STACK
ANNEX
061
9*4
Some Phases in the Development
of the Subjective Point of ^Oie^w
during the Post- Aristotelian Period
VAGNY GUNHILDA SUNNE
PHILOSOPHIC STUDIES
ISSUED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
NUMBER 3
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
The Department of Philosophy of the University of Chicago issues
a series of monographs in philosophy, including ethics, logic and meta-
physics, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy. The successive
monographs are numbered consecutively with a view to their subsequent
publication in volumes. These studies are similar to the series of
Contributions to Philosophy, but do not contain psychological papers or
reprints of articles previously published.
SOME PHASES IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE SUBJECTIVE POINT OF VIEW DURING
THE POST-ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO. ILLINOIS
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THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY
NEW TOBK
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON AND EDINBURGH
SOME PHASES IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE SUBJECTIVE POINT OF VIEW
DURING THE POST-ARISTOTELIAN
PERIOD
BY
DAGNY GUNHILDA SUNNE
B
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO. ILLINOIS
COPYRIGHT 1911 BY
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Published March 1911
Composed and Printed By
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.
Stack
Annex
r
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION . . . 9
1 . The Difference in Philosophic Standpoint between Aristotle and
St. Augustine
2. Indications of Interest in Inner Experience during the Pre-
Aristotelian Period
3. Development of Biological Psychology and Realistic Episte-
mology by Aristotle
4. Scientific Method Based on This Theory of Knowledge
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBJECTIVE STANDPOINT IN STOICISM . 18
1. Introduction: Social and Political Conditions; Chief Phases of
the Development of the Subjective Attitude
2. Attempts at a Theory of Knowledge on a Subjective Basis by
the Older Stoa
A. Doctrine of Assent with Reference to Sense-Perception
a) Zeno's Contribution
b) Limitation of Assent through Skeptical Criticism
B. Objective Character of the Object of Knowledge: the Con-
troversy between Cleanthes and Chrysippus
C. Analysis of Cognition on the Basis of Assent: Chrysippus
a) Assent Basal in Cognitive Functions
6) Analysis of the Object of Knowledge
c) Preconception as a Criterion
D. Development of the Subjective Attitude in Regard to
Concepts: Doctrine of the \cKr6v
3. Increased Subjectivism in the Middle Stoa
A. Social Conditions
B. Growth of Introspection
a) Increased Psychological Analysis
6) The Function of Reason
c) The Criterion; Analysis of Attention
4. The Subjective Attitude Dominant in Later Stoicism
A. Social and Political Conditions of Roman Stoicism
5
2067300
6 TABLE OF CONTENTS
l
PAGE
B. Subjective Attitude in Ethics
a) Cicero, Transition from External to Internal Control
b) Seneca
(1) Psychological Analysis
(2) Moral Reformation
(3) Spirituality in Religion
(4) Political Conflicts
C. Ethical and Religious Environment of Later Stoicism
D. Increased Emphasis on Self-Consciousness
a) From the Individual Standpoint: Epictetus
(1) Reflective Consciousness
(2) Self-Consciousness the Daemon
(3) Theory of Knowledge
(4) Autonomy of Will
6) From the Universal Point of View: M. Aurelius
(1) Cosmic Interrelationship
(2) Social Relationship
(3) Autonomy of the Spiritual Element in the Soul
(4) Self-Consciousness in Religion
III. EFFECT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE ON
SCIENTIFIC METHOD ........ 49
1. Introspective Psychology and Inductive Method: Epicurus
A. Thought and Sense-Perception as Psychological Processes
B. Judgment and Inferential Reasoning
2. Changes in Method of Later Epicureans Due to Advance in
Psychology
3. Problem of Attention in Relation to Method
A. Practical Standpoint of Pyrrho and Arcesilas
B. Analysis of Attention and Scientific Procedure by Carneades
C. Analysis of Inference in Theory of Signs by Carneades,
Middle Stoa, and Progressive Epicureans
4. Demolition of Deductive Analysis and Formal Scientific Con-
cepts by Skeptics
A. Destructive Criticism of Scientific Concepts by Aenesidemus
and Agrippa
B. Criticism of All Speculative Systems on the Basis of Real
and Phenomenal and Outline of Method of Applied -Science:
Sextus Empiricus
TABLE OF CONTENTS 7
PAGE
5. Personal Experience Made Basal in Scientific Procedure by
Empirical Physicians
A. Early Stages of Empirical Method; Influence of Psycho-
logical Analysis
B. Value of Individual Experience Admitted and Occult Causes
Rejected by Celsus
C. Experimentation Based on Personal Observation: Galen
D. Scientific Development of Inductive Method by Menodotus;
Logical Formulation by Sextus Empiricus
6. Summary Changes in Character of Universal; Importance of
Individual Experience; the Nature of a Problem
IV. SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE AS A BASIS OF METAPHYSICS ... 78
1. General Character of the Imperial Period
2. Neo-Platonism, Metaphysics Based on Psychology with the
Emphasis on Intellect
A. The Rise of Neo-Platonism
B. The Soul-Body Relation as a Problem
C. Psychology of Mental Processes and Reflective Conscious-
ness
D. Metaphysical System Based on Psychology
3. Psychology and Metaphysics of Augustine Based on Analysis
ofWiU
V. SUMMARY 91
I. INTRODUCTION
I. THE DIFFERENCE IN PHILOSOPHIC STANDPOINT BETWEEN
ARISTOTLE AND ST. AUGUSTINE
In St. Augustine's philosophy the starting-point is the same as in
the beginning of modern thought, namely, the certainty of inner experi-
ence. Not even the Skeptic, says St. Augustine, can doubt sensation
as such; moreover, this very experience reveals not only the content
that had formed the basis of relativistic or positivistic interpretations,
but also the conscious self, the perceiving subject. For Aristotle and
his contemporaries, perception was essentially a cognitive process,
apprehending the forms of sensible objects without the matter. Such
apprehension of external objects was regarded as direct, the awareness
as awareness of the objectively real character of things. A mind as
such perceiving was foreign to their modes of thinking; the person, com-
posite of body and soul, thinks and knows, was their view. There is
ample evidence that self-consciousness was recognized by Plato in his
theories of sensation; and that Aristotle made a psychological analysis
of it as a mental phenomenon, though he utterly disregarded it in his
metaphysics and epistemology. In the earlier period, therefore, mind
was studied in its manifestations in nature and society; with the close
of ancient speculation, the investigation was based predominantly on
introspection and the analysis of mental operations of the individual
thinker. It is accordingly an interesting inquiry how this change of
viewpoint was effected and what were the consequent alterations in
scientific method. Though such a development cannot be treated in
isolation from the social life, the scope of this paper will allow only most
general and cursory references to the social, political, and religious
influences affecting the philosophic thought of the post-Aristotelian
period.
2. INDICATIONS OF INTEREST IN INNER EXPERIENCE DURING THE
PRE-ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
The Ionian philosophers viewed physical reality as a concrete whole;
there was no antagonism between human nature and universal nature
in either theory or practice. Heraclitus revolted from the conception
of the world established by tradition and the theories of teachers, over
against which he set up the claims of reason. To the " obscure philos-
9
10 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST- ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
opher" scientific research was difficult; for he believed there is an idea
expressed in things, a meaning which it is the aim of philosophy to bring
to light. It seemed to this ontological idealism that the strife and
discord discernible in nature, which had been first mentioned by Anaxi-
mander, is an expression of a deeper harmony. Thus the notion of
illusion developed, because the hidden harmony was regarded as more
perfect than the apparent. In this early development of philosophy
also, progressive emphasis was laid on the impersonal element in nature
till in Democritus the gods were abolished. On the other hand, the
system of Parmenides which influenced to a marked extent the thinking of
his successors made no attempt to explain or even describe nature, but
endeavored to clarify an idea that should be the permanent truth about
things.
Athwart this philosophic development came the humanistic move-
ment of Sophism. The Sophist discovered the world to be himself
and hence all inquiry had a personal aim. Doubting any positive knowl-
edge of the world of nature, he turned to the more comprehensible life
in society. Now appeared the first attempt at a study of mind, which
was further developed by Socrates. Thus the Sophists from an indi-
vidualistic, and Socrates with his followers from a universalistic stand-
point investigated the human mind in its social aspect.
Though the distinction between sensation and reason was early made
in Greek philosophy, metaphysical interests predominated. All mental
processes were conceived as material operations. In its origin Greek
psychology was a division of physics or physiology. Cognition was con-
sidered a property of the matter composing the human organism. Em-
pedocles first touched on the distinction between sensory and physical
facts in his doctrine of symmetry and similarity between object and
sense-organ. He attempted to exhibit a common element in the various
kinds of sense-perceptions but denied any fundamental difference between
them and physical processes. Yet from his time on, two opposite stand-
points are apparent in philosophy : the assertion or the denial of a funda-
mental distinction between physical interaction and sense-perception. 1
In accordance with his physical theories, Democritus regarded
thought and sensation as bodily changes because he had observed that
both these activities depend on the organism. The distinction between
Ao'yos and ato-flrjo-is had already been drawn. Therefore, there must be
two regions of knowledge: one dealing with an intelligible world the
formation of things from atoms the other with sense-perceptions. All
1 Cf. Beare 294-95.
INTRODUCTION II
sensations were explained in terms of direct contact and mechanical
manifestations of pressure and impact. Thinking was supposed to
take place when the soul-atoms are harmoniously united. Thus the
difference between sense and thought processes was held to be that of
impact versus organized physical movement. So Democritus tried to
formulate the principle to which pure knowledge must conform and to
state it as a relation of concepts to sense-perception, not in terms of
subjective functions but in those of objective contents. It is typical of
the thoroughness of Democritus that he attempted on the basis of the
atoms to explain the world as perceived and thought out. In the
previous systems, the differences between the two realms had been
pointed out and made irreconcilable. Democritus tried to give a
thoroughly scientific explanation of their connection, that is, of mind
and its relations, from the physical side.
Plato on the other hand was the first philosopher to demarcate
sense-perception from physical reaction by defining sensation as a
movement common to soul and body. Here sensation signifies any
immediate consciousness, perception including pleasure-pain. He con-
tended that sensationalism cannot account for the synthesizing activity
of thought and rejected psychological analysis based on physical analo-
gies. We find in Plato an opposition not so much between soul
and body as between thought and sense one faculty over against another.
Against the Protagorean theory that sensible objects possess their so-
called attributes only by acting and being acted upon in the interplay of
object and sense-organ, Plato insisted that the defects of sense are not
in the perceiving subject but in the object, for the particulars of sense
are incessantly changing. No scientific treatment of psychological
problems is given, though there are numerous examples of introspective
analysis unequaled for keenness and subtlety. For the metaphysical
and ethical implications of mind as objectified in society viewed from
a spiritual standpoint formed the chief subject of investigation.
3. DEVELOPMENT OF BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND REALISTIC
EPISTEMOLOGY BY ARISTOTLE
The construction of a thoroughly realistic epistemology based on a
correlation of physics with psychology was one of the achievements of
Aristotle. In accordance with his teleological standpoint he deals in
his psychological treatise with soul as belonging to all animate beings.
Soul as such he considers a mere logical entity. It is possible to give a
purely generic definition of soul as of geometrical figure, but there is
12 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST- ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
nothing corresponding to it apart from the particular kinds of soul. 1
Aristotle criticizes severely the treatment of mental processes in the
abstract as well as the limitation of observations to the human soul.
It is the embodied individual that is the subject under consideration.
The view of the soul as an entity is vigorously opposed; the soul is
simply the eiSos of a concrete living being. It is not the soul that
learns and pities; man learns and pities with his soul. 2 And yet Aris-
totle speaks of the soul as the subject of sensations, feelings, and thoughts;
and the very fact that he so often refers to a central organ apparently
signifies a tendency to locate some peculiarly psychical part.
Activity is the basal principle of Aristotle's psychology just as motion
is fundamental in his physics. His theory implies that a process of
the human organism is of the same kind as some motion in the external
world. When a movement is caused by the stimulation of the sense-
organs, the form of the external object is communicated to the organism.
The content of sensation or thought, whether in the sense-organ or in
the physical world, is equally objective. Aristotle believed that the
assertion of the relativity of perceptions and the denial of the objective
validity of sense-qualities on the part of earlier philosophers were due
to their failure to distinguish the ambiguity of the terms sensation and
sensible thing. "When they mean the actual sensation and the actual
sensible the statement [that without seeing there is neither white nor
black, without tasting no flavor, etc.] holds good; when they mean
potential sensation and potential sensible this is not the case." 3
According to Aristotle the first two stages of cognition, sense-percep-
tion and reproductive imagination, 4 furnish the content of common-sense;
this same content, regarded as potential, is the passive reason on which
creative reason operates. Aristotle received the groundwork of his
theory of sensation from Plato. He defines it as the transmission of
some stimulus or impression through the body to the soul. 5 In this
manner he connects physics and empirical psychology. By means of
his physical theories of motion, efficient cause, matter and form, potenti-
ality and actuality, he demarcates sensation from physical interaction
and explains the relation of sensation to sense-organ, and of perceiving
subject to sensible object. In the reception of the form of a thing with-
out the matter, object and act are correlative; they can be distinguished
logically, though in the perceptive, process they coincide. 6 The par-
1 De An. 413-15, 013. * avTcurta.4 In his treatment of recollection, he speaks of it as a search
depending on will, thus recognizing its purposive character. So he
also asserted that the distinctions between truth and falsehood made by
theoretical reason are generically the same as the objects of pursuit and
avoidance of practical reason, good and evil. 5 But this line of investiga-
tion was not further developed. Such a position toward will and reflect-
ive consciousness was due to the view held of cognition and epitomizes
the great contrast between the philosophical attitude at the beginning
and end of the post-Aristotelian period.
4. SCIENTIFIC METHOD BASED ON THIS THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
As thought is concerned either with recognition and contemplation
of truth or with devising rules for producing results, Aristotle held that
science must be either theoretical or practical. The first principle of
the former disciplines cannot be proved and the end of the latter can
form no matter for deliberation. Scientific knowledge of universals
1 De An. 425, 62; DeSom. 455, 015.
2 2V. Eth. 1170, 029; Beare 289.
3 irdpepyov. Met. 1074, 635.
4 Z)e ^4w. 433, 09; De Mem. 453, 012.
s De An. 431 ^10; TV. Eth. 1139, 026.
16 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST- ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
is based on experiential knowledge of particulars. True perception
is possible and its objects actual; 1 the doubts raised in regard to sense-
perception are due to the application made of it. 2 The object of per-
ception is implicitly universal. "The concrete individual is perceived
but the perception is of the universal, as for example, of a man, not of
Kallias, a man." 3 Ultimate principles are apprehended by induction
in the Socratic sense. For sense-perception gives rise to memory which
depends on the experienced connection of facts, whether that of conti-
guity, similarity, or contrast, and "repeated memories of the same object
to experience; .... and experience leads to the principles of art and
science." 4 Psychologically, then, the mind comes by the apprehension
of such principles by induction from examples of their truth in concrete
cases.
But such induction merely makes possible the direct intuition of
the implied principles, but does not prove them; for they are not prov-
able. 5 "Some first principles are seen by induction, others by per-
ception, others by a sort of habituation, and some in one way and others
in another." 6 By perception or direct insight the first principles of
mathematics are recognized. In more complex subjects, especially the
physical sciences, the truth of a proposition can be seen only as exempli-
fied in a number of instances. Demonstration or scientific analysis
as discussed in the analytics has to do only with middle terms, that is,
with causes in the theoretical sciences and means in the practical. At
each end of this process recourse must be had to immediate insight
whether sensuous or intellectual. 7 The instrument for getting at
mediate propositions is the syllogism which is the only form of proof
whether in demonstrative or deliberative analysis. 8 Hence there are
two forms of reasoning, the purely scientific and the inferential. 9
Empiricism as developed in Aristotle was probably due to his associ-
ation with medical pursuits, more particularly with the method of
Hippocrates who combined remarkable ability of diagnosis with clear
insight into the importance of experience. But Aristotle develops
and proves his theories not by observation but by reasoning. The
observed facts are instances of the general proposition, which when
clearly perceived becomes immutable and elevated beyond the possi-
' Met. iv. 5-6.
2 De An. 428, 618. 6 N. Eth. 1098, 63.
3 An. Post. 100, ai6; N. Eth. 1143, a 35- 7 fbid. 1142, azj.
4 De Mem. 451, 632; An. Post. ii. 100, a. 8 Ibid. 1139, a6.
5 Ibid. 91, 633. 9 tirisTi)iioinicbv ical XoyiffTucbv.
INTRODUCTION 17
bility of proof or refutation. Concepts were thus clearly stated and
then organized. No mere observation, however, had scientific value.
The importance of exactly defined investigation was recognized; but
only the completely generalized form was an object of knowledge.
In the pre-Socratic period matter was the knowable phase of nature.
With the Socratic movement form became dominant, and through the
categories of possibility and realization Aristotle made an important
advance on the Platonic ideas by way of biology. It was in this direction
that he developed his psychology. Here he deals not with consciousness
but only with the objects of consciousness. For a thing has value for
knowledge only if it has the form of a universal. In his scientific
treatment, then, Aristotle accepted as given in generalized perception
the physical phenomena of which the qualities were to be determined.
No attempt was made to analyze the immediate object of knowledge
into the conditions out of which it arises, or to investigate the different
experiences under these varying conditions. The object of knowledge
was presented and then known because of its nature. Therefore it could
only be analyzed into more ultimate forms of knowledge, until, when the
intuition of final objects of cognition was achieved, the goal of science
was also attained.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBJECTIVE STANDPOINT IN
STOICISM
i. INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS; CHIEF
PHASES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE
It was in the period following the death of Alexander, while the
Greek world was in a turmoil of confusion consequent on the splitting
up of the empire into separate states, that the post-Aristotelian schools
began to formulate their position. The main characteristic of the time
from 323 to 280 B.C. was the predominance of the individual, as has been
forcibly brought out by recent historians. 1 The desires and advantages
of the rulers were of paramount importance; the people were disregarded
and were rarely able to assert themselves with success. What the
generals of Alexander achieved they owed to their own efforts; for the
mingling of the various tribes and nationalities under one government
left the leaders without the loyal support accorded a chieftain from
his own people and forced them to depend on themselves as individuals.
The prominent role that women played in political events is another
indication of increasing significance of personal influence. Another
significant fact is that the sovereign claimed divine descent or at least
a divine mission in order to gain his ends more easily. While among
the Greeks who came under the influence of kings the oriental cults and
the deification of the rulers transformed the beliefs of the people, in
the independent cities, such as Athens, philosophy attempted in various
ways to solve the problems raised by these changes in religious convic-
tions as well as by Skepticism and also in general by the tendency to
make momentary benefits the aim of all endeavor. As philosophy thus
attempted both to interpret and to direct this great social movement,
the individualistic and subjective point of view gradually superseded
the objective standpoint just outlined. It was especially in the search
for the criterion of truth that the subjective attitude began to emerge.
As a naturalist, Aristotle had viewed the world as a system of specific
forms; these complete organisms could be explained by studying the
parts in reference to the whole, as means to an end. Thus his investi-
gation of soul was a biological treatise in which development, the transi-
tion from potentiality to realization, was the keynote. The underlying
motive was the desire to exhibit the universal form in the empirical data
1 Cf . Holm Hist, of Greece IV, chaps. 1-3.
18
THE SUBJECTIVE STANDPOINT IN STOICISM 19
of nature and life, since the universal exists potentially in the concrete .
Aristotle's problem was determined by his epistemological position
(based on the Socratic concept and the Platonic mediation between ideas
and particulars) that universals are the only objects of scientific knowl-
edge and that the concrete particulars, reality in the strict sense, are
presented in sense-perception. Hence no regulating principle was de-
manded or furnished; and the search for it became the dominant problem
of post-Aristotelian philosophy.
Discarding the Aristotelian conception of transcendence, the Stoics
developed the other side of the latent dualism, the view of the world as
an organism, by adopting the Heraclitean notion of primordial fire,
eternal, divine, possessed of thought and will. 1 All existing things
partake of this divine substance which appears as hold or bond of union
in inorganic matter, as vital principle in plants, irrational soul in animals,
and rational soul in man. 2 Together with significant contrasts in ethics
the ideal of Aristotle was carried to its logical conclusion; but a new
spirit was introduced with the doctrine of universal law and still more
by the ever-increasing emphasis on will, self-determination, which
involved a practical instead of a theoretical standard of life. The
concrete was the object of study; but not the individual in general so
much as the particular person. The introduction of assent or acknowl-
edgment into the cognitive process by Zeno was the entering wedge of
the subjective standpoint. As the volitional attitude gradually became
basal in psychology and epistemology, the need of a standard became
imperative. It is possible to trace in the older Stoicism the growing
emphasis on assent as fundamental in knowledge, the increasing skill
in psychological analysis, while the criterion of truth remained dis-
tinctly objective. The problems thus raised were bequeathed to the
Middle Stoa; then the stress fell on attention and the need of reason
in all forms of knowing was recognized. In later Stoicism the judgment,
the interpretation, the " view " became of sole importance. The relation
between universal and particular, abstract and concrete, remained a
vexing problem while the tendency was ever toward a subjective inter-
pretation of the universal. Thus when the individual as such asserted
himself, the will began to be treated as a specific function, just as Aristotle
in contrast to Plato had discriminated activity from the other functions
of the soul ; the more analytic point of view tended toward a transforma-
tion of the philosophical attitude.
1 Arnim I, 37-44.
3 Pearson Z. 43; Aurel. Med. vi. 14; Sext. ix. 81.
20 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST-ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
2. ATTEMPTS AT A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE ON A SUBJECTIVE BASIS
BY THE OLDER STOA
A. Doctrine of Assent with Reference to Sense-Perception
To the founder of Stoicism ethics was the climax of philosophy;
so the study of human nature, individual and social, was basal. More-
over, both his physics and his epistemology were psychological in char-
acter. His followers also made valuable contributions to psychology in
their treatment of assent, motive, and emotion. Of the eight parts or
rather functions of the soul enumerated by Zeno, 1 the five senses and
reason were cognitive functions. The cognitive soul in its different
activities was conceived through analogy of substance and its qualities
by Chrysippus; 2 but this logical formulation was undoubtedly founded
on Zeno's view of the soul as unified activity. The term ^ye/aovtKoV was
used by Zeno 3 and was sometimes identical with tyvxt in the narrower
sense; as the controlling soul-function it was active reason. With Zeno's
insistence on will, all mental processes became species of judgment 4
and hence the ^y^ovLKov was for him the soul not only as thinking
but as willing. The difference between such a definition and Aristotle's
tentative characterization of soul is evident; a step had been taken to
shift the emphasis from insight to assent.
Zeno's particular contribution to the theory of knowledge 5 was, in
the first place, the voluntary assent in sense-perception, and in the
second, the division of avTao-ia and crvyKara^eo-is, the term ato-Orjcris meant immediate appre-
hension. 1 In its wider connotation it comprehended the whole process
of sense-perception; the first impression of the object in the sense-organ
is unconscious and mechanical and becomes perception in the ^y-
POVLKOV to which the stimulation is conveyed; by assent, absolutely
certain perception is obtained. Such technical psychological discrimi-
nation, which in its precise formulation began with Chrysippus, had a
tendency to substitute for the actual experience distinctions made for
the sake of exact definition. The Stoics, however, were emphatic
in their insistence on the importance of assent, for upon it, they
believed, depended knowledge, science, and all forms of activity. This
emphasis became more pronounced in the controversy with the Academy.
For, in the opinion of the Stoics, moral freedom was involved in this
question. Moreover, they made a tacit assumption that assent to an
impression implied its correctness. Accordingly, if their opponents
acknowledged such assent they also admitted the possibility of certain
knowledge. Thus these older Stoics had not only admitted volition as a
factor in cognition, but had gradually rendered it basal for all knowledge
and hence made a definite approach toward a subjective standpoint.
(b) Analysis of the object of knowledge. On the other hand the older
Stoa, and Chrysippus in particular against the Skeptics, gave much
attention to the characterization of the object of knowledge. For they
grounded their doctrine of absolute certainty on the freedom of assent
and the objective character of the criterion, using this term in its most
usual connotation of that in accordance with which a thing is judged,
as a avTa(Tia. KaTaXrjTrTiKr). 2 Since the Stoics used Ka.Taha.fj.(3dveiv in
the technical sense, to apprehend, comprehend, a avTao-ta KaToX^im.^
signified an apprehending, knowing impression, one fitted to give knowl-
edge and apprehending the object of knowledge. That this was the
meaning intended seems clear from the explanation given by Sextus. 3
"The Stoics consider this particular presentation as one apprehending
completely the external objects and as absorbing thoroughly the dis-
tinctive marks of these objects." 4 Some true fyavraaiai are KaTa\rjTrTiKai,
others are not. For they may be true, exact impressions, and yet not
be means of certain knowledge. To insure certainty, the impression
1 Plut. De Vir. Mor. c. 3; Plac. vii. 9; Cic. Ac. i. 40.
2 Sext. P.H. ii. 15-16, 22-78; vii. 35, 261.
3 Sext. vii. 248.
4 Cf. ibid. 411 and 247.
26 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST-ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
must in the first place be from an existing object; and in the second
correspond to it, so as to exclude visions of madmen and all forms of
illusion; finally it must give accurately all the characteristics of the
real object. 1 Hence some peculiar sign is essential, a distinctness which
brings conviction of its truth. That the KaraA^-nxou avraa.vra//,a, IJ/VXTJ,
and vovs to which he attributed respectively euo-^o-is, opjum, Soy/Mara.
M. Aurelius used favrao-ia to mean impressions of sense and adhered
to Zeno's theory of ruTrwo-ts. 8 Predominantly favTaa-ia signifies a
thought product with a sense of valuation and appreciation. 9 The
tests to be applied to such an impression are "objective character, sub-
jective affection, and logical relation." 10 This valuation made by a self-
conscious subject is also characteristic of wcA^is. "The view taken
is everything." "The world is a process of variation, life is a view, an
opinion." 11 Significant is the frequent occurrence of Soy/xa, conviction or
principle, the general conception of the value of things as distinguished
from avTao-ia, and
then favTaviai are described as formed by impressions of the under-
standing or of the other criteria. 4 It is therefore evident that in the
final formulation of his theory Epicurus understood by a.vTaavTaa-ia KaTaXrjirTiKTfj, which was considered an infallible criterion 4
because the sign on the basis of which it is recognized as true is not a
common but a special sign.
1 Sext. vii. 160; cf . Vol. Here. xxvi. 4.
2 Cic. Fato 23, 31. s Stob. Ed. ii. 40.
Cic. Ac. ii. 101, 103; cf. 34, 42, 84-85.
THE SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 6 1
In place of this infallible sign completely and indubitably presented,
to which a sound mind must give assent, a "calculus of probabilities"
was developed by Carneades on the basis of his psychological analysis.
The criterion of the merely probable presentation was to be employed
in unimportant matters and in cases where time is not allowed for
investigation. The criteria of greater probability must be used in
important decisions, the third especially in ethics, science, and philosophy
in general. 1 The Academic philosopher enjoyed research into the most
important and hidden things (physics). Unlike the dogmatist he did
not assent, believe, and affirm, but abstained from rash judgment and
rejoiced in discovering what seemed probable in such matters. 2 As all
knowledge depends on experience, the formulation of hypotheses neces-
sarily involves induction based on the agreement of signs. For in-
ference is founded on the agreement of signs as is the diagnosis of
the physician. 3 In discussing the case of the cord that resembled
a serpent Carneades clearly showed that in sound reasoning a man
does not judge according to common signs, but that a thorough
investigation of all the signs is indispensable to discover the special
sign that insures correct inference. 4 The conditions under which the
most probable inference can be drawn are analyzed in treating of the
third criterion. 5 Furthermore, inference from what has been observed to
something else immediately perceived demands indistinguishability
of signs, and from what is observed to what is not directly observed
requires the greatest possible resemblance. Here the subjective atti-
tude is clearly utilized in the determination of method.
Thus the modification made by the Middle Stoa in the theory of
the criterion is seen to be a requirement demanded by Carneades for
the highest degree of probability. Moreover, Carneades had outlined
in his calculus of probabilities the chief features of the inductive method
set forth by the Epicureans, Demetrius and Zeno, in the treatise of
Philodemus, Hept o-^/xetW KCU (nj/xeuocrewv. Furthermore, besides these
Epicurean criticisms of the Stoic position as supported by Dionysius
of Cyrene, otherwise famous for his mathematical ability, there is also
another exposition of the Epicurean standpoint that gives evidence of
an earlier stage of the theories, perhaps as expounded by Apollodorus.
For these reasons it may be concluded that the detailed investigation of
methods of inference and grounds of certainty was provoked and largely
1 Sext. vii. 181.
2 Cic. Ac. 127-28; cf. 108. * Ibid. 187; P.H. i. 227.
3 Sext. vii. 179, 182. s Ibid. vii. 182-89.
62 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST- ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
determined by the criticisms of the Stoic and Epicurean doctrines made
by Carneades. 1
The discussion of scientific methods and grounds of validity by these
Stoics and Epicureans represented by Dionysius, Demetrius, and Zeno
may be briefly summarized. As all existing things are divided into two
classes, the obscure, which either are not manifest for the time being or
else can never be directly experienced, and the apparent, there is need
of signs only in the case of the former, by which their existence and con-
stitution may be inferred from the latter by virtue of the interrelation
of all things. Since things in general are classified into genera, these
into species which in turn are composed of individuals, signs are either
common or special. The older dogmatists, as has been noted, had insisted
that correct inference must be made on the basis of a special sign and that
the essential requirement was the determination of such sign. The
contention of Carneades, that signs are common and that only varying
degrees of probability and not absolute certainty can be attained, com-
bined with their own advance in psychological analysis, had effected
important modifications in the views of scientific methods supported
by their successors.
The Middle Stoa maintained that conclusions based on resemblance
of signs are never certain. As it is a matter of observation that things
and properties differing from those usually experienced have been dis-
covered, 2 there may also be unknown forces and substances different from
those yet observed. Thus if it is inferred that all men are mortal because
that is true among us, such a conclusion is not certain, just as it did not
follow that the Acrothoites are shortlived because that is true of all
human beings known to us. To insure certainty, it must be presupposed
that beings unknown to us are similar to us in every respect; then no
new knowledge is gained, no inference is made. Hence the query is
raised whether a certain degree of similarity is sufficient or if absolute
sameness is indispensable for correct inference. The latter is nonsense;
the former gives no certain conclusion. 3 The Stoics therefore concluded
that only the second method, logical connection of antecedent and
consequent, gives certainty. If a is so related to b that if the one is
disproved, the other is sublated, then only is the inference certain and
not merely probable. 4 Such relation can be recognized only through
1 Cf. Schmekel34off.
2 Illustrated by the magnet and skeleton of a giant in Crete.
3 Cf. Criticism of Epicurean Tenets, Vol. Here. 5, 1-7; 20, 22.
4 Ibid. 6, 34; 3, 30; 29, 4.
THE SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 63
reason. The Epicureans, they held, were mistaken in their assertion
that such a judgment depends upon, and receives its validity from,
inference based on observed resemblances. 1 Analogy is useful for it
must be employed in observation and experiment; 2 but it does not
give certainty which is afforded by logical proof alone. 3
Zeno, the Epicurean, contended against the Stoics that inference
by induction is the basis of all formal inference. He drew a distinction
between coexistence and sequence, 4 discussing not only the properties
of kinds, general and particular, but also inferences such as, smoke is
the sign of fire that may not be visible, a wound through the heart
signifies death. 5 He laid down and illustrated the principle that infer-
ences must rise from restricted to wider generalizations, and from these
descend again to particulars. 6 He acknowledged that such a method
gave only probability ; but also asserted that there is no other means of
gaining new knowledge. 7 To the Stoic query: How can there be valid
inference from the observed to the unobserved when it is impossible
to know all cases and it does not suffice to know merely some, he replied
that it is necessary to observe what is inseparably connected with each
phenomenon. 8 Experience is the test of experience. Experience
teaches that in some cases observation of one characteristic is sufficient
to pass a judgment about the unknown; in others, several observed resem-
blances give no basis for inference. 9 False conclusions are corrected
through experience, that is, by observation of phenomena.
The Stoics then urged that observation alone is not enough; certain
inference depended on a general law which is grasped only by reason.
In fact, the Epicureans implied that the basis of inference is found in
the nature, peculiar characteristic, or uniformity on which the Stoics
laid such stress; no clear formulation of this causal connection, however,
is found in the fragments. It is, therefore, noteworthy that in Lucretius
no principle is more emphasized than the constancy of nature. "It
is absolutely decreed according to the conditions of nature what each
thing can do and what it cannot do." 10
These Stoics and Epicureans, then, did not merely accept the deliver-
ances of reason and sense in their search for the unknown. Observation
and comparison were completed by the insight of reason in the one case;
1 Ibid. 7, 5. 6 Ibid. 5, 7, 23.
2 Ibid. 32, 34; 34, i; 35, 5, 27. 7 Ibid. 5, 30, 3.
3 Sext. P.H. ii. 99, 103-4. 8 Ibid. 37, 26.
- Vol. Here. 2, 7; 5, 12, 36. 9 Ibid. 26-31.
s Ibid. 36, 2; i, 35. IO Lucr. i. 586; v. 677-79; cf- v i- 29-32.
64 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST- ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
in the other, rational scrutiny was required for sense-experience, and
some elucidation had been given of the contributions of reason which
had been only a problem to Epicurus. These significant modifications
in their scientific methods are clearly due to an inspection of these modes
of procedure from a subjective standpoint.
It was not merely a theoretical interest that aroused these discussions
about the theory of knowledge and the methods of investigation and
demonstration. In connection with the work in history, geography, and
mathematics that engaged the philosophers of this period, the examples
used in the disputes about the validity of inference deserve notice.
They deal with characteristics of men under varying conditions, plants
in different climates, minerals, and laws of number. Zeno's criticisms
of the principles of geometry were perhaps called forth by the arguments
of Dionysius whose mathematical achievements were celebrated, and
his own views of mathematics were based on his empirical method.
The controversy between Carneades and the Stoics about the basis of
moral laws, w r hether reason or utility, was not mere dialectical sword-
play, but a vital question, as the modifications in doctrine and divisions
among the leaders of the Stoa suggest. As the ethical tenets were made
more adapted to the needs of the time, so in specifically political doctrines
an attempt was made to reconcile cosmopolitanism with the actual
conditions. The steady growth of Rome and the contrast between the
position of this great power and the political impotence of the Greek
cities led these philosophers to consider the nature of the best state and
the value of government. As the discussions in the Scipionic circle
left their impress upon the political theories of Panaetius, Posidonius,
and Cicero, so the problems and the interests of the period influenced
the general trend of thought in turn. The effect of Greek philosophy on
Roman law as a whole was significant and especially important in the
creation of a jus naturale. Sophocles and Socrates had enunciated
the principle of universal law; the Stoa developed it theoretically and
practically. Then the Skeptical Academy worked out the theory of
probability, the basis of jurisprudence. " Greece had philosophy, but
no jurisprudence It was Rome that first introduced the maxim
that judicial decisions must be guided by general principles and not by
impluses of the moment." The Roman praetors first decided cases in
accordance with their own law which was not suitable for non-Romans.
Then by aid of Greek philosophy the juris-consults created the jus
naturale. "If Rome laid down the proposition that laws were to be
applied in accordance with fixed principles, Greek philosophy taught
THE SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 65
the judges how to group the particulars under general rules." 1 Interest-
ing in this connection is the account of the development of civilization
and the origin of institutions, social, political, and religious, given by
Lucretius. 2 He has transferred the Greek cosmic strife into the life
of man and thus anticipated Hobbes. His aim is to help men, to free
them from the supreme evils, superstition and fear of death. Epicurus
is to him a god not because he has added to the knowledge of the world,
but rather because he has brought freedom to the human spirit. Thus
in every line of thought a change of viewpoint is evident. With the
dissolution of tribal and customary institutions incident to the social
and political changes, and the consequent bankruptcy of many in beliefs
and tenets, the individual was thrown back upon himself, and the analysis
of his own attitudes became imperative.
It is convenient at this point to recapitulate the phases of this move-
ment in which the development of the subjective point of view is most
conspicuous. Epicurus, starting on an empirical basis, had attributed
to sense the capacity of grasping infallibly things as they are ; inference
to the unknown must begin with, and return to, this incontrovertible
basis. The reason for such a position becomes manifest when it is
taken into consideration that the foundation of his ethics was freedom
of the will. Therefore reason might make modifications "of its own
accord." Here is the essence of subjectivity; but he made no attempt
to determine the relation of the process of reasoning to this brute sense-
material. In ethics the stress was placed on immediate feelings though
the importance of the quality of pleasure was made prominent; in the
theory of knowledge the need of regulations and principles became evi-
dent as the function of reason was accentuated especially by the criticisms
of the Skeptical Academy. A similar attitude is reflected in the treat-
ment of scientific method. Logical inference was to be applied only
to the unknown which was rigidly restricted and no attempt was
made to determine the relation of this irresponsible rational activity to
sense-experience or to analyze its mode of procedure. The Pyrrhonists
had withdrawn into the "field of self," abandoning all cognitive problems
as insoluble. Assuming a similar standpoint, Arcesilas constrained by
the requirements of practical life endeavored to utilize the subjective
attitude methodically. With Carneades the problem of attention became
the focus of interest while he tried to find grounds and limits of inference
by analyzing concrete acts of judgment. Thus the subjective stand-
point was definitely utilized for developing a scientific method. From
1 Holm Hist, of Gr. IV, 498-524. 2 Lucr. v. 771-1457.
66 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST-ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
this vantage-ground the analysis of methods of investigation and demon-
stration was conducted. Here both Stoics with their insistence on
logical proof and Epicureans with their emphasis on actual observation
and experience discovered a common starting-point in their attempt
to ascertain the basis of correct inference.
4. DEMOLITION OF DEDUCTIVE ANALYSIS AND FORMAL SCIENTIFIC
CONCEPTS BY THE SKEPTICS
A . Destructive Criticism of Scientific Concepts by A enesidemus and A grippa
It has already been shown what influence the Skeptical criticisms,
more specifically the arguments of Carneades, had on the Middle Stoa
and their Epicurean opponents. The radicals among the latter seem
to have yielded to the more orthodox members and the school as a whole
apparently abandoned the bolder scientific researches. Progress along
this line, however, was made through the labors of Skeptics and physi-
cians of the Logical and Empirical schools. With Antiochus the dog-
matism of the Middle Stoa triumphed in philosophy. He was a con-
servative of conservatives and an acute champion of purely formal
analysis. Stoicism in its earlier stages had given evidence of the inter-
action of the theory of absolute truth and certainty with the social-
political tendency to cosmopolitanism and the undermining of traditions
and customs. That the formal concept was dominant at first is evinced
by the advance of the exact sciences, mathematics and astronomy. But
the importance of assent.in all forms of judgment and activity was accen-
tuated as psychological analysis was quickened by Skeptical criticisms.
When the contrast between the ideal of science and the variability of
practical conditions was brought to consciousness, self-examination led
to discrimination between truth and certainty 1 and to an investigation
of the validity of all inference in a theory of implication (signs). The
empirical basis and the problematical character of social life were brought
into sharp opposition with the ideal of method and knowledge. Hence
the fact that Antiochus, while trying to reconcile two diverse phases
of thought, attributed the greatest weight to the practical argument is
an indication of the trend which philosophy was taking. In the treat-
ment of scientific methods this same tendency was manifested in the
joint labors of the Skeptics and Empirics. For the apparent triumph of
dogmatism, when Antiochus became president of the Academy, brought
about a strong reaction on the part of Pyrrhonic Skepticism, which had
1 Cic. Ac. ii. in, 58, 73, 119.
THE SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 67
been in abeyance during the ascendency of the Skeptical Academy,
in the person of Aenesidemus, a former member of the Academy.
Now began the formulation of a correspondence theory of knowledge,
on which was based the demolition of prevalent scientific methods on
formal grounds. Identifying reason with sense and considering the
latter universal, Aenesidemus defined true appearances as those appear-
ing in the same way to all, while those appearing only to particular
individuals are false. Thus his criterion, the sensuous counterpart of
the rational standard set up by the Middle Stoa, was the harmonious
judgment of all normal individuals. For he maintained that it is possible
for the individual to say how the external objects appear to him, but not
what they are in themselves. In the ten tropes he made a clear and
comprehensive arrangement of his arguments: difference in sense-organs,
divergent emotional reactions, diverse modes of judging, variations in
aesthetical and emotional values. 1 From these tropes it is evident that
Aenesidemus implicitly assumed things qualified by all sensuous,
aesthetic, and value attributes existing independent of the subject.
Being always in some relation to the subject in the act of knowing,
things in themselves cannot be known. 2
On this same basis, Aenesidemus formulated a systematic line of
arguments to show that there is no absolute truth, no causality, and
no demonstration. The proof is consistent and cogent, as long as truth
and cause are taken as absolute entities. 3 The dogmatists, however,
asserted that causes may be known from their effects, that phenomena are
the signs of the reality of causes as being their effects. Aenesidemus
replied that no such absolutely necessary relation can be proved by the
criterion of the agreement of all normal individuals. 4 Thus while taking
part in the controversy about scientific methods carried on by the Stoics
and Epicureans, Aenesidemus proceeded like a dialectician, demolish-
ing a logic of consistency dealing with absolute entities. The outcome of
his destructive criticism was virtually to destroy logical entities and the
formal method which he used, and to leave for both theory and practice
an empirical procedure 5 that gave scope to individual initiative and
judgment.
A purely analytical method of criticism became dominant in the
Skeptical school with the five tropes of Agrippa, a systematic attack on
the reasoning process nominally, but in fact an assault on sheer analysis, 6
1 Sext. P.H. i. 40-144. 4 Ibid. viii. 215.
2 Ibid. i. 139-40. s Ibid. vii. 349-50; viii. 216.
3 Ibid. viii. 40-48; ix. 218-27. 6 Ibid. i. 177.
68 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST-ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
for they are illustrations of analysis carried to its utmost limits- Thus
Pyrrhonic Skepticism began with the denial of absolute knowledge on
the ground of contradictions in sense-perception and general beliefs,
man himself being a part of the discord; then came a systematic formu-
lation of these arguments which implied that things in themselves
correspond to things as known except as regards the relation to the
knower; and on this basis it was shown that the demonstration of the
truth of things unrelated to the subject that perceives and knows is
futile. Finally, the modes of reasoning were abstracted and treated as
independent of the material to be related. The mind had been set over
against the thing which, when known, was not itself but affected by that
relation. Thus the theory of objects of knowledge constituting absolute
entities was being gradually demolished by carrying out to its logical
limits the method by which it was established.
B. Criticism of All Speculative Systems on the Basis of Real and
Phenomenal, and Outline of a Method of Applied Science:
Sextus Empiricus
For this same method of purely formal analysis was soon being
applied not merely to sense-perception and reason as such, but to specific
systems of thought. Thus in Sextus Empiricus the logic, ethics, and
physics of all schools are criticized on this ground, by presenting argu-
ments of equal strength for and against every doctrine. The Skeptic's
doubt, however, does not include phenomena, things as they appear to
and affect him; every statement made applies only to his own subjective
states. 1
Both phenomena and things in themselves were included under the
general term, irpdy/juaTa. 2 Phenomena or K 6v6fja.ra.
74 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST -ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
of Chrysippus for his lack of consistency and introspective analysis in
his treatise on the ^ye/xovucdv, he also severely criticized the Stoic for
using quotations without bringing evidence to prove the assertions. 1
So he also refused to accept the various theories about soul that were
in vogue in the different philosophic schools because he could not recon-
cile them with the observed interaction of soul and body.
It is, however, in his experiments that the effect of the new attitude
is most clearly shown. Though he opposed fixed dogmas, Galen believed
that a fortuitous combination of atoms could not account for the uni-
verse and that the guidance of a wise Providence guaranteed the results
of experiments when uniformity had been duly observed. He proved
the functions of the brain and nerves by the different effects of injury
to the brain and to the heart which had previously been considered the
seat of mental activity. 2 He also examined the structure and function
of the different sense-organs, laying special emphasis on psychological
analysis. 3 In his dissections and vivisections he made use of animals
and corpses and supported his theories by experiments. He worked in
a scientific spirit, on the principle that the physician is a servant of
nature. 4
The definite formulation of this inductive method was the result
of the combined labors of Skeptics and Empirics. The Empirical tripod
was made the basis of this methodology. The first stage, personal
observation, was divided into three phases: 5 direct and accidental
experience of some treatment that is either beneficial or injurious;
intentional experimentation with different remedies; trying the reme-
dies thus discovered in various cases. Such individual investigation
must be supported by the experience of other observers. 6 When, by
experimentation in a number of cases, the regularity of the effects is
demonstrated, then a rule may be formed and a system of such rules
constitutes an art. 7
D. Scientific Development of Inductive Method by Menodotus; Logical
Formulation by Sextus Empiricus
The scientific development of this method was chiefly due to Meno-
dotus. According to him, since the same remedies do not always
bring the same result in similar diseases, it does not suffice to enumerate
1 Plac. 312-19. 3 Cf. Ar. ii. 855-60.
* Ibid. 300-301. 4 G. xvi. 35.
5 (j) Trepiirrwffis; (2) airroffx^ov; (3) /wyitTjTuciJ; Subf. 36; G. i. 66.
6lffTopla. ^ G. i. 66; Subf. 88.
THE SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 75
the favorable results, but it is necessary to observe whether the same
remedy produces the same result always, frequently, or rarely. The
physicians of the Logical school also admitted inference from similar
cases but claimed that knowledge of the real causes can be attained
only through logical proof. In opposition to them the Empirics used
the term inferential reasoning* to designate the method of discovering
phenomena temporarily obscure (not the intrinsic nature), and con-
tended that they did not use demonstration but observation. They
acknowledged that such inductive inference afforded probability not
certainty. 2 But when experience has verified such inference, even
though it be only in a single case, practical certainty is obtained. Thus
the Empirical method as practiced by Menodotus did not employ mere
observation of facts nor purely logical inference but a combination of
the two. For the Empirics, like the Stoics before them, recognized the
need of reasoning in the repetition of experiments but maintained that
only sequences, and not occult causes, became known in this way.
Hence the Empirical method had made a decided advance over that of
the Stoics and Epicureans already discussed, because it made use of
the subjective attitude. Among the Empirical physicians the method
of induction which had been given its greatest impetus by the psycho-
logical analysis quickened by Skeptical criticism, particularly of Car-
neades, reached its climax in ancient times.
In Sextus we get the logical form of this method in his theory of
the so-called reminding or suggesting signs. 3 Things which are directly
and immediately experienced or are entirely beyond experience have
no signs; no demonstration applies to them but only to things that are
for the moment not perceived or those that are by nature capable of
being observed only indirectly. 4 To the latter, the Stoics applied the
indicative signs; for example, the movements of the body are signs of
the soul. In the hypothetical syllogism the indicative sign forms the
antecedent and the thing signified the consequent. 3 Against this form
of inference Sextus made a determined assault. 6 For the Skeptic ad-
mitted only the reminding sign by which things temporarily unobserved
are inferred. Such inference proceeds by the law of association of
ideas which reminds us of what we have perceived in connection with
the object in question. Thus smoke suggests the presence of fire, the
scar the previous wound. Having often observed phenomena con-
nected, as soon as we perceive the one, memory suggests the other which
&rtXo"yii)avTao-ia) the higher and lower processes meet, as it is the
psychical organ of memory and self-consciousness. 7 This whole psy-
chology treatment is most obviously based on introspection and shows
advance in a more definite utilization of the subjective attitude.
Plotinus first clearly made use of the conception of reflective con-
sciousness, 8 which had become ever more and more prominent as intro-
spective analysis was more widely applied. Without reflective con-
sciousness, Plotinus contended, there could be no synthesis of the
impressions and in a sense no understanding. It was especially by
emphasizing the unity of mental activity, as distinguished from a
material process, and its synthesizing power, that he was able to develop
his philosophical system. He made a clear analysis of subject and
object in thought, distinguishing also between activity and content. 9
Reflective consciousness is the peculiar characteristic of thought. 10 On
the other hand, lack of self-consciousness is no evidence of the absence
of mental activity. Theoretical and practical activities may be unac-
companied by consciousness of them; for example, in intense reading or
1 Ibid. 2. 6 Ibid. iv. 4, 17.
3 Ibid. ii. 8. 7 Ibid. iv. 3, 29-31.
3 Ibid. iv. 6, 3. 8 ffvvalff6i)ffts, Trapa.Ko\o66iio'ls.
Ibid. iv. 3, 27. 9 Enn. v. 3, 5.
s Ibid. i. i, 13. I0 Ibid. ii. 9, i; v. i, 12.
84 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST-ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
in the performance of a brave act. 1 His introspection also taught him
that self-consciousness makes activities less distinct and that the mind
functions better when it is not so diffused but withdrawn within itself.
Self-consciousness differs from the conscious apprehension of external
objects. "The knower cannot place himself outside like an observer and
gaze on himself with the eyes of the body." 2 This stage of reflective
thought is, according to Plotinus, inferior only to the complete unification
in which even thought disappears.
D. Metaphysical System Based on Psychology
In the unbroken hierarchy which Plotinus established from matter
(formless, indeterminate, a mere recipient of forms) to the absolute One,
universal mind (that is, intellect at one with the intelligible) is formed
by- the One and in turn produces the Soul of the Whole which creates
all other existences. On the basis of his psychological analysis, Ploti-
nus then declared: "As in the nature of things there are these three prin-
ciples, so also with us." 3 "Everything there is also here," 4 the "world
here" being taken to signify the soul and what it contains. "There are
as many formal differences as there are individuals, and all pre-exist in the
intelligible world." 5 "Not only the Soul of the Whole, but each partic-
ular soul, has all things in itself; they differ in energizing with different
powers." 6 Matter was to him a conception useful to explain evil.
He defined it as "incorporeal and unextended, like a mirror that repre-
sents all things so that they seem to be where they are not and itself
keeps no impression." 7
Though Plato had suggested the identification of the spiritual with
immaterial, all psychical activities were restricted to the world of becom-
ing. Aristotle, limiting it to the divine, had attempted to unite tran-
scendence and immanence in his doctrine of vovs, an immaterial principle
entering the human being from without. These supra -scientific specula-
tions had been set aside on account of the Peripatetic devotion to strictly
scientific investigation and Academic Skepticism, while Stoic, Epi-
curean, and Skeptic schools had brought other doctrines into the fore-
ground. With the development of the subjective attitude, epistemo-
logical considerations based on ethical idealism among the Stoics and in
the neo-Platonic movement the predominantly religious spirit which
1 Enn. i. 4, 10.
2 Ibid. v. 8, ii. s Ibid. v. 7; v. 8, 4.
s Ibid. v. i, 10. 6 Ibid. iv. 3, 6.
4 Ibid. 9, 13. ' Ibid. iii. 6, 7.
SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE AS BASIS OF METAPHYSICS 85
referred the Platonic dualism to the antagonism between soul and body
as exemplified in ascetic practices and in the spirituality of God, had
made individual personality the essential basis of philosophic inter-
pretation. On all sides, then, a separation had been made between
physical and psychological activities, that compelled Plotinus to struggle
with the mind-body relation. Fluctuating distinctions were drawn by
the later Stoics who accorded to the mind's interpretation and evaluation
of presentations the chief importance in life. According to Plotinus,
all reality is mental, and the so-called physical is an image of the soul.
Moreover, the Platonic ideas were regarded by the neo-Platonists as the
original thoughts of deity and as such the constitutive elements of
intellectual activity, thus spiritualizing an immaterial world. Mind
self-active and creative, as experienced by an individual as individual,
not only began to be basal in psychology and epistemology, but as a
metaphysical principle bridged the dualism provocative of the religious
movement. All that really exists in the world of sense is spirit; cor-
poreal substance is an idea as it has shaped itself in matter. Now
mind did not mean mind in general, as a logical concept. The indi-
vidual soul, as revealed in introspection, differed from the Soul of the
Whole only in energizing with different powers. From the subjective
standpoint an x explanation had been given of the fundamental tenet,
"Not only the Soul of the Whole, but each particular soul has all things
in itself." 1 Standing at opposite poles of thought, Aristotle and Plotinus
had both declared that the "soul is somehow all existing things."
Yet with the adoption of a new standpoint Plotinus maintained in
fundamental details the position of Aristotelian thought. For he held
that the contemplative life is higher than the practical. To the former
belong freedom and self-dependence. 2 Practice issues from theory and
returns to it. Production and action imply either the inability of
thought to grasp its object adequately without going forth from itself,
or else a by-product, not willed but naturally resulting from that which
remains in its own higher reality. External activity whether in man
or nature was, therefore, regarded as an attenuated product of contem-
plation. 3 But Plotinus showed the influence of the new standpoint when
he asserted that complete apprehension of the absolute was impossible
through any forms of thought but was attained through an emotional
attitude in which self-consciousness was lost. 4 Man must of his own
free will prepare for this union with deity by divesting himself of his
1 Ibid. iv. 3, 6. 3 Ibid. iii. 8, 6.
2 Ibid. vi. 8, 5. * Ibid. vi. 7; v. 3.
86 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST- ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
sensuous nature and individual will. Though the inspiration was
gained only by absolute absorption of the individual into the divine,
this ideal of ecstasy issued from an attempt to recognize individual
experience, not only from the cognitive but from the emotional and voli-
tional aspect.
3. PSYCHOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS OF AUGUSTINE BASED ON ANALYSIS
OF WILL
Will became definitely fundamental in the psychology and philosophy
of St. Augustine. He turned to the inner world of individual experience
and there found a means to reconcile religious dogmas with philosophical
tenets by emphasizing will in preference to intellect. Thus he discovered
the basis of all knowledge of God and of the human soul ; for the scru-
tiny of his own personality revealed will as the essence of reality. Augus-
tine was impelled to this psychological analysis by the problem of evil
which had been steadily growing in importance in the consciousness of
men and more urgently pressing for solution. He first sought an
answer in Manichaeism, then in Skepticism; neo-Platonism seemed to
offer a more satisfactory explanation, but finally free-will appeared
to solve the problem. 1 The more he considered the matter, the more
this point of view appealed to him. Instead of stopping with a mere
assertion, he began to defend and strengthen his position by psycho-
logical analysis.
Augustine seeking a starting-point for his philosophy made indi-
vidual experience as such the basis and contrary to the opinion of the
Skeptics he found a way to certainty in doubt. Against the Academy
in particular, he urged, as Antiochus had done, that probability pre-
supposes certitude. 2 Though familiar with illusions, dreams, and other
favorite arguments of the Skeptics, 3 he maintained that when one per-
son says a certain object is perceived and another denies it, the dispute
is in fact a matter of terms as long as something is perceived. Doubt
itself furnishes a strong foothold for certainty, for it implies the reality
of the conscious being. 4 The soul is the whole personality, a living
unity; by its very existence and self-consciousness, it is certain of its
own reality as the most incontrovertible truth.
From Platonism Augustine adopted the theory of the dualism between
two worlds, the intelligible in which truth dwells, and the sensible
which we experience through the senses and which affords only probable
1 Conf. viii. 3, 5. 3 Ibid. iii. 24.
2 Contr. Ac. ii. A De Tr. xv. 21; x. 12-14.
SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE AS BASIS OF METAPHYSICS 87
grounds of certainty. 1 Through sense-perception the external and
spatial world is perceived; that which is conceived through reason is
non-spatial and is located in the knowing mind. 2 The understanding
transfers sense experience into knowledge and thus forms an interme-
diary between sense and reason. The information given by the senses
concerns changeable objects 3 which therefore cannot be grasped by
reason which alone gives absolute certainty. When the object is beyond
the province of intellect or sense, speculations to which it gives rise are
baseless and trifling. 4
But in spite of this Platonic tendency, Augustine fully acknowledges
the importance of empirical knowledge. 5 In his detailed study of sense-
perception he lays the foundation of one of the processes by which the
mind arrives at the knowledge of intelligible objects and finally of God.
The objects of our awareness are of two kinds, the external objects of
sense and the mental activities apprehended by the internal sense which
also distinguishes objects of the external sense. 6 The object as visually
perceived is an object of the external sense; the seeing, itself, of the
internal sense. Without the latter sense, we should be unable to
influence our sense-organs; for we would not open our eyes to see unless
we knew that by lifting the eyelids, the rays of light are permitted to
stream in, nor close our eyes to avoid some unpleasant sight unless we
believed that by so doing we should be unable to see. Here a distinct
emphasis is laid on the volitional and purposive aspect.
This prominence of will becomes even more evident in his detailed
psychological treatment. In every form of sense-perception there are
three factors: for instance in vision, the visible object which may exist
before it is seen; the act of seeing which did not exist before the object
was seen; the attention of the mind, the act of will which directs the
sense-organ toward the object and keeps the attention fixed during the
act of perception. 7 Augustine made further advance by noting that
for an act of will, reflective consciousness is an essential requirement.
External objects may make impressions that remain unnoticed. Thus
he had found himself reading a letter without knowing what he read,
"the will being fixed on something else and consciousness not being so
applied to the bodily sense as the latter to the letter." So also, when
conversing, we may be thinking of something else and not observe the
1 Ibid. iii. 37.
2 De Gen. xii. 15. s De Tr. xii. i.
3 De Div. Quaest, 83, 9. 6 De Lib. Arb. ii. 10.
4 Epist. 13, 2. 7 Epist. 137, 5; Trin. xi. 2, 5.
88 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST-ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
words of the speaker. "We hear the words but are not conscious of
them, because, as the words fall upon our ear, the act of will by which
they are wont to be impressed in consciousness is absent. It is nearer
the truth to say that we are not aware of the words, than that we do
not hear them." 1 Thus Augustine gives a psychological explanation of
phenomena that had been previously noted by Aristotle and commented
upon by Plotinus. An act of will explained to Augustine how the
countless forces impinging on our sense-organs are brought to con-
sciousness. Hence the will has a twofold function to perform in sense-
perception: to make sense-impressions into objects of consciousness,
and through attention to transform an immediate into a cognitive
experience.
Augustine also found will to be the essential element in imagination.
This reproductive activity of the internal sense likewise presents three
factors: memory, 2 which with its contents received through sense,
corresponds to the external world in the process of sense-perception;
an image of the thought-object; an act of will which directs the atten-
tion to the image and makes it an object of consciousness. When we
cease to attend to this presented object, it disappears as a thing of which
we are aware, but is still retained in memory until called forth by another
act of will. 3 The will is still more influential in productive imagination.
In this field the will is free to build its fanciful structures and error
results when these are interpreted as actual objects. 4
A study of thought revealed to Augustine a similar significance of
will. He distinguished a twofold aspect of reason, the one concerned
with corporeal and temporal objects and the other with the intelligible
world. 3 Still he guarded carefully against the interpretation of any
real separation of the mind into two parts. Practical reason presupposes
certain premises and standards. In order to proceed from presupposi-
tions beyond the immediate content of knowledge, will must be in evi-
dence as a desire for inquiring and investigating. Thinking is there-
fore a willed act of thought. 6 Augustine struggled manfully with the
problem of their relation. He acknowledged that we would not seek
a thing we know, but also that it is impossible to will the unknown.
The solution of the problem seemed to him to be that an act of will
must have reference to something partly known; and because our knowl-
1 Trin. xi. 15.
2 Memoria denotes both memory and awareness: Trin. xiv. 14.
3 Ibid. xi. 6-8. s Ibid. xii. 2-3; ratio, metis.
* Ibid. 17. 6 Ibid. ix. 18.
SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE AS BASIS OF METAPHYSICS 89
edge is partial, the will drives us to know more. On this basis will is
superior to practical reason.
In its contemplative function, reason deals with the objects of the
intelligible world, the supreme principles of thought and conduct. It
is somewhat difficult to interpret Augustine's position, as it underwent
various changes. 1 At first he held the Platonic theory of reminiscence;
but finding it impossible to reconcile it with his religious views, he
identified the neo-Platonic vovs with the Ao'yos, divine wisdom. Then
Augustine contended that the will directs the activity of practical reason
in bringing the data of the outer and inner sense under the principle of
rational insight, but that knowledge of these principles is essentially
revelation. For here divine grace and personal faith both enter in.
The illumination of the individual consciousness by the eternal truths,
the prototypes of concrete existences, is an act of grace, in which the
human mind lacks the initiative power. 2 The attitude of the individual,
however, is also important. Such rational insight is bestowed only on
the person who by his efforts shows himself worthy of the privilege.
Then, too, faith rather than insight effects the appropriation of these
principles, and faith contains the factor of assent, determined by no
intellectual compulsion. Thus in all psychical activities Augustine held
the volitional attitude as basal. Like Plotinus he recognized the inter-
relation of conative, cognitive, and affective elements and found a
solvent for his psychological problems in will.
Augustine's analysis of error also gives evidence of the prominence
of will. External objects present themselves just as they are, and the
sense-organs merely receive the impulse from without, having no power
to make any alterations. 3 "Corporeal appearance, because it has no
will, does not lie or deceive; nor do the eyes deceive, for they cannot
report to the mind anything but their affection. So it is with the other
senses. If anyone thinks the oar in the water is broken, he does not
have a poor messenger, but a poor judge." 4 Error, then, is caused by
the will which too hastily and indiscriminately refers the impressions
to some object without due consideration of the subjective factors.
Thus the subjective standpoint became dominant in psychology by
the recognition of the significance of unconscious elements, by emphasis
on the object of knowledge as the object of attention, the importance of
will in error, the identification of thinking with an act of will, and the
discovery of the essence of personality in the conative attitude.
1 Ibid. xii. 24; De In. An. 34; Retract, i. 8.
2 De Civ. Dei viii. i. 3 De V. Rl. 61. * Con. Ac. iii. 26.
go SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST-ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
Not only was the inmost reality of the human being ascribed to will,
but the grounds of all reality were discovered in psychical activity.
For according to Augustine the one form of knowledge ascends from
sense-data to the highest principles; the other, more noble, consists in
the study of the inner mental activity which reveals these norms of
reason, invariable and universal. As changeless forms of all reality
they are ideas in God who is the sum and source of all truth. Although
complete knowledge of God is unattainable, all rational knowledge is
ultimately of God. Hence the deity is the essence of all truth and also
the absolute personality who can be comprehended only by self-knowl-
edge of the finite personality. The three aspects 1 of psychical reality,
conscious presentation, understanding, and will, are also the categories
of all reality, being, knowing, and willing which are encompassed by the
omnipresence, omniscience, and absolute perfection of God. So in a
knowing and willing personality, Augustine discovered not only the
fundamental psychical principles, but the highest metaphysical and
religious reality.
1 Memoria, intellectus, volunlas, or esse, nosse, velle.
V. SUMMARY
In conclusion, some of the main phases in the development of the
subjective attitude may be summarized. The problem of knowledge
was a product of the consciousness of the contradictions involved in the
philosophic systems on the one hand, and of the uncertainties incident
to the disruption of customs and beliefs on the other. These made an
examination of the grounds of knowledge imperative. During the
pre-Socratic period, a most significant change in the philosophical
standpoint had been brought about, from the view of matter as the
intelligible phase of nature to that of form as alone knowable. Socrates
found that a more thorough examination of self brought to light uni-
versal and permanent elements of knowledge. Plato accepted his
results and endeavored to mediate between the world of being and
becoming, but it never occurred to him to find justification for the
universal in the world of becoming. Aristotle treated more definitely
psychological problems than Plato, but his exposition was mainly
biological. Taking his stand on the reality of the individual and the
necessity of the universal for knowledge, he worked out a theory of
knowledge that was thoroughly objective and realistic. Thus the
emphasis fell on external control and on mind in its outer manifestations.
When the attention began to center not on the type, but on personal
will and assent, on the individual as individual, the need of control and
of a criterion became apparent. It was during the investigations of this
problem by the post-Aristotelian schools, while they tried to recognize
more adequately the ever-widening and diversifying demands of indi-
vidual personality, that the subjective point of view developed.
Building upon the cardinal assumption of immanence the identity
of the nature of man and that of the universe the most significant
innovation o,f Stoicism's founder, Zeno, consisted in the insistence upon
voluntary assent and the establishment of a theory of knowledge on
the presentations that give certain knowledge of reality. His basal
concept was agreement, harmony of the inner and outer, the individual
and the universe, so that when such a presentation was given, the mind
necessarily assented. The universal aspect was emphasized by Clean-
thes, who defined the agreement by the physical theory of tension. This
predominance of the psycho-physical point of view forced Chrysippus,
when the Stoics were assailed by the Skeptics, to recognize more defi-
92 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST- ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
nitely the human individual and to resort to psychological analysis in
the attempt to base a theory of knowledge on voluntary assent. The
interest was thus transferred from the object of knowledge to the process
of attention. Influenced by Skeptical criticism of the given infallible
criterion, the Middle Stoa turned to a scrutiny of the formation of the
judgment and accorded the individual a greater share in determining
a standard.
The Pyrrhonists had assumed the ultra-subjective standpoint but
had at the same time renounced all epistemological problems and
attempted to find the goal of all endeavor in this very attitude. Prac-
tical exigencies forced them first to recognize and interpret their affec-
tions. Then Arcesilas, though denying a theoretical criterion of cer-
titude, was compelled to appeal to the "reasonable," or "probable,"
as the standard of practice, thus referring the decision to individual
interpretation. In the controversy between Carneades and the dog-
matic schools, the analysis of attention wrought remarkable changes in
the view generally held of the criterion and method of verification.
The grounds of certainty were examined and the "special sign" of the
Stoic, favravia KaTaXrfTrTuc^, was shown to depend for its validity on
the individual's investigation of all circumstances connected with the
act of cognition. From the Skeptic assault, especially that of Carneades,
on the criterion of truth which involved criticism of the grounds of
ethics, religion, and all scientific demonstration, and from the resulting
restatement of the dogmatic position, three definite philosophic move-
ments can be traced: a transformed Stoicism, neo-Platonism, and
Skeptical Empiricism.
Epicurus had started on an empirical basis to give a logical exposi-
tion of atomistic physics. His ethical principle of free-will made it
absolutely necessary that the sense-data be trustworthy, for reason
might add, subtract, combine; and therefore empirical certitude would
otherwise be problematical. Hence he inevitably insisted on the criteria ,
sense and affection, and on the natural development of preconceptions.
Everything that was directly experienced was tested by these infallible
standards. Only in reference to matters unknown was reason brought
into play, not through formal demonstration but by calculation from
observed to unobserved that could not be disproved by future experi-
ence or at least not refuted by actual experience. Thus by giving
thought a more dignified and influential position than was accorded it
by sheer sensationalism, Epicurus introduced the subjective attitude
as a solvent for problems. But no attempt was made to determine the
SUMMARY 93
modes of operation of the voluntary rational activity upon the matter
of affection and sense in valid inference. To Epicurus, as to the earlier
Stoics, the objects of sense and thought were given completely and
the manipulating activity was guaranteed by the uniformity tacitly as-
sumed. As the Stoics had modified brute nature by the conception of
rational activity, so Epicurus, besides the rigid mechanism of pure atom-
ism, introduced free-will, both evidence of the growing appreciation of
personality.
The widening influence of psychological analysis combined with
Skeptical criticism made the later Epicureans give added weight to rea-
soning. As Epicurus had advanced on sheer sensationalism by assigning
awareness of sense and thought presentations to the understanding and
more particularly discriminating sense from thought not only by the
kind of objects but by difference in function, so his followers made
further progress by maintaining that preconceptions are needed to
grasp the simplest notions and finally that reasoning and inference are
involved in all cognition. Thus a sounder scientific method began to
be formulated as a result of the psychological analysis that had been
aroused especially by the stringent arguments of the Skeptical academy.
When philosophy began its investigations into the underlying prin-
ciples of ethics, metaphysics, and the special sciences, mathematics
furnished the ideal of certainty and of method. The habit of making
exact definitions and drawing deductions from them, fostered by the
discussions in which the Greeks were masters, developed into a passion
for demonstration. At the Socratic period, a great body of solutions
to a variety of problems had been accumulated. Then during the
upheavals of the Sophistic movement, practical problems arose in
which these propositions were used and had to be analyzed into their
presuppositions, and scientific thought became conscious of itself.
Thus there existed a series of political and ethical postulates, and the
art of the Sophists consisted in showing how these traditional dicta of
the community might be analyzed into more fundamental axioms and
how cases might be presented effectively on this basis. Such is the
type of analysis that prevails in Aristotle. Parallel with this logical
development is the work of Euclid, in collecting different solutions and
tracing these back to axioms and postulates, thus giving novel demon-
strations. But when moral and political problems began to be argued,
it was found that verbal agreement did not necessarily imply complete
agreement in meaning and that the wider the generalization, the greater
the opportunity for variation. So inferences came to be regarded as
94 SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT IN POST-ARISTOTELIAN PERIOD
expressions of individual belief and conviction and therefore the deter-
mination of the criterion was most important. Aristotle showed that
the same degree of certainty cannot be attained in practical disciplines
as in the mathematical sciences, still the ideal of method was retained.
When the universal was discovered, the work of the scientist was com-
pleted, for every experiment was then merely an instance under the
general proposition.
After the academy had returned to a dogmatic position at the ascend-
ency of Antiochus, the Skeptics took up the formal destructive criticism
of the dogmas maintained fixedly and often uncritically by the other
schools, and, by their demolition of the validity of sense-perception,
demonstration, and all reasoning by deductive analysis, aided the Empi-
rical physicians to build up an inductive method. While the Skeptics
proper, despairing of theoretical certitude, devoted their attention to
practical pursuits, the Empirics developed their special art by construct-
ing hypotheses founded on observation and verified by experience. So
the interpretation of the changing conditions of disease and the variable
effects of remedies grew into a procedure of individual analysis and
testing. Accordingly the value for knowledge of individual experi-
ence was recognized and the universal became subject to experimenta-
tion as the fact and not the unknown appeared to be the problem.
Gradually, however, by reliance on recorded observations and the
authority of such physicians as Galen, the rules thus discovered became
stereotyped into fixed principles of the art of medicine. A similar
congealing process was also affecting all other lines of thought and
activity during the last centuries of the Roman Empire.
From the concessions made to the criticisms of Carneades, a Stoicism
that had reinterpreted the doctrines of the older leaders gradually
emerged. Reason as analyzing and weighing evidence, not merely
giving assent of necessity, became the criterion. The universal rational
law transformed by religious emotions became the inner self, the ideal,
potentially bestowed on all, but in actuality a character that could be
degraded or elevated by individual effort. The effect of such a change
is evident in the doctrine of different stages of progress and in the impor-
tance placed on the evaluation of experience. The divine was during
the later period not primarily a formal law, but an indwelling spirit.
In Seneca and Epictetus the individual aspect predominated, in M.
Aurelius, the cosmic. For all, "the little field of self" was the ultimate
reality.
In neo-Platonism, the spiritual monism, which had been develop-
SUMMARY 95
ing on the moral and religious side in later Stoicism in conflict with a
material ontology, became a metaphysical system. All knowledge was
held to be of the immaterial and spiritual, but only the images of the
absolute were cognitively apprehended; union with reality itself could
be achieved only through an emotional state that surpassed all
knowledge. Augustine based his philosophy on the absolute certainty
of a conscious mind. In psychical activity in its various forms he dis-
covered the principles of reality. The essence of personality was to
him the undetermined will and for that reason he located there the
conflict between the universal and the individual as well as its solution.
Thus in this period, the individual, who is the focus of interest, is at
first set over against the permanent unchanging universal in the theory
of knowledge, in scientific method, in ethics, in politics, and in religion.
As the individual tries to readjust himself to this external control,
the internal control develops, and in turn reinterprets the universal,
until the ideal of knowledge finally becomes not a reproduction of ex-
ternal reality but a harmonious organization of inner experience through
which the external meaning is also interpreted.
The development can be traced briefly in the growth of the term av-
racria. Originally identified indefinitely with either sense or thought, it
was by Aristotle used for presentation in sense-perception and concep-
tion and, as a technical term, for imagination. Stoics and Epicureans
at first emphasized the sensuous presentation, then the thought-image,
both defined in material terms. At the same time the Stoics labored
with the import of judgment and meaning. All signification they held to
be incorporeal and acknowledgment to be given not to the symbol or the
thing signified, but to the meaning expressed by the proposition. Then
as the importance of the inner experience increased, avTa.