THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 FROM THE LIBRARY OF 
 FRANK J. KLINGBERG
 
 TOWARDS AN 
 ENDURING PEACE 
 
 A SYMPOSIUM OF PEACE 
 
 PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS 
 
 1914-1916 
 
 COMPILED BY 
 
 RANDOLPH S. BOURNE 
 
 WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 
 
 FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS 
 
 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR 
 
 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 
 
 NEW YORK
 
 VAIL-BALLOU COMPANY 
 BINQHAMTON AND NEW YORK
 
 CO!tC 
 
 Library 
 
 JX 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PART I PRINCIPLES OF THE SETTLEMENT: ECONOMIC 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Problems of Economic Opportunity, by John A. Hobson . . 3 
 
 Trade as a Cause of War, by H. N. Brailsford .... 9 
 
 Economic Imperialism, by H. N. Brailsford 15 
 
 The Problem of Diplomacy, by Walter Lippmann ... 22 
 
 Socialists and Imperialism, by William English Walling . . 33 
 
 The Higher Imperialism, from the New Republic ... 38 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE SETTLEMENT: POLITICAL 
 
 Nationality and the Future, by Arnold J. Toynbee ... 43 
 Nationality and Sovereignty, by Arnold J. Toynbee ... 57 
 The Governmental Theory, by G. Lowes Dickinson .... 70 
 
 The Way Out of War, by G. Lowes Dickinson 76 
 
 Lowes Dickinson's Plan, from the New Republic . . .81 
 The Morrow of the War, by the Union of Democratic Control 86 
 No Peace Without Federation, by Charles W. Eliot . . .108 
 
 PART II. A LEAGUE OF PEACE 
 
 Bases for Confederation, by John A. Hobson 119 
 
 Existing Alliances and a League of Peace, by John Bates 
 
 Clark 135 
 
 Protection of Small Nations, by Charles W. Eliot . . .143 
 A League to enforce Peace, by A. Lawrence Lowell . . . 148 
 The Constitution of a League, by Hamilton Holt . . . 160 
 Pacifism and the League of Peace, from the New Republic 164 
 
 The Economic Boycott, by John A. Hobson 174 
 
 Economic Coercion, by Norman Angell 184 
 
 World-Or,ganization and Peace, by A. A. Tenney .... 189 
 
 iii 
 
 1567180
 
 PART III. TOWARDS THE FUTURE 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The New Outlook, by Nicholas Murray Butler . . . .203 
 
 Above the Battle, by Romain Rolland 205 
 
 The New Idealism, by Rudolf Eucken 214 
 
 The Future of Patriotism, by Walter Lippmann . . . .217 
 The Future of Civilization, by A. E. Zimmern . . . .221 
 Towards the Peace that Shall Last, by Jane Addams and 
 Others 230 
 
 APPENDIX: PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROBLEMS 
 
 I INTERNATIONAL 
 
 1. Ford Neutral Conference at Stockholm . . 243 
 
 2. Central Organization for a Durable Peace . . 247 
 
 3. Union of International Associations . . . 248 
 
 4. International Bureau of Peace 249 
 
 5. International Congress of Women .... 250 
 
 6. Conference of Socialists of Allied Nations . . 259 
 
 7. Conference of Socialists of Neutral Nations . 261 
 
 II UNITED STATES 
 
 8. League to Enforce Peace 264 
 
 9. National Peace Convention 264 
 
 10. World Peace Foundation 266 
 
 11. American School Peace League 267 
 
 12. Women's Peace Party 268 
 
 13. New York Peace Society 270 
 
 14. Socialist Party of America 271 
 
 15. David Starr Jordan 273 
 
 16. Nicholas Murray Butler . . . ; ." . . . 275 
 
 17. Chamber of Commerce of the United States . . 276 
 
 III GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 18. Union of Democratic Control 277 
 
 19. Fabian Society . . . . 278 
 
 20. Independent Labor Party 296 
 
 21. National Peace Council 298 
 
 22. Women's Movement for Constructive Peace 298 
 
 23. Australian Peace Alliance ....... 300 
 
 iv
 
 PAGE 
 
 24. Charles Roden Buxton . 301 
 
 25. H. N. Brailsford 302 
 
 IV GERMANY 
 
 26. German and Austro-Hungarian Socialists . . 306 
 
 27. "Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft" 306 
 
 28. Manifesto by Eighty-eight Professors and States- 
 
 men 308 
 
 29. South German Social Democrats 310 
 
 30. German Socialists . . .310 
 
 31. Peace Manifesto of Socialists 311 
 
 32. Dr. Bernhard Dernburg 314 
 
 33. Prof. L. Quidde 316 
 
 34. Ed. Bernstein . . 317 
 
 V FRANCE 
 
 35. General Confederation of Labor 322 
 
 VI SWITZERLAND 
 
 36. Swiss Peace Society 323 
 
 37. Swiss Committee for Study of Principles of 
 
 Durable Treaty of Peace 323 
 
 VII HOLLAND 
 
 38. Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Eaad (Dutch Anti- 
 
 War Council) 325 
 
 VIII Norman Angell on Differential Neutrality for America 326 
 INDEX . 333
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 When the storm has gone by and the skies after 
 clearing have softened, we may discover that a corrected 
 perspective is the result of the war that we are most 
 conscious of. Familiar presumptions will appear fore- 
 shortened, and new distances of fact and possibility will 
 lie before us. 
 
 Before the fateful midsummer of 1914 the most 
 thoughtful part of mankind confidently held a lot of 
 agreeable presumptions which undoubtedly influenced 
 individual and collective conduct. The more intangible 
 of them were grouped under such name symbols as 
 "idealism," " humanitarian impulse," "human brother- 
 hood," "Christian civilization." The workaday ones 
 were pigeonholed under the rubric: "enlightened eco- 
 nomic interest." Between the practical and the aspira- 
 tional were distributed all the excellent Aristotelian mid- 
 dle course presumptions of the "rule of reason" order. 
 
 And why not? The nineteenth century had closed in 
 a blaze of scientific glory. By patient inductive research 
 the human mind had found out nature's way on earth 
 and in the heavens, and with daring invention had turned 
 knowledge to immediate practical account. The struggle 
 for existence had become a mighty enterprise of prog- 
 ress. Steam and electricity had brought the utmost parts 
 of the world together. Upon substantial material foun- 
 
 vii
 
 dations the twentieth century would build a world repub- 
 lic, wherein justice should apportion abundance. 
 
 Upon presumption we reared the tower of expectation. 
 
 Yet on the horizon we might have seen some of us did 
 see a thickening haze and warning thunderheads. Not 
 much was said about them, but to some it seemed that 
 the world behaved as if it felt the tension of a rising 
 storm. With nervous eagerness the nations pushed 
 their way into the domains of the backward peoples. 
 They sought concessions, opportunities for investment, 
 command of resources, exclusive trade, spheres of influ- 
 ence. Private negotiations were backed by diplomacy, 
 and year after year diplomacy was backed by an ever 
 more impressive show of naval and military power. 
 
 But we did not believe that the Great War impended. 
 There would still be restricted wars here and there of 
 course, but more and more they could be prevented. The 
 human mind that had mastered nature; 's way could 
 master and control the ways of man. Economic interest 
 would bring its resistless strength to bear against the 
 mad makers of the wastes of war. A sensitive conscience 
 would revolt against the cruelties of war. Reason, which 
 had invented rules and agencies to keep the peace within 
 the state, would devise tribunals and procedures to sub- 
 stitute a rational adjustment of differences for the arbit- 
 rament of war between states. 
 
 The world has recovered from disaster before now, it 
 will recover again. Presumptions that disappointed have 
 been reexamined and brought into truer drawing. Ex- 
 pectation has been more broadly built, it will be more 
 broadly built again. 
 
 There is conscience in mankind, and the war has sub- 
 
 viii
 
 limely revealed it, as it has revealed also undreamed of 
 survivals of faithlessness and cruelty. The presumption 
 of rational control in human affairs has been foreshort- 
 ened, but not painted out. In the background stand 
 forth as grim realities, forces of fear, distrust, envy, 
 ignorance, and hate that we had thought were ghosts. 
 Conscience is as strong and as sensitive as we believed 
 it to be; reason is as effective as we presumed; but the 
 forces arrayed against them we now see are mightier 
 than we knew. So now we ask, By what power shall con- 
 science and reason be reinforced, and the surviving forces 
 of barbarism be driven back ? 
 
 There is but one answer left, all others have been shot 
 to pieces. Conscience and reason are effective when they 
 organize material energies, not when they dissipate them- 
 selves in dreams. Conscience and reason must assemble, 
 coordinate, and bring to bear the economic resources 
 and the physical energies of the civilized world to narrow 
 the area and to diminish the frequency of war. 
 
 But how ? General presumptions will not do this time. 
 There must be a specific plan, concrete and practical; 
 a specific preparedness, a specific method. And what is 
 more, plan, preparedness, method must be drawn forth 
 from the situation as the war makes and leaves it, not 
 imposed upon it. They must be a composition of forces 
 now in operation. 
 
 There were academic plans aplenty for the creation 
 of pacific internationalism before the war began. The 
 bankers had invented theirs; the socialists, the concilia- 
 tionists, and the international lawyers respectively had 
 invented theirs. The free traders, first in the field, had 
 not lost hope. 
 
 ix
 
 It would be foolish to let ourselves think in discour- 
 agement that all these efforts to organize "the interna- 
 tional mind" were idle. They were not ineffective. 
 They did not organize the international mind adequately, 
 much less did they reform its habits, but they quickened 
 it; they organized it in part, they pulled it together 
 enough to make it powerful for the work yet to be done. 
 
 What we have to face, then, is not the extinction or 
 abandonment of internationalism, but the fact that the 
 ideal, the all-embracing and thoroughly rational interna- 
 tionalism lies far in the future, and that before it can 
 be attained we must have that partial internationalism 
 which is practically the same thing as the widening of 
 nationalism that is achieved when nations cooperate in 
 leagues or combine in federations. The league of peace 
 may be academic or it may soon stand forth as a tre- 
 mendous piece of realism, we do not know which, but the 
 forces that are holding many of the nations together in 
 military cooperation now are present realities, and they 
 will be realities after the military war is over. There 
 will still be tariffs, but the areas within which tariff 
 barriers will no longer be maintained will be immensely 
 widened. Beyond these areas will be, as now, various 
 arrangements of reciprocity. In like manner, there will 
 be a determination on the part of the cooperating na- 
 tions to stand together for the enforcement of interna- 
 tional agreements and to discipline a law-breaking state 
 that would needlessly resort to arms. The international- 
 ism of commerce, of travel, of communication, of intel- 
 lectual exchange and moral endeavor will continue to 
 grow throughout the world, but in addition there will be 
 the more definite, the more concrete internationalism of
 
 the nations that agree in making common cause for the 
 attainment of specific ends. 
 
 Within this relatively restricted internationalism there 
 will be, there is now, a certain yet more definite aggre- 
 gation of peoples, interests, and traditions upon which 
 rests a great and peculiar moral responsibility. The 
 English-speaking people of the world are together the 
 largest body of human beings among whom a nearly com- 
 plete intellectual and moral understanding is already 
 achieved. They have reached high attainments in sci- 
 ence and the arts, in education, in social order, in justice. 
 They are highly organized, they cherish the traditions 
 of their common history. To permit anything to en- 
 danger the moral solidarity of this nucleus of a perfected 
 internationalism would be a crime unspeakable. To 
 strengthen it, to make it one of the supreme forces work- 
 ing for peace and humanity is a supreme obligation. 
 
 FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.
 
 CONCERNING THE AUTHORS QUOTED 
 
 Jane Addams has been head resident at Hull House 
 in Chicago for many years. She is widely known 
 for her leadership in the social movement, and par- 
 ticularly for her connection with the International 
 Congress of Women at The Hague. 
 
 Norman Angell is the author of "The Great Illusion," 
 and one of the most brilliant of the workers in the 
 cause of peace. He is also the author of "Inter- 
 national Polity," "Arms and Industry," and "The 
 World's Highway." 
 
 Ed. Bernstein is one of the leaders of the German 
 Social Democracy of the revisionist wing. 
 
 H. N. Brailsford is a prominent English traveler, cor- 
 respondent, and essayist, and one of the most il- 
 luminating writers on world-problems. His books 
 include "The War of Steel and Gold," "Shelley, 
 Godwin and their Circle." 
 
 Nicholas Murray Butler is President of Columbia 
 University, Acting Director of the Division of Inter- 
 course and Education of the Carnegie Endowment 
 for International Peace and Chairman of the Ameri- 
 can Association for International Conciliation. 
 
 Charles Roden Buxton is a prominent English Liberal, 
 and member of the Union for Democratic Control. 
 
 John Bates Clark is Director of the Division of Econom- 
 ics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for 
 International Peace and Professor of Political Econ- 
 omy at Columbia University. 
 
 Bernhard Dernburg is the German ex-Minister of Col- 
 onies, who spent some time in America at the be- 
 ginning of the war as semi-official spokesman for 
 German opinion. 
 
 Charles W. Eliot is President Emeritus of Harvard 
 University, and a leader in the peace movement. 
 
 Rudolf Eucken is one of the most widely-known of living 
 German philosophers. He visited America in 1913. 
 xiii
 
 G. Lowes Dickinson of Cambridge University, England 
 is author of " Letters of a Chinese Official," "Jus 
 tice and Liberty," "A Modern Symposium," etc. 
 
 Franklin H. Giddings is Professor of Sociology at Co- 
 lumbia University. 
 
 John A. Hobson is one of the best-known English 
 economists, the author of "The Rise of Modern 
 Capitalism," "The Science of Wealth," "The In- 
 dustrial System," "Towards International Govern- 
 ment," etc. 
 
 Hamilton Holt is managing editor of The Independent. 
 
 Paul U. Kellogg is an editor of the Survey in New York. 
 
 Walter Lippmann is one of the most brilliant of the 
 younger American publicists, an editor of the New 
 Republic, and author of "A Preface to Politics," 
 "Drift and Mastery," and "The Stakes of Diplo- 
 macy." 
 
 A. Lawrence Lowell is President of Harvard University. 
 
 Romain Holland is the author of " Jean-Christophe. " 
 His attitude on the war has forced his exile from 
 France to Geneva. His eloquent book "Above the 
 Battle" expresses the emotion of a cosmopolitan 
 soul confronted with the madness of a world-war. 
 
 Prof. L. Quidde was one of the leading German pacifists 
 before the war. 
 
 A. A. Tenney is assistant Professor of Sociology at 
 Columbia University. 
 
 Arnold J. Toynbee is the son-in-law of Prof. Gilbert 
 Murray, and the author of "Nationality and the 
 War," and "Greek Policy Since 1882." He is 
 one of the most brilliant students of problems of 
 nationality. 
 
 Lillian Wald is head-worker at the Henry Street Settle- 
 ment in New York City. 
 
 William English Walling is a prominent American 
 Socialist, editor of the New Review, and author of 
 "Socialists and the War," etc. 
 
 Alfred E. Zimmern is in the English Education service, 
 
 and is author of "The Greek Commonwealth." 
 
 xiv
 
 PREFACE 
 
 The aim of this book is to present a discussion of some 
 of the most hopeful and constructive suggestions for 
 the settlement of the war on terms that would make for 
 a lasting peace. The selections are taken from books, 
 magazines, manifestoes, programs, etc., that have ap- 
 peared since the beginning of the war. Part I contains 
 a discussion of the general principles of a settlement, 
 economic and political. Part II contains the more con- 
 crete suggestions for the constitution of a definite League 
 of Peace. Part III presents some of the reconstructive 
 ideals "Towards the Future" as voiced by writers 
 in the different countries. In the Appendix are collected 
 definite programs for peace put forward by associations 
 and individuals, international organizations, etc., in this 
 country, Great Britain, Germany, France, Holland, Den- 
 mark and Sweden, and Switzerland. 
 
 The books quoted form, it is believed, an indispensable 
 library for the understanding of international questions : 
 
 "Nationality and the War," by Arnold J. Toynbee. 
 New York: E. P. Button and Co. 
 
 ' ' Towards International Government, ' ' by John A. Hob- 
 son. 
 
 "The Stakes of Diplomacy," by Walter Lippmann. 
 New York: Henry Holt and Co. 
 
 "The Road Toward Peace," by Charles W. Eliot. Bos- 
 ton: Houghton Mifflin Co. 
 
 "The War of Steel and Gold," by H. N. Brailsford. 
 New York: Macmillan. 
 
 "The War and Democracy," by A. E. Zimmern and 
 others. New York : Macmillan. 
 
 "The World's Highway," by Norman Angell. New 
 York: Geo. H. Doran & Co. 
 xv
 
 PART I 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE SETTLEMENT
 
 PART I. PRINCIPLES OF THE 
 SETTLEMENT: ECONOMIC 
 
 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 
 
 The growing dependence of modern civilized and Most 
 
 , . , , i i j j. j/u e Tf international 
 
 thickly populated countries foi' the necessaries of life quarrels hare 
 and industry, for commercial profits, and for gainful 
 investments of capital upon free access to other coun- 
 tries, especially to countries differing from themselves 
 in climate, natural resources, and degree of economic 
 development, is of necessity a consideration of increas- 
 ing weight in the foreign policy of to-day. Every ac- 
 tive industrial or commercial nation is therefore fain to 
 watch and guard its existing opportunities for foreign 
 trade and investment, and to plan ahead for enlarged 
 opportunities to meet the anticipated future needs of 
 an expanding trade and a growing population. It 
 views with fear, suspicion, and jealousy every attempt of 
 a foreign country to curtail its liberty of access to other 
 countries and its equal opportunities for advantageous 
 trade or exploitation. The chief substance of the trea- 
 ties, conventions, and agreements between modern na- 
 tions in recent times has consisted in arrangements about 
 commercial and financial opportunities, mostly in coun- 
 tries outside the acknowledged control of the negotiating 
 parties. The real origins of most quarrels between such 
 nations have related to tariffs, railway, banking, com- 
 mercial, and financial operations in lands belonging to 
 
 3
 
 The present one or other of the parties, or in lands where some 
 
 war produced . . ' . 
 
 by economic sphere of special interest was claimed. Egypt, Morocco, 
 Persia, Asia Minor, China, Congo, Mexico, are the most 
 sensitive spots affecting international relations outside 
 of Europe, testifying to the predominance of economic 
 considerations in foreign policy. The stress laid upon 
 such countries hinges in the last resort upon the need of 
 "open doors" or upon the desire to close doors to other 
 countries. These keenly felt desires to safeguard exist- 
 ing foreign markets for goods and capital, to obtain by 
 diplomatic pressure or by force new markets, and in 
 other cases to monopolize markets, have everywhere been 
 the chief directing influences in foreign policy, the chief 
 causes of competing armaments, and the permanent un- 
 derlying menaces to peace. The present war, when regard 
 is had to the real directing pressure behind all diplomatic 
 acts and superficial political ferments, is in the main a 
 product of these economic antagonisms. This point of 
 view is concisely and effectively expressed in a striking 
 memorandum presented by the Reform Club of New 
 York to President Wilson : 
 
 Consider the situation of the present belligerents. 
 
 Serbia wants a window on the sea, and is shut out by Aus- 
 trian influence. 
 
 Austria wants an outlet in the East, Constantinople or 
 Salonica. 
 
 Russia wants ice-free ports on the Baltic and Pacific, 
 Constantinople, and a free outlet from the Black Sea into 
 the Mediterranean. 
 
 Germany claims to be hemmed in by a ring of steel, and 
 needs the facilities of Antwerp and Rotterdam for her Rhine 
 Valley commerce, security against being shut out from the 
 East by commercial restrictions on the overland route, and 
 freedom of the seas for her foreign commerce. 
 
 England must receive uninterrupted supplies of food and 
 raw materials, and her oversea communications must be 
 maintained. 
 
 4
 
 This is true also of France, Germany, Belgium, and other 
 European countries. privilege is 
 
 Japan, like Germany, must have opportunity for her ex- t^primar 
 panding population, industries, and commerce. 
 
 The foreign policies of the nations still at peace are also 
 determined by trade relations. Our own country desires 
 the open door in the East. 
 
 South and North American States and Scandinavia are 
 already protesting against the war's interference with their 
 ocean trade. 
 
 All nations that are not in possession of satisfactory har- 
 bors on the sea demand outlets, and cannot and ought not 
 to be contented till they get them. , 
 
 Nations desiring to extend their colonial enterprises enter- 
 tain those ambitions for commercial reasons, either to pos- 
 sess markets from which they cannot be excluded, or to de- 
 velop such markets for themselves and be able to exclude 
 others from them when they so determine. 
 
 The generalization from these statements of fact is 
 expressed in the formula, "The desire for commercial 
 privilege and for freedom from commercial restraint is 
 the primary cause of war." 
 
 Now, that the foreign policies of nations are, in fact, 
 determined mainly by these commercial and financial 
 considerations, and that the desire to secure economic 
 privilege and to escape economic restraints is a chief 
 cause of war, are indisputable propositions. So long as 
 these motives are left free to work in the future as in 
 the past there will be constant friction among the com- 
 mercially developed nations, giving rise to dangerous 
 quarrels that will strain, perhaps to the breaking- 
 point, any arrangements for arbitration that may be 
 made. . . . 
 
 Disputes arising from these economic causes are even 
 deeper seated and more dangerous than those connected 
 with the claims of nationality and autonomy. Indeed, 
 political autonomy is shorn of most of its value unless
 
 trad rn i tional ^ * s accompanied by a large measure of economic liberty 
 restricted. as regards commercial relations with the outside world. 
 The case of Serbia, liable at any moment to be denied 
 access to the sea, or to be cut off by Austria from her 
 chief land markets, is a case in point. Or once again, 
 would the autonomy of such a country as Hungary, Bo- 
 hemia, or Poland, however valid its political guarantees, 
 satisfy the legitimate aspirations of its population if 
 high tariff-walls encompassed it on every frontier? 
 Such instances make it evident that no settlement of 
 "the map of Europe" on lines of nationality can suffice 
 to establish peace. The effective liberty of every people 
 demands freedom of commercial intercourse with other 
 peoples. A refusal or a hindrance of such intercourse 
 deprives a people of its fair share of the common fruits 
 of the earth, and deprives the other peoples of the world 
 of any special fruits which it is able to contribute to the 
 common stock. 
 
 If any international Government existed, representing 
 the commonwealth of nations, it would seek to remove 
 all commercial restrictions which impair the freedom of 
 economic intercourse between nations. 
 
 These restrictions are placed by the Eeform Club 
 Memorandum under the four following categories: 
 
 First. There is the restriction of tariffs imposed by na- 
 tions. 
 
 Second. There are restrictions upon the best uses of 
 International commerce, of the terminal and land transfer 
 facilities of the great trade routes and seaports of the world. 
 A few such ports command entrance to and exit from vast 
 continental hinterlands. It is vital to these interior regions 
 that their natural communications with the outside world 
 should be kept widely open, and this is equally vital to the 
 rest of the world. Obstructive control of such ports and 
 routes to the detriment of the world's commerce cannot and 
 should not be tolerated by states whose interests are ad-
 
 versely affected. But routes and ports are needed for use, National 
 not government; and port rivalries constantly tend towards grou p g control 
 offering the best and equal facilities to all. The swelling foreign policy, 
 tides of commerce are clearing their own channels, and mu- 
 tual interests will more and more prompt the states through 
 which the principal trade routes pass to facilitate the move- 
 ment of commerce. 
 
 Third. There are restrictions upon opportunities to trade 
 with territories ruled as colonies or being exploited within 
 spheres of influence. This is what now remains of the old 
 mercantile system which flourished before our Revolutionary 
 War, and which has been weakening ever since. Great 
 Britain claims no preference for herself in her colonies. 
 Other states have been less liberal. The fear of such re- 
 strictions being applied against them is to-day the main 
 motive for a policy of colonial oversea possessions. If in- 
 dustrial states could be assured of the application of the 
 open-door policy, no state would envy another its colonies. 
 Colonies should be the world's. 
 
 Fourth. There are restrictions in the free use of the sea. 
 Unlike land routes, ocean routes are offered practically with- 
 out cost to all, whithersoever the sea runs. Over these, 
 however, until modern times commerce has been subject to 
 pillage by regular warships as well as by pirates. The 
 claims of commerce have been more slowly recognized on the 
 sea than on the land; and, to an extent now unthinkable on 
 land, warring states still feel free to interfere with neutral 
 traders. . . . 
 
 Another factor of increasing importance in the recent 
 conflict of nations has been the competition between 
 groups of financiers and concessionaires, organized upon 
 a "national" basis, to obtain exclusive or preferential 
 control in the undeveloped countries for the profitable 
 use of exported capital. Closely related to commercial 
 competition, this competition for lucrative investments 
 has played an even greater part in producing dangerous 
 international situations. For these financial and com- 
 mercial interests have sought to use the political and 
 the forcible resources of their respective Governments 
 
 7
 
 opposition* to ena ^ e them to obtain the concessions and other priv- 
 determine ileges they require for the security and profitable ap- 
 poiicy. plication of their capital. The control of foreign policy 
 
 thus wielded has been fraught with two perils to world- 
 peace. It has brought the Governments of the compet- 
 ing financial groups into constant friction, and it has 
 been the most fruitful direct source of expeditionary 
 forces and territorial aggressions in the coveted areas. 
 As the struggle for lucrative overseas investments has 
 come to occupy a more important part than the struggle 
 for ordinary markets, the economic oppositions between 
 European Governments have become more and more the 
 determinant factors in foreign policy, and in the com- 
 petition of armaments, upon which Governments rely 
 to support and to achieve the aims their economic mas- 
 ters impose upon them. 
 
 John A. Hobson, "Towards International Govern- 
 ment," pp. 128-139.
 
 TRADE AS A CAUSE OF WAR 
 Decent men in the belligerent countries feel a natural idealism hides 
 
 . -!.! real causes 
 
 repugnance in time of war to any discussion of the of war. 
 economic bearings of the struggle. If nations are to 
 fight with clear consciences and single hearts, they must 
 fight on in the belief that any objects which concern 
 their statesmen beyond the objects of defense and na- 
 tional security are purely idealistic. We are all prag- 
 matists in wartime ; we believe what will conduce to vic- 
 tory. Cool observers see clearly the widening out of an 
 immense range of colonial, imperial, and economic is- 
 sues which will confront us at the settlement and after 
 it. But these things are not debated as we debate the 
 issues of nationality in this war. One might suppose 
 from a study of our press that we are much more vitally 
 interested in the fate of the Slovenes than we are in the 
 trade of China. 
 
 This idealism is absolutely sincere, and a natural con- 
 sequence of the exaltation of emotion which belongs to 
 any war of nations. We can endure the thought that 
 our young men are falling in many thousands for the 
 liberties of little peoples. That brief statement of our 
 aims would end in bathos if we were to add to it the 
 subjection of China to Japanese suzerainty, the parti- 
 tion of Turkey into spheres of influence, the acquisition 
 by the Allies of the German colonies, and the setting up 
 of a Russian customs house at Constantinople. The mis- 
 chief of this obsession is that the very field which stands 
 
 9
 
 Our need is most in need of illumination from critical yet idealistic 
 
 organization * 
 
 to make thinking is left in a half light of semi-secrecy, and the 
 
 change with- will of democracies hardly dreams of intervening in the 
 clash of the interests which divide it. Public opinion 
 and the fortunes of war will govern the settlement of 
 Belgium and Alsace, but in our present temper it is only 
 too probable that all the colonial and economic issues 
 involved in it will be left to the diplomatists with only 
 the interests behind them. 
 
 The penetrating memorandum addressed by the New 
 York Reform Club to President Wilson has sketched 
 broadly but with sure insight the commercial and colo- 
 nial questions which helped to lead up to this war. 
 None of these issues appeared in the negotiations which 
 preceded the war, but most of them were latent in the 
 consciousness of the statesmen and even of the peoples. 
 The curse of our unorganized Europe has been that 
 fundamental change has rarely been possible save as a 
 sequel of war. Diplomacy was always busied with a 
 pathetic conservatism in bolstering up the status quo, 
 or in arranging those little readjustments which might 
 just avail to stave off war. We shall not banish war 
 from Europe until we are civilized enough to create 
 an organization that can make and impose fundamental 
 changes without war. The best we can do in the mean- 
 time is to prepare to avail ourselves of the brief moment 
 of settlement during which the structure of Europe will 
 still be fluid under the shock of war, to bring our ideal- 
 istic and democratic forces to bear upon these larger 
 issues. 
 
 The Reform Club's memorandum deals with three of 
 these questions: the abolition of capture at sea in war- 
 time, the freedom of the world's straits and highways 
 in time of war, and the exploitation of colonies under a 
 system of protection. The system of legalized piracy 
 
 10
 
 which permits navies to prey on commerce in wartime is 
 undoubtedly the most potent incentive to swollen anna- incentive for 
 
 . . colome- 
 
 ments at sea. So long as it survives, the opinion of the 
 mercantile classes will never effectively back the demand 
 for economy in armaments, for it is bound to regard 
 navies as an insurance. The question of the ownership 
 of straits stands high among the many competing causes 
 of bloodshed. It explains the German struggle for 
 Calais no less than the Allied expedition to the Darda- 
 nelles. One may doubt, however, whether a proposal 
 to neutralize any of the more vital of these straits the 
 Straits of Dover or Gibraltar, for example would stand 
 a chance of calm consideration on the morrow of such a 
 war as this. It will be feasible when war is no longer 
 an ever-present terror ; and when that day comes it will 
 have lost its importance. Far more central in our prob- 
 lem is the general question of colonialism. It is a com- 
 monplace to say that modern industrial peoples desire 
 colonies almost solely for economic reasons, and that 
 one of the chief motives for this expansion would disap- 
 pear with any approach to free trade. If the British 
 colonies had not granted a preference to the mother coun- 
 try, and if French colonies were not hedged about with 
 an impenetrable tariff wall, the feeling among German 
 industrialists that their expansion was " hemmed in" 
 would have been less acute, and the pressure for ' ' places 
 in the sun" would have been less powerful. 
 
 But it is doubtful whether the question of markets 
 is as potent a cause of armaments and war as the com- 
 petition to secure concessions, monopolies, and spheres 
 of influence. The export of capital means much more 
 for the modern politics of imperialism than the export 
 of manufactured goods. The conquistador of to-day is 
 the financier who acquires mining rights in Morocco, 
 loan privileges in Turkey, or railway concessions in 
 
 11
 
 and for con- China. The foreign policy of Great Britain and our 
 
 cessions and , 
 
 monopolies. place in the European system has been governed tor a 
 generation by the occupation of Egypt, whither we went 
 in the wake of the bond-holders. It explains our long 
 bickerings with France; it helped to fling an isolated 
 France into the arms of Russia; it brought us finally 
 into the disastrous bargain over Morocco which underlay 
 our feud with Germany. The competition of national 
 financial groups for concessions in Turkey or China is 
 not the competition of the market-place at home. Be- 
 hind the financier stands the diplomatist, and behind 
 the diplomatist is his navy. There is a clash of armor- 
 plates when these competitors jostle. The struggle for 
 a Balance of Power in Europe has often seemed little 
 more than a race for the force and prestige which would 
 enable the dominant Power or group of Powers to secure 
 the concessions of the monopoly spheres which it coveted 
 in the half-developed regions of the earth. No modern 
 nation would openly make war to secure such ends as 
 these, for no democracy would support it. Even the 
 half-evolved democracy of Russia recoiled from the 
 Manchurian War. But every nation, by pursuing these 
 ends, makes the armed peace and the unstable equili- 
 brium which prepares our wars. 
 
 The remedy is so simple that only a very clever man 
 could sophisticate himself into missing it, and it is as 
 old as Cobden. It is not necessary to establish universal 
 free trade to stop the rivalry to monopolize colonial mar- 
 kets ; it would suffice to declare free trade in the colonies, 
 or even in those which are not self-governing. To deal 
 with the evil of "concessions" all that is required is a 
 general understanding that financiers must win their 
 own way, by merit or push or bribes, and that the doors 
 of the embassies will be banged in their faces when they 
 seek support. These sentences are easily written, but 
 
 12
 
 they would involve the democratization of diplomacy 
 everywhere, the overthrow of the colonial group in declared by 
 
 ' ! i i international 
 
 France, and the conioundmg ot the national economists agreement, 
 in Germany. The force which might work such miracles 
 is nowhere mobilized, for, with all their will to peace, 
 the democracies nowhere understand the bearings of 
 these colonial and commercial issues on war and arma- 
 ments. It requires some imagination to understand 
 that when two embassies compete in Peking for a rail- 
 way concession, the issue may be determined by the 
 balance of naval power in the North Sea. It requires 
 some habit of observation to realize that because this 
 may happen in Peking, the investing and governing 
 classes are bound to keep up the balance in the North 
 Sea. The nexus is none the less simple and clear, and 
 it will hold as long as diplomacy continues to engage in 
 this disguised imperial trading, so long as capital pos- 
 sesses nationality and regards the flag as an asset. 
 
 There are none the less ways of escape which are 
 neither Utopian nor heroic. It ought not to be utterly 
 beyond the statesmanship of Europe to decree some 
 limited form of colonial free trade by general agreement 
 to apply it, for example, to Africa. France would 
 oppose it, but what if Alsace were to be restored on this 
 condition? To open a great colonial market to Ham- 
 burg, while ending the dream of revanche, would be to 
 remove the two chief causes of war in western Europe. 
 American statesmanship may ere long have the power to 
 propose such a bargain as this. For the plague of con- 
 cession-hunting the best expedient would probably be 
 to impose on all the competing national groups in each 
 area the duty of amalgamating in a permanently in- 
 ternational syndicate. If one such syndicate controlled 
 all the railways and another all the mines of China and 
 Turkey, a vast cause of national rivalry would be re- 
 
 13 

 
 f moved. The interests of China and Turkey might be 
 capital inter- secured by interposing a disinterested council or arbi- 
 trator between them and the syndicate to adjust their 
 respective interests. Short of creating a world state or 
 a European federation, the chief constructive work for 
 peace is to establish colonial free trade and internation- 
 alize the export of capital. 
 
 H. N. Brails ford, "Trade as a Cause of War," The 
 New Republic, May 8, 1915. 
 
 14
 
 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 
 
 The evils of an unrestricted competition for conces- ETU of 
 sions and monopolies between rival financial groups influeno." f 
 backed by their Governments, are so notorious that diplo- 
 macy has found several typical formulae for bringing 
 them to an end. The obvious method of resolving such 
 conflicts is the demarcation of spheres of "influences," 
 "interest" or "penetration" within which each of the 
 competing Powers enjoys a monopoly respected by the 
 others. This method is open to two grave objections. 
 In the first place, it is rarely adopted before a ruinous 
 conflict has exhausted the competitors. For years or 
 decades they carry on a trial of strength which affects not 
 merely their local relationship, but their attitude to one 
 another in Europe, and is measured year by year in 
 their military and naval estimates. If we were to take 
 the sum by which British and German armaments have 
 increased in the present century, it would be possible 
 to allocate the increase, roughly, somewhat as follows: 
 50 per cent, or less for the settlement of the question, 
 Who shall exploit Morocco?; 25 per cent, or more for 
 the privilege of building a railway to Bagdad and be- 
 yond it; 25 per cent, or more for the future eventual- 
 ities which remain unsettled the fate of the Portuguese 
 colonies in Africa, and the destinies of China. In the 
 second place, the delimitation of spheres of interest is 
 almost inevitably fatal to the national existence of the 
 country partitioned, and as inevitably adds a vast bur- 
 den to the commitments of the Imperial Power. Persia 
 
 15
 
 bfc^e es "de furnishes the obvious illustration. Sir Edward Grey is 
 pendencies." clearly resolved that he will not allow himself by the 
 march of events to be drawn into the assumption of any 
 direct responsibility for the administration of the Brit- 
 ish sphere. It is a laudable resolve, but Russia may at 
 any moment frustrate it. She deals with her own 
 sphere on the opposite principle, and her sphere happens 
 to include the seat of the central government. That 
 government is already a puppet of Russian policy, en- 
 joying only a simulacrum of independence. How much 
 longer can a government which is not a government con- 
 tinue to rule the southern sphere? Sooner or later a 
 choice must be made. Either Russia must withdraw, or 
 some separate government under British protection must 
 be created for the south. Turkey is drifting rapidly 
 towards a dissolution in which the spheres which the 
 Great Powers already claim will be formally delimited. 
 It is easy to predict what that will mean. There will 
 be first provincial loans, then provincial advisers, and 
 finally a military control, under which each of these 
 "spheres" will become what Egypt already is, a depen- 
 dency of a European Power. 
 
 The method of avoiding financial competition by 
 marking off zones of monopoly, is clearly the worst 
 which can be pursued. There are alternatives. Let us 
 consider what methods might be followed if the Powers 
 were sage enough to shrink from the terrific conflict 
 which may one day overtake them for the partition of 
 China. China is so thickly peopled that crude conquest 
 presents few attractions. Even Japan could not settle 
 her surplus population in a country where every hill is 
 terraced and every field subjected to intensive cultiva- 
 tion. But there is here a field which capital is already 
 eager to exploit, and every year diminishes the resistance 
 of prejudice and inertia to its ambitions. The attempts 
 
 16
 
 to mark out spheres of influence have so far been tenta- ^ 
 tive and unsuccessful. Our own claim to the lion's Til - 
 share, the Yangtse Valley, is admitted by no other 
 Power, and it is doubtful whether the Foreign Office 
 still maintains it. There are several principles which 
 might be adopted if the Powers desired to avoid the 
 jealous and dangerous struggle for concessions. In the 
 first place, the simplest plan and the best would be the 
 adoption of a self-denying ordinance by all the chief 
 competitors. Let it be understood that British, French, 
 and German banks may compete among themselves for 
 railways and loans, but that none of them shall receive 
 any aid or countenance whatever from the embassies or 
 consulates of their respective countries. If that could 
 be decided, the allotment of concessions would be set- 
 tled either by the merits of the competitors or more prob- 
 ably by their skill and audacity in bribing Chinese offi- 
 cials. One may doubt, however, whether any of the 
 Powers has sufficient faith in the honor of its competi- 
 tors to enter on such an undertaking. A second and 
 more hopeful plan might be borrowed from the under- 
 taking negotiated by France and Germany over Morocco. 
 They agreed to promote cooperation among their sub- 
 jects, who were to share in agreed percentages in the 
 coveted opportunities for public works. A vast "pool" 
 or syndicate in which all the rival financial groups were 
 represented, might be left to internationalize all the op- 
 portunities of monopoly in China on a plan which would 
 give to each its allotted share in the risks and profits. 
 The scheme worked badly in Morocco, and indeed created 
 the friction which led to the Agadir incident. Some- 
 thing of the kind existed in China while the alliance of 
 the banks of the Six Powers subsisted, and it eventually 
 broke down. By this method friction may be avoided 
 among the Great Powers, but China would be subjected 
 
 17
 
 p^acl Without 
 destroying 
 
 nationality. 
 
 ^ an intolerable financial dictation, which would be 
 none the less oppressive because it was cosmopolitan. 
 There exists, however, in the Ottoman Public Debt, a 
 model which might be followed elsewhere. Its council 
 represents all the bondholders of every nationality, and 
 usually maintains good relations with the Porte. If the 
 railways of Turkey, China, and Persia could be amal- 
 gamated, each in a single system under a cosmopolitan 
 administration, the risk of partition and all the danger 
 to peace, which this risk entails, might be removed. The 
 obvious step is to confer on these syndicates of capital- 
 ists an international legal personality, which would en- 
 able them to sue or be sued before the Hague Tribunal. 
 Some disinterested council nominated by The Hague 
 should be interposed between the syndicate and the State 
 in which it operates, so that the intervention of diplo- 
 macy may be as far as possible eliminated. 
 
 The problems raised by the export of capital have 
 been considered in this chapter mainly from the stand- 
 point of the creditor State, which sees its diplomacy in- 
 volved in the process. We have found, so far, no solu- 
 tion which is satisfactory from the standpoint of the 
 debtor nation. The inroad of foreign capital always 
 means for it some loss of independence, and it has noth- 
 ing to gain by agreements among competing Empires. 
 It may, indeed, keep its independence by playing on 
 their rivalries. Its shadowy autonomy vanishes when 
 they come to terms. The pacifist and the nationalist 
 are here divided in their sympathies. The former, 
 thinking only of European peace, rejoices when Russia 
 and Britain end their differences by the partition of 
 Persia. The latter, seeing only that a nation has been 
 destroyed, regards the agreement as a peculiarly evil 
 development of Imperialism. Both are right, and both 
 are wrong. The ideal expedient would preserve Euro- 
 
 18
 
 pean peace without destroying the victim nationality. j go 
 To propose that expedient requires an excursion into Doctrine. 
 the realms of Utopian construction. We can propose 
 nothing which seems feasible to-day, but a solution is 
 conceivable which requires only an easy step in the 
 organization of the civilized world for peace. The mo- 
 tives for the partition of Persia were rather political 
 than financial. The object-lesson of Egypt, where the 
 occupation had its origin in debt, is a more typical in- 
 stance of modern processes. It happens that the Hague 
 Conference has laid down a principle which is capable 
 of fruitful extension for dealing with such cases as these. 
 The Drago Doctrine, put forward by Senor Drago, a 
 jurist and statesman of the Argentine Republic, sup- 
 ported by the United States and eventually adopted by 
 all the Powers, provides that no creditor State may 
 use arms to enforce a liability upon a debtor State, un- 
 less a decision of the Hague Tribunal has recognized 
 the liability and prescribed the method of payment. 
 This doctrine, even as it stands, is of immense value to 
 minor but civilized States like the South American re- 
 publics, Portugal and Greece, which may find themselves 
 obliged to defer payment of an external debt. The 
 Hague Tribunal would in such a case, if it realized its 
 opportunities, act as a good County Court Judge would 
 do at home refuse to admit a merely usurious claim, 
 and lay down terms and dates of payment which would 
 admit of the debtor's recovery from any temporary dif- 
 ficulty. 
 
 But to defeat the more unscrupulous methods of the 
 international usurer, this idea requires some amplifica- 
 tion. It may be necessary for a debtor State, some 
 grades below the level of Portugal and Greece in civil- 
 ization, to mortgage some part of its revenues, and to 
 accept, at least over part of them, some degree of foreign 
 
 19
 
 Permanent control. That means, if the creditor country has also 
 Bureau. political ambitions, the almost certain loss of its inde- 
 
 pendence. There are also States like Turkey which 
 stand in need of expert advice for the reorganization 
 of their finances, but dread the consequences of admit- 
 ting any foreigner, who may perhaps think more of the 
 interests of European finance and of his own mother- 
 land, than of those of the country which employs him. 
 To draw the full advantage from the international ma- 
 chinery at The Hague, there ought to be evolved a per- 
 manent Credit Bureau to which weak and timid States 
 might apply. It might conduct enquiries into their sol- 
 vency, lend them experts to reorganize their finances, 
 help them to negotiate loans in neutral markets on fair 
 terms, and in case of need provide the commissioners who 
 would control their mortgaged revenues. It would act 
 as a trustee or as a Court of Chancery towards its wards. 
 It could have no political ambitions to further, and the 
 country which applied to it need not tremble for its 
 independence. Persia or Egypt, had this Bureau ex- 
 isted, might have turned to The Hague for help. If, in 
 the end, owing to civil war, or the hopeless incapacity 
 of native statesmen, forcible intervention became inevit- 
 able, it would lie not with any interested Power, but 
 with The Hague itself, to take the initiative of summon- 
 ing a European Conference to prescribe the nature and 
 limits of the interference. It is even possible that the 
 Bureau might be used as an arbitrator at the request 
 of a State like China, hard pressed by the rivalry of Em- 
 pires competing for concessions, to decide between them 
 in its name, and to appoint a neutral adviser or board of 
 advisers, who would stand between it and the greedy 
 Powers in the allotment of its financial patronage. 
 
 A Europe which has organized itself for peace will 
 be at no loss for expedients wherewith to reconcile th 
 
 20
 
 appetites of capital with the rights of nationality. A f a x j^ f ugt 
 spectator of the moving cosmopolitan drama which is be r a ade 
 played, the world over, around this central motive of humane 
 the export of capital, can readily invent attractive 
 schemes for the regulation of the process. But such ex- 
 ercises tempt one to ignore the dynamics of the problem. 
 The same primitive forces of greed which in earlier cen- 
 turies inspired conquests and migrations are still strong 
 enough to grip diplomacy and build navies. Our first 
 task is to win at home the power to control this export 
 of capital, to check it where it disregards the current 
 ethical standards, to rebuff it where it would lead us into 
 international rivalry, and at last to use it as the potent 
 servant of a humane diplomacy. It can be forbidden to 
 carry the devastations of slavery into distant continents. 
 It can be checked in its usurer's practises upon simple 
 States. It can be used, if it be firmly mastered, to starve 
 into submission a semi-civilized Empire which meditates 
 aggressive war, or draws from Western stores the funds 
 to finance its own oppressions. 
 
 H. N. Brails ford, "The War of Steel and Gold," pp. 
 241-253. 
 
 21
 
 THE PROBLEM OF DIPLOMACY 
 
 The chief 
 problem of 
 diplomacy is 
 the weak 
 State. 
 
 This whole business of jockeying for position is at 
 first glance so incredibly silly that many liberals regard 
 diplomacy as a cross between sinister conspiracy and a 
 meaningless etiquette. It would be all of that if the 
 stakes of diplomacy were not real. Those stakes have to 
 be understood, for without such an understanding diplo- 
 macy is incomprehensible and any scheme of world 
 peace an idle fancy. 
 
 The chief, the overwhelming problem of diplomacy 
 seems to be the weak state the Balkans, the African 
 sultanates, Turkey, China, and Latin America, with the 
 possible exception of the Argentine, Chile, and Brazil. 
 These states are "weak" because they are industrially 
 backward and at present politically incompetent. They 
 are rich in resources and cheap labor, poor in capital, 
 poor in political experience, poor in the power of de- 
 fense. The government of these states is the supreme 
 problem of diplomacy. Just as the chief task of Amer- 
 ican politics to the Civil "War was the organization of 
 the unexploited West, so the chief task of world diplo- 
 macy to-day is the organization of virgin territory and 
 backward peoples. I use backward in the conventional 
 sense to mean a people unaccustomed to modern com- 
 merce and modern political administration. 
 
 This solicitude about backward peoples seems to many 
 
 22
 
 good democrats a combination of superciliousness and 
 
 and the 
 weak g tate 
 
 And yet the plain fact is that the interrelation of 
 peoples has gone so far that to advocate international 
 laissez-faire now is to speak a counsel of despair. Com- 
 mercial cunning, lust of conquest, rum, bibles, rifles, 
 missionaries, traders, concessionaires have brought the 
 two civilizations into contact, and the problem created 
 must be solved, not evaded. 
 
 The great African empires, for example, were not 
 created deliberately by theoretical imperialists. Ex- 
 plorers, missionaries, and traders penetrated these coun- 
 tries. They found rubber, oil, cocoa, tin ; they could sell 
 cotton goods, rifles, liquor. The native rulers bartered 
 away enormous riches at trivial prices. But the trad- 
 ing-posts and the concessions were insecure. There were 
 raids and massacres. No public works existed, no ad- 
 ministrative machinery. The Europeans exploited the 
 natives cruelly, and the natives retaliated. Concession 
 hunters and merchants from other nations began to come 
 in. They bribed and bullied the chiefs, and created still 
 greater insecurity. An appeal would be made to the 
 home government for help, which generally meant de- 
 claring a protectorate of the country. Armed forces 
 were sent in to pacify, and civil servants to administer 
 the country. These protectorates were generally sanc- 
 tioned by the other European governments on the pro- 
 viso that trade should be free to all. . . . 
 
 It is essential to remember that what turns a territory 
 into a diplomatic "problem" is the combination of natu- 
 ral resources, cheap labor, markets, defenselessness, cor- 
 rupt and inefficient government. The desert of Sahara 
 is no " problem, ' ' except where there are oases and trade 
 routes. Switzerland is no "problem," for Switzerland 
 is a highly organized modern state. But Mexico is a 
 
 23
 
 Economic problem, and Haiti, and Turkey, and Persia. They 
 
 penetration * " , * 
 
 into weak have the pretension of political independence which 
 protected they do not fulfil. They are seething with corruption, 
 eaten up with "foreign" concessions, and unable to con- 
 trol the adventurers they attract or safeguard the rights 
 which these adventurers claim. More foreign capital is 
 invested in the United States than in Mexico, but the 
 United States is not a "problem" and Mexico is. The 
 difference was hinted at in President Wilson's speech 
 at Mobile. Foreigners invest in the United States, and 
 they are assured that life will be reasonably safe and 
 that titles to property are secured by orderly legal 
 means. But in Mexico they are given "concessions," 
 which means that they secure extra privileges and run 
 greater risks, and they count upon the support of Eu- 
 ropean governments or of the United States to protect 
 them and their property. 
 
 The weak states, in other words, are those which lack 
 the political development that modern commerce re- 
 quires. To take an extreme case which brings out the 
 real nature of the "problem," suppose that the United 
 States was organized politically as England was in the 
 time of William the Conqueror. Would it not be im- 
 possible to do business in the United States? There 
 would be an everlasting clash between an impossible 
 legal system and a growing commercial development. 
 And the internal affairs of the United States would con- 
 stitute a diplomatic "problem." 
 
 This, it seems to me, is the reason behind the outburst 
 of modern imperialism among the Great Powers. It is 
 not enough to say that they are "expanding" or "seek- 
 ing markets" or "grabbing resources." They are do- 
 ing all these things, of course. But if the world into 
 which they are expanding were not politically archaic, 
 the growth of foreign trade would not be accompanied 
 
 24
 
 by political imperialism. Germany has "expanded" 
 wonderfully in the British Empire, in Russia, in the political 
 United States, but no German is silly enough to insist 
 on planting his flag wherever he sells his dyestuffs or 
 stoves. It is only when his expansion is into weak 
 states into China, Morocco, Turkey, or elsewhere that 
 foreign trade is imperialistic. This imperialism is actu- 
 ated by many motives by a feeling that political con- 
 trol insures special privileges, by a desire to play a large 
 part in the world, by national vanity, by a passion for 
 ' ' ownership, ' ' but none of these motives would come into 
 play if countries like China or Turkey were not politi- 
 cally backward. 
 
 Imperialism in our day begins generally as an attempt 
 to police and pacify. This attempt stimulates national 
 pride, it creates bureaucrats with a vested interest in 
 imperialism, it sucks in and receives added strength 
 from concessionaires and traders who are looking for 
 economic privileges. There is no doubt that certain 
 classes in a nation gain by imperialism, though to the 
 people as a whole the adventure may mean nothing more 
 than an increased burden of taxes. 
 
 Some pacifists have attempted to deny that a nation 
 could ever gain anything by political control of weak 
 states. They have not defined the "nation." What 
 they overlook is that even the most advanced nations are 
 governed, not by the "people," but by groups with 
 special interests. These groups do gain, just as the rail- 
 road men who controlled American legislatures gained. 
 A knot of traders closely in league with the colonial 
 office of a great Power can make a good deal of money 
 out of its friendships. Every government has contracts 
 to be let, franchises to give; it establishes tariffs, fixes 
 railroad rates, apportions taxes, creates public works, 
 builds roads. To be favored by that power is to be 
 
 25
 
 The 
 
 backward 
 States are 
 the arenas of 
 international 
 friction 
 
 favored indeed. The favoritism may cost the mother- 
 land and the colony dear, but the colonial merchant is 
 not a philanthropist. . . . 
 
 The whole situation might be summed up by saying 
 that the commercial development of the world will not 
 wait until each territory has created for itself a stable 
 and fairly modern political system. By some means or 
 other the weak states have to be brought within the 
 framework of commercial administration. Their inde- 
 pendence and integrity, so-called, are dependent upon 
 their creating conditions under which world-wide busi- 
 ness can be conducted. The pressure to organize the 
 globe is enormous. . . . 
 
 Out of this complexity of motive there is created a 
 union of various groups on the imperial program: the 
 diplomatic group is interested primarily in prestige ; the 
 military group in an opportunity to act; the bureau- 
 cratic in the creation of new positions; the financial 
 groups in safeguarding investments; traders in securing 
 protection and privileges, religious groups in civilizing 
 the heathen, the ' ' intellectuals, ' ' in realizing theories of 
 expansion and carrying out "manifest destinies," the 
 people generally in adventure and glory and the sense 
 of being great. These interested groups severally con- 
 trol public opinion, and under modern methods of pub- 
 licity public opinion is easily "educated." 
 
 Who should intervene in backward states, what the 
 intervention shall mean, how the protectorate shall be 
 conducted this is the bone and sinew of modern diplo- 
 macy. The weak spots of the world are the arenas of 
 friction. This friction is increased and made popular 
 by frontier disputes over Alsace-Lorraine or Italia Ir- 
 redenta, but in my judgment the boundary lines of Eu- 
 rope are not the grand causes of diplomatic struggle. 
 Signor Ferrero confessed recently that the present gen- 
 
 26
 
 eration of Italians had all but forgotten Italia Irredenta, w * g a i of 
 and the Kevanche has been a decadent French dream prestige in 
 until the Entente and the Dual Alliance began to clash countries. 6 
 in Morocco, in Turkey, in China. Alsace-Lorraine has 
 no doubt kept alive suspicion of Germany, and predis- 
 posed French opinion to inflicting diplomatic defeats in 
 Morocco. But the arena where the European Powers 
 really measure their strength against each other is in 
 the Balkans, in Africa, and in Asia. . . . 
 
 This war is fought not for specific possessions, but 
 for that diplomatic prestige and leadership which are 
 required to solve all the different problems. It is like 
 a great election to decide who shall have the supreme 
 power in the Concert of Europe. Austria began the 
 contest to secure her position as a great Power in the 
 Balkans; Kussia entered it to thwart this ambition; 
 France was engaged because German diplomatic su- 
 premacy would reduce France to a "second-class 
 power," which means a power that holds world power 
 on sufferance; England could not afford to see France 
 "crushed" or Belgium annexed because British impe- 
 rialism cannot alone cope with the vigor of Germany; 
 Germany felt herself "encircled," which meant that 
 wherever she went to Morocco, Asia Minor, or China 
 there a coalition was ready to thwart her. The ultimate 
 question involved was this : whenever in the future diplo- 
 mats meet to settle a problem in the backward countries, 
 which European nation shall be listened to most ear- 
 nestly? What shall be the relative prestige of Germans 
 and Englishmen and Frenchmen and Russians; what 
 sense of their power, what historical halo, what threat 
 of force, what stimulus to admiration shall they possess? 
 To lose this war will be like being a Republican poli- 
 tician in the solid South when the Democrats are in 
 
 27
 
 ^obiem is power at Washington. It will mean political, social, 
 
 due to com- and economic inferiority. 
 
 unorgTnizId Americans have every reason to understand the dan- 
 gers of unorganized territory, to realize clearly why it 
 is a ' ' problem. ' ' Our Civil War was preceded by thirty 
 or forty years of diplomatic struggle for a balance of 
 power in the West. Should the West be slave or free, 
 that is, should it be the scene of homesteads and free 
 labor, or of plantations and slaves? Should it be formed 
 into States which sent senators and representatives to 
 support the South or the North? We were virtually 
 two nations, each trying to upset the balance of power 
 in its own favor. And when the South saw that it was 
 beaten, that is to say ' ' encircled, ' ' when its place in the 
 Western sun was denied, the South seceded and fought. 
 Until the problem or organizing the West had been set- 
 tled, peace and federal union were impossible. 
 
 The world's problem is the same problem tremen- 
 dously magnified and complicated. 
 
 The point I have been making will, I fear, seem a par- 
 adox to many readers, that the anarchy of the world 
 is due to the backwardness of weak states ; that the mod- 
 ern nations have lived in an armed peace and collapsed 
 into hideous warfare because in Asia, Africa, the Bal- 
 kans, Central and South America there are rich terri- 
 tories in which weakness invites exploitation, in which 
 inefficiency and corruption invite imperial expansion, 
 in which the prizes are so great that the competition 
 for them is to the knife. 
 
 This is the world problem upon which all schemes for 
 arbitration, leagues of peace, reduction of armaments 
 must prove themselves. The diplomats have in general 
 recognized this. It was commonly said for a generation 
 that Europe would be lucky if it escaped a general war 
 over the breakup of Turkey in Europe. The Sick Man 
 
 28
 
 has infected the Continent. Our own "preparedness" European 
 campaign is based on the fear that the defenselessness {^"'"^t 
 of Latin America will invite European aggression, that problem, 
 the defenselessness of China will bring on a struggle in 
 the Pacific. Few informed people imagine for a mo- 
 ment that any nation of the world contemplates seizing 
 or holding our own territory. That would be an ad- 
 venture so ridiculous that no statesman would think of 
 it. If we get into trouble it will be over some place like 
 Mexico, or Haiti, or the Philippines, or the Panama 
 Canal, or Manchuria, or Hawaii. . . . 
 
 Europe has also recognized that some kind of world 
 government must be created. The phrase world gov- 
 ernment, of course, arouses immediate opposition; the 
 idea of a European legislature would be pronounced 
 Utopian. Yet there have been a number of European 
 legislatures. The Berlin Conference of 1885 was called 
 to discuss "freedom of commerce in the basin and 
 mouths of the Congo; application to the Congo and 
 Niger of the principles adopted at the Congress of Vi- 
 enna with a view to preserve freedom of navigation on 
 certain international rivers . . . and a definition of 
 formalities to be observed so that new occupations on 
 the African coasts shall be deemed effective." The 
 Powers represented made all sorts of reservations, but 
 they managed to pass a ' ' General Act of the West Afri- 
 can Conference." The Congo Free State was recog- 
 nized. As Mr. Harris says: "Bismarck saw in this a 
 means of preventing armed conflict over the Congo Ba- 
 sin, of restricting the Portuguese advance, and of pre- 
 serving the region to free trade." What was it that 
 Bismarck saw? He saw that the great wealth of the 
 Congo and its political weakness might make trouble in 
 Europe unless the Congo was organized into the legal 
 structure of the world. 
 
 29
 
 Conference at Algeciras was an international 
 legislature in which even the United States was repre- 
 sented; the London Conference after the Balkan wars 
 was a gathering of ambassadors trying to legislate out 
 of existence the sources of European trouble in the Bal- 
 kans. But all these legislatures have had one great 
 fault. They met, they passed laws, they adjourned, and 
 left the enforcement of their mandate to the conscience 
 of the individual Powers. The legislature was interna- 
 tional, but the executive was merely national. The leg- 
 islature moreover had no way of checking up or control- 
 ling the executive. The representatives of all the na- 
 tions would pass laws for the government of weak ter- 
 ritories, but the translation of those laws into practise 
 was left to the colonial bureaucrats of some one nation. 
 
 If the law was not carried out, to whom would an 
 appeal be made? Not to the Conference, for it had 
 ceased to exist. There was no way in which a European 
 legislature could recall the officials who did not obey its 
 will. Those officials were responsible to their home 
 government, although they were supposed to be execut- 
 ing a European mandate. Those who were injured had 
 also to appeal to their home government, and the only 
 way to remedy an abuse or even sift out the truth of 
 an allegation was by negotiation between the Powers. 
 This raised the question of their sovereignty, called 
 forth patriotic feeling, revived a thousand memories, 
 and made any satisfactory interpretation of the Euro- 
 pean Act or any criticism of its administration a highly 
 explosive adventure. 
 
 Suppose, for example, that Congress had power to 
 pass laws, but that the execution of them was left to the 
 States. Suppose New York had its own notions of tariff 
 administration. How would the other States compel the 
 New York customs officials to execute the spirit and let- 
 
 30
 
 ter of the Federal law? Suppose every criticism by 
 Pennsylvania of a New York Collector was regarded as senate for 
 
 A * ik. T TT 19 it 6RCn AF6nft 
 
 an infringement of New York s sovereignty, as a blow of friction, 
 at New York's pride, what kind of chaos would we suf- 
 fer from? Yet that is the plight of our world society. 
 
 The beginnings of a remedy would seem to lie in not 
 disbanding these European conferences when they have 
 passed a law. They ought to continue in existence as a 
 kind of senate, meeting from time to time. They ought 
 to regard themselves as watchers over the legislation 
 which they have passed. To them could be brought 
 grievances, by them amendments could be passed when 
 needed. The colonial officials should at least be made to 
 report to this senate, and all important matters of policy 
 should be laid open to its criticism and suggestion. In 
 this way a problem like that of Morocco, for example, 
 might be kept localized to a permanent European Con- 
 ference on Morocco. Europe would never lose its grip 
 on the situation, because it would have representatives 
 on the spot watching the details of administration, in a 
 position to learn the facts, and with a real opportunity 
 for stating grievances. 
 
 The development of such a senate would probably be 
 towards an increasing control of colonial officials. At 
 first it would have no power of appointment or removal. 
 It would be limited to criticism. But it is surely not 
 fantastic to suppose that the colonial civil service would 
 in time be internationalized; that is to say, opened to 
 men of different nationalities. The senate, if it devel- 
 oped any traditions, would begin to supervise the bud- 
 get, would fight for control of salaries, and might well 
 take over the appointing power altogether. It would 
 become an upper house for the government of the pro- 
 tected territory, not essentially different perhaps from 
 the American Philippine Commission. The lower house 
 
 31
 
 Preyention 
 of war by 
 international 
 commissions 
 for unorgan- 
 ized regions. 
 
 would be native, and there would probably be a minority 
 of natives in the senate. . . . 
 
 An organization of this kind would meet all the diffi- 
 culties that our Continental Congress or that any other 
 primitive legislature has had to deal with. There would 
 be conflicts of jurisdiction, puzzling questions of inter- 
 pretation, and some place of final appeal would have to 
 be provided. It might be the Senate of European rep- 
 resentatives; but if the Senate deadlocked, an appeal 
 might be taken to The Hague. The details of all this 
 are obviously speculative at the moment. 
 
 The important point is that there should be in exist- 
 ence permanent international commissions to deal with 
 those spots of the earth where world crises originate. 
 How many there should be need not be suggested here. 
 There should have been one for Morocco, for the Congo, 
 for the Balkan Peninsula, perhaps for Manchuria ; there 
 may have to be one for Constantinople, for certain coun- 
 tries facing the Caribbean Sea. Such international gov- 
 erning bodies are needed wherever the prizes are great, 
 the territory unorganized, and the competition active. 
 
 The idea is not over-ambitious. It seems to me the 
 necessary development of schemes which European diplo- 
 macy has been playing with for some time. It repre- 
 sents an advance along the line that governments, driven 
 by necessity, have been taking of their own accord. 
 What makes it especially plausible is that it grasps the 
 real problems of diplomacy, that it provides not a pana- 
 cea but a method and the beginnings of a technique. It 
 is internationalism, not spread thin as a Parliament of 
 Man, but sharply limited to those areas of friction where 
 internationalism is most obviously needed. 
 
 Walter Lippmann, 
 87-135. 
 
 'The Stakes of Diplomacy/' pp. 
 
 32
 
 SOCIALISTS AND IMPERIALISM 
 Possibly we shall learn nothing from the war ; at Peace 
 
 impossible 
 
 the present moment it looks that way. For all the without 
 world, including Socialists, seem to be divided between eco^oSfic 
 militarists and pacifists. By pacifism I mean of course confllcts - 
 the movement Socialists have attacked for fifty years 
 up to the present war under the name of "bourgeois 
 pacifism," the idea that disarmament, the Hague Trib- 
 unal, and similar devices could put an end to militarism 
 and war. 
 
 In one sense of course every internationalist, whether 
 Socialist or Democrat, is a pacifist. Every internation- 
 alist is opposed to war. But from the days of Marx 
 and before, up to the present time, all Socialists have 
 been prepared for certain war-producing contingencies 
 which can be abolished neither by calling them "illu- 
 sions," as Norman Angell has done, nor by any other 
 phrases or exorcisms. Nor can the economic causes of 
 national conflict be avoided by disarmament, Hague 
 tribunals, international police, or abolition of secret di- 
 plomacy, as proposed by the Women's Peace Party, the 
 British Union of Democratic Control, the Independent 
 Labor Party, etc. In a word, no measure dealing with 
 military affairs or with mere political forms can in the 
 long run have any effect whatever as long as the pres- 
 ent conflict of economic interests between the nations 
 remains. The whole effort of the bourgeois pacifist from 
 
 33
 
 ofnations *^ e Socialist standpoint is to attempt in spite of the 
 do conflict. horrible and tremendous lessons of the present war to 
 close our eyes resolutely to the great task that lies before 
 us, namely, to find a way either in the near future or 
 ultimately to bring the conflict of national economic 
 interests to an end. 
 
 There are two economic forces in the world which can 
 not be conjured away either by words, by mere political 
 rearrangements, or by any action whatever with regard 
 to arms whether making for more armament or less 
 armament. There is no power at present which can 
 prevent a great independent nation like Russia or Japan, 
 Germany or Austria, where the political conditions are 
 in whole or in part those of the eighteenth century, from 
 declaring wars of conquest either against helpless, back- 
 ward or small countries, or against the economically 
 more advanced and more democratic countries like Eng- 
 land, France, or the United States. It is true that in- 
 dustrial capitalism now preponderates in Germany, but 
 no German publicist has ever denied the tremendous in- 
 fluence of the landlord nobility, both over the govern- 
 ment and over the economic and political structure of 
 German society. It is true also that these great agri- 
 cultural estates are partially operated under capitalistic 
 conditions, but the position of agricultural labor through- 
 out enormous districts of Prussia is certainly semi- 
 feudal. This is equally true of Austria, and the land- 
 lord nobility is perhaps even more predominant in Hun- 
 gary than in Prussia. 
 
 The second fact which can not be conjured away by 
 phrases or mere political rearrangements is that under 
 the present system of society there is a direct conflict 
 of interests between all nations, even the most civilized. 
 This is why Norman Angell, in his new book ("Arms 
 and Industry"), is at such great pains to deny that na- 
 
 34
 
 tions are economic units and "competing business ^rkers 
 firms." His denial is futile. gain from 
 
 n 3 T -i T ' ii-i successful 
 
 Even under individualistic capitalism all elements of imperialism, 
 the capitalist class have a greater or less interest in the 
 business of the nation to which they belong; under the 
 State Socialist policy, which is spreading everywhere, 
 this community of interests is still closer. Moreover, 
 under State Socialism even the working classes gain a 
 share (of course, a small one) of whatever profits accrue 
 from the successful competition of one's own nation 
 with other nations, and especially from such competition 
 in its aggressive form, "imperialism." 
 
 Socialists have sometimes denied that the economic 
 interests of the working people of the various nations 
 conflict. 
 
 Otto Bauer, of Austria, the world's leading Socialist 
 authority on Imperialism who was to report on the sub- 
 ject for the International Socialist Congress to have been 
 held in Vienna last summer is of the contrary opinion. 
 He believes that one of the worst features of the present 
 system is that, under capitalism, the immediate economic 
 interests of the working people of the various nations do 
 conflict. 
 
 Only in so far as the working people attach greater 
 importance to attaining Socialism than to anything they 
 can gain under the present society, are their interests in 
 all nations the same. In so far as the working people 
 aim at an improvement of their condition this side of 
 Socialism their economic interests are often in conflict. 
 
 Moreover, State Socialism, political democracy, and 
 social reform, since they tend to give the working people 
 a slightly greater share in the prosperity of each nation, 
 intensify the workers' nationalism and aggravate the 
 conflict of immediate economic interests. This is why 
 all the labor union parties of the world are tending in 
 
 35
 
 Only solution the same direction, as that in which the German Party 
 
 is industrial 
 
 and financial has been so clearly headed since the war a tendency 
 aiization. very clearly formulated by Vorwaerts when it recently 
 
 asked whether the German Party was not becoming a 
 "nationalistic social reform labor party." 
 
 The bourgeois pacifists consider war to be the "great 
 illusion." In favoring war, under any conditions, they 
 say, the capitalists, the middle classes, and the working 
 classes are all mistaken. The only people that gain are 
 the officers of armies and navies, and armament manu- 
 facturers. It is needless for Socialists believers in the 
 economic interpretation of politics to point out that 
 such a conclusion can only be reached by an abandon- 
 ment of the economic point of view. 
 
 In the opinion of internationalists, war can be abol- 
 ished neither by armament or disarmament, nor by any 
 measures leading in either direction. War can be 
 abolished only by abolishing the causes of war, which 
 every practical man admits are economic. By strength- 
 ening already existing and natural economic tendencies 
 which are slowly bringing the nations together, the 
 causes of war may be gradually done away with. 
 
 The outlook therefore is very hopeful provided the 
 intelligent (if selfish) ruling classes of the great capital- 
 istic nations (England, France, America) decide once 
 and for all to place no hopes either on militarism or 
 pacifism. These natural economic tendencies indeed 
 would already have made war impossible if they had not 
 been impeded by artificial obstacles, such as tariff walls, 
 immigration restriction, financial concessions to favored 
 nations, etc. 
 
 Socialists relied upon natural economic forces to 
 abolish competition, establish the trusts, bring about 
 government ownership, and prepare the way for demo- 
 cratic ownership. They rely upon similar economic 
 
 36
 
 forces to bring the nations together; reciprocal lower- ^ t ^ a d 
 ing of tariffs, the common development of the backward undemocratic 
 
 , . ,. countries. 
 
 countries by the leading nations, the neutralization of 
 canals and last but not least, the modernization of Rus- 
 sia, Japan, Prussia, and Austria, that is, the full estab- 
 lishment in these countries of industrial capitalism and 
 the semi-democratic political institutions that accompany 
 it as we see them in Great Britain, France, and 
 America. 
 
 William English Walling, "The Great Illusions," 
 The New Review, June 1, 1915. 
 
 37
 
 THE HIGHER IMPERIALISM 
 
 Cause of When the Socialists in the belligerent countries voted 
 
 fould in for the war budgets and took their seats in the war cab- 
 
 motlvM 1 : inets, their whole attitude towards war underwent a 
 fundamental change. It is true that in Germany and 
 elsewhere the Socialists berated the capitalists and mil- 
 itarists for bringing on the conflict, but having made 
 this protest, they acted exactly as did every one else. 
 They excused themselves on the ground that the war was 
 defensive. But the Kaiser and the Czar and the Presi- 
 dent of the French Republic all made the same excuse. 
 It was not that the Socialists did not have power to put 
 obstacles in the way of their governments. They did 
 not have the will. They were forced into a painful posi- 
 tion, where their love of country struggled against their 
 adherence to the proletariat of the world. Despite 
 themselves they were moved by idealistic considerations, 
 which according to their theory should have had no 
 weight. 
 
 For according to socialist doctrine the great events of 
 the world are determined by economic factors. The 
 idealists may speak of national honor and national duty, 
 of the inviolability of treaties and the sacred rights of 
 small nations, but the cause of all wars is really to be 
 traced to the clash of economic motives. If we are to 
 establish peace, we must found it on the customary reac- 
 tions of selfish men, who want things and are willing 
 to fight for them. Peace must be a peace between men 
 
 38
 
 aa they are. It will not come by preaching, nor by na- 
 
 tions surrendering their ambitions. It will not come of nationalist 
 
 . , , ... /. i capitalistic 
 
 through non-resistance, through the submission of the groups, 
 meek to the overbearing. It will not come through the 
 nations joyously disarming as the light of reason breaks 
 through the clouds. Reason is not so simple nor so un- 
 related a thing, for the material things that each nation 
 wants, and the means by which the nation gets them, 
 seem to the nation preeminently just and reasonable. 
 However pompous the superstructure of ethics and 
 ideals, the solid foundation of war, as of other social 
 developments, is economic. So long as nations, or at 
 all events their ruling groups, have conflicting economic 
 interests, war is inevitable. 
 
 According to the Socialist, therefore, war and capital- 
 ism were inseparable. War must continue so long as 
 the wage-system continued. The argument was simple. 
 The great owners of capital, earning more than they 
 could consume or profitably invest in home industries, 
 were compelled to send their surplus to colonies and de- 
 pendencies, where a new profit could be made. With 
 the rapid increase of capital, however, the competition 
 between the industrial nations for the possession of these 
 agricultural dependencies became keener. Such com- 
 petition meant war. As capitalism approached its cli- 
 max wars were bound to become more frequent, destruc- 
 tive, and violent. 
 
 If this theory had been true it would have followed 
 that the interests of capital would make for war and 
 the interests of labor would make for peace. The day 
 laborer, with no money in the bank, would not be inter- 
 ested in capital investments in Morocco, Manchuria, or 
 Asia Minor. He would have no national interests what- 
 ever. But, as we may read in the admirable book on 
 "Socialists and the War," by William English Walling, 
 
 39
 
 But now 
 competitive 
 imperialism 
 makes way 
 for imperial- 
 ism by com- 
 bination. 
 
 a few Socialists have for some time begun to recognize 
 that wage-earners do have special national interests and 
 that these interests may be directly opposed to the in- 
 terests of wage-earners in an adjoining country. If 
 Serbia is completely shut off from the sea, her wage- 
 earners suffer as acutely as do her peasants. If Swit- 
 zerland is surrounded by a wall of hostile tariffs, if Hol- 
 land and England are deprived of their colonies, the 
 loss is felt not only by great capitalists but by the man 
 who works with a trowel or a lathe. The ultimate in- 
 terests of German and British wage-earners are identical, 
 but if their immediate interests conflict, there will grow 
 up a spirit of nationalism in both countries, and wage- 
 earners will clamor for a national policy which may 
 lead to war. 
 
 This seems to shut a door that leads to peace. But in 
 shutting this door the newer Socialist thought has opened 
 another. It assumes that the capitalists! themselves are 
 increasingly likely to profit by peace, to desire peace, 
 and to achieve peace. According to the German Social- 
 ist, Karl Kautsky, we are approaching a new stage in 
 the industrial development of the world. At first cap- 
 italists exploited the resources of their own country. 
 Then they competed nationally for the exploitation of 
 colonies and dependencies, and this policy led to im- 
 perialism and war. Now they are beginning to unite 
 for the joint exploitation of all backward lands. Com- 
 petitive imperialism is making way for imperialism by 
 combination, just as competitive industry gave way to 
 the trust. English, French, German, and Belgian cap- 
 italists will unite to exploit dependencies, will have joint 
 spheres of influence, and the result will be peace with 
 profits. Imperialism in the old sense will die out, and 
 its place will be taken by a pacific super-imperialism, 
 a higher imperialism. 
 
 40
 
 What this theory actually means is that the normal de- 
 velopment of industry and finance will automatically imperialism 
 bring about international peace, and that socialism and with 
 even democracy are quite unessential to that end. So- 
 cialists may cry for peace, but they might as well 
 cry for free air. But the theory concedes too much 
 and goes too far. It is tainted with the same ultra- 
 rationalistic spirit as is the earlier socialist theory, from 
 which it is a reaction. War is not fought for economic 
 motives alone, although these are important. Serbia 
 would have been less vindictive had Austria conceded 
 her an outlet for her trade, but in any case Serbia would 
 not willingly be ruled by Austria, nor Bulgaria by 
 Greece. Racial pride, religious prejudice, ancient tradi- 
 tions of all sorts still divide nations irrespective of eco- 
 nomic interest. You cannot reduce a nation to a single 
 unit thinking only in economic terms. 
 
 Moreover, even on the purely economic side there are 
 infinite chances for war in the distribution of the profits 
 of joint enterprises among the capitalists of the various 
 nations. We all know how "gentlemen's agreements" 
 are broken as soon as it is profitable for the gentlemen 
 to break them, and we cannot wholly trust irresponsible 
 magnates, whether industrial or political, to be even in- 
 telligently selfish. Moreover, in the present state of the 
 world the higher imperialism is a policy fraught with the 
 very dangers and difficulties which it seeks to evade. 
 If the capitalists of Europe were determined to exploit 
 South America under a joint European control, the de- 
 cision might directly lead to war. There are too many 
 vested national interests in colonies, dependencies and 
 spheres of influence to make internationalization of in- 
 vestment an immediate specific against war. 
 
 But in this matter of the higher imperialism we are 
 less concerned to know how false than how true it is. 
 
 41
 
 vestment 
 one step 
 
 It is a thing to be desired if it circumscribes war, even 
 though it does not end war, if it tends towards peace, 
 even though it does not by itself alone assure peace. 
 We believe that this present war is not unlikely to end 
 in a combination of great nations with enormous capital, 
 willing to enter upon foreign investments jointly. The 
 great capitalists, who influence if they do not rule our 
 modern industrial nations, will often discover that it 
 is cheaper to divide than to fight. It will be better to 
 have twenty per cent, of a Chinese loan without going to 
 war than thirty per cent. or nothing at all after a 
 war. They will strive for the peace of "understanding" 
 the peace of give and take. 
 
 If the big speculators can thus merge their interests 
 and deal across national boundaries, the little investors 
 who have less to gain and more to lose by war will be 
 even more pacific. Farmers and wage-earners have a 
 still more attenuated interest in war, and a still more 
 obvious interest in peace. Once great liens of peace are 
 established, moreover, many of the incitements to war 
 will of themselves disappear. . . . 
 
 In the end, however, any internationalization of in- 
 vestment will be only a single step in the direction of 
 peace. There are many other steps to be taken. Edu- 
 cation, commerce, the development of an international 
 morality, the creation of machinery for dealing with 
 international disputes, are all essential to the evolution 
 of peace. Industrial and political democracy are above 
 all necessary. Men must be given a full life and a real 
 stake in the wealth that peace provides, and they who 
 bear the burdens of war must actually determine the 
 national policies which make for war or peace. 
 
 The New Republic, June 5, 1915. 
 
 42
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE SETTLEMENT: 
 POLITICAL 
 
 NATIONALITY AND THE FUTURE 
 
 For the first time in our lives, we find ourselves in wrhas 
 complete uncertainty as to the future. To uncivilized ourcon 6 
 people the situation is commonplace; but in twentieth- 
 century Europe we are accustomed to look ahead, to 
 forecast accurately what lies before us, and then to 
 choose our path and follow it steadily to its end; and 
 we rightly consider that this is the characteristic of 
 civilized men. The same ideal appears in every side of 
 our life: in the individual's morality as a desire for 
 "Independence" strong enough to control most human 
 passions: in our Economics as Estimates and Insur- 
 ances: in our Politics as a great sustained concentration 
 of all our surplus energies (in which parties are becom- 
 ing increasingly at one in aim and effort, while their 
 differences are shrinking to alternatives of method), to 
 raise the material, moral, and intellectual standard of 
 life throughout the nation. From all this fruitful, con- 
 structive, exacting work, which demands the best from 
 us and makes us the better for giving it, we have been 
 violently wrenched away and plunged into a struggle 
 for existence with people very much like ourselves, with 
 whom we have no quarrel. 
 
 "We must face the fact that this is pure evil, and that 
 we cannot escape it. We must fight with all our 
 
 43
 
 strength : every particle of our energy must be absorbed 
 in the war: and meanwhile our social construction must 
 stand still indefinitely, or even be in part undone, and 
 every class and individual in the country must suffer in 
 their degree, according to the quite arbitrary chance of 
 war, in lives horribly destroyed and work ruined. . . . 
 
 The psychological devastation of war is even more ter- 
 rible than the material. War brings the savage sub- 
 stratum of human character to the surface, after it has 
 swept away the strong habits that generations of civil- 
 ized effort have built up. We saw how the breath of 
 war in Ireland demoralized all parties alike. We have 
 met the present more ghastly reality with admirable 
 calmness; but we must be on our guard. Time wears 
 out nerves, and War inevitably brings with it the sug- 
 gestion of certain obsolete points of view, which in our 
 real, normal life, have long been buried and forgotten. 
 
 It rouses the instinct of revenge. ''If Germany has 
 hurt us, we will hurt her more to teach her not to 
 do it again." The wish is the savage's automatic reac- 
 tion, the reason his perfunctory justification of it: but 
 the civilized man knows that the impulse is hopelessly 
 unreasonable. The "hurt" is being at war, and the 
 evil we wish to ban is the possibility of being at war 
 again, because war prevents us working out our own 
 lives as we choose. If we beat Germany and then hu- 
 miliate her, she will never rest till she has "redeemed 
 her honor," by humiliating us more cruelly in turn. 
 Instead of being free to return to our own pressing 
 business, we shall have to be constantly on the watch 
 against her. Two great nations will sit idle, weapon 
 in hand, like two Afghans in their loopholed towers 
 when the blood feud is between them; and we shall 
 have sacrificed deliberately and to an ever-increasing 
 extent (for the blood feud grows by geometrical pro- 
 
 44
 
 gression), the very freedom for which we are now giving 
 our lives. 
 
 Another war instinct is plunder. "War is often the sav- 
 age 's profession: " 'With my sword, spear and shield 
 I plow, I sow, I reap, I gather in the vintage.' If we 
 beat Germany our own mills and factories will have 
 been at a standstill, our horses requisitioned and our 
 crops unharvested, our merchant steamers stranded in 
 dock if not sunk on the high seas, and our 'blood and 
 treasure' lavished on the war: but in the end Germany's 
 wealth will be in our grasp, her colonies, her markets, 
 and such floating riches as we can distrain upon by 
 means of an indemnity. If we have had to beat our 
 plowshares into swords, we can at least draw some profit 
 from the new tool, and recoup ourselves partially for 
 the inconvenience. It is no longer a question of irra- 
 tional, impulsive revenge, perhaps not even of sweeten- 
 ing our sorrow by a little gain. To draw on the life- 
 blood of German wealth may be the only way to re- 
 plenish the veins of our exhausted Industry and Com- 
 merce." So the plunder instinct might be clothed in 
 civilized garb : ' ' War, ' ' we might express it, " is an in- 
 vestment that must bring in its return." 
 
 The first argument against this point of view is that 
 it has clearly been the inspiring idea of Germany's 
 policy, and history already shows that armaments are 
 as unbusinesslike a speculation for civilized countries 
 as war is an abnormal occupation for civilized men. 
 We saw the effect of the Morocco tension upon German 
 finance in 1911, and the first phase of the present war 
 has been enough to show how much Germany's com- 
 merce will inevitably suffer, whether she wins or loses. 
 
 It is only when all the armaments are on one side and 
 all the wealth is on the other, that war pays; when, in 
 fact, an armed savage attacks a civilized man possessed 
 
 45
 
 flghVfor ^ no arms f r tne protection of his wealth. Our Af- 
 
 tradeno ghans in their towers are sharp enough not to steal 
 
 pays. each other's cows (supposing they possess any of their 
 
 own) for cows do not multiply by being exchanged, and 
 both Afghans would starve in the end after wasting all 
 their bullets in the skirmish. They save their bullets 
 to steal cows from the plainsmen who cannot make re- 
 prisals. 
 
 If Germany were really nothing but a " nation in 
 arms," successful war might be as lucrative for her as 
 an Afghan's raid on the plain, but she is normally a 
 great industrial community like ourselves. In the last 
 generation she has achieved a national growth of which 
 she is justly proud. Like our own, it has been entirely 
 social and economic. Her goods have been peacefully 
 conquering the world's markets. Now her workers have 
 been diverted en masse from their prospering industry 
 to conquer the same markets by military force, and the 
 whole work of forty years is jeopardized by the change 
 of method. 
 
 Fighting for trade and industry is not like fighting 
 for cattle. Cattle are driven from one fastness to an- 
 other, and if no better, are at least no worse for the 
 transit. Civilized wealth perishes on the way. Our 
 economic organization owes its power and range to the 
 marvelous forethought and cooperation that has built 
 it up; but the most delicate organisms are the most 
 easily dislocated, and the conqueror, whether England 
 or Germany, will have to realize that, though he may 
 seem to have got the wealth of the conquered into his 
 grip, the total wealth of both parties will have been 
 vastly diminished by the process of the struggle. 
 
 The characteristic feature of modern wealth is that 
 it is international. Economic gain and loss is shared 
 by the whole world, and the shifting of the economic 
 
 46
 
 balance does not correspond to the moves in the game of 
 diplomatists and armies. Germany's economic growth 
 has been a phenomenon quite independent of her polit- compromise 
 ical ambitions, and Germany 's economic ruin would com- 
 promise something far greater than Germany's political 
 future the whole world's prosperity. British wealth, 
 among the rest, would be dealt a deadly wound by Ger- 
 many's economic death, and it would be idle to pump 
 Germany's last life-blood into our veins, if we were au- 
 tomatically draining them of our own blood in the 
 process. 
 
 But issues greater than the economic are involved. 
 The modern "Nation" is for good or ill an organism 
 one and indivisible, and all the diverse branches of 
 national activity flourish or wither with the whole na- 
 tional well-being. You cannot destroy German wealth 
 without paralyzing German intellect and art, and Eu- 
 ropean civilization, if it is to go on growing, cannot do 
 without them. Every doctor and musician, every sci- 
 entist, engineer, political economist and historian, knows 
 well his debt to the spiritual energy of the German na- 
 tion. In the moments when one realizes the full horror 
 of what is happening, the worst thought is the aimless 
 hurling to destruction of the world's only true wealth, 
 the skill and nobility and genius of human beings, and 
 it is probably in the German casualties that the intel- 
 lectual world is suffering its most irreparable human 
 losses. 
 
 "With these facts in our minds, we can look into the 
 future more clearly, and choose our policy (supposing 
 that we win the war, and, thereby, the power to choose) 
 with greater confidence. "We have accepted the fact 
 that war itself is evil, and will in any event bring pure 
 loss to both parties: that no good can come from the 
 war itself, but only from our policy when the war is 
 
 47
 
 over: and that the one good our policy can achieve, 
 without which every gain is delusive, is the banishing of 
 this evil from the realities of the future. This is our 
 one supreme "British interest," and it is a German 
 interest just as much, and an interest of the whole world. 
 
 This war, and the cloud of war that has weighed 
 upon us so many years before the bursting of the 
 storm, has brought to bankruptcy the ' ' National State. ' ' 
 Till 1870 it was the ultimate ideal of European politics, 
 as it is still in the Balkans, where the Turk has broken 
 Time's wings. It was such a fruitful ideal that it has 
 rapidly carried us beyond itself, and in the last genera- 
 tion the life of the world has been steadily finding new 
 and wider channels. In the crisis of change from na- 
 tionalism to internationalism we were still exposed to the 
 plague of war. The crisis might have been passed with- 
 out it, and war banished for ever between the nations of 
 civilized Europe. Now that the catastrophe has hap- 
 pened (it is childish to waste energy in incriminations 
 against its promoters) we must carry through the change 
 completely and at once: we cannot possibly afford to 
 be exposed to the danger again. 
 
 No tool, machine, or idea made by men has an im- 
 mortal career. Sooner or later they all run amuck, 
 and begin to do evil instead of good. At that stage 
 savage or unskilful men destroy them by force and re- 
 place them by their opposite: civilized men get them 
 under control, and build them into something new and 
 greater. Nationality will sink from being the pinnacle 
 of politics only to become their foundation, and till the 
 foundations are laid true, further building is impossible. 
 But the bases of nationality have never yet been laid 
 true in Europe. When we say that " nationality was 
 the political ideal of the nineteenth century," and that 
 1870 left the populations of Europe organized in na- 
 
 48
 
 tional groups, we are taking far too complacent a view Nationalism 
 of historical facts. The same century that produced a 
 united Italy and Germany, saw out the whole tragedy 
 of Poland, from the first partition in 1772 to the last 
 revolt in 1863. Human ideas do not spring into the 
 world full-grown and shining like Athena: they trail 
 the infection of evil things from the past. 
 
 In the Dark Ages Europe's most pressing need and 
 only practicable ideal was strong government. Strong 
 government came with its blessings, but it brought the 
 evil of territorial ambitions. The Duke of Burgundy 
 spent the wealth of his Netherland subjects in trying 
 to conquer the Swiss mountaineers. Burgundy suc- 
 cumbed to the king of France. But the very factor 
 that made the French kings survive in the struggle for 
 existence between governments, the force of compact 
 nationality which the French kingdom happened to con- 
 tain, delivered the inheritance of the kings to the Nation. 
 
 The French Nation in the Revolution burst the chrys- 
 alis of irresponsible government beneath which it had 
 grown to organic life, but like a true heir it took over 
 the Royal Government's ideal: "Peace within and pi- 
 racy without." France had already begun aggression 
 abroad before she had accomplished self-government at 
 home, and in delivering herself to Napoleon she sacri- 
 ficed her liberty to her ambition. Napoleon's only en- 
 during achievements outside France were the things he 
 set himself to prevent, the realization, by a forceful re- 
 action against force, of German and Italian nationality. 
 Nationalism was converted to violence from the outset, 
 and the struggle for existence between absolute govern- 
 ments has merely been replaced by a struggle between 
 nationalities, equally blind, haphazard, and non-moral, 
 but far more terrific, just because the virtue of self- 
 government is to focus and utilize human energy so 
 
 49
 
 Intra- 
 national 
 oppression 
 has been 
 a chief 
 cause 
 of war. 
 
 much more effectively than the irresponsible government 
 it has superseded. 
 
 Naturally the result of this planless strife has been no 
 grouping of Europe on a just and reasonable national 
 basis. France and England, achieving racial frontiers 
 and national self-government early, inherited the Earth 
 before Germany and Italy struggled up beside them, 
 to take their leavings of markets and colonial areas. 
 But the government that united Germany had founded 
 its power on the partition of Poland, and in the second 
 Balkan War of 1913 we saw a striking example of the 
 endless chain of evil forged by an act of national in- 
 justice. 
 
 The Hungarians used the liberty they won in 1867 
 to subject the Slavonic population between themselves 
 and the sea, and prevent its union with the free prin- 
 cipality of Serbia of the same Slavonic nationality. 
 This drove Serbia in 1912 to follow Hungary's exam- 
 ple by seizing the coast of the non-Slavonic Albanians; 
 and when Austria-Hungary prevented this (a right act 
 prompted by most unrighteous motives), Serbia fought 
 an unjust war with Bulgaria and subjected a large Bul- 
 garian population, in order to gain access to the only 
 seaboard left her, the friendly Greek port of Salonika. 
 
 Hungary and Serbia are nominally national states: 
 but more than half the population in Hungary, and per- 
 haps nearly a quarter in Serbia, is alien, only held 
 within the state by force against its will. The energy 
 of both states is perverted to the futile and demoraliz- 
 ing work of "Magy arizing" and "Serbizing" subject 
 foreign populations, and they have not even been suc- 
 cessful. The resistance of Southern Slav nationalism on 
 the defensive to the aggression of Hungarian nation- 
 alism has given the occasion for the present catastrophe. 
 
 The evil element in nationalism under its many names, 
 
 50
 
 "Chauvinism," "Jingoism," " Prussianism, " is the one 
 thing in our present European civilization that can and 
 does produce the calamity of war. If our object is to justly 
 prevent war, then, the way to do so is to purge Na- 
 tionality of this evil. This we cannot do by any mechan- 
 ical means, but only by a change of heart, by converting 
 public opinion throughout Europe from ' ' National Com- 
 petition" to "National Cooperation." Public opinion 
 will never be converted so long as the present system 
 of injustice remains in force, so long as one nation has 
 less and another more than its due. The first step to- 
 wards internationalism is not to flout the problems of 
 nationality, but to solve them. 
 
 The most important practical business, then, of the 
 conference that meets when war is over, will be the 
 revision of the map of Europe. . . . 
 
 If we do not think about nationality, it is simply be- 
 cause we have long taken it for granted, and our mind 
 is focussed on posterior developments; but it is increas- 
 ingly hard to keep ourselves out of touch with other 
 countries, and though our blindness has been partly 
 distraction, it has also been in part deliberate policy. 
 We saw well enough that the present phase of the na- 
 tional problem in Europe carried in it the seeds of war. 
 We rightly thought that war itself was the evil, an 
 evil incomparably greater than the national injustices 
 that might become the cause of it. We knew that, if 
 these questions were opened, war would follow. We 
 accordingly adopted the only possible course. We built 
 our policy on the chance that national feeling could be 
 damped down till it had been superseded in the public 
 opinion of Europe by other interests, not because Na- 
 tionalism was unjustified, but because it endangered so 
 much more than it was worth. Knowing that we had 
 passed out of the nationalist phase ourselves, and that 
 
 51
 
 otherwise from our present political point of view war was purely 
 manent evil, we hoped that it was merely a question of time for 
 
 L e possible. the Continental populations to reach the same stand- 
 point. Notably in Germany, the focus of danger, we 
 saw social interests coming more and more to the front 
 at the expense of militarism. We threw ourselves into 
 the negative task of staving off the catastrophe in the in- 
 terim, by a strenuous policy of compromise and con- 
 ciliation, which has been successful on at least two crit- 
 ical occasions. Now that the evil has been too powerful 
 and the catastrophe has happened, the reasons for this 
 policy are dead. Nationalism has been strong enough 
 to produce war in spite of us. It has terribly proved 
 itself to be no outworn creed, but a vital force to be 
 reckoned with. It is stronger on the Continent than 
 social politics. It is the raw material that litters the 
 whole ground. We must build it into our foundations, 
 or give up the task, not only of constructive social 
 advance beyond the limits we have already reached, but 
 even of any fundamental reconstruction of what the 
 war will have destroyed. 
 
 Perhaps we might have foretold this from the case of 
 Ireland immediately under our eyes. Failure to solve 
 her national problem has arrested Ireland's develop- 
 ment since the seventeenth century, and imprisoned her 
 in a world of ideas almost unintelligible to an English- 
 man till he has traveled in the Balkans. This has been 
 England 's fault, and we are now at last in a fair way to 
 remedy it. The moment we have succeeded in arrang- 
 ing that the different national groups in Ireland govern 
 themselves in the way they really wish, the national 
 question will pass from the Irish consciousness; they 
 will put two centuries behind them at one leap, and 
 come into line with ourselves. The Dublin strike, con- 
 temporary with the arming of the Volunteers, shows 
 
 52
 
 how the modern problems are jostling at the heels of 
 
 the old. Although "Unionist" and "Nationalist" poli- tivenot 
 
 material. 
 
 ticians could still declare that their attitude towards 
 the strike was neutral, the parliament of the new Irish 
 state will discuss the social problem and nothing else. 
 
 Ireland, then, has forced us to think about the prob- 
 lem of nationalism; and our Irish experience will be in- 
 valuable to us when peace is made, and we take in hand, 
 in concert with our allies, the national questions of the 
 rest of Europe. To begin with, we already have a 
 notion of what Nationality is. Like all great forces in 
 human life, it is nothing material or mechanical, but a 
 subjective psychological feeling in living people. This 
 feeling can be kindled by the presence of one or several 
 of a series of factors: a common country, especially if 
 it is a well defined physical region, like an island, a 
 river basin, or a mountain mass; a common language, 
 especially if it has given birth to a literature ; a common 
 religion; and that much more impalpable force, a com- 
 mon tradition or sense of memories shared from the 
 past. 
 
 But it is impossible to argue a priori from the pres- 
 ence of one or even several of these factors to the exist- 
 ence of a nationality: they may have been there for 
 ages and kindled no response. And it is impossible to 
 argue from one case to another: precisely the same 
 group of factors may produce nationality here, and 
 there have no effect. Great Britain is a nation by geog- 
 raphy and tradition, though important Keltic-speaking 
 sections of the population in Wales and the Highlands 
 do not understand the predominant English language. 
 Ireland is an island smaller still and more compact, and 
 is further unified by the almost complete predominance 
 of the same English language, for the Keltic speech is 
 incomparably less vigorous here than in Wales; yet the 
 
 53
 
 Bwrtimliu" 1 absence of common tradition combines with, religious dif- 
 is largely ferences to divide the country into two nationalities, at 
 
 factitious. n , 
 
 present sharply distinct from one another and none the 
 less hostile because their national psychology is strik- 
 ingly the same. Germany is divided by religion in pre- 
 cisely the same way as Ireland, her common tradition is 
 hardly stronger, and her geographical boundaries quite 
 vague: yet she has built up her present concentrated 
 national feeling in three generations. Italy has geog- 
 raphy, language and traditions to bind her together; 
 and yet a more vivid tradition is able to separate the 
 Ticinese from his neighbors, and bind him to people of 
 alien speech and religion beyond a great mountain 
 range. The Armenian nationality does not occupy a 
 continuous territory, but lives by language and religion. 
 The Jews speak the language of the country where they 
 sojourn, but religion and tradition hold them together. 
 The agnostic Jew accepts not only the language but all 
 the other customs of his adopted countrymen, but tradi- 
 tion by itself is too strong for him: he remains a Jew 
 and cannot be assimilated. 
 
 These instances taken at random show that each case 
 must be judged on its own merits, and that no argument 
 holds good except the ascertained wish, of the living 
 population actually concerned. Above all we must be 
 on our guard against "historical sentiment," that is, 
 against arguments taken from conditions which once 
 existed or were supposed to exist, but which are no 
 longer real at the present moment. ; They are most 
 easily illustrated by extreme examples. Italian news- 
 papers have described the annexation of Tripoli as "re- 
 covering the soil of the Fatherland" because it was 
 once a province of the Roman Empire; and the entire 
 region of Macedonia is claimed by Greek chauvinists on 
 the one hand, because it contains the site of Pella, 
 
 54
 
 the cradle of Alexander 1 the Great in the fourth century 
 
 B. c., and by Bulgarians on the other, because Ohhrida, nationalistic 
 
 ' aims and 
 
 in the opposite corner, was the capital of the Bulgarian diTersitie 
 Tzardom in the tenth century A.D., though the drift of 
 time has buried the tradition of the latter almost as deep 
 as the achievements of the "Emathian Conqueror," on 
 which the modern Greek nationalist insists so strongly. 
 
 The national problems of Europe are numerous, and 
 each one is beset by arguments good, bad, and indif- 
 ferent, some no more specious than the above, some so 
 elaborately staged that it requires the greatest discern- 
 ment to expose them. Vast bodies of people, with brains 
 and money at their disposal, have been interested in 
 obscuring the truth, and have used every instrument in 
 their power to do so. It is therefore essential for us 
 in England to take up these hitherto remote and un- 
 interesting national problems in earnest, to get as near 
 to the truth as we possibly can, both as to what the 
 respective wishes of the different populations are, and 
 as to how far it is possible to reconcile them with each 
 other and with Geography; and to come to the con- 
 ference which will follow the war and is so much more 
 important than the war itself, with a clear idea of the 
 alternative solutions and a mature judgment upon their 
 relative merits. 
 
 To accomplish this we need a coordination of knowl- 
 edge on a large scale, knowledge of history, geography, 
 religion, national psychology and public opinion. . . . 
 
 With the growth of civilization the human and the 
 territorial unit become less and less identical. In a 
 primitive community the members are undifferentiated 
 from one another: the true human unit is the total 
 group, and not the individual, and the territory this 
 group occupies is a unit too, self-sufficing and cut off 
 from intercourse with the next valley. In modern Eu- 
 
 55
 
 Individuality 
 and tolerance 
 must be pur 
 international 
 ideals. 
 
 rope every sub-group and every individual has devel- 
 oped a "character" or "individuality" of its own which 
 must have free play; while the growth of communica- 
 tions, elaboration of organization, and economic interde- 
 pendence of the whole world have broken down the 
 barriers between region and region. The minimum ter- 
 ritorial block that can be organized efficiently as a sep- 
 arate political unit according to modern standards is 
 constantly growing in size: the maximum human group 
 which can hold together without serious internal di- 
 vergence is as steadily diminishing. 
 
 This would look like an impasse, were it not corrected 
 by the virtues of civilization itself. We started with 
 the fact that the essence of civilization was "Fore- 
 thought" and its ideal the "power of free choice": the 
 complementary side of this ideal, on the principle "Do 
 as you would be done by," is to allow free choice to 
 others when they are in your power. It is a virtue with 
 as many names as there are spheres of human life: 
 " Forbearance, "" Toleration, "" Constitutionalism. " . . . 
 
 Arnold J. Toyribee, 
 chap. I. 
 
 'Nationality and the War,' 
 
 56
 
 NATIONALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 The old Europe is dead, the old vision vanished, and Wemust 
 we are wrestling in agony for new inspiration. . . . forma of 
 
 We must beware of putting our new wine into old K1iarantee - 
 bottles. While guarantees hold, they conserve their 
 charge: when they break, the destruction is worse than 
 if they had never existed. Unless we can ensure that 
 the sovereign States of Europe respect European guar- 
 antees hereafter in other fashion than Germany at the 
 present crisis, we must modify the formula or else dis- 
 card it altogether. 
 
 Can the mechanism of the European system be safe- 
 guarded against its individual members ? . . . 
 
 We have asked our question and must accept the an- 
 swer. It is useless to fortify our new European organ- 
 ism by guarantees of the old order, because we cannot 
 fortify such guarantees themselves against the sovereign 
 national State. Whenever it chooses, the sovereign unit 
 can shatter the international mechanism by war. We 
 are powerless to prevent it : all we can do is to abandon 
 our direct attack, and look for the causes which impel 
 States to a choice as terrible for themselves as for their 
 victims. 
 
 "You ask," the Germans say, "why we broke our 
 contract towards Belgium ? It would be more pertinent 
 to ask how we were ever committed to such a contract 
 at all. 
 
 57
 
 near t f modem Germany is the industrial world 
 position. of the Rhineland and Westphalia. The Belgian frontier 
 
 and the Belgian tariff-wall rob this region of its natural 
 outlet at Antwerp, yet the contract expressly forbids us 
 to right this economic and geographical wrong by unit- 
 ing the sea-port to its hinterland. 
 
 "The chief need of modern Germany is a source of 
 raw produce and a market for her finished products in 
 the tropical zone. Belgium has staked out for herself 
 the one important region in Africa which was not al- 
 ready occupied by Prance or Great Britain. She can 
 do nothing with it, while we but this contract ex- 
 pressly forbids us to kick the Belgian dog out of the 
 manger. 
 
 "Because of this Belgian guarantee we must go in 
 want of almost everything we need, yet meanwhile our 
 great neighbors on either flank have conspired to take 
 from us even the little we possess already. The struggle 
 with France and Russia on which we are now engaged 
 has been impending for years, and on our part it is a 
 struggle for existence, but even here the same remorse- 
 less contract operates to paralyze our efforts. On the 
 scale of modern warfare the Western battle-front must 
 extend from Switzerland to the North Sea, yet the 
 greater part of this immense zone is neutralized by nat- 
 ural and artificial obstacles on either side. From Swit- 
 zerland to the Ardennes there will be stalemate: the de- 
 cision will be reached in the open country between the 
 Ardennes and the coast. Here, as soon as war broke 
 out, France and our own fatherland had to concentrate 
 the terrific energy of their armaments, yet we had con- 
 tracted away our initiative in this vital area, for it lies 
 within the frontiers of the Belgian State. The Govern- 
 ment we had guaranteed might prepare the ground for 
 France and ruin it for ourselves, yet because of the 
 
 58
 
 guarantee we must look on passively at the digging of 
 
 OUr grave. national 
 
 "Why, then, had we suffered ourselves to be bound * 
 hand and foot? We had not: our grandfathers had en- 
 tailed the bonds upon us. When they signed the con- 
 tract in 1839, they knew not what they did. At that 
 time Germany had no industry, Belgium had no colonies, 
 and the Franco-German frontier between the Ardennes 
 and the Jura was not closed to field operations by two 
 continuous lines of opposing fortifications. Had their 
 signature been demanded in 1914, they would have re- 
 fused it as indignantly as we should have refused it 
 ourselves. To us no choice was offered, and if we have 
 asserted for ourselves the right to choose, who dares in 
 his heart to condemn us ? Who will impose a changeless 
 law upon a changing world?" 
 
 This is Germany's argument about Belgium. Her 
 facts may be true or false, the arguments she builds 
 on them valid or fallacious. That is not the point. 
 Behind arguments and facts there looms an idea that 
 can inspire an individual nation to make war on Europe. 
 We must do justice to this idea, if it is not to play the 
 same havoc again. 
 
 Humanity has an instinctive craving for something 
 eternal, absolute, petrified. This seems to be a funda- 
 mental factor in our psychology: it has obtruded itself 
 equally in spheres as diverse as religion and politics, 
 but it has been especially dominant in diplomacy. 
 
 Whenever the European organism proves its insta- 
 bility by breaking down, we start in quest of a perfect 
 mechanism, a "permanent settlement." We are invari- 
 ably disappointed, but invariably we return to the quest 
 again. The Congress of statesmen at Vienna followed 
 this will-o'-the-wisp in 1814: in 1915 the belligerent 
 democracies are preparing to lead themselves the same 
 
 59
 
 European dance. "Europe is in a mess," we are all saying: "Let 
 
 organism us tidy her up 'once for all,' and then we can live corn- 
 is full of . * ML -it 
 
 dynamic fortably ever after. 
 
 "We might as well expect a baby to "live comfortably 
 ever after" in its swaddling clothes. . . . 
 
 So it is with the European organism. It is as full of 
 life, as perpetually in transformation, as the individual 
 national molecules of which it is woven, yet we confuse 
 it in turn with each of its transitory garments. If we 
 are to find a satisfactory issue out of the present crisis, 
 we must begin by correcting our standpoint. 
 
 The impending settlement will not be permanent, and 
 the better it fits the situation, the less permanent will it 
 fa 
 
 U". . 
 
 Our real work will be to regulate this immediate 
 settlement so that it varies in harmony with the subse- 
 quent growth of Europe and modifies its structure and 
 mechanism to meet the organism's changing needs. 
 
 We have now discovered the flaw in guarantees of 
 the old order. They were framed for rigidity, and 
 therefore were doomed to crack. Our new guarantees 
 must be elastic : they must be forged of steel not cast in 
 iron. 
 
 How can we frame guarantees of this malleable char- 
 acter? . . . 
 
 (i.) Firstly, we propose guarantees of political 
 independence and integrity in the case of the three 
 Scandinavian States, the Slovene Unit, the Greek islands 
 off Anatolia, Persia, and the Sultanate of Oman. The 
 autonomy guaranteed to Poland within the Russian Em- 
 pire comes under the same head. 
 
 (ii.) Secondly, we propose to guarantee economic 
 rights-of-way to one State across the political territory 
 of another. Instances of this type are the Russian rail- 
 way through Norway to the Atlantic and through Persia 
 
 60
 
 to the Indian Ocean; Poland's title to free trade down ^ tlcment 
 the Vistula, and to the enjoyment of a free port at can be 
 Danzig ; and Germany 's similar claim to an unhampered 
 outlet at Trieste. 
 
 Both these classes of guarantee are adapted from the 
 international machinery invented during the nineteenth 
 century. The first class is an extension of the political 
 guarantee given to Belgium in 1839, the second of the 
 economic right-of-way secured to her through Dutch 
 Avaters, in order to furnish the commerce of Antwerp 
 with a free passage down the estuary of the Scheldt to 
 the open sea. 
 
 Our standpoint towards these two classes is inevitably 
 prejudiced by their associations. We envisage them as 
 embodied "once for all," like their nineteenth-century 
 precedents, in a contract, and like nineteenth-century 
 diplomacy we tend to regard such contracts as so many 
 girders in a "permanent settlement." 
 
 (iii.) There is a third class, however, which has no prec- 
 edent in the past, and which will react upon our stand- 
 point in the very opposite direction : our proposed guar- 
 antee of alien minorities within the national State. . . . 
 
 The German populations transferred with Schleswig 
 to Denmark and with the Eastern frontier-zone to Au- 
 tonomous Poland; the Poles abandoned to Germany in 
 West Prussia; the Germans and Slovaks who cannot be 
 disentangled from Hungary; the Christian elements in 
 Anatolia and Arabia these are a few out of many in- 
 stances, and each one of them is a refutation of 
 "finality." 
 
 The fact that such minorities must inevitably be left 
 on our hands compels us to recognize that beyond a 
 certain degree the economic and the national factor are 
 not commensurable. Here is an essential imperfection 
 in the best settlement we can possibly devise. 
 
 61
 
 that these minorities require a guarantee re- 
 fSther veals a deficiency still more grave than the other, inas- 
 
 raciai much as it is not environmental but psychological. It 
 
 toleration. ., , , -,, , .. , . . . _. 
 
 means that hardly a single national society in Europe 
 has yet become capable of national toleration. Just 
 as people were persecuted for their religious beliefs in 
 the sixteenth century and for their political opinions in 
 the nineteenth, so they are still in the twentieth century 
 almost universally exposed to persecution for their na- 
 tional individuality. In this sphere the social evolution 
 of Europe is exceptionally backward, and the problem 
 of nationality will never be solved till thisi psychological 
 incongruity is removed. 
 
 This at once reduces to their proper proportion both 
 the immediate geographical settlement of the problem 
 which we have elaborated in this book and that guarantee 
 of alien minorities which we have found to be its neces- 
 sary supplement. In this light, the contracts in which 
 such guarantees are enshrined appear as the transitory 
 scaffolding they are. Weakened by the morbid hyper- 
 trophy of nationalism which has been preying upon her 
 for years, exhausted by the convulsion of war in which 
 the malady has culminated, Europe must walk on 
 crutches now or else collapse ; yet she will not be a crip- 
 ple forever. Relieved by these guarantees from the 
 immediate strain of unmitigated national friction, she 
 will be able to concentrate all her energy upon her 
 spiritual convalescence. As soon as she has trained her- 
 self to national toleration, she will discard the guarantees 
 and walk unaided. 
 
 So far from constituting a "permanent settlement," 
 our third type of guarantee is an intimation that the 
 problem still remains unsettled. The work will not be 
 complete until we can dispense with the instrument, but 
 the instrument will not accomplish the work unless it is 
 
 62
 
 wielded by a craftsman's hand. Not only are guaran- ^ nKing 
 tees of our third type merely the means to an end beyond organism 
 themselves : the contract in which it is embodied is in this new form of 
 case the least important part of the guarantee. exec 
 
 When we guarantee a national minority we have of 
 course to define certain liberties which it is to enjoy 
 liberties, for instance, of religion, education, local self- 
 government and all the parties to- the Conference must 
 contract responsibility for the observance of such stipula- 
 tions ; yet when we have done this, we cannot simply de- 
 posit our document in some international "Ark of the 
 Covenant" and go our ways. The essence of the guar- 
 antee is its subsequent interpretation. 
 
 The relation between the different elements in a coun- 
 try is continually changing. One church dwindles while 
 another makes converts; one race advances in culture 
 while another degenerates; man's indefatigable strug- 
 gle to dominate his physical environment alters the nat- 
 ural boundaries between localities: a barrier that once 
 seemed insurmountable is pierced, and leaves one for- 
 merly insignificant in relative prominence. Each of 
 these modifications demands an adjustment of the guar- 
 antee, and since they are an infinite series, the guarantee 
 itself requires ceaseless manipulation if it is to perform 
 its function aright. 
 
 This need cannot be satisfied by the original fiat of 
 the International Conference : it can only be met by the 
 appointment of a standing international committee with 
 executive powers, empowered, that is, to administer and 
 interpret the contracts to which the members of the 
 Conference have originally subscribed. Our third type 
 of guarantee has thus presented us with the clue we 
 sought. The letter of international law has proved inef- 
 fective hitherto because it has lacked the inspiration of 
 a living spirit, and this spirit can only be breathed 
 
 63
 
 ^7 a numan organ of international authority, 
 and the Supposing that such an organ were called into exist- 
 
 guarantees. i i -i .. -,-, 
 
 ence, what kind of international relations would natu- 
 rally fall within its scope? We can analyze its probable 
 sphere of activity into several departments. 
 
 (i.) The first branch would of course be those guar- 
 antees of national minorities which have just taught us 
 the necessity for its existence. 
 
 (ii.) The second branch would include the two sub- 
 jects of guarantee we dealt with first, namely, "Polit- 
 ical Independence ' ' and ' ' Rights of Way. ' ' We can see 
 now that their administration by a representative inter- 
 national executive would eliminate that defect of rigidity 
 which has always proved fatal to them heretofore. 
 
 Between them these two branches would cover all the 
 machinery we have suggested for our regenerated Euro- 
 pean organism. Are there any further spheres of na- 
 tional interaction over which our international organ 
 might properly assume control? It would be logical to 
 assign to it, if possible, all relations between sovereign 
 national States which are peculiarly subject to change. 
 
 Change is a harmonization of two rhythms Growth 
 and Decay. Some sovereign units are continually wax- 
 ing in population, material wealth and spiritual energy : 
 such are Great Britain and Germany, France and the 
 Russian Empire. Others, like the Ottoman Empire or 
 Spain, are as continually waning in respect of the same 
 factors. 
 
 This ebb and flow in the current of life causes, and 
 must cause, a perpetual readjustment of the relations 
 between units in the two complementary phases. Units 
 in the positive phase inevitably absorb the fibers and 
 trespass upon the environment of those which have 
 passed over into the negative rhythm. We cannot ar- 
 rest this process any more than we can abolish change 
 
 64
 
 itself: what we can do is to regulate it on the lines of P? 1 * 01 .'? 
 
 . . l international 
 
 civilization, instead of letting it run riot m a blind strug- organ would 
 
 , . . function. 
 
 gle for existence. 
 
 The current radiates in an almost infinite variety of 
 interactions. Great Britain, Germany, and India are 
 discharging surplus population into the empty lands of 
 the New World ; Great Britain and France are applying 
 surplus wealth to evoke the latent resources of countries 
 with no surplus of their own ; Great Britain and Russia 
 are putting forth spiritual energy to inspire primitive 
 peoples with the vitality of civilization. 
 
 Our international organ can handle no more than a 
 fraction of this world-wide interchange. 
 
 (i.) We may exclude at once from its competence 
 every interaction that is confined within the limits of a 
 single sovereign unit. Within the British Empire, for 
 example, it is patently impracticable to "internation- 
 alize" the problems of Indian emigration to Vancouver 
 or the Transvaal, of the closure of the Australian labor- 
 market against labor from the British Isles, of commer- 
 cial exploitation in Nigeria or Rhodesia, of autonomy in 
 Ireland or the Asiatic Dependencies. The Empire may 
 handle its own problems well or ill, but it will never 
 consent to waive its sovereignty in respect of them. We 
 should regard the proposition of international inter- 
 vention as a menace to the Empire's existence. We 
 should undoubtedly fight rather than submit to it, and 
 every other sovereign State would do the same under 
 similar circumstances. In purely internal affairs inter- 
 national authority will never obtain a footing at the 
 expense of the individual unit. 
 
 (ii.) We may likewise exclude interactions between 
 two or more sovereign States in spheres that fall entirely 
 within their respective sovereignty. The Dominion of 
 Canada or the U. S. A. would never submit to interna- 
 
 65
 
 tional regulation the question of Japanese immigration 
 
 and of along their Pacific seaboard. If Russia wished to float 
 
 a loan, she would never allow our international organ to 
 decide where and in what proportions it should be placed : 
 she would insist on keeping her hands free, and making 
 the best bargain for herself both from the financial and 
 the political point of view. Italy and the Argentine 
 would never relinquish their respective sovereign rights 
 over the Italian laborers who cross the Atlantic every 
 year to reap the South American harvests. Interna- 
 tional authority would be flouted as uncompromisingly 
 in these instances as in the former. 
 
 (iii.) There are some units, however, so raw in their 
 growth or so deeply sunk in their decay as to lack the 
 attribute of sovereignty altogether units which through 
 want of population, wealth, spiritual energy, or all three 
 together are unable to keep the spark of vitality aglow. 
 Such dead units are the worst danger that threatens the 
 peace of the world: each one of them is an arena entic- 
 ing the living units around to clash in conflict, a vacuum 
 into which the current of life swirls like a maelstrom. 
 In these "no-man's-lands" where no sovereignty exists, 
 our international organ can and must assert its own 
 sovereignty against the sovereign States outside. 
 
 (a) In every such area the standing international ex- 
 ecutive should regulate immigration from over-populated 
 sovereign units German colonization, for instance, in 
 Anatolia, or Indian settlement on the alluvium of Irak. 
 
 (&) It should likewise regulate the inflow of cap- 
 ital. . . . 
 
 (c) In areas where the pressure of spiritual energy 
 is so low that the population cannot save itself by its 
 own efforts from political anarchy, the international 
 executive should be prepared to step in and organize. 
 "strong government." . . . 
 
 66
 
 Morocco, the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire the pres- f^^ye 
 ent war is not really being waged to settle these prob- could have 
 lems: it is being waged because they have been settled the war of 
 already, and settled on such unjust and injudicious lines 
 that all parties concerned have found it worth while to 
 stake their existence for the reversal of the settlement. 
 No one need have been involved by such problems in a 
 struggle for life. They were all problems of expansion, 
 and their solution ought at worst to have disappointed 
 the expectation of immoderate gains: it ought never, as 
 it has done, to have threatened the parties with the loss 
 of what they possessed already before the problems were 
 probed. 
 
 Why has the contrary occurred? Because, just for 
 lack of that international executive with the sovereign 
 authority we postulate, these issues that were not vital 
 have been fought out, like issues of life and death, by 
 war not by the war of arms which has descended upon 
 us now like some recurrent plague, into which we re- 
 lapse at rarer and rarer intervals as we advance in civil- 
 ization, but by the unobtrusive, unremittent war of di- 
 plomacy which is being waged year in and year out be- 
 tween the sovereign States of Europe, and which has in- 
 creased appallingly in violence during the last genera- 
 tion. 
 
 In this disastrous diplomatic warfare our opponents 
 in the present war of arms have been uniformly the 
 aggressors. If Austria-Hungary is now struggling for 
 existence, it is because she deliberately embarked nearly 
 forty years ago upon a diplomatic campaign of aggran- 
 dizement against South-Slavonic nationality. If Ger- 
 many is fighting back to back with her in the same 
 ghastly struggle, it is because Germany has wielded dip- 
 lomatic weapons still more ruthlessly against her other 
 European neighbors. 
 
 67
 
 -^ or tne terrible embitterment of the diplomatic con- 
 test Germany herself is entirely responsible, but she 
 has inevitably exposed herself to reprisals as severe as 
 her own provocative blows. She opened the battle over 
 Morocco by forcibly intruding upon a sphere where she 
 had no shadow of claim to expansion : thereby she drew 
 France and Great Britain into diplomatic alliance 
 against her, and laid herself open to the humiliation of 
 1911, when Franco-British diplomacy mobilized its finan- 
 cial forces and drove her to retreat by cutting off her 
 supplies. In Turkey she might easily have satisfied her 
 needs without any battle at all. The untenanted area 
 was vast, the claims staked out on it were singularly nar- 
 row: when German enterprise circumvented the enter- 
 prise of Great Britain and France, and secured all the 
 railway-concessions in the virgin hinterland of Anatolia, 
 French and British diplomacy grumbled but did not at- 
 tempt to open hostilities. Yet instead of reaping her 
 harvest in peace, Germany again precipitated a diplo- 
 matic conflict by extending her ambitions to Bagdad and 
 the Persian Gulf. The moment she aspired to absorb 
 the whole Ottoman Empire, Great Britain and Russia 
 entered into diplomatic cooperation, and opposed her 
 purpose with all their might. Germany's Arabian ven- 
 ture has jeopardized her Anatolian gains, and if she is 
 defeated in the present struggle, she will probably be 
 excluded from the Ottoman area altogether. 
 
 The diplomatic warfare over three secondary issues, 
 which ought never to have been settled by fighting at all, 
 has thus left none of the combatants unscathed. On 
 the contrary, the wounds inflicted then have festered 
 till their poison has threatened each combatant with 
 the pains of dissolution, and made that quack-physician 
 the diplomatist call out in panic for the knife of that 
 quack-surgeon the war lord. 
 
 68
 
 This diplomatic warfare is the objective of our new 
 international organization. Upon diplomacy we can and 
 must make a direct attack. If we can draw this mon- 
 ster's teeth, we shall no longer be troubled by its still 
 more monstrous offspring War. 
 
 Arnold J. Toyribee, "Nationality and the War," 
 chap. XII. 
 
 69
 
 THE GOVERNMENTAL THEORY 
 
 International 
 politics 
 dominated 
 by a 
 theory. 
 
 The position I intend to put forward and defend is 
 this: War is made this war has been made not by 
 any necessity of nature, any law beyond human con- 
 trol, any fate to which men must passively bow; it is 
 made because certain men who have immediate power 
 over other men are possessed by a certain theory. Some- 
 times they are fully conscious of this theory. More 
 often, perhaps, it works in them unconsciously. But it 
 is there, the dominating influence in international poli- 
 tics. I shall call it the governmental theory, because it 
 is among governing persons Emperors, Kings, Mini- 
 sters, and their diplomatic and military advisers that 
 its influence is most conspicuous and most disastrous. 
 But it is supported also by historians, journalists, and 
 publicists, and it is only too readily adopted by the ordi- 
 nary man, when he turns from the real things he knows 
 and habitually handles to consider the unknown field of 
 foreign affairs. 
 
 Very briefly, and, therefore, crudely expressed, the 
 theory is this: "The world is divided, politically, into 
 States. These States are a kind of abstract beings, dis- 
 tinct from the men, women, and children who inhabit 
 them. They are in perpetual and inevitable antagonism 
 to one another; and though they may group themselves 
 in alliances, that can be only for temporary purposes to 
 meet some other alliance or single power. For States 
 are bound by a moral or physical obligation to expand 
 
 70
 
 indefinitely, each at the cost of the others. They are nat- 
 ural enemies, they always have been so, and they always ernme 
 will be; and force is the only arbiter between them. 
 That being so, war is an eternal necessity. As a neces- 
 sity, it should be accepted, if not welcomed, by all sound- 
 thinking and right-feeling men. Pacifists are men at 
 once weak and dangerous. They deny a fact as funda- 
 mental as any of the facts of the natural world. And 
 their influence, if they have any, can only be disastrous 
 to their State in its ceaseless and inevitable contest with 
 other States." 
 
 Stated thus briefly, and in its most uncompromising 
 terms, this is what I have called the governmental theory. 
 I propose to criticize it in detail. But before doing so I 
 will ask the reader to compare with it the ordinary atti- 
 tude of the plain men and women who inhabit these 
 States, and who have to bear the burden of the wars in 
 which the theory involves them. These ordinary people, 
 in the course of their daily lives, do not think at all in 
 terms of the State. They think about the people they 
 come in contact with, about their business, their friends, 
 and their families. When they come across foreigners, 
 as many of them do, in business or in travel, they may 
 like or dislike them, but they do not regard them as pre- 
 destined enemies. On the contrary, if they are intelli- 
 gent, they know themselves to be cooperating with them 
 in innumerable complicated ways, implying mutual ad- 
 vantage. Differences of language and of social habit 
 make it easier for most people to associate with their 
 fellow-countrymen than with foreigners. But that is all. 
 There are, of course, among these men and women real 
 enmities and spontaneous quarrels. But these do not oc- 
 cur because men belong* to different States. They occur 
 because they really have injured one another, or hate one 
 another ; and they occur, naturally, for the most part, be- 
 
 71
 
 Governments, tween men of the same State, because it is these who most 
 
 not peoples, 
 
 make wars. often come into direct contact with one another. It is 
 not, therefore, these enmities of ordinary men that give 
 rise to wars. 
 
 Wars are made by governments, acting under the in- 
 fluence of the governmental theory. And of this fact 
 for a fact it is among civilized "Western peoples in 
 modern times no better example could be given than 
 the present war. Before it broke out nobody outside 
 governmental and journalistic circles was expecting it. 
 Nobody desired it. And though, now that it is being 
 waged, all the nations concerned are passionately inter- 
 ested in it, and all believe themselves to be fighting in 
 a righteous cause, yet no ordinary citizen, in the days 
 preceding its outbreak, would have maintained that there 
 was any good reason for war, and few even knew what 
 the reasons alleged were or might be. Even now the dif- 
 ferent nations have quite opposite views as to which Gov- 
 ernment was responsible. We believe it was the German 
 Government; and with equal conviction Germans be- 
 lieve it was the British. But nobody believes that it was 
 the mass of the people in any nation. The millions who 
 are carrying on the war, at the cost of incalculable suf- 
 fering, would never have made it if the decision had 
 rested with them. That is the one indisputable fact. 
 How can such a fact occur ? How is it possible for Gov- 
 ernments to drag into war people who did not desire war 
 and who have no quarrel with one another? 
 
 The immediate answer is simple enough. In no coun- 
 try is there any effective control by the people over for- 
 eign policy. That is clear in the case of the great mili- 
 tary empires. But it is true also of France and of Eng- 
 land, where, in other respects, government is more or 
 less under popular control. The country has no real 
 choice, for it gets its information only after the decisive 
 
 72
 
 action has been taken. That is an important truth which 
 ought to lead to important changes in our methods of obsessed by 
 conducting foreign affairs. But it is only part of the 
 truth. For we have now to notice this further fact: 
 that in all countries, in Germany no less than in England 
 and France, no sooner is the war declared than it is sup- 
 ported by the whole nation. The voice of criticism is 
 silenced, and every one, whatever his opinion about the 
 origin of the war, gives his help to see it through. Why 
 is that ? The reason is obvious. As soon as war is made, 
 the people of one country, conscious just before of no 
 cause of enmity, do really become enemies of the people 
 of another country ; for armed populations are marching 
 on armed populations to massacre them. Everybody, 
 therefore, is bound to fight in self-defense. It is too 
 late to ask whether there was any real cause of quarrel ; 
 for, quarrel or no, there is real and imminent danger. 
 To meet that danger becomes, therefore, the immediate 
 necessity which overbears every other consideration. 
 And that is the deepest reason why wars made by govern- 
 ments without, and even against, the will of peoples, will 
 always be supported by peoples. 
 
 But though that is the most powerful reason, it is not 
 the only one. There is a further fact. The ordinary 
 man, though he does not live under the obsession of 
 the governmental theory, is not protected against it by 
 any knowledge or reflection. As far as he is concerned, 
 he knows no reason for war, and, left to himself, would 
 never make it. But he has a blank mind open to sug- 
 gestion; and he has passions and instincts which it is 
 easy to enlist on the side of the governmental theory. 
 He has been busy all his life ; and he has no education, 
 or one that is worse than none, about those issues which, 
 in a crisis like that which has come upon us, suddenly 
 reveal themselves as the issues of life and death. His- 
 
 73
 
 go r vlrn a ment tor ^' no doubt, should have informed him. But history, 
 poison the for the most part, is written without intelligence or con- 
 
 pubhc mind. . . 
 
 vietion. It is mere narrative, devoid of instruction, and 
 seasoned, if at all, by some trivial, habitual, and second- 
 hand prejudice of the author. History has never been 
 understood, though it has often been misunderstood. To 
 understand it is perhaps beyond the power of the human 
 intellect. But the attempt even has hardly begun to be 
 made. 
 
 Deprived, then, of this source of enlightenment, the 
 ordinary man falls back upon the press. But the press 
 is either an agent of the very governments it should exist 
 to criticize (it is so notoriously and admittedly on the 
 Continent, and, to an extent which we cannot measure, 
 also in England), or else it is (with a few honorable ex- 
 ceptions) an instrument to make money for certain in- 
 dividuals or syndicates. But the easiest way for the 
 press to make money is to appeal to the most facile emo- 
 tions and the most superficial ideas of the reader; and 
 these can easily be made to respond to the suggestion that 
 this or that foreign State is our natural and inevitable 
 enemy. The strong instincts of pugnacity and self-ap- 
 probation, the nobler sentiment of patriotism, a vague 
 and unanalyzed impression of the course of history, 
 these and other factors combine to produce this result. 
 And the irony is that they may be directed indifferently 
 against any State. In England, for instance, a hundred 
 years ago, it was France against whom they were mar- 
 shaled; sixty years ago it was Russia; thirty years ago 
 it was France again; now it is Germany; presently, if 
 governments have their way, it will be Russia again. 
 
 The foreign offices and the press do with nations what 
 they like. And they will continue to do so until ordi- 
 nary people acquire right ideas and a machinery to 
 make them effective. . . . 
 
 74
 
 The governmental theory holds that States are the 
 great realities, and that they are natural enemies. My states are 
 
 unreul 
 
 reply is that States are unreal abstractions; that the abstractions, 
 reality is the men and women and children who are the 
 members of the States ; and that as soon as you substitute 
 real people for the abstract idea that symbolizes them 
 you find that they have no cause of quarrel, no interests 
 or desires of a kind to justify or necessitate aggressive 
 war. And, if there were no aggressive war, there could, 
 of course, be no cause for defensive war. . . . 
 
 O. Lowes Dickinson, "The War and the Way Out," 
 Atlantic Monthly, January, 1915. 
 
 75
 
 THE WAY OUT OF WAR 
 
 Noaggran- We will to perpetuate European peace. How are 
 
 dizementl ,. ~ . T i ... , 
 
 we to accomplish it? By keeping in view and putting 
 into effect certain clear principles. 
 
 First, the whole idea of aggrandizing one nation and 
 humiliating another must be set aside. What we are 
 aiming at is, not that this or that group of States should 
 dominate the others, but that none should in future have 
 any desire or motive to dominate. With that view, we 
 must leave behind the fewest possible sores, the least 
 possible sense of grievance, the least possible humiliation. 
 The defeated States, therefore, must not be dismembered 
 in the hope of making or keeping them weak; and that 
 means, in detail, that, if the Allies win, the English 
 and the French must not take the German colonies, or 
 the Russians the Baltic Coast, the Balkans, or Constanti- 
 nople ; and that, if Germany wins, she must not dismem- 
 ber or subordinate to her system France or England or 
 the neutral powers. That is the first clear condition of 
 the future peace of Europe. 
 
 Secondly, in rearranging the boundaries of States 
 and clearly they must be rearranged one point, and 
 one only, must be kept in mind: to give to all peoples 
 suffering and protesting under alien rule the right to de- 
 cide whether they will become an autonomous unit, or 
 will join the political system of some other nation. 
 Thus, for example, the people of Alsace-Lorraine should 
 be allowed to choose whether they will remain under 
 
 76
 
 Germany, or become an autonomous community, or be 
 included in France. The same principles shall be ap- of small 
 plied to the Poles. The same to Schleswig-Holstein. 
 The same to the Balkan States. The same to the Slav 
 communities included in Austria-Hungary. There would 
 arise, of course, difficulties in carrying this principle 
 through. For, in the Balkan States, in Bohemia, and 
 elsewhere, there is an almost inextricable tangle of na- 
 tionalities. But with good-will these difficulties could 
 be at least partially met. 
 
 Even the wholesale transference of peoples of one 
 nationality from one location to another is a possibility ; 
 and, indeed, it is now going on. In any case the prin- 
 ciple itself is clear. Political rule must cease to be im- 
 posed on peoples against their will in the supposed in- 
 terest of that great idol, the abstract state. Let the Ger- 
 mans, who belong together, live together under the same 
 government, pursuing in independence their national 
 ideal and their national culture. But let them not im- 
 pose that ideal and that culture on reluctant Poles and 
 Slavs and Danes. So, too, let Russia develop her own 
 life over the huge territory where Russians live. But 
 let her not impose that life on unwilling Poles and Finns. 
 The English, in history, have been as guilty as other na- 
 tions of sacrificing nationality to the supposed exigencies 
 of the State. But of late they have been learning their 
 lesson. Let them learn it to the end. Let no community 
 be coerced under British rule that wants to be self-gov- 
 erning. The British have had the courage, though late, 
 to apply this principle to South Africa and Ireland. 
 There remains their greatest act of courage and wisdom 
 to apply it to India. 
 
 A Europe thus rearranged, as it might be at the peace, 
 on a basis of real nationality instead of on a basis of 
 States, would be a Europe ripe for a permanent league. 
 
 77
 
 7 suc ^ & ^ e& ^ Q only, in my judgment, can its fu- 
 ture peace, prosperity, happiness, goodness, and great- 
 ness be assured. There must be an end to the waste 
 upon armaments of resources too scanty, at the best, to 
 give to all men and women in all countries the material 
 basis for a good life. But if States are left with the 
 power to arm against one another they will do so, each 
 asserting, and perhaps with truth, that it is arming in 
 defense against the imagined aggression of the others. 
 If all are arming, all will spend progressively more and 
 more on their armaments, for each will be afraid of be- 
 ing outstripped by the others. This circle is fatal, as we 
 have seen in the last quarter of a century. 
 
 To secure the peace of Europe the peoples of Europe 
 must hand over their armaments, and the use of them 
 for any purpose except internal police, to an interna- 
 tional authority. This authority must determine what 
 force is required for Europe as a whole, acting as a 
 whole in the still possible case of war against powers not 
 belonging to the league. It must apportion the quota 
 of armaments between the different nations according 
 to their wealth, population, resources, and geographical 
 position. And it, and it alone, must carry on, and carry 
 on in public, negotiations with powers outside the league. 
 All disputes that may arise between members of the 
 league must be settled by judicial process. And none of 
 the forces of the league must be available for purposes 
 of aggression by any member against any other. 
 
 With such a league of Europe constituted, the problem 
 of reduction of armaments would be automatically 
 solved. Whatever force a united Europe might suppose 
 itself to require for possible defense would clearly be far 
 less than the sum of the existing armaments of the sepa- 
 rate States. Immense resources would be set free for the 
 general purposes of civilization, and especially for those 
 
 78
 
 costly social reforms on the accomplishment of which 
 depends the right of any nation to call itself civilized at 
 all. And if any one insists on looking at the settlement 
 from the point of view of material advantage and that 
 point of view will and must be taken it may be urged, 
 without a shadow of doubt, that any and every nation, 
 the conquerors no less than the conquered, would gain 
 from a reduction of armaments far more than they could 
 possibly gain by pecuniary indemnities or cessions of 
 territory which would leave every nation still arming 
 against the others with a view to future squandering of 
 resources' in another great war. This is sheer common 
 sense of the most matter-of-fact kind. 
 
 A League of Europe is not Utopian. It is sound busi- 
 ness. 
 
 Such a league, it is true, could hardly come into being 
 immediately at the peace. There must be preparation of 
 opinion first ; and, not less important, there must be such 
 changes in the government of the monarchic States as 
 will insure the control of their policy by popular opinion ; 
 otherwise we might get a league in which the preponder- 
 ating influence would be with autocratic emperors. But 
 in making peace the future league must be kept in view. 
 Everything must be done that will further it, and noth- 
 ing that will hinder it. And what would hinder it most 
 would be a peace by which either there should be a re- 
 turn to the conditions before the war but of that there 
 is little fear or by which any one power, or group of 
 powers, should be given a hegemony over the others. 
 For that would mean a future war for the rehabilitation 
 of the vanquished. 
 
 The mood, therefore, which seems to be growing in 
 England, that the British must "punish" Germany by 
 annihilating her as a political force; the mood which 
 seems to be growing in Germany, that she must annihilate 
 
 79
 
 View of 
 peoples must 
 supersede 
 view of 
 governments. 
 
 the British as the great disturbers of the peace all 
 such moods must be resolutely discouraged. For on 
 those lines no permanent peace can be made. Militarism 
 must be destroyed, not only in Germany but everywhere. 
 Limitation of armaments must be general, not imposed 
 only on the vanquished by victors who propose them- 
 selves to remain fully armed. The view of peoples must 
 be substituted once for all for the view of governments, 
 and the view of peoples is no domination, and, there- 
 fore, no war, but a union of nations developing freely 
 on their own lines, and settling all disputes by arbitra- 
 tion. 
 
 G. Lowes Dickinson, "The War and the Way Out," 
 Atlantic Monthly, Jan. 1915. 
 
 80
 
 LOWES DICKINSON'S PLAN 
 
 Writing in the Atlantic Monthly, Mr. Lowes Dickin- J 
 son attempts to point the moral of the war and to offer !*<* hard- 
 
 TT> A.-L. A.-L. j i. headednees. 
 
 a way out. His theory is that wars are made by govern- 
 ments without the consent and against the interest of 
 their subjects; they are made because the governmental 
 mind is obsessed with the illusion that States are "natural 
 enemies, ' ' that they have always been so and always will 
 be, that force is the only arbiter between them. This 
 fantasy of the governing caste, says Mr. Dickinson, is 
 what rules the State, and through control of foreign 
 policy and the press drags the population to slaughter. 
 The remedy is to shatter the illusion, to assert against 
 the criminal nonsense of the governing mind the human- 
 ity and commonsense of ordinary people. . . . 
 
 Now peace will have to be built on a very hard-headed 
 basis or it will be fragile and illusory. But it is just this 
 hard-headedness which Mr. Dickinson's argument seems 
 to lack. In our opinion he himself is building on an 
 illusion, and if his doctrine prevails among the workers 
 for peace their passion will be misdirected, and their dis- 
 appointment will be as deep as their hopes are high. 
 
 To prove these assertions, we need not go beyond the 
 example which Mr. Dickinson uses, the case of Russia 
 and her desire to hold Constantinople. Mr. Dickinson 
 dismisses this ambition with the statement that "for all 
 purposes of trade, for all peace purposes, the Darda- 
 
 81
 
 ^werh-reie- ne ^ es are open. And it is the interest of all nations 
 vantto alike that they should remain so." "What he is assuming 
 
 power 10 here is that it makes no economic difference whether Con- 
 stantinople is under one political government or another. 
 This is the center of Mr. Dickinson's argument, and it 
 rests on the doctrine of Norman Angell that "political 
 power is a consideration irrelevant to economic power." 
 Is it irrelevant in a case like that of the Dardanelles? 
 The Black Sea region is already a great agricultural 
 exporting region; it is destined most probably to be- 
 come the industrial center of Russia. But to carry out 
 goods, Russian ships must pass through a narrow Turkish 
 strait. Mr. Dickinson says that for all "peace pur- 
 poses" the passage is free. Is it? Let us suppose that 
 Mexico held New York harbor, or that Ecuador held 
 Liverpool. Would these harbors be free to American 
 and English commerce? They would be free if Mexico 
 and Ecuador were highly efficient governments imbued 
 with the doctrine of absolute free trade. Then commerce 
 might pass through easily. But if Mexicans or Ecua- 
 dorians took it into their heads to exercise sovereignty 
 by setting up a tariff zone around New York or Liver- 
 pool, who would regard political power as irrelevant to 
 economic power? Certainly not the Manchester ex- 
 porter as he paid his customs tax to the pleasant official 
 from Ecuador. 
 
 Although England is in no danger from Ecuador, 
 there are nations in the world which suffer just as fan- 
 tastically. There is the case of Servia, shut off from a 
 "window on the sea." Servia exports pigs, when she 
 isn't fighting for the privilege of exporting them. But 
 to export anything she has to run the gauntlet of an 
 Austrian tariff to the north, Albanian and Greek dis- 
 crimination to the west and south. Shut off from the 
 sea, she is like a man trying to get out of a restaurant 
 
 82
 
 who has still to tip the waiter, the headwaiter, the girl ^l tic&l 
 who took care of his hat, and the boy who brushed it. p w er is an 
 
 ... . -11 'i instrument 
 
 Political power is not in the least irrelevant to economic for 
 power. Mr. Dickinson has no doubt heard of a thing Conc 
 which we Americans call vulgarly "dollar diplomacy." 
 European powers do not call it that, but they practise 
 it. They call it staking out ' ' spheres of influence, ' ' and 
 there is nothing sentimental or illusory about it. The 
 nation that can secure political control of an undeveloped 
 country can decide who shall receive the mining rights 
 and the railroad franchises, can fix railroad rates to 
 favor its own manufacturers, can use all the methods 
 which Americans describe as restraint of trade. It may 
 have been dishonest, it certainly wasn 't a delusion, when 
 capitalists in those dreadful early days of this republic 
 bought political power to further economic ends. A 
 legislature or a governor was generally worth the price 
 in this country, and we presume that they would be 
 worth the price in Asia Minor. If German bureau- 
 crats governed Morocco, they would, we suppose, be good 
 to their friends, almost all of whom have at least a nomi- 
 nal residence east of Belgium, and French capitalists 
 might then be prospecting fresh mines and pastures new. 
 
 Mr. Dickinson ignores these considerations when he 
 speaks of national antagonisms arising "because a few 
 men of the military and diplomatic caste have a theory 
 about States, their interests and destinies." He ignores 
 the monopolies, the use of tariffs, the special privileges 
 of which political power is the instrument. He does not 
 face the fact that in every country there are exporters 
 of goods and capital, concession-hunters and traders, who 
 stand to gain by the use of governmental power in half 
 developed territory. To them at least it is not a matter 
 of indifference whether Germany is politically supreme 
 in say India or China. Since Germany has brought the 
 
 83
 
 theor rn not ntol doctrine ^ protection to its highest point, it would make 
 mere illusion, a very great difference to the commerce of other nations 
 if Germany developed a world-empire. 
 
 How little reality there is in Mr. Dickinson's con- 
 tention may be seen by analyzing his concrete propos- 
 als. Apart from the shattering of the great illusion of 
 the governmental mind by a propaganda, he suggests 
 a settlement of Europe on the basis of nationality, capped 
 by a League of Europe to maintain the peace. 
 
 Now there are all sorts of reasons for trying to found 
 States on nationality, and the only reason against the 
 proposal is the reason on which Mr. Dickinson's article 
 is built. He tells us on one page that "ordinary peo- 
 ple, in the course of their daily lives, do not think at all 
 in terms of the state." Then what difference does it 
 make to people of the same nationality that they should 
 be under different governments, and how is the world's 
 peace to be assured by gathering into one State people 
 who do not care about the State ? Either the people have 
 an interest in the State or they have not, but surely it is 
 futile for Mr. Dickinson to argue in one place against 
 the German contention that their emigrants are "lost," 
 and in another that the Danes of Schleswig-Holstein 
 should go back to Denmark. And what does he mean 
 by telling us that in the event of an Austro-German 
 victory "Italy and the Balkans will be pillaged to 
 the benefit of Austria, and Russia rolled back though 
 that would be all to the good from her ambition to ex- 
 pand in the West." Is Mr. Dickinson also afflicted with 
 the "governmental mind," that he should talk of "bene- 
 fit" to Austria and pronounce it good that "Russia" be 
 rolled back? What does he mean by telling us that 
 "the English and the French must not take the German 
 colonies, or the Russians the Baltic coast, the Balkans, 
 or Constantinople," for what difference does it make, 
 
 84
 
 except to the "governmental mind," who exercises polit- J 
 ical power? crucial 
 
 As for the League of Europe, surely no one here would 
 wish to obstruct the plan. But if the League is to be 
 based on nothing more realistic than an absence of gov- 
 ernmental thinking, it will be a very precarious league. 
 Every argument advanced by 1 Mr. Dickinson is based on 
 the assumption of absolute free trade in the world, yet 
 in his plan of peace he says not one syllable about how 
 tariffs and discriminations and monopolies are to be 
 wiped out. The conflict between Germany and Eng- 
 land is world-wide, yet Mr. Dickinson is thinking only 
 of rectified frontiers in Europe. 
 
 When he proposes so readily a League of Europe with 
 a police force to carry out its jurisdiction, has he con- 
 sidered the possibility of civil war within the League? 
 If Germany and Austria rebelled against the League, 
 they would presumably be attacked on all sides. But 
 they are now attacked on all sides. We had on this con- 
 tinent a league of States with a central government, a 
 Supreme Court, and an army. In 1861 some of the 
 States seceded, and the struggle which followed, called a 
 Civil War, was a terrible conflict. Has Mr. Dickinson 
 faced the fact that a League of Europe would be based 
 on the status quo, would be a sort of legalization of every 
 existing injustice? And how does he propose to amend 
 peacefully the constitution of Europe if some nation ob- 
 jects too seriously? 
 
 The New Republic, Jan. 2, 1915. 
 
 85
 
 THE MORROW OF THE WAR 
 
 DUE PURPOSE 
 
 ^war* This coun t I T (Great Britain) is at war, and has for 
 
 prepare the moment one overwhelming preoccupation: to render 
 
 safe our national inheritance. 
 
 The Union of Democratic Control has been founded 
 for the purpose of trying to secure for ourselves and 
 the generations that succeed us a new course of policy 
 which will prevent a similar peril ever again befalling 
 our Empire. Many men and women have already 
 joined us holding varying shades of opinion as to the 
 origins of the war. Some think it was inevitable, some 
 that it could and should have been avoided. But we 
 believe that all are in general agreement about two 
 things: First, it is imperative that the war, once be- 
 gun, should be prosecuted to a victory for our country. 
 Secondly, it is equally imperative, while we carry on the 
 war, to prepare for peace. Hard thinking, free discus- 
 sion, the open exchange of opinion and information are 
 the duty of all citizens to-day, if we are to have any hope 
 that this war will not be what most wars of the past 
 have been merely the prelude to other wars. 
 
 Our contribution to this necessary discussion are the 
 principles put forward for consideration by the Union 
 of Democratic Control. 
 
 The Union of Democratic Control has been created to 
 insist that the following policy shall inspire the actual 
 
 86 "
 
 conditions of peace, and shall dominate the situation 
 after peace has been declared: 
 
 1. No Province shall be transferred from one Govern- 
 ment to another without consent by plebiscite or other- 
 wise of the population of such Province. 
 
 2. No Treaty, Arrangement, or Undertaking shall be 
 entered upon in the name of Great Britain without the 
 sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for en- 
 suring democratic control of foreign policy shall be 
 created. 
 
 3. The Foreign Policy of Great Britain shall not be 
 aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintain- 
 ing the "Balance of Power"; but shall be directed to 
 the establishment of a Concert of the Powers and the 
 setting up of an International Council whose delibera- 
 tions and decisions shall be public, part of the labor of 
 such Council to be the creation of definite Treaties of 
 Arbitration and the establishment of Courts for their 
 interpretation and enforcement. 
 
 4. Great Britain shall propose as part of the Peace 
 settlement a plan for the drastic reduction by consent 
 of the armaments of all the belligerent Powers, and to 
 facilitate that policy shall attempt to secure the general 
 nationalization of the manufacture of armaments, and 
 the control of the export of armaments by one country 
 to another. 
 
 It is the purpose of this pamphlet to elaborate and 
 explain the considerations which underlie the policy out- 
 lined above. 
 
 No Province shall be transferred from one Govern- 
 ment to another without the consent of plebiscite of the 
 population of such Province. 
 
 87
 
 There 
 must b 
 general 
 recognition 
 of principle 
 of plebiscite. 
 
 This condition has been placed first because if ad- 
 hered to practically and in spirit, and if recognized by 
 the European Powers as a principle that must guide 
 all frontier rearrangements, it would help to put an 
 end to European war. 
 
 If no province were retained under a Government's 
 power against the will of its inhabitants, the policy of 
 conquest and the imposition of political power would 
 lose its raison d'etre. 
 
 The subject as a whole is wrapped up, of course, with 
 the principle of democratic government and is not merely 
 a problem of international but of internal politics, and 
 could not be treated briefly in a mere outline like the 
 present. But any one who reflects carefully on the sub- 
 ject will see that the peace in Europe ultimately depends 
 upon the acceptance of this idea. 
 
 It is obvious that there are many difficulties of detail 
 in its application ; that a plebiscite may be a. mere form 
 and not reflect the real wishes of the population con- 
 cerned, and under military control it can be used as an 
 instrument for obtaining an apparent sanction for op- 
 pression, and that in populations of mixed race it is 
 very difficult of application. But it should not be im- 
 possible to guard against the defeat of the principle 
 through defects in the working machinery. Plebiscites, 
 where used at the end of the war, might be carried out 
 under international supervision. The essential is that 
 the principle involved should be clearly enunciated. 
 
 Fortunately the Government has already given the 
 country a valuable lead in this matter. For Mr. 
 Churchill, speaking on September 11, said: 
 
 "Now the war has come, and when it is over let us 
 be careful not to make the same mistake or the same sort 
 of mistake as Germany made when she had France pros- 
 trate at her feet in 1870. [Cheers.] Let us, what- 
 
 88
 
 ever we do, fight for and work towards great and sound 
 principles for the European system, and the first of 
 those principles which we should keep before us is the another 
 principle of nationality that is to say, not the conquest 
 or subjugation of any great community, or of any strong 
 race of men, but the setting free of those races which 
 have been subjugated and conquered; and if doubt 
 arises about disputed areas of country we should try to 
 settle their ultimate destination in the reconstruction 
 of Europe which must follow from this war with a fair 
 regard to the wishes and feelings of the people who live 
 in them." 
 
 We agree with Mr. Churchill that the terms of peace 
 should secure that there shall in the future be no more 
 Alsace-Lorraines to create during half a century resent- 
 ment, unrest, and intrigues for a revanche. The power 
 of the victorious parties must not be used for vindictive 
 oppression and dismemberment of beaten nationalities, 
 but for the creation, by cooperation with all the bellig- 
 erents, victors and vanquished alike, of a true society of 
 nations, banded together for mutual security. The 
 future relationship of the States of Europe must be not 
 that of victor and vanquished, domination or subserv- 
 iency, but of partnership. The struggle of one nation 
 for domination over another must be replaced by the 
 association of the people for their common good. 
 
 n 
 
 No Treaty, Arrangement, or Undertaking shall "be 
 entered upon in the name of Great Britain without the 
 sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for en- 
 suring democratic control of foreign policy shall be 
 created. 
 
 89
 
 The peoples of all constitutionally-governed countries 
 are justified in demanding that diplomatic relations 
 with their neighbors shall be conducted with the main 
 object of maintaining friendly international intercourse. 
 The increasing social and economic interdependence, the 
 ramifications of the credit system, the facility and ra- 
 pidity of intercommunication, the developing community 
 of intellectual interest, the growth of a collective social 
 consciousness, are combining to minimize the significance 
 of the purely political frontiers which divide civilized 
 States. For these reasons the world is moving towards 
 conferences when political difficulties arise as a substi- 
 tute for war. The determination to preserve national 
 ideals and traditions offers no real obstacle. But the 
 common interest of civilized democracies cannot be ad- 
 vanced by a secret diplomacy out of touch with demo- 
 cratic sentiment. 
 
 The anomaly of such practises in a democratic State 
 has only to be understood to be condemned. All the do- 
 mestic activities of a constitutional Government are 
 tested in the crucible of public analysis and criticism. 
 But the Government department charged with the super- 
 vision of the nation's intercourse with its neighbors, 
 which if wrongly handled may react with ruinous effect 
 upon the whole field of its domestic activities and upon 
 the future of its entire social economy, not only escapes 
 efficient public control, but considers itself empowered 
 to commit the nation to specific courses and to involve 
 it in obligations to third parties entailing the risk of war, 
 without the nation's knowledge of consent. 
 
 During the past eight years particularly, the manage- 
 ment of the Foreign department has become avowedly 
 and frankly autocratic. Parliamentary discussion of 
 foreign policy has become so restricted as to be per- 
 functory. It is confined to a few hours' roving debate 
 
 90
 
 on one day in each session. The eliciting of information 
 by means of questions, never satisfactory, is rendered policy 
 extremely difficult by the ingenuity employed in evading autocratic, 
 the issues it is attempted to raise. Advantage has been 
 taken of the wholesome desire that discussion of foreign 
 policy should not partake of mere party recriminations, 
 to burke discussion altogether, and this process has re- 
 ceived the endorsement of both Front Benches. A claim 
 to ' ' continuity ' ' has been further evolved to stifle debate 
 on foreign affairs, whereas in point of fact, if one feature 
 more than another has characterized British foreign pol- 
 icy of recent years, it has been its bewildering fluctua- 
 tions. Parliamentary paralysis has had its counterpart 
 in the country. The present Government's tenure of 
 office has been marked by an almost complete abstention 
 from public reference to foreign affairs. The public has 
 been treated as though foreign affairs were outside and 
 properly outside its ken. And the public has ac- 
 quiesced. Every attempt to shake its apathy has been 
 violently assailed by spokesmen of the Foreign Office 
 in the press. The country has been told that its affairs 
 were in the wisest hands, and that mystery and silence 
 are the indispensable attributes to a successful direction 
 of foreign policy. The caste system which prevails in 
 the diplomatic service, and which has survived unim- 
 paired the democratizing of the majority of the public 
 services, facilitates these outworn political dogmatisms. 
 Appointment is made by nomination and selection. Can- 
 didates are required to possess an income per annum 
 of 400. The natural result is that the vast bulk of the 
 national intelligence is debarred from the diplomatic 
 field of employment. A study of the Foreign Office 
 list will disclose the fact that over 95 per cent, of the 
 British diplomatic staff is composed of members of the 
 aristocracy and landed gentry. 
 
 91
 
 Inevitable exile from their country results in our 
 diplomatic representatives abroad losing touch with the 
 nessi" center of affairs and living in a mental atmosphere re- 
 
 mote from the popular and progressive movements of the 
 time. Another pronounced characteristic of the system 
 is the indifference displayed by the Foreign Office to the 
 business interests of the nation. Our vast commercial 
 interests, so intimately affected by our relations with 
 foreign Powers, are regarded as lying outside the orbit 
 of diplomatic considerations. The connection between 
 politics and business and by business we mean the 
 entire framework of peaceful commerce upon which the 
 prosperity of this country depends appears to be ig- 
 nored, or, at least, treated with indifference and some- 
 thing like contempt. The services of our Consuls abroad 
 are not sufficiently utilized, and the Consular machinery 
 requires complete overhauling. Such questions as, for 
 instance, the effect upon British commercial interest of 
 British diplomacy supporting the acquisition of unde- 
 veloped areas of the world's surface by a Power like 
 France, which imposes differential tariffs upon British 
 goods, and opposing the acquisition of such areas by a 
 Power like Germany, which admits British goods on 
 terms of equality, does not appear to enter into Foreign 
 Office calculations. 
 
 In the last few years also has been added another in- 
 stitution which modifies national policy without coming 
 under Parliamentary control, the Committee of Imperial 
 Defense. Its influence upon the Cabinet is nominally 
 indirect, and its activities confined to the discussion of 
 hypothetical events. But no one can doubt that its 
 recommendations exercise a powerful effect on the execu- 
 tive decisions of the Government. No criticism of the 
 advice given by the Committee is possible in Parliament. 
 Momentous military and naval schemes are prepared 
 
 92
 
 there on which hang the issues of peace and war, as in 
 the case of our recent relations to France. It is an inti- military. ex- 
 mate and powerful means of framing Government policy Parliamentary 
 according to the ideas of military experts, without the 
 knowledge and control of Parliament. 
 
 In the various ways indicated, opportunities of evinc- 
 ing an intelligent concern in its foreign policy has been 
 increasingly withdrawn from the nation. The work of 
 the Department escapes all outside control, loses all 
 sense of contact with national life, and tends more and 
 more to become an autocratic institution, contemptuous 
 of the efforts of a small group of members in the House 
 to acquire information, and utilizing a powerful section 
 of the press to mold public opinion in the direction it 
 considers public opinion should travel. 
 
 The nation awoke with a shock to the evils of this state 
 of affairs in the summer of 1911, when it suddenly found 
 itself on the very brink of war with Germany over a 
 Franco-German quarrel about Morocco, and became cog- 
 nizant of the existence of diplomatic entanglements of 
 which it had no previous intimation. 
 
 It is obviously impossible to attempt here a full pre- 
 sentment of the Moroccan crisis of 1911. But the story 
 is inseparably intertwined with the avowals to the House 
 of Commons on August 3rd, 1914, of the secret under- 
 standing with France which has played so capital a part 
 in bringing about British intervention in the present 
 war. 
 
 So long as this situation prevails it must be perfectly 
 clear to any man of ordinary intelligence that the sys- 
 tem of government under which we live is not a demo- 
 cratic system, but its antithesis. It cannot be too often 
 insisted upon that the domestic concerns of the nation, 
 its constitutional liberties, its social reforms, all its in- 
 ternal activities in short, depend upon the preservation 
 
 93
 
 Nation must O f peaceful relations with its neighbors. War in which 
 
 participate in . 
 
 direction of this country is involved is certain to prove a serious 
 check to social progress. Hence it is a matter of abso- 
 lutely vital concern to the nation that the machinery of 
 its Foreign Office should be thoroughly capable of per- 
 forming its functions, and that the policy pursued by 
 that department should be pursued with the knowledge 
 and the consent of the nation. It is imperative not only 
 that a treaty with a foreign Power should require endorse- 
 ment by Parliament, but that no agreement or under- 
 standing possessing binding force and postulating the use 
 of the national military and naval forces should be valid 
 without the assent of Parliament. The nation should 
 insist upon this essential reform, and should seriously 
 apply itself to considering what other steps are needed 
 to ensure some mechanical means whereby a greater na- 
 tional control of foreign policy can be secured; whether 
 by the establishment of a permanent Committee of the 
 House of Commons, by the adaptation to suit our needs 
 of the American system under which, a two-thirds ma- 
 jority of one branch of the Legislature is required for 
 the validity of international agreements, or other pro- 
 cedure. But real and permanent reforms will not "be 
 obtained unless the nation is determined to assert its 
 fundamental right to participate in the formation of its 
 own foreign policy. 
 
 m 
 
 The Foreign Policy of Great Britain shall not ~be aimed 
 at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining 
 the "Balance of Power" ; but shall be directed to the 
 establishment of a Concert of Europe and the setting 
 up of an International Council whose deliberati&ns and 
 decisions shall be public. 
 
 94
 
 What does the "Balance of Power" mean? ^Balance 
 
 It is popularly supposed to mean that no single Power of Power." 
 or group of Powers should, in the interests of interna- 
 tional peace, be allowed to acquire a preponderating 
 position in Europe, and that the policy of Great Britain 
 should be directed against such a consummation. Brit- 
 ish policy during the past few years has been based upon 
 the assumption that Germany had attained, or was seek- 
 ing to attain, that position of eminence. 
 
 It is that idea which, in the minds of masses of our 
 people, justifies the present war. 
 
 But if this policy has been right in the past, what 
 prospect does the future hold ? The victory of the Allies 
 which is a vital necessity must enormously upset the 
 ''balance" by making Russia the dominant military 
 power of Europe, possibly the dictator both in this Con- 
 tinent and in Asia. 
 
 Eussia can draw upon vast sources of human military 
 material, only partly civilized. At present she is gov- 
 erned by a military autocracy which is largely hostile 
 to "Western ideas of political and religious freedom. 
 There is hope in the minds of Western Liberals that the 
 war may bring political liberation to Russia. At pres- 
 ent that is only a hope. For wars have as often been a 
 prelude to tyranny as to liberty. It is only too likely 
 that after a victorious war our national feeling may re- 
 vert to its old anti-Russian channel, and we shall again 
 have the "Balance of Power" invoked to protect Europe 
 and India against a new Russian preeminence. 
 
 Speaking generally, the "Balance of Power" is little 
 more than a diplomatic formula made use of by the 
 mouthpieces of the interests from whose operations war 
 comes. It signifies nothing more than that, at a given 
 moment, in a given country, there is an effort to hold up 
 to the public gaze the Government and the people of an- 
 
 95
 
 <3?the L other country as being intent upon the destruction of its 
 in making neighbors. At one moment it is Russia, at another 
 France, and at another Germany. The "Balance of 
 Power" was invoked for several years and down to 
 within a few weeks of the Crimean "War to inflame Brit- 
 ish public opinion against France. It was invoked 
 against Russia to justify the Crimean War, and France 
 was chosen as the ally with which to fight Russia! No 
 sooner had peace been signed than France became once 
 more the potential threat to the "Balance of Power"; 
 and again during the period of rivalry in West and Cen- 
 tral Africa, and in the Far East, in the late nineties. 
 
 Once the ball has been set rolling in the required direc- 
 tion, influences of all kinds are brought to bear for the 
 purpose of permanently fixing this idea in the public 
 mind. A flood of innuendo, denunciation, and distorted 
 information is let loose. Every dishonorable motive and 
 the most sinister of projects are attributed to the Gov- 
 ernment and the people selected for attack. The public 
 becomes the sport of private ambitions and interests, of 
 personal prejudices and obscure passions, which it can 
 neither detect nor control, and, for the most part, does 
 not even suspect. The power for mischief wielded by 
 these forces is to-day immense, owing to a cheap press 
 and to the concentration of a large number of news- 
 papers, possessing in the aggregate an enormous circula- 
 tion, under one directing will. At the present moment 
 the editorial and news columns of some fifty British 
 newspapers echo the views of one man, who is thus able 
 to superimpose in permanent fashion upon public thought 
 the dead weight of his own prejudices or personal aims 
 and intentions, and to exercise a potent influence upon 
 the Government of the day. 
 
 For the last few years these newspapers have striven 
 with unceasing pertinacity to create an atmosphere of 
 
 96
 
 ill-will and suspicion between Great Britain and Ger- 
 many. The effort has been continuous, systematic, and f Power" 
 magnificently organized, and inferential evidence is not 
 lacking that it has been pursued with the approval and 
 even with the assistance of certain official influences, and 
 to the satisfaction of certain foreign Governments. This 
 propaganda has had, needless to say, its counterpart in 
 Germany. The net result of the latest recrudescence of 
 the "Balance of Power" policy with its Alliances and 
 Ententes as the dominating factor in international rela- 
 tionships is now visible to all men. A quarrel (whose 
 culminating episode was the murder in a Bosnian town 
 of the heir to the Austrian throne last June) between 
 Austria and Serbia, to which the Russian Government 
 determined to become a party, has already involved the 
 peoples of France, Belgium, Britain, and Germany, the 
 first three of whom were not even remotely concerned, in 
 a terrible and desolating war. 
 
 Japan and Montenegro have also become involved, and 
 the same fate may overtake Holland, Italy, the other 
 Balkan States, and the Scandinavian Powers. But for 
 the policy of the "Balance of Power" the results of the 
 quarrel would almost certainly have been confined to 
 the parties immediately affected, and an early mediation 
 by the neutral Powers would have been possible. 
 
 Bright 's scathing denunciation of the fetish of the 
 "Balance of Power" appeals with even greater force to 
 us to-day: 
 
 "You cannot comprehend at a thought what is meant 
 by this balance of power. If the record could be 
 brought before you but it is not possible to the eye 
 of humanity to scan the scroll upon which are recorded 
 the sufferings which the theory of the balance of power 
 has entailed upon this country. It rises up before me 
 when I think of it as a ghastly phantom . . . which has 
 
 97
 
 it must be loaded the nation with debt and with taxes, has sacri- 
 
 superseded 
 
 by a council ficed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Englishmen, 
 has desolated the homes of millions of families, and has 
 left us, as the great result of the profligate expenditure 
 which it has caused, a doubled peerage at one end of the 
 social scale, and far more than a doubled pauperism 
 at the other." 
 
 For a system therefore which carries with it the im- 
 plication that the interests of nations are necessarily in 
 constant conflict and which involves the permanent divi- 
 sion of Europe into two hostile competing groups, we 
 must substitute machinery which will facilitate coopera- 
 tion and a reasonable solution of differences between all 
 the peoples of the world. 
 
 The objective should be a real council of the nations 
 with at first very limited powers, rather an expansion 
 of an alliance of three Powers against three, into a 
 league of six Powers, designed to act against any one 
 recalcitrant member which might threaten the peace of 
 the whole. To this ideal, indeed, the pronouncement of 
 Mr. Asquith in his Dublin speech has already pointed, 
 while it is noteworthy that Sir Edward Grey himself 
 seems in a significant passage of one of his despatches 
 to admit the failure of the balance principle and to indi- 
 cate that the nations must ' ' start afresh ' ' on the basis of 
 a general council. This passage is as follows : 
 
 "If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the 
 present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to 
 promote some arrangement to which Germany could be 
 a party, by which she could be assured that no aggres- 
 sive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or 
 her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or 
 separately. I have desired this and worked for it as 
 far as I could through the last Balkan crisis; and Ger- 
 many having a corresponding object, our relations sen- 
 
 98
 
 sibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian ^ 
 to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this mentof 
 
 ' diplomacy 
 
 present cnsis, so much more acute than any Europe has must be 
 gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am 
 hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow 
 may make possible some more definite rapprochement 
 between the Powers than has been possible hitherto." 
 
 It is from some such simple beginning, pursued with 
 good will and perseverance by all parties, that the na- 
 tions may hope to arrive at a system of cooperation to 
 replace the system of hostile alliances, the fruits of 
 which are the present war. 
 
 It is essential, of course, if the negotiations of such a 
 council are to be lifted out of the atmosphere of diplo- 
 matic intrigue which the secrecy of negotiations always 
 involves, that its deliberations be public. Publicity will 
 at one and the same time be a guarantee of openness, of 
 good faith, and of democratic control. 
 
 rv 
 
 Great Britain shall propose as part of the Peace settle- 
 ment a plan for the drastic reduction by consent of the 
 armaments of all the belligerent Poivers, and to facili- 
 tate that policy shall attempt to secure the general na- 
 tionalization of the manufacture of armaments, and the 
 control of the export of armaments by one country to 
 another. 
 
 The theory of the "Balance of Power" and secret 
 diplomacy are two factors which, in combination, make 
 for war. 
 
 Two other factors intimately connected with these 
 ensure its certainty. They are: a constant progression 
 in expenditure upon armaments, and the toleration of a 
 private armament interest. 
 
 99
 
 e labor wasted to endeavor to apportion 
 mean the responsibility between the various European Govern- 
 
 bankruptcy . . 
 
 of states- ments for the insane competition in armaments which of 
 recent years has attained incredible proportions. No 
 government can escape liability. Each government has 
 defended its policy on the ground that its neighbor's 
 action compelled it to do so. Many of the governing 
 statesmen of the world have alternately confessed their 
 helplessness, attacked their rivals, appealed to public 
 opinion, and blamed the warlike tendencies inherent in 
 the people whose destinies they control. Every govern- 
 ment, without exception, has proceeded on the assump- 
 tion that in order to ensure peace it had to be stronger 
 than its neighbor, a philosophy which could have but one 
 possible outcome war. In pursuance of this phantom, 
 a considerable proportion of the wealth of the European 
 States has been wasted, and activities have been with- 
 drawn from the constructive work of the world, to pre- 
 pare for the world *s destruction. And with every fresh 
 outburst of expenditure, responding to some diplomatic 
 check or alarmist propaganda, fresh fagots have been 
 piled around Europe's powder magazine. The disaster 
 which has fallen upon Europe is the fitting sequel to 
 the bankruptcy of statesmanship which this policy em- 
 bodies. 
 
 The more extensive the armaments, the greater the 
 temptation to seize an opportunity for testing their 
 efficiency; the greater the nervousness and irritation of 
 Governments when negotiating; the greater the pres- 
 sure upon those Governments of the powerful profes- 
 sional and other interests concerned in armament con- 
 struction. 
 
 The policy of gigantic armaments cannot in the very 
 nature of things ensure any final settlement of disputes 
 between States. It leads, and can only lead, to an in- 
 
 100
 
 tolerable situation from which war comes to be regarded 
 
 by diplomacy as the only escape. rests in 
 
 government 
 
 An all-round limitation of armaments must follow the demand, 
 present war if the world is to be permanently relieved 
 of the nightmare which has weighed upon it for so long. 
 We can no longer afford to listen to arguments as to the 
 impracticability of such a course from those whose claims 
 to the possession of human wisdom and experienced 
 guidance have so utterly broken down. 
 
 The difficulty of compelling a change in the policy of 
 European Governments has been intensified by the con- 
 ditions under which armament construction is carried on 
 in this and other countries. Every one is familiar with 
 the fact that the object of a commercial firm is to push 
 its wares in every legitimate manner, to advertise them, 
 and systematically to tout for orders both at home and 
 abroad. Every one is aware that there exists a power- 
 fully-equipped industry for the manufacture of military 
 and naval engines and instruments of offense. Disguise 
 it as we may, that industry waxes and wanes, the profits 
 its management derives rise and fall, the dividends 
 earned by its shareholders increase and dwindle in the 
 measure of the demand for the articles it produces. 
 That demand does not emanate from members of the 
 public. It emanates from the military and naval de- 
 partments of the public services. The industry relies, 
 therefore, for its existence and for its profits not upon a 
 private demand, but upon a Government demand, and 
 the extent of that Government demand will depend upon 
 the view which the Government may take of the number 
 and nature of these articles required to ensure the na- 
 tional safety. Such a condition of affairs is a permanent 
 and terrible danger both to democratic government and 
 to international peace. What are its implications? 
 
 There is created in every country an economi' force 
 101
 
 and creates j n private hands directly interested in war and in the 
 
 an economic * . . . . . 
 
 force inter- preparation for war; directly interested in assisting 
 preparedness, to bring about a general atmosphere advantageous to an 
 industry which, were wars to cease or the expenditure 
 on armaments to be substantially reduced, would suffer 
 accordingly. What the successful prosecution of an or- 
 dinary commercial undertaking requires this industry 
 also requires. The demand for the article must be 
 created. That basic situation engenders effects which 
 can only be appreciated in their cumulative significance. 
 It is not at all necessary to attribute sinister machina- 
 tions to individuals. These effects are automatic. An 
 industry disposing, as does this one, of an enormous ag- 
 gregate of capital possesses almost unlimited power of 
 influence and suggestion. For such purposes the press 
 is a potent instrument ready at hand. Many of those 
 most closely associated with this great industry are men 
 of considerable influence. Some have been in the public 
 service and have acquaintances in the Government De- 
 partments. Others may be on friendly and perfectly 
 honorable terms with the proprietors or editors of news- 
 papers or associations of newspapers. The proprietor 
 of a newspaper may be honestly convinced, or may by 
 arguments be persuaded, that an agitation for increased 
 armaments is advisable. If he is acquainted with one 
 of the directors of the armament industry that ac- 
 quaintance will hardly act as a deterrent to his enter- 
 taining those views. He may be furnished with special 
 information, accurate or otherwise, as to the projects, 
 real or alleged, of other Governments, which will be fa- 
 miliar to the director through his connection with Con- 
 tinental branches of the same industry. The press may 
 be utilized in a similar manner by certain permanent 
 officials in the nation's Foreign Department, who feel 
 that their views of the international situation can be best 
 
 102
 
 served by a press campaign of a certain kind. The in- ?" e !f ts 
 fluence of the industry which stands to gain from the manipulate 
 
 . , ,, I IT is government. 
 
 existence of these views, and the willingness of news- 
 paper editors and proprietors to push them on to the 
 public, cannot be expected to intervene against their 
 propagation. Again, an ambitious Minister, in charge 
 of one of the fighting branches of the public service, 
 desirous of placing his personality in the limelight and 
 focusing public attention upon the affairs of his De- 
 partment, will be from that circumstance a readier lis- 
 tener to representations from the industry in question. 
 Those representations may quite legitimately take the 
 form of pointing out that heavy expenses have been in- 
 curred in providing a certain type of machinery or spe- 
 cial accommodation for the construction of a particular 
 kind of offensive instrument, that the orders have not 
 kept pace with the expenditure, and that if further 
 orders be not forthcoming losses will ensue and future 
 facilities for production be necessarily restricted. There 
 would be nothing indefensible in representations of this 
 character. And again, it is not unlikely that a member 
 of Parliament, convinced of certain public dangers as- 
 sociated with the existing system, but representing a 
 constituency where this great industry is established and 
 employs, perhaps, not an inconsiderable section of the 
 local labor, may find his freedom of speech considerably 
 curtailed lest he should be accused of taking the bread 
 from the mouths of some of his constituents. 
 
 Endless, indeed, are the ramifications of a private in- 
 dustrial interest so wealthy and so well organized, and 
 dependent for its profits upon national expenditure in 
 instruments of warfare, and, consequently, in the ulti- 
 mate resort, upon war itself. The general influence 
 exerted upon public life as a whole ~by the very fact that 
 this industry is a private one, and possesses a large body 
 
 103
 
 of shareholders usually belonging to the upper strata 
 of society, cannot be regarded otherwise than as an un- 
 healthy and dangerous element in the nation. Empha- 
 sis is lent to this aspect of the case when it is borne in 
 mind that the armaments industry has of late years be- 
 come internationalized to a remarkable degree. Recent 
 disclosures, the accuracy of which has not been disputed, 
 in Germany, France, England, and Japan, have clearly 
 shown an inter-connection of the armament interest pro- 
 ductive of repellent accompaniments. This inter-con- 
 nection of interest has, for example, made it possible for 
 a body of British shareholders, including prominent ec- 
 clesiastics, members of Parliament, and even Cabinet 
 Ministers, to be financially interested in enterprises en- 
 gaged in the manufacture of engines of destruction 
 impartially used in the slaughter of Englishmen, French- 
 men, Germans, and Russians. 
 
 But however revolting this may be, it is insignificant 
 compared with the graver peril to which precedent allu- 
 sion has been made. Reflection must bring with it the 
 conviction that the armament industry is not one which 
 the nation can safely permit to be retained in private 
 hands and to be the subject of private profit. 
 
 What, then, is to be our policy in connection with the 
 war? First and foremost we must be victorious. That 
 is a prime necessity upon which the nation is unanimous. 
 We must win not only because many British institutions 
 of the highest value would be destroyed by our defeat, 
 not only because Prussia, our principal enemy, is the 
 leading exponent of that doctrine of military domina- 
 tion and intolerance which is incompatible with a per- 
 manently peaceful Europe; but also because we must 
 see justice done, as far as may be, to the least powerful 
 of our Allies. Ample compensation must be secured for 
 
 104
 
 Belgium to repair her material loss and in recognition 
 
 of the wrong done to her. must do. 
 
 What of the future? What lessons do the incompet- 
 ence and secret! veness, the jealousies and vanities of that 
 vaunted European statecraft which has plunged the 
 world in war convey to the peoples who are its victims? 
 
 What can the people do to amend a system under 
 which they are used as pawns in a game of chess ? 
 
 They can begin to understand what that system is and 
 that its existence is their undoing. They can begin to 
 understand the monstrous errors and fallacies which 
 underlie the whole teaching imposed upon their intelli- 
 gence. They can begin to understand that this im- 
 munity from public control enjoyed by the small group 
 of professional men who manipulate international rela- 
 tions has led to the establishment amongst the latter of 
 a standard of conduct which would not be tolerated in 
 the ordinary affairs of a well-ordered community. They 
 can begin to understand that "high politics" in the 
 diplomatic world has become a synonym for intrigue; 
 that a code of morals is therein practised which, in other 
 branches of the public service, would entail dismissal, 
 and in the business world would involve disgrace. 
 
 They can force themselves to a mental effort which 
 shall lead them to the realization of the complete arti- 
 ficiality of the conditions under which they suffer, the 
 remoteness from their real and vital needs of the issues 
 for which they are asked to sacrifice all that they hold 
 dear. They can rid themselves of the paralyzing belief 
 that their relations with their neighbors are so compli- 
 cated and mysterious as to be beyond their comprehen- 
 sion. They can bring themselves to grasp a plain and 
 demonstrable truth, and to appreciate its full signifi- 
 cance, which is that those to whom they have looked 
 for guidance, *hose who have told them that in the pre- 
 105
 
 servation of the "Balance of Power," and in the multi- 
 plication of colossal armaments lay the one chance of 
 international peace, have been utterly, hopelessly, calam- 
 itously wrong. They can put to themselves these simple 
 issues. 
 
 "By the terrible logic of events which now confront 
 us we see that the methods advocated by those to whose 
 training and wisdom we trusted to ensure peace among 
 the nations have entirely failed. The system which we 
 were induced reluctantly to support, far from preserving 
 peace, has precipitated us into the greatest conflict in 
 history, a conflict we passionately desired to avoid, and 
 for the avoidance of which we made heavy sacrifices 
 because, we were told, that therein lay our hope of 
 averting it. The system was wrong. We must evolve 
 another. ' ' 
 
 The idea of a federalized Europe, regulated by an 
 Areopagus, involving the disappearance, or substantial 
 reduction, of standing armies and navies, and the sub- 
 mission of all disputes to a Central Council, is not to 
 be dismissed. It is the ultimate goal to aim at. But it 
 cannot be attained until the constitutionally governed 
 democracies of the "West are brought to realize how im- 
 possible it is that their moral and spiritual development 
 and their happiness and well-being can be secured under 
 a system of government which leaves them at the mercy 
 of the intrigues and imbecilities of professional diplo- 
 matists and of the ambitions of military castes ; helpless, 
 too, in the face of an enormously powerful and inter- 
 nationalized private interest dependent for its profits 
 upon the maintenance of that "armed peace" which is 
 the inevitable prelude to the carnage and futility of 
 war. 
 
 To awaken these sentiments among the democracies of 
 this and other countries, to instil into them these con- 
 
 106
 
 victions, to ensure the cooperation of all forces in all 
 countries working to that end is the task to which different 
 
 countries 
 
 we must all turn our attention. must co- 
 
 Potentates, diplomatists, and militarists made this 
 war. They should not be allowed to arrange unchecked 
 and uncontrolled the terms of peace and to decide alone 
 the conditions which will follow it. The mass of the 
 people who suffer from their blunders and their quar- 
 rels must claim the ineradicable right of participating 
 in the future settlement. 
 
 And, when peace has come, the democratic parties of 
 Europe must set before themselves a new province of 
 political effort. That peace will be permanently pre- 
 served only if our artisans and industrialists keep up 
 with the artisans and industrialists of other countries a 
 constant and deliberate communication through their 
 political parties and other organizations which will pre- 
 vent misunderstandings and subdue the hatreds out of 
 which war ultimately comes. 
 
 "The Morrow of the War," Union of Democratic 
 Control, London, Bulletin No. 1. 
 
 107
 
 NO PEACE WITHOUT FEDERATION 
 
 The war has The great war has now been going on long enough to 
 mankind. enable mankind to form approximately correct views 
 about its vast extent and scale of operations, its sud- 
 den interference with commerce and all other helpful 
 international intercourse, its unprecedented wrecking 
 of family happiness and continuity, its wiping out, as 
 it proceeds, of the accumulated savings of many former 
 generations in structures, objects of art, and industrial 
 capital, and the huge burdens it is likely to impose on 
 twentieth-century Europe. From all these points of 
 view, it is evidently the most horrible calamity that has 
 ever befallen the human race, and the most crucial trial 
 to which civilization has been exposed. It is, and is to 
 be, the gigantic struggle of these times between the forces 
 which make for liberty and righteousness and those 
 which make for the subjection of the individual man, 
 the exaltation of the State, and the enthronement of 
 physical force directed by a ruthless collective will. It 
 threatens a sweeping betrayal of the best hopes of man- 
 kind. 
 
 Each of the nations involved, horrified at the immen- 
 sity of the disaster, maintains that it is not responsible 
 for the war; and each Government has issued a state- 
 ment to prove that some other Government is respon- 
 sible for the outbreak. This discussion, however, re- 
 lates almost entirely to actions by monarchs and Cab- 
 inets between July 23 and August 4 a short period of 
 
 108
 
 hurried messages between the chancelleries of Europe ^ 
 actions which only prove that the monarchs and min- th 
 isters for foreign affairs could not, or at least did not, 
 prevent the long-prepared general war from breaking 
 out. The assassination of the Archduke and Duchess of 
 Hohenberg, on the 28th of June, was in no proper sense 
 a cause of the war, except as it was one of the conse- 
 quences of the persistent aggressions of Austria-Hungary 
 against her southeastern neighbors. Neither was Rus- 
 sian mobilization in four military districts on July 29 
 a cause of the war; for that was only an external mani- 
 festation of the Russian state of mind toward the Bal- 
 kan peoples, a state of mind well known to all publicists 
 ever since the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. No more was 
 the invasion of Belgium by the German army on August 
 4 a true cause of the war, or even the cause, as dis- 
 tinguished from the occasion, of Great Britain's becom- 
 ing involved in it. By that action, Germany was only 
 taking the first step in carrying out a long-cherished 
 purpose, and in executing a judicious plan of campaign 
 prepared many years in advance. The artificial panic 
 in Germany about its exposed position between two 
 powerful enemies, France and Russia, was not a gen- 
 uine cause of the war; for the General Staff knew they 
 had crushed France once, and were confident they could 
 do it again in a month. As to Russia, it was, in their 
 view, a huge nation, but very clumsy and dull in war. 
 The real causes of the war are all of many years' 
 standing ; and all the nations now involved in the fearful 
 catastrophe have contributed to the development of one 
 or more of these effective causes. The fundamental 
 causes are: (1) The maintenance of monarchical Gov- 
 ernments, each sanctioned and supported by the national 
 religion, and each furnished with a Cabinet selected by 
 the monarch, Governments which can make war with- 
 
 109
 
 T^ st out any previous consultation of the peoples through 
 cause is their elected representatives; (2) the constant mainten- 
 
 the lust I**] . i i T .1 - 11 
 
 for world- ance of conscript armies, through which the entire able- 
 bodied male population is trained in youth for service 
 in the army or navy, and remains subject to the instant 
 call of the Government till late in life, the officering of 
 these permanent armies involving the creation of a large 
 military class likely to become powerful in political, in- 
 dustrial, and social administration; (3) the creation of 
 a strong, permanent bureaucracy within each nation for 
 the management of both foreign and domestic affairs, 
 much of whose work is kept secret from the public at 
 large; and finally (4) the habitual use of military and 
 naval forces to acquire new territories, contiguous or 
 detached, without regard to the wishes of the people 
 annexed or controlled. This last cause of the war is the 
 most potent of the four, since it is strong in itself, and 
 is apt to include one or more of the other three. It is 
 the gratification of the lust for world-empire. 
 
 Of all the nations taking part in the present war, 
 Great Britain is the only one which does not maintain a 
 conscript army; but, on the other hand, Great Britain 
 is 1 the earliest modern claimant of world-empire by 
 force, with the single exception of Spain, which long 
 since abandoned that quest. Every one of these nations 
 except little Servia has yielded to the lust for empire. 
 Every one has permitted its monarch or its Cabinet to 
 carry on secret negotiations liable at any time to com- 
 mit the nation to war, or to fail in maintaining the peace 
 of Europe or of the Near East. In the crowded diplo- 
 matic events of last July, no phenomenon is more strik- 
 ing than the exhibition of the power which the British 
 people confide to the hands of their Foreign Secretary. 
 In the interests of public liberty and public welfare no 
 official should possess such powers as Sir Edward Grey 
 
 110
 
 used admirably though in vain last July. In all P en ? any t . 
 
 * . * has been the 
 
 three of the empires engaged in the war there has lone leader in im - 
 
 ..,,.,., perialism. 
 
 existed a large military caste which exerts a strong in- 
 fluence on the Government and its policies, and on the 
 daily life of the people. 
 
 These being the real causes of the terrific convulsion 
 now going on in Europe, it cannot be questioned that 
 the nation in which these complex causes have taken 
 strongest and most complete effect during the last fifty 
 years is Germany. Her form of government has been 
 imperialistic and autocratic in the highest degree. She 
 has developed with great intelligence and assiduity the 
 most formidable conscript army in the world, and the 
 most influential and insolent military caste. Three 
 times since 1864 she has waged war in Europe, and each 
 time she has added to her territory without regard to the 
 wishes of the annexed population. For twenty-five years 
 she has exhibited a keen desire to obtain colonial posses- 
 sions ; and since 1896 she has been aggressive in this field. 
 In her schools and universities the children and youth 
 have been taught for generations that Germany is sur- 
 rounded by hostile peoples, that her expansion in Europe 
 and in other continents is resisted by jealous Powers 
 which started earlier in the race for foreign possessions, 
 and that the salvation of Germany has depended from 
 the first, and will depend till the last, on the efficiency of 
 her army and navy and the warlike spirit of her people. 
 This instruction, given year after year by teachers, pub- 
 licists, and rulers, was first generally accepted in Prussia, 
 but now seems to be accepted by the entire empire as 
 unified in 1871. 
 
 The attention of the civilized world was first called 
 to this state of the German mind and will by the tri- 
 umphant policies of Bismarck; but during the reign of 
 the present Emperor the external aggressiveness of Ger- 
 
 111
 
 German many and her passion for world-empire have grown to 
 
 ethics is much more formidable proportions. Although the Ger- 
 valor" and man Emperor has sometimes played the part of the 
 peacemaker, he has habitually acted the war-lord in 
 both speech and bearing, and has supported the military 
 caste whenever it has been assailed. He is by inheri- 
 tance, conviction, and practise a divine-right sovereign 
 whose throne rests on an "invincible" army, an army 
 conterminous with the nation. In the present tremen- 
 dous struggle he carries his subjects with him in a rush- 
 ing torrent of self-sacrificing patriotism. Mass-fanati- 
 cism and infectious enthusiasm seem to have deprived the 
 leading class in Germany, for the moment, of all power 
 to see, reason, and judge correctly no new phenomenon 
 in the world, but instructive in this case because it points 
 to the grave defect in German education the lack of 
 liberty and, therefore, of practise in self-control. 
 
 The twentieth-century educated German is, however, 
 by no means given over completely to material and phys- 
 ical aggrandizement and the worship of might. He 
 cherishes a partly new conception of the State as a col- 
 lective entity whose function is to develop and multiply, 
 not the free, healthy, and happy individual man and 
 woman, but higher and more effective types of humanity, 
 made superior by a strenuous discipline which takes 
 much account of the strong and ambitious, and little of 
 the weak or meek. He rejects the ethics of the Beati- 
 tudes as unsound, but accepts the religion of Valor, 
 which exalts strength, courage, endurance, and the ready 
 sacrifice by the individual of liberty, happiness, and life 
 itself for Germany's honor and greatness. A nation of 
 sixty millions holding these philosophical and religious 
 views, and proposing to act on them in winning by force 
 the empire of the world, threatens civilization with more 
 formidable irruptions of a destroying host than any that 
 
 112
 
 history has recorded. The rush of the German army ^ 
 into Belgium, France, and Russia and its consequences |J^"y e * 
 to those lands have taught the rest of Europe to dread domination 
 German domination, and it is to be hoped to make it 
 impossible. 
 
 The real cause of the present convulsion is, then, the 
 state of mind or temper of Germany, including her con- 
 ception of national greatness, her theory of the State, 
 and her intelligent and skilful use of all the forces of 
 nineteenth-century applied science for the destructive 
 purposes of war. It is, therefore, apparent that Europe 
 can escape from the domination of Germany only by 
 defeating her in her present undertakings ; and that this 
 defeat can be brought about only by using against her 
 the same effective agencies of destruction and the same 
 martial spirit on which Germany itself relies. Horrible 
 as are the murderous and devastating effects of this war, 
 there can be no lasting peace until Europe as a whole is 
 ready to make some serious and far-reaching decisions 
 in regard to governmental structures and powers. In 
 all probability the sufferings and losses of this wide- 
 spread war must go farther and cut deeper before Eu- 
 rope can be brought to the decisions which alone can 
 give securities for lasting peace against Germany on the 
 one hand and Russia on the other, or to either of these 
 nations, or can give security for the future to any of 
 the smaller nations of Continental Europe. There can, 
 indeed, be no security for future peace in Europe until 
 every European nation recognizes the fact that there is 
 to be no such thing in the world as one dominating na- 
 tion no such thing as world-empire for any single 
 nation Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Japan, or 
 China. There can be no sense of security against sud- 
 den invasion in Europe so long as all the able-bodied 
 men are trained to be soldiers, and the best possible 
 
 113
 
 The hopes for armies are kept constantly ready for instant use. There 
 
 federation .^ J 
 
 instead of can be no secure peace in Europe until a federation of 
 ,the European States is established, capable of making 
 public contracts intended to be kept, and backed by an 
 overwhelming international force subject to the orders 
 of an international tribunal. The present convulsion 
 demonstrates the impotence toward permanent peace of 
 secret negotiations, of unpublished agreements, of trea- 
 ties and covenants that can be broken on grounds of mili- 
 tary necessity, of international law if without sanctions, 
 of pious wishes, of economic and biological predictions, 
 and of public opinion unless expressed through a firm 
 international agreement, behind which stands an inter- 
 national force. When that international force has been 
 firmly established it will be time to consider what pro- 
 portionate reductions in national armaments can be pru- 
 dently recommended. Until that glorious day dawns, 
 no patriot and no lover of his kind can expect lasting 
 peace in Europe or wisely advocate any reduction of 
 armaments. 
 
 The hate-breeding and worse than brutal cruelties and 
 devastations of the war with their inevitable moral and 
 physical degradations ought to shock mankind into at- 
 tempting a great step forward. Europe and America 
 should undertake to exterminate the real causes of the 
 catastrophe. In studying that problem the coming Eu- 
 ropean conference can profit by the experience of the 
 three prosperous and valid countries in which public 
 liberty and the principle of federation have been most 
 successfully developed Switzerland, Great Britain, and 
 the United States. Switzerland is a democratic federa- 
 tion which unites in a firm federal bond three different 
 racial stocks speaking three unlike languages, and di- 
 vided locally and irregularly between the Catholic 
 Church and the Protestant. The so-called British Em- 
 
 114
 
 pire tends strongly to become a federation; and the 
 
 methods of government both in Great Britain itself and possible, even 
 
 . if the road 
 
 in its affiliated commonwealths are becoming more and is long, 
 more democratic in substance. The war has brought 
 this fact out in high relief. As to the United States, it 
 is a strong federation of forty-eight heterogeneous States 
 which has been proving for a hundred years that free- 
 dom and democracy are safer and happier for mankind 
 than subjection to any sort of autocracy, and afford far 
 the best training for national character and national ef- 
 ficiency. Republican France has not yet had time to give 
 this demonstration, being encumbered with many sur- 
 vivals of the Bourbon and Napoleonic regimes, and be- 
 ing forced to maintain a conscript army. 
 
 It is an encouraging fact that every one of the polit- 
 ical or governmental changes needed is already illus- 
 trated in the practise of one or more of the civilized 
 nations. To exaggerate the necessary changes is to post- 
 pone or prevent a satisfactory outcome from the present 
 calculated destructions and wrongs and the accompany- 
 ing moral and religious chaos. Ardent proposals to re- 
 make the map of Europe, reconstruct European society, 
 substitute republics for empires, and abolish armaments 
 are in fact obstructing the road toward peace and good- 
 will among men. That road is hard at best. 
 
 The immediate duty of the United States is presum- 
 ably to prepare, on the basis of its present army and 
 navy, to furnish an effective quota of the international 
 force, servant of an international tribunal, which will 
 make the ultimate issue of this most abominable of wars, 
 not a truce, but a durable peace. 
 
 Charles W. Eliot, "The Road Toward Peace," chap. 
 XI. 
 
 115
 
 PART II 
 A LEAGUE OF PEACE

 
 PART II. A LEAGUE OF PEACE 
 
 BASES FOR CONFEDERATION 
 
 After this war is over, will the nations fall back again The substitu- 
 into the armed peace, the rival alliances, the Balance of nership for 
 Power with competing armaments, the preparations for 
 another war thus made ' ' inevitable, ' ' or will they go for- 
 ward to the realization of the idea of ' ' public right, ' ' as 
 expounded by Mr. Asquith, "the substitution for force, 
 for the clash of competing ambitions, for groupings and 
 alliances and a precarious equipoise, of a real European 
 partnership, based on the recognition of equal rights and 
 established and enforced by the common will?" The 
 preservation and progress of civilization demand that 
 the peoples go forward. But how shall "public right" 
 be realized? 
 
 The issue is, perhaps, best approached by putting a 
 narrower, more concrete question: How can nations be 
 got to reduce their armaments? For this action will be 
 the best test and pledge of the establishment of ' ' public 
 right" and the reliance on a pacific future. Could a 
 conference of Powers bring about a reduction of arma- 
 ments by agreement? Surely not unless the motives 
 which have led them in the past to arm are reversed. 
 These motives are either a desire to be stronger than 
 some other Power, in order to take something from him 
 by force the aggressive motive ; or a desire to be strong 
 enough to prevent some other Power from acting in this 
 way to us the defensive motive. Now how can these 
 
 119
 
 The League 
 of Peace must 
 become an In- 
 ternational 
 government. 
 
 motives be reversed? Nations may enter into a solemn 
 undertaking to refer all differences or disputes that may 
 arise to arbitration or to other peaceful settlement. If 
 they can be got to adhere to such a general agreement, 
 international law and public right will take the place of 
 private force, and wars of aggression and defense will 
 no longer happen. But what will ensure the fulfilment 
 of their undertaking by all the signatory Powers ? Pub- 
 lic opinion and a common sense of justice are found in- 
 adequate safeguards. There must be an executive power 
 enabled to apply an economic boycott, or in the last re- 
 sort an international force. If this power is adequate, 
 it will secure the desired reversal of the offensive and the 
 defensive motives to armaments, and will by a natural 
 process lead to a reduction of national forces. 
 
 But it is not safe for the League of Nations to wait 
 until difficulties ripen into quarrels. There must be 
 some wider power of inquiry and settlement vested in a 
 representative Council of the Nations. This will in sub- 
 stance mean a legislative power. For peace cannot be 
 secured by adopting a purely statical view of the needs 
 and rights of nations in relation to one another. New 
 applications of the principles of political "autonomy" 
 and of "the open door" will become necessary, and some 
 international method of dealing with them is essential. 
 So there emerges the necessity of extending the idea of a 
 League of Peace into that of an International Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The new era of internationalism requires the replace- 
 ment of the secret diplomacy of Powers by the public 
 intercourse of Peoples through their chosen representa- 
 tives. If the Peace which ends this war is to be durable, 
 it must be of a kind to facilitate the setting-up of these 
 new international arrangements. No timid, tentative 
 quarter measures will suffice. Courage and faith are 
 
 120
 
 needed for a great new extension of the art of govern- " Arm ,ea 
 
 peace 
 
 ment. . . . must 
 
 Almost everybody hopes that, when this war is over, renewed. 
 it will be possible to secure the conditions of a lasting 
 peace by reducing the power of militarism and by setting 
 the relations between nations on a better footing. To 
 watchers of the present conflict it seems an intolerable 
 thought that, after the fighting is done, we should once 
 more return to a condition of " armed peace," with 
 jealous, distrustful, and revengeful Powers piling up 
 armaments and plotting singly or in groups against their 
 neighbors until Europe is plunged into another war more 
 terrible, more bloody, and more costly than this. Yet 
 nothing is more certain than that this will happen unless 
 the Peoples which are so vitally concerned are able to 
 mobilize their powers of clear thought, sane feeling, and 
 goodwill in carefully considered plans for a cooperative 
 policy of nations. 
 
 The first great obstacle to the performance of this task 
 is the state of mind of those who seem to think that all 
 that is required is "to crush German militarism," and 
 that, this incubus once removed, the naturally pacific 
 disposition of all other nations will dispose them to live 
 together in amity. It is not easy to induce such persons 
 to consider closely what they mean by "crushing Ger- 
 man militarism, ' ' or how its destruction, whatever it does 
 mean, would secure the peace of Europe, we will not say 
 in perpetuity, but for a single generation. But let us 
 suppose the most complete success for the arms of the 
 Allies, the slaughter or the capture of great German 
 forces, the invasion of Germany, and the dictation of 
 terms of peace by the Allies at Berlin. Such terms as 
 were imposed might cripple her military power of ag- 
 gression or revenge for some years. But would it kill 
 what we know as German militarism? If our accepted 
 
 121
 
 The peril of political analysis be right, the German militarism that 
 
 "crushing" J , 
 
 Germany. must be crushed is not an army and a navy, but a spirit 
 of national aggression, proud, brutal, and unscrupulous, 
 the outcome of certain intellectual and moral tendencies 
 embodied in the "real" politics and the "real" culture 
 of the nation. Can we seriously suppose that this evil 
 spirit will be exorcised by a crushing defeat on land and 
 sea, followed by a humiliating peace? If Germany 
 could be permanently disabled from entertaining any 
 hopes of recovering her military strength, or from exer- 
 cising any considerable influence in the high policy of 
 Europe, her feelings of resentment and humiliation 
 might perhaps be left to rankle in impotence, or to die 
 out by lapse of time. But nothing which the Allies 
 can do to Germany will leave her in such long-lasting 
 impotence. Even if stripped of her non-Teutonic lands 
 and populations, she will remain a great Power great 
 in area, population, industry, and organizing power 
 and no temporary restrictions or guarantees can long 
 prevent her from once more developing a military 
 strength that will give dangerous meaning to her thirst 
 for vengeance. Whether the hegemony of Prussia over 
 a confederation of German States (possibly including 
 Austria) be retained or not, Europe can have no security 
 that the same passions which stirred France to the most 
 strenuous efforts to recover her military strength after 
 1870 will not be similarly operative throughout Germany. 
 We cannot feel sure that the experience of the most 
 disastrous war will effectively destroy the hold of Prus- 
 sianism, and that the efficiency of intellect and will which 
 constitute that power will not be able to reassert their 
 sway over a broken Germany. 
 
 The fear of such a revival of German strength will re- 
 main ever-present in her neighbors, and will compel 
 them to maintain great military preparations. A beaten 
 
 122
 
 Germany, with a ring of military Powers round her, 
 watching every phase of her recovery with suspicion, and militarism in 
 
 . . general must 
 
 always liable to quarrel among themselves, will not give be broken, 
 peace to Europe. Even, therefore, if we assign to Ger- 
 many a monopoly of the spirit of aggressive militarism, 
 European peace is not secured by crushing Germany. 
 A saner review of the situation, however, will recognize 
 that Germany has no such monopoly of the spirit of ag- 
 gression, though that spirit has in her recent policy found 
 its most formidable and most conscious expression. If 
 the craving for a colonial Empire with "places in the 
 sun" was, as seems likely, the principal factor in the 
 aggressive designs of Germany, can we confidently assert 
 that no other State has in the past harbored such designs, 
 or may not harbor them again? The expansive Impe- 
 rialism of Great Britain, France, Russia, and even more 
 recently of Japan, gives the lie to any such assertion. 
 Pan-Slavism is in spirit identical with the Pan-Teuton- 
 ism which has contributed to this debacle, and Great 
 Britain and France are already sated with the overseas 
 Empire which Germany was craving. History shows 
 that, in every militarist State, aggressive and defensive 
 motives and purposes are present together in different 
 degrees at all times. While, therefore, we may reason- 
 ably think that the aggressive militarism of Germany 
 held increasing sway in the political direction of that 
 Empire during recent years, and was the direct efficient 
 cause of the present conflict, we cannot hold that, with 
 the defeat or even the destruction of the military and 
 naval power of Germany, militarism would tend to dis- 
 appear from the European system, and that the relations 
 between nations would henceforth undergo so radical a 
 change as to secure the world against all likelihood of 
 forcible outbreaks in the future. 
 
 Clearly, it is not German militarism alone, but mili- 
 123
 
 Real problem, tarism in general that must be broken. The real ques- 
 
 to change in- ** . 
 
 ner attitudes tion is how to change the inner attitude of nations, their 
 beliefs and feelings towards one another, so as to make 
 each nation and its rulers recognize that it is no longer 
 either desirable or feasible to seek peculiar advantages 
 for itself by bringing force to bear upon another nation. 
 But it may be urged, granted that disarmament may 
 not be set afoot spontaneously and separately by the 
 different nations, mutual disarmament can occur by ar- 
 rangement between the Powers, which, after the menace 
 of German aggression is removed, will be disposed to 
 take this step in concert. Such disarmament, it is usu- 
 ally conceived, will not stand alone, but will form an im- 
 portant feature of a larger international policy, by which 
 the Powers will agree among themselves to settle any 
 differences that may arise by reference to courts of con- 
 ciliation or of arbitration, and perhaps also to concert 
 measures of common action in dealing with States and 
 territories not within their jurisdiction. Such a concert 
 of European Powers has hitherto appeared to many to 
 yield an adequate basis for the peace of Europe, if it 
 could be brought about. It has also seemed to most men 
 the utmost limit of the actually attainable. The idea of 
 the possibility of any closer relation between sovereign 
 independent States has been dismissed as chimerical. 
 
 Now in any discussion of the feasibility of such a 
 concert of European or world Powers as will by mutual 
 agreement secure disarmament and a settlement of dif- 
 ferences by judicial methods, it must be recognized at 
 the outset that this war may make the successful pursu- 
 ance of such a policy more difficult than it would have 
 been before. A Balance of Power, whatever may have 
 been its other disadvantages, seemed in itself favorable to 
 the possibilities of an agreement in which each nation, 
 or group of nations, might be an equal gainer. But a 
 
 124
 
 decisive victory in war, which leaves the Allied nations 
 with a strong preponderance of power, is less likely to 
 yield a satisfactory basis of agreement for a mutual 
 disarmament. Is it likely that they will readily consent 
 to a reduction in their several military and naval forces 
 equivalent to the reduction they will demand in the 
 forces of the nations that have been their enemies? To 
 put the difficulty in concrete terms : "Would France con- 
 sent to an early reduction of her army upon terms which 
 would leave her fighting-strength as compared with that 
 of Germany relatively the same as before the war? 
 Would Great Britain consent to reduce her navy in the 
 same proportion as the reduction she required of Ger- 
 many? Even if the Allies believed that the proportion- 
 ate reduction would be duly carried out by Germany, 
 would they regard such an arrangement as affording the 
 desired security? Obviously not. It may, of course, be 
 urged that an agreed basis of reduction might be reached, 
 according to which the relative strength of army and 
 navy assigned to Germany would be smaller than before. 
 But the more closely the proposition is examined the less 
 feasible does it appear. What basis for the size of 
 armies could reasonably, or even plausibly, be suggested 
 - which would not assign to Germany a larger preponder- 
 ance over France in number of soldiers than she pos- 
 sesses at present? Size of population, or of frontiers, 
 the two most reasonable considerations for apportioning 
 defensive needs, would tell in favor of Germany against 
 France. True it would tell even more strongly in favor 
 of Eussia, assigning her, in fact, a relatively larger mili- 
 tary predominance in Europe than she has ever claimed. 
 But would either France or Germany regard the new 
 military situation as safe or desirable ? Nor would there 
 be any permanence in an arrangement based on such a 
 mutable factor as population, according to which the 
 
 125
 
 NO standard German preponderance over France and of Russia over 
 
 for proper- ^ . 
 
 tioning arma- Germany would be continually increasing. If area of 
 territory, as well as population and frontiers, were taken 
 into consideration in fixing a basis, France would come 
 off a little better in relation to Germany, but the size of 
 Russia, even if her European lands were alone included, 
 would give her an overwhelming advantage. If, as 
 might not unreasonably be claimed, the extra-European 
 possessions of Russia, Great Britain, and France must be 
 reckoned in, either on a basis of territory or of popula- 
 tion, Great Britain and Russia would possess a superi- 
 ority of military strength which would give them, acting 
 together, a complete control over the politics of Europe 
 and Asia. Or, were the United States to come into the 
 arrangement, the military strength of Anglo-Saxondom 
 might too obviously surpass that of any likely combina- 
 tion of other Powers. 
 
 Again, what basis of naval strength would be satis- 
 factory? Great Britain would not think of accepting 
 the area, population, or frontier factors unless the Em- 
 pire as well as the British Isles were counted in. On the 
 other hand, her proposal, that volume of shipping and of 
 foreign trade should count heavily in the basis, might 
 give her for the time being an even greater preponder- 
 ance over other navies than she has hitherto possessed. 
 
 If the comparison of the military and naval strength 
 of nations were conducted, as in the past, by direct con- 
 sideration of the numerical strength and the fighting 
 value of the several items of an army and a navy, agree- 
 ment upon a basis of reduction would be manifestly im- 
 possible. The discovery and acceptance of any standard 
 unit of naval or military value applicable to changing 
 conditions of modern warfare are found to be impractic- 
 able. For though every military budget implies the ac- 
 ceptance of some scale of values by which the worth of a 
 
 126
 
 battery of artillery is compared with that of a battalion Must get 
 
 , .. nd o* motives 
 
 of infantry, while every naval budget involves a calcula- which impel 
 
 . , , , , , armament. 
 
 tion or the worth 01 a submarine or a seaplane as com- 
 pared with an armored cruiser and a super-Dreadnought, 
 no two budgets would be found to support the same scale 
 of values. It is quite manifest that no agreement for 
 reducing armaments could be attained by stipulations as 
 to the number, size, or quality of the several forces and 
 arms employed. This difficulty in itself, however, is 
 not fatal to the proposal. For a far simpler and more 
 satisfactory method of agreement might be found by 
 disregarding the concrete armaments and accepting a 
 financial basis of expenditure which would leave each 
 nation complete liberty to apply the money prescribed 
 to it as a maximum expenditure on armaments in what- 
 ever way it chose. Though each nation, considering its 
 defense, would doubtless have to take into account the 
 sort of preparations for possible attack its neighbors 
 might be making, it would be entitled to spend as large 
 a proportion of its authorized expenditure upon guns, 
 torpedo-boats, aircraft, Dreadnoughts, as it chose. 
 
 The real difficulty, therefore, turns upon the agree- 
 ment upon a basis of comparative expenditure. Now 
 this difficulty appears insuperable, if reduction of arma- 
 ments be regarded as the sole, or the chief, mainstay of 
 a durable peace. For so long as the motives which have 
 hitherto impelled nations to increase their armaments 
 still retain the appearance of validity in any nation or 
 group of nations, no agreed basis for reduction will be 
 reached, or, were it reached, no reliable adherence to its 
 terms could be expected. For the reduction of arma- 
 ments involves the acceptance of and the adherence to a 
 principle of reduction by all the Great Powers. If any 
 single Great Power refused to come into the agreement, 
 or, coming in, was suspected of evading the fulfilment of 
 
 127
 
 Mere agree- 
 ment to re- 
 duce arma- 
 ment will 
 be futile. 
 
 its pledge by concealing some of its expenditure on arma- 
 ments, this method would have failed pro tanto, both as 
 an economy and a security. For each of the would-be 
 pacific nations would have to make adequate provision 
 against the warlike outsider or suspect. Now, that a 
 mere agreement for mutual disarmament would thus be 
 baffled is almost certain. So long as a Power, by simply 
 refusing to come in, could retain full liberty to pile up 
 arms with a view to a future policy of menace or ag- 
 gression, would there not be Governments which would 
 find some more or less plausible excuses for declining 
 the invitation to come in? Or could we feel complete 
 assurance that a Power with an aggressive past, after en- 
 tering into such an agreement, would faithfully fulfil it 
 when so many facilities of evasion present themselves? 
 Nay, there would be a positive incentive to an aggres- 
 sive or revengeful Power either to stay outside, or, en- 
 tering in, to violate secretly its obligations. For, by 
 either course, it would be enabled to steal a march in 
 military strength over its intended enemy, if the latter 
 were a faithful adherent to such a treaty. The slight- 
 est reflection suffices to show that a mere agreement for 
 disarmament or reduction of armament must be futile. 
 
 But, it will be contended, these difficulties may be 
 overcome by extending the agreement so as to bind the 
 signatory Powers to bring their united force to bear 
 upon any member convicted of a wilful evasion or in- 
 fraction of the agreement. That is to say, they must 
 engage to secure the agreement by an ultimate sanc- 
 tion of physical force. The administration of such an 
 agreement would, of course, involve the setting up of 
 some standing Court or Committee of Inquiry, vested 
 with full rights of inspection and judgment, and en- 
 dowed with a power of armed executive. 
 
 But if a treaty of reduction of armaments could be 
 128
 
 secured by such a guarantee of collective force, it would 
 
 still find itself confronted by the problem of the law- Hnkedw 
 
 r, . . reversal 
 
 less outsider. So long as an aggressive outsider were at 
 liberty to threaten or coerce a member ^f the League 
 without involving the hostility of the other members, 
 this danger would compel members of the League to 
 maintain large armaments, though they were secure 
 against internal hostility. A single Power, such as Ger- 
 many, Russia, or Japan, standing out for its absolute 
 right to determine its own expenditure and policy, would 
 cancel nearly all the economy of the agreement. It 
 would become self-evident that the Powers entering such 
 an agreement must bind themselves to a common defense 
 against such an outsider. They would be impelled to 
 this course by a double motive. In no other way could 
 each member gain that security which would win his 
 consent to a basis of reduction that would lower his 
 separate defensive power. Again, by pledging them- 
 selves to united action against an aggressive outside 
 Power, they would diminish, perhaps destroy, the aggres- 
 sive design or policy of such a Power. For such aggres- 
 sive policy and the armed force which supports it are 
 only plausible upon the assumption that they can be 
 successfully applied to gain a selfish national end. If 
 the united strength of the Treaty Powers remained so 
 great as to render the pursuance of its aggressive de- 
 signs impossible or too dangerous, the lawless Powers 
 might learn the lesson of the law, and, abandoning its 
 hopes of aggression, come into the League. 
 
 In a word, the proposal for reduction of armaments 
 only becomes really feasible when it is linked with a 
 provision for reversing the motives which lead nations 
 to increase their armed forces. Once bring to bear upon 
 the Governments of States a clear recognition of the 
 two related facts : first, that by no increase of their armed 
 
 129
 
 Must make it force will they be reasonably likely to succeed in any 
 
 too dangeroas ... . , , , ,, , , ,-. 
 
 for one Power aggressive design upon a neighbor ; second, that by the 
 lnother k pledged cooperation of their cosignatories they are not 
 dependent for defense upon their own force alone, then 
 obvious motives of economy and self-interest will lead 
 them to reduce their armaments. Though the military 
 caste may still plead the instability of pacific agree- 
 ments and the disciplinary advantages of National Serv- 
 ice, while contractors for armaments do their best to sow 
 dissension among the leagued Powers and to arouse the 
 military ambitions of new nations, these war interests 
 would no longer be able to play as heretofore upon the 
 fears and passions of the peoples. For whatever the 
 secret political and business policy behind the race for 
 armaments, its engineers could only make that policy 
 effective by periodic appeals to the menace of invasion. 
 Once make it manifest that no evil-minded foreigner can 
 threaten aggression against one country without meet- 
 ing an overwhelming strength of leagued forces, to which 
 one particular contribution is not of determinant im- 
 portance, and the balance of national motives leans 
 heavily and constantly towards smaller and less ex- 
 pensive forces. 
 
 The absolute strength of the rational and moral case 
 against war and militarism has in some degree obscured 
 the fact that, so long as pushful statesmen and diplo- 
 matists, ambitious soldiers, covetous financiers, and war- 
 traders were able to stimulate and carry out aggressive 
 policies of conquest and aggrandizement on the part of 
 stronger against weaker States, the apprehensions upon 
 which these same interests played in urging the neces- 
 sity of large expenditure upon defense were not un- 
 reasonable. It is only by making it too obviously diffi- 
 cult and dangerous for any one Power to attack any 
 other Power that the balance of reasonable motives is 
 
 130
 
 firmly weighted against armaments. This can only be 
 achieved by substituting for a world of isolated inde- ^^ 
 pendent States, or of Balances of Power, a world in aggression, 
 which the united strength of a sufficient number of 
 States is brought to bear immediately and certainly 
 against any disturber of the public peace. 
 
 "Splendid isolation" is no longer practicable in the 
 modern world of international relations. Group alli- 
 ances in pursuit of the Balance of Power are seen to be 
 nothing else than an idle feint. For the sole and con- 
 stant aim of each such group and Power is not to achieve 
 or to maintain the balance, but to weight it on one side. 
 Such an alternating and oscillating balance gives the 
 maximum of insecurity, and thus plays most effectively 
 the game of war and armaments. The only possible al- 
 ternative is the creation of such a concert or confedera- 
 tion of Powers as shall afford to each the best available 
 security against the aggression of another within the 
 concert and the best defense of all against aggression 
 from outside. 
 
 The general form in which a cooperation of nations for 
 these objects presents itself is that of a League or Con- 
 federation. The primary object of such a League is to 
 bind all its members to submit all their serious differ- 
 ences to arbitration or some other mode of peaceful set- 
 tlement, and to accept the judgment or award thus ob- 
 tained. Some advocates of a League of Peace think that 
 the sense of moral obligation in each State, fortified by 
 the public opinion of the civilized world, would form a 
 valid sanction for the fulfilment of such undertakings, 
 and would afford a satisfactory measure of security. 
 But most hold that it is advisable or essential that the 
 members of such a League should bind themselves to take 
 joint action against any member who breaks the peace. 
 . Assuming that a considerable body of nations entered 
 
 131
 
 Success 
 depends on 
 the size of 
 the nucleus 
 of leagued 
 States. 
 
 such a League with good and reliable intentions, how far 
 would it be likely to secure the peace of the world and a 
 reduction of armed preparations? The answer to this 
 question would depend mainly upon the number and 
 status of the Powers constituting the League, and their 
 relations to outside nations. If, as is not unlikely, at 
 first only a small number of nations were willing to enter 
 such a League, the extent of the pacific achievement 
 would be proportionately circumscribed. If, say, Brit- 
 ain, France, and the United States entered the League, 
 undertaking to settle all their differences by peaceful 
 methods, such a step, however desirable in itself, would 
 not go far towards securing world-peace or enabling 
 these leagued Powers to reduce their national arma- 
 ments. This is so obvious that most advocates of the 
 League of Peace urge that the leagued Powers should not 
 confine their undertakings to the peaceful settlement of 
 differences among themselves, but should afford a united 
 defense to any of their members attacked by any outside 
 Power which was unwilling to arbitrate its quarrel. A 
 defensive alliance of three such Great Powers (for that 
 is what the League of Peace would amount to at this 
 stage of development) would no doubt form a force which 
 it would be dangerous for any nation, or combination of 
 nations, to attack. But it would secure neither peace 
 nor disarmament. Nor would it, as an earnest advocate 
 of this procedure argues, necessarily, or even probably, 
 form a nucleus of a larger League drawing in other na- 
 tions. A few nations forming such a League would not 
 differ substantially from the other nominally defensive 
 alliances with which the pages of history are filled. 
 Their purely defensive character would be suspected by 
 outside Powers, who would tend to draw together into 
 an opposing alliance, thus reconstituting once more the 
 Balance of Power with all its perils and its competing 
 
 132
 
 armaments. Nay, if such a League of Peace were con- 
 
 stituted in the spirit of the Holy Alliance of a century have absolute 
 
 ,, .. .1 , preponderance 
 
 ago, or of the resurrection of that spirit which Mr. offeree. 
 Roosevelt represents in order "to back righteousness by 
 force" in all quarters of the earth, such an opposition of 
 organized outside Powers would be inevitable. The 
 League of Peace idea, in order to have any prima facie 
 prospect of success, must at the outset be so planned as 
 to win the adherence of the majority of the Great Powers, 
 including some of those recently engaged in war with 
 one another. For until there was an absolute prepon- 
 derance of military and naval strength inside the League, 
 the relief from internal strife would do very little, if 
 anything, to abate the total danger of war, or to enable 
 any country to reduce its armed preparations. Further, 
 it would seem essential that such a League should in its 
 relations to outside Powers assume a rigorously defensive 
 attitude, abstaining from all interference in external pol- 
 itics until they encroached directly upon the vital in- 
 terests of one or more of its members. Such an en- 
 croachment it would presumably treat as an attack upon 
 the League, and would afford the injured member such 
 power of redress as was deemed desirable by the repre- 
 sentatives of the Powers forming the League. 
 
 Before entering upon the fuller consideration of the 
 practicability of a League of Nations formed upon these 
 lines, it may be well to set forth in a brief, formal man- 
 ner the nature of the chief implications which appear to 
 be contained in the proposal. We shall then be in a 
 position to examine seriatim the various steps which the 
 advocates of this method of securing world-peace and dis- 
 armament desire to take, and the many difficulties which 
 are involved. 
 
 The signatory Powers to the Treaty or Agreement 
 establishing such a League of Peace would undertake : 
 
 133
 
 (1) To submit to arbitration or conciliation all dis- 
 putes or differences between them not capable of set- 
 tlement by ordinary processes of diplomacy, and to ac- 
 cept and carry out any award or terms of settlement thus 
 attained. 
 
 (2) To bring joint pressure, diplomatic, economic, or 
 forcible, to bear upon any member refusing to submit a 
 disputed matter to such modes of peaceable settlement, 
 sr to accept and carry out the award, or otherwise threat- 
 ening or opening hostilities against any other member. 
 
 (3) To take joint action in repelling any attack made 
 by an outside Power, or group of Powers, upon any of 
 the members of the League. 
 
 (4) To take joint action in securing the redress of any 
 injury which, by the general assent of the signatory 
 Powers, had been wrongfully inflicted upon any member 
 of the League. 
 
 J. A. Hobson, "Towards International Government," 
 pp. 5-27. 
 
 134
 
 EXISTING ALLIANCES AND A LEAGUE 
 OF PEACE 
 
 The war has converted the belligerent world to that Already 
 
 i j n . , . , . . . . , . the League 
 
 Kind 01 pacifism which consists in a grim detenmna- of Peace is 
 tion that the present Armageddon shall never be re- fl 
 peated, however long it may be necessary to fight in 
 order to ensure this outcome. To perpetuate the peace, 
 however, a strong League of Nations is indispensable, 
 and various plans for such a league are forming. Some 
 of these rely on an extension of treaties of arbitration 
 and conciliation, some would fortify these treaties by 
 giving to the league a power to coerce recalcitrant mem- 
 bers, and still others would create a world State with 
 a central government, an army and a navy. The first 
 question to be answered is, What kind of international 
 union can be secured? since, in the case of any new 
 league of this kind, the more ambitious the plan, the less 
 probable it is that nations will adopt it. In many minds 
 grave doubt exists whether even a modest plan will be 
 carried into execution. In the face of this doubt I wish 
 to express the audacious opinion that something having 
 the characteristics of a league of peace is rapidly evolv- 
 ing and in all probability will, at the close of the war, 
 require only a small modification to enable it to pre- 
 vent, so long as it lasts, the recurrence of a great war 
 on the Continent of Europe. 
 
 It is not necessary to create a league of peace de 
 novo and without reference to combinations which now 
 
 135 

 
 Even am- exist. Two great leagues have been formed, each em- 
 
 ances tend to 
 
 prevent war. bracing powerf ul States and each so firmly held together 
 that it acts toward the outer world much as a single 
 great empire would do. Since they are now waging 
 against each other the greatest war in history, the con- 
 clusion is much too lightly reached that such unions are, 
 by their nature, war-breeders. Defensive unions, how- 
 ever, are in line with the whole trend of political evolu- 
 tion. Great nations, created by combining smaller ones, 
 are in the order of the day, and so are federations of a 
 looser kind, such as those which preceded the German 
 Empire and our own Federal State. 
 
 Every such consolidation involves a risk that, if a 
 war occurs, it will be larger than it might otherwise be; 
 but it reduces the frequency with which wars occur. 
 Peace between great States continues through longer 
 periods than it does between warring districts which 
 later unite in such States. The prospect that peace shall 
 ever be universal depends on its tendency to establish 
 itself within larger and larger areas till it shall end by 
 embracing the world. European wars have occurred in 
 spite of alliances rather than because of them and the 
 general effect even of imperfect unions has been to 
 lengthen the intervals of peace. It is an even century 
 since a war akin to this one was waging in Europe, and 
 it is forty-four years since a war between any two great 
 nations has taken place on that continent. The con- 
 solidating tendency in itself makes for peace. 
 
 The present leagues have several times acted as peace 
 preservers. During the Moroccan trouble and the two 
 Balkan wars they averted a general struggle and they 
 might have averted the present one if, as unions, they 
 had been more complete than they were. It is a safe 
 guess that if it had been definitely known that Russia, 
 France and England would act as a unit in opposing the 
 
 136
 
 invasion of Serbia, the knowledge would have delayed ^ e * g c ^" 
 the invasion and possibly prevented it with all its fate- s.^e f 
 ful consequences. The first thing to be remembered is league are 
 that these two great leagues, both formed for defense, 
 will be in existence and probably vigorous when the war 
 shall end. 
 
 Let us assume that peace has been made, that both 
 the Entente and the Alliance continue to be strong and 
 that in everything political they are the Powers which 
 must first be reckoned with. Let us assume that, in 
 each of them, the constituent countries are held firmly 
 together because no single country can think of sur- 
 rendering the protection which union affords. Outside 
 of the Entente, France would be helpless against an at- 
 tack by Germany and outside of the Alliance Austria 
 would be helpless against one by Italy and Russia. Any 
 country standing alone would have a precarious hold on 
 its territory and its freedom. 
 
 The chief dangers that threaten a great league spring 
 from within, while those that threaten a small league 
 are from without. A union of all Europe would be en- 
 tirely immune against foreign attack and, for that very 
 reason, would be far more easily disrupted and plunged 
 into something like civil war. Such unions as the Al- 
 liance and the Entente, each of which has a great power 
 now arrayed against it, are held together much more 
 firmly. The bond that unites its members is the impera- 
 tive need of mutual protection. 
 
 If, as we have assumed, the war has ended neither in 
 a draw nor in a sweeping victory for one side if the 
 unsuccessful league has kept most of its territories and 
 its fighting strength the situation will throw an enor- 
 mous power into the hands of the neutral States. By 
 joining either union they might cause it to preponderate 
 over the other; and by joining the victorious one they 
 
 137
 
 Present could make it safe against any attack and able, if it were 
 
 nucleus for disposed to do so, to guarantee the peace of Europe. In 
 the smaller States of Europe the opinion is growing that 
 for them liberty and union are one and inseparable. It 
 may be vital for them to join a defensive league and, 
 by their union with it, cause it to become, if it were not 
 already, a true commonwealth of nations, great and 
 small, and fully committed to a just and peaceful policy. 
 In order to be a nucleus of such a commonwealth a 
 league should, if possible, already contain enough great 
 States to prevent any one from dominating the others. 
 If possible it should contain a number of the smaller 
 States and, as a group, it should be so free from aggres- 
 sive designs as to merit the confidence of States not as 
 yet in any combination. Since the Entente now virtu- 
 ally includes five great States and four small ones and 
 may soon be joined by more it already has important 
 qualifications for becoming such a league of peace as we 
 are suggesting a commonwealth of nations powerful 
 enough to preserve peace and vitally interested in doing 
 it. 
 
 The original purpose of each of the two leagues now 
 existing was protective. It aimed primarily to secure 
 each of its members against attacks by other Powers, 
 and this security, which all the members continue to 
 need, is what the small neutral countries are also com- 
 pelled to look for. What they must demand of any 
 combination which they are asked to join is, above all 
 else, protection. Now the more promising plans for new 
 leagues of peace which have been suggested contain no 
 provision for protecting their members from attacks by 
 nations outside of their circle. They content themselves 
 with preventing warfare between the members. On the 
 other hand, the present combinations have no formal and 
 constitutional machinery for settling internal disputes. 
 
 138
 
 A true commonwealth of nations needs to be assured 
 against both dangers and its constitution, therefore, will League 
 
 01 A CflCG 
 
 need to contain the best provisions that it is humanly 
 possible to devise for settling peacefully all internal dis- 
 putes and also for preventing or repelling attacks by 
 other States. This is saying that an enlarged Entente, 
 besides protecting its members, as it is now using all its 
 force in doing, will need to guard itself against the perils 
 that necessarily beset large leagues, those, namely, that 
 originate from within. The institutions of The Hague 
 will be for it well nigh a sine qua non of success, and 
 there must be measures for compelling a resort to them 
 in disputes between members of the league and in those 
 arising between any of them and States outside of it. 
 Such provisions as have been contained in the best con- 
 stitutions that have been suggested for new leagues will 
 be needed in one that may evolve out of one of the exist- 
 ing combinations. 
 
 If a new league should be formed without affording 
 protection against external attacks it would be necessary 
 that the Entente and the Alliance should continue. It 
 would be vain to ask their members to dissolve them and 
 trust to a new league that would leave each of them to 
 fight its own battles. The Entente or the Alliance, as 
 the ease might be, would then constitute a union within 
 a union a compact defensive body within a loosely or- 
 ganized combination for promoting the friendly settle- 
 ment of disputes. This is entirely possible. A new 
 league of many States might conceivably be formed and 
 either the Entente or the Alliance might join it bodily 
 and give its own members the protection which the larger 
 league would not give ; but a simpler and more natural 
 plan would be to enlarge one of the present leagues and 
 adopt the needed provisions for peacefully settling all 
 disputes of which a member is a party. 
 
 139
 
 Power of 
 neutrals to 
 help in form- 
 ing such a 
 League. 
 
 Of a league so formed the objection that it is the- 
 oretical and Utopian certainly cannot be urged. Nine 
 countries are already in effect in the Entente and that 
 combination is now fulfiling the one function that, in 
 making constitutions for new leagues, few persons are 
 bold enough to require of the members that of lavish- 
 ing life and treasure in defending each other. In this 
 respect, the present reality outstrips our dreams. As the 
 leagues will almost certainly continue it should be pos- 
 sible to give to one of them the relatively easy function 
 of settling peacefully the disputes occurring within its 
 membership. 
 
 Herein lies the golden opportunity for the neutral 
 States. They have a sense of danger and the protec- 
 tive feature of a league will attract them, though the 
 chance of being involved in a general war will, in itself, 
 repel them. It will probably repel them less than the 
 danger of being conquered by some great State, and 
 both dangers will be at a minimum if the international 
 body that they join is too strong to be attacked and if 
 its spirit as well as its formal constitution and the 
 interest of its members hold it in ways of peace and 
 justice. It will be in the power of the neutral coun- 
 tries to help effectively in making it so. They can con- 
 sent to join only a union of this character. 
 
 It will be hard indeed for the two leagues now in 
 deadly war with each other at once to unite in any single 
 union. Will the fact that one of them for a time holds 
 aloof be a source of danger? In one essential way it 
 will be a cause of security. It is sadly to be admitted 
 that, in 'the present moral status of the world, treaties 
 are not bands of steel and there is danger that they may 
 be broken when they are not buttressed by national in- 
 terests. Against the danger of disruption a defensive 
 league which does not include all States of Europe may 
 
 140
 
 be stronger than one which does so. The treaty that 
 binds such a league together will be powerfully reen- 
 
 ,.,, , J , consolidated. 
 
 forced it all the members have a sense or common danger 
 a sense of the presence of a foe strong enough to over- 
 come any country singly. Pressure from without means 
 solidarity within and, while enmities are strong, a hostile 
 nation might impart to a league more strength by remain- 
 ing outside of it than by joining it. 
 
 In the long run, all Europe should be consolidated. 
 The chance that it will become so by a single step is small, 
 and the best beginning of a general union will be fur- 
 nished by one of the existing leagues, enlarged by the 
 adherence of neutral States and fortified against the 
 danger of disruption from within by the exposure of 
 any seceding State to the peril of attacks from without. 
 The league may thrive on external hostility until the 
 good time shall come when the desired system of set- 
 tling international disputes shall be thoroughly estab- 
 lished and peace shall prevail by the supremacy of 
 reason. Guarding always the territory and protecting 
 the sovereignty of its members the league will develop 
 mutual interests so important that a new and powerful 
 tie will bind the countries together in addition to the 
 bond furnished by the necessity for defense. That neces- 
 sity itself will grow less, armaments may be curtailed 
 and the forces now engaged in mutual destruction may 
 become available for raising in many ways the level of 
 human life. Under such influences the league should 
 become too powerful to be attacked from without and 
 too indispensable to humanity to be weakened or dis- 
 rupted from within. 
 
 For these reasons I conclude that in the leagues now 
 at war may be afforded the most practical means of creat- 
 ing the league of peace. There is inspiration in this 
 possibility and there is a terrible spur to action in what 
 
 141
 
 Present w jn ensue if it is not realized desolated lands under 
 
 leagues . 
 
 maybe enormous debts with no assurance against a further 
 
 peace. struggle; neutral lands as well as belligerent ones in- 
 
 volved in the competition for larger armies, navies, ar- 
 senals, guns and fortifications; the people demanding 
 costly reforms by governments unable to afford them 
 and in peril of revolution if they refuse to do so. Only 
 in the relief from war and its burdens lies the possibility 
 of meeting such needs and giving to social progress an 
 upward trend. Such is the plain teaching of the pend- 
 ing struggle. It is as though the war demon himself 
 had led humanity to the parting of the roads where the 
 guide boards indicate, on the one side, the long way to 
 the Delectable Mountains and on the other, a short route 
 to the pit. Far reaching beyond all precedent is the 
 choice that humanity must soon make and lands at war 
 and lands at peace must participate in the decision. 
 
 John Bates Clark, Address at Lake Mohonk Confer- 
 ence, 1915. 
 
 142
 
 PROTECTION OF SMALL NATIONS 
 
 A small nation a nation of not more than fifteen mil- only a 
 lions, for example can have no independent existence in Jin protect" 
 Europe except as a member of a federation of States sma11 nations - 
 having similar habits, tendencies, and hopes, and united 
 in an offensive and defensive alliance, or under guaran- 
 tees given by a group of strong and trustworthy nations. 
 The firm establishment of several such federations, or the 
 giving of such guarantees by a group of powerful and 
 faith-keeping nations ought to be one of the outcomes of 
 the war of 1914-15. Unless some such arrangement is 
 reached, no small State will be safe from conquest and 
 absorption by any strong, aggressive military power 
 which covets it not even if its people live chiefly by 
 mining and manufacturing as the Belgians did. 
 
 The small States, being very determined to exist and 
 to obtain their natural or historical racial boundaries, the 
 problem of permanent or any durable peace in Europe 
 resolves itself into this: How can the small or smaller 
 nations be protected from attack by some larger nation 
 which believes that might makes right and is mighty in 
 industries, commerce, finance, and the military and naval 
 arts? The experience gained during the past year 
 proves that there is but one effective protection against 
 such a Power, namely, a firm league of other Powers 
 not necessarily numerous which together are stronger 
 in industries, commerce, finance, and the military and 
 
 143
 
 naval arts than the aggressive and ambitious nation 
 which heartily believes in its own invincibility and cher- 
 ishes the ambition to conquer and possess. 
 
 Such a league is the present combination of Great 
 Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and Japan against the 
 aggressive Central Monarchies and Turkey; but this 
 combination was not formed deliberately and with con- 
 scious purpose to protect small States, to satisfy natural 
 aspirations, and to make durable peace possible by re- 
 moving both fear of invasion and fear of the cutting off 
 of overseas food and raw materials. In spite of the lack 
 of an explicit and comprehensive purpose to attain these 
 wise and precious ends, the solidity of the alliance dur- 
 ing a year of stupendous efforts to resist military aggres- 
 sion on the part of Germany and Austria-Hungary cer- 
 tainly affords good promise of success for a somewhat 
 larger league in which all the European nations some, 
 like the Scandinavian and the Balkan, by representation 
 in groups and the United States should be included. 
 Such a league would have to act through a distinct and 
 permanent council or commission which would not serve 
 arbitrary power, or any peculiar national interest, and 
 would not in the least resemble the "Concert of Eu- 
 rope," or any of the disastrous special conferences of 
 diplomatists and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, called 
 after wars since that of 1870-71 to ''settle" the questions 
 the wars raised. 
 
 The experience of the past twelve months proves that 
 such a league could prevent any nation which disobeyed 
 its orders from making use of the oceans and from occu- 
 pying the territory of any other nation. Reduction of 
 armaments, diminution of taxation, and durable peace 
 would ensue as soon as general confidence was estab- 
 lished that the league would fairly administer interna- 
 tional justice, and that its military and naval forces 
 
 144
 
 were ready and effective. Its function would be limited 
 
 to the prevention and punishment of violations of inter- for T ftr 
 
 *, * . promises 
 
 national agreements, or, in other words, to the enforce- effectiveness 
 ment of treaty obligations, until new treaties were made. 
 
 The present alliance is of good promise in three im- 
 portant respects its members refuse to make any sepa- 
 rate peace, they cooperate cordially and efficiently in 
 military measures, and the richer members help the 
 poorer financially. These policies have been hastily de- 
 vised and adopted in the midst of strenuous fighting on 
 an immense scale. If deliberately planned and per- 
 fected in times of peace, they could be made in the 
 highest degree effective toward durable peace. 
 
 The war has demonstrated that the international 
 agreements for the mitigation of the horrors of war, 
 made by treaties, conferences, and conventions in times 
 of peace, may go for nothing in time of war; because 
 they have no sanction, or, in other words, lack penalties 
 capable of systematic enforcement. To provide the lack- 
 ing sanction and the physical force capable of compel- 
 ling the payment of penalties for violating international 
 agreements would be one of the best functions of the in- 
 ternational council which the present alliance fore- 
 shadows. Some years would probably be required to 
 satisfy the nations concerned that the sanction was real 
 and the force trustworthy and sufficient. The absolute 
 necessity of inventing and applying a sanction for in- 
 ternational law, if Europe is to have international peace 
 and any national liberty, will be obvious to any one who 
 has once perceived that the present war became inevit- 
 able when Austria-Hungary, in violation of an interna- 
 tional agreement to which she was herself a party, seized 
 and absorbed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and became gen- 
 eral and fierce when Germany, under Prussian lead, in 
 violation of an international agreement to which she was 
 
 145
 
 Such a League herself a party, entered and plundered neutralized Bel- 
 
 could benefit 
 
 Germany glum. 
 
 England? A strong, trustworthy international alliance to pre- 
 
 serve the freedom of the seas under all circumstances 
 would secure for Great Britain and her federated com- 
 monwealths everything secured by the burdensome two- 
 navies policy which now secures the freedom of the seas 
 for British purposes. The same international alliance 
 would secure for Germany the same complete freedom of 
 the seas which in times of peace between Germany and 
 Great Britain she has long enjoyed by favor of Great 
 Britain, but has lost in time of war with the Triple En- 
 tente. This security, with the general acceptance of the 
 policy of the ' ' open door, ' ' would fully meet Germany 's 
 need of indefinite expansion for her manufacturing in- 
 dustries and her commerce, and of room "in the sun" 
 for her surplus population. 
 
 It is a safe inference from the events of the past six 
 months that the longer the war lasts the more significant 
 will be the political and social changes which result from 
 it. It is not to be expected, and perhaps not to be de- 
 sired, that the ruling class in the countries autocrat- 
 ically governed should themselves draw this inference at 
 present, but all lovers of freedom and justice will find 
 consolation for the prolongation of the war in this hope- 
 ful reflection. 
 
 To devise the wise constitution of an international 
 council or commission with properly limited powers, and 
 to determine the most promising composition of an in- 
 ternational army and an international navy are serious 
 tasks, but not beyond the available international wisdom 
 and goodwill, provided that the tasks be intrusted to 
 international publicists, business men of large experi- 
 ence, and successful administrators, rather than to pro- 
 fessional diplomatists and soldiers. To dismiss such a 
 
 146
 
 noble enterprise with the remark that it is ' ' academic, ' 
 or beyond the reach of ' ' practical ' ' politics, is unworthy ur 
 of courageous and humane men; for it seems now to be 
 the only way out of the horrible abyss into which civili- 
 zation has fallen. At any rate, some such machinery 
 must be put into successful operation before any limita- 
 tion of national armaments can be effected. The war 
 has shown to what a catastrophe competitive national 
 arming has led, and would probably again lead the most 
 civilized nations of Europe. Shall the white race de- 
 spair of escaping from this hell? The only way of es- 
 cape in sight is the establishment of a rational interna- 
 tional community. Should the enterprise fail after fair 
 trial, the world will be no worse off than it was in July, 
 1914, or is to-day. 
 
 Whoever studies the events of the past year with some 
 knowledge of political philosophy and history, and with 
 the love of his neighbor in his heart, will discover, amid 
 the horrors of the time and its moral chaos, three hope- 
 ful leadings for humanitarian effort, each involving a 
 great constructive invention. He will see that humanity 
 needs supremely a sanction for international law, rescue 
 from alcoholism, and a sound basis for just and unselfish 
 human relations in the great industries, and particularly 
 in the machinery industries. The war has brought out 
 all three of these needs with terrible force and vividness. 
 Somehow they must be met, if the white race is to suc- 
 ceed in "the pursuit of happiness," or even to hold the 
 gains already made. 
 
 Charles W. Eliot, N. Y. Times, July 16, 1915. 
 
 147
 
 A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 
 
 T^pro- Without attempting to cover details of operation 
 
 the League. (which are, indeed, of vital importance and* will require 
 careful study by experts in international law and diplo- 
 macy), the proposal contains four points stated as gen- 
 eral/ objects. The first is that before resorting to arms 
 the members of the league shall submit disputes with 
 one another, if justiciable, to an international tribunal; 
 second, that in like manner they shall submit non- 
 justiciable questions that is, such as cannot be decided 
 on the basis of strict international law to an interna- 
 tional council of conciliation, which shall recommend 
 a fair and amicable solution ; third, that if any member 
 of the league wages war against another before sub- 
 mitting the question in dispute to the tribunal or coun- 
 cil, all the other members shall jointly use forthwith 
 both their economic and military forces against the State 
 that so breaks the peace; and fourth, that the signatory 
 Powers shall endeavor to codify and improve the rules 
 of international law. 
 
 The kernel of the proposal, the feature in which it dif- 
 fers from other plans, lies in the third point, obliging 
 all the members of the league to declare war on any 
 member violating the pact of peace. This is the provi- 
 sion that provokes both adherence and opposition; and 
 at first it certainly gives one a shock that a people should 
 be asked to pledge itself to go to war over a quarrel 
 which is not of its making, in which it has no interest, 
 
 148
 
 and in which it may believe that substantial justice lies The use 
 on the other side. If, indeed, the nations of the earth to compel 
 could maintain complete isolation, could pursue each its beforeVa 
 own destiny without regard to the rest ; if they were not 
 affected by a war between two others or liable to be 
 drawn into it; if, in short, there were no overwhelming 
 common interest in securing universal peace, the provi- 
 sion would be intolerable. It would be as bad as the 
 liability of an individual to take part in the posse comi- 
 tatus of a community with which he had nothing in com- 
 mon. But in every civilized country the public force is 
 employed to prevent any man, however just his claim, 
 from vindicating his own right with his own hand in- 
 stead of going to law, and every citizen is bound when 
 needed to assist in preventing him, because that is the 
 only way to restrain private war, and the maintenance 
 of order is of paramount importance for every one. 
 Surely the family of nations has a like interest in re- 
 straining war between States. 
 
 It will be observed that the members of the league 
 are not to bind themselves to enforce the decision of the 
 tribunal or the award of the council of conciliation. 
 That may come in the remote future, but it is no part 
 of this proposal. It would be imposing obligations far 
 greater than the nations can reasonably be expected to 
 assume at the present day; for the conceptions of in- 
 ternational morality and fair play are still so vague and 
 divergent that a nation can hardly bind itself to wage 
 war on another, with which it has no quarrel, to enforce 
 a decision or a recommendation of whose justice or wis- 
 dom it may not be itself heartily convinced. The pro- 
 posal goes no further than obliging all the members to 
 prevent, by a threat of immediate war, any breach of the 
 public peace before the matter in dispute has been sub- 
 mitted to arbitration; and this is neither unreasonable 
 
 149
 
 ^t mean nor impracticable. There are many questions, especially 
 cession of O f & non-justiciable nature, on which we should not be 
 willing to bind ourselves to accept the decision of an 
 arbitration, and where we should regard compulsion by 
 armed intervention of the rest of the world as outrage- 
 ous. Take, for example, the question of Asiatic immi- 
 gration, or a claim that the Panama Canal ought to be 
 an unfortified neutral highway, or the desire by a Euro- 
 pean Power to take possession of Colombia. But we 
 ought not, in the interest of universal peace, to object 
 to making a public statement of our position in these 
 matters at a court or council before resorting to arms; 
 and in fact the treaty between the United States and 
 England, ratified on November 14, 1914, provides that 
 all disputes between the high contracting parties, of 
 every nature whatsoever, shall, failing other methods of 
 adjustment, be referred for investigation and report to 
 a permanent international commission, with a stipulation 
 that neither country shall declare war or begin hostili- 
 ties during such investigation, and before the report is 
 submitted. 
 
 What is true of this country is true of others. To 
 agree to abide by the result of an arbitration, on every 
 non-justiciable question of every nature whatsoever, on 
 pain of compulsion in any form by the whole world, 
 would involve a greater cession of sovereignty than na- 
 tions would now be willing to concede. This appears, 
 indeed, perfectly clear from the discussions at The 
 Hague Conference of 1907. But to exclude differences 
 that do not turn on questions of international law from 
 the cases in which a State must present the matter to a 
 tribunal or council of conciliation before beginning hos- 
 tilities, would leave very little check upon the outbreak 
 of war. Almost every conflict between European na- 
 tions for more than half a century has been based upon 
 
 150
 
 some dissension which could not be decided by strict fiut would 
 
 . . * reduce prob- 
 
 rules of law, and in which a violation of international ability of 
 law or of treaty rights has usually not even been used 
 as an excuse. This was true of the war between France 
 and Austria in 1859, and, in substance, of the war be- 
 tween Prussia and Austria in 1866. It was true of the 
 Franco-Prussian War in 1870, of the Russo-Turkish 
 War in 1876, of the Balkan War against Turkey in 1912, 
 and of the present war. 
 
 No one will claim that a league to enforce peace, such 
 as is proposed, would wholly prevent war, but it would 
 greatly reduce the probability of hostilities. It would 
 take away the advantage of surprise, of catching the 
 enemy unprepared for a sudden attack. It would give 
 a chance for public opinion on the nature of the con- 
 troversy to be formed throughout the world and in the 
 militant country. The latter is of great importance, for 
 the moment war is declared argument about its merits is 
 at once stifled. Passion runs too high for calm debate, 
 and patriotism forces people to support their govern- 
 ment. But a trial before an international tribunal 
 would give time for discussion while emotion is not yet 
 highly inflamed. Men opposed to war would be, able to 
 urge its injustice, to ask whether, after all, the object is 
 worth the sacrifice, and they would get a hearing from 
 their fellow citizens which they cannot get after war 
 begins. The mere delay, the interval for consideration, 
 would be an immense gain for the prospect of a peaceful 
 settlement. 
 
 Most people who have been thinking seriously about 
 the maintenance of peace are tending to the opinion that 
 a sanction of some kind is needed to enforce the observ- 
 ance of treaties and of agreements for arbitration. 
 Among the measures proposed has been that of an inter- 
 national police force, under the control of a central coun- 
 
 151
 
 The u, s. cil which could use it to preserve order throughout the 
 
 and the in- ... ,... 
 
 ternationai world. At present such a plan seems visionary. The 
 force would have to be at least large enough to cope with 
 the army that any single nation could put into the field 
 under existing conditions let us say five millions of 
 men fully equipped and supplied with artillery and am- 
 munition for a campaign of several months. These 
 troops need not be under arms, or quartered near The 
 Hague, but they must be thoroughly trained and ready 
 to be called out at short notice. Practically that would 
 entail yearly votes of the legislative bodies of each of the 
 nations supplying a quota; and if any of them failed to 
 make the necessary appropriation there would be great 
 difficulty in preventing others from following its ex- 
 ample. The whole organization would, therefore, be in 
 constant danger of going to pieces. 
 
 But quite apart from the practical difficulties in the 
 permanent execution of such a plan, let us see how it 
 would affect the United States. The amount of the con- 
 tingents of the various countries would be apportioned 
 with some regard to population, wealth, and economic 
 resources; and if the total were five million men, our 
 quota on a moderate estimate might be five hundred 
 thousand men. Is it conceivable that the United States 
 would agree to keep anything like that number drilled, 
 equipped, and ready to take the field on the order of an 
 international council composed mainly of foreign na- 
 tions? Of course it will be answered that these figures 
 are exaggerated, because any such plan will be accom- 
 panied by a reduction in armaments. But that is an 
 easier thing to talk about than to effect, and especially 
 to maintain. One must not forget that the existing sys- 
 tem of universal compulsory military service on the con- 
 tinent of Europe arose from Napoleon 's attempt to limit 
 the size of the Prussian army. He would be a bold 
 
 152
 
 or sanguine man who should assert that any treaty to Objections, 
 limit armaments could not in like manner be evaded ; and 
 however much they were limited, the quantity of troops 
 to be held at the disposal of a foreign council would of 
 necessity be large, while no nation would be willing to 
 pledge for the purpose the whole of its military force. 
 Such a plan may be practicable in some remote future 
 when the whole world is a vast federation under a central 
 government, but that would seem to be a matter for com- 
 ing generations, not for the men of our day. 
 
 Moreover, the nations whose troops were engaged in 
 fighting any country would inevitably find themselves 
 at war with that country. 
 
 One cannot imagine saying to some foreign State, 
 "Our troops are killing yours, they are invading your 
 land, we are supplying them with recruits and muni- 
 tions of war, but otherwise we are at peace with you. 
 You must treat us as a neutral, and accord to our citi- 
 zens, to their commerce and property, all the rights of 
 neutrality." In short the plan of an international po- 
 lice force involves all the consequences of the proposal 
 of a league to enforce peace, with other complex provi- 
 sions extremely hard to execute. 
 
 A suggestion more commonly made is that the members 
 of the league of nations, instead of pledging themselves 
 explicitly to declare war forthwith against any of their 
 number that commits a breach of the peace, should 
 agree to hold at once a conference, and take such meas- 
 ures diplomatic, economic, or military as may be 
 necessary to prevent war. The objection to this is that 
 it weakens very seriously the sanction. Conferences are 
 apt to shrink from decisive action. Some of the mem- 
 bers are timid, others want delay, and much time is 
 consumed in calling the body together and in discus- 
 sions after it meets. Meanwhile the war may have 
 
 153
 
 broken out, and be beyond control. It is much easier 
 to prevent a fire than to put it out. The country that 
 is planning war is likely to think it has friends in the 
 conference, or neighbors that it can intimidate, who will 
 prevent any positive decision until the fire is burning. 
 Even if the majority decides on immediate action, the 
 minority is not bound thereby. One great Power re- 
 fuses to take part; a second will not do so without her; 
 the rest hesitate, and nothing is done to prevent the war. 
 
 A conference is an excellent thing. The proposal of a 
 league to enforce peace by no means excludes it ; but the 
 important matter, the effective principle, is that every 
 member of the league should know that whether a con- 
 ference meets or not, or whatever action it may take 
 or fail to take, all the members of the league have 
 pledged themselves to declare war forthwith on any 
 member that commits a breach of the peace before sub- 
 mitting its case to the international tribunal or council 
 of conciliation. Such a pledge, and such a pledge alone, 
 can have the strong deterrent influence, and thus furnish 
 the sanction, that is needed. Of course the pledge may 
 not be kept. Like other treaties it may be broken by the 
 parties to it. Nations are composed of human beings 
 with human weaknesses, and one of these is a disin- 
 clination to perform an agreement when it involves a 
 sacrifice. Nevertheless, nations, like men, often do have 
 enough sense of honor, of duty, or of ultimate self-in- 
 terest, to carry out their contracts at no little immediate 
 sacrifice. They are certainly more likely to do a thing 
 if they have pledged themselves to it than if they have 
 not; and any nation would be running a terrible risk 
 that went to war in the hope that the other members of 
 the league would break their pledges. 
 
 The same objection applies to another alternative pro- 
 posed in place of an immediate resort to military force : 
 
 154
 
 that is the use of economic pressure, by a universal agree- 
 ment, for example, to have no commercial intercourse r arand 
 with the nation breaking the peace. A threat of uni- 
 versal boycott is, no doubt, formidable, but by no means 
 so formidable as a threat of universal war. A large 
 country with great natural resources which has de- 
 termined to make war, might be willing to face com- 
 mercial non-intercourse with the other members of the 
 league during hostilities, when it would not for a mo- 
 ment contemplate the risk of fighting them. A threat, 
 for example, by England, France, and Germany to stop 
 all trade with the United States might or might not have 
 prevented our going to war with Spain ; but a declaration 
 that they would take part with all their armies and 
 navies against us would certainly have done so. 
 
 It has often been pointed out that the threat of gen- 
 eral non-intercourse would bear much more hardly on 
 some countries than on others. That may not in itself 
 be a fatal objection, but a very serious consideration 
 arises from the fact that there would be a premium 
 on preparation for war. A nation which had accumu- 
 lated vast quantities of munitions, food, and supplies of 
 all kinds, might afford to disregard it ; while another less 
 fully prepared could not. 
 
 Moreover, economic pressure, although urged as a 
 milder measure, is in fact more difficult to apply and 
 maintain. A declaration of war is a single act, and when 
 made sustains itself by the passion it inflames; while 
 commercial non-intercourse is a continuous matter, sub- 
 ject to constant opposition exerted in an atmosphere rel- 
 atively cool. Our manufacturers would complain bit- 
 terly at being deprived of dye-stuffs and other chemical 
 products on account of a quarrel in which we had no 
 interest ; the South would suffer severely by the loss of a 
 market for cotton ; the shipping firms and the exporters 
 
 155
 
 Drastic 
 threats by 
 a League 
 could prob- 
 ably pre- 
 vent war. 
 
 and importers of all kinds would be gravely injured ; and 
 all these interests would bring to bear upon Congress a 
 pressure well-nigh irresistible. The same would be true 
 of every other neutral country, a fact that would be per- 
 fectly well known to the intending belligerent and reduce 
 its fear of a boycott. 
 
 But, it is said, why not try economic pressure first, 
 and, if that fails, resort to military force, instead of in- 
 flicting at once on unoffending members of the league 
 the terrible calamity of war ? What do we mean by "if 
 that fails"? Do we mean, if, in spite of the economic 
 pressure, the war breaks out? But then the harm is 
 done, the fire is ablaze and can be put out only by blood. 
 The object of the league is not to chastise a country 
 guilty of breaking the peace, but to prevent the out- 
 break of war, and to prevent it by the immediate pros- 
 pect of such appalling consequences to the offender that 
 he will not venture to run the risk. If a number of 
 great Powers were to pledge themselves with serious in- 
 tent, to wage war jointly and severally on any one of 
 their members that attacked another before submitting 
 the case to arbitration, it is in the highest degree im- 
 probable that the casus foederis would ever occur, while 
 any less drastic provision would be far less effective. 
 
 An objection has been raised to the proposal for a 
 league to enforce peace on the ground that it has in the 
 past often proved difficult, if not impossible, to deter- 
 mine which of two belligerents began a war. The crit- 
 icism is serious, and presents a practical difficulty, grave 
 but probably not insurmountable. The proposal merely 
 lays down a general principle, and if adopted the de- 
 tails would have to be worked out very fully and care- 
 fully in a treaty, which would specify the acts that 
 would constitute the waging of war by one member upon 
 another. These would naturally be, not the mere creat- 
 
 156
 
 ing of apprehension, but specific acts, such as a declara- 
 tion of war, invasion of territory, the use of force at 
 sea not disowned within forty-eight hours, or an advance 
 into a region in dispute. This last is an especially dif- 
 ficult point, but those portions of the earth's surface in 
 which different nations have conflicting claims are grow- 
 ing less decade by decade. 
 
 It must be remembered that the cases which would 
 arise are not like those which have arisen in the past, 
 where one nation is determined to go to war and merely 
 seeks to throw the moral responsibility on the other while 
 getting the advantage of actually beginning hostilities. 
 It is a case where each will strive to avoid the specific 
 acts of war that may involve the penalty. The reader 
 may have seen, in a country where personal violence is 
 severely punished, two men shaking their fists in each 
 other's faces, each trying to provoke the other to strike 
 the first blow ; and no fight after all. 
 
 There are many agreements in private business which 
 are not easy to embody in formal contracts; agreements 
 where, as in this case, the execution of the terms calls 
 for immediate action, and where redress after an elab- 
 orate trial of the facts affords no real reparation. But 
 if the object sought is good, men do not condemn it on 
 account of the difficulty in devising provisions that will 
 accomplish the result desired; certainly not until they 
 have tried to devise them. It may, indeed, prove impos- 
 sible to draft a code of specific acts that will cover the 
 ground; it may be impracticable to draft it so as to 
 avoid issues of fact that can be determined only after a 
 long sifting of evidence, which would come too late ; but 
 surely that is no reason for failure to make the attempt. 
 We are not making a treaty among nations. "We are 
 merely putting forward a suggestion for reducing war, 
 which seems to merit consideration. 
 
 157
 
 though the 
 League 
 could not 
 meet all 
 possible con- 
 tingencies. 
 
 A second difficulty that will sometimes arise is the 
 rule of conduct to be followed pending the presentation 
 of the question to the international tribunal. The con- 
 tinuance or cessation of the acts complained of may ap- 
 pear to be, and may even be in fact, more important 
 than the final decision. This has been brought to our 
 attention forcibly by the sinking of the Liisitania. We 
 should have done very wisely to submit to arbitration 
 the question of the right of submarines to torpedo mer- 
 chant ships without warning, provided Germany aban- 
 doned the practise pending the arbitration; and Ger- 
 many would probably not have refused to submit the 
 question to a tribunal on the understanding that the 
 practise was to continue until the decision was rendered, 
 because by that time the war would be over. This diffi- 
 culty is inherent in every plan for the arbitration of in- 
 ternational disputes, although more serious in a league 
 whose members bind themselves to prevent by force the 
 outbreak of war. It would be necessary to give the 
 tribunal summary authority to decree a modus vivendi, 
 to empower it, like a court of equity, to issue a tem- 
 porary injunction. 
 
 In short, the proposal for a league to enforce peace 
 cannot meet all possible contingencies. It cannot pre- 
 vent all future wars, nor does any sensible person believe 
 that any plan can do so in the present state of civiliza- 
 tion. But it can prevent some wars that would other- 
 wise take place, and if it does that it will have done much 
 good. 
 
 People have asked how such a league would differ 
 from the Triple Alliance or Triple Entente whether 
 it would not be nominally a combination for peace which 
 might in practise have quite a different effect. But in 
 fact its object is quite contrary to those alliances. They 
 are designed to protect their members against outside 
 
 158
 
 Powers. This is intended to insure peace among the LeaRife h meant 
 members themselves. If it grew strong enough, by in- 1 " its 
 
 eluding all the great Powers, it might well insist on uni- 
 versal peace by compelling the outsiders to come in. 
 But that is not its primary object, which is simply to 
 prevent its members from going to war with one another. 
 No doubt if several great nations, and some of the smaller 
 ones, joined it, and if it succeeded in preserving constant 
 friendly relations among its members, there would grow 
 up among them a sense of solidarity which would make 
 any outside Power chary of attacking one of them ; and, 
 what is more valuable, would make outsiders want to 
 join it. But there is little use in speculating about 
 probabilities. It is enough if such a league were a source 
 of enduring peace among its own members. 
 
 How about our own position in the United States? 
 The proposal is a radical and subversive departure from 
 the traditional policy of our country. Would it be wise 
 for us to be parties to such an agreement? At the 
 threshold of such a discussion one thing is clear. If we 
 are not willing to urge our own government to join a 
 movement for peace, we have no business to discuss any 
 plan for the purpose. It is worse than futile, it is an 
 impertinence, for Americans to advise the people of Eu- 
 rope how they ought to conduct their affairs if we have 
 nothing in common with them; to suggest to them con- 
 ventions with burdens which are well enough for them, 
 but which we are not willing to share. If our peace or- 
 ganizations are not prepared to have us take part in the 
 plans they devise, they had better disband, or confine 
 their discussions to Pan-American questions. . . . 
 
 A. Lawrence Lowell, "A League to Enforce Peace," 
 Atlantic Monthly, Sept., 1915. 
 
 159
 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF A LEAGUE 
 
 Force for de- The problem of the League of Peace is actually the 
 for*cl for ag- problem of the use of force. Force internationally ex- 
 pressed is measured in armaments. The chief discussion 
 which has been waged for the past decade between the 
 pacifists and militarists has been over the question of 
 armaments. The militarists claim that armaments in- 
 sure national safety. The pacifists declare they inev- 
 itably lead to war. Both disputants insist that the pres- 
 ent war furnishes irrefutable proof of their contentions. 
 As is usual in cases of this kind the shield has two 
 sides. The confusion has arisen from a failure to recog- 
 nize the threefold function of force: 
 
 1. Force used for the maintenance of order police 
 force. 
 
 2. Force used for attack aggression. 
 
 3. Force used to neutralize aggression defense. 
 Police force is almost wholly good. 
 
 Offense is almost wholly bad. 
 
 Defense is a necessary evil, and exists simply to neu- 
 tralize force employed for aggression. 
 
 The problem of the peace movement is how to abol- 
 ish the use of force for aggression, and yet to maintain 
 it for police purposes. Force for defense will of course 
 automatically cease when force for aggression is abol- 
 ished. 
 
 The chief problem then of a League of Peace is this: 
 160
 
 Shall the members of the League "not only keep the P 16 p V nclples 
 
 ^ J for a League 
 
 peace themselves, but prevent by force if necessary its f Peace, 
 being broken by others," as ex-President Roosevelt sug- 
 gested in his Nobel Peace Address delivered at Chris- 
 tiania, May 5, 1910? Or shall its force be exercised 
 only within its membership and thus be on the side of 
 law and order and never on the side of arbitrary will 
 or tyranny? Or shall it never be used at all? Which- 
 ever one of these conceptions finally prevails the Great 
 War has conclusively demonstrated that as long as War 
 Lords exist defensive force must be maintained. Hence 
 the League must be prepared to use force against any 
 nations which will not forswear force. Nevertheless a 
 formula must be devised for disarmament. For unless 
 it is a law of nature that war is to consume all the fruits 
 of progress disarmament somehow and some way must 
 take place. How then can the maintenance of a force 
 for defense and police power be reconciled with the the- 
 ory of disarmament? 
 
 In this way: Let the League of Peace be formed on 
 the following five principles: 
 
 First. The nations of the League shall mutually agree 
 to respect the territory and sovereignty of each other. 
 
 Second. All questions that cannot be settled by diplo- 
 macy shall be arbitrated. 
 
 Third. The nations of the League shall provide a 
 periodical assembly to make all rules to become law un- 
 less vetoed by a nation within a stated period. 
 
 Fourth. The nations shall disarm to the point where 
 the combined forces of the League shall be a certain 
 per cent, higher than those of the most heavily armed 
 nation or alliance outside of the League. Detailed rules 
 for this pro rata disarmament shall be formulated by 
 the Assembly. 
 
 Fifth. Any member of the League shall have the 
 161
 
 Rights nd right to withdraw on due notice, or may be expelled by 
 
 duties within 
 
 the League. the unanimous vote or the others. 
 
 The advantages that a nation would gain in becom- 
 ing a member of such a league are manifest. The risk 
 of war would be eliminated within the League. Obvi- 
 ously the only things that are vital to a nation are its 
 land and its independence. Since each nation in the 
 League will have pledged itself to respect the territory 
 and the sovereignty of every other, a refusal to do so 
 will logically lead to expulsion from the League. Thus 
 every vital question will be automatically reserved from 
 both war and arbitration. All other questions are of 
 secondary importance and can readily be arbitrated. 
 
 By the establishment of a periodical assembly a 
 method would be devised whereby the members of the 
 League could develop their common intercourse and 
 interests as far and as fast as they could unanimously 
 agree upon ways and means. As any law could be ve- 
 toed by a single nation, no nation could have any fear 
 that it would be coerced against its will by a majority 
 vote of the other nations. By such an assembly the 
 League might in time agree to reduce tariffs and postal 
 rates and in a thousand other ways promote commerce 
 and comity among its members. 
 
 As a final safeguard against coercion by the other 
 members of the League, each member will have the right 
 of secession on due notice. This would prevent civil 
 war within the League. The right of expulsion by the 
 majority will prevent one nation by its veto power in- 
 definitely blocking all progress of the League. 
 
 But it will be said that all these agreements will have 
 no binding effect in a crisis. A covenant is a mere 
 "scrap of paper" whose provisions will be violated by 
 the first nation which fancies it is its interest to do so. 
 In order to show that their faith is backed up by deeds, 
 
 162
 
 however, the nations on entering the League agree to 
 disarm to a little above the danger point, and put all 
 their defensive power under a federal authority. This 
 is the real proof of their conversion to the peace idea. 
 
 Thus the nations which join the League will enjoy 
 all the economic and political advantages which come 
 from mutual cooperation and the extension of interna- 
 tional friendship and at the same time will be protected 
 by an adequate- force against the aggressive force of the 
 greatest nation or alliance outside the League. The 
 League therefore reconciles the demand of the pacif- 
 ists for the limitation of armaments and eventual dis- 
 armament and the demand of the militarists for the 
 protection that armament affords. Above all the estab- 
 lishment of such a league will give the liberal parties in 
 the nations outside the League an issue on which they 
 can attack their governments so as sooner or later to 
 force them to apply to the League for membership. As 
 each one enters there will be another pro rata reduc- 
 tion of the military forces of the League down to the 
 armament of the next most powerful nation or alliance 
 outside it; until finally the whole world is federated in 
 a brotherhood of universal peace and armies and navies 
 are reduced to an international police force. 
 
 Hamilton Holt, "The Way to Disarm," Independent, 
 Sept. 28, 1914. 
 
 163
 
 PACIFISM AND THE LEAGUE OF PEACE 
 
 Peace is not i n short, we have little faith, in a pacifism which is 
 resistance. mere laissez-faire, in the doctrine that peace is the 
 vacuum created by the absence of war. Peace is some- 
 thing 1 more original than that. It is a great construc- 
 tion, of infinite complexity, which will be aided but not 
 consummated by good intentions. It involves dangers, 
 failures, disappointments. The interests of the world 
 are interwoven, and no nation can work for peace by 
 adopting counsels of perfection in a policy of isolation. 
 Yet that is what mere non-resistance implies. It im- 
 plies an unwillingness to take the risk of participation 
 in world politics, it trusts vaguely that by staying at 
 home and minding our business, we can make our own 
 little cultivated garden bloom in peace and prosperity. 
 There is no internationalism in such a view of things. 
 The real internationalist is one who works first of all 
 to keep his own nation from aggressive action, who in- 
 fuses his own national policy with a desire for interna- 
 tional peace. He works to control his own government 
 so as to make it adopt a humanely constructive foreign 
 policy. He does not refuse to have part in the world's 
 affairs because the world may soil his hands. He real- 
 izes that; peace can be created only out of the strength 
 of intelligent people, that even God when he fought the 
 devil had to compromise his own perfection. 
 
 It is more than a century since Thomas Paine pro- 
 posed to secure the world's peace forever by a league 
 
 164
 
 between Britain, France and the United States. He ^hted ea fde 
 made the suggestion on the eve of the Napoleonic wars, jst sees a 
 
 r League of 
 
 and it is hardly an accident that the idea was revived Peace, 
 with a different trinity a few months before the pres- 
 ent struggle. It was Britain, France and Germany that 
 Jean Jaures would have united in a League of Peace. 
 At the parting of the ways the clear-sighted idealist has 
 always understood that the choice is not between war 
 and that sort of peace which is only a negation of war. 
 The choice in both these crises lay between shattering 
 war and constructive peace, between an open and de- 
 structive enmity and a peace based on a common will 
 and an active partnership. Mirabeau had the same 
 vivid perception, and what these three saw is still a 
 vision that haunts us among the mists of war. Of the 
 several proposals that arise inevitably in men's minds 
 when we think of preventing the renewal of this Con- 
 tinental struggle, there is none which sober thinkers pro- 
 pound so readily and none which has been worked out 
 with greater detail in England than this expedient of 
 the League of Peace. There are, indeed, a few who 
 dare to speak of the United States of Europe, and some 
 who discuss the creation of an international police force 
 to secure the law of nations and repress aggression. 
 But even they do not deny the inordinate difficulties. 
 This war has lasted long enough to teach all but the 
 unteachable that neither side will be able to crush and 
 dominate the other. But short of the compulsion of 
 irresistible might, will any influence suffice to bring the 
 enemies of to-day by their spontaneous choice into a 
 European federation? Is any people, even the most pa- 
 cific, prepared as yet to accept the surrender of sover- 
 eignty which entry into even a loosely-knit federation 
 would involve? 
 
 The League of Peace presents itself to practical men 
 165
 
 A practicable ag a dream capable of an early translation into fact. 
 The allies need only agree to join their forces against 
 any power which persisted, after offers of arbitration 
 or mediation (a reservation which no old-fashioned alli- 
 ance ever made) in attacking any one of them. It 
 would differ from other alliances partly by its insist- 
 ence on the duty of arbitration, partly by its frank and 
 public constitution, but mainly by the ready welcome 
 which it would offer even to the enemy of yesterday, 
 should he elect to enter it. The United States would 
 rally to it, seeing in it their best hope of safety, and 
 ultimately it might become a genuine Pan-European 
 League. It is sometimes suggested that Paine 's Anglo- 
 Franco-American combination might form its nucleus. 
 More often its advocates base their hopes on the Anglo- 
 Franco-Russian entente, expanded by adhesion of some 
 of the present neutrals. No one suggests, and this is 
 the weakest point of the whole scheme, that Germany 
 and Austria would be likely to join such a League at the 
 start, though no one of this way of thinking would de- 
 sire to exclude them. 
 
 Much would depend on the nucleus of the federation. 
 Crude military considerations render an Anglo-French- 
 American trinity impossible. Without discussing 
 whether the United States would care to enter "the 
 vortex of European militarism," it is enough to point 
 out that such a combination could not hope to hold the 
 rest of Europe in check, could not even safeguard 
 France against Germany alone, unless one or both of the 
 English-speaking nations adopted compulsory military 
 service. France must ally herself to some first-rate 
 military power ; no navy can protect her land frontiers. 
 The Anglo-Franco-Russian combination is open to other 
 objections. It does not represent a homogeneous civili- 
 zation. Every outbreak of anti-Jewish fanaticism in 
 
 166
 
 Russia, every assault on Finland or Persia, every re- ^t^^ore 
 minder that official Russia still belongs to the Dark Ages, J^ n Jf old 
 would tend to weaken the moral authority of such a 
 League. It has, moreover, too long a history. It would 
 seem even to charitable Germans a mere perpetuation 
 under a new name of the combination which M. Del- 
 casse and King Edward were accused of forming to ' ' pen 
 Germany in. ' ' It would seem to be nothing better than 
 an alliance to assure the victors in the perpetual pos- 
 session of the fruits of victory, and the new pacifist fa- 
 c.ade to the old armed fortress would only aggravate by 
 hypocrisy the sin of success. Germany would never join 
 this League ; she would scheme with all the arts of barter 
 and intrigue to detach Russia from it, and the old game 
 of the Balance of Power would go on. 
 
 The fatal objection to any alliance of this kind is 
 that it does not really meet the difficulty that no State 
 will abandon its sovereignty. This alliance would not 
 be a League of Peace unless it were prepared to exer- 
 cise a very sharp supervision over the foreign policy of 
 its members. If the old Anglo-Franco-Russian entente 
 had been a genuine League of Peace, it would have had 
 to say, for example, to Serbia, "You may join us, but 
 if you do join us, you must abandon forever your Ir- 
 redentist ambitions at the expense of Austria. We will 
 protect you against any unprovoked attack by Austria. 
 But you on your side must refrain from any encour- 
 agement to those who would dismember her. ' ' It would 
 have had to say with equal decision to France, "Join us 
 by all means, but at the cost of refraining from any 
 expansion in Morocco. You cannot march on Fez with- 
 out provoking some German reply." Such a League, 
 in short, would be a mutual insurance society, but the 
 risks would be too high unless the society could prohibit 
 its members from any deliberate playing with fire. It 
 
 167
 
 vid u for pr - ig not enough to say, "We will murder an Archduke 
 changing con- once in a way, but when he is dead and buried we will 
 go to The Hague about him"; or, "We will, to be sure, 
 take places in the sun which other people covet, but 
 when we have taken them we shall not wantonly attack 
 any unsuccessful rivals." The League of Peace would 
 either be the old imperialistic alliance under a dishon- 
 est name, or else it would be a highly conservative 
 federation which would keep its members in a very 
 strait pacifist jacket. If great powers would really 
 endure such a control they might as well face at once the 
 limitation of sovereignty implied in a United States of 
 Europe. 
 
 The vice of all such schemes is that they are based 
 too one-sidedly on the idea of preventing wars. They 
 take a static view of the world. They come quite natu- 
 rally from citizens of satisfied powers, weary of the bur- 
 den of defending what they have got. They ignore the 
 fact that life is change. They make no provision for 
 any organic alterations in the world's structure. We 
 can no more prevent war by organizing a defensive 
 league than revolution by creating a police. We must 
 deal with causes, must provide some means alternative 
 to war by which large grievances can be redressed and 
 legitimate ambitions satisfied. To recur to our concrete 
 cases: if it is desired to insure that Serbia shall not 
 again embroil a continent in war, some machinery must 
 be provided by which Austria can be required to treat 
 her subject Serbs reasonably well. When a "place in 
 the sun" like Morocco, one of the few unappropriated 
 parts of the earth fit for settlement by a white race, can 
 no longer maintain its independence, there must be some 
 impartial Power which can say, ' ' This rich potential col- 
 ony ought not to go to a State like France, with two 
 similar colonies already under its flag and a dwindling 
 
 168
 
 population at home, but rather to a State like Germany, 
 with no such colony of her own, despite her teeming reconciled 
 population, her great birth-rate, her vigorous and ex- 
 pansive commerce." 
 
 For such problems as this there is no solution in the 
 quasi-legal processes of arbitration. The fundamental 
 fact in the European history of the last twenty years has 
 been the restless search of Germany for colonies and 
 fields of exploitation. She felt her way in South Africa ; 
 the British Empire expanded to exclude her. She 
 turned a timid glance to Brazil; the Monroe Doctrine 
 was the flaming sword at the gate of that Paradise. 
 She coveted Morocco ; the British navy cleared its decks. 
 She penetrated Turkey down the spine of the Bagdad 
 Railway; she was met at the Gulf with opposing sea- 
 power. A League of the Satisfied might appeal to Lon- 
 don and Paris and Petrograd. But Berlin will ask, 
 "What hope does it offer to me that when my popula- 
 tion is still denser, my industry still more expansive, my 
 need for markets and fields of exploitation for my capi- 
 tal even more clamant than it is to-day, your League of 
 Peace will provide me with an outlet ? You bar the fu- 
 ture, and you call it peace." 
 
 The recent Philadelphia conference on The League to 
 Enforce Peace was extraordinarily sensible because it 
 recognized so clearly its own limitations. It did not 
 propose to stop the war. It did not urge anybody to 
 act before he was ready to act. It did not try to 
 stampede our government or any European government 
 into some theoretical program. It tried merely to focus 
 the ideas which have been most common in England and 
 America during the last ten months. Under impressive 
 circumstances, in a hall filled with noble memories, it 
 crystallized a number of vague ideas into an hypothesis. 
 The conference was visibly trying to reach, some mini- 
 
 169
 
 The Phiia- mum agreement for the purpose of clarifying the think- 
 ing of individuals and groups all over the world. 
 
 Nobody is expected to act upon the resolutions, but 
 everybody is expected to give what thought and knowl- 
 edge and imagination he may have towards maturing 
 the intentions which they expressed. The conference 
 did what every person must do constantly for himself 
 whenever he is trying to think out a long and complex 
 problem. It stopped for breath and for a renewal of 
 faith; it made a tentative proposal as a guide for the 
 thought which is to follow. With great sanity it took 
 no doctrinaire position, laid down no rule, such as peace- 
 at-any-price, honor-cannot-be-arbitrated, sovereignty-is- 
 one-and-indivisible, or any of the other assumptions 
 which obscure pacifist and militarist argument. The 
 delegates in Philadelphia were scientific in their spirit; 
 they did not even attempt that over-precise definition 
 of the final end which always results in the misleading 
 use of theory. They were not doctors who begin their 
 study of disease by trying to define the ideal healthy 
 man, they were not political doctrinaires who begin by 
 defining the ideally peaceful world. They were agreed, 
 as doctors are agreed, that a sounder organic constitu- 
 tion is required, and that pain and suffering should be 
 lessened as much as possible, but they did not attempt to 
 say that they would not inflict pain to cure pain, or 
 wage war to preserve the peace. 
 
 The idea which the delegates had uppermost in their 
 thoughts was a league of nations that should give power 
 to international law. It is an extension of The Hague 
 plan by which the nations attempt not only to set up a 
 court, but to compel those who have a dispute to go to 
 the court. As we understand the resolutions, they do 
 not take the added step of agreeing to enforce the deci- 
 sion of the court. 
 
 170
 
 The idea is based on a tremendous compromise, as 
 
 .^ ' back mterna- 
 
 our own history shows. We were once a league of for- tumaiiaw. 
 eign States, suspicious of common action and jealous of 
 each sovereign prerogative. On the greatest issue of 
 our history we fought our greatest war, and the States 
 which represented union and federalism put an end once 
 for all to the unlimited sovereignty of any individual 
 State. Our Civil War established the supremacy of the 
 federal power over the States. 
 
 The United States of the World would face the same 
 problem, though on a much more difficult scale. It will 
 find that a court to adjust mistakes is not enough, for 
 the really important conflicts that provoke war are not 
 "justiciable." They are matters upon which a policy 
 has to be declared upon which, in brief, legislation is 
 needed. Some kind of legislature a League of Peace 
 would have to establish, and with a legislature and 
 court would have to go an executive. This would open 
 up the problem of representation, of the large and popu- 
 lous State as against the small ones, of the "satisfied 
 Powers ' ' against the ' ' unsatisfied. ' ' For it is clear that 
 the British Empire will not consent to give to Montene- 
 gro equal representation, or the United States to Vene- 
 zuela. Here will be the question of conflicts between 
 international and national legislation, similar to the con- 
 flicts which our Supreme Court is called upon to settle. 
 All the problems of home rule, such as that of Ireland 
 within the Empire, and of Ulster within Ireland, would 
 have to be met in territory like that of the Balkans, 
 by the League of Peace. It would have to determine 
 whether, for example, the sovereignty of a national India 
 was an internal question for the British Empire, or a 
 legitimate subject for international settlement. 
 
 The League would have to work out the problem of 
 unexploited territories, of weaker peoples, and of dis- 
 
 171
 
 The business orderly States. Just as our original Union had the 
 League. whole West to organize, so the League would have 
 
 Africa, large parts of Asia, and the middle Americas 
 as a kind of international domain. It would have to 
 meet those who want merely to exploit, and to support 
 those who are liberal enough to throw about weaker peo- 
 ples that protection under which they can really grow 
 to freedom. Nor would that be all. The League would 
 have to legislate about concessions, trading rights, tariffs, 
 about spheres of influence, about the use of great ocean 
 and land highways. As soon as it grappled with the 
 economic aspects of diplomacy, it would find, just as our 
 government found, that interstate commerce cannot be 
 regulated satisfactorily by conflicting state interests. 
 
 In other words, there is no stopping short at a league 
 to prevent war. Such a league would either grow to a 
 world federalism, or it would break up in civil war. 
 But that, far from being an argument against the 
 League, is the strongest possible argument for it. It is 
 the first step towards a closer world organization, and 
 once that step is taken, the world will have to choose 
 between taking some of the next steps and returning to 
 the anarchy of sovereign nationalities. The vast impli- 
 cations of the League of Peace are what make it im- 
 portant. And its real service to mankind may well be 
 that it will establish the first rallying point of a world 
 citizenship. 
 
 The development of such a citizenship is one of the 
 great moral and educational problems of this century. 
 It cannot mean a vague cosmopolitanism. It must mean 
 the training of people who have learned to modify their 
 national policies so that these do not make impossible 
 an international allegiance. This war has offered us an 
 example of such citizenship. The Canadians, Aus- 
 tralians, and New Zealanders who are fighting in Flan- 
 
 172
 
 ders and at the Dardanelles are living and dying for aV 
 the largest political organization the world has so far federalism 
 known. Their allegiance in the British Empire is to a 
 State which embraces one-quarter of the human race. 
 Never before in history have men been loyal to so great 
 and so diversified a unit. They have literally come from 
 all the ends of the earth to preserve a union of democra- 
 cies. They have shown by example what any World 
 League most needs to know, that federalism on a grand 
 scale is not an idle dream. 
 
 The New Republic, March 20 and June 26, 1915. 
 
 173
 
 THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT 
 
 The nations 
 have a power- 
 ful non-mili- 
 tary weapon. 
 
 In the discussion of an International Executive en- 
 trusted with powers to compel the fulfilment of treaty 
 obligations, it must not be assumed that coercion can 
 only be exercised by the employment of armed force. 
 The boycott is a weapon which could be employed with 
 paralyzing power by a circle of nations upon an of- 
 fender against the public law of the world. No nation 
 to-day, least of all the great industrial and military 
 Powers, is or can become socially and economically self- 
 sufficient. It depends in countless ways upon inter- 
 course with other nations. If all or most of these ave- 
 nues of intercourse were stopped, it would soon be re- 
 duced to worse straits than those which Germany is now 
 experiencing. If all diplomatic intercourse were with- 
 drawn; if the international postal and telegraphic sys- 
 tems were closed to a public law-breaker; if all inter- 
 state railway trains stopped at his frontiers; if no 
 foreign ships entered his ports, and ships carrying his 
 flag were excluded from every foreign port; if all coal- 
 ing stations were closed to him; if no acts of sale or 
 purchase were permitted to him in the outside world 
 if such a political and commercial boycott were seriously 
 threatened, what country could long stand out against 
 it? Nay, the far less rigorous measure of a financial 
 boycott, the closure of all foreign exchanges to members 
 of the outlaw State, the prohibition of all quotations on 
 
 174
 
 foreign stock exchanges, and of all dealings in stocks * 
 and shares, all discounting and acceptances of trade bills, co-operation, 
 all loans for public or private purposes, and all pay- 
 ments of moneys due such a withdrawal of financial 
 intercourse, if thoroughly applied and persisted in, would 
 be likely to bring to its senses the least scrupulous of 
 States. 
 
 Assuming that the members of the League included 
 all or most of the important commercial and financial 
 nations, and that they could be relied upon to press 
 energetically all or even a few of these forms of boy- 
 cott, could any country long resist such pressure? 
 Would not the threat of it and the knowledge that it 
 could be used form a potent restraint upon the law- 
 breaker? Even the single weapon of a complete postal 
 and telegraphic boycott would have enormous efficiency 
 were it rigorously applied. Every section of the in- 
 dustrial and commercial community would bring organ- 
 ized pressure upon its Government to withdraw from so 
 intolerable a position and to return to its international 
 allegiance. It may be said, Why is it that such a 
 powerful weapon of such obvious efficacy has never been 
 applied ? The answer is that the conditions for its rapid 
 and concerted application have never hitherto existed. 
 For in order that it may be effective, a considerable 
 number of nations must have previously undertaken to 
 apply it simultaneously and by common action. And, 
 what is more, each nation must have confidence in the 
 ~b&na fides of the intention of other nations to apply 
 it. For the detailed application of the boycott, in most 
 points, must of necessity remain in the hands of the sev- 
 eral national Governments. Here comes the practical 
 difficulty. Every boycott has a certain injurious re- 
 bound. It hits back the nation that applies it. The 
 injury of suspended intercourse is, of course, not equal, 
 
 175
 
 And boycott otherwise the process would be futile. If the whole cir- 
 those who cle of A 's neighbors boycott him, each suffers half the 
 loss of his separate intercourse with A, but A suffers 
 this loss multiplied by the number of his neighbors. 
 Now if A's intercourse with all his neighbors is of equal 
 magnitude, each of them can probably afford easily to 
 bear the sacrifice involved in the boycott, trusting to 
 the early effect of their action in bringing A to terms. 
 But if one or two of A's neighbors are in much closer 
 relations with A than the others, and if, as may be the 
 case, they are getting more advantage from this inter- 
 course than A, the risk or sacrifice they are called upon 
 to undergo will be proportionately greater. They must 
 bear the chief brunt of a policy in the adoption of which 
 they have not the determinant voice. 
 
 Take, for example, the case of Germany. An all- 
 round boycott applied to her would evidently cause more 
 damaging reactions to Holland, Belgium, and Denmark 
 than to any of the greater nations whose united voice 
 might have determined its application. The injury to 
 Holland, in particular, might in the first instance be al- 
 most as grave as that sustained by Germany, the sup- 
 posed object of the boycott. It would evidently be nec- 
 essary to make provision against this unequal incidence 
 by devising a system of compensations or indemnity to 
 meet the case of such a special injury or sacrifice. 
 
 A brief allusion to the other side of the objection will 
 suffice, viz., the fact that any such boycott would be far 
 less potent or immediate in its pressure against some 
 nations than against others. "While Great Britain would 
 have to yield at once to the threat of such pressure, 
 Russia, or even the United States, could stand out for 
 a considerable time, and China might even regard the 
 boycott as a blessing. But it is pretty evident that in the 
 long run no civilized nation could endure such isolation, 
 
 176
 
 and that this weapon is one which the League might in .^ er 
 certain cases advantageously employ. 
 
 Other aspects of the social-economic boycott raise 
 other difficulties. While certain modes and paths of 
 intercourse lie directly under the control of the Govern- 
 ments of the cooperating States, others belong to pri- 
 vate enterprise. Though postal, railway, and tele- 
 graphic intercourse could be cut off easily by agreements 
 between Governments, private trading could not so easily 
 be stopped. It is not found a simple matter to stop all 
 trading between members of nations actually at war 
 when national sentiment sides strongly with the legal 
 prohibition. It might be much more difficult to prevent 
 all commercial intercourse for private gain when there 
 was no special hostility between the two nations in ques- 
 tion. But this is, after all, only a minor difficulty. 
 Provided that the respective Governments were prepared 
 to use their normal powers of control over the principal 
 modes of communication and of transport, the potency 
 of the boycott so established would appear exceedingly 
 effective. 
 
 It involves, however, a, risk which needs recognition. 
 The extreme pressure of the boycott might lead to for- 
 cible reprisals on the part of the boycotted State which 
 would, in fact, precipitate a war. Declaring what would 
 be in effect a blockade by sea and land, it might be 
 necessary for the League to patrol the seas in order to 
 stop "illegal traffic," and to keep some force along 
 the land frontiers for general purposes. A boycotted 
 nation might, in the stress and anger of the case, begin 
 hostilities against those of its neighbors who were most 
 active in the operations of the boycott. In that event 
 the economic boycott would have to be supported by 
 armed pressure. This would also be the case where the 
 breach of international law against which action was 
 
 177
 
 international taken consisted, not in refusing to arbitrate or concili- 
 
 Bank would . .-T-- 
 
 strengthen ate an issue but in an actual opening 01 hostilities. 
 Such an act of war, directed necessarily against some one 
 or more States, could not be met merely by a boycott. 
 It would involve armed cooperation as well, the economic 
 boycott forming an accompaniment. 
 
 There is another method of bringing financial pressure 
 upon a law-breaking State which deserves consideration. 
 It is put forward in the following terms by Mr. F. N. 
 Keen in his able little book, "The World in Alliance": 
 "The States comprised in the international scheme 
 might be required to keep deposited with, or under the 
 control of, the International Council sums of money, 
 proportioned in some way to their relative populations 
 or financial resources, which; might be made available to 
 answer international obligations, and an international 
 bank might be organized, which would facilitate the giv- 
 ing of security by States to the International Council 
 for the performance of their obligations and the enforce- 
 ment of payments between one State and another (as 
 well as probably assisting in the creation of an inter- 
 national currency and discharging other useful interna- 
 tional functions)." 
 
 The organized concentration of international finance 
 by the formation of an international bank is a line of 
 action which might immensely strengthen that body of 
 pacific forces the rising importance of which Mr. Nor- 
 man Angell has so effectively expounded. It might con- 
 solidate to an almost incalculable degree the effective 
 unity of the International League by placing under it 
 the solid foundation of world-peace, while the power 
 which such an institution would wield, either for pur- 
 poses of fiscal or financial boycott, would be enor- 
 mous. 
 
 But however highly we estimate the potentialities of 
 178
 
 the boycott as a valuable adjunct to the pressure of pub- 
 lie opinion in compelling obedience to treaty obligations, police 
 it is idle to pretend that the confidence required to in- 
 duce the chief nations to rely upon the due perform- 
 ance of these obligations by all their co-signatories will 
 be possible without placing at their disposal, for use in 
 the last resort, an adequate armed force to break the 
 resistance of an armed law-breaking State. Somewhere 
 behind international law there must be placed a power 
 of international compulsion by arms. If that force were 
 really adequate, it is probable that it would never be 
 necessary to employ it for any purpose save that of re- 
 pelling invasions or dangerous disorders on the part of 
 outsiders. Its existence and the knowledge of its pres- 
 ence might suffice to restrain the aggressive or lawless 
 tendencies which will survive in members of the League. 
 But in the beginnings of the organization of interna- 
 tional society it is at least possible, perhaps likely, that 
 some dangerous outbreak of the old spirit of state-ab- 
 solutism should occur, and that some arrogant or greedy 
 Power, within the circle of the League, might endeavor 
 to defy the public law. 
 
 For the States entering such a League will be of vari- 
 ous grades of political development: some may enter 
 with reluctance and rather because they fear to be left 
 out than because they believe in or desire the success 
 of the League. It is idle to imagine that a society start- 
 ing with so little inner unity of status and of purpose 
 can dispense entirely with the backing of physical force 
 with which the most highly evolved of national societies 
 has been unable to dispense. 
 
 What form, then, should the required international 
 force take, and who should exercise it? 
 
 The proposal to endow some executive international 
 body with the power of levying and maintaining a new 
 
 179
 
 HOW con- land and sea force, superior to that of any Power or 
 combination it may be called upon to meet, scarcely 
 merits consideration. Apart from the hopelessness of 
 getting the Powers to consent to set up a Super-State 
 upon this basis, the mere suggestion of curing militar- 
 ism by creating a large additional army and navy would 
 be intolerable. Nor is it any more reasonable to ex- 
 pect the Powers to abandon their separate national 
 forces, simply contributing their quota towards an inter- 
 national force under the permanent control of an Inter- 
 national Executive. No such abandonment of sovereign 
 power, no such complete confidence in the new interna- 
 tionalism, could for a long time to come be even con- 
 templated. Each nation would insist upon retaining 
 within its own territory and at its own disposal the 
 forces necessary to preserve internal order and to meet 
 at the outset any sudden attack made from outside. It 
 is evident, in other words, that the forces required by 
 the International League in the last resort, for the main- 
 tenance of public law and the repression of breaches 
 of the treaty, must be composed of contingents drawn 
 upon some agreed plan from the national forces and 
 placed for the work! in hand at the disposal of an inter- 
 national command. Such armed cooperation is, of 
 course, not unknown. Several times within recent years 
 concerted action has been taken by several European 
 Powers, and though the Pekin expedition in 1900 can- 
 not be regarded as a very favorable example, it illus- 
 trates the Avillingness of Powers to act together for some 
 common end which seems to them of sufficient impor- 
 tance. Is it too much to expect that the nations enter- 
 ing the Confederation will realize with sufficient clear- 
 ness the importance of preserving the integrity of their 
 international agreement to be willing to entrust a per- 
 manent executive with the duty of commandeering the 
 
 180
 
 forces necessary to achieve this purpose when they may 
 
 be required? beheld 
 
 It will doubtless be objected that there is a world of for the world- 
 difference between the occasional willingness of a group 
 of Powers to take concerted action upon a particular oc- 
 casion, for which each reserves full liberty of determina- 
 tion as to whether and to what extent it will cooperate, 
 and the proposal before us. It is absurd, we shall be 
 told, to expect that States bred in the sense of sover- 
 eignty and military pride will seriously entertain a pro- 
 posal which may bring them into war in a quarrel not 
 specifically theirs and compel them to furnish troops to 
 serve under an international staff. But many events 
 that have seemed as absurd are brought to pass. A few 
 decades ago nothing would have seemed more absurd 
 than to suppose that our nation would be willing to 
 equip an Expeditionary Force of several million men 
 to operate upon the Continent under the supreme con- 
 trol of a French general. Whether, in fact, such co- 
 operation as we here desiderate is feasible at any early 
 period will depend upon two factors: first, the realiza- 
 tion on the part of Governments and peoples of the civ- 
 ilized world of the supreme importance of the issue at 
 stake in this endeavor to lay a strong foundation for the 
 society of nations; secondly, the diminution in the in- 
 fluence of militarism and navalism as factors in national 
 life that is likely to occur if sufficient belief in the 
 permanence and efficacy of the new arrangement is once 
 secured. If nations can be brought to believe that 
 national armies and navies are too dangerous toys to be 
 entrusted to the indiscretion of the national statesmen 
 and generals, and are only safe if they are held in trust 
 for the wider world community, this conviction will 
 modify the surviving sentiments of national pride and 
 national pugnacity and make it easier to accept the new 
 
 181
 
 Each nation international status. Moreover, if, as the first-fruits of 
 the new order, a sensible reduction of national arma- 
 ments can be achieved, this lessening of the part which 
 armed force plays within each national economy will be 
 attended by a corresponding increase in the willingness 
 to place the reduced forces at the international disposal. 
 For the root motive of the international policy is the 
 desire of each nation to get a larger amount of security 
 at a smaller cost than under the old order. Those, 
 therefore, who confidently assert that States will not 
 consent on any terms to entrust their national forces to 
 an international command for the maintenance of the 
 treaty obligations under the proposed scheme in effect 
 simply assert the permanency of the reign of unreason in 
 the relations between States. 
 
 For though the general agreement of States to sub- 
 mit their disagreements to processes of arbitration and 
 conciliation with pledges to abide by the results would 
 be a considerable advance towards better international 
 relations, even if no sanction beyond the force of pub- 
 lic opinion existed to enforce the fulfilment of the ob- 
 ligations, it would not suffice to establish such confidence 
 in future peace as to secure any sensible and simultane- 
 ous reduction of armed preparations. No Government 
 would consent to any weakening of its national forces 
 so long as there was danger that some Power might re- 
 pudiate its treaty obligations. This being the case, the 
 burdens and the perilous influences of militarism and 
 navalism would remain entrenched as strongly as before 
 in the European system, advertising, by their very pres- 
 ence, the lack of faith in the efficacy of the new pa- 
 cific arrangements. So long as these national armaments 
 remained unchecked the old conception of State absolut- 
 ism would still survive. There would still be danger of 
 militarist Governments intriguing for aggression or de- 
 
 182
 
 fense in new groupings, and new efforts to tip the bal- 
 ance of armed power in their favor. 
 
 It is ultimately to the dread and despair of this al- 
 ternative that I look for the motive-power to induce na- 
 tions to make the abatements of national separatism 
 necessary to establish an international society. Whether 
 the end of this war will leave these motives sufficiently 
 powerful to achieve this object will probably depend 
 upon the degree of enlightenment among mankind at 
 large upon the old ideas of States and statecraft. 
 
 J. A. Hobson, "Toward International Government," 
 pp. 90-100. 
 
 183
 
 ECONOMIC COERCION 
 
 I want to suggest here that the forces of Europe will 
 not be readily deterrent of aggression until the following 
 conditions at least are fulfilled: (a) The forces placed 
 behind a policy the first object of which shall be to deter 
 aggression; (b) aggression so defined as to have no refer- 
 ence to the merits of a dispute between two nations or 
 groups, but to consist simply in taking any belligerent 
 action to enforce a State's claim against another with- 
 out first having submitted that claim to international 
 enquiry; (c) the economic pressure which is an essential 
 part of military operations rendered effective by the co- 
 operation of States which do not necessarily give military 
 aid at all; (d) economic pressure so organized as to be 
 capable of prolongation beyond the period of military 
 operations; and (e) the penalties attaching to aggression 
 made so plain as to be realized beforehand by any people 
 whose government tends to drift towards aggression. 
 
 If the new Congress of Vienna is effective, these con- 
 ditions will be fulfilled. 
 
 Any arrangement which includes them would partake 
 of the nature of a league of mutual guarantee of in- 
 tegrity, and would be one in which there would be fair 
 hope of economic pressure gradually replacing military 
 force as the compelling sanction. Economic pressure 
 might be that first felt if the outstanding feature of the 
 arrangement were that any constituent State resorting 
 to hostilities as the result of a difference with another, 
 
 184
 
 not previously submitted to an international court of 
 enquiry, by that fact caused boycott or non-intercourse to be outlawed, 
 be proclaimed and maintained against it by the whole 
 group. This would not prevent certain members of the 
 group from carrying on military operations, as well, 
 against it. Some of the group would go to war in the 
 military sense all in the economic sense; the respective 
 roles would be so distributed as to secure the most ef- 
 fective action. From the moment of the offending na- 
 tion's defiance of the international agreement to which 
 it had been a party, its ships could enter no civilized 
 ports outside its own, nor leave them. Payment of 
 debts to it would be withheld ; the commercial paper of 
 its citizens would not be discounted; its citizens could 
 not travel in any civilized country in the world, their 
 passports being no longer recognized. 
 
 Thus, the outlaw nation could neither receive from nor 
 send to the outside world material or communication of 
 any kind neither food nor raw material of manufacture, 
 nor letters, nor cables. Money due to him throughout 
 the world would be sequestrated for disposal finally as 
 the international court's judgment should direct; and 
 that rule would apply to royalties on patents and pub- 
 lications, and would, of course, involve precautionary 
 seizure or sequestration of all property ships, goods, 
 bank balances, business held by that nation's citizens 
 abroad. 
 
 It is doubtful whether at the present stage of interna- 
 tional understanding this arrangement could be carried 
 beyond the point of using it as a means to secure delay 
 for enquiry in international disputes. Its use as a sanc- 
 tion for the judgments of international tribunals will 
 probably require a wider agreement as to the founda- 
 tions of international law than at present exists. But a 
 union of Christendom on the basis of common action 
 
 185
 
 Terms of affainst aggression would be a very great step to the 
 
 outlawry : Tf . 
 
 the Fabian more ambitious plans. 
 
 It has, however, been suggested (by the Fabian So- 
 ciety) to use this method as a sanction for the judgment 
 of an international court in the following terms: 
 
 In the event of non-compliance with any decision or 
 decree or injunction of the International High Court, or 
 of non-payment of the damages, compensation, or fine 
 within the time specified for such payment, the Court 
 may decree execution and may call upon the Constituent 
 States or upon some or any of them, to put in operation, 
 after duly published notice, for such period and under 
 such conditions as may be arranged, the following sanc- 
 tions : 
 
 (a) To prohibit all postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and 
 wireless communication with the recalcitrant State ; 
 
 (b) To prohibit all passenger traffic (other than the 
 exit of foreigners), whether by ship, railway, canal, 
 or road, to or from the recalcitrant State ; 
 
 (c) To prohibit the entrance into any port of the Con- 
 stituent States of any of the ships registered as belong- 
 ing to the recalcitrant State, except so far as may be 
 necessary for any of them to seek safety, in which case 
 such ship or ships shall be interned ; 
 
 (d) To prohibit the payment of any debts due to the 
 citizens, companies, or subordinate administrations of the 
 recalcitrant State, or to its national Government ; and, if 
 thought fit, to direct that payment of such debts shall be 
 made only to one or other of the Constituent Govern- 
 ments, which shall give a good and legally valid dis- 
 charge for the same, and shall account for the net pro- 
 ceeds thereof to the International High Court; 
 
 (e) To lay an embargo on any or all ships within the 
 jurisdiction of such Constituent State or States reg- 
 istered as belonging to the recalcitrant State ; 
 
 186
 
 (f) To prohibit any lending of capital or other ut P be ati<m 
 moneys to the citizens, companies, or subordinate ad- organized 
 
 ... * part of 
 
 ministrations of the recalcitrant State, or to its national international 
 Government ; 
 
 (g) To prohibit the issue or dealing in or quotation on 
 the Stock Exchange or in the press of any new loans, 
 debentures, shares, notes, or securities of any kind by 
 any of the citizens, companies or subordinate adminis- 
 trations of the recalcitrant State, or of its national Gov- 
 ernment ; 
 
 (h) To prohibit all imports, or certain specified im- 
 ports, coming from the recalcitrant State, or originating 
 within it; 
 
 (i) To prohibit all exports, or certain specified exports 
 consigned directly to the recalcitrant State, or destined 
 for it. 
 
 It should be noted that if the future European coali- 
 tion means business at all in giving permanent effect to 
 its settlement provisions, the chief Powers would be com- 
 mitted, during any period of war, by virtue of their 
 military obligations, to everything contained in the plan 
 just outlined. All that the project under discussion in- 
 volves in addition is that (1) certain States interested 
 in the observance of public right, but which, by their 
 circumstances, are not suited to military cooperation, 
 should give economic aid by taking part in the embargo 
 arrangements. They should not be neutral, but should 
 refuse intercourse with the recalcitrant State while ac- 
 cording it to the others. (2) That such cooperation 
 should be duly organized beforehand by public arrange- 
 ment and be recognized as part of the normal measures 
 of international public safety and, being duly recog- 
 nized in this way, should become part of international 
 law an amended law in so far as the rules of neutrality 
 are concerned. (3) That the arrangements should in- 
 
 187
 
 Boycott elude provisions for prolonging embargo or diserimina- 
 
 threaten tion against an offending State after the period of mili- 
 
 offending 
 
 nation after tary operations had ceased. 
 
 The first point that occurs to one, of course, in consid- 
 ering such a plan is that it has proven ineffective in the 
 present war since this condition of non-intercourse is 
 exactly that in which Germany now finds herself, and it 
 is not at all effective. 
 
 To which I reply: 
 
 1. That Germany, as already pointed out, is not yet 
 subject to a condition of complete non-intercourse, since 
 from the beginning of the war she has been receiving her 
 mail and cables and maintaining communication with the 
 outside world, morally an immensely important factor. 
 Nor is it entirely moral. Large supplies have, despite 
 the naval blockade, come to her through Scandinavia 
 and Holland. 
 
 2. That, though, of slow operation, it is the economic 
 factor which in the end will be the decisive one in the 
 operations against Germany; as the ring tightens and a 
 necessary raw material like cotton is absolutely ex- 
 cluded, the time will come when this fact will tell most 
 heavily. If the non-intercourse had been world-organ- 
 ized the effect would have operated from the first. Inci- 
 dentally, of course, America and England, between them, 
 control the cotton of the world. 
 
 3. The effect of the suggested embargo, boycott or eco- 
 nomic pressure would be most decisive as a deterrent to 
 aggression, not so much by what it might be able to ac- 
 complish during a war as by what its prolongation would 
 mean to the aggressor afterwards. 
 
 Norman Angell, "The World's Highway," pp. 318- 
 324. 
 
 188
 
 WORLD-ORGANIZATION AND PEACE 
 The end of armed conflict is conceivable as the result Types of 
 
 . social 
 
 of either of two achievements. Permanent peace may organization, 
 come either upon the establishment of successful means 
 for the settlement of disputes or upon the elimination 
 of the causes which produce disputes. This paper is 
 limited to discussion of the second of these alterna- 
 tives. . . . 
 
 In large-scale organizations purposefully created be- 
 cause of their utility, history discloses few in which that 
 utility, in its broader aspect, has been appreciated by all 
 of the cooperating members. Only in organizations ap- 
 proaching a pure democracy has an approximation to 
 such conditions been attained. In other forms of or- 
 ganization, force or reward has been employed to gain 
 the cooperation of persons outside a limited number of 
 organizers, who alone have appreciated the full utility 
 of organization. Even in democracies, however, when 
 population is too large for all to participate in gov- 
 ernment, it is possible only for the majority of the mem- 
 bers of the organization to exercise control over general 
 policies; executive functions are of necessity delegated. 
 Thus three sub-forms of the utility type of organiza- 
 tion are to be distinguished. They may be termed re- 
 spectively the organizer-force, the organizer-reward, and 
 the democratic-control-expert-executive forms. 
 
 Brief analysis and appeal to history will serve to indi- 
 cate the relative stability of these forms, both with re- 
 
 189
 
 Peace can- 
 not come 
 from the 
 organizer- 
 force system. 
 
 spect to each other and to the sympathy type of organi- 
 zation. 
 
 Of the organizer-force form the slavery system and the 
 militaristic empire are examples. Neither of these sys- 
 tems, however, has inherent stability. Both run the dan- 
 ger of revolt. The militaristic empire breaks down sooner 
 or later because unlikeness of peripheral regions causes 
 local patriotism to assert itself whenever there is possi- 
 bility of success. Slavery does not survive the growth 
 of intelligence. Governments of the organizer-force 
 form, moreover, have to face the constant threat of revo- 
 lution. If Germany be cited as a possible exception, the 
 reply is, that special conditions have stimulated the loy- 
 alty of the Germans to their sovereign. Germany was 
 unified but recently and then only by war. Her people 
 have not yet wholly overcome the distrust of one another 
 engendered by long-standing local differences. Ger- 
 many has thus required a strong hand to create and to 
 preserve her unity. In addition, the Germans, not alto- 
 gether without reason, have believed themselves sur- 
 rounded by hostile nations. These conditions sufficiently 
 account for the exception. It must not be overlooked, 
 however, that even in Germany there has been a growing 
 dissatisfaction with the form of organization of her gov- 
 ernment. Thus the briefest examination of the organ- 
 izer-force form of organization discloses the futility of 
 expecting permanent international peace to result from 
 an extension of this form throughout the world. Even 
 in its local manifestations this form exhibits inherent 
 instability and lack of harmony. 
 
 The organizer-reward form of organization also ap- 
 pears to have its own peculiar tendency towards insta- 
 bility. This was true of the feudal systems of the past, 
 and is true of the great business corporations of to-day, 
 both of which are examples of the organizer-reward 
 
 190
 
 form. In the feudal system the reward offered by the ^ ar d S 
 organizers in return for service was protection ; in mod- democratic 
 
 . , , . systems. 
 
 ern industry the reward is a money wage. In both cases, 
 however, when subordinate members of the organization 
 have been ignorant, there has been some tendency to- 
 wards the exploitation as well as the utilization of such 
 members. To the extent, however, that intelligence has 
 developed, there has been less and less voluntary con- 
 tinuance of organizations whose utility has been thought 
 by the subordinate members to be limited to one class in 
 the organization. Force has been met by force. Since 
 intelligence is increasing, it is not fortuitous that the 
 great internal problem of advanced nations is the control 
 of such exploitive industry as exists, while the great po- 
 litical problem of less advanced nations is the struggle 
 for democracy. In both cases the struggle is to prevent 
 the organizer-reward form from becoming the organizer- 
 force form and to replace the instability and the lack of 
 harmony of these forms by the greater stability and 
 greater harmony of the democratic-control-expert-execu- 
 tive form. Far more than is the case in the other utility 
 forms, the democratic form directs its policies with a 
 view to the welfare of all its members. Minorities are 
 represented on the executive staff. All members of the 
 organization participate in control. The danger of dis- 
 satisfaction on the part of non-executive members is re- 
 duced to a minimum. 
 
 The most striking fact, however, with respect to the 
 question of the relative stability and harmony of the 
 various forms of organization is that the largest and the 
 most permanent relatively harmonious organizations that 
 have appeared among men are those great modern na- 
 tions whose inhabitants live in a unified area of char- 
 acterization and are essentially alike in language, race, 
 customs, traditions and religion. Homogeneity in all 
 
 191
 
 National these respects, it is true, does not as yet exist even on a 
 
 homogeneity * ' ' . . 
 
 means national scale and there is certainly no prospect of such 
 
 homogeneity on a world scale in the near future. These 
 considerations must not blind us to the fact, however, 
 that England, France, Spain, Germany, Russia, Italy, 
 the Scandinavian nations, the United States, Japan and 
 China the largest and internally the most harmonious 
 organizations yet known to man are each composed of 
 individuals the vast majority of whom are relatively 
 alike in language, customs and traditions, and for the 
 most part in race and religion. Nations that are 
 markedly heterogeneous in the characteristics mentioned, 
 such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Balkan 
 States and European Turkey, are notoriously unstable. 
 Furthermore, the stability possessed by the various util- 
 ity-form organizations that exist within or among the 
 stable nations of the world is, in large part, the result 
 of the stability and permanence of the nations them- 
 selves. The stability of all three of the utility forms 
 thus rests upon the inherent stability of the sympathy 
 type of organization. 
 
 If the foregoing analysis be correct, certain proposi- 
 tions of great importance for the problem of interna- 
 tional peace may now be stated. First, nationality on 
 the basis of sympathy is likely to persist for an indefinite 
 period. Second, because of the ignorance of the inhab- 
 itants of a number of important nations, the organizer- 
 force and the organizer-reward forms of government and 
 of business organization are also likely to persist, for 
 a considerable period, in various parts of the globe. 
 Third, where the organizer-force or organizer-reward 
 form of organization is superimposed on nationality, 
 readiness to maintain harmony with other national 
 groups can exist only when such international harmony 
 is to the interest of the organizer class in each of such 
 
 192
 
 nations. Where the democratic-control-expert-executive Peace win 
 , . . . follow in- 
 
 form prevails, readiness to maintain harmony with other creasing like- 
 national groups can exist only when such international ITmong the" 
 harmony is to the interest of each nation so organized, n 
 taken as a whole. 
 
 These propositions mean that, under present condi- 
 tions, permanent world peace can be produced only if 
 in the organizer-force and in the organizer-reward na- 
 tions the organizer is less interested in personal fame 
 than in the welfare of the whole organization, if the 
 organizing class does not seek aggrandizement or if the 
 organizing class is willing to permit a peaceful transi- 
 tion within the nation to the democratic-control-expert- 
 executive form of organization rather than to seek per- 
 petuation of its own control through foreign war. They 
 mean also that such peace can be maintained only if 
 democratic nations can be kept free from that trooping 
 of emotion which sometimes suddenly sweeps vast bodies 
 of men into unreasoning demand for aggressive action, 
 and if the interests of such nations lead them to desire 
 international peace. . . . 
 
 Let there ~be produced sufficient likeness among the peo- 
 ples of the world, and harmonious organization based on 
 sympathy will follow of itself. If there be created a suf- 
 ficient likeness among all peoples in ideals of progress, 
 in the desire for the betterment of the entire human 
 race, and in other equally important mental and moral 
 respects, then world harmony, based on sympathy, will 
 ultimately develop in the same way that the present har- 
 mony within homogeneous nations has resulted, in large 
 part, from a sympathy spontaneously created by resem- 
 blance in race, language, religion and customs. 
 
 That final permanent international peace can come, 
 however, only on the basis of world-wide like-minded- 
 ness is the chief contention of this essay. If this con- 
 
 193
 
 Action 
 
 be taken 
 towards 
 securing 
 this like- 
 mindedness. 
 
 tention is correct, advocates of international peace must 
 not only adopt policies calculated to produce like-minded- 
 ness, but must not shrink from the endeavor to produce 
 the central executive organization the natural result 
 of like-mindedness, and in itself, if established, a creator 
 of like-mindedness. 
 
 From the standpoint of producting like-mindedness it 
 is of comparatively small moment what one of a num- 
 ber of possible projects is used for the initial attempt. 
 It is of supreme importance only that the project chosen 
 should be the one most likely to succeed in evolving com- 
 mon response and cooperation. 
 
 The practical suggestions which follow, therefore, are 
 based on these two notions: first, the desirability of cre- 
 ating like-mindedness among the peoples of the world 
 on a plane above race, religion, language and customs; 
 and second, the desirability of creating a central execu- 
 tive organization, so far as possible responsible to the 
 peoples behind each national government, rather than 
 responsible to constituent governments. They suggest 
 action on the basis of combining the two most stable 
 forms of harmonious organization, namely, the sym- 
 pathy form growing out of like-mindedness, and the 
 democratic-control-expert-executive form of the utility 
 type. 
 
 The first suggestion under the principles thus outlined 
 is that there be established a world consular staff, to 
 assume some at least of the functions of the present 
 national consular services. The first duty undertaken 
 by a world consular service would be to systematize, for 
 the benefit of business the world over, such investiga- 
 tions as are now carried on in a somewhat haphazard 
 way by each national consular service. By centraliza- 
 tion, much duplication of effort would be eliminated and 
 a much more comprehensive plan of investigation car- 
 
 194
 
 ried out. The results, as now, would be available for all \ar 
 business men of all nationalities. From the beginning, service, 
 so far as possible, the chief executives of such a con- 
 sular staff should be elected by the people of each na- 
 tion, rather than appointed by governments the pur- 
 pose of this being to create in each voter the world over, 
 some sense of participation in a world-undertaking, and 
 to some extent a sympathy with other voters the world 
 over. The cost both of the consular service and of the 
 election of the executive officers of the service should be 
 met, not by appropriations from national governments, 
 but by a fixed percentage of the revenues of each na- 
 tion. The usefulness of the service itself to all the peo- 
 ple of the world would be, eventually, the guarantee that 
 the contribution of this percentage would be maintained. 
 Proposed changes in the percentage would ultimately 
 have to be submitted to the voters of all peoples. 
 
 The suggestion as thus outlined is an ideal not likely 
 to be soon realized, but it is possible that some begin- 
 ning toward a world consular service could be provided 
 for by the peace treaty to be signed at the close of the 
 present war. Such a beginning might well be a pro- 
 visional world-chamber of commerce, organized on the 
 basis of constituent national chambers, the character and 
 organization of which should be provided for in the 
 treaty. The subject will hardly receive notice during 
 the peace negotiations, however, unless, as the result of 
 previous publicity and discussion, the possibilities of 
 world organization latent in the proposition are fully 
 realized. 
 
 The second suggestion for the production of world- 
 wide like-mindedness is that there be undertaken a 
 world investigation into the natural resources of the 
 earth, and that a central world-conservation investiga- 
 tion commission be created. At the present time the 
 
 195
 
 world- conservation movement is organized on national rather 
 
 bureaus for . . 
 
 conservation than on world-wide lines, and the natural result is to 
 strengthen local rather than international sympathy. 
 The principle of scientific management would become 
 much more effective if adopted from a world standpoint. 
 Moreover, there is no reason why the results of a world- 
 wide conservation investigation should not produce rec- 
 ommendations that, through appeals to the peoples back 
 of the national governments, the governments themselves 
 would be forced to heed. The machinery for the con- 
 servation investigation might develop out of the world 
 consular service or become a part of the work of that 
 service. 
 
 The third suggestion for the production of world-wide 
 like-mindedness is that there be established a central 
 bureau of advice and information on all "human bet- 
 terment" projects. Thus far we have not advanced be- 
 yond the point of developing national bureaus of com- 
 merce and labor, hygiene, child welfare and other 
 similar interests, and of holding "international con- 
 gresses. ' ' A permanent world bureau would be far more 
 systematic in the dissemination of knowledge of success- 
 ful experiments. It would also tend to create world 
 sympathy. "With increasing prestige the bureau would 
 naturally extend its functions to those of recommenda- 
 tion and advice to national and local governments. 
 
 The fourth suggestion is that there be established a 
 permanent world commission on international migra- 
 tion. At the present time problems of migration, such, 
 for example, as those of the Japanese and Chinese to 
 the United States, are settled by the nations primarily 
 interested, without recognition of the fact that migra- 
 tion is essentially a world problem in which all human- 
 ity has an interest. The local problems of migration 
 
 196
 
 that arise from time to time are but a part of an age- 
 long movement of population which is gradually pro- 
 ducing an equilibrium between density of population and systems. 
 natural resources in every part of the world. Move- 
 ments between two nations, however, will never be set- 
 tled on reasons other than local. A world commission 
 would at least work toward a world-policy in this possi- 
 bly the most important of world-problems. 
 
 The fifth suggestion is that these and all other projects 
 for the creation of the world-mind and centralized or- 
 ganization be furthered by utilizing all the modern meth- 
 ods of the commercial "accelerator of public opinion," 
 the publicity agent and the advertiser versed in psy- 
 chologically efficient methods. There should be an ade- 
 quate world-publicity service, the task of which should 
 be to develop like responses to the proposed projects in 
 the populations back of governments, and by publicity 
 methods to develop that like-mindedness which is es- 
 sential for world-wide organization on the sympathy 
 basis. 
 
 The development of many other projects similar to 
 those outlined above, it is apparent, would inevitably 
 tend toward the production of centralized organization 
 with many departments. Separate world organizations 
 for different purposes could not long exist without inte- 
 gration. The central organization would inevitably as- 
 sume the duties of the international postal union; it 
 would create a world monetary system; and it would 
 assume the functions of an international court. With 
 increasing prestige, such an organization would gain 
 greater and greater moral power. Resting on like- 
 mindedness in the populations back of national govern- 
 ments, it would ultimately develop a world-loyalty and 
 find its recommendations enforced by the moral sense 
 
 197
 
 Peace 
 
 proposals 
 
 should 
 
 inaugurate 
 
 like- 
 
 tuindedness. 
 
 of the world. Force, except for local police purposes, 
 would not be needed. 
 
 The final suggestion based on the preceding analysis 
 is that the principle underlying these projects be 
 adopted as at least one of the fundamental propositions 
 for the guidance of peace negotiators at the close of 
 the present war. Peace should be established not upon 
 the basis of the interests of victorious nations alone, nor 
 even upon the combined interests of victors and van- 
 quished, but upon the basis of the future welfare of all 
 peoples. The inauguration of policies for the produc- 
 tion of like-mindedness might well be provided for in 
 the peace treaty itself. National boundaries should not 
 be set on a basis which will intensify national self-suffi- 
 ciency and aloofness, but on a basis which will encour- 
 age inter-communication and the development of like- 
 mindedness throughout the world. Moreover, the choice 
 of national representatives for the peace negotiations 
 should include men capable of taking the world-view 
 rather than the exclusively nationalistic view. Repre- 
 sentatives of the neutral nations should be admitted to 
 the proceedings. A popular demand that these repre- 
 sentatives be of the world-mind type should be created 
 immediately by publicity methods. So far as possible, 
 practical projects for the creation of the world-mind 
 and world-organization should be provided for in the 
 treaty of peace, and as a guarantee of good faith no in- 
 demnity other than a pro-rata contribution for the main- 
 tenance of these projects should be exacted. Provision 
 should be made also for permanently meeting the cost 
 of such projects, by agreement that a definite precentage 
 of national taxes be set aside for the use of the world 
 organizations created by the treaty. In short, an au- 
 thoritative and intelligent beginning toward world-or- 
 
 198
 
 ganization should be made at the close of the present 
 
 war. 
 
 A. A. Tenney, "Theories of Social Organization, and 
 the Problems of International Peace," Political Sci- 
 ence Quarterly, March, 1915. 
 
 199
 
 PART III 
 TOWARDS THE FUTURE
 
 THE NEW OUTLOOK 
 No one dare predict just what the end of this world Th WBr -' 
 
 .,, T . . Katharsis for 
 
 war will be, or when that end will come. It is possi- humanity, 
 ble, of course, that this cataclysm marks the end of cen- 
 turies of progress, and it is possible that man in 1914 
 crossed over the watershed of civilization and is now 
 to descend on the other side towards steadily growing 
 barbarism and the steadily extending rule of force. 
 That I say is possible; but I for one am an unconquer- 
 able optimist. I prefer to read history differently and 
 to see in this appalling catastrophe what the Greek called 
 a katharsis, a cleansing of the spirit. I prefer to think 
 of it as history's way of teaching beyond peradventure 
 or dispute the fallacy and the folly of the old ways 
 and the old policies. Surely that struggle for the bal- 
 ance of power which the historian Stubbs described as 
 the principle which gives unity to the plot of modern 
 history, surely that struggle has proved its futility. 
 Surely we can see the vanity of Ententes and Alliances 
 and of a division of the world into heavily armed camps 
 each waiting for an opportunity or for an excuse to 
 pounce upon the other. Surely the international poli- 
 tics of a Palmerston, or a Disraeli, or a Bismarck, strik- 
 ing and splendid as they were in their own way, surely 
 those policies are put behind us and are outgrown for- 
 ever. 
 
 A democratic federated people can teach the world 
 democracy and the use of the federative principle. A 
 
 203
 
 thfniu^ter. people devoted to civil liberty and to international honor, 
 
 nationally! no less lightly held than the honor of an individual 
 
 that people can teach the world the foundations upon 
 
 which to rebuild the shattered fabric of international law 
 
 and of broken treaties. 
 
 The outlook before the people of the United States 
 has changed. When Joseph Chamberlain returned 
 from South Africa his message to the people of Great 
 Britain was: "You must learn to think imperially." 
 The message which any American alive to the world's 
 situation to-day must bring to his fellow citizens is, you 
 must learn to think internationally! Domestic policies 
 and problems are perhaps no less important than they 
 have been in the past, but by their side and for the im- 
 mediate future surpassing them in interest and in im- 
 portance are the international problems and the inter- 
 national policies of the people of the United States. 
 For those problems and for those policies we must pre- 
 pare prepare thoughtfully, seriously, speedily; for 
 when the war shall be ended, we may truly say, as Gam- 
 betta said to the French people forty-five years ago, 
 "Now that the danger is past, the difficulties begin." 
 
 Nicholas Murray Butler, Address at 147th Annual 
 Banquet of Chamber of Commerce of the State of 
 New York, Nov. 18, 1915. 
 
 204
 
 ABOVE THE BATTLE 
 
 young men that shed your blood with so generous | 11* 
 a joy for the starving earth! heroism of the world! i flc i* lf "* ac ~ 
 "What a harvest for destruction to reap under this splen- youth i 
 did summer sun! Young men of all nations, brought 
 into conflict by a common ideal, making enemies of those 
 who should be brothers; all of you, marching to your 
 death, are dear to me. Slavs, hastening to the aid of 
 your race; Englishmen fighting for honor and right; 
 intrepid Belgians who dared to oppose the Teutonic 
 colossus, and defend against him the Thermopylae of 
 the West; Germans fighting to defend the philosophy 
 and the birthplace of Kant against the Cossack ava- 
 lanche; and you, above all, my young compatriots, in 
 whom the generation of heroes of the Revolution lives 
 again ; you, who for years have confided your dreams to 
 me, and now, on the verge of battle, bid me a sublime 
 farewell. . . . 
 
 my friends, may nothing mar your joy ! Whatever 
 fate has in store, you have risen to the pinnacle of 
 earthly life, and borne your country with you. And 
 you will be victorious. Your self-sacrifice, your courage, 
 your whole-hearted faith in your sacred cause, and the 
 unshaken certainty that, in defending your invaded 
 country, you are defending the liberty of the world 
 all this assures me of your victory, young armies of the 
 Marne and Meuse, whose names are graven henceforth 
 in history by the side of your elders of the Great Be- 
 
 205
 
 But have Dublic. Yet even had misfortune decreed that you 
 
 the leaders , , , -, -, i .-, -n *. in 
 
 done their should be vanquished, and with you France itselt, no 
 people could have aspired to a more noble death. It 
 would have crowned the life of that great people of the 
 Crusades it would have been their supreme victory. 
 Conquerors or conquered, living or dead, rejoice! As 
 one of you said to me, embracing me on the terrible 
 threshold: "A splendid thing it is to fight with clean 
 hands and a pure heart, and to dispense divine justice 
 with one's life." 
 
 You are doing your duty, but have others done 
 theirs? Let us be bold and proclaim the truth to the 
 elders of these young men, to their moral guides, to their 
 religious and secular leaders, to the Churches, the great 
 thinkers, the leaders of socialism; these living riches, 
 these treasures of heroism you held in your hands; 
 for what are you squandering them? What ideal have 
 you held up to the devotion of these youths so eager 
 to sacrifice themselves? Their mutual slaughter! A 
 European war! A sacrilegious conflict which shows a 
 maddened Europe ascending its funeral pyre, and, like 
 Hercules, destroying itself with its own hands! 
 
 And thus the three greatest nations of the West, the 
 guardians of civilization, rush headlong to their ruin, 
 calling in to their aid Cossacks, Turks, Japanese, Cinga- 
 lese, Soudanese, Senegalese, Moroccans, Egyptians, 
 Sikhs and Sepoys barbarians from the poles and those 
 from the equator, souls and bodies of all colors. It 
 is as if the four quarters of the Roman Empire at the 
 time of the Tetrarchy had called upon the barbarians 
 of the whole universe to devour each other. 
 
 Is our civilization so solid that you do not fear to 
 shake the pillars on which it rests? Can you not see 
 that all falls in upon you if one column be shattered? 
 Could you not have learned if not to love one another, 
 
 206
 
 at least to tolerate the great virtues and the great vices of JJ e f7 a ard " 
 each other? Was it not your duty to attempt you ti>8 m i 
 have never attempted it in sincerity to settle amicably 
 the questions which divided you, the problem of peoples 
 annexed against their will, the equitable division of pro- 
 ductive labor and the riches of the world? Must the 
 stronger forever darken the others with the shadow of 
 his pride, and the others forever unite to dissipate it? 
 Is there no end to this bloody and puerile sport, in which 
 the partners change about from century to century no 
 end, until the whole of humanity is exhausted thereby? 
 
 The rulers who are the criminal authors of these wars 
 dare not accept the responsibility for them. Each one 
 by underhand means seeks to lay the blame at the door 
 of his adversary. The peoples who obey them submis- 
 sively resign themselves with the thought that a power 
 higher than mankind has ordered it thus. Again the 
 venerable refrain is heard: "The fatality of war is 
 stronger than our wills." The old refrain of the herd 
 that makes a god of its feebleness and bows down before 
 him. Man has invented fate, that he may make it re- 
 sponsible for the disorders of the universe, those disor- 
 ders which it was his duty to regulate. There is no fatal- 
 ity! The only fatality is what we desire; and more 
 often, too, what we do not desire enough. Let each now 
 repeat his mea culpa. The leaders of thought, the 
 Church, the Labor Parties did not desire war . . . That 
 may be ... What then did they do to prevent it? 
 What are they doing to put an end to it? They are 
 stirring up the bonfire, each one bringing his fagot. 
 
 The most striking feature in this monstrous epic, the 
 fact without precedent, is the unanimity for war in each 
 of the nations engaged. An epidemic of homicidal fury, 
 which started in Tokio ten years ago, has spread like a 
 wave and overflowed the whole world. None has re- 
 
 207
 
 Comei Let sisted it; no high thought has succeeded in keeping out 
 * etandi of the reach of this scourge. A sort of demoniacal 
 irony broods over this conflict of the nations, from which, 
 whatever its result, only a mutilated Europe can emerge. 
 For it is not racial passion alone which is hurling mil- 
 lions of men blindly one against another, so that not even 
 neutral countries remain free of the dangerous thrill, 
 but all the forces of the spirit, of reason, of faith, of 
 poetry, and of science, all have placed themselves at the 
 disposal of the armies in every State. There is not one 
 amongst the leaders of thought in each country who 
 does not proclaim with conviction that the cause of his 
 people is the cause of God, the cause of liberty and of 
 human progress. And I, too, proclaim it. 
 
 Strange combats are being waged between metaphy- 
 sicians, poets, historians Eucken against Bergson; 
 Hauptmann against Maeterlinck; Holland against 
 Hauptmann; Wells against Bernard Shaw. Kipling 
 and D'Annunzio, Dehmel and de Regnier sing war 
 hymns, Barres and Maeterlinck chant pseans of hatred. 
 Between a fugue of Bach and the organ which thunders 
 Deutschland uber Alles, Wundt, the aged philosopher of 
 eighty-two, calls with his quavering voice the students 
 of Leipzig to the holy war. And each nation hurls at 
 the other the name " Barbarians. ..." 
 
 Come, friends! Let us make a stand! Can we not 
 resist this contagion, whatever its nature and virulence 
 be whether moral epidemic or cosmic force? Do we 
 not fight against the plague, and strive even to repair 
 the disaster caused by an earthquake ? Or must we bow 
 ourselves before it, agreeing with Luzzatti in his famous 
 article that "In the universal disaster, the nations 
 triumph"? Shall we say with him that it is good and 
 reasonable that "the demon of international war, which 
 mows down thousands of beings, should be let loose," 
 
 208
 
 so that the great and simple truth, "love of our coun- W 1 r * r * 11 at 
 try," be understood? It would seem, then, that love brothers! 
 of our country can flourish only through the hatred of 
 other countries and the massacre of those who sacrifice 
 themselves in the defense of them. There is in this 
 theory a ferocious absurdity, a Neronian dilettantism 
 which repels me to the very depths of my being. No! 
 Love of my country does not demand that I shall hate 
 and slay those noble and faithful souls who also love 
 theirs, but rather that I should honor them and seek 
 to unite with them for our common good. . . . 
 
 There was no reason for war between the "Western 
 nations ; French, English, and German, we are all broth- 
 ers and do not hate one another. The war-preaching 
 press is envenomed by a minority, a minority vitally in- 
 terested in maintaining these hatreds; but our peoples, 
 I know, ask for peace and liberty and that alone. The 
 real tragedy, to one situated in the midst of the conflict 
 and able to look down from the high plateaus of Swit- 
 zerland into all the hostile camps, is the patent fact that 
 actually each of the nations is being menaced in its 
 dearest possessions in its honor, its independence, its 
 life. Who has brought these plagues upon them? 
 - Brought them to the desperate alternative of overwhelm- 
 ing their adversary or dying? None other than their 
 governments, and above all, in my opinion, the three 
 great culprits, the three rapacious eagles, the three em- 
 pires, the tortuous policy of the house of Austria, the 
 ravenous greed of Czarism, the brutality of Prussia. 
 The worst enemy of each nation is not without, but 
 within its frontiers, and none has the courage to fight 
 against it. It is the monster of a hundred heads, the 
 monster named Imperialism, the will to pride and dom- 
 ination, which seeks to absorb all, or subdue all, or break 
 all, and will suffer no greatness except itself. For the 
 
 209
 
 Not revenge. Western nations Prussian imperialism is the most dan- 
 out the re- . . 
 
 establishment gerous. Its hand uplifted in menace against Europe 
 
 of justice ! . . . , , . 
 
 has forced us to join in arms against this outcome of a 
 military and feudal caste, which is the curse not only 
 of the rest of the world but also of Germany itself, 
 whose thought it has subtly poisoned. We must destroy 
 this first: but not this alone; the Russian autocracy too 
 will have its turn. Every nation to a greater or less 
 extent has an imperialism of its own, and whether it be 
 military, financial, feudal, republican, social, or intel- 
 lectual, it is always the octopus sucking the best blood 
 of Europe. Let the free men of all the countries of 
 Europe when this war is over take up again the motto 
 of Voltaire: "Ecrasons I'infdme!" 
 
 When the war is over ! The evil is done now, the tor- 
 rent let loose and we cannot force it back into its chan- 
 nel unaided. Moreover crimes have been committed 
 against right, attacks on the liberties of peoples and on 
 the sacred treasuries of thought, which must and will 
 be expiated. Europe cannot pass over unheeded the vio- 
 lence done to the noble Belgian people, the devastation 
 of Malines and Louvain, sacked by modern Tillys. . . . 
 But in the name of heaven let not these crimes be ex- 
 piated by similar crimes! Let not the hideous words 
 "vengeance" and "retaliation" be heard; for a great 
 nation does not revenge itself, it re-establishes justice. 
 But let those in whose hands lies the execution of justice 
 show themselves worthy of her to the end. 
 
 It is our duty to keep this before them; nor will we 
 be passive and wait for the fury of this conflict to spend 
 itself. Such conduct would be unworthy of us who 
 have such a task before us. ... 
 
 The neutral countries are too much effaced. Con- 
 fronted by unbridled force they are inclined to believe 
 that opinion is defeated in advance, and the majority 
 
 210
 
 of thinkers in all countries share their pessimism. There 
 is a lack of courage here as well as of clear thinking, humanity i 
 For just at this time the power of opinion is immense. 
 The most despotic of governments, even though marching 
 to victory, trembles before public opinion and seeks to 
 court it. Nothing shows this more clearly than the ef- 
 forts of both parties engaged in war, of their ministers, 
 chancellors, sovereigns, of the Kaiser himself turned 
 journalist, to justify their own crimes, and denounce the 
 crimes of their adversary at the invisible tribunal of hu- 
 manity. Let this invisible tribunal be seen at last, let 
 us venture to constitute it. Ye know not your moral 
 power, ye of little faith ! If there be a risk, will you 
 not take it for the honor of humanity? What is the 
 value of life when you have saved it at the price of all 
 that is worth living for? . . . 
 
 Et propter vitam, vivendi perdere causas. . . . 
 
 But for us, the artists and poets, priests and thinkers 
 of all countries, remains another task. Even in time of 
 war it remains a crime for finer spirits to compromise 
 the integrity of their thought; it is shameful to see it 
 serving the passion of a puerile, monstrous policy of race, 
 a policy scientifically absurd since no country possesses 
 a race wholly pure. Such a policy, as Renan points out 
 in his beautiful letter to Strauss, "can only lead to zoo- 
 logical wars, wars of extermination, similar to those in 
 which various species of rodents and carnivorous beasts 
 fight for their existence. This would ~be the end of that 
 fertile admixture called humanity, composed as it is of 
 such various necessary elements." Humanity is a 
 symphony of great collective souls; and he who under- 
 stands and loves it only by destroying a part of those 
 elements, proves himself a barbarian and shows his idea 
 of harmony to be no better than the idea of order an- 
 other held in Warsaw. 
 
 211
 
 m o/ the u c?ty ^ or *^ e ^ ner spirit- 8 ^ Europe there are two dwelling- 
 of Godi places: our earthly fatherland, and that other City of 
 
 God. Of the one we are the guests, of the other the 
 builders. To the one let us give our lives and our faith- 
 ful hearts; but neither family, friend, nor fatherland, 
 nor aught that we love has power over the spirit. The 
 spirit is the light. It is our duty to lift it above tem- 
 pests, and thrust aside the clouds which threaten to ob- 
 scure it; to build higher and stronger, dominating the 
 injustice and hatred of nations, the walls of that city 
 wherein the souls of the whole world may assemble. 
 
 I feel here how the generous heart of Switzerland 
 is thrilled, divided between sympathies for the various 
 nations, and lamenting that it cannot choose freely be- 
 tween them, nor even express them. I understand its 
 torment ; but I know that this is salutary. I hope it will 
 rise thence to that superior joy of a harmony of races, 
 which may be a noble example for the rest of Europe. 
 It is the duty of Switzerland now to stand in the midst 
 of the tempest, like an island of justice and of peace, 
 where, as in the great monasteries of the early Middle 
 Ages, the spirit may find a refuge from unbridled force ; 
 where the fainting swimmers of all nations, those who 
 are weary of hatred, may persist, in spite of all the 
 wrongs they have seen and suffered, in loving all men 
 as their brothers. 
 
 I know that such thoughts have little chance of being 
 heard to-day. Young Europe, burning with the fever of 
 battle, will smile with disdain and show its fangs like a 
 young wolf. But when the access of fever has spent it- 
 self, wounded and less proud of its voracious heroism, 
 it will come to itself again. 
 
 Moreover I do not speak to convince it. I speak but 
 to solace my conscience . . . and I know that at the 
 
 212
 
 same time I shall solace the hearts of thousands of others 
 who, in all countries, cannot or dare not speak them- 
 selves. 
 
 Romain Rolland, in Journal de Geneve, September 15, 
 1914. 
 
 213
 
 THE NEW IDEALISM 
 
 Germany What wishes may we have for the future? What 
 
 lasting tasks and what prospects does the New Year unroll be- 
 
 peace. j ore Ug 9 Naturally, our first wish is for a decisive vic- 
 
 tory, a victory which will bring us an honorable peace. 
 A discussion of how the conditions of peace should be 
 drawn up seems to us premature, in fact it runs coun- 
 ter to our feeling; for we are still too much under the 
 tension and excitement of the fight to pursue such 
 thoughts. However, it may be said that the German 
 people unanimously desire a settlement which will guar- 
 antee a lasting peace and which will prevent further 
 wars. Moreover, the wish is general that, when it is 
 time for peace negotiations, not only professional diplo- 
 mats, but also representatives of the various professions 
 and industries shall be consulted. Just as war is an 
 affair of the whole people, so, in its conclusion, the voice 
 of the whole people should have due weight. 
 
 Closely bound up with the desire for an honorable 
 peace is the hope that the mighty spiritual movement, 
 which the war has called forth, may continue to influ- 
 ence German life after the war. This war must be the 
 starting-point of a new epoch. The tremendous sacri- 
 fices which it entails will be justified only in case new 
 life comes forth out of loss and death and the achieve- 
 ments of the moment are transformed into permanent 
 gain. In this connection we think, first of all, of the 
 wonderful consciousness of unity which the war has 
 
 214
 
 awakened. The long history of the German people fur- *."**. 
 nishes no counterpart of such a unity of sentiment as orated after 
 we enjoy to-day. We must now see to it that this 
 unanimity of purpose is deeply implanted in German 
 life. Since, through common effort, so much has been 
 accomplished during the war, when peace has been re- 
 established, no one should be prevented from cooperat- 
 ing in the solution of our common tasks. In the fu- 
 ture there should be no discrimination on account of 
 political partisanship, whether in the pursuit of a pro- 
 fession or in the holding of a public office. 
 
 But especially must we hope that the sense of belong- 
 ing together, the sense of being dependent on each 
 other, the sense of being under obligation to each other 
 will persist beyond the war into peace. It is, however, 
 not only for the feelings of the individuals, but also for 
 our national life, that we should seek to win lasting 
 gain from the storms of the present. All the earnest- 
 ness and all the mighty force, which we have now ex- 
 erted, must be used in an energetic fight against all that 
 has threatened to lower our standards of life. 
 
 Such a reinvigoration of German idealism parallels 
 a similar movement which has spread throughout the 
 whole of humanity. Old forms of life have often been 
 found too narrow; they have, moreover, frequently lost 
 their basis in our minds. Therefore, the position of man 
 in the universe has seemed obscure and the purpose of 
 his life has become! very uncertain. On the other hand, 
 there now awakens a deep longing for the restrengthen- 
 ing, deepening and inner renewal of life. 
 
 As Germans, we must consider our attitude towards 
 the world of as much importance as our attitude to- 
 wards ourselves. We must not allow ourselves to in- 
 dulge in a narrow national life. We must not, and shall 
 not, have a false racial pride. On the contrary, we must 
 
 215
 
 ceaselessly broaden our lives, steadily preserving our 
 narrowly inter-relations with all mankind. Our great nation can- 
 not attain its proper level without keeping the whole of 
 humanity in mind. We wish to think highly enough of 
 ourselves to believe that we are capable of drawing to 
 ourselves everything great and good, that has arisen or 
 shall arise anywhere, so that we may use it in building 
 up the ethical civilization (Wesenkultur) which our 
 nature demands. 
 
 Rudolf Eucken, "German Thoughts and Wishes for 
 the New Year, 1915." 
 
 216
 
 THE FUTURE OF PATRIOTISM 
 
 There is another way of looking at this matter which f Ve't 
 will appeal to those who are speculating upon the fu- what seems 
 
 , . , . . . ,1 i v .1 secure and 
 
 ture oi mankind. Any one who thinks about the possi- protecting, 
 bility of a world state is stopped to-day by the fact that 
 there is no world patriotism to support it. How are 
 we to transfer allegiance from the national to the inter- 
 national State? 
 
 The answer depends upon an analysis of nationality. 
 I have described it as a retreat to the authority and 
 flavor of our earliest associations, as a defensive-offen- 
 sive reaction to what seems to us secure. Our loyalty 
 turns to what we associate with our protection and our 
 ambitions. The reason we are not loyal to mankind in 
 general or to The Hague or to internationalism is that 
 these conceptions are cold and abstract beside the 
 warmth of the country and place where we were born. 
 Impressed by the fear of Russian invasion, the interna- 
 tionalism of German socialists vanished. International- 
 ism offered no protection. The German army did. To 
 be a German was to be part of a tangible group with 
 power; to be a citizen of the world was to be homeless 
 everywhere. 
 
 And yet we find Canadians and Australians and New 
 Zealanders fighting and dying for a thing called the 
 British Empire, a vague, formless organization of one- 
 quarter of the human race. What is it that has pro- 
 duced this super-national patriotism? Nothing less, it 
 
 217
 
 Patriotism seems to me. than a realization that the protection and 
 
 cries to-day T-* . T . , 
 
 for ex- growth or the Dominions is bound up with the strength 
 
 of the Empire. Home is the place where you are safe ; 
 loyalty reaches back to the source of your security. That 
 is why danger has welded the British Empire instead of 
 disintegrating it. 
 
 Imagine the Empire shattered, its navy gone, and 
 the Dominions left to fetch for themselves. What would 
 Canada and Australia do ? They would, it seems to me, 
 develop a great loypHy to the United States. They 
 would not face the world alone. They would have to 
 find some larger political organization in which they 
 could feel secure. 
 
 In other words, loyalty overflows the national State 
 because in the world to-day the national State is no 
 longer a sufficient protection. People have got to a 
 point in their development where isolation terrifies 
 them. They want to be members of a stronger group. 
 In Europe they turned to a system of alliances because 
 no nation dared to stand alone. We have turned in 
 this country in part to an understanding with Great 
 Britain, in part to the Latin-American States. All of 
 which proves that patriotism is not a fixed quantity, that 
 it is not attached to the map as it was drawn when we 
 were at school, and that it is not only capable of expan- 
 sion, but is crying for it. 
 
 Fear has almost always played a large part in weld- 
 ing States together. The fear of England was a great 
 argument for federal union under our Constitution ; the 
 sense of weakness in the presence of unfriendly neigh- 
 bors undoubtedly helped to break down the separatism 
 of the little German principalities. Just as the ap- 
 pearance of an enemy tends to blot out political differ- 
 ences within a nation, so it will often unite a number 
 of nations. The rise of Germany had that effect on 
 
 218
 
 the Great Powers of Europe; the fear of her created a 
 
 league almost coextensive with western civilization. It the basis of 
 
 loyalty. 
 
 covered up the feud between France and England which 
 comes down through the centuries; it jolted together an 
 understanding with Russia, the great bogy of liberals. 
 
 It is not pleasant to think of fear as one of the most 
 powerful forces that unify mankind. It would be more 
 gratifying to think that cooperation was always spon- 
 taneous and free. But the facts will not justify this 
 belief. The inner impulse to compose differences seems 
 often to work most actively when there is pressure from 
 without. Forced by danger to cooperate, men seem to 
 discover the advantages of cooperation. The Germans 
 are daily discovering good qualities in the Turks; the 
 British are seeing deeper into the souls of Russians. . . . 
 
 The only way in which, world organization can com- 
 mand a world patriotism is by proving its usefulness. 
 If it affords a protection and produces a prosperity such 
 as the national State cannot produce, it will begin to 
 draw upon the emotions of men. If they are capable 
 of loving anything so abstract and complicated as the 
 British Empire, or even the United States, they are not 
 incapable of attaching themselves to a still larger State. 
 For the moment it was evident that patriotism could 
 embrace something more extensive and abstract than a 
 village which a man might know personally, world or- 
 ganization ceased to be an idle dream. If men could be 
 citizens of an empire scattered over all the seas, there 
 was no longer anything inconceivable about their be- 
 coming citizens of a State which covered modern civili- 
 zation. The idea has ceased to be a psychological im- 
 possibility. 
 
 Our problem is to broaden the basis of loyalty. And 
 for that task we have considerable experience to guide 
 us. Within a hundred and twenty-five years we have 
 
 219
 
 win not seen *ke we lding together of the United States, Germany, 
 
 stop at Italy, and Austria-Hungary. We have seen small rival 
 
 frontiers. States converted into members of federal unions. We 
 have watched patriotism expand from the local unit to 
 the larger one. We have seen Massachusetts patriots 
 converted into American patriots, Bavarians into Ger- 
 mans, Venetians into Italians. In the last few years we 
 have been witnessing the growth of an imperial patriot- 
 ism within the British Empire. 
 
 There is, so far as I can see, not the least ground 
 for supposing that the broadening of loyalty must stop 
 at the existing frontiers. The task of the great unifi- 
 ers, like Hamilton, Cavour, and Bismarck, looked just 
 as difficult in their day as ours does now. They had 
 States' rights, sovereignty, traditional jealousy, and 
 economic conflicts to overcome. They conquered them. 
 Who dares to say that we must fail ? . . . 
 
 Loyalty is a fluctuating force, not attached by any 
 necessity to some one spot on the map or contained 
 within some precise frontier. Loyalty seeks an author- 
 ity to which it can be loyal, and when it finds an au- 
 thority which gives security and progress and opportu- 
 nity it fastens itself there. The problem of world or- 
 ganization is to attach enough loyalty to the immature 
 World State to enable it to weather the inevitable at- 
 tacks. 
 
 Walter Lippmann, "The Stakes of Diplomacy," pp. 
 172-188. 
 
 220
 
 THE FUTURE OF CIVILIZATION 
 
 What hopes dare we cherish, in this hour of conflict, 
 for the future of civilization ? the sphere 
 
 The great, the supreme task of human politics and 
 statesmanship is to extend the sphere of Law. Let 
 others labor to make men cultured or virtuous or happy. 
 These are the tasks of the teacher, the priest, and the 
 common man. The statesman 's task is simpler. It is to 
 enfold them in a jurisdiction which will enable them to 
 live the life of their soul's choice. The State, said the 
 Greek philosophers, is the foundation of the good life; 
 but its crown rises far above mere citizenship. "There 
 where the State ends, ' ' cries Nietzsche, echoing Aristotle 
 and the great tradition of civilized political thought, 
 "there men begin. There, where the State ends, look 
 thither, my brothers! Do you not see the rainbow and 
 the bridge to the Overman?" Ever since organized so- 
 ciety began, the standards of the individual, the ideals 
 of priest and teacher, the doctrines of religion and moral- 
 ity, have outstripped the practise of statesmanship. For 
 the polestar of the statesman has not been love, but law. 
 His not the task of exhorting men to love one another, 
 but the simpler duty of enforcing the law, ' ' Thou shalt 
 not kill. ' ' And in that simple, strenuous, necessary task 
 statesmen and political thinkers have watched the slow 
 extension of the power of Law, from the family to the 
 tribe, from the tribe to the city, from the city to the 
 nation, from the nation to the Commonwealth. When 
 
 221
 
 The World w {\\ L aw take its next extension? When will warfare, 
 
 u already 
 
 one great which is murder between individuals and "rebellion" 
 between groups of citizens, be equally preventable be- 
 tween nations by the common law of the world ? 
 
 The answer is simple. When the world has a common 
 will, and has created a common government to express 
 and enforce that will. 
 
 In the sphere of science and invention, of industry 
 and economics, as Norman Angell and others have taught 
 us, the world is already one Great Society. For the 
 merchant, the banker, and the stockbroker political fron- 
 tiers have been broken down. Trade and industry re- 
 spond to the reactions of a single, world-wide, nervous 
 system. Shocks and panics pass as freely as airmen over 
 borders and custom-houses. And not "big business" 
 only, but the humblest citizen, in his search for a liveli- 
 hood, finds himself caught in the meshes of the same 
 world-wide network. "The widow who takes in wash- 
 ing," says Graham Wallas, in his deep and searching 
 analysis of our contemporary life, "fails or succeeds ac- 
 cording to her skill in choosing starch or soda or a wring- 
 ing machine under the influence of half a dozen compet- 
 ing world-schemes of advertisement. . . . The English 
 factory girl who is urged to join her Union, the tired 
 old Scotch gatekeeper with a few pounds to invest, the 
 Galieian peasant when the emigration agent calls, the 
 artisan in a French provincial town whose industry is 
 threatened by a new invention, all know that unless they 
 find their way among world-wide facts, which only reach 
 them through misleading words, they will be crushed." 
 The Industrial Revolution of the past century, steam- 
 power and electricity, the railway and the telegraph, 
 have knit mankind together, and made the world one 
 place. 
 
 But this new Great Society is as yet formless and in- 
 222
 
 articulate. It is not only devoid of common leadership 
 and a common government ; it lacks even the beginnings ^|} 
 of a common will, a common emotion, and a common emotion, 
 consciousness. Of the Great Society, consciously or un- 
 consciously, we must all perforce be members ; but of the 
 Great State, the great World-Commonwealth, we do not 
 yet discern the rudiments. The economic organization 
 of the world has outstripped the development of its citi- 
 zenship and government the economic man, with his 
 far-sighted vision and scientific control of the resources 
 of the world, must sit by and see the work of his hands 
 laid in ashes by contending governments and peoples. 
 No man can say how many generations must pass before 
 the platitudes of the market and the exchange pass into 
 the current language of politics. 
 
 In the great work which lies before the statesmen and 
 peoples of the world for the extension of law and com- 
 mon citizenship and prevention of war there are two 
 parallel lines of advance. 
 
 One road lies through the development of what is 
 known as International, but should more properly be 
 called Inter-State Law, through the revival, on a firmer 
 and broader foundation, of the Concert of Europe con- 
 ceived by the Congress of Vienna just a hundred years 
 ago itself a revival, on a secular basis, of the great 
 medieval ideal of an international Christendom, held to- 
 gether by Christian Law and Christian ideals. That 
 ideal faded away forever at the Reformation, which 
 grouped Europe into independent sovereign States ruled 
 by men responsible to no one outside their own borders. 
 It will never be revived on an ecclesiastical basis. Can 
 we hope for its revival on a basis of modern democracy, 
 modern nationality, and modern educated public opin- 
 ion? Can Inter-State Law, hitherto a mere shadow of 
 the majestic name it bears, almost a matter of conven- 
 
 223
 
 The ideal 
 of Inter- 
 State Law 
 must be 
 revived. 
 
 tion and etiquette, with no permanent tribunal to inter- 
 pret it, and no government to enforce it, be enthroned 
 with the necessary powers to maintain justice between 
 the peoples and governments of the world? 
 
 Such a Law the statesmen of Great Britain and Rus- 
 sia sought to impose on Europe in 1815, to maintain a 
 state of affairs which history has shown to have been in- 
 tolerable to the European peoples. There are those who 
 hope that the task can be resumed, on a better basis, at 
 the next Congress. ' ' Shall we try again, ' ' writes Profes- 
 sor Gilbert Murray, "to achieve Castlereagh 's and Alex- 
 ander's ideal of a permanent Concert, pledged to make 
 collective war upon the peace-breaker? Surely we must. 
 We must, at all cost and in spite of all difficulties, because 
 the alternative means such unspeakable failure. We 
 must learn to agree, we civilized nations of Europe, or 
 else we must perish. I believe that the chief counsel of 
 wisdom here is to be sure to go far enough. We need a 
 permanent Concert, perhaps a permanent Common Coun- 
 cil, in which every awkward problem can be dealt with 
 before it has time to grow dangerous, and in which out- 
 voted minorities must accustom themselves to giving 
 way." 
 
 Other utterances by public men, such as Mr. Roose- 
 velt and our own Prime Minister, might be cited in the 
 same sense ; but Professor Murray 's has been chosen be- 
 cause he has the courage to grasp the nettle. In his 
 words the true position is quite clearly set forth. If In- 
 ter-State Law is to become a reality we must "be sure to 
 go far enough." There is no half-way house between 
 Law and no Law, between Government and no Govern- 
 ment, between Responsibility and no Responsibility. 
 If the new Concert is to be effective it must be able to 
 compel the submission of all "awkward problems" and 
 causes of quarrel to its permanent Tribunal at The Hague 
 
 224
 
 or elsewhere ; and it must be able to enforce the decision 
 of its tribunal, employing for the purpose, if necessary, on Law - 
 the armed forces of the signatory Powers as an inter- 
 national police. "Outvoted minorities must accustom 
 themselves to giving way." It is a bland and easy 
 phrase ; but it involves the whole question of world-gov- 
 ernment. "Men must accustom themselves not to de- 
 mand an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," the 
 earliest law-givers might have said, when the State first 
 intervened between individuals to make itself responsible 
 for public order. Peace between the Powers, as between 
 individuals, is, no doubt, a habit to which cantankerous 
 Powers "must accustom themselves." But they will be 
 sure to do so if there is a Law, armed with the force to 
 be their schoolmaster towards peaceable habits. In other 
 words, they will do so because they have surrendered one 
 of the most vital elements in the independent life of a 
 State the right of conducting its own policy to the 
 jurisdiction of a higher Power. An Inter-State Concert, 
 with a Judiciary of its own and an army and navy under 
 its own orders, is, in fact, not an Inter-State Concert at 
 all; it is a new State: it is, in fact, the World-State. 
 There is no middle course between Law and no Law : and 
 the essence of Statehood, as we have seen, is a Common 
 Law. . . . 
 
 In discussing proposals for a European Council, then, 
 we must be quite sure to face all that it means. But let 
 us not reject Professor Murray's suggestion off-hand be- 
 cause of its inherent difficulties : for that men should be 
 discussing such schemes at all marks a significant ad- 
 vance in our political thought. Only let us be quite 
 clear as to what they presuppose. They presuppose the 
 supremacy, in the collective mind of civilized mankind, 
 of Law over Force, a definite supremacy of what may be 
 called the civilian as against the military ideal, not in a 
 
 225
 
 W e rk m f ** majority of States, but in every State powerful enough 
 "The Prin- to defy coercion. They presuppose a world map defi- 
 common- nitcly settled on lines satisfactory to the national aspira- 
 tions of the peoples. They presuppose a status quo 
 which is not simply maintained, like that after 1815, 
 because it is a legal fact and its disturbance would be 
 inconvenient to the existing rulers, but because it is in- 
 herently equitable. They presuppose a similar demo- 
 cratic basis of citizenship and representation among the 
 component States. They presuppose, lastly, an educated 
 public opinion incomparably less selfish, less ignorant, 
 less unsteady, less materialistic, and less narrowly na- 
 tional than has been prevalent hitherto. Let us work 
 and hope for these things: let us use our best efforts to 
 remove misunderstandings and promote a sense of com- 
 mon responsibilities and common trusteeship for civiliza- 
 tion between the peoples of all the various sovereign 
 States ; but meanwhile let us work also, with better hopes 
 of immediate if less ambitious successes, along the other 
 parallel road of advance. 
 
 The other road may seem, in this hour of dreams and 
 disaster, of extremes of hope and disillusionment, a long 
 and tedious track : it is the old slow high road of civiliza- 
 tion, not the short cut across thejields. It looks forward 
 to abiding results, not through the mechanical coopera- 
 tion of governments, but through the growth of an or- 
 ganic citizenship, through the education of the nations 
 themselves to a sense of common duty and a common 
 life. It looks forward, not to the definite establishment, 
 in our day, of the World-State, but only to the definite 
 refutation of the wicked theory of the mutual incom- 
 patibility of nations. It looks forward to the expression 
 in the outward order of the world's government of what 
 we may call "the Principle of the Commonwealth," of 
 Lord Acton's great principle of the State composed of 
 
 226
 
 free nations, of the State as a living body which lives * r l f d . 
 through the organic union and free activity of its several principle, 
 national members. And it finds its immediate field of 
 action in the deepening and extension of the obligations 
 of citizenship among the peoples of the great, free, just, 
 peace-loving, supra-national Commonwealths whose pa- 
 triotism has been built up, not by precept and doctrine, 
 but on a firm foundation of older loyalties. 
 
 The principle of the Commonwealth is not a European 
 principle: it is a world-principle. It does not proceed 
 upon the expectation of a United States of Europe ; for 
 all the Great Powers of Europe except Austria-Hungary 
 (and some of the smaller, such as Holland, Belgium, and 
 Portugal) are extra-European Powers also. Indeed if 
 we contract our view, with Gladstone and Bismarck and 
 the statesmen of the last generation, to European issues 
 alone, we shall be ignoring the chief political problem of 
 our age the contact of races and nations with wide va- 
 rieties of social experience and at different levels of civ- 
 ilization. It is this great and insistent problem (call it 
 the problem of East and "West, or the problem of the 
 color-line) in all its difficult ramifications, political, so- 
 cial, and, above all, economic, which makes the develop- 
 ment of the principle of the Commonwealth the most 
 pressing political need of our age. For the problems 
 arising out of the contact of races and nations can never 
 be adjusted either by the wise action of individuals or 
 by conflict and warfare ; they can only be solved by fair 
 and deliberate statesmanship within the bosom of a single 
 State, through the recognition by both parties of a 
 higher claim than their own sectional interest the claim 
 of a common citizenship and the interest of civilization. 
 It is here, in the union and collaboration of diverse races 
 and peoples, that the principle of the Commonwealth 
 finds its peculiar field of operation. Without this prin- 
 
 227
 
 cipl e > an ^ without its expression, however imperfect, in 
 
 British com- the British Empire, the world would be in chaos to-day. 
 tohoid' the We cannot predict the political development of the 
 
 p c e a ace. and various Great Powers who between them control the des- 
 tinies of civilization. We cannot estimate the degree or 
 the manner in which France, freed at last from nearer 
 preoccupations, will seek to embody in her vast dominion 
 the great civilizing principles for which her republic 
 stands. We cannot foretell the issue of the conflict of 
 ideas which has swayed to and fro in Russia between the 
 British and the Prussian method of dealing with the 
 problem of nationality. Germany, Italy, Japan here, 
 too, we are faced by enigmas. One other great Common- 
 wealth remains besides the British. Upon the United 
 States already lies the responsibility, voluntarily as- 
 sumed and, except during a time of internal crisis, suc- 
 cessfully discharged, of securing peace from external 
 foes for scores of millions of inhabitants of the American 
 continent. Yet with the progress of events her responsi- 
 bilities must yearly enlarge : for both the immigrant na- 
 tionalities within and the world-problems without her 
 borders seem to summon her to a deeper education and to 
 wider obligations. 
 
 But upon the vast, ramifying, and inchoate Common- 
 wealth of Great Britain lies the heaviest responsibility. 
 It is a task unequally shared between those of her citi- 
 zens who are capable of discharging it. Her task within 
 the Commonwealth is to maintain the common character 
 and ideals and to adjust the mutual relations of one 
 quarter of the human race. Her task without is to 
 throw her weight into the scales of peace, and to uphold 
 and develop the standard and validity of inter-State 
 agreements. It is a task which requires, even at this 
 time of crisis, when, by the common sentiment of her 
 citizens, the real nature and purpose of the Common 
 
 228
 
 wealth have become clear to us, the active thoughts of all * 
 political students. For to bring home to all within her * of Law 
 borders who bear rule and responsibility, from the vil- 
 lage headman in India and Nigeria, the Basutu chief and 
 the South Sea potentate, to the public opinion of Great 
 Britain and the self-governing Dominions, the nature 
 of the British Commonwealth, and the character of its 
 citizenship and ideals, and to study how those ideals may 
 be better expressed in its working institutions and execu- 
 tive government that is a task to which the present 
 crisis beckons the minds of British citizens, a task which 
 Britain owes not only to herself but to mankind. 
 
 Alfred E. Zimmern, "The War and Democracy," pp. 
 371-382. 
 
 229
 
 TOWARDS THE PEACE THAT SHALL LAST 
 
 War must At every stage of warfare in the past, men and women 
 
 iike S human in all nations have endeavored to abate and lessen it. 
 Their repeated endeavors have been answered by re- 
 peated wars, until the present war in Europe completes 
 the works of death, desolation, and tyranny. 
 
 In spite of this, these protests against war are des- 
 tined to succeed; as once before in the history of the 
 race, the sentiment of pity, of respect for human life, 
 called a halt to senseless slaughter. 
 
 There came a time in the history of the Greek and 
 Jewish people when a few set their faces against human 
 sacrifice as a religious rite of their highest faith, bound 
 up, like our wars, with old fealties and solemn customs 
 and with their most desperate fears. Humble men and 
 women, out of sheer affection for their kind, revolted. 
 In face of persecution and ridicule, they warned their 
 countrymen that in pouring human blood upon altars 
 to the gods, they wrought upon their kind more irre- 
 parable wrong than any evil against which they sought 
 to forefend. Finally, there came to be enough people 
 with courage and pity sufficient to carry a generation 
 with them; and human sacrifice became a thing of the 
 past. 
 
 It took the human race many centuries to rid itself of 
 human sacrifice ; during many centuries more it relapsed 
 again and again in periods of national despair. So have 
 
 230
 
 we fallen back into warfare, and perhaps will fall back JjJJ * p o . 
 again and again, until in self-pity, in self-defense, in test against 
 self-assertion of the right of life, not as hitherto, a few, 
 but the whole people of the world, will brook this thing 
 no longer. 
 
 OUR RIGHT TO PROTEST 
 
 By that opportunity, now ours as never before, to 
 weigh the case against war and to draw the counts from 
 burning words spoken by those who protest and who are 
 of all peoples we make single judgment and complete 
 indictment. 
 
 By that good fortune which has placed us outside the 
 conflict ; by that ill fortune by which the belligerent and 
 his rights have heretofore bestrode the world ; by mine- 
 strewn channels, and by international codes which offer 
 scant redress we speak as people of a neutral nation. 
 
 By the unemployed of our water-fronts, and the aug- 
 mented misery of our cities; by the financial depression 
 which has curtailed our school building and crippled our 
 works of good-will; by the sluicing of human impulse 
 among us from channels of social development to the 
 back-eddies of salvage and relief we have a right to 
 speak. 
 
 By the hot anger and civil strife that we have known ; 
 by our pride, vain-glory, and covetousness ; by the strug- 
 gles we have made for national integrity and defense of 
 our hearthstones; by our consciousness that every in- 
 stinct and motive and ideal at work in this war, how- 
 ever lofty or however base, has had some counterpart in 
 our national history and our current life we can speak 
 a common language. 
 
 By that comradeship among nations which has made 
 for mutual understanding; by those inventions which 
 have bound us in communication and put the horrors of 
 
 231
 
 war has war a t our doors; by the mechanical contrivances which 
 
 blighted 
 
 Life. multiply and intensify those horrors; by the quickening 
 
 human sympathies which have made us sensitive to the 
 hurts of others we can speak as fellow-victims of this 
 great oppression. 
 
 By our heritage from each embattled nation; by our 
 debt to them for languages and faiths and social institu- 
 tions; for science, scholarship and invention; by the 
 broken and desolated hearts that will come to us when 
 the war ends ; by our kinships and our unfeigned friend- 
 ships we can speak as brothers, 
 
 By all these things, we hold the present opportunity 
 for conscience-searching and constructive action to be 
 an, especial charge upon us; upon the newcomers among 
 us from the fatherlands; and upon the joint youth of 
 all the peoples of the two Americas. 
 
 WHAT WAR HAS DONE AND IS DOING 
 
 Its Blights 
 
 War has brought low our conception of the precious- 
 ness of human life as slavery brought low our concep- 
 tion of human liberty. 
 
 It has benumbed our growing sense of the nurture of 
 life; and at a time when we were challenging Reich- 
 stag, Parliament, and Congress with the needlessness of 
 infant mortality and child labor, it entrenches a million 
 youths with cold and fever and impending death. 
 
 It has thwarted the chance of our times toward the 
 fulfilment of life, and scattered like burst shrapnel the 
 hands of the sculptors and the violinists, the limbs of 
 the hurdlers and swimmers, the sensitive muscles of the 
 mechanics and the weavers, the throats of the singers 
 and the interpreters, the eyes of the astronomers and 
 the melters every skilled and prescient part of the hu- 
 
 232
 
 man body, every type of craft and competence of the *j " d 
 human mind. humanity. 
 
 It has set back our promptings toward the conserva- 
 tion of life; and in a decade when England and France 
 and Russia, Germany and Austria and Belgium, have 
 been working out social insurance against the hazards 
 of peace, it throws back upon the world an unnumbered 
 company of the widowed and the fatherless, and of aged 
 parents left bereft and destitute. ' 
 
 It has blocked our way toward the ascent of life, and 
 in a century wLich has seen the beginnings of effort to 
 upbuild the common stock, has cut off from parenthood 
 the strong, the courageous and the high-spirited. 
 
 Its Injuries 
 
 It has in its development of armaments, pitted human 
 flesh against machinery. 
 
 It has wrested the power of self-defense from the hands 
 of free-men who wielded lance and sword and scythe, 
 and has set them as machine-tenders to do the bidding 
 of their masters. 
 
 It has brought strange men to the door-silk of peace- 
 ful people ; men like their own men, bearing no grudges 
 one against another ; men snatched away from their fields 
 and villages where their fathers lie buried, to kill and 
 burn and destroy till this other people are driven from 
 their homes of a thousand years or sit abject and broken. 
 
 It has stripped farms and ruined self-sustaining com- 
 munities, and poured into a bewildered march for suc- 
 cor, the crippled and aged and bedridden, the little chil- 
 dren and the women great with child unborn. 
 
 It has razed the flowing lines in which the art and 
 aspiration of earlier generations expressed themselves, 
 and has thus waged war upon the dead. 
 
 233
 
 it has turned ft j^ tortured and twisted the whole social fabric 
 
 effort into de- 
 struction, of the living. 
 
 It has burdened our children and our children's chil- 
 dren with a staggering load of debt. 
 
 It has inundated the lowlands of the world's economy 
 with penury and suffering unreckonable, hopelessly de- 
 pressing standards of living already much too low. 
 
 It has rent and trampled upon the net-work of world 
 cooperation in trade and craftsmanship which had made 
 all men fellow-workers. 
 
 It has whetted a lust among neutral nations to profit 
 by furnishing the means to prolong its struggles. 
 
 It has blasted our new internationalism in the pro- 
 tection of working women and children. 
 
 It has distracted our minds with the business of de- 
 struction and stayed the forward reach of the builders 
 among men. 
 
 It has conscripted physician and surgeon, summoning 
 them from research and the prolongation of life to the 
 patchwork of its wreckage. 
 
 It has sucked into its blood and mire our most recent 
 conquests over the elements over electricity, and air 
 and the depths of ocean ; and has prostituted our prowess 
 in engineering, chemistry and technology, to the service 
 of terror and injury. 
 
 It has bent our achievements in transportation into 
 runways, so that neither volcanoes nor earthquakes, nor 
 the rat-holes of famine, but only the plagues can match 
 war in unbounded disaster. 
 
 Its Wrongs 
 
 It has in its compulsory service made patriotism a 
 shell, empty of liberty. 
 
 It has set up the military independent of and superior 
 to the civil power. 
 
 234
 
 It has substituted arbitrary authority and the morals 
 of foot-loose men who escape identity in the common uni- intelligence, 
 form, for the play of individual conscience, and that so- 
 cial pressure which in household and village, in neigh- 
 borhood and State, makes for individual responsibility, 
 for decency, and fair play. 
 
 It has battened on apathy, unintelligence and help- 
 lessness such as surrender the judgment and volition of 
 nations into a few hands; and has nullified rights and 
 securities, such as are of inestimable value to the people 
 and formidable to tyrants only. 
 
 It has threatened the results of a hundred martyr- 
 doms and revolutions, and put in jeopardy those free gov- 
 ernments which make possible still newer social con- 
 quests. 
 
 It has crushed under iron heels the uprisings of civil- 
 ization itself. 
 
 Its Evils 
 
 It has turned the towers of art and science into new 
 Babels, so that our philosophers, and men of letters, 
 our physicists and geographers, our economists and biolo- 
 gists and dramatists, speak in strange tongues, and to 
 hate each other has become a holy thing among them. 
 
 It has made were-wolves of neighboring peoples, in 
 the imaginations of each other. 
 
 It has put its stamp upon growing boys and girls, and 
 taught them to hate other children who have chanced to 
 be born on the other side of some man-made boundary. 
 
 It has massed and exploded the causes of strife, fos- 
 tering religious antagonisms and racial hates, inbreeding 
 with the ugliest strains of commercialism, perverting to 
 its purposes the increase of over-dense populations and 
 their natural yearning for new opportunities for enter- 
 prise and livelihood. 
 
 235
 
 we must join ft fc^ no t O nly shattered men's breasts, but loosened 
 
 m throwing " ' 
 
 off this the black fury of their hearts; so that in rape, and 
 
 cruelty, and rage, we have ancient brutishness trailing 
 at the heels of all armies. 
 
 It has found a world of friends and neighbors, and 
 substituted a world of outlanders and aliens and enemies. 
 
 It has lessened the number of those who feel the joys 
 and sorrows of all peoples as of their own. 
 
 It has strangled truth and paralyzed the power and 
 wish to face it, and has set up monstrous and irreconcil- 
 able myths of self -justification. 
 
 It has mutilated the human spirit. 
 
 It has become a thing which passeth all understanding. 
 
 STRIKING HANDS 
 
 We have heard the call from overseas of those who 
 have appealed to men and women of good-will in all 
 nations to join with them in throwing off this tyranny 
 upon life. 
 
 We must go further; we must throw open a peace 
 which shall be other than a shadow of old wars and a 
 prelude to new. We do more than plead with men to 
 stay their hands from killing. We hail living men. As 
 peace-lovers, we are charged, with the sanctity of human 
 life; as democrats and freemen we are charged with its 
 sovereignty. 
 
 By the eight million natives of the warring States liv- 
 ing among us without malice or assault one upon an- 
 other, let us leave the occasions of fighting no longer for 
 idle war boards to decide. 
 
 By the blow our forebears struck at barbarism when 
 they took vengeance out of private hands, let us wrest 
 the manufacture of armaments and deadly weapons from 
 the gun-mongers and powder-makers who gain by it. 
 
 By those electric currents that have cut the ground 
 236
 
 from under the old service of diplomacy, and spread the 
 
 new intelligence, let us put the ban upon intrigue and the nations. 
 
 secret treaties. 
 
 For we hold that not soldiers, nor profit-takers, nor 
 diplomats, but the people who suffer and bear the brunt 
 of war should determine whether war must be ; that with 
 ample time for investigation and publicity of its every 
 cause and meaning, with recourse to every avenue for 
 mediation and settlement abroad, war should come only 
 by the slow process of self -willing among men and women 
 who solemnly publish and declare it to be a last and sole 
 resort. 
 
 With our treated borderland, 3000 miles in length 
 without fort or trench from the Atlantic to the Pa- 
 cific, which has helped weld us for a century of unbroken 
 peace with our neighbors to the north, we would spread 
 faith not in entrenched camps but in open boundaries. 
 
 With the pacts of our written constitutions before us 
 which bind our own sovereign States in amity, we are 
 convinced that treaty-making may be lifted to a new and 
 inviolable estate, and lay the foundations for that world 
 organization which for all time shall make for peace upon 
 earth and good-will among men. 
 
 With our experience in lesser conflicts in industrial 
 life, which have none the less embraced groups as large 
 as armies, have torn passions and rasped endurance to 
 the uttermost, we can bear testimony that at the end of 
 such strife as cleaves to the heart of things, men are 
 disposed to lay the framework of their relations in larger 
 molds than those which broke beneath them. 
 
 With our ninety million people drawn from Alpine 
 and Mediterranean, Danubean, Baltic, and Slavic stocks ; 
 with a culture blended from these different affluents, 
 we hold that progress lies in the predominance of none ; 
 and that the civilization of each nation needs to be re- 
 
 237
 
 W a e d throu h freshed by that cross-breeding with the genius and the 
 
 type of other human groups, that blending which began 
 
 th^war 1 on the coast lands and islands of the JEgean Sea where 
 
 European civilization first drew its sources from the 
 
 Euphrates and the Nile. 
 
 With memories of the tyranny which provoked our 
 Revolution, with the travail still upon us by which we in 
 our turn have paid for the enslavement of a people, with 
 the bitterness only now assuaged which marked our pe- 
 riod of mistrust and reconstruction, we bear witness that 
 boundaries should be set where not force, but justice and 
 consanguinity direct; and that, however boundaries fall, 
 liberty and the flowering-out of native cultures should 
 be secure. 
 
 With our fair challenge to the spirit of the East and 
 to the chivalry of the West in standing for the open door 
 in China when that Empire, now turned Republic, was 
 threatened by dismemberment, we call for the freeing of 
 the ports of every ocean from special privilege based on 
 territorial claims, throwing them open with equal chance 
 to all who by their ability and energy can serve new 
 regions to their mutual benefit. 
 
 With the faith we have kept with Cuba, the regard 
 we have shown for the integrity of Mexico and our 
 preparations for the independence of the Philippine Is- 
 lands, we urge the framing of a common colonial policy 
 which shall put down that predatory exploitation which 
 has embroiled the West and oppressed the East and shall 
 stand for an opportunity for each latent and backward 
 race to build up according to its own genius. 
 
 By our full century of ruthless waste of forest, ore 
 and fuel; by the vision which has come to us in these 
 latter days of conserving to the permanent uses of the 
 people, the water power and natural wealth of our public 
 
 238
 
 domain, we propose the laying down of a planetary 
 policy of conservation. 
 
 By that tedium and monotony of life and labor for 
 vast companies of people, which when war drums sound, 
 goads the field worker to forsake his harvest and the 
 wage-earner to leap from his bench, we hold that the 
 ways of peace should be so cast as to make stirring ap- 
 peal to the heroic qualities in men, and give common ut- 
 terance to the rhythm and beauty of national feeling. 
 
 By the joy of our people in the conquest of a conti- 
 nent ; by the rousing of all Europe, when the great navi- 
 gators threw open the new Indies and the New World, 
 we stand for such a scheming-out of our joint existence 
 that the achieving instincts among men, not as one na- 
 tion against another, nor as one class against another, 
 but as one generation after another, shall have freedom 
 to come into their own. 
 
 Jane Addams, 
 Lillian Wald, 
 Paul U. Kellogg. 
 
 239
 
 APPENDIX 
 PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS
 
 PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS 
 
 1. INTERNATIONAL 
 
 NEUTRAL CONFERENCE FOR CONTINUOUS MEDIATION, 
 STOCKHOLM 
 
 To the Governments, Parliaments and Peoples of the 
 Warring Nations: 
 
 A conference composed of delegates from six neutral Ford Neutral 
 
 " Conference at 
 
 countries Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Switzer- Stockholm, 
 land and the United States has been convened at Stock- 
 holm upon the initiative of Henry Ford to work for the 
 achievement of an early and lasting peace, based upon 
 principles of justice and humanity. This conference 
 represents no government. It has no official sanction. 
 It represents the good will of millions throughout the 
 civilized world who cannot stand idly by while the deadly 
 combat rages unchecked. It does not attempt to im- 
 pose its judgment upon the belligerents, but its mem- 
 bers, as private individuals, unhampered by considera- 
 tions which restrain governments, have resolved to do 
 everything within their power to promote such discus- 
 sion as may tend to bring the belligerents together on 
 just and reasonable terms. 
 
 Through a thousand channels utterances have already 
 reached the conference pleading that a long continuance 
 of the struggle will mean ruin for all, but as both sides 
 believe that only complete victory can decide the issue, 
 
 243
 
 ever new sacrifices of blood and treasure are made, ex- 
 hausting the present and impoverishing the future. 
 Still, we are convinced that an agreement between the 
 warring nations might even now be reached were cer- 
 tain universal principles to be accepted as a basis of 
 discussion ; principles which cannot be violated with im- 
 punity, whatever the military results of the war. 
 
 The first duty of a neutral conference, then, is to call 
 attention to those universal principles and concrete pro- 
 posals upon which agreement seems possible, and upon 
 which there may be founded a peace that will not only 
 satisfy the legitimate demands of the warring nations 
 themselves, but also advance the welfare of humanity 
 at large. The neutral conference does not propose to 
 discuss all the issues at stake. Nor does it desire to set 
 forth a plan for the construction of a perfect world. 
 But it emphasizes the universal demand that peace, when 
 it comes, shall be real, insuring mankind against the re- 
 currence of a world war. Humanity demands a lasting 
 peace. 
 
 In presenting this appeal to governments, parliaments 
 and peoples for discussion and comment the neutral con- 
 ference hopes that no formal objection may prevent its 
 sympathetic consideration both by those in authority 
 and by the people whom they represent. 
 
 (A) Right of Nations to Decide Their Own Fate. 
 History demonstrates that dispositions contrary to the 
 wishes of the peoples concerned bring with them the dan- 
 ger of future wars of liberation. Hence the acceptance 
 of these principles appears generally to be regarded as 
 an essential prerequisite to the satisfactory settlement of 
 this war; namely, that no transfer of territory should 
 take place without the consent of the population in- 
 volved, and that nations should have the right to decide 
 their own fate. 
 
 244
 
 It follows that the restoration of Belgium must first 
 be agreed upon before there can be an understanding 
 between the belligerent powers. Furthermore, the oc- 
 cupied French territory should be returned. A recon- 
 sideration of the difficult Alsace-Lorraine question is also 
 an absolute necessity. The independence of Serbia and 
 Montenegro should be assured. 
 
 In its wider interpretation, the principle of the right 
 of nations to decide their own fate postulates the solu- 
 tion of a problem like the Polish question by guarantee- 
 ing the union of the Polish nation as an independent 
 people. Further applications would be the adjustment 
 of the frontiers between Austria and Italy, as far as 
 possible, according to the principle of nationality; au- 
 tonomy for Armenia under international guarantee, and 
 the solution of various national questions in the Bal- 
 kans and in Asiatic Turkey by international agreement. 
 
 (B) Economic Guarantees. Economic competition 
 is generally admitted to be one of the causes of the 
 present war. Hence the demand becomes more and 
 more insistent that the economic activity of all peoples 
 should be afforded development on equal terms. The 
 recognition of the principle of the open door in the col- 
 onies, protectorates, and spheres of influence would be 
 an important step in this direction, as would also the 
 internationalization of certain waterways, e. g., the 
 Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The German colonies 
 ought to be returned, the exchange of colonies made pos- 
 sible by satisfactory compensation, and Germany 's access 
 to the Near East guaranteed. 
 
 (C) Freedom of the Seas. The principle of the free- 
 dom of the seas should be recognized. 
 
 (D) Parliamentary Control of Foreign Policy. Ef- 
 fective parliamentary control of foreign policy should 
 be established, so that secret treaties and secret diplo- 
 
 245
 
 macy may no longer endanger the most vital interests of 
 the nation. 
 
 (E) International Organization. Far more impor- 
 tant, however, for the welfare of humanity than the 
 solutions thus far suggested is the creation of an inter- 
 national organization, founded, upon law and justice, 
 which would include an agreement to submit all disputes 
 between States for peaceful settlement. Hence the al- 
 most universal opinion that in the coming treaty of 
 peace the principle of such an international order of 
 justice must be accepted. 
 
 (F) Disarmament. Equally important with the in- 
 sistence upon an international organization is the de- 
 mand that disarmament be brought about by interna- 
 tional agreement. 
 
 (G) A World Congress. In order to bring about 
 the creation of an international order of justice it will 
 be necessary to secure the adherence thereto of both 
 belligerents and neutrals. The difficulties that result 
 from the present catastrophe do not affect the warring 
 nations alone. They affect the whole world. In their 
 settlement the whole world should participate. A world 
 congress should therefore be called together. Such a 
 congress should concern itself with more than the im- 
 mediate questions arising out of this war. Problems 
 like that of guaranteeing political and spiritual freedom 
 to special nationalities united with other peoples, though 
 not direct issues of this war, are nevertheless of vital im- 
 portance to the future maintenance of peace. 
 
 In the foregoing an attempt has been made to sug- 
 gest a possible approach to the task of uniting again 
 the international bonds that have been torn asunder in 
 this fratricide war. Whatever may be the ultimate so- 
 lution, there is abundant evidence of the growing con- 
 viction among belligerents and neutrals alike that the 
 
 246
 
 hope of the world lies in the substitution of law and 
 order for international anarchy. The neutral confer- 
 ence, therefore, feels justified in hoping that the end of 
 this war will witness the institution of an international 
 order of justice which shall make possible an enduring 
 peace for all mankind. 
 Easter, 1916. 
 
 CENTRAL ORGANIZATION FOR A DURABLE PEACE 
 The Hague. 
 
 An important international gathering was held at The qrganiz 
 Hague from the seventh to the tenth of April, 1915. u n r *j r e 
 The meeting, for which arrangements had been made Peace. 
 by the "Dutch Anti-War Council/' who sent invita- 
 tions to a limited number of persons, was composed of 
 more than thirty people, belonging to the following coun- 
 tries: United States of America, Austria, Belgium, 
 Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Hungary, Norway, 
 Sweden and Switzerland. Letters of sympathy were 
 also received from Denmark, France, Italy, Russia and 
 .Spain. 
 
 The object of the meeting was not to suggest steps to 
 bring the war to an end, but to consider by what prin- 
 ciples the future peace of the world could be best guar- 
 anteed. After full discussion a minimum program was 
 unanimously adopted. 
 
 MINIMUM-PROGRAM 
 
 1. No annexation or transfer of territory shall be 
 made contrary to the interests and wishes of the popula- 
 tion concerned. Where possible their consent shall be 
 obtained by plebiscite or otherwise. 
 
 The States shall guarantee to the various nationalities, 
 247
 
 included in their boundaries, equality before the law, 
 religious liberty and the free use of their native lan- 
 guages. 
 
 2. The States shall agree to introduce in their col- 
 onies, protectorates and spheres of influence, liberty of 
 commerce, or at least equal treatment for all nations. 
 
 3. The work of the Hague Conferences with a view to 
 the peaceful organization of the Society of Nations shall 
 be developed. 
 
 The Hague Conference shall be given a permanent or- 
 ganization and meet at regular intervals. 
 
 The States shall agree to submit all their disputes to 
 peaceful settlement. For this purpose there shall be 
 created, in addition to the existent Hague Court of Arbi- 
 tration (a) a permanent Court of International Justice; 
 (b) a permanent international Council of Investigation 
 and Conciliation. The States shall bind themselves to 
 take concerted action, diplomatic, economic or military, 
 in case any State should resort to military measures in- 
 stead of submitting the dispute to judicial decision or tb 
 the mediation of the Council of Investigation and Con- 
 ciliation. 
 
 4. The States shall agree to reduce their armaments. 
 In order to facilitate the reduction of naval armaments, 
 the right of capture shall be abolished and the freedom 
 of the seas assured. 
 
 5. Foreign policy shall be under the effective control 
 of the Parliaments of the respective nations. 
 
 Secret treaties shall be void. 
 
 Union of 
 Interna- 
 tional Ag- 
 tociationa. 
 
 UNION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: BRUSSELS 
 Secretary-General: Paul Otlet. 
 
 Project of World-Charter ("Charte Mondiale"), by 
 M. Paul Otlet. 
 
 248
 
 1. Court of arbitration and court of justice. 
 
 2. Council of inquiry and conciliation. 
 
 3. Council of States, taking in concert diplomatic, 
 economic and military measures. International armed 
 force consisting of national contingents under an inter- 
 national general staff. 
 
 4. International Parliament with two houses the 
 lower composed of delegates from the various Parlia- 
 ments; upper, of delegates from the international asso- 
 ciations representing the fundamental social forces. 
 
 5. No annexation and no right of conquest. Guaran- 
 tee of rights of minorities. Freedom of nationalities. 
 
 6. Democratic control of foreign policy. Suppres- 
 sion of alliances and of secret treaties. 
 
 7. Considerable reduction of armies, and application 
 of war budgets to education, etc. 
 
 8. Freedom of commerce, at least in colonies. 
 
 9. Woman suffrage. Reform of education and of the 
 press. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF PEACE (BUREAU INTER- 
 NATIONAL DE LA PAIX) 
 
 President: H. La Fontaine. 
 
 1. Neutral States should be called to participate in 
 
 . , tional Bu- 
 
 the peace negotiations, because a permanent peace ought reau of 
 to be guaranteed by the signature of all the powers of 
 the world. 
 
 2. No annexations must take place without the consent 
 of the populations concerned. In all the States of di- 
 verse nationalities the rights of minorities must be guar- 
 anteed. 
 
 3. There should be established an international or- 
 ganization of States, with permanent bodies and espe- 
 
 249
 
 cially an international tribunal before which will be 
 brought international disputes. 
 
 4. Armaments must be reduced according to general 
 agreement and placed under an international control. 
 All industrial establishments occupied with the manu- 
 facture of munitions must be expropriated. 
 
 5. Diplomacy in all the nations must be put under 
 the control of parliaments and public opinion. All trea- 
 ties and agreements which are not made public and 
 have the ratification of the representative bodies of the 
 nation are to be considered null and void. 
 
 6. All alliances, offensive or defensive, are to be pro- 
 hibited. 
 
 7. To all colonies without distinction must be applied 
 the principle of the "open door." No State shall be 
 able to impose a tariff system on another. The develop- 
 ment of free trade through international agreements 
 must be furthered. 
 
 8. The public institutions and the honor of each na- 
 tion are to be protected against foreign insult by penal 
 regulations internationally devised and guaranteed by an 
 international judicial body. 
 
 9. A new peace conference is to be called with the ob- 
 ject of establishing the permanent character of the in- 
 stitution and ensuring its automatic reunion. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF WOMEN 
 The Hague, Holland, April 28th, 29th, 30th, 1915 
 
 tioui M 6on- In a preparatory meeting of English, German, Belgian 
 w^men f and Dutch women, held at Amsterdam (February, 1915), 
 
 the following resolutions were drawn up to be put before 
 
 the International Congress: 
 
 250
 
 I. Plea for definition of terms of peace. 
 Considering that the people in each of the countries 
 
 now at war believe themselves to be fighting, not as ag- 
 gressors but in self-defense and for their national ex- 
 istence, this International Congress of Women urges the 
 Governments of the belligerent countries, publicly to 
 define the terms on which they are willing to make peace 
 and for this purpose immediately to call a truce. 
 
 II. Arbitration and conciliation. 
 
 This International Congress of Women, believing that 
 war is the negation of all progress and civilization, de- 
 clares its conviction that future international disputes 
 should be referred to arbitration or conciliation; and 
 demands that in future these methods shall be adopted 
 by the governments of all nations. 
 
 III. International pressure. 
 
 This International Congress of Women urges the Pow- 
 ers to come to an agreement to unite in bringing pressure 
 to bear upon any country which resorts to arms without 
 having referred its case to arbitration or conciliation. 
 
 IV. Democratic control of foreign policy. 
 
 War is brought about not by the peoples of the world, 
 who do not desire it, but by groups of individuals rep- 
 resenting particular interests. This International Con- 
 gress of Women demands therefore that Foreign Poli- 
 tics shall be subject to Democratic Control; and at the 
 same time declares that it can only recognize as demo- 
 cratic a system which includes the equal representation 
 of men and women. 
 
 V. Transference of territory. 
 
 This International Congress of women affirms that 
 251
 
 there should be no transference of territory without the 
 consent of the men and women in it. 
 
 VI. Women's responsibility. 
 
 This International "Women's Congress is convinced 
 that one of the strongest forces for the prevention of 
 war will be the combined influence of the women of all 
 countries and that therefore upon women as well as 
 men rests the responsibility for the outbreak of future 
 wars. But as women can only make their influence ef- 
 fective if they have equal political rights with men, this 
 Congress declares that it is the duty of all women to 
 work with all their force for their political enfranchise- 
 ment. 
 
 VII. Women delegates in the conference of the powers. 
 Believing that it is essential for the future peace of 
 
 the world that representatives of the people should take 
 part in the Conference of the Powers after the war, this 
 International Women's Congress urges, that among the 
 representatives women delegates should be included. 
 
 VIII. Woman suffrage resolution. 
 
 This International Women's Congress urges, that in 
 the interests of civilization the Conference of the Pow- 
 ers after the war should pass a resolution affirming the 
 need in all countries of extending the parliamentary 
 franchise to women. 
 
 IX. Promotion of good feeling between nations. 
 
 This International Congress of Women, which in it- 
 self is evidence of the serious desire of women to bring 
 together mankind in the work of building up our com- 
 mon civilization, considers that every means should be 
 used for promoting mutual understanding and good 
 
 252
 
 will between the nations and for resisting any tendency 
 to hatred and revenge. 
 
 RESOLUTIONS OF WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL PEACE 
 CONGRESS AT THE HAGUE 
 
 I. WOMEN AND WAR 
 
 1. Protest. 
 
 We women, in International Congress assembled, pro- 
 test against the madness and the horror of war, involv- 
 ing as it does a reckless sacrifice of human life and the 
 destruction of so much that humanity has labored 
 through centuries to build up. 
 
 2. Women's Sufferings in War. 
 
 This International Congress of Women opposes the 
 assumption that women can be protected under the con- 
 ditions of modern warfare. It protests vehemently 
 against the odious wrongs of which women are the vic- 
 tims in time of war, and especially against the horrible 
 violation of women which attends all war. 
 
 H. ACTION TOWARD PEACE 
 
 The Peace Settlement. 
 
 This International Congress of Women of different 
 nations, classes, creeds and parties is united in express- 
 ing sympathy with the suffering of all, whatever their 
 nationality, who are fighting for their country or labor- 
 ing under the burden of war. 
 
 Since the mass of the people in each of the countries 
 now at war believe themselves to be fighting, not as ag- 
 gressors but in self-defense and for their national ex- 
 istence, there can be no irreconcilable difference between 
 them, and their common ideals afford a basis upon which 
 a magnanimous and honorable peace might be estab- 
 
 253
 
 lished. The congress therefore urges the governments 
 of the world to put an end to this bloodshed and to be- 
 gin peace negotiations. It demands that the peace which 
 follows shall be permanent, and therefore based on prin- 
 ciples of justice, including those laid down in the resolu- 
 tions adopted by this congress namely: 
 
 That no territory should be transferred without the 
 consent of the men and women in it, and that the right 
 of conquest should not be recognized. 
 
 That autonomy and a democratic parliament should 
 not be refused to any people. 
 
 That the governments of all nations should come to 
 an agreement to refer future international disputes to 
 arbitration or conciliation, and to bring social, moral and 
 economic pressure to bear upon any country which re- 
 sorts to arms. 
 
 That foreign politics should be subject to democratic 
 control. 
 
 That women should be granted equal political rights 
 with men. 
 
 4. Continuous Mediation. 
 
 This International Congress of "Women resolves to 
 ask the neutral countries to take immediate steps to cre- 
 ate a conference of neutral nations which shall without 
 delay offer continuous mediation. The congress shall in- 
 vite suggestions for settlement from each of the bellig- 
 erent nations, and in any case shall submit to all of 
 them, simultaneously, reasonable proposals as a basis of 
 peace. 
 
 m. PRINCIPLES OF A PERMANENT PEACE 
 
 5. Respect for Nationality. 
 
 This International Congress of Women, recognizing 
 the right of the people to self-government, affirms that 
 
 254
 
 there should be no transference of territory without 
 the consent of the men and women residing therein, and 
 urges that autonomy and a democratic parliament should 
 not be refused to any people. 
 
 6. Arbitration and Conciliation. 
 
 This International Congress of Women, believing that 
 war is the negation of progress and civilization, urges 
 the governments of all nations to come to an agreement 
 to refer future international disputes to arbitration and 
 conciliation. 
 
 7. International Pressure. 
 
 This International Congress of Women urges the gov- 
 ernments of all nations to come to an agreement to unite 
 in bringing social, moral and economic pressure to bear 
 upon any country which resorts to arms instead of re- 
 ferring its case to arbitration or conciliation. 
 
 8. Democratic Control of Foreign Policy. 
 
 Since war is commonly brought about not by the 
 mass of the people, who do not desire it, but by groups 
 representing particular interests, this International Con- 
 gress of Women urges that foreign politics shall be sub- 
 ject to democratic control, and declares that it can only 
 recognize as democratic a system which includes the equal 
 representation of men and women. 
 
 9. The Enfranchisement of Women. 
 
 Since the combined influence of the women of all coun- 
 tries is one of the strongest forces for the prevention of 
 war, and since women can only have full responsibility 
 and effective influence when they have equal political 
 rights with men, this International Congress of Women 
 demands their political enfranchisement. 
 
 255
 
 IV. INTERNATIONAL. COOPERATION 
 
 10. Third Hague Conference. 
 
 This International Congress of Women urges that a 
 third Hague Conference be convened immediately after 
 the war. 
 
 11. International Organization. 
 
 This International "Women's Congress urges that the 
 organization of the Society of Nations should be further 
 developed on the basis of a constructive peace, and that 
 it should include: 
 
 (a) As a development of The Hague Court of Arbi- 
 tration, a permanent International Court of Justice to 
 settle questions or differences of a justiciable character, 
 such as arise on the interpretation of treaty rights or of 
 the law of nations. 
 
 (b) As a development of the constructive work of 
 The Hague Conference, a permanent international con- 
 ference holding regular meetings, in which women should 
 take part, to deal not with the rules of warfare but 
 with practical proposals for further international co- 
 operation among the States. This conference should be 
 so constituted that it could formulate and enforce those 
 principles of justice, equity and good-will in accord- 
 ance with which the struggles of subject communities 
 could be more fully recognized and the interests and 
 rights not only of the great Powers and small nations, 
 but also those of weaker countries and primitive peo- 
 ples, gradually adjusted under an enlightened interna- 
 tional public opinion. 
 
 The International Conference shall appoint: A per- 
 manent council of conciliation and investigation for 
 the settlement of international differences arising from 
 economic competition, expanding commerce, increasing 
 
 256
 
 population and changes in social and political stand- 
 ards. 
 
 12. General Disarmament. 
 
 This International Congress of Women, advocating 
 universal disarmament and realizing that it can only 
 be secured by international agreement, urges as a step 
 to this end that all countries should, by such an inter- 
 national agreement, take over the manufacture of arms 
 and munitions of war and should control all interna- 
 tional traffic in the same. It sees in the private profits 
 accruing from the great armament factories a powerful 
 hindrance to the abolition of war. 
 
 13. Commerce and Investments. 
 
 The Congress urges that in all countries there shall 
 be liberty of commerce, that the seas shall be free and 
 the trade routes open on equal terms to the shipping of 
 all nations. 
 
 Inasmuch as the investment by capitalists of one coun- 
 try in the resources of another and the claims arising 
 therefrom are a fertile source of international compli- 
 cations, this congress urges the widest possible accept- 
 ance of the principle that such investments shall be made 
 at the risk of the investor, without claim to the official 
 protection of his government. 
 
 14. National Foreign Policy. 
 
 This International Congress of Women demands that 
 all secret treaties shall be void, and that for the ratifi- 
 cation of future treaties the participation of at least 
 the legislature of every government shall be necessary. 
 
 This International Congress of Women recommends 
 that national commissions be created and international 
 conferences convened for the scientific study and elabora- 
 tion of the principles and conditions of permanent peace 
 
 257
 
 which might contribute to the development of an inter- 
 national federation. These commissions and conferences 
 should be recognized by the governments and should in- 
 clude women in their deliberations. 
 
 15. Women in National and International Politics. 
 
 This International Congress of Women declares it to 
 be essential, both nationally and internationally, to put 
 into practise the principle that women should share all 
 civil and political rights and responsibilities on the same 
 terms as men. 
 
 V. THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN 
 
 16. This International Congress of Women urges the 
 necessity of so directing the education of children that 
 their thoughts and desires may be directed toward the 
 ideal of constructive peace. 
 
 VI. WOMEN AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
 
 17. This International Congress of Women urges that 
 in the interests of lasting peace and civilization the con- 
 ference which shall frame the peace settlement after the 
 war should pass a resolution affirming the need in all 
 countries of extending the parliamentary franchise to 
 women. 
 
 18. This International Congress of Women urges that 
 representatives of the people should take part in the 
 conference that shall frame the peace settlement after 
 the war, and claims that among them women should be in- 
 cluded. 
 
 VII. ACTION TO BE TAKEN 
 
 19. Envoys to the Governments. 
 
 In order to urge the governments of the world to put 
 an end to this bloodshed and to establish, a just and last- 
 
 258
 
 ing peace, this International Congress of Women dele- 
 gates envoys to carry the message expressed in the con- 
 gress resolutions to the rulers of the belligerent and neu- 
 tral nations of Europe and to the President of the United 
 States. 
 
 These envoys shall be women of both neutral and 
 belligerent nations, appointed by the international com- 
 mittee of this congress. They shall report the result of 
 their missions to the International Women's Committee 
 for Constructive Peace as a basis for further action. 
 
 20. Women's Voice in the Peace Settlement. 
 
 This International Congress of Women resolves that 
 an international meeting of women shall be held in the 
 same place and at the same time as the conference of 
 the Powers which shall frame the terms of the peace set- 
 tlement after the war, for the purpose of presenting 
 practical proposals to that conference. 
 
 CONFERENCE OF SOCIALISTS OF THE ALLIED NATIONS 
 London, Feb. 14, 1915. 
 
 This conference cannot ignore the profound general s f oc A i 1 1 
 causes of the European conflict, itself a monstrous prod- Nations, 
 uct of the antagonisms which tear asunder capitalist so- 
 ciety and of the policy of colonial dependencies and 
 aggressive imperialism, against which international So- 
 cialism has never ceased to fight, and in which every 
 government has its share of responsibility. 
 
 The invasion of Belgium and France by the German 
 armies threatens the very existence of independent na- 
 tionalities, and strikes a blow at all faith in treaties. In 
 these circumstances a victory for German imperialism 
 
 259
 
 would be the defeat and the destruction of democracy 
 and liberty in Europe. The Socialists of Great Britain, 
 Belgium, France, and Russia do not pursue the political 
 and economic crushing of Germany ; they are not at war 
 with the people of Germany and Austria, but only with 
 the governments of those countries by which they are 
 oppressed. They demand that Belgium shall be liber- 
 ated and compensated. They desire that the question of 
 Poland shall be settled in accordance with the wishes of 
 the Polish people, either in the sense of autonomy in the 
 midst of another State, or in that of complete inde- 
 pendence. They wish that throughout all Europe, from 
 Alsace-Lorraine to the Balkans, those populations that 
 have been annexed by force shall receive the right freely 
 to dispose of themselves. 
 
 While inflexibly resolved to fight until victory is 
 achieved to accomplish this task of liberation, the So- 
 cialists are none the less resolved to resist any attempt 
 to transform this defensive war into a war of conquest, 
 which would only prepare fresh conflicts, create new 
 grievances, and subject various peoples more than ever 
 to the double plague of armaments and war. 
 
 Satisfied that they are remaining true to the principles 
 of the International, the members of the Conference 
 express the hope that the working class of all the dif- 
 ferent countries will before long find themselves united 
 again in their struggle against militarism and capitalist 
 imperialism. The victory of the Allied Powers must be 
 a victory for popular liberty, for unity, independence, 
 and autonomy of the nations in the peaceful federation 
 of the United States of Europe and the world. 
 
 II 
 
 On the conclusion of the war the working classes of 
 all the industrial countries must unite in the Interna- 
 
 260
 
 tional in order to suppress secret diplomacy, put an end 
 to the interests of militarism, and those of the armament 
 makers and establish some international authority to set- 
 tle points of difference among the nations by compulsory 
 conciliation and arbitration, and to compel all nations 
 to maintain peace. 
 
 m 
 
 The Conference protests against the arrest of the dep- 
 uties of the Duma, against the suppression of Russian 
 Socialist papers and the condemnation of their editors, 
 as well as against the oppression of Finns, Jews, and 
 Russian and German Poles. 
 
 CONFERENCE OP SOCIALISTS FROM SWEDEN, NORWAY, DEN- 
 MARK AND HOLLAND, HELD AT COPENHAGEN 
 
 The Conference states that Capitalism, in its imperial- socialists 
 
 . . . . f Neutral 
 
 istic form, expressed by the constantly increasing arma- Nations. 
 ments, and by arrogant politics of aggrandizement, sup- 
 ported by the secret and irresponsible diplomacy of the 
 Great Powers, have now led the world to the catastrophe 
 .predicted and always warned against by the Social 
 Democracy. 
 
 In this moment, when the world is struck with terror 
 at the horrible devastation this war has caused, the Con- 
 ference desires to give expression to the firm and strong 
 will to peace, existing within the nations represented at 
 the Conference. 
 
 The delegates are of opinion that the chief aim of the 
 conference is to be the strengthening and uniting of that 
 public will which, undoubtedly, in all countries, demands 
 the end of the war in such a way that a permanent peace 
 may be secured. To realize this aim, the conference 
 addresses itself to the democratic workmen, particularly 
 
 261
 
 to those of the belligerent countries, pointing at the same 
 time to those principles of international solidarity and 
 proletarian conception of justice which have been sanc- 
 tioned at all our international congresses. These prin- 
 ciples were expressed by the Congress of Copenhagen, 
 1910, in the following way : 
 
 The parliamentary representatives of the Social De- 
 mocracy are bound to work in order to realize the follow- 
 ing aims: 
 
 1. International compulsory arbitration. 
 
 2. Restriction of the preparations for war ending in 
 final disarmament. 
 
 3. Abolition of secret diplomacy with full parliamen- 
 tary responsibility as to foreign politics. 
 
 4. Recognition of the right of self-determination of 
 nations, of resistance to oppression and war-intrigues. 
 
 The Conference considers it the duty of all socialistic 
 parties to be active in order to render possible an early 
 conclusion of peace, and to work energetically in favor 
 of such conditions of peace as may form a basis of inter- 
 national disarmament and of the democratization of for- 
 eign politics. 
 
 The Conference protests against the infringement of 
 international right in the case of Belgium and expresses 
 a hope that the Social Democracy in all belligerent coun- 
 tries will in the strongest way possible oppose every vio- 
 lent annexation at variance with the right of self-deter- 
 mination of the peoples. 
 
 The Conference, thus, reiterates the principles of peace 
 of the International, and summons the International 
 Bureau to convoke the social democratic parties to joint 
 deliberation, if not earlier, at least at the beginning of 
 the negotiations of peace, in order to examine the con- 
 ditions of peace, because the Conference considers it ab- 
 solutely necessary that the conditions of peace be not 
 
 262
 
 stipulated without the collaboration of the working men 
 and women, or against their will, and summons the work- 
 ing class in all countries to concentrate their efforts in 
 order to realize a permanent peace throughout the 
 world. This war, with all its horrors, has only been 
 possible, because the Capitalist class of the different 
 countries still holds the power in its hands. The Con- 
 ference hence summons the Socialists to work with the 
 greatest energy in order to conquer the political power, 
 so that Imperialism may be ruined, and that the Inter- 
 national Social Democracy may fulfil its great mission 
 of emancipating the people. 
 
 Copenhagen, Jan. 17-18, 1915. 
 
 263
 
 PEACE PEOPOSALS AND PROGRAMS 
 2. UNITED STATES 
 
 LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 
 
 OBJECTS 
 League to l. An International Court to try all justiciable ques- 
 
 enforce 
 Peace. 
 
 2. A Council of Conciliation for consideration of non- 
 justiciable questions. 
 
 3. Use of joint economic pressure and military force 
 against signatory beginning hostilities contrary to terms 
 of alliance. 
 
 4. Formulation and adoption of a code of interna- 
 tional law. 
 
 The League's proposal is that economic pressure and 
 military force shall be used to compel signatory Powers 
 to take their international differences to the court for 
 adjudication rather than to the battlefield. It frankly 
 hopes to promote peace and aid its establishment by us- 
 ing economic and military force. 
 
 NATIONAL PEACE CONVENTION, 
 
 HELD UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE EMERGENCY PEACE 
 FEDERATION, CHICAGO, 
 
 February 27 and 28, 1915. 
 
 National 1. Foreign policies of nations should not be aimed 
 
 Oonven- at creating alliances for the purpose of maintaining the 
 
 tion. 264
 
 "balance of power," but should be directed to the estab- 
 lishment of a " Concert of Nations, ' ' with 
 
 (a) An international court for the settlement of all 
 disputes between nations; 
 
 (&) An international congress, with legislative and 
 administrative powers over international af- 
 fairs, and with permanent committees in place 
 of present secret diplomacy; 
 
 (c) An international police force; 
 
 (d) The embodiment in international law of the prin- 
 
 ciple of non-intercourse, as the sanction and en- 
 forcement of international obligations. 
 
 2. The gradual reduction and final abolition of na- 
 tional armaments should be accomplished upon the 
 adoption of this peace program by a sufficient number 
 of nations, or by nations of sufficient power to ensure 
 protection to those disarmed; such reduction should be 
 graduated in each nation according to the degree of dis- 
 armament elected in other nations, and should be 
 progressive until complete abolition is finally at- 
 tained. 
 
 3. The manufacture of armaments for private profit 
 should be prohibited, and the export of munitions of war 
 from one country to another should be directly under 
 governmental control. 
 
 4. The protection of private property at sea, of neu- 
 tral commerce and of communications should be secured 
 by the neutralization of the seas, and of such maritime 
 trade routes as the Dardanelles and the Panama and Suez 
 Canals. 
 
 5. National and international action should be aimed 
 at the removal of inequitable trade barriers and other 
 more fundamental economic causes of war. 
 
 6. The democracies of the world should be extended 
 
 265
 
 and reinforced by general application of the principles 
 of self-government and of universal adult suffrage. 
 
 7. No province should be transferred from one gov- 
 ernment to another without the consent of the population 
 of such province. 
 
 8. No treaty, alliance, or other arrangement should be 
 entered upon by any nation, unless ratified by the rep- 
 resentatives of the people; treaties for securing delay 
 before commencing hostilities, and adequate machinery 
 for insuring democratic control of foreign politics should 
 be created. 
 
 WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION 
 
 Boston, Mass. 
 World 1. No territory should be transferred from one nation 
 
 HfilCB 
 
 Founda- to another in disregard of the inhabitants, nor any re- 
 
 adjustment be made of which the effect would neces- 
 sarily be to sow the seeds of future war. 
 
 2. As the alliances and ententes of Europe have 
 proved their incapacity to safeguard the welfare of the 
 people, the nations of that continent should establish 
 and maintain a representative council in order to insure 
 mutual conference and concerted action. 
 
 3. Competition in armaments should end. The na- 
 tions should agree to abandon compulsory military serv- 
 ice and to limit military force to purposes of police and 
 international defense. 
 
 4. All manufactures of arms, armaments and muni- 
 tions for use in war should hereafter be national prop- 
 erty. No private citizen or corporation should be per- 
 mitted to engage in such manufacture. The export of 
 such goods for use in armies and fleets should be pro- 
 hibited. 
 
 266
 
 5. No neutral nation should permit its citizens to make 
 loans to belligerents for war purposes. As our own 
 State Department has said : ' ' Loans by American bank- 
 ers to any foreign nation which is at war are incon- 
 sistent with the true spirit of neutrality." 
 
 AMERICAN SCHOOL, PEACE LEAGUE 
 
 1. A Concert of Europe. The surest method of estab- American 
 lishing permanent peace is to bring about a Concert of 
 Europe, based upon the knowledge that, with nations as 
 
 with individuals, cooperation and not conflict is the law 
 of progress. In order to insure mutual conference and 
 concerted action, there should be organized a representa- 
 tive Council whose deliberations and decisions would be 
 public. This would mark the end of offensive alliances 
 and ententes which have proved their inability to safe- 
 guard the real and permanent interests of the people. 
 
 2. Nationality Must be Respected. No territory 
 should be transferred from one nation to another against 
 the will of the inhabitants, nor should any readjustments 
 be made which might breed fresh wars. National bound- 
 aries should coincide as far as possible with national sen- 
 timent. No terms of settlement should be regarded as 
 satisfactory if they impose upon any nation such harsh 
 and humiliating terms of peace as would be inconsistent 
 with its independence, self-respect, or well-being. All 
 idea of revenge should, of course, be rooted out. 
 
 3. Limitation of Armaments. Since the policy of 
 huge national armaments has lamentably failed to pre- 
 serve peace, competition in armaments should end. The 
 nations should agree to have no military forces other 
 than those maintained for international police duty. 
 Militarism should be abandoned by all nations, because 
 
 267
 
 they recognize the absolute futility of force as a means 
 of advancing the moral or material well-being of any 
 country. To facilitate the elimination of militarism, 
 the conditions of peace should stipulate that all manu- 
 factories of arms, armaments, and munitions for use in 
 war shall hereafter be national property. No private 
 citizen or corporation should be permitted to engage in 
 such manufacture. 
 
 PROGRAM OF WOMEN'S PEACE PARTY 
 Organized in Washington, January 10, 1915. 
 
 women's 1. The immediate calling of a convention of neutral 
 
 Party. nations in the interest of early peace. 
 
 2. Limitation of armaments, and the nationalization 
 of their manufacture. 
 
 3. Organized opposition to militarism in our own 
 country. 
 
 4. Democratic control of foreign policies. 
 
 5. The further humanizing of governments by the ex- 
 tension of the franchise to women. 
 
 6. "Concert of Nations" to supersede balance of 
 power. 
 
 7. Action toward the gradual organization of the 
 world to substitute law for war. 
 
 8. The substitution of an international police for rival 
 armies and navies. 
 
 9. Removal of the economic causes of war. 
 
 10. The appointment of our Government of a commis- 
 sion of men and women, with an adequate appropriation, 
 to promote international peace. 
 
 268
 
 PROGRAM OP WOMEN'S PEACE PARTY 
 Washington, January, 1916. 
 
 1. That no increased appropriations for war prep- 
 arations be voted during the present session. 
 
 2. That a joint committee be appointed to conduct 
 a thorough investigation with public hearings, and report 
 within the next six months upon the following matters: 
 
 a. The condition of our military and naval de- 
 
 fenses with special reference to the ex- 
 penditures of past appropriations; 
 
 b. The probability of aggressive action by 
 
 other nations against the United States 
 by reason of antagonism with respect to 
 race, trade, national expansion, property 
 holding in foreign lands and other causes 
 of war; 
 
 c. The possibility of lessening by legislative 
 
 or diplomatic action the sources of fric- 
 tion between this country and other na- 
 tions. 
 
 3. That action be taken to secure by our Government 
 the immediate calling of a conference of neutral nations 
 in the interest of a just and early peace. (To that end 
 we endorse the principles embodied in House Joint Reso- 
 lution 38.) 
 
 4. That action be taken to provide for the elimina- 
 tion of all private profit from the manufacture of arma- 
 ments. 
 
 5. That action be taken which shall provide Federal 
 control over unnaturalized residents. 
 
 6. That action be taken to bring about the creation 
 of a joint commission of experts representing Japan, 
 China, and the United States to study the complex and 
 
 269
 
 important question at issue between the Orient and the 
 United States and make recommendations to the various 
 governments involved. 
 
 7. That action be taken to convene the Third Hague 
 Conference at the earliest possible moment and that all 
 voting American delegates shall be civilians who repre- 
 sent various important elements in the country, includ- 
 ing if possible the business, educational and labor in- 
 terests and women, and that the delegates from the 
 United States be instructed to advocate world organiza- 
 tion and a peaceful settlement of all international diffi- 
 culties. 
 
 One change was made in the platform adopted by the 
 party a year ago. Economic pressure, instead of an in- 
 ternational police, was urged as a substitute for rival 
 armies and navies. 
 
 NEW YORK PEACE SOCIETY 
 
 New In the platform of the New York Peace Society appear 
 
 Pece these five "conditions of a permanent peace": 
 
 1. A union of a sufficient number of Powers to guar- 
 antee permanent peace by the maintenance of military 
 force which can be used at need as a police against any 
 Power which threatens hostilities. 
 
 2. A treaty which shall not only arrange the bound- 
 aries of the States and their colonies, but also guarantee 
 the territories so established against attack either from 
 within or without the league. 
 
 3. The removal of enmities, (a) By making peace in 
 a generous spirit at the close of the present war, and 
 before the forces on either side shall have been com- 
 pletely crushed, (b) By respecting racial affiliations in 
 the adjustments of territory made in the treaty of peace. 
 
 4. A renewal of the conferences at The Hague, the 
 
 270
 
 meetings to be held so frequently as to constitute a Stand- 
 ing Committee of the nations for promoting measures of 
 common interest, and for removing in their incipient 
 stages causes of contention. 
 
 5. A treaty agreement to refer all differences within 
 the league for adjudication either to arbitration or to a 
 permanent court. 
 
 "The present war," says the platform in part, " has 
 made it clear that the arming of all nations menaces the 
 peace of all. A common reduction of armaments under 
 an international agreement seems to present itself as 
 the sole condition of tolerable security and welfare of 
 all. Such a consummation would give to humanity its 
 own possible compensation for the unparalleled tragedy 
 of the war." 
 
 SOCIALIST PARTY OP AMERICA 
 
 I. Terms of peace at close of present war must be 
 
 such as to protect the nations from future wars America, 
 and conserve the identity of the smaller nations. 
 
 1. No indemnities. 
 
 2. No transfer of territory, except upon consent and 
 by vote of the people within the territory. 
 
 II. International Federation United States of the 
 
 World. 
 
 1. Court or courts for the settlement of all disputes 
 between nations. 
 
 2. International congress, with legislative and admin- 
 istrative powers over international affairs, and with per- 
 manent committees in place of present secret diplomacy. 
 
 3. International police force. 
 
 III. National disarmament. 
 
 1. National disarmament shall be effected immediately 
 271
 
 upon the adoption of the peace program by a sufficient 
 number of nations, or by nations of sufficient power so 
 that the international police force developed by the 
 terms of the program shall be adequate to insure the pro- 
 tection of the disarmed. 
 
 2. No increase in existing armaments under any cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 3. Pending complete disarmament the abolition of the 
 manufacture of armaments and munitions of war for 
 private profit. 
 
 4. International ownership and control of strategic 
 waterways, such as the Dardanelles, Straits of Gibraltar, 
 and the Suez, Panama and Kiel Canals. 
 
 5. Neutralization of the seas. 
 
 IV. Extension of democracy. 
 
 1. Political democracy. 
 
 (a) The declaration of offensive war to be made 
 only by direct vote of the people. 
 
 (&) Abolition of secret diplomacy and the demo- 
 cratic control of foreign policies. 
 
 (c) Universal suffrage, including woman suf- 
 frage. 
 
 2. Industrial democracy. 
 
 Radical social changes in all countries to eliminate the 
 economic causes of war, such as, 
 
 (a) Federation of the working classes of the 
 
 world in a league of peace. 
 (6) Socialization of the national resources, pub- 
 lic utilities and fundamental equipment 
 of industry of the nations. 
 
 (c) Elimination of all unearned income. 
 
 (d) Immediate and progressive amelioration of 
 
 the conditions of labor. 
 272
 
 V. Immediate action. 
 
 1. Efforts to be made in every nation to secure the of- 
 ficial adoption of the above program, by the governing 
 bodies at the earliest possible date. The adoption of 
 the program (contingent upon its acceptance by a suffi- 
 cient number of the nations to ensure its success) to be 
 immediately announced to the world as a standing offer 
 of federation. 
 
 2. The federation of all tha possible peace forces that 
 can be united in behalf of the above program for active 
 propaganda among all nations. 
 
 3. Efforts through the international and the national 
 organizations of the Socialist party of all nations to 
 secure universal cooperation of all socialist and labor 
 organizations in the above program. 
 
 DAVID STARR JORDAN'S RESOLUTIONS AS TO RATIONAL 
 TERMS OF PEACE 
 
 WHEREAS, The Great War in Europe is working havoc David 
 without parallel among the best racial elements in all Jordan, 
 nations concerned, thereby exhausting the near future 
 and bringing subsequent impoverishment to the race ; 
 
 WHEREAS, An intolerable burden of sorrow and misery 
 is thrown on the women and children of Europe, those 
 who had no part in bringing on the war and no possible 
 interests to be served by it; 
 
 WHEREAS, No possible gain, economic or political (the 
 restoration of Belgium being secured), can compensate 
 any nation for the loss, distress and misery involved in 
 this war and aggravated by each day of its continuance ; 
 
 WHEREAS, No probability appears that military opera- 
 tions in any quarter can of themselves bring the war to 
 its end; 
 
 273 

 
 WHEREAS, A sweeping victory tends to leave an in- 
 creasing legacy of hate, with seeds of future wars; 
 
 RESOLVED, That the rational interests of the civilized 
 world demand that the war be brought to a speedy close ; 
 and 
 
 RESOLVED, That a way to honorable and lasting peace 
 may be possible along the following lines : 
 
 1. Recognition of the fact that no nation can estab- 
 lish rule or dominion over any other civilized nation, 
 large or small, that peace cannot be maintained by the 
 overruling power of any one nation, but rather by inter- 
 national agreements of those nations which reject ag- 
 gressive war. 
 
 2. Guaranteed security to the small States of Europe, 
 with relief of peoples held in unnatural allegiance. 
 
 3. The freedom, under international guarantees, of 
 the High Seas and of the channels of trade, with im- 
 munity of commerce from belligerent attack. 
 
 4. The removal of hampering tariff restrictions. 
 
 5. Compensation to Belgium, as determined by im- 
 partial arbitration. 
 
 6. The neutralization of Constantinople, with ade- 
 quate safeguarding of the rights of Christian and Jew- 
 ish peoples within the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 7. An international conference to secure terms of 
 peace; with reduction of national armament, the estab- 
 lishment of a supreme international tribunal, the main- 
 tenance of an international police force, accompanied by 
 recognition of the stability of International Law. 
 
 May 13, 1915. 
 
 274
 
 SIX LESSONS OF THE WAR 
 
 First. That the various Hague Conventions, sol- 
 emnly entered into in 1899 and in 1907, have been vio- sutler, 
 lated frequently since the outbreak of hostilities, and 
 that, obviously, some greater and more secure sanction 
 for such Conventions must be provided in the future. 
 
 Second. That in not a few instances the rules and 
 usages of international law have been thrown to the 
 winds, to the discredit of the belligerents themselves 
 and to the grave distress, physically and commercially, 
 of neutral powers. 
 
 Of course every one understands that international 
 law is merely a series of conventions without other than 
 moral sanction. If, however, the world has gone back 
 to the point where a nation 's plighted faith is not moral 
 sanction enough, then that fact and its implications 
 ought to be clearly understood and appropriate punitive 
 action provided for. 
 
 Third. That any attempt to submerge nationalities 
 in nations other than their own is certain to result in 
 friction and conflict in the not distant future. Any at- 
 tempt to create new nations, or to enlarge or diminish 
 the area of nations, without having regard to nationality, 
 is simply to organize a future war. 
 
 Fourth. That the transfer of sovereignty over any 
 given district or people without their consent, is certainly 
 an unwise, and probably an unjust, action for any gov- 
 
 275
 
 eminent to take, having regard for the peace and happi- 
 ness of the world. 
 
 Fifth. That the international organizations which 
 had been carried so far in such fields as maritime law, 
 postal service, railway service, and international arbitra- 
 tion, should be taken up anew and pursued more vigor- 
 ously, but upon a sounder and a broader foundation, and 
 made a certain means of protecting the smaller and the 
 weaker nations. 
 
 Sixth. That competitive armaments, instead of be- 
 ing an assurance against war, are a sure cause of war and 
 an equally certain preventive of those policies of social 
 reform and advance that enlightened peoples everywhere 
 are eager to pursue. 
 
 Nicholas Murray Butler, quoted in N. Y. Times, May 
 16, 1915, 
 
 CHAMBER OP COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 of hB com r 1- A. more comprehensive and better-defined sea-law, 
 
 the'u. s. 2 - ^ n international court. 
 
 3. A council of Conciliation. 
 
 4. International conferences for the better establish- 
 ment and progressive amendment of international law. 
 
 5. Power to enforce agreement: The organization of 
 a system of commercial and financial non-intercourse, 
 to be followed by military force if necessary, to be ap- 
 plied to those nations entering into the foregoing ar- 
 rangements and then going to war without first submit- 
 ting their differences to an agreed-upon tribunal. 
 
 276
 
 PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS 
 3. GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 
 
 1. No Province shall be transferred from one Govern- nion of 
 
 Uemo- 
 
 ment to another without the consent by plebiscite or cratic 
 otherwise of the population of such Province. 
 
 2. No Treaty, Arrangement, or Undertaking shall be 
 entered upon in the name of Great Britain without the 
 sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for en- 
 suring democratic control of foreign policy shall be 
 created. 
 
 3. The Foreign Policy of Great Britain shall not be 
 aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintain- 
 ing the Balance of Power; but shall be directed to con- 
 certed action between the Powers, and the setting up of 
 an International Council, whose deliberations and deci- 
 sions shall be public, with such machinery for securing 
 international agreement as shall be the guarantee of an 
 abiding peace. 
 
 4. Great Britain shall propose as part of the Peace set- 
 tlement a plan for the drastic reduction by consent of the 
 armaments of all the belligerent Powers, and to facilitate 
 that policy, shall attempt to secure the general national- 
 ization of the manufacture of armaments, and the con- 
 trol of the export of armaments by one country to an- 
 other. 
 
 
 
 277
 
 Fabian 
 Society. 
 
 FABIAN SOCIETY 
 
 London, July 17, 1915. 
 
 PROPOSED ARTICLES OF SETTLEMENT 
 
 The signatory States, desirous of preventing any fu- 
 ture outbreak of war, improving international relations, 
 arriving by agreement at an authoritative codification 
 of international law and facilitating the development of 
 such joint action as is exemplified by the International 
 Postal Union, hereby agree and consent to the following 
 Articles : 
 
 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPERNATIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
 1. There shall be established as soon as possible within 
 the period of one year from the date hereof (a) an Inter- 
 national High Court for the decision of justiciable is- 
 sues between independent Sovereign States; (6) an 
 International Council with the double function of secur- 
 ing, by common agreement, such international legislation 
 as may be practicable, and of promoting the settlement 
 of non-justiciable issues between independent Sovereign 
 States; and (c) an International Secretariat. 
 
 The Constituent States 
 
 2. The independent Sovereign States to be admitted as 
 Constituent States, and hereinafter so described, shall 
 be: 
 
 (a) The belligerents in the present war; 
 
 (&) The United States of America; 
 
 (c) Such other independent Sovereign States as have 
 been represented at either of the Peace Coferences at 
 The Hague, and as shall apply for admission within six 
 months from the date of these Articles ; and 
 
 278
 
 (d) Such other independent Sovereign States as may 
 hereafter be admitted by the International Council. 
 
 Covenant Against Aggression 
 
 3. It is a fundamental principle of these Articles that 
 the Constituent States severally disclaim all desire or 
 intention of aggression on any other independent Sov- 
 ereign State or States, and that they agree and bind 
 themselves, under all circumstances, and without any 
 evasion or qualification whatever, never to pursue, be- 
 yond the stage of courteous representation, any claim 
 or complaint that any of them may have against any 
 other Constituent State, without first submitting such 
 claim or complaint, either to the International High 
 Court for adjudication and decision, or to the Inter- 
 national Council for examination and report, with a 
 view to arriving at a settlement acceptable to both 
 parties. 
 
 Covenant Against War Except as a Final Resource 
 
 4. The Constituent States expressly bind themselves 
 severally under no circumstances to address to any Con- 
 stituent State an ultimatum, or a threat of military or 
 naval operations in the nature of war, or of any act 
 of aggression; and under no circumstances to declare 
 war, or begin military or naval operations of the nature 
 of war, or violate the territory or attack the ships of 
 another State, otherwise than by way of repelling and 
 defeating a forcible attack actually made by military or 
 naval force, until the matter in dispute has been sub- 
 mitted as aforesaid to the International High Court or 
 to the International Council, and until after the expira- 
 tion of one year from the date of such submission. 
 
 On the other hand, no Constituent State shall, after 
 279
 
 submission of the matter at issue to the International 
 Council and after the expiration of the specified time, 
 be precluded from taking any action, even to the point 
 of going to war, in defense of its own honor or interests, 
 as regards any issues which are not justiciable within 
 the definition laid down by these Articles, and which 
 affect either its independent sovereignty or its terri- 
 torial integrity, or require any change in its internal 
 laws, and with regard to which no settlement acceptable 
 to itself has been arrived at. 
 
 THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL 
 
 5. The International Council shall be a continuously 
 existing deliberative and legislative body composed of 
 representatives of the Constituent States, to be appointed 
 in such manner, for such periods and under such condi- 
 tions as may in each case from time to time be deter- 
 mined by the several States. 
 
 Each of the eight Great Powers viz., Austria-Hun- 
 gary, the British Empire, France, Germany, Italy, Ja- 
 pan, Russia and the United States of America may ap- 
 point five representatives. Each of the other Constitu- 
 ent States may appoint two representatives. 
 
 Different Sittings of the Council 
 
 6. The International Council shall sit either as a 
 Council of all the Constituent States, hereinafter called 
 the Council sitting as a whole, or as the Council of the 
 eight Great Powers, or as the Council of the States other 
 than the eight Great Powers, or as the Council for Amer- 
 ica, or as the Council for Europe, each such sitting be- 
 ing restricted to the representatives of the States thus 
 indicated. 
 
 There shall stand referred to the Council of the eight 
 Great Powers any question arising between any two or 
 
 280
 
 more of such Powers, and also any other question in 
 which any of such Powers formally claims to be con- 
 cerned, and requests to have so referred. 
 
 There shall also stand referred to the Council of the 
 eight Great Powers, for consideration and ratification, 
 or for reference back in order that they may be recon- 
 sidered, the proceedings of the Council for America, the 
 Council for Europe, and the Council of the States other 
 than the eight Great Powers. 
 
 There shall stand referred to the Council for Europe 
 any question arising between two or more independent 
 Sovereign States of Europe, and not directly affecting 
 any independent Sovereign States not represented in 
 that Council, provided that none of the Independent 
 Sovereign States not so represented formally claims to 
 be concerned in such question, and provided that none 
 of the eight Great Powers formally claims to have it re- 
 ferred to the Council of the eight great Powers or to 
 the Council sitting as a whole. 
 
 There shall stand referred to the Council for America 
 any question arising between two or more independent 
 Sovereign States of America, not directly affecting any 
 independent Sovereign State not represented in that 
 Council, provided that none of the independent Sov- 
 ereign States not so represented formally claims to be 
 concerned in such question, and provided that none of 
 the eight Great Powers formally claims to have it re- 
 ferred to the Council of the eight Great Powers or to the 
 Council sitting as a whole. 
 
 There shall stand referred to the Council for the 
 States other than the eight Great Powers any question 
 between two or more of such States, not directly affect- 
 ing any of the eight Great Powers and which none of 
 the eight Great Powers formally claims to have referred 
 to the Council sitting as a whole. 
 
 281
 
 The Council shall sit as a whole for 
 
 (a) General legislation and any question not standing 
 referred to the Council of the eight Great Powers, the 
 Council of the States other than the eight Great Powers, 
 the Council for Europe or the Council for America re- 
 spectively ; 
 
 (6) The appointment and all questions relating to 
 the conditions of office, functions and powers of the Inter- 
 national Secretariat, and of the President and other offi- 
 cers of the International Council ; 
 
 (c) The settlement of Standing Orders, and all ques- 
 tions relating to procedure and verification of powers ; 
 
 (d) The financial affairs of the International Council 
 and International High Court, the allocation of the cost 
 among the Constituent States, and the issue of precepts 
 upon the several Constituent States for the shares due 
 from them; 
 
 (e) The admission of independent Sovereign States 
 as Constituent States; and 
 
 (/) Any proposal to alter any of these Articles, and 
 the making of such an alteration. 
 
 Membership of the Council and Voting 
 
 7. All the Constituent States shall have equal rights 
 to participation in the deliberations of the International 
 Council. Any Constituent State may submit to the 
 International Council sitting as a whole any proposal for 
 any alteration of International Law, or for making an 
 enactment of new law; and also (subject to the pro- 
 visions of these Articles with regard to the submission 
 of justiciable issues to the International High Court) 
 may bring before the Council any question, dispute or 
 difference arising between it and any other Constituent 
 State. 
 
 When the International Council is sitting as the Coun- 
 282
 
 cil of the eight Great Powers or as the Council of the 
 States other than the eight Great Powers each of the 
 States represented therein shall have one vote only. 
 
 When the International Council is sitting as a whole 
 or as the Council for Europe or as the Council for 
 America, the number of votes to be given on behalf of 
 each State shall be as follows : 
 
 As agreed to by the Hague Conference, the relative 
 position of the States works out into the following scale 
 of votes: 
 
 Austria-Hungary, the British Empire, France, 
 Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United 
 
 States of America 20 votes each 
 
 Spain 12 
 
 The Netherlands 9 
 
 Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, 
 
 Sweden, China, Roumania, Turkey 6 
 
 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico 4 
 
 Switzerland, Bulgaria, Persia 3 
 
 Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Serbia, Siam 2 
 
 The other Constitutent States 1 vote 
 
 Legislation Subject to Ratification 
 
 8. It shall be within the competence of the Inter- 
 national Council to codify and declare the International 
 Law existing between the several independent Sovereign 
 States of the world; and any such codifying enactment, 
 when and in so far as ratified by the Constituent States, 
 shall be applied and enforced by the International High 
 Court. 
 
 It shall also be within the competence of the Inter- 
 national Council from time to time, by specific enact- 
 ment, to amend International Law, whether or not this 
 has been codified; and any such enactment when and in 
 so far as ratified by the several Constituent States shall 
 
 283
 
 be applied and enforced by the International High 
 Court. 
 
 Whenever any Constituent State notifies its refusal to 
 ratify as a whole any enactment made by the Interna- 
 tional Council, it shall at the same time notify its rati- 
 fication of such part or parts of such enactment as it 
 will consent to be bound by : and the International Coun- 
 cil shall thereupon reenact the parts so ratified by all 
 the Constituent States, and declare such enactment to 
 have been so ratified, and such enactment shall there- 
 upon be applied and enforced by the International High 
 Court. 
 
 When any enactment of the International Council 
 making any new general rule of law has been ratified 
 wholly or in part by any two or more Constituent 
 States, but not by all the Constituent States, it shall, so 
 far as ratified, be deemed to be binding on the ratifying 
 State or States, but only in respect of the relations of 
 such State or States with any other ratifying State or 
 States ; and it shall be applied and enforced accordingly 
 by the International High Court. 
 
 N on- Justiciable Issues 
 
 9. When any question, difference or dispute arising 
 between two or more Constituent States is not justiciable 
 as defined in these Articles, and is not promptly brought 
 to an amicable settlement, and is of such a character that 
 it might ultimately endanger friendly relations between 
 such States, it shall be the duty of each party to the 
 matter at issue, irrespective of any action taken or not 
 taken by any other party, to submit the question, dif- 
 ference or dispute to the International Council with a 
 view to a satisfactory settlement being arrived at. The 
 Council may itself invite the parties to lay any such 
 question, difference or dispute before the Council, or 
 
 284
 
 the Council may itself take any such matter at issue into 
 its own consideration. 
 
 The Constituent States hereby severally agree and 
 bind themselves under no circumstances to address to 
 any other Constituent State an ultimatum or anything 
 in the nature of a threat of forcible reprisals or naval 
 or military operations, or actually to commence hostil- 
 ities against such State, or to violate its territory, or 
 to attack its ships, otherwise than by way of repelling 
 and defeating a forcible attack actually made by naval 
 or military force, before a matter in dispute, if not of 
 a justiciable character as defined in these Articles, has 
 been submitted to or taken into consideration by the 
 International Council as aforesaid for investigation, 
 modification and report, and during a period of one year 
 from the date of such submission or consideration. 
 
 The International Council may appoint a Permanent 
 Board of Conciliators for dealing with all such ques- 
 tions, differences or disputes as they arise, and may con- 
 stitute the Board either on the nomination of the sev- 
 eral Constituent States or otherwise, in such manner, 
 upon such conditions and for such term or terms as the 
 Council may decide. 
 
 When any question, difference or dispute, not of a 
 justiciable character as defined in these Articles, is sub- 
 mitted to or taken into consideration by the Interna- 
 tional Council as aforesaid, the Council shall, with the 
 least possible delay, take action, either (1) by referring 
 the matter at issue to the Permanent Board of Concilia- 
 tors, or (2) by appointing a Special Committee, whether 
 exclusively of the Council or otherwise, to enquire into 
 the matter and report, or (3) by appointing a Commis- 
 sion of Enquiry to investigate the matter and report, 
 or (4) by itself taking the matter into consideration. 
 
 The Constituent States hereby agree and bind them- 
 285
 
 selves, whether or not they are parties to any such mat- 
 ter at issue, to give all possible facilities to the Inter- 
 national Council, to the Permanent Board of Concili- 
 ators, to any Committee or Commission of Enquiry ap- 
 pointed by either of them, and to any duly accredited 
 officer of any of these bodies, for the successful discharge 
 of their duties. 
 
 When any matter at issue is referred to the Board of 
 Conciliation, or to a Special Committee, or to a Com- 
 mission of Enquiry, such Board, Committee or Commis- 
 sion shall, if at any time during its proceedings it suc- 
 ceeds in bringing about an agreement between the par- 
 ties upon the matter at issue, immediately report such 
 agreement to the International Council; but, if no such 
 agreement be reached, such Board, Committee or Com- 
 mission shall, so soon as it has finished its enquiries, and 
 in any case within six months, make a report to the 
 International Council, stating the facts of the case and 
 making any recommendations for a decision that are 
 deemed expedient. , 
 
 When a report is made to the International Council 
 by any such Board, Committee or Commission that an 
 agreement has been arrived at between the parties, the 
 Council shall embody such agreement, with a recital of 
 its terms, in a resolution of the Council. 
 
 When any other report is made to the Council by any 
 such Board, Committee or Commission, or when the 
 Council itself has taken the matter at issue into consid- 
 eration, the Council shall, after taking all the facts into 
 consideration, and within a period of three months, come 
 to a decision on the subject, and shall embody such de- 
 cision in a resolution of the Council. Such resolution 
 shall, if necessary, be arrived at by voting, and shall be 
 published, together with any report on the subject, in the 
 Official Gazette. 
 
 286
 
 A resolution of the Council embodying a decision set- 
 tling a matter at issue between Constituent States shall 
 be obligatory and binding on all the Constituent States, 
 including all the parties to the matter at issue, if either 
 it is passed unanimously by all the members of the Coun- 
 cil present and voting ; or where the proposed enactment 
 does not affect the independent sovereignty or the ter- 
 ritorial integrity, nor require any change in the internal 
 laws of any State, and where such enactment shall have 
 been assented to by a three-fourths majority of the 
 votes given by the representatives present and voting. 
 
 The International Secretariat 
 
 10. There shall be an International Secretariat, with 
 an office permanently open for business, with such a staff 
 as the International Council may from time to time de- 
 termine. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the International Secretariat to 
 make all necessary communications on behalf of the 
 International Council to States or individuals; to place 
 before the President to bring before the Council any 
 matter of which it should have cognizance; to organize 
 and conduct any enquiries or investigations ordered by 
 the Council; to maintain an accurate record of the pro- 
 ceedings of the Council; to make authentic translations 
 of the resolutions and enactments of the Council, the 
 report of the proceedings, and other documents, and to 
 communicate them officially to all the Constituent States ; 
 and to publish for sale an Official Gazette and such other 
 works as the Council may from time to time direct. 
 
 Subject to any regulations that may be made by the 
 International Council, the International Secretariat shall 
 take charge of and be responsible for (a) the funds be- 
 longing to or in the custody of the International Coun- 
 cil and the International High Court; (6) the collec- 
 
 287
 
 tion of all receipts due to either of them; and (c) the 
 making of all authorized payments. 
 
 THE INTERNATIONAL HIGH COURT 
 
 11. The International High Court shall be a perma- 
 nent judicial tribunal, consisting of fifteen Judges, to 
 be appointed as hereinafter provided. Subject to these 
 Articles it shall, by a majority of Judges sitting and 
 voting, control its own proceedings, determine its ses- 
 sions and place of meeting, settle its own procedure, and 
 appoint its own officers. It may, if thought fit, elect 
 one of its members to be President of the Court for such 
 term and with such functions as it may decide. Its 
 
 members shall receive an annual stipend of , 
 
 whilst if a President is elected he shall receive an addi- 
 tional sum of . The Court shall hear and de- 
 cide with absolute independence the issues brought be- 
 fore it in conformity with these Articles; and shall in 
 each case pronounce, by a majority of votes, a single 
 judgment of the Court as a whole, which shall be ex- 
 pressed in separate reasoned statements by each of the 
 Judges sitting and acting in the case. The sessions of 
 the Court shall be held, if so ordered, notwithstanding 
 the existence of a vacancy or of vacancies among the 
 Judges ; and the proceedings of the Court shall be valid, 
 and the decision of a majority of the Judges sitting and 
 acting shall be of full force, notwithstanding the exist- 
 ence of any vacancy or vacancies or of the absence of any 
 Judge or Judges. 
 
 The Judges of the Court 
 
 12. The Judges of the International High Court shall 
 be appointed for a term of five years by the International 
 Council sitting as a whole, in accordance with the fol- 
 
 288
 
 lowing scheme: Each of the Constituent States shall 
 be formally invited to nominate one candidate, who 
 need not necessarily be a citizen or a resident of the 
 State by which he is nominated. The eight candidates 
 severally nominated by the eight Great Powers shall 
 thereupon be appointed Judges by the International 
 Council sitting as the Council of the eight Great Pow- 
 ers. The remaining seven Judges shall be appointed 
 by the International Council sitting as a whole, after 
 selection by exhaustive ballot from among the candidates 
 nominated by the Constituent States other than the 
 eight Great Powers. On the occurrence of a vacancy 
 among the Judges nominated by the eight Great Pow- 
 ers, the State which had nominated the Judge whose seat 
 has become vacant shall be invited to nominate his suc- 
 cessor, and the candidate so nominated shall thereupon 
 be appointed by the International Council sitting as the 
 Council of the eight Great Powers. On the occurrence 
 of a vacancy among the other Judges, each of the Con- 
 stituent States other than the eight Great Powers shall 
 be invited to nominate a candidate to fill the vacancy; 
 and the International Council sitting as a whole shall, 
 by exhaustive ballot, choose from among the candidates 
 so nominated the person to be appointed. 
 
 A Judge of the International High Court shall not be 
 liable to any legal proceedings in any tribunal in any 
 State, and shall not be subjected to any disciplinary ac- 
 tion by any Government, in respect of anything said 
 or done by him in his capacity as Judge ; and shall not 
 during his term of office be deprived of any part of the 
 emoluments or privileges of his office. A Judge of the 
 International High Court may be removed from office 
 by a resolution of the International Council sitting as 
 a whole, carried by a three-fourths majority. 
 
 289
 
 The Court Open Only to State Governments 
 
 13. The International High Court shall deal only with 
 justiciable questions, as defined in these Articles, at 
 issue between the national Governments of independent 
 Sovereign Sates, and shall not entertain any applica- 
 tion from or on behalf of an individual person, or any 
 group or organization of persons, or any company, or 
 any subordinate administration, or any State not inde- 
 pendent and Sovereign. The International High Court 
 may, if it thinks fit, deal with a suit brought by a Con- 
 stituent State against an independent Sovereign State 
 which is not a Constituent State ; or with a suit between 
 two or more such States. 
 
 Justiciable Issues 
 
 14. The justiciable questions with which the Inter- 
 national High Court shall be competent to deal shall be 
 exclusively those falling within one or other of the fol- 
 lowing classes, viz. : 
 
 (a) Any question of fact which, if established, would 
 be a cause of action within the competence of the Court ; 
 
 (&) Any question as to the interpretation or applica- 
 tion of any international treaty or agreement duly reg- 
 istered as provided in these Articles, or of International 
 Law, or of any enactment of the International Coun- 
 cil; together with any alleged breach or contravention 
 thereof ; 
 
 (c) Any question as to the responsibility or blame at- 
 taching to any independent Sovereign State for any of 
 the acts, negligences or defaults of its national or local 
 Government officers, agents or representatives, occasion- 
 ing loss or damage to a State other than their own, 
 whether to any of the citizens, companies or subordinate 
 administrations of such State, or to its national Gov- 
 
 290
 
 eminent; and as to the reparation to be made, and the 
 compensation to be paid, for such loss or damage ; 
 
 (d) Any question as to the title, by agreement, pre- 
 scription, or occupation, to the sovereignty of any place 
 or district ; 
 
 (e) Any question as to the demarcation of any part of 
 any national boundary; 
 
 (/) Any question as to the reparation to be made, or 
 the amount of compensation to be paid, in cases in which 
 the principle of indemnity has been recognized or ad- 
 mitted by all the parties ; 
 
 (gr) Any question as to the recovery of contract debts 
 claimed from the Government of an independent Sov- 
 ereign State by the Government of another independent 
 Sovereign State, as being due to any of its citizens, com- 
 panies or subordinate administrations, or to itself; 
 
 (ft,) Any question which may be submitted to the 
 Court by express agreement between all the parties to 
 the case. 
 
 The question of whether or not an issue is justiciable 
 within the meaning of these Articles shall be determined 
 solely by the International High Court, which may de- 
 termine such a question whether or not formal objection 
 is taken by any of the litigants. 
 
 If any State, being a party to any action in the Inter- 
 national High Court, objects that any point at issue is 
 not a justiciable question as herein defined, the objec- 
 tion shall be considered by the Court; and the Court 
 shall, whether or not the objecting State enters an ap- 
 pearance, or argues the matter, pronounce upon the 
 objection, and either set it aside or declare it well 
 founded. 
 
 It shall be within the competence of the International 
 High Court, with regard to any justiciable question in 
 respect of which it may be invoked by one or more of the 
 
 291
 
 parties, summarily to enjoin any State, whether or not 
 a party to the case, to refrain from taking any specified 
 positive action or to discontinue any specified positive 
 action already begun, or to cause to be discontinued any 
 specified positive action begun by any person, company 
 or subordinate administration within or belonging to 
 such State, which in the judgment of the Court is de- 
 signed or intended, or may reasonably be expected to 
 change the status quo with regard to the question at issue 
 before the Court, or seriously to injure any of the par- 
 ties to the case. Any such injunction of the Interna- 
 tional High Court shall be binding, and shall be enforce- 
 able, in the same way as a judgment of the Court, in the 
 manner hereinafter described. 
 
 Immediate Publicity for All Treaties, Existing and 
 Future 
 
 15. No treaty or agreement between two or more in- 
 dependent Sovereign States shall be deemed to confer 
 any right to invoke the International High Court, or 
 shall be treated as valid, or be in any way recognized 
 by the International Council or the International High 
 Court, or shall be held to confer any rights, to impose 
 any obligations, or to change the status or legal rights 
 of any person, company, subordinate administration, 
 district or State, unless a duly authenticated copy of 
 such Treaty or Agreement has been deposited by one or 
 all of the States that are parties to it, in the Registry of 
 the International High Court, within twelve months 
 from the date of these Articles, in accordance with any 
 rules that may from time to time be made by the Court 
 for this purpose ; or in the case of a Treaty or Agreement 
 hereafter made, within three months from the date of 
 such Treaty or Agreement. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the officer in charge of the Reg- 
 292
 
 istry immediately after deposit to allow the duly accred- 
 ited representative of any Constituent State to inspect 
 and copy any Treaty or Agreement so deposited; and 
 promptly to communicate a copy to the International 
 Secretariat for publication in the Official Gazette, 
 
 Undertaking to Submit All Justiciable Questions to the 
 International High Court 
 
 16. The Constituent States severally undertake and 
 agree to submit to the International High Court for trial 
 and judgment every question, difference or dispute com- 
 ing within the definition of a justiciable question as laid 
 down by these Articles that may arise between them- 
 selves and any other independent Sovereign State or 
 States; and at all times to abstain, in respect of such 
 questions, from anything in the nature of an ultimatum ; 
 from any threat to take unfriendly or aggressive action 
 of any kind with a view to redressing the alleged griev- 
 ance or punishing the alleged wrongdoing ; and from any 
 violation of the territory of any other State or attack on 
 the ships of such State or other military or naval opera- 
 tions, or other action leading or likely to lead to war. 
 
 Enforcement of the Decrees of the Court 
 
 17. When in any case upon which judgment is given 
 by the International High Court, the Court finds that 
 any of the parties to the case has, by act, negligence, or 
 default, committed any breach of international obliga- 
 tion, whether arising by Treaty or Agreement, or by 
 International Law, or by enactment of the International 
 Council in accordance with these Articles, the Court may 
 simply declare that one or other litigant State is in de- 
 fault, and leave such State voluntarily to make repara- 
 tion; or the Court may, in the alternative, itself direct 
 reparation to be made or compensation to be paid for 
 
 293
 
 such wrong, and may assess damages or compensation, 
 and may, either by way of addition to damages or com- 
 pensation, or as an alternative, impose a pecuniary fine 
 upon the State declared in default, hereinafter called 
 the recalcitrant State ; and may require compliance with 
 its decree within a specified time under penalty of a 
 pecuniary fine, and may prescribe the application of any 
 such damages, compensation, or fine. 
 
 In the event of non-compliance with any decision or 
 decree or injunction of the International High Court, or 
 of non-payment of the damages, compensation, or fine 
 within the time specified for such payment, the Court 
 may decree execution, and may call upon the Constituent 
 States, or upon some or any of them, to put in opera- 
 tion, after duly published notice, for such period and 
 under such conditions as may be arranged, any or all of 
 the following sanctions viz. : 
 
 (a) To lay an embargo on any or all ships within the 
 jurisdiction of such Constituent State or States regis- 
 tered as belonging to the recalcitrant State; 
 
 (6) To prohibit any lending of capital or other 
 moneys to the citizens, companies, or subordinate admin- 
 istrations of the recalcitrant State, or to its national 
 Government ; 
 
 (c) To prohibit the issue or dealing in or quotation 
 on the Stock Exchange or in the press of any new loans, 
 debentures, shares, notes or securities of any kind by 
 any of the citizens, companies or subordinate adminis- 
 trations of the recalcitrant State, or of its national Gov- 
 ernment ; 
 
 (d) To prohibit all postal, telegraphic, telephonic and 
 wireless communication with the recalcitrant State ; 
 
 (e) To prohibit the payment of any debts due to the 
 citizens, companies or subordinate administrations of the 
 recalcitrant State, or to its national Government; and, 
 
 294
 
 if thought fit, to direct that payment of such debts shall 
 be made only to one or other of the Constituent Govern- 
 ments, which shall give a good and legally valid dis- 
 charge for the same, and shall account for the net pro- 
 ceeds thereof to the International High Court; 
 
 (/) To prohibit all imports, or certain specified im- 
 ports, coming from the recalcitrant State, or originating 
 within it; 
 
 (g) To prohibit all exports, or certain specified ex- 
 ports consigned directly to the recalcitrant State, or des- 
 tined for it; 
 
 (h) To prohibit all passenger traffic (other than the 
 exit of foreigners), whether by ship, railway, canal or 
 road, to or from the recalcitrant State ; 
 
 (i) To prohibit the entrance into any port of the Con- 
 stituent States of any of the ships registered as belong- 
 ing to the recalcitrant State, except so far as may be 
 necessary for any of them to seek safety, in which case 
 such ship or ships shall be interned; 
 
 (j) To declare and enforce a decree of complete non- 
 intercourse with the recalcitrant State, including all the 
 above-mentioned measures of partial non-intercourse ; 
 
 (fc) To levy a special export duty on all goods destined 
 for the recalcitrant State, accounting for the net pro- 
 ceeds to the International High Court ; 
 
 (I) To furnish a contingent of war-ships to maintain 
 a combined blockade of one or more of the ports, or of 
 the whole coastline of the recalcitrant State. 
 
 The International High Court shall arrange for all the 
 expenses incurred in putting in force the above sanc- 
 tions, including any compensation for loss thereby in- 
 curred by any citizens, companies, subordinate ad- 
 ministrations or national Governments of any of the 
 Constituent States other than the recalcitrant State, to 
 be raised by a levy on all the Constituent States in such 
 
 295
 
 proportions as may be decided by the International Coun- 
 cil; and for the eventual recovery of the total sum by 
 way of additional penalty from the recalcitrant State. 
 
 When on any decree or decision or injunction of the 
 International High Court execution is ordered, or when 
 any sanction or other measure ordered by the Court is 
 directed to be put in operation against any Constituent 
 State, it shall be an offense against the comity of na- 
 tions for the State against which such decree, decision, 
 injunction or execution has been pronounced or ordered, 
 or against which any sanction or other measure is di- 
 rected to be enforced, to declare war, or to take any naval 
 or military action, or to violate the territory or attack 
 the ships of any other State or to commit any other act 
 of aggression against any or all of the States so acting 
 under the order of the Court; and all the other Con- 
 stituent States shall be bound, and do hereby pledge 
 themselves, to make common cause with the State or 
 States so attacked, and to use naval and military force 
 to protect such State or States, and to enforce the or- 
 ders of the International High Court, by any warlike 
 operations that may for the purpose be deemed neces- 
 sary. 
 
 [See New Statesman, special supplement, July 17, 
 1915, for program, with notes and queries, here omitted.] 
 
 INDEPENDENT LABOR PARTY 
 
 Annual Conference, Norwich, April 5 and 6, 1915. 
 Drafted Resolutions: 
 
 independent This Conference calls upon the workers to guard 
 against allowing elements to enter the peace settlement 
 which would be a pretext and excuse for future devastat- 
 
 296
 
 ing wars ; in order that the peace may be just and lasting, 
 the Conference demands: 
 
 1. That the people concerned shall give consent before 
 there is transfer of territory : 
 
 2. No future treaty, agreement or understanding be 
 entered into without the knowledge of the people and 
 the consent of Parliament, and machinery to be created 
 for the democratic control of foreign policy : 
 
 3. Drastic all-round reduction of armaments, by inter- 
 national agreement, together with the nationalization 
 of the manufacture of armaments, and the national con- 
 trol of the export of armaments, by one country to an- 
 other : 
 
 4. British foreign policy to be directed in future to- 
 ward establishing a federation of the nations, and the set- 
 ting up of an International Council, whose decisions 
 shall be public, together with the establishment of courts 
 for the interpretation and enforcement of treaties and 
 International Law. 
 
 5. This Conference is of opinion that an International 
 Arbitration Court should be established, with power, as 
 an alternative to war, to enforce its decisions by declar- 
 ing a postal, commercial, transport and financial boy- 
 cott against any dissenting nation. 
 
 6. This Conference is of opinion that no war should 
 be declared without the consent of Parliament. 
 
 7. Recognizing that a permanent peace must be based 
 upon mutual confidence and goodwill between the na- 
 tions, which can only be shown effectively by the aban- 
 donment of all material preparations for war, this Con- 
 ference urges the abolition of armaments, the disband- 
 ing of military and naval forces, and the prohibition of 
 the manufacture and import or export of munitions of 
 war. 
 
 297
 
 NATIONAL PEACE COUNCIL: FEDERATION OF BRITISH 
 PEACE SOCIETIES 
 
 National 1. Establishment of an international peace commission 
 
 Council. such as those already established between the United 
 
 States and certain other Powers. 
 
 2. Peace commission to extend its functions to include 
 both those of a commission of inquiry and of a per- 
 manent Hague court of arbitration. 
 
 3. Formation of a permanent Congress of Nations 
 composed of delegates appointed by the Parliaments, 
 to settle important international affairs which might 
 give rise to war; further elaboration by the Congress 
 of the Hague Conventions regulating the conduct and 
 methods of warfare. 
 
 4. No territorial change without consent of the popu- 
 lation involved. 
 
 5. Foreign policies and treaties subject to parliament- 
 ary control. 
 
 6. Armament question to be put before Congress of 
 Nations. 
 
 7. Congress to seek to remove obstacles to freedom of 
 trade. 
 
 WOMEN'S MOVEMENT FOR CONSTRUCTIVE PEACE 
 London 
 
 Object: to organize public union and to bring its pres- 
 sure to bear upon the Governments of the world to the 
 furtherance of the following ends: 
 
 PROPOSITIONS 
 
 1. The reinforcement of the Democracies of the world 
 by the inclusion of the mother-half of the human race 
 into the ranks of articulate citizenship. 
 
 298
 
 2. The creation of some constitutional machinery, 
 where none at present exists, by which the Democracies 
 may exercise some control over foreign policy. 
 
 3. That all treaties and alliances on the part of any 
 Democratic nation shall be ratified by the representatives 
 of the people. 
 
 4. That the manufacture of armaments shall be nation- 
 alized and that the export of ammunition from one coun- 
 try to another shall be vetoed. 
 
 5. That the allies shall be held to their slogan that 
 this is a war to end war. 
 
 6. That at the conclusion of peace no province shall 
 be transferred from one Government to another without 
 the consent of the population concerned; that this con- 
 sent shall be obtained by plebiscite and that women, who 
 have suffered equally with men, shall be included in the 
 plebiscite. 
 
 7. That women as well as men should be sent as rep- 
 resentatives of their nation to the Hague Conference. 
 
 8. That the Democracies shall press for some kind of 
 international agreement by which all the nations shall 
 put themselves at the back of any one lawabiding nation 
 that is aggressively attacked, or of any small country 
 that is menaced by a stronger Power. 
 
 9. That the idea be brought to the front and the pos- 
 sibility discussed of the formation of an European Sen- 
 ate composed of representatives of every European na- 
 tion. That this Senate exist for the discussion of inter- 
 national concerns and in this way a means may be con- 
 structed whereby nations can seek to obtain what is 
 necessary to the development of their national life by 
 bargain and by exchange, instead of by secret treachery 
 or open slaughter and loot. 
 
 299
 
 SUGGESTED ADDENDA 
 
 That the Hague Conference which regulates the rules 
 of war is based upon a pernicious principle in that it 
 treats as natural the existence of war, and only aims to 
 prune off some features regarded as objectionable, in- 
 stead of trying to render war impossible. 
 
 AUSTRALIAN PEACE ALLIANCE 
 
 Australian 1. The establishment of an effective and permanent 
 
 Hance. international arbitration court elected on a democratic 
 
 basis, including women delegates. 
 
 2. The setting up of adequate machinery for ensuring 
 democratic control of foreign policy. 
 
 3. The general reduction of armaments and the na- 
 tionalization of their manufacture. 
 
 4. The organization of the trades unions and workers' 
 associations, with a definite view of ending war. 
 
 5. The termination of the present war at the earliest 
 possible moment, and the following principles to govern 
 the terms of peace: 
 
 ( i.) No Province or Territory in any part of 
 the world shall be transferred from one 
 Government to another without the con- 
 sent by plebiscite of the population of 
 such Province. 
 
 ( 11.) No treaty, arrangement or undertaking 
 shall be entered upon in the name of 
 Great Britain without the sanction of 
 Parliament. Adequate machinery for 
 ensuring democratic control of foreign 
 policy shall be created. 
 
 (in.) The foreign policy of Great Britain shall 
 not be aimed at creating Alliances for 
 300
 
 the purpose of maintaining the "Bal- 
 ance of Power," but shall be directed to 
 the establishment of a concert of Europe 
 and the setting up of an international 
 council, whose deliberations and deci- 
 sions shall be public. 
 
 (iv.) Great Britain shall propose as part of the 
 peace settlement a plan for the drastic 
 reduction of armaments by the consent 
 of all the belligerent Powers, and to fa- 
 cilitate that policy shall attempt to se- 
 cure the general nationalization of the 
 manufacture of armaments and the pro- 
 hibition of the export of armaments by 
 one country to another. 
 
 ( v.) The universal abolition of conscription or 
 compulsory military training. 
 
 MR. CHARLES RODEN BUXTON ON PEACE 
 TERMS 
 
 1. Total evacuation by Germany of Belgium, France, 
 Poland and Baltic provinces, and by Germany and Aus- 
 tria of Serbia. 
 
 2. No indemnity, of course, from Great Britain, but 
 compensation to Belgium by Germany for damage done. 
 
 3. The special demands of France against Germany, of 
 Italy and Serbia against Austria, and of Russia against 
 Turkey to be agreed upon with Great Britain by the 
 States concerned. This country to use its influence to 
 secure that such demands are in harmony with the 
 principle of nationality. 
 
 4. Germany's right to a colonial empire to be recog- 
 nized, though not necessarily to exactly the same terri- 
 tories as those previously possessed. 
 
 301
 
 POINTS FOB A CONFERENCE 
 
 The following points might be referred to a conference 
 representing neutral and belligerent States: 
 
 a. The repartition of Africa, with a view to more con- 
 venient frontiers and to the interests of the native popu- 
 lation. 
 
 6. The question of equal economic opportunities, in- 
 cluding the open door, in all colonial possessions. 
 
 c. The discussion and definition of immunity from 
 capture of goods other than contraband and the modifi- 
 cation of commercial blockade, whether by submarine 
 warfare or otherwise. 
 
 d. As a condition of the preceding point the question 
 of equal, comprehensive, and effective guarantees against 
 future war on land as well as on sea; binding Germany 
 as well as other nations, including ourselves. 
 
 BRAILSFORD ON A PEACE BY 
 SATISFACTION 
 
 BrauL'. A peace in which neither side could dicate the settle- 
 
 ford, ment might aim either at general frustration or general 
 
 satisfaction. A sullen peace, in which each side used up 
 the remnants of its military strength to veto the claims 
 of the adversary, would be of all peaces the worst, for 
 it would leave standing all the old causes of unrest. This 
 war came about because Europe had evolved in peace no 
 machinery by which demands for large and necessary 
 changes could be met without war. Each people post- 
 poned its larger ambitions until war should come, and 
 the knowledge of each that only war offered a chance 
 of satisfaction made our universal strife. The claims of 
 
 302
 
 the Entente Powers for certain satisfactions for the prin- 
 ciple of nationality, are to us familiar and sympathetic. 
 It must be realized that the German demand for eco- 
 nomic expansion is deeply rooted, and in the modern 
 world inevitable. For Manchuria, Morocco, Egypt and 
 Tripoli, the Entente Powers made, or were ready to 
 make war. The German craving for "a place in the 
 sun" may be condemned by those of us who have op- 
 posed Imperialism at home, but the ruling classes can- 
 not consistently censure it. For twenty years past, the 
 unsolved problem for European statecraft was to find 
 an outlet for these tremendous German energies, to cut 
 a canal in which the broad river could flow without 
 floods. The peace of Europe will never be secure until 
 this passion for Imperial work overseas, which is to-day 
 the strongest ambition in Germany, finds its useful satis- 
 faction. The forges are there. If they cannot make 
 rails, they will make cannon. 
 
 The formula of an enduring peace must be to remove 
 all the causes of strife in Europe, and we shall succeed 
 only if we can satisfy the enemy 's legitimate claims while 
 we secure justice for our friends. The general idea must 
 be, win from him the largest recognition of the idea of 
 nationality, while conceding to him the economic oppor- 
 tunities which he requires. The more, by the ordinary 
 working of barter that we concede, the more shall we ob- 
 tain. Let us attempt to sketch what the main lines of 
 such an exchange might be. 
 
 (A) ACTS OF RESTORATION 
 
 1. Belgium must be restored, Serbia re-instated, and 
 
 French territory evacuated. 
 2. The German colonies must either be restored, or 
 
 equivalent territories provided. 
 303
 
 (B) CLAIMS OP NATIONALITY 
 
 3. The ideal solution for Poland, in a political sense, 
 would be independence. But could a land-locked 
 State, between three great military empires, ever 
 be secure? The Poles, themselves, are not averse 
 to the idea of their re-union as a State within the 
 Austrian Empire. If they had the same status as 
 Hungary, they would be internally independent. 
 But if Europe consented to allow this accession of 
 territory to Austria, conditions might be laic 
 down. It might be stipulated that a like status 
 should be given to Bohemia, and to the Serbo-Croats 
 of Croatia, Bosnia and Dalmatia. Thus Austria 
 would become a quintuple Federal Empire (Aus- 
 tria, Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, Jugoslavia), and 
 one of the main problems of the war, the libera- 
 tion of the Western Slavs, would be satisfactorily 
 solved. 
 
 In return for this extension of territory Austrit 
 might be required to cede the Eastern (Ruthenian) 
 part of Galicia to Russia, and the Trentino to Italy. 
 
 4. The chief difficulty lies in Alsace-Lorraine. Let us 
 make the bold claim that it must be restored to 
 France (or such parts of it as desire this change). 
 What can we offer as a quid pro quo? The follow- 
 ing economic concessions suggest themselves (5, 6, 
 and?). 
 
 (C) ECONOMIC CLAIMS 
 
 5. That Germany be allowed to complete that closer 
 economic union with her Allies, and especially Aus- 
 tria, which seems to be her chief objective. We 
 cannot prevent the creation of "Mid-Europe" as an 
 economic unity, but we might reply to it by a boy- 
 304
 
 cott. An amiable regulation of tariff questions is a 
 necessity for peace. 
 
 6. We might further agree not to oppose such eco- 
 nomic expansion (railway and irrigation schemes) 
 in Turkey as Germany can arrange. Turkey would 
 become a German economic sphere, but there must 
 be guarantees for the fair treatment of the trade 
 in goods of other Powers. 
 
 7. A general measure by which all Powers renounced 
 differential tariffs in their tropical colonies would 
 ease the struggle for territory. France would be 
 reluctant to agree to this, but the condition is that 
 she secures Alsace. 
 
 (D) OTHER ISSUES 
 
 8. The greater part of Macedonia, in accordance with 
 the principle of nationality, must go to Bulgaria. 
 
 9. Russia might acquire the Armenian provinces of 
 Turkey. It lies with us to accord her an ice-free 
 port on the Persian Gulf. A Russian protectorate 
 over Persia might in the end be less fatal to Per- 
 sian nationalism than the present partition and con- 
 dominium. 
 
 10. Finally, the whole bargain must rest upon Ger- 
 many's assent to some scheme of permanent con- 
 ciliation and the reduction of armaments, and upon 
 our consent to consider a revision of certain usages 
 of sea-warfare. 
 
 H. N. Brailsford. 
 
 305
 
 PEACE PROPOSALS AND PEOGEAMS 
 
 4. GERMANY 
 
 GERMAN AND AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SOCIALISTS 
 Vienna, April 12-13, 1915. 
 
 fste ia df 1- Development of the international arbitration courts. 
 
 Powers ^' Recognition of the right of every people to deter- 
 
 mine its own destiny. 
 
 3. All treaties to be under democratic parliamentary 
 control. 
 
 4. International agreement to limit armament with 
 general disarmament as the ultimate goal. 
 
 BUND NEUES VATERLAND 
 
 Bund 1. Development of international organization, 
 
 vateriand. 2. Further development of international law by future 
 
 Hague conferences. 
 
 3. No annexation. 
 
 4. No secret treaties. 
 
 5. Open door. Freedom of the seas. 
 
 MANIFESTO OF THE DEUTSCHE FRIEDENSGESELLSCHAFT ' 
 
 German Notwithstanding the prohibition of the Government, 
 
 Society. demands for annexation are being more or less publicly 
 
 advocated. Six large agricultural associations go espe- 
 cially far in these ideas; indeed for one petition signa- 
 
 306
 
 tures are collected among those who because of "their 
 rank and education consider themselves the spiritual 
 leaders of public opinion." This movement has evi- 
 dently the support of important circles. The worst of 
 this is that those demands are known to the neutrals and 
 to hostile countries, who make them the foundation of 
 their accusations of German desires of conquest. Be- 
 sides they kindle ill-feeling against Germany, as the 
 Government and the whole German nation are held re- 
 sponsible for all this. 
 
 There is no doubt that the Imperial Government is 
 unjustly accused in this respect, whatever may be her 
 attitude towards other questions. Should such ten- 
 dencies be publicly criticized, then the world would soon 
 see that the greater part of the German nation is strongly 
 opposed to them. 
 
 The prohibition to discuss the aims of the war, which is 
 strictly maintained with respect to ourselves, prevents us 
 from criticizing this question thoroughly; and from or- 
 ganizing our opposition to such tendencies. 
 
 So far we have gladly obeyed the order not to discuss 
 these questions. After our experience, however, of the 
 way in which this prohibition and the above-mentioned 
 agitation are exploited abroad to the detriment of Ger- 
 man interests, we think it our duty to appeal to the 
 Government to grant "free speech to a free nation." 
 
 Until this has been granted, the German Peace Asso- 
 ciation can do no more than utter a general protest 
 against the danger of such annexation ideas. When 
 such ideas are considered the aim of war, the war will be 
 prolonged indefinitely, for months, perhaps for years. 
 Their realization would not strengthen, but weaken Ger- 
 many, abroad as well as at home, in peace and in future 
 wars. A new war would be inevitable shortly after such 
 a peace. 
 
 307
 
 The German Peace Association and all friends of the 
 people desire that the military supremacy of the Central 
 Powers, which we hope will decide the peace, shall be 
 turned towards the consolidation of Germany's position 
 in the world, towards the development of the economical 
 and national forces of the German nation. But they 
 hope also, that the coming peace may contain the ele- 
 ments of a durable peace and lay the foundation for a 
 lasting community of justice and culture between the 
 nations, which must be restored after the peace, howso- 
 ever bitter their hostility may be at present. The asso- 
 ciation is convinced that a sensible consideration of the 
 vital interests of the German nation will prevail over 
 empty phrases and private interests, when the conditions 
 of peace shall be drawn up. 
 
 L. QUIDDE, 
 0. UMFRID, 
 
 Stuttgart. 
 
 MANIFESTO BY 88 GERMAN PROFESSORS AND STATESMEN 
 
 Mani- Germany has not entered upon this war with the idea 
 
 Professors of conquering foreign territory, but in order to defend 
 state*- her existence, her internal unity, and her culture, which 
 
 were threatened by a hostile coalition. 
 
 When peace shall be discussed, those objects alone 
 should be Germany's care. Some petitions laid before 
 Your Excellency go against them : so we consider it our 
 duty energetically to resist such endeavors and to 
 declare publicly that we think their realization a polit- 
 ical error, which may produce dangerous consequences, 
 and not a strengthening but an ominous weakening of 
 the German Empire. 
 
 Practically we lay down the principle that annexation 
 or conquest of nations, which so far have been politi- 
 
 308
 
 catty independent, is not advisable. The German Em- 
 pire is the result of the idea of national unity, of na- 
 tional kinship. Foreign elements have been amalga- 
 mated only slowly and incompletely; so we object to 
 events, persons or tendencies which may be easily influ- 
 enced one way or another, disturbing the leading prin- 
 ciples of the creation of our Empire, and destroying the 
 character of our national State. 
 
 Of course we cannot allow a territory which we should 
 evacuate according to our conditions of the peace to be- 
 come a stronghold for our enemies, we cannot allow the 
 adversaries of Germany to settle there. There should 
 not be any possibility of the hostile feelings of the in- 
 habitants revealing themselves in hostile actions, which 
 might threaten the peace and security of our border- 
 provinces. Such dangers can be averted and we trust 
 that suitable and effective measures will be chosen and 
 applied to accomplish this. But those measures should 
 not after all lead to annexation in any form. 
 
 With our whole nation we share the conviction that 
 this war will end in a complete victory of Germany. 
 All those heroic deeds, those endless sacrifices and labors, 
 all this military glory and all the sorrow borne in mute 
 heroism, entitle Germany to a price of victory corre- 
 sponding as far as that is possible to what she has sac- 
 rificed. 
 
 The highest price will be the proudly acquired knowl- 
 edge that Germany need not fear a world full of ene- 
 mies, and the unprecedented! display of strength she 
 has shown before all the nations of the earth and the 
 generations yet to come. 
 
 The German nation can only conclude a peace which 
 assures the foundations of the strategical wants, of the 
 political and economic interests of the country and the 
 unimpeded development of its strength and its energy 
 
 309
 
 at home and on the free seas. We trust that with the 
 help of the bodies indicated by the Constitution Your 
 Excellency may succeed in obtaining such a peace reso- 
 lutely, while we are in the zenith of our military suc- 
 cesses. 
 
 PROPOSALS OF SOUTH GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 
 
 South 1 a. Restitution of status quo ante, or 
 
 social 1 b. Plebiscite in disputed territories (Alsace-Lor- 
 
 crttsT raine, Schleswig, Poland, Baltic Provinces, Finland, 
 
 Trentino). International possession of Bosphorus, Dar- 
 danelles, Suez Canal, Gibraltar, and Kiel Canal. 
 
 2. No indemnifications. 
 
 3. Confederacy of all European States. 
 
 4. Limitations of armies and navies. People's army 
 for defense only. 
 
 5. Alliance of all against aggression. 
 
 6. International Parliaments and permanent interna- 
 tional committees in place of diplomacy. 
 
 7. International police. International law-courts for 
 minor international offenses. 
 
 8. Guarantees of democratic government: equality of 
 electoral district, ten-year redistribution, proportional 
 representation, payment of members. 
 
 PEACE AIMS OF GERMAN SOCIALISTS: CONFERENCE OF 
 PARTY'S MEMBERS IN REICHSTAG WITH MEMBERS OF 
 PARTY COMMITTEE. 
 
 (Reported in New York Times, August 26, 1915.) 
 
 socialist j Peace must be a permanent one, leading the nations 
 
 Commit- to closer relations. 
 
 M 
 
 2. Germany's opponents must not be permitted to ac- 
 quire any German territory. 
 
 310
 
 3. "Most favored nation" clauses should be intro- 
 duced into peace terms with all belligerents. 
 
 4. Tariff walls should be removed. 
 
 5. So far as possible, freedom of the seas should be 
 established, the right of capture abolished, and the 
 straits, important for the world's commerce, should be 
 internationalized. 
 
 6. Austria and Turkey should not be weakened. 
 
 7. Annexations of foreign territories violate the rights 
 of peoples to self-rule, and weaken internal strength and 
 harmony in the German nation. Therefore, all plans 
 of short-sighted politicians favoring conquest are op- 
 posed. 
 
 8. Finally, the party demands the establishment of 
 an international court to which all future conflicts of 
 nations shall be submitted. 
 
 THE GERMAN SOCIALISTS' PEACE MANIFESTO 
 
 The manifesto was published June 26, 1915, in the 
 form of a full page advertisement in the Berlin Vor- 
 waerts. The paper was promptly suspended but not 
 until its message had crossed the German frontier. 
 The New York Times publishes a translation in full as 
 follows : 
 
 "For nearly a year the world has been devastated by 
 the fury of war. Hundreds of thousands of human lives 
 have been cut off in their prime, works of incalculable 
 value to civilization have been destroyed, and there has 
 been an appalling weakening of human forces. Millions 
 of mothers, wives, and children are weeping for their 
 lost sons, husbands and fathers. Want and harship 
 heighten the misery now oppressing the nations. Must 
 this terrible drama, which has no precedent in the his- 
 tory of the world, go on indefinitely ? 
 
 311
 
 "The Socialist Party foresaw this world catastrophe 
 and predicted it. It has consistently fought, therefore, 
 against the policies of imperial expansion and against 
 the fatal competition in armaments, which in the last in- 
 stance is the cause of this war. It has worked unceas- 
 ingly for a good understanding among the nations, for 
 the cause of our common civilization, and for the welfare 
 of mankind. When last year threatening war clouds 
 were gathering on the horizon the German Socialists 
 up to the very last moment bent all their energies to pre- 
 serving peace. But, to the misfortune of mankind, they 
 were unable to avert the catastrophe. 
 
 "Then when the Czar's Cossacks came across the bor- 
 der, pillaging and burning, the Socialists made good the 
 promise that had been given by their leaders they put 
 themselves at the service of the Fatherland and voted the 
 means for its defense. They not only did their duty in 
 defending Germany's national independence, but they 
 worked with all their might to safeguard its internal in- 
 terests in the matter of food supplies, in relieving the 
 needy, and in protecting the working classes against 
 avaricious tradesmen and narrow-minded bureaucrats. 
 
 "Faithfully observing the obligations which all So- 
 cialist parties are bound to respect, the German Socialist 
 Party, from the very first days of this awful tragedy, 
 has striven to further the cause of a speedy peace. 
 When the first war loan was voted, in August, 1914, the 
 Socialist group in the Reichstag, through its spokesman, 
 Herr Haase, said: 'We demand that as soon as guar- 
 antees of national safety are secured and the enemy 
 shows an inclination to make peace, the war be brought 
 to an end on conditions admitting of friendly relations 
 with neighboring nations.' 
 
 "This demand, which was accompanied by an expres- 
 sion disapproving any policy of conquest, was repeated 
 
 312
 
 when the new war loan was voted on December 2. On 
 May 29, after Italy had intervened, the statement was 
 made in the Reichstag in behalf of the Socialist Party 
 that the desire for peace was increasing and that the So- 
 cialists wanted no policy of conquest. At a meeting in 
 Vienna on April 12 and 13 representatives of the Ger- 
 man and Austro-Hungarian Socialist Parties again 
 adopted a resolution in favor of peace. But the German 
 Socialists have not been content with such measures. In 
 spite of opposition and suspicion, they have striven for a 
 renewal of international relations with the Social-Dem- 
 ocrats of all countries, and when the executive committee 
 of the international Socialist organization made a pro- 
 posal to hold a meeting at The Hague to discuss the pos- 
 sibility of peace negotiations, the German Socialist lead- 
 ers agreed, under condition that the French Socialist 
 Party participate. All efforts at an international agree- 
 ment, however, were thwarted by the attitude of the 
 French Socialists. 
 
 "We recognize with satisfaction that in England, as 
 well as in France, there are Socialists who are working 
 for peace. That cannot blind us to the deplorable fact 
 that the majority of the Socialists, both in England and 
 France, favor continuing the war until Germany is com- 
 pletely conquered. 
 
 "The Socialists in the Reichstag and the official lead- 
 ers of the Socialist Party have constantly and unitedly 
 fought against a policy of conquests and annexation. 
 We protest again with all possible emphasis against all 
 efforts looking to the annexation of foreign territory 
 and the oppression of other peoples measures now de- 
 manded by the great business organizations and influ- 
 ential political leaders. The mere fact that such efforts 
 are being made tends to postpone the day of peace, which 
 the whole public is now so earnestly awaiting. 
 
 313
 
 "The people want no conquest of land, they want 
 peace. If the war is not to go on indefinitely until all 
 the nations are completely exhausted, some one of the 
 Powers involved must stretch out the hand of peace. 
 Upon Germany, which has successfully defended itself 
 against superior forces, and which has frustrated the 
 plan to bring it to starvation, rests the duty of taking 
 the first steps toward peace. In the name of humanity 
 and civilization, and recognizing the favorable military 
 position which our brave troops have won, we urge the 
 Government to try to end the struggle. We expect of 
 our fellow Socialists in other belligerent countries that 
 they will make the same demand upon their own gov- 
 ernments. ' ' 
 
 GERMAN PROPOSALS FOR PEACE 
 
 Letter of Dr. Bernhard Dernburg to American News- 
 papers, April 18, 1915. 
 
 Dr. 1. The peace must be of a permanent nature. 
 
 Dernburg. g. The world is one interlocking family of nations. 
 
 World dominion is possible only with dominion on high 
 seas. All the seas and narrows must be neutralized 
 permanently by common and effective agreement guar- 
 anteed by all the Powers. 
 
 3. The free sea is useless without free cables. Cables 
 must be jointly owned by the interested nations, with a 
 world mail-system. Customs duties must be equal foi 
 all exports and imports, for whatever destination am 
 from whatever source. Preferential tariffs with col- 
 onies are the basis of world-empire, and must not be 
 permitted. 
 
 4. International law should be codified, with guaran- 
 tees to save all neutrals from implication in wars in 
 which they do not wish to take part. 
 
 314
 
 5. A natural commercial relationship between Ger- 
 many and Belgium must be established in workable form. 
 
 6. Germany should be permitted industrial expansion 
 in such foreign parts as need or wish for development. 
 
 Dr. Dernburg's Speech at City Club, Cleveland, 
 May 8, 1915. 
 
 1. Asks recognition of the truth that strong nations 
 showing great vitality and large increase are entitled 
 to enough soil, air and water to maintain and advance 
 their growing population. The lack of such proper ad- 
 justment of the conditions of the European Powers dur- 
 ing the last fifty years has been one of the primary 
 causes for unrest in Europe, and one of the principal 
 dangers to the peace of the world. 
 
 2. Since no readjustment of the kind can take place in 
 Europe on national lines, it is necessary to seek the solu- 
 tion, first, by the apportioning of all uncivilized parts 
 of the globe, that is, by a readjustment of colonial pos- 
 sessions, then by the creation of spheres of influence and 
 non-interference with nations who are willing to take 
 and to concede such spheres; further, by an open door 
 and equal opportunity policy all over the globe; and 
 finally, by the neutralization of all the seas and narrows, 
 cables and overseas mails of the world. This readjust- 
 ment must be sanctioned by a simple and codified in- 
 ternational law, safeguarded so that it cannot be broken 
 without putting the infractor outside the pale of inter- 
 national relationships, not only with the party attacked, 
 but also with all the parties remaining neutral. Eng- 
 land must give up her rule of the seas, which must be 
 placed definitely in the hands of all the Powers of the 
 world. World trade must be free and all colonies neu- 
 tralized. The decision whether there is to be a free and 
 
 315
 
 neutralized sea or a Chinese wall will also be decisive 
 regarding the fate of Belgium. If the sea remains forti- 
 fied, there can be no choice for Germany except to have 
 her own sea fortresses as well, and since the only way of 
 getting out into the high sea would be by way of Bel- 
 gium, there would be no possibility of Germany's con- 
 sidering the return of Belgium to its former status. 
 
 PROF. DR. L. QUIDDE ON REAL GUARANTEES 
 FOR A DURABLE PEACE 
 
 Prof. I. The annexation of Belgium would prolong the 
 
 indefinitely. 
 
 II. The strength of the German Empire ivould de- 
 crease instead of increase by the annexation of Bel- 
 gium, in times of peace as well as during the war. 
 
 The annexation of Belgium would destroy every out- 
 look of a better understanding between Germany and her 
 present enemies, after the war. It ivould make almost 
 the whole rest of the world remain our enemies and 
 would call forth a coalition of all against one. Germany 
 need not foster illusions in this respect, if she only con- 
 siders the effect of the invasion into Belgium upon public 
 opinion throughout the world, especially in those neu- 
 tral countries who were originally Germany's friends. 
 
 He who wishes to annex Belgium must have the cour- 
 age to face the fact that annexation will make the whole 
 world our enemy for an indefinite space of time and 
 will completely isolate Germany politically, so far as 
 the feelings of the nations are to bring about such isola- 
 tion. 
 
 III. The annexation of Belgium is bound to bring 
 about a new war. 
 
 It is evident that neither England nor France can 
 allow Belgium to be annexed by Germany as long as 
 
 316
 
 they do not wish to be annihilated themselves. Espe- 
 cially England would have to prepare retaliation with 
 all the force that she can display, and it would be easy 
 enough for her to find allies to support her. One may 
 differ vastly on the subject of annexation, its advan- 
 tages and drawbacks, but one cannot deny that durable 
 peace and annexation of Belgium are two things abso- 
 lutely incompatible. 
 
 Finally Prof. Quidde asks how it will be possible 
 to make a durable peace which at the same time guar- 
 antees the welfare of Germany. This will be first of 
 all a general removal of the causes that have led to the 
 war, followed by a thorough reorganization of Europe 
 on lines offering a better security for peace. 
 
 The first essentials for that reorganization are the 
 "open-door" and the "free sea," which will have to be 
 guaranteed by international treaties. 
 
 One of the best grounded charges against Interna- 
 tional Law is, that International Law is in many cases 
 so hopelessly rudimentary that the lack of precision 
 forms a temptation to violate it. It is necessary that 
 a strong agitation for the development, perfection and 
 sanction of International Law should result from the 
 experiences, the causes and the course of this war. 
 
 ED. BERNSTEIN ON PEACE TERMS 
 i 
 
 It is the vital interest of the majority of the German |^ n . 
 nation, that the present war should end by a peace treaty 8tein - 
 which, as to the rights and the relations of the nations, is 
 in conformity with the principles laid down in the pro- 
 gram of the German Social-Democrat Party and in the 
 resolutions adopted by their party-meetings and by the 
 International Social-Democratic Congresses. 
 
 317
 
 Only a peace based on these principles will result in 
 renewing the friendly relations between Germany and 
 the nations she is now at war with, as soon and as thor- 
 oughly as possible. 
 
 ii 
 
 The supreme principle, insisted upon in the program 
 and the resolutions of the Social-Democratic Party is the 
 right of peoples to decide their own fate, within the lim- 
 its of international law. 
 
 The German Socialists consider it their duty to defend 
 this principle by all available means against any attack 
 from any side whatsoever. No nation or part of a na- 
 tion having so far enjoyed national independence, may 
 be deprived of this right or see it impaired ; no territory 
 may be annexed, when the annexation would deprive 
 the inhabitants of that right. 
 
 The Social-Democratic Party do not admit the right 
 of conquest of one nation over any other. 
 
 ra 
 
 In the case of countries of European civilization, 
 which have lived under foreign rule, no territorial 
 changes shall take place without a referendum being 
 taken of the inhabitants. This referendum should be 
 arranged and supervised by representatives of neutral 
 States, so as to insure perfect freedom in voting. Any 
 inhabitant, who is of age and has lived in the country 
 for at least a year before the outbreak of the war, shall 
 have the right to vote. 
 
 In the interests of peace, all peoples of European civil- 
 ization living under foreign rule in sufficient numbers 
 to form a community in the international Concert, shall 
 obtain political independence. 
 
 When a sufficient number out of subject peoples in- 
 318
 
 corporated by force in one State, desire to belong to an- 
 other, they shall be given the right to decide by vote as 
 to which State they will belong. 
 
 rv 
 
 Transfer of territory outside of Europe shall only take 
 place under such conditions, as guarantee that the legal 
 and material conditions of such native population shall 
 not be injured. 
 
 v 
 
 Nations can only be safeguarded against a renewal of 
 war or wars of retaliation by developing and strengthen- 
 ing international law. 
 
 In this respect the following means should be empha- 
 sized : 
 
 a. Development of the Hague Conference into a Per- 
 manent International Conference for the Codification 
 of International Law and for International Arbitration. 
 Concentration of the various Hague institutions into a 
 permanent international court, suitably divided into 
 branch courts. 
 
 6. All States to bring those differences they cannot 
 themselves peaceably solve, before the Court of Justice 
 to be instituted by the Hague Conference, where they 
 will be settled either by mutual agreement, conciliation 
 or abitration. 
 
 c. All signatory States to refrain from war or war- 
 like measures till the Court of Justice has examined the 
 cause of war and till all attempts to settle the difference 
 in a peaceful manner, have proved useless. Any State 
 or Union resorting to hostilities contrary to these rules 
 to be treated as an enemy by all the others. 
 
 d. The Parliaments to decide about war and peace. 
 Secret treaties to be abolished. 
 
 319
 
 e. Development of International Law relating to the 
 conduct of war and the protection of the civil popula- 
 tion. Abolition of the right of capture at sea and of 
 the right to levy war-contributions. No hostages to be 
 taken. Abolition of the system of reprisals against in- 
 habitants of an invaded country for acts of self-defense 
 or defense of other non-combatants. Permanent com- 
 mittees to watch the actions of belligerents in occupied 
 territories and the treatment of prisoners of war and of 
 civil prisoners interned in the enemy's country. 
 
 /. Internationalization of transcontinental railways 
 and of all waterways connecting seas or lakes sur- 
 rounded by different countries, with the ocean. 
 
 g. Adoption of the principle of the Open Door for 
 all Colonies, Protectorates and for every territory which 
 lies in the sphere of influence of an European State. 
 
 h. These principles to be inserted into the constitu- 
 tions of the Powers. 
 
 BELGIUM 
 
 Whereas, Art. 2 already excludes any forcible annex- 
 ation of Belgian territory or any attack on the inde- 
 pendence of Belgium by another State, Germany has 
 moreover invaded Belgium, overpowered its army and 
 occupied its territory without any provocation from 
 the side of Belgium and as the Chancellor has himself 
 admitted violating the neutrality of Belgium in defi- 
 ance of the law of nations. Germany having thus made 
 her way into Belgium to satisfy her own designs, beat 
 down the resistance of the army and occupied the coun- 
 try by force, Germany is therefore bound in honor to 
 evacuate Belgium immediately on the conclusion of 
 peace, in accordance with the solemn delaration, made 
 on August 4, 1914, by the German Ambassador, Prince 
 
 320
 
 Lichnowsky, to the English Secretary of State, Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey, and to pay a full and ample indemnity to 
 
 he people of Belgium for the material and moral in- 
 
 ury which they have suffered. 
 
 321
 
 C. G. T. 
 
 PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS 
 5. FRANCE 
 
 FRENCH GENERAL, CONFEDERATION OF LABOR 
 
 1. Federation of nations. 
 
 2. Compulsory arbitration of international disputes. 
 
 3. Independence of nationalities. Bight of all peo- 
 ples to dispose of themselves to be safeguarded. 
 
 4. Suppression of secret diplomacy. 
 
 5. End of competitive armament. 
 
 6. Conference of organized labor forces of the work 
 at same time as conference of diplomats. 
 
 322
 
 PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS 
 6. SWITZERLAND 
 
 RESOLUTIONS OF Swiss PEACE SOCIETY 
 At Annual Meeting, May 17, 1915. 
 
 1. The avoidance of any annexation or territorial 
 changes which are in opposition to the interests and Socie *y- 
 wishes of a population ; a guarantee of religious liberty, 
 
 free speech and equality before the law, for the minority. 
 
 2. The creation of a permanent organization in which 
 all European States shall be equally represented, for the 
 purpose of safeguarding the order, peace and safety of 
 our portion of the earth. 
 
 3. The development of an international law organiza- 
 tion by continual Hague Conferences. 
 
 Swiss COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF 
 A DURABLE TREATY OF PEACE 
 
 President: Prof. Otto Nippold, Bern. 
 
 1. Participation of neutral nations in the settlement, commit- 
 
 2. Prohibition of secret treaties and agreements be- s t e ud f y r 
 tween nations. of Peace - 
 
 3. Participation of popular representative bodies in 
 control of foreign policy. 
 
 4. No annexation except after plebiscite of popula- 
 tions concerned. 
 
 5. Limitation of armaments to point of mere protec- 
 :ion. 
 
 323
 
 6. Manufacture of armaments to become State mo- 
 nopoly. 
 
 7. The States which participate in the settlement are 
 to mutually guarantee each other's territories. 
 
 8. Since the best guarantee for the preservation of 
 world peace lies in the creation of international law and 
 custom, arbitration must be substituted for war. 
 
 9. Disputed regions of the earth should be neutralized. 
 
 10. Free trade in all colonies. 
 
 324
 
 PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS 
 7. HOLLAND 
 
 NEDERLANDSCHE ANTI-OORLOG EAAD 
 
 The Hague 
 Founded on the 8th of October, 1914 
 
 The Council is of opinion that the following principles Dutch 
 are indispensable to attain a lasting peace: war" 
 
 1. Concert of the Powers instead of mutually opposed CounciL 
 Alliances ; 
 
 2. Limitation of armaments by international regula- 
 tions; 
 
 3. Influence of the different Parliaments on the peace- 
 treaty ; 
 
 4. Avoidance of the dangers engendered by annexa- 
 tion or by transfer of territory against the will of the 
 population ; 
 
 5. Removal of the obstructions to commerce or at least 
 of difference in treatment of the various nations in 
 colonies and settlements, according to international reg- 
 ulations. 
 
 6. New endeavors to promote compulsory arbitration 
 and compulsory inquiry of international differences. 
 
 
 325
 
 One vrould prefer to think otherwise, but the truth probably 
 is that the future peace of the world, and the nature of inter- 
 national organization depends a good deal less upon definitely 
 conceived plans like that of the League to Enforce Peace (how- 
 ever admirable and desirable it may be to promote definite 
 projects of that kind) than upon the nature of the foreign 
 policy which each nation individually pursues. Disagreements 
 between nations arise generally in situations in which both sides 
 honestly believe themselves to be in the right. Most nations 
 are honestly in favor of peace in general, and would go to The 
 Hague and assist in drawing up plans to maintain it; yet each 
 may be persisting in a line of conduct which, in its own view 
 entirely defensive and defensible, appears to another unwar- 
 rantably aggressive. And when that is the case paper arrange- 
 ments for avoiding conflict are apt to break down. 
 
 So the most practical question for each of us for some time is 
 likely to be this: what will be the effect of our own country's 
 conduct in its relations with other countries, upon the future 
 peace and international condition of the world? Or, to put the 
 question in another form : What can our country do, irrespec- 
 tive of what others may do, to contribute to a more orderly 
 international condition, saner world politics? 
 
 America is of course concerned in the present war whether 
 she will or no. She may, by her material resources in supplies, 
 ammunition, credit, be largely influencing its decision. As part 
 of the problem of protecting her own rights, incidentally 
 menaced by the operations of the war, she has taken very 
 solemnly a certain position in international affairs. She has 
 declared, for instance, that she stands irrevocably for the pro- 
 tection of innocent non-combatant life at sea in war time. She 
 would undoubtedly stand as decisively for certain lesser rights 
 
 326
 
 of trade and free communication on the seas as well (in the 
 past she has gone to war in their defense) but for the fact that 
 doing so against one belligerent would aid the cause of the other 
 guilty of still greater offenses. 
 
 And if we look beneath diplomatically expressed claims into 
 unofficial, but unmistakably expressed public opinion, we find 
 America standing strongly for certain other rules of life be- 
 tween nations the right of each nation to national existence 
 for instance like those violated in the invasion of Belgium. 
 
 Is America really serious in the stand thus made ? Or is she 
 going to avow by her future policy, if not in words, that she 
 will take no real risk nor assume any real obligation in support 
 of the principles she has been maintaining diplomatically and 
 by her clearly expressed public opinion. Is she going to sub- 
 mit lamely, to the indignities and violation of right involved in 
 the massacre of her innocent non-combatant citizens at sea ? 
 
 I put the question in that form because it is generally a 
 rhetorical prelude to the demand for warlike action. And yet 
 the American who is moved by his country's dignity and right 
 to have thought this thing out, as well as to have become angry 
 about it, knows that warlike action is perhaps the very last 
 thing though it may be the last thing which the situation 
 calls for; and that warlike action alone would be a betrayal of 
 his country's highest interests in the matter. If America is 
 really serious she must prepare herself in public opinion, in 
 -political education for action of a different kind: for the 
 abandonment of certain traditions about freedom from en- 
 tangling alliances, for the assumption of risks and obligations 
 which to most Americans is to ask a great deal more than the 
 mere act of going to war. 
 
 Why will war of itself not suffice? 
 
 Suppose this country goes to war, over, for instance, the sub- 
 marine issue; and is finally entirely successful, so far as de- 
 feating Germany is concerned. How do we then know that 
 America has got what she has been fighting for? Our de- 
 mands at the end of the war will be that American rights at sea 
 shall be respected; that, most particularly, non-combatants 
 shall not be drowned by attacks on merchantmen. Very good. 
 Germany gives us her promise. She has given it before. How 
 do we know that it will be kept either by her or any other 
 nation that in a future war may find a ruthless use of the sub- 
 marine the only weapon left to it against a power commanding 
 
 327
 
 the sea? Can we hope that if we show now that we are ready 
 to fight "at the drop of the hat," in future a hard-pressed 
 belligerent will be overawed by the great American navy? 
 Then why is not the belligerent we now propose to deal with 
 held in check by the combined navies of Great Britain, France, 
 Russia, Italy, Japan and Portugal? Again, when we have that 
 promise at the end of our victorious war how do we know that 
 it will be kept, that we shall have got what we have been 
 fighting for? 
 
 And what of the American case against the Allies ? Is Amer- 
 ica now to surrender rights upon which she has insisted ever 
 since she became an independent State and which she once 
 fought a war and twice very nearly came to war to defend ? Is 
 America, in fighting Germany to make the British Order in 
 Council the basis of future sea law, so that when say Japan 
 goes to war with some other nation America will have to submit 
 to Japanese control of her trade and communication with neu- 
 tral States even to mail and banking correspondence as she 
 now submits to British control? 
 
 It is quite obvious that American claims have this difference 
 from those of the Allies : they, in so far as they are territorial 
 can at the peace be satisfied on the spot. America's cannot. 
 Hers depend absolutely upon the establishment, after the war, 
 of a different and better international order; upon agreement 
 as to what shall constitute international law and some method 
 of ensuring its observance. 
 
 Now has it not become evident that the present German- 
 American situation contains the elements of a great opportunity 
 for America : not only of putting an end to a situation humiliat- 
 ing for herself but of creating a new state of world affairs out 
 of which might grow would almost inevitably grow the res- 
 toration of general peace on conditions that civilization could 
 accept? 
 
 But that result is certainly conditional on one thing: that 
 American diplomacy is great enough to make precedent, to be 
 dangerously honest to the point of dropping diplomatic make- 
 believe and breaking with diplomatic usage. 
 
 Germany says in effect that she will make military sacrifices 
 for the purpose of respecting American neutral right, if Amer- 
 ica on her side will reciprocally fulfil neutral obligation by 
 insisting on the military sacrifice from both belligerents; so 
 that American rights are not made a means of handicapping 
 
 328
 
 one party as against the other; are not invoked in what Ger- 
 many regards as so one-sided a fashion as to become an arm 
 for the use of one belligerent against the other. 
 
 Now it is quite within precedent, right and usage, to reply, 
 as in the past, to such a demand by diplomatic punctilio: 
 "America cannot discuss the behavior of one belligerent with 
 the other," and so forth and so forth. The American govern- 
 ment could make excellent debating points and be diplomati- 
 cally entirely correct. 
 
 But suppose, instead, it were undiplomatically honest and 
 unprecedentedly bold and said bluntly what every one knows to 
 be the truth : that because of the slowly acquired American con- 
 viction of the badness of the German cause the danger to 
 civilization and ourselves which this country has come to believe 
 inherent in that cause it is impossible for America to enforce 
 the law or what America holds to be the law sharply against 
 England, to take any action which would seriously add to the 
 chances of German victory ; to be, in other words, really neutral. 
 Suppose America bold and honest enough to avow the quite 
 simple obvious truth that we are not indifferent as to the out- 
 come of the war and that in the long run our conduct won't be 
 guided as though we were; that so long as we have reason to 
 believe German policy a menace it will encounter in one form 
 or another (not excluding necessarily even the military form) 
 our active or latent opposition. 
 
 And then, suppose that on top of that impossibly bold and 
 honest stand this country were further to announce that it can 
 only act effectively for the sea law Germany desires, and other- 
 wise withdraw its opposition, if Germany is prepared to reas- 
 sure us as to her cause by stating definitely that the terms upon 
 which she is prepared to discuss peace include such things as 
 the evacuation of Belgium and France and indemnification for 
 damage done ; the acceptance of the international principles in- 
 volved in the American claims ; recognition of the absolute right 
 to existence of all States great and small ; readiness to enter, at 
 least to the extent that others are ready, into European or 
 world arrangements for the guarantee of that right and the 
 mutual discussion and limitation of armaments; together with 
 such minor details as agreement to the appointment of an inter- 
 national commission to enquire into the violation of the laws of 
 war on land and sea and the punishment of the individuals con- 
 victed by that commission. 
 
 329
 
 Once convinced that Germany stands for a policy such as 
 peace on those terms would imply, America could on her side 
 (so this impossibly honest diplomacy might make plain) stand 
 effectively for the freedom of the sea as against England if 
 needs be at least to the extent of upholding the Declaration of 
 London; could assure Germany that this country would never 
 be reckoned among her enemies, but on the contrary would co- 
 operate with her in defense of that equality of commercial 
 opportunity in the world of which Germany accuses her enemies 
 of trying to deprive her. 
 
 Such a "Declaration of America's International Position" as 
 that which I am here imagining would, in more precise terms, 
 be about as follows: 
 
 1. Though America since the outbreak of the war has done 
 ^everything possible to observe the form of neutrality which in- 
 ternational practise had heretofore imposed upon States not 
 actively participating in a war, the circumstances of the present 
 conflict have shown that the future protection of her own par- 
 ticular interests are so identified with the maintenance of certain 
 general rules of international intercourse that in all future 
 wars she will differentiate in her treatment of the combatants. 
 Thus in no case will American resources be available for the 
 military purposes of a belligerent who had entered upon a war 
 refusing to submit his case to enquiry and the necessary delay, 
 and to adhere to certain rules necessary for the safeguarding 
 of innocent non-combatant life. 
 
 The United States could not in consequence feel that her re- 
 lations with Germany could be placed upon a really sound 
 foundation of friendly cooperation until that country had 
 
 (a) accepted the international principles (as for instance the 
 sanctity of non-combatant life) involved in the American claims 
 and the further principle that their violation is an unfriendly 
 act towards America whether American life and property are 
 concerned or not; 
 
 (b) undertaken to evacuate Belgium, France and Serbia and 
 indemnify Belgium for damage done; 
 
 (c) agreed to the appointment of an international commission of 
 inquiry into the violation of the rights of non-combatants on 
 land and sea, with authority to assess damages, and to payment 
 of any damages in which Germany may be cast, and to punish- 
 ment of individuals convicted of offenses against the laws of 
 war. 
 
 On the acceptance of these terms by Germany, America would 
 undertake : 
 
 330
 
 A. Not to furnish military or naval aid to Germany's enemies 
 in this war. 
 
 B. To become one of the guarantors of the integrity of Belgium. 
 
 C. In the event of the creation of new buffer States, to assist 
 in the maintenance of their inviolability by refusing to allow 
 American citizens to furnish their invader with supplies of any 
 nature: by the application, that is, of the principle of differential 
 neutrality above indicated. 
 
 D. To accord to German citizens in protectorates subject to 
 American control, commercial access on equal terms with Ameri- 
 can citizens and to support by the differential neutrality already 
 indicated the policy of the open door in all protectorates and 
 non-self-governing territories. That is to say America would 
 undertake not to furnish military or naval aid to any power 
 or group of powers that refused to apply the principle of the 
 open door in their protectorates, and to prohibit the export of 
 supplies or munitions to such powers in their military opera- 
 tions. 
 
 E. To join, pari passu, with other powers in any arrangement 
 for enforcing the submission of international disputes to enquiry. 
 
 Now whatever followed that announcement America and the 
 world would gain. If Germany refused she would by that 
 prove that she was still unchastened, not ready to surrender or 
 modify her policy of world hegemony. America then knows 
 that her fears are justified. She is definitely warned of a fact 
 which sooner or later she will have to face if it is really a fact. 
 And it is obviously far better that it should become patent to 
 America (and the world) now, than later (after a possibly 
 patched up peace). Indeed, on grounds simply of sheer na- 
 tional security America should attempt by some such means to 
 establish now, when Germany is relatively helpless so far as 
 damaging us is concerned, where she stands, what America 
 faces. It would enable her to make her future policy definite 
 and objective. 
 
 But suppose Germany, realizing at last that it is impossible 
 to maintain a national policy which during the next generation 
 or two will have to meet not only the opposition of the Western 
 democracies of Europe and the potential forces of Russia, but 
 all that North America might during the next generation de- 
 velop into, accepts? What if the German government were 
 pushed by the best elements of the German people to take the 
 opportunity thus so publicly offered for putting themselves 
 right with the world and starting afresh on a more workable 
 basis? 
 
 331
 
 If that happened which after all is the most probable thing 
 of all America, without striking a blow, would have secured 
 from Germany the main thing for which the Western democ- 
 racies are now fighting. Not only would she have laid the 
 foundation for the future protection of her own sea rights in the 
 only way in which finally they can be protected by an inter- 
 national law that is a reality because rooted in a real interna- 
 tional order but she would have helped win the battle of 
 democracy by bringing about a discussion of terms before the 
 democratic nations have bled themselves white. 
 
 Never in history had a nation such an opportunity. But to 
 take it means breaking with routine, employing a new method, 
 a new manner; great governmental boldness, great political 
 honesty. And all that is, perhaps, too much to ask. 
 
 But that is no reason why we should not face the fact that on 
 those conditions the opportunity is there. Nor why those most 
 responsible for the direction of American public opinion should 
 not help the nation to realize it. 
 
 NORMAN ANGELL. 
 
 332
 
 INDEX 
 
 Algeciras, 30. 
 
 Alliances, 135 ff, 144, 166; 
 
 prohibited, 94, 250, 266. 
 Alsace-Lorraine, autonomy of, 
 
 245, 260. 
 American School Peace League, 
 
 program of, 267. 
 Angell, Norman, 33, 34, 82, 
 
 326. 
 Annexation, 76, 249, 306, 308, 
 
 311, 316, 322, 325. 
 
 demnity, 321; and Germany, 
 58, 316, 320. 
 
 Berlin Conference of 1885, 29. 
 
 Bernstein, Ed., 317. 
 
 Bosphorus, neutralization of, 
 245. 
 
 Boycott, economic, 155, 174 ff, 
 186. 
 
 Brailsford, H. N., 302. 
 
 Bund Neues Vaterland, pro- 
 gram of, 306. 
 
 Arbitration, 249, 251, 254, 262, Butler, Nicholas Murray, 275. 
 271, 306, 324; compulsory, Buxton, Charles Roden, 301. 
 
 262, 322, 325. 
 Armaments, export of, 266; 
 limitation of, 99, 124, 246, 
 248, 249, 250, 256, 262, 265, 
 266, 267, 271, 276, 277, 297, 
 
 300, 301, 306, 310, 322, 323, 
 325; national manufacture 
 of, 102 ff, 250, 265, 266, 267, 
 268, 269, 271, 277, 299, 300, 
 
 301, 324. 
 
 Armed Peace, 121. 
 
 Australian Peace Alliance, pro- 
 gram of, 300. 
 
 Autonomy, 249, 254, 262, 275, 
 306, 318, 322. 
 
 Backward peoples, 22. 
 Balance of Power, 94 ff, 124, 
 
 265, 277, 301. 
 Bauer, Otto, 35. 
 Belgium, restoration of, 245, 
 
 260, 262, 274, 301, 320; in- 
 
 333 
 
 Capital, export of, 14, 21, 256. 
 Causes of war, 3, 5, 109, 265, 
 
 268. 
 Central "human betterment 
 
 bureau," 196. 
 Central Organization for a 
 
 Durable Peace, program of, 
 
 247. 
 Chamber of Commerce of U. 
 
 S., program of, 276. 
 Charte Mondiale, 248. 
 Citizen Army, 310. 
 Coercion, international, 130, 
 
 133, 134, 155, 160, 174, 184, 
 
 251, 255, 264, 270, 276, 293. 
 Concert of nations, 98, 106, 
 
 267, 268, 322, 325. 
 Commercial privilege as cause 
 
 of war, 5. 
 Commission on International 
 
 Migration, World, 196.
 
 Concessions, 24. 
 
 Conference of organized labor, 
 
 322. 
 Conservation Commission, 
 
 World, 195. 
 Constantinople, neutralization 
 
 of, 274. 
 
 Consular Service, World, 194. 
 Council of Investigation and 
 
 Conciliation, 128, 248, 249, 
 
 264, 276, 285, 298. 
 Council of States, 225, 249. 
 Court of International Justice, 
 
 248, 249, 264, 265, 271, 276, 
 
 297, 300, 311, 319. 
 
 Dardanelles, neutralization of, 
 245. 
 
 David Starr Jordan, program 
 of, 273. 
 
 Democracy, political, 310; in- 
 dustrial, 272, 300. 
 
 Democratic Control of foreign 
 policy, 89 ff, 109, 245, 248, 
 
 249, 250, 251, 254, 255, 257, 
 262, 266, 268, 271, 277, 297, 
 
 298, 299, 300, 306, 319, 323, 
 325. 
 
 Dernburg, Dr. Bernhard, 314. 
 
 Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft, 
 program of, 306. 
 
 Dickinson, G. Lowes, 82. 
 
 Diplomacy, 22, 67 ff ; secret, 90, 
 245, 261, 262, 322. 
 
 Drago Doctrine, 19. 
 
 Dutch Anti-War Council, pro- 
 gram of, 325. 
 
 Economic Imperialism, 7, 15 ff, 
 
 23 ff, 35. 
 Education, reform of, 249, 257. 
 
 Fabian Society, program of, 
 
 186, 278. 
 Far East, commission to study 
 
 problems of, 269. 
 Federation of nations, 106, 114, 
 
 172, 203, 265, 267, 268, 271, 
 310, 322, 323, 325. 
 
 Ford, Henry, 243. 
 
 Foreign policy, democratic con- 
 trol of, 245, 248, 249, 250, 
 251, 254, 255, 257, 262, 266, 
 268, 271, 277, 297, 298, 299, 
 300, 306, 319, 323, 325. 
 
 Freedom of nationalities, 50, 
 249, 254, 262, 275, 306, 318, 
 322. 
 
 Freedom of the seas, 7, 10, 245, 
 248, 256, 274, 306. 
 
 Freedom of trade, 6, 11, 250, 
 265, 274, 298, 311, 314, 315, 
 324, 325. 
 
 General Confederation of La- 
 bor, program of, 322. 
 
 German policy, 111 ff. 
 
 Great Britain, as example of 
 federalism, 114, 228. 
 
 Great Society, the, 222. 
 
 Guarantees, 57, 60, 245, 270, 
 324. 
 
 Hague Conference, 150, 248, 
 
 256, 270, 323. 
 Haase, 312. 
 
 Imperialism, 7, 15, 23, 35, 110. 
 
 Indemnities, 271, 310, 321. 
 
 Industrial democracy, 272, 300. 
 
 International Congress of 
 Women, program of, 250. 
 
 International Bureau of Peace, 
 program of, 249. 
 
 International Council, 277, 278, 
 280. 
 
 International Government, 18, 
 31, 64, 120, 179 ff, 246, 249, 
 256, 265, 271, 274, 278, 299, 
 310. 
 
 International High Court, 186, 
 278, 288. 
 
 Independent Labor Party, pro- 
 gram of, 33, 296. 
 
 International law, 221 ff, 264, 
 
 334
 
 265, 268, 276, 306, 314, 319, 
 
 320, 323. 
 International Parliament, 161, 
 
 249. 
 
 International Peace Commis- 
 sion, 298. 
 International organization, 29, 
 
 194, 276, 306. 
 International police force, 152, 
 
 181, 249, 264, 265, 268, 271, 
 
 310. 
 International Secretariat, 278, 
 
 287. 
 
 Justiciable issues, 290. 
 Kautsky, Karl, 40. 
 
 Language, guarantee of, 248. 
 League of Peace, 78, 79, 85, 
 
 120, 131, 135 ff, 143 ff, 165, 
 
 169, 270. 
 League to Enforce Peace, 148, 
 
 160, 264. 
 
 Like-mindedness, 193. 
 Loans for war, prohibition of, 
 
 186, 267. 
 
 Mediation, continuous, 243, 254. 
 'Militarism, 123. 
 Military service, 109, 152, 266, 
 
 301. 
 Minorities, rights of, 61, 249, 
 
 275. 
 
 Monetary System, World, 197. 
 "Most favored nation," 311. 
 
 Nationality, 47, 192, 217; free- 
 dom of, 249, 254, 262, 275, 
 306, 318, 322; respect for, 
 254, 267. 
 
 National Peace Convention, 
 program of, 264. 
 
 National Peace Council, pro- 
 gram of, 298. 
 
 Naturalization, 269. 
 
 Neutral Conference for Con- 
 
 tinuous Mediation, program 
 of, 243. 
 
 Neutralization of straits and 
 canals, 10, 265, 271, 310, 311, 
 314, 315, 320; of disputed 
 regions, 324; of Constanti- 
 nople, 274; of colonies, 315. 
 
 'Neutral States in peace nego- 
 tiations, 249, 268, 269, 323. 
 
 Non-intercourse, 265. 
 
 "Open Door," the, 4, 250, 306, 
 320 (see Freedom of trade). 
 
 Patriotism, 217 ff. 
 
 Pacifism, 164. 
 
 Peaceful penetration, 23. 
 
 Permanent Credit Bureau, 20. 
 
 Persia, guarantees for, 60. 
 
 Philadelphia Conference of 
 League to Enforce Peace, 
 170. 
 
 Plebiscite in transferred terri- 
 tory, 76, 87, 244, 247, 249, 
 251, 254, 266, 267, 271, 277, 
 297, 298, 299, 300, 310, 318, 
 323. 
 
 Preparedness, 269. 
 
 Poland, autonomy of, 245, 260. 
 
 Press, reform of, 74, 249. 
 
 "Principle of the Common- 
 wealth," 227. 
 
 Private property at sea, 265. 
 
 Publicity organization, World, 
 197. 
 
 Quidde, Dr. L., 316. 
 
 Eeform Club of New York, 
 
 memorandum, 4, 10. 
 Religious liberty, 248. 
 Rights-of-way, economic, 60. 
 
 Scandinavia, guarantees for, 
 
 60. 
 
 Serbia, autonomy of, 245. 
 Slovene Unit, guarantees for, 
 
 60. 
 
 335
 
 Small States, security of, 77, 
 143, 274, 275. 
 
 Socialism, 35, 272. 
 
 Socialists, allied nations, pro- 
 gram, 259; German and 
 Austro-Hungarian, program, 
 306 ; South-German, program, 
 310; German party, pro- 
 gram, 310, 311; neutral na- 
 tions, program, 261; Ameri- 
 can party, program, 271; 
 and imperialism, 33, 38. 
 
 Social organization, forms of, 
 189. 
 
 "Spheres of influence," 15, 83. 
 
 State, theory of the, 70. 
 
 Status quo ante, 310. 
 
 Straits, neutralization of, 245, 
 265. 
 
 Suffrage, universal adult, 266; 
 woman, 249, 251, 254, 255, 
 257, 268, 271, 298. 
 
 Swiss Committee for Study of 
 a Durable Peace, program, 
 323. 
 
 Swiss Peace Society, program, 
 323. 
 
 Switzerland, example of fed- 
 eralism, 114. 
 
 Tariff restrictions, 6, 82. 
 Trade as cause of war, 9. 
 
 Trades unions, organized 
 
 against war, 300. 
 Transfer of territory, 76, 87, 
 
 244, 247, 249, 251, 254, 266, 
 
 267, 271, 275, 277, 297, 298, 
 
 299, 300. 
 Treaties, secret, 245, 248, 249, 
 
 250, 257, 306, 323. 
 
 Union of Democratic Control, 
 program, 33, 86 ff, 277. 
 
 Union of International Asso- 
 ciations, program of, 248. 
 
 United States, example of fed- 
 eralism, 114, 228. 
 
 Vorwaerts, 36. 
 
 Walling, Wm. English, 39. 
 
 West African Conference, 29. 
 
 Women, as delegates to peace 
 conference, 251, 258, 259; 
 Committee for Constructive 
 Peace, program, 259; In- 
 ternational Congress of, 250; 
 suffrage, 249, 251, 254, 255, 
 257, 268, 271, 298. 
 
 Women's Peace Party, program 
 of, 33, 268. 
 
 World Congress, 246, 298. 
 
 World Peace Foundation, pro- 
 gram of, 266. 
 
 336
 
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