ifl aft 1
THE LIBRARY
OF"
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
GIFT OF
Fernand Balden'- per ger
V
CONTENTS
OF THE
THIRD VOLUME OF MEMOIRS.
Biographical Notice vii
CHAPTER I.
WAIt OF ITALY.
I. Remarks on the state of parties in France in 1793 — II.
Circumstances which occasioned the surrender of Toulon to
the English — III. Consequences of the reduction of Tou-
lon by the troops of the Convention — Appointment of Na-
poleon to the command of the artillery of the Army of
Italy 1
CHAPTER II.
SUMMARY OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
THE ARMY OF ITALY, 1792 1795.
I. Statement of the operations of the Army of Italy from
the commencement of the war, during the years 1792 and
1793, to the siege of Toulon — II. Napoleon directs the
army in the campaign of 1794. Taking of Saorgio,
Oneglia, the Col di Tende, and all the upper chain of
the Alps, (April, 1794) — III. March of the army across
Montenotte, (October, 1794) — IV. Maritime expeditions ;
battle of Noli, (March, 1795) — V. Napoleon appeases
several insurrections at Toulon. He quits the Army of
Italy, and arrives at Paris, (June, 1795) — VI. Kellerman
being defeated, rallies in the lines of Borghetto,(July, 1795)
—VII. Battle of Loano, (December, 1796.) 17
CHAPTER III.
THE THIRTEENTH OF VENDEM1AIRE.
I. Constitution of the year III — II. Additional Laws — III.
The Sections of Paris take up arms in resistance — IV. Dis-
positions for the attack and defence of the Tuileries — V.
Action of the 13th of Vendemiaire — VI. Napoleon com-
mander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior — VII. Barras
— VIII. La Reveillere Lepeaux — IX. Rewbell — X. Car-
not — XI. Letoumeur dp la Manche 63
IV ( ONTEN is
CHAPTEB IV.
DESCR] PTION OF I TA I.V.
I. Italy— 11. '1 lie Alps- III. The Apennines— IV. The great
plain of lt;il\ -V. The Valley of the 1'". and the Valleys
whose waters fall into the Adriatic North and South of
the Po VI. Frontiers <>i' Italy on the land side- \H.
Lines which cover the Valley of the Po —VIII. Capitals of
Italy — IX. Her maritime resources — X. Situation of the
different powers of Italy in ]?!>G 91
CHAPTEB V.
BATTLE OF MONTENOTTE.
I. Plan of the Campaign — II. State of the Armies — IIP
Napoleon arrives at Nice towards the end of March, 1796
— IV. Battle of Montenotte (April 12)— V. Battle of
Millestmo (April 14) — VI. Action of Dego (April 15) —
\ U. Action of Saint Michel (April 20); Action of Mon-
dovi I \|>m1 12) — VIII. Armistice of Cherasco (April 2S)
— IX. Examination of the expediency of passing the Po
and proceeding farther from France 136
CHAPTER VI.
BATTLE OF LODI.
I. Passage of the Po (May 7) — II. Action of Fomhio (May
8) — III. Armistice granted to the Duke of Parma (May
9)— IV. Battle of Lodi (May 10)— V. Entrance into
Milan (May 14) — VI. Armistice granted to the Duke of
Mndena May 20)— VII. Berthier — VIII. Massena — IX.
Augereau— X. Serrmier* 167
CHAPTER VII.
REVOLT OF PA VI A.
I. The army quits its cantonments to take up the line of
the Adigt II. Revolt of Pavia (May 24)— III. Taking
and sack of Pavia (May 26) — IVi Causes of this revolt —
V. The army enters the territories of the Republic of
Venice (May 28) — VI. Battle of Bor ghetto ; passage of the
Mincio (May 30) — VII. The army arrives on the Adige
(June S) — VIII. Description of Mantua— IX. Blockade of
Mantua (June 4) — X. Armistice with Naples (June 5). 19-fc
CHAPTER VIII.
MARCH ON' THE RIGHT BANK OF THE PO.
I. Motives of the march of the French army on the Apen-
nines — II. Insurrection of the Imperial Fiefs — III. En-
CONTENTS. V
trance into Bologna and Ferrara (June 19) — IV. Armistice
granted to the Pope (June 23) — V. Entrance into Leg-
horn (June 29) — VI. Napoleon at Florence — VII. Revolt
of Lugo — VIII. Opening of the trenches before Mantua
(July 18) — IX. Favourable posture of affairs in Piedmont
and Lombardy 215
CHAPTER IX.
BATTLE OF CASTIGLIONE.
I. Marshal Wurmser arrives in Italy at the head of a new
army — II. Situation of the French army — III. Plan of the
Campaign — IV. Wurmser debouches in three columns
(July 29) the right by the road of theChiesa, the centre on
Montebaldo, between the Adige and the lake of Garda,
and the left by the valley of the Adige — V. Grand and
prompt resolution taken by Napoleon ; Action of Salo ;
Action of Lonato (July 31) — VI. Battle of Lonato (Au-
gust 3) — VII. Surrender of the three divisions of the
enemy's right, and of part of his centre — VIII. Battle of
Castiglione (August 5) — IX. Second blockade of Mantua
(end of August) — X. Conduct of the different nations of
Italy, on the news of the success of the Austrians . . 232
CHAPTER X.
ACTIONS BETWEEN THE MINCIO & BRENTA.
I. Position of the Austrian army in the Tyrol, on the 1st of
Sept.— II. Battle of Roveredo (Sept. 4) — III. Wurmser
descends into the plains of the Bassanese — IV. Actions of
Primolano, Covolo, and Cismone (Sept. 7) ; the French
army forces the dofiles of the Brenta — V. Action of Ve-
rona (Sept. 7)— VI. Battle of Bassano (Sept. 8) — VI.
Wurmser passes the Adige by the bridge of Porto Leg-
nago (Sept. 11) — VIII. Battle of Saint-Georges (Sept.
19) — Wurmser is shut up in Mantua (Sept. 18) — IX.
Third blockade of Mantua 256
CHAPTER XI.
OPERATIONS OF THE ARMIES OF THE SAMBRE
& MEUSE AND RHINE, IN GERMANY, I79G.
I. Winter quarters — II. The Austrian armies of Germany
detach 30,000 men into Italy — III. Marches and actions
in the month of June — IV. The Army of the Rhine arrives
on the Necker on the 18th of July — V. The Army
of the Sambre and Meuse reaches the Mein on the
12th of July — VI. March of the Army of the Sainbre
vi cok"j i.N rs.
and Meuse from the Mein to the Naab ; position occu-
pied by it on the i3 1st of August — VII. March of the
Army of the Rhine from the Necker to the Lech; battle
of Neresheim (August 11); position occupied on the 23d
of August — VIII. Prince Charles's manoeuvre against the
Army of the Sambre and Meuse ; battle of Amberg(August
precipitate retreat of that army ; battle of Wurtzburg
S pt 3); the army encamps on the Lalm (September 10);
on the 20th it repasses the Rhine ; marches and counter-
marches of the Army of the Rhine, during September ; its
n treat— IX. Battle of Bibtrach (October 3) — X. Siege of
KebJ and of the tite de punt of Iluninguen — XI. Obser-
vations 277
CHAPTER XII.
BATTLE OF AHCOLE.
I. Marshal Alvinzi arrives in Italy at the head of a third
army — II. Good condition of the French army ; all the
nations of Italy confident of its success — III. Battle of the
Brenta (Nov. 5); Vaubois evacuates the Tyrol in disorder
— IV. Battle of Caldiero (Nov. 12)— V. Murmurs and
various sentiments of the French soldiers — VI. Nocturnal
march of the army on Ronco, where the troops pass the
Adige over a bridge of boats (Nov. 14) ; the army re-en-
tera Verona in triumph, by the Venetian gate, on the right
hank (Nov. 18) 313
CHAPTER XIII.
NEGOTIATIONS DURING 1796.
I. With the Republic of Genoa — II. With the King of Sar-
dinia—Ill. With the Duke of Parma— IV. With the Duke
ofModena — V. With the Court of Rome — VI. With the
Grand Duke of Tuscany — VII. With the King of Naples —
\ III. With the Emperor of (urmany — IX. Congress of
Lombardy. Cispadan Republic 372
CHAPTER XIV.
BATTLE OF HIVOLI.
I . Affair at Rome — II. Situation of the Austrian army — III.
Situation of the French army — IV. Plan of operations
adopted by the Court of Vienna — V. Action of St. Michel
■Ian. 1 .' — VI. Battle of Rivoli (Jan. 11)— VII. Passage
of the Adige bj General Provera; and his march on Man-
tua (Jan. 11)— VIII. Battle of la Favorite (Jan. 16.)—
IX. Capitulation of Mantua (Feb. 2) 401
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE.*
Napoleon has commenced his Memoirs with the
siege of Toulon. He did not consider his actions
previous to that date as belonging to history ; but
public curiosity requiring information respecting the
origin and progressive elevation of a man who has
played so grand apart on the theatre of life, it is there-
fore conceived that some notice of his family, his early
years, and the commencement of his distinguished
career, will not be misplaced here.
The Bonapartes are of Tuscan origin. In the
middle ages they figured as senators of the republics
of Florence, San Miniato, Bologna, Sarzana, and Tre-
viso, and as prelates attached to the court of Rome.
They were allied to the Medici, the Orsini, and Lomel-
lini families. Several of them were engaged in the
public affairs of their native states ; whilst others em-
ployed themselves in literary pursuits at the period of
the revival of letters in Italy. Giuseppe Bonaparte
published one of the first regular comedies of that
age, entitled The Widow ; copies of which exist in
the libraries of Italy, and in the Royal Library at
Paris, where is also preserved the History of the Siege
* This Notice, like the rest of the work, was dictated by Napoleon.
viii BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE.
of Home, by the Constable de Bourbon, of which
Nicolo Bonaparte, a Roman prelate, is the author.*'
This narrative is highly esteemed. In 1797, literary
men, whom no coincidence escapes, remarked the
circumstance, that since the time of Charlemagne
Rome had been twice menaced by great foreign
armies ; at the head of one of which was the Con-
stable de Bourbon, and at the head of the other,
one of the remote descendants of the family of his
historian.
When the French Army entered Bologna, the
Senate took care to have their Golden Book presented
to the General-in-chief by Counts Marescalchi and
Caprara, to draw his attention to the names of
several of his ancestors, inscribed amongst those of
the senators who had contributed to the honour of
their city.
In the fifteenth century, a younger branch of the
Bonaparte family settled in Corsica.^ At the time of
the campaign of Italy, there was no one left of all
* It appears, however, on referring to the work, in the Royal
Library at Paris, that this account of the sacking of Rome is written
by Jacopo, and not by Nicolo Bonaparte. Jacopo was a contempo-
rary and an ocular witness of the event ; his manuscript was printed for
the first time at Cologne, in 1756; and the volume contains a genea-
logy of the Bonapartes, which is carried back to a very remote period,
and describes them as one of the most illustrious houses of Tuscany.
Thip Nicolp Bonaparte, named in the text as the historian, was only
the uncle of Jacopo. He is, however, mentioned in the genealoiry as
a very distinguished scholar, and as having founded the class of Juris-
prudence in the University of Pisa.
t Zopf, in his Summary of Universal History, (Precis de l'histoire
univcrscllc) 20th edition, says that a scion of the Comnena family,
who had claims to the throne of Constantinople, retired into Corsica
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE. IX
the Italian branches, but the Abbe Gregorio Bona-
parte, Knight of St. Stephen, and Canon of San Mi-
niato. He was an old man of great respectability
and wealth. Napoleon, in his march on Leghorn,
stopped at San Miniato, and was received with his
whole staff at the house of his relation. During
supper, the conversation turned entirely on a Capuchin,
a member of the family, who had been beatified a
century before ; and the canon solicited the interest
of the General-in-chief to procure his canonization.
This proposal was several times made to the Emperor
Napoleon after the concordat ; but less importance
was attached to these pious honours at Paris than
at Rome.
Those who are well acquainted with the Italian
language know that it is optional to write Buona or
Bona. The members of the Bonaparte family have
used both these modes of orthography indiscrimi-
nately : of two brothers it has happened that one has
written his name with the u, and the other without it.
It seems that the suppression of this letter was com-
mon in very ancient times : in the church of St.
Francis, belonging to the Minor Friars in the town
of San Miniato, on the right of the principal altar
is a tomb with this inscription: —
iu 1462, and that several members of that family bore the name of
Calomeros, which is perfectly identical with that of Bonaparte.
KaAdv /xe'pos
bona parte.
It may hence be concluded that this name has been Italianized.
We do not believe that this circumstance was ever known to Na-
poleon.
X BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE.
CLARISSIMO SUAE AKTATIS ET PATRIAE VI RO
JOANN1 JACOBI MOCCII DE BONAPARTE
QUI OBIIT ANNO M.CCCCXXX X I . DIE XXV.
SEPTEMBRIS NICOLAUS DE BONAPAl! I 1
APOSTOLICAE CAMERAS CLER1CUS FECIT
GEN1TORI BENEMERENT1 ET POSTERIS.
The Christian name of Napoleon has also been
the subject of much discussion. It was usual in the
Orsini and Loraellini families, from whom it was
adopted by that of Bonaparte. The manner of writing-
it has been disputed in Italy. Some pretended that
it was derived from the Greek, and signified Lion of
the desert ; others that it was derived from the Latin.
The correct way of writing it is Napoleone. This
name is not found in the Roman calendar. From
the searches made in the martyrologies at Rome, at
the period of the Concordat, it appears that Saint
Napoleone was a Greek martyr.
Napoleon's great grandfather had three sons,
Joseph, Napoleon, and Lucien. The first of these
left only one son, whose name was Charles ; the
second left only a daughter, named Elizabeth, who
was married to the head of the Ornano family ; the
third was a priest, and died in 1791, aged eighty
years ; he was archdeacon of the chapter of Ajaccio.
Charles, who thus became the only heir to his father,
was the father of Napoleon. He was educated at
Rome and Pisa, where he took his degree of Doctor
of Laws. At a very early age he married Letitia
Ramolino, a lady of a very good family of the country,
descended from that of Colalto of Naples. By her
he had five sons and three daughters. Charles Bona-
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE. XI
parte was twenty years of age at the breaking out of
the war of 1 768 ; he was a warm friend to Paoli, and
a most zealous defender of the independence of his
country. The town of Ajaccio being occupied, at the
commencement of hostilities, by the French troops,
he removed with his family to Corte in the centre
of the island. His young wife, then pregnant with
Napoleon, followed Paoli's head-quarters and the
army of the Corsican patriots, in the campaign of
1769, across the mountains, and resided a long time
on the summit of Monte Rotondo, in the parish of
Niolo. But her pregnancy advancing, she obtained
from Marshal Devaux a safe conduct to return to
her house at Ajaccio. Napoleon was bom on the
15th ot August, being the feast of the Assumption.
Charles Bonaparte followed Paoli, on his retire-
ment, as far as Porto Vecchio, and wished to have
embarked with him; but the entreaties of his family,
his attachment to his children, and his affection for
his young wife, retained him.
The French government appointed provincial states
in Corsica, and continued the magistracy of the twelve
nobles, who, like the Burgundian deputies, governed
the country. Charles Bonaparte, who was very
popular in the island, formed part of this magistracy.
He was attached as counsellor to the tribunal of
Ajaccio ; this was an intermediate step for getting
into the supreme council of the country. In 1779
the states appointed him deputy for the nobles to
Paris. The clergy chose the bishop of Nebbio, and the
third estate a Casabianca. Charles Bonaparte took
with him his two sons, Joseph and Napoleon, the
one aged eleven years, the other ten; he placed the
Xll BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE.
former in the boarding-school at Autun, and the lat-
ter entered the military school at Brienne as a pupil.
Napoleon remained six years at that school. In
17K3, Field-marshal the Chevalier Kergariou, inspector
of the military schools, selected him to pass the
following- year to the military school at Paris, to which
three of the best scholars, chosen by the inspector,
were annually sent from each of the twelve provincial
schools. Napoleon remained only eight months at
Paris. In the month of August 1785 he was ex-
amined by the Academician Laplace, and received
the brevet of a second lieutenant of artillery in the
regiment of La Fere ; he was then sixteen years of
age. Phelipeaux, Pecaduc, and Demasis passed at
the same examination : they all three emigrated at
the commencement of the Revolution. The first de-
fended St. Jean d'Acre, where he evinced much
talent, and where he died ; the second was a Breton,
and attained the rank of major in the Austrian army;
the third, who returned to France during the consul-
ate, was appointed administrator of the crown move-
ables, and chamberlain.
The regiment of La Fere was at Valence, in Dauphi-
ny, where Napoleon kept garrison for the first time.
Some commotions having taken place in the town of
Lyons, he was sent thither with his battalion. This
regiment afterwards passed to Douay in Flanders, and
to Auxonne in Burgundy. In 1791 Napoleon was
made a captain in the regiment of artillery of Grenoble,
then in garrison at Valence, whither he returned.
The revolutionary ideas began to prevail. Part of
the officers emigrated. Gouvion, Vaubois, Galbo
Dufour, and Napoleon, were the four captains who,
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE. Xlll
having" preserved the good opinion of the soldiers,
kept them within the limits of order.
Napoleon was in Corsica for six months in 1792.
He took the earliest opportunity of waiting on Paoli,
with whom his father had been intimate. Paoli re-
ceived him in a very friendly manner, and did all in his
power to retain him, and keep him out of the way of
the disturbances with which the mother-country was
threatened.
In January and February 1793, Napoleon was in-
trusted with a counter attack on the North of Sardinia,
whilst Admiral Truguet was operating against Cagliari.
The expedition not having succeeded, he brought his
troops safely back to Bonifacio. This was his first
military achievement, and obtained him testimonials
of the attachment of the soldiers, and a local repu-
tation.
A few months after, Paoli, against whom an accu-
sation had been decreed by the senate, threw off the
mask and revolted. Previously to declaring himself,
he communicated his scheme to the young artillery
officer, of whom he used frequently to say " You see
that youth ; he is a man for a Plutarch's biography."
But all the persuasions and influence of this venerable
old man were unavailing. Napoleon agreed with him
that France was in a frightful state, but reminded him
that nothing that is violent can last long; and that
as he had an immense influence over the inhabitants,
and was master of the places of strength and of the
troops, he ought to maintain tranquillity in Corsica,
and let the fury of the moment pass away in France ;
that the island ought not to be torn from its natural
connexion on account of a momentary disorder ; that
XIV BIOGRAPH I (A I N'OTK I
it had every thing to lose in such a convulsion; thai
it belonged, geographically, either to France or Italy ;
that it never could be English ; and that as Italy was not
a single undivided power, Corsica ought constantly to
remain French. The old general could not controvert
all this, but he persisted in his plans. Napoleon quit-
ted the convent of Rostino, where this conference was
held, two hours afterwards. Affairs grew worse; Corte
openly revolted, bodies of insurgents from all quarters
advanced on Ajaccio, where there were no troops of
the line or means of resistance proportioned to the
attack. The Bonaparte family retired to Nice, ami
afterwards into Provence ; their property was devas-
tated ; their house, after being pillaged, was long used
as barracks by an English battalion. Napoleon, on
reaching Nice, was preparing to join his regiment,
when General Dugear, who commanded the artillery
of the Army of Italy, required his services, and em-
ployed him in the most delicate operations. A few
months after, Marseilles revolted ; the Marseillese
army got possession of Avignon ; the communications
of the Army of Italy were cut off; there was a want of
ammunition; a convoy of powder was intercepted ; and
the general-in-chief was greatly embarrassed by these
circumstances. General Dugear sent Napoleon to the
Marseillese insurgents, to try to induce them to let
the convoys pass, and at the same time to take all
necessary measures to secure and accelerate their pas-
sage. He went to Marseilles and Avignon, had inter-
views with the leaders of the insurgents, convinced
them that it was their own interest not to excite the
resentment of the Army of Italy, and got the convoys
forwarded.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE. XV
During' these proceedings Toulon had surrendered
to the English: Napoleon, now a lieutenant-colonel
(c/iefde batailhn), was ordered on service to the siege
of Toulon, on the proposal of the committee of artillery.
He joined the besieging army on the 12th of Sep-
tember, 1793.
During his residence at Marseilles, when sent to the
insurgents, having an opportunity of observing all the
weakness and incoherence of their means of resist-
ance, he drew up a little pamphlet, which he published
before he left that city. He endeavoured to open the
eyes of these frantic people, and predicted that the
only result of their revolt would be to furnish a pre-
text to the men of blood of the day, for sending the
principal persons amongst them to the scaffold. This
pamphlet produced a powerful effect, and contributed
to calm the agitation which prevailed.
MEMOIRS
OF
NAPOLEON.
WAR OF ITALY.
Chapter I.
I. Remarks on the state of parties in Fiance in 1793. — II.
Circumstances which occasioned the surrender of Toulon
to the English. — III. Consequences of the reduction of
Toulon by the troops of the Convention. Appointment
of Napoleon to the command of the artillery of the
Army of Italy.
I.
The Constituent Assembly went in some
respects too far, and in others did too little.
It was composed of men endowed with dis-
tinguished talents, but devoid of experience.
It committed two errors, which might have
produced the total ruin of the nation : the
first was the establishment of a constitution at
variance with the experience of all ages and
states, and the mechanism of which was con-
trived, not for the purpose of strengthening-
social order and promoting national prosperity,
Memoirs. — vol. hi. b
2 MF.MOIKS OF NAPOI.EOX.
but of restricting and annulling the public
power, which is that of government. Great
as this error was, it was less flagrant and had
less deplorable consequences than that of per-
sisting in re-establishing Louis XVI. on the
throne, after the affair of Varennes. What
then ought the Assembly to have done ? It
ought to have sent commissioners extraordi-
nary to Varennes, not to bring the King back
to Paris, but to clear the way for him, and to
conduct him safely beyond the frontiers; to
have decreed, by virtue of the Constitution,
that he had abdicated; proclaimed Louis XVII.
King; created a regency, confided the care of
the King, during his minority, to a Princess of
the House of Cond6, and composed the coun-
cil of regency and the ministry of the principal
members of the Constituent Assembly. A
government so conformable to principle, and
so national, would have found means to reme-
dy the disadvantages of the Constitution ; the
force of events would soon have led to the
adoption of the necessary modifications. It
is probable that France would have triumphed
over all her enemies, domestic and foreign, and
would have experienced neither anarchy nor
revolutionary government. By the period of
the King's majority, the Revolution would have
WAR OF ITALY. 3
been so well rooted, that it might have defied
every attack. To act otherwise was intrusting
the steering of the vessel, during a most tre-
mendous storm, to a pilot no longer capable of
conducting her ; it was calling the crew to in-
surrection and revolt in the name of public
safety ; it was invoking anarchy.
The royalists formed the right side of the
Constituent Assembly ; the constitutionals
took the left side, placing themselves at the
head of the people. But in the Legislative
Assembly the constitutionals formed the right
side, and the Girojiclins the left. In the Con-
vention, the latter in their turn composed the
right side, and the faction called that of the
Mountain, formed the left side, directing the
popular party. In the Constituent Assembly
the constitutionals demanded the expulsion of
the troops of the line, proclaiming the principle
that the assembly ought to be guarded by the
national guard. In the Legislative Assembly
they maintained a contrary opinion, and loud-
ly clamoured for troops of the line ; but the
Girondists indignantly rejected the employment
of any hired army against the majority of the
people. The Gironck party, in its turn,
claimed the protection of an army of the line
against the popular party. Thus did the dif-
B 2
4 MEMOIRS OF NATOLKON'.
ferent parties alternately change their opinions
according to circumstances.
The factions of the Gironde and the Moun-
tain were too violent in their mutual animosity.
Had they both continued to exist, the proceed-
ings of administration would have been en-
cumbered with so many impediments, that the
Republic could not have maintained the con-
test against the combination of all Europe.
The good of the country required the triumph
of one of these parties. On the 3 1st of May,
the Gironde fell, and the Mountain thence-
forth governed without opposition. The con-
sequence is known: the campaigns of 1793
and 1794 delivered France from foreign inva-
sion.
Would the result have been the same if the
Gironde party had gained the day, and the
Mountain had been sacrificed on the 31st of
May ? We think it would not. The Moun-
tain party, although checked, would always
have possessed great influence in France, in
the popular societies and armies, and would
have essentially diminished the energies of the
nation, the whole of which were necessary at
t hat crisis. There was undoubtedly more
talent in the Gironde than in the Mountain ;
but the Gironde was composed of more specu-
WAR OF ITALY.
lative men, with less resolution and decision
of will; they would have governed more
mildly, and it is probable that under their
reign only part of the excesses which the re-
volutionary government of the Mountain com-
mitted, would have taken place. The Gironde
prevailed in the towns of Lyons, Marseilles,
Toulon, Montpellier, Nismes, Bordeaux, and
Brest, and in several provinces. The home
of the Mountain was the capital, and it was
supported by all the Jacobins in France. On
the 31st of May it triumphed; twenty-two
deputies, the leaders of the Gironde, were
proscribed.
II.
Sixty-six departments, filled with indigna-
tion, took up arms. The people of Paris, they
said, had usurped the national sovereignty.
They raised battalions, and began a civil war ;
but the Mountain being masters of the Con-
vention and supported by the popular societies
and the armies, and having the treasury and
the assignat plate at their disposal, despised
the vain threats of the federalists. The small
army which marched on Paris, under the com-
mand of Calvados, was defeated by a few squad-
rons of gens-d'armes. In a few weeks peace
was restored throughout the Republic, with the
6 Ml MO IKS OF NAPOLEON.
exception of Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, and a
few towns of Languedoc. Lyons, besieged
by part of the army of the Alps, and by some
battalions of volunteers raised in Burgundy
and Auvergne, made a long and brilliant resis-
tance ; its national guard had been organized
long before, and 3000 refugees from the south-
ern provinces, amongst whom were many
ancient officers, had enlisted in it. Marseilles
and Toulon brought 6000 national guards into
the field ; Montpellier and Nismes, 4000.
These two divisions were to join at Orange,
and to proceed thence to the relief of Lyons.
The representatives of the people with the
army of the Alps, detached from Grenoble
2000 infantry of the line, 500 Allobrogian
horse, and two batteries of artillery, under the
command of Colonel Cartaux. This little
column descended the left bank of the Rhone,
fell in with the van of the Marseillese at
Orange, put them to flight, advanced on the
bridge of Saint-Esprit, dispersed the van of
the force from Nismes, occupied the castle,
and having marched on Avignon, drove the
Marseillese army from that place on the 16th
of July, and forced it to repass the Durance
precipitately. Cartaux took possession of
Aix on the 20th of August ; on the 24th he
WAR OF ITALY. /
attacked the camp of the confederates, which
was intrenched and lined with twenty pieces
of heavy cannon, forced it, and entered Mar-
seilles, which place was exposed to all the
horrors of civil war.
The Sections N 05 . 9, II, 12, 13, and
14, had declared for the Mountain, and sum-
moned the municipality to acknowledge the
Convention, which proposal had been rejected
with indignation. Both parties took up arms.
The conflict was still proceeding when the
fugitives from the camp of Septem brought the
news of the loss of the battle there ; at the
same moment the Allobrogians seized the gates
of Aix. The terrified leaders of the federal-
ists took refuge in Toulon, accompanied by
a thousand men.
The entrance of Cartaux into Aix became
known at Toulon on the 22d of August. On
this intelligence, the Sections set no bounds to
their violence; they arrested the representa-
tives of the people, Bayle and Beauvais, who
were on a mission there, and confined them in
Fort la Malgue ; the representatives Freron,
Barras, and General Lapoype, fled to Nice,
the head-quarters of the Army of Italy. All
the authorities at Toulon were compromised,
and they had all equally participated in the
H MEMOIRS OF NAPOLF.ON.
revolt ; the municipality, the directory of the
department, the Intendant of the Navy, most
of the persons employed in the arsenal, Vice-
Admiral Trogoff, who commanded the squad-
ron, and a great number of the officers, all
felt themselves equally guilty, and knowing
what enemies they had to deal with, saw no
means of safety but treason. They conse-
quently surrendered the squadron, port, arse-
nal, town and forts to the enemies of France.
The squadron, consisting of eighteen sail of
the line and several frigates, was at anchor in
the roads ; although betrayed by its admiral, it
remained loyal, and defended itself against the
English and Spanish fleets ; but, being aban-
doned by the land forces, and menaced by
those very batteries on the coast that ought to
have protected it, it yielded. The English
and Spanish admirals at first occupied Toulon
with 5000 men detached from their crews :
they hoisted the white flag, and took pos-
session in the name of the Bourbons. They
received reinforcements from Spain, Naples,
Piedmont, and Gibraltar ; by the end of Sep-
tember the garrison consisted of 14,000 men :
3000 of whom were English, 4000 Neapolitans,
2000 Sardinians, and 5000 Spaniards. They
then disarmed the national guard of Toulon,
WAR OF ITALY. i)
which had incurred their suspicion, discharged
the crews of the French ships, put 5000 Bre-
ton and Norman sailors, who caused them
some anxiety, on board four French ships of
the line, which they fitted up as transports,
and sent them to Rochefort and Brest.*
III.
On the 18th of December, at ten o'clock at
night, Colonel Cervoni broke down a gate and
entered the city at the head of a patrol of 200
men. He traversed the whole town : the deep-
est silence prevailed. The port was crowded
with baggage which the inhabitants had not
had time to put on board. A report pre-
vailed that matches were lighted for the pur-
pose of blowing up the powder-magazines;
piquets of cannoneers were accordingly sent
to secure them. Immediately after, the troops
intended to guard the city entered. Excessive
confusion prevailed at the naval arsenal, where
8 or 900 galley slaves were making the
most strenuous exertions to extinguish the
fire. These convicts had rendered the greatest
services, having overawed the English officer,
* For the account of the siege of Toulon, see Memoirs,
Vol. I. page 9.
10 MEMO I US 01 NAPOLEON.
Sir Sidney Smith, who had orders to burn
the ships and the arsenal, and performed his
task very ill. The Republic was indebted to
him for all the valuable treasures recovered.
Napoleon proceeded to the spot with all the
disposable cannoneers and workmen, and suc-
ceeded, in the course of a few days, in extin-
guishing the fire and preserving the arsenal.
The loss which the navy had suffered was consi-
derable, but it still retained immense resources;
all the magazines were sa^ed except the ge-
neral one. There were thirty-one ships of
war at Toulon at the time of its treacherous
surrender: four sail had been employed in
carrying 5000 soldiers to Brest and Rochefort ;
the combined troops burned nine in the roads,
they left thirteen dismantled in the basins, and
carried off four, one of which was burnt at
Leghorn. Fears had been entertained that
they would blow up the basin and several
of the jetties, but they had not time enough
for that purpose. The wrecks of the thirteen
ships and frigates which were burnt and sunk
in the roads contracted the channel ; many
attempts were made to remove them in the
course of the ten following years; at length,
some Neapolitan divers succeeded in getting
the whole out, piece by piece, by sawing the
MAR OF IT A LY. II
hulls. The army entered Toulon on the
19th, the troops had been seventy-two hours
under arms amidst mud and rain ; they aban-
doned themselves, on entering the town, to
some excesses, which seemed authorized by
the promises made to the soldiers during the
siege.
The General-in-Chief restored order by de-
claring that all effects in Toulon were the pro-
perty of the army ; he had the contents of the
private warehouses and the furniture of the
deserted houses, collected in central maga-
zines. The Republic afterwards seized the
whole, allowing only the gratification of a
year's pay to every officer and soldier. The
emigration from Toulon was very considerable,
the refugees crowded the English, Neapolitan,
and Spanish ships, which were consequently
obliged to anchor in the roads of Hieres, and
to make the emigrants encamp in the isles of
Porquerolles and the Levant. It is said that
the number of these emigrants amounted to
14,000. Dugommier gave orders to leave the
white flag hoisted on all the forts and bastions
of the roads, by which means a great number
of ships of war and merchantmen bringing
men or supplies intended for the enemy were
deceived. During the first thirty days sue-
12 MEMOIRS OK NAPOLEON.
ceeding the taking of the city, vessels richly
laden were daily captured. An English fri-
gate, on one occasion, had cast anchor under
the great tower, carrying supplies to the
amount of several millions ; she was consi-
dered as taken, and two naval officers in a
small boat boarded her accordingly, declaring
to the captain that they took possession of the
frigate as their prize. The captain clapped
them into the hold, cut his cables, and was
lucky enough to escape without farther loss.
One evening, towards the end of December,
the commandant of the artillery being on the
quay, about eight o'clock, saw an English
skiff come ashore, from which an officer
landed, and asked him for Lord Hood's lodg-
ings. This was the captain of a fine brig
which brought despatches and announced the
approach of reinforcements. The brig was
taken, and the despatches read.
The representatives established a revolu-
tionary tribunal, according to the laws of
that period ; but all the guilty had escaped
and followed the enemy ; all who had resolved
to stay, were conscious of their innocence.
Nevertheless this tribunal caused several per-
sons to be arrested, who had been prevented
from following the enemy by various accidents,
MAR OV ITALY. 13
and caused them to be punished in expiation
of their guilt. But eight or ten victims were
too few, and a dreadful measure, characteristic
of the spirit of that period, was resorted to.
It was proclaimed that all those persons who
had been employed in the arsenal whilst the
English were in possession of the town, were
to repair to the Champ dc Mars, and give in
their names ; and they were led to believe
that it was for the purpose of employing them
again. Nearly two hundred persons, head
workmen, inferior clerks, and other subal-
terns went accordingly, in full confidence.
Their names were registered ; it was proved
by their own confession that they had retained
their places under the English government,
and the revolutionary tribunal, in the open
field, immediately sentenced them to death.
A battalion of Sans-Culottes and Marseillese,
brought expressly for the purpose, shot them.
This action requires no comment ; but it was
the only execution that took place at Toulon ;
it is false that any persons whatever were killed
by grape-shot : neither the commandant of the
artillery, nor the cannoneers of the line, would
have lent themselves to such an action. It
was the cannoneers of the revolutionary army
who committed such atrocities at Lyons.
14 MEMOIRS OF X A POLEON.
By a decree of the Convention, the name
of Port dc la Montague was given to the Port
of Toulon, and it was ordered that all the
public edifices should be demolished, except
those deemed necessary for the navy and the
public service. This extravagant decree was
put in execution, but very tardily ; only five
or six houses were demolished, and those were
rebuilt shortly after. The English squadron
remained a month or six weeks in Hieres
roads : this created some anxiety ; there were
no mortars in Toulon capable of throwing
projectiles above 1500 toises, and the squad-
ron was anchored 2400 toises from the shore.
Had we then had some Villantroys mortars,
such as were afterwards used, the squadron
would not have been able to anchor in the
roads. At length, after blowing up the forts
of Porquerolles and Porteros, the enemy pro-
ceeded to the roads of Porto-Ferrajo, where
they landed a great number of the emigrants
from Toulon.
The news of the taking of Toulon, at the
moment when it was least expected, produced
a wonderful effect in France and throughout
Europe. On the 25th of December the Con-
vention ordered a national festival. The taking
of Toulon was the signal of the successes
WAR OF ITALY. 15
which attended the campaign of 1794. Shortly
afterwards the Army of the Rhine retook the
lines of Weissemburg, and raised the block-
ade of Landau. Dugommier, with part of
the army, marched for the Eastern Pyrenees,
where Doppet was only making blunders.
Another part of this army was sent into la
Vendue, and many battalions returned to the
Army of Italy. Dugommier ordered Napoleon
to follow him, but other orders arrived from
Paris, directing him first to replace the coasts
of the Mediterranean in a state of defence,
especially Toulon ; and afterwards to proceed
to the Army of Italy to command the artillery.
It was at Toulon that Napoleon's reputation
commenced. All the generals, representatives,
and soldiers, who had heard his opinions given
in the different councils, three months before
the taking of the place, anticipated the mili-
tary career he afterwards fulfilled. From that
moment he had acquired the confidence of all
the soldiers of the Army of Italy. Dugommier
wrote to the Committee of Public Safety,
soliciting the rank of brigadier-general for him,
and using these words " Reward this young
" man, and promote him, for, should he be un-
" gratefully treated, he would promote him-
" self." In the Army of the Pyrenees, Dugom-
1G MKMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
mier was continually talking of his command-
ant of the artillery at Toulon, and impressed
a high opinion of him on the minds of all the
generals and officers who afterwards went
from the Army of Spain to the Army of Italy.
Whenever he gained any successes, he used
to send couriers from Perpignan to Napoleon
at Nice.
CHAPTER II.
SUMMARY OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
THE ARMY OF ITALY.
During the years 1792, 1793, 1794, and 1795.
1. Statement of the operations of the Army of Italy from the
commencement of the war, during the years 1792 and
1793, to the siege of Toulon. — II. Napoleon directs the
army in the campaign of 1794. Taking "of Saorgio,
Oneglia, the Col di Tende, and all the upper chain of the
Alps, (April, 1794). — III. March of the army across
Montenotte, (October, 1794). — IV. Maritime expeditions;
battle of Noli, (March, 1795). — V. Napoleon appeases
several insurrections at Toulon. He quits the Army of
Italy and arrives at Paris, (June, 1795) — VI. Kellerman
being defeated, rallies in the lines of Borghetto, (July,
1795).— VII. Battle of Loano, (December, 1796.)
I.
The war of the first coalition began in 1792.
General Montesquiou, commanding the army
of the South, was intrusted with the defence of
the whole frontier from Geneva to Antibes. The
campaign opened in September. He marched
from his camp at Cessieux to the Isere, and to
fort Barreau ; and became master of Chambery
Memoirs. — vol. hi. c
18 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
and all Savoy in a few weeks. The Pied-
montese retired beyond the Alps. Lieutenant-
general Anselme, commanding a division of
10,000 men, was ordered to defend the Var,
from the camp of Tournoux, near the Col
d'Argentiere, to Antibes ; Admiral Truguet,
with nine ships of war, carrying 2000 soldiers,
was cruising between Antibes and Monaco.
The Var is a bad line of defence ; the French
squadron menaced its rear, which decided the
court of Turin to order its army to take up a
line of defence at the back of the Maritime
Alps, supporting the right on the Var and its
tributary streams, the centre on Lentosca, and
the left on the Roya, before Saorgio. On the
23d of September, General Anselme, being in-
formed by the French admiral that the anchor-
ing of his squadron in line before Nice had
determined the enemy to evacuate that place,
and that the Piedmontese army had begun its
movement, passed the Var at the head of 4000
men, and took possession of Nice, Fort Mont-
albano and Villa Franca, without experiencing
any resistance. The two latter places were in
a perfect state of defence, and provided with
excellent artillery : their garrisons were made
prisoners of war. Anselme had forded the
Var ; the next day but one the torrent in-
WAR OF ITALY. 19
creased, and he remained in Nice eight or ten
days separated from the rest of his army. The
enemy was ignorant of this circumstance, or
knew not how to profit by it. Anselme pushed
a vanguard as far as Lascarena, on the road to
Turin. The squadron proceeded to Oneglia,
a port belonging to the King of Sardinia. The
admiral summoned the commandant to sur-
render, but the bearer of the flag of truce was
put to death; the troops landed, and took pos-
session of the city. General Anselme was
unable to prevent them from committing some
excesses : he was even accused of participa-
ting in the disorders of which the city of Nice
complained ; and was accordingly recalled.
In the beginning of 1793 the government
separated the Army of the Alps from the Army
of Italy, and gave the command of the latter
to General Biron on the 15th of February,
1793. Several actions took place on the heights
of Lascarena, Sospello, and Lentosca; each
army occupied them in turn ; but Sospello at
length remained finally in the possession of
the French army. The vanguard encamped at
Brouis between Sospello and Breglio. On the
11 th of April, Biron got possession of Lentosca
and the heights as far as Belvedere, taking
many prisoners and several pieces of cannon,
c 2
20 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
Some time after he was called to the command
of the Army of La Vendee, and succeeded 1>\
General Brunet. The army having received
reinforcements now amounted to 30,000 men
under arms ; which number, with the troops
in garrison in Provence, the depots, and the
sick, swelled its regimental returns to G8,000.
The enemy were also reinforced by their own
levies and a fine Austrian division ; they had
fortified their position with a great number of
batteries and works ; their right was supported
on the camp of Utelle, their centre in ad-
vance of the Col de Raus, and their left before
Saorgio, a fortified place which crosses the
road from Nice to Turin.
General Brunet was desirous, for good rea-
sons, of gaining possession of all the maritime
Alps, driving the enemy beyond the Col di
Tende, and placing his army on the summit of
the Alps, at the sources of the waters, which
would be a much stronger position, and re-
quire fewer men to guard it. This plan was
very rational, and he had a sufficient force to
carry it into effect ; but he did not possess the
military talents necessary for directing so im-
portant an operation. On the 8th of June,
1793, he made a general attack throughout the
line. The French soldiers performed all that
WAR OF ITALY. 21
it was possible to do ; they carried all the
positions that could be taken ; but the camps
of Fourches and Raus, which the enemy occu-
pied, were impregnable. On the 10th of June
Brunet obstinately repeated his efforts, by
which the Piedmontese army acquired glory,
and the flower of the French grenadiers was
destroyed. The positions of the Piedmontese
were now considered too strong to be forced,
and they continued to fortify them. In the
month of August the treason of Toulon ren-
dered it necessary to send a detachment from
the Army of Italy to besiege that place ; but
although weakened, the army repulsed all
the attempts made by the Piedmontese in the
month of October, to enter Provence by pass-
ing the Var. One of their divisions, 4000
strong, was defeated and almost destroyed by
Dugommier at Gillette, which induced them
to resume their positions. Brunet, being un-
justly accused of treason, and of favouring
the insurrection at Marseilles, was delivered
up to the revolutionary tribunal at Paris, and
perished on the scaffold.
After the taking of Toulon, Napoleon passed
the first two months of 1794 in fortifying and
arming the coasts of the Mediterranean ; he
reached Nice in March, and took the chief
22 M 1 . MUIIIS V X A PO I. K O X .
command of the artillery. The army was
commanded by General Dumorbion. This
general, an old captain of grenadiers, had
obtained the ranks of brigadier-general and
general of division, in the campaign of 1792
and 1793, in the Army of Italy ; he was ac-
quainted with all the positions, and had com-
manded an attack under Brunet in the month
of June. He was sixty years of age, of a clear
understanding, personally brave, and tolerably
well informed, but a victim to the gout, and
constantly in bed ; he passed whole months
without being able to stir. General Gautier
was his quartermaster-general ; Deyssantier
his mustermaster-general ; Haller his pay-
master and storekeeper; General Dejar the
lieutenant-general of the artillery ; Colonel
Gassendi director of the park ; General Vial
commanded the engineers ; Generals Mac-
quart, Dallemagne, Massena, &c. commanded
the different corps ; the head-quarters had
been two years at Nice, where there was no
appearance of war, it being ten leagues from
the advanced posts.
II.
Napoleon spent part of March in visiting
the positions occupied by the army, and col-
WAR OF ITALY. 28
lecting information respecting the various ac-
tions which had taken place in 1792. He
remained several days at the camp of Brouis
occupied by General Macquart, and convinced
himself of the strength of the enemy's posi-
tions, and the imprudence of the attacks of the
8th and 12th of June, which had proved disas-
trous to the army, Amongst mountains there
are many positions to be found of great na-
tural strength, which we must take care not to
attack. The genius of this kind of warfare
consists in occupying camps, either on the
flanks or in the rear of those of the enemy,
which leave him only the alternative of eva-
cuating his positions without fighting, or of
coming out of them to attack you. In moun-
tain-war, he who attacks is always under a dis-
advantage ; even in offensive war, the art con-
sists in engaging* only in defensive actions, and
in obliging the enemy to attack. The enemy's
positions were well connected ; the right was
supported in a solid manner, but the left not
so well ; the country was much more practi-
cable on that side. Napoleon, therefore, con-
ceived a plan of operations, which, without
engaging the army in difficult affairs, was
adapted to put it in possession of the upper
chain of the Alps, and to oblige the enemy to
24 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
abandon of his own accord the formidable
camps of Raus and Fourches. This plan con-
sisted in turning the left of the enemy by
passing the Roya, the Nervia, and the Taggia,
in occupying Mount Tanardo, Rocca Barbena,
and Tanarello, and in cutting off the Saorgio
road, the enemy's line of communication be-
hind the hill of Marta.
A great number of privateers were stationed
at Oneglia, whence they intercepted the com-
munications between Nice and Genoa, which
annoyed the army and greatly impeded the
victualling of Provence, then afflicted with a
scarcity of provisions. The same operation
was adapted to remedy this evil : when the
army should be on Monte Grande, it would
command the sources of the Tanaro, and the
whole valley of Oneglia ; that town, as well as
Ormea, Garessio, and Loano, would fall into
its power ; thus this plan of campaign would
have three grand results; 1st, to place the
defence of the county of Nice in its natu-
ral position on the upper ridge of the Alps ;
2dly, to station the right in a country where
the mountains being much less elevated,
would afford greater advantages ; and 3dly,
to cover a portion of the Riviera di Genoa, and
destroy the haunts of the privateers which pre-
WAR OF ITALY. 25
vented communication between Genoa, the
grand centre of commerce, the army, and
Marseilles. There was no reason to fear that
the enemy would avail themselves of the de-
tachment which would be made by the French
army on its right, in order to act on the offen-
sive ; such a movement in a hilly country
would only be formidable in proportion to the
time that might be lost in striking the decisive
blow ; for if the troops have gained a few
marches on the enemy, they have arrived on
his flanks, and then it is too late for him to
take the offensive part. In mountain warfare,
to oblige the enemy to leave his positions to
attack yours, is, as we have already said, the
spirit and true method of conducting this kind
of war. In fact the positions at the Cols of Beo-
let, Brouis, and Perus, although not, perhaps,
so strong as those of the Piedmontese, were
nevertheless of great strength. Their numeri-
cal superiority would have been useless to them
there ; and moreover, if these positions had
been forced, the enemy, who would have been
stopped at the positions of the Col de Braous,
Castiglione, and Luceram, might have adopted
the plan of attacking the positions of Mount
Tanardo and the Tanarello as soon as they had
seen them occupied by the French ; but these
2G MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
positions were good in themselves, and we
should then return to the same principles of
mountain warfare ; we should oblige the
enemy to attack in this case. Besides, all
the French troops remaining at the camp of
Brouis, might, by crossing the Roya and
Mount Jove, hasten to their assistance ; and
finally, the operation on the sources of the
Tanaro and Ormea was in itself a diversion
which would tend to keep the enemy from
engaging in difficult and dangerous affairs in
the mountains, and induce him to return with
his army into the plain to cover the capital.
This plan was laid before a council, at
which were present the two popular represen-
tatives, commissioners to the army, General
Dumorbion, the general of the. artillery, Ge-
neral Massena, General Vial of the engineers,
and Brigadier-general Rusca, a light-infantry
officer, born in these mountains, and particu-
larly acquainted with them. The reputation
of the author saved him all long discussions.
His predictions concerning Toulon were re-
membered, and his plan was adopted.
There was one political objection, it was
necessary to borrow the territory of the Re-
public of Genoa ; but the allies themselves
had borrowed it six months before, when
WAR OF 1TALV. 27
2000 Piedmontese crossed the Genoese terri-
tory and embarked at Oneglia for Toulon.
They were only to have proceeded in small
detachments disarmed, but they had marched
in a body, under arms, with drums beating.
The catastrophe of the Modeste was also re-
membered ; this frigate had anchored in the
port of Genoa, and was moored against the
quay. On the 15th of October 1793, three
English ships and two frigates anchored in the
port ; an English seventy-four moored alongside
the Modeste. The master civilly requested
the officer on the quarter-deck of the frigate to
remove a boat which was in the way of the
manoeuvres of the English ship, which was rea-
dily done by the French. Half an hour after,
the English captain requested the commander
of the Modeste to hoist the white flag, saying,
he did not know what the tri-coloured flag
was, (the Allies were then masters of Toulon).
The French officer answered this insult as ho-
nour dictated : but the English had three plat-
forms prepared, which they threw on the fri-
gate and boarded her ; at the same time com-
mencing a brisk fire of musquetry from the
tops and deck ; the crew of the Modeste were
unprepared for any attack ; part of them threw
themselves into the water ; the English pur-
28 M I, MO IKS OF \ A POL EON.
sued the fugitives with their boats, killing and
wounding them. The rage of the people of
Genoa was unbounded ; the English agent
Drake was hooted and threatened, and in-
curred some danger, but Doria was doge ; the
senate made excuses, and the frigate was never
restored. The representatives of the people
at Marseilles laid an embargo on the Genoese
shipping; they expected that the Convention
would declare war; but France, and particu-
larly the South, was desolated by famine; the
Genoese flag was necessary to supply Provence
with provisions ; the Convention therefore
dissembled, declaring that the whole affair was
to be attributed to the weakness of the
Genoese, and that the usual relations between
the two countries should continue unaltered.
It was nevertheless true that the independence
and neutrality of this republic had been
violated.
On the 6th of April a division of 14,000 men,
forming five brigades, passed the Roya, and
took possession of the castle of Ventimiglia ;
one brigade, commanded by Massena, marched
on Mount Tanardo, and took up a position
there ; a second, after having passed the
Taggia, took up a position at Monte-Grande;
the three others, under the immediate com-
WAK OV ITALY. 29
mand of Napoleon, advanced on Oneglia, and
overthrew an Austrian division posted on the
heights of St. Agatha. The French Brigadier-
general Brule was killed in this affair. The
next day the army entered Oneglia, where
twelve pieces of cannon were found. The
whole population of the town and valley had
fled. Twelve more guns w r ere taken near the
Col Saint Silvestre ; the Piedmontese wished
to carry them off to Ormea, but they fell into
the hands of the 2d brigade, which debouched
by the Col Mezzaluna. The army marched on
Ponte di Nave : the remains of the Austrian
division were in position there ; they were
attacked, beaten, and precipitated from the
heights of Mount Ariol into the Tanaro ; the
fortress of Ormea capitulated the same day,
with a garrison of 400 men, an armoury of
several thousand musquets, and twenty pieces
of cannon ; a cloth manufactory, the ware-
houses of which were full, served to clothe the
soldiers. The next day, the 18th, the army
took possession of Garessio, and established
its communications by Mount San Bernardo,
and Rocca-Barbena, with Loano, another small
town on the sea shore, belonging to the King
of Sardinia.
Great alarm prevailed throughout Piedmont ;
30 MEMOIRS or NAPOLEON.
the enemy, as had been foreseen, hastily eva-
cuated all the sides of the Alps, but he was
nevertheless too late, and could not carry off
his artillery. From Tanarello, Massena de-
bouched in the rear of Saorgio, thus cutting
off the road and the enemy's retreat behind
the hill of Marta. Saorgio capitulated on the
29th of April ; this fort might have held out
longer, as it had considerable quantities of
provisions and military stores. On the 8th of
May, Massena proceeded by the Col Ardente,
to the Col di Tende, whilst General Macquart
attacked in front. The attack succeeded.
The army now possessed the whole upper
chain of the maritime Alps : its right, placed
before Ormea, communicated with the Col di
Tende by the Col de Termini, and from the
Col di Tende occupied the chain of the Alps as
far as the Col d'Argentiere, where was the
first post of the Army of the Alps. The execu-
tion of this plan produced 3 or 4000 prisoners,
sixty or seventy pieces of cannon, two for-
tresses, and the possession of all the high Alps,
as far as the first hills of the Apennines. The
army thus covered upwards of half the Riviera
di Ponente, and though it extended fifteen
leagues on its right, its position was thereby
strengthened, and required fewer troops to
WAR OF ITALY. 31
guard it. Nothing could now impede the
coasting trade between Genoa and Provence.
The loss of the army was slight. The fall
of Saorgio and of all those grand positions for
which so many plans had been formed, and so
much blood shed, increased Napoleon's repu-
tation in the army ; and public opinion already
called him to the chief command.
The train of mountain artillery had been
completed. Lieutenant-colonel Faultrier, sub-
director of the park, an officer of artificers,
had attended to its details : the Piedmontese
three-pounders, found in the arsenal of Nice
and the places of Ormea and Saorgio, or in the
camps abandoned by the enemy, were light
enough to be carried on the backs of mules ;
but this calibre was not sufficient for all occa-
sions. There had been sledge carriages and
handspikes made in the Corsican war of 1768,
which had been used for the conveyance of the
four-pounders that followed the columns ;
this method was adopted for the eight and
twelve-pounders, and the six-inch howitzers.
A mountain forge, portable on the backs of
mules, was also invented. In the expeditions
of Oneglia, Ormea, and Saorgio, a train of
artillery of twenty-four guns followed the army
in all its operations in the mountains, which
32 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
was very useful, especially on account of the
moral effect it produced on the troops and the
enemy.
But the Piedmontese Army, encamped in
the plains and hills at the foot of the Alps,
enjoyed the greatest abundance; it was re-
covering- from its fatigues and repairing its
losses; and was daily reinforced by the arrival
of fresh Austrian battalions : whilst the French
armies, encamped on the ridges of the upper
chain of the Alps, on a semi-circumference
of sixty leagues in extent, between Mont
Blanc and the sources of the Tanaro, were
perishing through want and sickness. All
communication was attended with great dif-
ficulty, provisions were scarce and very ex-
pensive, the horses suffered, and all the mate-
riel of the army was damaged. The hard
waters of those elevated regions caused much
sickness; the losses which the army suffered
every three months in the hospitals, might
have supplied the casualties of a great battle ;
these defensive operations were more burthen-
some to our finances, and more perilous to the
men, than an offensive campaign. Defensive
operations in the Alps, in addition to these
disadvantages, are attended with others which
arise from the topography of the country.
WAR OF ITALY. 33
The different corps encamped on these sum-
mits cannot assist each other ; they are insu-
lated ; twenty days are necessary for pro-
ceeding from right to left, whilst the army
defending Piedmont is in a fine plain, occupies
the diameter, and can, in a few days, assemble
in force at the point which it is intended to
attack. The Committee of Public Safety was
desirous that the army should assume the
offensive. Napoleon had conferences on this
subject at Colmar, with officers from the Army
of the Alps : but a difference of opinion pre-
vailed ; it was necessary, in the first place,
that these two armies should be under one
commander-in-chief.
III.
In September an Austrian division assem-
bled on the Bormida, and formed magazines
at Dego. An English division was to land at
Vado, and the two armies united were to oc-
cupy Savona, and force the republic of Genoa,
which would be deprived of all communica-
tions by sea and land, to declare against
France. The roads of Vado had succeeded
those of Oneglia, as the resort of the Eng-
lish cruisers and privateers, which inter-
Memoirs. — vol. hi. d
34 MEMOIRS OI NAPOLEON.
ceptcd the trade between Genoa and Marseilles.
The general of the artillery proposed to occupy
the positions of Saint- Jacques, Montenotte, and
Vado, whereby the right of the army would
be at the gates of Genoa. General Dumor-
bion set out himself at the head of three divi-
sions, forming 18,000 men, with a train of
twenty pieces of mountain artillery ; Napoleon
directed the army, which debouched by the
Col de Bardinetto, and penetrated into Mont-
ferrat by the road which runs along the Bor-
mida. He encamped on the 4th of October
on the height of Biestro, and on the 5th
descended into the plain. He was in hopes
of falling on the rear of the Austrian army ;
but the latter perceived his intention, and
operated its retreat on Cairo and Dego ;
General Cervoni pursued the enemy closely,
at the head of the vanguard which he com-
manded ; the cannonade lasted the whole of
the evening of the 5th, and had not ceased at
ten at night : the Austrian army fell back
on Acqui, abandoning its magazines and pri-
soners, and lost a thousand men.
General Dumorbion had neither orders nor
intention to enter Italy ; his cavalry was on
the Rhone, on account of the scarcity of pro-
visions ; in pursuing the enemy he would have
WAR OV ITALY. 35
committed an error, and drawn upon himself
all the Austrian and Sardinian forces. He
contented himself, therefore, with this recon-
noissance, fell back by Montenotte and Sa-
vona, and took up a position on the heights
of Vado, preserving a post in the valley of
Savona. The artillery armed the coasts in
such a manner as to enable these roads to
afford protection to a French squadron ; the
engineers constructed strong redoubts on the
heights of Vado, which communicated by
Saint-Jacques, Melogno, Settepani, Bardinetto,
and San-Bernardo, with the camps placed on
the heights of the Tanaro. This extension of
the right of the army weakened its position,
but produced many advantages : 1st, it gave
the army the command of the whole Riviera
di Ponente, and all the coasts, preventing the
Austro-Sardinian army from communicating
and acting in concert with the English fleets :
2dly, it secured the passage from Genoa to
Marseilles, because, as the army commanded
all the ports on the coast, it could establish
batteries to protect the coasters : 3dly, in
this position it had an opportunity of support-
ing the partisans of France in Genoa, and of
anticipating the enemy under the walls of
that city, if they should proceed thither, as it
D 2
36 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
was probable they intended to do. This opera-
tion, which baffled the schemes of the enemy
and secured the neutrality of Genoa, was
speedily known throughout Italy, and excited
great alarm. The advanced posts of the army
were thus within ten leagues of Genoa, and
the reconnoitring parties and couriers some-
times approached within three leagues of
that place.
Napoleon spent the rest of the autumn in
fortifying the promontories from Vado to the
Var with good coast-batteries, in order to
protect the passage from Genoa to Nice. In
January he passed one night on the Col di
Tende, whence, at sun-rise, he surveyed those
fine plains which were already the subject of
his meditations. Italiam ! Italiam !
IV.
The French fleets commanded the Mediter-
ranean during the years 1792 and 1793. After
the taking of Oneglia, Admiral Truguet an-
chored in the port of Genoa, where he remained
a considerable time, and whence he despatched
Rear-admiral Latouche Treville to Naples, with
twelve sail of the line. The Port-admiral
went to meet this squadron, and offered to
allow six ships to enter the port, declaring
WAR OF ITALY. 37
that the King could not receive a greater num-
ber without a breach of his neutrality. The
Rear-admiral took no notice of this, but cast
anchor before the windows of the palace, and
on the 16th of December 1792, landed Citizen
Belleville, who, in the uniform of the national
guard, was presented to the King by the Che-
valier Acton. He brought a letter from the
Admiral, demanding, 1st, that the King should
proclaim his neutrality ; and, 2dly, that he
should disavow the note of his minister at
Constantinople, who, in order to induce the
Porte to refuse to receive Semonville as Am-
bassador from France, had indulged in insulting
reflections on that nation. He obtained all he
required ; and the court of Naples thought
itself very fortunate in getting so cheaply rid
of so disagreeable a visit. In the month of
January 1793, Admiral Truguet sailed from
Genoa and anchored in the port of Ajaccio in
the Island of Corsica ; he there put on board
2000 men, troops of the line, whom Paoli, then
commanding the 23d military division, placed
at his disposal. With these troops he repaired
to the Isles of San Pietro, of which he took
possession, placed a garrison in the fort, and
anchored off Cagliari, the capital of Sardinia,
on the 12th of February. At the same time
38 ML.UOIHS OK NAPOLEON.
800 men from Bonifacio, under the command
of Colonel Cesar Colonne, and escorted by a
corvette, were operating a counter-attack in
the North of Sardinia. The Sardinian expe-
dition had been announced for six months;
the Sardinians were prepared ; they fired upon
the flag of truce which the Admiral sent to
summon Cagliari. The bombardment com-
menced, during which the Admiral was at
length joined by the convoy carrying the land
forces sent from Nice, and which were part of
the famous Marseillese phalanx, about 3200
strong. The landing was immediately effected.
In the mean time Rear-admiral Latouche Tre-
ville joined the squadron with his ten ships.
Every thing announced complete success, but
nothing could prevent the rout of the Marseil-
lese phalanx. It had at first refused to attack
in the day-time, to carry an important posi-
tion commanding the town. In the night the
columns fired on each other ; the disorder be-
came extreme ; the cry of treason was heard on
all sides. General Casabianca entreated the
Admiral to re-embark the troops ; he was
obliged to yield. The squadron had obtained
some important advantages by means of the
bombardment, but it lost the ship Leopard,
which grounded, having approached too close
WAR OF ITALY. 39
to the batteries. The expedition having thus
failed, the Admiral sent back to Italy the dif-
ferent troops which had been intrusted to him,
and contented himself with occupying in con-
siderable force the important harbour of the
Isles of San Pietro. War having been declared
against England and Spain, he received orders
to return into Toulon, and thus to abandon the
second object of his expedition, which was to
appear before Constantinople, to confirm the
alliance of the Porte with France, and to over-
awe the Russians. The Marseillese troops had
been hastily levied, and directed by clubs; they
carried terror into every country they landed
in, whether friendly or neutral ; searching
every where for aristocrats and priests, and
thirsting for blood and crime. The crews of
the squadron were complete, and composed of
experienced seamen ; but they were constantly
assembled in popular societies, engaged in
drawing up and signing petitions, and every
ship was a scene of the most dreadful anarchy.
General Casabianca, who commanded at the
landing, was a very brave man ; he had distin-
guised himself in the conquest of Savoy ; but
he was unaccustomed to commanding in chief;
and he had, besides, bad troops under his
command, and no staff; he could not possibly
40 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
have succeeded. He was the same who after-
wards became a senator.
In the month of March 1793, Spain having
declared war against France, the combined
English and Spanish fleets commanded the
Mediterranean, and cruised on the coasts of
Genoa and Provence. The treason of Toulon
had annihilated the French navy in the Medi-
terranean. On the retaking of that town, how-
ever, eighteen ships and part of the stores
were recovered. The Spanish fleet, dissatis-
fied with the English, returned to its ports ;
Rear-admiral Martin, with ten ships, sailed
from Toulon, and put to sea in 1794 ; being-
pursued by an English squadron of superior
strength, he anchored in the Gulf of Juan,
where the general of the artillery erected some
great batteries to protect him. Shortly after,
he availed himself of a gale of wind to re-enter
Toulon. This squadron was successively in-
creased during the autumn by the armaments
which were sent out from the arsenal of
Toulon.
In the beginning of 1795, Admiral Hotham,
with fifteen men-of-war, five of which were
three-deckers, and two Neapolitan, was cruis-
ing between Corsica and Italy. Admiral Mar-
tin, with a squadron of sixteen men-of-war
WAtt OF ITALY. 41
and one hundred transports, on board of which
were 10,000 men, lay in Toulon roads. There
were various opinions respecting the destina-
tion of this armament, when the Conventional
Letourneur, of La Manche, arrived with ex-
traordinary powers, and made it known that it
was the intention of the Committee of Public
Safety to occupy Rome, to punish that court
for the insults it was daily offering, and to
avenge the blood of Basseville. Basseville,
a French agent commissioned to the Pope,
had displayed the tricoloured cockade, as had
the artists of the Roman school who sat at
the Academy. A great number of French
emigrants, who were in that capital, excited a
popular commotion. On the 3d of January
1793 the rabble assailed BassevihVs carriage
with stones ; his coachman turned back and
drove him home ; the gates were broken down,
Basseville received the thrust of a bayonet in
the abdomen ; he was dragged into the street,
in his shirt, holding his bowels in his hands,
and at length left on a field-bed in a guard-
house, where he expired the next day.
Azara, the Spanish ambassador, who had
interfered to protect the French artists, was
himself in some danger. This outrage excited
general indignation in France ; the moment of
42 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
revenge had now arrived ; a force was to land
at the month of the Tiber, and to occupy
Rome, where it would find numerous partisans.
A council of war was held at Toulon to consi-
der of the means of executing this plan. Napo-
leon was of opinion that this expedition would
endanger the Army of Italy, and would itself
end disastrously ; but that, nevertheless, if it
were to be attempted, it would be necessary
at the same time to surprise Mount Argentare,
Orbitello, and the fortress of Civita Vecchia,
and land the army there ; he thought that
10,000 men were too small a force to attempt
such a coup de main ; that it was impossible to
effect it without cavalry ; that it would be
requisite to embark at least 1500 horses for
light dragoons or hussars, which, with 500
horses for the artillery and staif, would form a
considerable addition to the convoy. Scarcely
would the army have landed when it would
have to engage from 25, to 30,000 Neapolitans,
5000 of whom were good cavalry ; it would
also have to expect an Austrian division which
was coming up from Lombardy ; that it could
not reckon upon partisans at Rome, because
this operation was not calculated to be of long-
duration ; and after avenging the murder of
Basseville, and laying the city under contri-
WAR OF ITALY. 43
bution, it would be proper to think of embark-
ing again ; that were we masters at sea, this
operation, undertaken with only 10,000 men,
would be hazardous ; but that without com-
manding the sea, it would only be leading this
army to certain destruction ; that the French
squadron ought therefore to put to sea alone,
beat the English squadron, and drive it out of
the Mediterranean ; that the convoy might
then sail, and that, after landing the troops, the
squadron and convoy might make for Naples,
to alarm that court and oblige it to reserve its
forces for its own defence. The Representa-
tive was dissatisfied with the formal disap-
probation which his plans elicited from the
General of the artillery, more particularly as
all the general officers concurred in it. The
naval officers declared that the squadron would
be endangered if the convoy should sail whilst
an enemy's fleet was cruising in these seas.
It was resolved that Admiral Martin should
put to sea with the ships of war alone, to give
chase to the English.
He sailed on the 1st of March. On arriving
near San Fiorenzo, he captured the Berwick,
an English seventy-four, which stood out
from the roads. The French and English
squadrons met on the 8th, in the Channel of
44 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
Leghorn; at sight of the enemy Letourneur's
courage failed him ; he ordered a retreat ; the
English squadron now gave chase in its turn.
On the 13th the two squadrons were oft* Cape
Noli on the Riviera dc Genoa; the Mercure
of seventy-four guns, and the three-decker,
the Sans-Culotte, separated from the squadron
during the night. At daybreak next morning
the Ca Ira of seventy-four guns, which had
been dismasted by running foul of the Vicloirc,
fell under the wind ; the Censeur took her in
tow. The two fleets were equal in number,
but not in strength ; the French squadron of
fifteen ships was reduced to thirteen, none of
which were three-deckers ; the English squa-
dron of thirteen sail had four of three decks.
The French squadron continued its retreat,
but could not avoid two engagements ; the
Censeur and the Ca Ira fought an English
three-decker and two seventy-fours. The
Tonnant, the Duquesne, and the Vietuire, were
engaged throughout the day ; the rest of the
French line did not come into action. The
Censeur and the Qa Ira were captured, after a
gallant resistance. The squadron anchored at
the Isles of Hyeres, where it was joined by the
Sans-Culotle and the Mercure. The Ca Ira
sunk in the Spezzia roads ; the Illustrious, an
WAK OF ITALY. 45
English three-decker, also sunk and was lost,
in consequence of the action : thus the loss
on each side was two ships. This engage-
ment was the first that took place in the
Mediterranean, between the two nations, in
this war. If the French squadron had fought
in line in the Channel of Leghorn, it is proba-
ble that it would have supported the honour of
its flag.
But this event was very fortunate for the
Republic : if it had proved successful, and the
English ships had retired to Gibraltar, the
convoy would have sailed. This ill-planned
expedition, destitute of any reasonable object,
could not have failed to terminate in the most
disastrous manner. The troops landed, and
marched to Nice, where they were very useful,
two months after, in defending that frontier
against the attacks of the Austrian General
Devins. This armament cost the Treasury
some millions, but it did not fail to produce
great advantages. The Grand-duke of Tus-
cany acknowledged the Republic, and sent
Count Carletti as ambassador to Paris, whom
the Convention received on the 14th of March
1795. The republic of Venice, which had
refused to join the coalition, and had received
a French agent, was stimulated by the arma-
40 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
ment of a French squadron, and sent Quirini,
a Venetian noble, as ambassador ; his nomi-
nation was dated the 14th of March. Genoa
was confirmed in her determination of neu-
trality. The King of Naples had joined the
coalition when the English and Spanish
squadrons commanded the Mediterranean ; he
had contributed effectually to the defence of
Toulon ; but this prince, together with Rome,
the King of Sardinia, and the Dukes of Mo-
dena and Parma, were destined to yield to
the ascendancy of the Republic in the cam-
paign of 1796.
V.
From the 9th of Thermidor, (27th of July,
1794,) the South had been much agitated.
The revolutionary tribunal of Marseilles had
brought to the scaffold all the principal mer-
chants of that city. The Jacobins, composing
the popular society, had still the upper hand ;
they deplored the ruin of the Mountain fac-
tion, and were enraged at the moderate laws
which then prevailed ; besides, the remains of
the party of the Sections, although much
weakened by emigration and losses of all
kinds, excited disturbances from a violent
thirst for vengeance. The population of Tun-
WAR OF ITALY. 47
Ion, all the artificers belonging to the arsenal,
and the crews of the squadron, were attached
to the former party, and were inimical to the
representatives Mariette and Cambon, whom
they accused of being of the party of the
Retracteurs. Under these circumstances, a
French privateer brought into Toulon a Spa-
nish prize, on board of which were about
twenty emigrants, most of them of the Cha-
brillant family. A tumultuous mob assembled
at the arsenal and in the streets, and pro-
ceeded to the prisons to slaughter these unfor-
tunate persons. The representatives went to
the arsenal, and after haranguing the officers
of the department in a hall, they addressed the
men in the workshops, promising to deliver
up the emigrants to an extraordinary commis-
sion, and to have them tried within twenty-
four hours ; but they themselves were sus-
pected, they had no influence over public opi-
nion ; their speeches were misinterpreted, a
voice called out, " To the Lanterne with the
protectors of the emigrants !" It was late in
the day, and they were just beginning to light
the lamps. The uproar became horrible, the
crowd outrageous, the guard came up and was
repulsed. At this crisis Napoleon recognised
amongst the principal rioters several gunners
48 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
who had served under him at the siege of
Toulon ; he mounted a platform, the gunners
enforeed respect to their general, and obtained
silence ; he had the good fortune to produce
an effect ; the representatives got safe out
of the arsenal, but the tumult was still
greater in the streets. At the gates of the
prisons the resistance of the guards began
to slacken ; he repaired thither, the populace
was restrained from violence by his promise
that the emigrants should be delivered up and
sentenced the following morning. It would
have been no easy matter to persuade them
of what was perfectly evident, namely, that
these emigrants had not infringed the law,
as they had not returned voluntarily. During
the night he had them put into some artillery
waggons, and carried out of the town as a
convoy of ammunition ; a boat was waiting
for them in Hyeres roads, where they em-
barked and were thus saved. The ferment
increased at Toulon, and at length on the 30th
of May, the people flew to arms. The mob,
declaring itself in a state of insurrection, ar-
rested or put to flight all the representatives in
the town. But the latter obtained the ascen-
dancy at Marseilles, and marched against Tou-
WAR OF ITALY. 49
Ion. The action took place on the heights of
Cuges. Victory was inclining towards the peo-
ple of Toulon, when General Pacthod arrived
with a body of troops of the line ; in a few
days Toulon was subdued. Napoleon had left
Provence a month previous to this action.
The committees of government presented
the lists of general officers who were to serve
in the campaign of 1795. A great num-
ber of officers, who had been unemployed
from the end of 1792 to that of 1794, were
now ordered on service, but there were many
generals of artillery who could not be em-
ployed. Napoleon, then twenty-five years
of age, was the youngest of all ; he was en-
tered on the list of generals of infantry, to be
employed in the artillery when there should
be inspections vacant. He was to quit the
Army of Italy, of which Kellerman had just
taken the command. He conferred with that
general at Marseilles, gave him all the infor-
mation he could want, and set out for Paris.
At Chatillon-sur-Seine, he visited the father
of his aide-de-camp Marmont, where be heard
the news of the events of the first of Prairial,
which induced him to remain there a few days
until tranquillity should be restored in the ca-
Memoin. — vol. in. v
50 Ml. .MO IKS ol NAPOLEON.
pital. On reaching Paris he waited on Aubry,
a member of the Committee of Public Safety,
who had made the report on the military ser-
vice ; observed to him that he had commanded
the artillery at the siege of Toulon, and that of
the Army of Italy for two years ; that he had
fortified the coasts of the Mediterranean, and
that it was painful to him to leave a corps in
which he had served from childhood. The re-
presentative objected that there were many ge-
nerals of artillery, and that he was the young-
est, and that when there should be a vacancy
he should be employed. But Aubry himself
had been a captain of artillery six months be-
fore ; he had not served in the field since the
Revolution, and yet he had placed himself on
the list as a general of division and inspector
of artillery. A few days after, the Committee
of Public Safety despatched orders to Napo-
leon to proceed to the army of La Vendee to
command a brigade of infantry ; in answer to
which he gave in his resignation. In the
mean time Aubry's report had excited many
complaints ; the officers displaced repaired in
crowds to Paris ; many were distinguished
officers, but the greater part undeserving, and
indebted to the clubs for their promotion ; all of
them, however, finding Napoleon a man of un-
WAR OF ITALY. 51
blemished reputation, took care to mention him
in their memorials and petitions as an instance
of the partiality and injustice of the report.
VI.
Eight days after Napoleon had given in his
resignation, and whilst he was waiting for the
answer of the Committee of Public Safety,
Kellerman got defeated, lost his positions at
Saint-Jacques, and wrote that unless he re-
ceived reinforcements speedily, he should even
be obliged to quit Nice. This excited great
alarm ; the Committee of Public Safety assem-
bled all the deputies who had been with the
Army of Italy, in order to obtain information.
The latter unanimously nominated Napoleon
as the person best acquainted with the posi-
tions occupied by the army, and most capable
of pointing out the measures proper to be
adopted ; he received a requisition to attend the
Committee, and had several conferences with
Sieyes, Doulcet, Pontecoulant, Letourneur, and
Jean de Brie. He drew up the instructions
which the Committee adopted. He was then
by a special decree appointed brigadier-gene-
ral of artillery, to be specially attached, until
farther order, to the direction of the military
operations. In this situation he passed the
e 2
52 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
two or three months previous to the thirteenth
of Vendemiaire.
When Kellerman took the command of the
Army of Italy, on the 19th of May 1796, the
army was in the positions in which Napoleon
had placed it in the month of October in the
preceding year, after the action of Cairo.
These positions were the following: the left,
5000 strong, between the Col d'Argentiere
and the Col de Sabion ; the centre, command-
ed by General Macquart, occupied the Col de
Sabion, the Col di Tende, Monte Bertrando,
and the Tanarelle, being 8000 strong ; the
right occupied the Col de Termini, the heights
of Ormea, the Col San-Bernardo, Bardinetto,
Settepani, Melogno, Saint-Jacques, la Ma-
donna, and Vado. It consisted of 25,000 men,
commanded by the generals of division Ser-
rurier, Laharpe, and Massena.
The Court of Vienna had been seriously
alarmed at the result of the affair of Cairo and
the position which the French army had taken
up at the end of 1794. This position threat-
ened Genoa, the loss of which place would
have opened the road to the Milanese. The
Aulic council therefore assembled an army of
30,000 Austrians, under the command of Ge-
neral Devins, for the campaign of 1795, to act
M'AK OF ITALY. 53
in concert with the Piedmontese army. The
English squadron was cruising off Savona and
Vado, to second the operations of the Austrian
general, who moved his head-quarters succes-
sively from Acqui to Dego, and thence ma-
noeuvred against the heights of Savona, of
which he took possession on the 23d ; and
thus secured his communications with the
English squadron.
General Devins divided his army into three
corps, which debouched on the 23d of June.
The right, divided into five columns, attacked
the left of the French army, from the Col de
Termini to the heights of Ormea ; the centre
marched in three columns, which were sub-
divided into a great number, and attacked all
the positions between Bardinetto and Saint-
Jacques ; the left attacked the right in the
positions of Vado. On the 25th and 26th
there was a general and sanguinary conflict.
The French army preserved its positions, ex-
cept the redoubt of Melogno, the Col di Spi-
nardo, and the ridge of Saint-Jacques. By
the possession of the redoubt of Melogno, the
enemy threatened the centre of the army.
This position is only two leagues from Finale
on the sea-shore. On the 27th, Kellerman
ordered an attack, being convinced of the
54 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
importance of retaking this position; but he
was unsuccessful. On the 28th he retreated,
evacuated Saint-Jacques, Vado, and Finale,
and took up a temporary position. At length,
on the 7th of July, having received the orders
of the Committee of Public Safety, in answer
to his couriers of the 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th,
and 28th; he established his army in the
position of Borghetto.
Kellerman was a brave soldier, extremely
active, and possessed of many good qualities ;
but he was wholly destitute of the talents
necessary for the chief command of an army.
Throughout the conduct of this war he was
constantly committing errors. The Committee
observed to him, " that the army had extended
" its line, in 1794, beyond the heights of the
" Tanaro, and prolonged its right by Bardi-
". netto, Melogno, and Saint-Jacques, only to
" prevent the Austrian army from acting in
" concert with the English squadron, and to
" be in a situation to hasten to the relief of
" Genoa, in case the enemy should attack
" that city, either by sea, or by the Col de la
" Bocchetta; that it did not occupy Vado as
" a defensive, but as an offensive position, in
»• order to be able to debouch on the enemy
" if he should present himself in the Riviera;
WAR OF ITALY. o5
" that as soon as the Austrians advanced on
" Savona, he should have marched to tight
" them, to prevent them from getting posses-
" sion of that town and intercepting his com-
" munications with Genoa ; but that since he
" had not been able to do so, 1st, he ought
" to have evacuated Vado to support his right
" on Saint- Jacques ; 2dly, when, in conse-
" quence of the action of the 25th, the enemy
" had gained possession of Melogno and the
" ridge of Saint-Jacques, he ought, during the
" night, to have profited by the advantage
" which General Laharpe had obtained on his
" right, by evacuating Vado, and making use
" of Laharpe's troops to reinforce his attack
" on Saint- Jacques and Melogno, which would
" have been crowned with complete success ;
" 3dly, that when, on the 27th, he had re-
" solved to attack Melogno, there was still time
" to bring up his right, so as to have made it
" take part in this attack, had he profited by
" the fresh success which the right had ob-
" tained on the 26th over the left of the enemy,
" which manoeuvre would also have decided
"■ the victory." These despatches, which were
written in an authoritative style, created much
surprise amongst the officers of the staff; but
they soon guessed who had dictated them.
Ob MEMOIRS OV NAPOLEON.
In the Riviera di Ponente there are three
lines which cover the county of Nice and bar
the river ; the right being supported on the
sea, and the left on the upper ridge of the
mountains. The first of these lines is that of
Borghetto, the second that of Monte Grande,
the third that of the Taggia; Napoleon had
long previously reconnoitred these three lines,
accompanied by Adjutant-general Saint-IIi-
laire, a brave and excellent officer, who after-
wards gained the highest renown in a hundred
battles, and died a general of division on the
field of Essling. The sea forms the appui of
the right of the line of Borghetto, at the village
of Borghetto, one 'league from Loano, on a hill
which commands the whole plain of Leoano ;
and a great insulated rock forms that of its left.
On this rock Massena had a redoubt constructed,
to which the army gave the name of Petit
Gibraltar, in memory of Fort Margrave at Tou-
lon. It was opposite the Priest's Field ; from
that spot there is a communication over steep
rocks to the heights which command Ormea,
Loano, and Rocca Barbena ; Monte San Ber-
nardo and Garessio are without this line, and
naturally belong to the enemy ; but Ormea is
covered : this line is extremely strong ; its ex-
tent is considerable, being five or six leagues ;
MAR OF ITALY. 57
but it is almost every where unassailable : it
can only be attacked by the pass of Sucarello,
in which is the castle of that name, which was
put in a state of defence. This was an excellent
post in battle. In the course of July, August,
and September, Devins several times planned
an attack on this line ; but he never durst seri-
ously carry it into effect. From Sucarello there
is a line terminating at Albenga, passing behind
the little rivulet of the Arosoia ; this is a good
position in case that part of the line between
Sucarello and Borghetto should be forced.
The position of Monte Grande, which adjoins
the Col di Pizzo and the Col di Mezza Luna,
and is supported on the sea behind Saint-Lo-
renzo, is an inferior line, but nevertheless one
of great strength. That which rests its right
on the mouth of the Taggia, its centre on
Monte Cippo, and its left on Monte Tanardo
and the Col Ardente, whence it communicates
with the Col di Tende, is not so strong as that
of Borghetto, but stronger than that of Monte
Grande. The first line covers Oneglia and all
the positions of the Riviera, from Oneglia to
Borghetto. The second leaves Oneglia and
Ormea and all the debouches of the Tanaro un-
covered. The third leaves all that part of the
Riviera di Ponente, which lies between One-
58 ME MO IKS OF NAI'OLEON.
gliaand San Remo uncovered; this line, has the
peculiar advantage of being capable of de-
fending San Remo, and in case of being forced
thence, of affording an opportunity of evacu-
ating that town and resting on Ospitaletto,
between it and Bordeghera, without any dete-
rioration of the line. The enemy may turn the
first line by debouching by the valley of the
Tanaro, taking possession of Mount Ariol, and
then threatening to fall on Monte Grande and
Oneglia ; but Ormea and Mount Ariol are so
near the line that the reserves may serve to
defend these positions. It may also be turned
by the Col di Tende, but that would be chang-
ing the theatre of the war ; the enemy could
not make so grand a movement without our
being informed of it, which would suggest our
watching the moment when his troops should
be on their march, to attack and destroy
those he might leave before the line of Bor-
ghetto. The second line, and more particu-
larly the third, have the advantages of not
being liable to be turned by the valley of the
Tanaro, which is beyond them; of being con-
nected with the Col Ardente, that is to say,
as far as the Col di Tende ; and that the Col
Ardente and the Tanarda not only contribute
to the defence of the Col di Tende, but even
WAR OF ITALY. 59
when the Col di Tende is forced, take the road
leading to Nice, in rear, before it reaches the
defile of Saorgio. Considering, therefore, only
the defence of the county of Nice, the line of
the Taggia would be the best, because all the
troops would be concentrated, and at hand to
defend the Col di Tende.
The Government considered the command
of the Army of Italy beyond the abilities of
Kellerman, and in September placed him at the
head of the Army of the Alps, intrusting the
Army of Italy to General Scherer, who com-
manded the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees,
which had become useless through the peace
with Spain. Scherer conducted a reinforce-
ment of two divisions of good troops into Italy.
The Austrian army had likewise been rein-
forced ; in the campaign of 1795 it had not
fulfilled the hopes of its court; but yet it had
obtained important successes. It had taken
the position of Saint- Jacques and Vado, and
Avas intercepting Genoa, and in communication
with the English squadron.
In the beginning of November the French
army still occupied the line of Borghetto with
five divisions ; that of the left, commanded by
General Serrurier, was at Ormea ; two more,
commanded by Generals Massena and La-
GO MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
harpe, were at Sucarello and Castel Vecehio ;
and two, under the command of Generals
Augereau and Soret, were opposite Borghetto,
forming altogether an active force of between
35 and 36,000 men.
The head-quarters of the Austrian army
were at Finale ; its right, composed of Pied-
montese, was at Garessio ; its centre, com-
manded by Argenteau, at llocca Barbcna;
and its left, entirely composed of Austrians,
before Loano, where they had constructed a
great number of redoubts to defend the plain.
Their force in line was 45,000 men ; the
autumnal maladies caused them, as well as
the Piedmontese army, considerable loss. The
French army found it very difficult to subsist,
and the advanced period of the season made
the troops anxious to go into winter- quarters.
Scherer resolved to risk a battle which would
render his winter-quarters safe, and restore
his communications with Genoa, by compell-
ing the enemy to winter beyond the moun-
tains.
VII.
On the twenty-first of November, Massena
moved forward in the evening with his division
and that of Laharpe ; at daybreak he attacked
WAR OF ITALY. (5 1
the centre of the enemy, placed at Rocca Bar-
bena, overthrew them, pursued them vigorously,
and drove them into the Bormida, gained pos-
session of Melogno, and concluded the day by
bivouacquing with his vanguard on the heights
of Saint-Jacques. On the 22d he began skir-
mishing with the enemy's right at daybreak,
and kept the whole Piedmontese army in
check ; Augereau debouched by Borghetto,
attacked the left, and carried all the positions.
The enemy retreated precipitately on Finale,
whence they continued their retreat on Savona,
but saw themselves anticipated by Massena on
the heights of Saint-Jacques. Serrurier, who
by his able manoeuvres had kept in check troops
which were double the number of his own,
without sustaining any material loss, was re-
inforced by two brigades in the course of the
23d. On the 24th he made a serious attack in
his turn, and drove the Piedmontese army into
the intrenched camp of Ceva. The Austrian
and Sardinian armies suffered considerably,
losing the greater part of their artillery, bag-
gage, and magazines, and 4000 prisoners. The
French troops gained immortal glory on this
day. The Austrian army abandoned the whole
Riviera of Genoa, and went to winter beyond
G2 M E BIO 1 RS O F N A PO L I ON.
the Apennines. Both armies retired into win-
ter quarters. The communications of the
French were now unimpeded. Their head-
quarters were again transferred to Nice. Thus
ended the year 1795.
CHAPTER III.
THE THIRTEENTH OF VEN DEMI AIRE.
1. Constitution of the year III. — II. Additional Laws. — III.
The Sections of Paris take up arms in resistance. — IV.
Dispositions for the attack and defence of the Tuileries.
— V r . Action of the 13th of Vendemiaire — VI. Napoleon
commander in chief of the Army of the Interior. — VII.
Barras. — VIII. La Reveillere Lepeaux. — IX. Rewbell. —
X. Carnot. — XI. Letourneur de la Manche.
I.
The fall of the municipality of the 31st of
May, of Danton and Robespierre, led to the
overthrow of the revolutionary government.
The Convention was afterwards successively
governed by factions which never succeeded
in acquiring any preponderance ; its principles
varied every month ; a dreadful system of re-
action afflicted the interior of the Republic ;
domains ceased to be saleable, and the credit
of the assignats grew daily worse ; the armies
(J-! MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
were unpaid, requisitions and the maximum
alone supplied them with the means of subsist-
ence ; the soldier was no longer certain even
of bread ; the recruiting of the troops, the laws
on which subject had been executed with the
greatest rigour under the revolutionary go-
vernment, ceased. The armies still continued
to obtain brilliant successes, because they
were more numerous than ever, but they suf-
fered daily losses, which there were now no
means of repairing.
The foreigners' party, supported by the pre-
text of the restoration of the Bourbons, in-
creased daily in strength ; foreign communi-
cations had become more easy ; the destruc-
tion of the Republic was openly contriving.
The Revolution had lost its novelty, it had
alienated many persons by affecting their in-
terest ; an iron hand had oppressed indivi-
duals ; many crimes had been committed ;
they were now eagerly recalled to memory,
and popular animadversion was thereby daily
excited with increasing violence against those
who had governed, held administrative posts,
or in any manner whatever participated in the
success of the Revolution. Pichegru had sold
himself, yet the proselytes of the enemies of
the Republic were far from numerous in the
THIRTEENTH OF VENDEMI A I K E. 0*5
army, which remained faithful to the principles
for which it had shed so much of its blood and
gained so many victories. All parties were
tired of the Convention ; it was even tired of
its own existence, and at length saw that the
safety of the nation, and its own, required that
it should fulfil its commission without delay.
On the 21st of June 1795 it decreed the con-
stitution known under the name of the Consti-
tution of the year III, which confided the go-
vernment to five persons called the Directory,
and the legislature to two councils called those
of the Five Hundred and of the Ancients.
This constitution was submitted to the accept-
ance of the people convoked in primary as^
semblies.
II.
It was the general opinion that the short
duration of the Constitution of 1791 was
to be attributed to the law of the Constituent
Assembly, which had excluded its members
from the legislature. The Convention did not
fall into the same error, but annexed to the
constitution two additional laws, by which it
prescribed that two-thirds of the new legisla-
ture should be composed of members of the
Convention, and that the electoral assemblies
Memoirs. — vol. in. f
f)G ME MOT US OF NAPOLEON 1 .
of the departments should on this occasion
only have to nominate one-third of the two
councils. These two additional laws were sub-
mitted to the acceptance of the people. They
excited general dissatisfaction. The partisans of
the foreigners saw all their schemes frustrated :
they had flattered themselves that the majority
of the two councils would be composed of men
inimical to the Revolution, or even of those who
had suffered by it, and had hoped to accom-
plish a counter-revolution by means of the le-
gislature itself. This party was at no loss for
excellent reasons to disguise the true motives
of its discontent. It alleged that the rights of
the people were disregarded by the Conven-
tion, which, having been empowered only to
propose a constitution, was usurping the func-
tions of an electoral body. As to the con-
stitution itself, it was, undoubtedly, preferable
to what then existed ; and on this point all
parties were unanimous. Some, indeed, would
have preferred a president to the five direc-
tors, others would have desired a more popu-
lar council ; but in general this new consti-
tution was favourably received. The secret
committees, which directed the foreign party,
were by no means anxious about forms of go-
vernment which they did not mean to main-
THIRTEENTH OF VENDEMIAIRE. G7
tain ; they studied nothing in the constitution
but the means of availing themselves of it to
operate the counter-revolution; and whatever
tended to wrest authority out of the hands of
the Convention and conventionals was condu-
cive to that end.
The forty-eight Sections of Paris assembled,
forming forty-eight tribunes, which were im-
mediately occupied by the most violent ora-
tors, La Harpe, Serizi, Lacretelle the younger,
Vaublanc, and Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely.
It required little talent to excite people against
the Convention, but several of these orators
displayed much.
After the 9th of Thermidor, the city of Paris
had organized its national guard ; its object
had been to get rid of the Jacobins, but it
had fallen into the contrary extreme, and the
counter-revolutionists formed a considerable
number of its members. This national guard
consisted of 40,000 men armed and clothed,
and participated in all the exasperation of the
Sections against the Convention. The Sections
having rejected the additional laws, succeeded
each other at the bar of the Convention, loudly
declaring their opinions. The Convention,
however, imagined that all this agitation would
subside as soon as the provinces should have
v 2
08 MEMOIRS OF NAPOI.LOV.
manifested their opinions by the acceptance of
the constitution and the additional laws; it
erroneously compared this agitation in the
capital to the commotions so common in
London, or which so often occurred in Rome
at the time of the Comitia. On the 23d of
September, the Convention proclaimed the
acceptance of the constitution and additional
laws, by the majority of the primary assem-
blies of the Republic ; but on the following-
day the Sections of Paris, taking no notice of
this acceptance, appointed deputies to form
a central assembly of electors, which met at
the Odeon.
III.
The Sections of Paris had measured their
strength; they despised the weakness of the
Convention. This assembly at the Odeon was
a committee of insurrection. The Conven-
tion awoke from its lethargy, annulled the
meeting at the Odeon, declared it illegal, and
ordered its committees to dissolve it by force.
On the 10th of Vendemiaire the armed power
proceeded to the Odeon, and executed this
order. A few men collected on the square of
the Odeon, indulged in some murmuring and
abuse, but offered no resistance. But the
decree for closing the Odeon excited the in-
THIRTEENTH OF YEN DEM I A 1 UK. (59
dignation of the Sections. That of Lepelletier,
the district house of which was the Convent
of the Filles Saint-Thomas, was the most exas-
perated. The Convention decreed that the
place of its sittings should be closed, the meet-
ing dissolved, and the Section disarmed. On
the 12th of Vendemiaire (October 3d), at
seven or eight o'clock in the evening, General
Menou, accompanied by the representatives
of the people, Commissioners to the Army of
the Interior, proceeded with a numerous body
of troops to the place of meeting of the Section
Lepelletier, to put the decree of the Conven-
tion in execution. The infantry, cavalry, and
artillery were all crowded together in the Rue
Vivienne, at the extremity of which is the
Convent of the Filles Saint-Thomas. The
Sectionaries occupied the windows of the
houses in this street. Several of their bat-
talions drew up in line in the court-yard of
the convent, and the military force which
General Menou commanded, found itself com-
promised. The Committee of the Section had
declared themselves a representation of the
sovereign people in the exercise of its func-
tions ; they refused to obey the orders of the
Convention, and after spending an hour in
useless conferences, General Menou and the
70 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
Commissioners of the Convention withdrew
by a sort of capitulation, without having
dissolved or disarmed the meeting. The Sec-
tion, thus victorious, declared itself in per-
manence ; sent deputations to all the other
Sections, boasted its success, and urged the
measures calculated to ensure the triumph of
its resistance. In this manner it prepared for
the action of the thirteenth of Vendemiaire.
Napoleon, who had been some months at-
tached to the Committee directing the move-
ments of the armies of the Republic, was at
the Feydeau theatre, when he heard of the
extraordinary scene that was passing so near
him. He felt curious to observe all its cir-
cumstances. Seeing the conventional troops
repulsed, he hastened to the tribunes of the
Convention to witness the effect of this news,
and observe the character and colouring which
it would receive. The Convention was in the
greatest agitation. The representatives de-
puted to the army, wishing to exculpate them-
selves, eagerly accused Menou, attributing to
treachery what arose from unskilfulness alone.
Menou was put under arrest. Different repre-
sentatives then appeared at the tribune, stating
the extent of the danger, the magnitude of
which was but too clearly proved by the news
THIRTEENTH OF VENDI'JIIAIKE. 71
which arrived every moment from the Sections.
Every one proposed the general who possessed
his confidence to succeed Menou ; the Ther-
midorians proposed Barras, but he was by no
means agreeable to the other parties. Those
who had been at Toulon with the Army of
Italy, and the members of the Committee of
Public Safety, who were in daily communica-
tion with Napoleon, proposed him as the person
most capable of extricating them from their pre-
sent danger, on account of the promptitude of
his coup-dceil, and the energy and moderation
of his character. Mariette, who belonged to
the party of the Moderates, and was one of the
leading members of the Committee of Forty,
approved this choice. Napoleon, who was in
the crowd and heard all that passed, deliberated
for above half an hour on the course he was to
adopt. At length he made up his mind, and
repaired to the Committee, where he repre-
sented in the most forcible manner the impos-
sibility of directing so important an operation
while clogged by three representatives, who
in fact would exercise all power, and impede
all the operations of the general : he added,
that he had witnessed the occurrence in the
Rue Vivienne ; that the commissioners had
been most to blame, and had nevertheless
72 MEMOIRS OK NAPOLEON.
appeared in the Assembly 'as triumphant ac-
cusers. Struck with the truth of this reason-
ing, but unable to remove the commissioners
without a long discussion in the Assembly,
the Committee, to conciliate all parties (for
it had no time to lose), determined to propose
Barras as general-in-chief, appointing Napoleon
second in command. Thus they got rid of the
three commissioners without giving them any
cause of complaint. As soon as Napoleon
found himself invested with the command of
the forces which were to protect the Assembly,
he went to one of the cabinets of the Tuileries,
where Menou remained, in order to obtain
from him the necessary information respecting
the strength and disposition of the troops and
the artillery. The army consisted of only
5000 soldiers of all arms ; the park was com-
posed of forty pieces of cannon, then parked
at the Sablons, and guarded by twenty-five
men. It was one o'clock in the morning.
The General immediately despatched a major
of the 21st chasseurs (Murat), with 300 horse,
to the Sablons, to bring off all the artillery
to the garden of the Tuileries. Had another
moment been lost, he would have been too
late. He reached the Sablons at three in the
morning, where he fell in with the head of a
THIRTEENTH OF VENDEMIAIRE. 73
column from the Section Lepelletier, which
was coming to seize the park ; but his troops
being" cavalry, and the ground a plain, the
Sectionaries judged that all resistance was
useless; they accordingly retreated, and at
five in the morning the forty pieces of cannon
entered the Tuileries.
IV.
Between six o'clock and nine, Napoleon
placed his artillery at the head of the Pont
Louis XVI., the Pont Royal, and the Rue de
Rohan, at the Cul de Sac Dauphin, in the Rue
Saint-Honore, at the Pont Tournant, &c. con-
fiding the guarding of them to officers of known
fidelity. The matches were lighted, and the
little army was distributed at the different
posts, or in reserve in the garden and at the
Carrousel. The drums beat to arms in every
quarter. During this time the battalions of
the national guard were posting themselves
at the outlets of the different streets, surround-
ing the palace and the garden of the Tuileries ;
their drums had the audacity to come and beat
the generate on the Carrousel and the Place
Louis XV. The danger was imminent; 40,000
national guards well armed, and long since
organized, were in the field, and highly exas-
74 MEMOIRS 01' NAPOLEON.
perated against the Convention. The troops
of the line intrusted with its defence, were
few in number, and might easily be led away
by the sentiments of the population which sur-
rounded them : in order to increase its forces,
the Convention distributed arms to 1500 indi-
viduals called the Patriots of 1789; these were
men who, after the 9th of Thermidor, had lost
their employments and quitted their depart-
ments, where they were persecuted by public
opinion ; they were formed into three bat-
talions, and placed under the command of
General Berruyer. These men fought with the
most determined valour ; their example influ-
enced the troops of the line, and they were
mainly instrumental to the success of the day.
A committee of forty members, consisting
of the Committees of Public Safety and Gene-
ral Security, directed all the affairs, discussed
much, but resolved on nothing ; whilst the ur-
gency of the danger increased every moment.
Some proposed that the Convention should
lay down arms, and receive the Sectionaries
as the Roman senators received the Gauls.
Others wished the members to withdraw to
Caesar's camp on the heights of Saint-Cloud,
there to be joined by the Army of the Coasts
of the ocean ; and others proposed that depu-
THIRTEENTH OF VENDEMI AIRE. 7")
tations should be sent to the forty-eight Sec-
tions, to make them various proposals.
During these vain discussions, a man named
Lafond debouched on the Pont Neuf, about
two o'clock in the afternoon, at the head of
three columns, which came from the Section
Lepelletier, whilst another column of the
same force advanced from the Odeon to meet
them. They joined in the place Dauphine.
General Cartaux, who was stationed on the
Pont Neuf with 400 men and four pieces of
cannon, with orders to defend the two sides of
the bridge, quitted his post and fell back under
the wickets of the Louvre. At the same time
a battalion of national guards occupied the
Infant's Garden. They called themselves faith-
ful to the Convention, but nevertheless seized
this post without orders ; on another side,
Saint-Roche, the Theatre Francais, and the
Hotel de Noailles, were occupied in force by
the national guard. The Conventional posts
were not above twelve or fifteen paces from
them. The Sectionaries sent women to cor-
rupt the soldiers ; even the leaders presented
themselves several times, unarmed, and waving
their hats, to fraternize, they said !
7(5 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
V.
The danger rapidly increased. Danican,
the general of the Sections, sent a flag of
truce to summon the Convention to remove
the troops which threatened the people, and
to disarm the Terrorists. The bearer traversed
the posts, with his eyes bandaged and all the
formalities of war, about three o'clock. He
was thus introduced into the midst of the
Committee of the Forty, amongst whom his
threats caused much alarm, but he obtained
nothing. Night was coming on ; the Sec-
tionaries would have availed themselves of
the darkness to climb from house to house
to the Tuileries itself, which was closely
blockaded. Napoleon had eight hundred mus-
quets, belts, and cartridge-boxes, brought into
the hall of the Convention, to arm the members
themselves and the clerks, as a corps of re-
serve. This measure alarmed several of them,
who then began to comprehend the extent of
the danger. At length, at four o'clock, some
musquets were discharged from the Hotel de
Noailles, and some balls fell on the steps of
the Tuileries, and wounded a woman who was
going into the garden. At the same moment
Lafond's column debouched by the quay Vol-
THIRTFF.XTH OF VENDEMIAIRE. 77
taire, marching on the Pont Royal and Ideating
the charge. The batteries then fired ; an eight-
pounder at the Cul de Sac Dauphin opened
the fire and served as a signal. After several
discharges Saint-Roche was carried. Lafond's
column, taken in front and flank by the artil-
lery placed on the quay even with the wicket of
the Louvre, and at the head of the Pont Royal,
was routed ; the Rue Saint- Honore, the Rue
Saint-Florentin, and the places adjacent, were
swept by the guns. About a hundred men
attempted to make a stand at the Theatre de
la Republique, but were dislodged by a few
shells. At six o'clock in the evening all was
over. A few cannon shot were heard during
the night at a distance ; but they were only
fired to prevent the barricades, which some of
the inhabitants attempted to form with casks.
There were near two hundred of the Section-
aries killed or wounded, and almost as many
on the side of the Convention ; the greater
part of the latter fell at the gates of Saint-
Roche. Three representatives, Freron, Lou-
vet, and Sieyes, evinced resolution. The
Section of the Quinze-Vingts, in the Faubourg
Saint-Antoine, was the only one that assisted
the Convention, to whose aid it sent 250 men:
so completely had the late political oscilla-
78 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON".
tions of that body alienated the good will of
the people. The Faubourgs, however, al-
though they did not rise in favour of the Con-
vention, did not act against it. The strength
of the army of the Convention was 8500 men,
including the representatives themselves.
Assemblages still continued to form in the
Section Lepelletier. On the morning of the
14th some columns debouched against them
by the Boulevards, the Rue de Richelieu, and
the Palais Royal ; cannon had been placed at
the principal avenues ; the Sectionaries were
speedily dislodged ; and the rest of the day
was occupied in traversing the city, visiting
the rendezvous of the Sections, collecting arms,
and reading proclamations ; in the evening-
order was universally restored, and Paris was
completely quiet. After this grand event,
when the officers of the Army of the Interior
were presented to the Convention in a body,
Napoleon was appointed by acclamation, Com-
mander-in-chief of the Army of the Interior,
Barras being no longer allowed to combine the
title of Representative with military functions.
General Menou was delivered up to a council
of war ; the Committees were desirous of his
death. The General-in-chief saved him, by
telling the members that if Menou merited
THIRTEENTH OF V EN DEMI A 1 HE. 79
death, the three Representatives, who had
directed the operations and parleyed with the
Sectionaries, were equally deserving of that
punishment; that the Convention had, there-
fore, only to pass sentence on the three Depu-
ties, and then Menou also might be condemned.
The esprit de corps prevailed over the voices
of the General's enemies : he was acquitted.
The Commission condemned several persons
to death in contumacy ; Vaublanc amongst
others. Lafond was the only person executed.
This young man had displayed great courage
in the action ; the head of his column, on the
Pont Royal, re-formed thrice, under the fire of
grape, before it entirely dispersed. He was
an emigrant ; it was impossible to save him,
although the officers were very desirous to do
so ; the imprudence of his answers constantly
frustrated their good intentions. It is not true
that the troops were ordered to fire with pow-
der only at the commencement of the action ;
that would only have served to embolden the
Sectionaries and endanger the troops ; but it
is true that during the latter part of the action,
when success was no longer doubtful, they
fired with blank cartridges.
SO MEMOIRS or NAPOLEON.
VI.
After the 13th of Vendemiaire, Napoleon
had to reform the national guard, which was
an object of the greatest importance, as it
amounted to no less than 104 battalions. At
the same time he organized the guards of the
Directory, and reformed those of the Legisla-
tive Body. These very circumstances were
afterwards amongst the principal causes of his
success on the famous 18th of Brumaire. He
left such impressions on those corps, that on
his return from Egypt, although the Directory
had recommended its guards not to render
him any military honours, their request was
ineffectual, and the soldiers could not be pre-
vented from beating To the field, the moment
he appeared. The interval of a few months
during which he commanded the Army of the
Interior, was replete with difficulties and
trouble, arising from the installation of a new
government, the members of which were di-
vided amongst themselves, and often opposed
to the councils ; the silent ferment which
existed amongst the old Sectionaries, who were
still powerful in Paris ; the active turbulence
of the Jacobins, who used to meet in a patri-
otic assembly, under the name of the Society
THIRTEENTH OF VENDEMTAIRE. 81
of the Pantheon ; the agents of the foreigners
who fomented discord in all quarters ; and
above all, from the horrible famine which at
that time desolated the capital. Ten or twelve
times, the scanty distributions of bread, which
the government usually made every day, failed
entirely. An uncommon degree of activity
and dexterity was requisite to surmount so
many obstacles, and maintain tranquillity in
the capital under such unfavourable and
afflicting circumstances. The society of the
Pantheon daily caused the government in-
creased solicitude ; the police was afraid to
attack this society openly. The General-in-
chief caused the doors of their assembly-rooms
to be sealed up. The members stirred no
more, as long as he was present ; but after his
departure, they appeared once more, under the
influence of Babceuf, Antonelle, and others, and
occasioned the affair of the camp of Grenelle.
Napoleon frequently had occasion to harangue
the people in the markets, and streets, at the
sections, and in the faubourgs ; and it is wor-
thy of remark, that of all parts of the capital,
the faubourg Saint-Antoine was that which
he always found the readiest to listen to
reason, and the most susceptible of a generous
impulse.
Me main- — vol. hi. g
82 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
It was whilst he commanded at Paris, that
Napoleon became acquainted with Madame
de Beauharnais. After the disarming of the
Sections, a youth ten or twelve years of age
presented himself to the staff, soliciting the
return of a sword which had belonged to his
father, formerly a general in the service of the
Republic. This youth was Eugene de Beau-
harnais, afterwards Viceroy of Italy. Napo-
leon, affected by the nature of his petition,
and by his juvenile grace, granted his request.
Eugene burst into tears when he beheld his
father's sword. The General, touched at his
sensibility, behaved so kindly to him that
Madame de Beauharnais thought herself
obliged to wait on him the next day, to thank
him for his attention. Every one knows the
extreme grace of the Empress Josephine, and
her sweet and attractive manners. The ac-
quaintance soon became intimate and tender;
and it was not long before they married.
Scherer, who commanded the Army of Italy,
was reproached with not having profited by
his victory at Loano ; his conduct had not
given satisfaction. There were many more
agents than officers at his head-quarters. He
was constantly applying for money to pay his
troops, and refit different branches of the ser-
THIRTEENTH OF VENDEMIAIRE. Si}
vice, and for horses to replace those which had
died for want of forage. The government
being unable to supply him with either, gave
him dilatory answers, and amused him with
vain promises. Scherer perceived this, and
gave notice that if any further delay took
place, he should be obliged to evacuate the
Riviera de Genoa, to return on the Roya,
and perhaps to repass the Var. The Directory
consulted the General of the Army of the In-
terior, who presented a memorial on this
subject.
A young man of twenty-five could no longer
remain at the head of the army of Paris. The
reputation of his talents and the confidence
reposed in him by the Army of Italy, pointed
him out as the only person capable of extricat-
ing it from the embarrassing situation in which
it was placed. These considerations deter-
mined the government to appoint Napoleon
General-in- chief of the Army of Italy; he left
Paris on the 4th of March 1796. General
Hatry, a veteran of sixty, succeeded him in the
command of the army of Paris, which had
become less important, now that the crisis of
the scarcity was over, and the government was
established.
G 2
84 MK MO I US or NAPOLEON.
VII.
Barras was an officer in the regiment of the
Isle of France when the Revolution broke out;
he was elected a deputy to the National Con-
vention by his department, that of the Var.
After the 31st of May, he and Freron were
nominated commissioners to Provence, the seat
of the civil war. On his return to Paris, he
joined the Thermidorian party. Being menaced,
as well as Tallien, by Robespierre, they united
with the remainder of Danton's friends, and
brought about the events of the 9th ofThermi-
dor. At the critical moment, the Convention
appointed Barras to march to the commune
which had risen in favour of Robespierre; he
succeeded, and acquired great celebrity by this
event. After the fall of Robespierre, the Ther-
midorians became the men of France. On the
12th of Vendemiaire, at the time of Menou's
arrest, the committees, in order to get rid of
the three commissioners to the army of the
interior, adopted the plan of combining in the
person of Barras the powers of the commis-
sioners and those of commandant of that army.
But the occasion was too critical for him;
he had not seen service. The events of
Thermidor and Vendemiaire brought him into
THIRTEENTH OF VENDEMIAIUE. 85
the Directory. He did not possess habits of
application, yet he succeeded better than was
expected. He was censured for his extrava-
gance, his connexions with contractors, and the
fortune he made during the four years he was
in office, which he took no pains to conceal,
and which greatly contributed to the corrup-
tion of the administration at that period.
Barras was of tall stature ; he sometimes spoke
in moments of violent contention, and his voice
would then fill the hall. His moral faculties,
however, did not allow him to go beyond a
few phrases ; the passionate manner in which
he spoke might have made him pass for a man
of resolution. In Fructidor, he with Rewbell
and la Reveillere formed the majority against
Carnot and Barthelemy. After that day, he
was, apparently, the most considerable person
in the Directory, but in reality it was Rewbell
who managed affairs. After the 13th of Ven-
demiaire, he always supported in public the
character of a warm friend to Napoleon,
although they had quarrelled; Napoleon hav-
ing severely censured the measures which
followed the 18th of Fructidor, and especially
the law of the 19th. He displayed some dex-
terity on the 30th of Prairial, year VII, and did
not share in the disgrace of his colleagues.
86 MKMOIKS OF NAPOfcEON.
VIII.
La Reveillere Lepaux, deputy to the Con-
vention for Maine and Loire, was one of the
seventy-three persons arrested on the 31st of
May. He was lame, and of the most disagree-
able exterior possible ; he was as deformed as
iEsop. He wrote tolerably; his mind was of
little scope ; he was neither accustomed to
business, nor skilled in the characters of men ;
he was alternately governed, according to
events, by Carnot and Re w bell. The Jar din
des Plantes and Theophilanthropy formed his
whole occupation ; he was constitutionally fa-
natical, but a warm and sincere patriot, an
upright citizen, and a man of good intentions.
He entered the Directory poor, and left it so.
Nature had only endowed him with the qua-
lities of a subaltern magistrate.
IX.
Rewbell was one of the best advocates of Col-
mar ; he had a considerable portion of the spirit
which characterises a good practitioner; he was
apt to conceive prejudices against individuals ;
had little faith in virtue, and carried his pa-
triotism to extremes. Notwithstanding all that
has been said about him, he did not accumu-
THIRTEENTH OF VEN DEMI Al RE. 87
late wealth in the Directory ; he was, indeed,
constantly surrounded by contractors, but that
was because he was partial to the conversation
of active and enterprising men. He enjoyed
their flattery, without making them pay for
the complaisance he occasionally shewed them.
He had a particular animosity against the Ger-
manic system, and the immediate nobility of
the empire. He evinced energy in the assem-
blies, both before and after his magistracy : he
was fond of occupation ; he had been a mem-
ber of the Constituent Assembly and of the
Convention. When he was commissioner at
Mentz, he did not perform what might have
been expected of him ; he did not oppose
the surrender of the place, which might have
been longer defended. He had, like most
lawyers, a professional dislike to the military,
which he could not dissemble.
X.
Carnot entered the service at a very early
age, in the engineers. He maintained Mont-
alembert's system in his corps, and passed for
an original amongst his comrades. He was a
Chevalier de Saint-Louis at the time of the
Revolution, in which he engaged with ardour.
He was deputed to the Convention, and be-
88 ME.U01US OF iN'AI'OJ.KUX.
came a member of the Committee of Public
Safety along- with Robespierre, Barrere, Cou-
thon, Saint-Just, Billaud Varennes, and Collot
d'Herbois. He constantly evinced a violent
animosity against the nobles, which occasioned
several singular quarrels between him and Ro-
bespierre, who latterly protected a great num-
ber of them. He was industrious, sincere in
all his dealings, guiltless of intrigue, and easy
to deceive. He attended Jourdan, as commis-
sioner from the Convention, at the deblock-
ading of Maubeuge, where he rendered im-
portant services. When on the Committee of
Public Safety, he directed the operations of
the war : he was useful in this capacity, with-
out meriting all the praises that were lavished
upon him. He had no experience in war; his
ideas on every part of the military art were
erroneous, not excepting those relating to the
attack and defence of fortified places, and the
principles of fortification, which he had studied
from infancy. He printed works on these
subjects which could only be acknowledged
by a man destitute of all practical experience
in war. He proved himself possessed of mo-
ral courage. After Thermidor, when the Con-
vention placed all the members of the Com-
mittee of Public Safety under arrest, except
THIRTEENTH OK VENDEMIAIRF. 80
him, he wished to share their fate. This con-
duct was the more noble, because public opi-
nion was violently hostile to the committee ;
and because Collot d'Herbois and Billaud Va-
rennes, with whom he wished to be associated,
were in fact dreadful characters. He was
named a member of the Directory after Vende-
miaire ; but ever since the 9th of Thermidor,
his mind had been agonized by the accusa-
tions of public opinion, which attributed to
the committee the shedding of all the blood
which had flowed on the scaffolds ; he felt a
desire to please ; he suffered himself to be mis-
led by the leaders of the foreign party. He
was then exalted to the clouds, but he did not
deserve the praises of the enemies of France.
He found himself placed in a deceitful posi-
tion, and was overpowered on the 18th of
Fructidor. After the 18th of Brumaire he
was recalled and placed in the administration
of the war department by the First Consul, in
which situation he displayed but moderate ta-
lents, and had many disputes with the minister
of Finance, and Dufresne, the director of the
Treasury, in which he was generally wrong.
At length he quitted the ministry, convinced
that it could go on no longer for want of
money. As a member of the tribunate, he
90 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLhON.
voted and spoke against the empire; but his
conduct, uniformly upright, gave the govern-
ment no umbrage. The Emperor granted him
a pension of 20,000 francs. As long as affairs
prospered, he remained silent, and confined
himself to his closet ; but after the campaign
of Russia, at the time of the misfortunes of
France, he solicited employment. The city of
Antwerp was intrusted to him, where he con-
ducted himself well.
XI.
Letourneur, deputy from the department of
la Manche, had been an officer of engineers.
It is difficult to account for his having been
appointed to the Directory, it could only be
through one of those capricious resolutions
which great assemblies are liable to. He was
a man of little talent, and a petty character.
There were a hundred deputies in the Conven-
tion superior to him. He was, however, an
upright, honest, and well-meaning man.
CHAPTER IV.
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY.
I. Italy.— II. The Alps.— III. The Apennines.— IV. The
great plain of Italy. — V. The Valley of the Po, and the
Valleys the waters of which fall into the Adriatic, North
and South of the Po. — VI. Frontiers of Italy on the land
side. — VII. Lines which cover the Valley of the Po. —
VIII. Capitals of Italy. — IX. Her maritime resources. —
X. Situation of the different powers of Italy in 1796.
I.
Italy is surrounded by the Alps and the
sea. Her natural limits are determined with
the same precision as those of an island. This
country is comprised between the thirty-sixth
and forty-sixth degrees of latitude, and the
fourth and sixth of longitude from Paris. It
naturally divides into three parts, the continen-
tal portion, the Peninsula, and the islands.
The first of these is separated from the second
by the isthmus of Parma. If a semi-circle be
traced from Parma, as a centre, to the North of
that place, with a radius equal to the distance
92 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
from Parma to the mouths of the V r ar, or those
of the Isonzo (sixty leagues) it will give the ex-
tent of the higher chain of the Alps, which
separates Italy from the rest of the Continent.
This semicircle forms the territory of what is
called the Continental part, the surface of
which is 5000 square leagues. The Peninsula
is a trapezium comprehended between the
Continental part on the North, the Mediter-
ranean on the West, the Adriatic on the East,
and the Ionian sea on the South ; the two
lateral sides of which are from 200 to 210
leagues in length, and the remaining two sides
from 60 to 80 leagues. The surface of this
trapezium contains 6000 square leagues. The
third part, or the islands, that is to say, Sicily,
Sardinia, and Corsica, (which last belongs, in
a geographical point of view, to Italy rather
than to France,) forms a surface of 4000 square
leagues ; making the total surface of Italy fif-
teen thousand leagues. We have here con-
sidered the natural limits only, without enter-
ing into the political divisions. Savoy, which
is beyond the Alps, Dalmatia, and Istria, are
therefore not included ; whilst the Italian parts
of the Swiss Bailiwicks, which are on the
Italian side of the Alps, and all that part of
the Tyrol, the waters of which fall into the
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 93
Adige, and which is on the Italian side of the
Brenner, are included. These alterations,
however, make little difference. On the East,
the Isonzo has been considered as the boundary,
although the natural division of the mountains
would pass between Laybach and that river,
include part of Carniola and Istria, and ex-
tend from Fiume to the Adriatic. But at the
Isonzo, the Alps decrease in height, and be-
come of less importance.
The frontiers of Italy, towards the con-
tinent of Europe, are only 150 leagues in
extent ; which line is fortified by the strongest
barrier that can be opposed to mankind, the
highest mountains of Europe, defended by
eternal snows and steep rocks. The popula-
tion of the Continental part is 7,000,000 of
souls ; that of the Peninsula 8,000,000 ; and
that of the Islands 2,300,000. The total po-
pulation of Italy amounts to between seventeen
and eighteen millions.
The ancients divided Italy into three parts ;
Cisalpine Gaul, which comprised the whole of
the Continental part, and was bounded by the
Rubicon on the East, and the Magra on the
West : Italy, properly so called, containing
Tuscany, the Roman States, and part of the
kingdom of Naples : and Magna Graecia, or the
1)4 ME MO I US OK NAPOLEON.
Southern part of the Peninsula. The first part
was inhabited by the Gauls ; those of Autun
having founded Milan GOO years before the
Christian era : those of the Loire, Cremona,
and Mantua. The second part was inhabited
by the Italians, properly so called ; and the
third by Grecian colonies. In the time of
Augustus, the Roman citizens inhabiting Italy
were reckoned at 4,G00,000.
II.
The Alps, the greatest mountains in Europe,
divide Italy from the Continent. There are
many passes through them, but a few only are
frequented by armies, travellers, and traders.
At an elevation of 1400 toises, the last traces
of vegetation disappear ; at a greater elevation
it is with difficulty that man breathes and
lives; at a height exceeding 1600 toises are
glaciers and mountains of eternal snow, whence
rivers issue in all directions, which run into
the Po, the Rhone, the Rhine, the Danube,
and the Adriatic. The part of the Alps which
pours its waters into the Po and the Adriatic
belongs to Italy ; that part, the streams from
which flow into the Rhone, belongs to France ;
that from which the waters fall into the Rhine
and the Danube, to Germany. The Rhone
DESCRIPTION' OF ITALY. 95
receives the waters from all the sources of the
Alps on the side of France and Switzerland,
from the Saint-Gothard to the Col d'Argen-
tiere, and carries them into the Mediterranean.
The Cagna and the Arce, which fall into that
sea near Hyeres, do not rise in the Alps, but
in the hills of Provence. All the waters of the
Alps are received by the Durance and its tri-
butary streams, which fall into the Rhone.
Switzerland is entirely within the Alps, be-
tween the Rhine, the Rhone, and the Jura ;
it contains a surface of 2600 leagues covered
with great mountains, and full of lakes and
valleys, the two principal of which are those of
the Aar and the Limma. The waters of Swit-
zerland run into the Rhine or the Rhone ; none
of them into the Danube. Switzerland is
separated from the Valley of the Po by two
chains ; that which divides the Valley of the
Po from the Valley of the Rhone, which is the
high chain, and that which separates the latter
valley from that of the Rhine.
The waters of the Alps of Cadore, the
Julian, and Noric Alps, run into the Danube,
either by perpendicular valleys, like those of
the 111, the Lech, the Iser, the Inn, and the
Ens, or by transverse valleys ; after running
parallel with the Danube, they at length fall
9G MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEOV.
into that river, as the Drave and the Muer.
Hence the plains of Germany are divided from
those of Italy, or the Valley of the Danube
from the Valley of the Po, 1st, by the high
chains of the Alps which command Italy, and
whence flow the waters which on one side run
into the Po and the Adriatic, and on the other
into the Drave ; 2dly, by the chain which
divides the Valley of the Drave from that of
the Muer ; and, 3dly, by the- chain which di-
vides the Valley of the Muer from the Valley
of the Danube.
All the valleys run perpendicularly from the
summit of the Alps into the Po or the Adri-
atic ; and there is no transverse or parallel
valley ; whence it follows that the Alps on
the side of Italy form an amphitheatre which
terminates at the higher chain. By guarding
the outlets of all these valleys, the whole fron-
tier is guarded. The elevation of the mount
which commands the Col di Tende, is 1400
toises; that of Mount Yiso 1545 toises ;
Mount Genevre 1700 toises ; the Peak of
Gletscherberg on the Saint-Gothard 1900
toises, and Mount Brenner 1250 toises. These
summits command the semi-circumference of
the high chain of the Alps, and when seen
from a short distance, look like giants of ice,
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 97
stationed to defend the entrance of this fine
country.
The Alps are divided into the Maritime,
Cottian, Grecian, Pennine, Rhetian, Cadorian,
Cadoric, Noric, and Julian. The Maritime
Alps divide the valley of the Po from the sea ;
forming a second barrier on that side : the Var
and the Cottian and Grecian Alps divide Italy
from France; the Pennine Alps separate Italy
from Switzerland ; the Rhetian Alps from the
Tyrol ; the Cadorian and Julian Alps, from
Austria. The Noric Alps are a second line,
and command the Drave and the Muer.
The Maritime Alps begin at Mount Ariol,
eight leagues from the Mediterranean, near
Savona; they run parallel with the sea, and
near the shore, as far as the Col d'Argentieres,
where the Cottian Alps commence. The
county of Nice is situate on their sides towards
the sea. Their principal and most frequented
passes are the Col Ardente and the Col di
Tende. The latter is 897 toises above the
level of the sea. The torrents which rush
from the Maritime Alps are the Aroscica,
which descends from Monte Grande, and
falls into the sea near Albenga ; the Taggia,
which descends from the Col Ardente, and
the mouth of which is near San Remo ; the
Memoirs. — vol. in. h
98 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
Roya, which descends from the Col di Tende,
and ends at Ventimiglia, after a course of
twelve leagues ; and the Var, which descends
from Mont Pelouse, near the Col d'Argen-
tieres, flows in a serpentine direction for
twenty-two leagues, and reaches the sea be-
tween Nice and Antibes, forming the boundary
of France and Italy. The passes of Argen-
tieres, Mount Genevre, and Mount Cenis, are
in the Cottian Alps ; that of the Little Saint-
Bernard is in the Grecian Alps ; those of the
Great Saint-Bernard, the Simplon, and the
Saint- Gothard, in the Pennine Alps ; the
Splugen and the Brenner in the Rhetian
Alps ; and Tarvis in the Carnic, also called
the Julian Alps.
Mont-Blanc is the most elevated point of
these mountains, and overlooks all Europe.
From that central point the elevation of the
Alps constantly decreases, both towards the
Adriatic and the Mediterranean. In the range
of mountains commanding Mount Vigo, are
the sources of the Var, which falls into the
Mediterranean ; of the Durance, which falls
into the Rhone ; and of the Po, which crosses
all the plains of Italy, collecting the waters
of this declivity of the Alps, and of part of the
Apennines. In the range of mountains which
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 99
command the Saint-Gothard, are the sources
of the Rhine, the Rhone, the Inn, one of the
largest rivers that run into the Danube, and
the Ticino, one of the most considerable
streams that run into the Po. In the range
of mountains commanding Mount Brenner,
are the sources of the Adda, which empties
itself into the Po, and the Adige, which falls
into the Adriatic. Lastly, in the Cadorian
Alps, the Piave, Tagliamento, Isonzo, Brenta,
and Livenza, arise at the foot of those moun-
tains. The Po, the Rhone, and the Rhine,
have each a course of from 120 to 200
leagues ; these are very great rivers, in point
of depth, breadth, and rapidity ; but the
Danube, which has a course of 555 leagues,
and receives 120 navigable rivers, is the first
river in Europe. The Nile in Africa is still
more considerable, running 800 leagues.
III.
The Apennines are mountains of the second
order, far inferior to the Alps ; they cross
Italy, and divide the waters which empty
themselves into the Adriatic, from those
which flow into the Mediterranean. They
commence where the Alps terminate, at the
hills of Saint-Jacques, near Mount Ariol, the
h 2
100 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
last of the Alps. Saint-Jacques and the Col
di Cadibona, near Savona, are still lower ; so
that this point is at once the lowest part, both
of the Alps and Apennines. From the first
pass, that of Cadibona, the Apennines con-
stantly increase in elevation by a progress
inverse to that of the Alps, as far as the centre
of Italy. These mountains are divided into
the Ligurian, Etruscan, Roman, and Neapo-
litan Apennines.
The Ligurian Apennines commence at the
mountains of Saint-Jacques, at the source of
the Bormida, near Savona ; and terminate at
Mount Saint-Pellegrino on the confines of
Tuscany. They extend fifty leagues, and se-
parate the states of Genoa from Montferrat
and the Duchy of Parma. The upper ridge is
from three to twelve leagues from the sea,
and from twelve to twenty from the Po.
Mount Saint-Pellegrino rises eight hundred
toises above the sea. The waters of the
Ligurian Apennines descend on one side into
the Mediterranean, by torrents of extreme
rapidity, which form a great number of little
valleys ; and on the other side into the valley
of the Po through less rapid streams. The
Magra is the most considerable of those which
run into the Mediterranean, which it reaches
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 101
near Spezia, after a course of twelve leagues.
At the time of the campaign of 1796, there
was no road along the sea-side practicable
for artillery ; in order to proceed from Nice
to Genoa, it became necessary to transport
the pieces on mountain carriages, and, on the
opening of the campaign, the different trains
had to reach Savona by sea, whence they
penetrated into Italy by the Col di Cadibona,
which was easily rendered practicable for
carriages. There was at that time but one
road by which it was possible to proceed from
the sea into the interior of Italy, which was
that of Genoa, called the Bocchetta road.
But in 1812 the road from Nice to Genoa,
called the Corniche road, was open for thirty
leagues, and afforded an easy communication
for carriages between those two cities. The
road from Savona to Alessandria, by Cadibona,
and that from Spezia to Parma, have opened
two other ways from the ports of Savona and
Spezia to the Po. Savona is twenty leagues
from the Po, Genoa fifteen, and Spezia twenty-
four.
The Etruscan Apennines begin at the moun-
tain of Saint-Pellegrino and end at Mount
Cornaro ; they are thirty leagues in extent ;
rise gradually, and approach the Adriatic.
102 MEMOIRS OV NAPOLEON.
Mount Cornaro is ten leagues from Rimini,
a port of the Adriatic, and forty leagues from
Orbitello, a port of the Mediterranean. These
mountains separate Tuscany from the Duchies
of Parma and Modena, and from the Legations
of Bologna and Romagna. The Arno and
the Ombrone are the principal rivers which
flow from the tops of these mountains into
the Mediterranean. They do not run perpen-
dicularly to the sea, but in a serpentine direc-
tion ; they are considerable streams ; on the
other side the waters flow into the Mediter-
ranean in rapid torrents of no great extent
of course. At the time of the campaign in
Italy, in 1796, there were two roads which
crossed the Apennines and formed communi-
cations between the Mediterranean and Adria-
tic: that of Modena, called the Grafignana,
came out on Lucca, and crossed Mount
Cimone, which is 1000 toises above the level
of the sea. In 1812 a road from Florence to
Rimini had been marked out, and the works
necessary for its construction commenced.
The Roman Apennines begin at Mount Cor-
naro, and end at Mount Velino ; their extent
is sixty leagues ; they divide the peninsula
in the middle between the two seas. Their
distance from them never exceeds from twelve
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 103
to fifteen leagues, the breadth of the peninsula
in that part being thirty. Mount Velino is the
most elevated point of the Apennines ; it is
1300 toises above the level of the sea. From
this point the Apennines decrease in height
as far as the extremity of the kingdom of
Naples. This mountain is covered with snow
throughout the summer. Thus, in the space
of 130 leagues, from the Col di Cadibona, the
Apennines have progressively risen to a height
of 1300 toises. Mount Velino is the culminat-
ing and central point of the peninsula of Italy.
It is situate eighteen leagues from Rome, and
eighteen leagues from Pescara, the opposite
point on the Adriatic. The elevation of
Mount Saint-Genevre, near Rome, is 675
toises ; that of Mount Reticosa is 455. Of the
waters of the Roman Apennines running into
the Mediterranean, the Tiber is the principal
river ; it receives forty-two torrents, and it
runs fifty leagues. It meanders in a direction
parallel to the Apennines, and its source is on
the summit of the Etruscan branch of those
mountains. The Roman Apennines pour their
waters into the Adriatic, through little valleys
perpendicular to the sea. There are three
roads across the Roman Apennines, forming
communications between the Mediterranean
104 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
and the Adriatic : 1 st, that from Fauo to
Perugia and Rome ; 2dly, that from Ancona
to Foligno, Spoleto, and Rome ; 3dly, that
from Pescara to Terni and Rome.
The Neapolitan or Vesuvian Apennines run
for seventy leagues between the Adriatic and
the Mediterranean, and divide the peninsula
almost equally from Mount Velino to Mount
Caruso. The elevation of Vesuvius is 584
toises. These mountains gradually decrease
in height. The upper ridge of the Neapolitan
Apennines passes within fifteen leagues of
Naples and eighteen of the Adriatic. The
valleys are serpentine ; the principal rivers are
the Socco and the Volturno. Beyond Mount
Caruso, the Apennines divide into two branches.
One of them enters Calabria, and the waters
from its summits run on one side into the
Mediterranean and on the other into the gulf
of Tarento. The apex of this chain approaches
the Mediterranean, and is lost near Reggio,
after having traversed a space of fifty leagues.
The other branch entering the countries of Bari
and Otranto, divides the waters which run
into the Adriatic from those which run into
the gulf of Tarento ; its course is thirty leagues.
All these mountains obey the invariable law,
and constantly decrease in height ; thus the
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 105
upper ridge of the Apennines may be traversed
for the space of 280 leagues from Cadibona to
the Sicilian sea. This is the outline of the
upper ridge of the Apennines, or ridges, which
pour their waters into the Mediterranean on
one side, and into the Adriatic on the other.
Different ramifications spread forth and extend
to the two seas, but they are all subordinate
to the principal chain.
IV.
The great plain of Northern Italy is com-
prised between the Alps, the Apennines, and
the Adriatic. It is composed of the valley of
the Po, and the valleys which open into the
Adriatic, North and South of the Po. This
plain includes Piedmont, Lombardy, the
Duchies of Parma and Modena, the Legations
of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, and all
the States of the Republic of Venice. It is
one of the richest in the world, being covered
with great and populous cities, and maintaining
a population of five or six millions of inha-
bitants.
The Po, which the Greeks called Eridanus,
may be considered as a sea, from the great
number of rivers which run into it : on the left
bank all those which fall from the ridge of the
106 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
Rhetian, Pennine, and Cottian Alps ; on the
right all those which flow from the Maritime
Alps and Ligurian Apennines. At Turin it re-
ceives the Doria, which rises in Mount Genevre;
at Chivasso the Uora-Baltea, which descends
from Mount Saint-Bernard ; "between Casal
and Valenza the Sesia, which rises in the Sim-
plon ; at Pavia the Ticino, which springs from
Mount Saint-Gothard ; between Piacenza and
• Cremona the Adda, which descends from the
Brenner ; near Borgo-forte, the Oglio ; a lit-
tle farther, the Mincio. On the right bank it
receives the Tanaro, the source of which is in
the Col di Tende, and which, before it reaches
the vicinity of Bassignana between Valenza
and Alessandria, receives the Stura, which
descends from the Col d'Argentieres, and the
Bormida, which descends from the heights of
Bardinetto and Saint-Jacques ; above Castel-
Nuovo it receives the Scrivia, which descends
from the Col de la Borghetta ; near Piacenza,
the Trebia, which rises in the Col di Toriglio,
three leagues from Genoa; near Colorno, the
Tarro, near Guastalla, the Crostolo, near Miran-
dola, the Panaro, near Mantua, the Secchia,
and near Ferrara, the Reno; the sources of all
which rivers are in the Ligurian Alps. The
Po enters the Adriatic by seven mouths,
ten leagues from Ferrara, ten leagues from
DESCRIPTION' OF ITALY. 107
Venice, two leagues from the mouths of the
Adige, and eight leagues from Ravenna ; it
runs 130 or 135 leagues ; its width opposite
Turin is 130 toises ; opposite Placenza two
hundred toises ; at Borgo-forte three hundred
toises ; at Ponte de Lagoscuro, opposite Fer-
rara, six hundred toises. It is raised above
the soil, and its fall is one foot in a thousand
toises. It is inclosed by dykes which, in
some places, are no less than thirty feet in
height ; and the fine plain which its waters
traverse is, like Holland, constantly menaced
with submersion. The rivers which enter the
Po by the right bank, particularly beyond the
Tarro, cause frequent inundations, and occa-
sion a vast number of accidents and disorders,
which circumstance gives rise to grand ques-
tions in hydraulics, and has rendered the Ita-
lian engineers more expert in that science than
any other savans in Europe. The management
of the waters has often occasioned wars be-
tween Parma, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara.
Whenever the waters of the Po rise rapidly
more than three feet above their ordinary level,
entire populations hasten to the dykes to as-
sist in their preservation. These alarms often
happen two or three times in the year ; and
sometimes several years elapse without any
such occurrence. The tributary streams of
108 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
the two banks of the Po differ in this respect,
that those of the left bank are rivers, and those
of the right torrents ; because those of the left
bank descend from the Alps, where there are
glaciers, and are never dried up ; whilst those
of the right bank descend from the Apennines,
mountains of the second order, with a great
slope, whence the waters run rapidly during
the rainy season.
The rivers North of the Po, which fall into
the Adriatic, are the Adige, which rises at the
foot of the Brenner ; the Brenta, the source of
which is in the last hills of the Alps, on the
Trent side ; the Piave, the Livenza, and the
Tagliamento, which rise in the Cadorian Alps;
and, lastly, the Isonzo, the source of which is
at the foot of the Col de Tarvis. All these
rivers fall into the Adriatic, or into the Lagunes
of Venice. The Adige alone remains a river
throughout its course, whilst the others are
only torrents.
The valleys of the South of the Po comprise
successively, from North to South, the Senio,
the Ronco, the Savio, and the Luzo or Rubicon,
and together constitute the provinces of Ro-
magna. These inconsiderable torrents are
fordable nearly throughout the year, except
in the season of the great floods ; their source
DESCRIPTION OF ITALV. 109
is in the Etruscan Apennines, and they fall
into the Adriatic in the vicinities of Fusignano,
Ravenna, Faenza, Cesena, and Rimini. All
the lakes of the district of Comacchio, on the
right bank of the Po, are diversions or nitra-
tions of the Po, the waters of which river
spread as far as Ravenna.
V.
France borders on Italy from the mouth of
the Var, in the Mediterranean, to the Little
Saint-Bernard. From the foot of the Saint-
Bernard, on the French side, at the village of
Scez, to the valley of Barcelonetta, it is
thirty leagues : on the Italian side it is only
eighteen, measuring from the valley of Aosta
to the valley of the Stura opposite the Col
d'Argentieres. But from the Stura it is neces-
sary to clear the upper chain of the Alps in
order to descend into the county of Nice and
proceed along the left bank of the Var. An
army from Italy, which has passed the Var,
has entered France ; but an army from France,
which has passed that river, has not entered
Italy ; it is only on the acclivities of the Mari-
time Alps. Until it has cleared the upper
ridge of the Alps to descend into Italy, that
obstacle remains in full force.
110 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
The Var is a torrent which is fordable du-
ring part of the year. It runs amongst moun-
tains, where all the roads are impracticable for
artillery. An army, therefore, could not enter
Italy by way of the Var, except by the lower
part of that river, in order to gain possession of
Nice in the first instance. In order to render
the Var a line of any importance, it would re-
quire a fort at the mouth, to close the passage,
destroy the fords, or form inundations. After
passing the Var, and gaining possession of the
county of Nice, the army must, in order to
enter Italy, either pass the Col di Tende, or
march along the coast as far as Oneglia, to
pass the Alps at Ponte di Nave, and reach the
Tanaro, or proceed along the sea-side to Sa-
vona and Genoa, to pass them at Cadibona
and the Bocchetta. The best line that can be
taken in order to oppose these plans, is that of
the Roya. The right of this line reaches from
the Col di Tende to Saorgio ; the centre from
Saorgio to Briglio ; and the left from Briglio
to the sea. The fortress of Saorgio and a
little fort on the heights of Briglio would serve
as an appui to this line, and guard the road
leading to Tende. Should this line be forced,
the Riviera di Genoa affords several others ;
such as the branches of Monte Grande, which
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. Ill
cover San Remo. But then the Col di Tende
would remain without the line, and would re-
quire to be defended by the fortress of Coni,
and by a corps placed in Piedmont. The for-
tress of Genoa is important as a point of appui
to this frontier, and a great sea-port.
If a French army would enter Italy by the
Cottian and Grecian Alps, it ought to pass by
one of the five cols, of Argentieres, elevated
900 toises, of la Croix, Mount Genevre, or
Mount Cenis, elevated 1060 toises, or of the
Little Saint-Bernard, elevated 11 50 toises. If
this upper ridge belong to the King of Italy,
casemated towers ought to be constructed on
the heights to protect the little fortresses de-
fending these passes. From the Col d' Argen-
tieres a French army ought to debouch into
the three valleys of the Stura, the Maira, and
Blino ; from the Col de la Croix into the val-
leys of Saint-Martin and Pragelato; from the
Col du Mont Genevre into the valleys of Prage-
lato and Suza ; from Mount Cenis into the valley
of Suza : from the Little Saint-Bernard into
the valley of Aosta. The King of Sardinia
had the forts of Demonte, Chateau Dauphin,
Exilles, Fenestrelles, la Brunette and Bard,
which formed a second line, closing all these
debouches, just as the fortresses of Coni, Or-
112 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
mea, and Ceva closed the debouches of the
Maritime Alps. The frontiers of states are
either chains of mountains, great rivers, or
vast and arid deserts. Thus France is de-
fended by the Rhine, Italy by the chain of the
Alps, and Egypt by the deserts of Libya, Nu-
bia and Arabia. Of all these obstacles deserts
are undoubtedly the most difficult to pass ;
mountains are the second class of impedi-
ments, and large rivers are only the third.
On the frontiers of Switzerland four prin-
cipal passes form the communication between
the two states ; those of Saint-Bernard, at an
elevation of 1240 toises ; of the Simplon, at
1050 toises ; of the Saint-Gothard, 1060 toises,
and of the Splugen, 988 toises. The Simplon
opens upon the right bank of Lake Maggiore and
of the Ticino. From Domo d'Ossola to Lake
Maggiore there are several positions which are
easily fortified, amongst others the Chateau
d'Arona. The Ticino forms a last line against
the aggressions of France, as well as against
an army debouching by the Simplon ; the right
is supported on Lake Maggiore and the moun-
tains ; the left on the Po and the denies of
Stradella, which communicate uninterruptedly
with the Ligurian Apennines. The Ticino is
rapid and broad ; the bridge of Pavia re-
DF.sciup'rrox or itai.y. 113
trenched and well-guarded, and a good fort at
the defile of Stradella would cover Italy on
the side of France. The pass of the Saint-
Gothard is impracticable for artillery. From
the Saint-Gothard to the Lake of Lugano, and
between Lakes Maggiore and Como, there are
many positions which afford good lines, and
where a few forts of little expense would have
a good effect ; indeed there were such for-
merly. At all events, the command of all the
lakes ought to be secured by armed boats.
The fourth pass, that of the Splugen, opens
into the Valteline, which district, in a geogra-
phical sense, undoubtedly appertains to Italy,
as its waters belong to the valley of the Po, to
which they flow by the Adda. The Adda
forms the Lake of Como ; but that lake is sur-
rounded by impracticable rocks, like all the
lakes of the Bergomasque and Brescian.
On the Austrian side, Italy borders on the
Tyrol, Carinthia, and Carniola ; this frontier
is at once the weakest and the most extended.
On the Tyrolian side is the pass of the Bren-
ner, at an elevation of 730 toises, leading to
Trent. From Trent three roads lead into
Italy : one on the Chiesa, the Lake of Idro,
and Brescia, which the fortress of Rocca
d'Anfo completely bars ; another runs along
Memoirs. — vol. III. i
114 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
the left hank of the Adige, and opens on Ve-
rona, the Adige serving as a line against this
debouche ; the third runs along the Brenta,
and debouches at Bassano, on the left bank of
the Brenta. On the Carinthian side is the Col
de Tarvis ; and lastly, on that of Carniola, is
the line of the Isonzo.
In 1796 the Alps were passable for the pur-
pose of entering Italy : 1st, by the road of the
Col di Tende, at the debouche of which was
the fortress of Coni ; 2ndly, by the Col d'Ar-
gentieres, but there was no road in that direc-
tion practicable for artillery, and the position
of the Pas de Suze and Fort Demonte de-
fended the valley of the Stura ; 3rdly, from
Grenoble and Briancon, by Mount Genevre ;
but this road was impracticable for artillery,
and at its opening into Piedmont were Fene-
strelles and Exilles ; 4thly, by Savoy, Cham-
bery, and Mount Cenis, but from Lanslebourg
to la Novalese the roads were imoracticable
for waggons, and the valley \vas closed by the
fortresses of Suza and la Brunette ; 5thly, the
Tarentaise led to the foot of the Little Saint-
Bernard ; 6thly, the Valais led to the Great
Saint-Bernard ; but the passage of these two
mountains was not practicable for waggons;
and Fort Bard, which closed the valley, inter-
DESCRIPTION' OF ITALY. 115
cepted the passage into the plain ; 7thly, by
the Valais there was a road reaching to Brig,
where it ceased to be practicable for waggons.
The passage of the Simplon was impossible, as
were those of the Saint -Gothard and of the
Splugen. In 1812 all these fortresses were
demolished, that is to say, Coni, la Demonte,
la Brunette, Suza, Bard, and Exilles ; and four
great roads had opened the Alps to all sorts of
carriages, which were not even under the ne-
cessity of locking the wheels ; namely, the
roads of the Corniche, Mount Genevre, Mount
Cenis, and the Simplon. These roads, which
cost so many millions and so many years' la-
bour, are considered as the finest works of this
kind which were ever executed by man.
The lines which an Italian or' French army
ought to take in order to oppose an invasion
on the side of Germany, are those which run
along the right banks of the rivers which fall
into the Adriatic, North of the Po : these lines
cover the whole valley of the Po, and thereby
close the peninsula, and cover Upper, Mid-
dle, and Lower Italy. These are the best
lines of defence : those which run along the
rivers which fall into the Po, cut the valley of
that river, leave Middle and Lower Italy un-
i 2
116 Mi: MO I HS OF NAPOLEON.
covered, and thereby render it necessary to
have two armies to manoeuvre on the two
banks of the Po.
The lines of defence which cover the valley
of the Po, are those of the Isonzo, the Tag-
liamento, the Livenza, the Piave, the Brenta,
and the Adige. The line of the Isonzo covers
all Italy, being the boundary of that country.
From Tarvis to Caporetto this river runs
through impracticable mountains. At Capo-
retto is the road leading to Udine by way of
Cividal. In the third part of this line, from
Gorizia to where the Isonzo falls into the sea,
are the debouches of Gradisca, Gorizia, and
Monte Falcone. The Venetian fortress of
Palma-Nuova contributes to the defence of
this line as a depot and reserve ; but this line
is turned by the road of the Ponteba, which
descends on Osopo and the Tagliamento ; it
is therefore necessary to occupy a position
near Tarvis, by means of a good fortress, to
intercept the two roads, that of the Ponteba
and that of the Isonzo. The line of the Liven-
za may be turned by its left at Sacile, in the
mountains ; the Livenza is not fordable ; al-
though narrow, it is marshy. The line of the
Piave is defended by the forest of Montello,
whence it is covered, as far as the sea, by
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 117
impassible morasses ; but that river is ford-
able in many places. To render this line
of some importance, it would be necessary
to contract the bed of the Piave in such a
manner as to render it impossible to ford it in
any part, and to contrive means of forming-
inundations ; this line has the advantage of
covering Venice. The line of the Brenta, on
the left of Bassano, is closed by gorges easy
to defend ; from Bassano to Brontolo the
Brenta is fordable. The high road from Mu-
nich to Verona, which crosses the Brenner
and the xldige, turns these five lines; so that
if the enemy had a corps-d'armee in Bavaria
and the Tyrol, he would reach the right bank
of the Adige by this route, and would cut off
the army occupying one of these lines from
Italy.
The Adige is the sixth and last line which
covers the valley of the Po; it is incomparably
the best. This river is broad, rapid, and deep ;
and is not fordable in any part: at Verona it
is sixty toises wide. But this line leaves the
Venetian territory and the city of Venice unco-
vered. By occupying the lake of Garda with
a few gun-boats, and the road of the Chiesa
by the fort of Rocca-d'Anfo, the line of the
Adige completely covers all the rest of Italy.
118 MEMOIRS OF X A l'OI.LOX.
The mountains of the Brescian, Bergomasque,
and Milanese countries, are impracticable ; the
enemy could only penetrate by the Xiniplon,
supposing him master of Switzerland. This
line is divided into three parts : the first
between the Lake of Garda and the level of
Rivoli ; the second from Rivoli to Legnago ;
and the third from Legnago to the sea. The
first is defended by the heights of Montebaldo
and the position of la Corona : the enemy
cannot penetrate thither with artillery ; he
must gain possession of the level of Rivoli,
to be able to receive his artillery, which, in
that case, he would cause to descend by the
road which runs along the left bank of the
Adige. Beyond Roveredo, the forts of Ve-
rona and that part of the town which is on the
left bank, ought by all means to be occupied
as tetes-de-pont. The small fortress of Leg-
nago serves the centre of the line as a tete-
de-pont. From Legnago to the sea there
are many morasses ; by making use of the
waters of the Adige, the Brenta, and the Po,
a communication may be secured with the
fortified place of Venice. By cutting a dyke
of the Adige, lower than Porto Legnago, all the
ground between that river and the Po may
be inundated : their waters may be united
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 119
with those of the Molinella; the whole coun-
try from Legnago to the sea is then impracti-
cable. By opening the sluice of Castagnaro,
the canal called Bianco is filled by the waters
of the Adige ; this canal falls into the Po ; it
then forms a second line. In case the enemy
has passed the Adige between Castagnaro
and the sea, the best way of defending the
Adige is to encamp on the left bank, on the
heights of Caldero, behind the Alpon, with
the right supported on the marshes of Arcole,
with two bridges at Ronco, the left supported
on some fine heights which it would be easy
to intrench in a few weeks ; then all that part
of the line between Rivoli and Ronco would
be covered, and if the enemy would pass the
Adige between Arcole and the sea, the defen-
sive army would be in a situation to fall on
his rear.
The Mincio is the first line which cuts the
valley of the Po: in order to occupy this line,
it is necessary to be master of the Lake of
Garda and the fortress of Rocca-d'Anfo. The
Mincio is a river of inconsiderable breadth,
and but a slight obstacle in itself; but, on
stopping up all the irrigatory canals which
draw off its waters, it ceases to be fordable.
The fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua con-
120 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
stitute the principal strength of this line.
Mantua defends the Serraglio and part of the
Mincio as far as the Po. The hills of Mon-
zembano and la Volta on the right bank,
command the left bank ; those of Salionza
and Valeggio on the left bank, command the
right bank, A small citadel on the left bank,
at the hill of Valeggio, another on the hill of
Salionza, the restoration of the small fortress
of Goito, covered by inundations, would
render this line pretty good ; nevertheless, the
army occupying it would be obliged to have
a detached corps on the right bank of the Po.
The Oglio is fordable in many places; it
has the disadvantage, towards its source and
on its left, of approaching the Adda; so that
an army placed on the right bank of this river
would easily be cut oft' from Milan, as it fre-
quently happened in the wars of Venice and
the Visconti. But if the retreat of this army
could be effected by the right bank of the Po,
this line might in that case be of some utility.
The Adda is occasionally fordable ; permanent
or field fortifications are necessary at Lecco,
Trezzo, Cassano, and Lodi, as well as armed
boats on the Lake of Como. The fortress of
Pizzighettone supports the lower part of the
line : a fortress at Piacenza, with a bridge on
DESCRIPTION UK ITALY. 121
the Po, would complete this line ; but in
default of such fortress, a second army would
be requisite on the right bank of the Po.
The Ticino is a good line; it is a broad,
deep, rapid river, but it is necessary to occupy
Pavia as a tete-de-pont : a fortress at la Stra-
della would complete this line, to stop the
enemy on the right bank of the Po : for want
of such fortress an army is requisite on the
right bank of the Po. La Stradella is the
narrowest point of the valley of the Po ; a fort
would entirely close it up. The last hillocks
of the Ligurian Apennines abut on this dis-
trict. The valley is not a cannon-shot in
width; the Po runs close to the foot of the
hills. The cannon of la Stradella would play
on all points ; both above and below that
place, the valley is two or three leagues in
breadth, and a fort like that of la Stradella
would not bar it.
VI.
Italy, insulated within its natural limits,
separated by the sea and by very lofty moun-
tains from the rest of Europe, seems destined
to form a great and powerful nation ; but she
has a capital defect in her geographical form,
which may be regarded as one of the causes of
122 MEMOIRS OK NAPOLEON.
the calamities she has suffered, and of the
parcelling out of this fine country into several
independent monarchies or republics : her
length is disproportionate to her breadth. If
this country had been bounded by Mount
Velino ; that is to say, if it had extended about
as far as Rome, and all that part of its territory
which is comprised between Mount Velino
and the Ionian sea, including Sicily, had been
thrown between Sardinia, Corsica, Genoa, and
Tuscany, Italy would have had a centre near
every part of her circumference, with an unity
of rivers, climate, and local interests. But
the three great islands, which form a third of
her surface, have insulated interests and po-
sitions, and are each under peculiar circum-
stances; and that part of the Peninsula which
is south of Mount Velino, and which forms the
kingdom of Naples, is unacquainted with the
interests, climate, and wants of the whole of
the valley of the Po.
Thus, whilst the Gauls were passing the
Cottian Alps, six hundred years before the
Christian era, and settling in the valley of the
Po, the Greeks were landing on the southern
coasts from the Ionian sea, and founding the
colonies of the Tarentincs and Sal en tines, of
Croto and Sabargte, states which were known
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 123
under the generic name of Magna Graecia.
Rome subjugated both Gaul and Greece, and
reduced all Italy under her command. Seve-
ral ages after Christ, when the seat of empire
was transferred to Constantinople, the barba-
rians passed the Isonzo and the Adige, and
founded several states ; the throne of the pow-
erful monarchy of the Lombards was fixed at
Pavia. The fleets of Constantinople main-
tained the imperial sway on the coasts of the
southern part. At a later period the Kings of
France often penetrated into Italy by the Cot-
tian Alps ; and the Emperor of Germany by
the Cottian and Rhetian Alps ; the Popes
opposed these princes to each other, and by
that policy maintained themselves in a kind of
independence, promoted by the divisions and
anarchy that prevailed in the different cities.
But although the South of Italy is, by its
situation, separated from the North, Italy is
one single country ; the unity of manners, lan-
guage, and literature, must, at some future
period, more or less remote, at length unite its
inhabitants in one single government. The
first and essential condition of the existence of
this monarchy, must be to become a maritime
power, in order to maintain its supremacy
over its islands, and to defend its coasts.
124 MKMOIKS OF NAPOLEON.
There are various opinions respecting the
place best adapted to become the capital of
Italy. Some point out Venice, because it is
of the first importance to Italy to become a
maritime power. Venice, protected by its
situation from every attack, is the natural
depot of the commerce of the Levant and of
Germany : it is, commercially speaking, the
nearest point to Turin and Milan ; even more
so than Genoa ; the sea places it near every
part of the coasts. Others are led by history
and the memorials of antiquity to fix on Rome ;
these say, that Rome is more central ; that it is
convenient to the three great islands of Sicily,
Sardinia, and Corsica, as well as to Naples,
the seat of the greatest population in Italy ;
that it is at a proper distance from every point
of the assailable frontier; whether the enemy
advance by the French, Swiss, or Austrian
frontier, Rome is still at a distance of 120
leagues ; that, should the frontier of the Alps
be forced, Rome is covered by the frontier of
the Po, and after that by the frontier of the
Apennines; that France and Spain are great
maritime powers, whose capitals, nevertheless,
are not established in sea-ports ; that Rome,
near the coasts of the Mediterranean and
Adriatic, is in a situation to provide for the
DESCRIPTION 01' ITALY, 125
victualling and defence of the frontiers of the
Isonzo and Adige from Ancona and Venice,
with economy and despatch, by way of the
Adriatic; that, by means of the Tiber, Genoa,
and Villa Franca, she can take care of the
frontier of the Var and the Cottian Alps ; that,
by means of the Adriatic and Mediterranean,
she is favourably situated for harassing the
flanks of any army which should pass the Po,
and penetrate into the Cottian Alps, without
commanding the sea ; that the dep6ts which
a great capital contains might be transferred
from Rome to Naples and Tarento, to save
them from a victorious enemy ; and finally,
that Rome exists ; that she affords more re-
sources for the occasions of a great capital
than any city in the world ; that she has,
moreover, on her side, the magic influence and
dignity of her name. It is accordingly our
opinion that Rome is unquestionably the ca-
pital which the Italians will one day choose.
The population and wealth of Italy would
enable her to maintain a military force of
400,000 soldiers, independently of her navy.
War in Italy requires less cavalry than in
Germany ; 30,000 horse would be sufficient for
Italy ; the artillery ought to be numerous in
order to defend the coasts and naval establish-
]2G MEMOIRS OF XAVOLKOX.
ments. Horses are scarce in Italy, yet Naples,
Tuscany, and Rome, furnish very valuable
ones ; Albania, Switzerland, Germany, and
Africa, ought to supply Italy with horses. The
studs which have been sacrificed to the pro-
motion of agriculture and the profit derived
from horned cattle ought to be restored. In
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the dif-
ferent powers of Italy maintained a hundred
thousand horses ; at that period Tuscany alone
had an army of 100,000 men, because the ar-
mies never went farther than a few days' march
from their respective cities. An army of
400,000 men would be sufficient to enable
Italy to furnish three armies of 100,000 men
each, to defend its French, Swiss, and German
frontiers.
VII.
No part of Europe is so advantageously si-
tuated as this peninsula for becoming a great
maritime power. Its coasts extend from the
mouths of the Var to the straits of Sicily, two
hundred and thirty leagues ; from the straits
of Sicily to the cape of Otranto on the Ionian
sea, one hundred and thirty leagues ; from the
cape of Otranto to the mouth of the Isonzo in
the Adriatic, two hundred and thirty leagues ;
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 127
and the extent of the coasts of the three islands
of Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia, is five hundred
and thirty leagues. Italy has, therefore, in-
cluding its great and small islands, twelve
hundred leagues of coast ; without taking into
this calculation those of Dalmatia, Istria, the
mouths of the Cattaro, or the Ionian Isles,
which, under the empire, were dependent on
Italy. France has a hundred and thirty
leagues of coast in the Mediterranean, and
four hundred and seventy on the Atlantic, in
all six hundred leagues ; Spain, including her
islands, has five hundred leagues of coast in
the Mediterranean, and three hundred on the
Atlantic ; thus Italy has half as much coast
again as Spain, and twice as much as France.
France has three ports, the towns of which
contain a population of 100,000 persons ; Italy
has Genoa, Naples, Palermo, and Venice,
whose population is superior ; Naples contains
400,000 inhabitants. The opposite coasts of
the Mediterranean and the Adriatic being at a
short distance from each other, almost the
whole population of Italy is within reach of the
coasts ; Lucca, Pisa, Rome, and Ravenna, dis-
tant from three to four hundred leagues from
the sea, are capable of enjoying all the advan-
tages of maritime towns, and of supplying
12S MEMOIRS or NAPOLEON.
great numbers of seamen ; her three great mi-
litary ports for armament and building are,
la Spezia for the Ligurian seas, Tarento for the
Ionian, and Venice for the Adriatic. Italy-
has all kinds of resources in timber, hemp, and,
in general, every thing necessary for ship-
building ; la Spezia is the finest port in the
world, its roads are even superior to those of
Toulon ; its defence by land and sea is easy ;
the plans drawn up under the empire, and the
execution of which was commenced, proved
that, at a moderate expense, the naval esta-
blishments might be placed in security, and
inclosed in a place capable of making the
greatest resistance. Its docks would be con-
venient for receiving the timber of Corsica,
Liguria, and Tuscany ; and iron from the isle
of Elba, the Alps, and the whole of the Apen-
nines. Its squadrons would command the
seas of Corsica and Sardinia, and would be
able, in case of need, to put into the ports of
Porto Ferrajo, San Fiorenzo, Ajaccio, Porto
Vecchio, San Pietro in Sardinia, Vado, and
Villa Franca. Tarento is wonderfully well
situated for commanding Sicily, Greece, the
Levant, and the coasts of Egypt and Syria ;
under the empire there were plans drawn up
for its land fortifications and naval establish-
DESCRIPTION" OF ITALY. 129
ments ; the greatest fleets may lie in this port
sheltered from the winds and secure from the
attack of any superior hostile force. Finally,
at Venice, there is already every thing need-
ful. The Venetians had no ships that drew
above eighteen feet water ; but under the Em-
pire a great number of ships were built on the
French plan, and, by means of the works con-
structed at the canal of Malamoko, and by the
aid of floating butts, ships completely armed,
built on the model of French seventy-fours,
have come out of this canal, and fought with
glory a few minutes after their launch. A
commission of the engineers of the bridges and
roads, of which Proni was president, had
drawn up a plan, which at the expense of a
few millions and some years' labour would have
enabled the vessels to come out completely
armed without the aid of butts. Sicily, Malta,
Corfu, Istria, Dalmatia, and especially Ra-
gusa, afford ports and shelter for the largest
fleets. The ports of Genoa, Castelmare, Bari,
and Ancona, which first-rate ships can enter,
would be four secondary ports, either for
building or for equipping, repairing, and re-
victualling small squadrons. Italy can raise
and maintain for the naval service, even in her
actual declining state, 120,000 seamen ; the
Memoirs. — vol. in. k
130 MEMOIRS OF NAPOr.FOV.
sailors of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice, have been
celebrated for ages. Italy might keep dp
three or four hundred ships of war, of which
100 or 120 might be ships of the line of seventy-
four guns ; her flag might contend with suc-
cess against those of France, Spain, Constanti-
nople, and the four Barbary powers.
VIII.
The King of Sardinia possessed Savoy, the
county of Nice, Piedmont, and Montferrat.
Savoy and the county of Nice had been taken
from him in the campaigns of 1792, 1793,
1794, and 1795, and the French army occu-
pied the upper ridge of the Alps. Piedmont
and Montferrat, included between the Ticino,
the states of Parma, the republic of Genoa and
the Alps, contained a population of 2,000,000
of inhabitants, which, with the 500,000 of
Sardinia, and the 400,000 of Savoy and the
county of Nice, raised the number of his sub-
jects to about 3,000,000. In time of peace the
King of Sardinia maintained 25,000 men under
arms ; his annual revenue amounted to twenty-
five millions. At the commencement of the
campaign of 179(5, he had brought into the
field 60,000 men, by means of the subsidies
of England and by extraordinary exertions.
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 1 A 1
These were national troops, inured to war by a
long contest. The fortresses of la Brunette,
Suza, Fenestrelles, Bard, Tortona, Cherasco,
Alessandria, and Turin, were in good con-
dition, well armed, and completely provided
with stores and provisions ; and the frontier
was, on account of these fortresses situated in
the defiles of all the mountains, considered as
proof against every attack.
The republic of Genoa, lying to the south of
Piedmont, and composed of the Riviera di
Ponente, which has a coast of thirty leagues,
and the Riviera di Levante, which has one of
twenty-five, contained 500,000 inhabitants.
It did not usually maintain more than 3
or 4000 men under arms ; but in case of
need all the citizens of Genoa became sol-
diers ; and 8 or 10,000 men of the imperial
fiefs and the valleys of Fon tana- Bona were
formed into regiments for the defence of the
capital. The city of Genoa is extremely well
fortified. The walls are four leagues in cir-
cuit, but only a few points are assailable,
The small fortress of Gavi defends the defile of
the Bocchetta.
The republic of Lucca, a small country ex-
tending along the Tuscan sea, had a popula-
tion of 140,000 souls, and a revenue of two
k 2
132 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON f.
millions. The duchy of Parma, Placcnza, and
Giiastalla contained .000,000 inhabitants. It
bordered on the republic of Genoa, on the Po,
and on the states of Modena; its military es-
tablishment was 3000 men, its revenues four
millions.
Austrian Lombardy, separated from the
states of the King of Sardinia by the Ticino,
from Switzerland by the Alps, from the duchy
of Parma by the Po, and bordering, on the
east, on the states of the republic of Venice,
formed a population of 1,200,000 souls. Mi-
lan was the capital, and had a citadel in good
condition. This part of Italy belonged to
Austria, had no military establishment, and
even paid a tax to be exempt from recruiting.
Austria had only one Italian regiment, that of
Strasoldo. Pavia, Milan, Como, Lodi, Cre-
mona, and Mantua, formed the subdivisions of
Austrian Lombardy ; the fortifications of Piz-
zighettone on the Adda were in a bad state ;
Mantua, although neglected, \vas a good for-
tress.
The republic of Venice had, on the west,
Austrian Lombardy, on the north the Cadorian
Alps separating it from the Tyrol and from
Carinthia ; on the east Carinthia, Carniola,
Istria, and Dalmatia ; her population was
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 133
3,000,000 of inhabitants. She could bring
50,000 men into the field ; her fleet ruled the
Adriatic. She had thirteen regiments of Scla-
vonians, who were good soldiers. The Bergo-
masque, the Brescian, the Cremasque, the Po-
lesina, the Veronese, the Vicentine, the Pa-
duan, the Bassanese, the Trevisan, the Cado-
rine, the Feltrine, the Bellunese, and the
Frioul, formed the Venetian states on the
right bank of the Isonzo ; Istria and Dalmatia
those on the shores of the Adriatic.
The duchy of Modena included the duchies
of Reggio, Modena, and MirandoJa. It bor-
dered on the Po, on the duchy of Parma, on
the Legation of Bologna, and on the Tuscan
Apennines. It was governed by the last scion
of the house of Este; whose daughter, the wife
of the archduke Ferdinand of Austria, was his
heir. The duke of Modena was wholly Aus-
trian ; his military establishment was 6000
men ; he had an arsenal, a depot of artillery,
and a rich treasury. The population of his
states amounted to 400,000 souls.
Tuscany, bounded by the Mediterranean,
the Apennines, the republics of Genoa and
Lucca, and the states of the Pope, had a popu-
lation of 1 ,000,000 ; the archduke Ferdi-
nand, the Emperor's brother, governed there.
134 MEMOIRS t)l NAPOLEON.
His military establishment was G000 men ; his
revenues fifteen millions of francs. He pos-
sessed a great commercial port, Leghorn. The
Grand Duke of Tuscany had acknowledged the
republic in 1795 ; he was neutral, and at peace
with it ; Tuscany and the republic of Venice
were the only powers of Italy at peace with
France.
The states of the Pope were bounded by the
Po, Tuscany, the Adriatic, the Mediterranean,
and the kingdom of Naples. They contained a
population of 2,500,000 souls, of which the
three legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Ro-
magna, formed 900,000 ; the Marches, and
Saint Peter's Patrimony, including Rome,
1,600,000. The port of Ancona on the Adri-
atic had a bad fortress ; Civita Vecchia, on the
Mediterranean, was regularly fortified. The
troops kept on foot by the Pope amounted to
four or five thousand men.
The kingdom of Naples, bounded by the
states of the Pope and by the sea, contained a
population of 6,000,000 of souls, of whom there
were 4,500,000 on the continent, and 1,500,000
in Sicily. The Neapolitan army was 60,000
strong. The cavalry was excellent : the navy
consisted of three ships of the line, and several
frigates.
DESCRIPTION OF ITALY. 135
Corsica had belonged to France ever since
the middle of the last century : her population
was 180,000 souls ; this country was then in
the power of the English. The isle of Malta,
containing a population of 100,000 souls, be-
longed to the order of Saint-John of Jerusalem.
Thus the military establishment of the powers
of Italy amounted to 160,000 men under arms,
and might easily have been increased, in a
short time, to 300,000. The Italian army was
much stronger in infantry than in cavalry ;
but excepting the Piedmontese and Sclavo-
nians, the troops were far from good.
CHAPTER V.
BATTLE OF MOXTENOTTE.
I. Plan of the Campaign. — II. State of the Armies. — III. Na-
poleon arrives at Nice towards the end of March, 1796. — IV.
Battle of Montenotte, (April 12). — V. Battle of Millesimo,
(April 14).— VI. Action of Dego, (April 15).— VII. Action
of Saint Michel, (April 20) ; Action of Mondovi, (April 22).
— VIII. Armistice of Cherasco, (April 28). — IX. Examina-
tion of the expediency of passing the Po, and proceeding far-
ther from France.
I.
In 1796 the King of Sardinia, whose military
and geographical position had procured him the
title of Porter of the Alps, had fortresses at
the outlets of all the passes leading into Pied-
mont. For the purpose of penetrating into Italy
by forcing the Alps, it was necessary to gain
possession of one or more of these fortresses ; the
roads did not allow of bringing up a battering
train ; the mountains are covered with snow
during three quarters of the year, which leaves
but little time for besieging fortresses. Napo-
BATTLE OF MOXTE XOTTE. I'M
leon conceived the idea of turning the whole of
the Alps, and entering Italy precisely at the point
where those lofty mountains terminate and where
the Apennines begin, as has already been stated
in Chapter IV. Mont Blanc is the most elevated
point of the Alps, whence the chain of these
mountains decreases in height towards the Adri-
atic, as well as towards the Mediterranean as far
as Mount Saint- Jacques, where they end, and
where the Apennines begin, which rise gradually
as far as Mount Velino near Rome. Mount
Saint-Jacques is therefore the lowest point, both
of the Alps and Apennines, the spot where the
former end and the latter begin. Savona, a sea-
port and fortified town, was well situated for a
depot and point of appui : from this town to la
Madonna it is three miles ; a firm road leads to
that town, whence it is six miles to Carcari by a
road which might in a few days be rendered
practicable for artillery. From Carcari there are
carriage roads leading into the interior of Pied-
mont and Montferrat. This was the only point
by which Italy could be entered without passing
mountains : the elevations of the ground there
are so trifling, that at a later period, under the
Empire, a canal was planned for joining the Adri-
atic to the Mediterranean by the Po, the Tanaro,
the Bormida, and locks from that river to Sa-
vona. The scheme of penetrating into Italy by
138 M I MOl KS OF X.\ I'OI.IOX.
Savona, Cadibona, Carcari, and the Bormida,
afforded hopes of separating the Sardinian and
Austrian armies ; because Lombardy and Pied-
mont would be equally menaced from those
points; Milan and Turin might be marched upon
with equal facility. The Piedmontese were in-
terested in covering Turin, and the Austrians in
covering Milan.
II.
The army of the enemy was commanded by
General Beaulieu, a distinguished officer, who
had acquired reputation in the campaigns of the
North. It was provided with all that could
render it formidable, and was composed of Aus-
trians, Sardinians, and Neapolitans. Its num-
bers were double those of the French army ; and
were to be successively increased by the contin-
gents of Naples, of the Pope, of Modena, and of
Parma. These forces were divided into two
grand corps ; the active Austrian army, com-
posed of four divisions of infantry of forty-two
battalions, forty- four squadrons of cavalry, and
one hundred and forty pieces of cannon : in all,
45,000 strong; under Lieutenants-general d'Ar-
genteau, Melas, Wukassowich, Liptay, and Se-
bottendorf. The active army of Sardinia, com-
posed of three divisions of infantry and one divi-
sion of cavalry, in the whole 25,000 men, and
BATTLE OF HONTE&OTTE. 139
sixty pieces of cannon, was commanded by the
Austrian General Colli, and by generals Pro-
vera and Latour ; the rest of the Sardinian
forces garrisoned the fortresses, or defended the
frontier, opposite to the French army of the Alps,
under the command of the duke of Aoste.
The French army was composed of lour ef-
fective divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry,
under Generals Massena, Augereau, Laharpe,
Serrurier, Stengel, and Kilmaine ; it amounted
to 25,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry, 2500 artillery,
sappers, civil list, &c. Total, 30,000 men pre-
sent under arms. The effective strength of the
army amounted, according to the returns of the
ministry, to 106,000 men; but 36,000 were pri-
soners, dead, or deserted. A regular review had
long been expected for the purpose of striking
them out of the states of situation. 20,000 were
in the 8th military division, at Toulon, Mar-
seilles, and Avignon, between the mouths of the
Rhone and those of the Var: they could only be
employed in the defence of Provence, depending
on the ministry. There remained an effective force
of 50,000 men on the left bank of the Var ; of
whom 5000 were in the hospitals, 7000 formed
the depots of the corps of infantry, cavalry, (the
latter being 2500 men, not mounted,) and ar-
tillery ; there remained 30,000 men actually
under arms, ready to take the field : 8000 men,
110 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
infantry and artillery, were employed in the
garrisons of Niee, Villa Franca, Monaco, the
coasts of Genoa, and Saorgio, and in guarding
the upper ridge of the Alps from the Col d'Argen-
tieres to the Tanaro. The cavalry was in the
worst condition possible, although it had long
been on the Rhone to recruit itself; but it had
suffered for want of provisions. The arsenals of
Nice and Antibes were well provided with artil-
lery, but destitute of means of carriage, all the
draught horses having perished for want. The
poverty of the finances was such that the govern-
ment, with all its efforts, could only furnish the
chest of the army with 2000 louis in specie to
open the campaign with, and a million in drafts,
part of which were protested. The army was
totally destitute, and had nothing to expect from
France; all its dependence was on victory; it
was only in the plains of Italy that it could or-
ganize means of conveyance, procure horses for
the artillerv, clothe the soldiers, and mount the
cavalry. It consisted, however, of only 30,000
men actually under arms, and thirty pieces ot
cannon ; and it stood opposed to 80,000 men
and two hundred pieces of cannon. If it had
been under the necessity of engaging in a general
battle, its inferiority in numbers and in artillery
and cavalry would undoubtedly have prevented
it from making an effectual resistance; it had,
BATTLE OK MONTEXOTTIv. 141
therefore, to compensate for its inferiority in
number by rapid marches ; for the want of artil-
lery by the nature of its manoeuvres ; and for its
inferiority in cavalry by the choice of positions.
The character of the French soldiers was excel-
lent ; they had distinguished themselves and
grown inured to war on the summits of the Alps
and Pyrenees. Privations, poverty, and want,
are the school that forms good soldiers.
III.
Napoleon reached Nice on the 27th of March ;
the picture of the army which- general Scherer
laid before him, was even worse than any thing he
had been able to conceive. The supply of bread
was precarious, and no distributions of meat had
been made for a long time. There were no
means of conveyance but 500 mules ; it was use-
less to think of carrying above thirty pieces of
cannon. The state of affairs daily grew worse ;
there was not a moment to be lost; the army
could no longer subsist where it was : it was in-
dispensably requisite either to advance or to fall
back. Napoleon gave orders to advance, and
thus surprise the enemy in the very opening of
the campaign, and dazzle him by striking and de-
cisive successes. The head-quarters had never
been removed from Nice since the commence-
ment of the war : he instantly put them on their
M2 MEMOIRS or NAPOLEON.
march for Albenga. All the civil lists had long
considered themselves as permanently stationed,
and were innch more intent on procuring the
comforts of life for themselves than on supplying
the wants of the army. Napoleon reviewed the
troops, and addressed them thus : " Soldiers, you
" are naked and ill-fed ; government owes you
" much, and can give you nothing. The pa-
" tience and courage you have shewn in the midst
" of these rocks are admirable ; but they gain you
" no renown ; no glory results to you from your
" endurance. It is my intention to lead you into
" the most fertile plains in the world. Rich pro-
" vinces and great cities will be in your power ;
" there you will find honour, glory, and wealth.
" Soldiers of Italy, will you be wanting in cou-
«' rage or perseverance ?" This speech from a
young general of twenty-six, already renowned
for the operations of Toulon, Saorgio, and Cairo,
was received with eager acclamations.
For the purpose of turning the Alps and en-
tering Italy by the Col di Cadibona, it was ne-
cessary to collect the whole army on its extreme
right ; a dangerous operation, had not the snow
then covered all the debouches of the Alps. The
transition from the defensive to the offensive
order is one of the most delicate of military ope-
rations. Serrurier posted himself at Garessio
with his division to observe Colli's camps near
BATTLE OF Al ONTLN'OTT F . 143
Ceva; Massena and Augcrcau took positions
at Loano, Finale, and Savona. Laharpc was
placed so as to menace Genoa; his vanguard,
commanded by Brigadier-general Cervoni, occu-
pied Voltri. The French minister demanded of
the senate of Genoa a passage by the Bocchetta,
and the keys of Gavi, declaring that the French
wished to penetrate into Lombardy, and support
their operations on Genoa. This caused a great
bustle in the city : the councils placed them-
selves in permanence. The effects of these mea-
sures were also felt in Milan.
IV.
Beaulieu, greatly alarmed, hastened precipi-
tately to the aid of Genoa. He advanced his
head -quarters to Novi, and divided his army into
three corps : the right, composed of Piedmontese,
and commanded by Colli, whose head-quarters
were at Ceva, was ordered to defend the Stura
and Tanaro. The centre, under the command of
d'Argenteau fixed their head-quarters at Sasello,
and marched on Montenotte to intercept the
French army, during its march on Genoa, by
falling on its left flank, and cutting it off from the
road of laCorniche. Beaulieu in person marched
with his left, by the Bocchetta, on Voltri to cover
Genoa.
At first sight these dispositions appeared to be
144 Ml. .MO I ItS OF \ A POL FOX.
skilfully made ; but on a more attentive exami-
nation of local circumstances, it was discovered
that Beaulieu was dividing his forces, as no com-
munication was practicable between his centre
and his left, except round the back of the moun-
tains ; whilst the French army, on the contrary, was
stationed in such a manner as to be able to unite
in a few hours, and fall, in a mass, on either of
the enemy's corps; on the defeat of one of which
the other would be absolutely compelled to re-
treat. General d'Argenteau, commanding the
centre of the enemy's army, encamped at Lower
Montenotte, on the 10th of April; on the 11th
he marched on Montelegino, to debouch by la
Madonna on Savona. Colonel Rampon, who was
ordered to guard the three redoubts of Montele-
gino, having received intelligence of the enemy's
march, pushed forward a strong reconnoitring
party to meet him, which was driven back from
noon to two o'clock, when it regained the re-
doubts, which d'Argenteau attempted to carry by
assault. He was repulsed by Rampon in three
consecutive attacks ; and as his troops were fa-
tigued, he took up a position, intending to turn
the redoubts in the morning in order to reduce
them. Beaulieu debouched on Genoa on the
10th; he attacked General Cervoni, before Voltri,
the same day ; the latter defended his position
throughout the day, took up another on Mount
BATTLE OF MONTENOTTE. 145
la Fourche on the 11th, fell back in the course of
the evening and night, and rejoined his division,
that of Laharpe, which on the 12th before day-
light was in position in the rear of Rampon, on
Montelegino. During the night Napoleon march-
ed with Augereaus and Massena's divisions ; the
latter by the Col di Cadibona and by Castellazzo
debouched behind Montenotte. At day-break
on the 12th, d'Argenteau, surrounded on all sides,
was attacked in front by Rampon and Laharpe,
and in rear and flank by Massena's division ; the
rout of the enemy was complete ; they were all
killed, taken, or dispersed : four stand of colours,
five pieces of cannon, and 2000 prisoners were
the trophies of this day. During these occur-
rences Beaulieu presented himself at Voltri, but
found nobody there; he conferred, without im-
pediment, with the English admiral Nelson ; it
was not until the 13th that he heard of the loss
of the battle of Montenotte and the entrance of
the French into Piedmont. He was then obliged
to make his troops fall back precipitately, and
repass the bad roads into which the dispositions
he had made had led him. Such was the circuit
he was obliged to take, that two days elapsed be-
fore part of his troops could reach Millesimo,
and he was twelve days in evacuating his maga-
zines at Voltri and la Bocchetta, which compelled
him to leave troops there to protect them.
Memoirs. — vol. iii. l
146 Ml.MOIKS OF NAPOLEON'.
V.
On the 12th the head-quarters of the army
reached Carcari ; the Piedmontese had retreated
on Millesimo, and the Austrians on Dego. These
two positions were connected by a Piedmontese
brigade, which occupied the heights of Biestro :
at Millesimo the Piedmontese occupied both
sides of the road which covers Piedmont ; they
were joined by Colli, with all the force he could
muster from the right. At Dego the Austrians
occupied the position which defends the Acqui
road, the direct road to the Milanese : they were
joined by Beaulieu with all the force he could
bring from Voltri. In this position General Beau-
lieu was conveniently situated for receiving all
the reinforcements which Lombardy could afford
him : thus the two great openings into Piedmont
and the Milanese were covered. The enemy
was in hopes to fix and intrench himself there ;
for, advantageous as the battle of Montenotte had
been to the French, the superiority of the enemy
in number had enabled him to repair his losses.
But on the next day but one, the 14th, the
battle of Millesimo opened the two roads of
Turin and Milan. Augereau, forming the left,
marched on Millesimo ; Massena with the centre
advanced on Biestro and Dego ; and Laharpe
with the right proceeded by the heights of Cairo.
BATTLE OF MONTI'.NOTTE. 147
The French army thus occupied four leagues of
ground from right to left; the enemy had sup-
ported his right by causing the hill of Cossaria,
which commands both branches of the Bormida,
to be occupied. But on the 13th General Auge-
reau, whose troops had not engaged at the battle
of Montenotte, attacked the right of the enemy
with such impetuosity that he carried the de-
files of Millesimo, and surrounded the hill of
Cossaria. The Austrian general, Provera, with
his rear-guard 2000 strong, was cut off: in this
desperate condition, he resorted to a desperate
expedient ; he took refuge in an old ruined cas-
tle, where he barricaded himself. From its top
he saw the Sardinian army making dispositions
for the battle of the following day, and conceived
hopes of being extricated. Napoleon was sensi
ble of the urgent importance of gaining possession
of the castle of Cossaria in the course of the
13th, but this post was too strong; several at-
tacks failed : the next day the two armies en-
gaged. Massena and Laharpe carried Dego,
after an obstinate conflict ; Menard and Joubert
took the heights of Biestro. All Colli's attacks,
for the purpose of delivering Provera, were fruit-
less ; he was constantly beaten and closely pur-
sued : Provera, in despair, laid down his arms.
The enemy was briskly pursued into the gorges
of Spigno, on the Acqui road, by 400 men of the
l 2
148 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
22d chasseurs, 7th hussars, and 15th dragoons,
and left behind him thirty pieces of horse-artil-
lery, sixty ammunition waggons, fifteen stand of
colours, and 6000 prisoners, amongst whom were
two generals and twenty-four superior officers.
The General-in-chief was every where present at
the most decisive moments.
The separation of the Austrian and Sardinian
armies was thenceforth very evident. Beaulieu
removed his head-quarters to Acqui on the Mi-
lanese road ; and Colli proceeded to Ceva, to
oppose the junction of Serrurier, and to cover
Turin.
VI.
In the mean time Wukassowich's division of
Austrian grenadiers, which had been directed
from Voltri by Sassello, reached Dego at three
in the morning of the 15th of April. The posi-
tion was then occupied only by a few French
battalions : these grenadiers easily carried the
village, and occasioned great alarm at the French
head-quarters, where it was found difficult to
conceive how the enemy could be at Dego,
when the advanced posts stationed on the Acqui
road were undisturbed. Napoleon marched to
Dego, which place was retaken after a very hot
action of two hours, and nearly the whole of the
enemy's division were taken or killed. Adjutant-
BATTLE OF MONTENQTTE. 149
general Lanusse, who was afterwards a general of
division, and fell at the battle of Alexandria in
Egypt (in 1801), decided the victory, which for
a moment appeared doubtful. At the head of
two battalions of light troops, he climbed the left
side of the hill of Dego ; some battalions of Hun-
garian grenadiers hastened up to prevent their
reaching the summit : the two columns thrice
advanced and fell back again; but the third
time, Lanusse, placing his hat on the point of his
sword, boldly advanced and decided the victory.
This action, which took place in the sight of the
General-in-chief, obtained Lanusse the rank of
brigadier-general. Generals Causse and Bonnel
were killed ; they came from the Eastern Py-
renees ; the officers who had served in that
army always displayed remarkable courage and
impetuosity. It was at the village of Dego
that Napoleon, for the first time, took notice
of a lieutenant-colonel whom he made a colonel :
this was Lannes, who afterwards became a mar-
shal of the empire, and duke of Montebello, and
evinced the greatest talents : in the sequel he
will be constantly seen taking a most conspi-
cuous part in all events.
After the action at Dego, operations were
directed against the Piedmontese, and it was
thought sufficient to keep the Austrians in check.
Laharpe was placed in observation at the camp
J 50 M K MOl R 8 F N A POL J-O K .
of San-Benedetto on the Belbo ; Beaulieu was
so much weakened that he attempted nothing
more than to rally and organize the wreck of his
army. Laharpes division, being obliged to
remain several days in this position, suffered
through the scarcity of provisions, the want of
means of conveyance, and the exhausted state of
this country through the presence of so many
troops ; and this division abandoned itself to
some disorders.
Serrurier, having heard at Garessio of the
battles of Montenotte and Millesimo, occupied
the heights of San Giovanni di Murialto, and
entered Ceva on the same day that Augereau
arrived on the heights of Montezemoto. On the
17th, after a fruitless resistance, Colli evacuated
the intrenched camp of Ceva, repassed the Tana-
ro, and retreated behind the Corsaglia, occupying
la Madonna di Vico by his right. On the same
day the head-quarters were advanced to Ceva ;
the enemy having left there the artillery of his
camp, which he had not had time to carry off,
and contented himself with placing a garrison
in the fort.
The arrival of the army on the heights of Mon-
tezemoto was a sublime spectacle : from that
position the troops beheld the immense and fer-
tile plains of Piedmont ; the Po, the Tanaro,
and a multitude of other rivers meandered in the
BATTLE OF MONTENOTTE. 151
distance ; in the horizon a white girdle of snow
and ice bounded this rich valley of the promised
land. Those gigantic barriers, which appeared
the limits of another world, which nature had
delighted to render formidable, and on which
art had lavished all its resources, had fallen as
by enchantment. " Hannibal forced the Alps,"
said Napoleon, contemplating those mountains,
" and we have turned them." A happy expres-
sion, which in two words conveyed the idea
and principle of the campaign. The army
passed the Tanaro, and for the first time found
itself in the plains : the cavalry became neces-
sary ; General Stengel, who commanded it,
passed the Corsaglia at Lezegno on the right
bank of that river, near its junction with the
Tanaro.
VII.
On the 20th General Serrurier passed the
bridge of Saint-Michel to attack the right of
Colli's army, whilst Massena was passing the
Tanaro to turn his left : but Colli, sensible of
the danger of his position, had abandoned it
during the night, and was himself marching on
his right, to take position at Mondovi. By this
fortuitous circumstance, he arrived with his
forces before Saint-Michel, precisely at the
moment when Serrurier was debouching from
the bridge. He halted, opposed Serrurier with
152 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON,
superior numbers, and compelled him to fall
back. The French general would nevertheless
have maintained his ground in Saint-Michel, had
not one of his light infantry regiments taken to
pillage. He debouched on the 22d by the bridge
of Torre, Massena by that of Saint-Michel, the
General-in-chief by Lezegno. These three co-
lumns advanced on Mondovi: Colli had already
raised some redoubts and taken up a position
there, with his right on la Madonna di Vico,
and his left on la Bicoque. Serrurier carried
the redoubt of la Bicoque, and decided the
battle of Mondovi. This town and all its maga-
zines fell into the power of the victor. General
Stengel, who had advanced too far into the plain,
with a thousand horse, in pursuit of the enemy,
was attacked by the Piedmontese cavalry, which
was brave and in excellent condition. He made
every disposition that might be expected from a
consummate general, and was operating his re-
treat on his reinforcements, when, in a charge,
he received a mortal thrust and fell dead. Colo-
nel Murat, at the head of three regiments of
cavalry, repulsed the Piedmontese, and in his
turn pursued them for several hours. General
Stengel, a native of Alsace, was an excellent
hussar officer; he had served under Dumouriez,
and in the other campaigns of the North ; he was
adroit, intelligent, and active, combining the
BA'ITLE OF MONTENOTTF. 15^
qualities of youth with those of maturity ; he
was the true general for advanced posts. Two or
three days before his death, having been the first
to enter Lezegno, the General-in-chief arrived
some hours later, and found every thing he could
want ready. The defiles and fords had been
reconnoitred ; guides had been secured ; the
curate and post-master had been interrogated ;
an understanding had been entered into with
the inhabitants ; spies had been sent in seve-
ral directions ; the letters at the post-office
seized, and those which contained any military
information translated and analyzed; and all
proper measures taken for forming magazines of
provisions for the refreshment of the troops.
Stengel, unfortunately, was near-sighted, an es-
sential defect in his situation, and which proved
fatal to him.
The loss of the Piedmontese in this battle
amounted to 3000 men, eight pieces of cannon,
ten stand of colours, and 1500 prisoners, amongst
whom there were three generals. After the bat-
tle of Mondovi, the General-in-chief marched on
Cherasco, Serrurier advanced on Fossano, and
Augereau on Alba. Beaulieu had marched from
Acqui on Nezza-della-Paglia with half his army,
to make a diversion in favour of the Piedmon-
tese, but too late ; he fell back on the Po as soon
as he heard of the treaty of Cherasco.
154 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
VIII.
These three columns entered Cherasco, Fos-
sano, and Alba, all at the same time. Colli's
head-quarters were at Fossano ; Serrurier dis-
lodged him thence. Cherasco, at the junction of
the Stura and Tanaro, was a fortified place, but
ill armed, and unfurnished with stores, because
it was not a frontier place. This acquisition was
important ; not a moment was lost in putting it
in a state of defence ; its artillery-magazines con-
tained every thing necessary for the completion
of its armament. The French army passed the
Stura, and arrived before the little town of Bra.
Serrurier's junction had afforded the means of
communication with Nice by Ponte-di-Nave ;
and reinforcements of artillery, with all the stores
that could be got ready, arrived from thence. In
all these actions the army had enriched itself
with a great quantity of cannon and horses ;
many more of the latter were levied in the plain
of Mondovi : a few days after entering Cherasco,
the artillery could furnish sixty guns well sup-
plied and horsed. The soldiers, who had been
without distributions during the ten days of this
campaign, now received them regularly : pillage
and disorder, the usual attendants of rapid move-
ments, ceased ; discipline was restored ; the ap-
pearance of the army was speedily improved
BATTLE OF MONTENOTTE. 155
amidst the abundance and resources which this
fine country afforded ; besides, the losses had
not been so great as might have been supposed.
The rapidity of the movements, the impetuosity
of the troops, and, above all, the art of always
opposing them to the enemy in at least equal
numbers, and often superior, added to the con-
stant success obtained, had saved numbers of
men. These losses, moreover, were repaired,
soldiers arrived by every road from all the de-
p6ts and hospitals of the Riviera di Genoa, on
the mere report of the victories gained, and of
the abundance which the army enjoyed. The
condition of the French army had previously
been so wretched that it would almost be
rash to describe it ; for several years the pay
received by the officers had only been eight
francs per month ; and the staff had been en-
tirely on foot. Marshal Berthier preserved
amongst his papers an order of the day, dated
from Albenga, granting a gratification of three
louis to each general of division. Cherasco is
ten leagues from Turin, fifteen from Alessandria,
eighteen from Tortona, twenty-five from Genoa,
and twenty from Savona.
The Court of Sardinia no longer knew what
course to adopt; its army was discouraged and
partly destroyed ; the Austrian army no longer
thought of any thing but covering Milan.
15G MKMOIKS OF NAPOLEON.
Throughout Piedmont great agitation prevailed ;
the Court was far from enjoying the confi-
dence of the public ; it placed itself at Napo-
leon's discretion, and solicited an armistice.
Many persons would have preferred marching on
Turin ; but Turin was a fortified place ; heavy
cannon would have been requisite for forcing
its gates. The King still had a great number
of fortresses ; and notwithstanding the victories
which had just been gained, the slightest check,
the least caprice of fortune, might overturn every
thing. The two armies of the enemy were still,
taken together, superior to the French army,
notwithstanding the reverses they had sustained ;
they had a considerable train of artillery, and
their cavalry, in particular, had suffered no loss.
The French troops, in spite of their victories,
were alarmed ; they were struck with the mag-
nitude of the enterprise ; success appeared pro-
blematical when the feeble means that were to
produce it were considered ; they were disposed
to exaggerate the least reverse. There were
officers, and even generals, who could not con-
ceive how any one could dare to think of the
conquest of Italy with so little artillery, so bad a
cavalry, and so feeble an army, which sickness
and the distance from France would daily weaken
still more. Traces of these sentiments in the
army may be seen in the proclamation which the
BATTLE OF MONTE VOTTK. 157
General-in-chief addressed to his soldiers at
Cherasco.
" Soldiers, you have, in fifteen days, gained
" six victories, taken twenty-one stand of co-
" lours, fifty-five pieces of cannon, and several
" fortresses, and conquered the richest part of
"Piedmont; you have taken 15,000 prisoners,
" and killed or wounded upwards of 10,000 men.
" Hitherto you have fought for barren rocks,
" now celebrated through your valour, but use-
" less to the country ; but your services now
" equal those of the Armies of Holland and the
" Rhine. You were utterly destitute ; and you
" have supplied all deficiencies. You have
" gained battles without cannon, passed rivers
" without bridges, performed forced marches
" without shoes, and bivouacked without brandy,
" and often without bread. None but republican
" phalanxes, the soldiers of liberty, could have en-
" dured what you have; thanks be to you, soldiers,
" for your exertions. Your grateful country owes
" its prosperity to you ; and if the conquest of
f Toulon was an omen of the immortal cam-
" paign of 1793, your present victories foreshow
" one still more glorious. The two armies which
" lately attacked you with confidence now fly
" before you in consternation ; the perverse men
" who laughed at your distress, and inwardly
'? rejoiced at the triumphs of your enemies, are
158 MEMOIRS OF iVAPOLKON'.
" confounded and trembling. But, soldiers, you
" have yet done nothing, for there still remains
" much to do. Neither Turin nor Milan are
" yours; the ashes of the conquerors of Tarquin
" are still trodden under foot by the assassins of
" Basseville. It is said that there are some
" amongst you whose courage is enervated ; who
" would prefer returning to the summits of the
" Apennines and Alps! No, I cannot believe it.
*' The victors of Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego,
M and Mondovi, are eager to extend the glory of
" the French people !"
Conferences on the subject of a suspension of
hostilities were held at head-quarters in the house
of Salmatoris, then maitre-d'hotel to the King of
Sardinia, and afterwards prefect of the palace to
Napoleon. The Piedmontese General Latour,
and Colonel Lacoste were charged with the
King's powers. Count Latour was an old soldier,
a lieutenant-general in the Sardinian service,
decidedly hostile to all new ideas, of little infor-
mation, and but moderate capacity. Colonel
Lacoste, a native of Savoy, was in the prime of
life ; he expressed himself with facility, was a
man of talent, and made a favourable impression.
The conditions were : That the King should se-
cede from the coalition, and send a plenipoten-
tiary to Paris to treat for a definitive peace ; that
in the mean time there should be an armistice ;
BATTLE OF M0XTEX0TTE. 159
that Ceva, Coni, and either Tortona or Alessan-
dria, should immediately be surrendered to the
French army, with all their artillery and stores ;
that the army should continue to occupy all that
part of the country which was then actually in its
possession ; that a free communication should be
allowed by the military roads in all directions
from the army to France, and from France to the
army ; that Valenza should immediately be eva-
cuated by the Neapolitans, and placed in the
possession of the French general until he should
have effected the passage of the Po ; and lastly,
that the militia of the country should be dis-
banded, and the regular troops dispersed in the
garrisons so as to give no umbrage to the French
army.
From that moment the Austrians, left to them-
selves, might be pursued into the interior of
Lombardy. Part of the troops of the Army of
the Alps, which had now become disposable,
were about to descend into Italy. The line
of communication with Paris was shortened by
one half; and lastly, we had points of appui and
grand depots of artillery to form our battering
trains, and to besiege Turin itself, if the Direc-
tory should not accede to the peace.
100 MEMOIRS ok NAPOLEON.
IX.
The armistice being concluded, and the for-
tresses of Coni, Tortona, and Ceva occupied, it
became a subject of deliberation whether to
advance, and how far? It was allowed that the
armistice by which all the fortresses had fallen,
and the Piedmontese army had been separated
from that of Austria, was useful ; " But would it
'* not be still more advantageous to avail ourselves
" of the means already acquired, and to revolu-
" tionize Piedmont and Genoa completely, pre-
" viously to any farther advance? The French
** government possessed the right of refusing the
" negotiations proposed, and of declaring its will
" by an ultimatum. Would it not be impolitic
" to remove farther from France, and pass the
" Ticino, without securing the rear ? The kings
" of Sardinia, who have been so useful to France
" as long as they remained faithful, have likewise
" been the most effectual contributors to her re-
" verses when they changed their policy. At this
" time the disposition of that Court does not
" allow of the slightest misapprehension. The
" nobles and priests rule it ; they are the irre-
" concilable enemies of the republic. If we
" advance and suffer a defeat, what shall we not
" have to dread from their hatred and revenge?
" Even Genoa may well excite much anxiety.
BATTLE OF MONTENOTTF. 1G1
" The oligarchical system still predominates
" there; and however numerous the partisans of
" France may be, they are without influence in
" political decisions. The Genoese citizens may
" declaim as much as they please, but that is the
" extent of their power. The Oligarchs govern;
" they command the troops, and have at their
" disposal from eight to ten thousand peasants
" of Fontana-Bona and other valleys, whom they
" summon to their aid when they want them.
" Lastly, are we to stop after passing the Ticino,
" or to pass the Adda, the Oglio, the Mincio,
" the Adige, the Brenta, the Piave, the Taglia-
" mento, and the Isonzo ? Is it prudent to leave
" in our rear such a numerous and hostile popula-
" tion ? In order to proceed rapidly, is it not best
" to proceed deliberately, and to form points of
" support in every country we occupy, by chang-
" ing the government, and intrusting the admi-
" nistration to persons of the same principles
" and interests as ourselves t If we advanced
" into the Venetian countries, should we not
" oblige the Republic of Venice, which has
" 50,000 men at its disposal, to side with the
" enemy? "
To all this it was answered : " The French
" army ought to profit by its victory : it ought
" not to halt except on the best line of defence
" against the Austrian armies which will speedily
Memoirs. — vol. hi. m
162 MEMOIRS or NAPOLEON.
" debouch from the Tyrol and the Frioul. This
" line is the Adige : it covers all the valleys of
" the Po ; it cuts oft* lower and middle Italy; it
" insulates the fortified city of Mantua, which may
" probably be taken before the enemy's army
" can recover itself, and be in a situation to suc-
" cour it. It was through overlooking this princi-
u pie that Marshal Villars missed the whole object
'* of the war in 1733. He was at the head of
" 50,000 men assembled at the camp of Vigevano
" in October; there was no army before him,
" and he might have gone wherever he would.
" He confined himself to remaining in observa-
" tion of the Oglio, occupying positions on both
''sides of the Po; having thus lost the oppor-
" tunity, he never found another. Three months
u after, Mercy arrived in the Seraglio with an
" army. Marshal de Coigny, although at the
" head of a very superior army during the whole
" campaign of 1734, and victorious in two
" pitched battles, those of Parma and Guastalla,
" did not know how to take advantage of such
" great successes ; he manoeuvred alternately on
" the two banks of the Po. Had these generals
" been well acquainted w r ith the topography of
" Italy, Villars would have taken up a position
" on the Adige in the month of November, thus
" intercepting all Italy; and Coigny would have
" availed himself of his victories to hasten thither
" with all possible despatch.
BATTLE OF MONTEXOTTE. 1 G3
M On the Adige it is easy to provide for all the
" expenses of the army, because the burthen will
" be divided amongst a great population — that of
" Piedmont, Lombardy, the Legations of Bologna
" and Ferrara, and the Duchies of Parma and
" Modena. Is it feared that Venice will declare
" war against France 1 The best way of prc-
" venting her, is to carry the war, in a few days,
" into the midst of her states : she is not pre-
" pared for such an event ; she has not had time
" to levy troops and form resolutions ; the Senate
" must be prevented from deliberating. If the
" army remain on the right bank of the Ticino,
" the Austrians will force that republic to make
" common cause with them, or she will throw
" herself into their arms, under the influence of
" party spirit. The King of Sardinia is no longer
" formidable; his militia is disbanded; the Eng-
" lish will stop their subsidies; the domestic
" affairs of that country are in the worst state
" possible. Whatever course the court adopts,
" the number of malcontents will increase ; after
" fever comes debility. All his remaining forces
" do not amount to more than from fifteen to
" eighteen thousand men ; and these, dispersed
" through a great number of towns, will scarcely
" suffice to maintain internal tranquillity. Be-
" sides, the dissatisfaction of the Court of Vienna
" with the Cabinet of Turin will be constantly
m 2
KI4 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
" increasing : the latter will be reproached by
" Austria with having despaired of the common
" cause on the loss of a single battle. It was not
" thus that Victor Amadeus acted in 1705, after
" the victory gained by Vendome at Cassano,
" when Prince Eugene was driven back to the
" banks of lake Iseo, and when three French
" armies invaded all his dominions, even the
" county of Nice: he had nothing left but Turin ;
" yet he remained firm, and persisted in his al-
" liance with Austria. He was rewarded the
" following year by the battle of Turin, in which
" he re-conquered all his territories, in conse-
" quence of that most daring march by Prince
" Eugene, which it pleased fortune to crown
" with the most signal success.
" There is nothing to fear from the oligarchs of
" Genoa ; the best guarantee against them is to
" be found in the immense profits they make by
" their neutrality. It is wished to protect the
" principles of liberty in Piedmont and Genoa;
" but for that purpose a civil war must be kindled,
" the people must be excited to revolt against
" the nobles and priests ; and this course will in-
" cur the responsibility of all the excesses which
" such contests never fail to occasion. On the
" other hand, the army, on reaching the Adige,
" will command all the States of the house of
" Austria in Italy, and all those of the Pope on
BATTLE OK MOMENOTTL. J 6-3
" this side of the Apennines; it will be in a
" situation to proclaim the principles of liberty,
" and to excite Italian patriotism against the
" sway of foreigners. It will not be necessary
" to sow dissension between the various classes
" of citizens. Nobles, citizens, and peasants,
" will all be called on to exert themselves una-
" nimously for the restoration of the Italian na-
" tion. The word Italiam ! Italiam ! proclaimed
" at Milan, Bologna, and Verona, will produce a
" magical effect. But were it pronounced on
" the right bank of the Ticino, the Italians would
" say, Why do you not advance ?"
Colonel Murat, principal aide-de-camp, was
despatched to Paris with twenty-one stand of
colours and the treaty for the armistice of Che-
rasco. His arrival at Paris, by way of Mount
Cenis, with so many trophies and the King of
Sardinia's act of submission, caused great joy in
the capital, and excited the most lively enthu-
siasm. The aide-de-camp Junot, who had been
despatched after the battle of Millesimo by the
Nice road, arrived after Murat.
The province of Alba, the whole of which the
French occupied, was more hostile to the royal
authority than any other part of Piedmont, and
that which contained the greatest quantity of
revolutionary germs. Some disturbances had
already broken out, and others occurred at a
1GG MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
later period. If the French had wished to con-
tinue the war against the King of Sardinia, they
would have found the most aid and the greatest
disposition to insurrection in that province. Thus,
in fifteen days, the principal point of the plan of
the campaign was secured. Great results were
obtained; the Piedmontese fortresses of the Alps
had fallen ; the coalition was deprived of the aid
of a power which furnished from sixty to seventy
thousand men, and was still more important on
account of its situation. In the course of a month
from the commencement of this campaign, the
legislature five times decreed that the Army of
Italy had deserved well of its country ; in the
sittings of the 21st, 22d, 24th, 25th, and 2Gth of
April ; and each time for new victories.
According to the conditions of the armistice of
Cherasco, the King of Sardinia sent Count Revel
to Paris to treat for a definitive peace ; which
treaty he concluded and signed on the 15th of
May 1796. By this treaty the fortresses of Ales-
sandria and Coni were surrendered to the Army
of Italy ; Suza, la Brunette, and Exilles, were
demolished, and the Alps opened : thus the King
of Sardinia was placed at the mercy of the Re-
public, having no other fortified points than Turin
and Fort Bard.
CHAPTER VI.
BATTLE OF LODI.
I. Passage of the Po (May 7). — II. Action of Fombio (May 8).
— III. Armistice granted to the Duke of Parma (May 9). —
IV. Battle of Lodi (May 10).— V. Entrance into Milan (May
14). — VI. Armistice granted to the Duke of Modena (May
20). — VII. Bcrthier. — VIII. Massena. — IX. Augereau. —
X. Serrurier.
I.
The gates of the fortresses of Coni, Tortona,
and Mantua, were opened to the French in the
beginning of May. Massena marched with his
division to Alessandria, where he captured nu-
merous stores belonging to the Austrian army.
The head-quarters reached Tortona, by way of
Alba, Nizza-della.-Paglia, and the convent of Bos-
co. Tortona was a very fine fortress ; it was
abundantly provided with artillery and military
stores of all kinds. Beaulieu had retreated in
consternation beyond the Po to cover Milan ; he
intended to defend the passage of the Po, oppo-
site Valenza, and after that passage should be
108 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLKON.
forced, to dispute those of the Sesia and Ticino.
He stationed his troops on the left bank of the
Cogna, at the camp of Valeggio; he was there
reinforced by a reserve of ten battalions, which
made his army equal to the French force. In all
the military and political arrangements, Valenza
had been designated as the place where the
French would attempt the passage of the Po. In
the conferences at Cherasco this supposition had
been suffered to appear, though in a mysterious
manner. An article in the concluding part of
the armistice prescribed the surrender of that
town to the French, to enable them to effect
the passage of the river. Scarce had Massena
reached Alessandria when he pushed forward
parties in the direction of Valenza. Augercau
set out from Alba, and encamped at the mouth
of the Scrivia. Serrurier repaired to Tortona,
where Laharpe had arrived by the Acqui road.
The grenadiers of the army had been assembled
there to the number of 3500 ; they formed ten
battalions. With these choice troops, the cavalry,
and twenty-four pieces of cannon, Napoleon ad-
vanced by forced marches on Placenza, to sur-
prise the passage of the Po. The moment the
intended passage was unmasked, all the French
divisions abandoned their positions, and marched
with all possible speed on Placenza. On the
7th of May, at nine o'clock in the morning, he
BATTLE OF 1.01)1. 169
arrived before that town, having marched sixteen
leagues in thirty-six hours. He proceeded to
the bank of the river, where he remained until
the passage was effected, and the van was on
the opposite bank. The ferry-boat of Placenza
carried 500 men or 50 horses, and crossed in
half an hour. Colonel Andreossy of the artillery,
director of the bridges, and Adjutant-general
Frontin had taken, on the Po, between Castel-
Saint-Joane and Placenza, ten boats carrying
500 wounded men, and the pharmacy of the Aus-
trian army. Colonel Lannes passed first, with
900 grenadiers. Two squadrons of the enemy's
hussars in vain attempted to oppose their land-
ing. A few hours after, the whole of the van
was on the opposite side. In the night of the
7th the whole army arrived ; on the 9th the
bridge was completed. In the evening of the
7th, General Laharpe, commanding the grena-
diers, fixed his head- quarters at Emetri, between
Fombio and the Po. This river is very rapid at
Placenza ; it is two hundred and fifty toises in
breadth. The passage of rivers of such import-
ance is amongst the most critical of military
operations.
II.
Liptay's division of the Austrian army consist-
ing of eight battalions and eight squadrons,
170 MEMOIRS Of NAPOLEON.
having marched from Pavia, arrived during the
night at Fombio, one league from the bridge of
Placenza. On the 8th, in the afternoon, it was
discovered that the steeples and houses of the
village were embattled and filled with troops ;
and that cannon were planted on the roads,
which crossed some rice-fields. It became of
the utmost importance to dislodge the enemy
from Fombio. He might receive great reinforce-
ments ; it would have been much too dangerous
to be compelled to give battle with so large a
river in the rear. Napoleon gave orders for such
dispositions as the nature of the ground required.
Lannes attacked on the left ; Lanusse in the cen-
tre ; Dallemagne on the right : in one hour the
village was carried, and the Austrian division
which defended it routed, with the loss of their
cannon, 2500 prisoners, and three standards.
The wrecks of this corps threw themselves into
Pizzighettone, and there passed the Adda. A few
days before, the fortress of Pizzighettone had
not been put in a state of defence, and was con-
sidered so far from the theatre of war and from
all danger, that the enemy had not thought of it ;
but Liptay had time enough to raise the draw-
bridges and place some field-artillery on the
ramparts. The French van-guard halted at night
at the landing place of Malleo, at half cannon-
shot distance from Pizzighettone. Laharpe exe-
BATTLE OF LODI. 171
cuted a retrograde movement, in order to place
himself in advance of Codogno, and to cover the
roads to Pavia and Lodi. It had been ascertained
from the prisoners taken at Fombio, that Beau-
lieu was on his inarch to encamp with his army
behind Fombio. It was therefore possible that
some of his corps, not knowing what had taken
place in the afternoon, might advance to Co-
dogno to take up their quarters there ; and the
troops were instructed accordingly. After giving
orders for the most vigilant look-out, the General-
in-chief returned to his head-quarters at Pla-
cenza. During the night Massena passed the
Po, and placed himself in reserve at the head of
the bridge, to support Laharpe in case of need.
What had been foreseen took place : the march
of the troops from Tortona to Placenza, rapidly
as it was executed, had not been so secret but
that Beaulieu had received information of it.
He put all his troops in march to occupy the
country between the Ticino and the Adda, in
hopes of arriving opposite Placenza in time to
prevent the passage of the river ; he knew that
the French were unprovided with pontoons.
One of the regiments of cavalry which preceded
the column in which he was, presented itself at
General Laharpe's advanced posts, coming by
way of Pavia, and gave the alarm there. The
bivouacs were speedily under arms ; after a few
] 7'2 MEMOIRS ()1 NAPOLEON.
discharges they heard no more of the enemy ;
nevertheless Laharpe, folLowed by a piquet and
several officers, went forward to ascertain what
was the meaning of this attack, and to interro-
gate in person the inhabitants of the first farm-
houses on the road, who told him that this alarm
had been caused by a regiment of cavalry which
was ignorant that the French had passed the Po,
and that it had turned to the left to make for
Lodi. Laharpe returned to his camp. But, in-
stead of returning by the road by which the
troops had seen him set out, he unfortunately
took a by-path. The soldiers were on the
watch ; they received their general with a very
brisk fire of musquetry. Laharpe fell dead,
pierced by the bullets of his own soldiers. He
was a Swiss of the canton of Vaud. His hatred
of the government of Berne had exposed him to
persecutions, from which he had sought an
asylum in Fi ance. He was an officer of distin-
guished bravery ; a grenadier both in stature
and in courage ; he commanded his troops skil-
fully, and was much beloved by them, though of
an unquiet temper. It was remarked that during
the action of Fombio, throughout the evening
preceding his death, he had seemed very absent
and dejected ; giving no orders, appearing as it
were deprived of his usual faculties, and entirely
overwhelmed by a fatal presentiment. The news
BATTLE OF LODI. 173
of this melancholy event reached head-quarters
at four in the morning 1 . Berthier was instantly-
sent to this division of the vanguard, and found
the troops in the greatest affliction.
III.
On entering the states of Parma, Napoleon
received, at the passage of the Trebbia, envoys
from the prince, requesting peace and his pro-
tection. The Duke of Parma was of no political
importance ; the seizure of his states could be
of no advantage. Napoleon left him in posses-
sion of the government, imposing on him, as the
conditions of the armistice, all the sacrifices of
which his states were capable. Thus every
benefit was obtained from them, without the
trouble of undertaking the administration ; this
was the wisest and simplest course. On the
morning of the 9 th, the armistice was signed at
Placenza. The duke paid two millions in money,
furnished the magazines of the army with a great
quantity of hay, wheat, &c, supplied sixteen
hundred horses for the artillery and cavalry, and
engaged to defray the expenses of all the military
routes, and the hospitals which should be estab-
lished in his states. It was on this occasion that
Napoleon imposed a contribution of works of
art for the Museum at Paris ; being the first
instance of the kind that occurs in modern
174 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
history. Parma furnished twenty pictures, chosen
by the French Commissioners, amongst which
was the famous Saint-Jerome. The duke offered
two millions to be allowed to keep this picture ;
the opinion of the army-agents was decidedly in
favour of the acceptance of the money. The
General-in-chief said that there would very soon
be nothing left out of the two millions proposed ;
whilst the possession of such a masterpiece by
the city of Paris would be ornamental to that
capital, and would produce other chefs-d'crnvre
of art.
The city of Parma is situate thirty leagues from
the gulf of Rapalo in the Mediterranean, at the
same distance from the mouths of the Po in the
Adriatic ; sixty leagues from the mouth of the Var,
the western frontier of Italy on the French side ;
twenty-five leagues from the Isonzo, the east-
ern frontier of Italy, and boundary of that coun-
try towards Germany ; sixty leagues south from
the pass of the Saint-Gothard, the boundary of
Switzerland ; two hundred and ten leagues from
the Ionian sea ; twenty leagues from Spezia, and
four leagues from the Po. Its population was
40,000 souls. Its citadel was in a bad condition.
The duchies of Parma, Placenza, and Guastalla,
were possessed by the house of Farnese. Eliza-
beth, wife of Philip V., heiress of that house,
brought these duchies into the house of Spain.
BATTLK OF LODI. 17.0
Don Carlos, his son, possessed them in 1714, who
being afterwards called to the throne of Naples,
these duchies passed to the house of Austria, in
1748, by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle ; the in-
fant Don Philip was invested with them, whose
son Ferdinand succeeded him in 17G2. He was
Condillac's famous pupil, and died in 1802. He
inhabited the castle of Colorno, surrounded with
monks, and occupied with the most minute and
rigid observance of religious practices.
IV.
The army levied four hundred artillery horses
in the eity of Placenza. On the 10th it marched
from Casal-Pusterlengo on Lodi, where Beaulieu
had effected the junction of Sebottendorf s and
Roselmini's divisions, and had directed Colli and
Wukassowich on Milan and Cassano. The fate
of these last troops depended therefore on ra-
pidity of marching. They might be cut off from
the Oglio, and made prisoners ; but within a
league of Casal the French army met with a
strong rear-guard of Austrian grenadiers, posted
in an advantageous position, defending the Lodi
road. It became necessary to manoeuvre, which
was performed with the utmost ardour, the ene-
my resisting with all the obstinacy which cir-
cumstances required ; at length his ranks fell
into disorder, and he was hotly pursued even
176 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON".
into the town of Lodi. This place was walled ;
the enemy attempted to close the gates, but the
French soldiers entered pell-mell with the fugi-
tives, who rallied behind the line of battle, which
Beaulicu had taken up on the left bank of the
Adda. This general unmasked from five and
twenty to thirty pieces of cannon to defend the
bridge ; the French immediately opposed a like
number to him. The strength of the Austrian
line was 12,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, which,
with the 10,000 who were retreating on Cassano,
the 8000 who had been beaten at Fombio, and
the remains of whom had retreated to Pizzighet-
tone, and the 2000 of the garrison of the castle
of Milan, made up about 35 or 36,000 men, being
all that remained of the Austrian army.
Napoleon, in hopes of cutting off the division
which was marching by Cassano, resolved to
pass the bridge of the Adda the same day, under
the enemy's fire, and to astonish them by so
daring an operation. Accordingly, after a few
hours' rest at Lodi, about five o'clock in the
evening, he ordered General Beaumont, com-
manding the cavalry, to pass the Adda half a
league above the town, where there was a ford
which was then practicable ; and as soon as he
should reach the opposite side, to open a can-
nonade on the right flank of the enemy with a
battalion of light artillery. At the same time he
BATTLE OF LODI. 177
placed at the debouche of the bridge and on the
right bank all the disposable artillery of the
army, directing it against the enemy's guns
which enfiladed the bridge ; he formed the gre-
nadiers in close column behind the rampart of
the town on the edge of the Adda, where it was
nearer the enemy's batteries than the line of the
Austrian infantry itself, (which had withdrawn to
a distance from the river to take advantage of a
rise in the ground which sheltered it from the
balls of the French batteries,) and when he per-
ceived the fire of the enemy's artillery slacken,
he ordered the charge to be beaten. The head
of the column, by a mere wheel to the left,
reached the bridge, which it crossed at a running
step, in a few seconds, and instantly took the
enemy's cannon ; the column was only exposed
to the enemy's fire at the moment of wheeling to
the left to pass the bridge. It accordingly
reached the opposite side in a twinkling, without
any sensible loss, fell on the enemy's line, broke
it, and forced him to retreat on Crema in the
greatest disorder, with the loss of his artillery,
several stand of colours, and 2500 prisoners.
This vigorous operation, conducted, under such
a murderous fire, with all suitable prudence, has
been regarded by military men as one of the
most brilliant actions of the war. The French
did not lose above 200 men ; the enemy was
Mtmoirs. — vol. hi. n
178 MFMOIKs Off BTAPOLEON.
destroyed. But Colli and Wukassowich had
passed the Adda at Cassano, and were retreat-
ing by the Brescia road, which determined the
French to march on Pizzighettone ; they consi-
dered it important to drive the enemy instantly
from that fortress, before he should have time to
put it in a state of defence and victual it ; it was
scarcely invested when it surrendered ; it con-
tained 300 men, whom the enemy sacrificed to
facilitate his retreat. Napoleon, in his nightly
rounds, fell in with a bivouac of prisoners, in
which was an old garrulous Hungarian officer,
whom he asked how matters went with them :
the old captain could not deny but that they
went on badly enough ; " but," added he, " there
" is no understanding it at all ; we have to do
" with a young general, who is this moment be-
" fore us, the next behind us, then again on our
"flanks; one does not know where to place
" oneself. This manner of making war is insuf-
" ferable, and against all usage and custom."
The French cavalry entered Cremona after a
brilliant charge, and pursued the Austrian rear-
guard as far as the Oglio.
V.
No French troops had yet entered Milan, al-
though that capital was several days' march in
the rear of the army, which had posts at Cre-
BATTLE OF LQDI. 170
mona. But the Austrian authorities had aban-
doned it, and taken refuge in Mantua. The
town was guarded by the national guards. The
municipality and the states of Lombardy sent a
deputation to Milan, with Melzi at its head, to
make a protest of their submission, and implore
the clemency of the victor. It was in memory of
this mission that the King of Italy afterwards
created the duchy of Lodi, in favour of Melzi.
On the 15th of May the victor made his entrance
into Milan under a triumphal arch, amidst an
immense population, and the numerous national
guard of the city, clothed in the three colours,
green, red, and white. At the head of this corps
was the duke of Serbelloni, whom the members
had chosen for their commander. Augereau retro-
graded to occupy Pavia ; Serrurier occupied Lodi
and Cremona ; and Laharpe's division Como,
Cassano, Lucca, and Pizzighettone, which place
was armed and victualled.
Napoleon addressed the following order of the
day to his men: " Soldiers, you have rushed
" like a torrent from the top of the Apennines,
" you have overthrown and dispersed all that
'* opposed your march. Piedmont, delivered from
" Austrian tyranny, indulges her natural senti-
" ments of peace and friendship towards France.
" Milan is yours; and the republican flag waves
" throughout Lombardy. The dukes of Parma
N 2
180 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
" and Modena are indebted for their political
" existence only to your generosity. The army
" which so proudly threatened you, can now
" find no barrier to protect it against your cou-
" rage; neither the Po, the Ticino, nor the Adda
" could stop you a single day : these vaunted bul-
" warks of Italy opposed you in vain ; you passed
" them as rapidly as thp Apennines. These
" great successes have filled the heart of your
"country with joy; your representatives have
" ordered a festival to commemorate your vic-
" tories, which has been held in every commune
" of the Republic. There your fathers, your
" mothers, your wives, sisters and mistresses,
" rejoiced in your victories, and proudly boasted
" of belonging to you. Yes, soldiers, you have
" done much. — But remains there nothing more
" to perform ? — Shall it be said of us that we
" knew how to conquer, but not how to make
" use of victory ? Shall posterity reproach us
" with having found Capua in Lombard y ? — But
et I see you already hasten to arms. An effenii-
" nate repose is tedious to you ; the days which
" are lost to glory, are lost to your happiness.
" Well then ! let us set forth, we have still forced
" marches to make, enemies to subdue, laurels
" to gather, injuries to avenge. Let those who
" have sharpened the daggers of civil war in
" France, who have basely murdered our minis-
BATTLE OF LODI. 181
" ters, and burnt our ships at Toulon, tremble !
" The hour of vengeance has struck : but let the
" people of all countries be free from apprehen-
" sion ; we are the friends of the people every
" where, and more particularly of the descend-
" ants of Brutus and Scipio, and the great men
" whom we have taken for our models. To
" restore the Capitol, to replace there the statues
" of the heroes who rendered it illustrious, with
" suitable honours, to awaken the Roman peo-
" pie, stupefied by several ages of slavery — such
" will be the fruit of our victories ; they will
" form an historical era for posterity : you will
" have the immortal glory of changing the face
" of the finest part of Europe. The French peo-
" pie, free, and respected by the whole world,
V will give to Europe a glorious peace, which
" will indemnify her for the sacrifices of every
" kind which for the last six years she has been
" making. You will then return to your homes,
" and your countrymen will say, as they point
" you out, ' He belonged to the Army of Italy.' '
The army spent six days of rest in improving
its materiel; nothing was spared to complete the
trains of artillery. Piedmont and the Parmesan
had afforded great resources, but those found in
Lombardy were much more considerable, and
furnished the means of discharging the arrears of
pay, supplying all the wants of the troops, and
182 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
establishing regularity in the different branches
of the service.
Milan is situate in the midst of one of the rich-
est plains in the world, between the Alps, the
Po, and the Adda, thirty-two leagues from the
summit of the Alps at the pass of the Saint-Go-
thard ; eight leagues from the Po, six from the
Ticino, six from the Adda, forty-three from
Mount Cenis, twenty-eight from Genoa, twenty-
eight from Turin, twenty-nine from Parma,
and fifty-six from Venice. Its population was
120,000 souls; its circumference 10,000 toises ;
it had ten gates, one hundred and forty
convents of men and women, and a hundred
confraternities. The cathedral is the finest and
most vaunted in Italy, next to St. Peter's at
Rome ; it is faced with white marble, was begun
by Galeasso in 1300, and finished in 1810 by
Napoleon. The hospital, the Ambrosian library,
and a great number of fine palaces, adorn this
city. The Naviglio forms its communication
with the Ticino and the Adda ; their waters unite
in Milan by means of six locks. Another canal
was constructed during the existence of the
kingdom of Italy, to join Pavia and Milan, esta-
blish a direct communication with the Bp, and
facilitate intercourse with Genoa. The convey-
ance of goods from that city was effected by
wheel-carriages as far as Cam bio on the Po,
BATTLE OK LODI. 183
where they were embarked on that river, went
by the lower Ticino to Pavia, and were there
unloaded for Milan : but by means of the new
canal they now proceed thence by water as far
as Milan, whence they are again forwarded on
the Adda. Milan was founded by the Gauls of
Autun in the year 580 before the Christian era.
This city has been besieged forty times, and
twenty times taken. Its citadel was built on
the ruins of the Palace of the Visconti ; every
thing there reminds one of Saint-Ambrose and
Saint-Charles Borromeo. Under the Roman
empire, Milan was the capital of Cisalpine Gaul.
It was afterwards the capital of the kingdom of
the Ostrogoths; was at the head of the league
of the Lombard Republics in the 11th century;
afterwards the strong hold of the Guelphs during
the 12th and 13th centuries. Otho Visconti, one
of the archbishops of Milan, favoured by the
Guelphs, usurped the sovereignty, which the
Visconti retained until 1450, when that family
became extinct. The natural heiress, Valentina
Visconti, wife of the duke of Orleans, who
was assassinated by the duke of Burgundy, the
grandfather of Louis XII., brought that duchy
to the house of France. The Condottiere Fran-
cesco Sporza succeeded the Visconti. Louis
XII. took possession of Milan in 1508, and it
remained under the government of France until
184 ME MO IKS OF NAPOLEON.
1526, when Charles V. seized it, and bestowed
it on Philip II. The kings of Spain possessed
it until 1714, when it passed to the house of
Austria, to which it still belonged in 179G.
Milan was the capital of Austrian Lombardy,
which was divided into seven provinces ; those
of Milan, Pavia, Varese, Como, Lodi, Cremona,
and Mantua. Lombardy had its particular pri-
vileges : the Emperor of Austria kept a prince
of the blood there as governor-general, and con-
fided most affairs of importance to his chief
minister. The states of Lombardy were com-
posed of deputies from the seven provinces, and
were frequently in opposition to the governor-
general and the Austrian minister. Amongst these
deputies Count Melzi enjoyed the greatest cre-
dit, through his talents, patriotism, and integrity.
He was afterwards president of the Italian re-
public, and chancellor of the kingdom of Italy.
He was sincerely devoted to his country, and
to the idea of the independence of Italy. His
family was considered at Milan as one of those
distinguished by nobility and wealth. On the
liberation of Italy, green, white, and red be-
came the national colours ; national guards were
established in all the towns. Serbelloni, the
senior colonel of those of Milan, was the greatest
landholder in the country ; he enjoyed great
popularity, and a very considerable fortune.
BATTLE OF LOO I. 185
He was afterwards well known at Paris, where
he long resided as ambassador from the Cisalpine
republic. At Milan, as in all the great towns
of Italy, and perhaps throughout Europe, the
French Revolution at first excited the most lively-
enthusiasm, and found partisans every where ;
but at a later period, the hideous scenes acted
during the Reign of Terror, dissipated these fa-
vourable sentiments. Yet revolutionary ideas
still had warm partizans at Milan; the mass
of the people was allured by the attraction of
equality. The Austrians, notwithstanding their
protracted rule, had not inspired the people of
Lombardy with any feelings of attachment, with
the exception of a few noble families; they were
generally disliked on account of their pride and
the rudeness of their manners. The governor-
general, the archduke Ferdinand, was neither
beloved nor esteemed ; he was accused of being
fond of money, of influencing the government in
favour of depredations, of speculating in wheat,
and other offences of this kind, which are always
very unpopular. He was married to the princess
Beatrice d'Este, daughter and heiress of the last
duke of Modena, then reigning.
The citadel of Milan was in a good state of
defence, and well supplied with provisions.
Beaulieu had left in it a garrison of 2500 men.
The French general Despinois was intrusted
186 M KM OIKS OK NAPOLEON.
with the command of Milan and the blockade of
the citadel. The artillery department formed
the besieging train by drawing the guns and
military stores from the Piedmontese fortresses
occupied by French garrisons, namely, Tortona,
Alessandria, Coni, Ceva, and Cherasco.
VI.
The three duchies of Modena, Reggio and
Mirandola, on the right bank of the lower Po,
were governed by the last prince of the house of
Este, a covetous old man, whose only pleasure
was to amass gold. He was despised by his
subjects. On the approach of the French, he
sent the commander d'Este, his natural brother,
to solicit an armistice and Napoleon's protection.
The city of Modena was surrounded by a Avail
with bastions, and had a well-furnished arsenal ;
its military establishment was 4000 men. This
prince was of no political importance ; he was
treated in the same manner as the duke of Parma,
and without regard to his consanguinity to the
house of Austria. The armistice was concluded
and signed at Milan on the 20th of May. He
paid ten millions, gave horses and provisions of
all kinds, and a certain number of works of art.
He sent plenipotentiaries to Paris to treat for
peace, but it was not concluded ; the negotia-
tions went on slowly, and were at last broken off.
BATTLE OF I.ODI. 1 S7
Wishing to place his treasures in security, he
sought an asylum at Venice, where he died in
1798. On his death the house of Este, so famous
in the middle ages, and celebrated with so much
taste and genius by Ariosto and Tasso, became
extinct. His daughter, the princess Beatrice,
wife of the archduke Ferdinand, was the mother
of the Empress of Austria, who died in 1816.
The successive arrivals of the news of the pas-
sage of the Po, the battle of Lodi, the occupation
of Lombardy, and the armistices concluded with
the dukes of Parma and Modena, so intoxicated
the Directory, that it adopted the fatal plan of
dividing the Army of Italy into two armies.
Napoleon, with 20,000 men, was to pass the Po,
and march on Rome and Naples ; and Kellerman,
with the other 20,000, was to command on the
left bank of the Po, and to cover the siege of
Mantua. Napoleon, indignant at this piece of
ingratitude, sent in his resignation, refusing to
be instrumental to the destruction of the Army
of Italy and of his brethren in arms. He de-
clared that all the men who should penetrate
deep into the Peninsula would be lost ; that the
principal army, intrusted to Kellerman, would
be inadequate to maintain its ground, and would
be compelled to repass the Alps in a few weeks.
One bad general, said he, is better than two good
ones. The government became sensible of its
188 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLKON.
error, and recalled its liberticidal decrees ; and
from that time interfered no farther with the
Army of Italy than merely to approve whatever
Napoleon did or projected.
VII.
Berthier was then about forty-two years of
age. His father, a geographical engineer, had
had the honour of seeing Louis XV. and Louis
XVI. occasionally, being employed to draw
plans of the chases, and these princes being fond
of pointing out the errors they discovered in the
plans, on their return from hunting. Berthier,
in his youth, served in the American war as
lieutenant-adjoint to Rochambeau's staff; he
was a colonel at the period of the Revolution,
and commanded the National Guard of Versailles,
where he strongly opposed Lecointre's party.
Being employed in la Vendee as quarter-master-
general of the revolutionary armies, he was
wounded there. After the 9th of Thermidor he
was quarter-master-general to General Keller-
man, in the Army of the Alps, and followed him
to the Army of Italy. He it was who caused
the army to take the line of Borghetto, which
stopped the enemy. When Kellerman returned
to the Army of the Alps, he took Berthier with
him ; but when Napoleon took the command of
the Army of Italy, Berthier solicited and ob-
BATTLK OF LOIM. 1^0
tained the place of quarter-master-general, in
which capacity he constantly followed Napoleon
in the campaigns of Italy and Egypt. He was
afterwards minister at war, major-general of the
grand army, and prince of Nenfchatel and Wa-
gram. He married a Bavarian princess, and was
loaded with favours by Napoleon. His activity
was extraordinary ; he followed his general in
all his reconnoitring parties and all his excursions,
without in the least neglecting his official duties.
He was of an irresolute character, unfit for a
principal command, but possessed of all the
qualifications of a good quarter-master-general.
He was well acquainted with the map, understood
the reconnoitring duty perfectly ; attended per-
sonally to the despatch of orders ; and was
thoroughly trained to presenting the most com-
plicated movements of an army with perspicuity.
There was an attempt made, at first, to disgrace
him with his general, by describing him as Na-
poleon's Mentor, and asserting that it was he
who directed operations ; but this did not suc-
ceed. Berthier did all in his power to silence
these reports, which rendered him ridiculous in
the army. After the campaign of Italy, he had
the command of the army ordered to take pos-
session of Rome, where he proclaimed the
Roman republic.
190 MKMOIIiS OF XAPOI.KOV.
VIII.
Massena was born at Nice, and entered the
French service in the Royal Italian regiment ;
he was an officer at the commencement of the
Revolution. He advanced rapidly, and became a
general of division. In the Army of Italy, he
served under the generals in chief Dugommier,
Dumorbion, Kellerman, and Scherer. He was
of a hardy constitution, and an indefatigable
character ; night and day on horseback amongst
rocks and mountains, the warfare peculiar to
which he was particularly acquainted with. He
was resolute, brave, intrepid, full of ambition
and pride ; his distinguishing characteristic was
obstinacy; he was never discouraged. He neg-
lected discipline, and took little care of the
affairs of the army, for which reason he was not
much beloved by the soldiers. He used to
make very indifferent dispositions for an attack.
His conversation was uninteresting; but on the
report of the first cannon, amongst balls and
dangers, his ideas gained strength and clearness.
If defeated, he began again as if he had been
victorious. After the campaign of Italy, he was
commissioned to carry the preliminaries of Leo-
ben to the Directory. During the campaign of
Egypt, he was commander-in-chief of the army
of Helvetia, and saved the Republic by winning
BATTLE OK l.UDI. 191
the battle of Zurich. lie was afterwards a Mar-
shal, duke of Rivoli, and prince of Essling.
IX.
Augereau, who was born in the faubourg Saint-
Marceau, was a Serjeant when the Revolution
broke out. He must have been a distinguished
sub-officer, for he was selected to go to Naples
to instruct the Neapolitan troops. He at first
served in La Vendee. He was made a general in
the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees, where he com-
manded one of the principal divisions. On the
peace with Spain he led his division to the Army
of Italy, and served in all the campaigns of that
army, under Napoleon, who sent him to Paris on
the occasion of the 18th of Fructidor. The
Directory afterwards gave him the chief com-
mand of the Army of the Rhine. He was inca-
pable of conducting himself in this capacity,
being uninformed, of a narrow intellect, and
little education ; but he maintained order and
discipline amongst his soldiers, and was beloved
by them. His attacks were regular, and made in
an orderly manner ; he divided his columns judi-
ciously, placed his reserves with skill, and fought
with intrepidity : but all this lasted but a day ;
victor or vanquished, he was generally disheart-
ened in the evening; whether it arose from the
peculiarity of his temper, or from the deficiency
192 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
of his mind in foresight and penetration. In
politics he was attached to Babceuf s party, that
of the most decided anarchists, and he was sur-
rounded by a great number of them. He was
nominated a deputy to the Legislative Body in
1798, engaged in the intrigues of the Manege,
and frequently made himself ridiculous. The
members of that society were not devoid of infor-
mation ; nobody could be less adapted than Au-
gereau for political discussions and civil affairs,
with which, however, he was fond of meddling.
Under the empire, he became duke of Casti-
glione and Marshal of France.
X.
Serrurier was a native of the department of the
Aisne ; and at the commencement of the Revo-
lution was a major of infantry : he retained all
the formality and strictness of a major : was very
severe in point of discipline, and passed for an
aristocrat, in consequence of which opinion he
ran great risks in the midst of the camps, espe-
cially during the first few years. He gained the
battle of Mondovi, and took Mantua, and had the
honour of seeing Marshal Wurmser file off before
him. He was a brave man, of great personal
intrepidity, but not fortunate. He had less ener-
gy than the other two, but excelled them by the
morality of his character, the soundness of his
BATTLE OF LODI. 193
political opinions, and the stfict integrity he ob-
served in all his intercourse. He had the honour-
able commission to carry the colours taken from
Prince Charles to the Directory. He was after-
wards made a Marshal of France, governor of the
Invalides, and a senator.
Memoirs. — vol. Ill,
CHAPTER VII.
REVOLT OF PAVIA.
I. The army quits its cantonments to take up the line of the
Adige. — II. Revolt of Pavia (May 21). — III. Taking and
sack of Pavia (May 26). — IV. Causes of this revolt. — V.
The army enters the territories of the Republic of Venice
(May 28). — VI. Battle of Borghetto ; passage of the Mincio
(May 30). — VII. The army arrives on the Adige (June 8).
— VIII. Description of Mantua. — IX. Blockade of Mantua
(June 4). — X. Armistice with Naples (June 5).
I.
On the opening of the campaign, the city of
Mantua was disarmed. The Court of Vienna
was in hopes that its army would assume and
preserve the offensive : it calculated on victories,
not on defeats ; and it was not until after the
treaty of Cherasco, that it ordered Mantua and
the fortresses of Lombardy to be armed and vic-
tualled. Some military men have been of opinion
that if the French army, instead of taking up
cantonments in the Milanese, had continued its
march to drive Beaulieu beyond the Adige,
REVOLT Or PA VI A. 195
Mantua would have been surprised : but it would
have been against all principle to leave so many
large towns and a population of more than a mil-
lion of inhabitants behind, without taking posses-
sion of the former, and ascertaining the dispo-
sitions of the latter. The French remained only
seven or eight days in Lombardy. On the 27th
of May all the cantonments were raised. These
few days had been well employed ; the French
dominion was secured by the national guards
formed in all the towns of Lombardy, the change
of all the public authorities, and the new organi-
zation of the country. General Despinois took
the command of Milan ; a brigade invested the
citadel ; the divisions of infantry and cavalry
formed small depots of convalescents and wearied
men, who kept garrison in the most important
points ; the depdt of Augereau's division, 300
strong, was collected in the citadel of Pavia, and
seemed a sufficient force to guard that city and
the bridge over the Ticinc.
II.
On the 24th the head-quarters were fixed at
Lodi. Two hours after the arrival of the General-
in-chief at that place, he was informed of the in-
surrection of Pavia, and of all the villages of that
province, which Augereau's division had quitted
on the 20th. A slight commotion had even taken
n 9
19G MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
place at Milan. He instantly set out again for
that capital with 300 horse, six pieces of ar-
tillery, and a battalion of grenadiers. He ar-
rived there the same evening, and found tran-
quillity restored. The garrison of the citadel,
which had made a sortie to favour this revolt, had
returned within its ramparts ; the mobs had en-
tirely dispersed. He proceeded to Pavia, sending
on the archbishop of Milan before him, and des-
patching agents in all directions with proclama-
tions for the information of the peasants. This
archbishop was an old man of eighty, of the
house of Visconti, respectable for his age and
character, but without talent or reputation; his
mission was wholly fruitless ; he persuaded no-
body. The insurgents of Pavia, who were to
have joined the garrison of the castle of Milan,
had pushed a vanguard of 800 men as far as
Binasco. Lannes attacked it : Binasco was
taken, pillaged, and burnt : it was hoped that
-the conflagration, which was visible from the
walls of Pavia, would over-awe that city. This
was by no means the case; 8 or 10,000 pea-
sants had entered the town, and made them-
selves masters of it; they were led by some tur-
bulent individuals and agents of Austria, who
cared little for the misfortunes of the country,
and, in case of failure, had secured means of
reaching Switzerland. In the evening the fol-
REVOLT OF PAVIA. 107
lowing proclamation was published in Milan,
and was posted, during the night, on the gates
of Pavia: "A misled multitude, destitute of all
" effectual means of resistance, is committing
" the greatest excesses in several communes,
" disregarding the republic, and defying the
" army which has triumphed over kings ;
" this unaccountable delirium deserves pity ;
" these poor people are led astray and allured
" to their destruction. The General-in-chief,
" faithful to the principle adopted by his Nation
" of not making war upon the people, is willing
" to leave a door open to repentance ; but after
" twenty-four hours, those who shall not have
" laid down their arms shall be treated as rebels ;
" their villages shall be burnt. Let the terrible
" example of Binasco induce them to open
" their eyes ! its fate will be that of every com-
" mune that persists in the revolt."
III.
On the 26th the French column left Binasco,
and reached Pavia at four in the afternoon ;
the gates were closed. The French garrison
had capitulated ; the insurgents had for several
hours been masters of the citadel ; this success
had emboldened them. It seemed a difficult
thing, with only 1500 men and six field-pieces,
to gain possession of a city containing 30,000
IDS MKMOIIts OK NAPOLEON.
souls in a state of insurrection, enclosed within
a wall, and even an ancient rampart with bas-
tions, in very bad condition, it is true, but not
to be taken by a coup de main. The tocsin was
sounding throughout the adjacent country ; the
least retrograde step would have increased the
evil and rendered it necessary to recall the army
which had reached the Oglio. Under these
circumstances temerity was the dictate of pru-
dence ; Napoleon risked the attack. The six
pieces of artillery continued firing a long time,
for the purpose of battering down the gates,
but without success ; the grape and shells,
however, dislodged the peasants posted on the
walls, and enabled the grenadiers to break
down the gates with axes. They entered at
the charge, debouched on the square, and lodged
themselves in the houses at the tops of the
streets. A troop of cavalry proceeded to the
bridge of the Ticino, and made a successful
charge; the peasants were fearful of being cut
off, fled from the city, and gained the fields ;
the cavalry pursued them, and sabred a great
number of them. The magistrates and principal
inhabitants, with the archbishop of Milan and
the bishop of Pavia at their head, then came
to implore pardon. The 300 French who had
been taken prisoners in the citadel, liberated
themselves during this tumult, and came to the
REVOLT OF PA VI A. 199
square unarmed, and in bad plight. The Gene-
ral's first impulse was to have this garrison
decimated. ''Cowards," said he, "I intrust-
" ed you with a post essential to the safety
" of the army, and you have abandoned it to
" a mob of wretched peasants, without offer-
" ing the least resistance." The captain com-
manding this detachment was arrested. He
was a weak man, and attempted to justify him-
self by an order given by General Haquin. The
latter was coming from Paris ; he had been
stopped by the insurgents whilst changing horses
at the post-house ; they had clapped a pistol
to his breast, threatening him with death unless
he caused the citadel to surrender, He per-
suaded the garrison of the fort to deliver it up.
But the guilt of General Haquin, however great,
could not justify the commandant of the fort,
who was, in no respect, under his command ;
and even if he had been so, ought to have ceased
to obey, the moment the general was made
prisoner ; this captain was accordingly delivered
over to a council of war, and shot. The confu-
sion in the city was extreme. Fires were al-
ready lighted to set several quarters in flames ;
but compassion prevailed. The pillage, never-
theless, lasted several hours ; but occasioned
more fear than damage : it was confined to some
goldsmiths' shops ; but report exaggerated the
*200 MEMOIRS OK NAPOLEON'.
losses suffered by the city, which was a salutary
lesson for all Italy. Light columns were sent
into the country, and effected a general disarm-
ing. Hostages were taken throughout Lom-
bardy, and the selection fell on the principal
families, even when no suspicion attached to
them. It was conceived to be advantageous
that some of the persons of most influence should
visit France. In fact they returned a few
months after, several of them having travelled
in all our provinces, where they had adopted
French manners.
The city of Pavia is situate seven leagues
from Milan, on the Ticino, two leagues from
its junction with the Po. It is eight hundred
and fifty toises in breadth, and two thousand
five hundred in circuit ; it has a stone bridge
over the Ticino, the only one which crosses
that river : it is surrounded by a rampart of
bastions, in ruins, and was the capital of the
monarchy of the Lombards. In the Xlth and
Xllth centuries this city was very powerful,
and the rival of Milan, being the seat of the
Ghibelline party, that of the emperors and nobles ;
whilst Milan was for the Guelphs, that is to say,
on the side of the Popes and the people. In
1517, Francis I. by his own fault, lost the
famous battle of Pavia, where he was taken
prisoner. The University of Pavia is celebrated ;
REVOLT OF PA VI A. '201
Volta, Spallanzani, Marcotti, Fontana, &c. were
professors there.
IV.
This insurrection was attributed to the extra-
ordinary contribution of twenty millions which
had just been imposed, to the requisitions neces-
sarily made by the army, and perhaps to some
particular instances of oppression. The troops
were destitute of clothing, which occasioned the
titles of banditti and brigands, bestowed upon
them by the enemy. The Lombards and other
Italians did not consider themselves conquered ;
it was the Austrian army that had been defeated,
there was no Italian corps in the Austrian ser-
vice ; the country even paid a tax to be exempt
from recruiting : it was a settled principle with
the Court of Vienna that it was impossible to
make good soldiers of the Italians. This circum-
stance, the necessity under which the French
army lay, of subsisting upon the local resources,
materially retarded the progress of public spirit
in Italy. If, on the contrary, the troops could
have been maintained at the expense of France,
numerous levies of Italians might have been
raised at the very commencement. But to at-
tempt to call a nation to liberty and indepen-
dence, to require public spirit to arise amongst
her inhabitants, to expect her to raise troops,
202 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
and at the same time to take away her principal
resources, are two contradictory ideas, and their
reconciliation is a proof of talent. Nevertheless,
discontent, murmurs, and conspiracies existed at
first. The conduct of a general in a conquered
country, is surrounded with difficulties : if he is
harsh he irritates his enemies, and increases their
numbers; if he is gentle, he excites hopes which
afterwards make the abuses and oppressions
necessarily attached to a state of war the more
severely felt. Nevertheless, if under such cir-
cumstances an insurrection be suppressed in time,
and if the conqueror exert a mixture of severity,
justice, and mildness, the affair will have a good
effect, will be rather advantageous than other-
wise, and will be a security for the future.
V.
In the mean time the army had continued its
march on the Oglio, under the command of Ber-
thier ; the commander-in-chief rejoined it at
Soncino, and on the 28th marched with it into
Brescia, one of the largest towns of the Venetian
Terra Firma ; the inhabitants of which were dis-
contented with the government of the Venetian
nobles. Brescia is eleven leagues from Cremona,
fifteen from Mantua, twenty-eight from Venice,
twenty-four from Trent, and fourteen from Milan.
It submitted to the Republic of Venice in 1420'.
Its inhabitants amount to 50,000; those of the
UK VOLT OF PA VI A. 203
whole province to 500,000, some living in the
mountains, others inhabiting rich plains. The
following proclamation was posted : " It is to
" deliver the finest country in Europe from the
" iron yoke of the proud house of Austria, that
" the French army has braved the most formida-
" ble obstacles. Victory, uniting with justice,
"has crowned its efforts with success; the
" wreck of the enemy's army has retreated be-
" yond the Mincio. In order to pursue them,
" the French army enters the territory of the Re-
" public of Venice, but it will not forget that the
" two republics are united by ancient friendship.
" Religion, government, and customs shall be
" respected. Let the people be free from ap-
" prehension, the severest discipline will be kept
" up; whatever the army is supplied with shall be
" punctually paid for in money. The General-in-
" chief invites the officers of the Republic of Ve-
" nice, the magistrates and priests, to communi-
" cate his sentiments to the people, in order that
" the friendship which has so long united the
" two nations may be cemented by confidence.
" Faithful in the path of honour as in that of vic-
" tory, the French soldier is terrible only to the
*.' enemies of his liberty and his government."
The Senate sent Proveditores to meet the
army, to make protestations of its neutrality.
It was agreed that the senate should supply
204 MEMOIRS OK NAPOLEON.
all necessary provisions, to be afterwards paid
for. Beaulieu had received great reinforcements
on the Mincio ; on the first news of the move-
ments of his army, he had removed his head-
quarters behind the Mincio, being desirous to
defend that river in order to prevent the invest-
ing of Mantua, the fortifications and supplies of
which were daily increased. Disregarding the
protestations of the Venetians, he forced the
gates of the fortress of Peschiera, and made that
place the appui of his right, which was com-
manded by General Liptay ; he supported his
centre on Valeggio and Borghetto, where he
placed Pittony's division, while Sebottendorf's
took up a position at Pozzuolo, and Colli's at
Goito ; the garrison of Mantua stationed posts on
the Seraglio. The reserve, under Melas, 15,000
strong, encamped at Villa Franca, to advance on
any point that should be menaced.
VI.
On the 29th of May, the French army had its
left at Dezenzano, its centre at Montechiaro, and
its right at Castiglione, wholly neglecting Man-
tua, which place it left on its right. On the 30th
at day-break, it debouched on Borghetto, after
having deceived the enemy by various move-
ments, which led him to think it would pass the
Mincio at Peschiera, and drew his reserve from
REVOLT OF PA VI A. 2()5
Villa Franca to that place. On approaching
Borghetto, the French vanguard fell in with
3000 Austrian and Neapolitan cavalry in the
plain, and 4000 infantry intrenched in the village
of Borghetto, and on the heights of Valeggio.
General Murat charged the enemy's cavalry ; he
obtained an important success in this action : it
was the first time that the French cavalry, on
account of its bad condition, had measured its
strength to advantage with the Austrian cavalry :
it took nine pieces of cannon, two standards, and
2000 men, amongst whom was the Prince de
Cuto, who commanded the Neapolitan cavalry.
From that time forth the French cavalry emu-
lated the infantry. Colonel Gardane, who was
marching at the head of the grenadiers, charged
into Borghetto ; the enemy burnt the bridge,
which it was impossible to restore under the fire
from the height of Valeggio. Gardane threw
himself into the water ; the Austrians imagined
they saw the terrible column of Lodi, and beat a
retreat ; Valeggio was carried. It was then ten
in the morning, by noon the bridge was restored,
and the French divisions passed the Mincio.
Augereau went up the left bank, advancing on
Peschiera, and occupied the heights of Castel
Nuovo ; Serrurier followed the troops which
were evacuating Valeggio and retiring on Villa
Franca. The General-in-chief marched with this
200 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
division as long as the enemy was in sight, but,
as they avoided an engagement, he returned to
Valeggio, which place had been fixed on for
head-quarters. Massena's division, appointed to
cover Valeggio, Avas preparing dinner on the
right bank of the Mincio, and had not yet passed
the bridge. Sebottendorf s division, having heard
the cannonade at Valeggio, had begun its march
up the left bank of the river ; their scouts ap-
proached Valeggio without meeting with any
troops ; they entered the town, and penetrated
as far as the lodgings where the General-in-chief
was ; his piquet guard had barely time enough
to shut the carriage gateway, and cry to arms,
which afforded him an opportunity of mounting
his horse and escaping through the gardens be-
hind the house. Massena's soldiers overturned
the kettles and passed the bridge. The sound
of the drums put the Austrian hussars to flight.
Sebottendorf was closely and vigorously pursued
during the whole evening, and lost a great num-
ber of men.
The danger which Napoleon had incurred,
convinced him of the necessity of having a guard
of picked men trained to this service, and espe-
cially charged to watch over his personal safety.
He formed a corps to which he gave the name
of Guides. Major Bessieres was directed to
organize it. This corps thenceforth wore the
REVOLT OF PA VI A. 207
uniform which was afterwards worn by the chas-
seurs of the guard, of which it was the nucleus :
it was composed of picked men who had served
ten years at least, and rendered great services in
the field. Thirty or forty of these brave fellows,
opportunely set on, always produced the most
important results. The Guides had the same
effect in a battle, as the squadrons on duty after-
wards had under the Emperor; which is easily
explained, because both were under his imme-
diate direction, and he ordered them forward
at critical moments.
Bessieres, who was born in Languedoc, served
originally in the 2 2d chasseurs, in the army of
the Eastern Pyrenees. He possessed a cool
species of bravery, was calm amidst the enemy's
fire ; his sight was excellent, he was much habi-
tuated to cavalry manoeuvres, and peculiarly
adapted to command a reserve. In all the great
battles he will be seen to render the greatest
services. He and Murat were the first cavalry
officers in the army, but of very opposite qualities.
Murat was a good vanguard officer, adventurous
and impetuous ; Bessieres was better adapted
for a reserve, being full of vigour, but prudent
and circumspect. From the period of the crea-
tion of the Guides, he was exclusively intrusted
with the duty of guarding the General-in-chief
and the head-quarters. He was afterwards
208 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
duke of Istria, marshal of the Empire, and one
of the marshals of the guard.
VII.
In order to cover the siege of Mantua and
Italy, it was necessary for the French army to
occupy the line of the Adige, and the bridges of
Verona and Legnago. All the insinuations of
the Proveditore Foscarelli against marching on
Verona were fruitless. On the 3d of June,
Massena took possession of that city, situate
thirty-two leagues from Milan, twenty-five from
Venice, and sixteen from Trent, with three stone
bridges Over the Adige. Ponte-Vecchio is sixty
toises in length and has three arches ; this town
contains 60,000 inhabitants, and is handsome,
large, rich, and very healthy. It became subject
to the Venetians in 1405 : its walls occupy both
sides of the river, and are six thousand toises in
extent :„ its forts are situate on the heights, com-
manding the left bank. Porto-Legnago was
armed, and the army of observation occupied
Montebaldo with its left, Verona with its centre,
and the lower Adige with its right, thus covering
the siege of Mantua. The object was attained ;
the tri-coloured flag waved on the passes of the
Tyrol. It was now time to force Mantua, and
take that bulwark from Austria : hopes were
entertained of accomplishing this undertaking
REVOLT OF PA VI A. 20!)
before the arrival of the new Austrian army ; but
what battles, what events, what dangers were
first to be encountered !
VIII.
Mantua is situate amidst three lakes formed by
the waters of the Mincio, which springs from
the Lake of Garda at Peschiera and runs into
the Po near Governolo. The city then commu-
nicated with the town by means of five dykes ;
the first, that of la Favorite, which separated the
upper from the middle lake, is a hundred toises
in length ; it is of stone, the mills of the town
are built against it ; it has two flood-gates for
discharging the water ; at its outlet is the citadel
of la Favorite, a regular pentagon, tolerably
strong, and protected, on several of its fronts,
by inundations. It is by this causeway that
people leave Mantua to go to Roverbella, and
thence to Verona or Peschiera. The causeway
of Saint-George is sixty toises long ; it leads into
the faubourg Saint-George ; it is the road to
Porto Legnago. This causeway was closed by
a stone gate, and in the middle of the lake by
drawbridges. The third dyke is the causeway
of Pietoli ; the lower lake is there only eighty
toises wide ; but the ground between the lake
and the place is occupied by an intrenched camp
under the place, with ditches full of water. The
Memoirs. — vol. hi. p
210 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON'.
fourth dyke is that of the gate of Ceresa, which
leads to Modena; it was closed by a stone gate;
the lake at that part, was of considerable breadth.
Lastly, the fifth dyke or causeway was that of
Pradella; it is two hundred toises long-, and is
the road to Cremona, defended by a hornwork
placed in the midst of the lake. Thus, of the
five causeways, that of la Favorite or Roverbella
was the only one defended by a citadel ; the
four others were without defence ; so that the
besiegers, placing a handful of men at the extre-
mities of these causeways, could blockade the
garrison. In the time of the kingdom of Italy,
there being an intention of completing this grand
fortress, it was thought important to occupy all
the debouches of the dykes by fortifications ; the
engineer Chasseloup had a permanent fort con-
structed before the causeway of Pradella ; so
that it would now be necessary, in order to
blockade Mantua, to blockade the four forts
placed at the four outlets.
The Seraglio is the space comprised between
the Mincio, Mantua, the Po, and la Fossa Maes-
tra, a canal which runs from the Lake of Mantua
into the Po at Borgo-forte : it is a triangle of
five or six square leagues, an island. Mantua
requires a garrison of at least 12,000 men; this
garrison ought to maintain itself as long as pos-
sible in the Seraglio to make use of the resources
REVOLT OF PA VI A. 211
which are to be found there, the land being- very
fruitful, and in order to continue masters of the
course of the Po, and draw supplies from the
right bank of that river. Governolo was for-
merly fortified. The abbey of Saint- Benedetto,
the central seat of the Benedictines, is on the
right bank of the Po, opposite the mouth of the
Mincio : the garrisons of Mantua make use of this
abbey in time of peace, by fixing an hospital
for convalescents there, the air being better than
at Mantua.
IX.
The besieged, who were fully sensible of the im-
portance of maintaining themselves at the head of
the five causeways, proceeded with great activity
in the construction of retrenchments there ; but
the French did not allow them sufficient time. On
the 4th of June the General-in- chief proceeded
himself to the faubourg Saint-George; carried it,
after a brisk action, and drove the enemy into
the place : they had scarcely time to raise the
draw-bridges of the dyke ; had they delayed a
few minutes longer, the place itself would have
been in danger. Augereau gained possession
of the Ceresa gate after a firm resistance ; the
enemy evacuated Pietoli, and retired into the
hornwork. The besiegers being thus masters
of the heads of the four dvkes, the besieged
212 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
could now make no sortie except by the citadel
of la Favorite, so that the. garrison was kept in
check by a besieging army of inferior force.
Serrurier was intrusted with the direction of the
blockade ; he fixed his head-quarters at Rover-
bella, as the point nearest to the citadel of la
Favorite, on which he placed 3000 men in obser-
vation ; GOO men were posted at Saint-George,
600 at Pietoli, 600 at Ceresa, and 1000 at Pra-
della ; and 2000 men, including artillery, caval-
ry, and infantry, formed flying columns round
the lakes, while a dozen gun-boats, manned by
French seamen, cruised in them. Thus, with an
army of only 8000 soldiers of all descriptions
actually in the field, Serrurier blockaded a gar-
rison amounting to 14,000 effective men, of
whom more than 10,000 were under arms. It
was not conceived necessary to form lines of
circumvallation, which was an error ; but the
engineers held out hopes that the place would be
surrendered before the Austrian army would be
able to come to its relief. Undoubtedly such
lines would have been of no use against Wurm-
ser, when he revictualled the place on the eve of
the battle of Castiglione. Napoleon, who then
raised the blockade and abandoned his besieg-
ing train, would have also abandoned his lines
of circumvallation ; but when Wurmser was
driven into Mantua after the battle of Bassano, it
REVOLT OF PAV1A. 213
is probable that if there had been lines of circum-
vallation, he would not have been able to force
them, and would have been obliged to lay down
his arms : this was the third blockade. When
lines of circumvallation were constructed round
Saint-George, they produced the surrender of the
general's corps, and the success of the battle of
la Favorite, in January 1797.
X.
The King of Naples, seeing Upper Italy in
the power of the French, sent Prince Belmontc
to head-quarters to request an armistice, which
was signed on the 5th of January. The Neapo-
litan division of cavalry, of 2400 horse, quitted
the Austrian army. A Neapolitan plenipoten-
tiary repaired to France to conclude a definitive
peace with the Republic. As the King of Naples
could bring 60,000 men into the field, this ar-
mistice was an important event ; and the more
so as this prince, remote from the theatre of the
war, is, on account of his geographical situation,
out of the influence of an army commanding
Upper Italy ; it being 200 leagues from the
Po to the extremity of the peninsula.
The General-in-chief found it difficult to in-
duce the French government to adopt his poli-
cy ; they wished to revolutionize Rome, Naples,
and Tuscany, without calculating the distances,
214 MEMOLltS OF NAPOLEON.
chances, or strength they would have to con-
tend with. They had formed erroneous ideas
respecting - the localities, the spirit of the peo-
ple, and the power of the revolutionists. The
principles of war which regulated the determi-
nations of the cabinet, were erroneous, and con-
trary to rule.
Colonel Chasseloup commanded the engineers
in the Army of Italy ; he was made a general.
He was one of the best officers of his corps ;
of an unsteady character, but well acquainted
with all the resources of his art.
Lespiuasse, who commanded the artillery, was
an old officer of great personal bravery and zeal.
Dammartin, Sugny, and Songis, were officers
of merit. The artillery general Dujard, who
was sent to fortify the coasts of Nice and Pro-
vence, was assassinated in the Col di Tende
by the Barbets.
Beaulieu, after all these disasters, fell into
disgrace with his master ; he was recalled, and
Melas took the command of the Austrian army
ad interim, and fixed his head-quarters at Trent.
Marshal Wurmser was removed from the com-
mand of the Army of the Upper Rhine to that
of Italy.
CHAPTER VIII.
MARCH ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE PO.
I. Motives of the march of the French army on the Apennines.
— II. Insurrection of the Imperial Fiefs. — III. Entrance
into Bologna and Ferrara (June 19). — IV. Armistice
granted to the Pope (June 23). — V. Entrance into Leghorn
(June 29). — VI. Napoleon at Florence. — VII. Revolt of
Lugo. — VIII. Opening of the trenches before Mantua (July
18). — IX. Favourable posture of affairs in Piedmont and
Lombardy.
I.
The army had fulfilled its destination. It
occupied the line of the Adige, covered the
siege of Mantua, middle and lower Italy ; and
was in readiness to oppose the Austrian armies,
whether they should debouch by the Tyrol, or
the Frioul. The French could advance no farther
until Mantua should be taken, and the princes
of the right bank of the Po disarmed. But in
order to besiege Mantua, a battering train was
requisite : that of the army had been left at
Antibes ; that which had been formed of the
216 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
heavy cannon taken from the fortresses of Tor-
tona, Coni, and Ceva, was engaged in the siege
of the citadel of Milan : it was, therefore, of pri-
mary importance to accelerate the siege of that
fortress.
Gerola, the Austrian minister at Genoa, had
excited the Imperial Fiefs to insurrection, organ-
ized free companies, composed of the Austrian
prisoners who had escaped and were daily es-
caping, of Piedmontese deserters, or natives of
Piedmont, who had turned smugglers since the
disbanding of the Piedmontese army. The oli-
garchy of Genoa contemplated with pleasure all
the schemes put in execution by this minister to
annoy the French army. The evil had become
intolerable ; the routes of the army by Genoa,
Savona, and Nice, were almost intercepted, so
that a battalion of 600 men had been compelled
to fight several times in order to join the army.
A prompt and efficacious remedy was necessary.
The Court of Rome was arming ; and if its
body of troops had been reinforced by the 6000
English in Corsica, a formidable diversion would
have been effected on the right bank of the Po,
the moment the Austrian army was ready to
resume offensive operations. It was therefore
necessary to repass the Po, force the Pope's
army beyond the Apennines, compel the Court of
Rome to conclude an armistice, pass the Apen-
MARCH ON THE UK. Ill BANK OF Til E PO. 217
nines, occupy Leghorn, drive out the English
factory, unite the five or six hundred Corsican
refugees in that city, and send them to Corsica
to raise an insurrection, which would detain the
English division there to defend itself. Marshal
Wurmser, who had quitted the Rhine with 30,000
chosen troops, was marching on Italy. He could
not arrive before the 15th of July ; there were,
then, thirty or forty days left, during which the
necessary detachments might conveniently be
spared, so as to return to the Adige by the mid-
dle of July.
II.
Napoleon repaired to Milan, had the trenches
opened before the citadel, proceeded thence to
Tortona, and directed a column of 1200 men,
commanded by Colonel Lannes, to march into
the Imperial Fiefs. Colonel Lannes entered Ar-
quata after an obstinate resistance, shot the bri-
gands who had slaughtered a detachment of 150
French, and demolished the chateau of the Mar-
quis de Spinola, the principal instigator of these
commotions. At the same time the aide-de-
camp Murat proceeded to Genoa, and being"
introduced into the Senate by Faypoult, the mi-
nister of the republic, demanded and obtained
the dismission of the governor of Novi, the ex-
pulsion of the Austrian agents, and the ambas-
21* MEMOIRS ()!• NAPOLIlOK.
sador Gerola from Genoa, and the establishment
of columns of Genoese troops at the different
halting-places, with instructions to clear the
roads, to escort the French convoys, and to re-
store the safety of the communications.
General Augereau, with his division, passed
the Po on the 14th of June, at Borgo-forte,
reached Bologna and Ferrara in four marches,
and took possession of these two legations, which
belonged to the Pope. General Vaubois col-
lected a brigade of 4000 men and 700 horses at
Modena. Napoleon left Tortona, passed through
Placenza, Parma, and Reggio, and on the 19th
arrived at Modena. His presence electrified the
people of those two cities, who loudly called for
liberty ; but the armistice was scrupulously ob-
served by the Regency. He exerted all his in-
fluence to retain these people in the obedience
they owed to their sovereign, and to still the
ferment which existed amongst them. At Mo-
dena he accepted the fetes which the Regency
offered him, studied to inspire it with confidence,
and to give it that respectability in the eyes of
the people of which it stood in need. The old
duke had long before fled to Venice with his
treasures. The road from Modena to Bologna
passes under the glacis of Fort Urbino, belong-
ing to the Pope ; this fort had old bastions and
advanced works •, it was armed, victualled, and
MARCH ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE PO. 219
defended by a garrison of 800 men. The troops
of Augereau's division, which had entered Bo-
logna the same day, had not had time to take
possession of it, or to blockade it. Colonel Vig-
noles, deputy quarter-master-general, advanced
against it with 200 guides, and made the garrison
capitulate ; they surrendered as prisoners of war.
The fort was lined with sixty pieces of cannon,
half of which were forwarded to Borgo-forte,
where was the park of the besieging train.
III.
Augereau's division found at Bologna a cardi-
nal and 400 men, and took them prisoners. The
cardinal obtained leave to go to Rome on his
parole ; a few months afterwards, as he con-
ducted himself very ill, General Berthier sent
him orders to return to head- quarters ; he an-
swered in a very specious style, that he was re-
leased from his parole by a brief from his Holi-
ness, which caused much laughter in the army.
In the citadel of Ferrara were found 114 pieces
of cannon, with abundance of ammunition. Forty
of these guns were sent to Borgo-forte.
Bologna is surnamed the Learned. It is situate
at the foot of the Apennines, on the Reno, and
contains from fifty to sixty thousand inhabitants.
The Academy at Bologna, called the Institute of
the Sciences, is the most renowned in Italy; its
220 MEMOIRS OK NAPOLEON.
noble streets are adorned with porticoes in ar-
cades for the convenience of foot-passengers; it
has a canal communicating- with Venice. This
city exercises a great influence over all the three
legations, which were dissatisfied with the go-
vernment of the Popes, a bastard, disgraceful
government for all secular people. What can be
worse, said they, than to be governed by priests?
We have no country ; we are ruled by men de-
voted to celibacy, who belong to the Christian
religion, and consider affairs in a false point of
view ; they are accustomed from infancy to theo-
logical studies, which do not tend in the least to
qualify them to judge of the affairs of the world.
Bologna, in particular, was ardently desirous of
liberty ; that town and Brescia contained the
warmest partisans, and those best disposed to
work the triumph of the Italian cause. There
was no place that testified a more sincere affec-
tion for the French than these. Bologna per-
sisted in these sentiments ; the entrance of the
army was a triumph. Caprara, Marescalchi, and
Aldini, deputies of the senate, did the honours ;
the two former were of the best families in the
country. Caprara, then a senator, was after-
wards master of the horse to the King of Italy,
and Marescalchi minister of exterior relations ;
Aldini was the best advocate in Bologna; he was
the confidential man of the senate ; and he after-
MARCH ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE PO. 221
wards became minister secretary of state to the
King of Italy. There were three or four hundred
Spanish Jesuits at Bologna at that period ; they
were alarmed ; the richest and youngest had
sought an asylum at Rome ; the staff of the
army dispelled their fears, and ordered that all
proper respect should be paid to them. There
were men of distinguished merit amongst them.
In the course of the few days that Napoleon
remained at Bologna, the appearance of this
city was entirely changed. Never was a general
revolution in the manners and habits of a people
more promptly effected. All who were not
priests assumed the military dress and the sword;
and even a great number of ecclesiastics were
drawn in by the spirit that animated the people.
The city as well as individuals gave a great
number of entertainments, bearing a character
of popularity and grandeur which had not pre-
viously been seen in Italy. The French general
shewed himself constantly in the midst of the
people, without guards ; and made a point of
going to the theatre every evening with no other
escort than the Bolognese.
IV.
In the mean time the Vatican was struck with
alarm. Azara, the Spanish minister, provided
with powers from the Pope, came with all pos-
222 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
sible despatch to conclude an armistice, which
was signed on the 23d of June, and removed
the apprehensions of his Holiness, who engaged
to send a minister to Paris to treat for a defini-
tive peace with the Republic ; and agreed that
the armistice should last until the conclusion of
peace ; that Bologna and Ferrara should remain
in the possession of the French army ; that the
French should garrison Ancona ; that he, the
Pope, should pay twenty-one millions in money,
horses, and articles necessary for the army ; and
that he should give up one hundred works of
art, to be chosen by the French commissioners,
for the museum at Paris. Military circum-
stances were such that it could never have been
Napoleon's intention to march to Rome. Never-
theless the philosophers and the enemies of the
holy see, regarded this suspension of hostilities
with dissatisfaction : the people of Bologna in
particular were apprehensive of returning under
the Pope's authority ; but they were easily con-
vinced that the French being now masters of the
conditions of peace, it would not be made with-
out securing their liberty. They exacted a
promise to this effect, and immediately armed a
body of national guards.
MARCH ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE PO. '223
V.
This important affair, which secured the flanks
of the army from molestation, and contributed to
conciliate the people to the French, being ended,
Napoleon passed the Apennines, and on the 2Gth
of June joined Vaubois' division at Pistoia. He
lodged at the bishop's, the same who afterwards
contended so warmly for religious opinions con-
formable to those of the constitutional priests.
Manfredini, the prime minister of the Grand
Duke of Tuscany, alarmed at the report that the
French troops were to pass through Florence,
came to head-quarters ; he was satisfied, and
convinced that the French were extremely desi-
rous to cultivate the friendship of the Grand
Duke, and that they only passed over his ter-
ritories on their way to Siena. On the 29th of
June, Murat, who commanded the van, on leav-
ing Firenzuola, turned suddenly on Leghorn,
and arrived there in eight hours, hoping to sur-
prise the English merchants, who had a hundred
ships laden in the port ; but they received timely
notice, and took refuge in the ports of Corsica.
The walls of Leghorn must have been intended
to inclose 8 or 10,000 inhabitants : but com-
merce has made such progress there, that the
population has increased to above GO, 000 souls ;
whence it has become necessary to build im-
2*24 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEOPT.
mense faubourgs, which obstruct the glacis. It
is difficult to enter the port. The roads arc
distant from the land, and far from safe ; some
accident happens every year. They have suc-
ceeded the port of Pisa, which was situate at
the mouth of the Arno, the principal river of
Tuscany. This is the port of Florence ; it is
much frequented by the English, who have
established a factory there as an entrepot for
their manufactures, and for their Indian and
colonial merchandize. The occupation of Leg-
horn and the destruction of the factory, was
sensibly felt by the trade of London. The
Corsican refugees in France assembled to the
number of 600 at Leghorn. The communication
with Corsica by the shores of Fiumorbo and la
Rocca, could not be intercepted. A multitude
of agents penetrated into the interior of the isle
with proclamations. The viceroy, Elliot, soon
perceived the effects. Several insurrections took
place. The refugees were persons of import-
ance : their vicinity and correspondence excited
the warlike population of the mountains. A
series of sanguinary actions took place ; the
English daily lost numbers of men ; they were
not sufficiently numerous to maintain their foot-
ing in the country ; there was no longer any fear
of their disturbing the coasts of Italy. At
length, in the month of October, Gentili and
MARCH ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE PO. 225
the Corsican refugees landed in a body in the
isle, raised a general insurrection, and drove out
the English. Spanocchi, the Tuscan command-
ant of Leghorn, was distinguished for his extreme
partiality to the English ; some instances of mis-
conduct of which he was guilty, filled up the
measure of his offences ; he was arrested and
taken to Florence, where he was placed at the
disposal of the Grand Duke. The French Consul
Belleville had the management of the contentious
business relating to the English merchandize.
Notwithstanding the efforts of a multitude of
robbers who nocked from Genoa and Marseilles,
the chest of the army received twelve millions
from this property. Vaubois was left in com-
mand of the city with a garrison of 2000 men ;
the rest of the troops repassed the Apennines
and the Po, to rejoin the army on the Adige.
VI.
The General- in-chief went from Leghorn to
Florence, in consequence of the invitation of the
Grand Duke. He arrived there without any
escort, and alighted at the residence of the
French minister, where a battalion of the prince's
guards awaited him as a guard of honour. He
was highly satisfied with the Archduke, and
visited with curiosity every object calculated
to excite his attention in this ancient and im-
Memoirs. — vol. hi. a
220 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
portant capital. The French troops twice cross-
ed the grand duchy, but they passed at a great
distance from Florence, observed the strictest
discipline, and gave rise to no complaints. The
Tuscan minister confessed that the English had
more authority than himself in Leghorn, and
complained of the arrogance of the English
general.
Whilst at dinner with the Grand Duke, Na-
poleon received the news of the taking of the
Castle of Milan, which had capitulated on the
29th of June. This castle had several large
towers, the remains of the Visconti-palace, which
commanded the country ; some pieces mounted
thereon swept the trenches, and had retarded the
approaches for several days. The garrison, 2500
strong, were made prisoners of war ; a hundred
pieces of cannon were found in this castle. The
besieging train was immediately embarked on
the Po for Mantua, and with the pieces taken
from the castle of Urbino and Ferrara made up
two-hundred guns well supplied, which were
thought sufficient for the siege of Mantua. After
dinner, the Grand Duke conducted his guest
into the celebrated gallery of Florence, to view
the masterpieces of art which it contained ; he
admired the Venus de Medicis. The Anatomist
Fontana shewed him some very fine models in
wax, and he ordered similar ones for Paris.
MARCH ON THE RIGHT BANK OK THE PO. 227
Manfredini, the Grand Duke's majordomo and
principal minister, had been preceptor to this
prince as well as to the Archduke Charles ; he
was a native of Padua in the Venetian States,
and proprietor of the Austrian regiment of Man-
fredini. He was an enlightened man, as much
attached to all the philosophical ideas of the
Revolution as shocked at their excesses, he had
constantly opposed the pretensions of the Court
of Rome, which after the death of Leopold had
endeavoured to overturn the acts of that prince.
He was a man of a clear understanding, generally
esteemed, and had, moreover, a secret inclina-
tion for the independence of Italy. There was
not a generous heart or noble mind in the coun-
try that did not feel involuntarily impelled,
whatever might be their rank or situation in the
world, to sacrifice their dearest affections to the
independence and restoration of the fine country
of Italy.
VII.
After a short stay at Florence, Napoleon pro-
ceeded to Bologna, where he spent several days
in regulating the public impulse towards liberty.
Lugo had revolted, excesses had been commit-
ted there against small French detachments.
General Beyrand marched thither with his bri-
gade, he met with some resistance ; 4 or 5000
q2
228 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
peasants had thrown themselves into the town;
he attacked and defeated them, and took the
town by assault; it was pillaged. The Bishop of
Imola, afterwards Pius VII, in whose diocese
this insurrection had broken out, published a
mandate to open the eyes of the deluded popu-
lace. Render unto Ccesar that which is Ccesars y
said he ; Christ commands us to obey him who has
power. He even sent the Bishop of Edessa, then
his grand-vicar, and afterwards his almoner, to
Lugo, who failed in his mission. The rebels
received him with respect, but did not obey his
orders. They submitted only to force. The
army passed the Po ; there were only a few
piquets of gens-d'armes and some depots left on
the right bank. The country was so well dis-
posed, that the national guards were sufficient ;
although the regency of Modena was entirely
devoted to the enemy, it was powerless ; in
Reggio and Modena the patriots were by far the
most powerful party.
VIII.
Mantua was commanded by General Canto
d'Irles, who had under him Generals Roccavina,
Roselmini, and Wukassowich, with 12,000 in-
fantry, 500 cavalry, 600 artillery, 150 miners, and
100 seamen, total 14,000 men. The head-quarters
of the army were removed from Bologna, to Ro-
MARCH ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE PO. 229
verbella, where was Serrurier, who commanded
the blockade ; there were several French sloops
on the lower lake. Colonel Andreossy had
collected a considerable number of boats, in
hopes of surprising the place. One hundred
grenadiers had embarked, they were to land at
two in the morning under the battery and bas-
tion of the palace, to seize the postern gate, and
let down the drawbridges of the causeway of
St. George, by which the army was to enter the
city. This scheme appeared infallible. Colonel
Lahoz, a native of Mantua, was to head the
column, accompanied by several patriots of the
country. But the Po having fallen considerably,
and the waters of the lower lake having run off
with great rapidity, there was not sufficient
water for the boats, which were obliged to get
amongst the reeds, to avoid being perceived from
the place ; they grounded there during the night,
and it was impossible to get them off. The next
night the waters abated still more, and this
expedition was therefore abandoned. It was
debated whether the trenches should be opened
or not. The storm from the Tyrol seemed ready
to burst. But Chasseloup promised to take the
place in fifteen days open trenches, it being ill
armed and the garrison much weakened. The
General-in-chief resolved to make the attempt.
Generals Murat andD'Allemagne passed the lower
230 |] !•'. M Ullls o l N Al'O L EO N .
arm of the lake at Pietoli, where it was very
narrow, and after a warm action got possession
of the ground which was not overflowed from
Pietoli to the palace del T, and of the in-
trenched camp of Migliazetto ; on the 18th of
July, all the natural obstacles were surmounted,
there was nothing before the besiegers but a
simple bastion and a large ditch full of water.
General Chasseloup of the engineers opened the
trenches ; the siege became merely an ordinary
one. On the 22d, the trench was fifty toises
from the covered way ; the enemy attempted
several sorties to retard the approaches ; the
skirmishes became sanguinary, but he was al-
ways repulsed with loss. Colonel Dupont, at
the head of a battalion of grenadiers, behaved
gallantly ; he was the same officer who after-
wards distinguished himself at the time of the
surrender of Cairo in Egypt.
IX.
But the moment of the resumption of offensive
operations by the Austrians was approaching.
Napoleon, being freed from anxiety respecting
the works of the siege of Mantua, wished to
accelerate the progress of the internal organiza-
tion of Lombardy, in order to secure his rear
during the contest which was about to begin : he
proceeded to Milan, in order to return by the
MARCH ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE PO. 23]
time of the recommencement of hostilities. The
King of Sardinia had placed himself absolutely
at the disposal of the Republic, he had given up
all his fortresses. Suza, Exilles, and Demonte,
were demolished. Alessandria was in the pos-
session of the Army of Italy. The chevalier
Borgues resided at Milan, as charged with the
temporary affairs of Sardinia ; but the King fre-
quently sent the Count de Saint- Marsan to head-
quarters, either to give particular explanations,
or to request the assistance necessary for main-
taining tranquillity in the country ; his affairs
could not have been in better hands ; the Count
was, both personally and in point of character,
agreeable to the commander-in-chief. He was
of one of the best families in Piedmont ; was
from twenty-five to thirty years of age, of a
cool, mild, enlightened character ; he suffered
no prejudices to sway his mind, and consequent-
ly saw things as they really were. He was per-
sonally hostile to the Austrian policy, a senti-
ment inherited from his ancestors and confirmed
by his own experience.
CHAPTER IX.
BATTLE OF CASTIQLIONE.
I. Marshal Wurmser arrives in Italy at the head of a new army.
— II. Situation of the French army. — III. Plan of the Cam-
paign. — IV. Wurmser debouches in three columns (July 29),
the right by the road of the Chiesa, the centre on Monte-
baldo, between the Adige and the lake of Garda, and the left
by the valley of the Adige. — V. Grand and prompt resolution
taken by Napoleon ; Action of Salo ; Action of Lonato (July
31).— VI. Battle of Lonato (August 3).— VII. Surrender of
the three divisions of the enemy's right, and of part of his
centre. — VIII. Battle of Castiglione (August 5). — IX. Se-
cond blockade of Mantua, (end of August). — X. Conduct of
the different nations of Italy, on the news of the success of
the Austrians.
I.
The Court of Vienna being informed of the ar-
rival of the French on the borders of the Tyrol,
and of the blockade of Mantua, relinquished its
intended offensive operations in Alsace, and de-
tached Marshal Wurmser at the head of 30,000
men from the Army of the Upper Rhine, into
BATTLE OF CASTIGL1 NE. 233
Italy ; which detachment, added to Beaulieu's
army, which had been recruiting for two months,
and to the garrison of Mantua, raised that army
to 80,000 men, exclusive of the sick in Mantua.
The French army had fulfilled its task in de-
stroying that of Beaulieu ; had the armies of the
Rhine been equally successful, this grand contest
would have been finished. But reports of the
preparations making by the house of Austria
were spread throughout the Venetian territory ;
they were greatly exaggerated in commercial let-
ters, in which it was stated that before the end
of August Austria would be mistress of Milan,
and the French expelled from the peninsula,
without being able to reach the Alps ; the pro-
verb would again be verified this year, that Italy
was their tomb.
II.
Napoleon contemplated all these preparations
with attention, and was seriously alarmed at
them. He convinced the Directory that it was
impossible for 40,000 men to withstand, alone,
the efforts of the whole Austrian power; he re-
quired either that reinforcements should be sent
to him, or that the armies of the Rhine should
take the field without delay. He reminded them
of the promise which had been made to him on
his quitting Paris, that they should commence
234 MEAIOIKS OF NAPOLEON.
operations on the 15th of April ; and that never-
theless, although two months had elapsed, they
had not left their winter-quarters. They opened
the campaign at last, in the month of June, but
the diversion was then useless to the Army of
Italy. Wurmser's 30,000 men were on their
march, and expected to arrive. In this situation,
reduced to his own forces alone, he assembled
all his army on the Adige and Chiesa, left only
one battalion in the citadel of Ferrara, and two
at Leghorn ; and depots only at Coni, Tortona,
Alessandria, Milan, and Pizzighettone. The siege
of Mantua began to produce sickness ; although
the troops which the general kept before that
unhealthy place were only equal in number to
two thirds of the garrison, the losses were never-
theless considerable. He could not muster, with
the army of observation on the Adige, above
30,000 men actually under arms ; yet with this
small number of brave soldiers he was to con-
tend with the principal army of the house of
Austria. A very active correspondence was kept
up between Italy and the Tyrol, where the ene-
my were assembling ; and the fatal influence of
these grand preparations on the minds of the
people became every day more evident. The
partisans of the French trembled ; those of Aus-
tria behaved in a haughty and threatening man-
ner ; but all were astonished that such a power
BATTLE OK CASTIGLIONE. 235
as France should leave an army which had de-
% served so well of its country without assistance
or support : these remarks even reached the sol-
diers themselves, by means of their daily com-
munications with the inhabitants.
Soret's division, posted at Salo, covered the
country between the lakes of Idro and Garda,
intercepting the road from Trent to Brescia, by
the valley of the Chiesa ; Massena, placed at
Bussolengo, occupied la Corona and Montebaldo
with Joubert's brigade; the rest of his division
encamped on the level of Rivoli. D'Allemagne's
brigade of Despinois' division guarded the bridges
of Verona ; the other brigade of this division, the
Adige as far as Porto Legnago ; Augereau's divi-
sion, Porto Legnago and the lower Adige. Ge-
neral Guillaume commanded at Peschiera, where
six gallies, under the command of Captain Lalle-
mand, kept possession of the lake of Garda ; Ser-
rurier was besieging Mantua ; Kilmaine com-
manded the cavalry of the army, Dammartin the
artillery. Head-quarters were fixed at Caste I-
Nuovo, which place was within a convenient dis-
tance of the Adige, the Chiesa, and Mantua.
III.
Wurmser fixed his head-quarters at Trent, and
assembled his whole army in the Italian Tyrol :
he divided it into three corps ; that of the left
236 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
commanded by Generals Davidowich, Mezaros,
and Metroski, 20,000 strong, was intended to
debouch by the valley of the Adige ; Mezaros
was to proceed along the road on the left bank,
and to penetrate into Verona by the heights ;
Davidowich and Metroski, the cavalry and artil-
lery, were to pass the Adige on a bridge built
opposite la Dolce, and to advance on Cassario ;
the centre, 30,000 strong, under Wurmser, form-
ing four divisions, under Generals Melas, Sebot-
tendorf, Bayalitsch and Liptay, were to pene-
trate by Montebaldo and the country between
the Adige and the lake of Garda ; the right, con-
sisting of 20,000 men, under Quasdanowich, the
Prince de Reuss and Ocskay, was to pass by the
Chiesa, advance on Brescia, and turn the whole
of the French army, which, being separated from
Milan, would thus have its retreat cut off: its
entire destruction was to be the result of this
skilful plan. Proud of his great superiority,
Wurmser meditated not how to conquer, but
how he should make use of his victory, and ren-
der it decisive and fatal to the enemy.
IV.
Napoleon had been at Milan but a few days
when he heard of the movements in the Tyrol ;
he repaired with all possible speed to Castel-
Nuovo, wherehe fixed his head-quarters; in (his
BATTLE OF CASTIG LION'E. 237
little town he was within reach of the mountains,
Monte Baldo and Verona. On the twenty-ninth
in the morning, he was informed that la Corona
was attacked by an army ; that the light troops
of Mezaros's division were debouching upon the
heights of Verona on the left bank of the Adige ;
and that numerous columns were descending by
the Rocca d'Anfo. In the course of the night,
farther intelligence arrived every hour ; it ap-
peared that Joubert, being attacked at la Corona,
had resisted throughout the day, but that in the
evening he had fallen back on the level of Rivoli,
which Massena occupied in force ; that the nu-
merous lines of the fires of the Austrian bivouacs
covered the country between the lake of Garda
and the Adige ; that on the heights of Verona,
the whole division of Mezaros had joined his
light troops ; that on the Brescia side, Quasda-
nowich, who had debouched by the valley of the
Chiesa, had divided his force into three columns,
one of which covered the heights of Saint-Ozetto,
appearing to direct its march on Brescia ; that
another had taken up a position at Gavardo, and
threatened to advance on Ponte di San Marco
and Lonato ; and that the third had marched on
Salo, where it had been fighting ever since three
o'clock in the afternoon. On the 30th, at day-
break, advices arrived that the column of Saint-
Ozetto had penetrated to Brescia, where it had
238 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLF.ON.
met with no resistance, and had made prisoners
of four companies left there to guard the hospitals.
One of the communications of the army with
Milan was thus intercepted ; that of Cremona
was the only one which now remained. Scouts
already appeared on all the roads from Brescia
to Milan, Cremona, and Mantua, announcing that
an army of 80,000 men had debouched by Bres-
cia, and that another, of 100,000, was at the
same time debouching by Verona; that Soret,
fearful of rinding himself cut off from Brescia and
the army, had retreated on the heights of De-
zenzano, leaving General Guyeux at Salo, with
1500 men, in an ancient castle, a kind of for-
tress, secure from a coup de main; that the ene-
my's column at Gavardo had sent a few light
horse towards Ponte di San Marco, but that
they had been kept in check there by a company
of chasseurs, ordered to guard that bridge.
V.
Wurmser's plan was now unmasked ; he had
taken the lead in moving, and expected to keep
it. But he considered the army as fixed about
Mantua, and imagined that by surrounding this
fixed point, he should surround the French army.
In order to disconcert his schemes, it was neces-
sary for the French commander himself to take
the lead, to render the army moveable by raising
BATTLE OF C ASTIG LION E. 239
the siege of Mantua, sacrificing- the trenches and
besieging train, for the purpose of advancing
rapidly, with the whole army in junction, upon
one of the enemy's corps, and afterwards against
the two others successively. The Austrians were
superior in number in the proportion of five to
two ; but if the three corps were attacked sepa-
rately by the whole French army, the latter
would be superior in number on the field of
battle. The right under Quasdanowich, which
had debouched on Brescia, was the farthest ad-
vanced, and Napoleon therefore marched against
this corps first. Serrurier's division burned the
carriages of their besieging train, and their plat-
forms, threw their powder into the water, buried
their shot, spiked the guns, and raised the siege
of Mantua in the night of the 31st of July. Au-
gereau's division proceeded from Legnago to
Borghetto on the Mincio ; Massena's troops de-
fended the heights between the Adige and the
lake of Garda during the whole of the 30th.
D'Allemagne's brigade directed its march on
Lonato. Napoleon proceeded to the heights
behind Dezenzano ; made Soret march back on
Salo, to disengage General Guyeux, who was
compromised in the disadvantageous post in
which General Soret had left him ; nevertheless
he had engaged a whole division of the enemy's
troops there for forty-eight hours, who had five
240 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
times attacked him by assault, and been five
times repulsed. Soret came up at the very mo-
ment when the enemy was making a final at-
tempt, fell on his flanks, totally defeated him,
and took a number of colours, cannon, and pri-
soners. At the same time General Ocskay's
Austrian division had advanced from Gavardo on
Lonato, to take up a position on the heights,
and effect a junction with Wurmser on the Min-
cio. Napoleon himself led D'Allemagne's brigade
against it. It performed prodigies of valour;
the thirty-second was part of it. Ocskay was
routed, and suffered great loss ; the remains of
these two divisions, beaten by Soret and D'Alle-
magne, rallied at Gavardo. Soret was fearful of
compromising himself; he came back, and took
up an intermediate position between Salo and
Dezenzano. In the mean time Wurmser's cavalry
and artillery had passed the Adige. Being now
master of all the country between the Adige and
the lake of Garda, he placed one of his divisions
on the heights of Peschiera, to mask that place
and guard his communications ; he directed two
others with part of his cavalry on Borghetto, to
seize the bridge over the Mincio and debouch
on the Chiesa, in order to place himself in com-
munication with his right. Lastly, with his two
last divisions of infantry, and the rest of his
cavalry, he marched on Mantua, to force the
BATTLE OF CAST1GLIONE. 241
French to raise the siege of that place ; but it
had already been raised twenty-four hours be-
fore : he found the trenches and batteries entire,
the guns overturned and spiked ; the whole place
covered with the wreck of carriages, platforms,
and ammunition of all kinds. The precipitation
with which these measures seemed to have been
effected, probably gave him great satisfaction ;
for every thing he saw around him seemed much
more like the effect of terror than the result of
a calculated plan.
Massena, after having kept the enemy in check
throughout the 30th, passed the Mincio in the
night at Peschiera, and continued his march on
Brescia. The Austrian division, which appeared
before Peschiera, found the right bank of the
Mincio lined with skirmishers detached by the gar-
rison and by Massena's rear-guard, commanded by
Pigeon, who had orders to dispute the passage of
this river, and, when he should be forced, to retire
and rally on Lonato. When Augereau marched
for Brescia, he had passed by Borghetto, broken
down the bridge, and left a rear-guard to line
the right bank, with orders to fall back on Cas-
tiglione when it should be forced. Napoleon
marched the whole night of the 31st of July,
with Augereau's and Massena's divisions, on
Brescia, which place he reached at ten o'clock
in the morning. The Austrian division, hearing
Memoirs. — vol. hi. R
242 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
that the French army was debouching upon it
by all the roads, retreated precipitately. On
entering Brescia they had found 500 sick, but
their stay was so short and their departure so
hasty that they had no time to reconnoitre or
dispose of their prisoners. General Despinois
and Adjutant-general Herbin, each with several
battalions, went in pursuit of the enemy on Saint-
Ozetto and the debouches of the Chiesa; and
Napoleon, with the two divisions of Augereau
and Massena, then returned, by a rapid counter-
march, on the side of the Mincio, to the Chiesa,
whence those two divisions had marched to sup-
port their rear-guards, which by this counter-
march became their vanguards.
VI.
On the 2d of August, Augereau, on the right,
occupied Montechiaro ; Massena, in the centre,
encamped at Ponte di San Marco, connecting
his line with that of Soret, who, on the left,
occupied an eminence between Salo and Dezen-
zano, facing about to keep Quasdanowich's right
in check, which was already thrown into disor-
der. In the mean time the rear-guards which
Augereau and Massena had left on the Mincio,
had retreated before the enemy's divisions, which
had forced the passage of that river. That of
Augereau, which had orders to join at Castiglione,
BATTLE OF CASTIGLIOX E. 243
quitted its post too soon, and returned in a dis-
orderly manner to rejoin its corps. General
Valette, who commanded this rear-guard, was
cashiered before the troops, for not having shewn
more resolution on this occasion. As for General
Pigeon, with Massena's rear-guard, he reached
Lonato in good order, and established himself
there. The enemy, taking advantage of General
Valette's error, entered Castiglione on the 2d,
and intrenched themselves there. On the 3d the
battle of Lonato took place; it was fought by
Wurmser's two divisions that passed the Mincio
over the bridge of Borghetto (that of Liptay
being one), and by Bayalitsch's division, which
he had left before Peschiera; which, with the
cavalry, composed a body of 30,000 men : the
French had from 20 to 23,000. The victory was
not doubtful. Neither Wurmser, with his two
divisions of infantry and the cavalry which he
had taken to Mantua, nor Quasdanowich, who
was already retreating, could be present at this
battle.
At day-break the enemy advanced on Lonato,
and commenced a vigorous attack, intending by
this point to effect his junction with his right,
respecting which he now began to be anxious.
Massena's vanguard was overthrown, and Lonato
was taken. The General-in-chief, who was at
Ponte di San Marco, placed himself at the head
r 2
244 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON'.
of the troops. The Austrian general having ex*
tended his line too far, still with the intention of
gaining on his right, in order to open his commu-
nications with Salo, his centre was broken ; Lona-
to was retaken at the charge, and the enemy's line
intersected. One part fell back on the Mincio,
and the other threw themselves into Salo ; but
the latter being taken in front by General Soret,
whom they met, and in the rear by General
Saint-Hilaire, and turned on every side, were
obliged to lay down their arms.
The French had been attacked in the centre,
but on the right they were the assailants. Au-
gereau encountered Liptay's division, which co-
vered Castiglione, and broke it after an obstinate
action, in which the valour of the troops supplied
the want of numbers. The enemy suffered
greatly, lost Castiglione, and retreated on Man-
tua, whence his first reinforcements reached him,
but not until after the engagement. Augereau's
division lost many brave men in this hard-fought
action ; the army particularly regretted General
Beyrand and Colonel Pourailles, highly distin-
guished officers.
VII.
During the night Quasdanowich was informed
of the result of the battle of Lonato ; he had
heard the cannon all day : his position was
BATTLE OF CASTIGLIONE. '24')
rendered very precarious ; his junction with the
main body of the army was becoming impos-
sible. Besides, he believed that the French
divisions which had manoeuvred against him on
the 2d were still following him, which made the
French army appear to him immense: he saw
it in all directions. Wurmser had directed part
of his troops from Mantua towards Marcaria, in
pursuit of Serrurier : he could not avoid losing
time in recalling them on Castiglione. On the
4th he was not ready for action : he spent the
whole day in collecting his troops, rallying those
who had fought at Lonato, and renewing the
supplies of his artillery. Napoleon, about two
or three o'clock in the afternoon, reconnoitred
the line of battle taken up by the Austrian
army, which he found to be formidable; it
still presented from 25 to 30,000 combatants.
He ordered Castiglione to be intrenched, rec-
tified the position taken up by Augereau, which
was defective, and set out for Lonato, in order
to superintend, personally, the movements of all
his troops, which it became of the utmost im-
portance to assemble in the course of the night
round Castiglione. Throughout the day, Soret
and Herbin on the one side, and Dallemagne and
Saint-Hilaire on the other, had followed the
march of the three divisions of the enemy's
right, and of those cut off from the centre at
24 6 MEMOIRS ()l NAPOLEON.
the battle of Lonato, and had pursued them
closely, making prisoners at every step : whole
battalions had laid down their arms at Saint-
Ozetto, others at Gavardo, and others were
still wandering in the neighbouring valleys.
Four or five thousand men having been informed
by the peasants that there were only 1200 French
in Lonato, marched thither in hopes of opening
a road towards Mantua. It was five o'clock in
the evening. Napoleon was also entering Lo-
nato, coming from Castiglione ; a flag of truce
was brought to him ; and he heard at the same
time that some columns of the enemy's troops
were debouching by Ponte di San Marco, that
they wished to re-enter Lonato, and summoned
the town to surrender. But as he was still mas-
ter of Salo and Gavardo, it was evident that these
could only be straggling columns that wanted to
clear themselves a passage. He ordered his nu-
merous staff to mount, had the officer who came
with the flag of truce brought in, and ordered
the bandage to be taken off his eyes in the midst
of all the bustle of the head-quarters of a com-
mander-in-chief. " Go and tell your general,"
said he, " that I give him eight minutes to lay
" down his arms; he is in the midst of the French
" army : after that time there are no hopes for
"■ him." These four or five thousand men who
had been harassed for three days, wandering
BATTLE OF CASTIGLIONE. 247
about and uncertain of their fate, were convinced
that they had been deceived by the peasants,
and laid down their arms. This one fact may
convey an idea of the confusion and disorder of
those Austrian divisions which, having been de-
feated at Salo, Lonato, and Gavardo, and pur-
sued in all directions, were almost destroyed.
All the rest of the 4th, and the whole night,
were spent in rallying all the columns and con-
centrating them on Castiglione.
VIII.
Before day -break on the 5th, the French army,
20,000 strong, occupied the heights of Casti-
glione, an excellent position. Serrurier's divi-
sion, consisting of 5000 men, had received orders
to set out from Marcaria, to march all night, and
to attack Wurmser's left in the rear, at daylight ;
the firing of this division was to be the signal for
the battle. A great moral success was looked
for from this unexpected attack, and in order to
render it more sensible, the French army made a
feint of falling back; but on the report of the
first cannon fired by the division of Serrurier
(who being ill, his place was supplied by General
Fiorella,) the troops marched briskly forward and
attacked the enemy, whose confidence was al-
ready shaken, and whose first ardour had evapo-
rated. The hill of Medole, in the midst of the
'248 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON 1 .
plain, was the appui of the enemy's left ; Adju-
tant-general Verdier was ordered to attack it ;
the Aide-de-camp Marmont directed several bat-
teries of artillery against it: the post was carried.
Massena attacked the right, Augereau the centre,
and Fiorella took the left in rear. The light
cavalry surprised the head-quarters of the enemy,
and were very near taking Wurmser. The ene-
my retreated from all points. Nothing but the
excessive fatigue of the French troops could have
saved Wurmser's army, which reached the left
bank of the Mincio in great disorder, hoping to
rally and make a stand there. That position af-
forded the advantage of a communication with
Mantua; but Augereau's division marched on
Borghetto, and Massena's on Peschiera. General
Guillaume, commandant of that fortress, having
only 400 men, had walled up the gates, and
some hours were lost in clearing them again.
The Austrian troops which blockaded Peschiera
were fresh; they long maintained the conflict
with the 18th of the line, commanded by Colonel
Suchet, but at length they were broken, and lost
eighteen pieces of cannon and many prisoners.
The General-in-chief marched with Serrurier's
division on Verona, where he arrived on the 7th,
during the night. Wurmser had had the gates
shut, wishing to gain the night for his baggage
to file off, but they were battered down by the
BATTLE'. OF CAST1GLIONE. 249
cannon, and the French took the town. The
Austrians lost a great number of men. Auge-
reau's division, finding it difficult to effect its
passage at Borghetto, passed the Mincio at the
bridge of Peschiera. Wurmser, having lost the
line of the Mincio, tried to preserve the impor-
tant positions of Montebaldo and Rocca d'Anfo.
General Saint-Hilaire attacked Quasdanowich,
by the valley of the Ydro, on the 12th, took
possession of Rocca d'Anfo, Lodrone, and Riva,
and made many prisoners, which obliged the
Austrians to burn the flotilla on the lake. Mas-
sena marched on Montebaldo, and retook la
Corona on the 11th. Augereau reascended the
left bank of the Adige, traversing the ridges of
the mountains, until he reached the heights of
Alia. The fighting and manoeuvres of these two
divisions produced 200 prisoners and several
pieces of cannon. After the loss of two such
battles as those of Lonato and Castiglione, Wurm-
ser perceived that he could no longer dispute
the power of the French to occupy whatever po-
sition they might choose ; he therefore retreated
to Roveredo and Trent. The French army itself
stood in need of repose. The Austrians, not-
withstanding their defeat, were still 40,000
strong; but there was this difference, namely,
that one battalion of the Army of Italy was now
sufficient to put to flight four battalions of the
250 MEMOIRS OF N A POL* ON.
enemy, and that the French troops were picking
up cannon, prisoners, and military effects in all
directions.
Wurmser had, indeed, revictualled the garrison
of Mantua ; and withdrawn from it the brigades
of Rocca Vina and Wukassowich ; but he had
only brought back half his fine army. Nothing-
could equal the discouragement and dejection of
his troops since their reverses, except the ex-
treme confidence with which they had opened the
campaign. The Austrian general's plan, which
might have succeeded under other circumstances
and against another antagonist, was calculated to
produce the fatal result with which it was at-
tended ; and although at the first glance the de-
feat of this numerous and excellent army in so
few days, seems attributable only to the talents
of Napoleon, who incessantly invented new ma-
noeuvres as occasion required, whilst the enemy
was confined to a general plan laid down before-
hand, it must be allowed that this plan rested on
an erroneous foundation ; it was an error to make
corps which had no communication with each
other act separately in the face of a centralized
army, whose communications were easy ; the
right could only communicate with the centre by
Roveredo and Ledro. It was a second error to
subdivide the corps of the right, and to allot dif-
ferent tasks to its several divisions. That which
BATTLE OK CASTIGLIONE. 25 1
went to Brescia found nobody opposed to it, and
that which reached Lonato had to contend with
the troops which were at Verona the preceding
day, opposed to the left, which was now entering
the Veronese with no enemy before it. The
Austrian army contained some very good troops,
but it had also some of very indifferent quality :
all those who came from the Rhine with Wurm-
ser were excellent ; but the skeletons of Beau-
lieu's old army, which had been so often de-
feated, were disheartened. In the different en-
gagements and battles which occurred between
the 29th of July and the 12th of August, the
French army took .15,000 prisoners, 70 pieces
of cannon, and nine stand of colours, and killed
or wounded 25,000 men ; the loss of the French
army was 7000 men; 1400 being taken, GOO
killed, and 5000 wounded, half of whom were
only slightly hurt.
IX.
The garrison of Mantua employed the first few
days after the raising of the siege in destroying
the works of the besiegers, and in getting in the
guns and stores which they had abandoned ; but
the reverses sustained by Wurmser speedily
brought the French once more before the place.
But the loss of their artillery had left them des-
titute of the means of resuming the siege. This
252 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
train of artillery, formed, by great exertions, of
pieces collected in the different fortresses of
Italy, was a very severe loss. Besides, the open-
ing of the trenches and the duty therein would
have been too dangerous for the troops, at the
moment when the malignity of the climate was
about to commence its usual ravages during the
dog-days. Napoleon did not attempt to form a
second besieging train, as it could not have been
ready before new enemies would have exposed
him to the chance of losing it as he had lost the
former, by forcing him to raise the siege a second
time. He therefore contented himself with a
mere blockade. General Sahuguet was ap-
pointed to the command of it ; he attacked
Governolo, and caused General Dallemagne to
attack Borgo-Forte; on the 24th of August he
was master of the whole of the Serraglio, had
driven the enemy into the place, and increased
the strictness of the blockade. He then pro-
ceeded to multiply the redoubts and works on
the line of countervallation. The troops were
daily diminished in number by the ravages of the
fever, and it was foreseen with consternation
that this destruction would increase during the
autumn. The garrison, was, indeed, subject to
the same calamity, but was better sheltered in
the houses, and enjoyed more accommodations
than the besiegers.
BATTLE OF CASTIGLIONE. 253
X.
On the first rumours of the reverses sustained
by the French army, the Italians of the different
states discovered their secret inclinations. The
enemy's party appeared the stronger at Cremona,
Casal Maggiore, and Pavia ; but, in general,
Lombardy continued to manifest a good spirit ;
at Milan, in particular, the people shewed great
firmness, which subsequently gained them Napo-
leon's confidence, who supplied them with arms,
which they had constantly and earnestly soli-
cited, and of which they afterwards made a good
use. He wrote, shortly after, to the Milanese,
in these terms : " When the French army beat a
" retreat, and the partisans of Austria and ene-
" mies of the liberty of Italy, regarded it as
" irretrievably lost ; when you yourselves could
'* not possibly suspect that this retreat was only
" a stratagem, you proved your attachment to
" France and to liberty ; you displayed a zeal
" and resolution by which you have merited
" the esteem of the army, and well deserve the
" protection of the Republic. Your people ren-
" der themselves daily more worthy of liberty ;
" they are constantly acquiring fresh energy,
" and they will, no doubt, one day appear with
" glory on the stage of the world. Accept the
" testimony of my satisfaction, and of the sincere
254 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
" prayers of the French nation to see you free
" and happy."
The people of Bologna, Ferrara, Reggio, and
Modena, evinced a lively interest in the cause of
the French ; the news of their defeats was ill re-
ceived, but the accounts of their victories were
hailed with enthusiasm. Parma remained faith-
ful ; the Regency of Modena assumed a hostile
attitude. At Rome the French were insulted in
the streets ; and the execution of the conditions
of the armistice was suspended. Cardinal Mat-
tel, archbishop of Ferrara, testified his joy at the
raising of the siege of Mantua, and called on the
people to revolt. He took possession of the
citadel of Ferrara, and hoisted the colours of the
Church ; the Pope immediately sent a legate
thither ; they thought the French army already
beyond the Alps. After the battle of Castiglione,
Cardinal Mattei was ordered to Brescia ; when
brought before the Commander-in-chief, he an-
swered only by the word peccavi, which disarmed
the victor, who merely confined him three months
in a seminary. This cardinal was afterwards the
Pope's plenipotentiary at Tolentino. He was of
a princely family in Rome ; a man of little talent
or information, but who passed for sincerely
devout; he was a scrupulous observer of the
practices of religion. After the death of Pope
Pius VI, the Court of Austria made great efforts
BATTLE OF CA.STIGLIONE. 255
in the conclave at Venice to get him elected
Pope, but did not succeed ; Chiaramonti, bishop
of Imola, gained the election, and took the name
of Pius VII.
It was to reward Augereau's good conduct at
the battle of Lonato, when he commanded the
right, and was ordered to attack Castiglione, that
he was afterwards made a duke with that title.
That day was the most brilliant of General Au-
gereau's life, nor did Napoleon ever forget it.
CHAPTER X.
MANOEUVRES AND ACTIONS BETWEEN THE MIN-
CIO AND THE BRENTA. (SEPTEMBER.)
1. Position of the Austrian army in the Tyrol, on the 1st of
Sept. — II. Battle of Roveredo (Sept. 4). — III. Wurmser
descends into the plains of the Bassanese — IV. Actions of
Primolano, Covolo, and Cismone (Sept. 7) ; the French army
forces the defiles of the Brenta. — V. Action of Verona
(Sept. 7).— VI. Battle of Bassano (Sept. 8).— VII. Wurmser
passes the Adige hy the bridge of Porto Legnago (Sept. 11).
— VIII. Battle of Saint-Georges (Sept. 19). — Wurmser is
shut up in Mantua (Sept. 18). — IX. Third blockade of
Mantua.
I.
The Armies of the Sambre and Meuse, and of
the Rhine and Moselle, had at length passed the
Rhine ; they advanced rapidly into the heart
of Germany ; the former had reached the Red-
nitz, and the latter the Lech. Wurmser, re-
cruited with 20,000 men, was in the Tyrol ; he
was commencing his movement to advance from
Trent, with 30,000 men, to the relief of Mantua,
marching by the defiles of the Rrenta, Bassano,
and the Lower Adige, and leaving Davidowich,
ACTIONS BETWEEN THE RUN CIO & B RENT A. 257
with 25,000 men, in charge of the Tyrol. Napo-
leon was sensible of the importance of occupying
the Austrian army, in order to prevent its de-
taching any troops against the army of the
Rhine, which was approaching the plains of
Bavaria. As soon, therefore, as he discovered
Wurmser's intentions, he resolved to assume the
offensive, defeat him in detail, by surprising him
in flagrante delicto, and complete the destruction
of this army, which had caused him so much
anxiety, and had not sufficiently expiated its
offences by the disasters of Lonato, and Cas-
tiglione.
General Kilmaine, with a corps of 2500 or
3000 soldiers of all weapons, was charged with
the guarding of the Adige, in order to cover the
blockade of Mantua, which was commanded by
General Sahuguet ; Kilmaine occupied the plains
of Verona and Porto Legnago. That part of
the walls of Verona which is on the left bank
of the Adige, had been restored, and the forts
put in a state of defence capable of sustaining
a siege. In the instructions which Kilmaine
received, all the events which took place were
foreseen.*
* These instructions, which must be in the hands of Ki)-
tnaine's heirs, are an important historical document.
Memoirs. — vol. hi. s
258 MEMOIRS OF NAPOr.EOX.
On the first of September, Wurmser and his
head-quarters were still at Trent ; Davidowich's
head-quarters were at Roveredo, covering the
Tyrol by Wukassowich's division, which was en-
camped at Saint-Marc, having its vanguard at
Serravalle, and its advanced posts at Alia, and
by Reuss's division, encamped at Mori, on the
right bank of the Adige, with its vanguard at
the bridge of Serea, and its advanced posts on
Lodrone, its reserve in the excellent position of
Galliano, behind Roveredo : the three divisions
and the reserves of cavalry with which Wurmser
wished to operate on the Adige, were on their
march between Trent and Bassano ; Mezaros's
division near that town ; Sebottendorfs at Ro-
vigo and Magano ; and Quasdanowich's at Lavis.
Vaubois' division, forming the left of the
French army, marched on the same day, the first
of September, from Ladroneup the Chiesa, along
the road leading to Trent. Massenas division,
the reserve of cavalry, and the head-quarters,
passed the Adige by the bridge of Pola, directing
their march by the road of the left bank. Au-
gereau's division left Verona, and marched as a
second line by the same road ; its light infantry
occupying the upper ridge of the mountains
which command the valley on the left bank of
the Adige.
The Tyrol is one of the most ancient posses-
ACTIONS BETWEEN THE MINCIO& BRENTA. 259
sions of the house of Austria, to which the people
are strongly attached. The Trentine country,
which is the southern part, also called the Ita-
lian Tyrol, was governed by a bishop, who was
sovereign of Trent. There are three roads lead-
ing from Trent into Italy ; one to Bassano, along
the Brenta ; one to Verona, by Roveredo, along
the left bank of the Adige ; and one to Brescia,
crossing the Sarca, doubling the lake of Garda,
running along the Chiesa, and passing Rocca
d'Anfo. There is a communication between the
Verona road, and that of Bassano, by a cross
road, without going back to Trent, from which
place both roads branch out.
II.
The prince of Reuss wished to defend the
bridge of the Sarca; but General Saint- Hilaire,
who commanded the vanguard of Vaubois' divi-
sion, attacked him furiously, carried the bridge
at the point of the bayonet, made a great
number of prisoners, and pursued the enemy
closely as far as their camp at Mori. At the
same time General Pigeon, commanding Mas-
sena's vanguard, overthrew that of Wukassowich
at Serravalle, pursuing them to the camp of
Saint-Marc and taking several hundred prisoners.
The two armies met on the 4th of Septem-
ber at day-break, on both sides of the Adige.
s2
2G0 Memoirs of napoleon.
The attack was impetuous, the resistance obsti-
nate. As soon as Napoleon perceived some
hesitation in the Austrian line, he made General
Dubois charge with 500 horse ; the charge
was successful, but Dubois received three bul-
lets, and fell dead on the spot. He was a brave
officer, and had distinguished himself in the
preceding campaigns on the Rhine. The troops
entered Roveredo intermixed with the enemy,
who were unable to rally until they reached the
defile before Calliano, a very strong position,
where the Adige is inclosed between very steep
mountains. The defile is not four hundred toises
wide, and the entrance is defended by fortifica-
tions and a wall supported by several batteries.
General Davidowich was posted there with a
reserve ; General Dammartin planted a battery
of light artillery so as to take the gorge ob-
liquely. The skirmishers engaged, and obtained
some success on the mountains. Nine battalions
in close column rushed into the defile, attacked
and overthrew the enemy ; his artillery, cavalry,
and infantry, were all thrown into confusion and
intermixed. Fifteen pieces of cannon, seven
stand of colours, and 700 men were taken.
At the same time General Vaubois forced the
camp of Mori, and pursued the enemy briskly
up the right bank of the river, in the direction
of Trent. Lemarrois, aide-de-camp to the Ge-
ACTIONS BETWEEN THE M1NCIO& BRENTA. 2G1
neral-in-chief, was grievously wounded in a
daring and brilliant charge at Roveredo. This
young man had distinguished himself in Vende-
miaire at Paris ; he was of a very ardent character,
and came from the department of La Manche.
The army continued its march during part of
the night. On the 5th, at day-break, it entered
Trent. In the evening Vaubois' division, con-
tinuing its march, took up a position on the
Avisio, three leagues from Trent ; the wrecks of
Davidowich's army were in position behind that
river. Napoleon ordered the general command-
ing the cavalry to ford the river with three
squadrons, to cut the enemy's line, and to take
the troops which defended the bridge in the rear,
whilst he caused them to be charged in front.
The enemy was thrown into the greatest disor-
der, and abandoned his position; and General
Vaubois established himself on the banks of the
Avisio.
III.
The loss of the battle of Roveredo, instead of
stopping Wurmsers movement on Bassano, only
accelerated it : indeed, being cut off from Trent
and the Tyrol, it was necessary for him to get
out of the denies as speedily as possible, and to
collect his army at Bassano, in order to take up
his line of operations by the Frioul. But another
motive determined him to take this step : he
262 MEMOIUS OF NAPOLEON.
suffered himself" to be persuaded that Napoleon
wished to march to Innspruck, to join the Army
of the Rhine, then arrived in Bavaria ; and on
this false supposition he ordered Mezaros's divi-
sion to march on Mantua. On the 7th of Sep-
tember it arrived before Verona ; and at the same
time, Wurmser's head-quarters, with Sebotten-
dorfs and Quasdanowich's divisions and his re-
serves, reached Bassano ; and his rear-guard
took position at Primolano, to defend the passes
of the Brenta. In the night of the 5th of Sep-
tember, intelligence reached Trent from General
Kilmaine at Verona, that Mezaros's division had
passed the Brenta and was marching on the
Adige, and that it would probably attack Verona
on the 7th of September. Napoleon instantly
conceived the idea of hemming in Wurmser
between the Brenta and the Adige, or, if on the
approach of the French, he should fall back on
the Piave, of surrounding and taking Mezaros's
division, which was already compromised, and
too far advanced to retreat. He intrusted the
defence of the Italian Tyrol to General Vaubois,
who from his position at the Avisio, could easily
advance to the Brenner to meet Mezaros's gene-
ral, should his right reach Innspruck. At night
he organized the administration of the country,
and caused the following proclamation to be
posted-
ACTIONS BETWEEN THE MINCIO & BRENT A. 2G3
" Tyrolese ! you solicit the protection of the
" French army : you must render yourselves
" worthy of that protection ; and, since the ma-
" jority of you are well disposed, compel the
" few obstinate men amongst you to submit.
" Their senseless proceedings tend to draw the
" horrors of war upon their country ; the supe-
" riority of my arms is now sufficiently proved.
" The Emperor's ministers, purchased by Eng-
" lish gold, are betraying their master, and that
" unfortunate prince does not take a single step
" without committing an error. You wish for
" peace, and the French are fighting for the same
" object. We only enter your territories to force
" the Court of Vienna to yield to the wishes of
" distracted Europe, and to listen to the cries of
" its own people ! We do not come to aggrandize
" France ; Nature has marked our limits by the
" Rhine and the Alps, whilst she has placed the
" limits of the house of Austria in the Tyrol. Ty-
" rolese, whatever may have been your conduct
" heretofore, return to your homes, quit the co-
" lours so often defeated and so powerless in
" your defence : the conquerors of the Alps can
f? have nothing to fear from a few additional ene-
" mies, but the generosity of my nation com-
" mands me to endeavour to save unnecessary
'? victims. We have rendered ourselves formid-
" able in battle, but we are the friends of all who
264 MEMOIRS OF VAI'Ol.KO.V.
" receive us with hospitality. The religion, cus-
" toms, and property of all the communes which
" submit shall be respected ;" &c.
On the Gth, at day-break, Napoleon commenced
his march, with Augereau's divisions in front,
Massena and the reserve, by the defiles of the
Brenta, to proceed on Bassano with all possible
expedition. It was necessary to perform this
march of twenty leagues, over a difficult road,
in two days at the utmost. In the evening the
head-quarters and the army were at Borgo-Val-
Sugagna.
IV.
On the 7th at day-break, he recommenced his
march; his van soon fell in with that of Wurm-
ser, in position behind Primolano : it seemed im-
possible to dislodge them from this post; but
nothing could withstand the French army; the
fifth light infantry, dispersed as skirmishers, and
supported by the three battalions of the fourth of
the line in three close columns, broke the double
line of the Austrians. The fifth dragoons, com-
manded by Colonel Milhaud, cut off the road.
Almost the whole of the enemy's vanguard laid
down their arms ; all the artillery, colours, and
baggage, were taken. The little fort of Covolo, a
kind of Chiusa, in vain attempted to resist ; it
was turned and taken. At night the French
ACTIONS BETWEEN THE MINCIO & I'.KJ.N IA. 265
army bivouacked in the village of Cismone, where
Napoleon took up his head-quarters, without at-
tendants or baggage, and passed the night half
dead with hunger and fatigue. A soldier (who
reminded him of the circumstance at the camp
of Boulogne, in 1805, when he was emperor)
shared his ration of bread with him. Several
parks of ammunition waggons, twelve pieces of
cannon, five stand of colours, and 4200 men
were taken.
V.
The same evening Mezaros's division attacked
Verona, which place it was in hopes to occupy
without resistance. But all the ground before
Verona had been put in a defensive state ; a
strong half-moon had been constructed before
the Vicenza gate. General Kilmaine expected
Mezaros. He defended the approaches of the
town by means of some squadrons of cavalry,
which, falling back behind the fortifications, al-
lowed thirty guns from the ramparts to shower
grape on the Austrian column. After a few vain
attempts, Mezaros, considering it impossible to
take the town by main force, encamped at St.
Michel, and demanded reinforcements and pon-
toons to enable him to pass the Adige and sur-
round the town ; but Wurmser being just then
surprised and menaced in Bassano, ordered him
26G MEMOIRS OK NAPOLEON.
to fall back and join him with all possible expedi-
tion. He hoped to collect his army together in
time to stop the French before Bassano. It was
too late. Mezaros's division did not reach Mon-
tebello until the 8th, the day on which the
battle of Bassano was fought.
VI.
On the 8th of September, before day-light,
Napoleon was at the advanced posts; at six
o'clock the vanguard attacked, and overthrew
six battalions which were in position in the
passes on the two banks of the Brenta ; their
remains fell back on the line of battle, which
was about 20,000 strong, but which made only
a weak resistance. Augereau's division attacked
the left ; Massena's the right ; the enemy was
broken in all directions, and driven back on Bas-
sano. The fourth of the line, in a close column,
passed the bridge as at Lodi. At three o'clock
the army entered Bassano, and took 6000 pri-
soners, eight stand of colours, two pontoon trains,
two hundred baggage waggons, thirty- two pieces
of cannon, and one hundred ammunition waggons
of all kinds, all which waggons had teams of
four horses. Wurmser retreated in disorder on
Vicenza, being now unable to retreat on the
Piave ; at Vicenza he rallied Mezaros's division.
He thus found himself cut off from the heredi-
ACTIONS BETWEEN THE MtNClO & BRENTA. 267
tary states, and from his communications with
Austria. General Quasdanowich, with 3000 men,
being cut off from Bassano, fell back on the
Frioul. On the 9th, Massena's division march-
ed on Vicenza, and Augereau's on Padua, inter-
cepting those two great roads, in case Wurmser
should attempt to return to the Brenta, in order
to reach the Piave. But that general, after his
defeats at Roveredo, in the passes of the Brenta,
at Bassano and before Verona, had now no troops
under his command but such as were much dis-
heartened; he had lost the flower of his army; out
of a force of 60,000 men, he had now but 16,000
in junction under his command. Never was
there a more critical situation. He himself de-
spaired, and the French were every hour in
hopes of seeing him lay down his arms.
VII.
Of these 16,000 men, 6000 were cavalry, of
good quality, and not discouraged, not having
suffered loss or been defeated. These horsemen
spread themselves over the country in search of
a passage across the Adige ; two squadrons of
them passed to the right bank of the Adige at
the ferry of Albaredo, to reconnoitre the posi-
tion of the French, and obtain some intelligence
from Mantua. It was impossible for Wurmser
to pass the Adige at this ferry, closely followed
208 MEMOIRS of NAPOLEON.
as he was by the French army, and alter having
lost his pontoons at 13assano. His position was
become desperate, when the French evacuated
Legnago without destroying the bridge. This
error, committed by a lieutenant-colonel, saved
Wurmser. Kilmaine when attacked at Verona by
Mezaros's division, had ordered the 400 men who
guarded Legnago to join him, and directed Sahu-
guet to replace them by a detachment from the
forces blockading Mantua. The lieutenant-colo-
nel who commanded this detachment, having had
a few men sabred on the road from Legnago to
Mantua, suffered himself to be persuaded that
the whole of the Austrian army had passed at
Albaredo, and was about to cut off his retreat.
He gave credit to the report spread by the
enemy of the disasters experienced by the
French army, which was said to have perished
in the Tyrol. Believing himself intercepted, he
was perfectly bewildered, evacuated the place,
and retreated on Mantua. Wurmser, informed
of this fortunate occurrence, instantly marched
on Legnago, entered the place without firing a
shot, and availed himself of the bridge to pass
the Adige. At the same time the General-in-
chief reached Arcole. On receiving this vex-
atious intelligence, he took possession of the
ferry of Ronco, sent Massena over to the right
bank, and ordered Augereau to march from Pa-
dua on Legnago : still entertaining hopes of sur-
ACTIONS BETWEEN THE ftftNCIO & BRENTA.2G9
rounding the Marshal once more by reaching- the
Molinella before him. Kilmaine, with all the
disposable force he could muster, had stationed
himself on that river, intercepting the road to
Mantua : but his force being inconsiderable, it
was necessary to join him before the enemy
should reach him. Wurmser lost valuable time
at Legnago ; whether excessive fatigue compelled
him to give his troops a little rest, or whether,
supposing the French to be on the road from
Vicenza to Ronco, he hesitated for a time, in hopes
to open once more his natural communications
by way of Padua. As he had a great number of
cavalry, he was enabled to obtain intelligence
and watch the French at a great distance. His
scouts informed him that the French were at
Montagnana, a place in his front, where they
had arrived by way of Padua ; and that they
were approaching Legnago by the two roads.
He then commenced his march on Mantua.
There are two roads leading from Ronco to
Sanguinetto, where it was intended to intercept
the enemy : one of them runs on the left, along
the Adige, and intersects the road from Legnago
to Mantua at Cerea ; the other leads direct from
Ronco to Sanguinetto. General Pigeon, with
Massena's vanguard, marched directly on San-
guinetto; but Murat, who was sent forward to
reconnoitre with the light horse, had taken the
Cerea road, as that which would bring him
270 m t: M o i its o 1 N apol v. < I N .
nearest to the enemy. He soon began a can-
nonade with them. Pigeon, hearing the cannon,
rested his left on Cerea, advanced to that place,
and drew up the fourth light demi-biigade in
line behind the rivulet to stop the way. Wurm-
ser was cut off; he would have been lost, had he
not succeeded in forcing a passage. He attacked
Cerea, deployed his whole army, and surrounded
the small vanguard of the French, which was
soon broken ; 3 or 400 men remained in his
power. Being left master of the field of battle,
he continued his march on Sanguinetto without
delay. It was during the conflict at Cerea that
the General-in-chief, having galloped up to the
village just as his vanguard was routed, had
only just time enough to turn round, clap spurs
to his horse, and get clear off. Wurmser came
up, a few minutes after, to the very spot where
he had been, and learning the circumstance
from an old woman, sent in pursuit of him in
every direction, particularly recommending that
he should be brought in alive. After reach-
ing Sanguinetto, Wurmser marched all night.
Having discovered that Sahuguet's and Kil-
maine's reserves were waiting for him at the
Molinella, he quitted the high road, turned to
the left, and reached Villa-Impenta on the 12th,
where there was a little bridge guarded by a
small detachment ; his cavalry surprised it. Ge-
ACTIONS BETWEEN' THE MINCIO& BRENTA. 271
neral Charton, who hastened with 500 men of the
12th light demi-brigade from the army before
Mantua, to defend this bridge, could not reach it
in time ; he then formed the square, on the road,
and made a vigorous resistance ; but he was sa-
bred by the Austrian cuirassiers, and left dead
on the field. This detachment was lost. On the
14th the reverses of the old Marshal were airain
alleviated by another slight advantage at Duc-
Castelli, similar to those of Cerea and Villa-
Impenta ; a battalion of light infantry was there
cut off and broken by two regiments of cuiras-
siers, and lost 300 men. The troops were exces-
sively fatigued, and their duty began to be neg-
ligently performed.
VIII.
The trifling successes obtained by the Austrian
army, in the actions of Cerea, Villa-Impenta,
and Due-Castelli, encouraged it to keep the field.
The garrison of Mantua came out, and Wurmser
encamped his army between Saint-Georges and
the citadel. He had then 33,000 men under his
command ; 5000 were in the hospitals ; he left
5000 to guard the place ; and encamped with
25,000, of whom 5000 were cavalry ; he was
in hopes, by thus occupying the country, to
find an opportunity of reaching Legnago, and
repassing the Adige : but General Bon, who
272 A! KM oiks OF NAPOLEON.
commanded Augereau's division, entered Leg-
Dago on -the 13th of September, made 1700 pri-
soners, took twenty -four pieces of horse artillery,
and liberated 500 French soldiers, who had been
taken at Cerea and in other petty engagements.
On the 16th he reached Governolo, forming the
left of the army ; Massena, who was at Due-
Castelli, formed the centre ; Sahuguet, with the
troops engaged in the blockade, was at la
Favorite, forming the right; Kilmaine had col-
lected all the cavalry. The forced marches per-
formed during this last fortnight, had greatly
weakened the regiments. On the 16th, in the
evening, the army amounted to 24,000 men
under arms, of whom 3000 were cavalry. The
two armies were equal in strength, but their
quality was very different ; of the enemy's troops
the cavalry alone retained their confidence.
On the 19th of September, General Bon began
his march from Governolo, supported his left on
the Mincio, and approached Saint-Georges. The
action became very brisk ; the Austrians sent
their reserve to take part in it. Bon was not
only stopped, but even lost a little ground. Sa-
huguet engaged on the right ; the enemy thought
the whole line was in action, when Massena
debouched in column on the centre, and car-
ried disorder into the enemy's army, which re-
treated precipitately into the town, after having
ACTION'S BETWEEN' THE MINCIO & BRENTA. 273
lost 3000 prisoners, amongst whom was a regi-
ment of cuirassiers, completely mounted, with
three standards and eleven pieces of cannon.
After the battle of Saint-Georges, Wurmser
spread his troops throughout the Serraglio, threw
a bridge over the Po, and got provisions into
the place. On the 21st of September he attacked
Governolo, and was repulsed with the loss of
1000 men, and six pieces of cannon ; had he
gained possession of this point, he meant to
have endeavoured to reach the Adige. At
length, on the 1st of October, Kilmaine, who
commanded the blockade, entered the Serraglio,
seized Pradella and Ceresa, -and completely
blockaded the place. This operation, which oc-
casioned several very hot actions, maintained
with a few men, did the General great credit.
From the 1st of June to the 18th of September,
the enemy had lost 27,000 men, of whom 18,000
were taken prisoners, 3000 killed, and 6000
wounded, seventy-five pieces of cannon, twenty-
two ensigns and standards, thirty generals, eighty
of the civil list from head-quarters, and 6000
horse. The marshal and 16,000 men had been
obliged to throw themselves into Mantua: 10,000
men out of this army had escaped into the Tyrol
under Davidowich, and into the Frioul under
Quasdanowich. The French army had lost 7500
j\lemows.—\oj.. in. t
274 MF.MOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
men ; of whom 1400 were taken, 1800 killed, and
4300 wounded.
Marmont, whom the General-in-chief des-
patched to Paris with the colours taken in the
battles of Roveredo, Bassano, and Saint-Georges,
and the actions of Primolano and Cismone, was
one of his aides-de-camp: he had found him an
ensign of artillery at Toulon, and had taken him
into his service. He was afterwards Duke of
Ragusa and a marshal of France. He came from
the department of the Cdte d'Or.
IX.
The troops having, for the present, no enemy
before them, took a little rest. Vaubois occupied
Trent, and intrenched himself on the banks of
the Avisio ; Massena's division occupied Bassano,
observing the passage of the Piave. Augereau's
division occupied Verona ; Kilmaine commanded
the blockade of Mantua. The battles of Rove-
redo, Bassano, and Saint-Georges, the inter-
mediate actions, and the sickness incident to the
blockade, had weakened the troops. The gar-
rison of Mantua at first made numerous sorties
in great force; but reverses and sickness soon
cooled its ardour. At the end of October it
amounted to 17,000 men under arms, and about
10,000 in the hospitals ; that is to say, nearly
30,000 mouths to feed ; whence it was hoped that
ACTTOKS BETWEEN THE MINCIO & BRENTA. 275
the place would speedily be surrendered ; but
the old marshal had the greater part of his cavalry
horses salted, which, added to the provisions of
all kinds which he had collected in the vicinity,
and particularly those he had obtained from the
Regency of Modena, which on both occasions,
when the siege was raised, had sent in convoys
prepared long beforehand, put the place in a con-
dition to make a longer defence than had been
expected. Contrary to all probability, and to
the opinion of all Italy, the French army was
yet to gain more sanguinary and glorious vic-
tories, and Austria was yet to levy and to lose
two armies, before this bulwark of Italy was
to yield to its fate.
Kilmaine was of Irish origin, and an excellent
cavalry officer : he possessed coolness and a
quick eye ; he was well adapted for the com-
mand of detached corps of observation, and all
delicate commissions which require discernment,
talent, and sound judgment. He had been em-
ployed in Prairial against the faubourg Saint-
Antoine. At the period of the campaign of Italy
he was about fifty years of age. He rendered the
army important services, and would have been
one of its principal generals, but for the delicacy
of his health. He was well acquainted with the
Austrian troops; and, understanding their tactics
thoroughly, never suffered himself to be imposed
T 2
27G MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
upon by the false reports which they are accus-
tomed to spread in the rear of an army, nor by
those heads of columns which they place on the
communications, in all directions, to make the
enemy believe there are great forces present,
when in fact there are none. His political opi-
nions were verv moderate.
CHAPTER XI.
SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMIES
OF THE SAMBRE AND MEUSE AND RHINE, IN
GERMANY, DURING THE YEAR 1796.
I. Winter quarters in 1796. — II. The Austrian armies of Ger-
many detach 30,000 men into Italy. — III. Marches and ac-
tions in the month of June. — IV. The Army of the Rhine
arrives on the Necker on the 18th of July.— V. The Army of
the Samhre and Meuse reaches the Mein on the 12th of July.
— VI. March of the Army of the Samhre and Meuse from the
Mein to the Naah ; position occupied hy it on the 21st of
August. — VII. March of the Army of the Rhine from the
Necker to the Lech; battle of Neresheim (August 11); po-
sition occupied on the 23d of August. — VIII. Prince Charles's
manoeuvre against the Army of Samhre and Meuse ; battle ol
Amberg (August 24); precipitate retreat of that army ; bat-
tle of Wurtzburg (September 3) ; the army encamps on the
Lahn (September 10); on the 20th it repasses the Rhine;
marches and countermarches of the Army of the Rhine, dur-
ing September ; its retreat. — IX. Battle of Biberach (Octo-
ber 8). — X. Siege of Khel and of the tite-de-font of Hunin-
guen. — XI. Observations.
I.
Prussia concluded her peace with the Repub-
lic in April 1795. By a convention signed on
the 17th of May following, regulations were made
278 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
respecting the conduct to be pursued by the
belligerent armies in the provinces which they
would be obliged to cross. But this convention
having given rise to many discussions, it was sti-
pulated, at Berlin, on the 20th of August, that a
line should be drawn from Wesel on the Rhine
along the frontiers of the mountains of Thuringia,
which line no belligerent army should cross; that
the territories of the King of Prussia and of the
German princes who should adhere to this Prus-
sian confederation, and situate to the south of this
line, should be neutral ; but that the belligerent
armies should nevertheless be at liberty to cross
them, on paying for the supplies they should
require, but should not be allowed to construct
any intrenchments therein.
During the summer of 1795, the Austrians had
two armies acting on the Rhine ; one called that
of the Lower Rhine, under the command of Field-
Marshal Clairfaith ; the other called that of the
Upper Rhine, under the command of Marshal
Wurmser. To the former the French opposed
the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded
by General Jourdan, and to the second the Army
of the Rhine, commanded by Pichegru, who oc-
cupied lines of circumvallation round Mentz.
Notwithstanding the defection of Prussia, this
campaign ended favourably for the Austrians.
In October they forced the lines of countervalla-
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 1706. 271)
tion at Mentz, took a great number of field-pieces,
and repulsed Pichegru into the lines of Weissem-
burg. Hostilities were terminated by an armis-
tice, signed, on the 23d of December, 1795, by
which it was stipulated, 1st, that the Army of
the Sambre and Meuse should occupy the for-
tress of Dusseldorf, with its advanced posts three
leagues in advance on the left bank of the Wip-
per, whence its line should run along the left
bank of the Rhine as far as the mouth of the
Nahe, near Bingen, from which place it was to
pass up the left bank of the Nahe as far as the
mountains, reach the frontiers of Alsace, and run
along the lines of Weissemburg, whence the
Rhine was to form the limit as far as Bale ; 2dly,
that the Austrians should have their advanced
posts on the left bank of the Sieg, a river which
falls into the Rhine opposite Bonn ; that the
countries between the Wipper and the Sieg
should be neutral ; that the Austrian line should
run from the mouth of the Sieg along the right
bank of the Rhine as far as the mouth of the
Nahe, whence it should cross the Rhine near
Bingen, and pass up the left bank of the Nahe
as far as the mountains ; the Austrians thus
occupying Mentz and all the countries on the
left bank of the Rhine as far as Weissemburg,
whence their line should return to the right
bank, along which it was to run to Bale. These
2<S0 M E M OIKS F N A POLED N .
arrangements being concluded, J.ourdan fixed bis
head-quarters in the Hundsruck ; Pichegru his
at Strasburg ; Clairfaith his at Mentz ; and
Wurmser his at Manheim.
During the winter France and Austria omitted
nothing that was necessary to be done for the pur-
pose of recruiting and clothing their armies, and
putting them in the best possible state. The
success of the past campaign had inspired the
Cabinet of Vienna with great hopes. Clairfaith
was recalled, and Prince Charles was appointed
to command in his stead. General Pichegru
caused the French government much anxiety :
the operations which had caused the misfortunes
of the conclusion of the campaign were so unac-
countable, that they were ascribed to treachery,
of which, however, the Directory had no proofs,
and therefore did not dare to entertain so painful
a suspicion. They nevertheless seized the first
opportunity of removing this general from the
army, and appointed him ambassador to Sweden.
Pichegru refused this diplomatic mission, and
retired to his estate. Moreau was appointed
General-in-chief of the Army of the Rhine, of
which he took the command on the 23d of May,
179G.
II.
In the mean time the campaign had opened in
Italy in the month of April ; the battles of Monte-
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 1 79G. 281
notte, Millesimo, and Mondovi, had determined
the King of Sardinia to sign the armistiee of
Cherasco and abandon the coalition. The more
the Aulic Council had reckoned on the talents
and reputation of General Beaulieu, the greater
was its astonishment at this news. The Arch-
duke was immediately ordered to notify the
recommencement of hostilities, and to begin ope-
rations on the Rhine, either to hinder the French
from reinforcing their army beyond the Alps, or
to effect a diversion in the minds of the people, to
withdraw attention from the disasters of Italy.
When Napoleon left Paris at the end of Febru-
ary, he received a promise that the Armies of the
Sambre and Meuse should open the campaign in
the course of April, yet they remained in their
winter-quarters at the end of May. Every vic-
tory gained by the Army of Italy, every step
it advanced, rendered the necessity that the
French armies of the Rhine should begin opera-
tions more urgent and sensible. The moment
was, however, deferred under various pretexts,
but at length the imprudence of the enemy did
what the French government had not had the
wisdom to order. Moreau, who was at Paris,
had only just time enough to reach Strasburg.
All the troops cantoned on the Moselle, the
Sarre, and the Meuse, put themselves in motion,
and hostilities recommenced on the 1st of June.
282 MEMOIRS OF M A I'OI.KO X.
In the mean time the news of the battle of Lodi,
the battle of Borghetto, the investment of Mantua,
the arrival of the French head-quarters at Verona,
and of their advanced posts on the mountains
of the Tyrol, produced a change in the arrange-
ments of the Court of Vienna. This army, it was
said, marching forward with the utmost rapidity,
had no obstacle to impede its progress; it was
important to check its audacity. Wurmser re-
ceived orders to proceed into Italy with 30,000
men from the army of the Upper Rhine, to act
as a reserve to the remains of Beaulieu's army,
which was reforming in the Tyrol, Carinthia, and
Carniola; to march to the relief of Mantua be-
fore that place should fall, and to reconquer the
hereditary estates of Lombardy, the preservation
of which was of more importance than hazardous
conquests in France. The Emperor united his
two armies of the Rhine under the command of
the Archduke, commanding him not to begin
hostilities, but to let the armistice continue.
But this order came too late, that is to say, only
two hours before hostilities began.
The Archduke, weakened by detaching Wurm-
ser, renounced all the plans of conquest which
he had conceived, and confined his ambition to
defending the passage of the Rhine and covering
Germany. He had under his command: 1st, the
army of the Lower Rhine, under the artillery
OPERATIONS IN GE11MANY, 1796. 283
General Wartensleben, and the Lieutenant-mar-
shals de camp Kray, Werneck, Hotze, Graber,
Colloredo-Mels, Staader, and Lindt ; it consisted
of 101 battalions of infantry, containing 71,000
men, and 139 squadrons of cavalry, containing
22,700 men; total 93,700 men, out of which he
was to supply the garrisons of Ehrenbreitstein,
Mentz, and Manheim ; 2dly, the army of the
Upper Rhine, which, after Wurmser's departure,
remained under the command of the General
of artillery Latour, and of Lieutenant-marshal
de camp Starray, Frcelich, the Prince of Furstem-
berg, Reuss, Riesch, and the Prince of Conde" :
it consisted of fifty-eight battalions of infantry,
containing 65,000 men, and 120 squadrons of
cavalry, containing 18,000 men; total 83,000 men.
Thus the total of the Austrian forces on the
Rhine amounted to 176,700 men, in the month
of May ; but the departure of 30,000 men from
that army for Italy, without reckoning the first
detachment of 6000 men, reduced the Archduke's
army to 150,000 men.
The two French armies amounted, together,
to more than 150,000 combatants. That of the
Sambre and Meuse contained 65,000 infantry
and 11,000 cavalry; total 76,000 men; that of
the Rhine and Moselle 71,000 infantry and 6500
cavalry; total 77,500 men. The former was di-
vided into three corps ; the left under Kleber,
294 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
formed of Collaud's and Lcfebvre's divisions, was
on the right of the Rhine, at Dusseldorf; the
General-in-chief Jourdan was in the Hunsdruck,
with the centre, formed of the divisions of Cham-
pionnet, Grenier, and Bcrnadotte ; the right,
under the command of Marceau, was composed
of his division and that of Poncet ; General Bon-
naud commanded the reserve. The Army of the
Rhine and Moselle was formed in three corps ;
Desaix commanded the left, being the divisions
of Beaupuis and Delmas ; Saint-Cyr the centre,
Duhesme's and Taponnier's divisions ; Ferino the
right, Laborde's and Tharreau's divisions ; and
General Bourcier the reserve of cavalry.
III.
On the 1st of June Kleber marched from
Dusseldorf with his corps d'armce, consisting of
twenty-four battalions, and twenty squadrons;
on the 2d he reached the Sieg, passed that river
after an engagement with his van, and carried
the position of Ukerath. On the 4th he attacked
the Prince of Wurtemburg, encamped with a
corps of 15,000 men on the heights of Altenkir-
chen, beat him, and took 2000 men, four stan-
dards, and twelve pieces of cannon ; after which
he marched on the Lahn. The General-in-chicf
Jourdan passed the Rhine at Neuwied, and join-
ed his left on the Lahn. Marceau raised his
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 1790. 285
camp at Bergelfield, and advanced before Mentz.
Prince Charles drew a detachment of 8000 men
from the Upper Rhine, and marched on the Army
of the Sambre and Meuse. On the 15th of June
he attacked Lefebvre's division at Wetzlar, de-
feated it, and took a standard, and seven pieces
of cannon. Jourdan relinquished the plan he had
announced of giving battle on the 17th of June,
and put all his troops in retreat. He repassed
the Rhine by the bridges of Cologne and Neu-
wied, with part of his army, directing Kleber on
Dusseldorf. This general, being closely pressed
by the enemy, was obliged to receive battle at
Altenkirchen, on the 19th of June ; he extricated
himself from this affair with honour, and regain-
ed his position at Dusseldorf without sustaining
any material loss.
After Wurmser had put his detachment in
march for Italy, he contracted his position,
placed his left on the Rhine, at the little town
of Franckenthal, which he intrenched, and his
right so as to rest on the mountains. Moreau
ordered Desaix and Saint-Cyr to attack him ;
the former manoeuvred between the Rhine and
the mountains ; the second by Homberg and
Deux Ponts. On the 15th of June, after a
pretty warm action, the Austrian rearguard was
overthrown, and obliged to retreat on the tete-
de-pont of Manheim, losing 1000 men; but
28G MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON,
this slight success did not compensate for the
check sustained at the same time by the Army
of the Sambre and Meuse.
IV.
At length the French government became
sensible that Moreau's manoeuvres on the left
bank of the Rhine were of no assistance to the
Army of the Sambre and Meuse; he was there-
fore ordered to pass the Rhine. On the 24th of
June, at two o'clock in the morning, Desaix with
2500 men took possession of the Isle of Erlhen-
Rhin, and in the course of the morning carried
Kehl, taking 800 men and twelve pieces of cannon.
In the evening he began to construct a bridge
of boats, which was finished on the 25th at noon.
In the course of that day, these two divisions, the
reserve of cavalry, the head-quarters, and a divi-
sion of Ferino's, forming a total of 40,000 men,
passed to the right bank ; General Saint-Cyr with
his two divisions remained on the left bank oppo-
site the tHe-de-pont of Manheim ; and one of Ferino's
divisions on the Upper Rhine. General Starray
with twenty-six battalions, of which Conde's army
and the Swabian contingent formed part, was
charged with the defence of the Rhine from Switz-
erland to Rastadt ; Latour with twenty-two batta-
lions was at Manheim ; he kept guard from Rastad t
to the Mein, and occupied the tke-de-pont of Man-
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 179(1. 287
heim on the left bank. Starray's troops were dis-
persed along the right bank. He had two little
camps, each of 6000 men, placed nearly two
leagues from Kehl, one at Wilsteet, and the
other near Offemburg. On the 26th, Ferino
marched up the Rhine, and advanced on the
camp of Wilsteet; and on the 28th marched on
that of Offemburg ; the enemy evacuated them
both. At the same time Desaix, with his corps
and the reserve of the army, advanced on the
llenchen, where General Starray was in position
with 10,000 men. He attacked him briskly,
forced him, took ten pieces of cannon and 1200
men, and pursued him as far as Rastadt, where
General Latour had just arrived from Manheim
with 25,000 men, and taken a position behind
the Murg. But as soon as Saint-Cyr was in-
formed of the enemy's movement from Manheim
on the Upper Rhine, he followed him on the left
bank, passed the bridge of Kehl, advanced on
Freudenstadt, carried the redoubts placed on
Mount Kniebis, and forced the passage of the
Murg, after a brisk action which lasted the
whole day. On the 15th of July General Latour
fell back on the Alb, having lost 1000 men.
The French head-quarters were removed to
Rastadt. In the mean time Ferino took posses-
sion of the Kentzig, proceeding up the Rhine,
and, as fast as he advanced, the brigades which
288 MEMOIHS OF NAPOLEON.
were on the left bank passed the river, and in-
creased his forces.
On the 24th of June the Archduke, being in-
formed of the passage of the Rhine at Kehl,
marched at the head of twenty-four battalions
and two squadrons to the aid of his army of the
Upper Rhine, leaving 30,000 men under the
command of Wartensleben to observe Jourdan,
and 26,000 at the intrenched camp of Hechtz-
heim, to cover Mentz. Having rallied General
Latour behind the Alb, he then had under his
command forty-five battalions, and eighty squa-
drons : that is to say, on his left, in the mountains,
under General Keim, nineteen battalions and
nineteen squadrons ; in the centre before Ett-
lingen, thirteen battalions and twenty-eight
squadrons ; on his right, under General Latour,
ten battalions and twenty-nine squadrons ; and
three battalions and twenty-four squadrons in
observation. With these considerable forces, he
intended to attack the French army on the 10th,
and drive it into the Rhine, but General Moreau
anticipated him. On the 9th Saint-Cyr forced
the Rotensohl, beat Keim, and drove the Saxons
on the Necker. The Archduke, thus anticipated,
marched his centre and his right against Desaix.
The latter withstood the efforts of the Archduke,
and by dint of courage maintained his ground
during the greater part of the day, and in the
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 1796. 289
evening retreated on a position a little in his rear.
This vigorous resistance overawed the enemy,
who, fearful of being cut offby General Saint-Cyr,
who had already reached Nauenburg, beat a re-
treat on Pforzheim, on the 10th, after having de-
tached ten battalions to complete the garrisons of
Philipsburg and Manheim. The following day he
continued his march on Stutgard, where he pass-
ed the Necker, pursued by General Saint-Cyr.
In the mean time General Ferino had forced the
position of Biberach on the Kintzig, crossed the
Black Forest, and arrived at Willingen. The
enemy had entirely evacuated the whole of the
country between the Rhine and the Black Moun-
tains, and the Forest towns had received French
garrisons.
V.
As soon as it was known at the head-quarters
of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse that the
Army of the Rhine had effected its passage, Ge-
neral Kleber again set out, on the 29th of June,
from Dusseldorf. He was joined by Grenier's
division, which passed the Rhine at Cologne ; he
had an engagement at Limburg, and on the 8th of
July he passed the Lahn. The General-in-chief
Jourdan, with the rest of the army, joined him
by the bridge of Neuwied, pressed General War-
tensleben, had some vanguard affairs of ordinary
importance, and passed the Lahn in three co-
Memoirs. — vol. hi. u
290 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
lumns by the bridges of Giessen, Wetzlar, and
Leun. He had a very warm engagement at
Friedberg, beat the enemy, passed the Nidda,
debouched in the plains of the Mein, took up a
position before Frankfort, and granted Wartens-
leben an armistice of a few days to treat for the
surrender of Frankfort, which place opened its
gates ; but that gave the enemy time to gain two
marches, and to reach the Upper Mein. Frank-
fort was well fortified, victualled, and provided
with artillery and military stores. The fort of
Koenigstein, situate one march from Frankfort
on the high road to Cologne, surrendered on the
21st of July, with ninety-three pieces of cannon,
and a garrison of 500 men.
VI.
Jourdan, having received his instructions from
government, left Marceau with 30,000 men be-
fore the fortresses, and advanced into the heart
of Germany with only six divisions, composing a
force of 50,000 men. He skirted the borders of
the mountains of Thuringia on the confines of
Saxony, and thus left the Danube behind him.
On the 21st of July his van entered Schweinfurt,
at which place his head- quarters were fixed on
the 26th. Wurtzburg and its citadel, occupied by
3000 men of the Prince-Bishop's troops, capitu-
lated on the 3d of August. General Wartensle-
ben, with 31,000 men, retreated on Bamberg,
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, ]796\ 291
without offering any resistance. The Army of
the Sambre and Meuse followed him, passed the
Rednitz at Bamberg, and defeated him at the
action of Forsheim, on the 6th of August, upon
which he resolved to retire behind the Wils. The
head-quarters of the French were fixed at Lauf
on the 1 1th of August. The fort of Rothemberg,
situate on the high road from Bayreuth to Am-
berg, capitulated ; it contained forty-three pieces
of artillery. On the 15th of August the French
marched on Sulzbach and Arnberg; they fought
during the whole of the day ; four divisions
were engaged ; the enemy evacuated his posi-
tions on the Wils, and retired behind the Naab
to Schwartzenfeld, still removing farther from
the archduke's army. On the 19th the French
army was beyond the Wils; General Berna-
dotte was detached to Neumarck, on the road
from Ratisbon to Nuremberg, ten leagues from
Ratisbon : the two armies commanded the left
bank of the Danube, and might be considered as
in junction. On the 20th the General-in-chief,
with five divisions, advanced on the Naab ; the
enemy sustained a very severe engagement on
the heights of Wolfering, but evacuated them
during the night. On the 21st of August the
position of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse
was as follows : the head-quarters at Amberg ;
live divisions, amounting to 40,000 men, lining
u 2
292 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
the bank of the Naab, with Wartensleben's army
facing them ; on the right, ten leagues off, was
Bernadotte's division detached, consisting of
7000 men, observing theRatisbon road. Marceau,
with three divisions, 30,000 strong, was blocka-
ding Mentz and Ehrenbreitstein, and guarding the
Mein. The Naab is a small river which falls into
the Danube a league above Ratisbon. The line of
operations of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse
was by Lauf, Nuremberg, Bamberg, and Wurtz-
burg; it had no communication with the Army of
the Rhine, although the two armies commanded
the left bank of the Danube, and were placed be-
tween the archduke's army and that of Wartens-
leben : it was within a day's march of the frontiers
of Bohemia. The actions of Amberg and Wol-
fering had been very sanguinary : the French had
indeed remained masters of the field of battle,
but the losses of the two armies had been nearly
equal ; the number of prisoners taken on each
side had not exceeded two or three hundred.
These were the only events that had occurred
since the departure from Frankfort, and these
were in themselves unimportant.
VII.
The Army of the Rhine had passed the Necker
on the 22d of July, and was following Prince
Charles by the Gmund road on the left, and by
that of Goppingen on the right. These two roads,
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 1790. 293
the former of which runs along the valley of the
Rembs, and the latter the valley of the Wils, cross
the mountains of the Alb, called the Wurtemberg
Alps. The movements of the Army of the Rhine
were slow, which induced Prince Charles to think
that it was not yet positively destined to act
in earnest beyond the Necker, and to take up a
position on the level of Weissenstein. But on
the 23d of July, Desaix, having arrived at Gmund,
closely pursued the enemy's rear-guard, and came
to action at Aalen, where he took 500 prison-
ers. On the same day Saint-Cyr, who was
debouching by the road on the right, reached
Heidenheim on the Brentz. On the 5th and 8th
of August the vanguard engaged with various
success, and the loss of several hundred men.
The Saxon contingent abandoned the Austrian
army, and returned into Saxony.
Prince Charles, however, considering that the
French armies were only three days march apart,
and were about to effect a junction on the Alt-
mulh, determined to risk a battle to prevent that
operation. His rear became his van; he pushed
it on to Eglingen, where it was attacked by
the French, overthrown, and lost between 3
and 400 prisoners. But on the 11th, at day-
break, the whole Austrian army debouched in
eight columns. The French army was in ad-
vance of Neresheim, where it occupied a front of
'2 ( J4 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
eight leagues in extent ; it consisted of forty-
eight battalions and sixty-six squadrons, amount-
ing to 45,000 men. Duhesme, with 6000 men,
formed the right, resting on Brentz, two leagues
from the Danube. Taponier was in the centre
with nine battalions on the heights of Dunstel-
kingen, and three at Dischingen, a little in the
rear. Baupuy formed the left, in advance of
Schweindorf. Delmas, with 8000 men, formed
the vanguard, and was posted at Bopfingen. Two
of the three columns of the archduke's left de-
bouched by Dischingen and Dillingen, attacked
Duhesme in front and rear, separated him from
the centre, and forced him one march back,
whilst the third, commanded by General Froe-
lich, passed the Danube at Ulm, and took the
French army in the rear. The French head-
quarters, the parks and the civil-lists, being
driven from Heidenheim, fled to Aalen. Thus,
at the very beginning of the battle, the French
army was turned and cut, deprived of its line of
operations, and its parks and reserves thrown
into confusion. This result was of some import-
ance ; but the three columns which had been em-
ployed to produce it, being three leagues from the
field of battle, could take no share in the action.
The two columns of the right debouched by the
Nordlingen road, passed between the van and
the left, and attacked the extremity of the line
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 179G. 2!)5
of battle, where General Gazan commanded.
The three columns of the centre, which made
the principal attack, directed by the archduke
in person, consisted of nineteen battalions and
twenty-four squadrons. They debouched from
Aufhausen, overthrew Saint-Cyr's posts, who did
not expect so abrupt an attack, and was still in
the position he had taken the preceding evening,
after the action of Eglingen. He rallied them on
the heights of Dunstelkingen, and throughout the
rest of the day all the archduke's efforts to force
these positions were fruitless. The loss on each
side was upwards of 6000 men. At night the
archduke drew back his right on the road
between Nordlingen and Donawerth, to the
camp of Mcerdingcn, and his left to Dillingen
on the Danube. The centre passed the night on
the field ; a small French column retook Heiden-
heim, and restored the communications of the
army, which induced Moreau to remain on the
field of battle to collect his wounded, arrange
his retreat, or march forward, according to the
intelligence he should receive. He was victori-
ous ; the Army of the Sambre and Meuse had
already passed the Rednitz, and appeared to
direct its march by Amberg on Ratisbon ; it was
several marches in advance of Prince Charles,
who not having been able, in the action of the
11th, to overthrow the French army and drive it
296 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
into the defiles of the mountains of the Alb, had
not now a moment to lose to avoid being sur-
rounded ; he made his retreat in the night, con-
sidering the junction of the two armies as already-
effected, and relinquishing all thoughts of op-
posing it, for he abandoned to them the left bank
of the Danube, the Warnitz, and the Altmulh,
and repassed the Danube and the Lech ; the
Austrians seemed to have lost the campaign.
In the mean time General Ferino, with twenty-
three battalions and seventeen squadrons, being
one third of the army, after having crossed the
mountains of the Black Forest, had taken pos-
session of Lindan and Bregents on the Lake of
Constance, where he had left seven battalions
and three squadrons, under the command of
General Laborde, to observe the debouches of
the Tyrol, and had advanced by Stockach, with ■
sixteen, battalions and fourteen squadrons, on
Memmingen. On the 13th, General Abatucci,
who commanded his vanguard, attacked the
corps of Mindelheim, and destroyed several re-
giments of it; after which he joined the Army
of the Rhine, and formed its right on the Lech.
VIII.
General Moreau remained several days on the
field after the battle of Neresheim ; at length he
marched on Donawerth ; but he retrograded on
Hochstett without even sending a party of caval-
OPERATIONS IN' GERMANY, 179(3. 297
ry on the Altmulh, to endeavour to effect his
junction with the Army of the Sambre and Meuse.
This hesitation and these false manoeuvres en-
couraged the archduke ; he saw that he might
still oppose the junction of the two armies,
which he had despaired of being able to do. He
left General Latour behind the Lech, with thirty
battalions, to keep the armies on the Rhine in
check and retard their movements, while with a
detachment of 30,000 men, infantry, cavalry, and
artillery, he passed the Danube and advanced to
the Nuremberg road. On the 22d of August
he attacked Bernadotte in his position before
Neumarck, pursued him into Lauf and Nurem-
berg, and forced him to fall back to Forsheim.
General Wartensleben immediately put his troops
in motion and repassed the Naab. The Army of
the Sambre and Meuse retreated on Amberg and
Sulzbach ; but being attacked in this position,
in front by Wartensleben and in flank and rear
by a detachment from Prince Charles's army, its
general did not think it expedient to risk a serious
affair. His retreat had become very difficult ; he
had lost his line of communication, the road from
Lauf to Nuremberg; he was manoeuvring across
mountains and roads scarcely practicable for
carriages ; his artillery and waggons were much
damaged and thrown into confusion. These
precipitate and disorderly marches affected the
298 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
discipline of the army, which, on the 26th, ar-
rived at Forsheim, the left being at Ebermen-
stadt, where it halted on the 28th. The general
meditated several offensive operations, which,
however, the rapidity of Prince Charles's march,
and the offensive demonstrations which he made
on the rear of the French, did not allow him
to execute ; for the enemy had already sent
a division to Bamberg, created alarm at head-
quarters, thrown the parks and civil lists into
confusion, and intercepted the road from Bam-
berg to Schweinfurth, which place the army did
not reach, even by forced marches, until the
31st, and then by forcing a passage at the point
of the bayonet. In this town the troops halted,
as they needed rest. Wurtzburg was occupied
by General Hotze, who, with his division, block-
aded the citadel, in which General Bellemonte,
commandant of artillery, was shut up with 800
men ; he was supported by Starray's division.
The archduke, with the rest of the army, was one
march behind. Jourdan took advantage of this
dispersed state of the enemy's army, and resolved
to open himself a way to Wurtzburg. On the
2d of September in the forenoon he commenced
his march, and attacked Prince Charles on the
following day, the 3d; Kray and Wartensleben
arrived during the battle; they opposed Jourdan
with 40,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. The
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 1700. '2{){)
French were but 30,000; they lost the battle.
They had left Lefebvre's division at Schwemfurth.
Jourdan retreated on Arnstein and the Lahn,
where he arrived on the 10th of September; his
troops were harassed with fatigue, and much
disheartened. He fixed his head-quarters at
Wetzlar. Ever since the 22d of August he had
had to contend with the armies of Wartensleben
and the archduke, which amounted to 68,000
combatants, whilst he had but 44,000. On
reaching the Lahn, he joined Marceau and a
division of 10,000 men, which arrived from
Holland; and with these reinforcements found
himself superior to the enemy, In fifteen days
he had lost all his conquests in Germany, solely
through his adversary's manoeuvres and the loss
of the battle of Wurtzburg ; but every thing
might yet be retrieved, and there was still the
greatest probability that the fortune of the cam-
paign would change, and that it would terminate
favourably to the French. The general formed
a just conception of what was expedient to be
done, but he was wanting in activity and reso-
lution. He suffered himself to be anticipated
on the Lahn, and driven beyond the Rhine. The
brave Marceau was killed at the action of Alten-
kirchen ; Kleber and Collaud had been dismissed
from the army for insubordination. The army
was disseminated ; part crossed the Rhine ;
300 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
Lefebvre's division occupied the camp of Dussel-
dorf. Shortly after, Jourdan ceased to command;
but by a singular and inexplicable mode of con-
duct the Directory appointed Beurnonville, a
man scarcely capable of manoeuvring a battalion,
as his successor. The archduke left the banks of
the Lahn, with 12,000 men, to advance against the
Army of the Rhine and Moselle, which was still
in Bavaria, leaving Gen. Wernech with 50,000 men
to observe the Army of the Sambre and Meuse.
IX.
On the 23d of August, twelve days after the
battle of Neresheim, the French army of the
Rhine and Moselle passed the Danube, and
marched on the Lech ; General Desaix forming
the left, arrived opposite Rain at the mouth of
the Lech ; the centre, under the command of
Saint-Cyr, was at Augsburg, and the right, com-
manded by Ferino, was opposite Landsberg.
Lieutenant-general Latour, intrusted with the
defence of the passage of the Lech, had placed
three battalions in Ingolstadt, and a division of
eight battalions and twenty squadrons opposite
Rain, defending the Lower Lech, and had
stationed himself with fifteen battalions on
the heights of Friedberg opposite Augsburg;
Condi's corps formed the left opposite Landsberg.
On the 24th General Ferino forced a passage at
the ford of llanstetten; Saint-Cyr passed at the
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 179G. 301
ford of Lech-Hausen before Augsburg, and De-
saix at the ford of Langwied. The bridges at
Augsburg were immediately repaired, and after
a brave resistance General Latour was driven
from the fine positions of Friedberg, leaving 17
pieces of cannon and 1500 prisoners in the hands
of the victor. After the passage of the Lech, the
right of the French army advanced on Dachau,
three leagues from Munich, with its vanguard
under the walls of that city; the centre on Pfaf-
fenhotfen and Geisenfeld, with a corps of obser-
vation on Ingolstadt. The Austrian general re-
moved his head-quarters to Landshut on the
Iser, where he assembled his principal corps-
d'arme'e ; General Nauendorfs division, 8000
strong, which the archduke had detached to
observe the Danube, after the battle of Amberg,
occupied Abensberg, and covered Ratisbon.
Conde's corps occupied Munich ; in that position
he watched for several days for the movement
which the French general should make ; but find-
ing that he made none, he suspected that he had
passed to the left bank of the Danube in pursuit
of Prince Charles; consequently, on the 1st of
September, he advanced with his whole army in
several columns, on Geisenfeld, attacked the
left of the French, and penetrated as far as the
Paar, but was speedily repulsed and informed
by the prisoners that the army had not stirred,
:{<)2 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
and was completely mustered on the right bank
of the Danube. He then returned to his posi-
tions; the losses on both sides in this action
having been equal ; the enemy left a howitzer in
the hands of the French. On the 7th of Septem-
ber General Moreau determined, without anv
particular project in view, to march forward.
On the 9th the left reached Neustadt, being-
supported on the Danube opposite Abensberg,
the centre on Menburg and the right at Mosburg.
Munich and Freysing had fallen into the power
of the French ; but the enemy were in position
on the left bank of the Iser. Moreau met with
few obstacles in this movement, and made up-
wards of 500 prisoners. The enemy expected he
would advance on Ratisbon, but he did not move
on the 8th or 9th, and on the 10th he retreated in
order to resume his positions and detach General
Desaix, with 12,000 men, to seek the Army of
the Sambre and Meuse, which was then above
eighty leagues distant from him. Desaix passed
the Danube in the night of the 10th at Neuberg,
and arrived at Achstett on the 12th ; on the 14th
he pushed on to Heydeck, half way to Nurem-
berg, where he heard the particulars of all the
events which had taken place for a long time
back, and that the Army of the Sambre and Meuse
was already repulsed to the Rhine ; he made a
retrograde march, and on the ICth rejoined the
army on the Danube. In the mean time General
OPERATIONS IN T GERMANY, 1796. 303
Latour, being informed of Desaix's movement,
came forward ; he engaged in actions of little
importance in all directions ; but having obtained
information of the weakness of Desaix's detach-
ment, and of the superiority of the forces on the
right bank of the Danube to his own, he acted
with circumspection.
When the archduke abandoned the Rhine he
left the following garrisons: in Mentz 15,000
infantry and 1200 cavalry; in Ehrenbreitstein
300 infantry ; in Manheim 8800 infantry and 300
cavalry; in Philipsburg 2500 infantry and 300
cavalry. Jourdan had left Marceau's division
with those of Poncet and Bonnard, 2G,000 strong,
on the Mein, to blockade Mentz and Ehrenbreit-
stein. But against Manheim and Philipsburg
Moreau had only left a moveable column of 2800
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, uuder the com-
mand of Brigadier-general Scherb, whom he had
brought from the garrison of Landau. The Arch-
duke on reaching the Lahn, immediately ordered
General Petrasch to take nine battalions from
Manheim and Philipsburg, to attack General
Scherb, and to carry the tetes-de-pont of Kehl and
Huningen. General Scherb was still at Bruchsal;
having received timely notice from deserters, he
beat a retreat on the 13th of September, and re-
tired on Kehl, which place was not yet completely
repaired. Petrasch followed and attacked him, on
the 18th, with forces quadruple to his, but failed
304 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
in the attempt, and lost a great number of men.
The French were partly indebted for this success
to the zeal evinced by the national guard of
Strasburg. Moreau was much alarmed at this
action, which had nearly cut off his retreat ; he
felt the necessity of approaching the Rhine, and
commenced his retreat. He repassed the Lech
on the same day that Jourdan repassed the Rhine,
and took up a position on the 20th behind the
Schmutter, on the 21st behind the Mindel, and
on the 22d behind the Gunz. He marched in
three columns, Ferino commanding the left, Saint-
Cyr the centre, and Desaix the right, (with re-
spect to the direction in which the retreat was
made). General Froelich followed Ferino, Latour
followed Saint-Cyr, and General Nauendorf pro-
ceeded along the left bank of the Danube, on a
line with Desaix. The fortress of Ulm, which
was not garrisoned, was fortunately occupied by
a detachment under the command of Montri-
chard, twenty-four hours before General Nauen-
dorf could enter it. On the twenty-fourth the
French army took up a position on the Iser,
supported on Ferino at Memmingen, and on
Desaix in Ulm. On the 25th, 26th, and 27th, it
continued its retreat : Desaix proceeding along
the left bank of the Danube, made for Ehingen ;
the Austrians entered Ulm six hours after his
departure. On the 27th the army arrived on the
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 179G. 305
Feder-See, where intelligence was received that
General Petrasch occupied the debouches of the
Black Mountains, and that the frontier towns
were occupied by hordes of insurgent peasants.
On the 28th General Latour attacked at all points,
and was every where repulsed ; General Nauen-
dorf, whose troops had up to that time com-
posed the right of the Austrian army, left it,
advanced on Tubingen, and joined Petrasch in
the position of Rothweil, thus securing the val-
leys of the Kintzig and Renchen with his forces,
whilst Prince Charles, with a corps of 12,000
men, arrived at the village of Renchen, sending
out light horse on the Kintzig near Kehl. Gene-
ral Latour, thus weakened, had only 25,000 men
left ; he found himself compromised ; yet as he
was encamped at Steinhausen and appeared to
suspect nothing, Moreau felt the necessity of
removing him thence in order to have an oppor-
tunity of forcing the passes. On the 2d of Oc-
tober he attacked him vigorously at Biberach.
The Austrians, notwithstanding all the resistance
they could make, were overwhelmed by numbers
and completely routed, and left two standards,
several pieces of cannon, and 4 or 5000 prisoners,
in the hands of the victor.
After this battle Moreau continued his retreat :
the baggage, lumber, and wounded, were sent by
way of the frontier towns to Huninguen. Mo-
Memoin. — vol. hi. x
306 MEMOIRS <>i NAPOLKON.
reau attacked the passes and took possession of
the villages of Rothweil and Willingen, on the
10th of October; the army countermarched on
the passes of the Val d'Enfer ; Saint-Cyr arrived
on the 12th at Freyburg in the valley of the
Rhine. The army spent the 13th, 14th, and 15th,
in passing this terrible defile, and took up a po-
sition behind the little river of Eltz, covering
Freyburg. In the mean time Prince Charles had
reached Etteinheim, where he was successively
joined by Petrasch on the 15th of October, by
Nauendorf on the 18th, and by Latour on the
20th ; Condi's and Froelich's corps followed the
rear of the French army into the gorges of the
Val d'Enfer and on the frontier towns ; thus the
French were in junction from the 15th, and in
communication with France by the bridges of
Vieux Brisach, and Huninguen ; the spirit and
means of the troops were improved, yet they
remained inactive. On the ISth the enemy
marched against them with 36,000 men ; his left
supported on the Rhine, commanded by Pe-
trasch; his centre commanded by Wartensleben,
and his left by Latour : an obstinate conflict en-
sued, with equal advantages and losses on both
sides. FYcelich and Conde's corps had entered
Waldkirch by the valley of the Black Forest ;
the General-in-chief thought it expedient to ap-
proach Freyburg, refusing his right, but still
OPERATIONS IN GERMAN* - , 179G. 307
covering that town and New Brisach. On the
21st, Desaix passed the Rhine at New Brisach,
and marched down the left bank to Strasburg.
The army evacuated Freyburg, and took up a
position, with the right resting on Kaudern, and
the left on the Rhine at Schliengen. It was
attacked there on the 23d, and having been
weakened by the detachment of Desaix's troops,
was very inferior in number; but as it occupied
a fine position, it was enabled to defend its
ground, and on the 26th of October repassed the
Rhine over the bridge of Huninguen in some little
disorder. Ferino remained on the Upper Rhine ;
the rest of the army proceeded to Strasburg.
Thus, after having kept up the war in Germany
for four months, disarmed and detached from the
cause of the Emperor the Margrave of Baden,
the Duke of Wurtemberg, and the Elector of Ba-
varia, granted them armistices, and imposed con-
tributions which it had not time to collect, after
gaining several victories, and without sustaining
any important defeat, the French army repassed
the Rhine, retaining nothing on the right bank
but the fortress of Dusseldorf and the tetes-de-pont
of Kehl and Huninguen.
X.
Dusseldorf, being far to the North, did not
attract the attention of the Austrians, but the
x 2
308 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
fortress of Kehl and the tete-de-pont of Huningueu
enabled part of the French army to winter on
the left bank, and to disturb Germany ; they
therefore resolved to take possession of those two
places. On the 28th of October, 40,000 men
invested them, and formed lines of counterval-
lation before Kehl, consisting of fifteen redoubts,
having the Rhine for the appui of the right and
left, and connected with each other by intrench-
ments of nearly 3500 toises in extent, and com-
pletely investing the whole of the fortifications
of Kehl on the right bank. The French were
equally active in palisading and arming the fort
and the hornworks of the Upper and Lower
Rhine, and in lining all the left bank with bat-
teries ; they established themselves firmly in all
the isles, especially in those of Ehrlen-Rhin and
ToufFue, before which latter place, at 1500 toises
distance from Kehl, they constructed a priest's
cap in the form of a tite-de-potit. The distance
from this cap to the Kintzig was 1000 toises.
They established an intrenched camp of 1000
toises in extent perpendicularly to the Rhine,
and a ttte-de-pont at the Isle of Ehrlen-Rhin. It
was 500 toises from Kehl down the Rhine to the
mouth of the Kintzig. These works were guard-
ed by sixteen battalions, which relieved each
other every twenty-four hours.
Notwithstanding these formidable defensive
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 1796. 309
preparations, Prince Charles persisted in be-
sieging a place which he could only blockade on
one bank, and could not separate from Strasburg
and all France. On the 21st of November, he
opened trenches against the works of the Kintzig.
On the 22d of November at day-break, Desaix
made a sortie at the head of 16,000 infantry and
3000 cavalry from the intrenched camp of Kehl,
forced the lines of countervallation, and got pos-
session of the village of Sunheim, situate a league
from the Rhine, and in the rear of the enemy's
camp. But the force he commanded was too
inconsiderable ; he was obliged to return into
his works after having destroyed several redoubts
of the line of countervallation, spiked fifteen
pieces of cannon, taken six, and made 1500 pri-
soners. On the 28th of November the enemy
at once unmasked all his batteries. The ap-
proaches against the works of the Kintzig had
been only a false attack, the principal one being
directed against the priest's cap before the Isle
of Touffue, and against the Isle of Ehrlen-Rhin.
The enemy's plan was to destroy the bridges
over the Rhine. On the 6th of December he got
possession of the Isle of Touffue and the priest's
cap ; on the 9th he was master of all the exterior
of the intrenchments, and stationed himself in
the old church of Kehl. On the 18th he got
possession of all the right of the French intrench-
310 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
ments and the redoubt of Trou-de-Loup. On the
3d of January he was master of the whole Isle of
Ehrlen-Rhin. On the Gth he attacked the horn-
work of the Upper Rhine, destroyed the bridges ;
and on the 10th of January entered Kehl by
capitulation. The French evacuated that fort,
and carried all that belonged to them to the
Strasburg side of the river. The losses on both
sides were very considerable, the consumption
of ammunition immense. The French artillery
was superior on account of the great number of
batteries which had been constructed on the left
bank. Both armies suffered greatly from the
frosts of November, December, and January.
In the mean time the Prince of Furstemberg
had remained opposite Huninguen with thirteen
battalions. The right of the Army of the Rhine,
under the command of Ferino, had remained in
that place. General Abbatucci commanded in
the tete-de-pont, and as fast as the enemy made
preparations and showed his intention of besieg-
ing the tete-de-pont, this young officer took every
necessary step to prepare for the most vigorous
defence. The enemy's batteries were ready on
the 25th of November. He attacked the tete-de-
pont with a brisk cannonade ; the bridge was
broken on the 29th. On the 30th of November
the Austrians made an assault with G000 men ;
the action was hot, and obstinately maintained.
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 179G. 311
The enemy was repulsed, leaving one third of
his men on the field, or in the hands of the
French. Young Abbatucci, a General aged
twenty-four, made a sortie at the head of the
garrison in order to drive the Austrians from a
lunette in which they attempted to make a lodge-
ment; he succeeded, but was mortally wounded.
The result of this assault caused the suspension
of the siege; but on the 19th of January, after
the taking of Kehl, the enemy opened the
trenches again; and on the 19th of February, the
garrison capitulated, and repassed the Rhine.
The success of these two operations enabled
Prince Charles to take up his winter quarters
along the left bank in Brisgaw and the country of
Baden, and to detach powerful reinforcements to
the army which was assembling behind the Piave,
and of which he took the command in February.
This army was intended to avenge Beaulieu,
Wurmser, and Alvinzi, and to reconquer Mantua,
Lombardy, and Italy.
XI.
Observation I. — The unfortunate result of this
campaign is to be ascribed to the plan of opera-
tions adopted by the Government. The object
of this invasion of Germany was, 1st, to make a
diversion to hinder the Cabinet of Vienna from
drawing new detachments from its army of the
312 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON'.
Rhine to reinforce its army of Italy ; 2dly, to de-
tach the princes of the Germanic body from the
Emperor, subdue the Princes of Baden, Wurtem-
burg, and Bavaria, and strengthen the confede-
ration by the neutrality of Prussia, and by the
alliance of Saxony and the Northern princes, who
had not yet acceded to it ; 3dly, to support the
war in Germany, and draw contributions and
horses from that country, in order to furnish the
infantry, cavalry, and artillery with all neces-
saries, and to employ the resources of the Re-
public itself in creating an army of reserve ;
4thly, to get possession of the fortresses of Ehren-
breitstein, Mentz, Manheim, and Philipsburg, to
secure the frontiers of the Rhine, and render the
troops blockading those places disposable for the
conclusion of that campaign and for the following
one ; 5thly, to secure the winter quarters of the
French troops in Germany, and their positions,
by taking possession of Ingolstadt and Ulm, in
order to make a combined attack on the heredi-
tary states both from Italy and Germany, after
the taking of Mantua in the spring of 1797.
For these purposes there were two things re-
quisite ; 1st, to blockade the fortresses of Ehren-
breitstein and Philipsburg strictly, and to besiege
Mentz and Manheim ; 2dly, to cover the sieges
and blockades by a powerful army, which should
carry the war into the midst of Germany, and
OPERATIONS IX GERMANY, 179G. 313
threaten the hereditary states. This army should
have been formed of four corps, each composed
of three divisions of infantry, several brigades of
chasseurs and hussars, and a reserve of heavy
cavalry, making together from 140 to 150,000
men.
The army of observation on the Rhine ought
to have consisted of three corps, of seven divi-
sions of infantry, and several brigades of cavalry,
making 60,000 men in all ; with its first corps, of
two divisions, it should have guarded Holland and
Dusseldorf and blockaded Ehrenbreitstein ; with
its second corps, three divisions strong, it should
have besieged Mentz ; and with its third corps,
of two divisions, it should have blockaded Phi-
lipsburg and Manheim, and guarded Kehl and the
tete-de-pont of Huninguen. The general total of
the two armies would thus have been from 200,
to 210,000 men. Now these troops existed : trie
Armies of the Rhine and Sambre and Meuse, at
the beginning of the campaign, were 160,000
strong ; the Army of Holland 30,000 ; from la
Vendue and the interior of France 20,000 men
might have been drawn, who were no longer
necessary there ; total 210,000.
The trenches ought to have been opened before
Mentz the day after the blockading of the place ;
June, July, August and September would have
been sufficient for taking it, and it is even possi-
:U4 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
ble that there would have been time enough to
take Manheim with the same besieging train.
The fortresses of Ehrenbreitstein and Philipsburg
would not have been able to resist a nine months'
blockade, and would have capitulated during the
winter. The junction of the Grand Army ought
to have been effected under the walls of Stras-
burg, by the left bank of the Rhine, in the course
of February, March, and April, by masked move-
ments. Much might have been expected from
so considerable an army, supposing it to have
passed the Rhine unexpectedly, and advanced
rapidly in all directions, crushing the troops dis-
persed for the purpose of defending the river ;
the enemy's armies would have abandoned the
Rhine, and concentrated themselves on the
Danube. The French army would have oc-
cupied Ulm ; from that point, as a centre of
operations, it should have manoeuvred in Wur-
temberg, on the Warnitz, on the Lech, and in
Bavaria, having only one line of operations on
Kehl, New Brisach, and Iluninguen. It would
have overwhelmed every thing by its masses, and
taken up its winter quarters on the frontiers of
the Austrian monarchy, after having disarmed
and subdued the princes of the Germanic body.
The plan adopted at Paris was conceived in a
different spirit: 1st, the places were neither
blockaded nor besieged, but only observed from
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 1796. 315
a distance ; 2dly, two armies, commanded by
two generals independent on each other, entered
Germany by two lines of operations directly
opposed ; they marched at random, without
concert or communication; they were repulsed
without having been defeated in any pitched
battle. All this arose from the erroneous mili-
tary principles which then prevailed. It had
been observed that in the campaigns of 1794, in
which the enemy was master of the places of
Cond6, Valenciennes, Landrecy, and Quesnoy,
the French had failed in several direct attacks
on the centre, and had succeeded when they
divided their army into those of the North and
of the Sambre and Meuse, directing the former,
that of Pichegru, on the enemy's right, by
Menin, along the sea-coast, and the other, that
of Jourdan, on his left by the Sambre. The
result of that plan of operations had been the
conquest of Belgium ; the enemy had been
driven beyond the Roer and the Rhine ; and
shortly after the Flemish fortresses had succes-
sively capitulated.
But the principles which had been derived
from these observations were erroneous. The
success of that campaign, far from being attri-
butable to the plan of operations, took place,
on the contrary, in spite of the defects of the
plan, and solely through the great superiority of
316 MEMOIRS OF NAKOLEON.
the truops whicli the Republic had on that fron-
tier; so that, although divided into two separate
armies, each of the republican armies was nearly
equal in strength to that of the Austrians. At the
battle of Fleurus, General Clairfaith had an army
as numerous as that of General Jourdan, but that
of Jourdan was but a portion of the troops which
France had in the North, and Clairfaith had as-
sembled the greater part of his forces ; had he
maintained the battle to the last and proved
victor, he would have afterwards beaten Piche-
gru, and notwithstanding the great number of
French battalions, the French would have been
overthrown in consequence of the defects of the
plan. If instead of having two armies, one on
the right and the other on the left, the whole
French army had been united on the Sambre,
at the fields of Fleurus, leaving a corps of ob-
servation on Dunkirk, Jourdan's army, being
twice as strong as Clairfaith's, would have met
with no resistance, would have outflanked the
left of the enemy like a torrent, and cut oft' his
retreat to the Rhine ; the success would have
been certain and decisive. But the disad-
vantages resulting from such military principles
became much more dangerous in a war of in-
vasion in a foreign country. The two French
armies had, in 1794, their flanks supported as
follows; one of them on the places of Charle-
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 179G. 317
mont, Givet, and Philipville, the other on the
fortress of Dunkirk and sea ; and their other
wings were supported either on fortresses or
on part of the French territory. The communi-
cation between the two armies was impeded
by the central position of the enemy, but it
was carried on a little more in the rear. In
the campaign of 1796, the left, the right, and
the rears of the two armies were all equally un-
supported : in Flanders the two armies were re-
gulated every twenty-four hours by orders from
Paris. In 1796 no central direction was possi-
ble, and every operation ought to have emanated
from a single commander-in-chief; but there
were two. It may therefore be fairly said that
in 1794 the false principles of the plan of the
campaign prevented the French from gaining
decisive advantages, and that in 1796 they were
the occasion of the loss and disasters of the
Armies of the Sambre and Meuse and of the
Rhine and Moselle.
The Republic was desirous of peace, and of
having the frontier of the Rhine for its boundary.
We had no right to require this frontier as long
as the enemy occupied Mentz. It was, therefore,
necessary to besiege Mentz, which place is the
more dangerous to besiege as it stands on the
left bank. An army which is marching to the
conquest of a country has its two wings sup-
31 S MEMOIItS OF NAPOLEON.
ported on neutral countries or great natural ob-
stacles, such as large rivers or chains of moun-
tains, or else it has only one wing, or none at all ;
in the first case it has only to take care that its
front is not broken, in the second it ought to
make the wing which is supported its appui, in
the third case it should keep its different corps
well supported on its centre, and never separate
from them ; for if a difficulty arises from having
two flanks unsupported, the disadvantage is
doubled by having four, tripled by having six,
quadrupled by having eight ; that is to say, by
dividing into two, three, or four different bodies.
The line of operations of an army may, in the
first case, appuy indifferently on the left or right
side ; in the second case it ought to appuy on the
wing supported ; in the third it ought to be per-
pendicular on the middle of the army's line of
march. At all events it is necessary to have, at
every five or six marches, a fortified place or in-
trenched position, on the line of operations, to
collect magazines of provisions and stores in, to
organize convoys and make a centre of motion, a
determined point to shorten the line of opera-
tions. Ulm is the first natural pivot of the in-
vasion of Germany ; this place, situate on the Da-
nube, affords to those who occupy it facilities for
manoeuvring on both banks. It is an unique point.
for containing extensive depots on the greatest
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 17 ( J(). 319
river of Europe, a river which washes the walls
of Ingolstadt, Ratisbon, Passau, and Vienna : on
the French side this place is at the outlet of the
Black Mountains.
Observation II. — (Jourdan). — 1st. At the
opening of the campaign the General of the
Army of the Sambre and Meuse manoeuvred at
once on both banks of the Rhine, with his left
separated by that river from his centre and his
right. If Kleber had been attacked by 30,000
men instead of 15,000, at Altenkirchen, on the
7th of June, he would have been in a perilous
situation. On the 1st of June the whole army
should have joined at Dusseldorf and marched
on the Sieg, the Lahn, and the Rhine, and there
taken up a good position on the heights and in-
trenched it, and waited there until the Army of
the Rhine had crossed to the right bank of the
Rhine.
2dly. The arrival of the Archduke on the
Rhine, with a detachment, did not oblige Gene-
ral Jourdan to dislocate his army : he might at
first have maintained his ground on the Lahn, by
retrenching himself in a good position, and if he-
was resolved to come nearer his depots, he
ought, in doing so, to have kept all his army in
junction on the right bank of the Rhine ; his at-
titude would thus have overawed the enemy,
who would not have ventured to weaken their
320 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
force while before him, by detaching twenty -
four battalions to act against the Army of the
Rhine and Moselle.
3dly. In the beginning of July the Army of the
Sambre and Meuse again march forward. The
passage of the river effected by the Army of the
Rhine, had compelled the Archduke to hasten to
the Upper Rhine ; he had only left Wartensleben
36,000 men, who ought to have been annihilated ;
but the principle of those days was to march in
every direction as if to beat the covers. The
enemy's rear-guard being only followed by equal
forces, and not being at the same time even out-
flanked on its right or left, or broken in the cen-
tre, was never compromised, and occasioned as
much loss as it sustained.
4thly. From the Mein, the General of the Army
of the Sambre and Meuse moved on Schwein-
furth and Bamberg, his left being supported on
the mountains of Saxony, (which country had just
acceded to the Prussian neutrality, and its con-
tingent had consequently left the Austrian army,)
and his right unsupported. By this movement
he increased the space which separated him from
the Army of the Rhine, because he receded from
the Danube, whilst the latter army was passing
to the right bank of that river. Each army acted
exactly in the contrary manner to that in which
it ought to have manoeuvred : the former rested
OPERATIONS IN GERMAN V, 1 79(>- 321
on its right and the latter on its left, whilst the
latter should have rested on the right and the
former on the left, in order to join in a compact
mass.
5thly. The Army of the Sambre and Meuse
passed the Rednitz at Bamberg, on the 8th of
August, marched on Nuremberg and Lauf, and
thence, making a turn to the left, moved on the
Naab by Sulzbach and Amberg; thus exposing
the right flank, during a march of thirty leagues,
to the debouches of Bohemia, and the left flank
to those of the Danube, of which the enemy was
master, as he still occupied Bavaria, the right
bank of the Lech, and the left bank of the War-
nitz ; the army was therefore in column, forming
a narrow strip thirty leagues in length, and sur-
rounded on all sides by enemies. Thus, if the
march of thirty leagues from Frankfort to Bam-
berg was contrary to the object which ought to
have been kept in view, the junction of the two
armies, the march from Bamberg to Amberg was
rash, and evidently endangered the existence of
the army. This part of Bavaria, on the right
bank of the Rednitz, is a country full of defiles,
formed by the first hills of the mountains of Bo-
hemia, a difficult and barren country, and having
no communication but the road from Nuremberg
to Amberg. To cover this road, Jourdan sent
Bernadotte's division to Neumarck, ten leagues
Memoirs. — vol. hi. y
322 MEMOIRS OF NAPOI.IOV.
from him, to menace Ratisbon. The Army of the
Sambre and Mense ought to have proceeded
from Frankfort along the left bank of the Mein,
advanced on Mergenthein, secured its right flank
by joining the left of the Army of the Rhine,
and then, wheeling on its right, to have brought
its left on Ratisbon. On reaching Wurtzburg it
was still in time to form its right line on Nurem-
berg ; its general should have marched by the
Neumarck road and approached Ratisbon ; at all
events he should have manoeuvred in such a
manner as to make his retreat, if it should be-
come necessary, on the left of the Rhine by
going up the Rednitz, and by no means down
that river.
6thly. The General of the Army of the Sam-
bre and Meuse received advices, at one and the
same time, that Prince Charles was marching
against him, that he had defeated Bernadotte, that
he was master of Lauf and Nuremberg, and that
all the communications of his own army were
cut off. This was because his line of operations
was bad, and. because he was manoeuvring in
opposition to all the rules of war.
7thly. But Bernadotte being defeated, what
could the General-in-chief do in the false posi-
tion in which he was placed ? He should have
forced the passage of the Naab before the arrival
of the Archduke on Amberg, advanced on Ratis-
OPERATIONS I\ GERMANY, 179G. 323
bon, from which place he was but a few leagues
distant, and there effected his junction with the
Army of the Rhine. The first vigorous move-
ment would have obliged Prince Charles to con-
centrate his forces, and to call in all his detach-
ments, which would have cleared up and dissi-
pated that imaginary storm, which was always
increasing, because the French general con-
stantly gave way to it. The Austrians are re-
markably expert in spreading false reports, and
in promulgating erroneous notions amongst the
inhabitants; they are great masters of the art
of creating alarm in the rear of an army ; but if
you draw the sword of Rinaldo from its scab-
bard, the enchantment is instantly dissolved.
8thly. — 1st. At the battle of Wurtzburg Jour-
dan injudiciously left a fourth of his troops at
Schweinfurth ; Lefebvre's division, in addition
to the force he had, would have secured him the
victory. 2dly. If he had set out from that town
at two o'clock in the morning of the 2d of
September, he would have arrived on the field of
battle at ten o'clock ; and had he rushed head-
long upon the enemy, he would have over-
whelmed the twenty battalions of Hotze and
Starray, taken Wurtzburg, and made Marceau
join him there. The Archduke had dispersed his
forces in an unskilful manner, and could not ope-
rate their junction until a very late hour on the
y 2
324 U i.moi lis OF \ \ POLEO N
3d; but although Jourdan arrived by noon on
the 2d, he gave the Archduke eighteen hours to
rally his army, who had 45,000 men in line by
nine o'clock in the morning of the 3d. — 3dly.
Jourdan occupied on the field thrice as much
ground as he ought to have done ; he was
obliged to form his troops in one line only, and,
intrepid as they were, there was every probabi-
lity that they would be broken.
Othly. The course of the Lahn from Coblentz
to Giessen, is twenty-four leagues ; that river
is thirty leagues from Dusseldorf. If Jourdan
had assembled all his divisions on his extreme
left at Wetzlar, he would have defeated his
enemy and repulsed him to the Mein, and
shortly after to the Danube. His forces were
greatly superior after the junction of Marceau's
corps and the division from Holland. He men-
tioned this intention, but he lost the time in
planning it in which he should have carried it
into effect. His army formed a cordon along
the Lahn ; his line was broken at Limburg by
the retreat of Marceau's corps ; he then made
his columns fall back precipitately on Altenkir-
chen. 2dly. At that place he was still in time
to resume offensive operations, and retrieve
every thing, but he was deficient in resolution.
3dly. When he ordered the retreat, he ought
at least to have made it, if lie considered it in-
OPERATIONS FN GERMANY, 1 790. 325
dispensable, with all his army in junction, as far
as the intrenched camp of Dusseldorf ; for whilst
it remained in mass on the right bank of the
Rhine, the Archduke could not have detached
any of his forces, because he would constantly
have had to apprehend an offensive movement
by so important an army. But all was lost
when Jourdan disjointed his army at Altenkir-
chen, and the left alone continued its movement
on Dusseldorf whilst the rest repassed the Rhine,
as if the left bank and the Hundsdruck had any
thing to fear: it was the Army of the Rhine
and Moselle, which was then in the heart of
Germany, that the Archduke was aiming at.
Then it was that the Army of the Rhine and
Moselle was abandoned.
lOthly. The conduct of the Army of the Sam-
bre and Meuse, reinforced by the troops from
Holland, during October, November, December,
and January, is inexplicable.
Observation III. — (More a u.) The passage of
the Rhine took place on the 24th of June ; it
ought to have been effected between the 1st
and 4th of that month, at the moment when the
Army of the Sambre and Meuse was beginning
to move. On the 24th of June, the day of the
passage, the first troops reached the right bank
at three in the morning ; the bridge might have
been finished by noon, and the whole army
326 M E M ( ) I K S ( ) F N APOL K ON ,
might have passed and been formed in line
before day-break on the 25th. The bridge was
not completed until the 25th at noon, which
was twenty-four hours too late. Such opera-
tions as the passage of a river like the Rhine
are so delica" e, that the troops ought not to
remain so long exposed without communication.
2dly. On the 26th the Army of the Rhine
had only 40,000 men on the right bank ; Saint-
Cyr, with 20,000 men, remained in the Palati-
nate on the left bank, and Laborde with 10,000
on the Upper Rhine. The three corps and the
reserve, forming the whole of the army, 60,000
strong, ought to have been on the right bank by
noon on the 26th at latest, on their march to
surprise and overwhelm the enemy's divisions
dispersed along the river. On the 27th of June
the army ought to have entered Rastadt, on the
30th Sforzheim, after insulating Philipsburg
and Manheim, and cut off the enemy from
Necker, where it ought to have arrived from the
1st to the 4th of July. The General would thus
have gained fifteen days, and spared his troops
several unimportant actions; in lieu of which
he would have gained several brilliant victories,
which would have rendered his adversary, then
so inferior in strength, still weaker ; and this
before Prince Charles could have effected his
return from the banks uf the Lahn. The inde-
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 17i)(>. 3*27
cision of the French general gave the enemy's
commander time to collect his army at Etlingen,
three marches from Kehl, thirteen days after
the passage of the Rhine. What could the
French general have to fear for the territory of
the Republic, when he commenced offensive
operations with 70,000 men ?
3dly. After the passage of the Rhine, and
previously to effecting his junction with the
Army of the Sambre and Meuse, this General de-
taches his right, forming nearly one-third of his
army, (20,000 men) under Ferino, who marches
up the bank of the Rhine, crosses the Black
Mountains, and proceeds to the Lake of Con-
stance, whilst the centre and the left march on
the Necker ; the army being thus cut into two
parts, separated by the Wurtemberg Alps, the
mountains of the Black Forest, and the Danube,
whilst, on the contrary, General Starray, who
was opposed to Ferino, after having disputed
the debouches of the Black Mountains, cen-
tralises his forces on the Necker, and joins the
left of Prince Charles's army : two-thirds of the
Army of the Rhine arrive on the Necker, 50,000
strong, and having before them the majority
of the enemy's troops. Jourdan, on the Mein,
and Ferino, on the Lake of Constance, had only
very inferior forces before them. Thus, in this
march, the French formed three separate corps,
328 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON'.
having nothing in common amongst them, with
three lines of operations, and six flanks, five of
which were unsupported. The flanks being the
weakest part, should be supported; and if that
cannot be done, we should have as few of them
as possible.
4thly. The ir.arch of the Army of the Rhine
on Stutgard, across the Wurtemberg Alps, is
consistent with the spirit of this war ; but its
General should have had Ulm occupied, a place
so important that it is impossible, without pos-
sessing it, to conduct the war on the basin of the
Danube, which extends from the mountains of
the Tyrol and Switzerland to those of Thuringia
and Saxony. He ought to have rested his right
on the Danube, and in that case, on his arrival
at Neresheim, he would not have found himself
unsupported. But although turned at the battle
of Neresheim both on his right and left, and with-
out any central support, he maintained the honour
of the French arms, and evinced coolness and
perseverance.
5thly. After the battle of Neresheim he ought
to have proceeded by forced marches to the
Warnitz and the Altmulh, to have joined Jour-
dan, fixed his head-quarters at Ratisbon, fortified
that point, which, next to Ulm, was of the most
importance to him, and manoeuvred on both
banks. The junction of the two armies might
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 179(5. 329
have been effected on the 15th and lGth of
August; the success of the campaign would have
been decided. Instead of this he did every thing
his enemy could have wished ; he remained
twelve days inactive at the most critical period
of the campaign; resolved, at length, to pass the
Danube and the Lech ; after which he again re-
mained sixteen days inactive ; one would have
thought he did not know that there was a French
army on his left. It was not until the 10th of
September, a month after the battle of Nere-
sheim, and when the Army of the Sambre and
Meuse was already on the Lahn, eighty leagues
from him, that he resolved to detach Desaix's
division on the left bank of the Danube to obtain
intelligence of Jourdan. On the 19th of Septem-
ber he commenced his retreat and repassed the
Lech ; the Army of the Sambre and Meuse was
then hors de combat on the left bank of the Rhine,
and he had all the enemy's forces to contenqj
with. He remained thus thirty-two days in pre-
sence of General Latour, whose forces were not
above half equal to his own, without attacking
him, giving battle, and overwhelming him ; on the
contrary, he did him no harm whatever. The
only important affair in this campaign was the
battle of Biberach, which arose from the necessity
there was for the army to secure its retreat ;
a battle which would have had more important
330 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLKOV.
results, if operations hud been continued, the
following day, by the pursuit of General Latour
with part of the army, whilst the rest manoeuvred
to open the debouches of the Black Mountains.
It was in this retreat that the importance of Ulm,
that key of the Danube, was felt.
Gthly. On arriving at Freyburg and Vieux
Brisach on the 14th of October, there were two
courses to choose between ; either to repass the
Rhine the same day, and give the army an op-
portunity of resting, in order to combine with
the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, or to march
immediately against Prince Charles to take ad-
vantage of his not being yet in force, drive him
beyond the Renchen and the Murg, and prevent
his junction with Latour; the French would have
maintained their ground in the country of Baden
and in Brisgaw. Instead of that, the French
general remained in position on Freyburg, allow-
ing Prince Charles to rally all his detachments;
and what is more extraordinary still, after detach-
ing a third of his army under General Desaix to
the right bank of the Rhine, he still persisted in
the same irresolution, exposing the other two-
thirds to total destruction. This error was im-
portant ; the army re-entered France in disorder,
and like an army vanquished and beaten, an
attitude in which, previously to the 20th, it did
not stand, being proud of the victory of Biberach;
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 1700. 33 I
nor would it have had this appearance if it had
returned sooner.
7thly. A peculiar circumstance of this cam-
paign is, that the French generals, notwith-
standing their errors, sustained no material loss,
and always had the opportunity of retrieving
every thing. Moreau, after the battle of Bibe-
rach, was still master of the fortune of the cam-
paign. He had only to have marched on Roth-
weil, crushed Petrasch and Nauendorf, who had
not altogether 15,000 men; after which he
should have marched against the Archduke, who
was at the mouth of the Rench with less than
9000 men. Even on the 15th of October, when
Moreau had arrived in the valley of the Rhine,
he might still have retrieved his affairs by march-
ing rapidly up to Kehl ; he would thus have
driven the Archduke from the Rench, and pre-
vented his junction with Nauendorfs and Latour's
corps ; and as he would have then been in com-
munication with the Army of the Sambre and
Meuse, he would unquestionably have induced
that army to advance. Lastly, he might still
have rectified his mistakes even during the siege
of his tetes-de-pont. Had he debouched by the
intrenched camp of Kehl with 50,000 men, he
might have overwhelmed General Latour's besieg-
ing army, which did not, at most, exceed 35,000
&32 MEMOIRS OK NAI'OI.KON.
men, and might still have taken up his winter
quarters on the Danube.
Observation IV. — 1st. The French and Austrian
armies were equal in numbers, but the Archduke
had 20,000 cavalry more than his enemy. This
advantage would have been decisive with any
other nation, but the Germans do not know how
to avail themselves of their cavalry ; they are
afraid to hazard it, they estimate it above its
real value, and spare it too much. The horse
artillery is the complement of the cavalry service :
20,000 horse and 120 pieces of light artillery are
equal to 00,000 infantry with 120 pieces of can-
non. In countries consisting of extensive plains,
such as Egypt, or of deserts, such as Poland, it
would be difficult to say which would eventually
have the advantage; 2000 cavalry with twelve
pieces of light artillery are therefore equal to
6000 infantry with six pieces of cannon. In line
of battle these divisions occupy a line of 500
toises, twelve infantry or four horsemen per toise.
A cannon-shot, which should kill all that stands
on the ground having a frontage of one toise,
would therefore kill twelve foot soldiers, or four
horsemen and four horses. The loss of twelve foot
soldiers is much more considerable than that of
four horsemen and four horses, because it is a
loss of eight men against one of four horses. The
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 1796. '-VYS
equipments of four horsemen and their horses are
not equal in value to those of twelve foot-soldiers;
thus even in a financial point of view, the loss
of the infantry is more costly than that of the
cavalry. If the Archduke had commanded the
troops of a nation accustomed to employ the
cavalry boldly, and had had officers trained to en-
courage them and lead them to victory, it would
have been impossible for a French army to pene-
trate into Germany with an inferiority of 20,000
cavalry. This will seem clear, when it is con-
sidered what Napoleon effected with cavalry
against the Russian and Prussian infantry, at
Vauchamp, Nangis, &c.
2dly. In June, when the Archduke heard that
the French army had passed the Rhine at Kehl,
he marched from the banks of the Lahn to the
aid of General Latour ; he left General Warten-
sleben with 36,000 men on the Lower Rhine, and
26,000 men in the intrenched camp of Hechfshein
before Mentz. The Archduke ought only to have
left 8000 men in garrison at Mentz with some
thousands of convalescents, and only 25,000 men
with Wartensleben, and should then have pro-
ceeded with 60,000 men, to the aid of his army
of the Upper Rhine ; he would then have been
able to assemble from 90 to 100,000 men upon
the Alb. Who could then have resisted him?
334 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLKON.
On the 9th of July he would have beaten Desaix,
driven him to the left bank of the Rhine, and
gained possession of Kehl and the bridge of the
Rhine. He had nothing to fear from the Army of
the Sambre and Meuse, because it was disjoined;
but even if it had resumed offensive operations,
and arrived on the Mein between the 10th and
15th of July, how would that have effected him,
if he had then been master of Kehl, and Moreau's
army had been driven into Alsace ?
3dly. Had he collected in a single camp on
his right, the 50,000 men he had on the Alb, and
debouched in three columns on the Murg on the
9th of July, he would have turned Desaix on his
right and left, and broken him in the centre ; he
would have routed him, driven him into Alsace,
and gained possession of the bridge of Kehl.
Saint- Cyr, cut off" from the Rhine, would have
been repulsed to the Necker, and Ferino on
Huninguen. When two armies are in line against
each other, and one of them has, like the French
army, to effect its retreat by a bridge, whilst the
other, like the Austrian army, can retreat on all
points of the semi-circumference, the latter has
every advantage, and every opportunity of mak-
ing daring attempts, striking grand blows, man-
oeuvring on the flanks of the enemy ; it holds
all the aces, and has only to play them.
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY, 179G. 335
4thly. The Archduke ought to have armed
and victualled Ulm, that key of the Danube, and
thrown a good garrison into it.
5thly. The battle of Neresheim was his only
remaining resource to prevent the junction of the
two French armies on the Altmulh ; had he been
victorious, he would have driven the Army of the
Rhine and Moselle into the Wurtemberg Alps
and on the Necker, and the principal army being-
defeated, that of the Sambre and Meuse, which
was only secondary, would have been compelled
to retreat on the Mein. At the battle of Neres-
heim the French army was scattered over a line
of eight leagues, in a difficult country, without
any appui for its flanks ; the Archduke was mas-
ter of the whole course of the Danube ; his
attacks ought to have been wholly made by the
left ; he should have taken a line of battle pa-
rallel to the Danube : his retreat was secured on
Ulm, and the bridges of Guntzburg and Dillin-
gen ; had he manoeuvred thus, he would have
gained a great victory. The French would have
paid dearly for their folly in not supporting their
right on the Danube, and not having had Ulm
occupied by Ferino.
6thly. Being unsuccessful at the battle of
Neresheim, the Archduke relinquished all oppo-
sition to the junction of the French armies; had
336 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON,
he still wished to prevent it, he would have ope-
rated his retreat by the Warnitz and the Altmulh,
maintaining himself on the left bank of the Da-
nube ; leaving 30,000 men under General Latour
behind the Warnitz, he would have gained the
five or six marches he wanted for advancing
against Jourdan ; instead of that, he passed the
Danube, the Warnitz, and the Altmulh. Warten-
sleben manoeuvred during the whole month of
August to get away from the Danube and cover
Bohemia. Nothing thenceforth opposed the
junction of the two French armies.
7thly. In passing the Danube and the Lech,
after the battle of Neresheim, the Archduke had
no other object in view, whatever may have been
asserted, than to cover Bavaria. His position
was delicate : the Army of the Rhine and Moselle
consisted of 60,000 men ; that of the Sambre
and Meuse of 50,000; this made, therefore,
110,000 men, whom he might consider as assem-
bled before Ratisbon, and occupying positions
on both sides of the Danube ; he had but 90,000
men to oppose them with. The battle of Nere-
sheim had made his situation worse : it had been
advantageous to the French. His confidence
was restored when he found that Moreau, who
had remained several days inactive, showed the
greatest hesitation, marched on Donawerth, coun-
termarched on Aichstett, and did not even send
OPERATION'S IN" GERMANY, 179G. -VM
out scouts on the Altimilh ; in short, that the
French generals were manoeuvring as if they had
been mutually ignorant of the existence of an-
other French army in Germany ; that the 400
Hungarian hussars, who were observing the
Altmiilh, were still there, and sending parties to
the very gates of Nuremberg and on the War-
nitz. It was then that he conceived the idea of
his fine movement, passed the Danube with
28,000 men on the 17th of August, and advanced
against the Army of the Sambre and Meuse. It
is related that when he spoke on the subject to
General Latour, whom he left with 30,000 men
on the Lech, that general, alarmed at the danger
which this small corps was about to incur, made
some observations to him : " How would it be
" possible for him," he said, " to make head
" against a victorious French army of twice his
" strength ?" To which the Prince replied : " Of
" what importance will Moreau's arriving before
" Vienna be, if I beat Jourdan's army in the
" mean time ?" He was right, but he should
have encouraged the general by posting him in
advance of Ratisbon, with orders to place him-
self on the left bank of the Danube ; Moreau
would not, in that case, have been able to make
any attempt on the left bank.
Sthly. The Archduke did not attack Bernadottc
at Neumarck until the 22d of August ; that is to
Memoirs. — vol. III. z
338 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
say, five days after the passage of the Danube ;
he attacked him with little vigour, and did him
no harm ; it was a fine thought ill executed.
Bernadotte ought to have been surrounded and
attacked twenty-four hours after the passage of
the Danube, with such impetuosity and supe-
riority of force that his total defeat must have
been the result.
9thly. He marched on Amberg on the 24th of
August, but only with a few troops; he employed
the greater part of his 28,000 men on secondary
objects ; he ought only to have sent a few squa-
drons to follow Bernadotte, and to have fallen
furiously, with his whole corps, on the rear of
Jourdan's corps ; he might thus have decided the
campaign on the banks of the Naab.
lOthly. On the 20th of September, when Jour-
dan disjoined his army, and repassed to the left
bank of the Rhine, the Archduke ought to have
advanced on Ulm with 40,000 men, ordered
General Latour to pass to the left bank of the
Danube at the bridge of Ingolstadt, and joined
him by forced marches. He would have reached
Ulm at the same time as the French army, which
would then have had to make head against 70,000
men ; and its retreat would then have become
difficult indeed. But instead of that, the Arch-
duke brought only 12,000 men to the Upper
Rhine, leaving a great number of troops on the
OPERATIONS IN G FKIU A .V Y, 1 790. ."{I}'.)
Lower Rhine with General Werneck to no pur-
pose. He also misemployed part of these 12,000
men in secondary objects, so that he arrived
before Kehl with only 8 or 9000 men.
1 lthly. He ought to have ordered Latour,
Frcelich, and Nadasti, to manoeuvre on the left
bank of the Danube, outflanking the retreating-
army ; they would have been in position there
to receive Petrasch and all the detachments.
12thly. In this campaign the Archduke man-
oeuvred on good principles, but timidly, like a
man who perceives, but has not studied them.
He struck no decisive blow ; and up to the last
moment, as we have already noticed, the French
generals might always have retrieved their af-
fairs; whereas the Archduke ought to have de-
cided the campaign in the action of the Murg.
Observation V. — At the end of December, the
French armies had had two months' rest ; they
were re-organized, recruited, perfectly recovered,
and superior to the two Austrian armies opposed
to them : nevertheless, Prince Charles ventured
at once to open the trenches before the tetes-de-
pont of Kehl and Huninguen in their presence.
If the whole Army of the Rhine, reinforced by a
detachment from that of the Sambre and Meuse,
had debouched by Kehl or by Huninguen, it might
have attacked Prince Charles's camps at day-
break with twice his force, carried all his lines
z 2
340 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
of countervallation, taken the whole of his artil-
lery, parks, and magazines, and gained a brilliant
victory, which would have compensated for the
disasters of the campaign, restored the honour of
the French arms, placed Germany in a hazardous
situation, and allowed the French to winter on
the right bank of the Rhine. If the French army
had only been composed of new-levied troops,
raw and untrained soldiers, a supposition pre-
cisely contrary to the fact, the French general
could not, certainly, have ventured to attempt
the raising of sieges by a battle; but in that case,
having more arms, more means, and a more ad-
vantageous position than the enemy, he ought to
have heaped works on works, and batteries on
batteries ; to have approached by lines of coun-
ter-attack, supported by the positions of the left
bank and by the isles ; and then even these sieges
must have proved ruinous to the enemy, occa-
sioned the destruction of his equipments, military
stores, and troops, and obliged him, through
weariness, to go into winter-quarters.
These two sieges do not show Prince Charles's
prudence, but are extremely glorious to his
army, and prove its bravery and excellent spirit ;
they have always been considered by military
men as events little honourable to the French
armies. The possession of the two tetes-de-pont
was, in fact, very important to France ; the
OPERATIONS [N (iEKMAW, 1796. LJ4 1
Rhine is a great obstacle ; it obliged the enemy
to abandon the whole valley of the Rhine, as far
as the Black Mountains, to the French army,
which would have been advantageous at once,
both in a military and financial point of view.
Apprehensions for Germany would not have al-
lowed the Austrians to carry so many troops into
Italy. The French officers have alleged, by way
of excuse, that the government left them exposed
to the greatest privations, that the pay was in
arrear, that they were ill fed, and that the engi-
neers and artillery had no money to supply their
occasions. But these reasons have not been
thought satisfactory ; these privations only tend
to prove, that it was necessary to confound the
enemy by a clap of thunder and a decisive battle
in which all chances would have been in favour
of the French. There was more than sufficient
space for an army of 50,000 men to deploy in the
isles and in the ground comprised between the
Priest's-cap and the Kintzig.
The Austrian officers who have wished to jus-
tify Prince Charles's imprudence and inconsi-
derateness in commencing these sieges, have
stated that he was aware of the discouragement
which existed in the French armies, of the asto-
nishment which the result of the campaign had
excited in the leaders, and that it was chiefly on
their irresolute conduct that he calculated for
342 MEMOIRS 01 NAPOLEON.
conducting so dangerous an enterprise to a for-
tunate issue, which he considered necessary for
the success of his intended campaign in Italy.
Others have said that these sieges were under-
taken by order of the Court of Vienna and against
his opinion, which is possible.
CHAPTER XII.
BATTLE OF ARCOLE.
I. Marshal Alvinzi arrives in Italy at the head of a third army.
— II. Good condition of the French army ; all the nations of
Italy confident of its success. — III. Battle of the Brenta,
(Nov. 5) ; Vauhois evacuates the Tyrol in disorder. — IV. Bat-
tle of Caldiero, (Nov. 12). — V. Murmurs and various senti-
ments of the French soldiers. — VI. Nocturnal march of the
army on Ronco, where the troops pass the Adige over a bridge
of boats, (Nov. 14.); the army re-enters Verona in triumph,
by the Venetian gate, on the right bank, (Nov. 18).
I.
All the couriers who reached Vienna with
news of Prince Charles's successes, were fol-
lowed by couriers from Wurmser, bringing ac-
counts of his disasters. The court passed the
whole month of September in these alternations
of joy and sorrow. The satisfaction derived
from its triumphs, did not compensate for the
consternation excited by its defeats. Germany
was saved, but Italy was lost : the army which
344 MEMOIRS 01 NAPOLEON.
guarded that frontier had disappeared. Its nu-
merous staff, its old marshal, and a remnant of
troops, had only been able to find temporary safe-
ty by shutting themselves up in Mantua, which
place, reduced to the last extremity, in want of
every thing, and ravaged by the autumnal fevers,
would soon be compelled to open its gates to the
conqueror. The Aulic Council felt the necessity
of making extraordinary efforts : it assembled two
armies ; the first in the Frioul, the other in the
Tyrol ; appointed Marshal Alvinzi to command
them, and ordered him to march to save Mantua
and deliver Wurmser.
II.
The influence of the proceedings of the Armies
of the Sambre and Meuse and Rhine was calcu-
lated to be speedily felt in Italy. If those two
armies should not maintain themselves on the
right bank of the Rhine, it was of the utmost im-
portance that they should send strong detach-
ments to reinforce the Army of Italy. The Direc-
tory promised much, but performed little ; they
sent, however, twelve battalions, drafted from the
Army of la Vendee, who reached Milan in the
course of September and October ; care was
taken to make them march in twelve columns.
The notion was spread abroad that each of these
columns was a regiment, and had its full comple-
BATTLE OF AHCOLE. 345
ment of men, which would have been a very
considerable reinforcement. It is true that the
French soldiers did not need encouragement ;
they were full of confidence in their chief and in
their own superiority; they were well paid,
clothed, and fed ; the artillery was fine and nu-
merous; the cavalry well mounted. The Italians
of every state had connected themselves with the
interest of the army on which their liberty and
independence depended ; they were as much con-
vinced of the superiority of the French over the
German soldiers, as of that of the general who had
vanquished Beaulieu and Wurmser, over Marshal
Alvinzi. Public opinion had undergone a great
change since the preceding month of July. At
that time, when Wurmser's approach was an-
nounced, all Italy expected his triumph ; at pre-
sent no one doubted that of the French army.
The public spirit of the Transpadan States, of
Bologna, Modena, and Reggio, was such that
they might be depended on for repulsing the
Pope's army themselves, if it should enter their
territories according to the threats held out.
III.
In the beginning of October Marshal Alvinzi
was still with his army before the Isonzo; but at
the end of that month, he removed his head-quar-
ters to Conegliano, behind the Piave. Masscna,
346 MEMOIH* Of X A I'OLKO.V.
stationed at Bassano, was watching his move-
ments. Davidowich had assembled a corps d'ar-
mee of 18,000 men in the Tyrol, inclosing the
Tyrolese militia. The General of division Vaubois
covered Trent, occupying the Avisio with a corps
of 12,000 men. Augereau's division, the reserve
of cavalry, and the head-quarters of the French
army, were at Verona. Alvinzi's plan was to effect
his junction with Davidowich in Verona, and to
march thence on Mantua. On the 1st of Novem-
ber he threw two bridges across the Piave, and
marched in three columns towards the Brenta.
Massena, threatening to attack him, compelled
him to deploy his whole army ; and when he
had ascertained that it amounted to upwards of
40,000 men, he raised his camp of Bassano, re-
passed the Brenta, and approached Vicenza, where
Napoleon joined him with Augereau's division
and his reserve ; and on the 6th, at day-break,
advanced to give battle to Alvinzi, who had fol-
lowed Massena's movement. He had fixed his
head-quarters at Fonte Niva ; his van, under
General Liptay, on the right bank of the Brenta,
at Carmignano, in advance of his left, which was
commanded by General Provera. His right, un-
der the command of Quasdanowich, was in posi-
tion between Bassano and Vicenza. General
Metrouski commanded a corps of observation in
the gorges of the Brenta, and General Hohenzol-
BATTLE OF AM COLE. 347
lern commanded his reserve. Massena attacked
at dawn of day, and after an action of several
hours drove back the van, Quasdanowich, Lip-
tay, and Provera's division, to the left bank of
the river* killing a great number of men, and
making many prisoners. Napoleon advanced
against Quasdanowich at the head of Auge-
reau's division, and drove him from Lenove upon
Bassano. It was four o'clock in the afternoon ;
he considered the passage of the bridge and the
taking of the town on this day as of the greatest
importance; but Hohenzollern having come up,
he ordered his brigade of reserve to advance
for the purpose of seconding the attack of the
bridge; a battalion of 900 Croats, which had
been cut off, had thrown themselves into a village
on the high road ; as soon as the head of the re-
serve appeared to cross the village, it was re-
ceived with a very brisk fire ; it became neces-
sary to bring up howitzers. The village was
taken, and the Croats shot ; but a delay of two
hours had taken place, and the troops did not
reach the bridge until night ; they were obliged
to postpone the forcing of this passage until
the following day.
Vaubois had received orders to attack the
enemy's positions on the right bank of the Avisio.
On. the 1st of November, he attacked those of
Saint-Michael and Sogonzano. The enemy were
;M8 memoirs or napoleon.
in considerable force, and defended themselves
with the greatest intrepidity. Vaubois was not
altogether successful, nor was the attempt he
made the following day more fortunate. At
length he was himself attacked in turn, his posi-
tion of the Avisio was forced, and he was obliged
to abandon Trent. Having rallied his troops,
he took up a position at Calliano ; but Landon,
manoeuvring by the right bank of the Adige,
with his Tyrolese, had outflanked him, and got
possession of Nomi and Torbole. It appeared
to be his intention to advance on Montebaldo
and Rivoli. Vaubois had no longer any troops
on the right bank, or any means of opposing this
manoeuvre, which, had it been executed by the
enemy, would have endangered not only his
corps but the whole of the French army. This
news reached the French head-quarters at. two
in the morning. There was now no room for
hesitation ; it was indispensably necessary to
hasten to Verona, now so imminently threatened,
and to abandon the former plan, with every idea
of making a diversion. The original scheme of
the General-in-chief was, after driving Alvinzi
bevond the Piave, to proceed up the defiles of
the Brenta, and to cut oft' Davidowich. Colonel
Vignoles, of the staff, a confidential officer, was
sent to collect all the troops he could muster at
Verona, and to march with them on la Corona
BATTLE OF A-ltCOLE. ',149
and Rivoli. lie found there a battalion of* the
40th, just arrived from la Vendue, and overawed
the first skirmishers of the enemy, who came up
to la Corona. On the following day, Joubert
reached that important position, with the 4th
light demi-brigade, brought from the blockade of
Mantua : after this there was nothing to appre-
hend. At the same time Vaubois threw bridges
over the Adige, crossed back to the right bank,
and proceeded to occupy the position of la Co-
rona and Rivoli in force.
From the Brenta, the French army filed
through the city of Vicenza, during the whole of
the 7th. The inhabitants who had witnessed the
victory it had gained, could not account for this
movement in retreat. Alvinzi had also com
menced his retreat, at three in the morning, to
pass the Piave ; but he was soon informed by
his light cavalry of the retrograde movement of
the French army. He returned on the Brenta,
and the next day passed that river to follow his
antagonist's movement.
Napoleon had Vaubois' division assembled on
the plain of Rivoli, and addressed them thus :
" Soldiers, I am not satisfied with you ; you
" have shown neither discipline, perseverance,
" nor bravery ; no position could rally you ; you
" abandoned yourselves to a panic terror. You
" suffered yourselves to be driven from positions
350 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
" in which a handful of brave men might have
" stopped an army. Soldiers of the 39th and
" 85th, you are not French soldiers. Quarter-
" master-general, let it be inscribed on their
" colours, They no longer J arm part of the Army of
" Italy . r This harangue, pronounced in a severe
tone, drew tears from these old soldiers : the
rules of discipline could not suppress the ac-
cents of their grief: several grenadiers, who had
received honorary arms, cried out, " General, we
" have been calumniated ; place us in the van,
" and you shall see whether the 39th and 85th
" belong to the Army of Italy." Having thus
produced the effect he wished, Napoleon ad-
dressed a few words of consolation to them.
These two regiments a few days after covered
themselves with glory.
IV.
Notwithstanding the reverses which Alvinzi
had sustained on the Brenta, his operations were
crowned with the most brilliant success. He
was master of the whole of the Tyrol, and of
all the country between the Brenta and the
Adige. But the most difficult task still remain-
ed, namely, to force the passage of the Adige
in the face of the French army, and to effect
his junction with Davidowich by marching over
the bodies of the brave soldiers posted before
BATTLE OK ARCOLE. 351
Verona. The road from Verona to Vicenza runs
along the Adige for three leagues, as far as Villa-
nuova, where it turns at right angles to the left,
and runs straight to Vicenza. At Villa-nuova
the little river Alpon cuts it, and after running
through Arcole falls into the Adige, near Albare-
do. To the left of Villa-nuova are some heights
known by the name of the position of Caldiero,
by occupying which Verona is covered, and it
becomes easy to fall on the rear of an enemy
manoeuvring on the lower Adige. As soon as
the defence of Montebaldo was provided for, and
Vaubois' troops had regained their confidence,
Napoleon determined to occupy Caldiero, as
affording more chances in favour of defensive
operations, and more energy to his attitude. On
the 1 1th, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the army
passed the bridges of Verona. Verdier's brigade,
which was at the head, overthrew the enemy's
vanguard, made several hundred prisoners, and
took up a position, at night, at the foot of
Caldiero. The fires of the bivouacs and the
reports of spies and prisoners, left no doubt re-
specting Alvinzi's intentions : he meant to receive
battle, and had fixed himself firmly in these fine
positions, resting his left on the marsh of Arcole,
and his right on Mount Olivetto and the village
of Colognola. This position is good in both
directions. He had covered himself by some
352 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
redoubts and formidable batteries. At day-break
the enemy's line was perceived : his left was
impregnable; his right seemed ill supported.
Massena received orders to march with his divi-
sion to take advantage of this defect by occupy-
ing a hill which outflanked the enemy's right,
and which he had neglected to occupy. Bri-
gadier General Launay intrepidly climbed the
acclivity at the head of a corps of skirmishers ;
but, having advanced too far, the division which
was to support him could not come up with him
in time, being stopped by a ravine, and he was
repulsed and taken prisoner. The enemy, now
apprised of their error, immediately rectified
their position ; and it was no longer possible to
attack them with any hope of success. In the
mean time the whole line engaged, and the fire
was maintained throughout the day. The rain fell
in torrents ; the ground was so completely soaked
that the French artillery could make no move-
ment, whilst that of the Austrians, being in posi-
tion and advantageously placed, produced its
full effect. The enemy made several attempts
to attack in his turn, but was repulsed with
loss. The two armies bivouacked in their re-
spective positions. It continued to rain all night
so heavily that the General-in-chief judged it
expedient to return into his camp before Verona.
The loss in this affair was equal on both sides ;
BATTLE OF AKCOLE. Ao'si
the enemy, with reason, claimed the victory ;
his advanced posts approached Saint-Michael's,
and the situation of the French was become
truly hazardous.
V.
Vaubois had suffered considerable loss ; he
had not now above 8000 men left. The other
two divisions, after having fought valiantly on
the Brenta, and failed in their operation on Cal-
diero, did not now amount to more than 13,000
men under arms. The idea of the superior
strength of the enemy pervaded every mind.
Vaubois' soldiers, in excuse for their retreat, de-
clared that the enemy were three to one against
them. The enemy had also suffered loss, no
doubt, but he had gained great advantages. He
had counted the small number of the French at
his ease ; and accordingly he had no longer any
doubt of the deliverance of Mantua, or of the
conquest of Italy. In his delirium of confidence,
he had a great number of scaling-ladders made,
and loudly threatened to take Verona by storm.
The garrison of Mantua had awakened from its
lethargy, and made frequent sorties, incessantly
harassing the besiegers, who amounted only to
8 or 9000 men, and had to restrain a garrison of
20,000, out of which number, however, there
were 10 or 12,000 sick. The French were no
Memoirs. — vol. hi. 2 a
354 MEMOIRS OF XAPOI.ION.
longer in a situation to carry on offensive opera-
tions in any direction ; they were checked on
one side by the position of Caldiero, and on
the other by the denies of the Tyrol. But even
if the enemy's position had allowed of any enter-
prise against him, his numerical superiority was
too well known : it was therefore necessary to
let him make the first move, and to wait pa-
tiently until he should make some attempt. The
weather was extremely bad ; every movement
was made in the mud. The affairs of Caldiero
and the Tyrol had evidently damped the confi-
dence of the French soldier; he was, indeed,
still persuaded of his superiority on equal terms,
but did not now feel capable of resisting such
superior numbers. A great number of the
bravest men had been wounded two or three
times in different battles since the army entered
Italy. Discontent began to show itself. " We
" cannot," said the men, " do every body's duty.
" Alvinzi's army, now present, is the same that
" the Armies of the Rhine, and Sambre and
" Meuse, retreated before, and they are now idle :
" why are we to perform their work ? If we are
" beaten, we must make for the Alps as fugitives
" and without honour ; if, on the contrary, we
" conquer, what will be the result of our new
" victory ? We shall be opposed by another
" army like that of Alvinzi, as Alvinzi himself
BATTLE OY ARCOLE. 355
" succeeded Wurmser, and as Wurmser suc-
" ceeded Beaulieu ; and in this unequal contest
" we must be annihilated at last."
To these remarks, Napoleon caused the fol-
lowing answer to be made. " We have but one
" more effort to make, and Italy is our own.
'.' The enemy is, no doubt, more numerous than
" we are, but half his troops are recruits ; when
"he is beaten, Mantua must fall, and we shall
" remain masters of all ; our labours will be at
" an end ; for not only Italy, but a general peace
" is in Mantua. You talk of returning to the
" Alps, but you are no longer capable of doing
" so : from the dry and frozen bivouacs of those
" sterile rocks, you could very well conquer the
" delicious plains of Lombardy ; but from the
" smiling flowery bivouacs of Italy, you cannot
" return to the Alpine snows. Succours have
" reached us ; there are more on the road ; let
" not those who are unwilling to fight seek vain
" pretences : for only beat Alvinzi, and I will
" answer for your future welfare." These words,
repeated by every one in the army that pos-
sessed a generous heart, raised the spirits of the
troops, and brought the mover by degrees to an
opposite way of thinking. Thus, one while the
army, in its dejection, was desirous of retreat
ing ; at another moment it was filled with enthu-
siasm and talked of advancing. " Shall the sol-
2 a 2
350 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
" diers of Italy patiently endure the insults and
" provocations of these slaves ?"
When it became known at Brescia, Bergamo,
Milan, Cremona, Lodi, Pavia, and Bologna, that
the army had sustained a check, the wounded
and sick left the hospitals, before they were
well cured, to resume their stations in the ranks ;
the wounds of many of these brave men were
still bleeding. This affecting sight filled the
mind with the most lively emotion.
VI.
At length, on the 14th of November, at night-
fall, the camp of Verona got under arms : three
columns began their march in the deepest si-
lence, crossed the city, passed the Adigc by the
three bridges, and formed on the right bank.
The hour of departure, the direction taken,
which was that of a retreat, the silence observed
in the order of the day, contrary to the invari-
able custom of announcing that an engagement
is to take place, the state of affairs, every thing,
in short, indicated that the army was retreating.
The first step in retreat would necessarily be fol-
lowed by the raising of the siege of Mantua, and
foreboded the loss of Italy. Those amongst the
inhabitants who placed the hopes of their future
lot in the victories of the French, followed with
anxious and aching hearts the movements of
BATTLE OF ARCQLE. 357
this army, which was depriving- them of every
hope. But the army, instead of keeping the
Peschiera road, suddenly turned to the left,
marched along the Adige, and arrived before
day-light at Ronco, where Andreossy was com-
pleting a bridge. By the first rays of the sun,
the troops were astonished to find themselves,
by merely facing to the left, on the opposite
shore. The officers and soldiers who had tra-
versed this country before, when in pursuit
of Wurmser, now began to guess the General's
intention : he intended to turn Caldiero, which
he had not been able to carry by an attack
in front: not being able with 13,000 men to
withstand 40,000 in the plain, he was removing
his field of battle to roads surrounded by vast
marshes, where numbers would be unavailing,
but where the courage of the heads of the co-
lumns would decide every thing. The hopes of
victory now animated every heart, and every
man vowed to surpass himself in order to second
so fine and daring a plan. Kilmaine had re-
mained in Verona with 1500 men of all arms,
with the gates closed, and all communication
strictly prohibited; the enemy was therefore com-
pletely ignorant of this movement. The bridge
of Ronco was constructed on the right of the
Alpon, about a quarter of a league from its mouth ;
which situation has been censured by ill-informed
•S£>8 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
military men. In fact, if the bridge had been
carried to the left bank opposite Alberedo ; 1st,
the army would have had to debouch on a vast
plain, the very thing which the General wished to
avoid; 2dly, Alvinzi, who occupied the heights
of Caldiero, might have covered the march of a
column which he would have directed on Verona,
by stationing troops on the right bank of the
Alpon : he would have forced Verona, feebly
guarded as it was, and would have effected his
junction with the Army of the Tyrol ; the divi-
sion of Rivoli, taken between two fires, would
have been obliged to retreat on Peschiera, and
the whole army would have been strangely com-
promised : Whereas, by constructing the bridge
to the right of the Alpon, the invaluable advan-
tages were secured, 1st, of drawing the enemy
into three roads crossing an immense marsh ;
"idly, of being in communication with Verona, by
the dyke which runs up the Adige and passes by
the villages of Porcil and Gambione, where Al-
vinzi's head-quarters were, without leaving any
position for the enemy to take, or any natural
obstacle to cover the movement of any troops
he might detach to attack Verona. Such an
attack was, indeed, now impossible, for the whole
French army would have taken such troops in the
rear, whilst the walls of the city would have
stopped them in front. Three roads branch out
BATTLE OF ARCOLE. 359
from the bridge of Ronco ; the first, on the left,
goes up the Adige towards Verona, passes the
villages of Bionde and Porcil, where it debouches
in a plain ; the second and centre one, leads to
Villa-Nuova, and runs through the village of
Arcole, crossing the Alpon by a little stone
bridge ; the third, on the right, runs down the
Adige and leads to Albaredo. It is 3G00 toises
from Ronco to Porcil, 2000 from Porcil to Cal-
diero, and three leagues from Caldiero to Verona.
It is 2200 toises from Ronco to Arcole, 3000
from the bridge of Arcole to Villa-Nuova ; 100
from Ronco to the mouth of the Aipon, and 500
thence to Albaredo.
Three columns entered upon these three roads;
the left one marched up the Adige as far as the
extremity of the marshes, at the village of Por-
cil, whence the soldiers perceived the steeples
of Verona ; it was thenceforth impossible for the
enemy to march upon that city. The centre
column marched on Arcole, where the French
skirmishers got as far as the bridge unperceived.
Two battalions of Croats, with two pieces of can-
non, had bivouacs there for the purpose of guard-
ing the rear of the army, and watching any par-
ties which the garrison of Legnago might send
into the country ; that place being only three
leagues off, on the right. The ground between
Arcole and the Adige was not guarded ; Alvinzi
3(>0 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
had contented himself with ordering patroles of
hussars, who thrice every day visited the dykes
of the marshes on the side of the Adige. The
road from Ronco to Arcole meets the Alpon 1200
toises from Ronco ; it then runs along- the right
bank of that little rivulet for 10,000 toises, as far
as the stone bridge which turns to the right, at
right angles, and leads into the village of Arcole.
The Croats were bivouacked with their right
supported on the village and their left towards
the mouth of the rivulet, with the dyke in their
front, separated from them by the stream ; by
firing in front, they took the column, the head
of which was near Arcole, in flank ; the soldiers
fell back precipitately as far as the point where
the road ceases to expose the flank to the left
bank. Augereau, indignant at this retrograde
movement of his van, rushed upon the bridge at
the head of two battalions of grenadiers ; but,
being received by a brisk flank-fire, he was driven
back on his division. Alvinzi, being informed of
this attack, could not at first comprehend, but at
day-break he was enabled to observe the move-
ment of the French from the neiafhbourincr stee-
pies. His reconnoitring parties of hussars were
received with discharges of musquetry on all the
dykes, and pursued by the cavalry; he then
plainly saw that the French had passed the
Adige and were in his rear. It seemed to him
BATTLE OF ARCOLE. 3()I
absurd to suppose that a whole army could thus
have beeu thrown into impassable marshes ; he
thought it must be some light troops which had
moved in this direction to alarm him, and to
mask a real attack by troops which would de-
bouch by the Verona road. But his reconnoitring
parties having brought him intelligence that all
was quiet towards Verona, he thought it impor-
tant to drive these light troops from the marshes.
He therefore directed a division, commanded by
Metrouski, on the dyke of Arcole, and another
on the left dyke, commanded by Provera. To-
wards nine o'clock in the morning they attacked
with impetuosity. Massena, who was intrusted
with the left dyke, having allowed the enemy to
get fairly upon the dyke, made a desperate charge,
broke his column, repulsed him with great loss,
and took a number of prisoners. The same thing
happened on the dyke of Arcole. As soon as the
enemy had passed the elbow of. the road, he was
charged and routed by Augereau, leaving pri-
soners and cannon in the victor's hands : the
marsh was covered with dead. It became of the
utmost importance to gain possession of Arcole,
for, by debouching thence on the enemy's rear,
we should have seized the bridge of Villa-Nuova
over the Alpon, which was his only retreat, and
established ourselves there before it could be
occupied against us; but Arcole withstood seve-
362 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
ral attacks. Napoleon determined to try a last
effort in person ; he seized a flag, rushed on the
bridge, and there planted it; the column he com-
manded had reached the middle of the bridge,
when the flanking fire and the arrival of a division
of the enemy frustrated the attack ; the grena-
diers at the head of the column, finding them-
selves abandoned by the rear, hesitated, but
being hurried away in the flight, they persisted
in keeping possession of their General ; they
seized him by his arms and by his clothes, and
dragged him along with them amidst the dead,
the dying, and the smoke ; he was precipitated
into a morass, in which he sunk up to the middle,
surrounded by the enemy. The grenadiers per-
ceived that their General was in danger ; a cry
was heard of " Forward, soldiers, to save the
General! " These brave men immediately turned
back, ran upon the enemy, drove him beyond
the bridge, and Napoleon was saved. This was
the day of military devotedness. Lannes, who
had been wounded at Governolo, had hastened
from Milan; he was still suffering; he threw him-
self between the enemy and Napoleon, covering
him with his body, and received three wounds,
determined never to abandon him. Muiron, Na-
poleon's aide-de-camp, was killed in covering his
General with his own body. Heroic and affecting
death ! Belliard and Vignoles were wounded in
BATTLE OF ARC OLE. 303
rallying the troops forward. The brave General
Robert was killed, he was a soldier who never
shrunk from the enemy's fire.
General Guieux passed the Adige at the ferry
of Albaredo with a brigade. Arcole was taken
in the rear; but in the mean time Alvinzi,
having ascertained the real state of affairs, had
become fully sensible of the danger of his posi-
tion ; he had abandoned Caldiero precipitately,
destroyed his batteries, and made all his parks
and reserves repass the bridge. From the top
of the steeple of Ronco the French had the mor-
tification to see this booty escape them ; and it was
only by witnessing the precipitate movements of
the enemy that the whole extent and conse-
quences of Napoleon's plan could be compre-
hended. Every one then saw what might be the
results of so profound and daring a combination.
The enemy's army was escaping from destruc-
tion by a hasty retreat ; General Guieux was
not able to march on Arcole by the left bank
of the Alpon until near four o'clock : the village
was carried without striking a blow ; but it
was now unimportant, being six hours too late ;
the enemy had resumed his natural position.
Arcole was now only an intermediate post
between the fronts of the two armies, whereas
in the morning it had been in the rear of the
enemy. The day was, however, crowned with
3(54 MEMOIRS 01 X A I'OLKON.
important results. Caldiero was evacuated ;
Verona was no longer in danger; two divisions
of Alvinzi's army had been defeated with consi-
derable loss ; numerous columns of prisoners,
and a great number of trophies, filed off through
the camp, and filled the officers and soldiers
with enthusiasm ; the troops regained their
spirits, and the confidence of victory.
In the mean time Davidowich with the corps
of the Tyrol had attacked and taken la Corona ;
he occupied Rivoli. Vaubois occupied the
heights of Bussolengo ; Kilmaine, relieved from
all apprehensions for the left bank by the eva-
cuation of Caldiero, had directed his attention
to the walls of Verona and the right bank ; but
if Davidowich should march on Vaubois, and
force him to throw himself on Mantua, he would
oblige the French to raise the blockade of that
city, and cut off the retreat of the head-quartern
and the army which were at Ronco. It is thir-
teen leagues from Rivoli to Mantua, and ten
from Ronco to that city, by very bad roads ; it
was therefore necessary to be ready, by day-
light, to support Vaubois, protect the blockade
of Mantua and the communications of the army,
and beat Davidowich, who had advanced in the
course of the day. In order to succeed in this
plan, it was necessary to calculate the hours.
The (Jeneral-in-chief, uncertain what might have
BATTLE OF ARCOLE, 305
passed during the day, thought it best to sup-
pose that every thing had been unfortunate on
Vaubois' side; that he had been forced, and had
taken up a position between Roverbella and
Castel-Nuovo. He caused Arcole, which had
cost so much blood, to be evacuated ; made the
army fall back on the right bank of the Adige,
leaving on the left bank only one brigade and a
few pieces of cannon, and ordered the soldiers
to prepare their mess in this position. If the
enemy had marched on Rivoli, the bridge over
the Adige must have been raised, and the army
must have disappeared before Alvinzi, and reach-
ed Vaubois in time to assist him. He left
bivouacs at Arcole with lighted fires kept up
by piquets of the grand guard, in order that
Alvinzi should perceive nothing. At four in the
morning the army got under arms ; but at the
same time one of Vaubois' officers brought word
that he was at six o'clock the preceding even-
ing still at Bussolengo, and that Davidowich had
not moved. That general had commanded one
of Wurmser's corps ; he remembered the lesson
he had received, and was not forward to com-
promise himself. Alvinzi, however, being in-
formed of the retrograde march of the French
about three in the morning, had Arcole and
Porcil occupied, and at day-light directed two
columns on the two dykes. The firing began
3CG MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
about 200 toises from the bridge of Ronco,
which the French crossed again in charging-
time, fell on the enemy, broke them, and pursued
them as far as the outlets of the morasses, which
they filled with the Austrian dead. Several
standards and cannon, and a number of pri-
soners, were the trophies of this day, on which
two more Austrian divisions were defeated. In
the evening the General-in-chief, from the same
motives and calculations as the preceding day,
made the same movements as before, concen-
trating all his troops on the right bank of the
Adige, and leaving only a van-guard on the left
bank.
Alvinzi, deceived by a spy who assured him
that the French were marching on Mantua and
had only left a van-guard at Ronco, debouched
from his camp before dawn. At five in the
moraine:, it was known at the French head-
quarters that Davidowich had made no move-
ment, and that Vaubois was still in the same
positions ; the army again crossed the bridge ;
the heads of the columns of the two armies met
halfway up the dykes ; the action was obstinate,
and for a moment doubtful, the 75th being
broken ; the balls reached the bridge. The
General placed the 32d in ambush, lying on their
faces, in a little wood of willows, along the dyke,
near the head of the bridge ; they rose at the
BATTLE OK AHCOLE. ?>(jl
proper moment, fired a volley, charged bayonets,
and overthrew into the morass a close column
of 3000 Croats, who all perished there. Mas-
sena, on the left, experienced some vicissitudes ;
but he marched at the head of his troops, with
his hat at the end of his sword by way of a
standard, and made a horrible carnage of the
division opposed to him. In the afternoon the
General-in-chief conceived that the decisive
moment had at length arrived; for if Vaubois
had been defeated this day by Davidowich, he
would have been obliged to proceed the next night
to his aid and to that of Mantua. Alvinzi would
then advance on Verona, and would carry off
the honour and benefit of victory ; and all the
advantages gained during these last three days
would be lost : whereas by repulsing Alvinzi
beyond Villa-Nuova, he would be enabled to
march to the assistance of Vaubois, by Verona.
He had the prisoners carefully counted, and
recapitulated the losses of the enemy, by which
means he convinced himself that the Austrian
force had been diminished by upwards of 25,000
men, in the course of these three days ; so that
henceforth, his number in the field would not
exceed those of the French by much more
than a third. He ordered the army to march
out of the morasses, and to attack the enemy
in the plain. The events of these three days
;j(>S Ml-. Mollis of napoleon.
had so materially altered the characters of the
two armies, that victory was certain. The
army passed the bridge constructed at the
mouth of the Alpon : Elliot, aide-de-camp to
the General-in-chief, had been charged to con-
struct a second ; he was killed there. At two
o'clock in the afternoon the French army was
formed in line, with its left on Arcole, and its
right in the direction of Porto Legnago. The
enemy was in front, with his right resting on the
Alpon and his left on some marshes ; he occu-
pied both sides of the Vicenza road. Adjutant-
general Lorset had marched from Legnago with
6 or 700 men, four pieces of cannon, and 200
horse, to turn the marshes on which the enemy
supported his left. Towards three o'clock, when
this detachment was advancing, the cannonade
being brisk throughout the line, and the skir-
mishers engaged, Major Hercule was ordered
to proceed with twenty-five guides and four
trumpets across the reeds, and to charge the
extreme left of the enemy when the garrison
of Legnago should begin to cannonade them in
the rear. That officer executed the movement
in an able manner, and contributed greatly to
the success of the day ; the line was broken,
the enemy commenced his retreat. The Aus-
trian general had placed 6 or 7000 men in
echelon in his rear, to secure his parks and his
BATTLE OF ARCOLE. 369
retreat ; he had not more troops than the French
on the field of battle; he was closely pursued
all the evening-, and had a great number of
men taken prisoners. The army passed the
night in its position.
Notwithstanding the victories of these three
days, it was matter of speculation amongst the
generals and superior officers, what orders the
General-in-chief would give for the next day ;
they thought that he would be content with
having dispersed the enemy, and would not
enter the plains of the Vicentine, but return
to Verona by the left bank of the Adige, to
march thence against Davidowich and occupy
Caldiero, which had been the first object of
his manoeuvre. But the enemy's loss had been
so severe, during these three days, both in men
and confidence, that he was no longer formidable
in the plain ; at day-light it was perceived that
he had retreated on Vicenza ; the army pursued
him, but, after reaching Villa-Nuova the cavalry
alone continued the pursuit, the infantry waiting
for reports of the stand which should be made
by his rear- guard.
The General-in-chief entered the convent of
St. Boniface, the church of which had served
as an hospital ; between 4 and 500 wounded
had been crowded into it, the greater part of
them were dead ; a cadaverous smell issued
Memoirs. — vol. m. 2 b
370 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
from the place: Napoleon was retiring, struck
with horror, when he heard himself called by his
name. Two unfortunate soldiers had been three
days amongst the dead, without having had their
wounds dressed ; they despaired of relief, but
were recalled to life at the sight of their General.
Every assistance was afforded them.
Having ascertained by the reports that the
enemy was in the utmost confusion, was making
no stand in any direction, and that his rear-guard
had already got beyond Montebello, Napoleon
faced to the left, and proceeded to Verona to
attack the Army of the Tyrol. The scouts
captured a staff-officer, sent by Davidowich to
Alvinzi ; he came from the mountains, and sup-
posed himself in the midst of his friends. It was
found by his despatches that the enemy had had
no communications for three days, and that
Davidowich was ignorant of all that had taken
place. In the three days' engagements at Arcole,
Alvinzi had lost 18,000 men, of whom G000 were
taken prisoners, four standards, and eighteen
pieces of cannon.
The French army re-entered Verona in triumph
by the Venice gate, three days after having quit-
ted that city almost clandestinely by the Milan
gate. It would be difficult to conceive the as-
tonishment and enthusiasm of the inhabitants ;
the most declared enemies of the French could
BATTLE OF AKCOLE. 371
not suppress their admiration, and added their
homage to that of the patriots. The army, how-
ever, made no stay there, but passed the Adige
and adffcnced on Davidowich, who had attacked
Bussolengo on the 17th, and driven Vaubois on
Castel-Nuovo. Massena marched thither, joined
Vaubois, and attacked Rivoli. Augereau marched
on Dolce, on the left bank of the Adige, took
1500 men, two pontoon trains, nine pieces of
cannon, and a great quantity of baggage.
But these grand results were not obtained
without loss. The army stood more than ever
in need of repose ; it was not expedient for it to
enter the Tyrol and spread itself so far as Trent.
It was to be expected that Mantua would open
its gates before the Austrian general could form
a new army : the garrison of that place had been
reduced to half rations; desertion from it had
become frequent; the hospitals were crowded
to excess : every thing announced a speedy sur-
render : the mortality was dreadful, and diseases
daily swept off more men than would have suf-
ficed to win a great battle.
2 it 2
CHAPTER XIII. *
NEGOTIATIONS IN 179G.
I. With the Republic of Genoa.— II. With the King of Sar-
dinia.— III. With the Duke of Parma— IV. With the Duke
of Modena.— V. With the Court of Rome.— VI. With the
Grand Duke of Tuscany. — VII. With the King of Naples.
— VIII With the Emperor of Germany. — IX. Congress of
Lombardy. Cispadan Republic.
I.
The minority of the aristocracy which govern-
ed the Republic of Genoa, the majority of the
third-estate, and the whole population of the
Riviera di Ponente, were friendly to the French
ideas. The city of Genoa was the only city of
that state of any strength ; it was defended by
double walls with bastions, a great quantity of
artillery, 6000 soldiers of the line, and 6000
national guards. At the first signal of the Senate
30,000 men of the inferior corporations, such
as those of the colliers and porters, and the
peasants of the valleys of Polcevera, Beragno,
and Fontana Bona, were ready to take up arms
in defence of the prince. It would have required
NEGOTIATIONS IN 179(>. 373
an army of 40,000 men, a besieging-train, and
two months' works, to have gained possession of
this capital. In 1794, 1795, and at the beginning
of 1796, the Austro-Sardinian army covered
Genoa on the North, and communicated with
that city by the Bocchetta; the French army co-
vered it on the West > and communicated with it
by the Corniche di Savona. Genoa, thus placed
between the two belligerent armies, could with
equal facility receive aid from either, and held
the balance between them ; had she declared for
either, that one would have acquired a great
advantage : under these circumstances Genoa
possessed great weight in the scale of Italian
affairs. The Senate was sensible of all the deli-
cacy of this position, and of all the strength it
acquired thereby : it availed itself of this strength
to preserve its neutrality, and constantly dis-
regarded the offers as well as the threats of the
coalition. The commerce of the city increased,
and brought immense wealth into the Republic.
But the Port of Genoa had been violated by the
English squadron ; the catastrophe of the frigate
la Modeste had made a powerful impression on
the minds of the French; the Convention had
dissembled, but only waited for a favourable
opportunity to exact a memorable reparation.
Several of the noble families most attached to
France had been banished, which was another
374 .UK MO I US OF NAPOLEON.
insult that the French government had to avenge.
After the battle of Loano, in the winter of 179G,
the Directory was the more inclined to think
the moment favourable, because the extreme
poverty of its Army of Italy made it attach great
importance to an extraordinary aid of five or six
millions. Negotiations on the subject had com-
menced, when Napoleon arrived to take the
command of the army ; he disapproved of this
mean policy, which could never have succeeded,
and must necessarily have had the effect of ex-
asperating and disgusting the important popu-
lation of this capital. " We must," said he,
" either scale the ramparts, fix ourselves there
" by a vigorous coup de main, and destroy the
"aristocracy; or respect its independence, and
" above all, leave it in possession of its money."
A few days after, the enemy's armies having been
driven beyond the Po, and the King of Sardinia
having laid down his arms, the Republic of Genoa
was at the mercy of France. The Directory
would have established democracy there, but
the French armies were already too far advanced.
The presence of a corps of 15,000 French under
the walls of Genoa, and perhaps their stay there
for several weeks, would have been necessary
to ensure the success of such a revolution.
Nothing was now talked of but the march
of Wurmser, who was then crossing Germany
NEGOTIATIONS IN 179(3. 375
and entering the Tyrol. From that time it be-
came necessary to concentrate the army on the
Adige, first for the purpose of defeating Wurmser,
and afterwards on account of the manoeuvres in
the Tyrol, and Alvinzi's movements to extricate
Wurmser when blockaded in Mantua. The army
had, moreover, nothing to fear from the Genoese;
their rulers were divided amongst themselves,
and the people were favourable to us.
Girola, the Emperor's minister, taking ad-
vantage of the removal of the army, and being
secretly favoured by the feudatory families, had
kindled an insurrection in the Imperial Fiefs, and
formed bands of Piedmontese deserters, of vaga-
bonds thrown out of employment by the dis-
banding of the Piedmontese light troops, and of
Austrian prisoners, who, having been ill guarded
by the French, had escaped on their route. These
bands infested the whole of the Apennines, and
the rear of the army. In the course of June it
became of urgent importance to put an end to
this state of affairs ; a detachment of 1200 men,
and the presence of the General-in-chief at Tor-
tona, proved sufficient to restore order and tran-
quillity. Napoleon then gave instructions to the
French minister at Genoa to set negotiations on
foot for the purpose of increasing our influence
in the government, as far as that could be done
without rendering the presence of an army ne-
cessary.
«}?() M EMOI US 01 N \ i'ol.J.O.V.
He required, 1st, the expulsion of the Austrian
minister Girola ; 2dly, that of the feudatory fami-
lies, conformably to one of the statutes of the
Republic ; and, -idly, the recall of the banished
families.
These negotiations were much protracted. In
the mean time five French merchantmen were
captured under the Genoese batteries, which did
not attempt to protect them. The Senate, alarmed
at the menaces of the French agents, sent the
senator Vincente SpinOla, who was much in
favour with the French, to Paris, where, after
some negotiation, he signed, on the Cth of
October, 1796, a convention with Charles La-
croix, the Minister of exterior relations. All the
causes of complaints which France had against
Genoa were consigned to oblivion ; the Senate
paid a contribution of four millions, and recalled
the persons banished. This event would have
afforded an opportunity, which ought to have
been seized, of forming an offensive and defen-
sive alliance with this Republic, adding to the
Genoese territory the Imperial Fiefs and Massa
di Carara, and requiring a contingent of 4200
infantry, 400 cavalry, and 200 artillery. But
notwithstanding its utility, this system of alli-
ance with oligarchs was repugnant to the feel-
ings of the democrats of Paris. This conven-
tion, however, restored tranquillity, which con-
NEGOTIATIONS IN 179(5. 'Ml
tinued up to the time of the convention of Mon-
tebello in 1797 ; and as long as the French army
remained in Germany there was no reason to
complain of the conduct of the people of Genoa.
II.
The armistice of Cherasco had insulated the
Austrian army, and enabled the French army to
drive it out of Italy, to invest Mantua, and to
occupy the line of the Adige. The peace con-
cluded at Paris in the succeeding month of May
placed all the fortresses of Piedmont, except
Turin, in the power of France. The King of
Sardinia thus found himself at the disposal of the
Republic. His army was reduced to an effective
force of 20,000 men ; his paper money threatened
both individuals and the state with ruin ; his
subjects were discontented and divided ; even
the French ideas had a few partisans. Some
politicians wished to revolutionize Piedmont, in
order to get rid of all anxiety with respect to the
rear of the army, and to increase our means of
annoying Austria ; but it was impossible to over-
turn the throne of Sardinia, without direct inter-
ference by means of an imposing force ; and the
scenes which were passing before Mantua were
sufficient to occupy all the troops of the Republic
in Italy ; besides, the revolution in Piedmont
might draw on a civil, war ; in which case it
378 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
would become necessary to leave in Piedmont, in
order to overawe the people, more French troops
than we could obtain of Piedmontese. In case of
retreat, the populace, which would have been
thrown into a ferment, would inevitably be guilty
of excesses. Besides, might not the Kings of
Spain and Prussia become alarmed, at seeing the
Republic, from its hatred to monarchs, over-
throw with its own hands a prince with whom
it had concluded peace only a few days before ?
These considerations led Napoleon to the same
result by an opposite road ; that of an offensive
and defensive treaty of alliance with the King of
Sardinia. This plan combined all advantages,
and was liable to no objection. In the first place,
this treaty was, in itself, a proclamation which
would keep the discontented in awe, who would
no longer confide in the protestations of the demo-
crats of the army, and their promises of the as-
sistance of France ; the country would therefore
remain in tranquillity. 2dly. A division of fine
well-disciplined veteran Piedmontese troops, con-
sisting of 10,000 men, would reinforce the French
army and afford new chances of success. 3dly.
The example of the Court of Turin would have a
beneficial influence on the Venetians, and con-
tribute to determine them to seek, in an alliance
with France, a guarantee for the integrity of their
territory and the maintenance of their constitu-
NEGOTIATION'S IN 170(). 379
tion ; and yet the Picdmontese troops, being
joined to the French army, would imbibe its
spirit, and attach themselves to the general who
had led them to victory ; at all events they would
be hostages placed in the midst of the army as a
security for the disposition of the people of Pied-
mont towards it ; and if the King could not
maintain himself, placed as he was between the
democratic republics of Liguria, Lombardy, and
France, his fall would be the result of the na-
ture of things, and not of a political act calcu-
lated to excite the resentment of other kings in
alliance with France. " The alliance of France
" with Sardinia," said Napoleon, " is like that of
" a giant embracing a pigmy; if he stifles him,
" it is against his will, and merely owing to the
" extreme difference of their organs."
The Directory was not willing to comprehend
the wisdom and profundity of this policy ; it au-
thorized the opening of negotiations, but threw
obstacles in the way of their conclusion. M.
Poussielgues, secretary of legation at Genoa, had
conferences at Turin during several months ; he
found the Court disposed to form an alliance
with the Republic, but evinced little diplo-
matic skill in suffering himself to be drawn into
concessions which were evidently extravagant.
He promised Lombardy to the King of Sardinia.
Now it was totally out of the question to think
380 MEMOIRS OK NAPOLEON.
of increasing the territories of that prince: nor
should hopes have been held out to him that were
not to be realized : he was a sufficient gainer by
a treaty which guaranteed the integrity of his
kingdom.
When Mantua opened its gates, and Napoleon
marched on Tolentino to dictate the terms of
peace to the Holy See, and place himself in a
situation to march on Vienna, he perceived the
importance of bringing the affairs of Piedmont to
a conclusion, and authorized General Clarke to
negotiate, with M. de Saint-Marsan, a treaty of
offensive and defensive alliance, which was signed
at Bologna on the 1st of March 1797. The King
received from the Republic the guarantee of his
estates; he furnished to the French army a con-
tingent of S000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and twenty
pieces of cannon. Having no doubt of the ratifi-
cation of a treaty ordered by the General-in-chief,
the Court of Turin hastened to assemble its con-
tingent, which would have joined the army in
Carinthia, but the Directory hesitated to ratify
this treaty, and the contingent remained in Pied-
mont, in cantonments near Novarre, during the
whole campaign of 1797.
III.
The policy proper to be observed towards the
Infant Duke of Parma was prescribed by our
NEGOTIATIONS IN 17!)f>. .'JSl
relations with Spain ; in the first instance an ar-
mistice Mas granted him on the 9th of May, 179G,
and a few months after he signed, at Paris, his
peace with the Republic; but the French ministry
did not know how to accomplish the object which
the General-in-chief had in view. The successes
of the Army of Italy had induced the King of Spain
to conclude a treaty of offensive and defensive al-
liance with the Republic, in August 1792 ; in con-
sequence of which it would have been easy to pre-
vail on the court of Madrid to send a division of
10,000 men to the Po, to guard the Infant Duke
of Parma, and by means of the lure of an increase
of territory for that prince, to allow that division
to march under the French colours. Its presence
would have overawed Rome and Naples, and
would have contributed in no small degree to-
wards the success of the military operations. The
alliance with Spain having determined the Eng-
lish to evacuate the Mediterranean, the French
and Spanish squadrons were masters of that sea,
which facilitated the movements of the Spanish
troops into Italy. The sight of a Spanish divi-
sion in the ranks of the French army, would have
had a beneficial influence on the decision of the
Senate, with respect to an alliance with France,
and reinforced the army with 10,000 Sclavo-
nians.
3fl2 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
IV.
The armistice of Milan of the 20th of May had
terminated hostilities with the Duke of Modena ;
the French army was not numerous, the country
it occupied was immense, and to detach two or
three battalions for any secondary object would
have been blameable. The armistice with Modena
placed all the resources of that duchy at the dis-
posal of the army, and did not require the em-
ployment of any troops to maintain public tran-
quillity. The commander d'Est, invested with
the duke's powers, commenced negotiations at
Paris for a definitive peace : the French ministry
prudently took care not to expedite its conclu-
sion. The Duke, who was entirely devoted to the
Austrians, had retired to Venice, and the Regency,
which governed his states, had passed several
convoys of provisions into Mantua, during the
raising of the blockade, in the beginning of Au-
gust and latter part of September. As soon as
the General-in-chief was informed of this direct
infringement of the armistice, he complained to
the Regency, who in vain attempted to justify
themselves under colour of certain ancient trea-
ties. Under these circumstances, however, a
detachment from the garrison of Mantua, which
had passed the Po at Borgo-forte, was cut off;
they marched to Reggio on the 20th of October,
negotiations ix 1790. MS:.!
intending to proceed into Tuscany ; the inhabi-
tants of Reggio shut the gates of the town. The
detachment took refuge in the fort of Monte
Cherigio, where the patriots surrounded it, and
forced it to lay down arms. Two of the inhabit-
ants of Reggio were killed in this petty encoun-
ter, and were the first Italians who sealed the
liberty of their, country with their blood! The
prisoners being conducted to Milan by a detach-
ment of the national guard of Reggio, were there
received in triumph by the congress of Lom-
bardy, the national guard of Milan, and the Ge-
neral-in-chief. Several civic feasts were given
on this occasion, which contributed to heighten
the enthusiasm of the Italians. Reggio proclaim-
ed its liberty ; the people of Modena wished to
follow the example, but were restrained by the
garrison : in this state of affairs there was no
choice. The General-in-chief declared that the
armistice of Milan had been violated by the con-
duct of the Regency in revictualling Mantua ; he
caused the three duchies of Reggio, Modena, and
Mirandola to be occupied by his troops, and on
the 8th of October, by virtue of his right of con-
quest, proclaimed their independence. This re-
solution improved the situation of the army, by
substituting, for a malevolent regency, a provi-
sional government wholly devoted to the French
cause. National guards, consisting of warm
384 MEMOIRS of NAPOLEON.
patriots, were raised and armed in all the towns
of the three duchies.
V.
Hostilities having - ceased with Rome, by the
armistice of Bologna of the 23d of June 17!M>,
that Court sent Monsignor Petrarchi to Paris.
After spending several weeks in conferences, that
minister sent to his Court the terms of peace
proposed by the Directory. The assembly of Car-
dinals was of opinion that they contained mat-
ters contrary to the faith, and were inadmissible.
Monsignor Petrarchi was recalled. In Septem-
ber the negotiations were renewed at Florence ;
the commissioners from government to the army
were furnished with the powers of the Directory.
At one of the first conferences, they presented to
Monsignor Galeppi, the Pope's plenipotentiary, a
treaty in sixty articles, as a sine qua non, declar-
ing that they could alter nothing in it. This was
also judged, at Rome, to contain matters con-
trary to the faith ; Monsignor Galeppi was re-
called, and the negotiations were broken off on
the 25th of September. The Court of Rome, no
longer doubting but that the French government
had resolved on its destruction, abandoned itself to
despair, and determined to ally itself exclusively
with the Court of Vienna. It began by suspend-
ing the armistice of Bologna ; it had still sixteen
NEGOTIATIONS IN 1 TOG. 385
millions to pay, which were on their way to
Bologna, where they were to be delivered
over to the treasury of the army. These con-
voys of money returned to Rome, where their
re-entrance was a triumph. Monsignor Al-
bani set out for Vienna on the Oth of October, to
solicit the support of that court; the Roman
Princes offered patriotic gifts, and raised regi-
ments. The Pope dispersed proclamations to
kindle a holy war in case the territory of the
sacred see should be attacked. All these efforts of
the Court of Rome were considered capable of
producing an army of about 10,000 men, the
worst troops possible; but this court relied on
the King of Naples, who secretly engaged to sup-
port it with an army of 30,000 men ; and al-
though the enmity and bad faith of the Cabinet
of the two Sicilies were known to the Vatican,
its aid was invoked : " All means seem good to
" them, in their delirium," wrote the minister
Cacault; "they would cling to red-hot iron."
This state of affairs had a pernicious effect on
all Italy.
Napoleon had no need of this increase of diffi-
culties ; he was already menaced by Alvinzi,
whose troops assembled in the Tyrol and on the
Piave. He reproached the French ministry with
having left him ignorant of negotiations which
he alone was able to direct. Had he been ap-
Memoirs. — vol. hi. 2 c
386 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
pointed to conduct them, as ought to have been
the case, he would have delayed the opening of
them for two or three weeks, in order to have
received 16,000,000 due from the holy see, by
virtue of the armistice of Bologna. He would
not have suffered spiritual and temporal affairs
to be mingled in the treaty, because when once
the latter, which were the most essential, were
settled, the delay of a few months in coming to
an arrangement with respect to the former was
of no consequence ; but the mischief was done.
The government acknowledged this, and invested
him with the authority necessary to remedy it, if
possible. The object was to gain time to calm
the agitation of the passions, to restore confi-
dence, and to prevent the effects of the alarm
excited in the Vatican. He directed M.
Cacault, the French agent at Rome, to disavow
confidentially all the spiritual part of the nego-
tiations of Paris and Florence ; to intimate that
he was intrusted with the negotiation ; and that
neither the Directory nor the commissioners had
any thing more to do with it, but himself alone.
These overtures produced a good effect. To
make a greater impression, the General went to
Ferrara, on the 21st of October, alighted at the
house of Cardinal Mattei, archbishop of that city,
and had several conferences with him ; he con-
vinced him of his pacific intentions, and got him
NEGOTIATIONS IN 179G. .']S7
to set off for Rome to carry words of peace di-
rectly to the Pope. A few days after, the battle
of Arcole put an end to all the hopes which had
been raised in Italy by Alvinzi's army. Napo-
leon judged this a favourable moment for con-
cluding the affairs of Rome : he proceeded to
Bologna with 1500 French and 4000 Cispadans
and Lombards, threatening to march on Rome ;
but the Court of Rome this time despised his
threats ; it was in correspondence with its mi-
nister at Vienna for the purpose of treating, and
knew that two new and powerful armies were
advancing into Italy. The cardinal and the Aus-
trian minister at Rome said openly, " The Pope
" will evacuate Rome, if necessary ; for the far-
" ther the French general removes from the
" Adige, the nearer we shall approach our deli-
" verance." In fact, a few days after, Napoleon,
being informed of Alvinzi's movements, repassed
the Po, and proceeded with all possible speed to
Verona. But the battle of Rivoli, in the month
of January 1797, destroyed the hopes of the ene-
mies of France for ever. Mantua shortly after
opened its gates ; the moment for punishing
Rome had now arrived ; a small Gallo-Italian
army marched on the Apennines. All disputes
between France and the Court of Rome were at
length ended by the treaty of Tolentino, as will
be seen in Chapter XV.
2 c 2
3$& MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON*.
VI.
The Grand Duke of Tuscany was the first
prince in Europe who acknowledged the Re-
public. When the army invaded Italy, lie was
at peace with France ; his states, situated be-
yond the Apennines, had no influence on the
theatre of the war. Although a French brigade
advanced on Leghorn, after Mantua was in-
vested, it was only to drive out the English
traders, and facilitate the deliverance of Corsica;
in other respects the independence of the states
of Tuscany was not infringed. The garrison of
Leghorn never amounted to more than 1800
men. It was, no doubt, a sacrifice, to employ
three battalions on a secondary object, but the
57th demi-brigade, which had suffered severely
and needed repose, was at first put on this
duty. Manfredini, the Grand Duke's first minis-
ter, exerted much talent and activity in re-
moving the obstacles which might have been
prejudicial to his master, who was, on that occa-
sion, indebted to him for the preservation of his
states. Three or four conventions of little im-
portance were signed between the French ge-
neral and the Marquis of Manfredini; by the
last, signed at Bologna, Leghorn was evacuated
by the French garrison ; on this occasion the
Grand Duke poured two millions into the chest
NEGOTIATIONS I\ 17!)0. 389
of the army to liquidate old accounts. At the
treaty of Campo Formio, this prince preserved
the integrity of his states. He had suffered
some alarm, but no damage, during the war of
Italy; care was taken to do him no injury, as
well from respect for existing treaties, as from a
desire to mitigate the animosity entertained by
the house of Lorraine against the Republic, and to
detach it from the English.
VII.
When the French army had arrived on the
Adige, and Middle and Lower Italy were thereby
cut off from Germany, Prince Pignatelli came to
head-quarters, to demand an armistice for the
King of Naples, which he obtained ; it was
signed on the 5th of June 1796. The Neapolitan
division of 2400 horse, which formed part of
Beaulieu's army, went into cantonments round
Brescia, in the midst of the French army. A
Neapolitan plenipotentiary went to Paris to ne-
gotiate and sign a definitive treaty with the Re-
public. The conclusion of this treaty was im-
peded by the ill-timed chicanery practised at
Paris, and also through the system of bad faith
constantly pursued at the Court of the two Sici-
lies. The Directory ought to have thought them-
selves extremely fortunate in disarming the King
of Naples, a prince who had G0,000 men under
390 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
arms, and could have spared from 25 to 30,000
to march on the Po. Napoleon incessantly urged
the conclusion of this treaty. The Ministry of
exterior relations at Paris wanted a contribution
of some millions, which the Court of Naples very
reasonably refused to pay ; but in the course of
September, when it became known that the alli-
ance between Spain and France and the deliver-
ance of Corsica from the English yoke had deter-
mined the Cabinet of St. James's to recall its
squadrons from the Mediterranean, which left the
command of the Mediterranean and the Adriatic
to the Toulon fleets, the Court of Naples was
alarmed, and subscribed to all that the Direc-
tory required; peace was signed on the 8th of
October. But the hatred and insincerity of this
cabinet, and its disregard of its signature and
treaties were such, that, long after the peace, it
took a pleasure in alarming Italy by movements
of troops on her frontiers, and offensive demon-
strations, as if war had actually existed. It
would be difficult to describe the indignation
excited by this want of all decency and con-
tempt of all human engagements, which even-
tually brought on the ruin of that cabinet.
VIII.
The French government charged Napoleon in
the beginning of September, when the Armies of
NEGOTIATIONS IN 179C. 39 1
the Rhine and Sambre and Meuse were still in
Germany, to write to the Emperor, that unless
he would consent to peace, he would destroy
his naval establishments at Fiume and Trieste.
There was no advantage to be expected from so
unbecoming a step. At a later period, when the
Armies of the Sambre and Meuse and Rhine had
been forced to retreat into France, and the tctes-
de-pont of Kehl and Huninguen were besieged,
Moreau proposed an armistice, which the Arch-
duke refused, declaring that he claimed the pos-
session of the two titesrde-pont ; but as Marshal
Wurmser, with nearly 30,000 Austrians, was block-
aded in Mantua, and Alvinzi's efforts to relieve
him had failed at Arcole, the Directory conceived
hopes of getting the principle of a general armis-
tice acknowledged, by which France should pre-
serve Huninguen and Kehl, and Austria Mantua.
General Clarke consequently received the neces-
sary powers for proceeding to Vienna to propose
this general armistice, which was to last till June
1797. The sieges of Kehl and Huninguen were
to be raised, and Mantua placed in statu quo.
Austrian and French commissioners were daily
to send the provisions necessary for the troops
and inhabitants into the place. General Clarke
arrived at Milan on the 1st of December, to
make arrangements with the General-in-chief, who
was instructed to adopt all necessary means for
.'J! 12 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLKON.
procuring this plenipotentiary the passports for
which he had occasion. Napoleon said to him,
It is easy to force the enemy to raise the sieges
of* Kehl and Iluningucn ; the Archduke has only
40,000 men before Kehl ; Moreau must march
out of his intrenched camp at break of day with
G0,000 men, beat the Archduke, take his parks,
and destroy all his works ; that moreover Kehl
and the tctt-de-pont of Huninguen were not equi-
valent to Mantua; that it would be impossible
to prove the number of inhabitants, men, women,
and children, or even that of the garrison ; that
Marshal Wurmser, by reducing every body to
half allowance, would save in six months where-
withal to subsist six months longer; that if the
armistice was intended to pave the way for nego-
tiations for peace, that was a new reason for not
proposing it whilst Mantua was in the power of
Austria; that it was, therefore, necessary to gain
a victory under the walls of Kehl, and to wait
for the surrender of Mantua ; after which an
armistice and peace might be offered. But the
orders of government were positive. General
Clarke wrote to the Emperor, and sent him a let-
ter from the Directory, in consequence of which,
Baron Vincent, aide-de-camp to the Emperor,
and General Clarke, met on the 3d of January at
Vicenza, where they had two conferences. Baron
Vincent declared that the Emperor could not
NEGOTIATION'S IX 1790. 393
receive at Vienna a plenipotentiary from the Re-
public, which he did not acknowledge; that he
could not, moreover, separate from his allies ;
and lastly, that if the French minister had any
communication to make, he might apply to M.
Giraldi, the. Austrian minister at Turin. Thus,
fortunately, this disastrous idea of an armistice
was eluded by the enemy. The French minister
had scarcely reached the Adige on his return,
when Alvinzi began to manoeuvre to raise the
blockade of Mantua, which occasioned the
battles of Rivoli and la Favorite, as may be seen
in Chapter XIV.
Nevertheless, the Cabinet of the Luxembourg
chose to see in this answer of Baron Vincent's,
although it does not appear wherefore, a door
opened to negotiation ; and in the course of
January 1797, the Directory sent instructions
to General Clarke for the peace he was autho-
rized to sign, on condition, 1st, that the Emperor
should renounce Belgium and the Luxembourg
country ; 2dly, that he should ratify the cession
of Liege to the Republic, and some other little
acquisitions that had been made ; 3dly, that he
should promise his influence to give the Stadt-
holder an indemnity in Germany; 4thly, that
the Republic should restore to Austria all
her Italian dominions. These conditions were
not approved of by Napoleon, who thought that
394 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON,
the "Republic had a right to require the limits of
the Rhine and a state in Italy to support the
French influence, and keep the Republic of
Genoa, the King of Sardinia, and the Pope
dependent on France; for Italy could never be
looked upon as in the situation it stood in be-
fore the war. If the French should ever again
pass the Alps without having kept a powerful
auxiliary there, the aristocracies of Genoa and
Venice, and the King of Sardinia, would unite
still more closely with Austria by indissoluble
ties, influenced by the necessity of securing their
internal existence against democratical and po-
pular ideas. Venice, who for a century had pos-
sessed no influence in the balance of Europe, now
enlightened by experience and the danger she
had recently incurred, would collect energy,
treasures, and armies to reinforce the Emperor,
and to repress ideas of liberty and independence
in the terra-firma. Pontiffs, kings, and nobles,
would combine to defend their privileges, and
prevent modern ideas from passing the Alps.
Three months after, Napoleon signed prelimi-
naries of peace, on the conditions of the limits of
the Rhine ; that is to say, with the fortress of
Mentz, and an additional population of 1,500,000
souls to the Republic, beyond what the Directory
demanded, and the existence of one or two demo-
cratical republics in Italy, communicating with
NEGOTIATION'S IN 1796*. 395
Switzerland, barring all Italy, from North to
South, from the Alps to the Po, surrounding
the King of Sardinia, and covering Middle and
Lower Italy, along the line of the Po. In case
of necessity the French armies, debouching by
Genoa, Parma, Modena, and Bologna, would at
once reach the Piave, after turning the Mincio,
Mantua, and the Adige. This Republic, with
3,000,000 of inhabitants, would secure the influ-
ence of the French over the 3,000,000 of inha-
bitants of the kingdom of Sardinia, and the
3,000,000 belonging to the States of the Church
and to Tuscany, and even over the kingdom of
Naples.
IX.
The line of conduct to be observed towards
the people of Lombardy was a matter of delicacy;
France had determined to conclude peace the
moment the Emperor would renounce Belgium
and the Luxembourg ; and restore Lombardy
to him at that price. No engagement, therefore,
could be contracted, no guarantee given contrary
to these secret arrangements of the cabinet. On
the other hand, the country had to support all
the expenses of the army, which not only ab-
sorbed its revenues, but occasioned additional
burthens of greater or less amount, according to
the longer or shorter stay of the troops in par-
ol)G MEMOIRS 01 NAPOLEON.
ticular places. In France the indirect taxes had
been suppressed ; the system of contributions
was very insufficient ; the treasury was indepen-
dent; every thing was conducted in a disorderly,
corrupt, and unskilful manner; every branch of
the public service was left unprovided for ; it
became necessary to send contributions from
Italy ; very important sums to assist the Army
of the Rhine, the Toulon and Brest fleets, and
even the establishments at Paris. In Italy, how-
ever, it became essential to counterbalance the
influence of the Austrian party, composed of the
nobility, and of a part of the clergy, on which the
influence of Rome was exerted with more or less
success. Napoleon supported the party that
aimed at the independence of Italy, but without
committing himself; and, notwithstanding the
critical state of the times, he captivated the opi-
nion of the majority of these people. He not
only paid great respect to religion, but he omitted
nothing that was calculated to conciliate the
minds of the clergy. He knew when and how
to use the talisman, the magic word of liberty,
and, above all, of national independence, which
from the days of Rome had never ceased to be
dear to the Italians. He intrusted the adminis-
tration of the provinces, towns, and communes, to
the inhabitants, choosing the most eligible men
and those who enjoyed the greatest popularity;
NEGOTIATIONS IX 179(1. ;$07
and he confided the police to the national guards,
who, throughout Italy, were raised in imitation
of those of France, under the Italian colours,
red, white, and green. Milan had been of the
Guelph party, and this was still the general dis-
position of the minds of the people. The patriots
daily increased in number, the French ideas made
rapid progress, and the public spirit was such
that after Wurmser's destruction, the General-in-
chief authorized the Congress of Lombardy to
levy a legion of 3000 men. In the course of
November, the Polish generals Zayoncheck and
Dombrowski, arrived from Poland, with a great
number of their officers, to offer their services to
Italy ; upon which the congress was authorized
to raise a Polish legion of 3000 men. These
troops were never brought into the field to
oppose the Austrians in line ; but they served to
maintain public tranquillity, and to keep the
Pope's army in check. When difficulties after-
wards arose, which induced the French general
to proclaim the Cispadan republic, the Congress
of Lombardy was much alarmed ; but it was
satisfactorily explained that the difference was
occasioned by a difference of circumstances.
The army's line of operations did not pass
through the Cispadan territory ; and, in short, it
was not difficult to convince the most enlighten-
ed persons, that even had it been true that this
398 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
was connected with the wish of the French go-
vernment not to form engagements which the
fortune of war might possibly prevent it from
fulfilling, that ought not to alarm them ; for
after all, it was very evident that the fate of
the French party in Italy depended on the
chances of battles ; that, moreover, this guaran-
tee which France thenceforth gave to the Cis-
padan republic was equally favourable to them ;
because, should it one day happen that the
course of events should oblige France to consent
to the return of the Austrians into Lombardy
the Cispadan republic would then be a refuge
for the Lombards, and an altar on which the
sacred fire of Italian liberty would be preserved
from extinction.
Reggio, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara, situate
on the right bank of the Po, composed the whole
extent of the country from the Adriatic to the
states of Parma, by which they were joined to
the Republic of Genoa, and by the latter to
France. If there was an apprehension of the
necessity of restoring Lombardy to Austria, in
order to facilitate peace, the importance of main-
taining a democratical republic on the right
bank of the Po, against which the house of
Austria could bring forward no right or claim,
was the more clearly perceived.
These four states existed several months in
NEGOTIATIONS IN 170G. 3 ( J9
independence, under the government of their
municipal authorities: a junta of general safety,
composed of the Capraras, &C. was organized
to concert defensive measures, and keep the dis-
affected in awe. A congress composed of a
hundred deputies assembled at Modena in the
course of November; the colours of Lombardy
were displayed as the Italian colours; some fun-
damental principles of government were resolved
on ; that is to say, the suppression of the feudal
system, equality, and the rights of man. These
small republics formed a confederacy for com-
mon defence, and taxed themselves to raise an
Italian legion 3000 strong. The congress was
composed of persons of all conditions; cardinals,
nobles, merchants, lawyers, and men of letters.
Their ideas expanded insensibly ; the press was
free, and at length, at the commencement of
January 1797, after some resistance, local pre-
judices were overcome, and these people united
in a single state, entitled the Cispadan re-
public, of which Bologna was declared the
capital ; and a representative constitution was
adopted. The effect of this step was felt in
Rome. The organization and spirit of these
new republicans were an effectual barrier against
the principles propagated by the holy see, and
against the troops it was assembling in Romagna.
The Congress of Lombardy formed an alliance
400 MEMOIRS OK NAPOLEON.
with the Cispadan republic, which at this period
fixed the attention of all the people of Italy.
Of all the Italian cities, Bologna is that which
has constantly shown the greatest energy, and
the most considerable share of real information.
In February 1797, after the peace of Tolentino,
Romagna, having been ceded by the Pope, was
naturally reunited to the Cispadan republic,
which augmented its population to near two
millions of souls.
Such was the state of Italy at the end of the
year 179G and in the spring of 1797, when the
French army resolved to pass the Julian Alps,
and to march on Vienna.
CHAPTER XIV.
BATTLE OF KIVOLI,
I. Affair of Rome. — II. Situation of the Austrian army. — III.
Situation of the French army. — IV. Plan of operations
adopted by the Court of Vienna. — V. Action of St. Michel,
(Jan. 12.)— VI. Battle of Rivoli, (Jan. 14)— VII. Passage
of the Adige by General Provera ; and his march on Mantua,
(Jan. 14)— VIII. Battle of la Favorite, (Jan. 16.)— IX.
Capitulation of Mantua, (Feb. 2).
I.
The animosity of the Senate of Venice against
the French cause increased daily ; but a two-
fold dread fettered its enmity : the presence of
the victorious army, and the mental agitation
that pervaded most of its towns on the terra-
firma. However, it raised levies of Sclavonians ;
new battalions successively arrived in the La-
gunes. The two parties were now face to face,
in all the towns of the terra-firma. The castles
of Verona and Brescia were occupied by French
troops. Some commotions which had happened
at Bergamo showed the necessity of occupying
Memoirs. — vol,, in. '2d
402 \I I. MO I US Ol NAPOLEON.
the citadel. General Baraguey d'Hilliers took
possession of it. This precaution, according
to Napoleon's hopes of the speedy surrender
of Mantua, seemed sufficient. He did not wish
to engage the Senate in discussions which would
have led to new difficulties, previously to the
fall of that place. Thus both parties were still
dissembling.
The negotiations with Rome were broken off;
experience had proved that nothing could be
obtained of that court but by the presence of
force. It was requisite to put an end to this
state of uncertainty, which kept up a ferment
in Italy. Before the arrival of the new Austrian
armies, 3000 French and 4000 Italians passed
the Po and entered Bologna on the 6th of Ja-
nuary ; the General-in-chief had arrived there
from Milan. Manfredini, first minister to the
Grand Duke of Tuscany, hastened thither to
attend to the interest of that prince, and re-
turned to Florence convinced that the French
were marching on Rome. The Vatican did not
become the dupe of these menaces, being ac-
quainted with the plans adopted at Vienna, and
in hopes of their success. The Austrian mi-
nister encouraged the Court of Rome. Nothing,
he said, could be more favourable to their views
than to draw the French into the heart of Italy :
the Pope must even quit Rome, if necessary ;
BATTLE OF KIVOLI. 40,']
the defeat of the French on the Adige would
thereby be rendered the more inevitable ; it was
on the banks of the Tiber that the fate of Italy
was to be decided !
II.
In fact, Alvinzi was daily receiving consider-
able reinforcements ; the Paduan, Trevisan, and
Bassanese countries were covered with his troops.
Austria had employed the two months which
had elaDsed since the battle of Arcole, in brin°-
ing into the Frioul divisions drafted from the
banks of the Rhine, where the French armies
were in winter-quarters. A national impulse
had been given to the whole monarchy. Several
battalions of excellent sharp-shooters were raised
in the Tyrol. They were easily persuaded that
it was incumbent on them to defend their ter-
ritory and reconquer Italy, which country was
so essential to the prosperity of their mountains.
The successes of Austria in Germany, in the
last campaign, and her defeats in Italy, had
both, in different ways, animated the public
spirit of her subjects. The great towns offered
battalions of volunteers : Vienna raised four
battalions, who received from the Empress
colours embroidered with her own hands: they
lost them, but not before they had defended
them with honour. At the beginning of January
2 d 2
404 MEMOIRS or NAPOLEON.
1797, the Austrian army of Italy consisted of
eight divisions of infantry, of equal strength,
to which were attached several brigades of light
cavalry, and a division of cavalry of reserve ;
making in all from G5 to 70,000 fighting men
(sixty-four battalions and thirty squadrons), and
6000 Tyrolese, besides 24,000 men of the garri-
son of Mantua; making a total of from 9C to
100,000 men.
in.
The French army had been reinforced since
the battle of Arcole by two demi-brigades of
infantry from the coast of Provence, of which
the 57th formed part, and by a regiment of
cavalry ; in all 7000 men; which compensated for
the loss sustained at Arcole and in the blockade of
Mantua. It was formed in five divisions : Jou-
bert commanded one of them, and occupied
Monte Baldo, Rivoli, and Bussolengo ; Rey, with
a less numerous division, was in reserve at De-
zenzano ; Massena was at Verona, with a van-
guard at Saint-Michel ; Augereau at Legnago,
with a vanguard at Bevilacqua ; Serrurier was
blockading Mantua. These five divisions
amounted to 45,000 men, under arms, of whom
only 30,000 belonged to the Army of Observa-
tion. Joubert had covered la Corona with in-
trenchments ; V r erona, Legnago, Peschiera, and
BATTLE OF RIVOLI. 405
Pizzighettone, were in a good state of defence ;
the citadels of Brescia and Bergamo, the fort
of Fuentes, the citadel of Ferrara, and fort
Urbino, were likewise occupied by the French,
whose gun-boats also rendered them masters
of the four lakes of Garda, Como, Lugano, and
Maggiore.
IV.
Wurmser had attacked by three debouches,
that is to say, by the road of the Chiesa, by
Monte Baldo, and the valley of the Adige. His
columns were to join at Mantua. A few months
after, Alvinzi had entered Italy with two armies,
one advancing by the Tyrol, the other by the
Piave, the Brenta, and the Adige ; they were to
join at Verona. The Court of Vienna adopted
this time a new plan, connected with the ope-
rations of Rome, and ordered two grand attacks
to be made, the principal one by Monte Baldo,
the second on the Lower Adige by the plains
of the Paduan country ; they were to be inde-
pendent of each other. The two corps-darmee
were to unite before Mantua. The principal
one was to debouch by the Tyrol ; if it defeated
the French army, it would arrive under the
walls of Mantua, and would there find the
corps which would have reached that place by
crossing the Adige. If the principal attack
40G MEMOIRS OP NAHOLKON.
should fail, and the second should succeed, the
siege of Mantua would still be raised and the
place victualled ; this corps-d'arm^e would then
throw itself into the Serraglio, and establish its
communications with Rome ; Wurmser would
take the command of the army which was form-
ing in Romagna, with his 5000 cavalry, his staff,
and his numerous train of field-pieces. The
great number of generals, officers, and dismounted
cavalry, who were in Mantua, would serve to
discipline the Pope's army, and form a diversion,
which would compel the French to have two
armies also, one on the right and the other on
the left bank of the Po. A very intelligent secret
agent sent from Vienna to Mantua, was arrested
by a sentinel as he was passing the last post of
the blockading army. He was forced to give up
his despatches, although he had swallowed them ;
they were inclosed in a ball of sealing-wax, and
consisted of a small letter written in very minute
characters, and signed by the Emperor Francis.
He informed Wurmser that he would be relieved
without delay; at all events, he ordered him not
to capitulate, but rather to evacuate the place,
pass the Po, proceed into the Pope's territories,
and there take the command of the army of the
Holy See.
BATTLE OK RIVOLI. 407
V.
Pursuant to the plan adopted by the Court of
Vienna, Alvinzi commanded the principal attack,
at the head of 5000 men, and advanced his head-
quarters from Bassano to Roveredo ; General
Provera took the command of the corps-d'armee
destined to act on the Lower Adige, which was
formed of three divisions, and 20,000 strong.
He fixed his head-quarters at Padua. On the
12th of January his left division, commanded by
Bayalitsch, took up a position at Caldiero ; and
Hohenzollern, with the vanguard, at Montagnana.
On the 12th, Hohenzollern marched on Bevil-
acqua, where he found the French vanguard
commanded by the brave General Duphot, who,
after a slight resistance, retreated behind the
Adige, passing the bridges of Porto Legnago.
Bayalitsch's division attacked Saint-Michel : it
consisted of eight battalions and six squadrons.
Massena marched to the aid of his vanguard ;
the Austrians were broken, and hotly pursued as
far as Caldiero, leaving 900 prisoners.
The General-in-chief having been inibrmed, at
Bologna, by the agents from Venice, of the move-
ment of the Austrian army on Padua, had or-
dered the Italian troops to encamp on the fron-
tiers of the Transpadan country, to keep the
Pope's army in check ; and had directed the
408 MKMOIKS OF NAPOLEON.
3000 French from Bologna on Ferrara, where
they had passed the Po at Ponte di Lagoscuro.
He himself had crossed that river at Borgo-
Forte, and proceeded to head-quarters at Rover-
bella. He arrived at Verona during the action
of Saint-Michel. In the evening he ordered
Massena to withdraw his whole division behind
Verona in the course of the night. The enemy
was in operation ; it was therefore necessary to
keep all the troops beyond the defile, that they
might be able to march without delay to what-
ever point the true attack should be made on.
During the night he received from Legnago a
report that the Austrian army was in movement
on the Lower Adige, that its general staff was
there, and that two pontoon trains had been
seen. General Duphot's report left no doubt as
to the numerous forces deployed before him ;
he had seen above 12,000 men, and supposed
that they were only the first line. Joubert sent
word from la Corona, that he had been attacked
during the whole of the 12th, but that he had
kept the enemy in check and repulsed him : and
this seemed to confirm the opinion that the true
attack was on the Lower Adige.
VI.
The enemy had not yet unmasked his plans,
and the moment for adopting a decisive course
BATTLE OF IUVOLI. 400
had not yet arrived. The troops held themselves
in readiness for a nocturnal march. The divi-
sion encamped at Dezenzano proceeded on the
13th to Castel-Nuovo, to wait for fresh orders.
The news from the Chiesa was satisfactory as
to that point. It rained very heavily ; at ten
o'clock the troops were under arms, but Napo-
leon had not yet determined in what direction he
should move them ; whether they were to march
up or down the banks of the Adige. At ten in the
evening the reports from Monte Baldo and the
Lower Adige arrived. Joubert intimated that on
the 13th, at nine o'clock in the morning, the
enemy had deployed numerous forces; that he
had fought all day ; that his position was very
much confined ; that he had been fortunate
enough to maintain his ground ; but that, at two
in the afternoon, perceiving that he was out-
flanked on his left, by the march of an Austrian
division along the lake of Garda, which threaten-
ed to place itself between him and Peschiera,
and on the right by another division, which had
marched along the left bank of the Adige, con-
structed a bridge near Dolce, a league from
Rivoli, passed the river, and was filing along the
left bank, past the foot of Monte Magnone, to
carry the level of Rivoli, he had considered it in-
dispensably necessary to send a brigade to secure
this important level, the key of the whole posi-
410 MEM0IKS OF NAPOLEON.
tion ; and that at four o'clock he had likewise
judged it necessary to follow this movement in
retreat, in order to reach the level of llivoli by
daylight ; that he should be obliged to evacuate
his position in the night, and retreat on the
Lower Adige, unless he received orders to the
contrary. Pro vera had lined the left bank with
troops, and a fire of musquetry was kept up
on each side. The enemy's plan was now un-
masked. It was evident that he was operating
with two corps; the principal one on Monte
Baldo, and a minor one on the Lower Adige.
Augereau's division appeared sufficient to dis-
pute the passage of the river with Provera, and
defend it against him ; but on the Monte Baldo
side the danger was imminent ; there was not a
moment to lose, for the enemy was about to
effect a junction with his artillery and cavalry,
by taking possession of the level of Rivoli, and
if he could be attacked before he could get pos-
session of that important point, he would be
obliged to fight without artillery or cavalry.
All the troops were therefore put in march to
reach Rivoli by day-break ; the General-in-chief
proceeded to the same point, and arrived there
at two in the moining.
The weather had cleared up ; the moon shone
brilliantly; the General ascended several heights,
and observed the lines of the enemy's fires, which
BATTLX OF HI VOL I. 411
filled the whole country between the Adige and
the lake of Garda, and reddened the atmosphere.
He clearly distinguished five camps, each com-
posed of a column, which had commenced their
movements the preceding day. From the fires
of the bivouacs he calculated that there must be
from 40 to 45,000 men. The French could not
bring more than 22,000 men into action on this
field; this was a great disproportion; but then the
French had the advantage of sixty pieces of can-
non and several regiments of cavalry. It seemed
evident from the positions of the five bivouacs of
the enemy, that Alvinzi would not attack before
ten in the morning. The first column, that of Lu-
zignan, on the right, was at a great distance ; its
intention seemed to be to get behind the level of
Rivoli in order to surround it ; it could not reach
its destination before ten o'clock. The second
column, that of Liptay, seemed to intend to at-
tack the position on the left of the level. The
third, that of Koblos, was spread along the foot
of Monte Magnone, in the direction of Saint-
Mark's chapel. The fourth column was composed
of fourteen battalions, and of the artillery, ca-
valry, and baggage of the army ; it had passed
the Adige at Dolce, having marched down the
right bank to the foot of Monte Magnone : it was
now opposite Osteria della Dugana, in echelons
near the hamlet of Incanolc, at the foot of the
412 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
level of Rivoli : it was to debouch by this road,
and thus Alvinzi would have united his in-
fantry, artillery, and cavalry. The fifth column,
under Wukassowich, was on the left bank of the
Adige, opposite the Venetian Chiesa.
Upon this general view Napoleon formed his
plan. He ordered Joubert, who had evacuated
Saint-Mark's chapel on Monte Magnone, and who
now occupied the level of Rivoli only with a rear-
guard, to resume the offensive forthwith, to re-
gain possession of the chapel without waiting for
daylight, and to repulse the fourth column, under
D'Ocskay, as far as possible. Ten Croats, having
been informed of the evacuation of Saint-Mark's
by a prisoner, had just entered the chapel, when
Joubert sent General Vial up to it, about four
o'clock in the morning, and retook it. The firing
began with a regiment of Croats, and succes-
sively with the whole of d'Ocskay's column,
which by daylight was repulsed as far as the
middle of the ridge of Monte Magnone. The
third Austrian column, that of Koblos, then
hastened its march, and reached the heights on
the left of the level of Rivoli a little before nine
o'clock, but without artillery. The 14th and
85th French demi-brigades, which were in line
in this position, had each a battery. The 14th,
which occupied the right, repulsed the enemy's
attacks ; the 85th was outflanked and broken.
BATTLE OF RIVOLI. 413
The General-in-chief hastened to Massena's di-
vision, which, having- marched all night, was
taking a little rest in the village of Rivoli, led
it against the enemy, and in less than half an
hour this column was beaten and put to flight
at half past ten. Liptay's column hastened to
the aid of that of Koblos. Quasdanowich, who
was at the bottom of the valley, perceived that
Jouberthad left no troops at Saint -Mark's chapel,
that he had advanced in pursuit of Ocskay, and
that the firing approached the level of Rivoli ; he
therefore considered the opportunity favourable
for debouching*. He detached three battalions
to climb the heights up to the chapel, and two
to protect the passage of his cavalry and artillery.
The victory depended on the success of this
enterprise, but its execution was very difficult,
it was an absolute escalade. Joubert ordered
three battalions to run back, who reached the
chapel before those of the enemy, and repulsed
them to the bottom of the valley. The French
battery of fifteen pieces of cannon, placed
at the level of Rivoli, overwhelmed all who
offered to debouch with grape-shot. Colonel
Leclerc charged with 300 horse in platoons, and
Major Lasalle, farther on, with 200 hussars ; the
intrepidity of these charges decided the success
of the day ; the enemy was overthrown into the
ravine ; all who had debouched, infantry, cavalry,
414 Mi'. MO IKS OF NAPOLEON.
and artillery, were taken. Half the army, con-
sisting of the columns of Quasdanowich and
Wukassowich, not having been able to debouch,
became useless and afforded no assistance. In
the mean time, the first column, that of Luzignan,
was coming up to its appointed position ; it had
fallen in with the French reserve of Dezeuzano,
composed of the 67th and 58th, in position at
Orza, and left one of its brigades to keep them in
check. The other brigade, 5000 strong, de
ployed on the heights of Pipolo, on both sides
of the Verona road, behind the level of Rivoli,
supporting its right on the Adige. These troops
had no artillery ; they thought they had turned
the French army ; but it was too late ; scarcely
had they arrived on the height when they wit-
nessed the rout of Ocskay, Koblos, and Liptay ;
they then foresaw the fate which awaited them,
and which they had no means of avoiding. They
were first cannonaded by fifteen twelve-pounders
of the reserve, for a quarter of an hour, and imme-
diately afterwards attacked and entirely taken.
The second brigade of this column, which had
been left in the rear to oppose the reserve of
Dezeuzano, then began to retreat ; it was pursued
and dispersed, and the greater part killed or
taken. It was two o'clock in the afternoon, the
enemy was every where defeated, and dreadfully
cut up. Joubert advanced with such rapidity
BATTLE OF RIVOLI. 415
that at one moment it was supposed that the
whole of Alvinzi's army was taken. La Scaliera
was the only retreat open to the enemy, but
their general, aware of the danger he stood in,
faced about with a reserve, checked Joubert,
and even made him give ground a little. The
battle was won ; the French had taken the twelve
pieces of cannon which debouched by Incanole,
several colours and 7000 prisoners. Two detach-
ments of the 18th and 32d which were joining
the army, had fallen in with Luzignan's division
whilst it was cutting off the Verona road. They
spread a report in the rear that the French army
was surrounded and lost. This day the General-
in chief was several times surrounded by the
enemy; he had several horses killed. General
Chabot occupied Verona with a few men.
VII.
On the same day, Provera constructed a bridge
at Anghiari, near Legnago, passed the river and
marched on Mantua ; leaving a reserve to guard
his bridges. Augereau could not attack them
until the 1 5th; he then had an engagement, which
lasted several hours, killed or took all the guard,
and burned the pontoons. It is difficult to pre-
vent an enemy who is provided with pontoons
from passing a river, when the object of the army
defending the passage is to cover a siege ; the
41G MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
latter should have taken measures for reaching
an intermediate position between the river
which it defends and the place it covers, before
the enemy. As soon as Provera had passed the
Adige, Augereau should have directed his march
on the Molinella, where he would have arrived
before Provera. Napoleon being informed, on
the 14th, at two o'clock in the afternoon, in the
midst of the battle of Rivoli, that Provera was
constructing a bridge at Anghiari, immediately
foresaw what was about to take place. He left
the task of pursuing Alvinzi on the following day
to Massena, Murat, and Joubert, and instantly
marched with four regiments to station himself
before Mantua. He had thirteen leagues to
march. He entered Roverbella as Provera ar-
rived before Saint-Georges. Hohenzollern with
the vanguard had presented himself on the 16th,
at break of day, at the gate of Saint-Georges,
at the head of a regiment wearing white cloaks ;
he knew that this suburb was merely covered
by a simple line of countervallation, and was in
hopes to surprise it. Miolis, who commanded
there, had no guard except towards the city ;
he knew that a French division Mas on the Adige,
and thought the enemy far distant. Hohenzol-
lern's hussars resembled those of the first French
hussar regiment. But an old serjeant of the
garrison of Saint-Georges, who was gathering
BATTLE OK RIVOLI. 417
wood about two hundred yards from the walls,
observed this cavalry ; he conceived doubts which
he communicated to a drummer who accompanied
him ; it seemed to them that the white cloaks
were too new for Berchini's regiment. In this
uncertainty these brave fellows threw themselves
into Saint-Georges, crying To arms, and shut the
barrier: Hohenzollern galloped up, but he was
too late ; he was recognized, and fired upon with
grape. The troops speedily manned the pa-
rapets. At noon Provera surrounded the place.
The brave Miolis, with 1500 men, defended him-
self all day, and thus gave time for the succours
from Rivoli to arrive.
VIII.
Provera communicated with Mantua by means
of a bark which crossed the lake, and concerted
operations for the ensuing day. On the 16th,
as soon as it was day, Wurmser made a sortie
with the garrison, and took up a position at la
Favorite. At one o'clock in the morning, Na-
poleon stationed General Victor, with the four
regiments he had brought with him, between la
Favorite ar.d Saint-Georges, to prevent the garri-
son of Mantua from joining the succouring army.
Serrurier, at the head of the troops of the
blockade, attacked the garrison ; Victor's divi-
sion attacked the army of succour; it was in this
Memoirs. — vol..- ill. 2 r
418 MKMOlKS OF N AJ'OI.I (),V.
battle that the 57th earned the title of thribU.
They attacked the Austrian line, and overthrew
all who attempted to resist; by two o'clock in the
afternoon the garrison was driven back into the
place, and Provera capitulated and laid down his
arms. A number of standards, much baggage, se-
veral parks, 6000 prisoners, amongst whom were
several generals, fell into the victor's power. In the
mean time a rear guard, which Provera had left
at la Molinella, was attacked by General Point
of Augereau's division, defeated and taken. Of
all Provera's troops, only 2000 men who re-
mained beyond the Adige, escaped ; all the rest
were taken or killed. This action was called
the Battle of la Favorite, from the name of a pa-
lace belonging to the dukes of Mantua, situate
near the field of battle.
On the Pazzone side, Joubert chased Alvinzi
throughout the 15th, and reached the Scaliera
(ladder-path) di Brentino so rapidly, that 5000
men were intercepted and taken. Murat, with
two battalions of light troops, embarked on the
lake of Garda, and turned la Corona ; it was with
difficulty that Alvinzi escaped. Joubert marched
on Trent, occupied the old positions of the
Avisio, and made 1000 prisoners in different re-
connoisances. General Augereau marched to
Castel Franco, and thence to Treviso ; he was
also obliged to engage in several slight affairs.
BATTLE OK KIVOLI. 419
Massena occupied Bassano, and placed his ad-
vanced posts on the Piave ; he made 1200 pri-
soners in two actions fought with his vanguard.
The Austrian troops retreated across the Piave.
All the passes of the Tyrol were blocked up by
the snow, which was the greatest ditficulty Jou-
bert had to surmount. The French infantry tri-
umphed over all obstacles. Joubert entered
Trent, and occupied the Italian Tyrol. All the
Austrian sick were taken, as well as considerable
stores. The army occupied the same positions
as before the battle of Arcole. The trophies ac-
quired in the course of January in the several
actions were 25,000 prisoners, twenty-four co-
lours and standards, and sixty pieces of cannon.
And lastly, the enemy's loss was at least 35,000
men.
Bessieres carried the colours to Paris. The pri-
soners were so numerous that they created some
difficulty ; many escaped in passing through
Switzerland ; there was a system organized for
this purpose ; nevertheless General Key escorted
them with 4000 men.
It was in acknowledgement of the services ren-
dered in so many battles by General Massena,
that the Emperor after vvaids made him Duke of
Ilivoli.
420 MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON.
IX.
The garrison of Mantua had long subsisted on
half rations ; the horses had been eaten. Wurmser
was informed of the results of the battle of
Rivoli. He had no longer any thing to hope
for. He was summoned to surrender, but
proudly answered that he had provisions for a
twelvemonth. A few days after, however, Kle-
nau, his first aide-de-camp, came to Serrurier's
head-quarters. He protested that the garrison had
still sufficient provisions for three months ; but
that the marshal not believing that Austria would
be able to succour the place in sufficient time, his
conduct would be regulated by the conditions
which should be prescribed to him. Serrurier
replied that he would take the orders of his
General-in-chief on the subject. Napoleon went
to Roverbella; he remained incognito, wrapped
in his cloak, whilst the conversation between
the two generals was proceeding. Klenau, em-
ploying all the customary expedients, expa-
tiated at length on the great resources which
Wurmser still possessed, and the quantities of
provisions he still had in his magazines of re-
serve. The General-in-chief approached the
table, took a pen and spent nearly half an
hour in writing his decisions in the margin of
Wurmser's proposals, whilst the discussion was
BATJLK OF U1VOI I. 421
proceeding with Serrurier. When he had
finished, " If Wurmser," said he to Klenau, " had
" but provisions for eighteen or twenty days, and
" talked of surrendering, he would not deserve an
° honourable capitulation ; but I respect the Mar-
" shal's age, his bravery, and misfortunes. Here
'* are the conditions I grant him if he opens his
" gates to-morrow. If he delays a fortnight, a
" month, or two, he shall still have the same
" conditions; he may therefore hold out to his
" last morsel of bread. I am about to set out
" instantly to pass the Po, and I shall march on
" Rome. You know my intentions; go and com-
" municate them to your general." Klenau, who
had been quite at a loss to understand the first
words, soon comprehended who it was that ad-
dressed him. He examined the decisions, the
perusal of which filled him with gratitude for
such generous and unexpected treatment. Dissi-
mulation was now useless ; he acknowledged that
they had not provisions for more than three days.
Wurmser sent to request the French General, as
he was to cross the Po, to pass it at Mantua,
which would save much circuitous travelling over
bad roads, but all arrangements were already
made. Wurmser wrote to him to express his
gratitude, and a few days after despatched an
aide-de-camp to him at Bologna, to apprise him
of a conspiracy to poison him, which was to be
422 .MEMO! US OF NAI'OLl-.OX.
carried into effect in Romagna, and to give him
the necessary information to preserve himself
from the attempt. This notice proved useful.
General Serrurier presided at the ceremony of
the surrender of Mantua, and saw the old mar-
shal and all the staff of his army file off before
him : Napoleon was by that time in Romagna.
The indifference with which he withdrew himself
from the very flattering spectacle of a Marshal of
great reputation, Generalissimo of the Austrian
forces in Italy, delivering up his sword at the
head of his staff, was remarked throughout Eu-
rope. The garrison of Mantua still amounted to
20,000 men, of whom 12,000 were fit for service;
there were thirty generals, eighty commissaries
and agents of all descriptions, and Wu raiser's
grand staff. In the three blockades since the
month of June, 27,500 soldiers had died in the
hospitals or been killed in the different sorties.
Joubert, who was born in the department of the
Aisne, (formerly Bresse,) had studied for the bar;
the Revolution induced him to adopt the profes-
sion of arms. He served in the Army of Italy,
and was successively made a brigadier-general,
and general of division. lie was tall and thin,
and seemed naturally of a weak constitution; but
he had strengthened his frame amidst fatigues,
camps, and mountain warfare. He was intrepid,
vigilant, and active. In November 1706, he was
BATTLE OF RIVOLI. 42^
made a general of division, to succeed Vaubois.
He had the command of the corps of the Tyrol.
It will be seen that he acquired honour in the
campaigns of Germany. He was much attached
to Napoleon, who sent him to the Directory, in
November 1797, with the colours taken by the
Army of Italy. In 1799 he engaged in the in-
trigues of Paris, and was appointed General-in-
chief of the Army of Italy, after the defeat of
Moreau. He then married the daughter of the
senator Semonville. He fell gloriously at the
battle of Novi. He was still young, and had not
acquired all the experience necessary. His
talents were such that he might have attained
great military renown.
END OF THE THIRD VOLUME Of
MEMOIRS
LONDON :
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY
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