B 1423 L6a 1870 THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES GIFT From the Library of Henry Goldman, Ph.D. 1886-1972 CHAPTERS IN LOGIC ; CONTAINING SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S LECTURES ON MODIFIED LOGIC, AXD 8ELF.CTIONS FROM THE PORT ROYAL LOGIC. WITH PREFACE BY TUB REV. S. S. NELLES, D.D., Prq]kt$or of Ijogir in Vletnrto College. TORONTO : THE WESLEYAN METHODIST BOOK-ROOM, 88, KINO 8TRKKT EAST. 1870. B PREFACE. THIS little volume is a reprint of Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON'S Lectures on Modified Logic, and of the most valuable portions of the famous Port Royal Logic, translated by T. S. BAYNES. The design of the publication is to provide, in cheap and convenient form, a Manual or Text-Book, on what Hamilton calls " Modified or Concrete Logic," but what others have variously designated as Applied or Practical Logic. Whatever may be thought of the propriety of including this department of study within the science of Logic, there can be no doubt of its very great importance, and jvyt as little doubt of its having been sadly neglected. Those who have not mastered the elements of formal or technical Logic, as well as those who have, may derive immense advantage from a careful perusal of these pages. The merits of Sir William Hamilton are so well known, that it is perhaps unnecessary here to say anything in commendation of that pa.rt of the volume which was written by him. It may, however, be well to mention, VI PREFACE. that his Lectures on Modified Logic are here given in full, without alteration either of the arrangement or the text. From the nature of their topics, they form a distinct discussion in themselves, and suffer nothing in being separated from the other lectures in which the eminent author has so ably treated of the formal laws of thought. The other work, the Port Royal Logic, is less gener- ally known, but is regarded by high authorities as one of the very best of the many books extant on the science of Logic. " The treatise," says Mr. Baynes, " is characterised throughout by a vigor of thought, a vivacity of criticism, a freshness and variety of illustration, an honesty and love of truth, and withal a human sympathy, which rendered it a work not only of specific scientific value, but of general interest and instruction. Logic was thus redeemed from the contempt into which it had fallen, and placed on a level with the advancing philosophy of the time." To this may be added the testimony of Baron de Gerando, as cited by Mr. Baynes. Speaking of the parts which especially merit praise, he says, " Above all, that beautiful Dissertation on the Origin of Prejudices, and their in- fluence on the vices of reasoning in civil life. This Disser- tation, indeed, constitutes, of itself, an entirely new Logic one almost sufficient, and far more important than all the apparatus of the peripatetic Logic ; and it must be recorded to the praise of the Port Royal writers that this is a part of their woi'k which is peculiarly their OAvn." PREFACE. Vll Dugald Stewart, also, in his Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy, speaks of the Port Royal Logic as "a treatise of which it is hardly possible to estimate the merits too highly." And again : " No publication cer- tainly, prior to Locke 8 Essay, can be named, containing so much good sense and so little nonsense on the science of Logic ; and very few have since appeared on the same subject which can be justly preferred to it in ]X)int of practical utility. If the author had lived in the present age, or had been less fettered by a prudent regard to exist- ing prejudices, the technical part would probably have been reduced within a still narrower compass ; but even there he has contrived to substitute, for the puerile and contemptible examples of common logicians, several in- teresting illustrations from the physical discoveries of his immediate predecessors ; and has indulged himself, in some short excursions, which excite a lively regret that he has not more frequently and freely given scope to his original reflections. Among these excursions, the most valuable, in my opinion, is the Twentieth Chapter of the Third Part, which deserves the attention of every logical student, as an important and instructive supplement to the enumera- tion of sophisms given by Aristotle." The Editor of this compilation has confined his selections from the Port Royal Logic to this " twentieth chapter," which is given entire (with the exception of a few lines), and to those jjortionn of the Preliminary Discourse which Vlll PREFACE. are of general application. These selections make a suitable introduction to the Lectures of Hamilton on Modified Logic, and the two together furnish about the best instruc- tion that can be had on this important branch of the science of Logic. We live in times remarkable for the awakening and emancipation of thought. This is matter of rejoicing ; but freedom of thought brings corresponding dangers and responsibilities, and we cannot do too nmch to aid the inquiring multitudes in the proper use of that right of private judgment of which we are so justly proud. Works like the one here presented may serve to show that all intellectual activity has its laws, the violation of which brings invariable and heavy penalties ; may teach us to beware of the immoralities of the intellect ; may put those who are -trying to think, in the way of thinking soundly, by furnishing them with the best rules and cautions known to the world's great thinkers ; and may help us forward to that "good time coming," when in moral, political, and religious affaire, men shall pi-oceed with something like the steadiness, precision, and cei'tainty, which have already begun to mark the pursuit of mathematical and physical science. VICTORIA COLLEGE, March Slst, 1870. THE PORT-ROYAL LOGIC CHAPTER I. rRZLIMINAHY IN WHICH THE nZSION OF THIS NBW LOGIC IS SIT FORTH. THERE is nothing more desirable than good sense, and ac- curacy of thought, in discriminating between truth and falsehood. All other qualities of mind are of limited use ; but exactness of judgment is of general utility in every part, and in all the employments of life. It is not alone in the sciences that it is difficult to distinguish truth from error, .but also in the greater part of those subjects which men discuss in their every-day affairs. There are, in relation to almost everything, different routes the one true, the other false and it is reason which must choose between them. Those who choose well, are they who have minds well- regulatod ; those who choose ill, are those who have minds ill-regulated : and this is the first and most important differ, cnce which we find between the qualities of men's minds. Thus the main object of our attention should be, to form our judgment, and render it as exact as possible ; and to this end, the greater part of our study ought to tend. We 2 2 PRELIMINARY. employ reason as an instrument for acquiring the sciences ; . whereas, on the contrary, we ought to avail ourselves of the sciences as an instrument for perfecting our reason justness of mind being infinitely more important than all the specu- lative knowledges which we can obtain, by means of sciences the most solid and well-established. This ought to lead wise men to engage in these only so far as 7 they may contribute to that end,, and to make them the exercise only, and not the occupation, of their mental powers. If we have not this end in view, the study of the specu- lative science such as geometry, astronomy, and physics will be little else than a vain amusement, and scarcely better than the ignorance of these things, which has at least this advantage- that it is less laborious, and affords no room for that empty vanity which is often found connected with these barren and unprofitable knowledges. These sciences not only have nooks and hidden places of very little use ; they are even totally useless, considered in themselves, and for themselves alone. Men are not born to employ their time in measuring lines, in examining the relations of .angles, and considering the different movements of matter ; their minds- are too great, their life too short, their time too precious, to be engrossed with such petty objects : but they ought to be' just, equitable, prudent, in all their converse, in all their actions, and in all the business they transact ; and to these things they ought specially to discipline and train themselves. This care and study are so very neccessary, that it is strange that this exactness of judgment should be so rare a quality, We find, on every side, ill-regulated minds which have scarcely any discernment of the truth ; men who receive all things with a wrong bias ; who allow themselves to be carried away by the slightest appearances ; who are always PRELIMINARY. 3 in excess and extremes ; who have no bond to hold them firm to the truths which they know, since they are attached to them rather by chance than by any clear insight ; or who, on the other hand, entrench themselves in their opin* ions with such obstinacy, that they will not listen to any- thing that may undeceive them ; who determine rashly about that of which they are ignorant, which they do not under- stand, and which, perhaps, no one ever can understand ; who make no difference between one speech and another, or judge of the truth of things by the tone of voice alone, he who speaks fluently and impressively being in the right, he who has some difficulty in explaining himself, or dis- plays some warmth, in the wrong : they know nothing beyond- this. Hence it is, that there are no absurdities too groundless to find supporters. Whoever determines to deceive the world, may be sure of finding people who are willing enough to be deceived ; and the most absurd follies always find minds to which they are adapted. After seeing what a number are infatuated with the follies of judicial astrology, and that even grave persons treat this subject seriously, we need not be surprised at anything more. There is a con- stellation in the heavens which it has pleased certain persons to call the Balance, and which is as much like a balance as a windmill. The Balance is the symbol of justice ; those, therefore, that are born under that constellation, will be just and equitable. There are three other signs in the zodiac, which are called, one the Ham, another the Bull, another the Goat, and which might as well have been called the Elephant, the Crocodile, and tbe Rhinoceros. The Ram, the Bull, and the Goat, are ruminant animals ; those, therefore, who tuku medicines when the moon is under 4 PRELIMINARY. these constellations, are in danger of vomiting them again. Such extravagant reasonings as these have found persona to propagate them, and others who allow themselves to be persuaded by them. This inaccuracy of thought is the cause, not only of the errors we meet with in the sciences, but also the majority of the offences which are committed in civil life, of unjust quarrels, unfounded lawsuits, rash counsel, and ill-arranged undertakings. There are few of these which have not their origin in some error, and in some fault of judgment, so that there is no defect which it more concerns us to correct. But this correction is as difficult of accomplishment as it is desirable, since it depends very much on the measure of in. telligence with which we are endowed. Common-sense is nob so common a quality as we imagine. There are a multitude of minds heavy and dull, which we cannot reform by giving them the understanding of the truth, but only by restricting them to those things which are suited to them, by withholding them from judging about those things which they are not capable of knowing. It is true, nevertheless, that a great part of the false judgment of men does not spring from this principle, but is caused solely by preci- pitancy of mind and want of attention, which lead us to judge rashly about that which we know only obscurely and confusedly. The little love men have for truth leads them to take no pains, for the most part, in distinguishing what is true from what is false. They allow all sorts of reasonings and maxims to enter their minds ; they like better to suppose things true, than to examine them ; if they do not comprehend them, they are willing to believe that others understand them well : and thus they fill the memory with a mass of things false, obscure, and unintelli- PRELIMINARY. O gible, and then reason on these principles, scarcely consider- ing at all either what they speak or what they think. Vanity and presumption contribute still more to this effect. We think it a disgrace to doubt, and to be ignorant ; and we prefer rather to speak and determine at random, than to confess that we are not sufficiently informed on the subject to give an opinion. We are all of us full of ignorance and errors ; and yet it is the most difficult thing in the world to obtain from the lips of man this confession, so just, and so suited to his natural state, I am in error, and I know nothing about the matter. We find others, on the contrary, who, having light enough to know that there are a number of things obscure and un- certain, and wishing, from another kind of vanity, to show that they are not led away by the popular credulity, take a pride in maintaining that there is nothing certain. They thus free themselves from the labour of examination, and on this evil principle they bring into doubt the most firmly established truths, urd even religion itself. This is the source of Pyrrhonism [or Scepticism], another extravagance of the human mind which, though apparently opposed to the rashness of those who believe and decide everything, springs nevertheless from the same source, which is, want of attention. For as the one will not give themselves the trouble of discerning errors, the others will not look upon truth with that care which is necessary to perceive its evi- dence. The faintest glimmer suffices to persuade the one of things very false, and to make the other doubt of things the most certain ; and in both cases it is the same want of application which produces effects so different. True reason places all things in the rank which belongs to them ; it questions those which arc doubtful, rejects thoso 6 PRELIMINARY. which are false, and acknowledges, in good faith, those which /are evident, without being embarrassed by the vain reasons of the Pyrrhonists, which never could, even in the minds of those who proposed them, destroy the reasonable assurance we have of many things. None ever seriously doubted the existence of the sun, the earth, the moon, or that the whole was greater than its parts. We may indeed easily say out- wardly with the lips that we doubt of all these things, because it is possible for us to lie ; but we cannot say this in our hearts. Thus Pyrrhonism is not a sect composed of men who are persuaded of what they say, but a sect of liars. Hence they often contradict themselves in uttering their opinion, since it is impossible for their hearts to agree with their language. We see this in Montaigne, who attempted to revive this sect in the last century ; for, after having said that the Academics were different from the Pyrrhonists, inasmuch as the Academics maintained that some things were more probable than others, which the Pyrrhonists would not allow, he declares himself on the side of the Pyrrhonists in the following terms : " The opinion," says he, " of the Pyrrhonists is bolder, and much more probable." There are, therefore, some things which are more probable than others. Nor was it for the sake of effect that he spoke thus : these are words which escaped him without thinking of them, springing from the depths of nature which no illusion of opinions can destroy. But the evil is, that in relation to those things which are more removed from sense, these persons, who take a pleasure in doubting everything, withhold their mind from any application, or apply it only imperfectly to that which might persuade them, and thus fall into a voluntary uncertainty in relation to the affairs of religion ; for the state of darkness into which they have PRELIMINARY. 7 brought themselves is agreeable to them, and very favourable for allaying the remorse of their conscience, and for the un- restrained indulgence of their passions. Thus, these dis- orders of the mind, though apparently opposed (the one leading to the inconsiderate belief of what is obscure and uncertain, the other to the doubting of what is clear and certain), have nevertheless a common origin, which is, the neglect cf that attention which is necessary in order to discover the truth. It is clear, therefore, that they must also have a common remedy, and that the only way in which we can preserve ourselves from them is by fixing minute attention on our judgments and thoughts. This is the only thing that is absolutely necessary to preserve us from deceptions. For that which the Academics were wont to say, that it was impossible to discover the truth unless we had its characters, as it would be impossible to identify a runaway slave we might be in search of, unless we had some signs by which, supposing we were to meet him, we could distinguish him from others, is only a vain subtlety. As no marks are necessary in order to distinguish light from darkness but the light which reveals itself, so nothing else is necessary in order to recognize the truth but the very brightness which environs it, and which subdues and per- suades the mind, notwithstanding all that may be said against it ; so that all the reasonings of these philosophers are no more able to withhold the mind from yielding to the truth, when it is strongly imbued with it, than they are capable of preventing the eyes from seeing, when, being open, they are assailed by the light of the sun. But since the mind often allows itself to be deceived by false apjxjarances in consequence of not giving duo attention to them, and since there are many things which cannot be 8 PRELIMINARY. known, save by long and difficult examination, it would certainly be useful to have some rules for its guidance, so that the search after truth might be more easy and certain. Nor is it impossible to secure such rules : for since men are sometimes deceived in their judgments, and at other times are not deceived, as they reason sometimes well and some- times ill, and as, after they have reasoned ill, they are able to perceive their error, they may thus notice, by reflecting on their thoughts, what method they have followed when they have reasoned well, and what was the cause of their error when they were deceived ; and thus on these reflections form rules by which they may avoid being deceived for the future. This is what philosophers have specially undertaken to accomplish, and in relation to which they make such magni- ficent promises. If we may believe them, they will furnish us, in thai part which is devoted to that purpose, and which they call logic, with a light capable of dispelling all the darkness of the mind ; they correct all the errors of our thoughts ; and they give us rules so sure that they conduct us infallibly to the truth, so necessary, that without them it is impossible to know anything with complete 1 certainty. These are the praises which they have themselves bestowed on their precepts. But if we consider what experience shows us of the use which these philosophers make of them, both in logic and in other parts of philosophy, we shall have good grotlnds to suspect the truth of their promises. Since it is not, however, just to reject absolutely the good there is in logic because of the abuse which has been made of it, and as it is not possible that all the great minds which have applied themselves with so much care to the rules of reasoning, have discovered nothing at all solid ; and finally, PRELIMINARY. 9 since custom has rendered it necessary to know (at least generally) what logic is, we believed that it would contribute something to public utility to select from the common logics whatever might best help towards forming the judgment. This is the end we specially propose to ourselves in this work ; with the view of accomplishing which, we have inserted many new reflections which 'have suggested them- selves to our mind while writing it, and which form the greatest and perhaps the most important part of it, for it appears the common philosophers have attempted to do little more than to give the rules of good and bad reasoning. Now, although we cannot say these rules are useless, since they often help to discover the vice of certain intricate arguments, and to arrange our thoughts in a more convincing manner, still this utility must not be supposed to extend very far. The greater part of the errors of men arise, not from their allowing themselves to be deceived by wrong conclusions, but in their proceeding from false judgments, whence wrong conclusions are deduced. Those who have previously written on logic have little sought to rectify this, which is the main design of the new reflections which are to be found scattered through this book. These, in brief, are the views we have had in writing this Logic. Perhaps, after all there are few persons who will profit by it, or be conscious of the good they have obtained, because but little attention is commonly given to putting precepts in practice by express reflections on them. But we hope, nevertheless, that those who have read it with some care may receive an impression which will render them more exact and solid in their judgments, even without their being conscious of the good, as there are some remedies 2* 10 PRELIMINARY. which cure diseases by increasing the vigour and fortifying the parts. Be this as it may, it cannot trouble any one long, since those who are a little advanced may read and understand it in seven or eight days ; and it will be strange if, containing so great a diversity of things, each does not find something to repay him for the trouble of a perusal. CHAPTER II. OF THE BAD REASONINGS WHICH ARE COMMON IN CIVIL LOT AND IN ORDINARY DISCOURSE. WE have seen some examples of the faults which are most common in reasoning on scientific subjects ; but since the principal use of reason is not in relation to those kinds of subjects which enter but little into the conduct of life, and in which there is much less danger of being deceived, it would, without doubt, be much more useful to consider generally what betrays men into the false judgments which they make on every kind of subject, especially on that of morals, and of other things which are important in civil life, and which constitute the ordinary subject of *their con- versation. But, inasmuch as this design would require a separate work, which would comprehend almost all the whole of morals, we shall content ourselves with indicating here, in general, some of the causes of those false judgments which are BO common amongst men. We do not stay to distinguish false judgments from bad reasonings, and shall inquire indifferently into the causes of each, both because false judgments are the sources of bad reasonings, and produce them as a necessary consequence, and because in reality there is almost always a concealed and enveloped reasoning in what appears to be a simple judgment, them being always something which operates on 12 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. f the motive and principle of that judgment. For example, when we judge that a stick which appears bent in the water is really so, this judgment is founded on that general and false proposition, that what appears bent to our senses is so really, and thus contains an undeveloped reasoning. In considering them generally, the causes of our errors appear to be reducible to two principles : the one internal the irregularity of the will, which troubles and disorders the judgment ; the other external, which lies in the objects of which we judge, and which deceive our minds by false appearances. Now although these causes almost always appear united together, there are nevertheless certain errors, in which one prevails more than the other ; and hence we shall treat of them separately. OF THE SOPHISMS OF SELF-I cause which they maintain. They will never then accuse their adversaries of obstinacy, of rashness, of wanting com- mon sense, before they have clearly proved this. They will not say, before they have shown it, that they fall into intolerable absurdities and extravagances ; for the others, on their side, will say the same of them, and thus accom- plish notliing. And thus they will prefer rather to observe that most equitable rule of St. Augustine : Omittamus ista communia, quce dici ex utraque parte possunt, licet vere diet ex utraque parte non possint. They will thus be content to defend truth by the weapons which are her own, and which falsehood cannot borrow. These are clear and weighty reasons. VI. The mind of man is not only in love with itself, but it is also naturally jealous, envious of and ill-disposed towards others. It can scarcely bear that they should have any ad- vantage, but desires it all for itself ; and as it is an advan- tage to know the truth, and furnish men with new views, a secret desire arises to rob those who do this of the glory, which often leads men to combat, without reason, the opinions and inventions of others. Thus, a* self-love often leads us to make these ridiculous reasonings : It is an opinion which I discovered, it is that of my order, it is an opinion which is convenient ; it is, therefore, true ; natural ill-will loads us oftxm to make tlicso others, which are equally nltsurd : Some onn -ls<> said mi<;U 18 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. a, thing ; it is, therefore, false : I did not write that book ; it is, therefore, a bad one. This is the source of the spirit of contradiction so com- mon amongst men, and which leads them, when they hear or read anything of another, to pay but little attention to the reasons which might have persuaded them, and to think only of those which they think may be offered against it ; they are always on their guard against truth, and think only of the means by which it may be repressed and obscured in which they are almost invariably successful, the fertility of the human mind in false reasons being inexhaustible. When this vice is in excess, it constitutes one of the lead- ing characteristics of the spirit of pedantry, which finds its greatest pleasure in quibbling with others on the pettiest things, and in contradicting everything with a pure ma- lignity. But it is often more imperceptible and concealed ; and we may say, indeed, that no one is altogether free from it, since it has its root in self-love, which always lives in men. The knowledge of this malignant and envious disposition, which dwells deep in the heart of men, shows us that one of the most important rules which we can observe, in order to win those to whom we speak from error, and bring them over to the truth of which we would persuade them, is to excite their envy and jealousy as little as possible by speak- ing of ourselves, and the things which concern us. For, since men love scarcely any but themselves, they cannot bear that another should intrude himself upon them, and thus throw into shade the main object of their regard. All that does not refer to themselves is odious and imper- tinent, and they commonly pass from the hatred of the man to the hatred of his opinions and reasons. Hence, wise persons avoid as much as possible revealing to others the SELF-LOVE INTEREST PASSIONS. 19 ' advantages which they have ; they avoid attracting atten- tion to themselves in particular ; and seek rather, by hiding themselves in the crowd, to escape observation, in order that the truth which they propose may be seen alone in their discourse. The late M. Pascal, who knew as much of true rhetoric as any one ever did, carried this rule so far as to maintain that a well-bred man ought to avoid mentioning himself, and even to avoid using the words / and me ; and he was accus- tomed to say, on this subject, that Christian piety annihilated the human me, and that human civility concealed and sup- pressed it. This rule, however, is not to be observed too rigidly, for there are many occasions on which it would use- lessly embarrass us to avoid these words ; but it is always good to keep it in view, in order to preserve us from the wretched custom of some individuals, who speak only of themselves, and who quote themselves continually, when their opinion is not asked for. This leads those who hear them to susj>ect that this constant recurrence to themselves arises only from a secret pleasure, which leads them contin- ually to that object of their love, and thus excites in them, by a natural consequence, a secret aversion to these people, and t<> wan Is all that they say. This shows us that one of the characteristics most unworthy of a sensible man is that which Montaigne has affected in entertaining his readers with all his humours, his inclinations, his fancies, his mala- dies, his virtues, and his vices, which could arise only from a weakness of judgment, as well as a violent love for him- self. It is true that he attempted, as far as possible, to re- move from himself the suspicion of a low and vulgar vanity, by Hj>eaking freely of his defects, as well as of his good qualities, which has something amiable in it, from the appear- 20 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. ance of sincerity ; but it is easy to see that all this is only a trick and artifice ; which should only render it still more odious. He speaks of his vices in order that they may be known, not that they may be detested ; he does not think for a moment that he ought to be held in less esteem ; he regards them as things very indifferent, and rather as creditable than disgraceful ; if he reveals them it gives him no concern, and he believes that, he will not be, on that account, at ail more vile or contemptible. But when he apprehends that anything will degrade him at all, he is as careful as any one to conceal it ; hence, a celebrated author of the present day pleasantly remarks, that though he takes great pains, without any occassion, to inform us, in two places of his book, that he had a page, (an officer of very little use in the house of a gentleman of six thousand livres a-year) he has not taken the same pains to inform us that he had also a clerk, having been himself counsellor of the parliament of Bordeaux. This employment, though very honoiirable in itself, did not satisfy the vanity he had of appearing always with the air of a gentleman and of a cavalier, and as one unconnected with the brief and gown. It is nevertheless probable, however, that he would not have concealed this circumstance of his life if he could have found some Marshal of France who had been coun- sellor of Bordeaux, as he has chosen to inform us that he had been mayor of that town, but only, after having in- formed us that he had succeeded Marshal De Biron in that office, and had been succeeded by Marshal De Matignon. But the greatest vice of this author is not that of vanity, for he is filled with such a multitude of shameful scandals, and of epicurean and impious maxims, that it is wonder- ful that he has been endured so long by everybody, and SELF-LOVE INTEREST PASSIONS. 21 that there are even men of mind who have not discovered the poison. No other proofs are necessary, in order to judge of his libertinism, than that very manner even in which he speaks of his vices ; for allowing, in many places, that he had been guilty of great number of criminal excesses, he declares, nevertheless, that he did not repent of them at all, and that if he had to live over again he would live as he had done. " As for me," says he, " I cannot desire in general" to be other than I am. I cannot condemn my universal form, though I may be displeased with it, and pray God for my entire reformation, and for the pardon of my natural weak- ness ; but this I ought not to call repentance any more than the dissatisfaction I may feel at not being an angel, or Uato ; my actions are regulated and conformed to my ;-.Ut and condition ; I cannot be better, and repentance does not' properly refer to things which are not in our power. I never expected incongruously to affix the tail of a philoso- pher to the head and body of an abandoned man, or that the meagre extremity of uiy life was to disavow and deny the most beautiful, complete, and largest portion* of the whole. If I had to live ow ncrair I would live as I have done ; I do not lament over the past ; I do no fear for the future." Awful words, which denote the entire extinction of all religious feeling, but which are worthy of him who said also, in another place : " I plunge myself headlong blindly into death, as into a dark and silent abyss, full of a mighty sleep, full of unconsciousness and lethargy, which engulphs me at once, and overwhelms me in a moment." And in another place : " Death, which is only a quarter of an hour's passion, without consequence, and without injury, doca not deserve any special prccepta." 22 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. Although this digression appeals widely removed from this subject, it belongs to it nevertheless, for this reason- that there is no book which more fosters that bad custom of speaking of one's self, being occupied with one's self, and wishing all others to be so too. This wonderfully cor- rupts reason, both in ourselves, through the varfity which always accompanies these discourses, .and in others, by the contempt and aversion which they conceive for us. Those only may be allowed to speak of themselves who are men of eminent virtue, and who bear witness by what means they have become so, so that if they make known their good actions, it is only to excite others to praise God for these, or to instruct them ; and if they publish their faults, it 19 only to humble themselves before men, and to deter them from committing these. But for ordinary persons it is a ridiculous vanity to wish to inform others of their petty advantages ; and it is insufferable effrontery to reveal their excesses to the world without expressing their sorrow for them, since the last degree of abandonment in vice is, not to blush for it, and to have no concern or repentance on account 'of it, but to speak of it indifferently as of anything else ; in which mainly lies the wit of Montaigne. VII. We may distinguish to some extent from malignant and envious contradiction another kind of disposition not so bad, but which produces the same faults of reasoning ; this is the spirit of debate, which is, however, a vice very in- jurious to the mind. It is not that discussions, generally, can be censured. We may say on the contrary that, provided they be rightly used, there is nothing which contributes more towards SELy-LOVE 'IXTEBEST PASSIONS. 25 giving us different hints, both for finding the truth, and for recommending it to others. The movement of the mind, when it works alone in the examination of any subject, is commonly too cold and languid. It needs a certain warmth to inspire it, and awaken its ideas, and it is commonly through the varied opposition which we meet with that we discover wherein the obscurity and the difficulties of con- viction consist, and are thus led to endeavor to overcome them. It is true, however, that just in proportion as this exer- cise is useful when we employ it aright, and without any mixture of passion, so, in that proportion, is it dangerous when we abuse it, and pride ourselves on maintaining our opinion at whatever cost, and in contradicting that of others. Nothing can separate us more widely from the truth, and plunge us more readily into error, than this kind of dispo- sition. We become accustomed, unconsciously, to find reasons for everything, and to place ourselves above reason by never yielding to it, which leads us by degrees to hold nothing as certain, and to confound truth with error, in re- garding both as equally probable. This is why it is so rare a thing for a question to be determined by discussion ; and why it scarcely ever happens that two philosophers agree. They always find replies and rejoinders, since their aim is to avoid not error but silence, and since they think it less dis- graceful to remain always in error than to avow that they are mistaken. Thus, unless at least we have been accustomed by long discipline to retain the perfect mastery over ourselves, it is very difficult not to los sight of truth in debates, since there are scarcely any exercises which so much arouse our passions. What vices have tbey not excited, say* a celo- 24 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. brated author [Montaigne], being almost always governed by anger ! We pass first to a hatred of the reasons, and then of the persons. We learn to dispute only to contradict ; and each contradicting and being contradicted, it comes to pass that the result of the debate is the annihilation of truth. One goes to the east and another to the west one loses the principle in dispute, and another wanders amidst a crowd of details and after an hour's storm, they know not what they were discussing. One is above, another below, and another at the side one seizes on a word or similitude another neither listens to, nor at all understands what his opponent says, and is so engaged with his own course that he only thinks of following himselfj not you. There are some, again, who, conscious of their weakness, fear everything, refuse everything, confuse the discussion at the onset, or in the midst of it, become obstinate, and are silent, affecting a proud contempt, or a stupid modesty of avoiding contention. One, provided only that he is stri- king, cares not how he exposes himself another counts his words and weighs his reasons a third relies on his voice and lungs alone. We see some who conclude against them- selves, and others who weary and bewilder everyone with prefaces and useless digressions. Finally, there are some who arm themselves with abuse, and make a German quarrel in order to finish the dispute with one who has worsted them in argument. These are the common vices of our debates, which are ingeniously enough represented by this writer,* who, without ever having known the true grandeur of man, has sufficiently canvassed his defects. * The greater part of this page is taken directly from Montaigne, Essay* iii. 8. His sentiments are here referred to with approbation; and it would have been but fair, since when quoted for condemna- SELF-LOVE INTEREST PASSIONS. 2S We may hence judge how liable these kinds of confer- ences are to disorder the mind, at least unless we take great care not only not to fall ourselves first into these errors, but also not to follow those who do, and so to govern ourselves that we may see them wander without wandering ourselves, and without losing the end we ought to seek, which is the elucidation of the truth under discussion. VIIL We find some persons, again, principally amongst those who attend at court, who, knowing very well how incon- venient and disagreeable these controversial dispositions are, adopt an immediately opposite course, which is that of contradicting nothing, but of praising and approving every- thing indifferently. This is what is called complaisance, which is a disposition convenient enough indeed for our fortune, but very injurious to our judgment, for as the con- troversial hold as true the contrary of what is said to them, the complaisant appear to tak as true everything which is said to them, and this habit corrupts, in the first place, their discourse, aad then their minds. Hence it is that praises are become so common, and are given so indifferently to everyone, that we know not what to conclude from them. There is not a single preacher in the " Gazette," who is not most eloquent, and who does not ravish his hearers by the profundity of his knowledge. Al who die are illustrious for piety ; and the pettiest authors lion he is always mentioned by name, that he should here also havo been expressly referred to. The gay and easy scepticism of Mon- taigne, however, so offended the moral earnestness of the Port* Royal writers, that they can scarcely allow him Any merit ; and rarely, when referring to him, Jo him justice. 3 26 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. might make books of praises which they receive from their friends. So that, amidst this profusion of praises, which are made with such little discernment, it is master of won- der that there are found some BO eager for them, and who treasure them so carefully when given. It is quite impossible that this confusion in the language should not produce some confusion in the mind, for those who adopt the habit of praising everything, become accus- tomed also to approve of everything. But though the false- hood were only in the words, and not in the mind, this would be sufficient to lead those who sincerely love the truth to avoid it. It is not necessary to reprove everything which may be bad, but it is necessary to praise only what is truly praiseworthy, otherwise we lead those whom we praise in this way into error. We help to deceive those who judge of their persons by these praises ; and we com- mit a wrong against those who truly deserve praises, by giving them equally to those who do not deserve them. Finally, we destroy all the trustworthiness of language, and confuse all ideas and words, by causing them to be no longer signs of our judgments and thoughts, but simply an out- ward civility which we give to those whom we praise as we might do a bow, for this is all that we can infer from ordi- nary praises and compliments. IX. Amongst the various ways by which self-love plunges men into error, or rather strengthens them in it, and pre- vents their escape from it, we must not forget one which is without doubt among the principal and most common. This is the engaging to maintain any opinion, to which we may attach ourselves from other considerations than those SELF-LOVE INTEREST PASSIONS. 27 of its truth. For this determination to defend our opinion leads us no longer to consider whether the reasons we em- ploy are true or false, but whether they will avail to defend that which we maintain. "We employ all sorts of reasons, good or bad, in order that there may be some to suit every one ; and we sometimes proceed even to say things which we well know to be absolutely false, if they will contribute to the end which we seek. The following are some ex- amples : An intelligent man would hardly ever suspect Montaigne of having believed all the dreams of judicial astrology. Nevertheless, when he needs them for the purpose of fool- ishly degrading mankind, he employs them as good reasons, " When we consider," says he, " the dominion and power which these bodies have, not only on our lives, and on the state of our fortune, but also on our inclinations, which are governed, driven, and disturbed, according to their influences, how can we deprive them of a soul, of life, and of discourse?" Would he destroy the advantages which men have over beasts through the intercourse of speech, he relates to us absurd stories, whose extravagance no one knew better than himself, and derives from them these still more absurd conclusions : " There have been," says he, " some who boasted that they understood the language of brutes, as Appollonious Thyaneous, Melampus, Tiresias, Thales, and others ; and since what the cocmographers say is true, that there are some nations which receive a dog as their king, they must give a certain interpretation to his voice and movements." [Essays, ii. 12.] We might conclude, for the same reason, that when Caligula made his horse consul, the orders which ho gavo 28 * SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. in the discharge of that office must have been clearly un- derstood. But we should do wrong in accusing Montaigne of this bad consequence ; his design was not to speak rea- sonably, but to gather together a confused mass of every* thing which might be said against men, which is, however, a vice utterly opposed to the justness of mind and sincerity of a good man. Who, again, would tolerate this other reasoning of the same author on the subject of the auguries which the pagans made from the flight of birds, and which the wisest amongst them derided ? " Amongst all the predictions of time past," says he, " the most ancient, and the most certain, were those which were derived from the flight of birds. We have nothing of the like kind nothing so admirable ; that rule, that order of the moving of the wing, through which the consequences of things to come were obtained, must certainly have been directed by some excellent means to so noble an operation ; for it is insufficient to attribute so great an effect to some natural ordinance, without the intelligence, agreement, or discourse of the agent which produces it ; and such an opinion is evidently false." [Essays, ii. 12.] Is it not a delightful thing to see a man who holds that nothing is either evidently true or evidently false, in a treatise expressly designed to establish Pyrrhonism, and to destroy evidence and certainty, deliver to us seriously these dreams as certain truths, and speak of the contrary opinion as evidently false 1 But he is amusing himself at our ex- pense when he speaks in this wav, and he is without excuse in thus sporting with his readers, by telling them things which he does not, and could not without absurdity, believe. SELF-LOVE INTEREST PASSIONS. 29 He was,, without doubt, as good a philosopher as Virgil, who does not ascribe to any intelligence in the birds even those periodical changes which we observe in their move- ment accordftg to the difference of the air, from which we may derive some conjecture as to rain and fine weather. But these mistakes being voluntary, all that is necessary to avoid them is & little good faith. The most common, and the most dangerous, are those of which we are not conscious, because the engagement into which we have entered to defend an opinion disturbs the view of the mind, and leads it to take as true that which contributes to its end. The only remedy which can be applied to these is to have no end but truth, and to examine reasonings with o much care, that even prejudice shall not be able to mia lead us. CHAPTER III. OF THE FALSE REASONINGS WHICH ARISE FROM OBJECTS THEMSELVES. WE have already noticed that we ought not to separate the inward causes of our errors from those which are de- rived from objects, which may be called the outward, be- cause the false appearance of these objects would not be capable of leading us into error, if the will did not hurry the mind into forming a precipitate judgment, when it is not as yet sufficiently enlightened. Since, however, it cannot exert this power over the un- derstanding in things perfectly evident, it is plain that the obscurity of the objects contributes somewhat to our mis- takes ; and, indeed, there are often cases in which the pas- sion which leads us to reason ill is almost imperceptible. Hence it is useful to consider separately .those illusions which arise principally from the things themselves : I. It is a false and impious opinion, that truth is so like to falsehood, and virtue to vice, that it is impossible to dis- tinguish between them ; but it is true that, in the majority of cases, there is a mixture of truth and error, of virtue and vice, of perfection and imperfection, and that this mixture is one of the most ordinary sources of the false judgments of men. SOPHISMS ARISING PROM OBJECTS THEMSELVES. 31 For it is through this deceptive mixture that the good qualities of those whom we respect lead us to approve of their errors, and that the defects of those whom we do not esteem lead us to condemn what is good in them, since we do not consider that the most imperfect are not so in everything, and that God leaves in the best imperfections, which, being the remains of human infirmity, ought not to be the objects of our respect or imitation. The reason of this is, that men rarely consider things in detail ; they judge only according to their strongest impres- sion, and perceive only what strikes them most ; thus, when they perceive a good deal of truth in a discourse, they do not notice the errors which are mixed with it ; and, on the contrary, when the truths are mingled with many errors, they pay attention only to the errors, the strong bears away the weak, and the most vivid impression effaces that which is more obscure. It is, however, a manifest injustice to judge in this way. There can be no possible reason for rejecting reason, and truth is not less truth for being mixed with error. It does not belong to men, although men may propound it. Thus, though men, by reason of their errors, may deserve to be condemned, the truth which they advance ought not to be rejected. Thus justice and truth require, that in all things which are thus made up of good and evil we distinguish between them ; and in this wise separation it is that mental precision mainly appears. Hence the fathers of the church have taken from pagan books very excellent things for their morals, and thus St. Augustine has not scrupled to borrow from a heretical Donatist seven rules for interpreting Scripture. * 32 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. Reason obliges us, when we can, to make this distinction ; but since we have not always time to examine in detail the good and evil that may be in everything, it is right, in such circumstances, to give to them the name which they deserve from their preponderating element. Thus we ought to say that a man is a good philosopher who commonly reasons well, and that a book is a good book which has notoriously more of good than of evil in it. Men, however, are very much deceived in these general judgments ; for they often praise and blame things from the consideration only of what is least important in them, want of penetration leading them not to discover what is most important, when it is not the most striking : thus, although those who are wise judges in painting value in- finitely more design than colour, or delicacy of touch, the ignorant are, nevertheless, more impressed by a painting whose colours are bright and vivid, than by another more sober in colour, however admirable in design. It must, however, be confessed, that false judgments are not so common in the arts, since those who know nothing about them defer more readily to the opinion of those who are well informed ; but they are most frequent in those things which lie within the jurisdiction of the people, and of which the world claims the liberty of judging, such as eloquence. We call, for example, a preacher eloquent, when his periods are well turned, and when he uses no inelegant words ; and from this M. Vaugelas says, in one place, that a bad word does a preacher or an advocate more harm than a bad reasoning. "We must believe that this is simply a truth of fact which he relates, and not an opinion which he supports. It is true that we^fcrd people who judge in THOSE WHICH ARISE FROM OBJECTS THEMSELVES. 33 this way, but it is true also that there is nothing more un- reasonable than these judgments; for the purity of lan- guage, and the multitude of figures, are but to eloquence what the colouring is to a painting that is to say, only its lower and more sensuous part ; but the most important part consists in conceiving things forcibly, and in express- ing them so that we may convey to the minds of the hearers a bright and vivid image, which shall convey these things not only in an abstract form, but with the emotions also with which we conceive them ; and this we may find in men of inelegant speech and unbalanced periods, while we meet with it rarely in those who pay so much attention to words and embellishments, since this care distracts their attention from things, and weakens the vigor of their thoughts, as painters remark, that those who excel in colours do not commonly excel in design the mind not being capable of this double application, and attention to the one injuring the other. We may say, in general, that the world values most things by the exterior alone, since we find scarcely nny who penetrate to the interior and to the foundation of them ; everything is judged according to the fashion, and unhappy are those who are not in favour. Such a one is clever, in- telligent, profound, as much as you will, but he does not speak fluently, and cannot turn a compliment well ; he may reckon on being little esteemed through the whole of his life by the generality of the world, and on seeing a multi- tude of insignificant minds preferred before him. It is no great evil not to have the reputation which we merit, but it is a vast one to follow these false judgments, and to judge of things only sui>ernciully ; and this we are bound, as far ax possible, to avoid. 3* 34 ' soPriTSite COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. II. Amongst the causes which lead us into error by a false lustre, which prevents our recognising it, we may justly reckon a certain grand and pompous eloquence, which Cicero calls abundantem sonantibus verbis uberibusgiie seten- tiis ; for it is wonderful how sweetly a false reasoning flows in at the close of a period which well fits the ear, or of a figure which surprises \is by its novelty, and in the contem- plation of which we are delighted. These ornaments not only veil from our view the false- hoods which mingle with discourse, but they insensibly engender them, since it often happens that they are neces- sary to the completion of the period or the figure. Thus, when we hear an orator commencing a long gradation, or an antithesis of many members, we have reason to be on our guard, since it rarely happens that he finishes without exaggerating the truth, in order to accommodate it to the figure. He commonly disposes of it as we do the stones of a building, or the metal of a statue : he cuts it, lengthens it, narrows it, disguises it, as he thinks fit, in order to adapt it to that vain work of words which he wishes to make. How many false thoughts has the desire of making a good point produced ! How many have been led into falsehood for the sake of a rhyme ! How many foolish things have certain Italian authors been led fa write, through the affectation of using only Ciceronian words, and of what is called pure Latinity ! Who could help smiling to hear [Cardinal] Bembo say that a pope had been elected by the favour of the immortal gods Deorum immortalium beneficiis ? There are poets even who imagine that the essence of poetry consists in the introduction of pagan divi- nities ; and a German poet, a good versifier enough, though THOSE WHICH ARISE FROM OBJECTS THEMSELVES. 35 not a very judicious writer, having been justly reproached by Francis Picus Hirandola with having introduced into a poem, where he describes the wars of Christians against Christians, all the divinities of paganism, and having mixed up Apollo, Diana, and Mercury, with the pope, the electors, and the emperor, distinctly maintained that, without this, it would not have been a poem, in proof of which he al- leged this strange reason, that the poems of Hesoid, of Homer, and of Virgil, are full of the names and the fables of these gods ; whence he concluded that he might be allowed to do the same. These bad reasonings are often imperceptible to those who make them, and deceive them first. They are deafened by the sound of their own words, dazzled with the lustre of their figures ; and the grandeur of certain words attaches them unconsciously to thoughts of little solidity, which they would doubtless have rejected had they exercised a little reflection. It is probable, for instance, that it was the word vestal which pleased an author of our time, and which led him to say to a young lady, to prevent her from being ashamed of knowing Latin, that she need not blush to speak a lan- guage which had been spoken by the vestals. For, if he had considered this thought, he would have seen that he might as justly have said to that lady that she ought to blush to speak a language which had been formerly spoken by the courtezans of Rome, who were far more numerous than the vestals ; or that she ought to blush to speak any other lan- guage than that of her own country, since the ancient vestals spoke only their natural language. All these reasonings, which are worth nothing, are as good as that of this author ; 36 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. and the truth is, that the vestals have nothing to do with justifying or condemning maidens who learn Latin. The false reasonings of this kind, which are met with continually in the writings of those who most affect elo- quence, show us how necessary it is for the majority of those who write or speak to be thoroughly convinced of this excellent rule, that there is nothing beautiful except that which is true ; which would take away from discourse a multitude of vain ornaments and false thoughts. It is true that this precision renders the style more dry and less pompous ; but it also renders it clearer, more vigorous, more serious, and more worthy of an honourable man. The impression which it makes is less strong, but much more lasting ; whereas that produced by these rounded periods is BO transient, that it passes away almost as soon as we have heard them. III. It is a very common defect amongst men to judge rashly of the actions and intentions of others ; and they almost always fall into it by a bad reasoning, through which, in not recognising with sufficient clearness all the causes which might produce any effect, they attribute that defect defi- nitely to one cause, when it may have been, produced by many others ; or, again, suppose that a cause, which has ac- cidentally, when united with many circumstances, produced an effect on one occasion, must do so on all occcasions. A man of learning is found to be of the same opinion with a heretic, in a matter of ciiticism, independent of religious controversies : a malicious adversary concludes from this that he is favourable to heretics ; but he concludes this rashly and maliciously, since it is perhaps reason and truth which have led him to adopt that opinion. THOSE WHICH ARISE FROM OBJECTS THEMSELVES. 37 A writer may speak with some strength against an opinion which he believes to be dangerous ; he will, from this, be accused of hatred and animosity against the authors who have advanced it ; but he will be so unjustly and rashly, since this earnestness may arise from zeal for the truth, just as well as from hatred of the men who oppose it. A man is the friend of a vicious man : it is, therefore, concluded that he is connected by some bond of interest with him, and is a partaker in his crimes. This does not follow : perhaps he knows nothing about them ; and perhaps he has no part in them. We fail to render true civility to those to whom it is due : we are said to be proud and insolent ; *but this was perhaps only an inadvertence or simple forgetfulness. All exterior things are but equivocal signs, that is to say, signs which may signify many things ; and we judge rashly when we determine this sign to mean a particular thing, without having any special reason for doing so. Silence is sometimes a sign of modesty and wisdom, and sometimes of stupidity. Slowness sometimes indicates pru- dence, and sometimes heaviness of mind. Change is some- times a sign of inconstancy, and sometimes of sincerity. Thus it is bad reasoning to conclude that a man is incon- stant, simply from the fact that he has changed his opinion ; for he may have a gqpd reason for changing it. IV. The false inductions by which general propositions are derived from some particular experiences, constitute one of the most common sources of the false reasonings of men. Three or four examples suffice them to make a maxim and a common-place, which they then employ as a principle fo deciding all things. 38 SOPHISMS COMMON IN CIVIL LIFE. Thei'e are many maladies hidden from the most skilful physicians, and remedies often do not succeed : rash minds hence conclude that medicine is absolutely useless, and only a craft of charlatans. There are light and loose women : this is sufficient for the f- jealous to conceive unjust suspicions against the most vir- tuous, and for licentious writers to condemn all universally There are some persons who hide great vices under an appearance of piety ; libertines conclude from this that all devotion is no better than hypocrisy. There are some things obscure and hidden, and we are often grossly deceived : all things are obscure and uncer- tain, say the ancient and modern Pyrrhonists, and we cannot know the truth of anything with certainty. There is a want of equality in some of the actions of men, and this is enough to constitute a common-place, from which none are exempt. ' Reason," say they, " is so weak and blind, that there is nothing so evidently clear as to be clear enough for it ; the easy 'and the hard are both alike to it ; all subjects are equal, and nature in general disclaims its jurisdiction. We only think what we will in the very mo- ment in which we will it ; we will nothing freely, nothing absolutely, nothing constantly." Most people set forth the defects or good qualities of others only by general and extreme propositions. From some particular actions we infer a habit : from three or four faults we conclude a custom ; and what happens once a month or once a year, happens every day, at every hour, and every moment, in the discourses of men, so little pains do they take to observe in them the limits of truth and justice. THOSE WHICH ARISE FROM OBJECTS THEMSELVES. 39 V. It is a weakness and injustice which we often condemn, but which we rarely avoid, to judge of purposes by the event, and to reckon those who had taken a prudent reso- lution according to the circumstances, so far as they could see them, guilty of all the evil consequences which may have happened therefrom, either simply through accident, or through the malice of others who had thwarted it, or through some other circumstances' which it was impossible for them to foresee. M"H nut only love to be fortunate as much as to be wise, but thi-y make no distinction between the fortunate and the wise, nur between the unfortunate ;ui