REESE LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF 'CALIFORNIA.
Receirtd
(7
Accessions No. .3LS7i>f/. Shell
THE LAW OF LOYE
LOVE AS A LAW;
MORAL SCIENCE, THEORETICAL AND
PRACTICAL.
BY
MARK HOPKINS, D. D., LL. D.,
PRESIDENT OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE.
UNIVERSITY
NEW YORK:
CHARLES SCRIBNER AND COMPANY.
1869.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1868, by
MARK HOPKINS,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.
RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE:
STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY
H. 0. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY.
PREFACE.
IF we accept the principles of classification
adopted in the following work, the position of
Moral Science as compared with other sciences is
either superior or central. It is superior to those
sciences, as intellectual philosophy, which are con-
ditional for it ; and central for those, as the science
of government, which are but an application of its
principles.
It is from this position of the science, together
with its unsettled condition, that I have been led of
late to devote to its advancement the little time I
could spare from my more immediate and pressing
duties. That some advancement has been made I
am encouraged to hope from the favorable reception
of the " Lectures on Moral Science " published by
me five years since. In those " Lectures," morality
was made rational, both as based on ends and as
involving intuitions ; the different kinds of ends
and of good were distinguished; the relation of
6 PREFACE.
will to ultimate ends was shown ; the law of lim-
itation was established ; the faculties were classified
from their relation to ends ; and from that relation,
and from their relation to each other, it was shown
that the highest end of the whole man was the same
with that made known by revelation. (This point,
if established, is of the utmost moment, as render-
ing religious skepticism rationally impossible.) The
relation of virtue to happiness and also, to worldly
good was shown, and of rights to right.
As the above points were, for the most part,
either new in themselves, or put in new relations,
and may not have been always expressed in the
best way, it is not strange that they failed to be
rightly apprehended by some critics who read the
work, as well as by some who certainly did not.
Nor is it, perhaps, strange that some who hold
strenuously, and as a part of their theological ortho-
doxy, that it enters into the " chief end of man " to
enjoy God, should have counted the same doctrine
an alarming philosophical heresy. In the following
work the above doctrines are implied, for further
reflection has but confirmed 'me in them; but of
some of them a fuller exposition is demanded, new r
points require to be stated, and the principles need
to be applied in a practical part.
PREFACE. 7
In addition to the above, or if not in each case
strictly in addition, yet as requiring fuller statement,
some of the points which may be thought to justify
the publication of another work are the following :
1. The making of obligation the moral idea with
no necessary intervention of the idea of right, obli-
gation to choose the supreme end and good being
immediately affirmed on the apprehension of it, thus
placing the primary seat of obligation in generic
choice without volition, and as distinguished from
it.
2. The fact that a Sensibility is a condition for
the formation of moral ideas. This was implied in
the former work, but not so distinctly stated, because
I had not then given the attention they deserve to
the very able lectures on this subject of President
Finney in his volume on " Systematic Theology,"
in which this doctrine was, so far as I know, fully
stated for the first time.
3. The distinction between the two forms of spon-
taneous activity. This had been made by Dr.
Hickock.
4. The coalescence of the idea of individual and
of the general good in the one idea of good on
which the law of conscience is based.
5. The separation of the idea of obligation from
8 PREFACE.
authority. This had been done by President Fin-
ney, Dr. Hickok, and others.
6. The distinction between conscience as an im-
pulse and as a law.
7. The mode in which love includes all other
duties.
8. The finding of a basis for the reconciliation,
not of any two opposing systems, but of two classes
of systems that have always been opposed. It is
quite time this should be done, as it certainly will
be at some time, both in Mental and in Moral
Science.
9. The bringing into unity of physical, mental,
and moral science through the law of the condition-
ing and conditioned, and the law of limitation based
upon that.
10. A classification of duties new as respects its
basis ; and the application of the law of limitation
to the practical part.
11. A fuller recognition of the difference be-
tween the powers and the susceptibilities, and of the
contrasted laws of our frame by which we receive
and give.
12. The doctrine of rights as related to ends.
This was seen by Whewell, but not fully applied.
13. The relation of both rights and ends to the
just powers of government.
PREFACE. 9
14. The derivation of the right to punish from
the violation of rights.
15. The natural right of man to the Sabbath.
Other points might be mentioned. How far any
of these are absolutely new I do not know, nor is it
important ; but the system, taken as a whole, seems
to me so far new as to justify its publication.
When the former work was published it was sup-
posed that the doctrine of ends had not before been
made thus prominent in a moral system. That is
still supposed ; but a legal friend has called my at-
tention to a work on " The Civil Law in its Natural
Order," by Jean Dornat, a French lawyer, in which
the course of thought is often strikingly similar to
that in the " Lectures." His work was published
in Paris in 1674, and republished in this country by
Little & Brown, so recently as 1853. If ends
hold the place in a Moral System assigned them in
the " Lectures," it is obvious they must hold a
similar place in the Civil Law, and this was seen
and stated with great clearness by Domat.
As the " Lectures," which were published as a
work of original investigation, have been used as a
text-book in several of our colleges and seminaries,
it is thought best, though the present work is of the
same general character, to have some reference to
10 PREFACE.
that in its structure and arrangement. To combine
the qualities of a good text-book with original inves-
tigation is not easy. In some respects, and for some
classes, the processes of original investigation well
stated are better than anything else. In other
respects, and for other classes, they are not desira-
ble. On this point each teacher must judge for
himself, and the work will find its place according
to its merit and adaptation. As far as possible
technical and obscure terms have been avoided,
and it is hoped the system has been made too plain
to be misapprehended.
The substance of the following work was deliv-
ered the last winter in a course of lectures before
the Lowell Institute. In the delivery of them
much use was made of the blackboard, whenever
ideas were to be traced back to their source, or
principles were to be carried out to their results.
This was an experiment, but the results were such
as to assure me that the blackboard may be made
use of with much advantage in illustrating this and
kindred subjects before popular audiences, as well
as before college classes.
It only remains that I express my obligations to
the friends who have aided me in this work by their
suggestions. Among these I would particularly
PREFACE. 11
^nention my early and constant friend, Dr. John
Morgan, of Oberlin, to whom I arn greatly indebted ;
also Dr. Ray Palmer of New York ; and on the sub-
ject of suffrage, Judge C. C. Nott, of the Court of
Claims, Washington.
WILLIAMS COLLEGE, Septernher, 1868.
\
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION.
PAGB
Different Theories 1
MORAL SCIENCE.
Definitions and Preliminary Statements ..... 29
PART I.
THE LAW OF LOVE : THEORETICAL MORALS.
DIVISION I.
OF LAW.
CHAPTER I.
Of Law in General 34
CHAPTER II.
Obligation: Moral Ideas : Conditions and Characteristics . . 30
CHAPTER III.
Obligation: Freedom a Condition 44
CHAPTER IV.
Obligation: an End a Condition 47
CHAPTER V.
Obligation: a Good as a Condition 51
x iv CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VI.
PAGE
Obligation: Two Forms of Spontaneous Action . ... 59
CHAPTER VII.
Obligation : Personality a Condition 63
CHAPTER VIII.
Obligation: Necessarily Affirmed 69
CHAPTER IX.
Obligation : Paley : Obligation and Authority .... 74
CHAPTER X.
Ultimate Moral Ideas : Whewell : Theory of Right '. . .73
CHAPTER XI.
Is the Affirmation of Obligation Law ? 85
CHAPTER XII.
Conscience - 90
DIVISION II.
OF LOVE.
CHAPTER I.
Rational Love: its Characteristics and Sphere .... 99
CHAPTER II.
Complacent Love and Righteous Indignation .... 10-4
DIVISION III.
THE LAW OF LOVE.
CHAPTER I.
How Love becomes Law 106
CHAPTER II.
The Relation of Love to other Duties 110
CONTENTS. XV
CHAPTER III.
PAQB
Reconciliation of Systems 114
CHAPTER IV.
Other Relations of the Sensibility to the Moral Nature . . 119
PART II.
LOVE AS A LAW : PRACTICAL MORALS.
Preliminary Statement , 125
V
I.
Love as a Law distinguished from the Law of Love . . . 132
II.
Classification of Duties 136
CLASS I.
DUTIES TO OURSELVES.
I.
Classification 140
DIVISION I.
The Securing of our Rights 140
DIVISION II.
The Supply of our Wants . 142
DIVISION III.
The Perfecting of our Powers ....... 142
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
Perfection as related to Direct Action for Others: of the Body:
of the Mind 143
CHAPTER II.
Perfection as related to Unconscious Influence . . . . 156
CHAPTER III.
Perfection as related to Complacency 158
CHAPTER IY.
Perfection as related to the Glory of God 160
CHAPTER V.
Perfection as related to Self- Love 161
CHAPTER VI.
Habits ... ,102
CLASS II.
"DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW MEN.
PRELIMINARY.
Self-Love and the Love of Others .108
FIRST GREAT DIVISION.
DUTIES OF MEN TO MEN.
DIVISION I.
DUTIES REGARDING THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS.
'CHAPTER I.
Of Rights 170
CONTENTS. xvil
. CHAPTER II.
PAGE
Personal Rights : Life and Liberty 179
CHAPTER III.
Right to Property ^ 182
CHAPTER IV.
Right to Reputation 195
CHAPTER V.
Right to Truth 199
DIVISION II.
DUTIES REGARDING THE WANTS OF OTHERS.
CHAPTER I.
Justice and Benevolence ....... 202
CHAPTER II.
Supply of the Wants of Others 207
DIVISION III.
PERFECTING AND DIRECTING THE POWERS OF OTHERS.
CHAPTER I.
Duty of Influence from the Relation of Character to Well-being.
Obstacles to Change of Intellectual State and of Charac-
acter 211
CHAPTER II.
Spheres of Effort: Who may labor in them .... 221
XVlii CONTENTS.
SECOND GREAT DIVISION.
DUTIES FROM SPECIAL RELATIONS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
Rights of Persons: Right and Rights: Special Duties : The
Family 223
CHAPTER II.
Government: Responsibility: Punishment 232
CHAPTER III.
Relation of the Sexes: Chastity . ...... 246
CHAPTER IV.
Rights and Duties in Relation to Marriage ... 249
CHAPTER V.
The Law of Divorce 257
CHAPTER VI.
Rights and Duties of Parents and Children .... 260
CHAPTER VII.
Society and Government: The Sphere of Government: Origin
of Government : Mode of Formation .... 268
CHAPTER VIII.
Government Representative and Instrumental: The Right of
Suffrage 282
CHAPTER IX.
Forms of Government: Duties of Magistrates and Citizens . 297
CONTENTS. x i x
CLASS III.
DUTIES TO GOD.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
Duties to God defined 304
CHAPTER II.
Cultivation of a Devotional Spirit 308
CHAPTER III.
Prayer * 314
CHAPTER IV.
The Sabbath QOO
^fTil^
THE ^A
[UNIVERSITY
^%FO^^
INTRODUCTION.
DIFFERENT THEORIES.
MORALITY regards man as active. Hence moral
science must imply a systematic knowledge of those
powers in man which tend to, or regulate action,
as those powers are related to each other, and to
the objects that excite their action. These powers
are related to each other as a system capable of
harmonious action, and of securing through such
action the highest good of the individual and of the
whole.
Into the conception of a system of active powers
the idea of order, subordination, and of a supreme
controlling power must enter ; and that action of
such a system which would secure the highest good
of the individual and of the whole is right action.
Such action must be rational. It presupposes an
end good in itself, and known to be good ; but it
can be moral only as we have a moral nature
affirming obligation to such action.
Of the nature and foundation of moral obliga-
tion which I suppose to be thus affirmed, different
2 INTRODUCTION".
accounts have been given. This has arisen in part
from the ambiguity of language, but more from a
partial apprehension and wrong adjustment of the
facts and principles of our complex nature. A
striking fact, as of association, or a powerful princi-
ple, as of self-love or sympathy, is seized upon and
made to account for everything. It becomes the
centre of a system having in it, perhaps, much that
is plausible, and much truth in its details, but as a
system wholly false. Such systems are not useless.
They insure a careful examination of the facts
made central ; the incidental truth involved, as in
the treatise of Adam Smith, is often of much value ;
and something is done in limiting and exhausting
the possibilities of error.
And not only are different systems produced from
Different ^ e a ^ ove causes, but the moral problem
thelTr'ilr f itself is differently.stated. By some it is
problem. made an inquiry concerning the moral
nature ; by some, concerning the nature of virtue ;
by some, concerning* the source ^and nature of right ;
by some, after an ultimate rule? and by some, after
the nature -and foundation, of ground, of obliga-
tion. This last I think preferable. In the fact of
obligation all are agreed. All are agreed that-all
mankind are under obligation to do some acts and
to abstain from others. Without obligation there
can be no morality and no law, and a statement of
the ground and conditions and limitations of obliga-
tion, would be a statement of the theory of morals.
INTRODUCTION. 3
As I propose to use the term, a ground of obli-
gation for us must presuppose a moral nature in
us ; and the question what that nature is, is entirely
different from any that may respect the ultimate
ground or reason _for its activity. The nature and
constitution of the eye are one thing, the nature
and constitution' 1 of light, without which the function
of the ey 'could not be performed are another.
The eye and light are related to each other, and
each is so indispensable to vision that either might
be said to be at its foundation. But the questions
in optics respecting the eye, and those respecting
light, are entirely distinct ; and if the powers of the
eye were regarded by one man as the foundation of
the faculty of sight, and if the properties of light
were so regarded by another, and if, because they
were using the same word, they were to go on
under the delusion that they were treating of the
same ' thing, it is easy to see the confusion that
must ensue. In the s#me -way the intellect, with
its capacities, and laws, is on? thing, and truth, the
, object of the intellect, is another. These so imply
each other that without truth the intellect could
not act, and either might be said to be the founda-
tion of mental activity. Here, also, there would
be the same confusion if men were to mistake one
for the other, or, without being aware of the transi-
tion, were to apply the same terms to both.
But this is precisely what has happened in specu-
lations on morals. Men have sometimes spoken of
4 INTRODUCTION.
the various faculties and powers involved in the
moral nature, such as conscience and free will, as
- lying at the foundation of obligation; sometimes
they have spoken of that ultimate ground or reason
in view of which alone the moral nature can
legitimately act, and sometimes they have included
both. The fact of this confusion is said by Sir
James Mclntosh to have been a great, and indeed
the m#in reason of the confusion there has been in
the perplexed speculations on the subject of morals.
Speaking of the difference between the " Theory
of Moral Sentiment," and the " Criterion of Mo-
rality," he says : " The discrimination has seldom
been made by moral philosophers ; the difference
between the two problems has never been uniform-
ly observed by any of them ; and it will appear in
the sequel, that they have been not rarely alto-
gether confounded by very eminent men, to the
destruction of all just conception and of all correct
reasoning in this most important, and perhaps most
difficult, of sciences."
But this confusion will not surprise us if we ob-
serve how the speculations on these different sub-
jects imply and almost necessarily run into each
other. If we would understand optics, we must
understand both the eye and light, and that not
merely as they are in themselves, but as they are
related to each other. If we would understand
moral science, we must understand both the facul-
ties which act and that in view of which they act ;
INTRODUCTION. 5
but we must be careful to keep our speculations on
the one subject distinct from those on the other.
If I say that self-interest is the ground of obliga-
tion I mean that it is that in view of which obliga-
tion is affirmed by a moral agent fully constituted/
If, on the other hand, I say that free will is the
ground of obligation, I do not mean that it is that
in view of which obligation is affirmed, but that it
is a power essential to a moral agent, a necessary
condition of the affirmation of obligation, whatever
the ground may be.
If, again, it be said that self-interest is the ground
of obligation and we would controvert that, we
need to know what other possible grounds there
may be ; if there may be what are called a priori
grounds we must know that, and be able to state
them, and this will involve the question of a priori
knowledge and principles of action, and a decision
of some of the highest and most disputed problems
of mental science.
Shall we then regard as the foundation of obliga-
gation those faculties which are necessary _
J The ground
to constitute us moral beings : or that in ? obligation
o ' that in view
view of which, being thus constituted, ^adonis
obligation is affirmed ? With given facul- affirmed -
ties I see a crow flying over my head. In view of
that fact I feel no obligation. With the same
faculties I see a man in danger of drowning. In
view of that fact I do feel under obligation to aid
him if I can. Here is a ground of difference, and
-6 INTRODUCTION.
of obligation. What is that ground ? Is there any
ground common to all cases ? Without questioning
, what others have done, and simply desiring distinct-
ness, I prefer to call that the ground of obligation
in view of which obligation is affirmed. In seeking
for this, however, we shall necessarily be drawn
into an examination of those faculties and mental
products on which moral agency is conditioned, for
it must be remembered that that in view of which
obligation is affirmed may itself, like the idea of
right, be the product of mental agency.
Moral philosophers have indeed been divided in-
Dependence ^ ^ wo c l asses > as they have belonged to
on Sentai one or the otner of the two great schools
of mental science that have divided
thinkers from the time of Plato and Aristotle in
reality, as they have settled in one way or another
the great problem of the origin of knowledge. A
sensationalist, believing that all our knowledge is
from experience, that there are no necessary prin-
ciples, or forms of knowledge given by the mind
itself, can believe in no a priori principles of moral-
ity, and will, almost of course, adopt a low, fluctu-
$ting, and selfish system of morals. But one who
finds s in the mind itself as well as in the senses a
source of primitive knowledge, given indeed, not
without the senses, but on the occasion of them,
may consistently, and will naturally, look to the
same source for the principles, or elements, or prim-
itive facts, or ultimate ideas, or ground, or founda-
INTRODUCTION. 7
tion, or whatever he may please to call it, of morals.
Hence, the great battle of scientific morality is to
be fought on the field of mental science.
On this field some, as those who so make the -
mind the product of organization as to bring it
under the laws of matter and of necessity, and all,
indeed, who deny the fact of liberty, so decide
mental problems as to make morality impossible.
Others necessitate a basis of self-interest, or of
mere sentiment, while others still so solve these
problems as to admit, in some form, of what may
be called a rational system.
Nor, I may remark in passing, need it discourage
those who have not studied mental science formally,
that moral problems strike their roots so deeply into
that, for on this class of subjects sound judgment is
native to the common mind. It is even true that
where accurate statement is most difficult, intuition
is most certain, and when such statements are made
they commend themselves with great readiness to
the common consciousness.
With this view of the ground of obligation and
of the connection of mental with moral Varioug
items.
science, we pass to consider some of the 8yst01
systems respecting obligation and its ground which
have been adopted by different philosophers.
Of these the first commonly mentioned, as it was
the first in point of time among modern p,^ theory .
systems, is that of Hobbes. By him the Hobbe8 -
ground of obligation'' Was found in the authority of
8 INTRODUCTION.
the Civil Law. According to Hobbes, a regard to
personal advantage is the only possible motive to
human action. " Acknowledgment of power is
called honor.", " Pity is the imagination of future
calamity to ourselves." " Laughter is occasioned
by sudden glory in our eminence, or in comparison
with the infirmity of others." " Love is a concep-
tion of his need of the one person desired." u Re-
pentance is regret at having missed the way."
There are -no social affections, no sense of duty, no
moral seiitiments. As a desire for his own pleasure
is supreme in every man, it will follow that the state
of society is naturally one of war. But as nothing
can so interfere with this supreme desire or end of
man as war, it becomes obligatory on men to com-
bine, by an expression of their common will in the
form of law, for the preservation of peace ; and as
there is no other possible standard, it follows * that
men must be bound by the behests of law, whatever
they may be.
A system* resting on a view of our nature so low
and .partial, 'and thus favorable to arbitrary power,
was not fitted for permanence among a free people,
and had nearly passed from remembrance, except
in the schools, when an attempt was made to revive
it in connection with the enforcement of the fugitive
"
slave law. This attempt gave rise to the expression
so prevalent for a time, of " the higher law ; " and
._ik really seemed at one time that we had a party
among us who denied the existence of any such
law.
INTRODUCTION. 9
Of this system it has been well said, that it must
either be right to obey the law and wrong to dis-
obey it, or indifferent whether we obey it or not.
If it be morally indifferent whether we obey it or
not, the law which may or may not be obeyed with
equal virtue cannot be a source of virtue ; and if it
be right to obey it, the very supposition that it is
right implies a notion of right and wrong that is
antecedent to the law, and gives it its moral effi-
cacy.
A second theory of obligation is that it is based
on self-interest. . - Second the-
HT1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r ^ ' S6 ^~
Much might be said to show that this interest.
was the system of Paley, whose work was formerly
taught almost universally, both in England and in
this country. Many things in his book are consis-
tent with this theory only, while others would seem
to imply that of general utility. Probably he did
not discriminate sharply between them.
This system supposes the same low and imperfect
view of the facts of oar nature as is implied in the
preceding one. It fails to show the distinction
between interest and duty, or why all actipns that
are for our interest, as a good bargain,^ are not vir-
tuous. It ignores or denies the fact of 'disinterested
affection, contradicting thus the general conscious-
ness which attributes merit to actions in proportion
as self is forgotten. As that which is the founda-
tion of obligation should be supreme in our regard,
this system would require us to regard self-interest
10 INTRODUCTION".
supremely, and everything else as subordinate to
that. It would thus be wrong to love God su-
premely and our neighbor as ourselves ; and in-
deed any high, or noble, or generous act would,
according to this system, be either impossible or
wrong.
The plausibility of this system arises from the
fact that self-interest has its place in one that is
correct ; and also from the fact that men exalt self-
interest so unduly, and do so generally make it
practically the centre of their thoughts and actions.
A third system founds obligation on utility. The
Third sys- assertion is, not only that we are under
tern; of . * .
utmty. obligation to do those things that are use-
ful, but that their usefulness is the ground of the
obligation.
To set aside this view it is only necessary to
understand the meaning of terms. By a ground of
obligation we mean the ultimate reason in view of
o
which it is affirmed. But by its very definition
utility cannot be ultimate. " Some things," says
Sir William Hamilton, " are valuable, finally, or
for themselves these are ends ; other things are
valuable, -not on their o\^n account, but a$ condu-
cive towards certain ulterior ends these are
means. The value of ends is absolute ; the value
of means is relative. Absolute value is properly
called a good ; relative value is properly called a
utility." Whatever is useful, then, can have value
only as it is related to the end which it may be
INTRODUCTION. H
used to promote. A plough is useful, but only as
it is related to the value of a crop. Unless there
be ends that have value in themselves, means can
have no value, and so nothing can be useful. But
no one will contend that we can be under obligation
to choose that as an ultimate and supreme end
which can have no value except as it is related to
an end beyond itself.
The plausibility of this system is from the fact
that we are so often under obligation to choose that
which is useful, and from a failure, in doing this, to
distinguish the ground from a condition of obliga-
tion. The absolute value of an end may be the
ground of obligation to choose it, but we can be
under obligation to choose means only on condition
that they shall be useful in attaining the end. Of
course a system which should place obligation to
choose an end on the ground of an intrinsic value
that should have no end beyond itself, and so no
utility, could not properly be charged with being a
system of utility.
The word utility expresses a relation a relation
between that which vis valuable in itself and the
means of obtaining it. A fourth svstem, Fourth
system ;
that of Dr. Wayland, bases obligation on wayiand.
the relations of one being to another. " It is," says
he, "manifest to every one that we all stand in
various and dissimilar relations to all the sentient
beings, created and uncreated, with which we are
acquainted. Among our relations to created beings
12 INTRODUCTION.
are those of man to man, or that of substantial equal-
ity of parent and child, of benefactor and recipient,
of husband and wife, of brother and brother, citizen
and citizen, citizen and magistrate, and a thousand
others. Now it seems to me that as soon as a
human being comprehends the relation in which
two human beings stand to each other, there arises
in his mind a consciousness of moral obligation,
connected by our Creator with the very conception
of the relation."
Here it will be observed that no enumeration
of the relations on which obligation depends is at-
tempted. Some are specified, and there are said to
be " a thousand others." Nor is any attempt made
to show what is common to all these relatidns in
virtue of which they are *the ground of obligation.
Relations as such cannot be the ground of obliga-
tion. Why must these relations be between sensi-
tive beings? Why are not all relations between
sensitive beings, as those of time and space, the
ground of obligation ? The relative height of two
men, as tall and short, constitutes a relation, but
not a ground of obligation. In themselves relations
have no value, and aside from the beings related
they cannot exist. They cannot be made objects
of choice or grounds of action. There is in them
nothing ultimate. They are simply the occasion or
condition of our apprehending a ground of obliga-
tion that lies wholly beyond themselves. It is true
that whatever we do we must do in some relation,
INTRODUCTION. 13
and this gives the system its plausibility; but this
incidental connection of relations with grounds of
action that lie beyond them can never make them
an adequate basis for a moral system.
Analogous to this system of relations are two
"others those of Dr. Samuel Clarke and Fifth and
of Wollaston. Of these the first founds teowvDr.
_.-,. . in f* i 11 Clarke and
obligation on the fitness ot things ; and the woiiaston.
second on conformity to truth, or to the true nature
of things. A man owes a debt. It is according to
the fitness of things that he should pay it, and that
fitness is the ground of the obligation. It is true
that there is a difference between a man and a tree,
and on the ground of this difference there is an
obligation to treaJb them differently. Not to do so
would be acting a lie, and so, according to Wol-
laston, 'all immorality is an acted lie.
Of these systems it is to be said that both fitness
and truth, as that is here used, express, not any-
thing ultimate, but only a relation. Between the
fact of the debt and its payment there is a fitness,
but it is not on the ground of its fitness that the
payment is to be made. The fitness has no value
in itself, and could exist only as the debt has value*
in some relation to an ulterior good. If there were
no good of any kind to be gained by the payment
of the debt no satisfaction of any sentiment
there would be no fitness in paying it. So of
truth. It is true that there is a difference between
a man and a tree, and that they are to be treated
14 INTRODUCTION.
differently, not however on the ground of the truth,
which has value only for what it indicates beyond
itself, but because a man is capable of a rational
good and a tree is not.
It is to be said, also, that both fitness and truth
are terms quite too broad to be used accurately as
the basis of a system, since there is a large class of
^fitnesses and of truths that have no relation to
v -morals. To use a pen for writing is according to
": ^the fitness of things, and is a practical affirmation
- y of the truth that the pen was made for that, but
' there may be in it nothing moral. Besides, there
7 is as much fitness in an immoral act to produce evil
as there is in a moral act to produce good, and it is
as much according to the true nature of things that
it should produce evil. It cannot, therefore, be
either the fitness or the truth on which the ob-
ligation depends.
The plausibility of these systems is from the fact
that all obligatory acts are in accordance both with
the fitness and with the true nature of things,
though these are not the foundation of the obliga-
tion to do them.
Another system of the same class is that of
. Seventh Jouffroy, which makes order the basis of
iouffroy. obligation. This was mentioned by me
in my former volume, and I have nothing to add to
what was then said. Order may be affirmed of
mere physical being, in which there can be nothing
moral. It expresses a relation, and nothing ultimate.
INTRODUCTION. 15
It can never be chosen for its own sake. Beings
may place themselves in order for the sake of an
end beyond, but not for the order itself. At least,
such order cannot be obligatory. It would be ab-
surd for an army to preserve the order of its march
if that would insure its destruction. The order of
an army is for its safety and efficiency, and can be
obligatory on no other ground. The same princi- ,
pie applies in all cases of order. It can never be
so valuable as to become obligatory, except as sub-
servient to an end beyond itself.
From several passages in Jouffroy it would appear
that he identified the order of the universe with its
end. Doing this, we can readily see how he might
have adopted the system, but to do it is simply an
abuse of terms. Order cannot be the end of the
universe. That must be some good of the beings
that compose the universe, which may or may not
be attained by means of order.
According to an eighth system, the will of God
is the ground of obligation. We are, it Eighth sys-
. _ tern ; will
is said, under obligation to do whatever of God.
He commands, simply because He commands it.
Philosophically this is the same doctrine as tha,t
of Hobbes, who referred everything to the will of!
the lawgiver, or of the law-making power, regarded^
simply as will, and accompanied by power. The
question is, whether the will of any being, taken
by itself, and without reference to those quali-
ties and motives that lie back of will, can be the
1 6 INTRODUCTION.
ground of obligation. It is true that the will of
God is an infallible rule, and that we are to do un-
hesitatingly whatever He commands. It is true,
also, that this can be said of no other will, whether
of an individual or of any number of individuals
however organized. It is this fact, that the will of
God is to be always and implicitly obeyed, that
gives the system now in question its plausibility.
But are we to obey his will simply because it is his
will ? or from faith, that is, because we have ade-
quate ground for implicit confidence in Him that his
will will always be determined by wisdom and good-
ness ? It is precisely here that faith comes in.
God commands that for which we can see no good
reason except that He commands it. He may even
command that which, aside from his will, shall seem
opposed to all our apprehensions of what is right
and best. This renders faith possible, and furnishes
it with a distinct field for its conflicts and triumphs.
But if his will, simply as will, be the ground of
obligation, then faith is impossible, and that great
bond and actuating principle of the social universe
is annihilated. Certainly if there be nothing back
of will as the ground of obligation, that is to be
accepted, whatever it may be, and there is nothing
for faith to rest upon.
Again, there is nothing ultimate in will whether
regarded as choice or as volition. In either case
we distinguish between the act and the object.
The act is for the sake of the object, and can never
INTRODUCTION. 17
be an end or object of choice for itself. It can
have no moral quality except from something back
of itself, and no value except from something be-
yond itself.
Hence, it will follow again, if the will of God be
the ground of obligation, that God has no moral
character. Choice, volition, will, are but the expres-
sion of character. If there be nothing back of these
for them to express, there can be no character. On
this supposition, too, all the acts of God would be
equally right by a natural necessity, and the appeal
of God to Abraham " Shall not the judge of all
the earth do right ? " was absurd.
Once more, on this supposition moral science is im-
possible. Science supposes uniformity and grounds
of certainty. These may be found in those grounds
of action which ought to influence a free being, but
never in the acts of such a being. The ground of
our confidence that a free being will pursue a given
course must be faith, and not science.
This system has been strangely adopted under
the impression that it honors God. It renders it
impossible that He should be honored.
The next system we shall consider is that of those
who say that right is the foundation of N i nt hsy S -
obligation. According to this, we are to do t(
right for the sake of the right. This is, perhaps,
the prevalent theory at the present time.
On the face of it, nothing could seem simpler than
this theory ; but the ambiguities of the word right
2
18 INTRODUCTION.
, .* have produced confusion. If we take right as an
adjective expressing the quality of an action, and
opposed to wrong, it is obvious that it cannot be the
ground of obligation, because it expresses nothing
ultimate, but only a relation. Used thus, the only
conceivable meaning of the word right is either con-
formity to a standard or rule, or fitness to attain an
end. So it is commonly used by moralists. " Right,"
says Paley, " means no more than conformity to
the rule we go by, whatever that may be." " The
adjective right," says Whewell, " means conform-
able to a rule." He who solves a sum according to
a rule does it right. In this sense simple Tightness
t does not even involve a moral quality, and so cannot
be the foundation of obligation. Whence then
comes the moral quality ? Here is a right act that
has no moral quality. Here is another morally
right. Whence the difference ? This can be only
from something in the rule, or standard, or end that
lies beyond the act ; and if the moral quality come
from one or the other of these, the obligation must
also. But whatever may be the origin of the moral
quality in an action morally right, it is plain that
the quality of an action can never be the ground of
an obligation to do that action. Look at this. A
man does a wrong action ; he steals. He does not
do this for the sake of the quality of the action
I its wrongness ; but for the end that lies beyond the
action. A man does a right action ; he gives money
in charity. He does not do this for the sake of the
INTRODUCTION. 19
Tightness of the action, but to relieve a case of dis- ,
tress. If he were to do it for the sake of the rio-ht-
o
ness of the act, the act would not be right. Think
of a man's doing good to another, not from good
will, but for the sake of the rightness of his own act.
Think of his loving God for the same reason ! Cer-
tainly, if we regard right as the quality of an action,
no man can be under obligation to do an act morally
right for which there is not a reason besides its
being right, and on the ground of which it is right.
That reason, then, whatever it may be, and not the
rightness, must be the ground of the obligation.
But are we not under obligation to do what is
morally right? Certainly, always. So are we
always under obligation to do what is according to v
the fitness of things, and the truth of things, and the -
will of God ; but these are not the ground of the
obligation, and the quality of right in an action
neither is, nor can be, the ground of the obligation
to do it.
Is there, then, in morals a right which is not the
quality of an action ? Yes ; a man has rights. He
has a right to life and liberty. Here the word right
is used as a substantive, and means a just claim.
This we understand, and the ground of it will be
investigated hereafter, but it has no relation to our
present subject.
Is there still another sense of the word right?
This is claimed, and in this too it is used as a sub-
stantive, and with the article jrefixed "the
20 INTRODUCTION.
right." Can we here, as before, gain definite
notions ? I fear not. " The term right," says Dr.
Haven, in his excellent and popular work, and he
represents a large class of writers, " expresses a
simple and ultimate idea ; it is therefore incapable of
analysis and definition." " It expresses an eternal
and immutable distinction, inherent in the nature of
things." And not only right, but wrong is also
such an idea, for he says, " Right and wrong are
distinctions immutable and inherent in the nature of
things. They are not the creations of expediency
nor of law ; nor yet do they originate in the divine
character. They have no origin. They are eter-
nal as the throne of Deity ; they are immutable as
God himself. Nay, were God himself to change,
these distinctions would change not. Omnipotence
has no power over them, whether to create or to
destroy. Law does not make them, but they make
law. They are the source and spring of all law and
all obligation." l
I am of those who believe that there are simple
and ultimate ideas. That of existence, or being, is
one. All men have, and must have an idea of
something, of themselves, as -existing. Here we
have the idea, and something actual which corre-
sponds to it ; and I understand what is meant when
it said that existence, being, not the idea, but the
thing, had no origin, and that it may be the source
of law. Is then the idea of right such an idea ?
1 Moral Philosophy, p. 47.
INTRODUCTION. 21 -
Is there anything corresponding to the idea, but
different from it, that has existed from eternity ?
Is it like space, of which we might plausibly say
that it existed independently of God and of all
creatures, so that if they were withdrawn the
eternal right would still exist? Is this true also of
wrong ? If so, we might well, as some do, put
right above God, and wrong too. This seems to be
claimed, but cannot be, for we are told that " right
and wrong are distinctions" not things, but " dis-
tinctions immutable and inherent in the nature of
things." But what things ? We are told again,
" When we speak of things and the nature of things,
as applicable to this discussion, we do not of course
refer to material objects, nor yet to spiritual intelli-
gences, but to the actions and moral conduct of intel-
ligent beings, created or uncreated, finite or in-
finite." Here, then, \ve have moral action which is
eternal and has no origin ; for if the distinction be
eternal, inhering in the nature of things, the things
themselves in which they inhere must also be
eternal. But further, if these eternal distinctions
inhere in these eternal actions, what is this but to
make them qualities of the actions, which, as we
have already shown, would preclude the possibility
of their being the ground of obligation to do the
actions. We have also distinctions in moral actions
actions, observe, already moral, which are " the
spring of all law and all obligation." But is this
what the author really means ? Probably not, for he
22 INTRODUCTION.
immediately adds, " We mean to say, that such and
such acts of an intelligent voluntary agent, whoever
he may be, are, in their very nature, right or
wrong." This is quite different from the proposi-
tions with which we have been dealing. It simply
amounts to saying that certain acts, not eternal, but
such as you and I may do, are right or wrong, and
that no reason can be given for it, except that they
. are so. Now I believe, and that, I suppose, is the
real difference between us, the point on which this
whole question turns, that when an action is right
or wrong a reason can always be given why it is so,
and that in that reason the ground of the obligation
is to be found. We are never to do, or to intend
to do right for the sake of the right, but we are to
, Intend to do that, the doing of which is right, for
the sake of that which makes it right.
The analogy is often insisted on, it is by Dr.
Haven, between mathematical and moral ideas.
Mathematical ideas and truths, it is said, are neces-
sary and eternal. But how ? Is it meant that
either ideas or truths can exist except in some
mind? Is it meant that mathematical ideas are
any more eternal in the divine mind than any other
ideas that are there ? Is anything more meant
than ,that, by the very nature of intelligence it is
necessitated, if it act at all as intelligence, to form
certain ideas, and also to assent to certain proposi-
tions as soon as it understands them ? If this be
all, and it could be so understood, it would sweep
INTRODUCTION. 23
away much vague, not to say unintelligible phrase-
ology. Certainly it enters into our conception of
an intelligent being that he must have certain ideas,
and into our conception of a moral being that he
must have a knowledge of moral distinctions ; and
if we suppose an intelligent and moral being to have
existed eternally, we must also suppose, according to
our inadequate mode of thinking on subjects invol-
ving the infinite, that certain intellectual and moral
ideas have also been eternal, though in the order of
nature the being must have been before the ideas.
But this does not make these ideas in any sense in-
dependent of God, or above him, or a fountain of
law, or of anything else. It simply enables us to
think of God as having always existed, and as hav-
ing always had within himself the conditions of in-
telligent, moral, and independent activity, so that
he might himself, in his own intelligence and wis-
dom, become the fountain of all law.
When, as in the present case, the existence of a
simple and ultimate idea is claimed, the appeal must
be directly to consciousness. On this ground one
may assert, and another deny ; and there is nothing
more to be said. Neither argument nor testimony
can avail anything. We can only so appeal to the
general consciousness by applying tests as to show
what that consciousness really is.
This system will be referred to again. It is
plausible, because every action that is obligatory is
also right, as it is also fit, and according. to the
divine will.
24 INTRODUCTION.
The only other system of which I shall speak is
that of Dr. Hickok. According to him a reason
can be given why a thing is right. " The highest
good," he says and in this I agree with him
" must be the ground in which the ultimate rule
shall reveal itself." This is a great point gained.
It concedes that right is dependent upon good of
some kind, that is, that a reason can always be given
why a thing is right ; and it only remains to inquire
what that good is.
But here, if I understand him rightly, I am still
compelled to differ from my able and highly
esteemed cotemporary. That good we are told is
" the highest good," " the summum bonum." What
then is that ? Says Dr. Hickok, " The highest
good, the summum bonum, is worthiness of spiritual
approbation." By this, it would seem, must be
meant worthiness of approbation on the ground of
the acts, or states, of our own spirits. The doctrine
then will be, that the ultimate ground or reason
why a man should do a charitable act is not at all
the good of the person relieved for the sake of that
good, but that he may preserve or place his spirit in
such a state as shall be w r orthy of his own approba-
tion. This is stated most explicitly. "Solely,"
says Dr. Hickok, " that I may stand in my own
sight as worthy of my own spiritual approbation, is
the one motive which can influence to pure moral-
ity, and in the complete control of which is the
essence of all virtue." 1
l Moral Science, p. 60.
INTRODUCTION. 25
To those aware of the endless disputes of the
ancients respecting u the summum bonum" further
progress may seem hopeless if we must first decide
what that is ; but it will be sufficient for our present
purpose if we decide the province within which it
is. By " the summum bonum " is generally meant
the greatest good of the individual. That, it would
seem, must be meant here, because worthiness of
approbation can belong only to the individual, and
can be directly sought by the individual only for
himself. But if this be meant, then the " summum
bonum," and the end for which man was made, are
not the same. Man was not made to find the ulti-
mate ground of his action in any subjective state of
his own, of whatever kind. He was made to pro-
mote the good of others as well as his own, and the
apprehension of that good furnishes an immediate
ground of obligation to promote it. The good of
the individual is too narrow a basis to be the ground
of obligation ; and besides, it is not in accordance
with our consciousness to say, when we are laboring
for the good of others, that the ultimate and real
thing we are seeking is our own worthiness of
approbation.
But again, the man is worthy of approbation only
as he is virtuous. It is virtue in him that we
approve. But virtue is a voluntary state of mind,
and that can never be chosen as an ultimate end.
By necessity all choice and volition respect an end
beyond themselves. But the ground of obligation,
26 INTRODUCTION,
as we now seek it, is that ultimate end in view of
which the will should act. As ultimate, the reason
of the choice must be in the thing chosen, and not
in the choosing. It is therefore impossible that any
form, or quality, or characteristic of choice, any
virtue, or goodness, or holiness should be the ground
of obligation to choose. The same thing is to be said
of law in every form, and for the same reason.
Law can never be ultimate.
In this case, as in most of the others, a rule may
be drawn from that which is assumed as the ground
of obligation, because no man can be under obliga-
tion to do anything that is not in accordance with
his highest worthiness. This may be a criterion
or test, just as the will of God or fitness is, of what
he ought to do, but never a ground of the obligation
to do it-
Is it asked, then, what is your own system ? It
is implied in the opening remarks of the chapter, is
very simple, and can be stated in few words. .
In seeking the foundation of obligation, I suppose
moral beings to exist. As having^ intelligence and
sensibility I suppose them. capable of apprehending,
ends good in themselves, and an e$d thus goo^ that
is both ultimate and supreme. In the apprehension
of such an end I suppose the, moral reason must
affirm obligation to choose it^ and that all acts that
will, of their own nature, lead to the attainment of
this end, are right.
This puts man, as having reason, into relation to
INTRODUCTION. 27
his end in the same way that the brutes, as having
instinct, are put into relation to their end, and gives
us a philosophy in accord with other philosophies of
practical life. What is the philosophy of the eye ?
It consists in a knowledge of its structure and use,
or end ; and from these, and these only, can rational
rules be drawn for the right use of the eye when
well, or for its treatment when diseased. Knowing
these, we know how we ought to use the eye. We
know the ground of our obligation in reference to
it. It is so to use it that the end of the eye may be
most perfectly attained. So we ought to use the
eye, and the ground of our obligation is the fact
that the eye has relation to an end that has value in
itself. If it had not, we could be under no such
obligation. The same is true of every part of the
body, and of every faculty of the mind. And if
true of these, why not of the man himself? Has
he an end valuable for its own sake ? If not, what
is he good for ? But if he have such an end, why
not, as in case of the eye, find in this end the
,reason of all i^se of himself, that is, of all rules of
conduct, and also the ground of obligation ? Can
there be anything higher, or better, or any more
ultimate ground of obligation, than that a man
should propose to himself the attainment of the
very end for which God made him ? What more
can Qod ask of him or man ? What more can
he wish for himself?
It will be observed that I here use the word end
28 INTRODUCTION.
in its most general sense, without specifying at all
what it may be. If it be to make money, so be it;
if to eat and drink, so be it. But whatever it may
be, if a rational system of philosophy be possible, the
ground of obligation must be in the end, and the
rules of conduct will be from that. So the Apostle
viewed it. " If," says he, " the dead rise not," if
this life be all, " let us eat and drink, for to-morrow
we die." This is good philosophy, and also common
sense. It is just drawing the rule of conduct and
of duty from the end.
MORAL SCIENCE.
DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS.
" MORAL PHILOSOPHY is that science which
teaches men their duty, and the reasons of it."
This is Paley's definition ; and no better has since
been given.
Moral Philosophy may also be defined as the
science which teaches men their supreme end, and
how to attain it. It is thus both theoretical and
practical. As theoretical, it explains the ground of
obligation. As practical, it teaches what we ought
to do. As distinguished from Natural Science,
which teaches what is, Moral Science teaches what
ought to be.
All questions under Theoretical Morals may be
resolved by an exposition of
THE LAW OF LOVE.
And all questions under Practical Morals may
be resolved by an exposition of
LOVE AS A LAW.
30 MORAL SCIENCE.
Hence, the following treatise will be simply an
exposition of these two expressions.
In analyzing the Law of Love, the order of in-
vestigation pursued in the " Lectures on Moral
Science " will be reversed. In those, we started
with an examination of the constitution of man in
the light of ends, and found the Law of Love,
thus identifying the law of the constitution with
the revealed law of God. In this law, as requiring
file highest activity of the highest powers upon
their appropriate object, we identified the formula
for virtue with that for happiness. We found a
law in the keeping of which there is, and must be,
the great reward. This Law of Love thus found
we now assume, and seek its characteristics and
conditions, or prerequisites.
PART I.
THE LAW OF LOVE.
THEORETICAL MORALS.
DIVISION I.
OF LAW.
CHAPTER L
OF LAW IN GENERAL.
WHAT then is law ; and what are the ideas con-
ditional for it, or prerequisite to it ?
To the idea of law in its broadest sense, that of
force, of uniformity, and of an end, are prerequi-
sites. The subject of law, that which is controlled
according to it, is force, either as tending to, or as
producing, action. Being is implied, but that can
be the subject of law only as it is endowed with
force, or is under its control. The object of law
is the control of force, by direction and regulation,
with reference to an end. Stated in form, the laws
of nature are expressions of the mode in which
force is controlled with reference to an end. Moral
laws, and those of society, are expressions of the
mode in which force should be controlled. With-
out force there would be nothing to control ; and
in force acting at random there is no law.
Laws are then of two kinds of things, and
of persons. They are those in accord- Twokinds
ance with which things are controlled, oflaw>
34 MORAL SCIENCE.
and those addressed to persons. Under the first,
the sequences are uniform, and, so far as the human
will is concerned, necessary. Under the second,
there is an alternative presented to beings endowed
with reason and free-will. They may obey or they
may disobey.
Differences Between these two kinds of laws the
between .
them. differences are radical.
Under the first, the subject does not understand
the law, knows nothing of the end proposed, is not
capable of choosing it, is under no obligation to
choose it, and has not control of the force requisite
for its attainment. It is passive, and its movements
are necessitated. It is only in an improper sense,
or figuratively, that rules in accordance with which
beings thus unconscious are controlled, can be called
laws.
The most striking ground of analogy between
Reason these two classes of laws, and the basis
of their common name, is in their re-
sults. This is order. Uniformity, and thus
order, must be the result of the first class of laws ;
it is the result of the second when obeyed.
Of the first class of laws, the laws of things,
Laws of there are several kinds, as physical, vital,
TheJTthe mental ; all having, however, the char-
perience. acteristics above mentioned. In all there
is a force uniformly directed to an end. Up to a
certain point the mind itself is as much subject to
this class of laws as is matter. These laws, or
rather the uniformities which are their exponent,
for their
common
name.
OF LAW IN GENERAL. 85
are at the basis of experience, are the condition of
education, and of that intelligent activity by which
means are adapted to ends.
For this class of laws, the laws of things, the
conditional ideas will be, (1) Being. (2) Ideag con
Force. (3) Uniformity. (4) An End. *> f
Physical law will then be the product things -
of being putting forth force uniformly. So far all
will agree. I would add, for an end.
The second class of laws, or laws of persons, are
obeyed consciously. The subjects of them Lawg of
understand the law, are capable of choos- P ersons -
ing the end it proposes, are under obligation to
choose it, and have at their own control the force
requisite for its attainment.
Under this class law is not merely a rule regula-
ting force and producing uniformity, or as Law here
some less accurately say, the uniformity f^p^ive 11 *
itself; but, as designating the end, it is cause b oi>iig-
directive. It is also imperative. That, - atory>
however, which makes it to be law, is the fact that
it is obligatory. An end may be designated, we (
may be commanded to attain or accomplish it, but
if there be no obligation there is no law.
For this form of law the prerequisite ideas will -
be, (V) Being, conscious and rational. Prerequisites
to laws of
(2) Force, under the control of such a persons,
being. This will include free-will. (3) An end
which can possibly be known as such only as there
is in it a good ; and (4) Obligation. We may
then have not only law, but moral law.
CHAPTER II.
OBLIGATION : MORAL IDEAS : CONDITIONS AND
CHARACTERISTICS.
OBLIGATION being then the essential element
obligation; m mora l l aw > m a ll ^ aw binding upon
its origin. mora l beings, we next inquire afte*r the
origin and nature of that.
Of obligation we can make no division as of
The conce different kinds. Some have indeed spoken
i^rtio f n b " f obligation as perfect and imperfect,
simple. meaning by perfect obligation that which
can be exactly defined and enforced. But while
obligation may respect different persons, may arise
in different relations, and may or may not be capa-
ble of being enforced by an authority from without,
yet the conception of it is an ultimate conception,
and the same in all. It supposes a being capable
of forming the idea and having the feeling of it,
and, if he have a moral nature, so constituted that
he mus^ under certain conditions, form this idea
and have this feeling.
Without this there could not be a moral nature.
What we mean by a natural endowment, or a nature,
OBLIGATION. 37
is a constitution such that under given conditions
certain results will uniformly follow. Thus NO moral
if pain uniformly follow the near approach without
the idea of
to a fire, the being thus anected is obligation.
said to have a sensitive nature. If men uniformly
tend to associate with each other, they are said to
have a social nature. In the same way, if a being
be so constituted that the idea and feeling of obliga-
tion will uniformly arise under given circumstances,
we say that he has a moral nature. We say that
he is endowed not only with Reason, but with
Moral Reason. This, and this only, can constitute
man a moral being.
What then is moral reason ? This we shall best
learn from what reasor^is, for that has .
Moral
been much more fully investigated. Rea- ^ e a a t s ^e'be S st
son is that power of the mind by which frJJJJ e pure
it is furnished with those ideas and affir- reason -
mations which are presupposed in all rational think-
ing. These ideas are those of being, identity,
causation, of space, of time, and othe^like them,
the origin of which has been fully discussed. These
are universal and necessary. The affirmations, as
that all changes are in time, that all bodies are in
space, and that every event must have a cause, are
simply evolutions of these ideas when the occasion
for them arises, and so are equally necessary and
universal. These ideas and truths are implied in
all our conceptions of beings and objects,' and are
so immediately and necessarily given that we can-
88 MORAL SCIENCE.
not conceive of man as rational without them. As
so intimate to ourselves, they were slow in being
brought into distinct recognition and statement, but
as they are fundamental, such recognition and state-
ment are essential to the progress of either mental
or moral science.
Such being the function of reason, that of moral
r^aloL how reason should be, and is, analogous. It is
analogous. t j jat power Q f tne mm d by which it is
^ furnished with those ideas and regulative principles
which are presupposed in all moral action.
These ideas are those of personality ; of an end
Primary including a good and a supreme good ; of
moral** free-will, and of obligation. These are pre-
supposed in every moral act, as are those
of being, time, causation, etc., in every act of com-
prehension ; and they have, whenever a moral/ act
is performed, the characteristics given by Kant as
distinctive of the others, that is,<of universality and
necessity.
Of the above, obligation is the strictly moral idea ;
but as the others are so dependent upon that that
they could not be formed without it, they may be
properly said to originate in the Moral Reason.
They are primary ideas involved in all moral action,
and so conditional for it.
There are other ideas given by the Moral Reason,
Seconda as those f merit and - demerit, which fol-
morai f l w action, and so may be called second-
ary. They are all either an immediate
reason
OBLIGATION. 39
knowledge of the personality by itself; or a mani-
festation by it of that which is so inherent and
essential to itself that the one cannot be conceived
of without the other.
These ideas hold, indeed, the same relation to
the powers of feeling and of will, the Analogy be-
, ^ * t tween ideas
other constituents of our threefold being, of v and
moral
that the ideas of simple reason do to the reason,
power of thought. We have a power of thought.
Involved in this, and so involved that they must
be given with it, are the ideas of being, of time,
and space, etc. But if there are essential ideas
accompanying the revelation to ourselves of our
intellectual being, we might well suppose there
would be such ideas connected with the revela-
tion to ourselves of our emotive and voluntary
powers. And so we find it. Involved in tfe
power of feeling is the idea of good ; and in the
power of will, in the form of choice, is the idea of
freedom. These and others of this class, have, as has
been said, the same relation to man as active that
the ideas of mere reason have to him as contempla-
tive. Hence, as man is moral only as he is active,
they are said to be the product of the Moral Reason.
And again, as man is practical only as he is active,
and as these ideas are regulative in practice, they
may be called the product of the Practical Reason.
This, I suppose, is what was intended by Kant
under that name.
As underlying moral action, the ideas above men-
40 MORAL SCIENCE.
tioned have the characteristics of universality and
necessity for all moral beings. They are further
distinguished as having in them an element of feel-
ing, without which they could not be, as they are,
immediately related to action. This some are slow
in apprehending ; but it comes from the fact, scarcely
recognized as yet, that the Moral Reason is wholly
conditioned upon a Sensibility, and that thus the
ideas which it gives partake of " the root and fat-
ness of the olive " from which they spring.
Without the requisite conditions no ideas are
Moral ideas possible, and without a sensibility the first
wholly con- r . . . J
ditioned condition for moral ideas is not given.
upon a
sensibility. "\\T e might as well have the -idea of iden-
tity, or of resemblance, without that of existence,
as to have the idea of benevolence, or o justice, or
of right, or of rights, or of obligation, without the
action, as a previous condition, of a Sensibility, and
the idea of good, enjoyment, well-being originated
by such action. How is benevolence possible
towards a being that can neither enjoy nor suffer ?
How can we be just to one who has no interest to be
secured, and who can be neither rewarded nor pun-
ished ?
Through the It was formerly the doctrine of philoso-
elementof ^ S.
feeling moral phers that reason is a directive, but not a
ideas become L
motives. motive force.
" Reason the card, but passion is the gale,"
says Pope, and this was the opinion of his time. But
since the ^Reason has been investigated, some have
OBLIGATION. 41
said that the ideas furnished by it become motives.
Jouffroy says this, but he says it with no discrimina-
tion of the different classes of ideas, and no explana-
tion of the prevalence, almost universal, of the op-
posite opinion. The explanation is to be found in
the two classes of ideas just spoken of. Those
of the pure reason, primitive and unconditioned, as
those of being, of space, and their derivatives, as of
identity, and of mathematical relations, can never
become motives. Only those ideas can become
motives that are conditioned on a Sensibility. These
can and do. Thus it is that the idea of obligation
becomes a motive, because, being conditioned on
feeling, it has an element of feeling in it, while yet,
as an idea, it is rational.
This view of moral ideas precludes the analogy
so commonly drawn between them and mathemat-
ical ideals regarded as necessary and eternal.
It is here, in the fact that a Sensibility is the
condition precedent of all moral ideas, and Thig fact
so of any manifestation of a moral nature, JfJe happi- f
that we find the root of those theories of ness theory *
morals that make happiness or well-being ultimate.
In their relation to morals the Sensibility and its
products are not to be regarded merely as a utility,
or as an object of choice lying before the mind as a
motive, but also as lying back of all moral ideas and
as their condition. If there were no good to be
bestowed and recognized as such within a Sensibility,
there could be no love, and so no holiness. If there
42 MORAL SCIENCE.
were no evil that could be suffered, there could be
no selfishness or malice. When, therefore, it is
said, as it has been, to be an a priori law that
benevolence is right and malice is wrong, it cannot
be so a priori and transcendental as to exist till
there is a knowledge of what benevolence and
malice are, and so of that good and evil without
which neither of them could be.
Nor is there anything anomalous in this relation
of a Sensibility as a condition for moral ideas, since
the same is true of a Will. The idea of a Will in
freedom as much underlies all moral ideas as does
that of a Sensibility. The truth is that moral ac-
tion, as the highest form of our activity, implies the
activity and cooperation of the three great depart-
, ments of our nature the Intellect, the Sensibility,
and the Will, and can be conceived of only aS from
a Person fully constituted. The idea of being from
the Intelject, o a good from the Sensibility, and of
freedom, from the Will, must each be a condition of
any moral i r dea^r' From the Sensibility we have the
idea of an -essential ^oojj, a good in itself. N From
the Will as choosing such a good for its own, sake,
or the reverse, we have the ideas of essential good-
ness and essential wickedness, goodness and wicked-
ness in ^themselves. Notning J:hat proceeds from
the Sensibility can be goodness'; nothing that pro-
ceeds from the Will can be a good. Thus do we*
give each element of personality its place ; ; thus do
we discriminate them ; and thus does moral action
OBLIGATION. 43
imply that circle of interdependence among these
faculties which we find in the essential functions of
all life, where there is, in strictness, no first, and no
last.
From the above it would appear that moral ideas
differ from others ; first, as conditioned
^ M ! Conclusions.
upon the previous action or a sensibility ;
second, and because they are thus conditioned, as
blended with feeling; third, and as thus blended
with feeling, having in them the power both of
impulse to action and of causing enjoyment and suf-
fering.
CHAPTER III.
OBLIGATION: FREEDOM A CONDITION.
OF the ideas now mentioned, it is with that of
obligation, as preeminently the moral idea, and as
giving its validity to law, that we are especially
concerned ; but as the others are conditions for that,
we must, if we would trace its origin, examine them
in that relation.
Clearly the first condition of obligation is the idea
of freedom, or of the power of rational choice. As
has been said, the idea of freedom is immediately
and necessarily given to us in the knowledge we
have of ourselves as possessed of will in the form
of choice. It is not a moral idea except as it is a
condition for moral action, and is the product of the
Moral Reason only as moral ideas furnish the alter-
native in kind which makes rational freedom possi-
ble. If man were wholly animal, freedom to choose
between different degrees or even kinds of animal
enjoyment would amount to little ; but as the moral
and spiritual differ in kind from the animal, the
Moral Reason furnishes the occasion for the exercise
OBLIGATION. 45
of the highest possible freedom. When such an
alternative is presented, the idea of freedom reveals
itself at once as involved in the power of choice, and
so a constituent of that will which is among the
central parts of our nature.
This origin of the idea of freedom must practi-
cally remove all ground of dispute about liberty,
unless we are prepared for absolute skepticism ;
for if our primitive and necessary ideas do not rep-
resent realities and so furnish a safe basis for action,
our nature is false, and all search after truth is
hopeless. That such is its origin is evident from
the uniformity and tenacity with which men have
held to it, notwithstanding dialectical subtleties and
apparent demonstrations to the contrary. The
power of choice, involving rational freedom, is an
original and primary manifestation of our being,
just as thought is, and can no more be practically
denied than the being itself.
But this power of choice does not include all
that has been commonly understood by Som etbing
will. It does not include volition, or the SSSe*^-
putting forth of energy for the attain- IferstooTby
ment of that which we choose. These
have been grouped under the one name Will, or, as
Hamilton proposes to call it, the Conative Power.
But the movements are distinct, and should be so
designated.
The one is properly the Elective, and the other
the Conative Power ; and if this distinction had al-
46 MORAL SCIENCE.
ways been made it would have saved much confu-
The elective s * on ' Of these the putting forth of energy
nadve ec " * s ^ e more obtrusive, and has attracted
powers. more attention, but the elective is the lead-
ing power. A generic choice once made and con-
tinuing, must be followed by executive volitions, if
the means are possessed for attaining the end chosen.
If not, the choice will stand alone, and bide its
time.
It is this power of choice that belongs, as an ele-
Thedee est men ^ary constituent, to a rational soul,
t f h e is d p o n wer and 5t is in this that the deepest freedom
of choice. consists a freedom which can be taken
away only by destroying the soul itself. External
obstacles may prevent our attaining, or even strug-
gling for, that which we choose. If the choice be
not absolute we may be forced, as it is said, to work
for an end which we do not choose, and this is sla-
very; but still there always remains an absolute
power of choice which no weapon can reach and
no violence can overcome. Man can always be
loyal to God and to duty.
It is this freedom that is the first condition of
obligation. Without the consciousness of a freedom
of choice it is impossibla that the idea of obligation
should arise. Without it man would be a thing.
CHAPTER IV.
OBLIGATION : AN END A CONDITION.
THE second condition of obligation is the con-
ception of an end. This is primarily from An end a
the Sensibility, as that of freedom is from condition -
the Will. If there be choice there must be some-
thing to be chosen ; the two are correlatives. In
all rational action this conception of an end must
be as elementary as the power of choice, since
without it we can neither conceive of the action
nor the choice.
But there must not only be an end, there must
also be a paramount, or supreme end. A supreme
rrn i i en< * neces ~
Inere must be something which it is sary.
imperative that the man should choose, for if we
suppose several ends, and it be indifferent which is
chosen, or whether any, there can be no obligation.
An end may be subordinate, ultimate, or supreme.
A subordinate end is one chosen for the sake of
something beyond itself. An ultimate end Ends of
6 * 7 three
is one chosen for its own sake. A supreme Kinds.
end is also ultimate, and is one which, in any con-
flict of ultimate ends, ought to be chosen.
48 MORAL SCIENCE.
An ultimate end never lies proximate to volition.
ultimate Volition simply produces action, but ulti-
di3tin- w mate ends are the results of action, and
Sion'to ts depend upon forces over which volition
Lon ' has no control. If a man would have the
effects of light resulting in sight as an ultimate end,
he must open his eyes. The opening of them is by
volition, the seeing is the result of forces with which
volition, exce'pf indirectly, has nothing to do.
For the attainment of most ultimate ends both
Volition not choice and volition are required, but for the
' STSSta.^ highest end of the individual, if we sup-
^reme tht pose that to be the enjoyment of God, only
choice is needed without volition. The
choice of Him as a portion without volition is as the
opening of the eyes, and the light of his counten-
ance irradiates the soul.
And just here it is that we find the germinant
Faith and points of faith and works, those two great
works. forms of activity in all rational life,
whether Christian or secular. The essential ele-
ment of faith, which is not belief from the intel-
lect, but confidence or trust from the will, is found
in choice ; and the essential element of works is
found in volition. These two, choice and volition,
have th,eir common root in what we call the will,
as the nerves of sensation and of motion have their
common root in the spinal cord, and between these
the analogy is perfect. As sensation inspires mo-
tion, so does choice volition, and faith works ; and
as sensation and motion are inseparably united ex-
OBLIGATION. 49
cept at their very root, so should be choice and
volition, faith and works.
That some ends may be thus attained by choice
without volition it is important for us to see, be-
cause, as will be shown hereafter, 'it brings us to
the precise seat of responsibility, and simplifies the
moral problem.
That there should be for man a supreme end. f
is essential to his unity, and to any con- .
* ' A supreme
ception of him as made by a wise and j^JJJJJSJ 11 * 1
good being. Without this there could be unity>
no unity in the race, no basis for character, or con-
sistency of action.
But that there should be such an end is not suf-
ficient. For any ' rational action it is essen- Man must
tial that man should know what the end end.
is. This he may do formally, so as, to be able to
state it, or implicitly, as Jbe knows his own exist-
ence, which he may never think of stating, but of
which the knowledge is involved in all his actions.
That he is thus capable of knowing his end is the
chief distinction of man. The great dif- a
Such knowl-
ference between him and the brutes is ^fef^s-
not that he can abstract and generalize, tinction - ,
not that he can make his own faculties the object of
his study, becoming in recent phraseology both
subject and object, but it is that his Maker takes
him into his own counsel by revealing to him his
end, and permits him either to choose or reject it ;
either to cooperate with or work against Him.
Without such knowledge of his end man would
4
50 MOKAL SCIENCE.
be in simple bewilderment. This is the turning
point between a nature capable of sympathy, coop-
eration, friendship, wisdom, and one that is not.
So our Savior puts it. " Henceforth," says he, " I
. call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not
what his lord doeth, but I have called you friends,
for all things that I have heard of my Father I have
made known unto you." A being that can enter
into cooperation with God by choice is in a r'elation
entirely new, and must have endowments infinitely
higher than those of any being incapable of this. In
the sense now specified, all creatures below man, ani-
mate and inanimate, are literally and solely servants
of God, not knowing what he doeth. Man may
not only be a servant, but a friend. It was with a
- full apprehension of the grandeur of this relation
that Abraham was called in the Scriptures, " the
Friend of God." That nmn is not thus his friend
is the cause of all the puzzles in moral science.
It' is, too, through this power of choosing a su-
preme end that man has character as dis- Character
tinguished from characteristics. Mere from the
choice of su-
things and the brutes have characteristics ; preme end>
man has character, and this is determined by the
end chosen. If the supreme end chosen be money,
the man is avaricious ; if power, he. is ambitious ;
if the love and service of God, he is religious, and
nothing short of such' a supreme choice can make
-him either avaricious, or ambitious, or religious.
' This is the point of supreme wisdom and folly, the
cardinal point of destiny for every man.
CHAPTER V.
OBLIGATION : A GOOD AS A CONDITION.
WE see from the above the necessity of an end,
and of a supreme end. But the word A good M a
includes not merely an idea in the intellect CODdition -
of something that can be comprehended and at-
tainecj by the use of means, there is also in it an
element by which it is addressed to our emotive
nature; To be chosen by us there must be in it,
or seem to be, a good. Tracing it back we shall
find that there must be something valuable for its
own sake something good in itself, and recognized
as such within a sensibility.
What then is a good ? Strictly there is no good
that is not subjective, and so, known as subjective
. . . and objec-
such within some conscidusness ; but it tive good
will accord more with the cast of our Ian- guished.
guage, and tend to a clearer apprehension of the
subject, if we say that all good is either objective
or subjective. An objective good is anything so
correlated to a conscious being as to produce sub-
jective good. Subjective good is some form of en- ^
joyment or satisfaction in the consciousness.
52 MORAL SCIENCE.
This subjective good, not our own, but that of
Their reia- a ^ conscious beings, is so a good and
conscS sh tfie g od tliat if tnere were no conscious-
ness there would be no objective good.
If there were not a conscious being in the uni-
verse, nor could ever be, it would be good for noth-
ing.
As further showing the relation of objective good
The supreme ^ US > ^ ma J ^6 Sa ^ tna ^ ^ na t O11
good of each ^ ne su P reme regard of any one is fixed,
as the source of his subjective good, is his
God.
The objects and beings so correlated to us as to
TWO classes produce subiective good are of two classes.
of objective JL_ ,
good. They are those that cannot produce this
good voluntarily, and cannot themselves enjoy it ;
and those who can produce it voluntarily, and who
can themselves enjoy it.
Those things that can produce subjective good
First class- on 'y involuntarily are mere things, and
means'of have value in proportion to their power
to produce such good., A picture is val-
uable in proportion to the satisfaction, whether
from its intrinsic qualities, or from association, which
it is capable of giving. This is true of all mere
things. There is here no apprehension of moral
qualities,, no sense of obligation, no love. All such
things are merely things, and the means of good.
The good that can come from them is inferior in
and limited in degree.
S * OF THE '\*>
OBLIGATION. (( U NI V Ml SIT
Vv OA * :1F n K
The second class of beings who may come into
such correlation to us as to produce sub^*""^. ;
, Second class ;
jective good is of those who are capable of ^uTes^of
producing it voluntarily, and who are good -
themselves capable of enjoying it. These are per-
sons, and that disposition in them which leads them
to produce subjective good is called goodness. In
doing this they are not simply a condition, or a means,
but are a cause of good.
There are conditions and means of subjective
good, and also causes, and these are to be Distinction
carefully distinguished. The inanimate - JJ^Jg^
creation, with its laws, is the condition, andcauses -
not the cause of vegetable life. Vegetables exist
only through a force which subordinates to itself all
the laws of mere matter, and so could not have
been developed from matter and its laws, but must
have been superinduced by a cause above them.
As thus a condition for vegetables and serving them,
mere matter with its laws is lower than they. In
the same way vegetables are lower~ than animals,
and animals than man. Always, as is stated in the
third Lecture on Moral S.cience, that which is the
condition of another thing, and so serves it, is lower
than it. In this upward progress of forces as con- v
ditioning and conditioned, that which comes last' is ,
always the highest. But in thus passing up we ulti-
mately reach personality, and in that a true cause.
This brings us to the culmination, and we must
again go downward. A cause we always conceive
54 MORAL SCIENCE.
-of as higher than its effects. God, as a cause, is
higher than the universe, and so man, as far as he is
a true cause, is higher than any effects or results of
his activity. When once we have reached a per-
sonal cause there is no longer any place for condi-
tions, but only for effects, and these must always be
lower than the cause.
If then it be said that holy activity or virtue, or,
The erson w ^ich is the same thing, the person acting
a means of * accor d m g to h* 8 highest law, is a means of
happiness, happiness, we say that this does not ex-
press their true relation. The holiness is noi a
means of happiness, but the cause. It is the per-
son choosing in accordance with the end for which
God made him ; and as thus choosing, worthy of
respect, of admiration, of approbation, of compla-
cent love, of veneration. This is no " dirt-philos-
ophy," or " bread-and-butter philosophy," or " util-
itarian philosophy." It affirms obligation immedi-
ately and necessarily, and if it be in view of a
* good, as in view of what else can it be ? it is
in view of good as such ; of the good of others far
more than of our own ; and so far as it is our own,
a good like that of God himself, as being from the
activity of a nature made in his image and con-
formed to his will. Who shall say that this is low,
or mercenary, or unworthy? It is the choice of
good for the sake of good ; the good of God, and
of his universe, and this, if anything can be, is
essential goodness. That is, indeed, an utterly
OBLIGATION. 55
heartless and debasing system, which, instead of
the grandeur and play of personalities involving
free-will, and high sentiment, and disinterested
love, would reduce the universe to a machine, the
parts of which are merely utilities, and to be esti-
mated too by each one with reference to their effect
upon himself.
But besides being direct causes of good to us
there is another relation in which persons conscious
being to be .
stand to our subjective good. They are lovedas
J possessing
not only capable of causing subjective worfc ^-
good in us, but also of enjoying it, and of suffering
its opposite, and as such are to be loved with a
virtuous love for their intrinsic worth or value
as beings. A being with great capacity for sub-
jective good has great worth in distinction from wor-
thiness, and is to be loved on this ground. The
love of being in the abstract, and aside from such
capacity, is impossible. Such a being, and especially
one capable of virtue, or holiness and the good from
that, cannot merely become the cause to another
of subjective good and so excite gratitude and com-
placency, but may become to that other an object
of effort, and so call out the activity of his powers
in their highest form that there will result to him
his own subjective good.
If we except mere sensitive good, it is indeed
only the attributes of personality, imme- Attributes
diately seen or reflected, that can be the ^i^Sy
direct cause of subjective good to us as ^bjectfve
they are drawn out in our behalf, or its good -
56 MORAL SCIENCE.
indirect cause as we are active in behalf of
others.
It would appear then, that there are two ways in
subjective which subjective good may come to us.
good comes - *
through re- - Qiie is through the action of other things
ceiving and
giving. an( j persons upon us ; the other through
the activity of our own powers put forth with
reference to them that is, virtually through re-
ceiving and giving. This distinction is radical.
It is made in view of the broadest and most fun-
damental division of our nature, except perhaps
that of soul and body, and one which will be made
the basis of a classification of duties in the subse-
quent practical part.
According to this all subjective good is from
Through activity either in receiving or in giving,
me7a p nd bil ~ tnat is > through the susceptibilities or the
powers. powers. Others may exercise goodness
towards us and thus be the cause to us of subjec-
11 tive good through our capacity of receiving. We
- may also exercise goodness towards them, that is,
choose and seek to promote their good, and from
this activity of the powers in thus giving there will
be to us a higher and purer form of subjective good
than any other.
We contemplate others as capable of subjective
^ Relation good. As such we see that they have
good e of ntbe worth, and love them impartially. We
ou 1 r e own nd see tnat their good is unspeakably desira-
fue d defined". ble and valuable for its own sake, as
OBLIGATION. 5~7
much so as our own ; we choose that good for
them, we put forth efforts that they may attain it,
and in so doing we find the highest form of bur~
own subjective good. This impartial love, this
choice of \gooi for, others and effort to enable them
to attain itj i^ virtue; Virtue is not the choice or
love of virtue, or of right: it is the love of God
s ' O *
and' of our neighbor as ourselves the willing of
good the good will. That is virtue, that is right,
and it is in the putting forth of this good will that
our highest worthiness is found.
What is, then, the end and good of man ? Objec-
tively, God is his end and good. Every G oa, man's
man may properly say that God is his SSvnRnd
good. He made man so that only himself good
can be to him an adequate source of subjective
^good. Hence his dependence and filial relation
forever as made in the image of God. God is
such a good that not only all can choose Him and
find Him as adequate to each as if no other had
thus chosen Him, but that each new choice of Him,
both as augmenting his glory and increasing the
good of others, augments the joy of those who
have already thus chosen.
And not only must we receive all things from
Him, but it is only as we give back to him our active
] OV e as we love Him for his own sake as infinite
in being and in excellence that the highest joys
of holiness can come. Those joys are indeed from
the very activity that constitutes the holiness.
58 MORAL SCIENCE.
Whether we regard ourselves then as passive or
active, God is our good. " All our springs are in
Him." He is our sun. He is to us all that recent
research shows the sun to be to the forces of nature,
and more than this.
The subjective end and good of man, on the
subjective otner hand, will be, subordinately, that
Inordinate ; which we receive through the action upon
supreme. ug o f o fa er things and beings, while our
supreme good is the joy from holy activity in the
love and service of God. The very highest good
is in the putting forth of energy in God and towards
God. The happiness from this is no happening.
It is the infallible outgrowth of our innermost being
when we act according to our law. This, with all
joys of complacency in others or in ourselves inci-
dent to it, is holy happiness, or blessedness. It is
the happiness that comes from holy activity.
We have thus a subjective good both from our
passivities and our activities, from receiv-
ing and from giving. Both of these, and
in their order as higher and lower, are expressed
by the Scriptures when they say, " In thy presence
is fullness of joy ; at thy right hand are pleasures
forevermore." The joy is as an aroma from the
love, the adoration, and every highest form of vol-
untary activity called forth by the immediate be-
holding of God. The pleasures forevermore are
from the action of the susceptibilities in their adjust-
ment to the surroundings of heaven, which are fore-
shadowed by so many wonderful adjustments here.
CHAPTER VI.
OBLIGATION : TWO FORMS OF SPONTANEOUS ACTION.
BUT to understand fully the relation of our sub-
jective good to our freedom and causative Two forms
power, we need to see the relation of free- nL^ac-"
dom to the two forms of spontaneous ac- tlon '
tion.
There is first a form of spontaneous action that
precedes choice, and is conditional for it. First form
The original forms of the activity of our choice,
being in its fundamental faculties, and by which
men become revealed to themselves, are purely
spontaneous, and are the condition of all voluntary
activity. We must be, and through a spontaneous
activity know ourselves to be, before we can put
forth any voluntary activity. Consciousness itself,
in which is all subjective good, is from or in an ac-
tivity that is wholly involuntary, that commenced
and can terminate by no agency of ours.
There is also a spontaneous activity that suc-
ceeds voluntary activity and is consequent Second form
J J . succeeds
upon it. Gaining through consciousness a choice.
knowledge of ourselves, and then the control of our
faculties, we find that each form of voluntary ^ac-
60 MORAL SCIENCE.
tivity is followed and with a certainty like that of
the laws of nature by results in the consciousness
that are from a spontaneous and involuntary ac-
tivity.
The above is true both of the body and of the
ultimate mind. We put forth voluntary effort in
fn- s th a e ffect " g a i nm g food, in preparing it, in bringing
p^ximTte to * fc to tne niouth, and in masticating and
the win. swallowing it, but all this is only that It
may be delivered over to the charge of the in-
voluntary activities in tasting, in digestion, and as-
similation. No growth, or pleasure, or pain of the
body, nothing that is an ultimate end for that, can
be directly willed into being. We eat, and pleas-
ure and nutrition are the result. We approach
too near the fire, and pain is the result. These are
from activities, but not from those willed by us.
We know them, indeed, not immediately as ac-
tivities, but only in growth, and pleasure and pain
which are their result.
And so it is in the mind. We will to lie ; but
ultimate we ^ llot wn ^ ^ ne sname an d * ne remorse
nofdl^tif tnat follow. We love; but we do not
will the joy that is in it, and that cannot
be separated from it. In no case can we will di-
rectly either joy or sorrow, happiness or suffering,
or, indeed, any ultimate end. We can only will
tfc>se acts that are uniformly connected with such
' an end by our constitution, or, which is the same
thing, by the appointment of God.
OBLIGATION. 61
It is through these results in the consciousness of
his creatures that depend on activities not subject
to their will, that God governs them. All growth,
perfection, and enioyment, on the one ,,
J * God governs
hand, and all degradation and suffering on ^cTresuits
the other, are the result of spontaneous ofwilL
action consequent on voluntary action. In these
are physical pleasure and pain ; in these joy and
sorrow ; in these remorse, misery, the anguish of
despair ; in these is the blessedness of the righteous,
the peace that is like a river, the pleasures that are
at God's right hand forevermore.
But while the agent is thus compelled to work
between these tw^o forms of spontaneous Manrespon-
. . . , -M-II Bible * r ^ e
activity, which may be called the original second form
, / . J . of activity
and the secondary, their relation to him only
as free and responsible is wholly different. For the
first he is in no sense responsible. He is no more
responsible for his original faculties and desires, or
for any action of them before the possible control
of will, than he is for his being itself. For the
second he is responsible, because though spontane-
ous after the voluntary act, yet the nature of this
spontaneous activity will depend on that act. The
results are indirectly subject to the will.
We have thus seen what subjective good is, and
how it is related to our powers of agency. Theideaf0 f
Being the product of all activity that is ^! e
according to its law, the idea of it must mentar y-
run back to the very beginnings of consciousness,
62 MORAL SCIENCE.
and enter into our conception of ourselves. Of the
three great forms of our activity, knowing, feeling,
and willing, that of feeling can, like the others, be
known only by its action : and if good be indeed the
product of its first activity, then the idea of it must
be as elementary as that of thought, or of feeling
itself.
So far as good and its opposite are the product
Good and f our being without our own agency,
gtftanS-' 8 they are the immediate gift or infliction of
God.
So far as they are the result of our agency
and^TiSL they were probably intended as reward
ment. or p un i s hment, as we do or do not con-
form to the laws of our being.
CHAPTER VII.
OBLIGATION : PERSONALITY A CONDITION.
WE have now examined all the ideas conditional
for obligation except that of personality. Personalit
This holds the same place among ideas of a conditiori -
the Moral Reason that the idea of being does among
those 'of pure reason; for as all attributes and
changes and causations imply being, so do all moral
actions imply a person.
The idea of personality is simple, but it must
imply at least Moral Reason and Free-will, idea of P er-
T . . , 1.1.1 sonality sim-
It must consist in that which, in the P^-
upward progress of the creation, is added to the
animal nature that it may not only have a home
in that nature and govern it, but also govern itself
according to its own recognized law. It must con-
sist in that which gives its dignity and excellence to
our nature, and so its right to govern. This right
is from the power of self-government with reference
to ends, and so of voluntary cooperation with God,
or the reverse. It is in this that the peculiarity
and dignity of man and his right to dominion are
found. Probably the first apprehension of the
person by himself, his first knowledge of himself as
a person, is the consciousness of this dominion, first
64 MORAL SCIENCE.
over himself, and then over all that is below him.
u And God said let us make man in our imao-e,
O '
after our likeness, and let them have dominion"
The right and power of control over that which is
below him man could not have if he had not
dominion over himself.
Such prerogatives and powers, if known at all,
Seat of re- mu st be known immediately, and in
sponsibihty. k nowm g ourselves as possessing them ;
and so, as persons, we reach the centre and seat of
responsibility. This is not the reason, the will, the
conscience ; it is the person, the self, the Ego, the
man, that chooses and is under obligation.
Is man then a person ? a being whose nature
and prerogative it is to know and choose his own
end, whatever that may be ? If not, he is not ra-
tional. No definition of man as rational can be given
as far as his actions tend to ends which he neither
knows nor chooses. But if man be a person, then
we are prepared to find the point at which obliga-
tion arises.
As simple law always has respect to force acting
obligation uniformly, so does obligation, or moral
respects ' ^
choice. law, always have respect to force under
the control of a person. The science of morals has
for its condition and subject a person acting. With-
out this as given it is inconceivable. But as it is
; distinctive of the action of a person that it is deter-
mined by choice, obligation will respect that. It
^ will be obligation, first to choose some end and good,
OBLIGATION. 65
and then to act rationally for the attainment of that.
It will therefore respect the voluntary, and not at
all the spontaneous action of our nature, except
as its spontaneous is determined by its voluntary
action.
At this point able men, as Drs. Chalmers and
Archibald Alexander, have differed ; Dr. Two theo
Chalmers contending that every moral act Stature
is voluntary, and Dr. Alexander, that this f eo s ^ a -"
can be only if the word voluntary be tion -
made to include acts that are spontaneous. " The
word necessary," he says, " should never have been
applied to any exercises which are spontaneous or
voluntary, bocause all such are free in their very
nature."
It would doubtless have been conceded by both
that a sense of responsibility, and so of obligation,
is impossible with reference to an event like the ebb
and flow of the tides, that has no connection proxi-
mate or remote with the will. Certainly no one
insists more strongly than Dr. Alexander upon
freedom as a ground of responsibility. He even
says that he would admit the self-determining
power of the will, whether he understood it or not,
if that were necessary to establish the doctrine. 1 But
we have seen above that one form of spontaneous
action has no reference to x the will. It will not do
therefore to say that spontaneous action as such, is
free. What then makes the difference ? The truth
i Moral Science, p. 111. .
66 * MORAL SCIENCE.
seems to be that spontaneous action is never, like
choice, free in its own nature, and that it can become
so only indirectly and from its relation to choice.
But it is said that the motives, the desires, and
affections that lie back of our choice, are spontane-
ous, and that we are responsible for these.
Here it is to be observed, that as there is, as we
Moral spon- have seen, an original spontaneity, having
JegaiSre- no relation to choice, and for the results
sponsibiuty. of whicli WQ are not respons ftl e , and a
spontaneity of the sensitive nature for which we are
responsible only from its relation to will, so there
is a spontaneity of the emotive and moral nature, for
which we are responsible only in the same way.
Thus, when a man has become fully a miser, his
desires and affections, his hopes and fears all centre
in his treasure, and become motives to him in a mul-
titude of subordinate choices. They are all sponta-
neous, he is responsible for them, and they are all
sinful ; but this is only because they are the indi-
rect result, not, as Dr. Alexander seems to sup-
pose, of volition, but of choice. If the man had
not originally chosen money as his supreme end,
there would have been no such spontaneous product
and no such guilt.
The difficulty has been in a failure to perceive
the relation of our generic and radical
* Difficulty
r*iation e of by cn i ces to subsequent spontaneous action,
'pontlneo t^e character of which is yet determined
action. k fa Q cno i cef This is so intimate that
OBLIGATION. (37
even where the choice is not of the most radical
kind, it will yet so control the character of a large
class of desires, of affections, hopes, fears, and sub-
ordinate choices, as to cause them to be the reverse
of what they would have been. Two men, who,
with a full apprehension of the principles involved,
chose different sides in the late civil war, must have
had opposite desires and affections, and the same
events that caused hope and joy to the one, caused
fear and sorrow to the other. But all this is to be
traced back to the original choice. That determined
the army in which they marched, the leaders under
whom they served, the friendships they formed, and
very largely the direction and spontaneous move-
ment of their whole sympathetic and emotive nature.
And this, with the exception that the choice is
more radical and all-pervading, is what Man , grela .
takes place under the moral government ^rmined
of God. By a thorough choice of Him b y choice -
and his cause, the whole current of the soul, all its
motives and subordinate choices, its dispositions and
tempers, its desires and affections, its hopes and
fears, its joys and sorrows, and its ultimate des-
tiny, will be the reverse of what they would have
been if an opposite choice had been made. All
these are spontaneous, or at least independent of
volition. We are responsible for them, but only
through their relation to that generic and perma-
nent choice which determines character, and in
which character consists.
68 MORAL SCIENCE.
The difference between the natural and the moral
Moral affec- affections is, that the moral affections are
tions as dis- . . . .
tinguished conditioned upon the previous choice of
from IT. 1-1
natural. a supreme end, and derive their charac-
ter from the character of that.
We thus see the relation of spontaneous to vol-
untary action. In no case is spontaneous
Conclusion. . . , . -
action either free or responsible except
from its relation to previous voluntary action. So
far Moral Philosophy goes. It makes freedom a
condition of responsibility, and says there can be no
freedom where there is no choice.
CHAPTER VIII.
OBLIGATION NECESSARILY AFFIRMED.
THE ideas prerequisite to obligation have now
been considered, and we pass to that, its necessary
AII , affirmation ;
And here we are prepared to say that involves
the moment a man comes to the knowl- the ultimate
edge of his end, including the true good morals.
of his nature as constituted by t God, the Moral Rea-
son necessarily affirms obligation to choose that end.
Such an affirmation for the guidance of man
analogy would lead us to expect. It is guchaffir _
just that for him as rational, that instinct 5^" jj?'
is for the brute, except that man, as free, 8tiuct>
has an alternative. The law of instinct is always
from the end of the animal, and its impulses are
towards that ; and we should expect that the law
of the rational being would, in the same way, be
from his end, and that, in connection with the pre-
rogative of freedom, and for man as rational, there
would be both an idea of the end, and an impulse
towards it.
And it is just this that we find. This supreme
end need not be, and is not, known in its obligation
abstract and general form, but obligation lS!cu f ~
70 MORAL -SCIENCE.
is affirmed the moment there is furnished an occa-
sion for choice in any specific case involving the
end. If the end be to love God, or man, then, as
soon as we are brought into such relations to them
that love is possible, the obligation will be affirmed.
It is precisely thus that we judge and work in each
particular case under mathematical axioms before
being able to state them.
The affirmation of obligation thus made involves
This afflr- both an idea and a feeling ; and these are
mation in- . p v p
toivesan so in a state or fusion that we say mdit-
feeiing. ferently, the idea, or the feeling of obliga-
tion. The Moral Reason being conditioned,* as we
have seen, upon a sensibility, this is true of all its
^products. Like carburetted hydrogen, they are
charged with both light and heat. The product of
reason simply, is an idea ; the product of the Moral
Reason is an idea and a feeling thus blended, and
* this is higher. The brutes have feeling, but not
reason. Man has feeling and reason separately,
and often as opposed to each other, but in his
proper personality there is a perfect blending of
that part of his nature which feels with that which
knows, so that the moving and guiding powers be-
come one. " The wheels are full of eyes round
about."
Now let the elective power, not the conative, as
Hamilton has it, act in accordance with
Results. , , n , , . , . ,
the law ot the being thus given, and the
moral heavens are set in order for their glad way.
OBLIGATION. 71
We have now a personal force, a person under obli-
gation to control himself with reference to an end
and according to law.
Thus do we find law Moral Law. Moral Law
is the affirmation by the Moral Reason of Moral Law
. deduced,
obligation on the part of every man to defined.
choose that as his supreme- end which God designed
him for, and to do whatever would legitimately flow
from that choice. If the question respect any infe-
rior end we may be governed by inclination, choos-
ing it or not, as we please.
What the end of man is we are to learn as we
learn what the end of the eye, or the ear, Highestend
or the hand is. We are to examine his f h t a ; d
structure, his susceptibilities, his powers how i earn * d -
physical, mental, moral', and however complex they,
may be, if there be convergence and unity it can
be seen. *That there is such convergence and unity
was shown in my former lectures. In them the~-
separate systems of which man is composed were
examined. Each system has, of course, its own
end. The end of the body is to be the home and
servant of the mind, and it is most perfect when it
most perfectly fulfills that end. The end of the in-
tellect is to apprehend all that knowledge of God
and his works that will enable man to secure not
only his highest, but his whole end. In the same
way each of the other systems, as the desires, and
the affections, has its end. But when we understand
the whole structure of man and his relations, it is
72 MORAL SCIENCE.
as obvious, as was formerly shown, that he was
made to love God with all his heart and his neigh-
bor as himself, as it is that the eye was made to see
with, or the ear to hear with. This is his highest
end as active love itself as an activity, and the
further activities that spring from love. This is
what he was made to do. As capable of enjoyment
his highest end is *the joy that comes from thus
- -loving. These God 'has inseparably united. The
joy can come only from the love ; the love cannot
be without the joy.
Now what we say is, that no unperverted rational
TMsneces- and moral being can be brought into a
eary affir- . . . . ' T . p
matian the position in which he must put forth either
ultimate fact * *
in morals. love good-will on the one hand, or
' selfishness or malignity on the other, and not affirm,
immediately, and necessarily, obligation to love.
This affirmation is altogether peculiar, and is the
primary, or, if you please, the ultimate fact in mor-
als. It is made in view of the end as good the
good of beings capable of good. In it is involved
all that we mean by the word ought, which has in it
an element both of impulse and of authority. Im-
pulse is not law, even that from the moral nature.
It never can be. It is only the affirmation, the
rational affirmation of obligation that can give
binding force to law. We are under obligation
we ought to choose the good and refuse the evil.
* The good we choose and seek to promote, as good,
as Saving value in itself. The choice is right.
OBLIGATION. 73
Any impulse from a natural principle of action is
an indication that a thing is to be done if Thegphere
there be no counteracting reason ; but of im P ulse -
lower impulses are to give place to higher, and all
others to those from the moral nature. It is the."
impulses from this that are virtually made by many
the basis of moral science ; but no impulse can be
the basis of science, or can have authority as such.
Science, and the direct authority of reason -as dis-
tinguished from that which is indirect through
faith, can be base'd only on insight and comprehen-
sion ; and if the reason on the ground of which
obligation is affirmed by the Divine Mind is so hid-
'den from man that he cannot affirm it on the same
ground, then science is impossible, and this whole
subject must be relegated to the region of faith.
But if man is capable of seeing in the good of
God and his creatures that which has in- Choice of
finite worth as valuable in itself, and if he ^nded'by
is so constituted as necessarily to affirm reason -
obligation to choose and promote this good, and to
see that the principle of action which would secure
it is infinitely lovely, then is there upon him from
each and all of these the behest of reason, affirm-
ing its own authority, requiring him to choose this,
and from which he can no more escape than from
his being itself.
CHAPTER IX.
OBLIGATION : PALEY : OBLIGATION AND AU-
THORITY.
THE above account of obligation is wholly differ-
ent from that given by Paley. According to him,
to be under obligation and to be obliged are the
o o
same thing, and "a man is obliged when he is
urged by a violent motive resulting from the com-
mand of another." But according to the view
above given no direct command of another is in-
volved, and in the sense in which Paley uses the
word, the motive need not be violent.
As obligation is so early and so much connected
with the command of others, as of parents, of civil
rulers and of God, it is not, perhaps, strange that
some should make the obligation dependent on the
command. But surely mere will, a command as
such, cannot be the foundation of obligation, for
what is to legitimate the command ? Either com-
mand must be obligatory as such, or there must be
some test in a moral being by which it can be de-
termined whether a command is a righteous com-
mand, and it is only on the supposition of such a
test that any being can be " a law unto himself."
OBLIGATION. 75
But such a test can consist only in a direct affirma-
tion of the Moral Reason. Let its grounds be fully
set forth and a decision must be given within the
consciousness of a moral being from which there
can be^/or him, no appeal. The affirmation is that
the person is under obligation, and as long as this
continues to be made the man must act in accord-
ance with it or disclaim the authority of his moral
nature. Refusing to act in accordance with obliga-
tion thus affirmed, the purity and dignity and worthi-
ness of a moral being would be compromised, and
baseness and conscious degradation would be in-
curred. There would be the reaction of reason
against itself as failing to act reasonably, and so
self-condemnation, remorse, the biting back of him-
self by a being that condemns himself. So far as
we can see, it must pertain to the very nature of a
moral being to affirm obligation to choose and pro-
mote well-being rather than the reverse, and that
the alternative must be either that we do choose
this, or that we give ourselves up to be governed by
some lower principle of action and so to degrada-
tion and self-condemnation. This affirmation and
alternative we may reverently say belong to God
himself as a moral being. With him there can be
no motive from the command of another, and yet
there is no being in whom the affirmation is so ab-
solute. " Shall not the judge of all the earth do
right?"
CHAPTER X.
ULTIMATE MORAL IDEAS: WHEWELL : THEORY OF
RIGHT.
WE are now in a position to see distinctly the
Relation of relation to each other of ultimate ideas in
ultimate . . 1 .
moral ideas, morals. According to the above state-
ments moral action is in two spheres, that of choice,
and that of volition or conduct. In the sphere of
choice the ultimate conditional idea for a moral act
is an end or good ; the ultimate moral idea is obli-
gation, or the affirmation of the ought; and the
ultimate moral act is choice. Of the obligation to
choose one end rather than another the ground
must be in the end chosen, since, if two ends be
equally valuable, it can make no difference which is
chosen. The choice may be right or wrong, but
by no possibility can the obligation depend upon
any quality in the act of choosing.
In the second, or what I regard as the sub-
uitimate ordinate sphere of moral activity, the
ideas in ... ... i i 1*1
secondary ultimate conditional idea is a rule or law ;
sphere of i i i 11
morals. the ultimate moral idea is right, and the
ultimate moral act is a volition producing conformity
or want of conformity to a rule ; or, if a rule be not
admitted, it is doing right because it is right.
OBLIGATION. 77
Right has commonly been supposed to be the
ultimate, or rather to be the moral idea. Right not
T . . -, ii i *ke m ra i
t is said, and that is perhaps the popular idea -
system now, that right is a necessary and indepen-
dent idea ; that the distinctions of right and wrong
are inherent in the nature of things in the same
way as mathematical ideas are independent and
necessarily involved in the relations of space and
of quantity. But right and wrong, morally con-
sidered, can have nothing to do with any nature of
things existing necessarily, as we conceive space to
do, but only with the nature of persons, so that no
act which may not affect the interest of some per-
son can be a moral act. Right and wrong have,
indeed, nothing to do with things, but only with
actions, and it produces confusion to speak of the
nature of things, and of necessity from that when
the province of morality is wholly without, or rather
above the sphere of things, and when the only
necessity there is about it is the necessary affirma-
tion by the Moral Reason that a person capable of
apprehending good and evil is under obligation to
choose the good and reject the evil.
But if, with Whewell, we make right mean
" conformable to a rule," we shall then
Whewell.
have obligation as the moral idea, and
right will be, as it really is, a moral idea only as it
involves that.
Many acts having no reference to the supreme
end we call right, but they involve no obligation,
78 MORAL SCIENCE.
and hence are not moral. In studying it is right to
sit or to stand, because the end may be reached equal-
ly well in either way. But every ac^ bearing upon
the supreme end, and because it does thus bear
upon it, involves obligation and is thus a moral act.
The obligation which is in it, and which makes
it a moral act is there from the affirmation of the
Moral Reason in view of the good there is in the
end.
The above view provides perfectly for freedom in
what this setting obligation and moral law over
ciudes n and against all mere impulsion and craving;
implies. j t affirms that the ultimate act in morals
is generic choice ; that the proper object of choice
is good, and therefore that right is not the last word
that can and must be said on this subject. It holds
that right is a quality of action, and that action must
have some end besides its own quality. It therefore
goes back to a good to be chosen for its own sake,
and to an ultimate law demanding that it be thus
chosen, and makes all morally right action to be
right from its relation to that. This generic choice
of good it identifies with the love commanded in
the Bible, and the choice itself that is, the choos-
ing with that wisdom which the Bible says is " the
principal thing." It does not find that the law
of God is that we are to do right, but that we are
to love the Lord our God with all our hearts, and
our neighbor as ourselves, and that to do this is to
do right.
OBLIGATION. 79
The confusion from a failure to discriminate the
spheres above mentioned may be seen by
a reference to the "Elements of Morality "
by Whewefl. Whewell has just passed away, and
is the last eminent English writer on this subject.
That I may not misrepresent him, and may the
better show the relation of ideas at this point, I will
quote him at some length.
" The adjective right" he says, " signifies conformable
to rule ; and it is used with reference to the object of
the rule. To be temperate is the right way to be
healthy. To labor is the right way to gain money. In
these cases the adjective right is used relatively, that is
relatively to the object of the rule.
" It has been said also that we may have a series of
actions, each of which is a means to the next as an end.
A man labors that he may gain money, that he may
educate his children : he would educate his children,
in order that they may prosper in the world. In these
cases the inferior ends lead to higher ones, and derive
their value from these. Each subordinate action aims
at the end next above it as a good. In the series of
actions just mentioned, a man's gain is regarded as a
good because it tends to the education of his children.
Education is considered as valuable because it tends to
prosperity.
" And the rules which prescribe such actions derive
their imperative force and validity, each from the rule
above it. The superior rule supplies a reason for the
inferior. The rule, to labor, derives its force from the
rule, to seek gain: this rule receives its force (in the
80 MORAL SCIENCE.
case we are considering) from the rule to educate our
children : this again, has for its reason to forward the
prosperity of our children.
" But besides such subordinate rules, there must be a
supreme rule of human action. For the succession of
means and ends with the coi responding series of subor-
dinate and superior rules, must somewhere terminate.
And the inferior ends would have no value as leading
to the highest, except the highest had a value of its
own. The superior rules could give no validity to the
subordinate ones, except there were a supreme rule
from which the validity of all of these were ultimately
derived. Therefore there is a supreme rule of human
action. That which is conformable to the supreme
rule is absolutely right ; and is called right simply, with-
out relation to a special end. -The opposition to right
is wrong.
" The supreme rule of human action may also be
described by its object.
" The object of the supreme rule of human action is
spoken of as the true end of human action, the ultimate
or supreme good, the summum bonum.
" There are various other ways of expressing the
opposition of right and wrong, and the supreme rule of
human action ; namely, the rule to do what is right and
to abstain from doing what is wrong. We say we ought
to do what is right ; we ought not to do what is wrong.
To do what is right is our duty ; to do what is wrong is
a transgression, an offense ; a violation of our duty !
" The question why ? respecting human actions, de-
mands a reason, which may be given by a reference
from a lower rule to a higher. Why ought I to be
OBLIGATION. 81
frugal or industrious ? In order that I may not want
a maintenance. Why must I avoid want ? Because I
must seek to act independently. Why should I act in-
dependently ? That I may act rightly.
a Hence, with regard to the supreme rule, the ques-
tion Why ? admits of no further answer. Why must I
do what is right ? Because it is right. Why should
I do what I ought ? Because I ought. The supreme
rule supplies a reason for that which it commands by
being the supreme rule.
" Rightness and wrongness are, as we have already
said, the moral qualities of actions. The rules which,
in subordination to the supreme rule, determine what is
right and wrong, are moral rules. The doctrine which
treats of actions as right and wrong is morality"
It may seem strange that such a man should
come so near the truth and yet miss it, but it only
shows how difficult it is on subjects of this class to
make a step, which yet, being made, will seem per-
fectly obvious. Having admitted that the object of
the supreme rule of human action is the true end
of human action, no reason can be given why the
supreme rule should not hold the same relation to
the supreme end or good that any other rule does
to its end. That would make all rules, as they
obviously are, secondary, and would carry moral
action back to the choice of a supreme end. But
instead of this he allows of no moral action what-
ever with reference to the end, but only with refer-
ence to the rule. " The supreme rule," he says,
6
82 MORAL SCIENCE.
" supplies a reason for that which it commands by
being the supreme rule." Rightness and wrongness,
which are solely from conformity or want of con-
formity to rules, he makes the only moral qualities
of actions, and leaves no place for moral action as
intrinsically good or evil, and as having reference
to that end, which, as he allows, gives to all rules
except that which is supreme, their validity. Whe-
well perceived the necessity of ends ; he subordi-
nated rules to them ; he even subordinated lower
ends and rules to those that are higher, though he
gave no principle of subordination and no law of
limitation. But having done this he stopped short,
and made rules, and conformity to them, and right,
ultimate, instead of ends, and choice, and obliga-
tion.
Whewell says explicitly that the end of human
action is happiness. " The supreme object," says
he, " of human action is happiness. Happiness is
the object of human action contemplated in its most
general form, and approved by reason." l And yet
he regards himself, and is regarded, as belonging 1
to the a priori school, because he stops short in his
analysis, and draws all moral conduct from rules.
The system which makes right the ultimate
Theory of moral idea, with no avowed reference to
right: two
phases. rules, has two phases.
The first regards the sense, or intuition of right,
as immediate and infallible. An action is
right because it is right, and there is an
i Sec. 573.
OBLIGATION. 83
immediate intuition of it. This admits not only of
no rule as a standard, but of no regard to conse-
quences.
The other phase of this system not only allows,
but requires, the use of the intellect in gecond
seeking for relations, consequences, utili- phase '
ties, but says that the sense of right is developed
only in connection with the apprehension of these.
But it does not tell us what the particular relations
and consequences needed for this development are,
nor why the sense of right should spring from one
more than another. It is, indeed, only the indefi-
nite system of relations. It gives a place to wis-
dom, but instead of making it the right choice of a
supreme end, in which alone is wisdom, or at least
without which there can be none, it makes it merely
skill, or the means to an end.
The first phase of the above system is definite
and consistent with itself. It speaks of Thefirst
" Intuitive Morals." But it tends rather phase>
to the barren declamation of the heathen philoso-
phers about virtue, than to the love of God and
man, and would make fanatics.
The second phase of the above system making
right an intuition, but making it depend Thesec0 nd
on the perception -of relations without phase '
defining precisely what those relations are, is too
indefinite to be the basis of any system. Practically
it would agree with the system which makes good
ultimate, and if terms were perfectly understood, it
84 MORAL SCIENCE..
might be found that the advocates of the two sys-
tems really think alike.
But if, with Whewell, we make right mean
" conformable to rule," we shall exclude
Conclusions. ... . . - rTT , ,
intuition at this point. We nave, how-
ever, only to make all rules, the supreme rule no
less than others, derive their authority from ends,
to find room for the moral intuition in connection
with the supreme end. It is there that an ultimate
analysis would carry it, and it is in connection with
that, and with choice as the ultimate action of the
will that we find that affirmation of obligation of
which we have spoken, and in that Moral Law.
CHAPTER XL
IS THE AFFIRMATION OF OBLIGATION LAW ?
BUT tlie question now arises, whether the affirma-
tion above spoken of would be law. When the
Moral Reason affirms obligation to choose and to do
good, and to reject and abstain from doing evil, is
that law ? Law, it is said, requires a lawgiver, and
a penalty annexed.
Something will here depend upon definition, but
that it is properly a law will appear (1) Affirmation
. . ... of obligation
Because it it be not so, then it is impos- is law.
sible that any moral being should be " a law unto
himself."
Animals are a law unto themselves by that un-
reflective principle which we call instinct, and which
beautifully typifies the operation of the moral na-
ture. There is in them force, an end, and guiding
power, which, as producing uniformity, must act by
some rule, and so is called a law. As guiding it to
its end, instinct is the law of the animal ; and, in
the same way, this affirmation of obligation to choose
his end is properly, and ought to be accepted as, the
law of the man. The animal having his end chosen
for him, and having no alternative, knows the law
86 MORAL SCIENCE..
only as an impulse ; but man, having comprehen-
sion, with a possible alternative, knows the law also
as an idea, and the end proposed by it as the proper
object of rational choice. This makes the law in
man to be that of a person ; it makes it to be moral
law, and we can conceive of no other possible way
in which a person can be a law unto himself.
Moral, as distinguished from positive law, is that
Moral law, f r which a reason can be assigned aside
from the command. To a rational being
mere command can never be a reason for obedience
except through faith. Mere command may appeal
to the sensitive nature through fear, but not to
reason. For one who could trace no connection
between the thing commanded and his supreme
end, confidence in the lawgiver as wise and good,
and that alone, could make the law obligatory.
Ultimate reasons for actions can be drawn only
from ends, and the highest reasons from the highest
ends. If then we suppose the whole end of a being
to be in question, the highest possible obligation
will be imposed ; and the affirmation of obligation
in view of such an end will be simply the affirma-
tion by reason of obligation to act reasonably.
What higher end or ground of obligation can there
be than the good of all beings capable of good, our-
selves included ? and it is the affirmation by the
Moral Reason of obligation to promote this fully and
impartially that we call Moral Law.
If we may venture to speak of God in such a
IS THE AFFIRMATION OF OBLIGATION LAW? 87
connection, we can conceive of Him as acting mor-
ally in no other way than this. He acts in Godact8in
view of ends, and so rationally, but if wof fe
his reason did not affirm obligation to choose some
ends and reject others, we cannot see that He would
be amoral being. So is He a law unto himself. So
only can He be. So is man, who is made in his im-
age, a law unto himself; and it is because man is
made in his image that God proposes to him the
very same end as a ground of obligation which He
himself recognizes. God seeks his own glory, which
is simply his perfections manifested in promoting
the highest ends. He seeks to promote blessedness
unselfishly and impartially. Man is to do- the same,
and for the same reason. The will of God does
indeed come in, and the conscience is so made as
to respond to that, but the ultimate ground of obli-
gation is not in will as will, but in those ends, hav-
ing intrinsic value, which ought to determine the
will.
But (2) Authority is an attribute of law, and
obligation as thus affirmed involves that. Obligation
. . involves
It is this attribute of authority which authority.
Bishop Butler specially claimed as belonging to the
moral faculty, and as fitting it to legislate
for man. " It is," says he, " by this fac-
ulty natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that
he is a law to himself; by this faculty, I say, not
to be considered merely as a principle in his heart
which is to have some influence as well as others,
88 MORAL SCIENCE.
but considered as a faculty in kind and nature
supreme over all others, and which bears its own
authority of being so."
And not only is there this inherent authority in
the nature of obligation, but, as affirmed obligation
by the reason of a creature it implies a dTvhiTcom-
divine command. In creating beings in his
image, and in placing before them the same ends in
view of which He acts, there is implied the whole
authority of God as guardian of the universe for the
attainment and security of those ends. This it is
that makes Him a father, and his creatures children,
for in a well-constituted family the father and the
children act for a common end, the father from
comprehension of the end, the children, according
to their intelligence, partly from that, and partly
from faith ; and no being incapable of acting for
the same end as a parent can be properly a child.
Again, it may be inquired whether all authority
does not imply a penalty when the com- obligation
T , . , implies a
mands imposed by it are not obeyed. If penalty,
so, then the notion of penalty, which has been
thought by many to be essential to that of law, is
not wanting here. That a command uttered
through the constitution should announce distinc-
tively its own penalty, is not, indeed, possible. As
fear, when there is danger to the constitution from
the violation of physical well-being, does not an-
nounce the nature or extent of the penalty, but
only the fact that there is one, so we might appre-
OBLIGATION. 89
hend that there would be, connected with danger
to moral well-being, something indicative of pen-
alty, " a certain fearful looking for of judgment,"
and this we find there is.
Thus do we find Moral Law. It is an affirmation
through the Moral Reason of obligation to Conclugion
choose the supreme end for which God ^fween 06
made us, that is, to choose the good of all SvSied nd
beings capable of good, our own included, law-
and to put forth all those volitions which may be
required to attain or secure that good. Such a law
within a man will cause him to be without excuse
in the absence of positive law, and will enable him
to recognize the sacredness and obligation of a
code of moral laws when imposed by another. It
makes him a proper subject of moral government.
It is from this that the law externally revealed
finds a response in every breast, and becomes its
own witness that it is from God ; and if it be in-
deed the true law of the conscience then can that
never be at peace till it and the law are in con-
formity. If we suppose a revealed law to be iden-
tical with the Moral Law in its substance, it will still
differ from it in emanating from an authority with-
out ourselves, and in having annexed to it a positive
and specific penalty. 1
i See Appendix A.
CHAPTER XI.
CONSCIENCE.
MORAL REASON affirms Moral Law. This makes
Conscience possible. Conscience is the
Definition, . / 7
andfunc- moral consciousness oj man in view oj his
tions. . -I -!\/r i T T
own actions as related to Moral Law. It
is a testifying state. As the name imports, it is
a double knowledge, a knowledge by the man of
himself together with a knowledge of the law and
as related to that. It involves a recognition by the
person of the moral quality of his own acts, and the
^feelings consequent upon such recognition. It
affirms obligation before the act, approves or dis-
approves after the act, and in doing this indicates
^future reward and punishment.
As thus' defined, Conscience is not the whole of
conscience the moral nature. The Moral Reason rec-
whoie of the ognizes Moral Law, and affirms its univer-
moral na- *' . p ,, , .. . T .
ture. sal obligation for all moral beings. It is
the office of Conscience to bring man into personal
relation to this law. It sets up a tribunal within
him by which his own actions are judged, but it is
under Moral Reason and not under Conscience that
CONSCIENCE. 91
we judge of the conduct of others. For such judg-
ment there is needed the knowledge of Moral Law,
of the moral quality of actions, and the ability to
compare the actions with the law. In all this is
knowledge involving Moral Reason ; there is the
science, but not the con-science. There is no im-
pulse, no testifying state, no self-approval or re-
morse, all of which must be regarded either as a
part of Conscience, or inseparable from it.
In Conscience, as affirming obligation in view of
good to be attained or promoted by our- Conscience
selves, there is involved a peculiar motive j^ 1 ^ 68 the
to action that is expressed by the word " ou s hfc -"
ought. This is a motive wholly unknown to any
being below man. An animal may be moved by
hope, or fear, or desire, or impulse, but we have no
evidence that any one ever does an act because it
ought. There is no evidence that an animal ever
consciously recognizes law of any kind, much less-
Moral Law. But the peculiar significance and bind-
ing force of the word ought as from its relation to
Moral Law. There is in it impulse, but also obligaV
tion the felt bond upon a rational creature, as
rational, to obey the law of his being.
It is solely as the interpreter of Moral Law that
Conscience has 'authority. From that is its ^ f u ^ ori * y
power to originate the word ought, and J^^ 8
whenever the mandate and impulse in- and scope,
volved in that word are truly derived from the law
they are to be obeyed at all hazards. It would be
92 MORAL SCIENCE.
absurd to say that anything could excuse a man
from doing what he ought to do. Moral Law must
be supreme. If there be not a faculty in man that
recognizes moral law, he is not a moral being ; but
if there be, then % that law must have authority in
virtue of its being law. It must be always obliga-
tory and can admit of no exception. Rules, as
means to an end, may admit of exception, but the
great Law of Love can admit of no exception.
The word ought, as has been said, implies both
obligation impulse and obligation. These are to be
and impulse n .. i i p i i IT
dfotin- distinguished ; for while obligation always
guished. , , J
Limitation involves impulse, there are yet impulses
of moral J
impulses. from the moral nature, often too mistaken
for conscience, which do not involve obligation.
These were needed. Coming up, as man does from
entire ignorance, he needed in his moral nature
particular tendencies and impulses to direct him in
a more special way than could belong to the general
command of royal authority that must bear sway
over all. Accordingly we have special impulses
under such limited ideas as justice, mercy, and
truth. These afford a presumption in favor of the
course indicated, but require regulation precisely
like pity, or shame, or any other spontaneous or
impulsive part of our frame. Such impulses may
conflict with each other. Pity would relieve all
beggars ; benevolence would say no. Justice would
often punish when mercy would say no. If there
were an absolute justice with no limitation from
CONSCIENCE. 93
love, mercy would be impossible. Even the im-
pulse to truth is to be so controlled that the truth is
not to be spoken at all times. Besides, what is to
prevent justice from running into revenge, or com-
passion from becoming weakness ? Plainly we need
an authority that shall decide even among the im-
pulses of the moral nature.
This distinction between impulses towards some
particular form of right action, and that impulse
general control of the Moral Reason which law.
becomes an enlightened conscience when our own
actions are concerned, has been too much over-
looked. We need to make it because many con-
found these particular impulses with Conscience,
and great abuses have come from following them
blindly. Impulse cannot be law.
But if impulse be not law, we need to inquire
under what conditions the decisions of Con- conscience
science must be given so that the impulses Decide to
connected with them may be safely fol- rightly -
lowed.
In deciding this, we are to remember that the
decisions of the conscience no more depend on the
will than do those of the intellect. The conditions
being given its action is necessitated, and we can
control that action only by controlling the con-
ditions. If this were not so, man would not have a
moral nature. But since he can control the con-
ditions, a man may be bound to have right de-
cisions of his conscience precisely as he is to have
right decisions of the intellect.
94 MORAL SCIENCE.
Both the intellect and the conscience act in two
Analogous different and analogous spheres. The
conscience first sphere of the intellect is that of ulti-
and Intel- ...
lect. mate intuitions. In this it is uniform and
infallible in its judgments. That twoparalled lines
cannot enclose a space, and that every body must
be in space, all capable of understanding the terms,
will agree. So the first sphere of the conscience is
that of ultimate choices, where the supreme end of
man, and essential goodness and wickedness are
concerned. Here Conscience is brought face to
face with Moral Law, and when this is done it can
decide in but one way. It cannot approve the
choice of evil as evil. It cannot say, or be made to
say, that malignity, which is essential wickedness,
is, or can be obligatory. When the law says,
" choose the good, reject the evil ; " " love God and
your neighbor," Conscience must recognize this as
obligatory .under all circumstances, because there
are no conditions, and no means can come between
the conscience and the choosing. Even volition is
not needed. The act of choosing is simple and
ultimate. No one can teach another how to do it,
and if a man do not choose the good, the cause and
the fault must be in himself.
But the good which it is the end of man to pro-
conscience mote is seldom presented thus purely and
follows the TT r r .
judgment. simply. Hence the need or the exertion,
often of the strenuous exertion, of every faculty to
discriminate it. Hence cases before the tribunal of
CONSCIENCE. 95
conscience may be like those before a court, re-
quiring a careful weighing of testimony and of
probabilities. In such cases the question is not, it
never can be, Shall we do right? Shall we do
what we ought to do ? but, What is right ? What
ought we to do ? and in deciding this it will be
found that we are really inquiring whether the
course in question can be brought under the Law
of Love. If not, there would be no tribunal. In
these cases, and always, the moment we pass beyond
the ultimate choice and supreme end to that where
means are to be used, there is room for diversity
of judgment. Different practices claim to come
under this law of love. That claim is denied, and
in the ignorance and endless confusions of this world
it is often difficult to settle questions that thus arise.
Is revenge, or polygamy, or the sale of ardent spirits
right ? Is war right ? Is it right to deceive an en-
emy? Here the conscience may not be fairly
brought face to face with the moral law. It must
follow the judgment, and that may be wrong from
ignorance or prejudice. Are these for the highest
good of the community and of those engaged in
them ? Are they accordant with the law of love ?
This law every conscience will affirm that we ought
to obey. Here will be uniformity. But in regard
to specific practices the decisions will vary as they
are supposed to be, or not to be, in accordance with
the law. In this way honest, but partially in-
formed persons may differ in regard to many things.
96 MORAL SCIENCE.
This will not show a diversity of moral judgment, or
in the action of Conscience, but simply that it will
follow the judgment.
But the main cause of the diversity and confusion
Confusion f moral judgments among men is the
j ? udm<Tnts. stupefying and bewildering effect of the
choosing of a wrong supreme end. When
that is once done principle is abandoned, the guid-
ance of Conscience is abandoned, and it immediately
becomes the interest of the man to evade fair issues.
The end being decided on, irrevocably so, every-
thing will be viewed in false relations. The orig-
inal question in regard to which Conscience is in-
fallible is now put and kept out of sight, and every-
thing will be judged of as right or wrong from its
relation to the end chosen. In such cases Con-
science will still wait on the judgment even though
a wrong supreme end has been chosen. It does
not approve anything as evil, but the man has said
to evil, " Be thou my good," and the conscience is
deceived. Thus it is that a man may come to think
that he " ought to do many -things contrary " to
truth and righteousness, and go on acting upon
false judgments which a thorough honesty would
sweep wholly away.
Of such honesty, or as some would call it, sin-
sincerity cerity, the ultimate point is that a man
conditional J ]
foreniight- p u t himself face to face with the Moral
ened con- L
science. Law, and the whole of it that, as our
Saviour says, he should " come to the light." Let
CONSCIENCE. 97
this be done, and the moral consciousness will re-
spond rightly, and the impulse connected with such
response will have legitimate and sovereign author-
ity. The simple question is, Has God so revealed
the Moral Law in man that he can be a law unto
himself? If so, Conscience must be the moral con-
sciousness in presence of that law, and all mandates
and impulses from that consciousness must be
authoritative, or there is, and can be, no law. Such
impulses will be rational and moral, and a conscience
so acting will be an enlightened conscience.
But if the moral being, the person, turn wholly
from the law, if he choose a wrong su- Result of a
7 u & want of sin-
preme end, then is the seat itself of author- cerifc y-
ity corrupted. He turns from the ark of God and
the tables of the law to the worship of idols. There
is now no rightful authority. There is anarchy.
The law being set aside, the -very condition of a
right moral consciousness is wanting. " Unto
them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing
pure ; but even their mind and conscience is de-
filed." The man is lost. The light that was in
him has become darkness, and "how great is that
darkness." If a man would have " a good con-
science," he must first be "in all things willing to
live honestly."
What we say, then, on this subject is, 1st, that
when the conscience is fairly brought face
J Conclusions.
to face with the Moral Law, the great law
7
98 MORAL SCIENCE.
of love, its decisions will be uniform and authorita-
tive.
2d. That persons may honestly differ respecting
the means of fulfilling the Moral Law, one approving
as right what another disapproves as wrong. And
3d. That when once a wrong supreme end has
been chosen no consistency or uniformity of judg-
ment can be expected. " Even their mind and con-
science is defiled."
We have thus considered Conscience in its double
nature, as both rational and impulsive. That it has
a nature thus double has always made it difficult of
investigation ; but only through such a faculty, con-
ditioned on a sensibility, were moral law and ade-
quate motive power possible.
DIVISION II
OF LOVE.
CHAPTER 1.
RATIONAL LOVE : ITS CHARACTERISTICS AND
SPHERE.
HAVING now considered the nature and relations
of Law, particularly of Moral Law, we turn to those
of Love.
Like law, love is a term of great breadth and
variety in its application ; like that too, it Love, an
includes in its lowest use mere things term,
without sensibility. We are said to love food,
money, books, fame. Thus used it includes only
the element of desire, which is common to love in
all its forms, but does not constitute it. The com-
mon element of law is a rule regulating force, and
its common result is order. The common element
of love is desire, and its common result an inclina-
tion towards, or complacency in the object loved.
In this application of it moral science has no more
to do with love than it hus with law as applied to
matter.
100 MOKAL SCIENCE.
There is also an instinctive love, sometimes called
instinctive natural affection. This is common to ani-
mals and to man. It is from the emotive
nature simply, and so, blind and passionate, not
comprehending itself or its object. As instinctive,
it is an affection which leads to acts often of great
apparent self-denial, which tend to promote or secure
the end of the being loved. It tends to secure that,
and not the end of the being putting forth the love,
and is thus a beautiful type of a higher rational
and disinterested love. This rational love always
has its root in a generic choice. It is by having its
root in such a choice that rational and moral love,
and indeed all rational and moral affections, are
distinguished from those that are natural.
In accordance with the above, rational love pre-
Rationai supposes a knowledge of the supreme end
of the being loved, and involves the choice
for him of that end. Its object must be a person.
In strictness we desire things, but love only per-
sons. It is not properly a disposition, though a
disposition and a habit of acting so as to secure
the end chosen will be generated by any generic
act of choice. Only a rational being can have a
supreme end, and the choice by us of that end for
another so as to be willing to put forth efforts and
make sacrifices for its attainment is rational love.
In the whole process and formation of this love
Elements of three things are to be distinguished,
rational There is (1) a perception of worth as
RATIONAL LOVE. 101
distinguished from worthiness. This involves an
appreciation of the capabilities, and also of the lia-
bilities of the being, and can be, only as we know
his end, the desirableness of his attaining it, and
the fearfulness of his not doing so. This is rather
a condition of love than one of its elements. There
is (2) a " propension " of mind, as Edwards calls
it, towards the being, and a desire that he should
attain his end. This is an indispensable element of
love, but not the love itself. It is spontaneous,
and may be overcome by other forms of spontane-
ous action. That it may become rational love
there must be (8) a choice for the being of his end,
and such a devotement of ourselves to him that
is, to the attainment by him of his end and good,
that we shall be willing to make sacrifices for it as
we would for our own. It is this last only which
constitutes the whole process, rational and free, and
brings it under the control of Moral Law. 1
From this general character of rational love we
see at once what self-love and benevo- seif-iove
lence must be, and their relations to each lence.
other. Self-love is the choice by any being of his
own legitimate good. It is the choice for himself
of the good that must come from the activity of his
powers in the pursuit and enjoyment of his supreme
end. Benevolence is the choice and will that other
beings shall attain their own legitimate good, that
is, the good that must come to them from the activ-
1 See Appendix B.
102 MORAL SCIENCE.
ity of their powers in the pursuit of their supreme
end.
In its lower forms benevolence is manifested by
so controlling all sensitive beings within our power,
and incapable of choosing their end, that that end
shall be attained; and in its higher form, by seek-
ing to induce all who are capable of choosing their
own end to choose it. The measure of benevolence
is the amount of effort and self-sacrifice that any
one is willing to put forth and endure that others
may attain their end. Rational love as a whole
will then include a choice by us for all other beings
of their end and good, and for ourselves of our own
end and good. It will also include the necessary
volitions and activities for the attainment of those
ends.
In the above statement it will be seen that the
Seif-iove point of union between self-love and be-
fen^harl " nevolence is the common element of good,
monized. . is
valuable in itself, and that through this they con-
stitute the one whole of rational love. Hence the
ground of obligation for self-love and benevolence
is the same ; and hence, too, there can never be
opposition between them. On the contrary, they
are conspiring forces, not only as having a common
object, but as mutually contributing to each other.
That form of activity by which we promote the
good of others, is, more than any other, promotive
of our own good.
RATIONAL LOVE. 103
From a failure to perceive this narmony, or
rather unity in the parts of one whole, much use-
less discussion and some pernicious systems have
arisen. That this union should be seen and acted
on is one of the great wants of the world.
CHAPTER H.
COMPLACENT LOVE AND RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION.
BEFORE leaving the topic of love, it ought to be
First indi- added, that, subsequent to rational love,
of C rat1onai an( ^ ma( le possible by it, are certain indi-
iove. rect resu it s ; and first, the love of compla-
cency. This is not the love commanded by God,
since that includes love to the wicked, and even to
our enemies. It is conditioned, not on being as
having capacity for good and evil, but as having
will and choosing rightly. Its condition is moral
excellence in the person beloved, and it also implies
moral excellence in the person loving. It is not
approbation or admiration. These may be felt by
the wicked. It is delight and joy in view of the
beauty of holiness, and a sympathy with its pos-
sessor by which we are united in affection to him.
This is among the highest and most delightful of
the affections, and will be one great element of the
joy of heaven, but it differs from rational love in
being not so much a choice as an emotion, or rather
it is choice in connection with all that makes emo-
tion delightful. This emotion, which is what is
commonly meant by the love of complacency, is
COMPLACENT LOVE AND RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION. 105
one of those spontaneous and uniform results of
generic choice of which I have spoken, which is
not the direct product of will, but for which we are
responsible.
And not only are the love of complacency and
the affections cognate with that made second indi-
possible by rational love, but also right- rect result '
eous indignation and the affections cognate with
that. These involve no malignity. They are but
the necessary evolution of rational love when its
ends are imperilled by wickedness. They are neces-
sary to the authority of law, and to the guardian-
ship of the rights and interests of the universe.
The interests at stake in God's universe are un-
speakably precious. As these are apprehended and
valued, the worthiness and beauty of an impartial
and entire consecration to them are more seen, and
so also are the un worthiness and baseness of a dis-
regard of them, or opposition to them, and just so
intense as the approbation and the admiration may
be on the one hand, must the condemnation and
abhorrence be on the other. It is this double as-
pect of love, revealing the whole moral nature, and
turning in every way like the flaming sword that
kept the way of the tree of life, that is termed
holiness.
DIVISION m.
THE LAW OF LOVE.
CHAPTER I.
HOW LOVE BECOMES LAW.
WE have thus seen what Moral Law and Rational
Love are. Moral Law is the necessary affirmation
by the Moral Reason of obligation to choose and
promote well-being. If we suppose a choice or an
action that can have no bearing upon well-being,
it is impossible to conceive of obligation to make
the choice or perform the action. Neither can be
right or wrong. But if any choice or action will
promote well-being, Moral Law will demand that
the choice be made or the action done. But it is
this very choice that is the central element of the
love demanded, for rational love is the choice by
us of the supreme end and good of another, invol-
ving a readiness to make sacrifices for that end and
good as we would for our own. Hence it is that
" Love is the fulfilling of the law," the very thing
it requires.
In this view of it there is a double motive for
HOW LOVE BECOMES LAW. 107
the choice of good, one the imperative of law, the
other the intrinsic value and attraction T
Double mo-
of good. If there were not in this in- choic f eof he
trinsic value, aside from the affirmation of good '
obligation, a reason why good should be chosen,
obligation must base itself upon nothing, and could
not be rationally affirmed. No one can be under
obligation to anything for which there is not, aside
from the obligation, more reason than there is
against it. The thing required is the choice of a
supreme end and commitment to it. This may be
done from the imperative of law, or from the at-
traction of good, or from their combined effect, the
whole nature thus conspiring to induce that love in
which must be found our own highest good, and
through which alone we can do good to others.
Being the rational choice of good, love can never
become a bondage, though it be required by an im-
perative, but it is only when the choice is so abso-
lute in view of the good that the imperative comes
in simply as a conspiring force swelling the current
and adding the joy of self-approbation, that there
is perfect freedom. Let the imperative be in view
of an object approved by reason, and attractive of
every rational affection, and the consent of the soul
will be that of a young heart affiancing itself to the
object of its choice. It will be Reason choosing
rationally with no disturbing influence, and that is
perfect freedom. It is a rational creature putting
forth every energy with perfect love under a per-
fect law.
108 MORAL SCIENCE.
Thus it is that love as obligatory is the law of
Love, the our being. In substance, and as express-
imperative T 1
in G( (Ts i n nr his inmost nature. LOVE is the one
word and in m 5 t m
niaa - imperative word uttered by (jrod in the
Bible. It is also the one imperative word uttered
by Him through the constitution and conscience
of man, and in the coincidence of these two utter-
ances we find a perfect proof that both are from
Him.
Law and Love ! These are the two mightiest
forces in the universe, and thus do we
Conclusion. . , .. n .
marry them. I he place ot the nuptials
is in the innermost sanctuary of the soul. As in
all right marriage, there is both contrariety and deep
harmony. Law is stern, majestic, and the fountain
of all order. Love is mild, winning, the fountain
of all rational spontaneity, that is of the spontaneity
that follows rational choice. Love without law is
capricious, weak, mischievous ; opposed to law, it is
wicked. Law without love is unlovely. The high-
est harmony of the universe is in the love of a
rational being that is coincident with the law of that
being rationally affirmed ; and the deepest possible
jar and discord is from the love, persistent and utter,
of such a being in opposition to his law. It is be-
cause there is in the Divine Being this harmony of
law with love that He is perfect. It is because this
harmony is required in the Divine government that
that is perfect, and no philosophy for the regulation
of human conduct can be both vital and safe in
HOW LOVE BECOMES LAW. 109
which that same union is not consummated. In
our philosophies, generally, this is not done. Let
it be done, and philosophy will no longer be com-
plained of as inefficient or skeptical ; it will work
with power and in harmony with the Bible. Such
a union is demonstrably the only condition of per-
fection for the individual or for society, and when
it shall be universally consummated, the Millen-
nium will have come.
CHAPTER II.
THE RELATION OF LOVE TO OTHER DUTIES.
HAVING now seen what the Law of Love is, we
Love in- need to see how it connects itself with spe-
cific duties, cific duties. Love is sometimes said to be
the sum of all our duties, and that it does include
them in some sense the Scriptures assert when they
say that " Love is the fulfilling of the law."
But how does love include other duties ? Is it
by a process of generalization, as we group
The difficulty. , r . ,. . -, ', i ^i
a great number of individuals under the
one term animal ? So some think, making each
virtue a part of love. Others say that a generaliza-
tion so wide as to include under a single name and vir-
tue all others, as justice, mercy, truth, temperance,
etc., becomes indefinite and valueless ; and besides
that we are conscious of other moral ideas, and of
judging immediately and intuitively under them in
a way to preclude this view. Thus it is said that
we are immediately conscious of obligation to tell
the truth without conscious or actual reference to
any law of love.
This difficulty we obviate by observing the rela-
tion of primitive ideas to our subsequent thinking.
THE RELATION OF LOVE TO OTHER DUTIES. Ill
As we have seen, moral action implies the activity
of each of the three great departments of D ifficult
our nature, the Intellect, the Sensibility, obviated -
and the Will, and each of these furnishes an ultimate
idea always involved in such action. From the in-
tellect, in the form of reason pure, we have the idea
of existence, from the sensibility that of good, and
from the will that of freedom.
In the department of intellect we have as the
condition of all other ideas, whether intui- in intellect
. . . a conditional
tional or from experience, the idea or ex- idea.
istence. We then have, not as generalized from it,
but as conditioned and regulated by it, the idea, let
us say, of our personal identity. Involved in this
are the two ideas of existence and of time, and
wherever the idea of personal identity goes that of ex-
istence and of time must go with it. It can no more
outrun or transcend them than the shadow can out-
run its substance, and yet it has a similar source as
an idea of reason, and is, within its sphere, the
basis of immediate and necessary judgments. This
is true of other necessary ideas, as of causation
and resemblance, all of which have their conditions
and subordinations.
And the same is true of moral ideas. The char-
acteristic of these is that they presuppose A condi-
* _ * A tional idea
a person capable of acting with reference in morals.
to an end that includes a good. They all imply
freedom, and a good in some sensibility to be en-
joyed. It is the idea, necessarily affirmed, of
112 MORAL SCIENCE.
obligation to choose and impartially promote this
good that holds the same place among moral ideas
that the idea of existence does among those of pure
reason.
The idea of existence is awakened by the first
object we know, and enters unchanged into our
conception of every new object till we reach that of
an illimitable and infinitely diversified universe.
This is by no generalization, no gathering of the
many into one, but by the transfusion of the one
idea into the many. The idea of existence as an
idea cannot change, but our conception of actual
and possible existence may be illimitably enlarged.
So it is with the idea of good. It arises from
Thiscondi- the first normal activity of the sensibility,
tional idea . . . _.
that of good, and travels with us as we discriminate its
various kinds, just as we do the various kinds of
existence, till we reach the conception of a perfect
and absolute good for God and his creatures. Hav-
ing thus the idea of good, and of obligation to love,
that is, of the Law of Love, under that, we can then
have the idea, let us say of justice, as conditioned
upon the idea of that wider obligation, and as al-
ways carrying that with it. Entering into it as a
conditioning idea, love will be so a part of justice
that justice can never go counter to love, or to any
other of the virtues, into all of which, as a part,
love must thus, and equally, enter. As it is the
presence of the idea of being that enables us to
assert anything under the ideas of identity or re-
THE RELATION OF LOVE TO OTHER DUTIES. 113
semblance, so it is the presence of good that enables
us to assert any obligation under justice or truth.
As in this sense under love, and partaking of it
as conditioned upon it, there is room for Duties how
any number of specific moral ideas, as of fromiove.
justice, mercy, veracity, and for the affirmation of
immediate obligation under them within their
sphere, while yet that obligation will be limited by
the conditioning idea that gave to each particular
idea its leave to be. The idea of justice is a moral
idea. It is an idea of a mode of action in which
the interests of persons are involved. It is not the
same as the idea of love or of benevolence, nor is
it, as some have asserted, an attribute of benevo-
lence. It is as independent of love as the idea of
identity is of that of existence, but no more ; and
the judgments under the one are as immediate as
those under the other. Still its very existence and
sphere are determined by the wider idea of good
and of obligation to choose that ; and though jus-
tice must do its " strange work," it will yet cease
to be justice and become tyranny if it ceases to
have its root in love and its limit from that.
We thus find provision for that comprehensive-
ness of love which is attributed to it in
. . Conclusion.
the Scriptures, and also for those imme-
diate impulsions which arise in connection with
specific moral ideas, but which are yet to be tested
and limited by their relations to the wider law,
to that, indeed, which alone is absolute law
8
CHAPTER III.
RECONCILIATION OF SYSTEMS.
FROM the general views above given it is obvious
how impossible it must be to construct a complete
system of morals that is either wholly intuitional,
or wholly teleological. Intuitional systems have
their basis in the Moral Reason ; teleological sys-
tems have their basis in the Sensibility ; but as the
products of the Moral Reason are conditioned upon
those of the Sensibility, it is clear that the ideas from
each must be inseparably intertwined in any system.
Failing to see that a theory of action for the whole
man the highest form of his activity, must be
based on his whole nature, the advocates of the in-
tuitional system have sought to construct a theory
from the intellect alone. Finding the ideas of ob-
ligation, right, justice, in their place as essential
*and ineradicable parts of our frame, they have not
^sufficiently noticed their dependence upon a Sensi-
bility, and their nature as involving feeling. The
advocates of teleological systems, on the other hand,
have often, like Paley, and with the whole school of
experience, either denied altogether or questioned
the existence of moral intuitions, failing to see the
RECONCILIATION OF SYSTEMS. 115
impossibility of morality at all without them. But
if we admit on the one hand that a Sensibility, and
its products in some form, are the necessary con-
dition of moral ideas ; and on the other that there
are moral ideas that are regulative in their sphere
as those of the pure reason are in theirs, we have
materials for a system in which the demands of the
Reason and of the Sensibility are both met. The
Will acting from the combined light and warmth of
the two will have both impulse and guidance, and
that circle of interdependence heretofore spoken of
will be complete.
It has been supposed that either goodness, or a
good holiness, or happiness must be ultimate
in a moral system. The truth is, each is ultimate.
Goodness is wholly from the Will, and ultimate for
that. It is the impartial choice of good, and can be
goodness only from its relation to that. A good,
on the other hand, is wholly from the Sensibility,
and is ultimate for that. It can have no moral
quality. When we say holy happiness, we simply
mean happiness from holiness. Goodness is good
in itself intrinsically so. It is worthy of appro-
bation on its own account. It is the only thing
that can be commanded or approved. A good, on
the other hand, is a good in itself intrinsically a .
good. It is valuable on its own account. It is the
only thing that has intrinsic value, and all good
things are good from their relation to this. We
have thus an ultimate goodness, but possible w only on
116 MORAL SCIENCE.
the condition of an ultimate good. It is the very
choice of good by the Will that is immediately known
as goodness. It is the blessedness accompanying this
choice that is immediately known as a good, and the
highest good. Thus is there from the very action
of the will the highest form of sensibility. Thus
do the Sensibility and the Will each contribute its
equally independent and indispensable part to the
one moral system.
In what is said above, goodness is used as synony-
mous with holiness. They are the same except
that holiness indicates goodness, more especially in
its aspect towards wickedness.
Perhaps the relation of the ideas in question, to-
Good and gether with the ambiguities of the word
good, as originating both from the Sensi-
bility and the Will, may be illustrated thus :
i Goodness. Good. A good man, as choosing
(good, and producing it volun-
tarily.
Sensibility f A Good - Good. A good apple, as pro-
I ducing good involuntarily.
Intellect Kational Ideas.
When therefore the Scriptures say, " Acquaint
now thyself with Him and be at peace : thereby
good shall come unto thee ; " they must refer to a
product of the Sensibility. When an eminent writer
says, " I hold that there is an inherent and essen-
tial distinction between good and evil, just as there
is between truth and falsehood," 1 he must refer to
1 Dr. McCosh, Pres. Review, No. 63, p. 7.
RECONCILIATION OF SYSTEMS. 117
a product of the Will, and can only mean that there
is an inherent and essential difference between
goodness and wickedness.
Moral Science must be based on the facts of our
nature. Those facts no man has stated
more accurately than Bishop Butler, and
the system contained in the present work is that
which I suppose those facts, as stated by him, not
only justify, but require. Butler stated facts, but
framed no system for the reconciliation of those
seemingly discrepant. No man asserted more
strenuously than he the direct approval by con-
science of certain actions irrespective of conse-
quences. That he saw as a fact. And yet he
says, "It may be allowed without any prejudice to
the cause of virtue and religion, that our ideas of
happiness and misery are of all our ideas the near-
est and most important to us ; that they will, nay,
if you please, that they ought to prevail over those
of order, and beauty, and harmony, and proportion,
if there should ever be, as it is impossible there
ever should be, any inconsistence between them/' 1
This he saw as another fact, that is, he saw the ex-
istence of an ought from this source that must domi-
nate over all others, if conflict were possible. Again
he says, " Though virtue, or moral rectitude does
indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is
right and good as such, yet when we sit down in
a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this,
i Sermon XI.
118 MORAL SCIENCE.
or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it
will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to
it." 1 These facts involve the relation of virtue to
happiness which has always been the insoluble
point, or at least the chief point of division, in
moral science. The facts Butler saw, but did not
attempt to harmonize them into a system, and so,
like all broad and fair-minded men thus situated,
may be fairly claimed by opposing systems so long
as the true system in which these must unite is not
seen. Such a uniting system may be found, if we
make the Sensibility a condition for moral ideas,
and if we make a distinction between conscience as
an impulse and as a law ; and I see no other way.
In speaking of the relation of the Sensibility to
the moral nature, we have hitherto re- G oodasa
garded it chiefly as conditional for the ac- n^rtobo
tion of that nature. And from this view sacrificed -
of it, it will follow that the moral nature can never
require the sacrifice of good as a whole. Good is the
product of the Sensibility, the ultimate idea having its
origin in that. If there be nothing good in itself,
there can be no ultimate choice, no supreme end,
and no obligation. Good being thus the occasion on
which obligation is affirmed, it is absurd to say that
there can be obligation to obey a law when the
result of obedience, as such, would be misery ; and
no one can rationally encounter misery in any form
except on the faith of an ultimate good.
i Sermon XI.
CHAPTER IV.
OTHER RELATIONS OF THE SENSIBILITY TO THE
MORAL NATURE.
BUT the Sensibility has other relations to the
moral nature, besides being a condition for its ac-
tion, and no theory of morals can be complete if
these are not understood.
And first there is a sensibility originating in the
activity of the moral nature itself, and, as gensibility
it seems to us, inseparable from that ac- JSfmowi m
tivity. The moral nature would cease to nature -
be what it is if the fulfillment of obligation were fol-
lowed by no complacency, and its violation by no
remorse or sense of degradation. It is through this
form and kind of sensibility that we are capable of
our highest enjoyment and suffering, that indeed
which belongs to us as moral beings. Being thus
the necessary product of our natures in its modes
of voluntary activity, and not directly dependent on
the will of another, the enjoyment and suffering
coming thus are not properly reward and punish-
ment. They are not a bestowment or infliction,
but a part of our being in its necessary action as so
constituted. It is this relation of a sensibility thus
120 , MORAL SCIENCE.
originated that gives to the individual his indepen-
dence of external circumstances, and that lays fully
upon him the responsibility for his own essential
well-being.
But besides the sensibility thus inherent in a
Sensibility moral nature, and dependent directly upon
from other . . .
sources. choice without volition even, there is also
a sensibility in a great variety of forms from other
sources than the moral nature, and for the gratifica-
tion of which most actions are done. From this
both good and evil may come to us through our own
voluntary actions, through the actions of others, or
through dispensations of Providence over which we
have no control. As it is not within this sphere
that our supreme end lies, and as those only are
moral acts which respect the supreme end, we are
under no obligation to have any particular amount
or kind of good from it, and if this alone be in ques-
tion, are free to choose or reject, to exert ourselves
or not with reference to it.
Any sensibility not from the moral nature may
This last become its adjuvant. Its impulsions and
may aid or , . . . ..-,.,,
conflict with solicitations may coincide with the require-
the moral ^
nature. ments of the Moral Law, and the momen-
tum of joyful activity may be thus increased. Any
such sensibility may also be used to tempt or to force
the will to act in opposition to moral law. Here is
the double nature of man, and the ground of the
conflict between the flesh and the spirit. He that
consecrates himself to the obedience of moral law is
of the spirit ; and he that gives himself up to the
OTHER RELATIONS OF THE SENSIBILITY. 121
control of any impulse or solicitation, or principle of
action uncontrolled by moral law, is of the flesh.
It is also only through a sensibility not from the
moral nature that there can be reward in these the
, . -. . 1 sanctions of
and punishment in any proper sense, and government,
so government as distinguished from influence.
Clearly there can be no government where there is
no dependence on the will of another, and no fear
from the action of that will in case of disobedience.
To some it seems low and mercenary to be influ-
enced by this form of sensibility, but it cannot be low
or mercenary to be influenced by that which alone
can be the sanction of government, and which comes
not alone, but as an expression of the approbation
or disapprobation of a perfect moral governor. It
cannot be low or mercenary to desire and seek for
a good that is an end in itself, and that is so in-
herent in a sensibility given by God as to be of its
very essence when it is in right action.
I will only add that where moral order reigns
good from all forms of sensibility is distrib- Man , g
uted according to character ; that though a
man may be called to oppose for a time his duty -
moral convictions to all that he can suffer through
natural sensibility, yet that this cannot be permanent
under a righteous moral government ; and that the
good of each is so a part of the whole that obligation
on the part of any individual to sacrifice his own
highest good for the sake of that whole is not only
impossible, but, as impairing the very ground on
which obligation is affirmed, is absurd.
PART II.
LOVE. AS A LAW.
PRACTICAL MORALS.
LOVE AS A LAW.
PKELIMINARY STATEMENT.
IF we would conduct life by philosophy, it is not
enough to know its law and its end. We must also
know how to apply that law, and to reach that end.
We need both parts of that perfect wisdom which it
is the part of moral science to teach. Perfect wis-
dom consists in the choice of the best ends, and of
the best means to attain them. What belongs to
the first part we have considered. Love is our
general principle and primal wisdom ; but specific
duties will depend on a knowledge of our nature
and relations. If we are to direct forces, or to use
instruments, we must know what those forces and
instruments are. If there are in us different kinds
of powers, or forms of activity, and so, possible forms
of good, or if there are limitations within which
the powers must act, these we need to know.
Hence we proceed to a brief statement of the
nature, relations, and limitations of our powers.
ls. The Powers.
For the purposes of moral science the powers are
126 MORAL SCIENCE.
divided into those that are GOVERNING, and those
that are INSTRUMENTAL.
The governing powers are those that are essential
to personality. They are the moral nature. By
them we elect and sanction ends, and through their
activity we find ends beyond which there are no
others. More definitely these powers are :
Moral Reason, including Conscience,
The Moral Affections, and
The Power of Choice or Free-will.
The Instrumental Powers are :
The Instincts,
The Appetites,
The Desires, and
The Natural Affections. These indicate ends.
To these we add
The Intellect, in the light of which we apprehend
and pursue ends.
2d. The Forms of Activity.
Of each class of powers there are two forms of
Spontaneous activity, the spontaneous and the volun-
?r r ylj- un ~ tar y- The spontaneous activities are the
tivity. condition of those that are voluntary ;
through them we have a knowledge of ourselves ;
they give impulse, and their action may become
temptation. In its original and pure form sponta-
neous action involves no responsibility. It is the
realm into which rational and voluntary agency
is put for its subjugation, direction, and culture.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 127
Voluntary activity is choice itself, and all action
that is determined by choice. It is the condition
of moral quality in acts, and of responsibility.
There are also two forms of activity as related to
good, giving us two forms of that. These suscepti-
T , i i ,i i ..-,.-,.. bilities and
are indicated by the words susceptibilities powers.
and powers, that point to a distinction running
through the whole frame, physical and mental.
In our physical constitution there is a double set
of nerves, like the double track of a railway ter-
minating in a metropolis. In this, provision is
made for action upon us from without inward, which
terminates in sensation ; and for action by us from
within outwards, which originates in volition. We
are thus acted upon and we act ; we receive and
we give. We receive first and as a condition of
giving, and there is good in that ; but it is higher
and more blessed to give than to receive.
In the upward movement of forces in the uni-
verse as conditioning and conditioned those Giving and
below simply give. They are wholly for recelvin s-
the sake of those above till we come to organization.
In all organization the action is circular. While
the higher is built up by the lower, and is sustained
by it, as the brain by the stomach, it yet reacts
upon that lower, and becomes in its turn essential
to that. Any action here, however, from the higher
to the lower is simply to sustain the lower in its
place and function as tributary, never to elevate it
out of that place. But when we reach society re-
123 MORAL SCIENCE.
garded as organic, and which an organic body
typifies, the object of action from above is to ele-
vate the lower to an equality with the higher.
This may be done selfishly from a perception of the
inseparable connection in the divine economy of the
welfare of the two ; or it may be done benevolently,
and only for the sake of the lower. This is the
highest and most blessed form of giving. So God
gives.
Through both these forms of activity there are
Pleasure enjoyment and growth. Through both
and joy. a Distinct form of good. Through the
susceptibilities, the passivities, the movement from
without inward, we have pleasure ; through the
activities, the choices, the volitions, the movement
from within outward, we have joy, happiness,
blessedness. And as these forms of good are
different in their origin, so are they in their
quality. By the one we are allied to the animals,
by the other to the angels. For the one we are
dependent upon circumstances, for the other upon
choice.
It is in this division of our nature and of the
TWO direc- forms of good that we find the ground of
tionsof .
activity. the two great directions of human activity.
The prevalent tendency in men is to remain in in-
dolent passivity, enjoying the good there is in im-
pressions from without, or, if they act, doing so for
the sake of those impressions. This, with such sur-
roundings as may be imagined, would give a Mo-
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 129
hammedan Paradise. But it is possible for man to
subordinate all passive impressions, and all pleasure
from them, to some form of the activities. It is
possible for him to do this in building up the spirit
in greater efficiency in holy activity. In this, with
its appropriate conditions and surroundings, is the
essential idea of the Christian heaven.
We have spontaneous and voluntary activity ;
we have susceptibilities and powers. From some
form and combination of these the good of man
must come. Shall they act promiscuously, or is
there provision made for subordination and order ?
This leads us to consider
3c?. The Law of Limitation.
The basis for such a law is found in that relation
offerees and of faculties as conditioning and con-
ditioned which gives its unity to the universe, which
is always perfectly regarded in nature, and without
regard to which by man there can be in his life no
harmony. Of this law, which is more fully ex-
plained in the Third Lecture on Moral Science,
only an outline can be given here.
The great forces of inorganic matter are three :
1. Gravitation.
2. Cohesion.
3. Chemical Affinity.
The forms of life, a higher form of force, are
three :
1. Vegetable Life.
130 MORAL SCIENCE.
2. Animal Life.
3. Rational Life. This brings us to man. In
studying him we find that the great divisions of the
body, according to its functions, are three :
1. Those for building and repairing.
2. Those for support and locomotion.
3. Those for sensation and volition.
The great divisions and functions of the mind
are three :
1. Intellect.
2. Feeling.
3. Will.
This gives us four groups, and their relation will
be best seen if we arrange them in two, thus, put-
ting those below which are lower :
Rational Life, Will,
Animal Life, Sensibility,
Vegetable Life, Intellect,
Chemical Affinity, Sensation and Volition,
Cohesion, Support and Locomotion,
Gravitation, Building and Repairing.
In the first double group we have general forces ;
in the second we have man ; but in each the lower
is a condition for the higher, and this gives us the
rank not only of the forces but of their products.
In all cases a force, or faculty, or product is lower
than another when it is a condition for it. From
this the law of limitation is deduced, which is, that
no force or faculty may act beyond the point where
tf X^ v OF THE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT! ] 101
. + K
it ceases to be a condition for the test action of
that which it conditions, and which is thusaBo^it.
This law will hold till we reach the action of the
highest power, which, not being the condition for
anything above it, has no limit except the capacity
of that power.
From the above law we may readily deduce both
the natural and the Christian law of self- Naturaland
denial. The natural law presupposes ^o^sSf-
powers unimpaired, and requires no sup- demal -
pression or limitation in the action of any power
that would not interfere with the best action of
some power above it. The Christian law pre-
supposes moral evil, malady, derangement, but re-
quires no suppression or limitation of action which
would not interfere with the elimination of evil in
ourselves or others, and the restoration of the
powers to their normal condition.
The above distinctions and divisions will be
essentially involved in the following practical part ;
and as they have not hitherto been distinctly in-
corporated into our systems of morals, an explicit
statement of them seemed to be required.
I.
LOVE AS A LAW DISTINGUISHED FROM THE LAW
OF LOVE.
HAVING considered the Law of Love and made
the needful preliminary statements, we now proceed
to love as a law. We inquire what love, working
under the law of limitation, would require men to
do. According to the Scriptures, " Love is the
fulfilling of the law." Hence the Law of Love and
of obligation or duty are coincident. The reason is
that love is that which the law requires, and with
which, if love be perfect, it is satisfied.
This is conceded, or at least not denied, by wri-
ters on morals ; and yet when specific duties are to
be deduced, they either do it wholly from the
stand-point of conscience and not of love, or incon-
sistently, from love out. of regard to the Scriptural
law. But accepting the Scriptural doctrine, be-
lieving that the Law of Love covers the domain of
morals, we proceed to inquire what that law re-
quires.
This inquiry it will be observed is wholly deduc-
tive. In all inquiries respecting duties except the
highest, there are two orders of questions: The
LOVE AS A LAW. 133
first asks, What ought to be done ? The second,
How ought it to be done ? To the broadest pos-
sible " What ? " on this subject, but one answer can
be given. " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God
with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself."
This is the law of love. As a spiritual act, it is
the primal wisdom, and, corresponding to it there is
no " How ? " No one can explain to another how to
love, because the love is a primitive act, and no
means can intervene.
Thus regarded love is an act and a choice, and
as rational must itself have a motive. Love as an
act and as a
Ihere must be a reason on the ground motive.
of which love may be demanded by the con-
science. That reason, as we have seen, is the
worth of being, or its capacity of good and evil.
But the act having been done, the generic choice
having been made, love becomes a motive in all sub-
sequent acts. The first and great question is, What
does the law demand ? To this the reply is, Love.
The second question is, What does Love demand ?
And to every " What ? " here, there is a " How ? "
Or, if we please, all questions of this order may be
comprised in one, How shall the demands of love
be carried out ?
It is in morals as in astronomy. In that we first
find the law, and then apply it. The law being
given, we inquire at what time the sun and moon
ought to be in such relation as to produce an eclipse.
This inquiry is of a different order from those which
134 MORAL SCIENCE.
have it for their object to find the law, or the rea-
sons of it. If we suppose, with Kepler, each
planet to be accompanied by an angel, whose busi-
ness it is to see that its radius vector shall describe
equal areas in equal times, all the inquiries and
efforts of the angel might have relation solely to
that result ; but without understanding both the
law and the reasons of it, he could know nothing
of the philosophy of the heavens.
Failing to distinguish, at this point, as most have
Love as done, between love as an act demanded by
choice and _ . . _ . .
as emotion, the conscience and itselt requiring a mo-
tive, and love as the motive of subsequent sub-
ordinate acts and demanding them, we fall into
confusion. In the one case we have the law
of love ; in the other love as a law. In the
first case the main element of the love is choice 1
rather than emotion. In the second the choice is
implied, but emotion seems more prominent. In
the first the choice is like the body of the sun, in
itself dark ; in the second it is like the same body
with the elements of light and heat and beauty
gathered and floating around it.
Over the subordinate inquiries arising under love
office of as a l aw the conscience must watch, de-
audTntei- 6 manding not only perfect uprightness and
candor, but such painstaking in informing
the judgment as to secure that secondary wisdom
which more often bears the name, and by which
i See J5ac. Sermon, 1864.
LOVE AS A LAW. 135
means are adapted to ends. But while the con-
science must keep watch of the processes, the pro-
cesses themselves are carried on by the intellect.
The great work of the conscience is done in an-
swering the first question, and in holding the will
in the form of choice up to a perfect correspond-
ence with the law. Subsequently its work will be
to bring subordinate choices and specific volitions
into conformity with the generic choice, and in
doing so, questions that will be relatively principal
and subordinate, the " What ? " and the " How ? "
will constantly arise.
Accepting then the law of love, we shall need to
inquire, what in the several departments
of duty does that law require, and how
are those requirements to be carried out?
II.
CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES.
IN answering the above questions, a classification
of duties is needed.
In this we shall be guided by that principle of sub-
Principieof ordination, on which the law of limitation
classifica- , . , , . 1 ,, .
tion. is based, as stated m the third or the
Lectures on Moral Science. It is as true of
duties as it is of forces, faculties, and enjoyments,
that those are lower which are conditional for
others.
But are some duties conditional for others ?
First de- The condition of good work is a good in-
iSve. strument, of good fruit a good tree ; and
of doing good to others, and glorifying God, a good
man.
Our first and lowest duty will then respect our
own state, including both disposition and capacity.
The first and imperative demand of love is, that we
secure those conditions in ourselves, by which our
power to do good will be the greatest.
We thus reach our FIRST CLASS OF DUTIES under
First class fa e } aw o f love. They are those which
of duties *
res P ec ^ ourselves. They respect either
ur "
CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES. 137
our own state or condition ; and till we reach ab-
solute perfection, will have for their object a change
for the better in one or the other of these. They
are not distinctively duties to ourselves, though
involving all that has commonly been regarded as
such ; but will include everything possible to en-
able us to benefit others and glorify God. Hence
they will be held as duties, not so much from regard
to ourselves, as on other and higher grounds.
The SECOND CLASS OF DUTIES are those to our
fellow men. These will have for their ob- gecond class .
ject, until they reach perfection, a change our'feuow
for the better, either in their state or condi- n
tion.
That these are lower than our duties to God will
probably be conceded, but are they condi- These con .
tional for them? In a sense they are. JJSTttaT
Whatever may be said of an innate or
connate idea of God, and of duty to him as all-per-
vasive, it is true that practically, and in a normal
state, the parent would be known before God, and
that God would be known through him. The sig-
nificance of " Our Father which art in heaven," is
reached only through a knowledge of what a
father on earth is ; and our duties to the earthly,
typify those to the heavenly Father, and prepare
us for them.
But besides this priority of time, and so a condi-
tioning from the order in which the faculties are
developed, duties may be so related that one cannot
138 MORAL SCIENCE.
be consistently or acceptably performed except on
the condition that another has been. One who de-
frauds another may not bestow charity upon him.
He must be just before he is generous. In the
same way immediate duties to God so imply those
to men, that a man is in no condition to do the
former who has not done the latter.
This requires attention. It is the essence of
NO religion superstition, and has been the curse of the
without HIT
morality. race, to frame something called religion
that could be gone through with formally, and be
rested on for salvation, to the neglect of the love of
man, and the duties from that. Hence we need to
emphasize the impossibility of religion without moral-
ity. This the Scriptures do both in the Old Testa-
ment and the New. " I," says God, " hate robbery
for a burnt-offering." " When ye spread forth your
hands, I will hide mine eyes from you, yea when
ye make many prayers I will not hear ; your hands
are full of blood ; wash ye, make you clean, put
away the evil of your doings from before mine
eyes ; cease to do evil, learn to do well ; seek
judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the father-
less, plead for the widow." " If," says the Saviour,
" thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there re-
memberest that thy brother hath aught against
thee, leave there thy gift before the altar and go
thy way ; first be reconciled to thy brother, and
then come and offer thy gift." " If a man say, I
love God, and hate th his brother, he is a liar. For
CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES. 139
he who loveth not his brother whom he hath seen,
how can he love God whom he hath not seen? "
This view cannot be too strongly enforced, and
ought to enter into the substance of every treatise
on duty.
As prior then in time, and as prerequisite for ac-
ceptable worship, our duties to our fellowmen are
conditional for our duties to God.
Our THIRD CLASS OF DUTIES will be those to-
wards God.
These are higher than any other because of their
object, of the higher faculties involved, Third class;
and because they imply all the others. God*
If the love of man be first, as it would be in a child
growing up normally, it will be conditional for that
of God, which will follow as certainly as the full
day follows . the morning twilight ; but when once
there is the love of God, it will be seen to include
or imply the love of his creatures. As man now
is, the true relation seems to be, when specific
duties are required, the performance first of those
toward man as a condition of the acceptable per-
formance of those toward God.
It will be remembered that in classifying physical
forces as higher and lower, we begin
with that which is broadest, and at each ties as
, i i r T higher and
step m our ascent comprehend fewer indi- broader.
iduals, till we reach man ; but in classifying duties
we reverse the process ; we begin with that which
is narrowest, and as we ascend reach the broadest
140 MORAL SCIENCE.
and grandest generality, including not only our
duties to all the creatures of God with whom we
are in relation, but to God himself.
CLASS I.
DUTIES TO OURSELVES.
I.
CLASSIFICATION.
WE now proceed to consider the first class of
conditions duties in detail. These will require that
thes^duties we secure those conditions in ourselves by
ai to ourdS- which we can work most efficiently under
tiestoothers. the ]aw Q f love .
These conditions are :
1. That we secure our rights ;
2. That we supply our wants ; and
3. That we perfect our powers.
Of these each in its order is conditional for the
next, and they will include all that we need to do
for our own good, and to enable us to do good to
others.
DIVISION I.
THE SECURING OF OUR RIGHTS.
%
WE are to secure our rights so far as they may
be a condition to our best working under the law
of love.
The only right that must be secured for the above
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 141
end is that to life. As long as there is life men
may act under this law, in whatever condition they
may be. Hence the right to life is more sacred
than any other, and hence the right to defend it
even by taking the life of another. God has en-
dowed men with life, has placed them in their
positions here, often with many others dependent
upon them, has implanted within them an instinct
of self-preservation r has made the life of each as
sacred as that of any other, that security of life
which the instinct guards is essential both to the
well-being of society and of the individual, and if,
with these interests in question, life is wrongfully
assailed, it not only comes within the law of love to
defend it by taking, if necessary, the life of another,
but it is an imperative duty. God does not regard
life as too sacred to be taken for the violation of
natural law, and it is not only by a righteous moral
law that life is taken in such cases, but by a natural
law implanted in the constitution.
The right to life must be defended to the utmost.
Of the other great rights, as of liberty, property, and
reputation, we may be deprived and still work under
the law of love. These rights we are to secure as
far as possible in compatibility with that law,
but as no absolute rule can be laid down, and as
the subject of rights will be treated further on, it is
not necessary to speak of them more fully here.
It is only to be said that at each point we are
to yield or defend these rights as the law of love
wisely interpreted may require.
142 MORAL SCIENCE.
DIVISION II.
THE SUPPLY OF OUR WANTS.
THE second condition of our action under the
law of love is the supply of our wants.
By wants is here meant those things which are
necessary for the well-being of the body and the
mind. These and nothing beyond are essential to
full work under the law of love. To provide these
requires toil, and this toil every one not incapacitated
by feebleness or infirmity is bound either to undergo
himself, or to pay others an equivalent for it. No
duty is more strongly insisted on in the Scriptures
than this. Not to perform it not only violates the
first law of equity, but deprives us of all position
and stand-point from which to labor for others.
DIVISION III.
THE PERFECTING OF OUR POWERS.
HAVING life and having our wants supplied, we
are next to perfect our powers. This is the third
duty to ourselves under the law of love. It is of
much wider scope than those before treated of, but
that the law of love requires it will be seen if we
look at the ways in which we can minister to the
good of others.
These are three :
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 143
1st. By putting forth our energies, physical and
mental, directly to that end. Relation of
OJ -D j.- J.-L perfection to
zd. J3y exerting over them an uncon- the good of
. J others.
scious influence.
3d. By awakening in them the joy of compla-
cency.
For each of these the one comprehensive con-
dition and duty is our own perfection. " Be ye
therefore perfect." How is this duty to be per-
formed ?
CHAPTER I.
PERFECTION AS RELATED TO DIRECT ACTION FOR
OTHERS; OF THE BODY; OF THE MIND.
According to the views in the preliminary state-
ment, the process in attaining; this per- Perfection
f .. f , .,,. ^ T byupbuild-
fection must be one or upbuilding. In ing.
the language of the Scriptures, it must be an
" edification." This gives us a point of departure
and a method, which the term " self-culture " does
not. In this view the instrumental powers, the
appetites, the desires and natural affections, and the
intellect are given us that through them we may
build up a perfect body and a perfect mind. These
powers we can control in three ways. We can
incite, restrain, and guide them, and these we are to
do partly from the good there is from their own
regulated activity, but chiefly as they are con-
ditional for the moral and spiritual nature. Of that
nature our perfection would require the fullest pos-
sible expansion and activity.
144 MORAL SCIENCE.
In building ourselves up then so as to become
Physical effective working powers, we begin with
perfection
first. the body. Love would require us to seek
physical perfection, because this would include
strength, beauty, and grace, and each of these would
aid in the highest ministries of love. The more
strength love has to wield, the more efficient it will
be ; the more it is clothed in beauty and in grace,
the more satisfaction it will give.
For the perfection of the body we are dependent
TO this end on the appetites, the lowest of the instru-
law of limit- L r
atkmfor mental powers over which we have con-
the appe-
tites, trol. As lower, they are a condition for
all that is above them, but their immediate object
is the upbuilding and well-being of the body, and the
continuance of the race. Through them we appro-
priate such things as the body needs, and we have
only to say that in doing this they are to be held
strictly subject to the law of limitation. By their
constitution they are in a measure self-regulating,
but must always require rational control with ref-
erence to their ends. They may be of any degree
of strength, and be indulged to any extent up to
the point where they cease to be in the best man-
ner a condition for the activity of that which is
above them. The stronger they are the better, if
their action be for the strength, beauty, and grace
of the body, and for the upbuilding of the intellec-
tual and moral powers ; and all pleasure through
them that is incidental to such upbuilding, or even
compatible with it, is legitimate.
DUTIES TO OUKSELVES. 145
From the varying relations of the appetites, more
precise rules for their regulation cannot be laid
down.
As, however, the evils from the appetites are so
great, we may not pass them without Banger from
notice. The first great danger from the tites.
natural appetites is, that men will find in the good
from them their supreme end. This multitudes do.
Such are sensualists ; for the character is always
determined by that in which the supreme end is
found. Such persons may wallow in gross sen-
suality, or seek their gratifications in a refined and
fashionable way, but they will belong to the sty
of Epicurus, will live unworthily, and will die and
be forgotten, leaving the world no better for their
having lived in it.
The second great danger from these appetites, is
that those who have higher aims will be constantly
allured and seduced by them, so that the whole
tone of their life will be lowered. Those are few
to whom some soil from sensuality does not cling.
" Fleshly lusts " not only injure the body, but
" war against the soul."
The third danger from the appetites is in the for-
mation of those that are artificial. These have noth-
ing to do with upbuilding, as the substances on
which they fix are all poison and incapable of being
assimilated. The pleasure from them terminates
in itself; the tendency to increase the amount of
the stimulus is strong ; the nervous system is im-
10
146 MORAL SCIENCE.
paired by them ; habits are formed which hold
men in fearful bondage, and it may be questioned
whether the best state of the moral powers and
the highest spiritual exercises are compatible with
habitual stimulation, either alcoholic or narcotic.
If God had judged it best that man should have an
appetite for these substances, doubtless He would
have implanted it.
Held in their proper place, the appetites are pro-
ductive only of good ; but looking at the history or
at the present state of man, we find the amount of
misery and degradation from abuse of the natural
appetites, and from artificial ones which are them-
selves an abuse, to be appalling beyond description.
Of the great corruption of the heathen, one of the
most prominent forms is sensuality, their very re-
ligion being often but a deification of this. Of coun-
tries nominally Christian, especially in their great
cities, the corruption is unutterable, and seldom, if
ever, has Christianity so pervaded a community as to
lift them wholly out of this slough. Hence we
raise a warning cry at this point. Hence a right
training of the young must involve a control by
them of their appetites, since a failure here is a
failure in all that is above them.
But while the proximate object of the appetites
Appetites is the perfection of the body, they alone
not suffi- . -ri ' i i
dent. are not sufficient for that. Jb or its highest
strength, beauty, and grace, there are needed in
addition health and physical training.
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 147
1. Health. This is to the body what virtue is
to the soul, its normal state, its good : and
Health.
for this, attention is needed, not only to
the appetites, bat to air, exercise, sleep, and cloth-
ing. The care of health through these is a duty,
not only from the consequences to ourselves of its
failure, but because the power of love would thus
be paralyzed, and instead of aiding others we should
become a tax upon their energies, if not a burden.
Needless ill-health in its myriad forms is an incubus
upon society ; and, though it may seem harsh to
call it so, it is, as a violation of the law of love, a
crime.
This whole subject is not as yet brought as it
should be within the domain of the conscience.
The consequences of neglecting the laws of health,
of imprudence, and excess, are constantly attributed
to a mysterious Providence. They have the same
relation to Providence as typhoid fever in the filthy
wards of a city. They are visitations under Prov-
idence rendered necessary by the neglect and folly
of man.
2. Physical training. Health alone will not secure
perfection of form or of power. Espe- Phy8ical
cially will it not secure grace, which is tramin s-
higher than beauty, and is expressed chiefly
through motion. Hence the need of physical
training.
The true subject of education is man in the unity
of soul and body. If either factor be neglected,
148 MORAL SCIENCE.
the highest results cannot be reached. Hence a
well regulated system of physical culture is not only
a legitimate part of education, especially of a liberal
education, but it is demanded. In this we have de-
clined from the wisdom of the ancients.
Physical training may be carried too far ; it may
physical become an end. Not subordinated to a
training higher culture, or out of proportion, it is
guarded. a d e f orm ity and a nuisance. It also needs
to be guarded against an ambition to perform diffi-
cult and dangerous feats. If it can be guarded at
these two points, it must become an essential ele-
ment in our system of education.
Strength, beauty, grace, these are the fruits of
physical training and health. Of these
Results. , . i i T
strength is put forth solely under the di-
rection of will, and its exertion for others may im-
pose obligation. Beauty and grace, on the other
hand, produce their effects without our direct voli-
tion. They are as an emanation, a fragrance, a
soft green, which we admire and enjoy without feel-
ing obligation.
Are we then under obligation even with regard
to the body, to seek not only strength to be used by
will for the good of others, but also those perfec-
tions and accomplishments even which may become
a source of pleasure when contemplated by them ?
Yes, even though they are so often sought and dis-
played from vanity. By all means let beauty be
sought ; beauty of person, and even of dress. This
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 149
nature teaches. The flowers are not simply becom-
ing, they are beautiful. Nor do the Scriptures
forbid it. The Apostle Peter, with his quiet and
solemn eye, does not condemn outward adorning
except as in antagonism to the higher " ornament
of a meek and quiet spirit ; " " the plaiting of
hair," and " wearing of gold," and " putting on of
apparel," are not to be the adorning. Rightly sub-
ordinated they may have their place, but are as
nothing when compared with the " hidden man of
the heart, which is in the sight of God of great
price."
Let grace be cultivated. That costs nothing.
But let nothing be done from self as central. Let
it be in sympathy with the tendency of every or-
ganizing and vital force in nature towards perfec-
tion, and as putting us in harmony with the
" Kosmos." Above all let it be for others. If
vanity could but be exorcised by love, accomplish-
ments would at once fall into their place and be-
come admirable. The taint which attaches to them,
as in the service of vanity and egotism, would be
removed, and the social questions which arise
concerning them would be easily settled.
But if we are to seek a perfect body, p erfec tion
much more a perfect mind.
Here again there must be upbuilding. Love
being presupposed, its first business will be to put
and hold in its place each of the instrumental
powers.
150 MORAL SCIENCE.
Of these the desires are to the mind what the
Law of Hm- appetites are to the body. They are nat-
itation for / . J
the desires, ural and necessary principles of action,
having no moral character in themselves, but re-
quiring control. Like the appetites they are to be
governed, not on the principle of repression, but
by being made to minister to something higher.
Let the desire of life, and of property, and of knowl-
edge, and of power, and of esteem, have their full
scope, provided they violate no right of others, and
that what they appropriate is used in the service of
the affections, and under the guidance of conscience.
But here, as in the appetites, we must draw atten-
Dangers tion to the great danger there is from
from the . &
desires. perversion and abuse.
And here, also, the first danger is that the object
of some one of the desires will be adopted as the
supreme end.
In this case the character formed, and the re-
sults, are very different from those when the ap-
petites are thus adopted. The appetites have a
natural limit. They are satisfied, and cease their
craving ; excess in them ultimately and speedily
debilitates both body and mind ; the sphere of the
sensualist is narrow ; he dies and is forgotten. But
the desires have no natural limit. " They grow by
what they feed on," and are all absorbing. Hence
we have the poltroon when we should have the
martyr ; we have the miser, emaciated and cowering
over his gold ; we have the pale student outwatch-
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 151
ing the stars ; we have the conqueror desolating
continents, and the shifting devotee of public opin-
ion. These fill the world with their deeds. They
trample on appetite, and may seem nobler than its
slaves, but are equally in bondage, and some of
them beyond comparison more mischievous.
And here it may be well to state what that is in
which the selfishness, and idolatry too, of selfishness
the race consist. It is in adopting as their and
supreme end the good there is from the activity of
some lower part of their nature. This is selfish-
ness. Its primary form is not that of enmity to
God, or to any one else. There is no conscious
malignity. It disclaims this when imputed to it,
and says, " Is thy servant a dog that he should do
this thing?" Not interfered with, it is good-na-
tured, perhaps cultivated and elegant. But let any
one, even God, come between it and the end made
supreme, and it becomes aversion, enmity, bitter
and uncompromising rebellion. In such cases, the
form varying with the appetite or desire, and scope
being given, there is no form of deception, and no
extent or refinement of cruelty to which a people
civilized, and cultivated through art, will not go.
This, too, is idolatry. It is the true idolatry of
the race, which has always found symbols to rep-
resent that which they have made their supreme
end, and who have really worshipped their own sel-
fish passions as reflected in those symbols.
It need only be added that those who have chosen
152 MORAL SCIENCE.
higher ends are in constant danger through inor-
dinate desire, even more than through inordinate
appetite.
After the desires, the affections will require at-
Theaffec- tendon by one who would perfect himself
ur^and'" as an agent for doing good. The affec-
MoraL tions are Natural and Moral. The differ-
ence between these is, that the moral affections are
consequent upon acts of will or choice, and derive
their character from the character of these acts.
The natural affections are found in us acting spon-
taneously, like the desires.
For the most part the natural affections do not
require repression. They rather need culture, and
under that are capable of expanding into great
beauty. Nor is there from them such danger of
abuse that attention need be drawn to it here. It
is sufficient to say that they are to be developed
under the law of limitation.
The intei- Of the instrumental powers it only re-
mains to speak of the Intellect.
The necessity of training, and if possible, per-
fecting the Intellect if a man would do much for
his own good or that of others, is admitted. To
this every seminary of learning testifies. Its rela-
tive importance is doubtless overestimated, since
education has come to mean chiefly the training of
the intellect.
The general statement here is that the law of
love requires that every talent and means of in-
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 153
fluence, whether general or professional, should be
cultivated to the utmost.
Does an artisan fail, as in making a steam boiler,
to provide in the best way for the safety and com-
fort of the community ; is a physician ignorant of
the right remedy, or a lawyer of the precedent on
which his case turns ; does the clergyman lack
quickening and persuasive power ; each is con-
demned by the law of love, and responsible for the
consequences if the failure could have been avoided.
There may be faithfulness at the moment, at the
bedside, in the court-room, in immediate prepara-
tion for the pulpit but the failure and guilt may
lie far back in the indolent self-indulgence and dis-
sipation of the years of preparatory study.
We now pass to the Governing Powers. It is one
thing for a person to improve his instru- Governing
mental powers, as he might his knife or Powers -
his reaper, and another to improve those which are
more distinctively himself. It is in these that we
find the worth and dignity of man, in these the
image of God. In these is the germ of immortality ;
in these the seat of spiritual conflict.
For the education of these powers there are no
institutions except those of Christianity. Improve _
The Church with its Bible, and ministry, ntof
iese pow-
ers.
and the Spirit of God pervading all, is
God's institution for the education of these powers,
and training them up into the likeness of Christ,
and so of God. Nor would human institutions be
154 MORAL SCIENCE.
of any avail. Improvement here must begin in the
Will itself, by its submitting itself to the laws
of reason and of conscience, and opening the
whole man to every high and holy influence
which God may bring to bear upon him. All
powers are to be improved, and these no less
than others, by their being exercised in the sphere
and under the conditions appointed for them by
God. So only. But the sphere of these powers is
to rule. Hence they can be improved only as they
are permitted to be active in ruling. But that
they should do this nothing can secure but that
ultimate act of choice which determines character,
and which lies beyond the reach of all institutions
and external appliances. If these powers be held
in abeyance, their place being usurped by appetite
or desire in the form of passion, they will be dwarfed
and perverted, and will manifest themselves in
every form of superstition and fanaticism.
Such is the sphere of the governing powers. He
who would cultivate them must permit them to
govern, and to govern uniformly. So shall they
gain strength, and so shall he walk in increasing
light until "the perfect day."
But the conditions under which these powers are
conditions to act > an d the helps offered, require to be
and helps. k nO wn no less than their sphere. These
cannot here be treated of at large, but I desire to
advert to the subject of immediate divine aid, be-
cause that is so generally regarded as alien to phi-
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 155
losophy. It is not so, for the whole philosophy of
upbuilding would lead us to anticipate that man in
his highest powers would be connected with that
which is still higher. And in this it is accordant
with the voice of heathen antiquity, and of the
Scriptures. Always men have spoken of the voice
of God within them, and the Scriptures speak of
the " light that lighteth every man that cometh
into the world." The expressions vary, but the
import is that there is a direct access of the Spirit
of God to the spirit of man, both for illumination
and quickening. For the reception of these the
Moral Reason is adapted as the flower is adapted to
receive the light and warmth of the sun, and no
symbol could be more beautiful than that of the
flower that turns itself to the sun and follows it in
its course.
But are w r e not here in danger of mysticism ?
Yes; but only as we are in danger of
conflagration from the use of fire. Let us
be cautious and encourage no mysticism. Let us
also be cautious and neither ignore nor quench any
light offered us by God. This is a vital question in
our upbuilding. I hold that this communication
and aid are in strict accordance with philosophy,
and my conviction is that whoever attempts perfect-
ing his directive powers without prayer, and open-
ing his mind, by putting away wickedness, to the
illuminating and quickening influences of the Spirit
of God, will fail of success.
156 MORAL SCIENCE.
It is only by thus building up himself through the
whole range of his faculties, that man can reach
the highest efficiency when he would put forth
direct acts of will in the service of love.
CHAPTER H.
PERFECTION AS RELATED TO UNCONSCIOUS INFLUENCE.
The second mode of doing good to others is by
unconscious influence or example.
This, in its highest degree, requires perfection not
so much of the powers, as in their control and mode
of action. No lower power may act beyond the
point at which it becomes a condition for the action
of a higher. The appetite for food or drink may
not be so indulged as to prevent the fullest activity
of the desire of knowledge or of power. The desire
of power may not become so engrossing as to dwarf
the affections or stifle any claim of justice or of
right. Napoleon cared nothing for appetite, but
was gluttonous of power. When a man chooses the
object of any lower power for his supreme end, that
determines his character, his energies are directed
to that, his development is around it, and he be-
comes unsymmetrical, as a tree whose upward sap
is arrested and expands it into a deformity. This
most men do. They lack the controlling and
directive power needed to keep the faculties in
subordination, and even if they choose the highest
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 157
end are long in bringing moral symmetry into their
lives. Only when this is done are they in a con-
dition to exert the highest unconscious influence
over others, and when this is done, this influence is
more efficient than any other.
The direct power of man over nature is slight
compared with that which he gains through her own
forces. The same is true of society. As God in-
tended man to be a social being, He implanted in
him those principles by which he may have a com-
mon life, and through which that life may be reached
and modified throughout a nation, and for ages.
Among these principles is that sympathy and un-
conscious imitation by which families and nations
are assimilated, and to reach, as it may be done, the
common life through this is the sublime st work of
man.
It is in early life that this unconscious imitation
is most operative. Every child is a Chinese. Give
him a cracked saucer for a model, and he will make
a cracked set; The child needs formal teaching by
words, but his principles are formed and practical
habits moulded chiefly by that action of those
around him which expresses their inner life. From
this there is a subtle and pervasive influence that
no direct teaching can counteract. It is thus that
families, neighborhoods, sections of country are
reached and assimilated, and to this all contribute.
It is through this that great men, men great in
character and action, reach their highest influence.
158 MORAL SCIENCE.
They are simply set in the firmament of the past,
and shine.
Doubtless the power of a book, of the word spoken,
of mere teaching, is great, but this silent shining
addresses different principles, and under different
conditions. Power is from the inner life in its in-
tegrity, and this is most perfectly and certainly
revealed by action. Hence " Example is better
than precept." The word not weighted from the
life sounds hollow. Hence the folly as well as guilt
of attempting to substitute anything for that thor-
ough sincerity of character from which alone good
influences can legitimately flow.
We here find a special danger to preachers, and
to all who teach professionally or formally. They
are tempted to " say and do not." There is no
surer way to destroy self-respect and bring such
teachings into contempt. Against such teachers
the Bible denounces its heaviest woes. " Woe
unto you Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, for ye
devour widows' houses, and for a pretense make
long prayers : therefore ye shall receive the greater
damnation."
CHAPTER III.
PERFECTION AS RELATED TO COMPLACENCY.
The third way of benefiting others through a
care for our own state, is by awakening in them the
joy of complacency.
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 159
Under the former head we regarded man as
active, with powers to be addressed ; under this we
regard him as having susceptibilities. Our object
then was action, character ; it is now enjoyment.
The highest susceptibilities are moral, and it is
from manifestations of moral character that we
have our highest enjoyment through the susceptibili-
ties. Through these we have the love of compla-
cency, the sense of moral beauty and grandeur,
esteem, veneration, and the emotions which, in
their highest form, become worship.
For the susceptibility to natural beauty and
grandeur God has provided. Nature is full of ob-
jects that correspond to this ; it is among our
purest and best sources of enjoyment, and is the
forerunner and type of the higher enjoyment from
the beauty of holiness. But the moral susceptibili-
ties can be awakened only by character. For these
the great provision is in God himself, whose charac-
ter is perfect ; but aside from this, these susceptibili-
ties may be drawn out in high activity by human
character. If all people were to reflect the image
of Christ in their radical character, the ideals of
literature and art, or rather something more beau-
tiful and better, would live and act before us, and
no one can estimate the enhanced joy from moral
beauty.
It is an office of Love to increase material beauty.
She smiles upon the marriage of taste with industry.
She would esteem it a crime to mar nature ; she
160 MORAL SCIENCE.
would, if possible, restore the beauty of Eden.
How much more then must Love feel under obliga-
tion to increase moral beauty ; how much more a
crime to diminish it. In a community whose moral
nature is developed, high moral character is the
purest, the best, the amplest contribution to mere
enjoyment that can be made. It is better than
pictures or statues or landscape gardens. Such a
contribution every man can make by attending to
his own state, and it is among the more imperative
obligations of Love to do this.
That this end of love would be most fully
reached by our perfection, is too plain to need
enforcement. Everywhere the highest complacency
demands perfection.
CHAPTER IV.
PERFECTION AS BELATED TO THE GLORY OF GOD.
We have thus seen that our own perfection is
a condition of our best ministrations to others in
each of the three ways in which it is possible for
us to minister to them, and that love would there-
fore oblige us to seek that perfection. We are also
under obligation to seek it, because it is a condition
of our most fully glorifying God.
God is glorified by the manifestation of his per-
fections. In the products of his wisdom and power
He is glorified, as they are seen to be perfect. He
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 161
is more glorified as He himself is seen to be perfect
in his moral character and government, and as He
is loved and obeyed by creatures made in his image.
This love and obedience are the sum of human duty :
they are perfection. They are also the glorifying
of God, and, it may be added, the enjoying of Him.
That God should be glorified by us voluntarily, and
enjoyed in any other way, we cannot conceive. In
this view of it, therefore, perfection can hardly be
said to be a condition of glorifying God. It is the
glorifying of Him.
CHAPTER V.
PERFECTION AS RELATED TO SELF-LOVE.
From the above it appears that love to others and
to God would require us to seek our own perfection.
But this is just what would be required by a reason-
able self-love, and is there no place for that ? Yes ;
and we here reach the point, not only of the recon-
ciliation of self-love with benevolence, but of their
convergence. Self-love is legitimate. Our own good
is of intrinsic value, and we are especially bound
to care for it as it is that part of the universal
good which is more especially intrusted to us. God
cares for it, and why not we ? In doing this we
have reason to believe that we not only work with
Him for our own good, but as He himself works,
" From hence, also, it is evident," says Edwards, in
11
162 MORAL SCIENCE.
his " Treatise on the Nature of Virtue," " that the
divine virtue, or the virtue of the divine mind, must
consist principally in love to himself." If this be
correct, our virtue will consist in some degree in
love to ourselves. While, therefore, we allow self-
love a place in prompting efforts for our own per-
fection, it is a subordinate one.
It is worthy of notice that it is no part of the
divine law, as directly expressed, that we love our-
selves. It is simply implied in the command to
love our neighbor as ourselves. The reason
doubtless is the deep harmony there is between
loving God and our neighbor and loving ourselves.
So perfectly coincident are they as reciprocally re-
sulting, both and equally, from perfect powers act-
ing rightly, that if we love God and our neighbor
we do the very thing that self-love would require,
and there is no need of enforcing a further law.
To love God and our neighbor is the best way of
loving ourselves.
CHAPTER VI.
HABITS.
In speaking of individual upbuilding and perfec-
tion, the subject of habits may not be omitted.
Habits presuppose original faculties and suscep-
Habits, ac- tibilities by which acts are done and im-
passive, pressions are received independently of
habit. They are formed by repeated voluntary
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 163
action of the powers, and by repeated impressions
on the sensibility. No man, therefore, is born with
habits, but every one has a tendency to form them ;
and, according to the distinction just made, they
will be either active or passive.
Active habits are formed by the repetition of
voluntary acts. It is an ultimate fact in Active
our constitution, that repetition, practice, hablts -
use, produces, always facility in doing the acts re-
peated, and sometimes, in addition, a tendency to
do them. Facility and tendency, these are the
results of acts voluntarily repeated, which required
at first careful attention and painful effort. Both
facility and tendency are spoken of as the result of
habit, but they need to be distinguished ; and we
also need to distinguish a tendency to do a thing in
a particular manner, from a tendency to do it at all.
By repetition one gains facility in writing his name,
and a tendency, if he write it at all, to do so in a par-
ticular way ; but he does not gain a tendency to
write his name. For doing that a rational motive
is required. The same may be said of all acquired
skill. This is gained by the repetition of acts
giving facility, and a tendency to do the thing in a
particular manner. But in some cases a step further
is taken, and a tendency is acquired to do the thing
itself. This may go so far that habitual action may
seem automatic, and not only not to be from the
will, but to be in opposition to it. It is this ten-
dency which is more particularly spoken of as
164 MORAL SCIENCE.
" habit." This it is that may need to be guarded
against, or to be overcome.
Of such a constitution the object is evident. It
object of * s no ^ t trammel us, or to reduce us to
routine, but to enable us so to incorporate
into our being the results of voluntary action as to
avail ourselves of those results with the least pos-
sible attention, and so that the mind may be free
to enter upon new fields of effort. This it is desir-
able to notice, because many writers have enlarged
the sphere of habit quite too much.
Such being the nature of active habits, and the
object of that constitution by which they are formed,
it is obvious,
1. That men must be responsible for their habits,
and for all acts done from them. Not
habits. only do specific habits originate in the will
as prompted by original and controlling faculties
that act independently of habit, but they can
never wholly escape from the control of will.
2. It is obvious that when men rest in any form
Habits con- f habitual action, they defeat the end for
101^01% which the capacity for habits was given,
trammel us. W j 1 j c ] 1 [ s t o gj ve freedom to enter upon
new fields of activity. Habit, as habit, is automatic
and mechanical. It is simply conservative, while
man never reaches a point where conservatism is
not for the sake of progress. Hence, while we are
to seek by repetition all possible facility and power,
we are to guard sedulously against being brought
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 165
into bondage to any tendency. It is sad to see the
power of rational will and free choice narrowed
down by any blind force, natural or acquired.
3. It is obvious that bad habits may be formed
as well as good ones. In these there is
Bad habits.
a tendency to increase in strength in-
definitely ; and when we have this accumulated
power thus added to the force of original passion,
we have a bondage the most fearful known. Hence
the wisdom of letting evil alone " before it be med-
dled with."
4. It is a point of wisdom to " set the habits,"
as Paley says, " so that every change may The s e t
be a change for the better." In illustra- of habits -
ting this he says that " the advantage is with those
habits which allow of an indulgence in the devia-
tion from them. The luxurious receive no greater
pleasure from their dainties than the peasant does
from his bread and cheese ; but the peasant, when-
ever he goes abroad, finds a feast ; whereas the
epicure must be well entertained to escape disgust.
Those who spend every day at cards, and those
who go every day to plough, pass their time much
alike ; but then whatever suspends the occupation
of the card-player distresses him ; whereas to the
laborer every interruption is a refreshment ; and
this appears in the different effects that Sunday
produces upon the two, which proves a day of rec-
reation to the one, but a lamentable burden to the
other." *
1 Moral Philosophy, chap, vi.
168 MORAL SCIENCE.
Passive habits, as has been said, are formed by re-
passive peated impressions. These, no less than
active habits, have it for their end to regu-
late action. This they do by their effect both upon
the enjoyment and the suffering caused by impres-
sions. The end being action, the means are disre-
garded ; and emotions and impressions, both pleas-
ant and unpleasant, are moderated by such habits
when they would interfere with the best condi-
tion for action. The doctrine of Bishop Butler is
that, " From our very faculty of habits, passive
impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker.
Thoughts, by often passing through the mind are
felt less sensibly ; being accustomed to danger
begets intrepidity, that is, lessens fear ; to dis-
tress, lessens the passion of pity ; to instances of
others' mortality, lessens the sensible apprehension
of our own. And from these two observations
together, that practical habits are formed and
strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive
impressions grow weaker by being repeated upon
us, it mast follow that active habits may be
gradually forming and strengthening by a course
of acting upon such and such motives and excite-
ments, whilst these motives and excitements them-
selves are by proportionable degrees growing less
sensible, that is, are continually less and less
sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen." l
This shows how needful it is that motives, excite-
1 Analogy, Part I., chap. v.
DUTIES TO OURSELVES. 167
ments, sympathies, legitimately connected with ac-
tion, should be followed by such action, for no one
is so hardened and hopeless as he who has become
familiar with such motives without corresponding
action. " Going," says Butler, " over the theory
of virtue in one's thoughts, talking well, and draw-
ing fine pictures of it ; this is so far from neces-
sarily or certainly conducing to form a habit of it
in him who thus employs himself, that it may
harden the mind in a contrary course, that is,
form a habit of insensibility to all moral consid-
erations."
But while the above gives us the relation of
active and passive habits, and contains Qualification
of Butler's
practical truth of the utmost moment, it doctrine.
may be questioned whether the doctrine of passive
impressions, as stated, does not require qualification.
No proof is given by Butler that " from our very
faculty of habits, passive impressions must grow
weaker." It is even conceivable that they might
grow stronger. The law applies to all that depends
on physical organization as now constituted, perhaps
goes further, but is not a necessary law of intellect
and sensitive being. Let that on which sensibility
depends remain unworn, as surely it may, and there
will be no reason why the thousandth impression
should not be as vivid as the first.
CLASS II.
DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW MEN.
Duties to our fellow men will fall into two great
divisions, which we shall treat separately, with
divisions under each.
I. Duties to men as men.
II. Duties growing out of special relations.
PRELIMINARY.
SELF-LOVE AND THE LOVE OF OTHERS.
In passing to these we must not omit to say that
Seif-iove as love to our fellow men requires atten-
and love of . , . .
others re- tion to our own condition and state, so
ciprocally . . .
dependent, self-love requires attention to their condi-
tion and state. If we can best minister to our fel-
low men only as we are perfect, they can best
minister to us only as they are perfect. As social
beings, our whole interest and enjoyment will de-
pend upon the condition and state of others, and
the promotion of their well-being is that of our
own. So intimate and reciprocally dependent are
a rational self-love and a love of others. They are
not only not opposites, as some have supposed,
DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW MEN. 169
but are different phases of one common principle,
equally necessary to the common end.
In our duties to others the law is that we shall
love our neighbor as ourselves.^ We must then
do for him as we would for ourselves. But, as we
have seen, we are to regard our own rights, to sup-
ply our wants, and to perfect and direct our powers.
If, then, we would love our fellow men as we do
ourselves, we must
1. Regard, and, if necessary, aid in securing
their rights ;
2. Supply their wants ; and
3. Do what we can to perfect and direct their
powers.
These will include, and in their order as lower
and higher, all our duties to our fellow men.
In these ways we are to " do good to all as we
hav r e opportunity." But through rela- Ground of
i ! i I-, n t - i special rights
tions established by (jrod, indicating the and duties,
ends not only of the individual, but of the family
and of society, we are required, wliile we give to all
their rights, to supply the wants and to seek to per-
fect and direct the powers of some rather than of
others. To empower us to do these more effec-
tually, we may have special rights over persons ;
we may owe them special duties ; and they may
have special claims and be under special obligations.
This will give us what have been called the " rights
of persons" in distinction from the "rights of
things." and will require a separate consideration
of the rights and duties of the family and of society.
FIRST GREAT DIVISION.
DUTIES TO MEN AS MEN.
DIVISION I.
DUTIES REGARDING THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS.
CHAPTER I.
OF RIGHTS.
WE are now prepared to pass to the consideration
of rights.
Of rights the correlative is obligation, and the
obligations corresponding to rights give the lowest
form of duty to others. For the most part rights
are guarded by negative precepts, the command
being " Thou shalt not." They belong to others
already, and can be taken or withheld from them
only by positive injury. This love can never do.
The least that love can do for others is to respect,
and concede to them, all their rights ; and no one
who violates or withholds the rights of another can
consistently claim to be benevolent toward him.
That we give to others their rights, is therefore the
proper condition of all higher forms of duty.
DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW MEN. 171
As actions are right from their relation to an end,
so all rights are founded in the relation of those
things to which men have a right, to some Founda tion
end indicated through our nature, and to of nghts '
be attained either by ourselves or others.
For every active principle in man, for every
natural desire, affection, or capacity, indicating an
end to be attained, there is a corresponding natural
right ; and these rights are higher or lower accord-
ing to the dignity and sacredness of the end, or,
which is the same thing, of that part of our nature
in which they originate. Thus there are rights
which would secure the attainment by instinct of
its ends, and by the appetites of their end. And
so of the desires, and of the intellect, and of the
natural affections, and of the moral and spiritual
nature. Whoever is permitted to pursue unob-
structedly all the ends indicated by these several
active principles, has all his rights ; and in doing
so he has a right to have and to do everything that
will not interfere with the rights of others. If ob-
structed on any other ground, he would not have
all his rights. Having endowed man with active
principles, the purpose of God evidently was to
place him in such conditions that he should be in-
duced, required, and enabled to secure the ends
indicated by those principles ; and when in the
pursuit of those .ends he is arrested by any inter-
ference with such divinely constituted conditions,
the indignant protest which arises in the breast of
every man is the voice of God in the assertion of
172 MORAL SCIENCE.
rights. We are so constituted that, in apprehend-
ing the relation between these active principles and
their ends, the moral reason necessarily forms the
idea of rights.
Rights, as thus founded, are of several kinds.
And 1st, There are what have been called
Kinds of "rights of things " and "rights of per-
rights. sons." This is a radical distinction, and
needs to be clearly understood.
Men have a right to things that they may be
enabled to attain their own ends. They have
rights over persons that they may enable those per-
sons to attain their ends. Rights of things are to
guard against the encroachment of others, and
their sole correlative is obligation on the part of
others. From the use of anything to which one
man has a right, others are under obligation to ab-
stain, and to abstain wholly. Of rights over others,
having it for their object to enable them to attain
their end, the correlative is still obligation on the
part of others ; but they also involve obligation on
the part of him in whom the right vests to those
others. The parent has a right over the child, and
the child is under obligation to respect that right ;
but the parent is also himself under obligation to
the child to use that right solely for the end for
which it was given.
As rights have their foundation in their relation
Limit of to an enc ^ so they find s their limit in the
same relation. Relatively to others a man
DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW MEN". 173
may have a right to do what he will with his own,
but in truth and before God, no man has a right
to use anything except for the end for which it was
given. No man has a right to destroy his property
wantonly, or to use it foolishly, though no other
man may have a right to prevent him.
Here, too, we find not only the foundation, but
the limit of all rights of government whether human
or divine. If any being be in a position to secure
his own ends independently of all others, then no
other being can have any rights over him. It is on
this ground that any right over God is impossible,
and his right over his creatures as moral Governor
is not from his relation to them as Creator and Pre-
server, as these relations are simply from his power,
but it is from his capacity and disposition to do for
them what is necessary for the attainment by them
of their end. Moral government is by law, and no
man will say that it would be right in God to give
his creatures a law that would lead them astray in
seeking their supreme end. So far as we can un-
derstand it the whole end of the moral government
of God is to lead his creatures to the attainment by
them of that end. If any one should fail of this
ultimately and finally, and it should appear that God
had not provided conditions by which it was possible
for him to attain it, the fault would not be in the
creature. But .there will be no such failure. No
creature shall ever be able to charge such a failure
upon God. Hence the righteousness of his govern-
174 MORAL SCIENCE.
ment, his right under that government to control
his creatures, and the guilt of their rebellion. In
the same way parents and civil rulers, holding rela-
tions established by God, through which their aid is
indispensable to others in the attainment of their
ends, have rights over them, but only for the attain-
ment by them of those ends. If any man make use
of another for his own ends simply, he uses him as
a tiling. This, when done by an individual, is
slavery ; when done by a government, it is tyranny.
Rights, again, are natural, and adventitious.
Rights Natural rights are both of things and of
adventi- and P ersons They are those which would
belong to man if there were no civil
government. A man has a natural right to those
means and conditions of good which God has pro-
vided to enable him to secure his end, such as air,
light, water, the unappropriated products of the
earth and waters, and the fruit of his own labors.
Parents have also a natural right to the obedience
and respect of their children, and children to the
love and care of their parents, because these grow
out of natural relations. Adventitious rights are
those which grow out of civil society. No man is
naturally a ruler, or judge, or sheriff, or legislator.
These have rights as such, but they are adven-
titious. So also are many of the rights of property.
Rights are also alienable and inalienable. Alien-
Rights alien- able rights are those which may be law-
able and in- _ , TTT ,
alienable. fully transferred to another. We do not
DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW MEN. 175
here inquire what others may unlawfully do in de-
priving us of rights, which will still be ours and
may again be exercised when we have the power,
but what we may do in transferring to others rights
which will cease to be ours. The ground of this
o
distinction will be found in the ends which these
rights respect. All rights from the lower powers,
as the desires and natural affections, that do not
respect the supreme end, are alienable. A man
may transfer to another his property, or his right
over his child. But a man has an inalienable right
o
to himself in the use of all those means and condi-
tions which are necessary to the attainment of his
supreme end. These he cannot alienate, and no
one can rightfully deprive him of them. No man
may lower his true manhood ; but if, without doing
this, he can alienate or part with anything, he is at
liberty to do it.
If the foundation of rights has been correctly
stated, it will follow that the rights of all Equal
men are equal. As rights are founded right8 '
on ends indicated by active principles, if men have
common active principles and a common end, that is,
if they are men, they must have common and equal
rights. This is the doctrine of the Declaration of
Independence, and the foundation of republican
institutions. The condition in which men are
-born, and their natural endowments, may be of the
greatest diversity, but the right of one human being
to all the means and conditions given him by God
176 MORAL SCIENCE.
for attaining his ends must rest on the same ground,
and be as perfect and sacred as that of any other.
That men have equal rights has been regarded as
self-evident, but some confusion has arisen from not
distinguishing clearly between the rights of things
s of and of persons. As regards rights of per-
be'distin sons ^ P rac ^ ca ^ evas i n has been attempted.
tinguished. All children, it is said, are indeed born with
equal rights, but, as unable to secure their own ends,
they need for a long time to be under guardianship,
and if there are persons or races who are under the
same need, they may be treated in an analogous way.
This is true, but before the desired application of
it may be made, it must be shown that such persons
are really unable to take care of themselves. There
are idiots and incompetent persons who must be
thus cared for, but to suppose large classes or races
to be left thus and without natural guardianship
would be an imputation upon Providence ; there
are no such races. It must also be shown that any
such assumed guardianship is a rightful one, and
will secure its legitimate ends. Such a guardian-
ship for the ends of those over whom it is assumed,
would not be coveted. The law of love would re-
quire us first to give all persons their rights, and if,
after a fair trial, they are unable to take care of
themselves, then to have guardians appointed by
lawful authority, and for their good. This would
be wholly contrary to the spirit of slavery, which
consists in using persons as things, and for our own
ends.
DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW MEN. 177
The rights which men, all men, thus have as em-
powered of God to secure their own ends,
are those of Justice and of Truth, which
last is also a form of justice.
As between man and man, justice consists in con-
ceding and rendering to every one all his rights.
He who has all his rights has no injustice done him.
Divine Justice consists not only in this, but also in
rendering to every one his deserts. These two
forms of justice are entirely distinct. Desert of
punishment depends upon guilt ; but with guilt as
such and in distinction from injury to the individual
and to society, man cannot deal. That depends
upon the heart, which he cannot know and can
have no claim to regulate. Man looks on the act
and infers the motive. He may not punish ex-
cept on the presumption of a bad motive, but his
punishment must be graduated, not by the pre-
sumed badness of the motive, but by the tendency
of the act to injure society. God, on the other hand,
looks at the motive and disregards the act. He sees
and punishes guilt in .intention where there is no
outward act. Hence " Vengeance belongs to Him."
He only can administer punitive justice. Man may
guard rights ; he may prevent any violation of them
in the name of justice and within its limits. And
the sentiment of justice within him may find satis-
faction in such punishment, but the measure of pun-
ishment by him must be found in its necessity to
guard the rights of society, and not in any satis-
12
178 MORAL SCIENCE.
faction of absolute punitive justice. Any other
right can be had only from direct revelation.
We now pass to consider more particularly the
rights which belong to all men.
But in doing this we must notice an element
Secunt an which enters into our conception of all
tuTTnclp- rights that of security. The right to
turn of right. secur ity m the possession and use of any-
thing rests on the same ground as the right to the
thing itself, since the end on which the right is
based cannot be fully attained without this. With-
out security there is no enjoyment or free use of
anything, and perfect security alone gives its full
value to a possession. This is the element and con-
dition in connection with our rights which we
value more than any other. Hence this element is
recognized in law ; and if there be good reason to
believe that any one will violate the rights of others,
he may be bound over to keep the peace.
CHAPTER II.
PERSONAL RIGHTS : LIFE AND LIBERTY.
SECURITY being thus implied in all rights, the
first class which we shall notice is those of the
Person.
Every person has a right to life, and to such
security and freedom as will enable him to attain
the several ends indicated by his active powers.
On the right to life all others depend. This is
the first guarded in the Decalogue. It is Rightto
also the first mentioned in the Declaration Hfe>
of Independence, where it is said to be inalienable.
It is so. It may be forfeited for crime ; it may be
surrendered for the sake of principle or of humanity,
but cannot be alienated for a consideration.
How, then, may the right to life be so forfeited
that others may have the right to take it H owfor-
away ? feited -
This may be done in four ways, and
1. By attempting the life of another. The right
to take life in defending life is recognized by the
laws of all countries and by all persons, except a
few extreme non-resistants.
2. The right to life may be forfeited by attempt-
180 MORAL SCIENCE.
ing house-breaking or robbery in the night. The
law properly makes a distinction between such
attempts by day and by night, and in the latter
case justifies the taking of life. Still every such
attempt will not make this morally right, and for
such cases no general rule can be laid down.
3. The right to life may be forfeited by resisting
the officers of the law. If officers of the law are
resisted in its execution, they have a right, as a last
resort, to take life. If a mob which they have
been commanded to disperse, will not disperse, they
have a right to fire upon it.
4. The right to life is forfeited by murder, that
is, by taking life with malice aforethought.
The death penalty was early authorized and de-
manded by the Bible, not from cruelty, but on the
very ground of the sacredness of human life.
" Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his
blood be shed, for in the image of God made He
man." The estimate placed by a lawgiver upon
any right, can be measured only by the penalty by
which he guards it ; and as death is the highest
possible penalty, they who impose this show the
highest possible estimate of the value of life. That
is a sophism by which those who reject this penalty
would persuade themselves or the community that
in so doing they are more humane than others, or
set a higher value on human life. It is the reverse.
But the right to take life can depend upon no
estimate of its value by us. It must come either
directly or indirectly from God, directly by rev-
PERSONAL RIGHTS : LIFE AND LIBERTY. 181
elation, and indirectly from its necessity to the
ends of government. Government is from God,
and has thus a right to do what is essential to its
own being and ends ; and if the security which is
its great end can be attained only by the death of
those who would destroy it, then society may put
them to death. Society has thus the right, and
must judge how far, in the varying phases of civil-
ization and Christianity, it may be necessary to use
it.
The rights of the Person are also infringed by
any violence actual or attempted. An assault is
violence attempted. Battery is any degree of vio-
lence, even the slightest touch in anger, or for in-
sult. Violence may also result in wounding or in
maiming the person attacked.
Under rights of the person is also included,
the Right to Liberty. By this is here Rightto
meant, not freedom of choice, but the libert y-
liberty of external action in carrying out our choices.
It is the right to do whatever any one may choose,
provided he does not interfere with the rights of
another.
Liberty to this extent is plainly essential to the
end of man as a responsible being, and hence a
natural right. It is also inalienable so far as it is
necessary to the highest end of any man ; but if
by parting with some portion of it, for even
slavery does not wholly take it away, a man can
better subserve the great ends of love, he is at
liberty to do it.
CHAPTER III.
RIGHT TO PROPERTY.
THE Right to Property reveals itself through an
itsfounda- original desire. The affirmation of it is
tion> early and universally made, and becomes
a controlling element in civil society.
The sense of this right, thus originally given, is
deepened by observation and reflection. Without
this society could not exist. With no right to the
product of his labor no man would make a tool, or
a garment, or build a shelter, or raise a crop.
There could be no industry and no progress.
It will be found too, historically, that the general
well-being and progress of society has been in pro-
portion to the freedom of every man to gain prop-
erty in all legitimate ways, and to security in its
possession. Let the form of the government be
what it may, if there but be freedom of industry,
and security in the possession and enjoyment of its
results, there will be prosperity.
The laws of every government relate largely to
property. They regulate the modes of its acquisi-
tion and transfer, and punish violations of the right.
The acquisition of property is required by love,
RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 183
because it is a powerful means of benefiting others.
There is no giving without a previous get- p roper t y to
ting. A selfish getting of property, though be acquired -
better than a selfish indolence or wastefulness, is
not to be encouraged ; but the desire of property
working in subordination to the affections should
be. Most blessed would it be if all the desires
could thus work, but especially this. Industry,
frugality, carefulness, as ministering to a cheerful
giving, would then not only be purged from all
taint of meanness, but would be ennobled. " There
have," says Chancellor Kent, " been modern
theorists, who have considered separate and ex-
clusive property as the cause of injustice, and the
unhappy result of government and artificial insti-
tutions. But human society would be in a most
unnatural and miserable condition if if were pos-
sible to be instituted or reorganized upon the basis
of such speculations. The sense of property is
graciously bestowed upon mankind for the purpose
of rousing them from sloth and stimulating them to
action. It leads to the cultivation of the earth, the
institution of government, the establishment of jus-
tice, the acquisition of the comforts of life, the
growth of the useful arts, the spirit of commerce,
the productions of taste, the erections of charity,
and the display of the benevolent affections."
Property may be acquired,
1. By appropriating so much of those things
which God has given to all as we need for our
MORAL SCIENCE.
own use. Some things which God has given to all,
Direct modes as air and sunlight, cannot be appropriated,
of acquiring
property. and so cannot become property. But
the spontaneous fruits of the earth, the products of
the waters, and so much land as may be necessary
for individual support, and as shall be permanently
occupied, may, by appropriation, become property.
2. Property may be acquired by labor.
Labor is the chief source of value, and the
laborer has a right to the value he creates. This
is a natural right resulting directly from a man's
right to himself. It may not be easy, it is not, to
adjust the questions that arise between the claims
of accumulated labor in the form of capital and of
labor directly applied, or wages ; but the principle
is, that the value created should be shared in pro-
portion to the labor represented or applied.
In the above ways property may be acquired
indirect directly. It may also be acquired indi-
modes. rectly, and
1. By exchange. This may be either by barter,
which is an exchange of commodities ; or by bargain
and sale, in which the purchaser gives money.
2. By gift. The right to give away property is
involved in the right of ownership.
3. By will. The right to bestow property by
will is admitted in all civilized countries. This is
natural and beneficial to society. The right how-
ever is not absolute, but may be so limited by law
as not to counterwork the general spirit of the in-
stitutions of a country.
RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 185
4. By inheritance. When persons die intestate,
their property is inherited by their relatives in
accordance with law.
5. By accession. " This is the right to all that
one's own property produces, whether that property
be movable or immovable, and the right to that
which is united to it by accession either naturally
or artificially. This includes the fruits of the earth
produced naturally or by human industry, the in-
crease of animals, and the new species of articles
made by one person out of the materials of another."
" Also title by alluvion, or the deposit of earth by
natural causes." l
6. By possession. To prevent litigation the laws
properly fix a limit beyond which a man shall not
be disturbed in the possession of property, however
it may have been acquired. This gives no moral
right, but is what is called " right by possession."
The right of property is exclusive. No man, no
state, has the right to take it away without This right
an equivalent, and the owner has a right exclusive -
to put it to any use he may please that is consistent
with the rights of others.
Property may be real or personal. Real estate
consists of lands and of appurtenances, as Property
real or per-
houses, trees, shrubs, that cannot be easily sonai.
moved. All other property is personal.
With the exceptions to be mentioned hereafter,
the right of property is violated if it be taken with-
1 Kent's Commentaries.
186 MOBAL SCIENCE.
out the free consent of the owner; or if through
Thto r%ht concealment or deception the owner fail
tti to have a full knowledge oi
lent offered. If property be taken with consent
enforced by fear, or by violence without conser
is robbery.
If taken by forcibly entering a dwelling in the
night, it is burglary.
If simply taken without the knowledge or con-
sent of the owner with no violence, it is tl
If property be taken, and through concealment
or misrepresentation the owner be ignorant of the
equivalent offered, it is cheating.
If the equivalent offered be a forged paper, it is
fraud. The line between fraud and cheating is not
sharply drawn. In a large sense they cover the
same ground, but while there is fraud in all cl
ing, yet forgery is a fraud, and not cheating.
If property be taken with consent obtained by
lying or deception without an equivalent, it is ob-
taining property under false pretences.
Of these, robbery, as violating both the rights of
person and of property, is the highest crime. As
violating both the rights of security and property,
burglary comes next. The others are criminal in
the eye of the law, for that is the only crimni
that can here be estimated, as they tend to un-
the right of property and disturb the order of
society, and this tendency may vary with time and
circumstances.
RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 187
The right of property is exclusive, but as it is an
inferior good, it may not stand in the way Groundof
of the great interests of the community, or fefence with
of the life of the individual. Hence the thi8right>
community have the right, provided for and asserted
under all governments, of taking in a legal way,
and for a fair equivalent, private property for the
convenience and safety of the public. And indi-
viduals have the right to take property as food to
preserve life.
It is commonly said that the right of property
precludes the taking of the least thing without the
consent of the owner, but consent may sometimes
be presumed. The rule is to take nothing we
should not be willing the owner should see us take.
To take an apple in passing through an orchard is
not stealing.
In the ways above mentioned property is wrong-
fully taken. It may be taken rightfully with the
free consent of the owner, whether as a gift or for
an equivalent. If for an equivalent, it may be by
exchange or by purchase.
The law of exchange, as already indicated, is
that each party should have a full knowl- Lawof ex _
edge of that which is offered as an equiva- chan e -
lent. In exchange intrinsic values are not consid-
ered, but the convenience or taste of the parties.
Hence a fair transaction can require nothing but
freedom from constraint, and a full knowledge by
each party of the equivalent offered.
188 MORAL SCIENCE.
The law of exchange by purchase, or of buying
and selling, is the same, so far as the seller is con-
cerned, as that of simple exchange, except that a
trader is bound to ask for that in which he professes
to deal, no more than the market-price. A fair
transaction requires that there shall be no conceal-
ment or deception in the article sold, that no more
than the market-price be demanded, and that no
improper motive, as vanity, or a depraved appetite,
be appealed to. In selling an article in which he
does not profess to deal, a man may ask what he
pleases.
Property may be permanently and rightfully
alienated, by gift, by exchange, and by
Gambling. '. J _ & J J
sale. It is also permanently alienated by
gambling. This has different forms. In some cases,
as in dice and in lotteries, it is simply an appeal to
chance. In others, as in cards, there is a mixture
of chance and skill. In others, as in betting, of
chance and judgment. In all cases the object is
gain without an equivalent, and while there is such
gain on one side there is, on the other, loss without
compensation. In legitimate trade both parties are
benefited ; in gambling but one. Legitimate trade
requires and promotes habits of industry and skill ;
gambling generates indolence and vice, and stimu-
lates a most infatuating and often uncontrollable
passion. It is wholly selfish, and wholly injurious
in its effects upon the community. That a practice
thus inherently vicious should be resorted to for
RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 189
charitable purposes, does not change its character,
but only tends to confound moral distinctions.
But are all appeals to chance in the distribution
of property gambling ? Not necessarily, Alienation
/' of property
it we define it by its motives and results, by chance
4 /> XT V 1 1 notalwa }'S
A picture is given to a fair, is o individual gambling.
will give for it its value ; that value is contributed
by a number, and the picture disposed of by lot.
This differs from an ordinary lottery : 1st, Because
there are no expenses, and all that is given goes for
an object which the parties are gathered to promote.
2d, The prize is given so that nothing is taken for
prizes from the amount paid in, but the whole goes
for the proposed object. 3d, This may be done
from a simple desire that the fair should realize the
worth of its property and so benevolently. And
4th, Appeals to chance under these conditions are
not likely to be so frequent or general as to en-
danger the habits of the community. All this may,
and should, in fairness, be said. It should also be
said, 1st, That no form of charity should be tolerated
for a moment that in the actual state of a com-
munity will foster a spirit of gambling. It should
be said, 2dly, That any attempt to promote a benev-
olent object by an appeal to selfish motives is
wrong. Benevolent giving is a means of Christian
culture, but selfish giving in the form of benevo-
lence is a deception and a snare. If the cause of
benevolence cannot be supported benevolently, it
had better not be supported at all. Any other
190 MORAL SCIENCE.
mode of supporting it will dry up its fountains.
While therefore we do not say that all appeals to
chance in the distribution of property are gambling,
we do say that all combinations and arrangements
to cause persons to give money for benevolent ob-
jects otherwise than benevolently are wrong, and
more especially if they tend to promote a spirit of
gambling.
But not gambling only, speculation also requires
attention in its relation to morals. In
Speculation. . . i iv
some of its forms, as in buying and selling
stocks, or wheat, when there is no delivery, what
is called speculation is mere gambling. It is sim-
whatis ply betting on the question of a future
called specu- ' , W
lation. market price. But in speculation, as dis-
tinguished from gambling, the speculator does not
expect to get something for nothing. There is
a bargain and a transfer of what each party ac-
cepts as an equivalent. Speculation is purchase or
sale in the expectation of a change of prices. With
fixed prices, which are the basis of ordinary profits,
it is impossible. The problem here is to give
enterprise and sagacity a fair field without vio-
lating the law of love. And 1st, If the ground on
which a change of prices is expected is equally
known, or accessible to both parties, all agree that
the transaction is fair. 2d, If one party has the
power to cause fluctuations in price, and buys or
sells with the intention of doing this, all will agree
that this is swindling. But 3d, If there be a
RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 191
certainty that there will be a rise of price in
consequence of an event known only to the pur-
chaser, then the inquiry is whether he may avail
himself of his knowledge. On this opinions differ.
It may be said on the one hand that the owner
receives full compensation for his property as esti-
mated by any price he may have given for it, any
labor he may have bestowed upon it, or any expec-
tations he may have formed from it, and that if
there is to be an increase of value without labor
if somebody is to gain without loss to anybody, it
may as fairly be the man who by his enterprise or
good fortune has the knowledge as he who has the
property. It may be said on the other hand that
when a man raises a crop, he does it with the ex-
pectation of any advantage that may accrue through
unforeseen events, and that for a quicker or more
fortunate man who has bestowed upon it no labor
at all, to step in and seize an advantage that would
have been his in the natural course of events is
not strictly honest, to say nothing of the law of
love.
In solving such cases, it may be said that society
may be established and exist permanently cooperation
. , p . . and compe-
on two principles that of competition, tition.
and that of cooperation. The first has its advantages,
and the evils of it are diminished as general intelli-
gence is increased. Under it the evils of ignorance
are felt pecuniarily, and intelligence is thus stimu-
lated. Under this system transactions like the
192 MORAL SCIENCE.
above would be allowable. It is only -transactions
based on such a system that human law can regulate.
But the principle of cooperation is far higher, and
the results would be better. This would require
that each man should be made acquainted with, the
facts, and not only be permitted to act in view of
them, but be advised respecting them.
The above is a common case. There is another
less common and differing from it in one respect.
A man discovers a mine on the farm of another.
May he buy the farm and say nothing of the mine ?
In the above case advantage would accrue to the
holders of the property despite the will of him who
had the knowledge, but here the whole increased
value comes from the knowledge and is dependent
upon it. May not he then who has the knowledge
avail himself of the whole of the increased value ?
So it would seem, and yet if men had confidence in
each other as disposed to act on the principle of
cooperation, the owner would be informed of the
facts, and would share the profits equally with him
who informed him.
In connection with this subject it should be said
that nothing tends more strongly to demoralize a
community than unsteady prices. It unsettles in-
dustry, and promotes a spirit of gambling ; and any
legislation that so tampers with the currency, or
disturbs values in any way as to produce this, will
affect disastrously the moral, no less than the pecu-
niary interests of the country.
RIGHT TO PROPERTY. 193
But property is not only parted with permanently
by sale or exchange, but also temporarily Temporary
J . P . . alienation
for a compensation. If it be money, it of property.
is loaned ; if real estate, it is rented ; if a horse, it is
let.
Money differs from other property in being
created by law for the public convenience. Hence
its amount, the conditions on which it may be
issued, and the rate of interest have always been re-
garded as proper subjects of legislation. The pub-
lic must have a right to prevent that which it creates
for its convenience from becoming an injury, but
the precise legislation required will be a question of
expediency rather than of morals. Where money
is abundant, and the amount in a country is large,
and especially in a commercial community, it may
be wise to permit men to take what interest they
can, when under other circumstances it would not.
And banks, being created for the convenience of
the public, may be restricted in their rate of interest
when individuals would not. Their possible com-
bination and power to control the currency may
require this. The rule is, that all possible freedom
compatible with the public interest should be con-
ceded in their use of money both to banks and to
individuals. This being understood, bargains in
regard to interest are to be regulated on the same
principles as other bargains.
When money is loaned, money is to be returned,
but when real estate is rented, or when horses and
13
194 MORAL SCIENCE.
carriages are let, the same property is to be re-
turned. In the mean time the property may be
abused ; and this gives rise to the rule in such cases
that it is to be used only for the purpose for which
it was rented or let, and that the same care is to
be taken of it that a reasonably careful man would
take of his own property. If, in connection with
such care, the property should be injured by acci-
dent in the use contemplated in the bargain, the
loss will fall on the owner ; if in any other use, on
the person in temporary possession.
Property is also often lent without compensation
simply for the convenience of the borrower. In
this case the lender is under obligation not to de-
-mand it arbitrarily and without reference to the
specific use for which it was borrowed. The bor-
rower is under obligation to use the property with
care and to return it promptly.
CHAPTER IV.
RIGHT TO REPUTATION.
THE next right that belongs to man is that of
Reputation.
The desire of esteem is as natural as that of
property, and is equally the foundation of a right.
With most it is a stronger desire, and so the foun-
dation of a right that is more precious. If there
are those who say with the Roman miser,
" Populus me sibilat at mihi plaudo,
Ipse domi simul ac nummos contemplar in area,"
" The people hiss me, but I applaud myself at home,
while I gloat over my hoarded riches/' they are
but few. In the Scriptures a desire for this is en-
couraged, and it is set above property. " A good
name is rather to be chosen than great riches, and
loving favor rather than silver and gold." With
many, reputation is dearer than life, and as society
is now constituted, the means of enjoying life are
even more dependent on this than upon property.
If knowledge is power so is reputation, and espe-
cially is it power in the form of influence. If then
a man have such a possession, we may not detract
from it except for a good reason.
196 MORAL SCIENCE.
The most common mode in which the right of
This right reputation is violated is by slander. The
fa tedT 10 sian- essence of this lies in diminishing the rep-
utation of another without good cause,
whether by truth or falsehood. It was formerly a
maxim of law " the greater the truth, the greater
the slander." The reason of this was that the
truth tended more to injure reputation than false-
hood. Now, however, the courts accept the plea
of truth in mitigation of damages, and generally in
full justification. The malice or the mischief may
be as great, or even greater, if only truth be told ;
but society is not bound to shield a man by its laws
from the natural results of his own acts when fairly
made known.
Slander may be malicious, selfish, or inconsid-
erate. It is seldom probably from pure malice.
That is not the usual form of human wickedness.
But there is scarcely a position or occupation in life
in which any considerable reputation w r ill not so bring
him who has it into competition with others, that it
shall either be, or be supposed to be, for their in-
terest to have it diminished. And as the facilities
for slander are almost unlimited, as the modes of it,
by insinuation, hints, injunctions of secrecy, so tend
to veil its real nature, as it has so many shades, and
as there is not the same danger of legal prosecution
as in taking from the property of another, our treat-
ment of others in regard to their reputation, when
they are in competition with us, becomes one of the
most trying tests of character.
RIGHT TO REPUTATION. 197
The test of character is however scarcely less
severe under the temptations in the ordinary inter-
course of society to inconsiderate slander. There
is here no malice, no competition, no special object,
but topics of conversation are needed ; there is
excitement in telling news, and words really slan-
derous are uttered unmindful of the exaggerations
that are sure to follow, and of the deep wounds
they may give. In such a case lack of criminal
intention is no more an excuse than it would be in
a man who should throw the slates of a roof he
might be repairing into the street of a city careless
of the passers below.
Against the higher forms of slander a man of
average principle would be guarded, but it was
probably with special reference to these lighter
forms that the Apostle James says, " If any man
offend not in word the same is a perfect man and
able to bridle the whole body." Christians are re-
quired to lay aside " all evil speaking." They are
to be put in mind "to speak evil of no man." So
carefully do the Scriptures guard the sacred and
precious right of reputation.
It would appear thus that there are two distinct
cases in speaking of others when reputa- Reputation
.. T ,1 T when rightly
tion is in question. In the one an indi- diminished.
vidual has a reputation, and we know of nothing he
has done either in gaining it or since it was gained
that, if truthfully stated, would diminish it. To
diminish reputation in such a case would be to add
198 MORAL SCIENCE.
the guilt of lying to that of slander. We have no
more right to do it than we have to steal. In the
second case an individual has a reputation, but we
know things either in regard to his mode of gain-
ing it, or that he has done since, which, if truthfully
stated, would diminish or perhaps blast it. In this
case we are not only permitted to state what we
know, but are bound to do it when required to do
it by justice, or for the protection of the innocent,
or for the good of the offender ; but we are to do it
with the temper and limitations required by the law
of love.
But reputation may be diminished not only by
slander, but also by ridicule. The obiect
Ridicule. .. r
of this is to awaken contempt. 1ms may
be proper when provoked by pretense or affectation,
by extravagance or absurdity, perhaps by persistent
awkwardness or carelessness, but never to bring
into contempt anything that is genuine. The mo-
ment this is done, and it may be done towards any
man, however keen the wit, or perfect the mimicry,
or droll the caricature, we obscure the distinction
between that which is reputable and venerable,
and that which is contemptible, and thus not only
wrong the individual, but undermine those higher
sentiments on which the stability of the community
depends. Ridicule is an effective weapon, but re-
quires care in its use, and out of its sphere is de-
moralizing and dangerous.
CHAPTER V.
RIGHT TO TRUTH.
WE have now considered the rights commonly
mentioned as belonging to all men, the general
right to security, the right to life, to liberty, to
property, and to reputation. I am inclined to say
there is still another the right to truth.
This has the same foundation as other rights, that
is, in its necessity to men for the attainment by
them of their ends ; it is often so spoken of as to
imply that it is a right, as when one is said to have
no right ' to the truth, and in grave cases men are
put under oath and the right is enforced by law.
We should hence have naturally expected that it
would be regarded as a right and classed among the
others. Whewell does, indeed, place the right of
contract among the primary rights of men, and
bases it on the need of mutual understanding. But
in that mutual understanding which is essential to
the order of society there is no proper contract.
Nor is such understanding by any means wholly
based on anything that can be called either a con-
tract or a promise. Men act on expectation based,
either, as in nature, on uniformity of causation
200 MORAL SCIENCE.
without reference to obligation; or on confidence in
those who have voluntarily excited expectation and
who feel, on that ground, bound not to disappoint
it. Which then is the prevalent element in the
affairs of life ? A man keeps a shop. Do I expect
to find it open during business hours because he is
under contract, or has promised to keep it open?
No, he may shut it up for a holiday, as John Gilpin
did his, and break no contract ; or he may shut it
up indefinitely and give no notice. My expectation
in this, and in a multitude of similar cases, is based
on that uniform operation of motives, which, aside
from any sense of obligation and in compatibility
with freedom, gives stability and consistency to con-
duct. It may be difficult, it is, to separate expec-
tation thus based from that which rests upon an
implied promise. This always exists when expec-
tation is voluntarily excited, and carries obligation
with it, and it is from the two combined that we
feel so secure of the uniform conduct of those
around us. So far, however, as a right exists in
this case, I should prefer to call it a right to truth
rather than a right of contract, though it is perhaps
of little consequence what we call it.
But such cases are on the same general ground
with others, in which there is certainly.no contract.
All human interests connect themselves with truth.
As has been said, men act on expectation, and can
act successfully only as their expectations are well
founded, that is, as they are founded in truth. But
RIGHT TO TRUTH. 201
God has made men so dependent on each other for
information, that neither the ends of the individual
nor those of society can be attained unless the repre-
sentations which they make to each other are large-
ly true, and what I say is, that when any legitimate
end of another depends on his being told the truth,
he has a right to the truth. It must be so or there
are no rights. A traveller asks the right road.
He has a right to the truth. A child asks if a berry
be poisonous. It has a right to the truth, and such
cases are so numerous, that a right to truth seems
to me among the most sacred and important of our
rights.
But it may be asked, who shall decide when a
man has a right to the truth. In some cases the
law decides it. Where it does not, the person of
whom it is demanded must decide. Certainly he
who asks an impertinent question, or any question
not essential to the attainment by himself of some
legitimate end, has no right to the truth, though
the absence of such right will not justify a lie.
A right to truth, as stated above, will include
that of contract whether express or implied.
If any say that a right which cannot be en-
forced is no right, it is replied that this is enforced
every time an oath is taken, for the only object of
an oath is to enforce the truth ; and that this right
can be enforced quite as fully as the right to repu-
tation.
DIVISION II.
DUTIES REGARDING THE WANTS OF OTHERS.
CHAPTER I.
JUSTICE AND BENEVOLENCE.
HAVING considered Rights, we next pass to the
supply of Wants. This is the second great class
of duties required by love as a law.
The transition here is from the duties of justice,
to those of benevolence. Between these there are
important differences. These were formerly indi-
cated by saying that the obligations and claims of
justice were perfect, while those of benevolence
were imperfect. But this form of expression was
objected to as weakening the force of obligation,
and of late the differences themselves have been
too much overlooked.
But it is one thing for a man to ask for the pay-
ment of a debt, and quite another, however great
may be his need, to ask for charity. In the first
case he has a right to the money, and the person
owing it is under obligation to pay it on the ground
of that right. In the second case the person asking
has no right to the money, but it may still be right
JUSTICE AND BENEVOLENCE. 203
for the person asked to give it, and he may be
under obligation to do so. There may be a claim
of humanity, if not of justice, and an obligation on
the ground of that claim where there is no right.
Hence the first difference between the duties of
justice and those of benevolence will be that one
respects rights, and the other right. These are gen-
erally coincident, that is, it is generally right for a
man to do what he has a right to do ; but they may
be opposed. A rich landlord may have a right to
collect his rent from a poor widow upon whom un-
expected and unavoidable misfortune has fallen, arid
take from her her last crust and her last blanket,
but it would not be right. The rent might be
justly due, the claim might be valid in law, the law
might enforce it, and properly, for otherwise there
could be no law ; but it would not be morally
right.
A second difference, growing out of the first, is,
that as rights are capable of definition and precise
limitation, the obligations growing out of them may
be enforced by human law, whereas that which is
right, being incapable of such definition and limita-
tion, the obligation growing out of it cannot be thus
enforced. Hence the proper business of legislation
is to secure to all their rights, and not to oblige any
to do right. If there are courts of equity their
object is not to compel the doing of right, but to
prevent the doing of wrong through the imperfec-
tions and under the forms of law. That legislation
204 MORAL SCIENCE.
should seek to pass from the guardianship of rights
to an attempt to compel the doing of right, is nat-
ural ; but this has seldom been done without con-
fusion and mischief.
A third difference between the duties of justice
and those of benevolence is, that while rights are
the ground of a claim, and he in whom they vest
may properly be indignant if the claim be not met,
he who asks aid as charity can never make a claim,
and has no ground for indignation if his claim be
refused. It may be that the person asked is under
obligation to give, but of that he who asks is not
to be the judge. If he might be, two spheres
totally different would be at once confounded.
Goodness must be free to choose its own methods,
else it would not be goodness. The rich man who
refused all applicants for aid, and lived in odium
that he might accumulate enough to supply a city
with water, was afterwards justified and lauded.
He was under obligation to be beneficent, but was
at liberty to choose his own methods ; and even if
he had not chosen to recognize the obligation, it
was not for those who had no claim on him but that
of humanity to call him to account.
A fourth difference is, that while a fulfillment of
the obligations corresponding to rights excites no
gratitude, a fulfillment of obligation in doing right
by supplying wants, does excite gratitude. No man
is grateful for the payment of a debt. It is simple
justice, and is, or should be, a matter of course.
JUSTICE AND BENEVOLENCE. 205
But if wants are gratuitously supplied, even though,
as in the case of the good Samaritan, the benefactor
could not fail of supplying them without a violation
of obligation, gratitude is felt. The reason is that
in the one case the man receives simply what is his
own, what he has a right to, and may claim ; and
this is always thus where simple justice is done.
The natural order of things, except as provided for
by the natural affections, is that every one should
have his rights and supply his own wants. In this
there would be no call for gratitude, while any
interference with this order by an infraction of
rights would awaken indignation. But when this
natural order has been broken in upon, and there
is want or suffering for which he who gives relief
is in no way responsible, then the supply of that
want, and the relief of that suffering, can come only
from simple goodness ; and such goodness manifested
in behalf of any individual is the proper ground of
gratitude. Be it that the benefactor is under ob-
ligation to be good. The action of the moral
nature enters into, and forms a part of goodness.
But this obligation having been recognized, and
goodness, instead of its opposite, having been freely
chosen, the exercise of such goodness towards an
individual whose rights we have not violated, and
whose wants and sufferings are from no agency of
ours, is a ground for gratitude, and all the ground
there can be. There is no contrariety, as some
seem to think, between a pervasive moral nature
206 MORAL SCIENCE.
on the one hand, and the utmost freedom of choice
and the fullest play of every generous affection on
the other. That these affections should have wide
scope is right, and if there be obligation it is only
to the choice of that which is inherently lovely in
the promotion of good.
CHAPTER II.
SUPPLY OF THE WANTS OF OTHERS.
WITH this view of the differences between the
duties of justice and those of benevolence we pro-
ceed to consider what the law of love would require
in the supply of physical wants.
Give a person all his rights, and it is to be
expected that he will supply his own wants. From
the feebleness of infancy and of age, and from
sickness, this is, however, often impossible ; and
then, though there be no claim but that of human-
ity, love would require others to supply them.
Here two propositions are to be established.
The first is, that whenever a person has. Lovede .
all his rights, and it is possible for him to Sigent
supply his own wants, love not only does actlvlty -
not require us to supply them, but positively for-
bids it if our doing so would encourage either indo-
lence or vice.
Intelligent activity is the great source of good to
man. It is the foundation of self-respect and of the
respect of others. Beauty of person and talent we
admire, but these are gifts. Will, intelligently
exerted for a worthy end, is the only object of
208 MORAL SCIENCE.
approval. Mental attainments always, and wealth
generally, the great means of doing good to
others, depend on such activity. There is be-
sides, as the* inseparable concomitant of such activ-
ity, a satisfaction of the highest kind, and that can
come in no other way. Of this activity, want is
the appointed stimulus. Opposed to it is indolence,
a besetting sin of the race ; the mother, not only
of imbecility, but of every vice and in the stern
contest of God's ordinance of want with this sin,
love cannot interfere. An apostle commanded,
" If any would not work, neither should he eat."
The second proposition is that when it is im-
when wants P oss ible for persons to supply their own
wan ^ s ? Love requires that they be sup-
p lie( j by others.
This impossibility as it appears in infancy, in sick-
ness, in disability from accident or sudden calamity,
and in old age, is divinely appointed as a part of
our condition here ; and over against it we find the
promptings and claims of natural affection, of friend-
ship, of neighborhood, and of humanity. In the
spontaneous play of these, if we could but exclude
indolence and vice, we should find an adequate pro-
vision for the supply of all wants. The wants and
liabilities of each would but tend to the union of
the whole, and the burden of their supply, if indeed
it would be a burden, would not be greater than
the discipline of character would require. No
legislation would be needed. But indolence and
SUPPLY OF THE WANTS OF OTHERS. 209
vice do exist, and from them come want and suffer-
ing that assume such proportions as to require
legislative action. May not, then, such want and
suffering be left to the provision made by law ?
No ; and this for the sake of both parties.
Legislation can do much, but when its provisions
are best administered it is impersonal ; Legislation
ft -XT i not suffi-
hke the laws ot JNature, it must go by cienttose-
J cure this
general rules, and so cannot touch the supply.
heart. It has in it the power of relief, but not of
reform. It may reach want, but not character, and
till that is reached nothing effectual or permanent
is done. The present life is not retributive, but
disciplinary, and when the laws of well-being have
been so far transgressed as to bring want and suffer-
ing that call for charity, these should lead to refor-
mation. But this they seldom do. More often we
find either a hardened defiance or a languid and
hopeless discouragement. What is then needed is
such kindness and sympathy as will bring to the
poor and suffering and degraded the hope of res-
toration to his own self-respect, and to the respect
and love of others. This can come only from a
manifestation of individual and personal interest.
Love begets love, and for all who can love there is
hope. If love thus manifested, and seconded by
the natural fruits of transgression, will not work a
reformation, no human effort can avail.
Nor will the highest interests of the benefactor
himself permit that the relief of want and suffering
H
210 MORAL SCIENCE.
from indolence and vice should be left to legislation
alone. If we except the forgiveness of enemies, and
kindness to those injurious to us personally, there is
no way in which Christ can be imitated so closely
as by doing good to the degraded through their own
fault, and to those seemingly lost. There is no
achievement like that of lifting a man sunk in vice
and enchained by evil habits onto the high ground
of Christian manhood, and fixing him permanently
there ; and the more there is of sympathy, and of
effort for this, the more is the character improved.
For the sake of both parties then, we are for-
bidden to remit the care of the poor by their own
fault to provision made by law.
DIVISION III.
PERFECTING AND DIRECTING THE POWERS OF OTHERS.
CHAPTER I.
DUTY OF INFLUENCE FROM THE RELATION OF CHAR-
ACTER TO WELL-BEING OBSTACLES TO CHANGE
OF INTELLECTUAL STATE AND OF CHARACTER
BUT we are not only to supply the physical wants
of men as we have opportunity, we are also to seek
to perfect and direct their powers.
In speaking of our duty to ourselves, nothing was
said of directing the powers, because they were sup-
posed to be under the direction of the law of love.
The inquiry was what love, supposed to exist,
would require us to do. But as a condition of well-
being, a right direction of the powers, so far as it
can be distinguished from perfection, is even more
important than that. It is necessary to progress
toward perfection.
There is here a distinction to be made between
the intellectual and moral powers. For th& im-
provement of the moral powers the two conditions
of activity, and right direction, are requisite, but
activity alone is needed to improve the intellectual
212 MORAL SCIENCE.
powers. The burglar gains adroitness and skill in
picking the lock as rapidly as the lock-maker in
guarding against him. With given activity it
matters little for purposes of skill and efficiency
on what objects the intellect is employed, or for
what end. But if the moral powers are not em-
ployed on right objects and directed to a right
end, there is not only perversion but deterioration.
The more active they are the more they deterio-
rate. If, therefore, we would do the highest good
to men we must seek, not only to perfect their
powers, but to perfect the moral powers by direct-
ing them rightly. Our object must be to produce
a change not merely in the condition, but in the
state of men ; and not merely in their intellectual
state involving acquisitions and capacity, but in
their moral state which involves, or rather which is,
character.
And here, in character, whether we would con-
fh e iract n er 0f sult f r our own good, or that of others,
being. 1 " we find that condition of well-being which
is to be singled out as " the one thing needful."
It is to be distinguished from everything else
from all dispositions and tendencies so native as to
be wholly independent of choice, and which, if they
lie back of choice, have yet no moral character till
they are sanctioned by that. It is to be distin-
guished from all characteristics, which are accidental
peculiarities ; from acquisitions, which are what we
gain, whether of material or of power, character
being implied ; and from all accomplishments, which
DUTY OF INFLUENCE, ETC. 213
are acquired perfections in ourselves, and means of
pleasing others, if we have a disposition to please
them. So far from consisting in any of these
things, it is this that controls and directs them all.
This can transform and renovate all dispositions,
can remedy all infelicities of temperament and of
temper. Character can triumph over the most ad-
verse circumstances, turning; them into means of its
7 o
own advancement. It can transfigure and glorify
the humblest lot. It is the possibility of this in
our humanity, and its capacity for it that gives to
that humanity its highest value, and it is the higher
manifestations of this that give it its dignity. What
then is it ? It is the very essence, not of our sub-
stantial being as given by God, but of ourselves as
having capacity to choose our own ends, and to
take our own place in his universe. It is deter-
mined by and consists in our radical choice. It is
our deepest love. When we know what the su-
preme chosen end of any man is, we know his
character. This it is that determines his affinities
in the moral world where the attractions and re-
pulsions are stronger than they are in the physical
world. With this, the deepest, central love of its
being, right, humanity comes into such a relation
to the Maker and Proprietor of all, that it enters
into the possession and inheritance of all things ;
with this wrong, it not merely falls away into in-
difference to all that is good, but into repugnance
to it, and enters a realm of positive evil and suffer-
ing corresponding to the good of which it is capable.
214 MORAL SCIENCE.
From this relation of character to well-being it
must be our duty to do what we can that the char-
acter of others should be right; but the intellec-
tual acquisitions and power of others, and especially
their character, hold a relation to our efforts en-
tirely different from the supply of their wants. If a
man fail to supply his own wants we can do it with-
out his cooperation, or at least, we can so provide
for them that his cooperation, unless he may choose
to commit suicide, is a matter of course ; but no
man can be benefited to any great extent intellec-
tually, or at all morally, without his own active co-
operation. We have direct power over matter, but
can reach mind only by influence. If any one
choose he can oppose a barrier to anything we can
do that we cannot overcome.
And not only so, there is a tendency in ignorance
Barriers to an( ^ v * ce * erec ^ suc h barriers. Mind has
Ignorance ^ s v ^ 8 ^ ner ^ as we ^ as matter. The
and vice. ignorant person sees what he sees and is
content with it. He is not content with the igno-
rance as such, but with knowledge, that is, with what
he knows, and every person who is content with
what he knows is in the same condition, only he
may be a little less ignorant. The man has knowl-
edge, it is his knowledge ; in the light of it he sees
and walks, he sees nothing beyond, and so desires
nothing. If this knowledge, however limited, be
connected with customs of long standing, so that in
the light of it the man walks where his fathers
DUTY OF INFLUENCE, ETC. 215
walked, and if enlargement of knowledge would
draw after it a change of associations and habits,
and especially if fancied interest from short-sighted
views come in, then will new ideas not only not be
welcomed, but they will be resisted. And so strong
is this tendency that if a people be ignorant there is
no hope that enlightenment will spring up from
themselves. There is no example of it in history.
It must come from above, or from without ; when it
does come it will be resisted, and the resistance will
be in proportion to the ignorance and the fancied
interests in question.
But if this be true of ignorance, much more will
it be of vice. Vice involves habits of action, chosen
habits. Its very essence is in these. It relates not
merely to associations of thought, to ordinary cus-
toms and the routine of life, but to the whole direc-
tion and tendency of the man, to the tenor and
current of his affections and choices. Vices differ
as appetites, desires, passions may be stronger ; but
they have a common root in the fact that the man
is not lifted from the plane of indulgence in that
propensity which is strongest, whatever it may be, to
the higher ground of subjugating all propensities
and merely impulsive tendencies to the demands
of intelligent choice, and the voice of conscience
speaking in accordance with that. It makes a
radical difference whether the conduct has its root
in rational choice and be sanctioned by the con-
science, or in blind impulsion of whatever kind.
216 MORAL SCIENCE.
In the one case the man is controlled by what in
the Scriptures is called the spirit in opposition to
the flesh, and in the other by that which is called
the flesh in opposition to the spirit. In its nature
all impulsion is blind. Each appetite and desire
finds its motive in its own object. In themselves,
impulsion, desire, appetite, have no moral character,
but the man who gives himself up to the control of
any one of these has a moral character. He lays
aside his true manhood. He debases himself.
Outwardly he may do nothing unseemly, but he
permits that to rule which ought to serve. He falls
into bondage, and nothing but favoring outward
circumstances, or an amiable temper, or a selfish
prudence, can stand between him and any crime.
In a sense and to a certain extent the impulsive
and the rational powers may be coincident, but they
can never act in the same manner, nor have the
same end. Impulsion, appetency of every kind, are
independent facts in our constitution. They are to
control us up to a certain point, and then are to be
regulated. Up to the point where they need reg-
ulation they may be said to be coincident with the
rational power, but they are blind ; they are essen-
tially of the nature of servants, and whoever gives
himself up to the permanent guidance and control
of anv one of them, or to be controlled by them in
turn as each may be strongest, is in bondage. This
bondage may assume a great variety of forms, and
be more or less inveterate and debasing, but in
DUTY OF INFLUENCE, ETC. 217
every form it is bondage, and more to be dreaded
than that which is physical. We call it bondage,
and it is so. It is an unnatural position, a degrada-
tion. Let the spiritual nature with its powers of
comprehension abdicate its seat and work in sub-
jection to the lower and blind nature of appetency
and impulsion, and the broad wisdom appropriate to
that nature degenerates into the cunning of the
serpent. Intellectual power becomes a curse, and
instead of holding his erect position and communing
with the heavens, the man, that which is distinc-
tively so, goes upon his belly and eats dust.
This bondage is felt, but it is chosen, for though
it be bondage, there is yet in it a certain freedom,
the freedom of abandonment and insubjection.
There is in it no trouble or sacrifice of self-denial,
for the higher nature, in whose behalf alone self-
denial is possible, is set aside. If we add to this
the blindness and paralysis that come upon the
spiritual powers when they are thus ignored and
abused, the light that is within us becoming dark-
ness, we shall not wonder that it is so seldom, if
ever, that any one who has come under the power
of this bondage breaks away from it of his own
accord, or by his own strength.
We have, then, three conditions of humanity in
their order as lower and higher, in which Threecon .
we are required to put forth efforts in its q^ng 16 "
behalf: physical want, ignorance, and I e
will not say vice, but that state in which the ra-
218 MORAL SCIENCE.
tional and spiritual powers are in bondage to those
that are impulsive.
Of these, physical want, as producing immediate
First phys- suffering, and as addressing us through
icaiwant. fa Q senses, makes an appeal that is uni-
versally felt. Hence all mankind have a sympathy
with the disposition that would relieve such want.
From the time of Job, and doubtless from the be-
ginning, men have commended him who has been
" eyes to the blind," and " feet to the lame," and a
" father to the poor," and who has " caused the
widow's heart to sing for joy." Besides, physical
suffering is often unavoidable. It may be from
hereditary disease, or from misfortune, or accident,
and no possible agency, or want of agency, on the
part of the sufferer can come in to check our sym-
pathy. It is to be said, too, though giving to sup-
ply physical suffering often requires delicacy, yet
that we approach in this less near to the centre of
personality, and are less in danger of wounding
either self-love or a just self-respect.
But, with the evils from ignorance, all this is in
Second and a g reat measure reversed ; and with those
noH?iic!f" from spiritual bondage, and from vice, as
and vice. distinguished from its physical effects, it is
wholly so. There is here no immediate suffering ;
the senses are not appealed to ; there is nothing to
measure the evil, and those who are the subjects of
the evil are not conscious of it. Ignorance may be
from indolence and neglect, or from mere wilfullness.
DUTY OF INFLUENCE, ETC. 219
It is often self-complacent, or perhaps makes itself
unconsciously ridiculous and absurd. Still less
visibly do spiritual bondage, and vice except in its
lower forms, connect themselves with suffering.
Around these wealth and learning and accomplish-
ments are often gathered ; they array themselves
in the fashions and organize the gayeties and pomps
of this world. Having their seat within, and being
connected with much that is attractive, it is not for
one man to say how far they exist in another. As
they must be from choice and involve the supreme
choice, and are always wrong, whoever seeks to
remove them must venture into the very seat of
personality, and always with direct or implied cen-
sure. It is not therefore to be wondered at that
while those who have relieved physical suffering,
and those who have enlightened ignorance through
the regularly constituted forms of education have
been welcomed and commended, those who have
sought to enthrone conscience and benefit men
spiritually should have been thought intrusive and
fanatical, and should have been resisted and per-
secuted. The truth is, that over large portions of
the earth this form of doing good has not been
attempted. Its necessity has not been recognized.
Its very nature has not been understood. Christ is
the only person who ever made this his sole aim, or
at least, who made all things else subservient to
this. He alone saw clearly what was the great
want of the race. This, we can now see, has its
220 MORAL SCIENCE.
foundation in the nature and condition of man, as
much so as physical or intellectual want, and also
that it should be recognized as furnishing the high-
est sphere of labor for the good of man. But this
sphere has not been recognized distinctly, and this
labor has not been done except where the teachings
of Christ have come. He first revealed fully the
motives and conditions of successful work, He inau-
gurated the system by his own crucifixion, and it
has been carried forward since only by the spirit of
self-renunciation which He thus illustrated.
In each of the spheres above mentioned, it is
more blessed to give than to receive. The reason
Giving and ^ s > that g^ vm g implies a superiority of the
receiving. gi ver m the possession of the thing given,
and also the exercise of faculties capable of confer-
ring a higher joy. He who would relieve physical
want must have money, or food, or clothing to give ;
he who would enlighten the ignorant must have
knowledge, and he who would lift another from any
form of spiritual bondage or vice, can work effec-
tually only by standing, in some points at least,
above him.
CHAPTER II.
SPHERES OF EFFORT : WHO MAY LABOR IN
THEM.
BUT while there are thus these three great fields
of labor, and while it is more blessed in each to give
than to receive, the question arises, who may enter
in to labor in them.
In the first, the field of physical want, the ca-
pacity, the right, and the obligation have always
been supposed to go together. If any man had
wealth, and was disposed to employ it in relieving
such wants as wealth can directly relieve, no one
has objected ; but to labor as teachers, and also for
the spiritual interests of men, men have been espe-
cially set apart. This has been done for good rea-
sons, but I suppose that here also the capacity gives
the right and imposes the obligation. For the sake
of order, and to guard against error, governments
and ecclesiastical bodies have assumed to authorize
teachers and those qualified to minister to the spir-
itual wants of men, but they have no power except
to exclude those who have not the capacity. Ca-
pacity is given of God, and no man or body of men
has a right to forbid one who has it to do a good
222 MORAL SCIENCE.
work to Ills fellow men. If one who has capacity
be thus forbidden, it is still his duty to go on as the
Apostles did, doing his work and taking the conse-
quences. This may bring on conflicts and turn the
world upside down, but any other doctrine would
be fatal to progress.
As referring to distinct parts of our nature, the
Three three spheres of beneficence spoken of
spheres dis- PUT*
criminated, above need to be carefully discriminated,
and in the minds of very many, the third needs to
be legitimated. We need not merely to see their
limitations, but especially the difficulties and obsta-
cles of each. We need also to see their relations
as higher and lower, the lower good being a condi-
tion for the higher, and the lower work furnishing
the best introduction to that which is higher, and
the best standing-point for it. He who fails to do
good to the bodies of men when that is in his power
and they need it, or who fails to enlighten the ig-
norant when he can, will enter upon a higher work
at a great disadvantage, if indeed he can succeed in
it at all. We need, finally, to see, what it has been
my general object to impress in these remarks, that
each of these spheres is open to all who can enter
in, and that the relations of men to each other as
men, impose upon all the obligation to do for others
in each of these spheres whatever they can.
SECOND GREAT DIVISION.
DUTIES FROM SPECIAL RELATIONS.
CHAPTER I.
RIGHTS OF PERSONS : RIGHT AND RIGHTS : SPECIAL
DUTIES : THE FAMILY.
WE have now seen that it is our duty to do good
to all
1. By conceding to them their rights ;
2. By supplying their wants ; and
3. By directing and perfecting their powers.
But this good is to be thus done to all in their
simple relation to us as fellow men. As such they
stand to us in the relation of perfect equality not
necessarily an equality of condition, but an equality
of rights. We have no right over them, they have
no claim upon us on the ground of having been
in any way specially committed to us.
But in the relations, constituted by God, of hus-
band and wife, and of parent and child, Foundation
and others growing out of these, there is *f s^dai
a commitment of each to each, and of ri hts -
some to others ; and there is a foundation laid for
224: MORAL SCIENCE.
what Lave been called the rights of persons, with
their corresponding duties, claims, and obligations.
As has been said, the right of parents over the
child is from the fact that God has so committed
the child to them, that they are either indispensa-
ble to the attainment by the child of its end, or can
do for it what no one else can. This right, thus
founded, involves the duty on the part of the par-
ents of doing what they can to enable the child to
attain its end. This is the very purpose for which
the right over the child was given, and no duty can
be more imperative.
We have thus, in special relations of which those
special f tne family are but an example, an oc-
casion for special duties. As we pass to
the consideration of these duties that arise from
or under the " Rights of Persons," we make an
important transition. We come into a region in
many respects new. It is one thing to treat of
duty among equals having a common standard, law,
or authority, to which they must alike defer, and
quite another to treat of it among beings who have
reciprocal rights and duties, claims and obligations.
In the one case, the standard may be simply imper-
sonal law, or what must mean the same thing, the
law of obligation as revealed in each one, and so
there be no responsibility except of the being to
himself. There could be no government, no obe-
dience, no punishment. In the other case, all these
will exist, and in treating of these duties, newques-
OF THE
TTiTT'
RIGHTS OF PERSONS, E|
tions and principles must be involvec
quire attention.
And first, it may be well to notice more fully,
though it does not belong here exclu- Relation of
sively, the relation to each other of Right, nights.
and of Rights. Neither of these can be, except
with reference to an end. The idea of an eternal
'Right existing in the order of thought before God,
or any being who could have the conception of an
end, and controlling him, is to rue inconceivable.
Right relates to what beings are to do ; rights to
what th^y may claim and require others to do.
That is the right thing to be done in a family by
which the ends of the family as God instituted it
would be attained, and a parent has rights that he
may cause those ends to be attained. In the im-
perfection of human arrangements men may have
legal rights which it would not be right to enforce,
but it would be a contradiction to say that they can
have a right morally to do that which is not right.
He who enforces his rights for the end for which
they \vere given, does right ; he who does it for
any other end is a tyrant.
We next ask attention to the claims of The famil
special duties and of the family, out of
which they all grow. rights
It is said by some that we are to regard every
man, and labor for him according to his intrinsic
worth, irrespective of any special relation to us.
This has a show of breadth and of liberality, but
15
226 MORAL SCIENCE.
is contrary to nature, and would defeat its own
end.
If there be one set of arrangements more illus-
trative than others of the divine wisdom and good-
ness, it is that by which the knowledge and strength
and affection of the parent that natural affection
which fixes upon the child as his own is set over
against the ignorance and weakness and utter de-
pendence of the child. This, if any thing can, in-
dicates the ministry to which . the child is to be
entrusted. Throughout animated nature the good
of the whole is reached by specific ministries indi-
cated and animated by specific affections. Through
them a large part of the good on the earth is con-
ferred and enjoyed, and he who would set them
aside, would set aside one of the widest and most
pervading of all the provisions and arrangements
made by God.
It will follow from what has just been said, that
those who thus go contrary to nature must defeat
their own end. Is that end the happiness, or the
best care of the race ? The race has no existence
separate from the individuals of whom it is com-
posed, so that what is best for each individual is
best for all. But it is found that the happiness of
individuals is best promoted by a faithful attention
to those special duties which are involved in these re-
lations which God has established. The children of
each parent are committed to him. This gives him
a specific duty. These are his platoon as an under
RIGHTS OF PERSONS, ETC. 227
officer in the great army of the race. There may
be higher duties in relation to the army and its
commander than the care of his platoon. Exigen-
cies may occur when this shall be, for no natural
affection or impulse can give absolute law, but un-
der all ordinary conditions it is the business of each
parent to take care of his own children. It is not
for him to look the world over and compare his
children with those of others and decide on their
relative value or worthiness. By the voice of na-
ture and of God, as well as by every advantage of
labor and of influence, his first duty is to his own
children, and as this is the case with every other
man, it will follow that in this way all children will
be taken care of in the best possible manner.
And what is thus true of the parental relation is
true in its measure of all the relations of kindred,
as of brother and sister, and the more distant grades
of affinity. It is also true of those to whom we
are bound by friendship, of those to whom gratitude
is due, of those who stand in the relation of neigh-
bors and even of fellow citizens.
Of course specific affections need regulation.
There is danger of excess in them and of absorp-
tion by them. They do not give law, but are as
much intended to have an influence in social life as
the instincts are in the control of the body. With-
in limits, and under ordinary conditions, a man may
rationally yield himself to the guidance of his in-
stincts with the conviction that they are the voice
228 MORAL SCIENCE.
of a higher reason than his own. Let a man ignore
Instinct and Appetite in the care of his animal life,
and hand the care of that life over to Reason to be
provided for on scientific principles and there will
be no longer spontaneity or beauty in that life, and
its efficiency will be impaired. In the same way,
if we disallow those feelings which naturally spring
from the near affinities and proximities of social life
we take away its warmth and spontaneity, and sub-
stitute the limited and discordant views of individ-
uals for the wisdom of God.
The family is the ordinance of God, and its un-
derlying idea is religious. It is, indeed, a training-
school for the community and the state, but only as
preparatory to fitness for a place in that great family
above of which the family here is a type, and for
which it should be a preparation. It is the first
form of human society, the foundation and source
of all other forms, and as that is such will they be.
It was because the family is thus the fountain-head
of society, and must determine its character, that
our Saviour insisted so strongly upon its sacredness.
In nothing were his teachings more in opposition to
the spirit of his time, or to the general spirit of the
world, and nothing in those teachings caused greater
surprise to his disciples. But he knew his ground,
he abated no jot from the strictness of his require-
ments, and the history of the world since shows the
wisdom of his precepts. Without this the materials
for a free government never have been furnished
RIGHTS OF PERSONS, ETC. 229
and never can be. This it is, just this, that our
people need not only to see, but to have impressed
upon them, for it is upon the purity, the sacredness,
and the well-ordering of families that the perma-
nence of our institutions must depend. Have what
public schools you will, enlighten the people as
you may, and without the family as formative,
formative of habits of obedience and of a temper of
mutual forbearance, and as offering in its spirit
the only model of a right government, the perma-
nence of free institutions in any such form as will
make them a blessing is impossible.
On this point I feel that I cannot speak too
strongly, because we are here at the root. Most
questions of what is called social science pertain to
the branches, but in this the right constitution
and ordering of families, is God's social science,
and if men will but learn and apply this fully, most
other questions that now pertain to that science will
disappear. Remove the swamp and the malaria and
there will be no occasion to discuss the mode of
treating the epidemic.
But while insisting thus upon the claims of the
family, I would not be insensible to those Basis of
n i* i IT commun-
of the idea that underlies communism, ism.
The basis of communism is, for the most part, sec-
ular and economic, and its advantages are wholly so.
It seeks the best distribution and results of labor.
But may not these be as well reached through the
family as in any other way ? If not, it would be a
230 MORAL SCIENCE.
strange exception to the law by which that which is
lower is best attained by attaining most fully that
which is higher. The difficulty has been that fam-
ilies have not been so ordered as to attain the higher
end, and then, in their isolation and selfishness evils
have arisen for which communism has been sug-
gested as a remedy. This has been tried with every
advantage by earnest, enthusiastic, and cultivated
people, but has uniformly failed. It always will.
But while there will be economic as well as so-
cial evils as long as the real end of the
Cooperation. . . . .
family in training up children for (rod is
not reached, and while communism, as dispensing
with the family, can never succeed, yet another idea,
represented by another word, has arisen, through
which a measure of success, perhaps a large one,
may be hoped. That word is cooperation. To this
there is no objection. Through this, in perfect
compatibility with family relations and interests,
much may be done to diminish labor, to increase
production, and to divide more equally, not to say
justly, the common results of labor and of capital.
How much may be done in this way we do not yet
know. The experiment has not been fully tried.
Let it be tried. Let whatever can be done in this
way be done ; but let us hold fast to God's institu-
tion of the family. Let us hold fast to the doctrine
of special duties made imperative upon us by our
personal relations. Let us not put off work at our
own doors for distant work, mistaking indolence, or
RIGHTS OF PERSONS, ETC. 231
sentimentalism, or the love of notoriety, or all to-
gether, for either philanthropy or religion. Finding
a chart laid down for us in the voyage of life, let us
follow it, and not venture in seeking the good of
the whole to substitute our own wisdom for the
wisdom of God.
CHAPTER IL
GOVERNMENT I RESPONSIBILITY : PUNISHMENT.
ACCEPTING these special duties, or, indeed, recog-
nizing Rights of Persons at all, we reach at once
the right of the parent to command, and the corre-
sponding obligation of the child to obey; or, more
generally, we reach the right of one moral being to
govern another, involving both command or author-
ity, and obedience ; we reach Faith as the only ra-
tional ground of obedience ; we have Responsibility,
both of those who govern for the governed, and of
those who are governed to those who govern ; and
we have Punishment. These are great ideas in
morals ; the larger part of our duties are connected
with them, but they can have place only under a
system of special relations, and in connection with
special rights growing out of the relations and caus-
ing the duties to vary endlessly as the relations
vary. At these ideas we need to look.
The foundation of the right of government and
Govern- * ts limitations as they are related to an
ment. enc ^ nave already been referred to. This
right first appears in the parent. If he is to secure
the end of the child, it is indispensable that he
GOVERNMENT : RESPONSIBILITY : PUNISHMENT. 233
should Lave the right to control him. So far as
that may be necessary, he has a right to control
him physically and by force. Such control in very
early years he is bound to exercise. Subsequently
he has a right to command, and the child is under
obligation to obey. This is properly government
the control of one intelligent and moral being by
the expressed will of another. On the one side
there is a command, on the other there is obe-
dience.
And by obedience here is not meant conformity
to the will of the parent on the ground of
. .,, T Obedience.
perceived reasons aside from that will. It
is one thing to appeal to the reason of a child,
showing him the reasons why we wish, or command
him to do a particular act so that he may do it, not
on the ground of the command, but of the reasons ;
and it is quite another thing to give the command
without reasons, and to be obeyed simply on the
ground of the command. Of these only the last
is obedience. If the child so sees the reasons for
action that he would perform the act on the ground
of those reasons without regard to the will of the
parent, such an act cannot be in obedience to that
will. There are parents who seek to control their
children by such presentation of reasons and call it
government ; but it is not government. The child
may do right, and this may be the best thing for the
parent to do, but he should not delude himself with
the idea that he governs, or that the child obeys.
234 MORAL SCIENCE.
To obey is to do the will of another, simply on the
ground that it is his will. He who obeys may see
reasons for it, or against it, or see no reasons at all,
but he would do the act equally in either case be-
cause he was commanded to do it. If that be not
the reason, it is not obedience.
Now it is just this obedience to which the parent
has a right, and which the child is bound to yield.
But, you will ask, is not the child a rational crea-
ture, and is not his reason to be appealed to ? Yes,
his reason is to be appealed to, but in so far as he is
under government in distinction from influence,
that reason is to be exercised, not in an attempt to
comprehend the reasons by which the will of the
parent is determined, which would be to put him-
self upon an equality with him, but in comprehend-
ing the reasons for confidence or faith in the parent.
This brings us to consider the great principle of
principle faith which underlies all rational control of
one being by another. This is a rational
principle, wholly so, having two branches as it makes
its demands upon the understanding or the will,
and is expressed in belief or in obedience. Their
common root is confidence. Belief because another
says it, is confidence expressed in believing ; obe-
dience because another commands it, is confidence
expressed in action. This is the great and only pos-
sible uniting, elevating, and assimilating principle
where an inferior being is to be governed by the
will of a superior, that is, to be governed at all ; or
GOVERNMENT : RESPONSIBILITY : PUNISHMENT. 235
where any one being is to be governed by the will
of another. The child, the subject, the being gov-
erned, may not know the reason of the command,
but he knows that he who gives it is wise and good,
and he feels that it is the most rational thins; he can
o
do to believe a proposition simply because he says
it, and to do an act simply because he commands it.
As this rational faith is the sole principle of gov-
ernment aside from fear or force, it be- fait hand
comes us to examine it well as needed in vernment -
this relation of parent and child, where we first
find the need of it. In early life children need to
be controlled wholly by their parents, and they are
to be so guided that they may pass gradually from
that control to a perfect independence of them, and
to a wise course of action under the government of
God. In this subjection and control there is to be
no shade of degradation, no slavish fear, but only a
control made necessary by the condition of the
child, I will not say to the fulfillment of its destiny,
but to the attainment of its end. Such control will
be reached by a subjection in perfect faith, both of
the understandin ; and the will of the child to the
understanding and will of the parent, and in no
other way. This will be government ; it will be
subjection, but it will be government by one quali-
fied both by wisdom and by love to govern ; it will
be submitted to in the recognition and full faith of
this wisdom and love, and can therefore have in it
nothing misleading or degrading. The child simply
236 MORAL SCIENCE.
works under the law of love in his peculiar rela-
tions as ordained by God ; and that is all that any
creature can do. He is to rise as rapidly as possi-
ble to his position of independent action, but in the
process of thus rising, his wisdom and duty are to be
subject to his parents. If the parent be what he
should be, the end will thus be reached perfectly.
If he be not wholly what he should be, such sub-
jection will still be generally right and best, but if
the parent become disqualified by vice or imbecil-
ity to direct the child to his end, then the civil law
may interfere, or the child may himself seek other
protection and guidance. This shows that the duty
does not arise from the mere relation. Remove the
idea of an end to be attained, and that of duty will
also disappear.
And here we find, not merely the principle of
Responsi- faith, which, though rational, wholly so,
bihty * and under the circumstances the only
rational thing possible, is yet not philosophy at all,
any more than instinct is, but we also find the fact of
responsibility. This also has two branches. There
is both a responsibility for others, and to others ;
though responsibility for others must, except in God,
ultimately resolve itself into responsibility to an-
other. This is a great fact in morals, and the
ground of it needs to be clearly stated.
If any hold that the will of another is the ground
of obligation, responsibility to him will follow of
course. But if a man be under obligation on a
GOVERNMENT : RESPONSIBILITY : PUNISHMENT. 237
ground independent of the will of another, how can
lie be responsible to that other ? Most philosophers
do in fact find a ground of obligation other than the
mere will of any being ; but all our duties are so
connected with responsibility, and all the duties of
every created being must be, that many have not
thought of duty as possible without that. Respon-
sibility has seemed to them to be involved in the
very conception of law, as much so as obligation.
And in one sense it is ; but in any sense in which a
moral being can be a law unto himself it is not in-
volved ; and the question is, how such a being, thus
capable of being a law to himself, can, consistently
with this, become so subject to another as to be
responsible to him.
This difficulty has been clearly seen by Dr.
Hickok, and he sets it aside by saying, that inas-
much as positive authority must have other ends
than spiritual worthiness, it has nothing to do with
pure morality, and pure morality has nothing to do
with it except to see that none of its requisitions are
opposed to morality. " Pure morality," he says,
" in the contemplation of such occasions will not be
sufficient to cover all the methods of dealing with
human conduct, and thus other systems of motives
must be found and classified which do not direct
themselves " immediately to the end of highest wor-
thiness, and thereby other rules of human action
must be attained than the ultimate rule of pure
morality. But no such motives may be applied, and
238 MORAL SCIENCE.
no such rules adopted contrary to the claims of pure
morality." 1 Again, it is said of authority that, "it
is introduced as a necessary means of constraint
where pure morality will not admit of an appli-
cation ; but in no case, and for no reason, may it be
used in conflict with morality ; and hence the neces-
sity of subjecting all authority to the criterion of a
rigid Moral Science by which only can it be known
that it is nothing but righteous authority that has
been tolerated. Positive authority, thus, must come
within the field of a pure moral science. It will not
govern by morality, but it must govern in full ac-
cordance with morality." 2
Here it may be asked, if positive authority does
not govern by morality, what it does govern by ;
and also how any authority can be a " righteous au-
thority " that has no moral quality and is exercised
outside of the field of morality. All government,
as such, is by authority, and it would seem desirable
to find a ground for that by which the government
of God may be a moral government, and not simply
not immoral.
The question respecting the ground of responsi-
Eighteous bility then recurs, and an answer to it is
authority. suggested in the expression used above,
" Righteous authority," that is, an authority having
its foundation in Rights. Has the parent a right
to govern ? If so, responsibility must follow, for
without that there can be no government. This is
i Moral Science, p. 146. 2 Ibid., p. 148.
GOVERNMENT : RESPONSIBILITY : PUNISHMENT. 239
self-evident. On what ground then -can govern-
ment be justified ? Why not leave each moral be-
ing to the control of his own moral nature, and to
the results of his own action under the guidance of
that nature ? There might then be guilt on the
violation of obligation, the shock of which would be
felt within his own being, but no responsibility to
another. This is so with God. He is, and can be
responsible to no one ; but the responsibility of crea-
tures to Him must follow directly from the posses-
sion by Him of the right to govern them. These
must go together. To-day a child is at large in the
streets. He has no responsibility to any teacher,
and no teacher has any right over him. To-morrow
the parent places the child in a school, and now the
teacher has rights, and the child is responsible.
The teacher not only has the right, but is under
obligation to use all legitimate means to attain the
ends of the school, and the pupil is responsible to
him for that, and only that which would interfere
with those ends. Any authority needed to attain
those ends is righteous authority, as growing out of
his rights, and no other authority is righteous. So
the responsibility of the child to the parent is directly
from the right of the parent to control him, and must
be coextensive with that right. But, as we have seen,
the rights of the parent are from his relation to the
end of the child and of the family, which he is under
obligation by the affirmation of his own moral nature
to take every proper means to secure, and so the
child must be directly responsible to him.
240 MORAL SCIENCE.
And not only is there responsibility to others, but
Response also, as has been said, for others. If these
others. do ultimately coalesce from the fact of the
responsibility of all to God, yet this aspect of the
subject requires attention. The parent is responsi-
ble for the welfare of the family, that is, he is under
obligation to God to see that that welfare is guarded
and promoted. He not only has a right but is un-
der obligation, on the ground of that, to guard their
rights. So far as he is able he is bound to see that
no selfishness of one shall so encroach upon another
as to debar him from the exercise of any natural
right or the attainment of any legitimate end. Here
again we have the right of government, not merely
that the end of the individual may be attained, but
that the rights of all may be guarded. From his
very position the parent must be the guardian of the
child if his rights are to be secured, or if his end is
to be attained ; and hence we see that rights, gov-
ernment, and responsibility have a common ground
in their necessity for the attainment of a common
end having intrinsic value, and in view of which
obligation is immediately affirmed. The child is
bound to have faith in the parent because he has
reason to believe that he is wise and good, and will
do all things for the ends of the family ; and the
man is bound to have faith in God because he has
reason to believe that He is wise and good, and will
do all things for the ends of his intelligent and
moral kingdom ; and so the child and the man can
GOVERNMENT : RESPONSIBILITY : PUNISHMENT. 241
joyfully submit to government, and acknowledge
responsibility under it with the conviction that so
only can they work for that end in view of which
obligation is affirmed. So only can conduct become
rational, so only can we have science in the place
of blind impulsions, and unity in the principle of
conduct in our various relations.
There is one point more concerning responsibility.
It always has respect to some person. A
, bility to a
man may violate obligation as affirmed person.
within himself, and it be nothing to another except
as a moral being ; but if he be responsible to
that other, then a failure to meet that responsibility
is a violation of a right that must admit and may
demand retribution. If a parent command a child
to do an act which he has a right to command, the
child is directly responsible to him for obedience.
If the child refuse to obey, not only is an ordinance
of God that is inwrought into the very structure of
society set aside, but the personal rights of the pa-
rent are invaded. Not only is obligation violated
and guilt incurred, but there is a direct personal
affront, an infringement of a sacred right, and the
parent is bound to vindicate that right in the only
way possible, that is, by punishment.
We have thus the origin, not only of the right of
government, but of punishment, the idea Punishmentj
and right of which are, indeed, involved what?
in the very notion of government. The conse-
quences within the moral being himself, of violating
16
242 MORAL SCIENCE.
obligation, the shock that may ensue, whatever that
may be, is not punishment. It cannot be. punish-
ment is the vindication by a person, through some
positive infliction, of violated rights. In no other
way can such rights be vindicated, and rights gen-
erally be protected, except possibly by some expres-
sion of a displeasure as great as would be manifested
by inflicting the punishment. In no other way can
the attitude of the person towards his own authority
and rights, or towards universal righteousness as-
sailed through these, be indicated, and his moral
character be made to appear, g Government being
by authority, is an expression of Will^ and if punish-
ment is to sustain government, that too must be,
and must be known to be, an expression of the same
will. Evil may be suffered and inflicted that is not
punishment. Evil from accident, or misfortune, or
from the laws of nature regarded as impersonal, is
not punishment. Nor is evil inflicted by equals
upon equals punishment, nor that inflicted from
anger, or malice, or for the sake of discipline. This
latter, evil inflicted for the sake of discipline, is gen-
erally supposed to be punishment, and parents say
to children that they punish them for their own
good. But if that be the sole end the infliction of
evil has no reference to law, and cannot be properly
punishment. Punishment presupposes a law ad-
ministered by a personal lawgiver having rights.
It presupposes a righteous penalty annexed to the
law, and that the law has been violated. These
GOVERNMENT : RESPONSIBILITY : PUNISHMENT. 243
conditions being given, punishment is the infliction
of a previously declared penalty by the will of the
lawgiver for the sake of sustaining the authority
of the law. That authority can be sustained in no
other way. Nothing but a penalty proclaimed, and,
if need be, inflicted, can make known and measure
the regard of the lawgiver for the law. Hence, as
entering into the very conception of government,
punishment is justified. It can never be wanton,
or capricious, or revengeful, for evil thus inflicted
would cease to be punishment, but the extent of it
must be measured by its necessity for the attain-
ment of the ends of government, and what that
extent should be only a righteous and competent
lawgiver can judge. Obviously, as proclaimed bt
forehand, the penalty must express, and that onl
can, the estimate by the lawgiver of his own rights,
and of the rights of others that are in question, and
also his benevolent desire to present the highest
moral motives the case will allow to prevent the in-
fraction of law. And then, whatever it is right to
affix as a penalty beforehand it must be not only
right, but necessary to inflict as punishment, else,
unless some adequate reason can be given, all gov-
ernment must be abandoned.
In connection with the above, two things are to
be noticed. The first is, that the proper violation of
ground of punishment under anv govern- proper
. , . P ", , ? . g^und of
ment is not the violation of obligation, punishment
that is, guilt as such, but only the violation of obli-
214 MORAL SCIENCE.
gation, as that violates rights. In human govern-
ments this is avowedly so. They do not claim to
punish guilt as such, or to measure it except as it
violates the rights of the community. Under the
divine government it happens, or rather it must be,
that the violation of obligation and of the divine
rights, and so of the rights of his intelligent uni-
verse, correspond, but the punishment is not in
view of the guilt as such, but as it is guilt that vio-
lates the rights of others. There must be guilt.
That is the only condition of punishment, but not
its ground. If we may suppose guilt that would
violate no rights of God, or of any other being,
however detestable it might be in itself, or whatever
the consequences might be within the being himself,
it would be no ground of punishment. There is no
abstract inexorable justice that would require it,
and hence, even though guilt may have been in-
curred, if the rights of all be perfectly preserved
and secure, punishment may be righteously omit-
ted. It will not be demanded.
The second point to be noticed in connection with
Appeal of the above, is that the appeal of penalty
penalty to IP .1
worthy fear, when threatened, and or punishment,
when inflicted, is not primarily to any form of the
Sensibility that can be reached through positive in-
fliction. This appeal is not therefore to the fear of
suffering as suffering merely, but of suffering as it
may be caused by that recoil of personality against
aggression upon its rights, which is an inherent and
GOVERNMENT: RESPONSIBILITY: PUNISHMENT. 245
essential part of righteousness a fear of suffering
as expressing the disapprobation of the lawgiver,
and felt to be deserved. This is no unworthy fear,
as some seem to suppose.
There are three sources of suffering to us as
moral beings. The first is, the recoil of Three
our own moral nature when the law of its morauuffer-
being is transgressed. This is remorse, in mg '
which a man constantly accuses and condemns him-
self. The second is the expression of disapproba-
tion by others without any act of will put forth
towards us. They may do, and we may fear, no
hostile act, but the look of mingled displeasure and
sorrow is felt and remembered with a pang, and
this feeling will increase with the excellence and
dignity of the being, and if we have wronged him
personally, with his kindness and love towards us.
A third source of suffering to us as moral beings is
from a direct act of will withdrawing from us con-
ditions of good, and inflicting upon us positive evil.
To avoid each of these, to avoid simple suffering
even, would be a suitable motive ; but it is not by
the fear of suffering that moral creatures can, or
ought to be governed. Not so does God or any
wise man seek to gorern them, but by the fear of
penalty. It is by the moral nature alone that suf-
fering can be known as penalty, and hence it is to
that nature, and to no ignoble and unworthy fear,
that penalty appeals.
CHAPTER III.
RELATION OF THE SEXES: CHASTITY.
WE have now considered the general topics con-
nected with the transition from those duties which
we owe to all men, to those special rights and du-
ties which are indicated by our special relations,
and it will be next in order to consider the rights
and duties themselves.
The special relation on which all others depend
is that of the sexes. In connection with this the
first general duty is that of Chastity.
Chastity is a duty of the individual both to him-
self and to the community.
Effect upon 1st. It is a duty to the individual him-
the individ-
ual, self.
By chastity is -meant personal purity, and upon
the violation of this, whether by solitary or social
vice, God has set the seal of his condemnation by
the effects of it upon both the body and the mind.
All solitary vice tends to weakness and insanity,
the extent of both which from this cause is little
suspected ; and in connection with the social vice
there is a disease, one of the most loathsome and
wretched ever known, which seems to have been
sent as a special judgment and check upon it.
RELATION OF THE SEXES : CHASTITY. 247
Nor is the effect upon the mind less debasing.
" However it may be accounted for," says Paley,
" the criminal intercourse of the sexes corrupts and
depraves the mind and moral character more than
any single species of vice whatsoever. That ready
perception of guilt, that prompt and decisive resolu-
tion against it, which constitutes a virtuous charac-
ter, is seldom found in persons addicted to these
indulgences. They prepare an easy admission for
every sin that seeks it ; are in low life, usually the
first stage in men's progress to the most desperate
villainies ; and in high life to that lamented disso-
luteness of principle, which manifests itself in a
profligacy of public conduct, and a contempt of the
obligations of religion and of moral probity. Add
to this that habits of libertinism incapacitate and
indispose the mind for all intellectual, moral, and
religious pleasures, which is a great loss to any
man's happiness."
2. Obedience to the law of chastity is a duty to
the community. From the time of Sodom, Effect upon
r> T i i i i *ke com "
sins ot hcentiousnesss have been the chief mumty.
cause of the corruption and downfall of nations.
There is no ruin and degradation like that which
these sins bring upon the woman, and there is no
general debasement like that of a great city deeply
infected with this class of vices, and those that in-
evitably accompany them. If men could be brought
to obey the laws of God in regard to chastity and
marriage, and also in regard to narcotic and intox-
248 MORAL SCIENCE.
icating substances, laws written not only in his
Word, but in their physical and moral nature, the
great obstacle to the intellectual and moral improve-
ment of the race would be removed. Abstinence
from these is not virtue. It may give greater skill
to fraud, or more power to ambition, but it is a con-
dition of virtue. It is in connection with these
sins that man is capable of degrading himself below
the brutes ; and through them what is called civiliza-
tion, that is, skill in literature and the arts, and in
producing the elegancies and luxuries of life, may
coexist with a state of society to which the savage
state would be infinitely preferable. Certainly
every one owes it to society to do what he can to
relieve it from this incubus.
In combating this class of sins in ourselves the
Theimagi- proper point to guard is the imagination
nation to be __ . .
guarded. and the thoughts. JLhis is the citadel.
With this sufficiently guarded, we may go anywhere
and be subject to any form of outward temptation,
for " to the pure all things are pure." But few
only can go thus. Against no class of sins do we
more need to put up the petition : " Lead us not
into temptation." We need to guard the senses,
especially as temptation may come through them in
the guise of the fine arts, which have often been of
great efficiency in corrupting a people.
CHAPTER IV.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN RELATION TO MARRIAGE.
AFTER the general duty of chastity it will be in
order to consider :
1. The rights and duties of the sexes in their re-
lations to each other previous to marriage.
2. The rights and duties, in their relation to each
other, of those who are married.
3. The law of divorce.
4. The rights and duties of parents.
5. The duties and rights of children.
1. Of the rights and duties of the sexes in their
relations to each other previous to marriage.
These will relate, first, to the period pre- Rights and
. , duties before
vious to being engaged to be married. engagement.
That is a critical period when young persons first
awake to a consciousness of those sentiments which
are to unite them so closely, and to affect so nearly
their own happiness and that of the coming gener-
ations. A new world is opened up to them full of
susceptibility, emotion, sentiment, romance, passion,
and with capabilities of both happiness and misery
unutterable. What shall be done ? Left to them-
250 MORAL SCIENCE.
selves, there is danger of imprudence and misjudg-
ment. Controlled by others, there is danger that
that which is highest in sentiment and purest in af-
fection will be sacrificed to fancied interest, or to
ambition. It is not easy for the parties themselves,
much less for others, to distinguish the glamour of
a transient infatuation from the conscious recogni-
tion and opening affection of two natures made to
supplement each other. In the freshness and glow
of such sentiments prudence is spurned, and an ap-
peal to duty seems cold and impertinent. Hence,
in some countries, in most indeed, young persons
have been kept during this period under the strict-
est surveillance, and everything pertaining to mar-
riage has been regulated by others. Among the
Moravians, partners were, until recently, assigned
by lot. There are persons living in this country
now who obtained their wives in that way. But in
this country now it is virtually in the hands of the
young people themselves, giving rise doubtless to
greater happiness in some cases, but in others to
mistakes and scenes both ludicrous and sad. By
those who have had opportunity to observe it has
been gravely questioned which course is best. In
any way there will be persons unmatched and mis-
matched. But however this may be, this matter
not only now is, but will continue to be chiefly in
the hands of those more immediately concerned, and
in view of that they have duties whether they will
heed them or not.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN RELATION TO MARRIAGE. 251
And here the one duty of those whose affections
are yet free is to withhold themselves from any at-
tempt to awaken affection in another except with a
view to marriage. This will be hard where there
is conscious beauty and power ; vanity and pride
will plead strongly, and many will go as far as they
can or dare. But the existence of an affection that
cannot be requited is a great evil, and to awaken
purposely, or to seek to awaken such an affection,
is a crime. It is trifling with feelings that God in-
tended should be sacred, and causes a revulsion that
nothing else can. It makes cynics and misan-
thropes of the most hopeless kind. One who can
thoughtlessly or heartlessly trifle with a true affec-
tion, or who mocks at it and treats all claim to it
as a pretense, is lost, is incapable of even conceiv-
ing of the great happiness there is in affection with
security for its basis, and which God intended should
be connected with the marriage state. Only when
there is a view to marriage may that more intimate
acquaintance be sought which will justify an en-
gagement, and when the parties are on this footing,
the one duty is frankness in relation to everything
that could affect the feelings of the opposite party.
After an engagement is entered into, the rights
and duties of the parties become more Rights and
i r 111 duties after
definite. Ihe parties are now betrothed, engagement,
affianced, engaged to each other by a promise only
less sacred than that of marriage. They are, and
should be known to be, in such relation to each
252 MORAL SCIENCE.
other that it would be criminal in either of them to
seek the affection of another, and that it will be
criminal in any other to seek the affection of either
of them.
The length of an engagement involves no prin-
ciple except that neither party has a right to pro-
long the time beyond that desired by the other,
without good reason. In general, short engage-
ments are best.
The levity and capriciousness with which such en-
gagements are broken are to be deprecated. If it
be found that there was concealment or deception
in relation to anything material at the time of the
engagement, or if there be gross immorality or
licentiousness subsequently, the other party will be
justified in breaking the engagement. Nothing
short of one or the other of these can justify such
a step of one party without the consent honorably
obtained of the other. An engagement is not mar-
riage, but only preliminary to one, the object of
which is a happy life in the attainment of the ends
of marriage. Incident to an engagement, though
not the object of it, is a more perfect acquaintance,
and if, in connection with this it should appear that
their mutual happiness is not likely to be secured,
and this shall be the opinion of each, they are not
only at liberty, but are bound to break an engage-
ment which they find to have been made under a
misapprehension, though, it may be, without fault
on either side.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN RELATION TO MARRIAGE. 253
Perhaps it ought to be said, as the affections of
woman are stronger than those of man, and as she
is not allowed the initiative, so that the injury of a
broken engagement would be greater to her, it is
incumbent on, the man to be especially scrupulous
on this point.
The reciprocal rights and duties of husbands and
wives grow, like all others, from the law Kigh tsand
of love, but from that law as applied in husbands
this special and most intimate and sacred a
relation. With the affection that should form the
basis of marriage, the happiness that may flow from
it is greater than any other not distinctively religious.
It is, indeed, made in the Scriptures a type of that
higher happiness which is to flow to the church from
her union with Christ. A failure to attain this hap-
piness can arise only from ignorance or from a want
of right purposes and dispositions.
There is often ignorance or misapprehension of
the reciprocal rights and duties involved in mar-
riage. God has indicated in the structure of the
physical frame, and in the mental characteristics
which correspond, different spheres of duty for the
husband and the wife. The adaptation of each sex
to its sphere is equally perfect, and as both are parts
of one indivisible race, the terms superior and in-
ferior are not properly applicable. What is needed
is a distinct recognition by each sex of its own
sphere, and a cheerful acceptance of its responsi-
bilities and duties. The object is unity through
254 MORAL SCIENCE.
diversity, and, within limits, the greater the diver-
sity the greater the beauty of the possible unity.
If God has made, as He has, by nature and by
revelation, the husband the head of the house, then
the truest and best happiness of the wife will be
found only in recognizing him in that relation. If
God has made it the business of the wife to " guide
the house," then the husband will find his peace and
happiness in giving her the reins in that depart-
ment. Of course there are exceptions, as there are
to the command to children to obey their parents.
If the parent become imbecile, or intoxicated, or
command the child to steal, he is bound not to obey.
The relation is changed, and the law of love must
be interpreted by the relation. So it is universally.
If through ignorance, or inadvertence, or wayward
speculations and theories of equality that recognize
no difference, the natural relations fail of recognition,
the full benefits of marriage cannot be realized,
though the temper may be right.
But while ignorance is one cause of failure in
causes of married life, the great source of trouble is
unhappi- P i . j j-
ness. a want of right purposes and dispositions.
It is some form of selfishness on one part, or both.
The husband is imperious, exacting, unsympathiz-
ing, self-indulgent, perhaps sensual to the extent of
vice. The wife is indolent, neglectful, extravagant,
does not talk as much as she should. Perhaps there
was an original failure of a full commitment of each
to each, so that there never has been that conscious
RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN RELATION TO MARRIAGE. 255
unity and perfect confidence in which the charm of
married life consists, for next to loving with a per-
fect love is the happiness of a perfect confidence,
and of an assurance that love is returned. The
great duty then will be to cherish and cultivate
mutual love.
But can love be cultivated ? On this point there
is much misapprehension. Love is radi- Cultiv;ition
cally an act of will. True, that which of]ove '
leads to marriage is accompanied by admiration, by
desire, by sentiment, but these do not become love
till the will authorizes them by an act of choice, and
this fact gives the will an indirect control over all
the emotions and feelings connected with it.
In the first place then, each can cultivate those
qualities in themselves that will tend to secure love.
Each can seek to become more lovable. A reso-
lute purpose and persevering effort in this will work
surprising changes, and is far better than complaints
of want of affection. Such complaints tend only to
aggravate the difficulty. In the second place, hus-
band and wife may seek, and are bound to seek, the
improvement of each other ; and by this I mean not
merely intellectual improvement, but improvement
in all that is a ground of esteem and of rational affec-
tion. The mode and measure of this will so depend
upon their relative age, upon acquirements and
temperament, that no details can be given ; but a dis-
position to give and to accept aid in this way will
greatly tend to mutual love. But in the third place,
256 MORAL SCIENCE.
and which is perhaps quite as important as either,
we can form the habit of looking at excellences and
overlooking deficiencies and ev 311 faults. Let each
party adopt the spirit of the couplet
" Be to her faults a little blind,
Be to her follies very kind."
and it would, I will not say pour oil upon the
troubled waters, but would prevent them from ever
becoming so troubled as to " cast up mire and dirt."
This I say on the supposition that there are faults
to be overlooked and follies to be kind to, but if
there are, and I have known such, husbands whose
wives have for them no faults or follies, and if there
are wives whose husbands have none, these remarks
do not apply to them.
In these ;ways a vast deal may be done in the cul-
tivation of mutual love, and this, as inclusive of all
other duties, and sure to draw them after it, and
also as being so little understood and appreciated, is
the one great duty that needs to be inculcated upon
those in the marriage state.
CHAPTER V.
THE LAW OF DIVORCE.
MARRIAGE, as we have seen, involves a union
Sacredness altogether peculiar. In its perfection it is
of marriage. a S pi r i tua ] un i on , and only in it does the
life of each party become complete. That this union
should be, and should be understood to be for life, is
essential to the interests of both parties, to the wel-
fare of children, and to the interests of the State.
Only on the condition of such understanding can
there be a perfect commitment of each to each, and
that perfect community of interest and of life which
radically separates marriage from all forms of pros-
titution and unlawful cohabitation. As thus pecu-
liar and sacred, the original institution of God was
that the union should be of one man with one
woman, and for life. Under the Mosaic dispensa-
tion divorce was permitted on various grounds,
but the original ground and sacredness of marriage
was not lost sight of. This appears from a remark-
able passage in Malachi showing the unreasonable-
ness and evils of both polygamy and divorce, and
the displeasure of God towards them. " And this,"
says he, " have ye done again, covering the altar of
17
258* MORAL SCIENCE.
the Lord with tears, with weeping, and with crying
out, insomuch that he regardeth not the offering any
more, or receiveth it with good will at your hand.
Yet ye say, wherefore ? Because the Lord hath
been witness between thee and the wife of thy youth
against whom thou hast dealt treacherously. Yet
is she thy companion and the wife of thy covenant.
And did not he make one ? Yet had he the residue
of the Spirit." He might have made any number as
easily. " And wherefore one ? " continues the pro-
phet. " That he might seek a godly seed. There-
fore take heed to your spirit, and let none deal
treacherously against the wife of his youth. For
the Lord God of Israel saith that he hateth putting
away." What a picture ! Poor wronged women
bathing the altar of God with their tears ; those who
did the wrong seeking to be religious by offerings
while they yet held on to the wrong ; God rejecting
their offerings, asserting the law of marriage, declar-
ing that He made one woman for a perpetual union
with one man that the children might be trained for
Himself, and implying that this could be done in no
other way.
The original law of marriage, thus asserted by
Malachi, Christ fully restored. This law is based
on the very nature of marriage, and is confirmed
by the fact that rather more males than females are
born, allowance being made for their greater expos-
ure to the causes of death. This has been so felt
to be a law of nature that among various nations,
THE LAW OF DIVORCE. 259
the Romans and Scythians, who have not had the
light of revelation, marriage has been held sacred,
adultery has been punished by death ; and the very
law of divorce laid down by Christ has been
adopted. Hence it is the duty of Christian States
to make this law their standard, and to approximate
it as nearly as the state of public sentiment will
allow. No doubt there are cases of peculiar hard-
ship. Persons of uncongenial temperaments and
tempers are united. There will be ill-assorted mar-
riages and misadjustments of every degree. There
will be vice and abandonment on one part or the
other, and such cases are liable to be of peculiar
hardship to the woman. But facility of divorce
will set back its influence to the very fountain-head
of the institution. It will affect the spirit with which
marriage is entered upon ; it will generate and mul-
tiply the very evils for which divorce is sought.
Nothing can so tend to repress petty differences,
liable to become exaggerated into permanent feuds,
as the consciousness, always felt like a pervading at-
mosphere, even when it is not recognized, that they
are inseparably united and must be mutually depend-
ent. If facility of divorce be sought, as it is, on the
ground of cases of special hardship to women, it is
to be remembered that the evils of divorce fall
with peculiar hardship upon her, and that the purity
and general elevation of the sex will always be in
proportion to the strictness with which the law of
marriage is enforced.
CHAPTER VI.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN.
IN considering the reciprocal rights and duties of
parents and children, we are, as before, to be
guided by the Law of Love interpreted by the re-
lation. The child is entrusted to the parents by
God. In its original weakness, ignorance, and en-
tire dependence, the parents have, and must have,
the right of entire control. As the child becomes
capable of taking care of itself, this right will be
modified, till, at length, when the occasion for it
shall cease, the right will cease altogether. This is
typified by what we see among the lower animals.
They have no knowledge of rights, but the care and
control of the young is provided for by an in-
stinct which ceases when the young are able to take
care of themselves. If the young need no care,
there is no instinct, showing how carefully every-
thing in nature is furnished and regulated with ref-
erence to ends.
The right of control thus belonging to the parent
is to be used, first, to promote the end of the child,
and second, of the family.
The end of the child is not identical with what is
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN. 261
sometimes called, and supposed to be, the good of
the child, consisting in his own personal advance-
ment or enjoyment, in some " summum bonum "
that can belong to him alone ; but it is the very end
indicated in his constitution, and for which God
made him, that is, not merely to be a recipient of
good, but an originator and promoter of it, in sym-
pathy with God in his spirit, and in harmony with
Him in his methods. It will thus enter into the con-
ception of his end that he should promote the good
of the family.
In marriage and in the birth of children the fam-
ily is constituted. This is a divine institution hav-
ing an end that can be reached only through all
its members; and while the child may not be, as
the ancients supposed, used selfishly, as a thing, for
the good of the parent, he may yet be required to do
all things that are legitimately for the e*hds of the
family. He may be required to labor for the com-
mon support, and it is the duty of the parent so far
to control each child that no one shall interfere
with the rights of any of the others.
This right of control may and should be en-
forced by physical means if necessary. There is an
end to be attained for the child himself. It is of
the last importance to him that he should be taught
obedience and subordination. These are in the or-
der of God's providence, and he who does not know
how to obey will never know how to rule. The
same thing is important to the peace of the family
262 MORAL SCIENCE.
and of society, and must be secured by every legit-
imate means. Let persuasion be tried. Let reason
be appealed to ; but if these will not suffice, the rod
should not be spared. Perhaps the rod was for-
merly used too much. It will be quite as mischiev-
ous in every way to use it too little. The child has
a rational nature, but may not be reasonable. He
has also an animal nature, and there is no reason
why that should not be appealed to. Do you think
it degrading to your child to whip him ? You need
not do that. Whip the mule that is in him. If
possible whip it out of him, and then you will have
a child and not a mule. The less we have of the
use of the rod the better, but government, subor-
dination, order must be maintained, and if these
cannot be had without the rod, the parent is dere-
lict in his duty if he do not use it.
The rights of the parent are for the sake of his
First duty of Duties, and to enable him to perform
piro/phy?" ^em. His first du ty is to provide for phys-
:ai wants. j ca ] wan ^g 5 j n wno l e or ' m part, according
to the age of the child, and to make such provision
as shall comport with his condition in life. He is
bound to provide for his health and physical devel-
opment, and to put him to no such employment in
kind or degree as shall interfere with these.
The second duty of the parent is to secure such
Second duty; intellectual education and such training,
blon> in some industrial pursuit, or in some pro-
fession, as shall secure his support and his useful-
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN. 263
ness as a citizen. It might be supposed that nat-
ural affection would secure this, but in all states of
society there are individual cases in which it does
not, and it is found that high civilization and aggre-
gate labor have hitherto, by some misadjustment,
precipitated a stratum of society in which artificial
appetite and animal want have so been the prevail-
ing element as to subordinate natural affections,
making the children mere instruments of selfishness,
and dooming them, almost by necessity, to a similar
condition. It is this state of things that has justi-
fied, and that alone could justify an interference by
society with the hours of labor, which, we should
naturally suppose, parents would best know how to
regulate. It is the duty of the parent to make over
to society good material for its upbuilding, and if
any class of parents fail to do this, society not only
has the right, but is bound in self-defense to inter-
fere.
The third great duty of the parent relates to
moral and religious training. " Man does Thirdduty .
not live by bread alone," nor can the JJ2i" d '
child. He is capable of being trained for training '
God, and God has entrusted him to the parent that
he may be thus trained. The only effectual way in
which the parent can do this is himself to be what
the child should be. There is in example an im-
perceptible and pervading influence that can be had
in no other way. Let this be good in principle, and
judicious in outward form, and all other good in-
264 MORAL SCIENCE.
fluences will, almost of course, fall into its train.
Let this be evil, and it will be mainly through this,
in connection with physical deterioration, that the
iniquities of the fathers will be visited upon the
children to the third and fourth generation.
But besides this, much may be done in giving
direction to reading, in regulating associations, in
forming habits. And all this, especially the forma-
tion of habits of thought and feeling, as well as of
action, is to be begun very early. They will then
become incorporated into the life as they will not be
likely to be, and perhaps never can be afterwards.
In all this there is to be care not to do anything
obtrusively or in excess. Much harm has been
done by bending the bow too far. It flies back. It
may be difficult in the stress and pressure which
active business life, and especially public life, brings
upon men to give the time needed for such training
of children, but no folly can be greater than that so
common in this country, by which parents make
themselves slaves to lay up money which, for want
of right training and moral qualifications in the
children, becomes their ruin. Nothing can be more
sad or instructive than the history, in this regard,
of many of our wealthy families. It is no less the
wisdom of parents, in behalf of their children than
in behalf of themselves, to " seek first the kingdom
of God and his righteousness." The highest value
of wealth must be to purchase for children, indi-
rectly of course, more knowledge, more wisdom,
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN. 265
more health, better habits, to give them better facil-
ities for usefulness, and more chances of it ; in
short, to raise them to a higher manhood. Thus a
high manhood, a pure, elevated womanhood, is the
end to be reached. If it can be reached, as cer-
tainly it may, without wealth, that is of little conse-
quence. If wealth becomes obstructive of this, it
is a curse. But it need not be thus obstructive.
Instead of vanity, pride, dissipation, luxury, effemi-
nacy, the result of wealth may be, and should be,
the training of families not only in the knowledge
and virtues that give dignity to life, but also in
every accomplishment that can give it grace.
We now pass to the rights and duties of chil-
dren.
It is sometimes said that a right and an obligation
are reciprocal : that wherever there is a Rights of
. ,. children
right there is a corresponding obligation, claims.
This is not strictly true. The parent, as a parent, is
for the sake of the child. His rights are to enable
him to perform his duties, and both are for the sake
of the child, and these rights and duties commence
before there can be either duties or conscious rights
on the part of the child. And when the child be-
comes capable of duties and conscious of rights, these
have generally no reference to the end of the parent.
The rights give no right of control, but are simply
claims, and the duties are mostly such as are re-
quired by the well-being of the child, which is, or
should be, the great object desired by the parent.
266 MORAL SCIENCE.
The duties of children may all be comprised in
Duties of the one wor d "A0w0r," as that is used in
children. the pjf^ Commandment. This sentiment
of honor towards the parent, expressing itself in
outward act according to the changing relation of
parent and child in the progress of the child towards
maturity, would hold the parent and child in per-
petual harmony, and would secure to both every
end contemplated by the parental relation. The
child that honors his father arid mother will render
them implicit obedience in his early years. If, as
his power and right of self-control are increased, it
should become his duty to differ in any respect from
the parent, or even to disobey him, as in rare and
exceptional cases it may be, the spirit of the law
will still be preserved, and all will be done that can
be with a good conscience, to meet not only the
commands, but the feelings and the wishes of the
parent. The temper expressed by this word
" honor," is precisely that which is needed to fit
the child for his duties towards God and towards
society as represented by government. This spirit,
extending itself from the parental relation into all
others, permeating the character, becomes a foun-
tain of courtesy, and makes the difference between
a people reverent, mutually respectful, and capable
of self-control, and an irreverent, reckless, profane
mass of individuals incapable of self-government,
and sure to inaugurate, sooner or later, in the name
of liberty, a ^state of society compared with which
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN. 267
despotism would be a blessing. So long as children
honor their parents in this land, there will be piety
towards God, and freedom in the State ; but if these
fountains be corrupted, whatever form governments
may assume, men will fall off from their allegiance
to God, and the spirit and benefits of freedom will
depart.
CHAPTER VII.
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT: THE SPHERE OF GOV-
ERNMENT : ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT : MODE OF
FORMATION.
WE now proceed to consider Civil Society and
Civil Government.
Government is the agent of society for the ac-
Government complishment of its ends, and like the
how divine. f am i]y 9 { s a divine institution. By a divine
institution, we mean one made necessary by God
through relations ordained by him for the attain-
ment of our end. The fact that food is necessary
to sustain life, makes the use of it of divine ap-
pointment ; and the fact that the end of the child
cannot be attained except through control by the
parent, gives the parent rights directly from God,
and imposes upon the child corresponding duties.
No assent or contract on the part of the parent, or
of the child, is required to constitute the family so
far as to render valid every right and obligation
needed for the attainment of its ends. The rights
and duties are from the ends. The relations, caus-
ing the family to be what it is, indicate those ends,
and through them, the will of God. These rela-
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 269
tions and ends man cannot change. He can only
act or refuse to act in conformity with, or in refer-
ence to them. Acting in conformity with these
relations, and with reference to these ends, the
blessings intended to flow from the family will be
realized, and as there is a failure in this, evil will
result. The institution is from God, it cannot be
changed by man. All he can do is to conform, or
refuse to conform, to the relations it involves, and
seek, or refuse to seek the ends indicated by those
relations.
And precisely so it is with Civil Government. It
is a divine institution, if not as directly, CMl
yet as really as is the family. The ernmenta
divine insti-
tution.
rights which society has, and which it may
rightfully exercise through some form of govern-
ment it has from no contract. Men may, if they
choose, express the rights and duties involved in
government in the form of a contract, but it is a
mistake, and may lead to mischievous consequences
to suppose that these rights and duties originate in
any form of contract. By the constitution of God
the ends of the individual can be attained only
through government, and therefore the rights of
government and the duties of individuals under it
originate in the same way as the rights and duties of
parents and of children. The individual is born in
society. That is his natural state, and as thus born
both society and he have reciprocal rights and duties.
These he may recognize and have all the benefits
270 MORAL SCIENCE.
of society and of government, or he may refuse to
recognize them and be deprived of these benefits,
but the rights and duties exist independently of
his will. They exist, and in entering into society,
the individual comes under no new obligation, and
gives up no right.
The above view is opposed to that of Mr. Jeffer-
son, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence,
where it is said, that governments " derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed." If, as
most have supposed, this refers to the foundation of
government, and not to its form, the view would
exclude the will of God as underlying government.
It would also take away its authority, for the con-
sent that may be given at will may be withdrawn
at will. Besides, the principle would require, not
merely the consent of a majority, but of every man.
Such a doctrine maj' please the popular ear, and be
accepted when there is no strain upon the govern-
ment ; but when, as in our late struggle, there is such
a strain, the instinct of the nation sets aside all doc-
trines of mere contract or consent, and practically
asserts an authority resting on a deeper basis. If a
government overstep the limit of just authority it
may be resisted, but within those limits its rights
are from God.
The distinction between society and government
Distinction w ^ ^e more prominent if we suppose
demand 80 " eacn individual composing the society to
government k e p er f ec t ? that is, to exercise a perfect
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 271
self-government. In that case nothing that could
properly be called government would be needed.
There might be regulations respecting all matters
requiring uniformity and involving no principle, as
the age for voting, or the distribution of the prop-
erty of one dying intestate. These might be
made by the united experience and wisdom of the
community, and to them all would conform, not as
under government, but as apprehending the rea-
son of them, or, at least, the necessity of uniform-
ity. We should thus have, with perfect family
government, and perfect self-government, which is
simply obedience by the individual to the law of
God, society without civil government, but capable
of being organized into a civil government when-
ever the occasion should arise..
Such occasion can arise only as civil government
may be needed to enable individuals to Groundand
reach their end, and it will have 'no right Jjcivngov-
to do anything which will not contribute ernments -
to that. Government can have for a legitimate
end only the good of the governed. The object of
it is to do that for the individual whereby he may
be enabled to attain his end which he could not do
for himself.
What then can government do for the individual
which he cannot do for himself?
To answer this question fully we must contem-
plate government in two aspects : 1st, as the indi-
vidual may take a part in forming and administering
272 MORAL SCIENCE.
it ; and 2dly, as it is an agency standing apart from
the individual and above him for the doing of that
which he could not do himself.
In treating of government it has been this latter
Participation aspect that has been almost wholly re-
develops the
governed. garded. It we suppose a despotic govern-
ment to do for the people all that it can do, - let it
be wholly paternal, yet the influences under which
the individual will be formed will be wholly different
from those under a free government where it is the
duty of the individual to understand and take part
in the formation and the administration of the gov-
ernment. Free institutions have their value not
merely from their greater tendency to secure the
rights of the individual, but also from their educa-
ting, formative, developing power. Free institutions
tend to become, and will become in themselves, a
great university for political education, as well as a
sure guarantee that provision shall be made for uni-
versal education in other directions. As, therefore,
man has a right to the best means of development
as well as to the best conditions for action under a
government, it may be said that he has a right to
free institutions whenever and wherever he is capa-
ble of so administering them as to secure their
ends.
But apart from this, regarding government as
something already formed, the inquiry arises what
it can properly do for the individual which he could
not do for himself, for, as self-help is the great con-
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 273
dition of growth, it must dwarf the individual, and
deaden enterprise to have the government do what
the individual can.
And here it is to be said that the first and great
function of government is to secure to all Government
their rights. Of rights we have already X^ghtT
spoken. They include all that is necessary of alL
for the attainment by the individual of his end.
Give man his rights in regard to Life, to Liberty,
to Property, to Reputation, to Truth, and give him
Security respecting all these, and you do for him
all that is essential. If, with such conditions, he
fail of attaining the ends he ought to attain it must
be his own fault.
It is sometimes said to be a separate office of gov-
ernment not only to secure the rights, but Government
. _ _ . . _ must re-
to redress the wrongs or the individual, dress wrongs.
There is room for this distinction, though the secur-
ing of rights and the redress of wrongs are really
the same thing viewed in different aspects. If a
man has been wronged it is his right to have that
wrong redressed if that be possible, and if that be
not possible, it is the right of society to demand
such punishment as will give them all the security
of which the case admits. The great end therefore
of a government is to secure promptly and efficiently
the rights of all who are under it, and it is a good
government in proportion as it does this. This, of
course, can be done only as there is perfect equality
for all in the eye of the law. It is against the vio-
18
274 MORAL SCIENCE.
lation of a right as such, of any right, of the right
of the humblest and poorest, that the government is
to guard, and if any difference be made it should be
in favor of the humble and the poor. The prompt,
efficient, impartial protection of rights and the re-
dress of wrongs, is then the first great office of gov-
ernment.
A second legitimate function of government is to
Government & VQ facilities, sometimes for individual, but
Center- 111 " more often for associated enterprise. It
may thus limit and regulate copyrights,
and patent-rights, and may incorporate companies to
enable them to pursue branches of business which
could not well be undertaken by individual enter-
prise. Whatever individual protection or further-
ance any individual may need to attain the ends of any
lawful form of industry he ought to have provided
no special privilege be given him, for no partiality
or favoritism should be shown in legislation. And
in incorporations, as of banks, the acts should be
passed not at all for the special benefit of those who
are incorporated, but of the public. All such acts
should either be open to all, or should be limited
solely by a regard to the public good.
This general head of furnishing facilities opens a
field of legislation into which abuses may readily
creep ; still it is not only legitimate, but well-nigh
indispensable. Government, as the agent of society,
may even undertake enterprises in its own name that
shall furnish facilities for the people generally, but
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 275
the utmost caution is needed in selecting, and in
carrying forward such enterprises. It is a special
danger under our form of government that public
enterprises will be entered upon for private advan-
tage, and that they will be carried forward both
wastefully and corruptly.
These then are the direct objects which a govern-
ment may propose to itself, the protection of all
rights, the redress of wrongs, and the furnishing of
facilities, without favoritism, for the enterprise of
the people.
There is also an object which must be regarded
as legitimate, which largely gives tone to Seif-preser-
a J & yationof
the measures adopted under every form government.
of government, and that is its own preservation.
Whatever has a right to be has a right to all the
means necessary to its permanence and well-being.
Hence despotic governments must maintain stand-
ing armies. Hence limited monarchies must have
an aristocracy to stand between them and the peo-
ple, and both must exercise control over both educa-
tion and religion. Without these no monarchy has
been permanent, or can be. If, by extraordinary
talent and sagacity, a man like Louis Napoleon may
seize the reins and hold them for his lifetime, it is
yet felt that his government has no permanent basis.
Louis Napoleon has a son who would naturally suc-
ceed him, but if you ask a Frenchman what would
happen if the father should die, he simply shrugs
his shoulders, and says nothing. It was the instinct
276 MORAL SCIENCE.
of self-preservation that led Napoleon and the Eng-
lish aristocracy to take part against us in our late
struggle, and it is to be expected that every estab-
lished form of government, and every invested in-
terest should be governed in the same way.
It is on the principle we are now considering that
Hence right free governments have the right to pro-
of govern- * . . B . r
mentto vide tor and maintain schools instead or
maintain
schools. standing armies, and to restrict the right
of voting and of office-holding within such limits
as the safety of the Republic may require. The
apprehension of these two rights, especially of the
right to tax the property of all, whether they have
or have not children to educate, has been slow in
finding its way into the public mind, and would still
be contested even in many parts of our own coun-
try, but it rests on solid ground if it can be shown,
as ckarly it can, that virtue and intelligence are the
essential conditions of a free and popular govern-
ment. It is only on this ground that this right can
'rest, for the government can have no right to take
property of' one man for the benefit of others unless
it be essential to its own being or well-being.
But may not- the government promote intelligence
Legislation and morality for their own sake ? May it
not directly IT r> i
for morality, not legislate directly lor their promotion
as ends ? No. It must protect the rights of all,
redress their wrongs and give them facilities such
as a government only can give, and leave the pro-
motion of virtue and intelligence, except as these
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 277
may be demanded for its own being or efficiency, to
individual effort, or to voluntary association. Es-
pecially is it to be said that government may not
interfere in any way with religion except as such
interference may be required by the principles above
mentioned.
But may T there not be legislation in favor of tem-
perance ? No. The promotion of temperance is
no proper object of legislation. Temperance has
the same relation to legislation that honesty has.
The laws against stealing are not for the promotion
of honesty, but for the protection of rights ; and in
the same way if the traffic in ardent spirits did not
interfere directly or indirectly with the rights of
others it would not be a proper subject for legisla-
tion. Let those who carry on this traffic guarantee
the public against the crime and increase of tax-
ation it occasions and there need be no legislation
on the subject. But the moment any business can
be shown to be the cause of crime on which the
courts established by the government must sit, or of
taxation which the government must assess and
collect, it comes within the range of legislation, and
the community have a right to the best legislation
that can be devised for their protection. Neither
liquor sellers nor liquor dealers have any rights be-
yond the point where their acts begin to touch the
right of others to property or to security, or even
their right to be protected from those moral con-
ditions which, as human nature is now constituted,
278 MORAL SCIENCE.
will insure the corruption of the young and of the
weak through temptations addressed to their senses,
and which are obtruded upon them.
Much has been said of attempts to make men
moral by legislation, and of prescribing to men what
they shall eat and drink ; but no one who under-
stands the proper objects of legislation would think
of doing either of these. If morality may be indi-
rectly promoted by legislation, so much the better.
If, in order to abate taxation and crime and nuis-
ances, it may become necessary to render intoxica-
ting drinks less accessible than some who might
safely use them would desire, this is not the object
intended, but only the means necessary for a legiti-
mate end.
It will appear from the above, that in addition to
True end of measures needed for its own preservation,
government. ^ ch j ef fo nct i on o f government is the
removing of obstacles. Its end is attained when all
the individuals under it attain their end. But this
can be done only through the positive exertion by
each one of his own faculties, and all that govern-
ment can do is to secure favorable conditions for this.
The fatal mistake has been, that governments have
proposed ends of their own, and in securing these
have been utterly reckless of both the rights and
the ends of the individual. When this is done in
the least degree, it matters not what the form of
government may be, it is a perversion
tyranny.
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 279
We next inquire when, in the progress The origin
c - -1 L -L of govern.
or the race, civil government becomes ment.
necessary.
If we make, as we must, a distinction between
government and society, society being the principal,
and government the agent, then government can-
not be needed, or possible, till there is society. But
as demanding civil government, a single family can-
not constitute society. The family has a govern-
ment of its own, and suffices for itself. Before
there can be civil government, there must be an
aggregation of families. Hence it is that the family,
and not the individual, is the unit of civil govern-
ment. This, in the patriarchal form, would natu-
rally grow out of the union of several families hav-
ing a common origin ; and this again would naturally
extend and consolidate itself in monarchy. This is
supposed to have been the actual origin of govern-
ment.
This needs to be fully comprehended ; for if society
ever consisted of disintegrated individuals, standing
on an equality, and an attempt had been made to
construct something unknown before, to be called a
government, all would have had an equal right to
take part in such construction. But consisting as
society did of families, and needing only such ex-
tension and modification of principles of government
already existing as should secure in wider relations
the conditions of well-being previously secured in
the family, there would be not only a natural right,
280 MORAL SCIENCE.
but a necessity, that in the formation of civil govern-
ment families should be represented by their heads.
Such a work could not have been done by the body
of those whose rights were to be secured, and, if
formally done, the heads of families would be the
divinely appointed representatives to do it. If
these were to meet and adopt such a form of gov-
ernment as should seem to them best adapted to
secure civil liberty, that government would not
stand simply as the product of human wisdom and
will, but, as growing out of relations divinely consti-
tuted, would have divine authority.
But no such formal meeting was originally held.
With no discussion of abstract rights, by a move-
ment spontaneous, gradual, self-adjusting, as all
primitive movements for the attainment of ends in-
dicated by nature are, government would naturally
grow out of the union of several families having a
common origin, the head and natural representative
of each family caring for its interests as occasion
might arise. In this way, but for usurpations and
abuses, government might have gone on indefinitely.
In some cases, as throughout the East, these usur-
pations and abuses were such as to crush out liberty,
and produce permanent degradation and hopeless-
ness among the people. In others they have
resulted in agitation, revolution, discussion of rights,
and in attempts to found governments on such
rights.
So instinctive, however, has been the tendency
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, ETC. 281
above indicated to crystallize into governments by
an inherent force, that formal declarations Mode of
of rights had scarcely been thought of j^
till our own revolution, and then their ments>
effect was less than has generally been supposed.
There was no destruction of old governments, and
construction of new ones on the basis of principles
formally laid down. The colonial governments
were continued. The laws were essentially the
same under the Confederation as before, though the
seat of sovereignty was changed; and when the
Constitution was formed there was simply a new
distribution of some of the essential powers of gov-
ernment, and a new mode of appointing those by
whom the government should be administered. It
was not the object to find a new basis of govern-
ment, but such a mode of appointing its officers and
such a distribution of its functions as should give
the best guarantee that its ends should be secured.
There had been abuse, and the object was to guard
against that. The inquiry then was, and is now,
how government may be so guarded from abuse
as to secure for all that civil liberty which is its
end.
CHAPTER VIIL
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE AND INSTRUMENTAL :
THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE.
IF we suppose government to have originated as
above, spontaneously, formally, or in whatever way,
it is plain that those who take part in it, whether in
its original formation, or by voting or by holding of-
fice, must act largely in a representative capacity.
They must act for the children, the sick, the infirm,
the insane, the criminal, the absent. If adult women
were permitted to vote, there would still remain a
large majority who could take no part in the gov-
ernment, and whose rights could be secured only
as they were thus represented. Hence all con-
cerned in government act as trustees and guardians.
Government is not an end, it is instrumental. It is
as a bridge over which all must pass, and what
society cares for is to have a bridge that will carry
all safely over. It is in that that essential rights
and interests are involved, and society has a right
to see that only those are engaged in building the
bridge who know how, and are disposed to build it
well.
But if government be thus representative and
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 283
instrumental, it will follow, since natural rights be-
long to all, that the right to take part in Right of
it, whether by voting or holding office, J^*
cannot be a natural right ; and also that suffra s e -
society will have the right to say who shall exercise
that right, and on what conditions. Hence society
may rightfully require that voters and office-holders
shall be above a certain age, shall have a certain
degree of education, shall have committed no infa-
mous crime, and the like.
It also follows from the representative character
of voting, that the exercise of the right guffrage as
becomes a duty, and that citizens cannot duty<
treat it, as they frequently would, as a personal
right or privilege which they may rightfully at their
pleasure forego ; but it imposes a solemn obligation,
requiring in the voter the exercise of his intelligence
and discretion, if not for himself, at least for the sake
of others who cannot take part in the government,
and even for the sake of posterity, who will one day
inherit his work, and be affected by his care or his
neglect. So essential is this that society might com-
pel the exercise of this right, and insist that those
to whom it is committed shall not lay it lightly aside,
nor be allowed to shield themselves under the idea
that it is a personal right and privilege, and thus
stand idly by while others inflict an injury on soci-
ety ; but might require of them, as of more formal
guardians and trustees, that they shall act for the
benefit of their wards, though they may not care
284 MORAL SCIENCE.
sufficiently for their own rights, as members of soci-
ety, to protect them.
But while it is undeniable that the right of suf-
Right of frage extends to interests far beyond those
suffrage, how ~ . , . . , , , 1 .
conferred. ot the individual who may claim to exer-
cise it, and hence that no individual can claim to
exercise it as a natural right, it still remains a duty
for society to confer this right in the most just and
secure manner that human wisdom can devise.
And here it is to be said that there has doubtless
been from the first the spontaneous and unconscious
operation of a principle which should be a control-
ing one, that is, that those should vote on any sub-
ject on whom the responsibility with reference to
it falls. It has seemed right that those who are to
go to war should determine the question of war,
and that those who are liable to do military and
police duty, and sit on juries, who are to work on
the highways and pay the taxes, should vote on
those subjects ; that those, in short, whoever they
may be, who do the fighting, and the working, and
the tax-paying, should also do the voting. It would
be quite as unjust that war should be declared
through the votes of women and children who could
take no part in it, as that men should impose taxes
on property which women have acquired. If it be
said that the interests of women are as much opposed
to war as those of men, and that they would never
urge and inaugurate and perpetuate one in oppo-
sition to the judgment of the men, this is refuted
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 285
by what occurred at the South during our late civil
war, for it is well known that the war was intensi-
fied and prolonged by the spirit of the women,
though they had no power to vote. If women and
children had taken an active part in the great duties
and responsibilities of society, beyond question they
would have been allowed to vote.
But accounting thus for what has been, we inquire
what ought to be. On what principle Basis of the
ought society to confer the right of taking suffrage,
part in the government ?
And here it is plain that no one ought to be ex-
cluded arbitrarily, that is, unless such exclusion is
required by the ends of government. In this view
all agree on two grounds of exclusion. One is in-
competence, the other presumed hostility to, the
government. On these grounds minors, foreigners
not naturalized, criminals, and those who have
shown hostility to the government, are excluded.
This being conceded, and putting aside for the
moment the question in regard to women, the one
great principle which must be observed by society
in conferring the right of suffrage, and which is
practically found to be the foundation and safeguard
of civil liberty, is that that right should be attainable
by all. It is to be something attainable by all, not
possessed. Thus society may require that all voters
shall have attained a uniform and discreet age, but
distinctions may not be drawn between the rich and
the poor, the white and the black, the learned and
286 MORAL SCIENCE.
the unlearned. To the youth of each of these
classes society may rightly say that when they reach
such age, and not till then, they shall come equally
into possession of this right.
Nor may society impose any condition upon the
right of suffrage which the mass of the people can-
not comply with. Thus society may not require
that voters shall be free from sin, but may require
that they shall be free from crime, for a moral life
is a condition with which all can comply. Thus
society may not limit the right of suffrage to pro-
found mathematicians, nor to men learned in the
ancient languages, for these would necessitate talent
and education not practically within the reach of
every youth ; but it may require that every voter
shall be able to read the English language, for that
is attainable by every American youth, and neces-
sary, in the present age, to secure an ordinary intel-
ligence.
Such is the basis on which the right of suffrage
should be conferred. Forbidding that the right
should be withheld from any race or class as such,
and that any part of society should have or exercise
the right of excluding any other part, it secures to
every person the right to rise.
But besides the right of suffrage, which is the
Right of right to take a part in the affairs of the
representa- m .
tion. government, there is a totally distinct right,
a right of representation. These two are often
confounded, but are distinct, for those who do not
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 287
vote are still entitled to be represented. In prac-
tical effect, as in theory, the child is represented by
the father, and the wife by the husband. All indi-
viduals have an interest in government, and where
the individual possesses an interest, that interest
necessitates and confers a right, for wherever there
is a right to govern there must also be a right to be
governed rightly. The representative in the legis-
lature represents far more than the minority of men
who voted for him. He represents their opponents
who voted against him, their wives and children
who did not vote, and he represents, and is bound
to provide for the well-being of even criminals who
have forfeited the right to vote. This generality
of representation is sought to be secured by what is
termed " manhood suffrage," and it is this which
must prevent one class from dominating over or ex-
cluding another from the substantial right of repre-
sentation, and which must secure to all that equal
protection and care without which civil liberty can
but imperfectly exist.
There is also a right of representation which in
this country has received but little favor Representa-
. . tion of
or attention as yet, but which may in time property,
be found essential to the existence of popular gov-
ernment, and that is the representation of property
as distinct from the representation of persons. Men
owe certain common duties to society, and society
owes a certain common protection to them, but
there are also expenses of government which are not
288 MORAL SCIENCE.
drawn equally from all men, but which are contrib-
uted in different proportions by individuals. This
principle is very old, and has borne an important
part in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race, it hav-
ing been enunciated as early as Magna CJiarta in
the declaration that taxes should be laid only with
the consent of the taxed given through the " Com-
mons " in Parliament ; and again in the Bill of
Rights ; and again in the revolution of the Amer-
ican colonies, where the principle in question was
the power to tax without the consent of the taxed,
or without representation. There exists now the
case of unmarried women holding property on which
the government imposes taxes without affording a
correlative right of representation ; and there is also
the case of resident aliens whose property is taxed
in the same way. This withholding of representa-
tion from tax-paying women, and at the same time
requiring them to contribute equally with men to
the ordinary expenses of government, already strikes
the common mind as injustice ; and it may be that
the growing interests of civilization will one day re-
quire that these two bases of representation shall be
separated, and that one branch of the legislature
shall represent property, and be chosen by those
who contribute towards the expense of maintaining
government, and that all such shall be allowed to
take part in the government to that extent, what-
ever may be their nationality, race, or sex. Of the
equity of such representation there can be no ques-
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 289
tion. Government is supported wholly by property ;
the larger portion of legislation respects property,
and it may readily happen in communities like the
city of New York, where irresponsible and destitute
foreigners are constantly made voters, that great in-
security and oppression should result from subject-
ing property to the control of mere numbers.
We have thus the family as the unit of society.
We have government as necessarily rep- Has woman
resentative. We have a right in all the vote,
members of society to representation; to protection
in all their rights ; to be governed rightly. We have
also the two grounds on which persons have been
called on to take part in the government : responsi-
bility for personal service, and the support of the
government by their property. With these ele-
ments we inquire whether the right of suffrage
should be extended to woman. The question is
not whether she has a natural right to vote, for
none have that, but whether her own elevation and
best influence, and the ends of society require that
that right should be bestowed upon her.
This question has been discussed as if the sexes
constituted different classes, and as if there were,
or could be, in their real interests, a conflict be-
tween them. That is a great mistake. A man and
his wife are. not of a different class ; and their in-
terests, together with those of their family, are
identical. The very existence of society, indeed,
depends on men and women as entering into a special
19
290 MORAL SCIENCE.
relation which not only unites their interests, as in
a partnership, but identifies them, and makes each
sex reciprocally the guardian of the other. The
cases where this relation does not exist are strictly
exceptional, and society is not organized, and does
not exist for exceptional cases.
This question, therefore, should not come in the
form of a partisan discussion, but of a mutual in-
quiry what the rights of woman are, and how she
may be elevated to the highest point in culture and
legitimate influence. And upon such an inquiry
man should enter with no less alacrity and candor
than woman, for if there be anything which must
react with swift retribution upon society, it is any
needless ignorance or degradation of its wives and
mothers.
The family, as has been said, is the unit of society.
This character of it should be, and unconsciously is,
one of the most cherished objects of Christian civil-
ization, and unhappy will be the nation whose legis-
lative mind shall regard society simply as a mass of
individuals, and not as a combination of families.
The family being regarded thus, as a divine institu-
tion sufficing for itself, and society being regarded as
a combination of families, society will have a double
life, or rather, its one life will be within two spheres.
There will be the domestic life of the family, and
the public life of society. Of these the family is
the more important and sacred, and over this in its
domestic life, it is the duty and dignity and happi-
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 291
ness of woman to preside. This is her sphere, not
inferior to that of man, but different from it. Here
she has not only a right to vote, but to rule. If, as
is to be supposed, she is fitted for her place, nothing
will be added to the dignity of the husband or to
the happiness of the family by any interference with
her where the responsibility properly falls upon her.
The sphere of society on the other hand belongs to
man, at least it has been hitherto regarded as belong-
ing to him. For the support of its institutions and
for those duties more immediately required for its
welfare he is responsible. Here man has the right
to vote, and nothing will be added to the dignity of
the wife or to the happiness of society by any inter-
ference of the wife where the responsibility properly
falls upon the husband. By a natural relation, and
so by the appointment of God, the wife is the centre
of the domestic circle, the chief source of its happi-
ness, and guardian of her husband's interests and
rights in all that pertains to it. By a natural rela-
tion the husband is the house-band, the provider for
its wants, its defender, and the guardian of the
rights of the wife as of the children in their relations
to society. He is the natural representative of both.
The wife is not a child, but according to the Chris-
tian conception is nearer than that, is one with her
husband, and their interests are one. If .we suppose
society composed of families alone, and if the rights
of wives and children would not be secured by giv-
ing to every husband and father a share in the gov-
292 MORAL SCIENCE.
ernment, the fault would not be in the system, but
in individual corruption that would work itself out
whatever system might be adopted. Women have
had wrongs, and so have children. These must be
redressed, but this will not be done by disregard-
ing ^iny relation established by God. If parents
and children, and husbands and wives, will act in
the spirit of those relations, society will be perfected.
If they will not do that, no political relations will
avail. The same spirit on the part of men that
would concede the right of voting, would concede
and secure in a representative capacity every right
without that.
For each of the spheres above spoken of, men
and women are fitted respectively by their physical
organization and by their mental instincts and ten-
dencies, and their relations to the children require
that the spheres should be kept separate. It is not
that man is not competent to set the table and rock
the cradle, or that woman is not competent to vote.
It is because the one life of society will work itself
out in more perfect results, if these two great but
interdependent spheres be left to those who natu-
rally have charge of them.
But while the above is said, society is to hold it-
self ready to make any changes which its changing
modifications may require. In the primitive stages
of* society, when the chief business of governments
was to carry on offensive or defensive war, women
had no desire to take part in government, and their
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 293
presence would have been an inconvenience and
injury. But society has now greatly advanced, so
that there are many fields, especially that of educa-
tion, in which woman may properly act, and in
which her aid will be an advantage to society ; and
it is possible that in a future and higher stage of
progress these fields will be increased, and woman
be assigned to perform her definite part in the gov-
ernment. Yet so long as the sexes remain fused in
one common mass, as has always been the case with
society, so long the indiscriminate mingling of the
sexes, either in the domestic sphere or in the gen-
eral management of government, will be found an
inconvenience, a source of embarrassment and weak-
ness. If, however, it should be found advantageous
to society and to woman herself that the number of
her employments should be increased, and her re-
sponsibility to society enlarged, there would probably
be no opposition to a corresponding enlargement of
the right of suffrage.
If we adopt this view of the family as the unit
of society, and of the natural right of representa-
tion, the principle which it contains will harmonize
and protect all interests. Let the family be regarded
as the unit of society, and the principle adhered to
of giving to each unit a single and equal represen-
tation, and society may provide for exceptional cases
by general laws. Such cases arise when the chil-
dren of a family reach maturity and do not marry,
and in the case of widows who are the heads of
294 MORAL SCIENCE.
families. For the case of widows no remedy is pro-
vided, but in equity there should be. When the
sons of a family reach the age of manhood they go
forth and become, in theory as in fact, the stocks of
new families, which sooner or later they support,
maintain, and represent, and hence they are made
responsible for the duties and burdens of society.
They may not, indeed, instantly marry and become
the heads of new families, but they are preparing
for that, and are essentially doing the work of main-
taining the future family by the work of preparation.
The daughters, on the contrary, remain at home,
and are identified in its interests with the old family
until they are taken forth to form parts of new fam-
ilies. They do not go forth by themselves, nor un-
dertake the work of preparation, but stay protected,
maintained, and represented in and by the original
stock. Perhaps, exceptionally, they may acquire
property, and in the contemplation of law, establish
for themselves new homes. Society will never fos-
ter such a system, for it would be prejudicial to its
own ends ; but nevertheless it might protect the in-
dividual by allowing her to exercise the suffrage of
property representation. The right of personal
suffrage she could hardly ask. and society would
hardly allow, except as she should be willing and
fitted to do the work of the juror, the policeman,
the sheriff, the soldier, except as she should be-
come subject to all the duties and responsibilities on
which the great interests of society depend.
GOVERNMENT, ETC. 295
In speaking on this subject nothing has been said
hitherto of sentiment and a sense of propriety as
distinguished from rights, and nothing need be, ex-
cept as those indicate, as natural sentiment always
does, what is right. But sentiment depends so much
upon custom, and custom is so varied and capri-
cious that it is difficult to know what natural sen-
timent is. Throughout the East it shocks the sense
of propriety for a woman to appear in public un-
veiled, or to walk the streets arm-in-arm with her
husband, probably even more than it would here for
her to vote and take part in the stormy debates of a
town meeting. Still, sentiment has a real basis. In
reading the account lately given by a missionary of
his finding a man in the house knitting and his wife
at work in the field, we cannot help feeling that the
sense of ludicrous impropriety as well as of indigna-
tion is well founded. That there is in the minds of
large portions of the people of this country perhaps
stronger among the well educated and refined, and
stronger among women than men a feeling of pro-
priety that w r ould be offended by the promiscuous
mingling of women with men in the conduct of pub-
lic affairs, cannot be questioned. It is the sentiment
which makes woman strong through her weakness.
It lay at the foundation of all that was good in
chivalry. It has been a strong auxiliary to Chris-
tian principle in elevating woman. It sets her apart
in many hearts as something sacred, and adds to life,
otherwise hard and prosaic, much of its beauty.
296 MORAL SCIENCE.
For this sentiment Americans are distinguished. It
should be cherished rather than weakened, and if, as
many think, it would be destroyed, or essentially
impaired by extending the suffrage to woman, those
who wish her elevation will hesitate long before tak-
ing such a step.
CHAPTER IX.
FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. DUTIES OF MAGISTRATES
AND CITIZENS.
AFTER considering elementary points so fully, it
will not be necessary to spend much time on the more
beaten grounds of forms of government, and of the
rights and duties of citizens and of magistrates.
Governments have always been classed as Mon-
archies, Aristocracies, and Democracies, Formsof
but substantially they are now, and indeed f s 7 e e n r t "Si ent
always have been, either monarchical or two<
republican. There are indeed privileged classes, as
in England, who have an hereditary share in the
government, but there is no government that is in
fact or in form aristocratic.
Monarchies are either absolute or limited, as the
power rests with one man alone or is divided with
others. The monarch may be elective, or heredi-
tary, though of an elective monarchy there is now
no example. That the monarchy should be hered-
itary conduces to the stability of the government,
and to peace.
Democracies, that is governments by the people
themselves, instead of by representation, are impos-
298 MOKAL SCIENCE.
sible except for very small communities. Repub-
lican government is representative and elective.
There may be a simple independent republic, such
as the several States were before the formation
of the Federal Union, or there may be a federal
republic, with powers divided between the central
government and the several states.
The object of government, that is, security in the
enjoyment of every right, may be attained under
any form. A monarch may concede every right,
and his character may give security, but practically
it is found that rights are best secured where a large
amount of power is retained in the hands of the
people, and where the government itself is one of
checks and balances.
The essential condition of freedom and security
The neces- * S ^ a ^ ^ 1G ^ nree g rea * functions of gOVem-
ment, the Legislative, the Judicial, and the
functions of Executive, should be kept distinct, and
government. should fce ^ <Jiff erent han( J s . Let the
laws be made by one set of men, with penalties fixed
before transgression ; let the question of an infrac-
tion of law and the declaration of the penalty be in
the hands of another set of men, and the execution
of the sentence in still other hands, and a good de-
gree of security and freedom can hardly fail to be
enjoyed. Still, much will depend on the method in
which the legislative body and the judiciary are
appointed and constituted. The object is the best
laws and their perfect administration. Society is
FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, ETC. 299
therefore bound to elect men of wisdom and integ-
rity, and laws passed by such men after due deliber-
ation will be all that can be reached in the present
imperfect state.
To secure due deliberation and a view of each
subject upon all its sides, the legislature Twoieg-
' a islative
should consist, and commonly does, ot two bodies,
bodies. In some cases these are elected in different
methods and serve for different periods, and this
would seem best adapted to secure the end. It
gives opportunity also for the representation of every
interest*
It has been thought in this country that the office
of legislation was a right and a privilege Rotation
to be enjoyed in rotation, with little refer- in office -
ence to integrity and wisdom, especially with little
reference to any special knowledge of the science of
legislation. If the legislative body be numerous,
such a theory will be comparatively harmless if a
fair proportion of competent legislators be elected.
In such bodies the business is really done by a few,
and if the numbers that serve simply as ballast do no
positive mischief, there is little objection to the prin-
ciple of rotation for them. Crude legislation how-
ever is too great an evil to be lightly incurred, and
too many men may not be set aside just as experience
would render their services valuable. Society owes
it to itself to see that its legislation moves on in the
full light of the experience of the past, and of the
best talent and wisdom of the present.
800 MORAL SCIENCE.
Laws having been made, and penalties annexed,
The judi- cases will arise under them, respecting both
clary. property and crime, that will require a ju-
diciary department. The sure and speedy and
inexpensive administration of justice is an essential
condition of the well-being of a people. The speed-
iest and least expensive method of reaching this is
by a single judge deciding cases on the spot, or, in
cases of importance and difficulty, two others might
be added. The objection to this is the danger of
passion, prejudice, and corruption. Hence juries
and courts of appeal have been introduced. These
have guarded against corruption, but have in many
cases so been the means of delay and expense that
the rich could baffle and worry out the poor, and
that it is often better pecuniarily to lose a just claim
than to contest it in law. Such a state of things
is disgraceful to civilization and to Christianity, and
should be remedied by an enlightened people. What
is needed is an impartial and competent judiciary,
through which speedy and inexpensive justice may
be reached. This end has been sought not merely
through the constitution of the judiciary, but also
through the mode of its appointment, and the ten-
ure of office. Obviously these should be such as to
secure the appointment of the best men, and that
the judge himself shall be unaffected in his prospects
and private interests by his decisions. That these
conditions should be secured by an elective judi-
ciary, holding office for a limited and comparatively
FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, ETC. 301
brief time, would not seem possible in the present
state of public morals.
It is the business of the executive to see that the
laws are enforced, and that all sentences Theox .
of the judiciary are carried out. The ecutive -
executive also represents the majesty of the na-
tion before other nations, and in all international
transactions is the medium of communication with
them. The character of these duties demands that
they be performed by a single person. If the ex-
ecutive have, as he should have, to guard his own
prerogatives, a veto power, he is so far a part of the
legislature ; but beyond that his sole business is to
execute the laws. This he must do, certainly, as he
understands them. He must execute a law in what
he supposes to be its true intent and meaning, seek-
ing, if there be doubt, the best aid from legal ad-
visers. But when a law has been passed, having
fully the forms of law, he must accept it as such,
and may not delay or refuse its execution on the
ground of its alleged unconstitutionality, though, if
there be doubt, he may take immediate measures to
have the constitutionality of the law tested.
To secure always a suitable executive has been a
great problem. In most nations the executive of-
fice has been hereditary. This has many advan-
tages. It .tends to stability and a uniform policy,
and prevents the excitement and corruption incident
to an election. Besides, in many countries an intel-
ligent and patriotic election would be impossible.
In this country the executive is elective, virtually
302 MORAL SCIENCE.
by the whole people, and hitherto the strain has not
been found too great. Whether this will continue
to be the case when wealth shall be indefinitely in-
creased, and interests shall be extended and compli-
cated, is a problem. It can only be as there shall
be a virtue and an intelligence among the people
hitherto unknown. Probably the danger would be
diminished, if the tenure of office were for six years,
with no possibility of a reelection.
The duties of the citizen are, 1st. To obey the
First dut laws so far as his conscience will allow him
dtizen; to ^ so * ^ * s possible for men to cherish
obedience. willfulness and fanaticism under the pre-
tense of conscience, and the presumption is in favor
of the law as right, and of the obligation of the citi-
zen to obey. Still there have been, and are liable to
be, under all forms of government, wicked laws, and
if, with the best light a man can gain, he shall deem
it wrong to obey a law, he is bound to disobey it, and
take the consequences whatever they may be. He is
bound to obey God rather than men.
2. The citizen is bound to bear cheerfully his
Second duty; share of the burdens of government, and
submission ~ . TT , . , . , p
to taxation, ot society. Whether called upon tor per-
sonal service, or for property in the way of taxation,
he is to stand in his place and do his part without
subterfuge or evasion.
3. So far as his influence goes he is bound to see
Third duty ; that the best men are selected as candi-
iuffrage. dates for office, and so to cast his vote
as will most benefit the country.
FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, ETC. 303
4. The citizen is bound to give his aid in all at-
tempts to secure the rights of others, and F(mrthduty .
to enforce law and order. He may not S e govern-
stand supinely by and see the right of ment '
property violated. If, through general supineness,
the property of individuals be destroyed by a mob,
society is bound to make it good. Against the ten-
dency of liberty to license, and of license again to
despotism, every citizen is to guard.
If we look at history, or at the state of most
countries now, we cannot value civil lib- y a i ueof
erty too highly. Hitherto it has existed civil liberty '
but imperfectly, and has reached its present posi-
tion only through great sacrifices and struggles.
The end of government, as for the individual, the
ground of human rights, and the rights themselves,
have not been well understood. These are now
understood by some, and it has become possible to
instruct a whole people in them. Let this be done,
and if, in connection with such instruction and the
advancing light of science the community may but
be so pervaded by the spirit of Christianity that a
permanent and constantly advancing civilization
may be possible, there will be nothing to prevent the
attainment by man of all the perfection and happi-
ness of which the present state will admit. The
highest earthly conception is that of a vast Christian
commonwealth, instinct with order, and with such
triumphs and dominion over nature as modern
science is achieving, and promises to achieve.
CLASS III.
DUTIES TO GOD.
CHAPTER I.
DUTIES TO GOD DEFINED.
DUTIES to God are distinguished from others by
Relation to having God for their object. It is one
the e one uties; tnm g for tne subject to disregard the sov-
great duty. ere jg n indirectly by breaking his laws in
injuring a fellow subject, it is another for him to
meet that sovereign personally and show towards
him disregard or contempt. There are accordingly
both duties and sins of which God is the immediate
object, and which have reference to Him alone.
Such are worship, and blasphemy. It is this capacity
of coming directly to God that makes man a child,
or rather it is the necessary result of his being a
child.
So far as we can separate religion from morality
Religion religion consists in those duties of which
guished God is the object. That these cannot be
from mo- f i 11 T
raiity. performed acceptably except on condition
of performing our duties to our fellow men has al-
DUTIES TO GOD DEFINED. 805
ready been shown. In this sense our duties to our
fellow men are conditional for those to God, and so
lower. Whether they are also conditional as prior
in time is less clear. Many suppose that the moral
nature is first called into action towards man, and
observation favors this. But the relation of God to
the soul as Creator and as all-pervading in his
presence, and the necessary idea which, according
to some, is formed of Him from the first, has led
others to the belief that the moral nature is first
stirred towards God, and that there can be no form
of duty without some reference to Him.
But be this as it may, while all must allow that
there can be no genuine religion without Reli(rion
morality, it is generally supposed there can ^St
be morality without religion. This may moralit ^-
be differently viewed as we suppose morality to con-
sist in outward conduct, or in a state of the heart.
There are many reasons why outward conduct should
be in accordance with the rules of morality, though
it may not proceed from love. Doubtless, also, the
moral nature, in common with the other parts of our
nature, and taking its turn with them, is constantly
brought into activity towards men with no conscious
reference to God. But if we mean by morality the
love of our neighbor as a paramount and controlling
principle, and by perfect morality the love of our
neighbor as ourselves, then there is no reason to
suppose that it can exist without religion. The
principle in each is identical, and supposing God to
20
306 MORAL SCIENCE.
be known, they reciprocally imply each other. Cer-
tainly this is the only morality that has an adequate
basis, or that can be relied on as consistent.
With this view of the relation to each other of
these two branches of duty, we inquire what those
duties are of which God is the object.
And here the first and great duty of every one is,
Man's great to 9 e himself t Grod. This is the great-
duty- est and most solemn of all acts. It in-
volves the highest possible prerogatives of a creature,
and is the highest possible privilege as well as duty.
The whole wisdom of man lies in his confiding him-
self implicitly to the guidance of the divine wisdom,
and to the protection of the divine power. It was
by withdrawing himself from this guidance and pro-
tection that man sinned originally ; he can be
restored only by accepting them anew.
As Creator, God is the absolute owner of all
things. As omnipotent, He can do with them as
He pleases. But if He would be a Father and
Moral Governor He must have children and subjects
in his own image, and with the prerogative of
choosing or rejecting Him as their supreme good.
Control by force, order by an impulse from without,
is the opposite of control by love, and of order from
a rational choice, and the highest duty of man is to
give himself in the spirit of a child, that is by faith,
to God.
The above will include everything. Whoever
holds himself fully and constantly in the attitude to
DUTIES TO GOD DEFINED. 307
God of a child, does all that he can. This will in-
clude love and obedience. Still we need to specify
in three particulars
1. The cultivation of a devotional spirit ;
2. Prayer ; and ^
3. The keeping of the Sabbath.
CHAPTER II.
CULTIVATION OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT.
A DEVOTIONAL spirit may be cultivated
1. By the exercise of devotion. This is on the
principle that all our active powers are strengthened
by exercise. There is no active power that does not
gain facility and scope by repeated acts under the
direction of will.
2. A devotional spirit may be cultivated by a
right use of Nature.
The physical universe is but a visible expression
of the power and the thought of God.
This power and thought are seen in the very con-
stitution of matter. It was not any matter, but
such matter, and in such proportions, that was
needed for the forms that we see, and for vital pro-
cesses. The varieties and affinities and relative
quantities of matter as much show that it was created,
and for a purpose, as its forms and movements show
that it is used for a purpose. It is therefore the
voice of Science as well as of Revelation that He
" hath measured the waters in the hollow of his
hand, and meted out heaven " that is the extent of
CULTIVATION OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 309
the atmosphere " with the span, and comprehended
the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the
mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance."
But the more obvious manifestations of thought
and power are in form and movement. It is in the
forms that we see, so diversified some changing,
some permanent, each adapted to an end together
with those uniform and recurring movements which
reveal unlimited force and skill, that what we call
Nature consists. Through this we gain our concep-
tions of beauty, and of the most perfect adaptation
of means to ends. Physical science is but the
thought of God expressed through this. Upon this,
suspended as it is in immensity, so vast in its magni-
tudes, so mighty in its forces, so perfect in its organi-
zations even the most minute, so extended yet pre-
cise in its periods, no one can look without wonder,
unless it be from ignorance or criminal stupidity.
But all this may be regarded with two habits of
mind utterly different.
Through the element of uniformity in nature it is
possible to regard it as having no relation to a per-
sonal God. Through that element God so hides
himself behind his works that very many are prac-
tically, and some theoretically, pantheistic or athe-
istic. They see nothing in Nature but impersonal
forces and fixed relations.
A devotional spirit is the opposite of this.
Through Nature it sees God. It sees, and culti-
vates the habit of seeing Him in everything. To
310 MORAL SCIENCE.
such a spirit the earth and the heavens are a temple,
the only temple worthy of God. To it the succes-
sion of day and night and the march of the seasons
are constant hymns. To it, not the heavens alone,
but the whole frame-work and structure of Nature
with its ongoings " declare the glory of God."
This is the spirit which it is the duty and happi-
ness of man to cultivate. The highest use of
Nature is not the support of man, but to lead him
up to God.
3. A devotional spirit may also be cultivated by
observing the Providence of God as it respects
Nations, individuals, and particularly ourselves.
The warp of our earthly life is those uniformities,
called laws, without which there could be no educa-
tion of the race, and no rational conduct. But these
laws intersect and modify each other. They are so
related to the results of human will, and the results
of different wills apparently unrelated so combine and
converge to unexpected ends, as to have produced
an impression almost universal that the filling in of
those seeming contingencies which go to make up
the completed pattern of our lives is controlled by
wise design. In this is Providence. This it is that
in every age takes Joseph from the pit and makes
him ruler of Egypt. Through this it is that the
arrow shot at a venture finds the joints of the har-
ness. Here, as in Nature, it is possible for men to
substitute something else, as chance, or fate, for
God; but those who believe in Him will nowhere
CULTIVATION OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 311
find more striking evidence of a divine hand, and
o ~
" he who will observe the Providence of God will
have providences to observe."
4. But the main nutriment of a devotional spirit
must be found in the Scriptures.
In the Scriptures we have an unequivocal revela-
tion of God as personal, and so of his attributes as
moral. It is only in view of personality and moral
attributes that devotion can spring up. Sentiment
and sentimentalism there may be in view of force
regarded as impersonal, but not devotion, not wor-
ship. These require a Father in Heaven, an infinite
God, universal in his government and perfect in his
moral character. Whatever may be said of the
truth of the Scriptures, it is demonstrable that the
God whom they reveal must call forth the highest
possible adoration, and hence that the knowledge of
God as revealed in them must, more than anything
else can, quicken intelligent devotion. The attri-
butes and character of God as made known in the
Scriptures hold the same relation to devotion that
the infinity of space, and the awful force that sus-
tains and moves in it the array of suns and planets,
holds to the emotion of sublimity ; and as nothing
can supersede infinite space in that relation, so noth-
ing can supersede the God of the Bible as the
ground and .stimulus of the highest possible devo-
tion.
Thus recognizing God in the three great modes
in which He is revealed, in Nature, in Providence,
o!2 MORAL SCIENCE.
and m Revelation, we shall cultivate a devotional
spirit.
In contrast with a devotional spirit is
Profane ness.
one that is profane.
This may manifest itself in action or in speech.
The true conception of this world is that of a temple
involving both the ownership and the indwelling of
God. As there is nothing that God does not own,
any reckless or vicious use of what is his is a form
of profaneness. It is a profanation to convert what
God gave for food into a means of gluttony or
drunkenness. If travellers were to stop in a cara-
vansera, and in the presence of him who built and
furnished it were to destroy the food and injure the
furniture he had provided for all, he would be
grieved and justly incensed. It would be an un-
grateful disregard of his wishes, and an abuse of his
goodness. But this is what men do who pervert the
works of God from the end designed by Him, and
such conduct toward Him is profaneness.
But while this is really profaneness, and in an
aggravated form, it is not generally so regarded.
The term is commonly applied to some form of
speech implying disregard or contempt of God, or
of the sanctions of his moral government ; and more
particularly to an irreverent use of his name. This
is an offense that would excite astonishment if it
were not so common. It differs from others in be-
ing wholly gratuitous, and is thus, perhaps, the most
striking evidence of the depravity of the race. The
CULTIVATION OF A DEVOTIONAL SPIRIT. 313
thief, the sensualist, the ambitious man has a temp-
tation that appeals to a natural desire; but that a
creature and child of God, supported wholly by his
goodness and responsible to Him, should wantonly
profane his name, could not beforehand be credited.
That there should be in Christian lands communities
in which such profaneness is thought an accomplish-
ment, and so an evidence of manhood that boys are
tempted to it on that ground, shows a standard of
manhood that has depravity for its essence.
Profaneness can be of no possible use to him who
indulges in it, or to any one else. If it were not
wicked it would be simply superfluous and ridicu-
lous. As it is, it is, as Robert Hall said, in allusion
to feudal times, merely " a peppercorn rent to show
that a man belongs to the devil." So far from giv-
ing, as some suppose, assurance of the truth of what
is spoken in connection with it, it is the reverse.
All observation shows, mine certainly does, what
might have been inferred without it, that he who
will swear, will lie. Why not ? The practice is
scarcely less offensive to a just taste than to a sen-
sitive conscience, and whoever may be guilty of it,
deserves to be not only condemned and abhorred,
but despised.
CHAPTER III.
PRAYER.
THE second great duty which we owe exclusively
to God is Prayer.
Literally, prayer is supplication, it is asking ; but
prayer as commonly used it includes all that we
worship. m ean by worship. It includes in addition
to supplication, adoration, confession, and thanksgiv-
ing. To a being like man each of these would seem
to be the dictate of nature. What more reasonable
than adoration in view of an Infinite Majesty ?
What more suitable than confession in view of guilt,
or than thanksgiving in view, not simply of good-
ness, but of mercy, and of a love unutterable ?
What more natural than that the creature and
child, in view of his wants, should ask the Creator
and Owner of all, and his Father, to supply those
wants ? That each of these, excepting the last, is
not only suitable but a duty is generally conceded,
but that man should ask and that God should give
because of his asking, has seemed to many incom-
patible with the fixed order of nature, and with his
infinite attributes.
By asking is here meant, not simply desire ex-
PRAYER. 315
pressed, but paramount desire. There must be
a desire for the thing asked greater than Prayer is
for anything else that would be incom- desire,
patible with it. This is prayer, and nothing else is.
If a man may have either an estate or so much
money for the asking, but cannot have both, how-
ever much he may desire the estate he cannot
really ask for it, unless he desires it more than the
money. And so, whatever desire a man may have
of heaven, or of the presence with him of the Spirit
of God, yet if he have a stronger desire for any form
of worldly good, any form of expression that he
might use in the guise of prayer would not be ask-
ing. It would be hypocrisy to the omniscient eye.
It is only a paramount desire presented to God with
the submission becoming a creature, that is prayer,
and the question is whether, in consequence of such
prayer, man will receive what he would not with-
out it.
On this point the Bible expresses no doubt.
There is in that no recognition of the dif- Testimony
ficulties raised by philosophy. It teaches of the Bible '
us how to pray; it commands and exhorts us to
pray ; it gives us examples in great number and
variety of direct answers to prayer ; it makes prayer
an essential element of a Christian life ; it says ex-
plicitly, " Ask and ye shall receive." It would be
impossible that the duty and efficacy of prayer
should be taught more clearly than they are in the
Bible.
316 MORAL SCIENCE.
These teachings of the Bible are confirmed by
the analogy of our earthly life, and by the instinct
of the race.
From his infancy the child asks and receives.
Asking is one of the two legitimate ap-
Aualogy. m . . .
pointed ways in which his wants are to be
supplied. For some things, and at some times, it is
the only way. It is just an expression of that de-
sire and dependence which are appropriate to the
relation of parent and child. Without recognized
dependence in the way of expressed desire on the
one hand, and an ability and willingness to supply
wants thus indicated on the other, the chief beauty
and significance of the parental relation would be
gone. Can it be then that we have a Father in
heaven, and yet that the very feature which gives
warmth and beauty and value to the earthly relation
should be wanting ? Without this the name would
lose, in its transference to God, its chief significance,
and Christ would not be the benefactor He is sup-
posed to have been in teaching the race to say,
" Our Father."
On this point too the instinct of the race has been
voice of manifested unequivocally. Universally, or
nearly so, when, as the Psalmist says, men
"draw near unto the gates of death," when " they
that go down to the sea in ships " " mount up to the
heaven," and " go down again to the depths," " and
are at their wits' end," " then they cry unto the
Lord in their trouble." Not only speculative ques-
PRAYER. 817
tioners of the efficacy of prayer, but professed athe-
ists have often been brought to extremities in which
this instinct has so asserted itself that they have
cried unto God.
It may also be doubted whether the highest bless-
ings can be received except on the condition of
asking. Health, rain, a prosperous journey, may
come to men whether they ask or not. But the
highest blessings are from the direct communion of
man with God. This is the great distinction of man,
that God himself may be his portion and good. To
be enjoyed, this blessing must be desired and sought
for, and it can be sought for only by asking. To
obtain the larger number of blessings we need, we
must not only ask, but put forth active exertion ; but
here the only active exertion possible is the asking.
Nor would it seem fit that God should bestow this
blessing on any other condition. Other things may
come alike to all, but it might have been anticipated,
even if He could do it otherwise, that God would
give his Holy Spirit, as a sanctifier and comforter,
only to those who should ask Him.
Not only from the Bible, then, but from the anal-
ogy of our earthly life, from our whole nature as
practical, and from its necessary relation to our
highest wants, should we infer the efficacy of asking.
The question then recurs whether, in Ob j ection
the light of a philosophy that apprehends ^mutabii-
immutable law and the infinite attributes lty of law *
of God, all this be not a mere seeming and delusion.
318 MORAL SCIENCE.
To the efficacy of asking for the Holy Spirit, or
for any direct agency of God upon our minds, there
can be no objection from the immutability of phys-
ical law, since that can have no relation to what is
done immediately by a personal being. From this
highest region and sphere of prayer, therefore, no
cavil about fixed law can debar us. Nor, on the
view of the immutability of law (the only correct
one), taken by the Duke of Argyle in his " Reign
of Law," can any valid objection lie against the effi-
cacy of asking, for example, for rain. " There are,"
says he, "no phenomena visible to man of which
it is true to say that they are governed by any inva-
riable force. That which does govern them is
always some variable combination of invariable
forces. But this makes all the difference in reason-
ing on the relation of will to law this is the one
essential distinction to be admitted and observed.
. . . . In the only sense in which laws are
immutable, this immutability is the very charac-
teristic which makes them subject to guidance
through endless cycles of design. It is the very
certainty and in variableness of the laws of Nature,"
that is, of each individual law taken separately
" which alone enables us to use them, and yoke them
to our service." If, as some suppose, man can cause
rain by the firing of cannon, then it may be obtained
by asking it even of him. In such a case there
would be simply a different adjustment of invariable
laws ; and if results may be thus produced to some
PRAYER. 319
extent by the intervention of human will without a
miracle, it cannot be irrational to suppose they may
be thus produced to any extent by the divine will.
The arrow shot at a venture that finds the joints of
the harness, is governed by ordinary laws. Nothing
but their nice adjustment is needed to carry it pre-
cisely there. The intervention of will is supposed,
but in no other relation to fixed law than that of the
human will when it causes ice by a freezing mix-
ture. This removes a difficulty which has weighed
heavily on many minds.
There remains the objection from the ob j ection
infinite attributes of God. S d ' 8
As infinite in knowledge, God knows attributes -
what we need before we ask Him. We can tell Him
nothing new. He also knows what events are to
be, therefore they cannot be changed. As infinite
in goodness, He will do for us what is best whether
we ask Him or not.
In obviating these difficulties, we may say
1. That no one can read the speculations of such
men as Spinoza, Kant, Cousin, and Hamilton, upon
the Infinite, without feeling that they are dealing
with a subject which they do not fully grasp ; and
that it can never be wise to set the results of such
speculations in opposition to the practical principles
of our nature. The apparent contradictions result-
ing from these speculations were such that Kant
felt obliged to recognize or invent what he called a
Practical Reason, as the only basis of rational
conduct.
320 MORAL SCIENCE.
2. The objection so makes God infinite as really
to limit Him, and virtually to deny his personality.
It makes it impossible for Him to be a Father, or
moral Governor. Prayer is an act of choice and
free will. So is murder. And if, because God is
infinite, and knows what is to be, and will do what
is best, it can make no difference with a man
whether he prays or not, for the same reason it can
make no difference whether he murders or not. It
will follow that God will do what He will do, with-
out reference to human conduct, which is subversive
of moral government, and a practical absurdity. If
we regard God as a person, and man also, the pos-
sibility of such direct intercourse as prayer involves
must be allowed ; nor can we conceive of a being,
especially of an Infinite Being, having fully the
attributes of personality, that is, being really God,
to whom it would be impossible to answer prayer.
Why not say that the immutable God immutably,
that is always, answers prayer ? The difficulty lies
in connecting personality with infinite attributes,
and those who deny that prayer may be efficacious,
really deny the personality and fatherhood of God.
It is to the fatherhood of God that we cling. To
that we turn with infinite relief, from those limitless
and dreary abstractions, which philosophy calls the
Infinite and the Absolute. Without that, we are
orphans : virtually, all is Fate. With that, nothing
can rationally prevent the child from coming to the
Father, or even the sinner, when he sees evidence
PRAYER. 321
of placability, from coming " boldly unto the throne
of grace, that he may obtain mercy, and find grace
to help in time of need."
With this view of the nature and reasonableness
of prayer, it only remains to say that its The form
form is of little consequence. Prayer is of prayer *
more than desire more than sincere desire. It
is paramount desire offered to God with a filial
spirit. Of necessity this will be both reverent and
importunate. Such prayer, whether repeated from
memory, or read from a book, or, as would seem
most natural, uttered directly from the promptings
of the heart, is always heard.
21
CHAPTER IV.
THE SABBATH.
THE last duty to be considered is the keeping of
the Sabbath.
To man, originally, the Sabbath must have come
as a positive institution, since he could have seen
no reason for it, aside from the divine command.
It has since been commonly regarded as partly pos-
itive and partly moral. Now, however, as a reason
can be assigned for it, and even for the proportion
of time designated, it may be regarded as wholly
moral.
In considering the Sabbath, we shall first treat of
the Religious, and then of the Civil Sabbath.
By the Religious Sabbath, we mean a day set
apart by God himself for his own worship, and to
secure, in connection with that, the religious cul-
ture and final salvation of men.
By the Civil Sabbath, we mean a day made
" non-legal," in which public business shall be sus-
pended, and in which all labor and recreation shall
be so far restrained, that the ends of a religious Sab-
bath may be secured by those who wish it.
THE SABBATH. 323
Iii treating of the religious Sabbath, we naturally
consider, first, its origin and history.
Concerning these, the points which the friends of
the Sabbath accept and regard as established are
the following :
1- That the Sabbath was given to our first par-
ents in Eden, according -to the account in Genesis
ii. 2, 3 ; and that it was intended for the race.
2. That we find unmistakable indications of the
Sabbath, both in the Scriptures and in heathen liter-
ature, between the original command and the giving
of the Law.
3. That when the Law was given, the command
to hallow the Sabbath was made conspicuous, as
one of the ten commandments. That it has the
same rank as the other commandments, all of which
are moral in their character, and universally binding.
4. That during the subsequent history of the
Jews the Sabbath is referred to by the prophets in
a way to show that v they classed it with the other
commandments, and that they regarded its obser-
vance as intimately connected with the prosperity of
the nation.
5. That at the time of our Saviour the Sabbath
was observed with great strictness ; that the people
assembled regularly for public worship, and that
Moses and the prophets were read in the syna-
gogues every Sabbath-day. Also, that this worship
was attended by our Saviour, and that while He re-
proved the superstitious observances and over-
324 MORAL SCIENCE.
scrupulousness that had crept in, He yet recognized
the Sabbath as a divine institution, and as " made
for man."
6. That after the resurrection of Christ the day
was changed, and that the Christian Sabbath, with
substantially the same ends, has been perpetuated
till the present time.
These points have been amply discussed by many
writers, and as they belong to history rather than
to philosophy, they will not be further noticed here.
We proceed to inquire what may be known of the
origin of the Sabbath, from the character and condi-
tion of man.
And here we observe that the religious Sabbath
authenticates itself as from God. This it does in
various ways.
1. Regarding man as sinful, taking him as we
now find him in every country where the Sabbath
is unknown, the very conception of a holy Sabbath
would have been impossible. There could have been
nothing within him or without him to suggest it.
2. Regarding men as selfish, the rich and the
powerful would never have originated an institution,
or consented to it, which would not only free laborers
and dependents and slaves from labor one seventh
of the time, but would require that time for the
service of another.
3. As the Sabbath corresponds with no cycle or
natural division of time, it must have been impos-
sible for any man, or number of men, to single out
THE SABBATH. 325
one day, and set it apart authoritatively. Man could
neither have decided rightly the proportion of time
to be set apart, nor have guarded the sanctity of
the day by penalties. If the division of time into
weeks were wholly unknown, it would be impossible
that it should be introduced by man.
4. Man could not have so associated the Sabbath
with the grandest ideas made known by revelation,
or possible to thought, as the creation of the world,
the resurrection of Christ, the outpouring of the
Spirit, and the rest of a holy heaven. He could
not have made it span the arch from the beginning
till the consummation of all things.
5. The Sabbath authenticates its divine origin
not only as it thus blends with the highest ideas and
interests of man, as connected with the past and the
future, but by its analogy with the works of God as
simple, and at the same time touching the interests
of the present life at so many points. In this it is
like the air and the water, which seem so simple,
yet subserve so many uses.
As thus impossible to have been originated by
man, as connected with the creation of the world,
with the resurrection of Christ, with the outpouring
of the Spirit, and with the rest of heaven ; being
analogous to nature, and promoting every interest
of time, we say that the religious Sabbath comes to
man bearing its own credentials as from God.
From the origin of the Sabbath we T
V n necessary
turn to its necessity tor man. for man.
I. Of its necessity* for man as an individual.
326 MORAL SCIENCE.
Of this the first ground is tlie necessity man is in
For religious ^ ren 'gious instruction. The religion of
instruction. the g^ } g n()t ft form ^ caR be g()ne
through with mechanically, or a superstition that
can be inherited, or imposed upon ignorance. It is
a religion of light. This is its glory. But rational
ideas of God and of his worship, and of the duty
and destiny of man as a religious being, can no more
be reached without instruction than similar ideas of
civil society. Upon such instruction the Bible in-
sists, both in the Old Testament and in the New,
and for this, if it is to be made general, the Sabbath
is indispensable.
But it is not simply instruction that man needs.
For persua- -^ e nee ds persuasion. Indifference and
aversion are to be overcome. Men are
tempted to forget God, to neglect prayer, and make
light of accountability. They are tempted to live,
and most men do live, for this world alone. Here
is the great need of a Sabbath. There is need of
time and opportunity to persuade men ; to go, if need
be, " into the highways and the hedges, and compel
them to come in."
But again, if we suppose an individual intelli-
For culture g en % religious, the Sabbath would be
and growth. nee( jed f or ^s culture and growth. Were
men open every day to the calls of society, and sub-
ject to the pressure of competition in business, the
tide of worldliness would become resistless. The
Sabbath brings the world to a solemn pause, as
THE SABBATH. 327
under the eye of God. It enables man to subordi-
nate sense to faith, and lifts him up to the power of
living for the unseen and the future.
Again, man cannot reach his end as isolated.
He is social, and needs public and social Forsocial
worship, as well as instruction, and for ends *
these the Sabbath is indispensable. The Sabbath,
the pulpit, the Sabbath-school, and the social meet-
ings appointed on the Sabbath and revolving about,
it, are inseparable. Withdraw these, and it is
doubtful whether the Church itself would survive.
The pulpit, in connection with the Sabbath, is the
only institution ever established on earth for the
general diffusion of religious instruction, and for
securing a form of social worship that should bring
all men together in equality and brotherhood before
God.
II. The Sabbath is needed not only for the indi-
vidual, but for the family.
The Sabbath and the family were instituted in
Paradise these only, and they natu- For the
rally support each other. Where there is ofThe 0683
no Sabbath, the domestic relations are not fanuly -
held sacred, and where the domestic relations are
not held sacred, there is no Sabbath. Let but
these two institutions, the family and the religious
Sabbath, be sustained in their integrity, and every
interest of the individual and of the family will be
secured.
III. The Sabbath is essential to the state, if free
government is to be maintained.
328 MORAL SCIENCE.
No people ever have been, or ever can be, raised
to a point of knowledge and virtue that would en-
able them to maintain permanently a free govern-
ment, that is, self-government, without that circle of
agencies of which the Sabbath is an essential part.
Without the Sabbath and the Bible there has
The sabbath been no such diffusion of knowledge
government, among a whole people as would qualify
them for liberty. It was among those who most
highly esteemed the religious Sabbath, and were
persecuted for maintaining it, that the idea of edu-
cating the whole people first arose and was made
efficient. The idea had its germ in that estimate of
man as man, which underlies the whole system of re-
ligion of which the Bible and the Sabbath are a part.
But knowledge is not sufficient for freedom.
There must also be virtue, principle, and a right
social state. Outward forms and amenities must
spring from good will, and love as a law must be
applied in the relations of life as it never has been,
or can be without the Sabbath and its teachings. 1
IV. We next observe, that man needs the Sab-
l As the capacity of man for free government is now on trial, and
especially in this country, this point is of special interest to the patriot
as well as to the Christian, and has attracted no little attention. Two
years since, at the request of the New York Sabbath Committee, a
paper was read by me before the National Sabbath Convention, held at
Saratoga, in which it was maintained:
1, " That a religious observance of the Sabbath would secure the
permanence of free institutions."
2. " That without the Sabbath religiously observed the permanence
of free institutions cannot be secured; " and
THE SABBATH. 329
batli as a physical being, and not he alone, but the
animals that are subjected to labor by him. It is
worthy of notice that cattle are especially mentioned
in the fourth commandment.
If this be so, it is a fact of high import, not only as
showing the wide relations of the Sabbath, but the
subordination of physical to moral ideas in the whole
structure of the present system.
The question is, Will man and animals do more
work, do it better, have better health, and ph gical
live longer by laboring six days and rest- f e r c ^e ty
ing the seventh, than by laboring seven Sabbath -
days in the week ? This question can be decided
only by facts, and by a wide and careful induction.
On this point extensive observations have been
made by cautious men, and facts like the following
are stated : " The experiment was tried on a hun-
dred and twenty horses. They were employed for
years seven days in a week. But they became un-
healthy, and finally died so fast that the owner
thought it too expensive, and put them on a six
days' arrangement. After this he was not obliged
to replenish them one fourth as often as before.
Instead of sinking continually, his horses came up
again, and lived years longer than they could have
3. " That the civil as based on the religious Sabbath is an institution
to which society has a natural right, precisely as it has to property."
These propositions, it is believed, can be established, and if so the
Sabbath must be from God.
The paper referred to having been published by the Sabbath Com-
mittee and extensively circulated, it is, perhaps, sufficient to refer to it
here.
330 MORAL SCIENCE.
done on the other plan." Numerous cases of this
kind are stated by Dr, Justin Edwards in his " Sab-
bath Manual."
A friend writes me that when the extensive stable
of the 3d Avenue Railroad, in New York, was com-
pleted, he was invited to inspect it ; and noticing that
the stables were arranged in groups of seven, he
found on inquiry " that the object was to have a
gang or team of horses together ; that each car re-
quired three pair of horses per day, each pair going
about twenty-four miles ; but that this was not
enough, for that a horse, no matter how well fed
and cared for, required rest, and that the only way
to give it to him and still keep the car running was
to have an odd horse which should come in and take
his turn at the work." This gave each horse a
seventh part of the time for rest. " It had been
tried, the superintendent said, with less, and with
more, but that it took just about seven horses to run
the car all the time." My friend adds : "This re-
sult had apparently been reached through pure
experience, but however reached, it had not been
founded upon any Scriptural reason ; and I have no
doubt but that the superintendent and directors were
entirely unconscious of the fact that they were fol-
lowing a divine precept."
In view of facts like the above, Dr. Edwards felt
authorized to say of laboring animals that " when
employed but six days in a week, and allowed to
rest one, they are more healthy than they can be
THE SABBATH. |U JH 7^tg J^yl
when employed during the whole se^ T T^ey dft fc*.
more work, and live longer."
And what is true of animals is true of man.
Prom extensive inquiries, from reports made by
government commissioners, and from the opinion of
many scientific physicians, Dr. Edwards concludes
that " men who labor six days in a week, and rest
one, can do more work in all kinds of business, in
all parts of the world, and do it in a better manner
than those who labor seven." Also, " that it is
now settled by facts that the observance of the
Sabbath is required by a natural law, and that were
man nothing more than an animal it would be for
his interest to observe the Sabbath." 1
The above refers to physical labor ; but as the
power of vigorous and persistent mental The mental
. powers need
labor depends on the state of the body, it a sabbath.
will follow that more such labor can be done, and
better done by those who keep the Sabbath, than by
those who do not. This is confirmed by facts,
beginning with the testimony of Sir Matthew Hale,
which seems to have first called attention to the
subject. He said : " If I had at any time bor-
rowed from this day any time -for my secular em-
ployment I found that it did further me less than if
I had let it alone, and therefore, when some years'
experience, upon a most attentive and vigilant
observation, had given me this instruction, I grew
peremptorily resolved never in this kind to make a
i See Sab. Doc. No. 1, p. 41.
332 MORAL SCIENCE.
breach upon the Lord's day, which I have now
strictly observed for more than thirty years." On
this point more recent testimony is abundant, but
need not be added.
The views above presented rest on their own
basis, though they could never have been reached
without revelation, and they justify us in calling
special attention to the saying of our Saviour, that
44 the Sabbath was made for man." Viewing him
in whatever aspect, whether as a physical, an in-
tellectual, or a moral and religious being; whether
in his domestic, his social, or his civil relations, we
see that the Sabbath is an integral and essential
part of the divine arrangement for his training and
well-being.
If the preceding views are correct, and also the
Man's right doctrine of rights already considered, it
to the civil ! i i
Sabbath. will follow that man has a right to the
civil Sabbath, on the same ground that he has a
right to property, or to anything else ; and that it
belongs to legislation to secure him in the enjoy-
ment of that right.
Rights are from the necessity of those things to
which man has a fight, to secure the various ends
indicated by the active principles of his constitution,
and they vary in importance and sacredness accord-
ing to the importance and sacredness of the end.
But the highest end of man is a religiously social
end. His most sacred right must therefore be to
the requisites and conditions for attaining that end,
THE SABBATH. 333
and he will have a right to demand of society what-
ever legislation may be required for that. The
civil society which does not afford to every man the
most favorable conditions for the attainment of the
ends for which God made him, needs modification,
and if it would render such attainment impossible,
it needs reconstruction.
In saying the above we disclaim any purpose to
make men moral or religious by legislation, or to
interfere with any liberty that would not trench
upon rights. Give us our rights, give us the still-
ness and quiet needed for the religious impression
of the Sabbath, for the instruction of families, and
for public worship, and we are content. To these,
as needed for the attainment of our highest ends, we
have a right.
" It may also be said that society, as being from
God, has a natural right to anything necessary to
secure its own ends. If, therefore, it can be shown,
as it can be, and has been, that those ends cannot
be secured without the Sabbath, then society has,
on this ground also, a right to legislate in favor of
the civil Sabbath." l
It only remains to speak of the manner in which
the Sabbath should be kept.
How the Sabbath must be kept must Manner of
be determined in part from its origin, but SeSSed
chiefly from its end.
As associated with great and joyful events in the
1 See Sabbath and Free Institutions, p. 17. N
334 MORAL SCIENCE.
past, the Sabbath is of the nature of a festival, and
should be a day of joy. As calling us to cease from
the toil imposed by the primeval curse, and to lay
aside its soiled garments, the Sabbath is a day of
release and of refreshment. As pointing to a rest
of holy activity, in which the curse of toil shall be
wholly lifted from us, the Sabbath is a day of de-
lightful anticipation, and of earnest preparation.
To one acquainted with its origin, and sympathizing
with its end, the whole tone and aspect of the day
must be bright, and its spirit free ; but, as has been
said, the manner of keeping the day, its duties and
employments, must be mainly determined by its
end.
Is the end of the Sabbath physical ? Then it is
to be spent in physical culture. Is it intellectual ?
Then the schools, and lyceums, and libraries should
be opened and thronged. Is the end aesthetic ?
Then we are to listen to fine music, and view works
of art. Is it social ? Then we are to make calls,
and attend dinner parties. Is the end communion
with nature, or with the God of nature, distinc-
tively ? Then we are to walk in the fields and
woods, and go on excursions. Is the end of the
Sabbath religious? Then it is to be kept holy.
Then are we to bring ourselves by every method of
his appointment, into immediate and conscious re-
lation to God as a holy God, and our end will be
the promotion of holiness in ourselves and others.
This is the end designated by God, the only worthy
THE SABBATH. 335
end, the only end, even, in connection with which
any other can be fully secured.
But while the above is the end, it does not follow
that it is the only end ; for here, as else- II}gher and
M'here, we find higher and lower ends, lowerends -
and here, too, the law of limitation holds. Every
lower good may be promoted, and should be, but
only so far as it is a condition for one that is higher.
Holiness is the supreme end. So far as that will be
promoted by physical rest and " bodily exercise,"
by study, or art, or social intercourse, or commun-
ion with nature, these will be in place, but no further.
" The Sabbath was made for man," and whatever
labor or service his good may require us to perform
on that day, we are to do all works of necessity and
mercy. But we are to remember that it was made
for man especially as a religious being, and as his
great need is conformity to God, if the Sabbath be
not so kept as to promote that, it fails of its chief
end. It fails to be properly a Sabbath. But let it
be kept so as to promote this end, and every inferior
good will follow. There will be physical rest. There
will be that study of the Word of God and that
meditation which give light and depth to the intel-
lect. There will be sacred song, with so much of
art as higher ends may demand or permit. There
will be that family worship which hallows the home,
and that public and social worship which at once
humbles and exalts men, and brings them together
as one family before God. Man will have sympathy
336 MORAL SCIENCE.
with nature, not merely as expressing the natural
attributes of God, but as the basis and frame- work,
and in some of its aspects, the silent prophecy of a
higher moral and Christian system. All this he
will have under the law of limitation, and in addi-
tion, the limitless good that comes from conformity
to God, and direct communication with Him.
Such a law of the Sabbath is as precise as can be
given and not keep men children, or make them
machines. It avoids all precisionism, allowing each
one to decide for himself, whether or not he may
pluck the ears of corn as he passes through the field,
and rub them with his hands.
The requirement to keep the Sabbath holy places
Holiness ^ m a peculiar position, as making holi-
arighfS)- ness necessary to the right keeping of it.
servance. j t is se lf-evident that the religious Sabbath
must be kept religiously, and that only a relig-
ious man can do that. Here is the great difficulty
with the Sabbath ; but it is only the same as with
the service of God in any form. " Ye cannot," said
Joshua to the Israelites of old, " serve the Lord, for
He is a holy God." The very reason why they
should do it was the reason why they could not.
The faculties can act with alacrity only with ref-
erence to a congenial end. Let a man " hunger
and thirst after righteousness," and all opportunities
and means of attaining it will be welcomed and im-
proved. This alone can free the Sabbath from that
impression of negation and vacuity and restraint
THE SABBATH. 337
which they must feel who are brought up to keep
it strictly, but have no sympathy with its ends as
religious. Restrained by conscience or by custom
from employments and pleasures that are congenial,
and with no taste for the proper business and enjoy-
ments of the day, it will be " a weariness," and they
will say, as was said by men similarly situated three
thousand years ago, and has been ever since, " When
will the Sabbath be gone, that we may set forth
wheat ? " For this irksomeness of the Sabbath
there are but three possible remedies. One is that
God should change his law ; one that men should
obey it ; and the third, that they should disregard
and pervert it by spending the day in business or
pleasure.
The observance of the Sabbath has been supposed
to be peculiarly a guard against crime. Wh
It is so because it is more purely than any- ^ a ^"J rd
thing else a test of regard to the authority crime -
of God. As no time is intrinsically holy, and
nothing but the command of God can make it so,
the observance of a specified time on that ground is
almost sure to be connected with the fear of God in
other things. Hence, of 1232 convicts in Auburn
State prison, only 26 had conscientiously kept the
Sabbath ; and of 203 who were committed in one
year, only two had conscientiously done so. For
the same reason, desecration of the Sabbath is often
the beginning of a course of vice and crime. As of
old with the Israelites, the Sabbath seems to be set
338 MORAL SCIENCE.
as a sign between God and men, and when they dis-
regard that, all fear of Him departs. It is, there-
fore, ominous of every form of evil when a young
person begins to disregard the Sabbath. Tell me
how the Sabbath is spent, and I will give you a
moral history of the rest of the week.
It has also been supposed that something of dis-
Providence crimination, enough to show r which side
and the .
Sabbath. God is on, may be discerned in special
evils which follow Sabbath desecration. It is said
by careful observers, and confirmed by striking
facts, that those who seek to obtain their own ends,
whether of business or pleasure, by appropriating
God's time for them, often find themselves strangely
thwarted, sometimes by seeming accidents and sud-
den events, and sometimes in the long lines of God's
providence. This may well be, for if the law of
the Sabbath be the law of God, we may be sure
that there is no such inflexibility of natural forces
that they cannot be brought to conspire with it, and
that in some way it will ultimately vindicate itself.
" Who hath hardened himself against Him, and
prospered ? "
The religious Sabbath has been dwelt upon thus
at length, from the conviction that it is
Conclusion. .,.,...,,. i/-i i
vital to individual piety, to the family, and
to our free institutions ; and also that it can be sus-
tained only by a clear apprehension of its grounds,
and by vigilance and struggle. To a perverted
Sabbath, a day of amusement, spectacles, idleness,
THE SABBATH. 839
and consequent vice and degradation ; despotism, in-
fidelity, and formalism have 110 objection. Such a
day is their surest means of undermining everything
opposed to them. It is the temple of God become
a den of thieves. It is a holy Sabbath that is the
point of their common attack, and this it is that the
friends of an enlightened Christianity, and of free
institutions, are called upon to sustain.
The fourth and the fifth commandments stand
together in the centre of the Decalogue ; and as it
is through these that there is a connection between
the two tables of the divine Law, so it is through
the Sabbath that a divine influence passes into the
family, and through that into society- This is the
divine order the Sabbath and the family mutu-
ally supporting each other ; and God, through
them, working out a perfect society. It remains
to the Christian and the patriot to accept this order,
and work together with Him.
APPENDIX A.
HAVING reached this point, it may be serviceable to
some if, as I was urgently requested, I indicate the
method in which the processes we have gone over were
presented on the blackboard.
The first word taken was "Law." It being pre-
sumed that each hearer had some notion in his mind
corresponding to the word, the audience were requested
to make that notion definite, and to state to themselves
what must have been in their minds before they could
have had it. The word was then written in front of a
vertical line, and each one requested to think what must
have lain back of it, and proximate to it. When the
first word had been fixed on, the next was sought, and
so on, till the process was completed. When this was
done the order was as in the text, but the numbers
were reversed. Thus
43 2 1 |
Being. Force. Uniformity. An End. j
It was then read backwards, thus. Being, originating
force, uniformly, so as to accomplish an intelligible end,
gives us the conception of Law.
This applies to physical law, though even with refer-
ence to that all might not be agreed. That, however,
is of no consequence here, the object being simply to
312 APPENDIX B.
show the method. After Law, Moral Law and Obli-
gation were investigated in the same way, though the
process was much more extended. Attention was thus
concentrated, and ideas and their relations were made
more definite. It is obvious that the method admits of
wide application.
APPENDIX B.
To show to the eye how inclusive the word " Love "
is, as ordinarily used, the following scheme was placed
on the blackboard. In this, as in all cases of develop-
ment, the word is placed on the left side of the line.
Love of -
Complacency, or com-
placent Love.
J Spontaneous
after choice.
God.
Our Neighbor
Self. \
[Rational.
Good in itself.
Brothers,
Children.
Parents.
etc.
Natural Affecti<
Esteem.
Power.
Knowledg
Property.
Life.
e.
Desires.
Food and Drink.
Appetites.
Spontaneous
before choice.
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