintendent 
 rescues her when she is captured by them. A surprising climax 
 brings the story to a delightful close. 
 
 DESERT GOLD 
 
 Illustrated by Douglas Duer, 
 
 Another fascinating story of the Mexican border. Two men, 
 lost in the desert, discover gold when, overcome by weakness, they 
 can go no farther. The rest of the story describes the recent uprising 
 along the border, and ends with the finding of the gold which the 
 two prospectors had willed to the girl who is the story's heroine. 
 
 RIDERS OF THE PURPLE SAGE 
 
 Illustrated by Douglas Duer. 
 
 A picturesque romance of Utah of some forty years ago when 
 Mormon authority ruled. In the persecution of Jane Withersteen, a 
 rich ranch owner, we are permitted to see the methods employed by 
 the invisible hand of the Mormon Church to break her will. 
 
 THE LAST OF THE PLAINSMEN 
 
 Illustrated with photograph reproductions. 
 
 This is the record of a trip which the author took with Buffalo 
 Jones, known as the preserver of the American bison, across the 
 Arizona desert and of a hunt in "that wonderful country of yellow 
 crags, deep canons and giant pines." It is a fascinating story. 
 
 THE HERITAGE OF THE DESERT 
 
 Jacket in color. Frontispiece. 
 
 This big human drama is played in the Painted Desert. A 
 lovely girl, who has been reared among Mormons, learns to love a 
 young New Englander. The Mormon religion, however, demands 
 that the girl shall become the second wife of one of the Mormons — 
 
 Well, that's the problem of this sensational, big selling story, 
 
 BETTY ZANE 
 
 Illustrated by Loms F. Grant. 
 
 This story tells of the bravery and heroism of Betty, the beauti- 
 ful young sister of old Colonel Zane, one of the bravest pioneers. 
 Life along the frontier, attacks by Indians, Betty's heroic defense 
 of the beleaguered garrison at Wheeling, the burning of the Fort, 
 and Betty's final race for life, make up this never-to-be-forgotten story. 
 
 Grosset & Dunlap, Publishers, New York
 
 JOHN FOX, JR'S. 
 
 STORIES OF THE KENTUCKY MOUNTAINS 
 
 May be had wrheraver books are sold. Ask for Grosset and Danlap's list 
 
 THE TRAIL OF THE LONESOME PINE . 
 Illustrated by F. C. Yohn. 
 
 The "lonesome pine" from which the 
 story takes its name was a tall tree that 
 stood in solitary splendor on a mountain 
 top. The fame of the pine lured a young 
 engineer through Kentucky to catch the 
 trail, and when he finally climbed to its 
 shelter he found not only the pine but the 
 foot-pritits of a girl. And the girl proved 
 to be lovely, piquant, and the trail of 
 these girlish foot-prints led the young 
 engineer a madder chase thaa "the trail 
 of the lonesome pine." 
 
 THE LITTLE SHEPHERD OF KINGDOM COME 
 
 Illustrated by F. C. Yoha. 
 
 This is a story of Kentucky, in a settlement known as "King- 
 dom Come." It is a 11;^ rude, semi-barbarous; but natural 
 and honest, from which often springs the flower of civilization. 
 
 " Chad." the "little shepherd" did not know who he was nor 
 whence he came — he had just wandered from doer to door since 
 early childhood, seeking shelter with kindly mountaineers who 
 gladly fathered and mothered this waif about whom there was 
 such a mystery — a charming waif, by the way, who could play 
 the banjo better that anyone else in the mountains, 
 
 A'KNIGHT OF THE CUMBERLAND . 
 
 Illustrated by F. C. Yohn. 
 
 The scenes are laid along the waters of the Cumberland' 
 the lair of moonshiner and feudsman. The knight is a moon- 
 shiner's son, and the heroine a beautiful girl perversely chris- 
 tened "The Blight." Two impetuous young Southerners' fall 
 under the spell of "The Blight's " charms and she learns what 
 a large part jealousy and pistols have in the love making of the 
 mountaineers. 
 
 Included in this volume is " Hell fer-Sartain" and other 
 stories, some of Mr. Fox's most entertaining Cumberland valley 
 narratives. 
 
 Aak for com^hu fret list of G. & D. PofiuJar Cof>yn'ghttd Fiction 
 
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 JACK LONDON^ S NOVELS 
 
 May be had wherever books are sold. Ask for Grosset & Dunlap's list 
 
 JOHN BARLEYCORN. Illustrated by H. T. Dunn. 
 
 This remarkable book is a record of the author's own amazing 
 experiences. This big, brawny world rover, who has been ac- 
 quainted with alcohol from boyhood, comes out boldly against John 
 Barleycorn. It is a string of exciting adventures, yet it forcefully 
 conveys an unforgetable idea and makes a typical Jack London book. 
 
 THE VALLEY OF THE MOON . Frontispiece by George Harper. 
 
 The story opens in the city slums where Billy Roberts, teamster 
 and ex-prize fighter, and Saxon Brown, laundry worker, meet and 
 love and marry. They tramp from one end of California to the 
 other, and in the Valley of the Moon find the farm paradise that is 
 to be their salvation. 
 
 BURNING DA\T:.IGHT. Four illustrations. 
 
 The story ot an adventurer who went to Alaska and laid the 
 foundations of his fortune before the gold hunters arrived. Bringing 
 his fortunes to the States he is cheated out of it by a crowd of money 
 kings, and recovers it only at the muzzle of his gun. He then starts 
 out as a merciless exploiter on his own account. Finally he takes to 
 drinking and becomes a picture of degeneration. About this time 
 he falls in love with his stenographer and wins her heart but not 
 her hand and then — but read the story! 
 A SONOFTHESLTsl . Illustrated by A. O . Fischer and C. W. Ashley. 
 
 David Grief was once a light-haired, blue-eyed youth who came 
 from England to the South vSeas in search of adventure. Tanned 
 like a native and as lithe as a tiger, he became a real son of the sun. 
 The life appealed to him and he remained and became very wealthy. 
 THE CALL OF THE WILD . Illustrations by Philip R. Goodwin and 
 Charles Livingston Bull. Decorations by Charles E. Hooper. 
 
 A book ot dog adventures as exciting as any man's exploits 
 could be. Here is excitement to stir the blood and here is pictur- 
 esque color to transport the reader to primitive scenes. 
 
 THE SEA WOLF. Illustrated by W. J. Aylward. 
 
 Told by a man whom Fate suddenly swings from his fastidious 
 life into the power of the brutal captain of a sealing schooner. A 
 novel of adventure warmed by a beautiful love episode that every 
 reader will hail with delight. 
 
 WHITE FANG. Illustrated by Charles Livingston Bull. 
 
 "White Fang" is part dog, part wolf and all brute, living in the 
 frozen north ; he gradually comes under the spell of man's com- 
 panionship, and surrenders all at the last in a fight with a bull dog. 
 Thereafter he is man's loving slave. 
 
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