REESE LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF 'CALIFORNIA. Receirtd (7 Accessions No. .3LS7i>f/. Shell THE LAW OF LOYE LOVE AS A LAW; MORAL SCIENCE, THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL. BY MARK HOPKINS, D. D., LL. D., PRESIDENT OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE. UNIVERSITY NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER AND COMPANY. 1869. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1868, by MARK HOPKINS, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts. RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE: STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY H. 0. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY. PREFACE. IF we accept the principles of classification adopted in the following work, the position of Moral Science as compared with other sciences is either superior or central. It is superior to those sciences, as intellectual philosophy, which are con- ditional for it ; and central for those, as the science of government, which are but an application of its principles. It is from this position of the science, together with its unsettled condition, that I have been led of late to devote to its advancement the little time I could spare from my more immediate and pressing duties. That some advancement has been made I am encouraged to hope from the favorable reception of the " Lectures on Moral Science " published by me five years since. In those " Lectures," morality was made rational, both as based on ends and as involving intuitions ; the different kinds of ends and of good were distinguished; the relation of 6 PREFACE. will to ultimate ends was shown ; the law of lim- itation was established ; the faculties were classified from their relation to ends ; and from that relation, and from their relation to each other, it was shown that the highest end of the whole man was the same with that made known by revelation. (This point, if established, is of the utmost moment, as render- ing religious skepticism rationally impossible.) The relation of virtue to happiness and also, to worldly good was shown, and of rights to right. As the above points were, for the most part, either new in themselves, or put in new relations, and may not have been always expressed in the best way, it is not strange that they failed to be rightly apprehended by some critics who read the work, as well as by some who certainly did not. Nor is it, perhaps, strange that some who hold strenuously, and as a part of their theological ortho- doxy, that it enters into the " chief end of man " to enjoy God, should have counted the same doctrine an alarming philosophical heresy. In the following work the above doctrines are implied, for further reflection has but confirmed 'me in them; but of some of them a fuller exposition is demanded, new r points require to be stated, and the principles need to be applied in a practical part. PREFACE. 7 In addition to the above, or if not in each case strictly in addition, yet as requiring fuller statement, some of the points which may be thought to justify the publication of another work are the following : 1. The making of obligation the moral idea with no necessary intervention of the idea of right, obli- gation to choose the supreme end and good being immediately affirmed on the apprehension of it, thus placing the primary seat of obligation in generic choice without volition, and as distinguished from it. 2. The fact that a Sensibility is a condition for the formation of moral ideas. This was implied in the former work, but not so distinctly stated, because I had not then given the attention they deserve to the very able lectures on this subject of President Finney in his volume on " Systematic Theology," in which this doctrine was, so far as I know, fully stated for the first time. 3. The distinction between the two forms of spon- taneous activity. This had been made by Dr. Hickock. 4. The coalescence of the idea of individual and of the general good in the one idea of good on which the law of conscience is based. 5. The separation of the idea of obligation from 8 PREFACE. authority. This had been done by President Fin- ney, Dr. Hickok, and others. 6. The distinction between conscience as an im- pulse and as a law. 7. The mode in which love includes all other duties. 8. The finding of a basis for the reconciliation, not of any two opposing systems, but of two classes of systems that have always been opposed. It is quite time this should be done, as it certainly will be at some time, both in Mental and in Moral Science. 9. The bringing into unity of physical, mental, and moral science through the law of the condition- ing and conditioned, and the law of limitation based upon that. 10. A classification of duties new as respects its basis ; and the application of the law of limitation to the practical part. 11. A fuller recognition of the difference be- tween the powers and the susceptibilities, and of the contrasted laws of our frame by which we receive and give. 12. The doctrine of rights as related to ends. This was seen by Whewell, but not fully applied. 13. The relation of both rights and ends to the just powers of government. PREFACE. 9 14. The derivation of the right to punish from the violation of rights. 15. The natural right of man to the Sabbath. Other points might be mentioned. How far any of these are absolutely new I do not know, nor is it important ; but the system, taken as a whole, seems to me so far new as to justify its publication. When the former work was published it was sup- posed that the doctrine of ends had not before been made thus prominent in a moral system. That is still supposed ; but a legal friend has called my at- tention to a work on " The Civil Law in its Natural Order," by Jean Dornat, a French lawyer, in which the course of thought is often strikingly similar to that in the " Lectures." His work was published in Paris in 1674, and republished in this country by Little & Brown, so recently as 1853. If ends hold the place in a Moral System assigned them in the " Lectures," it is obvious they must hold a similar place in the Civil Law, and this was seen and stated with great clearness by Domat. As the " Lectures," which were published as a work of original investigation, have been used as a text-book in several of our colleges and seminaries, it is thought best, though the present work is of the same general character, to have some reference to 10 PREFACE. that in its structure and arrangement. To combine the qualities of a good text-book with original inves- tigation is not easy. In some respects, and for some classes, the processes of original investigation well stated are better than anything else. In other respects, and for other classes, they are not desira- ble. On this point each teacher must judge for himself, and the work will find its place according to its merit and adaptation. As far as possible technical and obscure terms have been avoided, and it is hoped the system has been made too plain to be misapprehended. The substance of the following work was deliv- ered the last winter in a course of lectures before the Lowell Institute. In the delivery of them much use was made of the blackboard, whenever ideas were to be traced back to their source, or principles were to be carried out to their results. This was an experiment, but the results were such as to assure me that the blackboard may be made use of with much advantage in illustrating this and kindred subjects before popular audiences, as well as before college classes. It only remains that I express my obligations to the friends who have aided me in this work by their suggestions. Among these I would particularly PREFACE. 11 ^nention my early and constant friend, Dr. John Morgan, of Oberlin, to whom I arn greatly indebted ; also Dr. Ray Palmer of New York ; and on the sub- ject of suffrage, Judge C. C. Nott, of the Court of Claims, Washington. WILLIAMS COLLEGE, Septernher, 1868. \ CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION. PAGB Different Theories 1 MORAL SCIENCE. Definitions and Preliminary Statements ..... 29 PART I. THE LAW OF LOVE : THEORETICAL MORALS. DIVISION I. OF LAW. CHAPTER I. Of Law in General 34 CHAPTER II. Obligation: Moral Ideas : Conditions and Characteristics . . 30 CHAPTER III. Obligation: Freedom a Condition 44 CHAPTER IV. Obligation: an End a Condition 47 CHAPTER V. Obligation: a Good as a Condition 51 x iv CONTENTS. CHAPTER VI. PAGE Obligation: Two Forms of Spontaneous Action . ... 59 CHAPTER VII. Obligation : Personality a Condition 63 CHAPTER VIII. Obligation: Necessarily Affirmed 69 CHAPTER IX. Obligation : Paley : Obligation and Authority .... 74 CHAPTER X. Ultimate Moral Ideas : Whewell : Theory of Right '. . .73 CHAPTER XI. Is the Affirmation of Obligation Law ? 85 CHAPTER XII. Conscience - 90 DIVISION II. OF LOVE. CHAPTER I. Rational Love: its Characteristics and Sphere .... 99 CHAPTER II. Complacent Love and Righteous Indignation .... 10-4 DIVISION III. THE LAW OF LOVE. CHAPTER I. How Love becomes Law 106 CHAPTER II. The Relation of Love to other Duties 110 CONTENTS. XV CHAPTER III. PAQB Reconciliation of Systems 114 CHAPTER IV. Other Relations of the Sensibility to the Moral Nature . . 119 PART II. LOVE AS A LAW : PRACTICAL MORALS. Preliminary Statement , 125 V I. Love as a Law distinguished from the Law of Love . . . 132 II. Classification of Duties 136 CLASS I. DUTIES TO OURSELVES. I. Classification 140 DIVISION I. The Securing of our Rights 140 DIVISION II. The Supply of our Wants . 142 DIVISION III. The Perfecting of our Powers ....... 142 CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. PAGE Perfection as related to Direct Action for Others: of the Body: of the Mind 143 CHAPTER II. Perfection as related to Unconscious Influence . . . . 156 CHAPTER III. Perfection as related to Complacency 158 CHAPTER IY. Perfection as related to the Glory of God 160 CHAPTER V. Perfection as related to Self- Love 161 CHAPTER VI. Habits ... ,102 CLASS II. "DUTIES TO OUR FELLOW MEN. PRELIMINARY. Self-Love and the Love of Others .108 FIRST GREAT DIVISION. DUTIES OF MEN TO MEN. DIVISION I. DUTIES REGARDING THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS. 'CHAPTER I. Of Rights 170 CONTENTS. xvil . CHAPTER II. PAGE Personal Rights : Life and Liberty 179 CHAPTER III. Right to Property ^ 182 CHAPTER IV. Right to Reputation 195 CHAPTER V. Right to Truth 199 DIVISION II. DUTIES REGARDING THE WANTS OF OTHERS. CHAPTER I. Justice and Benevolence ....... 202 CHAPTER II. Supply of the Wants of Others 207 DIVISION III. PERFECTING AND DIRECTING THE POWERS OF OTHERS. CHAPTER I. Duty of Influence from the Relation of Character to Well-being. Obstacles to Change of Intellectual State and of Charac- acter 211 CHAPTER II. Spheres of Effort: Who may labor in them .... 221 XVlii CONTENTS. SECOND GREAT DIVISION. DUTIES FROM SPECIAL RELATIONS. CHAPTER I. PAGE Rights of Persons: Right and Rights: Special Duties : The Family 223 CHAPTER II. Government: Responsibility: Punishment 232 CHAPTER III. Relation of the Sexes: Chastity . ...... 246 CHAPTER IV. Rights and Duties in Relation to Marriage ... 249 CHAPTER V. The Law of Divorce 257 CHAPTER VI. Rights and Duties of Parents and Children .... 260 CHAPTER VII. Society and Government: The Sphere of Government: Origin of Government : Mode of Formation .... 268 CHAPTER VIII. Government Representative and Instrumental: The Right of Suffrage 282 CHAPTER IX. Forms of Government: Duties of Magistrates and Citizens . 297 CONTENTS. x i x CLASS III. DUTIES TO GOD. CHAPTER I. PAGE Duties to God defined 304 CHAPTER II. Cultivation of a Devotional Spirit 308 CHAPTER III. Prayer * 314 CHAPTER IV. The Sabbath QOO ^fTil^ THE ^A [UNIVERSITY ^%FO^^ INTRODUCTION. DIFFERENT THEORIES. MORALITY regards man as active. Hence moral science must imply a systematic knowledge of those powers in man which tend to, or regulate action, as those powers are related to each other, and to the objects that excite their action. These powers are related to each other as a system capable of harmonious action, and of securing through such action the highest good of the individual and of the whole. Into the conception of a system of active powers the idea of order, subordination, and of a supreme controlling power must enter ; and that action of such a system which would secure the highest good of the individual and of the whole is right action. Such action must be rational. It presupposes an end good in itself, and known to be good ; but it can be moral only as we have a moral nature affirming obligation to such action. Of the nature and foundation of moral obliga- tion which I suppose to be thus affirmed, different 2 INTRODUCTION". accounts have been given. This has arisen in part from the ambiguity of language, but more from a partial apprehension and wrong adjustment of the facts and principles of our complex nature. A striking fact, as of association, or a powerful princi- ple, as of self-love or sympathy, is seized upon and made to account for everything. It becomes the centre of a system having in it, perhaps, much that is plausible, and much truth in its details, but as a system wholly false. Such systems are not useless. They insure a careful examination of the facts made central ; the incidental truth involved, as in the treatise of Adam Smith, is often of much value ; and something is done in limiting and exhausting the possibilities of error. And not only are different systems produced from Different ^ e a ^ ove causes, but the moral problem thelTr'ilr f itself is differently.stated. By some it is problem. made an inquiry concerning the moral nature ; by some, concerning the nature of virtue ; by some, concerning* the source ^and nature of right ; by some, after an ultimate rule? and by some, after the nature -and foundation, of ground, of obliga- tion. This last I think preferable. In the fact of obligation all are agreed. All are agreed that-all mankind are under obligation to do some acts and to abstain from others. Without obligation there can be no morality and no law, and a statement of the ground and conditions and limitations of obliga- tion, would be a statement of the theory of morals. INTRODUCTION. 3 As I propose to use the term, a ground of obli- gation for us must presuppose a moral nature in us ; and the question what that nature is, is entirely different from any that may respect the ultimate ground or reason _for its activity. The nature and constitution of the eye are one thing, the nature and constitution' 1 of light, without which the function of the ey 'could not be performed are another. The eye and light are related to each other, and each is so indispensable to vision that either might be said to be at its foundation. But the questions in optics respecting the eye, and those respecting light, are entirely distinct ; and if the powers of the eye were regarded by one man as the foundation of the faculty of sight, and if the properties of light were so regarded by another, and if, because they were using the same word, they were to go on under the delusion that they were treating of the same ' thing, it is easy to see the confusion that must ensue. In the s#me -way the intellect, with its capacities, and laws, is on? thing, and truth, the , object of the intellect, is another. These so imply each other that without truth the intellect could not act, and either might be said to be the founda- tion of mental activity. Here, also, there would be the same confusion if men were to mistake one for the other, or, without being aware of the transi- tion, were to apply the same terms to both. But this is precisely what has happened in specu- lations on morals. Men have sometimes spoken of 4 INTRODUCTION. the various faculties and powers involved in the moral nature, such as conscience and free will, as - lying at the foundation of obligation; sometimes they have spoken of that ultimate ground or reason in view of which alone the moral nature can legitimately act, and sometimes they have included both. The fact of this confusion is said by Sir James Mclntosh to have been a great, and indeed the m#in reason of the confusion there has been in the perplexed speculations on the subject of morals. Speaking of the difference between the " Theory of Moral Sentiment," and the " Criterion of Mo- rality," he says : " The discrimination has seldom been made by moral philosophers ; the difference between the two problems has never been uniform- ly observed by any of them ; and it will appear in the sequel, that they have been not rarely alto- gether confounded by very eminent men, to the destruction of all just conception and of all correct reasoning in this most important, and perhaps most difficult, of sciences." But this confusion will not surprise us if we ob- serve how the speculations on these different sub- jects imply and almost necessarily run into each other. If we would understand optics, we must understand both the eye and light, and that not merely as they are in themselves, but as they are related to each other. If we would understand moral science, we must understand both the facul- ties which act and that in view of which they act ; INTRODUCTION. 5 but we must be careful to keep our speculations on the one subject distinct from those on the other. If I say that self-interest is the ground of obliga- tion I mean that it is that in view of which obliga- tion is affirmed by a moral agent fully constituted/ If, on the other hand, I say that free will is the ground of obligation, I do not mean that it is that in view of which obligation is affirmed, but that it is a power essential to a moral agent, a necessary condition of the affirmation of obligation, whatever the ground may be. If, again, it be said that self-interest is the ground of obligation and we would controvert that, we need to know what other possible grounds there may be ; if there may be what are called a priori grounds we must know that, and be able to state them, and this will involve the question of a priori knowledge and principles of action, and a decision of some of the highest and most disputed problems of mental science. Shall we then regard as the foundation of obliga- gation those faculties which are necessary _ J The ground to constitute us moral beings : or that in ? obligation o ' that in view view of which, being thus constituted, ^adonis obligation is affirmed ? With given facul- affirmed - ties I see a crow flying over my head. In view of that fact I feel no obligation. With the same faculties I see a man in danger of drowning. In view of that fact I do feel under obligation to aid him if I can. Here is a ground of difference, and -6 INTRODUCTION. of obligation. What is that ground ? Is there any ground common to all cases ? Without questioning , what others have done, and simply desiring distinct- ness, I prefer to call that the ground of obligation in view of which obligation is affirmed. In seeking for this, however, we shall necessarily be drawn into an examination of those faculties and mental products on which moral agency is conditioned, for it must be remembered that that in view of which obligation is affirmed may itself, like the idea of right, be the product of mental agency. Moral philosophers have indeed been divided in- Dependence ^ ^ wo c l asses > as they have belonged to on Sentai one or the otner of the two great schools of mental science that have divided thinkers from the time of Plato and Aristotle in reality, as they have settled in one way or another the great problem of the origin of knowledge. A sensationalist, believing that all our knowledge is from experience, that there are no necessary prin- ciples, or forms of knowledge given by the mind itself, can believe in no a priori principles of moral- ity, and will, almost of course, adopt a low, fluctu- $ting, and selfish system of morals. But one who finds s in the mind itself as well as in the senses a source of primitive knowledge, given indeed, not without the senses, but on the occasion of them, may consistently, and will naturally, look to the same source for the principles, or elements, or prim- itive facts, or ultimate ideas, or ground, or founda- INTRODUCTION. 7 tion, or whatever he may please to call it, of morals. Hence, the great battle of scientific morality is to be fought on the field of mental science. On this field some, as those who so make the - mind the product of organization as to bring it under the laws of matter and of necessity, and all, indeed, who deny the fact of liberty, so decide mental problems as to make morality impossible. Others necessitate a basis of self-interest, or of mere sentiment, while others still so solve these problems as to admit, in some form, of what may be called a rational system. Nor, I may remark in passing, need it discourage those who have not studied mental science formally, that moral problems strike their roots so deeply into that, for on this class of subjects sound judgment is native to the common mind. It is even true that where accurate statement is most difficult, intuition is most certain, and when such statements are made they commend themselves with great readiness to the common consciousness. With this view of the ground of obligation and of the connection of mental with moral Varioug items. science, we pass to consider some of the 8yst01 systems respecting obligation and its ground which have been adopted by different philosophers. Of these the first commonly mentioned, as it was the first in point of time among modern p,^ theory . systems, is that of Hobbes. By him the Hobbe8 - ground of obligation'' Was found in the authority of 8 INTRODUCTION. the Civil Law. According to Hobbes, a regard to personal advantage is the only possible motive to human action. " Acknowledgment of power is called honor.", " Pity is the imagination of future calamity to ourselves." " Laughter is occasioned by sudden glory in our eminence, or in comparison with the infirmity of others." " Love is a concep- tion of his need of the one person desired." u Re- pentance is regret at having missed the way." There are -no social affections, no sense of duty, no moral seiitiments. As a desire for his own pleasure is supreme in every man, it will follow that the state of society is naturally one of war. But as nothing can so interfere with this supreme desire or end of man as war, it becomes obligatory on men to com- bine, by an expression of their common will in the form of law, for the preservation of peace ; and as there is no other possible standard, it follows * that men must be bound by the behests of law, whatever they may be. A system* resting on a view of our nature so low and .partial, 'and thus favorable to arbitrary power, was not fitted for permanence among a free people, and had nearly passed from remembrance, except in the schools, when an attempt was made to revive it in connection with the enforcement of the fugitive " slave law. This attempt gave rise to the expression so prevalent for a time, of " the higher law ; " and ._ik really seemed at one time that we had a party among us who denied the existence of any such law. INTRODUCTION. 9 Of this system it has been well said, that it must either be right to obey the law and wrong to dis- obey it, or indifferent whether we obey it or not. If it be morally indifferent whether we obey it or not, the law which may or may not be obeyed with equal virtue cannot be a source of virtue ; and if it be right to obey it, the very supposition that it is right implies a notion of right and wrong that is antecedent to the law, and gives it its moral effi- cacy. A second theory of obligation is that it is based on self-interest. . - Second the- HT1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r ^ ' S6 ^~ Much might be said to show that this interest. was the system of Paley, whose work was formerly taught almost universally, both in England and in this country. Many things in his book are consis- tent with this theory only, while others would seem to imply that of general utility. Probably he did not discriminate sharply between them. This system supposes the same low and imperfect view of the facts of oar nature as is implied in the preceding one. It fails to show the distinction between interest and duty, or why all actipns that are for our interest, as a good bargain,^ are not vir- tuous. It ignores or denies the fact of 'disinterested affection, contradicting thus the general conscious- ness which attributes merit to actions in proportion as self is forgotten. As that which is the founda- tion of obligation should be supreme in our regard, this system would require us to regard self-interest 10 INTRODUCTION". supremely, and everything else as subordinate to that. It would thus be wrong to love God su- premely and our neighbor as ourselves ; and in- deed any high, or noble, or generous act would, according to this system, be either impossible or wrong. The plausibility of this system arises from the fact that self-interest has its place in one that is correct ; and also from the fact that men exalt self- interest so unduly, and do so generally make it practically the centre of their thoughts and actions. A third system founds obligation on utility. The Third sys- assertion is, not only that we are under tern; of . * . utmty. obligation to do those things that are use- ful, but that their usefulness is the ground of the obligation. To set aside this view it is only necessary to understand the meaning of terms. By a ground of obligation we mean the ultimate reason in view of o which it is affirmed. But by its very definition utility cannot be ultimate. " Some things," says Sir William Hamilton, " are valuable, finally, or for themselves these are ends ; other things are valuable, -not on their o\^n account, but a$ condu- cive towards certain ulterior ends these are means. The value of ends is absolute ; the value of means is relative. Absolute value is properly called a good ; relative value is properly called a utility." Whatever is useful, then, can have value only as it is related to the end which it may be INTRODUCTION. H used to promote. A plough is useful, but only as it is related to the value of a crop. Unless there be ends that have value in themselves, means can have no value, and so nothing can be useful. But no one will contend that we can be under obligation to choose that as an ultimate and supreme end which can have no value except as it is related to an end beyond itself. The plausibility of this system is from the fact that we are so often under obligation to choose that which is useful, and from a failure, in doing this, to distinguish the ground from a condition of obliga- tion. The absolute value of an end may be the ground of obligation to choose it, but we can be under obligation to choose means only on condition that they shall be useful in attaining the end. Of course a system which should place obligation to choose an end on the ground of an intrinsic value that should have no end beyond itself, and so no utility, could not properly be charged with being a system of utility. The word utility expresses a relation a relation between that which vis valuable in itself and the means of obtaining it. A fourth svstem, Fourth system ; that of Dr. Wayland, bases obligation on wayiand. the relations of one being to another. " It is," says he, "manifest to every one that we all stand in various and dissimilar relations to all the sentient beings, created and uncreated, with which we are acquainted. Among our relations to created beings 12 INTRODUCTION. are those of man to man, or that of substantial equal- ity of parent and child, of benefactor and recipient, of husband and wife, of brother and brother, citizen and citizen, citizen and magistrate, and a thousand others. Now it seems to me that as soon as a human being comprehends the relation in which two human beings stand to each other, there arises in his mind a consciousness of moral obligation, connected by our Creator with the very conception of the relation." Here it will be observed that no enumeration of the relations on which obligation depends is at- tempted. Some are specified, and there are said to be " a thousand others." Nor is any attempt made to show what is common to all these relatidns in virtue of which they are *the ground of obligation. Relations as such cannot be the ground of obliga- tion. Why must these relations be between sensi- tive beings? Why are not all relations between sensitive beings, as those of time and space, the ground of obligation ? The relative height of two men, as tall and short, constitutes a relation, but not a ground of obligation. In themselves relations have no value, and aside from the beings related they cannot exist. They cannot be made objects of choice or grounds of action. There is in them nothing ultimate. They are simply the occasion or condition of our apprehending a ground of obliga- tion that lies wholly beyond themselves. It is true that whatever we do we must do in some relation, INTRODUCTION. 13 and this gives the system its plausibility; but this incidental connection of relations with grounds of action that lie beyond them can never make them an adequate basis for a moral system. Analogous to this system of relations are two "others those of Dr. Samuel Clarke and Fifth and of Wollaston. Of these the first founds teowvDr. _.-,. . in f* i 11 Clarke and obligation on the fitness ot things ; and the woiiaston. second on conformity to truth, or to the true nature of things. A man owes a debt. It is according to the fitness of things that he should pay it, and that fitness is the ground of the obligation. It is true that there is a difference between a man and a tree, and on the ground of this difference there is an obligation to treaJb them differently. Not to do so would be acting a lie, and so, according to Wol- laston, 'all immorality is an acted lie. Of these systems it is to be said that both fitness and truth, as that is here used, express, not any- thing ultimate, but only a relation. Between the fact of the debt and its payment there is a fitness, but it is not on the ground of its fitness that the payment is to be made. The fitness has no value in itself, and could exist only as the debt has value* in some relation to an ulterior good. If there were no good of any kind to be gained by the payment of the debt no satisfaction of any sentiment there would be no fitness in paying it. So of truth. It is true that there is a difference between a man and a tree, and that they are to be treated 14 INTRODUCTION. differently, not however on the ground of the truth, which has value only for what it indicates beyond itself, but because a man is capable of a rational good and a tree is not. It is to be said, also, that both fitness and truth are terms quite too broad to be used accurately as the basis of a system, since there is a large class of ^fitnesses and of truths that have no relation to v -morals. To use a pen for writing is according to ": ^the fitness of things, and is a practical affirmation - y of the truth that the pen was made for that, but ' there may be in it nothing moral. Besides, there 7 is as much fitness in an immoral act to produce evil as there is in a moral act to produce good, and it is as much according to the true nature of things that it should produce evil. It cannot, therefore, be either the fitness or the truth on which the ob- ligation depends. The plausibility of these systems is from the fact that all obligatory acts are in accordance both with the fitness and with the true nature of things, though these are not the foundation of the obliga- tion to do them. Another system of the same class is that of . Seventh Jouffroy, which makes order the basis of iouffroy. obligation. This was mentioned by me in my former volume, and I have nothing to add to what was then said. Order may be affirmed of mere physical being, in which there can be nothing moral. It expresses a relation, and nothing ultimate. INTRODUCTION. 15 It can never be chosen for its own sake. Beings may place themselves in order for the sake of an end beyond, but not for the order itself. At least, such order cannot be obligatory. It would be ab- surd for an army to preserve the order of its march if that would insure its destruction. The order of an army is for its safety and efficiency, and can be obligatory on no other ground. The same princi- , pie applies in all cases of order. It can never be so valuable as to become obligatory, except as sub- servient to an end beyond itself. From several passages in Jouffroy it would appear that he identified the order of the universe with its end. Doing this, we can readily see how he might have adopted the system, but to do it is simply an abuse of terms. Order cannot be the end of the universe. That must be some good of the beings that compose the universe, which may or may not be attained by means of order. According to an eighth system, the will of God is the ground of obligation. We are, it Eighth sys- . _ tern ; will is said, under obligation to do whatever of God. He commands, simply because He commands it. Philosophically this is the same doctrine as tha,t of Hobbes, who referred everything to the will of! the lawgiver, or of the law-making power, regarded^ simply as will, and accompanied by power. The question is, whether the will of any being, taken by itself, and without reference to those quali- ties and motives that lie back of will, can be the 1 6 INTRODUCTION. ground of obligation. It is true that the will of God is an infallible rule, and that we are to do un- hesitatingly whatever He commands. It is true, also, that this can be said of no other will, whether of an individual or of any number of individuals however organized. It is this fact, that the will of God is to be always and implicitly obeyed, that gives the system now in question its plausibility. But are we to obey his will simply because it is his will ? or from faith, that is, because we have ade- quate ground for implicit confidence in Him that his will will always be determined by wisdom and good- ness ? It is precisely here that faith comes in. God commands that for which we can see no good reason except that He commands it. He may even command that which, aside from his will, shall seem opposed to all our apprehensions of what is right and best. This renders faith possible, and furnishes it with a distinct field for its conflicts and triumphs. But if his will, simply as will, be the ground of obligation, then faith is impossible, and that great bond and actuating principle of the social universe is annihilated. Certainly if there be nothing back of will as the ground of obligation, that is to be accepted, whatever it may be, and there is nothing for faith to rest upon. Again, there is nothing ultimate in will whether regarded as choice or as volition. In either case we distinguish between the act and the object. The act is for the sake of the object, and can never INTRODUCTION. 17 be an end or object of choice for itself. It can have no moral quality except from something back of itself, and no value except from something be- yond itself. Hence, it will follow again, if the will of God be the ground of obligation, that God has no moral character. Choice, volition, will, are but the expres- sion of character. If there be nothing back of these for them to express, there can be no character. On this supposition, too, all the acts of God would be equally right by a natural necessity, and the appeal of God to Abraham " Shall not the judge of all the earth do right ? " was absurd. Once more, on this supposition moral science is im- possible. Science supposes uniformity and grounds of certainty. These may be found in those grounds of action which ought to influence a free being, but never in the acts of such a being. The ground of our confidence that a free being will pursue a given course must be faith, and not science. This system has been strangely adopted under the impression that it honors God. It renders it impossible that He should be honored. The next system we shall consider is that of those who say that right is the foundation of N i nt hsy S - obligation. According to this, we are to do t( right for the sake of the right. This is, perhaps, the prevalent theory at the present time. On the face of it, nothing could seem simpler than this theory ; but the ambiguities of the word right 2 18 INTRODUCTION. , .* have produced confusion. If we take right as an adjective expressing the quality of an action, and opposed to wrong, it is obvious that it cannot be the ground of obligation, because it expresses nothing ultimate, but only a relation. Used thus, the only conceivable meaning of the word right is either con- formity to a standard or rule, or fitness to attain an end. So it is commonly used by moralists. " Right," says Paley, " means no more than conformity to the rule we go by, whatever that may be." " The adjective right," says Whewell, " means conform- able to a rule." He who solves a sum according to a rule does it right. In this sense simple Tightness t does not even involve a moral quality, and so cannot be the foundation of obligation. Whence then comes the moral quality ? Here is a right act that has no moral quality. Here is another morally right. Whence the difference ? This can be only from something in the rule, or standard, or end that lies beyond the act ; and if the moral quality come from one or the other of these, the obligation must also. But whatever may be the origin of the moral quality in an action morally right, it is plain that the quality of an action can never be the ground of an obligation to do that action. Look at this. A man does a wrong action ; he steals. He does not do this for the sake of the quality of the action I its wrongness ; but for the end that lies beyond the action. A man does a right action ; he gives money in charity. He does not do this for the sake of the INTRODUCTION. 19 Tightness of the action, but to relieve a case of dis- , tress. If he were to do it for the sake of the rio-ht- o ness of the act, the act would not be right. Think of a man's doing good to another, not from good will, but for the sake of the rightness of his own act. Think of his loving God for the same reason ! Cer- tainly, if we regard right as the quality of an action, no man can be under obligation to do an act morally right for which there is not a reason besides its being right, and on the ground of which it is right. That reason, then, whatever it may be, and not the rightness, must be the ground of the obligation. But are we not under obligation to do what is morally right? Certainly, always. So are we always under obligation to do what is according to v the fitness of things, and the truth of things, and the - will of God ; but these are not the ground of the obligation, and the quality of right in an action neither is, nor can be, the ground of the obligation to do it. Is there, then, in morals a right which is not the quality of an action ? Yes ; a man has rights. He has a right to life and liberty. Here the word right is used as a substantive, and means a just claim. This we understand, and the ground of it will be investigated hereafter, but it has no relation to our present subject. Is there still another sense of the word right? This is claimed, and in this too it is used as a sub- stantive, and with the article jrefixed "the 20 INTRODUCTION. right." Can we here, as before, gain definite notions ? I fear not. " The term right," says Dr. Haven, in his excellent and popular work, and he represents a large class of writers, " expresses a simple and ultimate idea ; it is therefore incapable of analysis and definition." " It expresses an eternal and immutable distinction, inherent in the nature of things." And not only right, but wrong is also such an idea, for he says, " Right and wrong are distinctions immutable and inherent in the nature of things. They are not the creations of expediency nor of law ; nor yet do they originate in the divine character. They have no origin. They are eter- nal as the throne of Deity ; they are immutable as God himself. Nay, were God himself to change, these distinctions would change not. Omnipotence has no power over them, whether to create or to destroy. Law does not make them, but they make law. They are the source and spring of all law and all obligation." l I am of those who believe that there are simple and ultimate ideas. That of existence, or being, is one. All men have, and must have an idea of something, of themselves, as -existing. Here we have the idea, and something actual which corre- sponds to it ; and I understand what is meant when it said that existence, being, not the idea, but the thing, had no origin, and that it may be the source of law. Is then the idea of right such an idea ? 1 Moral Philosophy, p. 47. INTRODUCTION. 21 - Is there anything corresponding to the idea, but different from it, that has existed from eternity ? Is it like space, of which we might plausibly say that it existed independently of God and of all creatures, so that if they were withdrawn the eternal right would still exist? Is this true also of wrong ? If so, we might well, as some do, put right above God, and wrong too. This seems to be claimed, but cannot be, for we are told that " right and wrong are distinctions" not things, but " dis- tinctions immutable and inherent in the nature of things." But what things ? We are told again, " When we speak of things and the nature of things, as applicable to this discussion, we do not of course refer to material objects, nor yet to spiritual intelli- gences, but to the actions and moral conduct of intel- ligent beings, created or uncreated, finite or in- finite." Here, then, \ve have moral action which is eternal and has no origin ; for if the distinction be eternal, inhering in the nature of things, the things themselves in which they inhere must also be eternal. But further, if these eternal distinctions inhere in these eternal actions, what is this but to make them qualities of the actions, which, as we have already shown, would preclude the possibility of their being the ground of obligation to do the actions. We have also distinctions in moral actions actions, observe, already moral, which are " the spring of all law and all obligation." But is this what the author really means ? Probably not, for he 22 INTRODUCTION. immediately adds, " We mean to say, that such and such acts of an intelligent voluntary agent, whoever he may be, are, in their very nature, right or wrong." This is quite different from the proposi- tions with which we have been dealing. It simply amounts to saying that certain acts, not eternal, but such as you and I may do, are right or wrong, and that no reason can be given for it, except that they . are so. Now I believe, and that, I suppose, is the real difference between us, the point on which this whole question turns, that when an action is right or wrong a reason can always be given why it is so, and that in that reason the ground of the obligation is to be found. We are never to do, or to intend to do right for the sake of the right, but we are to , Intend to do that, the doing of which is right, for the sake of that which makes it right. The analogy is often insisted on, it is by Dr. Haven, between mathematical and moral ideas. Mathematical ideas and truths, it is said, are neces- sary and eternal. But how ? Is it meant that either ideas or truths can exist except in some mind? Is it meant that mathematical ideas are any more eternal in the divine mind than any other ideas that are there ? Is anything more meant than ,that, by the very nature of intelligence it is necessitated, if it act at all as intelligence, to form certain ideas, and also to assent to certain proposi- tions as soon as it understands them ? If this be all, and it could be so understood, it would sweep INTRODUCTION. 23 away much vague, not to say unintelligible phrase- ology. Certainly it enters into our conception of an intelligent being that he must have certain ideas, and into our conception of a moral being that he must have a knowledge of moral distinctions ; and if we suppose an intelligent and moral being to have existed eternally, we must also suppose, according to our inadequate mode of thinking on subjects invol- ving the infinite, that certain intellectual and moral ideas have also been eternal, though in the order of nature the being must have been before the ideas. But this does not make these ideas in any sense in- dependent of God, or above him, or a fountain of law, or of anything else. It simply enables us to think of God as having always existed, and as hav- ing always had within himself the conditions of in- telligent, moral, and independent activity, so that he might himself, in his own intelligence and wis- dom, become the fountain of all law. When, as in the present case, the existence of a simple and ultimate idea is claimed, the appeal must be directly to consciousness. On this ground one may assert, and another deny ; and there is nothing more to be said. Neither argument nor testimony can avail anything. We can only so appeal to the general consciousness by applying tests as to show what that consciousness really is. This system will be referred to again. It is plausible, because every action that is obligatory is also right, as it is also fit, and according. to the divine will. 24 INTRODUCTION. The only other system of which I shall speak is that of Dr. Hickok. According to him a reason can be given why a thing is right. " The highest good," he says and in this I agree with him " must be the ground in which the ultimate rule shall reveal itself." This is a great point gained. It concedes that right is dependent upon good of some kind, that is, that a reason can always be given why a thing is right ; and it only remains to inquire what that good is. But here, if I understand him rightly, I am still compelled to differ from my able and highly esteemed cotemporary. That good we are told is " the highest good," " the summum bonum." What then is that ? Says Dr. Hickok, " The highest good, the summum bonum, is worthiness of spiritual approbation." By this, it would seem, must be meant worthiness of approbation on the ground of the acts, or states, of our own spirits. The doctrine then will be, that the ultimate ground or reason why a man should do a charitable act is not at all the good of the person relieved for the sake of that good, but that he may preserve or place his spirit in such a state as shall be w r orthy of his own approba- tion. This is stated most explicitly. "Solely," says Dr. Hickok, " that I may stand in my own sight as worthy of my own spiritual approbation, is the one motive which can influence to pure moral- ity, and in the complete control of which is the essence of all virtue." 1 l Moral Science, p. 60. INTRODUCTION. 25 To those aware of the endless disputes of the ancients respecting u the summum bonum" further progress may seem hopeless if we must first decide what that is ; but it will be sufficient for our present purpose if we decide the province within which it is. By " the summum bonum " is generally meant the greatest good of the individual. That, it would seem, must be meant here, because worthiness of approbation can belong only to the individual, and can be directly sought by the individual only for himself. But if this be meant, then the " summum bonum," and the end for which man was made, are not the same. Man was not made to find the ulti- mate ground of his action in any subjective state of his own, of whatever kind. He was made to pro- mote the good of others as well as his own, and the apprehension of that good furnishes an immediate ground of obligation to promote it. The good of the individual is too narrow a basis to be the ground of obligation ; and besides, it is not in accordance with our consciousness to say, when we are laboring for the good of others, that the ultimate and real thing we are seeking is our own worthiness of approbation. But again, the man is worthy of approbation only as he is virtuous. It is virtue in him that we approve. But virtue is a voluntary state of mind, and that can never be chosen as an ultimate end. By necessity all choice and volition respect an end beyond themselves. But the ground of obligation, 26 INTRODUCTION, as we now seek it, is that ultimate end in view of which the will should act. As ultimate, the reason of the choice must be in the thing chosen, and not in the choosing. It is therefore impossible that any form, or quality, or characteristic of choice, any virtue, or goodness, or holiness should be the ground of obligation to choose. The same thing is to be said of law in every form, and for the same reason. Law can never be ultimate. In this case, as in most of the others, a rule may be drawn from that which is assumed as the ground of obligation, because no man can be under obliga- tion to do anything that is not in accordance with his highest worthiness. This may be a criterion or test, just as the will of God or fitness is, of what he ought to do, but never a ground of the obligation to do it- Is it asked, then, what is your own system ? It is implied in the opening remarks of the chapter, is very simple, and can be stated in few words. . In seeking the foundation of obligation, I suppose moral beings to exist. As having^ intelligence and sensibility I suppose them. capable of apprehending, ends good in themselves, and an e$d thus goo^ that is both ultimate and supreme. In the apprehension of such an end I suppose the, moral reason must affirm obligation to choose it^ and that all acts that will, of their own nature, lead to the attainment of this end, are right. This puts man, as having reason, into relation to INTRODUCTION. 27 his end in the same way that the brutes, as having instinct, are put into relation to their end, and gives us a philosophy in accord with other philosophies of practical life. What is the philosophy of the eye ? It consists in a knowledge of its structure and use, or end ; and from these, and these only, can rational rules be drawn for the right use of the eye when well, or for its treatment when diseased. Knowing these, we know how we ought to use the eye. We know the ground of our obligation in reference to it. It is so to use it that the end of the eye may be most perfectly attained. So we ought to use the eye, and the ground of our obligation is the fact that the eye has relation to an end that has value in itself. If it had not, we could be under no such obligation. The same is true of every part of the body, and of every faculty of the mind. And if true of these, why not of the man himself? Has he an end valuable for its own sake ? If not, what is he good for ? But if he have such an end, why not, as in case of the eye, find in this end the ,reason of all i^se of himself, that is, of all rules of conduct, and also the ground of obligation ? Can there be anything higher, or better, or any more ultimate ground of obligation, than that a man should propose to himself the attainment of the very end for which God made him ? What more can Qod ask of him or man ? What more can he wish for himself? It will be observed that I here use the word end 28 INTRODUCTION. in its most general sense, without specifying at all what it may be. If it be to make money, so be it; if to eat and drink, so be it. But whatever it may be, if a rational system of philosophy be possible, the ground of obligation must be in the end, and the rules of conduct will be from that. So the Apostle viewed it. " If," says he, " the dead rise not," if this life be all, " let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." This is good philosophy, and also common sense. It is just drawing the rule of conduct and of duty from the end. MORAL SCIENCE. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS. " MORAL PHILOSOPHY is that science which teaches men their duty, and the reasons of it." This is Paley's definition ; and no better has since been given. Moral Philosophy may also be defined as the science which teaches men their supreme end, and how to attain it. It is thus both theoretical and practical. As theoretical, it explains the ground of obligation. As practical, it teaches what we ought to do. As distinguished from Natural Science, which teaches what is, Moral Science teaches what ought to be. All questions under Theoretical Morals may be resolved by an exposition of THE LAW OF LOVE. And all questions under Practical Morals may be resolved by an exposition of LOVE AS A LAW. 30 MORAL SCIENCE. Hence, the following treatise will be simply an exposition of these two expressions. In analyzing the Law of Love, the order of in- vestigation pursued in the " Lectures on Moral Science " will be reversed. In those, we started with an examination of the constitution of man in the light of ends, and found the Law of Love, thus identifying the law of the constitution with the revealed law of God. In this law, as requiring file highest activity of the highest powers upon their appropriate object, we identified the formula for virtue with that for happiness. We found a law in the keeping of which there is, and must be, the great reward. This Law of Love thus found we now assume, and seek its characteristics and conditions, or prerequisites. PART I. THE LAW OF LOVE. THEORETICAL MORALS. DIVISION I. OF LAW. CHAPTER L OF LAW IN GENERAL. WHAT then is law ; and what are the ideas con- ditional for it, or prerequisite to it ? To the idea of law in its broadest sense, that of force, of uniformity, and of an end, are prerequi- sites. The subject of law, that which is controlled according to it, is force, either as tending to, or as producing, action. Being is implied, but that can be the subject of law only as it is endowed with force, or is under its control. The object of law is the control of force, by direction and regulation, with reference to an end. Stated in form, the laws of nature are expressions of the mode in which force is controlled with reference to an end. Moral laws, and those of society, are expressions of the mode in which force should be controlled. With- out force there would be nothing to control ; and in force acting at random there is no law. Laws are then of two kinds of things, and of persons. They are those in accord- Twokinds ance with which things are controlled, oflaw> 34 MORAL SCIENCE. and those addressed to persons. Under the first, the sequences are uniform, and, so far as the human will is concerned, necessary. Under the second, there is an alternative presented to beings endowed with reason and free-will. They may obey or they may disobey. Differences Between these two kinds of laws the between . them. differences are radical. Under the first, the subject does not understand the law, knows nothing of the end proposed, is not capable of choosing it, is under no obligation to choose it, and has not control of the force requisite for its attainment. It is passive, and its movements are necessitated. It is only in an improper sense, or figuratively, that rules in accordance with which beings thus unconscious are controlled, can be called laws. The most striking ground of analogy between Reason these two classes of laws, and the basis of their common name, is in their re- sults. This is order. Uniformity, and thus order, must be the result of the first class of laws ; it is the result of the second when obeyed. Of the first class of laws, the laws of things, Laws of there are several kinds, as physical, vital, TheJTthe mental ; all having, however, the char- perience. acteristics above mentioned. In all there is a force uniformly directed to an end. Up to a certain point the mind itself is as much subject to this class of laws as is matter. These laws, or rather the uniformities which are their exponent, for their common name. OF LAW IN GENERAL. 85 are at the basis of experience, are the condition of education, and of that intelligent activity by which means are adapted to ends. For this class of laws, the laws of things, the conditional ideas will be, (1) Being. (2) Ideag con Force. (3) Uniformity. (4) An End. *> f Physical law will then be the product things - of being putting forth force uniformly. So far all will agree. I would add, for an end. The second class of laws, or laws of persons, are obeyed consciously. The subjects of them Lawg of understand the law, are capable of choos- P ersons - ing the end it proposes, are under obligation to choose it, and have at their own control the force requisite for its attainment. Under this class law is not merely a rule regula- ting force and producing uniformity, or as Law here some less accurately say, the uniformity f^p^ive 11 * itself; but, as designating the end, it is cause b oi>iig- directive. It is also imperative. That, - atory> however, which makes it to be law, is the fact that it is obligatory. An end may be designated, we ( may be commanded to attain or accomplish it, but if there be no obligation there is no law. For this form of law the prerequisite ideas will - be, (V) Being, conscious and rational. Prerequisites to laws of (2) Force, under the control of such a persons, being. This will include free-will. (3) An end which can possibly be known as such only as there is in it a good ; and (4) Obligation. We may then have not only law, but moral law. CHAPTER II. OBLIGATION : MORAL IDEAS : CONDITIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS. OBLIGATION being then the essential element obligation; m mora l l aw > m a ll ^ aw binding upon its origin. mora l beings, we next inquire afte*r the origin and nature of that. Of obligation we can make no division as of The conce different kinds. Some have indeed spoken i^rtio f n b " f obligation as perfect and imperfect, simple. meaning by perfect obligation that which can be exactly defined and enforced. But while obligation may respect different persons, may arise in different relations, and may or may not be capa- ble of being enforced by an authority from without, yet the conception of it is an ultimate conception, and the same in all. It supposes a being capable of forming the idea and having the feeling of it, and, if he have a moral nature, so constituted that he mus^ under certain conditions, form this idea and have this feeling. Without this there could not be a moral nature. What we mean by a natural endowment, or a nature, OBLIGATION. 37 is a constitution such that under given conditions certain results will uniformly follow. Thus NO moral if pain uniformly follow the near approach without the idea of to a fire, the being thus anected is obligation. said to have a sensitive nature. If men uniformly tend to associate with each other, they are said to have a social nature. In the same way, if a being be so constituted that the idea and feeling of obliga- tion will uniformly arise under given circumstances, we say that he has a moral nature. We say that he is endowed not only with Reason, but with Moral Reason. This, and this only, can constitute man a moral being. What then is moral reason ? This we shall best learn from what reasor^is, for that has . Moral been much more fully investigated. Rea- ^ e a a t s ^e'be S st son is that power of the mind by which frJJJJ e pure it is furnished with those ideas and affir- reason - mations which are presupposed in all rational think- ing. These ideas are those of being, identity, causation, of space, of time, and othe^like them, the origin of which has been fully discussed. These are universal and necessary. The affirmations, as that all changes are in time, that all bodies are in space, and that every event must have a cause, are simply evolutions of these ideas when the occasion for them arises, and so are equally necessary and universal. These ideas and truths are implied in all our conceptions of beings and objects,' and are so immediately and necessarily given that we can- 88 MORAL SCIENCE. not conceive of man as rational without them. As so intimate to ourselves, they were slow in being brought into distinct recognition and statement, but as they are fundamental, such recognition and state- ment are essential to the progress of either mental or moral science. Such being the function of reason, that of moral r^aloL how reason should be, and is, analogous. It is analogous. t j jat power Q f tne mm d by which it is ^ furnished with those ideas and regulative principles which are presupposed in all moral action. These ideas are those of personality ; of an end Primary including a good and a supreme good ; of moral** free-will, and of obligation. These are pre- supposed in every moral act, as are those of being, time, causation, etc., in every act of com- prehension ; and they have, whenever a moral/ act is performed, the characteristics given by Kant as distinctive of the others, that is, no unity in the race, no basis for character, or con- sistency of action. But that there should be such an end is not suf- ficient. For any ' rational action it is essen- Man must tial that man should know what the end end. is. This he may do formally, so as, to be able to state it, or implicitly, as Jbe knows his own exist- ence, which he may never think of stating, but of which the knowledge is involved in all his actions. That he is thus capable of knowing his end is the chief distinction of man. The great dif- a Such knowl- ference between him and the brutes is ^fef^s- not that he can abstract and generalize, tinction - , not that he can make his own faculties the object of his study, becoming in recent phraseology both subject and object, but it is that his Maker takes him into his own counsel by revealing to him his end, and permits him either to choose or reject it ; either to cooperate with or work against Him. Without such knowledge of his end man would 4 50 MOKAL SCIENCE. be in simple bewilderment. This is the turning point between a nature capable of sympathy, coop- eration, friendship, wisdom, and one that is not. So our Savior puts it. " Henceforth," says he, " I . call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth, but I have called you friends, for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you." A being that can enter into cooperation with God by choice is in a r'elation entirely new, and must have endowments infinitely higher than those of any being incapable of this. In the sense now specified, all creatures below man, ani- mate and inanimate, are literally and solely servants of God, not knowing what he doeth. Man may not only be a servant, but a friend. It was with a - full apprehension of the grandeur of this relation that Abraham was called in the Scriptures, " the Friend of God." That nmn is not thus his friend is the cause of all the puzzles in moral science. It' is, too, through this power of choosing a su- preme end that man has character as dis- Character tinguished from characteristics. Mere from the choice of su- things and the brutes have characteristics ; preme end> man has character, and this is determined by the end chosen. If the supreme end chosen be money, the man is avaricious ; if power, he. is ambitious ; if the love and service of God, he is religious, and nothing short of such' a supreme choice can make -him either avaricious, or ambitious, or religious. ' This is the point of supreme wisdom and folly, the cardinal point of destiny for every man. CHAPTER V. OBLIGATION : A GOOD AS A CONDITION. WE see from the above the necessity of an end, and of a supreme end. But the word A good M a includes not merely an idea in the intellect CODdition - of something that can be comprehended and at- tainecj by the use of means, there is also in it an element by which it is addressed to our emotive nature; To be chosen by us there must be in it, or seem to be, a good. Tracing it back we shall find that there must be something valuable for its own sake something good in itself, and recognized as such within a sensibility. What then is a good ? Strictly there is no good that is not subjective, and so, known as subjective . . . and objec- such within some conscidusness ; but it tive good will accord more with the cast of our Ian- guished. guage, and tend to a clearer apprehension of the subject, if we say that all good is either objective or subjective. An objective good is anything so correlated to a conscious being as to produce sub- jective good. Subjective good is some form of en- ^ joyment or satisfaction in the consciousness. 52 MORAL SCIENCE. This subjective good, not our own, but that of Their reia- a ^ conscious beings, is so a good and conscS sh tfie g od tliat if tnere were no conscious- ness there would be no objective good. If there were not a conscious being in the uni- verse, nor could ever be, it would be good for noth- ing. As further showing the relation of objective good The supreme ^ US > ^ ma J ^6 Sa ^ tna ^ ^ na t O11 good of each ^ ne su P reme regard of any one is fixed, as the source of his subjective good, is his God. The objects and beings so correlated to us as to TWO classes produce subiective good are of two classes. of objective JL_ , good. They are those that cannot produce this good voluntarily, and cannot themselves enjoy it ; and those who can produce it voluntarily, and who can themselves enjoy it. Those things that can produce subjective good First class- on 'y involuntarily are mere things, and means'of have value in proportion to their power to produce such good., A picture is val- uable in proportion to the satisfaction, whether from its intrinsic qualities, or from association, which it is capable of giving. This is true of all mere things. There is here no apprehension of moral qualities,, no sense of obligation, no love. All such things are merely things, and the means of good. The good that can come from them is inferior in and limited in degree. S * OF THE '\*> OBLIGATION. (( U NI V Ml SIT Vv OA * :1F n K The second class of beings who may come into such correlation to us as to produce sub^*""^. ; , Second class ; jective good is of those who are capable of ^uTes^of producing it voluntarily, and who are good - themselves capable of enjoying it. These are per- sons, and that disposition in them which leads them to produce subjective good is called goodness. In doing this they are not simply a condition, or a means, but are a cause of good. There are conditions and means of subjective good, and also causes, and these are to be Distinction carefully distinguished. The inanimate - JJ^Jg^ creation, with its laws, is the condition, andcauses - not the cause of vegetable life. Vegetables exist only through a force which subordinates to itself all the laws of mere matter, and so could not have been developed from matter and its laws, but must have been superinduced by a cause above them. As thus a condition for vegetables and serving them, mere matter with its laws is lower than they. In the same way vegetables are lower~ than animals, and animals than man. Always, as is stated in the third Lecture on Moral S.cience, that which is the condition of another thing, and so serves it, is lower than it. In this upward progress of forces as con- v ditioning and conditioned, that which comes last' is , always the highest. But in thus passing up we ulti- mately reach personality, and in that a true cause. This brings us to the culmination, and we must again go downward. A cause we always conceive 54 MORAL SCIENCE. -of as higher than its effects. God, as a cause, is higher than the universe, and so man, as far as he is a true cause, is higher than any effects or results of his activity. When once we have reached a per- sonal cause there is no longer any place for condi- tions, but only for effects, and these must always be lower than the cause. If then it be said that holy activity or virtue, or, The erson w ^ich is the same thing, the person acting a means of * accor d m g to h* 8 highest law, is a means of happiness, happiness, we say that this does not ex- press their true relation. The holiness is noi a means of happiness, but the cause. It is the per- son choosing in accordance with the end for which God made him ; and as thus choosing, worthy of respect, of admiration, of approbation, of compla- cent love, of veneration. This is no " dirt-philos- ophy," or " bread-and-butter philosophy," or " util- itarian philosophy." It affirms obligation immedi- ately and necessarily, and if it be in view of a * good, as in view of what else can it be ? it is in view of good as such ; of the good of others far more than of our own ; and so far as it is our own, a good like that of God himself, as being from the activity of a nature made in his image and con- formed to his will. Who shall say that this is low, or mercenary, or unworthy? It is the choice of good for the sake of good ; the good of God, and of his universe, and this, if anything can be, is essential goodness. That is, indeed, an utterly OBLIGATION. 55 heartless and debasing system, which, instead of the grandeur and play of personalities involving free-will, and high sentiment, and disinterested love, would reduce the universe to a machine, the parts of which are merely utilities, and to be esti- mated too by each one with reference to their effect upon himself. But besides being direct causes of good to us there is another relation in which persons conscious being to be . stand to our subjective good. They are lovedas J possessing not only capable of causing subjective worfc ^- good in us, but also of enjoying it, and of suffering its opposite, and as such are to be loved with a virtuous love for their intrinsic worth or value as beings. A being with great capacity for sub- jective good has great worth in distinction from wor- thiness, and is to be loved on this ground. The love of being in the abstract, and aside from such capacity, is impossible. Such a being, and especially one capable of virtue, or holiness and the good from that, cannot merely become the cause to another of subjective good and so excite gratitude and com- placency, but may become to that other an object of effort, and so call out the activity of his powers in their highest form that there will result to him his own subjective good. If we except mere sensitive good, it is indeed only the attributes of personality, imme- Attributes diately seen or reflected, that can be the ^i^Sy direct cause of subjective good to us as ^bjectfve they are drawn out in our behalf, or its good - 56 MORAL SCIENCE. indirect cause as we are active in behalf of others. It would appear then, that there are two ways in subjective which subjective good may come to us. good comes - * through re- - Qiie is through the action of other things ceiving and giving. an( j persons upon us ; the other through the activity of our own powers put forth with reference to them that is, virtually through re- ceiving and giving. This distinction is radical. It is made in view of the broadest and most fun- damental division of our nature, except perhaps that of soul and body, and one which will be made the basis of a classification of duties in the subse- quent practical part. According to this all subjective good is from Through activity either in receiving or in giving, me7a p nd bil ~ tnat is > through the susceptibilities or the powers. powers. Others may exercise goodness towards us and thus be the cause to us of subjec- 11 tive good through our capacity of receiving. We - may also exercise goodness towards them, that is, choose and seek to promote their good, and from this activity of the powers in thus giving there will be to us a higher and purer form of subjective good than any other. We contemplate others as capable of subjective ^ Relation good. As such we see that they have good e of ntbe worth, and love them impartially. We ou 1 r e own nd see tnat their good is unspeakably desira- fue d defined". ble and valuable for its own sake, as OBLIGATION. 5~7 much so as our own ; we choose that good for them, we put forth efforts that they may attain it, and in so doing we find the highest form of bur~ own subjective good. This impartial love, this choice of \gooi for, others and effort to enable them to attain itj i^ virtue; Virtue is not the choice or love of virtue, or of right: it is the love of God s ' O * and' of our neighbor as ourselves the willing of good the good will. That is virtue, that is right, and it is in the putting forth of this good will that our highest worthiness is found. What is, then, the end and good of man ? Objec- tively, God is his end and good. Every G oa, man's man may properly say that God is his SSvnRnd good. He made man so that only himself good can be to him an adequate source of subjective ^good. Hence his dependence and filial relation forever as made in the image of God. God is such a good that not only all can choose Him and find Him as adequate to each as if no other had thus chosen Him, but that each new choice of Him, both as augmenting his glory and increasing the good of others, augments the joy of those who have already thus chosen. And not only must we receive all things from Him, but it is only as we give back to him our active ] OV e as we love Him for his own sake as infinite in being and in excellence that the highest joys of holiness can come. Those joys are indeed from the very activity that constitutes the holiness. 58 MORAL SCIENCE. Whether we regard ourselves then as passive or active, God is our good. " All our springs are in Him." He is our sun. He is to us all that recent research shows the sun to be to the forces of nature, and more than this. The subjective end and good of man, on the subjective otner hand, will be, subordinately, that Inordinate ; which we receive through the action upon supreme. ug o f o fa er things and beings, while our supreme good is the joy from holy activity in the love and service of God. The very highest good is in the putting forth of energy in God and towards God. The happiness from this is no happening. It is the infallible outgrowth of our innermost being when we act according to our law. This, with all joys of complacency in others or in ourselves inci- dent to it, is holy happiness, or blessedness. It is the happiness that comes from holy activity. We have thus a subjective good both from our passivities and our activities, from receiv- ing and from giving. Both of these, and in their order as higher and lower, are expressed by the Scriptures when they say, " In thy presence is fullness of joy ; at thy right hand are pleasures forevermore." The joy is as an aroma from the love, the adoration, and every highest form of vol- untary activity called forth by the immediate be- holding of God. The pleasures forevermore are from the action of the susceptibilities in their adjust- ment to the surroundings of heaven, which are fore- shadowed by so many wonderful adjustments here. CHAPTER VI. OBLIGATION : TWO FORMS OF SPONTANEOUS ACTION. BUT to understand fully the relation of our sub- jective good to our freedom and causative Two forms power, we need to see the relation of free- nL^ac-" dom to the two forms of spontaneous ac- tlon ' tion. There is first a form of spontaneous action that precedes choice, and is conditional for it. First form The original forms of the activity of our choice, being in its fundamental faculties, and by which men become revealed to themselves, are purely spontaneous, and are the condition of all voluntary activity. We must be, and through a spontaneous activity know ourselves to be, before we can put forth any voluntary activity. Consciousness itself, in which is all subjective good, is from or in an ac- tivity that is wholly involuntary, that commenced and can terminate by no agency of ours. There is also a spontaneous activity that suc- ceeds voluntary activity and is consequent Second form J J . succeeds upon it. Gaining through consciousness a choice. knowledge of ourselves, and then the control of our faculties, we find that each form of voluntary ^ac- 60 MORAL SCIENCE. tivity is followed and with a certainty like that of the laws of nature by results in the consciousness that are from a spontaneous and involuntary ac- tivity. The above is true both of the body and of the ultimate mind. We put forth voluntary effort in fn- s th a e ffect " g a i nm g food, in preparing it, in bringing p^ximTte to * fc to tne niouth, and in masticating and the win. swallowing it, but all this is only that It may be delivered over to the charge of the in- voluntary activities in tasting, in digestion, and as- similation. No growth, or pleasure, or pain of the body, nothing that is an ultimate end for that, can be directly willed into being. We eat, and pleas- ure and nutrition are the result. We approach too near the fire, and pain is the result. These are from activities, but not from those willed by us. We know them, indeed, not immediately as ac- tivities, but only in growth, and pleasure and pain which are their result. And so it is in the mind. We will to lie ; but ultimate we ^ llot wn ^ ^ ne sname an d * ne remorse nofdl^tif tnat follow. We love; but we do not will the joy that is in it, and that cannot be separated from it. In no case can we will di- rectly either joy or sorrow, happiness or suffering, or, indeed, any ultimate end. We can only will tfc>se acts that are uniformly connected with such ' an end by our constitution, or, which is the same thing, by the appointment of God. OBLIGATION. 61 It is through these results in the consciousness of his creatures that depend on activities not subject to their will, that God governs them. All growth, perfection, and enioyment, on the one ,, J * God governs hand, and all degradation and suffering on ^cTresuits the other, are the result of spontaneous ofwilL action consequent on voluntary action. In these are physical pleasure and pain ; in these joy and sorrow ; in these remorse, misery, the anguish of despair ; in these is the blessedness of the righteous, the peace that is like a river, the pleasures that are at God's right hand forevermore. But while the agent is thus compelled to work between these tw^o forms of spontaneous Manrespon- . . . , -M-II Bible * r ^ e activity, which may be called the original second form , / . J . of activity and the secondary, their relation to him only as free and responsible is wholly different. For the first he is in no sense responsible. He is no more responsible for his original faculties and desires, or for any action of them before the possible control of will, than he is for his being itself. For the second he is responsible, because though spontane- ous after the voluntary act, yet the nature of this spontaneous activity will depend on that act. The results are indirectly subject to the will. We have thus seen what subjective good is, and how it is related to our powers of agency. Theideaf0 f Being the product of all activity that is ^! e according to its law, the idea of it must mentar y- run back to the very beginnings of consciousness, 62 MORAL SCIENCE. and enter into our conception of ourselves. Of the three great forms of our activity, knowing, feeling, and willing, that of feeling can, like the others, be known only by its action : and if good be indeed the product of its first activity, then the idea of it must be as elementary as that of thought, or of feeling itself. So far as good and its opposite are the product Good and f our being without our own agency, gtftanS-' 8 they are the immediate gift or infliction of God. So far as they are the result of our agency and^TiSL they were probably intended as reward ment. or p un i s hment, as we do or do not con- form to the laws of our being. CHAPTER VII. OBLIGATION : PERSONALITY A CONDITION. WE have now examined all the ideas conditional for obligation except that of personality. Personalit This holds the same place among ideas of a conditiori - the Moral Reason that the idea of being does among those 'of pure reason; for as all attributes and changes and causations imply being, so do all moral actions imply a person. The idea of personality is simple, but it must imply at least Moral Reason and Free-will, idea of P er- T . . , 1.1.1 sonality sim- It must consist in that which, in the P^- upward progress of the creation, is added to the animal nature that it may not only have a home in that nature and govern it, but also govern itself according to its own recognized law. It must con- sist in that which gives its dignity and excellence to our nature, and so its right to govern. This right is from the power of self-government with reference to ends, and so of voluntary cooperation with God, or the reverse. It is in this that the peculiarity and dignity of man and his right to dominion are found. Probably the first apprehension of the person by himself, his first knowledge of himself as a person, is the consciousness of this dominion, first 64 MORAL SCIENCE. over himself, and then over all that is below him. u And God said let us make man in our imao-e, O ' after our likeness, and let them have dominion" The right and power of control over that which is below him man could not have if he had not dominion over himself. Such prerogatives and powers, if known at all, Seat of re- mu st be known immediately, and in sponsibihty. k nowm g ourselves as possessing them ; and so, as persons, we reach the centre and seat of responsibility. This is not the reason, the will, the conscience ; it is the person, the self, the Ego, the man, that chooses and is under obligation. Is man then a person ? a being whose nature and prerogative it is to know and choose his own end, whatever that may be ? If not, he is not ra- tional. No definition of man as rational can be given as far as his actions tend to ends which he neither knows nor chooses. But if man be a person, then we are prepared to find the point at which obliga- tion arises. As simple law always has respect to force acting obligation uniformly, so does obligation, or moral respects ' ^ choice. law, always have respect to force under the control of a person. The science of morals has for its condition and subject a person acting. With- out this as given it is inconceivable. But as it is ; distinctive of the action of a person that it is deter- mined by choice, obligation will respect that. It ^ will be obligation, first to choose some end and good, OBLIGATION. 65 and then to act rationally for the attainment of that. It will therefore respect the voluntary, and not at all the spontaneous action of our nature, except as its spontaneous is determined by its voluntary action. At this point able men, as Drs. Chalmers and Archibald Alexander, have differed ; Dr. Two theo Chalmers contending that every moral act Stature is voluntary, and Dr. Alexander, that this f eo s ^ a -" can be only if the word voluntary be tion - made to include acts that are spontaneous. " The word necessary," he says, " should never have been applied to any exercises which are spontaneous or voluntary, bocause all such are free in their very nature." It would doubtless have been conceded by both that a sense of responsibility, and so of obligation, is impossible with reference to an event like the ebb and flow of the tides, that has no connection proxi- mate or remote with the will. Certainly no one insists more strongly than Dr. Alexander upon freedom as a ground of responsibility. He even says that he would admit the self-determining power of the will, whether he understood it or not, if that were necessary to establish the doctrine. 1 But we have seen above that one form of spontaneous action has no reference to x the will. It will not do therefore to say that spontaneous action as such, is free. What then makes the difference ? The truth i Moral Science, p. 111. . 66 * MORAL SCIENCE. seems to be that spontaneous action is never, like choice, free in its own nature, and that it can become so only indirectly and from its relation to choice. But it is said that the motives, the desires, and affections that lie back of our choice, are spontane- ous, and that we are responsible for these. Here it is to be observed, that as there is, as we Moral spon- have seen, an original spontaneity, having JegaiSre- no relation to choice, and for the results sponsibiuty. of whicli WQ are not respons ftl e , and a spontaneity of the sensitive nature for which we are responsible only from its relation to will, so there is a spontaneity of the emotive and moral nature, for which we are responsible only in the same way. Thus, when a man has become fully a miser, his desires and affections, his hopes and fears all centre in his treasure, and become motives to him in a mul- titude of subordinate choices. They are all sponta- neous, he is responsible for them, and they are all sinful ; but this is only because they are the indi- rect result, not, as Dr. Alexander seems to sup- pose, of volition, but of choice. If the man had not originally chosen money as his supreme end, there would have been no such spontaneous product and no such guilt. The difficulty has been in a failure to perceive the relation of our generic and radical * Difficulty r*iation e of by cn i ces to subsequent spontaneous action, 'pontlneo t^e character of which is yet determined action. k fa Q cno i cef This is so intimate that OBLIGATION. (37 even where the choice is not of the most radical kind, it will yet so control the character of a large class of desires, of affections, hopes, fears, and sub- ordinate choices, as to cause them to be the reverse of what they would have been. Two men, who, with a full apprehension of the principles involved, chose different sides in the late civil war, must have had opposite desires and affections, and the same events that caused hope and joy to the one, caused fear and sorrow to the other. But all this is to be traced back to the original choice. That determined the army in which they marched, the leaders under whom they served, the friendships they formed, and very largely the direction and spontaneous move- ment of their whole sympathetic and emotive nature. And this, with the exception that the choice is more radical and all-pervading, is what Man , grela . takes place under the moral government ^rmined of God. By a thorough choice of Him b y choice - and his cause, the whole current of the soul, all its motives and subordinate choices, its dispositions and tempers, its desires and affections, its hopes and fears, its joys and sorrows, and its ultimate des- tiny, will be the reverse of what they would have been if an opposite choice had been made. All these are spontaneous, or at least independent of volition. We are responsible for them, but only through their relation to that generic and perma- nent choice which determines character, and in which character consists. 68 MORAL SCIENCE. The difference between the natural and the moral Moral affec- affections is, that the moral affections are tions as dis- . . . . tinguished conditioned upon the previous choice of from IT. 1-1 natural. a supreme end, and derive their charac- ter from the character of that. We thus see the relation of spontaneous to vol- untary action. In no case is spontaneous Conclusion. . . , . - action either free or responsible except from its relation to previous voluntary action. So far Moral Philosophy goes. It makes freedom a condition of responsibility, and says there can be no freedom where there is no choice. CHAPTER VIII. OBLIGATION NECESSARILY AFFIRMED. THE ideas prerequisite to obligation have now been considered, and we pass to that, its necessary AII , affirmation ; And here we are prepared to say that involves the moment a man comes to the knowl- the ultimate edge of his end, including the true good morals. of his nature as constituted by t God, the Moral Rea- son necessarily affirms obligation to choose that end. Such an affirmation for the guidance of man analogy would lead us to expect. It is guchaffir _ just that for him as rational, that instinct 5^" jj?' is for the brute, except that man, as free, 8tiuct> has an alternative. The law of instinct is always from the end of the animal, and its impulses are towards that ; and we should expect that the law of the rational being would, in the same way, be from his end, and that, in connection with the pre- rogative of freedom, and for man as rational, there would be both an idea of the end, and an impulse towards it. And it is just this that we find. This supreme end need not be, and is not, known in its obligation abstract and general form, but obligation lS!cu f ~ 70 MORAL -SCIENCE. is affirmed the moment there is furnished an occa- sion for choice in any specific case involving the end. If the end be to love God, or man, then, as soon as we are brought into such relations to them that love is possible, the obligation will be affirmed. It is precisely thus that we judge and work in each particular case under mathematical axioms before being able to state them. The affirmation of obligation thus made involves This afflr- both an idea and a feeling ; and these are mation in- . p v p toivesan so in a state or fusion that we say mdit- feeiing. ferently, the idea, or the feeling of obliga- tion. The Moral Reason being conditioned,* as we have seen, upon a sensibility, this is true of all its ^products. Like carburetted hydrogen, they are charged with both light and heat. The product of reason simply, is an idea ; the product of the Moral Reason is an idea and a feeling thus blended, and * this is higher. The brutes have feeling, but not reason. Man has feeling and reason separately, and often as opposed to each other, but in his proper personality there is a perfect blending of that part of his nature which feels with that which knows, so that the moving and guiding powers be- come one. " The wheels are full of eyes round about." Now let the elective power, not the conative, as Hamilton has it, act in accordance with Results. , , n , , . , . , the law ot the being thus given, and the moral heavens are set in order for their glad way. OBLIGATION. 71 We have now a personal force, a person under obli- gation to control himself with reference to an end and according to law. Thus do we find law Moral Law. Moral Law is the affirmation by the Moral Reason of Moral Law . deduced, obligation on the part of every man to defined. choose that as his supreme- end which God designed him for, and to do whatever would legitimately flow from that choice. If the question respect any infe- rior end we may be governed by inclination, choos- ing it or not, as we please. What the end of man is we are to learn as we learn what the end of the eye, or the ear, Highestend or the hand is. We are to examine his f h t a ; d structure, his susceptibilities, his powers how i earn * d - physical, mental, moral', and however complex they, may be, if there be convergence and unity it can be seen. *That there is such convergence and unity was shown in my former lectures. In them the~- separate systems of which man is composed were examined. Each system has, of course, its own end. The end of the body is to be the home and servant of the mind, and it is most perfect when it most perfectly fulfills that end. The end of the in- tellect is to apprehend all that knowledge of God and his works that will enable man to secure not only his highest, but his whole end. In the same way each of the other systems, as the desires, and the affections, has its end. But when we understand the whole structure of man and his relations, it is 72 MORAL SCIENCE. as obvious, as was formerly shown, that he was made to love God with all his heart and his neigh- bor as himself, as it is that the eye was made to see with, or the ear to hear with. This is his highest end as active love itself as an activity, and the further activities that spring from love. This is what he was made to do. As capable of enjoyment his highest end is *the joy that comes from thus - -loving. These God 'has inseparably united. The joy can come only from the love ; the love cannot be without the joy. Now what we say is, that no unperverted rational TMsneces- and moral being can be brought into a eary affir- . . . . ' T . p matian the position in which he must put forth either ultimate fact * * in morals. love good-will on the one hand, or ' selfishness or malignity on the other, and not affirm, immediately, and necessarily, obligation to love. This affirmation is altogether peculiar, and is the primary, or, if you please, the ultimate fact in mor- als. It is made in view of the end as good the good of beings capable of good. In it is involved all that we mean by the word ought, which has in it an element both of impulse and of authority. Im- pulse is not law, even that from the moral nature. It never can be. It is only the affirmation, the rational affirmation of obligation that can give binding force to law. We are under obligation we ought to choose the good and refuse the evil. * The good we choose and seek to promote, as good, as Saving value in itself. The choice is right. OBLIGATION. 73 Any impulse from a natural principle of action is an indication that a thing is to be done if Thegphere there be no counteracting reason ; but of im P ulse - lower impulses are to give place to higher, and all others to those from the moral nature. It is the." impulses from this that are virtually made by many the basis of moral science ; but no impulse can be the basis of science, or can have authority as such. Science, and the direct authority of reason -as dis- tinguished from that which is indirect through faith, can be base'd only on insight and comprehen- sion ; and if the reason on the ground of which obligation is affirmed by the Divine Mind is so hid- 'den from man that he cannot affirm it on the same ground, then science is impossible, and this whole subject must be relegated to the region of faith. But if man is capable of seeing in the good of God and his creatures that which has in- Choice of finite worth as valuable in itself, and if he ^nded'by is so constituted as necessarily to affirm reason - obligation to choose and promote this good, and to see that the principle of action which would secure it is infinitely lovely, then is there upon him from each and all of these the behest of reason, affirm- ing its own authority, requiring him to choose this, and from which he can no more escape than from his being itself. CHAPTER IX. OBLIGATION : PALEY : OBLIGATION AND AU- THORITY. THE above account of obligation is wholly differ- ent from that given by Paley. According to him, to be under obligation and to be obliged are the o o same thing, and "a man is obliged when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the com- mand of another." But according to the view above given no direct command of another is in- volved, and in the sense in which Paley uses the word, the motive need not be violent. As obligation is so early and so much connected with the command of others, as of parents, of civil rulers and of God, it is not, perhaps, strange that some should make the obligation dependent on the command. But surely mere will, a command as such, cannot be the foundation of obligation, for what is to legitimate the command ? Either com- mand must be obligatory as such, or there must be some test in a moral being by which it can be de- termined whether a command is a righteous com- mand, and it is only on the supposition of such a test that any being can be " a law unto himself." OBLIGATION. 75 But such a test can consist only in a direct affirma- tion of the Moral Reason. Let its grounds be fully set forth and a decision must be given within the consciousness of a moral being from which there can be^/or him, no appeal. The affirmation is that the person is under obligation, and as long as this continues to be made the man must act in accord- ance with it or disclaim the authority of his moral nature. Refusing to act in accordance with obliga- tion thus affirmed, the purity and dignity and worthi- ness of a moral being would be compromised, and baseness and conscious degradation would be in- curred. There would be the reaction of reason against itself as failing to act reasonably, and so self-condemnation, remorse, the biting back of him- self by a being that condemns himself. So far as we can see, it must pertain to the very nature of a moral being to affirm obligation to choose and pro- mote well-being rather than the reverse, and that the alternative must be either that we do choose this, or that we give ourselves up to be governed by some lower principle of action and so to degrada- tion and self-condemnation. This affirmation and alternative we may reverently say belong to God himself as a moral being. With him there can be no motive from the command of another, and yet there is no being in whom the affirmation is so ab- solute. " Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" CHAPTER X. ULTIMATE MORAL IDEAS: WHEWELL : THEORY OF RIGHT. WE are now in a position to see distinctly the Relation of relation to each other of ultimate ideas in ultimate . . 1 . moral ideas, morals. According to the above state- ments moral action is in two spheres, that of choice, and that of volition or conduct. In the sphere of choice the ultimate conditional idea for a moral act is an end or good ; the ultimate moral idea is obli- gation, or the affirmation of the ought; and the ultimate moral act is choice. Of the obligation to choose one end rather than another the ground must be in the end chosen, since, if two ends be equally valuable, it can make no difference which is chosen. The choice may be right or wrong, but by no possibility can the obligation depend upon any quality in the act of choosing. In the second, or what I regard as the sub- uitimate ordinate sphere of moral activity, the ideas in ... ... i i 1*1 secondary ultimate conditional idea is a rule or law ; sphere of i i i 11 morals. the ultimate moral idea is right, and the ultimate moral act is a volition producing conformity or want of conformity to a rule ; or, if a rule be not admitted, it is doing right because it is right. OBLIGATION. 77 Right has commonly been supposed to be the ultimate, or rather to be the moral idea. Right not T . . -, ii i *ke m ra i t is said, and that is perhaps the popular idea - system now, that right is a necessary and indepen- dent idea ; that the distinctions of right and wrong are inherent in the nature of things in the same way as mathematical ideas are independent and necessarily involved in the relations of space and of quantity. But right and wrong, morally con- sidered, can have nothing to do with any nature of things existing necessarily, as we conceive space to do, but only with the nature of persons, so that no act which may not affect the interest of some per- son can be a moral act. Right and wrong have, indeed, nothing to do with things, but only with actions, and it produces confusion to speak of the nature of things, and of necessity from that when the province of morality is wholly without, or rather above the sphere of things, and when the only necessity there is about it is the necessary affirma- tion by the Moral Reason that a person capable of apprehending good and evil is under obligation to choose the good and reject the evil. But if, with Whewell, we make right mean " conformable to a rule," we shall then Whewell. have obligation as the moral idea, and right will be, as it really is, a moral idea only as it involves that. Many acts having no reference to the supreme end we call right, but they involve no obligation, 78 MORAL SCIENCE. and hence are not moral. In studying it is right to sit or to stand, because the end may be reached equal- ly well in either way. But every ac^ bearing upon the supreme end, and because it does thus bear upon it, involves obligation and is thus a moral act. The obligation which is in it, and which makes it a moral act is there from the affirmation of the Moral Reason in view of the good there is in the end. The above view provides perfectly for freedom in what this setting obligation and moral law over ciudes n and against all mere impulsion and craving; implies. j t affirms that the ultimate act in morals is generic choice ; that the proper object of choice is good, and therefore that right is not the last word that can and must be said on this subject. It holds that right is a quality of action, and that action must have some end besides its own quality. It therefore goes back to a good to be chosen for its own sake, and to an ultimate law demanding that it be thus chosen, and makes all morally right action to be right from its relation to that. This generic choice of good it identifies with the love commanded in the Bible, and the choice itself that is, the choos- ing with that wisdom which the Bible says is " the principal thing." It does not find that the law of God is that we are to do right, but that we are to love the Lord our God with all our hearts, and our neighbor as ourselves, and that to do this is to do right. OBLIGATION. 79 The confusion from a failure to discriminate the spheres above mentioned may be seen by a reference to the "Elements of Morality " by Whewefl. Whewell has just passed away, and is the last eminent English writer on this subject. That I may not misrepresent him, and may the better show the relation of ideas at this point, I will quote him at some length. " The adjective right" he says, " signifies conformable to rule ; and it is used with reference to the object of the rule. To be temperate is the right way to be healthy. To labor is the right way to gain money. In these cases the adjective right is used relatively, that is relatively to the object of the rule. " It has been said also that we may have a series of actions, each of which is a means to the next as an end. A man labors that he may gain money, that he may educate his children : he would educate his children, in order that they may prosper in the world. In these cases the inferior ends lead to higher ones, and derive their value from these. Each subordinate action aims at the end next above it as a good. In the series of actions just mentioned, a man's gain is regarded as a good because it tends to the education of his children. Education is considered as valuable because it tends to prosperity. " And the rules which prescribe such actions derive their imperative force and validity, each from the rule above it. The superior rule supplies a reason for the inferior. The rule, to labor, derives its force from the rule, to seek gain: this rule receives its force (in the 80 MORAL SCIENCE. case we are considering) from the rule to educate our children : this again, has for its reason to forward the prosperity of our children. " But besides such subordinate rules, there must be a supreme rule of human action. For the succession of means and ends with the coi responding series of subor- dinate and superior rules, must somewhere terminate. And the inferior ends would have no value as leading to the highest, except the highest had a value of its own. The superior rules could give no validity to the subordinate ones, except there were a supreme rule from which the validity of all of these were ultimately derived. Therefore there is a supreme rule of human action. That which is conformable to the supreme rule is absolutely right ; and is called right simply, with- out relation to a special end. -The opposition to right is wrong. " The supreme rule of human action may also be described by its object. " The object of the supreme rule of human action is spoken of as the true end of human action, the ultimate or supreme good, the summum bonum. " There are various other ways of expressing the opposition of right and wrong, and the supreme rule of human action ; namely, the rule to do what is right and to abstain from doing what is wrong. We say we ought to do what is right ; we ought not to do what is wrong. To do what is right is our duty ; to do what is wrong is a transgression, an offense ; a violation of our duty ! " The question why ? respecting human actions, de- mands a reason, which may be given by a reference from a lower rule to a higher. Why ought I to be OBLIGATION. 81 frugal or industrious ? In order that I may not want a maintenance. Why must I avoid want ? Because I must seek to act independently. Why should I act in- dependently ? That I may act rightly. a Hence, with regard to the supreme rule, the ques- tion Why ? admits of no further answer. Why must I do what is right ? Because it is right. Why should I do what I ought ? Because I ought. The supreme rule supplies a reason for that which it commands by being the supreme rule. " Rightness and wrongness are, as we have already said, the moral qualities of actions. The rules which, in subordination to the supreme rule, determine what is right and wrong, are moral rules. The doctrine which treats of actions as right and wrong is morality" It may seem strange that such a man should come so near the truth and yet miss it, but it only shows how difficult it is on subjects of this class to make a step, which yet, being made, will seem per- fectly obvious. Having admitted that the object of the supreme rule of human action is the true end of human action, no reason can be given why the supreme rule should not hold the same relation to the supreme end or good that any other rule does to its end. That would make all rules, as they obviously are, secondary, and would carry moral action back to the choice of a supreme end. But instead of this he allows of no moral action what- ever with reference to the end, but only with refer- ence to the rule. " The supreme rule," he says, 6 82 MORAL SCIENCE. " supplies a reason for that which it commands by being the supreme rule." Rightness and wrongness, which are solely from conformity or want of con- formity to rules, he makes the only moral qualities of actions, and leaves no place for moral action as intrinsically good or evil, and as having reference to that end, which, as he allows, gives to all rules except that which is supreme, their validity. Whe- well perceived the necessity of ends ; he subordi- nated rules to them ; he even subordinated lower ends and rules to those that are higher, though he gave no principle of subordination and no law of limitation. But having done this he stopped short, and made rules, and conformity to them, and right, ultimate, instead of ends, and choice, and obliga- tion. Whewell says explicitly that the end of human action is happiness. " The supreme object," says he, " of human action is happiness. Happiness is the object of human action contemplated in its most general form, and approved by reason." l And yet he regards himself, and is regarded, as belonging 1 to the a priori school, because he stops short in his analysis, and draws all moral conduct from rules. The system which makes right the ultimate Theory of moral idea, with no avowed reference to right: two phases. rules, has two phases. The first regards the sense, or intuition of right, as immediate and infallible. An action is right because it is right, and there is an i Sec. 573. OBLIGATION. 83 immediate intuition of it. This admits not only of no rule as a standard, but of no regard to conse- quences. The other phase of this system not only allows, but requires, the use of the intellect in gecond seeking for relations, consequences, utili- phase ' ties, but says that the sense of right is developed only in connection with the apprehension of these. But it does not tell us what the particular relations and consequences needed for this development are, nor why the sense of right should spring from one more than another. It is, indeed, only the indefi- nite system of relations. It gives a place to wis- dom, but instead of making it the right choice of a supreme end, in which alone is wisdom, or at least without which there can be none, it makes it merely skill, or the means to an end. The first phase of the above system is definite and consistent with itself. It speaks of Thefirst " Intuitive Morals." But it tends rather phase> to the barren declamation of the heathen philoso- phers about virtue, than to the love of God and man, and would make fanatics. The second phase of the above system making right an intuition, but making it depend Thesec0 nd on the perception -of relations without phase ' defining precisely what those relations are, is too indefinite to be the basis of any system. Practically it would agree with the system which makes good ultimate, and if terms were perfectly understood, it 84 MORAL SCIENCE.. might be found that the advocates of the two sys- tems really think alike. But if, with Whewell, we make right mean " conformable to rule," we shall exclude Conclusions. ... . . - rTT , , intuition at this point. We nave, how- ever, only to make all rules, the supreme rule no less than others, derive their authority from ends, to find room for the moral intuition in connection with the supreme end. It is there that an ultimate analysis would carry it, and it is in connection with that, and with choice as the ultimate action of the will that we find that affirmation of obligation of which we have spoken, and in that Moral Law. CHAPTER XL IS THE AFFIRMATION OF OBLIGATION LAW ? BUT tlie question now arises, whether the affirma- tion above spoken of would be law. When the Moral Reason affirms obligation to choose and to do good, and to reject and abstain from doing evil, is that law ? Law, it is said, requires a lawgiver, and a penalty annexed. Something will here depend upon definition, but that it is properly a law will appear (1) Affirmation . . ... of obligation Because it it be not so, then it is impos- is law. sible that any moral being should be " a law unto himself." Animals are a law unto themselves by that un- reflective principle which we call instinct, and which beautifully typifies the operation of the moral na- ture. There is in them force, an end, and guiding power, which, as producing uniformity, must act by some rule, and so is called a law. As guiding it to its end, instinct is the law of the animal ; and, in the same way, this affirmation of obligation to choose his end is properly, and ought to be accepted as, the law of the man. The animal having his end chosen for him, and having no alternative, knows the law 86 MORAL SCIENCE.. only as an impulse ; but man, having comprehen- sion, with a possible alternative, knows the law also as an idea, and the end proposed by it as the proper object of rational choice. This makes the law in man to be that of a person ; it makes it to be moral law, and we can conceive of no other possible way in which a person can be a law unto himself. Moral, as distinguished from positive law, is that Moral law, f r which a reason can be assigned aside from the command. To a rational being mere command can never be a reason for obedience except through faith. Mere command may appeal to the sensitive nature through fear, but not to reason. For one who could trace no connection between the thing commanded and his supreme end, confidence in the lawgiver as wise and good, and that alone, could make the law obligatory. Ultimate reasons for actions can be drawn only from ends, and the highest reasons from the highest ends. If then we suppose the whole end of a being to be in question, the highest possible obligation will be imposed ; and the affirmation of obligation in view of such an end will be simply the affirma- tion by reason of obligation to act reasonably. What higher end or ground of obligation can there be than the good of all beings capable of good, our- selves included ? and it is the affirmation by the Moral Reason of obligation to promote this fully and impartially that we call Moral Law. If we may venture to speak of God in such a IS THE AFFIRMATION OF OBLIGATION LAW? 87 connection, we can conceive of Him as acting mor- ally in no other way than this. He acts in Godact8in view of ends, and so rationally, but if wof fe his reason did not affirm obligation to choose some ends and reject others, we cannot see that He would be amoral being. So is He a law unto himself. So only can He be. So is man, who is made in his im- age, a law unto himself; and it is because man is made in his image that God proposes to him the very same end as a ground of obligation which He himself recognizes. God seeks his own glory, which is simply his perfections manifested in promoting the highest ends. He seeks to promote blessedness unselfishly and impartially. Man is to do- the same, and for the same reason. The will of God does indeed come in, and the conscience is so made as to respond to that, but the ultimate ground of obli- gation is not in will as will, but in those ends, hav- ing intrinsic value, which ought to determine the will. But (2) Authority is an attribute of law, and obligation as thus affirmed involves that. Obligation . . involves It is this attribute of authority which authority. Bishop Butler specially claimed as belonging to the moral faculty, and as fitting it to legislate for man. " It is," says he, " by this fac- ulty natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to himself; by this faculty, I say, not to be considered merely as a principle in his heart which is to have some influence as well as others, 88 MORAL SCIENCE. but considered as a faculty in kind and nature supreme over all others, and which bears its own authority of being so." And not only is there this inherent authority in the nature of obligation, but, as affirmed obligation by the reason of a creature it implies a dTvhiTcom- divine command. In creating beings in his image, and in placing before them the same ends in view of which He acts, there is implied the whole authority of God as guardian of the universe for the attainment and security of those ends. This it is that makes Him a father, and his creatures children, for in a well-constituted family the father and the children act for a common end, the father from comprehension of the end, the children, according to their intelligence, partly from that, and partly from faith ; and no being incapable of acting for the same end as a parent can be properly a child. Again, it may be inquired whether all authority does not imply a penalty when the com- obligation T , . , implies a mands imposed by it are not obeyed. If penalty, so, then the notion of penalty, which has been thought by many to be essential to that of law, is not wanting here. That a command uttered through the constitution should announce distinc- tively its own penalty, is not, indeed, possible. As fear, when there is danger to the constitution from the violation of physical well-being, does not an- nounce the nature or extent of the penalty, but only the fact that there is one, so we might appre- OBLIGATION. 89 hend that there would be, connected with danger to moral well-being, something indicative of pen- alty, " a certain fearful looking for of judgment," and this we find there is. Thus do we find Moral Law. It is an affirmation through the Moral Reason of obligation to Conclugion choose the supreme end for which God ^fween 06 made us, that is, to choose the good of all SvSied nd beings capable of good, our own included, law- and to put forth all those volitions which may be required to attain or secure that good. Such a law within a man will cause him to be without excuse in the absence of positive law, and will enable him to recognize the sacredness and obligation of a code of moral laws when imposed by another. It makes him a proper subject of moral government. It is from this that the law externally revealed finds a response in every breast, and becomes its own witness that it is from God ; and if it be in- deed the true law of the conscience then can that never be at peace till it and the law are in con- formity. If we suppose a revealed law to be iden- tical with the Moral Law in its substance, it will still differ from it in emanating from an authority with- out ourselves, and in having annexed to it a positive and specific penalty. 1 i See Appendix A. CHAPTER XI. CONSCIENCE. MORAL REASON affirms Moral Law. This makes Conscience possible. Conscience is the Definition, . / 7 andfunc- moral consciousness oj man in view oj his tions. . -I -!\/r i T T own actions as related to Moral Law. It is a testifying state. As the name imports, it is a double knowledge, a knowledge by the man of himself together with a knowledge of the law and as related to that. It involves a recognition by the person of the moral quality of his own acts, and the ^feelings consequent upon such recognition. It affirms obligation before the act, approves or dis- approves after the act, and in doing this indicates ^future reward and punishment. As thus' defined, Conscience is not the whole of conscience the moral nature. The Moral Reason rec- whoie of the ognizes Moral Law, and affirms its univer- moral na- *' . p ,, , .. . T . ture. sal obligation for all moral beings. It is the office of Conscience to bring man into personal relation to this law. It sets up a tribunal within him by which his own actions are judged, but it is under Moral Reason and not under Conscience that CONSCIENCE. 91 we judge of the conduct of others. For such judg- ment there is needed the knowledge of Moral Law, of the moral quality of actions, and the ability to compare the actions with the law. In all this is knowledge involving Moral Reason ; there is the science, but not the con-science. There is no im- pulse, no testifying state, no self-approval or re- morse, all of which must be regarded either as a part of Conscience, or inseparable from it. In Conscience, as affirming obligation in view of good to be attained or promoted by our- Conscience selves, there is involved a peculiar motive j^ 1 ^ 68 the to action that is expressed by the word " ou s hfc -" ought. This is a motive wholly unknown to any being below man. An animal may be moved by hope, or fear, or desire, or impulse, but we have no evidence that any one ever does an act because it ought. There is no evidence that an animal ever consciously recognizes law of any kind, much less- Moral Law. But the peculiar significance and bind- ing force of the word ought as from its relation to Moral Law. There is in it impulse, but also obligaV tion the felt bond upon a rational creature, as rational, to obey the law of his being. It is solely as the interpreter of Moral Law that Conscience has 'authority. From that is its ^ f u ^ ori * y power to originate the word ought, and J^^ 8 whenever the mandate and impulse in- and scope, volved in that word are truly derived from the law they are to be obeyed at all hazards. It would be 92 MORAL SCIENCE. absurd to say that anything could excuse a man from doing what he ought to do. Moral Law must be supreme. If there be not a faculty in man that recognizes moral law, he is not a moral being ; but if there be, then % that law must have authority in virtue of its being law. It must be always obliga- tory and can admit of no exception. Rules, as means to an end, may admit of exception, but the great Law of Love can admit of no exception. The word ought, as has been said, implies both obligation impulse and obligation. These are to be and impulse n .. i i p i i IT dfotin- distinguished ; for while obligation always guished. , , J Limitation involves impulse, there are yet impulses of moral J impulses. from the moral nature, often too mistaken for conscience, which do not involve obligation. These were needed. Coming up, as man does from entire ignorance, he needed in his moral nature particular tendencies and impulses to direct him in a more special way than could belong to the general command of royal authority that must bear sway over all. Accordingly we have special impulses under such limited ideas as justice, mercy, and truth. These afford a presumption in favor of the course indicated, but require regulation precisely like pity, or shame, or any other spontaneous or impulsive part of our frame. Such impulses may conflict with each other. Pity would relieve all beggars ; benevolence would say no. Justice would often punish when mercy would say no. If there were an absolute justice with no limitation from CONSCIENCE. 93 love, mercy would be impossible. Even the im- pulse to truth is to be so controlled that the truth is not to be spoken at all times. Besides, what is to prevent justice from running into revenge, or com- passion from becoming weakness ? Plainly we need an authority that shall decide even among the im- pulses of the moral nature. This distinction between impulses towards some particular form of right action, and that impulse general control of the Moral Reason which law. becomes an enlightened conscience when our own actions are concerned, has been too much over- looked. We need to make it because many con- found these particular impulses with Conscience, and great abuses have come from following them blindly. Impulse cannot be law. But if impulse be not law, we need to inquire under what conditions the decisions of Con- conscience science must be given so that the impulses Decide to connected with them may be safely fol- rightly - lowed. In deciding this, we are to remember that the decisions of the conscience no more depend on the will than do those of the intellect. The conditions being given its action is necessitated, and we can control that action only by controlling the con- ditions. If this were not so, man would not have a moral nature. But since he can control the con- ditions, a man may be bound to have right de- cisions of his conscience precisely as he is to have right decisions of the intellect. 94 MORAL SCIENCE. Both the intellect and the conscience act in two Analogous different and analogous spheres. The conscience first sphere of the intellect is that of ulti- and Intel- ... lect. mate intuitions. In this it is uniform and infallible in its judgments. That twoparalled lines cannot enclose a space, and that every body must be in space, all capable of understanding the terms, will agree. So the first sphere of the conscience is that of ultimate choices, where the supreme end of man, and essential goodness and wickedness are concerned. Here Conscience is brought face to face with Moral Law, and when this is done it can decide in but one way. It cannot approve the choice of evil as evil. It cannot say, or be made to say, that malignity, which is essential wickedness, is, or can be obligatory. When the law says, " choose the good, reject the evil ; " " love God and your neighbor," Conscience must recognize this as obligatory .under all circumstances, because there are no conditions, and no means can come between the conscience and the choosing. Even volition is not needed. The act of choosing is simple and ultimate. No one can teach another how to do it, and if a man do not choose the good, the cause and the fault must be in himself. But the good which it is the end of man to pro- conscience mote is seldom presented thus purely and follows the TT r r . judgment. simply. Hence the need or the exertion, often of the strenuous exertion, of every faculty to discriminate it. Hence cases before the tribunal of CONSCIENCE. 95 conscience may be like those before a court, re- quiring a careful weighing of testimony and of probabilities. In such cases the question is not, it never can be, Shall we do right? Shall we do what we ought to do ? but, What is right ? What ought we to do ? and in deciding this it will be found that we are really inquiring whether the course in question can be brought under the Law of Love. If not, there would be no tribunal. In these cases, and always, the moment we pass beyond the ultimate choice and supreme end to that where means are to be used, there is room for diversity of judgment. Different practices claim to come under this law of love. That claim is denied, and in the ignorance and endless confusions of this world it is often difficult to settle questions that thus arise. Is revenge, or polygamy, or the sale of ardent spirits right ? Is war right ? Is it right to deceive an en- emy? Here the conscience may not be fairly brought face to face with the moral law. It must follow the judgment, and that may be wrong from ignorance or prejudice. Are these for the highest good of the community and of those engaged in them ? Are they accordant with the law of love ? This law every conscience will affirm that we ought to obey. Here will be uniformity. But in regard to specific practices the decisions will vary as they are supposed to be, or not to be, in accordance with the law. In this way honest, but partially in- formed persons may differ in regard to many things. 96 MORAL SCIENCE. This will not show a diversity of moral judgment, or in the action of Conscience, but simply that it will follow the judgment. But the main cause of the diversity and confusion Confusion f moral judgments among men is the j ? udm