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GIFT OF 
 HORACE W. CARPENTIER 
 
THE LIFE 
 
 OF 
 
 YAKOOB BEG; 
 
 ATHALIK GHAZI, AND BADAULBT; 
 
 AMEER OF KASHGAR 
 
 BY 
 
 DEMETKIUS CHAELES BOULGEB, 
 
 MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY. 
 
 WITH MAP AND APPENDIX. 
 
 LONDON: 
 H. ALLEN & CO., 13, WATEKLOO PLACE, S.W. 
 
 1878. 
 [All rights reserved.} 
 
w 
 
 CARPHNTIER 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED BY WOODFALL AND KINDER, 
 M1LFORD LANE, STRAND, W.C. 
 
THE LIFE 
 
 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
TO MY FATHER, 
 BRIAN AUSTEN BOULGER, 
 
 THE FOLLOWING PAGES, AS SOME PAINT TOKEN OF FILIAL AFFECTION 
 AND GRATITUDE. 
 
 422393 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 THE following account of the life of Yakoob Beg was 
 written with a twofold intention. In the first place, it 
 attempts to trace the career of a soldier of fortune, who, 
 without birth, power, or even any great amount of 
 genius, constructed an independent rule in Central Asia, 
 and maintained it against many adversaries during the 
 space of twelve years. The name of the Athalik Ghazi 
 became so well known in this country, and his person 
 was so exaggerated by popular report, that those who 
 come to these pages with a belief that their hero will 
 be lauded to the skies must be disappointed. Yakoob 
 Beg was a very able and courageous man, and the task 
 he did accomplish in Kashgaria was in the highest 
 degree creditable ; but he was no Timour or Babur. 
 His internal policy was marred by his severity, and the 
 system of terrorism that he principally adopted ; and 
 his external policy, bold and audacious as it often was, 
 was enfeebled by periods of vacillation and doubt. Yet 
 his career was truly remarkable. He was not the 
 arbiter of the destinies of Central Asia, nor was he 
 even the consistent opponent of Russian claims to 
 supremacy therein. He was essentially of the common 
 mould of human nature, sharing the weaknesses and 
 the fears of ordinary men. The Badaulet, or "the 
 
Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 fortunate one/' as he was called, was essentially indebted 
 to good fortune in many crises of his career. He 
 cannot, in any sense, be compared to the giants pro- 
 duced by Central Asia in days of old; and among 
 moderns Dost Mahomed of Afghanistan probably should 
 rank as high as he does. Yet he gives an individuality 
 to the history of Kashgar that it would otherwise lack. 
 The recent triumphs of the Chinese received all their 
 attraction to Englishmen from the decline and fall of 
 Yakoob Beg, the hero they had erected in the country 
 north of Cashmere. 
 
 In the second place, the following pages strive to 
 bring before the English reader the great merits of 
 China as a governing power ; and this object is really 
 the more important of the two. It is absolutely 
 necessary for this country to remember that there are 
 only three Great Powers in Asia, and of these China is 
 in many respects the foremost. Whereas both England 
 and Eussia are simply conquering Governments, China 
 is a mighty and self-governing country. China's rule 
 in Eastern Turkestan and Jungaria is one of the most 
 instructive pages in the history of modern Asia, yet it 
 may freely be admitted that the brief career of Yakoob 
 Beg gave an interest to the consideration of the Chinese 
 in Central Asia that that theme might otherwise have 
 failed to supply. The authorities used in the com- 
 pilation of the facts upon which the following pages 
 have been erected are principally and above all the 
 official Eeport of Sir Douglas Forsyth, and the files of 
 the Tashkent and Pekin Gazettes since the beginning 
 of 1874. Mr. Shaw's most interesting work on " High 
 Tartary," Dr. Bellew's "Kashgar," and Gregorieff's 
 work on " Eastern Turkestan," have also been consulted 
 
PREFACE. ix 
 
 in various portions of the narrative. A vast mass of 
 newspaper articles have likewise been laid under con- 
 tribution for details which have not been noticed any- 
 where else. 
 
 In conclusion, the author would ask the English 
 reader to consider very carefully what the true lesson of 
 Chinese valour and statesmanship may be for us, because 
 those qualities have now become the guiding power in 
 every Indian border question, from Siam and Birma to 
 Cashmere. Mr. Schuyler's " Turkestan/' which still 
 maintains its place as the leading work on Central Asia, 
 although not treating on the affairs of Kashgar, has 
 been frequently referred to for the course of affairs in 
 Khokand; but, in the main, Dr. Bellew's historical 
 narrative in Sir D. Forsyth's Eeport has been followed. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAB . 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 ETHNOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR 14 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 HISTORY OF KASHGAR 22 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 THE CONQUEST OF KASHGAR BY CHINA . . . \ . .41 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR 54 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE BIRTH OF YAKOOB BEG AND CAREER IN THE SERVICE OF 
 KHOKAND ... 76 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 THE INVASION OF KASHGAR BY BUZURG KHAN AND YAKOOB BEG . 92 
 
Xli CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PAGE 
 WARS WITH THE TUNGANI . HO 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR . . . 137 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 YAKOOB BEG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA 173 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 YAKOOB BEG'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND 212 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 YAKOOB BEG'S LAST WAR WITH CHINA, AND DEATH . . .236 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR 258 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 THE CHINESE FACTOR IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION . . 277 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 THE POSITION OF Los-NoR 
 
 TREATY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA .... 
 TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND CASHMERE 
 TREATY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND KASHGAR .... 
 TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND KASHGAR .... 
 RULES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE JOINT COMMISSIONERS AP- 
 POINTED FOR THE NEW ROUTE TO EASTERN TURKESTAN . 330 
 A STORY FROM KASHGAR 334 
 
YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR. 
 
 THE state of Kashgar, which comprises the western 
 portion of Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, has been 
 defined as being bounded on the north by Siberia, on 
 the south by the mountains of Cashmere, on the east 
 by the Great Desert of Gobi, and on the west by the 
 steppe of " High Pamere." This description, while suf- 
 ficiently correct for general speaking, admits of more 
 detail in a work dealing at some length with that 
 country. Strictly, the name Kashgar or Cashgar applies 
 only to the city, and it was not until after the time of 
 Marco Polo, when it was the most populous and opulent 
 town in the whole region, that it became used for the 
 neighbouring country. The correct name is either 
 Little Bokhara or Eastern Turkestan, and the Chinese 
 call it Sule. Eecent writers have styled the territory 
 of the Athalik Ghazi Kashgaria. It certainly extended 
 through a larger portion of Chinese Turkestan than 
 did any past native rule in Kashgar, the Chinese of 
 course excepted. The definition given above of the 
 limits of Kashgar states that on the north it is 
 bounded by Siberia, but this is erroneous, for the ex- 
 tensive territory of Jungaria or Mugholistan intervenes. 
 Jungaria under the Chinese was known as Hi from its 
 capital, and now under the Eussians is spoken of as 
 
YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Kuldja, another name for the same city. This very 
 extensive and important district was included in the 
 same government with Kashgar when the Chinese 
 dominated in all this region from their head-quarters 
 at Hi ; but in the final settlement after the disruption 
 of the Chinese power in 1863, while Kashgar fell to 
 the Khoja Buzurg Khan, and the eastern portion of 
 Jungaria, together with the cities of Kucha, Karashar, 
 and Turfan south of the Tian Shan range, to the 
 Tungani ; Kuldja or Hi was occupied by the Russians. 
 The frontier line between Kuldja and Kashgar is very 
 clearly marked by the Tian Shan, and the same effectual 
 barrier divides the continent into two well-defined 
 divisions from Aksu to Turfan and beyond. Eastern 
 Turkestan is, therefore, bounded on the north by the 
 Tian Shan, and on the south the Karakoram Mountains 
 form a no less satisfactory bulwark between it and 
 Kohistan and Cashmerian Tibet. As has been said, on 
 the west the steppe of Pamir and on the east the desert 
 of Gobi present distinct and secure defences against 
 aggression from without in those directions. There are 
 few states in Asia with a more clearly marked position 
 than that of which we have been speaking. Nature 
 seems to have formed it to lead an isolated and indepen- 
 dent existence, happy and prosperous in its own resources 
 and careless of the outer world ; but its history has been 
 of a more troubled character, and at only brief intervals 
 has its natural wealth been so fostered as to make it that 
 which it has been called, "the Garden of Asia." This 
 condition of almost continual warfare and disturbance 
 during centuries, has left many visible marks on the 
 external features of the country, and in nothing is this 
 more strikingly evident than in the small population. 
 A region which contains at the most moderate estimate 
 250,000 square miles, is believed by the highest 
 authorities to contain less than 1,000,000 inhabitants. 
 In breadth Kashgaria may be said to extend from, 
 longitude E. 73 to 89, and in width from latitude N. 
 
GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR. 3 
 
 36 to 43; but the ancient kingdom of Kashgar has 
 been always considered to have reached only to Aksu, 
 a town about 300 miles north-east of Kashgar. When 
 the Chinese about fifty years ago conceded certain trade 
 privileges to Khokand, they were not to have effect east 
 of Aksu ; this fact seems conclusive as to the recognized 
 limits of the ancient dynasty of Kashgar. The capital 
 of this district, which at one time has been a flourishing 
 kingdom under a native ruler, at another a tributary of 
 some Tartar conqueror, and then distracted by the 
 struggles of his effete successors, and at a third time a 
 subject province of the Chinese, has fluctuated as much 
 as the fortunes of the state itself. Now it has been 
 Yarkand, now Kashgar, and yet again, on several occa- 
 sions, Aksu. The claims of Kashgar seem to have pre- 
 vailed in the long run, for, although Yarkand is still 
 the larger city, Yakoob Beg established his capital at 
 Kashgar, and made that town known throughout the 
 whole of Asia by the means of his government. 
 
 Kashgar is situated in a plain in the north of the 
 province, and the small river on which it is built is 
 known as the Kizil Su. Immediately beyond it the 
 country becomes hilly and mountainous, until in the far 
 distance may be seen the snow-clad peaks of the Tian 
 Shan, and the Aksai Plateau. Although the population 
 is barely 30,000, there is now an air of brisker activity 
 in the bazaars and caravanserais of this capital than in 
 any other city in the country. The trade carried on 
 with Eussia in recent years has given some life to the 
 place ; but few, if any, merchants proceed more inland 
 than this, whether they come from Khokand or from 
 Kuldja. The town stretches on both sides of the river, 
 which is crossed by a wooden bridge ; but there are no 
 buildings of any pretensions for external beauty or 
 internal comfort. The orda or palace of the Ameer, 
 which is in Yangy Shahr, five miles from the city, is a 
 large gloomy barrack of a place with several buildings 
 within each other ; the outer ones are occupied by the 
 
 B 2 
 
4 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 household troops and by the court officials, and the 
 inner one of all is set apart for the family and serai 
 of the ruler himself. In connection with this is a 
 hall of audience, in which he receives in solemn state 
 such foreigners as it seems politic for him to honour. 
 In the old days, Kashgar used to be a strongly fortified 
 position, but the only remains of its former strength are 
 the ruins which are strewn freely all around. Kashgar 
 is, therefore, an open and quite defenceless town, and 
 lies completely at the mercy of any invader who might 
 come along the high road from Aksu or Bartchuk, or 
 across the mountains from Khokand or Kuldja; but at 
 Yangy Shahr, about five miles south of Kashgar, Yakoob 
 Beg constructed a strong fort, where he deposited all his 
 treasure, and this may be taken to be the citadel of 
 Kashgar as well as the residence of the ruler. Yangy 
 Shahr means new city, and as a fortification erected by 
 a Central Asian potentate with very limited means, it 
 must be considered to be a very creditable piece of 
 military workmanship. The Andijanis or Khokandian 
 merchants who have at various times settled here, form 
 a very important class in this town in particular, and it 
 was they who more than any one else contributed to the 
 success of the invasion of Buzurg Khan and Mahomed 
 Yakoob. It is, however, said that these merchant classes 
 had become to some extent dissatisfied with the late 
 state of things, whether because Yakoob Beg did not 
 fulfil all his promises, or for some other reason, is not 
 clear. If Kashgar under its late rule was not restored 
 to that prosperous condition which excited the admira- 
 tion of Marco Polo, and the Chinese traveller, Hwang 
 Tsang, before him, it may be considered to have been 
 as fairly well-doing as any other city in either Turkestan, 
 while life and property were a great deal more secure 
 than in some we could mention. 
 
 Situated about half-way on the road to Yarkand is 
 Yangy Hissar, a town which has always been of impor- 
 tance both as a military position and as a place of 
 
GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR. 5 
 
 trade. It has greatly fallen into decay, however, but 
 still possesses a certain amount of its former influence 
 from being a military post, and from the exceptional 
 fertility of the neighbouring country. 
 
 Yarkand, about eighty miles as the crow flies, and 120 
 by road, to the south-east of Kashgar, is still the most 
 populous of all the cities of Eastern Turkestan. It lies 
 in the open plain on the Yarkand river, and its walls, 
 four miles in circuit, testify to its former greatness. 
 Under the Chinese it was quite the most flourishing 
 town in the region, and even now Sir Douglas Forsyth 
 estimates that it contains 40,000 people, while the sur- 
 rounding country has nearly 200,000 more. The fruit 
 gardens and orchards, which extend in a wide belt round 
 it, give an air of peculiar prosperity to the country, and 
 quite possibly induce travellers to take a too sanguine 
 view of the resources of the country. In addition to the 
 abundance of fruit and grain produce that is brought 
 into the city for sale, there is a large and profitable 
 business carried on in leather. Yarkand has almost a 
 monopoly of this article, and the consumption of it 
 is very great indeed. The Ameer himself took large 
 quantities yearly for his army, for, in addition to that 
 required for boots and saddles, many of his regiments 
 wore uniforms of that substance. 
 
 But, although Yarkand is the chief market-place of 
 the richest province, and although its population is 
 thriving and energetic, there is a general consensus of 
 opinion that it has become much less prosperous and 
 much more of a rural town since the transference of 
 the seat of government to Kashgar, and the disappear- 
 ance of Chinese merchants with the Chinese ruler. A 
 very intelligent merchant of the town replied as follows 
 to questions put to him, as to the Chinese and native 
 rulers, and it will be seen that it was especially favour- 
 able to the claims of the Chinese as the better masters. 
 
 ' What you see on market-day now, is nothing to the 
 life and activity there was in the time of the Khitay. 
 
6 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 To-day the peasantry come in with their fowls and eggs, 
 with their cotton and yarn, or with their sheep and 
 cattle and horses for sale, and they go back with printed 
 cotton, a fur cap, or city made boots, or whatever do- 
 mestic necessaries they may require, and always with 
 a good dinner inside them ; and then we shut up our 
 shops and stow away our goods till next week's market- 
 day brings back our customers. Some of us, indeed, go 
 out with a small venture in the interim to the rural 
 markets around, but our great day is market-day in 
 town. It was very different in the Khitay time. 
 People then bought and sold every day, and market- 
 day was a much jollier time. There was no Kazi Eais, 
 with his six Muhtasib, armed with the dira to flog 
 people off to prayer, and drive the women out of the 
 streets, and nobody was bastinadoed for drinking spirits 
 and eating forbidden meats. There were mimics and 
 acrobats, and fortune-tellers and story-tellers, who 
 moved about amongst the crowd and diverted the 
 people. There were flags and banners and all sorts 
 of pictures floating at the shop fronts ; and there was 
 thejW/<2#, who painted her face and decked herself in 
 silks and laces to please her customers." And then, 
 replying to a question whether the morals were not 
 more depraved under this system than under the strict 
 Mahomedan rule of the Athalik Ghazi, the same witness 
 went on to say " Yes, perhaps so. There were many 
 rogues and gamblers too, and people did get drunk and 
 have their pockets picked. But so they do now, though 
 not so publicly, because we are under Islam, and the 
 shariat is strictly enforced." 
 
 This very graphic piece of evidence gives a clearer 
 picture of the two systems of government, than perhaps 
 paragraphs of explanatory writing ; and, to return to 
 the immediate subject before us, it shows that Yarkand 
 has deteriorated in wealth and population since the 
 Chinese were expelled from it fifteen years ago. 
 
 Khoten is situated 150 miles south-east of Yarkand, 
 
GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR. 7 
 
 and about ninety miles due east of Sanju. It lies on the 
 northern base of the Kuen Lun Mountains, and is the 
 most southern city of any importance in Kashgaria. 
 Under the Chinese, it was one of the most flourishing 
 centres of industry, and as the entrepot of all trade with 
 Tibet it held a bustling active community. The Chinese 
 called it Houtan, and even now it is locally called Ilchi. 
 In addition to the wool and gold imported from Tibet, 
 it possessed gold mines of its own in the Kuen Lun 
 range, and was widely celebrated for its musk, silk, and 
 jade. It likewise has suffered from the departure of the 
 Chinese ; and the energy and wealth of that extra- 
 ordinary people have found, in the case of this city also, 
 a very inadequate substitute in the strict military order 
 and security introduced by Yakoob Beg. 
 
 Ush Turfan, New Turfan, is a small town on the road 
 from Kashgar to Aksu, and is not to be confounded 
 with the better known Turfan which is situated in the 
 far east on the highway to Kansuh. This latter town is 
 called Kuhna Turfan, or Old Turfan, to distinguish it 
 from the other. Ush Turfan, without ever having been 
 a place of the first importance, derived very considerable 
 advantage from its position on the road followed by the 
 Chinese caravans, and Yakoob Beg converted it into a 
 strong military position by constructing several forts 
 there. 
 
 Aksu, one of the old capitals of Kashgar, may fairly 
 be called the third city of the state, although it has, 
 perhaps, more than any other declined since the expul- 
 sion of the Khitay. Before that event took place there 
 was a road across the mountains to Hi, by the Muzart 
 glacier, and relays of men were kept continually employed 
 in maintaining this delicately constructed road in a state 
 fit for passage both on foot and mounted. But all this 
 has been discontinued for many years now, and not only 
 is the road quite impassable, but it would require much 
 labour and more outlay to restore it to its former utility. 
 In the neighbourhood of this town there are rich mines 
 
8 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 of lead, copper, and sulphur. These have, practically 
 speaking, been untouched in recent years. Coal is also 
 the ordinary fuel among the inhabitants ; and both in 
 intelligence as well as in worldly prosperity, the good 
 people of Aksu used to be entitled to a foremost position 
 among the Kashgari. As a consequence of the blocking 
 up of the Muzart Pass, the old trade with Kuldja has 
 completely disappeared, and all communications with 
 this Eussian province are now carried on by the Narym 
 Pass to Vernoe. This change benefits the city of 
 Kashgar, but is a decided loss to Aksu. Aksu may still 
 justly rank as an important place, and under very 
 probable contingencies may regain all the ground it has 
 lost. In conclusion, we may say that Yakoob Beg has 
 converted its old walls and castles into fortifications, 
 which are said to be capable of resisting the fire of 
 modern artillery. 
 
 We have enumerated six cities Kashgar, Yangy 
 Hissar, Yarkand, Khoten, Ush Turfan, and Aksu and 
 these constitute the territory of Kashgar proper. At 
 one time, indeed, it was called Alty Shahr, or six cities, 
 from this fact. In addition to these may be mentioned, 
 in modern Kashgaria, Sirikul, or Tashkurgan, in the 
 extreme south-west, which is principally of importance 
 as the chief post on the frontier of Afghanistan. Near 
 Sirikul are Badakshan and Wakhan, and it has been 
 asserted that Shere Ali, of Afghanistan, viewed with a 
 suspicious eye the presence of Kashgar in this quarter. 
 It is quite certain that he would not have tolerated 
 that further advance along the Pamir, which Yakoob 
 Beg seemed on several occasions inclined to make. 
 Sirikul commands the northern entrance of the Baroghil 
 Pass, and has consequently been often mentioned in 
 recent accounts of this road to India. 
 
 Maralbashi, or Bartchuk, a military post of some 
 strength, is strategically important, as being placed at 
 the junction of the roads from Kashgar and Yarkand, 
 which lead by the bed of the Yarkand river to Kucha. 
 
GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR. 9 
 
 But it possesses greater interest for us, as being the 
 chief town of the district inhabited by the extraordinary 
 tribe of the Dolans. These people are in the most back- 
 ward state of intelligence that it is possible to imagine 
 human beings to be capable of. In physical strength 
 and stature they are, perhaps, the most miserable objects 
 on the face of the earth, but their social position is still 
 more deplorable. Some of their customs are of the most 
 disgusting character, and their dwellings, such as they 
 are, are of the rudest kind and subterranean. Travellers 
 who have seen them in the larger cities, say that all the 
 rumours that have been circulated about them do not 
 exaggerate the true facts of the case , and the most 
 pitiable part of the matter is, that they have become so 
 resigned to their degraded position, that they are averse 
 to any measure calculated to improve their existence. 
 They have been compared to the Bhots of Tibet, but 
 these latter are quite superior beings in comparison 
 with them. They are treated with contempt and de- 
 rision by all the neighbouring peoples. 
 
 Kucha is, or rather was, another very flourishing 
 city which has never recovered the loss of Chinese 
 wealth, and the subsequent disturbances during the 
 Tungan wars. At one time Kucha had at the least 
 50,000 people, and it was not less famed than Aksu for 
 the resources and ingenuity of its people. But now it 
 is almost a deserted city. The greater part of the old 
 town is a mass of ruins, and during the nine years that 
 have elapsed since the Tungani were crushed by the 
 Athalik Grhazi, scarcely anything has been done to re- 
 pair the damage caused in those very destructive wars. 
 
 Korla, Kouralia, or Kouroungli, as it has been 
 named, and Karashar, two towns which lie to the east 
 of Kucha, have likewise never revived from the period of 
 anarchy and bloodshed, through which the whole of 
 this district has passed; but even the state of these 
 places contrasts favourably with the far worse ruin 
 wrought at Turfan. Turfan, perhaps more than any 
 
10 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 other, profited by the trade with China, for, although 
 it may not itself have been as rich as either Aksu or 
 Kucha, it derived a certain source of income as the 
 rendezvous of all the caravans proceeding either east 
 or west, or north to Urumtsi and Chuguchak. Very 
 often a delay of several weeks took place, before mer- 
 chants had arranged all the details for crossing the Tian 
 Shan to Gruchen, or for proceeding on to Hamil through 
 the desert, and Turfan flourished greatly thereby. Now 
 its streets are desolate, the whole country round it is 
 represented to be a desert, and all its former activity 
 and brightness have completely disappeared. Yakoob 
 Beg had extended his rule a short distance east of 
 Turfan, to a place called Chightam, but Turfan may be 
 styled his most eastern possession. 
 
 We have now given a somewhat detailed description 
 of the chief cities of Kashgaria, and in doing so we have 
 distinctly intended thereby to convey the impression to 
 the reader that it is only these and their suburbs that 
 were at all productive under the late regime. To 
 those who have been to Kashgar, nothing has remained 
 more vividly impressed on their mind, than the exceed- 
 ingly prosperous appearance of the farms in the belt of 
 country from Yarkand to Kashgar; but at the same 
 time this wealth of foliage and of blossom has only made 
 the barrenness of the intervening and surrounding 
 country more palpable. The farms are certainly not 
 small in extent, but rather isolated from each other, and 
 surrounded by orchards of plums, apples, and other 
 fruit trees, in which they are completely embowered. 
 A Kashgarian village is not a main street with a line 
 of cottages and a few large farms ; but it is a conglo- 
 meration of farmsteads covering a very extensive area 
 of country, and presenting to the eye of a stranger 
 rather a thinly peopled district than a community of 
 villagers. Again, although the soil is naturally fertile, 
 the system of agriculture is of an exhaustive character, 
 and it seems probable that only a small portion of the 
 
GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR. 11 
 
 land on each farm is at all productive. But these 
 settlements, which present an exterior of rural happiness 
 and simplicity, are but oases in an enormous extent of 
 barren country. If each proprietor seems to possess 
 more land than he can require, and if the fertile soil 
 produces bountifully that which is unskilfully sown 
 therein, the total amount of land under cultivation 
 is still very limited indeed. Worse still, the soil is 
 gradually exhausted, and as the system of sowing but one 
 kind of grain seems to have taken deep root among the 
 people, it is to be feared that it may be perpetuated 
 without hope of recovery. There is a constant difficulty 
 to be overcome, too, on account of the meagre supply 
 of water. The general aspect of the region is barren, 
 a bleak expanse stretches in all directions, and in the 
 distance on three sides the outlines of lofty ranges com- 
 plete the panorama. The scarcely marked bridle track 
 that supplies the place of a highway in every direction 
 except where the Chinese have left permanent tokens of 
 their presence, offers little inducement to travellers to 
 come thither ; nor must these when they do come expect 
 anything but the most imperfect modes of communi- 
 cation and of supply that a backward Asiatic district can 
 furnish. If we wish to imagine the scene along the road 
 from Sanju to Yarkand, we have only to visit some of 
 the wilder of the Sussex Wealds to have it before us in 
 miniature. The spare dried-up herbage may be still 
 more spare, and the limestone may be more protruding 
 on the Central Asian plain ; and the wind will certainly 
 remind you that it comes either from the desert or from 
 the mountain regions ; but you have the same undu- 
 lating, dreary expanse that you have above Crowborough. 
 The miserable sheep watched by some nomad Kirghiz 
 will alone forcibly remind you that you are far away 
 from the heights of the South Downs. In the far 
 distance you will see the cloud-crested pinnacles of the 
 Sanju Devan or of the Guoharbrum, and then the 
 traveller cannot but remember that he is in one of the 
 
12 TAKOOB BEG. 
 
 most inaccessible regions in the world. But if these 
 southern roads are scarcely worthy of the name, the 
 great high road from Kashgar to Aksu, Kucha, Korla, 
 Karashar, and Turfan is a masterpiece of engineering 
 construction. It need not fear to brave comparison with 
 those of imperial Rome herself, and remains an enduring 
 monument to Chinese perseverance, skill, and capacity 
 for government. In China itself there are many great 
 and important highways, but there the task was facili- 
 tated by the possession of great and navigable rivers. 
 In Eastern Turkestan no such assistance was to be found, 
 and consequently this road, along which was conducted all 
 the traffic that passed from China to Jungaria, Kashgar, 
 Khokand, and Bokhara, had to be maintained in the 
 highest state of efficiency. To do this we cannot doubt 
 was a most expensive undertaking, and, not mentioning 
 such an exceptional work as the Muzart Pass, one that 
 required a very perfect organization to accomplish with 
 the success that for more than a century marked it. 
 
 The great drawback in the geographical position of 
 Kashgar, is the want of a cheap and convenient outlet 
 by water. The country itself suffers in a less degree 
 from the same cause, but with a more perfect system of 
 irrigation, the rivers, such as the Artosh, &c., which in 
 spring carry down the mountain snows, might be made 
 to give a more extended supply throughout western 
 Kashgar at all events. The climate is equable, and the 
 people suffer from no very prevalent disease, except in 
 the more mountainous parts, and in Yarkand, where 
 goitre is of frequent occurrence. The people themselves 
 seem to be frugal and honest, but indeed there are so 
 many races to be met with in this " middle land," that 
 no general description can be given of them all. The 
 Andijanis, or Khokandian merchants, are the most pros- 
 perous class in the community, and they appear to be, 
 from all accounts, possessed of more than an average 
 amount of business capacity in the arts of buying and 
 selling. The Tarantchis are the descendants of Kash- 
 
GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR. 13 
 
 garian labourers imported by the Chinese into Kuldja 
 in 1762, and there is still both in the army and in the 
 state a large number of Khitay remaining, who were 
 permitted to pursue in secret the observances of their 
 religion. The other races are ill disposed towards them, 
 and attribute all the vices they can think of to their 
 doors. But these Khitay managed to efface themselves 
 in the country, and although they formed a very im- 
 portant minority among the males, they never appear 
 to have been regarded in the light of a possible danger 
 when their brethren from China should draw near. 
 In addition to the native Kashgari, and these two 
 important elements just mentioned, there are numerous 
 immigrants from the border states, particularly from 
 Khokand, to the people of whom Yakoob Beg naturally 
 manifested especial favour. We have now given at 
 some length a description of the geographical features 
 of Kashgar, and are about to follow it up with an 
 ethnological description as well as a historical state- 
 ment of the past features of the same region. It is 
 hoped that these preliminary chapters will clear the way 
 from some obscurity for a correct appreciation of the 
 career of the late Athalik Grhazi. 
 
 Kashgaria may be said to be a portion of Asia which 
 possesses some great advantages of position and very 
 considerable resources, but by a singularly hard fortune, 
 except for the brief period of Chinese rule in modern 
 times, it has been so distracted by intestine disturbances 
 that it has retrograded further and further with each year. 
 It is quite possible that its natural wealth has been too 
 hastily taken for granted, and that it does not possess 
 the necessary means of restoring itself in some degree 
 to its former position. This is quite possible, but the 
 best authorities at our disposal seem to point to a more 
 promising conclusion, and to justify us in assuming that 
 the position, natural resources, and general condition of 
 Kashgar will enable a strong and settled rule to raise 
 it into a really important and flourishing confederacy. 
 
14 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 ETHNOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR. 
 
 IN the extensive region stretching from the Caspian 
 and Black Seas to the Kizil Yart and Pamir plateaus, 
 and from the Persian Gulf to Siberia, the two great 
 families, the Aryan and the Turanian, have in past 
 centuries striven for supremacy. The latter, embracing 
 in its bosom in this part of the world the more 
 turbulent and warlike tribes, succeeded in subjecting 
 those who claimed the same parent stock as European 
 nations. The Tajik or Persian is the chief representa- 
 tive in this region of the Aryan family, and he has now 
 for many centuries been the subject of the Turk rulers 
 of the various divisions of Western Turkestan. These 
 latter are the personifiers of Turanian traditions. The 
 Tajik appears to have been subdued, not so much by 
 the superiority of his conqueror in the art of war, as by 
 his own inclination to lead a peaceful and harmless life. 
 The pure Tajik, hardly to be met with now anywhere in 
 Asia, except in the mountainous districts of the Hindoo 
 Koosh, is represented to us to have been of an imposing 
 presence, with a long flowing beard, aquiline nose, and 
 large eyes. He is generally tall and graceful ; yet in 
 Khokand and Bokhara the Tajik is at present viewed 
 much as the Saxons were by the Normans. In those 
 states, too, a man is spoken of by his race. He is an 
 Usbeg, a Kipchak, a Kirghiz, or a Tajik, as the case 
 may be, and by this means the rivalry of past ages is 
 to some extent preserved down to the present time. It 
 is the dissension spread, or rather the destruction of any 
 
ETHNOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR. 15 
 
 sympathy between the various races caused, by these 
 outward tokens of diversity in origin, that has made 
 Western Turkestan the familiar home of intestine dis- 
 turbance, which has in its turn led up to the easy 
 dismemberment of the various Khanates by Eussian 
 intrigue and by Eussian force. In Eastern Turkestan 
 the rivalry of races has become less bitter, and in nothing 
 is this better manifested than in the fact that there a 
 man is described by his native town. He may be a Tajik, 
 or an Usbeg, or a Kirghiz, or a Kipchak, too, but he is 
 only known as a Yarkandi, or a Kashgari. And while 
 we are at once struck by this broad and salient differ- 
 ence in popular custom, and consequently in popular 
 sentiment also, between the Western and Eastern 
 divisions of Turkestan, a slight inquiry is sufficient to 
 show that the antipathies of the various races towards 
 each other have become much more a thing of the past 
 in Kashgari a than they have in the Khanates of Kho- 
 kand and its neighbours. At all events, the antipathies 
 that still prevail in that state are clearly traceable to 
 other causes than Aryan- Turanian hostility, and are 
 undoubtedly produced either by religious fanaticism, 
 motives of personal ambition, or the hatred roused by 
 Chinese pretensions on the one hand, and Khokandian 
 on the other, to the supreme control of Kashgaria. 
 Bearing these facts clearly in mind, it is evident that 
 ethnographical descriptions will not make the political 
 relations of the peoples of the state more easily 
 intelligible ; yet, as matter of historical import, these 
 cannot be altogether passed over in silence. 
 
 The inhabitants of the little known regions now 
 variously known as Jungaria and Eastern Turkestan 
 were, until recent years, considered to be of pure Tar- 
 tar origin, and consequently members of the Turanian 
 family. There are some still who believe that this 
 definition is the most accurate. Others dispute it on 
 various grounds, and with much plausibility. There is 
 no question that the original inhabitants, historically 
 
16 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 speaking, were the Oigurs, or Uigurs, and these people 
 were certainly Tartars. But frequently the Tajik 
 merchants who traded with Kashgar in the earlier 
 centuries of the Middle Ages, took up their abode in 
 the country, and by degrees a large colony of Tajik 
 immigrants was formed on the foundation of the 
 original Oigur stock. These Tajiks gradually became 
 Tartarised, but they still retained the unmistakable 
 characteristics of the Aryan family. The two brothers 
 Schlagintweit, and Mr. Shaw following in their footsteps, 
 were the first to maintain this view, which is becoming 
 generally accepted. We have, therefore, in Kashgar 
 the strange spectacle of a Tajik people becoming not 
 only unidentifiable from the Turanian stock with which 
 it has been intermingled ; but we have also a race 
 tolerance that is unknown in any other portion of 
 Asia. Undoubtedly the hostility of the settled and 
 peaceful Andijani immigrant and Kashgari resident to 
 the irreclaimable Kirghiz is deep-rooted, and, so long as 
 the latter continues a source of danger to all peaceful 
 communities, abiding ; but even this sentiment, and the 
 religious hatred that has at various epochs marked the 
 political intercourse of Buddhist and Mahomedan, are 
 probably less durable, and susceptible of greater im- 
 provement in the future, than the race antipathies that 
 seem perennially vital among the tribes of Western Asia. 
 The vast majority of the inhabitants of Alty Shahr 
 are of Tajik descent. In the course of centuries the 
 purity of their lineage has been leavened by much inter- 
 mingling with Tartar blood, both at the time of the 
 Mongol subjection and of the Chinese. In addition to 
 these two great divisions, there are many Afghan 
 and Badakshi settlers, who have flocked to Kashgar 
 whenever the progress of events seemed to justify the 
 expectation that military service in that state would 
 prove a remunerative engagement. Many of these 
 remained, and they have also left a clear impression on 
 the features of the inhabitants. It is, however, to pre- 
 
ETHNOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR. 17 
 
 historic times, or certainly to a period lost in the mist 
 of history, that we must refer for that general exodus 
 of the Aryan family from the Hindoo Koosh and the 
 plains of Western Asia into the more secluded prairies 
 of Kashgar, which took place when the Turanian 
 nations first spread like destroying locusts over the face 
 of that continent. It was at this period that Khoten, 
 which in its name shows its Aryan origin, was founded. 
 The great nomadic tribe of the Kirghiz, or Kara 
 Kirghiz, as the Eussians call them, to distinguish them 
 from the Kirghiz of the various hordes who, by the 
 way, are not true Kirghiz at all, has at all times played 
 a fitful, yet important part in the histories of Khokand, 
 Jungaria, and Eastern Turkestan. Preserving their 
 independence in the inaccessible region lying west of 
 Lake Issik Kul, and along the Kizil Yart plateau and 
 range, this tribe has always been a source of trouble to 
 its neighbours, whosoever they might be. On various 
 occasions, too, they have joined the career of conquest 
 to their usual avocation of plunder, and under the few 
 great leaders that have arisen amongst them they have 
 appeared as conquerors, both of Eastern and Western 
 Turkestan. But their achievements have never been of 
 a permanent nature. Like the irregular undisciplined 
 mass of horsemen which constitute their fighting force, 
 their chief strength lay in a sharp and decisive attack. 
 They had not the organization or the resources neces- 
 sary for the accomplishment of any conquest of a per- 
 manent kind. Their incursions, even when most 
 formidable and most sweeping, were essentially mere 
 marauding onslaughts. Their object was plunder, not 
 empire ; and having secured the former, they recked 
 little of the value of the latter. At one time they were 
 able to carry their raids in almost any direction with 
 perfect impunity ; but as settled governments arose 
 around their fastnesses, and curtailed their field of 
 operations, what had been a life of adventure through 
 simple love of excitement, became a struggle for sheer 
 
 c 
 
18 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 existence. The region where they dwelt was far too 
 barren to support throughout the year even the limited 
 numbers of the Kirghiz, and yearly they had to issue 
 forth against prepared and disciplined enemies in search 
 of the sustenance that, to preserve their existence, had 
 to be obtained. But for the intestine quarrels that were 
 sapping the life strength of the Asiatic states slowly 
 away, there is no doubt that the Kirghiz would have 
 been gradually exterminated. Soon, however, they had 
 the skill to avail themselves of these disagreements to 
 sell their services as soldiers to the highest bidders ; and 
 although they were not equal to the Kipchak tribes in 
 valour, their alliance was considered of importance, and 
 on many a dubious occasion sufficed to turn the fortune 
 of the day. By such measures of policy their existence 
 has been preserved, and at the present time they perform 
 much the same functions, and are regarded in much the 
 same manner by their neighbours, as in the past. 
 
 The Kipchaks, another great tribe, who however are 
 scarcely represented at all in Kashgaria, pride them- 
 selves on being the most select of all the Usbegs, but 
 their day of power has passed by, for the present at all 
 events. Thirty years ago they were at the height of 
 their success, but they incurred the jealousy of other 
 Usbeg tribes and of the Kirghiz. Owing to the abilities 
 of their great chief, Mussulman Kuli, they succeeded in 
 erecting in Khokand a powerful state, which was able 
 to restrain the encroachments of Bokhara, at that time 
 the great enemy of the former Khanate. But the plots 
 that broke out against them in 1853, in conjunction with 
 the advance of Eussia on the Syr Darya, were crowned 
 with success, and with the execution of Mussulman 
 Kuli the Kipchak power was completely broken. Since 
 that date, however, several of the more distinguished 
 leaders who have appeared on the scene, such as Alim 
 Kuli and Abdurrahman Aftobatcha, have been mem- 
 bers of this clan. The eastern portion of the domi- 
 nion of Yakoob Beg is almost exclusively inhabited by 
 
ETHNOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR. 19 
 
 Cal mucks, or tribes of Calmuck descent. The great 
 majority of the inhabitants of Manchuria and Jungaria 
 are of Calmuck descent, and even in Russia in Europe 
 there are many settlements of this tribe along the 
 Volga and the Don. None of these, however, possess 
 any political importance except those who inhabit the 
 country north of Gobi and between Eastern Turkestan 
 and China, and the chief of these are the Khalkas. 
 The Calmucks are attached by old associations to the 
 Government of Pekin ; and, although they have some- 
 times revolted against, and often caused trouble to, the 
 Central Government, they have generally acknowledged 
 their culpability and submitted to the Chinese autho- 
 rities. In the revolt of the Tungani the Calmucks 
 remained true to China, and performed very opportune 
 service on various occasions. The Chinese army in 
 Eastern Turkestan was mainly recruited from among 
 these tribes, who became distinguished from the Tun- 
 gani by their religion and fidelity. 
 
 The origin of the Tungani, or Dungans, as the 
 Russians call them, is much in dispute ; and as they 
 played so important a part in the loss of Kashgar and 
 Hi by China, as well as in the history of the rule of 
 Yakoob Beg, it may be as well to put the facts as they 
 stand at some length before the reader. There is no 
 question, we believe, that the Chinese in applying the 
 term Tungani attach the meaning thereto of Maho- 
 medan. There is equal reason for supposing that the 
 term Khitay, literally meaning simply Chinese, has 
 been applied to the Buddhists by general usage. If 
 we acknowledge the validity of these two assumptions 
 and, so far as we have been able to ascertain, the 
 best authorities have adopted them there would be 
 little difficulty in explaining who the Tungani were. 
 Granting these, they would simply be the Mahomedan 
 subjects in the eastern portions of China. But others 
 believe that the Tungani are a distinct race, presenting 
 peculiar ethnological features. According to this ver- 
 
20 TAKOOB BEG. 
 
 sion, the tribe of the Tungani can be traced back as 
 a distinct community to the fifth and sixth centuries, 
 when they were seated along the Tian Shan range, 
 with their capital at Karashar. The most recent inves- 
 tigations, under Colonel Prjevalsky, are believed to show 
 no signs of there having been any important cities in this 
 quarter. It may be convenient to mention here, that 
 at that time they were Buddhists ; but when Islamism 
 broke over Asia in the eighth century, they were among 
 the first to adopt the new tenets. This defection from 
 the religion of China brought them into collision with 
 the Emperors of Pekin, and many of these Tungani 
 were deported into Kansuh and Shensi, where we are 
 to suppose they continued a race apart, with their own 
 religion and their own code of morality, for more than 
 ten centuries. Even granting the possibility of such a 
 consistency to a new religion, which history informs us 
 was thrust upon them at the point of the sword, it seems 
 scarcely credible that we should not hear more of this 
 troublesome tribe in Chinese history. Frequent allusions 
 are made in imperial edicts and other official procla- 
 mations to the Tungani, but always in reference to their 
 religion, and not in any way as if they were any other 
 but heretic Chinamen. Besides, even in this way little is 
 heard of the Tungani until the sixteenth and seven- 
 teenth centuries, when very sharp measures were taken 
 against them by the emperors, solely because religious 
 propagandists from their ranks were appearing as 
 enemies of a Buddhist Government. The theory that 
 the Tungani were a people and not a sect is new, but 
 it is possible that it may be a true discovery. On the 
 other hand, it is far more probable that it is only an 
 ingenious attempt at elucidating what appears on the 
 face of it to be a simple matter enough. The reader 
 must decide for himself between the two versions. If 
 the Tungani are to be considered a distinct race, then 
 the majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Turkestan 
 are not Calmucks, but Tungani ; if the view taken here 
 
ETHNOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF KASHGAR. 21 
 
 is adopted, then they are Calmucks who have at various 
 times adopted Mahomedanism. These are the chief 
 tribes of this portion of Central Asia ; and in the fol- 
 lowing pages it may be as well to bear in mind that 
 Khitay is applied exclusively to the Buddhist or govern- 
 ing class, and Tungani to the Mahomedan or subject 
 race in Kansuh and its outlying dependencies. As race 
 antipathies have not entered during recent times so 
 much into the contests of the people of the regions 
 immediately under consideration as religions, the differ- 
 ence as to the true significance of the term Tungani 
 does not materially affect one's view of the general 
 question. 
 
22 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 HISTORY OF KASHGAR. 
 
 THE great difficulty encountered in giving a description 
 of the past history of Kashgar is to evolve, out of the 
 series of successive conquests and subjections that have 
 marked the existence of that state for almost two 
 thousand years, a narrative which shall, without con- 
 fusing the reader with a mere repetition of names that 
 convey little meaning, place the chief features of its 
 history before us in a light that may make its more 
 recent condition intelligible to us. We may say in com- 
 mencement, that those who desire a historical account 
 in all its fulness of Kashgar must turn to that con- 
 tributed by Dr. Bellew to the Official Eeport of Sir 
 Douglas Forsyth on his embassy to Yarkand. They 
 will there find ample details of the events that took 
 place in this region of Central Asia from the commence- 
 ment of our era ; but a mere reiteration of the various 
 calamities, with brief and intermittent periods of pros- 
 perity, each wave of which bore so striking a similarity 
 to its predecessor, would not serve the purpose we have 
 at present in view viz., of considering its own history, 
 for the purpose of better understanding its relations with 
 its neighbours and with China, and how the state con- 
 solidated by the Athalik Ghazi was constructed on ruins 
 handed down by an almost indistinguishable antiquity. 
 For a considerable number of years anterior to the 
 ninth century, the Chinese Empire extended to the 
 borders of Khokand and Cashmere. But the dissen- 
 sions that marked the latter years of the Tang dynasty 
 
HISTORY OF KASHGAR. 23 
 
 were not long in producing such weakness at the ex- 
 tremity of this vast empire that the subject races and 
 their proper ruling families were enabled to obtain 
 either their personal liberty or their lost positions once 
 more, unhappily without in any case achieving with 
 the severance of their connection with China any per- 
 ceptible amelioration in their lot indeed, on almost 
 every occasion only binding themselves with harder 
 fetters, and sinking into a deeper state of servi- 
 tude. When the petty princelets of Kashgar, Yarkand, p fL 
 Turfan, and the rest broke away from their allegiance 
 to Pekin, and when the imperial resources were unable 
 to coerce their rebellious subjects, the whole country 
 passed under the hands of their feudatories, who 
 split up into innumerable factions, waged continuous 
 war, and sacrificed the happiness and welfare of the 
 subject people to a desire to promote their own indi- 
 vidual interests. As the barons and counts of Italy in 
 the Middle Ages devastated some of the fairest pro- 
 vinces of Europe, so these Oigur princes fought for 
 their own hand in the valleys of the Artosh and the Hi. 
 It is very possible that this state of things would have 
 continued until China became sufficiently strong and 
 settled to reassert once more her dormant rights over 
 her lost provinces, but that a new force appeared on the 
 western frontiers of Kashgar. As early as 676 the 
 Arabs, under Abdulla Zizad, had crossed over from 
 Persia, and were carrying destruction and terror in 
 their course along the banks of the Oxus. At that 
 moment a beautiful and gifted queen, named Khaton, 
 ruled for her son in Bokhara. She had not long been 
 left a widow when her country was threatened by this 
 unexpected and terrible invasion. Although assistance 
 came to the queen from all the neighbouring States, 
 including Kashgar, she was defeated twice in the open 
 field, and compelled to seek safety within the walls of 
 her capital. But the Arab leader was unable to take 
 the city by storm, and slowly retired, with a large 
 
24 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 number of captives and an immense quantity of booty, 
 back to Persia. Some years later the Arabs again 
 returned, but withdrew on the payment of a heavy 
 indemnity. Another chief, Kutaiba, was still more 
 successful, for on one occasion he carried fire and sword 
 through Kashgar to beyond Kucha. This was the first 
 occasion on which the doctrines of Mahomed had been 
 carried into the realms of China, and with so cogent 
 an argument as the sword it is not wonderful that some 
 hold was secured on the country. Subsequent expe- 
 ditions in the next few centuries strengthened this 
 beginning, and it was not long before the ruling classes 
 of Kashgar became infected with the new doctrine. 
 
 In the tenth century, Satuk Bughra Khan, the ruling 
 prince of Kashgar, who had been converted to Islam, 
 forced his people to adopt that religion, although it is 
 tolerably clear that up to this time there had been no 
 acknowledgment of supremacy to the representative of 
 Mahomed on earth. A disunited state, which had on 
 several occasions felt the heavy hand of the authority of 
 its generals, and at whose very gates its power was con- 
 solidated, could not but be in some sort of dependence 
 to the stronger power, as there was no ally to be found 
 sufficiently powerful to protect it, now that the Chi- 
 nese had retrogressed into Kansnh. Towards the end of 
 the tenth century the Mahomedans met with a series of 
 reverses from the Manchoo and Khoten troops, who still 
 preserved their relations, political and commercial, with 
 China. It was in the neighbourhood of Yangy Hissar 
 that their general, Khalkhalu, inflicted the most serious 
 defeat on the Mahomedan rulers of Kashgar, but within 
 the next twenty years, assistance having come from 
 Khokand, these defeats were retrieved, and Khoten 
 itself for the first time passed under the rule of Islam. 
 The family of Bughra Khan was now firmly established 
 as rulers of Eastern Turkestan, and their limits were 
 almost identical with those of the late Yakoob Beg. 
 
 The Kara Khitay, who had migrated from the country 
 
HISTORY OF KASHGAR. 25 
 
 bordering on the Amoor and the north of China, after 
 long wanderings, had settled in the western parts of 
 Jungaria, and, having founded the city of Hi, in course 
 of time formed, in union with some Turkish tribes, a 
 powerful and cohesive administration. Their chief was 
 styled Gorkhan, Lord of Lords, and their religion was 
 Buddhism. It was of this tribe, according to some, 
 that the celebrated Prester John, or King John, was 
 supposed to be the chief in the Middle Ages. Some 
 neighbours who had been harassed by predatory tribes 
 came to Grorkhan for assistance, which was willingly 
 conceded ; but, having successfully repulsed the Kipchaks 
 and other tribes, this leader did not withdraw from the 
 country he had occupied as a friend and ally. Not only 
 did he then annex Kashgar and Khoten, but he crossed 
 the Pamir into the province of Ferghana, and in a short 
 period brought Bokhara, Samarcand, and Tashkent under 
 his dominion. This extensive empire was of very brief 
 duration however, and civil war was waged for more 
 than half a century after the first successes of Gorkhan, 
 in which Khiva, or Khwaresm, and the Kara Khitay 
 fought for supremacy. A chief of the Naiman tribe of 
 Christians, Koshluk by name, then entered the lists 
 against the aged Grorkhan, who was, after some hard 
 fighting, defeated and captured. This was in the year 
 1214. Koshluk's triumph was also, however, of very 
 brief duration, for he now came into contact with one 
 of the most formidable antagonists that the soil of Asia 
 has ever produced, Genghis Khan. 
 
 The Mongols or Mughols began to appear as a dis- 
 tinct tribe about the same time that the Kara Khitay 
 migrated to Jungaria, and as early as the commencement 
 of the twelfth century they had carried destruction into 
 the Chinese provinces of Shensi and Kansuh. When 
 Genghis Khan appeared upon the scene he found the 
 tribe which he was destined to lead to such great 
 triumphs in a state of singular strength, and its neigh- 
 bours either at discord among themselves or only just 
 
26 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 recovering from a long period of anarchy. The Chinese 
 were particularly divided at that moment, and Genghis 
 Khan, who had family connections in that empire, soon 
 found it an easy task to lead successful inroads into the 
 heart of his rich but defenceless neighbour. Genghis 
 Khan was born at Dylon Yulduc, in the year 1154. 
 His father, Mysoka Bahadur, was a great warrior, and 
 waged several successful wars with the Tartars. The 
 earlier years of Genghis Khan were occupied exclu- 
 sively in overcoming the difficulties of his own position. 
 His tribe, divided into several distinct bodies, formed 
 only one confederacy when a foe had to be encountered 
 in the field. It required years to remove the dislike 
 they experienced at submission to a distinct authority ; 
 and it was only when the renown of his military 
 achievements threw a halo over his name that these 
 tribes could be induced to acknowledge a supremacy 
 which they had become powerless to resist. But dur- 
 ing these years, when he led a life unknown and insig- 
 nificant as the chief of a small nomad clan, he was all 
 the time preparing for a wider career, and for a more 
 extended authority. It was while he was residing in 
 the remote district round the salt springs of Baljuna 
 that he drew up the code on which his administrative 
 system was founded. It was based on the fundamen- 
 tal principle of obedience to the head, on the main- 
 tenance of order and sobriety in the ranks of the 
 warriors, and on the equal participation in the spoils 
 of battle by all; but its regulations were so strict on 
 the former points, and the gain of the individual had 
 to be so completely sacrificed for the advantage of the 
 many, that at first the establishment of this code of 
 order had rather the effect of driving his followers from 
 him, than of attracting to his standard zealots capable 
 of the conquest of a world. It was not until the year 
 1203, when he was nearly forty-nine years of age, that 
 Genghis Khan succeeded in bringing all the Mongol 
 tribes under his leadership. No sooner had he accom- 
 
HISTORY OF KASHGAR. 27 
 
 plished this much than he embarked on military 
 enterprises, which, in the course of a very few years, 
 placed the greater part of Asia at his disposal. Having 
 subjugated various Tartar and Tangut tribes, he in- 
 cluded them in his military organization, and by making 
 them embrace his system of compulsory service in the 
 army, he found himself in the possession of an enor- 
 mous following. Genghis Khan therefore ruled at the 
 time we have specified over Kashgar, including Khoten, 
 Jungaria, and the Tangut country ; and there was no 
 force capable of opposing his except, in the east China, 
 and in the west the government of Khiva, at this period 
 omnipotent in Western Turkestan. The rumours which 
 reached the Shah of Khwaresm of the formation of this 
 new confederacy in Mugholistan induced him to send 
 an embassy to discover the true facts of the case, and 
 accordingly, while Genghis Khan was prosecuting a 
 war against the Chinese, there arrived in his camp the 
 emissaries of Western Asia. Haughty and imperious 
 as this conqueror undoubtedly was, he received the 
 embassy affably, and with expressions of the deepest 
 friendship. He sent them back with rich presents and 
 the following characteristic message : " I am King of 
 the East. Thou art King of the West. Let merchants 
 come and go between us and exchange the products of 
 our countries." In furtherance of this wish he sent a 
 mission composed of merchants and officials to represent 
 the advantages that would be derived from mutual 
 intercourse. But the Shah of Khiva, either incredulous 
 of the formidableness of the adversary with whom he 
 had to deal, or mistaking his own strength, did not 
 reciprocate the amicable expressions of Genghis Khan, 
 nor, when the merchants who had been despatched to his 
 country were murdered, did he make any offer of repara- 
 tion. Such treatment would not be tolerated by any 
 civilized ruler of the nineteenth century, much less was it 
 brooked by an irresponsible conqueror, whose will was 
 his sole law, in the thirteenth. As soon as his campaign 
 
28 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 with China had closed with success, Genghis Khan 
 made every preparation for the punishment of this act 
 of treachery. It was then that Genghis Khan, with an 
 armed horde of many hundred thousands, burst upon 
 the astonished peoples of Western Asia like a meteor 
 from the east. It was then that some of the fairest 
 regions of the earth were given over to a soldiery to 
 devastate, a soldiery who had raised the work of destruc- 
 tion to the level of one of the fine arts ; and whose 
 handiwork in Bokhara, Balkh, Samarcand, Khiva and 
 the lost cities of the desert, is to he seen clearly im- 
 printed in the ruins which mark the site of ancient 
 capitals, even at the present moment, 700 years after 
 the Tartar conqueror swept all resistance from his 
 pathc Afghanistan, and the mountain ranges which are 
 now considered to be impassable by Eussians, did not 
 retard the progress of this " Scourge of God/' Cabul, 
 Candahar, Ghizni fell to the warriors of far distant 
 Mongolia, as they fell not forty years ago to British 
 valour, and as they must again fall when the onset shall 
 be made with equal intrepidity and with equal disci- 
 pline. And not content with having defaced the map 
 of Asia, with having converted rich and populous cities 
 into masses of ruins, and with having depopulated 
 regions once prolific in all that makes life enjoyable, 
 Genghis Khan carried the terror of his name into 
 the most remote recesses of the Hindoo Koosh. He 
 wintered in the district of Swat on our north-west 
 frontier, a territory which is quite unknown to us 
 except by hearsay, and which has only been occupied 
 by the Mongol and Macedonian conquerors. From his 
 headquarters on the banks of the Panjkora he sent 
 messengers to Delhi; and it is uncertain whether he 
 did not meditate the addition of an Indian triumph to 
 those already obtained. 
 
 A rebellion in the far eastern portion of his domi- 
 nions distracted his attention from the Indus, and he 
 was compelled to hasten with all speed to quell in 
 
HISTOKT OF KASHGAR. 29 
 
 person the rising that was jeopardising his position 
 in the seat of his power. He hastily broke up from 
 his quarters in Swat, and, by the valley of the Kunar 
 and Chitral, he entered Kashgar, through the Baroghil 
 Pass. Although he suffered much loss from a journey 
 across mountain roads, which were scarcely practicable 
 in the early spring, he succeeded in reaching Yarkand, 
 with his main body, and hastening across Turkestan 
 arrived at Karakoram, his capital, in time to quell the 
 disturbance. After this his life was spent in conquering 
 China, a feat which he never accomplished. But in 
 several campaigns, extending over a period of about 
 twenty years, he worsted the Imperial troops so con- 
 tinually, that before his death, in 1227, he had occupied 
 all the northern provinces of that empire, with Pekin, 
 and left to his son and successor, Ogdai Khan, the task 
 of completing the work which he had commenced. On 
 the death of Genghis Khan, his vast possessions were 
 divided amongst his children, and Kashgar, including 
 Jungaria, Khwaresm, and Afghanistan, fell to the lot 
 of Chaghtai Khan. This ruler was able to hold during 
 his life the extensive territory he had succeeded to ; 
 but on his death dissensions broke out in all quarters of 
 the country, and produced a fresh distribution of the 
 various provinces. It may be mentioned that, although 
 Chaghtai was a fanatical Buddhist and a confirmed 
 debauchee, he was a prudent and sagacious ruler, and 
 no unworthy successor to his distinguished father. The 
 dissensions that broke out on his decease continued, 
 with more or less violence, for a period of almost 100 
 years after that event took place, and they finally only 
 received a momentary solution in the formation of a 
 new kingdom of Mugholistan, or Jattah Ulus, as it 
 was more specifically called, under one of Chaghtai's 
 descendants. 
 
 As briefly and as clearly as possible, we will endeavour 
 to lay before the reader the chief events of this troubled 
 epoch, when the numerous progeny of Genghis Khan 
 
30 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 warred throughout the whole extent of Central Asia, 
 and a term was only at last placed to their restlessness 
 by their disappearance. In the first place, it may be as 
 well to mention, that the religions of Christ, Buddha, 
 and Mahomed, were equally tolerated in Eastern 
 Turkestan during the greater part of this period. The 
 Arab invasion and the advance of Islam, had been 
 hurled back beyond Bokhara " the Holy," by the 
 victorious arms of the great Buddhist conqueror, Gen- 
 ghis Khan ; and for a long period after the Mongol 
 conquests, little was heard of attempts at conversion to 
 the tenets of the " true Prophet." But it must not 
 be supposed that, although Genghis Khan, in the sack 
 of Bokhara, had almost exterminated the race of Maho- 
 medan priests, he was disposed to stamp out the new 
 heresy from his realms. Having crushed its power in 
 the field, he was quite content to let it live on or die 
 out, so long as his imperial or personal interests were 
 not affected. So we have the strange picture before us, 
 of the three great doctrines of the earth flourishing side 
 by side in Eastern Turkestan in the fourteenth century. 
 The Nestorian Christians of Kashgar, who in the time 
 of Marco Polo were rich and flourishing, were obliged 
 later on to succumb to the violent measures of the other 
 members of the community, and have entirely disap- 
 peared for many centuries. 
 
 Shortly after the death of Chaghtai Khan, Kaidu, a 
 great-grandson of Genghis, obtained the throne of 
 Kashgar and Yarkand ; and a few years later on, by a 
 skilful piece of diplomacy, backed up by force, added 
 thereto the greater part of Khokand and Bokhara. 
 His triumph was, however, of brief duration, and he 
 was displaced by other competitors. Dava Khan, the 
 son of Burac, the great-grandson of Chaghtai, had been 
 appointed governor of Khoten, but his ambition was 
 not satisfied with less than the throne of Western 
 Turkestan also. He eventually obtained his desire ; 
 but in a rash moment he threw himself in the path of 
 
HISTORY OF KASHGAR. 31 
 
 the Chinese Emperor, Timour Khan, who was returning 
 from a raid carried almost to the gates of Lahore. He 
 was defeated somewhere in the neighbourhood of 
 Maralbashi, and was compelled to acknowledge the 
 supremacy of China. He is of some note to us, as 
 having been the father of Azmill Khoja, who was 
 selected as ruler by the people themselves, about the 
 year 1310, and from whom descend that line of Khoja 
 kings of Kashgar, who have clung to their hereditary 
 claims for a longer time than any other royal Central 
 Asian house. The last of the Chaghtai Khans who 
 held the sceptre with any effective purpose, was Kazan 
 Ameer. On his death another period of trouble broke 
 out, and military governors and rival princelets of 
 dubious titles advanced their pretensions to the vacant 
 seat. Up to this all the rulers had, however, been 
 Buddhists. Toghluc Timour, one of the few remaining 
 representatives of the Genghis families, had only been 
 saved by the pity of a leading man in Kashgar, from 
 one of the most extensive massacres of his kinsmen, and 
 for years he was obliged to lead an uncertain existence 
 in the mountains or deserts bordering on the state. 
 His associations were all Buddhist ; but one day he was 
 so struck by the definition of the " true faith " given 
 by the descendant of a Mahomedan priest, spared by 
 Genghis Khan at the destruction of Bokhara, that he 
 made a vow to become a Mussulman when he had 
 regained his rights. Not long after this the turn of 
 events in Kashgar made people seek for some person 
 with recognized claims to be their ruler, and none in 
 this respect surpassed Toghluc Timour. He, on suc- 
 ceeding to the throne, openly owned his conversion to 
 Islam, and in a few years he was gradually imitated 
 by all the leading chiefs of Turkestan. From this 
 time downwards to the present day, the religion of the 
 majority in this state has been Mahomedanism, except 
 perhaps during the Chinese rule, when the number of 
 Chinese merchants, officials, and soldiers, put the 
 
32 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 minority of the followers of Buddha on a par with those 
 of the rival religion. Toghluc died in 1362. 
 
 It was about this time that the second great 
 conqueror of Asia appeared upon the scene. Timour 
 was horn in 1333 in the Shahrisehz suburb of Kish. 
 He was the son of Turghay, governor of that district 
 and chief of the Birlas tribe, and on the death of his 
 father he himself became governor of Kish also. 
 During his earlier years he was hospitably received at 
 the Court of Kazan Ameer, and that ruler, in addition to 
 giving him several high and distinguished appointments, 
 married him to his beautiful granddaughter Olja Turkan 
 Khaton. Timour did not continue long in favour at 
 Court. His restless spirit impelled him to fields of 
 greater activity than any the Ameer could, or indeed felt 
 disposed to, place at his disposal. He openly mutinied 
 against the central authority in his government of 
 Kish, and on being overthrown by the troops of the 
 state, he sought safety with his wife among the 
 Turcomans of the Khivan desert. Among these 
 uncertain nomads he felt scarcely secure, and collecting 
 round him a small band of desperadoes, he entered 
 upon a more ambitious enterprise by undertaking a 
 marauding expedition into the Persian province of 
 Seistan. This was attended with considerable success, 
 but he himself was wounded in the foot by an arrow. 
 From the effects of this wound he never completely 
 recovered, and was known henceforth as Timour Lang, 
 Timour the Lame, whence the well-known name of 
 Tamerlane. The eclat obtained by this marauding 
 expedition stood him in good stead, for shortly after- 
 wards he was able to raise a sufficient force to invade 
 Tashkent. He occupied the whole of what is now 
 Russian Khokand including Ferghana, and he placed a 
 fresh occupant on the throne, Kabil Shah, in 1363. In 
 the following years he contended for supremacy with 
 another chief named Husen, and in 1369 had so far 
 been victorious that he threw off the mask, and declared 
 
HISTORY OF KASHGAR. 33 
 
 himself king. He made Samarcand his capital, and 
 converted that once populous city into the wonder and 
 admiration of Western Asia. Having settled his 
 internal affairs, he commenced operations against the 
 states lying beyond his border. The mountaineers of 
 Badakshan were the first to incur his wrath, and after 
 several stubborn battles they were obliged to acknow- 
 ledge his supremacy. He then turned his attention 
 to his northern frontiers, beyond which the Jattah 
 princes reigned in Jungaria. He overcame their prince, 
 Kamaruddin, in several encounters, but not with com- 
 plete success until his final campaign against him in 
 1390. As he advanced they retired to the fastnesses east 
 of Lake Issik Kul, and only reissued from their hiding- 
 places when the invader had withdrawn. 
 
 To return to Kashgar, on the death of Toghluc, his 
 son Khize Khoja was displaced and did not regain 
 possession of his kingdom till 1383, when he was thirty 
 years of age. He was a stanch Mussulman, and was 
 on terms of as much amity and as close alliance with 
 Timour as it was possible for any neighbour, wishing to 
 preserve his independence, to be. Allied as he was with, 
 yet not participating in the wars of Timour, against the 
 Jattahs, he suffered in common with those people from 
 the expedition of 1389-90, when both sides of the Tian 
 Shan were ravaged by the armies of that ruler. Although 
 for the next fifteen years they maintained friendly 
 relations, it can easily be imagined that Khize Khoja 
 was not very comfortable with so formidable a suzerain 
 just over his frontiers. The irksomeness of the position 
 is well illustrated by the orders transmitted to Khize 
 Khoja by Timour, to have corn planted and cattle col- 
 lected at certain places for the immense army which he 
 was levying for the invasion of China. It was while 
 engaged in fulfilling these commands, that news reached 
 the ruler of Kashgar that this " Scourge of God " had 
 died suddenly on the 5th of February, 1405. Khize 
 Khoja himself survived but a short time afterwards. 
 
34 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 For the second time within the short space of 150 years 
 had the possessions of a great conqueror to undergo 
 the process of redistribution. In Timour's case it was 
 simpler than it had been in that of Genghis Khan, for 
 the former ruler left no worthy representative of his 
 cause as the Mongol conqueror had in Ogdai and 
 Chaghtai. The branches of the great family of 
 Genghis struck root so deeply, that down to modern 
 times he has had descendants who perpetuate his name, 
 but Tirnour left none such. With the death of his 
 favourite son Jehangir, his hopes of having a worthy 
 successor expired. 
 
 Kashgar was in particular the scene of confusion and 
 trouble, and it was not until about 1445 that any settled 
 government was attained, when Seyyid Ali, grandson of 
 the aged and patriotic minister Khudadar, restored some 
 order and cohesion to the distracted country for a short 
 period. He died in 1457. During these years Yunus, 
 king of Jungaria, played a very prominent part in all 
 the disturbances that were occurring on his borders. 
 He is represented to have been a very enlightened 
 prince, and emissaries from foreign nations returned 
 from his court relating with surprise how they had 
 found a courteous and refined man where they expected 
 to have seen a coarse and savage Mongol. While 
 Yunus ruled in Jungaria another striking individual was 
 predominant in Kashgar. Ababakar, son of Saniz, who 
 was the son of Seyyid Ali, ruler of Kashgar, was one of 
 the few sovereigns of that state whose acts entitle them 
 to consideration. During a long and troubled tenure of 
 power he had the good fortune to overcome many 
 difficulties, and although his career was to become 
 clouded before his death, the brilliant years that pre- 
 ceded the catastrophe justify us in c onsidering his career 
 for a little while. He was a great athlete, hunter and 
 soldier, and was so favoured by his mother on that 
 account that he distanced his brethren in the race for 
 supremacy. As governor of Khoten he soon absorbed 
 
HISTORY OF KASHGAR. 35 
 
 Yarkand, and long and furious were the wars he 
 waged with Hydar, the ruler of Kashgar, who was 
 assisted by Ytinus of Jungaria. Nor, although success- 
 ful on several occasions in the field against the allied 
 forces, could Ababakar hope to overcome the huge armies 
 at the disposal of Yunus ; and it was not until Hydar 
 himself foolishly broke off from Yunus, that Ababakar 
 succeeded in asserting his claim to all Eastern Turkestan. 
 War then broke out between Hydar and Yunus, and the 
 latter with the assistance of large reinforcements from 
 Jungaria overthrew and captured his former ally. But 
 these dissensions favoured the cause of Ababakar, and 
 on the death of Yunus in 1486, his possession of 
 Kashgar became undisputed. The first serious danger 
 with which he was menaced after his complete posses- 
 sion of Kashgar, was in 1499, when Ahmad, the son of 
 Yunus, or Alaja the "slayer," as he was generally 
 called, invaded his territory at the head of the Jattah 
 Mongols. The campaign was in the commencement 
 indecisive, but Ababakar before long triumphed over 
 his northern invader. 
 
 During the next fifteen years Ababakar ruled in peace 
 and prosperity in Kashgar, accumulating great riches 
 and presenting an object of attraction to his covetous 
 neighbours. During these years the country, although 
 ruled in an arbitrary way, flourished, and, as one of the 
 native chronicles put it, " A traveller could go from 
 Andijan to Hamil on the borders of China without fear 
 of molestation, and without having to make an extra 
 long march in order to find a place wherein to rest and 
 obtain refreshment." But in 1513 a storm broke upon 
 his country that resulted in his complete overthrow. Said, 
 son of Ahmad and brother of Mansur, who was ruling in 
 Jungaria, undertook the invasion of Kashgar in that 
 year, and it was not long before he occupied Kashgar, 
 which, how r ever, Ababakar left but a heap of ruins. 
 His advance on Yangy Hissar was opposed, but, having 
 defeated the army of Kashgar before that city, he occu- 
 
 D 2 
 
36 TAKOOB BEG. 
 
 pied it without any further opposition, and thus secured 
 what has heen called the key of Yarkand as well as of 
 Kashgar. For some months Ababakar remained shut 
 up in Yarkand, but on the approach of Said's army he 
 abandoned that position and fled to Khoten. But not 
 long afterwards he retired still further into the moun- 
 tainous country south-east of Kashgar, and halted some 
 time at Karanghotagh. But being first plundered and 
 then deserted by his attendants, he withdrew into the 
 valleys and deserts of the Tibetan table-land. For many 
 months he wandered, half-starved and solitary, in this 
 deserted region, and at last it was reported that he had 
 been found murdered by some of the mountaineers. 
 Such was the end of the once magnificent Ababakar, a 
 prince who in his fortunes reminds us very much of the 
 great Darius. That he was avaricious is clear to those 
 who read of the great treasures he had stored away ; 
 that he was bloodthirsty and cruel is impossible of 
 denial ; but that he possessed in his earlier years many 
 of the virtues, with some of the vices, of a great ruler 
 is equally incontestable. His son Jehangir, whom he 
 had left in command at Yarkand, on the approach of the 
 army of Said fled to Sanju, and was in a few months 
 captured and executed. About this epoch the third 
 great Asiatic conqueror was appearing on the scene. 
 Babur was born in 1481, and was chosen to succeed 
 his father Uman Sheikh on the throne of Khokand, 
 by the nobles of that state, when he was only twelve 
 years of age. This conqueror of India influenced but 
 indirectly the fortunes of Kashgar. His career was in 
 another sphere, and it is not necessary here to enter 
 into any description of his life, such as has been given 
 of his predecessors Genghis Khan and Timour. 
 
 Said, having overcome Ababakar, employed himself 
 in extending his rule over the neighbouring states. 
 He was seized with the desire of occupying that moun- 
 tainous region, which is divided into almost as many 
 petty states as it contains mountain chains, lying be- 
 
HISTORY OF KASHGAR. 37 
 
 tween our Indian frontier and the Pamir and Badakshan. 
 But although he employed all his resources in en- 
 deavouring to subject the Kafirs of Bolor, or Kafiristan 
 as it is now called, he was unable to make any 
 permanent additions in this direction. In other years 
 he carried fire and sword into Tibet and Cashmere ; and 
 it was when returning from one of these expeditions, 
 in the year 1532, that he expired from the effects of the 
 rarefied atmosphere, near the Karakoram pass. His 
 death was the signal for the outbreak of fresh distur- 
 bances. His legitimate sons were ousted by Rashid, 
 the son of Said by a slave, who had already dis- 
 tinguished himself as a general in the wars against 
 Kafirisfcan and Tibet, and on the death of Eashid after 
 a brief reign, the confusion became, if possible, worse 
 confounded. It would be tedious in the extreme to 
 follow the variations that now took place. Benedict 
 Groes, a Portuguese missionary and traveller, found a 
 ruler named Mahomed Khan on the throne in 1603, 
 by whom he was hospitably received ; but as he had 
 placed the sister of the Khan, when returning from a 
 pilgrimage to Mecca, under an obligation to him, this is 
 scarcely a fair criterion either of the personal merits of 
 this ruler, or of the state of civilization to which the 
 country had attained. 
 
 It was now that the Khoja family appeared promi- 
 nently upon the scene. Two factions were playing the 
 parts of Montagu and Capulet in Eastern Turkestan in 
 the earlier years of the seventeenth century. They were 
 known as the Aktaghluc and Karataghluc, and in the 
 course of their strife the leader of the former called in 
 to his aid the Khoja Kalar of Khodjent, a descendant 
 of Azmill before mentioned. It was in the year 1618 
 that this Khoja first came to Kashgar, and his grand- 
 son, Hadayatulla, was the chief means of attracting 
 the affections of the people to this family. That 
 veneration has not disappeared to-day, and the Hazrat 
 Afak, as he is generally spoken of, is scarcely inferior in 
 
38 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 the eyes of the people to Mahomed himself. The 
 great miracles he is reported to have wrought, and the 
 peculiar sanctity which attached to him during his life, 
 gave him complete ascendancy throughout the country, 
 and before his death he was entrusted with the supreme 
 authority. His son, Yahya or Khan Khoja, succeeded 
 him during his lifetime, but was murdered in a riot 
 a few months after the death of Hadayatulla. Then 
 recommenced with fresh vigour the old series of disturb- 
 ances. Aspirant after aspirant appeared in the political 
 arena, but, as each had little claim to lead on account 
 of original merit, a successful rival always was forth- 
 coming, and so this wearying cycle continued until 
 1720. 
 
 The course of the history of Kashgar has now been 
 brought down to the commencement of the eighteenth 
 century, during which a fresh change occurred in the 
 history of the country by the Chinese conquest. It may 
 be well, therefore, before narrating that event and the 
 causes which immediately produced it, to consider the 
 chief lessons taught us by the history of Eastern 
 Turkestan, as revealed in the preceding pages. The 
 most cursory reader must have been struck by the fact, 
 that only twice in the course of eight centuries did the 
 country secure a firm and settled government, and they 
 were when two conquerors, Genghis Khan and 
 Tamerlane, reduced every semblance of authority to' 
 one bare level of subjection. At fitful moments there 
 arose, indeed, some leader, Yunus, Ababakar, or the 
 first Khojas, capable of preserving for a few years his 
 frontiers against the inroads of hostile neighbours, and 
 of maintaining an outward show of prosperity and 
 tranquillity to foreign travellers ; but even such gleams 
 of sunshine as these were transitory on the dark horizon 
 of the condition of mankind in Central Asia. With 
 the fall of each pretender, too, hopes of an improvement 
 became fainter in the breasts of the people ; and when 
 the successors of the Khoja saint showed themselves 
 
HISTORY OF KASHGAR. 39 
 
 not less amenable to the errors and frailties of their 
 predecessors than any past ruler had been, it was to some 
 extraneous circumstance, we may feel sure, that the 
 people looked for aid. There is an old saying in this 
 part of the world, that when " the people's tithe of 
 bricks is full, then comes a Moses in the land;" and it 
 cannot be doubted that in the year 1720 the people of 
 Kashgar had suffered much and for so long, that relief, 
 so that it came effectually from some quarter or another, 
 could not be otherwise than welcome. But the Moses 
 who had been, for centuries almost, expected, had as yet 
 not proved forthcoming, and as " hope deferred maketh 
 the heart sick," so had the Kashgari lost the courage 
 even to look forward to a period when their life of 
 misery, under oppressive tyrants and exorbitant taxa- 
 tion, aggravated by every form of peculation in its levy, 
 might be changed for a more favourable state of being. 
 There can be no doubt that if the chaos which reigned 
 throughout Jungaria and Kashgar had continued 
 much longer those vast regions would have been com- 
 pletely exhausted. As it was the population decreased 
 in alarming proportions, and the wealth and general 
 resources of the country disappeared with no apparent 
 means of supplying the gap. What is, perhaps, most 
 surprising of all is that all these later rulers seem to 
 have lived in a sort of fools' paradise with regard to 
 the resources of their state. The thought never seems 
 to have occurred to them that there must be an end 
 some day or other to a realm distracted by continual 
 wars and sedition, and that subjects who have been 
 tyrannised over for centuries will at last rise up in arms 
 and teach their tyrants, in the words of the poet, " how 
 much the wretched dare." These Khans or Ameers of 
 Central Asia are not worthy of one moment's consi- 
 deration for their own sake ; but, as some account of 
 them is a proper preparation for the modern history of 
 Kashgar, they have been described in this chapter. 
 From the disappearance of Chinese authority in Central 
 
40 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 and Western Asia in the eighth and ninth centuries, 
 down to the commencement of the eighteenth century, 
 the history of Kashgar, in common with that of its 
 neighbours, was a series of misfortunes. There is 
 nothing to attract our sympathies in any of the rulers, 
 with the exception perhaps of Yunus ; and all our com- 
 miseration is monopolised for the unhappy races who 
 peopled that region. We therefore have arrived at this 
 crisis in a fit state to appreciate the feelings of the 
 Kashgari at the changes that occurred in the eighteenth 
 century; and before we consider, in a fresh chapter, 
 those alterations we may close this without regret at 
 the disappearance of a long line of Central Asian 
 Khans, who possessed scarcely one redeeming quality 
 among many vices. 
 
41 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 THE CONQUEST OF KASHGAR BY CHINA. 
 
 BEFORE continuing the narrative of the events that took 
 place in Kashgar after the year 1720, until it fell into 
 the hands of the Chinese in 1760, it may he as well to 
 consider briefly the history of China, in order that it 
 may be intelligible to us how that power was induced 
 to undertake such far distant enterprises, and how, 
 moreover, it was able to accomplish them successfully. 
 In the earlier years of the seventeenth century the 
 dynasty of Ming was seated on the throne of Pekin, 
 but its power had been shaken to its foundations by 
 repeated disasters in wars with the Mantchoo Tartars, 
 who had wrested the province of Leaou Tung from the 
 Emperor Wan-leh, before his death in 1620. The 
 Mantchoos are said to have been the descendants of the 
 Mongol conquerors of the thirteenth century, who had 
 been forced to take refuge in the wilds north of China 
 when the native Chinese rose up and destroyed their 
 power. Whether this very plausible suggestion be true 
 or not, or whether, as some affirm, these were a new 
 race issuing from the frozen regions of Kamschatka and 
 driven south by the necessity for obtaining sustenance for 
 their increasing numbers, matters little for our present 
 purpose. It is certain that they were a warlike people at 
 this time, and that they could bring considerable num- 
 bers into the field, and it is very probable that, when 
 they had obtained some success, their ranks were swollen 
 by recruits from their Tartar kinsmen of Eastern Jun- 
 garia. On the death of the Chinese Emperor Wan-leh, 
 
42 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 dissensions broke out in China as to his successor, and 
 in the struggle that ensued the Mantchoos were invited 
 in to support the cause of one of the claimants. Their 
 aid turned the scale in his favour ; but when the for- 
 tunes of war had been clearly manifested, the Mantchoos 
 showed no disposition to take their departure as had 
 been stipulated. As the Saxons in our own history, 
 and the Mongols in the Chinese had acted, so now did 
 the Mantchoos, and in 1644 their first Emperor 
 Chuntche was installed in the imperial dignities, as 
 the first of the present ruling dynasty of Tatsing, or 
 " sublimely pure. 55 When Chuntche was crowned by 
 his victorious soldiery, it must not be supposed that he 
 had conquered the whole of China. During the seven- 
 teen years of his reign he was constantly engaged in 
 warring with the native Chinese forces ; but always 
 with invariable success. In 1661 Kanghi, his son, 
 ascended the throne, and by a series of judicious mea- 
 sures and successful enterprises, firmly maintained the 
 position won in China by his father. It was during 
 this brilliant reign that Tibet was annexed to the 
 Chinese Empire, and from Cochin-China and the fron- 
 tiers of Birma to the Eiver Amoor there was none to 
 question the power of the Mantchoo Government. It 
 cannot be doubted that the conquest of Tibet opened up 
 fresh ideas in the minds of the Chinese as to their right 
 to rule in Eastern Turkestan ; and with the re-assertion 
 of their old suzerainty over the Tibetan table-land, the 
 remembrance of a similar claim, at a far distant epoch, 
 over Jungaria and Turkestan would be forced on the 
 minds of the Chinese people, until some ambitious ruler 
 or viceroy might avail himself of the opportunity of 
 distinction by acquiescing in, and giving effect to, the 
 popular desire. Kanghi was too prudent to jeopardize 
 his recently consolidated state by expeditions either 
 into Jungaria or Turkestan ; and was quite satisfied 
 with the respect shown to his empire by the Eleuthian 
 princes of those regions. On Kanghi's death, in 1721, 
 
THE CONQUEST OF KASHGAR BY CHINA. 43 
 
 his son, Yung-Ching, came to the throne, and during 
 his short reign, the example of his two predecessors not 
 to interfere in the troubles of the states lying beyond 
 Kansuh, was closely followed. Yung-Ching died in 
 1735, and thus made way for his ambitious and war- 
 like son, Keen-Lung. When Keen-Lung first com- 
 menced to reign for himself he found that he was 
 irresponsible ruler of a most powerful empire, at peace 
 within itself, and satisfied to all outward seeming with 
 its de facto government. His treasury was full ; the 
 country was, perhaps, at its very highest point of pros- 
 perity, and the sovereign had only to maintain in this 
 wealth and vigour the nation which had been brought 
 to such a pitch by the wisdom of his predecessors. 
 To a warlike monarch, however, the career of ruler of a 
 thriving, peace-loving, and domestic people, has never 
 been a palatable one, and Keen-Lung thought, as have 
 many other great sovereigns of our own age, that the 
 only use of a wealthy and numerous subject race was to 
 enable the ruler to undertake high-sounding enterprises, 
 and to spread the terror of his name through distant 
 regions. The reputation and the real strength of the 
 Chinese Empire were so great at this time in Asia, that 
 no single power, or even any possible confederacy, would 
 have thought of entering the lists against it. Keen- 
 Lung had, therefore, no just cause for hostilities with 
 the neighbouring states, as they were always too willing 
 to offer the amplest reparation for any cause of offence 
 to the Imperial dignity. The conquest of Turkestan 
 was therefore an object with which he would heartily 
 sympathise ; and when we remember his warlike dis- 
 position, and the exact condition of China at the time, 
 possessing a superabundance of wealth, and of numbers 
 sufficient to achieve far more difficult enterprises than 
 the one in question, it is easier to understand the eager- 
 ness with which Keen-Lung intervened in the affairs of 
 Jungaria, when the following opportunity, which we 
 are about to narrate, offered for so doing. 
 
44 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 It is now time to return to Kashgar and narrate the 
 events that were happening in that troubled district. 
 The feud between the Aktaghluc and Karataghluc 
 factions reached its height when Afak, who had been 
 placed on the throne of Yarkand by the Calmucks, under 
 Graldan, the chief representative of the Aktaghluc, 
 succeeded in expelling all the prominent supporters of 
 the rival clan. Afak ruled for some years, but with 
 difficulty maintained himself in some parts of Kashgar, 
 against the Calmucks, Kirghiz, and Kipchak. His 
 sons had no better fortune, and the state was finally 
 divided between a Kipchak and a Kirghiz leader. 
 These quarrelled between themselves, but happily they 
 each expired in the first encounter. Acbash, one of the 
 sons of Afak, was executed at Yangy Hissar in the 
 course of this contention ; but he had previously called 
 in to his assistance from Khodjent, in Khokand, a 
 Khoja, Danyal, of the rival Karataghluc faction. This 
 roused the enmity of the more bitter among the Akta- 
 ghluc, and, on this, Khoja Ahmad was brought in to 
 represent their interests. Danyal was besieged in 
 Yarkand, but, with the assistance of a contingent of 
 Kirghiz, he was able to repulse his assailants. But, 
 although successful in the field, Danyal was compelled 
 shortly afterwards to flee, and leave his rival in posses- 
 sion of the state. He fled to the Calmucks, in Jun- 
 garia, and pleaded so well, that an army was lent him 
 to regain Kashgar. Victory attended this expedition, 
 but the Calrnuck leader, who had captured Ahmad at 
 the siege of Kashgar, instead of placing Danyal in 
 power, took both him and his rival as prisoners to his 
 capital of Hi. With so forcible a settlement of the 
 question, little room was left for useless complaining to 
 the ambitious Danyal, and from this time down to the 
 Chinese conquest, the Calmuck rulers of Ili asserted 
 their right to supremacy over Eastern Turkestan. 
 Danyal, himself, was appointed, some years later on, 
 governor of Kashgar, now called Alty Shahr, or six 
 
THE CONQUEST OF KASHGAR BY CHINA. 45 
 
 cities ; but, under him, there was a local governor for 
 each town, appointed by the Calmucks themselves. 
 His power was more apparent than real. His eldest 
 son was kept at Hi as a hostage for the good behaviour 
 of his father, and Danyal, himself, had frequently to 
 proceed to Hi to make his report on the state of affairs 
 in Kashgar. Such was the condition of Kashgar, as a 
 subject province of the Calmuck rulers of Hi, governed 
 by Danyal, a member of the Karataghluc party, in the 
 year 1740. On the death of Galdan, the son of Arabdan 
 Khan of Jungaria, in 1745, two chiefs, Amursana and 
 Davatsi, or Tawats, seized the governing power, and for 
 a time they divided the authority fairly between them ; 
 but it was not long before they fell out, and resolved to 
 advance their own interests at the expense of each other. 
 Amursana was unable to cope with the armies of his 
 rival, Davatsi, and, having been defeated in several 
 encounters, fled from Jungaria to China. On his arrival 
 at Lanchefoo he demanded permission to proceed to 
 Pekin to lay his grievances at the feet of the Emperor, 
 and to offer in his name, and in that of many of his 
 compatriots, the districts of Hi and of Kashgar to his 
 omnipotent majesty. 
 
 The request was granted, and Keen-Lung received 
 him with favour, promised to consider what he had 
 stated, and, in the meanwhile, gave him titles and 
 revenues within the Chinese Empire. Amursana's 
 address was so insinuating, and he played so skilfully 
 on the king's ambition and love for military renown, 
 that at last Keen-Lung consented to lend him the 
 forces, which he had been so lavish of promises to 
 secure. In 1753, the Chinese army, under Amursana, 
 appeared in Jungaria, and, after several desperate en- 
 counters, Davatsi was driven out of that state, and, ac- 
 cording to one account, was delivered up to the Chinese 
 by Khojam Beg, the governor of Ush Turfan. Accord- 
 ing to another version, he was captured in the field ; 
 but both agree that he was taken to Pekin and there 
 
46 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 executed. Amursana, having regained his position in 
 Jungaria, now turned his attention to the conquest of 
 its dependency, Kashgar. He was now supreme in 
 Jungaria, with his capital at Hi ; but his army, which 
 maintained him in his position, was a Khitay force, 
 owing allegiance solely to the Emperor of Pekin, and 
 only obeying the instructions issued by his general ac- 
 companying the Eleuth prince Amursana. At this 
 epoch Yusuf, a son of Galdan, had seized the chief 
 authority in Kashgar, and, raising a cry that the true 
 religion of Islam was in danger from the advance of the 
 Khitay, endeavoured to rally to his cause in the struggle 
 that he saw was approaching the Mahomedan govern- 
 ments of Khokand and Bokhara. Amursana, on the 
 northern frontiers of Kashgar, was eagerly watching for 
 the opportunity to arise for an active interference in 
 that state, and Yusuf was prudent in seeking beyond 
 his frontiers for allies that were able to assist him 
 against the machinations of his foes. Yusuf had made 
 himself the leader and representative of the Karataghluc 
 party in the state, and Amursana accordingly resolved 
 to put forward the pretensions of the rival Aktaghluc 
 faction. In this design the Chinese general acquiesced, 
 and, with the assistance of the Calmuck governors of 
 Ush Turfan, and Aksu, no delay interfered with its 
 prompt realization. The descendants of the ancient 
 Khojas were consequently sought out, and Barhanud- 
 din, son of Ahmad, was selected for the purpose. He, 
 at the head of a mixed following, promptly seized 
 Ush Turfan, and was there received with acclamation, 
 and several of the minor tribes joined him at once. 
 Yusuf was, however, hurrying up with a large force 
 from Yarkand, and Barhanuddin's chances seemed to be 
 more than doubtful, when Yusuf died on the way. His 
 son Abdulla, who took the name of Khoja Padshah, 
 hastened on, however, and besieged Barhanuddin in 
 Ush Turfan. Abdulla then endeavoured to come to 
 terms with Barhanuddin, and made overtures for the 
 
THE CONQUEST OF KASHGAR BY CHINA. 47 
 
 reconciliation of the Karataghluc and Aktaghluc par- 
 ties to be cemented in a crusade against the invad- 
 ing Khitay. Barhanuddin, a true Mussulman, was per- 
 sonally inclined to accept the arrangement offered, but, 
 as he was surrounded by Chinese officials and their 
 allies, he was constrained to give instead the advice 
 that Abdulla should surrender to the Chinese and ac- 
 knowledge their supremacy. Abdulla was not at all will- 
 ing to forfeit his independence without some struggle, 
 and the siege of Ush Turfan was pressed on. In the 
 camp of the besieging forces there were some who 
 favoured the pretensions of Barhanuddin, and these 
 deserting from the Karataghluc cause, the remaining 
 forces of Abdulla were compelled to retreat with pre- 
 cipitation. Barhanuddin immediately advanced on 
 Kashgar, where he was received with open arms. 
 Yarkand soon afterwards fell into his possession, and the 
 conquest of Kashgar by the descendant of the Khojas 
 and the triumph of the Aktaghluc party were complete. 
 So far the Chinese had been merely spectators of 
 the progress of events in Kashgar. Amursana had 
 induced them to approve of this enterprise of Bar- 
 hanuddin, and they had given general support in the 
 war with Yusuf and his son ; and it was not until 
 Barhanuddin, elated with his success, set their wishes 
 at defiance, that they resolved to occupy the country. 
 But before that, Amursana's career had been cut short. 
 Although escorted by a large force of native Chinese 
 troops, he had aspired, in 1757, to establish himself 
 as an independent prince in Jungaria, and had broken 
 loose from Chinese control. The forces he raised were, 
 however, defeated with remarkable ease by the Chinese, 
 and Amursaua was compelled to flee once more from his 
 home this time with no certain refuge, as he had 
 before in Pekin. The Eussians were then in possession 
 of Siberia, but their influence for good or for ill beyond 
 their desert and almost impenetrable stations was prac- 
 tically nil ; but, such as it was, it seemed to Amursana 
 
48 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 the only place affording any prospect of security. He 
 died at Tobolsk, in 1757, soon after he arrived there; 
 but the implacable Chinese haughtily demanded from 
 the Russians his body as a proof of his decease, and the 
 Eussian government sent it to Kiachta for surrender 
 to them. Such was the career of the ill-fated, but 
 ambitious, Amursana, who was the immediate cause 
 of the introduction of Chinese power into Eastern 
 Turkestan. 
 
 With so unmistakable a proof before his eyes of the 
 power of the Chinese, it is strange to find Barhanuddin 
 also proving contumacious in Kashgar, but so it 
 was. In 1758, the very next year after the death of 
 Amursana, this ruler and his brother Khan Khoja 
 broke out in open mutiny to the Chinese. At Hi some 
 Khitay officers were maltreated, and outspoken con- 
 tempt was shown for Chinese commands. Such attitude 
 could not be brooked by any established rule, and, to do 
 the Chinese simple justice, never had been tolerated by 
 them on any occasion ; and accordingly a Chinese army 
 was despatched from Hi to chastise this recalcitrant 
 ruler, and to remind him that the arm of Chinese power 
 was terribly long. Barhanuddin and his brother were 
 defeated in several pitched battles, city after city opened 
 its gates to the dreaded invader, and the last repre- 
 sentatives of the Khojas were compelled to seek refuge 
 in the isolated region of Badakshan. But even here 
 they were not safe. The terror of the Chinese name 
 had gone before them, and the sovereign of Badakshan, 
 eager to propitiate the conqueror, sent the heads of the 
 two brothers to the Chinese general, who was advancing 
 from Yarkand. Only one of the numerous sons of 
 Barhanuddin escaped the destruction wrought in the 
 family of the Khojas by the victorious Chinese : his 
 name was Khoja Sarimsak. The Chinese had now 
 completely annexed all the territory north of the 
 Karakoram and east of the Pamir and Khokand, and 
 it does not appear that in doing so they had suffered 
 
THE CONQUEST OF KASHGAR BY CHINA. 49 
 
 any great loss. By availing themselves of Amursana's 
 claims in Jungaria they had obtained a firm foothold in 
 that state, and then by an equally skilful manipulation 
 of the rival parties of Aktaghluc and Karataghluc, they 
 had extended their authority over Kashgar as well. 
 When their puppets, Amursana and JBarhanuddin, 
 became restive as Chinese vassals, and strove for inde- 
 pendence, the Chinese forces were called into action and 
 swept all opposition from their path. All this may 
 seem the most unjustifiable ambition, nor do we wish 
 to palliate in any way the terribly harsh repressive 
 measures adopted by the Chinese. There is no doubt 
 that, so long as there remained the shadow of any 
 opposition to their rule, they did not temper their 
 power with any exhibition of mercy. It is computed 
 that almost half a million of people were slain during 
 the wars of these two or three years, and that the great 
 majority of these were the innocent inhabitants, who 
 had been massacred. Nor, although we should be 
 disposed to think that this is a greatly exaggerated 
 number, have we any reason to doubt that the sword of 
 the Chinese was called into use whenever any resistance 
 was offered to their advance, and that the feelings of 
 the soldiers were embittered to a great extent . by 
 religious fervour, in their encounters with the Mussul- 
 mans. The Chinese, having conquered Kashgar, turned 
 their arms against Khokand, and entered Tashkent and 
 the city of Khokand in triumph. As the year 1760 
 was drawing to a close, quite a panic was spreading 
 through Western Asia at the advance of the Chinese. 
 Afghanistan, then as now the only formidable Maho- 
 medan territory left intact from foreign conquest, 
 was implored by the suffering Islamites to check the 
 Chinese advance. Then, as recently on a somewhat 
 similar occasion, Afghanistan thought prudence the 
 better part of valour, and confined her action to the 
 invasion of Badakshan, which she coveted, in order 
 to punish its ruler for the murder of the fugitive 
 
50 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Khojas. But, having terrified Khokand, the Chinese 
 wisely retired to the proper frontier of Kashgar, and 
 then set about consolidating their rule there by an 
 energy and administrative capacity which must excite 
 the admiration of every governing nation. 
 
 It was some years, however, before the conquest of 
 Kashgar, which had been so rapidly accomplished, could 
 be considered to have been altogether completed. 
 Fresh troops had to be summoned from Kansuh, and 
 military settlers imported in large numbers from Shensi 
 and other Chinese provinces, to supply the place of the 
 massacred Kashgari. Settlers were also brought from 
 the neighbourhood of Urumtsi and Hamil; and with 
 these and imperial troops sent from Pekin, the Chinese 
 felt complete masters of the situation. It was only 
 then that the Chinese viceroy considered himself suffi- 
 ciently strong to place his army in detachments in the 
 various cities. Up to that time it had been kept 
 mobilised in one, or at most two or three stations, 
 ready for instant action. When the Chinese withdrew 
 from Khokand they imposed a tribute on that state, 
 and then they turned their arms against the nomad 
 tribes on the north of the Jungarian frontier. The 
 various hordes of the Kirghiz nomads sent in their 
 submission one after the other, and the Chinese 
 invariably accepted their fealty, and as a rule rewarded 
 their duteous behaviour with Chinese titles and rank. 
 Thus Ablai, Chief of the Middle Horde, was made Prince 
 in 1766, and Nur Ali, of the Little Horde, went so far 
 as to send special emissaries to Pekin, where they were 
 favourably received, and returned with recompenses for 
 the fidelity of their master. The Chinese had thus 
 secured their position in Jungaria and Kashgar before 
 the close of 1765, and by their possession of Khoten, 
 they had opened up communications with their province 
 of Tibet. On the south they possessed an admirable 
 frontier, and it was only in the south-west that any 
 check seemed to be put upon their advance. As already 
 
THE CONQUEST OF KASHGAR BY CHINA. 51 
 
 mentioned, the Ameer of Afghanistan had overrun 
 Badakshan, in chastisement for the murders of Bar- 
 hanuddin and his brother ; and he was continually 
 receiving applications to declare an open war against 
 the Chinese. His own troubles with the rulers of 
 Scinde and Persia were sufficient to keep his religious 
 sympathies within due bounds. But he sent an embassy 
 to Pekin, to point out that his fellow-religionists were 
 suffering under the conquering sway of the Chinese 
 forces in Central Asia; and on its return with an 
 unsatisfactory reply, he appears to have stationed a 
 large body of troops in Badakshan. The proud Durani 
 monarch was probably eager to oppose the Chinese, but, 
 wiser than his contemporaries in Turkestan and Jun- 
 garia, he accurately reckoned up the risks of the enter- 
 prise, and contented himself with the maintenance of 
 the powerful empire he had erected on the ruins of 
 the conquests of Nadir Shah. When the Afghans had 
 done so much, and given promises of aid in the defence 
 of Samarcand, it is not to be wondered at if the people 
 of Kashgar thought they would do more, and risings 
 took place in several parts of the state, notably at Ush 
 Turfan. The Chinese measures were prompt and 
 effectual ; the rebellion was suppressed, the inhabitants 
 massacred, and the town destroyed. This failure struck 
 so complete a panic into the hearts of the people, that 
 no inducements, for more than half a century, could 
 encourage them to rise against the Chinese. The 
 Chinese conquest of Kashgar gave an effectual solution 
 to the rivalries of the numerous claimants to its sove- 
 reignty, and among other competitors to the Khojas, 
 that is, to the descendants of that Sarimsak who alone 
 survived the massacre of his family in 1760. While 
 very possibly the people may have suffered that mental 
 depression which must accompany the installation of a 
 foreign rule, and despite the very harsh and unmis- 
 takable evidences given by the Chinese of their intoler- 
 
 E 2 
 
52 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 ance of opposition, there was some prospect, notwith- 
 standing these, that the Chinese would prove permanent 
 masters, and that their rule would consequently become 
 milder and milder every year. It was this feeling, that 
 things could not become much worse, that rendered the 
 Kashgari apathetic in their resistance to the Chinese. 
 They did not dare to expect much improvement in 
 their lot ; but at all events they might suppose that 
 Chinese massacres would cease with the disappearance 
 of resistance, whereas massacres by their own country- 
 men and tyrants had been for centuries an every-day 
 occurrence. 
 
 Before considering the Chinese occupation of Kashgar, 
 it may be useful to give some description of the Akta- 
 ghluc and Karataghluc parties, of whose rivalry the 
 history of Kashgar in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
 eighteenth centuries is so full. It may be remembered 
 that in 1533, Eeshid, the younger son of Said, who 
 had distinguished himself in his father's wars, seized 
 the state from his brothers, to whom he was inferior 
 both in age and in birth on his mother's side. In 
 effecting this he availed himself of the alliance of the 
 Usbeg rulers west of Pamir, and during the negotiations 
 that were transacted between them, the distinguished 
 divine, Maulana Khoja Kasani, of Samarcand, visited 
 him. He was greeted with the most striking marks of 
 Eeshid's affection, and granted a large estate in Kashgar. 
 He married and left two sons in that state to represent 
 his interests and share his possessions. The elder son, 
 whose mother was a Samarcand lady, was averse to the 
 younger, whose mother was a native of Kashgar. In 
 the course of time they each rose prominently in the 
 service of the state, but they transmitted their antipathy 
 to their descendants. Khoja Kalan, the elder, whose 
 influence was greatest in Yarkand and Karatagh, was 
 the founder of the Karataghluc, or "Black Mountaineers." 
 Khoja Ishac, the younger, whose influence was greatest 
 
THE CONQUEST OF KASHGAR BY CHINA. 53 
 
 in Kashgar and Actagh, another form of Altai, was the 
 founder of the Aktaghluc, or " White Mountaineers." 
 The descendants of either of these Khojas, or priests, 
 the sons of the great divine of Samarcand, claim the 
 title of Khoja, but that must not be confounded with 
 the more exclusive signification it possesses as repre- 
 senting the once ruling family. 
 
54 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR. 
 
 THE Chinese conquest of Jungaria and Eastern Turkestan 
 having become an accomplished fact, what did the new 
 rulers do to justify their forcible interference in Central 
 Asia ? What measures did they adopt to conciliate the 
 subject peoples, and what to increase the prosperity of 
 a vast region, naturally fertile, but impoverished by 
 centuries of improvident government and of civil 
 anarchy and war ? Did they follow the precedent that 
 had been set them by every past ruler of those coun- 
 tries, and leave the people to their own devices, to 
 starve or to exist as best they might, so long as the 
 tribute money was forthcoming ? Did the Chinese 
 Viceroys of Hi, or their lieutenants in Kashgar, Yarkand, 
 Aksu, or Kucha adopt a policy of inaction, and pursue 
 a line of conduct of unprincipled selfishness in advancing 
 their own personal fortunes, and thus prove that they 
 were of the same stamp as all other Asiatic despots, 
 careless of the day and utterly regardless of the morrow? 
 The best way to see how they acted, what they did, 
 and what they did not that was possible, is to follow 
 their rule in Kashgar with some attention. In itself 
 this may be found to be no uninstructive lesson for us, 
 who are also a great governing people ; and from the 
 perusal of what the Chinese administrators did in 
 Central Asia we may arise willing to accord them high 
 praise, because we are better able than other nations to 
 appreciate the difficulties of their task. 
 
 After the fall of Amursana, the Chinese, in the first 
 
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR. 55 
 
 place, organized their administrative system upon the 
 following basis : The supreme authority was vested in 
 the hands of the Viceroy of Hi. Under him an amban, 
 or lieutenant-governor, administered affairs in Kashgar. 
 His place of abode was Yarkand. In internal matters 
 the Yarkand Amban was without a superior south of the 
 Tian Shan, but in external affairs he only acted in 
 subordination to the Viceroy of Hi, who alone was in 
 communication with Pekin. Under each of these poten- 
 tates there were the usual deputy-ambans and Tay 
 Dalays, or military commanders. All the cities had 
 Gulbaghs constructed outside of them, and these forts 
 were held by Chinese troops that is, by a mixture of 
 Khitay and Tungani. It is computed that 20,000 
 troops used to garrison Kashgar and the neighbourhood 
 alone. The military posts were restricted to Chinamen, 
 and the higher judicial and administrative offices were 
 also withheld from the subjected race. But these were 
 the only privileges retained by the Chinese. 
 
 The Khan, or chief Amban, who resided in Yarkand, 
 made all the appointments to the minor offices, which 
 were filled almost exclusively by Mahomedans. The 
 only precaution the Chinese seem to have taken was to 
 refuse employment to a Kashgari in his native town, so 
 that a Yarkandi would have to go to Aksu, or some 
 other place away from his home, if he desired to parti- 
 cipate in the government of his country. But beyond 
 this there was no restriction, and nominally the Hakim 
 Beg, the highest Mussulman officer, ranked on an 
 equality with the Chinese amban. His subordinates 
 were all Mahomedans, with the exception of his per- 
 sonal guard of Khitay troops. In the hands of these 
 natives of the country lay all the administration of 
 justice among their co-religionists, the collection of the 
 revenue, and the levying of customs dues on the frontier 
 and of trade taxes in the cities. It was only when 
 cause for litigation arose between a Buddhist and a 
 Mussulman that the amban interfered. We have 
 
56 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 therefore the instructive spectacle before us of a Bud- 
 dhist conquest becoming harmonized with Mussulman 
 institutions, and Chinese arrogance not content with 
 tolerating, but absolutely fostering, a regime to which 
 its hostility was scarcely concealed. This is the only 
 instance of the Chinese exhibiting such more than 
 Asiatic restraint towardsMahomedans; for their dealings 
 with Tibet, a country of peculiar sanctity and Buddhist 
 as well, is not a case in point. The scheme worked 
 well, however. Chinese strength was husbanded by 
 being employed only when absolutely necessary to be 
 called into play, and the people, to a great degree their 
 own masters, did not realise the fact of their being a 
 subjected nation. Their first anxiety was the payment 
 of their taxes far from exorbitant, as it had been 
 under their own rulers ; but that task accomplished, 
 they could free their minds from care. 
 
 Very often their own countryman, the Hakim Beg, 
 was a greater tyrant than the Chinese amban in the 
 fort outside their gates ; but against his exactions they 
 could obtain speedy redress. When their Hakims, or 
 Wangs as the Chinese called them, became unpopular in 
 a district, the amban promptly removed them ; even if he 
 considered they were not much to blame, he always trans- 
 ferred them to some other district. The first object in 
 the eyes of the amban was the maintenance of order, 
 and he knew well enough that order could not be main- 
 tained, unless he resorted to force, which he studiously 
 avoided, if the people were discontented. The people 
 therefore could repose implicit trust in the Chinese 
 amban securing a fair hearing and justice for them in 
 their disagreements with their own leaders ; and the 
 Mussulman Wangs, who were the old ruling class, saw 
 the unfortunate tax-payer at last secure from their 
 tyranny through the clemency of a Buddhist conqueror. 
 We are justified in assuming that the population saw 
 the force of these patent facts, and that, if not perfectly 
 to be relied on in any emergency, the Chinese had no 
 
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR. 57 
 
 danger to expect from the tax-producing and patient 
 Kashgari. 
 
 So long as the Chinese rule remained vigorous that 
 is, for about the first fifty years the Ambans worked 
 in perfect concord with the Wangs, and through them 
 with the people. But the internal relations between 
 these various personages became more complicated and 
 less cordial through the importation, about the begin- 
 ning of this century, of a fresh factor into the question. 
 The Chinese had granted the cities west of, and includ- 
 ing, Aksu very considerable privileges in carrying on 
 trade with Khokand ; and in the course of commercial 
 intercourse a Khokandian element was slowly imported 
 into these cities, when it became a people within a 
 people, enjoying the prosperity to be derived from the 
 Chinese Empire, but not experiencing any sentiment of 
 gratitude towards those by whom the favours were 
 conferred. After some years, when these Khokandian 
 immigrants had become numerous, the Chinese ac- 
 quiesced in their selecting a responsible head for each 
 community, and this head, or Aksakal, was nominated 
 by the Khan of Khokand, the only temporal sovereign 
 these people recognized. The creation of this third power 
 in the state, which was first sanctioned as a matter of 
 convenience, was to be fraught with the direst con- 
 sequences for the Chinese. The Khitay would be jus- 
 tified in saying that the Aksakals were " the cause of 
 all their woe," in Kashgar at all events. The Aksakals 
 were far too prudent to challenge the supremacy of the 
 Chinese officials, and their first object was rather to 
 make themselves independent of the Wangs than to 
 compete with the Ambans. In this they were success- 
 ful, for the Chinese neglected to take into account the 
 dangers that might arise from these same bustling, in- 
 triguing, and alien Aksakals. The Wangs had always 
 been obedient vassals, but the plausibility of the Aksa- 
 kals put them on a par with their rivals. The Chinese 
 washed their hands of the quarrel, and may have 
 
58 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 imagined that their rule was made more assured by 
 divisions among the Mussulmans. In this they were 
 mistaken. The Aksakals, who after a time repudiated 
 their obligations to the Wangs, became the centre of 
 all the intrigue that marked the last half-century of 
 Chinese rule, and, puffed up by their triumph over the 
 Wangs, did not hesitate to challenge the right of the 
 Ambans to exercise jurisdiction over them. But of 
 this more later on. 
 
 While the Chinese adopted these liberal measures in 
 their dealings with the Mussulman population, they 
 did not neglect those other duties which belong to the 
 government by right. The greatest benefit they could 
 confer was of course the preservation of order, and to 
 maintain the balance impartially between the numerous 
 litigants was the first article in the creed of the Chinese 
 viceroys. As tranquillity settled down over these dis- 
 tracted regions, trade revived. The native industries, 
 which had greatly fallen off, became once more active ; 
 and foreign enterprise was attracted to this quarter, 
 which Chinese power soon made the most favoured 
 region in Central Asia. But the rulers did not rest 
 content with the mere preservation of good order. 
 They did not leave it to the inclination of an indolent 
 people to progress at as tortoise-like a speed as they 
 would wish ; but they themselves set the example which 
 the rest felt bound to imitate. Not only did the enter- 
 prising Khitay merchant from Kansuh and Szchuen 
 visit the marts of Hamil and Turfan, but many of 
 this class penetrated into Kashgar proper, where they 
 became permanent settlers. These invaluable agents 
 supplied the deficiency that had never before been filled 
 up in the life of the state, for they brought the highest 
 qualities of enterprise and practical sagacity, together 
 with capital, as their special characteristics. In the 
 train of these Khitay merchants came wealth and in- 
 creased prosperity. Yarkand, Kashgar, Aksu, and 
 Khoten became cities of the first rank, and the popu- 
 
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR. 59 
 
 lation of the country in the year 1800 was greater than 
 it had ever been before. 
 
 There was perfect equality too between all the 
 various races in respect to trade. The Chinese did not 
 demand special immunities for their own countrymen, as 
 might have been expected. The Khitay, who came all 
 the way from Lanchefoo in search of a fortune, must 
 be prepared to compete in an. equal race with the 
 Khokandi, the Kashgari, or the Afghan. His nation- 
 ality would obtain for him no immunity from being 
 taxed, or could give him no advantage over the foreign 
 or native traders. The main portion of the trade of 
 the country remained in the old hands. Khokand 
 benefited as much as Kashgar by the trade, and China, 
 in a direct manner, least of the three. 
 
 The Chinese have at all times been justly famous for 
 their admirable measures for irrigating their provinces. 
 The wonderful canals which cut their way, where there 
 are no great rivers, in China proper are reproduced even 
 in this outlying dependency. Eastern Turkestan is one 
 of the worst-watered regions in the world. In fact 
 there is only a belt of fertile country round the 
 Yarkand river, stretching away eastward along the 
 slopes of the Tian Shan as far as Hamil. The few 
 small rivers which are traced here and there across the 
 map are during many months of the year dried up, and 
 even the Yarkand then becomes an insignificant stream. 
 To remedy this, and to husband the supply as much as 
 possible, the Chinese sank dykes in all directions. By 
 this means the cultivated country was slowly but 
 surely spread over a greater extent of territory, and the 
 vicinity of the three cities of Kashgar, Yaogy Hissar, 
 and Yarkand became known as the garden of Asia. 
 Corn and fruit grew in abundance, and from Yarkand 
 to the south of the Tian Shan the traveller could pass 
 through one endless orchard. On all sides he saw 
 nothing but plenty and content, peaceful hamlets and 
 
60 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 smiling inhabitants. These were the outcome of a 
 Chinese domination. 
 
 The Chinese, besides possessing a dual line of com- 
 munication with their own country, one north and the 
 other south of the Tian Shan, had also a caravan route 
 from Khoten to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. There was 
 also some intercourse with Cashmere by this way. The 
 jade, for which Khoten was justly, and is still, famous, 
 was exported in immense quantities, both to Tibet and 
 to China, through Maralbashi. This mineral was held 
 in high esteem by Chinese ladies, and alone sufficed to 
 make the prosperity of Khoten assured. Gold, silk, and 
 musk, were other articles included in the commerce of 
 this nourishing city. There was also, in the Chinese 
 time, a very extensive manufacture of carpets and cotton 
 goods. The gold mines, which, with two exceptions, 
 have not been worked since the same time, are believed 
 to be scarcely touched, and only await a fostering hand 
 to be put in working order once more. 
 
 The Chinese also devoted great attention to the coal 
 mines in the vicinity of Aksu, and these were worked 
 both by private enterprise and the Government. Coal 
 was an article of common use in that city, but it does 
 not appear to have been exported beyond the neigh- 
 bourhood. It is known that the Chinese took greater 
 interest in the development of the internal means of 
 wealth of the country than in inducing foreigners to 
 enter it. Thus, we see that mines, in a special degree, 
 received state approval and support. The gold mines of 
 Khoten, the coal of Aksu, and the zinc of Kucha, are 
 all conspicuous instances of this ; as, under all past, 
 and the recent Mahomedan, rule, they have been most 
 foolishly, but consistently neglected. 
 
 Nor were those special trades for which Kashgar had 
 in prosperous moments been renowned, neglected. The 
 leather-dressers of Yarkand and Aksu, the silk-mercers of 
 Kashgar and Khoten, were never so busy as in the 
 warlike days of Keen-Lung, and the great mass of the 
 
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR. 61 
 
 people, the agricultural class in the villages, was equally 
 prosperous and well governed. Trade was fostered on 
 all sides, and the conquering power was content to stand 
 aside and witness the steady progress of its subjects 
 towards hitherto unattained and unattainable prosperity. 
 
 Lastly, the Chinese directed their attention to the 
 improvement of the means of communication between 
 one part of the province and another. It was absolutely 
 necessary to the security of their rule that there should 
 be an easy and always open road between Hi and 
 Kashgar. Therefore, a way was cut, at great expense, 
 through the Tian Shan, north of Aksu, and this pass 
 was known as the Muzart, or Glacier. So difficult was 
 the country through which it passed, and such the 
 danger from ice-drifts and snow-storms, that relays of 
 men had to be kept constantly at work in order to 
 prevent it getting out of repair for a day. The con- 
 struction of this road was, in the first place, most 
 expensive, but, perhaps, the cost of repairing was much 
 more. This, the most striking engineering achievement 
 of the Chinese, has become practically useless, through 
 fifteen years of neglect. If China is to regain Hi, it 
 will, no doubt, be restored. The passes west of this, by 
 the Narym Eiver to Vernoe, and through Terek to 
 Khokand, were those selected by Yakoob Beg to supply 
 its place. 
 
 The next object to which the Chinese specially paid 
 attention was the preservation of their road home to 
 China. Thus the road in Tian Shan Pe Lu, and the other 
 in Tian Shan Nan Lu, were kept in the most effective 
 state possible. The former, north of the mountains, 
 passed through Manas and Urumtsi to Hamil; the latter, 
 south of them, through Aksu and Kucha to the same 
 place. The alternative route from Kucha to Kashgar 
 and Yarkand, through Maralbashi, was also much used, 
 more especially, however, by those who desired to break 
 off at that outpost in the desert to reach Khoten and 
 Sanju. In each city there was appointed a committee 
 
62 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 to superintend the roads in the district, and this Eoad 
 Board was a highly important and useful corporation. 
 It was by such measures as these that the Chinese 
 made their rule a blessing to Kashgar and Jungaria for 
 more than fifty years. Of course, there was the fiscal 
 side of these schemes of public utility. Eoads could 
 not be opened up and maintained in order, canals could 
 not be dug, the state could not administer justice, pro- 
 mote trade, and make itself respected abroad, without 
 an assured revenue, and this revenue, after the first ten 
 years, was very productive. 
 
 The principal taxes were the tithe on the produce of 
 the land, called " ushr" and the zakat (fortieth), on 
 merchandise and cattle. Then, in the cities, there was 
 a house tax, which was essentially, like our own income 
 tax, a war tax, fluctuating in accordance with the 
 military necessities, caused by foreign or civil war. 
 From the mines, too, the state derived a large annual 
 sum, which was generally devoted to some object of 
 public utility. There was also the tribute money from 
 the Kirghiz nomads, whose flocks and horses were num- 
 bered and taxed at a low rate, in return for which they 
 were taken under the protection of China. In addition 
 to these great taxes there were several smaller ones, such 
 as a fee on fuel sold in the market, and another levy 
 on milch-kine kept in cities. A writer on Kashgar has 
 said that these " proved a ready means of oppression, 
 and a prolific source of that discontent which left the 
 rulers without a single helping hand, or sympathising 
 heart, in the hour of their distress and destruction." 
 But this assumption of cause and effect is scarcely just. 
 
 Of course, all taxes can be made a ready means of 
 oppression by the tax-gatherer, who, in this case, was a 
 Mussulman and fellow-countryman. But taxes are 
 absolutely necessary to all good government, and when 
 we consider what China did with her revenue, with 
 what public spirit her representatives laid it out in 
 plans for the advantage of the state, can we pronounce an 
 
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR. 63 
 
 opinion that she imposed unfair burdens on the sub- 
 jected race ? Moreover, no one denies the prosperity 
 general throughout Kashgar in those days, a period 
 looked back to with regret by the inhabitants during 
 the most favoured years of Yakoob Beg's rule. It is 
 not in accordance with facts, then, to imply that the 
 Chinese ground Kashgar under them by severe taxa- 
 tion, and whatever petty tyranny there was, was carried 
 on not by the Khitay Ambans, but by the Mahomedan 
 Wangs. 
 
 In the hour of distress and destruction the people, 
 indeed, proved traitorous to their best friends, or, more 
 generally, apathetic ; leaving to the energetic Andijani 
 element within their gates the task of crossing swords 
 with Buddhist rule, to which the hostility of these 
 immigrants had always been declared. 
 
 The short-sightedness of the Kashgari played the 
 game of the more fanatical and ambitious people of 
 Khokand; but the rule of China did not pass out of 
 Eastern Turkestan until the disturbances of forty years 
 had generated ill-feeling that formerly was not, and had 
 so embittered the relations of governing and governed, 
 that what had come to be considered a lenient and 
 impersonal government, assumed all the darker hues of 
 a military and foreign despotism. Even then China did 
 not fall until there was dissension within herself, when, 
 split into three hostile camps, her sword dropped nerve- 
 less from her hand in Central Asia, 2,000 miles away from 
 her natural border. To follow Chinese rule in Kashgar 
 down to 1820, is to observe the monotonous course of 
 never varying prosperity. From that year to 1860, the 
 tale is of a different complexion, less monotonous but 
 also less satisfactory. 
 
 In 1758 and 1760 Chinese armies entered Khokand. 
 Tashkent fell in the former year, and the capital in the 
 latter. The Chinese then withdrew, after imposing a 
 tribute upon Khokand. During the long reign of 
 Keen-Lung that is, down to 1795 the tribute was 
 
64 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 regularly paid. After that year, however, the payment 
 became irregular, and border warfare of frequent occur- 
 rence between the two neighbours. At last, in 1812, 
 Khokand, then under an able prince, refused to pay tri- 
 bute any longer, and the Chinese acquiesced in the repu- 
 diation. Nor did the change in the relations between 
 China and Khokand stop here ; for, a few years after- 
 wards, the Chinese found it expedient to pay Khokand 
 an annual sum to keep the Khoja family, whose repre- 
 sentatives were residing in Khokand, from intriguing 
 against them. The amount of the subsidy was 3,500 
 of our money. In addition to this, the Khan of Kho- 
 kand was permitted to levy a tax on all Mahomedan 
 merchandise sold in Kashgar through Andijan mer- 
 chants. This tax was collected by the Aksakals before 
 mentioned, and was a very profitable source of income 
 for the impecunious khans. But even these conces- 
 sions and perquisites did not satisfy the Mussulmans 
 of Central Asia, who saw in Chinese moderation an 
 evidence of weakness and decline- The Aksakals, in 
 these years of Mahomedan revival, became political 
 agents of the greatest importance. It was they who 
 gave a point to all the discontent there might be in 
 Kashgar ; it was they who attributed to the Chinese 
 the blame for whatever evils this world is never wholly 
 free from ; and it was they who agitated for the return 
 of the old Khoja kings, who were always destined, in 
 their eyes, to bring the most perfect happiness. With 
 such causes at work both within and without their posi- 
 tion, the Chinese had not to wait long before their 
 authority was more openly challenged. 
 
 Sarimsak, the only member of the Khoja family sur- 
 viving the massacre by the Chinese, had fled, as a child, 
 into the impenetrable recesses of Wakhan. From 
 thence, in later years, he had gone to settle in Kho- 
 kand, where he married. This prince had three sons 
 Yusuf, Bahanuddin, and Jehangir, the youngest and 
 best known. In 1816, the first outbreak against 
 
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR,. 65 
 
 Chinese authority occurred, when a small rising took 
 place in Tash Balik, a town to the west of Kashgar. 
 This was speedily put down, and its leaders executed. 
 It was but the forerunner of the storm. 
 
 In 1822, Jehangir resolved to reassert his claims over 
 Kashgar, and, while his eldest brother continued to 
 reside in retirement at Bokhara, he joined the Kara 
 Kirghiz. With a party of these, under the command 
 of their chief, Suranchi Beg, Jehangir raided up to the 
 city of Kashgar. He was there repulsed in the suburbs, 
 and compelled to flee. He then joined the Kirghiz of 
 Bolor round Narym, who were nominally feudatories of 
 China, and, with their aid, commenced a patty sort of 
 border war. A small Chinese force was despatched 
 against him, and drove the Kirghiz up as far as Fort 
 Kurtka. On their return from this successful attack, 
 they were, however, surprised in one of the defiles, and 
 almost all were destroyed. This was the first reverse 
 the Chinese had ever met with in the field, and it was 
 at once bruited about through all parts of Central Asia. 
 It gave a life to the Khoja cause which it had hitherto 
 lacked, and adventurers from all parts flocked to the 
 standard Jehangir now raised on the borders of Kash- 
 gar. The Khan of Khokand so far assisted him as to 
 send him a skilled general, Isa Dadkhwah, and extended 
 over his cause that protection and sanction which Kho- 
 kand has ever since thrown over the Khoja family. 
 
 In the spring of 1826, Jehangir advanced in force 
 against Kashgar, and the Chinese, despising their as- 
 sailant, left their fortifications to encounter him in the 
 open. A battle then ensued, of which the particulars 
 have not come down to us, but which resulted in the 
 defeat of the Chinese. Jehangir entered Kashgar in 
 triumph, was received with acclamations by the people, 
 urged on by the Aksakals, and proclaimed himself sove- 
 reign of the country, under the style of Seyyid Jehangir 
 Sultan. His first act the most significant exposure of 
 the true sentiment of the Kashgarian people there well 
 
66 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 could be was to order the execution of the Mahomedan 
 Wang of Kashgar, by name Mahomed Seyyid. 
 
 The fall of Kashgar was the signal to the Aksakals 
 throughout Altyshahr to begin that work for which 
 they had been long preparing. In Yangy Hissar, Yar- 
 kand, and Khoten risings at once took place. The 
 Chinese, surprised and unarmed, were butchered in the 
 streets, and the Gulbaghs, as the visible token of the 
 foreign rule, were razed with the ground. 
 
 The Gulbagh of Kashgar itself alone held out, but it 
 at last fell, after sustaining a long siege, into the hands 
 of Jehangir. His triumph completed, he had to con- 
 cern himself more with his relations with Khokand 
 than about the Chinese, who were mysteriously quiet. 
 Mahomed Ali Khan, of Khokand, who thought that 
 Jehangir's success was solely due to him, laid claim 
 to a certain historical superiority over his vassal of 
 Kashgar, to which the Khoja prince was not willing 
 to assent. A large Khokandian army which had been 
 sent to Kashgar returned, after losing 1,000 men 
 before the walls of the Gulbagh, and its withdrawal was 
 the signal for plots and counterplots to break out in the 
 palace of the new ruler. These he promptly repressed, 
 reduced the intriguing general, Isa Dadkhwah, in rank, 
 and had emancipated himself from his thraldom to Kho- 
 kand, when the news came that the Chinese were at last 
 returning. 
 
 Although the western portion of Altyshahr had fallen 
 away from the Chinese, Aksu and Maralbashi remained 
 true to their allegiance. The Chinese still possessed 
 the military keys of the country. Moreover, their pos- 
 session of Hi gave them an enormous strategical ad- 
 vantage, and in the Tungan population they possessed 
 an almost inexhaustible supply for recruiting " revin- 
 dicating " armies. It is apropos here to state that 
 China retained both of these advantages down to the 
 time of Buzurg Khan and Yakoob Beg, and that, so 
 long as she possessed them, the utmost Mussulman 
 
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR. 67 
 
 fanaticism and Khokandian patronage of the Khojas 
 could do was futile against the arrest of fate. During 
 six months Jehangir ruled in Kashgar, and during six 
 months the Chinese viceroy made his preparations at 
 Hi for a thorough revenge. An army of more than 
 100,000 men, raised from the Tungani, the Calmucks, 
 and the Khitay garrison, was despatched from Hi, and 
 in January, 1827, entered Aksu. Here all the brigades 
 were concentrated, and the Viceroy, in conjunction with 
 the general under him, by name Chang-Lung, drew up 
 the plan of campaign, which was as follows : A small 
 army of 12,000 men was sent against Khoten across the 
 desert through Cay Yoli, while the remainder of the 
 host advanced on Maralbashi. Here another detach- 
 ment of 7,000 strong was directed against Yarkand, 
 while the main body marched on Kashgar by the banks 
 of the Kizil Su. 
 
 Their advance was unopposed until they reached 
 Yangabad, or Yangiawat, where Jehangir had concen- 
 trated an army computed at 50,000 men, but probably 
 considerably less. When the armies sighted each other 
 they pitched their camps in preparation for the decisive 
 contest that was at hand. In accordance with imme- 
 morial custom, each side put forward on the following 
 day its champion. On the part of the Chinese a gigantic 
 Calmuck archer opposed on the part of Jehangir an 
 equally formidable Khokandi. The former was armed 
 with his proper weapons, the latter with a gun of some 
 clumsy and ancient design, and while the Khokandi 
 was busily engaged with his intricate apparatus, the 
 Chinese archer shot him dead with an arrow through 
 the breast. Of course, neither army would have acqui- 
 esced in the decree of the God of Battles as shown by 
 the fate of its champion, but, in this case, it was true 
 that 
 
 " Who spills the foremost foeman's life, 
 His party conquers in the strife." 
 
 After a sharp, but brief, skirmish, the Kashgarian army 
 
 F 2 
 
68 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 withdrew in confusion, and the following day the 
 Chinese surrounded Kashgar on three sides. During 
 the night the heart of Jehangir misgave him, and he 
 fled to the Karatakka mountains. But here the snow 
 had rendered the passes impracticable, and, after hiding 
 for a few days in that difficult region, he was captured 
 by the Chinese. His fate was that usually met with by 
 traitors to that empire, for, being sent to Pekin, he was 
 executed after torture. In this war Ishac Wang, of 
 Ush Turfan, played a great part against the Khoja 
 prince, and was rewarded for his good service by being 
 appointed Wang of Kashgar. The Chinese constructed 
 a fresh fort, Yangyshahr, in the place of the destroyed 
 Gulbagh, and left a large Khitay garrison under Jah 
 Darin. But Ishac Wang, who was given some such 
 title as Prince of Kashgar, was soon afterwards deposed 
 and recalled to China. 
 
 The Chinese authority was re-established without 
 difficulty in the three cities, and peace settled down 
 over Eastern Turkestan. But the repressive and puni- 
 tive measures that the Chinese felt compelled to adopt 
 raised a bitterer sentiment in the minds of the people 
 than had previously existed. The Chinese were, in- 
 deed, only employing the same weapons that had been 
 used against themselves, but none the less did these 
 reciprocal atrocities dissipate whatever friendship there 
 had been. Among other acts the Chinese removed 
 12,000 Mahomedan families from Kashgar to Hi, and 
 these, destined to play an important part in the his- 
 tory of that province, became known as Tarantchis, or 
 Toilers. 
 
 The Chinese resolved to punish Khokand as well. 
 They broke off all trade with that state, and happy 
 would it have been for them if they could have con- 
 tinued to preserve a closed frontier. But the Khan of 
 that time was Mahomed Ali Khan, the most ambitious, 
 as he was the ablest, of the princes of that country. 
 He had just annexed Karategin, and had acquired some 
 
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR. 69 
 
 of the outlying provinces of Badakshan, which Mourad 
 Beg, of Kundus, had absorbed about the same time. It 
 was not probable that he would put up with the Chinese 
 defiance. He was prudent enough to delay his advance 
 until the main body of their army had been withdrawn. 
 But, as soon as he was informed that the Chinese had 
 gone back to Hi, Mahomed Ali, calling Yusuf, Sarim- 
 sak's eldest son, from his retirement in Bokhara, placed 
 him at the head of an army, under the charge of his 
 own brother-in-law, Hacc Kuli Beg. The Chinese were 
 worsted at Mingy ol, and all the cities west of Aksu 
 turned against the Chinese, as before, and proclaimed 
 for Yusuf Khoja. Then the massacres were repeated, 
 and the invasion of Yusuf was that of Jehangir over 
 again in exact detail. But Yusuf" s triumph was still 
 more brief. Whereas Jehangir had ruled for nine 
 months, Yusuf only swayed the sceptre for three. 
 
 The Chinese movements were delayed by small Mus- 
 sulman revolts in Barkul and Shensi until the spring of 
 1831, but then, when they returned, they found that 
 Yusuf and the Khokandian army had retreated some 
 months before. The facts were that the moment Kho- 
 kand invaded Kashgar, Bokhara attacked Khokand, and 
 Hacc Kuli Beg had to be recalled to cope with matters 
 more pressing than Khoja rights. With the general 
 had gone Yusuf, far from anxious to encounter the 
 Chinese alone. The return of the Khokandian army 
 sufficed to dispel all danger from Bokhara, and, a few 
 months after, Mahomed Ali Khan recommenced opera- 
 tions in the east this time against the Kirghiz under 
 Chinese protection. The Chinese were thoroughly sick 
 of these petty disputes, and made a treaty with Kho- 
 kand, by which that state acquired fresh commercial 
 privileges, in addition to the old ones, and by which the 
 importance of the Aksakals rather increased than waned. 
 Mahomed Ali Khan had acquired all he wanted, and 
 discouraged the Khoja party, as, indeed, the terms of 
 this treaty compelled him to do. The risings under 
 
70 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Jehangir and Yusuf were undoubtedly a great blow to 
 Chinese prestige. To all appearance each had nearly 
 been successful, and the Chinese, whose prestige was 
 enormous in Central Asia quite as great as that of 
 Eussia is now had been, on one or two occasions, 
 openly defeated. But, after all, this was a little matter 
 compared to the shock the sentiments, called into being 
 by sixty happy years, had received. Between Buddhist 
 and Mussulman, between Chinaman and Central Asiatic, 
 all the old antipathy was revived in the butcheries of 
 Yarkand and Kashgar. The Kashgari showed that they 
 could not appreciate the benefits they had received from 
 China, and the Chinese, enraged at the slaughter of 
 their countrymen, and, perhaps, also at the ingratitude 
 evinced towards them, retaliated in kind. They did 
 not appreciate that moderation, which Europeans have 
 not always shown under similar circumstances, and 
 wrought out their revenge in their own ancient 
 fashion. It is absolutely necessary that the reader 
 should remember that the two rapidly succeeding 
 invasions of Jehangir and Yusuf form a turning-point 
 in the history of the Chinese rule in Kashgar. Up to 
 that epoch it is difficult to find words sufficient to do 
 justice to China's beneficent government there ; after 
 that year it would be absurd to employ the same lan- 
 guage. For the change the chief blame must fall upon 
 the fickle and ungrateful Kashgari themselves, and then 
 on the intriguing Andijanis. The Chinese are justified, 
 at least, in saying that, having for more than half a 
 century ruled this people with justice, they only relaxed 
 in their efforts to promote its well-being when their un- 
 armed countrymen and soldiers had been surprised and 
 butchered by thousands. 
 
 Strange, and almost contradictory, as it may appear, 
 there was a brief respite during which things seemed 
 to have got into their old groove of happy prosperity ; 
 and the chief credit for this must be given to a Maho- 
 medan sub-governor of the Chinese viceroy. Zuhurud- 
 
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR. 71 
 
 din, such was his name, had raised himself to the high 
 post of Amban in Kashgar, a post never before held 
 by any other than a Khitay. By birth he was of 
 Kashgar, but he always represented himself as having 
 been born and brought up in Khokand, where he had 
 been imprisoned for a political offence. For seven or 
 eight years he governed Kashgar to the perfect satis- 
 faction both of the people and of the Chinese, and 
 among some of his public acts may be mentioned the 
 reconstruction of new forts outside the cities, in the 
 place of those destroyed in the recent revolts. These 
 were known now as Yangyshahr instead of Gulbagh. 
 But in 1846 Zuhuruddin's rule was disturbed by hos- 
 tilities on the part of Khokand and the Khojas. 
 
 In 1845 Khudayar Khan had been called to the 
 throne after the death of Mahomed Ali, but his 
 authority was not without its rivals. In the state of 
 confusion that then ensued, Khokandian adventurers 
 urged the Khoja princes, who were now represented by 
 the sons of Jehangir, to renew their old attacks against 
 the Chinese. To these advisers the Khojas turned a 
 willing ear, and preparations were accordingly made 
 for the enterprise. At that time Khokand was full 
 of adventurers to whom Mahomed Ali had been able to 
 give constant employment, but who now under the 
 more peaceful rule of Khudayar idled their time in the 
 cities of that khanate. Among these and the ever 
 willing Kirghiz, it was not difficult for the princes of 
 Kashgar to raise an army, formidable in numbers, if 
 not remarkable for cohesion. At that time there were 
 seven prominent Khoja princes in Khokand, of whom 
 we may here mention Eshan Khan, usually called Katti 
 Torah, Buzurg Khan, and Wali Khan. This inroad 
 did not take its name from any one of these, but from 
 them all combined ; thus it was distinguished as Haft 
 Khojagan, or that of the Seven Khojas. 
 
 With his brothers and relations and a considerable 
 following, Katti Torah advanced upon Kashgar, always 
 
72 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 the first object of these invaders, which fell after a siege 
 of thirteen days through treachery. This was the only 
 success they achieved ; the other cities would have no- 
 thing to do with them; and after two months' indulgence 
 in unbridled licence the Chinese beat them in a fight at 
 Kok Kobat, and drove them out of the country. For 
 the first time there was an air of ridicule thrown over 
 these Khoja invasions in the eyes of the Kashgari, 
 while the outrages they had committed during their 
 brief stay had raised bitterer feelings still. Zuhurud- 
 din, who fell under the displeasure of the Chinese, was 
 removed from his post, and fresh Ambans, once more 
 Khitay, were appointed. For nine years the Khojas 
 remained passive, but in 1855 Wali Khan and his 
 brother Kichik Khan, began to bustle once more on the 
 Kashgarian frontier. It was not until 1857 that Wali 
 Khan succeeded in forcing the advanced guard of 
 pickets maintained in the passes by the Chinese, but 
 having accomplished that his triumph was rapid. 
 Kashgar fell into his possession by a coup de main, and 
 once more a Khoja prince was seated in the or da at 
 Kashgar. Artosh and Yangy Hissar fell into his pos- 
 session, and lie threatened Yarkand. But everywhere the 
 Chinese garrisons remained unconquered in the forts, 
 biding the exhaustion of their foe and the arrival of 
 reinforcements. After a rule of nearly four months the 
 armies of Wali Khan having been then defeated by 
 the Chinese, the Khoja fled to the remote state of 
 Darwas, where he was surrendered to Khokand by its 
 chief Ismail Shah. This ruler, the most tyrannical, 
 bloodthirsty, and licentious of all the Khojas, met the 
 fate which he deserved long afterwards at the hands of 
 Yakoob Beg. His temporary tenure of power is still 
 remembered with dread by the people, who consider 
 him to have been the most incarnate monster who ever 
 held the destinies of their country in his hand. The 
 Chinese were more severe in their punitive measures 
 after this campaign than they had been after any other, 
 
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR. 73 
 
 but, notwithstanding the part Khudayar and his people 
 had played in Wali Khan's affair, the old relations 
 between "these incompatible people/' as Dr. Bellew 
 aptly calls them, were restored. After this event there 
 was but one minor disturbance caused by an inroad of 
 Kirghiz nomads, headed by the sons of one of the 
 principal victims of Chinese vengeance, but this had 
 no political importance. 
 
 The invasion of Wali Khan was the last of those 
 Khoja expeditions which took place prior to the Tungan 
 revolt. In the thirty -two years that elapsed from the 
 date of Jehangir's attempt to that of his son, there 
 had in all been four of them. That of Jehangir him- 
 self being the first ; of his elder brother Yusuf, the 
 second ; of Yusuf's eldest son, Katti Torah, the third ; 
 and of Jehangir's second son, Wali, the fourth. Not 
 one of these is in any sense noteworthy, except for the 
 crimes with which it was attended, and none of them 
 did more than inflict an untold amount of misery and 
 suffering on their own followers, as well as on the 
 people they claimed to represent by right divine. It 
 may also be noticed that with each enterprise there was 
 a decline in moral character. Thus Jehangir was infi- 
 nitely the best of them in every sense, and ruled fairly 
 according to his lights. His brother Yusuf was of a 
 more timid mind, but evidently not less imbued with 
 some notion as to the sanctity of his mission. But 
 from these to Katti Torah is a long descent. That 
 prince seemed to aspire to securing his personal comfort 
 and enjoyment alone, and disregarded all his subjects' 
 complaints at the arbitrary rule of his deputies. But 
 Wali Khan, the next of these Khoja kings from " over 
 the mountains," excelled his cousin in vice, and tyranny, 
 and utter want of purpose, not to speak of honour, 
 quite as much as Katti Torah surpassed their sires. 
 Nor can there be much hesitation in saying, from what 
 Buzurg Khan did during the few months he held 
 
 O O 
 
 power, that, had not Yakoob Beg clipped his flight, 
 
74 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 lie would have surpassed Wall Khan in his own pecu- 
 liar vices. The reader will scarcely be disposed to take 
 much interest in this irredeemable family, mad with the 
 insanity of wickedness. But in justice to the Chinese, 
 and to Yakoob Beg, it is only right that the rivals of the 
 former should be made to appear in their true colours. 
 All the sanctity that a peculiarly venerable descent from 
 Hazrat Afak could give ; all the stories told of the good 
 deeds of some of their ancestors ; all the affection that 
 naturally attaches to a native rule, and all the dislike 
 that must undermine a foreign, be it never so beneficent ; 
 all these things were destroyed by the weakness and ill 
 success that attended the first two Khojas, and by the 
 cruelty, indifference, and licentiousness that marked the 
 last two. When Buzurg Khan came he found loyalty 
 to the Khoja the heirloom of a few families, not of a 
 people. 
 
 Had the Chinese restrained their vindictive feelings 
 after the war with Jehangir, and proclaimed a free 
 pardon to every one save the Khokandis, and then 
 devoted their attention with the old vigour to peaceful 
 pursuits, we believe that the Chinese rule would have 
 been permanently secured. At that moment the Chinese 
 were strong enough to have defied Khokaud, and to 
 have broken off all intercourse with that state. By 
 dismissing the Aksakals, and severing the connection 
 between the two states, the Chinese would have dispelled 
 a danger that was for forty years to be ever before them, 
 and, in the end, when the Tungani also rose, was to 
 overcome them. Even clemency after Yusuf 's inroad, 
 which was really caused by the Chinese repressions, 
 might not have been wholly in vain, and would have 
 consolidated their position, when reinvigorated by 
 Zuhuruddin's tenure of power. But the Chinese did 
 not appreciate the quality of mercy. They could be 
 just and impartial in the ordinary avocations of life, 
 but to those who revolted against their authority they 
 showed no trace of human feeling. For a man to rebel 
 
THE CHINESE RULE IN KASHGAR. 75 
 
 against tliem was certain death ; for a people, history 
 tells us, the fate was not far different. Nor in dealing 
 with such did they hesitate to supplement their military 
 strength by the most despicable of artifices. Garri- 
 sons, accorded honourable terms, ruthlessly butchered ; 
 princes, who threw themselves on their mercy, deported 
 to Pekin to be hanged or tortured out of life : these 
 are frequent occurrences in the history of China, and of 
 her career in Central Asia the tale is identical. Yet, 
 while drawing a veil over these blots on an otherwise 
 brilliant surface, should we not desire to conceal them 
 wholly from the view. It is necessary that they should 
 be stated to understand what Chinese domination means 
 as a whole ; of its great benefits there can be no doubt, if 
 the people will remain quiescent. For fifty years, or for 
 fiVe hundred, China will rule an unmurmuring people 
 with justice, and lead them into the paths of prosperity 
 and peace; but if they rebel, if they openly defy authority, 
 if they invite a hostile stranger within their borders, 
 the punishment will be as sweeping, as cruel, and, in 
 one and a higher sense, as wrongfully foolish, whether 
 the association of the races may have been for fifty 
 years or five centuries, as it was in the case of Kashgar. 
 There is not much reason for hoping that China will 
 deviate from her ancient custom, on the occasion now 
 transpiring, of demanding " an eye for an eye " and 
 " a tooth for a tooth." 
 
76 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 CHAPTEB VI. 
 
 THE BIRTH OF YAKOOB BEG AND CAREER IN THE 
 SERVICE OF KHOKAND. 
 
 WE have now traced the history of Kashgar and of the 
 neighbouring states down to the year 1860, imme- 
 diately before the last Khoja invasion under Buzurg 
 Khan, and the Kooshbege, Mahomed Yakoob. Before 
 giving an account of that enterprise it is necessary that 
 the reader should know what the past career of the 
 future Athalik Grhazi had been. The previous chapters 
 have, it is hoped, thrown some light on the state of 
 Central Asia, and will assist the student of the question 
 in comprehending how it was that Yakoob Beg achieved 
 success, and what claims he may have to be considered 
 a great ruler, for having done a work that is unique in 
 the annals of modern Asia. 
 
 Mahomed Yakoob was born in or about the year 
 1820, in the flourishing little town of Piskent, in the 
 khanate of Khokand. His father, Pur Mahomed 
 Mirza, had, at various periods of his life, filled positions 
 of responsibility in the government of the towns in 
 which he resided. Thus, a native of Dihbid, near 
 Samarcand, he had migrated to Khodjent, in the reign 
 of Mahomed AH Khan, with the intention of entering 
 the priestly order. There, although he enrolled himself 
 as a student in a religious seminary, for some reason or 
 other, he appears to have changed his mind, and, instead 
 of entering the Church, turned his attention to secular 
 affairs. He was soon made Kazi of Kurama, a district 
 and town of Khokand, and married a lady of that 
 
THE BIRTH OF YAKOOB BEG. 77 
 
 place. By this marriage he had one son, Mahomed 
 Arif, who has since filled several posts of trust in 
 Kashgar, notably that of Governor of Sirikul ; but of late 
 this half-brother of Yakoob Beg seems to have been, 
 either for incompetence or some other reason, under a 
 cloud. Pur Mahomed, or Mahomed Latif, as he was 
 more usually called, changed his residence from Kurama 
 to Piskent, about the year 1818, and he shortly after 
 his settlement in his new abode married again, his 
 second wife being the sister of Sheik Nizamuddin, the 
 Kazi of Piskent. Yakoob Beg was the issue of this 
 marriage. The family of Yakoob Beg's father seems 
 originally to have come from Karategin, on the borders 
 of Badakshan, but in the time of the Usbeg conquest 
 of that district the father of Mahomed Latif, then an 
 infant, took refuge in Khokand. It is uncertain 
 whether Mahomed Latif was born before their arrival 
 at Dihbid or afterwards ; and it is now asserted that he 
 claimed descent from Tamerlane. Whether this was a 
 claim brought forward when his son was advancing in 
 the world or not, it is impossible to test its accuracy. 
 The parents of Yakoob Beg were therefore not without 
 some pretensions, and it would seem that the bad 
 fortune, from which for some generations they had 
 been suffering, was beginning to disappear before the 
 ability of Yakoob Beg raised it to a higher point than 
 ever. In addition to the claims of his father and 
 grandfather as Kazis of an important community, a 
 sister of Yakoob Beg married Nar Mahomed Khan, 
 Governor of Tashkent ; and, as we shall see later on, 
 this connection was very instrumental in promoting the 
 interests of the youthful Yakoob. 
 
 Piskent, Pskent, or Bis-kent, as it is sometimes spelt, 
 is still a flourishing little community, fifty miles south 
 of Tashkent, on the road to Khodjent. Its inhabitants 
 are a thrifty, good-tempered set of people, who take 
 great pride in the fact that the great Athalik Ghazi, 
 the supporter of Islam, and the reputed terror of the 
 
78 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Eussians, was one of themselves. In this little settle- 
 ment there are many Tajiks, and this, doubtless, with 
 other reasons, induced Mahomed Latif, a Tajik himself, 
 to take up his abode there. To the east of Piskent the 
 mountains begin to rise, which stretch onward until 
 they become the Tian Shan and the Kizilyart ranges, and 
 in these elevated regions the Tajik descendants muster 
 in strong numbers. The Tajiks are Persian in their 
 origin, and consequently of the Aryan stock, in contra- 
 distinction to the Turk or Tartar ruling class in Western 
 Turkestan. They have, however, for so many gene- 
 rations been restricted to a limited career in the organi- 
 zation of the state, that, quite unjustly as it is, they 
 have come to be regarded as an inferior race. English 
 writers have fallen into this mistake, and have accepted 
 as correct the definition given by the Turks of this 
 subject race. As a matter of fact the contrary holds 
 true, and the Tajik is superior to any of his masters 
 in point of mental capacity. They are represented 
 to still retain the fine presence and long flowing 
 beards which distinguish those of Aryan blood from 
 their Tartar opposite ; and in height and strength they 
 quite eclipse every other race of Central Asia. It was 
 of this race that Yakoob Beg was the representative, 
 and, although the greater part of his life was passed in 
 ruling nations almost exclusively Tartar, some of the 
 more prominent among his supporters, as well as the 
 flower of his army, boasted that they, too, represented 
 that master race, whose birth-place was to be found in 
 the Indian Caucasus. The Tajiks still speak a Persian 
 dialect, and their Iranian origin is thereby rendered 
 almost indisputable. 
 
 Mahomed YakooYs early years were passed at his 
 home at Piskent, and it is said that it was intended that 
 he should follow the profession which his father had re- 
 pudiated. As a youth he was too wayward to submit 
 to any check on his impulses, and the design of educating 
 him as a " mollah," if it was ever seriously entertained, 
 
HIS CAREER IN KHOKAND. 79 
 
 was abandoned long before he arrived at man's estate. 
 He appears to have passed the first twenty years of 
 his life in an idle, uneventful manner at Piskent, and 
 then suddenly to have resolved to seek his fortune as 
 best he might in the troubled waters of Khokandian 
 politics. In 1845, we find him in the train of the 
 newly seated khan, Khudayar, as "mahram," or chamber- 
 lain, and shortly afterwards, by the influence of his 
 brother-in-law, the Governor of Tashkent, nominated a 
 Pansad Bashi, a commander of 500. This was in 1847, 
 about which year he married a Kipchak lady of Zuelik, a 
 village in the district of Ak Musjid. He had three sons, 
 of whom we shall hear more hereafter, by this marriage 
 Kooda Kul Beg, Kuli Beg, and Hacc Kuli Beg. Later 
 on, in the year 1847, he was raised to the rank of Koosh- 
 Bege, or " lord of the family " more intelligibly de- 
 scribed as vizier and entrusted with the charge of the 
 important post on the Syr Darya, called Ak Musjid, 
 " White Mosque." This post he held with credit for six 
 years, until 1853, when the Eussians commenced that 
 forward movement, of which we have not yet seen the 
 close. At that time, Eussia had not acquired one of the 
 numerous strategic points now in her possession. The 
 Syr Da,rya then was as far off from her frontier as the 
 Oxus is now. Ak Musjid, built in the lower reaches of 
 the river, and representing a Khokandian outpost of 
 exceptional importance, was the grand obstacle in the 
 path of the Eussians operating from Kazalinsk, at the 
 mouth of the Syr Darya. It was resolved, therefore, that 
 this post, which, doubtless, encouraged all the marauders 
 in the neighbourhood to continue their depredations 
 against the Eussian caravans, should be wrested from the 
 hands of its owners, and either razed to the ground or 
 converted into a Eussian stronghold. General Perovsky 
 was entrusted with this undertaking. The distance 
 from Kazalinsk, or Fort No. 1, to Ak Musjid is not 
 much over 200 miles, along the banks of the Syr 
 Darya. Not many commissariat arrangements were 
 
80 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 necessary, nor did the distance to march require much 
 time to delay the Russian officer in beginning his 
 operations against the fort. The army with which 
 he appeared before- -the walls may not have been large 
 in numbers when compared with the armies of modern 
 times, but, in all that makes a disciplined force formi- 
 dable, it was exceptionally well supplied. The artillery 
 was in greater strength than is usually considered 
 necessary, and the expedition was still more efficient in 
 engineers and cavalry. The garrison of Ak Musjid was, 
 on the other hand, ill supplied, both in provisions and in 
 ammunition, and the fort itself presented, neither in its 
 position nor in its construction, any feature that an 
 engineer officer would have considered calculated to 
 make it capable of sustaining the attack of artillery for 
 twenty-four hours. The Russian lines were constructed 
 in the most approved method ; but twice were their 
 approaches destroyed, and twice their mines counter- 
 mined. During twenty-six days the Russian bom- 
 bardment was fast and furious, and during all that 
 time the Khokandian defence was stubborn and per- 
 sistent. But all the efforts of the garrison to break 
 through the beleaguering lines were unavailing, and 
 after so long a cannonade little more resistance could 
 be expected from ramparts which were pierced in several 
 places by wide and gaping breaches. The resolute 
 commandant, who had done everything required by the 
 most exacting code of military honour, confessed that 
 there was nothing to be gained by a continued defence, 
 and as it was known that the Russians were making 
 preparations for an early assault, a messenger was 
 despatched without delay to the Russian commander, 
 expressing the willingness of the garrison to capitulate 
 on honourable terms. General Perovsky, who had 
 expected an easy triumph here, and possibly some more 
 extended triumph in farther regions, was indignant at 
 the resistance opposed to him by a paltry place like Ak 
 Musjid, and received the messenger from the fort with 
 
HIS CAREER IN KHOKAND. 81 
 
 ill-concealed impatience. Scarcely bestowing any atten- 
 tion on the letter, couched in humble terms as it was, of 
 the commandant, General Perovsky petrified the asto- 
 nished emissary with the decla" tion that on the 
 morrow the fort would be takeL. by assault. This 
 arbitrary assertion of his power, which was carried 
 into practice, of course successfully, the next day, on 
 an occasion when magnanimity ought to have been 
 shown by the successful general, does not redound to the 
 credit of the officer in question, and throws an instruc- 
 tive light on the latitude left to Russian generals in 
 their instructions, and on the opinion felt for Central 
 Asiatics by the civilizing representatives of the White 
 Czar. To say that General Perovsky was urged to this 
 act of gratuitous tyranny by a desire to obtain a cross 
 of either St. Anne or St. George, is, after all, only to 
 magnify the offence, and that Ak Musjid has taken the 
 name of its conqueror, Fort Perovsky, is the means of 
 perpetuating, not his fame, but his infamy, and the 
 courageous conduct of the defenders. In the winter 
 following its fall Yakoob Beg, with Sahib Khan, 
 brother of the Khan of Khokand, attempted to retake 
 the fort, but the coup proved abortive, and the Eussians 
 have never receded from their new acquisition. 
 
 Khudayar Khan had been elevated to the throne of 
 Khokand in 1845, by the energy of Mussulman Kuli, 
 a Kipchak chief, of singular astuteness, and aptitude for 
 business. During his tenure of the post of Wazir. 
 Khokand was peacefully and beneficently governed ; but, 
 as on every similar occasion in Central Asia, the ruler 
 soon became jealous of the popularity acquired by his 
 minister, although his own position was in reality con- 
 firmed by the wise measures of the very man to whom 
 he had conceived a covert hostility. So with Khudayar 
 Khan, the effeminate, and his minister, Mussulman 
 Kuli, in the decade of which we are now speaking ; as 
 with Buzurg Khan, the debauchee, but correct repre- 
 sentative of the Khojas, and his general and vizier, the 
 
 G 
 
82 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Kooshbege, Mahomed Yakoob, in the following. In 
 1858, Mussulman Kuli was seized by order of Khudayar 
 Khan, and barbarously murdered ; and from that occur- 
 rence the decadence of this unfortunate ruler of Kho- 
 kand can be traced until, at last, he became a mere 
 pensioner on the bounty of the Russians. Although 
 Yakoob Beg became, to a certain extent, notorious 
 for his gallant defence of Ak Musjid, it would appear, 
 from his being styled after that event simply " Mir," or 
 chief, that he had sunk in grade in his official status. 
 It is probable that the chief cause of this was his failure 
 to retake it, and not his ill success in defending it. He 
 was, however, entrusted with the charge of the Kilaochi 
 fort, a post which he held down to the murder of Mus- 
 sulman Kuli. 
 
 Khudayar Khan had an elder brother, Mullah Khan, 
 who had been passed over by Mussulman Kuli, when 
 the state was put in order after the dissensions that arose 
 on the death of the great ruler, Mahomed Ali. Now, 
 on the death of Mussulman Kuli, who had given vita- 
 lity to the regime of Khudayar, Mullah Khan and his 
 partisans began to intrigue once more. Several Kipchak 
 and Kirghiz leaders joined his cause, and Yakoob Beg 
 at once became one of his most active supporters. Khu- 
 dayar Khan was deposed, and retired into temporary 
 seclusion. For his services to the new ruler Yakoob 
 Beg was made Shahawal, an officer corresponding to a 
 chamberlain or court intendant. He was soon restored 
 to his old rank of Kooshbege, and appointed governor 
 of the frontier fort of Kurama, the same place of which 
 his father had been Kazi. And in 1860 he came still 
 more to the front, when he was summoned to Tashkent 
 to assist Kanaat Shah, the Nahib of Khokand, in mak- 
 ing preparations in case the Eussians, who had for some 
 time seemed to be threatening Khokand, should cross 
 the frontier. Mullah Khan was murdered at this time, 
 having held the reins of power but for the brief space 
 of two years, and Khudayar Khan emerged from his 
 
HIS CAREER IN KHOKAND. 88 
 
 hiding place. He was welcomed both by Kanaat Shah 
 and Yakoob Beg; and in return for their support he 
 consented to forget the past. Yakoob Beg, as his 
 reward, received the governorship of Kurama. It was 
 during these troubles that Alim Kuli, a Kirghiz chief- 
 tain, appeared upon the scene. He possessed many of 
 the attributes that distinguished his predecessor Mussul- 
 man Kuli, and his successor, in the eyes of the people, 
 Yakoob Beg. He had undoubtedly a great capacity 
 for intrigue, but was inferior to the former in adminis- 
 trative capacity, and to the latter in military skill. He 
 now set Shah Murad, grandson of Shere Ali Khan, up 
 as a claimant to the throne, and was speedily joined by 
 Yakoob Beg, who once more abandoned the cause of 
 Khudayar Khan, who, it must be remembered, had 
 always treated Yakoob Beg in a friendly way, and who 
 in their early days had been his boon companion. This 
 conspiracy was unsuccessful, and Yakoob Beg, who had 
 yielded up Khodjent, with the defence of which he had 
 been entrusted by Alim Kuli, on the approach of the 
 forces of Khudayar Khan, took refuge in Bokhara. 
 Here he was favourably received, and resided as a noble 
 attached to the court. In 1863 the Ameer of Bokhara, 
 Muzaffur Eddin, marched a large army into Khokand 
 for the purpose of restoring his brother-in-law, Khu- 
 dayar, to the throne, for he had again been deposed by 
 the intrigues of Alim Kuli; Yakoob Beg accompanied 
 this force, and once more appears, for the last time, 
 on the troubled arena of Khokandian politics. The 
 Bokhariot army was soon recalled, and Khudayar Khan 
 was left to face the difficulties of his position unaided. 
 In a few months an arrangement was come to between 
 Alim Kuli and Yakoob Beg and other leading nobles 
 against Khudayar. Sultan Murad, who had first been 
 supported and then murdered by Alim Kuli, having 
 been thus effectually removed, this king- maker had 
 set up Sultan Seyyid in his place. Yakoob Beg so far 
 profited by this new confederacy that he was restored to 
 
 G 2 
 
84 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 his old offices and perquisites, and sent once more to hold 
 his former post as governor of Kurama. He collected 
 as many allies as he was able, and brought them with 
 him to assist in the capture of Khodjent. On this 
 important town being secured the regent Alim Kuli 
 passed through Kurama on his way to seize and settle 
 the capital, Tashkent. He appointed a connection of 
 his own, Hydar Kuli, with the title of Hudaychi, as 
 governor of Kurama, and took Yakoob Beg in his 
 train to Tashkent. Shortly after their arrival at 
 Tashkent, news came of the Eussian occupation of 
 Tchimkent, and the survivors of the force driven out 
 by Tchernaief soon appeared with a confirmation of 
 the intelligence. This was in April, 1864, and until 
 October of that year, when the Eussians appeared before 
 the town, Yakoob Beg was engaged in strengthening 
 the fortifications of the capital. When the army of 
 General Tchernaief did appear in the neighbourhood, 
 Yakoob Beg, with a rashness that cannot be too strongly 
 condemned, went forth to encounter it in the open. As 
 might have been expected, the Eussians were victorious, 
 and Yakoob Beg was compelled to seek refuge with 
 his shattered forces within the walls of Tashkent. The 
 Eussians themselves had suffered some loss, and either 
 awed by the bold demeanour of their old antagonist, or, 
 as is more probable, encountering some difficulty in 
 bringing up supplies, and being unprovided with a 
 siege train, thought the more prudent policy would be 
 to retire to Tchimkent until reinforcements and other 
 necessaries should arrive. Alim Kuli, in the course of 
 a few days after this reverse, arrived at Tashkent in 
 person with a large body of troops, and employed all 
 his energies in strengthening the defences before the 
 return of the Eussians. It is very certain that on 
 this occasion, the first on which Yakoob Beg had a 
 command of any consequence, he permitted his natural 
 impetuosity to get the better of his discretion, and 
 that it was the height of madness on his part to enter 
 
HIS CAREER IN KHOKAND. 85 
 
 into an engagement in the open with the disciplined and 
 formidable forces of Tchernaief, when, by leaving that 
 general to undertake the siege of Tashkent, he might 
 have had it in his power to inflict a serious, and for the 
 time conclusive, blow against the Eussians when the 
 reinforcing army of Alim Kuli came up. With half 
 his army discouraged by defeat, Alim Kuli found him- 
 self restricted to a policy of inaction, through the 
 over-hastiness of his lieutenant. The Eussians did not 
 return until after the departure of Yakoob Beg for 
 Kashgar, but when they did they found that Alim Kuli 
 had made every preparation in his power to receive 
 them. On the first occasion they were again forced to 
 retreat after a skirmish which the Khokandians claim 
 as a victory; but in 1865 they appeared before the 
 walls in greater force. Alim Kuli, with a gathering 
 vastly superior in numbers to the Eussians, attacked 
 them a few miles to the north of Tashkent, and the 
 fortunes of the day hung in the balance, until the fall 
 of Alim Kuli, who, whilst boldly leading a charge of 
 Kirghiz cavalry, was pierced in the chest by a musket 
 ball. He was carried from the field by a faithful officer, 
 and expired that night in Tashkent. Alim Kuli appears 
 to have been actuated to some extent by a disinterested 
 patriotism, as much as by more personal motives. 
 With his fall, and the departure of Yakoob Beg 
 for another sphere of operations, all hope of a con- 
 tinued state of independence for Khokand was dis- 
 sipated. After this severe defeat the Eussians laid close 
 siege to Tashkent. The Khokandians in their distress 
 applied to Bokhara for aid, and the Eussians hastened 
 to occupy Chinaz to intercept it. The Bokhariot army 
 was routed by the Eussian army under General Eo- 
 manoffski at the battle of Irjar, in May, 1866, eleven 
 months after Tashkent had been occupied by Tchernaief. 
 It was during this period of anarchy, with a hostile 
 Eussian and an allied Bokhariot force on his soil, that 
 Khudayar Khan once more supplanted the nominee of 
 
86 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Alim Kuli, Sultan Seyyid, and at the close of the cam- 
 paign Khudayar was left in possession of the southern 
 portion of Khokand. This Khan appears to have been of 
 an unambitious nature, for, during his various exiles, he 
 devoted himself to private business with an energy he 
 had never shown in the management of the public 
 affairs, and when he at last sank into private life and be- 
 came a pensioner of the Eussian Court, on the complete 
 annexation of his state, he is said to have acquired not 
 only a happiness, but many virtues unknown to him in 
 his more elevated lot. The unfortunate Sultan Seyyid, 
 after wandering for some years out of Khokand, was, 
 when he ventured to return in 1871, executed. Many 
 of the partisans of Seyyid on the defeat by the 
 Russians, and on the overthrow of his rivals by Khuda- 
 yar, sought refuge in the mountains of the Kizilyart, 
 whence they proceeded to join Yakoob Beg in Kashgar, 
 where they arrived at a most opportune moment as will 
 be seen. 
 
 To return to Yakoob Beg. After his defeat before 
 Tashkent he was employed under Alim Kuli in re- 
 pairing the defences of that town and collecting troops 
 from the whole district, but his reputation had been 
 lowered by that reverse. There was a certain jealousy 
 between the Kirghiz chief and the Tajik soldier of 
 fortune. Yakoob Beg saw in Alim Kuli an obstacle to 
 his further promotion, and Alim Kuli recognized in the 
 Kooshbege a possible rival and successor. Any excuse 
 therefore to keep Yakoob Beg in the background, or 
 indeed to get rid of him altogether, would be very 
 welcome to Alim Kuli. We hear little more of the 
 unsuccessful general until his departure for Kashgar a 
 few months afterwards. He had to wipe out in other 
 regions and against other foes the stain he had incurred 
 in his encounters with the Russians. 
 
 While these events were in progress at Tashkent, an 
 envoy arrived there from Sadie Beg, a Kirghiz prince 
 on the frontiers of Hi and Kashgar. He brought 
 
HIS CAREER IN KHOKAND. 87 
 
 intelligence that his master had availed himself of the 
 dissensions among the Chinese, to seize the city of 
 Kashgar, and he requested the Khan of Khokand to 
 send him the heir of the Khojas, in order that he might 
 place him on the throne. As the facts really stood, 
 Sadie Beg had only laid siege to Kashgar, and, finding 
 that he was met with a strenuous resistance, had 
 recourse to the plan of setting up a Khoja king to 
 strengthen his failing efforts, but of the true state of 
 affairs in Kashgar it is evident that everybody in 
 Tashkent was profoundly ignorant. The Khokandian 
 policy had always been, however, to maintain their 
 interests intact in Eastern Turkestan, and to weaken 
 in every possible way the credit of the Chinese. An 
 envoy bringing news of a fresh revolt in Kashgar was, 
 therefore, sure of a friendly reception at Tashkent, even 
 if he did not return with some more striking tokens of 
 amity. But on this occasion the danger from Russian 
 movements was so close at hand, and all the efforts of 
 the state were so concentrated in preparations for defence, 
 that Alim Kuli, whatever he may have thought of its 
 prospects, and however much he may have sympathized 
 with its object, was unable to give the Kirghiz emis- 
 sary any aid in his enterprise. When, however, Buzurg 
 Khan, the only surviving son of Jehangir Khan, 
 either of his own free will, or instigated, as some say, 
 by Yakoob Beg, offered to assert his claims on Kashgar, 
 Alim Kuli expressed his approval of the design, and 
 gave his moral assistance so far as was compatible with 
 no active participation therein. He, however, gave 
 Buzurg Khan the services of Kooshbege Mahomed 
 Yakoob to act as his commander-in-chief, or Baturbashi. 
 Thus did Alim Kuli free himself from his troublesome 
 subordinate, and despatched on an errand which seemed 
 likely to end in disgrace and defeat, but which really 
 led to empire, the only native whom he dreaded as being 
 capable of supplanting him. 
 
 Yakoob Beg had up to this point given little promise 
 
88 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 of future distinction. He had, indeed, earned the 
 reputation of being a gallant soldier, if a not very 
 prudent one ; and in the intrigues that had marked the 
 history of his state for twenty years, he had borne his 
 fair share. But no one would have dreamt of prognos- 
 ticating that he possessed the ability necessary to win 
 campaigns against superior forces, and then to erect a 
 powerful state on the ruins that fell into his possession. 
 The most favourable opinion would have been, that he 
 would have died manfully as a soldier, and as a true 
 Mussulman. When he embarked in the enterprise of 
 conquering Kashgar, he was no longer in the first flush 
 of youth, but was a man who covered his fiery spirit 
 and great ambition with a cloak of religious zeal and 
 diplomatic apathy. Twenty years' experience in the 
 most intriguing court in Central Asia had placed every 
 muscle at his complete command, and even in the most 
 disastrous moments in his career, he is always 
 represented as being calm and collected calm in his 
 belief in Kismut, and collected in a persuasion of his 
 own resources. One fact that will account for the 
 slowness with which he advanced into notoriety is that 
 he was entirely dependent on his own capacity for 
 promotion. He had no wealth, no large following, and 
 in the two leaders, Kipchak and Kirghiz, Mussulman and 
 Alim Kuli, he had competitors of almost equal merit with 
 himself, while they each possessed personal power and 
 family connections that placed them far beyond the reach 
 of the hardy soldier and court chamberlain. Some of bis 
 detractors had availed themselves of his impecuniosity 
 to circulate stories of his having had dealings with 
 the Eussians ; but these, although invested with cir- 
 cumstances originating in non- Russian quarters, are 
 probably without any truth. The chief charge, to be 
 taken for what it is worth, is, that the weakness of his 
 defence of the Ak Musjid district, after the Ml of the 
 fort, was owing to his having received a large bribe 
 from the Eussians. Another is, that in 1863, after his 
 
HIS CAREER IN KHOKAND. 89 
 
 return from Bokhara, lie neglected to retard the Eussian 
 movements for a pecuniary consideration. In both 
 cases the sum mentioned is very large ; and besides the 
 apparent falseness of these rumours, we have only to 
 consider that he was not worth a bribe, and that his 
 opposition to the Eussians was marked by all the want 
 of foresight of religious zeal. All these considerations 
 make such rumours appear in their true light ; and 
 although we are aware that a follower of Yakoob Beg 
 confirmed, if he did not originate, these charges, 
 it seems to us that the Eussians, if there had been 
 truth in the report, would long ago have placed the fact 
 before the peoples of Asia, and required Yakoob Beg 
 when Ameer of Kashgar to have acted in a more 
 friendly way towards his former employers. But the 
 simple reason that Yakoob Beg could not have rendered 
 any service to the Eussians worth the thousands of 
 pounds he is said to have received, ought to demolish 
 the whole fabrication. If Yakoob Beg's life proves one 
 thing more than another, it was that he was a most 
 fanatical Mussulman, and as such hating the Eussians, 
 as the most formidable enemy of Islam, with the most 
 intense hate his fiery nature was capable of. This 
 man's whole life must have been the greatest hypocrisy 
 if he was not genuine in his religious intolerance, 
 and that intolerance rendered any connivance with 
 Eussian measures an impossibility. Owing to his early 
 connection with the church, and his maternal grand- 
 father's high position therein, Yakoob Beg was always 
 distinguished for the strict orthodoxy of his views. 
 Through all his life he seems to have made it his chief 
 object to keep the church on his side. When he was 
 reduced to the most desperate straits in his after life in 
 Kashgar, when some of the most faithful of his 
 followers fell off from him, and when even Buzurg 
 Khan, the man whom he had placed upon a throne, 
 declared him a rebel and a traitor, he never lost heart 
 so long as the ministers of the church held by him ; and, 
 
90 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 on the other hand, they, recognizing the fidelity of their 
 champion, supported him through good and ill repute. 
 Whilst residing at Bokhara " the holy " he had attached 
 to his person several of the most distinguished preachers 
 of Islam throughout Asia, and he had taken all the 
 vows that give a peculiar sanctity to the relations that 
 connect the layman with his priest. It was here that 
 he publicly announced his intention of going on 
 pilgrimage to Mecca ; an intention which he repeated 
 on several occasions during his rule of Kashgar, but 
 was obliged, by the position and precarious existence of 
 that state, always to perform by deputy. When he had 
 established himself as ruler, his first measure was to 
 re-enforce the Shariat and to endow several shrines 
 that had been erected to the memory of the chief 
 Khoja saints. It was by such means that he at every 
 crisis of his life had striven to make his interests 
 identical with those of his religion, and when he 
 became a responsible and successful prince his past life 
 stood him in such good stead, that he easily came to be 
 regarded throughout Asia as the most faithful and 
 redoubtable supporter of Islam. 
 
 At this period of his life he is described by one who 
 knew him as being of a short but stoutish build, with 
 a keenly intelligent and handsome countenance. He 
 had, during the vicissitudes of his career in Khokand, 
 been so often near assassination, or execution, that the 
 result of the morrow had, to all external appearance, 
 become a matter of secondary consideration to him, and 
 his features, schooled to immobility by a long career of 
 court intrigue, appeared to the casual observer dull and 
 uninteresting. When, however, the conversation turned 
 on subjects that specially interested him, such as the 
 advance of Eussia, the future of Islam, or the policy of 
 England, he threw aside his mask, and became at once 
 a man whose views, with some merit in themselves, 
 were rendered almost convincing by the singular charm 
 of his voice and manner. He was honourably distin- 
 
HIS CAREER IN KHOKAND. 91 
 
 guished at all times by the simplicity of his dress, and 
 his freedom from the pretension and love of show 
 characteristic of most Asiatics; and at the very highest 
 point of his power he was only a soldier, occupying a 
 palace. As was well said of Timour, the Athalik Ghazi 
 placed the " foot of courage in the stirrup of patience/' 
 and he evidently set himself to copy the great lessons 
 of military success that might be learnt from the careers 
 of Glenghis Khan, Timour, and Baber. Such is some 
 account of the commander-in-chief to the expedition of 
 Buzurg Khan. The Khoja, himself, was a man about 
 the same age as his lieutenant, but in every other 
 respect as different as he well could be. Personally a 
 coward, fond of show and every kind of luxury, and of the 
 treacherous, fickle nature that marked his race, he had 
 done nothing during his past life to compensate for the 
 want of the most ordinary virtues. Although he par- 
 ticipated in the expedition of Wali Khan, he showed no 
 possession of merit, and in the subsequent occupation 
 that the Khojas maintained in Kashgar during a few 
 weeks, he, perhaps more than any other of his kinsmen, 
 disgusted the people by his open and unbridled licen- 
 tiousness. Such were the two men who, in the latter 
 days of 1864, set out from Tashkent for the recovery 
 of a kingdom. Of their chances of success few would 
 have ventured then to predict a settlement in their 
 favour; none, certainly, such as was obtained by 
 Yakoob Beg. It is now time for us to relate how they 
 fared in Eastern Turkestan. 
 
92 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE INVASION OF KASHGAR BY BUZURG KHAN AND 
 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 THE Chinese were on several occasions, as we have seen, 
 threatened in Eastern Turkestan by the pretensions of 
 the Khojas, and the secret or open machinations of 
 Khokand. But they had at all times triumphed over 
 every combination of circumstances, so long as they 
 themselves were united. The temporary success of 
 Jehangir Khan was obliterated by the excesses which 
 characterized his occupation of the country, and by the 
 energy and large display of force with which the 
 Chinese pacified the state on his flight ; and the last, 
 under Wali Khan, can scarcely be dignified by any 
 other appellation than that of a marauding incursion. 
 But a great and important change had occurred in the 
 few years that had elapsed since 1859. The Chinese 
 no longer presented a collected force to the onslaught of 
 an assailant. In every quarter of their empire, vic- 
 torious rebels had established themselves, and had 
 detracted in an immeasurable degree from the effective 
 strength of the Government. A Mahomedan ruler 
 swayed over the Panthays, in Yunnan, from his capital 
 at Ta-li-foo ; the Taepings round Nankin were at the 
 summit of their career, just before the appearance of 
 Colonel Grordon, when, in 1862, a fresh danger broke out 
 in the provinces of Kansuh and Shensi. From a remote 
 period there had been extensive Mussulman settlements 
 in these provinces, and so early as the seventeenth 
 century they had been the cause of trouble to the great 
 
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR. 93 
 
 Kanghi. The Emperor Keen-Lung, indeed, at one 
 time attempted to settle the question for ever by order- 
 ing the massacre of every Mahomedan over fifteen years 
 of age. Even this sweeping measure did not have the 
 desired effect, and whether persecution was the means 
 or not of giving vitality to the cause, it is certain that 
 they had become more numerous, more resolute, and 
 more confident in their own superiority to the other 
 Chinese by the middle of the present century. These 
 Mahomedans were known as Tungani, Dungani, or 
 Dungans, while the Buddhist Chinese are spoken of 
 as Khitay. Many writers are not satisfied with this 
 j simple explanation of the name Tungani, and will have 
 I it that they were a distinct race, who were either trans- 
 ; ported to China at some period of Chinese conquest, or 
 ; were compelled to seek refuge there by some advancing 
 barbarian horde. They even assert that they can trace 
 the name and origin of this people to a tribe dwelling 
 in the country of the lower waters of the Amoor; but 
 while there is complete uncertainty on the subject it 
 seems simpler to accept the signification that the word 
 Tungani conveys to the Chinese, and that is Mahome- 
 , dan. We know, for certain, that these people had 
 i resided in Kansuh and its neighbouring province for 
 centuries that they were remarkable for a superiority 
 in strength and activity over the Khitay, and that they 
 possessed the virtues of sobriety and honesty. They 
 were also not infected by the disease of opium smoking, 
 and we should imagine them to have been a quiet, con- 
 tented, and agreeable people at their most prosperous 
 period. Their physical superiority to the Khitay would 
 probably be owing to their abstention from " bang " 
 and opium, and we need not suppose that they were the 
 descendants of a stronger race, who had issued from the 
 frigid north, when we have an explanation so much sim- 
 pler and more natural at hand. They were found by 
 their Khitay rulers to form excellent soldiers, policemen, 
 and other Government servants, such as carriers, &c. In 
 
94 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 this last employment many found their way to Hamil, 
 thence to Turfan and Urumtsi, and their numbers were 
 increased by discharged soldiers, who remained as military 
 settlers sooner than return to Kansuh. In the course of 
 a few generations their numbers became much greater, 
 until, at last, in the cities we have named, they formed the 
 majority of the inhabitants. In Kuldja, too, they were 
 very numerous, but south of the Tian Shan they do not 
 seem to have advanced westward of Kucha in any great 
 force. At Aksu the Andijan influence, supreme in Western 
 Kashgar, presented an impassable barrier to the Tun- 
 gani, who, it must be remembered, had no sympathy 
 with Khokand. The Tungani were, therefore, Ma- 
 homedan subjects of China, originating in Kansuh, but 
 who had also, in the course of time, spread westward 
 into Chinese Turkestan and Jungaria. They were em- 
 ployed in the service of the country without restriction, 
 nor can we find that they were subjected to any unfair 
 usage, after the measures taken against them in the 
 earlier days of Keen-Lung. They may not have been 
 as highly favoured as the Sobo tribes, and they may 
 have been subjected to some ridicule in Kansuh ; but in 
 Jungaria they were on an equality with all the other 
 Chinese, and immeasurably better placed in the political 
 scale than the Andijanis or Tarantchis. The Chinese 
 had just grounds for believing that no danger to their 
 rule in Eastern Turkestan or Jungaria would ever be 
 caused by the Tungani, and it is not easy to explain 
 how their reasonable anticipations were falsified. The 
 Tungani were fervent, if not the most orthodox in 
 form of, Mahomedans, and it would appear that they 
 were not free from a belief in their own superiority to 
 the Khitay. This feeling was fostered by the "mollahs," 
 or priests, who became very active within the Chinese 
 dominions, when these had been extended by conquest 
 into the heart of Asia. A.s if in retaliation for a Khitay 
 conquest the Mahomedan religion was undermining the 
 outworks of its rival's power slowly, but surely. The 
 
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR. 95 
 
 impulse given to trade by the security and patronage 
 that accompanied Chinese rule was, at least from a 
 purely Chinese point of view, neutralized as an advan- 
 tage by the admission into the empire of energetic and 
 eloquent preachers of the superior merits of Mahome- 
 danism. It required many generations before the effect 
 of their efforts became perceptible, and it was not until 
 the power of China fell into an extraordinary decline a 
 decline which many thought, with some show of reason, 
 was to herald the fall, but which later events have 
 seemed to make but the prelude to a more vigorous 
 life than ever that these Mahomedan missionaries 
 among the Tungani knew that the time to reap what 
 they had sown with patience and persistency was at 
 hand. It is impossible not to connect this event in some 
 degree with that unaccountable revival of fanaticism 
 among Mahomedans, which has produced so many im- 
 portant events during the last thirty years, and of which 
 we are now witnessing some of the most striking results. 
 In 1862, a riot occurred in a small village of Kansuh ; 
 it was suppressed with some loss of life, and people were 
 beginning to suppose that it possessed no significance, 
 when a disturbance broke out on a large scale at Hou- 
 chow, or Salara. The Tungani had risen, and the un- 
 fortunate unarmed Khitay were massacred right and 
 left. The rising soon assumed the proportions of a 
 civil war, and the infection spread to the neighbouring 
 province of Shensi. Then ensued scenes of the most 
 atrocious barbarity. The Khitay, who all their lives 
 had lived at peace and as neighbours with the Tun- 
 gani, were butchered without mercy. The Mahome- 
 dan priests seized all the governing power into their 
 own hands, and set their followers the example of un- 
 scrupulous ferocity. The movement, even if we make 
 allowance for the difficulties besetting the government 
 in other regions, must be considered to have been at- 
 tended by unexpected success. It can only be ac- 
 counted for by the supposition that the Khitay were 
 
96 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 taken completely by surprise, and realized neither the 
 extent nor the nature of the danger to which they were 
 exposed. Before the end of 1862, a Tungan govern- 
 ment was established in Kansuh, and its jurisdiction 
 was for a time acknowledged in Shensi. The priests 
 formed an administration amongst themselves, and set 
 themselves to the task of consolidating what they had 
 won, and of preparing for the time when the Chinese 
 should come for vengeance. The events happening 
 in Kansuh were naturally of interest to the Tungani 
 in the country lying beyond it, and it was not long 
 before the example set them was followed in Hamil, 
 Turfan, Urumtsi, Manas, and other cities of that dis- 
 trict. The same success attended the movement here 
 as in Kansuh. The Chinese power was subverted, the 
 Khitay massacred with greater circumstances of cruelty, 
 if possible, and a new Tungan state was formed in 
 those cities. Each district retained a nominal indepen- 
 dence, under the headship of a priest, or body of priests, 
 or of one of the native Tungan princes, and then the 
 movement spread with irresistible strides to Karashar, 
 Kucha, and Aksu. There it stopped, and south of the 
 Tian Shan the Tungan revolt proper never extended 
 west of Aksu. 
 
 In Altyshahr and Kuldja for some months longer 
 the Chinese maintained the external show of power, 
 but all their communications with China were cut off, 
 and neither in numbers nor resources had they suffi- 
 cient means to cope with the Tungani unaided. They 
 would have accomplished as much as could have been 
 expected from them if they succeeded in keeping pos- 
 session of that which they still occupied. The Tun- 
 gan element in Kucha and Aksu was not predominant. 
 It had to share power with the Khojas, and, as we shall 
 see later on, the Khojas of these two cities seized the 
 governing power for themselves. It was the appear- 
 ance of the Tungan sedition in these cities, which 
 occupy a middle relation to the purely Chinese cities 
 
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR. 97 
 
 of Hamil and Ummtsi, and the almost totally Kho- 
 kandian cities of Yarkand and Kashgar, that roused 
 the Kashgari to a full appreciation of the importance 
 to themselves of this movement, and the Chinese gar- 
 risons and settlers to an equally just realization of 
 their own danger. The Kashgari, not free from the 
 fanaticism of all their co-religionists, and naturally 
 elated at the successes of the Tungani, forgot, with their 
 well proved fickleness, all the benefits they had received 
 from the Chinese, and waited eagerly for a favourable 
 opportunity to come for them to imitate the example 
 set them by their eastern neighbours. Nor had they 
 long to wait, although it was not from them that came 
 the first spark that lighted the firebrand of civil war 
 and anarchy throughout the length and breadth of 
 Altyshahr. 
 
 It will be remembered that the Khokandian govern- 
 ment had the right to nominate in each city, where they 
 received dues on Mahomedan merchandise, an agent or 
 tax-collector to look after the proper levy of the tax. 
 In some of the larger cities this official would require 
 a considerable staff of assistants, and thus a certain 
 number of skilled Khokandian officials were perma- 
 nently located on Kashgarian or Chinese territory. 
 After the failure of the expedition of Wali Khan, in 
 which these officials seem to have disappeared, either 
 having become merged in the body of his partisans or 
 sacrificed during the massacres of that time, a fresh 
 batch of Khokandians was installed, and occupied, in a 
 legal sense, the same position as their predecessors. 
 It would appear, however, that the natural result of 
 their aid to Wali Khan followed, and that the Chinese 
 Ambans regarded their presence with scarcely concealed 
 dislike, and proclaimed that these Khokandian tax- 
 gatherers were devoting more of their attention to the 
 propagation of heretical religious and political doctrines 
 than to the collection of dues on silk and other articles 
 of commerce. It would require but the slightest un- 
 
 H 
 
98 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 toward circumstance to fan this ill-feeling into the most 
 insatiate hatred and hostility. The danger was ren- 
 dered the more serious when the Chinese Ambans per- 
 ceived for the first time that the sympathies of a large 
 portion of their Tungan soldiery were estranged from 
 them. It was doubtful whether the Tungan regi- 
 ments could be relied on against a fresh Khoja revolt, 
 and it was certain that they would not combine in any 
 repression of the Mahomedan religion, even though the 
 sufferers should only be Andijanis. Such was the state 
 of the public mind in Altyshahr in 1862, when the 
 Tungani revolted and obtained success in Kansuh and 
 Shensi. 
 
 As early as 1859 the hostility of the Chinese Ambans 
 to the Andijani tax-collectors received a forcible illus- 
 tration in the town of Yarkand. At that time Afridun 
 Wang was governor, and, whether there was any per- 
 sonal enmity at the root of the action or not, he found 
 little difficulty in convincing both himself and the other 
 Chinese residents that the Andijani agent had been 
 stirring up discontent against them in the town. Ac- 
 cordingly, as self-preservation is the first law of nature, 
 this Khokandian official, with his attendant, was ar- 
 rested and executed. There may have been some 
 foundation for the accusations made by Afridun Wang 
 against his rival : more probably there was none ; but 
 on referring the matter to the Viceroy of Hi for decision 
 
 O / 
 
 it was decided that the governor should be removed. 
 The Khokandian government sent fresh agents, and it 
 is not stated that any reparation was given to the fami- 
 lies of the sufferers. From this it would appear that 
 the post of tax-collector in Altyshahr for His High- 
 ness the Khan of Khokand was not a very desirable 
 position. Afridun Wang retired to his native town of 
 Turfan, where, three years later on, he contributed more 
 than any one else to the success of the Tungan move- 
 ment. His policy, if anti-Khokandian, was pro-Maho- 
 medan or Tungan, and his case is very typical of the 
 
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR. 99 
 
 nature of this rising. In Turfan he continued to be 
 one of the chief men, until, six years later on, it fell to 
 the Athalik Grhazi. 
 
 His successor in the governorship of Yarkand did not 
 interfere with the Khokandian officials, but for this 
 moderation he made up by the exactions he committed 
 on the residents, more particularly on the Mahomedan 
 portion of them. His extortions and cruelties had the 
 effect as much of disgusting his own followers as of 
 rousing a spirit of opposition among the oppressed. 
 It was while things were in this uncertain state at 
 Yarkand that the governor received secret notice of 
 the Tungan revolt in Kansuh, and he at once per- 
 ceived that, when this important intelligence became 
 known, not only would his own Tungan troops become 
 more openly mutinous, but that the Khojas might seize 
 the opportunity to assert their claim to the country once 
 more. In this special case, in addition to the general 
 apprehension that would be felt by any Chinese gover- 
 nor at the aspect of affairs, there was personal fear for 
 the unjustifiable acts of his government, and the Amban, 
 in his trepidation, resolved on the most strenuous pre- 
 cautions to avert the danger from himself. He sum- 
 moned a council of war of his Buddhist lieutenants, 
 and stated the exact position to them ; how the 
 Tungan portion of their forces could not be depended 
 on ; how the Tungan settlers would join them ; and 
 how the Andijani agents would do their utmost to unite 
 in one cause against themselves all those who followed 
 the teaching of Islam; and how all these events, 
 which before were possible, had been rendered probable 
 by the Tungan successes in the east. He dwelt on 
 the fact that no time was to be lost in the execution of 
 such precautions as they thought necessary ; that at 
 any moment the news might arrive, and then they 
 would be in a minority; and he did not attempt to 
 conceal the purport of his address that he was in 
 favour of sharp measures, of going to the root of the 
 
 H % 
 
100 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 evil at once, and of massacring every Mussulman in 
 the town. The council of war was not prepared to en- 
 dorse such a violent proceeding without careful consider- 
 ation. There were many dissentients, and the meeting 
 was adjourned. It reassembled, and, on this occasion, 
 although the supporters of more moderate measures had 
 decreased, it adjourned once more before deciding. The 
 danger evidently appeared more appalling to the go- 
 vernor than to his subordinates ; perhaps also there 
 was some personal dislike for their chief even among 
 his Khitay following. At the second meeting they 
 seemed, indeed, more willing to acquiesce in his pro- 
 posed strong measures, and this may have been caused 
 by their observation of the state of public opinion in 
 the interval. But even then no final decision could be 
 arrived at, and the Khitay never had a chance after that 
 of making any defence in Yarkand. The Tungan 
 troops were not long in hearing, through their chief 
 officer, Mali Dalay, that there was' a plot on foot among 
 the Khitay to disarm, or, as others said, to massacre 
 them, and they then learnt of the Mahomedan revolt in 
 China and along the road thither. They immediately 
 determined to be beforehand with the Amban and his 
 lukewarm council, and no weak hesitation marred the 
 execution of their plot, as it had that of the Chinese 
 governor. 
 
 The Khitay troops, unarmed, were surprised during 
 the night, and cut down without quarter, and the small 
 body of survivors sought refuge in the Yangyshahr fort. 
 This was in August, 1863, and no fewer than 7,000 
 Khitay soldiers are computed to have fallen on this 
 'single occasion. The Tungan troops were thereupon 
 joined by the townspeople, and the question then to be 
 decided was, who was to be supreme, the Tungani or 
 the Andijan-Kashgari Mahomedans. The former were 
 simply an unlettered and rather savage soldiery ; the 
 latter possessed keen intellects for manipulating a fana- 
 tical people, and for improvising an administration of a 
 
THE INVASION OF KA.SHGAR. 101 
 
 superficial character. The balance of power was evenly 
 distributed until reinforcements arrived from Aksu and 
 Kucha to the anti-Tungan party. Two Khojas who 
 had been banished from Kucha, for endeavouring to 
 promote their own interests in the name of Khokand, 
 had fled to Aksu, where they met the same fate. In 
 this latter flight many of similar principles joined them, 
 so that when they reached Yarkand they had a nume- 
 rous force at their back. The Khojas in the first place 
 joined their forces to the Tungani, to storm the remain- 
 ing Khitay in the Yangyshahr. The Khitay after 
 a gallant resistance perceived that further opposition 
 was impossible. Then occurred one of those deeds, 
 which, if Europe instead of Asia had been the scene, 
 would have been handed down to posterity as a rare 
 example of military devotion and courage, but which, 
 although not unique even in the annals of the campaign 
 we are entering upon, having occurred in little-known 
 Eastern Turkestan, is not realized as an event that has 
 actually taken place. It is a myth of the myth-land to 
 which it belongs. And yet, when we read how the Am- 
 ban summoned all his officers to his chamber, where he 
 sat in state surrounded by his wives, his family, and his 
 servants; how all were silent, and yet sedate and prepared; 
 how, at the given signal that all were present, and that 
 the foe was at the gate, the aged warrior dropped his 
 lighted pipe into the mine beneath ; how the exulting 
 foe won alter all but a barren triumph ; and how the 
 Khitay taught the natives that if they had forgotten 
 how to conquer they had not how to die, we feel that 
 there is an under-current throughout the story, that, 
 apart from the admiration it must command, has claims 
 to our own special sympathy. The Chinese, as we did 
 in India in the dark hours of 1857, asserted their 
 superiority over the semi-barbarous races under their 
 sway, even when all hopes of a recovery seemed to 
 be abandoned. After the fall of the citadel the Khoja 
 
102 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 element was supreme in Yarkand, and a priest named 
 Abderrahman was set up as king. 
 
 The other cities of Altyshahr promptly followed the 
 example of Yarkand, and the Chinese power was com- 
 pletely subverted on all hands. The Khitay were mas- 
 sacred whenever they fell into the hands of the Maho- 
 medans, and the only places that still held out were the 
 citadels, notably the Yangyshahr of Kashgar. The 
 inhabitants of this city appear to have been unable to 
 keep their advantage over the Chinese, for they appealed 
 to the Kirghiz to come in and assist them. These 
 nomads, under their chief, Sadie Beg, were nothing 
 loth to join in expelling the Chinese, as such a change 
 could only increase their advantages by substituting an 
 unsettled for a settled government. Siege was accord- 
 ingly laid to the citadel of Kashgar, but the irregular 
 troops of the new allies were unable to make any im- 
 pression on the fort, defended as it was by a large 
 Khitay garrison. If the Chinese commander had 
 assumed a more active policy, he might have destroyed 
 his opponents, but he was waiting for the arrival of 
 reinforcements, which he expected before many 
 months. In not relying solely on his own resources 
 he proved himself unable to read the changed signs of 
 the time ; if, indeed, he was not already meditating that 
 surrender, which he ultimately concluded with Yakoob 
 Beg. Sadie Beg, finding himself unable to take the 
 fort, and knowing that it was uncertain how long the 
 Kashgari would remain friendly to himself, resolved to 
 play the part of king-maker, and sent the embassy to 
 Tashkent for a Khoja to come and rule Kashgar, only 
 he omitted to say that Kashgar was not conquered. 
 
 We can now return to Buzurg Khan and his com- 
 mander-in-chief. When they left Tashkent they had 
 only a following of six, among whom were Abdul la, 
 Pansad ; Mahomed Kuli, Shahawal ; and Khoja Kulan, 
 Hudaychi. All of these played a very prominent 
 part under Yakoob Beg. From Tashkent they went to 
 
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR. 103 
 
 Khokand, where their numbers rose to sixty- eight. 
 Here the final preparations were made, and during the 
 first days of January, 1865, this band of adventurers 
 crossed the Khokand frontier into Eastern Turkestan. 
 The mountain forts seem to have been deserted, for 
 no opposition was encountered in the passage of the 
 Terek defile. Several small bodies of troops joined 
 them, and they reached Mingy ol in the neighbourhood 
 of Kashgar with increased numbers and confidence. 
 Sadie Beg had conceived a more sanguine view of his 
 situation by this time, and half repented that he had 
 invited the Khojas in at all, more particularly when he 
 found that the Khoja had a following of his own, and 
 a skilled commander and minister in Yakoob Beg. 
 He then strove to dissuade Buzurg Khan from proceed- 
 ing further with an enterprise fraught with great peril, 
 for he represented the Chinese as sure to return, when 
 summary vengeance would be exacted. But his argu- 
 ments were unavailing. Either Buzurg Khan or his 
 adviser, Yakoob Beg, was deaf to all entreaty. The en- 
 terprise they had embarked on must be continued to 
 the bitter end. They could not think of returning to 
 Khokand with nothing accomplished, with the stigma 
 attaching to them of a retreat when there had been 
 no foe. Sadie Beg could not but submit with the best 
 grace possible ; and Buzurg Khan was accordingly 
 placed on the throne of his ancestors. 
 
 In his " orda " or palace he administered justice and 
 received the congratulations of his own followers and 
 of the Andijani townspeople. The court rules were 
 drawn up on the model of those in use in Khokand, 
 and while the expedition had but established itself, in 
 an uncertain manner, in one city it was thought neces- 
 sary that etiquette should be as strictly defined and 
 enforced as if all this were taking place in a brilliant 
 and luxurious capital. In a few days Sadie Beg, on 
 finding that he played but a secondary part, revolted, 
 and set himself up as ruler at Yangy Hissar. It was 
 
104 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 now that Yakoob Beg came to the front, and assumed 
 the control of affairs until the fall of the contemptible 
 Buzurg. With great difficulty after the desertion of 
 their Kirghiz allies was a force of 3,000 men collected 
 around the new Khqja in Kashgar. Sadie Beg ad- 
 vanced on the capital with a much larger army, and 
 Yakoob Beg had for a time to remain on the defensive. 
 Each day, however, brought in recruits to his camp, 
 while, the army of the Kirghiz leader presenting no 
 object of sympathy to the people, his rival's remained 
 stationary, if it did not decrease. An encounter at 
 last commenced between the two forces which was 
 made general by the intrepidity of Abdulla. The 
 Kirghiz levies of Sadie were unable to withstand the 
 vigorous charges that were led against them, and broke 
 after a short combat into headlong flight. In the 
 mountains the Kirghiz gathered around their chieftain 
 in force, and, hovering on the northern districts of 
 Kashgar, presented a danger that must be removed by 
 Yakoob Be^ before he could advance farther. His 
 
 o 
 
 troops were therefore directed to proceed against the 
 Kirghiz in their fastnesses, and it was not long before 
 the Kirghiz, driven into a corner, turned at bay on their 
 pursuer. The forces on either side were about equal, 
 some 5,000 men in either army. But, as is customary 
 in the East, the Kirghiz army put forth a champion, 
 Suranchi by name, who had obtained great renown for 
 his extraordinary height and strength. The challenge 
 did not remain unanswered, for Abdulla stepped forward 
 to the encounter. The fight, though furious, was short, 
 and the smaller Khokandian warrior was victorious over 
 his more ponderous antagonist. The Kirghiz power 
 after this reverse was broken up, and Sadie Beg took 
 refuge with Alim Kuli at Tashkent. Yakoob Beg's 
 first campaign against the Kirghiz, who had sworn 
 alliance with him, and by whose invitation he was pre- 
 sent in Kashgar, had thus ended victoriously, and he 
 was now able to resume the main purpose of conquering 
 
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR. 105 
 
 Kashgar. Having rendered Kashgar secure from sur- 
 prise on the north, and leaving a force to maintain their 
 hold on it, and to keep in check the Khitay garrison, 
 Buzurg and Yakoob proceeded south to occupy Yangy 
 Hissar. The town was occupied without difficulty, but 
 an attempt to storm the citadel in which the Khitay 
 had taken refuge was repulsed with loss. Sending 
 Buzurg Khan back to Kashgar, Yakoob Beg resolved 
 to go on to Yarkand and endeavour to bring that city 
 under their immediate influence. 
 
 At this period he loudly proclaimed that there should 
 be no differences among the Tungani, or Mahomedans, 
 in their war with the Buddhists, and that Khojas and 
 Tungani had but one interest in common. As we 
 have seen, the Tungan disturbances broke out first in 
 Yarkand of any city of Altyshahr, and accordingly an 
 earlier settlement founded on a compromise had been 
 attained there, than was the case in its northern 
 neighbours, Kashgar and Yangy Hissar, where an 
 ambitious Kirghiz chief had sought to carve a 
 kingdom for himself. After Abderrahman Khoja had 
 been made king or ruler in Yarkand, and after the 
 Khitay had been destroyed with their citadel, a fresh 
 arrangement was agreed upon between the Tungani 
 and the Khoja party. By its terms the Tungani 
 maintained possession of the citadel, and the Khojas 
 held jurisdiction in the city. Neither of them would be 
 disposed to view with any friendly eye the appearance 
 of a claimant to supremacy in the person of a Khoja 
 sovereign of the whole country, and it was as the repre- 
 sentative of such a person that Yakoob Beg resolved to 
 visit Yarkand. His march was delayed as much as 
 possible, and it was not without some difficulty that he 
 at last obtained admittance with his small following 
 into the city. Yakoob Beg was naturally incensed at 
 this inimical treatment from his fellow-religionists, and 
 he soon set himself to the task of humbling the 
 dominant Khojas of Yarkand. During a street riot 
 
106 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 that was probably instigated by the wily Khokandian, 
 the leading Khojas were seized, and their followers 
 expelled from the city. With a force of only a few- 
 hundred men, Yakoob Beg had established himself as 
 master in the largest city of the country ; his success 
 on this occasion was very temporary. As ill fortune 
 would have it for him, a fresh army of 2,000 men from 
 Kucha had arrived at Tagharchi, and, there joined by 
 the forces from Yarkand and the neighbourhood, pre- 
 sented a very formidable appearance. They marched 
 on the city at once with complete confidence in their 
 superior numbers, and Yakoob Beg, always in favour of 
 the boldest course, marched out to meet them. In a 
 skirmish, however, the detachment under Abdulla was 
 badly cut up owing to the rashness of that officer, and 
 Yakoob Beg at once recognized the necessity for a 
 prompt retreat. During the following night he made 
 a forced march and arrived the next day at Yangy Hissar 
 with no very great loss in men, but without any baggage 
 whatever. The enterprise to Yarkand then appeared 
 in its true light as a rash venture. 
 
 The Khitay in the fort of Yangy Hissar still held 
 out, and Yakoob Beg resolved to overcome them before 
 he attempted any fresh enterprise. He called up 
 reinforcements from Kashgar, and pressed the siege 
 with renewed vigour, and after strictly environing it for 
 forty days the garrison surrendered. Although Yakoob 
 Beg himself seemed desirous of showing moderation to 
 the prisoners, more than 2,000 Chinese were massacred. 
 During all these petty events, which had not produced 
 even the results of past Khoja enterprises, there had 
 been discontent and division within, as well as op- 
 position from without. At this time a fresh danger 
 was appearing on the horizon. A Badakshi army was 
 advancing with hostile intent on Sirikul, and although 
 Yakoob Beg disregarded its approach while he pressed 
 on the works against the citadel of Yangy Hissar, when 
 that fort fell it attracted his attention once more. The 
 
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR. 107 
 
 Khitay garrison in the Yangyshahr of Kashgar was 
 also a source of danger to the newly founded dynasty, 
 and, although its inactivity had continued for a long 
 period, it was uncertain at what moment it might pass 
 off. We can only account for the extraordinary lethargy 
 of the Chinese commander by supposing that he was in 
 complete ignorance of what was passing in the country. 
 At many moments it must seem to an observer of the 
 facts that the Chinese governor, who had under him 6,000 
 or 7,000 disciplined troops, could have crushed all the 
 opposition of such heterogeneous crowds as those fighting 
 under or against Yakoob Beg were up to this time. 
 With the destruction of the Yangy Hissar garrison the 
 prospects of Yakoob Beg greatly improved, and less op- 
 portunity was left to the Chinese governor for assuming 
 the offensive, than when he possessed an ally in so close a 
 position as Yangy Hissar. Yakoob Beg also resolved to 
 press the Khitay still more in this their last strong- 
 hold, and before he encountered other opponents to 
 crush the Khitay, as he already had the Kirghiz. 
 At this point Sadie Beg reappears in Kashgar at the 
 head of a Kirghiz force to oppose Yakoob Beg, and for 
 a moment it seemed as if he were to have better fortune 
 on this occasion. But Abdulla, the most trusted as 
 well as the most courageous of Yakoob Beg's lieutenants, 
 collected such forces as he could, boldly threw himself 
 in his path, and, having routed Sadie in a sanguinary 
 engagement, prepared to press that unfortunate chieftain 
 into flight or ruin. Yakoob Beg, in want of allies and 
 soldiers however, interfered and suggested an alliance 
 instead of a war a outrance. The thwarted Sadie was 
 only too glad to get off on such favourable terms, and 
 joined his forces to those of his late enemy now 
 besieging the Khitay with renewed vigour. This 
 merciful termination of a difficulty, that might have 
 become serious had it not been cured in time, was a 
 performance very creditable in a diplomatic sense to 
 Yakoob Beg. In a small way it may be compared with 
 
108 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Frederick the Great's action at Pirna, where he receive< 
 the services of 40,000 Saxon troops. But, perhaps, still 
 more remarkable was the manner in which Yakoob Beg 
 averted the danger from the Badakshi army. The 
 Badakshi, like their kinsmen the Afghans, may be con- 
 sidered, cceteris paribus, to be superior soldiers, on account 
 of their larger build and more active habits, to other 
 Asiatics, so that Yakoob Beg with his half-disciplined 
 followers would have had some difficulty and must have 
 incurred considerable loss in overcoming these new in- 
 vaders. He made overtures to them, and the Badakshi, 
 seeing that he was likely to give them exciting and 
 profitable employment, entered into negotiations with 
 him. The result was that they took service under him ; 
 and Yakoob Beg for the first time found himself at the 
 head of a large army, composed of Khokand, Kashgar, 
 Kirghiz, and Badakshan levies. It was fortunate for 
 himself that he had been able to arrange his affairs so 
 satisfactorily, for a fresh danger was approaching from 
 the east. 
 
 The reader may have observed that we have said little 
 of Buzurg Khan during the operations of the campaign 
 up to this point. Indeed, there is little or nothing 
 to say of the movements of that prince, for he had 
 been mainly stationary at Kashgar, where he passed 
 his time in his harem, or besotted under the use of 
 drugs. Yakoob Beg had from the very commencement 
 come to the front as responsible chief, and as events 
 progressed the people and the army came to look upon 
 him as their future ruler. But Yakoob Beg, it would 
 seem, was really in earnest in supporting the Khoja 
 prince, for on several occasions not only did he give 
 Buzurg the most salutary advice, but he also compelled 
 him to take an active part in the public business. Such 
 fits of action were most distasteful to the effeminate 
 prince, and he always returned with renewed zest to 
 the illicit pleasures in which he indulged. One of the 
 occasions on which Yakoob Beg endeavoured to instil 
 
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR. 109 
 
 into his sovereign some idea of the responsibilities of 
 his office was this invasion by the Khoja-Tungani power 
 of Altyshahr. Early in the summer a large force, esti- 
 mated at 40,000 men, collected by the cities of Aksu, 
 Kucha, and Turf an, appeared at Maralbashi, whence 
 it equally threatened Kashgar or protected Yarkand. 
 Yakoob Beg's utmost efforts, if we are to credit the 
 native report, only availed to bring some 2,500 men into 
 the field; but it is more reasonable to suppose, that, 
 with his Kirghiz, Kipchak, and Badakshi auxiliaries, 
 he had many more troops under him, perhaps 12,500 
 instead of 2,500 men. Be the exact numbers of the 
 forces what they may, however, it is certain that he 
 was greatly outnumbered by the invader, and that the 
 diverse elements of his army detracted very much from 
 its effective strength. The Tungan army advanced from 
 Maralbashi on Yangy Hissar, where Yakoob Beg had 
 concentrated his army. He had drawn Buzurg Khan 
 and such of the court followers as he could from their 
 ignominious inaction in the capital to encounter the 
 dangers and risks of a field of battle. Both sides were 
 eager for the encounter, which took place in the 
 neighbourhood of Yangy Hissar. The tactical disposi- 
 tion made by Yakoob Beg of his forces was such as 
 would command the approval of skilled officers, and, 
 having done all that mortal man could do to insure the 
 result, he commended himself and his cause to Allah. 
 The battle was long and stoutly contested. During 
 hours it was impossible to say to which side the balance 
 of victory was inclining ; at last the Kirghiz troops, 
 half-hearted in their fighting, were driven from the field, 
 and the Badakshi division, which had up to that 
 moment stubbornly held its ground, immediately 
 followed the shameful example thus set it. There now 
 only remained the division under the immediate orders 
 of Yakoob Beg to withstand the onset of a whole army 
 victorious in two different quarters of the field. The 
 situation, on which the fate of the whole enterprise 
 
110 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 depended, might have filled the boldest heart with 
 momentary despair. Yakoob Beg had, however, so 
 braced himself to the effort, that no more than ordinary 
 emotion was permitted to betray the disturbed mind 
 within, and with the exclamation that " Victory is the 
 gift of God," he inspired his soldiery to continue the 
 fight throughout the afternoon. The enemy, dismayed 
 at the dauntless courage shown by this mere handful of 
 men, and having incurred great loss in his effort to 
 crush them, drew off his weakened forces towards 
 evening ; and Yakoob Beg, boldly seizing the opportu- 
 nity for assuming the offensive, drove them from the 
 field in disorder and with considerable loss. In addition 
 to the loss in killed and wounded, more than 1,000 
 Tungan soldiers enlisted under the standard of Yakoob 
 Beg, and that general found himself on the morrow of 
 one of his greatest battles, with a greater force under 
 his command than he had just before it commenced. 
 This great triumph gave fresh lustre to the Khoja 
 family, and redounded to the military renown of 
 Yakoob Beg. Nor should it be forgotton that on this 
 occasion he showed that he possessed, besides military 
 genius of some merit, qualities of an estimable character. 
 For the first time in the annals of these wars the 
 prisoners were treated with some consideration. For 
 some reason or other this victory was not followed up, 
 and the defeated Kucha army retired on Maralbashi, 
 which it continued to hold for some months longer. 
 The indirect results of this victory were scarcely less 
 important, however, than the immediate and direct con- 
 sequences of it. 
 
 Buzurg Khan, who had been present at this battle, 
 was among the first to seek refuge in flight ; and when 
 he received intelligence of the final success his satisfac- 
 tion was almost eclipsed by his personal chagrin and 
 mortification. Up to this event he had been content to 
 let Yakoob Beg act the king so long as he could indulge 
 undisturbed in his debaucheries ; but from this date 
 
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR. Ill 
 
 there became mingled with, his wounded vanity a con- 
 viction that Yakoob Beg was becoming so powerful and 
 so popular that he might prove a dangerous subject. 
 The weak-minded prince then permitted himself to be 
 made the tool of every rival that the success of Yakoob 
 Beg had raised up for himself either in the court or in 
 the camp, and listened to tales brought him of his lieu- 
 tenant's plots, when the conspirators most to be feared 
 by himself were the ambitious chieftains in whose power 
 he was placing his person and his crown. After the 
 defeat of the Kucha army, the ruling parties in Yar- 
 kand thought it would be wise to come to terms with 
 their victorious and aggressive neighbour, and accord- 
 ingly an embassy was despatched to Yangy Hissar by 
 the Khojas of Yarkand to tender their submission to the 
 sovereign of Kashgar, and to ask to be favoured by the 
 nomination of a city governor, who would be agreeable 
 to Buzurg Khan and his vizier, Yakoob Beg. It is 
 suggestive to watch how the name of the vizier occupies 
 almost as prominent place in all their addresses as that 
 of his master. The Tungan governor in the Yarkand 
 Yangyshahr, not to be behindhand in his worship of 
 the rising sun, immediately sent a similar expression of 
 obedience to Kashgar. 
 
 The course of events once more takes us back to 
 Kashgar, where the Chinese still held the citadel against 
 all comers. But with each fresh success of Yakoob Beg 
 over his numerous opponents, and with the spread of 
 the Tungan power into Jungaria, hope almost com- 
 pletely deserted the unfortunate Khitay, who, in this 
 solitary fort, alone maintained the name of Chinese 
 authority. Treason, within the walls, was now to aid 
 the efforts from without. Kho Dalay, the superior 
 officer in the citadel, although not the commandant, 
 came to an arrangement with Yakoob Beg, by which 
 honourable terms were conceded to the garrison ; and 
 3,000 Khitay troops surrendered and settled in Kash- 
 gar. They were required to acknowledge formally the 
 
112 YAKOOB EEG. 
 
 supremacy of the Khoja, and to make a profession of 
 Islamism. But they were never really interfered with 
 in the observance of their own rites among themselves, 
 and had nothing to complain of in their duty. They 
 were called after their recantation " Yangy Mussulmans," 
 or " New Mussulmans." These were the last Khitay 
 troops who surrendered to the new conquerors, and with 
 them every vestige of Chinese authority disappeared 
 from every part of Jungaria and Eastern Turkestan. 
 Even among this garrison, reduced by a long siege and 
 its attendant deprivations to despair, there was a small 
 minority who preferred death to the dishonour involved 
 in surrender. Chang Tay, the commandant, refused to 
 be any party to the arrangement made between Klio 
 Dalay and Yakoob Beg. When the day approached 
 for the entry of the Kashgarian army, this resolute 
 Amban withdrew to his palace, and having collected his 
 family and dependents around him blew them all up 
 with the explosion of a mine that he had constructed 
 underneath. In the confusion that arose from this 
 incident, the enemy broke into the fort, and it was not 
 for some hours that Yakoob Beg succeeded in obtaining 
 control over them once more. During that interval of 
 insubordination many Khitay were murdered, but not 
 without resistance. Kho Dalay and almost 3,000 men 
 remained to take service in the conquering army, as 
 already explained. The new alliance was cemented by 
 the marriage of Yakoob Beg to the beautiful daughter 
 of Kho Dalay, by whom he has had several children, 
 too young as yet to take any part in public affairs. 
 Perhaps Yakoob Beg's moderation to the Khitay is to 
 be explained by this circumstance, and it is certain that 
 down to the very end his Khitay wife exercised great 
 influence over her husband. 
 
 This was in September, 1865, nine months after his 
 first arrival in Altyshahr, and in that period he had 
 worked, if not very rapidly, with considerable thorough- 
 ness. The Khitay destroyed, the Kirghiz subdued, 
 
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR. 113 
 
 and the Tungan influence cheeked in its aggression 
 against Western Kashgar, such was the tale of his 
 achievements. Several battles and sieges successfully 
 brought to an issue, and a numerous army formed 
 out of the diverse fragments of conquered and con- 
 querors. Personally, too, Yakoob Beg had done 
 much towards preparing the public mind for the as- 
 sumption of power by himself, and the reigning chief 
 had done still more by his neglect of duty and aban- 
 donment to pleasure. Buzurg Khan might stand for 
 the typical roi faineant, and Yakoob Beg was a more 
 than ordinarily resolute and determined maire du palais. 
 The citadel of Kashgar had not long surrendered 
 when messengers arrived, reporting the near approach 
 of a large body of men from Khokand, but who they 
 were, or with what intention they came, none knew. 
 These were the unsuccessful conspirators against Khu- 
 dayar Khan, who, after the death of Alim Kuli, had ob- 
 tained his power once more; and these having been driven 
 out of Khokand by his armies, were compelled to seek 
 refuge in Kashgar. Yakoob Beg sent them the laconic 
 message, while they were hovering on the frontier, that 
 " if they came as friends, they were welcome ; if as foes, 
 he was ready to fight them/' Until the arrival of this 
 declaration there appears to have been some hesitation 
 among the Khokandians what to do, as some were wish- 
 ing to attempt the conquest of Kashgar in their own 
 interests ; but when so clear a statement was sent 
 them by Yakoob Beg, and when they learnt more 
 definitely of the permanence of his success, they 
 threw off their reserve and joined the confederacy of 
 Kashgar. In the meanwhile fresh disturbances were 
 breaking out in Yarkand, and thither he proceeded in 
 the later months of 1865 to quell them, taking Buzurg 
 Khan with him. On his arrival before the town both 
 the Khojas and the Tungani hastened to profess the 
 greatest desire to fulfil his wishes, although they kept 
 him outside their gates. It is probable that neither 
 
114 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 party could have offered any prolonged resistance to 
 him, had they not been encouraged to do so by 
 Buzurg Khan. That prince had for some time been 
 fretting against the iron will of his lieutenant, and, now, 
 in an ilL humour at being carried from his amusements 
 and idleness at Kashgar to suffer the deprivations of a 
 camp life before Yarkand, broke loose from all control, and 
 plotted in his own camp, and in the enemy's, to free him- 
 self from his troublesome general. The plot among the 
 Tungan soldiery had assumed alarming proportions, and 
 all was ready to put an end to the career of Yakoob, 
 when it was fortunately discovered by his faithful friend 
 Abdulla. Precautions were taken, and the plot in the 
 camp was effectually thwarted ; but Yakoob Beg was 
 not strong enough then to show his resentment. This 
 danger was only removed to give place to another. The 
 Tungani soldiers in Yakoob's service now opened up com- 
 munications with their kinsmen in the Yangy-Shahr, 
 and they formed the following plan to destroy the re- 
 maining portion of the Kashgarian forces. The garrison 
 was to simulate a desire to yield into the hands of Yakoob 
 Beg both their own persons and the fort, and when he, 
 unsuspecting any covert design, should be lulled into a 
 false sense of security, the Tungani in his service could 
 join the Tungani in the fort in making a night attack 
 on the other forces. The plan promised well. Yakoob 
 Beg was deceived by the friendly overtures of the Tun- 
 gani, and relaxed his precautions, and, during the 
 night that was to precede the surrender of the Tungani, 
 the conspirators marched out of the fort, and being 
 joined, as had been arranged, by the other confederates, 
 surprised Yakoob Beg and his immediate followers. 
 A desperate resistance was offered by the half-armed 
 men, but the Tungani were victorious, and Yakoob Beg 
 had much difficulty in collecting around him on the 
 morrow a few hundred soldiers. Among those, how- 
 ever, was Abdulla and some of his more trusted com- 
 panions. The Kirghiz under Sadie Beg could not 
 
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR. 115 
 
 be trusted, and it seemed that that chief was still in- 
 clined to play for his own hand. At this, the most 
 critical period of his life, Yakoob Beg's tact and resolu- 
 tion were most conspicuous. When he was surrounded 
 on every hand by hostile factions, and could count on 
 the fidelity of scarce five hundred men, he triumphed 
 over every obstacle, and rose omnipotent over the petty 
 jealousies and dissensions of those who sought to crush 
 him. Buzurg Khan seized the moment of this disaster 
 to draw off into a separate camp with a large body of 
 troops and all the Kirghiz, and it is very possible, as 
 has been asserted, that he instigated the successful 
 Tungan coup. There is no evidence that he did, and I am 
 personally of opinion that it originated among the Tun- 
 gani themselves, and that Buzurg Khan only rejoiced at 
 its occurrence, as he would have done at any other 
 reverse to Yakoob. The position now was as follows : 
 In the citadel were the victorious Tungani, and in the 
 town they shared the distribution of power with the 
 townspeople. Outside in one part was Buzurg Khan, 
 with a force that was equivocal in its sympathies, and 
 that might at any moment become hostile, to Yakoob 
 Beg ; and in another part was Yakoob Beg himself and 
 his attenuated following. Affairs could not look less 
 hopeful, and if the three parties could have accommo- 
 dated their own differences for but the short space of 
 twenty-four hours, Yakoob Beg must infallibly have 
 been destroyed: as it was, they did nothing with an 
 enemy like Yakoob Beg in their proximity, and permitted 
 him to redeem all he had lost by his too great credulity 
 in the good faith of his brother Mussulmans. Let us 
 now see how he saved himself. The first point to do 
 was to restore the courage and self-confidence of his own 
 soldiers, and to do that, it was necessary to strike a 
 sharp blow that was sure of success. The fort could not 
 be taken by a coup de main, but the city, large and strag- 
 gling, presented a more inviting aspect for such an 
 attempt. Abdulla, the Murat of the army of Kashgar, 
 
116 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 with the most determined intrepidity, carried it hy 
 assault, although here again he attacked without awaiting 
 the arrival of the other contingents. Like Edward Bruce, 
 
 " Such was his wonted reckless mood, 
 Yet desperate valour oft made good, 
 Even by its daring, venture rude, 
 Where prudence might have failed." 
 
 This achievement put an end to the rejoicings among 
 the Tungani, and compelled them to recognize what a ter- 
 ribly energetic and enterprising foe they had to deal with. 
 But, at this moment, a severe mishap occurred which 
 almost neutralized the advantage thus gained. Buzurg 
 Khan, unable either to crush Yakoob Beg or to enjoy 
 the indulgences to which he had enslaved himself, re- 
 solved to secure the latter, happen what might. He 
 accordingly fled from Yarkand with many followers, 
 and retired to his palace at Kashgar. There, not content 
 with pillaging the palace of Yakoob Beg, he proclaimed 
 him a traitor and rebel, and offered a reward to whom- 
 soever should bring him his head. Another general 
 was appointed to the command of the army, and pre- 
 parations were made for defending Kashgar against any 
 attempt of Yakoob Beg to attack it. But fortunately 
 the Tungani in the citadel of Yarkand were not aware 
 of this dissension among the Kashgari, and as they were 
 struck with admiration for the valour of Yakoob Beg, they 
 surrendered to him soon after the flight of Buzurg. He 
 was then able to turn his undivided attention to his 
 refractory chief. Yakoob Beg had always, as we have said, 
 befriended the church ; he was now to experience some 
 benefit for that very commendable respect. Among the 
 first means of crushing Yakoob Beg that Buzurg Khan had 
 employed was an appeal to the Sheikh-ul-islam of Kash- 
 gar to proclaim his Baturbashi outside the pale of the 
 law. This the ecclesiastic refused to do, and asserted, on 
 the contrary, that Yakoob Beg had deserved well both 
 of his country and of the Mahomedan world. Foiled in 
 his effort to stir up a religious feeling against his general, 
 
THE INVASION OF KASHGAR. 117 
 
 Buzurg Khan was reduced to the more cogent, but in 
 his hands quite useless, argument of the sword. Nor 
 was the field, limited as it must appear to us, free from 
 other pretenders. Sadie Beg, instead of coalescing with 
 Buzurg Khan, set up his own pretensions to rule the 
 country ; and the Kucha Khojas and Tungani began to 
 collect troops in view of possible eventualities. 
 
 The army of Buzurg Khan, which had marched out 
 to oppose the entry of Yakoob Beg, was outflanked and 
 defeated by Abdulla in the country between Yangy 
 Hissar and the capital ; and Yakoob Beg, pressing on 
 with irresistible strides, was received in Kashgar with 
 the acclamations of the people and of his soldiers. He 
 was then publicly proclaimed ruler, and his friend the 
 Sheikh-ul-islam ratified the people's choice. Buzurg 
 Khan, who had taken refuge in the Yangy-Shahr, was 
 seized in his palace there, after a very slight resistance. 
 Some of the more prominent of Yakoob Beg's rivals 
 were executed, and Buzurg Khan himself was placed in 
 a state of honourable confinement. He still persisted in 
 futile intrigues, and so long as he remained in Kashgar 
 was a source of endless trouble to the new government. 
 For more than eighteen months he was permitted to re- 
 main however, and then, being detected in instigating 
 the murder of Yakoob Beg, was banished to Tibet. 
 After wandering for some years, he found his way to 
 Khokand, where he is believed to be still residing with a 
 large family. He may be considered to have been the last 
 Khoja prince ruling Kashgar, for it is scarcely probable 
 that, in any future settlement of that country, a restoration 
 of the old reigning family will be supported by any one. 
 He is no exaggerated type of the rule among Central 
 Asian despots, who present to our gaze a long series of 
 petty tyrants and debauchees, until for a few years they 
 are displaced by a successful soldier such as the Athalik 
 Ghazi, or by a skilful minister such as Mussulman Kuli 
 was in Khokand. 
 
 The Kirghiz chief, Sadie Beg, did not long hold out 
 
118 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 against the consolidated power of Yakoob Beg ; and the 
 Kucha movements were suspended. In a little more 
 than twelve months Yakoob Beg had occupied Kash- 
 gar, Yangy Hissar, and Yarkand. Sirikul and Khoten 
 also acknowledged his rule ; but his further operations 
 against them will be narrated by-and-by. He felt now 
 so secure in his seat that he permitted the Badakshi 
 contingent to return home, presenting each soldier 
 with a large present. Ever since that time Yakoob 
 Beg seems to have maintained some influence in Badak- 
 shan, and to have been inclined on several occasions 
 to compete with Shere Ali of Afghanistan for the pos- 
 session of that province. His ambition was never 
 fully revealed in this quarter; but it is certain that 
 Shere Ali regarded him with scarcely concealed sus- 
 picion and dislike. 
 
 With the assumption of personal power by Yakoob 
 Beg, on the deposition of the Khoja Buzurg Khan, the 
 first part of the enterprise undertaken in the later days 
 of 1864 was brought to a termination. In the more 
 extended operations of Yakoob Beg against the Tun- 
 gani and Khoten, may be perceived the effects of events 
 outside his immediate sphere upon this energetic ruler, 
 who, until his last years, never realized the strength 
 of the Eussians, and who had, up to the year 1870 
 when Kuldja was occupied, convinced himself that he 
 could retard the progress of the great Northern power. 
 It was that idea, besides a thirst for military renown 
 and excitement, that urged him on to the construction 
 of what he fondly believed might prove a formidable 
 and extensive state. As ruler of Kashgar, he could 
 not be anything but a kind of vassal of the Khan of 
 Khokand ; as monarch of Eastern Turkestan, he might 
 treat on terms of equality with the Czar of Eussia or 
 the Emperor of China. It was no unworthy ambition, 
 and Yakoob Beg, created Athalik Grhazi, Champion 
 Father, in 1866 by the Ameer of Bokhara, accom- 
 plished so much of it as was possible. 
 
119 
 
 CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 WARS WITH THE TUNGANI. 
 
 YAKOOB BEG, having deposed Buzurg Khan and sup- 
 pressed all resistance on the part either of the Tungani 
 or of the Chinese in Western Kashgar, had some leisure 
 to make a careful survey of his exact position. The 
 result of the desultory fighting of the previous twelve 
 months had been eminently satisfactory to himself; 
 but, to say the least, it was dubious how long this 
 state of things might last. Former adventurers had 
 accomplished as much as he had, but the Chinese 
 had always returned with renewed vigour. How was 
 Yakoob Beg to know that the rumours were well 
 founded which asserted that that empire had been sore 
 stricken in other fields than against the Tungani, and 
 that even the victories over the Taepings were not con- 
 sidered a complete set- off to the disasters in every other 
 quarter of the empire? European critics predicted 
 that the last hour of the Chinese Empire was fast ap- 
 proaching; but Yakoob Beg, with far more imperfect 
 means of intelligence at his disposal, feared still, even 
 when the citadel of Kashgar surrendered, that the 
 Khitay would return for revenge. His fears were not 
 groundless, as we now know, but he anticipated events 
 by more than ten years. Yakoob Beg was not so san- 
 guine in his own resources or good fortune that he 
 believed that he should not have to encounter the 
 danger that had overwhelmed all his predecessors, and 
 his first object accordingly was to gather all his 
 strength together in a compact mass to resist the 
 Chinese when they should come. But the dissensions 
 
120 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 that had, during the conquest of Altyshahr, manifested 
 themselves so palpably in the ill-assorted conglomera- 
 tion which had gathered round the standard of JBuzurg 
 Khan brought home to the mind of Yakoob Beg the 
 disadvantages of a divided people. He accordingly 
 determined that, whatever else he might fail or suc- 
 ceed in achieving, his most resolute effort should be to 
 weld into one cohesive and effective whole Andijani 
 and Tungani, Kashgari and Khitay. It was no mean 
 ambition; but to cement such discordant elements 
 a policy of " blood and iron " was required. Yakoob 
 Beg did not shrink certainly in its application; but 
 when he had accomplished the task he had set himself to 
 bring about he discovered that the cost had been so great 
 that the state, both in population and in wealth, was 
 at a lower point than it had ever been before. But in 
 the earlier days of 18G6 no doubt crossed his mind on 
 this latter point. It must be remembered that, strange 
 to say, the great success of Yakoob Beg in Kashgar 
 had alienated the sympathy of the government of Klio- 
 kand from his cause ; and, although this may be ex- 
 plained by the antipathy of Khudayar Khan, now 
 firmly seated on the throne, who could not entertain 
 any amity for a subject who had on several occasions de- 
 serted his cause, it is impossible to attribute to that senti- 
 ment alone a fact which must have had some deeper and 
 less personal explanation. At all stages of the history 
 of these petty princes of Asia are we met by the spec- 
 tacle of mutual jealousy and recrimination, whenever 
 any one of themselves seemed about to exalt himself 
 above his fellows, either by the success of his arms or 
 by the beneficence of his rule. Earely, indeed, had 
 any of them shown that he possessed more than ordi- 
 nary ability or courage ; but, whenever the phenomenon 
 did appear, he was at once proclaimed by his neigh- 
 bours to be a dangerous innovation, and as such to be 
 thwarted and opposed. The practice has come down 
 to our own day, and during the long wars that Eussia 
 
WARS WITH THE TUNGANT. 121 
 
 has waged in Asia we have never beheld two states, no 
 matter how insignificant, combine to oppose the common 
 foe. The Khokandians have never aided the Bokha- 
 riots or the Khivans, nor have the Afghans or the 
 Kashgari the Khokandians. They have kept the ring, 
 so to speak, as each of them has gone down singly 
 before the prowess of the Muscovite, in a manner that 
 ought to excite the admiration of all those who pre- 
 serve the memories of the traditional honours of the 
 prize ring ; but, as their own existence has been the 
 penalty, it is questionable whether their conduct, in- 
 spired by regard for no law of chivalry, but simply by 
 mutual antipathy, has been very prudent. Over such 
 petty jealousies had Yakoob Beg to triumph before he 
 could hope to complete his dream of an united Kashgaria. 
 His path was beset with difficulties. In satisfying him- 
 self with too little he might imperil what he had secured, 
 but in attempting too much he might jeopardize every- 
 thing he had won. Under such circumstances the bold- 
 est man might have stood uncertain, and the most reso- 
 lute inactive until hurried into action by the progress 
 of events. For some months Yakoob Beg seems to 
 have remained uncertain what should be his next move. 
 In 1865, before his last advance on Yarkand, he had 
 seized Maralbashi or Bartchuk, and by so doing not only 
 had he secured communication between Aksu and Yar- 
 kand, but also between Aksu and Khoten. This position, 
 lying 200 miles to the east of Yangy Hissar, has always 
 been and is still very important, and Yakoob Beg is 
 supposed to have fortified it very strongly. This success 
 was the permanent result of his great victory over the 
 Tungani from Aksu and Kucha in the neighbourhood 
 of Yangy Hissar, and it effectually secured his flank 
 during further operations. It was not, however, until he 
 turned his attention to the southern city of Khoten, 
 that the importance of this acquisition was made incon- 
 testable. Then it enabled him to devote his attention 
 exclusively to the extension of his sway southward to 
 
122 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 the mountains of Karakoram and Kuen Lun, beyond 
 which he might expect no enemy. In Khoten the Mufti 
 Habitulla had been invested with supreme control, after 
 the deposition of the Chinese authorities ; and during 
 his government of the city and district, order appears 
 to have been maintained without unnecessary exactions. 
 When YakoobBeg made his first appearance in Yarkand, 
 after his earlier successes round Kashgar, it will be re- 
 membered that the Yarkandi acknowledged the supre- 
 macy of the new Khoja king. Their example was 
 speedily followed by Habitulla of Khoten, and it is not 
 stated that, even during the progress of hostilities with 
 Yarkand, this ruler repudiated the arrangement into 
 which he had entered. It is true that he was far removed 
 from the immediate sphere of action, but that will not 
 alone account for an indifference to the progress of events 
 in Kashgar, which Khoten had never manifested on any 
 previous occasion. Khoten may, therefore, be considered 
 to have been exceptionally well behaved towards the new 
 Khoja dynasty located at Kashgar ; and when Yakoob 
 Beg advanced to the south of Yarkand, Habitulla 
 hastened to send representatives to the camp of the 
 conqueror. They were received with consideration, but 
 deep down in the breast of Yakoob Beg there lurked 
 either an inveterate distrust of, or dislike to, the Mufti 
 Habitulla. Dissembling his true feelings, Yakoob Beg 
 sent a message requesting the presence of the Mufti in 
 his camp. The Mufti, deluded by the friendly treatment 
 bestowed on his emissaries, came with many of his 
 relations and followers into the camp of the Kashgarian 
 general. At first, we are told, they were treated with 
 every mark of respect and kindness ; they were feasted 
 and clothed in precious garments, but all these honours 
 were but the preliminaries to the concluding ceremony. 
 During the progress of the evening meal they were 
 disarmed, and led out to execution, while an attack was 
 made from several quarters on the town. Even then 
 the resistance was prolonged, and the slaughter by the 
 
WARS WITH THE TUNGANI. 123 
 
 infuriated soldiery of the Athalik Ghazi continued long 
 after all serious opposition had ceased. It is impossible 
 to exonerate Yakoob Beg from the chief blame on this 
 occasion, and if he had been a civilized European general, 
 we should have made use of the phrase, that " It must 
 ever remain a blot on his career ;" but it would be the 
 height of irony to apply such a phrase to this unscru- 
 pulous Asiatic, who, if not worse than the school in 
 which he was brought up, was certainly not much better 
 in a moral sense. As the fact stands, the seizure of 
 Khoten, and the massacre of the unarmed leaders of that 
 city, appear to have been acts as unnecessary as they 
 were unjustifiable. Khoten may have seemed to the 
 Athalik Ghazi of exceptional importance for several 
 reasons, and he may have felt doubtful of the fidelity 
 of Habitulla and his followers ; but, so far as we are 
 aware, the reasons for this action are shadowy in the ex- 
 treme, even regarded from the point of view of political 
 expediency. Down to the present day, too, the memory 
 of this massacre, needless even in the eyes of a people 
 accustomed to the shortest cuts to power by wholesale 
 slaughter, has rankled in the minds of the inhabitants 
 of Khoten and Sanju, and the Athalik Ghazi was least 
 popular in that part of his state in which, according to 
 the traditions of his predecessors, his action had been 
 most sweeping, and accordingly most safe. This was 
 early in the year 1867, and the Athalik Ghazi had now 
 an opportunity for settling his relationship with his 
 eastern neighbours, the Tungani. 
 
 The Tungan movement proper originated, as ex- 
 plained in the last chapter, in the Chinese provinces of 
 Kansuh and Shensi, and then extended with scarcely a 
 check to Turfan south of the Tian Shan and to Urumtsi 
 north of that range. The flame soon spread from Tur- 
 fan to Karashar, Kucha, and Aksu, and at all of these 
 towns it was fomented by the appearance of the new 
 element of the Mahometan Khokandian, and native 
 settlers, acting in combination with the Chinese Tungani. 
 
124 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 North of the Tian Shan the movement received a tem- 
 porary repulse ; and it is necessary to say something in 
 explanation of the course of the Mahomedan revival in 
 Hi before we proceed to discuss the earlier wars of Ya- 
 koob Beg with the Tungani. As early as 1860 serious 
 complications had arisen in that province, although 
 the Chinese had always been more firmly situated there 
 than in Kashgar. In that year a plot was concocted 
 to murder the Chinese viceroy and to upset the exist- 
 ing government. It was discovered, however, and fell 
 through. There appear to have been more causes at 
 work in Hi to produce discontent than in the southern 
 state, and it was not so much a question here between 
 Khitay and Tungani, as it was between a people cla- 
 mouring for work, for less taxation, and for payment for 
 what they had done, and an administration that was 
 unable to satisfy the demands made upon it from all 
 sides. That last resource of a government at its wits* 
 ends for money, the depreciation of the current coin and 
 the issue of fictitious paper, was adopted by the Viceroy 
 of Hi. The measure, which it had been expected would 
 lessen the difficulty, only added fuel to the flame. The 
 situation of affairs was becoming desperate ; the people 
 were encouraged by the disasters of the Chinese in the 
 neighbouring states to increase the number of their 
 demands ; and the Chinese officials appear to have lost 
 their heads in the storm that was gathering from all sides 
 around them. They were but the effete representatives 
 of a system which in its vigorous days had claims to 
 general admiration, and they are only saved from in- 
 curring our contempt by the possession of courage, the 
 sole virtue left them. When the Chinese first conquered 
 Eastern Turkestan they brought from Kashgar a large 
 number of settlers, and placed them in the country 
 round Hi. They became known as Tarantchis, and, in 
 the course of two or three generations, had increased 
 into a very numerous community. These were always 
 at heart disaffected to the Chinese, but, as they occupied 
 
WARS WITH THE TUNGANI. 125 
 
 a very subordinate position, would probably never have 
 thought of revolt had not a large division of the con- 
 querors set them the example of insubordination. So 
 soon as the discontent among the working classes had 
 assumed formidable proportions by the pecuniary em- 
 barrassment of the Chinese, and the Tungan successes 
 in the east of Jungaria had raised a fanatical feeling to 
 swell the hatred against a declining and Buddhist rule, 
 the Tarantchis were not backward for their part in reviv- 
 ing their almost forgotten grievances, and in joining in a 
 defensive and offensive alliance with the Tungani. Each 
 party collected such forces as they could, but in the 
 encounter that ensued the disciplined soldiers of the 
 Viceroy overcame the far more numerous mob by which 
 they were opposed. The fortress of Bazandai, however, 
 within the next few days, fell into the power of the 
 insurgents, and that achievement more than compen- 
 sated for the disaster in the open field. Hi itself sur- 
 rendered in January, 1866, and a Tungani-Tarantchi 
 government was formed. The Chinese viceroy had 
 in the meanwhile destroyed himself and many of his 
 followers and assailants by setting fire to a mine of 
 gunpowder under his palace. The Tungan element 
 gradually superseded the Tarantchi in the administra- 
 tion of the state, and the five years of independence, 
 which continued until the Eussians came in 1871, were 
 chiefly marked by petty disagreements which had no 
 influence on the progress of events in this part of Asia. 
 The trade with Ili fell off, and many other valid reasons 
 for Eussian intervention were accumulated during those 
 few years of national existence. 
 
 With the beginning of 1867, Yakoob Beg, secure 
 on the south and on the west from aggression, found 
 himself in a position to cope with the disjointed but 
 allied Tungan states on his north and east. The hosti- 
 lity of the Tungani and Khojas of Aksu and Kucha had 
 been already demonstrated, and it was to be surmised 
 that they were only waiting to recover from the disastrous 
 
126 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 campaign of 1865 to renew their efforts to drive the 
 Khokandian adventurers out of Kashgar. The facts 
 that they acknowledged the same religious tenets, and 
 that they had overcome, to some extent, a common 
 enemy in the Chinese, and that they certainly had 
 each to fear most from their return, seem to have 
 weighed little with either the Tungani or the Athalik 
 Ghazi. To do the latter simple justice, it must be 
 remembered that the Tungani had been the aggressors, 
 and that their attitude never ceased to be unfriendly 
 towards himself. It is certain that he made some efforts 
 to effect an amicable arrangement with the ruling party 
 in Aksu, but his advances were received with coldness, 
 and both the Khojas and the Tungani of that city held 
 aloof from all intercourse with the new-comer. Both 
 parties remained watching each other for some time, 
 each waiting for the other to take the initiative. The 
 Tungani had experienced the weight of the military 
 power of Yakoob Beg, when they had taken the offensive 
 in the earlier days of his appearance at Kashgar. It 
 was, therefore, not very probable that they would repeat 
 the experiment when he presented a far more formidable 
 and united presence to their attack. Practically speak- 
 ing, Yakoob Beg was safe from invasion from the east 
 so long as he maintained order within his own frontier; 
 and the Tungani in Hi on his north had manifested no 
 special hostility against his state. Secure from any 
 aggression on the part of the Tungani, Yakoob Beg 
 might with some reason have declined to push to extre- 
 mities his relations with them. It was certainly incon- 
 venient that an antagonistic state should exist on his 
 very borders, but, as he was in a very strong position for 
 defence, the disadvantages of abandoning it to assume 
 an offensive policy were all the more apparent. What 
 necessity could be alleged to justify a scarcely excusable 
 attack in a moral sense, and a quite unnecessary in a 
 political ? The proximity of Aksu was in a strategic 
 sense more than neutralized by the possession of Maral- 
 
WARS WITH THE TUNGANI. 127 
 
 bashi, and, with the lapse of time and the return of 
 peace, the trade route from Kashgar to Aksu might he 
 expected to revive once more. But such temporizing 
 measures as these, involving the endurance of Tungan 
 indifference, could not he "brooked "by the Athalik Grhazi. 
 The orthodoxy of these Mahomedans was not ahove 
 suspicion, and to so devout and energetic a Sunrii as 
 Yakoob Beg these differences were scarcely less offensive 
 than if they had been believers in a rival religion. 
 Dictatorial announcements were made to the Khoja- 
 Tungaii rulers of Aksu; and, on their persisting in 
 defiance, Yakoob Beg collected his forces to chastise 
 them. The doctrines of the Tungani were impeached 
 as not being in strict accordance with the Shariat, and 
 the religious fervour of the Sunnis was appealed to, to 
 bring these recalcitrant people to an acknowledgment 
 of the error of their ways. In addition to the semi- 
 religious element thus imported into the question, 
 Yakoob Beg also laid claim to the country up to Kucha 
 as part of the old territory of the Khoja kings. 
 
 In the spring of 1867 his army set out in two 
 divisions for Aksu. The Tungani appear to have been 
 paralyzed when the danger that had for many months 
 appeared menacing came upon them. The resistance 
 encountered at Aksu, naturally and artificially a very 
 strong place, was not prolonged, and Yakoob Beg swept 
 on against Kucha. Here the Tungani, having some- 
 what recovered from their trepidation, made a desperate 
 stand, and with the reinforcements that had arrived from 
 Turfan presented a sufficiently formidable appearance. 
 The ruling authorities in Kucha were Khojas, who in 
 the time of the Chinese had the custody of a shrine sacred 
 to the memory of a Mahomedan saint, but who at the 
 outbreak of disturbances left the temple for the council 
 chamber, and the offering up of prayers to the memory 
 of the saint for the more difficult task of issuing edicts 
 for the management of a people. Unhappily for their 
 reputation in our eyes, they had specially distinguished 
 
128 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 themselves in the massacres of the Khitay. Their 
 brief tenure of power seems to have been fairly benefi- 
 cent, and, in the lull that succeeded the deposition of 
 the Chinese and preceded the invasion of Yakoob Beg, 
 they obtained without doing anything very noteworthy 
 the approval and affection of their subjects. At Kucha, 
 therefore, more than 500 miles distant from his own 
 capital, with a long line of hostile country in his 
 rear, Yakoob Beg found himself opposed by the full 
 power of the Tungani. Previous to advancing beyond 
 Aksu he had sent back officers to Kashgar to bring up 
 fresh levies, and he had resorted to that doubtful 
 expedient of drafting into his army many of the 
 Tungani captured at Aksu. Arrived in front of Kucha 
 he was unable to prosecute the siege with any vigour 
 until the arrival of his reinforcements. The moment of 
 delay was attempted to be turned to account by Yakoob 
 Beg and some of the more prudent of his counsellors; 
 but the Tungani, whether unwilling to acknowledge 
 their inferiority or incredulous of the good faith of the 
 Athalik Ghazi, refused to enter into negotiations that 
 they asserted were unnecessary. Yakoob Beg had in- 
 vaded them in their possessions, and he had annexed 
 Aksu ; the only condition in which they could acquiesce 
 was a withdrawal of his army. All the efforts of the 
 more peaceful and the more prudent on either side were 
 unavailing, and each party used every exertion to bring 
 up fresh troops to decide the question of superiority be- 
 tween Tungani and Kashgari. For several weeks the 
 two armies stood facing each other, the one stationed on 
 the hills to the north and west of the city, commanding 
 the main road from Aksu, the other in the environs and 
 the fortifications of the city itself. The Tungani were far 
 the more numerous, but in the quality of his main body, 
 and in general efficiency both of weapons and of experi- 
 ence among the officers, the advantage was completely 
 on the side of Yakoob Beg. The nucleus of his force 
 comprised Afghan, Khokandian, and Badakshi troops, 
 
WARS WITH THE TUNGANI. 129 
 
 veterans in the wars of the two previous years. The 
 Timgani were either the assassins of helpless Chinese, or 
 the fugitives of Aksu or Yangy Hissar. They were im- 
 perfectly armed, without any organization, and without 
 any competent leaders. Above all, the cause they were 
 fighting for was vague, and many of them in their 
 hearts sympathized more with Yakoob Beg than they did 
 with their own chiefs. The Kashgarian army, on the 
 other hand, was encouraged by a long series of brilliant 
 achievements, and looked forward with eagerness to the 
 fray as the means of exalting their own religion, and as 
 affording them an opportunity for advancing their own 
 personal interests by the plunder of so rich a city as 
 Kucha. The reinforcements were consequently eagerly 
 expected, and some of the more ardent spirits demanded 
 that they should be led without delay against the enemy. 
 Yakoob Beg was so far prudent that he refused to be 
 urged into premature action by the impetuosity of his 
 followers, and the arrival of reinforcements sooner than 
 was anticipated enabled him not only to keep the ex- 
 citement of his soldiery within due bounds, but also to 
 commence active operations at an earlier date than had 
 seemed possible. The Tungan leaders, deluded by the 
 inaction of Yakoob Beg into a belief that he was unable 
 to prosecute the enterprise he had undertaken, assumed 
 the offensive, only to be worsted in several minor 
 engagements. The Tungan troops were driven within 
 the walls, and the siege was prosecuted with the closest" 
 rigour. The garrison of Kucha was not sufficiently 
 numerous to guard in proper strength the wide- stretch- 
 ing suburbs and extensive fortifications of the existing 
 Kucha, and the cities that had in olden days stood upon 
 its site. Not many days elapsed before Yakoob Beg 
 perceived that the defence was confined to a limited 
 portion of the fortifications, and that several points 
 were entirely neglected. He resolved, therefore, to put 
 an end to the slow process of a siege by carrying the 
 town by a general assault. With the whole of his 
 
130 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 available force he attacked the city on three sides ; but 
 the Tungani resisted strenuously, and all his direct 
 attacks were repulsed with heavy loss. To his son 
 Khooda Kul Beg he had entrusted an attack in the 
 rear of the city, and on the success of that movement 
 now entirely depended the result of the assault on 
 Kucha. That division by great good fortune and the 
 gallantry of its leader was victorious, and, although this 
 promising son of Yakoob Beg, then only a little more 
 than twenty years of age, was killed in the confusion 
 that ensued on the entrance into the city, Kucha fell. 
 The triumph was, perhaps, not too dearly purchased. The 
 Tungan power had received a blow, which took the 
 sting out of its menace, and effectually protected Kashgar 
 from any possible confederacy among the Tungan cities. 
 Yakoob Beg followed up the success of Kucha with all 
 his usual promptitude, but his power was not yet suffi- 
 ciently matured to justify him in carrying on extensive 
 operations at such a distance from the base of his 
 resources. But another reason at this time combined 
 to recall his attention to another part of his dominions. 
 The Russians were advancing both in Khokand and in 
 the district of Vernoe to the west of Kuldja. 
 
 It was evident that prudence demanded a prompt 
 return, and for the present all further triumph must be 
 abandoned. However, before Yakoob Beg returned to 
 regulate events in the western portion of his dominions, 
 he had the satisfaction of receiving the submission 
 humbly tendered by the ruling bodies of Karashar, 
 Turfan, Hamil, and Urumtsi. After this brilliant 
 campaign, he slowly retraced his steps through Kucha 
 to Aksu. Then he turned into the mountains, and 
 reduced Ush Turfan, which in his onward march he 
 had passed by ; and, after this acquisition, the Tungani 
 of Hi expressed a desire to enter into terms of amity 
 with one who had brought his empire into direct con- 
 tact with their state. All these events occurred during 
 the year 1867; and, although now and then uncertain 
 
WARS WITH THE TUNGANI. 131 
 
 rumours readied England of these changes in Eastern 
 Turkestan, the world in general, even the Eussian 
 world, remained indifferent to the progress of events of 
 which it is now difficult to trace the exact course. But, 
 with the close of this first Tungan campaign, and with 
 the extension of the new state up to the walls of Kucha, 
 the Russian Government, as will be seen in a later 
 chapter, endeavoured to arrive at some clear view on 
 the exact condition of the newly formed confederacy to 
 which they in their career of conquest were approaching 
 so rapidly. 
 
 This commencement of foreign interest in, nay, 
 almost supervision of, his actions in Eastern Turkestan, 
 imposed some restriction on the hitherto unrestrained 
 caprice of Yakoob Beg, and the country beyond Kucha 
 up to Turfan was saved for a short time from the 
 depredations from which in 1871-73 it suffered so 
 much. On his return to Kashgar after this triumphant 
 progress, and after having annexed the three important 
 cities, Aksu, Kucha, and Ush Turfan, the danger which 
 had seemed to threaten the state from Eussia passed 
 off, and Yakoob Beg proceeded to consolidate his hold 
 on what he had secured. Aksu and Kucha were forti- 
 fied, and various small forts were constructed in the 
 passes leading to Khokand and Kuldja. Every pre- 
 caution was taken that he had it in his power to observe, 
 to ensure the safety of his little kingdom from without, 
 and for the moment all murmur within seemed to be 
 hushed by the loud acclamations at the victories of the 
 Athalik Ghazi. He had, indeed, accomplished no slight 
 task, and could afford to regard his handiwork with 
 some complacency. To erect a powerful state on the 
 ruins of the Chinese power, and to unite in some sort 
 of settled government turbulent races and antagonistic 
 sects, was no mean achievement ; and to all the credit due 
 to such Yakoob Beg has indisputable claims. But for 
 him, confusion and disunion would have settled down 
 over Eastern Turkestan, until either the Eussians or the 
 
132 TAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Chinese had come to establish a respectable govern- 
 ment ; but for him Kashgar would have lapsed into a 
 state of almost hopeless disorder, and Eussian triumphs 
 would have been facilitated. But, when Yakoob Beg 
 returned to find that he was not seriously threatened in 
 Kashgar, he experienced deep regret and mortification 
 that he had abstained from prosecuting his wars with 
 the Tungani with a greater vigour. He eagerly looked 
 forward to an excuse for resuming his discontinued 
 operations against them. In the interval that elapsed, 
 he waged a small war in the mountainous region of his 
 territory extending into Badakshan and the Chitral. 
 Sirikul had, ever since the appearance of the Badakshi 
 army in the service of Kashgar, acknowledged a certain 
 kind of obedience to Yakoob Beg ; but in 1868, the 
 governor hitherto supported by the Athalik Ghazi 
 broke out into revolt, and committed several acts of 
 depredation in the contiguous districts of Sanju and 
 Yarkand. Yakoob Beg without delay despatched a 
 small force against him, and, by the help of some 
 mountain guns and the judicious employment of a 
 small but select body of cavalry, was successful in over- 
 coming all resistance with very slight loss. In Feb- 
 ruary, 1869, Yakoob Beg, having tried several milder 
 alternatives, formally annexed this district, and carried 
 the inhabitants into Yarkand. He resettled the terri- 
 tory with Kirghiz nomads and Yarkandis. Once more, 
 he was able to turn his attention to the east, and in 
 1S69 commenced those final campaigns against the 
 Tungani which only ceased with the reappearance of 
 the Chinese. The great blot in the career of Yakoob 
 Beg is the resumption of hostilities against the Tun- 
 gani. In 1867, when he first engaged with any vigour 
 the Tungani, some excuse may be found for that un fore- 
 seeing action, in the fact that the Tungani were un- 
 broken, and might have proved formidable neighbours. 
 But in 1869, they had been hurled back on Korla, and, 
 although it may be true that they were inconvenient 
 
WARS WITH THE TUNGANI. 133 
 
 neighbours, robbing caravans and molesting travellers, 
 it is difficult to justify the later campaigns of Yakoob 
 Beg against them, especially as they were conducted by 
 himself and his lieutenants with exceptional ferocity. 
 But, however weak may have been the impulse, and 
 however disastrous in the result may have been his cru- 
 sade against the Tungani, it was not difficult to discover 
 a plausible excuse for proceeding to extreme measures 
 with his troublesome neighbours. In the autumn of 
 1869, Korla fell before his triumphant arms, and it 
 would appear that he then turned north into the valleys 
 of the Tekes and the Yuldus, two rivers rising in the 
 Tian Shan, and flowing through Jungaria. This move- 
 ment aroused the susceptibilities of the Eussiaiis, and 
 afforded a very simple excuse for the acquisition of 
 Kuldja. In that state, disturbances had arisen between 
 the Tungani and the Tarantchis, and it must have fallen 
 an easy prey to the Athalik Ghazi had he been per- 
 mitted to advance. The Russians had, however, in 
 1871, entered Kuldja, and explained their action by 
 asserting that they had only done so to restore order, 
 and to prevent its falling into the hands of Yakoob 
 Beg. They merely held it in trust for the Chinese, so 
 they said, and would restore it to them, its rightful 
 owners, so soon as they should be able to keep per- 
 manent possession of it. While Yakoob Beg despatched 
 a large detachment into the country of the Tian Shan, 
 his main body was prosecuting with vigour the war 
 against Karashar and Turfan. Yakoob Beg did not 
 always conduct the war in person, for his two sons, 
 Kuli Beg and Hacc Kuli Beg, were now growing up, 
 and they, assisted by some- of the older lieutenants, 
 triumphed in various actions over the Tungan rulers of 
 Turfan and Hamil, while even the princes of Urumtsi 
 and Manas over the Tian Shan were unable to oppose 
 the valour and energy of their adversary. The glory 
 of these military achievements was tarnished by the 
 ruthless manner in which the district was laid waste, 
 
134 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 and the inhabitants were massacred ; and the senseless- 
 ness of these proceedings only required an hour of trial, 
 such as the Chinese invasion, to prove how fatal it would 
 be to the enacters of these atrocities. Without any 
 great cessation, their operations were carried on down 
 to the end of 1873, and it does not appear that Yakoob 
 Beg derived any benefit whatever from these costly and 
 remote undertakings. Although the Tungan chiefs of 
 Urumtsi and Hamil were on several occasions defeated 
 by the armies of the Athalik Ghazi, their cities were 
 never occupied, and they consequently escaped that 
 desolation which stretched from the walls of Kucha to 
 the regions north of Lake Lob. Chighfcam, a small town 
 lying half way between Turfan and Hamil, was the 
 extreme point to which the Kashgarian forces pene- 
 trated. The noble families of Urumtsi, Turfan, and 
 Hamil were almost totally destroyed in the fall of 
 Turfan ; and their place in their own cities was seized 
 by Tungan generals and adventurers, who began to 
 retreat westward from Kansuh, on the rumours of 
 Chinese preparations for invading Jungaria. 
 
 The wars against the Tungani certainly served one 
 useful purpose in enabling Yakoob Beg to collect a 
 large and disciplined force round his standard ; but the 
 attractions of service in his army lost much of their 
 value in the eyes of the hardier clans of Turkestan and 
 the neighbouring states, when it became known that 
 the prospect of loot and prize money in districts im- 
 poverished by several years of hostilities had dimin- 
 ished. The rigour of the discipline maintained, too, 
 was irksome to nomads and irregulars accustomed to 
 the easier service and freedom from restraint of the other 
 Asiatic princes ; and during the later years of his rule 
 there were many desertions, and a difficulty was en- 
 countered in inducing recruits to enter his army. The 
 old practice, employed with such success in the earlier 
 years of his rule, of inducing the conquered to com- 
 bine with the conqueror, was no longer possible, for 
 
WA.RS WITH THE TUNGANI. 135 
 
 extermination had become the order of the day. The 
 Usbegs, Kirghiz, and other tribes, could not supply in 
 sufficient numbers the requirements of the state, and 
 the Tungani, who should have comprised the largest 
 portion of the subjects of the Athalik Grhazi, were 
 coerced into subjection with an undiscriminating 
 severity. The result was really a paralysis through 
 sheer want of people, and it was not known until the 
 hour of trial came how weakened his forces had be- 
 come. Every inducement was held forth to Afghan, 
 Badakshi, and, above all, to Indian soldiers to join, 
 but these, although they formed a nucleus of trust- 
 worthy and efficient soldiers, were far too few to consti- 
 tute a formidable army. We are justified in assuming 
 from the facts that these Tungan wars, conducted 
 in an unsparing manner, were the greatest mistake 
 that marked the career of Yakoob Beg. So far as his 
 occupation of Kucha goes, he could at least say that he 
 had secured a valuable prize. He had acquired every 
 part of what could be considered Kashgar, and his 
 kingdom was effectually guarded, and his revenues 
 prospectively increased, by the possession of the great 
 cities of Aksu and Kucha. He might exclaim with 
 justice that he had eclipsed all his predecessors in mili- 
 tary prowess, and if he had been wise he would then 
 have turned his attention to the well government of 
 his state, and by so doing have demonstrated that he 
 was of a higher capacity for ruling a people, as well as 
 for commanding an army, than any Khoja prince of 
 the past. Had he abstained from prosecuting with 
 such unflagging persistency his inveterate dislike of the 
 Tungani, he might easily have come to terms with his 
 neighbours, and the harm they could have done him 
 would have been infinitesimally small. But the chief 
 advantage of that more prudent policy would have been 
 visible when the Chinese advanced to chastise the 
 Tungani. Not only would the Tungani have been 
 more capable of resisting the Khitay, not only would 
 
136 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Manas and Urumtsi have been capable of offering a 
 more determined defence, but the Tungani could have 
 retired on Turfan, and held the country round that 
 town, as well as Karashar and Korla, for a protracted 
 period against General Kin Shun. The Athalik Grhazi 
 with untouched resources could have awaited with just 
 confidence the advance of the Chinese upon his strong 
 frontier city of Kucha, and, as the Chinese accom- 
 plished the difficult task of crushing the Tungani, he 
 would have had the satisfaction of knowing that in all 
 probability the Chinese effort would have been spent 
 before it reached his own borders. 
 
 It is impossible to judge men except by the results 
 of their actions, and the result of Yakoob Beg's inces- 
 sant and unnecessary interference with the Tungani 
 was that the Chinese army was able in a few months to 
 dissipate the remaining Tungan communities, and to 
 encounter in the full flush of their triumph the nume- 
 rically weaker forces of Yakoob Beg. It is, therefore, 
 impossible to exonerate the ruler from great blame in 
 hastily undertaking operations which a little conside- 
 ration ought to have shown to be unwise. Having 
 traced Yakoob Beg's wars with the Chinese Mahomedans, 
 it is time to consider his rule of Kashgaria proper, and 
 the events that during these years were transpiring in 
 other quarters of the state. 
 
137 
 
 CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 YAKOOB BEG's GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 
 
 YAKOOB BEG'S chief claim to our consideration is that, 
 for more than twelve years, he gave a settled govern- 
 ment to a large portion of Central Asia, and that, how- 
 ever faulty his external policy may have been in critical 
 moments, his internal management was founded on a 
 practical and sufficiently just basis. As a warrior he 
 had done much to justify admiration, and had proved 
 on many a well-fought field, and in many a desperate 
 encounter, his claims to be considered a fearless and 
 resolute soldier ; but in this quality he was equalled, if 
 not excelled, by his own lieutenant, Abdulla Beg, the 
 Murat of Kashgar, while some of the deeds of his son, 
 Beg Bacha, will rank in daring and surpass in ferocity 
 anything achieved by the Athalik Ghazi. But in 
 capacity for administration Yakoob Beg far surpassed 
 his contemporaries, and the merit of his success was 
 enhanced, not so much by the originality of the method 
 adopted, as by the unique vigour and perseverance with 
 which it was put into force. The secret of his power 
 can only be discovered by constantly bearing in mind 
 the fact that he had constituted himself the champion 
 of the Mahomedan religion in Central Asia. The 
 Ameers of Bokhara and Afghanistan might trifle with 
 the seductive promises of the Eussians, and might con- 
 sent to sacrifice the interests of their religion for a 
 transitory advancement of their worldly possessions ; 
 but to such degradations the Athalik Grhazi true 
 " champion father " as he was never stooped. With 
 
138 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 whatever imaginary power the sympathy and good-will 
 of the Mahomedan peoples of Turkestan may have 
 clothed this ruler, there is no question that his atti- 
 tude towards the Muscovite would have warranted the 
 assertion of greater power than was ever attributed to 
 him ; and the secret of this delusion, an attitude of 
 defiant strength without any solid foundation for so 
 bold a course, can only be unravelled by remembering 
 that the Athalik Ghazi strove to represent, not so 
 much Kashgaria, as the whole Mahomedan world of 
 Central Asia. The necessities of his own position, 
 when, having conquered Kashgar, he found that he 
 had aroused the susceptibilities of the Eussians, com- 
 pelled him to seek in every direction for aid, and to 
 have recourse to every artifice for increasing his 
 strength, or its semblance, in order to avoid the dis- 
 solution of his state and a subjection to the Czar. So 
 well did he succeed in his efforts, and so prompt were 
 his movements and so fearless his attitude, that the 
 Eussians were deluded into a belief which was, as we 
 emphatically insist, unfounded that Kashgar would 
 prove a more formidable antagonist than either Bok- 
 hara, or Khokand, or Khiva. 
 
 The interior management of a state, which, young 
 in years, yet seemed to tower among its fellows, might 
 be supposed to be a very interesting topic to dilate 
 upon ; but on this subject there is less direct evidence 
 than could be wished. Even Sir Douglas Forsyth, in 
 his official report, is not able to throw as much light as 
 is desired on the inner working of the administrative 
 system of Yakoob Beg. Still, such as it is, with the 
 exception of the Eussian writer, Grregorieff, he is the 
 only authority on the subject. 
 
 To commence with the court and the immediate 
 surroundings of Yakoob Beg, we are struck by two 
 inconsistencies. In the first place, there were no great 
 nobles, or indeed adherents of his family ; those chiefs 
 who, whether they were Khokandian nobles or Kirghiz 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 139 
 
 or Afghan adventurers, had proved their fidelity to 
 his rule, and their capacity for service, were actively 
 employed as governors of districts, or as commandants 
 of fortresses in the wide-stretching dominions of their 
 imperious master. Periodically they came to pay their 
 respects in the capital, and at frequent intervals Yakoob 
 Beg, in his journeys to the frontier, visited them, and 
 superintended their operations in person; but, in so active 
 a community where there was a dearth of mankind, the 
 intellectually gifted members of the society were too 
 valuable to be permitted to devote their energies and 
 their attention to the object of becoming palace orna- 
 ments. Yakoob Beg had forced himself on a people who 
 regarded him with indifference, and he had to maintain 
 himself in his place by a never relaxing vigour. To 
 make this possible, he required a large staff of efficient 
 and trustworthy subordinates, who may be divided into 
 three classes of various capacities, viz., soldiers, adminis- 
 trators, and tax-gatherers. Until the last few months 
 of his reign there was no symptom that his system was 
 declining in vigour, or that his supply of competent 
 officials was limited and susceptible of being exhausted. 
 Even in his most prosperous years, however, there was 
 always a difficulty in obtaining a full supply ; and 
 in all inferior posts the disaffected Khitay had to be 
 employed. The Tungani of Kucha and Aksu were 
 scarcely more to be trusted in an emergency than their 
 Buddhist kinsmen. Yet the extensive civil service of 
 the state, which undertook the education, the religion, 
 the civil order, the local administration of the people 
 all into its own hands, had to be kept in working order, 
 whatever else might happen. It can at once be perceived 
 that, when a government which never obtained any deep 
 hold on the affections of the people had only a limited 
 population to draw upon, it was only a question of time 
 to solve the difficulty by an exhaustion of the supply of 
 suitable brain material, or by the uprising of an, at heart, 
 dissatisfied people. No one will ever understand the 
 
140 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 secret of Yakoob Beg's rule unless he constantly bears 
 in mind that his strict orthodoxy as a Mussulman, and 
 his still stricter enforcement of the laws of his religion 
 
 O 
 
 within his borders, were elements of strength only in 
 his external relations ; in his internal affairs they placed 
 him in the light of a tyrant, and prevented his people 
 ever experiencing any enthusiasm for his person and 
 rule. It is doubtful whether outside the priesthood and 
 the more fanatical Andijanis there was any great re- 
 ligious zeal at all, and it is quite a delusion to speak of 
 the Kashgari, as a whole, as being fanatical Mahome- 
 dans, in the same degree that it is true to say so of the 
 Bokhariots or Afghans. In addition to there being no 
 noble or wealthy official class in the city of Kashgar, 
 there was also the strange inconsistency of an intensely 
 strict etiquette being enforced side by side with extreme 
 plainness in costume and ceremonial. It is rare indeed 
 to hear any traveller to Kashgar speaking of the rich- 
 ness or finery of court functionaries. Even Hadji Torah, 
 or the Seyyid Yakoob Khan, as he is now called, and Ma- 
 homed Yunus, the governor of Yarkand, two of the most 
 trusted and prominent followers of the Athalik Grhazi, 
 were not to be distinguished from a host of minor lumi- 
 naries in the court circle by any external insignia of 
 their elevated position. Some of the military, officers 
 of the household troops, wore a device of a dragon's 
 head worked in silk over their plain uniform of leather ; 
 and this seems to have been a custom surviving the 
 disappearance of the Chinese. Hadji Torah who re- 
 cently visited this country, and who had on previous 
 occasions travelled in Eussia, Turkey, and India how- 
 ever, alone among Kashgarian notables, had introduced 
 into his household some of the comforts and luxuries of 
 European life. His example was not imitated by many 
 others, and, after a brief period of fashion, the improve- 
 ments he had striven to make popular died out and were 
 lost sight of. The ordinary dress of a person above the 
 rank of gentleman is a large blanket-like cloak worn 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 141 
 
 over a close-fitting tunic and breeches ; and the dress of 
 the peasant is similar, only his cloak is usually a sheep- 
 skin. The Ameer himself set the example of exceeding 
 plainness in his costume, and his followers were far too 
 skilled courtiers to vary their practice from that of their 
 ruler. But what his court lacked in pomp it gained in 
 impressiveness by the perfect system of etiquette en- 
 forced, and by the external show of reverence to the 
 ruler and to his religion, manifested in every petty detail 
 of the palace ceremonial. The Ameer received publicly 
 in his audience- chamber every day, when all petitions 
 and stringent punishments were submitted to him. His 
 sliaghawals, or foreign secretaries, made their report to 
 him on whatever business might be most pressing, 
 whether it was concerning his relations with India or 
 Russia, with Afghanistan or the Tungani ; and the local 
 governors, who might happen to have arrived at the 
 capital, were received in audience, either to present their 
 personal respects to the ruler, or their reports of the 
 government of their provinces. But with the exception 
 of a few of his kinsmen, and more intimate associates, 
 such as Abdulla, none were permitted to be seated in 
 his presence. Even these could not sit within a certain 
 distance of their sovereign. All subjects who were 
 allowed to approach his person had to do so in the 
 humblest manner, and with the deepest expressions of 
 humility and subjection. His son, Kuli Beg, was still 
 more particular in his intercourse with his subjects. 
 Even his cousin, Hadji Torah, a man whose experience 
 and lineage entitled him to exceptional consideration, 
 never placed himself on an equality with this youthful 
 despot, and always clothed his words and thoughts 
 when in conversation with him in an outward show of 
 humble respect and deferential obsequiousness. It will 
 be at once surmised, and, so far as our information 
 warrants an opinion, with correctness, that all this ter- 
 rorism alienated any good feeling from the ruling family 
 that its prowess in the field and the cabinet might have 
 
142 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 secured for it. In Kashgar we have a forcible proof of 
 the truth of Tennyson's line, that " he who only rules 
 by terror doeth grievous wrong ;" and yet, founded as it 
 was on a military system, and on the deepest distrust of 
 the subject races, it could not well have been otherwise. 
 The most unmistakable proof of how Yakoob Beg's 
 rule was founded, and how it was maintained, is to be 
 seen in the fact that his orda, or palace, was one large 
 barrack, the interior compartments of which were 
 devoted to the accommodation of the royal household. 
 His out-houses were filled with cannon of every descrip- 
 tion, from antiquated Chinese irjirs to modern Krupps and 
 Armstrongs, and his select corps of artillerymen, clothed 
 in a scarlet uniform, seldom left the chief cities, except 
 for serious operations against foreign enemies. At the 
 Yangy-Shahr of Kashgar, too, he kept his military stores, 
 and it was said that in his workshops there he was able 
 to construct cannon and muskets in considerable numbers 
 in imitation of the most perfect weapons of European 
 science. But it must be noted that we have no record of 
 any of his home-made weapons being used in actual 
 hostilities, while the supply of arms received from 
 liussia, or this country, is known to have been made 
 the most of. Besides the natural aptitude of his sub- 
 jects of Chinese descent for imitation, he had in his 
 service, particularly in his artillery, many sepoys who 
 had deserted our service either at the time of the mutiny 
 or since. These soldiers, valuable either as non-com- 
 missioned officers or in higher ranks still, combined with 
 a large number of good troops from Khokand and the 
 mountain tribes of the neighbourhood, gave a cohesion 
 and vigour to the whole army that was simply ines- 
 timable. That army, it may be here convenient to say, 
 was divided into two classes widely differing from each 
 other, and called upon, except in an emergency, when 
 all the resources of the state were summoned to take 
 part in its defence, to perform duties as opposite as their 
 own composition. The army of the Ameer, founded on 
 
YAKOOB BEG's GOVERNMENT OF KASIIGAR. 143 
 
 that confused assemblage with which he -conquered 
 Kashgar, was divided into two bodies, the jigit or 
 djingJiite, the horse soldier, and the sarbaz, or foot 
 soldier. The former of these was the more formidable 
 warrior, being selected for personal strength or skill. 
 The jigits were trained to fight on foot as well as on 
 horse, and were armed with a long single-barrelled gun 
 and a sabre. Their uniform was a serviceable coat of 
 leathern armour mostly buff in colour, and to all intents 
 and purposes they correspond with our dragoons, or, 
 perhaps, still more closely with the proposed corps of 
 mounted riflemen. The sarbaz, among whom are 
 included the artillerymen, presented greater varieties of 
 efficiency than his mounted comrade ; still he had gone 
 through some regular drill and training, and resided in 
 barracks. He was a regular soldier, and might be trusted 
 in defence of his country up to a certain point. In 
 numbers it is impossible to state accurately how many 
 jif/its and sarbazes there were in the service of the state ; 
 some months ago they would have been placed as high 
 as 50,000 or 60,000 strong, possibly at a higher number 
 still; now we are wiser on the subject, and we have gone 
 to the other end of the scale. It is probable, however, 
 that Yakoob Beg never had 20,000 perfectly trust- 
 worthy soldiers in his army, and that after the conclu- 
 sion of the Tungan wars, half that number would more 
 accurately represent his force of jigits and sarbazes. 
 But in addition to the more or less effective main body, 
 there was a nondescript following of Khitay, Tungani, 
 half-savage Kirghiz, and rude degraded savages like the 
 Dolans, that in numbers would have presented a very 
 formidable appearance. The Khitay must at once be 
 struck out of the estimate, for they were never per- 
 mitted to go beyond the immediate vicinity of Yarkand 
 and Kashgar, where they kept themselves apart, and 
 were employed as military servants, as sentries, and as 
 workmen in the military shops and factories. The 
 Tungani, who enrolled themselves at various epochs in 
 
144 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 the service of Kashgar, were more than dubious in 
 their fidelity to the state ; besides they were of such 
 questionable courage, that they were no allies of any 
 importance. Even as compared with one another, these 
 were of varying kinds of efficiency ; the Tungani who 
 joined Yakoob Beg in the earlier portion of his career 
 seeming to be the best of them. Those who joined 
 after the fall of Aksu and Kucha, less efficient and more 
 ambiguous in their fidelity ; and those who dwelt in the 
 country from Korla to Turfan and Manas, were totally 
 inefficient, and not to be trusted to any degree what- 
 ever. The Kirghiz and Kipchak nomads were rather a 
 source of danger to their friends than of dread to their 
 foes. Yakoob Beg had, therefore, at his orders but a 
 very limited force to maintain his own dynasty against 
 the machinations of Khoja and Tungan, and to defend 
 a long and vulnerable frontier against many powerful 
 and ambitious neighbours. It was absurd for him to 
 think of venturing single-handed across the path of 
 Russia, and to do him justice he never deluded himself 
 into the idea that he could. All he seems to have 
 aspired to was to resist to the uttermost any invasion of 
 his territory by them, and to die sooner than surrender. 
 Limited in numbers as his regular forces were, they seem 
 to have had every claim to be placed high in the rank of 
 Asiatic soldiers. They were certainly not as formidable 
 a body as the Sikhs or Ghoorkas, probably not as the 
 Afghans; still they were infinitely superior, except in num- 
 bers, to any forces the Ameer of Bokhara or the Khan of 
 Khokand could place in the line of battle. To Yakoob 
 Beg alone belongs the credit of their organization. 
 
 Yakoob Beg's system of administration was simple in 
 the extreme. A Dadkwah, or governor, was appointed 
 for each district, and in his hands was vested the supreme 
 control in all the affairs of his province. Yet he was no 
 irresponsible minister who could tyrannize as he pleased. 
 Tyrannize in small ways, undoubtedly, many of them did, 
 but, as the life of the subject could only be taken away 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 145 
 
 by order of the ruler himself, the most powerful weapon 
 in the hands of an unscrupulous viceroy was removed. 
 
 Ai stated periods, too, he had to proceed to Kashgar 
 to give a report of the chief occurrences in his province, 
 and on such occasions petitions containing charges 
 against the Dadkwah were formally considered in his 
 presence. It may he said that this proceeding was a 
 farce, and it is probably true that a favoured viceroy 
 could laugh at any ordinary accusation against his cha- 
 racter. But that would be an exceptional case. Many 
 Dadkwahs were reduced in official rank, for malpractices, 
 and some, such as Yakoob Beg's own half-brother, were 
 removed for incompetence in their charges. Side by side, 
 too, with the Dadkwah, ruled the Kazi or Judge, who, 
 if of course not on a par in rank with the viceroy, was still 
 invested with complete authority in all legal decisions 
 on crime. This prominence given to the legal autho- 
 rities had a good effect on the public mind, for, although 
 the Kazi, as a rule, might not dare to thwart the wishes 
 of the Dadkwah, the effect of the law being supreme 
 was scarcely detracted from. And what was that law ? it 
 may naturally be asked. Precisely the same as the law of 
 every other Mahomedan state, with a few innovations 
 traceable to the influence of the Chinese. The Shariat, 
 the holy code of the Prophet followed in all the Sunni 
 states, was enforced by Yakoob Beg, with particular 
 severity ; and in its working no sense of mercy was 
 permitted to temper the harshness of its regulations. 
 Crimes committed by women were punished with greater 
 inflictions than the same committed by men ; and the 
 ordinary punishments, whipping, mutilation, and torture 
 could be inflicted by order of the Dadkwah, Only in 
 capital cases had the decision to rest with the sovereign. 
 Thieves, beggars, and vagrants found wandering about 
 the streets at prohibited hours were immediately locked 
 up, and brought before the Kazi, who would either 
 administer a caution, or a whipping, if the accused had 
 previously offended. Another check on the abuse of 
 
146 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 i 
 
 power by the officials was to be found in the following 
 regulation. A charge to be visited with a severer punish- 
 ment than twenty heavy strokes from the dira a leather 
 strap, fixed in a wooden handle had to be investigated 
 by a member of each official rank ; so the Kazi passed 
 a culprit on, with his comments, to the Mufti, the Mufti 
 to the Alim, and the Alim to the Dadkwah. If any of 
 these officials dissented from the remarks of his sub- 
 ordinate, and the matter was found impossible to arrange 
 by mutual concessions, it was either referred to the 
 sovereign for solution, or was permitted to fall through. 
 The Dadkwah had also to be present at every punish- 
 ment within his jurisdiction, and was directly responsible 
 to the Ameer for any miscarriage of justice. The Kazi 
 Eais, or head judge, had the right to decide all minor 
 matters for himself for instance, in his patrols through 
 the streets, if he met a woman unveiled he could order 
 her to be struck so many times with the dira ; or if he 
 found a man selling adulterated food, or using light 
 weights, he could confiscate his goods, or in some other 
 manner mulct him in addition to administering a certain 
 number of strokes. He and his attendants were parti- 
 cularly energetic and zealous in compelling idlers about 
 the bazaars to repair to the mosques at prayer time, and 
 in a very paternal and authoritative manner did the Rais 
 exercise his petty power for the good of his people. 
 Even on his despotism there was some check, as he had 
 no authority to inflict more than forty blows with the 
 dira for one offence. Intimately connected with the 
 administration of justice was the police system, which 
 in its intricate ramifications permeated all sections of 
 society. Much as we may feel admiration for the judicial 
 code, which, up to a certain point admirably administered, 
 ensured a certain kind of rough justice throughout the 
 Athalik Ghazi's dominions, the police laws and discipline 
 have greater claims to our favourable opinion, as evi- 
 dences of an astonishing capacity for government. In 
 his legal code, Yakoob Beg simply adopted the laws 
 
YAKOOB EEC'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAU. 147 
 
 enforced on all true believers by the Koran, and he had 
 no claims to originality as a lawgiver. But as a ruler 
 adopting all those checks on sedition which lie at the 
 disposal of an unscrupulous sovereign, and which were 
 brought to such a pitch of perfection under Fouche 
 and the Second Empire, Yakoob Beg has reason to be 
 placed in the very highest class of such potentates. In 
 this achievement, too, he was not a plagiarist, and, as he 
 must have been ignorant of similar regulations existing 
 in Europe, he must be allowed the credit of having 
 originated a system of police in which it is difficult to 
 find a single flaw. In China, indeed, something of the 
 same kind has at all times existed, and at periods when 
 the Emperor grasped the sceptre firmly, and made his 
 individuality felt in the management of affairs, the police 
 were one of the most active tools of power. But even 
 in that empire there is no record of their having attained 
 so complete a control over the actions and sentiments of 
 the people as in Kashgaria during the last decade. It 
 appears, too, that in superiority of system lay the sole 
 pre-eminence of the latter ; for the Tungan, or police- 
 man, of China was, individually man for man, a superior 
 class to the Kashgarian and other constables of Yakoob 
 Beg. In short, the whole credit of their existence belongs 
 to that ruler. 
 
 Let us now give some account of this important 
 body. It was divided into two chief divisions quite 
 distinct from and irrespective of each other, secret 
 and municipal. The secret was not, like ours, a percep- 
 tible class of detectives, acting in combination with the 
 municipal, to which was entrusted the discovery of crimes 
 and conspiracies. It may loosely be described as con- 
 sisting of every member of the community, for all 
 desired to stand well with the powers that be, and the 
 easiest way to attain that object would be to place all 
 confidential information at their disposal. But it is 
 evident that even in a state of irresponsible power, like 
 Kashgar, a clear encouragement, such as this, to invent 
 
148 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 libels of one's neighbours, could only end in unprofitable 
 litigation and confusion. There was certainly a check 
 on the too zealous imaginations of the subjects, and, 
 although there is not much evidence on the subject, it 
 appears to have been twofold. In the first place a 
 libeller incurred the risk of receiving very severe punish- 
 ment, particularly if the person libelled were of saintly 
 lineage, or if he filled any official post. This operated 
 as a check on too hasty accusations, especially when it 
 became known that the reward for such service was 
 seldom speedily forthcoming, and scarcely ever answered 
 the expectations of the informer. But this check, which 
 alone seems to have been adopted in the earlier years of 
 Yakoob Beg's authority, was found to be insufficient as 
 his power became consolidated. The secret police then 
 became organized to a certain degree ; that is to say, they 
 so far formed a distinct corps that a member had to be 
 approved of either by the Dadkwah or the Eais. So 
 well, however, was the secret of their individuality 
 maintained that few of them were generally known to 
 the people. Suspicion was wide-spread throughout all 
 ranks of society, and the governor in his orda, or the 
 Eais in his hall of justice, or the shopkeeper in his booth, 
 or the artisan in his hut, never felt safe that his neigh- 
 bour, the man with whom he was holding the most 
 friendly converse, was not dissecting his expressions to 
 discover whether they contained anything treasonable. 
 Members of this formidable body were always attached 
 to the suite of either foreign envoys or merchants ; and 
 their presence in the rear of the cortege, always effectually 
 closed the mouths of the inhabitants, or only induced 
 them to open them to give false or contradictory replies. 
 There can be no doubt that this secret organization, 
 brought to a high pitch of perfection during the later 
 years of his reign, gave a consistency and strength to 
 Yakoob Beg's tenure of power that was wanting to all 
 his predecessors. In leaving this part of the system, it 
 is as well to point out in conclusion that this detective 
 
YAKOOB BEO's GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 149 
 
 force was only useful in discovering what was about to 
 occur in the state among Andijani or Tungani, and 
 that it was powerless to attempt the repression by force 
 of any outbreak of popular feeling. Its members were 
 simply spies, and as a body its value vanished when its 
 members became generally known Constant changing, 
 and the introduction of fresh members, were the sole 
 effectual means of preserving the incognito of a large 
 body of men, and women even, who preserved official 
 communication only with the local governor or judge. 
 The municipal police were subdivided into urban and 
 suburban, and they present a complete contrast to the 
 vague body we have just attempted to describe. Their 
 functions were known and recognizable. They were 
 the functionaries who put into practice the behests of 
 the Kazi, and they maintained order in the streets and 
 bazaars, much as our own do. The Corbashi is the head 
 of this body, and his subordinates are styled tarzacjchL 
 They wore a distinct uniform, and had drilling grounds 
 attached to barracks, in which, however, they were not 
 all compelled to reside. They were essentially military 
 in their rules, and presented a powerful first front to all 
 evil-doers and would-be rebels. It was they who accom- 
 panied the Kazi Rais in his daily circuit of the streets 
 and market-place, and it was from their weapon, the dira, 
 that the ordinary punishment was received. Their prin- 
 cipal avocation seems to have been to maintain order in 
 the towns during the night-time, for in the day we only 
 hear of a few of them being detailed for personal attend- 
 ance on the Dadkwah and Kazi. With sunset their 
 true importance is more visible, for not only were they 
 stationed in all main thoroughfares, squares, and other 
 open places of the city; but until sunrise patrols at 
 frequent intervals throughout the night visited all the 
 chief quarters of the town. The power vested in their 
 hands during these hours was very great, and it was 
 dangerous for any stranger to venture out after pro- 
 hibited hours. All persons found in the streets after 
 
150 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 sunset were arrested and incarcerated until the morning, 
 when, if they could give a satisfactory account of them- 
 selves, they were released, with a caution not to keep such 
 unseemly hours for the future. If, however, they were 
 unable to explain their business, a further term of 
 imprisonment was imposed; and it was a matter of some 
 difficulty for a stranger to obtain his complete liberty 
 for some time afterwards. The suburban police fulfilled 
 much the same duties, and on all the country roads 
 patrols passed up and down during the night, while 
 pickets were stationed at the cross-roads. In the same 
 manner as in the towns all travellers, except those 
 armed with a passport, were interned for a minute in- 
 vestigation into their affairs in the morning. And 
 " thieves, beggars, and wanderers " were chastised at 
 the discretion of the local magistrate. The vagrant laws 
 were as much enforced, too, as they were in this country 
 in the days of Queen Elizabeth, and in a general mode 
 of interference with the thoughts and actions of its sub- 
 jects, the Kashgarian government had attained a height 
 of excellence that would entitle it to rank with the 
 Inquisition. Still there was order. No riots occurred 
 to distract the harmony of the public weal, and to an 
 external observer, especially to one belonging to a coun- 
 try where order is considered the greatest desideratum, 
 the government of the Athalik Ghazi seemed to be the 
 perfection of an Asiatic state, and that order a reason for 
 attributing all other virtues to its originator, 
 
 Travellers, however, who were provided with a passport, 
 were accorded privileges of transit, and were permitted, 
 if they felt so disposed, to continue their journeys during 
 hours interdicted to less privileged mortals. In each 
 chief town there were offices for the issue of these per- 
 mits to travel. Not many obstacles were thrown in the 
 path of those, who left permanent guarantees in the 
 shape of property behind them for their return, in 
 accomplishing their desire for travel; but rarely was 
 permission granted to any one, not blessed with these 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 151 
 
 worldly advantages, to proceed further than the neigh- 
 bouring district. Indeed in all cases leave to visit 
 foreign states, other than Khokand or Bokhara, was a 
 matter of difficulty to be obtained, and only in the most 
 exceptional cases was it granted. But it appears that 
 there were some evasions of this regulation by a simula- 
 tion of religious zeal, for the Sheikh-ul-Islam had it in his 
 power to grant permits to leave the country on pil- 
 grimages to Bokhara the "holy," or to Mecca. In 
 themselves the passports were simple in phraseology. 
 They merely stated the name and address of the 
 traveller, the nature of his business, and his destination. 
 Having obtained the consent of the Dadkwah, and the 
 authority of the Kazi, no difficulty was experienced 
 in procuring the necessary slip of paper. Infractions 
 of this permission, by too long an absence, or by pro- 
 ceeding in some forbidden direction, were visited on a 
 first offence with a fine. On a repetition of it, however, 
 the punishment became more severe. It would be 
 interesting to know how these protectors of the 
 public peace were paid, and by what means. But 
 on this point there is little trustworthy information. 
 We, however, know of one tax which was devoted to 
 the support of the urban police, but of the funds from 
 which the suburban were remunerated, we have no 
 authority for any assertion. A weekly tax was levied 
 from all the shop and booth owners, to go towards the 
 payment of their protectors ; but it is not supposed that 
 this amounted to a sufficient sum to maintain the large 
 force in the more important cities. The difference was 
 probably paid out of the state coffers under the head of 
 justice. Judging from this we cannot be far wrong in 
 assuming that a similar tax was levied on the farmers 
 and country residents for the support of the suburban 
 police ; and as the secret police required less outlay in the 
 country than in the cities, it is possible that that tax more 
 nearly defrayed the total cost, than it did in Yarkand 
 or Kashgar. The police supervision and the military 
 
152 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 terrorism, freely resorted to on all occasions offering an 
 excuse for such an extreme measure, have not been with- 
 out their effect in leaving traces of their existence and 
 influence in the daily life of the Kashgari, and on the 
 countenances and sentiments of the subject peoples. 
 Where formerly lived a light-hearted and happy race 
 there now seemed as if a never-to-be-removed gloom 
 had settled down on the face of the land, and neither the 
 assurance of security nor the irregular encouragement of 
 the ruler to commerce could remove the blight that had 
 fallen upon the energies and happiness of the people. 
 As one of them expressed it, in pathetic language, 
 " During the Chinese rule there was everything ; there 
 is nothing now." The speaker of that sentence was 
 no merchant, who might have been expected to be de- 
 pressed by the falling-off in trade, but a warrior and 
 a chieftain's son and heir. If to him the military 
 system of Yakoob Beg seemed unsatisfactory and irk- 
 some, what must it have appeared to those more 
 peaceful subjects to whom merchandise and barter 
 were as the breath of their nostrils ? All the ad- 
 vantages of a perfect police system, heavily weighted 
 by the incumbrance of a costly addition of spies and 
 tale-bearers, would seem as nothing compared with the 
 loss incurred by the fetters placed on individual motion 
 and enterprise. Considered by itself, the police or- 
 ganization of Kashgar was, perhaps, the most perfect 
 design achieved by Yakoob Beg, and his community of 
 spies will rank with anything in effectiveness that has 
 ever been accomplished by any potentate. But as a 
 permanent addition to his strength it is permissible to 
 doubt whether he really secured his rule by employing 
 the latter, or obtained much more by the formation of 
 the former than the services of a trained body of trust- 
 worthy, courageous men. The restrictions imposed on 
 trade by the severance of all communications with the 
 East by the Tungan wars and by the limited amount of 
 liberty granted the native Kashgari, proved most deter- 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 153 
 
 rent to all mercantile adventure, and placed in the 
 hands of Khokandians or Eussians on the north, and 
 of Cashmerians and Punjabis on the south, most of the 
 trade still carried on with Eastern Turkestan. 
 
 The trade carried on by the Athalik Ghazi's state, if 
 we are to judge solely by amount, with foreign coun- 
 tries, was greatest with Eussia and her dependencies; but 
 if we investigate the matter more closely we find that 
 the result is a little more satisfactory to ourselves. 
 The direct trade that was carried on by way of Leh with 
 Khoten and Sanju was steadily increasing, while that of 
 Eussia by Khokand had for some time remained sta- 
 tionary, if it had not even decreased. And then much 
 of the Eussian trade has to be scored to this country, 
 for in the marts of Kashgar, underneath Eussian exte- 
 riors, were very often to be found English interiors, and 
 the brand of well-known Manchester and Liverpool 
 makers was discovered beneath some gaudy and brilliant- 
 looking cover hailing from Moscow or Nishni Nov- 
 gorod. Besides, recent investigations have proved that 
 some of the goods exported from Shikarpore, in Scinde, 
 through the Bholan Pass find their way through the 
 mountainous districts that intervene into the territory 
 of his late Highness the Ameer of Kashgar. Nor had 
 Yakoob Beg totally neglected all means for inducing 
 merchants to enter his state ; indeed, his chief objection 
 seemed to have been, not that they should have entered 
 his state, but that they should leave it. Serais were 
 built in all the chief towns for the accommodation of 
 such merchants as might take up a temporary abode 
 within his territory, and the Andijaui Serai, or hotel, 
 specially constructed for merchants from Khokand, was 
 one of the largest and most striking buildings in the 
 city of Kashgar. Yakoob Beg had even detailed off 
 to take care of the serai and its occupants a large 
 number of the old Khitay, or Yangy Mussulmans, who 
 were generally employed throughout the city as do- 
 mestic servants. When we come to the description of 
 
154 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 the relations of Yakoob Beg with England and with 
 Eussia we will speak more fully of the details of those 
 treaties of commerce which were ratified on several 
 occasions, and whose ostensible object was the promo- 
 tion of trade and other friendly intercourse. 
 
 We have now considered the army, the police, the ad- 
 ministration of justice, and the court of Yakoob Beg, 
 and the only chief subject that remains to be discussed are 
 the principles of finance adopted by the Ameer. To keep 
 any state, even an Asiatic state, in a fit condition for pre- 
 serving its independence, a settled revenue is requisite, 
 and Yakoob Beg, whose atmosphere was one of almost 
 continual warfare, was on several occasions pressed for 
 money in a manner difficult to be conceived by us. 
 His military operations languished for the want of 
 the sinews of war, and we are told on credible autho- 
 rity that many of his soldiers received only payment 
 out of the spoil taken at the sack of Turfan and other 
 places. So long as his ordinary expenditure was in- 
 creased by the addition of an extraordinary war out- 
 lay, so long was he unable to make his receipts and 
 expenditure balance. On the cessation of hosti- 
 lities against the Tungani, and the partial revival 
 of trade in ^consequence, his fiscal affairs assumed a 
 brighter aspect, and it is possible that during the last 
 few years of his reign his revenue showed a surplus. 
 But to obtain that success, a most joyful one to every 
 embarrassed potentate, Yakoob Beg had to resort to 
 many strange expedients, and to manifest much patience 
 and long-suffering ; and in overcoming petty obstacles 
 and minor details, he proved himself to be a man of more 
 than average ability, no less than he had previously by 
 the skilful manipulation of armies and intriguers. Here 
 again he erected a structure distinct and separate from 
 that handed down to him by the Chinese. Compara- 
 tively speaking, the Chinese had been wealthy to the 
 Athalik Ghazi, and they received in moderate imposts 
 on merchandise alone almost a sufficient sum to defray 
 
TAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 155 
 
 the total cost of their administration. Yakoob Beg had 
 no such certain source of revenue ; he had to raise from 
 an impoverished and only half- conquered state a sum 
 almost as large as that required by the Chinese. That 
 he did it remains the chief proof of his skill as a finance 
 minister, and is another reason for our regarding this 
 extraordinary ruler with admiration. We may feel sure 
 that if we could follow closely the history of his fiscal 
 efforts, and the numberless plans that proved abortive, 
 we should have revealed one of the most instructive and 
 interesting narratives of modern Asia. There are no 
 materials out of Kashgar, if there are such there, for 
 such an investigation however, and we can only follow 
 as best we may be able, the thread of events by the light 
 of such authorities as are at our disposal. In court and 
 personal expenditure he set an example that might with 
 advantage be followed by other rulers in Asia even at 
 the present day, and in a strict economy and supervision 
 of the petty sums that in the aggregate make all the 
 difference in any state between a surplus and a deficit, 
 were to be found the two guiding principles of his con- 
 duct. Kashgaria might be in a very backward state of 
 cultivation, and years of commotion and warfare had 
 undoubtedly thrown it back in the ranks of prosperity 
 and civilization, but the Athalik Ghazi was persuaded 
 of the truth of the Latin philosopher's saying, that 
 " Parsimonia rnagna vectigalia est." It must be re- 
 membered that Yakoob Beg set himself a different task 
 to accomplish than had the Chinese. Their idea was 
 not so much to extend their empire, although there has 
 always been a tendency with the Chinese to be aggressive 
 against small neighbours, as to acquire a territory that 
 could be made a paying thing : much as the pioneers of 
 Anglo-Saxon conquest have made their impression in 
 every quarter of the globe in search of wealth and adven- 
 ture, did the Chinese by a seemingly irresistible impulse 
 spread over the continent of Asia. In doing so they were 
 actuated as much by calculation of possible profit as by 
 
156 YAKOOli BEG. 
 
 any desire for military renown. The Emperor Keen- 
 Lung himself was flattered by the triumphs achieved 
 beyond Gobi ; but his lieutenants and viceroys aimed at 
 more mercenary objects, and but for the golden promise 
 held forth by a permanent conquest of Turkestan would 
 have induced their master to direct his efforts to some 
 more profitable undertaking. The Chinese, having 
 acquired Kashgar, were far too sagacious to use up its 
 resources by an organized system of pillage, and they 
 accordingly, let it be granted chiefly with a view to their 
 own personal aggrandizement, devoted their attention to 
 the development of its natural wealth by means already 
 detailed in a previous chapter. For three generations 
 the officials grew rich on the prosperity of their depen- 
 dency, and for the same period the people themselves 
 were scarcely less flourishing. The Chinese had accepted 
 no slight responsibility in undertaking the government 
 of Kashgar on principles identical with those by which 
 they held authority in Tibet ; but, owing to wonderful 
 perseverance and good management, they triumphed 
 over every difficulty. The revenue raised for state and 
 local purposes was very great, and it sufficed to preserve 
 good order for many years, and to add permanent im- 
 provement to the state in every direction. The task 
 voluntarily undertaken by the Chinese was far more 
 onerous than that Yakoob Beg found he had to execute ; 
 but they came to it with many advantages that he 
 wanted. They had a large and faithful army ; he had 
 only an uncertain gathering, which might flee or desert 
 on the first symptom of disaster : they had the resources 
 of a great and powerful empire at their back ; he had 
 nothing but his own energy and determination : and 
 above all, they had a reputation that added to their 
 strength and facilitated their undertakings, while he 
 was regarded as a mere military adventurer, receiving 
 the contempt of Tungan and Khoja alike. The very 
 nature of things made the Chinese turn most of their 
 attention to commerce, while for years Yakoob Beg's 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAB. 157 
 
 sole thought was to consolidate his military strength 
 and form a large standing army. For many years, then, 
 Yakoob Beg only spent money on the drilling of sol- 
 diers and the purchase of weapons. Now and then, 
 when some danger seemed to threaten him, either from 
 Eussia, Afghanistan, or the Tungani, he would devote 
 considerable sums to the construction of forts in the 
 line of the menaced position. But his chief expenditure 
 was confined to his army, and the maintenance of his 
 dynasty by his police system. The administration of 
 justice required a certain sum of money, and the Church 
 for its support came in for a fair share of the good 
 things that were going. It is clear that his expendi- 
 ture, if not very great in our eyes, would severely tax 
 a population of 1,000,000 people in no very high state 
 of prosperity. The chief source of wealth in the past 
 had always been the trade with China, and when that 
 was broken off, the slight increase in intercourse with 
 Russia and India was not a sufficient compensation. In 
 fact, the country was very poor, without the ingenuity 
 and commercial instincts of the Khitay. During the 
 days of the war under Buzurg Khan, the only means of 
 obtaining the necessary revenue was by despoliation and 
 enforced levies on the occupied portion of the territory. 
 When the western portion of Kashgaria was subdued, 
 Yakoob Beg found himself without any money in his ex- 
 chequer, and no easy means of filling it presented itself 
 to him. In these straits he had recourse to an expedient 
 that, if not very novel, was at all events very effective. 
 He issued a proclamation to his faithful subjects to the 
 effect that as conqueror he was landowner of the whole 
 state ; but that he was willing eager would have been 
 the more correct expression to sell it to them at a 
 cheap rate. He, however, exempted from this the old 
 possessions of the Chinese Wangs and Ambans, and 
 distributed their extensive domains among the more 
 prominent of his followers, who in return acknowledged 
 their liability to military service. The system was an 
 
158 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 exact copy of the old feudal regime, and Yakoob Beg was 
 vested with all the rights and authority of the feudal 
 lord of the Middle Ages. The parallel is still further 
 maintained hy the large reward that the Church re- 
 ceived for its aid to the new ruler. The old revenues, 
 devoted to the support of the temples and religious 
 seminaries in the past, and which had miscarried during 
 the troublous period of the war for the possession of 
 Turkestan, were restored, and fresh possessions were 
 added thereto, to demonstrate the generosity of the sove- 
 reign and his veneration for the religion of Mahomed. 
 His old friend the Sheikh-ul-Islam was stillmore fortunate, 
 and a large estate was set apart for his special enjoy- 
 ment. Nor does it appear that the Mussulman priests 
 abused the fresh power and advantages they thus secured; 
 for among the toilers in Kashgaria none were more ener- 
 getic than they in educating the people, and in extending 
 their influence over their minds, both for the benefit of 
 their religion and for the security of the power of the 
 Athalik Ghazi. But in one respect, and it is impossible 
 to exaggerate its importance, Yakoob Beg's endeavours 
 to found a strong military class, bound to him by ties 
 of past favours and others yet to come, were abortive ; for 
 with rare exceptions his followers refused to fill their 
 new avocation of landed proprietors. Instead of devot- 
 ing their attention to the questions arising from agri- 
 culture and other rural pursuits, they sub-let all their 
 possessions to Andijani immigrants, and, residing in their 
 city or das, gave themselves over either to lascivious 
 pleasures or to complete indolence. Even so distin- 
 guished a warrior as Abdulla Beg, the slayer of more 
 than 1 2,000 persons, as his panegyrists boasted, suffered 
 from the pervading effeminacy on the cessation of active 
 hostilities ; and in the lower ranks of the service such 
 deterioration in energy was still more manifest. This 
 change in the spirit of his earlier supporters, among 
 other things, obliged Yakoob Beg to depend the more 
 on the Andijani merchants and shopkeepers, and con- 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 159 
 
 duced to his adopting more favourable views on foreign 
 trade in the later years of his power. 
 
 The sum of money which he immediately received by 
 the sale of lands placed him in a condition to under- 
 take those wars against the Tungani, which added so 
 much to the extent of his territory and to the respon- 
 sibilities of his position. Indeed, for several years after 
 its first enforcement it continued to bring in a certain 
 amount to the coffers of the State. But even this 
 resource was transitory, and the sum of money received 
 by this means and in the shape of spoil, from Yarkand, 
 Kashgar, Khoten, and other places, was not sufficient to 
 meet the expenditure caused by the formation of a large 
 army. Neither of these practices could be regarded as a 
 permanent means of obtaining a revenue, for the former 
 would scarcely admit of a repetition, and the latter soon 
 exhausted itself. So when his rule had become a little 
 settled, and these modes of raising money, in addition 
 to the still more reprehensible practice of robbing 
 foreign merchants, had become out of date to a certain 
 degree, the Athalik'Grhazi had -to place his fiscal arrange- 
 ments on a more practical and honourable basis. While 
 he laboured under some disadvantages, already enume- 
 rated, as compared with the Chinese, he had the great 
 advantage over them that he strove for an object more 
 easily accomplished than the restoration of Kashgar to 
 its pristine welfare ; and in his budget he had only 
 steadily to keep in view how much he required to main- 
 tain so many jigits, and so many police in his pay, and 
 to keep in his exchequer a small surplus for any untoward 
 emergency. He left the roads to take care of them- 
 selves; the irrigation works, sadly wanted in various parts 
 of the state, must be reserved for his successors; and all 
 proposals for the amelioration of the people were shelved 
 for a more opportune occasion. But so many thousand 
 jiyits must be in the ranks ; so many fresh guns and 
 cartridges must be placed in the arsenals ; and so many 
 adventurers must be induced by good pay to take service 
 
160 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 in the army as non-commissioned officers, in order that the 
 rank and file should be well drilled. The very necessities 
 of his position compelled Yakoob Beg to make all these 
 military preparations ; but the cost was great, and the 
 sacrifices thus imposed on ruler and on people were a 
 terrible strain. Eecent events make us inclined to believe 
 that a less active military and foreign policy, and a more 
 peaceable and domestic one, would have tended to have 
 added more strength to the Athalik Ghazi's rule than the 
 somewhat ostentatious military parade to which he had 
 recourse. Be that as it may, Yakoob Beg instituted in 
 1867 two taxes, which may be supposed to represent 
 the two chief classes of receipts during his tenure 
 of authority. The first of these was a tithe on all the 
 cereal produce of the country ; this tax was called the 
 Us/ir. The second, called the Zakat, was a customs 
 due levied on all merchandise entering Kashgar. The 
 UsJtr was payable on all land except that occupied by 
 the Church, or by those who owed military service to the 
 crown instead of other payment ; and even those who 
 rented land from the noble classes were obliged to sur- 
 render a tithe to the ruler. It would appear, therefore, 
 from this that it was not so much the land as its legal 
 possessor who was exempt from liability to the usual 
 obligations of citizenship. The danger contained in the 
 acquisition of all the crown lands by Andijani merchants, 
 and the gradual displacement of his more immediate 
 followers through the energy of these people, was not 
 imperceptible to Yakoob Beg, and he accordingly 
 adopted measures for preventing his nobles selling 
 their land with out his sanction. The receipts from this 
 Us/ir were very considerable, and it was the main source 
 of his revenue for years. \Ve have some idea of the 
 approximate value of land in Kashgar. The method of 
 measuring land for sale, and consequently also for taxa- 
 tion, is peculiar. It is not by any given size that it is 
 computed, or, indeed, strictly speaking by the amount 
 of crop it produces ; but at a rate in accordance with 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 161 
 
 the amount of wheat with which it had been planted. 
 The average rate was about a pound for as much land 
 as was sown with 20 Ib. of wheat. The tenant, as 
 has been said, paid the government dues and handed 
 over three-fourths of the net produce to the landlord 
 as rent, receiving for his portion only the one-fourth 
 remaining. Under this system it was only in very pros- 
 perous years that any but very large tenants made suffi- 
 cient to earn a competent livelihood. In bad years it is 
 possible that the landlord had to satisfy himself with a 
 smaller share, if he was not induced to surrender his 
 claim altogether for the disastrous period. But the tax- 
 farmers, entrusted with the collection of this rate, were 
 eager to become rich, no less than to earn a good name 
 with the authorities for bringing in a list with no de- 
 faulters. The unfortunate people were completely at their 
 mercy, and without any means of ascertaining the accu- 
 racy of the claim, or of opposing extortionate demands 
 on the part of the tax-collectors. They paid without a 
 murmur, perhaps without a suspicion of the imposition 
 that was being practised upon them, the sum demanded 
 of them, if they were able ; and as their dues were pay- 
 able without delay and on demand before anything else 
 was taken out of the total sum of the produce, the 
 Athalik Ghazi received his share with regularity, and his 
 tax-collector pocketed the excess sum for his own satis- 
 faction. In many cases it is known that the amount 
 claimed by the official exceeded by threefold the legal 
 demand. Such a system was no less hurtful to the 
 ruler than it was ruinous to the people. That in one 
 tax alone a larger sum should be extracted from the 
 people for the benefit of the .officials than was contri- 
 buted for the necessities of the state, exhibited a very 
 loose system of supervision on the part of the sovereign, 
 and is a strong piece of evidence that in many ways 
 Yakoob Beg was a mixture of contradictions. We can 
 scarcely persuade ourselves that he was aware of these 
 occurrences, and yet how could he be ignorant of them ? 
 
 M 
 
162 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 In addition to the Ushr there was another tax on home 
 produce, viz., the Tanabi, or tax on land devoted to the 
 production of vegetables or fruit. The Tanab is, by the 
 way, a lineal measure of forty-seven yards, and a Tanabi 
 is a piece of land forty-seven yards square. On this 
 extent of land cultivated for vegetables, or fruit, a small 
 tax was raised. More than any other tax did this vary 
 according to the character of the district, and to the 
 quality of the year's crop. It was seldom less than a 
 shilling a Tanabi, even in the least renowned district, 
 whereas in some parts, in good years, it was five shillings, 
 or even more. Here again, however, the middleman 
 interfered, and exacted as much as he saw there was any 
 possibility of his obtaining. This tax undoubtedly ought 
 to have produced a large sum, as a larger portion of the 
 soil is laid out as fruit and vegetable gardens than for 
 crops; but whether it was more difficult to raise, or there 
 was more peculation in transitu from the tax-payer to the 
 imperial exchequer, it is certain that we hear much less of 
 this tax than we should be disposed to imagine. The two 
 great taxes on home productions were therefore a corn due 
 and a fruit due. The rate was not in itself excessive, and 
 could be paid by any community without embarrassment. 
 It is uncertain to what extent the avarice of the officials 
 had made the conditions of these two taxes more 
 onerous, although, on the most favourable supposition, 
 the citizen was mulcted inno inconsiderable sum. A more 
 serious question for the ruler was, how did it affect 
 his own position with regard to his subjects ? Did 
 Yakoob Beg appear in the eyes of the Kashgari as an 
 exacting and oppressive tyrant on account of these heavy 
 impositions ? 
 
 It is impossible to speak on this point with any degree 
 of certainty, but it is only natural to expect that such 
 was the case. No tiller of the ground can feel grateful 
 to a sovereign who required him to hand over almost 
 one-third of his receipts before he made use of one penny 
 of them, even for the payment of his rent. It is scarcely 
 
YAKOOB BEG's GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 163 
 
 probable that Yakoob Beg approved of such enormous 
 profits going to his officials ; but, that having tolerated 
 petty exactions in his earlier days, he found himself un- 
 able to attempt the task of coping with the evil when 
 it had assumed such alarming proportions. It is im- 
 possible to believe that he remained in ignorance of what 
 was occurring under his very eyes, and there is some 
 evident foundation for the accusation that he partici- 
 pated in the division of the profits of his tax-gatherers. 
 We should be loth to admit the accuracy of such a 
 charge, and yet the arguments in its favour are too 
 plausible to admit of a very confident contradiction. It 
 would not speak well for the efficiency of his secret 
 police if he had remained in ignorance of a fact which 
 was losing him the sympathy of his subjects. 
 
 The gold mines at Khoten were worked after the fall 
 of that city in 1868, and continued productive down to 
 the present time. There is no information on the quan- 
 tities of the precious metal that are there turned out in 
 the year, but it is probable that they are not very great. 
 The coal mines near Aksu and Kucha are no longer 
 made use of, except by a few individuals, and the copper 
 mines in that district have, since the departure of the 
 Chinese, only been very partially explored. The jade 
 that used to come in great quantities from Aksu and 
 Khoten, is still to be found throughout Kashgar ; but 
 although it is probable that it still nearly all comes from 
 those cities, the Kashgari themselves tell a hesitating 
 tale as to its place of production. A visitor to Kashgar, 
 on going the round of the bazaars, soon found that the 
 people's tongues were tied by the presence, in his train, 
 of a number of the secret police, who had been specially 
 told off to prevent the Feringhee obtaining any trouble- 
 some information on the state of the people, or the 
 resources of the state. A striking instance was given 
 him of the close attention paid by these guardians of 
 order to the veriest trifles. The traveller inquired in 
 one stall where the jade, which was the chief commodity 
 
 M 2 
 
164 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 of the merchant in question, came from, and received 
 the reply, Aksu. Proceeding to another shop in the 
 street, he repeated the question, when he was informed 
 that it was imported from Khokand. But the traveller 
 said, your neighbour told me it came from Aksu. The 
 shopkeeper, taken aback by this abrupt remark, became 
 confused, and admitted that it came from Aksu. Warned 
 by a look from the official, he then repeated his original 
 assertion that it came from Khokand. The use of all 
 this absurd shuffling, and attempt to throw dust in 
 strangers' eyes, is impossible to discover ; for it was a 
 matter of little moment whether jade came from Aksu, 
 or Khokand, so long as we knew that it formed an 
 important commodity, both in the rough and in the 
 chiselled state, in the cities of Kashgaria. 
 
 The customs tax, or Zakat, is sanctioned by the 
 Shariat, and was levied at all the border posts on the 
 various roads leading into the state. Up to the ratifica- 
 tion of the treaties with Great Britain and Eussia, its 
 regulations were vague and elastic in the extreme. In 
 fact, any merchant who might have been so foolhardy 
 as to venture into Kashgar would have had reason, before 
 these events, to think himself fortunate if he escaped 
 the penalty of his rashness ; for assuredly his luggage 
 would not, but would have been confiscated for the 
 special benefit of his Highness the Ameer. So late as 
 1869, Russian merchants were robbed of their baggage, 
 and personally ill-treated, and only after long years of 
 negotiation did the Eussian Government obtain any 
 satisfaction for the injuries and loss inflicted on one of 
 their subjects. And then how did the Athalik Ghazi 
 send the sum of money he agreed to pay for the loss 
 the merchant had incurred? why in a depreciated 
 Chinese currency, part of a large number of coins that 
 he had found in a disused temple in Kashgar ! Before 
 this, all the external trade had been carried on with 
 Khokand and Bokhara, Afghanistan and Badakshan, and 
 the receipts from Zakat were quite insignificant, barring 
 
YAKOOB BEG's GOVERNMENT OF K ASH GAR. 165 
 
 such treasure trove as the spoliation of a merchant 
 from Tashkent, or from Leh. But with the persistent 
 efforts on the part of the Eussians on the north, and of 
 the English native merchants on the south, to pierce the 
 gloom hiding the country of Eastern Turkestan, it be- 
 came impossible for Yakoob Beg to maintain much 
 longer the incognito he was so jealous in maintaining. 
 Perhaps also the prospect of deriving an income from 
 Zakat, that should smooth down many of his difficulties, 
 was not without some influence on his mind when he 
 came into direct contact with civilized empires. His 
 expectations were far too sanguine, and he seems to 
 have once more, during the last twelve months of his life, 
 become indifferent to the advantages or disadvantages of 
 trade with his neighbours. In fact, when he placed 
 his customs on a fair footing, he found that it would 
 require many years to recoup him for the excessive 
 exactions he surrendered. The merchants who first 
 attempted to commence intercourse with Kashgar be- 
 came speedily discouraged by the dangers of the route, 
 and the small opening for a large remunerative trade in 
 a country whose wealth and population had been magni- 
 fied tenfold. In a country where the richest merchant 
 in the chief town possessed only a capital of 8,000, not 
 much could be expected in the way of fortune ; and 
 although the legal dues on all merchandise were fixed 
 at an ad valorem rate of 2-J- per cent., it was soon 
 discovered that if the ruler happened to be in want 
 of cash he would not scruple to take what he could from 
 the stranger. Both to the ruler, and to the foreign 
 merchant, the new arrangement contained distasteful 
 matter. The former perceived that he had surrendered 
 some of his imperial rights, and that he was not to be 
 recompensed by his receiving more money, and the latter 
 knew that the treaty stipulation would not save him from 
 having to pay excess fees. 
 
 The Zakat, far from showing the expected disposition 
 to increase, seemed rather inclined to remain stationary, 
 
166 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 if not to decrease ; and the foreign merchant had 
 obtained some promise on the part of the ruler of per- 
 sonal protection, and of assistance in the disposal of his 
 wares. His discontent at the stagnation in the customs 
 soon showed itself by his exacting excess dues, some- 
 times on British, sometimes on Russian, but more often 
 on Khokandian and Afghan merchants. Instead of 
 increasing his receipts, these strong measures only 
 threw them back, and left him in a worse plight than 
 he was in before. lie had not the patience necessary 
 to enable him to wait with confidence the fuller develop- 
 ment of trade, nor had he the perseverance or tact to 
 place fresh inducements in the path of merchants to 
 renew their intercourse with him and his state. Many 
 visited Kashgar with merchandise a first time ; but few, 
 indeed, repeated the visit. The ruler was off-handed in 
 his reception of them. They were scarcely accorded 
 any , liberty in their movements, and the profit of their 
 journey was greatly reduced by the payment of a due 
 of 5 per cent, instead of the stipulated condition of 
 2J per cent. It is a pure fiction, therefore, to say that 
 trade with Kashgar had increased during the rule of 
 the Athalik Grhazi through his friendly inclination. If 
 the amount of merchandise imported into his state had 
 increased, it was owing only to the necessities of its inha- 
 bitants, and was a fact that must have taken place either 
 by intercourse direct, or through native states, with the 
 two great providers of Central Asia. The exaggerated 
 enthusiasm that it was endeavoured to raise up in this 
 country about this same mythical ruler of Yarkand 
 never spread far, and there was always some scepticism, 
 if there could be no disproof, of the reports of the formi- 
 dableness of this new kingdom. Looking calmly at the 
 real state of Yakoob Beg's position, even at the height 
 of his power, we find him to have always been a pecunia- 
 rily embarrassed ruler, glad of the smallest windfall in 
 the shape of the spoil of a single merchant. The Zakat, 
 his advisers pointed out to him, might be made a most 
 
YAKOOB BEG J S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 167 
 
 productive source of revenue, if foreign merchants could 
 be induced to bring their wares into the country. The 
 loss the people had felt in the departure of the Chinese 
 might be amply repaired by the appearance of Russian 
 and English merchants to supply the same place that 
 they filled. If his aspirations were disappointed, and 
 the Zakat did not show any signs of possessing that 
 elasticity which had been predicted, it is probable that 
 in his impatience, heightened by the perception that 
 foreign trade might lead to foreign complications, he 
 did not give the scheme a sufficient time for a fair trial. 
 His other sources of revenue, Ushr and Tanabi, and the 
 gold mines of Khoten, brought in a sum enough to 
 meet the current expenses of the government and to 
 maintain in his service as many soldiers as his recruiting 
 officers were able to secure. But there was little if any 
 surplus ; and local improvements, and all outlay that 
 might have been reproductive and for the benefit of the 
 people, were strictly forbidden. The only works we can 
 find constructed by him, with a view to the advancement 
 of the interests of his subjects, were the merchants' serais, 
 built in each city, and these were self-supporting. 
 Yakoob Beg has no claim to being considered as a 
 beneficent ruler. He was a military dictator, who had 
 shown a rare power for inaugurating a rough system of 
 government, and whose campaigns had always been 
 singularly successful. As a ruler, showing a full appre- 
 ciation of the wants of his people, and adopting the 
 best possible measures to obtain them, he had no claims 
 to consideration. Indeed, he could not be compared 
 with the Chinese, who, however personal may have been 
 their motives, certainly raised the state to a high 
 pitch of material prosperity, and left many enduring 
 marks of their past occupation. These two domina- 
 tions, foisted on the Kashgari by the strong arm, while 
 each immeasurably superior to the Khoja claimants, 
 represented two distinct modes of governing a subject 
 race. The Chinese endeavoured to conciliate, and to 
 
168 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 make the necessity for their presence felt by the people ; 
 the Athalik Ghazi was supremely indifferent to the 
 prosperity of his subjects, so long as they were willing 
 to pay him the tribute money, and to serve in his army. 
 An exactly opposite result might have been expected, 
 for there was far more kinship between the Khokandian 
 adventurer and the Kashgari, than there was between 
 the Khitay and the Andijani. Admirers of Yakoob 
 Beg may, of course, plead that his rule had not acquired 
 sufficient consistency to justify him in tasking his 
 strength by great undertakings, such as the construction 
 of roads and canals. In one respect he had not the labour 
 at his disposal, and he was, consequently, hampered by 
 a difficulty that the Chinese were free from. Still when 
 we remember that all these works ought to have been 
 remunerative, and to have strengthened Yakoob Beg's 
 individual power, instead of taxing his resources, the 
 excuse cannot be admitted as entitled to our considera- 
 tion. Yakoob Beg has claims only to be admired for 
 having given us something better than a repetition 
 of the depravity of the Khoja rulers, and of course 
 among his coevals he is entitled to far the highest 
 place. If it is only asked for him that he should be 
 placed above them, no one can raise the slightest objec- 
 tion to it ; for beyond the shadow of a doubt, he was the 
 most energetic and talented ruler that had appeared 
 among the Khanates for several centuries. But it 
 would be affectation to deny that a higher place than 
 this has been claimed for him ; and before according his 
 right to occupy it, the evidence on which his claim rests 
 must be sifted with the greatest care. Even now I do 
 not say that his claims are un proven; but that it is open 
 to doubt whether his work has not been exaggerated, I 
 think must be admitted by every one who has studied 
 the course of his life in Kashgar. It is absurd to talk 
 of Yakoob Beg having been an equal of Grenghis 
 Khan or of Timour, in any other way than that of 
 showing that his personal abilities were of a transcendent 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 169 
 
 order. As a legislator and public benefactor, it is fair 
 to compare him with the Chinese, who possessed some 
 advantages over him, but who laboured under some 
 disadvantages in religion, and other conditions, as com- 
 pared with him. And when we do this, after impartial 
 consideration we find that the balance is greatly in 
 favour of the Chinese. What can we judge from this, 
 but that the rule of Yakoob Beg, while presenting 
 some striking features, was inferior in degree to that of 
 the Chinese? It is only fair to remember that the dif- 
 ficulties in his path were great, and that he overcame 
 many of them. Before closing this chapter some 
 description of the chief men who assisted him to 
 conquer the country, and then to govern it, may be 
 not without interest to the reader. 
 
 First among these, by right of his position as well as 
 by his high abilities, comes the Seyyid Yakoob Khan, 
 or Hadji Torah, as he has more conveniently been 
 called, the prince who has recently visited several of 
 the principal courts of Europe. He is a near relative 
 of the Athalik Ghazi, although, strange to say, there 
 is no consanguinity between them. He is a son of 
 Nar Mahomed Khan, the governor of Tashkent, who 
 married as his second wife Yakoob Beg's sister, and 
 who was instrumental in advancing the interests of 
 Yakoob Beg during the earlier days of his career in 
 Khokand. The Seyyid was almost as old as his uncle, 
 the Ameer of Kashgar, having been born in Tashkent in 
 1823; but despite this near connection Hadji Torah 
 played no part in the conquest of Kashgar. Until 
 Yakoob Beg achieved complete success in his enter- 
 prise in Eastern Turkestan he was considered by Kho- 
 kandians of high rank a simple adventurer. The 
 Seyyid Yakoob Khan was of the best lineage in 
 Turkestan, and it is very possible that until the year 
 1867 he regarded his uncle with a considerable amount 
 of indifference. Certain it is that Hadji Torah was 
 far otherwise employed than in assisting his relative 
 
170 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 when the latter was engaged in some of the desperate 
 encounters of his not uneventful career. In the civil 
 administration of Khokand he tilled, under Alim Kuli, 
 high posts, such as Principal of the Madrassa of Tash- 
 kent, and then he was appointed Kazi, or Judge. It 
 was after the fall of Ak Musjid that he commenced 
 that career of activity as a traveller and a negotiator 
 which brought him to the shores of the Bosphorus and 
 to the banks of the Neva and the Thames. That was 
 in the year 1854, and he was appointed as a sort of 
 secretary to the embassy of Mirza Jan Effendi, the am- 
 bassador sent by Mollah Khan to Constantinople for 
 aid. On a subsequent occasion he again visited Con- 
 stantinople in a similar capacity, after the death of 
 Mollah Khan, and during the brief tenure of power 
 by his successor, Mahomed Khan, the nominee of Alim 
 Kuli. This was in 1865, and during the troubles that 
 ensued in Khokand and the final success of Khudayar 
 Khan, the legal ruler of Khokand and antagonist of 
 Alim Kuli, Hadji Torah resided quietly at Constanti- 
 nople, where Abdul Aziz entertained him with sump- 
 tuous hospitality. It would appear that he obtained 
 some kind of reputation among the numerous visitors 
 from either Turkestan who came to Turkey, and apart 
 from his sacrosanct character few could fail to be im- 
 pressed favourably by his cheerful yet dignified manner. 
 His uncle in 1870 had indeed overcome all opposition 
 to his rule, and it might at a first glance appear strange 
 why he should desire to secure the services of a man of 
 whom he could have seen or known little for many 
 years. But Hadji Torah possessed abilities and experi- 
 ence rare among the inhabitants of Central Asia, and 
 to Yakoob Beg the very talents his nephew possessed 
 were those he was most in need of. 
 
 In 1870 the AthalikGhazi was anxious to draw close 
 the bonds of alliance with the Porte ; who could assist 
 him better than the man who had resided in Constanti- 
 nople for several years, and who had formed a friendly 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR. 171 
 
 intimacy with the Sultan? In 1871 Yakoob Beg first 
 recognized the imminence of danger to his state from 
 Eussia, then put in possession of Kuldja; who could 
 instruct him in the most effectual way of warding off 
 that danger, either by an alliance with England or by 
 propitiating the Eussians, than the travelled Hadji 
 Torah ? The very qualities that the Seyyid Yakoob 
 Khan possessed were those the Ameer Yakoob Beg stood 
 most in need of. He might search among all his fol- 
 lowers, those who had shared every vicissitude of his 
 strange fortunes, and he could not find one other with 
 an identical capacity. The overtures to his nephew are 
 thus easily intelligible, and the nephew himself gladly 
 greeted his entry into a wider career than was that of 
 an honoured guest on the hospitality of the Porte. 
 His subsequent embassies in the service of Kashgar to 
 St. Petersburg, Calcutta, Constantinople, and London 
 are too recent and too well known to require mention 
 here. When he settled in Kashgar he married a 
 daughter of Mahomed Khoja, the Sheikh-ul-Islam of 
 Kashgaria. His weight with the people was conse- 
 quently very great, and his judgment was greatly 
 valued by the Ameer. Even over Beg Bacha, the 
 turbulent and ferocious heir- apparent, Hadji Torah 
 had acquired some influence by his ready tact and 
 bonhomie. 
 
 Of the two chief personages, Mahomed Khoja and 
 Abdulla Pansad, the priest and the soldier, who assisted 
 Yakoob Beg, it is unfortunately impossible to discover 
 much, and that little has already been stated in the 
 preceding pages. There can be no doubt, however, 
 that they were the principal instruments in promoting 
 the aggrandizement of Yakoob Beg, and the two who 
 enjoyed more than any other the confidence and 
 friendship of the man they had supported so faithfully. 
 But of another well-tried follower we know more, 
 chiefly through the pages of Dr. Bellew. Mahomed 
 Yunus seems to have been the most educated and well 
 
172 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 informed among the governors of Yakoob Beg. He 
 had the reputation of being quite the best-informed 
 man in Kashgar, but as the curriculum of instruction 
 did not include modern languages, it is difficult to 
 guage the exact degree of that reputation. He was an 
 old and trusted follower of the Athalik Grhazi, for when 
 he was in the service of Khokand Mahomed Yunus 
 officiated as his scribe. He, however, as a civilian, 
 took no part in the expedition of Buzurg Khan, and it 
 was not until after the death of Alim Kuli and the 
 success of Khudayar Khan that he joined his firm 
 friend and master in Kashgar. So high an opinion 
 had Yakoob Beg of his talents, and so pressed was he 
 for skilled rulers, that Mahomed Yunus was at once ap- 
 pointed Dadkwah of the recently conquered district of 
 Yarkand, the richest, the most populous, and the most 
 turbulent of all the governorships in Kashgaria. The 
 skill with which he brought the troublesome Yarkandis 
 into complete submission to the new ruler, and the 
 rare ability he manifested in his administration of his 
 province down almost to the present time, justify the 
 selection of his whilome comrade in Khokand. At first 
 it seems that the governor ruled with a high hand, and 
 that the slightest symptom of insubordination was 
 checked by an immediate arrest and a not long-delayed 
 execution. During the last seven years, however, 
 his government had become milder, chiefly because all 
 evil-doers had been got rid of. Among some of the 
 minor followers may be mentioned Alish Beg, Dadkwah 
 of Kashgar; Ihrar Khan Torah, the first envoy de- 
 spatched from Kashgar to India ; and Mahomed Beg of 
 Artosh : but we have no sufficient information of them 
 to give an account of them that would be interesting 
 to the general reader. 
 
173 
 
 CHAPTEE X. 
 
 YAKOOB BEG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 
 
 YAKOOB BEG had in the earlier days of his career come 
 into contact with the Russians, and although, in the 
 long interval between the fall of Ak Musjid and his 
 departure from Khokand, the Eussians, chiefly owing 
 to the prostration resulting from the Crimean War, did 
 not press on with the energy that their first advance on 
 the Syr Darya seemed to promise, there is no doubt 
 that the possibility of its occurrence was the foremost 
 thought in the minds of Yakoob Beg and his contem- 
 poraries. Tn 1865, when the Eussians threatened and 
 eventually occupied Tashkent, and brought their frontier 
 halfway on its journey to the Oxus, Yakoob Beg was 
 far too much occupied with his own affairs in Kashgar 
 to attempt any interference in Khokand. With, how- 
 ever, the dismemberment of Khokand and the rout of the 
 Bokhariot army in the spring of 1866, his attention 
 was forcibly claimed by a fact that seemed in the future 
 to involve him as the next victim of Eussian aggran- 
 dizement. In that year, too, he had not only overcome 
 all resistance in the more important districts of Kash- 
 garia, but he had to a greater extent than before, become 
 responsible for the political actions of the people of this 
 state through the deposition of Buzurg Khan. As early as 
 1866, it may be assumed that the new ruler of Kashgar 
 had his attention directed to the movements of his old 
 antagonist, by their successes against the Khokandians 
 and Bokhariot s ; but it is clear that the Eussians were 
 not equally interested in his doings at this period. 
 
174 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 With the occupation of the northern portion of Kho- 
 kand, the rule of Eussia was brought into nearer proxi- 
 mity with that of the new power of Kashgar, and it 
 became only a question of time whether the two 
 governments were to attain a harmonious agreement, or 
 whether a series of petty disputes was to result in a 
 further extension of the Eussian Empire, towards both 
 India and China. The independent portion of the 
 Khanate of Khokand still intervened, and the difficult 
 country of the Kizil Yart mountains served the useful 
 purpose of giving the Athalik Ghazi breathing time, 
 ere he should arrive at a decision about his future 
 relations with Eussia. Indeed, up to this point the 
 interest of Eussia in the affairs of Kashgar had been 
 very slight, for it does not appear that much, if any, 
 intercourse had been carried on between the two terri- 
 tories in the past. Far otherwise was it in Hi, where 
 the Eussians had for many years been located as 
 merchants or as consuls. Their station at Almatie or 
 Vernoe, an important town and fort situated about 50 
 miles north of Issik Kul and 250 west of Hi itself, 
 had in a few years become a large and flourishing city, 
 instead of preserving its original character of a small 
 mountain fort. Eussian merchants carried on a very 
 extensive trade by this road with Hi, Urumtsi, Hamil, 
 and Pekin, and their relations with the Chinese mer- 
 chants had attained a very satisfactory basis. It was, 
 therefore, with no friendly feeling, that the Tungan 
 rising in Hi was regarded by a very large section of 
 the Eussians in the neighbourhood. The disturbances 
 that thereupon broke out, effectually put a stop to all 
 trade in this quarter for some time, and the old traffic, 
 or such of it as continued, with China had to be con- 
 ducted along the less direct route through Siberia. For 
 six years, the Eussians tolerated the uncertain state of 
 affairs in Ili, where the Tungani and the Tarantchis 
 disputed between themselves as to which should be 
 the ruling party ; but their dissatisfaction was scarcely 
 
YAKOOB BEO'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 175 
 
 concealed at the substitution of a native government 
 for that of China. When, therefore, Yakoob Beg, hav- 
 ing conquered the country south of the Tian Shan, 
 seemed to threaten the provinces north of that barrier, 
 it is not surprising that the Russians availed themselves 
 of excuses for forestalling him, and for placing their 
 commercial relations on an equally good footing a,, they 
 had been in the past with the inhabitants of Hi, by a 
 forced occupation of that territory. But the Russians 
 were resolved to give as little umbrage as possible to 
 the Chinese. Hi was formally acknowledged to be 
 Chinese territory, and the Czar voluntarily promised, 
 through his representative at Pekin, to restore it as soon 
 as the Emperor of China was able to despatch a suffi- 
 cient force to preserve order therein. This tact secured 
 the permanent goodwill of the Chinese, and Russia 
 obtained, in several important trade concessions, a very 
 gratifying reward for her skilful diplomacy. Her 
 friendly action to the Celestials was also heightened in 
 its effect by a piece of unfortunate policy on our part. 
 The Panthays had erected in Yunnan a Mahomedan 
 power, which seemed to have broken off completely 
 from Pekin, and report brought such tales to our 
 frontier of the power and goodwill of the Sultan of 
 the Panthays ruling in Ta-li-foo, that in an ill-advised 
 moment we entered into negotiations with this potentate. 
 The Chinese authorities very naturally took umbrage at 
 this tacit support of a rebellious vassal, and all our 
 subsequent efforts have been unable to remove the 
 suspicions produced by our vacillating attitude on that 
 occasion. The Russians still further preserved the 
 appearance of friendship for China by their refusal, 
 maintained during several years, to acknowledge the 
 government set up in Kashgar by Buzurg Khan and 
 Yakoob Beg. This action was however the less worthy 
 of approval, because at that period the Russians had no 
 immediate concern in Kashgaria. Their sole interest lay 
 in the course of events in Jungaria, with which they 
 
176 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 were intimately connected by trade and political asso- 
 ciations, stretching back for almost a century. Undoubt- 
 edly Jungaria was much affected by commotions in 
 Kashgaria, and we accordingly see, when the inarch of 
 events in the latter province assumed an aspect menac- 
 ing to the future independence of Jungaria, the Russians 
 taking prompt measures to secure the possession of 
 that province for themselves. When Hi passed into 
 the hands of Eussia, the old trade revived along 
 this route to a certain degree, and some intercourse 
 ensued with the Tungani of Urumtsi, Manas and 
 Hamil. Measures seem to have been taken to impress 
 on the rulers of those cities the prudence of not inter- 
 fering with merchants or travellers, and matters became 
 to a certain degree satisfactory for Eussian tranquillity. 
 The city of Hi never, however, recovered its former 
 prosperity, for Vernoe still remains the most important 
 town in this region. Originally a fort constructed in 
 1854, as a small mountain post, to defend the road from 
 the marauding Kirghiz, it has increased from its insig- 
 nificant origin into a large settlement of Cossacks and 
 Calmucks, and is now a very thriving community. It 
 was, therefore, it must be remembered, primarily with 
 Jungaria that Eussia was interested. So far as the 
 internal affairs of Kashgar were concerned, she could have 
 disregarded the dispute between the" rivals, Yakoob Beg 
 and the Chinese ; it was only when a powerful Maho- 
 medan state was erected in Eastern Turkestan, and 
 threatened both the independence of Hi, and also to 
 raise up disunion in Khokand, that Eussia was com- 
 pelled to consider what policy it would be wise to 
 adopt towards the recently proclaimed Athalik Ghazi. 
 Whether it was absolutely necessary or even prudent to 
 annex Hi, may be doubted with some reason, but it is 
 impossible to find fault with the Eussians for that step. 
 Probably it was the most excusable of all their conquests, 
 none the less may the decision have been founded on a 
 misapprehension of circumstances, or it may have been 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 177 
 
 premature to shut Yakoob Beg out from advancing into 
 a region where he would have been at the complete 
 mercy of the Russians. Nor is it clear even that 
 Yakoob Beg had the intention, so generously attributed 
 to him, of committing what would certainly have 
 resulted in political extinction, viz., an advance to the 
 northern side of the Tian Shan. The reader will, we 
 hope, perceive that as little interest was felt by the 
 Russians in the events transpiring in Kashgar as there 
 was in India, and this indifference continued down at 
 all events to the end of 1866. At that date Yakoob 
 Beg's enterprise had been crowned with complete suc- 
 cess and the Eussian Government, far more promptly 
 and accurately apprised of the course of events than our 
 Government in India, was obliged to devote some atten- 
 tion to this new" power, whose appearance was already 
 beginning to raise a ferment in the Mahomedan 
 states lying to the west of Kashgar. 
 
 In 1866, however, some indefinite agreement was 
 arrived at by the commanders of forces along the Naryn 
 borders, to abstain from interfering with each other's 
 actions. The Eussian forces were permitted to follow 
 refugees from Khokand and predatory Kirghiz within 
 the nominal frontier of Kashgar, and when occasion 
 arose a similar right was accorded to the Kashgarian 
 officials. By some good fortune, perhaps caused by a 
 feeling of mutual respect, no collisions of any conse- 
 quence occurred between the representatives of the two 
 powers during these early and vague negotiations. Al- 
 though the Eussian governors of Siberia and Turkestan 
 refused to acknowledge either Buzurg Khan or Yakoob 
 Beg, they seem to have done their best to make use of 
 these conciliatory measures along the northern frontier as 
 a lever for inducing Yakoob Beg to make overtures to 
 them for their support. If such was their intention 
 the firmness of Yakoob Beg thwarted all their designs, 
 as will be seen -in the sequel. To obtain, however, some 
 advantage out of the apparent apprehension of the 
 
178 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Kashgarian ruler for Russian power was absolutely 
 necessary, if only to demonstrate the perfection to which 
 Muscovite diplomacy had attained. So, while refusing 
 to acknowledge the new state in Eastern Turkestan and 
 deeply deploring the departure of the Chinese, orders 
 were given to the frontier officers to obtain the sanction 
 of the Kashgarian officials in the neighbourhood to the 
 construction of a bridge across the Naryn and of a 
 military road over the Tian Shan into Kashgar. This 
 was in 1867, and it is not to be wondered at that 
 the Kashgarian authorities replied with a categorical 
 refusal. To have acquiesced in this demand would have 
 been to have placed the city of Kashgar at the complete 
 mercy of the Russians. The position of that city is 
 most disadvantageous in a military point of view, and 
 the only obstacle an army advancing from Issik Kul has 
 to encounter is the difficulty of the road from the Naryn 
 torrent, and the general impracticability of the passes 
 through this portion of the Tian Shan range. The 
 Russian government was much disappointed at this 
 rebuff experienced at the hands of a native ruler, and 
 accordingly in great haste it was resolved that a fort 
 should be constructed on the Naryn just within their 
 frontier. In 1868 this fort was completed, but by that 
 time a fresh change had taken place in the state of 
 affairs, and hopes were entertained that an agreement 
 might yet be arranged by peaceful means with Kashgar. 
 During these two years there had been continual disturb- 
 ances and fighting in Western Turkestan. Bokhara, 
 instigated, according to Russian assertions, by Yakoob 
 Beg, had joined with Khokand and Khiva in a combined 
 uprising against Russia; but in so far as that uprising 
 was combined it never occurred, for both Bokhara and 
 Khokand fell an easy prey in detail to the armies of the 
 Czar. The punishment of Khiva was reserved for a future 
 occasion, and indeed of all the confederates Khiva was 
 the only one which obtained any successes in the field. 
 The most palpable result of that campaign was the 
 
YAKOOB BEG's POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 179 
 
 acquisition of Samarcand by Eussia, and for a time all 
 opposition seemed to be stamped out. No sooner, how- 
 ever, had the main Russian army returned to Tashkent 
 than a large force invested the small garrison left in 
 Samarcand, and the whole country rose in arms again. 
 The Russian garrison held tightly on to its post, and, 
 although in comparison to its strength its loss was most 
 severe, the town was preserved until the arrival of 
 General Kaufmann with reinforcements. Bokhara then 
 sued for peace, which, after some delay, was concluded 
 with the unfortunate Ameer Mozaffur Eddin. By that 
 treaty the Russians obtained the right to place military 
 cantonments at Kermina, Charjui, and Karshi. Kermina 
 is situated about fifty miles east of the town of Bokhara, 
 on the road from Katti Kurgan and Samarcand ; Karshi 
 about sixty miles south of Katti Kurgan, and half way 
 to the Oxus ; while Charjui is on the Oxus and some 
 eighty miles west of Bokhara. Of all these the last is 
 the most important, for thence a direct caravan route 
 leads to Merv and Meshed. Once more, in 1870-71, 
 Bokhara entered the field, but the enterprise collapsed 
 through the unconcerted measures of the allies and the 
 weakness of Khokand. During these five eventful years 
 of rebellion amongst the races of Western Turkestan, 
 Yakoob Beg preserved his neutrality. If the assertion 
 is correct that he had played an underhand part in the 
 formation of the league against Russia, assuredly he 
 endeavoured to make his actions contradict his diplo- 
 macy. Not a Kashgarian soldier participated in the 
 efforts made so repeatedly by Bokhara and Khokand to 
 shake off the bonds of Russian vassalage. Like Shere 
 Ali of Cabul, he devoted his attention exclusively to the 
 affairs of his immediate province, and wars in the 
 extreme east of his dominions against co-religionists 
 were a preferable alternative to the risks attending a 
 jeliad against the most formidable enemy of Islam ! 
 Russia had indeed little to complain of in Yakoob Beg's 
 interference in their possessions. His instigation of 
 
 N 2 
 
180 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 premature rebellions, or, if lie did not instigate them, the 
 approval extended to them by some of his chief ministers, 
 was the very kindest act he could have conferred on the 
 ruling power of Turkestan, for Eussia never has had 
 anything to fear from any isolated risings among the 
 people of this part of Central Asia. Nothing less than 
 an unanimous and concerted rising in Western Turkestan, 
 aided with a nucleus of regular troops and officers, such 
 as, to go no farther, either Afghanistan can supply, or 
 Kashgar could at one time have supplied nothing less 
 than this will ever produce a complete catastrophe to the 
 Eussian arms, and in a short campaign of a few months 
 send the Eussian legions back to their old quarters of 
 thirteen years ago. Whether Yakoob Beg ever was 
 strong enough to risk the independence of his state on so 
 important an enterprise may fairly be doubted, and he 
 showed a commendable prudence in abstaining from hos- 
 tilities when he had sufficient matters to occupy all his 
 attention, and to task all his resources within his own 
 borders ; but assuming such to have been the case, his 
 indifference to the suffering thereby inflicted on the Kho- 
 kandians must remain a blot on his fair fame. If the part 
 he played in these earlier plots was scarcely honourable, 
 how much less so was his action in the last rebellion of 
 1875. But it may be as well to postpone considering that 
 event until later on in this chapter. Yakoob Beg most 
 probably took a very selfish view of the state of affairs. 
 His own extremely uncertain tenure of power made him 
 anxious lest any storm from beyond his frontier should 
 wreck the frail bark in which he had asserted his claim 
 to independence, and the whole object of his policy 
 was simply to divert attention from himself to other 
 quarters. The Eussians above all must have their work 
 cut out for them in repression of continual sedition in 
 their possessions; while each day of respite witnessed 
 Yakoob Beg in a better position for making a strenuous 
 resistance when the time should come, according to Eus- 
 sian ideas, for an attempt to be made to crush his power. 
 
YAKOOB BEO'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 181 
 
 Viewed from this standpoint, the conduct of Yakoob 
 Beg towards his fellow-countrymen appears in a slightly 
 more favourable aspect, although his policy of expediency 
 has little in it to command admiration. Yet the result 
 answered his expectations. In 1868 the construction of 
 Fort Naryn was the avowed preliminary measure to an 
 occupation of Kashgar ; from that danger this policy of 
 compromise saved him. Again, in 1870, was he pro- 
 nounced an incorrigible enemy of the Czar, and an 
 expedition was prepared which was to bring him to his 
 senses ; once more a revolt in Khokand intervened to 
 distract Eussian attention and Russian arms from the 
 Naryn to Ferghana. The expedition against Khiva in 
 1873 also served the purpose of diverting to another 
 quarter the blow which should, according to many, have 
 descended on the offending head of the Athalik Ghazi ; 
 and lastly, in 1875 the insurrection in Khokand, the 
 most serious and the most nearly successful of all the 
 native wars against Eussia, saved him from an invasion 
 for which every preparation had been made. 
 
 To return to the year 1868, when the Eussian govern- 
 ment had constructed the fort on the Naryn, and had 
 openly proclaimed its intention of punishing the slight 
 put upon it by Yakoob Beg's refusal to permit the 
 construction of a road over the mountains to Artosh. 
 Up to that year the intercourse had been of a semi- 
 official character between the officers on either side of 
 the frontier. We have now come to a phase of the 
 question of a slightly different import. The Eussian 
 officials endeavoured to obtain from Yakoob Beg con- 
 cessions that would be advantageous to their country, at 
 the same time that they categorically declined to recog- 
 nize his official status as an independent prince. Their 
 antagonist was far too astute to permit himself to be 
 out-manoeuvred by so simple a device, and his officials 
 were quite unauthorized to enter into any arrangement 
 without its being brought before their master in the 
 manner consistent with his dignity. We have seen that 
 
182 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 the Eussians, failing in their diplomatic chicane, had 
 recourse to threats, although the irony of fate prevented 
 those threats ever being put into execution. But con- 
 currently with these efforts on the part of the Eussian 
 government, others of a different kind were being made 
 by individuals. The Eussian merchants of Kuldja 
 contained in their ranks several men whose enterprise 
 and courage had been remarkable in the manipulation 
 of trade with the Chinese and the Tungani. They were 
 not easily deterred from any undertaking which pro- 
 mised them brilliant remuneration, even though the 
 risk and uncertainty might be great. The pioneers of 
 commerce were free from the fetters that hampered 
 official movements. It was of little moment to them who 
 ruled in Kashgaria so long as he extended his protection 
 to their goods and their persons whilst they were within 
 his territory. The Eussian government viewed with 
 favour the efforts that were made to cross the Tian Shan, 
 for on the individual fell the greatest portion of the 
 risk, while the government profited much by the fruits 
 of his experience. The Eussian merchants were, there- 
 fore, not discouraged by their authorities when they laid 
 their proposals before General Kolpakovsky, as English 
 merchants would have been under similar circumstances 
 by the authorities at Calcutta nay, it is tolerably certain 
 that they received many inducements to persist in their 
 intention; both their patriotism and desire for advancing 
 their own worldly concerns were appealed to, to urge them 
 to attempt to obtain admission into Kashgar. When, 
 therefore, it became evident in 1868 that nothing was 
 to be obtained from Yakoob Beg by indirect means, and 
 when it was also decided that a military remedy would 
 not be convenient, the field was fairly cleared for ano- 
 ther kind of performers to begin operations. 
 
 Early in the year 1868, a Eussian merchant, named 
 Kludof, collected at Vernoe a small caravan. His chief 
 commodities consisted of those gewgaws, which, prepared 
 in Moscow, have been found, according to Eussian 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 183 
 
 experience, the most marketable articles in Western 
 Turkestan; but, in addition to these trumpery packages, 
 more useful necessaries, such as cotton goods and cutlery, 
 were taken as specimens of some of the real advantages 
 that would come in the wake of Eussian trade. Kludof 
 set out with the intention of crossing the Tian Shan 
 by the Naryn, and making for the border town of Ush 
 Turfan, whence Kashgar is easily reached by the high 
 road. But he had not proceeded far beyond Fort Naryn, 
 then in course of construction, when he was attacked 
 by a band of marauders. With the loss of all his 
 possessions he must still be considered fortunate in 
 having escaped without any serious personal injury. 
 Perhaps the robbers were inspired with some respect 
 for the person of a Eussian subject, or, as the indict- 
 ment against Yakoob Beg affirms, by the express orders 
 of that ruler, who wished to deter, without causing any 
 serious complication with the government, Eussian 
 subjects of any kind whatever from entering his 
 kingdom. As it happened, however, Kludof was a 
 very determined fellow, one not easily balked when 
 he had set his mind on accomplishing anything. The 
 government viewed his case with commiseration, and he 
 was assisted in collecting together another caravan of 
 larger proportions than its predecessor. Bat before 
 setting out on the same road he determined to make an 
 effort to reach the ear of Yakoob Beg himself, and by a 
 singular piece of good fortune he was able to do so 
 through a Kashgarian subject residing in Kuldja. The 
 presents, judiciously selected, with which he accom- 
 panied his letter complaining of the injury he had 
 received at the hands of Kirghiz subjects of the ruler 
 of Kashgar, yet only demanding as a reparation per- 
 mission to come into that state as a peaceful subject of 
 the Czar, fully propitiated Yakoob Beg, who sent a safe 
 conduct to Yernoe for Kludof and his caravan. This 
 merchant made a most favourable impression on the 
 ruler of Kashgar, and it seemed at one moment as if he 
 
184 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 would achieve what all the diplomacy of the two previous 
 years had failed in accomplishing. Even Yakoob Beg 
 was induced to take a slight step towards a better 
 agreement with his neighbour, for in the summer of 
 1868, he sent Shadi Mirza, one of his nephews, to 
 Vernoe, requesting that he might be permitted to go 
 on to Tashkent, to place before the governor of Turkestan 
 certain proposals from his master for a complete 
 understanding with Eussia. Simultaneously with the 
 despatch of Shadi Mirza by Yakoob Beg, a Eussian 
 officer, Captain Eeinthal, was commissioned by General 
 Kolpakovsky, the governor of Kuldja, to proceed to 
 Kashgar and demand the surrender of some Kirghiz 
 robbers, who, from within Yakoob Beg's dominion, had 
 sallied forth to pillage Eussian merchants. They had 
 also seized several inhabitants of Khokand and the 
 Naryn district ; and the Eussian government demanded 
 the unconditional surrender of these individuals as her 
 subjects. Captain Eeinthal was instructed to make 
 these two demands in a peremptory way, and to con- 
 vince the new government that Eussia would not permit 
 any infraction of the spirit of the treaties concluded 
 with the old government under the Chinese. Captain 
 Eeinthal was received in a sufficiently hospitable 
 manner, but his movements were scrupulously restricted 
 to the city. He did not, on this occasion, learn much 
 of importance about the country, but he was impressed 
 favourably by the appearance of such of the army as 
 he saw. The Kirghiz robbers were captured by the 
 order of Yakoob Beg, but he stoutly refused to sur- 
 render them. The Eussian prisoners were also kept in 
 honourable confinement as a guarantee for the safe return 
 of Shadi Mirza. They were, however, permitted to 
 return to Eussian territory when it became known that 
 Shadi Mirza was progressing favourably with his 
 mission to Tashkent. Captain Eeinthal accomplished 
 little or nothing on this embassade, and had to report, 
 on his return to his "superior, the strange tidings that 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 185 
 
 the new power was resolved to play an independent part 
 in Asia, and to answer defiance with defiance, and 
 threat with threat. This report must have seemed 
 scarcely credible, but there is no doubt that Captain 
 Eeinthal advised, as the result of his experience, the 
 adoption of a lenient and friendly policy towards the 
 new-comer. This concession to a Central Asian despot 
 was not agreeable at head-quarters, and the question 
 was shelved for the time. Shadi Mirza, who had been 
 detained at Vernoe, was at last permitted to continue 
 his journey to Tashkent, where he found General Kauf- 
 mann absent in Europe. Instructions were then issued 
 to send him on to St. Petersburg, where he arrived in 
 the last days of 1868. He had several informal inter- 
 views with the governor of Turkestan, but he was not 
 received by the Czar or any of the higher officials. In 
 fact, he was only treated as an ordinary traveller, and 
 not as the representative of a neighbouring state. 
 Nothing up to this had been done by the Eussian 
 government, showing that they recognized Yakoob Beg 
 as ruler of Kashgaria. The Chinese were still, in their 
 eyes, the de jure owners of that province, whoever might 
 be the temporary owners de facto. On the return of 
 Shadi Mirza to Kashgar, in January, 1869, the relations 
 between Eussia and Yakoob Beg may be said to have 
 returned to the exact status quo ante. All the Eussian 
 demands for trade had been unsuccessful, and, except the 
 brilliant journey of Mr. Kludof, no one had broken 
 through the mystic charm that shut out the Garden 
 of Asia from all foreign spectators. Their envoy, Cap- 
 tain Eeinthal, had been treated in a precisely similar 
 manner to that in which Shadi Mirza had been received 
 at Yernoe and St. Petersburg ; and a firm and dignified 
 attitude had effectually checked the Eussian officer when 
 he attempted to express those threats which formed the 
 principal part of his instructions. There was some- 
 thing imposing in the quiet way in which Yakoob Beg 
 asserted his equality in rank with the Czar of All the 
 
186 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Eussias. His invariable reply, when the great power 
 of Eussia was made use of as an argument to overcome 
 his refusal to accede to the trade concessions demanded, 
 was, " My brother, the White Czar, is a most powerful 
 monarch, and rules over the greater portion of the 
 earth, and I am only an insignificant prince in com- 
 parison to him. But none the less can I encounter the 
 danger like a true man, and esteem it a happiness to 
 die in defence of my country arid my faith. 57 To so 
 courageous and so honourable a reply what rejoinder 
 could be made by the abashed officers ? It is impossible 
 to refuse Yakoob Beg the highest admiration for his 
 stanchness in his opposition to Eussia. If for his own 
 narrow interests it may have been imprudent to throw 
 down the gage of battle so freely, all the more does that 
 attitude claim respect when we see him trampling on 
 purely selfish motives, and asserting his claim to leader- 
 ship in that wider question of Asiatic against Musco- 
 vite, of Mahomedan against Greek. Had he only been 
 consistent throughout his career, had he only been as 
 firm in his convictions and as prompt in carrying them 
 into practice as he generally was, when the occasion 
 came for a great effort against Eussia, how different 
 might have been his own fate and the present aspect of 
 affairs in Central Asia ! 
 
 For some time after these abortive proceedings the 
 Eussians abstained from any direct interference in Kash- 
 gar, but the conferring of the title of Athalik Ghazi, or 
 Commander of the Faithful, on Yakoob Beg by the Ameer 
 of Bokhara had roused the susceptibilities of Eussia too 
 much to be allayed. It seemed, indeed, as if this acknow- 
 ledgment of the orthodoxy of Yakoob Beg by the Head of 
 Islam in Central Asia heralded forth some understanding 
 between the two states, and that a menace was directed 
 against the Eussian government. Whether there was any 
 agreement between Mozaffur Eddin and Yakoob Beg it 
 is not possible at present to say, but that such should 
 have been brought about by their mutual antipathy to 
 
YAKOOB BEG's POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 187 
 
 Eussia would not have been very wonderful. However, 
 in the disturbances of 1870 Yakoob Beg took no active 
 part. While the Russian arms were triumphing over 
 every opponent in their newly acquired province of 
 Ferghana and its vicinity, Yakoob Beg was busily en- 
 gaged with the Tungani, who at that time were causing 
 trouble to him along his far eastern frontier. The re- 
 volt collapsed in Khokand, and Yakoob Beg, apparently 
 unconcerned with the events transpiring in the West, 
 w r as carrying his victorious arms to new conquests in 
 the East. During the year 1870, when murmurs of the 
 approaching storm were becoming audible, the Eussian 
 government endeavoured to obtain the alliance of Khu- 
 dayar Khan, of Khokand, for the purpose of bringing 
 Yakoob Beg within their influence. This Khan had, as 
 has been already mentioned, been betrayed by Yakoob 
 Beg, who had followed the example of the ambitious Vizier 
 Alim Kuli, and was now mainly dependent on the Eus- 
 sians for support against his rebellious subjects. He could 
 not be considered in any way, therefore, as likely to be 
 i'avourably disposed towards his neighbour of Kashgar, 
 or as lukewarm in the cause of his protectors and bene- 
 factors. The Eussians felt assured of his hearty support 
 in advocating their plan, which was as follows. From 
 time immemorial, as has been seen in the sketch of the 
 history of Kashgar, there have been two rival elements 
 in Kashgaria the Chinese and the Khokandian. The 
 Chinese was triumphant in modern times for a little 
 more than a century, while the Khokandian has, more 
 or less, at all other times been paramount. But when- 
 ever a native dynasty had attained a certain degree of 
 security therein, it was always threatened by the am- 
 bitious designs of the Khan of Khokand, who had 
 generally contributed most towards its successful estab- 
 lishment. The Eussian government resolved to avail 
 themselves of this historical fact to pour into the ear of 
 Khudayar Khan insidious counsels as to his claims as 
 feudal lord over Eastern Turkestan. There once more, so 
 
188 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 they argued, had a Khokandian subject formed an in- 
 dependent and rival administration, and all his victories 
 had been won by Khokandian sympathies, and by the 
 good right arms of Khokandian subjects. And how had 
 this soldier of fortune acted towards his own country 
 when he had received everything from her that he 
 needed ? By offering an asylum to all those who had 
 participated in the plots against Khudayar Khan him- 
 self, by encouraging sedition in the state itself against 
 the Eussians and their nominee, Khudayar, the legal 
 ruler of the state. As if these crimes were not suffi- 
 ciently serious, he had added thereto the insult of having 
 refused to recognize in Khudayar his liege lord ; and 
 Khudayar's own personal fears were worked upon to 
 yield that acquiescence to the Russian proposal that was 
 necessary to secure its success. It was pointed out to 
 him that a strong military power in Kashgar might give 
 an impetus to the plots then fermenting in the active 
 brain of Aftobatcha, the ambitious son of Mussulman 
 Kuli, the prime minister and vizier of thirty years ago. 
 The arguments were specious, and it cannot be doubted 
 that they made some impression on Khudayar Khan. 
 This much -to-be-pitied ruler, forced by the necessities of 
 his position to humour his Eussian advisers, still had 
 the courage to refuse to assert his claims as lord over 
 Kashgar. With a gentle irony he pointed to the map, 
 and showed how Khokand's frontier should extend 
 farther to the west than it did, and that a conquest over 
 the barren regions of the Kizil Yart would be but a 
 sorry equivalent for the loss of Tashkent and Hodjent. 
 He, however, promised to make use of his best means 
 for inducing Yakoob Beg to make overtures to the 
 Eussian government for the ratification of a treaty of 
 commerce. So Khudayar Khan indited a letter to 
 Yakoob Beg, at the dictation of his Eussian friends, to 
 this effect ; but he silvered the pill by a private message 
 giving information of the Eussian intentions in the 
 future. The tenor of that communication was that the 
 
YAKOOB REG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 189 
 
 Eussians were less eager than might have been sup- 
 posed to bring matters to a final crisis with Yakoob 
 Beg, and that they were most desirous of settling the 
 question without any flagrant loss of dignity by being 
 the first to recommence negotiations. Both publicly 
 and privately Khudayar Khan advised that the Athalik 
 Ghazi should make some concessions in form to the 
 Russian government. The Russians themselves, having 
 failed to induce Khudayar Khan to put pressure on 
 Yakoob Beg, appear to have arrived at the same con- 
 clusion as that set out in the letters of Khudayar. 
 Yakoob Beg must make the sign, and they would meet 
 him half way in his desire to share in the great benefits 
 accruing from a Muscovite alliance. The authorities at 
 Tashkent went so far as to flatter themselves that they 
 had attained a solution of one of their chief annoyances. 
 They had, by making use of the mediation of Khudayar, 
 gone so far as to open the door for Yakoob Beg to abase 
 himself. Such condescension was unheard t)f, and no 
 doubt was entertained but that this proud Mahomedan 
 ruler would gladly hasten to avail himself of the last 
 chance accorded him by the clemency of the Czar. 
 
 But they were reckoning without their host. Yakoob 
 Beg quickly perceived that the bold exterior of the Rus- 
 sian demands concealed a vacillating purpose, and that 
 a power which would go out of its way so far to bring 
 about an arrangement, would yield much more when 
 the discussion became directly carried on. He had 
 evidently impressed the few Russians who had visited 
 him with a belief in his strength, and rumour had 
 magnified his resources, and converted his small and 
 heterogeneous following into a regular and trained army. 
 He was not the man to destroy, when the game was 
 almost in his hands too, all the favourable impressions, 
 that stood him in such good stead during his career, 
 which, his policy for four years had succeeded in creating 
 about his personality. After a suitable delay his formal 
 reply to the official letter of Khudayar arrived, and its 
 
190 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 contents must have been eminently displeasing to the 
 Russians. In general terms he refused to enter into 
 negotiations with the Eussians, because they had refused 
 to acknowledge his own government, and had ever sup- 
 ported the cause of his enemies the Chinese. But, not 
 content with this blunt refusal to the offer made from 
 Tashkent, he went on to minor matters and dealt witli 
 the question of Eussian policy in specific . language. 
 The common enemy of him and all his co-religionists was 
 not worthy of any consideration from him or his allies, 
 the rulers of Khokand and Bokhara. " The Eussians 
 that have come here, into my state of Kashgar, look at 
 these localities and become acquainted with the state 
 of the country, and therefore it is better to forbid 'their 
 coming, for they are a treacherous and crooked-minded 
 people." In such plain terms did Yakoob Beg speak of 
 a power which could without any serious risk have 
 crushed him at any moment. Yet in one sense his 
 boldness was the height of prudence, and succeeded 
 when perhaps a less decided attitude would have com- 
 pletely failed. The Eussians were fairly deluded in their 
 estimate of their new antagonist, and all means having 
 been exhausted for inducing Yakoob Beg to abandon his 
 indifferent attitude towards themselves, it began to be 
 seriously discussed at Tashkent whether, if simply for 
 the purpose of obtaining accurate information of his 
 country, it would not be prudent to acknowledge the 
 existence of a ruler who had for nearly six years been 
 established as responsible sovereign of a very large por- 
 tion of Asia. The path was smoothed, too, for the 
 Eussian diplomatists by Yakoob Beg sending a letter to 
 the governor of Turkestan, stating that it was useless 
 for the Czar to attempt the establishment of diplomatic 
 relations through the good offices of Khudayar Khan ; but 
 that if the Eussians really desired to enter into alliance 
 with him they could send an embassy to him, when formal 
 steps could be commenced for securing the trade and 
 other agreements that were desirable. The letter was a 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 191 
 
 very dignified piece of writing, such as one European 
 sovereign would have sent to another in the Middle Ages. 
 " He did not deny/ 3 he said, " either the power or the 
 resources of Eussia, but as a brave man he placed his 
 trust in God, and he would never shirk the contest, 
 because all he aspired to was to die for his faith." 
 This letter produced a great impression at Tashkent, 
 and it was resolved to send an ambassador to Kashgar. 
 Before pursuing the narrative, it may be as well to 
 sum up what had passed between Russia and Kashgar up 
 to this period, for henceforth these two states were to 
 stand in a completely different relationship towards each 
 other. The Eussians strove to induce Yakoob Beg to 
 make the most favourable commercial and political con- 
 cessions to them, while they refused to grant him any 
 equivalent, except the dubious one, " advantage from the 
 produce of Eussian manufactures." They even added 
 insult to injury by openly proclaiming that they only 
 recognized the Chinese as the rulers of Kashgar, and 
 refused to discuss the arguments advanced by Shadi 
 Mirza in favour of his uncle's claim to be considered de 
 facto sovereign. They adopted an attitude of bullying 
 towards this Asiatic prince, and loudly proclaimed in 
 their practice the truth of the aphorism, that might is 
 right. They backed up their verbal threats on several 
 occasions by a show of military preparations, but not 
 once did they put those threats into execution. On the 
 other hand, Yakoob Beg's policy was consistent through- 
 out and dignified. While studiously avoiding any aggres- 
 sive measures, even under the excuse of defensive pre- 
 cautions, he was always firm in his refusal to recognize 
 any of the semi-official overtures that were repeatedly 
 made to induce him to show his hand. Instead of 
 appearing in the light of a suppliant, as according to 
 all precedent he should, he assumed the position of a 
 dictator. " Acknowledge me as legally constituted ruler 
 of Kashgaria, or else there is an end to all negotiation. 
 Send a properly accredited ambassador to me, and he 
 
192 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 shall be honourably received. A representative of 
 recognized rank shall then convey my token of friend- 
 ship to your master. Eefuse to grant me these just 
 considerations, and my kingdom is closed to your 
 merchants and officials without exception. Admission 
 shall only be obtained over my own body and that of 
 my devoted army." For the first time in the annals 
 of Eussian history an Asiatic ruler had tired out the 
 finessing and intrigue that had become customary 
 with that empire as the means for infinite conquest. 
 Yakoob Beg was the only sovereign who refused to 
 be subservient to the Czar, and eventually achieved a 
 diplomatic triumph over his representatives. In the 
 spring of 1872, Yakoob Beg was at the very acme of 
 his prosperity. Not yet had he commenced those later 
 campaigns against the Tungani, which more than any- 
 thing else tended to weaken his power and to raise dis- 
 content against his administration ; and, fresh from his 
 diplomatic success over the Eussians, he appeared in the 
 eyes of many Asiatics as a fit champion to redeem their 
 fortunes in a conflict with Eussia. Excusable as their 
 enthusiasm undoubtedly was, it is tolerably certain that 
 the power of Yakoob Beg was exaggerated both by the 
 adulation of his friends and by the nervous suscepti- 
 bilities of the Eussians. It is noteworthy that Eussia 
 proved herself on one occasion to be quite as liable to 
 this latter disease as England is assumed to be. 
 
 To Baron Kaulbars, the explorer of the sources of the 
 Syr Darya, was entrusted the delicate mission of repre- 
 senting the Eussian government for the first time at the 
 court of the Athalik Ghazi, and to no better diplomatist 
 could it have been consigned. He set out from Kuldja 
 early in May, 1872, carrying with him a large collection 
 of presents for the ruler and his chief advisers, and 
 arrived in Kashgar without any mishap in June of the 
 same year. Here he was received in the most cordial 
 manner, and the consideration and hospitality exhibited 
 towards him by the ruler were beyond all expectation. In 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 193 
 
 the picturesque phraseology of the East, the Athalik 
 Ghazi, at his first audience with Baron Kaulbars, said, 
 " Sit upon my knees, on my bosom, or where ye like ; for 
 }^e are guests sent me from heaven." The most complete 
 freedom of action was accorded, for the first time, to all the 
 members of the embassy, and two merchants who had 
 accompanied it for the purpose of exploring the country 
 received a safe-conduct to go on to Yarkand and Khoten. 
 Yakoob Beg scarcely attempted to conceal his gratifica- 
 tion at the presence of the Eussians; possibly his pleasure 
 chiefly arose from such an unmistakable admission of his 
 skill as a diplomatist. But in every way facilities were 
 afforded his visitors for seeing all objects of interest 
 round Kashgar. He views were held in honour of the 
 occasion, and as there happened to be a considerable 
 number of troops in the vicinity, passing through to 
 operate against the Tungani beyond Kucha, the show 
 was imposing enough. The Russians were favourably 
 impressed by what they saw, and Baron Kaulbars 
 expressed himself surprised at the military exactitude 
 with which the manoeuvres were carried out. Yakoob 
 Beg, always open to flattery, exclaimed in an enthusiastic 
 moment, " I look upon the Russians as my dearest 
 friends ; if I had not, should I have shown you my 
 military power ? Assuredly it is not usual even with 
 you to make known one's actual condition to an 
 enemy." Matters were now in a fair way to a pleasant 
 solution. Baron Kaulbars and Yakoob Beg were 
 mutually delighted ; but, after the time for pleasant talk 
 had expired, it was necessary that some definite arrange- 
 ments should be drawn up for the political and com- 
 mercial relations of the two countries in the future. 
 
 The chief objects the Russians had in view when they 
 sent Baron Kaulbars to Kashgar were three. In the first 
 place they wanted to acquire general information about 
 that state, and to discover whether Yakoob Beg was as 
 powerful as report had asserted. In tjie second, they 
 wished to put their relations on such a recognized basis 
 
194 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 with him that they might know what policy he was dis- 
 posed to adopt in Turkestan and Kuldja ; and in the 
 third they desired to secure the monopoly of the trade 
 of his state, so that they might forestall British enter- 
 prise, already beginning to direct its attention to this 
 quarter, since the journeys of Messrs. Shaw and Forsyth. 
 The last of these was the easiest to obtain, and the Athalik 
 Ghazi considered all the Eussian proposals with regard 
 to trade in a very amicable spirit; but with regard to the 
 second desideratum nothing but the vaguest generalities 
 could all the tact and ingenuity of Kaulbars succeed in 
 obtaining from his host. The first object was amply 
 secured, in so far as geographical and scientific informa- 
 tion was concerned ; but the precautions taken by the 
 Athalik Ghazi to deceive the Eussians as to his power 
 and hold on the country appear to have been successful. 
 Baron Kaulbars certainly confirmed much that had pre- 
 viously rested on mere hearsay ; the question is rather, 
 did he not vouch for more than his experience justified 
 him in doing ? The result of his mission was, that the 
 Athalik Ghazi was elevated to a position on a level with 
 the Ameer of Cabul, and there is no doubt whatever that 
 such a comparison was not warranted by the facts. A 
 treaty was signed by the Athalik Ghazi and Baron 
 Kaulbars, on the 2nd of June, ]872, but according to 
 the Old Style, still adopted by the Eussians, this was 
 the 21st of May, St. Constantine's day. There are two 
 stories with respect to this coincidence, and there is as 
 much evidence for one version as there is for the other. 
 It was said at the time that Yakoob Beg was so 
 desirous of showing his goodwill to the Eussians that he 
 had insisted on signing it on that day in honour of the 
 Grand Duke Constantine. Now there were two or three 
 improbabilities in this statement that struck several 
 observers. In the first place it was extremely impro- 
 bable that Yakoob Beg knew it was St. Constantine's 
 day at all ; and again, in the second place he was quite 
 as probably ignorant of the existence of a Grand Duke 
 
YAKOOB BEG's POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 195 
 
 Constantino. At all events, there was no valid reason 
 why a Central Asian ruler should conceive that his polite- 
 ness to that Grand Duke in particular would demonstrate 
 his desire to be on good terms with Eussians in general. 
 The other version, which, like many other circumstances, 
 has only leaked out in the pages of Mr. Schuyler, is 
 altogether more probaWe, and is not open to the same 
 objections. According to this, it was Baron Kaulbars, 
 who of course was aware of the saint's day, who demanded 
 that the treaty should bear that date, and who, as soon 
 as it was signed, sent off a message to General Kaufmann 
 saying that the Athalik Ghazi, out of friendship to that 
 genera], had specially requested that the treaty should 
 be signed on that day in honour of General Kaufmann's 
 patron saint. However flattered that distinguished gen- 
 eral and governor may have felt at the delicate atten- 
 tion of his ambassador, he had to decline the proposed 
 honour ; and in the despatch that was sent to St. Peters- 
 burg, describing the event, the name of the Grand Duke 
 Constantine was substituted for his own. There is little 
 doubt that this is the correct statement, and it cer- 
 tainly suggests quite a revelation as to the system in 
 Russian Asia of making things pleasant and agreeable 
 to one another, always, however, assuming that there be 
 an exceptional degree of power and pomp reserved for 
 his Excellency General Kaufmann. 
 
 Soon after the signature of this treaty, which bears 
 the name of its framer, Baron Kaulbars took his depar- 
 ture, with many expressions of friendship and goodwill 
 from the Athalik Ghazi. Arrangements were, however, 
 made, before he left, for an envoy to visit Tashkent from 
 Yakoob Beg. This ambassador took with him the 
 signed stipulations to be ratified, and was received at 
 Tashkent with every demonstration of amity and respect. 
 So certain did the Eussian government appear that their 
 relations with Kashgar would, if only for a short period, 
 be satisfactory, that special care was taken to make a 
 favourable impression on the Kashgarian envoy, and 
 
 o 2 
 
196 1AKOOB BEG. 
 
 after a short residence in the capital of Turkestan, the 
 nephew of Yakoob Beg, Hadji Torah, who had followed 
 the train of the treaty on a special mission, went on to 
 St. Petersburg, where he was entertained by the Czar, 
 taken to the reviews, and treated in a most hospitable and 
 princely fashion. The contrast between the reception 
 accorded to him in 1873 and that to Shadi Mirza in 
 1869 clearly marks the difference that was considered in 
 well-informed official circles to have taken place in their 
 relations with Kashgar. 
 
 We have now to consider whether the Russian Go- 
 vernment was justified in assuming so confidently that it 
 had secured the permanent friendship of the Mahomedan 
 ruler of Eastern Turkestan. On concluding his visit at St. 
 Petersburg, Hadji Torah turned south, and after stopping 
 for a brief delay at Moscow and Odessa, he arrived in 
 Constantinople, where he already had many friends and 
 connections. Without inquiring too deeply into his ac- 
 tions at the Imperial City for of them the reader will 
 be able to judge best by the sequel we will here simply 
 observe, that having also concluded his residence on the 
 Golden Horn, he took passage by the Suez Canal for India, 
 and arrived there in time to join the mission of Sir Douglas 
 Eorsyth, then on its way to Kashgar. Hadji Torah there- 
 fore brought to his uncle a vast amount of information 
 concerning the three Powers chiefly concerned in the for- 
 tunes of Kashgar Eussia, Turkey, and England. But 
 even before his return home, fresh disagreements had 
 broken out bet ween Russia and Yakoob Beg. They ear 1872 
 had not closed, before the Athalik Ghazi concluded some 
 secret negotiations that had been pending for some time 
 with the Sultan, and this champion of Islam appeared in 
 a new and holier light to Asiatics as Emir, or Ameer. 
 He acknowledged the suzerainty of the Porte; and, not 
 content with this formal declaration, gave an extra sig- 
 nificance to the event by issuing a fresh coinage, bear- 
 ing on one side the head of Abdul Aziz. The Russians 
 were, it can well be imagined, displeased at this alliance 
 
YAKOOB BEG's POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 197 
 
 between two Mahomedan states which might both be 
 considered hostile to their interests, and a very large 
 party in military circles clamoured for an expedition to 
 be sent at once against the insolent Mussulman. At one 
 moment it seemed as if this bellicose party was to gain 
 the day, for the testimony of all the officers and mer- 
 chants who had visited Kashgar showed that each day 
 Yakoob Beg was becoming more formidable. Prompt 
 measures were pressed on the government of Tashkent, 
 and General Kaufmann seemed half disposed to acquiesce 
 in the proposal to inflict summary chastisement on the 
 Athalik Ghazi. Fortunately for Kashgar, the Khan of 
 Khiva had been an older offender in the eyes of the 
 Russians, and the Home Government peremptorily for- 
 bade any steps being taken in the regions bordering on 
 the Chinese Empire. It is sufficiently clear that the 
 moderation of the home authorities was a wiser policy 
 than the impulsive demands of certain officers in Tash- 
 kent; but it is not so evident why Yakoob Beg abstained 
 from appearing in the role of the liberator of Khokand, 
 at so opportune a moment as that afforded by the great 
 expedition against Khiva in 1873. The treaty of Baron 
 Kaulbars had stipulated for the free admission of Russian 
 merchants into the state on the payment of a 2^ per 
 cent, ad valorem duty. Not only was there to be no 
 further exaction, but good treatment was guaranteed to 
 such Russian subjects as desired to travel in Kashgar, 
 and who came provided with a passport, and permission 
 to travel, from a Russian governor. During Baron 
 Kaulbars' residence in the country, nothing could be 
 more considerate than the treatment extended towards 
 the members of his suite, and the merchants who went 
 on to Yarkand were afforded facilities for disposing of 
 the small stock of merchandise which they had brought 
 with them on this journey. This friendly reception of 
 such merchants as came to Kashgar was maintained 
 during the period over which i^iese negotiations extended 
 down to the departure of Yakoob Beg's own ambassador 
 
198 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 from Eussian territory ; but with the arrival of Hadji 
 Torah at Constantinople, and the proclamation of the 
 fact that Yakoob Beg had been elevated to the dignified 
 position of Emir by the Sultan of Roum, a change came 
 over the spirit of his policy towards Russia. Indeed, 
 Yakoob Beg saw himself menaced by an unforeseen dan- 
 ger in this treaty of commerce. He had formerly been 
 averse to the presence of Russian merchants in his state 
 because he regarded them as spies ; but now that the 
 necessities of his position had to some extent compelled 
 him to enter into a formal treaty with their government, 
 he perceived that his little state literally ran the risk of 
 being invaded by the Russian merchants and traders who 
 flocked to Kuldja for the purpose of participating in the 
 spoils to be obtained by trafficking with the inhabitants 
 of Eastern Turkestan. He had always been averse to 
 trade. He was a warrior, and inclined to feel and to 
 express contempt at the juggling tricks of Muscovite 
 or Khitay. 
 
 But as the former could provide him with better 
 weapons for his army, and warmer clothes for his people, 
 in addition to trinkets for his serai, their presence, if only 
 they came in limited numbers, and at stated intervals, 
 could be tolerated; but when he perceived they were 
 about to descend on his state, like so many birds of prey 
 on an abandoned carcase, and when he surmised that in 
 all likelihood they would endeavour to mix themselves 
 up in the political divisions of Kashgar as they had in 
 Bokhara and Khokand, he determined to impose some 
 other check on their visits besides that insignificant 2^ 
 per cent, on goods that returned a profit of cent, per 
 cent. He had given his plighted word, however, that 
 merchants should receive fair treatment, and how could 
 he find a loophole to avoid fulfilling what he had pro- 
 mised, and yet at the same time escape bringing about an 
 open rupture with the Russian Government. The matter 
 required most delicate manipulation, but Yakoob Beg 
 proved himself equal to the occasion. It was not to be 
 
YAKOOB BEG's POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 199 
 
 expected, however, that Yakoob Beg could accomplish 
 his task of discouraging Eussian enterprise without 
 giving some umbrage to the government. 
 
 Despite the friendly reception of Baron Kaulbars, 
 there still remained some uncertainty in the minds of 
 individuals, whether the Athalik Ghazi was as sincere 
 in his protestations as he would have it believed. 
 There was, consequently, some disinclination among the 
 merchants of Kuldja to be the first to send a caravan 
 to Kashgar. They were all willing enough to share 
 the profits, but it was a risky experiment all the same ; 
 and each would prefer that his neighbour should inau- 
 gurate the enterprise. In commercial circles, there was 
 much discussion on the new state, and the prospects of 
 trade therewith, and there was much talk as to " who 
 should bell the cat." The hesitation, if indeed so 
 natural a sentiment deserves to be specified here, soon 
 passed off, and Mr. Pupyshef, a merchant, who had 
 had very large business connections with most parts 
 of Central Asia, resolved to send the first consignment 
 of merchandise to Kashgar. Mr. Pupyshef was, 
 however, unable to go in person, so his caravan set 
 out under the charge of his clerk Somof. It arrived 
 without " let or hindrance " in Kashgar, where Mr. 
 Somof was provided with accommodation in the Cara- 
 vanserai specially set apart for foreign merchants. But 
 a change was at once perceptible in the sentiments of 
 the ruler, as the personal freedom of the members of 
 the expedition was curtailed, and all their movements 
 were watched with the most exacting surveillance ; and 
 the residence of Mr. Somof was brief in the extreme, 
 for the Athalik Ghazi himself bought up the whole of 
 his stock of merchandise. Viewed as a commercial 
 speculation, this result should have been eminently 
 satisfactory; the Eussian merchant had to experience 
 no loss from delay in finding a purchaser for his arti- 
 cles. There was, however, another matter to be taken 
 into consideration, and that was the mode of payment 
 
200 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 by the purchaser. Mr. Somof received so many Chinese 
 coins at a value fixed b.y the Ameer himself, and Mr. 
 Pupyshef, on the return of his representative, estimated 
 the loss at 15,000 roubles. The Eussian government 
 took up the case of their subject, and presented a 
 remonstrance at Kashgar, demanding the immediate 
 restitution of the loss incurred by the Russian mer- 
 chant. Yakcob Beg's reply to this summary request 
 was a model of courtesy and tact. He denied alto- 
 gether that Mr. Somof had in any way been interfered 
 with. That gentleman was always at perfect liberty to 
 do what, and to go where, he pleased, and he was 
 quite mistaken in supposing that he, the Ameer, had 
 purchased his goods. The Badaulet had nothing what- 
 ever to do with trade, which he left entirely to his 
 subjects. He was simply a warrior and a follower of 
 the Prophet. He had nevertheless instituted inquiries 
 into the matter, and he had discovered that some of his 
 officers, who should be punished, had purchased the 
 merchandise in his name, hoping thereby to obtain it at 
 a cheaper rate. The Athalik Ghazi expressed his 
 regret at the occurrence, and would be most happy 
 to refund whatever sum the Eussian government con- 
 sidered their subject had lost by the transaction. A 
 commission was appointed at Tashkent, to inquire into 
 all the circumstances of the case, and after some discus- 
 sion the demand of Mr. Pupyshef was reduced from 
 15,000 to 12,000 roubles. The Ameer acquiesced in the 
 decision, but many months elapsed before Mr. Pupyshef 
 received his money, and then it was again in a depre- 
 ciated Chinese coinage. We are justified in assuming 
 that this was all planned, and that the obstacles thrown 
 in the path of Mr. Pupyshef were part and parcel of a 
 systematic attempt to disgust Eussian merchants with 
 Kashgar. The Eussian government, too, was afforded 
 no clear case for complaint, as Yakoob Beg expressed 
 his regret without reserve for the occurrence, all the 
 responsibility of which he shifted on to the shoulders 
 
YAKOOB BEG's POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 201 
 
 of some of " his officials whom he had ordered to be 
 punished." He paid without a murmur the fair 
 demands of Mr. Pupyshef, and if there was some delay 
 in the refunding of the money, it must be attributed to 
 the poverty of his exchequer, and not to any want 
 of goodwill. The burden of his complaint was, " I am 
 a poor prince ; my country is impoverished by the wars 
 that have occurred since the departure of the Chinese ; 
 and you will find little therein to repay you for your 
 trouble and expense in entering it. Why therefore will 
 you persist in coming to it ? You can do neither your- 
 selves nor my people any good by doing so, and you 
 only cause me anxiety and trouble in preserving your 
 countrymen from insult and injury, which you must 
 admit I have ever done." There was an under-current 
 of truth in this statement of the case, although it was 
 not credited in Kuldja, where everything that went amiss 
 was set down to the hostility of the Ameer. Yakoob 
 Beg had, however, succeeded in throwing cold water on 
 the enthusiastic preparations that were being made for 
 exploiting Eastern Turkestan, and his mode of doing so 
 had been quite original and characteristic. Few rulers 
 would have foreseen that the best way to get rid of a 
 troublesome visitor was to purchase what he had brought 
 to sell to the people ; and that the simple remedy of 
 paying in a questionable currency would suffice to deter 
 hundreds from following the example of Mr. Somof. 
 Yakoob Beg, however, was not satisfied with leaving 
 well alone. Having paid the claim of Mr. Pupyshef, it 
 might have been supposed that he would maintain a 
 discreet silence on his intentions in the future with 
 regard to Eussiaii merchants. He might have let the 
 question, indeed, find, as it would have found, its own 
 solution ; but, in a weak moment, to place his own 
 bona fides beyond suspicion, he desired the Russian 
 government to send another merchant to Kashgar, and 
 then it could judge by his reception whether the Ameer 
 was not amicably disposed towards his "close allies," 
 
202 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 the Eussians. The Eussian authorities took him at his 
 word, and after an interval of more than twelve months, 
 during 1 which Kashgar had been unvisited by a Eussian 
 merchant, another, a Mr. Morozof, came to put Yakoob 
 Beg's assertions to the test. True to his word, the 
 reception of this gentleman was most cordial. Facili- 
 ties were placed in his way for getting purchasers of his 
 articles, and the Ameer bought for his arsenals such 
 of them as seemed suitable. Mr. Morozof returned to 
 Kuldja, narrating how cordially he had been welcomed 
 by the ruler himself, and how the enterprise had com- 
 mercially been a success. Others followed his example, 
 and during the last two and a half years of his rule 
 Eussian merchandise, either through Eussian or native 
 agents, found its way in considerable quantities into 
 Kashgar. But this trade was always liable to periods 
 of depression through the clouds that frequently dark- 
 ened the political horizon, and the Eussians did not 
 derive the advantages from trade with this state, that 
 they had previously convinced themselves they were to 
 do. Indeed, English manufactures, after the year 1873, 
 entered into keen competition with theirs in the cities of 
 Kashgar, and had driven their goods out of the market of 
 Yarkand at all events before the close of the year 1876. 
 But this fact only served to impress more forcibly on 
 the Eussians the necessity either for annexing Kashgaria 
 or establishing on its throne some puppet, who would 
 be content with the post of deputy of the Czar. Indeed, 
 many suggested that the Chinese should be brought 
 back ; but then they were so far off, and apparently so 
 weak. The party advocating the absorption of Kash- 
 garia every day became stronger and more pronounced ; 
 and all observers agree that it was only a question of 
 time when the imperial fiat should go forth for the 
 extinction of the rule of Yakoob Beg. Colonel Eeinthal 
 was sent in 1874, to endeavour to place matters on a 
 more hopeful footing, but with little success. In addi- 
 tion to the question of trade privileges, the Eussians, 
 
YAKOOB BEO'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 203 
 
 in negotiating with native states, or securing treaties 
 at the point of the sword, always demanded the right of 
 having consular agents in the chief cities of the state. 
 The ostensible duty of these official representatives 
 was to look after the interests of their government, and 
 to protect the lives and property of Eussian subjects as 
 best they might be able. So far as these very necessary 
 functions were concerned, Russia had a perfect right in 
 demanding these safeguards, when such were deemed 
 to be required. But unfortunately for the reputation 
 of that country, the experience of Asiatics had amply 
 demonstrated that these declared duties were the least 
 important part of their office. 
 
 Their secret instructions were to lose no opportunity 
 of discovering the drift of public sentiment in the state 
 where they were stationed ; to learn all the ramifications 
 of the dynastic intrigues that unfortunately form the 
 chief incidents in the history of these states, and to 
 promote, by every means at their disposal, the interests 
 of the great empire into whose service they had been 
 admitted. When such latitude was allowed in their 
 instructions, and so many private and public induce- 
 ments were offered to raise their zeal, it cannot be 
 matter of surprise if we find the government informed 
 promptly of the shiftings of public opinion in the inde- 
 pendent and semi-independent Khanates of Central Asia. 
 Yakoob Beg was keenly alive to the dangers that would 
 arise to him personally from the introduction of such a 
 system into Kashgar, where the -discordant elements 
 out of which he had welded a military organization 
 were far from being completely healed. If the presence 
 of a mirza in Khokand and Bokhara had entailed a 
 decade of troubles and of gradual subjection, what was 
 he to expect, a mere military adventurer and a foreigner 
 in the land, from their presence in Eastern Turkestan? 
 But Baron Kaulbars had demanded this concession, per- 
 haps more than any other, and Yakoob Beg had to yield 
 something in form, if he did not surrender much in 
 
204 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 substance, to the importunities of his visitor. As a 
 great favour he consented to the appointment of caravan- 
 bashis, or superintendents of the personal comforts of the 
 merchants when they should arrive ; but a caravan-bashi 
 was an uneducated, unimportant personage, from whom 
 nothing need be feared. This did not at all please the 
 Eussian administrators, and all their subsequent efforts 
 were mainly devoted to the attempt to obtain an altera- 
 tion of this unimportant personage into the prying and 
 inquisitive mirza. To defeat their design Yakoob Beg 
 was no less firmly resolved, and the history of the 
 embassies, from that of Baron Kaulbars to that of Cap- 
 tain Kuropatkine, was one long course of fruitless efforts 
 to force the hand of the Athalik Ghazi on this point. 
 Colonel Eeinthal was sent in 1874, after the successful 
 journey of Mr. Morozof, to see if any better arrange- 
 ment could be attained, but, although the Ameer enter- 
 tained him very hospitably, he fared no better than any 
 of his predecessors. In that year, too, Yakoob Beg's 
 position had become firmer in his own state. The 
 Tungani had been driven back north of the Tian Shan 
 beyond Turfan, and into the regions east of Lake Lob ; 
 the disaffection, too, in the cities of Kucha and Korla 
 was also, to all appearance, dying out ;* but, above all, 
 the vast aegis of English protection had appeared to 
 be thrown over the integrity of his state. However 
 unjustified this supposition was by the treaty with Sir 
 Douglas Forsyth, the Ameer made as much use as possible 
 of his new-found ally ; and the large section of Anglo- 
 Indians, and authorities in this country on the affairs of 
 Central Asia, who, either out of sympathy for the man, 
 or from a belief in the identity of British interests with 
 his cause, proclaimed the advisability of supporting him 
 against Eussian aggression, gave a colourable excuse to 
 his declaration that England had extended for the first 
 time in her Trans-Himalayan policy her protection to 
 a native state lying north of her natural frontier. The 
 Eussian governments in Siberia and Turkestan, empha- 
 
YAKOOB BEG's POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 205 
 
 tically cautioned by their Foreign Office to give this 
 country no cause for umbrage, were at first inclined to 
 make that assertion an excuse for pushing their friendly 
 relations with the Ameer ; but their advances were not 
 reciprocated, and as it became more clear that the 
 importance of the Forsyth mission had been greatly 
 exaggerated by the representations of the Ameer, the 
 language of the Eussian authorities became once more 
 peremptory and menacing. In short, matters after more 
 than two years' discussion had retrogressed to the con- 
 dition they were in before the Kaulbars treaty. The 
 Eussians had not obtained their chief desire, the esta- 
 blishment of consular agents in Kashgar, and Yakoob 
 Beg, as in the past, boldly met threat with threat. Eely- 
 ing on his increased reputation as the most orthodox 
 and the most puissant of Mahomedans in Central Asia, 
 and confident that England would intervene between 
 the Eussians and the collapse of his state, he even went 
 so far as to temper his defiant, and almost bellicose, 
 attitude with such irony as the following incident is a 
 characteristic specimen of. Early in the year 1874 the 
 Duke of Edinburgh married Marie Alexandrovna, the 
 only daughter of the Czar ; and Yakoob Beg seized the 
 occasion to send a message of congratulation to the 
 Czar of All the Eussias on the auspicious event 
 saying, that he had heard that the son of his good ally, 
 the Queen of England and of India, was about to wed 
 the daughter of his friend the Czar, and that he hastened 
 to send him his congratulations upon the event. To this 
 effusive epistle no reply was deigned, and it is doubtful 
 whether it ever got farther than Tashkent. There is 
 no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that such 
 exhibitions as this is an instance of detracted from the 
 otherwise great and striking characteristics of the ruler of 
 Kashgar. His opposition to Eussia was most laudable ; 
 his maintenance of his privileges as an independent ruler 
 was prudent and worthy of our respect ; but his petty 
 insults to Eussia were neither wise nor dignified. He 
 
206 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 was clearly in the right in checking the aggressive 
 instincts of Russia, clothed in the specious garb of 
 commercial advantage ; he commands not less our 
 admiration for the energetic and persistent manner in 
 which he thwarted every endeavour to introduce Eussian 
 espionage and intrigue into Kashgaria ; but why should 
 he have weakened the effect of these splendid achieve- 
 ments, why should he have risked all he had secured, 
 by so senseless an insult as the message to the Czar that 
 has been just referred to ? 
 
 The authorities in Tashkent, perceiving that it was 
 doubtful whether English public opinion was ripe yet 
 for an active interference in Central Asia, reverted, 
 despite all orders from the home authorities to the 
 contrary, to their original intention of coercing the 
 ruler of Kashgar. In 1874, therefore, all preparations 
 for commencing the campaign in the approaching spring 
 were made ready. Provisions and munitions of war 
 were despatched to Naryn, and an auxiliary division 
 was to make a flank movement by the Terek Pass on 
 the west. It has been laid to the charge of the Eussian 
 generals in Asia, that expeditions are arranged for their 
 mutual advantage, both in obtaining higher rank and 
 orders. So seriously bitten had every officer since 
 Perovsky become by the desire for promotion and dis- 
 tinction, that the disease became generally known as the 
 St. George or the St. Ann Cross fever. Now during 
 the seven years previous to the date at which we have 
 arrived, if there had been a fair share of distinction and 
 spoil for the soldiers and the lower ranks of the officers, 
 some of those in higher posts considered that they were 
 aggrieved by the monopoly of supreme credit obtained 
 by General Kaufmann. This, indeed, had shown itself 
 very clearly after the fall of Khiva, a success for which 
 Kaufmann obtained all the credit, and yet towards 
 which the division under his command contributed little 
 or nothing. The etiquette, too, maintained in the little 
 court at Tashkent, and the semi-regal state observed by 
 
YAKOOB DEC'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 207 
 
 the successful general, were irksome to officers more 
 accustomed to the licence of a camp than to the punctilio 
 of a palace. Nor were there wanting more sinister 
 motives still among some of the chief general officers 
 who filled the subordinate posts in the service of the 
 Czar's representative. Prominent among them was 
 the youthful Scobelef, who, burning to distinguish him- 
 self, clamoured loudly for some expedition which, when 
 accomplished successfully, would be recompensed with 
 the Cross of St. George. Strong as General Kaufmann 
 may really be in the good opinion of his superiors, he 
 was unable to resist, if he were inclined, the demands 
 pressed upon him by Scobelef and his father, and the 
 more warlike portion of his forces. It is said, that in 
 addition to these palpable reasons there were others 
 touching the family rivalries of the Kaufmanns and 
 Scobelefs, who appear to have been at feud with each 
 other when younger men in the service of the palace, 
 when Nicholas was Czar. To remove these differences, 
 and to satisfy the demands of his other subordinates, 
 General Kaufmann consented that an expedition should 
 be arranged against Kashgar, and entrusted to the 
 command of the younger Scobelef. Towards the end 
 of 1874 the war-cloud was drawing ominously over the 
 Athalik Ghazi, and to all observers it seemed as if it 
 were about to break with destructive violence on his 
 devoted head. Loudly was it asserted that nothing but 
 British intervention would save him, and it was only 
 too clear that England's policy would be guided by 
 events. The Viceroy had certainly not advised that 
 an active participation should be undertaken in this 
 question. The failure, too, of the Granville-Gortscha- 
 koff negotiations to define a neutral zone had convinced 
 this country of the inutility of solving the question 
 between the two countries by treaty. But it was not 
 clear that, even if Kashgar were to fall into the power of 
 Eussia, our interests would suffer so much as to justify 
 us in adopting an extreme remedy. The path being 
 
208 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 thus left clear for Eussia to strike, every precaution 
 was taken by Glenerals Kaufmann and Scobelef that 
 the blow should be sharp and decisive. Not fewer than 
 20,000 Russian troops in all were to be directed against 
 Yakoob Beg, who too late now attempted some conces- 
 sions to his neighbours. Such troops as he could raise 
 were massed in the neighbourhood of Kashgar, while 
 another force under his son was stationed at Aksu. 
 But of the result there could not be two opinions. Very 
 few weeks' respite remained to the intended victim, when 
 an event occurred which changed the whole current of 
 Russian thought into a different channel. Yakoob Beg 
 was saved by the outbreak of disturbances in Khokand, 
 and, although the Russians never acknowledged that 
 they were so serious as to prevent them persisting in 
 their Kashgarian enterprise, still gradually the troops 
 who had been despatched to the frontier were recalled, 
 and those who had been ordered to set out for Naryn 
 were retained in Tashkent and Hodjent, the two towns 
 chiefly threatened. Although this event is not part of 
 Kashgarian history, yet it performed so useful a function 
 to that state, which indeed it may be said to have saved, 
 that some brief account of it here may not be unwelcome. 
 Khudayar Khan, after the death of Alim Kuli, his 
 hostile minister, in 1865, had been reinstated in his 
 possession of Khokand, partly by the efforts of his own 
 faction, and partly by Russian assistance. From that 
 year to the year 1875 he was de facto as he was de jure 
 Khan of Khokand, and, although imbroiled on several 
 occasions with Russia and with his own subjects in those 
 ten years, he still maintained a nominal independence in 
 the western half of Khokand, with his capital at the city 
 of the same name. For some reason, however, this Khan 
 never was popular. So far as we know concerning him, 
 he does not appear to have been any way worse than 
 his neighbours ; but one party in the state accused him 
 of being a tool of the Russians, while another, urged 
 on by the agents employed by that government, 
 
YAKOOB BEC'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 209 
 
 declared that he was gradually drifting the country into a 
 hopeless contest with that Power. Widespread through- 
 out the state there was dissatisfaction at his rule, and 
 the occasion afforded by a commotion among the Kirghiz 
 was eagerly seized by his subjects to rise for the pur- 
 pose of subverting his power. At first this movement 
 seemed to possess no importance for the Russians, and 
 was regarded as one of those dynastic squabbles that 
 had become too ordinary an occurrence to occasion any 
 surprise. The insurrectionary party, too, had put on 
 the throne Nasruddin, the eldest son of the Khan, a 
 youth who was supposed to be friendly to Russia, and 
 who was not likely to prove in any way formidable, 
 having become passionately addicted to vodka drinking. 
 But behind this ostensible ruler there were others who 
 aspired to greater eminence than the king-makers of a 
 petty state like Khokand. Chief among these was 
 Khudayar's brother-in-law, Abderrahman Aftobatcha, 
 who was entrusted with the chief control of the military 
 arrangements. This chief was the son of Mussulman 
 Kuli, the Kipchak minister of Khudayar's earlier days. 
 Either incredulous of the maintenance of a neutral 
 attitude by Russia, or urged on by a patriotic impulse 
 to free the enslaved portion of Khokand, these con- 
 federates issued a proclamation of war against General 
 Kaufmann. The border districts rose in response to 
 the proclamation, the communications between Tash- 
 kent and Hodjent were severed, and confusion for a 
 time reigned supreme within the Russian possessions. 
 The Khokandian forces hesitated to make any serious 
 attack and wasted their time in useless depredations in 
 the mountains. Had a prompt move been made on 
 Tashkent, or even on Hodjent, the insurrection might 
 have been successful. Bokhara might have struck in at 
 the critical moment, and Yakoob Beg awoke from the 
 lethargy into which his warlike spirit was sinking. Such 
 was not to be, however; and gradually the Russian scare 
 wore off. Colonel Scobelef scoured the country with 
 
210 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 his Cossacks; telegraphic communication was restored 
 between Hodjent and Tashkent ; and the country was 
 rapidly cleared of the rebels. The fugitives who had 
 accompanied Khudayar in his flight were sent to the 
 rear, and reinforcements were hastily summoned to take 
 part in the necessary offensive measures against Kho- 
 kand. It will be sufficient here to say that, having 
 been defeated in the fight at Makhram and several 
 other small engagements, the party of Nasruddin and 
 Aftobatcha sued for peace. This was granted, but Kho- 
 kand became the Eussian province of Ferghana, Colonel 
 Scobelef was raised to a major-general, and obtained his 
 Cross of St. George by the battle of Makhram. This 
 event, generally known as the revolt of the Khokandians 
 against Russia of 1875, marks an important era, for it 
 convinced the Khokandians and other Asiatics that any 
 attempt to obtain their liberty, short of a concerted and 
 organized movement, would be fruitless. There has 
 been no renewal of the attempt that then failed, but 
 which ought to have achieved more success. 
 
 To the discord unhappily existent among its victims 
 has Russia been chiefly indebted for the facility with 
 which her Asiatic conquests have been acquired, and to 
 the same ally it seems probable that she will be chiefly 
 indebted for their preservation. There is no clearer 
 evidence of this than the history of this last war with 
 Khokand. But when we endeavour to divide the share 
 of culpability for this dissension, we are on this occasion 
 bound to admit that the chief blame attaches to Yakoob 
 Beg. More than any other Asiatic ruler had he assumed 
 to himself the title of general protector of his religion 
 and his order, against the conquering strides of Russia; 
 more than any other had he fostered, by his bold and 
 defiant attitude towards that state, the belief that there 
 still remained some hope of coping with the danger by 
 a united league of Central Asian states ; more than any 
 other had he seemed to justify this aspiration ; and more 
 than any other must he be held culpable when he per- 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA. 211 
 
 mitted the moment that seemed most auspicious to slip 
 by unutilized. Moreover, when this insurrection broke 
 out in Khokand, he had made every preparation to de- 
 fend himself against a Russian invasion. He saw the 
 Esusians compelled, by the very necessities of their 
 position, to call off their forces to other quarters, and 
 yet he abstained from striking a blow in defence of 
 those interests which he had ever declared were most 
 sacred to him. It is impossible to explain such apathy 
 on so important an occasion as this was; and his refusal 
 to strike in on the side of Aftobatcha must remain the 
 greatest blot on an otherwise brilliant reputation. With 
 the collapse of that effort, and the subsequent occupation 
 of Ferghana, Eussian attention seemed to become more 
 occupied with the state of affairs on the Oxus and in 
 Cabul, than with the fortunes or misfortunes of Kash- 
 gar. During the few months that intervened between 
 the annexation of Khokand and the appearance of the 
 Chinese north of the Tian Shan, Yakoob Beg adopted 
 a more conciliatory policy towards Eussia, and might in 
 a short time have sunk into the position of a somewhat 
 more important Khudayar or Mozaffur Eddin. Other 
 events intervened, however, and gave a complete change 
 to the question, as will be considered in a later chapter. 
 We take our leave of this narrative of his dealings with 
 Eussia with an admiration that would be perfect but for 
 the weakness he exhibited in 1875. Even that vacilla- 
 tion will scarcely destroy all the claim that his bold 
 defiance and consistent opposition to all Eussian preten- 
 sions to supremacy over Eastern Turkestan gives him to 
 our respectful and admiring consideration. 
 
212 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 YAKOOB BEG'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 IN describing the relations that subsisted between Eng- 
 land and Kashgar, while under the rule of Yakoob Beg, 
 there will be no necessity for us to enter so deeply into 
 the under-currents that guided those relations, as was 
 necessary in the preceding chapter, where we detailed the 
 rivalry of Eussia and Kashgar. While England could 
 hold out a hand of friendship to the Athalik Ghazi, 
 because he sought to please us by making commercial 
 concessions, Eussia felt doubly piqued with the man who 
 for long refused her a similar foothold, and who, for a 
 brief space, went still farther in his defiance, secure as 
 he thought under British protection. Our government 
 could not fail to see, in the bold conduct of this ruler, 
 the result of a mistaken notion of what it would do 
 in the event of a war in Central Asia, and it strove to 
 bring home to the mind of Yakoob Beg and his emis- 
 saries a sense of our determination not to interfere 
 beyond the Karakoram. Looking back now on the 
 old legends that successive travellers brought us from 
 Eastern Turkestan, where such strange things had been 
 wrought, where the Chinese had been expelled, and a 
 new king from Khokand enthroned, and regarding them 
 in the light of our greatly extended information, even 
 since Mr. Shaw penned his interesting volume on High 
 Tartary, it will not be without some interest to trace 
 back the story of how Yakoob Beg's name first became 
 known to us, and how, for eight or nine years, a large 
 section of Englishmen wove a romance round his name, 
 and converted " the land of the six cities " into a fertile 
 
YAKOOB BEO'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 213 
 
 and populous region, which might serve as a barrier 
 to Russian progress, and which, like Cabul elsewhere, 
 should extend as another " cushion " from the moun- 
 tains of Hindostan to the Celestial range of the Chinese. 
 Those dreams have vanished now, and in their place has 
 risen up the very unromantic and matter-of-fact spec- 
 tacle of a Chinese triumph. 
 
 Whoever has chanced to reside in the valleys of the 
 Himalaya Mr. Shaw is the authority must experience 
 a desire to know of the countries beyond that range. 
 The desire is natural, but the obstacles of nature are 
 stupendous. To enter Tibet has been the object of 
 numerous Englishmen, from the time of Warren Hast- 
 ings, yet that object has been only attained by three 
 of our countrymen, the latest sixty-six years ago. There 
 are forty or fifty passes of various degrees of practica- 
 bility leading into Tibet from Nepaul, Sikhim, and 
 Bhutan ; and to act as a spur to the explorer there is a 
 highly civilized and peaceable race just beyond our 
 border of whom we know scarcely anything. Yet the 
 vision of Warren Hastings and of Thomas Manning 
 remains unfulfilled. 
 
 North of the Karakoram there were no similar in- 
 centives. Mr. Moorcroft who, fifty years ago, resided 
 in Ladakh, does not appear to have manifested any 
 desire to pierce the iron barrier to the north, although 
 towards Ruduk and Tibet he turned as if irresistibly 
 fascinated. The character which the brothers Michell 
 gave Little Bokhara, or Eastern Turkestan, expressed 
 a fact, which long deterred any traveller from attempt- 
 ing to explore it. " Little Bokhara," they said, " was a 
 country where every man carried his life in his hand, 
 and there were indubitable excuses for each successive 
 traveller who recoiled before the hardships and dangers 
 of a journey through that country." But although no 
 Englishman traversed the dizzy passes of the Karako- 
 ram and the Kuen Lun, now and then the people from 
 Sanju, Khoten, and the neighbourhood came to Ladakh, 
 
214 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 wliere they brought intelligence of the political events 
 that were taking place further north. Their intelligence 
 was often completely false, it was always vague and exag- 
 gerated, but it, at all events, told us whether peace or 
 war, satisfaction or dissatisfaction, was the existing cir- 
 cumstance in Eastern Turkestan. It was known in a 
 .general sense that China was the nominal ruler of this 
 vast region ; but the exact relations China held there, 
 how she conquered the country and when, and by what 
 means she retained her conquest, all these were unascer- 
 tained. There had, indeed, been one break in this state of 
 darkness when the learned traveller, Adolph Schlagint- 
 weit,in 18 57, penetrated, with a few native followers, into 
 Kashgar. The initial difficulties were successfully over- 
 come, and fortune seemed at first disposed to smile upon 
 his enterprise. Herr Schlagintweit had come, however, 
 at a singularly inopportune moment. The Khoja Wali 
 Khan had just invaded Kashgar, and his forces had 
 spread as far south as Yarkand, when the traveller 
 approached that city. He appears to have been able to 
 report himself to the Aksakal, representing Cashmere 
 at Yarkand, who, in turn, communicated with the Chinese 
 Amban, for permission for him to enter the city ; but 
 while detained outside the walls he was captured by a 
 roving party of Wali Khan's army. He was at once hur- 
 ried off to Wali Khan's head-quarters at Kashgar, where 
 that despot, in a fit of fury, brought about by excess in 
 " bang," ordered him to be executed. His followers 
 escaped, and brought back the tale of his death to 
 Ladakh. 
 
 Such was the untoward fate of the first explorer of 
 Kashgar. In the course of the early summer of 1868, 
 it became generally known that the Chinese had been 
 driven out of Kashgar, and that Yakoob Beg was ruling 
 the country, under the title, conferred upon him by the 
 Ameer of Bokhara, of Athalik Ghazi. He had sent a 
 sort of semi-official messenger, Mahomed Nazzar, in 
 that year into the Punjab, to take notes, as it were, of 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 215 
 
 our dominions. Mr. Shaw, in Ladakh, had heard of the 
 recent changes in Eastern Turkestan, and mentioned to 
 this envoy on his return the desire he had to visit 
 Kashgar, and see the widely famed Athalik Ghazi. The 
 envoy received the proposition with enthusiastic approval, 
 but it was considered more prudent to await the formal 
 assent of the ruler himself. After overcoming the diffi- 
 culties that beset his task, with prompt resolution Mr. 
 Shaw entered the dominions of the Athalik Ghazi in 
 December, 1868, being the first Englishman who had 
 ever entered Little Bokhara. His reception was singu- 
 larly cordial, and everything that the officials could do 
 to make his sojourn in the country pleasant to him was 
 done. One and all of the Khokandian dignitaries re- 
 ceived him as a friend and a brother ; and even M ahomed 
 Yunus, Dadkwah of Yarkand, the second man in the 
 kingdom, treated him in a spirit of marked cordiality. 
 It should be remembered that Mr. Shaw went there 
 without any official status whatever, and simply as an 
 English traveller. Of course, it was the best policy for 
 the Kashgarian rulers to greet him hospitably, and prove 
 that they had completely pacified Eastern Turkestan ; 
 but in pointing out the hospitable reception that was 
 given to Mr. Shaw, it is impossible to detract from its 
 merit by referring to such latent political motives as 
 these. Yakoob Beg received the English traveller in 
 special audience at Kashgar, and treated him in the 
 most cordial manner. On Mr. Shaw offering him a few 
 presents that he had brought from India, such as rifles, 
 &c., the ruler laughed, and said, " What need is there of 
 presents between you and me ? We are already friends, 
 and your safe arrival has been sufficient satisfaction to 
 me. 3 ' During Mr. Shaw's residence in Kashgar, which 
 extended over a period of three months, he had three 
 interviews with the Athalik Ghazi, who on each occa- 
 sion became, if possible, more friendly than on the pre- 
 vious one. Mr. Shaw was fairly treated on the whole, 
 and has of all writers on Kashgar given us the most 
 
216 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 graphic description of the people and the country. Mr. 
 Shaw's position was to a certain extent compromised by 
 the arrival of another Englishman, the lamented Mr. 
 Hay ward, who was murdered in a somewhat mysterious 
 manner, three or four years afterwards, in the neigh- 
 bourhood of the Cashmerian fortress of Gilgit. Both 
 travellers were for a time detained in a sort of honour- 
 able confinement in Kashgar, but all ended happily, and 
 the first two English explorers of Eastern Turkestan 
 returned in perfect safety to Ladakh. The result of 
 Mr. Shaw's interesting journey was not made known in 
 England until 1871, after he had set out and returned 
 from Kashgar a second time, in the first embassy of 
 Mr., now Sir, Douglas Forsyth. The result of this 
 visit to Yarkand and Kashgar was almost magnetic. 
 Not only did the Indian Government promptly take 
 into its consideration the question of what our political 
 relations were to be with the Athalik Ghazi, but the 
 whole Anglo-Indian community turned an attentive ear 
 to the stories told of the new country. A new avenue 
 for commerce had been opened up, and Eastern Turkestan 
 might, after all, prove the true gateway to the marts of 
 Bokhara and Kuldja. In our more immediate vicinity 
 there was the jade trade of Khoten to be revived, and 
 the wool of Tartary, of ancient fame, should alone form 
 a staple article of commerce. For Manchester goods 
 and Indian wares there was also a very inviting pros- 
 pect in the thickly populated districts of Yarkand and 
 Kashgar, which were at first supposed to contain a much 
 larger population than as a matter of fact they did. At 
 first it is probable that the main sentiment was one of 
 satisfaction on commercial grounds alone ; later on, the 
 progress' of events in Khokand and Kuldja made the 
 political motives appear more prominently before Eng- 
 lish minds. Atrading company was formed in conception, 
 but it did not begin operations until several years later 
 on, after the signature of the Forsyth treaty, for which, 
 and the official regulations concerning the working of 
 
YAKOOB DEC'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 217 
 
 that company, the reader may "be referred to the Appen- 
 dix of this volume. 
 
 Mr. Shaw himself formed a very roseate estimate of 
 the future of the trade between India and Kashgar, and 
 participated with all his wonted activity in promoting 
 the fortunes of the Yarkand Trading Company from his 
 advantageous post at Leh. Although the more sanguine 
 expectations were never realized, the company itself was 
 successful, and performed a very useful work under no 
 easy circumstances, Its functions are suspended during 
 the uncertainty that always follows a change in the 
 ruling power of a state, until it is seen what steps are 
 taken by the Chinese, or this country, to perpetuate, 
 under the Chinese sway, those good feelings which first 
 arose under Yakoob Beg. Many are sceptical of the 
 possibility of living ,011 terms of good neighbourship 
 with the Chinese, and of carrying on an intercourse, 
 which certainly does not exist anywhere along the whole 
 extent of the Anglo-Chinese frontier. But these persons 
 will scarcely admit that the Chinese are to blame in 
 this respect if we neglect the subject, for Russia by 
 right of several treaties, and by right also of diplomatic 
 ta<St, has a commercial status in every northern mart of 
 the Chinese Empire, from Ourga to Urumtsi, Manas, 
 Chuguchak, Kuldja and Kashgar. If the Chinese were 
 reinstalled in every one of their old possessions, yet 
 Eussia would have a legal foothold in all those out- 
 lying dependencies. English commerce must not by any 
 means despair of success in opening up the interior of 
 China from the direction of India and Cashmere. In 
 most cases, political action generally follows upon com- 
 mercial enterprise ; but in our dealings with the Chinese 
 the order is reversed, and political overtures and diplo- 
 matic arrangements must clear the way for the commerce 
 that must infallibly spring up between Hindostan and 
 not only Tartary and Tibet, but also the home provinces 
 of Yunnan and Szchuen. The root of the difficulty is 
 no doubt to be found in the fact that the Mantchoo 
 
218 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 caste is in many respects as much a race apart from 
 the mass of Chinamen as the Norman was in England 
 during the twelfth century. The Mantchoo mandarin 
 believes that in some undefined manner the introduc- 
 tion of European science and civilization into China 
 would tend to lower his influence and political power. 
 But if we are wise, we shall ignore this sentiment, and 
 endeavour to reach the people through their legitimate 
 authorities, the Tartar conquering race of two centuries 
 and a half ago, and not by attempting to influence the 
 rulers by a propagandist crusade among the people, as 
 some advise. 
 
 Some months after the return of Mr. Shaw to Leh, 
 the Athalik Ghazi, who had doubtless considered very 
 attentively that gentleman's suggestion to maintain a 
 representative at Lahore, despatched an envoy to India 
 for the purpose of expressing his desire for the esta- 
 blishment of friendly relations with the British Go- 
 vernment, for the development of trade between the 
 countries, and for the visit of a British officer to his 
 capital. He had fully realized by this time what Mr. 
 Shaw meant by saying that he came in no official capa- 
 city. If he intended, therefore, to reap any reward for 
 the manifestation of his friendship towards England, or 
 to be able to play England's alliance off against Russia's 
 hostility, he discovered that he must take the initiative. 
 In consequence of that discovery, Ihrar Khan came to 
 India, and was entertained by our Government in a 
 very friendly manner. It was in response to Ihrar 
 Khan's visit that Mr. Forsyth was sent as our first 
 envoy to Kashgar, in the following year. 
 
 Mr. Forsyth was accompanied by Mr. Shaw, who had 
 volunteered for the service, and by Dr. Henderson. He 
 reached Yarkand, by the same route as that followed 
 by Mr. Shaw, in safety, and without suffering any great 
 amount of inconvenience. But the mission had reached 
 the scene of its labours at a very inopportune moment. 
 The Athalik Ghazi had just been summoned away to the 
 
YAKOOB BEG's RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 219 
 
 far eastern frontier to repress hostile movements on the 
 part of the Tungan cities of Turfan and Urumtsi, and 
 it was very uncertain for how long a time he might be 
 detained there. Mr. Forsyth accordingly left Yarkand 
 in the month of September on his return journey, 
 without having had an opportunity of settling the 
 future of the relations between India and Kashgar. 
 Dr. Henderson, in his "Lahore to Yarkand/' chronicled 
 the events of this journey to the region north of the 
 
 TT- 1 J J & 
 
 Himalaya. 
 
 The very next year, 1871, Yakoob Beg sent Ihrar 
 Khan once more to India to renew his protestations of 
 friendship, entrusting him with letters, not only for the 
 Viceroy but also for Her Majesty the Queen. But there 
 was no immediate result from this later overture. 
 
 In the meanwhile Eussia had broken ground more 
 firmly in Eastern Turkestan. The treaty of commerce 
 between Eussia and her neighbour, which had been for 
 several years on the carpet, had at last been signed at 
 Kashgar on the 8th of June, 1872. That treaty con- 
 ceded no inconsiderable trade privileges to Eussia, for, 
 as will be seen from a perusal of its clauses, Eussian 
 goods entering the country could not be subjected to a 
 higher tax than 2-| per cent, ad valor em. In fact, but for 
 Yakoob Beg's prudence in restricting the appointment 
 of Eussian commercial agents in the cities to the inferior 
 caravan-bashi, a far different personage to the Aksakal, 
 that treaty would have placed Kashgar virtually in the 
 possession of General Kaufmann. Even as it was, 
 Eussia, regarded as a foe, had out-distanced England, 
 who was held to be a friend ; and for a considerable 
 time afterwards, English commerce, which had no status 
 there, hesitated to seek admission into the dominions of 
 the Athalik Grhazi. 
 
 But the treaty of Baron Kaulbars was in its essence 
 a sham, for no good feeling sprang up between the 
 countries ; and where there was distrust on either side, 
 trade languished, as was to be expected. Two months 
 
220 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 after this treaty, "Yakoob Beg sent his nephew, the Seyyid 
 Yakoob Khan, on a special embassy to Russia, whence 
 he went on to Constantinople, and returned via India. 
 He then had several long discussions with our autho- 
 rities relative to the measures that should be adopted 
 to place everything on a friendly footing between 
 Kashgar and ourselves. The Sultan had conferred 
 upon the ruler of Kashgar the high title of Emir ul 
 Moomineen, and shortly afterwards Yakoob Beg pro- 
 claimed himself in consequence of that decree Emir or 
 Ameer of Kashgar, under the title of Yakoob Khan. It 
 is appropriate here to say something of these two titles, 
 Khan and Beg. In this work the ruler of Kashgar has 
 been consistently called Beg or prince, and not Khan or 
 lord ; and for the following reasons. The title of Khan 
 is much higher than that of Beg ; it is, moreover, 
 hereditary. Gibbon, whose authority in these Central 
 Asian matters stands higher than many modern 
 scholars will admit, defines it as the distinguishing 
 mark of the descendants of Genghis Khan. His 
 heirs and their children became the Khans of West- 
 ern Asia. The Mongol who grafted himself on the 
 Turk and the Usbeg, brought with him the unique 
 authority that was vested by public voice in the house 
 of Genghis, the Khan of Khans. Now, although in his 
 later days Yakoob Beg, or his admirers, invented a 
 lineage for himself back to Timour, consequently making 
 him of Mongol descent, it is highly improbable that this 
 mythical descent was based on any reliable data, nor 
 can we admit any other claim to according Yakoob Beg 
 that higher title than one that will stand the criticism of 
 history. Yakoob Beg was not free from some of that 
 craving that haunts the minds of rulers " born out of 
 the purple" to claim cousinship with the select caste 
 of former sovereigns ; and the visible embodiment of 
 temporal sovereignty in Turkestan was this very title of 
 Khan, which has been so much abused in its application. 
 It is wrong, in a strict sense, to apply the title of 
 
YAKOOB BEO'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 221 
 
 Khan to Yakoob Beg, although he undoubtedly made 
 use of it during the last three years of his reign ; but 
 as a matter of mere convenience, it is also misleading. 
 On the stage of Asiatic politics there is another Yakoob 
 Khan, who is, by descent, a Khan, and possesses quali- 
 ties not less eminent than did his namesake in Eastern 
 Turkestan. Confusion was often caused by the con- 
 founding of one of these personages with the other, 
 whereas if each had been defined by his legitimate title, 
 there would have been no misunderstanding. Towards 
 the close of the year 1873, the Seyyid Yakoob Khan, 
 who, by descent, could claim the title which was not his 
 uncle's, returned to India, where he found that the 
 English mission was a few days ahead of him on its 
 journey to Kashgar. 
 
 The Indian government had, in the meanwhile, ap- 
 pointed Mr. T. Douglas Forsyth as their envoy to 
 Kashgar once more, and, during the summer of 1873, 
 preparations were busily in progress for the important 
 embassy that was to counteract the adverse effects of 
 Baron Kaulbars' treaty. As this is the turning-point 
 in Anglo-Kashgarian relations, it is necessary to follow 
 it in considerable detail. Upon Mr. Forsyth's embassy 
 depends the whole fabric of our policy in, and intercourse 
 with, Eastern Turkestan during the past four years. In 
 fact, but for Sir Douglas Forsyth's Eeport and Treaty, 
 even Mr. Shaw's interesting volume and intrepid jour- 
 ney would have failed to have preserved the vitality 
 of our interest in Kashgar and its ruler. 
 
 By the month of July, everything was in readiness 
 for a forward movement, but owing to the delay in the 
 arrival of Seyyid Yakoob Khan, or Hadji Torah as he 
 was more usually termed, Mr. Forsyth still lingered 
 at Murree. Captains Biddulph and Trotter, and Dr. 
 Stoliczka, in the meanwhile set out for Leh to explore 
 the routes between that town and Shahidoola. These 
 three gentlemen explored the country beyond Ladakh 
 very carefully, although it had already been described 
 
222 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 by Messrs. Shaw and Hayward, and Dr. Cayley. Mr. 
 Forsyth and the headquarters, after a short stay at 
 Srinagar in Cashmere, arrived at Leh on the 20th of 
 September. It may be useful to give here the names of 
 those who comprised this important embassy. In the 
 first place there was the envoy himself, Mr., now Sir, 
 T. Douglas Forsyth, C.B., and now K.C.S.I. His second 
 in command was Lieut.-Colonel T. E. Gordon, C.S.I., 
 who, after the prime object of the mission had been 
 accomplished, explored a very considerable portion of 
 the Pamir, the result of whose investigations is to be 
 found in his work "The Eoof of the World." Then 
 came Dr. Belle w, C.S.I., Surgeon-Major, entrusted with 
 the medical control of the expedition. The three mili- 
 tary men Captains Chapman, Trotter, and Biddulph< 
 held various functions ; the first as secretary, the latter 
 two in scientific capacities. In addition to these there 
 were the learned Dr. Stoliczka, who died from the effects 
 of the rarefaction of the atmosphere ; an English corporal 
 of a Highland regiment, and six native officers and skilled 
 assistants. There was also an escort of ten sowars, one 
 naick, and ten sepoys furnished by the Corps of Guides. 
 The appointments of the embassy were also most 
 carefully selected, and with special regard to the diffi- 
 culties that lay before it in the obstacles of nature, and 
 the inconveniences attending complete dependence on 
 natives for the means of transporting the large quantity 
 of impedimenta. One hundred mules " of a fair stamp " 
 were accordingly purchased in India by Tara Sing, a 
 merchant, and the treasurer to the embassy. And these 
 were equipped with saddles and trunks of a special 
 pattern, made in the government workshops at Cawn- 
 poor. Altogether, then, this English embassy to Kash- 
 gar was a very formidable undertaking, and in its pro- 
 portions assumed something of the appearance of a small 
 army ; in camp there were " 300 souls and 400 animals." 
 The day had gone by when English travellers enter- 
 tained doubts of entering Kashgar in company at the same 
 
YAKOOB EEC's RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 223 
 
 time, lest they should arouse the apprehensions of the 
 people. Mr. Yorsyth came vested with all the authority 
 of his Sovereign and the Viceroy, to negotiate a treaty of 
 amity with the ruler of Kashgar, and the people gene- 
 rally saw in that fact a guarantee of the preservation of 
 their liberties and independence. 
 
 So far as Shahidoola, the journey was in a well known 
 region, and outside the frontier of Yakoob Beg. At 
 that place the first sign of that ruler's power was en- 
 countered in the same way as Mr. Shaw, five years 
 before, had witnessed the advanced limit of the power of 
 the Athalik Ghazi in a southerly direction. A captain 
 of the Kashgarian army, Yuzbashi Mahomed Zareef 
 Khan, had been deputed to receive our envoy at the 
 frontier, and to give him a hearty welcome. After a 
 rest of four days, the whole expedition, advancing in two 
 bodies over the Grim Pass, Sanju Devan, entered the in- 
 habited territory of Sanju. Here Hadji Torah, who had 
 been travelling "post" after them from India, caught 
 them up, and by his tact and real friendship for this 
 country, contributed greatly to the complete success of 
 the mission. The passage of the Grim Pass, although 
 accomplished with success, was no easy task. Dr. 
 Belle w, in his book " Kashmir and Kashgar," gives the 
 following graphic description of it, which may be quoted 
 with advantage as showing some of the " obstacles of 
 nature " to the advance either of an army or a caravan 
 in this quarter : 
 
 "The scene which now burst upon our view is one 
 not easy to describe, still less to forget. Immediately 
 on either hand, like the portals of a gate, stood bare 
 banks of silver grey slate, which gently spread away 
 on each side into the slopes that, inclining together, 
 formed the theatre of the spectacle they limited. And 
 immediately in front commenced that gentle rise over 
 slabs of slate debris the natural dark hue of which 
 was lost in the bright sparkle of its abundant mica 
 which led at once on to the field of our vision. Here, 
 
224 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 at the foot of the ascent, one step took us from the 
 tiresome monotony of the bare rocks behind, with all 
 their dulness of hue, on to the snow, which overspread 
 all before with a white sheet of the most dazzling 
 brilliance. On the left and on the right it spread with 
 uniform regularity to the crests of the bounding ridges 
 in those directions ; whilst in front, it rose up as a vast 
 wall, whose top cut the sky in a succession of sharp 
 peaks with a clearness of outline rarely witnessed. 
 And above all, stretched the wide expanse of heaven, 
 with a depth unsearchable, in the speckless purity of 
 its azure, and with a calm such as often precedes the 
 storm. Wonderful was the scene !" 
 
 Such is the description of an eye-witness of this 
 striking scene, which in its solemnity approached the 
 sublime, in its grandeur the terrible. The last hun- 
 dred feet of the ascent was a sheer wall of ice, like 
 the Matterhorn, and up this the troopers' horses, and 
 the baggage mules and ponies, had to be lifted by 
 human force. More than a whole day was occupied 
 in surmounting this obstacle alone, but it was sur- 
 mounted with the small loss of eight mules and three 
 ponies. With the crossing of the Grim Pass, the 
 difficulties of nature disappeared, and henceforth the 
 course of the mission lay in the more sheltered plains 
 of Kashgaria. 
 
 After leaving Sanju, the country had, for some days' 
 journey, an appearance of barrenness, that was only 
 relieved by the avidity with which patches of more 
 promising soil had been cultivated, a fact which testified 
 alike to the beneficence of the ruler and to the assiduity 
 of his people. There is good reason for believing that 
 in the Yarkand and Khoten districts, Yakoob Beg's 
 administration was most successful. This may have 
 been caused by the superior qualities of the people over 
 the Tungani, and mixed populations farther east ; but 
 it must also be attributed to the absence of those 
 desolating wars which went on without any long 
 
YAKOOTC BEG'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 225 
 
 intervals down to the year 1874, in the country held by 
 the Tungani. The treachery of Yakoob Beg in mur- 
 dering the Khan Habitulla of Khoten had aroused 
 suspicions as to his good faith that only lay dormant 
 during the days of his power ; but the people of Kho- 
 ten, Sanju, Karghalik, and Kilia were far too thrifty 
 and too prudent to sit down supinely and dwell upon 
 their wrongs. They neither forgot nor forgave, but they 
 suppressed all trace of seditious opinions against the 
 new ruler. 
 
 The next city which Mr. Forsyth reached, Karghalik, 
 showed still further signs of prosperity and civilization. 
 " An eating-house, with its clean table, and forms, and 
 piles of china plates and bowls, at once took us back 
 across the seas to the recollection of many a country 
 restaurant in France." Special preparations had in 
 every way been made for the reception of the repre- 
 sentatives of England, and Mr. Forsyth expressed his 
 surprise at finding fire-places, like our own, ventilators, 
 and rich carpets from Khoten, famous in days of yore 
 for its manufacture of those articles, in the quarters 
 that had been set apart as his residence. Similar 
 preparations had been made at every stopping place, 
 and the people not less than the sovereign did their 
 best, arid spared no exertion, to make the stay of the 
 Feringhees as pleasant as possible for them. More than 
 that, even at the resting places during the daily march, 
 the headman or local magnate, without exception, always 
 entertained them at a " dastarkhwan," that is to say, at 
 a course of refreshments. The "dastarkhwan" literally 
 means table-cloth, and consists of any number of 
 distinct dishes, sometimes as many as a hundred, held 
 by as many attendants. This is a national custom, 
 from which there is never any deviation. It is incum- 
 bent upon the guest to break bread first, and then 
 present it to his host. One of their customs is refreshing 
 to any one who has come fresh from India, with all its 
 troublesome caste distinctions. " Be the host Turk or 
 
226 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 British, he and his guests eat alike from the same dish, 
 and hand food to the surrounding attendants, who are 
 troubled with no scruples of caste to interfere with their 
 hearty appetite." 
 
 The mission was now drawing close to Yarkand, 
 politically and commercially the most important city in 
 the state, and accordingly preparations were made for a 
 formal entry. At a village called Zilch ak a chamber- 
 lain, or Yasawal-Bashi, came out with a party of the 
 royal body-guard, Yakoob Beg's favourite jigits, in 
 their buff leather uniform, to act as an escort, and the 
 party was swollen en route by numerous influential 
 citizens and merchants, who advanced to give an early 
 welcome to the new arrivals. By these additions quite 
 an imposing cavalcade drew nigh to the walls of 
 Yarkand. The quarters set apart for the Englishmen 
 were in the fort, which lies to the north of the city, 
 so that Yarkand had to be ridden through before 
 their halting place was reached. The people who 
 thronged to witness the sight seemed very well 
 disposed, and altogether there was every reason to 
 feel well satisfied with these mutual first impressions, 
 which, some had asserted, would be far from pleasant. 
 
 The following day there was an interview of ceremony 
 with the Dadkhwali of Yarkand, Mahomed Yunus Jan, 
 for whose history the reader is referred to Chapter IX., 
 and then the visitors were permitted to go wherever 
 they liked. On Mr. Forsyth's former visit a similar 
 freedom had not been accorded him. Their first appear- 
 ance in the streets was the occasion for a great deal of 
 bustling on the part of the curious, but of friendly good- 
 will also. All the principal streets and bazaars were 
 visited in turn, such as the butchers' street, or market, 
 where the varieties of meat were clearly to be seen, and 
 their quality tested by their tails or heads being left un- 
 touched. It appears to be the fashion in Yarkand to 
 purchase the necessaries of life during the morning, and 
 the luxuries in the evening. There is a special evening 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 227 
 
 bazaar, called Sham, where hats and other clothes, in 
 addition to various other articles, are put up for sale in 
 the afternoon. This, when lit up with Chinese lamps, 
 must have presented a stirring sight, very similar to a 
 country fair in our country. Sir Douglas Forsyth does 
 not tell us whether under Yakoob Beg it was customary 
 to illuminate this bazaar with the gaudy lamps of the 
 Chinese, or whether our imagination of such a scene 
 must be referred back to the days of the old domination. 
 
 Nor were these harmonious relations confined to the 
 lower people and ourselves alone. Their rulers set an 
 example that all strove to imitate. Between the officers 
 of the mission and the Dadkhwah something more 
 cordial than a chivalrous sentiment of guest towards 
 host sprang up, and was heartily reciprocated ; while 
 Hadji Torah smoothed down all difficulties by his ready 
 tact and never -failing resource. The latter did not 
 remain the whole time of the three weeks that the 
 mission remained at Yarkand, but set out for the capi- 
 tal, in order to put the Ameer au courant with English 
 affairs, and the exact objects our authorities* had before 
 them with regard to his country. 
 
 MahomedYunus had placed at the disposal of the mis- 
 sion a considerable number of the carts of the country, 
 which proved very serviceable. These carts are strongly 
 built, with two wheels, six feet in diameter, and are 
 drawn by four or six ponies, as the case may be. They 
 are not permitted to carry a greater weight than ten 
 hundredweight, but with that load it is quite customary 
 for them to perform journeys of twenty and twenty-five 
 miles a day. In carts of this kind the heavier baggage 
 was carried from Yarkand to Kashgar, while the mem- 
 bers of the mission with a lighter camp followed on 
 some days afterwards. While mentioning these carts, 
 so superior to the Indian modes of conveyance, we will 
 remark that they also are used as omnibuses and stage 
 coaches. They ply frequently between the fort and 
 city of Kashgar, a distance of five miles, and they are 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 also used as a stage coach doing the whole distance 
 from Yarkand to Kashgar in five stages. But no com- 
 pany with its regulations and bye-laws has a monopoly 
 of this branch of locomotion, and there is a tariff fixed 
 by law which cannot be departed from. 
 
 On the 28th of November the mission set out from 
 Yarkand, and for a certain distance high officials, by 
 order of the Dadkwah, bore it company to speed 
 it on its journey. From Yarkand to Yangy Hissar the 
 country was equally prosperous-looking, but there was 
 much desert land as well. The villages of Kok Eobat 
 and Ak Eobat (names meaning Blue and White Post- 
 house respectively) wore a flourishing look, and the 
 appearance of Yakoob Beg's soldiery, still jigits, who 
 looked prim on parade, and yet could play the part of 
 waiter, carpenter, or what not, with equal facility, added 
 a sense of order and cohesion to the whole display. The 
 appearance of Yangy Hissar was made more imposing 
 to the view by the proximity of the formidable fort 
 Yakoob Beg had erected there ; but in itself, owing to 
 the houses being surrounded by mud walls, with crenel- 
 lated tops, it closely resembled a fortification. There 
 was only a brief stay here, and the mission then com- 
 menced its last stage of all. The 4th of December, 
 1873, was the eventful day which first saw an English 
 envoy enter that capital, which Mr. Shaw had visited 
 four years before in a non-official capacity. Special 
 quarters had been prepared, at a short distance from 
 the fort, where is also the royal palace, for the envoy, 
 and these Elchi Khana had been fitted up in a very com- 
 fortable, if not luxurious style. Ihrar Khan Torah, who 
 had visited India as envoy twice before, was the 
 first to pay a visit to the new arrivals, and to request 
 that they would come at once to see the Athalik Ghazi. 
 The following description is Sir Douglas Forsyth's own 
 account of his first interview with the Ameer : 
 
 " According to etiquette we dismounted at about forty 
 paces from the gateway, and walked slowly along with 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND 229 
 
 Ihrar Khan, the Yasawal-Bashi, or head chamberlain, 
 with white wand in hand going ahead. In the outer 
 gateway soldiers were seated on a dais with their fire- 
 arms laid on the ground before them, their arms folded, 
 and their eyes on the ground. We then crossed obliquely 
 an empty court-yard, and passing through a second gate- 
 way filled with soldiers, crossed another court, on all 
 sides of which soldiers in gay costumes were ranged 
 seated. From this court we passed into the penetralia, a 
 small court, in which not a soul was visible, and every- 
 where a deathlike stillness prevailed. At the further 
 end of this court was a long hall, with several window 
 doors. Ihrar Khan then led us in single file, with 
 measured tread, to some steps at the side of the hall, 
 and, entering almost on tiptoe, looked in, and, returning, 
 beckoned with his hand to me to advance alone. As I 
 approached the door he made a sign for me to enter, and 
 immediately withdrew. I found myself standing at the 
 threshold of a very common-looking room, perfectly 
 bare of all ornament, and with a not very good carpet on 
 the floor : looking about I saw enter at a doorway on 
 the opposite side a tall stout man, plainly dressed. He 
 beckoned with his hand, and I advanced, thinking that 
 it must be a chamberlain who was to conduct me to 
 ' the presence/ Instinctively, however, I made a bow 
 as I advanced, and soon found myself taken by both 
 hands, and saluted with the usual form of politeness, 
 and I knew that I was standing before the far-famed 
 ruler of Eastern Turkestan. After a few words of wel- 
 come the Athalik led me across the room and seated me 
 near him, by the side of a window. At this moment a 
 salute of fifteen guns was fired. His Highness asked 
 in an eager tone after the health of Her Majesty, and 
 of the Viceroy, and soon afterwards called, in a low voice, 
 to Ihrar Khan to bring in the other officers. They 
 came in one by one, and each was shaken by the hand, 
 and made to sit down by my side. Then there was a 
 long and somewhat trying pause, during which the 
 
230 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Athalik eyed each one of us with intent scrutiny. I had 
 been told that etiquette forbade the guest to speak much 
 on the first interview, and that it was a point of good 
 manners to sit perfectly still with downcast eyes .... 
 After this silent ordeal had been undergone for some 
 time, at a sign from the Athalik, sixteen soldiers came 
 in with the dastarkhwan, and the Athalik breaking a 
 loaf of bread shared it with us. After the cloth was 
 removed, we, remembering our lesson in manners, rose 
 up, and stroking our beards, said, l Allah o Akbar;' soon 
 after which the Athalik said, ' Khush, amadeed ' (' You 
 are welcome')." 
 
 Thus ended this imposing interview, imposing not for 
 any magnificence or barbaric splendour that appertained 
 either to the court or person of the ruler, but by reason 
 of the mysterious character of the Ameer himself, of his 
 vague power and influence, and of the hold he had ac- 
 quired over such of his subjects as comprised his court 
 and his body guard. All his Khokandian friends and 
 relations, whose fortunes, indeed, depended on his power, 
 were stanchly attached to his person. It could not be 
 given to envoys to possess such complete prescience as 
 to foresee that the jarring elements, that still existed 
 beneath the surface would suffice to overthrow his rule 
 still more irretrievably when it received its first shock 
 from external foes. To the observer, the appearance of 
 Yakoob Beg and his military following was the 1 highest 
 evidence of latent power. Order was supreme, and dis- 
 cipline was as apparent in the palace of the Ameer as in 
 the barrack yards of his fortresses. 
 
 The formal interview took place on the llth of 
 December, when the presents from our government to 
 the Ameer, carried by over 100 men, were delivered to 
 His Highness. There were guns of all kinds, including 
 two small cannon, vases, &c., &c.; but the token of 
 friendship at which the ruler showed most symptoms 
 of pleasure was the autograph letter of Her Majesty. 
 This letter was enclosed in a " magnificent casket of 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 231 
 
 pale yellow quartz, clamped with gilt bands and handles, 
 and "bossed with onyx stones." The Ameer received 
 this with unconcealed satisfaction, several times repeat- 
 ing, " God be praised." And then he made those 
 declarations of friendship which, taken in conjunction 
 with our admiration for the man, were the means of 
 riveting England and Kashgar into a closer alliance 
 than any that has as yet subsisted between ourselves 
 and any other Central Asian ruler. " Your Queen is a 
 great sovereign. Her government is a powerful and a 
 beneficent one. Her friendship is to be desired, as it 
 always proves a source of advantage to those who 
 possess it. The Queen is as the sun, in whose genial 
 rays such poor people as I flourish. I particularly 
 desire the friendship of the English. It is essential to 
 me. Your rule is just. The road is open to every one, 
 and from here to London any one can come and go with 
 perfect freedom." 
 
 On the 13th of December our representatives paid 
 their first visit to the city of Kashgar. The country 
 round Kashgar is very fertile, highly cultivated, and 
 thickly populated, and the mission was not less struck 
 by the air of prosperity prevalent here than it had been 
 at Yarkand. In addition, the people had a healthier 
 appearance, mainly through the absence of goitre. The 
 Dadkhwah of Kashgar, Alish Beg, who was a Kashgari 
 and not a Khokandian, was not less friendly than the 
 Governor of Yarkand had been, and a very pleasant day 
 was passed in his company. On the 18th a grand 
 review was held, but for some reason, far from clear, 
 only of the old Chinese troops who had taken service 
 under the new ruler when Kashgar citadel fell. The 
 description of the manoeuvres which this force performed 
 reads more like the display of an itinerant circus than 
 of a disciplined army, but, nevertheless, these Khitay 
 troops were excellent material for an army. Their 
 practice with the tyfo, an awkward weapon, being a sort 
 
232 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 of gun-cannon, carried by two men and served by three, 
 was pronounced very good up to 250 yards. 
 
 It is proper to state here, very clearly, that while the 
 English mission was on Kashgarian soil it lived and 
 travelled free of all expense, and as the Ameer paid his 
 subjects in hard cash for whatever service they rendered, 
 it is obvious that for a small state such as his was this 
 was no trivial expense. It is only fair that this fact 
 should be as widely known as possible, for some discon- 
 tent was aroused by a similar hospitality being extended 
 to the Seyyid Yakoob Khan last year. That discontent 
 arose from ignorance ; for it is hardly to be imagined 
 that any Englishman would grumble at reciprocating 
 the courteousness of a Central Asian potentate. The 
 mission remained at the capital almost four months, 
 and altogether the time passed very pleasantly. The 
 weather was certainly rigorous ; but then there was 
 much to be done in the way of business, sight-seeing 
 and amusement. 
 
 On the 2nd of February Yakoob Beg placed his seal 
 to the treaty of commerce, and this act concluded the 
 business portion of the English mission. On the 10th 
 of March formal leave was taken of the Athalik Ghazi, 
 and the mission returned to India. It had accomplished 
 its task with pre-eminent success, and the Forsyth Em- 
 bassy deserves long to be remembered as the most ably 
 conducted and practically useful embassy that ever set 
 out from India. 
 
 Since the signature of that treaty the Turkestan 
 Trading Company has been very actively engaged in 
 despatching several caravans annually into Kashgaria ; 
 but now, whether temporarily or permanently remains 
 to be seen, its operations have come to a standstill. In 
 these later years, Mr. Shaw, in his old post as Commis- 
 sioner in Ladakh, had been as quietly performing his 
 useful work as ever before ; and there were rumours 
 that he was to receive his reward in being sent as 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 233 
 
 another envoy, or rather as a resident agent, into Kash- 
 garia, last year. If the appointment were made, it has 
 at this date (October 1st) been for the time suspended; 
 and such entirely new considerations have come into 
 play that it may be postponed for an indefinite period. 
 Hadji To rail's visit to this country, in June and July, 
 1877, when the Turko-Russian war had rendered the 
 Eastern Question once more acute, revived our interest, 
 which had been flagging, in Eastern Turkestan. But 
 he came at an unfortunate moment, for June brought 
 us tidings of reverses round Turfan, and July did not 
 pass away without the intelligence of the death of the 
 Athalik Grhazi himself. 
 
 There had, before the receipt of this definite intelli- 
 gence, been absurd rumours of the part Yakoob Beg 
 was resolved to play in Central Asia as the ally of the 
 Porte, while he, poor man, was opposing with despair, 
 and at the cost of his life, a relentless and irresistible 
 foe. Such is the irony of circumstance ! The van- 
 quished in Asia was by some freak of imagination con- 
 verted in Europe into the arbiter of a great question, 
 and the guide of all those peoples of either Turkestan 
 who chafe at the bit because of Russian rule. But in 
 reality, with the return of Sir Douglas Forsyth, our 
 relations with Kashgar, which at one time promised 
 to have been most cordial, languished for want of a 
 motive. No amount of admiration would suffice to 
 make us permanently guarantee Kashgar against Russia, 
 for the bare facts concerning the intervening country 
 at once chilled the sympathy at our hearts. The Grim 
 Pass, and the road lined with desiccated travellers and 
 animals, effaced the bright picture of the orchards of 
 Kashgar and the busy streets of Yarkand. There was 
 a sigh of profound relief, that would not be suppressed, 
 when Sir JJouglas Forsyth's report made the fact clear, 
 that wherever else India might be menaced she was safe, 
 at least, from attack north of Cashmere. It is true that 
 there is a feasible route from Khoten to Euduk, and 
 
234 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 thence to India ; but Yakoob Beg did not hold it, and 
 its consideration was considered to be beside the 
 question. In fact, after 1874, we entertained much the 
 same opinion towards Kashgar and Yakoob Beg that 
 we did towards Poland and Kosciusko ; and we were 
 beginning to reconcile ourselves to a Russian installa- 
 tion in that state, when the returning Chinese made us 
 reflect more deeply on Central Asian matters, and 
 discover that after all has been said against the assertion 
 there exists a third, and hitherto neglected, great Power 
 in Central Asia. There was never anything save a 
 kindly feeling between the two countries, and all who 
 could admire bravery and justice and hospitality and 
 frank courtesy were attached to the individual who had 
 proved that he possessed all these attributes in no mean 
 degree. But there was no deeper sympathy than this, 
 or rather there was no stronger connecting link. The 
 Indian government felt that it would be championing 
 an unrecognized cause in supporting Yakoob Beg 
 against all comers, and in the press of more urgent 
 matters our relations with the Athalik Grhazi became 
 lost sight of. 
 
 The effect of this treatment upon the Ameer was not 
 unapparent, and during the last twelve months of his 
 rule he had become more Eussian and less English in 
 his policy. But we preserved " the even tenor of our 
 way." Yakoob Beg had no hold over us such as must 
 always be possessed by the ruler of Afghanistan. Prac- 
 tically speaking, his state was more inaccessible to us 
 than Tibet, and the Eussians at Yarkand would be a 
 source of far less danger to us than warlike and hostile 
 Chinese might become at Lhasa. To sum up, England 
 and Kashgar were friends because they had no reason 
 to be foes ; but they were indifferent friends. The tear 
 might be shed for mutual misfortunes, and condolences 
 might be uttered when cause for grief arose ; but that 
 was all. There was no alliance in the true sense, nor 
 was there firm and unswerving friendship. There was 
 
YAKOOB BEG's RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 235 
 
 a brief space occupied by sympathy and goodwill ; then 
 ensued an unbroken period of unvarying indifference. 
 Before 1877, the spark that had been kindled by Mr. 
 Shaw, and fanned to the dimensions of a flame by Sir 
 Douglas Forsyth, had gone out, and with its extinction 
 passed away the solid fabric that many had hoped to 
 rear upon the base which the enterprise of a few intrepid 
 men had diligently prepared. Whether we were pru- 
 dent or imprudent, true or false, kind or unkind, Yakoob 
 Beg leaned on a broken reed when he bade defiance to 
 Eussia, trusting on our support. This chapter of our 
 policy in Central Asia may be closed as speedily as 
 possible ; if we do not come out of it with much glory, 
 it is to be hoped that a lenient posterity may judge our 
 demerits with a merciful consideration for the preserva- 
 tion of a strict and irresponsible neutrality. 
 
236* YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 YAKOOB BEG'S LAST WAR WITH CHINA, AND DEATH. 
 
 UNTIL the close of the autumn of 1876 Yakoob Beg 
 had not devoted much personal attention to his eastern 
 frontier. After the first Tungan war and the capture 
 of Kucha he had confided to his son and his lieutenants, 
 the charge of maintaining order in the annexed districts, 
 and of protecting his dominions against any hostile 
 attempt on the part of the Chinese. About the month 
 of September in that year couriers arrived with strange 
 tidings in Kashgar. The message, we can well imagine, 
 was terrible in its brevity. The Chinese had appeared 
 north of the Tian Shan. They had sacked Urumtsi, 
 and were laying close siege to Manas. Their numbers 
 rumour had magnified to almost a hundred thousand 
 combatants, and they came armed with all the auxili- 
 aries Western science could supply. 
 
 Before following the movements of the ruler of 
 Kashgar upon the receipt of this intelligence, it will 
 be necessary to consider what had been the history of 
 this Chinese army which had so suddenly appeared 
 in Jungaria. When in the natural course of events the 
 Chinese government, having solved the Taeping and 
 Panthay difficulties, having restored order where disorder 
 had been supreme, and having created an army where 
 there had been only a disorganized rabble, turned its 
 attention to the question, which it had never lost sight 
 of, of chastising the Tungan rebels beyond Kansuh, 
 the victorious soldiers of Yunnan, instead of being 
 disbanded, were invited to participate in a fresh cam- 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S LAST WAR WITH CHINA. 237 
 
 paign in the regions beyond Grobi. It requires no great 
 stretch of imagination to realize the scene when the 
 imperial edict came before these veterans, calling on 
 all true soldiers to vindicate their country's honour and 
 their outraged religion against the Tungan outcasts ; 
 how the generals, such as Chang Yao, set an example of 
 enthusiasm which the main body of their soldiers 
 speedily followed. In the presence of such military 
 enthusiasm we are transported back to the days of 
 imperial Rome, when the subjection of one province 
 .was only the prelude to some fresh triumph, and when 
 every campaign found in the ranks of the army the 
 veterans of the last. So it was that the victors of 
 Talifoo, by long marches through Szchuen and Shensi, 
 reached Lanchefoo, the capital of Kansuh, where the 
 viceroy of that province was gathering together the 
 munitions of war, and the recruits who were to swell 
 the nucleus of trained soldiers to the proportions 
 suitable to an invading army. Some have considered, 
 and we are far from denying that there is much to 
 support such a view, that there was a political motive 
 at the root of this enterprise, the motive being a desire 
 on the part of the ruling family to give employment to 
 a large disciplined body of men, who if retained in 
 China proper would be at the service of any power- 
 ful conspirator or presumptuous aspirant to imperial 
 honours. Whether there is any foundation or not for 
 this supposition, it is certain that those troops who 
 were not required for garrison work in Yunnan were 
 taken by a round-about route at a great distance from 
 the capital to the north-west frontier town of Lan- 
 chefoo, there to prepare for the most arduous military 
 enterprise China had undertaken since her conquest of 
 Eastern Turkestan in the last century. 
 
 It is not certain when these movements began to be 
 carried out, but there appears to be no reason to doubt 
 that the advanced portion of the Chinese army had com- 
 menced its march westward before the end of the year 
 
238 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 1874. In the barren region between Lanchefoo and 
 Hamil, a tract of country some 900 miles as the crow 
 flies, but probably nearer 1,200 by the road followed by 
 the Chinese, such difficulties were encountered that one 
 if not two winters were occupied in overcoming these 
 preliminary obstacles to the advance of the main force. 
 The interval was not passed in complete idleness at 
 headquarters, where magazines of arms and stores were 
 being collected, recruits enlisted and drilled, and the 
 plan of campaign that was to astonish Asia, if not Eu- 
 rope also, was being drawn up by the Viceroy of Kansuh 
 in person and his able lieutenants. At last, with the 
 break of spring upon the desert plains of Grobi, the 
 Chinese army, which numbered in its entirety some 
 50,000 men, set out on the long road across the desert 
 to the more fertile regions lying north and south of the 
 Celestial Mountains. Of the details of this portion of 
 the enterprise the Pekin Gazette is strangely reticent. 
 The most profound secrecy was observed, and, although 
 it was known that military events were in progress in 
 the north-west, their object and their extent were mys- 
 teries. After the delay experienced by the advanced 
 guard, which had to form fixed encampments, or rather 
 settlements, in the desert, and plant the corn that was 
 to enable it to advance in the following spring, no 
 serious check was experienced by the Chinese until they 
 appeared before the walls of Urumtsi, which the Tungan 
 leaders had resolved to defend. 
 
 Although several officers in the service of Yakoob 
 Beg happened to be in the city, and several of the lead- 
 ing Tungani resided there, the defence was not prolonged, 
 and after a few days Urumtsi surrendered to the Chinese. 
 Many of the inhabitants had fled to the neighbouring 
 city of Manas, but the garrison was massacred by order 
 of the Chinese generals. There is no mention in this 
 case of what fate befell those of the inhabitants who 
 remained. 
 
 Urumtsi surrendered towards the close of August, 
 
YAKOOB EEC'S LAST WAR WITFI CHINA. 239 
 
 1876, and on the 2nd of September the Chinese sat 
 down before the fortifications of Manas, a much more 
 strongly situated city, and defended with the whole force 
 of the Tungan people. The first panic at the appearance 
 of the Chinese had passed off, and the defenders of 
 Manas recognized that they were not only fighting for 
 their cause and independence, but also for their lives 
 and the honour of their families. The terrible lesson 
 of Urumtsi was not without its effect upon the resolute 
 but despairing garrison of Manas. The capture of 
 Urumtsi was a creditable performance in a military sense, 
 but the campaign had to be decided before the ramparts 
 of Manas. On the 2nd of September the Chinese bat- 
 teries commenced to play on the north-east portion of 
 the wall, and for two months the bombardment was 
 carried on on all sides with more or less vigour. Several 
 assaults were repulsed, and the Tungani, in face of 
 superior odds and weapons, had behaved like brave men. 
 But the Chinese were as persistent in their attack after 
 an eight weeks' siege as they had been on the first day 
 of their arrival, and the provisions of the Tungani were 
 almost exhausted. With their supplies ebbed also their 
 courage, and, after an unsuccessful sortie, the Tungan 
 general, Hai-Yen, presented himself to the Chinese out- 
 posts begging to be accorded an honourable capitulation. 
 Ostensibly, terms were granted or, rather, to put the 
 matter as it is expressed in the official Chinese report, 
 everything was left vague and on the 6th of November 
 Hai-Yen and the main body of his fighting men came 
 forth from the city towards the Chinese camp. The sub- 
 sequent events are not clear, but it seems that the atti- 
 tude of this body was suspicious. The men were armed, 
 they were in a well-ordered phalanx, and to the Chinese 
 on the hills around it looked as if they were about to 
 attempt to cut their way through. Once the Chinese 
 generals entertained the suspicion, they proceeded to 
 act promptly upon it, as if it were an incontestable fact, 
 and the Tungani, attacked from all sides, by artillery, 
 
240 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 horse, and foot, were in a short time annihilated. Such 
 of their chiefs as were not slain were brought before the 
 Chinese generals, and forthwith executed "with the 
 extreme of torture." Every able-bodied man found in 
 the city or its vicinity was massacred ; but the report 
 distinctly states that the women, children, and old men 
 were spared, and there is no reason to doubt the veracity 
 of the Chinese. There would, in their eyes, be no need 
 to palliate such strictly just acts of retribution as these. 
 
 Not content with having chastised the living Tun- 
 gani, by annihilating them, as a race capable of self- 
 defence for a generation to come, the bodies of some of 
 the prime movers in the Tungan movement in its 
 infancy, such as To-teh-lin, Heh-tsun, and Han-Hing- 
 Nung, were exhumed and quartered, as an example to 
 all traitors to the Chinese Empire. The fall of Manas 
 struck a blow that resounded throughout Central Asia, 
 and at the intelligence a panic spread among all the 
 peoples of Chinese Turkestan and Jungaria. The enter- 
 prise had been conducted with such astonishing secrecy, 
 and the blow had been struck with such rapidity and 
 skill, that the effect was enhanced by these causes, new 
 alike in the annals of China and Central Asia. Not 
 only had the Khitay returned for revenge, but they had 
 brought with them all the auxiliaries that make 
 England and Eussia the dominant powers in that 
 continent. The Khitay no longer advanced in the 
 clumsy formation of a long-forgotten age, but in 
 obedience to orders based on the models of France 
 and Germany. Their artillery was not a source of 
 danger to the artillerists alone, but as effective as the 
 workshops of Herr Krupp can supply. But, above all, 
 their generals had made still more astonishing progress. 
 In the sieges of Urumtsi and Manas they had proved 
 themselves to be no mean tacticians ; in their next and 
 more extended enterprise they were to show that they 
 must be ranked still higher as strategists. 
 
 Before the end of 1876 the Tungani had ceased to be 
 
YAKOOB BEO'S LAST WAR WITH CHINA. 241 
 
 an independent people. The great majority of them 
 had fallen either in the field or by the hand of the 
 executioner ; and with their disappearance the first 
 portion of the task of the Chinese army was completed. 
 The blood of the Khitay massacred in 1862 and 1863 
 was atoned for, and Chinese prestige restored to as 
 great a height as at any time it had been in the present 
 century. More remained to be accomplished, in its danger 
 as in its result more important, which we have now to 
 consider, before their full task should be consummated ; 
 but the Chinese army and its generals had done, even 
 up to this point, a feat of which any country might be 
 proud. 
 
 These events appear sudden and strange to us 
 who are far removed from their influence, and who 
 only entertain a languid kind of supercilious interest 
 in matters in which the Chinese are the guiding spirit. 
 But what must they have appeared to Yakoob Beg in 
 his palace at Kashgar, although that palace was 1,000 
 miles removed from the spot where his victorious 
 enemies lay encamped ? It is impossible for us to 
 gauge the feeling of apprehension with which these 
 first triumphs of the Chinese were viewed throughout 
 Eastern Turkestan ; and if the bold heart of the 
 Athalik Ghazi did not misgive him, it was not through 
 any light spirit as to the gravity of the danger. 
 
 Intelligence of the fall of Manas reached Yakoob 
 Beg, probably, before the end of November, and in 
 consequence of the lateness of the season he had the 
 whole of the winter before him to make his preparations 
 for defence. The surrender of these cities was not 
 generally known in this country until April, 1877, 
 when we also heard of Yakoob Beg's march eastward 
 to protect his menaced frontier. There is very little to 
 be learnt of the internal affairs of Kashgar between 
 March, 1876, and March, 1877 ; that is to say, between 
 the close of the revolt in Khokand, with the surren- 
 der of Abderrahman Aftobatcha, and the mustering of 
 
242 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Yakoob Beg's army round the city of Turfan, or 
 Tarfur. There can be no doubt that in that period 
 some important changes had taken place in the senti- 
 ment of the Kashgarian people ; these changes may 
 not have been very perceptible to a casual observer, 
 yet in their consequences they were as important as 
 manifest sedition. It is not difficult to suggest what 
 some of these modifications may have been ; of what 
 they resulted in there can be no doubt the weakening 
 of the power of the Athalik Ghazi. 
 
 Yakoob Beg's over-caution in November, 1875, when 
 the last rising broke out in Khokand, damaged his 
 prestige more than a lost battle. It damped the 
 ardour of the Khokandian element among his followers, 
 and when we remember that these were his ablest and 
 most devoted partisans, this alone was a serious blow. 
 But there are many tokens that the disaffection was 
 not confined to any special party among his people, 
 but was spread amongst them all. The Tungan wars 
 had never been popular, and had been costly and 
 sanguinary operations. The old trade with Russian 
 territory, that once had been so lucrative, languished 
 for want of a fostering hand, and the difficulties of 
 that northern range of mountains, which the patience 
 and care of the Chinese had for a time pierced through, 
 were made the most of to prevent intercourse with 
 Kuldja and Yernoe. More than all, too, all Yakoob 
 Beg's skill as a " manipulator of phrases " could not 
 conceal the fact that his treaty with England was a 
 failure. It did not give him that British protection 
 which alone he cared for, and it did not provide, through 
 the greater obstacles of nature, his people with that 
 new trade outlet which was the sole object worth 
 securing in their eyes. The Forsyth treaty seemed to 
 bring the relations of England and Kashgar to a 
 sudden termination ; and the Kashgari were quite 
 shrewd enough to perceive that the Athalik Grhazi 
 would not be buttressed by English bayonets against 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S LAST WAR WITH CHINA. 243 
 
 Bussian aggression, if that instrument was to be held, 
 as in their eyes it could not be otherwise than held, 
 the only connecting link between the countries. The 
 consequence of this belief was a resignation to a 
 Bussian subjection at no distant date. 
 
 Yakoob Beg's tenure of power would be morally 
 weakened by the existence of these causes for discontent 
 among his people, and it was at such a moment, when 
 they had perhaps only slightly become clear to his 
 eyes, that the return of the Chinese was heralded. In 
 the face of a great and common danger a well-affected 
 people would have rallied round their head, and in the 
 crisis have found a joint necessity to produce a better 
 understanding than existed before among their com- 
 ponent parts. The country east of Kucha, where it was 
 inhabited at all, was inhabited by the few survivors of 
 the massacres ordered by Yakoob Beg's representatives. 
 Amongst these there could be no great amount of affec- 
 tion towards his cause. The garrison of the city of 
 Kashgar consisted in the main of the pardoned Khitay 
 soldiers Yangy Mussulmans, as they were called and 
 from them no stanch support could be expected against 
 their Buddhist countrymen (see Appendix). The Tungani 
 of Kucha and Aksu and the neighbourhood were the 
 most numerous recruits in the army, and from them at 
 least it might have been supposed that the Athalik 
 Ghazi would obtain faithful service. Even among 
 them, however, there was discontent. They had 
 everything to dread at the hands of the Chinese. 
 It was they who had massacred the helpless Khitay, 
 a deed from the stain of which Yakoob Beg at least 
 was free ; and it was they against whom the wrath of 
 China would in the first place be directed. But they 
 had also their grudges against the ruler. He had 
 beaten them in the field of battle, and had compelled 
 more than he had induced them to join his army. 
 They hated the Mahomedan Andijani only one degree 
 less than the Buddhist Chinaman, and their ambitious 
 
 R 2 
 
244 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 game had been foiled by the military talents of their 
 present ruler. They had run, in the years 1862-65, 
 all the risk attaching to a revolt against China, and 
 when they had accomplished their task they found 
 themselves defrauded of their reward. Therefore, in 
 the face of a Chinese invasion there was disunion in 
 the ranks of the very Mahomedan rebels who had 
 originated all these troubles. The nucleus of Yakoob 
 Beg's army, when these have been struck out as non- 
 efficient, was small indeed ; but it was only on that 
 nucleus he could depend in fighting for his crown 
 and his religion. 
 
 During the winter of 1376, when he was busy in 
 collecting arms, ammunition, and stores at Yarkand and 
 Kashgar, he must have discovered many of these dis- 
 cordant elements ; yet he pushed his preparations reso- 
 lutely on. He conceived that under the circumstances 
 the boldest policy would be the most prudent, and that 
 it' he could but beat the Chinese in the field by superior 
 tactics he might ride triumphant over all his difficulties 
 and dangers. With these views uppermost in his mind 
 he concentrated all his forces, Tungan included, along 
 the southern slopes of the Tian Shan, with his head- 
 quarters at Turfan. The Eussian officer, Captain 
 Kuropatkine, who had been sent to Kashgar on a 
 mission, and who had journeyed through the whole 
 extent of Kashgaria to meet the Ameer at Turfan, 
 computed Yakoob Beg's army at the following strength, 
 and supplied the accompanying information concerning 
 its disposition along the frontier. 
 
 The fort of Devanchi, guarding the principal defile 
 through the mountain range, was garrisoned by 900 
 jigits, armed with muskets and two guns one a breech- 
 loader. At Turfan there were with the Ameer 3,500 
 jigits and 5,000 sarbazes^ with 20 guns, mostly of 
 ancient make. Toksoun, a fortified place, some miles 
 nearer Korla, on the main road, was occupied by 
 4,000 jigits and 2,000 sarbazes with five guns. Hacc 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S LAST WAR WITH CHINA. 245 
 
 Kuli Beg had command here. At Korla there were 
 also about 1,500 men, who were brought up to the 
 front shortly after Captain Kuropatkine's departure. 
 With these 17,000 men, scattered over a widely 
 extended area, Yakoob Beg had to defend himself 
 against an enemy superior in numbers, and, as the 
 result showed, in generalship as well. 
 
 The Russian officer gave, on his return, a very gloomy 
 account of Yakoob Beg's affairs, predicting the speedy 
 disintegration of his state. He also asserted that the 
 Tungani were deserting in great numbers, and that 
 everywhere east of Kucha there was discontent and 
 distrust of the Kashgarian rulers. This disparaging 
 account was confirmed by Colonel Prjevalsky, some 
 months afterwards, upon his return from his adven- 
 turous journey to Lob Nor. In a letter, dated from 
 Little Yuldus, May 28, 1877, he said he had been very 
 kindly received, but also suspiciously watched by 
 Yakoob Beg. " All the way from Hoidu Grot to Lob 
 Nor he was escorted by a guard of honour, who 
 officiously endeavoured to satisfy his smallest wishes, 
 but would not allow him, or any of his people, to come 
 in contact with the inhabitants. Yakoob Beg some- 
 what peremptorily asked Colonel Prjevalsky to explain 
 why the Russians had provisioned the Chinese forces 
 arrayed against him ; but, in an interview at Korla, he 
 again and again assured the Russian traveller that he 
 was a friend and well-wisher to Russia. Notwith- 
 standing these precautions, Colonel Prjevalsky and the 
 other members of the expedition succeeded in making 
 the natives tell them that they were disgusted with the 
 military despotism of Yakoob Beg, and that they hoped 
 the Russians would soon be coming." 
 
 The information contained in this letter refers to the 
 end of April, 1877, or to a time after the first defeat of 
 Yakoob Beg by the Chinese, and his withdrawal to 
 Korla ; but it is # propos in this place as confirming 
 Captain Kuropatkine's remarks. 
 
246 YAKOOD BEG. 
 
 In addition to the 17,000, more or less, disciplined 
 soldiers whom Yakoob Beg had mustered at the fron- 
 tier, Captain Kuropatkine mentioned 10,000 Doungans 
 that is, the Tungani inhabitants of this eastern region. 
 Not only were these notoriously untrustworthy, but 
 they were also badly armed, and were, on the whole, a 
 source of weakness rather than of strength. Before 
 the close of the month of February the Athalik Ghazi 
 was at Turfan, constructing forts at Toksoun and 
 towards the Tian Shan, and endeavouring to inspire 
 his followers with his own indomitable spirit. 
 
 In the meanwhile the Chinese had not been idle. 
 They had, after their triumph over the Tungani, 
 established their headquarters at Guchen, near Urumtsi, 
 and had so far secured their communications with 
 Kansuh that a regular service of couriers was organized, 
 and a continual supply of arms, military stores, and 
 men flowed across Gobi to the invading army. For 
 instance, a large arsenal for the storage of arms was 
 erected at Lanchefoo, and on one occasion as many as 
 10,000 rifles of the Berdan pattern were sent in a 
 single convoy. While Tso Tsung Tang, the Viceroy of 
 Kansuh and Commander-in-Chief, was making these 
 preparations north of the Tian Shan, for forcing the 
 range with the melting of the snow, another Chinese 
 general, Chang Yao, was stationed at Hamil for the 
 purpose of seconding the main attack by a diversion 
 south of the range. In estimating the total number of 
 the Chinese army at 60,000 men that is, 50,000 round 
 Guchen and 10,000 at Hamil we would express only 
 what is probable. The total number may have been 
 more or less, but in estimating it at 00,000 men we 
 believe we are as close to exactitude as is possible under 
 the circumstances. In the month of March the Chinese 
 generals had made all their preparations for attacking 
 Yakoob Beg. So far as our geographical information 
 goes there is no direct road from Guchen to Turfan, 
 and consequently the chief Chinese attack was made 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S LAST WAR WITH CHINA. 247 
 
 from Urumtsi against Devanchi, where Yakoob Beg had 
 constructed a fort. But, although the larger army was 
 manoeuvring north of the Tian Shan, the decisive blow 
 was in reality struck by the smaller force advancing 
 from Harnil. If we are to judge from the disposition 
 of the Kashgarian army, the movements of this brigade 
 had not obtained that attention from the Athalik Grhazi 
 which they merited. 
 
 General Chang Yao captured the small towns of 
 Chightam and Pidjam in the middle of April without 
 encountering any serious opposition. And from the 
 latter of these places, some fifty miles east of Turfan, 
 commenced that concerted movement with his superior, 
 Tso Tsung Tang, which was to overcome all Kashgarian 
 resistance. A glance at the map will show that 
 Yakoob Beg at Turfan was caught fairly between two 
 fires by armies advancing from Urumtsi and Pidjam, 
 and if defeated his line of retreat was greatly exposed 
 to an enterprising enemy. Upon the Chinese becoming 
 aware of the success of their preliminary movements a 
 general advance was ordered in all directions. It is 
 evident that the Chinese were met at first with a 
 strenuous resistance at Devanchi, and that the forcing 
 of the Tian Shan defiles had not been accomplished 
 when news reached the garrison that their ruler had 
 been expelled from Turfan by a fresh Chinese army. It 
 was then that confusion spread fast through all ranks of 
 the followers of Yakoob Beg ; in that hour of doubt and 
 unreasoning panic the majority of his soldiers either 
 went over to the enemy or fled in headlong flight to 
 Karashar. In this moment of desperation the Athalik 
 Grhazi still bore himself like a good soldier. Outside 
 Turfan he gave battle to the invader, and though driven 
 from the field by overwhelming odds he yet once more 
 made a stand at Toksoun, forty miles west of Turfan, and 
 when a second time defeated withdrew to Karashar to 
 make fresh efforts to withstand the invading army. 
 Yakoob Beg probably lost in these engagements not less 
 
248 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 than 20,000 men, including Tungani, by desertion and 
 at the hands of the enemy. He consequently conceived 
 that it would be prudent to withdraw still farther into 
 his territory, and accordingly left Karashar, after a few 
 days' residence, for Korla. 
 
 Some weeks before the occurrence of these striking 
 events Yakoob Beg had sent an envoy to Tashkent to 
 solicit the aid of the Eussians against the advancing 
 Chinese. But the Eussians only gave his messenger 
 fair words, and did not interfere with Mr. Kamensky's 
 commercial transactions with the Chinese army. At the 
 moment, too, Eussia was so busily occupied in Europe 
 that she had no leisure to devote to the Kashgarian 
 question. 
 
 The Chinese had for many years been good friends 
 with Eussia, and Yakoob Beg had all his life been a 
 scarcely concealed enemy. Between two such comba- 
 tants the sympathies of the Eussian government must at 
 first have certainly gone with the former ; nor had 
 Yakoob Beg's attitude towards Eussia of late been as 
 discreet as it might have been. His nephew, the Sey- 
 yid Yakoob Khan, was notoriously an agent for some 
 indefinite purpose at Constantinople. His protection of 
 the Bokharan prince, Abdul Melik, or Katti Torah, the 
 most bitter enemy of Eussia in Central Asia, was also 
 ill calculated to attract Eussian sympathy to his side. 
 
 Moreover there was little or nothing to arouse 
 Eussian susceptibilities in Chinese victories so far 
 distant as Urumtsi or Turfari. In many respects, too, 
 this Chinese invasion was a relief for Eussia. It freed 
 her hands in Central Asia in a manner that perhaps 
 will never be sufficiently appreciated. Buddhist victories 
 in Eastern Turkestan struck a severe blow at Mahome- 
 dan vigour throughout the Khanates, and the waning 
 prestige of the Badaulet, or the " fortunate one/" acted 
 as a warning of strange significance to all the neighbour- 
 ing princes. 
 
 It is not difficult, therefore, to discover valid reasons 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S LAST WAR WITH CHINA. 249 
 
 why the Russians declined to negotiate between the 
 combatants, and although Yakoob Beg endeavoured to 
 come to terms with the Chinese, on the understanding 
 that his personal safety should be guaranteed, all his 
 diplomatic overtures were met by categorical refusals. 
 
 The Chinese after entering Toksoun came to a sudden 
 halt, for which the causes are not evident. But the 
 terror of their name had gone before them, and the 
 country east of Karashar was hurriedly abandoned by 
 its inhabitants. The Chinese delay may have been 
 caused by the necessity for collecting provisions to 
 enable them to advance further, or perhaps it may have 
 arisen from the outbreak of some epidemic, as asserted 
 by one of the Indian journals. On this point the 
 Pekin Gazette is profoundly silent. The number for the 
 23rd of June contained a narrative of the operations 
 round Turfan, and also a list of the honours and rewards 
 given to the successful generals ; but it and^its subsequent 
 issues are silent as to the causes for the Chinese inac- 
 tivity that then for many months ensued. The most 
 striking sentence in this report is that which says that 
 " the Mahomedans who submitted themselves were 
 permitted to revert to their peaceful avocations ; " 
 and if this be true, this is one instance, at all events, of 
 the Chinese exercising moderation. Strange as it may 
 seem, with this preliminary success the vigour of the 
 Chinese invasion appeared to die away, and for five 
 months nothing more was heard of the whereabouts of 
 the Chinese army. In that interval the most important 
 events occurred in Kashgaria, but with these, the 
 Chinese, although the originators of them, had nothing 
 to do. In the closing scene of all of the eventful life 
 we have been in these pages considering the invading 
 Khitay had no part. They were probably not aware of 
 what was taking place some 300 miles from their camp 
 until many weeks after it had happened ; and then 
 conceived that their best policy would be to give time 
 for the disintegrating causes at work within the state to 
 
250 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 have their full effect before they advanced westward 
 When Colonel Prjevalsky saw Yakoob Beg it must have 
 been within a very short period of his death. The 
 shadow of approaching events may have been upon the 
 defeated conqueror, who from recent disaster could 
 only presage worse yet to come. 
 
 Of the exact manner of Yakoob Beg's death there 
 are various accounts. The most probable is that he was 
 murdered by a party of conspirators, who were led by 
 Hakim Khan Torah. The date given is the 1st of 
 May. That Yakoob Beg should meet with a violent 
 death, considering that he was surrounded by such 
 doubtful followers as the Tungan chiefs, is not to be 
 marvelled at, and that the first reverse in his career 
 should be the signal for fresh disturbances is only what 
 we should expect from a consideration of his country and 
 its peoples in the light of past history. So far, then, as 
 the assertion goes, that Yakoob Beg was murdered, there 
 is nothing improbable about it. But there are many 
 discrepancies in the accompanying narrative. The first 
 intelligence of the death of the Ameer of Kashgar was 
 contained in a telegram published in the Times of 
 July 10 last year. It stated that his death occurred 
 at Korla, after a short illness, and that he had 
 nominated as his successor Hakim Khan Torah, to the 
 express disregard of his own sons. The telegram went 
 on to say that Hakim Khan had declined to accept the 
 gift, and that the Ameer's eldest son, Beg Kuli Beg, had 
 succeeded to the throne. A few days after this tele- 
 gram Hakim Khan Torah was identified with the 
 ancient dynasty of Kashgar, which Yakoob Beg had 
 first seated on the throne, and then displaced in the 
 person of Buzurg Khan. All this intelligence came 
 from Tashkent. On the 23rd of July we learnt in this 
 country, from the same source, that Beg Kuli Beg had 
 notified his father's death and his own accession to the 
 throne to General Kaufmann. There no longer 
 remained any doubt that Yakoob Beg was really dead. 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S DEATH. 251 
 
 For some reason or other Beg Kuli Beg does not 
 appear to have been a favourite with the Russians ; but 
 this aversion to him was based on some mistake, for 
 Beg Kuli Beg was certainly unfriendly to England, and 
 was scarcely civil to our envoy, Sir Douglas Forsyth. 
 Moreover, he at once placed himself in communication 
 with the Russian government, asking for advice as to 
 the course he should pursue with regard to the Chinese 
 invasion, and renewing his father's request that Russia 
 should stop the supplies sent to Urumtsi and Turfan 
 from Kuldja. It was reported, but not confirmed, that 
 his latter demand was complied with. 
 
 Nothing more was heard of the history of these 
 events until the end of August, when news reached 
 India through Ladakh and Cashmere that Yakoob Beg 
 " had been assassinated by Hakim Khan Torah, the son 
 of Buzurg Khan." This was the first hint that Yakoob 
 Beg had fallen by the hands of discontented partisans. 
 In itself so natural, it threw fresh light on the strange 
 deed he was reported to have done of disinheriting his 
 own family, and it speedily became the accepted version. 
 The question then was, who was Hakim Khan Torah ? 
 Two versions were put forward ; one was that he was 
 the son of Buzurg Khan, the other that he was a Khoja 
 chief of Kucha. The former was the more plausible, 
 but as his name does not occur in Sir Douglas Forsyth's 
 exhaustive report, it is open to some objection, more 
 particularly when we are told that he bore a principal 
 part in the conquest of Kashgar by Yakoob Beg. The 
 latter suggestion was much more difficult to prove, but 
 was not open to the same objection. Grant that 
 Hakim, or Aali, Khan Torah was a pardoned Kucha chief 
 when that city fell into the hands of the Athalik 
 Ghazi, and there was nothing extraordinary in his 
 having proved a traitor. Assume that he still conceived 
 he had claims upon the governorship of that city, of 
 which the Turkestan Gazette asserts he had been 
 Dadkwah, and there is nothing inconsistent in his 
 
252 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 having sought to realize his own ambitious schemes 
 the moment fortune frowned upon his conqueror. That 
 Hakim Khan, if son to Buzurg Khan, should seek to 
 revenge his father's deposition and life of exile is 
 not in itself strange we admit ; but if he were a sub- 
 jected ruler, who regarded Yakoob Beg as an adven- 
 turer from Khokand with no claims to his fealty, his 
 plot against and murder of the Kasbgarian prince at 
 once appears not only possible, but the true story. As 
 a leading Khoja of Kucha he would also have claims 
 to represent one branch of the old reigning family of 
 Kashgar. In the face, too, of a great and pressing 
 danger from the Chinese, his hereditary enemies, a son 
 of Buzurg Khan would scarcely make confusion worse 
 confounded by murdering the de facto sovereign ; where- 
 as a Kucha leader might aspire to play in such a crisis 
 the same part that Amursana did in the last century. 
 It was said that Hakim Khan entered into some 
 negotiations with the Chinese, who gave him little 
 encouragement. 
 
 The Turkestan Gazette still adhered to its original 
 statement that Yakoob Beg had died of fever on the 
 1st of May, after an illness of seven days' duration, and 
 that on the 13th of May the body was brought in 
 state from Korla to Kashgar for the purpose of being 
 deposited in the mausoleum of Appak Khoja. Then, 
 according to the Turkestan Gazette, there ensued one of 
 those atrocious deeds which have so often marked the 
 history of Central Asian states. The second son of the 
 dead Ameer, Hacc Kuli Beg, who had been with 
 him during his last moments, escorted the funeral 
 cortege, and was met at a short distance from the city 
 by his elder brother, Kuli Beg. The elder son at once 
 knelt before his father's coffin, and then rising, without 
 a moment's delay fired a pistol at his brother, who 
 dropped down dead. Not content with this fratricide, 
 Kuli Beg had the whole of the escort put to the sword, 
 and returned to Kashgar with his own followers escort- 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S DEATH. 253 
 
 ing the coffin. We know nothing whatever of the 
 reasons for this atrocious act, but the fact of Kuli Beg 
 being in Kashgar, and not in the east, shows how 
 Hakim Khan was able to establish his authority in 
 Kucha and Korla. It will be more convenient to 
 consider in another chapter the further' course of these 
 internal troubles, and also the final triumph of the 
 Chinese. 
 
 There are, therefore, two versions of how Yakoob 
 Beg met his death, and in support of each view there 
 is a certain amount of evidence. All the information 
 on the subject has been recorded, and it is conflicting. 
 The Chinese reports in the Pekw Gazette ignore the 
 subject altogether. Their personal hatred was directed 
 more against Bayen Hu, a Tungan leader who had fled 
 from Hamil some years before, than against the 
 Athalik Ghazi. Of the main fact that Yakoob Beg 
 died at Korla in May, 1877, there is no doubt, and 
 that the most eventful career that has marked its track 
 in the history of Central Asia for several generations was 
 then brought to a close. 
 
 Whatever opinion may be formed of the man from his 
 varied fortunes, there will be few who will deny that he 
 possessed great mental qualities ; some will be found, no 
 doubt, to question his action in deposing Buzurg Khan, 
 and with more justice may his earlier life be blamed 
 for his repeated desertion of his friend and patron 
 Khudayar. Others will call to mind his vacillating con- 
 duct in 1875, and deny that he possessed that decision 
 of character which is the salient feature in all truly 
 great men. His unnecessary wars with the Tungani, 
 and the short-sighted policy he pursued of extending 
 his empire up to the vicinity of China, were also calcu- 
 lated to lower his claims to be considered a general or a 
 statesman. In extenuation of these acts, which decidedly 
 undermined the fabric of his rule, it may be mentioned 
 that there is one side of Yakoob Beg's character that 
 has never received sufficient attention. It is what was 
 
254 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 the secret to his foreign policy. He certainly did not 
 aspire, as many thought, to contest unaided the palm of 
 superiority with Russia in Central Asia. He was far too 
 well informed to dream of that. Nor could he expect 
 to be able to extend his power to the south, where both 
 Afghanistan and Cashmere would resent his presence. 
 The only option left to him as a conqueror was to 
 continue aggrandizing himself at the expense of China. 
 We know not what dreams may have entered the mind 
 of the stanch Mussulman in his palace at Kashgar of 
 uniting in one crusade against China all the followers of 
 the Prophet in Central Asia and of emulating the deeds 
 of some of his predecessors who had carried fire and sword 
 into the border provinces of China, and whom even the 
 Great Wall could not withstand. Over these bright 
 imaginings, arising from tales told of the decadence of 
 China, we know not how much Yakoob Beg may have 
 brooded as he saw his power spread eastward through 
 fifteen degrees of longitude, through Aksu to Kucha, 
 Kucha to Korla, Korla to Karashar, and Karashar to 
 Turfan, until from his far outpost at Chightam he could 
 almost see the rich cities of Hamil and Barkul, cities 
 which are the key to Western China and Northern Tibet, 
 and imagine them to be within his grasp. But the 
 policy of Yakoob Beg will not be clearly appreciated, 
 unless we bear in mind that these ambitious longings 
 were held in check by fear of Russia, and by the 
 hostility of the Tungani, who continued to plot even 
 when subdued. His keen spirit must have chafed 
 greatly under the inability to accomplish that which 
 he conceived to be possible, and despite his numerous 
 triumphs he was at heart a disappointed man. 
 
 Moreover, during these later years, when the task he 
 had set before him had been nearly accomplished, and he 
 had leisure to look around, he was no longer young or as 
 energetic as he had been. He was entering, for an Asiatic, 
 upon the evening of life, and had no longer the physical 
 power to essay any protracted and desperate enterprise. 
 
YAKOOB BEGS DEATH. iiOO 
 
 For a " forlorn hope " he was as eager and as effective as 
 ever, but for those undertakings which require not only 
 desperate courage but also forethought and patience he 
 was no longer fit. But the Chinese invasion dispelled 
 all these, and many other illusions. In their eyes and 
 before their power, he was only another Sultan of Ta- 
 lifoo. His great qualities, which attracted sympathy 
 and a certain amount of respect, in India and England 
 were vain in the eyes of a people whose " empire has," 
 in their own tongue, " been planted by heaven." Before 
 Chinese viceroys and Mantchoo chivalry Khokandian 
 soldiers and Mussulman pride must be held vain. So 
 thought the Chinese, if they thought upon the subject 
 at all. And so must we think who view past history 
 by the aid of Yakoob Beg's overthrow. Yakoob Beg's 
 rule in Kashgar was for twelve years a visible fact; it 
 was recognized by England and by Kussia. The Central 
 Asian Khans gladly acknowledged the admission of 
 another to their fast dwindling ranks. Even Shere Ali, 
 an ostensibly powerful ruler, honoured Yakoob Beg not 
 so much with his friendship as with his jealousy. Yet 
 it was all fleeting fast away. 
 
 In comparison with Chinese power his was as nothing; 
 in comparison with Chinese perseverance his was weak- 
 ness ; in comparison with Chinese tactics, his tactics were 
 those of a school-boy ; and even in comparison with 
 Chinese courage his courage had to confess an equal. 
 There was not only the dead weight of numbers against 
 him, but there was also the quick weight of superior intel- 
 lect. There were superior strategy and superior wea- 
 pons ; greater force and greater determination ; no 
 hesitation in action, and perfect unanimity in council ; all 
 combined to crush one poor forlorn man, fighting with all 
 the desperation of despair for life, if not for liberty. 
 Worthier of a better fate, and meeting destiny with the 
 calm that is natural to brave men, Yakoob Beg's defeat 
 and death may serve to " point a moral and adorn a tale." 
 The tale has been told in these pages with as close a 
 
256 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 regard for fact as the meagre records will supply, and 
 for the personage whose name is the pivot round which 
 the main facts concentrate, it may be claimed that he 
 deserved attention even from Englishmen. It may well 
 be that some future generation may recur to this career 
 with interest as marking the only real break in the 
 Chinese domination in Eastern Turkestan. When the 
 massacres and other atrocities that marked the Khoja 
 invasions and the Tungan outbreak on both sides shall 
 have been forgotten or condoned, then it will be 
 admitted that, despite the great benefits conferred by 
 China on the people in the way of trade-fostering and 
 good government, there was some merit in the admini- 
 stration which a Khokandian soldier had unaided created 
 in this region. High credit, then, let us, who view the 
 subject from an impartial stand- point, pay this departed 
 warrior, who as a soldier met few equals, as a governor 
 none in his long career. Much as we may marvel at, 
 and perhaps impugn, Chinese strength, let us not judge 
 Yakoob Beg harshly, because Chinamen out- manoeuvred 
 him, and overthrew him in fair fight. It is an easy 
 gauge to apply, and one which would dispel all the 
 reputation the Athalik Ghazi had secured, if we deny the 
 Chinese the great qualities those who know them best 
 will accord them without hesitation. But in applying 
 so shallow a test to the case before us we should be 
 wronging our own understanding quite as much as its 
 victim. However much we may blame Yakoob Beg for 
 going out to encounter an enemy whom he ought to 
 have awaited either at Kucha or Aksu, his valour, and 
 also his mistaken contempt for the Chinese, are made 
 all the more clear. We may fairly claim for him that he 
 was the most remarkable man Central Asia in its fullest 
 extent has produced since Nadir Shah ; and that he 
 accomplished with insignificant means a task which 
 ordinary men, though born in the purple and ruling a 
 prosperous and thickly populated state, might have 
 
YAKOOB BEG'S DEATH. 257 
 
 failed to do. What better epitaph could be placed over 
 a courageous and just ruler ? 
 
 The moral of his career is a short one, but for us full 
 of significance. Those independent rulers who esta- 
 blish themselves for a space on the confines of China 
 are mere ephemeral excrescences; birds of passage who 
 must betake themselves away, if they can, when their 
 little hour has struck. English governments have never 
 understood the vitality of Chinese institutions. They 
 should appreciate it better in the future. 
 
258 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR. 
 
 WHEN Yakoob Beg died at Korla the task of reconquer- 
 ing Kashgar had barely commenced. The Chinese army, 
 victorious at Turfan, was lingering in idleness round 
 that city, exhausted, as some believed, by the greatness 
 of the effort. It was not clear even that the Chinese 
 aspired to achieve any greater triumph than that they 
 had already won, viz., the subjection of the Tungani, a 
 subjection which could not be considered accomplished so 
 long as Yakoob Beg remained in the neighbourhood at 
 the head of a large army ; and that with the withdrawal of 
 the Kashgarian army to Karashar the Chinese generals 
 might call a halt of an indefinite duration. Nor did it 
 follow as a matter of necessity that because the Chi- 
 nese had aken Turfan they could capture Kashgar or 
 Yarkand. Distance alone was no slight obstacle, and 
 when added to the barrenness of the country, which 
 would be made more desolate by the retreating army 
 of the Mussulmans, an impartial observer might have 
 hesitated to predict any very speedy triumph for the 
 Chinese. But besides these, there were other impedi- 
 ments, of which a prudent general had to take careful 
 cognizance. To seize Karashar or Korla only needed a 
 bold attack ; but to subject Kucha might have been a 
 more arduous undertaking than was even the siege of 
 Manas. A delay of two months in the heart of Eastern 
 Turkestan must have strained the resources of the 
 Chinese very much, and might have ruined their whole 
 enterprise. And even if Kucha fell there still remained 
 
THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR. 259 
 
 Aksu, and afterwards Ush Turfan in the north, and 
 Maralbashi in the south, barring the way to the vital 
 portion of the state round Kashgar and Yarkand. Now 
 the death of Yakoob Beg did not remove any one of 
 these defences, and for a time it was believed that his 
 son, who had always the repute of being a good soldier, 
 would make the best of the very strong line of defence 
 that he undoubtedly possessed. As a matter of fact, the 
 death of Yakoob Beg was an irretrievable disaster, for 
 it destroyed whatever cohesion and unity there were in 
 the country. He himself might have been unable to 
 avert a final overthrow, but the contest would have 
 been made more protracted. Therefore in the months of 
 May and June, 1 877, immediately after the death of the 
 Athalik Grhazi, it is strictly true to say that the Chinese 
 reconquest of the country had barely commenced. 
 
 The hesitation shown by the invading generals after 
 the victory of Turfan was at first caused by a belief in 
 the formidableness of their antagonist, and, when that 
 antagonist died, by a prudent resolve to permit the 
 disintegrating causes that speedily manifested them- 
 selves in Kashgaria to have full time to work in their 
 favour. Meanwhile they formed their plans in secret, 
 laid in large stores of supplies from Eussian territory, 
 and explored the little-known passes of Tekes and 
 Yuldus. A large number of fresh troops was received 
 from the Calmucks north of Chuguchak, who during the 
 worst period of the Tungan revolt had preserved that 
 city for the Chinese. 
 
 But before following the forward movement of the 
 Chinese it is necessary to say something of the internal 
 disturbances in Eastern Turkestan, more especially of the 
 rivalry of Beg Bacha and Hakim Khan for supremacy. 
 In the first place, it is necessary that it should be 
 distinctly understood that of the events that occurred 
 in Kashgaria between the death of the Athalik Grhazi 
 and the final advance of the Chinese army we are really 
 without any definite intelligence at all, and it is not 
 
 s 2 
 
260 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 probable that we shall ever be accurately informed of 
 the course of events during those five months. In the 
 absence of exact data, we must assume the events to 
 have taken place which are most in accordance with 
 probability. On Yakoob Beg's death, his eldest son, 
 Beg Kuli Beg, was either in the city of Kashgar or 
 somewhere on the road thither. It is probable that he 
 had been despatched to the rear, to bring up reinforce- 
 ments after the defeat at Turfan, and in his absence 
 Hacc Kuli Beg, the Ameer's second son, assumed the 
 command of the army when his father died. It is cer- 
 tain that he accompanied the funeral cortege of Yakoob 
 Beg back to Kashgar, and that he was murdered out- 
 side the walls by his brother. It was during this 
 time that Hakim Khan Torah appeared upon the 
 scene. It should be remembered that tidings of the 
 death of Yakoob Beg travelled very slowly to this 
 country, and that almost immediately after it arrived we 
 received intelligence of events that had occurred many 
 weeks after the death of the Ameer. We were therefore 
 hearing at the same time the particulars of the circum- 
 stances of Yakoob Beg's death, and of those commotions 
 which broke out some weeks after that event. 
 
 When Hacc Kuli Beg left Korla no personal repre- 
 sentative remained there of the dynasty of the Athalik 
 Ghazi, and during that interval the occasion arose for 
 the intriguing elements that a mixed court, such as 
 that of Yakoob Beg, could never be free from. Hakim 
 Khan seized that opportunity, and established his 
 authority in Karashar, Korla, and, probably, Kucha 
 also ; and during a short time Kashgaria was accord- 
 ingly divided into three hostile camps. It appears that 
 Beg Bacha, lulled into a false sense of security by the 
 inactivity of the Chinese, resolved to chastise the 
 insolence of his rebellious governor, a task which he 
 should have left for the Chinese. A war then broke 
 out between Beg Bacha and Hakim Khan, which 
 exhausted the few resources that still remained to a 
 
THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KA8HGAR. 261 
 
 ruler of Kashgar. The contest appears to have been of 
 a desultory nature, and although the final result was in 
 favour of Beg Bacha, he never appears to have recovered 
 possession of Karashar and Korla. In the neighbour- 
 hood of Aksu the battle of this war took place, and 
 Hakim Khan was defeated, "by the overwhelming 
 numbers of his enemy." Beg Bacha's chief loss was the 
 death of Mahomed Yunus, the Dadkhwah of Yarkand, 
 his ablest and most faithful adviser. Hakim then fled 
 to Eussian territory, with 1,000 sarbazes, who were 
 promptly interned by order of General Kolpakovsky, 
 and there he sought to restore his shattered fortunes 
 by carrying on intrigues with the Eussian government. 
 It is scarcely necessary to say that these came to nothing, 
 and that Hakim Khan has sunk into that insignificance 
 which, to judge from his acts when called into public 
 life, is his most befitting atmosphere. 
 
 While engaged on this successful campaign east of 
 Aksu, an event occurred of singular significance, as 
 illustrating the condition of Kashgar under Beg Bacha. 
 The Kirghiz chief Sadie Beg, who had disappeared 
 from the scene since his old rivalry with Yakoob Beg 
 thirteen years before, seized the opportunity afforded by 
 Beg Bacha's embarrassment to attack the city of Kash- 
 gar, denuded of the greater portion of its garrison. He 
 plundered the suburbs, and only withdrew when the 
 young Ameer hastened back from Aksu to defend his 
 capital. The Kirghiz, true to their nature, at once 
 sought the desolate regions of Kizil Yart. They had, 
 however, made the confusion arising from the death of 
 the Ameer and the disaffection of Hakim Khan worse 
 confounded, and completed those elements of weakness 
 and discord which had always proved an invaluable ally 
 to the Chinese. By themselves both Hakim Khan and 
 the Kirghiz depredator were beneath contempt; but 
 with an enemy established on the soil of the country, 
 they assumed a too clear and mischievous importance. 
 The minor seditions that manifested themselves in 
 
262 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Sirikul and at Khoten completed the round of dissen- 
 sion that, combined with external force, shattered the 
 fair show of Yakoob Beg's empire. We are completely 
 ignorant of the details of the disturbances that were 
 reported to have taken place round Tashkurgan or 
 Sirikul ; but it is plausible to suppose that these were 
 caused either by inroads on the part of the Wakhis 
 or Badakshis, or by some fresh Kirghiz attack. The 
 inhabitants of Tashkurgan being Yarkandi settlers, it 
 is not probable that the rising, or whatever form the 
 commotion assumed, originated with them ; at Khoteii 
 the rising was more tangible, and more easily under- 
 stood. The people of that city never forgave Yakoob 
 Beg his treachery towards their ruler, and the instant 
 he disappeared they hastened to take their revenge. 
 When the Kashgarian garrison was withdrawn the 
 towns-people simply deposed their dadkwah, and nomi- 
 nated a ruler of their own, who retained authority until 
 the triumph of the Chinese made it politic for them 
 and him to bow to the rising sun. The example of 
 Khoten had been followed by Sanju and the vicinity ; 
 and thus the whole southern portion of the state 
 acquiesced in the Chinese conquest, after the fall of 
 Kashgar, without the necessity for a single Chinese 
 soldier to be advanced south of Yarkand. It seems 
 probable that at this very moment the Chinese troops 
 have remained content with the submission of these 
 districts, and have not garrisoned those important towns 
 which skirt the Kuen Lun range with their own 
 soldiers. 
 
 When Beg Bacha returned post haste to Kashgar, to 
 encounter the Kirghiz, we said that Sadie Beg fled to 
 the Kizil Yart ; but he did not remain there long, for 
 soon we find him back again at the capital in high favour 
 with the Ameer, with whom he had come to terms. His 
 Kirghiz followers were taken into the pay of the state, 
 and just as this alliance had been struck up, tidings 
 came of events that made that alliance, however futile 
 
THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR. 263 
 
 and insignificant, a matter of the first necessity, both to 
 Kirghiz and Kashgar. The Chinese army was at last 
 advancing. The danger that had for five months been 
 hanging in suspense over the devoted heads of a Mus- 
 sulman people was close upon them. The long-feared 
 and long-expected Khitay were drawing nigh to the 
 capital, in irresistible strength ; and the apprehensions 
 of a cowed people made them know, too surely, that their 
 end was at hand. The dissensions among the people 
 themselves, the discord in the ruling house, and the 
 dissentient elements in every effort towards unity, had 
 all operated in favour of the invader. While the Chinese 
 had plotted and prepared in the deliberate manner of a 
 great nation, the people of Kashgar had entered into 
 cabals and schemes of party tactics that were well nigh 
 ludicrous. And all the time that the sap of their vigour 
 was being expended, the Chinese generals were drawing 
 the noose more closely together that was to strangle the 
 newly erected state beyond all chance of recovery. It 
 would almost seem as if the Kashgari and their rulers had 
 recovered from their first shock at the Chinese invasion, 
 and were becoming reconciled to their presence east of 
 Korla, when they experienced a second, more severe, and 
 more lasting shock, in the announcement that the Chinese 
 were again advancing. Their brief contentment passed 
 away, and all their old terror revived in tenfold force. 
 Hope died within their bosoms, and the resignation of 
 despair only nerved them to bear a fate which their own 
 valour should have striven to avert. It is time for us 
 now to return to the Chinese army, and to follow its 
 decisive operations. 
 
 North of the Tian Shan the supreme command was 
 vested in the hands of Tso Tsung Tang, generalissimo of 
 the army operating against Kashgar, and Viceroy of the 
 province of Kansuh. South of it the commanders were 
 Generals Kin Shun and Chang Yao, the former the hero 
 of the siege of Manas, the latter of the diversion against 
 Turfan from Hamil. The base of the former was Manas, 
 
264 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 of the latter Turfan. Their sources of supply were 
 Hamil, Barkul, and Chuguchak, within the Chinese 
 frontier, and Kuldja, Semiretchinsk, and Semipalatinsk, 
 without. Their weapons and ammunition were trans- 
 ported across the desert from Lanchefoo, and their ranks 
 were swollen by recruits from the Calmuck and other 
 tribes. It does not appear that the Chinese were very 
 eager to enlarge their army in size ; they rather aimed at 
 increasing its efficiency by the distribution of Berdan 
 rifles and Krupp's cannon ; and during the heat of the 
 summer months they remained at rest in their recently 
 acquired possessions. Nor is it probable that those 
 epidemics broke out in their ranks which it was asserted 
 had appeared amongst them. A sensational paragraph 
 was published in the Tashkent Gazette, which was copied 
 by some of the London newspapers, asserting that a 
 species of cholera, known in Kashgar by the name of 
 vuoba, had decimated the Chinese army, and that in 
 consequence of that calamity its advance was perma- 
 nently checked. Certainly, this was a piece of gross 
 exaggeration, even if there were a substratum of fact for 
 the assertion. Then, again, we were apprised, on high 
 authority, that' the Eussian government had put a stop 
 to the despatch of provisions to the country occupied by 
 the Chinese army, at the request of its new-found friend, 
 Beg Bacha. Yet there is no question that the caravans 
 of Mr. Kamensky continued to pass between Kuldja 
 and Manas, and that the chief caterers for the Chinese 
 army were the Eussian merchants of Central Asia. In 
 the course of their intercourse the best feelings do not 
 appear to have prevailed between the Eussians and 
 Chinese. The latter, flushed with their triumph, had 
 become arrogant, arid were too fond of referring to the 
 question of Kuldja to be agreeable to the actual posses- 
 sors of that province. On one or two occasions these 
 verbal disputes assumed a more dangerous aspect, and 
 from words the disputants proceeded to blows. Whether 
 this collision was magnified or not, the Eussian govern- 
 
THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR. 265 
 
 ment took no diplomatic steps to secure reparation for 
 injury to their subjects, and continued to wink at, if they 
 did not actually approve of, their merchants supplying 
 the Chinese. The clearest proof of this is that the mo- 
 ment Aksu fell a large caravan was despatched there 
 by Mr. Kamensky. Still there was no little bad blood 
 between the two people, and for a long time it was 
 doubtful whether Eussia would preserve her attitude of 
 neutrality until Kashgar had been finally subdued. Be- 
 neath all this doubt, and the uncertainty of the strength 
 and of the ultimate intentions of China, there existed a 
 sentiment of dissatisfaction in the minds of the Russians 
 at the renown China was acquiring, as well as at the pros- 
 pect of having to restore a rich and paying province. 
 
 In short, beneath the Tungan and the Kashgarian 
 questions there smouldered the Kuldjaquestion. Having 
 now shown how well prepared the Chinese were at every 
 point, how well armed, and how well fed was the tactical 
 unit, and how Eussia, although far from indifferent as to 
 the results, was really abetting the side of China, we 
 may pass on to those more active movements which 
 proved that the Chinese generals possessed the ability 
 and military knowledge necessary to make full use of 
 the very powerful weapon which they had created, and 
 which was capable of accomplishing the most arduous of 
 enterprises. 
 
 The first move v/as made south of the Tian Shan. 
 So far as we know, Tso Tsung Tang did not break up 
 from Manas until many weeks afterwards. A brigadier- 
 general, by name Tang Jen- Ho, left Toksoun on the 
 25th of August, 1877, with the advanced guard, to occupy 
 the outlying villages of Subashi and Agha Bula. He 
 does not appear to have had under him more than a few 
 hundred men. A fortnight later, on the 7th of Septem- 
 ber, Grenerals Tung Fuh-siang and Chang Tsun followed 
 after him with 1 ,500 troops, all infantry. They advanced 
 through Agha Bula, Kumush, and Usha Tal to Kuhwei. 
 At this place the troops were concentrated. 
 
266 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 The chief duty of these detachments was to prepare 
 the road for the advance of the main body, to lay in at 
 stated places stores of fuel and water, and to erect tem- 
 porary fortifications. So thoroughly was this portion of 
 the task performed, that General Kin Shun, now known 
 as Liu Kin-Tang, gave the order for a general forward 
 movement on the 27th of September. 
 
 The infantry followed the main road, while the 
 cavalry, under the immediate orders of the general, 
 proceeded by by-paths in the same direction. On the 
 2nd of October the Chinese army south of the Tian 
 Shan was assembled at Kuhwei. Its numbers were 
 probably about fifteen thousand men all told. On the 
 24th of September a small force of Kashgarian troops 
 threatened General Tang Jen-Ho's communications, but 
 on the appearance of the Chinese they " turned tail and 
 dashed away." The very next day after his arrival at 
 Kuhwei General Kin Shun continued his forward move- 
 ment. Two brigadier-generals, whose names it is not 
 necessary to mention, were entrusted with one division, 
 6,000 strong, with which to perform a flanking move- 
 ment against Korla. The commander in person led his 
 main body against Korla, arriving at the Eiver Kaidu, 
 which flows into Lake Bostang, half-way between Ka- 
 rashar and Korla. But his advance was here checked, 
 as Bayen Hu, the rebel leader, had flooded the country 
 by damming up the course of the river. The depth of 
 the inundation was said to be in the deepest parts over 
 a man's head, and in the shallowest it came up to the 
 horses' cruppers. The Chinese march was then changed 
 to a northerly direction, in order to strike the river 
 higher up, where the obstruction raised by the enemy 
 would be more easily overcome. A cart-road was care- 
 fully constructed along these alkaline plains, and the 
 Kaidu was dammed to stop the flow from the upper 
 course, and a bridge was erected over it. This detour 
 had caused some delay, yet Karashar was reached on the 
 7th of October, four days after Kin Shun had set out in 
 
THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR. 267 
 
 person from Kuhwei. The inundation from the Kaidu 
 had spread as far as here, and the town was several feet 
 under water. All the official and private residences had 
 been destroyed alike, and the Turki-Mussulman, as the 
 Pekin Gazette styles them, population had been com- 
 pelled by Bay en Hu to follow him in his retreat. It 
 would be interesting to know whom the Chinese meant 
 by Bayen Hu, but it is almost impossible to say. 
 As it was not Hakim Khan, the most probable per- 
 sonage would be one of the Tungan leaders, either of 
 TJrumtsi or Hamil, who had been mediatized by Yakoob 
 Beg and placed in command of the Turfan region. He 
 appears to have been the commander of that portion of 
 the Kashgarian army which was left round Korla. 
 
 Not only was Karashar deserted by its inhabitants, 
 but so was the whole country round about. Some, 
 indeed, had fled to the mountains, but these were afraid 
 to return when they saw the Chinese established in 
 their homes. And then the conquerors followed out 
 their usual plan by settling fresh colonists in the town. 
 The Mongol noble, Cha-hi-telkh, was directed to move 
 up some hundreds of the members of his tribe to occupy 
 this important post, to restore the homes and to retill 
 the fields ; and while this work of restoration was pro- 
 ceeding on territory conquered by the Chinese, that 
 through which they passed in hostile guise was subjected 
 to far other treatment. On the 9th of October the 
 Chinese marched against Korla from two sides, and on 
 that day a cavalry skirmish took place, in which fifteen 
 of Bayen Hu's horsemen were slain, and two taken 
 prisoners. From the evidence of these, who were dressed 
 in the Khokandian garb, but were Mussulman subjects 
 of China, being natives of Shensi, it was learnt that 
 Bayen Hu had withdrawn with all his forces to Kucha, 
 taking with him the produce of the country and the 
 majority of the people. They affirmed that the small 
 detachment to which they belonged was only a scouting 
 party, sent out to learn what the Chinese army was doing. 
 
268 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 When the Chinese had exhausted their stock of infor- 
 mation they beheaded them. The same day they entered 
 Korla, which they found to be completely deserted, 
 although not flooded. The walls remained, but many 
 of the houses had been thrown down. Here the general 
 was nearly reduced to a desperate plight, as the provision 
 train, which was transported by cart and camel, did not 
 come up, and there was the prospect of starvation com- 
 pelling the victorious army to retreat. But happily the 
 thought struck the able general, or perhaps some one 
 gave him a hint, that there might be some stores con- 
 cealed in the city which the Kashgari had been unable 
 to carry away with them. Accordingly the whole army 
 set to work to search the houses, and to dig into the 
 ground in all likely places for hidden stores. Their toil 
 was soon rewarded, and " several tens of thousand 
 catties' weight of food" were discovered. As a catty 
 weighs 1| lb., this was no slight supply for an army of 
 men which was probably under 10,000 strong. These 
 concerted movements of the army south of the Tian 
 Shan placed the country as far west as Karashar in the 
 possession of the invader. Their next advance, which 
 they could not expect to be as unopposed as their late 
 one, would bring them into the plain of Kashgar. No 
 sooner had Karashar and Korla fallen into their posses- 
 sion than an edict was issued inviting the Mahomedan 
 population to return to their homes, and many of them 
 accepted the invitation. In this quarter the arms of 
 China were not disgraced by any excesses, and modera- 
 tion towards the unarmed population extenuated their 
 severity towards armed foes. 
 
 While halting some days at Korla, Kin Shun heard 
 that Bayen Hu was coercing the people east of Kucha 
 at Tsedayar and other places, and compelling them to 
 withdraw to Kucha and to destroy their crops. He at 
 once resolved to frustrate the plan, and set out in person 
 at the head of 1,500 light infantry and 1,000 cavalry to 
 protect the inhabitants. By forced marches, sometimes 
 
THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR. 269 
 
 carried on through the better part of the night, he 
 reached Tsedayar on the 1 7th of October, when he learnt 
 that Bayen Hu had driven off the whole of the popula- 
 tion, and was already at Bugur, on the road to Kucha. 
 At the next village to Tsedayar, a fortified post known 
 as Yangy Shahr, he found that Bayen Hu was still 
 ahead of him, and that he was setting fire to the villages 
 on his line of march. Kin Shun left a portion of his 
 infantry behind to put out the conflagration, and reso- 
 lutely pressed on with the remainder of his force to 
 Bugur. This small town had also been set on fire, but 
 here the rapidity of the Chinese general's advance was 
 rewarded with the news that the enemy's army, with a 
 large number of the inhabitants, was only a short dis- 
 tance ahead. The rear-guard, composed of 1,000 cavalry, 
 was soon touched, and the Kashgari, emboldened by the 
 small numbers of the Chinese, came on to the attack in 
 gallant fashion. Their charge was broken, however, by 
 the steadiness of the Chinese infantry, armed with excel- 
 lent rifles, and the cavalry performed the rest. The 
 Kashgari left 100 slain on the field of battle and twelve 
 prisoners. From these latter it was discovered that the 
 main body of 2,000 soldiers was some distance on the road 
 to Kucha, with the family of Bayen Hu and the villagers 
 under its charge. It was too late to advance further 
 that day, but on the next the forward movement was 
 resumed. A large multitude " some tens of thousands 
 of people" was speedily sighted by'the advanced guard, 
 but on examining these through glasses it was disco- 
 vered that scarcely more than a thousand carried arms. 
 All the troops were then brought to the front, and Kin 
 Shun issued instructions that all those found with arms 
 in their hands should be slain, but the others spared. 
 
 The armed portion of the Kashgarian army drew 
 off from the unarmed, leaving in the midst the large 
 assemblage of Mussulman villagers who were being 
 carried off to Kucha. These were sent to the rear by 
 order of Kin Shun, and distributed in such of the vil- 
 
270 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 lages as were most convenient. In the meanwhile a 
 sharp fight took place a few miles in the rear of the old 
 position, near a village called Arpa Tai. The action 
 appears to have been well contested, but the superior 
 tactics and weapons of Kin Shun's small army prevailed; 
 and the Mussulman army retreated with considerable 
 loss and in great disorder. Kin Shun followed up his 
 success with marvellous rapidity and restless energy, 
 while the Kashgarian troops fled incontinently to Kucha, 
 abandoning the people and the country to the invader. 
 The unfortunate inhabitants implored with piteous en- 
 treaties the mercy of the conqueror, and it is with 
 genuine satisfaction we record the fact that Kin Shun 
 informed them of their safety, and bade them have no 
 further alarm. 
 
 By this time it is probable that the Chinese army had 
 been largely reinforced from the rear, for we have now 
 come to a more arduous portion of the enterprise, the 
 attack against Kucha. When the Chinese appeared 
 before its walls they found that a battle was proceeding 
 there between the Kashgarian soldiers and the towns- 
 people, who refused to accompany them in a further 
 retreat westward. On the appearance of the Chinese 
 army, the Kashgarian force evacuated the city, and 
 joined battle with it on the western side of Kucha. The 
 Chinese at once attacked them, at first with little success; 
 and a charge of the cavalry, numbering some four or five 
 thousand men, was only repulsed with some difficulty. 
 But the cannon of the Chinese were playing with remark- 
 able effect upon the Mahomedans, and the Chinese 
 reserves were every moment coming upon the ground. 
 The infantry were at last ordered to advance, under 
 cover of a heavy artillery fire, and the cavalry made a 
 charge at a most opportune moment. The whole army 
 then broke and fled in irretrievable confusion, leaving 
 more than a thousand of their number on the ground. 
 Their general, Ma-yeo-pu the Chinese called him, was 
 wounded early in the day, but, although stated to be a 
 
THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR. 271 
 
 noted man, it is impossible to recognize his identity under 
 the Chinese appellation. This was certainly the most 
 sanguinary and the best-contested action of the whole war. 
 The numbers on each side were probably about 10,000 
 men, and it was won as much by superior tactics and 
 skill as by brute force and courage. All the movements 
 of the Chinese were characterized by remarkable fore- 
 thought, and evinced the greatest ability on the part of 
 the general and his lieutenants, as well as obedience, 
 valour, and patience on the part of his soldiers. The 
 rapid advance from Kuhwei to Karashar, the forced 
 march thence to Bugur, the capture of Kucha, the for- 
 bearance of the conqueror towards the inhabitants, all 
 combine to make this portion of the war most creditable 
 to China and her generals, to Kin Shun in particular. 
 The reason given in the Official Report for the Kash- 
 garian authorities attempting to carry off the population 
 was that the rebels wished in the first place to deprive 
 the invading force of all assistance, thus making further 
 pursuit a work of difficulty, and in the second place, to 
 ingratiate themselves with the new Pahia (probably 
 Bacha) of Kashgar, Kuli Beg, by delivering this large 
 mass of Turki-Mussulmans into his hands. Bayen 
 Hu was, therefore, certainly not Hakim Khan. It is 
 tolerably clear that he must have been either a Tungan 
 refugee or a subordinate of Beg Bacha's. 
 
 A depot was formed at Kucha, and a large body of 
 troops remained there as a garrison ; but the principal 
 administrative measures were directed to the task of 
 improving the position of the Turki-Mussulman popu- 
 lation. A board of administration was instituted for the 
 purpose of providing means of subsistence for the des- 
 titute, and for the distribution of seed-corn for the benefit 
 of the whole community. It had also to supervise the 
 construction of roads, and the establishment of ferry 
 boats, and of post-houses, in order to facilitate the move- 
 ments of trade and travel, and to expedite the transmis- 
 sion of mails. Magistrates and prefects were appointed 
 
272 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 to all the cities, and special precautions were taken 
 against the outbreak of epidemic or of famine. All these 
 wise provisions were carried out promptly, and in the 
 most matter-of-fact manner, just as if the legislation, 
 and administration of alien states were the daily avoca- 
 tions of Chinamen. There is no reason to believe that 
 in the vast region from Turfan to Kucha the Chinese 
 have departed from the statesmanlike and beneficent 
 schemes which marked their re-installation as rulers; 
 and whatever harshness or cruelty they manifested to- 
 wards the Tungani rebels and the Kashgarian soldiers 
 was more than atoned for by the mildness of their treat- 
 ment of the people. 
 
 On the 19th, or more probably the 22nd of October, 
 Kin Shun resumed his forward movement, encountering 
 no serious opposition. His first halt was at a village 
 called Hoser, where he halted for one night, which he 
 employed in inditing the report to Pekin, which described 
 the successes and movements of the previous three weeks. 
 At the next town, known as Bai, Kin Shun halted to 
 await the arrival of the rear-guard, under General Chang 
 Yao. This force came up before the close of October, 
 and the advance against Aksu was resumed. Up to this 
 point the chief interest centred in the army south of 
 the Tian Shan, and in the achievements of Kin Shun. 
 Our principal, in fact our only, authority for this portion 
 of the campaign is the Pekin Gazette. 
 
 We have now to describe the movements of the 
 Northern Army, which was under the immediate com- 
 mand of Tso Tsung Tang, and which was oper- 
 ating in the north of the state, in complete secrecy. 
 That general had under him, at the most moderate 
 computation, an army of 28,000 men. By some it was 
 placed at a higher figure ; but a St. Petersburg paper, 
 on the authority of a Eussian merchant, who had been 
 to Manas, computed it to be of that strength. It was 
 concentrated in the neighbourhood of Manas, and along 
 the northern skirts of the Tian Shan ; and also on the 
 
THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR. 273 
 
 frontier of the Russian dominions in Kuldja. To all 
 appearance this army was consigned to a part of en- 
 forced inactivity, since it was impossible to enter Kuldja, 
 and thus proceed by their old routes through the passes 
 of Bedal or Muzart. But it was not so ; the travels of 
 Colonel Prjevalsky in the commencement of 1877 had 
 not been unobserved by the Chinese, and it was assumed 
 that where a Eussian officer with his Cossack following 
 could go, there also could go a Chinese army. By those 
 little-known passes, which are made by the Tekes and 
 Great Yuldus rivers, the Chinese army, under Tso Tsung 
 Tang, crossed over into Kashgaria ; and it is probable 
 that the two armies joined in the neighbourhood of Bai. 
 It was by this stroke of strategy on the part of Tso Tsung 
 Tang that the Chinese found themselves before the walls 
 of Aksu, with an overwhelming army, at the very sight 
 of which all thought of resistance died away from the 
 hearts of the Mussulman peoples and garrisons. Tso 
 Tsung Tang appeared before the walls of Aksu, the bul- 
 wark of Kashgar on the east, and its commandant, panic 
 stricken, abandoned his post at the first onset. He was 
 subsequently taken prisoner by an officer of Kuli Beg, 
 and executed. The Chinese then advanced onllsh Turfan, 
 which also surrendered without a blow. As we said, the 
 Chinese have not published any detailed description of 
 this portion of the war, and we are consequently unable 
 to say what their version is of those reported atrocities at 
 Aksu and Ush Turfan, of which the Eussian papers have 
 made so much. There is no doubt that a very large 
 number of refugees fled to Eussian territory, perhaps 
 10,000 in all, and these brought with them the tales of 
 fear and exaggerated alarm. We may feel little hesita- 
 tion in accepting the assertion as true, that the armed 
 garrisons were slaughtered without exception ; but that 
 the unarmed population and the women and children 
 shared the same fate we distinctly refuse to credit. There 
 is every precedent in favour of the assumption that a more 
 moderate policy was pursued, and there is no valid reason 
 
274 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 why the Chinese should have dealt with Aksu and Ush 
 Tin-fan differently to Kucha or Turfan. The case of 
 Manas has been greatly insisted upon by the agitators 
 on this " atrocity " question ; but there is the highest 
 authority for asserting that only armed men were mas- 
 sacred there. This the Chinese have always done ; it is 
 a national custom, and they certainly did not depart from 
 it in the case of the Tungani and Kashgar. But there 
 is no solid ground for convicting them of any more 
 heinous crime, even in the instances of Manas and Aksu, 
 which are put so prominently forward. 
 
 Early in December the last move of all began against 
 the capital, and on the 17th of that month the Chinese 
 took it by a coup de main. Beg Kuli Beg, according to 
 one account, fought a battle outside the town, in which 
 he was defeated ; according to another report, he had 
 withdrawn to Yarkand, whence he fled to Eussian terri- 
 tory, when he heard of the fall of Kashgar. It is more 
 probable that he resisted the Chinese attack on Kashgar, 
 for he certainly reached Tashkent, in company with the 
 Kirghiz Chief, Sadie Beg, who was wounded in that 
 battle. With the fall of Kashgar the Chinese recon- 
 quest of Eastern Turkestan was completed, and the 
 other cities, Yangy Hissar and Yarkand, speedily shared 
 the same fate. Khoten and Sirikul also sent in formal 
 promises of subjection. But the capture of Kashgar 
 virtually closed the campaign. No further resistance 
 was encountered, and the new rulers had only to begin 
 the task of reorganization. When Kashgar fell the 
 greater portion of the army, knowing that they could 
 expect no mercy at the hands of the Chinese, fled to 
 Eussian territory, and then spread reports of fresh 
 Chinese massacres, which probably only existed in their 
 own imagination. There can be no doubt that the 
 Chinese triumph has been thorough, and that it will be 
 many years before the people of Eastern Turkestan will 
 have again the heart to rebel against their authority. 
 The strength of China has been thoroughly demon- 
 
THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR. 275 
 
 strated, and the vindication of her prestige is complete. 
 Whatever danger there may be to the permanence of 
 China's triumph lies rather from Eussia than from the 
 conquered peoples of Tian Shan Nan Lu ; nor is there 
 much danger that the Chinese laurels will become faded 
 even before an European foe. Tso Tsung Tang and 
 his lieutenants, Kin Shun, who has since fallen into dis- 
 grace, perhaps he had excited the envy of his superior 
 and Chang Yao, accomplished a task which would reflect 
 credit on any army and any country. They have given 
 a lustre to the present Chinese administration which 
 must stand it in good stead, and they have acquired a 
 personal renown that will not easily depart. The 
 Chinese reconquest of Eastern Turkestan is beyond 
 doubt the most remarkable event that has occurred in 
 Asia during the last fifty years, and it is quite the most 
 brilliant achievement of a Chinese army, led by China- 
 men, that has taken place since Keen-Lung subdued the 
 country more than a century ago. It also proves, in a 
 manner that is more than unpalatable to us, that the 
 Chinese possess an adaptive faculty that must be held 
 to be a very important fact in every-day politics in 
 Central Asia. They conquered Kashgar with European 
 weapons, and by careful study of Western science and 
 skill. Their soldiers marched in obedience to instruc- 
 tors trained on the Prussian principle ; and their gene- 
 rals manoeuvred their troops in accordance with the 
 teachings of Moltke and Manteuffel. Even in such 
 minor matters as the use of telescopes and field glasses 
 we find this Chinese army well supplied. Nothing was 
 more absurd than the picture drawn by some over-wise 
 observer of this army, as consisting of soldiers fantasti- 
 cally garbed in the guise of dragons and other hideous 
 appearances. All that belonged to an old-world theory. 
 The army of Eastern Turkestan was as widely different 
 from all previous Chinese armies in Central Asia as it 
 well could be; and in all essentials closely resembled 
 that of an European power. Its remarkable triumphs 
 
276 TAKOOB BEG. 
 
 were chiefly attributable to the thoroughness with which 
 China had in this instance adapted herself to Western 
 notions. 
 
 With the flight of Beg Kuli Beg to Tashkent 
 closed the career of the house of the Athalik Grhazi in 
 Kashgar. Whatever turn events may take in this por- 
 tion of Central Asia, whatever schemes there may be 
 formed in Khokand, or elsewhere, of challenging anew 
 the Chinese domination, it will not be round the banner 
 of Kuli Beg that the ousted Khokandian officials will 
 rally. By his flight in the hour of danger, by the hesi- 
 tation which marked all his movements, and by the 
 murder of his brother in cold blood, this prince, of 
 whom much at one time was expected, has irretrievably 
 ruined both his career and his reputation. If on any 
 future occasion Eussia should seek to play the part 
 played of old by Khans of Khokand in the internal 
 history of Kashgar, it will not be Kuli Beg whom they 
 will put forward as their puppet. His old rival, Hakim 
 Khan, stands a much better chance than he, more espe- 
 cially if it be true that he is the representative of the 
 Khojas, being the son of Buzurg Khan, as many have 
 asserted. But the fact remains clear, that all the dreams 
 of Yakoob Beg of founding a personal dynasty in 
 Eastern Turkestan are now dispelled beyond all pro- 
 spect of realization. 
 
277 
 
 CHAPTEE XIV. 
 
 THE CHINESE FACTOR IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN 
 QUESTION. 
 
 THE overthrow of the Tungani, and the reconquest of 
 Kashgaria, have not completed the task that lay before 
 Chinese generals and soldiers in Central Asia. Great 
 and remarkable as those triumphs were, the Chinese are 
 not satisfied with them, because there yet remains more 
 work to be done. They have restored to the Emperor 
 Tian Shan Nan Lu, but so long as the Eussians 
 hold Kuldja, Tian Shan Pe Lu is only half won back. 
 Moreover, so long as a great military power is domiciled 
 in Kuldja, China's hold on the country west of Aksu 
 must be only on sufferance. As of old, the Chinese so 
 often reconquered Kashgar, when it had shaken off the 
 Chinese rule, from Hi, so might the Eussians at their 
 good pleasure play the same part against the Chinese. 
 In short, the Eussians remaining in Hi would neutralize 
 all the advantages that China had secured by her recent 
 military success. But, although there is a foundation of 
 well grounded apprehension at the strategical advan- 
 tages of Eussia, at the root of China's demand for the 
 surrender of Kuldja, that is not the only cause, or 
 even the principal one, for the Chinese making it. Of 
 all their Central Asian possessions, Hi was the most 
 cherished, and it was to recover that region more espe- 
 cially that Tso Tsung Tang undertook those arduous 
 campaigns which have so far ended in triumph, and 
 which were designed for, among other purposes, the 
 purpose of giving that Viceroy a prestige and influence 
 
278 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 that would enable him to play the rival to Li Hung 
 Chang. Hi was their metropolis in Central Asia, and its 
 fall marked the wide difference that there was between 
 the Tungan-Khoja rising of 1862-63 and all its pre- 
 decessors. The fall of Ili meant the fall of Chinese 
 power, and Chinese power cannot be held to be com- 
 pletely restored so long as Ili remains in alien hands. 
 On this point the Chinese are very keen. 
 
 Russia, on the other hand, hesitates to hand over Ili 
 for various reasons. In the first place, it is not cer- 
 tain that China has permanently reconquered Eastern 
 Turkestan, nor is it clear that the Imperial exchequer 
 will be able to bear a continual strain upon it for 
 Central Asian expenditure. Moreover there is the un- 
 known quantity of the rivalry of Li Hung Chang and 
 Tso Tsung Tang, and whatever influence the latter may 
 have with the army and the ruling caste on account of 
 his Mantchoo blood, the former holds the purse in his 
 hands, and can at any momet paralyse Chinese activity and 
 strength in Central Asia. The Russians also, whatever 
 rash promises they may have given at Pekin and they 
 certainly did promise to retrocede Kuldja to China, 
 whenever the Chinese should be strong enough to 
 return to Central Asia formally (teste General Kolpa- 
 kovsky's proclamation) annexed Kuldja "in perpetuity." 
 In the eyes of the people of Central Asia, that procla- 
 mation defines Russia s tenure of Kuldja, and not the 
 vague promise that was uttered in the ears of the 
 authorities at Pekin. Now Russia knows this as well 
 as we do ; and she is aware that no strict adherence to 
 her word of honour will induce the people of Western, 
 as well as of Eastern, Turkestan to believe that she 
 retrocedes Kuldja for any other cause than fear of the 
 Chinese. The Khokandians, the Bokhariots, as well 
 as the Kirghiz, the Calmucks, and the Kashgari, will 
 all argue that Russia restores Kuldja not through any 
 desire to fulfil her engagements, but simply because she 
 cannot decline to fulfil them without engaging in a war 
 
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION. 279 
 
 with China, and her compliance with the demand would 
 then be construed as an admission of her disinclination to 
 encounter China in the field. In fact, even if Eussia had 
 promptly restored Kuldja, she would not have secured 
 the credit she might have claimed for her good faith, 
 and she would have had no guarantee that the Chinese 
 would have rested content with the cession of Hi proper 
 and not gone on to claim, in a moment of military 
 arrogance, the restoration of the Naryn district, which 
 China at a period of weakness had herself ceded to 
 Eussia more than twenty years ago. Then, besides these 
 objections to the surrender of Kuldja on political 
 grounds, there are commercial and fiscal reasons why 
 Eussia should be loth to restore this province. Not only 
 has it become highly prosperous and thickly populated 
 under Eussian rule, but it has also been raised into one 
 of the most fiscally remunerative portions of the 
 Eussian possessions in Central Asia, and then there is its 
 admirable frontier in the Tian Shan, which places the 
 future trade with the western parts of China more at 
 its disposal, than it is through the Semipalatinsk and 
 Chuguchak route, and, above all, it effectually dispels all 
 sense of real danger from attack. The Chinese would 
 find that to force the Tian Shan range into Kuldja would 
 be a task almost impossible for them, and they would 
 be compelled to enter the province from the north by 
 Karkaru. By so doing, they would leave the whole 
 of their flank and line of communication exposed to an 
 attack with telling effect both at Manas and in Kash- 
 gar, and with a scientific foe such as Eussia, no sane 
 Chinaman could dream of attacking Kuldja except in 
 the most overwhelming force. It may be as well to 
 sketch here the history of Eussia' s rule in Kuldja from 
 1871 to the present time, before proceeding with the 
 consideration of the questions aroused by the difficulty 
 between Eussia and China. 
 
 When an independent government had been founded 
 in Kuldja in 1866, a ruler of the name of Abul Oghlan 
 
280 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 was placed upon the throne. He appears to have been 
 a Tungan, and he certainly was a truculent and self- 
 confident potentate. He refused to abide by the stipu- 
 lations of the Treaties of Kuldja and Pekin, and in 
 petty mattets as in great, set himself in direct opposi- 
 tion to Eussia. For five years be pursued his career 
 undisturbed by exterior influences, and during that 
 period he tolerated the inroads of his subjects into 
 Russian territory, urged the Kirghiz tribes beyond his 
 frontier to revolt, and forbade Russian merchants to 
 enter his dominions. On a small scale, he aped the 
 manners subsequently adopted by Yakoob Beg. But 
 he was only a minor and insignificant despot. His 
 people groaned under his tyranny, and the 75,000 
 slaves within his dominions were only too anxious to 
 be relieved from their bondage by any deliverer whatso- 
 ever. The state of Kuldja, as administered by Abul 
 Oghlan, was pre-eminently one that would fall to pieces 
 at the first rude shock from outside. For five years, or 
 thereabouts, the Russian authorities at Vernoe, Naryn, 
 and in Semiretchinsk put up with his veiled hostility ; 
 but when it became evident that his state was on the 
 eve of falling into divers fragments, of which Yakoob 
 Beg would, probably, come in for the lion's share, the 
 Russians, whose patience had become well-nigh exhausted, 
 resolved not to be forestalled in Kuldja, either by the 
 Athalik Ghazi, or the Tungani Confederation. A kind 
 of ultimatum was presented to Kuldja, in which Abul 
 Oghlan was given a last chance of retaining power, if 
 he consented to ratify the terms of the past treaties 
 with China. He does not appear to have distinctly 
 refused to do so, when he was required to enter into 
 this agreement with Russia. But he prevaricated and 
 delayed, until at last the patience of the Muscovite 
 authorities was quite exhausted. They resolved to 
 destroy the government of Abul Oghlan, to annex 
 Kuldja, and to bring their frontier down to the Tian 
 Shan. 
 
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION. 281 
 
 In May, 1871, Major Balitsky crossed the river 
 Borodshudsir, which formed the boundary between 
 the two countries, and, at the head of a small detach- 
 ment, advanced some distance into the dominions of 
 Abul Oghlan. His force, however, was small, and, after 
 a brief reconnaissance, he retired within Eussian ter- 
 ritory. Six weeks afterwards the main body under 
 General Kolpakovsky crossed the frontier into Kuldja 
 and marched on the capital. That invading army con- 
 sisted of only 1,785 men and sixty-five officers. At first 
 the forces of Abul Oghlan offered a brave resistance, 
 but the Eussian cannon and rifles carried everything 
 before them ; and on the 4th of July the ruler pre- 
 sented himself at the Eussian outposts. When taken 
 before General Kolpakovsky, he said, " I trusted to the 
 righteousness of my cause, and to the help of Grod. 
 Conquered, I submit to the will of the Almighty. If 
 any crime has been committed, punish the sovereign, 
 but spare his innocent subjects." The next day the 
 Eussian general entered the capital after a campaign 
 that had only lasted eight or nine days. Protection 
 was promised to all who would lay down their arms, 
 and the army of Abul Oghlan was disbanded. Abul 
 Oghlan was pensioned, and Orel was appointed as his 
 place of residence. Kuldja or "Dzungaria," as it is 
 called in the proclamation, was annexed " in perpetuity/' 
 and became the Eussian sub-governorship of Priilinsk. 
 There can be no doubt but that the Eussian occupation 
 of Kuldja was an unqualified benefit to the inhabitants 
 of that region. The declaration of the abolition of 
 slavery alone released seventy-five thousand human 
 beings from a life of hardship and hopelessness. The 
 return of trade, which had become stagnant, ensured 
 the prosperity and advancement of the active portion 
 of the community, and during the seven years Eussia 
 has ruled in Kuldja, the people have steadily progressed 
 in moral and material welfare. The population has 
 during the same period remarkably increased, and the 
 
282 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 / 
 
 valleys of the Hi teem with a population at once con- 
 tented and prosperous. The rule of Eussia in Kuldja 
 is the brightest spot in her Central Asian administra- 
 tion. The Chinese in demanding the retrocession of 
 Kuldja labour under the one disadvantage that they 
 come to oust a beneficent rule. This disadvantage is 
 made the greater by the bad name the Chinese have 
 earned in Kashgar and the Tungan country, by the 
 atrocities they are said to have committed. Those who 
 will take the trouble to scan the matter carefully, 
 and to consult the Pekin Gazette, as much as they do 
 the Tashkent, will find that these atrocities are for the 
 most part the creation of panic, and of malicious ob- 
 servers, and in the few cases where Chinese vindictive- 
 ness overcame military discipline, as at Manas and Aksu, 
 we have clear evidence that women and children were 
 spared. The Tashkent Gazette has laboured strenuously, 
 and not in vain, to disseminate the report of Chinese 
 atrocities ; and one London paper has so far assisted 
 the object of the Eussian press in raising a feeling of 
 indignation against China, on account of these reported 
 massacres in Eastern Turkestan, that it has placed 
 translations of these charges before the English reader, 
 and, on the authority of the Tashkent Gazette, has 
 indicted and summarily convicted the Chinese of the 
 grossest acts of inhumanity. We would venture to 
 suggest, that in common fairness to the Chinese this 
 journal should place before its readers the temperately 
 worded and dignified reports that have appeared in the 
 Pekin Gazette of those events upon which the Tashkent 
 Gazette has commented so indignantly. 
 
 As we said, the Chinese are fully resolved to regain 
 Hi. They may not be able to induce Eussia easily to 
 surrender it, yet they will not despair. In all proba- 
 bility they will fail altogether to re- acquire it by diplo- 
 matic means, yet they will not omit to employ all the 
 artifices that are sanctioned by modern diplomacy. 
 There have been rumours that China intended handing 
 
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION. 283 
 
 over to Eussia a strip of territory in Manchuria, which 
 would give to the Eussian harbour of Vladivostock a 
 land communication with the forts on the Amoor. But 
 this rumour had no solid foundation, and the latest 
 intelligence goes to show that China's successes beyond 
 Grobi, instead of making her moderate in the north, have 
 given her confidence sufficient to arouse her into a state 
 of opposition to further encroachments on the part of 
 Eussia in that direction. It is now said that Eussia 
 demands pecuniary indemnification for the money she 
 has expended in raising Kuldja to its present highly 
 prosperous condition ; and at a first glance nothing 
 could seem fairer, nor do we think that the Chinese 
 would have raised objections to the payment of a mode- 
 rate sum. But the sum demanded by the Eussians is 
 far from moderate. The exact amount has not been 
 mentioned, but the Chinese declare that it exceeds the 
 total cost of the campaign in the north-west, and that 
 certainly was not less than two millions sterling. This 
 is, of course, too exorbitant, and is only put forward as 
 a reason for declining to abide by her former agreement, 
 and to give her diplomatists a loom standi in their dis- 
 cussions with the Chinese representatives. A Chinese 
 Embassy has been authorized to proceed to St. Peters- 
 burg, and to endeavour to effect an understanding with 
 Eussia upon the Kuldja question; but it does not 
 appear to have started, and the real settlement lies in 
 the hands of Tso Tsung Tang and General Kaufmann. 
 The latest report is that the former has demanded afresh 
 the restoration of Kuldja ; the Eussian reply is awaited 
 with eagerness and some anxiety. In the meanwhile 
 the Chinese have suffered a local reverse of no signifi- 
 cance at the hands of a chief of Khoten, and their 
 power does not seem to extend south of Yarkand. But 
 they are hurrying up reinforcements, and 20,000 fresh 
 troops had reached Manas some weeks ago. They have 
 also an extensive recruiting ground amongst the Cal- 
 mucks,and their position of Chuguchak might be of great 
 
284 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 strategical importance. If the Kuldja question give 
 rise to a Eusso-Chinese war, the Chinese are sufficiently 
 numerous and sufficiently prepared to task the capacity 
 of an army of 20,000 Russians ; and it is quite certain 
 there are not 5,000 in Kuldja at present. But the 
 Kuldja question, despite the prominence it has attained, 
 is only one, if the most important and pressing, of 
 those questions that are raised and suggested by the 
 appearance of the Chinese in Central Asia. More 
 especially is this the case if, as can scarcely be doubted, 
 the Eussians refuse to restore Kuldja ; yet the Chinese, 
 knowing the strength of their adversary, shall hesitate 
 to attack where they cannot but recognize that the 
 penalties of failure must be immense. In that event 
 the Kuldja question will long remain unsolved, and for 
 a time perhaps it will be forgotten. But the Chinese 
 will not forget, nor will they condone the offence. But 
 whatever may be the interval, and however great the 
 delay, the Kuldja question will continue to remain a 
 most important portion of Central Asian politics, and 
 must, so long as it is unsettled, operate in a manner 
 adverse to the interests of Eussia. The Chinese need 
 only maintain their camps at Chuguchak, Karakaru, 
 Manas, Aksu, TJsh Turfan and Kashgar, and slowly 
 bring up reinforcements from Kansuh and from the 
 Calmuck country, to render Eussia's hold on Kuldja 
 dangerously insecure. In fact, in this matter the Chi- 
 nese have the game in their own hands, and can play a 
 waiting game ; whereas Eussia can only hope to profit 
 by precipitation on the part of Tso Tsung Tang. If 
 the Chinese refuse to hold any intercourse with the 
 faithless Eussians, and simply content themselves with 
 the declaration that they cannot re-enter into political 
 or commercial relations with them until Kuldja is re- 
 troceded, Eussia can never rest tranquil either in Kuldja, 
 Naryn, or Khokand. Above all, so long as she is occu- 
 pied in Western Asia as she is at present, she could 
 never dare to cross the path of China, and enter upon a 
 
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION. 285 
 
 war which would rage from Vladivostock and the Amoor 
 to Kuldja and Kashgar. Therefore the settlement of 
 the Kuldja question is not such an easy matter as might 
 be supposed ; nor does it find Russia so strong or China 
 so weak as might have been expected. But after all, 
 as we have just said, the Kuldja question is not the 
 only one suggested by the appearance of the Chinese in 
 Eastern Turkestan. There is the far wider one raised 
 by the appearance of the Chinese as a factor in the great 
 Central Asian question. The three great Asiatic Powers 
 have now converged upon a point ; what is to be the 
 result ? 
 
 The only way to be in a position to venture upon a 
 surmise as to the future, is to realize in its full signifi- 
 cance the lessons of the past. What have been the 
 mutual relations between England, B/ussia, and China? 
 We have assumed throughout this volume, and we 
 shall assume here, the irreconcilable hostility of Eng- 
 land and Bussia, in Asia at all events, veneered over 
 as it is by a lacquer of politeness and civilization. We 
 have only to consider the relations between England 
 and China, and between Bussia and China. To take 
 the latter first, they have always been united by ties of 
 friendship and reciprocity in commercial and political 
 rights. Their intercourse has been on the whole singu- 
 larly harmonious, and while we have been compelled to 
 wage three wars to obtain a standing for our merchants 
 in the seaports, Bussia, without being compelled to 
 resort to anything like the same extreme measures, 
 has been able to secure all she, or her merchants, 
 wanted in Middle and Western China. She has made 
 the Amoor a Bussian river ; she dominates the Yellow 
 and Japanese seas from Vladivostock ; and she has 
 acquired in her position among the Khalkas, and in 
 Kuldja, two portals to various weak points in the 
 Chinese Empire. Yet all the time she has been on 
 terms of the closest amity with China. She has several 
 commercial treaties of the most favourable character, 
 
286 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 and she has always been on the footing of " the most 
 favoured nation." But she has been more than that ; 
 she has been the most favoured nation. But the 
 Chinese have not failed to observe that this good 
 understanding with Russia has, so far as advantages 
 arising from it go, been a very one-sided affair. For 
 all Russia's protestations of friendship and good-will, 
 what advantages has China reaped from those high- 
 flown promises ? Whereas, the patriotic Chinaman 
 has but to look to the Amoor, and to the attenuated 
 province of Manchuria, to see what Russian friendship 
 means. He can go farther still. He has only to 
 enquire into the relations Russia has managed to 
 conclude with the Taranath Lama ; he has only to hear 
 what the people of Ourga think of Russia's position in 
 the vicinity of that important city ; and he cannot fail 
 to forjn a very clear and decided opinion as to what 
 Russia's friendship signifies. The Chinese have, in the 
 full extent of their northern frontier, a great question 
 in discussion with Russia. So long as China was weak, 
 and consequently unable to resent the patronage of her 
 friend, so long was Russia able to play " my lady 
 bountiful " with a good grace and perfect success. 
 But the moment China became strong, and in a position 
 to resent the condescension of her whilome ally, the 
 Chinese took a different tone, and already we hear of 
 the Chinese assuming a semi-hostile attitude in the 
 Amoor region. But whereas China's apprehension 
 for it is apprehension that is at the root of her hostility 
 to Russia, at Russia's designs in Manchuria and among 
 the Khalkas is vague at present her indignation is 
 clear and easily defined at Russia retaining possession 
 of Kuldja after she has demanded its restoration. In 
 short, all her apprehension along the northern frontier, 
 which has slumbered, but never died out, since the 
 Russians seized the Amoor posts during the Crimean 
 War, is reduced to a focus in Central Asia, where Russia 
 appears inclined to throw herself in the path of, or at 
 
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION. 287 
 
 least to retard, their victorious career. It is not so 
 much the Kuldja question, which is of local importance, 
 that is of pressing moment, as the rupture between 
 Eussia and China, that a crisis in the Issik Kul region 
 will make complete. That rupture has already taken 
 place, and no concession on the part of Eussia will 
 restore her good name with the Chinese. She may 
 hand Kuldja over now, or she may keep it by the 
 strong arm if she can ; but she has forfeited all claim 
 to consideration by the Chinese, through delaying to 
 accede to that which those people consider in every 
 sense their right and due. Had Eussia at once said to 
 China, " We will abandon Kuldja, and only require you 
 to guarantee the safety of the population," there would 
 have been not only the preservation of the good under- 
 standing between the countries, but there might have 
 been, for fresh purposes, a Eusso-Chinese alliance in 
 Central Asia. That alliance must have been fraught 
 with danger to this country, and for reasons that will 
 best be described under the head of Anglo-Chinese 
 relations. 
 
 But the Eussian authorities failed to grasp the 
 situation in its full extent. They treated the Kuldja 
 question as a mere local affair, and they trifled with 
 the Chinese as if the latter had no very strong interest 
 in the matter. They altogether ignored the terrible 
 earnestness of the Chinese character, and they treated the 
 demands of Tso Tsung Tang in a spirit of levity that 
 must have roused the ire of that general. Their policy, 
 regarded from any point of view, was shallow and 
 unwise, but, bearing in mind the past tact and diplo- 
 matic skill shown by Eussia in her dealings with China, 
 it must appear more shallow and foolish. Of course 
 this Kuldja question differs from all previous questions 
 in the essential point of all, that here for the first time 
 Eussia had to go back instead of advancing, as always 
 had been the case heretofore. The Eussian authorities 
 simply regarded the matter from the point of view of 
 
288 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 what effect it would have upon the peoples of Central 
 Asia. They persuaded themselves that to hand over 
 Kuldja would be to give an impetus to every hostile 
 element in Western Turkestan, as well as to lower their 
 prestige generally throughout Asia. As a leading 
 Eussian paper expressed it, " the retrocession of Kuldja 
 would be an act of political suicide, for not only would 
 it raise the prestige of China to a higher point than 
 ever before, but it would also undermine our position in 
 Eastern Asia, by giving the Chinese a strong military 
 position within our natural frontier. For these reasons 
 Kuldja cannot be restored." That paragraph sums up 
 the arguments the Eussians will employ in defence of 
 their continuing to retain possession of Kuldja. They 
 add something to their effect in the popular mind by 
 diatribes against the Chinese for rumoured barbarities, 
 by drawing comparisons, flattering to themselves and 
 to their administrative capacity, between the present 
 condition of Kuldja, and what it would become under a 
 restored Chinese rule. In depicting what this would 
 be, they entirely ignore the prosperous condition of 
 Kuldja before the Tungan revolt, and they appear to 
 assume that the anarchy existing there, when they 
 entered it in 1871, was due to the Chinese, instead of 
 being caused by the ingratitude and fickleness of its 
 own people. And they shut their eyes to the great 
 benefits China conferred upon Central Asia during the 
 century that she was paramount therein. They would 
 like us, and every other observer of the crisis, to do the 
 same. That is impossible, for the teaching of history 
 is clear, and points to a diametrically opposite conclu- 
 sion. We do not dispute the beneficence of Eussia's 
 government of Kuldja. We freely admit it. That is 
 no reason for maligning the Chinese, and asserting that 
 they are utter barbarians ; nor is it a reason, in the eyes 
 of Chinamen, for a refusal to restore Kuldja. By 
 refusing to entertain the overtures of Tso Tsung Tang, 
 which were made, there is reason to believe, before the 
 
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION. 289 
 
 attack on Yakoob Beg, the Russians huffed the Chinese ; 
 and by procrastinating ever since, when questioned upon 
 the subject, they have still further displeased them. 
 The Eussians are aware of this, and feel convinced that, 
 no matter how obliging they might be disposed to be, 
 the Chinese will now no longer appreciate their mode- 
 ration. If we admit this, as can scarcely be gainsaid, 
 what becomes of the Kuldja question, and of its 
 peaceful solution that many claim to see ? How can it 
 be peacefully solved, if Russia will not accede to the 
 terms from which China is resolved not to budge ? 
 Surely not by a fresh commotion on the part of the 
 Mussulman population, which some persons have pre- 
 tended to forecast by magnifying a petty success that 
 has been obtained by the insignificant ruler of Khoten 
 over a Chinese detachment. Surely not by such trivial 
 circumstances as the hostility of an outlying depen- 
 dency, will China be either expelled from Kashgar, or 
 induced to forego her claims on Kuldja. The success of 
 the Khoten chief is but a minor incident in the cam- 
 paign, and for that district and its people it must be 
 pronounced a great misfortune. The Chinese will exact 
 a terrible revenge. The Kuldja question will not be 
 solved by such means, English readers can feel assured ; 
 and the hostility of Eussia and China towards each other 
 will become more pronounced every day. Already petty 
 disturbances are reported to have taken place along the 
 border. Eussian merchants have been molested by parties 
 of brigands, among whom the assailed assert there were 
 Chinese soldiers ; and no satisfaction could be obtained 
 from their generals. Eepresentations have been made 
 to Tso Tsung Tang upon the subject, and his reply 
 has not been very amicable. Eussian caravans, which 
 were always welcome during the progress of the war at 
 Manas, Karakaru, and Urumtsi, are now no longer 
 greeted with the same cordiality, and the Chinese are 
 evincing an intention to close their frontier to Eussians. 
 Few caravans, the Tashkent Gazette informs us, now care 
 
 u 
 
290 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 to leave Kuldja for the territory occupied by the Chinese 
 army ; and slowly, but none the less surely, is the old 
 alliance between Russia and China departing to join the 
 things that were, but are not. But, although so much 
 is clear, it is almost impossible to predicate the future 
 course of the Kuldja question. It is not probable that 
 Tso Tsung Tang will openly attack the Eussians, yet 
 his hand may be forced by the home authorities, and 
 he may be left no alternative between that and the 
 abandonment of his enterprise. It must be always 
 remembered that Eussia's best weapon is intrigue at 
 Pekin, and a skilful envoy might so far manipulate the 
 rivalry between Tso and Li Hung Chang as to induce 
 the latter to paralyze the ambition of the former by 
 withholding supplies and reinforcements from the army 
 of Central Asia. So unpatriotic a course would, we 
 believe, be hateful to Li Hung Chang, and it, certainly, 
 would be attended with great danger, sure to recoil 
 upon his guilty head, if for a personal rivalry he debased 
 himself so far as to become the tool of his country's 
 foe. But yet it is in vain to deny that there is danger 
 to the preservation of China's most cherished interests 
 in the rivalry of some of her chief statesmen. The 
 Kuldja question, which scarcely admits of peaceful 
 solution in Central Asia, might be solved in the palace 
 at Pekin more easily and more effectually than by a 
 campaign on a large scale in Jungaria and Turkestan ; 
 and there is a possibility that Eussia may by this means 
 seek to nullify the danger from Tso Tsung Tang, and 
 to stultify the recent Chinese successes. It is very 
 doubtful whether they would succeed, for Chinese 
 opinion runs high upon the topic, and the Mantchoo caste 
 is united in its support of its member Tso Tsung Tang. 
 Even if they did; it would only be shelving the Kuldja 
 question, for so long as the Chinese remain in Kashgaria, 
 and at Manas and Karakaru, they must regard the pre- 
 sence of Eussia in Kuldja as a slight to themselves, as 
 well as a menace to their line of communications. 
 
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION. 291 
 
 But every probability is against their succeeding. Li 
 Hung Chang's position is not so secure that he can dare 
 to put himself in face of those who champion a national 
 cause, as is the re-absorption of Chinese Turkestan. The 
 return of Tso Tsung Tang with his veterans would be 
 the least danger that the adoption of an unpatriotic 
 policy would entail. If this home danger, then, does 
 not arise, the Kuldja question will be settled between 
 Tso and the Russian authorities in Khokand and Kuldja. 
 The result of that discussion cannot be doubtful. The 
 advocates on either side are soldiers, each equally confi- 
 dent in their own abilities and power, and each flushed 
 by a long tide of success. They will come to the dis- 
 cussion of the question with heated blood and excited 
 nerves ; reason will not be the presiding goddess at the 
 council board. There will be accusations and recrimi- 
 nations bandied from one side to the other. If such be 
 the case, the Kuldja question will not be long in discus- 
 sion, and before the close of the present year perhaps, 
 but more probably early next spring, there will be war 
 between Russia and China along the Tian Shan range. 
 Even if Tso is content to permit his arguments to be 
 clothed in diplomatic language, there will be no solution 
 of the difficulty, so long as Russia remains where she is ; 
 and consequently the difference will be as great between 
 Russia and China as if there were open hostilities be- 
 tween the countries. And this, after all, is the main 
 point, for the destruction of all friendly sentiment 
 between Russia and China means the addition of 
 another element to " the great game in Central Asia," 
 and that element, as an adverse one to Russia, is a 
 beneficial circumstance for this country. The difference 
 over the Kuldja question magnifies the previously exist- 
 ing discordant points between the countries, and irre- 
 trievably wrecks whatever prospect there once was of 
 Russia and China pursuing an identical policy towards 
 Baroghil and Cashmere. We have now to consider the 
 past relations between England and China, in order that 
 
 u 2 
 
292 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 we may be in a position to appreciate the full signi- 
 ficance of China's reappearance in Central Asia, and 
 also what is to be the probable ontcome of the gradual 
 approximation of the three Great Powers, and the slow 
 extinction of the once innumerable petty states of 
 Asia. 
 
 What, then, have been the mutual relations between 
 England and China in the past ? There is no necessity 
 to enter into the question of the footing we are on along 
 the sea-coast, for that is really beside the question ; nor 
 need we recapitulate the wars which we have at various 
 times been compelled to wage in Eastern China. The 
 result of those wars, those treaties, and that constant 
 inter-communication has been, that Englishmen have 
 secured a foothold in many of the principal cities, and 
 that English trade is supreme there. But the relations 
 along the land frontier are quite the opposite of those 
 obtained on the sea-board, and they are influenced by 
 entirely different considerations. During the last cen- 
 tury, and for a considerable portion of the present, we 
 were not, strictly speaking, neighbours of the Chinese ; 
 for between the two empires there intervened a belt of 
 semi-independent states, who nominally owned alle- 
 giance to China. Some of these were Nepaul, Sikhim, 
 Bhutan and Birma, with its dependency of Assam. It 
 was in the days of Lord Cornwallis that we first realized 
 the significance of the fact that Chinese prestige had 
 penetrated south of the Himalaya. The Grhoorka rulers 
 of Nepaul had, on several occasions, molested the peace- 
 able Tibetans, and at last had grown so bold, that on 
 one expedition they advanced as far as Lhasa, which 
 they plundered. At that moment the aged Keen-Lung 
 was meditating the retirement from public life, which a 
 few years afterwards, like the Asiatic Charles the Fifth 
 that he was, he adopted; but, on the news of this insult 
 to his authority, his warlike spirit fired up, and he vowed 
 that the marauders of Khatmandoo should dearly pay 
 for their audacity. A large army, of the reputed strength 
 
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION. 293 
 
 of 70,000 men, was collected, and the Chinese generals 
 advanced by the Kirong Pass upon the Nepaulese capital. 
 A desperate battle was fought along this elevated road, 
 resulting in victory to the Chinese. Several other 
 encounters took place with the same result, and the 
 Ghoorkas were compelled to sue for terms. The Chinese 
 showed no disposition to stay their advance, until Lord 
 Cornwallis mediated between the foes, and peace ensued. 
 Nepaul acknowledged its suzerainty to China, and agreed 
 to send tribute every five years to Pekin. For more 
 than half a century this was regularly sent, but during 
 the last thirty years it has been either discontinued, or 
 has grown irregular. But for us the main point is, 
 after all, that the Chinese, although yielding to the 
 remonstrance of Lord Cornwallis, really did so with a 
 bad grace. We had stood between them arid their 
 prey. 
 
 But this was not the full extent of the mistake we 
 had actually committed. We had annoyed the Chinese ; 
 but we had absolutely offended the people and the ruling 
 Lamas of Tibet. Warren Hastings had sent two mis- 
 sions one under Mr. George Bogle, the other under 
 Captain Turner to the Teshu Lama, and by means 
 of these embassies had broken ground very happily in 
 Tibet. He had also conferred an obligation upon him 
 by dealing leniently with the intractable Bhutanese or 
 Bhuteas ; and he had followed up that sense of obliga- 
 tion by the despatch of two successful missions. When 
 Lord Cornwallis threw the ceyis of British protection 
 over Nepaul, it is true that we had no diplomatic rela- 
 tionship with Tibet, but we were on a good footing with 
 the people generally, having a native representative at 
 Lhasa named Purungir Gosain, and being in high repute 
 at Shigatze, the chief city of the southern portion of 
 Tibet. The Tibetans, the instant the Ghoorkas raided 
 their country, notified the same to our government, and 
 requested its good offices to prevent the Ghoorkas in- 
 vading their country. The Chinese, their lawful pro- 
 
294 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 tectors, were so far away that much damage could be 
 inflicted upon them before the Chinese could have time 
 to despatch a vindicating army ; therefore they appealed 
 to their friends the English, whom they had always 
 found so just, for assistance in their extremity. Their 
 appeal was evidently made with the impression that it 
 would be granted. Therefore it was with double regret 
 they saw the English remain indifferent while the 
 Ghoorkas were pressing on against Lhasa, and ravaging 
 the fertile districts watered by the Sanpu. But their 
 regret and surprise at our government remaining indif- 
 ferent were as nothing compared with their indignation 
 when they learnt that we were actually interfering on 
 behalf of the marauding Grhoorkas. We saved the 
 Ghoorkas from condign chastisement, and we of course 
 prevented the establishment of a Chinese garrison at 
 Khatmandoo, which we could whenever we chose have 
 easily expelled ; but we offended the Tibetans and the 
 Chinese, and induced them to unite in a policy of hos- 
 tility against ourselves. After that war (1792) the 
 Himalayan passes were closed against us, and the Chi- 
 nese block-houses have effectually barred the way to 
 Tibet and Northern Asia ever since. Mr. Thomas Man- 
 ning, one of the most intrepid and highly gifted of 
 English travellers, penetrated into Tibet in 1812, and 
 resided there some time. But that is the only instance 
 in which an English traveller overcame Bhutea and 
 Ghoorka indifference and Chinese hostility. Tibet 
 remains a sealed book, and, despite treaty rights to enter 
 it, no Englishman goes thither, although the attrac- 
 tion is great, and the prize to be secured far from vague 
 or trivial. The assumed reason is the covert hostility 
 of the Chinese. 
 
 If we turn farther to the east, to Assam which we 
 have absorbed to Birma, and even to Siam, we find the 
 same causes in operation. We recognized in Yunnan 
 the Panthay Sultan of Talifoo ; we have always striven 
 to treat the kings of Birma and Siam as independent 
 
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION. 295 
 
 princes, whereas they are only Chinese vassals ; and we 
 are believed to have carried on intrigues with the Shans 
 and other tribes beyond the Assamese frontier. These 
 steps may be prudent or they may not for other reasons ; 
 but they certainly are imprudent for the reason that 
 they offend the Chinese. Asa policy intended to con- 
 ciliate the Chinese, our frontier policy on the north and 
 the east has been the worst possible, and a tissue of 
 blunders from beginning to end ; and the result is that 
 for the last half-century we have lived on the very worst 
 terms with the Chinese. We should have conciliated 
 them, but we aroused instead all their latent suspicion 
 and dislike. We should have become friendly neigh- 
 bours, and, on the contrary, we are neighbours who, if 
 not decidedly hostile to each other, shun each other's 
 presence. And the real base of our sentiment towards 
 the Chinese is to be seen in the fact that one of the 
 \ first articles in the creed of Indian state policy is " to 
 keep China as far off as possible." That precept, which 
 may have been very useful, has served its turn, and it 
 is time that our Indo-Chinese policy should be set upon 
 a new basis. With China once more supreme upon 
 our whole northern frontier, and with her presenting 
 ultimatums at Bangkok, and coercing the ruler of 
 Mandalay as she esteems fit, it is high time for us, 
 apart from the Central Asian question altogether, to set 
 our house in order with the Chinese. The mistakes we 
 made in championing the Grhoorkas, in acknowledging 
 the Pan th ays, and in a general policy of indifference to 
 Chinese opinion, have all tended to bring about the 
 present deadlock in our relations with China. Our 
 acknowledgment of the Athalik Grhazi cannot have con- 
 duced to the creation of any very friendly sentiment 
 among the Chinese towards us, and, therefore, at the 
 present moment we must assume that the state of feeling 
 existing among the Chinese in Tibet and Yunnan to- 
 wards us exists in Kashgaria also ; and that feeling is a 
 veiled hostility. Therefore, while the Chinese are be- 
 
296 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 ginning to regard Kussia with, the hostile feelings that 
 once were reserved for England, they have by no means 
 altered their old sentiments towards us. We have done 
 nothing whatever to induce them to do so. We have not 
 helped them in any way to regain Kashgar, and on the 
 whole English opinion may he said to have been more ad- 
 verse to, than in favour of, their claims. They have found 
 in the arsenals of Kashgar and Yarkand many proofs of 
 England's alliance with, and friendship for, Yakoob Beg; 
 and, on the other hand, they certainly owe much to the 
 assistance of Eussian merchants, and the forbearance 
 of the Eussian government. Nor should we for an 
 instant delude ourselves with the fallacy that the Chinese 
 will look to us for aid against Eussia, as Yakoob Beg 
 did. They have conquered Eastern Turkestan without 
 us in fact, despite of our moral opposition ; and they 
 will retain it if they can by their own right arms. It 
 will not enter their head for an instant to play the old 
 game of Yakoob Beg, of setting England off against 
 Eussia. But, although they will play a perfectly inde- 
 pendent game, it by no means follows that they will be 
 hostile to this country, if by some fortunate stroke of 
 diplomacy we could bring home to their minds the fact 
 that England is glad at the result of the war in Central 
 Asia, however much she may have failed during its 
 progress to recognize which was the rightful cause. 
 But what is that fortunate stroke of diplomacy to be? 
 and how is it to be brought to pass ? To each of these 
 questions it would be rash to give any confident reply. 
 In dealing with the Chinese we are not only treating 
 with a people whom we very imperfectly understand, 
 but also with a government the secret springs of whose 
 policy we neither know nor appreciate. The action we 
 might therefore adopt, founded though it should be on 
 the experience of some Englishman versed in the mys- 
 teries of China, might fail to accomplish what it seemed 
 calculated to secure. It might be crowned with success, 
 it might be condemned with failure. Of course the first 
 
THE CENTRAL. ASIAN QUESTION. 297 
 
 thing to decide is, how are we to take official cognizance 
 of China's reconqnest of Kashgaria, and how are we to 
 bring home to the minds of Tso Tsung Tang and his 
 lieutenants the knowledge that we have repented of our 
 shortsighted policy towards Yakoob Beg, and are will- 
 ing to atone for it in so far as we are able by an ample 
 recognition of the change in affairs north of the Kara- 
 koram ? 
 
 The Che-foo Convention gave us the right to send an 
 embassy to Tibet, on the condition that it should be 
 acted upon within a given space. We did not avail 
 ourselves of that concession, and the Chinese, we are 
 informed, consider that the right has lapsed. We may 
 have been wise or we may have been foolish in my 
 opinion we have been foolish in declining to enforce 
 the only real concession China made, in reparation for 
 the murder of Mr. Margary. Does this concession, 
 which we never made use of, entitle us to send a mission 
 to the Chinese in Kashgar ? Acting upon this precedent, 
 are we justified in supposing that the Chinese would 
 hold out a hand of friendship to an English envoy 
 coming from Leh to Yarkand ? It is much to be 
 feared that it would not. At the present moment, too, 
 the country must be in such a disturbed state, that the 
 Chinese would have a ready excuse if any accident 
 befel our envoy. Moreover, at the present moment an 
 envoy would have no definite object before him. A 
 few years hence, when the Chinese rule shall be com- 
 pletely restored throughout Eastern Turkestan, it may 
 be reasonable to expect a revival of trade in this direc- 
 tion ; but at present it would be premature to agitate 
 for it. Nor would a simple embassy of congratulation 
 look well. We have too recently befriended the Athalik 
 Grhazi to make our congratulations to his conqueror 
 anything but a mockery. The Chinese would be puffed 
 up with vanity, and think that we were only worship- 
 ping their rising sun. Whatever action we do take 
 in Central Asia, to effect an understanding with the 
 
298 TAKOOB BEG. 
 
 Chinese, we must be very careful that it has been well 
 considered, and that it is as cautious as it must be 
 clearly defined. Any mistake would be simply fatal to 
 the preservation of good relations with China. There- 
 fore, we must do nothing. Quieta non movere must be 
 our motto, and we must only look forward to some 
 auspicious occasion when it may be possible to enter 
 into cordial relations with China. 
 
 But, although our hands are tied in Central Asia, 
 they are not fettered at Pekin, and we certainly should 
 congratulate, if we have not done so already, the Chinese 
 on their remarkable successes in the Tian Shan regions. 
 That step might be pregnant with beneficent results, 
 and our desire to be on good terms with our new, yet 
 our old, neighbour might be met in a cordial manner by 
 the Chinese. The Chinese will not stoop to propitiate 
 us in order to preserve their rule in Eastern Turkestan ; 
 but it is against common sense to suppose that they 
 will be eager to embroil themselves with us at the same 
 moment that they are quarrelling with the Russians. 
 The Kuldja question must throw China into our alliance, 
 if we are not precipitate, and do not offer her any slight 
 by meddling with this semi-independent chief of 
 Khoten, who is said to have overthrown a Chinese 
 detachment. And, in negotiating with the rulers of 
 Kashgaria, we must remember that commercial advan- 
 tages are all very well, but that political are infinitely 
 more important. It has been tersely said that we 
 patronized Yakoob Beg in order to make a market for 
 Kangra tea ; but the very trivial advantages we secured 
 in a commercial sense were far more than counter- 
 balanced by the political disadvantages we derived from 
 a recognition of the Athalik Ghazi. In dealing with 
 the Chinese we must not set before us, as our guiding 
 star, the privilege of supplying the good people of 
 Kashgar and Yarkand with tea and other necessaries. 
 What we aspire to is to be on terms of amity with 
 China, as a power in Central Asia, which will possess 
 
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION. 299 
 
 everything it desires when Hi has been restored, and 
 which must accordingly be inclined to resent with us 
 the undue aggrandizement of Russia. These are the 
 future advantages that may accrue from an under- 
 standing between England and China. But at the 
 present juncture there are others similar in kind, but 
 immediate in effect. The Afghan question, which now 
 clamours for solution, and which will scarcely pass 
 through this crisis without finding our hold on Cabul 
 made more assured, is in many respects connected with 
 the Kuldja. 
 
 In each case the ambition of Eussia is the motive 
 power, and in each she seeks to play her game with as 
 little risk, and as much gain, as possible. In neither 
 will she fight, if she can avoid the necessity, yet in each 
 there is a point beyond which her honour and her 
 interests alike refuse to permit her to remain con- 
 cealed and neutral. The solution of the two questions 
 is being worked out simultaneously, and the progress 
 of the Afghan question will at least very seriously affect 
 the later stages of the Kuldja. If Russia has to fight to 
 defend Shere Ali, then we may be sure that Tso Tsung 
 Tang's legions will not remain inactive, and that General 
 Kolpakovsky will either have to beat a retreat to Vernoe, 
 or engage in a war out of which, on his own resources 
 alone, it will be impossible for him to issue victorious. 
 If Russia interfere openly in defence of Shere Ali, 
 Kuldja must be restored to the Chinese, otherwise 
 Russia's flank would be exposed to a crushing blow, 
 which the Chinese would not be slow to take advantage 
 of. Present events on the Hi and on the Cabul have, 
 therefore, this much in common, that they both aim, 
 directly or indirectly, at the fabric of Russian supremacy 
 in Central Asia. The occupation of Afghanistan by 
 England, or even a partial occupation of it as is very 
 probable, would seriously weaken Russian prestige in 
 Western Turkestan. A Chinese occupation of Kuldja 
 would undermine her position in Vernoe and Naryn and 
 
300 YAKOOB BEG. 
 
 among the Kirghiz. Admitting these, is it not natural 
 to suppose that in each case Eussia will fight, or that, 
 even if she does not fight in each case, she will fight 
 in the one that she may deem of the most importance ? 
 But we need not pursue the subject farther. The 
 Chinese are face to face with Kussia in the heart of 
 Central Asia, just as a few short months ago they were 
 opposed to Yakoob Beg and the power of the Tungani. 
 Their army is drawn up in hostile array ; it is each 
 day becoming more numerous and more perfectly pre- 
 pared. Its generals are the same who have led it to 
 constant victory ; its main body is the veterans of 
 three campaigns. The Chinese are persuaded, and it is 
 impossible to say not justly persuaded, of the righteous- 
 ness of their cause. The Eussians can have no equal 
 confidence either in their strength, or in their moral 
 position. They are not exactly championing a bad 
 cause, or a lost one, but, in comparison to the Chinese, 
 they have no legal position. It remains to be seen 
 whether by force of arms, or by diplomatic superiority, 
 they can make up for the flaw in their tenure of Kuldja. 
 Farther on, in the vista of the events yet to come, there 
 looms the prospect of an Anglo-Chinese alliance, that 
 must be most beneficial to the peoples of Asia generally. 
 But, before it will be possible for Englishmen to count 
 upon the presence of the Chinese as a favourable " factor 
 in the Central Asian question/' our relations with China 
 must be placed upon a firmer and a more friendly basis 
 than any which has yet existed. We have it in our 
 power to do this, and the ever-widening breach between 
 Eussia and China simplifies our task in no slight degree. 
 The day will come when Eussia will discover that the 
 Kuldja question was no trivial matter at all, and that 
 to it can be traced many important events in Central 
 Asia. England may also recognize in it one of the most 
 useful circumstances that have ever operated in her 
 favour in her long rivalry with Eussia. At the very 
 crisis of our border history, when we are on the eve of 
 
THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION. 301 
 
 dealing out well merited chastisement to an Ameer of 
 Cabul, Eussia finds herself weakened by being compelled 
 to discuss a question with China, when her attention is 
 required elsewhere. She will not yield what the Chinese 
 demand, yet she dare not refuse ; and the latter will 
 simply bide their time until she is hampered elsewhere. 
 It is no rash prophecy to say that China will be re- 
 installed, either by peaceful means or by force, in Kuldja 
 before the close of next year, probably long before. An 
 alliance between any two of the three great Asiatic 
 Powers must then be conclusive in all Central Asian 
 matters, and, before that alliance, the third will have the 
 prudence to submit. It behoves us to learn our lesson, 
 when that day comes, thoroughly and in good time. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 THE POSITION OF LOB-NOB. 
 
 LAKE LoB-NoR is placed in the map accompanying this 
 volume in accordance with the explorations of Colonel 
 Prjevalsky in 1876-77 ; the result of which was published 
 in Dr. Petermann's Mittheilungen as an extra number 
 during the spring of the present year. The accuracy of 
 the gallant explorer in identifying Lob-Nor with his 
 lake of Kara Koshun had not been challenged when 
 this map was drawn, and when the following good 
 reasons for doubting its accuracy were published on 
 the 14th of September, it was too late to make the 
 necessary alteration. 
 
 The quotation of Baron Ferdinand von Bichthofen's 
 strictures on Colonel Prjevalsky 's lakes is taken from 
 the Athenaum of the 14th of September, 1878 : 
 
 " It would appear that the Eussian traveller Pre- 
 jevalsky, in his last remarkable journey in the heart of 
 Central Asia, did not explore Lob-Nor at all, as he 
 claims to have done. Baron Ferdinand von Eichthofen, 
 one of the first comparative geographers of the day, has 
 examined the account of the journey, more especially 
 by the light of Chinese literature, and proves, almost 
 incontestably to our thinking, that the true Lob-Nor 
 must lie somewhere north-east of the so-called Kara 
 Kotchun Lake discovered by Prejevalsky, and that, in 
 all probability, it is fed by an eastern arm of the Tarim 
 river. This, at all events, would account for the re- 
 
304 APPENDIX. 
 
 markable diminution in bulk undergone by the waters 
 of that stream as they proceed southward, which, could 
 not but strike an attentive reader of the Eussian ex- 
 plorer's narrative. We have not space to reproduce all 
 the arguments which Von Richthofen adduces, but the 
 more important are these : Prejevalsky's lake was 
 fresh, whereas Lob-Nor has been called The Salt Lake, 
 par excellence, in all ages ; Shaw, Forsyth, and other 
 authorities, report that the name Lob-Nor was known 
 in those regions, whereas Prejevalsky found no such 
 name applied to his lake ; the Chinese maps, of the 
 accuracy of which Yon Richthofen has had repeated 
 proofs, represent Lob-Nor as lying more to the north- 
 east, and call two lakes lying nearly in the position of 
 those discovered by Prejevalsky, Khasomo, Khas being 
 the Mongolian for jade, a famous product of Khotan of 
 which mediaeval traders from China went in quest, pass- 
 ing by these very lakes en route. Another important 
 argument is, as we have mentioned, based on the bulk 
 of water discharged by the Tarim at its mouth. Von 
 Bichthofen' s theory presupposes that the Tarim River 
 has altered its course, and that the main rush of water 
 is now south-east instead of due east as formerly. The 
 whole question is well worthy of further investigation, 
 and it is possible that Prejevalsky, whom a recent 
 telegram from St. Petersburg reports about to return 
 to Central Asia, may be enabled to elucidate it. He 
 will return to Zaissan, the Russian frontier post, and 
 thence endeavour to make his way into Tibet by way 
 of Barkul and Hami. 
 
 " It is, however, certain that he will encounter great, 
 if not insuperable, obstruction, for we learn from private 
 advices from India, that the ill-advised publication in 
 the Chefoo Convention of the then proposed mission to 
 Tibet has resulted in the issue of the most stringent 
 orders to the Tibetan officials at all the various routes 
 and passes to allow no European traveller to enter into 
 the country on any pretext whatever." 
 
APPENDIX. 305 
 
 Having stated the view of Baron Ferdinand von 
 Kichthofen, which is endorsed by the high authority of 
 the Athenceum, and which bears, moreover, conviction 
 upon its face, it is but fair to give the vital portion of 
 Colonel Prjevalsky's own description. The Geographical 
 Magazine, for May, 1 878, contains in extenso the report, 
 and the sentences here quoted are from that translation. 
 
 "At a distance of fifteen versts from the smaller 
 lake, Kara Buran, the party diverged southward to the 
 village of Charchalyk, built about thirty years ago by 
 outlaws from Khotan, of which there are at present 114 
 
 engaged in tilling fields for the state Where 
 
 Charchalyk now stands, and also at the distance of two 
 days' journey from it, are the ruins of two towns, called 
 Ottogush-Shari (from Ottogush, a former ruler) and 
 Gas-Shari respectively. Close to Lob-Nor (Kara 
 Koshun) are the ruins of a third and pretty extensive 
 town called Kune-Shari. From inquiries, Prejevalsky 
 ascertained that about 1861 or 1802 a colony of Eus- 
 sians numbering about 160 or 170 people, including 
 women and children, with their pack-horses and armed 
 with flint-lock muskets, settled on the Lower Tarim 
 and at Charchalyk, but that they made no long stay, and 
 soon returned to Urumchi, via Turfan. .... Turning 
 to the Lob-Nor Lake (Kara Koshun), which the travel- 
 lers reached in the early days of February, it should be 
 observed that the Tarim discharges itself first into a 
 smaller lake (from thirty to thirty-five versts in length, 
 and between ten and twelve versts in breadth) called 
 Kara Buran (i.e. black storms) into which the Cherchen- 
 daria flows as well. A great part of the Kara Buran, 
 as well as of Lob-Nor, is overgrown with reeds, the 
 river flowing in its bed in the centre. The name Lob- 
 Nor is applied by the natives to the whole lower course 
 of the Tarim, the larger lake being called Chok-kul or 
 Kara Koshun. This lake, or rather morass, is in the 
 shape of an irregular ellipse running south-west and 
 north-east. 
 
306 APPENDIX. 
 
 "Its major axis is about 90 or 100 versts in length, 
 its minor axis not more than twenty versts. This in- 
 formation is derived from the natives, as Prejevalsky 
 himself explored only the southern and western end, 
 and proceeded by boat down the river for about half 
 the length of the lake, further progress being rendered 
 impossible by the increasing shallowness of the water 
 and the masses of reeds in every direction. The water 
 itself is clear and sweet, though there are salt marshes 
 all round the lake, arid beyond them a strip of ground 
 parallel with the present borders of the lake and 
 overgrown with tamarisks. It is probable that this 
 strip was formerly the periphery of the lake, and this 
 conclusion is corroborated by the natives, who say 
 that thirty years ago the lake was deeper." 
 
 It is clear that the true position of Lob-Nor has yet 
 to be denned by modern exploration, but we may safely 
 assume with the Athenaum that Colonel Prjevalsky's 
 Kara Koshun is not Lob-Nor. The accompanying map 
 then, in this particular, is unfortunately erroneous. 
 
 There is every reason for believing that Lob-Nor will 
 be found in the position assigned to it on the Chinese 
 chart, the accurracy of which has been so strikingly 
 proved by the correct position given to the two lakes 
 Khas-omo, which are identical with the Kara Koshun 
 and Kara Bunar of Prjevalsky. 
 
 It would be most interesting to obtain a diary or 
 other account of those Eussian settlers mentioned by 
 Prjevalsky, who entered the terra incognita of Central 
 Asia during the halcyon days after the signature of the 
 Treaty of Kuldja, and just before the outbreak of the 
 Tungan revolt. It is possible that they may have 
 solved during their return journey to Urumtsi the 
 enigma of Lob-Nor without knowing what they had 
 achieved. The reader will, therefore, have the kindness 
 to bear in mind that Lob-Nor is really (probably about 
 three-quarters of a degree) north-east of where it is 
 placed on the map, and that the lake represented there 
 
APPENDIX. 307 
 
 is only the Kara Koshun, or Chok Kul of Colonel 
 Prjevalsky. 
 
 The most recent information is, that Colonel 
 Prjevalsky adheres to his view as to the position of 
 Lob-Nor, and is preparing a reply which will be pub- 
 lished in a few weeks from this date (October 1st). 
 
308 APPENDIX. 
 
 TEEATY BETWEEN EUSSIA AND CHINA. 
 
 TREATY OF COMMERCE CONCLUDED BETWEEN EUSSIA 
 AND CHINA, AT KULDJA, ON THE 25TH DAY OF 
 JULY, 1851, AND RATIFIED ON THE 13TH DAY OF 
 NOVEMBER, 1851. 
 
 THE plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of 
 All the Eussias, and the plenipotentiaries of His 
 Majesty the Bogdokhan of Tatsing, hereby declare ; the 
 Governor General of Hi, and its dependent provinces, 
 as well as his deputy, have, after consulting together, 
 concluded in the city of Hi (Kuldja), in favour of the 
 subjects of both empires, a Treaty of Commerce, which 
 establishes a traffic in the cities of Hi (Kuldja), and of 
 Tarbagatai (Chuguchak). This treaty is composed of 
 the following articles : 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 The present Treaty of Commerce, concluded in the 
 interests of both powers, by demonstrating their mutual 
 solicitude for the maintenance of peace between, as well 
 as for the well-being of, their respective subjects, ought 
 to draw still closer together those links of friendship 
 which at the present moment unite the two Powers. 
 
APPENDIX. 309 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 The merchants of the two Empires will regulate 
 between themselves the interchange of commerce, and 
 arrange the various charges at their own will, and with- 
 out any extraneous pressure. On the part of Eussia a 
 consul will be appointed to superintend the affairs of 
 all Russian subjects ; and on the part of China, a 
 functionary of the superior administration of Hi. In 
 the event of any collision between the subjects of either 
 Power, each of these agents will decide, in accordance 
 with justice, the affairs of his own countrymen. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 This commerce being opened in consideration of the 
 mutual friendship of the two Powers, it will not be in 
 contravention of existing rights on either side. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 Russian merchants going either to Hi (Kuldja) or to 
 Tarbagatai (Chuguchak) will be accompanied by a 
 syndic (caravanbashi). When a caravan going to IK 
 (Kuldja) shall arrive at the Chinese picket of Boro- 
 khondjir, and when that destined for Tarbagatai 
 (Chuguchak) shall reach the first Chinese picket, the 
 syndic shall present to the officer of the guard the 
 certificate of his government. The said officer, after 
 having noted the number of men, of beasts, and of loads 
 of merchandise, shall permit the caravan to pass, and shall 
 furthermore cause it to be escorted from picket to picket 
 by an officer and soldiers. During the march, all dis- 
 turbance, or cause for such, shall be interdicted to soldiers 
 and merchants alike. 
 
310 APPENDIX. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 In order to facilitate the task of officers and soldiers, 
 Eussian merchants shall be obliged, in virtue of the 
 present treaty, to follow the route chosen by their body 
 guard, both going and returning. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 If, whilst Eussian caravans follow their route outside 
 the limit of the guard of Chinese soldiers, bands of 
 brigands from the outer clans (Kirghiz) shall commit 
 acts of pillage, of assault, or other crimes, the Chinese 
 government shall not be required to interfere in the 
 matter. When the caravan shall have arrived on 
 Chinese territory, similarly also during its residence in 
 the factories where merchandise is stored, Eussian mer- 
 chants must themselves guard and defend their property. 
 They will be expected still more carefully to look after 
 their animals when out at pasturage. If, despite all 
 precaution, something should happen to go astray, notice 
 of such loss must be promptly given to the Chinese 
 official; who conjointly with the Eussian consul shall 
 trace out with all possible diligence the lost article. If 
 traces of it are discovered, and those in a village held 
 by Chinese subjects, and the thief be captured, the 
 punishment shall be prompt and severe. If the thing 
 lost be recovered, or any portion of it, it shall be restored 
 to the person to whom it belonged. 
 
 ARTICLE VII. 
 
 In the event of disputes, litigations, or other trivial 
 incidents, between the respective subjects, the Eussian 
 consul and the Chinese official, of whom mention has 
 previously been made, shall use all their efforts to settle 
 
APPENDIX. 311 
 
 the affair satisfactorily. But if, despite every effort to 
 avoid such, a criminal case or one of general importance 
 should arise, it shall be decided conformably with the 
 regulations actually in force on the Kiachta frontier. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII. 
 
 Eussian merchants shall arrive each year with their 
 merchandise between the 25th day of March and the 
 10th day of December (of our style, or according to the 
 Chinese calendar between the day Tchin-ming and the 
 day Tong-tchi) ; after the latter of these dates, the 
 arrival of caravans shall cease. If the merchandise 
 imported during that period (8J months) should not be 
 sold, it shall be permissible to the merchants to remain 
 a longer space in China, in order to complete their sale ; 
 after which the consul shall take charge of their de- 
 parture. It is moreover understood that Kussian mer- 
 chants shall not obtain an escort of officers and soldiers, 
 neither for going nor for returning, if they have not at 
 the least twenty camels laden with merchandise. If 
 a merchant or the Eussian consul has need for some 
 special matter to send an express message, every facility 
 shall be accorded him for doing so. But in order that 
 the service of officers and soldiers should not become 
 too onerous, there shall only be twice in the same month 
 these extraordinary expeditions outside the line of the 
 advanced guards. 
 
 ARTICLE IX. 
 
 Eussian and Chinese merchants can see each other 
 without restriction about matters of business; but 
 Eussian subjects, finding themselves in the factory under 
 the care of the Eussian consul, may not walk about in 
 the suburbs and the streets, unless provided with a 
 "permit" from the consul; without such permit, they 
 must not go out of their enclosure. Whoever shall 
 
312 APPENDIX. 
 
 go out without permission shall be led back to the 
 consul, who will proceed against him according to law. 
 
 ARTICLE X. 
 
 If a criminal belonging to either of the two Empires 
 should flee to the other, he shall not be afforded 
 sanctuary ; but, on the part of each Power, the local 
 authorities shall take the most severe measures, and make 
 the most searching enquiries to arrest him. There 
 shall be reciprocal extradition of fugitives of this class. 
 
 ARTICLE XI. 
 
 As it is to be foreseen that the Eussian merchants, 
 who shall come to China on commercial matters, will 
 have with them carriages and beasts of burden, there 
 shall be assigned for their use, near the city of Hi, 
 certain places on the banks of the river Hi, and also near 
 the city of Tarbagatai other places where there is both 
 water and pasturage. In these encampments the 
 Eussian merchants shall confide their animals to the 
 charge of their own people, who shall take care that 
 neither cultivated lands nor cemeteries shall be in any 
 case injured or desecrated. Those who may contravene 
 this enactment shall be brought before the consul to 
 be punished. 
 
 ARTICLE XII. 
 
 In the exchange of articles of merchandise between 
 the merchants of the two Empires, nothing shall be left 
 on credit on either side. If, notwithstanding this clause, 
 some one should purchase his merchandise on credit, 
 the Eussian and Chinese officials shall on no account 
 interfere, and shall admit of no complaint, even if cause 
 for such might exist. 
 
APPENDIX. 313 
 
 ARTICLE XIII. 
 
 As Eussian merchants arriving in China for commer- 
 cial reasons should necessarily have special places for 
 their warehouses, the Chinese government shall assign 
 them, in the two commercial cities of Hi and Tarbagatai, 
 plots of land near the bazaar, so that the Russian sub- 
 jects may be able to construct there, at their own expense, 
 dwelling-houses and factories for their wares. 
 
 ARTICLE XIV. 
 
 The Chinese government shall not interpose obstacles 
 in any case where Russian subjects celebrate, within their 
 own buildings, divine service according to the rite of 
 their religion. In case a Russian subject in China 
 should happen to die either at Hi or at Tarbagatai, the 
 Chinese government shall set apart an empty space out- 
 side the walls of those cities, to serve as a cemetery. 
 
 ARTICLE XV. 
 
 If Russian merchants should take to Hi or Tarba- 
 gatai sheep for the purpose of exchanging them, the 
 local authorities shall take, on account of the govern- 
 ment, two sheep out of every ten, and shall give in 
 exchange for each sheep a piece of linen cloth (da-da, of 
 the legal measure) ; the remainder of the animals and 
 every other kind of merchandise shall be exchanged 
 between the merchants of the two Empires at a price 
 mutually agreed upon, and the Chinese government 
 shall not intermeddle in any manner whatsoever. 
 
 ARTICLE XVI. 
 
 The ordinary official correspondence between the two 
 Empires shall be made, on the part of the Russian 
 
314 APPENDIX. 
 
 government, through the medium of the superior admini- 
 stration of Western Siberia, and under the seal of that 
 administration ; and on the part of the Chinese govern- 
 ment through the medium, and under the seal, of the 
 superior administration of Hi. 
 
 ARTICLE XVII. 
 
 The present Treaty shall be authenticated by the 
 signatures and seals of the respective plenipotentiaries. 
 On the part of Eussia there will be prepared four copies 
 in the Eussian language, signed by the plenipotentiary 
 of Eussia; on the part of China, four copies in the 
 Mantchoo language, signed by the Chinese plenipo- 
 tentiary and his adjunct. The respective plenipotentiaries 
 will each keep a copy in the Eussian language, and a 
 copy in the Mantchoo, for the purpose of putting the 
 treaty into execution, and to serve for constant reference. 
 A Eussian copy and a Mantchoo copy shall be sent to 
 the directing Senate of Eussia; and a copy in each 
 language to the Chinese Tribunal for Foreign Affairs, to 
 be there sealed and preserved after the ratification of the 
 Treaty. 
 
 All the above articles of the present Treaty concluded 
 by the respective plenipotentiaries of Eussia and China 
 are hereby signed and sealed. The twenty-fifth day of 
 July, in the year 1851, in the 26th year of the reign of 
 His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and Autocrat of All 
 the Eussias. 
 
 (Signed) Colonel in the corps of Engineers. 
 
 KOVALEVSKI. 
 1 Chan, 
 
 Bovyantai. 
 
APPENDIX. 315 
 
 TEEATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND 
 CASHMEEE. 
 
 TREATY BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND His 
 HIGHNESS MAHARAJA EUNBEER SINGH, G.C.S.I., 
 MAHARAJA OF JUMMOO AND CASHMERE, His HEIRS 
 AND SUCCESSORS, EXECUTED ON THE ONE PART BY 
 THOMAS DOUGLAS FORSYTH, C.B., IN VIRTUE OF THE 
 
 FULL POWERS VESTED IN HIM BY HlS EXCELLENCY 
 
 THE EIGHT HONOURABLE EICHARD SOUTHWELL 
 BOURKE, EARL OF MAYO, VISCOUNT MAYO OF 
 
 MONYCROWER, BARON NAAS OF NAAS, K.P., 
 
 G.M.S.L, P.C., &c., &c, &c., VICEROY AND 
 GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, AND ON THE OTHER 
 PART BY His HIGHNESS MAHARAJA EUNBEER 
 SINGH AFORESAID, IN PERSON. 
 
 WHEREAS in the interest of the high contracting parties 
 and their respective subjects it is deemed desirable to 
 afford greater facilities than at present exist for the 
 development and security of trade with Eastern Turke- 
 stan, the following Articles have with this object been 
 agreed upon : 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 With the consent of the Maharaja, officers of the 
 British Government will be appointed to survey the 
 
316 APPENDIX. 
 
 trade routes through the Maharaja's territories from 
 the British frontier of Lahoul to the territories of the 
 Euler of Yarkand, including the route via the Chang 
 Chemoo Valley. The Maharaja will depute an officer 
 of his Government to accompany the surveyors, and 
 will render them all the assistance in his power. A 
 map of the routes surveyed will be made, an attested 
 copy of which will be given to the Maharaja. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 Whichever route towards the Chang Chemoo Valley 
 shall, after examination and survey as above, be declared 
 by the British Government to be the best suited for the 
 development of trade with Eastern Turkestan shall be 
 declared by the Maharaja to be a free highway in per- 
 petuity, and at all times for all travellers and traders. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 For the supervision and maintenance of the road in 
 its entire length through the Maharaja's territories, the 
 regulation of traffic on the free highway described in 
 Article II., the enforcement of regulations that may be 
 hereafter agreed upon, and the settlement of disputes 
 between carriers, traders, travellers, or others using that 
 road, in which either of the parties or both of them are 
 subjects of the British Government or of any foreign 
 State, two Commissioners shall be annually appointed, 
 one by the British Government, and the other by the 
 Maharaja. In the discharge of their duties, and as re- 
 gards the period of their residence, the Commissioners 
 shall be guided by such rules as are now separately 
 framed, and may, from time to time, hereafter be laid 
 down by the joint authority of the British Government 
 and the Maharaja. 
 
APPENDIX. 317 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 The jurisdiction of the Commissioners shall be denned 
 by a line on each side of the road, at a maximum width 
 of two statute Jcoss, except where it may be deemed by 
 the Commissioners necessary to include a wider extent 
 for grazing grounds. Within this maximum width the 
 surveyors appointed under Article I. shall demarcate 
 and map the limits of jurisdiction which may be decided 
 on by the Commissioners as most suitable, including 
 grazing grounds ; and the jurisdiction of the Commis- 
 sioners shall not extend beyond the limits so demar- 
 cated. The land included within these limits shall 
 remain in the Maharaja's independent possession, and, 
 subject to the stipulations contained in this Treaty, the 
 Maharaja shall continue to possess the same rights of 
 full sovereignty therein as in auy other part of his terri- 
 tories, which rights shall not be interfered with in any 
 way by the Joint Commissioners. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 The Maharaja agrees to give all possible assistance 
 in enforcing the decisions of the Commissioners, and in 
 preventing the breach or evasion of the regulations 
 established under Article III. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 The Maharaja agrees that any person, whether a sub- 
 ject of the British Government, or of the Maharaja, or 
 of the Ruler of Yarkand, or of any foreign State, may 
 settle at any place within the jurisdiction of the Com- 
 missioners, and may provide, keep, maintain, and let for 
 hire at different stages the means of carriage and trans- 
 port for the purposes of trade. 
 
318 APPENDIX. 
 
 ARTICLE VII. 
 
 The two Commissioners shall be empowered to estab- 
 lish supply depots, and to authorize other persons to 
 establish supply depots, at such places on the road as 
 may appear to them suitable ; to fix the rates at which 
 provisions shall be sold to traders, carriers, settlers, and 
 others, and to fix the rent to be charged for the use of 
 any rest-houses or serais that may be established on the 
 road. The officers of the British Government in Kullu, 
 &c., and the officers of the Maharaja in Ladakh shall be 
 instructed to use their best endeavours to supply pro- 
 visions on the indent of the Commissioners at market 
 rates. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII. 
 
 The Maharaja agrees to levy no transit duty what- 
 ever on the aforesaid free highway, and the Maharaja 
 further agrees to abolish all transit duties levied within 
 his territories on goods transmitted in bond through 
 His Highness's territories from Eastern Turkestan to 
 India and vice versa, on which bulk may not be broken 
 within the territories of His Highness. On goods im- 
 ported into or exported from His Highness's territory, 
 whether by the aforesaid free highway or any other 
 route, the Maharaja may levy such import or export 
 duties as he may think fit. 
 
 ARTICLE IX. 
 
 The British Government agree to levy no duty on 
 goods transmitted in bond through British India to 
 Eastern Turkestan or to the territories of His Highness 
 the Maharaja. The British Government further agree 
 to abolish the export duties now levied on shawls and 
 other textile fabrics manufactured in the territories of 
 
APPENDIX. 319 
 
 the Maharaja, and exported to countries beyond the 
 limits of British India. 
 
 ARTICLE X. 
 
 This Treaty, consisting of ten Articles, has this day 
 been concluded by Thomas Douglas Forsyth, C.B., in 
 virtue of the full powers vested in him by His Excel- 
 lency the Eight Honourable Eichard Southwell Bourke, 
 Earl of Mayo, Viscount Mayo, of Monycrower, Baron 
 Naas of Naas, K.P., G.M.S.I., P.O., &c., &c., Viceroy 
 and Governor- General of India, on the part of the 
 British Government, and by the Maharaja Eunbeer 
 Singh aforesaid ; and it is agreed that a copy of this 
 Treaty, duly ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy 
 and Governor- General of India, shall be delivered to 
 the Maharaja on or before the 7th of September, 1870. 
 Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Sealkote on the second 
 day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight 
 hundred and seventy, corresponding with the 22nd day 
 of Bysack Sumbut, 1927. 
 
 Signature of the Maharaja of Cashmere. 
 
 (Signed) T. D. FORSYTE, 
 MAYO. 
 
 This Treaty was ratified by His Excellency the 
 Viceroy and Governor- General of India at Sealkote on 
 the 2nd day of May, 1870. 
 
 (Signed) C. U. AITCHISON, 
 
 Officiating Secretary to the Government 
 of India, Foreign Department. 
 
320 APPENDIX. 
 
 TEEATY BETWEEN EUSSIA AND KASHGAE. 
 
 THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS OF FREE TRADE WERE 
 PROPOSED AND AGREED UPON BETWEEN GENERAL 
 AIDE-DE-CAMP VON KAUFMANN AND YAKOOB BEG, 
 CHIEF OF DJETY-SHAHR. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 ALL Eussian subjects, of whatsoever religion, shall have 
 the right to proceed for purposes of trade to Djety-Shahr, 
 and to all the localities and towns subjected to the Chief 
 of Djety-Shahr, which they may desire to visit in the 
 same way as the inhabitants of Djety-Shahr have hitherto 
 been, and shall be in the future, entitled to prosecute 
 trade throughout the entire extent of the Eussian Empire. 
 The honourable chief of Djety-Shahr undertakes to keep 
 a vigilant guard over the complete safety of Eussian 
 subjects, within the limits of his territorial possessions, 
 and also over that of their caravans, and in general over 
 everything that may belong to them. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 Eussian merchants shall be entitled to have caravan- 
 serais, in which they alone shall be able to store their 
 merchandise, in all the towns of Djety-Shahr in which 
 they may desire to have them. The merchants of Djety- 
 Shahr shall enjoy the same privilege in the Eussian 
 villages. 
 
APPENDIX. 321 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 Eussian merchants shall, if they desire it, have the right 
 to have commercial agents (caravanbashis) in all the 
 towns of Djety-Shahr, whose business it is to watch over 
 the regular courts of trade, and over the legal imposition 
 of customs dues. The merchants of Djety-Shahr shall 
 enjoy the same privilege in the towns of Turkestan. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 All merchandise transported from Eussia to Djety- 
 Shahr, or from that province into Eussia, shall be liable 
 to a tax of 2^ per cent, ad valorem. In every case this 
 tax shall not exceed the rate of the tax taken from 
 Mussulmans being subject to Djety-Shahr. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 Eussian merchants and their caravans shall be at 
 liberty, with all freedom and security, to traverse the 
 territories of Djety-Shahr in proceeding to countries 
 conterminous with that province. Caravans from Djety- 
 Shahr shall enjoy the same advantages for passing 
 through territories belonging to Eussia. 
 
 These conditions were sent from Tashkent on the 
 9th of April, 1872. 
 
 General Von Kaufmann I., Grovernor-Greneral of 
 Turkestan, signed the treaty and attached his seal to it. 
 
 In proof of his assent to these conditions, Mahomed 
 Yakoob, Chief of Djety-Shahr, attached his seal to them 
 at Yangy-Shahr, on the 8th of June, 1872. 
 
 This treaty was negotiated by Baron Kaulbars. 
 
 y 
 
322 APPENDIX. 
 
 TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND 
 KASHGAE. 
 
 TREATY BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND His 
 HIGHNESS THE AMEER MAHOMED YAKOOB KHAN, 
 
 EULER OF THE TERRITORY OF KASHGAR AND YAR- 
 
 KAND, HIS HEIRS AND SUCCESSORS, EXECUTED ON THE 
 ONE PART BY THOMAS DOUGLAS FoRSYTH, C.B., IN 
 VIRTUE OF FULL POWERS CONFERRED ON HIM IN THAT 
 BEHALF BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE ElGHT HON. 
 THOMAS GEORGE BARING, BARON NORTHBROOK OF 
 STRATTON, AND A BARONET, MEMBER OF THE PRIVY 
 COUNCIL OF HER MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY THE 
 QUEEN OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, GRAND 
 MASTER OF THE MOST EXALTED ORDER OF THE 
 STAR OF INDIA, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL 
 OF INDIA, IN COUNCIL, AND ON THE OTHER PART 
 BY SYUD MAHOMED KHAN TOORAH, MEMBER OF 
 
 THE 1ST CLASS OF THE OllDER OF MEDJIDIE, &C., 
 IN VIRTUE OF FULL POWERS CONFERRED ON HIM BY 
 
 His HIGHNESS. 
 
 WHERE AS it is deemed desirable to confirm and strengthen 
 the good understanding which now subsists between the 
 high contracting parties, and to promote commercial 
 intercourse between their respective subjects, the follow- 
 ing Articles have been agreed upon : 
 
APPENDIX* 323 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 The high contracting parties engage that the subjects 
 of each shall be at liberty to enter, reside in, trade with, 
 and pass with their merchandise and property into and 
 through all parts of the dominions of the other; and 
 shall enjoy in such dominions all the privileges and 
 advantages with respect to commerce, protection or 
 otherwise, which are, or may be, accorded to the subjects 
 of such dominions, or to the subjects or citizens of the 
 most favoured nation. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 Merchants of whatever nationality shall be at liberty 
 to pass from the territories of the one contracting party 
 to the territories of the other, with their merchandise 
 and property at all times, and by any route they please ; 
 no restriction shall be placed by either contracting party 
 upon such freedom of transit, unless for urgent political 
 reasons to be previously communicated to the other ; 
 and such restriction shall be withdrawn as soon as the 
 necessity for it is over* 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 European British subjects entering the dominions of 
 His Highness the Ameer, for purposes of trade, or 
 otherwise, must be provided with passports certifying 
 to their nationality. Unless provided with such pass- 
 ports they shall not be deemed entitled to the benefit of 
 this treaty. 
 
 ARTICLE IY. 
 
 On goods imported into British India from territories of 
 His Highness the Ameer, by any route over the Hima- 
 
 Y 2 
 
324 APPENDIX. 
 
 lay an passes, which lie to the south of His Highness's 
 dominions, the British Government engages to levy no 
 import duties. On goods imported from India into the 
 territories of His Highness the Ameer, no import duty 
 exceeding 2^ per cent., ad valorem, shall be levied. Goods 
 imported, as above, into the dominions of the contracting 
 parties may, subject only to such excise regulations and 
 duties, and to such municipal or town regulations and 
 duties, as may be applicable to such classes of goods 
 generally, be freely sold by wholesale or retail, and 
 transported from one place to another within British 
 India, and within the dominions of His Highness the 
 Ameer respectively. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 Merchandise imported from India into the territories 
 of His Highness the Ameer will not be opened for 
 examination, till arrival at the place of consignment. 
 If any disputes should arise as to the value of such 
 goods, the customs officer, or other officer acting on the 
 part of His Highness the Ameer, shall be entitled to 
 demand part of the goods, at the rate of one in forty, 
 in lieu of the payment of duty. If the aforesaid officer 
 should object to levy the duty by taking a portion of 
 the goods, or if the goods should not admit of being so 
 divided, then the point in dispute shall be referred to 
 two competent persons, one chosen by the aforesaid 
 officer, and the other by the importer, and a valuation 
 of the goods shall be made, and if the referees shall 
 differ in opinion, they shall appoint an arbitrator whose 
 decision shall be final, and the duty shall be levied 
 according to the value thus established. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 The British Government shall be at liberty to appoint 
 a ^Representative at the Court of His Highness the 
 
APPENDIX. 325 
 
 Ameer, and to appoint a Commercial Agent, subordinate 
 to him in any town or place considered suitable within 
 His Highness's territories. His Highness the Ameer 
 shall be at liberty to appoint a .Representative with the 
 Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and to station 
 Commercial Agents at any places in British India con- 
 sidered suitable. Such Representatives shall be entitled 
 to the rank and privileges accorded to ambassadors by 
 the law of nations, and the Agents shall be entitled to 
 the privileges of Consuls of the most favoured nation. 
 
 ARTICLE VII. 
 
 British subjects shall be at liberty to purchase, sell, 
 or hire land, or houses, or depots for merchandise, in 
 the dominions of His Highness the Ameer, and the 
 houses, depots, or other premises of British subjects, 
 shall not be forcibly entered or searched without the 
 consent of the occupier, unless with the cognizance of 
 the British Representative or Agent, and in presence of 
 a person deputed by him. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII. 
 
 The following arrangements are agreed to for the 
 decision of Civil Suits and Criminal Cases within the 
 territories of His Highness the Ameer, in which British 
 subjects are concerned: 
 
 (a.) Civil suits in which both plaintiff and defen- 
 dant are British subjects, and Criminal Cases 
 in which both prosecutor and accused are 
 British subjects, or in which the accused is a 
 European British subject, mentioned in the 
 Third Article of this Treaty, shall be tried by 
 the British Representative or one of his Agents, 
 
326 APPENDIX. 
 
 in the presence of an Agent appointed by 
 His Highness the Ameer; 
 
 (d.) Civil suits in which one party is a subject of 
 His Highness the Ameer, and the other party 
 a British subject, shall be tried by the Courts 
 of His Highness, in the presence of the 
 British Eepresentative or one of his Agents, 
 or of a person appointed in that behalf by 
 such Eepresentative or Agent; 
 (c.) Criminal cases in which either prosecutor or 
 accused is a subject of His Highness the 
 Ameer shall, except as above otherwise pro- 
 vided, be tried by the Courts of His Highness 
 in presence of the British Eepresentative, or 
 of one of his Agents, or of a person deputed 
 by the British Eepresentative, or by one of 
 his Agents; 
 
 (d.) Except as above otherwise provided, Civil and 
 Criminal Cases in which one party is a British 
 subject, and the other the subject of a foreign 
 power, shall, if either of the parties be a 
 Mahomedan, be tried in the Courts of His 
 Highness ; if neither party is a Mahomedan, 
 the case may, with consent of the parties, 
 be tried by the British Eepresentative or one 
 of his Agents ; in the absence of such consent, 
 by the Courts of His Highness ; 
 
 (?,) In any case disposed of by the Courts of His 
 Highness the Ameer to which a British sub- 
 ject is party, it shall be competent to the 
 British Eepresentative, if he considers that 
 justice has not been done, to represent the 
 matter to His Highness the Ameer, who may 
 cause the case to be re-tried in some other 
 Court, in the presence of the British Eepre- 
 sentative, or of one of his Agents, or of a 
 person appointed in that behalf by such 
 Eepresentative or Agent. 
 
APPENDIX. 327 
 
 ARTICLE IX. 
 
 The rights and privileges enjoyed within the domi- 
 nions of His Highness the Ameer by British subjects 
 under the Treaty, shall extend to the subjects of all 
 Princes and States in India in alliance with Her 
 Majesty the Queen ; and if, with respect to any sucli 
 Prince or State, any other provisions relating to this 
 Treaty or to other matters should be considered desir- 
 able, they shall be negotiated through the British 
 Government. 
 
 ARTICLE X. 
 
 Every affidavit and other legal document filed or 
 deposited in any Court established in the respective 
 dominions of the high contracting parties, or in the 
 Court of the Joint Commissioners in Ladakh, may be 
 proved by an authenticated copy, purporting either to 
 be sealed with the seal of the Court to which the 
 original document belongs, or, in the event of such 
 Court having no seal, to be signed by the Judge, or by 
 one of the Judges of the said Court. 
 
 ARTICLE XI. 
 
 When a British subject dies in the territory of His 
 Highness the Ameer his movable and immovable pro- 
 perty situate therein shall be vested in his heir, 
 executor, administrator, or other representative on 
 interest or (in the absence of such representative) in 
 the Representative of the British Government in the 
 aforesaid territory. The person in whom such charge 
 shall be so vested shall satisfy the claims outstanding 
 against the deceased, and shall hold the surplus (if any) 
 for distribution among those interested. The above 
 
328 APPENDIX. 
 
 provisions, mutatis mutandis, shall apply to the subjects 
 of His Highness the Ameer, who may die in British 
 India. 
 
 ARTICLE XII. 
 
 If a British subject residing in the territories of His 
 Highness the Ameer becomes unable to pay his debts 
 or fails to pay any debt within a reasonable time after 
 being ordered to do so by any Court of Justice, the 
 creditors of such insolvent shall be paid out of his 
 goods and effects ; but the British Representative 
 shall not refuse his good offices, if needs be, to ascer- 
 tain if the insolvent has not left in India disposable 
 property which might serve to satisfy the said creditors. 
 The friendly stipulations in the present Article shall be 
 reciprocally observed with regard to His Highness's 
 subjects who trade in India under the protection of the 
 laws. 
 
 This treaty having this day been executed in dupli- 
 cate and confirmed by His Highness the Ameer, one 
 copy shall, for the present, be left in the possession of 
 His Highness, and the other, after confirmation by the 
 Viceroy and Governor-General of India, shall be deli- 
 vered to His Highness within twelve months in ex- 
 change for the copy now retained by His Highness. 
 
 Signed and sealed at Kashgar on the second day of 
 February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight 
 hundred and seventy-four, corresponding with the fif- 
 teenth day of Zilhijj, one thousand two hundred and 
 ninety Hijree. 
 
 (Signed) T. DOUGLAS FORSYTH, 
 
 Envoy and Plenipotentiary. 
 
 Whereas a Treaty for strengthening the good under- 
 standing that now exists between the British Govern- 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 329 
 
 ment and the Euler of the territory of Kashgar and 
 Yarkand, and for promoting commercial intercourse 
 between the two countries, was agreed to and concluded 
 at Kashgar, on the second day of February, in the year 
 of our Lord eighteen hundred and seventy-four, corre- 
 sponding with the fifteenth day of Zilhijj, twelve 
 hundred and ninety Hijree, by the respective Pleni- 
 potentiaries of the Government of India and of His 
 Highness the Ameer of Kashgar and Yarkand, duly 
 accredited and empowered for that purpose : I, the 
 Eight Hon. Thomas George Baring, Baron North- 
 brook of Stratton, &c., &c., Viceroy and Grovernor- 
 General of India, do hereby ratify and confirm the 
 Treaty aforesaid. 
 
 Given under my hand and seal at Government 
 House, in Calcutta, this thirteenth day of April, in 
 the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and 
 seventy-four. 
 
 (Signed) NORTHBROOK. 
 
330 APPENDIX. 
 
 EULES FOE THE GUIDANCE OF THE JOINT 
 COMMISSIONEES APPOINTED FOE THE 
 NEW EOUTE TO EASTEEN TUEKESTAN. 
 
 1. As it is impossible, owing to the character of the 
 climate, to retain the Commissioners throughout the 
 year, the period during which they shall exercise their 
 authority shall be taken to commence on 15th May, 
 and to end on 1st December. 
 
 2. During the absence of either Commissioner, cases 
 may be heard and decided by the other Commissioner, 
 subject to appeal to the Joint Commissioners. 
 
 3. In the months when the Joint Commissioners are 
 absent, i.e. between 1st December and 15th May, all 
 cases which may arise shall be decided by the Wuzeer 
 of Ladakh, subject to appeal to the Joint Commis- 
 sioners. 
 
 4. The Joint Commissioners shall not interfere in 
 cases other than those which affect the development, 
 freedom, and safety of the trade, and the objects for 
 which the Treaty is concluded, and in which one of the 
 parties, or both, are either British subjects, or subjects 
 of a foreign state. 
 
 5. In civil disputes the Commissioners shall have 
 power to dispose of all cases, whatever be the value of 
 the property in litigation. 
 
 6. When the Commissioners agree, their decision 
 shall be final in all cases. When they are unable to 
 agree, the parties shall have the right of nominating a 
 single arbitrator, and shall bind themselves in writing 
 
APPENDIX. 331 
 
 to abide by his award. Should the parties not be able 
 to agree upon a single arbitrator, each party shall name 
 one, and the two Commissioners shall name a third, and 
 the decision of the majority of the arbitrators shall be 
 final. 
 
 7. In criminal cases the powers of the Commissioners 
 shall be limited to offences such as in British territory 
 would be tried by a subordinate Magistrate of the First 
 Class, and as far as possible the procedure of the 
 Criminal Procedure Code shall be followed. Cases of 
 a more heinous kind should be made over to the 
 Maharaja for trial, if the accused be not a European 
 British subject ; in the latter case he should be for- 
 warded to the nearest British Court of competent juris- 
 diction for trial. 
 
 8. All fines levied in criminal cases, and all stamp 
 receipts levied according to the rates in force for civil 
 suits in the Maharaja's dominions, shall be credited to 
 the Cashmere Treasury. Persons sentenced to imprison- 
 ment shall, if British subjects, be sent to the nearest 
 British jail. If not British subjects, offenders shall be 
 made over for imprisonment in the Maharaja's jails. 
 
 9. The practice of cow-killing is strictly prohibited 
 throughout the jurisdiction of the Maharaja. 
 
 10. If any places come within the line of road from 
 which the towns of Leh, &c., are supplied with fuel or 
 wood for building purpose, the Joint Commissioners 
 shall so arrange with the Wuzeer of Ladakh that those 
 supplies are not interfered with. 
 
 11. Whatever transactions take place within the 
 limits of the road shall be considered to refer to goods 
 in bond. If a trader opens his load, and disposes of a 
 portion, he shall not be subject to any duty so long as 
 the goods are not taken for consumption into the Maha- 
 raja's territory across the line of road. And goods left 
 for any length of time in the line of road subject to the 
 jurisdiction of the Commissioners shall be free. 
 
 12. Where a village lies within the jurisdiction of 
 
332 APPENDIX. 
 
 the Joint Commissioners, then, as regards the collection 
 of revenue, or in any case where there is necessity for 
 the interference of the nsual Eevenue authorities on 
 matters having no connection with the trade, the Joint 
 Commissioners have no power whatever to interfere; 
 but, to prevent misunderstanding, it is advisable that 
 the Eevenue officials should first communicate with the 
 Joint Commissioners before proceeding to take action 
 against any person within their jurisdiction. The Joint 
 Commissioners can then exercise their discretion to 
 deliver up the person sought, or to make a summary 
 inquiry to ascertain whether their interference is neces- 
 sary or not. 
 
 13. The Maharaja agrees to give rupees 5,000 this 
 year for the construction of the road and bridges, and 
 in future years His Highness agrees to give rupees 
 2,000 per annum for the maintenance of the road and 
 bridges. Similarly for the repairs of serais a sum of 
 rupees 100 per annum for each serai will be given. 
 Should further expenditure be necessary, the Joint 
 Commissioners will submit a special report to the Ma- 
 haraja, and ask for a special grant. This money will 
 be expended by the Joint Commissioners, who will 
 employ free labour at market rates for this purpose. 
 The officers in Ladakh and in British territory shall 
 be instructed to use their best endeavours to supply 
 labourers on the indent of the Commissioners at market 
 rates. No tolls shall be levied on the bridges on this 
 line of road. 
 
 14. As a temporary arrangement, and until the line 
 of road has been demarcated, or till the end of this year, 
 the Joint Commissioners shall exercise the powers de- 
 scribed in these rules over the several roads taken by 
 the traders through Ladakh from Lahoul and Spiti. 
 
 (Signed) MAHARAJA EUNBEER SINGH. 
 T. D. FORSYTH. 
 
APPENDIX. 333 
 
 (These rules were agreed upon in 1872, between the 
 Indian Government and Cashmere, for the purpose of 
 promoting trade with Eastern Turkestan and Central 
 Asia, which had been sanctioned by the Treaty of Com- 
 merce of 1870.) 
 
334 APPENDIX. 
 
 A STOEY FEOM KASHGAE. 
 
 MIRZA MULLA EAHMAT, of Kashgar, who arrived at 
 Peshawur lately, on his way to Mecca, has told what he 
 knows about events in Kashgar. The following is his 
 story: In the month of Jamadi-us-sani 1294 (June- 
 July, 1877), that Mahomed Yakoob Khan, the Badshah 
 of Kashgar, collected a large army to fight the Chinese. 
 He died near the town of Balisan (? Bai), and his army 
 then recognized Hakim Khan Torah as his successor. 
 The mullahs in Kashgar in the meantime appointed 
 Beg Kuli Beg, Yakoob's eldest son, as their Badshah, 
 according to Yakoob's will. Hakim Khan and the 
 army which joined him then came to Aksu, where Beg 
 Kuli Beg also arrived, meaning to capture the place 
 and the person of the usurper. A battle was fought 
 between Kuli Beg and Hakim Khan on the 26th and 
 27th of Eajab (27th and 28th July, 1877), and Hakim 
 Khan was defeated. Many of the soldiers belonging 
 to Hakim Khan's force fell in the battle, and many 
 others were starved, and some were drowned crossing 
 a river. Hakim Khan then went into Eussian territory 
 with 1,000 chosen soldiers. Beg Kuli Beg now seized 
 several towns and returned to Kashgar. In the mean- 
 time Naiz Hakim Beg, the Governor of Khoteri, re- 
 belled, and Kuli Beg met him in the field, and captured 
 Khoten. The Beg was scarcely a week at that place 
 when he heard that the Chinese had arrived at Aksu 
 and had taken it. An officer (Kho Dalay?) of the 
 Chinese army who had turned Mahomedan (but subse- 
 
APPENDIX. 335 
 
 quently recanted) attacked Yangy Shahr, the capital, 
 and, capturing it, shut himself up there. The town was 
 then besieged by the Governor of Kashgar, and the 
 siege continued for fifty days. Then Kuli Beg came 
 up, and, forcing his entry into the town, took possession 
 of it, and destroyed the fort. But on the 10th of Zillhij 
 (16th of December) a strong Chinese force entered the 
 country, and rapidly reconquered the possessions of the 
 late Yakoob Khan. Beg Kuli Beg then fled with his 
 men to Tashkent, which he reached by Mingyol Osh and 
 Marghilan, and put himself under the protection of 
 the Eussian Governor there. Mulla Yunus Jan, the 
 Governor of Yarkand, and his son and brother fell into 
 the hands of Hasan Jan Bai, Ikskal (? Aksakal). 
 
 The above is taken from the columns of an Indian 
 journal, and is inserted here for the purpose of showing 
 that the converted Chinese, or Yangy Mussulmans, did 
 revolt from their allegiance to Yakoob Beg the instant 
 a Khitay force appeared in Altyshahr. 
 
INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 Aali, see Hakim Khan. 
 
 Ababakar, 34-36. 
 
 Abderrahman Aftobatcha, 18, 209- 
 
 210. 211. 
 Abderrahman Khoja (King of Yar- 
 
 kand), 102. 
 Abdul Aziz, 170, 196. 
 Abdul Melik, 248. 
 Abdullah (Yusuf 's son), 46, 47. 
 Abdullah Pansad, 102, 104, 107, 
 
 114-116, 117, 137, 158, 171. 
 Abdullah Zizad, 23. 
 Ablai (Kirghiz chief), 50. 
 Acbash, 44. 
 
 JEgis of British protection, 204. 
 Afak, 44. 
 Afghan Ameer sends embassy to 
 
 Pekin, 51. 
 Afghanistan, 8, 49. 
 Afghan settlers, 16, passim. 
 Afridun Wang, 98-9U. 
 Agha Bula, 265. 
 Ahmad, 35, 46. 
 Ak Musjid, siege of, 79-81. 
 Ak Robat, 228. 
 Aksai Plateau, 3. 
 Aksakal, 57-58, 64, 69, passim. 
 Aksakals (risings under), 66, pas- 
 sim. 
 Aksu, 2,3, 37,46,66, 272,273. 
 
 coal at, 10 3. 
 
 description of, 7. 
 
 siege of, 127, 273. 
 Aktaghluc, 37, 44-46, 47, 49. 
 
 description of, 52-53. 
 Alaja " the slayer," 35 ; see Ahmad. 
 Alim, 146. 
 
 Alim Kuli, 83-85, 86, 87, passim. 
 Alish Beg, 172, 231. 
 
 Almatie, see Vernoe. 
 
 Alty Shahr, 8, 16, 44, passim. 
 
 Amban, 54, 63, passim. 
 
 of Yarkand, or Khan Amban, 54. 
 Ameer, or Emir, 196, 220, passim. 
 Ameers of Central Asia, 39. 
 Amoor, 25, 42. 
 Amursana, 45-48, 49, 252. 
 Andijani, 4, 12, 158, 160. 
 Andijani Serai, 153. 
 Appak Khoja, 252. 
 Arabdan Khan, 45. 
 Arabs, 23. 
 
 Arpa Tai, battle of, 270. 
 Artosh, 12, 22, 181. 
 Aryan family, 14, 17. 
 Athalik Ghazi, 1, 118, 186, passim. 
 Azmill Khoja, 31. 
 
 Babur, 36. 
 
 Badakshan, 8, 33, 36, 48, 49, 106, 
 
 107, 118. 
 
 Badakshi settlers, 16. 
 Badaulet, 200, 248. 
 Bahanuddin (son of Sarimsak), 64. 
 Bai, 272. 
 
 Barhanuddin, 46, 47, 48, 49. 
 Baroghil, 8, 29. 
 
 Bartchuk, 3 ; see also Maralbashi. 
 Bayen Hu, 253, 266, 267, 271. 
 Bazandai, 125. 
 Bedal Pass, 273. 
 Beg, 220-221. 
 Beg Bacha, see Kuli Beg. 
 Bellew, Dr., 22, 171, 222. 
 Benefits conferred by China on 
 
 Kashgar, 58, passim. 
 Berdan rifles, 246. 
 
338 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 Bhots, 9. 
 
 Biddulph, Capt., 222. 
 Birlas, 32. 
 Birma, 42. 
 Black Sea, 14. 
 
 Bokhara, 18, 23, 25, 30, 69, 83, 178, 
 209, passim. 
 
 Russian treaty with, 179. 
 
 sack of, 30. 
 Bolor, 37, 65. 
 Bostang Lake, 266. 
 Buddhism, 25, passim. 
 Buddhists, 16, 31, passim. 
 Bugur, fight at, 269. 
 Burac, 30. 
 
 Buzurg Khan, 2, 71, 87, 91, 103, 
 107, 108, 110. 
 
 intrigues against Yakoob Beg, 
 111, 117. 
 
 deposed by Yakoob Beg, 117. 
 
 Cabul, 28, 211. 
 
 Calmucks, 19, 44, passim. 
 
 Calmuck settlements, 19, 44. 
 
 Canals, 59. 
 
 Candahar, 28. 
 
 Caravanbashi, 204. 
 
 Carts used in Kashgar, 227-228. 
 
 Cashmere, 1, 37, 60. 
 
 Caspian, 14. 
 
 Cay Yoli, 67. 
 
 Chaghtai Khan, 29. 
 
 Cha-hi-telkh, 267. 
 
 Champion Father, 118. 
 
 Chang Lung, 67. 
 
 Chang Tay, 112. 
 
 Chang Yao, 237, 246, 247, 263, 272. 
 
 Chapman, Capt., 222. 
 
 Charjui, 179. 
 
 Chightam, 10, 134, passim. 
 
 China, 41-43, passim. 
 
 Chinaz, 85. 
 
 Chinese and Khokand, 49. 
 
 Chinese army, character of, 275. 
 
 Chinese at Lhasa, 234. 
 
 Chinese Empire in Central Asia, 
 
 22, 39, 43. 
 
 Chinese, first reverse of, 65. 
 Chinese in Kashgar, 49, 54-75. 
 Chinese merchants, 5. 
 Chinese moderation, 249, 270. 
 Chinese north of Tian Shan, 236. 
 Chinese overthrow Tungani, 236- 
 
 237, 238. 
 
 Chinese pay Khokand annual sum, 
 64. 
 
 Chinese principle in ruling Kash- 
 gar, 156. 
 
 Chinese reconquer Kashgar, 258- 
 276. 
 
 Chinese revindicating army, strength 
 of, 246. 
 
 Chinese rule, benefits and disad- 
 vantages of, 74-75. 
 
 Chinese, strategical advantages of, 
 (51). 
 
 Chinese Turkestan, see Eastern 
 Turkestan. 
 
 Chitral, 29. 
 
 Christians, 25. 
 
 Chuguchak, 10, passim. 
 
 Chuntche, 42. 
 
 Coal mines, 00. 
 
 Cochin China, 42. 
 
 Comparison between rule of Chinese 
 and Yakoob Beg, 108-169, 255- 
 257. 
 
 Constantinople, 196, passim. 
 
 Corbashi, 141). 
 
 Corps of artillerymen, 142. 
 
 Crusade, propagandist, against Khi- 
 tay, 47. 
 
 Czar, the, 185. 
 
 Dadkwah, passim, functions of, 11 L- 
 
 145. 
 
 Danyal, 44, 45. 
 Darius, 3(5. 
 Darwas, 72. 
 Dastarkhwan, 225. 
 Dava Khan, 30. 
 Davatsi, 45-46. 
 Delhi, 28. 
 Destruction caused by Genghis 
 
 Khan, 28. 
 
 Devanchi, 244, 247. 
 Devan defile, 244, passim. 
 Difference between Eastern and 
 
 Western Turkestan, 15. 
 Dihbid, 70. 
 Disunion in Central Asia, 120- 
 
 121, 210-211. 
 in China, 92. 
 in Kashgar, 259-263. 
 Djinghite, see Jigit. 
 Dolans, 9, 143. 
 Dungani, see Tungani. 
 Dungans, see Tungani. 
 
INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 339 
 
 Durani, 51. 
 Dylon Yulduc, 26. 
 
 Eastern Turkestan, 1, 15, 17, 38- 
 
 42, 59, passim. 
 Edinburgh, Duke of, 205. 
 Effects of Khoja risings on China's 
 
 prestige, 70. 
 Effects of past misrule in Kashgar, 
 
 39. 
 
 Elchi Khana, 228. 
 E.leuthian, or Eleuth princes, 42, 
 
 46. 
 
 Emir, or Ameer, 196, 220, passim. 
 England's policy towards China, 
 
 257 ; see chapter 14 also, 
 towards Kashgar, 212-235. 
 trade with Kashgar, 153, 202. 
 trans-Himalayan policy, 204; see 
 
 chapter 14 also. 
 English mission guests of Yakoob 
 
 Beg, 232. 
 Eshan Khan, 71. 
 
 Ferghana, 25, 32, 181, 187, 210. 
 First outbreak against China in 
 
 Eastern Turkestan, 64. 
 Forsyth, Sir T. D., 5, 22, 194, 196, 
 
 204, 216, 218-219, 233, 234. 
 Forsyth's report, 221, 233. 
 
 interview with Yakoob Beg, 228- 
 
 230. 
 second mission to Kashgar, 221- 
 
 232. 
 
 Galdan, 44, 45. 
 
 " Garden of Asia," 2, 59. 
 
 Genghis Khan, 25-29, 220, passim. 
 
 code of, 26. 
 Ghizni, 28. 
 Gibbon, 220. 
 Glacier, see Muzart Pass. 
 Gobi, 1, 2, 19, 156, 246, 
 Goes Benedict, 37. 
 Goitre, 12, passim. 
 Gordon, Col., 92, 222. 
 Gorkhan, 25. 
 Granville-Gortschakoff negotiations, 
 
 207. 
 Great road from Kashgar to Hamil 
 
 and Kansuh, 12. 
 Great Yuldus, 273. 
 Gregorieff, Professor, 188. 
 Grim Pass, 223-224. 
 
 Guchen, 10, 246. 
 Gulbagh, 55, 66. 
 Guoharbrum, 1L. 
 
 Hacc Kuli Beg (Khokandian gene- 
 
 ral), 69. 
 Hacc Kuli Beg (Yakoob Beg's son), 
 
 79, 133, 244, 252-253, 260. 
 Hadayatulla, 37, 38. 
 Hadji Torah, 140, 141, 169-171, 196, 
 
 220, 221, 223, 232, 233, 248. 
 Haft Khojagan, 71. 
 Hai Yen, 239. 
 Hakim Beg, 55. 
 
 Hakim Khan, 250-253, 259-261. 
 Hamil, 10, 59, 130, 246, 247. 
 Han Hing Nung, 210. 
 Hastings, Warren, 213. 
 Hayward, Mr., 216. 
 Hazrat Afak, 37, 38, 74. 
 Heh Tsun, 240. 
 Henderson, Dr., 218, 219. 
 Her Majesty, autograph letter of, 
 
 230. 
 
 " High Tartary," 212. 
 Himalaya, 213. 
 Himalayan passes, 213. 
 Hindoo Koosh, 14, 17, 28. 
 Hodjent, 37,44, 84,208, 209, passim. 
 Hordes, Kirghiz, 50. 
 Hoser, 272. 
 Houchow, 95. 
 Houtan, 7. 
 Husen, 32. 
 Hwang Tsang, 4. 
 Hydar Kuli, Hudaychi, 84. 
 Hyder, 35. 
 
 Ihrar Khan Torah, 172, 218, 219, 
 
 228. 
 Jlchi, 7. 
 Hi, 1, 2, 7, 22, 25, 44, 45, 48, 176; 
 
 see chapter 14, passim. 
 Hi, Viceroy of, 55, passim. 
 Irjar, 85. 
 
 Isa Dadkwah, 65-66. 
 Ishac Wang, 68. 
 Islamism, 20. 
 Ismail Shah, 72. 
 Issik Kul, 17, 33, 174. 
 
 Jade, 60, 16 3-1 64, 
 
 Jallab, 6. 
 
 Jattah Ulus, or Jattahs, 29, 33, 35. 
 
340 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 Jehangir (Ababakar's son), 8 ft. 
 Jehangir (Sarimsak's son), 04, 65- 
 
 68. 
 
 Jehangir (Timour's son), 34. 
 Jigit, 143, passim. 
 Jungaria, 1, 2, 15, 17, 25, 33, 34, 47, 
 
 134, 175, 236,jmMtt*t. 
 
 Kabil Shah, 32. 
 
 Kafiristan, 37. 
 
 Kafirs, 87. 
 
 Kaidu River, 30, 266. 
 
 Kalkhalu, 24. 
 
 Kamaruddin, 33. 
 
 Kamensky, Mr., 248, 264, 265. 
 
 Kamschatka, 41. 
 
 Kanaat Shah, 82-83. 
 
 Kanghi, 42. 
 
 Kansuh, 20, 24, 43, 92, passim. 
 
 Kara Khitay, 24, 25. 
 
 Kara Kirghiz, 17. 
 
 Karakoram, 2, 37, 48, 213. 
 
 Karakoram (city), 29. 
 
 Karanghotagh, 36. 
 
 Karashar, 2, 9, 20, 130, 247, 266. 
 
 Karataghluc, 37, 44, 46, 49. 
 
 description of, 52-53. 
 Karatakka mountains, 68. 
 Karategin, 68, 77. 
 Karghalik, 225. 
 Karshi, 179. 
 
 Kashgar River, see Kizil Su. 
 Kashgari resigned to Chinese con- 
 quest, 52. 
 Kashgar, 12, 25, 35, 45, 178, 
 
 history of, 22-40. 
 Kashgaria, 1, 2, 13, passim. 
 Kashgarian valley, description of, 10. 
 Kashgarian scenery, 11. 
 Kashgari not fanatics, 140. 
 
 dress of, 140. 
 
 " Kashmir and Kashgar," 223. 
 Katti Torah, Khoja, 71. 
 Kaufmann, General, 185, 195, 197, 
 
 206, 207, 209, 250. 
 Kaulbars, Baron, 192-195, 197. 
 Kaulbars Treaty, 219. 
 Kazalinsk, 79. 
 Kazan Ameer, 31, 32. 
 Kazi, 145, 146. 
 Kazi Rais, 6, 146. 
 Keen-Lung, 43-45, 63, 93, 156, 
 
 passim. 
 Kermina, 179. 
 
 Khalkas, 19. 
 
 Khan, 220-221. 
 
 Khan Arab an, see Am ban of Yar- 
 
 kand. 
 
 Khan Khoja, 38, 4S. 
 Khans of Central Asia, 39. 
 Khaton, 23. 
 
 Khitay, 5, 21,46, 93, 143, 340, jwww*. 
 Khitay merchants, 58. 
 Khiva, 25, 27, 178, 181, 197, 206. 
 Khivan desert, 32. 
 Khize Khoja, 33. 
 Kho Dalay, 111. 
 Khoja Ahmad, 44. 
 Khoja family, 37, 48, 64. 
 Khoja invasion, 73. 
 Khoja Ishac, 52. 
 Khoja Kalan, 52. 
 Khoja Kalar, 37. 
 Khoja Kings, 31. 
 Khoja Kulan, 102. 
 Khoja Padshah, see Abdullah. 
 Khojam Beg, 45. 
 Khokand, 3, 17, 36, 48, 49, 187, 
 
 passim. 
 Khokand pays tribute to China, 60, 
 
 63-64. 
 
 Khokand, rising in, 208-210. 
 Khokandian intrigues, 57. 
 Kkokandian tax-gatherers, 97. 
 Khoten, 17, 24, 25, 50, 118, 121- 
 123, 224-225. 
 
 description of, 6. 
 
 rising at, 262. 
 Khoten gold mines, 163. 
 Khoten jade, 163, passim. 
 Khudadar, 34. 
 Khudayar Khan, 71, 81-86, 120, 
 
 187-189, 208-209, pastim. 
 Khwaresm, see Khiva. 
 Kiachta, 48. 
 Kichik Khan, 72. 
 Kin Shun, 136, 263, 266-272. 
 Kipchak, 14, 25, passim. 
 
 description of, 18. 
 
 Kirghiz, 14, 16, 17, 104, 143, 1H4, 
 209, passim. 
 
 description of, 17. 
 
 nomad's submit to China, 50. 
 Kish, 32. 
 Kizil Su, 3. 
 Kizil Yart, 17, passim. 
 Kludof, 182-15. 
 Kohistan, 2. 
 
INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 341 
 
 Kok Robat, battle of, 72, 228. 
 Kolpakovsky, General, 182, 184, 281. 
 Kooda Kuli Beg, 79, 130. 
 Koosh Bege, 79, passim. 
 Korla, description of, 9, 245, 248, 
 
 207, 2(58, passim. 
 Koshluk, 25. 
 Kouralia, see Korla. 
 Kouroungli, see Korla. 
 Kucha, 2, 8, 127-130, 268, 269, 270, 
 
 passim. 
 
 battle at, 270-271. 
 description of, 9. 
 Kucha coal mines, 163. 
 Kucha Khojas, 127, passim. 
 Kuen Lun, 7. 
 
 Kuhna Turfan, 7 ; see Turfan. 
 Kuhwei, 265, 266. 
 Kuldja, 2, 94. 
 Kuldja question, 265. 
 Kuli Beg, 79, 133, 137, 141, 171, 
 
 250,251,252-253, 260-263, 274, 
 
 276. 
 
 Kumush, 265. 
 Kunar, 29. 
 
 Kurama, 76, 82, passim. 
 Kuropatkine, Capt., 204, 244-245. 
 Kurtka Fort, 65. 
 Kutaiba, 24. 
 
 Ladakh, 213. 
 
 Lahore, 31. 
 
 " Lahore to Yarkand," 219. 
 
 Lake Lob, 134, 245. 
 
 Lanchefoo, 45, 59, 24 6, passim. 
 
 Laws in Kashgar, 145-146. 
 
 Leaoutung, 41. 
 
 Leh, 153. 
 
 Lhasa, 60. 
 
 Little Bokhara, 1, 213. 
 
 Liu Kin Tang, see Kin Shun. 
 
 Lob Nor, see Lake Lob. 
 
 Mah Dalay, 100. 
 Mahomedanism in Kashgar, 24. 
 Mahomedanisni, passim. 
 Mahomed Ali Khan (ruler of Kho- 
 
 kand), 37, 66, QS t passim. 
 Mahomed Arif, 77. 
 Mahomed Beg of Artosh, 172. 
 Mahomed Khan, 170. 
 Mahomed Khoja, 171 ; see also 
 
 Sheikh-ul-Islam. 
 
 Mahomed Kuli, 102. 
 
 Mahomed Latif, see Pur Mahomed. 
 
 Mahomed Nazzar, 214, 215. 
 
 Mahomed Seyyid Wang, of Kash- 
 gar, 66. 
 
 Mahomed Yunus Jan, 140, 171- 
 172, 215, 226, 227, 261. 
 
 Makhram, battle of, 210. 
 
 Manas, 133, 236, 263. 
 siege of, 239-240. 
 
 Manchuria, 19. 
 
 Manning, Thomas, 213, 294. 
 
 Mansur, 35. 
 
 Mantchoo, 41, 42. 
 
 Maralbashi, 8, 31, 66, 110, 121; see 
 also Bartchuk. 
 
 Marco Polo, 14, 30. 
 
 Maulana Khoja Kasani, 52. 
 
 Ma-yeo-pu, 270. 
 
 Mecca, 37. 
 
 Merv, 179. 
 
 Meshed, 179. 
 
 Michell, Messrs , opinion on Kash- 
 gar, 213. 
 
 Military settlers, 50. 
 
 Mines in Kashgar, 8. 
 
 Ming dynasty, 41. 
 
 Mingyol, battle at, 69. 
 
 Mir, 82. 
 
 Mirza, 204. 
 
 Mirza Jan Effendi, 170. 
 
 Mollah Khan, 82, 170. 
 
 Mongols, 25, 41. 
 
 Mongols, murder of, 27. 
 
 Moorcroft, Mr., 213. 
 
 Moral of Yakoob Beg's career, 257. 
 
 Morozof, Mr., 202. 
 
 Moscow gewgaws, 182. 
 
 " Moses in the land," 39. 
 
 Mourad Beg, 69. 
 
 Mozaffur Ecldin, 83, 179, 186, passim. 
 
 Mufti, 146. 
 
 Mufti Habitulla, 122-123. 
 murder of, 123. 
 
 Mughol, see Mongol. 
 
 Mugholistan, 1, 29. 
 
 Muhtasib, 6. 
 
 Mussulman Kuli, 18, 81-82, passim. 
 
 Muzart Pass, 61, 78, 273. 
 
 Mysoka Bahadur, 26. 
 
 Nadir Shah, 61, passim. 
 Naiman tribe, 25. 
 Nankin, 92. 
 
342 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 Nar Mahomed Khan, 77, 169. 
 Naryn, 8, 61, 177, 178, 180, 183, 
 
 passim. 
 
 Nasruddin, 209-210. 
 Nestorian Christians, 30. 
 New Turfan, 7. 
 Nur Ali (Kirghiz), 50. 
 
 Ogdai Khan, 29, 34. 
 
 Oigur princes, 23. 
 
 Oigurs, 16. 
 
 Old saying in Kashgar, 39. 
 
 Olja Turkan Khaton, 32. 
 
 Opinion of Chinese rule, 152. 
 
 Orda, or palace, at Kashgar, 3, 142. 
 
 Orda, passim. 
 
 Oxus, 23, 211. 
 
 Pamere, see Pamir. 
 
 Pamir, 1, 2, 8, 25, 36, 48. 
 
 Panjkora, 28. 
 
 Panthays, 92, 175, passim. 
 
 Pekin, 29, 47, passim. 
 
 Pekin Gazette, 238, 249, 253, 267, 
 
 272. 
 
 Peroveky, General, 79-81. 
 Perovsky Fort, 81. 
 Persia, 14, 23. 
 Piskent, 76, 77. 
 Population of Kashgaria, 2, 59, 157. 
 
 of city of Kashgar, 3. 
 
 of city of Kucha, 9. 
 
 of city of Yarkand, 5. 
 Powers interested in Kashgar, 196. 
 Presents to Yakoob Beg, 230-231. 
 Prester John, 25. 
 
 Prince of Kashgar, see Ishac Wang. 
 Prjevalsky, Col., 20, 245, 250, 273. 
 Pupyshef, Mr., 199-200. 
 Pur Mahomed Mirza, 76. 
 
 Rashid, 37, 52. 
 
 Reinthal's, Capt., mission to Kash- 
 gar, 184-185, 202-204. 
 
 Rising against Russia, folly of, if 
 not combined, 180. 
 
 Risings in Khokand, see Khokand. 
 
 Road between Hi and Kashgar, 61. 
 
 " Road Board," 62. 
 
 Romanoffski, General, 85. 
 
 " Roof of the World," 222. 
 
 Royal Body Guard, 226. 
 
 Ruduk, 233. 
 
 Russia at Vernoe, 130. 
 
 Russia demands Consuls in Kashgar, 
 
 203, 205. 
 
 Russia in Central Asia, 47, 173. 
 Russia in Kulclja or Hi, 133, 174- 
 
 177, 279-282. 
 
 Russia invades Kuldja, 206. 
 Russia promises to restore Hi, 175. 
 Russian attitude towards Chinese, 
 
 248. 
 Russian merchants, 164, 182, 193, 
 
 197, 199, 202. 
 Russian policy towards Kashgar, 
 
 177-209. 
 Russian trade with Kashgar, 153. 
 
 Sadie Beg, 86, 87, 102, 103, 104, 
 
 307, 116, 117, 261, 263, 275. 
 embassy to Tashkent, 87. 
 truce with, 107. 
 Sahib Khan, 81. 
 Said, 35, 36, 37, 52. 
 Salara, 95. 
 
 Samarcand, 25, 33, 52, 179. 
 Saniz, 34. 
 
 Sanju, 7, 36, 224, passim. 
 Sanju Devan, 11, 2^:i. 
 Sarbaz, 143, passim. 
 Sarimsak Khoja, 48, 51, 64, 65. 
 Satuk Bughra Khan, 24. 
 Schlagintweit, Messrs., 16, 214, 
 
 passim. 
 
 Schuyler, Eugene, 195. 
 Scobelef, Gen., 207. 
 Scobelef, Col., 207, 210. 
 Scourges of God, 28, 33. 
 Seistan, 32. 
 
 Seven Khoja princes, 71. 
 Seyyid Ali, 34. 
 Seyyid Yakoob Khan, see Hadji 
 
 Torah. 
 
 Shadi Mirza, 184-185. 
 Shahidoolah, 223. 
 Shahrisebz, 32. 
 Sham, 226. 
 Shariat, 90, 145. 
 Shaw, Robt, 16, 194, 212, 213, 215, 
 
 218, 221, 232, 234. 
 Sheikh-ul-Islam, 116-117, 151, 158. 
 Sheikh Nizamuddin, 77. 
 Shensi, 20, 92, 237. 
 Shere Ali (Cabul), 8, 118, 179. 
 Shere Ali Khan (Khokand), 83. 
 Siberia, 1, 47. 
 Sirikul, 8, 106, 118, 132. 
 
INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 343 
 
 Six Cities, see Altyshahr. 
 
 Sobo tribes, 94. 
 
 Somof, Mr., 199-200. 
 
 St. George and St. Anne Cross 
 
 Fever, 206. 
 
 St. Petersburg, 185, 196. 
 Stoliczka, Dr., 222. 
 Story of St. Constantine's day, 194. 
 Subashi, 265. 
 " Sublimely Pure," 42. 
 Sule, 1. 
 
 Sultan Mourad, 83. 
 Sultan Seyyid, 83, 86. 
 SurancM Beg, 65, 104. 
 Syr Darya, 18, 79, 192. 
 Swat, 28. 
 Szchuen, 58, 237. 
 
 Taepings, 92. 
 
 Tagharchi, 106. 
 
 Tajik, 14, 78. 
 
 Talifoo, 92, 175, 237. 
 
 Tamerlane, see Timour. 
 
 Tanab, 162. 
 
 Tanabi, 162. 
 
 Tang dynasty, 22. 
 
 Tang Jen Ho, 265. 
 
 Tangut, 27. 
 
 Tarantchis, 12, 68, 124-125. 
 
 Tarfur, see Turfan. 
 
 Tartar, 15 passim. 
 
 Tarzagchi, 149. 
 
 Tash Balik, 65. 
 
 Tashkent, 25, 32, 49, 84, 208. 
 
 battle of, 85, 209, passim. 
 
 etiquette at, 206. 
 Tashkent Gazette, see Turkestan. 
 Tashkurgan, 8. 
 Tatsing, 42. 
 Tawats, see Davatsi. 
 Taxes in Kashgar, 56, 62, 63, 
 
 151-160. 
 Tay Dalay, 55. 
 Tchernaief, 84-85. 
 Tchimkent, 84. 
 
 Tekes, river and pass, 133, 273. 
 Tenure of land in Kashgar, 161. 
 Terek Pass, 61, 103. 
 Tian Shan, 2,20, 33, 59, 247, passim. 
 Tian Shan Nan Lti, 61. 
 Tian Shan Pe Lu, 61. 
 Tibet, 7,37,42, 50, 56, 60, 213, 217. 
 
 Cashmerian, 2. 
 Tibetan table-land, 36. 
 
 Timour, 32-34, 91. 
 
 Timour Khan (Chinese Emperor), 
 
 31. 
 Timour, Yakoob Beg's descent from, 
 
 77. 
 
 Tobolsk, 48. 
 Toghluc Timour, 31, 33. 
 Toksoun, 242, 244, 264. 
 
 battle at, 247. 
 To Teh Lin, 240. 
 Trade, 153. 
 Trade privileges, 57. 
 Trade with China, 217-218; see 
 
 chapter 14. 
 
 Trade with Kashgar, 166, 216-217. 
 Treaty between England and Kash- 
 gar, 232. 
 
 Treaty between Kussia and Kash- 
 gar, 194. 
 
 Treaty with Khokand, 69. 
 Trotter, Captain, 222. 
 Tsedayar, 268. 
 Tso Tsung Tang, 246, 247, 2fi3, 
 
 265, 272, 275, passim. 
 army of, 272. 
 Tungani, 2, 19, 20, 21, 93, 130, 144, 
 
 239, 241, 243, passim. 
 description of, 19, 93-94. 
 Tungan rising proper, 95, 96, 123- 
 
 124. 
 
 in Kashgar, 96, 102. 
 in Kuldja, 124-125. 
 Tungani desert Yakoob Beg, 245. 
 Tungani unorthodox, 127. 
 defend Kucha, 127-130. 
 Turanian family, 14, 15. 
 Turcomans, 32. 
 Turfan, 21, 130, 242, 244, 264. 
 
 battle at, 247. 
 
 Turfan Ush, see Ush Turfan. 
 Turghay, 32. 
 Turkestan, Eastern, see Eastern 
 
 Turkestan. 
 
 Western, see Western Turkestan. 
 Turkestan Gazette, 251, 252, 264, 
 
 passim. 
 
 Turkestan Trading Company, 232. 
 Tyfu, 231. 
 
 Uigurs, see Oigurs. 
 Uman Sheikh, 36. 
 Urumtsi, 10, 130, 133, 134, 236. 
 
 siege of, 238-239. 
 Usbeg, 14. ** 
 
344 
 
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 UshaTal, 265. 
 
 " Ushr" tax, 62, 160. 
 
 Ush Turfan, 7, 45, 46, 47, 130, 183, 
 
 273. 
 rising at, 51. 
 
 Vagrants, laws against, 150. 
 Value of land in Kashgar, 160-161. 
 Vernoe, 8, 130, 174, 176, 182. 
 Viceroy of Ili, 55, passim. 
 Viceroy of Kansuh, 237-238 ; see 
 
 also Tso Tsung Tung. 
 " Vodka," 209. 
 " Vuoba," 264. 
 
 Wakhan, 8, 64. 
 
 Wall Khan, 71, 72, 214. 
 
 character of, 72-73. 
 Wangs, 56, 63, passim. 
 Wanleh, 41. 
 
 Wealth of Kashgar merchants, 165. 
 Western Turkestan, 14, 15, passim. 
 
 Yahya, 38. 
 
 Yakoob Beg, birth of, 76 ; early 
 career, 78-91 ; character of, 88, 
 91 ; charges against, 89 ; sets 
 out against Kashgar, 91 ; expe- 
 dition against Kashgar, 103- 
 118; fails to take Yarkand, 
 106 ; defeats Tungan army 
 near Yangy Hissar, 109 ; 
 marries Kho Dalay's daughter, 
 112 ; attacks Yarkand again, 
 113-116 ; reverse at Yarkand, 
 114 ; takes Yarkand, 116 ; rea- 
 sons for wars with Tungani, 
 120 ; wars with Tungani, 126- 
 127, 127-130, 132-136; retro- 
 spect of his invasion of Kash- 
 gar, 119; his army, 134-135, 
 142-144 ; policy towards Tun- 
 gani, 135- 136 ; internal policy, 
 137-169; foreign policy, see 
 chapters 10 and 11 ; court of, 
 138-139 ; police system of, 146- 
 152 ; principles of finance of, 
 154-167; expenses of, 157; 
 revenue of, 167 ; reply to Rus- 
 
 sian threats, 186, 11)1-192; 
 reply to Khudayar Khan's 
 overtures, 190 ; sends envoy to 
 Tashkent, 195 ; arrangement 
 with Sultan, 196 ; his opinion 
 of trade, 198 ; out-manceuvres 
 Russia, 199-201 ; congratulates 
 Czar on marriage of his 
 daughter, 205 ; prepares to de- 
 fend himself against Russia, 
 208 ; weakness of his foreign 
 policy, 210-211; policy towards 
 England, 218-233; decline of 
 friendship towards England, 
 231; prepares to defend himself 
 against China, 244-246; com- 
 parison with China, 241-249; 
 death of, 250-253; resume of 
 career, 258-257, passim. 
 
 Yakoob Khan, 220 ; see Yakoob Beg. 
 
 Yakoob Khan, of Cabul, 221. 
 
 Yangabad, battle of, 67. 
 
 Yangy Hissar, 4, 24, 35, 36, 44, 
 
 105, 228. 
 
 fort surrenders to Yakoob Beg, 
 106. 
 
 Yangy Mussulmans, 112, 243, 
 passim. 
 
 Yangy Shahr, 34, 68, passim. 
 
 at Yarkand, gallant defence of, 
 
 101. 
 at Kashgar, 102, 107, 111-112. 
 
 Yarkand, 3, 5, 44, 226. 
 embassy to, 22. 
 river, 5, 59. 
 
 Tungan rising in, 99-102, 105- 
 106. 
 
 Yuldus, 133 ; see also Great Yuldus. 
 
 Yung Ching, 43. 
 
 Yunus, 34, 35, 40. 
 
 Yusuf (son of Galdan), 46. 
 
 Yusuf (son of Sari.nsak), (54, 09. 
 
 Yuzbashi Mahomed Zareef Khin, 
 223. 
 
 " Zakat" tax, 62, 160, 164-1(57. 
 Zilchak, 226. 
 Zuelik, 79. 
 Zuhuruddin, 70-72. 
 
 Woodfall & Kiiffler, Printers, Milford Lane, Strand, London, W.C. 
 
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