fj f .. ■>■ tt^ ■ B • r. ^ r( rV.% * - ♦ :♦ ►.u ^V (■ ^ \ »• \ *^f N- •. ■V.:f • ji AJ £x Libris C. K. OGDEN L NARRATIVE OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY TRANSACTIONS BRITISH INDIA UNDER THE ADMINISTKATION OF THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS. 1813 TO 1818. BY HENRY T. PRINSEP, OF THE HON. EAST INDIA COMPANY'S CIVIL SERVICE, BENGAL. " Res poscere videtur ut non modo casus eventusque rerum, qiii plerique f'artuiti smit, scd ratio etkm caussque noscantur." — Tacitus. LONDON : JOHN MURRAY, ALBEINLVRLE-STREET. 1820. Ot PREFACE THE work, now presented to the public, pretends to no merit, beyond that of a faithful relation of the very important changes and transactions, which have occurred in India between 1814 and 1819. The labovu- of the narrator has been chiefly occupied in compilation and extraction from the voluminous records of the Supreme-Government, which contain the most minute details of every political or military occurrence in every quarter of India. To aU these he had free access ; and, thus, the only qualities requisite for the undertaking, were those of dili- gence in research, and discrimination in the use or rejection of the materials before him. If he shall have succeeded in select- ing so much, as may render the politics of India, during the period under review, intelligible to those, who may ajiproach the subject with motives of curiosity or utility, — if readers of this class shall retire from the perusal, tolerably satisfied with the insight it has given them into the affairs of the period, and enabled to form a fair judgment upon the propriety of the measures adopted, his grand and primary object will have been attained. At the same time, he is not ignorant, that, in skilful 112^ y i O^i VI PREFACE. hands, the train of events, of which a faitlifiil and plain relation is here submitted, might have been wrought into a form, that would have awakened a lively interest in the general, as well as the curious or interested reader. The facts recorded are both singular and important ; the only circumstances, that can give a leffitimate attraction to a work of the historical class. But Indian habits and occupations, as well as the example of his precursors, prevent the narrator from anticipating much success, except with those of his readers, whose attention m-ay be excited by the recollection of Indian scenes, wherein they have them- selves borne a part, or by the tie of kindred with the present actors upon that wide field for British energy. In any other department of w riting, the narrator would pro- bably have followed the bent of his inclination, and have ven- tured his first literary work without the appendage of a name, which can give no title to favourable notice. But the pubhc has a right to demand, that every thing, pretending to the cha- racter of history, should bear that certificate at least ; and, in some cases, a notice of the sources of information, and of the circumstances which may have given a pecuhar command of them, or a pretension to more than usual authenticity. He feels himself compelled by this consideration, in addition to his name, to state briefly, that, on the first occasion of the Governor- General's leaving the presidency in the year 1814, to make the tour of the western provinces, he had the good fortune to be selected as one of the suite of the Marquess of Hastings, then Earl of iSIoira, and was, during the tour, attached to the sccre- tai-iat. On the occasion of his Lordship's second progress to the PREFACE. . Vli westward, that is to say, when he personally took the field in 1817, he had the lionour of again filling the same capacity as before, and continued to form part of the suite throughout the campaign, and until his Loixlship's return to the jnesidency. Kotwithstanding the extensive means of observation, which this employment opened to him, it never would have occurred to the narrator liiraself, that his time could be employed with advantage in the preparation of any thing for the press. It is not the ftudt of the service to which he belongs, causelessly to obtrude itself on the public in print. Its manifold duties gene- rally give fuU employment to all, who might be supposed to possess the capability ; and the office, to which he happened to be attached, was by no means one of the least laborious. However, when the rise of the IVIahrattas in arms, to oppose the execution of the Governor-General's plans for the sup- pression of the Pindarees, brought on a crisis of no common in- terest, it became a matter of evident importance, tbat the public curiosity should be satisfied in respect to the causes that had pro- duced the juncture ; and that the conduct of the Indian authori- ties, as well in the pre\ious intercourse with the native powers, as in the efforts to avert the mischiefs, M'hich then assumed a threatening aspect, should be secured from the possibility of misrepresentation, by a candid and early expose of all their operations. In the compilation of such a memoir, if exec\ited with but a moderate portion of skill, there seemed to be so much of public utility, as, in the narrator's circumstances, would warrant his regarding it as a point of public duty to make the attempt. Yet, though soon convinced that such a work was viii PREFACE. most desirable, it was some months before he could bring himself finally to resolve on commencing it. His employment in India, except on the two occasions abovementioned, had been confined exclusively to the internal branches of administration; and he felt the disadvantage, muler which he must vnidertake a task that, from its natvu-e, required a general survey of the political relations of the British dominion in the East. But, as no one of established political reputation appeared inclined to step forward on the occasion, and there was reason to fear, that, unless he took it up, an authentic account of the period might long be a desideratum, he was induced to consult on the subject with the Secretary to the Governor-General, whose idea of the importance of the matter appearing to correspond entirely with his own, he at length made the tender of his services, provided the assent of the Governor-General could be obtained, and there should be no objection to his unlimited use of the cecords of Government. The proposition was received by Mr. Adam with his characteristic hberahty, and met with his very decided encouragement. Through liim the nai-rator obtained the Governor-General's permission to avail liimself of the records of the Secretary's office, without wliich, as all the most important articles of information are usually recorded while matters are still in train, it would have been impossible to execute the work, except in the most imperfect manner. Such were the circumstances, under which the collection of materials was begun in February, 1818, when the campaign was drawing fast to a close. It has taken just a year to bring PREFACE. IX it to a conclusion. To those ac(j[iiainted with the nature of the records of the Indian Government, this will not be thought an immoderate time, when it is recollected, that it was neces- sary carefully to peruse and note the entire proccechngs of the political department for upwards of four years, before the nar- rative itself covdd be commenced. Much of the narrator's attention was besides devoted to other objects, being all the while in active employment. Thus, however desirous he may have been, that the work should appear wliile the curiosity of the public was yet at its height, he has found it impossible to present it at an earher moment. As it is, in his own judgment, too much has been sacrificed to the desire of expedition. It is necessary to premise, that the design has been, to trace the pohtical transactions of India from the origin of the hostile spirit amongst the Mahratta powers to the final crisis of the season of 1817-18 ; to relate the operations of that season, and explain, as far as may be possible, the settlement resulting therefrom. Else it might create some surprise, that, while events of comparatively minor interest are dwelt upon ^\ith a minuteness, which may, perhaps, be found tedious, the par- ticulars of the Goorkha war are passed over with a mere cursory notice. But these were in a measure foreign to the crisis in question ; and, as the time had gone by, when they could be considered to have a pecuhar claim to interest, it was thought best to Hmit the mention of that war to its influence upon the conduct of other powers, and only so far to allude to the operations of it, as might be necessary to explain that influence. b X PREFACE. Such as it is, the work is now given to the pubhc, with the full confidence, that it will not be regarded as a laboured exculpation of any specific scheme of policy. He can affirm, that he has not, in a single instance, designedly given a colour- ing to a fact, in order to make it suit the peculiar views of any class of statesmen : but he does acknowledge with some pride, that the present head of the Indian Government has claims to his personal attachment, which may have given a bias to liis political views and reasonings ; and further, that the habit of daily contemplating the development of his particular plans, from the moment of their conception, until they have been crowned with the predicted success, has produced a warmth of admiration, that may have warped his judgment upon the character of the system pursued. Yet has it been his ex- clusive aim throughout, to give a plain and candid statement of his own impressions on the events recorded : indeed, to have done otherwise would have been consistent, neither with the liberal confidence reposed in liim by the Marquess of Hastings, nor with the spirit, in which he himself undertook the task. The narrator is, at the same time, proud to own, that liis situation has given him the means of verifying several points of material import, by personal inquiry at the fountain head, and that lus impressions, in respect to the political measures adopted, have been submitted to the test of severe examinations, which have either confirmed their accuracy, or pointed to the means, by which they could be thoroughly sifted. Hence has resulted a further confidence, both of the authenticity of the facts de- tailed, and of the correctness of liis owti views and opinions. PREFACE. XI The narrator does not feel liimself at liberty, for the present, to obtrude his personal acknowledgments : it will suffice to declare, that he has deeply felt his obligation to the superior judgment, which has enabled him to discover errors and inac- curacies, that might have escaped his own observation ; and shall consider whatever value may hereafter be thought to attach to the performance, as an authentic continuation of the political history of India through the period in question, to be more ascribable to the aid he has received in its revision, than to any pains of his own in the compilation. Calcutta, February, 1819. 1)2 ADVERTISEMENT. THIS work was transmitted piecemeal for publication ; and its appearance has been retarded, partly by the neghgence of the hands to which the manuscript was confided, and partly by some unforeseen difficulties, which it is impossible, and perhaps immaterial, to explain. For any inaccui-acies of the type, or discrepancy in the spelhng of Indian words and names in the map and text, the Editor's professional avocations and total ignorance of Eastern orthography must plead in excuse. — A short glossary, and a catalogue of the native princes and persons ' of distinction, that figure in the narrative, is added for the convenience of the untravelled European reader. C. R. P. Temple, April, 1820. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. STATE of India on Lord Moira's Arrival-Relations of the British with Native Powers -Alliances, subsidiary, protective— disposition towards British-of States subject to their Influence— Nizam-P6shwa— other subsidiary Allies-of protected .Mlies- Independent Powers— Holkar—Sindheea— Nature of their power and administration since 1 805— military force— how employed-Disposition towards Brilish-Bhoosla— disposition-General view-Military adventurers not checked or suppressed-Pin- darees inl 8 1 4-their history-settlement on Nerbudda-mode of warfare-successes -Rise of Kureem Khan-his Power in 1 S06-and Fall-Chetoo-Dost Mahommed -Kureem's redemption-second rise-designs, and fall-Durras in 1814-Patans- their power— locality— Relations with Mahrattas and Rajpoots— Ameer Khan- his . - - Pace 1 Force m 1 8 1 4. - - ■ '^ CHAPTER II. NIPAL— MAHRATTAS. Nipal War-Governor-General leaves the Presidency-Intentions respecting predatory bands-defensive plans-that adopted-reasons-intrigues afoot-Bhopal and SSgur • alliance resolved on-condition of BhopM-designs of Mahrattas thereon-Ch.ef applies for British protection-terms offered-consequent military arrangements- progress of negotiation-communication to Sindheea-how received by hun- Bhoosla-and Peshwa-influence of Nipalese war-operations in that .,uarter- disasters-further preparations-successful close of the campaign-Preparations- in the Dukhun-on S. W. frontier of Hindoostan-augmentation of Bengal army -tranquillity of the season-Conduct of Bhopil-its Vakeel dismissed-communi^- cation thereof— Reflections - - " " * XVI CONTENTS. CHAPTER in. HYDERAB.\D— POONA. 1815. JUNE, JULY. Ilains set in — Hyderabad — ^Nizam's sons seize a dependent of the Residency — guard set upon them obliged to retire — troops called into Hyderabad — their submission and confinement in Golkonda — Poona — account of Bajee Rao — of Gykwar — his relation to Peshwa — to British — policy of Pe.shwa, and claims on Nizam — on Gykwar — referred to British arbitration — award as to Ahmedabad — Trimbukjee Dainglia — Gungadhur Sastree's negotiation — Intrigues at Brodera — protest of British Resident — renunciation of the arbitration — Gungadhur practised upon, and gained over — pilgrimage to Nassick — Sastree gives offence — his destruction planned — pilgrimage to Pundurpoor — dissimulation — Sastree murdered ... Page 59 CHAPTER IV. POONA CONTINUED. 1815. AUGUST TO DECEMBER. Resident — his resolves — returns to Poona — obtains proof against Trimbukjee — demands audience — presents a memorial — charging Trimbukjee — calls subsidiary force from frontier — Bajee Rao hesitates — asks proof — evades receiving it — Gykwar mission threatened — attempts to screen Trimbukjee — Hyderabad force called in — expedients offered and refused — instructions arrive — second memorial thereon — demand of Trimbukjee's surrender— Peshwa's irresolution — seizure of Trimbukjee and sur- render — reflections — effect in Guzerat - - - - 82 CHAPTER V. NIPALESE— PINDAREES. 1815-16. MAY TO MAY. Negotiations with Nipal— terms offered — Cession of Teraee refused— Demand modified — hesitation — Treaty signed — Ratification refused — War renewed — Ochterlony takes the command — penetrates the first range of hills — Battle of Mukwanpoor — Nipalese submit — Peace — Reflections — Pindarees — second reference to England — Army re- duced — Operations of Pindarees — party surprised — successful expedition — second British provinces ravaged with impunity — Concert of Pindarees with Mahrattas — intrigues of 1 8 1 .5 - 1 — Holkar's court — Ameer-Khan - - - lo.'i CONTENTS. xvu CHAPTER VI. BHOPAL— NAGPOOR. 18 Hi. MARCH TO JULY. Death of Vizier Mahommed — and of llagoojee Bhoosla — consequent deliberations — BhopM — its alliance declined — Kigpoor — Pursajee— his incapacity — Appa Saheb — his pretensions — character— Dhurmajee Bhoosla— his intrigues— their ill success — both parties court the British resident — who waits instructions — their tenor — alliance and terms offered — transactions at Nigpoor— Dhurmajee confined — Appa Saheb regent — seeks British alliance — Naroba — negotiation — its progress — conclusion — and signature — reflections — Subsidiary force called in — further transactions at NIgpoor .... - - Page 122 CHAPTER VII. jypooR, &c. 1816. APRIL TO OCTOBER. Jypoor alliance — orders from England— suspended — resumed — debated — resolved upon — Military preparations — Negotiation — protracted— broken off— internal condition of Jypoor — fresh overtures — and negotiation — Again broken off — Nagpoor affairs — Sindheea's supineness — and offer to Jypoor — Peshwa's conduct — and intrigues — Trimbukjee's escape — communications with Bajee Rao in consequence - 144- CHAPTER VIII. . PINDAREES. 1816-17. OCTOBER TO APRIL. Nagpoor subsidiary force moves to the Nerbudda — Pindarees alarmed — their first effort .—grand expedition in three divisions — 1st to Ganjam — 2d to Bidur — surprised by MajorM'Dowal — exploit of Sheikh Dulloo — 'id to Ahmednugur — surprised by INIajor Lushington — Ganjam penetrated — Borthwick's pursuit — 1st party intercepted — re- flections — resolution to extirpate the hordes — motives — Sindheea — Holkar — Dya- Ram of Hatras — his fort invested and bombarded — his escape — fort taken 162 CHAPTER IX. N A G P O O R— P O O N A. 1817. JANUARY TO JUNE. Niigpoor — Ram Chundur Wagh — Stideek Ulee Khan — Appa Saheb goes to Chanda — intrigues — death of Pursajee — by violent means — accession of Appa Saheb — change C xviu CONTENTS. of policy — intrigues with Peshwa — Poona — Pfeshwa's duplicity — Trinibukjee levies troops — is covertly supported — Resident's proceedings — Discussions with the Durbar — Subsidiary force called down — intercourse suspended — effect — operations against Trimbukjee — their success — Colonel Sniith called in to Poona — terms of demand — refused — Poona invested — Bajee Rao submits — Governor-General's instructions — conduct of Peshwa — New treaty signed — Its conditions — Reflections — Military movements ...-.-. Page 180 CHAPTER X. GENERAL PREPARATIONS. 1817. JUNE TO NOVEMBER. Treaty of Poona executed — cessions adjusted — vakeels dismissed — advantages to Gykwar — increase of subsidiary force — consequent cessions and exchange of territory — Governor- General's plans — Hindoostan — Dukhun — Madras army — liow disposed- delays in Dukhun — Lord Hastings leaves the Presidency — Political operations — their scale enlarged on Lord Hastings' sole responsibility — he takes the field— crosses the Jumna — General Donkin moves from Agra — negotiation with Sindheea — terms proposed — demand of Hindia and Aseergurh — reasons — treaty signed and ratified — consequent general order — its execution — Treaty with Ameer Khan — and Keroulee chief— Jaloun—Sagur—BhopSl . ... - 205 CHAPTER XL PINDAREES— POONA— NAGPOOR. 1817. OCTOBER TO DKCEMBER. Pindarees during rains — General Marshall from Bundelkhund — a Pindura enterprise — frustrated — operations on theNerbudda — Sir Thomas Hislop's retrograde movement — operations in Malwa — Sir Thomas Hislop recalled thither — Poona affairs — re- duction of Soondoor demanded — and effected — fresh levies of troops — Sepoys — tam- pered with — Kandtsh — critical situation of brigade — it moves to Kirkee — More Dikshut — Brigadier-General Smiih on the frontier — precautions — Peshwa's demands — Residency attacked and burnt — battle of Poona — Moro Dikshut killed — cruelties of Mahrattas — Brigadier-General Smith's move on Poona — attacks Bajee Rao's camp — city surrendered — Nagpoor — retrospect from July — Raja irresolute — receives titles from Poona — and is publicly invested — precautions of defence — British position — attacked — pressed — and partly carried — charge of Captain Fitzgerald — restores the day — defeat of the enemy — reflections — loss on both sides — influence of these events —charge of treachery weighed •• - - - i - 23 1 CONTENTS. ^^^ CHAPTER XI I. NAGPOOR— HINDOOSTAN. 1817. DECEMBER. Reinforcements to Nagpoor-ColonelGahan-MajorPitman-Brigadier-GcneralDoveton -Brigadier. General Ilardyman-Terms proposed to the Uaja-He tempor,zes-and surrenders-His camp attacked-and car.ied-Fort of Nlgpoor occupied by Arabs- be4eo-ed and assaulted without success-Arabs capitulate-Reasons for the Rajas reinst'ation-terms-dissent of Governor-General-retracted-British acqu>s>t.ons- ReHections-Himlooslan-Pindarees-Suspicious conduct of regular powers-eflect on Lord Hastings' plans-Cholera morbus-its virulence-and symptoms-Centre division arrives at Erich-moves back to the Sindh-movements in pursuit of I in- darees-affair at Bicheetal-wife of Kureem captured-Escape through Iluraotee- distress-Exploit of a Havildar-Consequent military dispositions Page 263 CHAPTER Xni. HOLKAR— HINDOOSTAN. 1817-18. DECEMBER, JANUARY, lEBRUARY. Brigadier-General Malcolm pursues Cheetoo-meets the army of Holkar-Falls back on Oojein-overtures from that durbar-Effect of Pfeshwa's defegtion-arn.y advances -Junction of the divisions of Malcolm and Hislop-negotiation tried-Regent put to death-hostilities-Battle of Mehudpoor-Junction of the Guzerat division-Terms offered-Treaty of Mundisor-affair of Rampoora-Effect on Sindheea-Juswunt Rao Bhao-affair of Jawud-Kumulner and other forts taken-Final settlement m that quarler-Pindarees expelled from Mewur-surprised at Kotree-further pursuit -Submission of Namdar Khan-Wasil Mahommed-Kureem and his son-how - - - 287 disposed of — Cheetoo . - - CHAPTER XIV. POONA. 1817-18. NOVEMBER TO APRIL. Peshwa's flight and pursuit-is cut off from the north-returns to the south-affair at Koragaon- resolute defence of Captain Staunton-re pulse of the enemy-remarks— flight of Bajee Rao continued-Briga.lier-General Pritzler's pursuit-Bajee Rao turns north-met by General Smith, and pursued up the Kishna-new distribution of British force-Suttara taken-idans of Governor-tieneral in respect to Pfishwa and Suttara Raja— reasons and reflections-instructions issued— Suttara Raja pro- claimed—General Smith pursues Bajee Rao-comes up with him at Ashtee-Gokla slain-Suttara family captured-notice respecting Gokla-Pcshwas distress-cap- ture of his forts-desertion of his Jageerdars-joined by Gunput Rao and Ram Deen tl'.ght to the northward ..---* c 2 XX CONTENTS. CHAPTER XV. HINDOOSTAN— KANDESH. 1818. FEBRUARY, MARCH. Holkar — Ameer Khan — his crafty conduct — guns obtained — Troops disbanded — takes refuge in Kota — Patans taken into British service— Policy of the measure — Proceed- ings of Sir David Ochterlony — Troops in the field in February — exchanges with Sindheea proposed — Lord Hastings quits the field with the centre division — S^gur — its reduction ordered — Reasons — Terms offered to Bunaeck Rao — and accepted — Dhamonee reduced — Mundela stormed — New distribution of theforces— SirThomas Hislop's return — Soandwara reduced — Sindvva occupied — Resistance at Talncr — and storm — Loss of officers — Garrison put to the sword — Killadar hanged — Sir 1 homas Hislop in communication with Brigadier-General Doyeton - Page '.i3:i CHAPTER XVI. NAGPOOR— DUKHUN. 1818. FEBRUARY TO MAY. Nlgpoor — ministry of restored Raja — his fresh intrigues and early treachery — Resident's suspicions and measures — Governor-General's first instructions — Detection of the plots — arrest of Raja and his ministers — Bajee Rao applied to by Bhoosla for aid — consequent proceedings — marches eastward — eludes Sir Thomas Hislop's division — Army of the Dukhun bioken up — progress of Bajee Rao— Brigadier-General Smith co-operates with Brigadier-General Dovelon — Lieutenant-Colonel Adams — repulse of Gunput Rao — Lieutenant-Colonel Adams at Ilingunghat — waits for other di- visions, and advances — route of Soonee — pursuit by Brigadier-General Doveton — dispersion of Mahratta army — detention and submission of sirdars — Wusota invested and captured — new distribution of the forces — capture of other forts — affair of Sola- poor — Chanda invested — its surrender - . . . . 355 CHAPTER XVII. NAGPOOR— PESHWA, &c. 1818. MAY, JUNE, JULY. Appa Saheb's exile — and escape — consequent measures — Bajee Rao's designs — frustrated — He sends an agent to Sir John Malcolm — is surrounded — negotiates — terms offered — intentions of Governor-General — approach of Brigadier-General Doveton — arrested — Bajee Rao submits — terms — objections — Reflections — Dispersion of Bajee Rao's army — Trimbukjee seized — Arabs refractory — General submission of the country — Review of Mr. Elphinstone's proceedings — their effect on the several classes of the CONTENTS. xxi population — cultivating — religious — military — commercial — Arabs of Kand^sh — their expulsion resolved — Siege of Malugion — vigorous sally — repulsed — Assault fails — Reinforcements — bombardment — explosion of magazine — surrender of the place — mistake in the terms — Close of the campaign - . Page 383 CHAPTER XVITI. GENERAL RESULT. Objects of this chapter — political result — Dukhun — Suttara Raja — Bhoosla — Nizam — Hindoostan — Holkar — Nuwab of Bhopal — Ameer Khan — Ghufoor Khan — Re- flections — Rajpoot princes — Kota — peculiarity in the treaty — Joudhpoor — Oodecpoor — Captain Tod's arrangements — con\ ention of Thakoors — and constitution fixed — Boondee — Bhikaneer— .Tesulmeer — Jy|)oor — indecision — treaty concluded — Stale of Jypoor — plan for its settlement — Raja's death — New military posts in Hindoostan — Sindheea — His present condition — external relations — internal government — how remedied — Auxiliary horse — Fate of sirdars — Baptiste — Bapoo Sindheea — Effect of their ruin — Probable issue — General reflections — Financial result — character of In- dian revenue — Financial condition in 1 8 1 4 — in subsequent years — Result up to 1818 — Home supplies — Value of territorial acquisitions — Comparative view — Home ter- ritorial charges explained — General reflections - - - - 418 GLOSSARY. Buncea, a merchant, or dealer.— Sawsc. Chela, an eleve, or ward. — Saiisc. Chitnavces, a private secretary.— Pm. Chout, black mail; redemption from tribute; the fourth part of any vUug.-Sansc. Choultry, an inn, or caravansera.— W/«c?. Coss, a measure of length ; about two miles.— Pcrs. Dak, post for letters or travellers —P«s. Dhurna, sitting in, a mode of importunate demand.— 6'a«sc. Durbar, the court of a prince. — Pcrs. Durra, a horde or band of freebooters.— HiMt?. Furnavees, a secretary.— P€r5. Gooroo, a family priest. — Hansc. Giiddee, the cushion or seat of state. — Hind. Hiirkara, a courier. — Pcrs. Jageer, a fief. — Pers. Jungiil, forest. — Sansc. and Pers. Killudiir, a governor. — Arab. Khutree, the military caste. — Hind. Khilat, a dress of honour. — Pers. and Sansc. Kutra, a walled town. Looteea, a common plunderer. — Sansc. Luhbur, a foray or marauding party. — Sansc. , Moonshcc, a linguist, or interpreter. — Arab. Miisnud. the cushion or seat of state. — Arab. Moolknerec, conquest.— Jrai. Nulla, a (hy torrent heA.— Sansc. Petta, atown: the suburb of a fort. — Sansc. Raj, a kingdom, or royal residence.— ^flWiC. RGsala, a body of horse resembhng a pulk of Cossacks.— 6'anic. XXIV GLOSSARY. Sirdiir, a chief, or superior officer. — Pets. Sebuiulee, the militia, or gens darmerie. — Pers. STpahee, or Sepoy, a foot soldier. — Peis. Sooba, a province, or government. — Arab. Srad'h, a funeral ceremonial. — Sa}isc. Sunniid, a deed of grant, or warrant. — Sansc. Sijrunjamce, military service tenure. — Pers. Syce, a groom, or liorse-keeper. — Sansc. Vakeel, an envoy, or negotiator. — Arab. . TITLES. Hi?idoo. ( Ptshwa, minister. ( Pcshkar, deputy. Sa?isc. Riija, ") Hind. Rana, > ruling prince. Hind. Nana, J Saiisc. Raj- Rana, regent, or viceroy. Hind. Sena-puttee, general ; title of the Raja of Berar. Hind. Sena-Klias-Khel, commander of the faithful b^nd. rBhio,-> Sa?isc. -^ „ . Y prmce. l Rao, J Sansc. Ram, a title of nobility. Sansc. Thakoor, a feudal lord. Baee, ) , }■ dowaarer princess. Baych, j ° ' Moosulma^i. Nizam, title of the Nuwab of Hyderabad originally ; viceroy of the Dukhun under the Moghuls. Arab. Nuwab, a governor ; a ruling prince. Arab. Vizier, a minister of state. Pers. Dewan, an administrator, or minister. Pers. Khan, a lord ; a title of nobility. Turk. Begiim, a dowager princess. Arab. Saheb, lord ; an appellation of rank. GLOSSARY. XXV TRIBES OF HINDOOS. Bheels, a tribe on the borders of Rajpootana. Jats, a north-western ti-ibe. Goands, a north-western tribe, inluibiting the Mohadeo range. Grasseas, a tribe inhabiting tiie Siitpoora range. Soandees, a tribe between Oojeen and Rarapoora. Names of the j)'innpalNative Princes mentioned in the Narrative, ivitJi their re^ective seats of' government, and the names of the British Mesidcnts. Moosulman Princes. Nizam. Nuwab Vizier of Oude, — Ghazee? Oodeen Hyder. J Nuwab Viziers of Bhopal. 1. Mahommed. 2. Nuzur Mahommed. Capital. British Residenti. Hyderabad. Mr. H. Russell. Lucknao. Bhopal. Mahrattas. Hindoo Princes. Raja of Suttara — Noor Nerayun. Peshwa — Bajee Rao. Gykwar. Anund Rao, nominal. Futteh Singh, actual. Rajas of NAgpoor. 1 . Ragoojee Bhoosla. 2. Pursajee Bhoosla (Bala Saheb). 3. Moodajee Bhoosla (Appa Saheb.) 4. Bajee Rao Bhoosla. Sindheea — Maha Raja Doulut Rao 7 Sindheea. J Holkar — Maha Raja Mulliar Rao 7 Holkar. 5 Nana of Sajrur. Govind Rao, legitimate. Bunaeek Rao, intrusive. Suttara. Poona. Brodera. Nii gpoor. Gwalior. Indore. SJgur. Captain Grant, assistant. Mr. Elphinstone. Mr. Jenkins C Mr. Strachey. C Captain Close. Major Agnew, assistant. XXVI GLOSSARY. Hindoo Princes. Bajpoots. Capital British Resident*. Rana of Oodeepoor. Oodeepoor. Captain Tod, assistant. Raja of Jypoor — Purtab Singh. Raja of Joudhpoor— Man Singh. Raja of Kota — Kishwur Singh. Raj-Rana — Zalim Singh. Jynagurh. Joudhpoor. xwld. Goorkha Raja. Ntpdlese. Katmandhoo. Mr. E. Gardner. DIRECTIONS FOR ARRANGING THE PLATES, &c. Page Head of the Marquess of Hastings to face the title page. Map - - -- - - .-1 1. Defile of Cheree — Ghatee pass 2. Lodgment on Malaoun Hills 3. Ghoorkha defences i. Position of Jyt'huk 5. Jypoor 6. Nagpoor Residency 7. Hatras t 8. Chanda5 9. Plan of operations at Poona t 10. Plan of operations at Nagpoor 5 1 1 . Plan of attack on Jawud 12. Plan of attack on Jubbulpoor 13. Plan of the battle of Mehudpoor - - - - 287 \4t. Kumulner") 15. Talner 16. Plan of assault on Sholapoor'^ 17. Plan of rout of Soonee 5 33 82 144 180 231 S!63 i - - - - - - 33S NARRATIVE. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. State of India on Lord Moira's Arrival — Relations of the Rritish with Native Powers — Alliances, subsidiary, protective — dis}Dosition towards Rritish — of States subject to their Influence — Nizam — Peshwa — other subsidiary Allies — of protected AUios — Independent Powers — Ilolkar — Sindheea — Naturti of their power and admlnistraliun since 1805 — niiUtary force — how onjiloycd — Dis- position towards British — Bhooslu — disposition — General view — Military ad- venturers not checked or suppressed — Pindarees in 1814 — their history — settlement on Nerbudda — mode of warfare — successes — Rise of Kurccm Khan — his Power in 1806 — and Fall — Cheetoo — Dost Mahonmicd — Kiu-cem"s redemp- tion — second rise — designs, and fall — Durras in 1814 — Patans — their power — locality — Relations with IMahrattas and Rajpoots — Ameer Klian — his Force in 1814. The Earl of INIoira, since created Marquess of Hastings, ar- rived in India, and assumed the government-general, about the end of the year 1813. The relations of the British dominion with the several native powers, as adjusted during the second administration of Lord Cornwalhs and that of Sir George Barlow, had continued up to this period with little variation. The attention of Lord iNiinto, the retiring governor-general, had been chiefly occupied, at first in preparing the states on oiu" western frontier, to resist the passage of the French, who were then thought to meditate an expedition over-land ; afterwards, in composing the discontents of the INIadras army ; and latterly, in wresting from the dominion of France, and the continental powers under her influence, their yet remaining insidar pos- B 2 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. sessions in the Indian ocean and in Polynesia. The only po- litical operations of the eight years in question, wliich require notice, as anywise affecting the general system of our political relations in India, are, first, the reception of the Seikh chieftains under protection in 1809, by Avhich measure, the British in- fluence was extended to the Sutlej, and the rising power and ambition of Eunjeet Singh materially curbed : secondly, a similar extension upon the Bundelkhund frontier, by the ad- mission of the Rajas of Duttea and Tearee, and the N"ana of Jhansee to our alliance, and by the measures adopted to curb and punish the Eewa principality, which, lying south-^vest of Benares, and east of Bundelkhund, had, in 1812, iuAdted and facilitated the march of a body of marauders from the banks of the Nerbudda into the rich provinces of Mirzapoor and South Behar. In other respects, no alteration whatever had taken place in our pohtical relations. The measures adopted for opposing the designs of ^Vmeer Khan, Avhich Avere supposed to be directed even to the subversion of the Nagpoor govern- ment, and the establishment of a IMoosulman power on its ruins, appeared, at one time, on the point of bringing about a sub- sidiary alliance with the Bhoosla Eaja ; but, for reasons, which need not be stated here, this connexion never took place ; and the attempts subsequently made to accomplish it in Lord Minto's time, were frustrated l>y the personal jealousy and secret hostihty of the Raja. At the period of Lord Hastings's arrival, the native powers may be classed \uidcr fovir heads. First, those with whom the British nation had formed subsidiary alliances. Secondly, those enjoying its protection without any subsidiary contract, and consisting, for the most part, of small principalities, scarcely meriting the name of substantive powers. Thirdly, acknow- ledged princes, with whom the British government was at peace, and connected by the mutual obligation of treaties, but 1813-14. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 3 with Avliom it had no further intercourse or influence, except in so far as the residence of a British representative at the court was sometimes a matter of stipulation. Fourthly, in- dependent chieftains and associations, who had never been acknowledged as substantive states, and to whom the British nation was bound by no engagements whatever. It may be useful, by way of introduction to the narrative of the late pohtical and military operations in IncUa, to give a brief sketch of the actual position of these respective classes, and of their disposition towards the British government at the commence- ment of the year 1814. The states connected with the British power by subsidiary alhances were, the Kizam at Hyderabad, the Peshwa at Poona, the Gykwar in Guzerat, and the Eajas of jMysore and Travan- core. The Xuwab of Oude ought, perhaps, in strictness to be added to these ; but the cessions, exacted of him by I>ord Wellesley in 1801, had so circvmi scribed his territories, and contracted his means, that, although independent in the ma- nagement of his remaining territories, and consecpiently tar superior to the pageant courts of Dehlee, IMoorshedabad, and Ai-cot, he is in too great dependence on the British govern- ment, to be regarded as one of the pohtical states of India. All the subsidiary alliances had been formed upon the same principles. The British nation had stipulated to furnish a specific force for the protection of the country, and for the maintenance of the sovereign's legitimate authority. This force was not to be employed in the duties of civil administra- tion, nor in the collection of the revenues ; and the British government had generally agreed not to interfere in such mat- ters. A subsidy, equivalent to the expense of the force, was furnished by the state thus protected, either in periodical money payments, or by territorial cession, more frequently the latter; a certain native contingent was also maintained, in 4 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. readiness to act with the subsidiary force, for the efficiency of" which the subsidizing state was answerable. But the most material provision of these treaties was, that the states ac- cepting them engaged to discontinue all pohtical negotiation with the other powers of India, except in concert M'ith the British government, and to submit all claims and disputes with others to its arbitration and final adjudication. The engagements for the simple protection of chieftainships and principalities had the same contrdlhng character, in respect to the external relations of the parties protected, with other native powers ; nor did they differ materially in substance from the subsidiary treaties, except inasmucli as there was seldom any consideration exacted for the protection to be afforded, and never any obligation on the British government to maintain a specific force for the purpose. The principal members of this class were — the Eajas of Bhurtpoor and IMacherree, Avith some other chieftains settled in the neighbourhood of Agra and Dehlee — the Bundcla Chiefs, whose possessions skirted the frontier of Bundelkhund — and, latterly, the Seikhs, with several others in different parts of India. The two Rajpoot states of Jypoor and Joudhpoor had been included in this system by Lord Wellesley ; but, in the settlement of 1805-6, they Avere left without the pale of our relations, from an apprehension that these were aheady too much extended. The Raja of Jypoor was considered, by his conduct in the war Avith Holkar, to have forfeited all claim to ovir farther protection ; while the Raja of Joudhpoor hiid refused to ratify the treaty concluded with Lord Lake by his representative ; so that no impediment arose out of any existing engagements with either state, to counteract the desire of tlie British government to withdraw from their connexion. Wlien mention is made of the extent of the British in- fluence, in the estimate of the national power and resources in 1813-14. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. » India, it is in allusion to the states and principalities, whose relation with us is of one or other of the above two descriptions. These must by no nieaiis be overlooked in such an estimate ; for it is one most striking feature of the connexion, indeed an express stipulation, that, in case of cxioency, the whole re- sources of the states in alliance shall be at the command and under the direction of the Eritish government. It must not, however, be supposed, that, of the powers thus subject to our ijifiuence, all were equally contented with their lot, or ready to afford the aid of their resources with equal zeal and alacrity. In proportion as the connexion with us had originated in motives of ambition, or interest, or necessity, or had resulted from a conviction of inability, by other means, to resist a more than transitory danger, with which their very existence was threatened from othrr quarters, in the same proportion were the princes, with whom these alliances subsisted, either restless and discontented at the restraints imposed on their schemes of further aggranthzement, or well satisfied with tlie undis- turbed enjoyment of what they felt conscious they ovred the possession of entirely to such alliance. Of the subsidizing states, the Nizam was our most useful ally, and had perhaps the best reason to be satisfied with his confederates. He had formed the connexion after receiving a severe defeat from the Peshwa, wliich must have produced a conviction of the inadequacy of his OAvn means of defence, and while the power of Tippoo Avas a subject of constant appre- hension to him. The overthrow of that prince, and the con- sequent a\igmentation of the power and influence of the British government, in some degree removed the imminency of the danger ; but these events, and the transactions connected with them, naturally led to a closer intercourse between the two states, and accustomed the Nizam habitually to rely on the British government ; \\ hile the annual incursions of the Pin- 6 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. dai'ees served to keep alive the sense of liis weakness. He had, besides, received from us in Berar, as the frmt of the alliance, an accession of territory yielding a revenue of 60 lack E'. But gratitude is seldom a motive for the good faith of })rinces ; our ground of confidence Avas the knowledge, that since forming the treaty, by which we undertook his protection, the Nizam had entirely neglected his private means, leaving his whole resources at our disposal, and allowing even liis military esta- bhshment to be modelled to our will, and placed under British officers. The successor of Nizam Alee Khan was, indeed, of a weak and indolent character, and the government was in the hands of a ministry*, wliich, but for the constant protection of the British resident, could not have withstood the intrigues of the disaffected and designing, who abounded both in the court and in the seraglio. The secret of the Nizam's attachment and devotion to o\u- interests is not difficult to be unravelled ; the prince himself was wrapped up in pageantry and sensual pleasure ; and the minister had become a creature of our own, insomuch that through him the resources and means of the state took whatever direction was pointed out by the British representative at this court. Not that the Nizam's government had thus degenerated through any design or agency of our * The nominal minister was a relation and favourite of the Nuwab's, named Moncer-ood-d'oullah, a weak man and unacquainted uith business; the rcaJ minister was a Hindoo, Raja Cliundoo Lai, who, under die tide of Naceb (deputy), con- ducted the whole government. The introduction of this man was tlie result of a com- promise with the Nizam ; whose claim to the independent choice of his minister was admitted on the part of the British government, on condition, that the Hindoo should be made deputy, and the principal never interfere with his administration. The Nizam, for some time after this arraagement, had shown considerable ill humour, and ullimately shut himself up in his palace, and refrained altogether from meddling with public affaks. His conduct sometimes betrayed imbecility and aberration of m.ind, and sometimes a degree of acuteness and intelhgence not incompatible with such a state of intellect. 1813-14. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 7 own ; on the contrary, ^^c had more reason to deplore, than to rejoice, at this dechne of its executive power, wliich was fre- (juently a source of great inconvenience to us, and was con- tinually calling in the strong arm of British authority to enforce its orders and uphold its weakness ; and this in a manner, which no delicacy could disguise altogether. The conduct of the Peshwa had been the exact reverse of that of the Nizam : he had availed himself with the utmost art of his connexion with the British nation to recover and improve his own resoiu'ces ; and, instead of trusting wholly to our aid, evinced at all times the greatest jealousy of any attempt, on the part of the resident at his court, to cement a closer union, and, by detaching him from other engagements, to confirm his dependence on the .support of the British government. In- deed, when the subsidiary alliance was first formed by Bajee Rao, the value of his attachment was correctly appreciated by the ]Marquess Wellesley. "With that depth of observation, for which his lordship was so justly celebrated, he thus prophetically warned the Honourable Court of Directors of the disposition they must expect to find in their new ally. " It was evident," Lord WeUesley wrote in April, 1804, " that the Peshwa had " only entered into the defensive alliance with the British " Government, because his highness was convinced he had no " other way of recovering any part of Ills just authority, or of " maintaining trantpiilhty in his empire. T/tc state of Ids high" " ness's affairs takivg a favourable tarn, Ii/'s //ig/tness, siijtjiorted " by the sentiments of tJie different bra)telies of the Mahratta " empire, teoidd be desirous of annuUing the engagements he had " made with the British Government." The events of the last few years afford the best development of Bajee Rao's actual dis- position towards us, after the lapse of ten years had enabled him to derive all the benefit he could Veap from our alliance, towards the consolidation of liis own power, and to court in 8 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. security the general sentiment of the Malu-atta nation, which had been thus designated as the foundation of some future rupture of tliis unnatural association. At the covu'ts of tlie three remaining powers, with whom subsidiary alliances had been formed, the ascendancy of the British influence was so firmly fixed, that an opposite interest could scarcely be said to exist in them. The conviction at these courts of the greatness of our power, and of the utter hope- lessness of any attempt to thwart our plans, caused them to give at once into the pohcy of sparing no effort to secure our favour, on which rested all their hopes of prosperity. AVith the Gykwar, the ties were much closer drawn than with the Nizam or Peshwa; the right of the British Government to interfere av ith certain qualifications in the internal administra- tion of the country being matter of stipulation by treaty with the state *. The Mysore Eaja is a prince of oru- own creation, and the Travancore Eaja a minor : tliis last state, however, was never entitled to much consideration in the scale of native powers, and for some time was altogether governed by Colonel Monro the resident, on whom the office of prime minister was conferred, with the title of Dewan. The disposition of the second class, viz. of protected states, * Tlie connexion with the Gykwar was anomalous. Soon after the subsidiary alhance, the utter imbecility of Animd Rao, and the confusion introduced into his affairs by Arabs and bankers, who liad been security for his debts, obliged the leading men of tlie state to solicit the Bombay government to take tliat security on itself, and to give its support to Seeta-ram, son of Raojee Appajee, as Dewan wth full powers, in the hope of thus restoring order and liquidating the debts. This ar- rangement failing from Seeta-ram's incapacity, he was deprived of power, and the administration placed in the hands of a commission, whereof the Britisii resident was a member. Afterwards Anund Rao's brother, Futteh Singh Gykwar, was brought forward and vested with the sole direction of affairs, under the resident's advice. This arrangement continued till Futteh Singh's death in 1818, Anund Rao Gykwar living as a cypjier in his own palace, where he was treated « itli every per- sonal attention ; but his constitutional imbecilitv continued. 1813-14. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 9 varied of course, in a similar manner to that of those, whose connexion was of a subsidiary cliaracter. The Eaja of Bhurt- poor's object, in accepting protection in 1805-G from a power, Mhose whole force he conceived he had recently baffled, was to recover, without other equivalent than the nominal sacrifice of unrestrained latitude of political action, the fortress of Deeg, and the greater part of his territory, then in our hands. He has ever since viewed us with the most arrogant hauglitincss, not exempt from suspicion, distrust, and fear. His Avhole con- duct has shown him to be the most hostile in heart and dis- position of all the princes of India. Feehng that his former success had made him the rallying point of disaffection from all quarters, he seemed evidently to court that dangerous pre-emi- nence, and to assume the attitude of one, that rather sought than avoided another occasion of trying his fortune against us : although in fact, he secretly di-eaded our power in the greatest degreed His policy was displayed in openly thwarting and irritating us to the full extent of our forbearance ; but conceding immediately, when he found he could safely risk no further provocation. The other protected chiefs in that direction were generally well contented, with the single exception of the IMacherree Kaja. who, finding himself in the vicinity of the Jypoor state, which was distracted by internal fliction and external attack, had at- tempted to avail himself of the opportunity of aggranchzing his own territory, at the expense of a helpless neighbour, and took occasion to seize upon some of his forts and villages. Our government, however, had interfered, and obliged the invader to make restitution ; and he had been further nndcted for de- laying instant obedience to the order for their evacuation. The eastern Seikhs, Avhom the terror of the Ihitish name alone had saved from the arms of Runjeet Singh, and the IJun- delas, who felt indebted to it for a similar protection from Sind- c 10 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. heea's officers, and from the marauders of the Nerbudda, were in every respect contented with the connexion, and evinced on all occasions, the most zealous attachment and obedience. But the Eaja of Rewa, though he had, in the first instance, volun- tarily embraced the alliance, very soon afterwards had repented of the engagement, and was evidently anxious to take the first opportunity of shaking it off. It would have been unreasonable to have expected, that the disposition of such various allies should be universally favourable, without reference to the dif- ferent circumstances, attending the contraction of the alliance, or to the capricious views, which the native princes are so apt to entertain, of what is best for their present interest. In the Avidely extended sphere of our alliances, it was natural, that several of the confederates should be disaffected, many lukewarm, and few zealous for the maintenance of the system of general re- gulation we had introduced. The greatest forbearance towards aU these different sentiments, and extreme moderation and con- sistency in our dealings, were essential to our success in the management of the stupendous machine, which we had or- ganized : particularly with a view to the possibiUty of still further extension of the system at feome future period. The states and powers of the tliird class, that is to say, those not cUrectly under our influence, and with whom our connexion was that of mutual amity alone, were, the Sindheea, the Bhoosla, and the Holkar families. British residents were stationed at the two former courts ; but none had ever resided at the Holkar Durbar, Indeed, since the derangement of Juswunt Kao's in- tellect, and more especially since his death, which occurred in 1811, the power, which his personal ability had erected and maintained, was crumbhng fast to pieces ; while Ameer Khan, IVIahommed Shah Khan, and other of his retainers, were raising themselves to consequence and independence on the ruins of the fortunes of his family. Juswunt Bao's son and successor, 1813-14. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 11 INIuUiar llao, was a minor ; and the intrigues of the womei). superadded to the frequent mutiny of the ti'oops for pay, and the gradual desertion of the different connnanders to seek their fortune in a life of predatory adventiu-o, were the only occur- rences to be found in the reports of the news-writers at this court. Sindlieea, since the peace concluded witli him in 1805, had steadily pursued the object of breaking the force and reducing the garrisons of the chiefs between the Chumbul and the Ner- budda, so as to estabUsh and consolidate his own po^vcr in that quarter. A person little conversant in the affairs of India, and observing on the map the uniform colouring of a given space, described as forming the dominions of a jMahratta chief, woidd be led to suppose, that liis authority Mas peaceably established over the whole of that space, in like manner as the Eritish au- thority is established within the tUstricts marked as its immediate possessions. This, however, is cpiitc inconsistent with tlie cha- racter of Mahratta conquest. Instead of commencing with the removal of the existing government, and the general assumption of the whole authority to liimself, a Mahratta chieftain begins, by appearing at the season of liarvest, and demanding a con- sideration for his forbearance in withholding the mischief he has it in his power to inflict. The \isit is annually repeated, and the demand proportionally enhanced. ^Vhatever is thus exacted is called the Chout, and the process of exaction a JMooIkgeeree (coiuitry-taking) expedition. When the same chieftain has been in the habit of contiiiuing his annual exactions from a certain district for a luunber of successive years, he considers the practice of making them as a matter of right and })roperty, and resents the interference of a stranger as an invasion of his property'. In process of time, perhaps, die has a cantonment, or reduces a fort and estabhshes himself in the neighbourhood; liis exactions swell to the full amount of the revenue ; and, in the end, the 12 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. authorities, that may heretofore have retained the local ad- ministration by paying these exactions, will either be superseded and reduced to mere cyphers, or be subdued and expelled by open force. The interval between the occurrence of this last act, and submission to the first exaction, will have been short or long, according as the opportunity may have been favourable for encroachment, or as the party, upon whom it has been attempted, happened to possess the sagacity to perceive, and the meaus to resist, the obvious tendency of such a system. At the epoch of the settlement with Sindheea and Holkar in 1805, when the British Government engaged not to interfere with the dependencies of those chieftains lying within certain limits ; that is to say, in Malwa, jNIewar, and jMarwar (including Kota, Joudhpoor, and Oodeepoor) ; the dominions of both fa- mihes exhibited every variety of the intermediate state above described. The towns and villages, of which they had complete occupation, were comparatively few, and were moreover scat- tered about in different directions, disconnected and inter- mingled one with another: except in these few, the army of either chief was the whole machinery of his government, and was at all times kept in motion for the purpose of enforcing contributions from reluctant tributaries, who regularly resisted, and often successfully. Under these circumstances, the effect of the peace concluded with the British was, merely to restrict the theatre of such warfare to their own assiuned dominions, and to allow the employment of the whole military power of each with greater activity against his respective dependents and nominal subjects. Thus, the confusion in that quarter of India, to which their operations w^ere thenceforth confined, was neces- sarily increased, rather than diminished, by the peace ; and one cannot wonder at the rapid rise of predatory hordes to poAver and consequence, under favour of such a state of affairs. liOrd WeUesley's plan for the suppression of this system was, to 1813-14. INTROnUCTORY MATTERS. 13 extend his subsidiary alliances, which he exjiccted woidd have the effect of inducing the native princes to discard their military establishments, as an useless expenditure and needless incum- l.n-ance. This plan was, however, abandoned by Sir George Harlow, so far as Sindheea and IJolkar were concerned ; indeed, their governments were so essentially miHtary, that it could scarcely have succeeded with them under any circumstances, unless, in progress of time, they should assume a more regular form. In 1805, and for some years after, Dowlut Rao Sindheea apparently took but little personal interest in the administration of his affairs. Until 1809, his government was, indeed, one of continual shifts and momentary expedients, and his durbar a mere arena for the factions of a selfish aristocracy, whereon to bring to issue their struggles for wealth and pre-eminence. The natural death of Ambajee Inglia, the too powerful Sooba of Gwalior, and the violent one of Surjce llao, the father-in-law of Sindheea, both which occurred in 1809, enabled this prince to introduce a ministry more dependent on himself Since that year, the control of affairs had been in the hands of a banker of the name of Gokul-paruk, recommended to office by his financial ability, and held in check by the counteracting influence and rivalry of personal favourites. Ey skilfidly managing this balance, Dowlut Eao had asserted and exercised a more direct personal control over the affairs of his principality, during the latter period. Up to 1810, Sintlhcca generally was in motion the whole of the favourable season, with the greater part of his army, em- ployed cither in punishing his own refractory officers, or in Moolkgccrce expeditions in INIalwa, Ehopal, or lxaj})ootana. Oojein was his' nominal capital ; but, after the forcible re- sumption of the Soobadaree of Gwahor from the family of his deceased vassal Ambajee, he pitched his camp a short tlistance 14 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14, to the south-west of that city and fortress ; and, as his court has never been moved from the spot, except for occasional pil- o'rimages, a second city has arisen on the site of his encamp- ment, rivalhng the old one in population at least, if not in the appearance and structure of its edifices. The great body of his troops have continued to be distri- buted over the surface of the country, enforcing tribute in the usual way, and taking every opportunity, by the capture of for- tresses, and the seizvu-e or expulsion of tlie petty Rajas and Cliieftains in actual possession, to consohdate liis power, and acquire a firmer hold of what had hitherto been more nominally than really under his dominion. The principal and most efficient of Sindheea's commanders employed on this service was Colonel Jean Baptiste Filoze, a man of ambiguous parentage on the father's side, his mother having been a common woman of a camp bazar attached to some of the French battahons. He had, however, been brought up, if not acknowledged, by the French officer whose name he bears; and the wreck of the infantry trained by the officers of that nation was placed under his command, on their desertion in the course of the war. A considerable portion of Sindheea's artillery was also attached to this force : and, in the interval between the settlement of 1805 and Lord Hastings' arrival as Governor-General, the forts and territories of Baliadur-gurh, Gurra-kola, Chanderee, Sheeopoor, with several others, had been wrested from their petty feudal lords by this commander. There were three other divisions of Sindheea's troops employed in the same manner, and com- manded respectively by Eapoo Sindheea, Juswunt Ecio Bhao (successor to Juggoo Bapoo deceased), and Ambajee Punt. A fifth corps was stationed about liis person at Gwalior, under command of one Jacob, a Portuguese half-cast, Arratoon an Armenian, and some other officers of distinction. The strength of each of these corps was from seven or eight to ten thousand 1813-14. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 15 men of all arms ; but it fluctuated accoidiuo; to the personal views and interests of the respective commanders, who were in- dividually answerable to their troo})S for pay, the greater part of Sindheea's territories being ])arceUed out amongst them, and assigned in lots for the subsistence of the several divisions by the discretionary levy of exactions and contributions by each within the specified limits. Under siich a system, the Gwalior Durbar could not be expected to exercise a very active control over any of the Chiefs so employed ; indeed, the intercourse of each Avith the court was an uniform scries of mutual dece})tion and jealousy. The disposition of the prince towards the British Govern- ment must, on the whole, be considered to have been, up to 1813 *, rather ftivourable than otherwise. He found us punctual paymasters of the annual stipend of seven lack of rupees, agreed in November 1805 to be paid to him and his Chiefs. Xor had we, on any one occasion, interfered v,'ith the prosecution of his system of exaction upon the petty feudatories within the circle of his influence. Even when he sometimes exceeded his limits, which, by the treaty of 1805, he had engaged to consider as sacred, Ave had uniformly manifested the same indifference ; and, though free to claim the advantage for ourselves, had never stepped forward to thwart liis views of aggrandisement. Indeed he had felt, that so long as he abstained from the territories of our actual allies, he might fearlessly pursue his own schemes in any direction ; and, as there was still abundant scope for his ambition, as well r.s of employment for his military de- pendents, Avithin the limits from Avhich Ave had AvithdraAvn, he had been sensible of no restraints from our neighbour- hood and superior poAA'er. This disposition resulted from * In tills year he received an emissary from the Pesliwa of the name of BuUaglice Tunt. 16 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. .1813-14. his experience of our past condvict ; but as there was no se- curity for our continuing to act on the same system, and as events seemed fast verging to that state, which must force on us the adoption of one, that could not but interfere with his plans and interests, it was natural that he should entertain a jealousy of our views, proportionate to the sense of his own comparative inferiority. The disposition of Holkar's court was similar ; and its Sirdars seemed to consider it their policy to avoid giving offence to the British Government, even when they affected personal independence. The resources of Ragoojee Bhoosla had been so reduced by the effects of the war of 1803, which deprived him at once of Berar and Cuttack, that he was scarcely strong enough to defend liis own dominions from the agg-ression of the lawless predatory bands, which had collected along the Nerbudda. The military establishments of this prince, with the exception of some corps of Arabs kept near the Eaja's person, were un- doubtedly more defective than those of any native potentate. While fewer European improvements had been grafted on the old Mahratta system, the latter had lost all those quahties that ever had made it formidable. Indeed, so despicable was the cha- racter of his troops, that in 1809-10, Ameer Khan, a Patau officer in Holkar's service, and one of those who was aspiring at independence, planned an attack on Nagj^oor in combination with the Pindarees, and would assuredly have annihilated the power of Eagoojee, had not the British gratuitously aided him in this extremity. A simultaneous movement from Hindoostan and the Dukhun induced Ameer Khan to abandon the design. It was on this occasion, that a INIadras and a Bengal force first met on the north of the Xerbudda ; Colonel Sir Barry Close having advanced to Seronj, one of Ameer Khan's principal pos- sessions, where he met Colone] ]Martindell from Bundelkhund. 1813-14. INTllODUCTORY MATTERS. 17 Kagoojee's disposition towards lis was far from friendly, not- withstanding the service thus rendered him : liis resentment for the loss of Berar and Cuttack over])owered any feeling of gratitude for this subsequent benefit. Yet fear dictated to him the necessity of keeping on the best terms with the British Government : for the idea of his ability to call in its aid, was his main security at this time against the ambitious designs of the adventurers in his neighbourhood. Under this conviction, he was nevertheless jealous in the extreme of his political in- dependence, and very averse to the formation of a specific de- fensive alliance of the same nature as those subsisting with the Xizam and Peshwa ; justly concluding it a sacrifice of his dignity and reputation among the states of India, to assume the cha- racter of dependence on a British subsidiary force. Such being the feeUng and disposition of the several great independent powers in India, there seemed httle in their con- dition or motions calculated to excite any present alarm. As far as they were individually concerned, the object of the set- tlement of 1805-6* appeared to have been attained ; their weak- ness afforded a security against any one of them meditating a separate hostile enterprise; at the same time, that the balance then established remained unaltered, and the mutual jealousies relied upon as the guarantee against a second coalition were yet unextinguished. Nevertheless, there was an unsoundness in. this system of our relations, which had been predicted by many, at the moment of their establishment on this basis. Its defects had begun to be apparent some time before 1814, and it could no longer be disguised, that the settlement of 1805 was, after all, but an incomplete arrangement, which must ere long be entirely remodelled. It had become manifest that tliis set- tlement, or rather the state resulting from it, instead of having a tendency to wean the population of India from habits of military adventure, in which so large a portion of it had there- D 18 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. tofoie been bred, rather multiplied the inducements to engage in that course of hfe. The class addicted to such habits was evidently fast increasing. At the time of the settlement, though there were certainly some bands of marauders and brigands, associated under different leaders for purposes of general de- predation, their number was not sufficient to attract notice, and it was thought that they must soon either be dissolved through want of effectual bonds of union, or be incorporated with the troops of the regular powers, or, at any rate, that these latter, as soon as they were relieved from foreign wars and expeditions, would have the means, and see the advantage, of restraining bodies of men, who professedly subsisted on the plunder of their neighbours. Instead of this result, however, either from weak- ness and indifference, or from some erroneous notion of the policy of favouring the lodgment, in their neighbourhood, of a military force, available as an addition to their own strength in the hour of need, without the charge of any regular pay or establishment, Sindheea and Holkar, if not active abettors of the growth of these freebooters, were, at least, very lukewarm in their efforts for their suppression. Their only solicitude was directed towards preventing aggression on themselves, and establishing a sort of nominal authority over as large a portion of the class as could be induced to acknowledge their supremacy. They even made liberal assignments of land to effect tliis object; and if a leader of a durra of Pindarees, so the associations were called, happened to make himself obnoxious, his ruin was at- tempted, by turning against him the arms of a rival leader; without reflecting, that such a policy must, in its consequences^ rather perpetuate than suppress the evil ; the ruin of one Chief serving but to consoHdate the equally dangerous power of an- other. It is by no means improbable, that the jMahratta states viewed the increase of the Pindarees with an eye to eventual service from their arms ; for they avowedly attributed the dis- 1813-14. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 19 asters of the operations of 1803 to their having imitated the European mode of warfare, and affected to helieve, that, liail they adhered to the Parthian method of their ancestors, the resuUs of the contest would have been very different. The predatory hordes still pursued the old method ; and the won- derful impunity and success with Avhich they engaged in the most distant expeditions, passing the most formidable l)arriers of nature and of military art, and baffling every attempt to in- tercept their return, liowever well concerted, gave a colour of probability to this opinion : indeed, their calculation was erro- neous,in one particular only, viz. that there were no strong holds in India which could hope to baffle our military skill, in case we should adopt the plan of pursuing the depredators to tlieir havmts. They were ignorant of the degree in wliich our means were superior to those of Aurung-Zeeb ; and recollecting that he, after having driven them into their fastnesses, could effect no more, readily gave into the belief, that the British power, noM' in its zenith, was only to be combated by the arms and arts with which Sevajee had foiled the ]\loghul in times of yore. It is immaterial, however, whether accident or design had permitted the predatory hordes to gain the strength they had attained in 1814. Their actual condition at that period en- titled them to be regarded as a distinct political interest of the day, requiring an equal exertion of vigilance and circumspection, as Hyder in the height of his power and inveterate animosity. The actual mihtary force at the disposal of these associations amounted to 40,000 horse, inclusive of the Patans, who, though more orderly and better disciphned than the Pindarees of the Nerbudda, possessed the same character, and were similarly circumstanced in every respect, supporting thejuselves entirely by depredation wherever they could practise it. This numl)er would be doubled, were we to add the remainder of Holkar's troops of the irregidar kind, which were daily deserting the D 2 20 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. service of a falling house, in order to engage in the more pro- fitable career of predatory enterprise, and the loose cavalry establishments of Sindheea and the Bhoosla, which were bound by no ties, but those of present entertainment, and were always in great arrear of pay. These materials formed the groundwork of an interest formidable at least to our repose, if not to our safety : and its centrical situation in India, nearly equi-distant from the dominions of the three presidencies, imposed the necessity of the most extensive annual precautions of defence, in spite of whicli, the territories of our allies, were continually overrun. On two occasions, once when they entered Guzerat in 1808-9, and again in 1812, when the Bengal provinces of jSIirzapoor and Shahabad were devastated, they penetrated into oiu' immediate territories, which for years had been exempt from such a calamity. The spirit of enterprise evinced on these occasions had much advanced the reputation of these associa- tions ; and, although they were not now united under any single head, there had grown up among them a principle of concert in prosecution of common objects, such as a man of superior energy and abilities, liad such an one chanced to arise among them, might model into the same description of force that Tymoor and Jhungeez Khan had directed to the devastation of the eastern world. The rise of Sevajee and of Hyder, both rapid and both formidable, was a proof that such things could take place in India as well as in other countries ; and the whole of the unsettled spirits of central India were exactly in the con- dition to engender such another conqvieror. They resembled the bands of Companions that swarmed all over Europe in the fourteenth century, and wanted but a leader, whose standard they could rally round mth confidence. The lawless and in- dependent character of the Pindarees, and the mode of their association, which rendered the Chiefs responsible to nobody for their acts, and made it impossible to hold any of the regular 1813-14. 'introductory MATTERS. 21 powers legitimately answerable for their dangerous existence, were the circumstances that made it necessary to watch their motions with especial caution, in order to anticipate the effects of any sudden combination. A\'ith this view, the British power had interposed at once, when ^Imeer Khan had attempted to collect a large body together, in prosecution of his design upon the dominions of the l^hoosla Eaja ; it being our luiiform and avowed object to preserve things on their actual footing, and to prevent any of those fluctuations of power, which generally end in erecting a vigorous and ambitious domination on the ruins of a weak superannuated government. It was evidently not for our interest, that either the Pindarees or the Patans should build up such an edifice on the site of any of the regular states with which we were at that time connected ; and it was cer- tainly incumbent on our policy to make some effort to pre- vent it. A short sketch of the origin of the predatory hordes, passing under the general denomination of Pindarees, and of the Chiefs under whom their numbers were arrayed in 1814, ^dll lead to a more distinct view of their actual condition at that time. The name of Pindara is coeval with the earliest invasions of Hin- doostan by the IMahrattas ; the actual derivation of the Avord is unkno^m, notwithstanding the researches of several etymologists. The designation was applied to a sort of roving cavalry, that ac- companied the Peshwa's armies in their expeditions, rendering them much the same service as the Cossacks * perform for the armies of Kussia. When the Peshwas ceased to interfere per- sonally in the affairs of Hindoostan, leaving that part of the Mahratta empire to the Sindheea and the Holkar Chieftains, the Pindarees were thenceforth ranged in t^vo parties, assuming * Pindara seems to have the same rcrcrenee to Pandour that Cozak lias to Cossack. 22 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. respectively the appellation of Sindheea-shahee, or of Holkar- shahee, accordingly as they attached themselves to the fortunes of either family. They still preserved, however, all the pe- cviharities of their own mode of association ; and the several leaders went over with their bands to one Chief or the other, as best suited their private interests, or those of their followers. In 1794, the principal leaders first obtained assignments of land from Sindheea, in the valley of the Nerbudda, and amongst the hills which skirt it on the north. From that time till about 1800, there were two principal Chiefs, the brothers Heeroo and Burun, whose standards were annually raised in that valley at the season of the Dussera*, (an annual festival that takes place at the end of October or beginning of November), as a rallying point for all loose spirits and unemployed mihtary ad- ventui'ers. Here they consulted upon the best means of pro- viding for the necessities of the year, by the exercise of rapine, accompanied by every enormity of fire and sword, upon the peaceful subjects of the regular governments. Until the close of the rains and tlie fall of the rivers, their horses were carefully trained, to prepare them for long marches and hard work. The rivers generally became fordable by the close of the Dussera. The horses were then shod, and a leader of tried courage and conduct having been chosen, all that were so inclined set forth on a foray or lulibur, as it was called in the Pindaree no- menclature. These parties latterly consisted sometimes of several thousands. All were mounted, though not equally well ; out of a thousand, the p"roportion of good cavalry might be 400 : the favourite weapon was a bamboo spear from twelve to eighteen feet long ; but, as fire-arms were sometimes indispensa- ble for the attack of villages, it ^vas a rule that every fifteenth or twentieth man of the fighting Pindarees should be armed * Vide Forbes's Oriental Memoirs. 1813-14. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 23 Avith a matchlock. Of the remuiiung 600, 400 were usually common looteeas, indifferently mounted, and armed with every variety of weapon ; and the rest slaves, attendants, and camp followers, moimted on tattoos or Avild ponies, and keeping up with the hihbur in the best manner they could. It is not siu'- prising, that a body so constituted, and moving without camp equipage of any Idnd, should traverse the whole of India in defiance of the most active pursuit by regular troops along the same line of march : indeed, the rapidity with which they spread their devastations to the southern extremity of the Peshwa's and of the Nizam's territories, over an extent of not less than seven degrees of latitude from the Nerbudda, baffled every attempt to interrupt or overtake them. The cruelties they perpetrated were beyond belief. As it was impossible for them to remain more than a few hoius on the same spot, the utmost despatch was necessary in rifling any towns or villages into which they could force an entrance ; every one, whose ap- pearance indicated the probability of his possessing money, was immediately put to the most horrid torture*, till he either pointed out his hoard, or died under the infliction. Notliing was safe from the pursuit of Pindarae lust or avarice ; it was their common practice to burn and destroy what could not be carried away, and, in the wantonness of barbarity, to ravish and murder women and children, under the ey€S of their husbands and parents. In the infancy of the establishment of the Pindarecs on tlie banks of the Nerbudda, their devastations Avere not carried to * A favourite mode of compulsion with them was, to put hot aslics into a bag, which they tied over tlie mouth and nostrils of their victim, whom they then thumped on the back till he inhaled the ashes. The effect on the linigs of the sufferer was such, that few long survived the operation. Another connnon mode was, to throw the victim on his back, and place a j)lank or beam across his chest, on which two people pressed with their whole weight. 24 liNTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. so great a distance as afterward.s, when tliey began to feel their strength, and when the desolation of the immediate neighbour- hood made it requisite to ])ush their expeditions to a distance, in order to make them sufficiently productive. AVith the fruits of these expeditions, the Chiefs were from the first enabled to keep together a large military force without much territorial revenue, and to offer tlie occasional services of a part of their strength to Sindheea, Holkar, and other neighbouring (,'hieftains, at a cheaper rate than the same amount of assistance was elsewhere procurable. By means of further assignments ob- tained in recompense for such services, and of conquests made by the bands thus kept together upon the Grassea (aboriginal) Rajas in the mountains bordering the Is^erbudda, who had never, yet submitted to the Mahrattas, the Pindaree Chiefs gradually extended their influence ; while, at the same time, the re- putation of these successes brought additional swarms of ad- venturers to their standard. About the year 1800, the two Chiefs Heeroo and Eurun died either in the course of nature, or by violent means, the one. at ISTagpoor, and the other at Asseergurh. Both left sons ; the former, Dost Mahommed and ^'\'^asil Mahommed ; the latter, the tAvo Rajuns ; but it ^vas not till after some time that these individuals succeeded to any part of their fathers' influence : the pre-eminence devolved, in the first instance, upon other Sirdars, according to their reputation and ability as leaders. Kureem Khan, a Holkar-shahce Pindara, was the first who rose to con- sequence after the death of the brothers ; indeed, he was not altogether free from suspicion of having procured the death of Burun at Asseergurh. Kureem was an active, bold, and am- bitious adventvirer, sufficiently devoid of principle to profit by the poUtics of the time. He commenced liis career, by joining the rising fortunes of Juswunt Rao Holkar, with a considerable party of followers, pledged to consider their own and their 1813-14. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 25 leader's interest as inseparable. His services proved valuable to Holkar, and were suitably rewarded. iV short time after, he was bought over by Sindheea, w ho gave him the title of Nuwab, and several assignments of land in the valley, and above the ghats of the Nerbudda : thenceforth he has been regarded as a Sindheea-shahee Pindara, though frequently found in arms against the adherents of his nominal superior. He enlarged his possessions by interfering in the internal affairs of Ehopal, and in the contests of this state with the Bhoosla. After worsting the latter, he excited a civil war in Ehopjil ; and giving his support to one party, was very near estabhshing his authority over the whole principality ; but the state was saved by the personal courage and conduct of A^izier Mahommed, M-ith the assistance of Dost INIahommed, the son of Heeroo, who l)egan about that time to rise into notice as a rival of Kureem. During the prosecution of this ambitious course of self-ag- grancUsement, there was never any intermission of the systematic predatory expeditions, that stiU formed one of the main re- sources by which the chieftains maintained their mihtary power. Sindheea himself, the Bhoosla Raja, and the Hindoo Chiefs of Bundelkhund, were the principal sufferers by their depredations at this period *. During the troubles of the Mahratta empire consequent upon the war with the British, Kureem Khan availed himself of the opportunity to seize on some possessions of Sindheea and of the Peshwa's jageerdars in Malwa ; insomuch, that after the conclusion of hostiUties in the year 1806, he was in the oc- cupation of a territory of not less than eleven pergunnas, whereof the principal were Bairsea, Chipaneer, Ashtar, Shuja- * Tlie tolerance of this practice may, in part, be accounted for by the recol- lection, that a predatory inroad is not considered derogatory to tlie dignity of a Mahratta government, which avowedly regards rapine as a legitimate resource of the state. 26 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. wulpoor, Sarungpoor, Ichawur, and Sehoree, above the ghats of the Nerbudda, together with Sutwas, and other places wdthin the valley. His annual land revenue from tliis territory exceeded fifteen lack of rupees, besides compensations for immunity from plunder, which he levied on most of the neighbouring Eajas and Chiefs. He had also built himself a fort in the part of his territory acquired from Bhopal, which was called, after him, Kureem-gurh. His power was now at the height ; for though there were several Pindaree leaders who had never joined Ms standard, and who even affected a rivalry for the supremacy he had arrogated ; still there were none whose means or influence at all approximated to those of Kureem. Though himself in- dependent in every respect, and even an usurper upon Sindheea on more occasions than one, he still affected to be attached to that Cliief's interest, and to call himself a Sindheea-shahee Pin- dara, for the obvious purpose of retaining some claim to pro- tection in case of exigency. His power, however, excited that prince's jealousy ; and in 1806, very soon after the settlement with the Enghsh, Sindlieea, by the proffer of his aid in the reduction of a fort (that, for want of artillery, had long baffled the attacks of Kureem), inveigled the Pindara to an interview, at which he seized liis person, making a simvdtaneous attack on his camp, which was completely plimdered. Kureem's pos- sessions were then quickly recovered; and, for five years, he was liimself detained a close prisoner in the dungeons of GwaHor. His durra, in the mean time, was not broken up, though re- duced to no more than two or three thousand horse, by the defection of the greater part of the sirdars of inferior note, who had been tempted, in the full tide of liis success, to unite their interest with liis. The fall of Kureem, however, strengthened the dm-ras of other leaders, particularly of Chetoo or Seetoo, a Chief under whom the two Kajuns, sons of Burun, held a subordinate rank, and who had always been the avowed rival of 1813-14. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. ii7 Kureem, though hitherto the power of the latter had greatly preponderated. The party of Dost INIahoinmed also acquired a great accession of strength by the ruin of Kurceni, whose durra had now httle else than plunder to subsist u})on. The search of this, however, it prosecuted with considerable success under Kureem's deputies, and especially one Xamdar Khan, who made Sindheea's territories the principal theatre of his de- predations, in revenge for the treachery employed against his leader. In 1811, Kureem purchased his release from Sindheea for six lack of rupees, which were punctually paid through Zalim Singh of Kota. Eeturning to the scene of his former power, he immediately raised fresh levies of infantry, and invited the Pin- daree Chiefs, who had before followed his fortunes, to rally again round his standard. In a very short time he recovered the greater part of the territory he had formerly possessed, and laid his plans to effect a general combination of all the Pin- darees, preparatory to an expedition of more than ordinary moment. Even his rival Cheetoo was induced to unite with his durra; and the Dussera of 1811 was celebrated by an as- semblage of not less than 25,000 cavalry of all descriptions, besides several battalions of infantry newly raised for the pur- pose. Kureem proposed to lead this force immediately against Nagpoor, the weakness of which was notorious to all the Pin- darees, whose detached parties had, a short time before, suc- ceeded in carrying off a considerable booty from a suburb of the city itself The Bhoosla state had fortunately won over Cheetoo by the recent grant of considerable jageers on the southern bank of the Nerbudda. He accordingly opposed the project, and retired with his durra in discontent. This division proved the ruin of Kureem, who had a second time awakened Sindheea's jealousy to such a degree, that Juggoo Bapoo, one of Sindheea's principal officers, was |ent with as large a force as could be collected, and with a reinforcement of E 2 28 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14.' some battalions of Holkar, to endeavour to chastise the pre- sumption of this upstart. There is reason to beheve, that this enterprise was promoted by Cheetoo, who feared the con- sequences of having thwarted the designs of Kureem in respect to Nagpoor ; at all events, he was the main instrument of its success, and the person who derived the greatest advantages ; the major part of liis late rival's possessions being allotted by Sindheea as his share of the spoil. Kureem, expecting from Chee- too at least neutrality and indifference to his fate, advanced boldly to encounter Juggoo Bapoo. His rival, however, took an active part against him, so that he was completely defeated near Mvmohur-Thana, aiid obhged to fly with a few adherents, and seek refuge in the camp of Ameer Khan beyond the Chumbul. The strong representations of Sindlieea and Holkar obliged the Patau Chief to place him in a kind of restraint, in which he remained until the end of 1816. His durra again declined to a secondary condition in comparison with that of Cheetoo, at whose cantonment of ISTemawur, on the Nerbudda, not less than 15,000 horse now annually assembled at the Dussera festival, to issue forth under a leader of his nomination, in whatever direction he might prescribe. In 1814, the following was supposed to be the relative strength of the Pindaree durras : Cheetoo 5000 good horse ; total of all descriptions about 10,000, exclusive of the Holkar- shahee Pindarees, mustering from 4 to 5000 more, who latterly attached themselves chiefly to his standard. The re- mains of Kureem's durra amounted to 2000 good horse ; total of every description, at least 4000. Under Dost Mahommed 6000, with the usual proportion of the best quahty ; this Chief held considerable jageers above the ghats of the Nerbudda, and usually cantoned in the Bhopal territory. There were, moreover, at least 6 or 8000 horse, under independent leaders of inferior note, who joined one or other of the superior Chiefs, 1813-14. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 29 as occasion suited. The party that penetrated into the district of INfirzapoor through Rewa was of the durra of Kureem, wlio planned the expedition a short time before his second fall. It was led by Fazil Khan, and, turning east as soon as it reached the jMirzapoor frontier, advanced to the neighbourhood of Gya, and then disappeared up the course of the Soane, before a single soldier from any British cantonment could come up with its track. Such was the anomalous and undefinable power that had grown up into consequence out of the political settlement of 1805-6. Its leading feature was hostility to all regular go- vernments, and of coiu-se most particularly to ourselves and oiu- allies, insomuch as to impose the necessity of constant vigilance along the whole extent of the south-west frontier of the Bengal presidency ; while, for the security of the Dukhun, the sub- sidiary forces of the Nizam and Peshwa were annually obliged to move to the northern frontier of their respective territories, notwithstanding ^\hicli precautions, the dominions of those states were continually penetrated and overrun. Ameer Khan and jMahommed-Shah Khan, the two Patan Chiefs, who were rising into a similar and equally formidable pre-eminence, commanded forces of a very different description from those of the Pindaree Chiefs, though actuated by the same predatory spirit : each of them, besides horse, had large bodies of infantry and several guns. ]Mahommed-shah Khan's infantry were the old battalions of Tukojee Holkar, undoubtedly the best m India not under the actual command of Eiu'0])ean officers. Ameer Khan's were scarcely inferior. The cavahy Avere besides paid by the month, instead of living avowedly on plunder alone, like the Pindarees. Indeed, the grand difference between the two classes was, that the Patans were banded together for the piu- pose of preying on governments and powerful Chiefs. To this end, their force moved about with the materials of regidar battles and sieges, so as to work on the fears of princes and men 30 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. in power, extorting contributions and other advantages from them, by such intimidation as an efficient army only could impress. "^Vhereas the object of the Pindarees was general ia})ine ; they preyed upon the population at large, withovit ar- rogating an ability to cope with the estabhshed governments ; their form and constitution, therefore, were framed with a view to this exclusive purpose. Eajpootana was the principal area for the exhibition of the species of depredation practised by the Patau leaders. The nature of the principalities of that tract, each of which was a petty feodal government, at war with its neighbours and with its own vassals, seemed to mark it out as their destined prey. Nor w^as it a new game that they were playing in that quarter ; they merely followed up what SincDieea and Holkar had long been habitually pursuing. Indeed, although the objects of the Patau Chiefs were wholly personal, and prosecuted with perfect independence of each other, still they represented the Holkar interest in the country, and had introduced their forces under sanction of that name. The very means they possessed, viz. the artillery and regular battahons, had belonged to the Holkar family, though now employed in supporting and estabUshing an interest virtually distinct. Notwithstanding this virtual independence of the Patans, Sindlieea did not leave them in the unthsputed enjoyment of the contributions and other advantages to be extorted from Rajpootana. A division of his army, under Bapoo Sindlieea, lay at Ajimeer, acting precisely on the principles of the Patans, and living on the plunder it could exact from Jypoor and .Toiidhpoor. Another force was stationed in the Oodeepoor ter- ritory, encroaching on the power and possessions of the Eaja there, and devastating the country. The Eajjioots, however, were considerably more jealous of Sindheea's apparently con- soUdated power than of the Patau Chiefs, whose very loose 1813-14. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 31 connexion with the Holkar family gave them the character of mercenaries, who, for objects of private interest, might be hired and discharged at pleasure. Thus in 1809, wlien Sindheea seemed to meditate an invasion of the Joudlipoor territory witli a very considerable force, the Eaja called in ]Mahommed-Shah Khan, and took his army into ])ay for the purpose of re])eUing the attack. This facility of tranferring their services according to theii- personal views, gave the Patau Chiefs the further advantage over Sindheea and liis commanders, of a pretext and power to interfere in the passing intrigues amongst the Kajpoots them- selves, and to become partisans of the several factions, from each of wliich they took care to reap some personal advantage. So long as they had the prospect of such recompense, they were not over- scrupulous of the means of earning it. Ameer Khan twice sold his services for the treacherous assassination of ob- noxious persons, and accomplished liis purpose on both occasions at conferences held under the most solemn guarantees. This Chief was the acknowledged head of the Patan interest. His views of ambition were, however, not confined to Rajpootana until 1814 ; when, finding from the activity of our preparations, whenever he seemed to be meditating an enterprise against the Bhoosla, that we were resolved to prevent his aggrandisement in that quarter, he moved from Malwa across the Chumbid towards Rajpootana ; and having strengthened his interest at the durbar of Holkar (then held at Rampoora-Bhanpoora), took upon liimself the supreme management of the Patan forces and interests. Mahonniied-Shah Khan, Jumsheed Khan, and the other sirdars, agreed to act in subordination to him. The former of these dying about the end of 1814, the troops he had conunanded became incorporated with those under the personal command of Ameer Khan. This military ad- venturer was thus placed at the head of a force of at least 32 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 1813-14. 30,000 horse and foot, furnislied with an artillery well manned and served ; yet he had no claim to be recognised as a substantive j)ower, though no one of the regular governments could fairly be held responsible for his acts. The field of his operations lay in a quarter where there was every likehhood of his coming ere long into contact with the British Government, or with those under its protection. Against this power, as well as the Pindarees, we were obliged to be continually armed, and on the alert. The want of any determinate territory or home, or of any other stake to be hazarded by the first act of hostihty, left us entirely without security for their peaceable demeanour ; there was nothing to re- strain them but mere motives of convenience, and the sense that the calculation of the chances of success was against them. This, however, was the result of continual and most expensive pre- paration, the necessity of which was a part of the evil that required a remedy. Such was the state of Incha at the beginning of the year 1814. In the subsequent chapters, the events which led to the final catastrophe of the year 1817-18 will be traced through the intermediate period, with as much conciseness as may be found consistent with the object of exhibiting a distinct view of the origin of those occurrences, and the share which the conduct of the British Government may have had in producing them. ,-.«o "■-"^-'.torf/. fr J*.'~^ ••■* EEIFIILIE by-w-McliGEHrOCHTKRlLOHYTiarniedtlieCHEREE-GHATIEE PASS. Sketch of GEHf'OCHTERi.ouTS Oferatiohs to effect a JLod^ementoh tliieMAiL.Au>i7?r hiiljls .- SraS^ ofjifiles. yr- 3 . Siocka^d Farts ced^/&> . 4-- -^^-Fea^ . a^[ unj-tvcXxided pa'ftf oecupltd. fy3 detachments tm miTTun^ o/'J^^j4firti mis , unfTt^irsted a/teryvards . S. JTye^upar, w^nce Cafif^lfafnillefij- de/achmenl' Tnaved en J^la-. Qu-artrry on-Ryla,. y. ^cut^. cf C^l. Thorn f-san -wtch a Sattalicn A^ 2 .e^ 2^'"''' on Dec&utZ . ^.Z^to&iul oceajt'ud cn--mom£n^ c^JS^aftd-macntain^d against 2 desperate a£tizc^. ^.A&utt cfJffa/crZawric with asirrvTta detach^^Dfo^td tC. Support sent ftj Cap^Sh^wers attack on£nemys //. GocrJcJi^ CarUcrtnufit . f2.3faiacu:n . f3 . Rutun^urh JFort whence CapfJhovfrs -ntarchd /4. . £aa VtUa^e. tg tthCch CapfShowers detoMment trert driven dock an his 6eino ^iiitd. fS.^uZla orJiivu-letu^OuTTit^raA. Zcndcn.I'ut'lished fy I, Marray. 2S20. CHAPTER II. NIPAL-TERRITORIES. 1814-15. Nipi'il AVar — Governor-General leaves the Presidency — Intentions respecting pre- datory bands — defensive plans — that adopted — reasons — intrigues afoot — Bliopill and Sagur alliance resolved on — condition of Bhopal — designs of Mahrattas thereon — Chief applies for British protection — terms offered — consequent mili- tary arrangements — progress of negotiation — communication to SIndheea — how received by him — Biioosla — and Peshwa — influence of Nipalese war — operations in that quarter — disasters — further preparations — successful close of the cam- paign — Preparations — in tiie Dukhun — on S. W. frontier of Hindoostan — aug- mentation of Bengal army — tranquillity of the season — Conduct of Bhopal — its Vakeel dismissed — communication thereof — Reflections. The negotiations Avhich had been for some time pending with the Goorkha government of Nipal *, respecting its usurpations on our northern frontier, were, in May 1814, brought to the issue of open war, by its countenance of the murder of some of our people, who had been placed in charge of the usurped and resumed villages in the Goruckpoor district, after the British Government had recovered possession without meeting with any resistance by a military force. The extreme un- healthiness of the lowlands, stretching along the foot of the whole range in which Nipal is situated, rendered it ne- cessary to wait the arrival of the cold season, before commencing active operations to avenge this outrage. The jVIarquess of * The reader, who wishes to know more of this new and rising frontier state, is referred to the pages of Kirkpatrick. 34 DEFENSIVE PLANS. 1814-15. Hastings had previously resolved to make a tour through the western provinces of the Bengal presidency, in order to visit , the different mihtary stations, and inform himself, by personal observation, of the actual state of affairs in the interior. In prosecution of this intention, he left Calcutta in June of that year, and arrived at Cawnpoor about the end of September, proceeding up the Ganges by the usual and techous navigation. The period of the journey was occupied in preparation for the approacliing contest with the Kipalese, and in arming the south- western frontier of the Bengal territories, and the northern frontier of oiu- alhes in the Dukhun, against the probable repe- tition of attempts by the Pindarees. It had been resolved by the Supreme Government, ,on the eve of the Governor-General's departure from the presidency, to make a strong representation of the formidable and rapidly augmenting power of the predatory associations to the home authorities, with the view of impressing them with the hke conviction of the danger to the British interests, arising from the continuance and progressive increase of bodies so capable of acqviiring a mischievous pre-eminence, and of receiving their sanction for the prosecution of a systematic combination of measures, for the suppression of tliis growing evil. It was agreed on all hands, that the necessity of such measures would soon be forced upon us ; and it was consequently essential, that those entrusted with the direction in England, should tlius early be apprised of the actual posture of affiiirs, and of the views respecting them, entertained by those who had the means of closer observation. There seemed to be time to wait the effect of this representation; for there was no reason at the date when it was made, to expect the occurrence of any thing to demand immediate operations in the quarter where the Pin- darees and Patans had fixed themselves, wliile the Indian go- vernment found intermediate employment in the war with the 1814-15. DEFENSIVE PLANS. 35 Nipalese. For the present, therefore, it was deemed advisable to dispose our means in a defensive attitude, sufficient to pre- vent or repel incursions ; and neither to advance to attack the Pindarees in their haunts, nor connnence that extended plan of connected movements, which, thougli necessary to the entire suppression of these predatory hordes, might alarm the inde- pendent states by its contrast with our recent system of general and scrupulous neutrality. The most effectual defensive measure, and the one most desirable in every point of view, seemed to be, the estabhshment of a subsidiary alliance with the Ehoosla Eaja, whereby the whole of our most exposed frontier, viz. the line from Bundel- khvmd to Cuttack, defended by the single position of Mid- napore, where a regular battalion was stationed, would thence- forth be skirted by the dominions of a power in strict alliance; and a force upon the Nerbudda, communicating on one hand with the southernmost position of Bundelkhund, and on the other with the troops at the northernmost point of the Nizam's dominions, would completely gaiard the whole Hue of our pos- sessions and those of our alhes, as far as it was possible to protect them against an enemy so active and impenetrable as the Pin- dara. This was a project nowise novel. The British Govern- ment had, for several years, been endeavouring to prevail on Eagoojee Bhoosla to accede to such a proposition, but coidd never conquer his repugnance and chstrust. The negotiations for the purpose, which had been open since 1812, were finally closed wliile the Governor-General was on his progress up the river, by a decided refusal on the part of the Eaja. The best alternative that presented itself on failure of the Kagpoor connexion was, to extend the chain of positions from Bundelkhund to the Nerbudda, by means of a connexion with the states of Sagur and Bhopal, and thereby draw a similar defensive line westward of the Nagpoor territories. The F 2 36 DEFENSIVE PLANS. 1814-15. necessity of adopting this alternative, should operations ever be undertaken without the co-operation of the Bhoosla, was fully acknowledged in the course of those discussions upon the prac- ticabihty and mode of suppressing the predatory associations, which had preceded the representation to the home authorities ; but it formed part of that extended system, which it had been resolved not to commence upon for the present, in fear of alarming the independent states. Wherefore, although Lord Hastings resolved in the end to adopt this course, he would have deferred so doing, notwithstanding the disappointment in respect to Nagpoor, had not some indications appeared of a combination amongst the IVIahratta powers, the danger of which required to be anticipated. At the time of rejecting our alhance, it was discovered, that the Bhoosla was actually engaged in negotiating one of an offensive and defensive character with Sindheea, for the sub- jugation of the Bhopal principality by their joint arms. One of the ostensible pretexts for this confederacy was, the necessity of a counter-preparation against the ambitious projects of the British Government, which were inferred, as well from the attempt to establish our influence at Nagpoor, as from the stir of our military preparation, which denoted that active operations were meditated in some quarter or other, though the immediate direction was at that time involved in mystery. Sindheea's jealousy, ever keenly attentive to all our movements, was redoubled by this show of preparation ; and it soon became evident from his conduct towards the Pindarees, that, whatever might have been his previous intention, he had now no wish to suppress them. As a further consequence of this jealousy, intrigue began to be busy at the quarters of Ameer Khan and the durbar * of Holkar, and even with Eunjeet Singh, the ruler * At the court of Holkar, affairs were at this time in tlie hands of IMynee Baee and Tanteea Alcek-hur, with whom Sindheea had considerable influence. The minister. 1814-15. INTRIGUES. 37 of the Punjab Seikhs. The Peshwa was suspected to have joined these intrigues thus early, if not to have been the first author and instigator of them ; a change having been observed in his conduct some time before, ^\hich will presently be more particularly adverted to. It is difficvdt exactly to define the immediate objects or extent of these intrigues ; whether merely defensive against any supposed designs on our part, for the further extension of our dominion, in a manner injurious to the interests of the contracting parties ; or offensive also, in case of a favourable opportunity. The advance of Eunjeet Singh's army to a position thi-eatening the territory of the protected Seikhs, which took place immediately after the division at Soodeeana, under Sir David Ochterlony, was moved into the hills to attack l^meer Singh, and the concentration of the Patans under Ameer Khan, which occurred at a critical moment, and within a few marches of our Agra frontier, afford reason to suspect that the object of the confederacy was not purely de- Tanteca, paid a visit to Gwalior early in 1815, in order to negotiate a treaty of closer union and concert between the two ianiilios, for the prosecution of common objects, under the general direction of the Peshwa, as supreme head of the Maliratta empire. The conciliation of the Pindarces by territorial grants in the respective dominions of both the families, and the concentration of the niihtary force of both states for the prosecution of ambitious designs against the Rajpoots, were the most striking articles of this offensive and defensive alliance, apparent on the face of the copies of this agreement, delivered in the sequel. There is reason, however, to believe that there were other secret articles, which have not even yet been divulged. Indeed it is well known, that there was one such article levelled against Ameer Khan, and more than suspected, upon many accounts, that another aimed at the diminution or subversion of the British interest. In the end, the negotiation came to nothing, from a strong surmise, that Sindheca's main object was to establish his influence at the court of Alulhar Rao, for the purpose of supplanting the family in their possessions. An opposite faction was also at work, and Tanteea Aleek-hur, with My nee Baee, yielded very soon after to Balaram Set and Toolsee Baee, whereof the former was favourable to Ameer Khan and the Fatans and jealous of Sindheea. S8 BHOPAL. 1814-15. fensive: but this is a point it is no longer important to in- vestigate. No sooner was Lord Hastings apprised of these intrigues, than he saw at once that their immediate result must have been, the consohdation of the Mahratta power over the whole tract, separating the Bengal territories from those of our allies in the Duklrun, which must not only have cut off the Ehoosla for ever from any connexion with us, by rivetting his dependence on Sindlieea, but have deprived us of the alternative offered in the connexion of Bhopal, by the previous subjugation of that state. Urged by these considerations, he resolved no longer to hesitate in stepping forward to complete his defensive arrangements, by forming a connexion with Bhopal and Sagur, in despite of any eflforts by the regular independent powers to counteract the design. It certainly was a bold stroke of policy ; but it pre- sented the double advantage of thwarting Sindheea's apparent design of estabhshing Iris influence over Nagpoor, and of rescuing another principahty, whose existence promised us many most essential benefits ; moreover, it served to complete those defensive measures, which the suspected disposition of the regidar powers, and their present undisguised encourage- ment of the predatory bands, rendered more necessary than ever for the security of our own provinces. Perhaps the very imposing boldness of the step, which exhibited a degree of vigour and resolution proportionate to the certainty of giving offence, was its best recommendation to his lordship's mind ; inasmuch as it was calculated to impress on the native princes a sense of the vigilance and confidence of his administration. A brief notice of the condition ^f Ehopal will not be here out -of place. The territory of tliis state lies in the valley of the Nerbudda, and above the liills to the north, between the 77th and 78th degrees of east longitude. The government has 1814-15. BHOPAL. 39 been vested in a Patau family since the days of Aurung-zeeb. The reigning Chief in 1814 was Vizier IVIahommed, who had acquired the succession, rather by proving himself the fittest of the family to sustain its decHning fortunes in arduous times, than as the lawful heir by the rules of herechtary descent. The family had preserved their pohtical independence against the most active efforts of the IVIahrattas in the fulness of their military preponderance ; although their position immediately between the Bhoosla and the Sindheea made their territory the particular object of Mahratta jealousy, and presented, as long as it should remain inviolate, an effectual bar to the consoli- dation of the influence of that nation in this part of India. On . a former occasion, when General Goddard was sent by Warren Hastings with an expedition from Hindoostan, in execution of his sagacious plan of alarming the JMahratta powers, then con- federated against us, into the acceptance of his ovni terms of peace, by penetrating through the very heart of their pos- sessions, the existence of this independent principality was one of the principal encom*agements to make the attempt. The family are still in possession of the strongest testimonials from General Goddard of the important services rendered him by the reigning Nuwab ; indeed, the ultimate success of the enter- prise, and the final accomphshment of that officer's wonderful march across an enemy's country all the way to Surat, were mainly to be attributed to his having found this principality in a state of independence and hostility to the iVIalu-attas midway on liis line of march. The importance of saving such a friend, when a hostile com- bination of the jMahrattas was to be apprehended, must be obviovis enough. Already, in execution of the offensive and de- fensive engagements between Sindheea and the Ehoosla, was the best appointed force of the former, that commanded by Colonel Raptiste, on one part of the frontier ; while Sudeek Ulee Khan, 40 BHOPAL. 1814-15. with the troops of Nagpoor, approached it on the opposite side ; and another division of Sindheea's troops, that under JuswuntEao Bhao, was also in the neighbourhood. No time was to be lost. Sindheea had before frequently attacked this state, and even besieged its capital, but without success, owing partly to the in- capacity of the connnanders he employed and their general ignorance of the mode of attacking fortified places, and partly to the gallantry and skill of Vizier jNIahommed's defence. The ISIaha-Raja, however, had never before entered Ehopal A\itli so efficient an army, and Baptiste's knowledge of European tactics and long and successful practice in the various sieges he had hitherto conducted, seemed to leave but httle hope that the ^-^izier would be able to save himself and his dominions on this occasion. His perpetual hostihty to the Mahrattas had naturally made liim look to us as a resource in the hour of extremity ; and that hour was now fast approaching. He was accordingly induced to make a very earnest solicitation for our support ; and for that purpose despatched an agent to Dehlee, who waited on INIr. Metcalfe the British resident there, and submitted, on behalf of his master, a specific proposition to be admitted within the pale of our protection. His application had reached the Go- vernor-General a short time before he had made his deter- mination, which was not finally resolved on until the beginning of October. ^A'hen his mind was fully made up on the matter, he lost no time in instructing INIr. JNIetcalfe to entertain the proposition, and, in case the agent should be furnished with powers sufficiently ample and explicit, to conclude with hiiii an engagement on the following basis — " The British Government " to afford its protection against the present designs of Sindheea " and the Bhoosla, and a perpetvial guarantee for the future ; " the Nuwab to be left in complete independence in the " management of his internal administration ; — the British troops 1814-15. BHOPAL. 41 'f to have free ingress and egress tlirough the Bhopal territories, " together with every faciUty in tlie provision oi' their supphes " and necessaries — a fortress to be dehvered as a present depot, " and, eventually, a spot to be allotted for a cantonment or i)er- " manent station — the Nuwab to renounce all connexion with " the Findarees, and not to negotiate with other powers, except '• in concert with the Eritish Government, abiding by its ar- " bitration in all differences with them," How^ever, as it was thought proi)er to hold out the prospect of some advantage by W'ay of inducement to enter into an alhance of tliis nature, the recovery of all the territories of the state, then in the hands of the Pindarees, was to be proposed, and the (iovernor-General prepared himseh' to abandon the claim of a money consideration for the expense of defending the territory, though the demand of a proportion of the charge, if contested, w as not to be hastily relinquished. The negotiation with the legitimate Chief of Sagur was in- trusted to the political agent in Bundelkhund, jNIr. Wauchope, and the basis of the connexion to be offered and concluded was precisely the same : a large proportion of the expense, it was, however, confidently expected, would be borne by the Nana. On discovery that the agent of Dehlee had not full powers from the Nuwab of Bhopal, both negotiations were removed to Bun- delkhund, which, from its vicinity to the two districts, seemed to be the most convenient spot for conducting them. In support of the course of policy thus resolved u})on, the troops in Bundelkhund were reinforced, and held in reathness ; the Nizam's sid)sidiary force ordered to advance innncdiately from JAlna to Ellichpoor, near the northern extremity of the valley of Berar ; the Poena subsidiary force to hold itself in readiness to act in its support, by moving on Jafeerabad, in the neighbourhood of Jalna ; at the same time, the Bombay govern- ment was directed to draw together the whole of the Guzerat 42. BHOPAL. 1814-15. troops at some point eastward of that province. The object of these military arrangements was to overawe the jVIahratta powers and predatory bands, in the event of their evincing an inclina- tion to obstruct the execution of the treaties which mi";ht be concluded. Colonel Doveton, the commandant of the Nizam subsidiary force, began his march from Jalna on the 3d No- vember 1814; and it was intended that, with this army, he should penetrate into J3hopal, to execute the protective sti- pulations of the treaty with the Nuwab Vizier. The negotiations having been thus opened, Mr. Wauchope addressed a letter to the Nuwab of Ehopal, explaining at length the terms on which the Governor-General was disposed to receive that state under protection, in compliance with the solicitations of the agent of his court, preferred at Dehlee. He hinted also at the Nuwab's bearing some part of the expense. An immediate answer was received from \^izier ^Nlahommed, agreeing to all the stipulations proposed, with exception of the delivery of a fort for a present depot, and of bearing a jiart of the expense. For the discussion of these two points, he de- clared his intention of deputing an envoy, as soon as the return of the person he had sent to Dehlee, which was daily expected. Mr. Wauchope had been placed in communication with the residents at the respective courts of Sindheea and the Bhoosla, in order that he might keep them apprised from time to time of the state and progress of the negotiations : and these residents had been instructed, so soon as they should be advised of the adjustment of preliminaries, to explain fully to the respective courts the designs of the British Government, with the reasons for them, in such a manner, as they might deem least likely to create alarm. This being the first occasion of departure from the delicacy of interference we had hitherto so rigidly observed, in respect to states circumstanced like Bhopal and Sagur, it was deemed necessary that the British representatives at the courts 1814-15. BHOPAL. 43 of the independent princes should be prepared, both to assert the right of extending the pale of our protection to any power free to contract, and to rebut any imputation of intended injury to their interests resulting from such extension in the particular instance, by showing it to be simply a necessary precaution for the support of our own defensive system, and by no means designed or intended to thwart their respective views. The resident at Sindheea's court (Mr. Richard Strachey), conceiving the Nuwab of Bhopal's unqualified assent to all the fundamental articles of the Governor-General's proposition to amovmt to a preliminary adjustment of the terms of alliance, proceeded forthwith to make the official communication to Sindheea of the intentions of the British Government in respect to Bhopal, on advice of the substance of the Nuwab's reply to Mr. Wauchope. Sindheea, on receiving the communication, inveighed in the strongest terms against our interference with the affairs of BhopAl, declaring the principality to be one of his dependencies in Malwa, with Avhich we were solemnly pledged by treaty to have no concern. The resident denied that it fell within the terms of the trea,ty, asserting it to be a free and independent state. Gopal Rfio Bhao, who took a prominent part in the discussion, declared the several places which had been wrested from Vizier Mahommed by Sindheea at different times, to be cessions in lieu of tribute justly due, the account of which was still iinsettled, and represented our interference to prevent the enforcement of these his just dues, as tantamount to a positive declaration of war. In point of fact, according to the Mahratta notions of political justice, Sindheea had a good title to whatever he could extort from ]Jhopal ; and, having been in the habit of making usurpations, and levying contri- butions on this territory as his peculiar and exclusive prey, he conceived no one else had any right to interpose. Tliis is the 44 BHOPAL. 1814-15. meaning he attached to the word dependency. It was no- toribus, however, that ^^izier Mahonimed had long maintained a most glorious struggle for his independence, and neither had himself, nor had any of the family before him, ever by treaty, or [other act of any kind, acknowledged the supremacy of any Mahratta state. The discussions on this point grew particularly warm, Sindheea taking an active personal part in them, and using language which might have been construed into menace : and when, at the close of the interview, j\Ir. Strachey requested that Colonel Baptiste might be ordered to refrain from active hostility against Bhopiil, until the Governor-General's instruc- tions upon the resident's report of the conference should arrive, the request was distinctly refused. Indeed, considering that there was yet no actual treaty concluded with Bhopal, the demand was, perhaps, rather premature. This conference took place on the last day of Xovember ; and the tone then assumed by the durbar was nowise lowered at an interview obtained by Mr. Strachey's moonshee three days after. Immediately on being apprised that this communication had been made to Sindheea, the residents at tlie other ^Nlaliratta courts resolved very jii'opeily, no longer to defer a similar ex- planation. The Nagpoor Eaja required time to consider of liis answer ; but; on being pressed by Mr. Jenkins, privately assured that gentleman, that Sudeek Ulee Khan should be forbidden to join the army of Baptiste, or to act hostilely against Bhopal. It was farther ascertained, that this court would not oppose the advance of the siibsidiary force at Ellichpoor tln-ough the portion of its territories which lay on the route from that station to Bhopal, in case events should require its movement in that situation. A private correspondence, however, was kept up the whole time between the Bhoosla and Sindheea ; and the intrigues, wliich had before been commenced in other quarters, were carried on with renewed activity. 1814-15. BHOPAL. i^ The Pcfshwa, on being informed of the intentions of the British Government, in respect to IJhopal, professed to be highly satisfied, because of the security that wbuld result to the Jageers of sfeveral of his dependants in tlie neighbourhood. Amongst others, the Vinshorekeer, in -whose concerns he took particular interest, had large possessions about Ashta and Shujawulpoor, which the Pindarees and Sindheea's commanders were con- tinually plundering, and of the greater part of which they had already divested him. Notwithstanding the exterior appearance of amity assuriied at Nagpoor and Poona, which, in the case of the former, was carried so far as to produce an offer by Ragoojee of a body of his troops to be taken into British pay, and the pressure of this offer with some importunity, there was still little reason to doubt that both these courts were heartily bent upon the com- bination, which accounts from every quarter during the months of November, December, and January, reported to be organiz- ing against the British power. ]Mahrattas, Patans, and Pin- darees, seemed for the moment to have forgotten all their mutual jealousies, luuler the notion, that the moment was near at hand, which would give the opportunity of a successfid rise against our galling superiority. The discovery that we had planned an extensive war in the hills, in which their reasonings from past history led them to anticipate our certain failure, and this anticipation Avas favoured by the untoward events that marked the opening of the campaign in that quarter, mainly contributed to lead all ranks to speculate on the speedy occurrence of such an ojiportunity. It was evident, however, that they were not yet prepared to act, nor had formed any consistent plan of future conduct. To retiu-n to the movements of the Governor-General: at the same time that he proffered protection to Bhopfd and SAgur, -and made those arrangements in support of that measure, which 46 NIPAL. 1814-15. have been above detailed, he put four divisions in condition to take the field against the Nipalese ; two of which, those from Meeruth and Soodheeana, had actually penetrated into the hills before the close of October. The resources for these measures had been raised by the loan of a crore of rupees (1,250,000/. sterling), obtained by Lord Hastings from the Nuwab Vizier, Ghazee Oodeen Hyder, who had recently succeeded his father, Sadut Ulee Khan, on the Musnud of Oude. By this supply, the treasuries of the Bengal Provinces, which his lordship had found at a very low ebb, were at once placed in a condition to sujiport operations on a most extensive scale. The failure before the stockaded hill and fort of Xala-panee, in which Major-General Gillespie lost his life, occurred on the last day of October. The place was breached, and a second un- successful attempt made to carry it by storm on the 27th No- vember ; and, though by the effect of continual bombardment, and by cutting off the suppHes of water, which were derived from without, the garrison was ultimately obliged to evacviate the position, and was cut up a little in its retreat, by a party under Major LutUow, still the sinister influence of these events, in damping the ardour of our own troops, and in giving courage to those of the enemy and hopes to the malcontents in every part of the ample surface of India, was for a long time counter- acted by no one brilliant exploit of our arms. Major-General Ochterlony had yet been able to effect nothing against the strong position, in which he found Umeer Singh posted, on the heights of Ramgurh : and, although in the beginning of January, he, by a skilful manoeuvre, compelled the enemy to retire to the yet stronger range of Malaoun, there was little eclat in such success; and, in the interim, the year 1814 had closed with failures still more unpropitious than even those of Nala-panee. On the 27th of December, Major-General Martindell, who had succeeded to Gillespie's command, made a combined movement 1814-15. NIPAL. 47 to occupy two arms of the heights of Jytuk, \vhither Runjoor Singh, son of Umeer Singh, had fallen back from Xahn. The operation was well planned; but, failing on one arm in con- sequence of the impetuosity of the troops, the general, instead of reinforcing the other, on which he had been successful, ordered a retreat, in the face of an enemy elated with this double success. This retrograde movement was of course fol- lowed up by the enemy, and attended with the loss of many valuable hves, and was regarded by the Nipalese as an important victory. In addition to these checks, two detachments from the main army, which had been collected in Sarun, for the purpose of penetrating into the valley of Xipal and attacking the capital, were, on the new year's day, surprised and cut off nearly to a man : an event which induced IVIajor-General INIarly to rehnquish offensive measures altogether in that direction. Major-General I. S. Wood was similarly deterred from acting on the offensive, by the result of two unsuccessful reconnoissances of the enemy's force opposed to him in the quarter north of Goruckpoor, wherein much ammunition was expended and several hves lost, without any equivalent or the gain of a single object. The coincidence of so many untoward events, at the precise juncture when Sindheea had assumed the decided tone which has been mentioned above, gave the Marquess of Hastings ground seriously to apprehend that the crisis was imminent : had one other important check occurred in the months of January or February, it would probably have embroiled us with the whole of the native courts. The Governor-General resolved to be prepared for the worst at all points. Instead, however, of relaxing his exertions on the northern frontier, in consequence of the suspicious aspect of things on the south and west, his judgment dictated the necessity of putting forth his whole strength in that quarter, in order, if possible, to secure some early success, signal enough to counterbalance the effect 48 NIPAL. 1814-15. produced on public opinion, by such a multiplicity of conser- cutive reverses. The several divisions employed against the hill country were, therefore, reinforced to the utmost possible ex- tent, though at the hazard of weakening the defences of tlie southern frontier. The Sarun division was increased to nearly 13,500 men, whereof upwards of 3000 were Europeans. The command was also entrusted to another officer ; but General Marly's successor, Major-General George Wood, perplexed by the unknown dangers of the Sal forest, which must of necessity be penetrated before reaching the hills, confined his efforts to some movements in the open Teraee, or lowland, on the hitlier side of the forest. The whole plan of the campaign in that quarter, as well as in Goruckpoor, where Major-General I. S. Wood commanded, was thus immediately frustrated for the season. The dawn of success was nevertheless soon visible on the west, where Major-General Ochterlony began by reducing the forts of the Ramgurh range, which had been left garrisoned, when Umeer Singh had retired on MaMoun. This favourable outset was quickly followed up in KhumAon, by an irregular force employed in that direction, under the command of Colonel Gardiner. His attempt to penetrate to Almora, having shown this quarter to be a vulnerable point, a brigade of the regular army, under Colonel NicoUs, was pushed rapidly forwards. This officer, in the short space of less than a month, captin-ed the city of Almora, after having defeated and slain the military governor opposed to liim ; and effected the conquest of the whole pro- vince. The fall of Almora, however, did not take place before the 25th of April. In the interim, the heights of Malaoun* had been carried by General Ochterlony on the 15th; and Umeer Singh, who had shut himself up in the fortress of that name, was soon afterwards reduced to such extremity, as to be obhged to surrender on terms for himself and for his son, who was * Vide plate at the head of this chapter. 1814-15. NIPAL. 49 eq\ially hard pressed at Jytiik. The wliole of the hill tract, from the Gogra to the Sultej, was thus left at our disposal on the close of the campaign : a result which c()m})letely redeemed the reverses of its commencement, and raised the reputation of the British arms amongst the native powers of India, to a height proportionate to their sanguine expectations of defeat and disaster. The reader has been conducted thus suddenly to the ter- mination of the Nipal operations for this season, without regard to the order of time, or occurrence of intermediate events. We left the native powers in December, 1814, under a very different impression resjiecting the war in the hill covmtiy, from that which was forced upon them in the following ]VIay. The mili- tary arrangements which had been made in October, for the support of the Bhopal negotiations, w^ere not of a magnitude to meet the extent of that combination, which seemed to be organizing against us in the course of December. Instead of being overawed by them, as had been expected, Sindheea had openly declared his resolution not to desist from hostility against that principality : and, as the Governor-General was determined to persevere in the policy he had entered upon, it became necessary to extend the scale of preparation in that quarter, as well as to the north, so as to provide against all hazards. The whole disposable force of the Madras army was accordingly ordered into the field, under the personal command of Sir Thomas Hislop ; by which means a body of 13,000 men was brought together on the northern frontier of the British ])osses- sions in the Dukhun, at a point whence it could at any time move forward in support of the two subsidiary forces in ad- vance. Beinforcements were at the same time ordered into Guzerat from the Bombay presidency ; and it was his lordship's intention, in case matters should come to an actual rupture with Sindheea in confederacy with the Bhoosla and the predatory H 60 MILITARY PREPARATIONS. 1814-15. associations of central India, imnietliately to assume the of- fensive on the side of the Dukhun, while he maintained such an attitude on that of Hindoostan, as he hoped would secure him from attack. This latter object, however, was not of easy ac- comphshment, while the Nipal war continued to require such extraordinary exertions. There had been at one period of the season, upwards of 45,000 * fighting men engaged either in the hills or the Teraee. The mihtary establishments of the Bengal Presidency were, however, scarcely sufficient, even in ordinary times, to man a frontier of upwards of 1500 miles, from Sood- heeana to Cuttack, in such a manner as not to expose its weak- ness. Indeed, the whole frontier eastward of Mirzapoor was absolutely defenceless ; and the Pindaree incursion of 1812 had completely manifested our vulnerabihty in that quarter. In tills emergency, the following were the measures adopted. It had heretofore been the practice to leave nearly all the civil duties of the western provinces to be executed by the regular army ; by which means the battahons wei-e broken into detach- ments, and their disciphne and efficiency very much impaired. From these duties they were instantly relieved ; and until pro- vincial corps should have been formed for the pui-pose, the civil officers were ordered to take into their service such temporary bodies of armed men, as they might be able to procure on the spur of the occasion. An arrangement was at the same time effected, which contributed most materially to the advantageous display of the inadequate jueans left available for the defence of the pro- vinces : viz. the calling out of the grenadier companies of the regi- ments of the line, not on actual service in the field, and forming * According to the returns, there were at one time in the field, Regulars - - . 33,059 Irregulars - - . ' 13,570 Making a total of - 46,629 1814-15. MILITARY PREPARATIONS. 51 them into independent battalions ; while their place in the corps was directed to be filled up by supplemental companies. By this measure, an addition of seven battalions was at once made to the nominal force. Besides the above temporary expedients to meet the present exigency, considerable levies of irregvdar horse and foot were authorized ; and Lord Hastings further deter- mined to make a permanent addition of three regiments to the regular army, and to form six provincial corps, for the civil duties of the upper provinces. The irregular levies are of sudi a nature, as to be available the very moment they are raised ; and as the individuals, especially of the horse, generally come from those ranks most likely to be opposed to us, their enhst- ment is always a measure of obvious momentary expediency. The new regiments could not be rendered fit for duty in the current season ; but the motive of this augmentation was a firm conviction of the insufficiency of the military estabhshment, even for ordinary times ; more particularly since the Goorkha power had risen to such importance, that henceforth that frontier would require as much vigilance as the southern and western. The Burmese of Ava and Arracan had also lately assumed a tone which rendered it })robable that it would soon become necessary to have a permanent force in this direction likewise ; and neither they nor the Nipalese had theretofore entered into the calculations ^\hich had regubited the extent of the Bengal establishments. Inclusive of all the provincial and local corps, this augmentation would still carry the Iknigal army to no higher numerical amount than about 80,000 fighting men ; which would be the whole force relied on for the i)reservation and protection of half * a million of square miles, with a popula- tion of 40 millions, and a revenue of 12,000,000/. sterling. Such were the provisions made by the JNIarquess of Hastings * Including Oude and the protected states, but not the other presidencies. n 2 52 MILITARY PREPARATIONS. 1814-15. to meet the crisis expected to occur in the season of 1814-15, Had it happened then, instead of three years afterwards, these preparations would have been no more than sufficient. The gloomy aspect of the campaign in the hills in January, induced his lordship to apply for two adchtional king's regiments from the Cape and ^Mauritius ; and it was too late to countermand them, when the favourable turn of the tide had rendered their presence unnecessary. The more requisite precaution of re- cruiting the finances of the government by a second loan of a crore of rupees from the hoards of the Nuwab Vizier, con- tributed not a Httle to the facihty with which these extensive arrangements were completed *. It was, of course, some time before the above preparations could be put into a train of activity. The Madras army was not concentrated till JNIarch, when Sir Thomas Hislop assumed the command. By that time, however, it had become evident, that whatever necessity might have existed in December and January for military preparations on so large a scale, there was little chance that any part of the force assembled in every quarter would be called into active service this season. The interference we had abeady exerted in favour of Bhopiil, backed by such an appearance of precautionary vigilance, had proved sufficient to save the principaUty from attack ; and the con- federates not having yet gone the length of agreeing upon a specific plan of hostilities, which nothing on our part had oc- curred to precipitate, matters seemed, by general consent, to be subsiding into a state of repose, which, though wakeful and feverish, yet promised to last out the season. The Bhoosla Eaja, on our requisition, arrested the advance of liis troops ; and Sindheea, notwithstanding his bullying refusal to abstain * Upwards of half of the previous crore had been devoted by the council at Fort William to the payingoff of an old Igan, which imposed upon his Lordship the necessity of raising this further supply. 1814-15. MAHRATTAS. _ 53. from hostile measures when requested by the resident, took the first opportunity of (piietly withdrawing his forces. A fair occasion for so doing was offered by the violent conduct of Juswunt Eao Bhao, whose differences ^^dth Colonel Baptiste proceeded to the length of obliging the colonel to attack and drive him off. After this, Baptiste staid some time in the neighbourhood of Bhopal, negotiating with Vizier jMahommed ; he then turned westward, ostensibly in pursuit of Juswunt Kao, leaving Bhopal altogether unmolested. Sindh^ea had before the end of December received a letter, addressed to him by the Governor-General on the subject of the discussions which had occurred at liis durbar. This letter, after explaining the grounds on which Bhopal was dealt with as a state free to negotiate and concl^jfte alliances at will, professed a readiness to receive any statements and proofs to the contrary, that the durbar might have to exhibit ; requiring, however, a suspen- sion of all acts of hostihty towards the Bhopal territory, until the question of its pohtical independence should have been disposed of. The court immediately caught at this proposition, having, as it should seem, already come to the resolution not to hazard an open rupture, for which it was nowise prepared : after some delay, a paper of complaints was accordingly drawn up, asserting Bhopal to be one of the dependencies of Sindheea, but adducing no proof whatever ; and further, accusing the British Government of having interfered with Sindheea's rights and possessions, by the extension of its protection to some of the Bundela Chiefs — a complaint, now preferred for the first time, though the measure had been adopted some years before. The Kaja of Xagpoor also gave in a similar paper of objections to our connexion with BhopAl ; the arguments of which were too trivial to be worth the recital. The object of the jNIarquess of Hastings in inviting these durbars to the adoption of such a course of proceeding, was, to 54 MAHRATTAS. 1814-15, testify his adherence to that moderation and regard to the rights of others, wliich had been the constant aim of the British Go- vernment in its transactions with the native powers ; and, by opening a door to negotiation, to prevent any sudden recourse to violent measures, Hkely to bring on a premature explosion. It shovdd be recollected, that the Governor-General's principal view in proffering his protection to Bhopfd, had been to save that state from destruction, and thus prevent that union of interests between Sindheea and the Ehoosla, which must in- evitably have ended in fixing the dependence of the latter on the former. The advantage of the connexion as a mere de- fensive arrangement against the Pindarees, however important, would scarcely have induced his Lordship to step forward at the particular juncture, had not the other two objects been so in- timately blended with the prosecution of the same hne of policy. The salvation of the principality, however, and the obstruction of Sindheea's apparent views on Ntigpoor, would as well be accomplished by a slow negotiation, wliich left things inteniie- diately just as they were, as by the hasty employment of force, directed to the acquisition of the same objects. Should war be vuiavoidable in the end, still, in the then actual state of India, delay was necessary for the full development of our means, and for the removal of the unfavourable impression made by the recent occurrences of the Goorkha campaign. In every point of view, therefore, the course adopted by the Marquess of Hastings was most judicious ; inasmuch as, even granting that no satis- factory result could ever be expected from negotiation, time at least would be gained ; and time, in fact, was every thing. This resolution was formed early in December ; and in furtherance of it, Mr. Wauchope was directed, on the arrival of the envoy from Bhopal, to call upon him, in the first instance, to exliibit proofs of the independence of the principality. All these matters remained in suspense the whole of the 1814-15. BHOPAL. 55 ensuing January ; during which time, the Nuwab gave out that he was under British protection, addressing letters to the com- mandants of the two subsidiary forces in the Dukhun, and to other British authorities, as if engagements had been actually siffned and executed. At the end of January, he addressed a letter to Mr. Wauchope, informing him that his Dehlce agent had returned and acquainted him with all that had passed : that his vakeel should accordingly set off for Banda as soon as the jMohurrum '•• was over. No vakeel, however, was despatched before the 18th March, or appeared at Banda until the 5th April. It was positively ascertained that the Nuwab, satisfied of his security from the steps already taken by the Governor- General, imagined he might now look about for other ad- vantages, and had employed this interval in close negotiation with Baptiste and Sudeek Ulee Khan, not only while their armies were threatening his territory, when the excuse of im- minent danger might have been admissible, but even after they had retired to a distance, and there was no longer any fear of attack being meditated by the jMahrattas. jMoreover, notwith- standing that it was an express stipulation of the Governor- General, to which he had distinctly declared his acquiescence, that he should not negotiate except in concert with the British Government, he gave no intimation of any intention so to act, and carefully concealed the nature of his communications ; even denying the having sent an agent to the quarters of Baptiste after his retrograde movement, though the fact had been public and was universally known. After such duphcity, it was not to be expected that nego- tiations, if opened at Banda, would be prosecuted with any cordiaUty on the part of the Nuwab. The Governor-General accordingly determined, in order both to mark his sense of the conduct pursued by the Nuwab, and to prevent his further * A Mussulman-festival. Vide Hunter's Hindoostanee Dictionary. 56 BHOPAL. 1814-15. trifling ^dth the British Government, to order his vakeel to be dismissed without an audience, as soon as he should appear at Banda. These orders were executed, and the negotiation thus broken off in April. Vizier Mahommed was, at the same time, assured, that no ill-will was harboured towards him, and that it was merely because liis conduct had shown that he had not a proper sense of the value of the connexion offered to him, or of the spirit in wliich it ought to have been received, that the British Government, for the present, withdrew from the discussion of it. This result of the negotiation, and the insincerity of the Bhopal prince's behaviour, which had been the occasion of its abrupt termination, were communicated in due course by the residents at the respective independent courts. It was, however, distinctly asserted on the part of the Governor-General, in reply to the objections delivered in by Sindheea and the Bhoosla, that no proof or argument whatever had been adduced, that could be construed to limit or preclude the right of the British Government to take the principality vinder protection on any future occasion, or to show that it had at any time been other than perfectly free and independent. No answer was made to tliis communication by either court ; the point may therefore be considered to have been virtually conceded by the Mahratta potentates. The negotiation with the legitimate Chief of Sagur, which was a corollary to that of Bhopal, was abandoned at the same time ; the delav and evasions of the Nana, Govind Rao, having shown, that to him also, notwith- standing his original solicitations, the connexion had become a matter of indifference. The season was verging towards it close, ere these events were finally concluded ; yet the inimical disposition which had been testified by the powers of central India had begun visibly to subside, or at least to be more guarded and disguised, through the extinction of any hope, that an opportunity of breaking out 1814-15. CLOSE OF SEASON. 57 would be offered by tlie operations of the mountain war of Nipal. 'Vhv Ciovernor-Cieneral felt, therefore, that it was un- necessary longer to maintain the same attitude of military pre- paration, which had been assumed luider a different aspect of affairs. The ^Madras army was accordin<^ly broken iip, and the Guzerat force ordered back to its cantonments. The two sub- sidiaiy forces of the Dukhun remained for some time longer in the advanced positions they had occupied, with a view to afford as nuich protection to the territories of the Nizam and Peshwa against predatory incursion, as the extended line to be defended would admit. Thus ended the first season of active operations. The Nipalese were soliciting peace v.ith every appearance of sin- cerity ; the native powers of central India had been inspired with a degree of awe that kept them (piiet ; and Bhopal, though not yet linked in actual alliance with us, had been as effectually protectetl, as if the treaty had been signed. Moreover,^ the interest for its preservation, evinced on this occasion, promised to afford security for the future, by leaving the Mahratta princes under the apprehension of oiu- again ste]i)ping forward in a similar manner to thwart a similar design. The A^izier jMa^ hommed seems evidently to have antici})ated this consequence of his application to us ; indeed, his whole conduct shows that it was his intention, for his own security, to avail himself of the reputation of our power, rather than of its actual exercise ; and that he never had any serious thoughts of binding himself to us in any connexion, which would interfere with his political in- de])endence. This high-minded and ambitious Chief was un- willing to forego the prospect of self-aggrandisement and ex- tension of territory, at the expense of the regular as well as irregular powers, which hemmed him in on every side. His resort to us was a mere temporary expedient ; and he wished I 58 REFLEXIONS. 1814-15. to have no further intercourse, than was barely necessary to gain his pvu-pose. The policy of the Governor-General's offer of protection to Bhopal has since been brought into question, on the ground of its tendency to give birth to those very intrigues, and that very disposition to conspire against the British domination, from which he had apprehended danger to our interests. But the previous existence of these intrigues, as evidenced by Sindheea's connexion with the Bhoosla, and by the concurring reports of the several British residents at the native courts, was the prin- cipal, and perhaps the sole reason, that induced Lord Hastings to adopt the measure ; the object of which had been to anticipate, and thereby prevent, the perniciovis consequences to be expected from the projects of the Mahrattas at the particular juncture. Doubtless, when the outset of the Goorkha war had been un- propitious, and when such extensive exertions were required for its prosecution, it is scarcely conceivable, that the risk of giving umbrage to the INIahratta powers and entaihng fresh embarrassment would have been incurred, without a sense of most imperious exigency. But probably in the opinion of some people, the best argument in favour of the course taken is to be found in the result wliich actually followed, notwithstanding the unlooked-for disasters of the campaign. It will have been seen, that the estabhshment of Sindheea's influence over the Bhoosla, and the destruction of Bhopal, were thereby com- pletely prevented. Although the greater part of the force of the Bengal presidency was known to be occupied in the hill country, and daily accounts of reverses in that quarter nuist have been eagerly circulated, the jNIahrattas were nevertheless deterred by the formidable aspect of the British preparations from resenting in any way this undisguised and du-ect counter- action of their views. CHAPTER III. HYDERABAD - POONA. 1815 — June— July. Rains set in — Hyderabad — Nizam's sons seize a dependent of the Residency — guard set upon them obliged to retire — troops called into Hyderabad — their submission and confinement in Golkonda — Poona— account of Bajec llao — of Gykwar — his relation to Peshvva — to British — policy of Pcshwa, and claims on Nizam — on Gykwar — referred to British arbitration— award as to Ahmc- dabad — Trimbukjec Dainglia — Gungadhur Sastree's negotiation — Intrigues at Brodera — protest of British Resident — renunciation of the arbitration — Gun- gadhur practised upon, and gained over — pilgrimage to Nassick — Sastree gives offence — his destruction planned — pilgrimage to Pundurpoor — dissimulation — Sastree murdered. The preceding chapter brought down the transactions of India to the month of June, 1815. The rainy season then com- mences, wliich is usually the signal for the suspension of active warfare, and drives into cantonments the few remaining troojis, that the hot months of April and jMay have not already com- pelled to seek such shelter. Yet even the rainy period of tliis season was not without anxieties. AVhilst a large body of troops was cantoned in Eehar, waiting the issue of the negotiations with Xipal, which was to regulate its movements on the drying up of the waters, occurrences were passing in the Dukhun at the two friendly courts of the Nizafu and Peshwa, which excited the most lively interest, and developed, in a manner not to be mistaken, the real disposition of those powers. The Nizam's sons and relations were allowed to live freely in Hyderabad ; and, after the manner of INIoosuhnan princes all I 2 60 HYDERABAD. 1814-15. over the world, collected about them all the dissolute vagabonds of the city, by whose agency they prosecuted a regular system of insult and extortion upon the rich and quietly disposed part of the comnuuiity. The swarms of desperate characters and Patau bravoes, that habitually infest the streets of Hyderabad, had found in the scions of the reigning flimily apt leaders for all their excesses, whose influence at the palace screened them from pvuiishment for the most flagitious crimes ; insomuch that even the ministerial authority was frequently insulted, and mur- ders openly committed with impunity. The most profligate and debauched of the princes were the two youngest sons of the Nizam, Shumsham-ood-oullah and ]Moobariz-ood-oullah, with their cousin and brother-in-law, Imteeaz-ood-oullah. These young men were supported in their extravagancies by Tuhneeut- oo-Nissa Begum, the mother, and Jchan Purwar Begum, the wife of the Nizam, and, shielded by this influence, carried their audacity to the utmost pitch, while the weakness and timidity of Kaja Chundoo Lai, the minister, rendered nugatory his attempts to control them. On more than one occasion, their iniquities had been the subject of a direct representation from the British Eesident to his Highness the Nizam, vvho had ordered them to be subjected to some restraint in consequence: Their intrigues, however, baflled the minister's attempts to carry these orders into effect; and not being prepared to go the length of securing their persons, he could produce no rcfcrma' tion in their conduct. In the month of August, these libertines seized an attendant of the British Eesident, with a view to extort money from him. Mr. H. Eussell, the Eesident, immediately complained of this indignity to the Nizam ; who, resolving to place the young men in actual confinement, sent a party of his reformed infantry, under the command of Captain Hare, with orders to plant sen- tries about the houses in which they resided. In execution of 1814-15. HYDERABAD. Gl his orders, Captain Hare inarched first to the residence of jNIoobariz-ood-oullah. On ajjproaching it he was fired upon from tlie houses on cither side, in which Patans armed with matchlocks had been previously posted. Some loss was sustained on the occasion ; and, amongst others, an officer of the Re- sident's escort was killed. iVfter carrying one or two of the liouses, and putting the armed people found in them to the sword for the sake of example. Captain Hare pushed on to the palace of ]Moobariz-ood-oullah, where he found the gates closed, and other jDrej)arations made for resistance. He succeeded, hoAvever, in forcing open one of the gates with some six-povmders he had with him ; but seeing the increased number of opponents, and that further perseverance in the attempt to execute his orders woidd probably cause the Patau popvdation of the city to rise en itx/sse, he retired to the house of llaja Chundoo Liil, to wait for further instructions. jNIeantime tlie Eesident had called in the whole disposable force froni the adjoining cantonment of Secunderabad ; but finding the brigade there too weak to act against the city, and fearing that the present disturbance might lead to a general insurrection, he kept the detachment at the Residency, and immediately despatched requisitions, as well to Colonel Doveton,to move down on Hyderabad from the northern frontier, as to the officer commanding at Pellaree, to detach a reinforcement. In the interim, he suffered matters to remain in complete suspense. Tliis gave the princes time to leflect on the probable consequences of their inconsiderate conduct ; and the violence of tlie Patau character soon gave way to tlie aulld apprehension of what would be the result. Thus the ferment in the city subsided of itself, and the pi'inces were easily induced to throw themselves on the mercy of the Xizani, in whose palace they took refuge. jNIr. Russell urged the necessity of their strict confinement, and it was determined tliat they should be sent to the fortress of Golkonda. This sentence, however, was not carried into effect, until after repeated and very earnest 62 HYDERABAD. 1814-15. solicitations of the Resident, who had to encounter the arts and intrigues of the Nizam's mother and favourite wife, as well as the indifference of the minister. When, at length, the princes were ordered off to Golkonda, the two Begums resolved to accompany them ; and both actually went into voluntary con- ^ finement, hoping by this means to induce the Nizam soon to restore the offenders to favour. But his Highness coolly ob- served, on being informed of their departure, that they were very welcome to go, for he beheved it was himself they had rather be rid of than the English ; nor did he afterwards evince much anxiety to obtain the Resident's consent to the release of the culprits. The principal fomenters of the disturbance were shortly afterwards seized and executed. Mr. Russell, seeing tranquillity thus quietly restored, countermanded the march of Colonel Doveton from the frontier, but retained the reinforce- ments he had received from the south, thinking it necessary to maintain the force cantoned at Secunderabad in a state of greater efficiency, as a security against the evidently hostile disposition of the Patau population of the Nizam's capital. By the end of September this affair was completely settled, and order re- established on a firmer footing than before. While Hyderabad was under the alarm of these disturbances, events and discussions of a much more serious nature were passing at Poona. It will be necessary to the due understanding of these, to enter into a somewhat detailed explanation of the character of Bajee Rao's pohcy, and the arts by which he had raised himself from the situation of a fugitive, to that elevation of rank and power, which finally inspired the presumptuous confidence of abihty to cope with the British nation. It will be in the recollection of the reader, that Bajee Rao was the son of *Ragoonatli Rao, or Ragoobee, the uncle and * Vide Forbes' Oriental Memoirs; also Mills' British India, and the authorities there cited. 1814-15. POONA. 63 murderer of Nerayun Rao, brother and successor to the great Madhoo Rao, who was the last of the family of the Peshwas that wielded in his own person the undivided sovereignty of the ^lahratta empire. The murderer was expelled by a combina- tion of the Chiefs ; and the infant son of the murdered Nerayun was placed on the Guddee with the name of INIadlioo Rao Nerayun. During the minority, the power of the state was in the hands of a triumvirate, Madhajee Sindheea and Tukojee Hol- kar exercising independent authority in Hindoostan and Kan- desh, while Nana Furnavees managed with uncommon abiUty the more difficult government of Poona and the southern ter- ritories. In 1795, the nominal Peshwa, Madhoo Rao Ne- rayun, threw himself from a window of his palace in a sudden tit of anger, at a hasty word from Nana Furnavees, whose guardianship and strict control were becoming irksome to a prince already arrived at years of maturity. He died on the spot, leaving as iiext heirs the sons of Ragoonath, his father's murderer, of whom Rajee Rao, the eldest, was accordingly pro- claimed : but, as he immediately commenced intrigues to rid liimself of the Nana's ascendancy, a fruitless attempt was made by the latter to set up a younger brother, Chimna Appa. Ba- jee Rao, though young, was an adept in intrigue and dissimula- tion of all kinds. By caUing in the aid of Sindheea, he first ruined the Fvu-navees ; and then, by availing himself of Hol- kar's rivalry Avith that chief, set hmits to the control which the latter aimed to exercise over his administration. When, after Tukojee Holkar's death in 1797, Sindheea had, by espousing the cause of one of the legitimate sons, and by circumventing and slaying the other, established his entire ascendancy over the concerns of this rival family, he made no scruple of straitening - the Pcshwa's authority at Poona. To earn his favour, Bajee Rao put to death Eithojee, the brother of Juswunt Rao, both of 64 POONA. - ,1814-15. whom were bastard sons of Tukojee Holkar. This act, which was committed in the firm beUef that the Holkar interest was irretrievably ruined, occasioned the irreconcileable hatred of Jus- Avunt Eao, and prevented a resort to the old policy of opposing the Holkar to the Sindhcea, when the fortunes of the former family were restored by the abilities and activity of the surviving bastard. Thenceforward, the only counterpoise to Sindheea seemed to be the British power ; and, as it was an early object of Lord ^Vellesley's policy, to detach the Poona state from the other jVIahratta chieftains, and bring it under the influence of the British Government, it became Bajee Kao's study to alFect to receive favourably the overtures made him on the subject ; and, by keeping up the appearance of a secret negotiation witli the British Kesident, to excite Sindheea's alarms, whenever he had any point to carry. Though the intrigues and activity of Juswunt Kao, and other chiefs in Hindostan, fomented under- hand by Bajee Eao himself, diverted Sindheea from the affairs of Poona and the Dukhun, about the year 1800, and left the Peshwa more free to pursue his own projects, still he had little authority over the powerful feudatories of the empire, but such as he derived from Sindheea's countenance and supe- rior means ; so that, until the victory of Juswunt Rao Holkar -over their joint forces, and his consequent flight from Poona into the Konkan, to throw himself under the protection of the English, he could be regarded as little better than a j)ageant in that chieftain's hands. The British army restored him to his capital and to independent authority within the Poona ter- ritory ; but bovmd him, as a condition of the alliance, in all transactions with the Nizam and with the independent jNIah- ratta powers, such as Holkar and Sindheea, to square his policy to our views. Amongst other matters, it was specially pro- vided in the treaty of Bassein, that the British Government should arbitrate the claims of the Pesliwa on the Gykwar state, 1814-15. GYKWAR. 65 in case it should be found im})ossil)le to settle them by amicable adjustment. As it was out of this very adjustment that the discussions and events arose, Avhich are about to be related, we shall be excused a short digression, for the purpose of explaining tlie nature and origin of the claims in question. The rise of the ( iykwar's ])ower in ( iuzerat was almost con- temporaneous with that of the I'cshwa's at Poona. Pillajee Gykwar, the first of the family, was Potel (managing proprietor) of a village near Poona. He entered the service of Trimbuk Kao, the Senaputtee, or general, of the Suttara dynasty, v.lio, after the conquest of Guzerat, ojiposed in arms the ascendancy of the first Peshwa. Pillajee was a principal officer of the Sena- puttee, when the latter was defeated and slain in 1731. After a struggle with the Powars, and other JNfahratta families, he cbtai)ied the chief management on behalf of the Senaputtee's descendants, and thus established his own power, by the same arts the Peshwa himself had practised towards the Suttara Kaja. Dying in 1747, his son Damajee succeeded to his rule, and received the additional title of Shumsheer Bahadhur, from the nominal head of the Senaputtee's family, which is the last act of authority that family appears to have exercised. Tlie Gykwars made good their independence in the province against the Peshwa's attempts to reduce them by force. aVrms proving unavailing, negotiation was tried, in order to procure an ac- knowledgment of supremacy. In the course of it, Damajee engaged in a conspiracy against the Peshwa's power, at the head of which was the Dhabareea of Tulleegfun. He marched his troops into the Dukliun in su])port of the conspirators ; and, on their failure, was himself ciicinn vented by a truce, pending which he was surprised and taken prisoner by Ealajee Peshwa. He was not released till he had agreed to resign the half of his possessions in Guzerat, to acknowledge his holding the other half in fief of the Peshwa, and to unite his forces with those of K 66 GYKWAll. 1814-15; Balajee, in a joint expedition for the reduction of Alimedabad, then in the tenure of the jMoghuls. This place, if conquered, was to be similarly divided. Ealajee's brother Eagoonath, father of Bajee Rao, commanded the Peshwa's troops on this enter- prise ; and Damajee having executed the first part of the treaty, in spite of the opposition of the ministry, who had conducted affairs during his captivity, Ahmedabad was reduced by their joint arms in 1753. Since then, Damajee continued a faithful dependent of the Pcshwa. He was present at the battle of Puneeput, in 1761, and attended at Poona in aid of Eagoonath the regent during Madlioo Rao's minority. For his services on this latter occasion he obtained the grant of Guzerat in per- petuity, together with the title of Sena Khas khel, or com- mander of the special band. In the subsecpient differences between the uncle and nephew, he took the part of the former ; but Madhoo Rao, being successful, punished him by the im- position of an annual tribute of 5^ lack rupees, and the furnish- ing of a contingent of 5000 horse. Damajee died five years after, in 1768, when the succession was disputed between Go- vind Rao, the second son by the first wife, and Syajee, the eldest son by the second wife ; which latter was almost an idiot, set up by Futteh Singh, another son, with a view to personal aggrandizement. Penthng this dispute, the Peshwa was enabled to enhance liis tribute by selling his countenance to the liighest bidder ; and Futteh Singh in the end carried the day, by agree- ing to an annual payment of 1,779,900 rupees, and to a money compensation, in hen of the contingent, of 675,000 rupees. With the help of the British he expelled his rival, and then paid his tribute or not according to his own abiUty, and to the Peshwa's means of enforcing it. It was, however, stipulated in the treaty concluded by us with Futteh Singh, in 1782, that he shovdd pay to the Peshwa the same tribute, and yield liini the same obe- dience as before the treaty. Futteh Singh died in 1789 ; and 1814-15. GYKWAR. 67 there have since been three successions. In 1802, Anund Rao, the reigning Gykwar, received a British subsidiary force, and made several cessions to reimburse the expense of an expedition, fitted out by the Bombay Presidency, to rej)el an invasion of his territory by ^Nlulhar Bao Holkar. On the last day of 1802, the treaty of Eassein was also concluded with the Teshwa. In 1 803, territory, yielding a revenue of 780,000 rupees, was ceded by Anund Rao in lieu of the subsidy ; and the force being in- creased in the course of the year, further cessions were added to the amount of 290,000 rupees. The British Government had since taken upon itself the guarantee of the Gykwar's debts, and the management of the greater part of liis territory ; and the cessions altogether amounted in 1814-15 to 13^ lacks. While we were thus gradually and peaceably establishing a complete ascendancy in Guzerat, the Peshwa's claims under tlie two engagem.ents with Damajee and Futteh Singh wei'e little attended to. At our suggestion, soon after the treaty of Eas- sein, Bajee Rao was induced to grant a farm of his share of Ahmedabad to the Gykwar for ten years. The fixed rent of this lease was regularly ])aid him ; but no steps were taken to bring the other matters in dispute to an adjustment, Bajee Rao having never thought proper to advance his claims. The reason of this negligence may be found perhaps in the pohcy he was pursuing nearer home. The ten years, that followed the restora- tion of his authority at Poona by the British arms, Avere sys- tematically devoted by Bajee Rao to the humiliation of the old Mahratta families, who, enjoying large jagheers and military tenures, on every occasion of ferment, chose their party, accord- ing as best suited their immediate interest, without conceiving themselves under the smallest obligations of fidehty and alle- giance to the Pcshwa's legitimate authority. He had conceived a particular enmity against this class, from a conviction that the state, to which he had been reduced by Juswunt Rao Holkar, k2 ^8 PESHWA. 1814-15- aiid the necessity he had felt of applying to the British for succour (a step most derogatory to the jMahratta name and reputation), was owing entirely to his having been deserted in the hour of need by the immediate vassals of the empire. He seems, therefore, very early to liave formed the resolution of seeking eveiy means of reducing this formidable class, and either hereafter entirely dispensing with them, entertaining what troops he might need individually, and in small bodies not ex- ceeding one hundred under one commander, or at least of re- modeUing the fiefs in such a manner as should leave the vassal in the most abject dependence on liis superior lord. The British subsidiary force, which was ever prompt to enforce the Peshwa's just rights, was the engine he relied on for the re- estabHshment of his authority over these jagcerdars ; but, as this force was only available Avliere right Avas on his side, he- contrived to turn its name, and the apprehension created by its state of perpetual efficiency, to equal account, on many occa- sions, when perhaps he could not have connnanded its actual service. In the course of the ten or eleven years following the treaty of Bassein, this policy had been successful in ruining b}' far the greater part of the old Mahratta famihes. The great power of the jageerdars southward of Poona, and the circum- stance of their having done good service to the Duke of Wel- lington, in the campaign which restored Bajee Eao to his capital, rendered it necessary for him to submit to our adjust- ment his relative rights over these latter. He was, however, greatly chscontcnted at the adjustment finally made by us in 1812, because it required him to renounce in perpetuity liis groundless claim of sovereignty over Kolapoor and SaAATint- waree, and fixed and defined liis other dues, which it is ahvays a favourite object of JMahratta pohcy to keep indefinite. Of course, having accepted the arbitration of the differences, we became the guarantee of its execution on both sides. It was 1814-15. PESHWA. 69 now found to be Bajce Rao's artifice to hold the jagecrdars to the fulfihnent of their \mvt of the award with the utmost rigour, leaving, at the same time, such inducements to deviate from the letter of it, that some were occasionally foiuid tri])ping, so as to forfeit our guarantee, and to give Jlajee Eao a claim to our assist- ance towards their reduction. The case of the Rasteeas, very powerful southern jageerdars, is a notable instance. While urging to us the necessity of chastising their confirmed obsti- nacy and refusal to furnish their full quota of troops, Eajee Rao was privately assuring the family, that he had no design to ruin them, and thus encouraging their resistance, until their utter destruction was finally effected by our agency. By the year 1813-14, the uniform prosecution of this crafty ])olicy had succeeded in effecting the consolidation of the Peshwa's authority over the whole of his Poena dominions ; it had also filled his treasvmes, as well by bringing into them the large revenue theretofore appropriated by individuals, as by the rigid exaction of fines and penalties. I'ntil these domestic objects had been attained, foreign affairs did not seem to occupy niuch of his attention ; to them he now began to devote himself. The Peshwa's government had indefinite claims on the Nizam ; amongst others, one for clwut on the revenue of nearly his whole dominions, originating in concessions made in an hour of extremity by Nizam Ulee Khan, but neither intended nor ex- pected to be observed, unless the same necessity should annually recur. These claims, hoAvever, the British government had engaged by the treaty of Bassein to adjust and determine ; and Bajee Rao began about 1813-14 to be most importunate for some adjudication. ^Vfter some time spent in pressing for a decision, the supreme-government resolved, that the senior assistant to the resident at Poona should repair to Hyderabad with the ministers of the Ponna state, and a commission be there instituted, to consider and ascertain the relative rights of the 70 PESHWA. 1814-15. parties. From this time forth nothing more was heard of the Peshwa's claims. He ceased to urge them the instant he found in us a readiness to perform our part of the engagement for their settlement ; either from distrust of our arbitration, or from an unwillingness to have his dues fixed and set at rest for ever. The claims on the Gykwar were brought forward at the same time, and the decennial lease of the moiety of Ahmedabad being about to expire, Bajee Kao gave notice of his intention to take the management into his own hands, and on no account to renew the lease. With respect to the other matters at issue, it appeared, that four years before the conclusion of the treaties of Bassein and Brodera, the Gykwar had, through fear of Sind- heea, agreed to pay up all arrears on Futteh Singh's engage- ment, besides fifty-six lack for his own investiture. It was on this basis that Bajee Kao expected the present adjustment of his pecuniary demands. They had been suifered to he by so long, that, when the account came to be made up, they were found to amount to a sum considerably exceeding three crore of rupees, of which upwards of two crore were on account of arrears of the tribute and commutation money agreed to by Futteh Singh, the remainder for the moiety of acquisitions made by Damajee, subsequently to the capture of Ahmedabad, besides the item of fifty-six lack above mentioned for the in- vestiture of Anund Rao, and upwards of thirty-nine lack in Uquidation of an old account. The Gykwar had little to set off against these claims, and was evidently in no condition to make good so heavy a balance, as would ultimately have proved to have been due, if the account had been settled on this basis. At the suggestion of the British Government *, Gungadliur Sastree, the * Gungadhur Sastree evinced extreme aversion to visiting Poena. The Peshv?a induced our government to urge it upon him, under our guarantee for 1814-15. PESHWA. 71 prime minister of the Gykwar state, came under our guarantee from Brodera to Poona, to endeavour to make some adjustment or compromise of these claims. He hoped also to obtain a renewal of the lease of Ahmedabad, by offering some advance of rent. This latter object was in vain attempted in every possible shape. Accordingly, in June ISl-l, the resident at Poona was obliged to consent to the half of ^Vhmedabad being dehvered to the Peshwa's officers ; and orders were issued for the purpose. The soubaship was given by Bajee Eao to Trimbukjee DaingUa, who deputed an agent of his own to take charge of the Peshwa's interests there. Tliis Trimbukjee had risen from the meanest origin by the basest arts. He was first a menial servant, then one of the famihar companions of Eajee Pao, whose social hours were passed in witnessing exliibitions of the grossest debauchery, and had risen to favour by the con- spicuous profligacy, with A\liich he ministered and assisted at such entertainments. Though known to have been some time a personal favourite, it was not till after the above appointment, and his nomination to command the contingent, when called out in 1814-15, that he was introduced by the Peshwa to Mr. El- pliinstone, as a person high in confidence. He thenceforward regularly assisted at all conferences, assuming at them a tone of arrogance and undisguised ambition, which seemed to advance him in his master's favour, in proportion as his tone was height- ened ; a clear indication of the change of Bajee Eao's sentiments or designs, and of his beginning to feel the British connexion, rather in the restraints it imposed on his desire to restore the Mahratta empire to its pristine splendour, than in the security his safety, by the holding out to us, that he was willing and able to come to an amicable arrangement, if he could have a personal communication with the Sastrce. But his real object seems to have been, to remove from the court of Brodera a minister, who was sure to oppose the conspiracy then in agitation for a general league against the British power. 72 PESHWA. 18U-15. it gave to the possession of what remained under his immediate sway. Mr. Elpliinstone early marked this change, and gave a prophetic warning to his own government, that a serious rupture must inevitably ensue, if Bajee Rao persevered in giving ear to the flagitious counsels of this abandoned favourite. The trans- actions of every day, after this man's influence had been esta- bhshed, bore evidence of the truth of this prediction ; and it was further attested by the conduct of the agent whom he sent to Ahmedabad, and who there commenced a course of intrigue and aggression, from which even the subjects of the British Go- vernment in the adjacent districts did not escape unmolested. ]\Ieanwliile Gungadhur Sastree, instead of meeting a reci- procal disposition to bring matters to a speedy adjustment, had to encounter systematic evasion and subterfuge. The Peshwa's ministers showed no inclination to accommodate matters, and would not recede an iota from their demand. He began there- fore to be sensible that his object could not be gained without larger sacrifices, either in satisfaction of the claims in dispute, or in personal gratifications to the ministers, than he felt himself authorised to consent to. This turn of the negotiation, in so far as it gave him time, which he hoped would bring the Poona court to a right understanding of his master's means, and of the futility of pretensions so much exceeding them, was not unacceptable to the Gykwar envoy. But the objects of Bajee Rao, or rather of Trimbukjee, who seems from the first to have been entrusted with the whole conduct of this negotiation, equally required time for their development. It happened, that the Gykwar minister had a rival for his official station at Brodera, in the person of Seeta-Rara, the former dewan of our choice, who was still supported by a strong party in the palace of the Gykwar, notv>ithstanding that the Sastree had, on Futteh Singh's elevation, obtained the entire control of affairs, by the direct interference of the British govern- 1814-15. PESHWA. 73 ment. Since then, Seeta-Ram liad been under some degree of surveillance, though by no means strict. Trinibiikjee, however, avaihng liimself of the Sastree's absence from Brodera, set on foot an intrigue, the object of which was to replace his rival in the ministry, to the Sastree's exclusion, and thus to establish the Peshwa's influence at the court of Brodera, in lieu of that of the British Government. In furtherance of this plan, an agent, named Govind Rao ]>urdojee, came from Seeta-Ram, in October, 1814, and was well received at Poona. A second agent, Bhug- wunt Rao, came in the month of January following ; and, on the Busunt Punchumee * festival, by the good offices of Trim- bukjce, they both obtained a favourable reception from the Peshwa himself, at the public audience of that day, wliich occurred in February, 1815. A letter was also procured in the hand- writing of Anund Rao, the nominal Gykwar, from wliich it would seem that he did not altogether discountenance these intrigues ; and they were more openly espoused by a party amongst the women of his household. It should be observed, too, that they were most active just at the time, when the re- verses at the opening of the Goorkha campaign, and the state of the negotiations respecting Bhopal, gave the Marquess of Hastings such strong reason to apprehend the worst from the disposition of the Mahratta powers towards the British interests. On the first appearance of these intrigues in October, jVfr. Elphinstone had protested against them ; whereupon Bajee Rao's ministers did not affect to deny their existence, but, on the contrary, justified them on the ground that the Gykwar was a dependent of the Peshwa, who was bound to look after his vassal's interests, that through the Sastree's mismanagement had been suffered to go to ruin. AVhen jNIr. Elphinstone argued, that his Highness's attempt to interfere was subversive of the British alhances with both states, our influence having * A Hindoo festival. Vide Hunter's Hindoostanec Dictionary. L, 74 PESHWA. 1814-15. been instrumental in producing the existing arrangements at the court of Brodera, under authority acquired by treaties with the Gykwar, which the subsequent treaty of Bassein had for- mally recognised; the argument seemed to make little im- pression, and produced no relaxation in the activity with which the intrigues were carried on. In October, Mr. Elphinstone had confined liimself to the request, that Gungadhur Sastree shovdd be dismissed, since no good seemed likely to result from protracting an amicable negotiation with a party, whom it was endeavoured at the same time, by secret intrigue, to undermine and remove from office. Howevei", at the Sastree' s own request, he refrained from insisting on this point. Gungadhur, it seems, was himself unwilling to break off the negotiation, having still hopes of effecting an amicable compromise by delay ; and he had been relieved from any fear in respect to the result of the in- trigues at Brodera, by Seeta-Eam's being subjected to further restraint, at the suggestion of the English Eesident at the court of the Gykwar. But in February, when it became evident to Mr. Elphinstone, that the negotiation must come to notliing if conducted in the manner it had been, and the arrival of the second agent from Seeta-Ram showed the . increased and alarm- ing vigour with which the intrigues were still pursued, he distinctly informed the Peshwa's government, that, unless the right wliich had been asserted to interfere in the internal ad- ministration of the Gykw^ar's affairs were formally renounced, the P6shwa must not expect the British government to arbitrate, or assist in enforcing his claims upon that state. At the same time, he demanded that the two agents of Seeta-Bam shovild either be delivered up, or at least discountenanced and dis- missed as offenders and conspirators against the established government of the Gykwar principality ; giving notice also, that unless the latter demands were complied with, he would break off the negotiation altogether, and the Sastree must return to Brodera by the end of Mai'ch. As Bajee Rao was not disposed 1814-15. PESHWA. 75 to make any renunciation of his asserted right, the negotiations, as far as the British Resident was concerned, were droj)ped on this ground, which was again most fully explained on the first day of the following month. GungacDiur was likewise recalled, and instructed to prepare for his departure ; but he was not forbidden to enter into a private negotiation for the settlement of the matter, without the participation of the British govern- ment, if he saw a favourable opportunity, and could effect it within a reasonable time. The bringing of matters so suddenly to this issue completely disconcerted Bajee Eao and his council ; for the Peshwa's go- vernment was in no condition to enforce any part of his claims, except by means of the Jh'itish ; and the main-spring of his intrigues with the faction opposed to Gungadhur was, the hope held out to them of granting in their favour better terms of settlement than Gungadhur could obtain by our arbitration. The Resident having now made the Peshwa's abandonment of all pretension of right to interfere with the Gykwar a condition of his exerting the British influence to obtain any thing from the present ministry of Brodera, while Bajee Rao firmly persisted in the resolution not to renounce the pretension, the other party had the decided advantage ; for he was at hberty either to join in insisting on the renunciation as a preliminary,, and thus evade payment of any thing ; or, by tendering a pror position for a separate adjustment on moderate terms, to save Bajee Rao from the supposed humiliation of publicly conceding the right to interfere. Every device was put in practice to induce Mr. Elphinstone to abandon this ground ; but having once assumed it, and being sensible that, with a view to the maintenance of our existing influence and relations with the Gykwar, the right of a third power to interfere could on no account whatever be recognised, it was of course impossible to recede. The consequence was, that Bajee Rao and Trimbukjee L 2 7^ PESHWA. 1814-15. immediately changed their behaviour towards the envoy, and now endeavoured by every art to win liim over, and to induce him to remain at the durbar, notwithstanding his recal. In this object they were successful. They commenced by opening a negotiation with every appearance of cordiality, the object of wliich was, to compromise the whole of the Peshwa's claims past and to come, by the cession of territory yielding a revenue of seven lack of rupees. This mode of adjustment was sug- gested by the Sastree himself, in order to flatter Bajee Rao's known eagerness for the extension of liis personal dominions ; and certainly it was the most favourable one for the Gykwar interests that could possibly be made ; for, besides arrears, the annual tribute claimed, amoimted, including the commutation for mihtary service, to upwards of twenty-four lack. Having this adjustment very much at heai"t, the Sastree resolved to stay and pursue the negotiation, without the participation of the British resident at Poona. Had there been occasion to refer to him, JNIr. Elphinstone was of course prepai'ed to resume the ground he had before made his stand upon ; but so long as the treaty could be carried on \nthout such a reference, he saw no objection to letting it take its o\\^^ course. In this manner passed the month of jNIarch, without the dis- missal of the Sastree. The negotiation continued open through the whole of April ; in the coiu'se of which month, no effort was spared to win him over to the interests of the Poona court. The Peshwa's sister-in-law was offered to his son in marriage, and the chief ministry of the Peshwa's affairs, that is to say, the situation held by Suda-Sheeo-Bhao jNIankeshur, was tendered to his acceptance. There can be no doubt that he was dazzled by these offers, and not only gave a favourable ear to them, but contracted a degree of intimacy with Trimbukjee, through whom they were made, which was very unusual amongst natives of rank, and, considering the previous animosity on both sides, 1814-15. PESHWA. 77 rather extraordinary. In the month of May, Eajcc Rao came to a determination to commence a series of pilgrimages, whereof the first was to be to Nassick near the source of the Godaveree. The negotiation for the marriage was at this time in a state of so much forwardness, as to induce the Pcshwa to take his family with him to Nassick, and to make preparations to have the ceremony performed at that place ; and in this idea the journey was commenced in May. In the mean time, however, Gun- gadhur had referred the proposed compromise of the claim on the Gykwar to Futteh Singh, the representative of Anund Rao, on whose part he rather unexpectedly met with a decided re- pugnance to a territorial cession of any extent, however hmited. In the hope of surmounting this difficulty, he did not candidly explain it to the Peshwa's government, but commenced a series of evasions for the purpose of gaining time. He also put off the marriage on various pretexts, not wishing it to take place, unless the adjustment was hkewise effected, which he daily found it more difficult to accompUsh. This conduct had the appearance of sUght ; and the Sastree having refused to suffer his wife to visit the wife of Bajee Rao, on the ground of the notorious licentiousness that prevailed in the palace of the Peshwa, all these circumstances, superadded to the tUsappoint- ment of faiUng to gain over a man so eagerly courted, produced a second change of disposition towards him, and revived the hatred that before subsisted in an aggravated degree, and with the further stimulus of personal pique for a private injury. Trimbukjee began to feel that he had committed liis master iji the matter of the marriage ; to break off wliich, after the famihes had been brought to Nassick for the purpose, and after all the publicity of preparation, would bring ignominy on the head of the Mahratta nation. Bajee Rao, who was naturally of a suspicious and resentful temper, seems from tliis time to have vawed revenge, and found in liis favourite a most willing in- 78 PESHWA. 1814-15. struraent. A plan was accordingly laid for the assassination of the Sastree, and prosecuted with a depth of dissimulation, which astonished even Mahratta dupHcity. The terms of intimacy that subsisted between Trimbukjee Daingha, and the object of tliis plot had grown so extremely familiar, wliile matters were running smoothly on, that the former, in an unguarded moment of friendly conversation, acknowledged, that during their pre- vious differences, he had resolved upon the other's destruction, and had even planned his death, in case he had taken his dis- missal when Mr. Elphinstone began to press it. This had been communicated by the Sastree to Mr. Elphinstone during the journey to Nassick, and doubtless was enough to have put him on his guard, by showing the character of the man he had to deal with. Yet such was the art with which both Trimbukjee and his master continued their intercourse with him to the last, that although liis destruction was meditated more than a month before it was put into execution, their victim never suspected any change of sentiment towards himself When the Nassick pilgrimage was accomplished, he assented with the utmost con- fidence to Trimbukjee's suggestion of proceeding to Pundurpoor on the Bheema with a smaller equipage, and sent the greater part of his escort, and half the establishment of the mission, to wait his return at Poona. Particular anxiety was shown, that Bapoo Myral, a penetrating wary Mahratta, who had been associated with the Sastree in the mission, though in a subor- dinate character, should not accompany the court to Pvindur})oor ; but this was attributed to some personal dislike, supposed to be entertained against him, rather than to fear of his prudence and foresight. It was a more important point to keep JMr. El- phinstone, who had attended the Peshwa as far as Nassick, from proceeding further; but the resident needed no more, than to find, that his attendance was not desired. While, therefore, the Peshwa continued his route to Pundurpoor, this gentleman 1814-15. PESHWA. 79 took the opportunity of visiting the more venerable remains of Ellora, to which the caprice of modern su])crstition did not attach an equal sanctity. About the end of June or the beginning- of July, Bajee Eao and Trimbukjee set off from Nassick, taking the devoted Sastree in their train. It was given out, as upon certain information received from several quarters, particularly from Nagpoor whence an agent had arrived, that a design had been formed against the Peshwa's life, and that Patau assassins had been engaged at Hyderabad for the purpose, who were on their way to execute their commission. Parade was made of every possible precaution against this imaginary danger. Access to Bajee Rao became more and more difficult : and he travelled, quite contrary to his usual practice, surrounded by armed attendants. ^Vhen the court arrived at Pundurpoor, these precautions were further increased ; and the Sastree ascertained that Seeta-Ram's agent, Burdojee, had been again admitted to favour, and had come to Pundurpoor escorted by one of Trimbukjee's people. He com- plained of this, but had yet no suspicion of the designs against himself. On the 14th July, the Sastree had been at an enter- tainment given to the Peshwa. On his return at night, feeling indisposed, he gave orders, that any one who should come with an invitation to go to the temple, should be told that he was unwell, and unable to attend. One Luchmun Punt came with such an invitation from Trimbukjee, and returned with that answer. The message was repeated, with notice, that as the Peshwa himself was going in the morning, the crowd had retired, and he had better come immediately with a small retinue. The Sastree, still feeling unwell, refused a second time, but sent two of his suite in his place. On their arrival, Trimbukjee, who was waiting at the temple, said to one of them (Roujee Mahratta), " I have twice sent notice to the Sastree that he had better " come to prayers now, but he refuses. I wish you would again " try to persuade him." Roujee accordingly returned, and 80 PESHWA. 1814-15. Gungadliur Sastree, fearing he might offend Trimbukjee by a third refusal, set off ^^'ith only seven unarmed attendants. On their way inquiries were overheard in a whispering tone, " which " is the Sastree ?" His attendants, in answer, pointed to the person that wore the necklace. This did not attract particular notice, having passed in the confusion of a crowd. Arrived at the temple, the Sastree j:>erformed his devotions, and continued some time in talk with Trimbukjee. On his return, he left three of his seven attendants, with an old family priest, whom he met at the temple, and walked back, escorted by a party of Trimbukjee's sepoys. He had not gone far, when three people came running up from behind, calhng out to make room, and flourisliing what seemed to be the twisted cloths used in clearing the way. On coming near the Sastree, one of them struck him from behind, and the blow proved to have been given with a sword. Others closed in from the front, and in an instant despatched him, wounding and putting to flight liis four at- tendants. The Gooroo*, who was following from the temple with the other three, came up while the flambeaux which had been thrown away were still smoking, and found the body shockingly mangled. They had met five men with drawn swords running back to the temple, where they had left Trim- bukjee just before they drew near to the spot. Indeed, there could be no doubt that Trimbukjee had contrived and super- intended the assassination. His conduct, when apphed to next day by the Sastree's people, who demanded an investigation for the discovery of the murderers, sufficiently e\anced his guilt. He said it was impossible to discover upon whom to fix suspicion, for the Sastree had many enemies, as for instance, Seeta-Eam, who was under restraint at Brodera, and Kanojee, one of the Gykwar family confined by the English in the Carnatic, avoiding, however, the least mention of Burdojee and Bhugwunt, though * Family priest 1814-15. PESHWA. 81 the former was known to be at Pundurpoor at the time. The Sastree's people got leave next day to return to Poena, where the rest of the mission was with Bapoo Myral ; and it was intimated to them, that there was no necessity for their again approaching either the Prshwa's or Trimbukjee's quarters. In the mean time, Bajee Eao, who heard of the murder the night of its occurrence, redoubled the precautions for liis personal safety. Trimbukjce too never went out without a strong guard ; both evidently apprehensive of retahation. Not only was no investigation set on foot, but the matter was prohibited to be talked of; and spies were employed to give notice of such as offended in tliis respect, Avho were apprehended vnider Trim- bukjee's authority. Burdojee and Bhugwunt came openly to Poona, where they lived without privacy or concealment. With these events, the month of July 1815 was brought to a close. The proceedings instituted on the part of the British Government, in consequence of this murderous outrage, will furnish the contents of a separate chapter. u CHAPTER IV. POONA CONTINUED. 1815. AUGUST TO DECEMBER. Resident — his resolves — returns to Poena — obtains proof against Trimbukjee — demands audience — presents a memorial — charging Trimbukjee — calls sub- sidiary force from frontier — Bajee Rao hesitates — asks proof — evades receiving it — Gykwar mission threatened —attempts to screen Trimbukjee — Hyderabad force called in — expedients offered and refused — instructions arrive— second memorial thereon — demand of Trimbukjee's surrender — Peshwa's irresolution — seizure of Trimbukjee and surrender — reflections — effect in Guzerat. Mr. Elphinstoke was at Ellora, when he heard of the Sas- tree's violent death, and of the suspicions attaching upon Trim- bukjee, though the circumstances were transmitted only by vague and indistinct report. He immediately saw the ne- cessity of taking a decided part. The deceased was the avowed minister of an ally of the British Government, who had come to a friendly court under the security of a special guarantee, for the purpose of assisting at an adjustment, wliich that government had undertaken and been called upon to make. Therefore, although the British Government Avas no further a party to the negotiation, in which he had latterly been concerned, than is impUed in his having entered upon it with the knowledge and tacit consent of the British representative, still nothing had occurred to annid the personal guarantee, on the security of which the Gykwar minister had ventured within the precincts of the Poona court. Under this impression, Mr. Elpliinstone no sooner heard of the manner of his death, than he addressed a letter to the Peshwa, expressive of liis concern at the event, wiKCTIOM of the Second Stoclcade. oecond otockade. Third otockade. Sketches of tlhie(&D©KKHA EEFE:^CTES intlieCHEEBlSEA-tSHATEE FASS. i?'?»i> •.-Vie'>^> • -I- /yanc^J BaH^ry BriH^h Fcrct M . FCrjtSaltMry British R, BritifA £7uarr^*nsnt . STOCKABED P4i'SlTI«N of the (&OOK.KHAS at JYTHUK. T'.M.V.'M P.,>i/..t.j 1 1815. PESHWA. BS and demanding a rigorous investigation, with a view to the speedy detection and punishment of the murderers ; he at the same time forwarded the intelhgence to the Governor-Cieneral, soHciting special instructions for his guidance in every possible event ; and expressing his intention, in the interim, to hasten back to Poona, and, if his examination of the Sastree's people should fix the guilt on Trimbukjee, and it should be found inexpedient to wait the arrival of instructions, immediately to accuse that favourite, and demand of the Pcshwa his arrest and trial, in vindication of the insult offered to the British name and authority. He did not think it necessary or advisable to travel out of his way, in order to fix upon Bajee Rao himself a charge of participation ; con- ceiving it more prudent, and, at the same time, quite as effectual for the sake of example, that the prince's minister and favourite, the adviser and instrument of the act, should be visited with the entire responsibility. Having formed this resolution, and called back the subsidiary force from Jalna, where it was then can- toned, to Seroor, in order to be prepared for the worst, the Resident directed his assistant, who had remained behind at Poona, to offer his unqualified protection to the remainder of the Gykwar mission, and even, if it should be necessary, to annountfe a rupture of the subsisting alliance with the Peshwa, as the con- sequence of any further attempt at violation. He then set off du-ect for Poona, where he arrived on the 6th of August. On the route, he met groups of pilgrims retiu-ning from Pundur- poor, all of whom agreed in giving the same account of the transaction, and in ascribing the perpetration of it to Trimbuk- jee. The Sastree was a Brahmin * of the highest caste, and of great reputation for sanctity of character ; tlie manner of his death, therefore, in a holy city, in the midst of a pilgrimage, at * For some account of the sacrilemous horror, with wliich the Hindoos regard the murder of a Brahmin, tlic European reader is referred to the narrative ofNcrayun Rao's murder by his uncle Ragoonath, contained in Forbes' Oriental Memoirs. M 2 84 PESHWA. ' 181^. "which myriads were collected, and in the very precincts of the temple of their resort, had inflamed the superstitious minds of all who witnessed it with more than ordinary horror and de- testation of the crime. Returning to their homes in every direction, they communicated their feeling wlierever they went, till it became the general sentiment of the ]Maliratta nation and Hindoo sect, to a degree quite unusual in a country, where the means of diffusing information are so limited. Arrived at Poona, Mr. Elphinstone made a very particular examination of the Sastree's people, and of every one Hkely to afford evidence or information. The result was, the clear establishment of the facts and circumstances above related ; and the evidence was so minute and consistent in all its parts, as not to leave a shadow of doubt in respect to Trimbukjee's direct participation and actual superintendance of the assassination. IMean time, Trimbiikjec and his master had augured from -the resident's demand of investigation, as well as from the pro- tection afforded to the remainder of the Gykwar mission, and the whole conduct of ]Mr. Elpliinstone, that it was his resolution to take a decided course in the matter of the Sastree's murder. lloth were consequently in the utmost alarm and suspense respecting his intentions, and began immediately to raise troops, and take every possible precaution for their personal safety. Trimbukjee hurried home to Poona, where he arrived on the 7th August at night. One of his personal adherents, who had charge of the city in his absence, had waited on jMr. Elphinstone in the course of the day, apparently to sound his intentions ; but on being directly questioned as to what investigation had taken place, and how it was that Bhugwunt Rao and Burdojee were living at large, he was confused, and could give no answer. The Peshwa himself entered Poona on the 9th by stealth, under cover of the night, in a close palanquin, without previous notice, ^dthout the troops being drawn out, or any one^ going forth to 1815. PESIIWA. 85; meet him. This was the more extraordinary, because it was, the (lay of the Dukshiiia * festival, when money is bountifully distributed among the Jhahmins, thousands of whom were col- lected for the purpose ; and the IVsliAvas had never yet been known to fail of presiding at the largess. The whole city was in alarm at these unusual demonstrations. The rest of the Gykwar mission under ]iapoo jNIyral were shunned by every one, and apparently regarded as victims already devoted to destruction. In vain were the utmost efforts made to quiet their fears. In this state of things, Mr. Elphin- stone saw the necessity of taking his measures without waiting the Governor-General's^ orders, which, at the earliest, coidd scarcely arrive in a month from that date ; an interval that would have allowed Trimbukjee to complete his preparations, and to remove, intimidate, or cut oif the witnesses, and must infalhbly have driven the Peshwa to make common cause witli his minister ; since, while the suspense continued, they both had common fears. On the 11th August, therefore, the re- sident demanded an audience, which was refused on the ground of indisposition. The demand was repeated next day, and evaded on the pretext, that an infant daughter had died, which rendered his highness impiu-e for three days. Unable longer to brook these subterfuges, especially as his object was to remove the cause of them, by relieving Bajee Kao from his state of suspense and personal alarm, he I'esolved to send a written note, which he had drawn out to be presented at the audience, in case one could liave been procured. The paper was sent to Suda Sheeoo Bhao, the usual channel of communication before Trimbukjee's late appointment ; but he dechned to present it, as did every other minister that was appUed to. .Vt last Mr. Elpliinstone resolved to send his Moonshee with it openly, but • For an account of this festival, see Scott- Waring. 96 PESHWA. 1815. all means of getting it delivered were stiU unsuccessful. Two people came, however, on the Peshwa's part, apparently to sound the resident as to its contents. He accordingly opened himself so far as to let it be seen, that the paper only affected Trimbukjee, and that Bajee Eao was not personally involved in the charge, and would be so only in the event of his continuing to countenance and support that favourite. After tliis ex- planation, the written paper* obtained a reception on the 15th August. It began with expressing a conviction, that the Peshwa must have been desu-ous of revenging the foul murder of a foreign minister and a Brahmin like himself, had his ministers suifered the truth to reach his ears ; but as it was evident they had not done so, and, under the circumstances, could not be expected so to do, it had become necessary that it should reach his highness through an unbiassed channel, on which account the British resident addressed him upon the matter. The memorial proceeded to charge Trimbukjee with direct par- ticipation in the murder of Gungadhur Sastree, showing how the universal voice of the nation marked him out as the guilty person, while the circumstances of the transaction, his uniform conduct before and after it, his suppression of aU investigation, even after it had been demanded by the British resident, and his actual encouragement of those, who would otherwise have been objects of suspicion, brought the charge home to him in * Those who would ascertain the real merits of Indian diplomacy, and would possess themselves of the secret necessary to those employed in such negotiations, for baffling the arts, deceptions, and subterfuges of the treacherous Mahratta and wily Brahmin, should obtain the perusal of Mr. Elphinstone's unassuming account of his part in these negotiations, in the record of his original correspondence with the Indian government. It is to be hoped these valuable papers will not be for ever withheld from public curiosity. The whole of the account here given of the Poona affairs is but a meagre abstract of that correspondence. Mr. Elpliinstone's letter of the I6th of August, on that part of the transactions now detailing, is perhaps as interesting a document as ever found its way into a record-office. 1815. PESHWA. 87 the clearest and most undeniable manner. After recapitulating the proofs, it thus continued :— " On all these grounds, I declare « my conviction of Trinibukjee Dainglia's guilt, and I call upon " your highness to apprehend him, as well as Govind Rao ]Jur- « dojee and Bhug\v'unt Rao Gykwar, and to deposit them in ♦' such custody as may be considered safe and trustworthy. Even " if your highness is not fully convinced of the guilt of these « persons, it must be admitted, that there is sufficient ground « for confining them ; and I only ask of you to do so, until his " excellency the Governor-General and your highness shall have " an opportunity of consulting on the subject. I have only to " add my desire, that this apprehension may be immediate. A " foreign ambassador has been murdered in the midst of your " hio-hness' court. A Brahmin has been massacred, almost in " the temple, during one of the greatest solemnities of your " religion ; and I must not conceal from your highness, that the " impunity of the perpetrators of this enormity has led to im- " putations not to be thought of against your highness' govern- " ment. Nobody is more convinced of the falsehood of such " insinuations than I am ; but I think it my duty to state them, " that your highness may see the necessity of refuting calumnies " so injurious to your reputation. I beg you also to observe, " that while Trimbukjee remains at large, his situation enables " him to commit further acts of rashness, which he may under- " take on purpose to embroil your highness with the British " Government. He is at the head of the administration at " Poona, and has troops at his command. He is likewise in " charge of your highness' districts, which are contiguous to the " possessions of the British Government, the Nizam and the " Gykwar ; and, even though he should raise no public dis- " turbances there, I cannot but consider with uneasiness and « apprehension, in what manner your highness' affairs will be " conducted. For these reasons, it is absolutely necessary, that .88 PESHWA. ■ 1815. ; " immediate steps should be taken ; as your highness will be " held responsible by the Governor-General for any acts of >' violence, which Trimbukjee may commit after this intimation. " I therefore again call on your highness to adopt the course :" wliich I have pointed out to you, as the only one which can ;" restore confidence to the pubhc ministers deputed to your " court. They cannot otherwise enjoy the security necessary _" to transact business Avith your highness ; nor can they with " safety even reside in the city : and every body will be obliged " to take such steps as he may deem necessary for his own pro- " tection. One consequence of this will be, an interruption " of your communication with the British Government, until " the measure I have recommended shall be adopted. I beg " that your highness's reply may be communicated through " some person unconnected with Trimbukjee Dainglia." The memorial concluded with assuring his highness, that the British ■Government had no design whatever of interfering with the .freedom of his choice of a successor to Trimbukjee, or with the independence of his internal administration ; which the J*eshwa might perhaps have suspected was the ulterior object of ;tliis attack on his minister. J Xothing could have been better adapted to work on Bajee Rao's hopes and fears, and induce him to screen himself by .sacrificing liis flivourite, than this memorial. The subsichary force marched into its cantonment at Seroor on the ITtli of August. Mr. Elphinstone had taken the precaution of strength- ening the brigade of tliis force, which was regularly cantoned at Poona, by having another battalion marched in, as if to reUeve 'j)ne of those composing the brigade. But as soon as the me- morial was received, he suffered the reheved battalion to join the main body at Seroor, thinking such a display of confidence would have a good effect tliis time. wX The Peshwa was evidently embarrassed and irresolute. He 1815. PESHWA. 89. sent a messenger to say that he was considering the memorial, and to propose a distant day for an interview. The resident declared himself" particularly desirous of an audience, but in- timated that he could not go to the palace, if he was to meet Trimbukjee there and at large. A day or two afterwards, a message came from the Peshwa, through Suda Sheeoo Bhao, declaring that Bajee Rao believed Trimbukjee innocent, but that if iMr. Elphinstone would undertake to prove the three distinct invitations, he would have him arrested. That gentleman at once closed Avitli the proposal ; but, though he did not cease to press the execution of the Peshwa's part of this offer, it was perpetually evaded. Tlie excuse set up by Trimbukjee for not ordering an immediate investigation on the night of the murder, was, that he was so busy sweeping the temple, that he did not hear of it in time. He thus admitted his having been at the spot, whence the assassins issued, and to which they were seen to return after the act was perpetrated. During this discussion, the situation of Bapoo Myral and the rest of the Gykwar mission became very critical. jNIr. Elphinstone had, some days before, advised their coming and encamping close by the residency ; but Burdojee and Trim- bukjee had been tampering with the escort, and had gained over the greater part, so that a strict watch was set on all their motions. On pretence of sending off the Sastree's children and family, the whole were marched a little way out of the city without disturbance ; but when it was proposed to move next morning to the residency, the escort broke out into open mutiny, and, under the pretext of demanding an adxance of pay, sur- rounded Bapoo JMyral and his people in such a manner, that escape was impossible. The difficulty of their })osit ion was ma- nifest ; but to have attempted a rescue by the British troo])s at Poena, would infallibly have pi'oduccd the massacre of the whole ; —the excuse of some disturbance being all that was needed to N 90 PESHWA. 1815. bring matters to tliis extremity. He contented himself, there- fore, with sending his guarantee of what money Bapoo ]\f yral might promise ; and, with this security, the latter \vas enabled to win over half the mutineers, and to get quit of the other half without bloodshed. The arrangement, however, cost a lack and a quarter, which was advanced by the resident in biUs on the Gykwar treasury. On the 20th August, hearing that the levy of troops was going on with increased activity, Mr. Elphinstone remonstrated, declaring, that if this measvu'e were not discontinued, he should be obhged to call in the subsidiary force to Poona, and take such measures for his own security, and for the interests of his government, as must lead to a ru})ture. In reply, a bullying message was received, stating, that however desirous the Peshwa was to preserve the alliance, the person accused in tlxis case was one of the greatest consequence, having 10,000 horse and 5000 foot at his devotion, besides fifty or sixty forts, and a territory yiekUng seventy-five lack of rupees ; that therefore it was necessary to proceed with caution, as there were many dif- ficulties in the way of the course recommended by the resident. Direct attempts were at the same time made to intimidate and buy off" the Avitnesses, whose evidence was known to constitute the proof possessed by IMr. Elphinstone. A fiu'ther message was sent, declaring it not to be conformable even to EngHsh law to imprison before conviction ; and that as yet no proof had been offered, that the assassins were in Trimbukjee's service, or otherwise connected with him. These, and other arguments verbally adduced, were answered at length in a \ATitten com- munication, the matter of which it would be superfluovis to detail. In the mean time, the indications of an intention on the part of Bajee Eao, either to make common cause with the favourite, or to abet his flight into the country, where, under 1815. PESHWA. "91 the pretext of rebellion, he might place the resources of the Poona state in direct hostility to the British Ciovernment, were growing daily more strong and conchisive. Mr. Kl})hinstone in consequence applied to have the Hyderabad force marched from the valley of lierar to Jalna, where it might be in readiness to act according to occasion. This api)lication was nearly simul- taneous with jNIr. Kussell's recall of that force to Hyderabad, for the settlement of the disturbance then excited by the princes. Hoping, however, that nothing serious would arise at that court, the resident at Poona repeated his request for a light force at least, to take up the pursuit, in case Trimbukjee should fly before Colonel L. Smith, the commandant of the Poona sub^ sidiary force. The Hyderabad commotion having subsided altogether in the interim, the whole of Colonel Hoveton's army moved upon Jalna at this requisition. During the remainder of August, attempts were made by the Peshwa to induce the resident to forego his demand of Trimbukjee's arrest, by the offer of several expedients, none of which went further, than that the accused should absent himself from court and from Poona, pending the judicial investigation of his suilt or innocence, and lose his office. Of coiu-se none of these offers coidd be listened to ; but he waited with some anxiety the receipt of the first orders on the subject from the Governor-General, before taking any further step. Those orders arrived on the 1st of September. They had been made out im- mediately on receipt of the first intelligence of the nun-der, which had been despatched from Ellora about the end of July, and had reached the Marquess of Hastings at Futtehgurh, in the middle of August. His Tordship"s instructions, assuming that there wovdd be found sufficient evidence to fix the crime on Trimbukjee, had provided specifically for every j)ossible case of his surrender, or support by his master. In the event of his being delivered up for trial and punishment at the resident's N 2 92 PESHWA. 1815. requisition, the British representative was authorised to gra- tify the Peshwa, if necessary, with an assurance that the life of the offender was not sought by the British Government, and that perpetual confinement would be the utmost severity exercised. But, in the event of that prince's refusing to bring his favourite to trial, or of his affecting to consent to an in- vestigation, and taking underhand means to render it nugatory, or of his refusing to dehver him up to punishment after the establishment of his guilt, Bajee Kao was to be held chstinctly and personally responsible for the act : so, hkewise, if he should abet Trimbukjee's escape from Poona, in order to raise the country, unless the flight should be attended with such circum- stances as should acquit his Highness of any knowledge or participation. In the event of this responsibihty being incurred, all communication was to be stopped, and preparations made to secure his person, or at least to prevent his leaving the capital ; but extreme measures were not to be resorted to, unless it should be hazardous to delay, or absolutely necessary to antici- pate his Highness's designs. A letter was addressed to the Peshwa himself by the Governor-General, in further support of the Resident's proceedings, which it was left to his discretion to present or not as he might deem expedient. Thus assured of the Governor-General's unqualified support in the course he had adopted upon his own judgment, Mr. Elphinstone prepared a second memorial, which he delivered on the 4th of September, together with the ^Marquess of Hastings' letter. This memorial began by setting forth the tenor of the instructions just received, and declaring Bajee Eao to have aheady incurred the responsibility adverted to in the Governor- General's letter, by systematic neglect of all investigation, and by evasion of the demand for the arrest of Trimbulcjee pre- paratory to his trial and piuiishment : it proceeded to recpiire the immediate dehvery of Trimbukjee to tlie British Govern- 1815. PESHWA. 93 ment, alleging his instructions to warrant the demand of capital punishment ; hut, out of regard for his Highness, and because he (the resident) thought the expression of his Highness's anxiety might yet prevail with the Governor-General to spare his hfe, he should be contented with his delivery, until the receipt of further orders. The memorial went on to declare the alternative of a refusal of this demand to be, a suspension of all commiuiication, and the calling in of the troops to Poona, where Mr. Elphinstone stated his intention still to remain, until he should be made acquainted with the ulterior wishes of the Governor-General, unless an attempt on the part of liis High- ness to leave Poona, or the continued levy of troops by his Highness, should render active hostility necessary in the interim. Up to this time, Mr. Elphinstone had contented himself with demanding that the Peshwa should himself hold Trimbuk- jee in restraint, until his trial should take place, as had been offered by Eajee I?ao himself The advance of this demand to that of the luiqualified surrender of the accused to the British Government had become absolutely necessary : for, with the disposition evinced by the Poona prince, it was evident that any investigation, which might now be set on foot by his authority, would be the merest mockery in the world. It was most for^ tunate, that the Governor-Generars instructions, warranting such an advance of demand, arrived at the particular jiuicture; for Eajee Pao was still evidently hesitating between the sur- render of his favourite and the rupture of the alliance ; and the oblocpiy attending the former alternative seemed to have by far the most weight witlx him. At one time he had resolved to make common cause with Trimbukjec, and relays of horses had been placed for their joint flight from the capital ; from which coiu'se he was dissuaded only by Gokla, a southern jageerdar, and one of the best military officers in his service. The second memorial of the 4th of September, with the Governor-General's 94 PESHWA. 1815. letter, found the P^shwa in this state of suspense ; and it was further communicated, on the part of the Resident, that unless Trimbukjee should be seized in the course of the following day, the alternative threatened would be resorted to. His eyes seem to have been opened by this communication to the real danger of his situation. Nearly the whole of the night of the 4th of September was spent in consultation with the Bhao, Gokla, and another person high in confidence, viz. Balooba, dewan of the Vinshor jageerdar. On the following morning the Bh^io was sent with a message, that his Highness would confine Trim- bukjee, on the condition that neither his life nor his surrender should be demanded. Mr. Elphinstone returned for answer, that he could hear nothing until the offender was seized. How- ever, he thovight it right to explain to the Bhao, that he con- ceived the surrender of Trimbukjee to the British Government, and of Burdojee and Bhugwunt to that of the Gykwar, would satisfy all parties, and set the whole affair at rest ; that no ad- vantage would be taken of any disclosures by Trimbukjee after his confinement, and that the investigation should be urged no further. These assurances seemed to be necessary to quiet Bajee Bao's personal apprehensions. The result of the con- ference was reported by the Bhao, the same morning, and the whole of this day also was spent in consultation. In the night, it was resolved to send Trimbukjee to a hill fort, and the se- lection being left to him, he was sent off to Wusuntgurh, under an escort of 200 Arabs and a body of horse. The Bhao next morning waited upon the Resident, to acquaint him with what had been done, and to request that the Gykwar negotiation might be re-opened, and every thing go on as before. Mr. Elphinstone declared, that now Trimbukjee Avas in confinement, the Peshwa must be answerable that he did not escape or create disturbances ; but that, before the matter could be considered as settled, he must be actually given up to the British Govern- 1815. PESHWA. 95 ment, according to the demand made and the present instruc- tions of his OM n court, for that he daily expected further orders, in answer to subsecpient comnuuiications, those now acted upon having been issued before the late evasive conduct of his Highness was knoAvn ; and he could not answer for what the next might contain: that, when received, he should be obliged to obey them to the letter, however injurious to his Highness's interests, unless the present demand should have been complied with in the interim ; in which case, he should of course suspend their execution, till the Governor-General was informed of the compliance with his first demand. The confinement of Trim- bukjec was believed throughout Poona to be a mere device to gain time ; and the mode of it, together with the continuance in office of all his adherents, confirmed this impression. The Bhao retiu*ned on the 7th of September, with an endeavour, by working on JMr. Elphinstone's feelings, to induce him to forego the demand for the delivery of Trimbukjee's person. He claimed himself the merit of having induced the Pesliwa to confine that favourite, stating that he had succeeded only by engaging })ersonally that this would satisfy the British Resident. If, therefore, the further demand were still persisted in, he w^as himself in a dilemma, from which poison alone could extricate him. It was hardly credible, that, knowing his senti- ments and resolutions so fuUy as the Bhao must have done, he would so have pledged himself; but it was resolved, at all events, not to recede. The attempt was repeated next day with the same ill success : yet the Bhao survi^ ed his difficulties. Secret intrigues were also set on foot through every medium likely to have influence at the British Residency ; but threats, entreaties, and persuasions were ahke ineffectual. Levies of horse and foot were still making every where ; and positive information was received, that it was the Peshwa's intention to fiy to the fort of Wye, and there raise the standard of the Mahratta empire. Mr.^ 06 PESHWA. 1815. Elphinstone accordingly resolved no longer to delay calling in the main body of the subsidiary force from Seroor, and gave the Peshwa notice of his having done so. This produced a message of remonstrance through the IJhao, which was answered in such terms, as seemed most likely to fix the Peshwa Vj wavering resolutions for the sacrifice of Trimbukjee. His surrender, it was announced, would be all the satisfaction expected : for that, except perhaps some atonement to the Gykwar for the murder of his minister, nothing further would be demanded by the British Government ; that one word from his Highness now could accomplish this : but, if he hesitated nuich longer, or attempted to leave Poona, an amicable settlement would be no longer possible. While this message was on its way, the Peshwa had sent for Major Ford, an officer of the Company's service, who had raised and disciplined a brigade of infantry for liis Highness, as part of his contingent. On his arrival, he was left with Chimnajee, Bajee Eao's brother, and Moro Dikshet, a minister who latterly had been growing into favour. These two consulted him on the best means of re-establishing the former terms of intercourse ; and on his recommending the dehvery of Trimbvikjee, as the only measure he covdd suggest, went with his advice into the next room, whence they brought his Highness' consent. The mode of his delivery was ac- cordingly arranged. A party of jMajor Ford's brigade was to bring him from Wusuntgurh, and the Peshwa (as the Resident was told next day) had no objection to a party of the British troops accompanying, but this was declined. At the close of the conference with the Major, Bajee Rao a})[)eared in person, ■ and confirmed what the other two hatl agreed to, requiring ]Major Ford's engagement, that the act of surrender should replace every thing on the former footing ; and that any fi-esh orders from the Governor-Geneial should be suspended, even should tliey arrive before he could acquaint Mr. Elphinstone. GopM 1815. PESHWA. 97 Punt, the manager of the brigade business at court, accompanied Major Ford to the Residency, and carried back thence the as- surance, that, on the dehvery of Trimbukjee, every thing should revert to its former state ; and that, except perhaps some satisfac- tion to the Gykwar, which must still be left to the Governor- General's discretion, no further demand or proceeding should be instituted in consequence of the Sastree's murder. On the 11th of September, 850 men of the brigade marched from Poona, under the command of Captain Hick ; and on the 19th they received charge of Trimbukjee; along with whom Ehugwuiit Rao and Govind Rao were delivered up at Poona, on the 25th ; and next day the three prisoners were sent down to Tanna fort in Salsette, under charge of a light battalion and a regiment of cavalry, from the subsidiary force. The main body of that force, under Colonel L. Smith, returned on the 29th to Seroor. Thus was accomplished, by negotiation, without a rupture of the alliance, and entirely through the spirit, firmness, and diplo- matic ability of the British Representative, the important object of vindicating the honour and reputation of his nation, which had received the grossest insult, in the murder of an ambassador, negotiating under its guarantee of protection. The Peshwa had submitted to the humiliation of sacrificing his minister and favovu'ite, in atonement for an act, M'hich had evidently been committed \\'ith his concurrence and participation. He had in \ain tried every artifice and subterfuge to avert or delay the moment of submission ; and when every attempt of this descrip- tion had been baffled by the firmness and vigilance opposed to him, there can be no doubt that his inclination was, rather to risk a rupture of the alliance, than to submit. But his own good sense, and the representation of the Sirdars in whom he placed his principal trust, satisfied him of the present insuf- ficiency of his means to cope single-handed with the British o 98 PESHWA. 1815. power. It was evident, however, that henceforward we had nothing to expect but rancorous and mahgnant hate ; and that the same fear, which had produced the important result on this occasion, would require to be constantly kept ahve, in order to curb the natural bent of his mind. Mr. Elpliinstone's conduct tlu'oughout the whole of tliis negotiation met with the Marquess of Hastings' particular approbation ; and his Lordship felt, tliat the successful termination of the affair was mainly attributable to the prompt and decisive tone assumed and maintained from the outset to the close of the discussion. On the whole perhaps it was fortunate, that the short sighted violence of Trirabukjee brought matters thus prematurely to a crisis between his master and the British Government. The uniform conduct of that favourite's administration, proceeding from ignorance, either real or affected, of the actual relations of the Peshwa at tliis period, had already given rise to so many infractions of the subsisting engagements, and of the treaty of Bassein in particular, that it would have been impossible to have suiFered them to pass much longer without notice *. His * In proof of this it may be sufficient to mention, that, on the 27th of the pre- ceding May, soon after the court arrived at Nassick, the Resident had found it necessary to present a remonstrance against Trimbukjee's measures. The most important infraction of the treaty of Bassein was, a treaty made with a Goandwana Raja, the preamble of which declared it to be offensive against both the Nizam and Bhoosla ; this had been negotiated by Trimbukjee himself^ after marching a hostile force into the Nizam's dominions and occupying several of his villages. The affair took place about the preceding February, when Trimbukjee had been sent with some troops in pursuit of the Pindara, Sheikh Duloo. I'he whole proceeding, however, was not only without the participation of the British Governriient, as required by the treaty of Bassein, but the troops had driven away an agent sent by the Resident to Niigpoor, to endeavour to settle a boundary dispute, that had occurred in the neighbourhood between the officers of the Nizam and Bhoosla ; and Trimbukjee had put himself in possession of the disputed lands. Many similar infractions of the subsisting engagements, which had been produced by the conduct of his agent at Ahmedabad, were also brought forward in this remonstrance. Mr. E. then 1815. PESHWA. 99 measures must soon have come to tlie pass of compelliug the Ihitish Government to demand the displacement of tlie minister, as a pledge, that the frequent acts of offence, which IkuI occurred under his administration. Mere without his Highness' counte- nance. In such an event, Trimljukjee woidd liavc been backed by popular feeling, and have been regarded as the victim of our displeasure, for honestly preferring his master's interests to ours ; and, at the other native courts, the Peshwa would have made a strong case of the indignity put upon him, and represented it as a warning of the consequence of too close a connexion with a power so constituted as the Eritish. In the issue, to which matters were brought by the Sastree's murder, we stood forth in the character of avengers of the death of a Brahmin ambassa- dor, and had the fuU advantage of the popular voice on our side, even among the Peshwa's own subjects. This favourable im- pression lasted beyond the immediate occasion ; insomuch that t\^'o years afterwards, when a rupture occurred with nearly all attributed these acts rather to the ignorance and Mahratta habits of the favourite, than to any deliberate design of breaking -nlih the British Government. But it cannot be denied, that the tone assumed at some of the discussions of that time was such as to indicate the most ambitious views. In one conference, the rights of the Peshwa coming under discussion, Trimbukjee went so far as to assert his master's right to the Chout of Bengal, under the cession of Aleevcrdee Khan, and to that of Mysore, agreed to by Hydcr Alee: such was the temper of the man, who had been specially appointed a short time before to conduct the business on behalf of the Ptshwa with the British Representative at his court. The high favour he still enjoyed made it difficult not to identify the Ptshwa with his minister. Had the Mahratta powers risen against the English in the year 1814-15, there can be little doubt, that Bajee Rao would have seized the first occasion to shake off his subsidiary connexion with us and take his station amongst them : but he was not yet prepared to take the lead himself, and offer an example for their imitation in the manner he did in 1817-18. Naturally suspicious and timorous, he would probably have j)re- ferred to take no active part, until he had seen what success attended others. Tlic bolder plan he ultimately adopted, he was goaded to by the continual loss and dis- appointment he incurred, in the prosecution of that course of insidious attack, which he commenced from this time forward. o 2 100 GYKWAR. 1815. the IVIahratta states, the cause of the British nation derived a vast accession of strength in public opinion, from recollection of the foul murder of this Brahmin, in which the quarrel had originated ; and the indifference manifested upon the subsequent downfall of the Peshwa's dynasty was owing, in a great measure, to its being regarded as a judgment on the reigning head of the family for his participation in this crime, polluted as he was already by the yet unexpiated murder of Nerayun Eao by his father Eagoonath. The Sastree's death, as might have been expected, excited a considerable sensation throughout Guzer^t. Futteh Singh and the party of the deceased, though they lamented the loss as ir- reparable, hoped from it, at any rate, the entire exoneration from all demands of the Poona government. On the other liand, the party in communication with Trimbukjee hoped, by his means and through the Peshwa's influence and power, to bring about a revolution in the affairs of the court of Brodera. Seeta-Ram and his adherents were raising troops, and making preparations to act according to the turn events might take at Poona ; a body of men under a marauding cliief in Seeta-Eam's interest approached from Dhur so near as Dawud ; and the two managers in Ahmedabad were acting in concert, and both le- vying horse and foot. Under these circumstances, the Bombay government had thought it advisable to detain the Guzerat force, which, on its presence becoming unnecessary in central India, had before been destined to the adjustment of affairs in Kutch, whence some of the border tribes had been latterly in the habit of making predatory incursions into GuzerAt. Every thing remained in a state of the most anxious suspense, until the amicable settlement of the discussions at Poona was known. It produced a simultaneous effect at Brodera and Ahmedabad. In the interim, Gungadhur Sastree's son was appointed to all 1815. GYKWAR. 101 his father's offices, rather in demonstration of the sense enter- tained of the services of the deceased, than out of regard to any superior quaUfications the son was thought to possess. After the dehvery of Trimbukjee and the two agents of Sceta-Ram to the British authority, the two latter were transferred to the Gykwar, and confined in hill-forts within the dominions of that state. The Bombay government, however, resolved to prevent the occurrence of similar intrigues, by taking Seeta-Kam into their own custody ; an arrangement to which the court of Brodera was not induced to accede M-ithout extreme difficulty. The question of the degree of compensation to be affiarded the Gykwar, for the murder of his minister and the representative of his court, was, in the following January, thus decided by the Governor-General, to whose arbitration it had been i-eferred. Assuming the surrender of Trimbukjee, the actual perpetrator, to be an entire exculpation of the Peshwa's government from any share or participation in the act, his Highness was declared to be exonerated from further responsibility, and, therefore, from the obligation to offer any specific atonement to the of- fended state. The resident was, however, instructed to en- deavour by persuasion to lead his Highness to make some hand- some provision for the family of the Sastree, as a spontaneous act of generosity : for the supreme government did not conceive itself to possess a right to make a special demand on this head. As a natiu-al consequence of tliis view of the question, the nego- tiation for the settlement of the Peshwa's claims on the Ciykwar was directed to be re-opened at the point where it had been broken off, in the same manner as if the murder had never taken place. The Peshwa occasionally revived it, but with little sincerity or interest; his mind being apparently engrossed with the pro- secution of an object nearer his heart, which, from this time, he will be found to have pursued with more consistency and 102 PESHWA. 1815. determination ; viz. * to bring about a general and secret com- bination of the Mahratta princes, directed against the British ascendancy. In the course of the negotiations respecting the surrender of Trimbukjee, Mr. Elphinstone was more than once assured that such a thing had been in agitation in the preceding season ; but the Poona Government assumed to itself credit for having abstained from giving direct encouragement to the pro- ject. Bajee Eao certainly was not then prepared to put every thing to hazard on such a risk ; but from tliis time he seems to have resolved to do so, and himself to head the confederacy, as soon as it shoidd be organized. "N^liile these events were passing at Poona, and, indeed, during the remainder of the year IS 15, nothing of moment occurred at any of the courts of southern and central India. It was ascertained, however, that confidential agents, men of family and name amongst the JMahrattas, were still intriguing at each Mahratta durbar, with such secrecy, that the object of the intrigues could only be gathered from suspicion and rumour. Bajee Eao occupied himself in incessant endeavours to obtain, through Mr. Elpliinstone, the release of his captive favourite ; but all his efforts directed to this end were of course unavailing. In January 1816, the Governor-General addressed a letter to his Higluiess, in such terms, as it was thought would be most effectual to extinguish all hope, that the British Government would ever consent either to release or give up the custody of this eminent offender. * This design originated at an earlier period. By confession of Trimbukjee, the conspiracy was in progress before the arrival of the Sastree at Poona. CHAPTEE V. NIPALESE— PINDAREES. 1815-16, MAY TO MAY. Negotiations with Nipal — terms offered — Cession of Teraee refused — Demand modified — hesitation — Treaty signed — Ratification refused — War renewed — Ochterlony takes the command — penetrates the first range of hills — Battle of Mukwanpoor — Nipfdese submit — Peace — Reflections — Pindarees — second re- ference to England — Army reduced — Operations of Pindarees — party sur- prised — successful expedition — second — British provinces ravaged with im- punity — Concert of Pindarees with Mahrattas — intrigues of 1 8 1 5-1 G — Holkar's coui't — Ameer- KJian. • After the settlement of the aifairs of Hyderabad and Poona, the negotiations with Nipal were the object which most en- grossed the attention of the Supreme Government. Those negotiations had been opened at the close of the first campaign in the preceding May ; Gujraj jMisur, the Gooroo (family priest) of the Kaja, having come down to the army in Sarun, with powers under the red seal for the purpose. The loss of the whole of the hiUs west of the Gogra, it seems, had opened the eyes of the Goorkha Cliiefs to the real danger of a war with the British, and had proved, that the confidence of security in the ruggedness of thek mountains was a vain illusion. The leachng party amongst them was, consequently, desirous of peace, and anxious to know the terms on which it woidd be granted. The Marquess of Hastings' conditions were hard enough ; the perpetual cession of all the liill country taken in the cam- paign, and as well of such parts of the low land as were in dispute before the war, as of the whole Une of Teraee to the 104 NIPAL. 1815-16. very foot of the hills. A fort and territory, which had been seized from the Sikkim Raja before the war, was also demanded ; for, having in the course of it formed an alhance with that Raja, and taken him under protection, we had become pledged to restore the integrity of his dominions. Besides these terms, a resident was to be received at Katmandhoo, which, to their pre- judices, appeared the first stage towards absolute subjection. Immediately on learning these conditions, the Gooroo broke off the negotiation, declaring he could not treat on the basis of any further cession of the lowland, except perhaps the disputed tracts. In its desire for accommodation, and from a hope of being less hardly pressed by other negotiators, the Goorkha government had made a second overture through the late Chief of Almora, Rumsah, who was in communication with the Ho- nourable E. Gardner, the British commissioner for the manage- ment of the conquered province. This also was broken off on the same ground. In August the negotiation was re-opened by the Gooroo ; and it having been ascertained, that the main objection to giving up the Teraee was, that most of the principal officers of the court of Katmandhoo enjoyed considerable jageers in that territory, the ]Marquess of Hastings was induced to offer the" grant of similar possessions, or of an equivalent in money pensions to the amount of two or three lack of rupees, to be left at the distribution of the Goorkha court. In September, the Gooroo again broke off the negotiation on the same ground, declaring, that the Goorkha Chiefs would never accede to a cession of the Teraee or low land, which was alleged to be the main source of their subsistence, the hills themselves being comparatively unproductive. It seemed evident from what had passed, that the demand of the Teraee was a bar to the re-estabhshment of peace, which no advantage we had to offer in any other shape, could compen- sate to the Goorkha government. Its repugnance to this cession 1815-16. NIPAL. 105 was solely owing to the estimate of its ])ecuniary value at present entertained by the court of Katniandhoo, and was not in the least ascribablc to any feeling of pride, or objection to the hr.miliation of the cession. The Jiritish Govennnent, on tlie contrary, insisted on the demand, rather from a sense of honour, and a desire to visit with marked severity the act of gross violence and insult, which had arisen out of former dis})utes about the Teraee, and had Ijcen the immediate cause of the war, than from any expectation of profit from the lands. The experience of a season's occupation of a considerable portion of them proved them to be of extremely difficult management and iixonsiderable advantage in revenue ; while the climate was so noxious, as to render the continuance of troops, and even of civil officers upon them, utterly impracticable for one-half the year. Under these circumstances, the supreme government, balancing the advantage of a restoration of peace against the gratification of forcing on the Goorkhas the sacrifice of an object extremely valuable to them, and only so to us in an incon- siderable degree, came to the resolution of relaxing the rigour of the original demand. A draft of a treaty was accordingly prepared and transmitted to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, ap- pointed to negotiate on the Sarun frontier, to be delivered openly to the Gooroo, in case of his expected re-appearance with a fresh overture ; accompanied by a declaration, that it contained the only terms on which the liritit^h Government Mere willing to make peace with the Nipal state. In this draft, the Teraee from the Kalee, a branch of the Gogra, to the Gunduk, was all that Mas insisted on, and of the rest so much only as was in our actual possession. Pensions to the extent of two lack were still offered to the Sirdars of the court ; and a stipulation to that effect was contained in one of the articles of the draft. A\'hen this draft was submitted to the Gooroo, and to Chundur Seekur Opadheii, another Brahmin associated witli him to treat on the part of p 106 NIPAL. 1815-16. Nipal, they declared Avithout hesitation, that they did not feel themselves competent to accede to such terras, withovit first submitting them to their court. They promised, however, that a definitive answer should be returned in fifteen days. The period expired, yet no instructions had been received. It was ascertained also, that the dehberations on the acceptance or rejection of these terms had occasioned some ferment at Kat- mandhoo. The stipulation for the allotment of pensions was particularly obnoxious and unpopular with one party, which represented it as placing the Raja's subjects and ministers in direct dependence on a foreign power. At the head of this party stood Umeer Singh and his sons, who had lately returned to Katmiindhoo, after the total loss of their provinces west of the Ganges. They had opposed ,the commencement of the war, as promising httle success ; but now it had been begun, were for continuing it to the last extremity. The Goorkha negotiators being unable to redeem their pledge by producing the definitive answer of the Raja within the time specified, offered a sub- missive apology, but begged the negotiation might not be finally broken off, until they should have proceeded to Katmandlioo and ascertained the cause. The Gooroo offered at the same time to sign the treaty provisionally, if the portion of the Teraee occupied by the British between the Koosa and Gunduk were substituted for the pensions proposed. This was refused, and the negotiation broken off; but the Goorkha negotiators de- clared, that they would return in twelve days with the treaty signed. This occurred on the 29th October. The Supreme-Government, on hearing of the continued re- luctance on the part of the Nipalese, called on the several authorities in charge of the contiguous cUstricts, for their opinion of the value of the several portions of the Teraee occupied by its officers since the commencement of the war, and the means of obtaining a good frontier fine, by the retention of part only 1815-lG. NIPAL. 107 of what had been acquired; thus ])repai-iiiaee*, the favourite wife of the deceased, and further, for inducing liis successor to adopt tlu' infant grandson of Eagoojee, to the perpetual exclusion of Apjia Saheb from all share in the administration, and ultimately from the succession itself. The intrigue first showed itself, in an attempt to have some other than Appa Saheb nominated to officiate at the sradh of the deceased Eaja, a ceremony always required to be performed by the nearest male heir, who being incompetent in the present case, the nephew, as next in the male line, had some sort of right to preside on his behalf * Not Pursajee's mother, who was not then living. 128 NAGPOOK. 181G. Hearing of this intrigue, Appa Sahcb openly expressed the highest indignation, professing his determination to resort to force, 'sooner than submit to be so superseded. His party at the same time talked loudly of the necessity of rescuing the government and public treasures from the hands of the worth- less and designing individuals, who, under the colour of the name, were usurping the authority of the young Raja. The popular voice was so strongly in his favoiu- on this point, that Hhurmajee's party, not being yet prepared for extremities, dis- claimed having ever meditated the supersession of the pre- sumptive heir, or appointment of another person to officiate for Fursajee at the approaching srahd. A readiness was at the same time expressed to admit Appa Saheb to a share in the govern- ment on certain conditions ; and effiarts were made to bring about a reconcihation, but thwarted underhand by Dhurmajee. The srahd was quietly performed on the 1st of April, the nephew of the deceased officiating as principal actor in the ceremonies. While matters remained in this unsettled state, both parties expressed the strongest desire for the return of Sreedhur Pundit, who was still the nominal prime minister at Ntlgi^oor, but having found his influence with Eagoojee on the wane, had retired some months before the death of that prince, on pretence of a pilgrim- age to Benares, where he still remained. This man was regarded . as the head of the English party at Xagpoor ; and the object of these professions of intention to abide by what he might determine was, to prevent a more active interference on our part in their favour. Of this, both seemed apprehensive, though nothing was farther from the Eesident's thoughts. Dhurmajee had however an ulterior object in view: for so long as this suspense should continue, the poAver, as well as the treasures, of the government, would remain at his disposal, in the same manner as they had been at the time of Eagoojee's decease. Thus every one seemed earnest in his protestations to Mr. 1816. NAGPOOR. 129 Jenkins, the British resident at Nagpoor, of desire to maintain the best understanding with the Enghsh. Appa Salieb, in particular, made chrect overtures through Juswunt Kao Kam Chundur, who was the negotiator of the treaty of Deogam, and had since been the appointed channel of connuunication between the resident and this court. He proposed to accept the terms before offered to Eagoojec, and to receive a svibsichary force, on condition of support against the designs of the opposite faction. Mr. Jenkins refused to interfere in this scene of intrigue until he should receive special orders from the Governor-Ge- neral, but lost no time in laying before the Supreme Government the real position of affairs at Nagpoor, asking instructions, as to how far, in the actual state of the Raja's intellects, he might consider himself warranted in receiving the overtures, and listening to the propositions of the presumptive heir, previously to his acquiring any direct ostensible share in the government. This was a question that depended on the degree of Pursajee's incapacity. If it were such as to prevent his being considered a free agent in the choice of the responsible functionaries of his government, then, of course, any faction that should attempt to exclude the next heir, being of fit age, from a share in the administration, could only be regarded as usurpers, assuming the Raja's name as a mere cloke to their illegal proceedings. In submitting this question, Mr. Jenkins had evidently so decided an opinion of the malady of the reigning Raja, as to think it would be usurpation in Dliurmajee's party, if, representing themselves as the ministers of Pursajee's choice, they refused to allow Appa Saheb the exercise of a fair jjortion of control over their acts of administration. ^Vherefore, on the same principle as the latter would have been warranted in the employment of force to obtain his right, would he likewise be free to solicit foreign aid for the purpose, and the British at liberty to connect 130 NAGPOOR. 1816. themselves with his party, if soHcited so to do, and to support his claims against the opposition of Dhurmajee, or of the other ministers of the late Raja. By the way, it is observable, that the turn taken by these intrigues and divisions at Nagpoor had a direct and obvious tendency to introduce a foreign influence, at the invitation of either party, or of both. If, therefore, we refrained from stepping forward, it was to be feared, that either Sindheea or the Peshwa, or some of the Pindaree leaders, would succeed in estabhshing themselves to our perpetual exclusion : at the same time, since the contention lay entirely between the factions of Appa Saheb and of Dhurmajee, the legitimate Raja having no greater interest on the one side than on the other, we seemed to have no other object of solicitude, than to connect ourselves with the rightful cause, which appeared undoubtedly to be that of the cousin and presvunptive heir. In the month of April, as before mentioned, the Supreme (Government came to the resolution of seizing the first oppor- tunity to form a subsichary alliance with NAgpoor. On hearing of the state of parties at that court, as described in the de- spatches of the resident, the government further resolved, that in case Pursajee's malady should prove to be such, as to render him utterly incapable of conducting public business, or of exer- cising the judgment requisite in the selection of fit persons for administrative affairs, the next male heir, if of matvire age and possessed of the requisite qviaUfications, should be con- sidered to possess an inherent right to represent the sovereign authority of the state, and that the Eritish Government would consequently hold itself free to negotiate with him directly, without any inquiry whether he derived his authority from the nominal and herecUtary prince, or otherwise. Wherefore, if Pursajee should appear to be incapacitated by the malady under which he laboured, in the degree stated, a point which must 1816. NAGPOOR. lyi unavoidably be left to the discretion of the resident and tlie general feeling of those attached to the court, and if Appa Saheb should be the next male heir in legitimate succession to Pur- sajee, Mr. Jenkins was instructed to negotiate with him as the rightfvd head of the state, and if practicable, to conclude a treaty on the basis of affording the aid of the British (iovern- ment in supportof his just pretensions, upon the conditions of a subsidiary alUance. The utmost caution was, however, directed to be observed, in ascertaining the precise degree of Pursajee's incapacity ; and some further inquiry was ordered into the other point, how far the heritable claims of the nephew were recognised by the Mahratta law of succession, as preferable to those of the grandson by the daughter of Ragoojee. The first instructions on this subject were forwarded on the 15th April. The division of the Hyderabad subsidiary force, then at Ellickpoor in the valley of the Poorna under Colonel Doveton, was placed at Mr. Jenkins's disposal, in case he should find it necessary to call for the whole, or any part of it, in support of the cause of Appa Saheb, under the conditional authority conveyed in his instructions, or for the execution of the treaty of alliance and subsidy, in case the negotiations should be brought to this issue. The terms of alliance to be proposed to the Nagpoor prince varied in nothing from those wliich it had been attempted to establish in the lifetime of the late Itaja. The Bhoosla state was to be incorporated in the league for the defence of the Dukhun, already subsisting between the Eritish Government, the Nizam, and the Peshwa ; and was to be ready with its whole resources, when required for the piu"])ose of promoting oi- securing that object. A contingent was at all events to be maintained in permanent efficiency, and ever ready to act with the British subsidiary force, and to consist of not less than four battalions of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a due pro- s 2 132 NAGPOOR. 1816. portion of artillery ; which contingent was to be posted some- where in the neighbourhood of the Nerbudda, and of which the Bhoosla was to bear a proportion of the expense. His court was also to refrain from negotiation, except in concert with the British Government, and to abide its arbitration of all dif- ferences with other powers. In short, the conditions w^ere the same as have been explained in the first chapter, to constitute the relations of such other states as had accepted subsidiary alliances ; the main object being to bring the Bhoosla into this class. In subsequent instructions regarding the conduct of this negotiation, the Supreme Government declared its wish, in the present instance, that whatever subsidy should be agreed on, should be stipvilated in the shape of periodical money payments ; with a proviso, however, for the eventual substitution of a ter- ritorial cession in case of irregularity of payments, or of the occurrence of such a change of circumstances as should render an arrangement of this nature more desirable than at present. The reason for this unusual preference of money payments was, that this subsidiary force must necessarily be thro^Mi so much in advance upon the frontier, and be so continually in the field in chase of the Pindarees, as to raise a probability of embar- rassments arising, from its having also to protect a territory of considerable extent, specifically assigned for its own support. Had a cession been demanded in the first instance, it could only have been granted somewhere in the neighbourhood of the position to be occupied by the subsidiary force, for there were no other lands belonging to the state conveniently situated for the purpose. Before Mr. Jenkins received any of these instructions, almost indeed before he was informed of liis own government being prepared to contract the alhance, the contest had been brought to a crisis at Nfigpoor, which produced renewed overtures of such a nature, as he did not hesitate to entertain on his own 1816. NAGPOOR. 133 responsibility, from their consonance to the spirit of the orders, under which lie had acted upon former occasions. It has been mentioned before, that a reconcihation, whicli was attempted between the two rival factions, miscarried in consequence of Dhurmajee's secret counteraction. He not only induced Buka Baee, the regent proposed by his party, to reject with scorn the paper of reconciliation, when submitted to her for signature ; but, after first agreeing to sign himself, next day retracted his assent, unless upon the condition, that Appa Saheb would give him the security of the Punnee Patans. This is a class of aMousulman assassins, whose existence would not be tolerated vuider any other civil institutions, than those engendered by the misrule of the Xizam and the ^Mahratta princes. The singu- larity and binding force of their contracts consist in tliis, that, if once their pledge is given for any one's personal security, they are notorious for never failing to redeem it, by the secret mur- der of the aggressor upon the person guaranteed. The distrust of Appa Saheb, intimated in the assumption of such a pretext for rejecting the reconciliation, joined to the known profligacy of Dhurmajee's character, made every one suspicious of his real designs. It was also discovered, that Dhurmajee had sent invitations to men of this description to come over from Hyderabad and Ellickpoor, a thing which gave great disgust to the leading people of all parties at the Xagpoor court. His behaviour was moreover offensively overbearing to every body ; insomuch, that all but men of desperate fortunes were ahenated and disgusted. Appa Saheb was encouraged by this posture of affairs to take measures for seizing him in the palace where he resided ; and havuig secured the concurrence of the principal people about the person of the Eaja, as well as of Pursajee himself, who seems to have been brought to declare himself in favour of his cousin, and consent to his acting in this, as in all other matters, as he might think best, a body of Appa 134 NAGPOOR. 1816. Saheb's personal retainers was marched into the fort of Nag- poor, and Dhurmajee secured without resistance or difficulty, together with his pubhc and private treasures. This measure was effected on the evening of the 11th of April, 1816; having been precipitated by a sense of the necessity of crushing this intriguer, before his command of treasure and connexion with the Punnee Patans should have made him formidable. Pursajee showed more energy on this occasion than could have been expected from his usual habits : for, when Appa Saheb's party was approaching the palace, there were not wanting some who represented their coming as hostile and dangerous to himself, and endeavoured to procure an order from the Raja for their lieing resisted, which the Arab mercenaries were well enough inchned to obey. Pursajee, however, had no personal alarm, and forbad any resistance ; declaring that Appa Saheb had full power in all things. Three days after Dhurmajee's apprehension, the ceremony of seating the Raja on the Guddee, which is the formal act of installation, was publicly performed, and Appa Saheb was on the same day solemnly declared to be vested, by the Raja himself, with the sole and entire conduct of the public affairs, under the title of Naeeb-o-Mokhtar — Deputy with full powers. The English gentlemen at Nagpoor were present at the ceremon} , and INIr. Jenkins was the first to offer his o^^^l congratulations and those of the government he represented, upon the au- spicious commencement of the new reign. Though Appa Saheb had thus quietly obtained the apparent object of his wishes, in being pubhcly acknowledged regent with full powers, he was still by no means so certain of retaining the quiet enjoyment of the dignity, as to cease to regard a subsidiary connexion with the British, as a most desirable measure of se- curity, in the unsettled state in which he foiuid all around him. The chief offices of the government were stiU held by the ministers 1816. NAGPOOR. 135 of Eagoojee, the greater part of whom had joined in the con- spiracy for his exchision. There was danger in attempting their immediate displacement, lest they should declare Pursajee's competency to resume the reins himself, and, by alarming him with fears for liis Ufe, obtain from liim a formal revocation of the late nomination to the regency. The ministers, indeed, though professing their ready acquiescence in the late arrangement, assumed a tone of independence by no means compatible with the Asiatic notion of the deference due from a minister to his master. Thus Naroba, the Chitnavees, or secretary of state, took an early opportunity to wait upon the new regent, in order to inform him, that if he wished to be served zealously by him- self, it would be necessary that the course of foreign pohcy, pursued by Kagoojee in the latter part of his hfe, should be maintained, particularly alluding to the communications that had for some time been passing between Kagoojee, on the one hand, and the Peshwa, Sindlieea, and Holkar, on the other, the object of which was to promote a spirit of concert and union amongst all the Mahrattas, directed against the British ascend- ancy. Naroba adverted also to another intrigue, which, it seems, had been in train some time before the death of Kagoojee, and had in view the endeavour, through the medium of English gentlemen returning to their native country, to open a direct communication with the King of England, in order to procure the restoration of the provinces of Cuttack and Berar, for a present consideration of 30 lacks of rupees. Such an intrigue, it is firmly believed, never had being, except in the machinations of a wily Mahratta of the name of Pursaram Kao, who, under- standing a little of the Enghsh language, had address enough to persuade the deceased Kaja, that nothing was easier than to open such a channel, and had procured considerable sums of money, under pretence of forwarding the project. In tliis in- 136 NAGPOOR. ' 1816, trigue Naroba wished the government of Nagpoor to persevere, being himself the ckipe of Pursaram's imposture. The regent was induced, by distrust of Naroba, immediately to commvuiicate what had passed to INIr. Jenkins, hoping thereby to secure his active support, in measures directed to the removal of this man, whose office he intended for liis private dewan Nagoo Punt. Naroba, however, had induced Sudeek Ulee Khan to accompany him, when he made this communication of his views and principles ; and, as this man was one of the principal commanders of the Bhoosla mihtary, upon whose affi^ction he knew he could place no rehance, Appa Saheb felt himself under the necessity of temporizing with the Chitnavees, not feeling sufficient confidence in his own means to take the decided part his inclinations prompted. The desire of removing this, and others of his uncle's ministers, for the purpose of intro- ducing men of his own choice, joined to the necessity he felt of disbanding, or at least re-organizing the military establisli- ments, which caused him so much alarm, were the motives that urged him to the determination of connecting himself in a subsidiary alliance with the British Government, on the terms which had been offi^red to the late Raja. He was apprehensive, however, that, in the event of his forming such a connexion, an effi)rt would be made to impose upon him a ministry made up of the party of Sreedhur Pundit, which it was supj)osed that Mr. Jenkins favoured. Accordingly, although the regent had resolved upon the alliance, he would not employ Juswunt Rao Ramchundur in the negotiation of it, knowing his anxiety for Sreedhvir's recall and restoration to favour and authority. This point Juswunt Rao had frequently pressed, both upon Appa Saheb and upon the resident. Indeed, he was rather disaj)- pointed at the lukewarmness evinced by the latter's refusing to make an earnest representation of the necessity of the 181G. NAGPOOR. 137 immediate recall of his patron to settle the affairs of the eourt. The persons employed by Appa Sahcb were his private dewan, Xagoo Punt, and Xerayun Pundit, a minister of the late Kaja, who had early espoused his party. The ncf^otiation was commenced by a visit of Nerayun to the Eesident on the night of the 22d April, the very same day on which ^Vppa Saheb had consulted jNIr. Jenkins about the removal of Naroba from office. Great mystery was observed upon the occasion ; and, in the course of the interview, Nerayun presented a paper, Avritten in the regent's own hand, signifying " that Nagoo Punt and Ne- " rayun Pundit enjoyed his entire confidence, and were com- " missioned to open his (Appa Saheb's) inmost wishes to Mr. " Jenkins, if he were disposed to meet them with equal cor- " diality." Having shown this paper, Nerayun invited the Resident to declare the views of his own eovernmejit. Mr. Jenkins explained, that he was in daily expectation of receiving detailed ijistructions from the Governor-General ; but that the views of his government were sufficiently apparent, from what had passed in the previous negotiation with Eagoojee, and as he had no reason to believe that they had luulergone any alteration, he should be prepared to meet the negotiators on the part of Appa Saheb, without waiting the arrival of fresh orders. It was accordingly agreed, that both Nagoo Punt and Nerayun Pundit should have a conference with Mr. Jenkins, at the residency, on the night of 24th April. Now that the heir-presumptive's pretensions were backed by Pursajee's late nomination to the regency, and he had thus become the recognised head of the Bhoosla state, oiu- repre- sentative had no doubts as to the propriety of receiving his overtures ; and in the absence of any ground for supposing that the views of his government in respect to Nagpoor had changed, since the miscarriage of the negotiations in 1814, he resolved to 1S8 NAGPOOR. 1816. renew them on the same basis without further delay. He was naturally desirous of availing himself of this favourable dis- position while it lasted ; a course particularly necessary, con- sidering the wavering characters of the native princes, and the total absence of any thing hke systematic pohcy in most of their acts and resolutions. The conference took place, according to appointment, on the night of the 24th. Nagoo Punt explained candidly his master's motives for desiring the alliance ; but after much unreserved discussion on both sides, it was agreed to proceed no further, until Mr. Jenkins should have received his instructions. On the same evening, Appa Saheb himself sent for the Kesident's moonshee, and after mentioning his desire to contract the al- liance on the terms proposed to Ragoojee, declared, that besides the four battahons and a regiment of cavahy before proposed to be stationed on the Nerbutlda, he mvist have another battaUon at Nagpoor for liis personal security. Mr. Jenkins received his first instructions on the 25th of April ; and a further conference was held on the 27th, when a Persian di'aft of the treaty proposed to Eagoojee being pro- duced, the conditions were fairly discussed article by article. The basis of the negotiation was at once agreed to ; and the only points remaining to be settled after the first conference were — the strength of the subsidiary force — the amount of the subsidy— and the natui'e and strength of the contingent to be furnished by the Bhoosla state. A further question was agi- tated by the Mahratta negotiators, viz. the mode in wliich the regent was to be assured of the personal support of the British Government against the designs of the domestic factions of N^gjjoor. As both parties were equally sincere in their desire for the alliance, it was not long before all these points were satisfactorily adjusted. The strength of the subsidiary force was fixed at six battahons and a regiment of cavalry, the increase 1816. NAGPOOR. 139 being made on the application of Appa Saheb, who was informed that less than two battaUons could not safely be cantoned at NAgpoor without support, in case he required a British force at that point. An article was further inserted in the treaty, by which it was stipulated, that two of the battalions of infantry should be stationed near the court of the Raja, one of which might be elsewhere employed on emergency, but not less than one complete battahon should always remain for his Highness' personal security. The subsidy demanded was, an equivalent to the field charges of the force to be furnished, which was estimated at eight lack of rupees ; and this amount had been agreed to, and a territorial cession fixed upon as the mode of payment, when Mr. Jenkins ascertained from his instructions, that, in the present instance, money payments at Nagpoor were to be preferred. In order to procure this substitution, an abate- ment of half a lack of rupees was made in the amount ; and it was stipulated, that the expediency of commuting this for a territorial cession at a subsequent period should be considered and determined by mutual consent, but that the British Govern- ment should be entitled to demand such cession, in the event of any irregularity in the payments. With respect to the con- tingent, 5000 horse and 3000 foot was at first mentioned ; but in consideration of the poverty of the state, which was strongly represented by the jNIahratta negotiators, it ^vas finally fixed at 3000 horse and 2000 foot, in the regulation of the discijjline and internal management of which the British Besident at the court was to have the right of offering advice. Some difficulty occurred in settling the mode, in which the regent was to be assured of the support of the British Govern- ment to his personal interests. Some such assurance seemed to be a sine qua non with the Mahratta negotiators. It was at last agreed, that the treaty should purport to be concluded " with 140 NAGPOOR. 181G. " Moodajee Bhoosla (Appa Saheb) exercising with full powers " all the functions of the government on behalf of the Maha-raja " Pursajee Bhoosla," thus involving a complete recognition of the authority of Moodajee ; in addition to which, Mr. Jenkins engaged that the Governor-General's answer to the formal letter, to be written on its ratification, should contain a distinct as- surance of support to Appa Saheb's administration of affairs, so long as Pursajee might remain in his present state of mental incapacity. The Mahratta negotiators were very urgent to have a stipulation introduced, that cows and bvdlocks shovild not be killed within the Nagpoor territory. But this was re- fused as unusual ; and they were obliged to rest satisfied with a verbal assurance, that the custom which prevailed at Poona shovdd also be observed here, and no bullocks or cows be killed on any account within the city itself; but the troops, when in the field, or at a distance, were not to be restricted in this par- ticular. All matters having been thus satisfactorily adjusted, the treaty was finally executed on the 27th May. Appa Saheb's signature was affixed with great secrecy in the night at the house of Nagoo Punt, one of the negotiators ; and it was agreed not to make it public, until the approach of the subsidiary force, which Mr. Jenkins promised immediately to call in from El- lickpoor, should remove every apprehension for the consequences of the expected displeasure of the adverse factions. It may be proper to mention, that early in the negotiation, and with a view to expedite its conclusion, the resident had pro- mised, on the part of the British Government, a pension of 25,000 rupees a year to Nagoo Punt, tlie chief negotiator, and of 15,000 to his colleague, both to commence from the signature of the treaty, and subject to the approbation of their master. Written engagements to this effect were accordingly dehvered to both in the regent's presence, immediately on receipt of the 1816. NAGPOOR. 141 signed treaty. These were to be commuted for sunmids under the Governor-General's seal, which it was engaged to procure. Appa Saheb seemed well pleased a\ ith the arrangement : indeed, a similar one had folloAved the treaty of Deogam, when Sreedhur Pundit and Juswunt l?ao Eamchundur obtained similar pensions of thirty and fifteen thousand rupees. The treaty was ratified by the Governor-General in council on the 15th June, and the assurance of personal support to Appa Saheb's administration, during the continued incapacity of Pursajee, was conveyed in the letter of congratulation adcUessed to that prince on the 13th July following. Thus was accomplished the most important extension of the system of our relations with the native powers of India, that had taken place since the general settlement of them ten years before. On our part, it was hoped, that the alliance would have the effect of detaching the Bhoosla for ever from the other members of the Mahratta confederation, at the same time that it gave us a most important vantage ground, whence to launch our operations against the Pindarces and those who might venture to support them. Judging from subsequent events, it would seem to have been regarded by the other contracting party as a mere stepping-stone to absolute authority in internal affairs, a necessary expedient at the moment for breaking a formidable aristocratic faction, backed by a still more formidable soldiery ; but one that might be rejected with scorn, so soon as the object should have been securely gained. The par- ties obtained, each of them, much of the advantage calcu- lated upon, though the result entirely answered the views of neither. Immediately after the execution of the treaty, an express was sent off to summon the subsidiary force to Nagjioor. Tlie resident had previously acquainted Colonel Doveton with the 142 NAGPOOR. 1816'. progress of the negotiations, and prepared him to receive a summons of this nature. That officer had accordingly held in readiness a force of the exact strength agreed upon in the treaty, giving the command to Colonel T\^alker of the 3d Madras cavalry. This force left the neighbourhood of Ellickpoor on the first of June ; and crossing the Wurda at Amner on the sixth, arrived at the distance of one march from Nagpoor on the eighth of June. Here the main body halted ; and two battalions, brigaded under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, marched in to the Bhoosla capital on the tenth, Colonel Walker accompanying them. The treaty, wliich had not till then been so much as suspected, was jjublished in the city on the preceding day. On the 18th June, a cantonment was fixed upon for the Nagj)oor brigade about tlu'ee miles to the west of the city. It was the resident's intention, that the remainder of the subsidiary force should move immediately to Pandoorna, there to canton during the rains, before it took up its final position on the banks of the Nerbudda near Hoshungabad. The continuance of the in- trigues at Nagpoor, however, induced our new ally to request that the departure of the main body might be postponed. Not only Naroba and his faction, but the Baees of the IVIvdial, and, amongst the rest, Kashee Baee Pursajee's wife, complained loudly of the conclusion of the treaty by Appa Saheb, without previously consulting them, declaring it to have been a con- dition of their acquiescence in liis nomination to the regency, that they should be consulted in all matters of importance. The treaty itself was not the ground of their complaint ; on the contrary, they avowed their readiness to give more advantageous terms, and made distinct overtvires for the purpose to Mr. Jenkins. But the regent's breach of personal faith awakened all this virulence ; and so rancorous was the enmity, that at last, fearing assassination, and having been dissuaded from accepting 1816. NAGPOOR. 143 a personal guard of our troojjs, ^Vppa Sahcb on the 27th June went to live at a garden-house adjoining the newly-chosen can- tonment of the brigade, as the only place where he could feel himself in security. The issue of these dissensions will be detailed in a subsequent chapter. CHAPTER VII. JYPOOR, &c. 1816, APRIL TO OCTOBER. Jypoor alliance— orders from England — suspended — resumed — debated— resolved upon — Military preparations — Negotiation— protracted — broken off— internal condition of Jyjioor — fresh overtures — and negotiation — Again broken off — Nagpoor affairs — Sindheea's supineness — and offer to Jypoor — Peshwa's con- duct — and intrigues — Trimbukjee's escape — communications with Bajee Rao in consequence. The N&gpoor alliance was not the only object, which en- gaged the attention of the Supreme Government during the hot season and the rains of 1816. The Goorkha war had no sooner been brought to an end, than it was resolved to endeavour to bring the state of Jypoor within the sphere of British pro- tection ; and the negotiations and military arrangements, com- menced for tliis purpose, were simultaneous with the occurrences at Nagpoor, detailed in the preceding chapter. The circumstances, under wliich the first connexion of the British Government with Jypoor was formed in 180S, and broken off in 1806, will be famihar to those at all conversant with the pohtical history of India. They are recorded in the work of Sir John Malcohn, * wliich appeared in 1811. One good effect of that pubUcation was, that it produced a revolution in the sentiments of those intrusted with the home administration of the affairs of our Indian empire, in conformity with the spirit of whose poUcy, the previous treaty with Jypoor had been * Political History of India. .r^^^^: ,, Xma^nAiilu^^iyJ^f^^ ,i^.; Jypoor Fmour the soiUTH ^itest SEETABTTLtsKE WfLhB & RKSIDENCi; Or IJAJC-'- M nSE WEST. 1816. JYPOOR. 145 dissolved, and the principality abandoned to the oppression and exaction of the ^Nlahrattas and Patans. Regretting the policy adopted towards this state in 1806, the secret committee issued orders from England on the 23rd December 1813, for taking it again under ])rotection. These arrived on the lOth June 1814, at the time when the Supreme-Government had found itself forced into war A\ith the Xipalese, and had i)repared to refer the expe- diency of offensive measures against the predatory associations to the previous consideration of the authorities in England, ^^'hen the execution of these orders came to be discussed, it was agreed, that the renewed connexion with Jypoor might well form part of the comprehensive plan proposed for the reduction of the free- booters ; that singly it was an object of Uttle importance, while it might involve us with the]\rahrattas,and prematurely bring on the necessity of the immediate prosecution of the very course it had been resolved to defer. These arguments prevailed; and the home authorities afterwards admitted the propriety of this postpone- ment of the execution of their orders at the particular juncture. On the Governor-General's return from the western pro- vinces, in September 18 15, conceiving the Goorkha war to be near its conclusion, his Lordship came prepared with a proposition then to carry the measure into effect. However, the suspense in regard to Xipal, and the ultimate renewal of war in that direction, prevented the matter from being immediately taken up. After the final termination of hostilities towards the end of March, the proposition was renewed ; indeed, the question was forced upon the Indian government, by the increasing distresses of Jypoor, and by the earnest appUcations of its llaja, to be received under the wing of protection. In the course of that month it had been ascertained, that Ameer Khan was collecting the whole of the Patan forces for the attack of Raja Purtab Singh in his capital of Jynagurh *, • Vide plate at the head of this chapter. U 146 JYPOOR. 1816. ostensibly to force upon him a change of ministers, but evidently with the design of reducing the state, if possible, to complete subjection. There was no reason, therefore, to doubt the Kaja's sincerity in the pressing overtures he made to Mr. Metcalfe through his agents at Dehlee, accompanied by an offer to submit to any sacrifices that might be demanded. These were soon followed up by similar solicitations and offers made directly to tlie Supreme-Government by the Eaja's resident vakeel at the presidency. Under these circumstances, it became necessary forthwith to decide upon the course of policy to be adopted in regard to Jypoor ; and the question was fully considered and discussed. It was again urged, that the proposed alliance ought to form a part of the general plan of operations against the predatory bands, and therefore should be suspended till the sanction of the home authorities should allow that plan to be commenced upon — that the premature adoption of this insulated measure, by immediately involving us with Ameer Khan and the Patans, and possibly also with Sindheea, who made equal advantage of exactions from Jypoor, which a connexion with the British must put an immediate stop to, would necessarily bring on that ex- tended scale of operations, and produce that change in the political relations of our eastern dominions, which had been regarded with so much alarm — that the committee's approbation of the postponement by the Supreme Government of execution of their previous orders was to be regarded as a virtual recal of them, or at least, as an acquiescence in the opinion, that the measure should only be prosecuted as part of a general system, without being desirable on its individual account. Giving to these arguments all the weight which they derived from the respectable quarter '\\hence they proceeded, the oNIarquess of Hastings, nevertheless, considered the government to be fi-ee to take Jypoor under its protection, in obedience to the orders of 1813, 1816. JYPOOR. 147 whenever the measure might be deemed expedient ; — and that this freedom of action was not in the least affected by the ap- proval of postponement at a juncture, when circumstances were obviously unfavourable. Ilis Lordship thou1ioor ministry had been twice changed. Manjee Doss's party, which was the most aristocratical and most hostile to the Patans, had ultimately gained the ascendancy ; and the strong national spirit it succeeded in exciting amongst the Eajpoots, was one of the principal instruments, by which the enterprise of Ameer Khan was successfully resisted. No member of this aristocracy, however, would willingly exchange a state of things, which leaves so wide an opening to his hopes and ambition, for the perpetual repose and tranquillity that must result from the introduction of our influence. This disposition might be expected to have prevailed, even if we had offered a settlement on the basis of leaving matters as we found them ; l«it there was reason for the aristocracy to suspect, that our guarantee of maintaining the Kaja's authority comprehended the enforcement of his just dues from themselves ; and their suspicions naturally made them oppose the completion of the aUiance. Besides, their success in baffling the Patans with their native means alone, had added much to the pride of their independence, and increased their aversion to allow the interference of a foreign power in their concerns. It was in the beginning of August that Mr. ]\Ietcalfe broke off the negotiation, thsmissing the agent, Sunkur Doss, who had been sent on behalf of Purtab Singh. The Sujjreme-Government had hopes, that some Uttle longer experience of the excesses of the Patans would produce a better feehng in the leading men of this principahty ; and not wishing to punish the duplicity of their past conduct, by making it a ground of perpetual exclusion from the benefits of future aUiance, emjjowered the resident to receive any new overtures that might bear the aspect of more sincerity. It was resolved, at the same time, thenceforward to make no miUtary preparations, until a treaty should be actually signed and executed, in order to prevent the recurrence of a fruitless expense. Before the close of September, the know- 162 JYPOOR. 1816. ledge of the final rupture of the negotiation produced a stir amongst the factions of Jynagurh ; and a considerable party expressed great dissatisfaction against jVIanjee Doss, to whom the failure was attributed. To quiet the murmurs of this party, for the event showed it was with no real design of completing the aUiance, agents were again sent off to Dehlee, the minister's brother being associated with Sunkur Doss in the mission. On the 17th of November they arrived at Delilee, and soon after waited on the British Resident. At the first audience they declared, that, knowing the wishes of the British Government, from what had passed at the former negotiation, they had come to conform to them, and to sign the treaty before proposed ; but that they wished first to submit a few requests to the Governor- General, leaving it to his generosity to accord them or not. The reduction and delivery of Tonk and Eampoora was their first re- quest ; this Mr. Metcalfe refused to forward or hsten to ; the second was for jageers or pensions to the negotiators, similar to what had been granted at Nagpoor ; and the third for a promise, that they should always have a good-tempered gentleman as Eesident. The request for pensions, as a matter of stipulation, was absurd, considering that the negotiation was not on the footing of reciprocal advantage, and that there was no object to be acquired by the British worth a pecuniary sacrifice ; the occasion of our treating at all being the compliance with their solicitation for salvation by our means fi'om impending ruin. Mr. Metcalfe having combated these points rather with ridicule than argu- ment, proceeded to state an omission in the draft of treaty before discussed, viz. the stipulation for our arbitration of all foreign disputes and claims, either for or against the principality. The greatest objections were raised to the insertion of any such article ; the chief of wliich appeared to arise from an appre- hension, that it might extend to the adjudication of the title to the Kaj of Jypoor, to which there was more than one claimant 1816. JYPOOR. 158 against Purtab Singh, particularly a pretender still living, wlio had been supported at one time by Sindheea. The scruples of the negotiators in respect to this article could not be got over, even although this construction was disavowed. The coni'erence accordingly broke up, with a distinct explanation to Sunkur Doss and his colleague, that the insertion of this new article was insisted ui)on under special orders from the Supreme Government ; consequently, that the point could on no accoiuit be conceded. Two days were allowed them to consider of it : the third was fixed for a second conference, at which they would be expected to sign the treaty, with this article introduced, either in the form ])roposed, or so modified as might be agreed upon in the interim ; or, if matters could not be adjusted bv that time, the negotiation would be dropped altogether. This restriction in point of time was necessary, to prevent the govern- ment of Jypoor from again making its advantages of the show of negotiation, without any intention to bring it to a point. Continued opposition being manifested to the stipidation for our arbitrament, it occurred to the Kesident, that the secret reason might be, the fear lest the liquidation of certain bonds, given at different times to Patan Sirdars, would be comprehended under its terms. To exclude this interpretation, he agreed so to word the article, as to confine it to claims of tribute or other demands on the part of Sindeea and Ilolkar as independent powers. In this form the negotiators waived their objections to the stipulation. But when the time came for the treaty to be signed, a new and extraordinary objection was started to the usual engagement to procure the ratification of Kaja Purtab Singh within fifteen days. The negotiators seemed to wish our representative to be satisfied M'ith their signature, and to act upon their treaty, without requiring its ratification by their master. They were told, however, in answer, that, if they objected to this article, they must take their immediate de- X 154 JYPOOR. • , 1816. parture ; and as they made no other reply than to solicit a delay of twenty days for the discussion of the point, not for procuring the required confirmation, the treaty was a second time abruptly terminated, with no more successful issue than the former. It was now most evident, that the object of the Jypoor administration was, to keep open a negotiation, not to conclude a treaty. Manjee Doss, a short time after the return of the agents, declared pubUcly to the British news-writer at Jyna- gurh, that he had never authorised the negotiators at Dehlee to agree to any stipulation for a money payment. It is difficult to conceive what could have been the object of this extraordinary communication ; but it was supposed to arise from a wish to ingratiate himself with the party adverse to the British alliance. He lost nothing in their eyes by this pubhc profession of dupli- city ; and on its being made matter of remonstrance by the resident at Dehlee, repHed only by evasion and further false- hood ; declaring, that the amount of subsidy was what he had not agreed to ; although, when the agents presented themselves the second time, it was distinctly explained beforehand, that, unless they were empowered to sign the treaty before proposed, of which the specific money stipulation formed an item, they could not be hstened to ; and the negotiators, after this intima- tion, declared, at their first audience, that they had come em- powered to sign. Immediately on the rupture of the first negotiation in xVvigust, the mihtary preparations wliich had been made for its eventual support were suspended ; and the troops destined for this being now available for other service, a force was directed to be formed under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, of the 10th B. N. I., and to hold itself in readiness to proceed to the Ner- budda at the close of the rains, in order to reheve the Madras troops there stationed under Colonel A'\^alker, of which for the present the N^gpoor subsidiary force was composed. 1816, NAGPOOR. 155 In the mean time, Appa Saheb, who in June had taken refuge at a garden-house adjoining to the new cantonment, as mentioned in the ])receding chapter, became reHe\'ed from his alarms. Having seized and confined Nar()l)a, the secretary, and estabhshed another of the widows of IJagojee in the control of the interior of the palace, and care of the IJaja's person, in tlie room of Euka Eaee, he returned to the city, and his authority was in appearance firmly established by the end of August. Goojaba Dada, who had likewise been an opponent of the regent, but was in the main a moderate man, and besides a relation, was merely debarred from indiscriminate access to the Raja's person ; and Svdeek Ulee Khan, seeing the turn affairs had taken, paid assiduous court to the Naeeb, and in a very short time acquired an influence seemingly little inferior to that of Xaffoo Punt and Neragun themselves. The two last men- tioiied favourites, indeed, complained to Mr. Jenkins, that the interested counsels of this officer had induced Appa Saheb to renounce liis original design of reducing and reforming his military establishments, by which means Sudeek Alice Khan had preserved to himself the chief military authority, with all its corrupt emoluments. In October, however, the old advisers of Appa Saheb so far prevailed, as to induce him to apply for a battalion, to be raised and disciplined by British officers, on the model of the reformed infantry in the Nizam's service. The Governor-General acquiesced at once in the proposal, and nomi- nated officers for the purpose. The object of this ai)i)lication was, to provide a further counterpoise to the Arabs, whose fidelity to himself he still mistrusted, on account of their known personal attachment to the son of Ragoojee, their late master. Yet tliis step seemed to indicate a degree of confidence and cordiality towards his new allies, little consistent with the treachery of his subsecpient conduct. To say the truth, there is ground to conclude, from this and other symptoms, thati\ppa x2 156 MAHRATTAS. 1816. Salieb, while Pursajee remained alive, was not engaged in the conspiracy, which had been for some time in progress for a general rising of the whole jMahratta nation. In the beginning of October, Colonel Walker moved to take up the position assigned to him, on the banks of the Nerbudda. His operations in that quarter, and the effect of the appearance of a British force so near the immediate haunts of the Findarees, together with their plans and expeditions for the season of 1816-17, will more properly form the subject of a separate chap- ter. Eut it may first be necessary to notice briefly what was passing during the rains at the other IVIahratta courts. Sindheea made no effort to avail himself of the distractions at the Ehoosla court, consequent upon the death of Ragoojee : indeed, the expedition with which the treaty of subsidiary alliance was negotiated by jNIr. Jenkins, and the secrecy ob- served in the conduct of that affair, had left no time for the operation of foreign intrigue, much less for the machinations of a durbar, so slow in its deliberations as that of Gwalior. In the same manner this cliieftain refrained entirely from further in- terference in the affairs of Bhopal ; so that the young Nviwab, having retained his father's counsellors in their offices, con- tinued to make head against the Pindarees, and to command their respect: keeping up at the same time an active corre- spondence with the pohtical agent in Bundelkhund, explaining every thing that passed between liim and the freebooters, and professing his desire to become, or at least to be considered, a dependent of the British dominion. Xeither did Sindheea make any effort whatever, in the course of 1816, to curb or reduce the Pindarees, notwithstanding that the subject was specially brought to his notice by the British Resident, on more occasions than one. His constant reply was, that repeated orders had been issued, prohibiting their violation of the British territories ; and that time and negotiation were necessary to 1816. MAIIRATTAS. 157 bring the refractory cliiefs to implicit obedience. It was ex- plained in private to the Resident upon one occasion, that Sindheea's ])lan was to inveigle tlie chiefs to an interview, and, by seizing their persons, to deprive the durras of their leaders, and cause their dissolution. It was evident, however, from the general tenor of his conduct, that he began to be alarmed, lest he sliould be visited with the whole responsibility for an evil, wliich his weakness had suffered to grow up within his domi- nions. He was moreover beginning to have a more accui'ate notion of his relative strength than he had entertained before the chscvissions in 1814, when he thought, by the loftiness of his tone, to restrain the British Government from interfering with Bhopal. In short, anxiety and alarm were fast succeeding to the jealous rivalry and contentious spirit, which the violent among his courtiers stiU vainly flattered him was the policy, warranted and demanded, by his relative position amongst the powers of India. To this cavise, and to habitual tardiness of judgment, is to be attributed the supineness with which Sind- heea witnessed the extension of our influence over the dominions of the Bhoosla, and which, though it in the end produced the determination to temporize with both parties, and, if possible, to keep well with both, till he could see the probable issue of affairs, yet prevented any exertion to court our favour by a vigorous and early effort against the Pindarees, the common enemy. Another reason for his Avant of energy at this junctin*e may be found in the circumstance, that his best troops, luider Baptiste, were fully employed in the siege of Eagoogurh, a fort belonging to a Eajpoot, named Baja Jysingh. That active chief, wlrile his own strong hold Avas closely invested, succeeded in a sudden surprise of Baptiste's fort of Sheeopoor, where tlie son and part of the treasure of the Colonel had been de})osited for safety. This passed in the beginning of June ; and, though the fort of Eagoogurh fell in the following August, Jysingh, as a 158 MAHRATTAS. 1816. partisan, gave full occupation to the whole of Baptiste's division, and had good success in several hght skirmishes and attacks on detachments and convoys during the whole of the rains, and even up to the close of the cold season. At length, having lost his late conquest of Sheeopoor also by tlie treacliery of his gar- rison, he went oif with his followers to form a new band of Pin- darees, and Avas not unsuccessful in his depredations on the territories of Sindheea, more particularly on Baptiste's assigned lands. Yet notwithstanding the indifference manifested by Sindheea to the passing occurrences at NAgpoor and on the Nerbudda, the opening of the British negotiation with Jypoor seemed to waken him to the policy of a counter-exertion, for the purpose of securing some personal advantage. He accordinglj^ opened a similar negotiation, tendering the assistance of his military means towards restraining the Patans ; and, in furtherance of this object, sent a reinforcement to Bapoo Sindheea at Ajimeer, to add to the efficiency of his estabhshment in that quarter. The Jypoor durbar amused Sindheea for some time with the hope of accepting his protection, pretty nearly in the same manner as they amused the British Government ; but the jNIahratta meeting this conduct with reciprocal duplicity opened a further negotiation with Ameer Khan, and in proportion as coolness was evinced on the part of the Eaja, pretended a cor- diahty with the Patau, in the hope of alarming the Jypoor ministry by the apprehension, that his weight would be throwTi into the opj^osite scale. But Jypoor had no real design of con- necting itself with any one ; and while it rehed on the known disposition of the British to afford it protection, as a sufficient resource against any extremity the united efforts of the Patans and Sindheea could reduce it to, reckoned also vipon the deterring influence of this knowledge, as its best protection against any actual design on their part to drive it to tliis last resort. Sind- 1816. MAHIIATTAS. 159 heea's plans came, tliercf ore, to the same issue with the Britisli negotiations ; that is to say, i)rodiiced no result whatsoever. At the court of Poona nothing particular occurred ; but the conduct of the Peshwa's government was an alternation of con- cessions, subservience, and conciliation, and of a spirit of recrimi- nation and litigious opposition. The prince himself assumed either character, with a versatility, that seemed to baffle every attempt to penetrate his real disposition and intentions. In this spirit, at one time he ordered extensive levies of horse and foot, and at another reduced his establishments to the lowest possible ebb : at one time he complained of the delays thrown in the way of the adjustment of his claims on the Nizam and Gykwar ; at other times himself created new and very chikUsh ones. All the while, every nerve was strained to procure the release of Trimbukjee, and every advantage, personal as well as national, was offered to j\Ir. Elphinstone through various channels, to engage him to forward this grand object of his desire. Active intrigues were at the same time carrying on in Hindoostan and GuzerAt, and special agents deputed to all the Mahratta courts, to persuade them to join the proposed coali- tion, promising advantages to those who were not prepared for open hostiUty, if they would but aid, by keeping up the appearance of concert, whence he anticipated a reduction of our tone, and a greater degree of deference to the general wish of the Mahratta nation. The British residents exerted themselves with activity to penetrate into all these intrigues, and generally with complete success. Those of the Peshwa at the court of Holkar, were made the subject of a special remonstrance, and produced abundance of protestations, but no change of conduct. Even Putteh Sing Gykwar was a party to these designs, and gave way for some time to the dangerous counsels of low com- panions and men adverse to the Britisli connexion ; but this disposition was overcome in him without any resort to strong ICO MAHRATTAS. 181G. measures, by the operation of his own good sense and ex- perience of the sohd advantages of the alliance, and by the judicious advice and moderation of the resident at his covirt. On the 12th of September, to the surprise of all, Trimbukjee Daingha succeeded in escaping from his confinement in Tannah, notwithstanding that the precaution had been taken of gar- risoning the fort entirely with Europeans, of whom a guard was continually mounted to observe his personal movements. The escape M^as eifected at eight o'clock at night, through a liole in the wall of the privy, which being detached from the jilace of actual confinement, communicated on the other side with a stable belonging to one of the officers of the garrison. 13y accustoming the sentries to attend him to tliis place at the same hour of the night, their suspicions were lulled to sleep, and he was suffered to enter alone, while the sentry with the hght remained without, in a situation, whence he could not see what passed within. The preparations for this escape were made by a man who had, with this design, taken service as syee, or horsekeeper, to the officer living in the adjoining premises, and who disappeared along with the prisoner. His com- munications with Trimbukjee are supposed to have passed while he was leading the horse under his care near the prison- door and the terrace, on which Trimbukjee was allowed to walk : for at these times this syee was generally observed to be singing IVIahratta songs, which the European sentries did not under- stand nor suspect. It was some miiuites before the escape was discovered, and the night being dark and rainy, Trimbukjee had slipped off his clothes and crossed the rampart by a rope previously attached to one of the guns, before the alarm was given, and thus gained the other side of the narrow and shallow channel separating Salsette from the Mahratta territories, before measures could be taken to intercept the passage. The resident at Poona was informed of this event by ex- ISIG. THLMBUKJEE. lO'l press. He immediately communicated the news to the Pcshwa, declaring that the Governor-Cieneral would expect tlie utmost efforts to l)e made by his Highness for the re-apprehension of this delinquent, as a necessary proof of attachment to the Ihitish Government ; while to afford him protection either overtly or underhand, would infallibly produce the mischiefs that had been avoided by his surrender. Bajee Rao wished to avail himself of the escape, to alter the terms on which his favoiu'ite had before been given up, and to make his own ex- ertions for the re-apprehension conditional, on receiving a pro- mise, that the prisoner should hereafter remain in his own custody. This attempt was of course resisted : but the fugitive for some time eluded all efforts to discover the place of his retreat ; and there could be no doubt that Bajee Rao abetted his concealment, notwithstanding his open professions to the contrary. Thus have the political events of India been traced to the close of the rainy season of 1816", about the middle of the month of October of that year. Y CHAPTEK VIII. PINDAREES. 181 6-1 7j octobeh to April. Niigpoor subsidiary force moves to the Nerbudda — Pindarees alarmed — their first effort — grand expedition in three divisions — 1st to Ganjam — 2d to Bidur — surprised by Major M'Dowal — exploit of Sheikh Dulloo — 3d to Ahmednugur ^surprised by Major Lushington — Ganjam penetrated — Borthwick's pursuit — 1st party intercepted — reflections — resolution to extirpate the hordes — motives — Sindheea — Holkar — Dya-Ram of Hatras — his fort invested and bom- barded — his escape — fort taken. Early in October 1816, Lieutenant-Colonel Walker had moved, as abovementioned, with the main body of the Xagpoor subsidiary force, to take up the position assigned to him on the southern bank of the Nerbudda. By the 25th of the month, liis defensive hue was completed. It extended from Soonee, which lies 27 miles S. S. W. of Hoshungabad, to Sirinugur, 120 miles east of the same place. AVith all the advantages of favourable ground, the force, consisting of but five battalions of infantry, and one regiment of cavalry, was evidently unequal to the defence of so extended a line ; more especially as the Eaja's contingent Mas in no present condition to afford effectual assistance. One of Colonel AA^alker's posts was no less than 90 miles distant from its nearest appui. But the first appearance of a British army in the valley of the Nerbvidda spread conster- nation amongst the Pindarees ; and Cheetoo's durra, ^hich occupied the cantonment of Nemawur, on the northern bank, a 1816-17. PINDAREES. 163 little lower down the river, prepared to retire with -their families in the direction of the Cihats into Malwa. Tn thea])prehen.sion of an inniiediate attack, the preparations which had been making for an expedition to the south, when the river should be ford- able, were suspended : and some time was lost by the chiefs of durras, in forwarding intreaties to Sindheea for an asylum for their families in some of his numerous strong holds, while they prepared for a desultory contest with the army, whose approach they daily expected. Sindheea openly rejected all such apph- cations, notwithstanding that they were accompanied with an intimation, that unless he helped them in this emergency, his territories should no longer enjoy immunity from ravage. Some of his military commanders, however, and a party in his ministry, privately gave them lio})es of ultimately obtaining their object, in case matters came to extremity ; assuring them that all pubhc acts and professions were merely intended to save appearances with the English. Emboldened in some measure by these assurances, and by observing that the British troops did not cross the Nerbudda, the several durras came to the resolution of pushing small parties between Colonel Walker's posts, and round his flanks, and thus pursuing the same system of predatory incursions into the British territories, that had in the past year been so productive and successful. On the 4th of November, a party crossed near Hintha, half of which proceeded on the Boorhanpoor road, and the other half towards Tamboornee. Colonel AV'alker imme- diately moved with a light force upon Hurda, to intercept their route ; and, after a vain pvu-suit for some distance along the Boorhanpoor road, succeeded by a sudden march eastward, in falling in with the latter party, while bivouacked in the jungle on the night of the 5th. This body suffered an inconsiderable loss, and fled precipitately back across the river. Similar at- tempts to pass were not renewed till the l.'3th, when the plan 164 PINDAREES. 1816-17. which had been agreed upon by the chiefs, in the interim, was carried into execution. Cheetoo's durra still continued in force to the west. At the same time, large bodies moved to the east, and upwards of 5000 jiassed the river in sight of the infantry post, on the extreme right of Colonel Walker's line, with a rapidity of movement, which baffled the efforts of the infantry to impede or harass their march, and the regiment of cavahy was on the opposite flank. In this manner the passage was effected, in sufficient numbers to form two luhburs, (expeditions), one of which continued its progress due east, and, penetrating by the route of Mundela, Chuteesgurh, and the forests and mountains forming the northern and eastern frontier of the Nagpoor do- minions, burst suddenly into the Company's district of Ganjam, with the evident and avowed intention of turning thence to Cuttack and Juggeruauth. By good fortune, the turbvdent character of the Kajas and landholders of Ganjam had caused the district to be well furnished with troops, and the luhbur was driven back before it could penetrate to any distance, as will presently be mentioned more particularly. The other body of these Pindarees took a southward direction, and passed within 20 miles of Xagpoor with impunity, notAvithstanding that an effort was made to intercept them, by a light detachment from the infantry brigade remaining at that city. They then crossed the Wurda into the Kizam's territory, before Colonel Doveton could bring up troops for the defence of that hne, from the posi- tion he occupied to shut the Ghats in the valley of the Poorna, in which quarter he was looking out for these marauders. This body, which at the lowest estimate amounted to 6000, was on the Godaveree, at Neermul, on the loth of December, and at Bidur on the 21st ; up to which point it had marched leisurely without interruption, or fatiguing its horses, plundering a broad line of country on either side of its track. The luJibur con- tinued some time in the neighbourhood of Bidur, while tlie 1816-17. - PINDAREES. IC)5 chiefs remained indecisive, as to the prosecution of the ukerior design of penetrating into the Coni])any"s ceded districts on tlie other side of the Kishna and Tooniboodra. Their indecision proved the ruin of the enterprise, as it afforded time for a hght force, detached from Hyderabad for tliis purpose, under Major jM'Dowal, to give the main body a complete surj)rise, about 30 miles to the west of Eidur. This occurred before daylight in the morning of the 15th of January; and such was tlie security into which the Pindarees had been lulled by their hitherto uninterrupted progress, that the infantry were close in upon the tents of the chiefs before they were discovered, and hardly a man of the party was mounted, by the time the first volley was discharged. The greater part of the horses and booty of the main division of this lahbur was abandoned on the rapid advance of the infantry. One leader, however, indignant at the want of energy betrayed by those vested with the chief command of the ex])edition, had carried away a body of from ,'3 to 500, a few days before this discomfiture ; and, passing rapidly across the Peshwa's territory, descended into the Kon- kan by the Amba Ghat in the western range, and thence shaped his course due north, plundering the western shores of India, ft-om the 17th to the 21st degree of north latitude, and return- ing by the valley of the Tap tee, and the route of Boorhanpoor. The conductor of this bold enterprise was a man named Sheikli Dulloo, and the singular hardihood of the exploit, joined to the uncommon skill and rapidity with which it was conducted, saved it from the fate which overtook every other expethtion of the kind this season. The only loss Sheikh Dulloo sustained from British troops was, when, on his return to the Nerbudda, in the following March, he fomid the ford, by which he hoped to re-cross to Cheetoo's durra, guarded by a havildar's party of our sepoys. Several of his men were shot in attempting to dasli across ; but Sheikh Dulloo himself, with his main body, and 166 PINDAREES. 1816-17. best mounted followers, retiring from the ghat, boldly swam the river lower down, though not without a further loss of men and horses, several of whom were drowned in the attempt. The ill mounted and less daring of the band dispersed and iled into the jungle on the southern bank of the river, where the greater part were cut off by the wild inhabitants of the neighbourhood : so that, of 260 Pindarees of the first and second classes, of which the band had consisted when it separated from the hihbur at Bidur, only 110 joined the durra; but these carried a rich booty in their saddles ; and the brilliancy of the achievement added even more to their reputation than its success had done to their wealth. Besides the above two bodies of Pindarees, which had turned the right flank of Colonel Walker's line, another detachment from Cheetoo's durra had succeeded in making good its route by the Boorhanpoor road, as above mentioned. It was subsequently reinforced, and succeeded in passing the valley of the Taptee and ghats of Berar, notwithstanding the dispositions made for their defence. This body passed between Aurungabad and Jalna on the 28th of November, and moved direct upon Ahmednugur. The Poona subsidiary force was not wholly in position for the defence of the Peshwa's frontiers against such incursions, a con- siderable part of the light troops having been called down to the south, where their presence v.as required to awe Appa Dussaee into submission. This man was a powerful southern jageerdar, who had subjected himself, by continued continnacy, to the penalty of a forfeiture of one-third of his jageer ; and the forfeiture was enforced by calling down a British detach- ment at the close of the rainy season, which did not completely effect the object until the middle of December 1816. On the 25th of this month, while on liis route to the northward with the 4th Madias native cavalry, which had formed part of the force employed to the south. Major Lushington obtained intel- 181G-17. PINDAREES. 167 ligence that this body of l^indarees was on the S. E. of Poona, He was at the tini'^ at Pupulwaree, twenty-five miles distant ; but as the Pindarees were ignorant of his being in the neigh- bourhood, and were phindcring at their leisure in fancied security, there was every hope of falling in with them : at all events, he resolved to make the effort. After an unremitting march of upwards of fifty miles, from one o'clock in the morning of the 26th, the Major succeeded in coming up with the hiJibur, at the time the Pindarees were cooking and eating after a long march. The surprise was complete ; and, as the ground was favourable for the pursuit of cavalry, a very large proportion was cut up. The loss of the freebooters was estimated to be very great, as between 7 and 800 were left on the field. The only casualty on the part of the British was the death of Ca])tain Darke, Avho received a spear through the body. A man of his troop had turned from the charge of a Pindarji, armed in this manner ; and, indignant at the sight, this spirited officer himself rushed for^^ ard, and fell a victim to the superiority of the Avcapon in skilful hands. The Pindara was immediately cut to pieces by Captain Darke's men. This /i/Iibio\ and that surprised a few days afterwards by jMajor JNI'Dowall, both suffered so severely, that they broke up, and fled back to the Nerbudda in the utmost confusion. However, before they coxdd arrive on its banks, the passes and ghiits were so well guarded, that the greater part of the fugitives perished, and but few reached the durras they had left in November. A remnant of the party surprised by JM'Dowall, was conducted across the river with great skill by its leader, who succeeded in making his way by the Charwa road, before the party sent to interrupt him by Colonel Walker arrived to occupy it. The Ganjam expccUtion is the only one that remains to be accounted for. This body was composed almost entirely of men 168 PINDAREES. 1816-17- from Wiisil ^Mahommed's durra. It ci-ossed the British frontier in the middle of December, marching upon Kimmedy, to which place Lieutenant Tweedle, who was on the frontier with a com- pany of j\radras native infantry, retired as the hiJibur advanced. Emboldened by this, the Pindarees attacked the town, and suc- ceeded in burning and plundering part of it on the night of the 19 th of December, though INIajor Oliver was there with three companies of infantry. Having ascertained that their camp was l)ut two miles distant, this officer determined to surprise it before morning, and met with complete success, occasioning considerable loss to the luhbur, notwithstanding the smallness of his force and his utter want of cavalry. In the course of the following morning the whole band moved off, taking the direct road to Ganjam, before which they appeared on the 25th. They plundered part of the town in haste, and retired through Goomsir. Lieutenant Boriliwick instantly commenced a most active pur- suit. On the 27th he fell in with about 1000, of whom he destroyed twenty men and fifty horses ; but, not satisfied with this success, he resolved to beat up the Pindara camp, which, in their confidence, from knowing the British troops to be infantry only, he rightly judged would not be far off. Leaving a jemadar's party to pursue the direct road, he himself, with fifty men of his company, took a circuitous lovite, so as to fall upon the enemy from the opposite quarter. His success was very brilhant ; and soon after the Pindarees disappeared from the province, abandoning the hope of being able to penetrate into Cuttack, and disheartened by the losses already sustained. In the mean time, the advance division of the Bengal troops, destined to relieve Colonel Walker, had moved down to the Nerbudda ; and jNIajor M'Morine, who commanded, leaving a detachment at Jubvilpoor on his arrival at that point on the 1st of January, so disposed the rest of his force, under Colonel 18K3-17. PINDAREES. 1^0 Walker's orders, as to extend the defensive line thence to Siri- nugur, and allow of the jMadras troops before stationed at the latter point being called in to strengtlien and complete the chain of posts from Sirinugur to Hoshungabad and Soonee. Wasil ]\Iahommed, seeing these further preparations, became apprehensive for the safety of the hihbur he had sent out, and despatched h'trcaras in every direction to warn them against returning by the same route, with positive injunctions to keep well to the north. This, however, availed them little ; for Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, who was in the course of January moving down in the same direction with the main body of the Bengal troops, sent forward parties to occupy the ghats and passes from Chandya northwards to Bundclkhund, so as ef- fectually to intercept the return of any body of marauders from tlie east towards the wSagur district, near which ^\^asil INIahommcd had fixed his head-quarters. These arrangements completely answered the purpose. On the 24th of January, Captain Caul- field, who was furthest in advance, heard of the approach of the luhbur from C^anjam, and fell upon them in the night with a squadi-on of the 5th Bengal cavalry, while attempting to return by the Chandya road. He captured 400 horses ; and the number of the slain was estimated at the same amount. Eamzan Khan, the leader of the party, v/as ascertained to be amongst these ; the chief next in rank had previously fallen in one of Tieutenant Borthwick"s attacks. The fugitives, after this discomfiture, made an effort to escape by a pass further to the north, where, on the 2Gth, they fell in with Major Clarke and the main body of the 5th Bengal cavalry, who cut up about 150 more. This expedition, therefore, which was the only one that penetrated the British frontier, suffered yet more severely than either of the other two. A small part of the advance, that had passed between Chandya and Jubulpoor, before Colonel Adams's detachments had taken z 170 PINDAREES. 1816-17. up their positions, were all of those engaged in it who escaped unmolested in their return homewards *. No further attempt was made this season to pass into the Dukhun, or to get beyond the defensive posts, connecting the frontier of our possessions in Bundelkhund wdtli those of the Bhoosla Eaja. From January forward the Pindarees carried on their trade of plunder for mere subsistence, and exclusively above the gh4ts in Malwa ; wliile such was the alacrity of the troops occupying the defensive Une, that, towards the end of the season, a band from WasiVs durra having ventured too far to the eastward, to ravage the country between Bundelkhund and Sagur, was surprised and driven back with loss by the rapid advance of a squadron of the 4th Bengal native cavalry, under Captain Eidge, from their post at Lohargaon. A party that came to the bank of the Xerbudda to reconnoitre, and ascertain the practicabihty of a passage, was in like manner stopped by the guard on the southern bank, while Major Clarke (the Bengal troops having by that time completely reUeved those of INIadras) crossed the river with cavahy at a different ford, and cut them up as they retired across the valley in their way to the hills that form the barrier of jNIalwa. Such were the proceedings of the Pindaree hordes during the season of 1816-17, and such the mihtary operations against them. Their plan of depredation tins year embraced a more ample expanse of territory, than had ever before been attempted, extending from shore to shore of the peninsula of India, and including all the intermediate provinces that had been spared the ravage of the preceding year. The report of Lieutenant- General Sir Thomas Hislop to the INIarquess of Hastings re- presented their diiFerent columns as amounting by liis estimate * This party was hotly but unsuccessfully pursued by infantry from Jubulpoor, under Major Popham. 1816-17. PINDAREES. 171 to 23,000 horse. This inroad had been foreseen to the full extent, and the precautionary measures of the British were con- sequently on a proportionate scale of magnitude. After the Bengal troops had crossed the Nerbudda to relieve Colonel ^Valker, there were no less than 32,000 regulars of the King's or Company's forces between that river and the Kishna, besides the reformed infantry and cavalry of the Nizam and the Peshwa's brigade, which, though paid by our alUes, were in effect devoted to the same service with their officers. In addition to the above force in advance, the utmost efforts had been made to arm the northern frontier of our immediate possessions in the Dukhun, to guard against a similar attempt to that of the pre- ceding year ; so that altogether the military effort on the side of INIadras was nearly as great, as it would have been in the e\ ent of operations of the most decisive kind. Notwithstanding all this, it was rather to gocJ fortune on our part, and to a relaxation of vigilance and activity on that of the enemy, than to our own exertions, that we must attribute the overtaking of the two larger bodies, and theii- severe chastisement by IVIajors Lushington and jNI'Dowall. So, likewise, the opportune march of Colonel Adams to the south most materially contributed to afford the means of completely intercepting the third expedition, which had penetrated into Ganjam, Thus it was accident, not the merits of our defensive pohcy, that had yielded us so nuich more brilliant successes tliis year than the last, and no argu- ment could be drawn from them in favour of the secm-ity of any combination of defensive arrangements. To build a system for the future upon the experience of tliis season, that should provide only for similar results, would involve an annual pre- paration on the same enormous scale of expense ; and even by the most favourable calculation, would not secure our provinces from invasion, and our subjects from the horrors of Pindara devastation, although we might, in some cases, happen to inflict '/ 9 172 PINDAREES. 1816-17. signal vengeance on the marauders, on their way homeward incimibered with spoil. The insufficiency of stationary posts of defence was abund- antly shown by the early success of the Pindarees in penetrating Colonel Walker's hne ; and it stands to reason, that if a light assailant of this description be allowed time to ascertain pre- cisely at what points the covering force may be expected to be found, he will always be able so to choose his hne of route, and to regulate the length of his marches, as to baffle the utmost vigilance of such stationary defenders, when they are under an interdict not to advance and meet the danger, or crush it in the embryo. The conviction of this disadvantage produced an alteration of policy before the close of the season : for Colonel Adams obtained permission to cross the Xerbudda, and the officers in post to the south of Bundelkhund to advance west- ward even into Sagur, in case an enemy should approach : whereas antecedently, the southern bank of the Nerbudda, or more generally the frontier of our own territories and that of our protected allies, had been fixed as the Hmit of their opera- tions. The two successful affairs of April were attribvitable to this judicious alteration. The pohcy and views entertained respectively by the British Ciovernment and by the native potentates of India regarding the Pindarees in the course of this season will now be shortly ex- plained. The Governor-General in council had, as before men- tioned, come to the resolution of waiting the arrival of the sanction of the home authorities to commence offensive measures for their suppression. In the interval Lord Hastings trusted, that the ad- vantage of defence acquired by the Nagpoor alliance might, in some degree deter, or at least enable us to repel aggression, either on ourselves or our allies. Early in the season, however, he became sensible of the futility of such expectations ; and even before the stoi*m had burst upon Ganjam, the council came to 1816-17. PINDAREES. I7'i the unanimous resolution to defer no longer the extiqiation oi" these banditti. On the 21st of ])ccend)er 1816, this deter- mination Avas formed, and l>ord Hastings gave innnediate notice of his intention to proceed in person to the scene of action, and to spare no efforts to accoinphsh the object in spite of any obstacles that might be raised by open or secret foes, ^\'ith respect to the time, it was resolved not to connnence until the following season, unless the formation of the Jypoor alliance should require operations against Ameer Khan, in which case his Lordsliip proposed to enter upon immediate action. 'I liis not having taken place, his departurefor the upper provinces was fixed for the following rains, that is to say, the month of June or July. It was still considered doubtful, whether Sindhcea would be in- duced to co-operate with us in this important olrject, or yield to the importunity of alternate entreaty and menace, addressed to him from the several dvirras. The certain opposition of Ameer Khan, or at least of his Patau mercenaries, and the probable secret counteraction of the Peshwa, were confidently anticipated : but with the resources of the Nizam and of the Bhoosla, who was supposed to be equally staunch, added to oiu- own strength in that quarter of India, there appeared little hazard of failure. But his Lordship resolved to place himself above that Uttle, by calling into }3lay the whole disposable means of the three presidencies, according to a comprehensive plan, which will hereafter be particularly developed. The resolution to undertake active measures was formed not only without any assurance of support from the home authorities, but at a time when the Supreme Government had reason to believe that a contrary disposition prevailed at the India House. It must be observed, that there had not yet been time to learn their sentiments on receiving information of the storm having burst \ipon their own district of Guntoor. This intel- ligence arrived in the course of the month of September 1816. 174 BRITISH POLICY. 1816-1 /. and seems to have wrought an immediate change in their aversion to offensive operations. When the Supreme Government re- solved to wait no longer for the expected sanction from home, no answer to its second reference had yet been received. The repeated violations of ovir own territory, and the expe- rience of the litter futility of defensive arrangements, irresistibly impelled the Governor-General to this course ; and his Lordsliip felt confident, a confidence justified by the result, if the result of a measure can ever be admitted to afford a fair test of its merit, that a knowledge of these circumstances would awaken die authorities in England to a sense of the magnitude of the evil, and the imperative duty and necessity of eradicating it. The reasons for postponing the commencement of operations till the close of the rains, unless prematurely brought on by the issue of the .Jypoor negotiation, will be obvious, when the time requisite fuUy to prepare so extensive a plan of mihtary and political movements, arid the vast advantage of commencing with the whole of the fair season to look forward to, are taken into consideration. The current of events appeared also to be daily tending to produce a state of public feehng and opinion more and more favourable to our views. The successes against the Pindarees, the increasing alarm and anxiety of Sindheea, the prospect of further improving our connexion with N^igpoor, and of comprehending Jypoor within the circle of our influence, as well as the time thus given for the newly-formed pacific re- lations with Nipal to take effect, all contributed to recommend that government should reserve the execution of its resolve, until the following season. There was every prospect, that the work would then be accomphshed in one campaign ; and the event has shown that the expectation was just. "Wherefore, although the effort for this purpose must necessarily be on the largest and most expensive scale, still the ultimate saving of charge and increase of reputation, from avoiding a warfare pro- 181G-17. NATIVE rowERy. 175 tracted indefinitely from year to year, were objects worth any sacrifice, and only to be ensured by having an entire season to act in, after a due allowance of time for previous preparation. It will not be necessary to detain the reader, by stating at length the views of the several native princes, in resjiect to the Pindarees. Their aggressions on ourselves and our allies were more than once brought to the notice of Sindlieea, by order of the Supreme Government ; and in proportion as we became earnest in representing the evil, this chief redoubled his pro- testation of hostiUty to the hordes, while his generals and mi- nisters continuetl to give them even open encouragement. A commander was at last appointed to conduct an expedition, that was to extirpate the whole race of Pindarees : but, Avhen the army was to be collected, delays and difficulties began to be started in such number, that, in the end, Ealajee Ingha, the officer nominated, never stirred from Gwalior. Some anxiety was shown, when the apprehension of our immediately advancing to the north of the Nerbudda was most hvely ; and care was taken to have troops in readiness to act according to the course of events. Peyond that point, the activity of this durbar chd not reach. Put we so far availed ourselves of Sindheea's pro- fessions and general policy, as to assume, that we were at perfect liberty to piu'sue the freebooters beyond his frontier, though it was not thought expedient to define the matter, by desiring any formal recognition of the right. Holkar's durbar, during the season 1816-17, was agitated by a violent struggle between the party of Ameer Xhan, whose agent Ghufoor Khan was at the head of the Patau interest, and had the regular battalions at his beck, and that of the native iVIahrattas, who had followed the fortunes of the family, and into whose hands Toolsee Pace the regent had latterly thro^vn herself and her ward, the young jMidhar Eao. The former mi- nister, Palaram Set, having been thought to favour the Patau 176 NATIVE POWERS. 1816-17- faction^ was arrested and put to death in prison ; and the dif- ferences between the two parties went so far, as to produce what was called a battle, though it amounted to no more than a dis- tant cannonade. The season passed without reconciliation or the complete reduction of either party : and Sindheea, who had at one time shown a disposition to interfere, in order to effect an accommodation, refrained in the end, and withdrew the force lie had kept in the neighbourhood for the purpose. One con- sequence of these, distvu'bances was, the release of Kureem Khan, the most noted of the Pindaree leaders, who had hitherto been kept under the appearance ,of some restraint. The occurrences at the courts of Poena and Nagpoor, during the season 1816-17, will be given in the following chapter. The operations against the fort of Platras in the Dooab, as they had considerable effect in calming the public mind of the native population of our own western provinces, and preparing them for the events that Avere to follow, will here find its proper place of notice. Soon after the Supreme Government had determined on the suppression of the predatory bands, indeed before the close of the month of December, the continued contumacy of Dya Eam and I3hugwunt Singh, two zemindars of the Dooab, was brought particularly under the notice of Lord Hastings and the covmcil, together with some further recent acts of unprovoked aggression upon peaceable residents within the Agra district. The rank of both these chieftains was that of mere talookdars, or renters of portions of land, but they held very strong forts ; and the government, on its acquisition of the province from Sindheea, the possessions of both lying in the Aleegurh district, behaved towards them with its usual consideration, and, so long as their quota of revenue was regularly paid, a strict conformity with the equalizing laws of our system was not enforced upon them. Presuming upon this moderation, and upon the strength of their fortresses of Hatras and Moorsan, they both levied ar- 1816-17. HATRAS. 177 bitrary duties, harboured thieves and robbers, and, disregardinj]; the authority of the courts of judicature, which they were bound to respect, sported with the persons and properties of the peace- able and well-disposed in their neighbourhood. At last, the Supreme-Government felt itself called upon to resent this con- duct ; and it was particularly politic not to pass it over at this time, as a nsing, of the Patau population of liohilkhund a few months before, to oj)pose an usual ordinance for the regulation of the police of cities and towns^ showed the minds of the peoj)le in this part of our dominions to be very unsettled. That in- surrection had, indeed, su])sided on the failure of the armed mob to overpower a small party of but three* companies of Sepoys, which had been marched into the city of IJarellee, wliere the green flag of jMahommed had been hoisted by the malcon- tents. Still, in the probability of extensive war with the jMahrattas and Patans, necessarily involving the risk of a successful inroad from beyond our frontier, the mischief would be incalculable, if the slightest idea of the internal instability of our power were suffered to go abroad. It was therefore important to strike a blow, that should impress all ranks with a proper estimate of our vigour and military means. Hatras f was reckoned one of the strongest forts in India. Dya-Ram was a Jat, and derived no small accession of confidence and estimation, from being a relation of the Phurt])oor l?ajn, with whom he claimed ecpiality of rank. The fort was k(>})t in the completest state of repair, and every improvement that ^vas * The exemplary conduct of tliis cletachment and of Captain Boscawcn its commander would deserve a much more particular notice, if the plan of this nar- rative would allow of such a digression. The llohillas penetrated the scjuare, into which the detachment was conipellcd to form itself, before the fourth side could be completed by the falling in of the picquots and light infantry They weio iitorall}' blown out again by the bold manoeuvre of turning one of the guns at the angle* inwards, loaded with grape. f Vide plate at the head of the next chapter. A A 178 HATRAS. 1816-17. introduced into our neighbouring fortress of Aleegurh, such as preparing a covered way, raising a glacis, and levelling the height of the ramparts, was carefully copied by this suspicious chief. At the close of 1816, it was resolved to reduce both Dya-Eam and Bhugwunt Singh to the level of subjects, and to employ an overwhelming force for the purpose, as well to bear down all opposition, as to give eclat to the measure. The divisions from Cawnpoor, from Meeruth, and from Muttra, were accordingly ordered to concentrate upon Hatras, and place themselves under the immediate command of Major-General Marshall, the com- manding officer in the field. On the 11th of February, the place was invested on all sides. Dya-Kam was then summoned to surrender a gate of his fort and allow of its being dismantled. After some evasion on his part, and a negotiation, which lasted till the 16th, he finally refused; when the siege immediately commenced. The Kvitra, or fortified town, was breached and evaciiated on the 23rd. Approaches were then made to the fort, and batteries erected under a smart, though ineffectual fire from the ramparts. By the first of March, the works of the besiegers were completed, and on the following morning forty- two mortars and three breaching batteries of heavy guns began to play on the fort. Such powerful means had never yet been employed against any fortified place in India. The effect was beyond measure destructive and astonishing to the garrison. The batteries continued to play till the evening, when, at fi\ e o'clock *, a magazine disproportionally large blew up within the place, destroying half the garrison and nearly all the buildings. The effect is described to have been awful. Dya-Eam with a few horse made his escape in the dark the same night ; and, though challenged and pur^ied by a picquet of the 8th dragoons, got off with little damage. The rest of the garrison, in attempting * The other magazine, one of yet larger dimensions, was likewise found penetrated by a shell ; but the fuse had dropt out. 181G-17. HATRAS. 179 to follow, were diiven in and obliged to surrender at discretion. Bhugwimt Singh agreed to dismantle his fort on the first siun- nions ; and thus Avas this important object gained, without any sacrifice of lives ; the casualties * of the assailants in the siege being too inignificant to mention ; while the impression of the utter futility of resistance spread far and wide through Plin- doostan, and even through the remote I^ukluui, where it ma- terially influenced the subseqiient conduct of the Mahratta chiefs and kuladars. * Killed— one European, five natives. A A O CHAPTER IX. N A G P O O R— P O O N A, 1817. JANUARY TO JUNE- Nagpoor — Ram Chundur Wagh — Sudeek Ulee Khan— Appa Saheb goes to Chanda — intrigues — death of Pursajee — by violent means — accession of Appa Sahcb — change of policy — intrigues with POshwa — Poona — Peshwa's duplicity — Trimbukjee levies troops — is covertly supported — Residents proceedings — Discussions with the Durbar — Subsidiary force called down — intercourse sus- pended — effect — operations against Trimbukjee — their success — Colonel Smith called in to Poona — terms of demand — refused — Poona invested — Bajee Rao submits — Governor-General's instructions — conduct of Peshwa — New treaty signed — Its conditions — Reflections — Military movements. Events, that led to very important results, were passing at Nagpoor and Poona, while the British were engaged with the Pindarees in the manner above described. At the former court, a party had been rapidly rising into favour, which threatened completely to undermine the influence possessed by those of the ministry, who had been instrumental in bringing about the subsidiary alliance with the Enghsh. At the head of this })arty was Ramchundur Wagh, the commander of Appa Saheb's private troops, before his elevation to the regency ; a man who had the character of a daring, deep-designing INIahratta. The Naeeb was liimself of a restless disposition, and a great lover of intrigue; and it was not long before he showed a decided preference to the counsels most suited to this turn of mind. Instead of giving his attention to the reform of liis internal administration, the object which the moderate men endeavoured to press upon him, he greedily listened to schemes for the concentration of all power hat:ras fort, from the trenches. t^^Sk^Aait ..'„ ^^ r t-^f in^i^frfiv^ i.^t4m.hilis'rjf.hi^''.? -~ CHANDA. 1817. NAG POOR. 181 in his own hands ov those of his immediate dependants. Xagoo Punt was of that class ; but Neraviui Pundit Avas one of the old advisers of Eagoojee ; and ha\ ing been the immechate in- strument, whereby the British alli;nice had been effected, he was early thought to be too much attached to. that nation, and to have its objects more at heart than those of the Bhoosla principality. So long, however, as Pursajee lived, and as there was a party in the state possessed of influence not derived from himself, Appa Saheb felt his dcpcndance on his English allies, and did not venture to break finally with Nerayun, who was supposed to enjoy their fullest confidence. A ])lan was there- fore laid to relieve the Naeeb from every source of apprehension on this head : and, in the course of January 1817, the following expedients were practised to carry it into effect. It will be recollected, that Sudeek Ulee Khan had been received into apparent favour by .Vppa Saheb, instead of being degraded along with ^Naroba, the late secretary. He had con- trived to make his peace through Pamcluuidur AA'^agh, but A\as too independent in power and influence for the reconciliation to be complete. The large assignments of territory he enjoyed Avere also an object of envy, as well to the prince, as to the favoui'ites by whom he was surrounded. Nagoo Punt and Nerayun were in the mean time, at the Eesidenfs desire, con- tinually urging a reform of the contingent furnished to the British under the treaty. The duty of providing and main- taining the stipulated force out of his assignments had been thrown upon Sudeek Ulee Khan ; and its notorious incomplete- ness and inefficiency had afforded ground of continual remon- strance. After having for some time seemingly favoured the system as well as the incUvidual, Appa Saheb resolved to avail himself of these complaints for the ruin of Sudeek Ulee ; whilst, by making it appear that the measure was forced upon him b\ 182 NAGPOOR. 1817. the British, and by leaving the execution to them, he hoped himself to escape the odium that would infallibly attend it. On some slight pretence, towards the end of January 1817, the Naeeb left NAgpoor, and went to the strong fort of Chanda *, situated about seventy miles south of the capital. Immediately after his departure, Xagoo Punt waited on Mr. Jenkins, with pressing instances, that he would take the opportunity of seizing the person of Sudeek Ulee, by means of the British troops at Nagpoor. He declared, that Appa Saheb's principal reason for leaving the city was, to allow of this arrest ; and showed a written authority, in the hand-writing of the regent, in proof that his sanction had been obtained. The paper, it is true, contained only an assurance, that Nagoo Punt had his entire confidence, and that a communication from him might be considered as authentic ; but it is very unusual for jVIahratta princes to give more specific credentials to those, whom they entrust with com- munications of the highest importance. The first overture on this subject was made on the 2M of January. On the Eesident's hesitating to afford his direct interference, the request was repeated at subsequent interviews, when both Nagoo and Xerayun were earnest in soliciting him to act. Some further credentials were shown in testimony of Appa Saheb's desire in the matter ; and as Sudeek, hearing that intrigues for his ruin Mere afoot, had begun to fortify his house, and make other defensive preparations, this circumstance was urged, together with sundry proofs that had been obtained of his being in correspondence with the Pindarees, to enforce the immediate necessity of strong measures. After some reflection, INIr. Jen- kins finally resolved not to stir in a case of so much importance, without a written or verbal application from the prince himself, which should prevent the possibility of his afterwards disavowing * Vide plate at the head of this chapter. 1817. NAGPOOR. 18a the act or pretending to be dissatisfied at it. But he strongly advised tlie ministers to execute the arrest with their own people, assuring them of his support ni case it should be necessary, and only requiring that they, as the ostensible ministers, shoidd take the responsibility of the deed in the first instance on themselves. For this Xagoo Punt was not prepared ; for he knew, that though Appa Saheb would have been glad enough to have seen the ruin of Sudeek, he was far from wishing that it should appear to be his own act. Finding himself, therefore, unable to move the resident from this judicious resolution, he immediately rejoined his master at Chanda, leaving Sudeek Ulee Khan, for the present, without further molestation. The ruin of this officer was, how- ever, only part of the plot, with the mature concoction of which the retirement of Appa Saheb to Chanda was connected. On the morning of the 1st of February, Pursajee Bhoosla, the reigning Raja, was found dead in his bed, without any alteration for the worse having been observed in his general health, or in the particular complaints under which he had for some time laboured. At the moment, no suspicion attached to any one ; and though it was whispered about, that the Eaja had met his death by violent means, Mr. Jenkins, who made private inquiries to ascertain the fact, could trace the reports to no certain source. He accordingly concluded them to be no more than the common rumours, which in India always attend the sudden death of a man in power; and, as the previous ailings of Pursojee made it less extraordinary that he should come to such an end, he treated the reports so hghtly, as not even to mention them in his despatches to the Supreme Government, announcing the event. Afterwards, however, when upon iVppa Saheb's deposition, free access was obtained to the servants and women of the interior of the palace, it was positively ascertained, that Pursajee ^\"as strangled about two o'clock in the morning ; and there was reason to believe, that an unsviccessful attempt had previously 184 NAGPOOll. 1817- been made, to administer poison in an offering of prepared betel leaf*, presented to him early in the same night by one of the Baees of the palace. Eamchundur Wagh himself appears to have come to the palace about midnight, and to have given directions for the perpetration of the deed. Its actual execution Mas entrusted to a man named Mun Bhut, who afterwards rose to great power, and was a prime mover of the treacherous attack made on the residency in the November following, Pursajee was 39 years of age. His body was burnt on the 10th of February; and his wife, Kashee Baee, ascended the funeral pile, and sacrificed herself upon it. Appa Saheb was immediately proclaimed successor to the Raja, by the name of Moodajee Bhoosla. The day of good omen for the new Raja's fonnal installation was not declared vmtil the 21st of April fol- lowing ; but this did not prevent his at once assuming the titles and dignities of the head of the Bhoosla state. Upon Appa Saheb's accession and .return from Chanda, Su- deek Ulee Khan was received ^dth marked attention ; and, as Xerayun, one of the ministers, who had pressed the British Resident to com])lete his downfal, was treated with a coolness equally pointed, it was for some time matter of doubt, whether the plot for the ruin of the former had really originated with liis Highness. It was soon afterwards pretty evident, that his secret disposition was as little favourable to the one as to the other : but some motives still existed, for practising deception to- wards the jMoosulman soldier ; while his elcA^ation to the un- divided honours of the Raja, under the sanction and formal recognition of the British Government previously obtained, rendered it no longer necessary for the prince to keep on terms with the minister, whom he suspected of favouring the British interest. About the end of February, Nerayun Pundit was especially removed from the conduct of the department of com- • Pursajee rejected it, finding it bitter. 1^17. NAGPOOR. 185 nmnication Avitli the ]>iitisli llesident ; and at first Purserani Rao, the very person -whose intrigues in the hfetinie of Eagoo- jee, Appa Saheb had liimself betrayed to the liesident, before liis own elevation to the Kegency, was appointed in his stead- Mr. Jenkins remonstrated against the causeless removal of Ne- rayun, observing, that the disgrace of this minister had the ap- pearance of being occasioned by his having exerted himself to induce his Highness to execute faithfully the treaty of alliance, especially that part of it which provided for the maintenance of the contingent in a state of efficiency ; that the default in this respect, and the removal of the minister who had attempted to prevent it, were calculated to give the British Government a very unfavourable impression of his disposition towards the alhance ; wliich was yet further increased by the selection of such a man as Purseram, to conduct the public communications with the English Resident. Appa Saheb was bent on the removal of Nerayun, and therefore would only listen to the remonstrance so far, as to nominate Ramchundur ^Yagh to the office, instead of Purseram, who was obnoxious on such plausible grovinds. Reference being made to the Supreme-Government, it was determined not to authorize any more pressing instances for the restoration of Nerayun, through fear of increasing the new Raja's incipient disUke of the alliance. His sacrifice was, tlierefore, submitted to, notwithstanding that it was considered most evident, that his disgrace was o\nng to his exertions to ])rocure the punctual execution of the treaty. Immediately on the fall of Nerayun, Nagoo Punt combined with Ramchundvu* A\"agh ; and, in a very short time, evei'y official station was filled by the new Raja's personal dependents. A persecution was also com- menced against Goojaba Dada, who, fearing for his life, took refuge first with Nagoo Punt, and afterwards at the British Residency, Vv^hence he was ultimately conducted in safety to li B 186 NAGPOOR. 1817. Allahabad. In the mean time, negotiations were openly kept on foot with the resident vakeels of the Peshwa, of Sindheea, and of Holkar: and, although circumstances arose at Poona, which placed Bajee Kao for a short time on a footing of direct hostihty with the British, liis representative at Nagpoor re- ceived daily letters and had daily audiences with the new Raja, making communications, the substance of which was withheld from the British resident, in direct violation of the treaty con- cluded only twelve months before. Indeed, from the time that Appa Saheb felt himself secure in the fuU possession of the honours and authority of the Eaja, he ceased to regard the British alliance as a necessary prop to his rule, and began to be sensible of the humihation of appearing to the Mahratta nation, as the first of the Bhoosla dynasty who had made a voluntary sacrifice of poUtical independence. It is true, there had not yet been time for the alHance to operate as a restraint on liis personal direction of internal or external affairs ; but it was not difficult for the designing men about him to convince liim, that it must ultimately have that effect. He, therefore, eagerly listened to the invitations of the agents of the other jNIahratta powers, to unite with them for the purpose of shaking off the connexion : nor was his personal vanity insensible to the flattery with which his alliance was courted, or to the distinction of being thought of so much consequence to the success of the coalition. Hence- forward he lent himself whoUy to the designs of Bajee Eao ; and, in April and jNIay, when matters were on the eve of a rupture with the latter, it Avas ascertained, that assurances of mutual support had passed between the two courts. But it is now time to state specifically the nature of the occurrences at Poona, to which allusion has more than once been made. Trimbukjee Daingha's escape, in September, has been akeady noticed. The place of his retreat could not be traced ; but, during the early part of the ensuing cold season, he remained in 1816. POONA. 187 perfect quiet ; and tliough, as might have been expected, his master made no exertions to seize him, still it could not l)e discovered, that he either harboured or gave him ostensible sup- port. There Avas consequently no intorru^jtion of the good understanding maintained by his Iliglmess with the British Government. On the contrary, studious efforts were made by him to win Mi: Elphinstone's confidence ; and, in this view, he ■solicited to be made a party to the plans which were, in the course of the season, supposed to be meditated by us against the Pindarees, and made a parade of issuing orders to his agent at Sindlieea's camp, to refrain from intrigues, and only to meddle in the politics of that durbar, as far as they might have relation to his claims in Hindoostan ; and even in them to do nothing without commiuiication with the IJritish Resident. He also professed a disj)osition to be satisfied with a very mode- rate composition for all his demands on the Gykwar, taking six lack of rupees a year, and giving up every thing else, but the right of investiture. The display of such an accommodating spirit, at a time when it was scarcely expected, was not at first attributed to a design in Bajee Rao to deceive the British Government. It was thought rather to have its origin in the desire to keep well with us at all events, however hostile his secret inclinations might be. The IMarquess of Hastings re- solved to encourage this disposition ; and accordingly a copy of a remonstrance, made in January to Sindheea, on the subject of the late incursion of the Pindarees into Cianjam, was forwarded to Poena, together with some explanation of the grounds on which the British Government proposed to take early measures for the suppression of these hordes. This communication liis Highness received in the course of February, with every de- monstration of satisfaction at the confidence thus reposed in him. BB 2 188 POONA. 1817. In the mean time, the plot he had contrived was drawing to maturity. In the course of the months of January and February, Mr. Elphinstone heard of the collection of troops in the ^Mohadeo hills, to the south of the Neera, and about 50 miles south-east of Poona. He early represented the circumstance to the Peshwa, who, with every appearance of alacrity, sent out a party of Gokla's troops to quell the supposed insurrection ; protesting all along that he had liimself heard nothing of the matter, and did not beheve the existence of any thing of the kind. The detachment went to the spot, and reported that no insurgents were to be found or heard of; though it lay for some time encamped in the neighbourhood of the ]Mohadeo temple, holding daily communication with the armed bodies that had been there assembled. Early in March it was distinctly ascer- tained, that Trimbukjee was himself in that part of the country, and had for some time been making extensive levies. The 18th of March was talked of as the day appointed for his ojDcn appearance in arms ; and the direct participation of Bajee Eao was evident, as well from general report, and from the conduct of the detachment sent to suppress the insurrection, as from positive information received of actual interviews between his Highness and that delinquent at Phoolsludiur, a village about 15 miles from Poona, which he gave many frivolous reasons for making the place of a lengthened stay. Large remittances of money, to the parts in insui'rection, were also traced through several hands, in a manner that left no room to doubt their having been made from Bajee Rao to Trimbukjee and his adherents. The Peshwa and his ministers persisted in stoutly denying the existence of any insurrection, or levy of troops, in the neighbourhood of jMohadeo. At the same time, all his Highness's forts were ordered to be put in a state of complete repair, and extensive levies of horse and foot were going on even 1817. POONA. 189 at Poona and tlic vicinity ; besides wliicli, agents were sent witli money into IMalwa and other (quarters, to invite men to the Diikhun, in order to enter his service. Up to the 24th of February, ^Nlr. Elphinstone had con- sidered the insurrection as levelled equally against the Prshwa's sovernment and the interests of the British nation, and liis commvniications with the Durbar were made in that belief. On that day, however, the reply of the Peshwa's oificer sent to quell it was put into his hands, winch, combined with ihv other circumstances alluded to, satisfied him of the necessity of taking up the matter in its proper hght, that is to say, as an underhand attempt of the prince himself to shake the British jwwer. The early part of jMarch was spent in remon- strances on one side, and on the other, in denials of the existence of any insurrection or asseniblage of troops, and in protestations of readiness to do any thing that might be suggested, and to send troops to any place that might be named to put it down. Mr. Elphinstone declared he wanted no troops, that he slioidd employ the British troops in dispersing the insurgents, and that the presence of those of his Highness would only lead to con- fusion : he demanded other proofs that the insurrection was not encouraged underhand ; such as the placing Trimbukjee's known adherents and the members of his family under restraint, in- stead of which they were continued in office and in favour. He demanded also, that the enlistment of troops by his Highness shovdd be discontinued, and the late extraortUnary levies dis- banded ; that the repairs of fortresses, and the measures that were taking for storing them with grain and ammunition, should cease ; adding, that while such things were going on, there could be no rehance on his Highness's sincerity, as such preparations could be meant against no other than the British. On one- occasion early in March, Bajee Kao remonstrated against the style of the resident's communications, declaring them to be of 190 POONA. 1817. a threatening nature, and calculated to produce a rupture. Generally, hoA\ ever, he met them by an outward show of ac- quiescence. Thus, on the 11th of IMarch, part of Trimbukjee's family was placed under nominal restraint, and other ostensible measures taken of the same cast ; wliile the most hberal pro- mises were continually made, to discontinue every thing which gave offence. But the preparations continued with the same activity and more secrecy, as well at Poona and its neigh- bourhood, as in Kandesh and other parts ; and Trimbukjee's insurrection in the south was growing every day into more importance. About the middle of March, Mr, Elphinstone resolved to call down the subsidiary force, and to employ it forthmth in the suppression of the insurrection, and eventually against Poona, in case Bajee Eao's conduct should render it necessary. On the 21st of March, he soUcited special in- structions for the case of a continuation of these hostile pre- parations, and of the covert support of Trimbukjee's rebelhon ; statins: it to be his intention to break off all communication with his Highness in the interim, and to announce the present relations of amity to be at an end, leaving it to his Lordship in council to restore them, \di\\ such demand of secmity for the future, as he might deem it proper to require. In commu- nicating this to the P^shwa, he stated his intention to assure him there was no design of committing acts of direct hostility, unless liis Highness's preparations should render such pro- ceeding necessary, or unless liis Highness shoidd attempt to leave Poona ; in either of which cases, hostilities against himself would be commenced, without waiting the Governor-General's orders. On the 1st of April these intentions were carried into effect ; the continued preparations of Bajee Eao, which went the length of even collecting gun bullocks for the artillery in his arsenal at Poona, and of sending all the treasures, jewels, and 1816. POONA. 191 wardrobe of his palace there to his strongest fort of llygurh, having rendered it necessary no longer to defer bringing matters to this issue. Accordingly, on that day the resident sent in a note, wherein, after reproaching his Highness with the wanton- ness of the aggression on the British Government, which he had been abetting underhand, and after recapitulating the abundant proofs of his so doing, and of his preparing for hostihty through- out his whole dominions, he notified the intention of imme- diately employing the subsicUary force for the suppression of the insurrection, and eventually for the support of the British in- terests against his Highness himself; declaring, that the good understanding between the two governments was now at an end, but that his Highness had one chance left of restoring it, that of disarming and waiting the Governor-General's deter- mination, which if he showed a disposition to try, no act of hostility would take place against himself, though any attempt to leave Poona would be held a decided indication of war. The Poona brigade was ordered to hold itself in readiness, and Colonel Leighton, its commanding officer, was desired to take such precautions as he might deem necessary for the security of the residency and cantonment. Affairs were left in tliis posture at Poona, while the main body of the subsidiary force, which liad previously been put in motion from the frontier, was formed into several divisions, whereof, one lightly equipped, and under Colonel Smith's personal command, hastened down to the southward to operate against the insurgents. jNlajor INI'DoAvall, with the detachment that had beat up the Pindarees on the 15tli of January, being still in the neighbourhood of Bidur, was at the same time called into Tooljajjoor to co-operate ; and another force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, was also summoned northward from the ceded districts of the Madi*as presidency. ]Mr. Elphinstone, in placing matters on this footing with the Peshwa, acted in conformity with the instructions he im POONA. 1817. had received from Lord Hastings during the first discussion respecting Trimbukjee, which had provided for the case of his leaving Poona, and raising disturbances in the country under the covert support of his master, and had prescribed the par- ticular course now adopted in that event. The circumstances were completely analogous ; the only chfFerence being, that the delinquent had escaped into the interior, after having been sur- rendered to us, instead of before. Bajee Eao was greatly alarmed when he saw matters brought to this issue. He sent his ministers to assure the resident of his disposition to do any thing that might be required, in order to restore things to their former state. It was distinctly ex- plained, that this was no^v become impossible, as it depended entirely upon the nature of the instructions that might be received, in which most probably securities for the future would be made a condition precedent to the renewal of the former terms of friendship between the governments ; that his Higli- ness had to choose betAveen two hues of conduct ; if he resolved to accede unconditionally to what the Governor-General might determine, he would disband his new levies, and place his forts in their former condition, bringing back his treasure, and showing other signs of confidence : if he only waited the arrival of in- structions to make up his mind, whether he would declare war or not, and wished to be understood so to do, he would leave tilings exactly in their present posture, but must take the con- sequences of the further loss of confidence resulting from the preference of the latter course. In the progress of the month, it was communicated to him through Major Ford, who still continued to be consulted and treated with confidence, that if his Highness seized and delivered up Trimbukjee before the arrival of the Governor-General's expected instructions, as he had done before, his conduct might again warrant the resident in suspending their immediate execution, and restore at once to the 1817. POONA. 193 former relations of amity. The month was consvnned in in- sincere negotiation on the part of the jNIahratta court, evincing alternate resolutions to submit and to resist. ]More than once pre})arations were made for his departure from Poona ; but the natural indecision and timidity of this prince's character kept him fixed to the spot to the last moment, in anxiety to know the extent of the demands that would be made upon him. Yet, instead of disarming in the interim, he increased the activity of his preparations. During this suspense, the troops had begun to act against tlie insurgents. On the 7th of April, a body of 100 newly raised troops were traced to the village of Jumta, and there disarmed by Colonel Smith, and their chief confined. Tills was all that was done to the south of Poona ; for the Peshwa's influence had so completely set the country against us, that although that officer, with the light divisions, scoured all the neighbourhood in which the insurgents had been collected, no information or assistance could be got at any of the villages, nor could any other party of their force be discovered. They had, indeed, decamped from that part of the country immediately on the approach of the troops, with the design of removing the seat of war into Kandesh. A body of 4000, chiefly horse, after having got clear off from Colonel Smith, was heard of in its way to the north by ]Major Smith, who commanded one of the de- tachments posted to cover Poona on the east. It was instantly pm-sued, and after a chase of 150 miles in four days, the 3.Iajor succeeded in overtaking the party, about a march westward of Toka on the Godaveree. This body had fallen in with and cruelly murdered Lieutenant A\^arre, an officer of the artiller}^ travelling with a small escort. A'\lien attacked, they made httle resistance, but dispersed with the loss of no more than fifty or sixty, for want of cavalry to pursue. A more briUiant affair occurred in Kandesh, where Ciodajee c c 194 KANDESH. 181 I . Dainglia, a relative of Trimbukjee, was busily collecting partisans. Upon calling down Colonel Smith to the south, measures had been taken to put the Nizam's troops and the Hyderabad sub- sidiary force in motion, to counteract the designs of the in- surgents to the north. Captain Sydenham, the political agent at Aurungabad, being apprised of Godajee's operations, de- spatched Captains Davies and Pedlar with a resfda, in number about 600, of the reformed horse, and a small party of the re- formed infantry of the Nizam, to the frontier of that prince's dominions in that direction, giving them instructions, if they should hear of the collection of troops, and could find an op- portunity of striking a blow, to attack and disperse them with- out ceremony. Such an opportunity occurred on the 20th of April, when, after a rapid advance of fifty miles into Kandesh, Captain Davies succeeded in falling in with a body of 2000, wliereof near 300 were Arab infantry, the whole under Godajee himself They took up a good position, and showed face ; whereupon Captain Davies resolved not to wait for the infantry, but at once to charge sword in hand with the horse he had in advance. The charge was completely successful, insomuch that the loss of the enemy was not less than 400 left on the field. It should be noticed, that these were the same troops that two years before had refused to advance against a body of routed Pindarees. But they were now acting under the influence of the confidence inspired by an able commander, and impelled by the sense of duty created by the novel assurance of regular pay. Of Captain Davies's men, seventy-four were killed and wounded, l^oth the officers were amongst tlie number of the latter, a cir- cumstance not to be wondered at; for the nature of the service required the example of a personal exertion on their part, Avhich neither was of a disposition to spare. The new distinctions of modern warfare, which assign the use of the arm to the private soldier, and that of the head only to the superior, had not yet 1817. POONA. 195 Ibund their way amongst the class of men led by Captain Davies on this occasion. Several of the enemy fell by his own hand l)efore he received his wound, which fortiuiately was not severe. Captain Pedlar's was more so, but still not dangerous. Nothing could be more creditable to the national character, than the exhibition, afforded by this conflict, of the superiority of troops similarly modelled, armed, and disciplined, and differing in no respect whatever from the enemy, except in the circumstance of their being led by the cool judgment and enterprising courage of British officers. ISIean while, affairs were coming to a crisis at Poona. On the 20th of April, Mr. Elphinstone found it necessary to increase the British force there, by calhng in Colonel Smitli with his light division. He gave notice to Bajee Bao that he had so done, stating the reasons, but assuring him that it would produce no alteration of his resolution to commit no act of direct hostility, unless his Highness compelled him to it, and to wait the receipt of his expected instructions. Discussions with the ministers and emissaries of his Highness continued as before, without pro- ducing any satisfactory result. On the 25th of April a private letter reached the resident^y from Mr. Secretary Adam, \\hicli opened in some degree the views of government, by sliowing the unconditional surrender of Trimbukjee, in case nothing shoidd have been done by the Peshwa in the interval, to be an indis- pensable prehminary to any new accommodation witli liim. The full instructions, which were despatched only the day after, the 7th of April, were detained for a fortnight, by an insurrection which broke out in Cuttack, and at this unlucky moment in- terrupted the DAk* communication between Calcutta and Poona. Colonel Smith had arrived at Poona on the 2Gth, and taken up ground at the village of Kirkee. On the 3rd of jNIay, the resident heard of the insurrection in Cuttack, and of the DAk * D;ik — post, conducted by native carriers on foot. c c 2 196 POONA. 1817. communication being cut off; he accordingly resolved to wait till the 6th for the chance of receiving the desired instructions, and, if not then arrived, to act on the imperfect intimation he already received of the Governor-Generars wishes. On that day, no furtlier despatch having arrived, Mr. Elphinstone so- licited a private audience of his Highness the Pcshwa, in order to apprise him, that the only terms on which the British Go- vernment could consent to any accommodation with his High- ness, after what had passed, were, his engaging to surrender Trimbukjee within a definite period, and liis giving substantial security not to fail in tliis particular. Eajee Eao, who seemed prepared for the communication, distinctly refused the pre- liminary proposed, with the appearance of very unusual coolness of determination. He did not rest his case on his want of ability to a])prehend the fugitive, for he would not even bind himself to make exertions for the purpose. On the next day, a Avritten iiote was sent in to the same general purport as the verbal communication, but specifically requiring a covenant to surrender Trimbukjee within one month, and to deliver the three hill forts of Singurh, Poorundur, and Eygurh, as pledges for its performance. Twenty-four hours were allowed for his Highness to come to a final determination on this proposition ; if not in the aifirmative, immediate hostility was denounced. The note was received with apparent indifference, nor were its contents noticed until the morning of the 8tli, when the time had nearly expired, and the troops were marcliing from the cantonment of the Poona brigade and from the village of Kirkee, to take up positions, according to a plan previously settled, so as completely to invest the city. The fears of this irresolute prince then predominated. None of his advisers, excepting (iokla and the commandant of his artillery, recommended a resort to arms. About ten o'clock in the morning, he sent vakeels, promising to agree to the terms, and to surrender the forts without delay. They were accordingly taken possession of 1817. POONA. H)7 in the course of that and of the following day. Kygurh was a place of peculiar strength, as indeed were both Poorundur and Singurh : but no difficulty was made in the delivery of them under the stipulation. On these prehminary terms, the Peshwa was admitted to throw himself upon the ultimate determination of the Governor-General in council, as to the conditions on which a final accommodation should be made with him ; but he was given to understand, that he must not expect the treaty of Bassein to be implicitly renewed. On the 10th of May, arrived the instructions of Lord Hastings in council. They prescribed exactly the course already adopted, so far as it had gone ; but provided distinctly for the three cases : first, of the actual surrender of Trimbukjee or sincere efforts of liis master to seize him, before the arrival of the instructions ; secondly, of the positive inaction of the prince ; and thirdly, of liis refusal or evasion, after receipt of the in- structions, of comphance with the enhanced demand to be made upon him in the second case. In the first case, the relations of the treaty of Bassein were to be restored, and every thing placed on the footing of the previous settlement, made on the surrender of Trimbukjee in 1815. In the second case, the demand of the surrender of that dehnquent within a time specified, and of hostages for performance was to be a positive preliminary to any accommodation ; with the further understanding, that no rencM-al of friendship could take place, Avithout the delivery of greater securities for the future, than the treaty of Bassein afforded. In the last case, that of decided war, the person of the prince was to be seized, and a temporary arrangement made for the government of the country. The further securities, to be insisted on in the second case, were, cessions of territory, including the fort of Ahmednugurh, to the extent of twenty-nine lack rupees, applicable to the raising and pay of a force of 5000 horse and 3000 foot on our own estabhshment, to replace the 198 POONA. 1817. contingent of his Higliness's troops, stipulated in the treaty of Eassein, but never furnished in full vipon any one occasion : also, the surrender to the British of all claims on GuzerAt, Bundelkhvuid, and in Hindoostan ; and, generally, a renunciation of the supremacy of the JMahratta empire. The renewal of the farm of Ahmedabad to the Gykwar, and the restoration of affiiirs in that quarter to the footing established by Colonel ^Yalker, were to form part of the new arrangement ; and the opportunity was to be taken of setthng some points of minor importance, which had for some time been the subject of mutual irritation. The Eesident prepared himself to execute these instructions, as soon as the month assigned for the apprehension of Trim- bukjee should expire. But he informed Bajee Eao of their arrival, and of the intimation therein, that his Highness had so far lost the Governor-General's confidence, as to have incurred the demand of greater securities for the future, without ac- quainting him Avith the probable extent of this ulterior demand. In the early part of the month, no sincere eiforts were made to seize Trimbukjee, notwithstanding the security given ; indeed, on the night of the 13th of IMay every thing was ready for the prince's flight from Poona, and he was on the point of departure ; even so late as the 17th, he issued pay to his troops and kept up the appearance of a resolution to break finally with the British. On the 20th, however, he made up his mind to the opposite course. The adherents and family of Trimbukjee were put in durance, and proclamations issued in every direction, offering tAvo lack rupees and a rent free village of 1000 rupees a year guaranteed by the British Government to any one, who should bring in the person of the fugitive. Copies of the pro- clamation were given to the Eesident, that he might aid in their circulation. This conduct satisfied every body of the Pdshwa's present sincerity: indeed it placed Trimbukjee's aj)- prehension, in a manner, beyond the influence of liis master's 1817. POONA. 199 caprice. ^Nlr. Elphinstoiie accordino-ly resolved to consider these exertions as a sufficient atonement, and to accept liis submission at the end of the montli, if his conduct were not changed in the interval, whether tlie culprit should be seized or not, for delivery according to the letter of the covenant. On the 28th of jNIay, ]Major Ford was authorised to accpiaint the Peshwa of the general natiu-e of the demands that were to be made u})on him, under the Governor-General's late instructions ; and on the 1 St of June following, the Kesident went in person, and explained, article by article, a draft he had prepared of the new treaty. This varied from the instructions in some few points of minor importance ; and in one material item, the amount of the cessions, fixing them at thirty-four instead of twenty-nine lack rupees, in order to cover extraordinary expenses of staff equipment, &c. of the forces to be raised and substituted for the Pcshwa's contingent, provision for wliich had been over- looked in the former estimate. The Peshwa and his minister endeavoured, with much dexterity, to reduce the sum of these demands, taking the ground of intreaty, and reliance on the compassion and gene- rosity of the British Government. It was urged by the ministers, that their master's offences, whatever they might have been, did not deserve so heavy a punishment, or one so grating to his Highness's feelings ; that we seemed to expect a strictness of fidelity beyond all reason, and more than a native potentate had it in his power to observe : and that, if we enforced so rigorous a fine, the world would cry out against us, and accuse his Highness of folly, in having originally formed the connexion with us. As proof of the wide scope of Bajee Eao's machinations against our interests was pouring in from every (piarter, ]Mr. Elphinstone was inflexible in insisting on every article of his draft. On the 7th of June, the month allowed for the appre- hension of ^^rimbukjee having expired, he demanded that the 200 POONA. 1817. treaty should immediately be signed, the only proof of submission that could now be given ; no reduction having been made in the levies of troops, and Trimbukjee not having been delivered up as agreed upon. Six days more were consumed in further discussion of the several items, and particularly in disputes respecting the districts to be ceded and the rates at which each should be taken. At length, on the ISth of June, tlie treaty was signed according to the original draft. The following is the substance. Article 1st renounces Trimbukjee Dainglia, engages to punish his adherents, and to surrender his family to the British Government, as hostages for his never being again countenanced. Article 2d re-establishes the treaty of Bassein, except as now modified. Article 3rd explains more specifically the former engagement not to take Europeans or Americans into the service of the Pcshwa. Article 4th eiigages, in further execution of the previous stipulation, respecting his Highness' conduct to other native powers, not to receive or send vakeelt-, or communicate in any manner, except through the British Eesident : further, renounces the character of supreme head of the Mahratta empire. Article 5th commutes his Highness' past claims on the Gykwar for an annual payment of four lack rupees, in case Anund Eao should consent ; if he should not, arbitration to be made under the treaty of Bassein : renounces all prospective claims unconditionally. Article 6th exchanges the proviso for the Peshwa's contingent of 5000 horse and 3000 infantry, for an engagement to furnish to the British Government the means of maintaining an equal force. Articles 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th, provide for the transfer and arromllssetuenf of territories to be ceded for this purpose, with their forts, accorthng to a schedule, and for the date and operation of the cessions from the 5th of .Jvme, the commencement of the Hindoo year. Article 11th authorises the discretionary increase of the sub- sidiary force and its employment in reducing the ceded districts. 1817. I'OONA. 2()\ Article 12th cedes Aliincdnuguvh \nth a glacis of 52000 yards, and engages to furnish pasture lands for the subsidiary force. Articles 13th and 14th cede to us rights over'^lhuidelkhund and Hindoostan, or in ]\Ialwa. Articleloth renews the farm of Alune- dabad to the Gykwar, for an annual payment of four and a half lack rupees; exclusive, however, of the Kattcewar tribute, .\rticle IGth ratifies the settlement of Pundurpoor, made the (Jth of Jxdy 1812, for the adjustment of the Peshwa's relative rights over the Jageerdars, and restores the Kasteea's forfeited Jageer. Article 17th stipulates the restitution of jNIelghat, an usurpation of Trimbukjee from the Xizam, in violation of the treaty of Bassein. Article 18th provides for the exchange of the ratifica- tions in the usual manner. The schedule alluded to in Article 7 specifies the following territories: 1st, the Konkan, or country between the sea and the western ghats, to the north of the high road from Poona to Bombay, rated by ]\Ir, Elphinstone at eleven lack rupees, but alleged by the Peshwa's minister to yield considerably more; 2d, the whole of the Peshwa's possessions in Ciuzerat» estimated at ten lack rupees, exclusive however of Ahmedabad Oolpar and the Gykwar's commutation-payment for past claims ; 3d, the Katteewar tribute, taken at four lack rupees ; 4th, the forts of Darwar and Koosigul, with sufficient territory in the neighbourhood and south of the AVurda to make the entire annual revenue ceded equal to thirty-four lack rupees. The cessions were to be immediate, except the lands in the Carnatic, the extent of which would depend upon Avhat might be ft)und to be the value of the Koiikan ; but the two forts named were to be surrendered forthwith. This treaty was ratified by the Governor-General on the 5th of Jvdy, 1817. It contains provisions for the settlement of all those points, that for a long time before had been the subject of acrimonious discussion at the Poona durbar, as well as for securing D u 202 POONA. 1817. the British Government, as far as seemed possible, against a continuance of his Highness' treachery and secret hostihty. The engagement being avowedly compulsory, and involving an aggrandizement of our own territories at the expense of our late ally, the first that had been made upon any Mahratta state since the settlement of 1805-6, was undoubtedly calculated to increase the apprehension and alarm, with ^\'hicll our power and policy were regarded. But the measure was exacted and ^var- ranted by Bajee Kao's indisputable perfidy ; and the detection of it at the moment, when we were on the point of entering on a connected plan of operations, directed to the extirpation of the predatory hordes, woidd have justified a still further reduction of the means of this prince than was actually effected, nay, perhaps, have warranted his entire suspension from the exercise of any kind of authority and influence pending those operations. Subsequent events showed the danger of restoring him to any share of power, until the projected measures had been completed. It was hardly to be expected, that his pride coidd ever forgive the humihation he had been subjected to, or that the sense of comparative weakness, which had been the motive of present submission, could for a moment influence his speculation on those ulterior chances, held out by the enterprise in which we were about to engage. This speculation, not his present conchtion, was the obvious source of all his subsequent treachery, and of all his past intrigues. Yet perhaps the risk was unavoidable ; for an attempt to remove the head of the ]VIahratta nation entirely from power and consideration wovdd, at this juncture, have been productive of much confusion, and must have contributed to exasperate the hostile disposition of that nation to an earlier and probably a more general ferment, at a moment too when we were less prepared. On the whole, there was equal moderation and justice in exacting, by way of safeguard against an ally of detected perfidy, whose services to a certain 1817. . POONA. 203 extent we were entitled to expect, that in lieu of the continp;ent he was himself bound to furnish to the cause, he should ])rovi(le the means of maintaining- an equal body at our own immediate disposition. As for the appeals made to oiu* liberality and com- passion after the final resolution to submit was taken, these were very justly allowed to have no weight in mitigating the terms imposed : such motives can have no legitimate influence, luitil confidence be completely re-estal)lished ; and no part of the Peshwa's conduct, from the time of our first connexion with him, had left an impression of his character, that entitled him to be restored to it in the former degree. The cessions now de- manded, though extensive, were by no means a dead loss to his Exchequer ; for he would hencefor\\'ard be saved the expense of supporting, from his own resources, the force they would enable us to keep up. It shovdd be recollected, that Eajee Rao had for ten years enjoyed the benefit of the British subsidiary force, without any corresponding pecuniary sacrifice on his part : for the cession of his Bundelkhund revenues, by way of subsidy, was a surrender of what he never had really possessed, ^\hat required an expensive military force to occupy, and ^\hat any other power would have been free to undertake the concpiest of For these reasons, it is fair to presume, that Bajee Rao will not be thought to have been too hardly dealt with on the present occasion. The subsichfj-y force returned to Seroor immediately after the execution of the treaty, in order to prepare itself to take a part in the general operations of the ensuing season. One battalion, however, was detached to take possession of the cessions in the Konkan. The force that had moved into Kandcsh, under Colonel Doveton, succeeded in keeping under that part of the country, and ultimately in expelling from it Trimbukjee and liis adherents. AVhat most contributed to this was the gallant storm of a strong hold occupied by them, • u D 5i 204 KANDESH. 181?. of the name of Dorana. Colonel Scott, of the 22d Madras native infantry, appeared before it with a detachment on the 1 Otli of Jidy, and resolved inunediately to attempt an escalade. ]\ taking ladders of his tent-poles, he forthwith attacked the Petta, and carried it in several places. The garrison retired into the fort ; which, alarmed at observing the further prepara- tions for storming that point also, they likewise surrendered. After this, Trimbukjee's adherents ceased to make head, and he > himself retired to Choolee INIvdieshwur on the Nerbudda, where he spent the rainy months with a few followers. Colonel Doveton moved back to his cantonment of Jalna on the 17th of July, CHAPTER X. GENERAL PREPARATIONS. 1817, JUNE TO NOVEMBEE. Treaty of Poona executed — cessions adjusted — vakeels dismissed — advantages to Gykwar — increase of subsidiary force — consequent cessions and exchange of territory — Governor-General's plans — Plindoostan — Dukhun — Madras army — how disposed — delays in Dukhun— Lord Hastings leaves the Presidency — Political operations — their scale enlarged on Lord Hastings' sole responsibility — he takes the field — crosses the Jumna — General Donkin moves from Agra — negotiation with Slndheea — terms proposed — demand of Hindia and Aseergurh — reasons — treaty signed and ratified — consequent general order — its execution — Treaty with Ameei- Khan — and Kcroulee chief — Jaloun — Sagur — Bhopal. The rainy season of 1817 was spent in preparations for a great military effort against the Pinclarees, and A\hatever powers of central India might support tliem ; and in arrangements for giving immediate effect to the several stipulations of the treaty of Poona, particularly those relating to the territorial cessions of the Pcshwa. Less difficulty or evasion was experienced, in obtaining the punctual execution of the treaty, than might have been expected from the kno^^^l personal character of that prince : but our con- tinued possession of his three forts of Singiuh, llygurh, and Poorundur, to which, from their strength and vicinity to Poona, he was known to attach a high value, was a powerful motive for alacrity ; since, without the vuiequivocal display of good faith on his part, he could scarcely have hoped for their restoration. The formal orders for the delivery of the forts and territories of Gu- HOG PESHWA. 1817. zerat and the northern Konkan, together with those for Koosigul and Darwar, were obtained by the 18th of June; and as, with exception of the killadar of Darwar, none of the subordinate officers made any demur to imphcit obedience, the wliole of these districts were in our hands before the end of Jidy, and the sole point remaining to be settled was, the value at which the Kon- kan should be taken, whence the extent of the further cessions to the south was to be regulated. It had been agreed to rate the Konkan at what the Peshwa's accounts of the average for the past twenty years might show to have been the actual receipts fi-om it, clear of all deductions, and with an allowance for the expense of collection. On reference to these, instead of their exhibiting a product of more than eleven lack rupees, the rate IVIr. Eljjhinstone had been willing to allow, the net value was not found to exceed seven lack ; so that, to make up the 34 lack rvipees, a territory producing 13 would, under the treaty, have been demandable in the Carnatic, instead of nine as at first assumed. In consideration of his former offer to accept nine, the Eesident, though he saw no reason why he should not draw the actual advantage, in the same manner as he must have abided the loss, still thought it right to act with some indulgence, and not to press with too much severity. Accordingly, he limited his present demand to 11 lack, notwithstanding which, many obstacles and delays were thrown in the way of the assign- ment of specific territory. The Resident, seeing this, made a Aviitten demand of Eanee Bednore, Soondoor, and some other districts, estimated to yield that amount : but, while this matter was under discussion, recei\TLng intimation of an arrangement on foot Avith Futteh Singh Gykwar, to obtain Ahmedabad for the Company, he so far modified the demand as to take the 4^ lack rupees of rent, payable for the Peshwa's moiety of that place by the Gykwar, instead of an equal cession towards the Carnatic, leaving 6k lack only to be made good from that quarter. On 1817. PESHWA. ii()7 this basis, an agreement was finally concluded in August ; Dar- war and Koosigul being taken at 84,000 rupees, and the Pcslnva's territories, south and eastward of the Wurda, to make up tlie remaining 56G,000 rupees. The other articles of tlie treaty had previously been exe- cuted. The resident vakeels of foreign states received tlieir formal dismissal, at the time the first orders for surrender were delivered. Bajee Eao himsehj after admitting Mr. Elphinstone to an audience, at which he seemed very sullen and dejected, quitted Poena on the 18th of June, on the pretence of his annual pilgrimage to Pundurpoor, leaving all minor arrange- ments to be settled by his ministers. The vakeels, though dismissed, were many of them natives of the Peshwa's territories, and had, therefore, claims to be allowed a continued residence there, notwithstanding theu' dismissal from public employ. Hence, it was impossible to prevent the continuation of their intrigues ; and, even if they had themselves been removed, other unacknowledged instruments and emissaries were at hand in abundance. Nevertheless, there was tliis advantage in the strictness of the 4th article of the treaty, that besides abolisliing the formal character of the communications that passed between the Peshwa and other powers, it imposed the necessity of con- ceahng the instruments and existence, as well as the nature of the intrigues afloat ; for it would thenceforward be a sufficient ground of complaint, that such things were passing, without waiting for proof of a hostile purpose, before they could bt; noticed. Thus, intrigue became much more hazardous to Eajee Rao ; though he was not of a disposition to be deten'ed by such hazards. This, however, was not the only object contemplated at the time of imposing tliis humihation. It was conceived to be the most pubhc and effectual mode of proclaiming to the other princes of India, the new condition, in which the former liead of the Mahratta empire was to be considered as having 208 ^ GYKWAR. 1817. placed himself. The case was not one in which feelings of tenderness towards the pride of Bajee Eao were entitled to much weight : but, since it was of importance to eradicate in him the disposition to regard liimself as the rallying point of the jNIahratta nation, and, if possible, to remove this dangerous notion from others, the pubhc dismissal of vakeels was thought to be a most effectual means of promoting the end, and in this \iew it was desirable to require it on this occasion. The treaty of Poona, independently of its advantageous compromise of all past claims by the Peshwa on the Gykwar family, for an annual payment of four lack rupees, gave the latter a most profitable lease of Ahmedabad, and remitted in perpetuity all tribute or compensation for mihtary service, extinguishing thereby all pretensions of feudal superiority. These benefits, which together were reckoned considerably to exceed 20 lack rupees a year in value, were about to be ac- corded to the Gykwar, for no other merit or claim on his part, except the murder of his minister and representative, for which deed this might be considered as a just atonement exacted from a prince, who had by his conduct identified himself wdth the actual perpetrator of the crime. The Bombay Government, thinking the 'moment of ovir having made such con'siderable acquisitions for this ally favourable for urging separate objects of mutual advantage to the two states, determined, at the time of imparting the above benefits, to attempt to })rocure Futteh Singh's consent to provide funds for an increase of the subsidiary force, and thus to bear a more just proportion of the general charge incurred in the defence of Guzerat, than had hitherto been contributed by the Gykwar. The proposed addition to the subsidiary force was 1000 infantry and two regiments of cavalry for the Guzer&t force. The troops subsidised at present consisted only of 3000 infantry, with no regular cavalry of any kind, ^^"ith a frontier so exjiosed, as that of Gykwar, on the 1817. GYKWAR. 209 east, the north, and the west, such a force was ohviously a very insuflficient protection. Indeed, its acknowledged inadequacy obhged us ahvays to keep a body of our own troops in the neighboiuliood ; many of whom, j)articularly a regiment of dragoons, (the King's 17th), were constantly acting with the subsidiary force, without any demand upon the (lyk^var for the expense of a reinforcement so necessary to its efficiency, though he derived the Avhole advantage. Under these circumstances, and in consideration of the very flourishing condition into which the affiiirs of the principality had been brought since the estabhshment of our influence, as well as of the many advantages at different times secured by us for the family, the Bombay Government thought itself warranted in asking an increase of subsidy on this occasion, sufficient to make the force kept up strong enough to act independently in support of our interests in that quarter. It was resolved, at the same time, to urge a further reduction and reform of the irregular and efficient, though very chargable military establishment maintained by the Gyk- war himself The Supreme-Government signified its entire approval of the proposition, if Futteh Singh's assent should be obtained. The provision for this additional subsidy, most desired by the Bombay Government, was the moiety of the Ivatteewar tribvite, reahzcd by its own agency for the Gykwar. The other half of this tribute had been enjoyed by the Pcshwa, and was included in the cessions of the treaty of Poena ; consequently, it was an object to exclude all foreign influence but our own from that part of the country. To this, however, Futteh Singh showed a decided repugnance ; but the advantages of the farm, just obtained of Ahmedabad, were tendered in lieu of it, and ultimately accepted, with some further rents of inferior im- portance, to complete the sum required for the increase of sub- sidy. A further arrangement was afterwards made for the E E 210 ■ GYKWAR. 1817. exchange of the interest in Ahmedabad, held by the Gykwar, independently of the farm, for three pergunnahs of our own, situated inconveniently near to Brodera. These were Dubhoee, Bhadhurpoor, and Saolee, yielding altogether near three lack, an amount which was expected to exceed the value of the interest accepted in exchange. Other advantages also had accrued to us from the treaty of Poona, affording the means of advantageous exchanges ; and the opportunity was taken of im- proving our frontier, and consoUdating our scattered possessions in Guzerat. so as to avoid the frequent collision of a divided authority, which existed under the former relations with the covirt of Brodera. The negotiation was conducted on the prin- ciple of equal exchange : but such are the habitual delays of a Mahratta durbar, and such the pertinacity with which it seeks to drive the hardest bargain possible, that the treaty was not concluded until the 6th of November, 1817, and much further matter yet remained to be adjusted ; insomuch, that the agree- ment was not forwarded for the final ratification of the Go- vernor-General, until the ISTovember follomng. The mutual transfers then amounted to 578,848 rupees : amongst them, in addition to what have above been mentioned, the British Go- vernment ceded its moiety of the town of Pittawud for the Gykwar's moiety of Oomrut, by which, and other similar ex- changes, the possessions of both were consohdated and improved. The hitherto indefinite frontier of our immediate territories in Guzerat was fixed by these arrangements. The pergunnahs of Gogo, Bhaonugur, and Sehoree, are the most southernly ; thence a hne through Eanpoor to Patree on the lesser Bin, and east- ward from Patree through Vurungam, Ahmedabad, and Kup- purwunj, to Bala-Sinore and Beerpoor on the Myhee, forms our western and northern boundary ; the Myhee is our boundary to the east. The only other changes consequent upon the treaty of 1817. PREPARATIONS. 211 Poona, wliich are of sufficient importance to require notice, were those which arose out of tlie cession of the Peshwa's riglits in Hindoostan and Bundelkhund. But, as the settle- ment of these fell in witli the preparations and general plan of the ensuing campaign, it is better to leave each separate case to find its })lace amongst the transactions, that brought us into contact mth the party whom it concerned. The cession of these rights by the Pcslnva, just at this time, gave us a great advantage in the subsequent operations : had they remained vested in IJajee Rao, as they would have done in the event of no rupture having occurred with him, and the expectation of thus acquii'ing the disposal of them could not have been anticipated, the peaceable settlement of central India would have been embarrassed and impeded by long and intricate disputes, and clogged at every step by endless intrigue and irritating discussion. The disposal of these benefits was desirable, rather as a means of effecting other objects by their exchange, than M^ith a view to appropriate the whole to ourselves, as was abundantly verified by the actual result. Proceed we now to explain the general .plan of opera- tions, devised for the execution of the Supreme-Government's determination to suppress and extinguish for ever the existing mischief of predatory associations. The plan of Lord Hastings embraced the whole circle of the reserved possessions of Sindheea and Holkar, including hkewise a great part of Eajpootana. Within these hmits, it was his intention, if possible, wholly to confine the campaign, by sur- rounding them with a cordon of efficient corps, which should converge simultaneously towards a common centre ; making provision, however, for the possible event of the enemy's passing this barrier, and by no means neglecting the defence of our own territories. On the side of Hindoostan, it was his Lordship's intention to have four divisions in the field, each of sufficient strength to act independently under any circumstances ; besides ■'e E 2 212 PREPARATIONS. 1817. two corps of observation, to guard the most exposed part of our frontier, in case the enemy should find the opportunity of undertaking an offensive enterprise. The points at which the several corps were ordered to collect were, KaUnjur in Bundel- khund, some point on the Jumna midway between Calpee and Etawa, Agra, and Rewaree. The two corps of observation were to be stationed, one about Eewa, to the south of Mirzapoor and Benares, and the other further eastward, in the southern extremity of Behar *. On the side of the Dukhun, his Lordship expected to have in the field at least four substantive corps and a reserve, each of strength enough to act independently. In Guzertit a corps was also to be formed, to penetrate in a north- easterly direction, and complete the cordon of the intended area of operations. It was his Lordship's design to assume the personal direction of the different movements, and to fix his head-quarters with the centre division of the Bengal army, appointed to rendezvous between Calpee and Etawa ; and it was deemed necessary, with a view to ensure a due consistency of action on the side of the Dukhun, to request the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Presidency to take the personal command of the troops between the Nerbudda and Kishna ; and to regulate the disposition of the forces to be there collected, so as to fall in with his Lord- ship's projects on the side of Hindostan. Sir Thomas Hisloj) accordingly took the field, under the Governor-General's orders, on the 21st of June ; and was vested with full pohtical powers, in addition to his mihtary command. Colonel Sir John INIal- colm, an officer of the Madi"as Establishment, of liigh name and merit, had returned to India in the beginning of 1817 ; and, * Beyond Behar to the east, the Bengal southern and western frontier was con- sidered to be sufficiently guarded by the troops already in position at Midnapoor and Cuttack; but, on the defection of the Ni'igpoor Raja, a reinforcement was sent from the Presidency, in which a squadron of dragoons was included. 18] 7- PRErARATIONS. 213 happening to come to Bengal to wait upon the Governor- General, just at the time when the plan of operations for the ensuing season was under deliberation, he was thought a fit person to be employed as the political agent on the part of the Governor-General, to aid Sir Thomas Hislop in that capacity ; but with a commission to act separately, with the concurrence of Sir Thomas Hislop, whenever circumstances might require it. This officer was in consequence made acquainted with the whole of the plans in contemplation, and returned to the head-quarters of the IMadras army early in July, carrying with him the com- missions of Erigadier-General for himself and Colonels Doveton, Smith, Floyer, and Pritzler. Sir John INIalcolm immediately set out on a tour to the several native courts, in order to concert measures with the respective British residents ; while Sir Thomas Hislop was engaged in making the military dispositions for the approaching campaign. Lord Hastings was extremely desirous of having two corps at least upon the Nerbudda by the close of the rains, if pos- sible ; wishing rather to fall upon the Pindarees, while their power of rapid movement would be cramped by the sAvollen state of the rivers. Colonel Adams, with the Nfigpoor sub- sidiary force, was already at Hoshungabad : the other force was to be assembled at Hindia, lower down the river. A movement from both these points, in combination with the left division of the Bengal force from Bundelkhund, in the direction of Sagin-, would effectually drive the Pindarees from their usual haunts above the gh4ts into JNIalwa. The troops under Sir Thomas Hislop's command, exclusive of the reserve, Avhich was ordered to collect in advance of Adoni, and placed under Brigadier-General Pritzler's direction, amounted to four battalions of European and thirty-one and a half of native infantry, eight regiments of native cavalry, a squadron of dragoons, two of horse artillery, and seven and 214 PREPARATIONS. 1817. a half companies of foot artillery. Besides the above, there were six battaUons of the Nizam's reformed infantry, and 4000 horse, tinder European officers : also 4000 Siladar horse, raised for the campaign by the Eaja of Mysore, under the stipulations of the treaty contracted with liim ; and the troops of Salabut Khan, a powerful jageerdar of the Nizam, settled under our guarantee at Ellichpoor in Berar. The following was the dis- position made of these extensive means : Oolonel Adams was already at Hoshungabad with the Nagpoor subsidiary force, which was constituted the fifth division of the army of the Dukhun. To Hindia Sir Thomas Hislop intended to proceed in person, with a division, to be called the first, composed of a squadron of dragoons and two regiments of native cavalry, one European and six native battahons of infantry, with field artillery, bvit no battering train. A brigade of the Nizam's infantry, the Mysore horse, and Salabut Khan's troops, were, with a few regulars, to be formed into a separate division, the tliird, to proceed in advance, under the command of Sir John Malcolm. Colonel Doveton's force was constituted the second division, and appointed to manceuvre in Berar, in support of Sir Thomas Hislop, and for the security of the Nizam's terri- tories. Colonel Smith's force was destined to form the fourth division, and to operate in Kandesh to the south of the Satpoora range of hiUs, which divides the valleys of the Taptee and Ner- budda, ke.eping in communication with Colonel Doveton on one side, and with the Guzerat force on the other. Sufficient pro- vision was thought to be made for the doubtful disposition of Bajee Eao and the Poona Malu-attas, as well as for the Nizam's weakness and the turbulence of the Patans of Hyderabad, by leaving three native battahons, reinforced by half 4he Bombay European regiment, at the former place, and a force similar in every respect at the latter ; both under the support of the reserve assembling in advance of Adoni, and capable of being further sup- 1817. PREPARATIONS. 215 ported by the divisions of Brigadier-Generals Smith and Dovcton, who were purposely held back from the most advanced Mne of operation; that they might be available in either direction. At Nagpoor the force was smaller ; consisting of only two weak Madras battalions, and three troops of Bengal cavalry. Tliere was certainly no hostile appearance in the conduct of our allies, at the time the above military chspositions were made. Yet Mr. Elphinstone leaned to the opinion, that the irritated feelings of Bajee liao, wliile the humiliations put upon him by the treaty of Poona were fresh in his memory, rendered it unsafe to carry the subsidiary force to a distance from the capital. But he yielded to the more confident judgment of Sir John ^Malcolm, who, on his arrival at Poona on the 5th of August, finding the Peshwa stiU absent, went out by dak, a distance of ninety miles, to meet him ; and, after having been received ^\dth great attention at tvv'o audiences, returned with the avowed conviction, that his Highness could not be meditating any fresh hostility. He urged also the advance of Colonel Smith to the north at an early period, as of material importance to the success of the general plan. The arrival of the Madi-as forward divisions at the points assigned to them was retarded by a continuance of heavy rain beyond the usual season, as well as by an attack of illness, of wliich Sir Thomas Hislop recovered with difficulty, and some other untoward circumstances : so that the first division, instead of arriving at Hindia by the beginning of October, as was intended, did not reach that point until the 10th of November. The operations on the side of Hindoostan were in some degree retarded in consequence. It is necessary to mention them more in detail. The Marquess of Hastings embarked a second time on the voyage up the Ganges on the 8th of July, 1817. He arrived at Cawnpoor in September, having stopped nowhere 216 PREPARATIONS. 1817. on the route, except for a very few days at the city of Patna, whither a comphmentary deputation had come down from Katmandhoo, to M'hich it was tliought politic to show every possible attention. In consequence of the delay on the side of the Dukhun, the Bengal troops were not put in motion till the middle of October ; the 10th of that month being fixed upon for the rendezvovis of the Bundelkhund army, and the 20th for that of the centre and Agra columns. The Kewaree force was intended to act as a reserve, and was therefore not required to be so early in motion. In the interval, the political operations had comm.cnced. The Supreme-Government felt itself authorized, by the in- structions already received from England, to undertake active measures for the suppression of the predatory hordes, so far as the dislodgment of the Pindarees from their haunts in INIalwa and Sagur, and to make such arrangements with the chiefs in the neighbourhood, or those to whom we might restore the lands recovered from the Pindarees, as should secure us against their re-estabhshment in that part of the country. The ]\Iar- quess of Hastings had himself always been of opinion, that, without a complete reform of the condition of central India, that is to say, without so altering the relations of the several princes and associations one to another, as to remove aU induce- ment to predatory and ambitious adventure, on the extensive scale on which it was now prosecuted, no partial measures, however brilliant or successful on our part, and distressing to the adventurers for the time, could prevent the speedy re- currence of the evil, and probably in a more formidable shape. His Lordship saw plainly, that with mere temporary expedients, the work would be left to be done o^er again, and that there could be no security for the future in any plan that did not settle, or provide the means of settling, every one's pretensions to dominion, so as to leave a broad Une of demarcation between 1817. PLAN OF POLICY. 217 the Chief of a regular government and the leader of lawless banditti. The whole of central India was at present the arena of a general scramble for dominion. It was re(|uisite at length to fix who should be acknowledged as the lawful jjossessors now and from this time forth. His mind was fully convinced, that without doing this, and without binding the recognised pos- sessors in such a league, as should on one hand check their dis- position to encroach on each other, by the prospect of certain loss of the stake each possessed, and, on the other, should unite them all by a sense of common interest against a common de]>redator, little Vvould have been done towards the eiadication of the prevailing habits of predatory adventure, which were the grand object of anxiety and alarm. He did not despair of being able to form such a combination, by offering the general guarantee and protection of the British Government ; though it was evident, that nothing short of that inflexible rigour of control and irresistible power of enforcing obcthence to its award, which the British Government alone could exercise, could possibly impose a due degree of restraint on the passions and ambition of a host of greedy pretenders, aspiring by right of birth, or of the sword, to the territorial sovereignties of this wide expanse. His Lordship hoped, that the principal Chiefs, Sindheea and Holkar, would voluntarily second the design upon a proper in- vitation, for both had reason by this time to know, that the fortunes of their flimilies were on the wane ; and though the invitation promised to gratify no ambitious views of aggrandize- ment, at any rate it would rivet their dominion over their remaining territories, and ensure to their families the entire inheritance, instead of a dilapidated succession, fast decreasing, day after day, by waste and usurpation, similar to wliat had been witnessed for the last ten years. The great ofllcers of both families, who had already tasted of these usurpations, and pro- F F 218 PLAN OF POLICY. 1817. bably expected further to gorge their appetite, were the persons from whom the most serious opposition to the plan was to be feared; but even they might be won over by the proffered guarantee of their past gains against the caprice of a master and the fickleness of fortune; and then, in fact, the needy and desperate alone would heartily oppose the execution of the design. To Ameer Khan it was resolved to offer such a gua- rantee immediately : his actual independence of Holkar might fairly be assumed, from his whole conduct since Juswunt Eao"s death. Sindheea's sirdars, on the contrary, could not be sepa- rately treated with, unless the temper of that prince should be declaredly inimical. Such was the outline of the policy which Lord Hastings determined to observe towards the ]\Iahratta powers of central India. In furtherance of it, he chd not hesitate boldly to assume the principle, that in the operations against the Pin- darees, no one could be suffered to be neutral, but all should be required to join in the league for their suppression, under con- ditions, securing their active co-operation, as well in the present measures of cure, as in the ulterior preventive efforts against the future rise of these or similar associations into dangerous importance. The independent principahties, like Bhopal and some of the Eajpoot states, were likewise to be included in the leao-ue, on the condition of a moderate tribute, sufficient to defray the expense of our general protection of all ; but in all cases where Sindheea or Holkar could establish the right to a separate tribute, that also was to be confirmed to them under British guarantee. The orders for the simultaneous execution of this extensive plan of concert throughout every part of India, were issued towards the end of September. It had been originally intended to wait tiU the armies were in the field ; but the discussions respecting the march of part of Sir Thomas Hislop's army by the route of Sindheea's territory of Boor- 1817. PLAN OF POLICY. 219 hanpoor, rendered it necessary that the communication of out designs slioukl not be longer delayed : suspense in respect to them being always more prejudicial than a direct knowledge of the worst that is to happen. The negotiations with Holkar, Ameer Khan, Jy])0()r, .loudh- poor, Oodeepoor, and the other Kajpoot states *, were entrusted to ]\Ir. Metcalfe, the resident at Dehlee. Ca])tain Close, the resident at the durbar of Sindheea, was appointed to conduct the negotiations at Gwalior. The revision of our relations with the Bundela Chiefs, who owed tribute or allegiance to the Peshwa, viz. those of J'hansee, Sumtar, Jaloun, Dutteea, and Tearee, and the settlement with Benaeek Rao, who, on behalf of a Mahratta woman, administered the affairs of Sagur f proper, were confided to the political agent in Bundelkhund, Mr. A\"au- chope. The resident at Nagpoor was directed to tender to the acceptance of Nuzur JVIahommed of Bhopal the terms which had been proposed to his father in 1814-15, and to require him, in case of his acceding to them, to forward without delay a written paper containing the several stipulations, preparatory to the advance of Colonel Adains through his territories. Nuzur- gurh w as named as the fort to be required of him for a depot. The arrangements of detail were left to Sir Thomas Hislop and Sir John Malcolm, whose arrival on the Xerbudda was then shortly expected. In communicating the course he was about to adopt to the council at Fort William, the Marquess of Hastings briefly de- * Kota, Boondce, Banswara, Bikanecr, and Jesselmeer. There was also a late dependent of the Peshwa's, the Kcroulcc Chief, with whom engagements were to be made at this residency. f The Jalounman, Nana Govind Kao, was the hereditary Chief of Sagiir ; but as it was a principle with us not to disturb occupancy, unless the occupant should range himself on the side of the enemy, Benaeek Rao was to be permitted to engage for what he held of S.'igur, notwithstanding the abstract right of Govind Rao. F F 2 220 MILITARY MOVEMENTS. 1817. clared his reasons for deviating from the more hmited views that seemed to be entertained in England, and at the same time expressed a confident hope, that the enlarged plan he had laid down for the secure and permanent attainment of his object would meet with the assent of the most considerable princes of central India. " It was his boast," he said, " to have " an earnest desire to accomplish every thing by pacific means, " and to be able to declare with sincerity, that the exclusive " object of his present preparations was to get rid of the greatest " pest that society ever experienced." He did not hesitate to take upon himself the undivided responsibility of acting with- out the full sanction of the home authorities ; for he felt con- fident the result Avould justify his determination in the eyes of those authorities, and of the British nation at large. On the morning of the 16th of October, the Governor- General took the field in person, and on the 20th reached the rendezvous of the centre division of the grand army, which was appointed to assemble at Secundera on the Jumna. The next day the force was reviewed. It consisted of two battalions of European and seven battalions of native infantry, five squadrons of European dragoons, and eight of native cavalry, besides two troops of a newly-raised corps mounted on dromedaries. There were also three troops of horse artillery, together with a light and heavy train, and every equipment for a siege, in case it should be found necessary to undertake any enterprise of that nature. The number of fighting men of the regular army attached to this division exceeded 12,500. On the 2Gth of October, this force crossed the Jumna on a bridge of boats constructed for the purpose, and thence proceeded in its march direct upon Gwalior, by the route of Jaloun and Seonda. The right division under IVIajor-General Donkin, in strengtii about 4000 infantry and 3000 cavahy, including an irregular corps, moved simultaneously in the same direction from Agra. The" 1817. SINDHEEA. 221 time of movement was so calculated, that the centre division should arrive at Seonda on the Sindh on the same day that General Donkin reached the Chumbul at I)hol})()or IJaree ; after which both forces would advance on (iwalior, or prosecute other operations, accordin<2; as circumstances might recpiire. Their approach accelerated and fixed Sindheea's determination to agree to the terms, upon which his co-operation in the campaign had been demanded. Yet he did not sign the treaty till the 5th of Xovember, when the two armies were respectively within but one march of the point assigned to them on his frontier. It will be necessary to give at some length the particulars of the negotiation. In the month of September, the resident first mentioned in durljar the march of our troops from the Dukhun to the Xer- budda by the route of Boorhanpoor, and applied, as a matter of mere form, for orders to his Highness' officers on the route to allow a free passage, and to afibrd every aid and facility due to us as friends and allies. At this period, the mihtary at Gwalior were more tumultuous than ordinary, having actually beset the quarters of the Chief with the clamorous demand of immediate payment of arrears, and held him in personal restraint. The talk of Bajee Rao's positive determination to break with the English was general through the camp; and the wish for Sindheea to join him in hostility was evidently tlie prevailing sentiment, insomuch that it was greatly feared he would be driven to this course. It seemed very doubtful, however, what fine of conduct it was the real intention of Sindheea to adopt. The reply of the durbar to the application for passes contained an assurance, that his Highness had not given up the intention of himself taking measures against the Pindarees ; and a hope was expressed, that, on hearing this, the march of the troops might be stopped, till it was seen what could be done. Tliis being declared impossible, after what had occurred in the last 222 SINDHEEA. 1817. two years, the passports were prepared and despatched on the 1st of October. The knowledge of our preparations on both sides of India augmented the ferment and confusion amongst the troops of Sindheea, and completely distracted the mind of the chief. In the hope of allaying this in some degree, it was resolved, as above noticed, not to defer the communication of our views and designs to the durbar, luitil the military preparations should be more advanced. Accordingly, between the 10th and 15th of October, the Governor-General's views were completely un- folded to his Highness, by the presentation of a note prepared and sent for the express purpose from head-quarters. This expose, after remonstrating Avith Sindheea for having harboured the freebooters, that during two successive years had ravaged our territories, and for having fed vis with empty promises of punishing the perpetrators of these enormities, while both before and since he was in constant correspondence with them, and was even supposed to share the booty, went on to combat the plea he had advanced, of inability to control their acts. Admitting it as a personal exoneration of liis Highness, it was nevertheless declared to constitute a virtual dissolution of the treaties, concluded with him under a different impression re- specting the efficiency of his government ; more especially to annul those stipulations, which left his Highness free and independent in his dealings with all feudatories and dependents in Malwa, Mewur and Marwai-, and prohibited our interference in their affairs. Of course, the moment he ceased to have the power of restraining the hostility of such dependents, when directed against ourselves, the restriction upon our taking measures for the purpose could no longer be suffered to have a binding effect. The note professed, that the British Govern- ment sought no objects of private advantage, but merely the suppression of the Pindarees, and the final and total extinction 1817. SINDHEEA. 228 of such associations ; and asserted, that to this object its phms would he exchisivcly directed : and his Highness' hearty co- operation Avas demanded, in the mode which the Resident would explain. It was further notified, that any harbourin<]f of the Pindarees, or reception of them into his ranks, or any en('t)urag&- ment of otliers in such conduct, would be redmity and disposition of our armies. Had he delayed the signature of the treaty another day, orders had been issued to the Resident to advance his demand, by requiring the perpetual cession of the Ragpoot tributes, together with the district of Ajimeer, in addition to the other stipulations. He affixed his signature on the very day these orders arrived, and thereby avoided these fresh demands. On the 6th of November, the day after the treaty was executed, it was ratified by the Governor-General, and the circumstance was communicated to the army under Lord Hastings' command, in the following short but expressive general order. " The Governor-General has great pleasvire in announcing " to the army, that the Maha Raja, Doulut Rao Sindheea, has " signed a treaty, by which his Highness engages to afford every " facihtation to the British troops, in their pursuit of the " Pindarees through his dominions, and to co-operate actively " towards the extinction of those brutal freebooters. In conse- " quence, the troops and country of his Highness are to be " regarded as those of an ally. " The generous confidence and animated zeal of the army " may experience a sliade of disappointment, in the diminished " prospect of serious exertion ; but the Governor-General is " convinced, that the reflection of every officer and soldier in independent powers of India, were found neatly pasted between the leaves of a Sanscrit book of the Vedas, which one of them, travelling in the character of a student, was carrying with him. Several sealed and some open letters from the chief himseU" were found upon them. The former were sent by his Lordship to be presented to his Highness in full durbar, unopened and without comment, in order that he might not suppose us to be ignorant of the intrigues and machinations afoot, and might be cautious not to provoke our vengeance by any overt act of hostility. 1817. SINDHEEA. 227 " this army will satisfy him, that the carrying every desired " point by ecjuity and moderation is the proudest triumph for " the Eritish character." Officers were immediately a})pointed to proceed to Sindheea's several corps. jNIajor Bunce of the king's £4th dragoons was sent to Bahadhur-gurh, Baptiste's head-quarters ; but Baptiste had gone off to Gwahor before his arrival, and the second in command said he could not receive the Major without expi'ess orders from his superior. JNIajor Ludlow was ordered to Ajimeer, where Bapoo Sindheea was stationed ; and Captain Caulfield to Juswunt Kao Bhuo's camp at Jawud ; but neither the state of that part of the country, nor that of the troops of this chief, were such as to allow of his joining for some time ; as will hereafter be more particularly mentioned. Although Sindheea was thus compelled to sign the treaty, it was not to be expected, that he would heartily join in the cause; and he endeavoured for some time to evade its stipulations, by every means in his power. For the first six weeks or two months afterwards, no effort whatever was made by him to furnish the 5000 auxihary horse stipulated for ; nor was any disposition shown to give us effectual co-operation. He was evidently on the watch for some insight into the probable result of what was passing with the other JMahratta powers, all of whom brought matters to the extremity of open war, in the course of November and December. Bajee Eao took the lead, by attacking the Residency and British troops at Poona, on the very day of the signature of the treaty at Gwalior. As long as the other Mahratta chiefs continued in this disposition, it was of course necessary to maintain towards Sindheea the same attitude which had compelled him to accept our terms ; for, until some decided blow should be struck, no efficient restraint but the certainty of immediate attack could be placed on his natural desire to set aside the engagements he liad entered into. G G 2 228 AMEER KHAN. 1817. This had been fully contemplated ; and his acceptance of our conditions was valued more for the effect it was expected to have, in paralyzing his underhand or open efforts against us, by exhibiting him to the world as one who had deserted the cause of our enemies, than from any hope of benefit from his co-opera- tion. As soon as our success in other quarters should have con- firmed Doulut Eao in his resolution to abide by his engagements, the treaty was so drawn, as to give us every advantage we could have desired at his hands, as will be abundantly evident in the sequel. Ameer Khan followed the example of Sindheea ; and an agent, whom he had sent to Dehlee to negotiate, signed the treaty, proposed to him by the Resident there, on the 9th of November. The terms were, a guarantee on our part to him- self and family of aU territories Ameer Khan might be in the actual tenure of, under grants from Holkar : the Patau army immediately to be disbanded, and the artillery to be given up for an equitable compensation : other articles secured the aid of Ameer Khan for the suppression of the Pindarees. In the negotiations respecting this treaty, it was agreed, that the com- pensation for the artillery, w^hich was fixed at five lack rupees, should be paid down in advance, to enable Ameer Khan to disband his army, which he could not effect without an advance of money. The son and heir of this chief was to come to Dehlee, and reside there as a hostage for his father's fidelity ; and, on his arrival, two lack rupees were to be paid, the remaining three lack to be afterwards remitted, as soon as the Resident was satisfied that Ameer Khan was diligently employed in the work of disbanding his troops. It was also settled, that territories belonging to any of the Rajpoot states, and forcibly occupied by him, should be given up on our requisition. This treaty was ratified by the Governor-General, on the 15th of November. A month had been fixed as the period for 1817. AMEER KHAN. 229 the counter ratification to be i)rociirccl from Ameer Khan ; but, before the expinition of that period, the rise of the Feshwa and Bhoosla in arms to oj)])ose our measures had occurred, and tliere was time within tlie month for him to learn the event of tlieir first efforts against us. This chief liad, therefore, all the ad- vantage of waiting to see the probable issue of affairs in other quarters, and he availed himself of this advantage to the utmost : insomuch, that it was for some time doubtful wliether or not he would abide by the act of his envoy. His own interest and inclination undoubtedly prompted him to seciu-e to himself independent dominion, as soon as possible ; but this was offered him at the price of the sacrifice of his army ; and his control over that army was not such as to enable him to disregard its feeling, which, until the ill success of Eajee Eao and Appa Saheb became known, was too decidedly hostile to the British propositions, for him to venture to declare himself in opposition to it. In the end, finding himself placed between General Donkin's force, and that assembled at Kewaree, under the com- mand of Major-General Sir David Ochterlony, he felt both the necessity of coming to a decision, and the advantage of choosing his side, Avhile the proximity of our divisions gave him the means of setting the feelings of his own retainers at defiance. He accordingly ratified the treaty in the course of December, and thenceforth entered heartily into the cause, adopting readily all our plans, and abiding by our suggestions. The Kerovdee chief, formerly a dependent of the Peshwa, signed a treaty, by which he placed himself under our protec- tion, and lent us the use of his means, on the same day with Ameer Khan. The tribute he owed the Peshwa being only 25,000 rupees per annum, was remitted in this case, in conse- quence of our past experience of his favourable sentiments. On the 8th of October, Govind Uao, the Xana of Jaloun, had signed a treaty, whereby the Peshwa's right of tribute and of 230 JALOUN— SAGUR— BHOPAL. 1817. military service, now transferred to us, was commuted for the cession of Mahoba, a pergunnah of 43 villages that jutted into our Bundelkhund frontier, and four other villages on the banks of the Jumna. Benaeek Kao of SAgur rejected the offer made to negotiate with him, in order to fix the i-elative situation he was' to hold towards the British Government, now that it had acquired the Peshwa's feudal superiority over that principality. The Nuwab of Bhopal, on the contrary, accepted at once, and with eagerness, the terms offered to him, and proved himself to the extent of his ability a stanch and zealous ally ; by which conduct he ultimately reaped abundant advantages, while Benaeek Rao brought on his own ruin. The circumstances that attended the opening of the cam-/ paign against the Pindarees, and the crisis brought on by the sudden rise of Bajee Rao and Appa Saheb in open hostihty, have been specially reserved for a separate chapter. Ccl' Smiths Cmt p.m J dmin^ BSZi British In/ajiiry l-O" Ox-alry Sya Rcw's Cemp abandoned on yi,v' 17*1827. Scale or MUfS h c d f s foatuni Taim up h- Col. Burr on 4''' Xor^ dSTi Resul/me whmit if E retirnl iy route hbb an S^Vov' Ma^or FonU Jiatt^' as thj^- canie t-n troiti Dho Toora l^Batt" of T^ Bomb' il infantry as adranctd and nearly .tumrni D".. D". .lis Tflrnied . .a/hsni'ards on piataut' Col Ahlne on the covcruuj of L7^ Sis BnoiMw \^atac Mfardry inllsh Iiahritrx- ■• .TJ" --■ Cmalry . 1 T.nrmv ^} ^ /-^ % it : : a y^n" Basilum on B'^Dec' i> 2"^ D°- mWD'' r 3"'....!)''. on m^J)" d Lnanxs Cuns ahand '' on £n^ adtanee e.tf Posiion of Col. i[' lead atier Enenus defeat g" Bntuli reserve h.'ti Ermmis Camp and (runs playing on British adiana "^ ^' -0° JmCol Oahan 1 Batters' of Bomtlers opened 20'' Dec' in Manrd position ai)aimt Fort SI" Dee'' no Enemis Slagaatie pp Sceta-Buldee Mils. jrfi %Eiunu OuA- Berse -0 ^ i? CHAPTER XI. PINDAREES— POONA— NAGPOOR. 1817. OCTOBER TO DECEMBER. Piiidarees during rains — General Marshall from Bundelkhund — a Pindara enter- prise— frustrated— operations on the Nerbudda— Sir Thomas Hislop's retro- grade movement — operations in Malvva — Sir Thomas Hislop recalled thither — Poona affairs— reduction of Soondoor demanded— and effected— fresh levies of troops — Sepoys — tampered with — Kandesh — critical situation of brigade— it moves to Kirkee — Moro Dikshut— Brigadier-General Smith on the frontier — pre- cautions— Peshwa's demands — Residency attacked and burnt— battle of Poona — Moro Dikshut killed— cruelties of Mahrattas— Brigadier-General Smith's move on Poona— attacks Bajee Rao's camp— city surrendered— Nagpoor— retrospect from July — Raja irresolute— receives titles from Poona— and is pubhcly in- vested—precautions of defence — British position — attacked — pressed — and partly carried — charge of Captain Fitzgcrajd— restores the day— defeat of the enemy— reflections— loss on both sides— influence of these events— charge of treachery weighed. The Pindarees cantoned for the rains of 1817 in three bodies, under Cheetoo, Kureem Khan, and A^^asil IVraliomnied. The durra of the former occupied the position furthest to the west, and shifted its ground several times in the season, from about Ashta and Ichawur westward to the Kalee-Sindh. Kureem, who liad resumed the command of his durra from Namdar Khan his Heutenant, lay about Bairsea, due north of lihopal. WAsil Mahommed, brother and successor to Dost JNIahommed, de- ceased, was at Garspoor, westward of Sagur. It was generally known throughout the durras, that the English meditated 232 PINDAREES. 1817. offensive operations against them in the approaching season. Kureem was therefore particularly active in recruiting his durra, and raising fresh infantry, with a view to enable him to meet the emergency. He was desirous also of concerting a general plan of defence with the leaders of the other durras ; and a meeting was accordingly appointed on the 15th of September for that purpose. The ill-will that subsisted between Cheetoo and this Chief was, however, too rancorous to allow of any cor- diality between them. At the same time, though the Chiefs received general assurances of support in the hour of need from all quarters, there was no one of the native princes yet willing openly to take their part, or to incur the responsibility of ad- mitting their families into any forts capable of affording them protection. Thus the rainy season passed without their having been able to disencumber themselves of their families and bag- gage, or to fix upon any consistent plan of action for the cam- paign. Sheikh Dulloo, the most adventurous of all the Chiefs, declared his intention of joining Trimbukjee at Choolee-Mu- heshwur, and seeking his fortune in another expedition to the Dukhun. The rest were distracted, and inclined to wait the issue of the expected rise amongst the INIahrattas in support of their cause. The spirits of Kureem's durra were damped by a destructive fire that accidentally broke out in their cantonment on the 17th of September, and consumed the greater part of their valuables. In the present temper of their minds, this was regarded as an omen of ill-fortune. Mean time, the left division of the grand army from Hin- doostan, consisting of two strong brigades of infantry and a regiment and irregular corps of cavalry, assembled on the 10th of October at Kalinjin*, under the command of Major-General Marshall. It immediately advanced on Punna in Eundelkhund, and thence continued its march to Hutta on the way to Sagur, where it arrived on the 28th of October. While this army was 1817. PINDAREES. 233 on the advance to the south, a bold enterprise was attempted from the diirra of ^^"iisil Mahommed at Garspoor, wlience an active JnJibu)' was sent out in a north-easterly direction to plunder our own provinces of JJundelkhund. It penetrated by the Heerapoor ghat to the westward of General Marshall's route, and ravaged the territories of some Eundela chiefs as far north as ]VIow, near Eaneepoor. From this to^vn the party was beaten off; but as they were thought to have thence taken a direction eastward, some alarm was felt at Banda, the civil station of ]Jun- delkhund, which was at this time totally Avithout ])rotection, all the troops of the province having marched to the south with General ^Marshall. The Marquess of Hastings hearing of this bold enterprise on the 1st of November, when he was at Jaloun with his division, detached two squadrons of the seventh native cavalry with the dromedary corjw and two light companies to proceed with all expedition under the command of JNIajor Gumming of the seventh native cavalry, so as to cover Banda, in case of that station being threatened. The marauders got intelligence of this detachment, and retired again to the south- west without doing farther mischief in Bundelkhund. jNIajor Gumming was, however, reinforced, and ordered to remain Mith his detachment about Kyta, in order to cover our frontier on that side, and more effectually to keep open the communication between General INIarshall and the centre division under his Lordship's personal command. During this diversion, the left division continued its advance from Hutta to Rylee, where it arrived on the 10th of November, and thence opened a communication with Colonel Adams at Hoshungabad. AY^sil Mahommed retired from Garspoor west- ward to Gunj Basouda, as this division advanced. On the same day that General ^Marshall arrived at Rylee, Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop reached Hurda, and took the command of the first division of the army of the Dukhun. Brigadier-General H H 234 PINDAREES. 1817. Sii' John INIalcolm had arrived in the valley of the Nerbudda some time before. Every thing was therefore now in readiness for the combined movement, that had been concerted to drive the Pindarees out of Malwa. In expectation of it, the Guzerat force had by this time advanced to Dohud or Dwahud, to inter- cept their escape westward ; and Lord Hastings having con- cluded the treaty with Sindheea, moved his own division to a position that should prevent their penetrating to the north or east ; while he ordered General Don kin to advance from Dhol- poor in a south-westerly direction, so as to guard the left bank of the Chumbul, and cut oif any retreat on that side. It had been planned, that one of Sir Thomas Hislop's divisions should penetrate into Malwa by marching straight upon Ashta, wliile another moved by Oonchod, further to the west ; that Colonel Adams should at the same time move upon Eessein, while General Marshall marched from Kylee westward on Sagur and Katgurh. The execution of this plan was, however, interrupted by in- teUigence which had reached Sir Thomas Hislop of the Peshwa's having risen in arms. After some dehberation as to the course to be adopted in this perplexity, the Lieutenant-General re- solved to send forward Sir John Malcolm with the third division, reinforced by a brigade of regular troops, while he liimself returned by the Boorhanpoor route towards the Dukhun, to support the divisions of Brigadier-Generals Doveton, Smith, and Pritzler, the two latter of which had previously been directed on Poona. In furtherance of this determination. Sir Thomas Hislop thought it advisable to employ himself in the first instance in summoning Aseergurh, the orders for the surrender of which had recently been forwarded to him, and in laying siege to it in case of resistance. This opinion was founded on the assumption of our interests in the Dukhun being more seriously endangered than the event showed them to have been. It is 1817. PINDAREES. 523 likewise true, that recent conmumications from INIr. Jenkins had described the Raja of Nagpoor as hkely to follow the example of Bajce Rao ; which had obli<);ed him to detain a brigade of Colonel Adam's force, and to order a battalion and additional troops of cavalry to hold themselves in readiness to march on Nagpoor, as a reinforcement to the troops there : nor was it long before he was obliged to avail himself of their active services. However, even in the worst event, the force of Bri- gadier-General Doveton was applicable in this direction, without the necessity of holding back a second division for the purpose. It was under these, circumstances that Sir Thomas Hislop, conceiving the safety of our interests in the Dukhun to be a consideration paramount to all others, resolved to divert the strength of his division from the suppression of the Pindarees, which he regarded as a minor object, and to devote his chief exertions to the support of those interests. Accordingly, the first division of the army of the Dukhun began to retrace its steps towards Boorhanpoor on the 19th of November : Sir John Malcolm having previously been despatched with the third and Colonel Adams with the fifth division, to prosecute alone the operations against the Pindarees. The former crossed the Xer- budda on the 16'th of November, the latter on the 14th. A movement had been combined with General IMarshall, so as to bring the three armies respectively to Ashta, Ressein, and Ratgurh, all on the same day, which was fixed for the 522d of November. They all reached their stations without fail. Three other points, TuUain, ]?airsea, and Gunj-Basouda, were then designated and occupied respectively by the three divisions on the 26th of November. The freebooters were by these opera- tions driven entirely out of their usual haunts ; and, as the ■divisions advanced, their agents were expelled from the several towns and villages, which were taken possession of or restored, u II 2 236 PINDAREES. 1817. according as there appeared to be claimants with a valid title or not. All that belonged to Sindheea or ]3hop4l were immediately deUvered over to the agents of these chiefs in attendance with the divisions. The Pindarees had hitherto retired in masses, with all their property and families, carefully keeping beyond the reach of a surprise. The durras had not yet joined, but they had converged in their retreat. After this, however, Kureem and Wasil Mahommed eflFected a junction about Seronj, and retired together on the high road leading by Nya-Seraee to Gwalior. Cheetoo moved westward, towards Holkar's army, which had by this time taken the field. During these movements, the Marquess of Hastings on the 14th of November received advice of the state of affairs at Poona, and the certainty of a rupture with the Peshwa, Ap- prehending the possibihty of Sir Thomas Hislop's suspending his advance into Malwa in consequence of the intelligence, his Lordship immediately issued the most distinct and positive instructions for his adherence to the original plan of the cam- paign, thinking Brigadier-Generals Smith and Pritzler strong enough to operate against Bajee Rao, while Brigadier-General Doveton's position in Berar wovdd overawe or enable him to act against the Nagpoor Raja, in case of his defection also. He declared it to be, at all events, of vital importance to the success of the general plan, that the first division should advance to the support of Sir John Malcohn, who might else be opposed by an accumulation of force, with which he would scarcely be com- petent to cope. These instructions were enforced in several subsequent communications, particularly one of the 21st of November from Erich. They reached the head-quarters of the Madras army, when they had abeady retrograded as far as Charwa. On receiving them, the Lieutenant-General imme- diately retraced liis steps ; and on the 26th of November again 1817. POONA. 237 began his march to the north, with intent to move by Oonehod direct upon Oojein, to which point he ordered Sir John Malcolm to look for his support. But ere we pursue further the narrative of occurrences in Hindoostan, it will be necessary to give some account of the important events that had taken place in the interval at Poona and NAgpoor. After the execution of the treaty of Poona, Bajee Eao had retired, and still continued, on chfferent pretences, to absent himself from his capital, whither he did not return till the end of September. His ministers had, in the interim, been very urgent for the performance of an old promise we had given, to reduce for him the rebelhous feudatory of Soondoor. It was a case of disputed succession, in which Bajee Kao had declared for Juswunt Rao Gorepara, to the prejuchce of Sheco Eao, the present occupant. The place being surrounded on every side by our own territories, we had been induced to offer our services for its reduction, in preference to allowing Bajee Kao to carry his own military rabble into the neighbourhood. But as yet the Madras Presidency had not found a convenient time for fulfilling this promise; and the court of Poona was always particularly urgent in pressing it, at moments of the greatest inconvenience. The object at the present juncture was evidently to throw obstacles in the way of the formidable assemblage of troops making in the north. Mr. Elpliinstone, sensible that our ally had a plausible pretext for complaining of our chlatori- ness in this instance, more especially as he was paying to the competitor, whom he favoured and recognised, a compensation of 10,000 rupees a year, suggested to Sir Thomas Hislop the pro- priety of employing in this service a part of the reserve then collecting about Adoni. The presence of Colonel Munro in the neighbourhood, where he had been sent as commissioner to take charge of the districts lately ceded by the Peshwa, afforded 238 POONA. 1817. to the Lieutenant-General the opportunity of availing himself of his services, without embarrassing Brigadier-General Pritzler's oj)erations with the rest of the reserve. Orders were accordingly issued to Golonel Munro to undertake the enterprise ; and he was shortly afterwards vested with a separate command of the reserve, and the rank of Brigadier-General, under orders from the Marquess of Hastings. The place was surrendered by Sheeo Eao Gorepara, on Colonel Munro's approach towards the end of October ; the British Government agreeing to assign to Sheeo Eao a provision about equal to what Juswunt Eao his competitor had been receiving. The latter, however, becoming involved in the subsequent measures of the Poona Court, Soon- door was ultimately restored to its former occupant. During the whole of October, Bajee Eao continued to collect troops from all parts, and to call upon his jageerdars to do likewise. The reason assigned for this conduct to Mr. Elphin- stone, at the first conference to which he was admitted, which however did not take place before the 14th of October, was his desire to co-operate in the objects of the present campaign to the utmost extent of his means. This pretence was too shallow to disguise his real designs, which were manifested by his altered conduct towards the jageerdars, to all of whom he was now studiously attentive, exerting himself with great address in gaining their attachment. Even Easteea, whose family had been entirely ruined not long before, and Appa Dussaee Kipaneekur, a third of whose jageer had lately been confiscated, together with the Vinshoorkur, who had himself much to expect from our success in Hindoostan, were completely won over by this conduct. The Peshwa's intention of heading the hostile league against our supremacy was evident from numberless other cir- cumstances ; particularly from the discovery of several profligate efforts to seduce the sepoys of the brigade, as well as those of Major Ford's battalions, to desert their colours. The native 1817. POONA. 239 officers and men of the regular corps were generally proof against his solicitations, and accpiainted their officers with the attempts matle to tamper with them. 13ut in Major Ford's battalions there was a larger proportion of jMahrattas, and it was natural enough that these should be won over on such an occasion. To^vards the latter end of October, there was an immense collection of ]Mahratta troops at Poona, the jageerdars having exerted themselves to bring forward all they could muster, and the prince himself having made extensive levies. Gokla was the adviser and principal commander in tliis crisis. The Mah- rattas fixed their several encampments close round the canton- ment of the brigade, the site of which had been chosen judiciously enough with a view to the defence of the city against external attack ; but it was particularly open to surprise, and other\\ise much exposed, when threatened by an enemy both within and without. In proportion as the accumidation of the Mahratta soldiery on every side became greater, the situation of the brigade grew more and more alarming. Each corps as it came in en- crpached upon the ground of its cantonment, and the horsemen rode blustering and prancing about, in the manner usual with Indian troops when their designs are hostile. Colonel Eurr, the officer in command at Poona, had a strong brigade of tlu-ee battalions ; but the European regiment had not yet joined from Bombay, nor was it expected till the 2d of November. ]\Ir. Elphinstone, though fully aware of the Peshwa's determination lo push matters to an open rupture, was nevertheless very unwilhng to be the first to resort to measures of actual or apparent hostihty. He therefore refrained from authorising the brigade to take up a stronger position, until it became obviously unsafe to allow of its remaining longer in the present one. He had remonstrated, but to no purpose, against the concentration of troops at the capital, and against the temper 240 POONA. 1817. they displayed ; for Bajee Eao distinctly refused to send away any part of his force. On the 31st of October, appearances were so menacing, that the Eesident resolved to move the brigade to Kirkee, where the ground was peculiarly advantageous. The stores were consequently sent off on that day, and the brigade followed on the next. Letters had in the mean time been despatched, to expedite the arrival of the European detachment, which also, by a for-ced march, came into Kirkee on the 1st of November. A brief description of the ground about Poena will be necessary to the clear understanding of the ensuing operations. The city of Poona * is situated on the right bank of the IMoota- Moola River, which runs from west to east, taking its name from two streams which unite to the north-west of the town. Just at the point of confluence stood the British Residency, separated from the city by the Moota, while the Moola came down with a sweep from the north. Tliis latter river was fordable opposite to the Residency ; and about a mile up the stream there was a good bridge over it, above which the river took a semicircular reach to the north. At the western extremity of the semicircle lies the village of Kirkee, between which and the river to the east is an admirable position for a brigade to occupy, protected by the river in the rear and on the left, and supported on the right flank by the village. The original cantonment was on the right bank of the Moota-Moola, to the east of the city, and close upon it, so that both the city and the Moota lay between the brigade and the Residency. By moving the troops to Kirkee, the Residency lay on the contrary between them and the enemy, forming an advanced position towards the city. Major Ford's battahons were cantoned at Dhapoora, a few miles distant to the west. * Vide plan at the head of this chapter. 1817. POONA. 241 After the removal of the troops to Kirkec, nothing but war was talked of jNToro Diksliut, who seems to have conceived an attachment to jNIajor Foid very uncommon between ]']ia-o])eans and natives, sent for that officer, and endeavoured to persuade him to accej)t his protection and assiu-ance of safety. His master, he said, wiiii l)ent upon an open rupture, and expected that the greater part of our native troops would come over to him, or at aU events, that the numbers he had collected must overwhelm the brigade. He advised jNIajor Ford, therefore, as a friend, to consult his own safety in such an extremity : adding, moreover, that he had exerted himself to the utmost to dissuade his prince from the course he was pursuing, but to no piu'pose, the counsels of Gokla and of the war party having prevailed ; that a sense of duty would oblige him to side against us, though much against his inclination : and that he was desirous of manifesting his friendship for Major Ford, by jiroviding for his personal security. When this officer explained what he considered his o^vn duty to require of him in such circumstances, and expressed his resolution to abide the residt, whatever it might be, More Dikshut took a very affectionate leave, commending his family to the Major's care, if the event should be adverse to the cause he had espoused, and assuring him of every personal attention and assistance that he could bestow in the opposite case. Brigadier-General Smith had proceeded northwards towards Byzapoor, on the borders of Kandcsh, early in the month of October ; and his absence, by depriA'ing the brigade at Poona of tlie support it usually derived from the vicinity of the main body at Seroor, which lies about thirty miles only to the north- west of the capital, naturally raised the hopes and courage of the enemy. On hearing of the hostile indications at Poona, a hght battaUon was ordered back to Seroor ; and, towards the end of October, the Brigadier-Cieneral himself concentrated his force at a place called Phool-Tamba, on the Godaveree. He I I 242 POONA. 1817. had arranged with Mr. Elphinstone, that, if he did not hear daily from Poona, he was to consider the communication as cut off, and immediately to march to the south. But, unless in the last extremity, his force was not to be diverted from the part assigned to it in the general operations towards Hindoostan. After the movement of the brigade to Kirkee, every day produced more decisive symptoms of approaching hostilities. An officer on his way to Bombay was attacked and plundered, and escaped with difficulty, severely woiuided. This occurred only two miles from Poona ; \\ here the Mahrattas were con- tinually riding round the cantonment, and abusing our men and officers as they lay at their posts. The Besident, therefore, thought it advisable to increase the strength of his force as much as possible, by calling in the light battalion that had been ordered back to Seroor, together with a corps of 1000 auxiliary horse, that had been forming there vuider Lieutenant Swanston. Still, however, he resolved to remain at the Eesidency to the latest moment, in order not to be the first to declare war, or to assume the appearance of hostility. The hght battalion left Seroor on the 5th of November, and moved half way to Poona. The news of its approach was conveyed to Bajee Eao in the forenoon of the 5th; and his army was immediately put in motion. A battalion of Gokla's at the same time moved round to the west, and took up a position directly between the Eesidency and the brigade at Kirkee, with the intention of cutting off the communication between the two. Mr. Elphin- stone sent to demand the reason of this hostile proceeding, and of the general movement of the troops. Upon this, an intimate at the palace of the Peshwa, named AVittojee Naeek, came on his part to say, that intelligence had been received of troops being on their way to Poona, as well from Seroor as from General Smith's army ; that Bajee Eao had twice before been the dupe of his own irresolution, but was now determined to be before- 1817. POONA. 243 hand in his. demands. These were cx])lained to l)e, that th^ Euro])eans lately arrived at Poona should l)e sent back to Bombay ; that the bri<^ade should be reduced to its usual strength, and be cantoned at such ])lace as ]}ajee Ixao might select. To these demands a categoiical and immediate answci' was required, on the tenor of wliich the question of peace or war would depend. ]Mr. lllphinstone replied, that he could not admit his Highness' right to make any such demands: at all events, it was out of his power to grant them, the extent of the force to be stationed at Poona having been fixed by superior authority. ^\"itli respect to the categorical answer required, he could only say, that, if his Highness joined his army, he should proceed to the brigade; and if his Highness' troops advanced towards the brigade, they would assuredly be attacked : for, though he was most anxious to avoid a rupture, he did not fear the issue. Wittojee Xaeek returned with this reply. He was no sooner gone, than the Peshwa, either upon a preconcerted signal, or more probably without waiting the answer, mounted his horse, and joined his army at the Parbutee Hill, which lies a little to the south-west of Poona. His troops immediately advanced on the Residency. Mr. lUphinstone and the gentle- men attached to his suite had barely time to mount their horses, and retire by the ford of the ^loola, inider cover of the Resident's honorary guard, ere the enemy arrived and took possession of tlie houses, from which there had not been time to remove a single article. The whole were plundered, and afterwards burnt ; whereby much valuable property was destroyed, and, amongst other things, all !Mr. Elphinstone's books and papers, a loss more irreparable than all the rest. The Resident's party made good its retreat along the left bank of the jNIoola, skir- mishing with some horse that followed, and imder the fire of Gokla's battalion from the o])j)osite side of the river. At the bridge they crossed and joined the brigade, which had previously I I 2 944 POONA. 181 rr turned out and advanced from Kirkee at Mr. Elphinstone's requisition, as soon as the hostile approach of the enemy had been observed. The position at Kirkee was admirably adapted to purposes of defence ; but it had been concerted between the Resident and Colonel Burr, that the brigade shoidd advance and fight its battle in the plain between Kirkee and the city. The plan was highly judicious ; for it was uncertain how far the fidelity of the sepoys had been proof against the late attempts to seduce them, and it Avas desirable, therefore, to risk something for the sake of inspiring them with additional confidence in themselves and their cause ; whereas, to coop them up in a defensive position, exposed to the taunts and insults of the Mahratta cavahy, would have had a most disheartening effect, and must have operated to increase the number of desertions, by giving to the enemy the advantage of the show of superiority. As it was, 70 men went over from Major Ford's battahon, and were followed after the action by 150 from the irregular horse, not- withstanding the success of the day. Besides the above reason, the enemy were Avell provided with artillery, which would have enabled them to give great annoyance to the position, and to wear out the spirits of the men by a succession of casualties, and the fatigue of continual alerts from day to day, before General Smith should arrive, which at the shortest could not be in less time than a week. IMoreover, although the IMahrattas were at present in the confidence of a great numerical superiority, an advance to the attack, in despite of their numbers, would con- found them by its boldness, and contribute to raise the spirits of our own people. At the same time, if we could obtain but a partial success in the plain, it would completely dishearten the enemy, and prevent his afterwards attempting any thing against the position ; an object, which was well worth some risk on our part. 1817. POONA. 245 AMiercfore, leaving tlic hcacUcparteis at the post of Kirkee, in charge of part of the 2d-()th IJonibay native infantry, Colonel Burr advanced with the remainder of his force, consisting of the Bombay lau-opean regiment, under ^Major A^"ilson, the i2d-lst and Ist-Tth Bombay native infantry. His line was formed mth the Europeans in the centre, the 2d-lst to the right, and the Ist-Tth on the left. ^V detachment of the battalion left in Kirkee, together with the Besident's escort, which had joined along with himself during the advance, w ere held in reserve to keep in check any parties of horse that might get round the flanks of the line. In this order, the brigade marched into action. jNIajor Ford, who, with his two battalionis, occupied a separate cantonment at Dhapoora, a short distance to the west, marched in immediately to take his share in the danger ; but the Vinshore jageerdar had been posted with a large body of horse to intercept him ; so that he was obliged to fight his way to the ground in squares, and did not reach the right of the line till the troops were hotly engaged. The fighting commenced a few minutes after ]Mr. Elphin- stone had joined the brigade by the Kirkee bridge. The enemy showed immense bodies of horse on our front, and opened a heavy cannonade from many guns, but chiefly from a distance. The fire was returned from the four G-pounders of the brigade, two of which were placed on each flank of the Europeans. In the mean time, the jNIahrattas attempted to push bodies of horse round our flanks, in which manoeuvre they partly succeeded. A spirited charge was then made in close column by one of Gokla's battalions, raised and commanded by Major Pinto, a Portuguese. It was du'ected against the left of our line, where the Ist-Tth was posted. The battalion was driven back after a short contest, with the loss of its immediate commander and many men : but the Ist-Tth, in its eagerness to follow up the success, for the purpose of capturing the guns of the repulsed 246 POONA. 1817. battalion, became separated from the general line of the brigade, Gokla, perceiving this, ordered down a body of his best horse to charge it while yet in the confusion of the pursuit. Moro Dik- shut also led a party of horse, under his command, to the charge At the same time. Our battalion was in considerable danger, the horse having got round both its flanks ; but Colonel Burr, hastening to the post with a part of the European regiment, while the two guns on its left were served with great effect, M^as enabled to restore the day, bring back the battalion into line, and afterwards form it en-potence (at right angles with the line), in order to check any further ill consequence from the enemy's out-flanking us. Major Ford had by tliis time brought up his battalions on the right, which, being formed in square, had a similar effect on that flank. In the above charge, Moro Dikshut was killed by a grape- shot from the guns on the left of the Europeans, which struck him after he had led on his party into the space intervening between the lst-7th and the rest of the line. He fell, respected by both parties. He had been stimulated to extraordinary exertion on this day, by an insinuation made in the presence of his prince, apparently with his countenance, that his general op- position to a ruptvire with the Enghsh was the result of personal cowardice. This taunt induced him to sohcit the honour of carrying the Juree Putka, or standard of the iMahratta emjiire, in the fight ; it was under his charge when he fell. Except in the above instance, the ]\Iahrattas never came to close quarters. They continued, however, to fire on our line as it advanced, occasioning some further casualties, but keeping always at a respectful distance. At night-fall, the troops returned to Kirkee, and were not afterwards molested. Our loss in this action was, 18 killed and 57 wounded; amongst the latter was Lieutenant Falconer, of the 2d-lst Bombay native infantry. The enemy left about 500 on the field. The 1817. POOXA. 247 light battalion and irregular horse came in from Seroor ^vithout opposition, on the morning of the following day ; and IJajee Eao, though he cb-ew up his troops in order of battle, refrained from giving us further molestation, but encamped his army on the groiuid of the old cantonment. No sooner was the die cast, than the jNIahrattas ])roceeded to give a ferocious character to their hostility, in order to widen the breach, and prevent any speedy reconciliation. Two oificers, Captain ^'aughan and his brother, who happened to be travel- ling with a small escort, were surrounded at Tulleegam, on the Eombay road ; and, having been induced to surrender by the offer of quarter, were both inhinnanly hanged. The Peshwa afterwards disavowed altogether this act of barbarity ; and it is probable enough that he had no share in the transaction. En- sign Ennis of the ]ioml)ay engineers, who was taking a survey about 50 miles from Poona, was likewise interce})ted and shot by Bheels. Two other officers, Lieutenants jMorieson and Hunter, of the ^Madras cavalry, w^ere marching towards Poona, from the Nizam's dominions, vitterly unconscious of the rupture, until they came within 520 miles of the city. Gokla then sent out a party of Arabs to bring them in. On the first alarm, they took post in a Choultree, and made a resolute defence with the havildar's party they had for escort; but were at last over- powered, and carried prisoners into Poona. Their lives were spared ; but they Avere sent innncdiately under a guard to the Konkan, and shifted from fort to fort, until re-captured three moiiths afterwards at A\'usota. So close Avas their confinement, tliat the bursting of a shell over their prison gave the first inti- mation of approaching dehverance, while the besiegers were equally in ignorance of their fate. The feeling of exasperation, with which the JMahrattas entered into the war, was yet more strongly evinced by their conduct to the women and dependents of the brigade, whom they found in and about the old canton- 248 POONA. 1817. ment. Most of these were mutilated, and sent into Kirkee in that state ; and many were put to death with studied cruelty. While this was passing at Poona, General Smith, finding the communication intercepted, was already on liis way to the south. On the 8th of November he arrived at Ahrnednugurh, having yet been little harassed on the march. Between this place and Seroor, parties of cavalry kept hovering about him ; but it was not till he had passed the latter place hkewise, that the enemy gave him any serious annoyance. He had no regular cavalry with him, the 2d of the Madras establishment not having yet joined. The only horse with the division were about 500 of the auxiliaries, lately raised under the treaty of Poona, commanded by Captain Spiller. The JNIahrattas appeared in such numbers, as to surround the Brigadier-General on every side ; and, though there was some skirmishing between them and Captain Spiller, in the course of which the latter succeeded in dispersing a much larger body than his own, and was wounded on the occasion, still the enemy found an opiiortunity of breaking in upon the hue of march and carrying off a part of the baggage. On the 13th, the division arrived at Poona ; and the next day Avas fixed for the attack of the Peshwa's camp. It was delayed, however, in consequence of some doubts entertained, respecting the practicability of fording the river at the place in- tended. On the morning of the iGth, Colonel ]Milne, of the King's 65th, Avas sent with a strong brigade to ford the Moota-^Ioola, a little below the old cantonment, in order to occupy a village on the east of the enemy's position, whence an attack was to be made at daybreak next morning, while General Smith advanced against his left. The Peshwa's army turned out to oppoye the passage of the river ; but it was effected in good order, under a heavy cannonade, which was answered from eight guns at- tached to Colonel INIilne's force. Our loss in this affair was about 60 men and an officer. Colonel JNIilne then took up his 1817. POONA. 249 gl'ound for the night on the enemy's right flank. Eefore day- light next morning, the combined attack was commenced as agreed upon ; but tlie camp was found deserted, the enemy having retired quietly in the night, leaving his tents standing. His rear-guard moved off as General Smith approached, and was cannonaded li'om a distance. He carried away all his guns, except one of enormous size, called jMaha-Kalee, which was too unwieldy for speedy transport, though mounted on a carriage that made it serviceable in the previous cannonade. Tlie city surrendered in the coui'se of the day, and was occupied by our troops, who were with difficulty prevented by General Smith's exertions from committing excesses, in revenge for what their families had suffered from the hands of the jNIahrattas. On the 19th, General Smith prepared for the pursuit of Bajee Rao, having been joined on the preceding day by the 2d jNIadras cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Colebrooke. On the same day, a detachment was sent out to capture the enemy's artillery, which was ascertained to have been left with a considerable part of his baggage in a position under cover of the fort of Singurh. The enterprise was conducted by Captain Turner of the light battalion, and was completely successful: eighteen guns, with all their tumbrils and ammunition, and a large quantity of baggage, fell into our hands on this occasion. The flight of the Peshwa and General Smith's unremitting pursuit were productive of nothing of importance during the remainder of the month of November, nor indeed imtil the commencement of the new year. Wherefore, instead of pro- ceeding with the narrative of operations in this quarter, it %vill be more perspicuous to relate here the occurrences at NAgpoor and in Hindoostan, during the two last months of 1817. Pending the discussions with I3ajee Pao, which ended in the treaty of Poona concluded in June, Appa Saheb lent himself openly to the intrigues and counsels of those, who wished him K K 250 NAGPOOR. 1817. to make common cause with the Peshwa. On hearing of his submission, the Nagpoor Raja began to have some personal apprehension of the consequences of the display of such a bias, and accordingly thought it necessary to put on the appearance of a line of conduct directly the reverse. Nerayun Eao was ostensibly reinstated in favour, and occasionally employed- in communications with the British Resident. In the course of .July, the discussions respecting the reform of the contingent were hkewise brought to a settlement ; the Bhoosla agreeing to a proposition, that certain of his jageerdars should furnish a definite number of their best horse, none to be paid at a lower rate than 20 rupees, and the whole to be under one well-paid commandant, with two British officers to be attached to the contingent, empowered to inspect and to exercise a general superintendance. In this favourable disposition the Raja continued tiU the end of October ; indeed, on the 21st of that month, Mr. Jenkins wrote, that although his Kighness Avas still in active communi- cation with Poona, he, the Resident, did not anticipate a change of conduct for the worse. But no sooner were the hostde designs of Bajee Rao towards the English made known un- equivocally at Nagpoor, than he came at once to the resolution of making common cause with the head of the I\Iahratta nation. Towards the middle of November this change became manifest, and, in consequence, the Resident requested, that a brigade of Colonel Adams's division might be halted to the south of the Nerbudda, and hold itself in readiness to detach a battalion with three troops of cavalry to reinforce the brigade at Nagpoor, which had suffered much from sickness. Things remained in this posture for some time, Appa Saheb continuing his military preparations. The news of the result of the action at Poona on the 5th of November occasioned no remission of these hostile demonstrations ; nor was any stronger effect produced by the 1817. NAGPOOR. 251 subscHjuent intelligence of General Smith's arrival at that city, with the main body of the subsidiary force. Appa Saheb, however, long hesitated as to the course he should pursue ; giving ear alternately to the counsels of those who urged liis adherence to the British alliance, and of those who stimulated him to the opposite line of pohcy, and represented it as an act of imperative duty to aid in the restoration of the jNfahratta empire to its pristine splendor and power. His inclination shifted from one side to the other, according to the prevalence of sober judgment and the cooler calculations of prudence and experience, or of the delusion of his imagination by the phantom of ideal greatness, presented to his mind as the sure result of daring enterprise, by the young and thoughtless among his courtiers, at moments M'hen his brain was already intoxicated with the deleteriovis fumes of the hooka. In the public communications between the Raja and the Resident, there was never a word that betrayed any inimical feeling ; on the contrary, the jVIahratta Moonshee attached to the Residency was sent for on the first arrival of intelligence of the Peshwa's defection, and, in his presence, Appa Saheb inveighed in the strongest terms against the treachery and want of faith evinced by Bajee Rao, in his conduct towards the English at Poona. On the night of the 24th of November, Mr. Jenkins received a note from Ramchundur Wagh, informing him that a Khildt, (dress of honour), had arrived for the Raja from Poona, and that his Highness intended next day to go in state to his camp, in order to be formally invested with it, and to assume the Juree Putka or golden streamer, the emblem of high command in the Mahratta armies, which, with the title of Senapnttee, general, had been conferred on him by the P6shwa. j\Ir. Jenkins was invited to assist at the ceremony ; but he remonstrated against the acceptance of the Khildt or of any titles from a power now at open war with the British, and refused to give the sanction K K 2 252 NAGPOOR. 1817. of his presence to such an act. Remonstrance was however of no avail : Appa Saheb went in state to his army on the 25th, and was formally invested with the Khildt and other insignia. His troops immediately took up positions very threatening to the safety of the Residency ; and the indications of approaching hostility were so strong, as to induce Mr. Jenkins to call in the brigade from its cantonment about three miles westward of the city, and to post it in the best attitude for defence of the Residency against any sudden attack. This was done on the evening of the 25th of November. Throughout the 26th, the symptoms of an intended attack grew stronger every hour. The Raja's infantry and large masses of cavaby, in bodies called goles, of various strength and number, began to show themselves on aU sides ; and every gun that could be got ready was wheeled out of the arsenal and brought to bear directly upon some part of our position. But there was yet no official message or com- munication from the Raja, The best defensive dispositions were made, that the nature of the ground and the limited time would allow. The force at XAgpoor consisted of two Madras battaUons of native infantry, the lst-20th and lst-24th, both reduced considerably by sickness. There were also two com- panies forming the Resident's escort, three troops of the 6th Rengal cavalry, and a detachment of the Madras artillery with four six-pounders. Lieutenant-Colonel Scott of the 1st- 24th commanded the whole ; and the following was his plan of defence*. The Residency Mes to the west of the city of Nagpoor, and is separated from it by a small ridge running north and south, having two hills at its extremities, called the Seetabuldee hiUs, about 330 yards ajiart. That to the north was the liigher, * Vide Plate fronting the title of Chapter VII. and plan at the head of this chapter. 1817. NAGPOOR. 259 though much the smaller of the two ; upon it were posted 300 men of the 24th native infantry, with one of the six-pounders, under the command of Captain vSadler, The 20th and the escort were stationed on the larger hill with the rest of the 24th and of the artillery ; and the three troops of cavahy in the grounds of the Residency, together with some hght infantry to keep off the hovering parties of the enemy's horse, but under orders not to advance into the plain against them. The women and valuables were lodged at the Residency. At sunset of the 26th of November, as our picquets were placing, they were fired upon by the Raja's Ai'ab infantry. Immediately afterwards, his artillery opened on the position, and was answered by ours from the liills. Our men were much exposed, pai-ticularly those on the smaller liill, the summit of which was not broad enough for the brow to afford any pror" tection. There was also a.bazar to the north-east of tliis liill^ that approached close to its foot ; here the Raja's Arab infantiy were posted, and kept up a very gaUing fire from under cover, of the huts and houses, which cut up our people most severely. The firing did not cease with the dayhght, but continued with. little intermission till about two o'clock of the morning, by, which time we had sustained a heavy loss, particularly on the smaller hill, where some assaults had been attempted that were repulsed with great difficulty. Captain Sadler, the officer in command there, was kiUed ; and Captain Charlesworth hke\\ise, the next in command, was wounded in the defence of this im- portant point. After two o'clock there was an intermission of the enemy's fire for some hours, with only now and then an occasional shot. Our troops availed themselves of the opportunity to strengthen their position and make up fresh cartridges. This was an awful moment for those, who were at leisure to calcidate uj)oit 254 NAGPOOR. 1817. the prospects of the morrow. It was evident, that what had passed was only the prelude of a more serious contest, when day should reappear. We had already suffered much ; and if the attack were renewed with tolerable perseverance by a con- stant succession of troops, it was quite manifest that our bat- taUons, however well they might behave, must in the end be overpow ered. The numbers of the assailants would allow, and, indeed, suggest this mode of acting ; and this seemed to be their design, as far as could be judged from their previous conduct. From the unavoidable haste with which the position on the Seetabiddee hills had been occupied, as well as the want of en- trenching tools in sufficient abundance, no artificial defences had been added to the natural strength of the ground. This omission was now remedied in the best manner the time would allow, by placing along the exposed brow of the hills, especially of the smaller one, sacks of flour and wheat, and any thing else capable of affijrding cover to the men. It was also deemed proper to confine the defence of the latter to the summit, many men having been lost from being placed in exposed situations on the declivity. The men of the 24th were also reheved early in the morning by a detachment from the 20th, and by the escort, to whom was entrusted the defence of this important post, the key of the whole position. At daybreak, the fire recommenced with more fury than before, additional guns having been brought to bear during the night. The enemy fought too with increasing confidence, and closed upon us during the forenoon. The Arabs in the Raja's service were particularly conspicuous for their courage and resolution ; and to them the assault of the smaller hill had been allotted. Goles of horse also showed themselves to the west and north, as well as to the south of the residency grounds, 1817. NAGPOOR. 255 SO as to oblige Captain Fitzgerald, who commanded the cavah-y, to retire further within them, in order to prevent any sudden coup-de-main in that quarter. About ten o'clock in the morning, the accidental explosion of a tumbril on the smaller hill created some confusion, as was natural from the confined space occupied by the detachment, and did so much injury to the screw of its gun, as to render it for some minutes unserviceable. The Arabs saw their oppor- tunity, and rushed forward with loud cries to storm the hill. Our men were disconcerted, and the smallness of the total force having made it impossible to hold a support in readiness for such an extremity, the hill was carried before the gun and the wounded could be brought off: the latter were all put to the sword. The Arabs immediately turned the gun against our post on the larger hill, and with it and two more guns of their OAvn which they brought up, opened a most destructive fire on the whole of our remaining position. The first shot from the captured gun killed two officers. Doctor Neven the surgeon, and Lieutenant Clarke of the 20th ; the second, a round of grape, was fatal to the resident's first assistant, Mr. George Sotheby*, and totally disabled four men besides. The fire * At the moment of receiving the wound, Mr. Sotheby was in the act of ad- dressing the men of the escort, wlio had escaped from the smaller hill, and endea- vouring to rally them and revive their spirits. A pistol he had in his girdle was struck on theliandle by a grape shot, that forced the muzzle into his body, and inflicted a desperate wound, of which he died in the course of a few hours. This gentleman was originally of the Bombay civil service, but had been tempted by early ambition to try his fortune in the college of Bengal, where his successful studies obtained him the highest possible distinction, and secured Inm employment under the Supreme-Government. He thenceforward attached himselt to the political line, and his abilities in this department had already been con- spicuous on many occasions ; nor was there any one of the junior officers of the de- partment, whose reputation stood so deservedly high, or whose services were more justly valued by die Governor-General. He was on the eve of rising to a station that must soon have led to fame and fortune; but after the rugged toils of this ^56 l^AGPOOR. 1817. from the smaller hill was so destructive, as greatly to distress the troops on the larger, which it completely commanded. The Arabs too, flushed with their late success, were seen advancing in great numbers along the ridge, as if with the design of attacking that remaining point : while the attention of our small party was divided between them on one side, and the main body o£ the enemy in the plain to the south, who were also closing fast. The prospect was most discouraging ; and, to add to the dif- ficulty of the crisis, an alarm had spread amongst the followers and famihes of the Sepoys, whose lines were to the west of the smaller hill, now occupied by the Arabs ; and the shrieks of the women and children contributed not a Httle to damp the courage of the native troops. They woiild scarcely have sus- tained a general assault, which the enemy seemed evidently to meditate. Just at this critical moment, the spirits of aU were raised to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, by observing a most successful and unexpected charge of the cavalry upon an immense gofe of the enemy's horse. Captain Fitzgerald had kept himself in reserve within the residency grounds, until the enemy, ac- cmnidating on all sides, and closing every instant more and laborious career had been surmounted, was unfortunately thus cut off, just on the point of reaching the summit of his hopes and expectations. The loss of a man of merit, from whom the state has received good service, is a subject of public regret at all times; but the interest felt is enhanced in a tenfold degree, when the in- dividual is yet the object of public hope, and is suddenly snatched away, ere it has been fully realised. Independently of any private sympathy for the deceased,, the death of one so generally known and esteemed as George Sotheby, considering the circumstances under which it occurred, could not have been passed over with the bare mention of his name among the list of the slain. The compiler of this nar- rative is, however, proud to acknowledge, that this notice is equally a tribute paid to private friendship ; for he long enjoyed the intimacy of the deceased, and had per- sonal experience of his worth. He was in his thirtieth year when his death occurred in the manner related. 1817. NAGPOOR. 257 more, brouo-ht at last a couple of light guns to bear upon him, the fire of which occasioned several casualties in his line. Seeing now that the case was one of absolute I'xtrcniity, he resolved to charge the gole that most immediately threatened him, in order if possible to capture these giuis. The residency grounds were boiuided on that side by a dry nulla, which the charge had to cross. Captain Fitzgerald himself led the column ; and as soon as thirty or forty men had got over, advanced at once upon the enemy. They retired before him as he pushed forwards, until, having passed to some distance beyond the guns, and seeing that the Mahrattas were making a demonstration of surroimd- ing his small party, he commanded a halt. In the mean time, the rest of the cavalry had also crossed the nulla, and followed the advance, but had very judiciously stopped short on reaching tlie abandoned guns. These were immediately turned upon the enemy by the men of the regiment, all of whom had been trained to the use of artillery, as a part of their ordinary discipline. Their well-directed fire kept the ]\Iahrattas at a distance, while two other guns that had also been brought in advance were similarly captured. The latter were instantly spiked ; but the cavalry retired with the former, dragging them back into the residency grounds, and firing as they retreated. The sight of what was passing on the plain below damped the courage of the assailants, in proportion as it elevated the spirits of our men. The firing was now recommenced from the larger hill with loud huzzas, and every one was watching the opportunity to recover the smaller one from the Arabs. An opportunity was very soon offered by the explosion of a second tumbril on the spot, which created a similar confusion Co that which the enemy had lately taken advantage of. The confined space on the hill increased the liability to such accidents. The circumstance was no sooner observed, than a ])arty from the larger hill, headed l)y several officers, who darted forwards 1. L 258 NAGPOOR. 1817. without any particular orders, rushed to the attack, and drove the Arabs from the post at the point of the bayonet, recovering our own gun as well as capturing the two others brought vip by the enemy. Amongst the rest. Captain Lloyd of the resident's escort distinguished himself on this occasion, as did Lieutenant Grant, the adjutant of the twenty-fourth, who, though twice wounded, was amongst the foremost of the party, and received a third and mortal wound in the assault. The tide of success had now turned, and Appa Saheb's troops gave way on every side. The Arabs, however, still remained in force about their bazar to the north-east of our position, until a briUiant charge was made upon them by Cornet Smith with a troop of the cavah-y, which succeeded in dispersing them, and in capturing two more guns. Our troops now moved down from the hills, and drove the enemy from all the surrounding houses and villages, securing all the guns not previously carried off. Thus, about noon of the 27th, terminated the most trying contest that our native army had ever been engaged in. Its fatigues and anxieties continvied without intermission for eighteen hours. Under Providence, the success of this action must be chiefly attributed to the bottom of the troops, and to the cool decision in the hour of danger which particularly marked the conduct of the officers engaged. The former quality is entirely distinct from any strength of Hmb or of muscular power requisite to the long endurance of fatigue. It is purely a virtue of the mind, and consists in a buoyant disposition, that never will abandon itself to despair. The natives of India are of themselves rather prone to throw up the game as lost upon the slightest reverse ; and the history of its wars, particularly that of the battles of Aurung-Zeeb, affords abundant instances of the ruin of a good cause, by yielding to this habitual despondency. If the character of the native sepoy is so different in our service, it is because he acts rather upon his officer's judgment than his 1817. NAGPOOR. 259 own ; and so long as he observes him coolly giving his orders, sees hope in implicit obedience, and never will desj)air while this ground of confidence remains. The conduct of the Jh'itish officers engaged at Nagpoor afforded a triuni[)hant dis})lay of that collected judgment under extreme ])eril, which, to the glory of the nation, is its peculiar characteristic. The well-timed charge of Captain Fitzgerald stands conspicuous amongst the many brilliant exploits achieved in the campaign. It was generally allowed to have given the turn to the tide of success on this day ; and, consequently, to have mainly contri- buted to the salvation of our interests within the Nagpoor dominions : to say nothing of the effect on public opinion, that would have been felt throughout India, even to Nip^l, had Appa Saheb succeeded in cutting off this brigade. The number of the combatants on either side was immensely disproportionate. Altogether, on ovu- side, there were not more than from tliirteen to fourteen hundred fighting men, including the cavalry and artillery : whereas the Bhoosla Raja had up- wards of 10,000 infantry on the field, and at least an equal number of horse. His chief reUance, however, was placed in a body of between 3 and 4000 Arabs, who behaved with great bravery on this, and, indeed, on all subsequent occasions. Our loss in killed and wounded amounted by the retiuns to 333, being about one-fourth of those engaged, a most unusual pro- portion for the victorious party. Amongst these were four officers * killed and seven severely wounded, besides Mr. Sotheby above mentioned. The loss on the liaja's side was never pre- cisely ascertained; but it must have been very severe. His * Captain Sadler and Lieutenant Grant of the 24'th Madras native infantrj-, Lieutenant Clarke of the 20tli, and Doctor Ncven, assistant surgeon, killed. Captains Charlesworth, Lloyd, and Pew, wounded severely ; also Lieutenants Thullier and Bayley, with Cornets Smith and Heansay of the cavalry, and several others slightly. 260 NAGPOOR. 1817. army was so disheartened after the action, that it could not he persuaded to renew the attack, notwithstanding that a Sepoy of the escort, who deserted immediately after, represented in strong colours the exhausted condition of our troops, and their want of ammunition for many more rounds, in order to excite them to a second trial. The result of this action proved the wisdom of the reso- lution of the commanding officer at Poona to advance and meet the enemy, in preference to abiding his attack. At Nagpoor, indeed, there was no choice ; but the much greater hazard of the contest there proves the superior advantage of numbers when acting on the offensive, with the same odds of skill and disciphne. It has been thought necessary to be thus particular in the account of these two affairs, because they formed two of the most glorious triumphs of the war, and because the effect, pro- duced by their issue, gave the Mahrattas a distrust of them- selves, highly favourable to the early accomplishment of Lord Hastings's views. Both the Peshwa and the Ehoosla evidently reckoned with certainty on their abihty to overwhelm the small force stationed at their respective capitals, and were astonished to find their utmost means baffted by mere detachments. In proportion as their estimate of their own strength had before been sanguine, they now gave way to despondency ; and though Bajee Rao was sensible, that he had too long practised the arts of duplicity, to be admitted to a reconciliation on any terms, that would leave him in the exercise of dominion, he never afterwards attempted any enterprise that showed the smallest confidence in his means, nor ever rose above the character of a heartless and desperate fugitive. Appa Saheb had yet something to hope from the known clemency and moderation of the English. As soon, therefore, as he despaired of the cause he had espoused, he resolved to establish a claim to forgiveness by the prompti- 1817. NAGPOOR. 261 tiulc of his submission. Immediately after the action of tlie 26'th and 27th, he sent vakeels to express his sorrow, and to dis- avow having himself authorised the attack. The JJaees, or women of the Kaja's family, also interceded for him ; but j\Ir. Jenkins refused to treat at all, while his army continued in force. Bajee Kao and ^V})])a Saheb have been accused of treachery, as well as of a breach of hospitality and of the laws of nations, in thus attacking the residents, who, in their capacity of ambassadors? might be deemed entitled to a sacred inviolability. There is, ho\vever, this palliative to be found for their conduct ; that the residents had each of them an army under his direction, ex- pressly designed for his support against the intrigues or violence of the coiut at which he resided. Thus armed, they of com-se lost much of the sacred character of heralds. If justice retpiired, as doubtless it did, that they shovdd at least have had the option of retiring unmolested, this option, or something equivalent to it, was afforded to IVIr. Elphinstone ; and if it was not tendered to Mr. Jenkins, it was merely because, when the matter was dis- cussed in the Kaja's council, it was decided to be useless to make an offer, which the attitude he had already assumed sho\\ed that the resident had no thought of accepting. AVith respect to the treachery of secret previovis preparation, if we allow to a native power the abstract right of shaking off our alliance under any circumstances, we must concede to him this further step, as inchspensable to its exercise. For, as it is an article of all our subsidiary alliances, that a military force shall be stationed at the capital, it is to be presumed, that open preparations for war would always be anticipated, and the design frustrated by the immediate employment of the force against the j^erson of the prince. ^Vherefore, if there ^\ as any treachery in the conduct' of these Mahratta cliiefs, it was not so much in the manner, as in the act itself of their defection ; for it is in the essence of our 262 NAGPOOR. 1817. contracts of alliance, that, although accepted by the native power for the sake probably of some present advantage, or to get rid of some temporary evil of yet harder endurance, the benefit on our side is intended to be permanent ; for which purpose, we stipulate for the perpetual continuance of the en- gagement, and the native power binds itself to tliis stipulation. Thus, it is as mvich an act of treachery in our ally to attempt to balk us of our advantage, by shaking us oiF after having got for himself the benefit stipulated for and contemplated, as it would be on our part to leave him to be in the first instance over- whelmed, after having engaged to assist him out of his dif- ficulties. In tliis view, the defection of both these princes was decidedly treacherous, inasmuch as both, with a full knowledge of the terms on which alone our aid would be granted, bound themselves personally and voluntarily to adhere to them in per- petuity, and neither had any plea whatever of any default in executing the stipidations on our part, to urge in justification of his breach in the performance of his own part of the engagement. 9l. /.a ■ oj 'Ike 'A iTTLE\ . I T JUBBII.I'OOR. aa I'.nmiys fOsUion in rivtit of Juhbidpoor , nqfit on sirm- hacflit , lal on Tank I!* 0\ Uardytnaiu disposiaoii for iithn:k.-( (iiuis in cctWv, 3 fovipiuues of the 17^ on eucJi suU tti'o -D9 ui reserve uiiJi 1 Sq? to coier hfit Flank luuia' t^ Tope . and (h\tilrv of aJvauce n-ah the 3.'M. (iitalrf- cotavu/ rufJit. / / A*i > * * * Tiifiuitrv ituitotimatt Occufiiai iy Maior Ku-luwd i'ulUih ■"H .Jl. if ^T'U -<4e4&^f't P3i^ o .*** ad hh t 1 Z^ Popes Sif" paJsuuf. and diar^iy titc Ouns m FUaik 2 Sif"' under Mofor OBnm nwvuig on tlu Enemy's flunk m rear of tiic Town foruft Kenedv cultutq off rctrmi of F.imnvs Innmtry Left wimj of tiu 11'!^ Stortnuu] tiie haah liiifht wmq of The n.cmeroiq captured Ctuis Kneniys broken OituJn- Jioqqaijc , tuid nw Guard Tope Kan nail. Fneniys I'ork finhsh foinp ^ '3reUaree~ Scale of a Mle JJ^S Sritish Cavalry -^W -J)". Bi^mtry I .. I £nemvs Caraitv -»^„^ SnwUTomh Two 6 F'^^ under L^ Kemps piavtng * ,fi on thr Enemy's tamp to drmv away du fire of the (funs dnruiq die charge 1 Fnains huimtiT famp of 2 Bad'" u'dh •/ {^uns 2 iiriiciyay attacked 3 Onqmal position of 'J 12 1"'^ and 26 f^ playmq on fiiemy's Camp at J'*' / 4- JusHimt Jinos Jfouse 5 Catnt'ay hy tvludi die Rao escaped to die Fort of Kimmmrmeer. 234ie7O3j0n ft I I I I i~r I I I T~r Scale of Tiu-ds jwir^ CHAPTER XII. NAGPOOIl— HINDOOSTAN. 1817, nECEMBEll. Reinforcements to Nagpoor— Colonel Gahan — Major Pitman— Brigadier-General Doveton — Brigadier-General Hardyman — Terms proposed to the Raja — He temporizes — and surrenders — His camp attacked— and carried — Fort of Nag- poor occupied by Arabs — besieged and assaulted without success — Arabs capitulate — Reasons for the Raja's reinstation — terms — dissent of Governor- General — retracted — British acquisitions— Reflections— Hindoostan — Pinda- rees — Suspicious conduct of regular powers— effect on Lord Hastings' plans — Cholera morbus — its virulence— and symptoms — Centre division arrives at Erich moves back to the Sindh— movements in pursuit of Pindarees— affair at Bicheetal — wife of Kureem captured — Escape through Huraotee — distress — Exploit of a Havildar — Consequent military dispositions. The Bhoosla Raja's defection and attack on the British Residency did not remain long unpunished. Troops poured into Nagpoor from every quarter : some in consccjuence of the provisional requisition of the Resident, others under orders from Sir Thomas Hislop or the JNIarquess of Plastings himseh". The first reinforcement that arrived was that under Lieutenant- Colonel Gahan, which had on the first alarm been ordered down from the valley of the Nerbudda. It consisted of a strong battalion of Bengal inlimtry, lst-22d, the remaining three troops of the 6th Bengal cavalry and two gallopers. This detachment arrived on the 29th, and gave entire confidence to the troops in position on the Seetabuldee hills, which till then had been under very considerable apprehension of a second attack, and ^64 NAGPOOR. 1817- of the ultimate failure of their stores and ammunition. Mr. .Jenkins had on the preceding day agreed to a suspension of arms, at the Raja's request, in order to allow time for this rein- forcement to join without molestation ; holding out, however, to Appa Saheb, the necessity of disbanding or separating himself from his army, as an indispensable prehminary to a restoration of peace on any terms. Major Pitman, who brought up the second reinforcement, was at Omraotee on the frontier of Berar, when he received a hasty note despatched by Mr. Jenkins on the night of the ,'25th, while the issue of the attack was yet doubtful. He immediately forwarded the note to Erigadier-General Doveton, who was then at Jafeerabad, and set off himself with two battalions and a few of the Xizam's reformed cavalry, hastening his march in the hope of arriving at the scene of danger in time to afford relief He reached Nagjioor on the 5th of December. Erigadier-General Doveton followed with the whole second di\dsion of the army of the Dukhun, and entered that city with the light troops in advance on the 12th of December. The rest of the division came up two days afterwards. On his arrival, he rightly judged the re-establishment of affairs at Nagpoor to be an object of paramount importance, in comparison ^vith the occupation or probably the reduction of Aseergurh, which was one of the duties originally assigned to him in the general plan of operations. Indeed, it was of the utmost con- sequence, that the Bhoosla should be crushed as early as possible, in order that other potentates might be deterred by the rapid and exemplary punishment of his defection, from following in the same career. In addition to the formidable force thus collected at Nagpoor, the Marquess of Hastings, immediately on hearing of the attack made upon the brigade there stationed, ordered down Brigadier- General Hardyman with the corps of observation under his 1817. NAGPOOR. 2G5 command, in RcAva. This officer, not receiving the order until the 6th of December, did not reach the neighbourliood until every thing had been already adjusted by General I)()\cton. His force was, however, of use in reducing Jubulpoor, where it gallantly routed a considerable body of troops opposed to it in the field, and in occupying the IJhoosla territory to the north and in the valley of the Nerbudda ; and its further advance was countermanded, to allow of its being so employed. In the mean time, Brigadier-General Doveton, having allowed his troops a day to recover from the fatigue of their long and liarassing marches, had proceeded to enforce upon Appa Saheb the accept- ance of such terms, as should break his military power, and reduce him for the future to a state of entire dependence on the British Government. On the morning of the 15th of December, Mr. Jenkins offered to the Raja the following terms of submission, as the only means of saving his army from attack, and himself from absolute ruin. The Eaja to acknowledge, that by his defection he had placed his territories at the mercy of the British Government, which was consequently absolved from all ties towards himself, and free to dispose of them at pleasure ; to give up all his artillery, leaving it to the discretion of the British authorities to restore such as they might think proper ; to disband the Arabs and other mercenary troops, who were to march off in the directions assigned, leaving the city and fort of Xagjwor to our occupation. Appa Saheb himself was required to come in and reside at the British Residency, as a hostage for the per- formance of these conditions, and four o'clock of the next morning was fixed as the limit of time for his acceptance of the conditions ; by which hour if he did not submit, it was declared, that he would be attacked without fui'ther ceremony. He was however given to understand, that, upon accepting the above terms, the former relations would be restored, and no greater sacrifice M M ^66 NAGPOOR. 1817 required, than a territorial cession sufficient to meet the charges of the subsidiary force, and due provision for our future exercise of so much internal control, as might be necessary to secure us against a repetition of similar conduct on the part of the Raja. Nerayun Pundit, who, since the breaking out of hostilities* had been the constant mediator between Appa Saheb and the British Eepresentative, came several times in the course of the 16th to temporize, and to solicit a longer respite. But Mr. Jenkins insisted on the acceptance of the terms by the next morning at the latest, though he extended the period to seven o'clock. In the evening of the 15th, General Doveton beat t» arms and approached the Seetabuldee position, where he bivouacked for the night. At six o'clock in the morning, Nerayun came again to say, that the Arabs and other troops would not allow his master to come in, and that a longer time would be indispensable to settle with them, and to withdraw them from the artillery which was demanded to be given up. The acceptance of the conditions was promised, but a respite of two or three days was sohcited. The period allowed for Appa Saheb to come in was now extended tiU nine A. M. ; with the understanding, that, by submission in tliis particular, he might obtain a farther extension for the execution of the other terms prescribed. When the time expired, nothing had been done. Brigadier-General Doveton accordingly advanced his army in ojder of battle*, to a position close iipon the Raja's camp on the south of the city, from which he had previously determined to make the attack, Appa Saheb now gave way entirely to his personal fears, and, mounting liis horse, rode off with his ministers, Nagoopunt and Ramchundur Wagh, and a few other attendants, straight to the Residency, where he deUvered liimself up to Mr. Jenkins. Notice was immediately sent to Brigadier-General * Vide Plan at the head of the preceding chapter. 1817. NAGPOOR. 26t Doveton, who halted upon receiving the information. The time for the surrender of the artillery and disbanding the army was then brought into discussion ; the Resident insisting on the instant execution of the former point, in order to prevent any clandestine removal of the guns, while the Kaja ])rossed for a fxu-ther delay. It was arranged, that the artillery should be abandoned and the troops withdrawn to a distance by twelve o'clock of the same day ; and Eamchundur ^Vagh was sent to ex- pedite the requisite arrangements for the purpose. He returned a little before twelve, reporting every thing to be in readiness ; whereupon a couple of Imrkaras were sent to the Brigadier- General, in order that he might detach a party to take possession of the guns said to be so abandoned. On questioning them more closely. General Doveton suspected that some deception was intended : and accordingly, instead of sending a party, he resolved to advance his whole hne. He tUd so by open column of companies from the right of battalions. The guides led him to the arsenal south of the city, where thirty-six guns were found and taken possession of without resistance ; a Lascar, however, was on the point of applying the match to one of them, when his arms were seized. The General, leaving Colonel Scott with a brigade from his left in possession of these guns, continued his advance towards the Sukur-Duree gardens, where he knew there were other batteries. The moment that the troops debouched from behind some trees separating the Sukur-Duree frdm Nagpoor, a heavy fire was opened upon their front and right flank : no time was therefore lost in forming them into line for the attack. The cavalry and horse artillery on the extreme right, under Colonel Gahan, made a detour round the Sukur-Duree garden, and, after carrying a battery that opposed them in that (juarter, came in flank of the main position of the enemy ; while Colonel M'Leod's division advanced to the attack in front under a heavy cannonade. The enemy was formed M M 2 268 NAGPOOR. 1817. in a retiring angle ; and after Colonel M'Leod had carried the right of his position, where his strength of infantry was the greatest, the guns on his left still kept playing on our reserve, under cover chiefly of his cavalry. Colonel Gahan charged and drove them off, continviing the pursuit to some distance ; but the guns were not silenced, until stormed shortly afterwards by a party from the reserve. By half-past one, seventy-five guns, mortars, and howitzers of different cahbre and descriptions were in our hands. The enemy's camp was also taken, with forty elephants, belonging for the most part to the Raja, and all his camp equipage. The troops had on this occasion to advance upwards of 1000 yards in face of a powerful artillery ; con- sequently the acquisition was not made without loss. Of the Europeans 39, and of the natives 102 were killed or wounded ; but fortunately no officer was amongst the number. Mun-Bhut and Gunput Rao were the Sirdars who instigated this resistance. Treachery on the part of the Raja was not suspected ; though it is not improbable that Ramchundur ^Vagh may have connived at the subtraction of many of the guns, under the notion, that Brigadier-General Doveton wotild have been satisfied with the capture of those left at the arsenal. Such a trick is so perfectly consistent with the half-measure policy pursued throughovit by Appa Saheb, as to leave it by no means clear, that he did not participate in the guilt of the blood unnecessarily shed on this occasion. But the point was never made the subject of a special investigation. Mun-Bhut Rao, wdth the Arab infantry, fled into the city, and occupied the fort, a place of considerable strength, within which were the Raja's palaces and other strong buildings. Two days were spent in endeavouring to persuade them to evacuate it and retire, on which terms they were promised a safe conduct to the NAgpoor frontier. Their arrears were also paid up in the course of this negotiation ; yet in the end they refused to 1817. NAGPOOR. 269 evacuate. The siege of the fort was accordingly commenced. By the 20th, a howitzer battery was erected at the foot of the larger of the Seetabuldee hills, and, on the 21st, the mound of a tank that lay between it and the fort, not 250 yards from the western (Jooma) gate, was seized, for the purpose of being con- verted into a breaching battery. ^Vll the captured guns that were thought to be of sufficient calibre were brought into this position ; and though it was soon found, that their fire had little effect in comparison with our own eighteen-pounders, yet on the 23d of December, the gate was considered to be sufficiently injured, to make an assault practicable. Accordingly, a storm was attempted on the morning of the 24th ; and four companies of the Bengal battalion, lst-22d, headed by a company of the Koyal Scots, and accompanied by the sappers and miners, ad- vanced to the Jooma gate, in the hope of estabhshing them- selves there, if not of carrying the place. At the same time, Colonel Scott led an attack on the Toolsee-bagh, a garden on the south of the city, and between it and the river Xag, while Major Pitman advanced to co-operate with a detachment of the Nizam's infantry. The breached gate was fovuid to be so com- manded from inner walls, as to have all the effect of a- second intrenchment ; and the storming party, after losing many men in attempting to penetrate or establish themselves, was in the end obhged to retire. On this failure, Colonel Scott and ^Nfajor Pitman were also recalled. Our loss was 90 killed, and 179 wounded. Lieutenant Bell, of the Royal Scots, was amongst the former, and Lieutenants Cameron and Cowell in the number of the latter. l^rigadier-General Doveton now saw, that the place could not be taken without a more sufficient battering train. He thei*e- fore resolved to wait the arrival of that attached to his own force from Akola, before he ventured to renew his operations. The Arabs, however, feeling that they had already done enough 270 NAGPOOR. 1817. for their honour, and that, being entirely without hope of sup- port, their ultimate reduction was almost inevitable, resolved to make the best advantage of their successful resistance, by offering to evacuate on terms. They accordingly proposed to march out with their famiUes, baggage, private property, and arms. The proposition was immediately accepted, as time was a principal consideration with us : and the garrison evacuated the fort on the 30 th of December, and was escorted beyond the Nagpoor frontier by a detachment formed for the purpose. Mun-Bhut surrendered himself to the Resident on the same day. The mihtary operations against the Bhoosla state were thus happily brought to a final conclusion, within little more than a month from the commencement of hostilities by the Raja. No- tliing now remained, but to make such a settlement of the Nag- poor Government, and of the relations of the state with the Bri- tish, as should give us complete security for the future, and some indemnification also for the past. There were many important considerations involved in the choice of the course to be now adopted, which rendered it desirable that the views of the Go- vernor-General should first be ascertained. But the communica- tion had liitherto been so completely cut off, that no instruction as to the treatment of Appa Saheb, in the event of his svibmission, had yet been receivecL The Raja stiU continued at the Re^ sidency ; and, as he was impatient to return to the palace, upon which the British flag was now flying, there seemed to be no ground for his further detention. The case, therefore, appeared to require the Resident to act upon his own responsibility, and come to some agreement, or at least lay the foundation for a final settlement without further delay. Mr. Jenkins had seen no cause to be dissatisfied with the conduct of the Raja since he had voluntarily surrendered liimself; on the contrary, he re- garded the circumstance of the abandonment of so many guns at the arsenal, as well as the subsequent payment of the arrears due 1817- NAGPOOR. 271 to the Arabs as soon as demanded, as clear proofs that he had ex- erted himself both sincerely and sedulously to execute the con- ditions demanded of him ; so that, although he had not come in within the prescribed time in the first instance, nor surrendered the whole of the guns, nor quietly disbanded the troops, nor given up the city and fort, agreeably to the letter of the stipu- lations, still, as his personal surrender had been received when he did come in, and as the failure of perfonnance in other respects axose from causes apparently beyond his control, the Resident did not consider his claim to be reinstated, with the hmitations and sacrifices he had been led to expect on his submission, to be at all weakened by subsequent events. Yet, while he felt the necessity of permitting the fallen prince to resume his station, he was no less sensible of the impossibihty of placing further confidence in one, who had proved himself to be so inveterately addicted to intrigue, and so complete a Mahratta at heart. His mihtary power had fortunately been annihilated; but the resources of the Nagpoor territory, if left to Appa Saheb's uncontrolled disposal, presented means of further mischief, which there could be httle doubt he wovild avail himself of, unless checked Anth a strong hand. In preparing the definitive treaty for the Raja's acceptance, jMr. Jenkins, therefore, resolved to assume and act upon the principle, of reducing the head of the Bhoosla state to the condition of a mere pageant, and giving the British Govern- ment a control over every branch of internal, as well as of external administration, to the extent of imposing a ministry of its own selection, though composed of native subjects of the Raja. The forts of the country were, according to this plan, to be open to the discretionary introduction of British garrisons ; and, for securing the svibordination of the capital, the Seetabuldee liills were to be fortified. In fact, we were to have complete military occupation of the whole country ; and, after liis recent expe- rience of the character of the ruling prince, the Resident could 272 NAGPOOR. 1817. not consider any less security as either solid or permanent. In addition to the powers of general control, territory equal to the full cliarge of the subsidiary force (about 24 lack rupees) was to be ceded in jDcrpetuity, in heu of the present annual payment of 7i lack, which only provided for the extraordinary field charges of the troops. The districts proposed to be demanded were, those held by the Kaja, north of the Nerbudda, including Sir- Gooja, Jushpoor, Sohagpoor, and Sumbhulpoor to the east ; aU the valley to the south of the river, and as far as Chupara, between Jubulpoor and Nagpoor ; together with Mooltaya, Bytool, Gawilgurh, and all the Raja's remaining possessions in Berar. Mr. Jenkins had drawn up a treaty on the above basis, and was on the point of submitting it to the Raja's acceptance, pre- paratory to his reinstallation ; when, on the 2d of January, he received the instructions issued by the Marquess of Hastings, on first hearing of the defection of the Bhoosla prince. These instructions peremptorily forbad any personal reconciliation whatever, directing the young grandson of Ragoojee, by the daughter married to Gooja Appa, to be placed on the Guddee, and affairs to be confided to the conduct of a regency of our own selection. The deposition of Appa Saheb was considered to be indispensable, both as a punishment for his defection at so critical a period, and from a conviction, that he could no longer be trusted even with the semblance of avithority. The powerfid motives, that had swayed the mind of Mr. Jenkins, were wholly unknown to his Lordship at this time : conse- quently, when indistinct accounts of the recent occurrences at Niigpoor, subsequent to the arrival of General Doveton at that city, were received by his Lordship from different quarters, before the official reports of the negotiations came to hand, the veto against the reinstallation of Appa Saheb was twice repeated, under the supposition of his reiterated default in the perform- 1817. NAGPOOR. 273 ance of his engagements ; unless the British Government should have been abeady too far committed to retract with honour. In consequence of the receipt of these instructions, Mr. Jenkins delayed to submit to the Raja his own draft of the definitive treaty, substituting a provisional engagement, which stipulated, that he should retain the gnddee until the pleasure of the Governor-General should be known ; but with a proviso for an eventual settlement on the basis above set forth, in case the JMarquess of Hastings should confirm his restoration. The Eesident confidently expected this confirmation, as soon as all the circvuiistances should have been made known ; and in this he judged rightly. For the Governor-General, on receiving the ample details contained in the official despatches, which, how- ever, were a long time on the road, became sensible of the ne- cessity of replacing Appa Saheb, not so much with a view to the immediate and adA-antageous settlement of affairs in that quarter, as from respect to the moral obhgation to do so, vnider the circumstances of his surrender. As a matter of pohcy, it may be right to mention, that the Baees along with the infant grandson of Ragoojee, who was nine or ten years old, and had ah'cady the title of Bala-Saheb, had, with Gooja Appa his father, been sent off against their will to Chanda, before General Dove- ton's arrival. This could not have been prevented at the time ; neither would it have been possible to have secured the person of the reigning prince, in the event of the most complete success of our arms, after all the reinforcements had come up. To have proclaimed the boy would, therefore, have only had the effect of occasioning his instant death ; after which we should have had a long and harassing war to wage against the actual sovereign, unaided by any party in the state, or any head round which the malcontents might rally. Convinced by the representation of these difficulties. Lord Hastings in the end approved of the propositions submitted by N N 274 NAGPOOR. 1817- Mr. Jenkins, and directed the treaty to be concluded on the basis above described, which was done in the ensuing month of February. However, when the specific cessions demanded came to be discussed, along with the other provisions for the control of the Eaja's internal administration, Appa Saheb pressed, with apparent earnestness, that the whole country should be taken under British rule, with a reservation of one- fourth of the revenues for his personal expenses, under a guarantee that this proportion should not fall short of fifteen lack rupees. For such an income, he offered to forswear his independence and abandon the cares of government altogether^ and to range himself in the same class with the jSTuwabs of the Carnatic and of Bengal. But the offer being saddled with other expensive provisions for creditors and relations of the Raja, and the possession of the country by the British Government being on other grounds not desirable, it was not thought fit to entertain it. By the arrangement actually concluded, we obtained the cession of territory that stood in the Bhoosla accounts as yield- ing a net revenue of 2,247,200 rupees, after deducting aliena- tions and demands of all kinds. The ceded country was fertile, and, with the exception of the jungul tract south of Behar, well watered by the Nerbudda and its tributary streams. Through the exertions of the troops commanded by General Hardyman, who defeated the Sooba of Jubulpoor * in a brilliant affair on the 19th of December, and of the reserve brigade of the sub- sidiary force under Lieutenant-Colonel IM'jMorine, which was equally successful against Sudoo-Baba of Sirinugurh on the 15th of January, the whole had been brought under subjection before the end of the latter month, except the forts of Choura- gurh and Mundela ; and the considerable resources they afforded were made available to the operations of the current season. * Vide plan at the head of this chapter. 1817- NAGPOOR. 275 It is impossible to close the account of this portion of the transactions at NAgpoor, without remarking on the extreme weakness and irresolution betrayed throughout by Appa Saheb. He might perha})S be excused for not concerting the time of liis defection Avith the Peshwa, so that both attacks should have been made the same day ; for the character of ]5ajee Kao warranted the precaution of waiting to see him actually committed, before his ally should stir a step. 13ut, after the resolution to join the confederacy was once formed, and after collecting an overwhelm- ing force, which he assured liimseh" must overpower the brigade at Nagpoor, his long hesitation before the attack was authorised, his disavowal of it after the failure, and his paltry attempt to throw on INIun-Bhut the whole responsibility, in the hope thus to escape himself, were acts of the most decided pusillanimity. He never seems to have known his own mind from first to last, but betrayed the greatest weakness and want of judgment, in so soon abandoning the cause he had espoused, before it was by any means desperate ; and particularly in not renewing the attack after the first repulse, when he knew our troops must be exhausted, instead of remaining idle at Xfigpoor, till the arrival of General Doveton with an overpowering force, without making any effort whatever to obstruct his march, or to cut off either of the detachments which preceded him. He must have felt, and indeed was explicitly told, that he could be admitted to no reconciliation that would leave hira pohtical independence or the reality of power : but sovereignty on any terms, though but a mere shadow, was too dearly prized in possession, to allow him fairly to commit it to the hazardous chance of a protracted struggle for the substance. No country was ever better adapted to desultory warfare than the Bhoosla territory ; the whole is a continued tract of mountains, ravines, and junguls, forming altogether as difficult a theatre of war as any in existence. Sub- sequent experience has proved the facility, ^ith which, had he N N 2 276 PINDAREES. 1817. retired with his army unbroken, he might have prolonged the contest indefinitely, and, by giving occupation to a large pro- portion of our military force, have prevented that concentration of means for the destruction of his confederate, the Pcshwa, which was afterwards so successfully directed to that object. However, there can be no doubt, that both must have fallen in the end ; but a great difference might have been made in the time, the charge, and the trouble, it would have cost us to effect our purpose. It was the peculiar merit of Lord Hastings' plan of operations, to have placed such means at command, as should make the cause of the Mahrattas desperate under any com- bination of circumstances ; and the further we trace the detail of events in their order of occurrence, the more reason shall we find to admire the forecast, which so disposed those means, that not one adverse circumstance or occasion of danger arose, without its remedy and corrective being found ready at hand. This will be particularly observable as we proceed with the narrative of the transactions on the side of Hindoostan, to which quarter it is time again to turn our attention. The march of the three divisions of Malcolm, Adams, and Marshall to Tullain, Bairsea, and Basouda, and the advance of the last named to Seronj, had completely driven the Pindarees out of their haunts in INIalwa by the end of November. As above related, the durras of Kureem and Wasil Mahommed retreated northward by Nya-Seraee on the main road to Gwahor ; while Cheetoo moved off in a westerly direction, as well to avail himself of the support he expected from the army of Holkar, which was already assembled in force, as to fall back on the position of Juswunt Rao Bhao, one of Smdheea's commanders, from whom he had obtained assvirances of protection and of a refuge for his family in the strong fort of * Kumulner. * Vide plate at the head of Chapter XV. 1817. MAIIRATTAS-AMEER KUAN. 277 The disposition of Holkar's military began at this time to assume a decidedly hostile character. The march of the main body of the Pindarees towards Gwahor, and the uniform conduct of Sindheea's captains, as well as the reluctance of the chief himself to execute the conditions of the treaty of concert he had lately signed under compulsion, seemed to indicate a similar bias in that durbar. It was also doubtful, whether Ameer Khan would ratify the engagements of his agent at Dehlee. Connecting all these appearances, therefore, with the open rcsoit of the Peshwa and of the Bhoosla to arms, there was certainly ground to apprehend the worst from the aspect of affairs at the close of the month of November. The Goorkhas of Nipal too were collecting their forces, and known to be in close comnumi- cation with the powers of Hindoostan ; so that the slightest reverse, in the temper of men's minds at the time, would soon have been magnified into a disaster, capable of involving the whole of India in one general combustion. The success at Nag- poor, however, confounded all their calculations, and operated powerfully to destroy the vain illusions of the ill disposed. Ameer Khan ratified the treaty of liis agent on the first receipt of the inteUigence; communicating to Sir David Ochterlony the circumstances of the battle, and using many expressions of wonder and admiration at the conduct of the troops engaged, with whose numbers he was perfectly acquainted. But the spirit which had been excited was not every where so soon allayed ; and in Hindoostan, as well as in the Dukhun, tliere were moments, when the firmness and decision of those entrusted with the chief direction of affairs were distinctly called forth into action. The sudden development of the extent of com- bhiation, which had been organizing against us, might have induced many to contract their views, in proportion to the increasing cloud of difficulties ; but had a contrary effect upon the mind of the Governor-General. To his eye, these crude 278 CHOLERA MORBUS. 1817. attempts to thwart his plans presented but the means of establish- ing the settlement he designed for India upon a broader and more solid foundation : so just and so unbounded was his reliance on the machinery he had prepared for the accomplishment of his purpose. Unlooked for circumstances, however, combined to put his Lordship's fortitude to the test. Having by his advance to the Sindh enforced upon Sindheea the acceptance of the treaty of concert, he was in the middle of November moving leisurely with the centre division to take up such a position, as might be calculated to connect the object of keeping that cliief in awe, with the interception of the Pindarees, should they attempt to penetrate by the north or east; when his army was afflicted ■svith a pestilence as violent and destructive, as any recorded in the pages of history. The malady, from some similarity in its principal features to that previously known by medical men under the title of the cholera morbus, has usually been designated by this appellation. It was, however, decidedly epidemic, and^ hke all similar visitations of nature, its source is matter of pure conjecture, though its progress has been distinctly traced. It was first observed in the Delta of the Ganges about the middle of the rainy season of 1 8 1 7 ; and, from the early part of September, its ravages were felt at Calcutta, where for a long time it destroyed upwards of 200 persons daily. Spreading thence up the course of the Ganges and its tributary waters, it reached the camp of Brigadier-General Hardyman about the beginning of October ; but as it was pitched in a healthy country, and liis force consisted of but one European and one native battalion ^vith a regiment of cavaby, its destructive effects, though serious, were not particularly marked, in comparison with what had previously been felt in its progress thither. Continuing west- ward, however, it fell with extraordinary violence upon the army commanded by Lord Hastings in person, wliich it over- 1817. CHOLERA MORBUS. 279 took on the commcnccnient of its march eastward from the Sindh on the 14th of Xovembcr. The year was one of scarcity, and grain had been collected for the troops and camj) followers with extreme difficidty, and of course of very inferior quality. That part of Bundelkluuid, where the division was encamped when the disease first showed itself was, moreover, low and notoriously unhealthy; besides which, except when obtained fi-om running streams, the water was generally indifferent. The time of the year too was precisely that, at which the heat of the day is most strongly contrasted with the cold of the night. All these circumstances, superadded to the crowded state of the camp of so large an army, gave to the epidemic, ^vhen it did break out, a degree of violence much exceeding what it had manifested in other parts of the country. For about ten days, that it raged with particular fury, the whole camp Avas a hospital*, and the deaths in this short period amounted, ac- cording to the nearest estimate that could be made, to a tenth of the whole number collected, Eiu-opeans and natives. Fighting men and camp followers were alike affected; but the latter, being generally worse clothed and fed, suffered in a greater proportion. Of the Europeans there were fewer cases of seizure ; but those which occurred were seldom otherwise than fatal, and usually so within a few hours. The camp continued for some days to move eastward, in the hope of finding a better chmate, as soon as it should reach the IJetwa ; but each day of march many dead and dying were abandoned on the route, and many more fell down on the road, for whom it was impossible to furnish the means of transport, though tlie utmost possible * The narrator himself lost seven men and a moonsJiec in about four days, besides twelve others who were sick and unserviceable for a month, out of an establishment of fifty-three; and others of the staff were equal sufferers. The fighting men filled die whole of the hospitals in the first two days; and for servants and followers every man's tent was his only receptacle, and himself the only doctor. 280 CHOLERA MORBUS. 1817. provision had been made by the previous distribution of carts and elephants for the accommodation of the sick. Such indeed was the general distress, that, so long as the epidemic raged, even the healthy were broken in spirit, and incapable of labour or fatigue; wliile the bazars and public estabUshments were deserted, and the whole efficiency of this fine army was, for the time, apparently destroyed. The symptoms of the disease may be described in few words. Its approach was indicated by a giddiness that came on sud- denly and %\dthout warning, attended with an immediate and total prostration of strength ; insomuch, that men fell from their horses in the line of march, and were unable afterwards to rise from the ground, though perfectly well when they had started in the morning. A nausea succeeded, with purging and vomiting, so violent as to defy the jxjwer of medicine. Laudanum was generally given at this stage in large quantities ; but the stomach would retain nothing, tlu-OAving up a peculiar green or whitish fluid. After this, the patient was seized with cramps and coldness from the extremities upwards, even to the parts about the heart. In the midst of his agonies, he felt a burning tliirst, and called incessantly for cold water, but vomited it the instant it was given. This lasted from 24 to 48 hours, and the person affected either died under its severity, or was left in a state of such extreme debility, that the utmost power of medicine availed nothing. The cure was very rare when these spasmodic affections came on with any degree of violence. It was observed of this malady, that neither the voice, nor the power of swallowing, nor the intellect, were ever lost while life remained ; also, that after death the bodies had a pecuhar smell, which was immediately perceptible at some distance. Medical men have never yet discovered wherein the disease lay ; much less have they found any probable cure. Laudanum or opium to allay the irritation within, and calomel, the universal specific 1817. PINDAREES. 281 of India, with stimulants when the patient is about to sink from exhaustion, form the most a})proved, if not the general practice. The medical art has gone no further. Towards the end of November, the Governor-General liad reached a healthy station at Erich on the IJetwa, and the epi- demic had visibly expended its virulence. The camp \vas, however, still crowded with convalescents, when the march of the Pindarees towards Gwalior threatened to call for the active exertions of the centre division, and the personal appearance of its noble commander ujion the scene of operations. It has before been mentioned, that one detachment had been sent from this division under Major Gumming, to cover the civil station of Bundelkhund. This had subsequently been pushed forward as far south as Tearee, while a second detach- ment, chiefly of cavalry, luider Colonel Philpot of His Majesty's 24th dragoons, was in the course of November stationed at Burwa-Sagur, so as completely to connect the centre division at Erich, with that of General Marshall, then moving on Seronj. But, as soon as it was ascertained that the durras of Kureem, and of Wasil Mahommed, had decamped to the nortliAvard, Lord Hastings ordered the detachment from Burwa-Sagur to move through Dutteea, across the Sindh, to cut them off from Gwalior ; and, at the same time, seeing reason to suspect the fidelity of his ally to his new engagements, he again marched upon the Sindli, from his station near Erich, calling in the detachment from Tearee. This movement had the double object of giving a support to Colonel Philpot, and more ef- fectually overawing the councils of the Gwalior durbar. His Lordship reached Soonaree, which is only 30 miles S. S. E. of Gwalior, on the 11th of December, where his unexpected ap- pearance had the desired effect. Sindheea was alarmed, and the Pindarees halted in consternation in the junguls and broken ground about Shahabad, not knowing what course to o o 282 PINDAREES. 1817. pursue, or whither to direct their march. Despairing of aid from Gwahor, they could not retrace their steps ; for General Marshall, though he had not been able to make all the progress expected, had nevertheless reached Nya Seraee on the 12th of December, wliile Colonel Adams was with liis force at Googul Chupra on the Parbutee ; both of which points were particu- larly well adapted to intercept their return southward. To force the passes of Huraotee to the S. W., or those of the Chumbul towards Jypoor, seemed the only modes of escape now left to the fugitives : but the state of the river, and a variety of precautions, wliich had been taken to strengthen the principal passes in the latter quarter, by troops from Agra and from General Donkin's division, rendered the passage of the Ghumbul, lower than Huraotee, wholly impracticable. Sir David Ochterlony had also arrived with the reserve in the neighbovirhood of Jypoor, and was prepared to support this line of defence. Again, with respect to escaping by Huraotee, the country there was in the hands of the Raj-Kana Zahm Singh, manager for the Eaja of Kota, who was now in strict alliance with us. Immediately upon the conclusion of the treaty with Sindheea, Captain Tod had been ordered from Gwahor, where he was acting assistant to the Resident, in order to cement a closer union with this cliieftain ; and he had not only been successfid in tliis object, having obtained from the Eaj-Rana the blocking up of aU the passes through his dominions, but had further induced him to place a contingent at the disposal of the British authorities, which had for some time been in the field. General Donkin also, with the right division, arrived at Boondee on the 10th of December ; and hearing from Captain Tod of the situation of the Pindarees about Shahabad, was now in fuU march eastward to cut them off, in case of any eflPort to escape in that direction. On the 13th of December, General Marshall made a move 1817. PINDAREES. 283 towards Shahabad, where he was informed the miited durras still remained encumbered with their baggage and families. At the same time Colonel Adams crossed the Parbutee, and took the same direction, to co-operate with the above movement. General INIarshall arrived in the afternoon of the 14th at the Lodwana Ghiit, one of those leading into Huraotee, which he found the Pindarees had lately forced, in consequence of the iU conduct of Zalim Singh's troops there posted. Here he was told, that the freebooters were still encamped at Eichee-Tal, a short distance only from the top of the Ghat. Accordingly, he lost no time in pushing forward his advanced guard with all the cavalry, in the hope of giving them a surprise. A party of about 1000 of the best mounted, immediately on perceiving the approach of the advance, presented themselves as if to oppose it ; but, instead of abiding a charge, led Colonel Newbery, who commanded the cavalry, into a long pursuit, away from the route by which the rest effected their escape. General Marshall, however, took much baggage that day, notwithstanding that no more than fifty or sixty of the enemy were killed. In the course of his advance next morning, he found the road strewed ^\ith loads of grain and other baggage, thrown away in the confusion of the flight. Kureem and Wasil had moved off westward, intending to cross the Chumbul by the Loharee Ghat, in the hope of being joined by Muhtab Khan, one of Ameer Khan's principal officers, as soon as they should penetrate to Jypoor. That Ghat, however, was guarded by the wing of one of (ieneral Donkin's battaUons, previously detached for the purpose ; and the General himself, after crossing the Chumbul on the 13th, was now in full march towards Burod, which lay in the direct hne of their retreat by this route. The Pindarees did not hear of General Donkin's approach, until he had surprised their advanced guard, in a night bivouac, about four miles north-east o o 2 284 PINDAREES. 1817. of Burod, capturing the wife of Kureem Khan, and all his state elephants, kettle-drums, standards, and other insignia of com- mand. The main body of the two durras was then only six miles distant ; but, on finding themselves intercepted, they instantly called a council of the leaders, when it was agreed, that, burning their tents and abandoning their baggage, all but the elite or fighting men should disperse, every one free to seek his own fortune. The two chiefs, with less than 4000, all well mounted, went off in the utmost haste to the south ; and passing to the left of Colonel Adams' division, while he was manoeuvring on the right bank of the Parbutee, made good their passage through ZaUm Singh's territory, although Colonel Adams, immediately on hearing of their flight that way, detached his cavahy under Major Clarke in pursuit. Of those left behind, many were cut up by the different divisions, some in attempting the Loharee Ghat, and the remainder by the villagers, who now- regarded their destruction as certain, and no longer hesitated to retahate on them the cruelties they had so often suffered at their hands. So complete was the despondency of these once formidable hordes, and so hopeless their present situation, that the appearance of the smallest party of our Sipahees was enough to make a large body of them throw every thing away and dis- perse. Availing himself of this feehng, on the night of the 23d of December, an Havildar, with only thirty-four men of Captain Tod's escort, ventured to attack a very considerable body, as it lay encamped in a part of Zahm Singh's territories. The whole galloped off on the first volley, deserting their camels, and even many of their horses ; but when the morning dawned soon after, and they saw the smallness of the party, they rallied, and showed a disposition to dispute the prize. The Havildar, however, manoeuvring as if he was merely the advance guard of a larger force, put them a second time to flight: nor did 181 7- PINDAREES. 285 they venture again to turn. Khooshal Koonwar, a Sirdar of note, was the commander of the routed party. The Havildar secured a large booty, and gained great credit by the enterprise. The object having been thus accomphshed in this (juarter, Major-General iNIarshall was ordered to return with the head- quarters of his division to Seronj, in order to be at hand to prevent any broken parties of the marauders from re-appearing in their previous haunts, as well as to hinder other powers from estabUsliing their jurisdiction in the territory whence they had just been expelled, unless with the express authority of the Governor-General or Sir Thomas Hislop. The scene of opera- tions, as far as concerned the Pindarees, was now entirely con- fined to Mewur, in wliich direction Chetoo had originally retired, and whither the remains of Kureem's and ^Vasil's durras had directed their flight. A new plan of operations was forthwith devised, in order to surround them similarly in this quarter. Colonel Adams moved down upon Gungrar to hem them in on the east ; while General Donkin, recrossing the Chumbul, proceeded to take post at Shahpoora, westward of the Bunas, so as to inclose them on the north. The Marquess of Hastings also despatched jNIajor- General Brown from the centre division at Soonaree, with a hght force, composed of the 3d native cavalry dromedary corps, one troop of horse-artillery, and some companies of hght infantry ; which, after being reinforced by a regiment of cavalry*, some irregular horse, and a battahon from Major-Gcneral Marshall's army, was directed to march by the line of Shahabad, and to the southward of Huraotee, so as to be available to the north of Colonel Adams, in case its services should be required in that direction. In the mean time, the divisions from the Dukliun, • 4th native cavalry, and 2d-lst native infantry. 286 PINDAREES. 1817. under Generals Sir Thomas Hislop and Sir John Maleohn, as well as the army from Guzerat under Sir WiUiam Keirr, had become available in the same quarter. But, before we follow up the operations against the Pindarees, it wiU be necessary to relate the other more important transactions, in which the two divisions from the Dukhun had just been involved with the army of Holkar. ^ •X- 1 I P s 3-. .5 ■ Hi S."^ 1 =5 V "^ a^ t, a? k; . S ^ ^ '^ 4;<*j bOJ.-i^^ C 'S ^ ■g 5 -a =5 ^- (^ r i a BJ a CHAPTER XIII. HOLKAR— HINDOOSTAN. 1817-18. DECEMBER, JANUARY, FEBRUARY. Brigadier-General Malcolm pursues Cheetoo— meets the army of Holkar — Falls back on Oojein — overtures from that durbar — Effect of Peshwa's defection — army advances — Junction of the divisions of Malcolm and Hislop — negotiation tried — Regent put to death — hostilities— Battle of Mehudpoor — Junction of the Guzerat division — Terms offered — Treaty of Mundisor — affair of Ram» poora — Effect on Sindheea — Juswunt Rao Bhao — affair of Jawud — Kumuhier and other forts taken — Final settlement in that quarter — Pindarees expelled from Mewur — surprised at Kotree — further pursuit — Submission of Namdar Khan — Wasil Mahommed — Kureem and his son — how disposed of— Cheetoo. It has been mentioned in the preceding chapters, that Sir John Malcohn, with the third division of the army of the Dukhun, arrived at TuUain on the 26th of November. Here being informed of Cheetoo's flight to the west, and that Kureem and Wasil had taken the northward route, he resolved to move in pursuit of the former, and proceeded by Sarungpoor to Agur. But the motions of the army of Holkar having latterly been very suspicious, it was arranged between the Brigadier-General and Colonel Adams, that the latter shoidd move westwai-d also as far as Eajgurh-patan, to afford his support in case of necessity. Sir John Malcolm arrived at Agur on the 4th of December, and from tliis point opened a communication with Captain Tod at Kota, whose information confirmed the reports of his own in- telhgencers, representing the intentions of Holkar, or at least 288 HOLKAR. 1817-18. those of his army, to be decidedly hostile. The reception of Cheetoo, whose camp was pitched close to that of Holkar, and who was himself admitted to an audience before he set off to deposit his family with Juswinit Kao Bhao in Kumulner, was a sufficient proof of the sentiments of the ruling party at this durbar. Sir John IMalcohn, therefore, having in the interim heard that Sir Thomas Hislop w^as on his return to Oojein, resolved to fall back upon that appui, and to let Colonel Adams advance to the north, in co-operation vdth the division of General Marshall, which was on the point of moving from Seronj. It will be necessary to give some explanation of the conduct of Holkar's administration at this juncture. It will be recollected, that it formed part of Lord Hastings' general plan, to conclude with this durbar a treaty of concert similar to that effected with Sindheea; with the difference, however, of detacliing Ameer Khan from his dependency upon the chief, and procuring the acknowledgment of liis independent sovereignty over such districts as might be in his actual posses- sion. In conformity with this plan, a letter had been addressed to the Kegency of Holkar by the Resident at Dehlee, at the same time that negotiations were opened with Sindheea and Ameer Khan, inviting it to send a confidential agent to Dehlee to treat, and intimating the terms on which it was the Governor- General's wish to form a closer connexion with his durbar. For a long time no answer was returned to this communication ; but on the 15th of November JVfr. Metcalfe received an overture from the Regent, Toolsee-Baee, offering to place herself and the young Mulhar Eao under the protection of the British Govern- ment. This overture, though conveyed with much secrecy, came either from the ministers of the day, Gunput Eao and Tanteea Jog, or at least with their knowledge and concurrence. Accordingly, on Captain Tod's being sent to Kota, he was instructed to open a communication through the ministers; 1817-18. IIOLKAR. 289 and as it was supposed to be the Baee's priiicijial object in making the offer, to rid herself and her ward of the influence of Ameer Khan and the rebelHous connnanders of his infantry, General Donkin was apprised beforehand of the i)robability that the Baee might need the active aid of a Jirilish force ; and this had been one of the objects of his advance up the left bank of the Chumbul. Soon afterwards, however, the news of the Peshwa's de- fection spread abroad, and the first impulse of the sirdars of Holkar was to march immediately to the south, in order to rally round the legitimate head of the INIahratta nation. The in- tention to move in that direction was soon publicly announced ; but it was at first supposed to be a feint on the part of the Baee and her ministry, who, finding it impossible to control the soldiery, were thought to ha^e taken this step with a view to deceive them by the appearance of a corchal unison of sentiment. But the sirdars were not to be so deceived; and suspecting that the ministry was intriguing underhand with the English, resolved upon its removal from office. On the 24th of No- vember, Tanteea Jog was accused in open durbar of a conspiracy to betray the principality to the English ; and he was accord- ingly stripped of his office and placed in close confinement. Gunput Kao was left nominally in the chief conduct of affairs ; but the real power fell into the hands of the Patau sirdars, at the head of whom was Ghufoor Klian, the avowed agent of Ameer Khan, and Eaindeen, one of the most considerable of the infantry officers. The march from Eampoora \vas com- menced very soon afterwards ; and it was resolved to move by Indrok on Mehudpoor, and thence by Indore across the Ner- budda by the ford of Choolee-JMuheshwur. Every effort was made to collect the dispersed infantry of Holkar's establish- ment; and, before the 28th, fourteen additional battalions under Eoshun-Beg and Koshun-Khan had joined on the fine of march. V p 290 HOLKAR. 1817-18. / Things were in this state in the camp of Mulhar Eao, when Cheetoo formed a junction with it, and the near approach of Sir John Malcohn brought it more directly into contact with the British armies. The mutinous troops were kept together by the promise of being paid their arrears on arriving at Indore, and the hopes of all were buoyed up by the expectation of a liberal supply of money from the coffers of Bajee Eao, as soon as they should have crossed the Nerbudda : assurances to this effect had been received from Poona but a few days before, so that it was no time to expect any favourable disposition towards ourselves, nor indeed was the soldiery inclined to pay much attention to the remonstrances addressed to the sirdars by Sir John Malcolm, in consequence of their reception of Cheetoo, or to the efforts of that officer to persuade them to relinquish the design of espousing the cause of the Peshwa. The sirdars themselves, however, were liberal of their professions, and an- swered the letters both of Sir John jNIalcolm and of the resident at Dehlee with general protestations of their desire to maintain the existing relations of amity. The march to the south was nevertheless continued : all ranks, particularly the regent- princess, expressing the most enthusiastic devotion to the cause of the Mahratta sovereign. Seeing, therefore, to what issue matters were fast verging, Sir John IMalcolm, as above men- tioned, fell back upon Oojein, in order to effect a junction with the division of Sir Thomas Hislop. The two divisions met on the 12th of December, and, after a halt of two days at Oojein, advanced on the 14th towards the camp of Holkar, for the purpose of giving effect to the nego- tiation. A draft of treaty was prepared, similar in most of the terms to that conchided with Sindheea, and was proffered to the acceptance of the durbar. Its reception was at first outwardly favourable ; and, to carry on the deception as long as possible, a confidential agent was sent to treat and discuss the several 1817-18. HOLKAR. 291 articles. Things continued in this uncertain state for some days, the two armies lying all the while within foiu'teen miles of each other ; that of Holkar heing at Melnidj)oor, while Sir Thomas Plislop was at Punhehar, a little to the north of Oojein. On the 17th of Decemher, the mutinous spirit of the Tatan sirdars openly gained the preponderance ; and, distrusting the designs of Gunput Kao and the Regent Eaee, whom they still suspected of a secret design to throw themselves upon British pro- tection, they seized and confined both, and broke off all further comnuuiicatio)! with Sir John jNIalcolm. It was the general feehng of the sirdars, that if the court ^^'ere to accede to the terms proposed, they would themselves lose all personal con- sideration ; and there was little cUfficulty in persuading the troops, that such a measure would necessarily deprive them for ever of their means of livelihood. In this feeling, it was una- nimously resolved to offer battle to the Enghsh, in preference to accepting the terms ; and, with a view to prevent any future intrigues from interfering with the resolution, the regent, Toolsee Baee, was carried down by night to the banks of the Soopra, and there put to death by order of Ghufoor Khan and the Patans. The ascendancy of the war faction was immediately apparent in the attacks made upon our foraging parties, from which cattle were daily carried off, not without some loss of lives. On the 20th of December, Sir Thomas Hislop, thinking thereby to curb this spirit of hostility, advanced to within seven miles of Holkar's camp ; but that very day a picquet of Mysore horse was attacked by a party of about 200 of Holkar's Parabaee horse, under circumstances which showed that they were not actuated by any motive of plunder. It was accordingly re- solved to enforce immediate submission to the terms proposed to the acceptance of the durbar, or to bring on a general action without further delay. p p 2 292 HOLKAR. 1817-18. On the morning of the 21st of December, the British army again advanced ; but its march was more openly opposed by bodies of Holkar's horse, which appeared on every side. A letter had been written over night to invite the durbar to sub- mission, and another to the agent employed to negotiate, to know why communication had been so abruptly broken off. To both of these answers were received on the march : the reply to the former contained mere general assurances ; but that of the negotiator explained more fully, that the sirdars were bent upon abiding the result of an action. Sir Thomas Hislop, therefore, no longer hesitated as to the course to be pursued. On approaching jVIehudpoor*, the enemy were discovered drawn up in hne on the opposite bank of the Soopra, as if they intended to dispute the passage of that river by the most prac- ticable ford, which lay a little above their position, that is to say, to the sovith of the town. A reconnoissance was imme- diately made by Lieutenant-Colonel Blacker, the quarter-master- general, who ascertained that there Avas ground on the opposite side of the river and within its bed for the troops to form upon after the passage, where they would be completely sheltered from the fire of the enemy's artillery by the brow of the over- hanging bank. He hke^dse observed, that on ascending the bank the men would only have to advance 300 yards before they reached the enemy's guns. Upon this report, it was determined to attack in front by the ford, notwithstanding the obvious dis- advantages of the ground, in preference to manoeuvring so as to tvu-n the position, which would have required a long detour and much time, while any appearance of hesitation could not fail to produce a very prejudicial effect. The enemy's right was protected by a deep ravine, and his left by a slight bend of the river, and a deserted village called Sitawud, not far from its * Vide plan at the head of this Chapter. « 1817-18. IIOLKAR. 293 bank. The ground on which the British army had to form itself after crossing- the ford, was within the two liorns of this position ; the enemy's hne retiring a little in the centre to make the most advantage of it. Sir Thomas Hislop placed tlie bag- gage in a village on the right bank called Doolait, under pro- tection of the rear guard and a few IVIysore horse ; and then, while Sir John Malcolm with the cavalry drove off the hovering parties of the enemy's horse, a few light troops were pushed across the ford, followed by fourteen guns of the horse artillery and a troop of rocketers. The passage was effected without much difficulty, although the enemy brought uj) some guns to bear on the ford. The horse artillery immediately opened a battery on the enemy's hne, while the rest of the army crossed to the low ground under cover of the bank, in order there to form for the attack. The enemy were so superior in artillery, that in a short time the whole of our guns were disabled. Four guns of the foot artillery were, however, opened with good effect, from a position they had taken on the opposite side of the river, a little nearer Mehudpoor, whence they enfiladed the left of the enemy's hne, wliich had been advanced between the village of Sitawud and the river, in order to open with more effect on the ford. By the time the horse artillery were nearly silenced, the British army had passed the ford, and was formed for the attack. The first brigade, composed of the flank companies of H. M.'s royal Scots and the ^Madras European regiment, with the second battalion of the ]\Iadras 14th native infantry, the whole under Lieutenant-Colonel K. Scott, was destined to the attack of the enemy's left. The Mght brigade, consisting of the rifle corps, with the Palam-cotta and Trichinopoly light infantry, the whole under Major Brown, formed the centre; and the second brigade, composed of the 2nd-6th ]\ladras native^infantry and the Nizam's battalions under Captain Hare, formed the left 294 HOLKAR. 1817-18. of our infantry line. The cavalry were directed to operate against the enemy's right, where the ground was most favoura- ble for this arm. The main attack, however, was entrusted to the first brigade, where the enemy was strongest in artillery, and the distance to be passed under his fire the longest. Sir John Malcolm solicited permission to lead this attack, which was granted ; and in the same manner Lieutenant-Colonel M'Gregor Murray, deputy adjutant-general to the King's forces, obtained leave to head the detachment of the royal Scots, wliich had precedence in it. These dispositions were no sooner completed, than the attack was commenced. The enemy's artillery was extremely numerous and well served, so that our loss was very severe, particularly in the first and in the light brigade, which latter being in the centre, was exposed to the cross fire of the whole line. The troops, however, ad- vanced with great steadiness, the Europeans * in particular reserving their fire and trusting to the bayonet alone. Holkar's artillerymen stood to their guns till they were bayonetted ; but his infantry battahons gave way as soon as the guns were carried. Meanwhile, the cavalry had turned the enemy's right, and driving off the horse who opposed them, made a dreadful slaughter of the broken infantry. Holkar's camp was directly opposite to Mehudpoor, a little to the north of the field of battle. This, with all the artillery, were soon in our hands ; but on the pursuit being continued, the fugitives attempted to rally, and got together some guns to cover their retreat across a ford about four miles lower down the river than Mehudpoor. * Sir John Malcolm observing a Sepoy battalion stop and fire in its advance, turned round to the men and said, " My lads, there is little use in that ; I think, we " had better give them the cold iron." Whereupon he was answered witli cha- racteristic bluntness from the ranks ; " Yes, your honour, I think we had ;" and the line advanced with shouldered arms in high glee, notwithstanding the de- structive fire then playing upon it. 1817-18. HOLKAR. 295 Upon this, Sir Thomas Hislop ordered his hne to be again formed ; but the guns were soon taken, and the feeble resistance offered at this point overpowered by the rapid advance of Sir John ]Malcohn with the cavahy and a hght detachment. Our camp was formed upon the field of battle, while Sir John Malcolm continued the pursuit across the river with the regular cavalry, and Captain Grant with the INIysore horse moved down the left bank. The enemy's flight was supposed to be directed nortliAvards towards Eampoora. An immense booty fell into the hands of the Mysore horse. Eight elephants and some hundred camels were brought in chiefly by them. The camp itself was foUnd deserted when entered by the regular army : sixty-three guns were, however, captured, and the total de- struction of so many disorderly battaHons was a yet more im- portant consequence of the success of this day. Our loss was severe, amounting to IT-i killed and 604 wounded ; among the former were tkree officers, Lieutenants M'Leod, Colman, and Glen; amongst the latter, no less than thirty-five, whereof eight were of the rifle corps alone *. * Names of officers severely wounded : Quarter-Master Griffin, horse artillery. Lieutenant Campbell, royals. Lieutenant Hancome, European regiment (since dead). Captain Norton, Lieutenants Gwynnc, Shahanan, Drake, Calder, Castment, . rifle corps. Gem, Lieutenant Jones, Palamcotta light infantry. Major Bowcn, "> Trichinopoly ditto. Lieutenant Palmer, J Lieutenant Gibbings, quarter-master-general's department. Lieutenant Lyon, brigade-major of cavalry. Besides other officers slightly wounded. 296 HOLKAR. 1817-18. Sir Thomas Hislop resolved to remain himself a week at Mehudpoor, and to establish a hospital and depot there ; while Sir John Malcolm continued the pursuit with a light division from his army, and followed up the victory. One of the principal reasons of this delay was, to allow of the junction of the Bombay army from Guzerat, which arrived at Eutlam on the 24th of December. This army had also been directed to move on Oojein, and, according to the original plan of operations, would have been in time to have taken part in the battle of Mehudpoor, had not its march been arrested by an order of recal addressed to JNIajor-General Sir Wilham Keir by the Bombay Government, immediately on hearing of the defection of the Bhoosla. This event, it seems, was so totally unexpected at that Presidency, that in the uncertainty how far the appearance of fidelity kept up at Brodera could be trusted, the Governor in council felt alarmed at the idea of the Guzerat force being so far removed from the territory of his Government, and wished to retain it for the protection of Surat and the Gykwar state from the secret or open attempts of Bajee Rao. The jNIarquess of Hastings was by no means pleased at this diversion of the Guzerat army from the part assigned to it in his original plan ; and no sooner heard of it, than he "called vipon the Bombay Government to rectify the error without delay. In the interim, however, the strong representations addressed to Sir William Keir by Sir Thomas Hislop, showing the necessity of liis advance into Hin- doostan, had induced that officer to resume his forward march after a short retrogade, before he received the positive order to that effi?ct, addressed to him by the Marquess of Hastings in person ; and he had from Rutlam furnished a light reinforcement to Sir John Malcolm, which joined at Kurdla on the 27th of December. On theSOth, the Guzerat army effected a junction with the head-quarters of the army of the Dukhun, and the united force then advanced iqjon INIundisor in support of Sir John INIalcolm, who had already reached that point. 18] 7-18. HOLKAR. 297 There was, however, little i'urtlier to be done in this quarter, except to receive the submission of the llolkar, whose power had been completely broken by the defeat of the 21st, and who, findino; retreat cut off by our divisions on every side, had no longer the means of resistance or evasioii. The negotiation was opened by Cihufoor Ivhaii, who sent the agent that had conducted the previous negotiations, to make inquiries about a son-in-law left wounded on the field of battle. This oppor- tunity was taken to forward the most humble assurances of the present altered sentiments of the leading men of the durbar. Tanteea Jog had already been released from confinement and restored to office ; and Sir John INIalcolm, in his reply to the above unofficial communication, caused it to be suggested, that the durbar could adopt no fitter course than to depute that minister immediately to the camp of Sir Thomas Hislop, to tender the submissions of the court, and conclude a treaty on the best terms he could obtain. In conformity with this in- timation, Tanteea Jog came into Sir John IVIalcolm's camp at Mundisor on the 1st of January. Ey this time, the Brigadier-General had received the in- structions framed by the iVIarquess of Hastings in the con- templation of a rupture, and prescribing the terms on which the Holkar's submission was to be accepted and his authority re- established. He accordingly entered at once vipon the negotiation. The terms proposed were, that Mulhar Rao Holkar should place himself and his dominions under British protection ; that he should confirm the engagement already concluded Avith ^Vmeer Khan, and renoiuice all sovereignty over the lands guaranteed to that chieftain ; the four pergunnas of Puchj)uhar, Deeg, Gungrar, and Ahoor, which Zalim Singh of Kota had for some years rented, to be ceded to the ]hitish in perpetuity, to enable them to recompense the useful services of the Raj-Kana ; also, all territories possessed by Holkar north of the Boondee hills or Q Q 298 HOLKAR. 1817-18. south of the S^tpoora range, including the fort of Sindwa in the latter, with a glacis, to be ceded to us, together with all claims for tribute on the Kajpoot princes. The state to be placed on the footing of other powers connected with us in subsidiary alliances, and its contingent to be fixed at 3000 horse. The Governor-General's plan for settling the factious differences that for so many years had distracted this durbar was to invest Ghufoor Khan, the avowed head of the Patau interest, with an hereditary jageer to be held of Holkar in perpetuity under our guarantee. It was thought that this measure would satisfy the expectations of that party, and probably tend to separate it for ever from the intrigues of the durbar ; and it was hoped the lands known to be already in Ghufoor Khan's pos- session would prove an ample provision. It was not known to his Lordship, when these instructions were issued, that Ghu- foor Khan was suspected of being the principal instigator of the mvirder of Toolsee Baee ; else in all probability a different ar- rangement would have been devised. As it was, however, Sir John Malcolm executed his instructions to the letter, and eflPected all these objects after a short negotiation, in which Tanteea Jog insisted principally on three points : first, the extent of the cession for the benefit of Zalim Singh, which he wished to hmit to two instead of four pergunnas ; secondly, the arrears due on account of the past year's tribute from the Eaj- poots, for which he soHcited our guarantee ; and thirdly, the retention of the forts of Chandore and Umba, with some villages in Kandesh and the Dukhun. Sir John INlalcolm distinctly refused to give up either of the above points, but promised to submit a reqviest on behalf of Mulhao Eao, that some hereditary civil rights in several of the villages in the Dukhun shovdd be reserved to the family, after and although the sovereignty should be ceded to us. The treaty was signed and executed on the 6th of January, in conformity with the original draft. The 1817-18. HOLKAR. 299 jageer secured to Ghufoor Khan, under its stipulations, in- cluded the perg'unnas of Sunjeet, i\Iulliar-gurh, Tal JNIoondawur, Joura, and Eurod, with the Peeplouda tribute : and the condi- tion of tenure was the military service of COO select horse, the number to be liable to increase on the eventual improvement of the jageer. The ratification of the Governor-General was affixed on the ITth of January 1818; and at the same time Sir John jMalcolm was authorised to make an advance of five lack rupees on the revenues of Koonch, one of the pergunnas of Holkar not included amongst the cessions, but bordering on our own territory of Bundelkhund. An arrangement had been made some years before with tliis durbar, by which we had un- dertaken the collection of its revenues, and annually paid them from the Delilee treasury. The pergunna having been assigned to a sister of Mulhar llao, its cession was not insisted upon ; and the sum advanced upon it was necessary to the peaceable settlement of his government in its new relations. Immediately on the conclusion of the above treaty, INIulhar Rao came in, with Gunput Rao, Ghufoor Khan, and his prin- cipal Sirdars, and placed himself under the protection of the British army. Tanteea Jog was vested with the principal ad- ministration of the pubUc affairs, the prince being a youth of about twelve years of age. Gunput Rao, who held the high office of hereditary dewan, was reduced to the exercise of a mere nominal authority. An occasion very soon occurred, to call forth the active exercise of our protective engagements. Roshun Reg and Roshun Khan, two principal officers of the infantry destroyed at Mehudpoor, had, with a few hundred men, the poor remnant of their fourteen battaHons, fled to Rampoora ; where, hearing of the submission of their chief, they exliibited symptoms of discontent, and acted as if they meant to set up for themselves. Sir Thomas Hislop, sensible of the necessity of vigorously sup- Q (i 2 300 HOLKAR. 1817-18. pressing the first symptoms of such a disposition, was about to direct the force under Colonel Adams, still posted at Gungrar, to the punishment of these refractory leaders : but hearing, in the mean time, of the arrival of General Brown, with the de- tachment from Lord Hastings' camp, at Sorel, in the direct line of Eampoora, thought it most convenient to use its services for this object. General Brown, with his usual activity, hastened forthwith to the spot ; and, appearing before Eampoora on the 10th of January, immediately made his dispositions to carry the place by assault, notwithstanding that it was surrounded by fortifications of some strength, and well capable of defence. About 400 of the infantry collected by the Roshuns were put to the sword in the town, and some horse, who fled in the opposite direction, were also cut up by the cavalry of our detachment, which had been sent round to intercept their escape. The two leaders themselves got clear off, but several other principal Sirdars were killed or taken prisoners. After this successful enterprize, the settlement of this territory pro- ceeded with the utmost tranquillity under the superintendance of Sir John Malcolm and Major Agnew, which latter had been appointed by the Governor-General to act temporarily as Re- sident at that court. Thus was peace re-estabhshed with the second of the three principal Mahratta powers, who had risen in arms to oppose the execution of his Lordship's plans. The immediate effect of so sudden an annihilation of the power of Holkar was apparent in the altered conduct of the Gwahor durbar, which from this time forward resigned itself to the most perfect acquiescence in every arrangement, indicated by the British Resident as the wish of the Governor-General. Juswunt Rao Bliao, too, the most tur- bulent of Sindheea's Sirdars, became somewhat more tractable ; and, dismissing Cheetoo with his durra, which had remained for some time in Iiis neighbourhood, received Captain Caulfield, J817-18 JUSWITNT RAO BHAO. 301 the officer appointed by Lord Hastings to act with his division, under the stipulations of the treaty of Gvvahor, with every assurance of deference to his Lordship's commands. Hut these professions were soon found to be deceitful ; for it was ascer- tained, that he was at the same time giving luiderhand the utmost ]>rotection in his power to the leaders and their banditti, by admitting them into his ranks, or concealing'; tliem in his different forts and villages. A body of 500 Tindarees, under Fazil Khan, were declared by Juswunt Rao to be a part of his regular establishment ; and he went so far as to request a pro- tection for them, in case they should fall in with any of the divisions of our army. Captain Caulfield granted the desired protection provisionally, until he should have ascertained the wishes of the Governor-General in respect to this party ; but, in the interim. Sir Wilham Keir, who had been despatched by Sir Thomas Hislop in pursuit of Cheetoo, was led by his hurkaras to the village Avhere Fazil Khan had been reported to be quartered, under information that a large party of Cheetoo's durra were there harboured. Upon the first appearance of the British troops, numbers of armed horsemen were seen to gallop forth from the opposite side of the village, which confirming the previous information, he ordered the cavalry to give chase to the fugitives, and immediately attacked the village. It was carried in a few minutes, and many Pindarees and others had been put to death, before the head man had time to produce Captain Caidfield's jjrotection, upon sight of which instant orders were issued to stop the pillage. This Avas not effected without resorting to the extreme measure of hanging a sepoy caught in the fact ; but the circumstances induced Sir AVilliam Keir to institute an inquiry upon the spot, when it was indis- putably proved, both by the confessions of many of the prisoners and by other evidence, that the major part of the horsemen found in the village had but Aery recently parted from the 302 JUSWUNT RAO BHAO. 1817-18. dixrra of Cheetoo, there to seek an asylum. This was one of many instances of Juswunt Rao's unwarrantable conduct. He harboured Bheekoo Seyud of Kureem's durra, the very Sirdar who had led the expedition into Guntoor in 1815, in a yet more barefaced manner ; suffering him to come within his camp, and pitch his tents within a short distance of that of Captain Caul- field : and, although the man was clearly identified, and Cap- tain Caulfield made the most earnest demands for his arrest or expulsion, he coidd procure no redress. The jVIarquess of Hastings, being apprised of this conduct, sent instructions on the 24th of January, authorising JusA^Tint Eao to be proceeded against as a pubUc enemy, pursuant to the conditions of the GwaUor treaty, unless he should in the inter- mediate space have adopted a different course of conduct. The detachment of General Brown was directed to give effect to these instructions ; but, before the arrival of the orders, matters had abeady been brought by this force to the issue of the sword with the refractory chieftain. On General Brown's approach to Jawud, Captain Caulfield renewed liis remonstrances, but stiU without producing any change in the conduct of Juswunt Eao. Accordingly, on the 28th of January, after having in vain waited the expiration of the period prescribed for comphance with his demand of the surrender of the harboured Pindarees, Captain Caulfield retired from Juswunt Eao's camp to that of the General ; and on the morning of the next day, having intelligence that arrangements were making secretly to remove the Pindarees to some place of safetv, suggested the sending round a squadron of our regular cavah-y to counteract this intention, by occupying the road through which they must pass. In performing this duty, the squadron was fired at both from the town and camp* ; where- * Vide plan at the head of Chapter XI L 1817-18. JUSWUNT RAO BIIAO, 303 upon the General ordered out his whole hne, and determined on the immediate assault of all Juswunt Eao's posts. The 3d cavalry, under Captain Hodges, were ordered down with the horse artillery to the support of Captain Swindell, who com- manded the squadron that had been fired vipon. This force was immediately led by Colonel Newbery, the brigadier of cavalry, to the attack of one of Juswunt Rao's cami)S, which lay on the south of the town : it was soon carried. General Brown determined to follow up his success against the town itself; and blowing open the gate with a twelve-pounder of the horse artillery, while the rest of the guns were employed in taking off the defences, the Major-General caused the place to be stormed by the 1st- 1st, under Major Bellingham, and by the dromedary corps, which was dismounted for the purpose, and led by Lieutenant Fatten, the only officer wounded in the whole affair. Captain Ridge, with the 4th cavalry, and a party of Rohilla horse, had in the mean time been sent round the town, vuider the guidance of Lieutenant Franklin of the quarter-master-generars department, to attack another camp to the north-west, in wliich a large portion of Juswunt Rao's force was cantoned. There were in this encampment six guns and two battalions, besides horse. Captain Ridge came upon them in a qviarter, whence he was exposed to the fire from the town as well as that of the troops in the camp. Leaving the town to the General, whose attack had by this time commenced on the opposite gateway, he charged at once into the camp, dispersed and cut up the battaUons, and captured all the six guns. The Rohilla horse were led on this occasion by Lieutenant Tm-ner, and behaved with as much spirit and steadiness as the regular cavah-y. The result was complete success in every quarter, without a single check. Juswunt Rao himself owed his escape to the fieetness of his horse, and got off with very few attendants. As soon as information was received of matters having been 304 PINDAREES. 1817-18. brought to this issue, General Donkin, who was still at Shah- poora, was ordered down to occupy the possessions of Juswunt Eao Ehao in Oodeepoor, and particularly the forts and districts of Kumulner, Rypoor, and Ramnagurh, three recent usurpations from the Eana, who had a few days only before placed himself under our protection. The acquisition of these fortresses was effected by the middle of February, the garrisons agreeing to evacuate on receiving their arrears, which in no instance ex- ceeded 4000 rupees. Kumulner * is one of the strongest hill forts in India, and there it was that the Pindarees had been desirous of depositing their families and baggage during this campaign. It was now restored to the Rana of Oodeepoor, along with the other recent usurpations. Jawud and Neemuch, two of Sindheea's pergunnas assigned to Juswunt Rao, were hkewise seized by us, and held for some time, but afterwards restored to the chief, in order to enable him to make a peaceable settlement with a man, who had otherwise sufficient influence to give trovible. It had been distinctly intimated to liim, at the time of concluding the treaty of Gwalior, that, in the event of any of his Sirdars requiring chastisement for infractions of the articles, the acquisitions made from them would be retained by us as a remuneration for the trouble of inflicting it. AVherefore tliis attack of Juswunt Rao and seizure of his territories gave Httle umbrage, and occasioned no discussions with the durbar. It is now time to notice the further operations against the Pindarees, after the remnant of the durras of Kureem and Wasil Mahommed had effected their escape through Huraotee to Mewur, where they had hoped to share the promised protection of Juswunt Rao Bhao. Early in January, Colonel Adams had taken vip a position at Gungrar, and General Donkin another to the north of jNIewur, while General Brown was advancing * Vide plate at the head of Chapter XV. 1817-18. PINDAREES. 305 towards Ranipoora. Upon the conclusion of the treaty with Holkar, ]\lajor-(icneral Sir ^Villiani Keir was iinniccliately despatched with his fresh division in a north-westerly direction from ]Mundis6r, to operate as2;ainst Chcetoo, or any other of the Pindaree chiefs of whom he might receive intelligence. The durra of the former was partially cut up in the neighbour- hood of SatooUa ; and several ^vere taken in villages, where they had singly or in small parties sought protection. Sir Thomas Hislop remained in the mean time at ]\lvujdis6r, a centrical point, well calculated for the general direction of affairs in this quarter. Harassed by the activity of Sir William Keir's pvu-suit, the marauders resolved to endeavour to retrace their steps to their haunts in jVIalwa and in the valley of the Nerbudda. Cheetoo succeeded in baffling eveiy effort made to overtake liim, and effected his object, by penetrating through a most difficult country to the south of JNIewur. He re-appeared near Dhar, where a very liigh range of hills sends forth the streams wliich form the INlhye, a considerable river, emptying itself into the Gulf of Kambay. In this march he was obliged to disencumber himself of his baggage, and lost many of his horses ; while Sir "William Keir, being unable to follow by the same route, made a circuit by the open plain beyond the sources of that river, and then moved southward up the Chumbul in the same direction. The wreck of Kureem's durra, under Namdar-Khan, — for both Kureem and his son had been left behind in a juiigul in the flight through Huraotee, — had rejoined Wasil ^lahommed; and both were driven, by the operations just described, to attempt, in common with Cheetoo, a return towards JNIalwa and the Nerbudda. After having rounded the camp of Sir I'homas Hislop at jNIundisor, they were proceeding easterly, with the confidence of no other British force being in their neighbour- hood ; when, after crossing the Chumbul, they bivouacked on the 12tli of January, at a small village named Kotree, on the U 11 306 PINDAREES. 1817-18. Kalee-Sindh. By good fortune, Colonel Adams was stiU lying at Gungrar, within a few miles of their bivouac. He detached the 5th Bengal cavalry to give them, if possible, a night surprise. Major Clarke, who commanded this regiment, fell in with their encampment about an hour before daylight of the 13th, and found them either in such security, or so worn down by con- tinued fatigue, that they evidently had no intelligence whatever of his approach, when he was within sight of their fires. Per- ceiving that he was quite undiscovered, he resolved to wait until the first appearance of dawn, that their flight might not be aided by the cover of darkness. On the first blush of day, he divided liis force, ordering three troops under Lieutenant Ken- nedy to attack in front, while with the other three he made a detour himself round the village, to come upon them in the direction their flight would obviously take on the first alarm of danger. The manoeuvre was most masterly ; and the loss of the durras in tliis affair was greater than they had sustained in any previous attack, not excepting that of the year before, when surprised by jNIajor Lushington in the Dukhun. The whole body was completely dispersed, and many leaders of note left dead on the field. Soon after tliis success, Colonel Adams having ascertained that the freebooters had entirely evacuated Mewur, with the intention of returning into INIalwa, hastened after them without delay, and sent notice of this movement to General Marshall, who had for some time been in the neighbourhood of Bairsea and Seronj expecting this event. On their march, the Pindarees were several times severely handled by detachments from the divisions of Adams and Marshall, and in the end harassed to such a degree, as to be unable longer to keep their followers together. It woidd be uninteresting to follow the track of these miserable fugitives with further minuteness. Such was the 1817-18. PINDAREES. 307 extremity of their distress, that Colonel Adams, judging them to be now ri])e for iHKjualiiied submission, caused an intimation to be conveyed to them through the Nuwab of Ehopal, that, if they were wilhng to throw themselves entirely on the mercy of the Eritish Goverimient, surrendering their arms and horses, the Sirdars might expect a hvelihood in some part of our j^ro- vinces remote from their old haunts, and the hves of their followers would be spared. Namdar Khan was the first to avail himself of this intimation. He deUvered himself uji to Colonel Adams on the 3d of February at Deorajpoor in the Bliopal territory, with all Ills yet remaining followers, which were no more than eighty-seven. He required no other terms tlian a bare assurance that he should not be sent to Europe or Calcutta: on receiving wliich he surrendered Avithout further stipulation. Others came in daily by twos or threes ; and all reported that ^Vasil IMahommed was in equal distress, and ready to avail himself of the same proffer of pardon. He had penetrated further to the east ; but soon after fled for refuge to Gwahor, where Sindheea, thougli from a point of honour he at first refused to seize and dehver him up, when the Resident discovered the place of his concealment, and demanded his seizure and surrender, was ultimately obhged to do so, at the express requisition of the Governoi'-General *. The rest, for the most part, followed the example of Namdar Khan. Kureem it appeared was alone in concealment at Jawud, a\ hen the ])lace was stormed by General Brown. He escaped with extreme difficulty on foot, and Uved for some time in the neighbouring junguls ; but, after a variety of risks and adventm-es, fincUng the restoration of his affairs utterly hopeless, he surrendered himself * Sindheea, on being tokl by the Resident that AVasil Maliommed was con- cealed in his camp, replied, that he had his leave to arrest the fugitive, but was required to do so himself, and that in broad day, that all India might see that an enemy of the British Government could nowhere find an asylum. II R 2 308 PINDAREES. 1817-18. to Sir John Malcolm on the 15th of February. His son, Shu- hamut Khan, with Ruttun Koonwiir, a noted leader of luhburs, and about 200 followers, were still lurking in the jungids and mountains of Huraotee and Boondee, when Zalim Singh of Kota conveyed to them the assu.rance of Hfe, and induced them to yield on the same terms as had been granted to Namdar Khan. Kureem Khan was settled with his family on an estate purchased for him in the Gorukpoor district, of the value of about 1000 rupees a month. WAsil Mahommed was on his seizure kept in strict surveillance at Ghazeepoor ; but continued evidently restless, and refused to send for Iris family, or to take measures to settle liimself in the manner desired by the British Government. At the close of the following rains he attempted an escape, having by some means or other procured relays of horses to be laid to carry him beyond our frontier ; but being detected in the act of getting out of the house in wliich he resided, he destroyed himself by taking poison. Thus were the two durras of Kureem and W^sil Mahommed annihilated. Cheetoo, though lie had suffered much in detail, had hitherto avoided a rencounter with any of the British corps in the field. But, on the 25th of January, he was heard of at Kurnod by Colonel Heath, who commanded the garrison and post of Hindia. A party was immediately sent out, which beat up his bivouac in the night, and utterly dispersed the remnant of his durra. The Bheels and Ghasseas were encouraged to plunder and destroy the fugitives, a commission they zealously executed. After tliis, Cheetoo wandered about j\Ialwa a short time with about 200 followers; and seeing liis affairs to be nearly desperate, endeavoured, through the Xuwab of Bhopal, to make terms for himself, in conjunction with his remaining adherents. For this purpose, he suddenly entered the Nuwab's camp ; but when he learned that Nuzur INIahommed had nothing to offer, beyond a slender personal maintenance in some distant 1817-18. PINDAREES. 301) part of Hindoostan, while he demanded a jageer in Malwa, and the entei'tainnient of himself with his men in the British service, lie decamped as suddenly as he had come. AMiile he staid, his horses were constantly saddled, and the men slept with the bridles in their hands, ready to fly instantly, in case of an attemj)t to seize them. Preparations were making for the purpose the very night he went off; but he was too much on his guard, and too much alive to suspicion, to allow them to be completed. He was instantly pursued by the Nuwab's people ; and General jVlalcolm also sent out parties to take him, which distressed him so much, that Kajun left him, and made his submission. INIahom- med Punah, his son, was hkewise made prisoner. Yet he sub- sequently found his way into Kandesh and the Dukhun, and made common cause with the Arabs and chiefs of the Pcshwa's routed army, with whom he became assimilated, receiving occa- sional protection from the Killadar of the fortress of Aseergurh. His durra was completely destroyed, and his followers almost entirely deserted him *. * Vide infra, Chap. 18. CHAPTEK XIV. POONA. 1817-18, NOVEMBEK TO APRIL. Peshwa's flight and pursuit — is cut off from the north — returns to the south — affau* at Koragaou — resolute defence of Captain Staunton — repulse of the enemy — remarks — flight of Bajee Rao continued — Brigadier-General Pritzler's pursuit — Bajee Rao turns north— met by General Smith, and pursued up the Kishna — new distribution of British force — Suttara taken — plans of Governor- General in respect to Peshwa and Suttara Raja — reasons and reflections — instructions issued — Suttara Raja proclaimed — General Smith pursues Bajee Rao— comes up with him at Ash tee — Gokla slain — Suttara's familycaptured — notice respecting Gokla — Peshwa's distress — capture of his forts — desertion of his Jageerdars — joined by Gunput Rao and Ram Deen — flight to the northward. It is now time to revert to the transactions of the war with Bajee Kao in the Dukliun. For the purpose of preserving the continuity of the narrative of occurrences in other quarters, we have reserved these for separate notice, there having as yet been no such direct connexion between the ojjerations on the two opposite sides of India, as to require the relation to be inter- woven. After his defeat at Poona on the 16th of November, the Peshwa fled southward towards his strong holds in the vicinity of Suttara. It was at first beheved, that he intended to shut himself up in some one of them, there to abide a siege. It appeared, however, that he had no sucli design, the recent fall of Hatras having shaken the confidence of all the native chief- 1817-18. PESHWA. 811 tains in their fortified places. His march to the south had no other object, than to effect a junction with a party sent before to carry off the family* of the Eaja of Suttara from Wusota. Fearing to trust a race of so much political im]iortance to the safe keeping of even the strongest of his forts, he resolved to carry the principal members of the family along with him, in order to prevent the possibility of their falling into our hands, or being set up by us in opposition to his own authority. Towards the end of November, Brigadier-General Smith, having completed his aiTangements for the occupation and eventual defence of Poona, set off in pursuit of the fugitive prince. On the morning of the 29th, he forced the passage of the Salpa-Glitlt, leading to the high land in which the Kishna takes its rise. Gokla, with a body of 5000 of the Pcshwa's best horse, had, since the 22d, been continually hovering about the Brigadier-General's Hne of march, for the purpose of taking advantage of the least confusion. It would have been far too harassing a duty for the single regiment of cavalry and few irregulars attached to the division, to have attempted to keep at a cUstance an enemy that never ventui'ed to stand a charge. However, by occasionally masking a galloper gun, and employing Shrapnell shells, the General was enabled to make the service of Gokla's horse rather too perilous for a continuance. On the day of his forcing the Salpa-Ghat, the nature of the ground gave an opportunity of opening the battery of a whole troop of horse- ailillery in this manner, and with such effect, that for some days afterwards, indeed, until the Ctli of December, the hovering clouds of horsemen completely dLsapjieared. Bajee Eao him- self usually kept at the distance of two long marches in advance. Nothing of interest occurred in this very long and arduous pursuit : it wiYL be sufficient, therefore, to notice the line of the * Vide Forbes' OrienUil Memoirs. 312 PESHWA. 1817-18. enemy's flight. Passing Suttara, he went as far south as Poosa Saolee (Possessolee.) From tliis point, either to avoid falling in with Prigadier-General Pritzler, who was advancing with the reserve from the ceded districts, or having no object in remain- ing to the south of the capital after the junction of the Suttara Raja's family, and naturally wishing to be joined by the support he expected from Hindoostan, he made a few long marches eastward, as far as Pundurpoor; and thence getting round Brigadier-General Smith, marched rapidly in a north-westerly direction, and, passing half-way between Poona and Seroor, moved northward as far as Wuttoor, on the direct road to Nassick. Here he was joined by Trimbukjee Dainglia, who brought with him a considerable reinforcement of horse and foot, raised in Kandesh, or invited down from Hindoostan into the service. General Smith followed close at his rear, arriving at Pundurpoor on the 8th of December, the second day only after Bajee Rao had left it. As soon as the Peshwa had passed clear of Poona, the Brigadier-general moved to the old canton- ment of Seroor, and, after recruiting his cattle, resumed the pursuit on the 22d of December. Keeping now greatly to the east of the enemy's route, he entered the valley of the Goda- veree, by the jSTimba-Deora Ghat, in the hope thus to intercept his retreat northward: for the Peshwa, finding himself less pressed, had loitered some days at Wuttoor, and in the neighbour- hood of the strong fort of Jooneer. He was still in vicinity of that place on the 26th of December, when his active pursuer had already advanced to Hun^mntgaon, yet fiu'ther northward than himself He then attempted to continue his march to- wards Nassick ; but General Smith was gaining fast upon him from the east, and he had scarcely descended the Ghat to the valley of the Peeree, on the 27th, when he heard that the Brigadier-general had ah-eady passed Sungumner, and was in fuU march to intercept liis flight. Pinding it now impossible to 1817-18. PESHWA. * 313 prosecute his march to the north without takinht up after blowing open the outer gate, upon which the place was soon carried, and the garrison, in number about 300, were put to the sword. The Killadar was executed on the s])ot, on the twofold charge of original resistance to the order of his sovereign and supposed implication in the treachery of the garrison. The example was highly useful, and no doubt intluenced the subsequent surrender of'the nuich stronger forts of Galna, Chandore, and other places, immediately on the presentation of the orders by the several detachments sent to occupy them. The total loss on the part of the British was seven officers and eighteen men killed and wounded. The death of Major Gordon was the subject of universal regret, as he deservedly enjoyed the highest estimation of his brother soldiers, as well as of the government he served. Leaving a garrison to occupy Talner, the Lieutenant-General crossed thc^Taptee, and advanced by Umulner to Pahrola, where he came into communication with Brigadier-General Doveton, then posted at Outran. This officer, having already completed the settlement of atfairs at NAgpoor, had returned westward by EUichpoor in the course of January, expecting orders to proceed against Aseergurh ; but, on the abandonment of the intention of reducing that fortress in the current season, he had been ordered to direct his march upon the point of Kandesh-Ootran, on the Gyrna. Sir Thomas Hislop now ordered him to move up the Gyrna to Bal, following himself^ the course of the Boaree, and sending a detachment to receive the surrender of Galna. No resistance was attempted ; and this, with several other of Holkar's possessions in the neighbourhood, was quietly occupied by the troops of the two divisions. ^Vhile these divisions were thus employed in Kandesh, Sii- Thomas Hislop received inteUigence that liajee Bao had pene- trated the Ghats separating that province from the vaUey of the Godaveree : whereupon he immediately hastened to the south, 354 KANDESH. 1818. ordering Brigadier-General Doveton to move on a parallel line in the same direction, in the hope of being able to intercept him before he should be apprized of their approach. It will be convenient, however, to relate the intermediate occurrences at the court of Nagpoor, before we return to trace the motions of the fugitive Peshwa, and the further operations against him. Jfit -■s^: '/^ Resnve Dnigrc'ns MU frUi" d^r' British Camp !)" of Jlay 1818. Sketfh ofthf Jfsimlt^ — ou the IPETTAH of SHOLAPOOR,) ^ atrac/c rr't/tc Sneni vs ^ifaiitrvA- Cims, — ■Si, f Scali e^lJiftle lit and Zf ■Kf' Sec II V m f^.pf 'U \\'' , £n^m I' w jB^-dv D'£wk^ti TLJE/it'nrv <2s hf first afi/^rirfd <'^trk(J dyJi-d'StL'-Batt c J"(.. J).". J).° — riavm^ {'n /Af^fm}'£d/>i»' d ■/ L* Troops oftitAS^Cav'm litu i/t/rrz/jn^ A' e e J^/- same adrnn^^d f J7U-SJ A-S'^Cm/c-h ^inf dif £n/-/n%' at li i, Bcdv f^t^e Emmy a^&ut MC^fiO strim^ k v9/^/j D" ije^t? 1 IfrtSffwiti'df^^rJf^d te sctmr fh^^ /n//s t Ounp a/'tfr acti^pn f 1 fflffuifrv A- A>/«.f / tCkvalrr Jungle £, 'fff/M/fM" ^^und^..j ^^4^„ CHAPTER XVI. NAGPOOR— DUKIIUN. 1818, FEBRUARY TO MAY. Nagpoor-ministry of restored Raja-his fresh intrigues and early treachery- Resident's suspicions and measures-Governor-Gcncral's first instructions- Detection of the plots-arrest of Raja and his ministers-Bajee Rao applied U> by Bhoosla for aid-consequent proceedings-marches eastward-eludes Sir Thomas Hislop's division- Army of the Duklu.n broken up-progress of Bajee Rao-Bricradier-General Smith co-operates vvidi Brigadier-General Doveton -Lieutenant-Colonel Adams-repulse of Gunput Rao-Lieutenant-Colonel Adams at Hingunghat-waits for other divisions, and advances-route of Soonee-pursuit by Brigadier-General Doveton-dispersion of Mahratta army -detention and submission of sirdars- Wusota invested and captured-new distribution of the forces-capture of other forts-affair of Solapoor-Chanda invested— its surrender. The affairs of Nagpoor have been passed over in silence, since Appa Saheb's return to the palace of the Bhooslas, under an arrangement confirmed by the Marquess of Hastings, as mentioned in the 12th Chapter. This occurred in the course of January, the date of the Raja's return being the 9th of that month. It will be recollected, that, when Appa Saheb made his sub- mission, the principal channel of communication between him and the Resident was Nerayun Pundit, one of the negotiators of the original subsidiary alliance. This man was rewarded for the share he had in that transaction, and for his former tried z z 2 356 NAGPOOR. 1818. fidelity to the British Government, by being immediately in- vested with the second place in the administration, under the name of Peshkar. !Nagoo Punt, however, the other negotiator of the alliance, a man more deep in Appa Saheb's confidence, was retained as dewan ; and Eamchundur Wagh, who had also submitted, together with his master, on the 16th of December, was not displaced, though known to have been an active insti- gator of the late hostilities. This man had been included in the indemnity for the past, by an express stipulation with Nera- yun, before Appa Saheb could be induced to come in ; and ]Mr. Jenkins, willing to regard the fact of his surrender along with his master, as a sufficient indication of his altered sentiments, not only showed towards him no displeasure at the part he had lately taken, but allowed him to retain his offices and influence in the court. The Eiu-opean reader will scarcely believe it possible, that, after submitting to be reinstated in the Guddee of Nagpoor by the mediation of the British Resident, at the sacrifice of his army and political independence, Appa Saheb should again have entered into treasonable plots against the power, which had thus restored him. It wovdd seem, however, that no sooner was the personal danger gone by, than he began to be ashamed of the weakness that had urged him to throw up a cavise by no means desperate ; and, sensible that he had acted more from fear than judgment, he could scarcely divest himself of the idea of his having been betrayed into the step, by what he now deemed to be Nerayun's interested exaggerations of the danger. Ashamed and mortified at the folly and cowardice of the course he had taken, he thought only of repairing the error, as soon as he should recover the means ; and by way of ensuring success, not only agreed with apparent readiness to the terms proposed, but proffered more than was asked, in the hope of regaining 1S18. NAGPOOR. 357 our confidence, and thereby masking his future conduct and designs. So rapid was this change of sentiments in the Raja, that, even while yet in our power, and Uving at the Residency, nay, at the very moment of subscribing to the terms which were to be the price of his restoration, was he practising the deception, by which he hoped to retrieve his affairs and renew our embar- rassments. In the interval between the attack on the Residency and the arrival of Rrigadier-General Doveton, secret orders had been issued to the several Goand and other jungul and mountain Rajas, to call out their followers, and offer every annoyance in their power to the British authorities, especially to cut off detachments in charge of convoys, and prevent the country from furnishing supplies to the different armies in the field. Appa Saheb and his ministers, while negotiating the terms of the treaty, perceiving, from the omission of any stipulation for the recal of these orders, that ]VIr. Jenkins had then no notice or suspicion of them, resolved to allow them to take effect, though perfectly aware, as they afterwards acknowledged, that the conse- quence of not recalling them would be, to raise the whole country in arms, not only against us, but against any government that might act under our sanction. This deception was continued in the measures taken to prevent the due execution of the treaty after its signature. It was ascertained, that the Killadars of iVIundela and Chouragurh had from the first received private instructions not to surrender to the public orders which should be presented. The commander at Dhamonee* also ])leaded the receipt of similar instructions, which order, to be effectual, nnxst have preceded the signing of the treaty, or at least have followed so closely, as to be sure of anticipating the public sum- • The private orders to Dlianioiiee were in tlicsc words: " Jysa noklio, wysakuro ;" " As you see, so do :" incaiiiiig, as the Killadar naturally interpreted them, " Resist, if you think yourself able." 358 NAGPOOR. 1818. inons ; which shows the early commencement of the plot. In prosecution of the same designs, orders were issued on the 18th of January, nine days only after the Eaja returned to his palace, for the Killadar of Chanda to recruit, and particularly to enlist Arabs. It was moreover subsequently ascertained, that, along with Gunput Kao, who carried off with him the remnant of the army defeated by Brigadier-General Doveton, an agent of the name of Sukha-Eam had been sent directly from Appa Saheb, carrying with him one of the seals of state in token of his mission, to convey the Raja's earnest request for immediate assistance towards throwing off the British yoke. The issue of this part of the intrigue will presently be mentioned, when we come to relate what was passing in the camp of Bajee Eao. The first suspicion entertained by Mr. Jenkins of the exist- ence of these designs was excited by the obstinate refusal of the Killadars and ganisons to evacuate IMundela and Chouragurh, notwithstanding the Uberal offer of all arrears ; for the rejection of which it was impossible to assign an adequate motive, without supposing them to have other resources or the assurance of other support in the back ground. Indeed, the Killadar of Choura- gurh asserted the receipt of private orders of a contrary purport, in reply to the summons sent to him by Lieutenant-Colonel M'j\Iorin. Coupling this obstinacy of the Killadars and the reasons so publicly assigned for it with some appearances of a similar nature in the behaviour of the Prince himself since his restoration, Mr. Jenkins thought it necessary to take mea- sures for ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the reports in circulation, and for watching the agents of the several parties, and endeavouring to intercept some of their confidential despatches. It was particularly an object to discover, whether the intrigues were confined to the ministry and inferior depart- ments, or originated with the Eaja himself. There was certainly ample ground to suspect Appa Saheb ; for it had been observed. 1818. NAGPOOR. 359 that, although he had since his return to the palace shut himself up in liis own apartments, professino- to be indifferent to all state concerns, still he was evidently discontented, and never saw Nerayun Pundit without reproaching him as the cause of his present degradation. .Vt the same time it was known, that he had frequent private conferences with Nagoo Punt and Pam- chundur, the purport of which was studiously concealed from their colleagues in administration, and from the Pesident. His participation in whatever intrigues were on foot was also infera- ble from his general character and conduct ; besides which, on more than one occasion, suspicion was excited by Nagoo Punt's mode of conducting the internal branch of the administration, particularly by some measures he took to favovu- the interests of those proscribed in consequence of their continued disobe- dience. When J\Ir. Jenkins preferred a com])laint against liim to Appa Saheb, the Paja pledged himself for the dewan's fidehty, and would listen to no argument tending to impeach it ; thus evidently identifying himself with the measures of the favourite. But the circumstance, which threw the strongest personal suspi- cion upon Appa Saheb, was, the discovery that, instead of bring- ing his treasvQ'es back to Nagpoor along with the women of his family, he had issued secret orders to have the greater part con- veyed back to Chanda and other forts, and even what was brought into the town was not openly deposited in the palace, but given out in trust with great secrecy and care. Influenced by these suspicions, Mr. Jenkins first set a ^yatch upon a man named Govind Pundit, whom he knew to be the agent at court on behalf of Nathoo-Pam, an officer who had been commissioned to expedite the surrender of ^Mundela. On the 4th of March, having intelligence that a letter was on its way from him to Xathoo-Pani, in the hands of a confidential messenger, he caused the bearer of it to be seized, and thus obtained possession of it. The letter gave circumstantial details 360 NAGPOOR. 1818. of what had passed at some conferences mth Nagoo Punt, and Ramchundur, to which Govind had been admitted, and afforded abundant evidence of those ministers having instigated the refusal to surrender Mundela. Upon this, Mr. Jenkins caused Govind Punt to be arrested and examined ; and being appre- hensive of an attempt on the part of Appa Saheb to depart secretly, redoubled his vigilance, and, under the pretence of an improved police regulation, ordered every possible precaution to be taken to prevent any one from quitting the town by night. Thougli the suspicions were strong, nothing further had yet attached to Appa Saheb himself; when a private letter of the date of the 6th of March, was addressed by Mr. Jenkins to the Governor-General, pressing for early instructions for his guidance. He was answered in the same spirit by Mr. Adam, the Governor-General's secretary, that, ^^ithout direct proof against the Raja, he was only to act against the ministers ; but that he would be justified in taking the most vigorous measures to "obtain the removal of such dangerous counsellors, as Xagoo Punt and Ramchvnidur had now proved themselves to be, and the exclusion from the durbar of others of the same stamp. In the mean time, however, reports poured in from every quarter of ap- plications by Appa Saheb to Bajee Rao for assistance, and of the hostile advance of Gunput Rao with succours. ]\[r. Jenkins, therefore, redoubled his efforts to penetrate the mystery. Having ascertained that two agents were about to be despatched by Ramchundur to Bajee Rao, one a confidential cintnavees (secretary) of Ramchundur himself, the other a bareedar (private servant) of the Raja, caused them to be seized just on the point of setting off. Before tliis strong measure, he had contrived to procure from the chitnavees an acknowledgment of the nature of his errand, which was made in a place where he could be overheard, and to a supposed friend, who was in reaUty a spy set to win his confidence. Atma-Ram (so was the secretary 1818. NAGPOOR. 361 named) destroyed a paper he had about him as soon as he found himself betrayed ; but it was discovered that this paper con- tained a few words in the Prince's own hand-writing, which were to give the assurance of his being a true messenger. Xext morning, when Appa Saheb was informed of the arrest of the courier, lie expressed the utmost anxiety to know if any paper had been foiuid upon him, and seemed much relievec^at learning that none was actually Ibrthcoming. This occurred on the 14th of !Marcli ; and at the same time arrived the positive intelligence of Gunput Eao being in full march to Nagpoor, while it was confidently reported, that the Peshwa was himself folloAving with his whole army, and had already passed the frontier of the Nizam's dominions in his way. Previous accounts had reported him to have moved in an easterly direction after evading the pursuit of Sir Thomas Hislop, so as to render such an intention extremely probable. It was rumoured also, that the Eaja was on the eve of flying to Chanda to meet him. The Peshwa's detachment of Gunput Rao with reinforce- ments, and movement with his main army in a direction to support that chief, was so strong a confirmation of the truth of the designs said to be in agitation at Nagpoor, as, even without positive proof and on mere suspicion, would have justified the most vigorous precautionary measures. More decisive evidence had, however, been obtained by the seizure of Atma-Ram and liis companion, evidence going directly to implicate the Raja himself. Feeling, therefore, that, should the Rhoosla jirince escape and join Bajee Rao, all that had been done to establish order in the Kagpoor dominions would be undone again in a moment, and being now armed with more convincing testimony, the Resident resolved to wait no longer for instructions, but to act upon his own responsibility, and take the only step, which could effectually secure the British interests intrusted to his S A 362 NAGPOOR. 1818. charge against the impending danger. Up to this time he had confined himself to measures of precaution and inquiry ; but the knowledge of these, and of the arrest of the couriers, was calcu- lated to precipitate the crisis with the Eaja, and to urge him to immediate flight, as the only means of avoiding the consequences of detection. Thus, it was impossible to delay for another mo- ment the necessary measures of prevention, however anxious he might have been to receive the instructions of the liigher powers, before he took so decided a step. Accorchngly, having determined immediately to place the Raja under close arrest, he sent notice of this intention over night to Buka Baee, whom the reader will remember to have been before mentioned, as the favourite wife of the deceased Ragoojee, and at all times attached to the party opposed to the reigning Raja. In the morning of the 15th of jVlarch, he despatched a note to Appa Saheb, informing liim that doubts had arisen, which made it absolutely necessary that he should come and remain at the Residency till they were cleared up, repre- senting sti'ongly the utter impossibility of resistance, and the prudence of immediate comphance, without rendering it neces- sary to resort to forcible measures. Buka Baee in vain exerted her influence to induce the Raja to attend to tliis very pe- remptory summons : whereupon, Mr. Jenkins being determined to enforce it, sent a party of Sepoys unarmed, under the con- duct of Captain Brown, 522d Bengal native infantry, and Dr. Gordon, the Resident's assistant, who succeeded in effecting the arrest, and fortunately without the necessity of entering the apartments reserved for the women. Xagoo Punt and Ram^ chundur AVagh were in like manner seized, and all three brought to the Residency, and placed under separate guards. They in some measure confessed their participation in the plot, particu- larly Nagoo Punt, who accused his master of being the cause of 1818. NAGPOOR. 36S his ruin by liis incurable love of intrigue, and made it his prin- cipal request, that, if doomed to imprisonment, he might be separately confined. The confessions of the Raja and of his ministers were quite unnecessary to convince the world of their criminality. Proofs multiplied from every quarter immediately after their appre- hension ; while the daily advance of IJajee Kao, and the gradual development of the intrigues that had been passing betweeii him and the Bhoosla, satisfied every one of the necessity of the Resident's precautionary measures. Amongst other articles of accusation, that transpired in the course of the inquiries insti- tuted on this occasion, the circumstances of the murder of Pur- sajee first came to light on the day before the arrest. Indeed, one of Mr. Jenkins' motives for holding the Raja in close con- finement was, the idea, that Lord Hastings might perhaps desire so heavy an accusation to be brought to trial, in order to visit the crime with the merited punishment, in the event of the charge being clearly established. In this posture affairs remained at Nagpoor, while the Re- sident awaited the Governor-General's instructions as to the steps to be next adopted. And here we will for the present leave them, turning aside to notice the circumstances of Bajee Rao's advance into this territory, and the events to which it led. We have already followed Ciunput Rao to the time of his junction with Bajee Rao, at the head of the broken horse of the Nagpoor army. The junction took place in the neighbourhood of Tambaornee, before Bajee Rao's retreat on Solapoor, whither Gunput Rao accompanied him, and was afterwards present at the battle of Ashtee. Naroo Sukha-ram, the agent before- mentioned, had followed in the train of this Sirdar, and delivered the errand from his master, soliciting aid : and the course to be adopted in consequence was under consideration, when Bajee 3 a2 364 PESHWA. 1818. Rao's army was surprised on the 20th of February. In the flight, Bajee Rao had scarcely got as far north as Purinda, when two hoojras (confidential messengers) arrived also from Nagpoor, pressing for the early adoption of some plan for the Raja's relief. On their heels followed two other similar messengers, who re- peated Appa Saheb's earnest entreaty for assistance, bringing a letter in his own hand-writing to confirm the veracity of their verbal statement. The despatch was brief and simple : " Su- " mana Meer to Gungana Dobeeya — Assist me in any way you " can." The names are those of two holy men, famous in Mah- ratta legends for the assistance they mutually rendered each other in extremity. These messengers Bajee Rao carried along with him, and continued his flight northward to Newasa, whence he endeavovu-ed withovit success to expel a garrison of Sebundees left by Colonel Deacon in his way to the south-west. From Newasa he directed his flight north-west to Kopergaon, crossing the Godaveree at Phool-tamba. Finding the heat of the pursuit somewhat abated, he took the opportunity of visiting Nassick, and then proceeded to Warner near Chandore, where he effected the before-mentioned junction with Ramdeen, who had brought with him somePindaree horse, and a portion of the routed infantry of Holkar. Hence the Nagpoor messengers were at length despatched with a written answer to the Bhoosla, the contents of which never transpired ; but there can be no doubt it con- veyed an assurance of immediate help. This was on the 2d of March ; and Gunput Rao and Sukha-ram at the same time solicited an advance of money, and leave to depart for Nagpoor, stating that preparations for war had been making at Chanda, that a force iindcr Chundojee Bhoosla was at Bhandaree, and that they had certain information of the hill people having risen in arms, as well as of Mundela and Chouragurh having been put into a condition to stand a siege. With a small advance of money and troops, they engaged to raise a general insurrection, 1818. PESHWA. 365 as soon as they should roach the IJhoosla territory ; and strongly reconnnended the Peshwa to proceed hiniseh" in the same di- rection by the route of Kandesh and JJoorhanpoor. IJajce Rao, though he seemed to listen favourably to this advice, could not be brought to give a distinct or innnediate answer, but desired Gunput Eao to wait a few days for his determination, lie then skirted the Ghats into Kandesh, collecting information as he went, as to the practicability of the plan, and the disposition of the several British tUvisions. ^Vt Unkye he first learnt Sir Thomas Hislop's arrival in Kandesh, and near approach in a direction to intercept completely the route by Eoorhanpoor ; whereupon he fled with the utmost precipitation across the Godaveree at Kopergaon, and as far south as Assee on the Peeree. Thence again, fearing to fall in with the division of Brigadier-General Smith in its advance from the south, he turned off due east, and continued his march in that direction. The suggestion of Gunput Rao was now openly adopted, and tliis chief sent forward by a parallel, but different route from that pursued by the main body, wliich passed the Nizam's ft-ontier, and crossed the Godaveree at Ruk-husbun to the south of Jalna, with the evident and avowed intention of entering the dominions of the Rhoosla state. On the 11th of March, Sir Thomas Hislop ascended from Kandesh to the plain of the Godaveree, and made one or two ineffectual efforts to come up wath the enemy ; but, finding that he had escaped by the superior rapidity of his marches, first to the south and then to the east, the Lieutenant-General re- solved, without further delay, to carry into effect the orders he had received from Lord Hastings. The several coips forming the head-quarter division were acconhngly distributed amongst the other forces in the field ; and, on the 31st of jNlarch, the final orders were issued from Lassoor for breaking up the array of the Dukhun. Sir Thomas Hislop liiniself, with the whole general 366 PESHWA. 1818. staff of the army, prepared for liis return to the Madras pre- sidency with a shght escort of cavah-y and infantry ; and subse- quently, in order to avoid the inconvenience of diverting so large a force as would be necessary to form an efficient escort, from the more important object of contributing to the settlement of the country, he resolved to proceed from Poona to Bombay, and thence round by sea to Madras, leaving all his escort at Mr. Elphinstone's disposal, along with the other troops in the field. In the meantime, Bajee Rao was hastening his fiight from his own dominions in the direction of Chanda. His march was marked with cruelties and excesses of the most wanton kind, which, indeed, were mostly attributed to the professional plun- derers brought down by Ram-Deen from Hindoostan ; for the Mahrattas had hitherto showm some moderation and forbearance in their passage tlirough the country. During the retreat, great pains were taken to mislead the pursuers. The Pcshwa liimself always gave out the Une of march for the day, withholding every morning from all his officers the next place of halting, until his standard and treasure elephants had actually moved forward. Brigadier-General Smith had not urged the northward pui-suit of Bajee Rao after tlie action at Ashtee on the 20th of February ; thinking it necessary first to escort the Raja of Suttara, to receive his formal investiture by Mr. Elphinstone. Tliis occasioned a few days respite ; after wliich the fight division, under the Bri- gadier-General, again proceeded to the north, and having halted to refresh at Seroor, left that place to prosecute the pursuit on the 10th of March. Hearing at tliis point of Bajee Rao's march eastward, the Brigadier-General moved towards JAlna, in order to concert a combined plan of pursuit A^dth the division of Bri- gadier-General Doveton, who had by tliis time received his reinforcements from Sir Thomas Hislop, and reached that posi- tion. Brigadier-General Doveton, who was the junior officer, resolved to march liimself upon Basum, and thence along the 1818. PESHWA. 367 GhAts into Berar, as far as Kurinja, in the hope of, by that means, effectually cutting off the ]\lahratta army from the north; and suggested to Jirigadier-( General Smith the advantage of his moving along the line of the (iodaveree, at such a distance from the river, as slioidd ])i-event the enemy from turning his right without crossing, which the difficulty of the fords gave him little chance of effecting, or of getting off to the southward again, without laying himself open to attack. The van of the iNIahratta army, after having traversed the Nizam's dominions from west to east without resistance, appeai-ed on the banks of the Wurda on the first or second of April, at a point near "Woonee, a little above the confluence of this river with the Payn Gunga. In this quarter, however, he found his plans wholly disconcerted by the preparations made for his re- ception. It will be recollected, that, after receiving the submis- sion of Xamdar Khan and other Pindaree leaders, the division of Lieutenant-Colonel xVdams had been ordered to return fi'om Hindoostan to its original station in the valley of the Xerbudda, there to prepare for the reduction of the fort of Chouragurh, the Killadar of which had been repeatedly summoned by Lieu- tenant-Colonel INI'^Iorine without effect. The beo;innin:Vppa Saheb in time to seize 3 D S86 APPA SAHEB. 1818. him, notM ithstanding the utmost exertion of despatch and vigilance in every quarter. Ere long it was ascertained, that he had fled in the first instance to Heraee, a place about forty miles south-west of Rychore, and thence to the INIohadeo hills, where he was har- boured and concealed by the Goands, and particularly by one Chyn-Shah, a Raja of considerable influence among them. By the close of the rains, he was enabled to collect round his standard a few followers from the wreck of Bajee Rao's army, and from among the fugitive Arabs diiven out of Kandesh. With this band he gave considerable trouble in the ensuing season : nor has the consequent disturbance of that part of the country yet been remedied, or the rising in his favour been en- tirely subdued to this day *. He has, however, for some months been confined to the hills, and reduced to the greatest straits ; and his partisans have been decidedly worsted, wherever they have ventured to show themselves. But of this more hereafter. The government of Nagpoor, immediately on hearing of the escape, authorised the offer of a reward of a lack of rupees in cash and a jageer of 10,000 rupees a year in land for the re- apprehension of the fugitive. The reward in ready money was afterwards doubled ; and it was for some time hoped, that the notoriously venal disposition of the Goands would have induced them to violate the rights of hospitahty ; but in the end these hopes proved in this instance fallaciovis, and the whole force of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams was consequently obliged to take the field in two bodies, one occupied in watching the passes into the Mohadeo hills, while the other is still employed in hunting him down within their range. Neither Nagoo Punt nor Ramchundur Wagh were parties to the escape ; but both were safely conveyed to Jubulpoor, and thence forwarded to * February, 1819. 1818. I'ESIIWA. 387 Allahabad, the i)lace of their original destination. The escape of Appa Saheb at this juncture was particularly unfortunate, as it gave a new head to the turbulent and factious, whose minds might else have been reconciled to submission, if not by the examjjle of their neighbours, at least by the total want of organisation and of \uiion, that must have followed the loss of every leader of note and personal influence. Bajee Rao had himself been reduced to extremity by the battle of Soonee, and was on the eve of throwing up the game. We have mentioned, that from Boree he turned northwards, directing his flight towards Hindoostan, in despair of being able to gain any thing by returning towards his late dominions. The faint reed, on which he now leant his hopes, Avas the idea, that, in the event of his reaching the territory of Doulut Kao Sind- heea, he might, either through that chief's mediation secure advantageous terms of reconcihation with the British, or, by di'awing him into his measures, obtain the necessary accession of strength, without which all further struggle w as utterly hopeless. The reputation of Sindheea's military power had always stood pre-eminent among the Alahratta states ; and, as he alone had survived the general crash of the late events, it was not unna- tural for the fugitive head of the nation to look to it as a resource in his present desperate condition. Submission, how- ever, was at this moment the primary object of his desire ; and, in token of his humiliation, he despatched agents both to Mr. .Jenkins at Niigpoor and to the commissioner at Poona, to intimate his readiness to tender his personal surrender. ]\rean- while, having crossed the Taptee on the 5th of May, just below its confluence with the Poona, he proceeded down the valley as far as Chupara, with a view to penetrate into Hindoostan by the Sindwa Ghat and Indore. At Chupara he discovered that this route was altogether closed against him by our possession of Sindwa, as well as by the judicious precautions already taken by 3 I) 2 S88 PESHWA. 1818. Sir John Malcolm for defence of the hne of the Nerbudda from Hindia downwards to Muheshwur. Equally baffled in this attempt, as he had been in his former design of reaching the Bhoosla dominions, he sent forward an agent to Sir John Mai- , colm, retiring himself eastward towards Eoorhanpoor, in order to wait the result of his mission. It appeared as if he intended, in case of failure, to shut liimself up in A seergurh as his place of final refuge, or explore a more easterly route to Hindoostan, should any one seem to be practicable. Every exertion had been made to provide against the possi- bility and danger of his penetrating to the north, and to over- whelm the adherents that still clung to his fortunes. There was fortunately at Hindia, besides the usual guard of that im- portant post, a strong detachment of infantry, having under its escort the guns taken at jNIehudpoor, and the hospital establish- ment and convalescent left there by Sir Thomas Hisloj), and now on their way to the Dukliun. The presence of these troops afforded the means of forming a force of sufficient strength to advance upon Bajee Rao from the north-east, and either attack him on that side, or at least effectually shut up the Ghats of the Satpoora range. Brigadier-General IMalcolm also jjrepared to advance in person, with what troops he could collect, from the neighbourhood of Indore to the north-^^'est, while Brigacher- General Doveton was known to be approaching from the south- ward. Hence it seemed more than probable, that the enemy would be again hemmed in, and give the opportunity of another affair as important as that of Soonee. Eastward of Hindia, the defence of the Nerbudda was confided to Brigadier-General Watson, who, after occupying Chouragurh, and affording Lieu- tenant-Colonel M']\Iorine a reinforcement to assist in the pursuit of Appa Saheb, had retired to SAgur with the greater part of his force, in conformity with orders received threct from the J\Iar- quess of Hastings for his occupation of that post. In antici- 1818. PESHWA. 389 pation of the ])ossil)ility of IJajce Kao's success in getting to the nortluvard, before the above precaution slioukl be in a sufficient state of forwardness to cut him off entirely from this hue of retreat, the jVfarcjuess of Hastinj2;s, on the first alarm, had in- structed Sir David Ochterlony to be in readiness to tlu-ow his force between the enemy and CJwalior, and in that case to take upon himself the personal and supreme direction of all the operations. Such were the accumulated means, witli which, if necessary, it was determined to crush the ex])iring efforts of the fugitive Peshw'a. That Prince, however, distracted at the ojjerations that he saw about to close upon him on every side, remained irresolutely hovering about Aseergurh, where he was visited by Sindheea's Killadar, Juswunt Rao Lar, who, during the whole of his stay in the neighbourhood, participated in all his counsels, and rendered every assistance in his power. In- deed, the reliance upon this resource and u])on the shelter of the fortress in case of need, appears to have been a principal motive of his delay at Dholcot in that vicinity. While Bajee Eao was thus wasting his time in indecision, and allowing the British forces to draw a net completely round him, Anund Rao Juswunt, the agent avIio had been sent to Sir John Malcolm, reached the camp of that officer at Mow, a few miles from liidore, late in the night of the Kith of May. The letter he brought from his master contained an a})})eal to the generosity of the British (Government, and a s})ice of adulation to the general himself, whom, in a strain of Asiatic compliment, he protested he had been looking out for on every side, as one of his oldest and best friends *, in order to solicit him to become * In the subsequent conference between the General and Bajec Rao, the latter urgently appealed to the long friendship between them ; stating that, of his three oldest and best friends, Colonel Close was dead and General Wcllosley in a distant land, and the only one now left him was Sir John himself. That officer's great experience of Indian politics and long intercourse with the native princes had indeed 390 PESHWA. 1818. the instrument of peace and reconciliation with the British. Particular allusion was made to the liberahty, with which con- quests heretofore made from Holkar and Sindheea had been restored without equivalent or reason ; with an evident insinua- tion, that a similar degree of generosity in his own instance was expected or hoped to result from his choice of this channel of reconciliation. Sir John Malcolm resolved at once to convert this commu- nication, which really differed httle in substance from what Mr. Elphinstone had been in the habit of receiving from the outset of the campaign, into a negotiation for surrender upon terms. The vakeel accordingly, finding the General in this mind, pressed him earnestly to advance to a personal conference with his master, for the purpose of discussing the terms and receiving his submission. This, however, was refused ; bvit Sir John's first and second political assistants. Lieutenants Low and M'Dowall, were despatched along with Anund Rao, bearing the General's reply ; and Lieutenant Low was instructed, if jjossible, to open a negotiation on the following basis : first, Bajee Eao to renounce all sovereignty in the Dukhun for himself and family for ever ; secondly, not to retvirn thither on any terms ; thirdly, the surrender of Trimbukjee and all persons concerned in the hanging of the two ^'^aughans at Tulligam on the first breaking out of the war. In the event of the Peshwa's agreeing to these prehminaries. Lieutenant Low was to insist upon his imme- diately separating liimself I'rom Ram-Deen and other proscribed rebels or Pindarees that might be with his army, and advancing to meet the Brigadier-General, who, in such case, engaged to be the medium of an adjustment with the British Government, on recommended him to their particular confidence, and made them look up to him for protection in their time of need. Of this feeling the best proof is to be found in the number of chiefs that surrendered to him, besides the Peshwa : amongst others, Kureem, Rajun, Kander-Buksh, &c. 1818. PESHWA. 391 the basis of personal security to the prince himself, and a Uberal maintenance at such holy city, as he might select for his fiiture residence. Protection from the attack of lirigadier-CJeneral Doveton, or any of the other divisions that threatened him, was not to be granted, except on compliance with the requisition to advaiice in the direction prescribed. Sir John Alalcolm, had in due course, been furnished with a copy of the Governor-Generars instructions to ^Ir. l-ilphinstone, which had put him in possession of the outline of his Lordship's intentions with regard to the personal treatment of Jiajee Eao, in case of his being reduced to surrender himself uncondition- ally ; and the terms, which Lieutenant Low was directed to offer, were framed iipon those instructions. Conceiving himself to be acting according to their spirit, the General did not think it necessary to wait the result of a reference for special ordei-s in the present instance : nor indeed would the distance from his Lordship's quarters at Gorukpoor have allowed of such a reference. The Alarqviess of Hastings, however, immediately on hearing of the step taken by Sir John jNIalcolm, could not avoid expressing his apprehension, that the deputation of an officer for the avowed pur})ose of negotiation Avould have the effect of cramping the military operations of the several di- visions, which it was particularly desirable to leave as free as possible to the last. It was evident that Eajee Rao could have but one motive of desire to submit, viz. the desperate posture of his affiiirs. Another rencontre with any of our divisions must necessarily complete his ruin ; consequently, any thing that embarrassed the military movements, besides im- peding the grand object of annihilating the mihtary power of the INIahratta sovereign, promised to give him a further ad- vantage in the negotiation also, as it must create an impression, that the basis of treaty was not that of an individual resorting to us for personal safety upon any terms that he could get, but 392 PESHWA. 1818. a bargain, founded upon views of a mutuality of interest ; in other words, a compromise, in which he was to receive vakie for his forbearance to exert his remaining means of mischief and annoyance. His Lordship particularly deprecated this con- struction being put upon the measure by other powers : nor did he feel less anxiety, lest the government should be committed in respect to the place of the captive's future residence, wishing to have this left to his own selection, as well as the fixation of the amount of the stipend for the chief's permanent estabhsh- ment, which he declared his intention of limiting to two lack rupees per annum. Instructions to this effect were issued from Gorukpoor, whither the Governor-General had retired on the breaking up of the centre division of the grand army. As had been apprehended, the letter containing them did not reach Sir John JNIalcolm until every thing was concluded ; but the event of Lieutenant Low's deputation proved the correctness of his Lordship's anticipation of its effect upon the mihtary opera- tions ; while the deviation from his wishes, in respect to the other points, showed that his anxiety was not without sufficient grounds. The Lieutenant proceeded on the 18th of May, in com- pany with Anund Rao Juswunt, and reached ]Mundhs6r on the next day. He was here overtaken by fresh orders from the Brigadier-General (who had on the night of the 18th received advice of the escape of Appa Saheb), in obedience to which the Lieutenant stopped short himself, and sent forwards a Soobadar of thelMadras cavalry, by name SeyedHuseinUlee,whom Sir John jVIalcolm had selected for his native aid-de-camp, and another native, together with the vakeels. The latter were made ac- quainted with the conditions on which their master was expected to advance and meet Sir John ]^,Ialcolm ; and the Lieutenant himself followed by easy stages, expecting that, by the time he arrived in the neighbourhood, the mind of the prince would be 1818. PESHWA. - 393 prepared by their representations for submission. Bajee Rao had all this while remained at J)h6lk6t, five miles north of Aseergurh, where every day his alarm increased at tlie approach of Brigadier-General Doveton from the south. On the 25th of May, this officer arrived at Eoorlianpoor, and was on the point of equipping a light force for the immediate attack of the enemy, when he received a letter from Lieutenant Low, dateol the 23d of J\Liy, giving him the first intimation of the mission and of its result being still in suspense. Although the letter contained no positive request to suspend his further operations, yet Brigadier-General Doveton could not but see the desire of the negotiator, that time should be allowed to Bajee Ilao : indeed it was mentioned, that Colonel Smith intended to halt at Bhekungaon to the north-west, until apprized of the result. The Brigadier-General accordingly deemed it right to remain at Boorhanpoor for the same purpose. In the mean time, Bajee Eao, though still undecided as to the acceptance of the con- ditions, was most earnest in the expression of his anxiety for the arrest of Brigadier-General Doveton 's advance. This Seyed Husein Ulee reported to Lieutenant Low, who, upon his arrival at BhekungAon on the 25th, inclosed to the Soobadar an absolute requisition on the Brigadier-General to delay his advance conditionally, in case Bajee Eao should have made a movement, however short, in the direction indicated. The Soo- badar was not himself in Bajee Eao's camp when he received this despatch, but forwarded the letter with two troopers, to whom he gave similar directions. The Brigadier-General having pre- viously upon his own judgment resolved to Avait the result, the receipt of any absolute requisition became a matter of no im- portance ; but it might have been otherwise. Up to the 30th of INIay, Bajee Bao continued in his position at Dh6lk6t, still equally irresolute. In the interim, however, Sir John Malcolm had brought down the force he had eol- 3 E 394 PESHWA. 1818. lected at Indore as far as Bhekungaon, where he found Lieu- tenant Low, together with the Peshwa's vakeels, who had come the day before to press him to proceed to tlieir master's camp, which he accordingly did by the order of the Brigadier- General. The troops from Hindia also had advanced to Peep- louda, while Brigadier-General Doveton still occupied Boorhan- poor. Being now, therefore, completely surrounded, Bajee Rao, on the 31st of May, sent Balooba, dewan of the ^^inshore Kur, to Sir John Malcolm, and agreed to a personal conference on the following day, at Kiree, a village on the plain about half a mile from the Ghat of that name in the Satpoora range. The meeting took place according to this appointment, at 5 p. m. of the 1st of June, Bajee Eao having come to Kiree for the pur- pose with all his family, and an escort of about 2500 horse and foot. In the conference that ensued, Sir John INIalcolm recapi- tulated the terms that had before been communicated, and pressed the immediate surrender of Trimbukjee : but this was asserted to be impossible, as that chief had a separate camp of liis own, and was in too great strength. Sir John then declared his intention to attack him forthwith, whereupon Bajee Rao replied he was welcome for his part, using the expression, " Mobat-uk,'" " Success attend you." He subseqviently, how- ever, solicited time to recal some of his own people from Trim- bukjee's camp, a favour that was perhaps incautiously granted, and thus most probably the opportunity was taken of warning Trimbukjee of his danger : for the attempt, when subsequently made, proved abortive. The conference lasted till 10 p. m. when the Peshwa re-ascended the Ghat, where he had some guns placed to protect his retreat ; all the neighbouring passes were hned with his Arab infantry. Sir John ^Malcolm retired to his tent, and the same night prepared a written note of the conditions, and forwarded it the next morning to Bajee Rao. They differed Uttle from those before tendered by Lieutenant 1818. PESriWA. 395 Low, except in the omission of the article for the surrender of Trimbukjee. It was insisted, however, that his Iligliness should proceed to Hindoostan without tlie delay of a day, and come to the British camp for the purpose within 24 liours. At the same time. Sir John iSIalcolm took upon liimself to guarantee, that the annual allowance to be assigned for the future main- tenance of his Highness should not fall short of eight lack rupees per annum ; and the >nitten paper further declared, that if his Highness, by prompt and full performance of the terms, should evince his entire confidence in the Eritisli Go- vernment, his requests in favour of jageerdars and adherents, who had been ruined by their fidelity to his cause, should meet with liberal consideration ; also, that his representations in favour of Brahmins and religious establisluiients founded or supported by his family, should be treated with attention. This article was subsequently explained, in respect to the jageerdars, to mean, that they shovdd be received upon the same terms as had been accorded by jMr. Elphinstone to those who had tendered their submission after the rout of Soonee ; viz. to retain any lands which belonged to their families in absolute property ; but lose those they held by su7-unj(imee, tenure of military service. In order to enforce compliance, or, in case of refusal, to proceed to attack the enemy's position, Brigadier-General Doveton was requested by letter to inter- pose, if possible, between his camp and Aseergurh, whither the Pcshwa had before conveyed a great part of his remaining valuables. Lieutenant-Colonel Russell was also ordered to advance from his position at BhoorgAon, and combine with that officer in an attack upon Trimbukjee. At length, upon these conditions, after a fruitless attempt at further procrastination*, Bajee Eao joined the camp of Sir • " It would fill a volume to detail the particulars of all the intrigues which " occurred. I have never witnessed a scene in which every shade of the Indian 3 E 2 396 PESHWa! 1818. John Malcolm, on the 3d of June, at 11 a. m. The engage- ment, although not exactly according with his Lordship's views, was nevertheless confirmed and ratified by the INIarquess of Hastings ; and Bithoor, a place of Hindoo pilgrimage, distant a few miles only from the large cantonment of Cawnpoor, was subsequently fixed upon for the residence of the deposed and exiled prince. The principal objection to tliis arrangement was, the extent of the personal allowance promised to his Highness, amounting to no less than 100,000/. a year for hfe. This was far beyond the probable amount of his personal expenditure in retirement, and it was feared might leave a surplus appHcable to purposes of intrigue and mischief Sir John ISIalcolm had been guided in the fixation of the stipend, by a recollection of the amount enjoyed by Umrit Eao, under the arrangement made with that chief, by the now Duke of Wellington. He thought there would be some insult, both to the prince and the feehngs of the Mahratta nation, in offering less to one, who had so long sat upon the guddee as his birthright, than was enjoyed, as the price of abdication, by a claimant by mere adoption. The cases, however, seemed to admit of little analogy ; for Umrit Eao was a chief of powerful influence and numerous adherents, brought " character was more strongly displayed. It is honourable to Balouba, the " Vinshorekur jageerdar, to the Purunder chief, and the manager of the in- " terests of the Gokla family, who committed their cause to him, that, thoun^h " they professed themselves hopeless of success, and, convinced by my arguments, " that their master had no choice but submission, they took care to make me " understand, when I informed them that their only claim to consideration rested " on the success of their influence in promoting this measure, that, though they " would use every means of persuasion and remonstrance to effect this end, harsh- " ness or coercion they would never resort to. The vakeel of the Vinshorekur " said, that his master's family had served that of the Peshwa for five generations, " and had always spoken boldly to them ; but added, that now that fate, Bukhf, " was on him, he must be silent : even unmerited reproaches had been and must " remain unanswered." — Malcolm's Despatches. 1818. PESHWA. 397 over in critical times, and at the outset of a war of doubtful issue. And, even in his case, the extent of the stipend had enabled the chief to entertain a large retinue, and create an influence of most ])ernicious tendency, necessary as the purchase may have been to the success of the operations of that period. Experience, therefore, was against entr\isting similar means to the discretion of chiefs so circumstanced : and the ex-Prshwa's proneness to intrigue Avas too notorious to admit of the hope, that, if possessed of the means, he would forbear to employ them. Independently, however, of all considerations of tenderness towards the feelings of this fallen head of the jMahrattas, and of the pohcy of conciliating the good- will of his late subjects, by indulgent and liberal treatment of their deposed monarch, con- siderations most apt to work upon the generous spirit of a British soldier, there were other reasons of no httle weight, which had helped to guide the conduct of Sir John ]Malcolm in this very dehcate business. The remnant of the ]\Iahratta army arrived in the neighbourhood of Aseergurh, in a most exhausted condition ; but the supplies received from that fortress, and the halt of several days in the vicinity, had re- cruited both men and cattle, and put them in a condition to renew their flight with their usual rapidity, wliich might again have baffled the pursuit of regular troops. Besides, the Killadar of Aseergurh had already afforded shelter to the remaining baggage and valuables of Bajee Eao ; and his conduct, in furnisliing him with guns and other stores, had shown his readiness to receive his fugitive prince within the cover of liis walls, in case of extremity. The near approach of the rainy season, and the absence of the small battery train attached to Brigadier-General Doveton's division, which had been recently sent to Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowal, and was now emj)loyed before Malugaon, made it impossible to undertake the siege 398 PESHWA. 1818. this season ; and even to invest it so closely as to prevent his personal entrance or exit, was, in the opinion of the most experienced officers, impracticable during the rains. The re- cent escape of Appa Saheb, who has not yet been retaken, had shown the difficulty of tracing a fugitive, however illustrious or important, in this wild and rugged tract, and amongst a friendly population. But the principal motives of desire for the immediate possession of the person of the Peshwa were, the saving of the great additional expense tliat must have been incurred by tlie protraction even of desultory warfare, and the speedy restoration of general tranquillity, by removing the ostensible cause and the leader of tumult and disorder. The whole country was still infested by the broken remnants of the Pindaree durras, and the dispersed Arab and other mercenaries, whom the late changes had turned loose upon the world. Already had they begun to flock from all parts towards the standard of the prince, who still possessed the hereditary respect and affections of the Mahratta nation ; and it was imjDossible to say how far the uncertain issue of protracted hostility might work upon the unsettled minds of the different chiefs, or to calculate the full effect of any casual check or disaster. In justice to one of the most distinguished officers that our Indian service can boast of, these reasons and motives should be duly weighed ; and it is but fair to add, that nothing has yet occurred to impeach or call into question the pohcy of the arrangement effected by his agency. Whatever opinion may be entertained of the terms granted, or the manner of accomphshing the end, no one ever for a moment doubted the advantages resulting from the actual possession of the ex-Pesliwa's person. The effect produced on the minds of the native population, by his progress in the character of an exile through ]\lalwa, so lately the territorj- of his nominal dependents and fevidatories, is hardly to be 1818. PESHWA. ^99 described. It appeared to make the same impressicm upon lii^h and low, and was considered by all as the consummation of the national downfall, and the final dissolution of the jNIahratta Confederacy, beyond hope of renovation. Nor was the generosity of the victors the least imposing part of the scene. 'J'he strong only can afford to be merciful and generous ; and what greater proof could be offered of the power and magnanimity of the British nation, than the quiet march of the vanqiushed prince to the place of his honourable retreat, escorted by his stiU re- maining adherents, and treated with every attention due to fallen greatness ? Bajee Rao joined the British camp with a force of from 4 to 5000 horse, and about 3000 infontry, of whom 1200 were Arabs, whose numbers were afterwards increased to near 2000, by the juncture of detached parties left to guard the passes in the hills. The Vinshorekur and the widow of Goklu resolved to accompany their late master to Hindoostan. The remamder of his vassals either deserted him immediately upon his sub- mission, or fell off one by one in the course of his march to the Nerbudda, whither he had proceeded in company with General IVIalcolm's division, and escorted by a large body of jNIahrattas and Arabs, whom he seemed for some time unwilling to dismiss, as if still fondly clinging to the shadow of departed power. The General, though not altogether satisfied with the continued pre- sence of this lawless soldiery, was loath to disturb by harsh in- terference the last moments of intercourse between a fallen Brince and his yet faithful adherents ; and experience led him to expect, that their numbers would gradually diminish on the march. It was not long before the nuitinous spirit of these disorderly retainers, and their tumultuous demands for their arrears of pay, compelled the ex-Beshwa to resort to the pro- tection and friendly mediation of the British commander, whose firnniess and concihatory justice soon relieved him from danger, 400 PESHWA. 1818. and dismissed them equally grateful for his clemency and content with his award. From the banks of the Nerbudda, the captive proceeded with a train reduced to Httle more than 600 horse and 200 infantry, every day more reconciled to his condition, and more inclined to regard his protector with deference and confidence. Eam-Deen, who had since the peace of ISIundisor deserted the standard of the Holkar, under which he had borne a prin- cipal command, and joined the Peshwa with the wreck of his army, submitted at the same time, upon a promise of pardon for his rebellion. Trimbukjee also was very solicitous to obtain terms ; but found the Brigadier-General inflexible in demanding his surrender as a prisoner, with a bare stipulation that his hfe should be spared, and some prospect of ultimate pardon at some future period, when tranquilhty should have been com- pletely restored. On these terms he refused to submit. Bri- gadier-General Doveton had on the 3d of June sent out a detachment to attack his camp; but, as it had marched by a route leading under the walls of Aseergurh, and the Killadar, though written to, refused a free passage, and opened his fire on the troops as they approached, the attack by that route was abandoned; and, before arrangements could be made to assail him by another road, he had disappeared mth his followers. Thus was the war in this quarter brought to a happy ter- mination ; for neither Trimbukjee nor any other of the sirdars attempted again to rally the dispersed forces of Bajee Eao, or longer to keep the field. A few Arabs, however, went off to the eastward in quest of Appa Saheb, and in their way* pos- * On the 18lh of July, Captain Sparkes, then at Rytoor, heard of some Arabs having entered his district ; when, immediately collecting his detachments, he set off in quest of them. His force consisted of but 107 fighting men of the ?d-10th Bengal native infantry. On the 20th, near Mooltaya, he fell in with about 1500 Arabs and a body of horse, who surrounded him on all sides as soon as the action 1818. ARABS-TRIMBUKJEE. 401 sessed themselves of Mooltaya, and overpowered a detachment of two companies gallantly led against them by Captain Sparkes, the officer in civil charge of the district. The residue of the Mahratta host returned quietly to their homes ; among the yest Trimbukjee, who for some time endeavoured to secrete himself in the villages lately subject to his influence ; but ]\Ir. Elphinstone succeeded in effecting his seizure in the course of the following month, when he was remanded to Tannah, the place of his former confinement, and has since been ordered round to Bengal, where it is pro})osed to confine him in the fort of Chunar. To inflict capital punishment on him was deemed an act of unjust rigour, as the escape was no aggrava- tion * of the original offence, for which he had only been sen- tenced to imprisonment for hfe. Besides, the subsequent con- duct of his then master had afforded pretty strong evidence of liis participation in the Sastree's murder. Throughout the whole of the late dominions of Bajee Rao, there was henceforward not one of his officers, who ventured to keep the field in opposition to the British authority. The last vestige of open hostility had been destroyed in the affair of commenced. Nevertheless, he made good for several hours a position he took up in haste, repeUing three different charges of the enemy. At last, having driven them back a fourth time, he was following to secure a better position about fifty yards off, when he was shot dead. The Soobadar who succeeded to the com- mand, for there was no other European officer present, met the same fate imme- diately after; when the whole detachment was cut to pieces, with tlie exception of nine men only, who were behind in charge of the baggage. A strong body of troops was immediately sent down from Hoshungabad by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, the advanced guard of which, under Lieutenant Kcr of the 7tli cavalrj-, a very promising officer, who has since fallen a victim to the climate, enticed the Arabs from the fortified town by a judicious feint, and then turning upon them, made them suffer severely. They were soon afterwards driven out of the district, and confined to the inaccessible parts of the Moliadeo hills. * The laws of England treat it as such ; but they are at variance in this par- ticular with justice and common sense. 3 F 402 CONQUERED TERRITORIES. 1818. Solapoor. Neither was there, by the close of IVIay, a single fortified place that still held out, excepting a few strong holds in Kandesh, obstinately defended by the Arab garrisons. Ky- gurh, where Bajee Eao had placed liis wife for safety, surren- dered to Lieutenant-Colonel Prother in the course of that month. The wife was treated with every possible considera- tion, and allowed one of the palaces of the deposed Prince for her residence, until an opportunity offered of sending her to rejoin her husband at his place of exile. The rapidity and apparent ease, with which the British rule was estabhshed over a country of so much natural strength and difficulty, as that composing the late dominion of the Peshwas, must excite astonishment in European readers ; more especially when the inimical spirit, testified by all ranks at the opening of the war, is taken into the account. Some of the causes, which had produced this important revolution in the minds of the natives of India, have already been hinted at in the relation of the different events as they occurred, and the mode in which they were turned to advantage. It may be useful, however, to give in this place a general summary of the course of policy pursued by Mr. Elphinstone throughout the transactions we have now brought to a close, in order that the merit of his services may be more justly estimated. At the time when Bajee Kao's concealed enmity broke forth into an open rupture, there was scarcely an individual from one end of his dominions to the other, that did not confidently reckon upon our being driven entirely out of the country'. Even our warmest weU-wishers apprehended the probability of this restilt: consequently, either from hope or from fear, every one assumed the appearance of hostihty. The two affairs of Poona, though they had helped to confirm the confidence of our own troops, were not sufficiently decisive to destroy the impression so universally entertained of our relative inferiority. 1818. CONQUERED TERRITORIES. 403 The two succeeding months passed without yielding any more decisive occurrence ; and, though Bajec Kao was all the Avhile little better than a fugitive, still, as that character accorded well enough with the policy and military habits of the ]\Iahrattas, and as the enemy had suffered no material loss, our superiority in the field was scarcely yet admitted. ^Miile this feeling was still prevalent, [Mr. Elpliinstone re- ceived instructions to occupy the whole of Bajee Kao's dominions on behalf of the British authorities, and found himself nominated sole commissioner for the execution of this bold measure. Bri- gadier-General ]Munro, who had already begun to operate against the southern teri-itories of the Peshwa, was anxious to expedite the avowal of the intentions of the British Government, thinking the assurance of never again experiencing the tyranny of Mah- ratta misrule would be of the best consequence. And doubtless, in that part of the country adjoining to our own frontier, where the people were in the habit of comparing their relative con- dition under the two governments, and were familiarised to the estimate of their relative strength, the step would have been attended with great advantage. jNIr. Elpliinstone, however, feared that our power was not yet sufficiently known and re- spected in the other and more remote quarters of Bajee Rao's dominions; and that, before the population should have good cause to anticipate our idtimate success in the war, the national spirit would j)robably bvit take fire at the arrogant presumption of an open declaration of the design to assume the whole sove- reignty to ourselves. Impressed ^ith this conviction, he determined to observe the utmost secrecy, until time and the march of events should have worked a revolution in the prevaiUng sentiment towards us. The first indication of our real views was exhibited on the fall of Suttara, when I\Ir. Elpliinstone issued the manifesto noticed in the progress of the narrative ; but the commissioner, 3 F 2 404 CONQUERED TERRITORIES. 1818. in order more accurately to mark the effect that should be pro- duced by this avowal of our intentions upon the minds of the Mahratta popvdation, at first circulated his eocjwse with great caution, and affected to make the communication a matter of individual confidence. Even after the capture of that fortress, doubt as to the result of the war was still the prevalent feeling, and the explanation of our views was consequently listened to with comparative indifference. The Mahratta Prince was still much too powerful for any class to divest itself of apprehension of the consequences of declaring against him, the more especially as he had aheady made several severe examples. His defeat at Ashtee, accompanied as that disaster was by the death of Gokla, his only miUtary commander of repute, and followed by the deHverance of the Suttara family, produced at once the desired change in the popular mind. The Peshwa's approximate downfal was now universally predicted, and all not actively embarked with him looked upon his power as already extinct. The desire of his favour and the fear of his resentment were thenceforward ahke discarded ; and what was to foUow on the estabhshment of our ascendancy, became the natural object of pubhc curiosity. The manifesto was now sought for and read with avidity : copies were made and circulated by the natives of every class ; and the declarations and assurances it contained became the general topic of conversation. This was exactly the disposition that the commissioner had desired to see excited ; and he resolved to allow it full swing, in the con- fidence, that the terms of his exjjose were calculated to satisfy all ranks of hfe, and that liis own reputation, and that of the government he served, wovild prevent the least doubt being entertained of its sincerity. The immunities held out gave contentment to every one, and the resolution to submit was cheerfully and promptly embraced. The rapidity of our sub- sequent successes was at once the cause and the effect of the 1818. CONQUERED TERRITORIES. 405 rapid diffusion of tliis sense of security, and of the conduct naturally resulting from it. Borne along by the impulse thus excited, the British in- fluence and authority spread over tlie land with magical celerity. Ap])lications to he received within the pale of our dominion came pouring in faster than civil otHcers could be ])rovided lor the administration of the districts that sued for our swav, and Ions before the means of military protection could be fiu-nished from our inadequate regular establishments. The most impregnable holds opened their gates as we have already seen, and not un- frequently before they were summoned : nor could the casual possessors urge any claim to consideration for the early sur- render, since the submission was so general. It was the com- missioner's peculiar merit to have taken advantage of the precise moment, when the tide of popular feeling, which flowed strong against him at the opening of the campaign, had expended its force, and to have made such use of the reflux, as to have arrived at the point of liis hopes before it had again reached the flood. It will be necessary to trace more minutely the effect of the commissioner's measures on the several classes of jNIahratta society, all of wlaich he ultimately succeeded in reconciling to the new form of government. In India, the terms rent and revenue are so nearly syno- nimous, that the distinction of payers and receivers of revenue affords a pretty complete classiflcation of the mass of population. The former class throughout the Peshwa's dominions, though Hindoos by race and in religious tenets, were very partially of the Mahratta nation ; and having experienced that most odious form of fiscal extortion, the farming system under the admini- stration of Brahmins* and Mahrattas, needed only the assurance * It has frequently been remarked, that a Hindoo is always a more avaricious and pitiless extortioner than a Moosulman. Great subtleness, unwearied patience, and a never satiated desire of accumulation, distinguish the Hindoo all over India ; 406 CONQUERED TERRITORIES. 1818. of future protection to throw off at once the yoke under which they groaned. To change it for any that promised to be hghter, was to them a most desirable occurrence. Mr. Elphinstone's proclamation gave them the guarantee of a direct resort on all occasions to British officers, the promise of remissions of tribute on account of military ravage, of protection and equal justice for the future, and, what was a greater boon than all, a guarantee that they should never again be deUvered over to Mahratta piUage or extortion. The effect of these assurances was per- ceptible in the immediate change of demeanor in the culti- vating class, who had no sooner lost all apprehension from the vengeance of Bajee Eao than they withheld the revenue from his delegates, expelled his officers, and voluntarily brought the rents and produce of their villages and towns into the British treasiuies. To give confidence and contentment to the payers of revenue, was perhaps the easiest part of the commissioner's duties. It was a far more difficult task, to procure a recognition of the new order of things from those, who enjoyed the benefits of the existing system — ^men of large hopes and expectations, whose wealth, influence, and education, placed superior means of obstruction at their disposal. The receivers of revenue or rent were of two classes ; the religious, which, under the Brahminical government of the Peshwas, had engrossed vast possessions, con- siderably increased of late by the superstitious personal character of the Prince ; and the military and official, at the head of which stood the jageerdars and ancient INIahratta famihes. To concihate the rehgious orders was a very material object. Accordingly, the commissioner's manifesto expressly set forth the murder of Gungadliur Sastree, a Brahmin of the highest while there is a love of ease and a heedlessness of the future, which give a libera cast to the character of the Moosulman. The latter also is fond of popularity, and frequently regards name beyond wealtii. 1818. CONQUERED TERRITORIES. 407 caste, as the original cause of the breach that had taken place between the British Government and the jVfahratta sovereign ; and held out a distinct assurance, that all existing establishments for religious pur})oses shovdd be maintained, and ail endowments, grants, or assignments made before the war, be held inviolate. To increase the eifect of these public professions, j\lr. ]{;iphin- stone took the earliest opportunity, after the battle of Ashtee, to repair in person to ^^^ye, a place of high repute for Hindoo sanctity, whither the principal Brahmins and several moderate men, who desired to stand aloof from the contest, were known to have retired. There he convoked a general assembly, and repeated verbally before them the assurances contained in his expose, so as to leave all minds satisfied of the sincerity of the intentions of the British Government towards them, and con- tent with the concessions to the interest of the rehgious orders. A similar meeting was afterwards convened for the same pur- pose at Poena ; and both there and at Wye presents were dis- tributed with a hberahty, which was intended as some sort of compensation to the class for the loss of that indiscriminate bounty, with which the Peshwas were wont to lavish gifts and largesses at festivals and on other occasions of rejoicing. The present expense of this measure was doubtless considerable ; but it produced a favourable disposition, or at least served to stifle the jealousy of a powerful body, whose neutrality more than repaid the sacrifice. The mihtary and official class, which can hardly be considered separately in a IMahratta community, in the shape of jageers and military tenures, had appropriated upwards of one half of the ordinary revenue of the whole territory. It yet remained to reconcile this important body to the new order of things. The re-establishment of the Suttara Eaja, in the very seat of the ancient power and splendour of his race, was well adapted to reconcile the older Mahratta families to the annihilation of 408 CONQUERED TERRITORIES. 1818. the more recent title and authority of Peshwa. It had the fur- ther effect of rendering the cause of Bajee Eao rather a personal than a national one ; more especially as the commissioner's ma- nifesto contained the promise to all, who might submit witliin two months of its date*, of enjoying in pei-j:)etuity, under British guarantee, whatever lands they might at the time be possessed of. Hence the great families sav/, that they had themselves notliing at stake, so they did but stand aloof or withdraw from the scene of action, wliile Bajee Bao on one hand and the British on the other were contending for the mastery. Besides, there were amongst the jageerdars many, who were indebted to the very guarantee now proffered for what they actually held, and none but what were well able to appreciate the value of the offer, and to set the superior security of property it afforded in comparison with the capricious duration of a despot's favor. To these motives are to be referred the frequent submissions of the great families, that we have had occasion to record as having been tendered immediately after the battle of Ashtee. The fear of forfeiting their lands to the victors then began to exceed their apprehension of Bajee Bao's vengeance, and quickened the determination of the generahty. But the indigent of the mili- tary class were not to be won over by the same motives ; for they had nothing to lose. Many of the old families too, from pride or from principle, resolved still to share the fortunes of their prince. Wherefore, until the spirit of mihtary adventure should have been subdued by a more Uvely fear than had yet been created, nothing could be hoped, while every thing was to be apprehended from the jealousy, with which it M^as natural the new order of things should be regarded by those, who suffered in the change. This object was fortunately accompUshed to the utmost extent that could be desired, by the result of the two affairs of Soonee and Solapoor. The fugitives from both returned * J 2th of February. The term expired five days before the rout of Soonee. 1818. CONQUERED TERRITORIES. 409 humbled to their homes, and showed in all their acts, that their minds were prepared for ever to abandon their calling with all its ambitious hopes and vicissitudes, or to be content with the moderate provision allotted to those who accepted emj)loyment in our Sebundee establishment. As an act of pohcy, tlie levies of men for this force were carried to a considerable extent, in order to furnish the means of livelihood to many that must else have been left wholly destitute. Kor, indeed, could their services have been well dispensed with ; for the regular army was unequal even to furnish garrisons for the forts reduced, much less was it in a condition to provide detachments for the duties of internal administration. By denouncing and rigorously enforcing the penalty of instant military execution to all persons guilty of plundering on their retm-n, and at the same time declaring every one's home to be a secure retreat to such as sought it with jieaceable intentions, the late dominions of the Pcshwa were, immediately on their subjugation, preserved in as perfect tran- quilUty, as in a season of profound peace. Xo small credit is due for the complete attainment of this object, considering the vast influx of military rabble, that followed the rout of the INIahratta army at Soonee, and the distressed circumstances in which all returned from the field. Previous orders had been issued to note the names of all the runagates, but to leave them unmolested, unless guilty of excess ; and proclamation had been made to the same effect. Thus, for their own security, it became a matter of scrupulous caution with the fugitives, to avoid ren- dering themselves obnoxious to the penalty. It deserves to be recorded, that a comparison of the excesses, which followed the dissolution of the Peshwa's tumultuary host, with those incident to a large and sudden reduction of the troops of an European state, on the conclusion of a peace or other similar occasion, would even have exhibited a result in favour of the Indian executive. 3 G 410 ARABS OF KANDESH. 1818. Such were the measures adopted for the reclamation of the military classes ; and their minds had been so impressed with awe, as well by the forecast of arrangement with which they had found themselves encountered at every step, as by the astonishing successes obtained from them by mere handfuls of disciphned troops, that, even before the knowledge of Bajee Hao's personal submission, the most sanguine and presumptuous had become sensible of the impotence of their utmost efforts, and were well prepared to take the law from our dictation. Of the mercantile class, as forming a distinct interest and a constituent part of the population of Bajee Rao's dominions, we have taken no account, because in fact the buneeas of India, though many of them absolutely rolling in wealth, are rather a despised caste, little remarkable for pvibhc spirit on any occasion, occupied in the exclusive pursuit of sordid and selfish gain, pos- sessed of no influence beyond the walls of the populous towns, and even there generally subservient to the government of the passing hour. The security of property and of pubUc credit, universally attendant on the introduction of the British au- thority, probably made them rather wish for our establishment, and secured their limited good offices in our favour : but Bajee Eao also had a strong party amongst them ; as indeed might any one else have had, who possessed but the means of pur- chasing their services. These details of Mr. Elphinstone's general plan for the set- tlement of the conquered dominions of the Peshwa, have a very partial application to the province of Kandesh. The greater part of this district had been usurped by Arab colonists, who could hardly be expected to be influenced by the motives of submission, that had operated so extensively upon the Mahratta inhabitants. Fortunately, the Arabs had proved tyrants in the exercise of their usurped authority, and the body of the people were consequently desirous of shaking them off; at the same 1818. ARABS OF KANDESII. 411 time, they were not sufficiently numerous to hope successfully to cope single handed with the Ihitish power. The condition of submission offered to them by our policy was, however, nothing short of retransportation to their native wilds of Arabia ; and, as this involved the sacrifice at once of all their past acquisitions, and of all their future prospects, the intrusive race was driven to desperation, and resolved to defend their possession to the last. The Arabs of Kandesh were undoubtedly jio better than lawless buccaneers, equally Incapable of regular military dis- cipline, or of systematic political subordination ; their ex])idsion was, therefore, a matter of absolute necessity. Accordingly, Captain Ih-iggs, when he commenced the work of reducing the province, declared by proclamation, that such A\ere the only terms, upon which the mihtary of the Arab nation could be allowed to capitulate. He offered, however, that the British Government shovdd be at the expense of their transport back to Arabia, and of discharging any actual arrears of pay. With these views towards the intrusive Arabs, though guided in respect to the rest of the population by the principles so successfully acted upon by Mr. Elphinstone, the subjugation of Kandesh was undertaken about the middle of May. As the divisions of Brigadier-Generals Doveton and Smith were then both employed in the pursuit of Bajee Rao, Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowal's force of about 1100 firelocks, and the garrisons of Talner and Sindwa, were the only regular troops immediately applicable to the service. The Arabs had concentrated their force at INIalugAon, a fort of more than ordinary strength ; and Captain Briggs, conceiving that he had establisheil an luuler- standing with part of the garrison through Baja liahadhur, late jageerdar of the place, until its forcible occupation by the Arabs, who now held him in a kind of thraldom, resolved to make liis first attack upon this point. On the 15th of May, Lieutenant- Colonel M'Dowal approached within five miles of ]\Ialugaon ; 3 G 2 412 MALUGAON. 1818. Raja Bahadhur now represented, that the Arabs in the fort were well disposed, and desired the aid of our troops to overawe those in the Petta, for which purpose he pointed out a position be- tween the two for the detachment to occupy. Captain Briggs was inclined to place confidence in these professions of the Eaja; but Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowal suggested, that, before taking up so hazardous a position, the fidelity of the garrison in the fort should be put to the test, by demanding the admission of a few companies of our troops. The demand was made and re- jected with scorn, as was also tlie offer of arrears, together with an advance for subsistence until such time as the Arabs might reach their native country. Indeed, it was soon found, that preparations had been made for a most obstinate defence, and that the siege would require the utmost exertion of courage as well as science to ensure success. The engineers broke ground at night-fall on the 18th of May, Lieutenant-Colonel INI'Dowal having disposed two-thirds of his force in working and covering parties, in the hope of com- pleting two batteries in the course of the night. The arrange- ments for this purpose were, however, no sooner completed, than a vigorous sally was made from the fort. Malug^on is situated on the Moosee, just above its confluence with the Gyrna. The ground chosen by the engineers was on the opposite bank of the Moosee, and Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowal gave orders to his covering parties, not to fire a shot until the enemy should have crossed the river. Immediately, therefore, that the firing began, Colonel M'Dowal, perceiving the determined nature of the attack, ordered down the whole of the troops that remained in camp to support the covering parties. Major Andrews, with a few men of the IVIadras European regiment, was the first to arrive on the scene of action. He found the Arabs within twenty paces of the working party, driving our advanced posts in before them. He was fortunate in being able to check their further progress, 1818. MALUGAON. 413 and ultimately to rally the covering parties and cbive the enemy back with considerable loss : the INIajor, however, himself received a shot through the shoulder ; while IJeutenant Davis, the senior engineer, who hastened forward on the alarm with a party from the trenches, was shot dead by the ^Vrabs in their retreat. In him the service lost one of the most distinguished officers of the jNfadras establishment : though young in rank, he had seen more desperate service than had fallen to the lot of most colonels*. The besiegers had altogether twenty-one killed and wounded by this sally, chiefly of the European regiment. Notwithstand- ing this attempt to interrupt their operations, the work was completed according to the original intention ; and, in the course of the night, two batteries were thrown up within 500 yards of the fort. However, after this sample of the opposition he was to expect, Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowal summoned to his aid every reinforcement he could procure, and thus collected from different quarters about COO more infantry, and 500 irregiUar horse from Hindoostan, who had joined before the 23d of jNIay. By the 28tli of the month, the breach in the curtain of the fort appeared to be practicable, and the defence, as well of the ram- part as of afausse-brai/e at its foot, seemed for the most part to be destroyed. At the same time, Lieutenant-Colonel ^NI'Dowal found his ammunition on the point of failing, which determined him to try the chance of an assault. The exact nature of the defences of the ditch and those of the covered way beyond it were not known ; but all that was visible above the glacis had been levelled by our fire. Under these circumstances, a few • He had accompanied Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie into the fort of Vellore during the mutiny there, and was particularly distinguished for the cool intrepidity, widi which from tlie top of the gateway he let fall a plunnnet, to ascertain the exact situation of the fastening, in order to be sure of the direction of his fire, when the galloper should arrive with which it was intended to blow open the gate. 414 MALUGAON. 1818. remaining shells, that had been especially reserved to the last for this purpose, were throAvn in to clear the breach, and the troops advanced to the assault at daybreak on the 29th of May. They were led by the surviving engineer officer, Ensign Nattes, followed by a party of sappers and miners, each carrying a bundle of wet grass to fill up the ditch if necessary. On arriving at the verge of the outwork beyond the ditch, it was found, that the rubbish of a low wall that had stood there had carefully been removed, and that beyond it the Arabs had dug a trench so deep, that it was unpossible to descend from the glacis. Ensign Nattes was killed on its verge, wliile in the act of pronouncing the word " impracticable." The troops were, however, unwill- ing to desist; but Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowal, finding that the breach had further been cut off from the works on either side, and that loopholed traverses had been erected to bear right upon it from within, while the trench above described made the attempt to pass forward hopeless, recalled the storm- ing party, but not till Major Greenlrill, the officer in command, and three other offipers, had been wounded, and the engineer abovementioned killed. A simultaneous attack, made on the Fetta by a party led by Lieutenant-Colonel ]\latthew Stewart, was completely successful, the place being carried sword in hand. Upon this failure, Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowal, having ex- pended all his ammunition, and being determined nevertheless not to move from before the place till its fall, turned the siege into a blockade, and sohcited further reinforcements, especially of artillery, from all quarters. Brigadier-General Smith had by this time returned to Seroor, with the greater part of the fight force he had carried eastward in pursviit of Bajee Eao. He immediately ordered off an ad- ditional train and a fresh supply of stores from the depot at Ahmednugurh, accompanied by a strong reinforcement of Eu- ropeans, and a native battahon under the command of Major 1818. MALUGAON. 415 Watson. The convoy arrived on the 9th of June, up to which date Httle had been done since the failure of the assault, except that three mines had been commenced fi'ora tlie Petta ; but, as the fort was built on a rock foundation, that plan of attack was abandoned. By the 11 th of June, a battery of five heavy mortars and four howitzers was completed, and opened its fire at day- break. The besiegers had discovered the sit\iation of the prin- cipal magazine ; and, in the course of the day, upwards of 300 shells were thrown principally in that direction, by wliich means it was at length fired, and exploded with a tremendous crash, blowing about thirty feet of the curtain outwards into the ditch, and at the same destroying and wovuiding many of the garrison. The Arabs now found their situation hopeless. Fearing that a longer resistance would bring on them a similar fate to what their comrades had met with at Talner, they sent two jemadars on the morning of the 12th of June, to ask on what terms they wovdd be admitted to surrender. Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowal replied, at discretion, for other terms could not now be granted. The jemadars returned ; and, on the morning of the 13th, Ubdool Kadur, the principal of the Ai-ab chiefs, came out and declared, that the garrison were prepared to surrender at discretion, but urgently solicited a written assurance that their lives should be spared. These freebooters had no accurate conception of the meaning attached, by the usages of European warfare, to the term siuTcnder at discretion ; and the recent occurrence at Talner had made them yet more suspicious and distrustful than before. Lieutenant-Colonel jNI'Dowal, there- fore, out of consideration for this feeling, declared his readiness to give the written assurance of their lives being safe ; and, in order further to encourage them, engaged that they should be well treated. By some mistake, however, the IVrahratta Moon- shee, who received orders to write a letter to this effect, usejj expressions capable of a much more extensive interpretation 416 MALUGAON. 1818. than was intended ; promising to do " whatever was most ad- " vantageous for the garrison ; that letters should be \\Titten " regarding the pay ; that the British Government should be " at the expense of feeding and recovering the sick ; and that " the Arabs should not want any thing till they reached the " places where they wished to go :" tliis latter expression being a mistake for " where it was intended to send them." Ubdool Kadur, having obtained this \\Titten paper, marched out on the morning of the 14th with the survivors of the garrison, 300 Arabs and about sixty Hindoostanees, when the whole laid dowTi their arms on the glacis, and surrendered themselves prisoners of war. The Lieutenant-Colonel now wished to transfer his prisoners to the political agent, Captain Briggs, with a view to their transportation back to their native country ; but that officer, conceiving the terms of the written letter not to warrant such treatment of the garrison, declined to take charge of them. Colonel M'Dowal declared the letter to have con- veyed a mere assvirance of clemency after compUance with his terms, wliich were, surrrender at discretion ; that, consequently, it ought not and was never intended to limit the right of dis- posing of the prisoners according to the original conditions. The point was, however, referred to IVIr. Elphinstone, who de- termined to allow the Arabs the utmost advantage they could be entitled to, by the most favourable construction of the terms of the letter ; and, as there was a kind of a promise of good offices for the recovery of the pay due to the garrison, as well as an expression admitting of a construction, that they were to go where they wished, he ordered the whole arrears to be paid up to them from the Government treasury, and that they should immediately be released, and furnished with a safe conduct, and money to supply their wants, till they reached any place they' might prefer to retire to. The capture of INIalugaon was the last operation of any con- 1818. - KANDESH. 417 sequence in the territories oi' liajee liao. The rest of Kandesh submitted with httle resistance ; and the disposition of troops for the maintenance of order, and for the immediate punislunent of any insurrectionary attempt or other interruption of the pubhc tranquiUity, became the only remaining requisite for the complete settlement of the country. Tlie province of Kandesh continued, however, for some time to be the scene of more dis- turbance, than was experienced in other parts of the Peshwa's late dominions ; wliich was partly owing to the clashing of the various Malii'atta authorities anterior to the establishment of our influence, which had brought the province to the lowest possible pitch of disorganisation, and partly to Sindheea's con- tinued retention of liis former interest within it. Eut an arrangement is now in progress, by which it is hoped to remedy tliis latter inconvenience. 3 H CHAPTER XVIII. GENERAL RESULT. Objects of this chapter — political result — Dukhun — Suttara Raja — Bhoosla — Nizam — Hindoostan — Holkar — Nuwab of Bhopal — Ameer Khan — Ghufoor Khan — Reflections — Rajpoot princes — Kota — peculiarity in the treaty — -Joudhpoor — Oodeepoor — Captain Tod's arrangements — convention of Thakoors — and con- stitution fixed — Boondee — Bhikaneer — Jesulmeer — Jypoor — indecision — treaty concluded — State of Jypoor — plan for its settlement — Raja's death — New mili- tary posts in Hindoostan — Sindheea — His present condition — external relations — internal government — how remedied — Auxiliary horse — Fate of sirdars — Baptiste-^Bapoo Sindheea — Effect of their ruin — Probable issue — General reflections — Financial result^ character of Indian revenue — Financial condition in 181 4 — in subsequent years — Result up to 1818 — Home supplies — Value of territorial acquisitions — Comparative view — Home territorial charges explained — General reflections. We have now arrived at the close of the narrative of the important military transactions, that occupied the season of 1817-18. But the account, which it has thus been attempted to give of what passed in that eventful season, would obviously be incomplete, were it to end here, without entering upon the more difficult, though necessary task, of presenting a summary of the pohtical state, that has resulted to IncUa from the widely extended operations above described ; nor is it to be expected, that the pubhc of England wiU rest satisfied, without a short statement of the financial advantages, that have accrued to the nation from the successful exertions of its IncUan servants. To bring these two important subjects distinctly under view will be the business of this concluding chapter. 1818. DUKHUN -SUTTARA RAJA. 419 Before we notice the general outlines of the new political condition, in which India has been left by the events of the campaign, it will be necessary shortly to recapitulate, in the first place, the arrangements made with the greater powers, Avith whom the coui'se of affairs successively embroiled us, and after- Avards to take a similar notice of the minor transactions of a political nature, which have been purposely reserved to be brought together in one view, on the eve of the termination of our narrative. The whole of the Peshwa's late dominions are now in- corporated with the former conquests of the IJritish nation, excepting that part allotted to form a dependent sovereignty for the Eaja of Suttara. The territory assigned for that pur- pose Mes within the following limits : the great range of western Gh^ts on the west, the Warner and Kishna rivers to the south, the Neera and Bheema to the north, and the frontier of the Nizam's dominions to the east. Of this territory, lands to the value of about 17 lack rupees per annum are still held in Jageer by the old feudatories of the Peshwa, whose allegiance and obligations of service have been transferred to the British Govei'nment. The net resources of the Eaja, therefore, cannot be regarded as beyond 15 or 16 lack, a revenue, which is far too little to confer much political influence or consideration. The chief claim of the Eaja to be dealt with as a distinct political interest must arise from the recollection, still fondly cherished by the Mahrattas, of the former splendour of the family, and from the respect, which long custom may still attach to its offices and employments, notwithstanding the inadequate and economical scale of its establishment under the present system. The personal character of the Eaja, Xoor Nerayiui, is represented to be not deficient in natural acuteness, though, from youth and the defects of education, utterly devoid of all 3 h2 420 DUKHUN-SUTTARA RAJA. 1818. substantial knowledge, and as ignorant of business and of the world, as well versed in the outward forms and ceremonials of royalty. The country designed for his principality was in the first instance occupied directly by the British authorities, and Captain Grant was appointed by Mr. Elphinstone to superin- tend its administration, on the same principles as were observed throughout the territory permanently assumed to ourselves. This arrangement will continue until the country becomes more tranquil and settled ; when the transfer will be made by de- grees, according as the Raja's character and competence for such a trust may unfold themselves, and justify the reposal of such a confidence in him. In the mean time, the revenues are care- fully brought to the account of the Suttara Government ; nor do the British authorities interfere with the domestic concerns of the Eaja, or his cUsposal of the siirplus after defraying the charges of management, and of some indispensable estabUsh- ments. Such is the character of the state, that now occvipies, in the pohtical horizon, the space so lately filled by the mischievous court of Bajee Bao. The jN'Iahratta famihes undoubtedly still look up in some degree to the Suttara Baja as their legitimate and hereditary superior ; but their entire independence of the family has been secured, by transferring tlie obhgations of allegiance exclusively to the British Government. The Rajas of Suttara will, therefore, henceforward find in them rivals rather than subjects, and must eventually and rapidly sink into the rank of equals, notwithstanding the broad line of nominal distinction, that must always separate this from the rest of the Mahratta famihes, in the scale of rank and importance. The motives of hope and fear, the only props by which a claim of real superiority could be sustained, are not amongst the instru- ments of power left at the Raja's disposal. Next to the settlement of the affairs of the Poona state, the 1818. DUKHUN— BHOOSLA. 421 arrangement made with the Bhoosla is the object most worthy of consideration. The extensive sacrifices demanded of this state, upon Appa Saheb's restoration to the guddee, left to the Jihoosla Httle more tlian half of the resources he possessed before the war; and, in the internal administration of tlie residue, our right of direct control was made a matter of special stipulation. Upon the chscovery of A])pa Saheb's continued infidelity, his person was secured, and his deposition became an act of necessity. The lihoosla state may be regarded as having been then placed at ovu* feet a second time ; nor was there any thing to prevent the Governor-General from moulding it to whatever shape might best accord with his views, to the extent €ven of occupying the whole for his own nation, had he been so minded. The state was, however, already sufficiently reduced for the completion of his plans, and the Marquess of Hastings, in confirming the deposition of our faithless ally, directed his successor to be seated on the guddee, without alteration of the terms, upon wliicli Appa Saheb had been reinstated in the preceding January. His subsequent escape during his con- veyance to Allahabad made no change in this determination ; and, instead of delaying its execution, rendered it the more necessary to use despatch, in giving a settled form to the government, which it had been resolved to establish in his stead. The jNIarquess of Hastings issued his final orders to this effect on the 18th of June; and they were carried com])letely into execution before the close of the month. Tlie reader will have anticipated, that the grandson of Eagoojee Bhoosla was destined for the succession ; and he was accordingly placed upon the guddee by the name of liajee llao Bhoosla. Euka Baee was constituted regent during the new Baja's minority, and Nerayun Pundit placed at the head of the ministry. This man was recommended by his fidelity, rather than his talents or 42^ DUKHUN— BHOOSLA. 1818. fitness in other respects : indeed, it was soon found, that he had neither the influence nor the habits of business necessary to conduct the pubHc affairs in the present circumstances of difficulty ; and the impossibihty of finding, amongst the more respectable of the old officers of the Nagpoor Government, persons fitted by capacity and experience for the executive duties of the administration, led Mr. Jenkins to depart from the original plan ; and, while the present embarrassments lasted, to employ British officers in the principal departments of the state. Over these he exercised himself a general control and supervision, though in the Eaja's name. The arrangement was sanctioned provisionally by the Governor-General ; but the Re- sident was directed to bear in mind the eventual revertence of the administration to the native autliorities, and to frame all his acts with reference to that transfer. It will readily be imagined, that this anomalous form of government was not without its inconveniences ; nor would it have been adopted, had the court of Nagpoor yielded proper materials for the formation of a respectable native ministry, whose fidelity could be relied on. However, with the view of gratifying the family of the yoiuig Eaja, and giving every practicable weight and respectability to the new government, Goojaba Dada, a relation of the Bhoosla, of whom mention has before been made, and who had all along been attached to the party of Buka Baee, was called down from Allahabad, whither he had retired to avoid the jealousy of Appa Saheb, and joined with Nerayun Pundit in the nominal administration. By this means, an efficient executive was estabhshed, which was too sensible of its dependence on the support of the British, not to co-operate heartily in the measures taken for preserving the tranquillity of the country, and in the efforts made to prevent the conta- giovis example of insurrection, set by the Goands of the INIoha- deo liills, from spreading to other parts of the territory, equally 1818. DUKHUN-BHOOSLA. 423 wild and difficult of access. Nevertheless, the influence of A))i)a Saheb succeeded in raising the hill country to the east of Nag- poor, and a partial rising was hkewise effected in other quar- ters during the season of the rains. At Kumpta, and in the Lanjhee hills, an insurrection was organised by a man of the name of Chimna Potel, little inferior in im})ortance to that of the jVIohadea range. But some Jh-itish detachments took the field from Nagpoor, in August, notwithstanding the severity of the rainy season ; and, by a series of well-combined operations, this rebellious disposition was put down before tlie close of September. The service was one of infinite suffering from fatigue, exposure, and unhealthiness of the cUmate ; and there w^ere several very brilhant exploits performed in the course of it. By the return of the cold season, resistance was confined to that portion of the hilly tract, in wliich Appa Saheb had first taken refuge ; and intelligence has just arrived of his expulsion thence towards Aseergurh, the capture* of which strong hold, if he there should seek an asylum, will soon bring the war to an end. Yet it must not be concealed, that the whole territory of tliis state is stiU, and must long continue, in a very unsettled * Appa Saheb did take refuge there, and the place was consequently mvested about the middle of INIarch. The Killadar, Juswunt Rao Lar, surrendered at discre- tion on the 9th of April ; but Appa Saheb had escaped in disguise before the in- vestiture was complete. Cheetoo was killed by a tiger in the adjoining jun«fuls, in which he sought concealment, on being refused admittance into the fort. The par- ticulars of this tragical death may perhaps be interesting. It appears, that Cheetoo and his son accompanied the ex-Raja in his flight from the hills ; but, on their pre- senting themselves at the gate of Aseer, the Killadar consented to admit Appa Saheb alone, desiring the Pindarees to wait a few days. The vicinity of the fort afl^orded no protection to the rejected fugitives from the British detachments approachiu'r in pursuit. The father and son consequently separated ; and Cheetoo on horseback and unaccompanied, dashed through a dangerous jungul, in the hope of ellecting his escape. Some days afterwards his horse was found grazing near tiic margin of the forest; upon him, his furniture, a bag of '250 rupees in coir., .several seal lin^s, and some documents containing promises of reward from the cx-Raja, for services 424 DUKHUN— BHOOSLA. 181 8 condition ; and it will require much moderation and vigilance in the executive, as well as the frequent display of our military strength, to estabhsh a settled government in this part of the late Mahratta empire. In order to rivet more firmly the dependence of the Ndg- poor state, the Governor-General resolved to reduce its mihtary estabhshment to the lowest possible scale ; and to put the contin- gent, that was to be the sole efficient force on its estabhshment, upon the footing which had been found so beneficial in the Nizam's dominions ; viz. placing both horse and foot under the command and direction of British officers. The contingent was fixed at two battalions of infantry, and 3000 horse ; the former to consist of natives of Hindoostan, armed, clothed, and disciplined like our regular sepoys : the horse to be raised in the country ; and it was hoped, that, by leaving this field of employment open to the military class, a considerable portion wovdd become reconciled to the new order of things. By these arrangements, the Bhoosla Eaja has been reduced to a condition scarcely superior to that of the reinstated Raja of Suttara. Both princes owe their elevation to the British arms ; both are young, and incapable of public business. At present, the government is virtually conducted by the British Resident, and his subordinate agents ; and measures have been taken for which Cheetoo might perform in support of his cause against the British Govern- ment. Search was immediately made for the Pindara ; the track of a tiger was observed; it was followed, and some articles of dress picked up all clotted with blood. A little further on, scattered fragments of the bones of the robber, and soon afterwards the head entire, the features of which were recognised to be those of Cheetoo. Thus perished the late formidable chief of 20,000 horse — the savage man, by his brother savage of the wilderness ! an incident worthy of the brush of Salvator Rosa, and the pen of a Byron. Mahommed Punna, the son, was taken soon after leaving the gate of Aseer : a competent sum was presented to him for the inter- ment of his father's mangled remains. 1818. DUXIIUN—BIIOOSLA— NIZAM. '425 the avowed purpose of perpetuating the poHtical dejjendcnce of both. If there be security for the public traiu[uillity of this district in any system, we may, therefore, surely i)lace confidence in one, which has established our direct autliority over one half of the country, and invested us with all the real ])ower and influence over the other. The public may already be con- gratulated on the successful trial of this system in the ter- ritories of the Poena state ; and, but for the disturbance that has necessarily resulted from Appa Saheb's being still at large, a similar degree of quiet might have been enjoyed by the subjects of the Bhoosla. With the other powers of the Dukhun, the political relations of the British have remained unaltered. ^\'ith the Kizam's Government there has never arisen a subject of discussion, since the confinement of the refractory princes in Golkonda. The power of this state is daily setthng more and more in the hands of the British party, at the head of which is Baja Chundoo Lai ; while the apathy of the Nizam himself is gradually increasing. The territories of this prince are as ill governed as any portion of India, scarcely even excepting those of Doulut Bao Sindheea; and although the efficiency, which the introduction of British officers has given to its military establishments, has doubtless contributed to the maintenance of public order, it has yet afforded a very inadequate remedy for the gross abuses and corruptions of the civil administration, in respect to which the British Goveriniient has, through motives of delicacy, abstained from all direct control or interference. So much for the Dukhun. We must now turn our atten- tion to the political changes effected on the side of Hindoostan, and the grounds, on which it is confidently hoped, that the annihilation of the habits of predatory adventure will follow, as a natural result of our late operations in that quarter. - Northward of the Xerbudda, the country wliich had so long 3i 426 HINDOOSTAN— HOLKAR. 1818. been a prey to military despotism, or rather license and anarchy, has now been parcelled out among a number of chiefs, of whom all but Sindheea hold their lands of the British Government, under the direct obligation either of feudatory or of tributary dependence. Even the proud court of the Holkar has fallen to tliis condition ; for the contingent of 3000 horse, that it has stipulated to maintain from its remaining resources, and to hold perpetually at our disposal, can be regarded in no other Hght than as a feudal obligation, although the treaty of alliance with this court is nominally of a svibsidiary kind. It is true, we have on our part engaged to furnish military protection to the re- maining territories of the family against any hostile attempt ; but, in requital for this protective engagement, we have obtained in perpetuity the cessions in the Dukhun, and those to the north of the Boondee hills, together with the assignment of aU the Eajpoot tributes enjoyed by the Holkar. Xor are we tied down to the maintenance of any definite force for the purpose, or to the occupation of any specified j^osition. Tlie obligation is, therefore, in effect no other than that of protection by the superior lord to his feudatories ; and the court of the Holkar has httle pretensions to a higher poUtical rank. In point of resources, the state has been so dismembered by the allotment to Ameer Khan, the guaranteed Jageer of Ghufoor Khan, and the absolute cessions to ourselves and to our stanch allies of Kota and Boondee, that 20 lack may be assumed as the very utmost revenue remaining to Mulhar Eao. The court has been induced to abandon the martial custom of residing in a camp, and to fix upon Indore for its future seat of government. The territory, though still greatly interwoven with that of Sindheea, is fast recovering under the orderly government ofTanteea Jog, backed by the weight and influence of the British Eesident and of Sir John Malcohn, Avho still continues invested with the general poUtical superintendence of affairs in that quarter of 1818. HINDOOSTAN-IIOLKAR -BTIOPAL. 4-27 India. The treaty of INIundisor, concluded by Sir John Mal- colm with Tanteea Jo«v on the l6th of'January, and ratified by the Marquess of Hastin<>s on the ITth of that month, is the basis on \vhich the present relations of this court are founded ; and, except in the subsequent arbitration of some disputed points with Sindheea, and in the adjustment of the frontier towards Boondee, with some few other matters of inferior im- portance, that treaty has suflliced for the trantjuil settlement of its affairs. Next to the Holkar, the most considerable military chief, under the late settlement, is the Nuwab of Bliopal. It has been mentioned, that, before the troops crossed the Nerbudda in the month of November, the Nuwab signed a preliminary eno-atJ-ement, binding himself to the conditions, on which the Governor-General had signified his consent to admit his father within the circle of protection; and that, during the whole operations, he furnished the contingent required of him, and heartily exerted himself in the cause. As a rcAvard for the cordiality displayed by the Nuwab, the Punj-jNIuhal of Ashta Ichawar, &:c. along with some other lands parcel of the Vinshore- kur's forfeited jageer, and whence the Pindarees had expelled his people, were, on their final dislodgement, annexed to BhopAl, whose boundary was by this addition advanced westward as far as the Kalee Sindh. A part of Shujawulpoor was subsequently added, and Islanniagurh was obtained from Sindheea in his favour by the way of negotiation. Tlie principality was thus placed on a most respectable footing. The definitive engage- ment, which permanently fixed the relations of the Nuwab, was concluded at Bhopal on the SHth of January 1818, and ratified by the Governor-General on the 8th of jNIarch following. The contingent he stipulates to furnish is limited to COO horse, and 400 foot ; a low proportion in reference to the resources of the State, but so fixed expressly to favom- the Nuwab. . As a more 3 I 2 428 HINDOOSTAN—BHOPAL— AMEER KHAN. 1818. substantial mark of consideration, the obligation of paying tribute, in return for the protection we have engaged to aiford, is waived in this instance, notwithstanding that the eventual payment of 125,000 rupees on this account was an item of the preliminary agreement, concluded with Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and Sir John Malcolm in November. Besides, the entire occupation of the Sagur territory has rendered it ex- pedient to station the mihtary force, required to awe this neighbourhood, within the frontiers of that province ; by which arrangement Nuzur INIahommed is relieved from the obhgation of furnishing a cantonment, and surrendering a fort to be con- verted into a depot for a stationary British force within his territory, which had also been a part of his original contract. Ameer Khan, notwithstanding the consideration he before enjoyed as the head of the Patau mihtary, occupies now a rank secondary to the BhoptU Nuwab. His possessions are so scattered and disconnected, that it wiU be long before any thing like order can be introduced into his affairs, even after he shall be relieved from his pecuniary difficulties, and from the continued importunity of his hungry troops and fol- lowers. He holds Seronj in jSIalwa, and Tonk on the Banas, wliich may be considered as his two principal possessions ; but there is scarcely a district of Kajpootana, or of the country east of the Chumbul, in which he has not some fort or assignment of lands, or some pending claim. The removal of all his thanas, or military posts, to hold in check the country he had usurped, was the first result of the treaties concluded with Jypoor and Joudhpoor. Yet he still holds some places previously obtained from those Eajas by the Holkar, and by that chief assigned to him ; for the terms of his engagement with the British Govern- ment secure to him all lands which he held by grant from the Holkar, his former master, and deprive him of such only as were- the fruits of his own unauthorized predatory career. He advanced 1818. IIINDOOSTAN-AMEEll KHAN-GHUFOOR KHAN. 429 a claim to the lands guaranteed in Jagecr to Ghufoor Khan, alleging that chief to have been merely an agent or manager, set over them on his behalf; nor is it by any means impro1)ahle, that such may have been the origin of Cihufoor Khan's title ; but as, in the late settlement with the Ilolkar, the present con- dition of Ghufoor Khan had introduced the stipulations for his benefit, it was not deemed advisable to be over scrui)idous in tracing the origin of his title; and the Governor-CJeneral's award rejected the claim : nor would his Lordship permit the feudal allegiance, due by Ghufoor Khan, to be transferred from the Holkar to the Tatan, as sohcited by Ameer Khan. How- ever, as one step towards the consohdation of this chiefs pos- sessions, Eampoora, which had been ceded by the Holkar to ourselves, has been conferred upon him, and it is further in contemplation to invest his son with a Jageer. There was an obvious advantage in raising the Eho])al mnvab and these two Patan adventurers to consideration in this particular part of India, in order that they might form a counterpoise to tlic preponderating influence of the Hindoos, who otherwise would have been sole masters of the whole country. No doubt, there exists at present very little community of feeling between the ]Mahrattas and the Eajpoots ; for, though both are equally of the Hindoo faith, and of the Khutree caste, they have for generations been at war with each other, and the memory of past injuries will for a long time survive the establisli- ment of outward tranquilhty. Still, as there is this common bond of union, it will not be thought an act of needless precaution to guard against the possibility of revolution, however faint ov remote. " It must be recollected, that these same KaJi)oots were the means of leading the Tllahratta to the gates of Hehlee ; and their union with the Hindoos of the ]:)ukhun it was, that drove the I^Ioosulmans to seek the foreign aitl of the Abdalees, and thus brought on the crisis, that, by their mutual destruction at 430 HINDOOSTAN-RAJPOOTS. 1818. Paneeput, opened the door for a few skilful Europeans, to raise upon their ruins the fabric of that power, which now holds them all in equal thraldom. Reserving the still unadjusted relations with Sindheea to our latest notice, we shall now proceed to detail the respective arrangements with the several Eajpoot princes. In point of rank, the Oodeepoor Eana is entitled to the first place in our consideration, as being the descendant of the family that opposed the Emperor Akbur in the field. All the other Kajpoots regard him with the deference of acknowledged infe- riority, even those that owe him no allegiance. Under our new system, however, each Eaja was to be recognised as distinct from the rest, and the condition of all to be that of protected independence. It will, therefore, be most convenient to observe the order, in which the several arrangements were concluded. It was to Mr. Metcalfe, the Eesident at Dehlee, that the Governor-General intrusted the execution of his plans in relation to the Rajpoot states ; and the reader has already been apprized, that, at the commencement of the campaign, he addi*essed a circular letter to them all, caUing vipon them to send agents with full powers to Dehlee, if they wished to participate in the advantages of the league about to be formed. None of them failed to send a plenipotentiary, for all Mere anxious to be relieved from their existing burthens and oppressions, more especially those resvdting from the laxity of the Mahratta management. In those where the government was exercised with any efficiency and order, there was no difficulty experienced in settling the terms of the alliance to be formed with the British. To them it was proposed, that any tribute, demandable under a fixed agreement with a Mahratta or a Patan chief, should be paid directly into the British treasury at Dehlee, leaving us to account for it to the party to whom it might be due. Tliis was accompanied with a tender of protection against external attack, 1818. HINDOOSTAN— RAJPOOTS— KOTA. 431 on the usual condition of abstaining from constructing new relations with other powers, and submitting to our arbitration of all external disputes. The first to conclude a treaty upon this basis, was Zalim Singh Kaj-Rana, or manager, of Kota, whose agent at Dehlee signed the engagement on the 53()th of December, which was ratified by the jNIarquess of Hastings on the (ith of January following. The tribute, which this chief owed to the ]\Iahrattas, was three lacks, reduced by admitted allowances and deductions to 257,G00 rupees of the country (Goman-shahee), equal to 244,720 rupees Dehlee currency. To this were to be added 19,997 rupees Dehlee currency, due from the relations of the fajnily, luider the designation of the seven kotrees or houses ; so that altogether the tribute of Kota payable at Dehlee amovuited to 204,717 rupees Dehlee currency. It will not be necessary to state the particular stipulations of the protective alUance concluded with Zahm Singh, as they corresponded with those of similar engagements Avith the other chiefs of this class. There was, however, a peculiarity in the engagement so charac- teristic of the Rajpoot character, that it ovight not to be omitted. The Eaja of Kota is still living ; but Zahm has long held him in strict surveillance, and in fact a prisoner in the fort of Gagroon, while he himself sways with a vigorous hand the whole power of the state. Conformably to the principle of regarding occu- pancy as the rule of right, the INIarquess of Hastings was pre- pared to have concluded the treaty for Kota directly with Zalim Singh, without reference to the legitimate but captive l\aja, and to have guaranteed the succession to his heirs ; but the Raj- Rana himself would not hear of such a proceeding ; and accord- ingly, at his own suggestion, ihe treaty has been made with the Raja Kishwur Singh, to whom and his heirs the Raj is guaran- teed, but with a reservation of the powers of administration to Zalim Singh and liis heirs for ever, under the title of Dewan. 432 HINDOOSTAN— RAJPOOTS-KOTA— JOUDHPOOR. 1818. Zalim, as well after the ratification, as during the negotiation of the treaty, proved a useful ally against the Pindarees, and was rewarded for his zeal by the acquisition in personal sove- reignty of four pergunnas he had farmed of the Holkar, and by a very favourable consideration in the arrangements subsequently made with Sindheea, to whom he owed tribute for Shahabad, and arrears of rent for some other places held in farm of that prince. The second in order of the Eajpoot princes to sign his en- gagements with the British Government, was Eaja Man-Singh of Joudlipoor. This prince had suifered severely from the irregular exactions of the Patans, though the Sindheea was the only power to whom he owed legitimate allegiance or tribute. The nominal amount due to that durbar was 180,000 rupees per annum, but the allowed deductions reduced it to httle more than the half, viz. 97,000 rupees Delilee currency, at which rate it was therefore fixed by the treaty. But it appeared afterM^ards, that a jagheer of 11,000 rupees had been reserved as a personal gratification to the British negotiator ; which, though of course de- clined by the individual, was subsequently thrown into the scale, and swelled the amount of tribute to 108,000 rupees. The ejection of all thanas, recently placed in the country by Ameer Khan, was the first advantage reaped by the Raja from his new con- nexion. His signature was delivered at Dehlee on the 6th of January ; and, in addition to the above tribute, the Raja engaged to furnish a contingent of 1500 horse. Of all the Rajpoot princes, the Rana of Oodeepoor had suffered most from the usurpations of rebellious subjects, as well as from the oppressions of the jNIahrattas and Patans. Indeed, he had lost nearly the Avhole of his dominions, and the money exactions of his oppressors were hmited only by the extent of liis means. His chief minister came early from Oodeepoor to settle the terms, on which his master was to be liberated from the misery 1818. IIINDOOSTAX— U \JP> OTS— OODEEPOOR. 433 of his present situation ; and, on the iGth of January, an arrange- ment was concluded \\ ith this state, by tlie terms of which four annas in the rupee, tliat is to say, one quarter of the total revenue that might be realized, was agreed to be paid into the British treasury for the first five years ; after which period, six annas, or three-eighths, was to be the pro])ortion. The same rate of three-eighths was promised upon all ne\v actpiisitions or ancient possessions recovered by our means in the intervening period. In return, we engaged to lend the aid of our influence towards restoring the Eana's affairs, which, what with external ravage, and the internal usurpations of his dejw?ndents, were now at the lowest ebb. The expulsion of the Pindarees and of I )uleel Khan, a Patan, who had for some months been devastating the Oodeepoor territory, was amongst the first advantages resulting to the Rana from the alliance with the British ; and, before the end of January, the affair with Sindheea's commandant of Jawud placed at our disposal further means of befriending this state. With a view more effectually to assist in the restoration of order to the affairs of this principality. Captain Tod, who had first been deputed to Kota to superintend the exertions of Zalim Singh against the Pindarees, and had since been employed in adjusting the affairs of Boondee, was ordered to proceed to Oodeepoor ; and, to add to the importance of his mission and in- crease liis influence, he was made the instrument for bestowing on the Rana the fort of Kumuhier, and other late acquisitions from Juswunt Rao Bhao. A more judicious selection of an agent could not have been made, for Captain Tod had made the character and history of the Rajpoots his peculiar study, and was consequently well quahfied to execute the task assigned him. He found the Rana in the lowest degree of indigence, and at the mercy of a few designing miscreants about his person; while the Thakoors, or feudatories, of the state maintained them- selves in perfect independence, and were their master's most 3 K 434 HINDOOSTAN— RAJPOOTS— OODEEPOOR. 1818. formidable enemies. At Captain Tod's suggestion, and under his safe conduct, a general assembly of the Thakoors was con- vened, for the settlement of the future constitution of the prin- cipality. After some days' debate and unavaihng discussion about immaterial points, Captain Tod, perceiving that, if left to themselves, they would come to no decision whatever, resolved liimself to draw up a charter of rights, and induce the Raja to submit it for their consideration and eventual adoption. The sixteen principal Thakoors were accordingly assembled at noon on the 4th of May, when the Eaja laid the plan before them ; and, after a debate that lasted without intermission until three in the morning of the 5 th, the following articles were agreed to, and the paper containing them signed by all present. Art, 1. Provided, that all usvu-pations made by individuals upon the Eana, or upon one another, since the Sumbut year 1822 (A. D. 1766), should be mutually restored. Art. 2. No Thakoor to continue to levy the impost known by the name of Ralnvaree Bhoom, a kind of black mail levied as an immunity from plunder. Art. 3. The Dhan Bisiva, or rateable impost upon the pro- duce of agriculture, to be the exclusive property of the Rana's government, and to be levied by no other authority. Art. 4. The Thakoors renounce all predatory habits, and engage to harbour or protect no tliieves, but to encoui-age trade, and leave all caravans unmolested. (This was a proviso that had become most necessary). Art. 5. The Thakoors engage to attend on the durbar at Oodeepoor in rotation for four periods, each of three months, with their respective mihtary followers, in order to give strength and respectabiHty to the executive government. Ai't. 6. At the Dussera of each year, a general meeting of the Thakoors to be convened for the settlement of all pubhc affairs of magnitude ; the meeting to commence ten days before 1818. HINDOOSTAN— RAJPOOTS-OODEEPOOR. 435 the Dussera, and not to last more than twenty days after it : but extraordinary meetin^-s to be held on extraordinary emergencies. Art. 7. The immediate feudatories of the prince bound to render immediate service, according to the terms by which they might respectively hold. Art. 8. All exactions, mutual violence, and fines on de- pendents to cease, and every one to be regulated in his con- duct by the new order of things to be established. Art. 9. The Thakoors bound to confirm what Ajeet-Singh, the Dehlee negotiator, had agreed to. Art. 10. The Eana vested M'ith the executive authority, for the enforcement of obedience to the new constitution to be established. The articles of the above settlement have been given at length, both because they are in their nature curious, and be- cause the arrangement promises to be productive of permanent good. It has given a right direction to the national spirit, and rendered the classes most interested themselves the instruments of the introduction of the new constitution. And this work they have, in fact, since undertaken with alacrity, under the im- pression, that they are labouring for the restoration of the good old timies of the recorded prosperity and power of Oodeepoor. The Marquess of Hastings entirely approved of the above plan of settlement ; and, in order to relieve the present exigencies of the Rana, and place the executive authority of the country on the footing necessary to ensure respect and obedience to its orders, he authorized an advance of money for present exigencies, to the extent of one or even two lack of rupees, in full confidence, that, on the estabhshment of order, the natural fertility of the country would make so rapid an improvement of its resources, as to afford the means of speedy repayment. Captain Tod still remains at Oodeepoor, charged with the superintendance of the settlement of affairs in that quarter ; and the utmost benefit 3 k2 436 RAJPOOTS- OODEEPOOR-BOONDEE. 1818. has already resulted from the system introduced at his sug- gestion. Should it eventually succeed, as there is every reason to hope it will, he will be recorded as having been the first to in- troduce among the natives of India the true principles of hmited and constitutional authority ; or at least to call again into action those principles, which, if they ever were known and practised at any former period of their history, have lain dormant so long, as to be well nigh obliterated. Perhaps in some future age, when the genius of Britain shall no longer lord it over the pro- strate realms of Asia, this germ of hberal institutions of internal pohty may be referred to as the commencement of a happier era in these ample regions, as the first lesson of self-government, which we shall have taught to the now slavish minds of the Hindoo race, and which may have afterwards led to the gradual diffusion of pohtical liberty and moral improvement. The Kaja of Boondee followed next in order, and signed the arrangement proposed for his acceptance on the 10th of February. His net annual tribute, payable to the Mahrattas, amounted to 80,000 rupees : but this chief had established a claim on the gratitude of the British Government, by the fidehty and hospitality, with which he assisted Colonel INIonson in his disastrous retreat in 1804. The rupture with Holkar fortunately afforded tl>e means of bestowing a substantial proof of our grate- ful recognition of his good offices on that occasion : not only were all Holkar's acquisitions from the Eaja recovered for him, but, in addition, the above tribute was released in peri)etuity, and moreover, the restitution of Sindheea's encroachments and possessions within the Raja's frontier was obtained for him by negotiation. The town of Patun was also an object of the Raja's strong desire, and he was indulged in the hope of being gratified upon some future occasion. But his loss of this place was of too old a date to allow us to call upon the Mahrattas gratuitously to resign possession ; while, as it lay below the Boondee range, 1818. RAJPOOTS-BIIIKANEER-JiTOOR, &c. 437 the third share enjoyed by Ilolkar did not fall within tlie cessions of the treaty of j\[undis6r. This third has since been acquired for the Eaja by compromise ; and, sliould an oppor- tunity offer, the share of Sindheea will probably be also obtained, in the ultimate arrangement with that chief. The l\aja of JJhikanecr within the desert was the next Rajpoot prince that came into the league. The treaty with him was signed on the 13th of March. The suppression of the practice of pillage, the restoration of property plundered within his territory, the obligation of paying for such British as he might require, and of rendering military aid according to his means upon our requisition, Mere the terms of this chief's ad- mission within the pale of protection. He had never paid tri- bute, and consequently no claim was now set up on that score. The Eaja of Jesulmeer was soon after received upon the like terms ; as was Kaja Kuluan Singh of Kishengurh in the neigh- bourhood of Ajemeer, a chief of minor consideration, who had also never been subjected to tribute. Arrangements with the Rajas of Uoongurpoor, Purtabgurh, and other chiefs of incon- siderable note and resources, situated to the south of Mewur, and on the frontiers of GuzerAt and ]\Ialwa, were concluded under the direction of Sir John INIalcolm, who had the general superintendance of political affairs in that quarter. The alUance formed with Jypoor remains to be mentioned. Though nearest in geographical position to Dehlee, this state was the last to send negotiators ; and, when they did at length arrive, they proved the most difficult to treat with. Jypoor, like Oodeepoor, owed no tribute either to^NIahrattas or toPatans; but its losses from the ravages and usur])ations of the latter, and from the system of depredation and anarchy pursued by its dependant Thakoors, were indefinite in extent ; and the remu- neration demanded for the relief, by our means, from evils so grievous, was fixed on a scale high in proportion. The nego- 438 HINDOOSTAN— RAJPOOTS— JYPOOR. 1818. tiation ultimately fell into the same hands, as had conducted the conference of 1816 ; but the personal indecision of the Raja was such, that the negotiators did not make their appearance at Dehlee until the middle of February ; and probably even a fur- ther delay would have been experienced, had not the Eaja begun to take alarm at the engagement concluded with Ameer Khan, and had not this apprehension been quickened by the approach of Sir David Ochterlony to liis capital, and by a show of making terms with some of his feudatories, which threatened to detach them for ever from their allegiance. Fearing now to be left com- pletely in the lurch, the principal people of the court were despatched to Delilee in all haste, along with the deputation ap- pointed to negotiate ; and, after much discussion, the terms were at length agreed upon, though the treaty was not actually signed until the 2d of April. The amount of tribute was the main diffi- culty : fifteen lack, with remissions for the first few years, was the rate demanded by Mr. Metcalfe, as in the former negotiation of 1816. To tliis, however, the envoys would not agree, and tendered in lieu no more than two lack and a half. In the end, the tribute was fixed as follows: for the first year notliing; four lack for the second ; five lack for the third ; six, seven, and eight lack for the three next successive years; after which eight lack to be the permanent amount, hable to be increased by five-six- teenths on any excess in the revenues of the state, beyond the estimated product of forty lack rupees. The territory is large, and its resources are confidently expected to yield, under good management, not less than eighty lack ; so that the agents of the Eaja will have gained httle, by their refusal of the fixed sum originally demanded. To restore order to the affairs of Jypoor, was a matter of in- finite difficulty. The aristocratical faction of Manjee Das had been dismissed in the preceding July, for presuming to put to death one of the Eaja's favourites. Manjee Das was himself struck by 1818. HINDOOSTAN-RAJPOOTS— JYPOOR. 439 the Raja in open durbar for the act, and afterwards j)laced in con- finement. Since then, the Prince had been surromuled by none but favourites and low dependants, amongst whom the intriouing Cheetoor Bhoj was the only man of ability, and he Avas a partizan of the Patau interest. In this plight Sir David Ochterlony found the court, wlien he went to visit the Eaja in May ; and, on that occasion, two favourite menials, one a eunuch, were pointed out to him as being, in conjunction with Cheetoor Bhoj, the Paja's principal ministers. The General found, that attempts had already been made to lavish on these creatures some of the first acquisitions resulting from the removal of the Thanas of Ameer Khan. He also discovered, that the Paja himself was a complete slave to the most odious vices ; while the greediness and cor- ruption of the favourites were tlie object of universal execration. Under these circumstances, it was deemed a necessary prelimi- nary to any attempt to settle the afiairs of this Paj, to summon a meeting of the Thakoors, similar to that which had been con- vened with so much judgment and good effect at Oodeepoor, in order to adjust their relations with the Paja, and estabUsh some principles for the guidance of their future conduct. The Tha- koors of Jypoor were, however, superior both in number and in relative power to those of the other Pajpoot states ; insomuch as to require the exertion of mihtary force against several, who, trusting to the great natural strength of their fortresses, pre- sumed to oppose the arrangements effected under oiu" me- diation. The holders of Ivooshalgurh and of J\radhoorajpoor, or Madhoogurh, w ere amongst the refractory ; but their strong holds were reduced without much trouble, though the latter had baffled the repeated attacks of Ameer Khan for the last two years. The settlement of Jypoor is still in progress, under the superintcndance of Major-Geueral Sir David Ochterlony, who 440 HINDOOSTAN— RAJPOOTS— JYPOOR. 1818. has lately been appointed to the Eesidency* of Dehlee. The Raja died in December 1818, before the settlement had been finally concluded ; and the succession is now in dispute between Man-Singh, a posthumous and alleged spurious son of the late Eaja's uncle, and a distant relation of the Narwar branch of the family, placed on the Juddee in the most hurried manner, and at an immature age, by Mohun-Ram, the eunuch minister before mentioned. All parties, however, agree in leaving the matter to the award of the British Government; and it will be one of the first blessings attendant on the estabhshment of its influence in this quarter, to effect a constitutional deter- mination of this important question of right, instead of leaving it to the doubtful issue of a civil war, the immediate consequence of which must be, to give a free rein to the tumultuous spirit of the Thakoors, and annihilate all executive control throughout the territory of the state. The relations established with the Holkar, with the Patans, of which race is the Nuwab of Bhopal, and with the Rajpoot states, form nearly the whole of what has been done to fix the poHtical dependance of the portion of Hindoostan not included within the arrangements of 1805-6. Divisions of the British army have been stationed in the positions most Ukely to give efficiency to the system thus introduced. Ajimeer, an acqui- sition from Sindheea, received in exchange for the Vinshorekur's lands on the Sindh and elsewhere, has been retained in our immediate occupation, for the especial purpose of being formed into a military post and depot. Another new station has been fixed at Sagur ; and Mow, near Indore, has been chosen for the cantonment of the force attached to the Holkar court. Some * Mr. Metcalfe has been called down to fill the office of Political Secretary, vacant in consequence of Mr. Adams's promotion to Council. 1818. HINDOOSTAN-SINDHEEA. 441 time must necessarily elapse, before all the claims of the several chiefs upon their respective de})eiulents, or u})()n each other, can be finally arranged, if indeed they can ever be coiii})letely so ; but the grand object of the campaign has been attained, by transferring all such disputes and jarring interests from the arbitremcnt of the sword, heretofore the sole innpire, to that of negotiation. To a superficial observer, indeed, the a])parently unaltered concUtion of Sindhcca Avill occur, as presenting an insu})erable obstacle to the final pacification of India ; but those, who look more closely into the relations newly established, \\ill see, that the condition of this jNIahratta chieftain has undergone a very material change from what it was before the war. I'he first and most essential point of variation is, that he now stands single in political independence. Surrounded now on every side, by either avowed tributaries, or dependents u})on our 2)ro- tection, he is quite as completely shackled in his external pohcy, as if bound by sealed contract to abstain from all dealings with his neighbours, except through our medium. Has he a claim to advance on any one of his neighbours ? he dares not use the means he possesses of enforcing it ; for, in so doing, he would in- fallibly commit an aggression on a protected ally of the 13ritish power, which, be the pretension ever so well founded, woidd never- theless be resented as an act of insult and direct hostihty to its authority. He has no alternative, therefore, but to lay his claim before it in the Avay of argument, to solicit its mechation, and abide by its award. Indeed, this effect of the extension of the British influence on all sides of him has been already experienced. Between Holkar and Sindlieea there were many points in ths- pute, which the British Government has for some time been occupied in adjusting ; and there are others still pending, for the decision of which the Gwalior Durbar is looking to the same umpirage. In Uke manner, we have been, and must continue 3 L 442 HINDOOSTAN-SINDHEEA. 1818. to be, the arbiters between Sindheea and Zalim Singh of Kota, with whom his Durbar has very intricate relations : so also with Boondee and other states ; for there is not a single prince or chief of acknowledged territorial jurisdiction within the whole circuit of India, with whom this court is free to pursue an inde- pendent Une of policy. Wherefore, as far as regards the external policy of the Durbar of GwaUor, it is scarcely possible, that any obstacle to the permanence of the desired tranquillity should arise out of the nominal independence in wliich it has been left. The anarchy of its internal administration might have proved a much more fruitful sovu-ce of embarrassment to our plans and arrangements for the maintenance of pvibhc peace, had not a corrective been provided for this evil also, though its operation will necessarily be but slow. Upon tliis subject, a Uttle further explanation will be indispensable. The want of order, that was generally found to prevail where- ever the influence of Doulut Eao Sindheea extended, was omng, partly to the nature of liis military establishment and the laxity of the subordination of its officers to the government, and of the men to their officers, and partly to the partial kind of success, that attended its tumultuary operations. After gaining pos- session of a fort or a district, the prior occupant was commonly left to prey upon the country with what followers he could collect or keep together; wliile the harassing and dangerous service of hunting down those, who had thereby been reduced to desperate courses, was by no means congenial to the habits or temper of a Mahratta army. The career of Jysingh, after he had lost his district of Kagoogurh and the other strong-holds he possessed, was a fair specimen of the mischief thus occasioned. Madlioo Singh, the expelled Kaja of Narwar, was another in- stance. Both turned captains of predatory bands, which Sind- heea had no prospect whatever of being able to suppress, with- 1818. IIINDOOSTAN— SINDIIEEA. 443 out a total cliange in his system. It was evident, that, so long^as his military commanders were thus licensed themselves to commit excesses without control, in the maimer they had practised liere- tofore, or, by their acts, to bring into existence bands of de- speradoes, with no other means of maintenance than the habit of general spoliation, little approximation could ])e made to the establishment of universal tranquillity. The stipulations of the treaty of Gwalior will be fovuid to contain very effectual pro- visions against the continuance of this evil. It will be recol- lected, that it was one of the articles, that British officers should be stationed with each of Sindheea's divisions, to supervise their movements ; and it was left to the Governor-General to assign the positions they should respectively occu})y. The object of this arrangement was, to enable us either to control the military commanders, or to bring matters at once to issue with them, if they should be so incHned. That the plan had the desired effect, the affair at Jawud is a convincing proof. There w^as, however, a further stipulation in the treaty, that 5000 horse should be maintained in an efficient state, and placed under the command of British officers, with our guarantee for their pay ; towards securing which, Sindlieea's stipend, liis Eajpoot tributes, and the lands about Aseergurh and Hindia were ceded for three years, by way of indemnity for the expense. To this well-paid and well-officered force the Governor-General looked for clearing the country of all depredators by profession ; and the means proved not only adequate to that end, but Sindheea has derived so much personal benefit from its disciplined exertions, that it has aheady become necessary to him. It has, indeed, been of the most essential service, in overawing the license of his military commanders, and enforcing the executive authority of the Dur- bar ; on which account it is still ke])t afoot under British officers, though the suppression of the Pindarees, the ostensible object of its original formation, has been for some time completed. 3 I- 2 444 HINDOOSTAN— SINDHEEA. 1818. Sindheea has always been equally anxious with ourselves, to put down the lawless independence of his Sirdars ; and no sooner had the occurrences of the war checked that ambitious spirit, which is the common characteristic of all the Mahrattas, and by which he was inspired like the rest at the commencement of our military operations, than he gave into the contrary impulse, and determined to profit by the occasion to extend his personal power, and reduce or get rid of the soldiers of fortune in his service, who were in reahty so many thorns in liis side. Circumstances favoured his views in this matter. Colonel Baptiste, the commander of liis most effective force, took alarm at the signature of the treaty of Gwahor; and, even before Major Bunce, the officer appointed by Lord Hastings to reside with his division, could reach his principal cantonment at Bu- hadhurgurh, he had hastened to the capital, as was mentioned above, with only a few attendants, to ascertain, and, if possible, to participate in the immediate councils of the Durbar. There he was in the first instance well received, and dignified with a higher military grade ; but no sooner had the battle of Me- hudpoor confirmed Sindheea in the resolution to keep well with the English at all hazards, than he threw off the mask towards Baptiste, had both himself and his son placed in strict confine- ment, and demanded of him to account for the revenues of the lands assigned for the pay of his troops, and to make good all' arrears. At the same time, care was taken to hold out Baptiste to the indignation of the mutinous soldiery, as the man who had defrauded them, and appropriated to liimself the treasures, from which only their dues could be satisfied ; and another commander was appointed to the troops left at Buhadhurgurh, over the heads of Baptiste's lieutenants there. By lois intrigues, a counter interest was estabhshed, but not without mutual violence ; and the auxihary force under British officers was, in the end, made use of to awe both parties into submission. Thus was the dan- 1818. IIINDOOSTAN— SINDHEEA. 445 gerous power of J3a})tiste annihilated. Pie was himself put to the torture * (not for the first time), in the hope of extorting a confession of his secret hoards. All his territorial assignments have been resumed ; and nothing remains to him now but Sheeo- poor, which liis family still hold with a garrison, and whither he supplicates in vain to be allowed to retire. Juswunt Eao Bhao, by his own violence, relieved the Durbar from the necessity of compassing his ruin by similar duj)hcity : but there can be little doubt, that the principal motive to re- concile Sindheea to the cession of Ajimeer, in exchange for our offer of lands of equivalent value in IMalwa and upon the Sindh, was, the jealousy he secretly entertained against his relation Bapoo Sindheea, whose main strength lay thereabouts. Bapoo surrendered the place agreeably to the orders presented ; but not without showing much ill-will, and probably more from ocular proof of the irresistible nature of our preparations to take it by force, in case of resistance, than from any respect to the order of his nominal master. As the result of these proceedings and events, it will be taken for granted, that what little organization before existed in the military estabhshment of Doulut Rao must now, upon the indiscriminate ruin of the superior commanders, have been utterly dissolved. Indeed, the natural consequence has been, the utter extinction of whatever military strength this state, on its former footing, may be thought to have possessed ; while the broken troops, having now the Durbar only to look to for their arrears, have crowded into GwaUor, and, by their cla- morous demands, increased the financial difficidties of their master ; insomuch, that, were it not for the presence of the auxiliary force under British officers, which ensures him a certain degree of respect, Sindheea would have every tiling to • Once before tow had been tied round his fingers, oiled, and set fire to, in order to extort some confession of concealed treasure. 446 HINDOOSTAN— SINDHEEA. 1818. fear personally from their importunity and discontent. There is nothing this Prince for his own part more earnestly desires, than to rid himself of the whole rabble, by disbanding them at once ; but for this he has neither money nor credit to borrow upon : nor does there exist within liis own dominions sufficient wealth for the purpose. In this extremity, it would seem, that he has but the choice of two courses ; either to tlirow himself into the hands of the rich bankers of the upper provinces of the British territory, who are able enough to assist him, but have refused to come forward without the security of our guarantee ; or to sohcit aid direct from the British Government. But, in either case, whether our bare guarantee be required, or the money be paid from our treasury, he is aware that he must submit to the sacrifice of a territorial security, and to the humihation of throwing himself on our mediation to effect a settlement ; and to tliis point matters appear to be fast con- verging. Gokul Paruk, the GwaHor minister for so many years, has proceeded on a pilgrimage to Mutra, within the British pro- vinces, whence he shows no disposition to return, notwithstand- ing the sohcitations of the Durbar, wliich still hopes to obtain the requisite funds through his means. As the supply for the discharge of the importunate military is an indispensable pre- hminary to the succession of any other to the office, the appoint- ment of a new ministry will probably form part of the arrange- ment resulting from an appeal to our influence. Every thing, however, is still in suspense, and it will be some time before the quiet settlement of this state can be finally completed. It is satisfactory to reflect, that tliis is the only pohtical object re- maining to be accompMshed, in order to affirm the indisputable predominance of the British power, and its right of overt con- trol throughout the whole of Hindoostan and of the Peninsula. There are, perhaps, who wiU say, granted that this object be 1818. GENERAL RESULT— POLITICAL. 447 gained to the full extent of your wislies; wliat permanent good is expected to follow from its attainment ? The answer is short and plain : a twofold benefit is antici})ated ; first, to the natives of India ; secondly, to the fabric of the British power. In respect to the former, the primary consequence of tlie establishment of the new system of political relations must be, the complete de- liverance of a portion of Hindoostan and of the Dukhun, com- prehending a space of nearly 40 square* geographical degrees, from the most destructive form of military violence. The total annihilation of the Pindarees, and other predatory associations, would alone have been sufficient for the purjiose ; but the finisliing hand has been put to that useful and necessary work, by erecting a barrier against all manner of usurpation from henceforward, whether by mere adventurers and soldiers of fortune, or by one legitimate chief upon his less powerful neighbour. A solid and permanent form of government, good or bad, Avill have been set over all this vast space, whicli, for half a century, has been the area of continued anarchy and devastation : such a government, as will secure its subjects at least from all external violence ; and the example of the ter- ritory, occupied by the Eundela chiefs, and by the Seikhs, to say nothing of the Mysore dominions, is abundantly sufficient to show, that this alone will ensure the revival of agricultiu-e and commerce, and restore the tract to a condition of high, if not of complete pi-osperity. The first step is always the most difficult to make: give but the impulse requisite to set the machine of improvement once in motion, and its own pro- gressive power and tendency will of itself effect the rest, unless counteracted by the active opposition of unthrifty military * The term, though not strictly correct, is expressive enough ; and, as the boundaries on either side are not sufficiently definite to allow a correct estimate of the number of square miles, this mode of estimating the extent must stand for the present. 448 GENERAL RESULT— POLITICAL. 1818. despotism, like to that which has just been subverted. This first step will have been secured, by the universal establishment of regular authority, and by the measures adopted for the main- tenance of order and tranquilhty in every quarter. For thus much those, under whose administration this advance has been effected, will at any rate have a claim upon the lasting gratitude of this great family of the human race. To the British interests in India, there will result from the new order of things, first, a perpetual immunity from the hostile ravage of our immediate provinces ; an evil, against the recurrence of which we could never have had any security, so long as this ample portion of India had been suffered to remain a hot-bed for the engendering of the instruments of rapine and disorder, and a place of refuge in defeat, or an asylum for the harvest of successful spoliation. The consohdation of the various parts under one uniform system, if that system afford but the prospect of sufficient stabihty, which experience leads us to discover in the recent arrangements, will leave us no ground of internal alarm ; while it advances the external frontier of the British dominions to the natural barriers of India, the sea, the Humachul, the sandy deserts of the Indus, and the impene- trable forests and mountains on the east. These barriers are assailable at very few points ; and the security they will afford from outward violence, cannot but give additional vigour to any effort that may be requisite, whether for the maintenance of internal order, or the resistance of foreign aggression, through any one of the few avenues of approach. In the latter event, there will be no enemy within to fear : the compact with each of the protected states will be sufficient to secure its fidehty and zeal in the common cause, against the occurrence of any but the most serious disaster ; and, in the utter absence of any mihtary power within the barrier, to threaten the integrity of an unguarded frontier, except such as would be available along 1818. GENERAL RESULT— rOLITICAL-FINANCIAL. 449 with oui- own against every invader, the strength that coukl be thrown forward to meet such an intruder would be ahnost unlimited ; and faulty, indeed, nuist the government be, if, with such means at its disposal, it should risk the bare possibility of disaster. In short, nothing more is wanting, than the lapse of time for the present genei-ation to forget their past habits, and for a new one to grow up in the daily contem])lation of the order and tranquillity, which it is now our comparatively easy task to establish and maintain. The population will soon be weaned of the habits of warfare and violence, and stimulated to the cultivation of the arts of peace, by the sense of security, and the hope of enjoyment ; and there is little doubt, that the system now introduced will speedily acquire a degree of con- sistency, which no internal combination, or effort of external hostihty, will be able to shake or endanger. The struggle we have just terminated is, however, the more important and worthy of attention, because it promises to be the last we shall have to maintain with the native powers. Hence- forward, we can have no enemies, but such as may be called into being by our own neglect or misgovernment, or by the distrac- tion of our own councils. Against the two former sources of danger, we ought to be continually on the watch. In respect to the last, we ought fervently to pray, that India may never be the scene of British dissension or party animosity ; but that, if any should unfortunately arise, it may be referred to the arbi- tration of the mother country. Nor is the additional stability of our political grandeiu' and ascendancy the sole advantage, that has resulted from the late extension of alliances and territorial limits: there are further benefits of a financial nature, that remain to be brought to account ; but which the subject of Indian finance is too little understood to enter upon, without some prehminary ex])lanation. The British public are doubtless aware of the marked diflE'erence between India and the other colonial dependencies 3 m 450 GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 1818. of the empire, arising from the constant retention in the hands of the government for the time being of the property in the soil, instead of its being parcelled out amongst a gentry tena- cious of their rights, in the manner observable in Europe, or becoming the prize of the first occupant, as is necessarily prac- tised in the first colonization of a desert tract. Thus the nation holds its Indian revenue as a property, instead of deriving it from the subjects in trust for the duties of manage- ment. Nearly three-foui'ths * of the whole revenue, realized from our Indian territories, is derived in this way from the land : so that the dominion, possessed by the nation in that country, may be likened to a large plantation ; and the question of finance resolves itself into one of cultivation, in the mode best calculated to raise a surplus for the proprietor. With this idea constantly before us, we will proceed with the inquiry, what financial benefits have resulted, or may be expected to result, from the recent operations ? The year of the Marquess of Hastings' arrival in India was considered as a remarkably productive one. The establishments were then on the peace footing, and every branch of revenue was in that year more than usually prolific. We shall commence, therefore, by showing what was the state of this national con- cern on the SOth of April, 1814, the close of that official year; and then trace consecutively downwards the financial effect of each year's exertion, until the close of the season of 1817-18, beyond which the accounts have not yet been made up : we * The remaining fourth is composed of various items. The customs, with an excise on spirits and one or two other articles, are heir looms of the former govern- ments ; the stamp duty being the only direct impost, which has originated with the British. In Bengal, the monopoly of salt for home consumption, and of opium for the China market, are two great sources of profit, and occasion the large comparative surplus of that presidency. The Mogul Government drew a revenue from the former by means of transit duties, the aggression of individuals on which brought on the rupture with K&sim Ulee. The opium monopoly was estabhshed in the same time of violence by the agency of contractors. 1818. GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 451 shall tlien, however, give upon estimate the ])rospects for the future. It is a singular coincidence, that the period either of war or of warhke preparation, takes its connnencement in the same year with the operation of the financial provisions of the act, rene^^^ng the charter of the Honourable Company. AVe shall presently have to notice those provisions more particularly. The accounts made up for the year ending in April, 1814, showed the Indian receipts for the 12 months to have been no less than 15,03,76,201 * sicca rupees. The expense of Inchan manage- ment, however, amounted to 13,58,43,011 sicca rupees; so that the net proceeds of the national concern were only 1,453,3,190 sicca rupees, about one million, eight hundred thousand pounds. This was a tribute capable of specific transfer to the excliequer of the parent state from the produce of its Indian concern, after defraying every expense of administration in the country. As to what became of this surplus f, that is a matter foreign to the present object. Suffice it to say, that there were home demands within the year, and those too for the expense of territorial management, which absorbed the whole ; but of this more hereafter. The Indian debt consists of two items. There is ah\ays a floating debt of deposits and out-standing demands, included in the annual accounts, though there be assets to meet it fully or in part. This debt is subject to no interest, and is entered with • Tliese sums may be converted into pounds sterling, by dividing by eight; but the numeration by sicca rupees is observed throughout, because it is tliat of the accounts of the Supreme Indian Government: 2s. 6d. is an assumed value for the sicca rupee, being about the medium rate of exchange with England. A Calcutta sicca rupee contains troy grains 175,927, which, compared with the standard shilling, equals 2-566. 100 Spanish dollars are coined into 210J sicca rupees; but, private bullion being subject to a seignorage duty, tlio mint produce is, sicca rupees 206y. This calculation is made upon the old standard of 62 shillings to the lb. of silver. f There was actually furnished to England in that year a sum of 1,48,59,957 sicca rupees. 3 M 2 452 GENERAL RESULT-FINANCIAL. 1818. this distinction. On the SOth of April, 1814, the out-standing demand, bearing no interest, was 3,09,46,564 sicca rupees. The more immecUate debt of India, viz. that on which interest was payable, stood on the same date at 23,15,86,634 sicca rupees, 23 crore 15 lack, or about 29 milhons of pounds sterling. To preserve the mode of illustration adopted above, this may be regarded as a mortgage on the revenues of the plantation, the amount having been raised and expended by the Indian exe- cutive in making the purchase for the nation ; and it is after allowing for the interest of this mortgage debt amongst the current charges of the year, that the above surplus is exhibited. Such was the financial conchtion of India during the first year of the Marquess of Hastings' administration. In 1814-15, the Nip^lese war commenced ; and the exigencies of that war, added to the expense of preparation against the Pindarees and Mahrattas, made a considerable alteration in the products of both that and the following year. The revenue also fell some- what short of the product in 1813-14, being only 14,69,84,106 sicca rupees, in 1814-15 ; and 14,66,86,106 sicca rupees, in 1815-16. The surplus beyond the charges of Indian manage- ment was consequently reduced to 1,18,54,412 sicca rupees in the former, and 35,77,488 sicca rupees in the latter year. The usual supplies were, however, furnished to England without material abatement, notwithstanding the reduction of surplus, the Marquess of Hastings having procured funds for liis mihtary operations, by the loan of two crore of rupees from the Nuwab Vizier at Luckn^o. In 1816-17, the same military attitude was maintained ; insomuch, that the disbursements nearly equalled the charges of 1815-16 ; but the revenue was unusually pro- ductive, being made to yield no less than 15,44,08,916 sicca ru- pees ; hence, notwithstanding that the scale of charge was about 80 lack, a miUion of pounds sterling, beyond the rate of the peace estabhshment of 1813-14, there was still a surphis on the management of 1,09,37,238 sicca rupees. 1818. GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 453 We now come to the great and tinal ctFort of 1817-18, the funds for which had been accumulating in the Indian treasury in the preceding years. For, althougli tlie sup])hes to England had aniuially exceeded the amount of the Indian surphis, still the resources, derived from loans and occasional remittances of bullion from Euro])e, had more than compensated for the deficiency. Thus the means in hand, which, at the begimiing of 1814-15, amounted to 4,70,75,2!)3 sicca rupees, had been increased to the enormous amount of 6,55,99,156 sicca rupees, upwards of eight millions of pounds sterling, lying in the several treasuries of the government, and consisting almost entirely of coin or bullion. The revenues of 1817-18 were fortunately even more productive than those of the preceding year, having advanced to 15,68,71,060 sicca rupees; so that, although the extra charges of the effort of tliis season exceeded by nearly 80 lack, a million of pounds sterling, those of tlie two previous years of preparation, and amounted to 15,27,00,957 sicca rupees, there was nevertheless an actual surplus on the Indian management of 41,70,103 sicca rupees. It needed, however, a crore more to make up the sup})ly expected in England from the Indian treasury ; and, as there was a cer- tainty, that the year immediately succeeding that of the grand effort must also be one of extraordinary expenditure, it was not considered safe to part with so large a portion of the sum in hand in the several treasuries. Accordingly, it was pro- posed to raise near 60 lack more by loan, and measures were taken with that view. An unlooked for supply of near 30 lack, beyond what was expected from England, enabled the Indian Government to preserve, for the eventual service of the year 1818-19, a balance in hand, reduced by only 35 lack from the rate of the preceding year ; there being on the 30th of Ai)ril, 1818, a total of 6,20,76,946 sicca rupees in the treasuries. In the current year, 1818-19, the new resources actpiired by the campaign will come distinctly into account. liut the 454 GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 1818. winding up of the war charges may, and indeed must, swell the expenditure of the season ; and the impossibihty of immediately placing every estabUshment on the permanent scale, designed for the approaching period of tranquillity, will preclude the expectation of a result so favourable, as we may hope to see annually recur at no distant date. The accounts have not yet been prepared ; the expense of the operations can, therefore, only be calculated with certainty up to the 30th of April, 1818 ; and the portion of charge remaining to be provided for in the current year of revenue, must be left to swell the estimate of current expenditure. We shall first show the extent of the pecuniary sacrifice made, to effect the introduction of the new system of relations, up to the SOth of April, 1818 ; to which date the accounts have been already brought up. It has been mentioned, that the Marquess of Hastings raised the funds, which enabled him to enter upon the extensive scale of operations which he adopted, without trenching materially on the annual remittance expected at home from India, by loans raised in India within the period. The debt account ought, therefore, to show the additional encumbrance brought upon the country by the execution of these measures. It will be found, that, in the course of the four years, between April, 1814, and April, 1818, there was debt incurred in India to the extent of 3,43,73,932 sicca rupees, tlu-ee crore and 43 lack, about four millions and a half of povmds sterling. Two crore of this was obtained by the Marquess of Hastings from the Nuwab Vizier, and 56 lack more came into our hands in consequence of the death of the Begum of Fizabad, his Highness' grand- mother. This princess had, during her lifetime, and in order to secure her property from confiscation, made a wdll bequeath- ing the whole to the British Government, on the condition of being allowed to bestow, in the way of legacies, perpetual pensions equal to the interest at six per cent ; an arrangement, which, having been previously guaranteed, was punctually 1818. GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 455 executed on her deatli in 1815-1(). Of the three crore and forty-three lack, therefore, the pubUc revenue was called upon to furnish no more than about ninety lack. Of the debt raised from the Nuwab V^izier, one crore of rupees was cancelled in consideration of territorial cessions, in the manner above mentioned in the narrative : by which means, the real increase of the debt was still further reduced from three crore and forty-three lack, to two * crore and forty- eight lack. But it will be recollected, that the balances in hand of that date exceeded those of April 1814; so that, although, by the debt account, there will be a deterioration of two crore and forty-eight lack, the amount of the still unexpended balance ought further to be deducted, in the estimate of the actual cost previous to the date in qu(;stion. The difference of the balances of the two periods was no less than 1,50,01,653 sicca rupees, one crore and a half The net deterioration there- fore was, in April, 1818, something less than a crore, 98,03,529 sicca rupees. Thus, upon the supposition, that the supplies annually fur- nished to England had been sufficient to meet the demands of England, the whole object of the Marquess of Hastings' plans would have been gained, at a sacrifice, uj) to this period, of less than one crore of rupees. But the supphes, though averaging annually one crore and thirty-five lack, were not equal to the home demand. On this point some explanation is necessary. By the provisions of the last act for renewing the Comi)any's charter, the revenues of India are chargeable, first, with the military establishments of the country ; secondly, with the interest of the territorial debts, and j)ay of the civil establish- * Total debt incurred - - 3,4.3,73,932 Deduct cancelled loan - - 95,68,750 2,48,05,182 The crore thus cancelled was in Lukhnao rupees, the conversion of" which into Calcutta siccas occasions the apparent difference. 456 GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 1818. ments. All these are primary charges, to be defrayed before any surplus can arise, applicable to an increase of dividend on the Company's stock, or to the liquidation of the principal of any territorial debts. Coupled, however, with the above debts and civil establishments in India, are sundry debts and civil establishments contracted or maintained in England ; the in- terest on which debts, and the pay of which estabhshments, is directed to be made good jt?«r« passu with similar items of ter- ritorial charge incurred in India ; so that there can be no such surplus tiU these also are provided for. These several items are to be advanced from India, at the fixed exchange of 2s. for the current, or 2*. 3d. (t^V) for the sicca rupee, out of the terri- torial receipts ; and the Company, in its commercial capacity, undertakes the risk of loss or 2:>rofit upon the remittance, as the case may be. It would seem, that the home territorial disbvu'sements have every year amounted to near two millions pounds sterling, while the Indian supphes have, as above explained, averaged no more than one million a^nd from six to seven hundred thousand pounds. To the above increase of Indian debt, there will thus remain to be added a further deterioration, to be reckoned as part of the charge of carrying the plans of the Indian executive into effect : viz. that resulting from the deficit of the home remittance, as compared with the home territorial charges; a deficit, that, under the operation of the act of Parliament, must be regarded as a territorial debt, payable by the country out of its territorial resources. ^We subjoin a statement, in Avhich this deficit will be found to be incorporated, and by the result of which the recent change of our relations will be seen to have cost in the acquirement upwards of two crore and fifteen lack, besides about sixty-two lack more remitted in bulhon from England over and above the payments on account of the British Government — a casual resource, unexpected by the Indian Exchequer ; and, whether remitted in payment of old debts of the nation, on 1818. GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 457 account of Java, the jVIauritius, and other such expensive acqui- sitions made before the passing of the Act, or advanced on any or M'hat other account, is not distinctly kno^vn to the Indian administration. 1814-15. 1 1815-16. 1816-17. 1817-18. Total of 4 Years. 1 ■ — Indian revenues S^ RM4,69,84,106 14,66,86,016 15,44,08,916 15,68,71,060 Ditto cliargcs - 13,51,26,694 14,31,08,528 14,34,71,673 15,27,00,957 Indian surplus - 1,18,57,412 35,77,488 1,09,37,238 Loan, resources, &c. 1,01,26,858 1,45,98,442 36,68,705 41,70,103 59,79,927 3,05,42,241 3,43,73,932 Total means - 2,19,84,270 1,81,75,930 1,46,05,943 1,01,50,030 6,49,16,173 Supplies to commerce for home territorial charges - 1,17,88,659 Demands of England 1 ,65,4 1 ,629 1,51,91,847 1,25,62,050 1,70,35,446*1,62,50,000 1,46,15,862 *1,60,79,647 5,41,58,418 6,59,06,742 Remains due to Eng- land - - 47,52,970, 18,43,619 36,87,950 18,13,785 1,17,48,324 Result debt gross Deduct cancelled loan - 95,68,750 Also amount in- crease of ba- lances - 1,50,01,653 Net debt . _ - Add debt to England S'R' t3,43,73,932 ►2,45,74,030 98,03,629 1,17,48,324 2,15,51,853 Bullion from London in , the four years in excess I of payments on account V 62,06,552 of the British Govern- 1 ment S^ R- Debt bearing interest in 1814 - - - 23,15,86,634 Debt ditto in 1818 - 25,28,04,984 DilTerence Add cancelled loan 2,12,18,340 95,68,750 Total interest debt incurred 13,07,87,090 2,77,58,405 * These two are upon estimates, the actual accounts not having been received from home. f That this does not correspond with tlic amount cxiiibited per contra, (3,43,73,932 sicca rupees) is owing to the Litter's including the floating no-interest debt and every thing else that appears in the accounts, on which the annual balance is struck. 3 X 468 ' GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 1818. By the above account, the net deterioration incurred, up to April, 1818, in the prosecution of the plans of the Indian Go- vernment, would appear to be, two crore and seventy-seven lack. We will suppose, that, when the accounts of the present year come to be made up, the general result will show an additional burthen of four crore, or, as the cash balances cannot again be reduced so low as they stood in 1814, four crore and a half: the campaigns will then appear to have ended with adding thus much to the debt of the Indian governments ; so that, instead of twenty-three crore and fifteen lack, the amount in 1814, the debt in India wiU have been raised to between twenty-seven and twenty-eight crore, or near thirty-five million pounds sterHng. The excess, at an interest of six per cent per annum, will entail an additional burthen of twenty-six lack on the territorial revenues of the country. In order, therefore, to show that financial advantage will have resulted from the late operations, it will be necessary to prove that the additional ter- ritorial resources acquired, added to the practicable reduction of Indian expenditure we shall, by the late operations, have been enabled to make, will be capable of supporting the whole of this burthen, in addition to that of the total home territorial demand. It is one of the disadvantages resulting from the very recent date, at which the compilation of tliis account has been under- taken, that there are yet no satisfactory materials wherefrom to calculate either the value of the resources required, or the probable degree, in which it will be practicable to reduce the Indian expenditure. With respect to the former, we can only state the annual rate, at which the territories stood in the accounts of the displaced governments ; neither can we undertake to say, ^vith any approximation to certainty, either at what time they are Hkely to become equally productive in our hands, or what intermediate allowances we shall have to make for the unsettled state of the country, and for the expense 1818. GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 459 of management. The following rough sketch must for the present suffice ; and, if the curiosity of the public should wish to be farther satisfied in tliis particular, and this narrative should chance to run through a second edition, the accounts of suc- ceeding years will have furnished the materials of a far more accurate statement of the real benefit, that sliall be found to have resulted from the events above detailed ; and the narrator \\ill then be able to present a clearer view of the actual con- dition of this national concern at the close of the cam])aigns, drawn from the comparison of financial returns. In the mean time, he has only to regret, that he can now offer no more satisfactory information. The territorial revenue of the Peshwa, exclusive of assign- ments of land on military tenure, was estimated, in 1815, at a total of 96,71,753 rupees, the average rate of the accounts of that government. ]\Ir. Elphinstone estimates the incumbrances arising from the provision for the Suttara Ixaja, the stipend of eight lack per annum to Eajee Eao, of three lack to his brother Chimnajee, with other necessary charges resulting ft'om the opera- tions, at no less than thirty-four lack per annum. The net gross acquisition will, therefore, be but sixty-two lack, inclusive of the cessions by the treaty of Poena, which were destined to the main- tenance of an auxihary force : and, though such a force may per- haps now be dispensed with, it will nevertheless be necessary to make some addition to the regular military estahlishment in lieu of it. From the resumed Jageers and Surunjamee tenures of the Poona state, a permanent further revenue of about 524,40,000 rupees is anticipated. AVhereforc, after a very liberal allowance for any addition to the military establishments re(iuisite for the acquired district, and for the expense of civil administration, which, in the western provinces of the Bengal presidency, averages a rate of sixteen per cent on the receipts of re^'enue, 3 N 2 460 GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 1818. we may assume that the dominions, late of Bajee Eao, will yield a net revenue of fifty lack. The ceded lands of the Bhoosla were entered in the accounts of that state at 22,47,000 rupees. Those of the treaty of ^lun- disor, which have been retained in our own hands, appeared, by Holkar's accounts of the year 1814, to have yielded no more than 4,42,500 rupees ; but this must have been owing to the complete anarchy that prevailed at that period ; for the same territories, in 1766, yielded to Tukojee Holkar no less than 17,03,000 rupees. A produce often lack may therefore be fairly assumed on this account. From Sagur and other retained ter- ritories in its neighbourhood, we may reckon upon a product of at least five lack, including the cession of JVIohaba by Govind Kao of Jaloun. Four lack more must be added for Ajimeer ; and the Rajpoot tributes, including those formerly paid to Sindheea and Holkar, cannot be assumed at less than fifteen lack. The Jypoor tribute alone wiU ultimately amoinit to that svmi ; but, as it must be some years before this can be expected, it will be fairer to confine the present view to the prospects of a more Hmited period. The gross receipts on this side of India are thus taken at a little less than fifty-six lack and a half*. Allow- ing Uberally for the additional civil charges incident to our pre- sent extended possessions, and for the new political as well as * Recapitulation. Bhoosla _ R= 22,47,200 Holkar . - 10,00,000 Sagur _ _ . - 5,00,000 Ajimeer . - 4,00,000 Tributes * " ~ - 15,00,000 Total 56,47,200 Poona I gross 87,11,753 1,43,58,953 1818. GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 4fil udniinistrative establislnnents, tliat have become necessary in conseqnence, we will assume the advantages gained from other states, exclusive of the Peshwa territory, to yield a net revenue of no more than forty lack. Thus, in ensuing years, when time shall have allowed the new acquisitions to reach the full measure of their productive power, we may look for a gross addition to the territorial resources of the Indian govenmient of eighty-seven lack from Poona, and fifty-six and a half from cessions in other quarters : and the net advantage of both may be fairly taken at about ninety lack. In the year 1817-18, part of these resources had become available : we will make the calculation, therefore, upon the result of the year preceding it, as exhibited in the above schedule. Supposing both the receipts and the charges of that year to be increased by the new acquisitions, in the ratio of the above rough estimate, then the Indian surplus, instead of one* crore and nine lack of rvqiees, would amount within a lack of two crore. If we can anticipate for the future a result of this nature from the increased resovu'ces only, without reference to any reduction of the expenchture, we may well be satisfied with the improve- ment in our financial prospects, consequent upon the late operations. The principal obstacle to our at once reckoning upon this permanent result may arise from an apprehension, that an excess of fifty-three lack, on the expenditure of 1816-17, will not pro- vide sufficiently for the additional charges of future years : for * Receipts 1816-17 Charges 15,4.t,08,916 14,31-,71,678 1,43,58,953 New 53,58,953 16,87,67,809 Total M-,SS,30,031 14,88,30,631 1,99,37,238 Supposed future surplus. 462 GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 1818. ninety- three lack was the difference between those of 1817-18, and of the year preceding ; and it is more than probable, that the disbursements in 1818-19 will be on the same high scale, if not indeed upon one yet higher. Considerably more than forty lack of the charges of 1817-18 were, however, expended in bringing the immense armies employed in that campaign into the field, an item which cannot recur ; while many of the temporary establishments and levies of the period must, in the end, if not very shortly, be reduced. It will, therefore, only be in the year of actual exertion, and in that immediately subsequent, when its accounts come to be wound up, that such a rate of charge will be experienced ; and we may still safely assume, that the per- manent expenditvire need not exceed the rate of 1816-17, by more than fifty lack ; and this without reckoning upon any re- duction of the war establishments ; while, by practicable re- ductions, we may fairly expect, that the charges might be brought to an equality ; for even the year 1816-17 was a season of very chargeable precaution. The above estimate is necessarily an extremely rough one ; but is by no means intentionally exaggerated. Its result must needs be satisftictory to the nation ; as it shows, that, without making any allowance for possible reductions of charge, the con- sequence of the late operations will be, to raise the surplus revenue beyond the expense of Indian management of its con- cern, to two crore of rupees, unless some serious disappointment occurs, in respect to the productive powers of the acquired ter- ritory. If the surplus be raised to this amount, the national tribute of two million will be secure, and there will be a farther annual excess of forty lack, applicable to the payment of the interest of the additional debt incurred in the acquirement of these advantages, as well as to the gradual extinction of the principal also, if that should be thought expechent. The British pubUc is probably Httle aware of the prosperous 1818. GENERAL RESULT-FINANCIAL. 463 and improving condition of its Indian concern. For the twenty years, from the dose of 1792-93 to that of 1812-13, the average annual balance furnished by India to England, beyond its receipts from that country, did not exceed 24,40,734 sicca rupees, though it has since averaged more than a crore and sixteen lacks per annum. Yet, to effect the very moderate remittance of the former period, and maintain the then establishments in India, was that debt contracted, which will now, by the late excess of war charges, have been raised to about* twenty-seven crore. Tliis is the average result of the seasons of war and of peace taken one with another. But, heretofore, whenever circum- stances called upon the Indian authorities for any extraordinary exertion, not only was this moderate remittance whoUy withheld from England, but besides, the annual expenditure in India very o-reatly exceeded the revenue. During the administration of Lord CornwaUis, the accounts were not kept in such a form, as to show readily the Indian deficit occasioned by the wars of that period. But of the INIahratta war of 1803 we have distinct financial accounts ; by reference to which it appears, that the annual extra charges, on the average of the four years to 1807 inclusive, exceeded the annual income of India by f 1,89,30,388 sicca rupees. Thus, the Indian resources at that time were to that extent incompetent to provide for exertions, which can now be made without occasioning any deficit, but on the contrary, * The Indian debt bearing interest was, in April, 1793, no more than 5,33,68,683 sicca rupees. ■f 1803-4 1804-5 1805-6 1806-7 Indian receipts 11,88,95,032 13,06,4-9,24-l 13,58,38,952 12,97,16,627 Do. disbursements 12,87,90,378 15,76,18,750 16,44,88,747 13,99,23,531 Deficit 98,95,346 2,69,69,509 2,86,49,795 1,02,06,904 Total deficit for four years 7,57,21,544 Average for each year 1,89,30,388 464 GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 1S18. still leaving a surpkis. In the single year 1 805-6, the extra charge, consequent upon the rupture with the Holkar, was larger than in the year 1817-18, when the whole strength of the three pre- sidencies was last brought into the field. The consequence was, that the Indian deficit of that year alone exceeded the whole deterioration of the four years of the late operations, being no less than two crore and eighty-six lack ; whereas, in- cluding the home demand at the average annual of rate of more than two miUion pounds sterling, an item which forms no part of the above deficit for 1805-6, the additional burthen of debt thrown upon India, up to April, 1818, has been shown, in the statement before given, not to have exceeded * two crore and seventy-seven lack. The improved condition of the national interest in India may well be inferred from the above comparison. To wage a four years' war with the ]\Iahrattas, cost, from 1803 to 1807 inclusive, no less a sum than seven crore and fifty- seven lack beyond the income derived from the country, and without allowing for the supplies to England, which of necessity were suspended during that period. But, on the late occasion, four years of active and most extensive exertion have been surmounted, not only without the occurrence of any deficit, but with an actual surplus of three crore and upwards, available for the purposes of the nation in England. Therefore, had the home demand been limited to this amount, the exertions India has been called vipon to make would have j)roduced no incum- brance whatever. It is because of the necessity of a still larger remittance, a necessity acknowledged whether in war or in peace, that the Indian administrations have found it necessary * The deficiency in the supplies home, though considered throughout as part of the burthen incurred, is not of the same nature as a debt incurred in the country; for, if met by loans raised at home, it will not involve an annual charge of more than four per cent, or five under the most disadvantageous arrangement that could be made. 1818. GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 46.5 to provide funds for the execution of their object, by incunino' new debt to the amount tliat has been mentioned. J Jut no part of the sum has been raised on terms, that Avill leave a jiermanent incumbrance of more than six per cent : wliereas lieretofore, in seasons of financial difficulty, loans were never negotiable at a lower rate of interest than twelve per cent. It should be observed too, that no fresh impost has been laid upon the territory, and that the receipt of the Indian revenue arises, not from the expedient of temporary taxation, in its nature liable to change or remission ; but the whole of these results have been produced irom land revenues, the property of the nation by right of conquest, fixed in their ratio, which no one is entitled to dispute, and for the administration of which the nation is accountable to no one upon earth. A word or two may be necessary on the subject of the home* territorial charges, the extent of wliich might else excite asto- nishment. A considerable portion goes towards paying the interest, and some part into a sinking fund, on lonns raised from the British public, in anticipation and aid of the Indian finances, or to defray charges of home management, for which India had not provided funds. Another considerable portion is expended * The following were the items of these charges for the two vcars 1614-15 and 1815-16. Passage of military - . _ _ . Freight — demurrage - - - . . Military officers on furlough and the retired list Carnatic debt ---... Loan of 1812, with sinking fund St. Helena — Bcncoolcn .... Political charses general .... Stores sent to India ..... Payments in England for King's regiments 1814-15 i^i.i-ih- £ 79,10.0 d'5H,976 72,610 182,222 283,993 20,5,142 182,831 137,408 2t4.,044 243,982 53,083 47,724 266,84-2 301,338 4-83,.343 439,080 252,974. 360,236 Total per annum i'l, 918,829 1,976,114 S o 466 GENERAL RESULT— FINANCIAL. 1818. in pensions to military officers on the retired list, or in the pay of officers on furlough, which are legitimate Indian charges ; so hkewise are the recruiting and depot expenses, and the chai'ge of sending out men for the King's regiments in India. A third large item of home expenditure is on account of iiiilitary and naval stores furnished to the country, and, therefore, is a payment for value received. It is only the remainder, after aU these de- ductions, that can be fairly considered as the expense of esta- bUshments, maintained in England for the due administration of the affiiirs of India. This residuary item is more particularly under the control of the British parhament. It may possibly be objected, that, unless India have provided an annual revenue, equal to the whole amount of these charges, plus the total expense of its local administration, and without incurring debt for the purpose, it must be regarded as a losing national concern ; the answer is, that, even sujjposing the sums raised to meet these charges to be money absolutely thrown away, without the least liope of any future retvu-n, the question would still remain behind, whether there be no other advantages arising from the dominion of India, to compensate for such an annual loss. The most obvious and striking benefits, that pre- sent themselves to our view, are the maintenance, and means of accumulation too, which the management of so large a concern affi^rds in its various departments to many thousands of British subjects, and the annual accession to the national capital of nu- merous private fortunes remitted to England, to say nothing of other funds supplied to British consumption from income drawn in India. But, if the inability to meet the full amount of pre- sent charge, without incurring debt, be taken to arise from the necessity of making a still further outlay to secure and improve what we before possessed ; and, if there be a prospect of national advantage to be derived from the sums so expended in improve- ment, then is the case completely altered. Undoubtedly, the 1818. CONCLUSION. 467 value of the concern must heretofore liave been affected by the extent of outlay still requisite to secure the full benefit, of which it could be made productive ; but, so long as there remained a rational probability of ultimately securing that benefit, there could be no wisdom in withholding the outlay, through fear of receiving no present adequate return, ^^^ould an individual, that has three parts of an estate, and a title to the remainder, which could be established at the ex])ense of a very few years . rent of the remaining portion, act wisely, in allowing himself to be deterred by the amount of present advance, from any exertion to make himself master of the whole ? Apply the same principle to the recent acquisitions of the empire in India, and to the outlay of debt, of which they are the returns. We have now got possession of the whole estate, and hold it without a parcenor or competitor. We may therefore expect, for it is in our power, henceforward to derive the full benefit that it can be made to yield, though we yet know not its real extent. The accumvdation of new debt is the price, by which this entirety of possession has been effected. The sums last borrowed were taken up merely to complete the object of former outlays : the one expense was a necessary consequence of the other. But this at least may be asserted with confidence; that, of all the national acquisitions successively made by the application of such means, no part of the estate will be found to have been purchased so cheaply, as this last portion of territorial sovereignty over the vast expanse of Asia, that lies within the natural barriers of India. ^Yith this summary of the present condition and prospects of Indian finance, we take leave of the reader, whom curiosity or past recollections shall have conducted thus far, through a simple narration of facts, perhaps uninteresting to the generality of Europeans. But it is fit, that the British ])ubhc should know the motives and the conduct of their countrvmen in the East, 468 CONCLUSION. 1818. and keep a vigilant eye upon the measures of delegates, |who ^ exercise an incalculable influence over the wealth and happiness ; = of that large proportion of the human race, which Providence has subjected to British dominion. The depositaries of this important trust court pubhcity, and invite inquiry. They are anxious to be judged by British feehngs and principles, tempered only by a due regard to the pecuUar circumstances, under whicli the Indian dependencies of the empire were first acquired, and to the moral duties, that have been entailed by this possession. To the approbation of their country they look for the chief re- ward of no common exertions, and of what, with all its splendour, can never be other than exile : and they are not afraid to place their labours, in every department of national administration, even that which they may be supposed to be least attentive to, the observance of public economy, in competition with those of their fellow countrymen, whether at home or in any other part of the world. THE END. V I.ONDON: rRiMTitn RY T. nAVisoN, vvnirtfK»A:is. UC S'v--rT;\ E[Ci-r\K: , [.uii. , > a. D 000 011 165 i*:^*l^' ^2 »cv."l>'%fcf