/ ETW SOUTH "VV^LES. 3FFICIAL REPORT OF THE )NAL AUSTRALASIAN IVENTION DEBATES, :Y, 2 MARCH TO 9 APRIL, 1891. GEORGE STEPHEN CnAP.MAy, ACTING GOVERNMENT PRI^TiiR. 1891 Withdrawisy=s^ 0(^ HOlS CONTE^S^TS. es .. . List th of Australia Bill) P*ge V vi vii XV 1 941 289859 NATIONAL^-^AUSTRALASIAN CONVENTION. DELEGATIONS FROM COLONIES. £it'03 (South 5Slalc0. The Honorable Sir Henry Parkes, G.C.M.G., The Honorable William Henry Suttor,.M.L.C. „,, TT ■ 11 TT'-iT ir Aril AT T> The Honorable Edmund Barton, Q.C., M.L.G. The Honorable \^ illiam McMillan, M. P. The Honorable Joseph Palmer Abbott, M.P. The Honorable Sir Patrick Alfred Jennings, George Richard Dibbs, Esquire, M.P. £it\3i Bc;tl;tni5. Sir Georo-e Grey, K.C.B. The Honorable Sir Harry Albert Atkinson, Captain William Eussell Pvussell, M.H.R. K.C.M.G., M.L.C. Quccnslitnti. The Honorable John MurtaghMacrossan, M.P. The Honorable Sir Thomas McHwraith, The Honorable John Donaldson, M.P. K.C.M.G., LL.D., M.P. The Honorable Sir Samuel Walker Griffith, The Honorable Arthur Rutledge, M.P. K.C.M.G., Q.C., M.P. The Honorable Andrew Josejih Thynue, M.L.C. The Honorable Thomas Macdonald-Paterson, M.L.C. §outh Jlustmliit. The Honorable Richard Chafifey Baker, C.M.G., John Alexander Cockburn, Esquire, M.D., M.P. M.L.C. Xhe Honorable Sir John William Downer, The Honorable John Hannah Gordon, M.L.C. K.C.M.G., Q.C., M.P. The Honorable Sir John Cox Bray, K.C.M.G., The Honorable Charles Cameron Kingston, Q.C., M.P. M.P. The Honorable Thomas Playford, M.P. •^Unemaniit. TIic Honorable William Moore, M.L.C. The Honorable William Henry Burgess, M.H.A. The Honorable Adye Douglas, M.L.C. The Honorable Nicholas John Brown, M.H.A. Tlie Honorable Andrew Inglis Clark, M.H.A. Tlic Honorable P.olton Stafford Bird, M.H.A. The Honorable Pliilip Oakley Fysh, M.L.C. Vuiovux. Tlie Honorable Alfred Deakin, M.P, The Honorable Henry John Wrixon, Q.C., ^LP. The Honorable James Munro. ^LP. Tlic Honorable Duncan Gillies, M.P. The Honorable Lieutenant-Colonel William The Honorable Henry Cuthbcrt, IVLL.C. Collard Smith, ^LP. The Honorable Nicliolas Fitzgerald, M.L.C. tThc Honorable William Shiels, M.P. cSlcstcni JVuolualia. The Honorable John Forrest, C.M.G., M.P. The Honorable .John Artlnir Wriglit, ^LL.C. The Honorable William Edward Marmion, The Honorable John Winthrop Hackctt, M.L.C. ^il'- Alexander Forrest, Esquire, M.P. The Honorable Sir James George Lee-Steere, William Thorley Loton, Esfiuirc, M.P. M.P. ^ * Decease reported Slst March. f Acting from 2nd to Cth March, during absence of Mr. Wrixon. VI NATIONAL AUSTRALASIAN CONVENTION. DELEGATES : ALPHABETICAL LIST. The Honorable Sib Henry Parkes, G.C.M.G., M.P, The Honorable Sir Samuel Walker Griffith, K.C.M.G., Q.C., M.P. Chainnvxn of Committees : The Honorable Joseph Palmer Abbott, M.P., Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, N.S.W. iEembcrs of the dBoubcntion: Abbott, The Honorable Joseph Palmer, M.P. Atkinson, The Honorable Sir Harry Albert, K.C.M.G., M.L.C. Baker, The Honorable Richard Chaffey, C.M.G., M.L.C. Barton, The Honorable Edmund, Q.C., M.L.C. Bird, The Honorable Bolton Stafford, M.H.A. Bray, The Honorable Sir John Cox, K.C.M.G., M.P. Brown, The Honorable Nicholas John, M.H.A. Burgess, The Honorable William Henrj', M.H.A. Clark, The Honorable Andrew Inglis, M.H.A. Cockburn, John Alexander, Esq., M.D., M.P. Cuthbert, The Honorable Henry, M.L.C. Deakin, The Honorable Alfred, M.P. Dibbs, George Richard, Esquire, M.P, Donaldson, The Honorable John, M.P. Douglas, The Honorable Adye, M. L. C. Downer, Tlie Honorable Sir John William, K.C.M.G., Q.C., M.P. Forrest, The Honorable John, C.M.G., M.P. Forrest, Alexander, Esquire, M.P. Fitzgerald, The Honorable Nicholas, M.L.C. Fysh, The Honorable Philip Oakley, M.L.C. Gillies, The Honorable Duncan, M.P. Gordon, The Honorable John Hannah, M.L.C. Grey, Sir George, K.C.B. Hackett, The Honorable John Win throp, M. L.C Jennings, The Honorable Sir Patrick Alfred K.C.M.G., LL.D., M.L.C. Kingston, The Honorable Charles Cameron Q.C., M.P. Lee-Steere, The Honorable Sir James George M.P. Loton, William Thorley, Esquire, M.P. *Macrossan, The Honorable John Murtagh, M.F Mcllwraith, The Honorable Sir Thomas, K.C.M.G., LL.D., M.P. McMillan, The Honorable William, M.P. Macdonald-Paterson, The Honorable Thomas M.L.C. Marmion, The Honorable William Edward, M.P Moore, The Honorable William, M.L.C. Munro, The Honorable James, M.P. Parkes, The Honorable Sir Henry, G.C.M.G. M.P. Playford, The Honorable Thomas, M.P. Russell, Captain William Russell, M.H.R. Rutledge, The Hofiorable Arthur, M.P. tShiels, The Honorable William, M.P. Smith, The Honorable Lieutenant-Colonel William Collard, M.P. Suttor, The Honorable William Henry, M.L.C Thynne, TheHonorable Andrew Joseph, M.L.C Wright, The Honorable John Arthur, M.L.C. Wrixon, The Honorable Henry John, Q.C., M. I Griffith, The Honorable Sir Samuel Walker, K.C.M.G., Q.C., M.P. .Secrctavji : r. W. Webb, Esquire, Clerk of the Legislative Assembly, N.S.W. * Decease reported 31st STarch. t Acting from 2nd to 9th March, during absence of Mr. Wrixon. IISTDEX TO NATIONAL AIFSTRALASIA:^r CONYES^TIOlSr DEBATES. 2 March to 9 April, 1891. NDEX TO SUBJECTS. Abbreviatiom : — adj., Motion of Adjournment ; m., Motion; ohs., Observations ; pers. expl., Personal Explanation. Addrbrses : Australian Natives' Association, 108. Australasian Wesleyan Methodist Church, New South Wales and Queensland, Con- ference of, 174. Brisbane Chamber of Commerce, 409. Broken Hill United Benefit Friendly Societies' Council, 313. Federated Builders' and Contractors" Associa- tion of Australia, 108. Improvement Societies' Union of Victoria, 174. Melbourne Chamber of Commerce, 350. New South Wales Licensed Victuallers' Association, 519. South Australia Literary Societies' Union, 174. Suva Chamber of Commerce, 905. Sydney Chamber of Commerce, 905. Tuckurimba Progi-ess Committee, 722. Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, 108, 174. Women's Christian Temperance Union, 174. Warrnambool Citizens, 264. Ad-iournment : Ob». on motions for, Mr. McMillan, 6, 721 ; the President, 6, 51J ; Mr. Munro, 7, 20.1, 512; Mr. Dibbs, 7; Mr. Baker, 8, 513; Sir John Bray, 2fJ4, 513; Mr. J. Forrest, 264, 515; Sir Samuel CJrilhth, 511, 513: h Mr. Al)bott, 512, 513, 788 ; Mr. Clark, 5 12 ; ^ Mr. Barton, 513, 514, 788; Mr. Thynne, 513; Mr. Dilibs, 514; Sir John Downer, 514 ; Mr. Brown, 721. B Barton, Hon. E. : Pi'r». dpi. as to absence when clause 55 of chapter i was being dealt with, 788, c COMMITTEK, RF.rOUT OF CoNSTITrTIONAL : Motion by Mr. J. Forrest, that a copy of tlie report, so soon as prepared, be forwarded by the President to tiie delegates, 515 ; de- bated by Mr. Munro, 516 ; Sir. Donaldson, Sir John Bray, 517 ; Sir Samuel Griffith, Committee, Eeport of Constitutional (ctd. ) : Sir George Grey, 518 ; withdrawn, 519 ; report presented, and motion by Sir Samuel Griffith that the report and appendices be printed, agreed to, 521. Committees, Appointment of : Motion Ijy Mr. .Suttor for ai^pointment of a committee to deal with the finance, taxation, and trade regulations, with power to report its conclusions to the Convention, 500 ; motion Avithdrawn, 502 ; motion by Mr. Barton referring the resolutions reported to the Convention by Committee of the Whole to two committees, the one for consideration of constitutional powers and machiner j', the other for consideration of provisions relating to finance, taxation, and trade regulation ; and directing that upon the result of the de« liberations of the committees, the committee on constitutional powers and machinery pre- pare and submit to the Convention a bill for the estalilishment of a federal constitu- tion, 501, 507 ; debated by Mr. Playford, 502, 504 ; Sir John Downer, 502 ; Colonel Smith, 502 ; Mr. Deakin, 503 ; Sir Samuel Grillith, 503, 506, 508 ; Mr. Cutlibert, 504 ; Mr. Wrixon, 505, 509; Mr. Dibbs, 505; Mr. Munro, 506; (amendment by Mr. Clark that a committee be also appointed to con- sider the (juestion of the establishment of a federal judiciary, agreed to, 506) ; Dr. Cookburn, 507 ; resolution, as amended, agreed to, 509 ; committees appointed, 509, 510 ; motion by Sir Samuel (Iriilith that in the event of the absence of any member of a committee the delegation by which he was chosen may have power to choose another member in his stead, agreed to, 510; motion by Mr. Barton that a majority of the com- mittees form aquorum, agreed to, 510. Committees, Chairman of : Motion by Mr. Munro that Joseph Palmer Abbott, Esquire, be appointed Chairman of Committees, agreed to, 313; motion by Mr. Barton that Mr. W. Moore take the chair in Committee on 7th April, agreed to, 788. Vlll Com INDEX TO SUBJECTS. Com COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA BILL : J^Iotion by Sir Samuel Griffith referring draft bill to Conunittue of the Whole Conven- tion, 521 ; debated by Mr. \Yrixon, 534 ; Mr. Baker, 542 ; Mr. Clark, 510 ; agreed to, 550. In Committee : Preliminary Provisions. Clause 1 (Short title), 550. Amendment by ]Mr. Muuro to change the name " common- wealth " to " federated states," 550 ; nega- tived on division and clause agreed to, 557. Clause 2 (Application of provisions referring to the Queen) agreed to with verbal amend- ment, 557. Clause 3 (Power to proclaim commonwealth of Australasia) agreed to, 557. Clause 6 (Repeal of Federal Council of Austral- asia Act), agreed to, 558. Clause 7 (The constitution and laws of the commonwealth binding) agreed to with verbal amendment, 5G0. Chapter I.— The Legislature. Part I. — General. Clause 2 (Governor-general), 560. Amend- ment by Sir George Grey providing that the governor-general may be elected, 561 ; negatived on division, 573 ; clause verbally amended, 574. Amendment by Mr. Baker that the governor-general may exercise such powers and functions as are contained in schedule B, and such other powers and func- tions not inconsistent therewith, 574 ; with- drawn, 578 ; clause verbally amended and agreed to, 578. Clause 3 (Salary of governor-general), 578. Amendment by Sir Hai'ry Atkinson pro viding that parliament shall be left free to deal with the question of salary, 578 ; with- drawn, 581. Amendment by Sir John Bray that until fixed by parliament the annual salary shall be £10,000,581 ; negatived on division, 584. Amentlment by Sir George (xrey tliat the annual salary be not less than £6,000, negatived, 584 ; clause verbally amended, 584. Amendment by Mr. Deakin to prevent alteration of salary of governor- general during continuance of office, 584 ; negatived, and clause, as amended, agreed to, 585. Clause 6 (First session of parliament) agreed to, 585. Clause 8 (Privileges, &c., of houses), 585. Amendment Ijy Mr. Adye Douglas to omit tlie provision giving the senate and house of representatives the powers appertaining to the House of Commons, 585 ; negatived, and clause verbally amended and agreed to, 5S7. Part II.— The Senate. Clause 9 (Senate), 588. Amendment by Mr. Munro to reduce the representation in the senate from eight to six members for each state, 588 ; negatived, 590. Amendment l)y Mr. Kingston to enable the state legislatures to adopt sucli system as may commend itself to their judgment for choosing the senate, 590; negatived on division, 598. Amend- ment by Sir Samuel Griffith that the senators COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA BILL : in eachstate shallbe certified by thegovernor to the governor-general, agreed to, and clause, as amended, agreed to, 599. Clause 10 (Mode of election of senators) agreed to with verbal amendment, 599. Clause 12 (Retirement of senators) verbally amended and agreed to, 603. Clause 13(How vacancies filled), 60.3. Amend- ment by Mr. Barton that the houses of par- liamentshallchoosesenators to fill vacancies, 604 ; negatived, and clause agreed to, 605. Clause 15 (Qualifications of senator), 605. Amendment by Mr. Macdonald-Paterson that senators must have been for ten years resident within the limits of the common- wealth, withdrawn, 606. Amendment by Mr. Adye Douglas to abolish residential qualification, 606 ; negatived, 60S. Amend- ment by Mr. Macdonald-Paterson provid- ing a residential qualification of seven years, withdrawn, 609. Amendment by Mr. J. Forrest providing a residential qualifica- tion of three years, negatived, 609. Amend- ment by Sii' Samuel Griffith that a senator must have been a subject of the Queen at least five years before he is chosen, agreed to, and clause, as amended, agreed to, 610. Clause 16 (Election of president of the senate), 610. Amendment by Sir John Bray to alter the method by which the choice of the president shall be made known to the go- vernor-general, negatived, and clause agreed to, 611. Clause 19 (Disqualification of senator by absence) agreed to, 611. Clause 22 (Quorum of senate) agreed to, Oil. Clause 23 (Voting in senate) agreed to, 612. Part III. — The House of liepresentatives. Clause 24 (Constitution of house of represen- tatives) agreed to, 613. Clause 25 (Qualification of electors), 613. Amendment by Dr. Cockburn that no pro- perty qualification shall be necessary for electors, and that each elector shall have a vote for one electoral district, 614 ; with- drawn, 628 ; resubmitted, 636 ; negatived on division, 637. Amendment by Mr. Bar- ton that the jmrliament of the common- wealth may make laws prescribing a uniform qualification of electors, 628; negatived, 636 ; clause agreed to, 637. Clause 26 (Provision for case of persons not allowed to vote) agreed to, 638. Clause 29 (Periodical reapportionment) agreed to, 639. Clause 32 (Qualification of member of hoiise of representatives). Amendment by Mr. Deakin providing for a three years' I'esi- dence within the limits of the common- wealth, 639 ; agreed to on division, 640. Amendment by Mr. Cuthbert that a mem- ber must be a sul)ject of the Queen for at least three years before he is elected, agreed to ; and clause, as amended, agreed to, 640. Clause 37 (Disqualification of members). Amendment by Mr. Gordon that the place of a member shall become vacant if for four consecutive weeks during a session he fails Com INDEX TO SUBJECTS. Com IX ;OMMOXWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA BILL : to give attendance without permission, 640; negativcLl, and clause agreed to, 64L Clause 38 (Issue of new writs), 641. Amend- ment by Dr. Cockburn to omit the pro- vision requiring a resolution of the house before the speaker issues his writ for the election of new members, 642; negatived, and clause agreed to, 643. Clause 41 (Duration of house of representa- tives), 643. Amendment by Sir John Bray that ever J' house of representatives shall continue for three years from the day appointed for the first meeting, 644 ; agreed to on division, 652. Amendment by Sir John Bray that parliament shall be called together not later than thirty days after the date appointed for tlie return of the writs for a general election, agreed to, and clause, as amended, agreed to, 652. Clause 43 (Continuance of existing election laws until the parliament otherwise pro- vides) agreed to, 653. Part IV. — Provisions relating to loth hoitsrs. Clause 45 (Allowance to members) agreed to, 655. Clause 46 (Disqualification), 655. Amend- ment by Air. Wrixon that if a person has been convicted of treason, felony, or in- famous crime, he shall be disqualified, pro- vided that he has not received a free pardon from the Crown, 655 ; negatived on division, and clause agreed to with verbal amendments, 659. Clause 48 (Disqualifying contractors and per- sons interested in contracts) agreed to, with verbal amendment, 660. Clause 49 (Place to become vacant on accepting office of profit), 660. Amendment by Air. Thynne that the clause shall not apply to members of the military or naval forces who are not in receipt of annual jjay, withdrawn, 661 ; and consideration of clause postponed, 662. Amendment by Sir Samuel GrilUth tliat the clause sliall not ajjply to j)ersons in receipt only of pay, half-pay, or a pension aa an officer of the army or navy, or in receipt of pay as an officer or member of tiic military forces of the commonwealth, agreed to, 898. Part V. — Poiwrx of ParHnmcnl. Clause 52 (Legislative powers of jtarlianuiit) : Sub-clause 1 (Regulation of trade and com- merce), 662 ; agreed to, 670. Sub-clau.se ?> (K.aising money by taxation), 670. Amendment by Mr. Dibbs that tlie })arliaincnt shall have [)ower to raise money, if required for defenc(! purjjoses in time of war, by any mode otli<;r than customs and excise, negatived, and sub-clause agreed to, 679. Sub-clause 4 (Borrowing money on the pulilic credit of the commonwealth), 679 ; agreed to, 683. Sub-clause 7 (Navigation an-clau.«e 7, 683 ; agreed to, and sub-clause agreed to, 6S4. COADIONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA BILL : Sub-clause 13 (Banking, incorporation of banks, and issue of paper money), 684 ; agreed to, 685. Sub-clause 19 (Status of foreign corporations), 685 ; agreed to, 686. Sub-clause 21 (Service and execution of pro- cess and judgments of the courts of one state in another state), 686 ; agreed to, 6S8. (Additional sub-clause proposed by Air. King- ston to give power to the parliament to make laws for the establishment of courts of conciliation and arbitration for the settle- ment of industrial disputes, 688 ; with- drawn, 689.) Sub-clause 23 (Immigi-ation and emigration) agreed to, 689. Sub-clause 27 (River navigation with respect to the common purposes of two or more states or parts of the commonwealth), 689. Amendment by Sir Samuel Griffith to provide for the conservation of water, 690 ; withdrawn, and sub-clause agreed to, 692. Sub-clause 28 (Control of railways with re- specttotransportforthepurposes of the com- monwealth). Amendment by Air. Gordon to include the regulation of traffic and traffic charges, 692 ; negatived on division, 697. Amendment by Air. Clark to prevent discriminating rates being charged for rail- way service by any state, company, or person, negatived, 697. Amendment by Air. Baker to give power to establish a uniform gauge of railway, negatived, sub- clause agreed to, 698. Sub-clause 30 (Exercise of legislative powers) agreed to, 698. Amendment by Air. Thynne that the follow- ing stand as sub-clause 3: — "The appro- priation of any moneys raised by the com- monwealth for any purpose authorised by the constitution," 698 ; witlitlrawn, 701. Clause 53 (Exclusive powers of the parlia- ment), 701 ; agreed to with verbal amend- ments, 704. Clause 54 (Laws appropriating any part of the public revenue, or imposing any tax or impost, shall originate in the house of repre- sentatives). Anitndmcnt l)y Air. Wrixon to sul)stitute the word " bills" for " laws," negatived, 704. Amendment by Air. liaker to omit the words "any ])art of the public revenue" with a view to the insertion in lieu tliereof of the W(n-ds "the necessary supplies for tlie onlinary annual services of the go- vernment," 705 ; negatived on division, and clause agreed to, 706. Clause 55 (Aj)j)ropriation and taxation bills), 7()(). Anieiidincnt by Air. liaker that tlie senate shall have ciiual powers witli tlie house of representatives in res))ectof all pro- posed laws, 707 ; withdrawn, 743. Aniiinl- ment by Air. l',aker to give the senate equal powers with the house of rei)resenta- tives in respect of all pro])os'jd laws impos- ing taxation, and ap[iro]>riating the neces- sary supplies for the ordinary annual ser- vices of the governinent, 743 ; ncg.itived on division, 755. Amendment by Air. .McAIillan to give the senate power to affirm or reject, Com INDEX TO SUBJECTS. Com COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA BILL : but not to ameiul, laws appropriating the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual services of the government, and power to amend laws imposing taxation, but pro- viding that when a law so amended had been returned to the senate by the house of representatives the senate should not have power to send it again to the house of re- presentatives with any amendment to which the house of representatives had not agreed, 755 ; negatived, 759. Amendment by All'. Wrixon providing for a joint meeting of members of the two houses to determine on suggested omissions or amendment of items in proposed laws, 760; negatived, and clause agreed to, 762. Clause 56 (Recommendation of money votes). Amendment by Sir John Bray to enable the house of representatives to pass any vote, resolution, or law, for the appropriation of the produce of any tax or impost to any purpose that has not been first recommended by message of the governor-general, 762; negatived, and clause agreed to, 763. Clause 57 (Royal assent to bills) agreed to, 763. Clause 58 (Disallowance by order-in-coi;ncil of law assented to by governor-general). Amendment by Dr. Cockbrrrn providing a pei'iod of disallowance of one year, 763 ; negatived, 765. Amendment by Dr. Cock- burn providing that disallowance shall be exei'cised on such subjects only as affect im- perial interests, negatived, and clause agreed to, 765. Chapter II.— Tlie Executive Government. Clause 4 (Ministers of state m£iy sit in parlia- ment). Amendment by Sir John Bray that no less than two of the officers ap- pointed by the governor-genei'al to adminis- ter the departments of state of the common- wealtii shall be members of the senate, 765; negatived, 766. Amendment l^y Mr. Wrixon that the officers appointed shall be responsible ministers of the Crown, 767 ; withdrawn, 776. Amendment by Sir Samuel Griffith that the officers appointed shall be the Queen's ministers of state for the commonwealth, agreed to, and clause as amended agreed to, 776. Clause 6 (Salaries of miuistei-s). Amendments by Sir Samuel Griffith that for the salaries of ministers there shall be payable a sum of £15,000 per annum until other provision is made by the parliament, 776 ; agreed to, and clause, as amended, agreed to, 777. Clause 8 (Authority of executive). Amend- ment by Sir Samuel Griffith that the execu- tive power and authority of the common- wealth shall extend to the execution of the provisions of the constitution, and the laws of the commonwealth, 777 ; agreed to, and clause, as amended, agreed to, 778. Clause 10 (Immediate assumption of control of certain departments), 778. Amendments by Mr. Adye Douglas to remove from the con- trol of the executive government the posts and telegraphs, and ocean beacons, buoys, lighthouses and ship?, negatived, and clause agreed to with verbal amendment, 779. COMINION WEALTH OF AUSTRALIA BILL : Clause 1 1 (Powers under existing law to be exercised by goveror-genei-al, with advice of executive council, or alone, as the case may be) agreed to with verbal amendments, 779. Cliapter III.— The Federal Judicature. Clause 1 (Supreme Court of Australia, and inferior courts), 779. Amendment by Mr. Kingston to give the parliament power to establish courts of conciliation and arbitra- tion for the settlement of industrial dis- suits, 780 ; negatived on division, and clause agreed to, 785. Clause 6 (Power of the Queen to allow appeal to hei'self in certain cases). Amendment by Mr. Wrixon that the Queen may in any case grant leave to appeal in council against any judgment of the Supreme Court, 785 ; negatived on division, and clause agreed to, 787. Clause 7 (Extent of poM' ers of federal courts) agreed to with A'erbal amendment, 787. Clause 8 (Original jurisdiction ; additional original jurisdiction may be conferred) verb- ally amended and agreed to, 787. Clause 10 (Xumber of judges) verbally amended and agreed to, 7S7. Cliapter IV. — Finance and Trade. Clause 3 (Money to be appropriated by law), 788. Amendment by Mr. Thj'nne restrict- ing powers of federal parliament for appro- priation of money to purposes authorised by the constitution, negatived, and clause agreed to, 789. Clause 4 (Power to levy duties of customs, excise, and offer bounties), 789. Amend- ment by Colonel Smith that laws of the several states imposing customs duties shall cease to exist twelve months after the im- position of uniform duties by the parliament of the comraonwedllth, 790 ; withdrawn, 801. Amendment by Mr. Dibbs that upon the constitution becoming law, and the commonwealth being established, the tariff of Victoria shall be the tariff' of the com monwealth until otherwise established by the parliament, negatived, and clause agreed to, 801. Clause 5 (Transfer of officers), 801. Amend meut by Mr. Gordon that the parliament shall not be responsible for any pensions agreed to be paid by the states, negatived, and clause agreed to, 802. Clause 8 (On establishment of uniform duties of customs and excise, trade within the commonwealth to be free) agreed to, 802. Clause 9 (Apportionment of surplus revenue), 802. Amendment by Sir Thomas Mcllwraith that the expenditure of the commonwealth shall he charged to the separate states in proportion to the numbers of their people, 805 ; agreed to on division, 830. Amend- ment by Mr. McMillan that the surplus revenue shall be returned to the several states until uniform duties of customs have been imposed, 830 ; agreed to, 831 Amendment by Mr. McMillan that after the imposition of uniform duties the sur- Com IJfDEX TO SUBJECTS. Con XI CO:\IMOX^YEALTIi OF AUSTRALIA BILL : plus revenue shall be returned to the several states or parts of the commouwealtli in the same manner and proportion until the parliament otherwise jjrescribes, 831. Amendment on the amendment by Sir John Bi'ay to bind the parliament to pro- vide some means of distributing the sur- plus, 831 ; amendment on the amendment negatived, amendment agreed to, and clause, as amended, agreed to, 833. Clause 1 1 (Xo preference to one state over an- other). Amendment by Sir Samuel GrifBth to omit the provision that vessels bound to or from one part shall not be bound to enter, clear, or pay duty in another part, 833 ; agreed to, and clause, as amended, agreed to, 835. Clause 13 (Public debts of states may be con- solidated by general consent), 835. Amend- ment, by Sir Jolin Bray, to place the power of consolidating the public debts in the hands of the commonwealth, {^37 ; nega- tived, 8iS ; clause agreed to, 8-49. Chapter V.— The States. Clause I (Continuance of powers of parlia- ments of the states) agreed to with verbal amendments, 850. Clause 5 (All reference to the Queen to be through the governor-general), 850 ; agreed to on division, 864. Clause 6 (.Saving of constitutions). Amend- ment, by Mr. Gordon, that it shall not be necessary to reserve any proposed alteration of the constitution of any state for the Queen's pleasure to be known, negatived on division, 804 ; amendment, by Sir George Grey, that it shall not be necessary to reserve for the Queen's pleasure any law made by a state, 864 ; negatived on division, and clause agreed to, 865. Clause 7 (Governors of states) agreed to, 866. Clause 8 (Appointment of governors), 866 ; agreed to on division, 877. Clause 10 (Memliers of senate or house of rejiresentatives not to sit in state parlia- m'jut), 877. Amendment l>y Mr. Bird re- moving llie disqualification of a memljer of the senate or house of representatives from being chosen as a member of the parliament of a state, 878 ; negatived, and clause agreed to on division, 881. Clause 11 (.Member of state parliament not to be member of the parliament of the com- monwealth), 8S2; agreed to, 883. Clause 14 (States not to levy duty of tonnage). Amendment by Sir Samuel (iriflitii that tlie ';onMiionweaith hhall not impose any tax on any land or otiier property belonging to the state-i, agreed to, and clause, as amended, agreed to, 8S.3. Clause 18 (Recognition of acts of state of various laws) agreed to with verbal amend- ments, 883. Chapter VI. - New States. Clause 1 (Admission of existing colonies to the commonwealth) agreee charged to the separate states in jDropor- tion to the numbers of their people, 830. Chapter V.— The States. Clause 5 (All reference to the Queen to be through the governor-general), 864. Clause 6 (Saving of constitutions). Amend- ment by Mr. Gordon that it shall not be necessary to reserve any proposed alteration of the constitution of any state for the Queen's pleasure, 864; amendment by Sir George Grey that it shall not be necessary to reserve for the Queen's pleasure any law made by a state, 865. Clause 8 (Appointment of governors), 877. Clause 10 (Members of senate or house of representatives not tositin state parliament), 881. Chapter VII.— Miscellanecui. Clause 1 (Seat of government to be determined by the parliament). Amendment by Mr. Dibbs that the seat of government be Sydney, New South Wales, 909. Chapter VIII.— Amendment of Constitution. Clause 1 (Mode of amending the constitution). Amendment by Dr. Cockburn to submit any law for the alteration of the constitu- tion to the electors of the several states, 897. Constitution, adoption of the, 937. Plebiscite of the people, 904. F FEDEPvAL CONSTITUTION: Resolutions proposed by Sir Henry Parkes affirming (1) the principles necessary to establishing and securing an enduring found- ation for tiie structure of a federal govern- ment ; and (2) indicating the constitution of the parliament, judiciary, and executive, 23; debated by Sir Samuel Griffith, 29 Fed INDEX TO SUBJECTS. Mac xiu EDERAL CONSTITUTION (continued J : Mr. Fysh, 41 ; Mr. Munro, 46; Mr. Play- ford, 53 ; Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, 60 ; Captain Russell, 64 ; Mr. Deakin, 68 ; Mr. Barton, 88 ; Sir John Do^^iier, 99 ; Mr. Thynne, 104 ; Mr. Baker, 109 ; Mr. Bird, 116; Sir Patrick Jennings, 123; Colonel Smith, 130 ; Sir George Grey, 135 ; Mr. Rutledge, 143 ; Mr. Kingston, 152 ; Mr. Fitzgerald, 164 ; Mr. Dibbs, 174 ; Sir James Lee-Steere, 190 ; Dr. Cockburn, 195 ; Mr. Brown, 205; Mr. Wrixon, 211; Mr. J. Forrest, 218 ; Mr. Gillies, 223 ; Mr. Clark, 242 ; Sir John Bray, 256 ; Mr. Mc:Millan, 264 ; Mr. Hackett, 274 ; Mr. Moore, 281 ; Mr. Cuthbert, 286 ; Mr. Adye Douglas, 295 ; :Mr. Abbott, 298 ; Mr. Suttor, 304 ; Mr. Donaldson, 306 ; Sir Henry Parkes, in reply, 313 ; motion by Sir Henrj' Parkes that the Convention resolve itself into Com- mittee of the Whole to consider the reso- lutions in detail, agreed to, 324. In Com mil fee : Part I. — Resolution 1 (Preservation of powers and privileges), 325 ; agreed to, 344. Resolution 2 (Free trade and intercourse be- tween the colonies), 346 ; agreed to, 370. Resolution 3 (Imposition of duties), 346 ; amendment by Mr. Gordon providing for uniform custom duties to be imposed by the federated colonies upon imported goods and to be fixed by the federal parliament, for free-trade between federated colonies, for bounties for manufacture or production, for a uniform charge for carriage upon lailway lines which afiect trade between two or more of the federated colonies, and for the expenses of the federal government to he . appropriated annually between the colonies iu proportion to their respective population, 352 ; withdrawn, ."01. Amendment Ijj' Mr. Deakin to empower the federal government and parliament to impose excise duties, 361 ; agreed to, 368. Amendment by Mr. Gordon providing for power to offer Ijounties being lodged ill the federal government and par- liament, agreed to, 3(i.S. Resolution, as amended, agreed to, 370. I Resolution 4 (Military and naval defence) agreeers, 373 ; agreed to, 374. Amendment by Dr. Cockburn i)rovif states, 876. Seat of government, 899. lotion to adopt report of Committee on bill. 905, b DiBBS, Mr. G. R. (continued) : Federal constitution resolutions, 174. Jn Committee : Powers, privileges, and territorial rights of colonies, 341. Customs duties, 360, 368. Creation of new states, 477. Ofiicers of the Convention, m. , 939, Plebiscite, m., 902, 903. President, m., 4. Reports of committees, adj., 514. Western Australian delegates, a!., 900, 903. Quorum, m., 22. GoRDOX, Mr. J. H. : Commonwealth of Australia Bill : In Committee: Disqualification of representatives, 640, Legislative powers of parliament : Regulation of trade, 663, 664, 665, 666. Control of railways, 692. Transfer of officers, 801, 802. Reference to Queen through governor-general 862. Saving of constitutions, 864. Divisions, m. , 12. Federal constitution resolutions : In Committee : Customs duties, 351, 352, 360, 363, 368. Amendment of money bills, 451. Amendment of constitution, 496. Grey, Sir George, K.C.B. : Adoption of the federal constitution, tj?., P2S 937. Courts of conciliation, expl., 788. Gre INDEX TO SPEECHES. Gri XIX REY, Sir George, K.C.B. (continued) : I'omnioinvealtli of Australia Bill : In Commi'fee : Short title, 553. Governor-general, appointment of, 561, 565, 568, 572. Governor-general, salary of, 5S0, 534. Composition of senate, 597. Qualifications of senators, COS, 609. Qualification of electors, 615, 621, 634. Disqualifications, 655. Vacation of seats, 661. Powers of the senate, 750. Disallowance of laws, 704. Reference to Queen tlirough governor-general, S63. Saving of constitutions, 864. Mode of amending constitution, 889. Seat of government. 899. Motion to adopt report of Committee on bill, 923. federal constitution resolutions, 135. In C'ommittft : Powers, privileges, and territorial rights of colonies, 327, 330. Constitution of parliament, 372. Amendment of money bills, 422, 452. Amendment of constitution, 477, 478, 486, 49.3. Plebiscite, m., 900, 903. rleports of committees, adj., 518. RiFFiTH, Sir Samuel, K.C.M.G., Q.C. : \dmission of the press and public, m., 13, 19. \doption of the constitution, m., 927, 932. \ppoiutment of committees, m., 503, 500, 508. rommouwealth of Australia Bill : Motion to consider bill in Committee, 521. In Comrnitti'.e : Short title, 550, 553. Repeal of Federal Council Act, 558. Constitution and laws of commonwealth binding, 558, 559. Governor-general, appointment of, 50G, 577. GoN^ernor-general, salary of, 579, 580, 583, 584. Privileges of liouses, 5SG, 587. Composition cf .senate, 588, 589, 591, 599. Election of sfiiators, 599. Retirement of senators, 600, 601, 602, 003. Vacancies in senate, 603. Qua]ification.s of senators, 607, 610. President of senate, 610, 611. Quorum f)f senate, (111. Voting in senate, 611. Composition of liouse of representatives, (n2. Qualification of electors, 61.3, 633. Persons not alloweil to vote, 638. I'eriodical reapportionment of representa- tives, 638, 639. . Qualifications of representatives, G39. i)iarjualification f)f representiitivea, 641. Issue of new writs, (i42. Duration of house of representatives, 044, 645, 646, 648, 650, 6.V2. Allowance to members, 654. Disqualifications, 655, 659. ^'acation of seats, 660, 661. Griffith, Sir Samuel, K.C.M.G., Q.C. (ctd.): Legislative powers of parliament : Regulation of ti-ade, 662, 663, 666. Munitions of war, 683, 684. Banking, &c. , 684. Corpoi'ations, 686. Execution of judgments, 687, 688. Immigration, 689. River navigation, 090, 691. Control of railways, 693. Exercise of powers at request of states, 698. Appropriation of money, 699, 701. Exclusive powers of parliament, 702, 703, 704. Origination of money bills, 704, 705. Powers of the senate, 714, 750, 760. Recommendation of money votes, 762. Disallowance of laws, 764. Ministers in parliament, 767, 770, 771, 774, 776. Salaries of ministers, 776, 777. Authority of executive, 777. Immediate control of departments, 778. Exercise of powers under existing laws, 779. Supreme Court of Australia, 781, 783. Original jurisdiction, 787. Appropriations to be by law, 789. Customs and excise duties and bounties, 794. Transfer of officers, 802. Free-trade within the commonwealth, 802. Apportionment of surplus revenue, 806, 829, 832, 833. Equality of trade, 833, 834. Consolidation of debts of states, 848. Powers of the states continued, 849, 850. Reference to Queen through governor-general, 850. Governors of states, 865, 874. Members of commonwealth parliament not to sit in state legislature, 878, 879, 880, 881. States not to lery tonnage duty, 883. Admission of existing colonies, 883. Mode of amending constitution, 884, 890, 891,894,897. Motion to adopt report of Committee on bill, 905, 907. Days of meeting, m., 8. Deatli of a delegate, vbs. , 520. Divisions, ??i., 1 1. Establishment of the constitution, m., 937. Federal constitution resolutions, 29. 1)1 Committci' : Powers, privileges, and territorial rights of colonies, 329, 338. Trade and intercourse, 345. Customs duties, 359. Constitution of parliament, 372, 375. Amendiiioit of money Ijills, 377, 380, 427, 456, 462. The executive, 466, 469, 473. Amendment of the constitution, 485, 489, 497. Plebiscite, w?., 900, 903. President, m., 3. Publication of proceedings of committees, adj. , 511. Reportsof committees, adj., 513, 518. Vice-president, in., 6. Votes of thanks, m., 938. XX Hac INDEX TO SPEECHES. McM Hackett, Mr. J. W. : Commonwealth of Australia Bill : In Committee : Governor-general, salary of, 585. Composition of senate, 589. Powers of the senate, 740. Federal constitution resolutions, 274. Jbnnings, Sir P. A., K.C.M.G., LL.D. : Admission of the press and public, m., 21. Commonwealth of Australia Bill : III Committee : Qualification of electors, 635. Powers of the senate, 739. Death of a delegate, obs. , 520. Federal constitution resolutions, 123. In Committee : Powers, privileges, and territorial rights of colonies, 330. Kingston, Mr. C. C, Q.C. : Commonwealth of Australia Bill : In Committee : Governor-general, appointment of, 567. Governor-general, salary of, 582, 583. Composition of senate, 590, 593, 596, 598. Qualification of electors, 632. Vacation of seats, 661. Legislative powers of parliament : Execution of judgments, 688, 689. Control of railways, 696. Powers of the senate, 735. Ministers in parliament, 775. Supreme Court of Australia, 780, 782, 785. Apportionment of surplus revenue, 828. Reference to Queen through governor-general, 860. Member of state parliament not to be mem- ber of commonwealth parliament, 882. Mode of amending constitution, 897. Federal constitution resolutions, 152. In Committee .- Powers, privileges, and territorial rights of colonies, 342. Customs duties, 364. Amendment of money bills, 403. The executive, 469, 475. Amendment of constitution, 482. Lee-Steere, Sir .J. G. : Federal constitution resolutions, 190. In Committee : Powers, privileges, and territorial rights of colonies, 344. LoTON, Mr. W. T. : Commonwealtli of Australia Bill : In Committee : Qualifications of senators, 609. President of senate, 610. Powers of the senate, 738. Customs and excise duties and bounties, 792. Maodonald-Patersox, Mr. T. : Commonwealth of Australia Bill : Motion to consider bill in Committee, 533. In Committee : Qualifications of senators, 605, 606, 608. Legislative powers of parliament : Power to borrow, 6S2, Banking, &c., 085. Governors of states, 873. I 801. bill, Macdonald-Paterson, Mr. T. (continued) Federal constitution resolutions ; In Committee : Customs duties, 360. Amendment of Constitution, 484, 492. Macrossan, Mr. J. M. : Federal constitution resolutions : In Committee : Powers, privileges, and territorial rights oi colonies, 325. Amendnient of money bills, 431. Marmion, Mr. W. E. : Commonwealth of Australia Bill : In Committee : Short title, 556. Retirement of senators, 602. Qualifications of senators, 607, 608. Qualification of electors, 614, 615. Allowance to members, 653. Legislative powers of parliament : Power to borrow, 682. Disallowance of laws, 765. Ministers in parliament, 766. Salaries of ministers, 777. Customs and excise duties and bounties. Motion to adopt report of Committee on 925. Federal constitution resolutions : In Committee: Customs duties, 348. McIlwratth, Sir T., K.C.M.G., LL.D. : Admission of the press and public, m., 21. Commonwealth of Australia Bill : In Committee : Customs and excise duties and bounties, 799. Apportionment of surplus revenue, 805, 808, H12, 814, 815, 824, 826, 830. Equality of trade, 834. ^ Governors of states, 872. Motion to adopt report of committee on bill,^ 921. \ Federal constitution resolutions, 60. In Committee : Customs duties, 365. Constitution of parliament, 371. Amendment of money bills, 393. McMillan, Mr. W. : I Addresses, obs., 174. _ | Admission of the press and public, m. , 12, 13| 20. Commonwealth of Australia Bill : Motion to consider bill in Committee, 532. In Committee : ] Legislative powers of parliament : ' Taxation, &c., 671. Munitions of war, 684. River navigation, 689, 691, 692. Control of railways, 693. : Powers of the senate, 718, 746, 755. Customs and excise duties and bounties, 791, 708. Apportionment of surplus revenue, 813, 821, 830, 831. Consolidation of debts of states, 839. Governors of states, 870. Days of meeting, m., 8, 9. Death of a delegate, o/>s". , 519. Divisions, m., 10, 12, 20. McM IXDEX TO SPEKCIIES. Pre XXI cMlLLAX, Mr. W. (continued ) : ^ederal constitution resolutions, '264. In Committee : Customs duties, 346, 35S. Amendment of money bills, 338, 455. amendment of constitution, 491. ruui, «'., "22. lions by concurrence, m., 8. rices of motion, m., i). les of debate, ?«., 9. Standing orders, m., G. iVestern Australian delegates, adj., 6. CORE, Mr. W. : /ommonwealth of Australia Bill : In Committee : Legislative powers of parliament : Regula- tion of trade, 664. Divisions, m., 10. Tederal constitution I'esolutions, 2S1. IrNRO, Mr. J. : Admission of the press and the public, m., 1.3. Adoption of the constitution, to., 932. Appointment of committees, m., 506. Commonwealth of Australia Bill : In Com m ittee : Short title, 550. Governor-general, appointment of, 564. Governor-general, salary of, 578. Composition of senate, 588, 593. Qualification of electors, 614. ]3isqualification of representatives, 641. Duration of house of representatives, 649. iJisqualifications, 657. Le^slative powers of parliament : Taxation, &c., 679. Corporations, 685. Appropriation of money, 700. Powers of the senate, 717. Royal assent to bills, 763. Appropriations to be by law, 789. Customs and excise duties and bounties, 790, 800. Apportionment of surplus revenue, 829, 831. Equality of trade, 835, Consolidation of debts of states, 846. Governors of states, 869. Mode of amending con.stitutiou, 884, 885. Motion to as., 5. ( Vide also President), Playford, Mr. T. : Admission of tlie press and public, to., 13. Adoption of the federal constitution, m., 935. Appointment of committees, m., 502, 504. Commonwealth of Australia Bill : In Committee : Short title, 552. Governor-general, appointment of, 576. Composition of senate, 594. Qualification of electors, 623. Duration of house of representatives, 649, 652. Legislative powers of parliament : Taxation, &c., 672. Munitions of war, 684. River navigation, 690. Powers of the senate, 733, 758. Supreme Court of Australia, .784. Customs and excise duties and bounties, 794, Governors of states, 868. Members of commonwealth parliament not to fait in state legislature, 878, 8S0. Mode of amending constitution, 887, 891. Motion to adoj)treportof Comnutteeonbill,921. Divisions, to., 10, 20. I'^ederal constitution resolutions, 53, In Committee: Powers, privileges, and territorial rights of colonies, 328. Customs duties, .347, 367. Amendment of money bills, 423. The executive, 472. Amendment of constitution, 497. Notices of motion, m., 9. Piesident, m., 4. \' ice- President, m., 6. Votes of thanks, »;., 93S. Prksident, The (Sir Henry Parkes, G.C.M.G.): Addres-ses, o/as., 108, 264, 519, 90.1 Admission of tiie j)rcsa and public, m. , 13. ( 'olonial defence, o/w , .350, Days of meeting, m. , 9. Dissolutiiin of the Convention, 940. Election of President, f»., 5. Judiciary, obs., 510, 511. xxu Pre IXDEX TO SPEECHES. WiR President, The (continued) : Officers of the Convention, ra. , 940. Publication of proceedings of committees, adj., 512. Reports of committees, ad]., 516. Shiels, Mr., oh$., 128. Telegram from the Queen, ohs., 68. Votes of thanks, m.. 9.38. Western Australian delegates, adj. , 6 ; ohs. , 127. RPSSELL, Captain : Commonwealth of Australia Bill : In Committee : Governor-general, appointment of, 567. Qualihcations of senators, 609. Periodical reapportionment of representa- tives, 638. Legislative powers of parliament : Taxation, &c., 672. Apportionment of surplus revenue, 826. Governors of states, 877. Federal constitution resolutions, 64. In Committee : Amendment of money bills, 405. Amendment of constitution, 496. President, m., 5. RuTLEDGE, Mr. A. : Admission of the press and public, m., 17. Commonwealth of Australia Bill : In Committee : Constitution and laws of commonwealth binding, 559. Qualifications of senators, 607. Disqualifications, 656. Motion to adopt report of Committee on bill, 922. Federal constitution resolutions, 143. I}i Committee : Amendment of money bills, 406. Shiels, Mr. W. : Admission of the press and public, w., 17. Divisions, m., 20. Smith, Colonel : Admission of the press and public, m., 21. Appointment of committees, m. , 502. Commonwealth of Australia Bill : In Com7nittee : Retirement of senators, 600. Legislative powers of parliament : iPower to borrow,. 679. Banking, &c., 684. Immigration, 689. Customs and excise duties and bounties, 790. Free-trade within the commonwealth, 802. Consolidation of debts of states, 840. Admission of existing colonies, 883. Federal constitution resolutions, 130. In Committee : Customs duties, 349. Amendment of money bills, 396. The executive, 470. SuTTOR, Mr. W. H. : Adoption of federal constitution, m., 933. Appointment of committees, m., 500. Commonwealth of Australia Bill : In Committee : Powers of the senate, 737. Federal Constitution resolutions, .304. Thyxxe, Mr. A. J. : Admission of the press and public, m., 16. Commonwealth of Australia Bill : In Committee : Vacation of seats, 661. Legislative powers of parliament : Taxation, &c., 673, 677. Power to borrow, 683. Banking, &c., 685. Appropriation of monej% 698, 699, 700, 701 Exclusive powers of parliament, 702. Powers of the senate, 722, 759. Ministers in laarliament, 772. Appropriations to be by law, 788, 789. Apportionment of surplus revenue, 832. Equality of trade, 835. Consolidation of debts of states, 849. Governors of states, 873. Federal constitution resolutions, 104. | In Committee : Powers, privileges, and territorial rights ol colonies, 340. J Customs duties, 347, 365, 367. \ Amendment of money bills, 401, 441. The executive, 471. Creation of new states, 477. Amendmentof constitution, 482, 495, 497, 493 Quorum, 77?., 22. Reports of committees, adj., 513. Wright, Mr. J. A. : Commonwealth of Australia Bill : Jn Committee : Short title, 554. Qualifications of senators, 610. Wbixox, Mr. H. J., Q.C. : Adoption of the constitution, m., 931. Appointment of committees, m., 505, 509. Commonwealth of Australia Bill : Motion to consider bill in Committee, 532, 534, In Committee : Governor-general, appointment of, 575. Privileges of hoiises, 586. Composition of senate, 588, 592. Retirement of senators, 601. Qualification of electors, 631. Duration of house of representatives, 645. Allowance to members, 653. Disqualifications, 655. Legislative powers of parliament : Regulation of trade, 665. ^Munitions of war, 684. Exclusive powers of parliament, 703. Origination of money bills, 704. Powers of the senate, 706, 759, 760. Ministers in parliament, 766, 774, 776. Immediate control of departments, 778. Appeal to Queen-in-Council, 785. Reference to Queen throughgovernor-geuei'al 854. Federal constitution resolutions, 211. In Committee : Powers, privileges, and territorial rights o colonies, 337, 343. Customs duties, 360. Constitution of parliament, 371, 376. Amendment of money bills, 381, 418, 461. The executive, 467, 473. Amendment of constitution, 492, 496. OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE DEBATES OF THE NATIONAL AUSTRALASIAN CONVENTION. MONDAY, 2 JIAECE, ISOl. oil of Deleprates— President — Secretary— Standing Orders, &c. — Vice-President — Adjournment: Western Australian Delegates. The delegates met in the Legislative Lssembly Chamber, Sydney, at 11 o'clock m. ROLL OF DELEGATES. Mr. MUNRO : At the Conference held I Melbourne, in 1890, the following 3Solutions were agreed to : — (L) That, in tlie opinion of this Conference, le best interests and the present and future rosperity of the Australian colonies will be [•onioted by an early union under the Crown ; ad, -while fully recognising the valualde services the members of the Convention of 1S83 in funding the Federal Council, it declares its Dinion that the seven years which have since apsed have developed the national life of Aus- 'alia in population, in wealth, in the discovdry ' resources, and in self-governing capacity to II extent which justifies the higher act, at all mes contcmplatcfl, of tlie union of these jlonics, under one legislative and executive overnment, on principles just to the several )Ionie3. (2.) That to the union of the Australian clonics contemplated by the foregoing resolu- on, the remoter Australasian colonies shall be ititled to admission at such times and on such inditions as may be hereafter agreed upon. (.".) That the members of the Conference louM take such steps as may be necessary to iducc the legislatures of their respective ■)lonie3 to appoint, during the present year, elegates to a National Australasian Convention, iipowered to consider and reijort upon an dcfpiate scheme for a federal constitution. A (4.) That the Convention should consist of not more than seven members from each of the self-governing colonies, and not more than four members from each of the Crown colonies. (5.) That the Premier of Victoria be requested to act as convener of the National Australasian Convention of delegates to be appointed by the several legislatures of the Australasian colonies, and to arrange, upon consultation with the premiers of the other colonies, the time and place of the meeting of the Convention. Pursuant to that authority I had the honor to communicate with the premiers of the other colonies, and fixed the place of meeting as this Legislative Assembly, Sydney, and the time as the 2nd of March, at 11 o'clock a.m. Accordingly, I have issued circulars to the delegates from the several colonies, which I have no doubt they have received. I have received let- ters from the prime ministers of the vari- ous colonies, informing me of tlie names of the delegates appointed for each colony, whicli letters I now lay on the table, including one from the Governor of Fiji, announcing that that colony would not be represented unless instructions to that effect were received fiom her INIajesty's Government. I have had a parcliment roll prepared in uljihabetical order of the different colonies, the names of the dele- gates of each colony to occupy a page in the roll. The names are printed on one side, and each delegate, as his name is called, will be good enougli to sign opposite his name. I wish to infcjrm the delegates also, that in addition to the roll that is to Boll of Delegates. [2 March, 1891.] Roll of Delegates. be kepfc as a rocoi-d of the pi'oceediugs, I have taken the liberty of having had printed a number of other rolls, so that one copy niay be given to each colony as a record of this important meeting. I shall only request the delegates to sign one copy at present ; the other copies may be signed at their pleasure. I shall first read over the names of the delegates for each colony, and then I Avill call upon them in rotation to sign the roll. I have had the names put in the roll in the order in which they appear in the resolutions of the various parliaments : — ■ New South Wales. The Honorable Sir Henry Parkes, G.C.M.G., M.P. The Honorable Willia^i McMillan, M.P. The Honorable Joseph Palmer Abbott, M.P. George Richard Dibbs, Esquire, M.P. The Honorable William Henry Suttor, M.L.G. The Honorable Edmund Barton, Q.C., M.L.G. The Honorable Sir Patrick Alfred Jennings, K.C.M.G., LL.D., M.L.C. New Zealand. Sir George Grey, K.C.B. Captain William Pussell PiCSsell, M.H.E. The Honorable Sir Harry Albert Atkinson, K.C.M.G., M.L.G. Queensland. The Honorable John Murtagh Macros- SAN, M.P. The Honorable John Donaldson, M.P. The Honorable Sir Samuel Walker Griffith, K.C.M.G., Q.C., M.P. The Honorable Sir Thomas McIlwraith, K.C.M.G., M.P. The Honorable Arthur Eutledge, M.P, The Honorable xVndrew Joseph Thynne, M.L.G The Honorable Thomas Macdonald- Paterson, M.L.C. [J/r. Munro. South Australia. The Honorable Eichard Chaffey Baker, G.M.G., M.L.G Tiie Honorable John Hannah Gordon, M.L.C. The Honorable Sir John Cox Bray K.C.M.G., M.P. John Alexander Cockburn, Esquirej M.D., M.P. The Honorable Sir John Y/illiam Downer, K. C. M. G. , Q. G , M. P. The Honorable Charles Cameron Kings- ton, Q.C., M.P. The Honorable Thomas Playford, M.P. Tasmania. The Honorable William Moore, M.L.G. The Honorable Ad ye Douglas, M.L.C. The Honorable Andrew Inglis Clark, M.H.A. The Honorable William Henry Burgess, M.H.A. 1 The Honorable Nicholas John Brown,' M.H.A. The Honorable Bolton Stafford Bird,, M.H.A. The Honorable Philip Oakley Fysii. M.L.C. Victoria. The Honorable Alfred Deakin, M.P. The Plonorable James Munro, M.P. The Honorable Lieut.-Colonel William Collard Smith, M.P. The Honorable LIenry John Wrixon, Q.C., M.P. The Honorable Duncan Gillies, M.P. The Honorable Henry Cuthbert, M.L.C. The Honorable Nicholas Fitzgerald M.L.G. Western Australia. The Honorable John Forrest, C.M.G. M.P. The Honorable William Edv.'Ard Mar 3II0N, M.P. The Honorable Sir James George Les Steere, Kt., M.P. The Honorable John Arthur WrighT;J M.L.a i Roll of Delegates. [2 jIarcii, 1891.] President. Hio Honorable Jonx Wixthrop Hac- KETT, M.L.C. Alexander Forrest, Esquire, M.P. iViLLiAJi Thorley LotoNj Esquire, M.P. The delegates present then signed the oil. The delegates absent were : — Sir George irty, K.O.B., New Zealand; the Honor- h\Q Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, K.C.M.G., jL.D., M.P., Queensland; the Honorable lenry John Wrixon, Q.C., M.P., Yic- oria; and the delegates representing Wes- ern Australia. 3Ir. 31XJNR0 : I find that the absentees re Sir George Grey, K.C.B., the Honor- ble Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, K.C.M.G., rl.P., and the Honorable H. J. Wrixon, ^.C., M.P. In this connection I desire intimate that a resolution was passed l)y he Parliament of Victoria-*— and I believe similar one has been passed by the Par- iament of Xew South Wales — empower- Qg the Governor-in-Council to appoint a aember of the Legislative Council, or of he Legislative Assembly, as the case may »e, to be a representative of the colony it the Convention should a vacancy occur. ;ho resolution to which I refer is in these nns : — That during the absence of any representative this colony on the National Convention to be eld in Sydney in March, 1891, or in tlie event jf any vacancy by death, resignation, or other- jrise on audi representation, the Governor, witli he advice of the Executive Council, is hereby ^'■vcrod to appoint a member of the Lcgis- • ; Council or tlie Legislative Assembly, as he case may be, to act as representative of this y on such Convention, or to fill auch -icy. n the absence of the Honorable IL J. Vrixon, one of the rcprescntativo.s of Victoria, the Honorable W. Shiel.s, Lttorney-Gcneral, has received a commis- iou under the seal of the colony, issued y the Governor, authorising him to take seat iu the Convention durin" the absence of any member, I was requested to bring this matter before the Convention, as the Honorable H. J. Wrixon is now absent. The Honorable W. Shiels entered the Chamber subsequently, and subscribed the roll on behalf of the Honorable H. J, Wrixon. PRESIDENT. Mr. MUN PtO rose to move : That the Honorable Sir Henry Parkes, G.C.M.G., Premier of New South Wales, do take the chair as President of this National Australian Federation Convention. He said : I think this is a fitting honor to confer upon the author of the movement on the part of these Australian colonies, which resulted in the Conference held in Melbourne last year. The hon. gentle- man has taken a deep interest in the subject of federation for a great number of years, and we, moreover, meet in the colony of which he has the honor to be the Premier. I have no doubt that in the position of President he will aid us with his counsel and advice, and that his occu- pancy of the chair will reflect credit upon our proceedings. Under these circum- stances I do not think we can do better than elect him to the position. Of course it is distinctly understood that as Presi- dent of this Convention he will occupy a position different from that of the Speaker of a legislative assembly or the President of a legislative council ; that he y.u11 be at liberty to take part in our debates as he may think proper, and that ho will also be free to vote. These matters, however, will, I have no doubt, be dealt with in our stand- ing orders, which, I believe, will be passed at a subsccjuont sitting of the Convention. Sir SAMUEL GlllFEITH: I havo much pleasure in rising to second the mo- tion made by I\Ir. Munro. If the circum- stances were altogether equal, there is no doubt that Sir Henry Parkes would be designated, in accordance with universal custom, as well as official courtesy, as the President. [2 March, 1891.] President. proper person to preside over this Con- vention, seeing that it is held in New South "Wales, of which colony he is the Prime Minister. But the circumstances are not equal. Nogentleman here, I think, will feel himself disparaged when I remind the Con- vention that Sir Henry Parkes is, in point of years and experience, more eminently qualified than any of us for the position. He has had, I believe, a larger official experience than has any other man in Australia ; he has been at the head of the Government of N"ew South Wales longer than any other man in the colony ; and he has taken a great interest in the subject of federation for many years. He is the immediate author of the present movement. All possible argument conduces to show that he is the proper person to fill the ■chair of this Convention. I am sure, how- ever, that the lion, gentleman would hesi- tate to accept the position if he were de- barred from speaking, and that we, also, .should hesitate to place him in the chair if that step were to have the effect of closing his mouth. This being understood, we shall be glad to look to him for advice and assist- ance, and to see him adorning the chair, Mr, PLAYPORD : I am glad to sup- port the proposal that Sir Heni-y Parkes do take the chair on the present occasion ; but I trust that his election to that posi- tion will in no way prevent him from taking an active part in the discussions that will follow, and that it will not pre- vent him from moving resolutions, because we are looking forward to his initiating- the proceedings, and bringing before us certain proposals. Tlie hon. gentleman v.-as the originator of the Conference that was held in Melboui'ue last year, and I am certain that we delegates, represent- ing the various Australian colonies, look to him to bring before us resolutions for our discussion. I trust, therefore, that the hon. gentleman's occupancy of the chair will not prevent him from taking that active [Sir Samuel Griffith. part in the pn'oceedings which we have all anticipated. I agree with Sir Samuel Griffith that there is no gentleman in the Australian colonies more deserving of the honor of occupying the position of Presi- dent on this important occasion. I have much pleasure in supporting the proposal^ Mr. FYSH : I desire, on the part of Tasmania, to congratulate Sir Henry Parkes upon the arrival of to-day, and! trust that he will be unanimously chosen President of this great Convention, and that to the very many important acts of: his life there will be added that which, I believe, will prove to be the most import- ant arising out of duties devolving upon him at this Convention. I trust that thei hon. gentleman Avill be preserved in ex- ceedingly good health, and that all the faculties of which he is possessed will be exerted in the course of this Convention with the hon. gentleman's accustomed energy and vivacity ; and that we shal have in him, as our President, that whici we fully expect — an able mind for th( conduct of these important proceedings I congratulate the hon. gentleman upoi his accession to the chair, and have grea pleasure in supporting the resolution. Mr. DIBBS : In view of the unanimou expression of opinion from the premier of the neighbouring colonies that Si; Henry Parkes should take the chair this Convention, I, as one of the delegate of New South ^Yales, cannot refrain fronJ expressing the pleasure we feel in findinj that unanimity to prevail ; and our pridi in the fact of our Premier being invited t( fill so high a position. We look to Si| Henry Parkes as, to a certain extent, tlii architect of the structure we are about t build, and we, like other gentlemen pr sent, look to our Premier for advice an exjilanation, and hope that he will in du( time place before us such a programme will enable us to proceed with the greai work before us. I can assure hon. gentle Fresident. [2 March, 1S91.] Secretary. nen that we appreciate the compliment taid to the colony through our Premier, ,ntl, personally, I have great pleasui-e in upporting the proposition which has been aade. Captain RUSSELL : Perhaps, as a epresentative of the most remote of the Australasian colonies, I may be permitted a the name of New Zealand to say with rhat pleasure I have heard Sir Henry i'arkes proposed as chairman of this great !!!onvention. It has been said that there 3 no man more suitable than is Sir Henry i*arkes for the position to wliicli I hope re shall shortly unanimously elect him ; lut I go further, and say that there is no aan one-half so suitable. Whether we ■iew him as Prime Minister of the mother olony of Australia, or in his private apacity as the most venerable member of his ConA'ention, or whether, on the other land, one reflects that his experience in lolitical life is perhaps greater than that if many of us put together, we must all grce that there is no man so fitted for the )Osition. This is the mother colony of Australia, and from the great figure pre- ented to the more i-emote colonies of \.ustralasia in Sir Henry Parkcs, we are, )erhaps, able to judge him more dispas- ionately than are the Australian colonies iroper. I feel that, having regard to lie position which the lion, gentleman las occupied in Australia, he will fittingly Town this, the summit of his life, in jecoming the President of a convention vhich must bo celebrated in tlio world's listory for all time to come. I Iiave )le;isurc, on behalf of New Zealand, in ;aying that we look forward with i>leasurc tJie hon, gentleman occupying the; posi- .ion of President of this Convention. Question resolved in the affirmative. The President elect, being conducted ;o the chair by the Honorable James ^lunro md theHonorableSirSamuel (jirifiitli,said: Mr. Munro, Sir Samuel Griffith, and hon. gentlemen, I could not under any cii'cum- stances do other than yield to your unani- mous choice. I am very conscious indeed of my many disqualifications for the office of President. It is hardly in my nature to observe that studied decorum which is so shining a quality in the Cliair. I have not been fitted for that situation in life. I therefore feel how great the honor is to be placed in that position on this great occasion and by this great body. I shall trust to that generous unanimity which has prevailed in carrying this motion to support me in discharging in the Chair duties which may become onerous, and I am quite sure I shall not trust in vain. I am certain the feeling which has been exercised in placing me here will be fur- ther exercised, if need be, to pardon my inefficiency, and that it will give me all the moral support that can be shown to the high position I am called to occupy. Having said this much, it becomes my duty to give this assurance, that so far as I know myself, I will command myself to dotheduties of this Chair so that there shall be no cause of complaint. I will try to so conduct the business as to oflcnd none, and, if possible, secure the good opinion which appears to have been formed to- day. I thank hon. gentlemen for the great distinction you have conferred upon me, and I trust none of you will see cause to regret the vote you have given. SECRETAHY, Mr. MUNKO : I think the motion I have now the honor to .submit will con- clude my business at this stage of tho proceedings. I have the honor to move : That Frederick WiUiam Webb, Esf^., bo appomted Secretary to the Couveution. Sir SAM ILL CllIFFlTH : I second the motion. Question resolved in the aflirmative. Standing Orders, ^hether we shall afford them time to be present. Mr. MUiS'RO : I might be allowed to ofier a word of explanation. As the con- vener I was in communication with all the colonies, and with the consent of the different colonies I postponed the holding of the fir-st meeting until the 2nd March, to meet 'he wishes particularly of the representatives of Western Australia. All the other colonies wanted to have the meeting very much earlier. Then when it came to within a week of the time for the meeting I received a telegi'am from the Premier of Western Australia, asking that the Convention should be postponed for a fortnight to enable them to get their business through and be present. I then put myself in communication with the premiers of the other colonies, including New Zealand, and found that it was the almost unanimous wish of the delegates that no postponement should take place. I then communicated with the representa- tives of Western Australia, informing them that it was impossible to postpone the meeting of the Convention. I venture to su"[crest to Mr. Dibbs that we are hei*e as delegates from the various colonies at a considerable amount of inconvenience to ourselves and the governments wo represent. And whilst I am exceedingly anxious that every courtesy should be shown to the representatives of Western Australia, I do not think it wise, after we have deliberated over the matter and come to the conclusion to meet on the 2nd 8 Motions hy Concurrence. [3 March, 1891.] Days of Meeting. ISIarch, to postpone the transaction of one in reference to the question, whicW "business for another week ; I am afraid will have to be deternnned by the deleH we could not aflbrd to do it. I am willing gates, of the Chairman of Committees. I that we should not pass any serious resolu- understand there is some difference of tions until the delegates from "Western opinion with regard to this latter point, | Australia arrive ; I believe they will be but probably that motion and the ono , here on Friday or Saturday. If we were with regard to the quorum can be taken to postpone our business until their arrival we should be departing from the under- standing arrived at that we should be here on the 2nd March, and proceed with business as early as possible. I have no doubt that the Aveek will be taken up with the consideration of preliminary matters. I do not think we ought to formally post- pone the business on account of the Western Australian delegates not being with concurrence, without the ordinary, notice. DAYS OF MEETING. Motion (by Mr. McMillan) proposed : That, unless otlierwise ordered, the Conven- tion shall meet daily (Sundays excepted) at 1 1 o'clock a.m. punctually. Mr. ABBOTT : I should like to know whether it is intended that the Conven-, tion shall sit on Saturdays, and if so, here, because of the absolute necessity of whether for the whole or half of the day ?j our proceeding with as much expedition as possible. Mr. BAKER : I venture to suggest with regard to one difficulty that if we do anything to which the \Vestern Australian delegates object, we can easily reconsider the matter when they arrive. In the meantime we may do a great" many things to which they will not object. Question resolved in the affirmative. Convention adjourned at 12'4 p.m. TUESDAY, 3 MARCH, 1801. Motions by Concurrence — Days of Meeting — Minutes of Proceedings — Notices of Motion — Rules of Debate — Rules of Debate in Committee — Official Record of Debates — Divisions — Admission of the Press and Public. The President took the chair at half- past 2 o'clock p.m. MOTIONS BY CONCURRENCE. Mr. McMillan : I have to move a series of resolutions, most of which are formal, and I intend to add one at the So far as I am personally concerned, I am quite willing to make my time suit the time of the delegates from the other colonies Mr. DiBBS : And sit even on Sundays Mr. ABBOTT: Yes, and sit even on Sundays, if it would suit those gentle- men. But perhaps they themselves would not care about assembling here on Satur- days. I should like to hear some expres- sion of opinion from the delegates from the other colonies. Mr. MUNPtO : In the event of the Convention not wishing to sit on Satur day on any occasion, they can easily carry out their intention by passing a resolution of which notice may be given the day be fore. I tliink it would be as well to carry the motion as it stands, because it wil enable us to meet on Saturday if we think proper to do so, it being understood that we do meet on Saturday unless otherwisi ordered. Sir JOHN DOWNER : I take the same view as the last speaker ; but I think it should not be necessary to give notice of motion in the event of our considering it inexpedient to sit on Saturday. There! end with i-egard to the quorum, and then would be nothing inconsistent with the \_Mr. Munro. JJinutes of Proceedings. [3 March, 1891.] Rales of Dehate. otion as submitted if a member were lowed to move on Friday that we ad- urn until Monday. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : As a mem- ;r of the Convention who has a good deal work to do besides that connected with le Convention, I venture to express a )pe that we shall not sit on Saturdays, jcause I am certain that in my case one ly in the week will be absolutely neces- ry to enable me to get through other work lat must be done. I do not ofler any ejection to the resolution being passed in s present form ; but I hope the Conven- on will not insist upon sitting on Satur- lys. The President : I would suggest that srhaps it would be better to amend the lotion by inserting the words "Saturdays lid ' before the word " Sundays." Mr. !SIcMiLLAX : I accept the suggestion I the President. Motion so amended, and agreed to. MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS. Resolved (on motion by Mr. McMillan) : That the secretary to the Convention shall ike minutes of each day's proceedings, mIucIi lall Ije printed and circulated amongst the slegates ; that such official record of the pro- sedings be signcil by the President and secre- iry ; and that the secretary be authorised to ake such record public, togetlier with notices : motions to be submitted to the Convention. NOTICES OF MOTION. Motion (by ]Mr. IMcMillan) proposed ; Tliat previous notice, in writing, sliall be ven at a sitting f>f tlic Convention of all mo- ons to be submitted hy the delegates, and that 1 notices of motions shall be printed and circu- ted daily amongst the delegates. Mr. PLAYFOIID : Of course we are to nderstand that this will not prevent a dele- ite from movin_<:j a motion without notice ith the consent of a majority of members ? ;Mr. McMillan : No ; a motion can be lade with concurrence ! Sir JOHN BPt AY : I would suggest to the mover that it would be desirable to in- sert the words "unless otherwise ordered," because an occasion may arise when it may be desirable to move a motion without notice, and if this resolution were literally interpreted, that would be impossible. I beg to move as an amendment : That after the word "That" the words "unless otherwise ordered" be inserted. Mr. AD YE DOUGLAS : What is the object of the amendment ? These are merely sessional orders subject to the rules of the House of Commons, and therefore it would be surplusage to put in the words "unless otherwise ordered," be- cause the Convention can always order it, and the insertion of the words would be an absurdity. The motion, as it stands, is perfectly regular, and is in accordance with the rules of Parliament. The pro- posed amendment will not be in accord- ance with the rules of Parliament, and it is quite unnecessary. Amendment agreed to ; motion, as amended, agreed to. RULES OF DI:BATE. Motion (by Mr. McMillan) proposed : That in the debates of the Convention, the ordinary rules of the House of Commons be ob- served ; but that the President or Vice-Presi- dent, as the case may be, have the same right as any other delegate to take part in the discus- sion of any question. Sir JOHN DOWNER : I think this motionwill require alittlcamcndment. AVc understand that the President is to move a motion in the Convention to-morrow, and if the resolution is carried in its present form it may raise some question as to whether such a proceeding Avill be strictly in order. I therefore bog to move, as an amendment : Tliat the words, "to make any motion and"' be inserted after the word "delegate," line 5. Amendment agreed to ; motion, as amended, agreed to. 10 Rules of Debate. [3 Mabcii, 1891.] Divisions. RULES OF DEBATE IX COMMITTEE. Motion (by Mr. McMillan) proposed : That ill Committee tlie rules of debate ob- served in Committees of the Whole in Parlia- ment be adopted by the Convention ; but that the President or Vice-President, as the case may be, have the same right as any other delegate to take part in the discussion of any question. Sir Jontf Downer : I think it would be better to insert tlie same words in this motion also. Mr. McMillan: laccepL the suggestion. Motion so amended and agreed to. OFFICIAL RECORD OF DEBATES. Resolved (on motion by Mr. McMillan) : That an official record of the debates in the Convention be made by the Parliamentary Re- porting Staff of this colony. DIVISIONS. Motion (by Mr. McMillan) proposed : That in anydivisions taken in the Convention the President or Vice-President, as the case may be, have the right to vote, and in case of an equality of votes exercise a second or casting vote ; and that the names of the delegates be printed in alphabetical order, without reference to the colonies which they represent. Mr. PLAYFORD : I think that in this case we are altogether departing from the usual parliamentary practice, which is certainly not to give the President or the Speaker a deliberative as well as a casting vote. My own idea is that if the votes are so equal as to call for the casting vote of the President the question sliould pass in the negative. I, therefore, ask the mover to strike out all reference to the President or Vice-President having a de- liberative as well as a casting vote. In order to take the sense of the Convention on the subject I shall move as an amend- ment : That the following wordsbestruck out : — "and in case of an equality of votes exercise a second or casting vote." Mr. MUNEO : I am afraid the pro- posed amendment w'ould not carry out the object desired by the hon. member. If he were to propose that " in the case of ai equality of votes the question shall pass in J the negative" I could understand the ^ position; but otherwise no pi-o vision will be made for what is to happen in the event of an equality of votes. If t! woi'ds " exercise a second or casting voti were struck out, and the words " tli question shall pass in the negative" in- serted, that I think would answer the purpose. Mr. MOORE : I scarcely think there any necessity at all for the resolution The rules of the House of Commons will provide for the case, and we might verv well do without the resolution altogetho: Mr. BARTON : The effect of the rules of the House of Commons will not be a the last speaker supposes, but it will b to give the President simply a castin< vote, and take away from him altcgethe; a deliberative vote ; and that certainly ii not the intention of the Convention. Be cause of the accident — if I may so put i — of Sir Heniy Parkes or Sir Samue' Grifhtb. being in the chair on any occa sion, it is not intended to take away theii deliberative vote. And would it not b^ desirable to avoid what would happen ir case the susrsrestion of the hon. member Mr. jNIunro, were adopted — that is to say that in case of an equality of votes th question should pass in the negative There is no reason why it should pass ii the negative any more than in the affirmj tive. What reason is there 1 Sir Samuel Griffith : Because tin question will not be carried by a m jority ! Mr. BARTON : But it will be carrier by a majority if the casting vote is exe: cised. I would suggest that the castin vote should be exercised, and the bette: provision would be to say that it shoul be exercised on the same principle o] which it is exercised by the Speaker the Legislative Assembly — that is, not i^ Divisions. [3 March, 1891.] Divisions. 11 jartisan way, but on certain principles, lion, "member, Mr. Munro, and so frame 3 chief one of wliicli is the allowance of his amendment that, in case of an equality portunity for farther discussion, which of votes, the question shall pass in the exactly what is wanted in this case. Eegative. Sir SAMUEL GRirFITH : It seems Mr. Playfoed : I am quite w illing to do me that having conceded to the Presi- so ! nt the right to initiate a motion and to Mr. GILLIES : We have already passed eak upon it, this necessarily involves the a resolution which sets out that we are to 5umption that he vrill be able to give an be guided by the practice of the House of iginal vote upon the motion. But I en- Commons. A resolution such as that pro- •ely concur with the hon. member, Mr. posed would certainly alter that determin- ayfoi'd," that the President ought not to ation at which we have already arrived. It ve two votes. In fact, I think that a ques- would be inconsistent. The practice of the )n carried in the Convention by a casting House of Commons is well known. That te is practically not carried at all. If body does not invest its speaker with a de- 3 have not a larger majority on any liberative as well as a casting vote, and, as lestion in this Convention than the cast- the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, has g vote of the Chair, we may consider pointed out, the question is bound to be at it is practically negatived, whatever raised as to whether we shall vote by colonies )pears on our records. I do not think or as individual members. I do not think yself it makes much difference in what we have an opportunity this afternoon, I'm this resolution is worded, because short as the sitting must be, to determine ir conclusions must be arrived at with that question. It is an important ques- actical unanimity. Still there are minor tion in the minds I believe of a number atters in which no doubt every delegate of the delegates, and I feel confident it is ould be willing that his own judgment also an important question in the minds ould bow to the opinion of the majoritj\ of many of the colonies which the dele- ^hether his colony would follow him in gates represent. Therefore if the mover lat is another matter to be considered of the resolution could see his Avay to terwards. But this resolution also raises postpone it and bring it up la-ter when we le question whetl)er the voting in this can really discuss that question it would onvcntion shall be by individuals or by be, to my mind, extremely desirable. I do lonies ? Tliere is, again, a difference of not think we shall lose anything by post- )inion on that point, if not in the Con- poning this matter for the present, because sntion, at any rate outside of it. I do the rules of the House of Commons will ot propose to discuss the matter at any determine our practice for some little time ngth ; but considering that we are to a to come, and in a day or two we may be able irtain extent a constitutional convention, to raise this question without an3alifficnlty. let here to deliberate and to devise the Sir JOHN UOWNEll : I would simply est things to be done, and that we shall point out that if the practice of the House ave to deal with a great number of dc- of Commons were followed the President dla, I am disjiosed to think the better plan Avould not have a deliberative vote, and I 'ould be that evidently intended by the certainly undo^rstand that you, sir, accepted roposer of the resolution — that we should the position in which you are now placed ive our votes individually. I would ask on tlie distinct understanding that j'ou tie delegate from South Australia, ^Mr. were to liavc a deliberative vote, the ques- 'layford, to accept the suggestion of the tion of a casting vote, of course, being left 12 Admission of the [3 March, 1891.] Po^ess and Public. open to the Convention to decide. But an important question will arise as to whether we are to vote individually or by colonies, and as there will not perhaps be time to discuss that question this after- noon, I would join with the hon. member, Mr. Gillies, in the suggestion that it should be postponed until we have a better oppor- tunity to consider it. Mr. GORDOX : With regard to the question whether we shall vote by colonies or by individuals, I would ask whether we are not bound by the 4th resolution adopt- ing the ordinary rules of the House of Commons 1 It is just a question whether we have not gone a little too far already in committing ourselves absolutely to the rules of the House of Commons, and whether we should not hark back a little. Mr. McMillan : I agree with the hon. member, Llr. Gillies, that if we want to open up a debate as to whether we are to vote individually or by colonies, it would be better to postpone this motion. We took it for granted that that question had been practically settled ; but, if there is to be a debate upon it, I shall be very glad to postpone this motion iintil tomorrow. Debate adjourned. ADMISSION OF THE PRESS AND PUBLIC. Mr. McMillan rose to move : (1.) That when the Convention is engaged in debating matters formally submitted by previous notice, or submitted by consent without notice, the press and public be admitted on the order of the President. (2.) That whenever the Convention is in Com- mittee the press and public be not admitted, unless otherwise ordered. He said : I am sure, as far as I know the minds of the delegates, that we have no desire to exclude the press from any im- j)ortant discussion whatever ; but it is simply to discuss the order of our business and to expedite business that we desire to hold any informal meetings. Question put. \_Sir Jolin Doioner. Mr. DIBBS : I desire to inove the orai.s- > &ion of all the words after the word "Tliat," 1 in the 1st clause of the resolution, with the view of inserting other words, which I hope will meet with the approval of mem- bers of the Convention, and which will., certainly meet with the approval of thi people from one end to the other of thi; colony. I beg to move : That all the words after the word " That," inj the first line of the 1st clause, be omitted Avith a view to insert the following words : — "during the sittings of this Convention the press and the public be admitted on the order of the Presi- dent." That clause 2 be omitted. I move this amendment for the purpose oi pointing out that, if ever that sentiment which was so much lauded last night — "one people and one destiny" — is to be given effect to, it will be by taking the people in all the colonies fully into ou confidence. That can only be done b; throwing open our doors wide to the pres! and the public, so that they may hear everj debate and argument used in favoiir o: a federated Australia. If my amendmen is carried, it will be necessary to omit the 2nd clause of the motion altogether. By adopting the course I suggest, we shal enable the public to judge whether oui decisions are in the interest of Australi as a whole, and of the respective colonial If the public know that all our proceed ings are subject to outside criticism, ther will be no feeling that this is a secret con- clave to take away the liberties of the pub lie. We will take the people with us a long way in any course which member desire to carry out, if we admit the presi and public to all our proceedings. Wt want to build up a nation, and in order tc do so, we must take into our confideno the people, who are the principal factor and the press also. Mr. DOUGLAS : We will all agree t( strike out the words necessary to giv( effect to the hon. member's amendment and that will best be done by omitting th Admission of the [3 March, 1891.] Press and Public. 13 ortls, "on the order of the President." . appears to me that our object is to have il matters dealt with before the public as uch as possible. t Mr. PLAYFORD : The best thing we |.n do is to follow parliamentary practice. .6 pi-actice of our Parliament is to ad- it the press and public, with the right to cclude them at any time if we please. Te shall accomplish all we desire by [opting the following amendment : — That all the words after the word " That "' in le first line be omitted with a view to insert le following words :— " all the proceedings of le Convention shall be open to the press and le public unless otherwise ordered." he clause with regard to proceedings in ommittee should, I think, be omitted together. In Committee the most im- artant portion of our work will have to 3 done. The whole of the debates on le Constitution which we may adopt, ad a great many matters of detail which re of exceedingly great interest, will all e dealt with in Committee ; and the pub- c will take the deepest interest in our roceedings at that time. They will take lore interest in those proceeedings than ley will in the merely formal resolutions diicli will be submitted prior to the Con- iitution being framed. Whenever we nd it is desirable that the press and pub- c should be excluded we can do .so under le amendment I propose. The more pub- c we make our procecding.s, as in the case f Parliament, the bettor it will be for us nd for the cause we are here to promote. Mr. Dir.ns : The object of Mr. Playford irould becarri'xlout byaddingto myamend- rjent thewords "unless otherwise ordered." The President : T would venture to uggest that it would be the better course or the mover to withdraw his motion and ;ive notice of a fresh one for to-morrow, imbodying the view.s of Mr. Playford. Mr. McMiLL.w : I understand that Mr. Dibbs agrees to accept !Mr. Playford's amendment. I would suggest that they should be amalgamated at once. J\lr. DiBES : If I accept the suggestion of ]\Ir. Playford, and add to my amendment the words " unless otherwise ordered," the whole question can be dealt with now. I will add those words to my amendment. Mr. Playford : I do not approve of the insertion of those words " on the order of the President." It should be "on the order of the whole Convention." INIr. McMiLLAX : It is only fair to those who drew this resolution to say that their only intention was that we should have the power within ourselves to sit without the public being present, and this was purely a formal motion, which would permit us to take any course we liked. I accept the amendment. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Mr. Presi- dent, for my part, I think the press and public — the press is only a part of the pub- lic, after all, and comes in as part of the public — should be admitted to all sittings of the Convention, sitting as a convention, whether you, sir, are in the chair as Presi- dent, or whether we are in Committee. I take this opportunity of saying so, because I observe it has been stated in various parts of Australia that I entertain a contrary view. I have never entertained or ex- pressed to any one a contrary ^icw. I be- lieve, as Mr. Playford has said, that the most important work of the Convention will take place in Committee. Tlicre the clo.sest arguments will be applied, and there the most instructive lessons will be given, if any lessons arc to be derived from what we say. I therefore entirely concur with the amendment of the hon. member, INIr. Dibbs. As to tlie words, "on tlic order of the President," I do not understand them to mean that tlie President would have power to exclude the public irom the House. I understand them to mean merely that if -500 persons desired to be 14 Admission of the [3 March, admitted, and tliere was only room for fiftj', those who vvcre admitted should he admitted on his order. Mr. GILLIES : When I saw this reso- lution first drawn I took it for granted that it practically proposed to carry out what was done in Melbourne last year, when all the important debates were open to the press and the public. But it was manifest to the minds of nearly the whole of the representatives that times would come when it would be much more con- venient for the membei-s themselves, and more convenient for the transaction of business, if they met without the presence of the public and the press. Kot that there was an intention to conceal any- thing ; but it was with the view of en- abling their business to be presented to the public and the press in a form in v/hich they would be able to discuss the subjects pi'operly and methodically. Ac- cording to the historical information which we hjive gathered as to the course pursued by the Bi-itish-Ainerican colonies when they considered the question of federa- tion, they did so with absolutely closed doors. There was no information given to the public at all. The discussions took place in private, and it was only occasion- ally at public meetings, and afterwards in the Iciiislative halls, that the members were in a position to tell the public what they had done. On this occasion we do not propose to do that. From all we have been able to learn the course then pursued was an unfortunate one, although unques- tionably it was done for the best purposes and objects. The public did not thoroughly well understand the whole course of pro- cedure, and their minds were partly made up, at any rate, in some of the pro^■inces, against the course that was proposed. The result was that in one of the provinces some of the best and foremost men, oc- cupying the highest public positions, were relegated for the time-being to private [Sir Samuel Griffith. 1 S 9 1 . ] Tress a n d Pu h lie. life, because the public did not understand i their objects at the moment, and did not ' appreciate them. If at this moment v proposed the absolute exclusion of the public and the press, it would be a terrible I mistake. We are all desirous that t;. press and the public should be thoroughly w^ell informed of what we are doing from time to time. But what I would urge is that there v/ill be times when v/e can dea,l | much better with questions privately, foi" the time-being, than we can deal with I them publicly. That they must be after- wards dealt with publicly is beyond ques- tion. In my judgment it is better that some important points should be thor- oughly thrashed out in detail, and then submitted in a proper and satisfactory form to the delegates, so as to enable them to discuss the subject thoroughly, and v/it!i such comprehension of their importance as would weigh both Vvith the public and the press. I feel convinced that if a resolu- tion be carried, providing that in all Com- mittee meetings of this Convention the press shall be present, before long we shall find out that we have made a mistake. The position into which we shall be forced will be this : that we shall not meet as a, delegation at all ; we shall meet privately, as we met this morning, and discuss sub- jects which, perhaps, would have been better discussed in a more formal manner. Our discussions must necessarily involve details, some of them very important^ which could be more expeditiously settlec if they v.-ere not first dealt with in th( presence of the press and of the public. Sir JOHN DOWNER : I take it tha in the case of all legislation, whatever dis position we may have to perform all ou] acts in the broad light of day, in the pres ence of the press and of the public, then must ahvays be, in matters of detail, som( degree of privacy. Y\'hen an attorney general is instructing the draftsman as to the contents of a ministerial bill, ther< Admission of the [3 JNIarch, 1891.] Fress and Ihchlic. 15 not usually a repoi'ter present to hear Practically, everything will be done in lat is being clone, nor is the public gen- the broad light of day. The only differ- illy admitted. I agree with what Mr. ence will be that, instead of so meeting, llies has said, that it would be an im- we shall be able to advance the cause jnse saving of time if we openly and better by the men sent from the differ- .•aightforwardly said, that when we are eut colonies consulting privately amongst jcussing the details of important ques- themselves, afterwards submitting the re- )ns we shall do so without admitting solutions they have arrived at publicly, e public, rather than resort to any ex- and explaining the reasons. That will be dient which may bring about identically much better than to allow the preliminary e same result, such as private and un- discussions to take place in public, when icial conferences, respecting which the possibly the delegates might commit them- blic would not be informed. It appears selves to opinions from Avhicli they might me that no vital mischief can come from have some difficulty afterwards in retiring. is proposal, seeing that the details we I know there is a strong public feeling on ree upon in Committee have to take this question. Of course the press are c form of resolutions which have to be particularly anxious that nothing should bmitted to the Convention, which have take place among us that they do not be justified, and the whole of the reasons understand. I sympathise with them in r adopting themwill have to be explained. that feeling, and I would be the last to a resolution is come to by a majority, wish to deprive them of any information 8 minority will take very good care to as to our course of action, or as to the ive the other side of the question properly ultimate conclusions we come to. But I sntilatcd. It was not merely in the case feel certain that the course adopted in Canada, but also in the case of the Melbourne was a wise and prudent one, nited .States, that the proceedings of the and might be well followed by this Con- on vention were originally conducted with vention. )Solute secrecy. AVhilst I would depre- ]Mr. IMUISTRO : It appears to me that te absolute secrecy as much as any mem- we are wasting time on what is really no ?r of the Convention would, I understand practical question. I understood that the at there is much of our business that hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, wishes to add to ould be conducted more expeditiously, his amendment the words " unless other- id many disagreements might very well Aviso ordered." Surely that covers the ! reconciled, if we liad an opportunity of whole ground ! If any necessity should )uferring in an informal way amongst arise for holding a private meeting, the irselves, instead of ahvays speaking ex words " unless otherwise ordered" would Uhedra, with every Avord Ave .said being meet the case. My own impression is that ted. .Speaking from my own point such an occasion Avill not arise at all. We n;w, I concur Avitli what the Conference are appointed delegates to draft a con- id in Melbourne. They came to a Avise stitution for a federal parliament and jsolution when they said that the discu.s- fculeral executive, and everything that avo on of principles should be public, but that do is of interest to the whole of tlio Aus- le discussion of details in Committee tralian colonies. While there may bo lould be private. In this instance the some little difTerenccs of opinion on details, iscussion has to be public ultimately ; it surely, Avhethcr we are sitting in Com- muot be suggested that tliis is a hole-and- mittee or in open House, we cannot deljato Miicr business in any shape or form. the (question in a proper manner unles.s 16 Admission of the [3 March, 1891.] Press and Public. tlic proceedings are open to the press and the public, and unless we deal with the question in a formal way ! We are not supposed to meet privately or in an in- formal manner. I am quite sxire that our business would be facilitated by transact- ing- it in the presence of the press and the public. I am quite sure that the business would be better conducted. If occasion arises at any time the President and Con- vention can order that the press and public be excluded ; but until that occasion arises I do not think there is any necessity for wasting time over this q^^estion. Mr. FITZGERALD: I apprehend there can be no diflerence of opinion among members as to the great import- ance which attaches to the creation of public opinion throughout the colonies on the question of federation. On the other hand, we have to consider that we come here in a spirit of compi-omise — to carry out that "give and take" policy which may be said to be the essence of British parliamentary government, Avithout which it will be impossible to obtain a successful termination of our labours. What we have to consider is whether the opening of our proceedings at all stages to the press will not considerably affect that spirit which must be such an important factor in our deliberations. There is a gi'eat deal to be said on this subject. We all recognise the value and importance to us of having all our proceedings known to the public of Australia ; but it is for us to consider whether it is wise to consent to the publication of these things — the publication of the surrender of important principles which delegates come here pre- pared to support, but which there will be a necessity for them to resign, if not wholly, certainly in part, if we are to come to any satisfactory conclusion. It is a most difficult question to decide. I am sure that the delegates do not desire to come to a hasty conclusion. I confess that [3/r. Munro. when I first read this resolution I thoug' it covered the ground entirely ; that u less there should be some good I'eason the contrary this Convention would coi sider that its deliberations on the deta: of any scheme of federation should be co; ducted in camera ; and, as has been wel put, that the result of the labours of the Convention in Committee shoiild form tht subject of resolutions which would be dis- cussed openly. The public would then have an opportunity of regarding the reso- lutions according to their merit, and would be able to form opinions as to their value, and as to how far they affected their in- terests or liberties. I think it is desirable that this question should not be decided this afternoon, but that there should be an adjournment in order to allow of further thought as to whether it would be to the advantage of the object we have all come here to further to have every detail, every concession, every argument made known to the world before we come to a conclusion. It is a matter of the utmost moment and weight, affecting in the most serious man* ner the result of the labours of this Con- vention, and I would i-espectfully suggest that the question should be postponed until to-morrow. Mr. THYNNE : In dealing with thia matter, reference has been made by tliel hon. member, Mr. Gillies, to the conduct of the convention in Canada, and by thei hon. member, Sir John Downer, to the' convention in the United States, and it' was shown that both conventions held theii sittings practically in secret; but I think that the circumstances under which we are now met are radically different from the circumstances under which both those con- ventions were held. I take it that the movement in favour of the federation of these colonies is one that has sprung wholly and solely from the people of the colonic themselves, for their own advantage, and I think it is in that respect that the move- Admission of the [3 March, 1891.] Fress and Public. 17 jnts which took place in Canada, and in 3 United States, were materially dif- ■ent, because they had powerful forces fcernal to the countries themselves which ged them strongly to enter into some •m of federation, I think that in this tter, unless we are entirely with the ople of these colonies, we are bound to set with a great deal of difficulty here- ;er, and it seems to me that we should making a very great mistake if we opted in this Convention any course of ocedure ditfering from that adopted in e parliaments of all the colonies, and that the complete opening of all the discus- ms, whether in Committee or out of it, the public. If we adopt the resolution lich has been moved by the hon. mem- Mr. JIcMillan, I think there will be me ground for fearing that suspicion 11 attach to some of the proceedings of is Convention, and I think that that )uld be a most unfortunate thing. 'I'he lendment should be carried without the lay wliich one hon. gentleman has re- lested. :Mr. SHIELS : I think the suggestion 'ered by Mr. Fitzgerald and other gentle- en i.s the correct one to adopt. "We are king a very serious step, and I think "^ 'I'lestion requires more consideration, are the complaints which have been ade against parliamentary government ! recent years, not only in these colonies it also in the mother country? They •e that there is an intolerable amount of ilk, that when the people expect work ley get — sometimes clorjuonce, but some- mes mere words, and words which had Jttcr have been left unspoken. The mrse being taken is, I think, a danger- is one, and will be dilatory in its action, le inevitable tendency of large bodies of jpresentativc men with tlie press before lem, being to rlietorical displays, and Iso to the exhibition of a spirit the very pposite to that which is so necessary in our deliberations — the spirit of compro- mise. A spirit of stubbornness is induced. Men having committed themselves in the sight of the press and of the public to a certain view, it is human nature that they will contend for that view to the last, so that, instead of being ready, in a s^iirit of compromise, to give up for higher objects, they will be unyielding and resisting wheu they should yield, and v.hen they ought to feel that the opinions in favour of a course opposite to that v/hich they advo- cate are worthy of their consideration. "SYe are taking a course essentially danger- ous at the pi'esent time, and I think that we ought not to have a discussion on this motion until further opportunity be given for consideration. I move : That the debate be adjoiiruetl until to- morrow. Mr. Macdonald-Paterson seconded the motion. Mr. RUTLEDGE : I must express my regret that the amendment moved by the hon. member, Sir. Shiels, has been submitted to the Convention. ^Ye have had twenty-four hours to think over this matter. Notice of the intention to move this motion was given yesterday when we met ; and I do not think that we shall derive any benefit, or that the proceedings of tliis Convention will be in any Avay facilitated by a further postpone- ment. I think we have all made up our minds pretty well as to what is the pi'oper course to adopt on the present occasion with regard to this matter, lion, gentle- men who have advocated that part of our proceedings should be conducted privately have endeavoured to strengthen their ar- guments by references to the procedure adopted when the UnitcdStatcsConvention assembled in the year 1787, and to the pro- cedure of the later convention assembled for the purpose of founding a constitution for for what is now the Dominion of Canada ; but, as has been observed by the hon. IS Admission of the [3 Maucii, ISOL] Tress and Fuhlic. member, INlr. Thynne, it must not be for- gotten that tlie circumstances which ob- tained in both those epochs were very dif- ferent from those which prevail at the pre- sent time. It cannot be contended that when the convention assembled in 1787, there was a public press of the character which we now have, not only in the metropolis of ISTew South ^Yales, but also in all the Australian capitals and in all the principal provincial tov/ns of these colonies ; and I think we assume too much when Ave take it for granted that we who are assembled here are the only persons who can exercise an educative elFect upon each other. A great many of us are only feeling our way. By the interchange of ideas in this Chamber we shall do a great deal to imbue each other with a true idea of the functions pertaining to us, and the objects we hope to achieve ; but while we hope to get a great deal of illumination from the interchan<]:e of opinions on the floor of this assembly, I think we must admit that we shall derive great benefit from the educative influence of the press outside. I think the more daylight we can let in upon our prececdings the more advantageous it will be, and the more it will facilitate the work of this Convention. We have to cultivate the sympathy of the people whom we are sent here to represent, and we should suffer a very great disadvantage indeed if we allowed the idea to go abroad that there was any part of our proceedings as a con- vention which it was desirable to shield from puljlic observation. Even in connec- tion with' our own legislative assemblies there is a great deal of business done in- formally in private. It is not done by the legislative assemblies as such, but it is done in committee.s, and in other meetincrs where members of both parties come together to arrange their respective programmes. "Why cannot we do this now ? There is nothinir in the amendment moved by the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Dibbs, wdiich prevents any number [3Ir. Rutledge. of the members of this Convention from as- sembling together in order to interchangf ideas, and I think, remembering this, thei'( is no need to suggest the desirableness oi having any part of the proceedings of thi Convention as a convention held in pi-ivate Some hon. gentlemen have sufrgested tha' if we do not adopt the expedient that hai been referred to by Mr. Fitzgerald, o: having part of our proceedings on occasioi in private, it will tend to produce a grea flood of oratory, and members will mab speeches for the sake of being reported but I conceive that if we have part of ou' proceedings in private in this way we shal bring about the very evil sought to b avoided, because when there will only bi formal motions submitted here to b' spoken to by the delegates, every delegati wall conceive it important to him to havi all his say on these resolutions ; whereas if the proceedings of the committee wer as open to the public as the proceeding of the Convention, when resolutions of i formal character were being discussed, del? gates would not have the same inducemen to make long speeches for the sake o being reported. Mr. Fitzgerald: The hon. member mus be mistaken when he connects me with thi idea. I have not entertained it, nor hav I expressed it. Mr. EUTLEDGE: I have not attr, buted the argument to the hon. delegate o o I but I know that the idea has existed ii some minds, and I am aware that there i i a fear that, unless some of the proceeding I of the Convention are conducted withou the press and the public being admitted there will be a tendency to open the flood gates of talk, and to obstruct, rather thai facilitate, the progress of business. Mr. BAKER : I confess that this is most diflicult question, and I have no made up my mind as to the side I shal take. But I rise to point out one funda mental difflculty which has not yet beei Admission of the Press. [3 March, 1S91.] Divisions. 19 riinted out by any delegate. Our proceed- _'s here have been compared to the pro- lings in parliament, and we are told lat, because the proceedings of parliament re open to the public, the proceedings of s Convention ought also to be always ;eu to the public. Now, the fundamental fference between this Convention and irliament is this : Parliament has power > decide upon and finally make laws. iter a bill has emerged from parliament id has received the royal assent it becomes 1 act, and binds the people ; but we are et here only to advise. Everything we ) has hereafter to be discussed and decided )on by the people. We are told — and, a doubt, correctly told — that it is our aty to educate the people up to this idea federation — to the adoption of a scheme hich I hope we shall frame in this Con- ntion. No doubt this is true ; but the iucation will come after we have adopted 16 scheme. It does not at all follow that le public shoiUd be necessarily admitted all the details of the framing of the ;heme. It will be a very difficult thing )r the delegates, after the scheme has been ■araed and adopted, to explain it, as they ill have to do, to the people of the vari- 118 colonics if the public are admitted to our discussions. I confess I see great ifficuUics on both sides. If we do ad- jit the public to every discussion it 'ill be difficult for the delegates when hey return to the diffiirent colonics from rhicli tlicy worn sent to cry back upon he opinions which they have strongly ad- 'ocated here, although tliey will have to ry back in respect to some of the details I that spirit of compromise, which is the mly spirit which should be admitted here, S present. If wo have to give way after lading strongly expressed our opinions it ffill be most difficult for us when wo get Jack to agree to views contrary to those which we favoured liere. On the other »nd, if the press and the public arc not admitted to all our proceedings T know that a suspicion will arise — I believe an unworthy suspicion — that something has happened which, for some improper reason, we do not want made public. But I ara quite sure that no such suspicion can pos- sibly be founded on truth. In conclusion, I hope that the amendment will be agreed to, and that we shall have a longer time to think over this matter. Sir SAMUEL GE,IFEITH : There is such a difference of opinion upon this subject that it seems to me that it will be necessary to dispose of notice of motion No. 7 before we can deal with the motion before us. At the present time we do not know how to divide, so that we are bound to postpone this motion. Motion agreed to ; debate adjourned. Convention adjourned at 3"47 p.m. WEDNESDAY, 4 MARCH, ISOl. The Roll —Divisions — Admission of the Press and tho Public— Quoiiim— Federal Constitution. The President took the chair at 11 a.m. THE ROLL. Sir George Grey, K.C.B. (New Zealand), and Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, K.C.M.G., LL.D., M.P. (Queen.sland), subscribed the roll. DIVLSIONS. Debate resumed (from page 12) on motion by Mr. McMillan : 'J'liat ill any divisiona taken in tlie Convention tlic Presidcnl or Vice-President, ns the case may be, liave the right to vote, and in case of an equality of votes excicise a second or eastiiitj vote ; and tliat tlio names of tlic delegates bo printed in alphabetical order, witliout rcfcrenco to the colonics v.hicli they represent, — Upon which Mr. Playford had moved an amendment to omit the words : and in cage of an equality of vote;? exercise a second or casting vote. 20 Divisions. [4 March, 1891.] Admission of the Press. Mr. McMillan : lu order to save time I have found out, to a great extent, tlie wishes of members of the Convention in regard to this motion and amendment ; and I will propose an alteration, subject, of course, to the concurrence of hon. members, •when I have stated what that alteration is to be. I find that it is the general desire that the President should not have a cast- ins: vote, and that when the votes are equal, a motion should be considered as having been practically decided in the negative. I propose, therefore, to omit the words " exercise a second or casting vote " with the view to the insertion of the words " the question shall be deemed to have passed in the negative." The President : As the matter now stands, the amendment moved by the hon. member, Mr. Playford, is in the way of the proposal by the hon. member, Mr. McMillan. Mr. PLAYFOED : I ask leave of the Convention to withdraw my amendment. Amendment, by leave, Avithdrawn. Motion (by Mr. McMillan) agreed to : That the words " exercise a second or casting vote " be omitted with a view to the insertion of the words " the qiiestion shall be deemed to have passed in the negative." Mr. SHIELS : Perhaps my hon. friend will allow me to suggest the advisability of providing for what may occur, namely, the desire of the Convention to have the question again submitted to it. The pass- in"' in the negative may be held to pre- clude the right of the Convention, excepting by special order, to have a matter again submitted for consideration. Perhaps it would be advisable to provide for any such contingency by adding words to the resolution such as the following : — but may be again submitted for consideration. Mr. McMillan : Notice of motion can be given under the orders of the day ! Mr. Gillies : The orders of the House of Commons would prevent that ! Mr. SHIELS : The difficulty will h - that when once the question is passed ii the negative — if you simply follow thii rules of the House of Commons which arK to guide our piocsedings — it cannot l brought forward again in the same session Mr. Playford : A motion can alway be rescinded ! Mr. SHIELS : I am only throwing ou the suggestion in order to prevent any thin of that kind. Question resolved in the affirmative, n II ADMISSIOX OF THE PRESS AND PUBLK Debate resumed (from page 19), o motion by Mr. McMillan : (1.) That when the Convention is engaged] debating matters formally submitted by previoi notice, or submitted by consent withoiit notia the press and public be admitted on the order ( the President. (2.) Tliat whenever the Convention is in Con mittee, the press and public be not admittq unless otherwise ordered. Upon which Mr. Dibbs had moved amendment to omit from the first pa graph the words : "when the Convention is engaged in debat matters formally submitted by previous noti or submitted by consent without notice," w a view to insert the words ' ' during the sitt of tlie Convention." Mr. McMillan : Again with the joct of saving time, I would ask my h friend, Mr. Dibbs, to withdraw his ame: ment with the view of substituting the : lowing : — That the press and public be admitted, u: otlierwise ordered, during the sittings of Convention, on t!ie order of tlie President. I think a motion of that kind will m the views of the delegates generally, still leaves it open to us to have close &. tings, if necessary, and it establishes tli general princijDle that, in most cases, th press shall be admitted. Mr. DIBBS : With the concurrence c the delegates, I have much pleasure i: I ji Admission of the [4 March, 1891.] Press and Puhlic. 21 hdra-wing my amendment. The prin- e I advocate is tlie free and open sussion of all our proceedings. Of rse we shall have the right to exclude press ; hut I feel perfectly certain t that riglit will never be exercised. Amendment and motion, by leave, hdraAvn. Motion (by Mr, McMillan) proposed : 'hat the press and public be admitted, mi- I otherwise ordered, during the sittings of the ivention, on the order of the President. 3ir THO:\I AS McILWRAITH : I can- ; understand why such a distinct change >uld be made from what was considered lessary yesterday. So far as I can lier from reading the debate of yestei'- 7, the opinion of most of the delegates that the pi'ess sliall be admitted whilst ; Convention is sitting as a convention ; fc that, Avhilst sitting in Committee, the ?ss shall not be admitted. I believe it is the intention ; and we do not get ay from it by simply throwing upon ursclf, Mr. President, the responsibility directing whether the press shall be mittcd or not. We have to look at lat will practically be the result if the ittcr is loft entirely to yourself. The nilt will be that the press will always present, because I do not think for a jmont you will ever take — unless moved rongly by the Convention itself to do so •the responsibility of ordering out the CSS. It is quite possible, therefore, that e press will always be present, unless mething happens in connection with liit to be present. It is not to prevent lything of that kind that we want the 'ess to be present. It is to curtail our 'occedings, to allow us to act in Com- ittoe with a great deal more freedom, id to allow us to come to a doterinina- Qn more quickly than we would do if le press were present. I believe myself that if the pi'ess are present at our pi-o- ceedings in Committee the Convention will be protracted from week to week. We will be posing to the press, and we will, possibly, be led by the press. We ought to come to the Convention with our own ideas and discuss them ourselves. I am perfectly satisfied that, in discussions in Committee, we shall come to much better, quicker, and freer determinations without the presence of the press than we shall if every motion in Committee is commented upon by the press. I shall not vote for the motion. Colonel SMITH : I regret to have to differ with the lion, gentleman who has just resumed his seat ; and I do so, not on account of the press, because that is a matter of the most profound indifference to me, but because I think the people of all these colonies ought to know every- thing that is said, whether in Committee or out of Committee. They ought to know the reason why v.^e arrive at certain reso- lutions in Committee. The people of the whole of the colonies are expected to in- dorse our actions, and to know the reasons for the decisions at which we arrive. For my part, I support most cordially the pror posal which was brought forward by the hon. member, ]\Ir. Dibbs, or the one now proposed liy the hon. member, Mr. INIcMil- lan. I certainly do think that if we act fairly to the i^coplo M-e represent in the various colonics we ought to allow the utmost publicity. The hon. member. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, knows that the at- tending and reporting of our proceedings is a costly matter for the press. It is not for the purpo.sc of pleasing us that the press are present, but for the purpose of letting the people of the various colonies know what we are doing, and why we are doing it. I coidially sui)port the proposal of the hon. member, ]\lr. INIcINlillan, Sir PATllICK JENNINCS : I must own that when I first considered this oo AdiniissioiiofthePi'ess. [4 March, 1S91,] Quoricm. subject I thought our proceedings would be expedited if certain debates which will take place in Committee were not attended and reported by the press. I certainly be- lieve, with all due respect to the delegates, that the reporting of all our proceedings will tend to prolong the sitting of this Convention. I find, however, that gentle- men whom we might most naturally expect would desii'e to return to their homes as early as possible are in no degree adverse to the probable prolongation of our sittings by the presence of the press fully to re- port all that is done. AYe are, no doubt, doing a great work ; and I think that we ought not to hurry over it. Every op))or- tunity ought to be given to discuss and reflect upon every proposal brought before the Convention. Under these circum- stances I have fallen in with the view put forward in the amendment proposed by the hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, yestei'day, and now substituted by the motion of the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, that it will be most desirable, in the interests of all the colonies, in the interests of the Aus- tralasian public, and as a means of giving very wide and broad information in re- gard to our proceedings, to have the whole of them rejjorted in the press. I think my hon. friend, Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, pro- bably misunderstood the meaning of the motion. I do not take it to be the in- tention of the President to exclude any person whatever ; he is simply to have the power to regulate the numbers of those who may attend — that is, for the purpose of keeping order and preventing overcrowd- ing. I do not expect there will be any occasion upon which the members of the Convention will comport themselves in such a way as to render necessary a motion that the press be excluded. I am quite confident, from the concourse of gentlemen who are here, with all their vast experience and ripe knowledge, that our proceedings throughout will be consis- [V hatever our views may be on other Here we create the power of raising revo- points, I think we .shall all be agreed upon nucs tlirough the Customs, which, of course, this: that for the defence of Australasia will open the field to the great and aggre.s- to be economical, to lo efficient, to be sivc debates as to Avhich form of custom.s equal to the emergency that may arise at duties will be most conducive to the wel- any time, it must be of a federal character, faro of the country as a whole. It may bo and must be under one command. I am — it is not for me even to prophesy or to .seeking to simplify my words as much as express my own opinions in that direction possible. I do not mean that the land ■ — it may be that the federal parliament forces and the naval forces shall be under will ;it once declare for a protective policy one commander-in chief ; Ijut that they for Australia against the world. Possibly should be under one kindred command — it may be that the federal parliament, com- that the naval officer in command equally posed, as we have a right to expect it will with the military officer shall be a federal First day. 26 Federal Constitution : [i March, 1801.] liesolutions. officer, and amenable to the national go- vernment of Australasia, Now, these are the conditions which appear to me to be essentially requisite that we should decide ill one way or the other — that should be strictly defined by this Convention before ■we can proceed to construct a bill to con- fer a constitution. I then proceed : Subject to these and other necessary provi- sions, this Convention approves of the framing of a federal constitution, which shall establish : (1.) A Tarlianient, to consist of a senate and a house of representatives, "What I mean is an upper chamber, call it what you may, which shall have Avithin itself the only conservatism possible in a democracy — the conservatism of maturity of judgment, of distinction of service, of length of experience, and weight of char- acter — which are the only qualities we can expect to collect and bring into one body in a community young and inexperi- enced as Australia is ; and a house of representatives upon a thoroughly popular basis. The resolution proceeds : the former consisting of an equal number of mem- bers from each pro^nnce, to be elected by a sys- tem which shall provide for the retirement of one-third of tho members every years, so securing to the body itself a perpetual existence combined with definite responsibility to the elec- tors ; the latter to be elected by districts formed on a population basis, and to possess the sole power of originating and amending all bills ap- propriating revenue or imposing taxation. I hold that these latter words must be en- grafted upon any constitution bill, especi- ally if the two houses are elective, because "we may naturally expect — if we have an elective upper chamber, whether elected by the colonies as provinces or by bodies of electors — that that body will contend for an equal authority in dealing with what are called money bills, unless we expressly provide that these bills shall originate and be amended in that chamber which is more directly and more truthfully responsible to \Sir Henry Parkes. the whole body of the electors. Hence, then, I contend that it will be absolutely necessary not to trust to derivations to be drawn from principles or practice in other countries, but to expressly provide that all money bills shall originate and undergo amendment only in the house of representa- tives. The next clause says : A judiciary, consisting of a federal supreme court, which shall constitute a high court of ap- peal for Australia, under the direct authority of the Sovereign, whose decisions as such shall be final. In seeking to create this supreme court of Australia, it will be observed that I seek to create within it an appellate court from which there shall be no appeal to the Queen in the Privy Council. For that reason, if the Queen has authority in England, she can have authority here. If she forms, even sentimentally, a part of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council she can also form a similar part of our Appellate Court. But at the same time I think we shall make a great mistake if we allow any appeal to be made outside the shores of the laew Australia. I appeal to, and I shall expect several gentlemen, learned in the law, who are delegates here, to dwell further, and in a much moi'e definite way upon this branch of the subject than I shall pretend to do. I think I have stated the object I have in view with sufficient clearness. The resolutions conclude : An executive, consisting of a governor-gene- ral, and such persons as may from time to time be appointed as his advisers, such persons sit- ting in Parliament, and whose term of office shall depend upon their possessing the confidence of the house of representatives expressed by the support of the majority. What is meant by that is simply to call into existence a ministry to conduct the affairs of the new nation as similar as it can be to the ministry of England — a body of constitutional advisers who shall stand as nearly as possible in the same relation to the representative of the Crown here k Federal Constitution : [4 MAEcn, 1891.] Resolutions. 27 as Ler Majesty's imperial advisers stand the revolutionary vr&r, and not only so, in relation to the Crown directly. These, Lut for several years — I forget at this then, are the principles which my resolu- moment how many — of the new republic, tions seek to lay down as a foundation, as we had the example that neither in war I have already stated, for the new super- nor in peace were those confederated states structure, my ohject being to invite other able to exercise anypower,and in thelamen- gentlemen to work upon this foundation so tations uttered by the great authors of the as to best advance the ends we have in view. Union of their inability to get anything I again express my desire that the discus- done we may find a warning to all future sion may be as free as possible ; that the peoples who attempt to govern themselves amendment of my scheme may not be guided as a whole. The thing is so reasonable by any consideration except what will be in the very nature of things that it hardly best for the country ; and that no import- admits of reference to history or elaborate ance whatever will be attached to the argument. Take our own example. Here source from which these resolutions come, we find a people I suppose about 4,000,000 I think I have sketched the grounds of strong. They have afforded in the great my resolutions with sufficient clearness, cities of Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, and, if so, certainly with sufficient fulness. Brisbane, and Hobart abundant proof of I am sorry to say my health will not per- the poAver of founding an empire. Go be- mit me to dwell very long upon the sub- yond the cities : they have accomplished ject, but I cannot refrain from saying a under responsible government what ap- few words on the general question. As pear to me, and what must appear to any to the wisdom of the great step we have stranger who knew the country thirty-five now taken — for so many eminent men years ago, marvels in the way of internal from different parts of Australasia meet- improvements. Not only the railways, but ing in this chamber as delegates from the roads, the telegraphs, and everything their respective colonies is in itself a great that conduces to the best ends of a civilised step — as to the wisdom of that step we community, has been achieved by this scat- have the warning of every country in the tered people in a marvellous manner. But world which has tried government by a all through this great, this noble, this suc- confederation. I know of no single in- cessful effort we have had different sources stance where anything like complete sue- of irritation, of bad neighbourhood, of tur- cess, anything like satisfactory success, has moil, of aggression, which, if they were to arisen where there has been a number of go on, must make these conterminous com- Btates of equal authority and power trying munitics instead of being a people of one to govern by confederated authority. But blood, one faith, one jurisprudence— one in we need not go any further than the the veryprinciplesof civilisation themselves striking example of the states which came — instead of that, must make us as cavil- into existence immediately after the de- ling, hostile, disputatious foreign coun- claration of independence in America. tries. The only way to stop that is for The history of those confederated states the whole people— and remember that the and their vain attempts to conduct their whole people in tlie final result must be affairs is a warning for all time to a free the arbiters— to join in creating one great people not to attempt to manage their union government which shall act for affairs in any other way than by a solid the whole. That government must, of ' united government representing the whole course, be sufficiently strong to act with I people. We had throughout the years of effect, to act successfully, and it must be I First day. r 2S Federal Constitution: [4 March, 1891.] Resolutions, sulVicieutly strong to carry the name and the fame of Australia witli unspotted beauty, and with uncrippled power through- out the world. Ojic great end, to my mind, of a federated Australia is that it must of necessity secure for Australia a place in the family of nations, -which it never can attain Avhile it is split up into separate colonies -with antagonistic laws, and with hardly anything in common. I do not now, Mr. President, dwell upon the many conflicts in the laws of these colonies which ought not to exist, such as the conflicts in our marriage laws, in the laws governing all monetary and financial institutions — I do not dwell upon these things — they are too numerous for me at this tioae — but every one of us knows the extent of the evil resulting from tins want of hai'mony. All that can be cured ; but it can be cured only by one great union government which shall faithfully represent us all. I regret to say, Mr. President, that my strength is not such as will enable me to keep on my feet many minutes longei". I have submitted these resolutions — pei'haps it is all the better — without any great effort in their support. I trust I have ex- plained them with a clearness sufficient for my purpose, and I trust that I have in- dicated with a clearness sufficient what the great object we aim at must be, and the means by which alone we can hope to accomplish it. I do not doubt that the gentlemen present will each of them address themselves to the subject which, I think, the resolutions have the merit of fairly launcliing in a spirit of patriotism, always keeping in view the welfare, the prosperity, the united strength, and the ultimate glory of our common country. We cannot fail if we set about this work in earnest. I .shall say no more now for the reason I have stated, but x-eserve anything that I may wish to advance in further support of these I'esolutions to the reply Avhich I have no doubt will [Sir Henry Parkes. be accorded to me. I have the honor to propose the resolutions standing in my name. Question proposed. Tlte President then resumed the chair. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: As no hon. member desires to proceed with the debate just now, and it is possible that some hon. member may be willing to speak this afternoon, I would suggest, Mr. President, that you should leave the chair until an hour which may be considered most con- venient for the Convention to meet in the afternoon. Mr. GILLIES : There is a feeling amon" a number of jrentlemen in the Con- vention that it would be extremely desir- able to adjourn until to-morrow, when we should go on with the general discus- sion. Of course, if any hon. gentleman is desirous of continuing the discussion raised by you, sir, on your resolutions to- day, I do not suppose that any hon. mem- ber would like to prevent that from taking place. But we ought to have an assui'ance from some hon. member that he is prepared to continue the discussion if we meet here at half-past 2 o'clock this afternoon. Sir JOHN BPvAY : It will be conveni- ent, perhaps, that some gentleman present, who is prepared to resume the discussion, should move an adjournment until that time. The President : If an intimation is made that an hon. gentleman will be pre- pared to take up the debate at half-past 2 o'clock, I will leave the chair now, and take it again at tliat houx'. If thex-e is a desii-e to adjourn until to-morrow, I think the adjoux-nment must be made by motion. But I would suggest that my leaving the chair until half-past 2 o'clock is the pre- fei-able course, Mr. DEAKIN: The understanding here was that one of the senior members of the Convention was likely to move the ad- journment of the debate until half-past 2 I Federal Comtituiion ! [4 March, 1891.] HesoliUions. 29 o'clock this afternoon. If that is not the case, I shall myself be prepai'ed to move an adjournment until that houz-. The President left tlie chair, and resumed it at half-past 2 o'clock. Sir SAMUEL GEIFFITH : I .should have preferred, Mr. President, that my hen. friend beside me, the Hon. James Munro, Prime Minister of the great colony of Victoria, should have followed you in the debate on the resolutions that you have submitted to us. But we are all of us, I suppose, conversant with the subject which we are met to discuss, and under these cir- cumstances I think that no useful purpose can be served by delaying the discussion. You, sir, have set us a very good example in many respects in the speech in which you opened it. I trust that the various speakers who may address the Convention will not be unduly long, while I hope, at the same time, that they will address them- selves in detail to the important matters wliich we have to consider. I do not pro- pose to address mj'self to the general as- pects of the question, because I feel that I could not usefully add anything to what has been so well said by yourself, nor could I say it so well ; but I propose to offer some observations which I think may be worthy of consideration before we come to a conclusion upon the important matters submitted in these resolution.s. Tlie hrst of the propositions, or the principles, sir, that you ask the Convention to affirm, is really, I think, the fundamental one of all. It is thequestion upon v/hich public opinion in the colonies is most agitated, namely, how far the sejiarato self-governing states on this continent are to surrender their I )wer3 of autonomy. The ^iropo-sition lich you enunciate is this : That tlie powers and privileges aiultonitorlHl li^lits of the Hovcral existing colonics shall re- main intact, cxceiJt in respect to such sur- renders as may be agreed upon as necessary and incidental to the power and authority of the national federal government. Entirely concurring in that proposition, I do not propose to offer many words in sup- port of it. But I will make this obser- vation : that that indication of the func- tions of the federal government is really the key to the whole of the resolutions that follow. We are met here to devise a con- stitution, that is, a great governmental machine to govern the general affairs of Australia. But before we can attempt to indicate what the nature of that machine should be, it is absolutely necessary that we should have a clear conception of the Avork that it has to perform. The work that has to be performed by independent states or provinces, of which we have several in Australia at the present time, is in many respects very different from the work that will have to be performed by that general governmental machine, and that consideration must be ever present to our minds in considering both the rela- tive functions of the two houses of Parlia- ment and the relation that is to exist between the executive and the legislative departments of government. For instance — and I will refer to this more particu- larly later on — the relationship betw-eeii two houses of Parliament that is quite ap- plicable to, and, I may say, is manifestly the proper one to adopt in, a single self-con- tained state may not necessarily be equally well adapted to a federation of states. It may well Ijc that the relations of the smaller house — the senate I will call it, using tlie Avord you have used in the resolution — to the other house represent- ing the people directly, may be different in a state of that kind. But I say that in considering all these matters we must bear in mind the functions which the general government and the general par- liament have to perform. Without refer- ring )nore in detail to that just now, I will pass on to the first of the great sub- jects you have referred to in the resolu- tions as one to be dealt with by the federal First day. 30 Federal Constitution .• [4 March, 1891.] Resolutions. parliament, thequostion of tariff orcustoms. You propose to afllrm that there shall be free-trade between the provinces, and that the general parliament alone shall have the power to ir.ipQ-j any restrictions upon trade, or to raise revenue from cus- toms. Not dissenting in the smallest degree from that proposal, I offer no obser- vation either in support of or against it. I do not think it necessaiy until some op- position is shown to it, to offer any fur- ther observations than you made in support of it. But I would point out at the pre- sent moment that the establishment of a federal tariff must be subsequent to the establishment of a federal parliament. The time that will be occupied in devising a federal tariff is at present unknown to us, and I think it follows almost as a matter of course that, until that federal tariff — that federal customs system — is adopted there must be a continuance of the existing system — and that for more reasons than one. First, because otherwise there would, for some time, be no source of revenue from the customs at all, and the various states would be thrown at once into a condition of inability to meet their en- gagements and carry on their functions. That is the first and most obvious reason ; but beyond that there is another question, which is a very serious one for us all to consider, and it is this : We in these colonies have been in the habit of relying to a very large extent for our revenue upon customs tariffs. The conditions of Aus- tralia in that respect are very different from those of the American States, which have never of late years — never since the very earliest inception of their present con- stitution — had to rely upon the customs for revenue. Their revenue has been derived from internal sources. We, in Australia, all rf-ly to a large extent on customs reve- nue ; and some security must be devised that the future customs revenue will still be available, and will be sufficient Avhen \Sir Sarmiel Griffith, distributed for the needs of the separate provinces. T myself do not apprehend that when the federal parliament meets any practical difficulty will be found in raising a sufficient external revenue by means of the customs, a revenue equal, or nearly equal, to that now raised by the colonies separately. An equal amount cer- tainly must be raised. In the third of these resolutions, you have referred to the dis- posal of that revenue. It appears to me that v/e must carefully bear in mind through- out our deliberations here the necessity of providing a sufficient amount of revenue to be disposed of amongst the separate states. I do not at present indicate, nor am I in a position to do so, how that will be secured ; but I will just indicate the great difficulty which might arise under some circumstances, which I do not think likely to happen. Suppose the federal par- liament were to consider it desirable that there should be something like absolute free-trade, or as near free- trade as possible, that as small an amount of money should be raised by customs as is compatible with the existence of the government. Then some other means of raisins: revenue would have to be devised by the separate states. I mention that, not because I wish to refer particularly to this branch of the subject, in respect to which a great many members of the Convention have a much larger knowledge than I possess ; but because it is a subject which requires to be carefully considered. We must secure for the federal government and for the separate governments, who will derive great part of their revenue from the surplus customs income of the gene- ral government, a sufficiency of money to carry on their work. In considering that also, we must not lose sight of the essential conilition that this is to be a federation of states, and not a single go- vernment for Australia. I will make that clear later on. I do not at present pro- Federcd Constitution : [4 March, 1891.] Resohdions. 31 pose to offer any observations in respect of tlie people, and also the assent of the to military and naval defences. We are majority of the states. That is the essen- all agreed that there must be one com- tial condition of the American Constitu- mand — of course, there must be sub-com- tion. It has given rise, no doubt, to much mands — but those are matters of detail. faction ; but any foi'm ^^. government Concurring, as I do, with the general probably -will, unless one \ody is abso- propositions which you have laid down as lutely preponderating in power. But that to the sreneral functions of the machine is a condition absolutely new to us in Aus- that is to be constructed, I wish to pro- tralia. It is absolutely new to us in the ceed to consider the question of the legis- British empire, that every law shall receive httive and executive power, because that the assent of a majority of the people, as is the machine which has to work, and it well as of a majority of the states. And I is our business, if we are capable of doing particularly wish hon. gentlemen here to our work — it is our business whether we consider how that will affect the concluding are capable or not — to devise a scheme that words of this first proposal as to the form will work, and to avoid any possible or prob- of the constitution, and also how it will affect able sources of friction, as far as historical the relationship of the executive to the par- information w-ill enable us to do so. And liament — that everything has to receive here let me insist upon the essential condi- the assent of the majority of the people tion — the preliminary condition — that the and the assent of the majority of the states. separate states are to continue as autono- Our present system in the colonies and in mous bodies, surrendering only so much of the British Parliament, as well as in that their powers as is necessary to the estab- of Canada, is that one house has a pre- lishment of a general goverament to do ponderating influence. It is practically for them collectively what they cannot suflicient for most purposes of government do individually for themselves, and which that a measure should commend itself to they cannot do as a collective body for that house, and if it commends itself to tliemsclves. You propose that there shall that house it will sooner or later have the be a parliament of two houses — a senate force of lav/-. The other house is a weaker, and a house of representatives, you pro- not so independent a body;, it can exer- pose to call them, and I know of no better cise at most a power of delay to prevent torms— tliat in onetlie statesshall be rcprc- undue liaste in government ; but sooner or sented equally, and in the other the poo[)lo later it has to give way. But if you re- of Australia in proportion to population. cognise the principle— and I think wo Wliat does that mean ? I ask hon. gen- must if we are to get federation of the tlomen here to consider the full extent of Australian colonies— that the states must all that is involved in the proposition, be- also concur by a majority in every pro- cause I take it that it is the key to tlie posal, then one house cannot have that whole of what follows. For it means this, preponderating influence. There must bo in the language of one of the writei-s of on all important matters a deliberate and those admirable papers which we have all notacoerccdconcurrenceofthetwobranches read, written for the purpose of inducing of the legislature. As to the constitution the American States and the state of of the senate, I may be permitted to say Kew York, in particular, to adopt the that I believe it can only be satisfactorily federal constitution of America — that every framed on a basis such as is indicated in law submitted to the federal pnrliament the resolution, that there shall be an equal shall receive the assent of the majority number of members from each state, and First day. 32 Federal Constitution : [l March, 1891.] Resolutions. that they shall retire periodically ;tliat is to tion of revenue or imposing taxes. That, say, it shall be a body incapable of disso- is, indeed, the only restriction that is in I lution — a continuous body periodically re- form adopted in any of the constitutions newed by the vacation of oflSce of a portion we have. Nor do I suggest for a moment of its members. The number of years that that any but the house representing the theyshouldholdoftke, is entirely a matter of people directly should have the power of detail. In respect to the concluding words originating taxation, or of originating ex- oftheresolution, in which you propose that penditure. But if every law has to ra- the lower house shall have the sole power ceive the approval of the majority of the of originating and amending all bills appro- people as well as of the majority of the priating revenue or imposing taxation, I states, it follows that they must have the desire to say that as at present advised it power of refusing their assent to any pro- seems to me that that is quite inconsistent posed taxation or to any proposed expendi- with the independent existence of the ture. senate as representing the separate states. Mr. Playford : That is involved in the The functions of a legislative council are resolution ! all more or less supposed to be founded on Sir SAMUEL GEIFFITH : It appears those of the House of Lords, the powers to me that the resolution strikes at that of which have become considerably dimin- altogether. Suppose that it was proposed ished, and are now principally those of a by the persons having the conduct of busi- checking and a useful revising body. This ness in the house of representatives to ex- is the case with regard to our councils, pend a lai'ge sum of money, say, in estal> especially the nominee bodies which exist lishinga federal arsenalinaparticularplace, in many of the colonies. The elective or in raising a large body of troops, and councils have a more real control ; but in suppose that the proposal were embodied, all great contests between the two houses as it might well be, in an appropriation of parliament, one representing the Avhole bill, should the senate representing the body of the people, and the other repre- states have the power to veto that expen- senting only part of them, the body repre- diture, or should it not? That is the senting only part of the people has neces- form in which the question has arisen in sarily had to give way ; and it has become the various colonies. It may be in Austra- recognised that the two houses have not lia, where we have some very large colonies in substance, although they have in form, and some very small ones, that a majority equal authoi'ity in the state. I understand representing, perhaps, two colonies only, that the first part of tliis proposition in- Avould have practically the power of en- volves the assumption that the two houses forcing that expenditure against the will shall have equal powers, and that all that of the majority of the states. And they is to be done shall be by the concurrence would have it, if it were not competent of the people and the states. If that is so, for the senate representing the states to I take it that the least you can give to the exercise the power of veto as to any house representing the states as states, is item of expenditure of which they disap- an absolute power of veto upon anything proved. That is a matter which must be that the majority of the states think ought considered, and I bi'ing it up at this early not to be adopted. I will illustrate that stage because it requires the fullest con- by one or two probable instances. The sideration from every gentleman present. limitation suggested in this resolution is We must know exactly what we mean- merely as to bills originating the appropria- whether we mean that the senate repre- [Sir Samuel Griffith. Federal Constitution. [4 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 33 enting the states is to have the power •f vetoing any law or anything in the lature of a law, because the authorisation »f expenditure for important purposes is a the nature of a la-.v, or whether we do lOt mean that. We must make up our [liuds as to what we do mean, ^yhen re have done that we can easily express ur meaning. I cannot see at present how lb is possible for the lower house alone to ave practically uncontrolled authority ver expenditure ; how it is possible to econcile that principle with the principle iat everything done by the federal legis- iture must have the assent of a majority f the states. I hope that hon. gentlemen rill consider the matter and address them- elves to it. I have no hesitation in ex- itessing what I believe to be the true olution of the question, not only as a mat- er of practical necessity for the purpose f establishing a federal constitution, but le best adapted for its stability wlien es- iblished. I do not think that the smaller Lustralian colonies will be content to re- Inquish the power of exercising the veto y a majority of states in regard to any roposal in the federal legislature, and I o not think it desirable that they should so, becau.se it would be departing from 10 fundamental princii)le enunciated in 10 first resolution, that wc are only surren- ering to the general government what is bsolutcly necessary for the benefit of the 'hole of Australia, leaving to the several bates their autonomy. If we leave to tlie tates a power of autonomy as ample as he resolution indicates, we must leave hem their individual existence as state ntities capable individually of voting as tates in favour of or in opposition to any roposed federal legislation. Without hat a source of friction will exist for the uture. It may be said that we are not amiliar with this form of constitution, n the British empire there is no instance 'f two liouses of parliament having co- C ordinate authority ; but we have au in- stance of it in America. Mr. Playford : We shall have to have an executive ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I will come to that directly. These are questions which lie at the root of the whole matter, and until we know our own minds upon them Ave cannot make much pro- gress in any matters of detail. It was pointed out early in the history of America that there was great danger of friction be- tween the two houses differently consti- tuted. It is said it was only a compro- mise — that no one thought it was the best plan at that time, but it was the only compromise possible. I believe myself, as I said just now, it is the only compromise possible now, and it is proposed in these resolutions. I also believe from the history of America for 100 years that it Avas the best plan that could be devised, and that Ave should do well to folloAv it, as you do, sir. But I also desire at the present moment to point out the necessary consequence of adopting that principle, that we may know exactly Avhat Ave are doing. I will not further occupy time on- that matter. I desire at present rather to- indicate these questions, Avhich must neces- sarily be considered and solved as prelimi- nary questions, than to argue at great length in support of any of them. Indeed, sir, I desire to follow your exam[)le this morning of brevity as far as possible. With regard to the judiciary I do not pro- pose to occupy the time of the Convention now. I believe there should be a supreme court, and that not on the American mode)-^ but a real court of appeal for Australia from all the Australian courts. Whether it should be absolutely final, or Avhetlier there should be under any conditions a right of appeal to a supreme court representing the whole empire, dififerently constituted certiiinly finm th;it which now exercises that jurifxliction— Avhethcr there First day. Federal Constitution : [i March, 1891.] Resolutions. siiould 1)8 such an ultimate power of ap- hold seats in Parliament— a limited num- peal under conditions, is a matter wliicli ber. That is part of the written Con- mav be considered later. I confess that on stitution. In the Australian colonies, that point my mind is open to conviction with few exceptions, the same propositions either wav. But next to the question of are the only ones that are to be found laid the constitution of the Parliament, the down by positive law. The ministers are legislative body, leaving aside the ques- appointed by the head of the state — the tion of the judiciary, upon which I believe Sovereign's representative— and they hold we are nearly all agreed— comes the ques- office during his pleasure, and they may, tionof the executive government; because, or a certain number may, hold seats in after alljthe legislature sits only sometimes, Parliament. In two of the colonies, I it is not in perpetual session, while the work of the fjovernment must be carried on every day. Now, here again, the ques- tion of the relationship of the executive to the legislature appears on the threshold. We are accustomed in these colonies, as ■we have been accustomed from our read- ing of the history of the United Kingdom for the last 100 years — not more, not so much indeed — ^^to the system called re- sponsible government, and I will venture to say that there are many misapprehen- sions as to what is the essence of the system called responsible government. "We are accustomed to think that the essence of responsible government is this : that the ministers of state have seats, most of them, in the lower house of the legisla- believe, is to be found an innovation, an addition to this proposition, stereotyping in formal language the practice that has grown up in Great Britain and in the other colonies since the system of respon- sible government has been invented ; thai is, that some of the ministers shall hole seats in Parliament. Victoria and Soutl Australia, I believe, have provisions oi that kind. Mr. Barton : And Western Australia! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : But thai is not common by any means to the systen of responsible government, as it is knowi throughout the British empire, nor as ii is kno.vn in the other European countriei where they have adopted, after profounc study, what they believe to be the essentia ture, and that when they are defeated on principles of the British Constitution as a an important measure they go out of present administered. office. That I venture, with the greatest .submission, to say is only an accident of responsible government, and not its prin- ciple or its essence. Inform — legal form, I mean, statutory foi-ra — so far as our written Constitution goes, and so far as the unwi-itten and partly written Con- stitution of the United Kingdom goes, the system depends on these propositions Mr. Gillies : It all comes to the sam( thing ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I wish b point out that it does not at all come to th same thing. And here I w(5uld again refe to that fundamental principle that th two houses are differently constituted, an( that one is of equal authority with th other — the one represents the states a — that the ministers are appointed by the states, and the otlier represents the peopi head of the state, the Sovereign, or her representative, and that they may hold seats in Parliament. That is all that will be found in the Constitution of the United Kingdom. They are appointed by the head of the state, and some of them may , [Sir 6'amuel Gri^ih. as people. Now in America the direct! opposite form of government from tha wliich wo call responsible governmen has been adopted. I submit with gn deference that the cs.sential difiei'euc is tins : that there the ministers may no Federal Constitution [4 March 1S91.] EesohUions. 33 dt in Parliament, wLereas under our form >f government ministers may sit in Parlia- ment, and in practice do. In the otlier rorm of government they cannot sit in Parliament, they are expressly dissociated trora Parliament. The origin of this dif- ference lies in the fact that the framers jf the American Constitution had been frightened by the tendency then lately ex- liibited in the United Kingdom of min- isters to overawe Parliament, and they thought it extremely desirable to separate the executive and legislative branches of government, following the arguments of a ^reat writer — I should rather say a cele- iarated writer — of those days, Montes ^uieu, the wisdom of whose observations a,nd the accuracy of ^vhose deductions knd assumption of principles may be, I submit with great respect, very open to ioubt. But the Americans adopted that ••^m — that the executive shall be en- [iiL-ly dissociated from Parliament, and thenifore may not sit in Parliament. As '. believe that the history of the American Constitution has shown the wisdom of having two houses of equal and co-ordinate luthority, so also lias it shown the uiiwis- lom of the system there adopted of liaving nnini.sters dissociated, and the executive government entirely dissociated, from the pf'islaturc. It has taught us the lesson that he character of legislation, the manner of egislation,and the result of legislation, tlie orderly conduct of business, and the good government of the country, are not neai-1y Vi well attained under the American sys- tem, where the executive is dissociated !rom Parliament, as under the system we have, where practically ministers are Inti- mately associated with Parliament. But this is what I desire to point out. In America wo have the system of two houses with co-ordinate jurisdiction. ;Mr. Baker : Not quite ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Well, for the purpose I am speaking of. When I use the v/ord co-ordinate, I use it with reference to what I said before — that the house representing the states must concur in every law that is passed. We have had in America the system of two houses with powers co-ox'dinate for that purpose. Mr. Gillies : No ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I say co- ordinate for the purpose of which I am speaking — -that the states must concur as well as the people in the passing of any law. We have on the one hand the system. of ministers being dissociated and excluded from Parliament. We have on the other hand, in all the British-speaking communi- ties, the other system — the system where one house is practically predominant, and where ministers have been associated with, and have practically, during the last fifty or sixty years, depended for their existence entirely upon, the pleasure of the Parlia- ment. Kow, what is proposed to be done 1 We propose, as I understand it, assuming that the house representing the states is to have the authority whiuh I think it must and ought to have, to associate Avith it a system which has never in the history of the world been tnod in conjunction with it. We propose to have an executive govornmcnt having possibly, and having probably, seats in Parliament. How shall we guarantee that the machine will work if we insist that these ministers shall hold their offices in form as well as in reality, by the will of one liou.se only ? Docs not the possibility of a very serious deadlock occur here to every hon. gentleman at once ? The majority of one house of the legislature will certainly bo made up of the representatives of the larger colonics. Probably two colonics in that house will be able to overshadow all the rest. IVIr. Playfori) : Possibly cue! Sir SAMUEL GPvlFFITH : Po.ssibly one some day ; but almost certainly two at no distant date. Now, that majority re[>resenting the people of these two states First day. 36 Federal Constitution : [i Marcif, 1891.] ResoliUions. ill that house woulil have the making and unmaking of governments. On tlie other hand, tliere wouhl be an independent body in the constitution representing the states. Suppose that independent body in the Constitution representing the states differed from these two states — and I look to more than six or seven states in this territory — suppose they differed from the house of representatives representing two states, there would be certainly a deadlock at once. Such a thing, I believe, occurred in one of the neighbouring colonies not very long ago. I point this out as a thing that may happen. I point out also that the experiment we propose to try has never yet been tried. We must take into consideration the existence of those two forces possibly hostile, even probably hos- tile, before, say, fifty or a hundred years are over, and we must frame our constitu- tion in such a way that it will work if that friction does arise. Mr. Playford : We will have the re- ferendum ; we will do it that way ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : What is the way to do it I am not now consider- ing. But I hope I am not misunderstood in calling attention to that difficulty as likely to arise. I believe myself that the system which we call responsible govern- ment is the best that has yet been invented in the history of the world for carrying on the good government of the people, and I hope that it will be instituted in the Federal Government of Australia. But, at the same time, I desire to point out the great possibility — almost probability — that that system, as we have it at the present time, if we insist upon members of the executive being members of the legisla- ture, and insist upon their commanding always a majority in one house of the legislature, may not work. We have to devise a constitution that will work, that will have within its bounds sufficient scope to allow of any development. I would [!>ir Samuel Griffith, point out, by w\ay of further illustration^ that under the Constitution of England, written and unwritten, under the written Constitution of Canada, ISTew South Wales, and, indeed, of all the colonies, excej)t Victoria, South Australia, and Western Australia, and in them to a limited extent, the whole system of the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches might be changed in practice without the change of a word in the written Constitution. Mr. Gillies : How 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I will pro- ceed to show how. It would not be con- trary to the Constitution of New South Wales, or of Queensland, or of Tasmania, or of New Zealand, if no member of the Executive had a seat in either house of the legislature. The Constitution would work just as it does work. The ministers would be appointed by the Governor as her Majesty's representative. They would hold office during his pleasure, and if the legislature thought that that was a more convenient way of carrying on the busi- ness, it would be carried on in that way. Mr. Gillies : And they would play " ducks and drakes" with the business ; no one would be responsible ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I believe myself that would be the result. But I do not profess to know all that is going to happen in the next fifty or a hundred years'. I do not profess to say that our experience in the Australian colonies, or even the, experience of Great Britain, is necessarily to be set up against the wisdom of America. I give credit to the American people for having a good deal of wisdom ; and al though I believe their system is not nearly as good a one as ours, yet some people think that even our system is not perfect, and contains within it the elements of change. Mr, Gillies : It has not changed for centuries ! Federal Constitution : [4 March, 1891.1 EesoliUions. 37 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The pre- then we deliberately, and with onr eyes lent system, as we have it, has not been open, make provision foravery serious dead- existence for one century or nearly one lock occurring, and that at a very early century. I have had long enough experi- period in the history of the Constitution. ence as a member of Parliament and as a minister to have seen very great changes in the relationship of ministers to one another, and of ministers to Parliament, in the Australian colonies. I have seen changes — changes occurring from time to time. You do not see the change when it takes place ; but if you look back fifteen ''•'■ twenty years, you can see how diiferent .iigs are in many respects, compared with what they were. Dr. CocKBURN : That shows the advan- ^a-e of having an elastic constitution ! Sir SAMUEL GPJFFITH : That is the conclusion I arrive at — that it is well to have a constitution so elastic as to allow of any necessary development that may take place. Mr. Deakin : Capable of being amended ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: Every- thing is capable of being amended. But I am addressing myself to the problem I understand we have before us, of a consti- tution which we hope will work like the American Constitution has worked for so many year.s, without the nece.ssity of radical imendment. Because, bear in mind the diffi- culty of amendment. The difficulty of an imondinent on a radical question like that Mr. Gillies : No ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I am per- fectly aware that this view is new to many hon. members. Mr. Gillies : Oh, no ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I am per- fectly aware that this view is new to many hon. members who have been ac- customed to think that the essence of re- sponsible government is that ministers should sit in Parliament, whereas I con- tend that the essence is that ministers should not be dissociated from Parliament. Our present development of the constitu- tion requires them to sit in Parliament. I hope that will continue to be the de- velopment. But I say we are launching in this respect upon an entirely unknown sea. Nobody has ever tried this experi- ment of a government depending on one house, and the machinery of the state equally depending upon another. Mr, Gordon : The senate will probably bo the better house of the two ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I am quite certain that the senate will consider itself quite as good a house as the other house. I believe also that the state loais- ^ . — „ - .. ^ — .vould be very great indeed. I am not by latures will insist upon its maintaining my means counselling a departure from ^^^'-^^ position. I hojie that no friction of ;he system of responsible government, this kind will arise ; but I have thought it ivliich I am in favour of, whicli I hope will '"J ^^"ty, at this early stage, to point out )e inaugurated, and wdiich I hoj)c will the apparent inconsistency, to my mind, :ontinue to be carried on. But I cannot ^^ the system of giving equal powers to ihut my eyes to the fact that the senate the states as represented in one house, and epreseiiting the states may entirely difier ^^ making the executive government de- rom the house of representatives r(i)re- enting the people ; and that if it is laid lown as a principle of the constitution hat the Queen's representative is b'Mind o dismiss liis ministers when they fail to ommand a majority in the people's liouse, pcnd for its existence upon the other house. Mr. Gillies: It must be soj for every liouso that has got the responsiljility of the money must have thp control ! Sir SAMUEL GPJFFITIL : The hon. gentleman interjects th.it it must ha so, First day. i f) t~v *38 Federal Constitution: [4 March, 1891.] Eesohdions. for every house that has the responsibility of the money must have the ultimate control. That I perfectly concede. One house must have the responsibility of originating expenditure, and of originat- ing taxation ; and, therefore, to that ex- tent it -will have a controlling effect, and no doubt finance is at the root of every- thinjr. The government cannot be car- ried on without money. But there are many things in the administration of go- vernment besides finance. For instance, of the constitution in which the federal parliament, as well as all the states, must collectively concur. A difficulty of tliat kind would arise in a time of great excitement. It is not like the difficulty of making a law. When you want to make a law, and you cannot all agree in making it, there is simply no law made, and you go on as before. But the govern- ment of the country must be carried on ; you cannot suspend, the government of the country while you call a constitutional this development might occur, and might convention, and get the consent of all the be the result of the practical experience of fifty years or a hundred years, or, per- haps, a much shorter time — that some of her Majesty's ministers controlling particu- larly those mattei's with which it is spe- cially the function of the house of represen- tatives to deal, should command the support of that house; but that others, administer- ing W'hat may be called more permanent departments, should be independent of it — that there should be, in fact, a combi- nation of the two forms of government; states to the amendment. Therefore, ifc is necessary to provide for it in our con- stitution. I have referred to this matter at rather greater length than I should have desired ; but it is a matter of very great importance, and it underlies the whole of our work. The relative consti- tution and powers of the two houses of leirislature underlie the whole of what we have to do. "SVe must remember that it is quite new to all of us. We have had no experience of its working. We are and which of us is wise enough to say that bound to put ourselves in the position of our successoi-s will not be able to improve men sitting in one house or the other — of upon anything which we have devised 1 men sitting in the senate representing a Is not that possible 1 Mr. Gillies : Quite possible; but what is not 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I am pointing out that we are launching upon an unknown sea. We are trying to lay down two hard and fast lines, which are small state, and feeling bound to exercise a- controlling influence as faras it can beexer- cised ; or as men supported by a large ma- jority in the house of representatives, and wishing to exercise the authority that men in that position feel they ought to exercise. We ought to put ourselves in each of these apparently inconsistent with one another, positions and imagine what arguments we , and insisting that nevertheless they shall both be observed. I ask, therefore, that hon. members will give their attention to this, and that in considering the forma- tion, functions, and tenure of office of the should be likely to use under such circum- stances. I do not propose to move any amendment to the resolutions now before I apprehend that it is desirable, for us, the present, that the discussion should be executive, they will endeavour to provide somew^hat general, although I hope that, against that contingency, by making such before the resolutions are finally put from provision that whatever the wisdom of our successors shall find to be best it may be possible for them to do without the ex- tremely inconvenient method of a revision [f this Convention .shall be closed — the cussion of these resolutions, difficulties M'inciple that the colonies, at any rate in many of which have been described to us •onnection with our senatorial work, shall by the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith le equal — I rise now to continue the debate — when I remember what has been done \\ the resolution which you have sub- by the men of old, who framed our present nitted. I make no excuse other than the constitutions, which we have been work- 3ne which I have offered, except this : that ing under for thirty-five or forty years, I am [ am aware that in the case of a disposed to believe that, embarrassed though 1 umber of gentlemen who have travelled we maybe by the conflicting opinions — ■n.m all parts of Australasia, and who I will not say conflicting interests, for •irgely represent the executives of their when Australia is spoken of we are no various colonies, they are here not so much longer to have conflicting interests — we it their own personal inconvenience as at shall be able to get over the difficulties inconvenience of the executives which arising from those conflicting opinions .uey rei)resent. A goodly number of the which may be expressed in this chamber ninisters of the Crown of all our colonies with respect to these various resolutions. ire now assembled in Sydney — some GOO I do not propose to follow the line of argu- ind some 1,200 miles away from their ment adopted by the hon. member. Sir seats of government — and practically some Samuel Griffith. There will be opportuni- )f the executive work of our colonies is at ties of doing so, as you, sir, have told us, in I standstill while we are present here. It Committee. And if you had not an- a, therefore, almost an absolute necessity nounced that it was your purpose to move ;hat a goodly number of the members of that the resolutions be considered in Com- j'overnments must find their way back, at mittee of the Whole, I should have in earlier period than that afc which this deemed it my duty to have reminded hon. Convention can close, to their executive members that subjects so important, so luties in their own particular localities. diverse, could not possibly be dealt with Cnder these circumstances, I think it is of by a body sitting as we now are ; but that the utmost importance that there shall not every word of each resolution would have be one day's delay in proceeding with the to be weighed and debated. That cannot important business which wo have before us. possibly be done unless the House finds its refore, although I was desirous to await way into Committee of the Whole. For somewhat the issue of this debate, to en- these reasons I purpose to address myself dcavour, perhaps, to gather some inspira- only to general principles, to what I deem to tion from what might be said ])y various bethcessentialportionsof these resolutions, speakers who have for a longer period treating the matter as if I were asking for . ..i,.,| over destinies .somewhat greater or supporting tlic second reading of a bill, til those which I have had the f)k'asurc when we debate principles only, and not of presiding over in the smaller colony of details. Although a measure may be 100 Tasmania; yet, when I think that we stand or 200 paragraphs in length, whatever may in the hall which is memorable by reason be the diverse opinions of hon. members First day. 42 Federal Constilution: [i March, 1891.] Resolutions. when ^ve go into Committee, it is only •with the great principles of the bill which we are supposed to deal when discussing its second reading. Therefore, for my purpose, I may limit my observations to what I regard as the essential portions of the work of this Convention. I feel sure that those essential portions are discovered in the three great points of commercial union, of defence, and what I ought to Lave taken first — that is, what is known in America as the sovereignty of the states. I doubt whether the general public has any particular interest at the present moment in the method in which you will frame your executive, and in the mode in which your duties will be discharged. But I believe the interest which is now concentrated around this Convention throughout the whole of the Australasian colonies, centres around those three questions which I have named, and it is with respect to those that the great masses of the people are more concerned than they are with any other. They are more concerned, firstly, as to what portion of the rights which they have been enjoy- ing for nearly forty years past it shall be proposed by this Convention to surrender, I am glad that the term " surrender " has been used in the first resolution. It should be indicative to all those whom we repre- sent throughout Australasia, that this Convention is unlikely to try their patience, to try their spirit of justice, in asking them to surrender any rights which they consider to be of vital importance to their local autonomies, that it is unlikely to ask them to surrender any rights which will not be more fittingly discharged by the greater executive of the dominion parliament. If, therefore, we are to explain in connec- tion with these resolutions what we mean by surrender, I would limit my explanation to a very few words. I say that it will be absolutely unnecessary to ask the people of these colonies to surrender to the do- [Mr. Fi/sh. ndnion parliament anything which can best be legislated for locally — anything which cannot be best legislated for by a central executive. Now, these may be far embracing words, but every man who runs may read in connection with an opinion of this kind, because he himself will be able as well as any of us to detect what it is that is best discharged locally. He will know that, with respect to the great future progress of his country, it must be by his voice that the extension of railways and of roads must be continued. He must know that it must be by his will and consent that possibly the education of the people shall be provided ; and he must know that, in connection with the various developments of his own province, there can be no interference by an executive which will sit 1,000 miles away, and which cannot, except in regard to some individual members thereof, have so close an identity with the work in which he is engaged, or such a knowledge of the necessities which surround the country in which he is living, as those who represent him in the local- parliaments. I believe, therefore, that we may limit our explanation of the term " surrender " to these very few words, and that the people may at once feel sure that this Convention is unlikely to ask them to give up any important right ; but that its purpose will be to continue in all its harmony, in all its prestige, the position of the local parliaments, and that the do- minion parliament, the great executive of the higlier national sphere at which w^e are to arrive, will not in any way detract from it. But they will continue, most likely, under the Constitution under which they live, to have the right of appointing their own representatives to their own local par- liaments, and, possibly, to have also in connection therewith their Upper Chamber ; and certainly in all matters their voice will '. be paramount. Under these circumstances, I deem it that our duty in connectioa Federal Constitution: [4 March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 43 dth this paragi-apli of the resolution will ot be a difficult one. "^e are not likely 5 disappoint the people ; and when we Dme to questions of detail we shall each e prepared to agree, I have no doubt, lost readily, as to what work of the ominion will be best undertaken by the -'"linion parliament, and what will be understood and undertaken by the 1 parliaments. But, turning from this, hich I believe to be the crux of the hole position — because it is to the "j\Treign riglits of the states that the ■ -pie's mind is more directed than to any ill' T matter — if there be any other point l.ich they are considering more deeply, and h affects tlieir interest more deeply, ; is that which is opened up by the great i:< stion as to the form of our trading be- n eacli other, as to whether it is to be jSit has beenin thepa.st, a question of waste- ill competition between colonies — whether re are bound to continue to be aliens to ach other, and to tax our very children 8 they pass from their homes, or whether re are going to establish something which rill be akin to the commercial biind of lermany — something which vs-ill enable all he goods, all the manufactures, all the nivals in tlie various ports of these colo- ies to pass to and fro through every other lort without fear, let, or hindrance. It } in connection with the commercial union f these colonies that the people are more Dterested in our proceedings, I tliink, than tt connection witli any other subject. It 3 a question which affects not only com- nercial men, but even tlie lowest strata of ociety. Our working-classes are as much nterested in the commercial union, which '. hope is designed in these resolutions, as hose who may be large importers, or who may be supposed to hold more important )Ositions in our community. And when ve .shall have become a union of commer- [ial 1 y- est a1)li shed j)eople, no longer com- l>eting with each other in connection with matters where there is a wasteful compe- tition, but shall have realised all the ad- vantages of a great corporation — of a great commercial partnership, then I think will be established in Australasia the greatest good of the gi'eatest number, and the people, the great masses of the community, will have reason to be grateful that this Con- vention has sat. But there is also the other third important point to which your resolutions so definitely refer — I allude to the question of defence. It is marvellous that we can for so long a period have travelled on our way accumulating wealth, distributing our commerce all over the country, sending our ships into almost all seas, and yet have never established any reliable defence for the whole. I know that a great number of individuals con- sider the probabilities of any attack upon these shores as very unlikely ; but we must always be prepared for the unlikely, for it is the unlikely which too often happens. I hold that we have no re- liable forces — there is no cohesion in our existing forces to carry out the great work for which they have been intended, and for which large expenditure is going on year by year. There can be no co- hesion where the links are distributed in all corners, and although we, as public men, have sworn allegiance to the Crown, and the people themselves have owned that allegiance, we are not in a position to defend the allegiance which wc owe, and irrespective of this fact, since we have borrowed over £170,000,000 from our creditors in all parts of the world, if there be any fear of some desultory marauder ever attacking some of these colonies we shall find commercially, and in connection with the depreciated value of our securities, that wc have been living in a fool's paradise, and that we .should have been much wiser had we dis- charged to ourselves, to the old country whose flag wc have reared, and to the First day. \ 44 Federal Conslitution : [4 March, 1891.] Resolutions. creditors wliose money we have borrowed, the resi)onsibility which rests upon every English community of defending itself from attacks, from whatever quarter they may come. The hon. member who has just re- sumed his seat may possibly have borne in mind the examples in connection with the position of the upper and lower branches of the legislature and their relative powers, which have now existed for thirty-five years, both in South Australia and in Tasmania. I should not have ventured to have spoken about Tasmania in this relationship, be- cause it might be said that it was an ex- ample which did not bear the importance which I was attaching to it, did I not find that Tasmania has been associated with South Australia in connection with the reading of the same Constitution — that she has been living under the same Constitution, and that some of the same difficulties have arisen, and have always been fairly overcome in the end in both cases. I am not prepared to consider — or if prepared to consider, I should consider it with very great concern — as to whether it is advisable or not to remove from what may be termed the senate or the upper house of the dominion parliament, any right which lieretofore we had given to our upper house, of veto, whether in respect of ordinary bills or in respect of money bills. We have lived for this period under a right which we have seldom felt to be grievous, and if the right has been exer- cised by the Legislative Council its exist- ence has only been grievous for a few days ; and that which has been resented at the time, and which may have been hurtful to the ministries of the day, has not always proved to be detrimental to community and to the people as a whole ; but the very check which has been exer- cised by the Legislative Council, I believe I may say of South Australia, as I do of Tasmania, has proved, under many circum- stances, to have been the outcome of pru- [J/r. Fijsh. dence ; and although the legislative coun- cils may not, on the first time of asking, have given the ministers all the taxation which they desired, or have given the repre- sentatives of the people in the popular branch of the assembly all the public works which they needed, yet the people have always ruled in the end, and the Legis- lative Council has after a time given way. We have discovered in these colonies what has been so long ago discovered elsewhere, that, in the end, the popular voice must rule ; and certainly we admit the very principle which is the foundation of all our liberties — that taxation and represen-j tation must go hand in hand, that where the representation so largely is there you must have the power of the purse. But we do not consider it an un- controlled power, and we have not felt any injury from the fact that there has, occa- sionally, been a brake put upon the wheel in connection with our public expenditure, or in connection with our proposals for schemes of taxation. I should therefore view with very great jealousy a departure from this principle— the growth of the practice in connection with which I have watched for so many years — and should expect the mover of these resolutions, in laying down so great a departure as this from what has been the principle, at any rate, in two of the great colonies of Australia • to give us Mr. Playford : No I Mr. FYSH : To be able exceedingly sound data for the purposes and objects which he advocates ; and we shall then, in regarding those objects, take care to do what great senators and states- men of old have done with respect to the constitution under which we live — look well ahead to see that we are not commit- ting ourselves to that unknown sea to which Sir Samuel Griffith has alluded. Mr. Playford : No ! Mr. FYSH : Do I understand the hon. delegate from South Australia to say that Federal Constitution : [i March, 1891.] Resolutions, 45 ith respect to the colony which he repre- ■nts they have not found this practice in le main satisfactory 1 History only re- )i\ls one very important instance with .aspect to South Australia where there has 3en such a diversity of opinion as to lead ) a rupture, and what was the result of lat great diversity of opinion *? If I am gilt, the popular branch of the legisla- jre did in the end win, and those houses t Parliament which stand as a credit to juth Australia to-day have afforded an xaiaple of what I have been alluding to. ■ o not purpose, having said there were I* important principles which would ■rn me in connection with these mat- . to follow those points which are so luch better dealt with by the law officers t the various governments, whom I am ■I'-ascd to know are associated wath us in 1 ■ work, but that we ought to have a ■iary which shall be a federal court for he whole of Australasia must be apparent all of us, whether w-e are, or are not, irgely engaged in trade. Those who have leen making the laws of their OAvn colo- lies, and those whose businesses liave ompelled the making of these laws, have elt the disadvantages of the incongruity )f the bankruptcy acts, and, domestically, ee regard our marriage and divorce laws IS great incongruities ; and when we free iur ports there can be no doubt tliat the •e^julations as to the navigation of our lects, and matters connected with our juarantine ports, and variousother subjects )f that kind, must be a federal concern ; 3ut as to wliethor it may be wise to be so lelf-contained in Australasia in connection ivith our judiciary system as not to permit in ajipr-al outside of Australasia must bf a natter of which I trust the law officers n\\ic\\ are .so well representing their respec- ;ive colonies here will put clearly before the Convention. I lean .strongly to the hope that the time is coming in Australa.sia when wc shall be as self-contained in law and in manufactures as we are self-contained in climate and ability to provide for our- selves not only the ordinary and common necessaries of life, but all those luxuries which experience and wealth brings. We are warned by our very wealth and pro- gress that there must be unanimity before this Convention closes its debates. I am glad, therefore, that you, sir, set a spirit of compromise, which I hope will continue day by day to be manifested by every mem- ber. I recognise the fact that no great good can be accomplished in a convention of this kind any more than among cabinets and legislators, unless we are prepai'ed to admit that wisdom does not rest with in- dividuals; but that there is a collective wisdonx in the Convention that is gathered together I have great faith, and in it and upon it I rely to overcome all difficulties, even such as those to which Sir Samuel Griffith has referred, so that we may be able to take back to our respective parliaments the Constitution which we are charged to prepare for them, and it will be a very great disappointment, I believe, to e\'ery pro- vince in Australasia if anything shall occur in the course of our debate.s, or if any great point shall arise about which we cannot clearly see our way to meet at the table and to effect some compromise upon — a compro- mise which shall at once be judicious to the opinions of the various hon. delegates, hon- orable to the whole of them, and satisfactory to the communities which we serve. ]\Ir. !MUNRO : After hearing your very important and interesting .speech, sir, and thatof my hon. friend, the Premier of Queens- land, and also of the Premier of Tasmania, and having these very important resolu- tions beforeus for our consideration, I think we shall require at least one night to think over them. For tliat reason I move : That the debate be now adjourned. Colonel Smith seconded the motion. Motion agreed to ; debate adjourned. Convention adjourned at 4 p.m. First day. \ 46 Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891. /Resolutions.' THURSDAY, 5 MARCU, 1S91. Federal Constitution (second day's debate)— Telegram from the Queen— Federal Constitution (second day's debate resumed). The President took the chair at 11 a.in. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. SKCOXD day's debate. Debate resumed on resolutions proposed by Sir Henry Parkes (vide page 23). Mr. MUNRO : Mr. President, in rising to address myself to the important sub- ject before the Convention, I have very great pleasure in congratulating you upon the very excellent address you gave us yesterday. It appeared to me that it was conceived in the proper spirit. "Whilst conciliatory to all of us, and giving us sood advice as to ho"w the business should proceed, it "U'as, at the same time, very clear and very distinct as to the principles upon ■which the Constitution ought to be founded. I confess that I felt very much relieved from anxiety on hearing the man- ner in which you laid down to us how our Constitution ought to be formed, because I felt, as the lion, member, Sir Samuel Griffith, indicated later on,thatweweresur- roundcd with a large number of difficulties — difficulties which we must endeavour to overcome as best we can. At the same time, you, sir, indicated to us the lines upon which we should proceed ; and I feel assured that all the members of tlie Convention will feel grateful to you for the indication you gave them of your views with regard to that matter. Now, I may say that whilst the speech was very conciliatory, it at the same time followed very closely the instructions which we, as delegates, have received. \Ve have come here to frame a constitution, and the in- structions that were given to us, I am happy to say, are very clearly laid down by the hon. member, Mr. Baker, in the book which hev.'as good enough to distribute amongst us. He puts it in this form : That it is desirable there should be a union of the Australian colonies. That is one of the principles that has already been settled by all our parliaments. Second, that such union should be an early one — that is, that we should remove all difficulties in the way in order that the union should take place at as early a date as possible. Third, that it should be under the Crown. Now, I am quite sure that is one of the most important condi- tions of all with which we have to deal — ■ that the union that is to take place shall be a union under the Crown. Fourth, that it should be under one legislative and executive government. That also is laid down by our various parliaments. Fifth, that it should be on principles just to the several colonies. I think these two points are the points upon which \yq shall find the greatest difficulty in arriving at con- clusions which will be in accordance with the instructions "n'e have received, and, at the same time, which will enable us to form such a constitution as will be valu- able for the colonies. I confess I agree very much with the President in his re- marks as to the union of the colonies, and as to his remarks in the direction that the government we are to form must be a stable government ; that it must be such as will be able to carry out effectively not only the making of laws for the federated colonies, but at the same time, as an ex- ecutive, will be able to carry out its own decisions and requirements, to preserve itself as a government for all the colonies. You also laid down that it must be a go- vernment as nearly as possible in accord- ance with the principles of the British Constitution, that is to say, that the rain- ' istry must be a responsible ministry, and that the house of representatives must re- present the whole of the people. These matters were very clearly laid down in ' your address. I also gathered from your j i Federal Constitutioyi [5 March, 1S91.] Eesohdions. 47 jmarks that you were ia favour of tin Itimate power, that is, the final decision 1 regard to the finances, being in the ouse of representatives. I know that my on. friend. Sir Samuel GritSth, went in nother direction, though not very clearly ; ut you, sir, were very clear upon this oinl. Sir Samuel Griffith, while prac- ically agreeing with the President with egard to these views, appeared to nie to le suri'ounded by doubts and difficulties, was sorry that he did not try to solve '- -0 doubts himself, because it is scarcely to us who have not studied this matter 1 the legal point of view, as the hon. aber has done, to have submitted to us imber of riddles which we are asked to p. hjir Samuel Griffith : I thought I did iolve them ! Mr. ^lUNRO : Well, if the hon. mem- 1- solved them, as far as my listening to : was concerned, and my reading of lis speech a second time this morning, I really saw no solution — none whatever. i\s far as I could gather he favoured a jonstitutional government; but he doubted whether constitutional government would work — and wliilst he informed us that he iiad grave doubts as to constitutional go- ernmont working under our peculiar cir- umstances, he did not indicate to us what ort of government would work, and that the difficulty wliich concerns me in this [matter. If he had said to us, " "Well, I feel isure, after giving full consideration to this [matter, that a constitutional form of go- |vernnient will not work with a senate and IB house of representatives — the senate re- Sprosenting the states, and the house of rc- Iprosontativos representing the whole of the people — tJiat constitutional govern- inicnt and responsible government will not ivork," it might have been dilfcrent ; but il found no solution of the difficulties in ithe hon. gentleman's remarks. Ho in- iformed us that he thought the senate ought to have power to amend money bills with a view to avoiding deadlocks. Sir Samuel Griffith : Vetoing — • amending by omission ! Mr. MUNEO : I admit that the form of amending was by veto — that is, separ- ating one portion from another, vetoing one portion, and allowing another por- tion to pass. At the same time, it is purely an amendment. To omit a clause from a bill is to amend the bill quite as much as to insert a clause. The hon. gentleman pointed out that, in his opinion, we were to get over deadlocks by giving the senate power to amend money bills by discriminative veto, if I may so call it — ■ that they were to have a veto in con- nection with money bills. The experi- ence of the past, however, tends entirely in a different direction. It is entii'ely in the direction of showing that if the upper house or senate has the power of amend ing money bills it makes deadlocks more certain than would be the case under any other circumstances, because if we did not give power of amendment to the senate, eventually the house of representatives must of necessity prevail, because the people will insist on their vieAvs being carried out. But if you give the power of amending money bills to the senate, the result will be that it is not the view of the people that will prevail, but the views of a sec- tion of the people. The hon. gentleman was good enough to point out that, suppos- ing two of the larger colonics were in favour of the expenditure of £1,000,000 on an arsenal, or on defences, or anything of that kind, and a majority of the smaller colonies combined against them, unless the senate had the power of amendment the result would be tliat tlie will of the ma- jority of members would prevail. Let us take the reverse of that. Let us take the case of 2,500,000 people wlio ought to be taxed for a particular purpose, and 250,000 people, representing some of the Second day. i 48 Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Resolutioyis. smaller states, are to have the power of Mr. MUNRO : I admit that that is preventing them being taxed in a certain clear enough ; but to whom is the execu-ij direction. What will the result be 1 The tive to be responsible 1 Is it to be respon- power of preventing taxation in a certain sible to both houses ; will it be absolutely direction must absolutely result in taxa- necessary to have a vote of want of confi- tion in another direction ; and the result dence in both chambers to remove a go- would be that the minority would govern vernment 1 Is that what is pi'oposed '? ( the majority. That would be the prac- Sir Samuel Griffith : No, no ! ! tical outcome of the proposal. If the Mr. MUNRO : I really want to under-' states, through the senate, are going to stand where we are, and what is meant, be empowered to veto the proceedings If the vote of the house of representatives of the house of representatives, so far as is not sufficient to dislodge a government, money matters are concerned, and prevent what is sufficient ? What is to be the the imposition of taxation in a given di- process by which a government is to be rection — if the minority can prevent that, dislodged. What is to be the process by the result will be that if you are to which a government is to be removed if carry on government at all, as you must the house of representatives has not the impose taxation, you must impose that power to remove them ? Whilst the hon. taxation in accordance with the will of gentleman submitted a number of conun- the minority. Surely that is not what drums to us, he did not clearly show us we wish to be done ; sui'ely this Con- how to get out of the difficulty. I fol- vention has not met for the purpose of lowed the hon. gentleman very closely, giving a power to the minority of the and I read his speech very carefully this people of this grand dominion to impose morning in order that I might understand taxation on the majority against their will. what he really means ; and it appears to That will be the practical result of Sir me that he brings us into this difficulty. Samuel Griffith's proposal. One side or He says, " I do not want this constitu- another must give way; and if the majority tion to provide that the executive shall be are bound to give way, the result must be responsible to the house of representatives; that the minority will rule. Surely that is I want the responsibility to be divided a state of affiiirs to which my hon. friend between the two chambers." But he has does not wish to brin^r us. not indicated how that is to be carried o Mr. Adye Douglas : What is the use of out; how the two chambers are to act the senate, then 1 with the view of either appointing or re- Mr. MUNRO : I Avill come to that in moving the executive. That is the diffi- a ilioment ; I am only dealing with the culty submitted to us, the difficulty which j question of finance at present. The hon. we do not get over. gentleman also puts it that he does not Sir Samuel Griffith : I propose to: think the government or the executive leave to the future the avoiding of these | should be responsible to the house of difficulties, and that v/e should not make representatives. difficulties in advance ! j Sir Samuel Griffith : No, no. I said Mr. MUNRO : I understand our duty ! nothing of the kind. I said I did not think as delegates to the Convention lies in this i it should be a rigid rule of the constitution direction : that we are to form a stable and that it must be responsible to one house workable government. We are to form only. I repeated that about ten times, and a constitution which will be so workable I thought I had made myself clear. that all interests in this grand dominion \^Mr. Munro. Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] liesolutions. 49 'ill be as fairly represented as possible, Ve must have the instrument sufRciently liable to enable us to carry on business 1 a proper manner. If we do not carry lis out we shall probably form an institu- on which will be something like the con- fess which was orisrinally formed in the to be sovereign, and their creature, the federal government, was to have only strength enough to bind the states into nominal unity, and only life enough to assure it of its own practical im- potence. Surely we are not going to impose a form of government of that kind. Surely we do not want to have a government which 'nited States, before they formed the Con- ^^^y^ ^^^ j^ave the inherent power in itself, and a constitution which will not give the itution which now exists, and in regard ) which this is said in "The United tates, its History and Constitution," by lexander Johnston, page 79 : The "Articles of Confederation," adopted in 77, were thus calculated for the meridian of e state legislatures which were to pass upon .em. The new government was to be merely a firm league of friendship" between sovereign ates, which were to retain every power not expressly " delegated to Congress ; there was be one house of congress, in which each state as to have an equal vote, with no national ecutive or judiciary ; and congress, while seping the power to borrow money, was to ive no power to levy taxes, or to provide in ly way for payment of the money borrowed^ y to make recommendations to the states, or quisitions on the states, which they pledged leir public faith to obey. The states were for- dden to make treaties, war, or peace, to grant ties of nobility, to keep vessels of war or dicrs, or to lay imposts which should conflict th treaties already proposed to Fi-ance or lain. Important measures required the votes nine of the thirteen states, and amendments e votes of all. Congress had hardly more than advisary power at the best. It liad no power prevent or punish offences against its own ws, or even to pcrfonn effectively tlie duties joined upon it by the articles of confedcra- on. It alone could declare war ; but it had ) power to compel the enlistment, arming, or ipport of an army. It alone could fix the seded amount of revenue ; but tlie taxes could ily be collected by the states at their own caHure. It alone could decide disj)utc.s bc- s'ccn the stiitcs ; but it had no power to compel ther disputant to respect or obey its decision.s. alone could make treaties with foreign nations, xi it had no power to jircvcnt individual states om violating them. Even commerce, foreign id domestic, was to be regulated entirely by JC states, anlaced upon a fair footing, and whereby federal government will take and pay k to the colonies some portion of the customs revenue. But the amount must be in proportion to the amount of tlie debt the federal government takes over " each individual colony. It will be a iji.iicult question to solve; but it is one [that will have to be solved. The way in which it was solved in Canada is well known to members of the Convention. I think it was the province of Quebec which had borrowed more than had any of the otlier provinces, and the federal govern- ment Kaid, *' We will take over your debt ; but we will not pay you anything out of the custom.s revenue." Other colonies which had borrowed less received, and con- tinue to receive, a certain subsidy from the Mr. PLAYFORD : Exactly. We, in South Australia, have built a war-ship, for which we have paid out of loan, and we shall expect the federal government to take it over. Then there are certain forts which we have erected partly out of loan, and partly out of the general revenue. We shall expect the federal government to take over those forts, and to pay us for them, and to take over the debt in con- nection with them. There are other ques- tions of a similar kind which sugo-est themselves naturally, and which will have to be similarly dealt with. Take the post- offices. If we agree that the post-offices should be under the federal government, that govei'nment must of course take over the debts in connection with them. Then thei'e are the telegraphs. I presume the federal government will take over the debt incurred by South Australia in tliat very excellent work of hers which has benefited the whole of the colonies — I refer to the overland telegraph to Port Darwin. The members of the Convention will see that with regard to these questions of the taking over of the customs revenue and the ad- justment of finances, tliey liave a great M'ork in front of thoni, and will, to my mind, have a very difficult question to solve. But that the federal government will not be able to give back to the colonies the whole of the customs revenue derived may be taken for granted. They may be able to give back a part ; but a part is all tlu^y will bo able to give. With reference federal government, in proportion to their to the next portion of the resolutions, re- debt, the dominion parliament taking their debts upon its own .slioulders. Mr. Diiin.s : Does tlu; hon. gentleman contemplate the federal government tak- ing over any portion of tlie public debt 1 -Air. PLAYFORD: Undoubtedly. I say that if the federal government take over the defences, they must take over the debts. > Mr. Fisii : For defence purposes ! k ferring to the naval and military defence of the colonies, I think very little objec- tion can be taken to it. Wo arc all agreed, 1 think, to defence forming a jjortion of the powers of the federal parliament. I now come to a very important part of the resolutions, which will, I think, create a great amount of di.scussion — I refer to the machinery by which we shall give cffijct to them, that is, by which we shall confer Second day. 56 Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. these powers upon tlie federal body. The resohition says : A parliament, to consist of a senate and a liouse of representatives, the former consisting of an C(iual numlier of members from each pro- vince, to be elected by a sj'stem wliicli shall pro- vide for the retirement of one-third of the mem- bers every years, ■ I think it will be better to provide for the retirement of more than a third. It will be better, perhaps, to adopt the American system, and to say, instead of one-third, that one-half should retire every three years, making the period for which the representatives are elected six years, one- half going out every three years. That, however, is a matter of detail. so securing to the body itself a perpetual exist- ence combined with definite responsibiUty to the electors, the latter to be elected by districts formed on a population basis, and to possess the sole power of originating and amending all bills appropriatmg revenue or imposing taxation. Now, this form of government which is proposed by the President is the form generally in vogue throughout the various Australian colonies. Sir Samuel Griffith : No ! Mr. PLAYFOE.D : In practice it un- doubtedly is so. Sir Samuel Griffith : Not so far as the senate is concerned ! Mr. PLAYFORD : There can be no doubt that in practice it i.s. We know that some of the legislative assemblies in the various colonies have greater power than have others ; but the genei'al prac- tice is that the houses of assembly — the people's houses in the various colonies — universally object to the legislative coun- cils of the different colonies amending their money bills. There is no doul>t about that ; and it is therefore stated in so many words in these resolutions what are the powers of the popular branch of the legis- lature in regard to money bills, so as to make the pjoint quite clear. Unfortu- [i/r. riayford. natel}^, the framers of our Constitution did not make it clear, and the result was that the two houses had no sooner set to work than a deadlock commenced between them. It is only by a compromise or compact entered into by the two houses, by means of which the Legislative Council was al- lowed to make suggestions to the Legisla- tive Assembly with regard to money bills — it is only by means of this understanding that we have been able to carry on legisla- tion at all. In its absence we should have had an unmistakable deadlock, and we should have had eventually to appeal to the home Government to pass a bill to en- able the machinery of government in the colony to work more smoothly. We may take this provision for granted if we are to have responsible government. The resolu- tions afterwards go on to provide for an executive, for a governor-general, and for the appointment of his advisers : such persons sitting in Parliament, and whose term of office shall depend upon their possessing the confidence of the house of representatives expressed by the support of the majority. That, at all events, carries out the same principle as is in force in the various colonics now, and unless you depart from that principle you are in this fix as to the senate, that you are about to give the senate powers co-equal with those of the house of representatives with regard to the amendment of money bills, thus creat- ing a state of things which must result in an unmistakable deadlock. Sir Samuel Griffith : Why 1 Mr. PLAYFORD : I represent a colony whose interest it would be to magnify the senate as against the house of representa- tives, because, in proportion to its popula- tion, it would be more largely represented in the senate than in the house of repre- sentatives, which, I imagine, will be elected upon a population basis. I say this : That unless we alter our system, and unless we adopt the American or the Swiss system, Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 57 and provide that the senate and house of of men — two houses — the result would he repi-esentatives at certain times shall meet that your machinery of government would and shall appoint their own executive — not work. The friction would often be which will not be in the sense in which very great ; and in many instances the we use the words, " responsible govern- Parliament would experience great diffi- dent " — unless you do this, the scheme is culty in arriving at any decision what- impracticable. So far as the senate is ever. Then there is another question with concerned, while we give it all the neces- which the two houses will have to deal at sary power to veto, to absolutely stop any the outset of their career, and in connec- legislation it believes to be injurious to the tion with which, if you give them co-ordi- community as a whole, even against the nate powers and jurisdiction, you will v\ill and wishesof the lower house, we must have a deadlock occurring, or I am very ut the same time provide that so far much mistaken. I refer to the estimates. as money bills are concerned one house They will come before the federal parlia- Miust rule, must have not only the sole ment annually, and I presume that the pr^wer of initiation, but must be able ordinary estimates for the year will have to say to the other house "You may make to be passed by the two houses. Do you suggestions, but we cannot concede you propose to give to the senate the right to the right of amendment." I should like enter into every little detail 1 Do you the members of the Convention to consider propose to give to the senate the right to tliose two questions. Take the first one veto — as was pointed out by Sir Samuel -a question that must occupy the atten- Griffith — every line 1 Will you give them tion of the new federal parliament directly the riglit to say whether a post-office shall it Ls called into being, at the outset of its be built here or a court-house there 1 If career — the question of tariff. Fancy for you once do that, you will get into a state a moment the ministry of the day, who- of confusion which will render the working ever they may be, responsible only to the of your constitution almost impossible. It lower liouse having to pass a tariff line could not be done upon such lines. by line through the two houses. It Sir Samuel Griffith : We liavc 100 would be practically impossible to do so. years of example to show the contrary ! The Parliament would never be able to ]\Ir. PLAYFOPD : Ko ; we have not come to a decision upon any important 100 years of example to show the contrary, question sucli as that of tariff if that were We have no such example in America, to the case, owing to the multiplicity of dc- which country the hon. gentleman, 1 jire- tails which would be taken into considcra- sumc, refers. Have you had there 100 tion by the two hou.ses. I have had .some years of example to show the working of experience in passing a tariff through a responsible government in connection with legislative assembly. I am informed that the house of representatives, which is, when the measure I pas.scd was in Commit- after all, in America the lower hou.se in tee I rose no less than 400 times to ex.- more senses of tlio word than one? Tho plain various matters. I know what it is to lower liouses in our jiarlianienls are more pass a tariff through one house, and I say powerful lli.m .nv iIk: upixr houses. Does that if the government of the day had to any one here intend to make the senate pas.s a tariff through the senate, as well as more powerful than the house of repre- through the house of representatives, and sentatives ? •were to have every line discussed by the Sir Samuel Gkutit]! : I did not pro- two houses, having to please two bodies pose to do so ! Second day. i 68 Federal Constitution : [5 Marcu, 1891.] llesolutions. Mr. PLAYFORD : That will depend upon the power you give it. If, as the Americans do, you give the executive power to your senate, if you give it the right, as it has in America, to amend money bills in whatever direction it pleases, and limit its power only so far as the initia- tion of those bills is concerned, no doubt it will become a body similar to the senate of the United States of to-day. But under a system of responsible government you can- not do that. You cannot graft responsible government on to the American system — a congress, as it is called, consisting of a senate and lower house — and make it work, because, directly you graft on to it respon- sible government, you take away at one stroke some of the powers the senate possesses. For instance, you could not allow the senate to say that the min- istry of the day should not appoint such and such a person ambassador to Pekin, or such and such a person ambassador to London. You cannot carry on respon- sible government and give to the senate the powers which it possesses in America at the present time. You cannot give the senate such powers and have at the same time a responsible executive. I think that in drawing up the details of any measure we may adopt, we ought to do all we can to prevent the lai'ger colonies — those hav- ing a preponderance of population — being placed in a position in which they can ride roughshod over the smaller ones. I be- lieve the larger colonies do not wish it, and we must provide some means of strengthening the senate and preventing the house of representatives from riding roughshod over it other than by giving to it power to amend money bills. One of the great powers the house of representa- tives would have, if the senate had no power to amend money bills, would be to tack on to such a bill some measure which they knew to be objectionable to the senate, but which they might think [J/?-, riayford. the senate would not throw out lest they might injure some other provision which they desired to see the law of the land. We ought to so frame our Constitution that this power attempted to be eser*- cised, and occasionally exercised by the lower houses in the colonies, could not be exercised by the house of representa- tives. Yfe should provide, I think, that as regards the appropriation bill or a tariff bill, each question must be forwarded to the senate separately, thus preventing the house of representatives from tacking on to, say, an appropriation bill a proposal for the expenditure of money in some direction apart from the ordinary expen- diture of the year, and of which the senate were known to disapprove. "With regard to loans for public works, v/e might provide that every work in respect of which it was proposed to borrow money should be contained in a separate bill. By that means we should empower the senate to reject a certain measure involv- ing a heavy, and in their opinion, an un- justifiable expenditure without at the same time throwing out other useful and requisite public works which they desired to see passed. Mr. DiBBS : Would tliat apply to a tariff I Mr. PLAYFORD : No ; that would involve too much detail. It would be impossible for the two houses to consider a tariff line by line. Of course it would be open to them to deal with the principles of a tariff. If the senate, for instance, objected to the principle of a tariff, they could throw out the bill. That is the posi- tion they ought to take iip in such a matter. If they were to insist upon going into every little detail the result would be an unworkable constitution. To the question raised by my hon. friend, Mr. Munro, with reference to the protection of manu- factures, I have already referred. There are several other phases of the question, at which I might just glance for a moment. Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 59 There is the power of veto which it is iroposed shoukl be exercised, I suppose, the Queen. It is an exceedingly im- portant power, and it seems to me that we should do all we can to prevent its exer- nse — that is to say, "we should do away .vith it as far as we possibly can. With \rd to this power, I think that when Mr. PLAYFORD : But there is this danger : I can see that we ought to make provision to meet in common fairness the smaller Austi'alian colonics. Two colo- nies- -say. Victoria and New South "SYales — might join themselves together, and might have a majority in the house of representatives, which -would, of course, people of the colonies have spoken out keep the ministry of the day in power ; ■. have said unmistakably that they want rtain law passed, and that vrhen a law demanded has been passed in a per- !y constitutional way, the power of ■>, as now exercised by the Queen, aid be abrogated. I think there should no power of veto whatever. It has not n exercised of late years to any gi-eat :nt in Canada, and it has been exer- d to a very limited extent in these jnies, and it is about time, I think, that .'.as done away -with altogether. If we cannot agree that it should entirely cease at once, we might agree to something like ,his : tliat on the passing of any important measure as to the wisdom of which the minds of the people of the colony ai'e ?ery much exercised, or to which a large number are opposed, it might be referred to the various constituencies by referendum, md if the constituencies decided by a ma- jority in favour of the measure so passed, it niiglit then become law, and should not under any circumstances be subject to the reto of the Imperial Government. Mr. Dinng : That will be another strand nf the rope gone ! Mr. PLAYFORD : I do not know that any strand will be gone. With regard to tbe question of the executive, I undor- Btood Sir Hanniel Griflith to say that lie thouirlit it mifdit be well to have an cx- the whole of the ministry might be taken from the representatives of New South Wales and Victoria, and the rest of the colonies have no representation w'hatever. Mr. Gillies : Sir John Macdonald was too wise to do that sort of thing, and we may follow his example. No wise govern- ment would do that. ]Mr. PLAYFORD : We might have an unwise government with a majority at their back, and who might do anything. If the two larger colonies were to join together, they could undoubtedly do that, and, as long as they kept a majority, they could keep on doing it. It would be a mistake. It may not be done in the first instance — I do not suppose it would be done ; but in drafting a constitution we should take up this point for the protec- tion of the other colonies: that they should have .some representatives, at all events, in whatever government is formed, and that the government of the country shall not be formed out of one state alone. Mr. Adye Douglas: How kind you are! Mr. PLAYFORD : I am considering Tasmania, as well as South Australia — not one colony alone. T say it is a question tliat we ought to consider. We ought to make provision, so that two colonies like Vic- toria and New South Wales, which would ecutive that would not be responsible to have their representatives elected wholly Parliament. on the basis of population, should not Sir Samuel Griffith : I said that the monopolise the representation. We ought constitution might ultimately tend to to consider whether it is not well to say work in that direction. I prefer the pre- that, at all events, the executive should Bent .'♦ystera. be distributed somewhat among all the Second day. 60 Federal Constitution: [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. colonies of the group. I tlo not know that there is any other point that I vash to bring before the delegates at present. All I wish to say is that, although I have my own views as to what will be the best con- stitution to frame, I am here willing and prepared to give way in the matter to the will of the majority ; because, unless we are prepared to give way to the will of the majority,'we shall do nothing. I think, taking them as a whole, that the resolu- tions lay the foundation of what will be, if carried into effect by an act, a useful form of government, and the best that we can adopt. At the present time, I think it would be a mistake to go away from the old responsible government under which we have been brought up, and attempt to establish a new form of government with- out responsibility to Parliament, and of which we have no knowledge. I think, therefore, that we can pass the resolutions, and I understand the moving of them means that we shall go into Committee of the Whole, and well consider them clause by clause. I will therefore not take up the time of members of the Convention any further; but say that I trust they will approach this subject on the give- and-take principle which we should ap- proach it, and not allow our own indi- vidual views and opinions to lead us into saying that, if we cannot carry all we want in a matter of this sort, we will do nothing. Sir THOMAS McILWRAITH : I should like to have heard the representa- tives from all the colonies address the Con- vention before I rose, being myself in a secondary position at the present time ; but, as Sir Harry Atkinson has assured me that the ISTew Zealand delegates do not intend to speak at the present stage, I have taken the floor, I was very much pleased with the speech in which you, Mr. Presi- dent, introduced the resolutions — a good deal better pleased with the speech than [J/r. Playford. with some of the resolutions themselves.! The first is : ' That the powers and privileges and territoriaL rights of the several existing colonies shall re-^ main intact except in respect to such surrender3| as may be agreed upon as necessary and inciden- tal to the power and authority of the national federal government. That is the germ and foundation of federal government, and if carried and believed in conscientiously by the delegates, I be- lieve it would be a foundation on which we could form a federal government. I look upon it as the cream of the resolutions put before the House. The other two in inverted order bring in a very large question : That the power and authority to impose cus- toms duties shall be exclusively lodged in the federal government and parlianient, subject to such disposal of the revenues thence derived as shall be agreed upon. And then following that : That the trade and intercourse between the federated colonies, whether by means of land carriage or coastal navigation, shall be abso- lutely free. These introduce a very large question, and although the debate up to the present time has been more confined to the difli- culty of framing a constitution that will work and to the details of that constitu- tion, I think that if those two resolutions are carried they will form the foundation of a federation, whether the whole of the colonies come in or not ; that is, if two such colonies as Victoria and New South Wales were to agree to terras like these, they would form the nucleus of a federation into which the other colonies in the future would be bound to come. I look upon the commercial aspect of the matter as of much greater importance than the legal aspect which has been taken by so many members. I have no doubt that when we get to business it is our position as colo- nists and as traders which will really in- fluence the whole of the votes of the dele- gates. We cannot hide that from ourselves, because we are bound to consider the in- J Federal Constitution: [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 61 erests of the colonies that wo represent is well as the interests of the federation. ["here is no question in my mind tliat the wo resolutions wliich 1 have read imply ree-trade between the federated colonies, md protection against the world. There s no doubt in my mind that that is im- )lied, because in the present position the )rotectionists will of course s'ote for it ; at 11 events, the protectionists of Victoria and !^ew South AVales will vote for it, and the ree-traders will require to vote for it too f they desire federation, because it is the mly means by which they can get the avenue. Unless they did, the effect of he first law passed would be to dislocate he revenue branch of the governments of he separate colonics. Take the case of Queensland, which I represent here. They cannot say to that colony all at once, "We intend to have free-trade, and the money i)reviously got by your government througli the customs, you must get from another source." That vrould burst up the confederation before it was fairly started. "NVe must jiroceed on the supposition that there will be free-trade among the colonies, and protection against the world. I believe the opinion of the colonies in general is that this would be a good national Australian policy, and one in which I thoroughly be- lieve. At the same time, those who liave, I will not say benefited by protection, but whose interests have been nourished under protection, must look with a great deal of consideration and sympathy towards colo- nies which have never tried it. At tlie immediate start, the result is plain. Who will get the trade 1 Those who already have protection. If a general tarifF is adopted by all the colonies, it will enlarge the area of trade for the manufacturers who have already obtained protection. The fact that they have been engaged in the industries so long will make compe- tition more difficult. In considering this question, therefore, we must consider the weak colonies that have industries started. This question will come up in Committee, and we shall have to give a great deal of consideration to those colonies which are going to lose at once, so far as that branch of the subject is concerned. Victoria is pro- tectionist, and many think that the people of New South Wales are protectionist too. I believe that, if they were looking after their own interests, they would be protec- tionists, because I do not know a country in the world better adapted for manufactures than this colony. You have a magnificent climate, land, minerals, splendid material for textile manufactures to your hand. These are now being exported, and the only great advance in manufactures has been made in the nei<:rhbourin£' colonies. If there were no other gain to Australia as the result of federation than the in- creased production which would follow from the adoption of protection again.st the world, it would be sufficient. Take the manufacture of wool alone. Why is it that we see only a few small pK'ces for manufacturing tweeds at Geelong, Ipswich, and a few other places 1 Mr. Gillies : Labour ! SirTHOMASMcILWR AITH : Labour will come where the coal is accessible, where there is cheap land and food, and nowhei'C can these things be obtained more advantageously than in New South Wales. AnIIoN. Member : What about Queens- land ? Sir THOMAS McILWRAITII : Ex- cepting Queensland, of course. 1 hap- pened to be speaking for tlio nionirnt of New South Wales, but the same may be said for the other colonies. We must, therefore, recognise the fact that this is going to be a big protectionist colony. I shall say nothing witli regard to tlie 4th resolution, which affirms that the military and naval defence of Australia should be intrusted to federal forces under one Second day. 62 Federal Co7istl(ution: [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions, command. That follows as a matter of course, and the resolution might have been omitted. The resolution ought simply to affirm the principles on which the bill should 1)0 founded. But when we come to the other conditions, which, though not ranked as such, really are the condi- tions upon which we are asked to form a federal government, I altogether dis- agree with the proposal which you, sir, have placed before the Convention. What do we say in order to i:)rocure federa- tion ? AVhat do we say to the Australian colonies 1 We say to the smaller states, " Federate." When they ask in reply, " What is federation 1 " we tell them of all its advantages. But we are im- mediately asked this one thing, " Well, we have the power of making all the laws v.-ithin ourselves, and of making them without consulting you ; why should we come under federation and consult you about our laws at all 1" That is the answer given by the small states to the big states that want to swallow them up, as it were. What is the reply when the small states say, " We cannot lose our nationality ; we are a unit now, and we must preserve our nationality in any kind of federation th.at may take place ?" They are answered at once, " Very well, we will allow you to be a unit and will create two houses of legis- lature, one of which shall be a senate in which each colony as it stands now shall be represented ; no matter what its length and breadth and population may be, it shall have the same voice and the same influence in that senate as is enjoyed by the other chamber." That is a sub- stantial quid pro quo ; that is something given on each side ; that is business. But what does this resolution propose? As Koon as we have given up our rights to the federal authority we are asked to v/ith- draw the right that has been given to be allowed to be considered a unit in the legislature. We are to give back that gift [Sir TJiomas Mclluraith. that the federation has given in considera- tion for something else, and to take some- thing else : because we are asked in the most important question that can possibly come before the legislature that this state representation in the federal council shall be a great deal less than was bargained for — it is to be less than one unit. The gentlemen who have spoken on this subject, Vy'ith the exception of the hon. member, Sir Samuel GriBith — even you yourself, sir, though you did not say much about it — took it for granted that the senate pro])osed in the resolutions would be something like the Upper House, which forms a chamber in the different lecjisla- tures of the colonies. But where is the resemblance between the two bodies ? Why is there a distinction drawn be- tween the powers of the members of the upper house and those of the members of the lower house 1 It is only for one reason. When the constitution originally came to us from Ena;Iand, this distinction did not exist. The tw^o houses were given equal pov/ers. But when it came to be seen tliat one chamber was elected to represent the whole of the people — though it does not really do that, for it does not repre- , sent the women — but at all events, when I it came to be recoGfnised as the chamber I that was supposed to represent the people, and that the other chamber represented only a section of the people, namely, those who had property, it naturally came about that this popular chamber said to the upper house, " In money matters we will not give you the same power that we possess." It seems to be assumed by mem- bers of the Convention w^ho have spokeai that it is quite impossible ^in the very;| nature of things that a money bill can be settled by two houses — that there is sure to be a deadlock. But the deadlock does not arise because two chambers deal with a money bill, because the two chambers, having equal powers in respect to those I Federal ConstiiutiGu : [5 MARcn, 1891.] Resolutions. 63 jubjects, deal \vith a great many other juestions besides that of finance. It is only here that we are to be curbed and «re are to be curbed here when no reason lor doing so exists ; because I have pointed 3ut that in the senate Queensland is to )e represented by the same number of nembers as New South "Wales, although Is population is only one-half of that of ;he mother colony. They may say that is unfair, but it is part of the bargain. Why ire the terms of that bargain to be made unfair to the smaller colonies 1 Why is the lower of those smaller colonies to be re- strained ] Those hon. gentlemen who have spoken have assumed — which is not the fact — that in the legislature shadowed forth in these resolutions the senate is to represent property. Hon. Members : No ! Sir THOMAS McILWEAITH : It is only on that assumption, and on no other, that their arguments can be based — that the house of i-eprcsentatives will represent the people, and that the senate will repre- sent the monied class. Mr. Playford : No ! Sir THOMAS McILWRAITH : That is the only ground on which their argu- ments can be based. In the disputes that have taken place between the two cham- bers in all the diCTcrcnt colonies, that has been the only reason that has been given. It cannot be assumed that there being two chamber.s, there are sure to he deadlocks, because the same reason would apply to deadlocks arising on fifty other occasions. Tlic contention has simply been that the people who find tlic money should have the sole right of saying how it shall be spent. Now, why should we assume that the senate will not represent the people of Australasia ? I hold tliat it ■will represent the people in every possible way. How do I know that the first men who are eli;cted for Queensland — the colony that I, as one, am here to repre- \ sent — will not be elected by the plebis- cite'? There cannot be a more thoroudi representation of the people, so far as numbers go, than by that system, which is one of pure democracy. There are no conditions stated on which the colonies shall elect their members, and the senate may, and no doubt will, represent the people quite as much aswill the representa- tives chosen by the people in any other way. A good many reasons can, of course, be given why this part of the resolutions, affirming that the sole power of originat- ing and amending all bills appropriating revenue and imposing taxation, should be given to the one house alone. I have given my views on the subject as a non- legal man. My hon. friend, Sir Samuel Griffith, explained the matter thoroughly to all legal minds, and I have not heard a single word in answer to his speech. I have heard it evaded, but I certainly have not heard one word in answer to it. There is one matter, and it is of far greater importance even than that aspect of the question, that has not been touched upon at all, and it concerns the position of Queensland at the present time. I think it is a very important matter where state rights are to be represented, and to be represented by one chamber in the new federal Icgi.slature, that provision should be made, or at all events that an indication should be given as to how provision shall be made, for the admission into the union of other provinces, and for the subdivision of colonies now existing. Not a word has been said as to that up to the present time. In Queensland we are on the eve of dividing the colony, if wc can, into three parts. We shall require some guarantee that Queensland is going to be recognised as three provinces in this new federal government, and at all cvcnt.s, un- less the thing is to come to a deadlock, wo must provide some method l)y whicli the Bubdivi.'iion of a colony sliall be made. Second day. 6i Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. Avhen domandecl by the people and ap- proved by the legislature. No provision has been made for that ; yet it is a ques- tion that will arise before a federal go- vernment can possibly be established. The question, I say, is bound to arise, and is in fact to the front now. I will not take up the time of the Convention any longer, be- cause I am "lad to see that the rule of the day is to make short speeches, and to speak to the point ; and I adopt that rule the more cordially because I consider that the passing of these resolutions is a mere formal matter, and that they will be thrashed out thoroughly by the Committee in detail. Captain RUSSELL : I see that the order-paper is headed the " National Australasian Convention," and, therefore, being a member of the Australasian group, I may say that so far, in listening to the debate, it has struck me, to use a quotation from the Bible, in which I am afraid I may not be absolutely correct, that " Whilst ye worship me with your mouths, your hearts are far fi-om me." I have been listening, as a representative of a remote part of Australasia, for the true federal .spirit. It has been supposed that the federal spirit does not exist in New Zea- land. I venture to say, without hesita- tion, that in any debate in New Zealand on the question of federation, we should have heard more of Australasia and less of Australia. It is a broad question that we are here to deliberate upon, and as I am now only filling a gap of five minutes, and have most distinguished colleagues to fol- low me, I am unable to enter upon the different subjects at the length I should wish ; but the great question that we have before us now is not the creation of one large colony on the continent of Australia, but to endeavour so to frame a constitu- tion that all parts of Australasia shall be able to attach themselves to it should they now or hereafter think fit to do so. It [^Sir Thomas Mcllioraith. is perfectly true that New Zealand has decided to send but three delegates to this Convention ; but I would point out that, at the deliberations of the conference last year, though nothing was affirmed on the subject, it was held by all the speakers that in all probability the voting at the Convention would take place by colonies, and if that is the case surely the voice of three men expressed in one vote might in itself be held to have as much effect as the voice of a host, inasmuch as it would be the still small voice of a strons; feeling, and not the loud popular clamour which so often means nothing at all. The great question that Australasia has to con- sider at this moment is whether Austral- asia will constitute herself the mother state to which all the other peoples in the neighbourhood shall attach themselves. There are many questions of great im- portance which hinge on that, and which have not been alluded to in this resolu- tion, and which could not have been alluded to by any of the previous speakers. The great object of any federal constitu- tion, according to my mind, at any rate — I speak for myself — the great desid- eratum should be to so frame a constitu- tion that the remoter portions of Austral- asia should be able to join themselves on to what we may term the mother colony, should they think fit so to do. My hon, friend, Sir Samuel Griffith, in speaking yesterday, dwelt much, and I think very properly, upon the question of the senate. It has been said that the people should have the entire power, seeing that they represent the purse. That is a truism. It has become, I think I may almost say, a fetish throughout all British-speaking com- munities, that the power in every question should rest with the bare majority. That majority is often very bare and very narrow ; and though to the very fullest extent I concede that the power must rest with the people, it is a very open I Federal Constitution: [5 Makch, 1891.] Resolutions. 65 -|u; .stion whether countries ought to he and defects in the system of responsible -ulimitted to the cyclonic effects of popular government ; that is to say, one of the ijusts of passion, unchecked by any author- principal questions which affect the de- itv whatsoever, and I venture to affirm, liberations of representative institutions :l;ough it may seem paradoxical, that the throughout Australasia is who is to be -enate might possibly more truly repre- premier and who is to go out of office, jent the majority of Australasia than Great public questions ai-e subordinated might the people's representatives in the in nine cases out of ten to personal popu- lOuse of assembly. In the first place, I larity and the maintenance of a certain w^ould say that it is absolutely essential set of people in office, and no hon. mem- i£ the weaker colonies are to come into a ber here who has sat long in a repre- federation that they shall have a numerical sentative chamber can deny that business [najority for the time-being, because we are of the greatest importance is perpetu- lot .speaking now for an ancient people in a ally shelved, that stone-wall is set up country fairly populated, but we are speak- jieriodically — I might almost say perpetu- :ng for large territories which yet have to ally — to endeavour to prevent public )Q colonised, in which great numbers of opinion being given eftect to, because Deople will be settled on places which at it chances that the large minority in present are waste and uncultivated — and if the house have some other views which see say that the sole power shall rest in the they wish to put before the country ; that, lands of those who chance at the moment in other words, we have failed during re- :o represent a majority of the colonised cent years by representative government portions of Australasia, how can we expect to get a true expression of opinion from Jiat we shall have a true federal union ? the people. I maintain that such is the How can we imagine that the outlying case in almost every colony in Australasia, districts will submit themselves to what, I have watched it with some care and I believe, may be the tyranny of a chance with great pain. But if we give con- majority 1 Let us give to the senate, then, siderable power to the senate I venture to full power, seeing that in all probability say that that power will to a very great it will represent numerically the majority extent diminish. It is not necessary that of Australa.sia rather than those who I should now go into details as to what chance to be the i)eople's delegates for the tlic business of the senate may or may not moment in the liousc of representatives, be ; but so soon as Australasia develops liiore are many points which have not into a nation, so soon as it l^ecomcs a power been considered, and with which I will having dealings witli foreign nations, I not botlier the Convention at the present maintain that the system of turning o\it time; but I would ask them to boar in governments upon .some small question — mind that if wc arc to adopt the present I will not .say of public policy, but some system of responsible government — and I very small question, the continual shuf- may mention incidentally that in New fiing of the cards, the ejectment of men Zealand there is a very strong section of from office owing to no failure of duty on public men who arc beginning to doubt their part, will become a very great incon- the wisdom of respon.sible government, venicnco. Wlicn wo begin to have am- and I appeal to the premiers of the bassador.s, or something similar to am- neighbouring colonies in this Convention bassadors, negotiating with foreign coun- as to whether thoy themselves do not tries, when wc liave an agent general re- admit that there arc very many drawbacks presenting us in England, I venture to E Second day. 66 Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. say that the ejectment of ministers from that will require to l)e dealt v.-ith most office continually anil perpetually with- carefully. Yet I have heard no member out any good reason at all v.ill inter- of the Convention speak on that subject. fere very materially indeed v.ith Avhat There is nothing in these resolutions con- I may term the foreign policy of Austral- templating the possibility that there will asia ; and, therefore, wo ought by some be a foreign race to deal with. But con- means or other to endeavour to put a check sider this difficulty, which I merely out- upon the system of the ejectment of min- line to you. The great and all-pervading isters from office without reason, thereby question that occupies men's minds in all curtailing the benefits which they could parts of the world at the present moment confer on the united colonies, and also in- — it is undoubtedly doing so novr in Aus- terfering materially with the foreign policy tralin, and it is a question more advanced of Australasia. The reason why I think in my own colony than here— is the great we should have a system of federation as social question — what is termed the social loose as possible is this : that all the more upheaval, and I venture to say tliat e\ery outlying portions of Australasia must be colony must be left to deal with a question allowed to work out their own destinies. like that. It is a matter for social dealing. AVhen you think that we, in our own It is a matter with which men will deal colony, ha^•e what may be termed a foreign rather through municipalities than through policy, inasmuch as we deal with an alien a great federation in advancing, vv-hati bc- race, that we have laws very materially lieveit is necessary we should advance, the affecting them, that the questions of native true liberties and freedom of the people. title are matters of very grave moment, Therefore, what w-e want is not the unitl- and that any interruption in our relations cation of Australasia, but a federation with those people might be of the most into which all portions of Australasia may serious importance to the colony, I think be drawn. Bear this in mind : That in the you will agree with me that we shall re- plenitude of your power, feeling yourselves quire to see that we have a safeguard in now the masters of the whole Pacific, it all such re.«;pects as these before v/e submit should be your duty to attract, as it were, ourselves to a federal authority. And so, by centripetal force, the whole of Austral- iu the colonies of northern Australia, you asia to yourselves. The day is coming yourselves may yet find that you have when the countless islands throughout the- difficulties unforeseen to cope with, It Pacific will be colonised, and though ^'our is true that the native races of the more power is gi-eat, and though you have an settled portions of Australia have given enormous start in colonisation, there will ydu but little trouble, and you have dealt be an enormous power in those southern with there summarily, but possibly when seas that must be either part of Austral- you go to northern Australia you will asia, or more or less inimical to our in- find there a i-ace more resolute and more terests. There is another point of view difficult to deal with. which seems to have been overlooked : Mr. Playford : No ! that is, if we are to be the centre of a Captain BUSSELL : Of course I must happy and pi'osperous power in these Ijow to the wisdom and experience of those seas we must have strong cohesion, be- who have already had to deal with them ; cause really not far away from parts of but be that as it may, if New Guinea is Australasia lies the great continent of ever to become a part of Australasian America, and the question has yet to be federation, there, at any rate, is a people solved whether America may not attract [Captain Eussell. i Federal ConslitiUiGn: [o March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 67 the majority of tlie trade, tlie majority of the power and influence oi the southern seas to her coast, and divert tliem from Aus- tralia. It is, therefore, our duty to con- sider how we can make the federation so loose that we shall attract all these vari- ous atoms to ourselves, rather than allow them to fly oS" to the great continent of America, which, I venture to say, is quite within the bounds of possibility, if Austral- asian statesmen are not sufiiciently wise to attract those atoms to themselves. Al- though we do hesitate, of course, in ISTew Zealand, to submit ourselves to federation, I should not like the world to think that we are inimical to the idea at all. Though we may be unwilling to submit ourselves to any drastic laws, although we are unwilling to abrogate any of the powers of government necessary for our internal management, which we possess at the present time, there are all sorts of laws to which we shall be only too happy to submit ourselves if we are able to do so. It is a matter of great importance to us that we should trade with Australia. In round numbers, one-fifth of the trade of New Zealand is done with the continent of Australia. It would be a great loss to us to lose that trade ; but, great as the misfortune would be to New Zealand, I venture to say that the loss would be three times as great to Australia to lo.sc our trade. Mr. DiBBS : No ! Captain RUSSELL: That is so long and broad a question that I will not go into it ; but I venture to say that there are other markets open to New Zealand be.iidcs Australia ; but Australia, whether she likes it or not, must consume many of the products of New Zealand. Mr. Playfoud : No ! Captain R,USSELL : Hon, members may say " No " ; but nevertheless I still hold my opinion. I venture to say that a great portion of our vegetable products w-ill come into Australia ; let Australia do v.-hatever she may to keep them out. Mr. DiBBS : Only if you federate ! Captain RUSSELL: Surely the hou. member, Mr. Dibbs, is not so narrow- minded as to believe that you can bring anything about by coercion. Has he for- gotten the fable of the east wind and the sun — how the east wind howled and blew on the traveller; but the more it howled and blew the closer he wrapped his cloak about him ] Then the sun came out and shone upon the ti'aveller, and he threw off his cloak. So I say that if you wish to attract New Zealand, if you wish to at- tract Australasia to your shores, it is not by taking any hostile steps that you will bring it about, but by the genial sun of Australia shining \ipon the whole of us. Mr. Dibbs : There is a disposition to be embraced ! Captain RUSSELL : Yes, there is a dis- position to be embraced ; but we think it should not be a bear's hug. We are anxious that the trade and intercoui-se between the federated colonies should be as free as pos- sible ; we are anxious by every means to trade with you. We recognise that our marriage laws might fairly bo assimilated. While we recognise that certainly in the matter of land defence we can gain nothing, yet with regard to maritime defence it is of great importance that New Zealand should be combined with Australia. I would also point out, a3 a very important factor of the case which has not been al- luded to, that probably the great coaling stations of the Pacific for marine purposes will be upon the west coast of the INIiddle Island of New Zealand. It is, therefore, a matter of great inqiortance, and abso- lutely essential to you, that the colony pos- 8es.sing these great coal-mines should be in close relationship with Australia ; because in the remote future — we are not acting for to-day, but are framing a constitution which may, I hopn, last for thousands Secoixd day. 68 Federal Constitution : [5 INrARCii, 1891.] Resolutions. of years — if alien races spring up, it will be a matter of great importance that the maguiticcut harbours and great coal re- sources of New Zealand should be one vitli and inseparable from the dominion of Australia. So, again, with the matter of the judiciary. I am not now prepared to give definitely my opinion upon that suV'ject, but, at any rate, I believe that I shall be right in saying that we should be anxious to do all we can to assimilate the laws on all important points throughout Australasia, and no difficulty would occur in agreeing to some such scheme as that. As to the executive, I said in com- mencing my speech that I thought it was, at any rate, a matter of debate amonsst a considerable section of tiie population of New Zealand as to whether the present form of responsible govern- ment is the best that could be established. I confess that my mind is somewhat nebul- ous on the point at present ; but, un- doubtedly, one feels more and more, as time goes on, that there ai'e anomalies in our present form of government. All these, I venture to say, are matters of no moment at the present instant. All we have to do is to consider how we can most broadly lay down the lines upon which our federation shall be built. It ought not ■to be built solely with a view to the circum- .stances existing at the present moment. Many portions of the Australian continent which at present would be practically un- represented will, at some future time, have a great say in the goveiuiment of the country; and therefore the constitution ought to ])(i so framed that we should not take into consideration only the great centres of population which exist at the present time ; but we should also offer inducements to all the outlying portions of Australasia to come under the federation. If that is done, I venture to say the day w ill come when there will be a truly federated Aus- tralasia, and not a union of Australia only. [Captairi Eussell. TELEGRAM FROM THE QUEEN. The President : Before the Convention adjourns for luncheon, I desire to announce to hon. members that I have received from his Excellency theGovernor a message from her Majesty the Queen. His Excel- lency telegraphed to her Majesty the suc- cess of the Convention banquet on Monday night and the opening of the Convention, and he has received from her most gracious Majesty the following reply : — Have received your telegi'am with gi'eat satis- faction, and am much pleased at the loyalty evinced on this important occasion. Victoria, Queen and Empress. I am sure we will give three cheers for the Queen. Hon. members gave three clieersfor her Majesty the Queen. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. SECOND day's debate KESUMED. Mr. DEAKIN : Fortunately for the Convention, I was not called upon to un- dertake the onerous task of opening this debate last afternoon. Fortunately for the Convention, again, a delay on my part led to our listening to the charming speech of the hon. delegate, Captain Russell, and I could have wished that other and older members had now been prepared to con- tinue a discussion so ably opened by the ])remiers of the various colonies. Among these gentlemen the last speaker, although not at present a pi-emier, occupies a some- what singular position, representing a colony whose affections we are clearly led to understand are with us, but whose judg- ment is not yet convinced as to the wis- dom of adopting the course which it is proposed to pursue. The hon. member. Captain Russell, is so ardent a New Zea- lander that in his reproaches, mild though they were, of the sister colonies, there ap- peared to be a certain desire to realise that Irish reciprocity which is all on one side. He was careful to tell us that we must not at the present time expect anything i Federal Constitution: [5 Makch, 1891.] Eesolutions. G9 from New Zealand ; but he laid down been seen in any constitutional country, with great fulness and freedom the duties and such as has never been seen in Austral- which we immediately owed to that most asia — a committee representing seven par- beautiful, important, and wealthy colony, liaments, ^vith the concui-rence of seven whose position, he led us to understand, governments, and the sanction of fourteen was that of the coy maiden, not unwilling, legislative chambers, having the direct ap- and indeed expecting, to be courted, and pvoval of every existing voice of the people whose consent would be granted by- and- of Australasia given through all its different by as a favour. It maybe that because political organs, and, therefore, claiming an they fell from a lady's lips, or from the authority second only to that of a chamber representative of a lady, as I may be elected directly by them. The duty ini- permitted at present to regard him, posed upon us is simply that of advising, tliat we may pass by certain heresies and, therefore, the latitude permitted to us about responsible and democratic govern- is, in some respects, large ; but, on the other ment which might otherwise seem to hand, the sphere within which we move is challenge a rejoinder. At all events, narrow, and must be narrow. It is not if the hon. member will permit me, I possible that any question of moment in will only endeavour to deal with them in this Convention can be settled by count of connection with the remarks which have heads, or even by count of colonies. Any been made with reference to the proposed conclusion arrived at, which is to be of constitution for Australasia. The fact that practical value, must be a unanimous con- the Premier of Queensland has seen fit to elusion, and the smallest of the colonies throw the apple of discord at once among requires to have any considerations which us is, to my mind, extremely fortunate, it may urge weighed with exactly the and if, as the hon. Premier of Victoria same attention as those which proceed from considered, he favoured us with a greater the most wealthy and the most populous. gift of dilhcultics tlian of solutions, that. We are here, therefore, sir, committed after all, was natural from the opener of from the first to a policy of compromise, to such a debate. The one solution which the all compromise that will be possible to us, hon. member has proposed I intend shortly seeking to be lionost representatives of our to examine as well as I can, treating especi- several parliaments and colonics, and in- ally the particular side of it which was so dicating to the best of our knowlodiro and admirably put before the Convention liy belief the attitude which they will take liis colleague, Sir Thomas Mcllwraitii. on each question. The jirincijilc upon One might be pardoned for dwelling upon which we must proceed is that embodied this occasion and forecasting its po.ssibIc in the well known church maxim, " In future; but our responsibilities are .so essentials, unity ; in non-essentials, liberty; great as to sober the most sanguine, as and in all things, charity." If we claim well as to arouse the most confident. I an indirect authority from the electors take it that if this Convention is to leave we are none the less conscious of the its mark upon the liistory of Australia, it fact thr-.t whatever is proi»osed by this will do so not by disquisition, Imt simply Convention inust be of such a nature as by the results which it will leave be- to meet wilh their sanction, or else it will hind it. We have been termed most pro- be proposed in vain. We know from the pcrly and accurately a parliamentary com- outset the liar of puVdic opinion Ijeforo mittcc — and a parliamentary committee which we are to be judged, and we know we arc ; but such a committee as has rarely from the commencement of onr labours Second day. 70 Federal Conslitution: [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. that tlio conclusion of tliem rests in other hands than ours— in the hands of wo less a body than the asseniWed peoples of all the Australasian colonies. Tliis, sir, is suf- cient in itself to make us careful in our deliberations, and guarded in our conclu- sions, especially if we take into account the further fact that the verdict of the electors — whether taken directly through the elec- you had, sir, in submitting these resolu- sions in their present form. You say : That in order to establish aiul secure ai enduring foundation for the structure of a federal government the principles embodied ia the resolutions following be agreed to. 1 Thus at once indicating to us that these resolutions, as they stand, are not laid before us to be accepted and criticised torates, or not so taken, will also require to word by word, as if they were sought to be be taken through allthepresent parliaments placed on permanent record; but that it is of Australasia. We have to consider not the principles embodied in them which we only the interests of the people regarding are now called upon to consider. That them as a whole, but also the different and course appears to me to have been most sometimes conflicting localisms which are wisely adopted ; and I shall therefore seek, created owing to the fact that this people in treating these resolutions in their order, is at present bound up within artificial not to dwell upon the language in v.'hich boundaries into a certain number of com- they happen to be couched, but cndea- numities. If the constitution or proposal vour, as far as possible, to cope with the for a constitution which is to be drafted in principles which they seem to embody. this Convention is to be a success, it must The first of these establishes beyond doubt command the sanction of the several par- the sovereignty proposed to be conserved liaments of those several communities. to the several colonies of Australasia, sub- Then as to the objects which we set our- ject to the limitations and surrenders which selves in preparing the draft of a con- -will appear set out in detail in the con- stitution, I fancy that we may without stitution proposed to be adopted for the impropriety, in fact, with entire pro- federal parliament. Subject to the express priety, adojit the unequalled language em- ployed in the preamble of the superb Con- stitution of the United States, and may without qualifying a single syllable claim that our labours are intended to achieve a similar result. We shall be entitled to announce, after receiving the popular ver- dict in its favour, that we, the people of Australasia, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our pos- terity, do ordain and establish this constitution. terms of that constitution, every liberty at present enjoyed by the peoples of the several colonies, and every power of their legisla- tures, and every potentiality wdiich is within their constitutions remains with them and belongs to them for all time. You lay this down at the outset as a cardinal principle, and as it has so far received the cordial approval of every delegate, I shall not proceed to debate it further than to note that it was exactly this princijDle which guided the founders of the existing Federal Council in their draft of that measure — The resolutions which have been proposed it puts into a fresh form Avith regard to by yourself in order to accomplish these this federation the very root idea of the objects contain in what may be considered present Federal Council Act. This is the their preamble, one phrase which has not postulate that to the several coloniesshould yet been commented upon, but which appears to me to deserve comment, as indicating on its face the obiect which [J/r. Dcakin. be left all possible powers and prerogatives, defined and undefined, while the federal go- vernment itself, however largely endowed I Federal CoiistiiiUion: [o March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 71 should Lave a certain fixed and definite This, however, has been ah-eady dealt -with, endowment within which its powers would The point which presented itself to the hon. be circumscribed. In the first resolution member, Sir Samuel Grifiith, in this connec- which you, sir, moved at the conference held tion was the probability of delay on the part in Melbourne twelve months ago, you most of the federal parliament in dealing with gracefully recognised the valuable services this most grave and important issue. In- to the cause of federation conferred by disputably the first task of the federal par- the founders of the Federal Council, which, liament will be to organise itself and its in Victoria, stands indissolubly associated administration. Indisputably the task of with the name of the Honoi-able James framing a common tariff for all Australasia Service, a gentleman v.-hom vre regret, by will be no ordinary task. T!ie difficulties bis own choice, is not one of the Victorian whichhavebeenfelt,and whichhavealready delegates on this occasion. He, sir, and l^ec-n grapliically pourtrayed by the hon. the other great representative men, among the Premier of South Australia in his ad- Avhora the late Eight Honorable "W. B. mirable speech this morning — the difficul- Dalley must always be gratefully remem- ties v\'hich have been felt in each province bered, when facing a similar problem to in coping with such questions will be be dealt \vith in a somewhat limited vray multiplied sixfold in dealing with the in- adopted this principle. It is something to terests of Australia. If we have found it note that the years that have passed since difficult for politicians to collect informa- then, and the experience gained since then, tion to enable them to deal with this intri- have only strengthened the opinion which cate question, when we have only had the they arrived at, that no union was possible interests of one colony to consider, if it in Australasia which did not preserve in docs not follow in exact arithmetical ratio, the fullest form the power and dignity of it yet does follow most distinctly that there the several communities which compose it. will be much more difficulty in framing a Indeed, if avc regard their pi-esent extent, tariti acceptable to the people of the whole their prcsentknownwcalth, and theirfuture of Australia. It is quit© clear, then, that prospects, we must admitthat in the future time must elapse before this common tariff tliey will rival in all respects kingdoms can be proposed ; and those who have pre- in Europe and states in America; and ceded me, including tlie Premier of Vie- that the parliaments wliich belong to such toria — Avith whom I am in licarty general communities cannot be other than bodies agreement, so far as his remarks touching clotlied with the higliest power, dignity, some questions are concerned — appear to and influence, to which it will be an lienor consider that this time, of itself, would to belong, and which will play a great offer sufficient grace to those colonies part in shaping the destinies of this conti- which have already adopted the policy of rent. Then, sir, we come to your 2n'I and developing their manufacturing industries 3rd resolutions, which I propose to briefly liy special legislation, ^^'ith all respect to consider together. It seems to me that them, I take, a contrary view. I be- 1 they might have been legitimately placed lieve that it is not sufficient that an indefi- in an opposite order — that we should first nite time must necessarily elapse before the haveassertcd the power and authority of the federal ]iarliament can deal widi this issue, federal government to establisli a common I believe that if we arc to obey the Ian- tariff, and that then wo should have Iiad guagn of tlie resolutions wliich sent us asacorollarytheprincipleoffreeintercliango here — if we are to pro[)Ose a constitution .between the several provinces of the union. which shall be just to the .several colonies Sccotul day. \ 72 Federal Constiiution : [5 March, 1891.] BesoUUions. } — sve oaunot be content ^vith leaving tlie demanded, seeing that ultimately, and at f: question as open as it is proposed to leave no distant date, the question of the tarifi it. What is the position of those colonies to be imposed upon our seaboard mustjoj which have advisedly, in pursuance of the be settled by the people of Australia powers intrusted to them, and in obedience as a whole, no matter what the verdict tothedictatesof their parliaments, adopted of individual colonies may be. That is a }n-otective policy 1 They have created, the goal towards which we are progress- t within longer or shorter periods, vested ing, and towards which we ought not to interests, in which millions of capital are progress too slowly, but which it would invested— millions of private capital of be impossible, which it would be unjust, the citizens of this country. Now, sir, I to attempt to gain at a single bound, would be the last to suggest, the last to I will not venture at this stage to sug- bclieve, that a federal parliament, I'epre- gest what, in my humble judgment, would! senting Australasia, would ignore con- be a sufficient guarantee to satisfy those siderations of this kind. I would be the colonies that their interests would not last to s\ippose that they could be guilty, be too soon, too rapidly, too hastily im- in obedience to any doctrine of economic perilled. I will only indicate that it ap- practice, of what might be termed the pears to me that we might safely lay down crime of sweeping away, at a blow, the in tho constitution the condition that dur- pn'otection under which these industries ing the first years of its existence it should and interests have been built up. I be- only be possible to reduce existing tariffs lieve that to be impossible. But the ques- by a certain percentage in a certain number tion here and now is, not of individual of years; so that if the first federal par- belief, or the belief of this Convention ; liament should feel bound to reduce duties it is our duty, in a matter of this kind, it could only do so to a certain extent. not to rest upon beliefs, but to obtain The people of the continent, as a whole, guarantees for the preservation of in- would be appealed to at least once, if not terests such as these. What are the twice, before protective duties were reduced guarantees which can legitimately be to revenue duties. In point of fact, the asked by tliose colonies which have estab- federal parliament on this question should lished industries under the shelter of pro- be asked to proceed by steps, to advance tective tariffs ? What is the considera- by degrees ; and the guarantee should be tion which they can reasonably ask from set out on the face of the proposed consti- their fellow-colonists, and especially from tution that those who have embarked their that one great colony in which we now capital in these industries under state en- stand, which has not yet seen its way to couragement and state sanction, should follow a similar policy 1 Let me say, at know the period of time within which the outset, that I, for one, frankly admit they could hope to retain the command of that a customs union is a sine qua non their markets, even if the federal parlia- of federal union ; that without a customs ment should give its judgment against a union there can be no federal union in p)rotective policy. I need scarcely i-epeat the true .sense of the term, and that all here that, in my opinion, the federal par- our efforts and all our labours must be liament is in no danger of giving any such directed to securing that customs union verdict. I believe that the portion of the so soon as it may be compatible with the speech in which the hon. member. Sir interests intrusted to us. With that pre- Thomas Mcll wraith, set out the conditions ruise, let us ask what might fairly be under which protection might be applied, [i/r. Deukin. Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Eesolutions. 73 xpresses the opinion of the bulk of the eople of this country, and tliat this is au pinion which, the better it is understood, he more it will find popular favour. ersonally, then, I have no more fear than ,ny member of this convention, as to what he ultimate result would be. It will mean k^ithout doubt an Australasian protective ariff; but I say it is incumbent upon us lot to rest upon individual beliefs in a mat- er of so much moment to special colonies ; ve must request and require some such uarantee as that which I have rudely lutlined. I would remind hon. members ?ho are apprehensive of such a proposal hat we all fondly hope and believe that he union which it may be our privilege inaugui'atc, will be an eternal union — union for all time of the states of Aus- ralasia, or into which all the states of Aus- :ralasia will, within a comparatively brief :»eriod, be irresistibly drawn. That being he case, why should a concession of a few ^ears be denied, when the object to be at- ;ained is permanent ] Mr. Adye Douglas : The hon. member lias no confidence in his own people ! Mr. DEAKIN: The hon. member must pardon me if I do not now see the perti- nency of his interjection. I was about ;o point out that, suitposing this prin- ciple to be adopted, this guarantee to be given, it does not necessarily imply that nothing should be done in the way of free intercliange between the Australasian colonie.s in tlie meantime. On the con- trary, that would rest with the several colonies themselves; and the sense that at no distant date an absolute union was in- evitable, would no doubt prove an argu- ment of considerable weight to induce them to prepare for it by every means in their power. Consequently, the condition which has been suggested would not prove an absolute bar to progress in this direction even during the term of the guarantee; but, on the contrary, it might be reason- ably anticipated that, with such a guaran- tee, offered and accepted, the several colo- nies who were for the time-being protected by it would see their way to enter into mutual arrangements for a more or less unrestricted e.Kchange across their borders; and, saving the rights and the vested in- terests to which I have referred, no one would more cordially support such a policy than myself. ^Yith regard to the 4:th reso- lution, I have only to say that the pro- mise which it offers is one of efficiency in the defence of Australasia, an efiiciency which I trust will be based upon as small a standing army as is compatible wdth the safety of the country, and upon as large an extension of the principle of citizen soldiery as is possible with the funds at our command. Then, sii', we approach the article of your resolutions — the first in the second part — which has, up to the present moment, called for the most criti- cism, and evoked the warmest debate. Your proposition that there should be two houses of ])arliament has been, so far, ac- cepted with unanimity. Your proposition that the house of representatives should be elected on the popular basis has not been challenged. The proposition that tliere should be a senate retiring by sections has also been adopted. The one article in this particular resolution which has been challenged is that whicli, in accordance with the established principles of the British Constitution, endows the popular chamber with the sole power of originating and amending all bills, appropriating n> venue, or imposing taxation. Those, .sir, who follow your resolution, and adopt it most cordially, have been accused of keep- ing in mind througliout the existing upper chamborsof Australasia, of ignoring the dif- ference between the second federal chamber and the second chamber in the .several colo- nies. But those who have made this accu- sation have not themselves been precise, nor could they be precise, in indicating Second day. 74 Federal Consiiluiion: [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. the particular mode of election which -was proposed to be adopted in order to ob- tain this senate. Some have inferred, it is evident, tliat the local legislative bodies would elect the members of the senate. Others have vaguely indicated the possi- bility of an election by the whole body of the people, or by provinces, and others have indicated a mixed method of election. I wish merely to point out from the be- ginning that, until the method of election is settled, the question in what degree the upper chamber really represents the state which it claims to represent must I'emain in some doubt. Sir Thomas McIlwraith : No ! Mr. DEAKIiSI' : It may nominally re- present the state, without really repre- senting it. If, for instance — and I do not think it would be an unwise pro- position — it is suggested that each colony shall determine for itself the method of election which shall be followed for tlie proportion of members which it is entitled to claim in the senate — and that would be a liberty which, until I hear reasons to the contrary, I think might be judiciously intrusted to the several colonies — if the several colonies be left free to frame their own constituencies for their own senate, then we shall, not impossibly, have a body which will have difiering claims to repre- sent certain states. I shall maintain from now, until I find the principle refuted by much stronger argument than I have heard brouglit against it, that there is only one means of thoroughly and effec- tively representing the people, and that is by direct election. No other choice, how- ever it may be based upon the indirect au- thority of the people, can claim to stand for a moment in comparison with that of men who receive their trust from the hands of the electors themselves, and who speak their sentiments, without the intervention of any other body, or subject to any other influence than the judgment and reason of [Mr. Deahin. the manhood of their colony. I say that, however high the title, however lofty the claims, of the senate, if it derives its origin from an indirect method of election, the representative character of its members cannot equal that of men who face the people directly, and win, in their own per- son, at the sword's point, and after fierce conflict, the confidence of a majority of the electors. Sir Samuel Griffith : Why not % Mr. DEAKIN : I say I shall accept that as a first principle until I hear stronger reasoning to the contrary than I have yet heard ; and I shall adopt, in this particular, the excellent plan of the hon. the Premier of Queensland, who has interjected, and whoso politic practice, througliout the whole of the debate, has been to request his oppo- nents to find plans, and then proceed to criti- cise them. I think that we who lay down a principle so generally accepted as this, \ are entitled to ask to be furnished, not with reasons for supporting it, but with reasons why we should not support it, or why we should accept some other principle in its place. Therefore, with all consideration and respect, I return the hon, gentleman's interjection, and invite him to show what method of appointment can claim, in direct- ness of authority, to rank with that of im- mediate election by the whole body of the people. Sir Samuel Griffith : Any kind of election ! Mr. DEAKIN : Any kind of election ! Sir Samuel Griffith : If it represent the state ! Mr. DEAKIN : I cannot conceive of an entity called the state apart from the people whose interests it embodies ; nor can I conceive anything within the state which can claim an equal authority with the final verdict, after solemn considera- tion, of the majority of its citizens. If the hon. gentleman has any metaphysical en- tity in his mind which can be placed above Federal Constitution : [5 3lARcn, 1S91.] Eesoluiions. 75 his, I shall be glad to learn its nature ; under the British Constitution. I believe rat at present I prefer to rest uj^on what that we cannot have a better ideal for our as been the solid substratum upon which second chamber than the House of Lords pular and responsible government has as its functions are now interpreted ; at >een carried on, of which we have had cen- the same time I will confess to hon. ries of experience, and which, the more members that in defining its exact position t has been honored, the more it has en- we might possibly have some difficulty. If lOwed us with liberty, and all that follows we follow the lines upon which I believe D the train of liberty. Until we have the the British Constitution is now interpreted, nethod of the election of the senate dis- we should require a seeond chamber cm- linctly before us vre cannot tell exactly with bracing just such members as you, sir, hat degree of authority it should be in- specified in your opening speech, men of rusted. But I Avill not quibble about mature experience, of ripe judgment, of rords. I will confess that, if elected, it is high character, qualified to give counsels to uite possible and justifiable to intrust it the nation with the certainty that they vith a very large authority. I would as- would be received with respect. Of such iure the hon. member that, in endeavouring men should a second chamber be composed, o answer his contention, I shall seek to and the pov.-ers intrusted to it should be neet his argument, so far as I understand those powers that have always belonged, t, not at its worst, but at its best ; to state under responsible government, to a second t, as far as I can, as I conceive ho w^ould chamber, namely, the power of review, the itate it in order to put it in its strongest power of revision, the povrer of a veto orm ; and if I cannot answer it in that limited in time. The hon. member, Captain orm I will not attempt to answer it at Bnssell, described in poetic language that I ill. I merely pointed out at the out- am afraid I v.-ould find almost as much diffi- let — and perhaps the hon. member's inter- culty in repeating as I should in imitating, ection has led me to appear to attach too the danger incurred in the absence of a veto, much consideration to it — that this is a He spoke, I fancy, of the " cyclonic fury" ircumstance that will require to be taken of the popular mind, and conjured up be- in to consideration, which has not yet been fore us the spectacle of a democracy carried aken into consideration, and which those hither and thither by violent impulses to who advocate the intrusting of the federal opposite points of the compass wilhin short uj'per house with extraordinary powers periods of time. If there be sucli a do- lave not yet thought fit to absolutely de- mocracy — and far be it from me to in- fine. I think that we may fairly cliallcnge sinuate that Captain Ru.s.sell has liad any tlif-m to define the method of election for experience of it — then I fancy tliat the tliis senate of thcirr-i, to wliich they wish second chandler which we have in view to give exceptional powers. To remove would prevent and provide against any ajiy misapprehension, let me say that per- such possible accident. It would bcacham- sonally I liave no ambition to see a second ber speaking witii weight, and acting with chamber in tlicse colonies Avhich .should authority, aljle to amend or reject all niea- )e a mere replica of the Canadian Upper sures other than financial — able to ab.so- House, which is confessedly inadequate for lutely reject financial measures, thougli not ihe position which it occupies ; nor do I to amend them, and able by this means to even desire to see a body whoso authority cliallenge the verdict of the country when- ti'ould be as capable of variable inteiiircta- ever and however it pleased, and as often tions as is that of the House of Lords as it might please. Will it bo contended Seco7ul day. Federal Constitution: [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions, that these arc small powers'? Oa the other hand, will it be contended that if that "cyclonic fury " proved not to be the mo- mentary outburs''''vo Avhich reference has been made, but the settled determination of the popular will — docs Captain Russell, and do those wlio think with him, contend that this is to be defeated 1 On the con- trary, he agrees in theory, at all events, with the practice of the British Constitu- tion which we are supporting. So, I take it, did Sir Samuel Griffith himself. He also indorsed the principle that, in the last re- sort, and after due consideration, the popu- lar determination must prevail, and the attempt of any body, short of that of a majority of the people, to obstruct its ex- ecution must be defeated and set aside. This, I understand them to admit; we admit ; all admit. It is simply a question, then, of the degree of veto — of the degree of check which a second chamber shall be authorised to present to the execution of what the popular chamber believes at the time to be the Avill of the people. If we are agreed that the authority to be intrusted to the senate is to be only a limited veto, then I ask how that is to be reconciled with the propositions which provide for a permanent and perpetual veto capable of being imposed by the second chamber upon measures which might under con- ceivable circumstances be passed again and again by the first chambei-, and be in- dorsed again and again by the people to whom they had appealed ? I think this is anothor point on wliich we, w-ho accept our governments as mq find them, who rest on the established practice that has come down with the precedents of at least a cen- tury if not two or three centuries, in its sup'^ rt, may say to our opponents, "It is for ^ )\x to come forward with some new and original defence of this absolute and permanent veto with which you pro- pose to intrust the second chamber. If you contend simply for a limited veto — if \,- Mr. Deakin. you contend, as the hon. member, Captaii Uussell, said, simply for such a veto a would enable the body of the peopL to reflect, to reconsider, and, if necessary to amend their judgment — then we ar heartily with you ; and the question o details need not long occupy us." Bu what we feel to be the real and importan point in the proposition of the hon. mem ber, Sir Samuel Griffith, and others, that they propose to establish — and wish to impress this upon the Conven tion — a second chamber, which is to hav' the power of absolute and continuous vet( upon the proposals sanctioned by tin popular chamber, and sanctioned by tb( people. Such is the possibility. Mr. Moore : No ! Mr, DEAKIN : Such is a distinct pos sibility. With the probabilities I wil presently deal. Mr. Bnowx : A veto for one session ! IMr. DEAKIN : If the hon. membei says a veto for one session, I cordially agree with him. I go further, and an! prepared to make greater concessions t( the upper chamber than lie asks. Whai' I say is that the proposal that emanater from the Premier of Queensland, sup- ported by the hon. member, Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, in his able speech, is a ple^'! for an absolute veto to be vested in th(' second chamber. To that I wish to dra^' attention, for the purpose of clearing tht argument. Hon. delegates will perceive probably, the relation which this bears tc the foj-mer argument. If the second cham- ber is to be endowed with an absolute veto, we are bound to ask, what is th(' constituency of that chamber — from whoug does it derive its authority to override all other powers in the state 1 Mr. CuTHBERT : Fi-om the people ! Mr. DEAKIN : We will ask, how from the people ? What proof shall w€ have that the senate has the approbation ol the people ? Federal Constitution: [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 77 Mr. Cuthbert: If elected by the 3ople ! Mr. DE AKIN : If elected Ly the people, ill they undertake, in the event of dis- ate, to face their electors in order to dis- )ver on which side the people are ? Mr. Adye Douglas : Yes ! Mr. DEAKIX : If so, then, we will arrow the question. If one chamber is to compelled to xmdergo what is known a penal dissolution — a dissolution which a personal penalty, an individual private pnalty inflicted upon every member of le popular house — if we are called upon ) undergo that trial at the pleasure of le upper chamber, let the upper chamber so enjoy the sweets of a similar appeal, ad be bound by the same verdict. If on. members are prepared to take that and, -we would, I confess, be obtaining a asis on which further argument w'ould D possible ; but I have not yet understood om any of those who have spoken that vy are willing to concede so much. Al- longh the senate Avould claim to speak 1 the name of the people, and to act in eir name, and although its authority is aimed because it represents the people, have yet to hear that its members are .illing to face the people, so as to dis- ■jver whether they represent them or ot. I will not state for a moment that it ill be possible for any federal second iiambcr to act as, in remote periods, we ill say, uj)per chambers in distant coun- ios have acted with regard to the popular iaiid)cr. "\Vf; liave heard of an ui)per liaiiiber which has been compelled to pass nasures demanded by the people, revenge s'lf on the government in power, and u the house that compelled the upper lamber to pass these measures, by enias- ulating or rejecting other measures in rdcr to prove that the government could ot carry on the business of the country. V'e have heard of an upper chamber turn- ig on a ministry which simply expressed the popular will and using the authority intrusted to it in order to injure that min- istry. Mr. jNIoore : Where v '' that take place 1 Mr. DEAKIN : In remote times and far distant countries. It has been done. I can appeal even to lion, members' re- collection of constitutional history as to whether it has not been done ; and why should it not be done *? Do you intrust a body with powers unless you expect it to exercise them 1 The American Senate has been intrusted to some extent with certain executive powers, and what is the re- sult ? There is not only their public action with reference to presidents' appointments; but their action with regard to those ap- pointments before they reach the table of the House ? Is it not a fact that the senators of the United States in their oavu states claim to, and pi-actically do, exercise the patronage of those states when their party is in power ? By these means they have been elevated — and we all desire to elevate second chambers ; but their ele- vation has been the means of depressing the house of representatives, and depriv- ing it of its due influence. Although it has strengthened the senate — has aggran- dised that body — it has seriously injured the popular Ijody and rendered it less fit to discharge some of its most solemn duties. Sir Joiix Bray : Do they admit that 1 INIr. DEAKIN : Wlien I speak of Americans, I speak of 00,000,000 people. I need not say that there is great diver- sity of opinion ; but tlie hon. mentbcr will find competent autncvities quoted in so recent a work as that of Mr. Biyce — quoted by liim as the verdict of Americans, and not as his venlict. 'I'o icturn to, tho point from which tliis digression led, mQ : If we endow the second chamber ■ ith special powcr.s, we endow them for tho l)urpose of their exorcising them ; if not, why endow them at all 1 If we endow them with an absolute veto, we must mean Second d . <0 Fcikml Constitution : [5 jNIarcii, 1891.] liesolations. them to exercise it. If not, we must say Avith what degree of veto we endow them. Wlion Ave know the constituency of the body which is to be intrusted with this ab- solute veto, we shall discover a body which is to be placed above the people — a body in which is to be vested a higher authority than that of the whole people. Sir Samuel Griffith : No ! Mr. DEAKIN : Then I fall back on Sir Samuel Griffith's policy, and say that I require to have this explained to me. Sir Samuel Griffith : Of separate states, as aggregations of their own people ! Mr. DEAKIN : I suppose that Sir Samuel Griffith means that they could elect senators whose policy they approved of, whose views might be diflferent from that of the body of the people. Sir Samuel Griffith : The majorities of the separate states might be of a different opinion from the majority of the people of Australia, taken as one ! Mr. DEAKIN : It is quite conceivable that immense majorities in the large states miglit be neutralised in the senate by small majorities in the small states. This is a state of things that has to be faced ; al- though it is not likely to occur frequently. The other position I was putting will also happen occasionall}', namelyj that the sen- ators elected by the several states will, at times, be at variance both with the majority of the states and with the majority of the people of the states, and the one case will occur as often as that to which Sir Samuel Griffith alluded. This arises because it is proposed to elect this body of persons for long terms within which gi*eat changes may take place. So far as any scheme is before ui3, it is not proposed that they should be in any way amenable to their constituents for seven or nine years. These have been mentioned as probable terms of oflico for the senators in the federal parliament, and if we have men elected for seven or nine years, do we not cleai'ly endow a body [3//'. BeaJdii, with power to reject legislation of vrhich the people may have approved since the commencement of the seven or nine years? Sir Samuel Griffith : Hear, hear ! % Mr. DEAKIN : The hon. member ad- mits that this might be the case. I ask, is that the most reasonable and practical way of securing the limited veto which we de- sire 1 An lion, member thinks it is. I beg to difier from him. I think that we might have senates based on the principle of the British Constitution, which could offer a more reasonable control on better grounds, and with a better surety for believing that j their members had the confidence of the people. That is why I fail to see that the hon. member has established his argu- ment in favour of endowing this senate, ' whose method of election we do not yet understand, with the power of absolute veto. Then, one more condition. I dai not wish to argue, or to be understood as- arffuing in the interests of the other branch of the legislature. I have spoken repeat- : edly of the popular house, it is true ; but I ■ look beyond it, as I do beyond the second^ chamber, to those from whom their joint authority emanates. I am willing in all cases to endow the second chamber with the utmost independence as regards the first, I do not wish to see the second chamber existing at the pleasure or acting under the control of the popular chamber. What I wish the second chamber to do is to act under the control, and only by the authority of the people — acting under the direction' of the clectorsof the country; and provided this be granted, I would never seek to aggrandise the popular chamber at the ex- pense of the upper house, any more than I would reverse the process. I will not re- peat, as it appeared to me, the clear and convincing argument of the hon. the Pre- mier of South Australia with reference to the manner in which the proposal of the hon. member to allow the senate to discuss estimates and amend money bills would be Federal Constitution: [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. jertain to promote deadlocks ; nor will I iwell on the other points so al:)ly urged by ;he hon. member, the Premier of South A.ustralia, with most of whose statements I jersonally cordially agree. I believe that ihe experience of hon. members in this iliamber, all of whom I think have been nembers of governments, must coincide vith that of the hon. gentleman ; in fact, the ion. the Premier of Queensland admitted 16 much. His arguments on this question ire all for exportation, none for home con- iumption. As regards his own upper lOuse, he is just as clear as ever that they lave gone far beyond their rights. It has jeen his duty, as leader of the popular ;hamber, to limit and confine them, and will be so in the futui-e. Sir Samuel Griffith : This is another lenate altogether ! Mr. DEAKIN : I am coming to that Mr. Fitzgerald : The hon. member ^kos the two things to be synonymous ? Mr. DEAKIN : The strong point of the ion. gentleman — although I could not con- ireniently deal with it earlier — is that he idmits this difference : he admits — and he las just reiterated his .statement — that he a dealing with tlie federal senate in a nanner different from that in which he Krould deal with any second chamber in ;ho colonies. Sir Thomas Mcllsvraith rc- )eated tlio point with emphasis, and made t plain that it is the federal character of ;he new second chamber which is relied apon absolutely and entirely to justify ite veto. Were we endeavouring to estab- lish any absolute unity among the people Df Australia, both gentlemen would be touud arguing on the s;iriic sido as I now im. Sir Samuel Griffith : I should, cer- tainly ! t Mr. DEAKIN : And I believe Sir "' maa Mcllwraith would also. If we o to be one people, and to forget all -.d divisions, then Sir Samuel Griffith and Sir Thomas Mcllwraith would be found on one and the same side. Tliere- fore, the whole case is narrowed down to one point — and I hope they will correct me if I am doing them an injustice — they contend that this departure is jus- tified because the several states are to have equal representation in the second chamber, which is to be the custodian of state rights. The second chamber is to be intrusted with a power of absolute veto, and with the power of amending all bills, because there is to be equal repre- sentation in the senate from each colony^ and because the several colonies will assist to form the federal government. Mr. Fitzgerald : And because of the vreaker states, of which this will be the chief protection ! Mr. DEAKIN: That, I think, is in- cluded in the argument. We have heard continually, through this debate, of state rights which are to justify this supreme authority on the part of the second cham- ber ; but we have never yet had the slightest indication, except from one or two illustrations of what state rights mean — of what state rights are, and of what peril they are about to be placed in. Sir Samuel Griffith : Something must be taken for granted ! Mr. DEAKIN : Yes ; but, as it scorns to me, much to the prejudice of the argument. We arc entitled to ask for some specific justification for this great departure, something more than a general statement about unknown state rights be- ing in danger. Tl is not a question of es- tablishing a federal legislature, wliich is to Iiave unlimited authority. The federal government is to have a strictly limited power; it is not to range at will over the w liole field of legi-slation ; it is not to legis- late for all conceivable circumstances of national life. On the contrary, its legisla- tion is to be strictly limited to certain de- finite subjects. The states arc to retain iSecond day. so Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions almost all tlieir pvosent powerSj and should be quite able to protect their own rights. Thus we get rid of the vague fear of the infringement of state rights, and we are entitled to ask those who use this term to take up the short list of federal powers which it is proposed to intrust to the fedei'al government, and to show us where state rights can be impaired by their exer- cise. I put aside the question of taxation for a moment, and in fact all financial ques- tions, with the intention of dealing with them a little later. I am extending my remarks more than I had intended to do ; l)ut the interjections with which I have been met — and I am very happy to answer them — are partly responsible for that. The list of authorities conferred upon the national Government of the United States of America is a short one. Putting aside the power to collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excise, and the power to borrow money, the main powers are to regulate commerce, to establish a uniform rule of naturalisation, to coin money, to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting, to establish post-offices, to grant cojiyrights, to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court, and to provide for defence. I hope that in thewarmth of my advocacy, I am not leading members to misunder- stand my position. I am arguing for the purpose of elucidation, and not intending for one moment to imply that there is nothing to be said in reply. Turning, then, to the United States, we find the powers in- trusted to the central government limited, defined, particularised. If we take the longer list of powers — because the longer it is the more it may tell against my argu- ment — of the Dominion of Canada, we find a number of subjects in which it must be clear to hon. members no question of state rights can be conceivably involved. I will briefly read them. There is the ques- tion of penitentiaries, criminal law, mar- riage and divorce, naturalisation, copy- [3fr. Deakin. rights, patents, bankruptcy, legal tender, interest, bills of exchange, weights and measures, savings' banks, banking, cui-- rency, ferries, fisheries, quarantine, navi- gation, beacons, salaries of officials, mili- tary, census, postal service, borrowing of money, taxation, trade, and debt. Sir John Bray : Borrowing of money ! Mr. DEAKIN : In the case of all but a few out of this list of nearly thirty tonics, it is almost inconceivable to im- agine a case in which state rights will be involved. Putting financial questions aside, the question of state rights cannot be in- volved in about twenty-seven out of the thirty subjects in the list. What is pro- posed in regard to our new senate 1 Un- derstand that I am seeking for elucida- tion. It is proposed that this body should have an absolute veto upon all subjects, whether they can afiect state rights or not. The contention of those who support the argument is by implication that the whole of these subjects, if legislated upon, will involve state rights. I meet the argument at once with a direct negative, by challeng- ing hon. members to point to an instance in which any questions such as those to which I have referred can be legislated upon in such a way as to affect state riglits. Let us now take the chief of them, that which relates to finances, and connected with which we have had the greatest amount of argument. In the first place, it is usually i admitted that it is essential that financial questions should be settled as far as possible' with less delay than pertains to other legis-' lation. The business of a country requires i to be carried on, the state's creditors re- quire to be paid, public works have to be ; continued, and it is highly desirable that there should be a speedy settlement of any financial legislation. When you give the second chamber a power of absolute veto in regard to these matters you cannot by any possibility obtain such a speedy settle- { .ment. Again, the senate is a body which Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 81 anless it be elected by a direct vote of the people andean be sent at an emergency to its jonstitueuts, will not have a direct respon- jibility to those people whose taxation it p about to govern, and whose expenditure |t is about to direct. That is a question hat requires to be taken into considera- ion. I presume, also, that it will bo a ardinal principle of the federal constitu- ion that taxation should be uniform. Sir John Bray : Not all taxation ! Mr. Fitzgerald : When the hon. gen- emansavs "uniform," does he mean that he same taxation will be in operation in 11 the colonies 1 Mr. DEAKIX : What I mean is that 11 federal taxation must be uniform. Sir John Bray : That is a very different hing from what I understood the hon. lember to say ! Mr. DEAKIN : That being so, 1 may iii-ly ask future speakers to point out in rdiat way the question of state rights can c involved. Sir JoHK Bray : The expenditure must e Just to tlie several colonies ! Mr. DEAKIN" : I have not yet come to le question of expenditure. The hon. lembcr is a little " previous," as the mericans say. I was talking in the first stance of taxation, and asking, taxation eing uniform in all the colonics, what agic you find in the artificial Ijoundaries rawn br-twefn one part of Australia and iiother which justifies you in considering lat the question of state rights is involved hen the taxation operates uniformly on oth sides of the borders? Sir Samuel Griffith : Take the case of icomc-tax ! :Mr. DEAKIN : It will bo the greatest atisfaction to mc when we get into Com- littee to meet interjections point by point; ut having regard to the time which I lust occupy, I could not do so without eglecting other portions of my argument. {ut a few words with regard to the ques- F 1 tion of income-tax. My mind is open on the subject ; but I cannot see how an in- come-tax can in any sense affect the ques- tion of state rights. The taxation falls upon men in proportion to their income whether they be on this side of the 3Iur- ray or on the other side, whether they be on one side or the other of the imaginary boundary which separates South Australia from Queensland, or whether they are in Tasmania, or elsewhere. What I want to know is how any province, how any- colony, can consider that its rights are impaired when it is proposed to deal witk its residents in exactly the same way as the citizens of Australia in every other colony of the group are dealt with ? How is it conceivable that any distinction can be made 1 How can we suddenly make an artificial boundary a real boundary ? Mr. Moore : What about the expendi-- ture 1 Mr. DEAKIX : As to the question of expenditure, I gather from the " nods and becks and wreathed smiles " with which supporters of the proposal have favoured me, that expenditure is considered to bo their strong point — that expenditure may in some way or other impair a state right. Wliat does this mean 1 There is some- thing in the apprehension, though it has nothing to do with states as sucli or their rights. It means what we have all to face in our several colonics — the constant cry of tlie country districts that towns in wliich tlic population is concentrated re- ceive an undue proportion of the public expenditure, that tliey are unduly favoured in comparison witJi distant localities, that more money is spent among them tlian would bo .sprint in a perfectly cquitaljly distribution. The same principle would apply — and I do not attempt to di.'^gui.se or conceal any argument that tells against my case — under the federal government. Tlie more populous towns or districts might argue that as thry paid most, they /Second day. 82 Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Iiesolutions. ouglit to receive a greater benefit than others ; but the probability is that on the whole they would receive a little more than tlieir due. INIr. Gillies : Precisely the same argu- ment would apply in every municipality in the colony ! Mr. DEAKIN : Exactly ; there is no local body in these colonies in connection with the expenditure of which the same aro-ument might not be used. It is per- fectly true that individual localities are in- terested in expenditure. But this suggestion is made, not in the interests of the state, but of the most petty localism that ctin be imaf^iued — in the vain and futile endea- vour, as it always was and will be, to mete out to each little borough the same amount of expenditure as to every other borough. Sir Samuel Griffith : No ! Mr. DEAKIN : It has nothing to do with the several states as states. It is con- ceivable that one part of a colony may be greatly benefited by federal expenditure and another not ; but there is no state right involved. Some portions of some colonies may be more and others less for- tunate. But I have yet to learn how that is to be prevented. Sir Samuel Griffith pointed to the expenditure upon forts and arsenals. He pointed out that a great deal of money might be expended upon a fort at one place, and none in another. Does the hon. gentleman imagine that it will be possible, if we are to have national defences, to consider whether a particular locality would not like to have a fort be- cause one is required in the public interest to be erected at another place 1 Are the central government to say that no fort can be erected here because a fort has not been erected there ? Sir Samukl Griffith : No ! Mr. DEAKIN : If the hon. gentleman's araunient does not mean that, what does it mean 1 [J//-. Deahin, Sir Samuel Griffith : That the r-- pendituro must be just to the sever colonies ! Mr. DEAKIN : 1 am in accord wit! the hon. gentleman if he can lay down an;| principle by which the expenditure can 1 1 made just to the several colonies. Tha reminds me of a point I was nearly pasjs ing. I may be pardoned for leaving thi part of my argument in a confessedly im* perfect state ; because, to answer all intci jections would take too long. I shall Ij delighted to resume the argument in Com mittee, to obtain more knowledge, and t challenge the advocates of the policy t^ show that any expenditure can conllic, with state rights properly so-called. Le ■ them in the first instance define st:ii rights, and then let us see how they wilj be impaired. I will be second to n(| delegate in my anxiety to preserve what understand to be state rights. So anxioui; am I to preserve them, that I wouki never dream of intrusting them to a senate' Let us know what stats rights are, am let us be careful to secure them under oui; constitution, so that they may never b(| liable to be swept away. We should fail in our duty if we did not embody in oui draft such a distinct limitation of federa power as v/ould put the preservation o state rights beyond the possibility of doubt If state rights are involved in the questior of taxation and expenditure of the fede ral body in any way, let us impose some special conditions to meet the case. These should receive the highest sanction, thai of the constitution, and not be left to tb( care of any second chamber, which miglil fail in the hour of need. I would support any proposal in this direction as cordiall) as would any delegate in the Convention We have yet to see the senate which wouli long resist a house of representatives and f powerful executive backed up by the popu lar will. In the course of your resolutions, sir, you distinctly set out the principles oi Federal Constitution: [o Mahch, 1891.] Resolutions. .s e British Constitution as to finance, and 3nd that one of the resolutions carried by e Cannadian Convention expressly indi- ted its adherence to a principle which, far as my poor judgment goes, this invention will do well to adopt. The i resolution of the Canadian Conven- in was as follows : — II framing a constitution for the general go- nment, the conference, with a view to the pet nation of onr connection with the mother mtiy, and the promotion of the best interests ;he people of these provinces, desire to follow model of the British Constitution, so far as circumstances permit. r my own part, I do not see how it per- tuates the connection with the mother mtry. That would be pei'petuated der one form as well as under another, 1 1 do believe "we should be promoting } best interests of the people of this ;at country if we too were to follow safe and splendid model. ^\"ith erence to an Australian court of appeal appears that questions of imperial erest must necessarily be I'eserved • the Privy Council. It may yet a subject for argument, to wdiich I ill bring an open mind, whether issues ''olving important principles of common ought not also to go to the Privy uncil, in order to preserve uniformity interpretation throughout the empire. ;ordially agree with the resolution, how- r, and believe that by far the greater rt of the appeals which at present go the Privy Council might be better -tied here by a federal court of appeal. )t only that, but I should be glad to the fedei'al government take under its itrol some of the superior and crimi- l court business at present transacted the several colonies ; but that is a estion distinctly for Committee. Then come to the last clause in the re.so- •-lon, which deals with the ajipoint- int of the executive and the governor- leral, the advisers of the governor- general to be members of parliament, and their term of office to depend upon their having the confidence of the popular house. If my opinion were asked in conversation or in a debating society as to whether respon- sible govei'nment had any defects I should be prepared to admit that it had; if asked whether the United States Constitution, wdiich is so widely revered, and obtains so much admiration, does not in some respects possess advantages which even the British Constitution doe.s not possess, I should admit that also. If asked whether the Swiss system of electing ministers from the House did not also possess advantages I should say, "Yes." Consequently, so far as theoretical argument goes, I am in agreement on those points with the hon. delegate. Sir Samuel Griffith ; but when he suggests that because we personally ap- prove of certain portions of foi'eign con- stitutions that we should at once adopt these innovations upon our traditions and bo prepared to embody them in a scheme for a federal constitution I come to a pause, Sir Samuel GRiFFixn : I made no such suggestion, nor anything like it. I sug- gested that the future should be allowed to work out its own destiny ! Mr. DE AKIN : I take it that the future will be allowed to do that wdiether the hon. gentleman suggests it or not. Sir Samuel Griffith : The hon. gentle- man puts an erroneous construction on what I said ! Mr. DEAKIN: I will say that Sir Samuel Griffith did not say it. What ho said led mo to infer that he doubted tho wisdom of continuing tho system of re- sponsible government in its present form. Sir Samuel GniFFrni : Of insisting on its continuance ! Mr. DEAKIN : He doubted the wis- dom of insisting upon its continuance in its present form. In this I cordially agrco with him. But the lion, gentleman mado no specific proposal. I regret that I have Second day. 84 Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. done him a momentary injustice; but it ■was only a momentary injustice. I under- stood him to cast grave doubts on our con- stitutions as they exist, and to imply that it would be a great improvement — that it might be preferable — to adopt some parts of the American, and even some parts of the Swiss, Constitution. Sir Samuel Griffith : I am totally misunderstood by the lion, member ! Mr. DEAKIN : Then I withdraw the statement. If the hon. gentleman had said so, I should be prepared theoretically to agree with him ; but not on that account to support their immediate introduction into the federal constitution. The lion, delegate from New Zealand — Captain Russell — indicated that some of these ideas had been passing through the minds of the people of New Zealand. Surely we shall be far safer in adhering as much as possible to the Constitution with which we are all familiar, and grafting upon it as little as possible that is new. I do not say for a moment that the premiers of Queensland and New Zealand have not made out a case for the consideration of the Convention with regard to the upper house. An Hox. Member : There is no upper house. The federal senate ! Mr. DEAKIN : I use the names in- differently. I do not know which it will assume. An Hojr. I»Iember : They mean two different things ! Mr. DEAKIN : I have been trying to argue An Hon. Member : The name was wrong Mr. DEAKIN : I should [be sorry to base an argument upon a name ; yet for all that there is something in a name. "We require to recollect what upper houses have been, and what they may be when re-born with a new name. Mr. Barton: I suppose the hon. member bases his argument_upon an upper house 1 [Mr. Deakin Mr. DEAKIN : I should be sorry think that it ever rested upon such perilous foundation. It is not a lil thing to create a new Upper House oi new pattern as is proposed. The Con tution which we now enjoy, it appears to be set aside with less ceremony tl one would have expected from gentlen who have lived under it, and have exerci its highest powers for many years. "^ seem to be ready to depart from insti tions which have the sanction of long perience, almost entirely on theoreti grounds. It is true that hon. memb have looked to the experience of otl countries ; but in doing this they hi ignored some of the most pertinent less< of our own, which is that if we establ two chambers of equal authority, we p pare the way for dissension, and encouK deadlocks. The constitutional history Victoria gives ample evidence of tl AVhat we have been so long striving f' and what we are still striving for in tl colony, is some means of arbitrament : the settlement of disputes between ] two chambers. An Hon. Member : Simply mechanic Mr, DEAKIN : I care not whether is mechanical or not, as long as it is the and as long as it proves effective. If allow the present state of things to exj| it must lead to dispute and contentid The final point to which I think it nee] sary to direct the attention of the Conv( tion most seriously, in order that in draj ing the constitution proposed to be adopt! by federated Australasia we may not sha' it without regard to recent interpretatic of colonial constitutional rights, is to found in the judgment in the case of i Toy versus Musgrove, delivered by t Supreme Court of Victoria. In th case the powers of the Executive a' those conferred upon the colony unCj the Constitution were challenged in tj courts and before the Privy Council. Tf Federal Constihition : [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. bo ling is one that will demand the most ful consideration when the federal stitution is being framed, because it been the common belief in Victoria t we had all the powers and privileges ching to responsible government, auffi- t to enable us to perform all the duties to exercise all the ris^hts devolving n us as a people. The gravest doubt low thrown upon this belief. The 3le of Victoria are under many obliga- s to their distinguished Chief Justice — especially for his judgment in this suit, rhich he has displayed the acumen of lawyer, the eloquence of the orator, the grasp of the statesman. Chief tice Higinbotham said : was the intention of the Legislative Council )rovide a complete system of responsible rnnient in and for Victoria, and tliat in- ion was carried into full legislative effect the knowledge and approval and at the in- ce of the Imperial Government by the " Con- tion Statute," passed by the Imperial Par- ent. v/as supported in his opinion by Mr. tice Kerferd, who for some time was orney-General of Victoria. Mr. Jus- Kerferd said : 1 tlic prerogatives necessary for the safety protection of the people, the administration le law, and the conduct of public affairs in for Victoria, under our system of responsible rnmcnt, have passed as an incident to tlie t of self-government (without Mhich tho t itself would be of no effect) and may bo ciscd by the representative of the Crown in «lvice of responsible ministers. SO two quotations embody the belief eh was held until lately in Victoria; majority of our own Supreme Court Tuled this reading. Mr. Justice Hams .said : Lave been for years in common with, I bc- !, very many others, under the delusion (as 1st term it) tliat we enjoyed in this colony onsible government in the proper sense of term. I awake to find, as far as my opinion , that we have merely an instalment of re- laible government. Mr. Justice Holroyd considers that we have only a measure of self-government, and two other judges concur. My col- league, Ml". Wrixon, who argued the case with great force and ability before the Privy Council, says : If the reading put by the Supreme Court in Victoria upon our Constitution Act be correct, then not only in tlie colony of Victoria, but in all the groups of Australasian colonies, the governments which we now enjoy are with- out warrant of law. That is a strong statement, and the judg- ment of the majority of our Supreme Court justifies nie in asserting that this Convention cannot too soon face the issue involved in it. I take it that the people of Australasia will not be satisfied with any "instalment" or any "measure" of respon- sible government, or any limitations, except such as are necessary to the unity of the empire. We claim, without shadow of doubt or vestige of qualification, all the poNvers and privileges possessed by English- men. The governor-general, as repi'esenta- tivc of the Queen in these federated colo- nies, should be clothed by statute with all the powers which should belong to the i-epre- sentativeof her Majesty ; he shouldbe above all risk of attack, because he should act only on the advice of resi->onsible ministers, avIio should be prepared either to obtain the sanction of Parliament for their acts or vacate office. Parliament, in its turn, should bo brought into intimate relation with the electorates. This is true, popular govern- ment. This will satisfy the people of Australia. Nothing less will satisfy them. And why should we distrust them, or ques- tion their capacity, or seek to impose tho bonds of an absolute veto upon them? The people of this continent wore not landed upon its shore to-day ignorant of the responsibilities of self-government, Thoy have anijily proved in tho past that thoy are entitled to bo trusted with all tho powers appertaining to a free people. They have believed that they enjoyed freedom Second day. SG Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. under tlieir present constitution second to none in the world. When the question of a second chamber comes to be consi- dered, they will assuredly not be satisfied to possess less freedom. More than this. In framing a federal constitution, we should set out with the explicit claim to possess and exercise all the rights and privileges of citizens of the British empire to the same extent that they are possessed and exercised by our fellow-countrymen in Great Britain itself. Australia is en- titled to absolute enfranchisement. In our union v\'e attain political manhood and the stature of a full-grown democracy. We can wear no constitutional garb capable of cramping a muscle or confining an artery of national life. We claim the fullest means of developing all its energies and all its aspirations, and of encountering all that can oppose them. Why place wisps of straw upon the arms of the young giant, only to become a cause of complaint and to be burst the first time his strength is put forth ? Establishing a constitution "broad based upon the people's will," we shall be securing the safety and security of the state which v.'e propose to raise. But to do anything short of this would be to sow the seeds of discord and disunion. We ax'e dealing with a constitution which has not yet reached the full period of its growth, which always has been and always will be steadily progressive, expan- sive, and adaptable to national growth. There are many things in the suggestions made by the lion, members from Queens- land and other delegate.?, which are worthy of the fullest consideration. These can be adopted as soon as they commend them- selves to the federal parliament. Under this system of government all things are possible. I have addressed myself to the subject hurriedly ; but I trust I have not been misunderstood. I am jjrepared to re- consider and review the whole question ■with the aid of those older and abler than [J/r. Deakin. myself, in the sincere desire to arrive at a sound conclusion. But I do trust that wc •shall not throw aside the constitution undei which we have had experience, we shal] not forget its triumphs and successes, ib proud history, and its splendid promise ; wi shall determine not to hastily interfere witl: its harmony, or destroy the symmetry of it.' proportions. "What we should aspire to se( is a strong government upon the broadcs popular basis, and with the amplest nationa power. We should seek to erect a constitu tional edifice, Avhich shall be a guarantee o liberty and union, for all time to come, ti the whole people of this continent and th' adjacent islands, to which they shall lean to look up with reverence and regard, whicl shall stand strong as a fortress and be hel< sacred as a shrine. ]Motion (by Mr. Barton) proposed : That the debate be now adjourued. Question put and division called for. The Presidext : I propose, if there is division, instead of appointing tellers, a we should do in a house of Parliameni to call upon the officers of the House t take the division. The request for a division was nc pressed. Motion agreed to. tSir Samuel Griffith : I wish to sa one word with reference to the divisio that did not take place on the motion c adjournment. I vras aware that one c the members of the Convention was jsr' pared to speak this afternoon and I unde stand that others were prepared to spea! But I vrish to say that I took my seat l your left, sir, just now for the purpose c emphasising by doing so the fact that tlji members who come from distant parts \ Australia, cannot aftord to adjourn if 4 o'clock every afternoon ; and I sincerel^ trust that member's whose homes ar nearer Sydney than those of many of xj" will bear that in mind and give consideK ation to distant members. i I Federal ConstiliUlon : [5 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 87 IMr. Playfoed : I only wish to say that if "sve cannot go on more expeditiously tiiau we have to-day — that is, stopping ;the debate soon after -4 o'clock — we shall not be able to allbrd the time that v/ill be necessary to enable us to complete our work. It wiU be simply out of the question (Unless members are prepared to go on with ithe work. Those who represent distant icolonies cannot afford to give more than isix weeks at the outside to the work ; but according to the progress we are now quaking, the time occupied will be more like three months. Mr. Abbott : I would like to point out jthat those who are complaining ai'e hon. Imembers who have themselves spoken and taken up a considerable portion of the time. It is all very well for those gentlemen to complain of waste of time ; but they are certainly under some obligation to those of us Avho have patiently listened to them. So far as I am concerned, as one of the members resident in New South ^Yales, I am prepared to sit here day and niglit. It is quite as inconvenient for us,'who have our business to attend to, to be here as it is for those who come from the other colo- nies. The New South Wales members are prepared to give every consideration to these who represent the other colonies, but it is not fair to say we arc wasting ti-iie. What about those gentlemen who have made long speeclies ? I do not charge them with wasting time, but would only observe tliat it is a strange thing that tho.se who complain of an early adjourn- ment have already made tlieir speeches. Mr. Bauton : I feel tliat I owe the Convention a word of explanation. I was quite unaware that there was a disin- clination to adjourn at \ o'clock, or that the question of an early adjournment vould have borne it-self so strongly on the mind and heart of tlie Convention, as it appears to have done all of a sudden. It WHS propo-sed this morning that wo should adjourn at half-past 12 o'clock until half-past 2 o'clock because somebody was not ready j but Captain Russell, with that gallantry which we might expect from the hon. member, filled the breach, and took us on to a quarter to 1 o'clock. It might have been supposed that those v.'ho were so anxious that the sittings of the Convention should terminate in a more reasonable time would have suggested then that the adjournment should take place until 2 o'clock. Instead of that, when you, sir, proposed that we should meet at half-past 2 o'clock, everybody was ready. Yesterday we adjourned at 4 o'clock; pre- viously we adjourned at 4 o'clock. Was 1 wrong in assuming that the sense of the Convention would be in favour of adjourn- ing at the instance of the gentleman who desired to speak ? I must confess it rather surpi'ised me to find that, as the hon. member, Mr. Abbott, has put it, at the instance of certain gentlemen who had already spoken, there was a sudden de- sire that, they having spoken — of course not for that reason — the debate upon these resolutions should be conducted v/ith the utmost celerity. I would join with these gentlemen in this way — if they will suggest that the remaining sittings of the Convention last from half-past 10 o'clock until 1 o'clock morning sittings, and from 2 o'clock until half-past 4 o'clock afternoon sittings, and that we should sit twice a week in the evenings. I am quite sure that the other delegates, who have not come from a distance, and who have not such large interests awaiting them in theii* colonics, will only be too glad to consult their convenience and adopt any proposal of that kind whicli they may bring Ijefore the Convention. But to save my.self from misapprehension I must say that when T moved the adjournment to-day I thovight it was in pursuance of a general desire to adjourn at 4 o'clock as indicated by the v/holo of our antecedent proceedings. Second day. I 88 Federal Constitution : [5 March, 1891.] Jiesolutions. Colonel Smith : I quite agree with what has fallen fioni the hon. member, Mr. Barton, anil, jiersonally, I am prepared to sit here all day, if necessary, and a reason- able part of the night in order to get through the business. Of course, short sittincrs are less inconvenient to the New South AVales delegates, because they are able to attend to their private business, while we are not, and on that ground we are entitled to some consideration. But what I wish to say is this : that I think w^e might sit occasionally — and I am glad the sucrsestion came from the hon. member, Mr. Barton — in the evening. We might sit three nights a week, on alternate even- ings, for a reasonable time, and it would enable us to get through our business much quicker. The debate now going on is, of course, a most important one ; but I was in hopes that a good deal of the business of the Convention would be referred to two or three committees, which would save an enormous amount of labour to the general body of the Convention. If we appointed committees, which should take certain sub- jects into consideration and report to the Convention, we should save an immense amount of time and trouble, and perhaps annoyance. I shall suggest this course later on. Sir Jonx Bkay : I was one of those who favoured the adjournment. It seemed to be the impression on the part of some of the delegates that only those who had made long speeches fav^oured the adjourn- ment. I have not had the pleasure of making a long speech, Ijut still I am anxious to go on with the business. I feel that in this, as in other things, we must be bound by the wi.sh of the majority, and it was clearly the wish of tlie majority to have an adjournment until to-morrow. As one of those coming from a distant colony, I hope the delegates will agree to expedite business as much as possible. "Whether we shall sit late in the eveninf^ or not must depend on the will of the majority of members, and if it is under- stood that all those who are prepared to speak will have an opportunity of doing so, and that the business w'ill not be con- cluded until thoy have had that oppor- tunity, none of us can grumble ; but I trust that adjournments will not be too frequent, and that we shall do all we can to expedite the business. Convention adjourned at 4 '22 p.m. FRIDAY, 6 MARCH, 1891. Federal Constitution (third daj-'s debate)— Addresses- Federal Constitution (third day's debate resumed). The President took the chair at 11 a.m. FEDERAL COXSTITUTIOX. THIRD day's debate. Debate resumed on resolutions proposec by Sir Heniy Parkes {vide page 23). Mr. BARTON : I am fain to say that the kind cheer just accorded to me gives me more trepidation than encouragement, because since I moved the adjournment of the debate yesterday upon the momentous questions that are now before this Conven- tion, I have been wondering at my own audacity. Nevertheless, I trust not to be too long in addressing this Convention, and I trust at any rate that I shall not wander away from my subject until I shall have found it necessary to close my re- marks. It does seem to me that you, sir, deserve the commendation of this Conven- tion for having introduced these resolutions in the form which they take. It w^ould not have been, at this stage of our proceedings, a wdse thing to endeavour, for instance, to enumerate completely the powers which should be given to the general government and to the provinces respectively. Nor Federal Constitution : [6 ^Farcii, 1S91.] Resolutions. 89 svould it have been wise to enter into de- under which vested interests have arisen ; ;ails of any kind, because there are certain and, no doubt also, that is an ai-gument natters which precede detail, and which which will prevail — and it has prevailed Bust be dealt with by us before we can even even with free-traders, much more, there- :ome to the conclusion that it will be within fore, with myself, as a protectionist — )ur power to draft or bring up the scheme that such vested interests, when they have )f a constitution which will be acceptable sprung up, are not to be lightly dealt with, ;o the several provinces. But the form in and that the security which they have en- vhich you have brought forward these reso- joyed, and under which they have been utions rests so much upon principle and so raised, shall not be lightly removed. Al- ittle upon detail that they are eminently though I cannot say that I agree with the ;alculated to secure that general accept- method proposed by my hon. friend — at mce which will be the basis of our future any rate, until I hear further argument abours, and which will enable us to attain about it — that it should be for the federal -he end for which we are working. I con- government to impose a gradual reduction ;ur strongly with the hon. member, Mr. of the higher tariffs until some point is !)eakin, in thinking that the form in reached at which it can be said that the in- ffhich the first batch of resolutions is terests which have sprung up are let down ntroduced is also one that should com- lightly ; still, I think means may be pro- mend itself to us — that is to say, what is vided under which all he asks for may be mdeavoured to be affirmed by these reso- secured, and at a price which, at any rate, utions is that certain great principles it is worth while for these colonies to give ihould be agreed to rather than that for their federation. If, for instance — ;here should be anything like a hard and and I only mention it as an instance — the last delimitation of any lines. The first provision were, and it were also implanted )f the resolutions I shall deal with in the constitution, that the individual n a minute or two in connection with states should maintain for themselves their ;he question of the parliament ; but rights as to the imposition of customs and Icaling now with Nos. 2 and 3, I do not excise — their tariffs — until a certain speci- ind it at this stage necessary to debate fied period after the proclamation of the ihem at any length. I cannot fail to agree constitution, it seems to me tliat that 30th with the 2nd and 3rd resolutions, would be a more effective, and more sim- )f course presupposing that the power and pie method of doing that which the lion, luthority to impose customs duties, given member requires. Speaking humbly for jy the 3rd resolution, also conveys tlie myself, I cannot see that, looking to )Ower to impose duties of excise corrc- the .spirit of compromise with which wc jponding. But it is suggested that, be- enter into this Convention, the colonies 'ore these resolutions can be implanted in generally — those ones, or tliat one which tny constitution, tliey .should be accom- is not attached to protection — will be pay- panied by certain guarantees. That raises ing any unreasonable price for the benefits X difficult question, and I am not quite of federation. I take it as a matter of Jure that upon that i)oint also I am not course that at some period, and at an n some agreement with the hon. member, early period, after the fedc^ration of the Mr. Deakin. No doubt tliere are some colonies, tlie trade and intercourse, wliether of the states whicli have given almost cei'- Ijy way of land carriage or coastal navi- tain guarantees to tlieir citizens of the gation, shall be aT>soluto]y free. It is continuance of certain forms of taxation impos.sible to suppose a perfect union, Third day. 90 Federal Consixluiion : [6 Marcu, 1891.] Resolutions. except under such a condition. But while that is laid down, it is equally open to us to say that for a certain time we may be able, and must be able, to put up with a union somewhat imperfect. I must say that it does appear to me, v,4ien one en- deavours to look at the matter from the point of view of others as well as from one's own point of view, that some compromise of this kind is one to which probably this Convention will be impelled if anything secure by way of a constitution is to arise, and come from its labours. Passing away from that question, which, of course, will be vastly more fully debated in Committee, I wish to deal with resolution Xo. 1 : That the powers and privileges and territorial rights of the several existing colonies shall re- main intact, except in respect to such surreiicTers as may be agreed upon as necessary and in- cidental to the power and authority of the national federal government. I should have liked to see added to this, unless indeed it is intended to be in- cluded, something which will specify that the actual territory of any existing pi'o- vince shall not be subject to any kind of diminution or absorption for the pur- pose of constituting new provinces, ex- cept with the consent of the legislatui-e of the province affected. That, sir, you may have intended in this resolution. If that is stated to be so, I am perfectly satis- fied ; but I am also equally satisfied tliat we are not likely to base federation on the good- will and union of the colonies un- less a guarantee of that kind be provided. With respect to the question of the powers, privileges, and territorial rights of the ex- isting colonies, I said that I would endea- vour to consider it in connection with the question of the parliament alluded to in the first resolution under the second head- ing. I take it that this first resolution must be an es.sential of any just union of the colonies. Unless, indeed, these terri- torial rights and piivileges are conserved, federation vrould appear to be v/ell nigh [i/ir. Barton. impossible ; and I think I may be par- doned for saying that it seems an obvious construction that the powers and privi- leges and territorial rights mentioned here are all those state rights as to which the hon. member, Mr.Deakin, yesterday asked the question, "What are the state rights 1" The state rights, it seems to me, are claimed bv rather a narrow term. It is state inter- ests we have to deal with, and unless the state interests are efiectually preserved in a federal scheme, that scheme wdll be worth nothing, because it can be worth only so much as consists of the goodwill of the parties to it. If that is so, all those state rights which are not to be specially assigned to the general authority must be religiously preserved to the various states, and it will, therefore, be essential that the constitution provide — and I take it as a necessary consequence that the consti- tution shall provide — for a legislative body which, in addition, to the functions of a house of representatives, and in addition to the functions of a second chamber, will also be the guardian of those individuali- ties, those state rights or interests. If those state rights or interests are threatened in any legislative proposal, whether or not it is contained in a money bill, they will be under the especial care of the federal senate ; and if state rights are threatened, whether in a money bill or not, it seems to me that it is not good argument to fall back upon the representative principle to the extent of saying that there i-s only one^ representative legislature, and, therefore^ only one which can deal freely with ques- tions of money and taxation if the very spirit upon which the federation rests is threatened by any scheme in a money or taxation bill. Mr. Deakix : If ! Mr. BARTOX : The " if" is not a long way ofi". Sir Thomas McIlweaith : There are precedents ! Federal Constitution : [6 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 91 Mr. B AE,TON : When I lieard the hon. reprefieutatiou unless we have two such member, Mr. Deakin, in his very brilliant bodies ? It seems almost an obvious pro- speech, talking so positively about the re- position that where you have not what presentative principle as being the only may be called — I do not speak from a re- safe^'-uard of the federation, it struck me ligious point of view — a unitarian consti- that he to some extent ignored the fact tution, but a legislative xinion such as we that it was possible for the representative propose in this case, unless you are going principle to be preserved and instituted to maintain the principle of representation from its very foundation in two chambers — you may call it the representation of just as well as in one. It is not because state individuality if you like— in the the representative principle has not been second chamber, you are not forming a preserved, or not well preserved, in most fedei'al constitution at all. If you ai'e form- of these second chambers, commonly called ing a federal constitution, and upon federal upper houses, that we are to come to the principles, you cannot kick the pi'inciple conclusion that the representation of the of representation out of the doors of the people from the very foundation of re- second chamber. If I am right in that pre.sentation is not to be found in a contention — and I believe that, at any second chamber ; and I take it that a sen- i-ate, it is a contention founded upon a ate founded upon some such basis as the correct sequence — it will be obviously as Senate of the United States, not only unwise as impossible at the same time to really conserves the representation of the maintain a constitution resting upon good- people, but is part of the organ by which will, and during tliat time to deprive the will of the people is expressed. The the second chamber of a veto, even in de- organ by which the will of the people is tail, upon propositions which may affect expressed is not necessarily the house of tho rights, and possibly the existence, of representatives alone. Because one cham- the states. It is not dillicult to imagine ber is called j^;ar excellence the house of an illustration. An illustration comes to representatives, because one house rests on us in the most familiar form. I am not local representation, it does not follow going to enter too much now upon ground that wo cannot make another house of re- that may be debatable ; but if we are to presentatives, which will represent not have the primary chamber — tho house of re- only the states themselves, but also, as Mr. presentatives, resting, as I hope it will rest> Deakin put it, cannot represent those upon universal suffrage and local represen- statcs without reiirescnting their people. tation — there is no doubt that, being based If that i.s so, and if the representative prin- ufjon population, it will give a very large ciple is as much implanted in one of those preponderance of power in that chamber to chambers as in the other, upon what princi- the most populous states. All of us are pie can it rest that the senate sliould not accustomed to legislative propositions in deal with the rjucstion of money or taxation, which (|uestions of policy, questions allect- but may v/ith any other question in which ing local or state intei'csts, are so inex- any state interests arc likely to be threat- tricably interwoven with questions of ened ? What is the object? Is it because money, that to deny the power of veto in we are simply accustomed to have the re- detail upon these is to prohibit the cxer- presentative power placed in one body that cise of state right at all. 1 ventui'c to say,, wc cannot conceive the idea of there being therefore, that if you once admit the prin- a form of federation, or a union of states, ciple of the custody of state interests in a in which there cannot be any thorough representative chamber, resting not upon Third daj/. Federal Constiiulion : [0 March, 1S91.J Resolutions. mere locality, but upon the indi\iclaalisin of the states — reprcsonting through the states their people just as the otlier house represents the people through a locally elected assembly — you can no more deny the right or veto in detail on questions of money and taxation than you can deny it in respect of anything else. It is clearly upon reasons of that kind that the framers of the Constitution of the United States saw they must give the power of amendment to the senate. I am not here, as has been suggested to-day somewhere else, to make a speech in favour of upper houses. My views in that respect have undergone some change, and I am, probably, no fonder than the hon. member, INIr. Deakin, is of the nominee principle in legislation, or, as I think Goldwin Smith lias called it, " the barefaced proposal" to permit the leader of a dominant faction to secure the interests of his faction by appointments which are not under the will of the people. But there is one re- sult of the argument which I now put for- ward, if it is correct, which I will ask hon. members to bear in mind. If you resolve to accept the Constitution of the United States Senate for our federal constitution you will find it to be an almost absolute necessity of the case that all your second chambers in your individual states shall be elective. If that has the approval of the hon. member, ]\Ir. Deakin, as I am sure it hag, he will see that one good result will flow from the custody of state rights being a.s much without limit as it is safe to make it. I said an illustration in this matter is to be found in the ca.se of the capital, and I wish to handle this subject as delicately as one may, looking at the various opinions which of course exist all round as to the place which .should be the capital. If we consider the very large preponderance of voting power gained by the principle of representation according to population in th€ house of repi-esentatives, as I suppose r Mr. Barton. it is to be called, we can conceive this state of things : the introduction of a bill fixing some place or city — either an exist- ing city or some arbitrarily defined area — as the capital of the federal dominion. We can conceive that bill being surrounded with all the necessary provisions to bring into effect the desire to constitute this capital, and then Ave shall see that it is impossible that a bill of that kind can be anything but a money bill — a bill of ex- penditure. If the principle of vetoing in detail is to be withheld from the federal senate, what is to be done with that bill ? Are all the senate, except the one state which shall find the capital within it, to combine in rejecting the bill, and ensuring its rejection time after time until each state finds something to its liking ? Is that the way in which the thing is to be done, or is it to be subject to proper re- strictions — subject to some other method of settling what may be a cause of friction and deadlock 1 Is it not better that such a matter should be dealt with separately from the money provisions? If it is not — and we can quite conceive those who are in a large majority in the house of representa- tives — a government with a large majority — taking: this means of enforcina; their will — and it cannot be called tacking in any sense — it is impossible to foresee an end to the trouble and friction that will ensue. That is one instance of the harm that will result if the federal senate is not in- trusted with some power of veto as to details, because the result will probably be that bill after bill for this purpose would be brought in, and be rejected one after another. Is it not more desirable for the prevention of friction — is it not more desirable in order that there may not be deadlocks, which my hon. friend seems so to anticipate — that the second chamber should not be confined to the veto, as I may say, in globe — the veto of a measure altogether? What is likely, for Federal Constitution : [6 March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 93 instance, to be the result of such a proceed- incr ] Do we not know what it has been in other places 1 I am not going to enter into any discussion of the justice of the position many times taken up by second chambers — upper houses, as they may, perhaps, be more technically called — in dealing with proposals coming from the representative chamber. But when we examine the course of these things we find that where the right of amendment, or the right of veto in detail has not been secured, the greatest friction has occurred. I do not say that has not been necessary ; I do not say that it may not have been wise — for that is a matter which we need not carry into this debate — to limit the powers of second houses, many of which are nominee; but what I do mean to convey is this : that we have r:een in our own experience that in cases where a right of amendment has been exercised, or a right, at any rate, of veto in detail, it lias been possible to excise an obnoxious provision, and pass the rest of a measure, and that that has fre- quently been accepted subject to future action. On the otlier hand, especially when you find that the whole custody of state rights as respects national measures is in the federal senate as the last resort, how great a temptation the restriction of the veto toancntire rejection will be to them to do one of two things, either to get rid of a whole measure of public i)olicy because it in part interferes with state interests, or, on the other hand, to surrender their func- tion of safeguarding those interests in order that a measure of public policy may not be lost. Is cither of these things good, and is not either of them likely to be avoided by granting a veto in detail ? 8o, therefore, I do not share the very ]>owcrfully stated objection of my lion, friend, Mr. Deakin, to the proposition raised by Sir Samuel Grillith. I think that when we come to examine this ques- tion a little more fully we shall find that we can get rid of any confusion arising from previous experience of bodies which do not embody the federal principle. "We shall be inclined on the very ground of the theory of representation to concede this veto in detail to a body which does em- body the federal principle. And I take pleasure in stating that this ai'gument ap- pears to me to be correct, because I find that there is an insinuation, out of doors at any rate, that the settlement of the principles of a federal constitution is likely to result in some sort of conflict between those who represent the large and populous states and those who represent the weaker ones. I trust that there will be no con- flict of that Kind, and speaking for myself — and I think I can speak for the whole of my brother delegates, though as to whether they are at one with me in this argument I know not — but speaking as to their wishes and desires, I am quite sure that they will not, at any rate, and that they feel that nobody else will be, parties to any attempt to take away anything which ought of I'ight to belong to less populous and less wealthy communities, simply by the exertion — as they may exert them un- der the federal cojistitution, if it is not righteously guarded — of powers which would collocate too much in the hands of the union, if it were under the unitarian system of government, in oblivion of the very fact that those rights rest on the fede- ral principle. I think, then, that the course of veto in detail tends rather ta lessen than to increase friction, because the danger of friction docs not rest in legislatures alone — the friction that will be dangerous will Ijc the irrita- tion of individual states in their political capacities. It must not be forgotten that there is to be a double citizenship con- ferred by this constitution upon every citizen of these states and of the great nation which we hope to found. If there Third day. 94 Federal Constitution : [G March, 1S91.] Resolutions. is that double citizenship .incl there is not individuality, if I may use the term, and in nil essentials a due representation of it highly representative of the component even in questions of money, then the fric- communities — to reduce that body because tion of which my hon. and learned friend of some experience which we have under sees so much danger in the relations be- a wholly different system to the level of a tween the senate and the house of repre- mere revising nominee chamber, would sentatives on occasions in other places, not be good work. It would be dangerous say in Amei'ica, would be merely a work ; it would be work which would re- surface indication of deep-seated irrita- suit, if it resulted in any union at all, in tion, which any negation of proper rights one which would be the subject of friction will evoke witliin the states which are and regret from day to day, and from parties to the compact. It is upon the year to year. Let us not run into this question whether you secure their good- danger. It is incumbent upon those Avho will or provoke their irritation that the represent the large states, w^hile taking dangers exist, and it depends upon our care that neither they nor anybody cai'e in that respect whether these dangers else sliall make too large a surrender, will gi'ow to a head or wither away. Mere to see th.at no form of government is specifications or schedules in acts of parlia- established which may place states weaker ment are not the only things to look to — in population at the mercy of others. And mere delimitation of rights and powers let us all recollect that these are change- — because it is in what we may call the ful communities ; that they are in various overlap that the daiiger arises. However stages of development ; that that which religiously you may separate and guard the is to-day the least populous may in fifty functions which you give to the one great years be the most populous ; that we are legislature and to the subsidiary legisla- not legislating for ourselves alone. Let tures, there are points on which it has been those who are anxious — of course, as I always found that they sometimes will know well, without any desire to be ag- overlap ; and following out the principle of gressors — for a form of constitution which the 1st resolution here, especially con- may result in an encroachment upon those sidering the vast growth to which they rights recollect that any of the states may Lad attained before this movement was one day be the victim of that very en- taken in hand, unless we conserve to the croachment; and therefore legislating for states not a mockery of their rights, but the future, as we hope the parliaments an effective assertion of them in case of will legislate upon our initiative, and not such overlap, wc shall soon find many who legislating for to-day, let us take the will regret their compact, and if it is a utmost care to introduce those protective compact that they find indissoluble, then provisions wdiich after all will be the pro- se much the worse for the union. So I tection of ourselves— the protection of take it that if you wish to preserve the ourselves as citizens of a federated state goodwill of the states, and their adherence in all our relations as such citizens, and to the general constitution, not as a mat- our protection for the future in respect of ter of compulsion, but as a matter of loyal our state individuality. The best way to good faith, you will do all that you can to do this is, I think, to recognise the fact secure, and not to reduce, the power to that while the ordinary will and impulse provide against any encroachment. And of the people is conserved, and its opera- te reduce a great representative body, tion is conserved in the house of repre- founded upon the very recognition of state sentatives, still the senate will be a [J/r. Barton. Federal Constitution : [G March, 1S91.] UesolutiovSt 95 part, and a necessary part, of the expres- sion of the people's will, because if it be not, we shall forget that each citizen has a double citizenship to perform. Xow, the Senate of the United States is, I have said, elected on some such system as, subject to further arguments, I hope to see existing in this federation, and we know what the result of that system is. The election is based on universal suffrage — because the senators are elected by the legislatures of the individual states who are elected by universal suffrage — and the re- sult is a legislative body the judgment and capacity of which comes quite up to the ideal or the standard outlined by the President in his opening speech. It is worth while considering on this point whether there is not a sacrifice of the intellect and power of a state when you take means to secure the representation which in the United States has been proved to have commanded the respect of all citizens, if you at the same time withhold from thosewhom you deem so capable tlie power of beneii- •cently guarding the interests of the states, and without which the states themselves might at any time, if they did not become rebellious, become at any rate wholly dis- satisfied. It is not, we hope, all of us, to bo the result of our labours tliat a consti- tution will be framed tlio possible result of which may, even in the far future, be a re- sort to violence. It is ui)on harmony and good-will that this constitution must be })ased, and the only way to base it so is to protect individual state rights in such a manner that there will bo no suspicion, no distrust, at any time har])0ured in the gf^-neral work of legislation by those who represent, in one body or the other, tlie etates which ai-e not the most numerous, and not yet the most advanced. Especially is it necessary in the condition at which we have arrived. When we consider that this is a state which is as large, or almost as large in itself as the thirteen states which formed the oricjinal American United States ; and when we consider the hugeness of the individual state interests with which we have to deal, caution in this respect is more incumbent upon us than it ever was upon any body of legislators ad- dressing themselves to a similar task. Now having, I trust, made myself plain upon that, and having, I hope, shown that unless there is somethingmorethana mere oowerof rejection of money measures in the federal senate there is at any time a possibility of a gormandising process being indulged in by the representatives of states in tho greatest numerical superiority, I should like simply to pass on to express, as we must all express, approval of the remainder of the first sub-section, that is to say, the formation of the house of representatives to be elected by districts formed on a population basis, with the sole exception that, instead of possessing the sole power of originating or amending all bills for raising revenue or imposing taxation, they, in the exercise of their power, or any serious portion of the exercise of it, should have the assistance of tho federal senate in tlie liighest form, at any rate, in a higher form than my hon. friend, Mr. Deakin, seems ready to give it. Now, with regard to the judiciary — and I hope that now I have come near to the close of my remarks. It is no use, 1 take it, our establishing a federal supreme court, if it is to have merely the academical functions of a court of appeal, if the term is admissible. A federal supreme court mu.st have power to enforce its decrees in every way. Its process must run througliout the length and breadth of tho federal states, and it must have power to cnforco its decrees against any individuals, just in tlie same way as the supreme court of any of the existing states has powci- to enforce its decrees against any citizen therein, otherwise federal laws will lose their sanc- tion ; because the executive, legislature, Third day 96 Federal Constitution : [G March, 1891.] Resolutions. and judiciary, constituting the three great arms of state, if every one of them does not rest upon and reach the indivi- duality of each citizen, then as far as one of them falls short, the constitution will be imperfect on one side. Therefore, the power of reaching, and reaching in the strongest form and v.-ay, the individual components of the states of the federation must be as strongly reposed in the federal judiciary as in cither the executive or the legislature ; and the wider the jurisdiction for necessary pui'poses that is given to them the safer the federation will be, because you are more likely to preserve that harmonious working of the constitution by intrusting the interpretation of it to a tribunal which will deal v»-ith the citizen in his individual relations than you are to preserve it by leaving the interpretation in the hands of those who may act as between state and state, and who may provoke the very kind of friction between community and com- munity which it is our object to avoid. To make the thing plainer — where it be- comes necessary to construe the validity of a statute, either the statute of one of the provinces, or where the statute of the federal parliament may seem to impinge upon the state statute itself — in either of those cases the safest course is to trust to the interpretation of the federal court, be- cause by that means the interpretation by individual cases is likely to meetwitha more harmonious acceptance than would be the result if jealousy were provoked by endea- vouring to settle it as between state and state. Quoting from Munro'sbook on the •' Constitution of Canada," at page 218, I find that there is cited a piece of legisla- tion, which, instead of taking the form, as it does of a sepai'ate act in Canada, might almost well be incorporated into our con- stitution as a provision binding on all. Munro says : In the case of those provinces that passed a law to such effect, provision was made for con- ferring a special jurisdiction on the supreme and [3/r. Barton. exchequer courts in controversies between the dominion and a province, or between provinces, or relating to the validity of provincial laws. When the legislature of any province forming part of Canada shall have passed an act agreed and providing that the supreme court and ex- chequer court or the supreme court alone shall have jurisdiction in any of the following cases : — (1.) Controversies between the Dominion of Canada and such province. (2. ) Controversies between such province and any other province or provinces which may have passed a like act. The two following are the provisions to which I more immediately refer: — - (3. ) Suits, actions, or proceedings in which the parties thereto by their pleadings shall have raised the question of the validity of an act of the Parliament of Canada when in the opinion of the judge of the court in which the same are pending, such question is material. (4.) Suits, actions, or proceedings in which the parties thereto by their pleadings shall have raised the question of the validity of an act of the legislature of such province when in the opinion of the judge of the court in which the same are pending, such question is material, then this section of the act is to be in force in the class of cases in respect of which such act may have been passed. In (1) and (2) the proceedings are to be in tlie court of exchequer, with an appeal to the supreme court. In (3) and (4) the judge who decides that the question is material is to order the case to be removed into the supreme corat for the decision of such question. And the decision of questions, I take it, by a high triljunal possessing the confi- dence of all the citizens of tlie federation will be much more likely to lead to peace and goodwill among them than any deci- sion outside of it, imposed as an over-burden upon the legislative or executive arms of the state. I see that it is proposed that this supreme court, this federal judiciary, is to constitute a high court of appeal for Australia, under the direct authority of the Sovereign, whose decisions shall bo final. It was well pointed out by the mover of the resolutions that the endeavour to get rid of the jurisdiction of the Privy Council for the Dominion of Canada was Federal Const'Ualion : [G Maucii, li^OL] iL'jsolutioiis. 97 fruitless one, because the Iiii[)erial Go- vernment refused to assent to such a ransfer of power. Whether they would issent to such a transfer of power now eems very doubtful. By precedent they vould not ; but I do hope that the mere act that the action of the Imperial Go- ernment has in a previous case been gainst the granting of any such power vill not deter the franiers of this constitu- ion from inserting provisions which will Jaim the power. It may be refused, nd, if it is refused, the refusal may be irovocativc of more or less dissatisfaction ; mt that it is a i»owcr to ask for, and a )Ower which will be benetioial when jaiued, I have not the remotest doubt. Of oursc there may be exceptions, as the ion. member, 31 r. Deakin, has so well lointed out, in cases wliere imperial in- erests arc concerned, or in cases — but I im more doubtful as le^jards followin^• lis argument in this part of it — in cases (V'here the stability and uniforuiity of inter- H'etation in matters of connnon law may )e endangered by not resorting to the ?rivy Council. In the first case there may >e an exception, but with regard to all ither cases, I trust tliat this Convention, md the parliaments to whom its conclu- ions arc to be i)resentod, will use their itmost ettbrts to .secure the abolition of lie Juri.sdiclioil of the Privy Council and he transfer of supreme authority to the :olonial judii.iary, whicli I am sure will be jeneficiul to tJie whoh; of the colonies. I Miy this witliout attemjjting to d<;rogalc from the autJjority of the Privy Council, jut thost; v»ho have watched the course of its decisions are aware that tliat tribunal is not always constituted in its best aspect ; that tliere are occasions when that board — because it is a board — is presided over by jurlges wlio, whether as regards their past judicial career, or, at any rate in some cases, as regards their existing capacity, would not be one whit superior, but — 1 almost tremble to say it — are not equal to the class of judges to be found in this conti- nent to constitute a federal supreme court. I feel no doubt at all that from the ranks of the very eminent members of the bar and of members of the amalgamated profession, as probably it may be, in these colonies there is amjjle material to be found for the constitution of a supreme court of appeal to which no citizen of Australia need fear to intrust the final adjudication of his claims, and I feel equally sure that the institution of a change such as this will be hailed with loud acclaim as one, if not of tlie most valuable provisions in principle in the constitution, yet as one of the most beneficially workable provisions which will accompany it. I have to thank hon. members for having: listened to me so kindly, and before sitting down I should like to read a few words which struck me on looking into a well-known authority last night as to the advantage of a federal union and the division of power. I find this in Story's " Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States/' section 291 — a book, as I said, that is of the highest authority, and I think the passage is cal- culated to give a clear indication in a very few words of the result that will follow upon the exercise of proper caution in the maintenance, on the one hand, of the execu- tive, parliamentary, and judicial strength of a general govcinmcnt within tin' powiTs assigned to it, and, on the other hand, the maintenance of state lights in all matters which it is not considered neccssaiy to hany the distance and dis Third dnj. 98 Federal Constitution : [G March, 1891.] Resolutions. courage merits oi its functionaries, might at last become as it was umler the federation— a mere show, if not a mockery, of sovereignty. So that this very division of empire may in the end, by the blessing of Providence, be the means of pcr- l)ctuating our rights and liberties by keeping alive in every state at once a sincere love of its own government and a love of the union, and by cherishing in different minds a jealousy of each which shall check as well as enlighten i)ublic opinion. As to tlie executive, I must say tliat the question raised by Sir Samuel Griffitli has given me, for one, considerable per- turbation. I knoAV that it is very easy to pooh-pooh the whole matter and to say, "You must look to the rej)resentative chamber, and that alone as the seat of ministerial responsibility" ; but, as I ven- ture to think, I have shown that we do not find, or shall not find, in a properly constituted federal body, the representa- tion all collocated in one chamber ; and if wedo not find it there, that admission places us at once in face of the difiiculty wliich Sir Samuel Griflith has suggested, and I am afraid that it is a difiiculty very hard to solve. But British communities have been in the habit of solving difiiculties sometimes by anomalous means ; and, v.'hei'e they have had to make a choice, they have made it sometimes not alto- gether in accordance with principle, and have been rewarded for their pains by the very beneficial working of their con- stitutions. Now let us endeavour to yet at some solution in this way. Is it certain that the question of legislative power and the question of ministerial responsibility rest on the same lines ? Is it quite clear that where it may be necessary to embody even the repre- sentative principle in two chambers for the exercise of legislative pov/er it is unfair or uniust to intrust theworkinir of the constitutional principle — the prin- ciple of ministerial responsibility — to one cliamber alone 1 I am afraid we shall have to solve this difficulty by making the ^^1/?*. Barton. executive of the dominion responsible ti> the chamber called the representati\ e chamber — to that one which has not the custody of state rights specifically v/ithin its control. One reason why I am led to conclude that this would not be a danger- ous result is the remark which fell from my hon. friend, Mr. Playford, yesterday. He said, if I understood him correctly, that we should not find it possible to graft on the American system the system of responsible government, and make it work. Yv'ell, I think that by allowing the operation of the principle of respon- sible government to i-est in the respon- sibility of the executive of the day to the house of representatives, we shall, at any rate, be able to make the constitution work. Although it may be impossible at the present stage to suggest any better provision, I must confess that I am not in love with the -solution that has been suggested, that a proportion of the minis- try of the day should retire upon the vote of one house, or of both, and that the others should remain in office. Sir S.A.MUEL GpjFFiTn : That is not pi'o- posed by any one ! I Mr. MuxRO : Suggested ! Mr. BAETOX : I am not sure that it was not proposed, but at any rate it struck me that it had been suggested. ' Sir Samuel Griffith : As a possible working out in time ! ]Mr. BAETON : As a possible working out in time. I do admit that there is a great deal of foi'ce in the suggestion that there are certain phases of constitutional development which, to a great extent, must be left to the workinsr — to that which ex- press provisions will evolve from them- selves, rather than to attempt to define them too strictly at the outset ; but I fail to see how the working of any such constitution as is likely to be framed will result in a limited ministerial responsi- bility of that kind. I take it that we Federal Constitution : [G March, 1S91.'] Resolutions. 99 shall Le shut up to the choioe of one of two things, the American system of dis- jociation of the executive, or the adhering that wluch we individually have found ;o work as well as anything else can n-ork in the present stage of political levelopment, that is, the ordinary prin- )le of constitutional government. In :hat respect I think that, irrespective of my question of a referendum, which I lave heard sucrcested. we shall tind our- the conservation of the general rights of wliicli the executive is the exponent : that is to say, vievring the federal executive in its distinction from the various executives of the provinces, the chamber which lias most to do with the conservation of the powers and functions of that executive, and within the lines of which it will oftenest act in its relation to the indi- viduals of the state, will be the house of representatives ; and if we work upon that elves safer in relying on the old lines line, I think we shall find it to be, perhaps, )f constitutional responsibility at the by no very great stretch of principle a de- ands of one chamlier, although it may cidedgain intlie workingof ourpoliticalsys- ot take unto itself the whole of the re- tem,and we shall find it possible to conserve jresentative principle, than we shall be by the principle of ministerial responsibility, attempting either to weld two chambers and responsibility to that house alone, together for executive purposes — which I I again thank hon. members for the kind- think would be a clumsy expedient — or by ncss with which they have heard rae. I venturing upon the dissociation of the hope, as I promised, that I have not wan- executive from the representative body, dered from the point, and that I have not the segregation of ministers from parlia- wearied by repetition. I have ventured ment, resulting, as we know it has resulted elsewhere, in a body of ministers not possessincj indeed the whole executive power, and whose working is hampered to thi'3 extent : that, being individually amen- able to a i)resi<1ent, tliey are only in the rory slightest degree animated by a com- to address myself to this subject because I think that, after all, no one can be blamed, however young he may be in so august an assembly as this, for bringing into the common stock his ideas and rea- sons, where the interests of liis coujitry and the interests of the very much greater mou ])olicy so far as regards their common country which he hopes to make his own action. That is a state of things which I donot think woiild conduce to gooSir, the hon. gentleman devoted there may be as to the working of some por- himself, during the greater part of his ad- tion of the constitution, the general verdict dress, to the discussion of the question raised of mankind as to the value of the general inyourresolutions,and developedgreatly in articles has been entirely in their favour, that most able speech which we heard from We know, too, the difficulties which met my hon. friend, Mr. Deakin, as to the the able gentlemen who drafted those power of veto to be lodged in the senate. articles in the very inception. We know It occurred to me at the time the hon. that this same question, about which my member, Mr. Deakin, was s})eaking, that hon. friend feels so strongly, and with- we could scarcely carry out his wishes out which he thinks this federation is im- without, in so doing, negativing the very . practicable, was discussed amongst the lirst branch of your resolutions. It ap- states represented at that convention, and pears to raethat the "powers'and privileges discussed from identically the same stand- and territorial rights of the several exist- point as this question must be discussetl ing colonies "' cannot remain intact if the here. We know that the states insisted })eople's will, as detined by that hon. gen- on union, but objected to unity ; that they tlernan, is to be supreme, and if th(i colo- wished a federation of independent states, nies, as a whole, are to be coerced by the but not an amalgamation into one emi^ire; individual votes of the inhabitants of the and we know, too, that the representatives whole. We are sent here, all of us I at that convention were equally divided^ think, under practically the same condi- and it was only by I'esorting to a com- tions. We are directed to endeavour to mittee that the difficulty was finally over- frame a constitution which will bring about come. And, sir, the difficulty was got union between the Australian colonies ; but over in precisely the manner which the we are also directed, in doing that, to take hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, suggests care that that constitution is based on terms should be resorted to here, by recognis- just to the several colonies. That, sir, of ing in one branch of the legislature the cour.se, is a sentiment which will, J am sure, states, and by recognising in another branch run through the intentions, although it of the legislatuie individual members of may sometimes fail in the expression, of the whole community of states, and giv- every hon. delegate, and it is one which, I ing both those houses, each of which, fear, would be entirely outraged if this in its own position, was absolutely neces- ] resolution were carried without the quali- sary to the preservation of the autonomy tication indicated by the hon. member, Sir of the individual states, jurisdiction whicli Samuel Griffith. Sir, as we all know, we was practically coordinate. I say prac- are not altogether without precedent and tically co-ordinate, because, in one par- \Sir John Dovraer. Federal Conslituthm : [6 March, 1801.] Eesohilions. 101 ticular, and iu one particular only, the jurisdiction was not so, and tliat was in the right to introduce money bills. But that convention finally a^jrecd in sroinij further than my hon. friend, Sir Samuel Griffith, wishes to go now, and not merely gave the senate the power of vetoing either Avholly or in part money bills sent up from the house of representatives, but gave them a general power of amending any bills which should be sent to them. With- out this acjreement the United States of America would not have been constituted, at that time at all events ; and under that agreement the states have progressed to the position which they have now attained, and although, as in every constitution, difficulties, jars, and discords will exist, still, on the whole, the jars and discords there have not been appreciably gi-eater than those in the constitutional govern- ments to which we are accustomed. Ko objection has ever been very seriously made by any large body of people, or, I would rather say, by the people generally, to the co-ordinate authority reposed in the senate, or to the method iu which that authority lias been exercised. There was then a greater disproportion, or as great, at all events, between the populations of the l.irgest and smallest of tliose states as there i-. now between the populations of the hirgest and the smallest of the Australian states proposing to federate. Nevertheless, equal representation, co-ordinate legislative authority, was given to the .smallest as to the largest. Pvxperiencc has shown us that that h.as worked thoroughly well, and lias proved as satisfactoiy to the larger popu- lations — to the stales containing the largest populations, one of whcli, 1 think, s«'nds forty representatives to the house of re- presentatives, whilst another sends only one — as to the smaller populations upon whom co-ordinate power w.is conferred. 1 rln not intend, even if I could, and I could not if I V, ishfd it, to go over the arguments so closely and logically put by the Lon. gen- tleman who has just sat down. I say that, if I wished to do it, I have not the power, and I am certain that every one here, what- ever his views on the ultimate question, must have been profoundly impressed by the manner in which the hon. gentleman submitted and stated his arguments. I should be sorry to be supposed to be ex- pressing my own concluded opinions, be- cause we are met here for deliberation ; but whilst I think, at the present at all events, that it would be impossible to establish this federation at all, and certainly not in a .satisfactory way, without the point raised by the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, being at least conceded, still, Avhen Ave have settled that question, of course we are not out of our troubles, becau.se there is moi'e to be looked at. If we do agree, as I think we must, that the two houses shall have co-ordinate legislative authority, and that it shall be competent for the senate at least to do what the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, suggests— to veto in detail any bills sent up to them, whether money bills or not, still we have got the further ditliculty to .settle, as to how the executive is to ha constituted. I cannot say that I have quite come to the same con- clusion as that of tlie last speaker on this subject. Although some of us are Aus- tralinns by birth, all of us have had luig- li.sh traditions handed down to us, and have a natural prejudice in favour of the methods of governments in (lie country from which we sprang. At the same time we must recollect, as the hon. member. Sir Siimucl Griffith, said, that we are considering something about which the nidthcr country's laws know nothing, some- thing quite outside the ordinary orbit of impf-rial concerns, anportunity of expressing my quired in bringing federation into being — opinion as to what 1 consider the crucial as to the best mode of initiating a federal l.oint of all, which is, that so far as the government in these colonies. I think constitution of the senate is concerned that under the terms of the resolutions Ave must follow the precedent of America, that have been passed by all tlie parlia- and, whilst showing every respect to the ments any general arguments in favour of views of individuals as represented in tlu^ federation are now quite out of place. We liouse of representatives, we must still take may assume that it is our duty to avoid care that the views of the states shall be considering that question, for it has been studied in an equal dcgi'ee in the represcn- settled by the anthorities that sent us here, tation of the senate. and we ought to devote ourselves immedi- Mr. THYNNE : As there appears to be ately and seriously to the work of framing considerable hesitation on the part of older a constitution which we hope will prove members of the Convention in continuing acceptable, because it will be just to the the debate, and as we have a little time different colonies. I wish to make a few before the usual hour for adjournment, T remarks upon the work which we have to propose to claim your attention for a few do in this Convention. In the first place, minutes I think I may be pardoned if I in framing a constitution, we are called point out what appears to me to be a mis- upon to assist in putting the highest stone apprehension of the views Avhich the hon. upon the great edifice of the political de- aud learned member, 8ir Samuel Griffith, Aelopment of these colonies. That develop- expressed in connection with the matter of ment has proceeded from very small begin- the executive. It sesms that the discus- nings, namely, in tlie first instance from .sion has proceeded upon the idea that the a military garrison in a Crown colony go- lion. and learned member. Sir Samuel A-erning not only people subject to servi- Griffith, in his speech advocated an im- tude, but also a small proportion of free mediate change from the present relation settlers, until it has now expanded into of responsibility of the executive to the colonies with certain limited powers of popular house. I understood that hon. self government, but still dependencies of and learned gentleman not to support that the British Parliament and tlie British view, but to recommend that the constitu- people. I was surprised to hear from two tion should be left open for such develop- such well-known statesmenin thesecolonies ments in government in these colonies in as the two hon. gentlemen from Yictoria future years as the circumstances of the -who have spoken, that they have been times may require. under the impression so long that these Sir Samukl Griffith : Hear, hear! colonies enjoyed the privilege of responsible Mr. THYNNE : I think, sir, that it government. It is an old saying that "a would be very unwise for us to impose any prophet is without honor in his own coun- fetter that is not absolutely necessary upon try," and it seems to me that that proverb the free and full development of the future ajiplies to the colony of Yictoria as well constitution which may be in force in these as to other places. Some ycai-s ago I had colonies. The function that we have to fulfil the privilege of reading a book written in meeting inthis convention is tliat of f ram- by a most distinguished Victorian, in which ing a federal constitution. We are asked to this question is dealt witli, and the words now advise the parliaments of the colonies, which he made use of at that time hav f [Sir John Doicner. Federal Comtitullon : [G March, 1801.] Riisclat'wns. 10a remained engraAen on iny memory ever since. I tliiuk they are Avords wliicli must never be forgotten by the people of tliese colonies until sucli time as the responsible government which he defines in his work is attained. Professor Hcarn's definition of responsible government is : Where a legislature is established, and a prt)- raise is made by the Crown of the exercise of the prerogative exclusivcl}' by tlic advice of jainisters liaviiig the coufulence of rarhamcnt. That is a complete and satisfactory defini- tion of the system of responsible govern- ment, and I think that no one can for a moment be under the impression that in Australia up to the present time we have been able to claim that full measure of responsible government. The Crown, in the exercise of itsprerogativeinconnectionwith many Australian matters — matters even of internal interest in Australia, matters of .social interest in Australia — has exercised its prerogative, not by the advice of Aus- tralian ministers, but by the advice of ministers responsible to the people in Great Britain and Ireland, through the Parlia- ment i-epresenting them. I think that the work in which wo arc engaged in framing a federal constitution directly involves the assumption in these colonies of that complete measure of responsible govern- ment. The Crown in all matters relating to Australian interests must exercise its prerogative exclusively by the advice of Australian ministers — the veto to which my hon. friend, Mr. Playford, referred iiiiist be exercised, not by the advice of ministers in other parts of the world, Init by the advice of ministers who are charged with Australian interest.s. It seems to me that in some portions of the di.scussion that has taken place the object or mean- ing of federation or a federal constitution has been, to some extent, lost sight of. The union of these colonic-s must take place in either one or two ways, namely, either by a unification under one all-powerful parliament, or by a federation which gives to the central federal parliament certain limited powers and reserves to the other parliaments all other powers. As I think we mav be in danger of overlookini*- some of the firstprinciples connected with federa- tion, I may be pardoned if I briefly define some of the characteristics of a federation. I shall quote from INIr. Dicey's recent work, which is vei"v clear in its languaw. He says : One of the characteristics of a federation is tliat the hnv of the constitution must l)e either le;Tally immutal)le or else capable of being changed only l)y some authority above and bej'ond the ordinary legislative bodies, whether federal or state legislatures, existing imder the constitution. That opens up a matter of very large con- sideration for this Convention, In the first place, what is the authority above and beyond the legislatures which is to have the power of chatiging the law of the constitution, or of regulating it in any form '? The answer, of course, is that it is the peo2")le of these colonies who are to be charged with that important function ; and T would, therefore, point out — and i think several hon. members who have had considerable experience in leading what may be called democratic paities in these colonies have forgotten for a moment — what the deinoci-acy of Australia is to be. It seems to me that some of the .sentiments that have been expressed here are the senti- ments of gentlemen who are so fresh from the struggle Avhich they have been engaged in recently, in connection withtheprivileges of the people in the particular colonies, that they have foi'gotten what will be the posi- tion of the democracy of Australia when this f(,'deration is completed. Tlie con- stitution of this federation will nfit bo charged with the duty of resisting privileged cla.s.se.s, for the whole power will be vested in the people thenjselves. They are the complete legislative power of the whole of these colonic.'^, and they shall be so. From Third day. lOG Federal ConsiitiUion : [G Maucii, 189 J.] liesoluiions. them will rise, llrst of all, the federal con- stitution which we arc proposing to estab- lish, and in the next place will come the legislative powers of the several colonics. The people will he the authority above and beyond the separate legislatures, and the royal prerogative exercised, in their intei-est and for their benefit, by the ad- vice of their ministers will be practically vested in them. They will exercise the sovereignty of the states, they will be charged with the full power and dignity of the state, and it is from them that we must seek the giving to each of those bodies that will be in existence concuri'ently the necessary powers for their proper management and existence. Each assembly, each legislature, whether state or federal existing under this constitu- tion, will be as Dicey again says — a merely subordinate law-making body whose laws will be valid, whilst within the authority conferred upon it by the constitution, Ixit invalid and unconstitutional if they go beyond the limits of such authority. These are two necessary consequences of every form of federal government, and this Convention must address itself seri- ously to the work of devising such a con- stitution as will preserve these tv/o prin- ciples in their full operation. I think that the power of the people which is in- volved by the considerations I have men- tioned is such as vvill put in the shade all those sentiments and ideas with which notably the speech of Mr. Deakin was charged with regard to the danger of the want of popular power in the new^ state. It seems to me that the democracy which he would like to see would be in- secure and unsteady, and wdthout those guards against the tyrannic exercise of the power of temporary majorities which are necessary to the peaceful government and continuance of every state in the world. The democracy I am anxious to see, and wliich I am sure we are all [Mr. Thijnne. anxious to see, would be at the same tin. calm and secure, without any danger ot sudden revolution, without any fear of an invasion of its ordinary rights and pii- vileges on the part of any class of people in the community. It is for that reason that I am so anxious to see that what have been called state rights and the rights of minorities are guarded in the new con- stitution against hasty, corrupt, or dishonest action on a part of any section, no matter how large it may be, in the new state. Un- less the senate be charged with sufficient power to protect the people of the fedei'a- tion against hasty and ill-considered legis- lation, the union consummated will be a weak and vacillating one, which will not inspire confidence either among our ovin subjects or among the peoples of the worLl with whom our government will have to deal. There must be some continuity, there must be some security against fickleness-, some guarantee that petulant changes will not be made either in the policy of the state or in its internal legislation. For these reasons, I think it is essential that the senp.te should be invested with a large amount of power, in fact, with powers almost co-ordinate with those of the hou:^;e of representatives, as proposed under these resolutions. In no case in the world's his- tory will it be found that a federal insti- tution has been successful otherwise. In no case have the stronger democracies of the world dispensed with those necessary safeguards of state rights and individual rights — those provisions for the proper conservation of the public policy of the country. I think the resolutions proposed by you, sir, in so far as they are in the direction of limiting the powers of tli^^ senate, do not go in the right direction, and I trust that in Committee we shall see our way to make a very necessary amend- ment in tliat respect. I have perhaps needlessly offered my arguments upon this subject, because, excepting by the speech Fedtral Const'dution : [G March, 1S91.] Resohiiions. 107 )f the hon. delegate from Victoria, Mr. )eakin, I do not tliink the position taken p by Sir Samuel Griffith has been seri- (usly challenged by any member of the bnvention. Mr. Bird : Yes, by ]S[r. Munro ! Mr. THYNNE : At all events by not nore than two, and the arguments offered Iready in response to the views of those jentlemen have been so strong that it Avas jerhaps almost unnecessary for me to illude to the subject. However, I thought hose pregnant words of Professor Hearn, md their appi ication in the present instance, night, with utility', bo brought under the lotice of the Convention. There is one )ther phase of the subject to which I think 10 allusion has yet been made. It is a )rovision which I think would add very nuch indeed to the weight and influence of the resolutions if it were introduced lereafter in Committee. I think these •esolutions would be much embellished and improved did theycontain a provision which would establish the right of the people of ;he colonies to pass not only the proposed Bonstitution, but to have all future amend- ments of it submitted to their direct vote for approval. That is a thoroughly demo- cratic system, by which the people arc jnarded against hasty and ill-considered changes of tlie constitution ; and the sug- gestion wliieh I make is one which, I think, might fairly receive from gentlemen who will follow me a little consideration. It has already been suggested that the in- Itroduction of the referendum would be a Tery useful thing. I am not now prepared to fully discuss tliat question. It would take me a long time to elaborate it ; but I do think that, whether we do or do not at any future time introduce the referen- dum, as in Swilzerlaiul, in its ai)plication to all legislation, we may very well, and with great advantage, adopt that particu- lar portion of it which deals Avith consti- tutional changes. It is in accordance with the theory which I put forw-ard, of the people being the great power — really the sovereign power— in these states that, be- fore the Crowii is asked to give its assent to any legislation making changes in the Constitution, the peo})le themselves should be asked to give their sanction to it. There is one other subject in connection with these resolutions, to which I will very shortly refer. It seems to me that the executive, as proposed in these re- solutions, is liable to become the crea- ture of the populous colonies. We must guard against that. Unless we desire to postpone federation indefinitely, we must consider the institutions with which we have to deal. We have to consult them ; Ave are asking for a surrender of power on the part of the difierent legislatures, and Ave have to I'eckon Avith them Avith retrard to the qidd pro quo they are to receive for that surrender. Unless they have some evidence that there is a thorough and complete intention to deal fairly and evenly Avith all of the colonies, Avhether large in population or not, I think those Avith large populations Avill be as ready to reject our Avork as those Avith small ones. There is one other ele- ment Avhich has been suggested to me by the paragraph of the resolutions Avitli re- ference to military and naval defences. I thiidv Avc shall do a useful Avork, that Ave shall do a good thing, by making it a part of the Constitution of Australia that in time of Avar every man in it shall bo liable to bo called upon to undergo mili- tary service. I think that Avould bo a great step in advance — a step tliat Avould secure for us the active interest and sup- port of all the people in these colonies; and I am sure Ave cannot afford to disown or to disregard any one of those sources of influence Avt; ought to exercise upon tho people. I have to thank hon. members of the CouA-ention for the patient hearing they haA-e given me. h\ taking advantage of Third day. 108 Addresses. [6 March, 1891.] Federal Conslitution. this opportunity to express a few ideas upon this subject, I trust I have made some slight contribution to the debate ; and I hope that in the later discussions which will undoubtedly take place in Com- mittee on each of the different proposals, we shall have as instructive a debate as we liave had from those hon. members who have preceded mc upon this cpicstion. ADDRESSES. The President : I have to announce to the Convention the receipt of the following letter from the "NVeslej-an Conference : — Sydney, 5th March, 1801. The Secretary, the Federation Convention. Sir, The conference has prepared an address to the Convention, and the Revs. A. J. Welib and John Gardiner have been appointed to pre- sent it. Would you please be so good as to obtain for us the information as to when we may pre- sent it. I have, &c., Arthur J. Webb. I propose instructing the secretary to in- form these gentlemen that the Convention will receive their address at 1 1 o'clock on Monday, unless that course be disapproved of. Sir JOHN BRAY : Before that is done I desire to call attention to tliis fact : that provision has been made for the proceedings of the Convention being governed by the .standing orders of the House of Commons. I understand, therefore, that it will be neces- .sary that any address should be presented by a member of the Convention. The question arises is it desirable to permit the f)resentation of addresses in the way sug- gested 1 We are all deeply indebted to the Wesleyan Conference for their address, and we shall be glad to receive it ; but I think wo ought to con.sider whether it should not be presented through a member of the Convention in the ordinary parliamentary Avay. The President : Since tiie views ex- pre.ssed by the hon. gentleman appeared to [i1/r, Thynne. be generally concurred in, T will instruct the secretary to inform the Confei'ence of ^^ the proper course of procedure. The secretary read the following tele- grams : — The Australian Natives' Association of Vic- toria sends greetings to the Federation Conven- tion, and trusts that its labours will result in a real and jierniauent step being taken towards an early establishment of Australian federation. The president and membei's of the council of the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures con- gratulate the President and delegates of the Aus- tralian colonies upon having to-day assembled in conference at Sydney for the purpose of drafting an Australian constitution, and fervently pray that their labours may be guided by wisdom and patriotism, and result in the adoption of afederal constitution which will prove acceptahle to the ^\ hole of the peoples of Australia, and may God save the Queen. Victorian Manufacturersrecomniend free-trade throughout Australasia, also free-trade Avith Great liritain for all goods not produced or made in Australasia, except alcoholic liquors. The Federated Builders and Contractors Association of Australasia congratulates the Federation Convention on having laid the found- ation of Australian national unity, and trusts, that the structure built on it during the remain- ing days of the Convention will l)e of a solid and enduring character, and satisfactory to the whole of the Australian people. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. THIRD bay's debate RESUMED. Mr. BAKER : I move : That the debate l:)e now adjourned until 2 o'clock. It will be observed that I have named 2, instead of half-past, as heretofore. Hon. Members : Commence from Mon- day ! Mr. Gillies : Some hon. members may have made appointments on tlie strength of the practice of adjourning until half- past 2. The President : It is not necessary that any motion should be made. I intimate that I will leave the chair now and resume it at 2 o'clock. Federal Constitution : [G March, 1S91.] lle very wide pl-ivileges to give, but I have only to say this, that those who will study the original constitution of New Zealand will find that in point of fact each one of the provinces had in law, granted by the British Parliament, the right to make its own constitution of exactly the nature it pleased, and to vary it from time to time. It will be very easy, therefore, for us to see that like privileges are conferred upon the Australian states, and I have no hesi- tation in saying that if we do not do that, even if they join you, some of them will have years of conflict before they will ob- tain a constitution suited to their wishes. They have had nothing hitherto to do with framing their own constitutions. These rest on acts of a distant parliament ; their voice was but little heard. For example, in New Zealand we had promised to us by one ministry a constitution of the utmost liberality. The states elected their own superintendents who were virtually lieu- tenant-go v^ernors. But the simple name of superintendent being given disarmed parliament at home and they did not hesi- 1 I believe that it is only by holding out such tate to give to the superintendents chosen inducements to the various states of Aus- tralia that we can possibly lead them all to join in one great and strong confederation. Well, then we have to consider what are the blessings we should obtain for them, [»Sir George Grey. by the people powers which they would not give to Canada, or did not give to Canada, when the superintendents were called lieu- tenant-governor.s, without having the great powers which the superintendents in New Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 137 Zealand had. But the lieutenant-governors slavery was in the United States, v.hich ■wei-e not allowed to be elected by the people will disturb the minds of the people at of Canada. iN'ow, I say that on the pre- large. Perhaps the great majority of the sent great and momentous occasion which states may desire to have a general law, has brought us here we have the power of either to regulate or to abolish an institu- giving to the states a constitution of the tion of the kind, or some similar institu- kind which I speak of. I think we ought tion, and the minority of the states may to give them that, and then let them frame refuse to agree to that, and thereupon their own constitution as they please from a deadlock would take place, and nothing time to time, so that they will possess all could be done. At last the majority would the powers of local self-government which determine that the majority should prevail ; men could possibly desire to have. Then butthenthedifficulty would be that the ma- you have this to guide you : the British joritycouldonlyprevailbybreakingthelaw. Parliament has already consented, and in Inthe minds of all English-speaking people, oneinstanceforneai-lytwentyyearsjithink, there is a respect for the law which makes those powers were exercised and were them hate to see it violently broken or set never abused. You thus see that not only aside. In that manner to the minority can you get the right from the same par- of states would become attracted a part liament which gave it before, but there of those who might think with tlie major- is every possibility and every probability ity upon the general subject, but who that powers so given will not be abused would not join in what they conceived in Australia any more than they remained to be an unlawful attack upon the con- safe and intact from all abuse when in- stitution of the country. The result would trusted to the people of New Zealand. be that parties would become more equal, Now, proceeding from that point to the and, probably, nothing less than a civil question of the constitution we are re- war would end a question which might quired to frame and to submit for the con- easily, perhaps, have been settled by dif- sideration of the people of Australia, we ferent legal arrangements. I think, there- are met at first, perhaps, apparently by fore, it will be our bounden duty to see greater diiyiculties — that is, we have to de- that the general assembly is not only on- fine wliat are to bo the powers of the stales dowed with certain powers which the states and what are to be the powers of the federal cannot exercise, but also that an addition government. "VVc; have two bodies to deal be made, as was done in the New Zealand with. But I think we can very easily over- Constitution, to this effect : that whenever come those difficulties. First, I think that tl'e general assembly of the country, or the this must inevitably be done — we must not congress of tlie country, chooses to legislate imitate the United States in saying that "pon any sul)j(!ct, that subject is added to the states arc to be paramount — that they those subjects which have been withdrawn are to be the sole possessors of power, fi'oni the power of the difl'erent states. and that then they, from these paramount Mr. Fitzgerald : No ! powers which they possess, arc to delegate Sir (! FORCE OBEY: If tliat is not such powers as thny please to the general done, of course we act against experience, assembly, or congress, or senate, or what- I hear lion, gentlemen say " No "; but tiicy ever you may please to term it, because must recollect that it was foreseen that the inevitable result of that will pj-o- dire results would follow front the adop- bably be, that a time will arrive in which tion of another system, and that those there will be some question, such as dire result.s did follow, and, with that Fourth day. 138 Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1891.] Mesolutions. ■example before us, it appears very doubtful if "wc ought not, pursuing the course of wisdom, to take steps which will prevent a repetition of the disasters which took place in the United States. Some other plan of doing it may be devised ; but the object should be attained in some way or other without subjecting ourselves to the ■chances of future great disaster. I need not go at length into the different subjects which I think should be submitted to the power of the general assembly or the con- gress. Those can bo all easily adjusted, I think, probably without any great dis- sension amongst ourselves. I believe that no trouble at all vrill arise upon that head ; but it will be essentially necessaiy that the point should be considered with very great care. jSTow, it may be said, perhaps, that in England tliey are little prepared to consider this subject for us, if it is to be carried out by act of parliament; but I should tell lion, gentlemen that they little know the care which British statesmen have in some instances be- stowed upon the consideration of the affairs of these colonies. For instance, we had the Premier of Great Britain, the Marquis of Salisbury, when a younger son of the late Slarquis, out in New Zealand, studying our constitution there with the greatest care — not the one that was then perfected, but the one which it was thought would be bestowed upon ]N"ew Zealand. He lived with me for several montlis, and the business that had been transacted in the day was gone through by him and my- self in the evenings that we spent together. Every matter was discussed, the reasons for each step taken were examined, arguments were held upon both sides, and hedevoted his mind as carefully to a study of these ques- tions as if he had been a New Zealander, and the member of the Government who had to consider what was best to be done for the country. And his was not a soli- tary instance in that respect. Other Brit- [Sir George Grey. ish statesmen have been out here directing their attention to these very questions. Only recently you have had here a young man, now a member of the House of Peers, M'ho spent at least one year and a half studying every question connected with New Zealand, who then came on to Aus- _ tralia, and visited every one of these colo- nies, and devoted considerable care and attentioii to their exact j^osition, the state of their legislation, and all that they had acquired ; and who, then, went on to the United States and Canada, and repeated the same thing there, and, when perfectly educated upon all these points, returned home to take his seat in the House of Peers, and to stand the friend of these com- munities whenever difficult questions arose. Now, with men of that kind to take our part, I think thei-e is great safety for us in reference to the steps which the British Parliament will take in regard to our re- quests. And that brings me to another point which, I fear, will give rise to some dilTerenceof opinion in this great assembly, and in which I may not carry people with nie ; but I believe in ray own mind that it is essential to you that every one of your officers should be elected by the people of this country. Even in the case of your governor-general I believe the people ought to have the risrht of choosing who that man shall be. Let them choose him from Eng- land if they please ; let them choose him from any part of the world, I would almost say, if they pleased. They will choose well, they will choose wisely, and no nation can be perfect — unless an imperial nation — a young offset, as we should be, of an imperial nation, we should not be perfect, unless the people had every office open to their ambition, and unless it were known that the really great and good men of the country could rise to the highest position, and exercise the highest duties in it. Why, if as is the doctrine at the present time, and I admit that it has been successfully ex- Federal Constitution : [9 ^March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 139 ercised — very sucessfully exercised in regard members of the Privy Council at home, to these colonies — if the doctrine is tliat I do not at all know why "we should not as far as possible the sous of peers should send home an officer who would conduct be sent out here to be educated as to the our business Avith the Queen directly, affairs of the colonics in order that they exactly as the Secretary of State for Tre- tnay act wisely in the legislative body at laud conducts the business of Ireland with, liome — I say that if such an education is the Queen, or as that officer in the Honso necessary and of great advantage then of Commons v.ho really manages Scotch to shut out our own people from an edu- affairs, and who manages them as if he were cation of the kind, and to say that no man a secretary of state, conducts the business in Australia shall have an advantage of of Scotland. I believe it would be of the the sort is an act of absolute cruelty to the greatest possible advantage to the colonies people of Australia — it is to ci'amp their that such an officer should reside in Eng- energies, to deprive them of the highest land instead of having agents-general there, education of all, and it is an act of which because he would become personally known we ought not to be guilty towards our to his sovereign, and to the leading men in fellow-countrymen. Then I would say to England, and friendships v/ould be formed this assembly, do not be led away by the and an education given from time to time idea that the nomination of governor is the as these men were clianged. I appro- only tie that binds us to Great Britain. hend that they would probably only fill If we send home a great portion of our the office for two or three years. There laws for the Queen's assent is not that to would be a constant change, and I believe bind us to Great Britain in the most that in that way a large proportion of your solemn way 1 Is not that to say that the population would be again educated in the sovereign of Great Britain is as absolutely best possible manner. These must seem a member of our legislature here as she almost too daring speculations ; but, in is of the legislature at liome 1 Her repre- point of fact, we are marching on to an sontative, who would be chosen by the altogether new epoch, to new times, and people, would in her name open and close the very essence of the constitution must bo tlie parliaments and perform all those tliis : I heard one lion, gentleman here state functions, but he would be a man chosen that we must remember that Ave are logis- by ourselves, and our own people Avould lating for tlie future; and I agree Avith be educated in the higliest possible man- hira if he meant that we are legislating in ner to discharge their duty to their conn- such a manner as to enable the future to try. For it is not only the man who is legislate for itself — that it is our object fortunate enough to attain tlie highest that freedom in every respect shall be pasiLion avIio Avill educate himself to the given, so tliat as each generation comes on greatest point that he can, but every one they shall say, "Blessed be those ancestors who aimed at the office Avould be endea- of ours avIio haA'c left us this freedom, so vouring to prepare liimself for it — num- that nothing can take place — no clianges bers of men would bo educated to a point in the state of the Avorld — but we possess to whicli they never Avould otherwise be all poAvers to define the measures most educated unless you opened such objects to necessary to bring peace and tranquillity their ambition. If it Averc thought ncces- at every epoch it comes on.' That is sary to bind us still further to Great the real duty Avhich avo should aim to Britain I do not sec wliy Ave, instead of fulfil; and it is only by allowing the (having agents-general, should not have people to speak, and at all times to declare ' Fourth day. no Federal Conatitution : [9 Mauch, 1S91.] EesoliUions. tlieir \iews and their wishes, and to have will Le made. Then there is one other them carefully considered, that we can in- thing that lies very near my mind. Let sure peace, tranquillity, and prosperity to us remember this. In my youth it was each countiy in each successive epoch of said tliat men of different religious faiths time as it arrives. Nov/, having given could not sit in the same legislatui'e to- these general views upon your general gather, and they were excluded — Jews, assembly, I need go no further. It does Catholics, Nonconformists — nobody it was not much matter in what kind of way on thought but members of the Church of the first occasion you allow elections to England could form a legislative body that take place, if the people have the power was of any use at all. To leaven them of altering that whenever they like. All with other material was to spoil the whole these things become quite minor questions thing. But it was found that that was a if you just hold in view these several great mistake ; that men of different re- matters, that the states — each state — shall ligious faiths could sit side by side in the have the power of modifying its form of same legislature; that talent and ability government whenever it likes; that, for can be drawn forth frovn any religious instance, neither the states nor the general opinions whatever. The nation has pro- body is to be told that " you must conduct gressed more than ever it has done before your form of government according to the in so short a })eriod of time ; and its happi- principles of what they call a responsible ness and tranquillity are greater. Now, I ministry." Why should that be told think we should establish this principle in to them 1 Why not let them conduct reference to federation. Let lis say that their form of government precisely as each if the English-speaking people choose to age chooses 1 Who can tell what politi- federate in one great body we shall not cal inventions are yet to be made 1 Why, ask what that form of government is. the principle of representation, as we In the same body could sit men who hail enjoy it, is, comparatively speaking, a from a republic, and men who hail from modern discovery, and tlie principle of a monarchy. Take the case of South federation has not developed yet. We are Africa, where there are two republics, the people for the first time to give it anew We might have federation in a wonder- form, if we please. We can develop it to ful degree if that rule were laid down, a higher point than it has ever been raised and surely if seven or eight states there to yet. It is an invention ; but, as is the met together to consult for the common case with electricity, day by day better good of South Africa, and to make a law modes will be found for administering it which would be beneficial to the whole of o — better means for making it useful to them, it could matter very little whether men. We now, as I say, take one step, the representatives of two states came and in taking that step let us open the fi"om republics, instead of from a mon- road to all future steps. Let that be our archy as in the case of the other states, care— to lead on, let us march into the Equally well can they advise upon that wide track of improving all these institu- which is good for the whole — equally well tions ; let us lead on, and you will find can tliey care for their fellow-countrymen, that grateful nations will follow, and we speaking the same language, with laws shall discover that we had known nothing, identical in all respects — equally well can although we now think we know so much they care for them, whether the head of — so great will be the changes which will the government is called a president, or occur, so great will be the inventions which whether, as in our case, we rejoice to [Sir George Grey. Federal Constitulion: [9 March, 1891.] lifsoludons. 141 live under so great and good a Queen. "What difference can it make? "We should be the first to lead on in that great im- provement, and to saj this : " Now, the federation of all English-speaking people may take place ; the United States can come in with us : all men speaking the common tongue can meet to debate upon wliat is necessary for the common benefit." I think hon. gentleman will feel, however crude these doctrines may be, that there is much in tliem. Remember this : that America must have a great deal to sav in regard to the Pacific Ocean. The last speaker alluded very kindly to the idea that was entertained years ago of feder- ating with all the islands of the >South Pacific, and arrangements were made by which that might be carried out. But what was the feeling in England ] Directly it was known that wc thought of com- mon customs duties for all the islands — all the i-slands, as well as these larger places — the moment that was thought of, and it was seen that it afforded the means of paying one or two European officers for the purpose of guiding and directing the natives in the line of duty which thoy should follow, the British Government became alarmed, and there was a peremptory order sent out which prevented that pdan being continued. It was finished at once. Well, not only was tliat the case, but so strong was the desire then to break up the empire — and this is a good illustration of the kind of change.s that you may have to meet, changes of human thouglit — that it was determined, if possible, to got rid of the outlying depen- dencies, and to reduce the dominions of Great lUitain. The Orange Biver sove- feignty was first thrown off. Then it was contemplated to throw other places off, and force them to become republics. It was Raid that England was too lai-ge ; that what you wanted was a nation — not think- ing of all these distant places — with their minds fixed upon manufactures and com- merce, manufacturing for the world ; it v.-as sufficient to breed up in your great cities a population in the last depths of misery, but always ready to rush into manufactures at the lowest rate of wages whenever an improvement of trade took place. It was said that Britain should confine herself to her manufactures, and to her own immediate territories, and leave the re.st of the world to itself. But, what thought other people, and what thought England ? Let me just give one illustration of this. I Avas arranging for the federation of all South Africa — triumphantly arranging it — certainly all the states, I belieA'e, but one would have joined, and that one would almost im- mediately afterwards have probably come in — but when it was heard of, the go- A-ernment then in power, and the opposi- tion at home, were alike filled with dread at such a federation as was contemplated. It was said that the man who contem- plated that was a dangerous man, and he must be got rid of, and without a mo- ment's warning I was dismissed from office as Governor and High Commissioner of the Cape. Well, there was one person in the realm who thought differently. Afterwards, within a few days, the ministry were put out in consequence of a quarrel with Lord Palmcrston — I think it was within twelve days — and the first thing that was said to tlic new ministry was, "That man is right ; you will yet long to do what he could have done, and you will bo sorry that it was not done; reinstate him in his position." It was the Queen who spoke, and what was her feeling towards lier people at lai-gel As the Prince Consort explained the mat- ter to myself, tliey felt the necessity of openings for the poor, for the adventurous. They thought no wrongful efforts should ever be made to extend an empire, that, so long as the people of CJreat Britain, urged by their indomitable energy, kept iiushing Fourth day. 142 Federal Conslituiion : [9 March, 1891.] Resolulions. on themselves, winning now races, winning new countries to join tlie great confedera- tion of English people, so long would it be wrong for the sovereign to injure her people by sayiug they should not go to these new homes, they should not open these new places for commerce, that they must remain shut up in a small and continually de- creasing empire at home, as it would have been, if the policy had been acted upon of striking off place after place. "Well, I maintain that the hearts which con- ceived that conception — that love for the English race— represented the true feeling of the nation ; and experience has shown that such was the case. Here we are in New Zealand in spite of the government of the day. They tried to stop the founda- tion of the colony. Thei'e they are at the Cape of Good Hope, spreading over the whole of the country, although the earlier settlers were punished if they attempted to pass the Orange River. Ko further spread of territory there was to be allowed. And now you have Great Britain grasping im- mense territories in Africa, probably going- even beyond her strength — such has been the change of public opinion upon this sub- ject. I ask you, therefore, whether we, in providing for the spread of the empire in the Pacitic, whether we, in providing for all English-speaking races coming into the one great confederation, shall not equally now be doing our duty to the future, as I believe that our noble Queen, and those who thought with her — there were really but few — thought rightly, thought well, when they determined that the energies of the British race should spread exactly as their instincts moved them, and, provided they committed no wrong upon others, .should be allowed to go in and replenish and fill up all the waste places of the earth. These are the points which appear to me so essentially nece.ssary for our guid- ance — this policy of letting all English- speaking people into the confederation, of [5i?' George Grey. not attempting to fetter our posterity by any peculiar laws, of simply giving thein power to enable them to determine what laws they would live under themselves. Holding those two main points in view we should, I think, accomplish all we could possibly desire. With reference to the sub- ject of defence I do not like to say much, I am very adverse to seeing a large force raised in this country ; I am very adverse to seeing a military spirit created, which should long for war. I would rather see a small — a very small — force, sufficient for all purposes which can possibly occur, be- cause I do not believe if we enter into this confederation that we shall ever be mo- lested. Let me state one point. There is intense jealousy amongst the European nations themselves. At one time it was thought that it was better to set up the old world in this new world. The whole efforts of people went to form off-shoots of British societies, as they said. Why here, even in this colony of New South ^Vales, when you were offered free and liberal institutions, some of . your first men wanted to set up peerages. The papex's and documents will show that. I know that in New Zealand, in the minds of many men, similar thoughts were entertained. A nobility was to be set up there, in the south of New Zealand, just as much as it was at home in England ; but in spite of all that could be done, this one feeling always pervaded these new countries, that they would have nothing Avhatever to do with those institutions of the old world ; and I say that if once you get up great military bodies here, the whole world will, by degrees, become a series of standing camps, as it is in Europe at the joresent day. Now, look how we stand. Fi'om the Atlantic, on the one side, back again to the same ocean really,. I may say, x;pon the other side, tliere lies a great space in the world in which there is no standing army at the present day, no Federal Constitution : [9 -\LvRCU, 1891.] Resolutions. 113 preparation made for military attacks, for military defence — the United States — ■ vath, I believe, 12,000 men to keep the Indian population down, and the whole is at peace and repose; her young men are not drawn into conscriptions, not prepared to be fit victims for slaughter, not certain to be slaurrhtered in some few vears' time in some obscure coi-ner or other, but all de- voting their energies to the development of the country, marrying, becoming famers, or filling ditierent trades and professions, not shut up in barracks, excluded from know- ing what the alFection of a wife and the love of children really is. Here, all are totally different, and for heaven's sake let us keep in our present position, and not go off into the mania which has made Europe the nations of standing camps "which it is. I hope that that is one thing we shall hold in view — in fact, one of the main things almost before every other. I will not detain hon. gentlemen longer. I have given what I believe to be an outline of a proper plan of proceeding. I will do my best to bring the points forward in Committee, as these questions ax'i.se. I entertain, in my own mind, a confident belief of this : that what I have asked for, whether it is donenowor not, will be done in Australasia — I will not say in my lifetime, although I liave seen great changes — but I believe it will be done in Australasia in a very short period of time. If it is done I have a confident belief, founded upon a long experience, that then a nation, educated in public schools first, then educated in public life afterwards in the world, so that the thought and care of their fellow-men is continually before their minds — I believe that such a nation will attain to higher prosperity than any other people have yet attained, because in the United States still arc many of those things wanting in that degree of perfection in which wo may have them hero ; and from the full exercise of the faculties of self-government, and of the management of the nation, will certainly spring pros- perity and happiness of a kind hitherto unknown. Mr. RUTLEDGE : Like the honored statesman who has just resumed his seat, it- is with feelings of diffidence amounting al- most to awe that I rise in this Convention — destined as it is to become historical in Australasia — to say a few words upon the very important proposals which you, sir, have suljmitted as a basis for a federal constitution which our several paiiiaments have sent us here to devise. After the many able and eloquent speeches that have been addressed to us, it seems to me that it is almost impossible that anything new in the w-ay of argument can be employed in the further discussion of your pi-o- posals. All that one can hope to do is to refrain from following too closely in the steps of the speakers v.'ho have preceded, and to endeavour to avoid as much as pos- sible all unnecessary repetition. You have struck, as it seems to me, the true keynote in the first paragraph of the first series of your propositions. You say, sir : That the powers and privileges and territorial rights of the several existing colonies shall re- main intact, except in respect to such surrenders as may be agreed iijion as necessary and inci- dental to the power and authority of the National Federal Government. Now, sir, this is a paragraph with which I am perfectly certain every member of this Convention will most cordially agree. Ko one can be foolish enough to imagine that in the case of a number of colonies, with public policies and local interests in many instances so entirely dissimilar, it is possible for real and enduring federation to take place unless there is an adoption of that give-and-take system to which you so happily adverted in the course of the admirable speech in which you moved these resolutions, wliich seem to me to con- sist in the surrender by some of the colo- nies of some of the high political privileges: Fourth day. lU Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1S91.] liesolutions. and some of the almost boundless political freedom they enjoy, in order that the well- being of the whole of the colonies may be thereby most efFectually promoted. I do not think it is necessary for me or for any other speaker to say very much with re- gard to the remaining paragraphs in this first series of proposals. There seems so far to have been remarkable unanimity in the treatment which the sevei^al reso- lutions have received ; but it is when we come to the first of the second series of resolutions that we happen upon difference of opinion. There have been some argu- ments employed by some hon. gentlemen who have addressed the Convention on this subject in opposition to the speech which v/as made by my hon. friend. Sir Samuel Griflith, in which he ventured to differ from the proposal so broadly stated as it is in the first resolution of the second series. Whilst there have been several speakers who have followed in tlie line which you have laid down, there have been other speakei's who have adopted a differ- ent line. But among all those who have ollowed you, sir, in the adoption of the view you have here submitted, I do not think there are any whose speech deserves the same amount of attention, or that ought to call forth the same amount of criticism, as the speech delivered by my hon. friend, Mr. Deakin. The speech which that hon. gentleman delivered was, I think every member of the Convention will agree, as to its manner magnificent ; but, v/ith regard to its matter, I shall oidy say this : that it seemed to me to scarcely bear out the very high reputation that hon. gentleman has attained as the prince of Australian-born orators, and as one of the foremost statesmen of these great colo- nies. Now, sir, the hon. gentleman was extremely dissatisfied with any attempt on the part of this Convention to depart from the strict lines of the form of constitution with which we are familiar in these colo- [i/r. Rutledfje. nies. Lest I should do the hon. gentle- man an injustice. I shall take the liberty of reading a few lines from his speech, de- livered last Tuesday. The hon. gentleman, in the course of his address to the Conven- tion, said this : The Constitution which we now enjoy, it ap- pears, is to be set aside with less ceremony than one would have expected from gentlemen who have lived mider it, andhave exercised itshighest powers for many years. We appear to be ready to depart from institutions which have the sanc- tion of long experience, almost entirely on theoretical grounds. It is true that hon. mem- liers have looked to the experience of other countries ; hut in doing this they have ignored some of the most pertinent lessons of our own, which is that if we establish two chambers of equal authority, we prepare the way for dissen- sion, and encourage deadlocks. The constitu- tional history of Victoria gives ample evidence of tliis. We have this remarkable anomaly : We have the hon. gentleman contending for the perpetuation in this new federal form of constitution of that form of government in regard to a second chamber with which WQ have become familiarised in these colo- nies; and yet, in the very same breath, we have the hon. gentleman deprecating in the sti'ongest possible language the dissen- sions and the deadlocks with which the history of the working of this very form of constitution has made us farciliar. I want to know, if a system like tliis has been tried and found wanting in the case of any of the colonies, why should we per- petuate, or endeavour to perpetuate, this system when we are here founding a con- stitution which we hope, as the hon. mem- ber. Sir George Grey, so eloquently put it, will be not a constitution for the present, but a constitution for all future time, and which will enable the federal parliament which shall come into existence, to legislate, when we are all dead and gone, in the most perfectly free manner for itself and for the requirements of its own time. The hon. membei', Mr. Deakin, seems to me to have Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1891.] Resolutions, 145 fallen into the error of imagining — or at least, if one follows liis language and ex- amines it critically, he seems to have fallen into the error of supposing that what we are aiming at, or ought to aim at, in the labours which have brought us together here, is to endeavour to construct a great state that shall be a sort of enlarged edi- tion of one of the existing colonies — say, for example, the colony of Victoria. The hon. gentleman loses sight of this fact : that we are not here for the purpose of endeavouring to effect an amalgamation of all the colonies — that the several states, with their diverse interests and their diverse claims upon the great federal government, that we hope to see come into existence are not to be merged — that we are not here to endeavour to construct a great unity, but that we are here to endeavour, if possible, to effect a great and lasting union of all these colonies in which, while the voice of the whole people, without any distinc- tion whatever, shall be heard in the great chamber of the people's representatives — in the house of representatives — the voice of the states, as distinct states, with sepa- rate claims and separate interests, shall )Q lieard witli equal empliasis and with equal effect in a .second chamber, which may be called the senate or the council of states, or by whatever otlier name it may JO designated. I do not think that wo ought for a single moment to attempt in what we do here to obliterate in any de- s^ree the individuality of the states which, ;aken as a wliole, are to form the great 'ederation of Australasia. To endeavour )0 do that^to destroy the individuality Df tlie states — .seems to me to strike at the very root of the leading principle of feder- ation, and if we are to have a federation hat .shall be sometl)ing of which we could be proud — if we are to have a federation ;hat .shall satisfy the aspirations of the 3eople of the several colonies whom we are lere to represent — we nnist have afedcia- K tion that will recognise that principle in the fullest and most marked degree. Depend upon it that the people of these colonies are not fjoinf' to surrender to a mere sentiment of federation all the rights and privileges which they have acquired, in many instances after very protracted struggles, by mean.s of separation. If I were to read the speech of my lion, friend, Mr. Deakin, literally, I should come to the conclusion that what he desires to do is this : to rub out all the lines of demarcation that separate the colo- nies as they exist in Australia to-day. He said in his speech the other day : What is there in tliis artificial boundary of the ^Murray River or the other artificial boundaries that divide tlie colonies of Australia from each other? ^Yllat is there in these artificial boun- daries that we should allow the people to remain separate fi'om each other, and allow them to have a voice in tlie senate of the nation which pos- sesses— as I hope it will possess — co-ordinate authority in all respects, except per- liaps in the origination of money bills, with the chamber of repiesentatives. He says, " Why should we recognise the existence of these imaginary boundaries?' But while I say that it is possible to mag- nify this question of imaginary boundaries to a disproportionate extent, yet tliese imaginary boundaries mean a great deal to the people who are included within these boundaries. If we were to rub out these boundaries to-morrow what sliould we be 1 We should revert to the condition of things which existed before any separa- tion at all (if Mil- several colonies from New South Wales ; and it is because the p(!0plc who inhabit these several sejiarato states know full well that there are bene- fits to be enjoyed as the result of thesepar- .-ition which they have acquired that they will never consent to surrender the rights .and privileges, or, at all events, the more substantial of their riglits and privileges, by obliterating all these lines of division, by becoming atnalgamated into one great Fourth day. IIG Federal Constitution : [9 Maiicii, 1891.] Resolutions. ■whole. If you are to liave a, senate wliicli \:-i to be on the model which my lion, friend admires — the model of the British Consti- tution — in which the upper chamber is to be merely a body for registering the de- cisions of the house of representatives, I want to know, if that is to be the outcome of our labours, h.ow we are to have a senate which will have any such powers as will safecruard the interests of the state ? We know that the general tendency of the existence of a body of that kind, which does not possess co-ordinate powers with the other branch of the legislature, is to degenerate into feebleness. The House of Lords, I say, with all due respect to that august body, has degenerated into a thing that almost merits the contempt of a great many of the free people of the British dominions, because, while they have all the pretensions that belong to an ancient and aristocratic house, and all the semblance of authority which ought to belong to men of distinguished position and rank, they ai'e reduced to the position of being a mere ap- pendage to the House of Commons ; and while they can for some years perhaps block the onward progress of legislation, they have no power whatever to shape legisla- tion or to effect any beneficent object with- out the authority conferred upon it by the House of Commons, without the sanction of that body, and without its concurrence. I think that that is a state of things which we ouicht not to desire to see instituted in connection with this proposed federation. I could understand the arguments of my hon. friend if there were anything in the creation of a second chamber possessing co-ordinate authority with the lower cham- ber in rcEfard to the amendment even of money bills — Icouldunderstandsomething, I say, of his argument if thei'e were any- thing inconsistent with true democracy in his proposition. But there is nothing in- consistent with true democracy in it. jNIy hon. friend talked of authority, and the \_Mr. RiUledge. power of his argument derived a great deal of its force from the manner in which he laid stress on the rights of the people. He combated the idea of a second chamber having the right to veto any proposed lesfislation of the lower chamber on the ground that that chamber uttered the voice of the people, which had a right to be heard. "Will not the voice of the people be heard in a senate wliich is composed of men who are as much elected by the people, though it may be in a different mode, as in the house of representatives itself % The history of the various legislative councils of these colonies is fraught with caution against the attempt to establish anything in the shape of a second chamber that will not rest upon the suffrages of the people. The reason why there have been dissensions and deadlocks in connection with the upper chambers in the various colonies is this, that theseupperchambers havenot in any respect derived their authority from the people in the same way as the lower chamber has. They have either not been elected by the people at all, or else have been elected by the people upon the basis of some special property qualification; and nobody can con- tend that a body of that sort is a body that can be said to represent the people, or which ought to be intrusted with powers co-ordinate Avith those that belong to the other branch of the legislature. The hon. gentleman talks about experiments. He seems to deprecate the idea of i:)lungini, into an experiment. He seems to think that, in the proposal that has been sug- gested by my hon. and learned friend. Sir Samuel Griffith, the motion which you, sir, have submitted with regard to the second chamber is not a motion that should be adopted by this Convention. It seems to be supposed that in this we are indulging in a sj^irit of experiment — that we are mak- ing experiments in legislation. I fail to see where the experimental part comes in. It does not seem to me that there is any- 1. Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 147 thing at all experimental about it. If there never had been anything of this kind in existence before I could understand that there might be some ground for the objec- tion that is raised, that we are about to j)lunge into an experiment. But America lias had the advantage of 100 years of the ■working of such a system as that which has been advocated by the hon. and learned member, Sir Samuel Griffith, and by several -other hon. gentlemen who have followed liim — of the system which finds so little favour in the estimation of the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Deakin. I dare say hon. mem- bers have read many works Avritten by American authors wliich jro to shov,- to ■what a marked extent the Senate has grown in the aflfections of the American people. The Senate is not regarded in America as a body which exists for the purpose of coming into conflict with the House of Representatives, or the result of the peculiar constitution of which is to constantly precipitate conflicts with the House of Representatives. The Senate of 'the United States of America is a body .that has grown steadily in the affections of the people of America until the veneration which at present exists for it is almost un- bounded. Hon. gentlemen, I dare say, have read the book, by Carnegie, called *' Triumphant Democracv." I propose to quote a few words from that author with regard to the Senate, the powers which it is proposed to confer upon a senate here being somewhat similar to, though less than, the powers conferred upon and enjoyed by the Senate in America. Mr. Carnegie say.s, at page 2G0 : It has been saiil, liy more than one political writer, tliat tlic American .Senate is tlie ideal jecond chamber of tlie woilil. Sonic assert that it is tlie only second cliambcr which possesses real power, and is permanently fixed in the hearts of the masses. It is certainly regarded in America as a great promotion to he elevated irom tlie house to the Senate, and it is none the '.es.i certain that the entire nation regards the Senate with pride and affection. He says later on : This hopeful student of a republican institu- tion, my Lord Salisbury, has said in a recent speech : The Americans, as 3011 know, ha-ie a senate. I wish we could institute it in this eountrj". JIal•^■e!lou3 in eflSciency and strength. Mr. Carnegie quotes, with evident pride, the opinion wliich that eminent statesman. Lord Salisbury', entertains of the American Senate as an institution which has been in operation for the last 100 years in that countrv, and the working of which he has had ample opportunity to very closely observe. But while it may be said that a writer like Carnegie is bound to speak well of the institutions of the country which has enabled him to acquire a stu- pendous fortune and become a millionaire, and that we ought not to take the opinions of a man like that when he speaks in ad- miration of this institution without a very considerable amoitnt of deduction, it is fortunate for the discussion on the present occasion that there is no need for us to con- fine our attention to the observationswhich have been made by writers of the class of Mr. Carnegie. I dare say hon. gentlemen have nearly all of them very carefully read the admirable work of Mr. Bryce. Now, Mr. Bryce cannot be said to be a writer like Carnegie, Avho is filled with enthusi- astic admiration of American institutions as such, but a calm, judicious, and dispas- sionate writer, Avho Avill speak of any in- stitution, particularly an American insti- tution, exactly as he finds it; and, in deal- ing with this que.stion of the Senate, Mr. Bryce makes the following remarks : — The respective characters of the twf) l)odies are wliolly unlike those of the so-called upper and lower chambers of Europe. In Europe there is always a dilTcrence of political com- plexion, generally resting on a diflPerencc in per- sonal composition. There the upper chanilitr represents the ai-istocracy of the country, ortho men of wealth, or the high ofGcials, or the in- fluence of the Crown and court ; while the lower chamber represents the multitude. Between the Senate and the House there is no such difference. Fourth day. lis Federal Constitution: [9 Makcii, 1891.] Resolutions. Both e(\ually represent the people, the whole people, and nothing but the people. The in- dividual members come from the same classes of the community ; and though there are more rich men (in proportion to niimbers) in the Senate than in the House, the influence of capital is not markedly greater. Both have been formed by the same social influences, and the social pretensions of a senator expire with his term of office. Both are possessed by the same ideas, governed by the same sentiments, equally con- scious of their dependence on public oiiinion. The one has never been, like the English House of Commons, a popular pet ; the other never, like the English House of Lords, a jjopular bug- bear. What is perhaps stranger, the two branches of Congress have not exhibited that contrast of feeling and policy which might be expected from the different methods by which they are chosen. In the House the large states are predominant, nine out of thirty-eight (less than one fourth) return an absolute majority of 325 representa- tives. In the Senate these same nine states have only eighteen members out of seventy-six, less than a fourth of the whole. In other words, these nine states are more than sixteen times as powerful in the House as thej^ are in the Senate. But, as the House has never been the organ of the large states, nor prone to act in their in- terest, so neither has the Senate been the strong- hold of the .- „all states, for American politics have never turned upon an antagonism between these two sets of commonwealths. Qiiestions relating to states' rights, and the greater or less extension of the powers of the national govern- ment, have played a leading part in the history of the union. But although small states might be supposed to be specially zealous for states' rights, the tendency to uphold them has been no stronger in the Senate than in the House. Collisions between the two houses are fre- quent. Each is jealous and combative. Each is pi'one to alter the bills that come from the other ; and the Senate in particular knocks about remcrselessly those favourite children of the house, the appropriation bills. The fact that one house has passed a bill goes but a little way in inducing the other to pass it ; the Senate would reject twenty House bills as readily as one. Deadlocks, however, disagreements over serious issues which stop the machinery of ad- ministration, are not common. They rarely cause excitement or alarm outside Washington, because the country, remembering previous in- stances, feels sure they will be adjusted, and [J/r. Rutledge. kno^^'s that cither house would yield were it unmistakably condemned by public opinion. The executive government goes on undisturbed, and the worst that can happen is the loss of a bill which may be passed four months later. Even as between the two bodies there is no great bitterness in these conflicts, because the causes of quarrel do not lie deep. Sometimes it is self-esteem that is involved, the sensitive self- esteem of an assembly. Sometimes one or other house is playing for a party advantage. That intensity which, in the similar contests in Euro jie, arises from class feeling is absent, because there is no class distinction between the two American chambers. Thus the country seems to be watcli- ing a fencing match rather than a combat a outrance. I dwell upon this substantial identity of char- acter in the Senate and the House, because it ex- plains the fact, surprising to a European, that two perfectly co-ordinate authoiities, neither of which has any more right than its rival to claim to speak for the whole nation, manage to get along together. Their quarrels are professional and personal rather than conflicts of adverse principles. The two bodies are not hostile ele- ments in the nation, striving for supremacy, but ser^•ants of the same master, whose word of re- buke will quiet them. I think that these extracts wdll go far to •show that the fears which may be enterr tained by some hon. gentlemen as to this^ experiment, as it is called, of giving co- ordinate powers to the second chamber are not well founded. 1 am well aware that my lion, friend, Mr. Deakin, has rested some ot his objections to the form of senate whicli I advocate, and which other members advo- cate, on the ground that it is impossible for us, with our ideas of constitutional govern- ment, and with the ideas which many mem- bers have of a government responsible tc the chamber of representatives, to graft on a system of that kind the system which we propose to construct as the result ot the labours of this Convention. I know that that oltjection was prominent in the hon. gentleman's mind, and it is only just to him to say that there is a good deal in the contention wliich he has set up, that it is difficult to graft the American sys- tem, which has an executive not at all Federcd Constitution : [9 March, 1891.] Eesolations. 149 responsible to the legislature, upon a sys- tem which is to combine a senate with co- ordinate powers wdth a system of responsi- bility to a house of representatives. But we have not all the wisdom of the ajjes concentrated in ourselves ; and I have not I the slightest doubt that in the course of tune such developments will take place as ; will render it possible to have a form of ; government which will be consistent, to a certain extent, with our ideas of respon- 1 sible government, and at the same time with the existence of a second chamber, possessing powers to which none of the second chambers of these colonies are in the least degree entitled. But, sir, I would like hon. gentlemen to bear in mind that I am very far from advocating for the federal parliament — which I hope will grow out of the labours of this Con- vention — a second chamber which shall be elected, as the members of the second cham- ber in the United States are elected, bv the combined vote of the upper chamber and the lower chamber of the states legislatures. Tliat iniglit be a very good method, but with some of the constitu- tions of these colonies as they are at present, it might not perhaps be all that could be desired. Many of the second chambers in the colonies being nominated clianibers, and not elected, and in the case of those that are elected not being elected by the sufTrages of the people generally, it might very fairly be said that the members of the senate, though elected by the legisla- tures of the colonics as they exist at the pre- sent time, would not be truly representative of the j)eoplo, and that therefore there is some reason why we .should not proceed to construct tJie senate after the model of the American Senate, posses.sing coordi- nate powers with the lower house, or the house of representatives. But I am not at all wedded to that principle, and I should l,o very sorry indeed to advocate from my [lace in this Convention a system by which the second chamber shall be founded ex- clusively upon the methods w^hicli are suggested by those who contend that the members of that second chamber shall be elected by the legislatures of the several colonies as they exist at present. I do contend, however, that a great mis- take will be made if we p'-oceed to the creation of a senate, or second chamber, in the federal constitution, Wxiich shall be deprived of those powers which we enjoy, or a great proportion of the powers that are now^ enjoyed by the Senate of the United States. "We know, sir, that if the ideas which you have embodied in your re- solutions are carried out, this will be the result : that in the case of financial propo- sals being sent up from the lower chamber to the second chamber, the senate will have no alternative but to accept the pro- posals in fflobo, or to entirely reject them. But our experience of the working of that system in these colonies is not particularly reassuring. We know that the effect of a second chamber rejecting the financial proposals of the lower chamber in their entirety, is to inflame the ^^ublic resent- ment against the upper chamber, as it is called. There might be very many things in the financial proposals which emanated from thegovernment and were cari'ied through the lower chamber, of which the members of the upper chamber cordially approved; but if it were incumbent upon them to reject a mea- sure because there was much in it of which they disapproved, although it contained a great deal that they did approve of, the re- sult would be to cause a very groat amount of public excitement, and to cause many per- sons in the community to raise their voices against the existence of a second chamber at all. I think we should guaiil against tliat, and if the senate or second chamber in the federal constitution were based upon the sufTrages of the people, although in a different way, yet as truly based upon the sufTrages of the people as the house of Fourth day. loD Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1891.] Resolutions. ropveseutatlves, then I cannot see on what ground it can be contended that the senate shoukl be deprived of coordinate powers with the lower assembly. I think that in a matter of this kind we should proceed as far as possible by familiar analogy, and, though perhaps the suggestion of the analogy may, in the minds of some hon. \nembers,be thought entirely inappropriate to an assemblage of this kind — though the suggestion or the expression of the analogy may in some quarters create a smile — yet it appears to me that in order to have a perfect system of federal government, we ought, as far as possible, to preserve an analogy to that form of government which prevails in a model family. Now, in the case of a model family we know that the husband represents the entire house- hold. An Hon. Member : In providing for the expenditure ! An Hon, Member : There is no federa- tion there ! Mr. RUTLEDGE : The husband is sup- posed, in the natural order of things, to be the representative of the entire household ; but, though he is a representative of the entire household, we know that the wife also plays a very important part in the government of that household. The wife comes very near to all those smaller con- stituent elements of the family circle, which may, perhaps, by analogy be likened to the great family of states which Avill exist in connection witli this gi'eat federal constitution. Colonel Smith : She is the home ruler ! Mr. RUTLEDGE : It is the wife that knows all about the particular interests which affect all the members of the family group : they come to her with their par- ticular ideas, and they look to her for the expression of their ideas and for the en- forcement of their particular claims. Mr. MuNRO : ISTot for finding the income ! [J/r. Rutledge. Mr. RUTLEDGE : With regard to that interjection, I say that he is a wise man who, being the head of a household, puts- all his financial projects into the crucible of the sagacious mind of liis wife, far more enlightened, far more discriminating than his own. Colonel Smith : With the power of veto ! Mr. RUTLEDGE : I say yes, with the power of veto. In this community many a man owes a great deal to the advice of his wife and the veto which she has put upon his proposals. We know that those strong- headed men who think that all wisdom is- embodied in themselves, who do not take their wives into their confidence, who do not consult their wives as to some particular speculation on which they desire to em- bark, are the men who very frequently come to grief. But the men who do take their wives into their confidence in this way, and who do permit them to have a considei'able voice in the management of family afiairs, even to putting a veto upon- their own impulsive tendencies in regard to financial proposals, are the men who go on very safe lines. No analogy is perfect ; every analogy will break down when yoit come to some particular modes of applying, it ; but I do regard a great family of states, governed by a house of representa- tives and a senate, as bearing a very con- siderable analogy to the constitution of a family ; and I say the same rule which prevails in the one ought to prevail in the other. Sir Thomas McIlwraith : The wife in- itiates most of the money bills there ! Mr. RUTLEDGE : The wives do initi- ate a great many of the money bills, and I appeal to the experience of a great many lion, gentlemen to know whether they have not bevBn saved very frequently from financial mistakesby consulting their wives in regard to important steps wliich they proposed to take in the very serious affairs of life. This question of a second cham- Federal Constitution : [9 Z\lAncir, 1891.] Resolutions. 151 Ler has been referred to hj a literary gentleirian who is well known, perhaps, to many members of this Convention, and he has spoken of it in conversation with [ me as being what may be called the [ expression of the second thought of the I ])eople. It is a very good thing, I think, [i to give the people an opportunity of having : a second thought on some proposal upon i which they have set their minds. The hon. member. Captain Russell, has referred in the course of his excellent speech to the cyclonic gusts of popular passion which sometimes pass over a community, and that ■ is the same idea which was present to the mind of Alexander Hamil ton whenhe wrote some of those admirable papers for " The \ Federalist." Why, sir, there have been times in the history of the community when the people have been seized with a sudden impulse in a particular direction, involv- ing gi-eat issues of public policy, and in- volving considerable public expenditure ; but if they had had an opportunity of re- considering their first decision how fre- quently would they have, if not entii-ely re- versed, atall events to a considerable extent modified that decision. And I take it, sir, that in the existence of a senate composed of men who are, equally with the house of repre- nentatives, representing the people of the whole of the .states, you have the embodi- ment of the second thought of the people, and in the case of the members of the senate, if you give tliem the power to dis- criminate between the various financial proposals of the government sent up from the lower chamber, you give that chamber the means of putting a check upon the impulsive proclivities of the representa- tives of the people as such, and of sug- gesting to the people them3elve.s a more excellent way of doing that in which all alike arc interested, and accomplishing the objects wliich all alike have in view. I cannot di.sguise from myself ttiis fact : that in creating a second chamber which has only limited authority and limited jurisdic- tion, even in the matter of financial pro- posals, you are laying the foundation for discord and for disagreement. We know very well that the animal which is chained u^D is always most disposed to show his teeth. The animal upon whom you place a great restriction, and forbid to him an amount of freedom which another may have — is always the one that displays a quarrel- some tendency. So I contend that the very fact of endeavouring to put a limit upon the powers of the second chamberis to engender in the minds of that second chamber a quarrelsome disposition which would not exist if it felt that it had equally free and unfettered authority with the members of the representative chamber. I do not propose to say many more words in advo- cacy of the view wliich I take with regard to this, which seems to me to be the crucial question which we have here to de- cide. I believe all the members of the Convention have come here with a sincere desire to solve the problem which is placed before us. I believe every member lias come here with a disposition to learn something, if possible, from every other member, and I am quite sure that no one has come here with preconceived ideas of so consolidated a character as cannot be contracted, or expanded, or modiGcd in any way whatever. As was well pointed out by the hon. member, Sir George Grey, we are to bear in mind that we are not here creating a federal consti- tution which is to serve the purposes of the present generation merely, but a federal constitution which shall last for all time ; and in endeavouring to erect such a political .structure as that, we ought to take care to make itsprovisions so elastic as to be capable of expandingto the necessitiesof all future occasions, and not to place rigid re- stiictionsaroundthatconstitution, the result of which will be that in the course of the agitations which must arise in future ycar.s Fourth day. 152 Federal Conslilulion : [9 March, 1891.] Resolutions. there will be such contontions and such dis- sensions as will ensure the demolition of the edifice which it is now our care to rear. We arc here, sir, for the purpose of building up, and I hope that we shall bear that fact in mind in all that we do. I should also like hon. gentlemen to endeavour to bear in mind that the feeling which pre- dominates in the minds of the people of the states is one of great timidity. The people of the states, whom we are here to represent, feel that they are venturing upon, to a certain extent, an unknown sea as far as their experience is concerned, and we ought to proceed in such a way as to reassure them at every step we go that in what we are doing, while we are taking care of the interests of the federal con- stitution, we are preserving, in all their integrity, as far as it is possible with the existence of a federal constitution, all those rights and privileges to the enjoy- ment of which they have been so long accustomed. Passing on to the question of a federal judiciary, I think I need say no more than this, that while it is a matter for congratulation that you have seen your way to make a proposition for a judiciarj', con.sisting of n federal supreme court, mIucIi shall constitute a high court of ajjpeal for Australia, under the direct authority of the SoA'ereign, whose decisions as such shall be final — we ought to makeprovision — and I haveno doubt we shall do so in Committee — as has been done under the United States Consti- tution, that this high court shall be pos- sessed, not only of the functions of an appellate court, butof original jurisdiction in those subjects which this Convention may see fit to prescribe. Before I take my seat, let me say with what great pleasure I find myself in the presence of represen- tatives of all of the colonies of Australia for the purpose of discussing the great question before us. I have been delighted with the cordial good feeling that has been exhiVjited by the delegates to this Conven- [J/r. liutledge. tion towards each other, both privately and sitting officially in this Convention. I have been delighted with the high tone and character of the speeches that have been addressed to us, and I feel that I should be dishonoring the members of this Conven- tion in my thoughts if I wei'e for a single moment to doubt that the result of their united labours here will be the laying- broad, and deep, and strong the founda- tions of a political edifice that shall be ample and adequate for the shelter and protection of the millions who are yet to inhabit the continent of Austi-alia, and that shall, in the course of a few years, I trust at the furthest, rear its noble pro- portions in all their symmetry and all their strength to the admiring gaze of the people of the whole civilised world. Mr. KINGSTON : I confess that in rising to address this assembly I am em- barrassed by an appreciation of the re- sponsibilities which must attach to every member taking part in its deliberations. I had thought of reserving such obser- vations as occurred to me until we were met in Committee for the purpose of dis- cussins; the details of the constitution it is our duty to frame ; but I have come to the conclusion that it is desirable that at the earliest stage each member of the Convention should state for the considera- tion of his fellow-delegates his views on such matters of general importance as have been already touched upon, or as are involved in the resolutions which you, sir, have submitted. Following the example which has been set by preceding speakers, I may say that I offer such suggestions as I shall proceed to make in all humility, endeavouring to emphasise the position which has been so well put by yourself and by the hon. delegate who immediately followed you, that our observations at this stage of the proceedings should par- take rather of the character of sugges- tions for the meeting of difficulties than Federal Constitution: [9 MARCir, 1801.] Resolutions. 153 of the sketching of any definite plan for the formation of a federal constitution, seeing that sixch plans can result only from the exchange of views among the delesrates when we shall have debated the subject much moi"e fully than at present. Coming to the resolutions, I may express my [hearty concurrence with the first of them, affirming that the powers and privileges and territorial riiihts of the several existing colonics .should remain intact. I am very glad indeed that an expression of opinion to this effect should have been embodied in our resolutions at so early a stage of these proceedings, because I think we shall do well to emphasise the fact that we are dealing with autonomous states, who have long enjoyed the blessing of self-govern- ment, and who should not be asked — and who, if asked, would not be likely to accede to the request — to sacrifice any of their existing powers other than those which it is absolutely necessary should be surrendered in the^national interest. I hope we shall set clearly before us the fact that a national government should be strictly limited to dealing with subjects in which the interests of the community as a nation are involved. I jjope that in our proceedings we shall feel that it is our duty, in approaching the seve- ral colonies, as we sliall require to approach thein at tlie conclusion of the deliberations of this Convention, to state in precise lan- guage that which we desire they should surrender for the benefit of tlie nation. I hope, also, that we shall make no request for a surrender which cannot Ijc justified on tlie score of the requirements of the national interest. I think that such a course as is recognised in the resolution to ■which I now refer will commend itself to all, and that any departure from the i)rin- ciple which is involved might Ije fraught with the most disastrous results. I am glad to observe that there appears to be practically a consensus of opinion among the delegates that the American system of preserving for the benefit of the states the powei'S which are not expi-essly conferred upon the federal government should be fol- lowed, rather than thesystem which obtains in Canada ; and I feel that not only will this course, in the natural order of things, com- mend itself to the various colonies when we i-equire to approach them, but that it will commend itself to every delegate pi-esent, and to every one who appreciates, as we must all appreciate, the benefits of the system of local self-government which these colonies have for so long enjoyed. I am glad also to notice that we make express provision for the recognition of the terri- torial rights of the provinces. It does ap- pear to me, however, that it will be ne- cessary in the federal constitution to make provision in some form or other for the possible altei'ation of the boundaries of the various states, which will be occasioned, doubtless, in some instances, by the crea- tion of fresh states. In this connection it is impossible to overlook the fact, which I think has been already referred to by one of the delegates — and which we all keenly appreciate at the present moment — that the important colony of Queensland is just now contemplating an early division of her great territory into two or more separate colonies. I think that under these circum- stanceswe .should 1)0 framing a constitution which overlooked inunediate requirements, if we did not make provision for the admission into the federal union of these colonies, which I understand are shortly to be called into existence. I trust, therefore, that we sliall find in the federal constitution some provision for meeting a case of that sort ; and it seems to me that if it took the shape of a section enabling provinces, with tlieconsent of theexisting local legishature.s, and by agreement with the federal parlia- ment, to be carved out of existing colonies, and to be admitted into the union upon such terms as may be agreed upon, we Fourth day. loi Federal ConstitiUion: [9 Maecii, 1891.] llesoliUions, slioukl be making a provision on the sub- ject wliich will shortly be of practical utility. I cannot help thinking, in con- nection with the possibility of the change;; to which I refer, that a provision of that sort, not laying down any hard and fast lines as to the terms on which the new provinces should be admitted into the union, would be preferable to one which did not permit of the federal government and the local legislatures arranging the matter as they thought best. It does ap- pear to me, in connection with the change to which I refer, that there may attach a considerable amount of importance to the result as affecting the representation of the colony which is likely to be most concerned — or of any other colony which may be the subject of a change^ — in the senate, in which I understand the generally accepted wish to be that all the colonies should be equally represented. I should like to say, sir, that although I confine my remarks to the question of the carving of future colo- niesoutofexistingprovinces, and to the ques- tion of their admission to theunion, Idotrust that our constitution may be of such a char- acter that while, in the terms of the reso- lution which was carried at the Melbourne conference only last year, we make pro- vision for the admission of what were then described as the remoter colonies of Aus- tralasia — words which I believe were in- tended to i-efer particularly to New Zea- land — we shall not lose sight of the possi- bility that at some time or other, perhaps shortly it may be considered desirable to extend the juj'isdiction of a united Australia to all British colonies in the Pacific. I feel more particularly im- pelled to refer to this matter on account of the course which was suggested by Lord Derby in connection with the at- tempted annexation of New Guinea. It does seem to me that if we had had in ex- istence at that time, as was pointed out by Lord Derby, a government representative [J/r. Kingston, of the whole of Australasia which could have spoken with a united voice on the subject of the imperial attitude towards the island in question, we should not at the present moment have occasion to de- plore the appropriation of a portion of that great territory by a foreign country. Under these circumstances, I think we should do well to make provision for the admission into the union which we are pro- posing to create, not only of what may be generally termed the remoter colonies of Australasia, but of all British colonies which may now exist, or which may here- after be founded in the Pacific, and which it may appear to a federal government should be subjected to Australian control. With reference to the 2nd resolution — • that trade and intercourse between the federated colonies, whether by means of land carriage or coastal navigation, shall be absolutely free— I consider it, following the course adopted by preceding speakers, in connection with the 3rd resolution, giv- ing to the federal government power to im- pose custon^s duties ; and presuming that the intention is that intercolonial free-trade should be established at the time of, but not before, the adoption of a federal tariif, I am prepared to give the proposition my heartiest support. Colonel Smith : Hear, hear ! Mr. KINGSTON: I desire to emphasise a point which, I regret, is not made so clear in the resolution to which I refer as are some other matters, and it is this : Ixx my humble opinion it would be a great mistake — and I can hardly believe that it is seriously contemplated — to enact intercolonial free-trade before the adop- tion of a federal tariff. I have my own opinion as to the lines upon v>rhich a i federal tariff will be framed. I cannot help thinking — looking at the course o£' legislation which has obtained in most of the Australian colonies, and at the , different fiscal systems they at present " Federal Constitutioii : [9 March, 1891.] liesoiiUions. 155 enjoy — that it is liigbly probable that the result of the deliberations of the federal parliament will be the adoption of a pro- tective tariff against the outside world. But what I venture to point out is this, that the resolutions, as thev stand, make no reference to the necessary provision that intercolonial free-trade is not to come into force until a federal tariff is adopted. Nor do they say anything whatever about the nature of the federal tariff. As regards its nature, it would probably be iiseless to define it here ; but I do think we ought to lay it down in the clearest possible language that there is no intention on the part of this Convention to do anything to bring about intercolonial free-trade before the federal parliament has disposed of the question of v.hat the nature of the federal tariff shall be. ' Colonel Smith : Hear, hear ! j Mr. KIXGSTON : What would be the iresult of intercolonial free-trade before the adoption of a federal tariff? I imagine rthat it is not intended to limit intercolo- 'I'll free-trade to the products and manu- lures of the different colonies, and so if fi e-trade between the colonies were estab- led, what would bo the position, I ask, of a Sydney importer, importing under a sys- tem of free-trade and competing in the mar- cctsof the various colonics with his imported ;joods, which, liy force of the provi.sions of the propo.sed constitution to which I have ventured to call attention, must be similarly admitted into the neighbouring states ? I am ready to believe that no doubt the intention is to act in the way I indicate ; but there are no matters which are likely to be more closely scrutinised than the propoHJils of this Convention with reference to commercial relationships. It has been suggested that in Committee these two re- solutions should be transposed, and I think [hat that is a suggestion well worthy of doption. I think it is also desirable to perfectly clear in the direction which I have indicated, that is, that intercolonial free-trade is only to be brought about at the time of the adoption of a federal tariff. Something has been said with re- ference to the attitude of the colony of Victoria in this matter. I confess that I was a little surprised to hear the utterances of one lion, member from that colony, who expres.ced himself with some hesitation as to the propriety of calling a system of intercolonial free-trade into existence immediately on the establishment of a federal constitution, or even immediately on the adoption of a federal tariff. I had shared the somewhat common idea that Victoria, by force of the protective system which she has so long enjoyed, had built up her manufactures to such a state of perfection that tlipy could defy compe- tition, and that if the barriers which pre- vent free commercial relationships between the colonies were done away with it would enable her to compete in the markets of all the other colonies with regai'd to local manufactures. However, I freely admit that we owe a duty to our manufacturers, to those whom, by the adoption of a certain fiscal system, we have encouraged to in- vest their capital in the establishment of manufactories which are only now, or latel\^, commencing to return them any profitable results. I can assure the hon. member that the arguments which have evidently operated on his mind a[)ply with tenfold force to our colony of South Aus- tralia, for there we have only had the benefit of a protective system during the last few years. it was originally adopted in a modilicd form in 1SS.5 ; and afterward.s, in 1887, wc practically copied the .systeni Avhich had Ijcen adopted with .so much succe.S3 in Victoria. I am happy to say, however, that although the minds of our manufacturers and colonists generally have been profoundly agitated liy this question, on its most careful investigation they havo Fourth day. 156 Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1391.] Jiesolutions, come to the conclusion that the question of intercolonial free-trade ought not to im- pede the coui'se of federation. Every step was taken to ventilate the subject. A committee of both houses was chai'ged with the duty of inquiring into, and re- i:>oi"ting upon, the probable result of inter- colonial free-trade in South Australia, and their repoi't, though of coui'se it is only something in the shape of a guide as regards the locality to which it refers, is as follows : — We recommend the adoption of intercolonial free-trade on the basis of a uniform tariff, and regard it as a corollary of the federation of the Australian colonies. We recognise the many difficulties which have to be overcome before federation can be accomplislied, and are of opinion, in the meantime, that practically the whole of the existing reasons for postponement will then have passed away. The benefits aris- ing from intercolonial free-trade will far out- weigh any disadvantages which may result. If that is the case, as I believe it is the case in South Australia, where we have only had for a short period the benefit of the protective system, how much more is it likely to be the case in Victoria where the circumstances are so different. At the same time I am inclined to think that it would be a good thing if our manufac- turers could know with some decrree of certainty when the encouragement, sup- port, and safeguai'd which they are deriving from intercolonial tariffs is likely to be with- drawn from them. I think it is a pity that that time should be allowed to be clouded by any degl-ee of uncertainty, and I should be happy, indeed, to support any resolution for the purpose of naming a tixed and de- finite time when intercolonial duties will 1)6 abolished, so that our manufacturers may know the circumstances with wliich they may have to deal, and may make their arrangements accordingly. I do not think it ought to be allowed to remain in such an uncertain state as the date of the accomplishment of our wishes with re- gard to the establisliment of Australasian [J/r. Kingston. federation. I am anxious and sanguine that that date shall be an early date ; but, at the same time, for the reasons to which I have already referred, it should be put within the four corners of a law, so that there may be no doubt or uncertainty on the subject, wliich is always prejudicial in commercial matters. As I have quoted the report of our commission for the pui'- pose of supplying information to hon. members as to the precise state of affairs in South Australia as far as we have been able to gather them, I should like to say that there is, on the general question of intercolonial free-trade, a paragraph in that report which appears to me to so fairly set out the advantages which we may expect to derive from the adoption of a system of that character, that I may be permitted to quote it, adopting it as my own ; Your commissioners are firmly convinced that the welfare of Australia will be promoted by the abandonment of all resti'ictions upon intercolo- nial trade by adopting such a policy the one object of which will be throughout Australia to render industry productive by leaving it to fol- low natural channels of employment, and by affording every possible facility to commerce to freely realise rajjid progress, wealth, and pros- perity by developing in each colony the industry for which nature has best fitted it, Avithout wasteful rivalry. These arguments appear to me to be well founded, and I shall therefore, subject to the qualifications which I have already indicated, be found supporting the resolu- tions touching upon that subject. The 4th resolution raises the question of defence, and I am disposed to think that a more prominent position might well have been given to this question than it occupies. I am not going to discuss the details of pos- sible provisions on the subject which may be considered necessary to be embodied in the constitution. An hon. member has already addressed himself to that question; but it seems to me that every citizen, or eveiy pei'son worthy of the name of citi- zen, recognises it as his duty in time of Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 157 war to take up arms in defence of his It is idle for one state, unless it erects a country. It is almost a corollary of that hostile barrier on its intercolonial bound- proposition, that it is the duty of every true aries, to attempt to pass useful legislation citizen in time of peace to qualify himself prohibiting or restricting an influx of to render eflicient service in time of need that character, if there is no community without unnecessary expense to the com- of action on the part of the rest of the munity of which he is a member. I trust colonies ; and when the doors of Australia that our federal legislation will recognise are thrown open by the omission of one the soundness of the principles which I state to do its duty, the undesirable class venture to lay down, and that effect will which any colony wishes to guard against be given to them at the earliest possible may come in, not at the front door, but at moment. I am hopeful, indeed, that when the back — not at her own seaports, but we have legislation of that character its re- through the territory of her neighbours. It suits will be apparent in the manhood of would be well, for this reason, to specify united Australia, and that it will addalike as one of the chief objects of the to the dignity and safety of the nation and adoption of a federal constitution the uni- be productive of the happiest results. The formity of legislation in the direction to preliminary resolutions, 1, 2, 3, and 4, seem which I have referred. No doubt we shall to me to deal with the chief objects of fede- have an opportunity in Committee to ration: defence and intercolonial free- amend the resolutions in this direction, and trade, accompanied by a federal tariff. if that is not thought desirable we may I think that, although it might possibly make the required provision in the bill, raise subjects which it is unnecessary to Having thus stated the general object of discuss at the present time, we might have the federation, we find in the three succeed- added to these a resolution which would ing paragraphs the means by which they recognise that in the natural order of nre proposed to be accomplished. I would things the federal parliament would be say here, that although I believe a con- properly charged Avith the duty of estab- trary opinion is entertained by some, it lishing uniform laws on matters of common appears to me we arc adopting a proper interest. We all know the difficulties course when first we fix the objects which which at present surround the adoption we desire to accomplish, and then sub- of legislation to give effect to provisions sequently proceed to lay down and de- which are desired equally by the people of fine the moans by which wo hope to effect the different colonies, and in which they tliem. Xo exception can be taken to the liave practically a common interest. There proposition that the parliament should con- are one or two questions which might sist of two liouses. An attempt has been almost be associated with the question of made to deal with some matters of federal defence. I regard as second only to the interest by means of a single chamber ; necessity of protecting our shores against but we know that the result has not actual invasion, the necessity of protecting been encouraging. A parliiimcnt consist- Australia against the influx of aliens, ing of two houses may be considered an Asiatics, criminals, paupers, and other essential of a federal constitution. AI- undesirable classes. In the legislation though an hon. member has questioned which we have been already compelled to wliether there is anything vciy much in adopt on these subjects, we know that there the name which we attach to either house, has been a striving after uniformity ; but I think that a very wise suggestion was that uniforinity has seldom been obtained. made that tlie second chamber should be Fourlli ilai/. 15S Federal Constitulion : [9 March, 1891.] Resolutions. dignified hy tho name of tlie council of the states, which at once gives an idea, to all who may be interested in considering its constitution, of the nature of the func- tions which it has to perform, and enables us at the earliest moment to dissociate it from the ideas which we ordinarily enter- tain with reference to second chambers, and which it appears to me, for reasons which have been already dwelt upon, can- not propei'ly apply to the proposed council of the states. This proposed term, I believe, is borrowed from the Swiss Constitution, and I think we might go further, and take advantage of the suggestion which we find in that constitution, as regards the name which should be attached to the more popu- lar branch of the legislature. It is proposed here to call it the house of representatives, I do not think we have in Australia — though, no doubt, vre have in Australasia — a body which is dignified by a term of the description used. I think it is the invariable practice in Australia to refer to our popular chambers as assem- blies, and it seems to me that if we v,^ere to keep to this custom, and apply the term "national " to the popular chamber, and call it the " national assembly," we would be adopting a course which has a irood deal to recommend it, and would facilitate the appreciation of the functions which itisintendedto repose in that branch of the parliament. I do not know whether it is intended in the federal constitution to provide for a uniform system as regards the election of the senate. For my own l^art, I venture to consider that any such at- tempt would be a mistake, and that we shall be doing best if we allow the people of the various states to provide such means as are acceptable to them ; and it appears to ane also that it would be absolutely im- possible, if we attempt to lay down a uni- form system, to deprive the people of the states of the I'ight of appointment by their -direct vote. I think it would be a very \_Mt. Kingston. great invasion of the popular rights pos- sessed by the inhabitants of any particular colony if the federal constitution were to provide that they should not exercise their right of election in such a way as would make the persons elected their di- rect nominees by the popular vote. And I would like to say in this connection that we ha.ve had some experience of the difiiciilties attendant on any attempt to secui'e uniformity in the appointment of federal senators. No doubt if uniformity were attempted, and it were not gener- ally provided in the federal constitution that senators should be elected directly by the peoj»le, some such course would be considei-ed desirable as obtains in other countries where they are elected by mem- bers of both branches of the legislature. But as has been pointed out by the hon. member, Mr. Rutledge, varying circum- stances affect the constitution of the second chamber in different colonies, and whilst in some colonies it might be considered a desirable thing to confide to the two houses the power in question, particularly - where the second house is elective, a simi- lar remark might not ajDply to other pro- vinces, where the second chamber, as has | been mentioned, is differently constituted. This question was discussed not so very long ago, in 1889, in the Federal Council, where there were present representatives of all the colonies of Australia except this great colony, and the result then unani- mously arrived at after most careful con- sideration was as follows : — The committee carefully deliberated on the ■ qiiestion of a uniform system for the selection i of representatives from the different colonies, but are unable to recommend any system. Con- j siderable advantage would probably result from . uniformity ; biit the differences in the constitu- tion of the parliaments of tlie various colonies > render objectionable the uniform sj'stem of elec- tion by members of Parliament ; and in the opinion of the committee it is not yet practicable to require the election of representatives by con- . stituencies of tlieijeople. Moreover, as the chief ' Federal Constilniion : [9 March, 1S91.] liesoh'tions. 159 object of any system must be to secure the re- presentation in the council of each colony in the manner most satisfactory to the people, it ap- pears to the committee that that object will be attained by continuing the present unrestrained right of the people in each colony to decide the ■matter for themselves through the local legisla- tures. I trust, tlierefore, that there will be no attempt to interfere v^-ith the independence of the people of the A-arious communities in settling this matter as they think best. So long as they are satisfied, so long as they are free to adopt whatever mode they please to secure their efiectual representation, it appears to me that it is a matter for them- selves, with which the other colonies have no right to interfere, and with which inter- ference would only be a source of difficulty and trouble with no corresponding beneficial Te.sults. The question of the constitution of the senate brings me face to face with one of the most important questions which have been raised during the course of the debate — the question of the powers which the senate ought to enjoy ; and I feel — I . imagine, in common with other delegates — very much indebted to the lion, mem- Ler, Sir Samuel Griffith, for the mode in which he called attention to the matter, and emphasised the great distinction which exists between the senate and the upper chambers with which we are accustomed to deal, tliougli Sir Samuel Griffith did not, po3.sibly, commit liimsclf to any very dis- tinct proposition as to the exact course that sjjould be pursued. Colonel Smith : lie gave us several in- dications — feelers ! Mr. KINGSTON : It appears to me that we will do well to copy the example whicli tlie hon. member lias set, and it will bo a pity, indeed, if at this early stage of our deliVjorations we commit ourselves to any definite course for meeting the diffi- culties which he has pointed out in such a way tliat it might make it difficult for us 2to subsequently withdraw and revise our opinions. Therefore, sir, I propose to dis- cuss the question in a similar strain, hardly contemplating the possibility of my being so fortunate as to hit upon the solution ; but rather venturing the expression of mv ideas in order that they may be criticised and their worth ascertained. Followinic up the arguments advanced by the pre- ceding speakers, I think there is no great reason for anticipating a collision of any serious nature between the two houses, because they are responsible to the same people. The sole distinction is that wliile the electoi's are the same, the electorates are different. "We have had, I might almost say, a miserable experience of con- flict between diffi?rent branches of colonial legislatures. But from what cause did that proceed 1 It arose from the fact that the electors were not the same, nor were the interests the same. Here the elec- tors are the same, and I venture to think also that here the interests arc the same. An Hox. Member : Not necessarily ! Mr. KINGSTON : I am inclined to think that, in matters of national import- ance — and national questions are the only ones with which the federal pai'liament wnll have power to deal — it will seldom occur that there wuU be such a clashing between state interests and national interests that a collision will be likely to be involved be- tween the representatives of the state in the senate and the representatives of the people in the national assemljly. The hon. member, Mr. Deakin, challenged the Con- vention to define what are state rights in national questions. Mr. Deakix : And I have not yet been answered ! i\li-. KINGSTON : I think the hon. gen- tleman has been fairly enough answered by one or two delegates who lia\(> spoken, and who liuvf f|uotcd instances. There may be occa.sions when tlie two tilings will be opposed, the one to the other. I do not think that such occasions will be Fourth day. IGO Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1891.] Resolutions. frequent, and I look forward to the time when it may be found advisable to alter the constitution of the federation in such a way as to obviate the necessity of special provision for the protection of state rights. But, at present, that time has not come. State rights must be protected, and I look upon it as an absolute essen- tial for the approval of such a constitu- tion as we may see fit to adopt here, by the parliaments and peoples of the dif- ferent colonies, that we may be able to point to full and effectual provisions and safeguards in the shape of protection for those rights and interests which are genei*- ally classed and included under the defini- tion of state rights. No doubt there is a ereat deal of fedex'al sentiment in the air, and we arc attempting to give it some practical effect ; but, at the same time, we must recognise this fact, that there is a feeling, and a natural feeling, though, pei'haps, it may not be capable of the most logical justification, on the part of the parliaments and peoples of the different states, that they will require safeguards to be provided for the preservation of state in- terests before they will have anything to do with the adoption of a constitution pi'oviding for a federal government. I know, sir, what the difficulty was only a short time since in connection with our own colony when it was sought to alter the representation enjoyed hy the various colonies in the Pederal Council. The alteration proposed to recognise only in the most infinitesimal degree the claims of extra population to extra representation. But what was the result 1 Why, it was affirmed in our Parliament, tliough by only one branch — and I think a sentiment exists in South Australia to a very considerable extent at the present time, which approves of the resolution then arrived at — that if extra representation was to be conceded to any colony in one chamber on account of extra population it was an essential to the ap- \Mr. Kingston, proval of the constitution that there should be a second chamber, in which all the states would be equally represented. I think the sentiment to which I have re- ferred exists throughout the majority of the states, and it is a natural one, and one which must be dealt with and met by con- cessions on the part of the larger states. Mr, MuNRO : And no concessions on the part of the smaller states 1 Mr. KINGSTON : Fair concessions should be made on both sides. It is only a question for us to ascertain what is fair under the circumstances. But the position we find is : the smaller states enjoying all the benefits of local independence ; other states, larger, enjoying similar privileges. We are of one mind that an effort should be made to induce all to enter a federa- tion ; and I appreciate the position which is emphasised by the interjection of the hon. member, Mr. Munro, that just as you make concessions which are pleasing to tlie people of the smaller states, and may meet their particular views, so you afford grounds for disapproval by the representa- tives and people of the larger colonies. It cannot be otherwise ; it must be so. All we have got to do is to find out, if we possibly can, what is fair under the cir- cumstances. Surely the hon. member, Mr. Munro, will recognise that the majority which you will be able to command in the popular branch of the assembly ought to be sufficient for all practical purposes ? Mr. MuxRO : Not if it is checkmated in the other chamber ! Islv. KINGSTON : Does the hon. dele- gate desire that the same sway should be exercised by the larger states in the senate as is enjoyed in the assembly 1 Mr. ]\IuNRO : No, I only want fair play f Mr. KINGSTON : There must be ti check, and a substantial check, and if the ' smaller states are only going to be offered ' something which is nominally a check, and which will not stand the test of time \ Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 161 and use, it appeal's to me difficult to sup- pose that there will be any disposition on their part to enter into an alliance, by which they practically subordinate their powers and interests in every federal ques- tion to the decision of the majority in the national assembly. It is suggested that the smaller states Colonel Smith : Will govern the lot ! Mr. KINGSTON : Will govern the lot ; but, when the claims of extra population are recognised in a national assembly, is not that a sufficient safeguard ? Mr. MuxRO : No ! I Mr. KINGSTON : Wull, it appears to me that we are either going to have a I senate worthy of the name or that we are I not. If we are to have a senate exercising !no practical control over the coui'se of [legislation, we had better have only one I chamber. If we are going to have two houses, let us have them possessing mutual control, the one over the other ; and, as regards the possibility of collision between the two, I have already dwelt on the simi- arity of constitution which would prevent the probability of such a clashing. I am willing to meet the views of hon. delegates ill any way which may be suggested for the purjiose of bringing the two houses collec- tively, or the one house — the senate — into touch with the popular sentiment. The peri- odical elections, it appears to me, will have such an ellect : but I have heard a further suggestion, that it might be j)rovided in the federal constitution that in the case of a jienal dissolution of the assembly a cer- tain proportion of the senators might bo s«;nt to the country. Mr. Playfoud : Send them all ! Mr. KINGSTON : Or .send th3 I understood the hon. member, Sir Georgf; Grey, to put was that he favoured the ajf- pointment of the governor-general of tlie future dominionofAustraliabeingacolonial appointment. But as long as this country is united to the Crown of England — and I hope that it is a very long day off indeed when it shall cease to be so — I maintain that the irovernor-general of the future dominion of Australia must be the ap- pointee of her Majesty the Queen, our sovereign, who is the apex of that struc- ture, and whose name we revere and re- spect in this colony equally as in any other Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1891.] Eesolutions. 165 part of her Majesty's dominions. "When I consider the men with whom I have the jnido and honor to be associated in this Convention — when I look around and see those men who have for so many years been in the foremost ranks of politics, men of high statesmanlike qualities, men who have fine abilities and trained experience ; men, many of whom it may be said, as in your case, sir, it may truly be said, are not only statesmen, but scholars — I say that it fills me with hope, as it does every other well-wisher of this movement, that in that combination of strength there will be found abilitv enough to devise a scheme which will confirm the happiness and pros- perity of this country. Xo doubt the diffi- culties that have to be overcome are numerous and startling ; but Australians, in their private life, are accustomed to en- counter dansfers and to o\ercome them ; and I say it would augur badly for the character of the foremost public men of tliis country if they should be daunted by those difficulties, and if they should not ?ucceed in devising the scheme that we all [Ifsire. Should it be otherwise, should ailui-e unfortunately attend this Conven- ioii, can we doubt that the result of this Jebate and of the further proceedings will iwaken such enthusiasm for this great ob- fct, that its progress must bo onward, that lif^ plough to which wo have set our hands »vill not be abandoned in mid-furrow, and hat, whether this year or next, the time at tU events is not far distant when this great )bjoot will be brought to a happy and mccossful conclusion ? Another subjoct >f congratulation is that should avo agree ipoii a scheme, there is, from the char- ictor of those men to whom I have alludcfl, fair and reasonable expectation that they vill by their influence, by thoir ability, ml thoir patriotism, be able to convince Jioir f<;llo\v-coloniststhroughout the length nd breadth of this land — and not only heir ft'Uow-colonists, but the parliaments of the colonies as well — to consent to the scheme, and to surrender those powers which it is proposed to take from them in this scheme of federation. I consider that this discussion is not in its academic stage, that we are now doing work which will save time in Committee, and that we are advancing solidly and securely the great object we have in view. I therefore think it would be important to refer, even before we allude to the terms of some of these reso- lutions, to some of the principles which have brought us together. If in this discussion we are not creating, we are certainly educat- ing public opinion in favour of this move- ment, and it is necessary to set before the public mind reasons adequate for the sur- render which weask at their hands. A great deal has been said about — and I think you yourself mentioned, in terms that I wish I could equal, as regards force and eloquence • — the great advantages which union would give to the well-being, to the power, and to the happiness and comfort of the people of this country. Every word of that is true; but I go further, and ask to put before the public mind that view which I think is an essential of this movement, quite as great as the other, and that is, the regard for tlie common safety. I do not mean alone external security ; I do not wish to lay too much stress upon that; but I ask that the colonies shall be preserved by union from each other. I hold it to be irrefutable that, as the wealth of these colonies grows, difficulties will increase. I am persuaded that there are causes of difference which, if mot early, can bo easily sot aside, but which, if allowed to grow, will increase until thoy become subjects of national magnitude. I say also, remembering that the antagonism of relations is always of the most lasting kind, that it is of the utmost importance that we sliould Ijy this federal govornniont, by the abolition of the causes which might lead to tliis divergence of feeling, have tliat union Fourth day. IGG Federal ConstiliUlon : [9 March, ISDL] Resolutions. Avhich would be a common parent to us all. Tliis national structure wliich it is proposed to erect I hope will have one ad- vantage wliicli similar structures of feder- ated states possess, and that is the advan- tage of well balanced powers. Without it we could have nothing but ruin and con- fusion ; and it is because those powei's have to be set out that these resolutions have been submitted by you, and in a speech the conciliatory tone of which I am sure hon. members who preceded me have attempted to imitate, and which it will be my duty to attempt to imitate also. Now, sir, we have heard a great deal of the word " rights " — territorial rights. There can be very little difficulty inexplainingthem; but it is necessary to say that a large and deep- seated doubt existed in the public mind of several of the colonies as to whether cupidity rather than patriotism was not the moving principle of this federation scheme. That doubt should be removed ; those traducers of our motives should be silenced, so that there may be no possible misapprehension as to why these words were introduced. If it were necessary, in order to complete the discomfiture of those who made this a ground of attack against the Convention, I would desire to see further words added to place it be- yond all doubt that there should be no diminution or absorption of any portion of the territory of any of the contracting states or colonies, not even for the purpose of making new colonies, much less for the purpose of aggrandising one at the expense of the other, without the consent absolutely freely expressed of the colony interested. "VVitli regard to the surrenders that may be agreed to, I am greatly pleased to find that there has been no hon. member yet who did not express his full concurrence in the lan^uajce of these resolutions. Every one of us knows that in order to form a national government there must be an absorption of some of the functions of [J/r. Fitzgerald. those states or colonies which form that government ; and it has been announced, and it is a settled conviction in all our minds, that not one iota is to be taken from any one of the contracting states be- yond that which is absolutely necessary for the formation of a national govern- ment. It is equally necessary for that go- vernment to be clothed with sufncient power to attain the national objects for which it comes into existence ; and if it is so invested it follows as a necessary sequence that it must be endowed with a re- venue sufficient for its objects. We come now to the question, how that revenue is to be obtained. It is said in the resolutions that it is to be obtained from the customs of the vaiious colonies ; but before allud- ' ing to that I vvill just deal with No. 2 of the resolutions — and here, sir, if I travel over ground that has been already most fully and ably dealt with, I apprehend that I may reasonably ask the indulgence of the Convention, because it appears to me that it is of tlie utmost consequence that there should be no possible mistake outside-, as to what the language of these resolutions is, and what the members of this Conven- tion mean. Previous speakers have ex- plained to us fully and ably the difficulties' Ihat will beset us on the road on which we are travelling. But we have a distinct and clear object in view. We see the goal at which we aim, and it is the settled, de- termined conviction, I honestly believe, of every member of this Convention, that so far as earnestness, perseverance, patience and devotion to the duties which he is' commissioned here to discharge are con- cerned, none will be wanting to reach that goal fairly and securely. It is true that v/e are only a consultative body. It is true that the absolute acceptance or rejec- tion of any scheme that we may form rests with those outside — with those whose commission we hold, namely, the people of the various colonies ; but nevertheless Federal Constitution : [9 Makch, 1891.] Resolutions. 1G7 it is our duty, as far as our abilities enable terchange of commodities — what does that us, to present to them a scheme which we mean among the family relations, as I call can honestly recommend, and which it -^^ill the people of this country, but offering be our duty afterwards to defend, and if facilities for domestic exchange ? Is it not possible see carried into law. The 2nd one of the blots on the fair famo of this resolution says : country that with these artificial lines and That the trade and intercourse between the barriers we cannot pass from one country federated colonies . . shall be absohitely free. to the other without being asked, "What I heard hon. members express the hope do those portmanteaus of your contain ? " that the language of this resolution would Why, everybody feels that if it was only 'o""o" be made clearer, and that it would be ex- when we were in a state of pupilage that plained to the outside world that no change such monstrosities could continue to exist, should be made in the present fiscal sys- and now that we have attained manhood tems of this country until the federation this is our first effort in acknowledgment of of the colonies is complete, and until a that fact. The people of Australia have new system of taxation has become law. stretched their limbs. They feel them- What necessity is there to declare that? selves animated by that high spirit which Can it be believed that men coming here characterised their ancestors. They feel trained in commerce, law, and finance, within them that they are doing a duty could be a i^arty to a scheme, could be at inspired by the same motives as those of all identified with any movement, the basis their race before them. They know that of which would be an injustice to that sec- menof their race have fashionedand formed tion of the people to advance whose inter- a large portion of the globe in a manner that ests our highest efforts should be directed ; redounds to their honor and credit, and to and is it necessary that we should give any the freedom of the world. They know that guarantee either to those who, advocating you cannot advance this country without protection, have expended their money for adding to the wealth, and the national im- the advancement of some object under the portance, andthepowerof that grand empire shadow of that law, or to those who, under to which we belong, and they know that the free- trade, have built warehouses, and have expansion of the empire means the happi- enlargcd and done everything to expand ness and the freedom of everybody who commerce — to open the doors to the wide lives under the protection of its flag. And •Aorld — -is it necessaiy for us to tell them here let me say that I listened with the that if a new system of taxation is agreed deepest attention to the account given by on which will savour of injustice, which will the lion, member. Sir George Grey, of liis bear any stamp of neglect, to them will be conversations with Lord Salisbury, and the extended the same protection as to those on interest that was taken by that great states- the other side? Let us give any guarantees man in these colonies. That was not only that will be required, wli(;ther for a year or interesting ; in my opinion, it is pregnant twoor five years. What is thatin the history with the greatest possible importance. To of this great countiy ] But if it were longer, men like Lord Salisbury, and others of the because it v/ould be just to make it longer, foremost statesmen of England nvIio havo I say let everything go, but let justice come to these colonies, and have had the op- stand, and let not our first efforts in this jiortunity of exchanging opinions with men direction give to anybody the right to say like the hon. member. Sir George Grey, and that our federal scheme was stamped with others of his breadth of view and long ex- any semblance of injustice. The free in- perience and higli ability, I attribute the Fourth day. IG.^ Federal Constitution : [0 March, 1891.] llesolutions. luippv change that has come ovei' public feeling among the foremost politicians of England. The time is not far distant — it is indeed within the recollection of all of us — when there was a large and influ- ential party in England who were pre- pared to lay down the diadem of empire. Tliere was a lai'ge party in England who considered that these colonies were an encumbrance rp.ther than a benefit to the empire. Happily those timesare passed, and happily, owing to the interference of those Alien who understood the resources, who were ■ eonvinced of the deep-seated loyalty and affection for the old country which exists in this new land, the policy has changed. That effete, effeminate policy is now chan<:>ed into a love for the most distant part of the empire so long as that empire is true to the traditions of the old land and loyal to its sovereign. Now, I come to the next part of the c|uestion — to the customs and the policy which may come from their transfer. You told us, sir, in terms as elo- (juent as they were generous and patriotic, that, if under this new federation the public voice of this country and the will of the people should be expressed in favour of a protective policy, you, though not con- vinced and ahvays struggling against it, would nevertheless bow to that decision. That exactly expresses the opinion of a number of men in the neighbouring colony of Victoria who, twenty years ago, fought this battle — fought it valiantly — who, wdien after the usual checks and dclaj-s which were necessary to ascertain the true feel- ing of the country, it was unequivocally ascertained, as it will be your experience in this colony, and all over the colonial empire, that modern democracy leans in the direction of protection, and was re- .solved upon having it as the laAV of the land, bowed and accepted it. I am not convinced. Educated in the school of be- lief that freedom of trade was the founda- tion of a people's comfort and happiness, [J/r. Fitzgerald. I nevertheless feel, like others, some diffi- culty in answering as to whether the predictions that I uttered twenty years ago, in my place in Parliament and out- side, have been verified — ■ whether that national impoverishment which we all pre- dicted has followed the protective policy. I have no hesitation in saying that it has not. I have no hesitation in saying that, whether the resources of that colony have been too great to be ruined, or whether the colony through the new policy has made its present position, it has during those twenty years made enormous strides. And I hold that its example, whether it be one of good or of evil omen, is bound to inoculate the neighbouring people, and we may as well regard it as a fact, as true as if we saw it written in lead, that that will be the policy of federated Australia. That is not our duty now. AVe have nothing now to do with it ; but this we have to do with, and to regard : that if that policy of protection cause the transfer to other colo- nies of those manufactures which have arisen in the older colonies which have, adopted protection, we must recognise the fact that the customs revenue will be largely affected, and that in all probability the new national federal government will re- cpiire to look to other forms of taxation for those works which will be necessary for the due discharge of its duties. I in- tend to give only a passing glance at the subject of defence, Init, in doing so, I must • acknowledge that as regards defence I recognise that it will be indeed a long' time before we have the happiness to wel-' come that great, that lovely colony of New Zealand as a portion of federated Australia. I feel that this scheme of federal defence, as regards military mat- ters, will never be found by New Zealand to be of any value to that country, and, as regards naval defence, the day is far distant when these colonies will be able to afford to expend such large sums in naval defence as Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1891.] IiesohUions. 1G9 to warrant tliein in sending tlieir ships across that stretch of ocean which divides us —unhappily divides us — from that great colony. Our system of naval defence for a Ions time to come will not consist of any ships larger than are necessary to pro- tect our ports against cruisers ; and those coal ports to which the hon. member, Captain Russell, alluded must, as they naturally are a portion of the strength of the empire, remain to be defended by the strong arm of England. With re- card to the defence of Australia, in what could federation do more practical 2O0d than in defence? In what matter can there be a greater necessity for one headship than in defence 1 The points which must be defended, which strengthen us in these colonies, are far distant, and how can we efficiently or economically de- fend them, except by having a united force — a force which will be under one head, and wliichwill be ready at any point, should our country ever be invaded. Reference was made to a standing army. A standing army ! AVhat a reflection upon the military spirit of young Australia. A standing army we may have merely as an example of what steadiness, discipline, and obedi- ence can do ; but our defence must be the stout arms of our .sons — our own sons as a militia, chargfd with the duty of do- f.iiding tliat land which they ouglit to love, and inspired by the devotion of those men wlio may be paid servants of the Crown, but who never, either in this coun- try or in the old country, turned their back, on an eneiiiy, or did anything but what will redound to the glory of English arms. The next point, wliich 1 may call t!ic first of the machinery clauses, lias been so ably and so fully discussed that T really liave to apologise to lion, members fur doing more than glance at it. But before I do that I must discharge what I feel is my boundcn duty- — a duty that is incumbent on me from a feeling of honor, for I confess that, being the oldest member in the Legislative Council in Vic- toria, I feel that an attack upon the cor- porate honor of that House is to me worse than an attack on my private honor. My hon. and learned friend, Mr. Deakin, with that dialectic skill of which he is the master, made a veiled attack upon that House. Hex. Members : No ! Mr. FITZGERALD : I say it was an attack on that house. Mr. Deakin : Which house ? Mr. FITZGERALD : The Legislative Council of Victoria. He clothes his at- tack on that house with a thin veil, which I tear away, because I want to hold up the perfect truth. The hon. gentleman said : We have heard of an upper chamber, which lias been compelled to pass measures demanded by the people, revenge itself on the government in ])ower, and on the house that compelled the upper chamljer to pass these measures, by emas- culating or rejecting other measures, in order to prove that the government could not carrj' on the ])usiness. That is a very .serious imputation. The hon. member said that the particular of- fender lived in remote times and in distant countries. The times are not too remote for me to acknowledge that I was an actor in every scene in which that house was in conflict with the Legislative Assembly. The country is not too remote for me to know that that hon. gentleman is far too young to do more tlian speak of it as a matter of history ; but it is the fashion witli some who read history oblicjuely — some who are brought up in an atmosphere of what I call democratic dih'ttanteism — that unless tlie view presented to tliem is of their own formation — unless it is such as their eyes arc accustomed to look upon — notliing is straight, nothing is lionorablc, nothing is pure. Now, the history of that struggle is one of tiie dark spots on the history of that colony; but I truly say that the Legis- lative Council — — An Hon'. Memuek : Oh, oh ! Fourth day. 170 Federal Constitution: [9 March, 1 89 1.] Resolutions. Ml-. FITZGERALD: " The galled jade may wince, our withers are uuwrung." We had to face a struggle then which Avas truly cue of cyclonic force. We liad one sucli as may heaven avert from this new federal government whenever it comes into existence. We had one which sets out an example for every lion, member of this Convention to keep constantly before his mind. We had a case where, if ever, the constitution was rigid and its terms were such as to prevent its being misunder- stood ; still we had the lav/ invoked in the name of passion and set aside. In that case we had power given for one purpose misused in order to apply it to another. Who succeeded in the struggle ? God for- bid that I should claim that a victory be- tween two constituent houses of parliament, both working for the common good of their country, should ever be a thing of which to boast. I call it not a victory ; but I say that the issue of that struggle, at all events, has warned any succeeding government against renewing the attack. I pass away from it with pleasure ; but I hope that hon. members will excuse me if I have im- parted into this explanation any word of warmth. Mr. Deakin : The hon. member is not warm ! IMr. FITZGERALD : One is not only warmed, but boiling, to find that the truth can be set aside — of course not wilfully — ■ far be it for me to impute that — but that truth can be set aside, history can be turned upside down, in order to make a point, to illustrate, and to demand powers for this new representative house under this new federal government which would place the whole power of this country in one branch of the legislature. I have very few words more to say. I feel that I am more than indebted to hon. members for the patience which they have extended to me ; and it would be in the hisrhest decrree ungrateful o o o on my part if I were to reward that kindness [Mr. Fitzgerald. by improperly or unnecessarily delaying my remarks. The next sub-section reads : A parliament, to consist of a senate and a houKc of representatives, the former consisting of au equal number of members from each province, to be elected by a system which shall provide for the retirement of one-third of the members every years, so securing to the body itself a perpetual existence combined with defi- nite responsibility to the electors, the latter to be elected by districts formed on a population basis, and to possess the sole power of originat- ing and amending all bills appropriating revenue or imposing taxation. I ask where is the point of the remarks we have heard about the necessity of the members of the senate representing the states in equal proportions being elected by the people, being responsible to the people, being liable to be sent back to the people if ever they dared to exercise the privilege of disagreement with the 'more popular house % Some of these observations could well have been delayed until the hon. gentlemen who indulged in them go back to their own colony, where they can use theni' with the weight and influence which, I have no doubt, they will command, after their colony has settled and determined in what form its representatives shall be elected. It is wasting time, I say, with all respect, for us to be reasoning when each colony will be master of the form in which that election shall take place. I have my own conviction as to what should be done, but I shall not trouble hon. gentlemen by stat- ing it. I only do what I am sure every member of the Convention does, and that is to offer a most fervent prayer that what- ever form of election may be decided upon the men appointed will be worthy of the high position to which they will be raised. Let them appoint them how they will, I, sir, from a long experience of a particular house, know that Avhen they enter the chamber they will come under its tradi- tional influence : they will recognise the re- sponsibility of theirposition, andthegreater the responsibility and the higher the stan- i I Federal Constitution : [9 Makcii, 1891.] Eesolutions. 171 dard which you expectthesemento reach the more certain will you betogetthebestmen. TV'hile we have admired the eloquence and force and fluency of those men who in- dulge in speeches about facing the people, cannot any one of us lay his hand on his heart and say, " We acknowledge the majesty or the people quite as much as those eloquent defenders, and it is be- cause we desire to protect the people against their own burst of passion, against their own frailties, against their own im- pulses, that we want to put a bit in the mouths of their representatives." It is in the interests of the people for the people, and we hold, as I have often said, that the best friends of the people are not their flatterers. We then want a senate which will not be a vulgar obstacle to the people's will, but a house clothed with all the checks necessary to ascer- tain the people's will. But never let it be thought that our superstructure will ever be lasting if any clause in our charter allows the people's will in its burst and flush of impetuosity at once to reach the statute-book. That is not what the sober-thinking, solid, and — I will use the word — conservative senate is for. The conservative senate is to be there to put a check upon the people's will — not to oppose it obstinately, not to oppose any law ujjon which the people are determined from liiiding its way to the statute-book, but, as I said before, to moderate that force which comes at times over communities, and which v/ould sweep us all away if there were not men of courage and of re- solution, to stand behind the impregnable position in which the law places tliem, and wait for the mollifying influences of time to test their judgment — in sober reason, away from the seductive voices of agitators, and of those who think that the people arc served by opposing everybody who stand between them and their own tvill, to wait and see if time docs not, with its mollifying influence, bring the people to consider and to recognise that their supposed quondam enemies were their best and their truest friends. Kow, how can it be said, how can it be argued, that if this emasculated charter were given to the senate of federated Australia, that senate would be able to occupy the posi- tion that I have endeavoured briefly to shadow forth as that which it ought to occupy 1 What is the use of ofiering to that senate co-ordinate power in legisla- tion, and denying it to them as regards money? Why, look at the list of measures which is put forward as the alpha and omega of the powers that the federal par- liament is to be intrusted with. Sir Jonx Bray : There is no list ! Mr. FITZGERALD : The list was read by my hon. friend, the Premier of Tic- toria. It is printed in Hansard, and I should most willingly read it if I thought that hon. members desired it to be read. The list was considered — and I have not heard any one disagree with it — to sketch out what would be deemed a just, reason- able, and proper list of measures for the various parliaments to be denuded of, and for the national parliament to be clothed with. The list, if hon. members will take the trouble to look at it, contains no mea- sure of any consequence of wliich money is not the keystone. There is not one single measure in that category which could not, by the deft turn of a drafts- man's pen, bo converted into a money bill. Let us understand, then, v/hcre we are going to. Let us know the full conse- queiiccs of what we are doing. We aro absolutely, then, denying in toto to the senate, or whatever it may bo called, any power in legislation whatever except the power of veto. I do not want to hold, before hon. members any threat as to what will happen then. Tlie senate of this federal parliament should, if they exercise that power at a time when a gale of Fourth day. 172 Federal ConstitiUion : [9 Marcu, 1891.] EesohUlons. cyclonic force is raging, would be then in the position not of being judged by the particular point or clause in the bill vhich they objected to, but they -svould be charjred with throwing the whole coun- try into confusion by rejecting a bill which was necessary to enable the work of go- vernment to go on. What remedy was left to them 1 Nothing, except to adopt or reject it. Is that the dignified position you would like the senate of the great federal dominion of Australia to occupy ? Is that a position which would reassure the smaller states as to their safety ? What do we ask the states to do 1 My hon. friend. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, told us in words of a solid, sensible kind, which we all remember, and which made a deep impression upon me, that the states are asked to go into a ha^ipy partnership, to join us in a confederation, we promising them that in every way their rights shall be maintained and protected. My hon. friend, Mr, Deakin, asks what are state rights. If he does not know, or if he asks simply for the purpose of making an effective point in the debate — but I can hardly believe that he does not know what state rights are. What is meant by state rights in this connection is, that every pri- vilege which a state has in its isolated condition — -that is, the right of saying whether any measiu-e shall be made law or not — shall still be preserved to that state in the federal senate. State rights with re- gard to territorial rights we have ex25lained; state rights as to material interests of states we understand ; and I say the only link "wanting to make the chain complete is to assert that the states shall have and are promised in equal proportions, no matter what their size or population, a voice in legislation equal to that which they would have in their independent parliament, and that if their representatives do not wish a money bill, or a clause in a money bill, to pass, they shall have the right tosay " No." [.l/y. Fitzgerald. Therefore, when you ask them to come in, you ask them on this condition : that they shall comein in a duplex position; that they shall come in as states of Australia ; states that are — -I use the word in its limited sense — sovereign states, independent in every- thing except that tie of allegiance to our grand mother country, which I hope will ever be preserved. The states are asked to surrender what ? To surrender the powers which they now possess ; but when they come in, you disregard their area ; you disregard their population, andyou pro- mise the smallest colony equal power and equal voice in the senate with the biggest. What is the use, sir, of offering that in one hand, and, with the other, taking it away 1 If the whole legislation that can affect the states concerns money, and if their rejoresentatives in the senate have no power over that money, except to reject it, I ask, how can you hope to get the small states to enter the confederacy 1 The great colony of Victoria and the great colony of Kcw South Wales rivalry has kejjt apart. In this new government that rivalry will disappear ; nobler thoughts will arise ; they will become members of one family ; there will be no more of these jiettyjealousies which have hitherto marred not only their progress, but their history ; they will be as one family. Let them unite — let them determine upon a course of action. And I am reminded, and it must be within your memory, sir, that, some years ago, in the Federal Council sitting at Hobart, a representative of a large and popular colony proposed — ^knowing that without revenue the council would be worth little — that its revenue should be derived from the total proceeds of the public lands of the colonies, not only from the sale, but also from the occupation of lands. The colony which he represented had little or no lands left unsold, and little or no lands unoccu- pied : all its lands were alienated. The re- venue of the Federal Council Avas to be Federal Constitution : [9 March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 173 derived by filcliing funds from the otlier many opportunities of observing tlieir legal colonies which came into the council sim- acumen, their high abilities, and their high ply to join a happy family. The motion character ; but I still say, without in the was rejected, and rejected properly — re- slightest degree reflecting upon them, that jected with that honor which I hope will Ihopewiser counsels willprevailinthisCon- characterise public men in Australia wher- vention ; that weshall never sever thatlink ever they meet. But is it not a warning which binds us to the throne of England by to us? Let the small states consider that makingthe sovereign thefountain of justice. when they go into the representative house, I sincerely trust that no change willbe made and they are at the mercy of the more in that system, which I have not yet heard populous states, election being according to complained of, and which, if altered, might population, some taxation proposals may be be the means, and the very serious means, of brought forward. Let me put forward as stopping capital from flowing into this coun- an illustration an excise duty on fruit or try. And now, sir, I will conclude by saying jam in Tasmania. Suppose that the as- that I trust the labours of this Convention sembly sends this proposal forward to the will end successfully. I hope, looking over senate, and the representative of Tasmania the vast territory of this great continent, .states that it means ruin to his country. having regard to its prodigious resources, I wonder where would be the justice of acknowledging the bounty of the Almighty that proceeding. The duty would be part in bestowing upon us such a grand inherit- of a number of items for taxation; it would ance ; considering the rapidity and solidity be part of the whole taxation proposals with which we have advanced, a rapidity of the government ; and yet you are asked which has discovered for us a page very seriously and deliberately, and asked with high in the histoiy of human progress, and force and eloquence, from an ultra-demo- seeing that we have now an opportunity to cratic view, to sweep away any limitation gather together the scattered elements of to the power of that house. You are our enormous wealth — enormous whether asked to propose an elective house; you under or above the surface — that we shall are asked to found an elective despot- in our eflbrts to improve the condition of ism — for concentrating tlie whole power this prosperous, though sometimes rest- of the government in one house is nothing less and energetic, people, so act, that they ♦*lse but a despotism. I appeal to hon. may under one; flag, and one constitution, members, I appeal to the great tliinking, enjoy all those blessings which it should be reasoning minds, wherever tliey may bo, our earnest endeavour to preserve and over the continent of Australia, is it consolidate. 1 unjust that we should stand out for the Motion (by Mr. Dinus) agreed to : preservation of tliat right to tlie smaller 'I'liat tli<; f the future fiscal policy of Australia, and .hat must not be done by inference, Ijut be learly laid down as one of the principles »f federation, before we can proceed one tep further in our discussion. Of coui'se here are other questions which will arise s we proceed in this debate. While re are iiere sitting in the Convention in he interests, and probably for the good f the whole of Australasia, I cannot ut my eyes to the fact that I stand here b-day as a representative of New South aks. I am here in my place to protect e interests of New South Wales as :ainst those of all the other colonies, but render at the same time fairness and slice to all. I am a member for Now outh Wale.s, and for New South Wales stand. Before I sit down 1 may say e or two words which may, perhaps, act a bomb-shell among the members of this nvention who may hold strong views in an opposite direction to those which 1 have uttered ; but I will let off that bomb-shell at a later period of the day. I may then have something to say on a ques- tion which in itself appears to me, so far as New South Wales is concerned, as a condition precedent to any federation at all. The question upon which it appears to me we ought to be unanimous is not, as indicated by the resolutions put before us, the dealing with certain things and leaving certain other things of grave importance to this colony, and to the whole of the Aus- tralasian colonies, to be assumed by infer- ence. I want the Convention at the very first sta^-e of its business to build a solid foundation by a concurrence of opinion, upon which a constitution may be formed at a later date. If we fail at this stage to come to an agreement upon this important question, then we shall fail in the end in at- taining anythinglikeaunionof the colonies. The fiscal question is in my opinion the bedrock of the whole structure. I was elad to hear the lion, members, Sir Thomas Mcllwraith and Mr. Fitzgerald, and other lion, memljers, touch slightly upon this question, which is the question of all ques- tions. Within the walls of this building at the present moment, and among the members of the present Convention, arc centlemen who sat in the convention to discuss the federation question in 11^84. The result of the labours of that conven- tion was the establishment of a federal council, from which, owing to a variety of reasons which need not be detailed here — but I believe solely on account of party reasons — New South Wales stood out in the cold. I remember when that con- vention was sitting we had that great pro- tectionist, ]Mr. (now Sir Graham) Berry, and that equally strong free-trader, Mr. James Service, representing Victoria. At thatconventiona general debate took place, unfortunately with closed doors, and I believe tlie closing of the doors of tliat Fiftli day. 178 Federal Constitution : [10 March, 1891.] Resolutions. convention had a great deal to do with New South Wales remaining out of the Federal Council. When the debate took place on the general question, before we entered into any particulars with regard to the preparation of a draft bill, T remember ■well asking Mr. Graham Berry a question. I may inform the Convention, what prob- ably most of them already know, that at that time my eyes were not open to the necessity of a different fiscal policy for New South Wales from that under which she has lived for so many yeai-s. I pointed out to tlie convention that they "were introducing a variety of extraneous subjects, including, for instance, a propo- sal to take possession of the whole of the islands of the Pacific Ocean, and I asked, the convention, specially addressing my remarks to Mr. Graham Berry, whether that gentleman was disposed to make the union of the colonies depend upon a cus- toms union? I asked whether the fiscal question, upon which the two great colo- nies of Victoria and New South Wales had been for so many years divided — I asked Mr. Berry whether he was prepared to sink his views in favour of the wishes of the majority, or whether he expected that the interests of Victoria should pre- vail as against those of all the other colo- nies 1 I was met with a direct refusal on the part of the Victorian representatives to entertain the question of the settlement of the fiscal question in the first instance as the basis upon which federation should take place, with a result of whicli we are all well aware. Hon. gentlemen have had the advantage of a variety of information supplied to them from different sources. We have even liad draft bills proposed by certain hon. gentlemen from some of the smaller colonies. We have had everything prepared, cut and dried, in order that federation may be almost complete when this Convention rises. Amongst the numer- ous pamphlets which have been circu- IMr. Dihhs. lated is a very useful compilation called " Leading Facts Connected with Federa- tion," from the pen of Thomas 0. Just, a resident of that important spot in the Pacific Ocean, the island of Tasmania. This gentleman gives us the views that were expx-essed on the subject when feder- ation was rampant, when federation was in the air, in the year 1877, as it became in the year 1884, and as, to a certain extent, it is in the air at the present moment. It is gradually coming down like one of those little balloons which we occasionally see explode about the suburbs of Sydney. The balloon rises, and the man comes down with a parachute. Federation is gradually assuming a somewhat solid form, and it is coming down to the range of practical jjolitics. Mr. Just offers us what I must admit were my views at that time, and my views with regard to the question re- main unchanged to-day. The quotation he gives us is from the leading paper of the Australian colonies, and that paper is tlie Sydney Morning Herald. On the 2 -Ith Aprils 1877, or about that time, some correspond- enceappeared in the press from awellknown colonial statesman — a gentleman who was at one time agent-general and at another time premier of this colony, and who took a very far-seeing view of all great political questions. I allude to Mr. William Forster — a gentleman who had the respect of tlie constituencies of New South Wales, and who never raised his voice within the walls of this chamber without being listened to with the most profound attention as a deep thinker. Mr. Forster took upon himself to write certain letters to the press of this colony on the question of federation. The Sydney Morning Herald — I repeat again, a paper that has the respect of the people of this colony, and I believe is also well respected in the other colonies as a journal of extremely moderate tone, and as one which, as we all know, has upheld , every government within the teri'itory of Federal Conslitution : [10 Maech, 1891.] Resolutions. 179 ]S"ew South Wales that has at all favoured the policy of free-trade — the Sydney Morn- ing Herald, replying to Mr. Forster's argu- ments, used these words : As to his observations upon a uniform customs tarifif, it is only necessary to point out that agreement upon the general principles of such taxation must precede, and not follow federation All the colonies interested must first agree either upon a protective system, as in America, of in- ternal free-trade with taxation upon imports from without, or upon a free-trade system, as in the United Kingdom, under which specific import duties would he levied upon articles of general consumption, witli corresponding excises upon the same articles when locally produced — the one system taxing trade, the other consumption. I should like to ask the Victorians if they have been converted ? I should like to ask the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, if he has been converted to the principles of free-trade, or does he adhere honestly to the principles of protection % I should like to ask the same of Mr. Munro. I would iven ask my free-trade friend opposite, Mr. < billies, whether he comes here representing a people Avho have been converted to free- trade ] The paper goes on to say : I'ntil, therefore, Victoria is converted to a frce- rade policy, or can convert her neighbours. Colonel Smith : "Wlio says this % Mr. DIBBS : The Sydney Morninrj Herald of 1877 ; and I may tell my hon. friend, Colonel Smith, that the Sydney Morning Herald voices the opinions of the moderate and temperate people of New South Wales. Until, therefore, Victoria is converted to a ' trade policy, or can convert her neighbours 1 I -ne of protection, tiierc can be no federal union between them. And I believe tliat is the voice of the whole of New South Wales. 1 leave the members from the other groat colonics, and even from the smaller colonies, to Hpeak for themselves on that point. Tlie article goes on to say : This is a vital fjuestion which must bo agreed upon in advance, antl could not, as Mr. Forster ^ M appears to imagine, be left to be fouglit out afterwards. Now, sir, we are engaged upon the con- sideration of this great work, and it ap- pears to me tliat Victoria has triumphed with regard to the principles of protection throughout the whole of Australasia, until, at the present moment, she has attacked the citadel of free-trade, New South AVales. Step by step, and one by one, the principles of protection started twenty-five years ago l)y Victoria have maintained their own, and Victoria has gradually drawn South Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand — 1 do not know much about West- ern Australia, because she is young in the business — but she has drawn Queens- land also into the same line of policy, the wisdom of which has been acknowledged by the statesmen of the other colonies, and she has at last approached to make one last convert in order to complete the chain. And now, Mr. President, I must congratulate you upon being the last con- vert to protection. You, sir, plainly in- dicate by the resolutions you have moved that you are the last convert to protection, and that tlie free-trade party can receive at your hands its death warrant — its mine dimittis, I may call it. Free-trade in this * colony has received from this Convention, or from its President, the Premier of the supposed free- trade colony of New South Wales, its death warrant. It appears to me that Victoria lias triumphed, that what the Herald in 1877 foreshadowed as the lines upon which federation might pos- sibly take place, namely, the conversion of the other colonies to protection, has been accomplisheil, and w(! (iud the Premier of tlio only free-trade colony prepared to siidc the fiscal (|uestion in advance and leave it to he scttlcfl by the federal par- liament wlien federation is established. I believe that tho people of New South Wales can look upon you as tho latest convert to the wisdom of the policy of pro- tection, which in twenty-five years has pushed Victoria into the proud position in Fifth day. 180 Federal Constitution : [10 March, 1891.] liesolutions. ■which she stands to-day. This fiscal ques- tion has taken, I gathei* fi-om some of the speeches which liave been delivered here, an extraordinary turn. To my sin-prise, I have gathered that Yictoria, in discussing the fiscal question in this Convention, is asking for guarantees to secure the pro- tection of her vested interests. Now, in a footrace, where one of the rivals has an ad- vantacfe of 25 vards start in 100, one would not ask for an assurance that tlie man who had the 25 yards start should win; or, when on the turf, horses are handicapped by weights, one would not ask for a guarantee that the hor.se with the heaviest weiglit should " play the Carbine" in the business. But it appears to me that Yictoria has had the effrontery to come here, and by the mouths of some of her delegates to tell us at once that she, in any settlement of this ques- tion, requires to have guarantees for the pro- tection of her vested interests, though one would think that, having the advantage of twenty -fiveyears' start on the whole of Aus- tralasia, she would not require anything more. We are prepared to give her the advantage which the energy and pluck of her •people and their determination to lead the whole of Australia, have gained for her in the twenty-five years' start which she has had ; but we are not prepared to give her more than that. If we are going to deal with this matter in the liberal spirit suggested by the press, if we are going to have, as the 2nd resolution puts it, intercolonial fi'ee-trade, and, if federation is to come within a reasonable time, intercolonial free- trade must come at once, and the colonies of South Australia, Queen.sland, Tasmania, and New South AVales will be the biggest victims, and will make the large.st sacritice. So far, the Parliament of New Soutli Wales has only given a sort of half-hearted ap- proval of even the meeting of this Conven- tion, and the people have not vet been con- sulted upon it at all, though in due time they will be consulted, and will have the [Mr. Bibbs. advantage of the public education which they are now receiving upon the big ques- tions which concern them in eivino" their decision. But coming back to this question of meeting each other in a friendly spirit, what in the name of reasoxi and right does Victoria require more than the fact that she has had tlie markets of pretty well the whole of Australasia open to her for the last twenty-five years ? Mr. Gordon : As much as she can get ! Mr. DIBBS : That is the weakness of human nature. The cry almost always is for more than the gods give us — far more than we deserve, and more than is our share ; but if Yictoria is to approach the other colonies in a generous and federal spirit, she must be prepared to join in the sacrifice which she may have to make through her manufacturei's, and must part with all the advantages which slie now possesses, and live in wholesome compe- tition with those more favourably situated; and I am prepared to say on behalf of New South Wales that in the day of rivalry and competition she will find that with our magnificent resources, with our coal, and iron, and metals unbounded, with every advantage in the way of natu- ral resources which a country can possess, we shall be her hottest competitor. But we must start perfectly fair and square in the race of competition, and the claims of the various colonies must be duly considered. I believe that South Australia, which has always shown a generous disposition, will be prepared to make what will be a fair ofFei", considering the size of the colony, and the almost juvenile manufactures which it possesses, and New South Wales is pre- pared to give to Yictoria all the advan- tages of her twenty-five years' start, and to stand shoulder to shoulder with her and do the best we can in honest competition. But I should like the lion, member, Mr. Gillies, who I believe will speak to-day, and whose speech will have an atteu- Federal Constitution: [10 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 181 tive Learin" fiom the members of the Convention and from the people of the various colonies, to be perfectly clear and straight, and if the speeches which have been delivered do not voice the sentiments of the people of Victoria, let him, as an enlightened statesman, give us the assur- ance that Tictbria wants nothing more than she now possesses, and that upon the question of federation she will ask for no other advantages than that which she has gained by the twenty-five years' advance in statesmanship which has been made by the people who have ruled her destiny. I .shall listen to my hon. friend's speech with great interest. From conversation which I have had with her delegates, I gather that South Australia is pi-epared to take a liberal view on this question, and we ask Victoria to come in now and to throw in her lot with us. If we can get Victoria to say that she is prepared to lay the foundation-stone of a possible federation by agreeing at once to a customs union, in advance, if need be, of the settlement of the federation question — if she Avill at once agree to throw in her lot with us, one of the greatest difficulties in the way of federation will be removed. But there are other big questions besides this question of protection. The big and difficult ques- tion of the rights to the Murray Kiver will have to be settled in a spirit of liberal conipromi.se. It is one of tho.se questions which no doubt federation would be the means of settling for ever, and a question which Victorian statesman no doubt will keep in their minds'-eye, and which the people of New South Wales will always have before them in coming to any adjust- ment of those bones of contention which have by our territorial boundaries been allowed to come between us. The magni- tude of the qiiestion was not seen at the time ; but it has developed until it lia.s be- come a cause of discord almost between the colonies. The fiscal question, however, appears to me to be the kernel of the whole business. It was in 1884 ; it is so to-day ; and it will remain the principal barrier, or, to use the expression of the Hon. James Service, the lion in the path, to anything like federation, unless Victoria gives a bold and generous assurance to this Convention that she is prepared to deal in the same liberal spirit as the two great colonies of South Australia and Queensland with the people of New South Wales. This being ac- complished, other matters will fall in like a piece of mosaic. Having laid the founda- tion-stone, your superstructure will rise with some prospect of being a permanent building ; but you will never advance one foot towards the accomplishment of federa- tion so long as the fiscal question remains unsettled, and the whole of the colonies of Australasia have the assurance by the re- solutions proposed by the President that free-trade New South Wales is prepared to make the fiscal question second to that of federation. The other day a letter was published giving the opinion of Sir Her- cules Robinson upon this question ; and when I read that letter I regretted that the hon. gentleman who had addressed Sir Hercules in the first instance had not pub- lished the letter which he wrote. It is a very important link in enabling one to comprehend what Sir Hercules Robinson m'hat was that ? Mr. DIBBS : The hon. member pro- posed to take from us, as British subjects, the chartered right which we possess of appeal to the Crown. Mr. MuNRO : I did not. I spoke in the other direction ! Mr. DIBBS : The hon. member spoke of establishing our appeal court, and of doing away with the necessity of appeal- ing to the Privy Council. The hon. mem- ber suggested that we should liiivc our ap- peal court, and that there would bo no arc a portion of the British Crown, joined necessity for sending cases to the Privy together by the most solemn tics and obli- Council of England. gations ; and we liave to bear the brunt of any misfortune which may fall upon us in connection with any attack upon our shores by rea.son of our enemies being the common enemies of England. We have already made certain provision, partially of a federal character, to assist the Im- perial Government in the protection of our shores frou) without ; but let us set our faces as a young nation — if I may use the word " nation" in advance — against stand- ing armies ; let us sot our face once and Mr. MuNRO : I said the reverse ! I\Ir. EiTZGERALi) : The hon. member said the opposite ! Hon. INlKMitKits : Hear, hear ! :\rr. DlBl'.S: 1 am very glad to take tli(^ li(;n. gentleman's statement, that ho said the reverse. I find, ilicii, that 1 have done the hon. member an injustice. The reason the matter made an impression upoJi my mind at the moment was the speech of the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griflltli, who told us, with his astute Fifth day. 186 Federal CoHstitulion : [10 Marcu, 1891.] Resolutions t knowledge as a lawyer, that his mind was still open on the subject, that he was pre- pared to hear arguments on botli sides of the question before making up his mind whether to agree to the establishment of an appeal court. However, if I have done the hon. member, Mr. Munro, an injustice, I certainly apologise. But the lion, member, Mr. Playford, took a more extreme view still. He proposes to take part in the formation of a constitu- tion which wull take the right of veto, or of approval or dissent on the part of the Crown to our bills, away from the Crown altogether. That wasclear enough, and that brought forth from me the in- voluntary ejaculation, " There's another strand of the painter gone !" And what did I hear from our revered friend from ISTew Zealand, Sir George Grey ? I heard a, proposal of a still more audacious char- actei". He threw out a suggestion for our adoption that we should stipulate for the election of a governoi'-general to pre- side over the federated colonies, to be elected by the people of those colonies. In God's name, what then is to become of the Crown? The matter reminds me very much of the story of "Ginx's Baby." After they had been squabbling about the " territorial rights " of that unfortun- ate baby until it had been kicked over- board, the writer concluded w4th these extraordinary words, " Good God, what has become of the baby T When one hon. member proposes to cut the Crown into mincemeat — when the hon. member, Mr. Playford, would deprive the Crown of its right of vetoing a bill, and when the hon. member, Sir George Grey, would take from the Crown the right of nomi- nating, and give us the power of elect- ing, our governor-general, what is to be- come of the Crown ? What is the Crown to be 1 Are we to send to the Fiji Islands for a block of wood which they use as one of their god.s, and set that up in the [Mr. Dibbs. capital of Australia, and say, " This is the representative of the Crow^i, without power or right of veto, and of our own election" 1 Mr. Playford : What power has the Crown now ? Mr. DIBBS : If the Crown has no power now, what does the hon. member propose to take away 1 The Crown has the power of vetoing our bills, and showed its power last year when it vetoed our Divorce Bill. We are gradually cutting that " crimson thread of kinship " — the words have be- come historical — we are gradually whit- tling away the powers of the Crown and creating for the future of Australia what the hon. member, Mr. Playford, is, per- haps, anxious to create, namely, the re- public of the united states of Australia. That is, I have no doubt, what we are coming to. Without poaching from the unprotected preserves of my hon. friend, Captain Russell, who rather usurped the position which hitherto I have held in this chamber, of being the only legitimate quoter of the sacred book, I think really that, after all, " out of the fulness of the heart the mouth speaketh." Out of the fullness of the heart of republicanism came the proposal to subvert the authority and dignity of the Crown, to cut the last link of connection with the Crown, and to establish the republic of Australia. That is what we are coming to, and it is the in- evitable destiny of the people of this great country. When England sent her pioneers to subdue the wilds of Australia, to civilise ' them and to make " the desert rejoice and blossom as the rose" — when she planted her colonies in this country she planted them with that germ and spirit of independence ■ which must, as time rolls on, develop into the establishment of a great republic. The cubs of the lion will, in due time, play the lion's part ; and I was intensely amused to ; find that that young cub. South Australia, , represented by my hon. friend, Mr. Play- Federal Constitution : [10 IMarch, 1891.] Hesolutions. 187 "ord, has solved the whole question of con- rertins; the authority of the Crown into a nyth. What we are doing to-day is pre- paring step by step for that grand future .vhich is to come ; and wiien that day arrives, it will be not to the discredit nor ;;o the injury of England, but for England's Greater strength and security, when she in |:he southern seas — separated as we are by Isuch a vast expanse — shall have ci'eated, as loreshadowed by the hon. member, Mr. iPlayford, not a dependency, but a nation of her own people, free and independent of the down. That is the boldest way in which to put the question. It was barely touched on before, but it was the honest convic- tion of the hon. member, Mr. Playford, and the hon. member. Sir George Grey, who pointed out tliat the people of this country would no longer, especially as time rolls on and develops still further the jiluck and independence of the people, re- piain as they are; but that in the future this country must become a nation of itself, in alliance with the old country. "Will any of us here say that it was to the loss of England that America separated from the control of the parent state, or that that ■event was not in the intere.st of humanity, was not for tlie benefit of the human race ? And will anybody tell me that it will bo against the intcre.st of humanity, of the Briti.sh race, or of England lierself, that in due time these colonies sliall become one gi'eat, united Australia, as friends and allies of the motherland ? That is our future, and what we are doing here step by step to day is laying the foundation of the inevitable which is to come. We talk about making a constitution whicli is to last fifty or a hundred years. Where siiall we be in fifty or a hundred years? I do not 8Up[)0se that I shall see my hon. friend, Sir John Jiray, fifty years hence sitting in that corner ; he might be elevated to tlic president's chair ; or be president of the republic itself. But we arc laying the foundation, and step by step are following in the lines of a great nation, and in due time we shall become what America has become, a separate, free, and independent state. That is what we are gradually doing. We may be to a certain extent working in fog and darkness ; but that will be the out- come of the whole question — of all our arguments, of all our debates, of all the thinking of the people of this country. I am as much in touch with the native-born population of Australia as is any man in the country ; and 1 feel that I express their sentiments when I say that from the germ of liberty implanted within us by our forefathers spring the aspirations which will forbid us to remain bound in alliance except as one friendly nation with another, always with that special respect that should be paid to the people of the fatherland. I am afraid that I have wearied hon. members as far as I have gone ; but it appears to me that before going again over a little bit of the ground, I have said sufficient to show that I shall oppose the military spirit, both inside this Convention and outside the walls of this chamber. Whenever I have the oppor- tunity I will do my utmost to cut down the military spirit and to instil into the people of this land a love of their homes, and also the necessity of defending them in the only legitimate manner. As the the hon. member. Sir George Grey, said, either yesterday or in his speech the other day at the Town Hall, we should educate our people up to all of this, and especially in New South Wales, where we are giving the people of the country practically a free education — and it should be common to all Australia — we should instil into the minds of our children the necessity for training, and, as a quid ]>ro quo for thatfree edu- cation, we shouM di'iiKiiid from them a certain amount of proficiency in the use of arms, wliirh of itself would lay the basis of a military organisation for the jturposes Fifth day. 188 Federal Constitution: [10 March, 1891.] Besolutions. of defence onlj. When -we have done that we sliould still come nearer to that great future foreshadowed by Wentworth Avhen lie spoke not of these colonies being depen- dencies of any fatherland or motherland — dependencies of any state whatever, but when he used words almost equal in elo- quence to the peroration of myhon. friend, Mr. Fitzgerald, last night. When he spoke of " Australasia with flag unfurled — a new Britannia in another world," the idea was uppermost in his mind, as a native- born Australian— as it is in the mind of nearly every native-born Australian now, and also in that of those Avho have cast in their lot among us — that the future of Australia must be " a new Britannia " with her own flag. We have had to re- pletion the building of castles in the air — treated to the prospect of royal courts, presided over, probably, by royal princes, where our wealthy citizens shall flock around, and enjoy all the pleasures which surround a royal court ; but, after all, when we come to the bed rock, we find that the national spirit of the rising generation of Australia is instinct with freedom which Avill impel our people at the earliest pos- sible moment to form a nation of their own. That is the aspiration, instinct, and spirit, I hope, of young Australia, and we are Iiere helping that spirit, according to the speeches of my hon. friend, Mr. Play- ford, and others, by building a constitu- tion like that of the United States, whicli is to last 1 00 years. It appears to me that, to ii.se a nautical expression, these resolutions are wrong side up. We ought to have begun building our ship by laying the keel. I think we have been putting aloft the top- gallant and royal yards without having re- gard to the sti^ucture upon which everything is to depend. We ought to have started by affirming, first of all, what we propose in theshapeof a federal parliament — bypoint- ing out that we would have two houses of legislature. In due time we should have [Mr. Bibbs. settled among ourselves what powers th( senate should have — it is pretty well agreec what the house of representatives shouk be. We should then have defined clearly and distinctly what the federal right; should be — but we are not doing that— we should state clearly and aboveboarc what the state rights should be, and, haV' ing done that, we should define — and th{ people of this country will not be satis fied until we do define — the basis of oui fiscal policy, as being one of the conditions which should follow at the earliest pos siblemoment in the programme. And then, as far as New South Wales is concerned, we must pay some little consideration as tc which city is to be the capital of the future empire. Where is that capital to be 1 Is if to be in Hobart 1 Tasmania is out of the field. Is it to be in Western Australia ? _ An Hex. Member : Yes ! I Mr. DIBBS : We have lent a hand in endeavouring to obtain for Western Aus- tralia free and independent government ; but no city in that colony is hardly fit to be the capital of Australia. Will the capital be in South Australia 1 Of course, if I put the question to Yictorians they will say that the capital should be in Vic- toria. An IIox. Member : No ! Mr. DIBBS : Tlien they are casting it at once upon New South Wales. I am sure Queensland has no ambition for it. But just one word, in all seriousness, with regard to the question of the capital. This question will have to be dealt with by this Convention. Hoy. Members : No ! Mr. DIBBS : Gentlemen, when they say "no," are speaking with a tender sympathy for their own colony. Colonel Smith : Was the hon. gentle- man ever in Ballarat 1 That is the place; for the capital 1 Mr. DIBBS : Yes, I have been in Bal- larat, and I do not know a better place to Federal Constitution : [10 March, 1891.] Besolutions, 189 ? the capital of Victoria ; but we cannot lake it the capital of Australia. It is a fit laco to be the capital of Victoria, but not for 10 whole of the colonies. I am speaking in li seriousness. 1 am speaking now for New oath Wales. I have veered round from i'- position from which I started. I stand ■,i.' as a representative of New South Tales, and the people of Xew South Wales ill not lend themselves to any scheme of ration, when the question is submitted '■m, unless first of all the fiscal ques- be settled — not the details of the tariff, he principle — for it must be clearly .'■d what the fiscal policy of the great try shall be. But there is the other lion upon which the people of New oiith Wales will require to know the pinion of hon. members, namely, as to :e the capital of this new federation ' bo ; and it may be worth while to t out that there is one spot alone — Mred by nature, favoured by the great Creator himself — where that capital should e, where, if we are to be a naval power, he centre of the naval operations should \e, where nature has planted boundless [elds of coal for naval purposes as well as or Australian manufactures, where we, lie parent state, have boundless resources, .nd wliere all the advantages of beauty »oint to one place on the face of Australia, Lnd in favour of wliich hon. members of hi.s Convention will have to make up lifir minds before our proceedings close. Hon. Mi;MnKKS : No ! !Mr. niniJ.S: r)h,yf's. There wasa certain nan went on a journey between Jericho and rcrus;ilriii. Well, the people of New South >\'ales do not propose to take that journey, >ut to liave the road marked out with uitablc liglilH. Mr. Pl.wfoud : There is a very good •oad between Jerusalem and Jericho ! -Mf. l>ir.BS: Yes; but the hon. mem- >cr knows wliat became of the iinfortu- late man who took it. That is one of tlie questions which it is no use our shirking. Now, I .speak on behalf of New South Wales, becau.se I am sworn to no master but New South Wales ; I know no other master but the people of New South Wales. When the day comes it will not be an open question more than the fiscal question ; but will have to be settled not so much in the interests of New South Wales as in the interests of the whole of Australia. If we are to go into a federa- tion, "we must know on what lines we are to go. We must know where the capital city is to be situated. Sir Joiix DowxER : No ! Mr. PLAYFORn : Let the people who are elected decide that ! Mr. DIBBS : There is a difference of opinion. Remember that, after all, we are only here acting without the authority of our masters. Our masters are behind the scenes in all this business. However much we may thrash out this big question, our masters, and our masters alone, will be the people who will settle that question. Mr. Playford : They will settle it when the first federal council is elected ! Mr. DIBBS : Oh, yes 1 This is the bombshell which I kept in reserve ; are hon. members prepared to take that ques- tion, and add it to the resolutions upon which we are to build ujj our constitution'? Mr. INIuxno : We are not authorised ! Mr. DIBBS : I know that. But New South Wales wants to know something about that question. We want unity. Wo want the river Muri-ay cjuostion settled. I would ask my lion, fricml, I\Ir. Gillies, whether he is authorised to settle the river Murray question? Mr. Adyk Douolas : No ! Mr. DIBBS: But thehon. member would 1)0 very glad, no doubt, to take it as an act of compromise. Ilowevti-, wlictlicr we are or are not .authorised to settle that question, we have to face our masters upon Fifth day. 190 Federal Constitution: [10 March, 1S91.] Resolutions. the whole questions involved in these reso- lutions and other resolutions that must be submitted, and, take my word for it, speaking on behalf of the people of New South Wales, the question of the capital is one which will weigh enormously with them in giving their adhesion to any sys- tem of federation. Mr. Playford : And with the other colonies as well ! Mr. DIBBS : And with the other colo- nies, I have no doubt. But we are dif- ferently situated. History gives us no guide in the selection of a federal capital. In the case of the United States of America it was the result of a compro- mise. In no other part of the world can I read in history of any place where the question of the federal capital was settled on the lines which the United States adopted. I am very much mistaken if the people of New South Wales, which, by reason of its wealth, its position, its resources, its popu- lation, will not claim to have as powerful a voice in that matter as many of the other parts of Australia put together. However, these are questions to be settled, and I have no doubt that the generous spirit of com- promise which has so far distinguished the debates will be extended even to a fair consideration of that question. In due time, if no other hon. member takes the lead, I shall test the question by proposing it as one of the cardinal points of the new constitution. These resolutions, Mr. Presi- dent, will be submitted to a committee, and in Committee of the Whole I reserve to myself the right of amending them to the fullest possible extent in the direction of the lines which I have indicated, and shall endeavour to the fullest extent to meet the neighbouring colonies in that liberal spirit, that federal spirit of com- promise, which you shadowed forth in your opening address. But I fear that if New South Wales is to be a factor in the new constitution, or in the federation, there [Mr. Dibhs. will have to be a generous concession made to her people, and she must have at least an equal voice in the discussion. I thank lion, members for bearing with me solong, for I fear that I have wearied them ; but I have indicated in a hasty fashion my views of the labours which I think this Convention may perform. Its ultimate out- come should be the building up in the future the great and glorious empire of Australia. Sir JAMES LEESTEERE : I cannot sajr, like some hon. members, that I rise with a feeling of awe to address this Con- vention, when I see around me the faces of so many friends who in former years have met to discuss the federal question ; but I do feel a certain amount of diffidence, and that diffidence would be very much in- creased were it not for the fact that I have more confidence in the present federal meeting of the representatives of Australia than I have ever had before, from the fact that I am now the delegate of a legisla- ture possessing equal constitutional rights with that of the other colonies of Australia. The delesrates of Western Australia are, I think, at a slight disadvantage in discuss- ing this question from not having been here at the commencement and not having had the benefit of listening to the inter- esting and instructive speeches delivered before our arrival. But, although we are at a certain disadvantage in that res- pect, I do not know that in other res- pects we have not been gainers, because, from a partial perusal of the reports of those speeches, I gather that there is. a consensus of opinion drifting in a direction which I think will be agree- able to the delegates and the people of Western Australia. I shall not detain the Convention very long, because I think that, the subject having being so tlio- roughly thrashed out, the sooner we leave off discussing general principles and deal with the details of the proposals, the more speedy progress we shall make. But I Federal Constitution: [10 March, 1891.] Itesoluiions. 191 ■wish to lay before the delegates the pecu- liar position in which Western Australia is placed as regards this question, and un- less very exceptional treatment is accorded to us I fear that we shall not be able to go ;into the federation at the present time. We have an immense territory, equal to about a third of Australia, but with a very small population, and I do not think it would be agreeable to the people of our colony to go into this federation if they were to be represented only on the basis jof population. I have seen a draft bill in Iwhich it is proposed to give Western Aus- tralia two member.s. Now, do hon. mem- ibers think that we shall consent to go into any federation if we are to be so miserably represented as to have only two members in the house of representatives ] It would be futile, I think, to attempt to persuade the people of Western Australia to accept federation on those terras. Sir Samuel Griffith : We propose an ; equal number in the .senate ! Sir JAMES LEE-STEERE : Certainly and that seems rather inconsistent, because it is wholly opposed to any constitution in existence at present that a district's or state's representation in the senate should be in excess of its representation in the hou.se of representatives. Mr. Clark : It is so in America. It is the case with several states in America ! Sir JAMES LEE-STEERE : But they represent a territory, and not a state. Sir Samuel Griffith : Rhode Island has only one ! Mr. Clark : Oregon has only one ! Sir JAMES LEESTEERE : I was not aware tliat it existed with regard to any state in the United States. With regard to the 1st resolution, I think I may say that I agi-ee with that re.solution for this reason : that there is such a decided opinion amongst the various delegates to ]»reserve, as far as possible, all the rights wliicli State legislatures possess at present, that I am quite certain they will not surrender any more than they can possibly help. And if it were not for that feeling, the re- solution itself is drawn up in such elastic terms, and properly so, I think, that I should feel some hesitation in giving my concurrence to it. But knowing what I dc^ of the feeling of provincial legislatures in this respect — knowing that they will not give up one iota more than they can help — I can unreservedly accept the resolution. The 2nd and 3rd resolutions I shall deal with together, because, to my mind, they cannot very well be separated in discuss- ing the fiscal policy as regards Western Australia. We are more exceptionally situated with regard to our customs re- venue than is any other colony in Aus- tralia, for this reason : that one-half of our revenue is derived from customs duties. The customs revenue of West- ern Australia is equal to £o per head of its population, which is more than double the amount per head collected in any other colony except Queensland. That being the case, where are we to find re- venue to carry on the government of our colony, and to carry on the public works- which we are now about to initiate for de- veloping our resources, if we are expected to give up one-half of our revenue ? We have just entered upon what we may call our national life, that is, upon a system of self-government, and the Government ha» initiated a scheme of public works, and is- about to raise a loan to construct those works. The Government has received a very large amount of support for tlio pro- gramme wJilcli it placed before Parliament, and its policy has been indorsed by Par- liament, becau.se ministers told the people and told tlio Parliament that the work.s- will ;ill l)e carried out witliout any resort to extra taxation, as the pro.secution of the works will cause such an influx of population as to increase the customs re- venue to such an extent tliat tliere will be Frfth day. 192 Federal Constitution : [10 IMarcii, 1891.] Resolutions. no need io impose any direct taxation on the people. What will the people of AVestern Australia say to us if we go back and tell them that we agreed in the Federal Convention to give up the whole of our customs revenue for the purposes of the federal government, that we shall not now have customs revenue to pay the interest on the money we are about to raise for the carrying out of a scheme of public works, and that therefore w^e shall have immediately to impose direct taxation 1 I ask hon. members whether, if that is the case, there would be the slightest proba- bility of the people or the Government of Western Australia agreeing to federate on such terras as these 1 I apprehend that all the delegates are keeping before their minds this fact : that whatever reso- lutions may be arrived at here, whatever constitution act may be drawn up here, they will have on their return to their several colonies to submit those resolu- tions and that bill— I do not know exactly to what body it is proposed to refer them, but I fancy it will have to be referred to tlie people by all the legislatures, because I do not think a single legislature has been elected since the question of adopting a fedei'al constitution was raised here, ex- cepting, of course, in AYestern Australia. Sir Samuel Griffith: In New Zea- land! Sir JAMES LEE-STEERE : I am told that a parliament has been elected in Kew Zealand since it was determined to have a federal convention here; butlamnot aware what w^as the result of the question when it was brought before the people of Xew Zealand. Sir Samuel Griffith : It was never discussed ! Sir JAMES LEE-STEERE : I was going on to say that it was exactly the •same in "Western Australia, for I do not think a single candidate for the suffrages •of the people referred to the federal con- \_Sir James Lee-Steere. stitution about to sit, or the federal con- stitution about to be brought before that Convention. Dr. CocKBURN : It ought to be the sole issue submitted to the people ! Sir JAj\IES LEE-STEERE : I think it should be made the sole issue at a general election. I do not think it is sufficient to refer the question to the legislatures. I A do not think a government would care to have a dissolution to refer the question to the people. I have not quite made up my mind yet in what way it should be done ; but I think the various colonies should devise some means by which the people may decide whether they will accept the federal constitution which I hope will be drawn up before we separate. With re- card to intercolonial trade, we in Western Australia are in this position — that one- half of our imports come from the other colonies, and one-third of our customs duties are levied upon articles coming from the other colonies, not necessarily tlie productions of those colonies, but goods imported into those colonies and re-ex- ported into Western Australia. It might be said that if we were to surrender our customs duties to the federal govei-nment it would not signify very much to us what the amount of those intercolonial duties was ; but it would make a great difference to us in this way — that we should receive so much less from the federal government, assuminji; that thev would I'eturn to us the amount of customs duties not required for the purposes of federal government. I ■ have not yet been able to gather whether it is intended that the federal government should take over the debts of the various colonies. That question was foremost in tlie minds of all of us at the conference | which was held in Melbourne last year. Mr. DiBBS : At a valuation ! Sir JAMES LEE-STEERE : It was im- pressed upon our minds at the Melbourne conference last vear that if the debts of Federal Cua.iliiul'w a: [10 March, 1891.] Hesolutlons. 193 the various colonies were taken over by the of Western Australia at the present time, federal government several of the colonies British Columbia occupied an extreme posi- Avould be placed at a great disadvantage. tion on the western coast of the Canadian But I have been given to understand that it dominion, and there was no communica- . is not now intended that the federal govern- tion by railway bet sveen that colony and ment should take over the debts of the colo- the dominion. In many other respects nies. I have, liowever, been told by some there is an analogy between tlie posi- hon. members tliat they intend to propose tions of Britisli Columbia, in respect to the that that sliall be done. It seems to me, dominion, and that of Western Australia therefore, that we are, to a certain extent, in respect to the otiier Australian colonies groping in the dark at the present time, and at the present time. It may be asked that tliat we scarcely know what we are really if I and my brother delegates— some of proposing to do under these resolutions. whom, I presume, will follow me — have Sir Joiix DowxiCR : Until we get into come here only to point out all these diffi- Committec ! culties, why have we come at all ? I have Sir JAMES LEE-STEERE :' I think often thought of the expression used by, I the sooner we abandon this discussion of ^'^"^k. Captain Paissell at the Melbourne' principle, and approach the details of .the conference, that there were 1,250 reasons measure upon which we hope to come to ^''^'7 ^^^^ Zealand should not join in a an agreement, tlie more speedily shall we federation of the Australian colonies. end our labours. I think, however, that I ^I"^'- I>ibbs : A reason for every mile ! have shown hon. gentlemen the difficulties Sir JAMES LEE-STEERE: Precisely; under which we in Wcstei-n Australia and it has often struck me that we of labour in agreeing to give up the whole of Western Australia might use the same our customs duties to the federal govern- argument, .seeing that the distance between ment unless some arrangement be made our capital and the nearest capital of the under which we shall be recouped. I am other Australian colonics is exactly tlio aware that in the case of some of the' same number of miles, namely, 1,250. We North American colonies which did not also might say that there were 1,250 diffi- ioin the Canadian federation in the lirst culties in the way of our joining an Aus- instance — I refer to Britisli Columbia tralian federation ; but we have come here and Prince Edward Island — an arrange- ment wa.s made willi tliose two colonics that thoy should receive .in annual sub- sidy from the Canadian Government by way of consideration for the surrciulcr of their customs duties. There is a further condition which T should like to sec made in the case of Western Australia, and it is not only to solve those dilHculties, but to join with the eminent men I see around me, and to see if we cannot overcome them. It is, 1 am sure, the anxious wish of rdl of us tliat we shoulil join most heartily in a federation of the.sc colonies. But it must be recollected that nil of the other Australian colonies have liad ;i lonir time this ; tliat the federal government should within which to develop their resources, agree to carry out a railway to that colon v. whereas we in W'cstiin Austialia have We should bo quite prepared to givo the had no time wliate\<'r. ^\'e are, in fact, npces.«ary land, as was done by British Co- but just comnicncing io do sf). Thfrefon; lunibia. In many respects tliere is, I think, we ie(iuire in proportion a larger amount a great analogy liotwof-n the circumstances of rcvcnut; for that purpose than is rc- and po.sition of British Columbia at the quired in the other ^Vustralian colonics, time of the Canadian federation, and tliose Unlike the hon. member wlio last addressed N Fifth Oaij. 194 Federal Constitution : [10 Mapx'ii, 1891.] EesoliUions. us, I feel no difficulty in giving my con- currence to resolution No. 4. I do not think it will be apparent to many lion, members that resolution Ko. -i points in any degree whatever to a standing army. It does not do so in my view ; and I am sure it was not intended to do so. The intention, I take it, is this : that we should maintain a permanent force or a militia, which would be available in time of danger, and with which we might be in a position to assist the mother country in her defence of this portion of her domi- nions. I myself, and most lion, gentle- men here, would feel humiliated if, on ■war breaking out between the mother country and some other power, we had to call upon her to send a force here to defend our hearths and homes. It is our desire that we should not be made to feel that . humiliation, and that we may be prepared, as we ouglit, to assist the mother country, rather than ask her aid, should war at any time break out. It is with that view that it is proposed : That the military and naval defence of Aus- tralia shall be intrusted to federal forces, under one command. I believe, as has been stated by some other members, that Major-CJeneral Edwards' report was the origin of the conference held in Melbourne to consider the ad- visableness of framing a federal consti- tution for the whole of Australia. Sub- section I of the resolutions, if I may so term it, provides for : A parliament, to consist of a senate and a liouse of representatives. ..... I entirely agree with those lion, members v/ho wish to give the proposed powers to tlie senate. There is no legislative body in the world so generally admired as is the Senate of the United States. It is a 1.)ody which is respected not only in the United States, but throughout the world. It has been said by one of the morning papers published in Sydney, from which the hon. gentleman \Sir James Lee-Steere. opposite — Mr. Dibbs — quoted, that we had no riglit whatever to give so much power to the upper house, and that in so doing we siiould be taking from the lower house a great deal of power. There is no country in the world more democratic than is America, and so far as my reading goes I have never seen any complaint that the Senate of America takes too much power from the House of Representatives. Bryce, in his history, says that tliere has never been any serious deadlock between the two houses. There are often conflicts between them, but they are invariably settled by a com- promise. Theie never has been, according to Bryce, any serious conflict between the Senate and the House of Bepresentatives in the United States. How are the right* of the smaller colonies to be safely guarded unless tlie senate we are about to establish is to have ricrhts co-ordinate with those of the lower house ? I do not see how the smaller states can consent to enter into a federation of the Australian colonies with- out conserving their state ria;hts. I think the senate, therefore, must be endowed with all the rights of the lower house, •except the right of originating money bills and taxation. With regard to the proposal to do away with appeals to the Privy Council, I may say that it does not> commend itself to mv mind. It vfould b© cutting another strand of the painter that binds us to the mother country. We have noAv few ties uniting us to the Crown, and this particular tie is, I think, one which ought not to be taken away from the ■ people of Australia. I noticed with some little surprise that all the legal members of the Convention have a^Dproved of the taking away of this right, and I have heard it said that they are the only gen- tlemen who have a right to express an oi^inion upon this point. Sir John Downer : ISTo ! Sir Jx^^MES LEE-STEERE : I do not agree with that view. I think the point Federal Constitution : [10 March, 1891.] Eesolui'ions. 195 is one tipon which the laymen of Aus- tralia ought to be consulted. Some bon. gentlemen have asked -what powei-s the Crown has in the colonies now. I think we must all confess that the Crown has a great deal of power in these colonies, when we consider that we could not feder- ate at ail except by the permission of the Crown, and of the Imperial Parliament. "We shall have to go to tlie Imperial Par- liament to get our federal constitution act passed. Of what use, then, is it to say that there is no power in the Crown 1 There is a great deal of power in the Crown, and I hope that it will continue to exist, and that the right of ultimate .ip- peal to the Privy Council of England will ■ not be taken av/ay from us. I have this con- solation — I believe that if the Convention agreed to the taking away of this power the dominion parliament would not agree to it. I partly agree with the last speaker that we shall have in some way to settle where the capital of the future federation is to be, and where the first federal parliament i.s to be called together. I think we might leave it to the federal parliament to de- termine, as was done in the case of British North America, where the seat of govern- ment should be. In the case of Canada tlio parliament decided that Ottawa should be the capital unless parliament should othenvise decide. Sir Joiix DowNKu : No ; unless the Queen should otlierwi.se decide ! Sir JAMES LEE-STEERE : At all events, we .shall have to make provision at the present time for the place where the ff'deral parliament shall be first called to- gether. ^[r. Pi.AVFOiiiJ : Leave it to the Queen ! Sir JAMES LEE-STEEUE: Who is to decide the question unless we do so ? The Queen would not take it upon herself to .say where the first parliament should meet. I feel i)retty confident that she would not do so; the responsibility is too great to permit of the Queen, even with the advice of her ministers, deciding the question. I myself have a strong suspicion that the place where the first federal par- liament meets will ultimately be the capital of federated Australia. Sir JonN Downer : Not necessarily \ Sir JAMES LEE-STEERE : Not neces- sarily, but there is a strong presumption in favour of the supposition. I can only express my hope that, if Sydney is to be fixed upon as the capital of federatedAus- tralia, the sessions of the federal parlia- ment will invariably be held in the winter instead of in the summer. I am quite cer- tain that the parliament would not get through its business so well or so satisfac- torily if it were to meet at the time of year at which we are now assembled. I will only say, in conclusion, that I hope we shall, before we separate, draft a constitu- tion bill that will be, in the terms of the resolution passed at the Melbourne confer- ence, just to all the colonies. Dr. COCKBURN : I think we are all agreed upon one thing, and that is that the field of discussion is a vast one, and that every inch of its ground is debatable. So far, hon. members who have spoken have, as the hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, put it, been treading somewhat gingerly upon the fringe; but I do not think we can justly .say that the hon. member himself, or Sir James Lee-Stcere, has abstained from going right into the heart of the territory. The hon. member, INIr. Dibbs, cei-tainly let some bomb-.shells fall into this Convention, and I feel that it is rather to the disadvan- tage of those who follow him that they have to address a somewhat mutilated assembly. He fired three .shells of the first magni- tude in his speech. The first was the shell of the fiscal question ; the second, the .shell of possible separation ; and the third, the greatest .shell of all, the (juestion of the site of thf capital of united Australia. It has been sai-hether it is that of a separate state, or the intermediate stage of a federation, or whether it is on the highest level of all, that of unification — still I think we shall best serve the real object of government if we regard all these, not as ends in them- selves, and therefore not entitled to supei*- Federal Constilut'wn : [10 Makch, 1891.] JResohotiGns. 199 stitious reverence, but simply as means ■with one object in. view — that is, good government, strictly utilitarian institu- tions, to which no sort of superstitious reverence ought to attach itself. Other- wise "we find that a rigid constitution becomes one of the strongest engines of conservatism. I quite agree with the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, that elasti- city is an advantage; and although vre arc about to depart from our unwritten and ■elastic constitution and embark on a writ- ten and rigid constitution, I think we should, as far as possible, give every i)lay to that elasticity consistent with federa- tion, for liitherto it has been attended by the very best results. I have men- tioned the fact, which we must all recocc- nise, that federation is essentially a com- promise, and that one of our most difficult problems will be to reconcile that elasti- city which is so necessary for the develop- ment of a constitution, with that rigidity ■which is recognised as being one of the characteristics of federation. Not only in that respect must federation be recog- nised as a compromise ; but it is also es- sentially a compromise between the rights of the state as such, and the rights of the central government. In your open- ing address, sir, you appealed to the mem- bers of this Convention to forget as far as pcssiblo their local inclinations and to lose sight of the lines which divide them. While agreeing with you that to a great extent thi.s must be done, still, as federa- tion is a compromise and essentially a bar- gain, if v/e lose sight of those inclinations which are one of the elements in the bar- gain, I am afraid we shall make rather a one-sided contract. It is not because we nre di.ssatisfied with our past histo*«y, as I take it, that we are seeking federation. On thri contrary', we liave much to be proud of, and it is because we arc so proud of our progress, and love so much tliose colonies with which our progress has been associated, that vre look to federation not to destroy, but to protect and shield, those institutions under which we have so far obtained our rights and privileges ; and we look upon federation as a cover, a power- ful cover, under which we can advance to a still greater development of our free- dom. And, sir, we could see at once that when the first crossing of swords took place between the two parties to the baroain — between the states-rights ele- ment and the element that makes for uni- fication — we could see on which side the strength of tlie argument lay ; and it will be here as it has been elsewhere. In America, the states-rights party won from the first all along the line ; and even now, although in America several great factors have been making for unity, the states- rights party is predominant. There are two causes in America which have had a great effect in cultivating among the Americansan attachment to their central government. The first is the fact that there were only thirteen of the states of America that had originally sovereign powers ; that of the forty-two states of which the union is now composed, the vast majority never had any other attachment than to the cen- tral authority, Tliey are the children of \:h\> union. They ai'e, as it has been well said, born of the compact. So that in America the vast majority of the states have never had anytliing like a divided attachment. They have, from the first, been attached only to the source from which they sprung — the central governnient. And then the war had a great amalgamating influence in America. That party which all through had been the states-rights party, and had been the exponents of liberty, found itself by a Aery strange irony of fate, to be, not the exponents of liberty, but the upholders of slavery, and the central authority, which, until then, had always been recognised as the party which, by its preponderating force, rather tended to crusli the liberties Fi/lh day. 200 Federal ComtUiUion : [10 March, 189 1.] Ileiulaiions. which were upheld by the states-rights party —that central party was enabled, througli the condition of the country, to take up the cause of freedom, and tliis again was a great force that made in America towards the authority of the central power. But even no\v, with all the ad- vantages which America has enjoyed, the states-rights party is still the predominant party ; and so it will be here. But see- ing that we are about to embai-k upon an altogether new experience, we must, above all things, avoid cai'rying into our new territory any false analogies. As has been well pointed out hy many speakers, there is no analogy whatever between the council of the states and an upper house. But although this has been well recog- nised, I cannot altogether agree with some of the arguments which have been brought forward in support of the contention that the council of the states or the senate should be given co-ordinate powers. I quite agree that they should liave co-or- dinate powers with the assembly wliich represents population. But some of the arguments have, to my mind, been ratlier of a mistaken nature. It has been con- tended that the council of the states should have co-ordinate authority with the popu- lar assembly, in order to act as a sort of check against hasty legislation — something to stand in the way of the will of the people. Xow, in America there is no such thing. Federation cannot exist, co-ordinate houses cannot exist and work together un- less they both recognise the sovereignty of the people, and yield to tlie sovereignty of the people ; and the attempt, either here, or in any other free country where the people have been accustomed to ex- ercise their liberties, to set up a council of the states — call it by what name you like — as something which is going to stand in the way for any length of time, or even for a short time, of tlie pronounced will of the people, I think will be found to end [Z)/-. Cockbiirn. in a disaster. There is no fear of bursts of popular opinion if popular opinion is allowed to flow easily and in broad chan- nels, as it does in free communities. It is only if it is improperly resisted that the force of poj5ular opinion becomes ovei'- whelming and carries all before it. And liere we must recognise as, I think, ths very principle of the Constitution in Am- erica, tliat both houses must be equally subject to properly expressed popular opinion, and that neitlier house, sur- rounded by what bulwarks you like, will be able to exercise a function which som? look to one house to undertake, and j to stand in the way of a properly e:i- pressed popular will. For this reason, , I think the council of the stales should | be elected direct from the people, because ' there can be no question but that demo- cracy has proved that the judgment of the whole people is better than the judgment of any section of the people, I should like to see the house of representatives , partake also in another respect of the nature of the council of the states. It is proposed to make the council of the states perpetual. It is proposed to have an in- fusion of new blood at periodical intervals — every two or three years. Why should not a similar principle apply to the house of representatives ? I do not think that in a federation you can have a dissolution of either house, penal or otherwise. I question very much whether it would be found possible to incorporate the principle of dissolving either house summarily witli the principles of federation, and therefore I should like to see the lower house also con- structed on the same basis as that on which it is proposed to construct the council of the states. Let the lower house be renewed from time to time by degi'ees. Let there be an infusion every year or every two years into that assembly of a certain j^ro- l)ortion of new blood. And we recognis.3 this, that the more often in a free country Federal Constitution : [10 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 201 the people are called upon to exercise their franchise the more interest they will take in the ends of government, and the better they will be able to make a wise choice. With regard to the powers that are to be conceded to the central authority, and the powers that are to remain with the states, I do hope that no attempt will be made to detine the powers which are not surren- dered by the individual states ; because to define means to limit, and if we know any- thing we know that the advance in the future will be in the direction of the state .iking upon itself many functions which re at present performed by private indi- \ iduals. There is a constant and increasing tendency on the part of the state to take upon itself all sorts of new duties, and we can hardly say at present what it may not be necessary for the state governments to take up. !Many things which are now en- tirely conducted by private enterprise, I believe, in accordance with the spirit of the time.s, will before no long inter\ al of time elapses, be undertaken by state go- vernment.s. Therefore, wc must not at- tempt to define, because in our ignorance of what cxten.sion may take place in this direction by defining wc shall limit. And then with regard to uniform legi.slation, there lias been an opinion generally ex- pressed that the more uniform our laws are the better. "Well, tlii.s is only true to a cer- tain extent. Wc have great problems to work out in tiiis new country, and it i.s much easier to work out a problem on a small scale, where it is possible to make an experiment on a small scale, than it is to work it out on a large scale. Many have advocated that the criminal law, for example, should be uniform, Mr. Clakk : I hope it will not I Dr. COCKUUUN: I quite agree with my hon. friend, the evolutionist, opposite. I hojio it will not ; because I recognise that our criminal law is not by any means perfect ; tliat we have many improvements to make before we even get hold of the rudimentary principles which should govern us in the treatment of criminals. IMr. Clark : Hear, hear ! Dr. COCKBURN : At the present our prisons are reformatories in no sense of the word. In South Australia — I do not know what is the case elsewhere — we have a First 03'enders Act, by which it is optional with the judge not to impose any sentence Avhatever on an offender who for the first time comes before a court of jus- tice. That, I think, is advisable, and that is an advance, an experimental advance, which can be made on a small scale by an individual state ; but it would be very difficult indeed to introduce a principle of that sort on a large scale at first. I do not think that this is the place in which to define one's own particular views ; but I look forward to further developments in this respect. I think that optional sen- tences — sentences for an indefinite term — are decidedly desirable here. I simply men- tion this to show that it is very much to the advantage of evolution thatas much ground as possible should be left available to the states in which to make experiments in legislation. Infact, we have in the state.';, in our several governments, reaped many triumphs of the working of indi\ idualism. N\'hatever may be the case with regard to persons or societies, the period of indivi- dualism with regard to states has not yet been passed, and under the competition andemulationwhich individualism in states will engender, wc can look forward to lay- ing up many stores of experience which eventually will be available for the whole of Australia, and ultimately for the whole of the human race. I will not dwell upon the question of the standing army, because that has been already so excellently dealt with by tiie hon. mcmV>cr, Sir Ceorgo Grey, the hon. mendjor, ^Ir. Dibb.s, and others, I think that those speakers have convinced this Convention that we do not Fifth day. 202 Federal Condilution: [10 Marcit, 1891.] Eesolulions, want to unduly foster the niilitary spirit ill these colonies. There is, however, just one matter mentioned by the lion, member, Mr. Bird, to which I desire to allude. The iion. member expressed some surprise that the attitude of South Australia Avith regard to the customs union appeared somewhat different now from -what it did twelve months ago. Mr. Bird : I expressed jjleasure ! Dr. COCKBURN: I think the hon. member also expressed surprise. I do not think there is anything to be surjDrised at in this, although I am glad that it has given pleasure to the lion, member. The fact is that those points which the South Australian representatives asked last year liave now been willingly conceded, it ap- pears, by the -whole Convention, and we liave no fear whatever that any injustice will be inflicted upon our industries. I think it is generally recognised that this O I/O is the case, and it is not necessary for South Australia to say anything further on the subject, seeing that those who last year v/ere rather opposed to her demands — the Yictorian delegates — this year have viewed the matter entirely from the stand- point which was then taken up by the delegates of the smaller colony. Now, there are many other points to which, if I liad spoken earlier in the debate, I should have alluded ; but I feel that these have been so ably dealt with by men ot maturer years, and larger experience, that it would be presumption on my part to further al- lude to them. In Committee there will be plenty of time for any expression of individual opinion. As far as possible I am seeking to avoid repeating arguments, and taking up ground so much better occu- pied before. However, I must allude to one sentence in your opening address, sir, in which you said that it was the experience of the world that confederations, as oj)posed to federations, had been disastrous. Now, as far as my reading of history has led \_Di: Cockhurn. me to form an opinion on the subject, I have come to the conclusion that the reason why confederation — federation on a somewhat loose principle— has been falla- cious in the past, is because no confederation had been constructed on such lines as to be able to stand the tost of a prolonged war. All the federations of which Ave read in history — that federation, the Achnean League, Avliich shed a lustre upon the de- clining days of tlie glory of Greece, fell from no other reason ; the first confedera- tion in America fell from no other reason. Mr. Adye Douglas : The hon. member is Avrong there ! Dr. COCKBURN : It was in conse- quence of the war that it ceased to exist. Mr. Adye Douglas : The confederation Avas not formed until the Avar Avas OA'er ! Dr. COCKBURN : Confederation was found to be unequal to the demands of the long v/ar Avith Great Britain, and a closer union Avas seen to be necessary. Mr. Clark : It was because of the demands of trade and commerce ! Dr. COCKBURN : No, it was because of the e:xpenses incurred in the war. The continental congress of America had made itself liable in consequence of the war for an enormous amount of money. Its credit Avas at stake, and it tried to get the money by levies upon the states ; but it was not forthcoming. It was distinctly the result of the Avar. I have ahvays been rather an admirer of the first step taken toAvards Australian unity. From the first, I gave allegiance to the Federal Council, Avhich is a loose confederation, and I must confess that as time goes on I find it somcAvhat difficult to seA'er that allegiance. Of course Ave all recognise that the Federal Council did not go far enough. It is necessary to give it an executive, and to provide for the common defence, and to have a supreme judiciary ; but I cannot help thinking that if Ave take the elements which form the basis of the Federal Council fully, and if A\-e add Federal Constitution : [10 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 203 to them these necessary things — an esecu- be our quickest way in the long run. We tive, means for defence, and a judiciary, and are all agreed on the question of union. if we continue to add to them the powers There is absolutely no opposition on that of that council — we shall solve the i:)roblem ground wliatever ; there is no obstacle which is at present facing us and which whatever to the carrying out of our views, presents so much difficulty. We shall, by The only resistance which we may en- beginning low down on the few common counter is that which may be due to our points of agreement, be able to buildup own momentum. The i-esistance increases gradually under the power of reference to according to the velocity with which vn-o the Federal Council which obtained in that travel. If we build gradually and give bill, a federation, and be able to reconcile time for endurance, we sliall find nothing whatthehon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, like the difficulties which will present contends for — elasticity and rigidity on cer- themselves if we attempt at once to launch tain points. I think it will be found when a definite, rigid constitution, which we ex- this Convention has concluded its labours pect to last for many years, practically that if the.se necessaries to which I have v.ithout change, or with change in only alluded are adding to the powei's of the small degrees. I think that all our paths Federal Council, and if instead of one cham- converge towards union; but at present ber, two chambers be made out of it, but on our steps lie in diverse and varied terri- the same model, and thenumber of members tory. Our eyes are fixed on the same point, be increased so as to give it that respect but at the same time we must give our at- which is its due among the colonies over the tention to the difficulties which lie in our destinies of which it will have, to a certain path, otherwisewe shall loseourselvesin the extent, to preside, we. shall liave arrived entanglements and the pitfalls at our feet. at a solid ground upon Avhich we can I think if we can in any way at this last commence to build a lasting fabric, be- moment recognise the past — recognise the cau.se time is a necessity in all endui'ing work that has been done, as was done in structures. If we begin on that ground, America, we shall do well. The American gradually adding to the building, I think Constitiition, which we all admire so much, ■we shall got the union which we desire to wasnotobtainedbyanysuddenflight. Much fee more quickly than if we break alto- as they saw that the powers of the conti- getlicT with tlic past. I am not now plead- nontal congress were inadequate for the ing for tlic Federal Council as it stands. Congress, they did not break with that It is inadequate in many respects. But if congres.s. lb had a voice in fixing the we give it an executive, the control of de- convention which framed the Constitution, fence, and provide for a judiciary, and settle, The resolutions carried at the convention at tlic same time, the fiscal question — were submitted to the Congress, and the which can easily be settled under such a Congress took upon itself the duty of re- principle as that — and if, supposing the fcrring them to the states. America did Convention favours the idea, wo divide the not olitain that proud position of federa- chamber into two, and have a house of re- tion by breaking in any way with the past, presentalives as wiell as a council of state, and I think we should be careful in break- but maintain that principle which was dis- ing with our pa.st. We must recognise I tinctivo of the Frderal Council, that it the work which has been already done, and [ should grow in power by the gradual re- which has not been utilised. Does it not j ference to it of matters agreed upon by appear that there is something strange the various legislatures, I think that will in our now applying for more complete Fifth day. 201 Ftderal Constitution : [10 Mauch, IbOl.] Resulutions. federal powers when we have not used tlie powers wLicli form part of our consti- tution ? "SYliy should wcnot work the ex- isting machinery up to its fullest, and when we tind it inadequate get other ma- chinery 1 I did not mean to refer to this point. I meant to keep away from any reference to the Federal Council, and I must apologise for not having done so. Mr. Clark : South Australia is not in it. The hon. member's colony is out of it I Dr. COCKBURX : She would not have gone out of it if there had been shown a general desire to utilise those means to the fullest extent. Our country would to- morrow, if Parliament met, gladly enter the Federal Council, and give it the powers and every opportunity to justify its exist- ence. However, I have been led into stating my opinion on the question of the Federal Council, because I felt it neces- sary to show that because confederations have not proved successful in the joast, that is no reason why a modified confed- eration should not be successful in the future. We are treading on altogether new ground ; we have no experience what- ever to guide us. The problems of the old country are no guide whatever to the solution of those pi'oblems which will have to be solved on the continent of Australia. As was pointed out by you, sir, Australia stands by itself. It is already defended, and defended in such a way that millions and millions of pounds might be expended "without so good a result, by that mighty moat which was placed round it at the dawn of creation, and it has, therefore, nothing to fear from those causes whicli, in past history, have proved so fatal to federation. I cannot help thinking that after we have been sitting hei'e, and when we get into Committee upon the details of the subject, we shall find that if we settle the fiscal question and give those additional powers which I have indicated to the Federal Council, we shall [Z>r. Cochhurn. have solved as much of the problem as ii is possible for us to solve. And in that' way, I think, we shall be able to make a solid step in advance. I am afraid that if we aim at too much, w-e shall get notliing. Any one can see at once the difference between the tone which pervades this Con- A'ention and the tone which pervaded the conference in Melbourne last year. Many subjects then brought forward as essential to federation have now been recoijnised as subjects with which we should not deal Our principal common ground is becoming more and more limited, and we shall find, as it becomes limited, the advantage of not ignoring the foundation already laid, and we shall discover that by meeting round the table we can get over the difficulties and misunderstandings which attached to that earlier form of confederation. As I said at the commencement of my addi'ess, we have no experience to guide us ; there- fore, in this matter we must fall back, to a certain extent, upon the authority of those who have studied the qttestion. It has been said that federation will only take root in the soil when the ground here has been prepared by a looser bond. Now, sir, the ground has already been prepared by a looser bond. "NVe have recognised the inadequacy of that bond. Let us recog- nise its present requirements ; let us build it up tipon a stu'e fotindation ; and, step by step, let us attempt to avoid, as far as possible, the rigidity which attaches itself to the federations which we have seen in other parts, and which is so fatal to evo- lution; and so, I think, we may hope to see, without let, without obstacle, the gradual development and the gradual red- ing of such a structure which we shall feel proud of from the commencement, and which will prove itself to be enduring for- ever. I must apologise for having tres- passed so long upon the time of hon. mem- bers, and I thank hon. members for the manner in which they have listened to me Federal Const'Undon : [10 March, 1S91.] Re solutions. 205 'yiv. BROWX : In addressing myself to mania has taken in the cause of federation he resolutions before the Convention, I from the very earliest day is well known; lave present to my mind the fact that all, inasmuch as through her late lamented a- iiearly all, that could be usefully said on premier, the Hon. Mr, Justice Giblin, she lie general matters which we are consider- gave no inconsiderable aid in formulating ng, lias been already said ; and it becomes the present Federal Council Act — to refer ore and more evident, I think, as wo briefly to the operation of that act so far as troceed, that the real work of this Con- it has gone. I am one of those who regret ention will only commence when we go to some extent, or have regretted until the nto Committee on the resolutions which past few days, that the institution which •ou, Mr. President, have submitted for was founded by the Federal Council Act ur consideration. At the same time,! has not been used in the manner indicated annot help feeling that those from whom jus?t now by the hon. member. Dr. Cock- derive my authority to sit here as a burn, as the beginning of larger and more elegate in this important assemblage important functions to be devolved upon vould not be satisfied if T, or any other a federal legislature. Xo one at all ac- elegate whom they have sent here to re- quainted with the facts supposes, that the u-esent their views, were to be altogether authors of that act ever intended that it ilent in this preliminary discussion. "What- should be anything more than the initia- ver diffidence I may naturally feel in tory step, in a series of steps, which would iddressing this august assemblage, is cer- ultimately lead on to the object which is aiidy not diminished by the consciousne.ss now, in a concrete form, before us in the if the ability with which the questions resolutions which youliave submitted to us. •efore us have been discussed by those who ^^'e always recognised the fact that we were lave preceded me. I am sure that we have simply doing what it was possible to do at lerived a great deal of interest and a great the time. We hoped that the Federal leal of instruction from the contest of legal Council would gather round it, as time icuraen and debating power between the went on, the adhesion of the whole of the ion. members. Sir Samuel Griffith and Mr. colonies ; and that, when that adhesion vras )eakin. We also owe very much — and in secured, there would be a central body his T am expressing the opinion of many around which the federal idea would gradu- lelegatcs besides myself — to the important ally grow, and that, as the interests of the Contributions to the discussion which wo people became more and more evident as fiavc received from the representative of regards federal legislation, they would be ■>outh Australia, the hon. member, Mr. able to evolve from that beginning some- 3aker, and the representative of New thing of a imuli more important and ini- 50Mtli Wales, the hon. member, ^Fr. Barton. posing character. It has been a matter of I'hose two gentlemen placed before the extreme regret, as you, Mr. President, very 'onvention, in the most clear, forcible, and well know, to those who have, like myself, ogical manner, the considerations which interested themselves in this question, that >ught to guide us in dealing with the tlieimportatit coloniesof New South Wales mportant questions which are before us. and, until a very recent time. South Austra- \t the .same time, there are some points lia, werenot al>leto see their wayto come in •aised in the discussion of the resolutions and lielp us ; and it is, of course, a matter .vhich I sliould like to touch upon ; but of equal regret that the important colony jcfore doing .so perhaps I may be per- of New Zealand has not been able to see nit ted —inasmuch as the i^terp<^t that Ta.s- its way to join us, although I know, Fifth da I/. 20G Federal Constitution : [10 M.vucir, ISOl.] Resolutions. having IiaJ tJic pleasure of meeting the hon. membei-, Sir Harry Atkinson, in the convention of 1883, and having subse- quently had conversation with his col- leagues who were present with him there, that it has not been from any want of loyalty to the cause of federation tliat that adhesion has not been given, but simply be- cause they found, as you, sir, found, in Xev,- South Wales and have placed the fact on pub- lic record, that it was impossible to get the people of their colony to interest themselves sufficiently in the subject to gain their as- sent to joining the Federal Council. I am quite sure of this, sir, that if it had been possible to carry on the Federal Council, always supposing, of course, that we had had the adhesion of the important colonies I have referred to, we should, as the hon. member. Dr. Cockburn, has said, have been much more likely to have ar- rived at satisfactory and enduring results than we can by going to work as we are now, and attempting at one stroke of the pen, as it were, to place before the various parliaments of the colonies, a carefully prepared paper constitution. Far be it from me to cast any doubts on the results of our labours. On the contrary, I do sincerely hope that the result of our being here will be to build up a constitution w^hich will fulfil the conditions required of it; that is to say, that it will furnish appro- priate means for attaining legitimate ends, I may say that, even supposing, as I sin- cerely hope will be the case, we succeed in arriving at conclusions which will be gener- ally satisfactory to those of our co-delegates whom we meet here from other colonies — in the not altogether impossible event of that result, when it is submitted to the various parliaments whom we repi-esent, being declined, or at all events not ac- cepted for a very considerable time, as I fear will happen in one or more of the colonies, it certainly must be matter for congratulation that, in the Federal \_Mr. Broion. Council we shall still have a rallying point round which the federal idea may gather and grow, and by-and-by render much more easy the task of those wdio desire to see an absolute and perfect union of the whole of the colonies. Having said so much, if you will permit me to do so, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, and those whose assistance you have been able to secure, on the success which has so far attended your labours in assemblin;^ this Convention — and I think it is only fair and right that I should give voij to the opinion which I know is held by many, that we are in no small degree in- debted to the self-denying, patriotic, and statesmanlike conduct of the hon. member, Mr. Gillies, for having arrived at the point at which we have arrived. I think, if the hon. member, Mr. Gillies, will permit me to say so, that there is no doubt that were it not for the means he took to secure the adhesion of ISTew South Wales and the other colonies to the proposal to assemble this Convention, we should not have been here to-day ; and, on my ow-n part, and on the part of those who are interested in the federal cause, whilst thanking you sincerely for the prominent part you have taken, a.\v\ the cordial and loyal manner in which you have acted towards the cause of federation, I join also with those who acknowledge their obligations to the hon. member, Mr. Gillies, for the work he has performed in connection with the matter, not forjjettinii: for a moment that the present Premier of Victoria, since he has had the opportunity, has also rendered loyal service in the same cause. As to the resolutions which are before us, the most important are those which refer to the tariff question, and on that point I think the Convention is as yet without the information wdiich it w'ill be necessary for us to have before we proceed very much further in the con- sideration of the question. We know that-, the hon. member, Sir James Lee-Steer.^, a*. Federal Constitution : [10 March, 1891.] EesGlutionSi 207 t the conference Lield in Melbourne last year, I raised the very important question as to the amount which would be sacrificed by each of the colonies by the abandonment of the intercnionial duties. I liave seen various calculations as to the amount that would be so sacrificed ; but I ha^e, as yet, seen no authoritative statement from any one in the position of treasurer of a colony as to what that amouiit is likely to be. Vv"e have, of course, before us, the calcu- lations of statisticians and others who have interested themselves in the matter ; but I think it would be well if this Con- vention were informed by some one who has had the responsibility of administer- ing the finances in a colony what is really likely to occur in that respect. With re- gard to the ultimate result which we all aim at, the free interchange of commodi- ties from Port Darwin on the north to Hobart in the soutL, and I hope also with our friends in New Zealand, no one wil], I think, question this proposition, that no matter what the individual losses may be — and we know some individuals must lose by the operation of such free interchange — they will be absolutely lost and merged, and must be considered of the very slightest importance in considoration of the vast advantages which will be given to the whole of the colonies by the increase of trade and commerce, and the enormously enlarged markets which will be placed at the disposal of those colonies which now, unfortunately, by hostile taiiiTs, are closed to them. It has been said that there has been a want of impelling force to drive us to this union ; that there is no prospect of war or inva.sion. I should like to ask those gentlemen wlio know wliat jjas been going on within the last twenty years how long they suppose it will lie before some very serious questions will arise between these colonies on the continent — ofcour.se, as far as Tasmania is concerned, we are in the happy position of not being in that close juxtaposition with our neighbours which sometimes leads to unpleasant results — but I ask them how long they think it is likely — tarifi's being avowedly constructed for the purpose of inflicting injury upon neigh- bours — that that state of things will con- tinue without some very serious results ? It is true that the difierences arising between the colonies in this matter have hitherto been adjusted without any very serious results ; but as the military forces of each colony increase — as they are in- creasing from day to day — with the power of each colony increasing, as it is increas- ing from day to day, does any lion, mem- ber of this Convention mean to tell me that there is not a risk of some very serious conflict arising ? But, quite apart from that impelling force, we have quite enough in the consideration of the enor- mous advantages that we shall all enjoy from a free interchange of products and manufactures throughout Australasia to cause us to vv-elcoine the day when that glorious state of affairs shall be brought about. It has been a surprise to me, as no doubt it has been to other lion, members of the Convention, to find the colony of Victoria the first to cry out for some consideration in the arrangement that may be made with this ultimate object in view. This is ono of those rather comical incidents with which we occasionally meet, which requires some explanation, and, no doubt, we shall have some explanation given later on. How- ever, I am inclined to agree witli those who are disposed to have some time fixed before the free interchange shall take place; and, if that is the only condition, I isjiould hope tlint New South "Wales will not be so rigid in its adherence to what it considers its rights in the matter, as was indicated by the hon. member, IVIr. Diljbs, this morn- ing. We are here, sir, to perform that duty which you have placed before us — to give and take — and if, in this matter above all other things, there i.s not a disposition to Fifth daij. 208 Federal Constitution : [10 Mauch, 1891.] Resolutions. civc and take, -svc are not likelv to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. I was very glad indeed, sir, that in the graceful and charming speech of the hon. member. Cap- tain Russell, we had recalled to our minds the fact that this is an Australasian Con- vention, and I shall be glad indeed^and I am sure that I am expressing the opinion of all my fellow-colonists — if the result of our labours shall be of such a character as to show ISTew Zealand that if she does join our federal union she certainly will not have any cause to regret having done so. There is no doubt that it is desirable that the union to be formed should be an Aus- tralasian union, and it will, I think, be de- plorable if one important member of these Australasian communities should, for any I'eason, think it necessary to stand out. While, as indicated by the hon. inember. Captain Russell, New Zealand has been, and is likely to be, so coy, I think that the coynes?' of New Zealand is far surpassed by the coyness of Western Australia. We have had placed before us by the hon. member. Sir James Lee-Steere, various conditions under which Western Australia is likely to consent to join the union. Those who take that view with regard to Western Australia I hope do not lose sidit of the fact that as regards that vast territory this is " the day of small thinars," and that although with her re- sources, her enormous extent of territory, and her position, she would be under some disadvantage now in joining the union — we are not here to contrive legislation for the present, but to look forward to a future day when instead of 40,000 inhabi- tants, which I think is the number in Western Australia now, there will be per- haps 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 within not very many years. But the hon. member. Sir James Lee-Steere, raised a question which I think demands some consideration with regard to the representation of the .smaller states in the house of representa- [J/r. Broion. tives. I quite concur in the view ex- pressed by that hon. member, namely, that the number of representatives pro- posed to be accorded to the smaller states Avould, if taken on the basis of population, be altogether inadequate ; and I think it will be for this Convention to consider later on whether they may not fairly stipu- late that as regards the existing smaller colonies, and as regards future smaller colonies — or states I suppose I should call them — which certainly will be carved out of tlie larger ones, there should be a mini- mum representation in the house of re- presentatives. The calculation giving a representative to each 20,000 inhabitants would be as the hon. member, Sir James Lee-Steere, said, two for Western Austra- lia, eight for Tasmania, sixteen for South Australia, as against fifty-six each for New South Wales and Victoria. I think it will be for us to consider whether, as regards the smaller states now existing or those which will come into existence hereafter, it would not be fair to say that there .shall be a minimum of twelve representatives. That, however, is one of those matters of detail which, of course, will have to be considered very carefully ; but I can un • derstand any representative of Western Australia taking exception to the small amount of representation which that colony would secure if the number of popu- lation alone were to be taken into consider- ation. With regard to the 4th resolution, providing for one command for the military and naval defences, I have been very much surprised at the way in which that resolu- tion was slurred over It was not noticed at all by some hon delegates ; and its full effect was not taken into considera- tion, or, at all events, not given promin- ence to, by those who have noticed it. I should like to know if there is to be an organised military and naval defence under one command in the Australian colonies, Avhat is to be done with regard to the large I Federal Constitution: [10 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 209 amount of defence which we now receive now in existence, and the possibility of from the mother country — partially paid encroachments on the rights of the people for only as regards annual maintenance, by the senate which we hope to create. and as to the other portion not paid for Witli regard to the appeal court — the at all ? Is it proposed by those who ad- judiciary — that is a matter which has vocate this step, that the defence now been dealt with by the legal members of afforded us by the mother country is to be the Convention, and as to which I am not continued as it is, or is it contemplated that there shall be some sort of treaty with the mother country as regards supplying any necessary defence that may be required liereafter ? There is no doubt that the taking of this step with regard to the defence of the colonies will involve a very disposed to trespass on the time of the Convention now. All I would say is, that it appears to me, while admitting that it would be an enormous convenience and saving of expense to parties in the colo- nies to have the opportunity of appealing to a local court of appeal ; yet I cannot see I mucli hirger expenditure than any that why the option of appealing to the Privy 1 we have contemplated for some time past. Council, as I believe is the case in Canada, . I am entirely in accord with those hon. should be withdrawn altogether ; and, as ; delegates who have taken the view that, regards severing the links that bind us to - in forming our legislative machinery, we the old country, if the establishment of the , should give the very utmost power that proposed court of appeal is to be taken as , can safely and properly be given to the an indication of a wish to sever that link in I, senate or state council, as it may be the least degree, as it has been taken by ^ called ; and I have been very much sur- some to mean, I say that it would be de- :■ prised to lind, on the part of many who plorable that it should come about. In this ' liave discussed the question, such a dis- connection, I should like to refer to the position to confuse the nature and the con- stitution of the senate with the nature and tlie constitution of tlie upper hou.ses, as we 10 w them in tlie colonies. It appeal's to me that nothing could be further from the truth than to represent tlie senate, as we intciiiplate it, as representing only a sec- jii of the people. A.s I understand the jiroposiition, the niember.s of the senate ill as thoroughly and as fully represent ic people cf the various states as the rf'presentativcs in the lower hou.se will I •present them. In the colonies now there re, I think, tluce noinineo councils, and 'ic others arc elected on a restricted fran- Iii.i'. With regard to the sojiate, its mcde I f election and its touch with the i)cople f the various states will be entirely dif- breiit ; and therefore I am (juite unable very able speech which we heard this morning from the hon. member, Mr. Dibb.^;, a i-epresentative of New South Wales. I am one of those who have been taunted from time to time wfth the possible re- sults of the cour.se that I have advocated, and am now advocating, to secure the union of these colonies. I am told that what wo arc going to do will lead to some- thing terrible in the future. All I can say is that what we have hitherto done, and as far as I know what we are likely to do in the future, has b('(!u done and will be done, with the full concurrence of the mother country. As far as I am aware, there is no disposition to hamper or cramp the efforts of these free communities in the southern seas in working out their own salvation as they may think proper; and if there is to L to follow my hon. friend, Mr. Deakin, in be, as indicated by the hon. member, Mr. his violent declamation against the past Dibbs, and other.'!, a complete separation ' ncroachments of upper hou.ses which are from the mother country, which God forbid Fifth day. 210 Federal Constitution : [10 March, 1891.] Etsolutions. — if there is to be that complete separation which has been so boldly, and if the hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, will jiardon me for saying so, I think injudiciously, indicated this morning — if there is to be that com- plete separation, there is no doubt that it Avill be with the full concurrence of those who are responsible for the destinies of the empire, and who have devoted their time and attention for many years to the solution of these problems. Mr. GiLLiKS : It won't come in our time ! Mr. BROWN : I am content to take things as they are. I think that if such I'esults as have been pointed out by the hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, are to come about, it will be a very long time hence. It is not for us to trouble ourselves about the ultimate results, but to carry out as best we can those institutions which are likely to give us the full benefit of the freedom which we have inherited. I have little more to add. I should have been pleased if we could have had some more certain indication from the hon. and learned member, Sir Samuel Griffith, and others who have studied the question as to what is likely to be the result of the attempt to graft ifpon the legislative body which we propose to create, responsible go- vernment as it is understood in the colo- nies. I hope we shall be able to see some way to do that, because the institution of responsible government, notwithstanding the carping, and sneering, and adverse criticisms to which it has been subjected from time to time has, on the whole, worked fairly well. It is a mode of government with which we are familiar, and one which, I think, is much more in accord with the instincts and the aspira- tions of the Australian colonies than any other mode of administering government which has been submitted for our con- sideration. And in this matter I am en- tirely in accord with the hon. and learned {Mr. Broicn. member, Mr. Barton, that we must take something for granted. I think it is not at all iri;possible or improbable that we shall find later on that the responsibility of ministers to the house of representa- tives will not be after all such a bad thing as it is feared it may be. For we have to consider — and I find from a conversa- tion with the hon. and learned member, Mr. Barton, that he is entirely in accord with me — that no body of men called upon to assume the responsibility of govern- ment would, in forming an administration, ignore — in fact they could not afford to ignore — the voices and wishes of the senate, or the council of the states, if it is to be: anything like as powerful as we liave in- dicated our wish to make it. And to talk of the possibility of the council of the states acting in the narrow-minded and obstructive manner indicated by the hon. I member, Mr. Deakin, is, I think, going very much beyond what we are entitled to assume. And with regai'd to the wish of the hon. and learned member. Sir Samuel Griffith, that elasticity should be given to^ the machinery of government, I think his views on this question have been very much mistaken. He has never said that he wished to see nothing but rigidity in the principles laid down for the founda- tion upon which the legislature will work ; but what he said, as I understood him, was that we cannot hope to have a consti- tution which will be in accord from time to time with the views and aspirations of the people for whom it is framed. The hon. and learned gentleman no doubt had i; his mind what has been well expressed by Professor Max M tiller : Nature teaches us that nothing can live which cannot grow and change, and all history con- firms nature's tcacliing by showing us tliat notliing has been more fatal to institutions than a blind faith in their finality. And when hon. gentlemen speak of the constitution of the United States of America, surely they have only to turn to Ftderal Constitution : [10 Mafx'U, ISOl.] Hesolut'ions. :il : the volumes of Mi\ Bryce, and other stan- dard works, to see how, partly by usage, I and partly by interpi-etation by the su- preme court, that constitution, not in very ; important principles, but in various priii- ; -ciples regulating the relations between j states and thefederal government have been varied very considerably during the last thirty or forty years, or longer. So that I think what Ave have to try to do on this occasion is not to lay down rigid rules to operate for all time ; but simply to con- struct the frame work of a constitution Avhich we may submit to our respective parliaments vrith some hope that they will concur in our work, in order that we may take the first step in the federation of the whole of the colonies. I hope the re- sult of our labours will be to give to those colonie.s, so far as such conditions can be secured by any human institutions, unity, strength, peace, and concord. Mr. WEIXOX : I shall endeavour, Mr. President, to briefly direct the attention of the Convention to certain issues which fteem to me to have been raised by the dis- cu.s.sion in which we have been engaged during the past week. The subject before the Convention is a vast one, and it would be impo3.siljle for us to here embrace it in every a.«!pect wliich it presents. But I think we should have debated in vain for the past week if we did not find certain issues eliminated from the general mass of discus-sion and on whicli our decision is now challenged. That those issues involve diffi- culties need not be conceded. We are all acquainted witli the difficulties which sur- round tliCH, 1891.] Hesolutione, That, sir, seems to me an exceedingly serious proposition, and we ought to pause well be- fore we go further with it ; for what does it mean ? Finance is government, and govern- ment is finance, and under the English sys- tem of government one or other house must appoint the executive, ISTo one here has proposed to take the executive out of both houses, as in America, and to have them appointed by the people. One house or the other under our proposed S3\stem must appoint the executive, and I say that the house that really controls the finances will be the house that will really control the government. You will observe that this veto, which we are now asked to give to the senate, will not be a power of general veto, such as the upper houses in these colonies now have, and which they exer- cise, and exercise properly, in an emer- gency. This is a power to be expressly given to the senate, to be exercised in the interests of the states, enabling it to amend in any way it pleases any of the financial proposals of the lower house. That means the handing over to that body of the real control of the finances ; and the handing over of tlie real control of the finances means the handing over of government. I ask lion, gentlemen in all seriousness to consider whether it is likely such a proposal could be seriously entei-tained? Our anxiety is to do something. Surely we do not wish merely to meet together here for the pur- pose of putting forward hypotheses which will come to nothing. Wo want to do something, and I ask hon. gentlemen to consider whether a scheme of government of the kind suggested will be lasting — that is, a scheme under which three or four states, with a population of some- thing over 1,000,000, could control the action of other states with a population of 2, ■250,000. Do hon. members think that that would be submitted to 1 Is it likely to last 1 The larger states, as well as the smaller one.s, have their feelings ; [J/?'. Wrixon. and while it may be quite right to give the smaller states a certain power and weight, this proposal would give them, not only weight, but the power of absolute command, control, and government over the whole of these dependencies. Now, it is of no avail to talk to us of the United States, because you are not proposing to copy their form of government. If you were proposing to take the executive out of the two houses, you might divide the power between them as you chose ; but that you do not propose to do. Sir John Dowxer : Why ? Mr. WRIXON" : I have not heard it proposed as yet — in fact, in the speeches of Sir Samuel Griffith, and of Mr. Barton, and other members who supported their view, the idea was repudiated. Mr. Clark : No ! Mr. WRIXON : Does the Attorney- General of Tasmania mean to say that ii is seriously proposed that we should star a dominion government upon the lines oS the United States 1 Mr. Clark : No ! An Hex. Member : Switzerland ! Mr. WRIXON: Or of Switzerlani either 1 Is that sei'iously proposed 1 An Hox. Member : It is to be a hybri( form of government — it is to contain little of everything ! Mr. WRIXON : Is it really propose^ to add to the difficulties of our position i: dealing with federation by going oflf int an entirely new experiment as to th federal government and instituting a form of government different not only from that of England but from that of each of the provinces 1 Dr. CocKCURX : It will be necessary ! Mr. WRIXON: I do not think so. That remains to be proved. If you adhere to the English principle of government you must bear this in mind, that what is really asked for by the smaller states is practically the control of the dominion. That is what it comes to. Federal Constitution : [10 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 215 Mr. Clark : What is asked fcr is co- jrdinate power ! Mr. WRIXOX : There is no such thing IS co-ordinate power in this matter. It s an observation at least as old as Shak- ipere that if two men ride a horse one uust ride first. If vou have the English lystem of government you can have no !0-ordinate powers as between the two louses : it cannot be done — it is an im- wssibility under the Engli.sh system. We ill know that under that system the lower louse is the real centre of government, Occasionally the upper house may differ 'rom the lower house, but that does not natter — the government goes on as before, '. would ask hon, gentlemen to pause jefore they seriously insist upon this view, jecause the effect of it would be this: that whUe it is put merelyas a6nancial question —as a question of amending a money bill — ihereal effect of it is to givethedetermining )Ower of government into the hands of, it DQay be, a small minority of the peoi)le. And I do not think any federation founded on those lines would be lasting, I think we are makin;; a large conces.sion to the smaller states in allowing thom equal representa- tion in the senate, I think also that there are otiier conce.ssions which might be made to those states. But, to maintain that they should Iiave the financial power krlaimed for them, would be to attempt to lay the foundations of this new confederacy in a thoroughly false way. But do I ignore the difficulty of the position] Do I at- tempt to say that nothing should be done for the smaller states? Do I look at ^merely one side of the question, and see only the difficulties on that one side ? No, sir, I atlmit that there is weight in the contention that the smaller states ought to be given as powerful a voice as is con- sistent with the carrying on of the ordinary principles of the Engli.sh .system of govern- ment in this dominion, I quite agree, for one thing, that with regard to the house of representative.^;, the smaller states should have a larger representation than that to which they would be entitled in proportion to their population. Mr. Clark : That is a sop ! Mr, WRIXOX : It is a very effectual sop — a sop that was given and taken in Canada. I think, for instance, that it is uni'easonable to provide, as was provided in the bill of my hon, friend who interrupts me, for two representatives of Western Aus- tralia in a house of 150. The Attorney- General of Tasmania talks of a sop. We should need to offer a very large sop if we were to constitute our house of representa- tives upon such lines. I, for one, would not be in favour of it. I think some minimum .should be fixed, and that any state, however small, should have a certain number of representatives in the lower house. The smaller provinces acting to- gether through their representatives would be a very important body, and would consti- tute a formidable minority. Hon, members will remember this : that all governments are, as the government in the dominion parliament will be, anxious to conciliate all sections of the house. Governments live by so doing, and the notion of a government wishing to override the views of all the smaller states is imaginaiy. It is the first duty and interest of a government to conciliate every section of the house, and if we were to give a fair representation to the smaller states, I think they would form an important body, liable at any time to be consolidated. Also, I think it is well worth consideration whether some provision might not be made that not more than a certain number of mem- bers from the large states should be min- ister.^. I think something might be done in that direction, so as to facilitate the go- veiniiient bc-ing composed partly of mem- bers from the smaller state.s, and partly of members from the larger ones. I think it in not impossible to introduce some such Fifth day. 216 Federal Constitution: [10 March, 1891.] liesohuions. pi'ovision. I tliink "\ve inigLt also indicate a certain class of measures which should be included in separate bills. It is pos- sible that the ingenuity of a carefully com- posed committee, looking at this question dispassionately and fairly, might be able to point out certain classes of works, federal and other, which might be dealt with in separate bills, and, in respect of these, we might give the senate the full power of veto. I ask the Convention to look at the question in the light of remedies such as those I have mentioned, and of others which hon. gentlemen may be able to devise better than those I myself sug- gest. We should i-ather look to measures such as these for a remedy for difficulties than to a violent change in the whole nature of our government, with the result that we might set up in the proposed federation a government by the few in- stead of by the many. I make this sug- gestion to the Convention with great sin- cerity, because I cannot but feel that if we simply adhere to an advocacy of each side, and allow ourselves to be divided into big states men and little states men, evincing no desire to come to a compro- mise or arrangement, we shall, in all pro- bability, seriously endanger the proposed federation. It is just in such a- case as this that the whole of the provinces of Australia look to us to arrive at some solution of the undoubted difficulty that presents itself. I will not dwell further on that subject. I wish to say one word about the consti- tution of the judicial body of the federa- tion. It would be one of the greatest ad- vantages of the federation to have one judiciary, and I trust that the I'esult of the arrangements we sliall make will bo to make the supreme court judges, and also the county court judges all through the dominion, the judges of the dominion go- vernment, under its authority and ap- pointed by it. I think the proposal to con- stitute a court of appeal for Australia is [il/?-. Wrixon. an excellent one. Many minor but great results will follow in the wake of these proposals. I am not disposed, at least until I have heard further argument from him, to agree with the disinclination of the hon. member, Mr. Clark, to pass a uni- form criminal law. I should have thought at the first blush that it would be advan- tageous to have the principles of the crimi- nal law uniform throughout our new do- minion ; as certainly a large portion of our law must be and will be. Look at the advantage it would be to the mercan- tile community to have a uniform patent law ; and I trust we shall have a uniform bankruptcy law, and have the process of the courts running throughout our great dominion. I know that so far I take the whole Convention with me — my learned as well as my unlearned friends — T mean unlearned in law only — but I now come to a point on which I have observed that several of my learned friends have ex- pressed opinions which I sincerely trust will be deeply considered before they are adopted : that is, in favour of taking away the appeal to the Privy Council. It seems to me that if you do that, you make a very great sacrifice for a very small gain.! At present it is one of the noblest charac teristics of our empire that over the whol of its vast area, every subject, whether h be black or white, has a right of appeal t his Sovereign foi* justice. That is a great right, and a grand link for the whole of the British empire. But it is more than that. It is not, as it might be considered, a mere question of sentiment, although I may say that sentiment goes far to make up the life of nations. It is not merely that ; but the xuiity of final decision preserves a unity of law over the whole empire. The Privy Council at any rate, when it decides, decides finally, and for the whole of the empire. If you provide that your court of appeal in Australia shall be final, this evil may arise : The Supreme Court of Austra- Federal Constitution : [10 March, 1S91.] Eesolutions. 217 lia will decide, say, a commercial question men wlio generally, I do not say on every on the construction of a charter party in one occasion, preside at the Privy Council, and way this year ; while next year the Judi- partly, perhaps, it may be, on account of the cial Committee of the Privy Council, com- feeling of veneration for the old land, and , posed, I will say for the sake of argument, partly, also, on account of the fact that of a very strong court, will decide the very the decision of the Privy Council is final same question in another way. We should and general throughout the whole empire — then be in this curious position : that we the decisions of that court are always ac- should have a different law from that of cepted and acquiesced in by the different the rest of the empire on a great mercan- colonies, the decisions of whose courts are tile question. There would then be a feel- dealt with by it. You will throw away all ing in our local courts as to whether they that if you take away the appeal to the should follow the decision of the court of Queen from the people of Australasia. I appeal in Australia, or the decision which do not think the evil you seek to cope with they might consider to be the better law is very great, and I do not think the ap- of the judicial committee in England. I peals would be very many. Every lawyer believe there is a vast gain in unity of ad- knows that when appeals are made, the ministration and interpretation of the law, courts impose conditions as to costs, and and in having in all these distant and scat- in other ways, which, as far as possible, tered dependencies, not only the decisions preveiit the appeals from being too numer- of the English judges to go upon, but ous. also the legal literature of England, the Sir John' Dowxer : The conditions im- books and comments upon them, to guide posed are insufficient ' us as to the law on different subjects. Mr. WPilXON : I hope to see tlie hon. All lawyers know how valuable that is. member. Sir John Downer, a member of All that, however, would be lost when you that appeal court, and I trust he will im- cut away the connection injudicial matters pose sufficient conditions before he allows between the dominion and the old country. an appeal to the Privy Council. I have I may mention another difficulty which no doubt he will do so, I will not delay .••eems to me to stand in the way of this the Convention any longer on this point ; proposal. I tliink it would be very diffi- but I have noticed that so many gentle- cult to constitute a court of ajipoal in Aus- men, particularly my legal brethren, have tralia sufficiently strong to conunand un- declared so positively in favour of a final questioned confidence in the provinces, the court of appeal in Australia, that I wish decisions of whose courts it would overrule. to ask lion, members to think about it be- I will take tlie example of my own colony fore wc arrive at a final determination. I of Victoria. There important matters arc will not detain hon. members any further, heard before six judges, and I believe I because I feel wc are bound to be brief if may .say truly, that tlioje judges are six of we want to get to business. I repeat that the ablest lawyers in A^ictoria, I douljt I do not think the difficulties are so great whether it would be possible to constitute when you look at them. There are always in the dominion a supreme court that difficulties when you wish to take action, would so completely overshadow that court, What we want to do is to grapple with and all other provincial courts, a.s to give one or two points, and I think they can perfect satisfaction when it reversed their be readily grappled with. The fiscal difli- dccisions. Whereas, when we go home to culty I believe to be imaginary. It only the old land — partly on account of the able needs to be taken in hand l)y an intelligent Fifih day. !1S Federal Constitution : [10 ]NrARCii, 1S91.J ResoJiitions. committee, jvho can see practically how ifc stands and what we should do. The state rights difficulty is equally imaginary, if we only fix in our minds what we want and what we intend to do. Sir John Downer : It is not imaginary in the way the hon. member has put it ! Mr. WRIXON : It is imaginary if we only fix in our minds what we desire to do. Mr. Fitzgerald : The hon. memljer has said that government is finance, and that finance is government ! Mr. WEIXON : The hon. member who favoui'ed me with his attention at that part of my address did not favour me with his attention when I pointed out ways in which the rights of the smaller states could be better secured ; and he ought to consider those ways before he decides ab- solutely in accordance with his intei-jec- tion. "With regard to the question of state rights, we must consider what is pro- posed. No one proposes that the smaller states should be swamped or voiceless. No one wishes that, or would agree to that. But on the other hand, does any- one propose that these smaller states should govern 1 No one will propose that, and if we approach the subject reasonably, we ought to have no difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion. The great characteristic of Englishmen has always been, not that they do not get into difficul- ties, but the wonderful way in which they get out of them ; how they fight through them ; how they face them ; how they work through to a solution of them. I venture to think that we who are Englishmen, or the descendants of Englishmen, will not be frightened by the difficult points which have been raised here, but that we shall grapple with them and o\ercome them ; and I have no doubt that we shall succeed in the enterprise which we have in hand. Mr. J. FORREST : It was not my in- tention to speak to-day; but as there seems [J/?'. Wrixon. to be a disinclination on the part of mem- bers to continue the debate, and as it is still early, I have no objection to offer to the Convention at this stage the remarks which I deem it my duty to make, and, as I have not very much to say, I shall not detain hon. gentlemen very long. I am very pleased indeed to be here ; and the colony I represent is both pleased and proud to have an opportunity of sending delegates to this great Convention. It is the first time, as you are all aware, that we in Western Australia have been able to meet the representatives of other colo- nics on quite equal terms; and it is a great pleasure to us and a great privilege that the first occasion on which we meet on equal terms the statesnien of Australia should be with the object of founding an Australian dominion. There is no doubt that the feeling in Australia is that it should not be allowed to remain a number of small states. I hope that the result of our deliberations in the Convention will be all that the people of Australia desire ; and I also hope that you, sir, who have conceived this great idea, may be rewarded for your great patriotism and your loyalty not only to the old country, from which you sprang, but also to Australia ; and I hope that the result of your exertions will be that, at no distant date, there will be established in Australia a federal dominion. These are my individual opinions. I have looked forward for many years to the day when this continent would become one great dominion under the Crown. I have read with very great interest the able speeches which were delivered by the members of the Convention before our arrival, and I have watched with much interest the proceedings of the Convention since. The speeches, so far as I am able to judge, are remarkable for their dignity and for their earnestness, as well as for their broad and patiiotic views. I notice also that the speeches generally were not Federal Const'ilution: [10 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 210 in any way local in tlie directions they took, I felt myself in some difficulty, because I should have liked to follow in the course taken by those who preceded me. I will, to the utmost of my power, and as far ;ts I am permitted, follow in that course. But I have a duty, and that duty compels ine to examine the matter clpselj', as it aliects the states having small populations and large areas, and foremost amongst »liese is the colony I represent— Western Australia. I regret that I shall have to 'h'scend in some remarks I shall have to !;;ake from the pinnacle to which other lion. members attained, and come down, i fear, to what may be called, by some, rather narrow views. The colony I repre- sent is in a very exceptional position. My lion. friend, Sir James Lee-Steei'e, has placed this before the Convention to some extent. It has a large area, nearly one- third of the continent of xVustralia, It has, as you are all awai-e, a small population. It is just entering upon the management of its own affair.s. It is like a young man just starting upon his career. Its people have not considered this great question of federation. We have no communication whatever with the other colonies exceitt by sea. A thousand miles of unoccupied country sfparates us from this part of Australia. All these colonics now are in- dependent. They have their own govern- ments, they are as independent and as free as any of the nations of the world, and wc shall have to ask them, in framing a con- htitution, to give up some of their indepen- dence in order to become a nation. Indivi- dually they will lose in prestige, and instead of being independent states, they will be- come to a certain extent merely provinces in order that collectively they may Ilourish, and in time Vjccomc a nation. I Vielievo that the question of j)restige is one which wiil have an important efTect in dealing with thi.s question when it comes to be con- sidered by the people of tlie dillerent colo- nies, because, to some extent now, all these colonies are prominently before the world. They have their independent governors, their independent legislators, and their in dependent governments, and they are to a certain extent known to the world ; but under afederated government we shall have to be content to sink our individual pro- vinces, and become part of the whole nation. I am quite sure that we shall lose in pres- tige individurJly, and we shall probably suffer socially. I believe that that, to a very large extent, has been the result of federa- tion in Canada. As far as I have been able to judge, and I have travelled through the country, the provinces of Canada are to a great extent unknown outside of the domi- nion. Even the statesmen and governors of the several pi-ovinces are scarcely known beyond thelimitsof their own country. But that is not the case in these colonies at the present time. We all know who is the Governor of Victoria or the Governor of New .South Wales, and who are the pro- minent statesmen hei'e. Few people, how- ever, will tell you anything about the pro- minent men in the states of America, or about the prominent men in the provinces of Canada. Although, as I said before, this is a matter of sentiment, it will have to be considered ; and, since we are to a great extent ruled by sentiment, it will be largely discussed, and will require great attention, when the question comes to be thrashed out in the j)arliaments of the dillerent colonics. At the same time, I feel sure that every Australian, whether he be an Australian by birth or by adoption, must look forward to the time when he will be a citizen of Australia, when his boast will be, not that he is a Victorian, a New .South Welslinian, a Queenslander, a. South Australian, or a Tasmanian, but that he is an Australian, and I believe that this is gradually l)econiing the position. It is not usual, when you meet people in other parts of the world, and ask them where Fiflh day. 220 Federal Constitution : [10 March, 1891.] Jxesolutioiis. they came from, for them to say that they are Tasmanians or Yictorians, but they call themselves Australians. I believe that this sentiment is taking deep root in the minds of the people of this continent, and that the desire of young Australians un- doubtedly is that Australia tJiall become a nation, and that we shall be no longer separated from one another by artificial lines. After all, these boundaries, as I believe was said by some one the other day, are merely artificial lines on the map. In some of the colonies where settlement has extended, they have at- tained some practical permanence, and are actually known on the ground, but as a rule how were they fixed ] Merely in a haphazard fashion on the map. The boun- dary between Western Australia and the more easterly colonies is the 129tli meri- dian of longitude ; but fhat boundary was iixed upon merely at haphazard, without any reference to the interests which might be involved. Again, the boundary between Victoria and New South Wales is the river Murray — a most unsuitable divi- sion. No line of division is so unsuitable as a river. The people living on each side of it marry, and become virtually the same people ; but they are divided by artificial boundaries, such as customs tariflfs, and everything is done to estrange them from, rather than to make them more friendly to, each other. In dealing with this ques- tion, I feel certain that although senti- ment, as I have just said, may play some important part, the good sense of the people of Australia will show itself; but we shall have to be able to show the people of the colonies that there is .something to be gained by their becom- ing federated. At any rate, if we can- not show them that there is something to be gained, we shall have to prove to them that they will not lose anything by feder- ation, and that in sinking to the condition of provinces or states — I do not think [J/r. J. Forrest. there is a great deal in the name, both words mean about the same thincc ; but, if T may be allowed to say so, I myself pre- fer the name state — they will be far greater as an integral part of the Aus- tralian dominion than as independent com- munities. That, it seems to me, will be the duty of those who have to impress upon the people of the different colonies the ad- vantages of federation. They will have to show that there is somethinof to be gained, or, at any rate, that there will be nothing lost by the act. I feel sure that upon our return to our respective colonies we shall be confronted with questions, not only by the supporters of the government in the house, but also by the opposition, who, on all subjects, even upon those which commend themselves generally, take an opposite side to that taken by the government; — we shall be asked, " What advantage are we to get by giving up our individuality and inde- pendence 1" and what will be our reply ? I have not heard this matter argued in this august assembly yet. It seems to be taken for granted by every one, in our desire to become a great nation, and to bind all parts of Australia together, that federa- tion is essential, and that the people will, of course, consider that federation is a de- sirable thinG:. Colonel SiiiTU : But the hon. member's colony will have to give up its independ- ence ! Mr. J. FORREST : We shall have to give up something. It is impossible to have a federal government unless that go- vernment is strong, and if any one holds the idea that we are to continue to enjoy all the privileges which we now have, I should like to ask what power is the federal government to have? We shall be asked, " What advantage are we to get by giving up our individuality V and we shall say, " Our desire is to become a nation. You will be defended in the time of war by the whole of Australia; Ave will make Federal Constitidioyi : [10 Marcu, 1891.] Resolutions, 221 you good laws, that shall apply and have effect throughout the Avhole of Australia, and Ave ■•.vill give you free-trade all over the continent." It occurs to me that those are the principal advantages which we shall be able to promise to those who ask us what they will gain by federation. Their reply Avill be something of this kind : "You say we will be a nation; but we are part and parcel of a great and mighty nation already, and, as far as the matter of defence, we are defended by the power of Great Britain — the land of our fore- fathers : she alone is able to pi-otect us from the forces we have to f eai-, from those forces which will come across the sea.'' Western Australia will ask, " How could Eastern Australia defend us ; how can she bring her armies, if she has them, to defend us from invasion. Why, there are 1,000 miles of unoccupied territory between our occupied lands and theirs." As to the good laws which are to prevail throughout Aubtralia, I expect the reply will be the one which these colonies once returned to tlie British Government : " We do not want your good lav/s ; we will have our own." Again, as to the question of free- trade : it will be argued that that policy is even undesirable, and if it is desirable they will say, " We should like to settle it in our own v.-ay." Tt will bo argued, too, that it is quite possible to have free trade without federation. These are some of the arguments which will be used, I fear, by .some of the smaller states, and I think they will require to be adequately replied to. I venture to think we shall have to show tliat the scheme is practically not disadvantageous to tlio diflferent states, or I feci sure it will be almost impossible to obtain their acquiescence. I agree generally with the able remarks of the lion, member, Sir Samuel Griffith, in reference to the com- position of the ujiprr hou.se, I believe that the only security the lower .states would have would be that the senate should be strong and powerful. The colo nies with sm.all populations and large areas must not be annihilated altoirether. Their only protection is a powerful upper house. I should like to ask hon, members what influence, for instance, would these small states have in a lower house of this federal parliament if they are to have two or three members representing them 1 It seems to me that if the lower house were fixed upon a basis of population, say, of 30,000 people for each representative — I do not suppose you would be able to have a lesser number than that, or the house would soon be too large — New South Wales and Victoria would each have something like 40 members, whereas Tasmania would have 5, Queensland, 1-i ; South Australia, 10 ; whilst Western Australia would have only 2. New South Wales and Victoria, which are two colonies situated close to- gether, whose interests are almost identical, having, to a large extent, the same climate, the .same productions, would each have more than the whole of the other colonies put together. The whole of the other colo- nies together would have about thirty re- presentatives, whereas each of these colonies would have about forty. I should like to ask, what .security would all the other smaller states have if these two colonies were in any way combined, and it is only natural to expect them to combine] I agree with what fell from the hon, member, ]\Ir, Barton, that resolution No, 1 should bo very clearly specified, and that tlic actual territory of any existing province shall not be sultject to any kind of iliniiimtion or ab- sorption for the purpose of constituting new pro- vince.?, except with the con.scut of the legislature of the province allccteil. It seems to me that that is an important provision, and I think it was clearly in- tended by you, Mr. President, when you drafted the resolution that tlie territory of any state should not be interfered with,, except with the consent of the parliament of that state. I think it would be well tO' Fifth day. ooo Federal Constitution : [10 IMarcii, 1891.] Resolutions. have the words employed by the hon. mem- Lei', Mr. Barton, added to the resolution so as to make it perfectly clear. I believe the only security to those states, with small populations, is that the senate or upper house should have equal power with the lower hou-se in regard to amending bills. I cannot see that there is any great objection to this, because, as far as I know, it is the custom which exists in the United Statesof America, and Ihavebeeninformed, and believe it is true, that it even exists in Tasmania, and that the Tasmanian upper house amends all bills, monetary or other- wise. I do not exactly know what the law of vSouth Australia is, but the same privilege was contended for there for a long time ; and I do not see any reason why the other house should not amend money bills, be- cause they would be as clearly the repre- sentatives of the people as would the house of representatives. I favour the election of the upper house of this federal govern- ment by the legislature in the same way as in the United States. I believe that it is the best possible way of getting an upper house, because the consequence of having an upper house elected by the masses of the people is that you get two houses too much alike, and the object of an upper house is thus, to some extent, frustrated. I cannot myself see what objection there can be to the legislature electing the upper house. I be- lieve you would get the most wise and most experienced house in that way. An upper house would be exactly the sort of house as that we now see before us, because we have all been nominated and elected by our respective legislatures. It seems to me, if I may be allowed to say so, that such a house would not be inferior to any house to be elected directly by the people. I do not see myself, with the little con- sideration I have been able to give to the subject, how the power to make and un- make ministries can be taken away from the lower house. A federal lower house £J/?-. J. Forrest. would be a different body from the provin- cial bodiesnowexisting. It would beelected by countries separated from one another. We should not have a lower house repre- senting a particular area of country, in the same way as we have in Victoria or Kew South AVales, or any of the other colonies ; but we should have in cur lower house a representative body elected by different] peoples, separated, probably, by wide dis- tances from each other, and I think there- fore that you would have a different kind of house from the lower house in any par- ticular state. You would not find them so influenced by local events, and you would find them, I think, more likely to take a calm judicial view of the situation than would any house representing the people in any particular state or province. I do not believe in too radical experiments or novelties in legislation, and I myself should very much prefer to see the future legislature of the dominion of Australia based on the principles of the legislature of the old country — in fact, similar in all respects to the legislatures of these colo- nies. It is a form of government under which we have been accustomed to live — under which we have flourished — andj which we, to some extent, understand. It is a form of government we are familiar] with and like, and I myself have no de- sire to go in for any novelties or new- fangled notions in government, even ifj they have been jDroved to exist in otlierj parts of the world. I would rather stickj to the old ship — follow the traditions ofl the British House of Commons, and try toj found in this part of the world something] like that which exists in the old country, I j am therefore very much inclined to favourl generally the resolutions which you, sirJ have placed before the Convention, except] that the senate should have power toj amend all bills, money bills included, and that the colonies with small populations should have a fixed number of representa- Federal Constitution: [10 March, 1S91.] liesoluiions. 223 tives until their population entitled tliem to exceed such fixed number. That has Leen very forcibly placed before hon. members by the hon. member, Mr. Brown, of Tasmania, and by my hon. friend, Mr. Wrixon, and I think that it would be a good way out of the difficulty. I think also that it is desirable that the constitu- tion act should make provision for new states to be admitted into the federation, so that any state which is not willing or able to enter into the federation at the present time might at some future time be enabled to do so. There is, I believe, a clause in the Canadian Constitution en- abling colonies to enter the federation, and I think that it would be a wise provision for us. While I am generally in accord ■with the resolutions which you, sir, have placed before us, with the one or two ex- ceptions that I have named, I believe there will be extreme difficulty, and that it is extremely unlikely that the colony which I represent will agree to join the proposed confederation unless we can show the people there some means of rapid communication between these colo- nies and our.selves. I do not myself think that that is an insuperable diffi- culty ; but it seems to rne a difficulty that will require to be removed before we shall be able to satisfy our people that it will be to their advantage to enter into the federation. I have now exhausted all that I have to say on the sul)ject. I thank hon. members for the attention that they have given me. I fear that I have not added very much to this very interest- ing debate ; but I can say, sir, that it is the desire of all Western Australians to join in this great federation ; and, as far as I am able, I will endeavour to urge on the mat- ter. At the same time, I see practical difficulties in the way. People sometimes look at things in a narrow point of view ; and, unless we can show them that it is to their material advantage to join with the other colonies — in fact, that if they will not gain anything, they will not, at any rate, lose anything — I see very great difficulties in the way. In conclusion, sir, I can only say that I hope that the time is not far distant when all the difficulties to which reference has been made by myself and others will be removed, and that we shall eventually be able to frame a constitution which will be acceptable to the people, and do justice to each part of Australia. Motion (by Mr. Gillies) agreed to : That the debate be now adjourned until to- morrow. Convention adjourned at 4'J:7 p.m. WEDNESDAY, 11 MARCH, ISDl. Federal Constitution (sixth daj's debate) — Adjournment. The President took the chair at 11 a.m. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIOX. SIXTH day's debate. Debate resumed on resolutions proposed by Sir Henry Parkes {vide page 23). INIr. GILLIES : I do not know, sir, whether it is an advantage to appear early or to appear late in this debate. Perhaps there are advantages both ways. This I can say : tliat hon. gentlemen Avho liavc addressed themselves to the subject before the Convention have adopted a course which I am sure many of us would often like to .see adopted in our own legislatures — that is, to make it a general rule to have the discussions as short as possible ; and I think we, to some extent, may claim that credit on the present occasion. It i.s not my intention, Mr. President, to discu.s3 technically the resolutions which you have submitted. We all take it for trranted that the resolutions are submitted in a general form to indicate what we Sixth day. 224 Federal Constitution : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. desire to see as the basis of a federal constitution, and in tliat liglit I view the resolutions as generally indicating the objects -svliicli we all have in view. I confess to have been taken a little by surprise yesterday when my hon. friend, Mr. Dibbs, spoke upon this im- portant question. I trust I did not do hira an injustice when I thought that a considerable portion of his speech appeared to have originated in a desire to speak slightly from a party point of view ; as a gentleman who, although I believe he is desirous of seeing a federation of the colo- nies, yet, at the same time, does not ap- pear to be quite satisfied with the federa- tion which is offered, or whicli we are likelv to accept. ^V^hile he was quoting from a public journal here which published some articles and letters some years ago upon the subject of federation, he indicated that it appeared to him, as far as I could gather, that we were making a mistake at the present moment, because we ai'e proposing a federation before we had accomplished a customs union. Now, history is some- times useful ; but I think ancient history of that kind is not at all useful on the present occasion. And I may be per- mitted to remind the hon. gentleman that sentiments such as these coming from liim at the present time, appear to indicate that he has forgotten the commission which tlie parliament, of which he is a member, has given to him to appear at this Convention to deal with this question. May I be per- mitted to remind him that he holds a commission to do certain Avork ? He has accepted that commission, and yet he does not appear to be perfectly clear as to the objects for which the commission was fur- nished to him. Will he allow me to draw his attention to a resolution passed in the legislature of ISJ'ew South Wales only a very short time ago, in Avliich it set out the principles in which it con- curred when it granted the hon. member [Mr. Gillies. a commission along with other hon. gentle- men to represent it in this Convention 1 (1.) That this House concurs in the following resolution : — (a) That, in the opinion of this conference, the best interests and the present and future prosperity of the Austrahan colonies will be promoted by an early union under the Crown ; and, while fully recognising the vaUiable services of members of the Conven- tion of 18S3 in founding the Federal Council, it declares its opinion that the seven years which have since elapsed have developed the national life of Australia in population, in wealth, in the discovery of resources, and in self-governing capacity, to an extent which justifies the higlier act, at all times contem- phvted, of the union of these colonies under one legislative and executive government, on principles just to the several colonies. It also passed a resolution that four mem- bers be appointed during the present year to act as delegates to a National Australian Convention, and be empowered to consider and report upon an adequate scheme for a federal constitution for the Australian colonies. And among the names of gentlemen wh were appointed on that occasion I find th^ name of George Richard Dibbs, Esquire, I should have thought, sir, that the mer fact of the hon. gentleman having accepte that commission to make an effort to fram an adequate scheme for a federal constil tution would have precluded him fro making the observation he made, that w were beginning at the wrong end ; because, from what he told us yesterday, it appear that in his judgment we ought to hav started by coming to an agreement as to a customs union before ever we attempted ' to frame a scheme for a federal constitu- ' tion. I think the hon. gentleman placed himself in a false position yesterday when he appeared to have forgotten the circum- stances in which he is placed. Mr. Dibbs : Did the Victorian Parlia- ment pass a similar resolution ? Mr. GILLIES: Exactly similar, I believe. With the exception of the names of the de- legates, it is verbatim ct literatim the same. Federal Constitution: [11 March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 225 • INlr. DiBBS : Then, may I ask the hoii. most perfect freedom between them in member, by way of explanation, whether regard to all articles passing to and fro. the delegates from Victoria were justified Every one understood that that would be by their commission in asking for material necessarily one of the principal objects that guarantees with regard to the fiscal policy would be secured by federation. Then of Victoria 1 the next question arose necessarily as con- Mr. GILLIES : If my hon. friend had nected with that, namely, that of course listened to what my hon. colleague, Mr. it would he indispensable that the federal Wrixon, said yesterday, he would liave parliament should have the power of im- found that he was completely under a mis- posing duties of customs in order, in the apprehension about any such demand for first place, to raise the necessary revenue, a guarantee. I would point out to him and iu the second place to obtain duties on tbat no proposal has been made ])y the articles introduced from abroad. In other Victoi'ian delegates, nor did the Parlia- ment ask them or require them in any way whatever, to insist upon any guaran- tee at all. But what Parliament called words, the question which was raised was whether it was contemplated by all hon. members that such a tariff would be im- posed on all articles coming from abroad upon them to do was what is stated in as, at any rate, would secure all the colo- the resolution, namely, to go to the Con- vention for the purpose of making an effort to frame an adequate scheme for a federal parliament and a federal govern- ment. That is what Parliament asked them to do, and of course, having to frame a constitution to carry out that object, tliat constitution must necessarily include a variety of measures which would require to be dealt with before it could be pro- parly framed. Mr. Deakik : " Just to the .several colonies "! Mr. GILLIE.S : And the only question tlint was raised by any of my colleagues, as far as I understood tliem wlien I heard their speeches and understood them after reading the report of tlieir speeches, was this f that one of the most important ques- tions that would como before the Conven- tion in the framing of that constitution would be the question of customs, ;ind that question is dealt with iu a very simple manner in the resolutions, which ) ou, 3Ir. President, have submitted. Tlic resolu- tions set out first what all tlio colonies understood — that one of the true objects of federation was to enable tlie colonies to join together, .so that tiiere would be the nies which had by means of the imposition of duties raised large sums of money, and originatedand maintained industries. That question was not raised merely by Vic- toria ; it has been raised by several other colonies. Mr. DiBBS : It was raised by Mr. Deakin ! Mr. GILLIES: Victoria wants no more guarantee than every other colony iu the group desires to have. Victoria is in this position : that she can express the most confident hope that justice; will be done to all the colonies by the federal i)ar- liament in this respect. Wo have not come into this ( 'onvcutiou for (he ]iurpos(>, of saying that if we do not got material guarantees we refu.se to join the federa- tion. The colony of Victoria makes no such statement. ]Iox. IMiCMiJioKS : Hear, hear! Mr. GILLIES: The colony of Victoria is prepared to join the other colonies in framins: a federal constitution, and lU creating a fi (lir.i (;n!l;uMi'iit for tlio pur- pose of acconqilishing great and necessary federal work; otherwise -she docs not de- sire to claim anything that the other colo- nics will not claim and obtain. Victoria Sixth ddij. 226 Federal Constitution : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. desires, as tlie lion, member, Mr. Dibbs, said yesterday, to join hand in hand with the other colonies in creating a federal consti- tution, a federal parliament, and a federal government, in the confident hope that justice will be done to all the colonies in the creation of that federation. The hon. member seemed to think that there were some proposals in these resolutions which involve such serious ditBculties that it would not be possible for him to concur in them ; in fact, I think he told us that he would take care in Committee to do all that he possibly could to take away the power proposed to be granted under the federal constitution to the federal parlia- ment of dealing with the very large subject of defences. The hon. member appeared to me to think that the object indicated in these resolutions was to bring about what is known as a standing army, which the hon. member thought would be a menace to the whole of the continent. 'Now, in one sense, all the colonies have small standinor armies. Colonel Smith : There are altogether 31,000 men ! Mr. GILLIES : The people themselves have undertaken the duty of creating such a force as, in their judgment, would be sufficient to meet any foe that might land on these shores. There is nothing in these resolutions that I can see that would justify the statement that it is contem- plated by any colony, or by any group of colonies, or by any individual, to bring about a standing army of such a kind as that to which the hon. member referred — a standing army that might be a menace to the liberties of the people. The people themselves have created such forces as we have, it is they who willingly main- tain them, and these resolutions contem- plate no more and no less. It is possible that when you have to consider the re- port of Major-General Edwards and the reports of your own officers, it may be [J//*. Gillies. found absolutely necessary to make some slight addition to the forces you already have upon this continent, and to pro- vide that those forces should be under tho command of some one having the control of the whole of them. In fact, a great deal has been written in the whole of the colo- nies as to the necessity for maintaining a federal force in a proper and effective con- dition, so that in the event at any future time — and I hope it will be in the distant future — of a foreign force landing at any point upon the continent, arrangements might be made by which a joint force might be concentrated at that point, and so that instead of separate defences we might have one united defence of Australia. Surely we are not to be told that, because ' that is in contemplation, there is at the same time some secret purpose or object of depriving the people of their rights ' on any particular occasion when possibly there may be some' great difference of j opinion on a great public question. There have been no peoples in these colonies whc have not enjoyed the most perfect freedom] to express their opinions in public, andj through theirrepresentatives in parliament^! on any public question of importance. There has never been any occasion when| such an opportunity has not been given to every man in this country, and so free and liberal are our laws and public insti- tutions that it has never been sujrffested by any mortal upon this continent that that right should be in anyway restricted. On the contrary, we all feel proud of 'the freedom which every one in this country enjoys. It is a freedom not surpassed in any state in the world, not even in the boasted republic of America. I venture to say that there is not a colony in this group but is so attached to its institutions and its laws, and the freedom existing under those laws, that there need be no suspicion of any body of the kind indicated l)y the hon. gentleman being created. It Federal Constitution: [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 227 is possible that tlie force now existing may I be increased sufficiently for the adequate defence of the shores of these colonies iiL'ainst assression ; but I am astonished that the hou. gentleman should for a mo- ment have imagined thai it was in the :!iind of any one of the colonies to create a anding army of such a character as \vould be a menace to the liberties of the i'-i'ople. Those liberties have been too ell enjoyed and too well appreciated to •rmit of any body of men, whether in a i. Jeralor in a local parliament, interfering with them, and I hope the hon. member will release from his mind any idea that it is contemplated under these resolutions to establish a federal force or standing army that would in the slightest degree interfere with our liberties, or tliat any of us, even in imagination, had that object in view. Mr. DiBBS : The hon. member forgets that we have heard other speeches de- livered in this chamber by the mover of these resolutions ! ;j[r. GILLIES : I have not heard a speech delivered in this chamber Avhich conveyed the opinion or idea the hon. member has suggested. Mr. DiBBS : Not in this Convention ! Mr, GILLIES : I heard the address of the President, and I confess I should be surprised if it were found possible to con- strue any portion of it as meaning an attack upon the liberties of the colonies. To mc it is utterly incomprehensible how that view could have got into the mind of the hon. member. I can only assure the hon. member — and I trust he will see that it is 80 — that it is not in any way in contem- plation, and that it is not expressed even in the most vague way language can sug- gest, to give effect to the idea he thought proper to indicate yesterday. I think there will be no dilficulty in the hon. member ob- tainingthe assuranceof every rn'-mbcrof the Convention that they have had no such idea in their minds, and that they would be among the fii'st — in fact, quite as ready as is the hon. gentleman himself — to put their foot down upon any proposition so utterly intolerable to the feelings and views of the whole of the people of these colonies. The hon. member touched another point, and since reading one of the newspapers pub- lished in Sydney this morning it would appear to me that either he himself was yesterday inspired or that he has since ins[)irpd some one else, because in the news- paper to which I refer — and it is a journal which is acknowledged to feel very strongly the importance of federation — the writer appears to have followed the hon. member in his idea that we were justitied in taking into consideration the question of the seat of the federal government. I thought yes- terday — and I trust the hon. member will excuse me if I am dealing with him un- justly — that he was dealing rather harshly with us when he said he intended to throw a bomb-shell amongst us. I thought that rather hard, because I could not imagine what necessity could have arisen for the throwing of bomb-shells. Mr. MuxRO : The hon. member wants to burst us up ! ]\Ir. GILLIES : Of course I assume — I am bound to assume — that although the hon, gentleman may have strong views on the question of federation, and can- not altogether agree with some of the views contained in these resolutions, yet he is honestly anxious to bring about a federation oi these colonies on terms just to each of tlicm, and to do so as soon as possiVile. I will take that for granted ; but I will ask the hon. member, seeing that we arc all gathei-ed together fur the purpose of framing such a constitution, seein" that all the colonies who sent us hither believe, so far as the expression of their opinions is concerned, that the time has come when that should be done, how is it that he is anxious to throw hixth day. 228 Ftdeml Constiiutlon : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. bombs amongst us 1 Of coufso, bombs are unpleasant things, and we can only assume tluit he was prepared to throw bomb-shells amonsst us because he desired to divide us, and to give us as much trouble as pos- sible in coming to conclusions. One of his bombs was, that we are bound to undertake tlie consideration of the ques- tion as to the site of the federal parlia- ment and federal government. I venture to submit that that would be a great mis- take. Our troubles are sutiicientlj numer- ous at the present time; our difficulties in the way of a general agreement are suffi- ciently great ; and we should be regarded as men without worldly experience if we unnecessarily at present undertook to de- termine the site of the federal parliament and federal "government. I believe there is a golden rule in the courts that the judges will not determine a point which they are not necessarily called upon to determine at once ; but they determine the point which comes foremost, and which may settle the question under considera- tion. That is an admirable rule, and in this case it Avould be a golden rule to fol- low. I feel certain that hon. members who have the responsibility of considering tlie important question of the framing of a federal constitution will agree that they are not called upon to consider questions that are not now pressing upon their atten- tion. That that question will have tobe con- sidered and determined by and-by there is no doubt ; but I do not think the mem- bers of this Convention will be held to be cowards, or to be afraid to determine that question when the time comes. I say the time has net come for the settlement of that question, and it is a most serious mistake for any hon. member to attempt to throw bombs into this Convention by raising unnecessary difficulties in the settle- ment of the questions we have to consider. I do not think, however anxious the hon. member may be for the settlement of the [J//-. Gillies. question of the site of the capital, that he need press it upon our attention ; because we have greater work before us, and work that must first be attended to. The hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, was also good enough to say that he had the spirit of a x'epublican. I do not know what that is. I do not know that if we created a republic on this conti- nent to morrow we could pass any better laws or establish a better constitution than the individual states enjoy at the present time. When I hear opinions ex- pressed that probably a republican form of government would be very much better than any other in these states, I feel bound to ask how can a man come to that con- clusion 1 Ts it merely because he is in love with a president, or that he does not like the Queen ? If our form of govern- ment Avere of a kind that was disagree- able or distasteful to him or to the people, I could understand such an opinion. Great changes in the government of states are not brought about without some reason, and unless the hon. gentleman desires we should think that he has some substan- tial reasons for his desire to alter the con- stitution of these states, I wonder why he made such a statement. It may be that at some future time, perhaps 100 years hence, we shall lie an empire and not a republic, and we might flourish quite as well under an empire as we should under a republic. But I must say that I think the time is not approaching, in fact as far as we can judge, it is far away, when this continent will be under a republican government. That the people will have an opportunity of deter- mining that for themselves when the time comes goes without saying. But it does not appear to me to be in the right tone and the right spirit to introduce such a question when we are called upon to frame a federal constitution for the purpose of en- abling a number of states to join together for doing hijrher work than the individual states can do for themselves. That was Federal Constitution : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 22.9 the idea '^•hicli was in the minds of those who, a number of years ago, desired to see these colonies federated. Thev foresaw, and, after all, it was not difficult to fore- see, that as these colonies were under separate governments and parliamentsthey would frame legislation which, instead of uniting with bonds of affection the people of these states belonging to the same race, professing the same religion, and living under one imyjerial government, would have the effect of increasing year by year the difficulties in the way of joining in a federal union. These men were, therefore, extremely anxious, even in the earliest days, to come to some understanding in favour of a great federal union. J3ut many of the colonies had only just then obtained their constitutions, and they be- lieved that the time had not come for them to join in a larger union. Now, however, when we are prepared to join in a larger union, we are coolly told, " What is the good 1 In all probability in a few- years we shall be a great republic, and we shall then have the whole of our destinies in our own hands. AYe can then make such laws as we think proper, without even consulting the Imperial Government or her Majesty." In my judgment such remarks do not sound well at the present moment. We have nothing to complain of. We have no reason to lind fault, and therefore there i.s no justilication in speak- ing of such a dissolution of the connection between these colonies and the empire. Wo stand in close relationship to the empire, and there is nothing which wc liave ever asked in reason in modern times that has not been granted. Although it may be true tliat wo may look forward with some degree of certainty to the probability that in the distant future we shall be a strong nation ; whether that will be under a re- public, or under an empire, or under a kingdom, it is impossible for us to say at the present time ; and at the present mo- ment it is not important what that form of government will be. All that any coun- try looks forward to is to be well governed. The form of government which they think best is the form of government which they are entitled to have. But so long as we have the freedom which we enjoy on this continent, where we can make v/hatever laws we think proper without interference or direction, and so long as we enjoy such a constitution as we have, and which is one of great elasticity, I feel perfectly cer- tain that we need not begin even to think of the foundation of a republic which may exist only in the minds of men 100 years hence. This debate has turned, after preliminary observations, on the important propositions contained in the I'esolutions of the Presi- dent. Before passing on to the two im- portant questions that have mostly occu- pied the attention of the Convention up to the present, I would venture to make one remark, which I think it is important should ha borne in mind. When a story is repeated with miserable iteration it often gathers force behind it by its constant utterance, and yet there may not be a word of truth in it. It is well that the people of this continent, and the public of this colony— because on this question jiro- bably Xcw South Wales and one or two other colonies are most interested — shouM clearly understand the point to which I am about to refer, namely, whether it is pro- posed in the creation of a federal constitu- tion togranttothc federal parliament power to divide the states, to take a portion of territory from one of them and grant it to some other state ? Now, does any lion, gentleman in this chamber believe that that is contemplated'? Jt is not contemplated. Nobody has ever said it publicly in any way, and I think it is very unjust that an insinuation should be thrown out that under one of the resolutions it will be possible to do what I .say was never contemplated, and to which utterance Sixth day. 230 FeJend Constitution : [11 March, 1801.] Resolutions. ^v.as never given by any lion gentleman in the Convention. This question is in the minds of many jieople who arc oppospj altogether to the establishment of federa- tion. One of the first reasons they give is, " Why, if New South Wales goes into this federation, what will happen? South Australia is anxious to have the silver- mines ; Victoria is anxious to go up to the Murrumbidgee ; Queensland is anxious to have some of our lovely flats." Now, is not this a pity, when we are engaged in audi an important work, the principles of which were considered by all the legisla- tures of tliis continent without a syllable having been hinted on that subject, or, if hinted, always disallowed, and without a syllable or a hint being contained in these resolutions, where, on the contrary, it is de- liberately set out that all the rights nowpos- sessed by the various colonies entering the union are to be preserved, except such as may be necessary to hand over to the federal parliament. And to hand over in what way ? To hand over, not generally, not using general language that might take in a whole host of things that people did not intend ; but using language so specific that only for the purposes of federation, and no other, shall these lands be taken, and then only small pieces, and with the consent of the state parliament. When we are told in this way that our objects are very deep and profound, but cunningly veiled and concealed — that we desire no less than to take a large portion of the territory of New South Wales — I say it is not fair, it is not just, that any gentleman should, even by the use of language, mistakenly create the idea that such is the intention under- lying the resolution, and the intention in the minds of members of this Convention. It is well thatwherever necessary we should emphasise the fact that the idea to which I have referred is a mistake, and that no such thing was ever contemplated. I now come to the two questions involved in the reso- [J/?-. Gillies. lutions which have formed the principal subject of debate. I did not originally imagine that there would be so much made of them. I did not think they indicated the trouble which is in the minds of some hon. members, and I will tell the Conven- tion why. I understood that the colonies represented here came together in good faith ] that, joining together for the purpose of doing a great and good work which tliey could not do individually, they came to this Convention in the most perfect good faith and trust, and in the belief that there was no idea of any two or three colonics being able to join together for the purpose of overreaching them when thfy had be- come federated. Yet there is a notion that tills is the very result that may be brought about, unless something is done to prevent it. For the first time, we are asked de- liberately on this continent to enter into a totally new state of things with reference to the powers of two houses of parliament. Under the proposed constitution it is in- tended to create a senate and a house of representatives. You, sir, I think, follow not only the track — but the beaten track — we have ever understood since we have been under responsible government, that the powers of the two houses of legislature, the senate and the house of representa- tives, should be absolutely equal in all re- spects but one, and the reason of that excep- tion is this : that two houses cannot do all the same work. I thought that principle was so well recognised that there would be very great difficulty indeed in raising any opposition to it, and instead of appealing to imagination and sentiment, I desire to appeal to experience. I desire to appeal to all the experience the Imperial Parlia- ment has had, and to all tlie experience the peojile of the colonies have had on this point. But for the explanation which some gentlemen have given who contend for what are called state rights, I should have imagined that state riuhts meant that Federal Constitution : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions, 131 tbey must watcli carefully over all powers taken away from individual states, and granted to tlie federal parliament. That is what I consider to be the protection of state rights. We all know what rights the states have, and if it were proposed to hand over certain of these state riglits to the new parliament to be created under federation, then I could understand that tlie .states would cpiestion every one of those rights, and search keenly and closely to see that they would be dealt justly by — to see, in fact, that rights that thoy have now the opportunity of exercising should not be taken away, unless they and all of us were satisfied that they were taken for federation purposes alone, and that it was indispensably neces.sary, in order to carry out our proposals in the interests of the whole people, that those rights should be taken away for the purpose of secur- ing the greatest good to the greatest num- ber. But now we are told that the rights of the .states may be jeopardised unless the f-enate has the same po.ver as the house of representatives to deal with all bills with the exception of money bills, and the only tiling that has not yet been a.sked for thij power of initiation. Now, I am ling to ask in a minute why it is that the l>ower of initiation should not be given "? But before we enter briefly upon that question, we must bear thi.s in mind, tliat the powers that it is proposed should bo given to the federal parliament are reduced to tlie smallest possible compass, with the object of not disturbing in the slightest degree the right to legislate on all subjects which has been granted to tlic several par- lifiments throughout this continent. Wo disturl) that power as little as pos.sible ; and the range of tlie subjects which the states will liave to discuss and determine is scarcely int(rrferei'ing landed straight o(i in a seaof trouble, because, as the hon. member, Mr. Playford, has pointed out, the idea of the senate amending a customs bill, is — it goes without saying — practically impos.si- ble, I can understand, as every one can understand, that twoh-gislatures, if they arc by any possibility to work harmoniously to- gether, must be reasonable, otherwise legis- lation is iinpossi))le, because the second branch of the legislature has the right to reject any bill which may be sent from the. first branch of the legislature, and the first branch has the legally constituted right to reject any bill which may be sent from the senate. Thei'efore, unless they are willing to be reasonable, you absolutely stick in legislation; you absolutely stick and cannot get ahead. The real reason of the possi- bility of two houses of parliament working together, is the fact that they bring to the consideration of various questions, not the idcaof personal squabbles or per.sonal power, but the idea that they both represent the people, and it therefore becomes them to be careful as to the manner in wliich they make proposals, and as to the manner in which they amend them. It is only by an anxious desire on their part to do the right thing, and by the wise and discriminate ex- ercise of the power possessed by each branch of the legislature, that it is at all possible to get any legislation through parliament. You, Mr. President, know that as well as any man in this community. I would like to know how it is that those gentlemen who claim the rii'ht of amendment have never for a second thouirht of asking for the right of initiation ? Should I tell them why ? I think that the popular branch of the legislature not only is the necessary house to initiate legislation wiih refer- ence to money bills, but with reference to finance gpnerally. It is because they ai'o nearer the ])eople ; they are more truly representative of the people ; and the people look to them with more confi- dence, as their direct i-epresentatives, than they would look to the best senate you could create. I have .said that tli(> hou.se of representatives, the popular branch of th(; legislature, is more in immediate con- tact with the people, and we have known that to our cost. Every hon. gentleman present has known it. ^\ liy, er-minded, honest Man can throughout the greatf-r portion of tlie year get work. At any rate, one thing we can say. Of course this is a divergence, I am sorry to say ; but, seeing the charac- ter of the interruption, I do not know that it is an improper divergence. If the hon. gentleman who madethe interjection thinks proper to look over the statistics of the colonies, he will find that in all the colonies there are lai'ge sums of money in the sav- ings banks, and in the various institutions where the jjeople can lodge their money and get a considerable amount of interest. Considering how we came here — and we all came here to do the best for ourselves — ■ I suppose that none of us were great pluto- crats — we did not bring any mountains of gold with ns, but came here to seek for it — and taking into account the circumstances of the colonies, the amount of wealth ac- cumulated in those institutions which, to a great extent, represent the working- classes, is something marvellous ; and to at- tempt to make a distinction between what some people call the working-classes and others, I do not think can be done. There are a few people who, through hard work, thrift, and good opportunities, have ac- quired great wealth, a fact to which I have no objection, and am sure that everybody would like to see everybody else in a coni- fortalde po.sition ; but as to talking about the working-classes as contradistinguished from any other classes in the state, I ven- ture to say that we are all members of the working-classes — the hon. gentleman him- self is a member of the working-classes — and to create such distinctions is quite unnecessary. I jiointed out that in Vic- toria the sufb-age is so low that the great body of the working men — I mean men who work every day with their hands, tratlcsmen and othf^rs — have votes for the Legi.slative Council, and themembers of the council see that they are under a great re- spon.sibility in representing such a large constituency. I see no distinction between the position of thf twohouses in a st.ite and the position which tlie two houses will occupy Sicth day. 236 Federal Constitution : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. in the federal parliament. Even assuming that some of the states are very naughty, how is it practicable for a few of those states to join together for the purpose of plunder- ing another state? I am taking for granted, as I must, that those v.'ho will be members of that senate will be men who will not be driven, but who will decline to be parties to the plundering of other states, if that should be attempted by bigger states. It is imagined that this will be done unless power is given to the senate to amend money bills. What are they to do 1 The proposal here is that each state is to return to the senate an equal number of repre- sentatives. How will that stand ? On this continent — not speaking of New Zea- land, but including Tasmania — there will be six states, each returning an equal num- ber of members. The two larger states— the two states that will represent 2,250,000 people, will return half the number that the other four states will return, although not numbei'ing one-third of their pojDula- tion. What are we to say about thati Are we to conclude that the smaller states being represented in the senate by double the number of members representing the larger states, will allow the larger states to swindle the smaller ones, or are we to turn round and suppose another thing ? Are we to assume that, being represented in the senate by two to one, it is possible that the smaller states would send representa- tives to the senate to eat up the bigger states? Am I to imagine that? I do not imagine that at all. I believe they will go hand in hand in an honest desire to serve the states on the continent within their limits of legislation — they cannot go out.side them — and seeing that their limits would be comparatively small, I say that it is the beginning of an injustice to in- sinuate that, although the senate Avould jierhaps have power to do lots of mischief to the larger states, they would think of doing it. In all legislation, whether it [Jir. Gillies. be general or financial, who has to bear the brunt ? I will suppose that a particu- lar tax is proposed, and that after being passed by the house of representatives it goes to the senate, the majority of the members there representing probably, as in- dicated, the smaller states. Do you mean to tell me, Mr, President, that you would be of opinion that the smaller states would reject a proposal of taxation, of which they in the abstract approved, because it affected their people ? Why, it would affect the larger states more than it affected the smaller ones. Who is to find the creat proportion of the money 1 Is it not the larger states ? Does any one mean to tell me that in the house of repi-esentatives the larger states, by their representatives, Avould think of imposing taxation of a chai-acter that would not be justifiable, and would not be approved in the face of the knowledge that it would be their own people who would pay nearly all of it, three-fourths of it any way ? Surely that is not a reasonable contention. Seeing that the distribution of taxation would be equal . in all the colonies, then those who are in the greatest majority, of course, must con- tribute the largest amount ; so that you have a perfect security that those who re- present the larger states in the house of representatives will be no parties to fleec- ing their own peojile, simply because they have a sort of idea that one of the smaller states would not like to be subjected to this taxation at all. Mr. GoRDOX : Have we the same suaran- tee as to the expenditure of the money 1 Mr. GILLIES : I hope so. I am glad the hon. member has reminded me of the point, as I was going to pass it over. The federal parliament will have the power of imposing certain taxation. An illustration was given — an unfortunate one, I think — by the hon. and learned members. Sir Samuel Griffith and Mr. Barton, who both touched the question raised by the hon. member Federal Constitution: [11 Makch, 1891.] Resolutions. !37 Ijebind me. The one said it was quite possible that some taxation would be pro- posed that would meet with the strong op- position, and disapproval of some of the small colonies. Well, as I said, the answer to that is that no tax which meets with any very strong disapproval will be proposed at all, for the simple reason that no people like to be taxed if they can help it. It is only upon urgent necessity that a tax will be imposed. For instance, as was remarked, take a proposal to increase the federal force, I will assume that it is sent to the senate in a separate bill. The senate will be in a position to say whether they think it is necessary to increase the federal force to the extent proposed, or whether it should be increased at all. It could reject the bill. Mr. Abbott : AVould it not be in the appropriation bill ? Mr. GILLIES : Certainly not. Mr. Abbott : That is not the case here ! Mr. GILLIES : That would be a bill con- taining a distinct enunciation of a principle. I am quite aware that sometimes increases in the forces are proposed in the annual appropriation bill ; but they have first been started by bills regulating the forces. In order that there might be no doubt on the subject, clau.sos might be inserted in our Constitution Act which would tie the liandsof parliament and of ministers down to seeing tliat propo.sals of that cliaracter, and all proposals containing important principles, and creating a new departure should be sent up to the second branch of the legislature in separate bills. But take other ca.se.s. We know, Mr. President — it is in your knowledge and in mine — that there are a number of cases in which larce penditure is proposed. For instance, some colonies liave the advantage of look- t ing forward to tlie defence of King George's ~ und ; others have the advantage of look- ing forward to the defence of Hobart ; others have the advanta'jo of lookincj for- ward to the defence of Thursday Island. May I ask the representatives of those colonies who will bear the brunt of that expenditure ] It will be the larger colo- nies. "Will they grumble ? Have they said a word in all the conferences we have had ? Have the larger colonies made one solitary objection to bear their share of the expenditure on those works, although so distant from them ? On the broad ground that it is in the interests of the whole of the colonies that that expenditure should be incurred, they are quite willing to contribute towards the works. So Avhen an hon. mem- ber thinks proper to insinuate that the larger colonies are going to do something which is unjust, I say, the experience we have had of the conduct of all the colo- nics, whether large or small, is that they are prepared always to come forward, and put their hands in their pockets without a grumble, and contribute to anything which is acknowledged to be for the welfare of the whole of the continent. I am sorry, therefore, to hear these objections raised on grounds which, I think, are wholly insuffi- cient. One may have an abstract idea of the desirability of gis'ing new powers to the new senate ; but I venture to say that all our experience shows that it is safer, and more for the public interest, that all these matters should be under the control of the popular branch of the legislature, which has a responsibility that the second branch has not, and never can have. I repeat that I do not see, and I hope no hon. member will imagine, that I am saying anything to the disparagement of the senate. I believe it Mill be a very powerful body, indeed ; but to make a comparison between it and the American Senate, is a big and huge blunder too, and the very arguments which I have been u.sing show that. The ]>ar- liamcnt of the United States is the par- liament of a republic. There is no queen to whom ministers arc responsible for every act thoy do. There is a president, who is Sixth day. 38 Federal Constitution : [11 March, 1891.] OTO Resolutions. responsible to the public. There are no responsible ministers, for the ministers are appointed by the President, and are respon- sible to him. His ministers do not go into parliament and explain the whole position ; they do not go and submit their estimates and defend them line by line ; and, in ad- dition to that, in some respects they have nothing like the powers of the Senate. The Senate was specially created, and granted sjiecial powers, some of them plen- ary, for the purpose of meeting a new and untried state of things : that is, instead of having responsible ministers, they had ministers who were not in parliament, and were not responsible to parliament, but were responsible to the President, who holds his office for four years. Now, if they had responsible ministers, who were re- sponsible only to parliament, I venture to say we might have had a different state of things altogether. But a new state of things was suddenly brought into exist- ence, they required to give great powers to one branch of the legislature, and they knew the popular branch of the legislature at that time was very excitable. The popular branch of the legislature is some- times very excitable all over the world, and it is an excellent thing that there should be a wise and judicious senate — and I hope we shall have that here — but it would not add to its usefulness to give it power to amend money bills. The great power that was given in America to the popular branch of the legislature in deal- ing with general legislation, and in initi- ating these bills, was at the same time, to a great extent counteracted by the original framers of the constitution, who feared that they might proceed too far. The Senate has worked this out with remark- able patience, and has done wonderfully well under all the circumstances. It has great power over the President, and great power over the constitution, and there is no doubt whatever that upon the whole it \_Mr. Gillies. has worked wonderfully well. But I chal- lenge any one to say that the English Con- stitution has not worked as well and with- out a real hitch. I challenge any one to say that the Constitution of these colonies, worked by many men with no previous experience of government, has not worked as well as the Constitution of the United States. I venture to say it has, because we have this advantage : that whenever any body of men, whether it be a govern- ment or a house of representatives, at- tempts to proceed too far, or behave im- properly, or behave unjustly, or not carry out, after thorough care and inquiry, the delil^erate wishes of the people, there is a means provided in the Constitution by which those men shall be displaced, and the coun- trj represented by the men of its choice. Again, some people may be inclined to ask, what is the use of the second branch of the legislature 1 I say it is of great use. Some- times there will be a difference of opinion between men in the popular house ; and whenever it comes, sir, to a conflict— such a conflict as a difference of opinion between ' the two branches may bring about — then I say public opinion will be able to decide the question ; and if public opinion is found to be reasonably evenly divided, then, of course, there will be no chance of expecting- that the second branch will give way. But what will result ? A most important thing will result : time will be given for the con- sideration of the new question raised, and time is a most important element in our constitution. It cools the hot-headed, and • it gives confidence to those who believe, they are right. There can be no doubt what- ever that there are occasions when the second branches of legislatures have per- formed important work in our constitutions by affording time for further consideration. That is what you, Mr. President, and what the Speaker of every legislative assembly in the world does. If two parties vote equally, the voice of Mr. Speaker is invariably given I Federal Constitution : [1 1 M arch, 1801.] Resolutions. 239 ■ — is bound by constitutional practice to be given — in favour of delay. All, then, that the senate would do — when the two houses disagreed, and w^ien it appeared that the general body of the people were not of one mind — would be to stand firm and give an opportunity for further considera- tion, and they might, by so doing, save the nation from ditEculty. Another question — and I will touch upon it very briefly — is that with which you have dealt in your resolutions, the responsibility of ministers to one house of parliament, that being the popular branch, it being understood that so long as they possess a majority of votes in the popular branch of the legislature they will remain in ofiice. Now, the posi- tion of ministers, as we all know, is this : that, in many cases, the constitution under which they exist contains no provision re- quiring them, of necessity, to sit in Par- liament. The English Constitution con- tains no such provision. But, for all that, we know that the law of Parlia- ment governs nearly everything. I ven- ture to say that if in England ministers did not sit in Parliament, they would not live one day longer. It is the practice of the Constitution. Although they are not compelled under the law to make their ap- pearance in Parliament, they are all anxious to do so, and if a minister be defeated in an election it i.s a cause of great heart- burning, because he is aware that it is neces- Kary that ho should ajtpear in Parliament in person. The English practice of carry- ing on public Ijusiness would be im[)rac- ticable unless niini.sters appeared in Par- lianjent, and ministers under the English Constitution are responsible first to the Sovereijrn, and then to Parliament. No doubt Parliament includes two branches — the Ilou.se of Lords and tlie House of Com- mons. But it is well known that if the l)0piilar branch of the legi.slature, tho House of Commons, does not approve of a ministry, it gets rid of them in no tinip. There is only one redress, and it is this : that ministers may induce the Sovereign to exercise the power of dissolution. The popuhir branch of the legislature being the branch which determines the existence of ministries, even if you inserted no provision on the subjcctitwould be indispensablethat ministers should appear in that branch. Their political existence is dependent upon the voice of the popular branch. Of what use, therefore, is it to shut our eyes to the fact? It is .said that it is not well that the existence of ministers should depend abso- lutely upon the popular branch of the legis- lature. If hon. members will insist upon shutting their eyes to all the experience" of the past they may make that contention ; but I challenge any one to point to a single instance of such a thing being tolerated throughout the whole experience of the British Constitution. It is necessary to remember that ours is a constitution that is not every constitution. It has not been made up of parts of all the constitutions of the world. It has been the grovvth of centuries ; it is based upon well-known principles ; its working is well recognised ; and he who runs may read it. Mr. GORDOX : It will not work in a federal government ! Mr. CILLIES: I require something more than a mere statement to thatefFect; I Require some proof of it. 1 do not be- lieve the hon. member could point to one set of circumstances in which the constitu- tion, as it is proposed to establish it — ministers being responsible to only one hou.se of the legislature— would not work. What I take it, sir, that you desire to in- dicate in these resolutions is that, in view of the working of the British Constitution^ we ought to follow this practice. But if I am asked whether it is indispensable that this particular provision should be included in our constitution, I say that it is not necessary — that it is not included in the British Constitution, and that it is Sixth day. 240 Federal Constilut'wn: [11 March, 1891.] liesolutions. not to be found in the majority of our own constitutions. The only jiro vision in the Victorian Constitution affecting the point is this : that there must be four ministers sitting in Parliament. Some of these might sit in the Legislative Coun- cil, if it were thought proper. But if you were to eliminate this proposition com- pletely, it would come to the same thing, because ministers must depend upon the support of the popular branch of the legis- lature. If the House of Commons finds in existence, or has thrust upon it, a ministry it does not want, what does it do 1 It stops supply. There is only one case in English history, so far as I am aware, in which a go- vernment succeeded in remaining in office when supply had been stopped. I refer to the well-known Pitt Government, which remained in office to support the king, and which subsequently appealed to the coun- try. But under any circumstances, if it be conceded ihat every government will have to abide by the will of the popular branch of the legislature, it cannot live, it cannot go on with business, if that branch be opposed to its existence. I ask the lion, member who just now interrupted me, to say whether, if the popular branch of the legislature under the new constitu- tion were dissatisfied with the govei'nraent of the day, and if an hon. member suc- ceeded in carrying a vote of want of con- fidence, the government could live % How could it possibly live unless the prime min- ister obtained a dissolution from the go- vernor-general] How long could the go- vernment live if he failed to obtain that dis- solution ? The hon. member, Mr. Gordon, is going round the subject when he says that the practice will not work with a federal government, because we all know perfectly well that the support of the popular branch of the legislature is as necessary to the -existence of a government as is breath to •every hon. member. One word upon another -question and I have finished. I can scarcely \Mr. Gillies. help calling it a funny question, and it is all the more funny because it emanates from some gentlemen who, I am sure, have had a long experience not only in parlia- ment, but as members of governments. They appear to think — I cannot exactly make out why — that a government should be formed which would be all-powerful, not only in the house of representatives, but in the senate, and they declare that they can devise a way by which all the states would be so represented that they would be bound to get fair play. I will put a case. I will assume, sir, that you were honored by the representative of your Sovereign in the person of our first governor-general by being asked to form the first fedei'al government, and that you, with your long experience, following out the idea hinted at the other dav, thou£;ht that you saw your way to a long political life if you could associate with yourself gentlemen from the Parliament of Victoria. You would thus have a government repre- sentina; New South "Wales and Victoria, and, according to the idea set forth the other day, it would have alife extending far beyond the ordinary span allotted to man. In fact, it would never be known when you could be put out of office. While you were supported by such an overwhelming majority, representing two great colonies, the hopes of the lesser colonies would ex- pire. A suggestion Avas therefore made that it would be wise to insert a provision in the constitution that each of the colo- nies should be represented in the ministry as nearly as possible. It is remarkable to hear hon. gentlemen put forth such a view. Surely their experience of parlia- ment teaches them differently. I will as- sumethatsuch a thing as has been described might happen, and that you, sir, might form a goA'ernment of that kind. I look around this hall, and I can see gentlemen who would be in opposition instantl}^, whether you represented New South Wales Federal Constitution: [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 241 01' not. There is my lion, friend, Mr. Dibbs. Do you think that he woukl sub- mit to such a government 1 It would be impossible. There are a number of other hon. members of the Kew South Wales Parliament as -well as Mr, Dibbs who would as naturally go into opposition as they would take their breakfasts if they were hungry. Mr. Dibbs : The hon. member forgets that the proposition came from a Victorian delegate ! Mr. GILLIES : If the hon. gentleman Past experience teaches me that as soon as a government is in office — if it be the best government under heaven, if an arch- angel wereat the head of it — there is strong opposition offered. Therefore, I think that this great fear which has been expressed is a real live bogey. Mr. Abbott : What is the good of an opposition if it is not strong enough ? Sir John Macdonald has been in office for thirteen years ! Mr. GILLIES : I would ask, how has he kept office so long 1 Was it his policy is correct I deplore the want of considera- to pick tlie members of his government tion shown by a Victorian delegate, because it must be self-evident to everybody that as soon as ever a government might be formed, no matter what it might represent, an opposition to it would be forthcoming im- mediately. If some gentlemen from Vic- toria were placed in the government, Avill any intelligent man tell me that there would not be a number of representatives from Victoria who would go straight into opposition 1 That would be the case with respect to every other colony. Mr. Goudon: Thehon. member is reckon- ing them very low ! ;Mr. GILLIES : It is impossible to tind gentlemen who will agree upon every point. I am taking tlio facts as I find them. The universal experience is that there never would be too powerful. But I point out lia.s been a government in this or any other that it is not at all likely. There would country wliicii has not had a very fair bo a large amount of opposition to a niin- amount of opposition. I do not assun)e istry composed in sucii a manner. Pro- tliat the iiicuiIkms of those oppositions have Ijably every member from the smaller colo- been dishonest or dishonorable. I take nies would consider it such a rank injus- from two great parties'? ISIot at all. In order to remain in office for a long time he adopted the course which has been sug- gested, of taking the members of his go- vernment from the various provinces. He did not render himself powerful by select- ing ministers from two great factions or colonies. He wished to convince the whole Dominion of Canada of his fairness and discrimination by selecting capable men from the various colonies. Mr. Gordon : Then it would be a good thing to provide that that should be done here ! Mr. GILLIES : But the reason given is altogether wrong. It was said that if two large colonies came together the ministry^ it for granted that men hold diflerent views from many of the views held l)y those in office, and although tliey nuiy have noj)or- sonal dislike to the members of the go- verniiifnt, tliey feel tliat it is their duty to tional>ly it will lie to the interest of who- tico tliiit \n- would go into opposition at once. Whetlii r tliat would \n- the case or not, that is not the prin(:i[)I(! on which wo should work our constitution. Unques- watch the course of Icgi.slation. You may assign whatever reason you like. It is not for me to seek for reasons ; 7 take things as I find them. If any man ignores all his past experience he i.s very unwise. Q ever is called upon to form the govern- ment in the first instance to .select those gentlemen who are best ablf in his judg- ment to do good work for tlie federation, and who at the same time will fairly and Sixth day. ^ M'2 Federal Constitution : [11 Marcu, 1891.] Resolutions. truly represent the whole of this conti- nent. If you frame your constitution and form your ministry with an anxious de- sire to do justice and give fair play to all, "without reference to the idiosyncracies of in- dividuals, and without calculating whether or not you will secure . one or tw^o votes, I feel perfectly satisfied your ministry will be fairly received by both branches of the legislature. The ministry will be bound to give satisfaction to the popular branch of the legislature, and if they do their duty they will give satisfaction to both houses. Mr. CLARK : At one stage of this de- bate I felt disinclined to take any part in it, firstly, because the opinions I hold upon the several subjects embraced in the reso- lutions had been fully and forcibly ex- pressed by speakers who had preceded me; secondly, because the ground traversed by those speakers — and over which I shall have to follow them — will have to be tra- velled over again when we go into Com- mittee to consider the resolutions seriatim. But upon stating this disinclination to a member of the Convention, he suggested that it was desirable, before we went into Committee, that every member of the Con- vention should take part in this debate, so that every member should as far as possible know the exact position of every other member with regard to the particular questions on which there may be the most divergence of opinion, so that the direc- tions in which mutual approaches are required, in order that a satisfactory com- promise may be efiected, may be ascer- tained at as early a stage as possible in our proceedings. Acting upon that suggestion, I have determined to address the Convention to-day, and to attempt to place before hon. members the opinions which I hold on those subjects respecting which the most divergence of opinion has up to the present time been expressed. I hold what may be considered very strong . and decided opinions upon some of these \_Mr. Gillies. questions; at the same time, I believe there is no hon. member more ready to meet other hon. members in compromise, and to give away very much that I value for the sake of the principle and substance of federation. I suppose that in political, as in private life, we all have our ideals ; but it is not given to any man to realise his ideal fully, either in private or public concerns. I do not expect my ideals to be realised in the federal constitution about to be framed, and I do not think any other member expects that his ideal will be realised. But it may be that upon ex- changing our private opinions, we shall each see in the ideals of others some very important points that never appeared to us before, and for which we are willing to exchange or sacrifice something which at one time we thought essential. The hon. member, Mr. Gillies, appears to have something like a horror of a written con- stitution. He wants everything to be left to usage and custom, and no doubt there is a great deal to be said in favour of an elastic constitution, which goes very much upon usage and custom. But I should like to point out to that hon. gentleman a fact which he may have overlooked, but which he will at once recognise to be a fact when I say to him that we are inevitably committed to the adoption of a written con- stitution in the matter of federation, and to one which must, to some extent, be very rigid. We have had that experience already in the Australasian colonies. We hear hon. members talk about livinc; under the British Constitution and work- ing our constitution upon the same lines ; but we have not the British Constitution in these colonies. Each colony has a written constitution, and we find on trac- ing the constitutional history of these colonies that one thing after another has been provided by law which was not thought necessary to be inserted in the constitutions first given to the colonies. Federal Constitution: [11 March, 1891,] Eesolutions. 243 For instance, in my own colony, and in South Australia, there is nothing said about ministers at all, except that a civil list is provided for her Majesty, including the judges and a few other officers named, such as the attorney-general, the solici- tor-general, and the colonial secretary. But when we come to the Constitution of Victoria we find it positively provided that there shall be four ministers — not mentioned as officers of the civil service by name, but simply referred to by the indefinite name of ministers — in parlia- ment. When we come to the Constitu- tion of Queensland we find a provision, that there shall be a certain number of ministers, six, I think, who may hold such offices and have such names as the gover- nor-general from time to time may assign to them. AVe are, therefore, going more and more in the direction of wi-itten con- stitutions every year that these colonies exist ; and with regard to the task now before us we are going to take a very much larger step than has yet been taken in the same direction. We are here, Mr. President, to consider and report upon an adequate scli(;me for a federal constitution for the Australasian colonies, and I should like hon. memljers to pause and think seri- ously what is meant by the words of our commission, as I may call it — the resolution pa-ssed at the conference in Melbourne — under which we are appointed. A federal constitution is a totally now tiling to tliesc colonies, and I may say a totally now tiling, in the sense in which wo understand it, to the British empire, because it is generally understood that we are not going to follow the lines of the Canadian Dominion. F have an aversion to overloading a speech with fpiotations. I know it only tends to weary members, and to deprive the speaker of that attention which he would like to secure ; but I have two quotations which I intend to offer to hon. members in con- nection with the observations I shall make, and I shall read the first one at this time. It consists only of a few lines from the English author who has studied the most closely, and written the most exhaustively on federal government — Mr. E. A. Free- man, the eminent historian of the ISTorman conquest. He says with regard to federal government in general : That ideal in its highest and most elaborate development is the most finished and the most artificial production of political ingenuity. It is hardly possible that federal government can attain its perfect form except in a highly refined age, and among a people whose political educa- tion has already stretched over many generations. Now, if the task set before us is to frame a constitution, and to produce a govern- ment upon the lines indicated in the quota- tion from Mr. Freeman, I think we shall have to depart very widely from the stan- dard which Mr. Gillies has set up and go a great deal in the direction which he seemed to deprecate, and that was, to depart from the beaten track ; we shall have to depart from the beaten track veiy much indeed. Colonel Smith : Why not 1 Mr. CLARK : The hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, who, I regret to see, is prevented from attending here to-day on account of indisposition, very properly and very wisely told us at the outset of his speech that we had two very important things to consider in connection with this matter. One was the respective powers of the two houses, and tlie other thejiosition of the executive, and I thoroughly agree with thatgentlenian,and those whofollowed him, in saying that a second chamber in a federal constitution must be a very different thing from a second chamber in a unified com- iiuinity. Some hon. members seem to be led away altogether by mere naTiics. Be- cause it is called a .second chaniber or o- senate thoy appear to mo to be incapable of diverting their minds from the nature and composition of the second chambers or senates of which they have had experi- ence. We call that chair and that tablo Sixth day. 2U Federal Constitution: [11 March, 1891.] Eesohitions. both pieces of furniture, and tlicy are made of the same material ; but they per- form very different functions and are mado for very different purposes ; and as the chair differs from the table in the inten- tion of its manufacturer and the use to which it is put, although they are both articles of furniture, so this second cliamber or senate in our federal constitution will be a totally diff'erent institution, and created for different purposes and different func- tions altogether, from those performed by the second chambers in the colonies at the present time. But before I proceed to deal definitely with the question of the power which should be given to this second cham- ber, 1 should like to deal first with the ques- tion of responsible government; because, believing that the second chamber, orsenate, ought to have the power which has been claimed for it by Sir Samuel GriflHth, and other hon. members, I also believe, with those gentlemen, that the position of the executive demands from us the most careful consideration. Not that I wish hon. mem- bers for one moment to think that I would like to see embodied in the federal consti- tution any distinct proposals committing us to the American or to the Swiss system. I merely wish to have a constitution as elastic as was asked for by the hon. mem- bei", Sir Samuel Gritiith, so that if it is found that responsible government, as we understand it, cannot be worked under the constitution, there may be room and op- portunity left to adopt some other system. The hon. member, Mr. Gillies, is a very great believer in responsible government, and, if I may say so, sang its praises very eulogistically in the admirable speech he delivered to the Convention ; and he asked, as if he challenged an answer, whether it had not worked admirably in these colonies, and quite as well as the Constitution of the United States. Well, I accept that challenge at once, and I tell the hon. gentleman that in these [Mr. Clark. colonies I'esponsible government has been at the same time a success and a failure. As a working machine, it has always been a success. It has been able to move, and the legislatui'es which have had responsible government associated with them have always been able to do their work. But has that work been of the highest or the best possible type ? Has not the very existence of responsible government very often lowered the character and quality of legislation ? I do not think there is an hon. member in this chamber who has had experience of it who will deny that such has been the case ; and if it could be pos- sible for us to devise a system which would g■i^■e us legislation of a higher and better character, free from the blemishes and blotches which responsible government has forced upon the legislation of the colonies* in the past, I think we all ought to I'ejoice to try such a system. Not that I am pre- pared to suggest any one, cut and dried, at the present moment ; but when we hear the praises of a certain system sung in the way in which they have been sung in this Convention, I think it only right that those who hold a different opinion, and who have formed their opinion from per- sonal experience, should speak out and express their convictions upon the matter. If I wished to quote authorities upon the disadvantages and defects of responsible government, I could go to very competent observers, and on the maxim that " On- lookers often see most of the game," I might think that it would be a trump card to quote the opinions of American and English authors who have watched the working of responsible government in these colonies ; but I will refrain from doing so, and will only quote the opinion of a colonial statesman. The quotation which I am now about to inflict upon hon. members is the second and only other quo- tation which I shall make in the course of my remarks. The hon. member, Mr. Federal Constitution : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions, 245 Deakin, spoke very highly of Chief Justice Higinbotham, both as a statesman and as a lawyer, and I think that I yield nothing to the hon. member in my admiration for the character, ability, and patriotism of that gentleman. It was my extreme plea- sure, some years ago, to hear him deliver .1 speech in the Legislative Assembly of Victoria, and that speech was so full of high thought and eloquence that it im- pressed itself permanently on my mind, and whenever this question of responsible government crops up I think immediately of a passage in it, with which I am so familiar that I can always go at once to Hansard and pick it out. It reads as follows : — I do not know wliethci' hon. members have observed it ; but it ought to be observed, that there ai'e many persons now in this country who have even begun to question the foundations of our Constitution — to ask, " What is the use of responsible government ; what good can pos- sibly come out of this House ?" These feelings of distrust and disapproval are, if I do not mis- take, almost entirely occasioned and generated by the accursed system under which the party on tliis side of the House are always striving to murder the reputations of the party on the other aide, in order to leap over the dead bodies of tlieir reputations on to the seats in the Treasury bench. I think that tliat description is as appli- cable to every legi.slatm'e in the Australian colonics now, as it appeared to Chief Jus- tice Higinbotham to be applicable to the legislature of Victoria at tlie time at whicli lie spoke. Mr. Dkakin : AVhat about the huiguage of parties in America ? ]\Ir. CLAllK : If the hon. gentleman wishes me to diverge at this moment, I will answer liim, and .say that party go- vernment is just as strong in America as it is in the Australian colonies, or in I2ng- land. Mr. Deakik ; Witliout responsible go- vernment ! Mr. CLAEK : But it cannot upset the ministry for the time-being simply for the purpose of upsetting them and getting their places, and for no other reason whatever. Mr. Gillies : Perhaps they ought to be upset, but cannot be ! Mr, CLARK : In connection with this question of responsible government, it ap- pears to be the opinion of a number of the members of the Convention that some pro- vision ought to be put in the constitution to the effect that the portfolios should be equally distributed among the differentcolo- nies. I know that the hon. member, Mr. Gillies, deprecates such a distribution ; but other hon. members appear to think very strongly upon the point, and if their wishes should jn-evail, I can only say that the pro- blem of working the systeni of responsible government under the federation would be made yet more conflicting and difficult than it would otherwise be. We must always re- member that the system has undergone new developments in this country, differing from any which it has undergone in the mother country. The questions considered crucial, and on which ministries go out of office here, are not the questions upon which they go out of oHice in England ; and the questions on which ministries would go out of office in England are not considered of sufficient importance in these colonies to cause a change. But the question of responsible government in connection with our federal constitution only becomes of chief import- ance to us in connection with the question of the distribution of powcus between the two branches of the legislature; and I shall now proceed to deal with the question of the relation of the two branches of the legislature in the proposed new constitu- tion, more partioilarly with the question of what power or what rights and privi- leges shall be given to the second chamber, which has been .spoken of sometimes as a senate and sometimes as a states house. I agree altogether with Mk' hon. member, Sir Samuel Criflitli, and a number of other speakers who have preceded me, that the Sixth day. 246 Federal Constitutioti : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. senate or states house ouglit to have what the lion, member, Sir Samuel Griilith, has very properly and concisely styled the power of veto in detail with regard to money bills, but not the power of initia- tion. I think, perhaps, it would be a con- venient course, at the very outset of my argument on this branch of the subject, to reply to the challenge thrown out by the hon. member, Mr. Gillies, when he asks, " Why not also claim for it the power of initiation 1 " Well, I would tell him why I think we may very well claim the power of veto in detail, and yet not claim the right of initiation. In the course of the debate it has been said that government is finance and finance is government. I do not altogether agree with that maxim, but there is a large amount of truth in it, and I agree with it so far as to admit at once that deadlocks with regard to finance are more serious and more injurious than deadlocks with regard to any other sub- ject. We can easily see that if both houses have the power of initiating money bills, we might have two adverse financial policies before the country at the same time, and each house would be prejudiced in favour of its own, and there would be a more serious kind of deadlock than any that has yet occurred with regard to money matters in any colony or any country with ■which I have any acquaintance, either personally or by reading. It is quite pro- bable — in fact, I believe it has occurred in past times — that two different bills deal- ing with the same subject may be intro- duced in two different branches of the same legislature. But they have not produced the serious deadlocks and the injurious consequences which would be produced by the initiation of two adverse financial policies ; and for that reason alone I think initiation ought to be confined to the one house, and I flatter myself that that is a very good and sufficient answer to the ob- jection of the hon. member, Mr. Gillies. [Mr. Clark. In dealing with finance we are dealing with what is admitted to be a very special, and what is commonly called a very peculiar question. Deadlocks or adverse policies with regard to finance would produce more embarrassing conditions than adverse poli- cies with regard to any other subject. As a matter of fact, the House of Lords is not deprived by law of the right to initiate ajoney bills ; and, if I remember rightly, it did once attempt to initiate a tax in the shape of a paper duty. Of course, when the bill came to the House of Commons it became a dead thing ; I believe it was laid beneath the table. Still, there was a positive assertion of a legal right to in- itiate a money bill, and it is only by cus- tom that that power has fallen into dis- use. But it is not so much that the House of Lords, out of any consideration to the smooth working of the government, or from motives of public policy, has resigned that right. It comes about in this manner : that we have responsible government and the unity of the cabinet in connection with the British Constitution, and no tax can be proposed except by message from the Crown. And the cabinet, being united and working together, of course it could only propose to tax in one house or the other. Therefore, even if the House of Lords did have the right of initiating taxation, it would not produce any ill consequences whilst you have responsible government, and the cabinet is working in unity, with the condition that no tax can be imposed ex- cept by message from the Crown. If every proposal to impose a tax must come from the cabinet, it becomes a mere matter of detail or of expediency whether it should be introduced into one house or the other. But when we come to America, where they have no responsible government, and the cabinet does not propose taxation, then it becomes necessary to confine the right of initiation in the constitution to one branch of the legislature ; and we ought, on the Federal Constitution: [11 March, 1891.] • Resolutions. 247 same lines, to confine the right of initiation that many important measures are decided to one branch of the legislature, although in the House of Commons, and are decided •sve may commence with responsible govern- in every colonial legislature, by a majority ment, because the time may come when we in that legislature who were returned by, may change our system. I do not say that and who represent, an absolute minority of that time ever will come, but it may come, electors. This may seem a very startling and if, in the future, we should cease to statement, but Mr. Fawcett, who has taken have responsible government, and to act on a great interest in this question, and the rule of every tax being proposed by who has very strenuously advocated the message from the Crown, it would be very adoption of the system known as Hare's awkward indeed for both branches of the for the purpose of remedying it, has legislature to have the right of initiation. made some very instructive and curi- Those who believe in giving to the senate ons analyses of important facts in re- or states house the right of vetoing money ference to the matter. And he did not go bills in detail, are also in favour of giving back to the. old days before the Reform each state an equal representation in that Bill of 1832 ; but he took the House of branch of the legislature; and the strongest Comaions of 1868, after several reform argument I have yet heard against the bills had been passed greatly extending double propo.sal to give the colonies equal the franchise, and endeavoui'ing to attain representation in that house, and to give to approximate, equal representation as far it the power of veto in detail in regard to as conditions would allow ; and yet, after finance, has come from the hon. members, those wide-searching reforms he found that Mr. Munroand Mr. Wrixon, who bothsaid ten successful candidates at the general that it would lead to the minority ruling election — I think it was of 1868 — only the majority. Now, both these gentlemen polled 1,873 votes, whilst ten unsuccess- seem to think that the British Constitu- ful candidates polled 83,217 votes. In two tion in particular, and representative go- most important measures — one the Trades- vernment in general, isfoundedon theprin- Unions Bill, and the other the Contagious ciple of an aVjsolute rule of the majority. Diseases Act — two important clauses were I take leave to flatly contradict that state- passed by a majority of members who re- ment. Neither the representative govern- presented only 287,000 electors, whilst ment in general nor the British Constitu- the minority in that division represented tion in particular is built on the system of 077,000. The absolute rule of the major- the absolute rule of the majority. There ity has never yet been accepted as the are men, both political writers and states- principle of the British Constitution, nor men,whohaveadvocated thatprinciplc,and is it the jirinciple of representative go- who have argued for equal and single elec- vernment. Representative government is loral districts in support of that doctrine. not an expedient or a makeshift to ob- Butsingle and equal electoral districts have viate the necessity of having every man never yet been adopted in England, and brouglit into one chamber to give his vote; have not been adopted, so far as I know, but it is a substantial institution devised in any of the Australian colonies. The for the special pui'pose of endeavouring, so electoral districts remain at the present far as possible, to get the intelligence and time, both in the Australian colonies and the judgment of the community to decide in England, very unequal in numbers, what .shall, and what shall not, be law, and as to the amount of representation and not simply to count mere heads. Of nssigncd to them ; and the consequence is course it is presumed, and very naturally, Sixth day. 248 Federal Constitution : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. that there will be more intelligence and judgment in the majority than in the minority. But it is not always the case, and while we presume that the majority Avill have a preponderance of intelligence and judgment among them, we always have to remember that, for the time-being, with regard to any measure, they may not have the preponderance of judgment and intelligence, and we must always give the minority an opportunity to prove that it is right and to become the majority. In fact, we must always challenge the majority for the time-being to legitimatise itself, and prove that it has the preponderance of judg- ment and reason and intelligence on its side. That is the object of all representative insti- tutions ; and therefore it is no argument to say that the proposal to give equal repre- sentation and veto in detail to the senate must occasionally give the minority the power of preventing any measure from being passed. That happens every day, and will happen under all representative systems, even if you have equal electoral districts. The Frenchmen are supposed to be more in love with theory and with political symmetry than Englishmen are, and in their endeavour to establish the absolute rule of the majority they have decided that if three or four candidates stand for an electoral district in France, and the one at the top of the poll does not get an absolute majority of all the electors polled, the two or three candidates who obtained the largest numbers of votes shall go to the poll again. I undertake to say that if you proposed to have such a provi- sion in our constitution the very first men to denounce it as theoretical, visionary, and un-English, would be the members of this Convention who have denounced the proposal of equal representation in the senate. They are not prepared to go tlie whole length of the principle they advo- cate, and boldly to attempt to establish the absolute rule of the majority. Even in the [Mr. Clark. election of the President of America the prin- ciple of the absolute rule of the majority is not exercised. Every man has not an equal right to vote for thePresident of the United States. The mass of the electors only elect a certain number of electors in every state, and those electors are selected on exactly the same principle as the congres- sional delegation ; that is to say, each state elects as many electors as it has members of Congress, including both branches ; and the consequence is that repeatedly thePresi- dent of the United States has been elected by an absolute minority of the people of that country. The gentleman who at present holds the position was elected by an abso- lute minority. Mr. Cleveland received an absolute majority of primary votes. The Americans submit to that state of things, and never indulge in a revolution to upset it. "With all their love of democracy and republicanism, they have never yet commit- ted themselves to that wide and uncertain sea of the absolute rule of the majority, but they have adhered to the definite prin- ci])le of representative government and con- stitutional system, and they abide by it even when the minority for the time carry the point at issue. But it has been said that the great objection to giving the senate the powers that some of us would claim for it, and giving equal repre- sentation, is that it would not so directly represent the people. The hon. member, Mr. Deakin, seemed to me to be prepared to give it the power which we claim for it if, in his own language, it could be said " to represent the reason and manhood of the respective colonies." I am quite pre- pared to accept any suggestion for the elec- tion of the senate which will produce that result. That is all that any of us want, and if the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, or any other hon. member, can show us that by direct election by the people the sena- tors would more directly represent the manhood and judgment of the states, I, for Federal Constitution : [11 March, 1891.] Eesolutions. 249 one, should be very pleased indeed to give my adherence to a proposal of that kind. IS'ow, it is said that if the senate or states house has co-oi'dinate power given to it with the other branch of the legislature, or, to be more particular, if it really has the power of veto in detail given to it in regard to finance, it will soon become the more powerful house of the two, and the other house will deteriorate ; and the ex- ample of the House of Representatives in America has been quoted in support of that statement. I quite admit that the Senate of the United States has always commanded the attention of the world more than has the House of Representa- tives, and that the majority of the great in- tellects who have ajipeared in the political arena of America have during the greater part of their careers exerted their influence and performed their work in that particu- lar branch of the legislature. But it is too sweeping an assertion to say that on adfcount of the power which that Senate possesses the other house has deteriorated. If it has deteriorated at all, it has done so for a variety of reasons. An^ongst the reasons which have been given for it, is the shortness of its term compared with the length of the term of the Senate, and that, I. believe, has been a very powerful factor in making able and prominent men desire to have a seat in tlio Senate rather than in the House of Ii"presnntativos. But I take uj) the challenge boldly, that tliat liousc is the inferior chamber that some writers and some speakers have described it to be. "Wo know that the Speaker of th.it house is possibly the most powerful personage in Congress, and that he has rajiidly been ac- quiring powers and a position more like those of tlie Premier of England than any other man in the American Govcrniucnt. The chairmen of the variou.s committees in in that branch of the legislature are also very powerful personages, and I believe exercise as much, if not more, influence in the legislature of the country than does any private member of the Senate. And there is this very important fact, which we can- not overlook, namely, that the majority of the great men of America who are now known to the world in connection with American history, and who helped to make America what it is to-day, have been mem- bers of that branch of the legislature at one time or other of their career. The names of the matchless Chief Justice Marshall, and Clay, Calhoun, "Webster, Garfield, and Lin- coln all occur to me as those of men who com- menced their career in that branch of the legislature and who adorned it while they were in it, and some of them never left it, except, as in the case of Garfield, when he left it to be President of the United States. And we have the brilliant instance of John Quincy Adams, who, after serving his coun- try as its ambassador at various courts, in Europe, and as senator and as president of the I'epublic, surpassed all his former career, and gave himself an immortal name by seventeen years' service in the House of Representatives, towards the close of his career. A house that could attract John Quincy Adams at that time of his life, and also the other men I have mentioned, is not the inferior and deteriorated house that some lion, members imagine, and which some writers have declared it to be. Some lion, members seem to think that fiscal or financial questions are the only ones ■which could occasion a deadlock, or the only ones with regard to which the public mind may become very much agitated if there should be a diflerence of oi)inion bc- twfcn the two branches of the legisla- ture. I admit that in the past taxation has bccMi the subject on which the public mind has been most agitated with regard 1o dillerences of opinion between the two ]ioui3e.s, and it has been the question which has most aflcctcd the rights and privileges of individual citizens. lUit I believe the world has passed through that stage when Sixth day. 250 Federal Constitution : [11 MARcn, 1891.] llesolutlons. taxation will be the most important subject ago by a gentleman who visited these colo- to be discussed. It will certainly always be nies, and whom several hon. members, no a very important one. But we know that doubt, have had the pleasure of meeting new political problems will arise in the — I allude to Mr. Moncure Conway — upon evolution of society, and I believe the time the working of the American Constitu- is fast ap])roaching when what are known tion. He called the book " Republican as social questions will create more differ- Superstitions." He was a great advocate ence of opinion and more agitation in the of government by one chamber, and I may public mind than taxation has ever done in say he ransacked American history to see the past. \Ye know that next to the right where the constitution of two chambers of an Englishman to be taxed only with his had worked badly; but in all his indict- own consent, and by the vote of his own ments against the Amei'ican Senate, and in rejiresentatives, he has always valued the all the instances where he referred to dead- right of freedom of contract. But we know locks, he does not produce one financial that the great principle of freedom of con- question ; they are all questions of slavery, tract is now being challenged, and pro- of organisation of territories, and such-like, bably we shall see legislation in the future Undoubtedly that constitution has received which will very much interfere with it, magnificent eulogies at various times from and, when that time comes, in all proba- writers and public men in England and bility we shall see as much agitation in in these colonies. We know the eulogy the public mind, as much excitement, as passed upon it by Mr. Gladstone, and we much division of opinion between various know that the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, classes of society on that fundamental prin- the other day spoke of it as " that superb ciple, as we ever saw on the question of constitution." But it has had one tribute taxation. Yet all the second chambers in paid to its excellence, one eulogy passed upon the colonies at the present time, and the it beyond anything that the tongue of man House of Lords, have power to veto in detail can ever give to it, and possibly beyond any- or in gloho bills dealing with that important thing which any other constitution ever had principle, and with other questions which or ever will have given to it. The eleven will probably hav€ to be dealt with in the states who, in 1861, seceded from the Union future. It is no use raising gliosts of the because they could not get what they re- past to frighten us in regard to the future. garded as their rights under it, because they I think questions of taxation will never be said it had become tyrannical and oppres- questions of agitation, or cause the same si ve, and had been swerved from its original revolutions in the future as they have intention, re-enacted it almost word for word in the past. I believe we have outgrown for themselves to live under, including this that stage of political development. The power of veto in detail in financial matters. American Constitution has been pointed to Where do you find such a tribute paid to as having worked for 100 years very satis- any other constitution in the world as factorily with this power of vetoing in de- that the men who seceded from it, after tail all financial questions vested in the asking to be delivered from its shadow. Senate. Some hon. members have said, re-enacted it verbatim et literatim to live " Oh, they have had friction and disagree- under? I now proceed to deal with the ques- ments there ; they have had secessions " ; tion of state interests. I prefer that phrase but curiously enough, broadly speaking, the which the hon. member, Mr. Barton, sug- disagreements have not been on financial gested to us in prefei'ence to the phrase questions. A book was written some years state rights ; because I think the phrase [Mr. Clark. Federal ConstitiUion: [II JMarch, 1891.] Resolutions, 251 "state rights" has occasioned a good deal of misapprehension in the minds of some persons, particularly in the mind of my hon. friend, Mr. Gillies, who seemed to think that the danger, which seemed to us so great on this question, amounted to a threat of whathe called "plunder." Inever had any dread of anything which we could call the plunder by one state of another. But I can very clearly see that state inter- ests may be endangered ; that certain states may unjustly suffer by the legislation of the federal government, if they are not equally represented in the senate, and if each state has not co-ordinate jDOwer with the others to veto any measure which may injuriously affect it. The hon. member, Mr. Deakin, asked, as if he challenged an answer, with full confidence that one could not be given, what powers given to the federal government, either in the American Constitution or in the Canadian Constitu- tion, could possibly create any danger to state interests ? I accept the challenge, and will tell him at once that there is one very important power given to the central government in both those consti- tutions, which may at any time endanger state interests ; and that is, the power to regulate commerce. It has frequently in America caused legislation which, in the judgment of many of the states, has injured their interests. New Jersey in particular lias been in the supreme court twice on the matter; but she has been defeated there. That is the answer to the state- ment of the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, that we should put our state interests under the protection of the federal constitution and the feileral courts. There are some injuries for which there is no judicial remedy ; the remedy is only jiolilical, and that has been recognised by all the writers on the American Constitution. Mr. Justice Story, who.se commentaries were quoted here a few days ago by the lion, member, Mr. Barton, and who was reckoned one of the greatest writers on American law, has left on record his de- liberate opinion, and as a matter of legal argument has placed it beyond all doubt, that the whole protective system of America is unconstitutional and is an in- jury to several of the states ; but he admits that there is no judicial remedy for the in- jury, that the remedy is only political, and can only be had at the polls, and that if the electors do not choose to remedy the injuiy, it must be submitted to as the in- evitable. We know that South Carolina attempted to secede from the Union thirty years before the civil war on that very ground. She said that the protective tariff was aimed at her jiroducts and her indus- tries, and would be e.specially injurious to her ; and since the civil war legislation under the right to regulate commerce has injuriously affected several states, which have gone to the supreme court and found that there is no judicial remedy, notwith- standing the pi'esence in the Constitu- tion of a direct provision apparently in- serted for their special protection. There is a clause in the American Constitution which positively prohibits any tax or im- post on exports. Now, there are several states that raise principally tobacco, and they cannot find a market for all they raise within the states themselves : they must export. It would be in direct vio- lation of the Constitution to impose an excise duty on tobacco. We can easily see that if that were allowed these states would suffer a special wrong. Yet it has been done by indirect means. Thuy have actually imposed a stamp duty on bales of tobacco, and they will not allow a bale of tobacco to leave the factories until the stamp duty has been aflixed. Two cases have been be- fore the sujireme court for the purpose of testing the validity of the tax under the fundamental provision of the Constitution, that there shall be no duty on exports ; but the act has been so framed, so cunningly tSixtJi day. 252 Federal Constitution , [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. devised, tliat the courts have decided that it does not come within that prohibition, and the tax remains. The states which raise tobacco feel the injury ; yet tliere is under the Constitution no judicial, but only a political, remedy for it. The island of jMauritius obtains most of its revenue from an export duty upon sugar. I do not know whether it is intended to insert in our federal constitution a provision similar to that in the American Constitution, and to prohibit the federal government from tax- ing exports ; but if we do not do so, might not the imposition of an export duty upon .sugar seriously affect Queensland and yet leave her without any judicial remedy? But let us not trust to judicial remedies. Let us embody distinct remedies for injured state interests in our constitution ; let us give to every state the power to protect itself. Self-protection is better than pro- tection by another, Mr. Playford : They do not do so in America ! Mr. CLARK : You cannot obtain per- fection in everything, and there are some things for which the only remedy is a political remedy — a I'emedy at the polls, as Mr, Justice Story says. You must go there and fight it out. With regard to the Canadian Constitution, there is another sec- tion under which federal legislation misht •seriously affect the different colonies — I re- fer to the right of the federal government to deal with the fisheries ; and it is quite con- ceivable that if the federal government here, a.s in Canada, had power to deal with the fisheries, it might take steps which would very seriously affect the various Australian colonies. My friend, Mr. Wrixon, said some- thing about the desirableness of a uniform criminal law, and while he was speaking I expressed the opinion that we should not have a uniform criminal law. The hon. member invited me, I understood, to give some reasons why we should not have it. I have placed my note upon criminal law YMr. Clark. under the head of state interests, because I believe it comes under that head. It might be desirable in some colonies or in some states, to make certain things crimes which it would not be desirable to make crimes in other states. We know that in the American union the eastern states are highly civilised, refined communities, ad- vanced in physical, intellectual, and artistic culture ; while, on the other hand, the western states, or the backwoods, as they are called, are in a very different position, politically, socially, and intellectually. It might be necessary in some of the states to pass stringent laws making certain things crimes which would not be so dealt with in other states. Besides, we know that the law is often used as a means of effecting indirectly some ulterior purpose, also for the purposes of class or special interests. The game laws of England occupied in former years, and occupy now to a certain extent, a foremost place in the provisions of British criminal legislation. We know what detestable and abominable laws they were, and we know that they were intro- duced not for the protection of life and property and individual liberty in the ordinary sense — not for the same purpose as that for which you make murder or forgery a crime — but for the conservation of certain class interests and class privi- leges. In America, in the days of slavery, it was made a capital felony in some states to teach a negro to read or write ; and even at the present day, when slavery has been long abolished, the marriage of black people with white people in some states is made criminal. Men who have chosen to marry a mulatto or a quadroon have stood in the criminal's box and have been sentenced as common criminals. Now, there was a time when the slave power was so strong in America that it appeared to be about to ti'ansform the whole union into its own hideous form and likeness, and, if the at- tempt had succeeded, it would have been Federal Constitution : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 253 a most lamentable state of things to have the laws which would have been then en- acted in force throughout the whole of the Union — in Massachusetts, in the home of the pilgrims, as well as in Louisiana. We do not want to run that risk. Do not let us, therefore, have a uniform criminal law, but let each state have its own law. I will proceed now to the question of the judiciary. The resolution as it stands pro- vides for only a court of appeal. I hope that when we get into Committee an amendment will be moved establishing a system of federal courts independently of, and in addition to, the state courts. I think we are irrevocably committed to that, if we ai-e going to have a federation in the true sense of the word, and not uni- fication — in other words, if we are about to adopt the principles of the American, and not those of the Canadian Constitu- tion. In Canada they have only one sys- tem. Canada is what may practically be called a unified community ; in fact, so unified is their judicial system, that the state governments cannot even appoint ordinary justices of the peace. Justices of the peace throughout the land have to be aj)pointed by the central govei'nment. The county court, as well as the superior judges, arc also appointed from that source, and hon. members can imagine what an immense amount of patronage that must trive to the central government. "Mr. Gillies rfferrod this morning to the long perioil of office which had been enjoyed by 8ir John Macdonald, and the hon. mem- ber seemed to think that it was due to that gentleman's tact and to the statesmansliij) he evinced in thedistribution of ministerial portfolios. When we know that he has the power of nominating every member of tlic senate, and every lieutenant-governor, and of appointing superior and inferior judges and justices of the peace, as well as the power of vetoing all local legislation, his long term of office is easily accounted for. With such reins in his hands he might be expected to remain in the saddle an indefinite time. We do not want to place it in the power of the prime minis- ter of our dominion to exercise patronage to that extent. What we want is a separate federal judiciarj^ allowing the state judiciaries to remain under their own governments. If you have your vari- ous governments moving in their re- spective orbits, each must be complete, each must have its independence. You must have an independent legislature, an independent executive, and an independent judiciary, and you can have only a mutilated government if you deprive it of any one of these branches. I therefore hope to see a complete system of federal courts, distinct from the provincial courts. I will not enter fully into the question now. I could give many other reasons why we should have a double system, and could men- tion many benefits which would flow from it. I content myself now by saying that I hope that in addition to a separate federal system of courts we shall have a court of appeal, as the resolution contem- plates. That will be an innovation, and a wholesome innovation, upon the American system. The American Supreme Court can- not hear appeals from the supreme courts of the vax'ious states except in matters of federal law. I hope our Supreme Court Avill take the place of the Privy Council, and hear appeals upon all questions of law. I now come to the question as to whether the decision of that court of appeal ought to be final or not. I unhesitatingly say thiit, so far as the cases which come be- fore that court arc purely Australian, the judgmont ought to be final ; but if a case comes bfifore it allV-ctiiig imperial interests, or depending upon the interpretation of an imjM'rial statute in force throughout tlie whole empire, it would be absurd to talk about taking away the right of ap- peal to the Privy Council. If the British Sixth day. 25J: Federal Constitution : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. legislature does' what it has the power to do, and what it has done — that is, if it passes a law for the whole empire, such as the British Merciiant Shipping Act or the Plimsoll Act — it would never listen to a proposal to take away from its own court the right of interpreting its own acts. That, I think, is perfectly clear. This reminds -me that when hon. members talk of break- ing our connection with the mother coun- try, or of cutting the first strand of the painter in a proposal to erect a federal judiciary, they have, it seems to me, a very hazy and imperfect notion as to what our I'elations to the mother country really are. Our real relation to her as dependencies does not depend upon our recognition of the Crown, or upon our appealing to the Privy Council. The great and mighty fact with re- gard to ourposition in relation tothemother country is that our legislative bodies are subordinate to the British Parliament, with their laws liable to be overruled by that Parliament. That is the position in which we shall remain while we are only a sub- ordinate legislature — almost as subordi- nate to the British Government as muni- cipalities are subordinate to the legisla- ture which creates them. It is that which makesus practically a dependency, whether or not there is an appeal to the Privy Coun- cil, and whether or not the name of the Queen is used in our acts of Parliament. That is really the essence of the position wdiich we hold as part of the British em- pire. It has been said that in addition to the cases which involve imperial interests, and the interpretation of imperial statutes, it may be desirable to have cases sent to the British Privy Council which embody funda- mental principles of the common law. When I heard that statement I was reminded of an article in the December number of the Contemporary Review, by one of the most learned and scientific lawyers and legal writers of the present day — Sir Frederick Pollock. He is so dissatisfied [Mr. Clark. with the system of teaching law in Eng- land, that he says if it is not very soon altered, the centre of the legal system of the Anglo-Saxon race will drift from the eastern to the western shore of the Atlan- tic, and that the colonies will look to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States for decisions on fundamental principles of the common law. The Ameri- can courts administer the same principles of common law that the English courts do, and so far from its being a disadvantage to have two independent centres of interpre- ters, it has been a benefit, and the common law of England has thus been enriched. The Privy Council and House of Lords have frequently quoted with respect, and liave acknowledged the benefit of, the de- cisions of the august tribunal on the other side of the Atlantic. There is no reason why our supreme court of ap- peal may not produce the same beneficent results, and enrich the stock of common law of the empire by being an independent centre of interpretation. The hon. mem- ber, Mr. Wrixon, seemed to think there might be an objection to making it a final court of appeal, because, he said, in Victoria they have six judges who are amongst the ablest lawyers at the bar, and that it might be difficult to get a tribunal which would command more respect for its judgments than was felt for the decisions of the Su- preme Court in that colony. I do not pre- tend to speak for the colony of Victoria, or any other colony, particularly; I speak generally ; but I think the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, will admit that we do not always get the six, or even the three, ablest lawyers in the community upon the bench of a colony. You get poor judges, just as you get poor politicians. Colonel SsiiTH : That is not the case now ! Mr. CLARK : It has been the case in times past, and it has been the case in other colonies. We must speak the whole truth and our whole conviction. I do not Federal Constitidion: [11 March, 1891.J Resolutions. 255 know whetlier those six able judges always sit together, or whether important ques- tions are not often decided by three or four of the judges. Therefore, the argument as to six of the ablest lawyers coinciding in a case would have a very infrequent application. But what is the tribunal to which we appeal now, and which the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, would retain 1 The Privy Council is a tribunal supposed to consist of fifteen judges, three forming a quorum. In one most important case that went from Queensland only three judges constituted the court ; and without any disrespect to them, but simply in the in- terests of truth, I say that probably those three judges were the weakest men of the whole fifteen. Two of them are now dead, and I may give their names without offence. The court consisted of Sir Barnes Peacock, Sir Montagu Smith, and Sir Ptobert Col- lier, when the important case of Daven- port versus the Queen was decided by the Privy Council. If the hon. member, Sir Samuel GriflSth, were here, he could tell us more about the case. He argued the case in his own colony, and carried the court there with him. That judgment of the court was reversed by the Privy Coun- cil, and I know that up to the present time Sir Samuel Griffith, and all the law- yers of Queensland, believe that their own court was rigiit, and the Privy Council wrong : and the hon. member, Sir Samuel GrifTitli, believesthatif he had had an oppor- tunity of going home to the Privy Council, he would have induced the judges to look at the case in another light. That is the disadvantage of having a distant court of appeal. It is always inconvenient to send counsel so groat a distance. My hon. friend, Mr. Wrixon, will not dispute tiio wisdom of .sending counsel home from the colonies to place our cases fully before the Privy Council, becau.se last year he saw that it was absolutely necessary to do so in the interests of his own colony, as our go- vernment also did in a case in which they were concerned. I know that Sir Samuel Griffith holds the same opinion, and that he regards the decision in the case I have quoted as a proof of the desirability of colonial cases being argued before the Privy Council by colonial lawyers. Mr, DiBBS : Yet the three judges to whom the hon. member has referred have given very good decisions on colonial questions 1 Mr. CLARK : That may be ; but we are here to speak the whole truth ; and I maintain that those three judges were the weakest of the team. The hon. member Mr. Wrixon, seemed to think that in the Privy Council we had a court for the whole empire which gave uniformity of de- cisions. There, again, he was a little forget- ful. The Privy Council is not the court of appeal for the whole empire. The House of Lords is the court of appeal for a large portion of the empire ; so that there are two separate, co-equal, and independent courts which are not bound by each other's decisions. The House of Lords subse- quently refused to follow the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Daven- port versus the Queen. Therefore, at the present time, we have conflicting decisions by two independent and co-equal courts in England. If wo have under our federal government a court of appeal whose de- cisions shall be final with regard to Aus- tralian matters, we shall not be trou- bled by having conflicting decisions ; wo shall not have one lawyer quoting a de- cision by the House of Lords to a colo- nial court as one it ought to follow, and a lawyer on the other side quoting a diflcrent decision by the Privy Coun- cil as one which ought to be accepted. I think that I have dealt with every sub- ject that I intended to speak upon except the one question of the power of the Queen to disallow federal legislation, which was referred to by the hon. member, Mr. Playford. I have almost anticipated my Sixth day. 25G Federal Constitution: [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. reniai'ks on that head by pointing out that have placed before us. I suppose we will we shall be a subordinate legislature, and all admit that, on meeting here at first, there that the subordinate position which we was on the part of every one of us a little liold is really the thing that decides our doubt and difficulty as to how the question place in the empire. If the power of dis- Avehadtodiscuss was to be first approached, allowance be taken away, the link between and we naturally relied upon you, sir, to put us and the Crown formed by the governor- us in a position to have a full discussion general will certainly be a cobweb. We of the whole subject. I think you have an- sliall be, to all intents and purposes, an swered all our expectations in the way you independent nation. I may sympathise have brought the matter before us, and al- with the hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, in look- though, for one, I would have preferred that, ing forward to that as the ultimate goal for in some respects, the resolutions had been these colonies ; but we have not met here differently worded, still I feel satisfied that to carry out that object, and I do not they will answer the purpose for which you think it would be wise for any of us to moved them. I think the discussion has attempt to hurry it. If it is for the benefit proved pretty clearly that it would havebeen of these colonies it will come in good time. easier for most of us if we had set to work Mr. Dibbs: May we not indulge in a in the first place to determine what sort of poet's dream ] government would be satisfactory to the Mr. CLAEK : We may ; but as one people of Australia, and the people of the not at all hurt by the sentiments uttered different colonies, before we attempted to by the hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, I would determine the powers to be intrusted to at present deprecate the taking away of the new parliament, because, assui^edly, we the power of disallowance, because that shall find in the long run that on the con- would really be severing our connection stitution of the federal parliament and the with the empire, for which I do not think federal executive will depend the powers we are prepared. I thank the members that the people of the different colonies are of the Convention for the patience with prepared to in'ti'ust to them. I feel from which they have listened to me. I am the discussions that have taken place, and, afraid I have been rather rambling ; but perhaps, from the feelings of the people I was anxious to touch upon various points. generally throughout Australia, that of I hope that I have made my own position whatever the senate and the house of repre- clear, so that as I said in my opening sentatives may consist, we must be prepared remarks the directions in which mutual to be governed by what is known as respon- approach is required, and the distance that sible government. Before we finally deter- hon. members stand from each other may mine that, however, I think we ought to be pretty well ascertained, and I shall consider whether or not, for the purposes be as prepared as any man to go half-way for which this government is to be formed, to meet the Convention on anyone of these it would not be possible to constitute a subjects. government on somewhat different lines Sir JOHN BRAY : I join with hon. thatwouldanswer betterfor theiourposeswe membei's who have preceded me in thank- intend to carry out. I take it for granted, ing you, sir, for having put before us these sir, as has been pointed out by you, and resolutions in such a shape that, while we assented to by everybody, that in one of can freely and fully discuss the whole ques- the two branches of the legislature, which tion of federation, we do not in any way for convenience you have called the senate, feelourselvespledgedtothe exact words you all the colonies should have an equal nuni- [Mr. Clark. Federal Constitution: [11 March, 1S91.] Itesolutions. 257 ber of representatives ; and if this Avere an ordinary form of government for the whole of the people of Australia without regard to the diflerent colonies of which Aus- tralia is constituted, I should unhesitat- ingly say that this suggestion on your part, and the acquiescence in it on the part of those representing other great colonies would be a very generous conces- sion to the smaller colonies. But I take it after all that we are not here simply to frame — and I think my hon. friends, Mr. Gillies and Mr. Deakin, fell into an error in this respect — we are not here simply to frame a constitution for the government of the people of Australia. We have also to proceed on principles just to the several colonies. We are not to recognise simply the fact that the majority of the people of Australia must in the end prevail. I be- lieve they must myself. I do not think there is any question about it. But still we are here intrusted with the task of proposing a form of government that shall aflbrd to the people of Australia an oppor- tunity to govern themselves. We must, however, at the same time recognise the rights of all the different colonies. Now wliat are tho.se rights ? was asked by the hon. member, Mr. Deakin. I will tell him one of them. In determining that we have to recognise the different colonics. We say this, that we must recognise them. Th-it is a point tliat has not boon put as clearly as it might have been. Why must we recognise the rights of the dilibrent colonics ? Because the different colonies under tlie constitution intrusted to them Lave undertaken certain duties and car- ried out certain public works. Thoy have undertaken certain responsibilities in con- nection with the paymei^t for those work.s, of which tlie new federal parliament does not propose to relieve them, Tliey have still to bear the burden of these duties and responsibilities, and we must do nothing whatever to prevent them from B seeing that proper provision is made in their own colonies in order that they n^ay carry out the duties and responsibilities they have undertaken. If the govern- ment we are now proposing to create for the whole of the people of Australia wei'e to say to all these different colo- nies, and if these diCerent colonies were willing to acquiesce in the proposal, "We will take over the whole government of Australia; we will perform all duties; we will undertake to carry through the obligations the different colonies have entered into," then we might fairly say to the people of Victoria and New South Wales, the two great colonies — colonies that at the present time contain two- thirds of the whole population of Australia — we might fairly say to them, " Since you have generously undertaken to carry out all our responsibilities and all our dutie.s, we recognise the fact that the nja- jority must prevail." But, so long as we say that each of the colonies must separ- ately undertake to perform these duties itself, so long must we say, in any sys- tem of federal government that is estab- lished, " The colonies, as colonies apart from the colonies as people, shall have an adequate voice in the representation of the people and in the discharge of parliamentary duties," I am pleased that not a single member of the Convention lias suggested that there should be any- thing less than an equal representation of all the colonies in the senate. It is true that in the act we .shall have ultimately to pass we shall have to make provision for the subdivision of some of the colonies, and of course it would bo unreasonable to sup- pose tliat such subdivision should take place without the federal jjarliament being consulted and acquiescing in subdivisions that would in any way affect the rej)resenta- tion of the colonies in the senate. We ai'O told tliat there is a possibility of Queens- land being divided into three colonies. So SixtJi day. 268 Federal Comtitution : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. far as South Australia is concerned I do not think there is any possibility for many years to come at any rate of any subdivision of that colony. But I think there is a misconcep- tion in the minds perhaps not of members of thisConvention,butintheminds of many members of the public, who seem to assume that the Northern Territory is part of South Australia, that South Australia runs from Adelaide to Port Darwin, whereas, as a matter of fact, this is not the case. South Australia has no larger territory than that which was first granted to her. At the present time she has the Northern Terri- tory placed under her control under letters patent from the Imperial Government, and it is quite possible for the Imperial Go- vernment at any time to deprive South Australia of the control of the Northern Territory. Some years ago, when I was in the government, and we thought that perhaps we should be able to deal more advantageously with the Nortliern Terri- tory than we believe we are able to do at the present time, we suggested to the Im- perial Government that, in order to avoid complications in the future, they should at once declare the Northern Territory to be part of the colony of South Australia. But the Imperial Government, while will- ing to assist us in any way with the go- ver-nment of that part of Australia, de- clined to accede to that proposal, and, there- fore, the Northern Territory isnopart of the colonyof South Australia and will require to be considered, I think, by members of the Convention when we go into Committee ; because, as I have said, there is a possi- bility of the mother country saying either that the Northern Territory shall be handed over to one of the other govern- ments of Australia or to the fedei-al go- vernment apart from South Australia, and probably in the end it might be found to be most advantageous if it were pos- sible to accomplish the latter. Now, I say that the states must for the reasons I have \_Sir John Bray. indicated be adequately represented in any federal parliament and federal government, and I was very glad to hear the suggestion thrown out by the hon, member, Mr. Wrixon, who represents a large colony, that it might fairly be conceded that only a certain number of members of the ex- ecutive should be chosen from any one colony. There is no doubt whatever that there is a great deal of reason and com- mon-sense in the suggestion made by the hon. member, Mr. Gillies, that anybody who undertakes to form a government— you yourself, sir, for instance, and I know from your experience that you would do it — should look round carefully and not simply consider what is most likely to satisfy the representatives of NewSouth Wales,and to carry out their wishes, but should consider the whole of the colonies, and form a govern- ment that would commend itself to the sup- port of the representatives of the whole of Australia. The hon. member went on to say that there was a reasonable way of conduct- ing things, and that he had no doubt what- ever that men would be chosen in both branches of the legislature who would act so reasonably and harmoniously together that all these causes of friction which we anticipate would prove imaginary and would disappear altogether ; and I felt then, as I feel now, that if we could select men who would sink all personal diflfer- ences, all the motives which might ap- pear to make them work harder for their own particular colony than for the rest of the country, we need have no writ- ten constitution at all. If the people of Australia could depend upon the men who were chosen to one house of the legislature not attempting to infringe upon the rights of the other house, but upon their doing their best to promote the in- terest of Australia without regard to the colonies from which they came, w^e should not need a written constitution. It seems to be taken for granted, too, that if we Federal Constitution: [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 259 are to have a system of responsible go- vernment, we must also have an opposi- tion. Now, I would ask hon. gentlemen in determining this question to consider whether it is absolutely necessary or de- sirable in the conduct of the affairs of any colony, or, at any rate, of a federal govern- ment, to have a responsible ministry and an opposition. Is it necessary to have men on the one side proposing what they believe to be best for the state, and men on the other side who advocate an opposite course, and who can only carry out their views by removing those who compose the govern- ment ? It does not appear to me to be ab- solutely necessary to have a responsible government and an opposition. I agree with the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, that we must not readily cut adrift from the old system under which we have worked, and worked well. I agree entirely with the hon. member that mistakes have been made under responsible government, per- haps in all the colonies. At any rate I admit that mistakes have been made in the colony which I represent, and perhaps I should not be thought presumptuous if I said that I think similar mistakes have also Ijeen made in the otlier colonies. But under no system of which I am aware is it possible to avoid mistakes ; though it ap- pears to me an extraordinary thing that the management of public affairs should be so different from what takes place in the management of our private affairs, either as individuals or as companies having con- trol of a largo amount of monr:y — that we should have on the one side men compos- ing a responsible government, whose pro- posals, wIkmi they are brought forward, are torn to pieces by the men on the other aide. We have been told by the hon. member, ]\Ir. Gillie.s, with a confidence that inspired belief in all of us, that if an archangel came down and attempted to lead this parliament, or any other par- liament, and introduced the most perfect measures, he would meet with opposition. Mr. Fvsn : One cannot have perfection in mankind ! Sir JOHN BRAY : I am sure that the people of Tasmania have the most perfect man at the head of their government ; I will not say that each of us think the same with regard to our own colony, but at any rate a good many people do. Still, I am not going to elaborate this point now ; but I ask hon. members to consider fully whether we are absolutely pledged to have a system of responsible government. I do not think we are, and I trust that when we get into Committee we shall not hastily dispose of this matter, but that we shall consider it carefully. I agree with those who say, like the hon. member, Mr, Deakin, and the hon. member, Mr. Gillies, that we must be absolutely satisfied that it is a better thing than we have got already. We must not drop what we have got for an experiment, and although we must not frame the constitution so rigidly as to prevent its being altered, yet at the same time we must have some basis which will give the colonies confidence that it will not be altered without the fullest and fairest consideration. I take it that we must provide .some means of altering the constitution of the federal parliament and the federal executive. It should not be done without thecon.sentof theothercolonie?pro- bably ; but still there must be some means of doing it, because I do not suppose that any of us is so sanguine as to hope that in the course of the next few weeks we shall be a])lc to frame a constitution that, vk'ith- oui alteration, will give satisfaction to the people of Australia for any great length of time. With regard to the powers of the senate, which is to contain an equal nund)er of representatives from each state, I am amongst those who say that we must give it very ample powers ; though I am per- fectly satisfied tfiat if we do adhere to a form of responsible government the voice that represents the largo ani undoubted Sixth day. !G0 Federal Constitution: [11 March, 1891.] Besolalions. majority of the people of Australia, must in the end prevail. But Ave must not make it too easy for that voice to prevail; we must not make it too easy for the ma- jority to say, " We represent the majority of the people of Australia, and although you represent the colonies of Australia, Ave must have our way." But, from niy knowledge of them, I cannot believe that the people of Australia, will be satisfied Avith any form of government that does not give the will of the people, Avhen it is iiltimately ascertained, the fullest possible control over the pai-liament and the "overnment under which thev live. Now, Avith regard to money bills. It seems to be assumed, I do not know Avhy, that the control of money is difterent from the control of everything else. I do not see Avhy it should be so. If the senate has the fullest possible power to alter the laws that control the liberty and the lives of the people, are they not to be intrusted Avith anything more than a nominal voice in the expenditure of j^ub- lic money 1 I say that I think they ought to be. It ought to be possible for them to have a direct A'oice, not in every detail — I do not ask for that — but in the expenditure of any large amount of money that involves any departure from the ordinary expendi- ture of the year. I think, however, that the ordinaiy appropriation bill ought not to be interfered with by the senate, providing that it contains only items necessary for the ordinary expenditure of the year. The hon. member, Mr. Gillies, acquiesced in that very clearly ; but at tlie same time we must not haA'e simply an understanding about this. We must have something defi- nite respecting it in the constitution act Avhich we have to prepare, and I suggest that Ave should have a provision, that no matter should be included in any money bill Avhich the senate shall declare .should, in the interests of any one of the colonies, or of all of them, be dealt [Sir John Bray. AN ith in a separate measui'e. We ought to allow them, not to reject a money bill because they do not like it, but to say, " We have looked at this bill, and it con- tains provisions which ought to be con- tained in one or more measures." They ought to have the right to say, " We re- quire you to send this subject up in a separate bill." We have in South Aus- tralia a system that on the Avhole has Avorked fairly Avell, but Avhich really in effect amounts to giving the poAver to the Legislative Council to alter money bills. About thirty-five years ago there Avas a collision between the two houses of parlia- ment with respect to money bills, and they met toECether and made Avhat is knoAvn as a compact. It is not, of course, part of the constitution, but it has been acted upon from time to time since. By that the Legislative Council can suggest, for example, that a certain line should be left out of a loan bill. In South Australia a separate bill for the construction of a rail- Avay is cari-ied through both houses of Par- liament before the amount for carrying out the Avork is included in the loan bill ; but in respect of harbour works and other pub- lic Avorks proposed to be carried out by loan, the Council has the right under this compact, not to amend the bill, but to sug- gest that a certain item should be omitted. If the Assembly do not omit the item, or the two houses do not come to an agree- ment upon the matter, it falls to the ground ; but the houses have power to ap- point committees to confer Avith each other, and to give the reasons Avhy the suggestion should be either acted u^Don or dropped. The system is arather complicated one, but, on the Avhole, it has Avorked with fair suc- cess in South Australia. With regard to taxation bills, I think the hon. member, Mr. Clark, fell into a little mistake in saying that a taxation bill required a message from the Crown before it could be considered. Mr. Clark : It is so in our parliament ! Federal Constitution : [11 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 261 Sir JOHN BEAY : It may be the practice, but I do not tliink it is the law, I understand that the South Australian Constitution Act is much the same as that of Tasmania. The 33rd section of " An act to establish a parliament in Van moneys which have been raised by means That is the point. It is for the Crown, through its ministers, to say what taxation is required ; but an absolute, direct mes- sage from the Governor is only required when it is proposed to appropriate the Diemen's Land" provides : All hills for appropriating any part of the revenue, or for imposing any tax, rate, duty, or impost, shall originate in the said house of as- sembly, and it shall not be lawful for the said house of assembly to originate to j)ass any vote, resolution, or bill for the appropriation of any part of the revenue, or of any tax, rate, duty, or impost for any purjiose which shall not have been first recommended by the governor. of the ordinary revenue or in any other way. I quite ogree with you, Mr. Presi- dent, that if we are to have anything like a complete system of fedei-ation we must have trade and intercourse absolutely free between the colonies. I was a little aston- ished at the excessive precaution which appeared to be displayed by the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Deakin, on behalf of his people That is to say that the house can raise in Victoria with regard to this question. money, but cannot determine what is to I think it is clearly tinderstood by all of be done with it, unless the governor by ns, beyond question, that the federal par- message makes a recommendation concern- liament must impose a customs tariff ing it. Then, in May's " Parliamentary before this free-trade and intercourse is Practice " it is clearly laid down that no accomplished, except, of course, by agree- private member can, without the consent ment between any one or more of the colo- of the governor, bring in a bill for taxa- nies. It may be desirable for us, in order to tion purposes. gi^'e more complete assurance, not simply Mr. Clark : It must be a minister ! to Victorians, but to colonists in all parts Sir JOHN BRAY : A message from the Governor is not necessary, but the re- quest must come from the Crown. It is stated on page 650 of May's " Parliament- ary Piactice "' : — The Crown, therefore, in the fiist instance, makes known to the Commons the pecuniary necessities of the government, and tlie Commons LTant sucli aids or supplies as ai-e rerjuircd to I'.isfy these demands; and provide, l)y taxes and by tlie appropriation of other sources of the income, the ways and means to meet the supplies wiiich are grantce com- mencement of our proceedings we were all rather chary about going into debate, I think that we should come to the under- standing now that we will sit longer and devote more time to the b>isiness each day. We have to finish more than this debate. We have to go into Committee on the resolutions, and if we agree to certain reso- lutions in Committee we shall have to draft a constitution and go through that, and if it is understood that we are to devote only three or four hours each day to the 264 AJ'/Oxirnment. [11 Mauuh, 1891.] Federal Constitution. business, it will be absolutely impossible for some of us to remain here — we must leave the business and not carry it on. Sir JOHN BRAY : Perhaps I may be jiermitted to say that it will be very con- venient if it is understood that we are to finish this debate to-morrow. Hon. mem- bers who wish to speak can be present and do so. I admit that we ought to have the fullest discussion, and if it is understood that this debate shall be brought to a con- clusion to-morrow, it being, if necessary, finished in the evening, every one who wishes to do so can speak. I think that, with the exception of the President, who may desire to speak at some length in reply, allhon. members whowish to speak should be prepared to do so to-morrow, Mr. J. FORREST : I think that there is no excuse for those hon. members who say that they are not prepared to speak at the present time. I have been here several days — some hon. members have been here longer than I have — and those who wish to speak should have been pre- pared to do so long ago, or at any rate now. "We, who represent Western Australia, are here at very great inconvenience indeed, and it is impossible for us to stay longer than is absolutely necessary; therefore, I hope that those hon. members who intend to speak will do so as soon as possible. It is now very early in the day, and I think that we might fairly have continued the de- bate another hour. I am very sorry to see that towards the evening there is a desire on the part of hon. members to avoid speak- ing before the next day. I hope that it will not continue. 3Ir. ]McMILLAN, in reply : I m^y say that as far as I am concerned I do not wish unnecessarily to stop the debate; but personally I have very many duties to per- form, and it is impossible for me to go on this evening. Question resolved in the affirmative. Convention adjourned at 3 '57 p.m. [J/r, Munro. THURSDAY, 13 MARCH, 1891. Address— Federal Constitution (seventh day's debate). The President took the chair at 11 a.m. ADDRESS, The President : I have received a tele- gram from the Mayor of Warrnambool, which the secretary will read. Telegram read by the secretary, as fol- lows : — ■ Warrnambool, 7 March, 1891. To Sir Henry Parkes, President of tlie Federal Convention. Meeting citizens held here yesterday, at wiiich suggestion partly supported that Warrnambool excellently situated for being seat of federal parliament, and respectfully solicit support of assembled Convention. Jxo. Hyland, Mayor. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. SEVENTH day's DEBATE. Debate resumed on resolutions proposed by Sir Henry Parkes (vide page 23). Mr. McMillan : Mr. President, there has been some considerable contention in my own mind during the last two or three days as to whether I should or should not address this Convention at the present stage of its proceedings; but when I had the pleasure of listening to the speech of my hon. friend, Mr. Dibbs, and when he told the Convention that New South Wales has not been a hard step-mother, but has been a loving mother to the other colonies, and when he went on to say that her re- bellious children have almost crushed her out of existence, it seemed to me it was time for somebody to rise to her defence. Mr. Dibbs : Hear, hear ! Especially a free-trader ! . Mr. McMillan : Sir, I do not intend to traverse the speech of my hon. friend, because I think that that class of criticism or hyper-criticism which is generally in- dulged in in our houses of parliament is not Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] JResolutions. 265 exactly the kind of debate wliich should obtain here. Hon. members do not; per- haps, know my hon. friend as well as 1 do. They, perhaps, to use a commercial expres- sion, merely see him in the bulk, which, sir, is very considerable ; but I know the hon. gentleman in detail, and I should not be surprised, knowing the eccentricities of his previous career, that, although he has thrown several bomb-shells, as he calls them, into the midst of the Convention, before our proceedings close my hon. friend ■will be found to bo one of the most docile in our midst. My hon. friend, jMr. Gillies, has, to a certain extent, rendered unneces- sary any criticism upon the speech of the hon. member, Mr. Dibbs. But one expres- .sion to which that hon. member gave utter- ance, and which he reiterated two or three times, I cannot allow to pass unnoticed. The hon. member said, " I speak for Kew South Wales." Mr. Dibbs : Hear, hear ! Mr. McMILLAISr : Why, sir, you would think that the hon. member had two- thirds of the people of New South Wales at his back. Mr. Dibbs : So ho has ! Mr. ]\l.cMILLAN : I contend that no delegate coming here for New South Wales can speak in that peremptory or autocratic way on this subject. When we liave concluded our deliberations the people of New South Wales will speak for tliem- .selvcs, and I am perfectly certain that wlien this i.ssue is put before tliem clear and distinct their verdict will be that Ave, the people of these colonies, should form a united Australia. I want, at this late stage of tlu! debate, to be as concise as pos- sible, witliout tedious repetition, following in the lines of previous speakers, although the speech of my hon. friend, Mr. Gillies, which took up many points with which [ intended to deal, has, to a certain extent, dislocated my speech. But it is just po.s- slblo that at this stage of our proceedings "we may by genei'al remarks save time in the later stages. It is not unreasonable to think that, at a certain stage of ou? proceedings, the finance minister of that colony — the mother colony — which for good or ill has kept to the fiscal tra- ditions of the mother country, should be heard, and should have some voice in the settlement of that fiscal question, which some hon. gentlemen say lies at the root of the whole matter. I think that there are some general views which may reasonably be expressed at the present moment, and, although the most practical part of our deliberations will be to form the body of a constitution, still I hold that it is the spirit and the vital force of tins discussion that will give shape to the anatomy of that body, and which will re- gulate its physiological functions. There- fore, I feel bound, sir, to make some pre- liminary remarks which may not meet with the approval of hon. members, and I trust that, although these remarks come from probably one of the youngest politicians in their midst, it will not be felt that they contain any imj^ertinence, but that what I say I say with the full conviction and approval of my own conscience, and with a view to the great destinies which are placed in our hands. Now, sir, what is the attitude that we ought to have assumed in coming into this Convention'? What is the spirit of the very resolutions which are the groundwork of our deliberations ? Tlie whole spirit of the Convention is in the mandate of the different parliaments of this country, and we arc met together, not exactly to accumulate obstacles, not exactly to see the dillercnccs which divide us, Ijut to promulgate a scheme which, by les.«ening those ditRcultics, by doing away with the diderences which divide us, will Ijring us into a central form of govern- ment which will not only bo a niacliincry for utilitarian jmrjioscs, Ijiit will also be a real live government in the centre of this Seventh day. 266 Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. country, radiating from itself the national life of the people, and bringing into itself the best forces of the various communities. Now, as far as I can see from the tenor of the debates up to the present time, the delegates have come here with more or less suspicion of one another's colonies. It seems to me that the lines which now divide us have been accentuated in their force, and that, instead of bringing our minds into that mental posture in which we might imagine ourselves to be when we have done away with our custom dif- ferences, when we have really become one people, we are debating this question en- tirely on the basis of existing divisions. When we come to consider the question of what has been called by some delegates state rights — but what, I think, was more appropriately termed by my hon. friend, Mr. Barton, the question of state interests — what, after all, are those state rights — ^what, after all, are these provinces with their machinery for local government — ma- chinery for doing exactly in certain areas what we do within our municipal areas ? Mr. Clark : No ! Mr. McMillan : I repeat, what we do within our municipal areas. If we are about to establish a constitution Avhich will be divided against itself, in which all parts do not work harmoniously together, which is not consummated step by step by a proper process from the lowest to the highest, we commence the creation at the very outset of a structure which, antago- nistic as it will be, in its different parts, will be .subject at any moment to fearful dislocation. Let us imagine that the customs barriers between the different colonies are removed, and what, then, are the actual and relative positions of these different communities one to an- other ? One hon. gentleman in the Legis- lative Assembly of New South Wales, in debating this question from very narrow grounds — probably owing to his legal train- [J/?-. McMillan. ing said, " Are we going to give to Vic- torians the same privileges as those which we ourselves enjoy 1 Here we are, with a certain debt, with magnificent assets, and with a magnificent territory, andpossessing all these rights and privileges : are we about to let Victoria, without any quid pro quo, enter into the possession of the whole of them T Why, sir, we welcome from Victoria now any able-bodied man who likes to come into our midst ; and six months after he crosses the Murray he en- joys all the privileges attaching to the wonderful assets of New South Wales. I confess that I cannot rise to the patriotism of New South Wales or of Victoria, but I can rise to the patriotism of a future Aus- tralia and of future Australians. And it seems to me that if we lose sight for one moment of this great union it must be an impediment in our national path, and we commence our constitution-making at the wrong end. If we are imbued with such a spirit in the making of a constitution, I can see nothing for it in the future but failure. Now, I do not conceive that there is any strict analogy between the position of the United States of America in their earlier history and our posi- tion at the present time. Nearly all the constitutions of these colonies have been given comparatively during the last few years. There is no absolute difference, either in tradition, in laws, or in anything else, between the different peoples of this country, and it seems to me that to draw any strict analogy of state rights, such as exist between peoples who have origin- ated in a different way and under different influences, would be entirely to miscon- ceive the basis of any future union of Australia. The states of these colonies are differently situated from those of the United States, and this is one of the most important points in connection with the whole of this discussion. We have a series of states, and although I hold as strongly Federal Constitutioyi: [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 267 as anyone that no territorial lines should be altered, except by the wish of the majority of the people of each state, still I say most emphatically, that if Australia were to be subdivided again no man in his senses would subdivide the continent as it is sub- divided at the present time. Eacli of these states has a littoral, each of them has a coast-line, which gives it all the elements of national life and independence. Each is so advantageously situated naturally that the time may come when, owing to its national resources and sea boundary, it may be an element of great danger to the union of Australia. Consequently it seems to me that unless, in making this constitution, we make the central govern- ment sufficiently strong, and give it all the elements of sovereignty, our national life may be endangered from within or from without; and unless we disabuse our minds of all narrow views at the present time, the constitution we create may, from the want of a true conception of Austra- lian nationality, and of the sovereignty of its power, be unequal to the strain, and the consequences will be lamentable for all future time. Now, sir, what are the essentials next to the sovereignty of the central government ? I am led, to a certain extent, into this line of argument, because I do not wish to traverse ground taken up before, and I may say at once that with a great many of the sentiments of my hon. friend, Mr. Gillies, I completely and absolutely agree. The question that we have to decide at the beginning i.s, what are the essentials of a sovereign govern- ment? We have had a great deal of dis- cussion in our legislative a.sscmblies, and a great deal of false alarm ha.s been raised as to certain questions — the disposal of our lands, tlie question of our debts, the con- trol of our railways. Now, none of these questions are in any sense essential to the sovereignty of the federal government. Tf tlie whole of our lands were alienated from the Crown, there would still be a necessity for a central government ; if our railways were, like those of America, in private hands, there would still be a necessity for a central government ; and, so far as our loans are concerned, that will be purely a matter of policy after we have formed the federation. Now, there are two essentials to a central government. It must be a go- vernment that will concentrate upon itself the life of the people, and it must be a go- vernment which will aid our national de- velopment. It must be in all its characteris- tics, and as far as its chambers are concerned, and as far as their powers and privileges are concerned, a government to attract all the ablest and best minds of the commu- nity. Now, let us take the military ques- tion. We have heard from Mr. Dibbs that in these resolutions military aggression is clearly forecast. There is nothing of the kind in these resolutions. Mr. Dibbs : The hon. member forgets the speeches of the President on other occasions ! Mr. Mc]\lILLAN : We simply say that the central government must have the nucleus of military power ; that it must be in a position to draw together all the mili- tary forces of the community ; and further- more — and probably what I am about to say will not agree with the views of my hon. friend — if you give the central government absolute control of the military power — and it is of no use to burk the question at this stage of the proceedings — you must place it in a position to command the whole of the volunteer forces of these colonies. It must not be for this colony or that to say, " Here is the point of daiiger," or, " There is the point of danger. We want the troops in our territory," or, "We want them there." If this is to be a union of a national character the moment the public safety is jeo[)ardise'S9. An Jio.v. Mk.miu:u : How are these pay- ments made 1 Mr. Mc^IILLAN : Each colony that I have named receives from and pays to the other colonies in taxes the amounts I have stated. Tliis is the debit and credit of the intercolonial intercourse in trade. Wo find that our friends in Victoria collect £-2')(),000, and they oidy pay away £59,000. "We find in the colony of New Zealand that they pay away £110,000, while they collect £18,000, Now, when you con- sider the debit and credit of the accounts, the sum of money for which the whole of these antagonisms between the colo- nies are created may be reduced to about £250,000. That is a very good com- ment on this question of free-trade and l)rotection between the colonies. Hon. members will understand that I am not now going into the general question ; but I am simply pointing out that while these duties are of small account to the respec- tive colonies, they have created a system of irritation and retaliation which has sometimes almost bordered on a civil war. Mr. McIlwraitii : The irritation is en- tirely here ! Mr. McMillan : I think in this con- nection it is only right that I should say openly and fairly that I am quite willing, personally, to leave it to the federal par- liament to decide as to the tariff of the future. I am willing to allow that at a certain time in my political experience I had other views ; but it seems to me that if we are to enter into a union such as that I have forecast, we must enter into it without jealousies and without suspicions, and we must trust to the great federal government of the future to deal with the tariff question. But I believe that a cer- tain time should elapse before that tarifi is approached, and for the reason, that up to the present we have all been looking upon our respective tarifls and upon tlie question of free-trade and protection solely from a local aspect. But when we come to adopt a tariff for the whole of Australia it will be necessary that a certain interval shall elapse, so that our minds may become accustomed to consider the question from a comprehensive view of the interests of a united Australia. And then, whatever the future mny be, T venture to think that when Quoonsland has to come into a common tariff, when A'^ictoria has to come into a common tariff — when a country like Vic- toria, practically without coal or iron, has to join in a common tariff witli New South Seventh day. 270 Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions, Wales, which has ahnost every mineral known in the world — such colonies will then find that their views of a tariff will alter exceedingly. They will find that the tariff which might have suited the localisms of the past will not suit the union of the future. Sir John Bray : Don't frighten them now ! Mr. McMillan : I, therefore, say in this Convention — and it is my only rea- son for using the alignment — that an in- terval should elapse, so that the minds of the people of the colonies, judging from the extreme localism that has been ex- hibited, should have time to view the question from a larger, broader, and more comprehensive aspect. That is my hope for the future, and that is the reason why I most unflinchingly believe that we should leave the federal parliament of the future to decide the tariff of the union. The hon. member. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, cer- tainly threw the greatest bomb-shell into our midst. If the quintessence of diflicul- ties could have been boiled down into the space of about twenty minutes, my hon. friend would have managed to boil them down in that space. Without having any reference to this debate, I should like to remind him of one fact, namely, that the dislocation of the finances of this colony might possibly be more affected by a pro- tective tariff, such as he said New South Wales must come to, if, as we vmderstand economically, a protective tariff continually decreases. Of course it is not necessary for me to refer to the remarkable statement of my hon. friend, Mr. Dibbs. That hon. gentleman said that this Convention must lay down the basis of a tariff before it comes to any conclusion. Mr. Dibbs : The principles which should guide the new government ! Mr. McMillan : I should like to point out one thing in regard to the tariff, and with regard to that dislocation of the [i/>. McMillan. finances to which the hon. member. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, has referred. I have before me a table which shows that at the present time we are borrowing all round at the rate of 4 '15 per cent. The loans outstanding at the present date are in amount over £181, 000,000,andtheinterest payable is £7,545,000. If the whole of these loans were converted, as they will be in time, into 3|^ per cent, loans, there will be a saving, taking the debt, even if it did not increase, at the present rate, of £1,180,000. Mr. Playford : What amount would you have to pay the present bondholders to get the loans converted into 3^- per cents. 1 Mr. McMillan : The existing loans at 4 per cent, and 5 per cent, are running out, and we shall never convert at above 31- per cent, in the future. Mr. Baker : Each colony can do that by itself ' Mr. ^" ^MILLAN : Exactly ; but I am only sa_; ..ig that if the finances are to re- ceive such a terrible dislocation from the loss of the £500,000, and other things, the tendency, on the other hand, will be to an immense saving in the future ; and I be- lieve that r .derated Australia will yet be able to borrow at the rate of 3 per cent. There is another question which enters intimately into the consideration of finance, and that is, the question of the cost of the central government. For the benefit of hon. members, I have had tables care- fully prepared with regard to the general revenue and expenditure of the central government. It is here proposed to give the whole of the customs of the colonies to the central government, and that, of course, is necessary to the sovereign character of the central government and the control of the coasts. I find that the total revenue from customs duties, in the whole of the colonies, is £8,641,000, and by the most careful calculation that we can make, the Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] Resolutiotis. 271 total expenditure of the central govern- ment would be £2,240,000 — that is to say, merely 1 2s. per head in federated Australia for all the advantages of central govern- ment ; and we would be able to return to tlie different colonies, as a surplus, £0,401,000. I remarked just now, that if our debts were reduced to 3| per cent., the amount at which we are borrowing at present, that would save £1,180,000, and if, in a federated Australia, we reduced the rate of interest to 3 percent., then we should save by that process alone nearly the whole of the£2,240,000 required for the purposes of central government. Of course, there will be another way of saving through the central government. All the fortifications will have to be taken over at a fair valua- tion, and colonies such as Victoria, which, I believe, has paid for nearly all its forti- fications out of revenue — I think I am correct in that — will, of course, have re- turned to them a substantial sum, which will reduce their debt. I nov come to a question on which I shall ^ , till very shortly — the question of the senate and the house of representatives. I do not agree with hon. members who say that the senate should be looked upon purely as a chamber for the protection of state rig^jts. Sir JouN Bhav : No one said it was to be purely for that purpose ! !Mr. McMillan -. I consider that one of its essential functions will be the pro- tection of state rights ; but at the same time it will certainly have all the elements of a second chamber — a chamber of great staVjility, a chamber which will attract to itself all the best elements, all the elements which have proved a success in othcrspheres of public life, whether in the local legisla- tures or in the house of representatives. That cliamber from its position as a second chamber, and as a check, will be one of the greatest bulwarks of the liber- ties of the people. As regards the ques- tion of money bills, I give in my adhesion simply to the confining of the initiation of money bills to the lower house. I believe that in every other respect the upper house must have coordinate power. If we are to have a house that will attract to itself all the ability of the country — if the men who have had years of experience in the legislatures of the different colonies, and perhaps in the house of representa- tives, are to be attracted to a house where the weight of their experience and their matured faculties must be felt, these men must go into a co-ordinate assembly, and they must feel that their position is one of the blue ribbons of the political life of the country. I think, if that is the char- acter of our upper house, as I believe it will be, we shall be able to trust to the wisdom and the patriotism and the well- known characteristics of our people ; and no arbitrary check — no artificial means — will be required to keep it from overriding the other assembly. The more power you give, then, to the upper chamber, the more likely it is that there will be but little friction between the houses, and that they will do their duty as patriots to their common country. Now, with regard to the question of veto, I can see that, unless we have some rather elaborate machinery, there will be great difiiculty between the senate and the house of representatives in dealing with money bills. I take it for granted, as was done by the hon. member, Mr. Gillies, that all questions of ordinary appropriation for which revenue is available will, of course, be decided al- most entirely by the house of representa- tives ; but there may be this difiiculty : A loan which it is desired to float may be initiated in the represontativc assembly, it may 1)0 for £.'50,000,000 ; tlu; up|)or house may think that that is £10,000,000 too much, and there must be some machinery by which they can intimate their opinion. Instead of the bill being thrown with in- dignity under the table in the assembly, Seventh day. 272 Federal Constitution : [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. the upper lionse should be able to say, understand the American system, we must *• ^Ve do not think you sliould have clearly understand the position of affairs £30,000,000 ; but we are quite willing to when that system was brought into exist- grant you £20,000,000." It seems to me ence, and here I come into direct and abso- that the only mode of settling differences lute conflict with the lion, member, Mr. in case of a deadlock is the system of con- Dibbs. That hon. member finds fault with ferences which have had such happy results the insertion of the words "under the in the United States. In them men get Crown " in the resolutions. But I tell away from the influence of party feeling my hon. friend if he is not willing to and are in a position analogous to that accept federation under the Crown he has which we occupy at the present time. no right to be here. They would be moi-e likely to come together Mr. Dibbs : The hon. member said that in a spirit of amity, and the common desire before ! would betodo what wasbestforthecountry. Mr. McMILLAN : I said in the early Consequently, I think some system of com- part of the proceedings that I did not be- mittee for dealing with financial affliirs lieve that my hon. friend thought that I between the two houses should be brought belie^'e he will come in with our results at into existence where necessaiy, in order the end just as amicably as anybody, to prevent deadlocks in these matters, " Under the Crown " makes all the differ- so that the upper house, without showing ence between the condition of affairs here any indignity to the lower house, can say now and the condition of affairs when the exactly what they mean. I believe that United States were federated. There they if our house of representatives is properly had their president and their two liouses, formed ; if it has a longer tenure of ex- and the system was what is called, in istence than that house has in America — commercial language, "check upon check." and the shortness of existence there is, I The states were suspicious of the central think, one of the great defects of the government. Congress was suspicious of its American system — if it becomes a real president, and the whole system was an house of representatives, with proper elaborate system of suspicion and check, powers, and if its machinery is such as to Butwehaveno need for any exti'eme caution attract to it the best men of the country, of that kind. We have a system of respon- you will find that no antagonism will sible government, and we have at the head exist between it and the upper house on of it a representative of her Majesty. Long these matters, which cannot easily be ad- may we have her representative among us. justed. As regards a penal dissolution of I do not agree with what my hon. friend, the upper house, that is a most extreme Sir George Grey, said on this point. It proposition. The upper house, if it is to seems to rae that this makes the whole have any characteristic, should have the difierence of thesystem^ — it goes to the very characteristic of stability. It is to be the root of the system. We have now a gover- liouse which, at the time of the greatest nor, whether he be able or not, who is above danger to the whole nation, when, perhaps, party feeling. He never ceases to exist, an enemy is at her very gates, instead of Ministers come and go, but there remains being open to penal dissolution, must be an absolute link of communication from in such a position that two-thirds of its the people right up to the head of the Go- members will stand secure with all the vernment. And who in this country wishes experience and wisdom of acknowledged to be better than the Prime Minister of and trained politicians. But, in order to federated Australia ? Who cares to be the [Mr. JIcMillan. Federal Constitution : [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 273 Governor of federated Australia when the to the top, and in the administration of a Prime Minister is the first man ia power in countiy with various classes of offices such tlie country ? His position will be the blue as law, public works, defence, and others ribbon of the highest possible ambition, and open, there will require to be such a diver- the difficulties which met the American sity as well as such an extent of talent that people, arising out of the conditions of po- there can be no fear that the smaller states litical life at the time which were 100 years wnll be snufted out if they send capable men behind our present development — they to the central legislature of the country, having to make a man either a despot or a I shall not attempt to enter into matters nonentity — for every president has been one which lie moi-e in the province of the legal or the other — do not exist Avith us. As the members of this Convention. I do not hon. member, Mr. Gillies, said, under our w^ant to delay for one moment unneces- form of government we have every pos- sarily this debate. I trust, in the remarks sible freedom. And if it suits the genius I have made with regard to the necessity for of our people and the conditions under a strong central government, I have given which we live, why should we look for- no oflence to those gentlemen who have ward to another .system, full of inexplic- taken an opposite view. In coming here able difficulties and dangers which nobody I am happy to say that I have been grati- can foretell ? Now, with regard to the fied to meet, as I have met, the picked men position of responsible ministers. I do not of Australasia. I have come away from see why these resolutions should say that the party spirit of our own Parliament, the ministers must be responsible to the not to a body going to criticise minutely lower house. Our Constitution says nothing every point of its deliberations as against of the kind. INIinisters cannot hold power each other, but to a body that are actuated a day after they have lost the confidence by one feeling, and that is a desire to make of the people; and by our machinery, hav- a constitution wliich will stand the test ing our Executive iu the two houses of of time. I wish to point out that we are Parliament — and I trust that the senate now making this constitution at a period will have some members of the executive of our existence when there is no hostile among them — we feel the breath of the or disturbing element in our midst. Why, people as we feel tlie wind of heaven, gentlemen, could you, as far as matters of 'I'wentyfour hours need only elapse before locomotion are concerned, have assembled the feeling of the people is known, and ia here ten years ago in this Chamber, with 8pite of those gentlemen who wish to bring the prime ministcns of the various colo- about tlie i)olitical Tiiillennium, I hope tliat nies, and other ministers of state per- there will always be an opposition, sturdy, forming important functions — could you critical, and independent, so that the have done that ten years ago ; would it ministry may always feel the breath of have been deemed possible ten years ago ? tlie peojih', and be turned out as .soon as If niy hon. friend, Sir Thomas Mcllwraitli, Ihey cease to represent the people. Now, wants to go up to the social troubles of with regard to the rights of the colo- (Queensland, we can send him up in twenty- nies, and more particularly of the smaller four hours by an express train. Are we colonies, I think that iii the considcra- to ignore the possihilities of the future? tion of the details of the constitution we Are we to ignore this fact : that now, at ought to consider the smaller states more a lime wlien. there is a chance of laying than the larger states. I believe that in truly the foundations of Australian union, all political matters the best men will rise every year brings us nearer, by processes of S Seventh day. 27 i Federal Constitution : [12 Maucu, 1891.] Itesoliitions. locomotion, to each other 1 Our eager friends in Western Australia ^\■ant a rail- way through ; and I believe thatwill be one of the first great undertakings of the Aus- tralian federation. Year by year we get nearer to one another, and year by year the question of Perth, Adelaide, Mel- bourne, and so on, will become less and less in the distance of the future. AVhat I want to impress upon hon. members of the Convention is this : that now, Avhen there are no hostile elements, when protection, which is calculated to call forth retaliation and to engender hostility among the different colonies, is now to be cut off completely amongst ourselves — I want to see a constitution created of such a character as will annihilate, not the localisms, but the nationalities of the dif- ferent states. I want to see a central go- vernment, which will prove of immense service in welding together the different elements of the people of this country. I want to see a central government, which, will deal with the black question in North Queensland, and with the great territories of Westei-n Australia, as far as by influence and by common consent they can be dealt Avith. We should do now what is pos- sible in that direction. If we accentuate our differences, and crystallise them under the constitution, we may never be able to undo. Do not let us feel, when the great future comes, that those who look back upon our early efforts, that those who knew we had this great opportunity before us, will be able to say, " Patriotic and able as these men were, anxious as they were to take action in these great affairs, they did not see with sufficient clearness the great future destinies of Australasia. They stopped short in the very essential element of national union ; and, by a wretched tra- vesty of a constitution they actually crys- tallised those differences which are now the great bane of these communities.'' I believe we shall do nothing of the kind. It is only . [J/r. Mc^hUan. with the view of raising my voice and try- ing to evoke in this Convention a spirit which will permeate our more utilitarian efforts, that I have risen to speak on this occasion ; and I trust, sir, that, inexperi- enced though 1 am as a politician, still, being ambitious as an Australian patriot, the few words to which I have given utter- ance this morning may contribute to the national union. Mr. HACKETT : My hon. friend, Mr. McMillan, has claimed the indulgence of the Convention as a young politician. I feel, sir, that my claim to the same privi- lege comes with double force, for not only am I a young politician in my adopted colony of Western Australia, but that colony itself is among the youngest, is the very youngest, of the Australian group of free states. In that connection, sir, pei'- haps you will allow me to emphasise the remarks of the hon. members, Sir James Lee-Steere and Mr. John Forrest, in ex- pressing our gratification at being able to be present on an equality with the other states of Australia in this Convention. I should like to take exception to something which the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, said in regard to that matter, when, with an air which grated a little, although, no doubt, it was wholly unintentional on his part, he spoke of Western Australia as claiming some extreme privileges, under the impression, perhaps, that as she was the youngest child of Australia, she was to be treated as the pet of the continent. None of us can forget that though our majority dates back only a few months, in reality we are the oldest child of the parent state of New South Wales ; that sitting here on an equality with the other states we feel we are sitting among our younger sisters ; and if there were any danger of our forgetting the duties that we owe to maternity, the hospitality, the extreme and gracious kindness we h.ave received at the hands of the parent state, Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 275 will make it ineffaceable from our minds. friend, Mr. McMillan, througli liis speech ; We have had the extreme disadvantage, on the contrary, I am sure I express the as the hon. member. Sir James Lee-Steere, regret of the representatives of my own has already put it, of arriving late in this colony, and no doubt also the regret of the debate. The speech to which most of the great majority of hon. members of the Con- other speeches have been replies, more vention, that those figures with which he or less, whether comments of censure or favoured us were not presented before the comments of approval, has been that of members of this assembly at an earlier the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith. We period in the debate. He sketched in the were unable to hear that speech, and we most cursory manner questions, and gave were also unable to hear a speech which, I us tables of figures which would require believe, produced as great an effect on the liours to consider adequately. Even his minds of those who heard it as it did on remark about the £2,000,000 which it the minds of those who read it — the speech would be necessary to present to the cen- of the hon. member, Mr. Barton. But I tral government, if it is adequately to would point out that our arriving late— do its duty, was imperfect and obscure, and I hope I may be forgiven for making What did the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, this passing reference to the matter— is in mean by those £2,000,000 1 What is the itself an emphatic argument in favour of money to pay for— for what things is it the movement we are here to advocate. required ? Apparently, the hon. member Travelling night and day, with most un- contemplates the central government tak- usual expedition, we took over a week to ing over the debts of the states, reach Sydney from our city of Perth. Had Mr. ]\IcMillan : No. I left details to we that communication which I believe the Committee ! is only a matter of time, we could have Mr. HACKETT : This more than ever shortened that distance by less than one- accentuates the difficulty in which I be- half. T take it that if federation is to be lieve the hon. member has placed the Con- anything more than a name, one of its vention by alluding in this slight fashion main objects will be, not only to strengthen to matters which should have been pre- the political bonds which unite us, but also sentod at an earlier opportunity. But one to abridge the physical barriers which Avord in reference to that debt. In the keep us apart. No doubt it is well to case of all the other colonies it is a talk of a union of hearts — I hope we have simple matter. You can estimate your that in Australia alrnady ; but I liave debt; you can put it down in pounds, been tauglit to consider that an alliance shillings, and pence. It is my intention of that kinited, and necessarily exhibited by us, will vanish, ai]per chambers of these colonies. There is no analogy between the two bodies. In tiie latter bodies the inter- ests of a single community are dealt with, while ill tlie fornu-r the diversified in- terests of a number of colonies mu.st be protected ; and I am sure that unless the senate lias some power, thf colonies will have no guarantee of the inviolability of their right.s, which is one of the things upon which the colonies, before entering upon the consi liideau Canal. There is no doubt at all of tlie wisdom of that selection. Tlietown isfar away from the boundary line of the United States, at a point where all the lines of com- munication connecting it with the various- Seventh day. 286 Federal Constitution : [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. places throughout the Dominion could be preserved incase of war, and, as I have said, the selection was a very happy one, and re- flected great credit upon those who made it. I have just been reading about the growth of Canada since the federation, and I in- tended to show the results which have fol- lowed federation there. I have made a note of the development of trade there, and it will show the desirableness of feder- ation. The inter-provincial trade between the eastern provinces is $55,000,000, which is equal to sixteen times the trade done in the first year of the confederation, and twenty-seven times the trade done in conference the taking of such steps as they outset, the first resolution, after recognis- ing the services of the Federal Council, declares " that the seven years which have elapsed since 1883 have developed the national life of Australia in population, in wealth, in the discovery of resources, and in self-governing capacity to an ex- tent which justifies the higher act, at all times contemplated, of the union of these colonies under the Crown, and under one legislative and executive government, on principles just to all the colonies." That was followed by a resolution which im- posed as a duty upon the members of that the year previous to it. They have now 14,000 miles of railway, including the rail- way between the Pacific and the Atlantic, representing a capital of $727,000,000, and 2,400 miles of inland navigation, the various connections of which have cost $.30,000,000. These great works could not have been carried out if the provinces had remained isolated, and I feel sure that fi'om the federation of Australia similar results will accrue. I therefore heartily might think necessary for the purpose of inducing their respective parliaments to send delegates to a national convention for one purpose — for the purpose of fram- ing a constitution. " Empowered to con- sider and report upon an adequat' scheme for a federal constitution " were the words of the resolution. Now, sir, those gentle- men loyally discharged their duty. They were all, apparently, of one mind that the resolutions were fitly, aptly, and pro- support the resolutions, and will render perly prepared ; and they ventured to sub- every assistance in my power to carry out niit them to their respective colonies; and the objects for which we are met here, and by the parliaments of those colonies they rpy prayer is that the future generations of these colonies may say of united Aus- tralasia, as Tennyson said of England : A land of settled government, A land of just and old renowni, Where freedom broadens slowly down From precedent to precedent. Mr. CUTHBEPvT : I think it right to consratulate the members of the Federal Conference which met about twelve months ago in Melbourne on the successful result which attended their efforts on that occa- sion. The very able manner in which the question of federation was debated by them was an education in itself to the whole of the colonies; and the result of their labours •was summed up in a series of resolutions which commended themselves to the people of the whole of Australia. At the very ,[J/r. Moore. have been indorsed. The result is, that those parliaments have settled for us the question as to whether it is desirable that a union of the colonies should take place or not. That question is answered, I think, in the affirmative, without any mistake ; the action of each colony in sending men from each parliament, selected with- out consideration of parties from both houses of the legislature. Accordingly a mission has been intrusted to us. We have been delegated to discharge the gi'eat, important, and delicate task of framing a constitution, making it as 2"»erfect as we can in all its proportions ; but, above all, just to all the colonies. That is a task which is approached by all members in a spirit of compromise ; and I think that Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 287 before we close our proceedings we shall Lave tlie satisfaction of knowing that the work we have undertaken will be fairly and properly accomplished, and that that work is in no degree inferior to the great undertaking of those eminent men who, in the autumn of 18G4, assembled in Quebec, and brought about the union of the ISTorth American provinces. Passing from that, I deal with the resolutions whicli you, Mr. President, have submitted in your usual calm, lucid, and dignified style. You have invited us to frankly, freely, and fully dis- cuss the principles embodied in these reso- lutions. The different speakers who have addressed themselves to this question have not dealt generally with the whole sub- ject of federation; but they have confined themselves, and I think properly so, to the principles embodied in the resolutions. Looking at the 1st re.solution, I think, hav- ing lieard what I have heard since I came over to this favoured colony of yours, that tliere is a section of the community who think that the delegates from Victoria and Queen.sland have some sinister object in view ; who think that they are actuated by an improper desire to fdch fi-om the parent state a portion of its territorial rights. I think that these gentlemen who entertain such an opinion have done us great in- ju.stice. Such an idea, I know, was never contemplated. I speak on bolialf of the Victorian delegates, and I may say that I .speak on V^ehalf of the delegates of all the colonies, when I .say that .such an idea never entered into thiir lieads ; and if it did, the language in which the ^solutions is couched would unmistakably show to those wiio read that none of the privilege.s, or powers, or territorial rights of the several colonies would be inter- fered with. It i.s provided that they are to remain intact, unless each particular state in order to accomplish the great federal object which we all liave so much at heart, sees its wav to surrender some part or joortion of the privileges, powers, and rights vvliich it has hitherto enjoyed. I am very pleased that that resolution stands first, becau.se those who entertain the opinion to which I have referred will have their minds completely disabused if they rely on the assurance of the dele- gates now assembled here. The 2nd re- solution, which affirms that we shall have free trade and intercourse throughout the length and breadth of the Australian con- tinent, is merely a repetition of the oft- expressed desire of numbers of the people of this colony — indeed, of all who desire the welfare and the advantage of Aus- tralia-^that there should be free-trade among the colonies ; but I gather, from the debates that have taken place, that there will follow in its train protection against the outer world. I think that the one is a corollary of the other. I think that it must follow as the night the day, that if we have free-trade among ourselves, we must have protection against the outer world. Unless we have that, how are we to meet our engagements ? It is proposed hereto hand over to the federal parliament the right to impose customs duties ; but, be- fore I come to that, I might say that it seems to me most strange that in a vast continent like that of Australia — equal al- most to the whole of Europe, where there are no great natural barriers, but where the whole of the continent is divided among five colonies, rich in resources, with fertile land, with great mineral wealth, with an enterprising and active population, sur- rounded by all the necessaries of life, and who ought, with the ])erfect freedom that they enjoy under their different constitu- tions, to Ije the best and the most contented people in the world — people sprung from the same race, and owning allegiance to one Sovereign — it is, I say, strange that those wlio are all sprung from one common stock should raise artificial barriers between themselves, which, T consider, are a blot Seventh day. 288 Federal Constitution: [12 Makcii, 1891.] liesolutions. upon their legislation, and a blot upon the civilisation of the nineteenth century : bar- riers which have been erected by them- selves in order to prevent that free-trade ■which ouarht to exist between a kindred people speaking the same language. These barriers, these customs duties, these hostile thrifts — what do they amount to, after all ? They are only calculated to irritate and to annoy, to create ill-feeling, and, pro- bably, in the not A'ery remote future, re- taliation ; and if federation is not brought about, and these colonies become power- ful, we know not what might happen in the not distant future. Suppose that some discordant element, some cause of umbrage arose between the people of the respective colonies, we know not but what we might be plunged into civil war. It is open to us at the present time to avert such a calamity, and the sooner these bar- riers of our own creation are removed the greater the satisfaction that will be felt throughout the Australian continent. But I know very well that these barriers can- not be removed until federation is accom- plished — until it becomes a living reality. I assume that all the delegates here are of one mind, and that they see the neces- sity of organising and bringing together all the powers of their intellect, in order to carry out the mission intrusted to them^ which is to frame a proper constitution. Assuming a federal parliament to be con- stituted, we must provide it with a pro- per source of revenue, in order that it may carry out its engagements and fulfil the duties which will devolve upon it in relation to the several subjects which may be speci- ally intrusted to its care, control, and juris- diction ; and it seems to me that the very best way to accomplish the end in view will be to allow the federal authority to impose customs duties. The colonies de- rive a great portion of their income at the pi-esent time from customs duties. There were some figures placed on this table this [iJfr. Cutlihert. morning for the first time, though I confess that when the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, referred to them I could not clearly grasp the whole subject, and I question whether any hon. member in the House was able to do so ; but it occurred to me that, putting it in round figures, we might say that the customs duties amounted to some £8,000,000, or a little more, for the whole of the colonies ; and that it would be necessary to spend something like £2,000,000 in order that the federal par- liament might meet its engagements. It may be said, " Surely this is a very heavy expenditure." But it must be borne in mind that the respective colo- nies will be relieved from the expenditure which is now necessarily entailed upon them in connection with various subjects such as defence and the other different matters referred to in the list submitted by the Premier of Victoria. I, therefore, agree with those who entertain strong views in favour of protection — like my hon. friend, Colonel Smith, who is an out-and-out pro- tectionist, and who very carefully guards the interests of the constituency which he has represented for so many years, and who, I think, has properly said that unless federation be on the lines of protection it would be useless to ask the co-operation of the colony of which he is one of the repre- sentatives. As to the material guarantees whiclihavebeenspokenof, I think that when vre come to close quarters in Committee — for up to this time we have been only skirmish- ing — the difficulties will disappear one after the other, and that this which was supposed to be the " lion in the path" will very soon disappear. Kow I come to deal Avith the military and naval defence of Australia, which it is proposed shall be intrusted io federal forces under one command. I cor- dially approve of that proposition, which has met with general acceptance all round — and why ? Because we know that the colonies recognise that the duty of protect- I Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 289 insj their own shores devolves upon them — that they have erected fortitications, and that many of the colonies have an efficient permanent corps of artillerymen which has been strengthened by the Aolunteers who have come forward in the cause of their country to give tlieir services as militiamen. But Ave are aware that there is a weakness all through the design. We are aware that, if any portion of the Australian continent were attacked, while a friendly and brotherly feeling would dictate that we ought to go to the rescue of the place attacked by a hostile foe, we have no power whatever to order our troops out of our own colony, to go and concentrate their forces with the others. And though we received reports from dif- ferent naval and military commanders as to the state of our forces and their efficiency — as to their courage, that was undoubted — we were not .satisfied merely with re- ports from our own officers ; we wanted an independent authority of eminence to give us bis candid opinion of the action wc had taken in our endeavour to form an effi- cient military and naval force. Accoi'dingly, the colonies united, as they have done on several occasions, always leading towards unity, and applied to the Imperial Go- vernment to .send an officer to rc|)ort on our forces. General Edwards thfii came here, and furnished us with his report, to the details of which I will not refer. But lie pointed out, unmistakably, whore our weakness lay. I think it was his report which induced you, >Mr. President, to com- niunicato with the premiers of the other colonics, the result being the conference in Melbourne to which I have already re- ferred. Some hon. gentlemen may think that by placing the whole of our forces under one command we want to raise a large military force which will saddle the country with expenses that may be deemed unnecessary. But, as I understand the resolution, it lias no such meaning. The federal parliament will look closely into the question of the finances. They will see that it will be expected by all the colo- nies that due economy shall be observed in the administration of the funds intrusted to them, and that it will be expected that out of the £8,000,000 of revenue handed over to them at least £6,000,000 will be available for redistribution among the co- lonies; and the colonies will look with a very observant eye upon all that is done by the federal parliament, because they will be interested parties, and they will know that in order to meet the engagements into which they have entered it will be neces- sary for them to husuand their resources- in every way. In my opinion, the placing cf the naval and military forces under one command will not be attended with much additional expense. We want no large standing army here. There is no necessity for it. If we protect our ports as we are doing, and having men, money, and the- munitions of war, having men in our artil- lery forces as well skilled and competent as any to be found in her ISIajesty's service, and in addition to that, having powerful and efficient guns of the latest type, we feel that the obligation devolves upon us to have a force sufficient to protect us against invasion. "Will hon. members permit me just to make one quotation fioni a work by a most cniinent man, highly skilled in the art of warfare? MajorClarke, writing on the navy, sets forth the advan- tages which the colonics rea]) from re- maining part of the empire. He summa- rises them as follows : — Their commerce, That is, the commerce of the colonies. wliicli in tlic'ir very life, lias receivcMl, and will icM'cive the protection of the greatest naval power of the world. 2. The necessary titandanl of the local defences of their ports is reduced to a minimum. .3. They rcfjuirc to 1)0 able to resist a cruiser raid, since a hostile fleet cannot reach them in force, except on condition of defeating and de- stroying strong British sfjiiadrons. jSeventh day. 290 Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. These are the words of one -who speaks Avitli authority, and who points out ex- actly the danger we are in. As long as England is mistress of the seas, as long as we are a dependency of England, we may rely on her support, and so long we may depend upon it no foreign powei', however strong, can set foot on these shores. Since Major Clarke wrote on this subject we must not lose sight of the fact that we have taken a new departure, and that we recognise that our commerce is the very life of our colonies. We have recognised this, that it is unfair that the mother country should be saddled with the whole expense of defending our commerce on the high seas ; and therefore, I am proud to say, as the result of a conference which took place in London, and to which we sent delegates, that for the first time, I think, in English history the colonies have entered into a partnership by which they are enabled to have the advantage of the support of what may be termed an Australian squadron. Under the British flag we may rest in security, leaving it to the squadron in this part of her Majesty's dominions to protect our commerce, and taking upon ourselvesthe duty of defending our shores. I have spoken, so far, briefly, because I think that at this late period of the debate I should be trespassing too much on the time and attention of hon. mem- bers were I to go through the whole of the subjects connected with federation. I have confined myself in the few remarks I have made to the principles contained in the four resolutions ; but I cannot conceal from myself that there yet remains one vital and important subject to be touched upon — one that has occupied more atten- tion than all the others put together. With regard to the amendments which may be submitted in Committee, they will not involve much difficulty, and I think the proceedings in Committee will be com- paratively short, as the principles em- \_Mr. Cuthbert. bodied are generally acceptable. I did not anticipate when the debate commenced that its great interest would centre, not on the constitution of the houses of parliament, but on the duties, and the privileges, and the rights to be conferred upon one of the two houses. Whether that house is to be called the second chamber, the senate, or the council of the states, is immaterial. To the very able speeches delivered on this subject I listened with great attention. The Premier of South Australia advocated the cause of the house of representatives, contending that as all power springs from the people, as I admit it does, the house of representatives must have the control of the purse, and that all measures relating to money matters, and the imposition of duties, must originate in that house. I am perfectly in accord with him as far as the origination of such bills goes. I think that usage has determined, if nothing else has, that they must originate in the house of assembly. I shall not discuss the question why, if the two houses are perfectly equal, those bills should not originate in the second chamber. Suffice it for me to say that I follow on the lines of parliamentary usage, and I say, " By all means give to the house of representatives the power Avhich the people's house has been in the habit of claiming, and which is fair, of originating those bills." There seems to be a unanimous agreement that all the states shall be represented in the house of representatives according to their popula- tion ; but when we look at the constitu- tion of the senate, the whole order of things is to be reversed, and each state is to have an equal number of representatives in that chamber. That principle is agreed to all around. For what reason is it agreed to, except to confer upon the senate equal and co-ordinate powers with the house of re- presentatives, not only in general legisla- tion, but also in all measures relating to money matters. I see the Premier of Federal Constitution : [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 291 Victoria sitting opposite to rue, and I should like to make that hon. gentleman, above all others in the Convention, a con- vert to my views. Mr. MuxRO : It will take the hon. mem- ber a long time ! Mr. CUTHBERT: Because I know how much depends upon Victoria acting in hearty co-operation with the views of members of the Convention. The leader of a powerful government has, perhaps without due con.sideration Mr. MuxRO : Oh, no ! Mr. CUTHBERT : Perhaps in a mo- ment of haste, expressed a certain view, because Victoria has a written constitution quite dissimilar from that which prev^ails in Tasmania and South Australia. In Tasmania the Council has claimed and exercised all along the power of dealing with money bills in the same way it deals with any other measure ; and a similar right, I understand, has been claimed in South Australia. Mr. MuxRO : With power of dissolu- tion ! Mr. Playford: Claimed, but never exercised ! Mr. CUTHBERT : I understand it has been claimed, and the difficulty has been bridged over by a course which I hope and trust will be adopted in this chamber, namely, by compromise. Suggestions, I understand, are ofFored by the .second cham- ber in South Australia for the consideration of the government or the other house. This practice keeps the two chambers in perfect touch with each other, and the difficulties that would arise from exercising the power of absolute veto are very much diminished indeed. My hon. friend, the Premier of Victoria, if I understood him aright, is prepared to give to the senate a power of veto in all matters. Mr. MuNRO : Hear, hear ! Mr. CUTHBERT: I would ask my hon. friend what that means in the ordinary transactions of life as between man and man ? If he is leaving Victoria, and he appoints me his agent, with a large and general power, to manage his affairs, to let the whole of his property, is it to be said that because I possess the large power of dealing with the whole of his properties I cannot let one of his houses ? Mr. MuNRO : If the hon. member does not get the authority, he cannot ! Mr. CUTHBERT : But I get the full and complete authority. You propose to give to the senate the complete power of veto. Whj' does not the greater include the less in parliament, as it does in private life 1 You say the senate are competent to exercise the larger power. The larger power means the power of throwing out a whole bill — of throwing the finances of the countiy into confusion — of causing the greatest disaster. But a remedy is about to be applied here. While you are will- ing to confer the larger power, why should you take away the lesser power, namely, that if in a particular bill there be one single item in which a principle of policy is involved, or where an expenditure or the imposition of a duty is disagi'eed with, the senate shall not have the limited power of veto ? Mr. IMuxRO : Why have you not that power in your chamber ? Mr. CUTHBERT: That is not an answer to the question. Mr. MuNRO : Oh, yes it is ! Mr. CUTHBERT: It is not, because the senate is to be constituted on a bi-oador basis. You acknowledge that the states are equally represented, and you are will- ing to give to the senate the larger power, but you deny it the le.ssor power. Mr. MuNRO : I would give them the same power as your chamber has ! Mr. CUTHBERT: My hon. friend says, " We are prepared to give the senate the larger power, but not the lesser power," because he has been brought up Seventh day. 292 Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] Hesolutions. in tlie practice under the Constitution of Victoria. That is the sole reason. Mr. MuxRO : Oh, no ! Mr. CUTHBERT : That is one of the reasons, and the principal reason, why the lion, gentleman is not a convert to my views. Mr. MuNRO : Because it would be vinjust ! Mr. CUTHBERT : Before I am done with the hon. gentleman, I think I shall convince him that there is nothing radi- cally wrong in tlie views taken up by the representatives of the different colonies. Mr. IMuNRO : My reason is that it is unjust ! Mr. Adye Douglas : "What is just % Sir Samuel Griffith : That is merely an epithet ! Mr. CUTHBERT : I take it, then, that, first of all, the hon. gentleman objects to give the lesser power because it is not given in the Constitution of Victoria. But we do not concentrate all the wisdom of the ages in Victoria. Mr. MuxRO : Certainly not ; I only wish yovi did ! Sir Samuel Griffith : The Victorians think they do ! Mr. CUTHBERT: I would put this position to the hon. member. Supposing an amendment were proposed in the Con- stitution of Victoria, how very different indeed would be the attitude of the Legis- lative Council now from what it was wlien it merely represented a handful of people ; for before the reform of the Constitution it represented only 30,000 persons. Mr. MuNRO : And was intensely conser- vative ! Mr. CUTHBERT : It was conserva- tive, and it was, perhaps, on that account that the restriction of the powers of the Legislative Council was stated in express language, namely, that it might accept or reject any bill that came before it, but that it could not amend a money bill. Xow, suppose it were the intention and ex- [i/r. Cuthbert. pressed wish of 130,000 of the principal electors in the colony of Victoria that an amendment should be made in the Con- stitution upon the lines indicated by those v\'ho have advocated that these powers should be conferred upon the senate Mr. MuxRO : You would never get it ! Mr. CUTHBERT : Not get it in Vic- toria ! The hon. member seems to forget altogether the change of circumstances. We had, I believe, only 30,000 electors before v/e had the reformed Constitution of 1880; but I believe the Council now represents 130,000 of what may be called the very pick and flower of the population of Victoria. We have represented there both rich and poor. Mr. MuxRO : No ! Mr. CUTHBERT : We have every care- ful and prudent man represented thei'e. We have every one there who has given a hostage to society that he is likely to make a good citizen. All are represented there, and the hon. member will not deny it. It is a great power in itself that the Legislative Council now speaks and acts with the full sanction and authority of over half a million of people. Mr. MuNRO : And it is very much less conservative than it used to be ! Mr. CUTHBERT : I am glad to hear that, because it is an indication to my mind that the hon. gentleman sees, and it would be surprising to me if it were not so, that the Legislative Council may, before long, ask for an amendment of its Consti- tution in this direction. Mr. MuxRO : If you get the power here you will try it there, I know ! Mr. CUTHBERT : I think it is very likely that some means may be devised by which the wishes of the various colonies represented here may be accomplished ; and I think it would follow certainly that if these powers were granted to the senate, the legislative councils of the colonies, situ- Federal Comtituiion: [12 March, 1891. J Resolutions. 293 ated similarly to the Legislative Council of Victoria, would certain! j claim the same right. Mr. MuxRO : Hear, hear ! Mr. CUTHBERT : It is the wonder of the thinking people of Victoria that in the question of finance their upper house really has no power, because, although the power of veto is all very well in its way, and is, I admit, a great power, still it must be very carefully exercised, and under very peculiar circumstances indeed. The Coun- cil must be perfectly satisfied in their own minds that the propositions laid down in the bill submitted to them are radically wrong, and that they have at their back, not only the constituents of their own chamber, but the whole people of the colony. Now, the hon. inember will see that the position taken up by those who advocate that the senate should be en- dowed with co-ordinate powers with the house of representatives, is not an unrea- sonable position, for where did this idea of giving equal representation spring from 1 It sprung from a precedent of 100 years, from wliat has taken place in America ; and we find that there the system which gives co-ordinate power does not work to the detriment of the people. I think it would be wise therefore, if, when you are giving the largerpower of veto, you granted also tlie power of veto in detail. I admit that it is all very well for me in this cham- ber to speak as I am doing ; but I know the difliculties which will meet the Premier of Victoria, when he presents that aspect of the case to the people of Victoria. We ought, as far as wc possibly can, to devise some means by whicli the difllcnltics that now separate certain sections of this cham- ber may be overcome. The hon. member, Mr. Gillies, in the admirable speech Ik; delivered yesterday, pointed out that all questions of public policy involving ex- penditure beyond the ordinary expenditure 1 of the year, that is, unusual expenditure, i might be contained in separate bills, and sent to the upper chamber in that form. Mr. MuNRO : Hear, heai\ We all agree to that ! Mr. CUTHBERT : My impression is that that is reasonable, and I think that we may so deal with the proposal in Com- mittee that we shall find that there is not, after all, such a great difference of opinion between us. Mr. Wrixox : Hear, hear ! Mr. CUTHBERT : I am sanguine that some means may be devised of bridging over the difficulty, because I earnestly wish that there should be a hearty co-operation among all the Victorian delegates upon this question. Except the Premier of South Australia, they seem to stand alone upon this question. The great majority of the chamber are, as I understand the feeling, to some extent opposed to their view. My hon. friend, Mr. Deakin, in the course of his speech, said, "If one chamber is to be compelled to undergo what is known as a penal dissolution, a dissolution which is a personal penalty, an individual private penalty inflicted upon every member of the popular house — if it be called upon to undergo that trial at the pleasure of the upper chamber, let tliat chamber also en- joy the sweets of a similar appeal, and be bound by the same verdict." If hon. members arc prepared to take that stand wc might, I confess, obtain a basis on which further argument would be pos- sible. Now, if I were proposing that the Legislative Council of Victoria should have the power of amending money bills, I would not attempt for one moment to lessen the duration of time for which the members of that body were elected. If tho choice were given to me in this way, " Will you take the power of amending monej bills, and in the event of a money bill be- ing .sent up to you and rejected by you in the first session, and being sent up to you and rejected by you in the second session, Seventh day. 29i Federal Constitution : [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. and it being of such vital importance to tlie government that they were prepared after your second refusal to take the view of the country at large upon the measure, and to ask for a dissolution, would you, the members of the upper house, be pre- pared to make a similar appeal T — my an- swer would be, " Yes ; I think it would be a very proper course to pursue." If we did that, we shoukl hear no more about deadlocks. They would be completely at an end, because after the bill had been re- jected in the first session, unless there was some great and potent reason for it, it w^ould not be sent up to the legislative council on the second occasion unless the "overnraent were determined to demand a penal dissolution. And how would tkat injure the council 1 "While we have been speaking about this question, we have con- fined ourselves altogether to the power of the senate ; we have not spoken of its con- stitution. I may say that the remarks of the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, were quali- fied by this statement : that he would like to know en what basis the senate shall be appointed. I take it that there could be ew better bases of selection of the senate than that which obtained in the ajipoint- ment of this distinguished assemblage. I think that question might very well be remitted to the two houses of parliament ; and that in the selection of members of the senate each house shoukl select an equal number. I know that other views are entertained. I know the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Fitzgerald, thinks that each state should be left to itself to say in what manner it shall elect members of the senate. Mr. PiTZGERALD : They claim that as a state riglit ! Mr. CUTHBERT : I think it is very likely that the result would be that it would be left to each parliament to appoint the senate, because I can see that if a colony were divided into eight provinces, the expenses of contesting an election [J/r. Cuthhert. would be so heavy that few men would wish to enter into such a contest : and the people would be better satisfied if the choice of the senate were made by the respective legislatures, and made in equal numbers by each house. I have put the case in this way, wishing to make a con- vert of the hon. member, Mr. Munro, to my view that there is nothing unreasonable in the desire entertained and expressed by several gentlemen that the senate should have co-ordinate powers with the house of representatives ; but I think that in Committee we shall be all prepared to- meet in a spirit of compromise, and I do trust and hope that the difficulties which at present seem to surround this very import- ant question may disappear. One word in connection with the judiciary and as to the powers of the supreme court which shall constitute a high court of appeal for Australia. Of course if we have a federa- tion of the colonies, we must have a su- preme covirt and a high court of appeal. I have listened to what has been said by the late Attorney-General of Victoria, the Attorney-General of Tasmania, and the Attorney-Generalof Queensland. While he was careful not to express any decided opinion, I am inclined to think that the Attorney-General of Tasmania was per- fectly right in one portion of the views which he presented — namely, that we ought not to interfere with the appoint- ments made, and to be made by the states of their respective judges. Leave that altogether to the states ; do not seek to deprive them of that power. But there must be a high court of appeal, and that high court should deal with questions be- tween the states and the federation. From that court I think it would be highly desir- able that there should be an appeal to the Privy Council. It is useless for us to entertain the idea that as long as we are a dependency — and I hope we shall be for a long time — the Queen will ever concede Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891. J Resolutions, 295 to these Australian colonies a request which was made by the North American pro- vinces, and refused. They were as anxious as are some hon. gentlemen here, that the decision of their court of appeal should be final ; but her Majesty, speaking in her own person in the Privy Council, says to all her subjects outside Great Britain and Ire- land that if any one is aggrieved and seeks redress, let him come to the Privy Council. I think that it is right that that preroga- tive and privilege should be still i-etained, and it would be unwise for us to ask for a thing which we know must be refused. Then it is proposed in these resolutions that we should have : (3.) An executive, consisting of a governor- general, and such persons as may from time to time be appointed as his advisers, such persons sitting in parliament, and whose term of ofEce shall depend upon their possessing the con- fidence of the house of representatives expressed by the support of the majority. As to the latter part of that, I think it might very well be excluded, and that we should adhere to the usages of Parliament. I certainly like to stick to the old land- marks. I was surprised and astonished when I heard one member after another trying to sever the links that connect us with the old country. I never thought that when these propositions were to be sub- mitted here I .should hear any hon. mem- bers say that the Crown should cease to make the few appointments which now rest in its hands in these colonies. I know that in my own colony of Victoria the Go- vernor and the ^Master of the Mint are the only ofRccrs appointed by the Crown. I was quite surprised when I heard hon. members say, in this Convention, that, in order to educate our young people to (ill the highest ofTices in the state, it was ne- cessary that we should take from our Queen that privilege which has been so long, so usefully, and properly exercised. It was also said that we ought to make our own acts of Parliament, and that the right of veto should be done away with. Surely we ought not to ask for any greater l^owers than the Canadians possess. It is sufficient that we pass our own laws, and unless the veto is exercised by the Queen within two years, that veto is completely at an end, and in the mean- time, until the veto is exercised, the mea- sure passed by us is the law of the land. How often Avill the veto be exercised 1 JSTot once in a century. I had intended to cut my remarks very short, and I am sorry that I have travelled so far out of the beaten track of what I intended to say ; but the subject is one of great im- portance, and I wished, if possible, to de- vise some means or see some way of get- ting over the difficulty which relates to the senate. I have to express my grateful thanks to hon. members who have listened so patiently to me. I have not forgotten that expression of yours, sir, in which you said that the tree of federation had been planted. I hope and trust that it is so ; that its roots Avill sink deep into congenial soil, and that it will grow, as years ad- vance, in strength and beauty ; and that it will flourish for many years to come ; that against its roots passion may beat in vain, and that under its branches the peo[)le may find shelter and protection. Uv. ADYE DOUGLAS: I shall en- deavour to carry out my intention to cur- tail my remarks in a diflerent way from that adopted by the last speaker ; and in- stead of commencing willi tlic first of the resolutions, I shall commence with the last, which says : An executive, consisting of a governor-general, an9G Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. " from time to time be appointed as liis advisers." I imagine that the executive government of the federation will be formed according to the general principles of go- vernment which liavo prevailed hitherto in the Australian colonies, and that the go- vernor-general will take his advisers from which side of the house he pleases, but will take care, and in fact must find it necessary, to take them from that side of the house which is in a majority. Consequently the governor's advisers must represent the ma- jority of the people ; and in no other way that I can imagine can a government of the kind be carried on. The words "respon- sible government " have been questioned in this Convention. Now, a term may in coui'se of time acquire a meaning which it did not have when first used, and " respon- sible government," as I understand the expression as used here, moans that the executive shall represent the majority of the house of representatives. Tlie gover- nor, nevertheless, may choose his advisers from either side of the house ; but he is certain, as I said before, to select them from amongst those who represent the majority of the people in the popular chamber. By no other means can I imagine that repre- sentative government could be carried out. But here the words used are, "as shall be appointed." Appointed by whom 1 It can only be by the governor-general, because I suppose no one here entertains the idea that thegovernor-gencral should betheappointee of the people at large, or of the federal par- liament or any portion of that parliament. The governor general must be the repre- sentative of the Queen by direct appoint- ment from her Majesty, and that being the case, the government will be carried on in fedei'ated Australia in the way usually adopted now in the different colonies. That appears to me to be the only way in which we can get along in this matter. The last speaker dwelt at length — though he did not enlighten us much — on the constitu- [.!/?•. Adye Douglas. tion of the senate. The discussion that has taken place on this subject has?, I think, clearly shown that the view taken by the majority of the Convention is that the senate must have the same power of dealing with finance as that exercised by the house of representatives, and if the senate has power to deal v.'ith finance it must have power to deal with the details of finance, or some particular mode must be invented by which it shall be able to deal with all questions of finance, except the estimates for the year. If some sys- tem of that kind is put before us, I think we shall have no great difficulty in com- ing to a determination on the point. This morning, one of the representatives of New South Wales placed before us cer- tain figures ; but I confess I was not able to follow that hon. gentleman ; and, like the last speaker, when he finished his statement I was in a greater fog than when he commenced. There is no doubt that it would take a considerable time for the hon, gentleman to instruct us suc- cessfully up to the point to which he de- sired us to go. I did not gather whether the hon. geutleiuan meant that the whole of the customs were to bo taken over by the federal government, as well as all the public works of the different colonies, or whether each colony was to manage its own affairs as hitherto, without refer- ence to the federal government. In the resolutions before us the word "customs" is used, and no reference is made to excise. In the American Constitution the word "excise" is introduced as well as the word "customs." I do not know, sir, Avhether it is intended by you to include excise under the word "customs." Excise is carried out in a variety of ways in the several colonies, and in many of them constitutes a very large proportion of the public revenue. I presume that the word " customs," as used in the resolutions placed before the Con- vention, simply applies to the importation Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 29T of articles into one colony from another, equal terms as regards fiscal matters, I am inclined to ask what lion, gentlemen think about their loyalty, and to say that their loyalty is a sham, and nothing else. How was I treated the other day '? When walk- ing down Circular Quay, I happened to mean ? Up to the present time free-trade see some goods that were imported, and or from a foreign state. In reference to what is termed " free-trade with the colo- nies," something has struck me as most ex- traordinary in regard to this subject. Now, what does free-trade with the colonies with the colonies is the thing we have been trying to keep out. Free-trade with foreign countries we do not seem to care about. Yictoriahaserected a barrier againstall pro- ductions except her own, and has taxed, not only the I'aw material, but also the manu- factured article ; and a similar policy has been pursued by nearly all the other colo- nies. Is it the intention that this state of things should be reversed, and that the im- ports of the different colonies shall be free as between each other 1 We have heard a good deal about loyalty in this Convention. Almost every member has spoken of his loyalty. Loyalty, "iiowever, docs not seem to be extended to the mother country with regard to her imports, and she is to be treated by these colonies as a foreign country. It is to be hoped that when such a proposal goes before the home Government some objection will lie taken to it. I could understand that in dealing with foreign nations we should put duties upon their goods, and I .should expect that we ourselves some man said to me, " That is the effect of free-trade." I said, " I am a free-trader " ; to which he replied, " You ought to be shot down, and I would shoot you dowai if I had the opportunity. I am a protectionist." Is that the sort of con- ductwe are to receive here because we have freedom of speech and freedom of opinion 1 Are free-traders to be crushed down be- cause Mr, Gordon : It was a juke ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : It was not a joke as far as I was concerned, for the per- son was very nearly doing what he threa- tened — not shooting me down, but striking me down. Mr. Gordon : Absurd ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : I hear hon. members talk about the House of Com- mons, and all that sort of thing. Now, many years ago I was in England, and there was a case pending from the colony of Tasmania — Hampton versus Eenton — in which the colony had asserted certain should Ije treated 1)y them in the same way ; rights, and an appeal went home to the but when the mother country takes all our Trivy Council. Upon that occasion, when productions without imposing the slightest one of thcTasmanian counsel was arguing duty it seems to me not a very generous proposal that wo should rai.so a barrier again.st the productions of the mother country and treat her as a foreign nation. Tliat is very loyal indeed ; in fact I am that the Parliament of Tasmanian had cer- tain inherent power.s, the judge, cither Sir Knight Bruce or Daron Pollock, said, " SIiow me your powers, Sir l*'rederick Thcsijicr. You arc contined within the astonisliod at the loyalty of this Conven- four corners of your Constitution Act," tioii. I am not going to iiillicL iijioii tlif 'I'lio Ic-irned counsel Iiail lircn ti-yiiig to Convention my opinions with re.spect to compari' lln' powers of the Pailiament of loyalty; but when T hear that we are to Tasmania with (liosc of tlu; House of be deprived of the Governor appointed by Commons. JUit who knows, as the judge the Queen, that we are to aboli.sh the power asked, what the powers of the Ifousc of of veto, and that wc are not to treat Commons are ? It is only the good sense with the mother country upon fair and of the House of Commons that keeps them Seventh day. 298 Federal Consiilution : [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. ■within any expression. We know tliat the ■svhole power of the English Constitution rests on what the House of Commons may dioose to interpret as the Constitution. Colonel Smith : Hear, hear. It is an unwritten law ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS: Just what they say is the constitution, is the consti- tution. We Ijnow that the Endish Con- stitution was a very different thing a few years ago from what it is now. The House of Lords is virtually gone, the power of the Queen is gone, and everything vests in the House of Commons. Mr. Fitzgerald : The press has come up since ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS: We shall have to carve out our own laws ; and we shall have to take other constitutions as a guide up to a certain point; but, when I look round and see the men who are assembled here, I can have no doubt that there is a sufficient amount of ability present to build up a constitution which will tend to the greatness of the Australian colonies, and which will show the mother country that, although Australia has been only a century in existence, we are fast ap- proaching the time when we shall be able to protect ourselves. But, with many of those who have spoken before me, I hope that that day is far off. I am, however, quite sure that the tendency of all our institutions, and of everything connected with us, is of a democratic character, and that sooner or later we must arrive at a democracy. But as long as we are sub- jects of the Queen, and hold our present position towards the mother country, I trust that the government of these colo- nies will be vested in a governor-general, appointed by the home authorities, and that our local governors will also, as far as possible, be appointed in the same way. I have only given my ideas in this way as a representative of a small section of the Australian people ; but I come from an [J/y. Adye Douglas. old colony, and I believe that in many re- spects we have carried out British institu- tions in their integrity. In the colony of Tasmania we have found it exceedinslv advisable and beneficial that the Legisla- tive Council should have the power of amending bills in any way that they think proper. If a large measure, containing several small items to which the senate ob- jects has to be rejected in its entirety, the effect will be to make the upper house a nonentity, because the house of repre- sentatives would only have to put an item of expenditure into a measure to practi- cally deprive the other house of all power with respect to it. I, therefore, trust that the federal senate will have due power, not only to exercise a veto, but also to amend bills ; provided always that some other method, which would get over the difficulty in a proper manner, is not de- vised to bridge it ovjer. I shall not de- tain the House longer. I think we have had from hon. members as fine oratorical displays, and as good a statement of the laws of Australia and of the mother country, as one could get anywhere, and I feel proud that in my latter days I have had the honor of attending such an assembly. In my younger days, when I first came to these colonies, how different things were I When I see such an assembly as this, I picture to my fancy what will be the re- sult in another fifty years. What a change will there be in Sydney and Melbourne, and our other cities ! As education extends, I think we may be proud of our adopted country, and consider oui'selves as a united people, and members of the federal govern- ment of Australia. Mr. ABBOTT : In addressing myself to these very important resolutions, it is not my intention to tread upon the ground which has been already occupied by hon. members in the very remarkable and able speeches which we have heard. It appears to me that on the present occasion we are like a Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] Eesolutions. 299 family who are making marriage arrange- ments for their daughters, and it is the desire of every delegate, as the parent re- presenting the daughter, to make the very best terms on behalf of the colony from which he comes. I think it is ourboundeu interest, in speaking for our colonies, to speak with no uncertain voice in reference to what is proposed to be done. There are those outside this Assembly, and in tLis colony, who are opposed to federation, and who have been raising up arguments against it, but those arguments are not based onfact, or on a true interpretation of these resolu- tions ; and when I address myself to these particular people, I shall do so more for the purpose of explaining the matter with re- gard to our own colony than for the pur- pose of giving any information or of lead- ing to any conclusion with regax'd to the proposals now before us. What struck me as the most remarkaljle of the speeches to which we have listened were those coming from the gentlemen representing Victoria, a colony which has had protec- tion for twenty-five years, and the people of which maintain, as protectionists always maintain, tliat if they are given protection they will be able to build up their own in- dustries, and to defy the world to com- pete with them. Now, I claim that I am a protectionist, and I ba\e always argued that we cannot have protection in New South Wales unless on the basis of federa- tion. Victoria has had protection now for twenty-five years. She has liad a market in every one of the Australian colonics, and she has become the great manufactur- ing centre of the whole of Australia; and ia it not totally opposed to protectionist principles for her delegates to say, '* If you want federation, you must give us a guarantee thatyou will maintain the manu- factures which for twenty-five years we have been building up"? If that is the result of protection for twenty-five years it almost makes me think that I have gone on the wrong path ; but I feel that I have not gone on the wrong path, and I believe that if Kew South Wales is to have a protective policy at all, it can only get it by federation. I claim that I^ew South Wales has a greater variety of raw material and of minerals of all kinds than any of the other colonies in the Australian group, and that if we had free- trade within the boundaries of the Austra- lian colonies, with protection against the world, it would not take us twenty-five years to draw from Victoria to Newcastle and elsewhere most of her large manu- factures. I believe that honestly. The hon. member, Mr. Deakin, has told us that his colony must have some guaran- tees for the industries which they have taken twenty^-five years to build up. But w-hat would be the use of her protective institutions, if the ports of New South Wales and of a few of the other colonies where they now get admission, were closed against them ; and what would be the use of pi'otection to New South Wales to-mor- row if shehadtobuild up her industries at the expense of herown people? Victoria did not do that. Victoria built upher industries at tlie expense of her Australian neighbours. Take my own electorate, away up the river Darling. Tf I go up there what do I find 1 Do I find any New South Wales machinery there? Most certainly not j I find Vic- torian machinery. Well, under federation we shall be able to compete with Victoria on equal terms. I do not care that Vic- toria has had twenty-five years start of us. With our resources, with our coal- fields, we shall be able to fight Victoria, not only in her own markets, but in the markets of Australia ; and for that reason I maintain that we nmst federate to get tho.se markets. There is no use in build- ing up protection within a small colony like this. Wo want larger fields, and we want to live in brotherly love with our neighbours in Victoria, and elsewhere in Seventh day. 300 Federal ConstihUion : [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. Australia. "We want no guarantees here. Although niy hon. friend, j\Ir. Dibbs, says it is not, undoubtedly the policy of this country as voiced at the polls is free- trado. If it were not so, the President Avoiild not be in the position he occupies at the present time. Mr. Dibbs : The hon. gentleman knows it was not ! Mr. ABBOTT : I know that there is a majority on the right of the Speaker in favour of free-trade. That is all I know. jNIr. Dibbs : You know that it was "more i:)opery than fiscal !" Mr. ABBOTT : I know the result of the elections gave the free-traders a ma- jority. If it were not so they could not have carried on their policy. That being so, why should not the hon. member, Mr, McMillan, come here and say to Victoria, " You must give us a guarantee for five or ten years that free-trade will not be inter- fered with in New South AYales T What is the use of asking for federation on those terms ? To ask for mutual guarantees to allow interests to remain as they are, and yet to federate for the common interest ! The idea is, to my mind, an absurdity. It is a fortunate thing for this country that we have had this Convention, meeting in the way in which ithas met, whether the results are likely to be beneficial at the present time or not. It is a fortunate thing for Aus- tralia that so many public men meet on one common platform, and have the oppor- tunity of mingling with one another, of discussing publicly the affairs of Australia, and privately, perhaps, local affairs. I think, Mr. President, when this Conven- tion concludes, whether its results come to anything or not, we shall have laid down a history in connection with this great Aus- tralian movement, which I hope Avill come to a safe and sound conclusion. I hope that we shall find that your efforts, and those of the hon, member, Mr. Gillies, v*-ill [Afr. Abbott. not be ineffective, but that good results will come from our deliberations, I was very much surprised to find my hon, friend, Mr. Dibbs, point out that before anything could be done we must settle the fiscal policy. How can we settle the fiscal policy 1 How can each of the colonies agree upon a common tariff] It would be absolutely im- possible for them to agree upon a common tariff at the present time if they all agreed to go for a policy of protection. But some of them will not do that. Therefore, I maintain that it is only by one Australian parliament that a common tariff can be formed ; and I do not think it is wise to try to keep out or assume that we must keep out of this federation until we can agree upon a common tariff. Mr, Dibbs : The hon. gentleman asks us to go in for a free-trade tariflf ! Mr, ABBOTT : Not until we provide the other tariff I do not think that has ever been proposed. It has been proposed that our tariffs shall remain as they are until the federal parliament shall pass a tariff for Australia. Excepting one speaker, I do not think any one has advocated any other proposal than that the tariffs shall remain as they are until the federal parlia- ment shall pass a tariff or Australia. I do not see how it could be otherwise. As I said before, how could there be a cor§- mon tariff, with the diversity of interests of each of the colonies 1 The federal tariff must be built up by the federal parliament, and the existing tariffs must be allowed to remain until that state of things comes about. The hon. member said that in speaking in that way, he was speaking the voice of New South Wales. Well, I hoj)e for the sake of the party with which the hon. member is connected, that he is speaking for New South Wales. It will show a change of policy, at all events, from that which was voiced at the last general election, and that the colony of New South Wales is prepared for this Federal Constitution: [12 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 301 change of tariff, which I am quite sure will be brought about by a federal parliament. I have heard a good deal of criticism Avith regard to tlie Federal Council. Many people thought ISTeAv South Wales acted unwisely in not entering into that body. Victoria, again, is responsible for that. Hon. Members : ISTo, no ! Mr. ABBOTT: Isav, with a knowledge perhaps not possessed by most people in this country, that Victoria is responsible for New South "Wales not being, at the present time, represented in the Federal Council. I remember well, for I was in the government at the time, and the hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, will bear me out, that just about that time the Melbourne Cup was run for, and members ran away to it, with the result that when the division took place the Government were in a minority, and so the Federal Council had to do, from that day to this, without the colony of New South "Wales. What has surprised me most of all are these dark hints about a republican forni of govern- ment. They came from my hon. friend, Mr. Dibbs. 1 cannot for the life of me see Avhat fault he, and gentlemen holding his aIcnvs, have to find with the existing state of things. Mr. iJiiJUs : I find no fault ! Mr. ABBOTT: Could they, under any form of republican government, have greater liberty tlian they have at the present time? Could they improve tlie existing state of things on behalf of the people of any one of the.se colonies if tliey had the most republican form of go- vernment in the world ? Have these gen- tlemen any of those complaints to make which were made by the celelirated fifty- six men wlio signed the Declaration of In- dependence ? As an historical fact it is interesting to refer to that, and to sec Avhat the complaints of those people were, who were crying out for a change of go- vernment. The history of the present king of Great Britain — say these patriots in their Declaration of Independence — is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states. To pi-ove this let facts be submitted to a candid world. He has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. Has that ever been the case since w^e have had responsible government ? Have we ever had such a complaint to make ? I admit that the Government of England at times have hesitated to pass some mea- sures ; but when they have been brought into imiformity with tlie laws of the empire the hesitation has ceased, and the measures have been assented to. Take our own Divorce Bill, which has been referred to. It was passed by this legislature, and the assent of the Queen was refused on the recommendation of the home Govern- ment; butimmediately afterwards a divorce law which was passed by the colony of Vic- toria, and which was brought into conform- ity with the suggestions of the Secretary of State, who was advised by the Crown law officers of England, was assented to. And so it will be, and has ever been, with re- gard to measures sent home to England. Where they do not interfere with im- perial rights or the laws of the empire they have been assented to. Another objec- tion : He has forbidden his governors to pass laws of iininediatc and pressing iin))orianc'c, unless suspended in tiieir ()])eration till his assent sli'ndut J am quite sure that the hon. member. Sir Henry Parkes, will be quite willing to agree to any modification of these words in order to make that morn clear. I can assure my hon. friend, Mr. tainly we are not here to make con,"ititu- INIacro.ssan, that I entirely agree with him 330 Federal Constitution : [13 March, 1891.] Resolutions. in all lie saitl, and holding those views, I think vv-e are quite safe in accepting the resolution as it is framed. Sir PATilTCK JENNINGS : I must confess that I was a little surprised at the observations of my lion, friend, ~Slv. Macrossan. I do not think it is our pro- vince here to say that none of the states of Australia shall in any way alter their present constitutions. I do not see why, if any particular colony choose to have a nominated upper house, they should not be allowed to have it. They may go further and have only one house as far as we are concerned. The resolution is only a decla- ratory introduction to the subj ec t with which we are to deal. We wish to declare that w^e have no intention and no desire to interfere with the powers, the pri\aleges, or the terri- torial rights of the several colonies ; tliat they shall remain intact. The colonies framed their constitution acts, they can alter them in the way provided for therein, and I have no doubt it will be in the power of the different states to make changes in their constitutions or to remain as they are just as they choose. That will not affect the federal power in any way, and I am glad to find that there is an express desire on the part of the delegates from the other colonies to impress on the minds of the people of this colony that any sus- picions of an intention to interfere with the territorial limits of New South Wales are repudiated by the whole of those dele- gates. What powers, what surrenders may be incidental will be, perhaps, a thing difficult to define. But they must be inci- dental to the necessary pov\'crs of the fede- ral parliament. Mr. KiNGSTOX : They must be defined in the long run ! Sir PATRICK JENNINGS : Perhaps this is an appropriate time to frame the definitions. Mr. KiXGSTOX : No; in tlie constitution bill! [»S'iV Samuel Griffith. Sir PATRICK JENNINGS: We know that certain surrenders must be made. We are also told that the powers and pri- vileges and territorial riglits of the dilTer- ent colonies shall remain intact. Tliere- fore it will be quite proper for the Con- vention to clothe tlie federal parliament with all those powers and privileges whicli are a.bsolutely essential to federal govern- ment. The federal newer must be stron^r, it must be respected, it must have suffi- cient life, and must be worthy of the work tliat vre want to accomplish. I am quite sure that all the powers that will be needed by the central government will be freely surrendered. I therefore am inclined to regard the resolution as an instruction to the framers of the constitution bill ; and I think it should remain as it is, unless it be desired that some hint as to the nature of the surrenders should be given. Sir GEORGE GREY : I should wish to remind the Committee that we are not here to form a federal parliaiiient, but that we are here to form a federal constitution. I felt most grateful to the Premier of South Australia for the assistance which he afibrded me. The hon. member stated, and I saw a look of satisfaction on his countenance, that South Australia was allowed to draw its own Constitution, and that it had not a nominated upper house. I envied him, and I felt that surely he would help other parts of Australasia to obtain so great a blessing as South Aus- tralia has obtained for herself. Mr. Playford : I think democracy would get on just as well with a nominated upper house, and sometimes better ! Sir GEORGE GREY : The answer to that is, that I have not proposed to force any kind of council upon the states ; but what I propose is this : that a state, hav- ing obtained the freedom to elect its legis- lature, the upper house being elected simply upon a ditferent franchise from the repre- sentative house, that is, a franchise of the Federal Constitution: [13 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 331 whole state — I suppose we shall grant that • — it shall then be left to that free legisla- ture to determine what form of government it will have. There would be nothins; to prevent them, the people of any state, from maintaining their beloved upper house, if they thought fit. I would not shut them oGF from a blessing of that kind if they de- sired it ; but whc']i we know that this Con- vention has the power of giving to all Aus- tralia so great and magnificent a gift as it can bestow upon it — that is, that each state shoukl choose its own legislature Ml". MuxRO : "\Vc all have that now ! Sir GEORGE GREY: Is it freedom that we should be at the mercy of a nomi- nated upper house, and that witliout the consent of that nominated upper house we cannot change it into an elective one 1 For how many years may we have to struggle before we can get a benefit of that kind ? For, remember, every federal constitution has been drawn with a dis- tinct declaration as to the powers of the states. That is the meaning of a federal constitution. I ask you to put that into your bill, not by a few vrords saying that there shidl be no interference whatever, and leading i)eople to believe that perliaps all have an equal constitution, with equal rights and with equal privileges, and yet absolutely condemning several of the states to continue for a .series of years to have a legislature which is not the legislature of freedom. For a nominated upper house is even worse than a house of peers. It is diflferent in its composition, it is difler- ont in its character, and I say no state can really be free which is governed by a nominated upper house, and can make no laws which tliat nominated upper house docs not agree to. Why should a few men po.ssess such a power over their fellow-inen as to say, "However you long for a certain law, however you v.i.sh a change to bi; made, no such law shall bo made, no such change shall be eflected" ? How long are a people free when they cannot make such laws as they like without the consent of a body composed of men chosen, not because they possess any special qualifications, but simply because of ministerial friendship, or because they have supported certain views? In all other cases of framing a federal constitution the constitutions of the states have been considered, and I say it is our bounden duty to follow that example, and to give the greatest amount of freedom we can to our fellow-men. All we can justly give, all they merit or deserve, we ought to bestow upon them. To tell us that we should not come in and join this great federal body vv'ithout agreeing to continue with a nominated upper house is, I think, imposing upon us a burden which we can- not be expected to undertake ; and I be- lieve it is not just to the people of any one of the colonies, when we require to make a federal constitution, not to give them the freest, the most liberal constitu- tion that we can. There arc no words in the resolution to justify us in saying that we have only to create a federal parlia- ment. That is directly contrary to the fact. Wc arc here to create a federal constitu- tion, and all I ask is to give to the states the power of framing their own form of government. Mr. KixcsTox : They have it ! Sir GEORGE GREY : ILow have they it 1 . Have they it with a nominated upj)er house 1 Not at all. Mr. Clark : Swamp them ! Sir GEORGE GREY : We might have to struggle with them for years ', every one knows that that is the case. It is our duty as statesmen to sketch out a liberal federal constitution ai«[)licable to all the states. If you intend to preserve a nominee upper house in some of the colo- nies, place the provision in your bill fairly; that is the proper way. Sir Patiuck Jknnixgs : It is proposed to leave things as they are ! 332 Federal Cons/lUtlion : [13 Mauch, 1891.] Eesolaliuns. 8ir GEORGE GEEY : If you want to make a federal constitution, it should be a constitution adapted to evciy state, and the power of alteration should be given. Sir Patrick Jexnings : We have the power of alteration ! Sir GEORGE GREY: Not by tlie people. Sir Patrick Jexnixcs : Yes; in each state : Sir GEORGE GREY: Yes; but not by the people. Sir Patrick Jexnixos : If the people desire a nominee upper house, why should they not have it ? Sir GEORGE GREY : ^Ye must make allowance for human infirmity. Is it pos- sible that the claims of friendship can be neglected "? Is it possible that family claims can be altosrether overlooked 1 Is it possible that the claims of colleagues vho have helped one for years can be overlooked 1 Could not the government of the day put into a nominated legislative council an old man like myself, simply to get rid of himl We know perfectly well that it is scarcely possible to have a fairly nominated upper house. Has England ever had a fairly nominated house of peers? Have not the nominations to that chamber been made chiefly through friendship and interest ? In very few cases indeed have peers been nominated on account of their great qualities. Mr. Gordon : Mostly on account of money ! Jlr. MuNRO : Neai'ly all are peers by birth : Mr. Deakix : Birth and breweries ! Sir GEORGE GREY : I\Ioney, I ad- mit, has been a great factor, and so it v.- ill be in the case of nominated upper houses in Australia. All that I say is that now, when \\*e have this great, this mighty power of making a really federal constitution, why should we not go as far as the colony of New Zealand went, and give to each state ['S'i?" George Grey. the complete power to choose their own legislatui'e 1 If they desire to pass a law- providing for a nominated upper house, give them the power to do so. I ask you, having it in your power to give so great a gift, not to close your hand and keep it. The people of this young country are about to spring into national life, and now is the time to give them this power, to en- courage them to do their duty, and to open up all tlie avenues of public life upon fair and just principles. We are re- quired to frame a federal constitution for these colonies, and if hon. members de- termin(} to form only a federal parliament, let them at least have the candour to admit that they are not fulfilling their instruc- tions, although they are doing that which they think will be for the best. Mr. MUNRO : I confess that although I followed the last speaker as closely as I could, I ilo not even now understand what he wants. Mr. Fvsii : We understand Avhat he wants ; but the question is how we are to give it ! Mr. MUNRO : As I understand the hon. member, he desires that this Conven- tion shall give to the local governments of these colonies the same powers as were given to them by the British Parliament originally in their constitutions. If that is what the hon. gentleman means, I do not think we have the power to do so. All that we are asked to do is to draft a con- stitution for a federal government. I am afi'aid the hon. member misunderstands the real position of the Constitution of these colonies. In the original constitutions of the various colonies, as far as I know — - and I am certain that it was the case in Victoria — provision was made for an alteration of the Constitution by the consent of a certain majority. And w^e have, in course of time, altered our Con- stitution now and aojain until we have the Constitution we want. Verv well. What Federal CunstUidion . [13 :\Iarcii, 1891.] licsohiiions. O .1 o oo3 more can be asked when each of the par- majority were in favour of it, a nominee liaments has the power ^vithin itself to majority ecjually in favour of it would frame a constitution as it thinks proper ? If Victoria says, " "We prefer a constitu- tion with an elective upper chamber,'' and if New South "Wales says, "A constitution with a nominee chamber suits us better,"' it is not for "Victoria to say to New South "Wales, " You are wrong,"' or vice versd. Each colony must be allowed independent action in that respect. The legislatures of the ditlerent colonies have done that which tliey thought best, and surely this body is not now to say to New South "Wales and Victoria, "You have had power all along to frame your Constitution, we do not be lieve in it, and we want to give you some- tliing new." Mr. Fitzgerald : To force sometliing new upon us ! Mr. MUNRO : The legislature in each colony lias power in itself, some by a bare majority, and some by a two-thirds ma- jority, without reference to the British Parliament, or any one else, to alter its constitution. Dr. CocKUUUN : How can a nominee ujtper house alter its constitution? 3Ir, .M 17X110 : A nominee upper liouse can alter its constitution if there be a majority in favour of it. iJr, (JocKUUKX : Hear, hear ! if a lua- joi ity of the nominees are in favour of it I Mr. ;ML'XII<) : I venture to say that it would be mucli easier to get a majority in a nominee upper house than in an elective upper house in favour of tlie will of the govurnniont of the day. ^Ir. I'AiiTON : Six times as easy I Sir PATliirK Jknxings : That is what Sir Ciraham I'l iry thought I Mr. MTNIKJ: Hf^ did, f-ertainly, and I did not agree witli him. Suppose the soon be forthcoming at the will of the go- vernment of the day. Dr. CocKBURX : Suppose the number of the nominee chamber were limited ? Mr. MUNRO : I do not know of any case in which the nuuiber of members of the Legislative Council is limited. Dr. CoCKBURX : It is limited in "Western Australia ! Mr. MUNPiO : That is a young colony, and Western Australia, like the rest of us, will have to light for its constitution. "When it gets a proper one it will appre- ciate it. If in Western Australia the mistake has been made of limiting the power of the government under the Con- stitution, the colony will have to do as we had to do, it Avill have to fight for its liberty as it thinks proper. Dr. CocKBURX : Wiiy cannot we luflp them ? Mr. MUNRO : We liave no right to do so. AVestern Australia has a constitution of its own, for which the i:)eople asked. Sir James Lei>Stei:kk : No ! Mr. MUNllO : I myself accoiii)>,uiitMi the delegates of Westein Australia whcii they went to London to ask for the Con- stitution. Sir Ja-MEs Lkk-Steeke: But they did not ask for a limited nominee upprr house ! Mr. :MI;NJ{() : I know that ; but West- ern Australia — or, at all events, its dele- gates — accepted it. It' WCsti-ni Australia wants sonu'lhiiig ilitl'cri'iit from .i iiDininrt' u|i|ici' limiM', that is a iliH'creiit thing. Sir .1 .\.Mi:s Jj:i; Sri;i;iti: : ^\'(• arc going to liavi' it In six years ! .Ml-. .AlL'NJtO : I have not the least v Zealand, and that no meml^er of the Convention would be listened to with more attention and with a greater desire to make concessions, than the hon. member, Sir George Grey. The difficulty is that first of all we have no authority in our commission to enter upon the question the hon. member desires us to deal with. If we accept the argument of the hon. member, Dr. Cockburn, that inas- much as the representation in the senate will possibly depend to some extent upon the upper houses of the colonies, we should take into consideration the constitution of those upper houses, it needs very little reflection to indicate that we must on the same grounds commence to consider the whole electoral systems of all the colonies, and having decided upon the ideally best system, then propose to alter the laws of the different colonies accordingly. But we are not sent here for that purpose. AVe are sent here, as the hon. member, Mr. Playford, truly said, to frame a federal con- stitution, and we are authorised to under- take no other task. If tlic hon. member, Sir George Grey, will pardon me, it seems to mo that his language was capable of bein" misunderstood. He said that if this Convention were to neglect to take the cotir.se which lie advised, we should be im- posing on New Zealand a nominee hou.se, from which it desires to be freed. Surely that is an over-statement. This Conven- tion iinpo.ses nothing upon anybody. It interferes in no sense with the constitution of any colony, and in no sen.se lessens any cxi.sting power of altering the constitution of any colony. If wc commenced any such thankless labour wo should place ourselves in this anomalous position : that having been .sent here to frame a federal constitu- tion for the whole of Australia, we shouM offer it to the colonies on condition that they alter their existing constitution.s. Surely that is something we are not justi- fied in attempting. We are not entitled to impose any conditions upon the accept- ance of a federal constitution. This will surely involve sufficient difficulties without our adding to them, I say this because I cordially sympathise both with the spirit and object of the remarks of the hon. member. Sir George Grey ; and if I could bring myself to believe that it was within the scope of our authority to undertake the task which he proposes, I would cordially join with him. Sir George Grey : Leave it to the law officers of the Crown ! Mr. DEAKIjS" : We are obliged to leave it to those who are more interested — the people of the several colonies under the constitutions which they now enjoy, I ac- knov/ledge the great difficulty to which the hon, member calls attention ; that nominee houses require to be asked to abolish them- selves. This is not the only desirable con- stitutional change. There are other direc- tions in which reform would be equally de- sirable ; but we are not authorised to enter into those questions. There are some re- forms of burning necessity ; but, liowever necessary they may be, however great our anxiety may be to accomplish them, we cannot enter upon them. Our task is al- ready surrounded by difficulties. We are weighted, if not overweighted ; and we simply dare not add another to the many difficulties under which we labour. Mr. BAIITON : I would point out,ashas been suggested l)y the hon. member, INIr. Playford, that what we are asked to deal with scarcely comes within the scope of the 1st resolution. The question whether we .should continue, as in this colony, with a constitution involving a nominated upper liouse, may be the sulyect of debate here- aftci-. It cannot, howe\'er, be said to come within thepurview of the powers, privileges, and territorial rights referred to in the re- solution, which are quite distinct from the 336 Federal Constitution: [13 Makoh, 1891.] liesohuions mattor of constitutional niacliineiy. The constitution of the upper houses is a ques- tion of constitutional machinery, and it is not a question whicli the hon. member, Sir Ilonry Parkes, apparently endeavoured to aim at in framing this resolution. He has endeavoured to settle the question of the powers, privileges, and territorial rights of the various colonies, and the principles which should guldens in dealing with them, entirely apart from the machinery by which t!ie federal constitution should be created. The one state of things he has put into the 1st resolution, and the other state of things into the 2nd resolution. The mode of appointing the various legislative coun- cils is not a matter connected Avitli the powers, privileges, and territorial rights within the meaning of this resolution at all. That is simply a matter of constitu- tional machinery •which will come within the purview of the second set of resolu- tions. Therefore I think there is a good deal of force in what has been suggested by the hon. member, Mr. Daker, that we ai'e jumping before we come to the stile in dealing with the subject of nominated houses before we come to the second branch of the subject dealt with iu these resolu- tions. It may be — especially when we come to consider that there will be a pro- bability, at any j-ate, of the members of the senate who are to represent the various provinces being elected by the legislatures of those provinces — a very important mat- ter for us to consider whether the legisla- tures of tliosc provinces, as they are bi- cameral, shall not in both branches depend upon the popular will. As the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Playford, has suggested, even although there ought to be no desire to limit the debate in any way, it may be vary important for us to consider whether even then the power delegated to us by the re.solutions appointing us entitles us in any way to discuss the constitutional machinery of our respective provinces. [J/i-. Barton. I am of opinion, with the hon. member, Mr. Playford, that it does not do so. As- suming, at any rate, that it does not give us the })owor to pass any resolution upon the subject, there has been a general consensus of opinion that the debate should not Ijc limited, and I, for one, shall not be among those who would raise any objection to that being discussed when the proper time arrives. But I submit that the proper time has not arrived yet to discuss the question of nominee chambei'S. That rests under the second batch of the resolutions, and not under the first. It is a matter of machinery, and not a matter of the "powers and privileges, and territorial rights," within the meanini!; assigned to those word'i by the first resolution. I wish to call at- tention to the use of the word " surrender'' in these resolutions. Does it mean a sur- render of powers and privileges as well as of territorial rights ; or does it refer merely to such surrender of territory as might be necessary, for instance, if we submit to our parliaments the propriety of constituting a federal capital ] I cjuitc share the regret expressed by the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, that it is a very great pity that we have to discuss the meaning of these reso- lutions, and especially the meaning of the word "surrender," in the absence of the hon. gentleman who has moved them. This is a word whicli .seems to me to re- quire considerable explanation, and with- out some explanation of it from the mover of the resolutions, it is A-ery difficult for us to say whether or not we will pass the resolution at all in its present form. An Hon. Member : Where is the hon. gentleman 1 Mr. BARTON : I understand that the mover of the resolutions, being greatly fati^jued, has sone home. If his collabora- tion with us is to be of the value we hope it will be, there is no one amongst us who will begrudge his taking rest at any period of the proceedings — knowing Avell the Federal ConsiikUion : [13 Makch, 1801.] Resolutions. 137 serious accident under which he has been suffering for a very long time, and the necessity to our proceedings of his con- serving all his energies, so as to make him of the best use to us during the proceed- ings of the Convention ; and I hope no suggestion, whether it may be called generous or ungenerous, will be made that 8ir Henry Parkes at any time is not doing well to take such rest as he needs. But I was going to submit this to the Convention : supposing a decision is come to upon this resolution this afternoon — whether we midit not arrive at somethinjc that will prevent any misconception of it by adding a separate clause afterwards. There is a portion of one of the clauses of the American Constitution which seems to embody all that will be required to define this resolution sufficiently. I will read the words : No new state shall be formed or erected within tlie jurisdiction of any otlier state, That is of course subject to any provision which may be made for the establishment of a federal capital. nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states con- cerned as well as of the Congress. i"\lr. KiXf;sTON : Is it worth while to insert tliat now ? Mr. JJAIITOX : There is one reason why I think it is. No doubt a committee will be appointed to draft a bill, M'hicli work will necessarily Iiave to bo conducted privately, because you cannot draft a bill, at any rate, with the reporters present taking down evciy suggestion you make. Dcforc the Committee goes to that woik it will be necessary tliat the people of :ill the colonies sJiouhl be aware of what wo arc procecfling to do ; and there is a feel- ing in some quarters of alarm, wliich I think might be very well removed by a provision of tliis sort. I would suggest, therefore, that before wo pass the resolution in its present form we ought to add .a Y second clause, which I shall be prepared to propose, in some such words as I have read. In a draft bill, which I find some gentleman lias prepared, it is put perhaps in a more logical form, and it Avould read rather in this way : No new state shall be formed by the junction of two or moi'e states, or parts of states, nor any state formed or erected witliin the jurisdiction of any otlier state, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of tlie federal parliament. Sir Samuel Griffitpi : That is from the American Constitution ! Mr. BARTON: Yes. It seems to me that it will give definition to the mean- ing of the word "surrender," and prevent its being misinterpreted by people out of doors in such a \yay as to cause them to feel any alarm or disti'ust at the proceed- ings of this Convention. If we are to build this structure entirely upon a foun- dation of goodwill^-as I think we are to do — we should proceed at each step so as to disarm suspicion, and let the world, or, at anv rate, the world we are dcalinjr with, know that no rude interference with the territorial rights, or with the actual land of any colony, is contemplated except with the consent of those who are con- cerned ; and I trust that if such an amend- ment is moved by me, it will receive the consideration of the Convention, or that something in a better form v, 111 he proposed l>y some other lion, member. I\lr. WIUXOX: With regard to the point brought forward by tlie last speaker, it is undoubtedly Avorthy of attention ; but I would submit to (lie lion, gentleman that it is somewhat premature to raise the question just now. All that tlu; re- solution does is to lay down the general I)rinciplc that the states shall retain every- thing except what it is agreed they shall surremh^r to the central government ; and it is impossible to say what tliat siinender - will include until we liave finished our task — until we have gone through the 338 Federal Constitution : [13 March, 1891.] Resolutions, whole of our measure, and determined "vvliat matters the states sluill retain to themselves, and what matters shall be con- ceded to the central government. There- fore, I submit that it would be premature now in this introductory statement of a general principle, to go on specifying either territorial or any other rights. Tliis is merely a sort of introduction to what we are afterwards to do, and it says " in respect of sucli surrenders as may be agreed upon" — that is, hereafter, and not while we are now discussing. As to the point mentioned by the hon, member about the rights of territories, I quite agree with him that it is important that a clause dealing with that question should be in- serted in the bill hereafter, and the words the hon. gentleman suggested from tJie American Constitution will be well worthy of attention ; 1jut at present the proposal seems to me to be prematui'e. As to what has been said by the hon. members. Sir George Grey and Mr. Macrossan, I hope they will not understand that v/e at all under-value tlie importance of their sug- gestion. The simple view which we all take in this Convention is that we have no commission to deal with it. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : With re- ference to the use of the word " sur- render," I think I can state the reason that induced Sir Henry Parkes to use that term. I believe the constitutions of all the colonies — certainly those of the older ones do- -contain an express provision that the legislatures of those colonies shall have power to " make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the territory in all cases whatsoevei'." That is practically autonomy. Consequently, any powders given to the federal parliament must in- volve a surrender of some of those auto- nomous powers. Therefore, I understood that Sir Henry Parkes thought that this w-as the aptest word by which to express the relationship of the states to the [Mr. Wrixon. federal government — they are surrender- ing some of their present absolute powers to the federal parliament. With respect to the suggestion of the hon. member, Mr. Barton, that we should amend this resolu- tion by inserting further limitations before we are in a position to frame a constitution, I would respectfully submit that we are by no means in a position to begin the draft of a federal constitution, nor shall we be even when we have passed these resolu- tions. There are at least some scores of sub- jects which must be defined by discussion. Mr. Wrixon : By resolutions ! Sir SAMUEL GPvIFFITH : Yes, by resolutions as an instruction to the framers of the draft. But for the purpose of fram- ing those resolutions the propositions now before us, as I understand, are intended as guide-posts in the first instance. One of the first things to be done will be, as was done in the United States, to classify the powers to be surrendered to the federal parliament. It is impossible, at this stage of the discussion, to define those powers ; but this resolution indicates the test that is to be applied as each subject comes up for consideration : " Is it necessary, or is it incidental, to the power and authority of the federal government 1 " If we affirm that principle, we shall easily be able to apply it, though, as to the mode of application, opinions may differ, and we shall then be able to proceed to the next step. Mr. MuxRO : Would not the word "or"' be better than the word "and"? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I should say so ; but tliat may be simply a mis- print. On this point I hope I shall not be considered as doing too much if I men- tion that a few months ago it became the duty of the Government of Queensland, in consequence of the state of things there, to consider, as a practical matter to be dealt witli within our own boundaries, ^\hat w'ere the proper subjects for a central parliament to deal with as compared with Federal Constitution: [13 March, 1891. J Resolutions. 339 those that should be left to local parlia- ments. The Government were, under the circumstances, obliged to make out a list — a tolerably complete one, I believe — of the different subjects for legislation and for executive government. Although it was not prepared in view of this Con- Acntion, and although it does not indicate the lines upon which we should advocate that the functions of a national Australian government should be defined, I believe it is a tolerably comi)lete list of the subjects which will have to be assigned by us to one authority or the other, and if any lion, members can find any advantage in perusing it, it is at their disposal. I think that what we should do, after dis- posing of these resolutions, which I would suggest .should not be amplified more than is necessary, is to appoint a committee, charged with the duty of preparing a second series of resolutions, founded upon and springing out of these. Mr. Playford : Draft the bill on these resolutions ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : They are not sufficient to draft a bill upon. No committee would know the opinions of the Convention sufficiently to be able to draft a bill upon these resolution.s. Sir Patuick Jkn'Xixg.s : Why not am- plify them ? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITII : They must be amplified to a very considerable extent. Suppose a committee framed a bill upon these resolutions, and it turned out that half the principles contained in it did not commend tliemselvcs to the Convention, they wovild have to do their work over again. I, for one, do not desire that any- thing of that .sort sliould happen, and I think that it is necessary that there should be an iutennediate stage Vjetween the adoption of these resolutions and the draft- ing of a constitution. I have had some experience of tljis sort of work, and I know tliat unless we are aware before- hand what are the lines upon which the Convention wishes the constitution to run, it will be impossible for a committee to frame one. Mr. Playford : These are the lines ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : These are some of the lines, the elementary lines; but there are a great many other things to be determined. For instance, what are the subjects which are to be left to the federal government ? There will have to be an enumeration of twentj' or thirty subjects. Mr. Playford : Put them into the bill, and if we do not like them we can strike them out. That will be a great deal better than having to draft a new series of reso- lutions. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : For in- stance, it will have to be determined how many members shall be sent to the senate from each state, how they are to be elected, in what rotation they are to go out, what the powers of the senate shall be, and many other matters. Mr. Playford : Put them all in the bill! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITII : The hon. member, if he had had any experience, would know that in drafting a bill it is better to know beforehand what is the ob- ject Avhich its promoters desire to obtain. Mr. Playford : We know the object ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I have mentioned several matters in connection with the senate upon which it is impos- sible for a committee to know the feeling of the Convention. Mr. Bakf.r : There is the puwe subject to amendment. The drafting com- mittee that v/e shiill elect will have such a knowledge of the feeling and opinion of hon. members, as can be derived from a study of the debates, that they will be able, as regards most ordinary matters of detail, at any rate, to frame provisions which will probably be within the drift of the discussion, or, at any rate, there will be a fair basis for proceeding in Commit- tee upon the bill. Why, then, without this intermediate stage, should we not lay down matters of principle, so long as they are matters of the inherent principle % It seems to me that it will be easier and shorter to do that, and it would not be necessary to add to the resolutions more perhaps than half a dozen provisions to en- able the drafting committee to have a suffi- cient set of instructions to prepare a bill that we can go on with. Therefore I move : That the following stand as clause 2: — "That no nevv' state shall be formed by separation from another state, nor shall any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned, as well as of the federal parliament. " Federal Constitution : [13 3Iakcii, 1891.] Ilesolutions. 345 Sir SAMUEL GEIFFITH : Before that resolution is formally put, I would suggest to the hon. and learned membei", Mr. Barton, whether he thinks it desir- able to propose that resolution formally from the chair in the absence of the hon. member. Sir Henry Parkes ? I do not pro- fess to be in that hon. gentleman's confi- dence with respect to the resolutions any more than is any other member of the Convention ; but he is specially in charge of these resolutions — they ai-e of his own drafting entirely, and I am under the im- pression that he does not desire, from his point of view, that they shall be amplified to any great extent, at any rate. They are now, of course, in the hands of the Com- mittee ; but it would not be courteous, nor in accordance with parliamentary pi-actice, to insist on any important amendment in the hon. gentleman's absence. Mr. Gordon : Are we only to agree and not dissent ? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I merely call attention to the hon. member, Sir Henry Parkes' unfortunate absence. Mr. Gordon : Then we should not sit ! Mr. Bauton : I thiidc that we might go on with tlic discuiiision, but not take a division until tlie next hitting day ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I may take tliis opportunity of adding to what I said just now, that one of the matters upon which tlic draftsman v.iil have to be instructed i.s, liow the governors of the colonies arc to be appointed. Is there a single member of the Convention who lias the .slightest idea what is the opinion of the Convention on that point 1 ]Mr. Playfoud : Tluy can put some- thing in the bill, and we can agree to or di.ssent from it ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The hon. member must have a very small knowledge of the drafting of bills if ho says tliat. Anothfrqucstion wliichhas to be considered very fully if<, what provi.sion is going to be made in reference to the enormous surplus revenue which the central goveniment v»ill have ? That is one of the most important matters that we shall have to deal with, and it must be discussed very full}'. Mr. MuNRO ; Yv'hat is the good of rais- ing new questions now ] Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I am merely pointing out that these are things vvhich must be settled in a preliminary manner before anything can be put into concrete form. Mr. MuNRO : If we are going to discuss the whole subject on every motion we shall never get through the business ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I am net proposing to discuss them, but am merely pointing out that there are a number of subjects besides those mentioned in the resolutions which must be discussed before they can be put into a concrete form. I ara disposed to think that the shortest way would be the appointment of a committee straight off. Colonel Smith : Why not do it ? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I have pointed out the objections to it. I am most anxious that we should get the busi- ness done as soon as possible. Mr. MUNRO : I want to call attention to what appears to me a slight irregularity. I understood that we wore to be governed by the standing orders of thellouse of Com- mons, which arc practically the standing orders of our legislatures. We have passed one resolution, and there are others to fol- low; but now it is proposed to bring a new resolution in between the 1st and the 2nd. That is not in accordance with our practice. My object in speaking is to try to get back to a business-like way of going on. Accord- ing to our practice we must cither add Mr. Barton's resolution by way of amendment to the one before the Chair, or allow it to re- main until all the resolutions are dealtwith. The Chairman : I am bound to say that, in my opinion, the hon. member is out of 346 Federal Constitution : [13 March, 1891.] Resolutions. order in proposing liis resolution at this stage. He should either have proposed it as an amendment, or liave waited until the whole of the resolutions had been disposed of, and then have proposed it as a new resolution. An hon. member having raised an objection to the resolution, I must rule it out of order. Mr. BARTON : I did propose at first to submit the proposal in the form of an amendment, but I thought the better course "was to submit it as a new resolution. I know that that is not strictly according to parliamentary rule, but I thought that a gi'eater degree of latitude would be allowed than is ordinarily permitted in Parliament. Mr. DEAKIN : I wish to propose that the 2nd resolution be postponed until after the 3rd resolution, with the view of giving No. 3 priority over it. Tliia, it appears to me, would be the logical order of deal- ing with the resolutiont^. The Chairman : According to parlia- mentary practice, if the 2nd resolution is postponed, it must be until after the dis- cussion on all the other resolutions. Mr. DEAKIN : There may possibly be no objection to the course I suggest. I move, with concurrence : That resohition !No. 2 be postponed and stand after resolution Xo. 3. Mr. FYSH : I must ask the ruling of the Chair on the subject, As the hon. member, Mr. Munro, pointed out, we must carry out our parliamentary practice in its entirety. The proper course, under the circumstances, will be to treat the re- solutions as a bill. If one is reserved it must be dealt with after the whole of the other resolutions have been disposed of. The Chairman : The hon. member, Mr. Deakin, has asked to be allowed to take another course, with concurrence. Does the hon. member object ? Mr. Fysh : No, I .shall not raise any objection. Motion agreed to. Resolution No. 3 proposed : That the power and authority to impose cus- toms duties shall be exclusively lodged in the federal government and parliament, subject to such disposal of the revenues thence derived as shall be agreed upon. Mr. DEAKIN : The first question that arises in connection with this resolution is whether the word " excise" will not re- quire to be inserted. I move : That after the word "customs," the words " and excise" be inserted. Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : Before that alteration is made we ought to have some explanation as to what the hon. member would include under the term "excise." In different colonies the word is interpreted in different ways. In Victoria, the excise duties are of the same character as those levied in England ; but in Tasmania we have a stamp duty which is virtually an excise duty. Every barrel of beer has to be stamped, and all breweries are subject to Government supervision. Would such a duty come within the meaning of " ex- cise " I Before the word is inserted we should know to what it is intended to apply. Mr. McMillan : I presume that when we come to deal with the matter in the federal parliament there will be a uni- form excise, and whatever principle is agreed to generally will be extended to all the colonies, consequently no difficulty can really arise. Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : A difficulty will arise at once if it is made payable ■ into the general revenue. I imagine so at ' least, because we in Tasmania should at once do away with the duty. Mr. McMillan : The fact of what , the hon. member's colony will do before- hand will not affect what the federal go- i vernment will do afterwards, even if they I had no excise whatever. The hon. mem- I ber referred to a system of affixing stamps j to beer barrels. It is simply a modus Federal Constitution : [13 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 347 operandi for collecting the excise duty • it can scarcely be called a stamp duty in the strict sense of the term. Mr. Adye Douglas: It is strictly excise ! Mr. PLAYFORD : There will be no more ditBculty, I imagine, in connection ^\ ith excise duties than in connection with customs duties. I suppose it is under- stood by all of us that the customs duties or excise duties shall be of a uniform character ; that one law shall not be made to suit Victoria, another law to suit South Australia, and another law to suit AVestern Australia ; but that whatever customs laws are passed shall be absolutely the same as regards all the colonies. I do not suppose it is necessary to insert every little thing in the resolutions for the information of the celebrated draftsman of this bill. Mr. THYNNE : There is something more in the insertion of the word "excise " than appears at the first blush. Perhaps the question of state rights may come in in a way which we do not anticipate. In Tasmania a great many articles are liable to excise duty vvhicli are not liable in the other colonies. ^Ir. Burgess : Only one — beer ! Mr. THYNNE: There is nothing to prevent a duty on the production of to- bacco being classed as an excise duty. In fact, many other products miglit bo made liable to excise duty in just the same way. Is the federal government to have the same power of imposing taxation on local production.? as the state governments have. The subject wants a little more considera- tion, I think. I can fore.see possibilities under which rival claims may be made l)y the separate colonic'^, and by the fixlcral government to impose taxation on the same objects. We must boar in mind that wo are producing in these colonies almost everything that we require. Some colonies produce what others cannot pro- duce. A tax on the productions of one colony would be a very unfair tax, and it might also have the effect of depriving each separate state of its own legitimate source of re^^enue. ]\rr. MUXPtO: The difficulty which has arisen must be coped with. It will be absolutely impossible to give the import duties to the federal government without the excise duties, unless we are to allow^ some colonies to take advantage of others. Take, for instance, the case of an article which I do not use. If the federal par- liament is allowed to put an import duty on whiskey for the whole of the colonies, and one colony puts an excise duty on the local manufacture, and another colony does not do so, the result will be that the colony which does not tax the local whiskey will get the local article produced to the largest extent, and it will be passed on to other places, because being a local manufacture it will not be liable to any duty. I understand, whatever we may do, we intend to apply the same law to every colony, consequently we cannot allow the excise duties to go without the customs duties, for otherwise the whole thing wmU be bound to go wrong. At the present time Tasmania has an excise duty on beer, Victoria has no such duty ; but there is not the lea.st doubt that if the revenue of Victoria were to become short, we should fall back on that article as a means of raising revenue. If we are to crive the ox- cise and customs duties to the federal par- liament, we shall expect that body to take a large amount of local expenditure off our Rhoulder.s. In this way one will balance the other. We spend, for instance, large sums on defence works, "We expect the federal parliament to take over the whole of the defences, and in that way one will balance the other. I am quite clear, how- ever, that if the excise duties ai-c not to go with the customs duties tho whole thing will Ijreak down. ISIr. PAKEll : I do not think the hon. member, ISIr. Munro, quite understood the 3 is Federal ConstitiUlon: [13 March, 1891.] Resolutions. argument of my lion, friend, Mr. Thynne. My lion, friend, as I understood liim, ad- mits that excise duties must be uniform throughout the colonies ; he also admits that the federal legislature must have the power to imposeexcise duties; but he points out that, although the duties may be uni- form in all the colonies, still they may be imposed on some article which is raised exclusively in one colony, as, for instance, sugar in Queensland. Therefore the ques- tion of state interests comes in, although indirectly, in considering the matter of regulating excise duties. My lion, friend's argument is worthy of our consideration, because taxation might be imposed in such a manner that one particular state would be prejudicially affected, and the rest of the states would obtain an unfair advantage. Mr. CLARK : Tlie case just mentioned is exactly parallel with the tobacco cases in America, to which I referred in my speech on the resolutions the other day. Having had these cases brought under my notice' I thought a great deal about the subject, and I think the only way in which we can avoid that state of things arising under our constitution is by providing that there shall be no export duties, and that there shall be no excise duty imposed upon any article v/hich is not also subject to custom duties. I think it will cover the whole ground if we have no export duties whatever, and no excise duties except on articles which are subject to import duties. Mr. BURGESS : There can be no doubt that the suggestion of my hon. friend, Mr. Clark, if given effect to, will cover most of the ground. If the hon. member, Mr, Baker, will look at the wording of the re- solution, I think he will see very clearly that the power of levying an excise duty will be lodged exclusively in the hands of the federal government, and that the local legislatures will have no power whatever to impose an excise duty upon any article. It is very necessary indeed that this power [^Mr. Baker. should be possessed by the federal go- vernment, particularly in view of the way in which the customs duties as a whole would Ijo affected if proper care were not taken to provide for this at the outset. The hon. member, Mr. McMillan, in his address to the Convention yesterday, re- ferred to the amount of duty that would be lost in connection with intercolonial free-trade. I think he stated that the total customs revenue of the colonies at the jire- sent time was something like <£8,G00,00O; but, that if we had intercolonial free-trade, that amount would be reduced by some £225,000. I am quite sure, however, that if the matter be carefully looked into, instead of the amount being reduced by some £225,000, it will be found that the reduction would amount to between £GOO,000 and £700,000. Take one item alone. On referring to the statistics of Queensland, I notice that the average ex- port of sugar from that colony is 40,000 tons per annum. Taking the average duty levied to be £5 per ton, that would repre- sent £200,000. In addition to that you would lose a large amount collected upon rum manufactured in Queensland, and upon the spirits and tobacco manufactured in both Kew South "Wales and Victoria, also upon the wine in South Australia, to say nothing of cereals. It will be found that the amount given by the hon. mem- ber would be largely increased. It is a matter of the greatest moment that we should see that the power of levying excise duties is placed in the hands of the federal parliament. Mr. MARMIOX : I can see that the gi\'ing to the federal pai-liament of tlie right to interfere with the separate states, so far as the levying of excise duties is con- cerned, may have rather an extraordinary effect, unless something is done in the j direction of the suggestion made by the i hon. member, Mr. Clark ; that is, provid- , ing for an import duty upon every article Federal Constitution: [13 March, 1S91.J Ecsohdions. 549 upon "wliich excise is levied. I mIII give mv reasons for thinkinsj so, and I do not think tliey have been touched upon by any one who has yet spoken. Take, for instance, the colony I represent — Western Australia. We are large producers of colonial wine, and we liope to be large producers of tobacco. We have also a lar2:e number of breweries. Take one of these items. It is proposed by these resolutions that trade and inter- course between all the Australian colonies shall be absolutely free. Let us suppose tl'.at the federal parliament levied an excise duty on colonial wine of a few shillings per gallon for purposes of revenue. There would be no objection to that ; but what would be the result if we had absolute free-trade between the colonies 1 Colonial wine would be imported into Western Australia from the other colonies, and would undersell the locally produced wine ; and the same thing would hold good with regard to tobacco, and the other items to which I have referred. I believe I am correct in that view. I believe it is abso- lutely necessary that we should carry out either the suggestion of the hon. member, Iklr. Clark, or one similar to it. Mr. Fitzgerald : The duty would be uniform in all tlio colonies ! Mr. :MARMI0N : I am afraid I have scarcely made myself understood. I have not said anything as to the uniformity of the duty. I do not know whether the customs duties, excise or import, would be uniform ; but the case I put is this : Sup- posing an excise duty were levied on tobacco in Western Australia of l.s. per lb. The manufacturer would have to pay the duty in tlic first instance, and later on tlic consumer would have to pay it. At the .same time, the tobacco grown in .South Australia, Victoria, and New South Wales would enter the colony duty free. Mr. Pi-AVFORD : But there would be an excise duty all over the colonies I Mr. MAPvMIOX : Then, I fear I have misunderstood the question ; but I thought an excise was a duty imposed upon inter- nal, and not upon external, productions. I have never read of an excise duty refer- ring to productions outside of the country in which the duty was levied. JNIr. J. Forrest : It is generally under- stood to be a duty levied upon home pro- ductions ! Mr. MARMION : Then my argument, I take it, is applicable ! Mr. DONALDSON : I think we ought to make haste slowly in this matter. It would be only riglit that the federal par- liament should have the right to levy an excise duty upon spirits, tobacco, and beer. These arc three items subject to excise at the present time. But suppose the parlia- ment were to go a little further, it might possibly put an excise duty upon sugar, and, as far as I know, there is only one colony in this group at the present time which grows sugar. Mr, Gordon: Excise would include licenses! Mr. Fitzgerald : The states representa- tive Avould see to those matters ! Mr. DONALDSON : I believe an ex- cise would also include a stamp duty, I should like to have this matter fully con- sidered. It is getting late, and in the absence of the mover of the resolutions I think they might now be postponed until our next sitting. I therefore move : That the Chairman do now leave tlic cliair, re- port progress, and ask leave to sit again. Colonel SMITH : I should lik(>, Ix-fore that question is put, to ask members of the ('onvcntion to consider the question as to how much of the customs revenue of the colonies is to be given up to the federal body until the general tariff is establi.shed, I quite understand the objections of Western Australia, and I think all the colonies would object to give \\\) the whole of their customs revenue before the general 350 Address. [IG ]\[arcii, 1891.] Federal Consiilution. tariff is framed. I think that some limit should he fixed, say about one-fifth of the total. A general tariff should be estab- lished before tlie colonies abandon the whole of their customs revenue. Progress reported. Convention adjourned at 4 "40 p.m. 210XDAY, IG MARCH, ISOl. Address — Reports on Colonial Defence — Federal Constitution. The President took the chair at 11 a.m. ADDRESS. The following address was read by the secretary : — 57, Queen-street, Melbourne, 13 March, 1891. Sir, — We have the honor, on behalf and at the rec^uest of the members of council of the Mel- bourne Chamber of Commerce, to tender to the members of the Convention the assurance of the profound sense entertained by the mercantile community of Melbourne of the importance attaching to the deliberations of the Convention and of their far-reaching consequences. The members of the chamber trust that the Convention will be influenced and guided by wise and patriotic counsels, and that on all the great issues v.'hicli will come under their con- sideration the conclusions arrived at may tend to the consolidation of Australian interests, the fuller development of our varied resources, and the firmer foundation of all the institutions of our civilisation on a national basis m harmony amongst ourselves as colonies, and always in truest touch with the heart of the great British empire. We are, &c. , Henry G. Turner, President. C. Hallett, Secretary. REPORTS OX COLONIAL DEFENCE. Mr. DIBBS : Before the orders of the day ai'e called on, I would like to ask, by way of suggestion, whether it would not be desirable that the reports with regard to our military defences, which have been \Colonel Smith. received by the various governments from Major-General Edwards and others, should not be printed and circulated in this room, for the purpose of enabling us to thoroughly understand the position of our military defences when we come to con- sider the 4th resolution "? I make that suggestion because, on making inquiries among hon. members from the other colo- nies, I have been told that certain infor- mation has been in their possession as members of Parliament which has not been placed in the hands of members of Parlia- ment in this colony. In dealing with a large question such as military defence is likely to be it would be a great assistance if hon. members had the advantage of having before them all the reports which have been made to the various governments. The President : There can be no ob- jection to affording the fullest information to members of this Convention which tho Government may have in its possession. But I would invite attention to the fact that the Convention is not called upon to consider the state of the military forces in this country, but to decide the question whether these forces should or should not be placed under a federal parliament ; and the light which may be thrown on the state of the forces in any colony by any reports will not in any way assist us in deciding upon the policy whether or not the forces of the country are to be placed under a federal government. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. In Co J)jmi7^^e (consideration resumed from 13th March) on motion by Sir Henry Parkes : \ The Chairman : The original question Avas that the following resolution be agreed to :— (.3. ) Tliat the power and authority to impose customs duties shall be exclusively lodged in tlie federal government and parliament, subject to such disposal of the revenues thence derived as sliall be agreed upon. i Federal Constitution: [16 March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 351 It has siuce been moved by tlie lion, mem- ber, Mr. Deakin, by way of amendment, that after the word " customs," in the second line, the following words be in- serted, " and excise." Mr. GORDON : I think the Convention did Avisely at its last sitting in postponing farther consideration of these resolutions until the members should have had time to give them fuller consideration, because, after all, it appears to me that the ques- tion involved in the resolution now before us touches a very vital point in the discus- sion. It touches the money bills, and, as was said by the hon. member, Mr. "Wrixon, the power of government really lies in the power of the purse. I support the suggestion made by several hon. members, that as much as possible we should clear the ground of this discussion as we proceed. The hon. member, Sir Samuel Gx-iffith, sug- gested that we should give the draftsman of the proposed bill merely a sketch of instructions, and leave a great deal to be filled up by those whose duty it will be to prepare the bill. Sir Samurl Griffith : No. My sug- gestion was the opposite ! Mr. GORDON : Then I must place niy.self in the ranks of those hon. members who liavo been so inifortunate as to more than once misunderstand tlie hon. mcmlier. Sir Samukl Guiffitii : The hon. mem- ber mistook the suggestion ! Mr. GORDON : I understood that two 8iigge.stion8 were before tlie Convention at its la.st meeting. Tlio first was that our instructions to the draftsman should be somewhat .sketchy, and that we should re- consider the bill when it was brouglit be- fore us. The other suggestion waH that ■we .should as nnich as po.ssible clear the ground of the discussion as we went along. I think our duty is to save time as much a.s possible, as was suggested by the hon. member, IMr. Playford, by settling every item and condition of the contract we are about to make before we instruct the draftsman to pi'epare the bill, because, even if we are only building "a castle in Spain," we had better now decide how high and deep the building shall be, how many rooms it shall contain, and leave the ques- tion of the decorations for future con- sideration. There are many definitions and provisions v.diich the draftsman must insert, and members of the Convention cannot insert those as they go along. But with regard to all the principles that must be embodied in the contract, and all the terms vital to its being carried out, we should clear the ground as we go along, so that we shall not afterwards have to re- trace our steps and make fresh arrange- ments. "Wich this view I shall at once propose an amendment upon the resolution before us. I beg to move : That all the words after the word " That " be struck out. The Chairmax : The hon. member can only do that if the mover of the present amendment withdraws it. Mr. GoRDOX : I did not understand that the original amendment had any prescrip- tive right. The Chairman : The original question was that this resolution be agreed to. Since then Mr. Deakin has proposed, by way of an aniendment : Tliat after the word "customs" the words "and excise" shall be introduced. Mr. FvsH : I understand that the hon. member, Mr. Gordon, desires to move a prior amendment, and, therefore, he would be in order. Mr. GORDON: rerli.ips the hon. mem- ber will temporarily withdrew liis sugges- tion as to exci.sc. \ -o are going to pay, and in the next place what we are going to get from federation. A knowledge of what the price is to be, and what are the advantages to be secured by the price paid, is the first preliminary to a commercial bargain, and the only dele- gate who made an attempt to tackle the question, " What have we to pay ?" was the hon. member, Mr. McMillan. We were pretty much on the heights of Pisgah before, viewing the promised land from a distance ; but the hon. member tried to ascertain our position and to come down to the hard logic of facts. He told us it will cost £2,000,000 to support the federal pai'liament, and to carry out the purposes for which it will be established. I be- lieve the hon. member is well within the mark in that estimate, and that the cost v.'ill be more. But for the purpose of my argument I shall assume that federation will cost £2,000,000. As to the con- clusion which he founded on some of his figures, that the colonies would get the money back again in the shape of the de- creased rate of interest at which they could borrow, I believe that to be thoroughly unsound, and it does not su]:)port his de- servedly gi-eat reputation as a financier. Mr. McMillan : I only mentioned that as one of the incidental matters in con- nection with the subject. I did not want to form any argument of a logical nature^ upon it. ^ Mr. GORDON : I did not hear the hon. member's speech ; but in the ofiicial repoi-t it certainly appears as a very substantial argument. Nothing could be more sub- stantial than a statement to the colonies to the efi'ect that if they spent £2,000,000 Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1891.] Besolutions. nr 53 upon federation, tliey would get that sum back within a few thousand povinds by the decreased interest Avhich they would have to pay for loans. It appeal's to me that the argument would be a good one, if true ; but I believe that it is most un.sound. Underlying the fact that the federal parliament would be able to bor- row more cheaply than the colonies now do is the fact that it would have to take over the assets of the colonies. But I do not think that that is possible. If they did take over the debts they would only take over those incurred on good assets. It is not to be supposed that they would take over the debts incurred in building breakwaters that shelter no ships, ! railways that carry no goods, or jetties on which the ;^rass is growing, and in the other reckless expenditure in which every colony has indulged. There are such as- sets everywhere, and only the other day I saw it stated that the great colony of Victoria was going to close one of her railways. The federal government would only take our picked assets, upon which tliey could borrow cheaply, and we should be left with our bad assets, upon which we would Jiave to go, cap in hand, to the Jews, to get any money at all, so that we should more than lose the advantage wliich wc now have of being able to bor- row at a cheap rate upon our good assets. Mr. 3Ilniio: I rise to order. Ls it understood tliat in Committee lion, mem- bers, speaking upon a special resolution, may debate all the matters that were raised in the discussion in the Convention'! At the presf-nt time the hon. member is sup- posed to bo speaking upon a special resolu- tion before the Connnittec ; but ho is really replying to a speech made by the hon. mem- ber, !Mi'. ^IcMillan, when the whole of the resolutions were before us. If we go on in that way we shall never finish the business. The Cii.vii!AiAX : T tliink that the lion, rnember, when he proposed his amendment, z ought to have handed it in to the clerk, so that I might be able to undei'stand whether he was speaking to the resolutions generally, or to the amendment. The hon, member would certainly not be in order in speaking of matters irrelevant tohis amendment; but I have not had an opportunity of forming an opinion as to whether he is doing so. Mr. GOEDOX : I am dealing with ex- cise duties, in relation to the question with which the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, dealt the other day. Mr. MuNRO : The hon. member was deal- ing with loans — a diflerent question alto- gether ! Mr. GORDON : I am dealing with cer- tain questions touching excise duties, and I believe I am in order in doing so. I shall be very loath to attempt to draw the discussion into channels which would VN^aste time ; but, in my opinion, I am trying to save time by dealing with the questions ti-eated in the resolution before the Conven- tion, namely, the collection of the excise duties, wliy we are asked to surrender them, and, if we surrender them, v, hat we are to get for them. It appears to me that my re- marks are in the main to the resolution before the Committee, and I shall continue them, as shortly as possil)](>, uidess hon. members object. I think I have shown that the conclusions arrived at by the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, are not justified by his figures ; but I will assume that his estimate of the cost of the federal govern- ment to the various colonies will be £2,000,000. That is what wc have to pay. Now, what shall we get for it ? A treaty, which is really a commercial Ijargain, is what has to be ciiactfid by this Conven- tion, and we must see that the connnercial a something like £4,000,000 in hand, and that means a contribution from South Australia of £400,000 annually, which Avill be kept from her, it a]>pears to me — of course this is entirely a suggestion — for long periods of time. Supposing the federal l^arliament only sits four months once in the year, there will be eight months during which there will be no arrangement as to the dispo.sition of the finances, and during which the executive of the federal parlia- ment will not know^ what expenditure their parliament is going to in.sist upon. They certainly must retain at least £4,000,000 every year in order to carry out their duties, and in order to be well supported for any expenditure the federal ])arliament may nutJiorise. As South Australia is at present situated, .she cannot a,(rord to let £400,000 per annum — and 1 do not think that is an unreasonal)le estimate — be locked up by the federal govenunent. It appears to mo that this will be a most expensive way of collecting £2,000,000. To say that the federal government shallcollect£8,000,0G0 35G Federal ConstiliUion: [IG March, 1891.] Resolalions. and hand back .£0,000,000 is to say that they are adopting absohitely the most ex- pensive and roundabout way of collecting £2,000,000. Wliy not let the colonies hand over £2,000,000, as provided by the federal parliament, at once 1 Sir JoHX Bray : We have not agi-eed about the £2,000,000 as yet; it is only imaginary at present ! Mr. GORDON: My ai'guraent is founded on the supposition that the figures of the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, are correct. I do not say that they are correct; but I think they are nearly correct. I do not think any delegate will estimate the cost of the fed- eral parliament at much under £2,000,000; but whatever the amount may be, it is simply a matter of pro]Dortion. The diffi- culty remains, that a very large amount of money will be kept out of the hands of the treasurers of the various colonies, and which the smaller colonies can ill afford to have reserved. Mi\ McMillan : That includes a large amount which we pay under any circum- stances ! Mr. GORDON : Xo doubt it includes defences. Let us take the case of South Australia with regard to defences. We pay £50,000 a year for our defences ; but our share of £2,000,000 will be £200,000, so that we will be paying £150,000 more than we are at present paying. The diffi- culty is this : it is not only the amount we have to pay, but it is the fact that a large amount of money which we want fi'om day to day will be absolutely locked up. I place this suggestion, which I will not fur- ther labour, before the Convention. Apart from that point, however, this will be for other reasons tlie most expensive Avay of collecting the £2,000,000, or whatever the amount required for the federal govern- ment may be. I am sure it will involve a large increase of officers. There will have to be a system of checking. You cannot collect the moneys of a colony, out [J/r. Gordon, of which deductions have to be made, and the balance refunded, with a staff that is sufficient to simply collect the amount and hand it over to one authority. Mr. MuNRO : Why not 1 Mr. GORDON : You cannot perform a double business operation of that sort as easily as you can perform a single busi- ness opex'ation. Mr. MuNRO : Cannot a cheque for £10,000 be draA\n without appointing an additional officer 1 Mr. GORDON : I will take the hon. member's own illustration. You cannot receive £10,000, and draw a cheque for £2,000and a cheque for £8,000 as cheaply as you can receive £10,000 and draw a cheque for £10,000. It is sa\ah c proposi- tion in financial business which cannot be controverted, that you cannot perform a large double business operation of this kind as cheaply as a single one. It involves a double set of books, and it must, in the nature of things, be more expensive. It is a question also whether the system pro- posed will not involve a dislocation of the civil service of all the colonies, as well as a dislocation of the finances. The customs service of every colony forms a lai'ge portioii of its civil service, and the customs officer will have to be transferred to the federal government. Some of the colonies have regulations which give their civil servants pensions and some have not, and the colo- nies that give pensions to their civil ser- vants will be involved either in a most expensive computation ©f pensions or in some adjustment of the relations between the civil servants themselves. This is, I think, quite clear. We have no system of pensions to civil servants in South Aus- | tralia, and we are not going to take over ' civil servants of the other colonies with their pensions or right to earn pensions. So the colonies with a civil service such as that . of tliis large colony of New South Wales, ) where the civil servants, either from lengtJi Federal ConstitvAion: [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 357 of service or other causes, earn pensions, culties of transport would prevent a long will have to compute their pensions or war. Xo nation in the world, excepting make a bargain with the civil servants the Chinese, could keep up three or four which will reimburse them for the loss campaigns against a country 12,000 miles they will incur by serving under another away ; and we have in addition the navies government, or the federal government of old England riding the seas to protect will have to take over their pensions, us. The American confederacy had no which it is not likely to do. Federation protections of this kind. The only argu- involves a dislocation of finances, a most ment in favour of the central govei'nment expensive mode of collecting the money re- not collecting the revenues is that the quired, and a large expense for readjust- American confederacy broke down under ment of the civil service. On these points it the same system; but, in a reasonable seems to me that the simplest system will contemplation of events, we may say that be for the colonies to pay over to the fede- it broke down from causes that will not ral government the contribution which the aft'ect us here. Even supposing it were federal government adjudges they must reasonable to suggest such a breakdown, pay. considering the distance and the possibili- Mr. Playford : That is the old con- ties, the balance of convenience is undoubt- federation in America which broke down ! edly in favour of my contention ; and when Mr. GORDON : I am aware that it is the strain does come it will be much the system of finance that prevailed under cheaper for us to make new financial ar- the American confederation, which broke rangements then, than to go on duiing the down, however, from causes that will not next fifty or sixty years paying through happen liere. the nose as we should do for such an Colonel Smith : Suppose one colony re- arrangement as the resolutions propose, iused to pay its proportion ? I am aware that this suggestion of mine Mr. GORDON : If one colony dared to contemplates a somewhat looser bond of refuse to pay its proportion, its credit on union than the resolutions contemjilate — the London money market would be lost (hat follows as a matter of cour.se; but altogether. It is as ea.sy to say that one if wo are to achieve anything beyond a colony will l)ring aljout a revolution and step in consultation the agreement at which secede from the federation as not pay its wedoai-rive will have to be somewhat less pi-oj)ortion. I am astonished that the lion. than the union contemplated by the reso- ni( inber, who has so much pride in the re- hit ions now before the Convention. I sources of the colony of A''ictoria, should think that the arrangement which I sug- suggest that any of the colonics will not gost will allow "Western Australia to come pay its contribution. To my iniml tlic into the federation on something like rea- tliing is absolutely unthinkaljje — at least, sonablc grounds. 'I'hc hon. delegates from s nmch as that any f»no of the colonics that colony tell us that they cannot give will secede from the union. Referring to up their customs duties right away ; they the intcijection of the hon. member, Mr. niiylit be allowed to keep them and pay Playford, I say that the causes that led only sucii a contribution for defence as the ;o the breakdown of the financial arrange- federal government decided was their fair ments of the old American confederacy arc share for the protection afforded them, and [lot likely to happen here. That was the wliicJi, T am sure, that colony would gladly result of the strain of a long war, wliicli pay. e are not likely to have here. Tiie diHi- Amendment proposed. 353 Federal Conslilution: [IG March, ISGL] llcsolatlons. Mr. McMillan : With all lesjiect to iny hon. fi-iend opposite, I tliiuk we are in great clanger of misconceiving the exact character of the debate upon these reso- lutions. As far as I understand, these resolutions were never intended to be amended in the elaborate manner fore- shadowed by the hon. member, and it seems to me that if we take that course we are simply now going through the discussion that will have to be carried out in a committee u2:>on financial matters. I take it for granted that probably one of the schemes to facilitate business will be after these resolutions have been passed in some shape or other, to have a series of committees dealing specitically with certain subjects, and then the outcome of those committees will be resolutions of a char- acter v.-hich will form the basis of a bill which will be capable of scientific amend- ment. It seems to me, therefore, that un- less we try to pass the general principles which only are embodied in these reso- lutions, we may get into second reading speeches, which may really be a reitera- tion of the elaborate speeches of last week ; consequently I would urge upon my hon. friend and others that it would be better for us to pass these i-esolutions with any verbal amendments that may be necessary ; but simply embodying in the result the principles of the resolutions. Mr. Gordon : These are principles in the amendment — as much principles as in the resolutions 1 Sir JOHN BEAY: I would ask the hon. member, Mr. Gordon, to withdraw the amendment. I may say, in justice to Sir Samuel Griffith, that it was not he who suggested that we should pass the resolu- tions in a general shape and discuss the matters aftei-wards, when they were em- bodied in a bill. It was I who made that suggestion. It is impossible, in a large Committee like this, to attempt to draft a l)ill. That is what we shall be attempting to do if we go into these details. "We have not had the amendments before us in print, and it is hardly fair to ask us, without see- ing them in print, to agree to a series of proposals like these. It is a pity that Mr. McMillan went into figures to the extent that he did, because he has thrown out tiie suggestion that the federal governmentwill cost £2,000,000 without telling us how he arrived at the estimate. Unless we know what the federal government is going to do it is impossible to form an estimate of its cost. I agree with Mr. Gordon in saying this : that if we all understand that the cost of the federal government is going to be £2,000,000 we could arrive at a much easier way of collecting it than by giving the federal goveinment power to collect £8,000,000 of customs duties, all of which they do not want, but we have not agreed on it. We cannot yet tell what the federal government is to consist of, and what its powers are. I agree with Sir Samuel Griffith, that they will have to be considered carefully and put into a bill. We must not ask this Committee, to decide upon details until we see them all in print. I agree with the suggestion of the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, that as far as possible we should adopt the resolutions now, it being distinctly understood that we shall have the fullest opportunity of dealing with thcni in a complete shape when the bill is brought in. If it is necessary to deal with the reso- lutions in this way we may fairly do it now, but we should not be taken by siu'prise by having important amendments f^roposed before we have seen what is to be proposed in print. Mr. DEAKTN : I would only say that if the hon. delegate, Mr. McMillan, is pre pared with a motion to refer these resolu tions to the various committees, to be dealt with by them in their various bi-anches, I should be glad to bow to that proposal, and to withdraw the amendment in referenc*^ to excise which I moved the other da}', t i Federal Const'dutioii: [IG MARCif, 1891.] Resolutions. 359 and also to witliholcl certain other amend- ments which I proposed to move at a later stago in regard to fiscal arrangements. It seems the proper way to deal with the different matters in separate committees, in the first instance, as that gives a better prospect of their speedy and satisfactory settlement than dealing with them in this large Committee. I shall be glad, tliere- fore, to fall in with the suggestion which has been made, and to withhold the amend- ments I propose to move, if such be the pleasure of the Committee. The points re- ferred to by the hon. member, Mr. Gordon, are worthy of most careful consideration. The hon. member has brought them for- ward in a manner to command the atten- tion of the Convention. The Convention docs not desire to avoid their consideration, but to discuss them at this stage appears to many hon. members to be inexpedient. Mr. McMillan : I do not propose that we should go into Committee at once, but that we should pass the resolutions as they stand, embodying the principles, and then . to proceed to the appointment of commit- tees. Sir JOHN DOWNER : I disagree .so radically with the details of some of the resolutions that I think I should not be satisfied with their being pa.ssed in tho formal way sugge.sted. We havo had nniuh discussion about the houses of par- liament and the relative rights of tho senate and tJie house of representatives ; and are wo, as a matter of form, to pass a resolution contrary to the opinion of a large majority, or at lea.st of a large section, of the dulogatcs ? I tliink the suggestion of the lion, membtr, Mr. Dcakiu, a very good one. After the long discussion wjiich we had when we wei*e sitting as a conven- tion, we should appoint committees to l)ring up a report as to any bill which may be necessary. But if we are to go through these resolutions in Committee and p.'iss them, we must treat them as matters of substance, and not at all as matters of form. We are not to introduce details such as are contained in my hon. friend, Mi-. Clor- don's amendment, upon which, although not inconsistent with the form of the reso- lutions, it is, nevertheless, inexpedient that we should come to a determination at the present stage. I cordially agree with the suggestion of the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, in which lie appears, unhappily, to have misunderstood the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, for vvhicli I am sorry. I should have been glad if the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, had intended what he seemed to suggest. The sooner we have the commit- tees appointed in the manner which he sug- gested, the better for us all, and the more time we shall have at our disposal. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : As I un- derstand, these resolutions were brought forward as a first basis upon which to found the constitution, so that we might settle the general principles upon which the constitution is to be framed. And we are in Committee to consider them, not to adopt them as they stand, but to make such modifications in substance as will commend them to the Convention. It would be quite foreign to the objects of the proposer to ingraft on them any thing- like details. That must be left to a sub- sequent stage, I indicated on Friday some doubt as to whether the resolutions them- selves went sulficiently into detail to en- able a .select committee to go to work ; but, on reconsideration, I confess myself converted to the view suggested by the hon. member. Sir John r.r.-xy,that we ought to agree to these resolutions with such modifications as arc necessary, and the)i set to work in committee. And no doubt we shall have dillerent connnittees. A com- mittee of delegates who are financial ex- perts, as suggested l)y Mr. Wrixon, will deal with financial matters, and the con stitutional branch of the subject might be intrusted to other hon. members. If this ;60 Federal Constilution: [IG March, 1891.] Eesolulions. is tlie correct view, I would cle|->recato any attempt to add additional resolutions to those now before the Committee. That should be left to a subsequent stage, when these and other details Avill have to be dealt with. I believe that that will carry- out the original intention of the movoi-, and I have come to the conclusion that it ■will facilitate business. But it is certain that "we cannot make further progress until ■we have disposed of these proposals. Mr. WRIXON: The proposal to ap- point the committee is excellent ; but there are two points on which we require a general understanding. One is the ques- tion of state rights, and the other that of the customs duties — the power of the fede- ral parliament, and how it shall impose customs duties. I believe that the dif- ference of opinion on these points in the Convention is not so very great, and that ■when they arc rightly looked into we may soon arrive at an agreement. It will assist us if we so deal with the resolutions as to avoid matters of detail, and the sooner the committees are appointed the better. Mr. GORDON : I sliould be glad to ■withdraw the amendment with tlie protest that it embraces questionsof policy on which a direction should be given to the Commit- tee. The Committee itself ought not to be allowed to decide a question of national polic}'. Thepoint of my amendment, that the duties shall be uniform, is undoubtedly a matter of national policy. My amendment ■with regard to bounties is of a somewhat smaller character, but is essential. And my amendment with regard to uniform railway rates on lines ■\\hich affect inter- colonial trade is undoubtcidly a most sub- stantial amendment, and a matter of na- tional policy. If the Convention by a majority decides to leave matters of policy to committees, I shall have nothing more to say ; but I protest that my amendment does include matters of policy on which the Convention ought specially to direct [Sir Samuel Griffith. the committees. The committees will liave to take into consideration very large de- tails, no doubt, and a great deal of scope must be given to their inquiries ; but to leave to the committees questions of broad policy such as these will not, I most re- spectively protest, be consonant with tlie duties of the Convention. Mr. MACDONALD-PATERSON : I rise to make an observation -with regard to "what has been repeated by the hon. member, Mr. Gordon, on the question : That the trade and intercourse between the federated colonies, whether by means of land carriage or coastal navigation, shall be abso- lutely free. The hon. member is under the apprehen- sion that he is the only delegate "who liolds these views. The question has, I know, been discussed by myself and a number of others, and we mutually agreed, particu- larly on the advice of the hon. member, Mr. Clark, to leave these subordinate mat- ters to be "worked out in Committee. Questions of subordinate or provincial policy are undoubtedly invok-ed in this very sub-section. I "svish hon. members to quite understand that the question of what may be termed the Australasian con- solidated finance, and that very question of railway tariffs in the interior — because it is no use having a customs union and pei'fect harmony of trade on the coast if "sve have a v/ar of railway tariffs in the in- terior— have been discussed amongst many hon. members. The hon. member, Mr. Gordon, will not, I trust, be under the apprehension that he is the only delegate "who has thought of these questions. Com- mittee is, I hold, the proper place to work out these questions, and I trust the sug- gestion to leave them to sub-committees "svill be carried out. Mr. DIBBS : I think my hon. friend, Mr. McMillan, has not dealt veiy gener- ously with the hon, member, Mr. Gordon, in condemning his remarks on the amend- 1 Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1891.] liesolutions. 3G1 ment. I have looked upon the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Gordon, during the sittings of the Convention as the most eloquent listener of all the dele^rates. We have heard nothing from the hon. member until to-day, and he spoke on what may be considered a fair amendment of the re- solutions. There is no doubt that the various sub-heads of the questions to be defined in the constitution bill can be best dealt with by committees. But I would ask the Convention whether, when the committees bring up their reports, lion, members will be prevented from discussing the subject-matter of those reports 1 The time which has so far been consumed in discussing the amendment has not been wasted, because it has been the means of thi'owing a certain amount of light on dif- ficult questions. For instance, in regard to the bounties and the possible war of railway tariffs, the hon. member has raised two points which are worthy of our con- sideration, and which will have to be con- sidered in the first in.stance by commit- tees, and afterwards by tlie Convention. I deprecate altogether any desire to hastily conclude the sittings of the Convention when we have just reached the very kernel of the busine.ss. All we have done up to tlie present time has been to make each other understand our views in set speeches ; but the real kernel of the whole business is, on wliat terms and conditions are we to construct this constitution ? A very easy way out of the difficulty has already been fore.sliadowed by sever:d hon. members. The resolutions will not pass tlie Conven- tion until they have ber-n amended ; tliey cannot be aniendfd until they have been dis- cu.s.sed,and if amendments are tobemade in one direction why should they not be made in another? I would make a .suggestion which I think will meet the views of the lion, mcmljer who moved the resolutions in the first instance. The hon. member told us distinctly that he introduced the resolutions not to form a basis for the con- stitution, but for the purpose of eliciting the views of hon. members. He says he is not bound strictly by the resolutions, and that being so, why should he not with- draw the whole of the resolutions and ap- point sub-committees to bring up I'eports on the various sub-heads of the consti- tution % Then we might have a discussion, and we might arrive at such conclusions as mia;ht become the basis of a bill. But as lone: as the resolutions are before the House they will be open to amendment, I intend to move one or two amendments on the 3rd and 4th resolutions, but I shall be very glad to waive my undoubted right to move amendments, if the whole of the resolutions are withdrawn and the ques- tions referred to sub-committees. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Mr. DEAKIN : I simply desire to know where we stand, and what is intended to be the method of dealing with these i-eso- lutions *? If it is proposed to amend them on general lines, I have amendments of a general character ; and if it is intended to refer them to committees, I do not desire to occupy the time of the Convention. I think we ought to arrive at some under- standing which will be fair to all the dele- irates as to how we are to deal with the lesolutions. Perhaps the mover will indi- cate his view.s. For instance, on this ques- tion of excise — the question with which we were dealing before the hon. member, Mr. Gordon, moved his amendment — is it pro- posed to deal now with a question of that sort? Because if it is, I wisli to amend my former amendment, and to submit it in this form : Tliat the resolution l)u aiiieiided by the inser- tion after the words " custoina duties" of the words, ".-iiid diiticH of excise upon goods the suliject of customs duties." Amendnmnt proposed. Sir IIEXIIY PAIJKE.S: The discu.s- .sion this morning lias almost convinced 3G2 Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1891. J Resolutions. me that we arc aiuiiug to some extent at very diOereut objects. ]\Iy lion, friend, Mr. Gordon, obviously does not want a union at all : what he wants is a federation of the colonies — colonies themselves really conducting business of a federal cliaractei'. But what these resolutions contemplate is the creation of a federal government for the whole of Australia, which is quite a different thing. Now, when I had the honor to submit the resolutions, I took occasion to repeat several times that I submitted the resolutions to be discussed, to be amended, to be rejected, to be dealt with in any way that the Convention thought fit; but I never supposed that if they were amended or rejected other matter would not be put in their place to give to the Convention what I think is essential before it can go into Commit- tee beyond the Committee of the Whole — that is, an outline of the basis of the constitution which we seek to biini;' into existence. Take the resolution on which the hon. member,' Mr. Deakin, has moved an amendment. It seems to me that what his amendment expi-esses is im- plied in the i-esolution as it now stands, and seeing that the resolutions are at best onlv an indication of the broadest features of the constitution which we seek to create, we should enter upon a useless and a laborious course if we sought to add to them all those conditions which certainly must be added in the bill. ]My object was simply to put before the Convention an embodiment of what may be called the cai'dinal principles, such, for example, as a legislature of two houses, and not of one ; such for example, as the electoral basis of the house of representatives ; such, for ex- ample, as the power of dealing with all bills imposing burdens on the people, or appropriating their money. These seemed to me to be the essential parts, forming in reality the very soul of any scheme to which we can agree. But these all presuppose \Sir Ilcnrjj Parhes. a federal government and a federal pa,rlia- ment for the whole of the colonies, and it is giving the go-by to our objects, as so em- bodied, to speak of states confederating as they now exist in doing some kind of fede- ral work which they never can do except in the most imj^erfect manner in their sepa- rate states. I hope I make it plain novv' that I am quite willing that any amendment should be made ; in fact, I should rejoice to see any made, so long as there is no attempt to add details which must in the result be imperfect, because any attempt of that kind cannot embrace all the details, and it v/ould therefore be better to omit all. I do not care, so far as these resolutions are concerned, as they have been submitted by me, if every one is altered, so long as the simple basis embodying what the Con- vention aims at in point of foundation principles is agreed to. I do not think I need detain the Convention longer, for I have already tried to explain the sense in which I submitted these resolutions. Mr. BAETON : It does seem to me that, after the statement we have had from the mover of these resolutions, there cannot possibly be any objection to the adoption of the amendment v.'hich has been mo'-^a by the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, because if the resolution now before us is extended to cover the ground of excise upon articles subjected to customs duties, the hon. mem- ber's amendment will make clear what, perhaps, is not now quite clear, and it is, therefore, unobjectionable. If, on the other hand, it be an amendment in point of principle, it is conceded by the mover of the resolutions that amendments in pohit of principle are what we have now to deal with. In either case, therefore, it does appear to me — subject to correc- tion — that the amendment moved by the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, is one which we might entertain at this time, and with vvhich we might deal at once. We do nol want to be told out of doors, or indeed Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1891.] Resolutions. 3G3 anywhere else, tbat in giving to tlie federal government tlie power to deal with customs duties we did not include the power to deal with excise on articles subject to those cus- toms duties. If we pass the resolution be- fore us in this form, I am afraid that that is what we shall be told. We are, there- fore, in this position : that the resolution intends the thing now proposed, but does not make tlie intention clear ; and, if it does not make the intention clear, the amendment ofiers a fair ground of debate, and LS quite within the principles upon which the resolutions are submitted. In either case, therefore, I hope the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Deakin, will not v»ithdraw his amendment. Mr. GORDON : The point so clearly put by the hon. member, Mr. Barton, satisfies me — as I am sure it jnust satisfy every member of this Convention — that, seeing that the object of the resolution is to estab- lish an absolute equation of trade — if that expression be permissible — between the colonies, any proposition which substanti- ally affects the position sought to be estab- lished involves a pi'inciple which ought to be discussed in open Convention, and not in a 'mmittee. The question of whether ex- cise duties shall al.so be fixed by the fedei-al government is no stronger as a matter of principle than the question as to whether bounties shall be fixed by it. In fact, if the one question may reasonably be considered, the otherhas equally strong claims upon our consideration. Stronger still are the claims of the q\iestion of railway rates, and if the object of the resolution be to establish a commercial equation — to place all the colo- nies absolutely, or as nearly as possible, upon the same basi.s as to trade and inter- course — then I submit that most strong support is given to me by the clear argu- ment of the hon. nionibfr, Mr. Barton, that any pro])osition which will effect that purpose — and my amendment does mo^t strongly effect it — much more so in fact than the amendment of jMr, Deakin — should be considered at once by the Con- vention. I think there can be no doubt but that the propositions I submitted should be considered in open Convention. I confess, however, that I am a little con- fused as to my position. Are we to pass resolutions now with which we do not agree, and to express our disagreement subse(|uently, or are we to amend them or ajipoint committees to lick them into shape ? That question is exercising the mind of the Convention I am sure as much as it is exercising my own mind, which is not at all clear upon the subject. Mr. IMUNRO: I think the delegate from South Australia who has just spoken misunderstands the position of the mover of the resolutions. He does not say they cannot be amended, but what he does say is that they should not be hampered by too much detail at this stage. I quite agree that the suggestion of the hon. member will come very properly before the Com- mittee. But if we are to include in the present resolutions every detail that can be imagined Mr. GoiiDON : I do not propose that ! Mr. MUNRO : I do not think the ques- tion of railway tariffs is one of those de- tails which .should be included now. jMr. GoKDOX : It is a question of national policy ! Mr. MUNRO : I quite admit that. Mr. Gordon : Then it is not a detail ! Mr. !M UNRO : I could name half a dozen other questions Avhich are quite as important ; but they are not questions which bear directly on the resolution be- fore the Committee. They are altogether different questions. Wliil(> I understand that the resolutions ought to b(> amended xipon questions of principle, wlien the ma- jority of the Convention is hostile to the principle included in any particular resolu- tion, still if we are going to make any re- solution dealing with the princi[)le only 364 Federal Constitution : [IG March, 1891.] Resolutions. the vehicle for hringing before the Commit- tee all the details that can be brought be- fore it, our consideration of the resolutions •will be extended over six months or more ; in fact, the avIioIc thing will go wrong. I quite agree that the original I'esolution really implies all that the hon. member, Mr. Deakin's amendment suggests ; but I, for my part, should prefer that he should "withdraw it now, and that we should carry the resolution as it stands. AVe all intend ■what the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, in- tends, but we are not agreed that this is the stage at which the matter should be considered. Mr. KINGSTON: I confess that I thoroughly disagree with the remarks of the hon. gentleman who has just resumed his seat, and who suggested that the amendment moved by the hon. member, Mr. Gordon, dealt with matters of detail onh'. To my mind it dealt with principles of t])e highest impoi-tance, which, unless affirmed, will in- terfere with the establishment of interco- lonial free-trade. If we are simply to pre- scribe that there shall be intercolonial free- trade while leaving the various states, so far as their railway systems are concerned, to pursue the cut-throat policy which they have already adopted in certain instances, I am sure we shall not reap one-half the advantage from intercolonial free-trade which we are anticipating. I am sure we .shall not derive those advantages which we have a right to secure, and which we .should be able to secure if, in framing this federal constitution, we pi'ovided for the abolition of the system the hon. member, Mr. Gordon, has attacked. I think we shall also be making a great mistake if we do not lay it down as clearly as possible that not only shall the federal government have control over customs duties, but that they shall also liave control over duties of excise, and power to prevent the continu- ance of the system of bounties estal)lished in some of the colonies, which would subject [J/?*. Munro. the manufacturer in other less favoured districts to serious disadvantages. But it appears to me that the error into which the hon. member for South Australia fell was in attempting to deal with these re- solutions in a wholesale manner, and in trying to practically strike out resolutions 2 and 3. The hon. member also submitted his resolutions without having given the Convention an opportunity of seeing them in print, and of fully considering them. In- stead of endeavouring to secure the affirma- tion in one block of the principles embodied in his resolutions, thehon. gentleman should seek to ingraft on the resolutions we are now considering the principles he has so ably advocated. That, I think, can be done without any serious interference with the lanfjuage of the resolutions. I am sure it will commend itself to the good sense of hon. nieinbers, that when we are giving instructions to the draftsman who will be intrusted with the preparation of the bill we ought to lay clown as clearly as possible precise rules for his guidance on matters of principle. But, as I'egards these three questions — uniformity of tarifFin thewhole of the federated states ; the control by the federal s:overnment of duties of excise The Chairmax : I would remind the hon. member that he is discussing matters that are entirely irrelevant to the amend- ment proposed by the hon. member, Mr. Deakin. The proposal is that there shall be added to the resolution on the paper these words, " and duties of excise upon goods the subject of customs duties." The hon. member is referring in very general terms to the amendment of the hon. mem- bei", Mr. Gordon. Mr. KINGSTON: At the particular moment when you called me to order, sir, I was referring to the subject embodied in the amendment of Mr. Deakin — that of the control of the duties of excise. I ac- cept your suggestion that the debate should be confined to that one question ; but I Federal Comtitution: [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 365 hope that after we have affirmed the prin- ciple embodied in the amendment now he- fore us we shall be able to deal with the other amendments relating to similar mat- ters of principle, in which case I promise the hon. member for South Australia, Mr, Gordon, my hearty support. Mr. THYNNE : On the last sitting day I suggested that the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, should be postponed for farther consideration. I am not sorry that it was postponed, for it has in the meantime evidently received further consideration, at any rate from the hon. gentleman who rooved it. But it seems to me that the amendment, as now proposed, is tending in the wrong direction. Its effect will be to give to the federal parliament power to impose excise duties only on those articles upon which import duties are imposed. That involves, I think, a forgetfulness of the powers to be conferred on the federal par- liament. The functions in relation to de- fence and other matters which we intrust to the federal government are such as only this Convention, and no other power, can limit. There is no limit to the claims that may under certain circumstances be made upon the resources of the federal govern- ment. The amendment now proposed tenJs in the direction of limiting tlic jiower of the federal parliament in legard to excise to the imposition of duties upon certain articles only, J. think the federal parlia- ment must have power to impose excise duties upon everything. It struck me on Friday that this cjuestion of excise duties raised a very imi)ortant quoslionas to how far the power of taxation which belongs to the states may be affected by a similar power of taxation being possessed by the federal parliament. The federal govern- ment may in the future come under great stress of circumstances, and there should be no limit to its power of taxation. Tlie necessity is here shown of seeing that the several state governments are properly re- presented and protected, I think that the amendment in its altered form ought not to be accepted. If excise duties are to be imposed, and if the power must be given to the federal parliament to impose them, that power must be given to them with- out limit. Instead of proposing to limit the excise duties to goods upon which im- port duties are already imposed, I hope the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, will revert to the amendment he originally proposed, I think that when the federal parliament Ls constituted the people will have sufficient confidence in it to believe that it will not impose duties of excise in a way detri- mentiil to the best interest of the commu- nity. Sir THOMAS McILAVRAITH: I thought the objection of the hon, member, Mr. Tliynne, would have taken quite a different direction to that which it did. I like the amendment better now than in its former shape. But as the hon. member who moved it has given so few reasons in its support, I look for these more in what other hon. gentlemen have said. The only reason given by the hon. member, ]Mr. Deakin, was that his proposal would make the powers of the federal parliament more uniform. Now, uniformity in a customs tariir nxcans that the customs tariff shall allect all the states ctjually ; but uniformity in excise is a very different thing. A uniform excise duty may be a duty which oppresses one state, and is paid liy one state only. For instance, take tiie case mentioned the other day by the hon, member, INlr. Donaldson. Suppose the federal parliament decided to impo.i;e an excise duty on sugar, wliat would be tlie effect ? It would fall almost entirely upon Queensland, New South Wales would be affected to a small extent, but the other colonies would not come under the opera- tion of the excise. I agree that the federal parlia)ncnt, having control of the customs, :j66 Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1891.] Resolutions. must also liave control of excise. But I believe — and this is why I am not going to oppose the amendment of the lion, mem- ber, Mr. Deakin — that we ought to put a limitation to that power in the bill itself — that is to say, we should limit the power of the fedei'al parliament to impose ex- cise duties to articles that are produced by the colonies equally, or, at all events, produced by all the colonies for export. You cannot select for excise an article like sugar, for instance, which is produced in one colony and exported to another, because 3"ou defeat one of the principal objects we have in view, namely, free-trade between all the colonies, and especially for home products. There would not be absolute free-trade between the colonies. Of course I do not believe that the federal parlia- ment would exercise the power I have in- dicated ; but I do not think it should be given to them without the limitation sug- gested. The Premier of Victoria instanced a case that showed the absolute necessity of their having that power. The hon. gentleman referred to the familiar article of whiskey, and pointed out that one colony could get all the trade of the colonies by simply lowering the excise duty. No doubt that is so, and on that account we must give the federal parliament the power of controlling excise duties. But for the pro- tection of the particular colonies, we must limit that power. It is very easily limited, because excise duties are confined in all the colonies, and to only three articles — beer, spirits, and tobacco, and we can easily make a special reference to those three articles, and, therefoi'e, as far as they are concerned, there is not the slightest objec- tion to the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. Deakin. I will not say anything more about the amendment, because I shall ex- pect to see embodied in the bill the limita- tion I have suggested. There is another point the hon. member has forgotten. In these colonies, there are not only import \_Sir Thomas McTlioraith. and excise duties, but there are also export duties, and he has forgotten to make any mention of these. Mr. DEAKIN : We have not come to them yet. In submitting this amendment, I did so almost without remark, because I thought I was following in the footsteps of the mover of the resolution by simply giving a general indication of what I thought was desirable, instead of entering into a detailed consideration of tlie ques- tion involved. It was for that reason I said nothing, and not, as the hon. mem- ber. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, appears to suppose, because there was nothing to say. On the contrary, although I recognise the eminent standing of that hon. member in everything relating to finance, I would point out to him what appears to me to be a misapprehension into which he him- self has fallen in considering this question. That was when he spoke of the danger of allowing the federal government the power of imposing excise on articles the product of only one or two colonies, and seemed to imagine that it might be made the means of oppressing those colonies. That is pos- sible; but it is also possible that it might be necessary to have the power of imposing excise even though the article cliosen micrht be the product of only one colony. An ex- cise duty is often associated with a pro- tective tariff, and if an article is highly pro- tected, it might, perhaps, be found necessary for the purposes of revenue, to be able to collect an excise on goods subject to a cus- toms duty. It would be perfectly possible to adjust an excise upon that particular article if produced l)y one colony in relation to the protective tariff so as to do perfect justice to the industry affected, while ob- taining a revenue for the state. I do not wish to enter upon these subjects, because J it would be possible to occupy the M-Jiole ' day with the discussion of this question alone. For the same reason, I am pre- pared, having brought the subject before Federal Constkution: [IG March, 1891.] Resolutions. 3G7 tlie Committee, eitber to withdraw the time to discuss such questions. So long- amendment or to put it in another form, as we indicate the main principles, that because I presume our object is not to carry will be sufficient for the draftsman, and a precise amendment that shall embody all the sooner we settle those main principles, the details of the views of the Committee, and the sooner w^e appoint another corn- but rather to give another committee a mittee to prepare the bill, the sooner Avill general direction to enable it to bring up our labours be brought to an end. a recommendation which we shall then be Mr. BAKER : There is one word in able to debate, having something definite the resolution which the hon. members, before us. Mr. Playford and Mr. Thynne, appear to Mr. PLAYFORD : I trust that if the have overlooked. I mean the word " ex- lion. member presses his amendment he will clusively." It is not intended by this rcso- do so without any limitation, because in a lution to limit in any way the power of matter of this kind the powers of the the federal government to impo.se taxation, federal body shovild be the same as those I quite agree that it is impossible to pro- given to the federal body in the United vide any limitation in the exercise of a States and the Dominion of Canada. Hon. power the objects of which are unlimited, members will see, on consideration, that The objects of this federal government, in- by giving the power of levying customs eluding as they do the question of the de- duties on particular articles you have given fence of these colonies, are unlimited, and as much power to injure a particular colony we shall have to give the federal parliament — if the federal government wovdd be so unlimited power of taxation. We are wicked as to do anything of the sort— as only dealing now with that form of taxa- by giving this power of imposing excise. tion with respect to which it shall have If the federal parliament desires to raise exclusive power, and therefore I think revenue, and they can do so better by that the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, is right means of an excise duty than in any other in not proposing to place a limit on the v.ay, they certainly should have the power. exclusi\e power of the federal govern- I quite agree with hon. members who .say mcnt to impose exci.se duties, and that the that as far as possible wo should deal only amendment, as suggested by him, is the V ith the more imj)ortant matters connected amendment which we ought to carry. T with the suV)ject, without going into detail. take it that we arc now asked to pass re- As I pointed out the other day, there is one solutions with wjiich we agree, admitting- point connected with tliis matter of more as we all do, that they do not in any way impoi-tancc than any one of the subjects in- cover the whole of the ground. This is troducod liy lion, members. That is, that all wc arc asked to do, and that is all I am \\\ giving tlie powr-r to levy customs duties prepared to do at present, throughout the colonies tliei'C should, at IMr. THYNNE : I wish to point out to any rate, be a proviso that the customs the hon. mr-mber, IMr. Baker, that the re- duties, when levied, shall be uniform. solution, if followed up, would be the one Mr. GouDON : Why not specify that? most likely to lead to difficulty between l\Ir. PLAYFORD : There is not the the state and federal governments. Bc- Klighlest necessity to put that in this reso- cause, if the view he takes is this : that lution. I guarantee that it will appear when an excise duty is imposed by a state In the bill v.hich will Ite prepared by a government upon goods produced in its committee, and if it does not wn can easily own state, it is deprived of the power of insert it. At present it is only waste of imposing that exci.se duty the moment the 3G8 Federal Constitution : [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions. federal government imposes an import the fiscal issue. It might be laid down in duty upon the same goods, he will take the constitution that the federal parliament away from the state governments imme- should commence, in the first instance, with diately the whole of their powers of taxa- a system of perfect free-trade, and should tion. This resolution raises a very im- not impose any customs duties without the portant question as to the future privi- direct warrant of its constituents. That leges of the state and federal governments. would be one proposal ; and I feel sure that We ought not to run away from this it will not commend itself for a moment to question now, but should stick to it until the members of this Convention, because it we come to some conclusion. We are try- would disregard the vested interests which ing to make haste, and may make the less have been created, not in one only of the speed with our work. Australian colonies, but in every colony Amendment agreed to. except one, and even in that one to some Mr. GORDOIST : I beg to move : slight degree. Then there is the other pro- That after the word "excise" the following position, which would be much more grate- words l)e added :— " and to offer bounties."' f ul to myself and to some otlier members of Mr. DIBBS : I should like to know the Convention. It is that the federal con- from the mover of this amendment if it is stitution should set out with the adoption his intention to practically destroy the of a protective tariff, and leave it to the bounty system existing in Victoria ? federal parliament, if it thought fit at a Mr. Gillies : It will not affect it ! future date, to gradually reduce that tariff. Mr. MuxRO : They will be used up before This, it might fairly be contended, should be that can apply 1 an equitable recognition of existing rights, Mr. DIBBS : There will be no l)Oun- and would not trammel tlie freedom of ties given in any of the colonies, except by the future federal parliament to any seri- the authority of the federal government ? ous degree. As I learn, however, from Mr*. Baker: Hear, hear ! the remarks which have been made by Amendment agreed to. the delegates during this debate, there is Mr. DEAKIN : Since it is the general some objection to take that course, and, consensus of opinion, as I gather it, that as far as I could gather the trend of their we at the present time should confine our- comments, they prefer to allow the federal selves, as far as possible, to broad general parliament to commence with this fiscal issues, and not enter into details, I shall issue exactly as it stands in the several refrain from proposing the amendment colonies. It is to propose a federal tariff w'hich I have drawn. It has reference to which shall take the place of the different the limitation to be imposed upon the fiscal tariffs nov/ in existence in the various powers of the federal parliament in the first colonies, and to impose any excise duties years of its existence. The question has which may be necessary for the proper been already brought under the notice of working of those import duties. It has the Convention, and it would be unneces- been generally admitted — although there sary for me to make any further remarks are one or two delegates who have taken concerning it were it not for a misappre- a contrary view — that the future federal J hension which has gradually increased since parliament will adopt a protective tariff; the remarks which the Victorian delegates and that, establishing intercolonial free- made in the early stages of the debate. It trade, it will be certain to iuipose protec- is perfectly open to us to adopt either of five duties against imports from the outside two or three different modes of dealing with world. It seems to have been imagined [J/r. Thynne. Federal Constituf ion: [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 3G9 that this should furnish a quite sufficient existence every year, and, consequently, answer to the delegates of those colonies there are a number of manufactures in who consider that the industries in their which there is a large amount of capital in- states are entitled to some special con- vested, which have only been started since sideration — inasmuch as they have been the imposition of the last tariflf, and have built up under state encouragement and only had one or two years of protection. I state support — before the support on which think that the members of the committee they have rested is rudely swept away. I charged with the consideration of the fiscal wish to point out, however, that that question may fairly have their attention argument has only a limited application. called to these points : that the colony It is perfectly possible for a future federal which has the highest protective duties parliament to adopt a protective tariflf, stands in a peculiar position, and is en- on the Tasmanian basis, which would leave titled to have that position considered, every one of the continental colonies out and that all the colonies having protective in the cold. The Tasmanian tariflf, if I tarifls are entitled to have their interests remember rightly, ranges on an average equally considered. This is an argument, at about 12^ per cent., and the federal par- although it comes from Victoria, which ap- liament would by adopting this standard in- plies to other colonies. An hon. member icidentally expose the industries of South behind me intei;jected that the revenue Australia, Queensland, Western Australia, necessities of a federal parliament will im- as far as they have been developed, and cer- pel it in the direction of a protective tariff, tainlythoseof Victoria, tofargreatercompe- I believe they will do so, and I am further tition than hitherto. It would expose the of opinion that when we thrash out this industries which have been built up under question, and consider the position of the a protective tariff" of 25 per cent, to compe- smaller colonies from which it is pi'oposed tilion under a tariff" of 12^ per cent. The .to withdraw their customs revenue, ably federal parliament will, to my mind, cei*- put by the lion, member, Mr. Gordon, to- tainly adopt a protective tai'iff"; but it is a day, and by the hon. member, Mr. Hackett, question of moment as to whether that pro- last week, we shall find that it will be neces- tcctive tariff" takes the 121 per cent, rate of sary to make provision so that those colo- Tasmania, the 1') pr-r cent, rate of Queens- juos shall suff"er little or no loss for some land, tlie 20 or 2."> pr-r cent, rate of South years to come. This matter will indirectly Australia, or tlie still higher rate of Vic- afi"cct the extent and height of duties iu toria ; and that is an all-important ques- the federal protective tariff". Consequently tion to the colony that has the highest pro- J am prepared to leave it in the hands of tective tariff of any colony in the gr.nip. the Committee to draft such a clause in the Then, again, hon. members have said that constitution as shall seem to them to oflfer Victorian industries have had the benefit the just piotection to which the infant of the Victorian tariff' for twenty-five years industries of all the colonies of Australia pa.st ; but the Victoiiau tariff", like every are fully entitleil. For my part, I am con- other tariff", has been built up by gradual vinced that when the federal i)arliament accretions, and it is only for the last two in its turn conies to consider the question, or three years that the industries there have it will 1)C governed not merely by revenue enjoyed a tariff at the present high rate. considerations, but will also remember that Mr. ^MiNno : Two years ! these jirotected industries have ceased to Mr. DEAKTN : Two years. Further Ix- Victorian or South Australian, and have ;han this, there are industries coining into .become national industries, and that it is 2 A 1 370 Federal Consiltidi oil . [IG Makcii, 1891.] Iicsolaiions. its (lutv to protect national industries, and to conserve national interests. We all frankly admit what the Chairman of Committees has stated, that New South Wales possesses unexampled facilities for the development of native industries with the assistance of a protective tariff; we admit the enormous natural resources of Queensland, with an extent which dwarfs that of Victoria into insignificance; we ad- mit the advantages enjoyed by the colony of South Australia, and the central situation of its capital for commanding the interior of the continent; we admit all that; but what we say in Victoria is that we are perfectly content, providing our industries receive that just protection to which they are entitled against the outside v/orld, to rely upon the enterprise of our people to maintain the industries we have, and to let them stand their chance with the rest when Australia has become one nation. Resolution, as amended, agreed to as follows : — That the power and authority to impose cns- toms duties and duties of excise upon goods the^ subject of customs duties, and to offer ):)ountie.s, shall be exckisively lodged in tlie federal govern- ment and parliament, subject to such disposal of the revenues thence derived as shall l^e agreed upon. Postponed resolution agreed tc : (2.) That the trade and intercourse between the federated colonies, whether by means of land carriage or coastal navigatio)i, shaH l>c al)SD- lutely free. Resolution agreed to : (4.) That the military and na\al defence of Australia shall be intrusted to federal forces, under one command. Preamble agreed to : Subject to these and other necessary condi- tions, this Convention approves of the framing of a federal constitution, which sliall estaltlisli — • Resolution proposed : (1.) A parliament, to consist of a senate and a liouse of reiMesentatives, the former consistiug of an equal number of members from each pro- vince, to be elected by a system which sliall provide for the retirement of one- third of the \_^fi'. Deakin. mendjers every years, so securing to the l)ody itself a perpetual existence combined with definite responsibility to the electors, the latter to be elected by districts formed on a popiilatiou basis, and to possess the sole power of originat- ing and amending all bills appropriating revenue or imposing taxation. Amendment (Mr. Baker) proposed : That the resolution be amended by the omis- ion of the words "a senate and a house of re- presentatives, the former,"' with a view to the ' insertion in their places of the words "two chambers, the one." Mr. GILLIES : I hope that we shall not omit those words. If we omit those words now, it appears to me to be an in- dication that the Committee disapproves altogether of calling the chambers a senate ! and a house of representatives. I think that the Committee will not disapprove of the use of the words " senate " and "house of representatives." I have not heard of any better term than " senate "' to apply to the upper branch of the legislature when it is appointed, nor of a better term than "house of representatives" to apply to the other house ; and if we now agree to omit those words it must clearly be an indication that the Committee approves of the omission of those words as indicating the respective houses. I do not think that we ought to do that. Mr. BARTON : I do not think that the omission of these words, and the insertion of the others proposed, will be an indication that the Committee disapproves of the tenns chosen ; but that, in this important, though rather subsidiary matter, the Com- mittee does not desire to come to a deter- mination without leaving it to some sub- committee, as has been suggested, to con- sider the various names that might really express the ideas underlying those two bodies. It has always seemed to me that, inasmuch as it is proposed that both these chambers should have a representative basis — as the idea of the representation of the people in one way or the other is at the bottom of each of them — we should get Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 371 rid of the distinction between tlie word "senate "' and the words " house of repre- sentatives." I am not discussing the ques- tion now, but I am simply putting forward a view on which, at any rate, the Commit- tee miglit well exercise its admitted power of choice, namely, that it will be better to get rid of the idea of a senate and house of representatives, because both those bodies are to be representative bodies, and that it would be a good idea to get rid of the ■word '• council," because, in some places, ■we have been accustomed to associate coun- cils with nominee bodies, which neither of tliose houses is to be. Inasmuch as they are both to be I'epresentative, I may give one example of names that might be suggested to the sub-committee amongst others which they will consider. The idea of the federation — of the equal powers of the states — is to be embodied in one of these chambers ; the idea of the national will as expressed by the national method of election by the people in the constitu- encies is to be embodied in the other. But, both being of a representative character, and, therefore, of the character of what we call " assernl)lics," why not call one the " federal assembly " and the other the "national a.sscmbly '"? If you do that, you express, at any rate, the idea that is at the bottom of the composition of both of them, namely, the idea of representation as we liavc been accustomed to express it by the use of the word " assembly " — and you express also the federal idea wliich outers into the composition of one, and the idea of the representation of the people as a whole, in their accustomed subdivi- sions of electorates, in the other. Sir Hknuv Parkes : Assembly No. 1 and Jissoinbly No. 2 ! Mr. BATITON : Call wliichever you like No. 1, and whichever yon like No. 2 ; but ina.smuch as No. 1 and No. 2 would be perfectly meaningless, and the words I have suggested would have a meaning, I suggest that the sub-committee would rather take my suggestion into considera- tion. Mr. WRIXON : Would it not be well if we determine the powers of the bodies 1 The names could be decided afterwards. What does all this question of name, which is entertaining the Convention, matter 1 The real point is to determine the powers to give to the two houses. If we delay in discussing the names, we shall be some time in settling the really important mat- ter that we have to determine. Sir THOMAS McILWRAITH: I think there is something in the objection made by the hon. member, Mr. Gillies. If we strike out these -words we really affirm that we disapprove of the names " senate" and "house of representatives." We do not want to do anything of the sort. It is better to leave the matter to the sub- committee with the words as they are. . Mr. BAKER : I originally rose Avith the view of seeking to amend the resolu- tion by leaving out the word " senate ' and inserting other words in lieu thereof, and I was proceeding to give reasons for the omission that I was about to propose, when I was met, I understood, by a unani- mous wish on behalf of the Committee, to strike out all the words and leave the matter open. Therefore, I gave up my original intention. If T am mistaken, and the Committee wish to discuss the matter now, I should like to give some reasons why I propose to leave out tlie word "senate" and insert other worda in lieu thereof. -M 1-. Plavfokd : Thrash it out now ! ^rr. T'.AKKR : Tin. reason why I wish to leave out the word " senate " and insert in lieu thereof the words "council of the states," is because I believe that when they go back to their own colonics, and to their own constituencies, it will facilitato lion, members of this Convention in ex- plaining the federal compact to the people 372 Federal Conslilulion. [IG March, 1891.] Itesoluiions. of those colonics. When wc see the great diflference of opinion which has arisen, even in this Convention, in reference to the powers that ought to be intrusted to the so-called senate, which I prefer to call the "council of the states," and when we see that that difference of opinion has, to a very great extent, arisen from confusion in the minds of some lion, delegates as to what the proper functions of the federal •council of the states ought to be — when we see that they have confused them with the functions of a second chamber in a uni- tarian form of government — it will surely facilitate them in explaining to the people the federal constitution if we give the .senate a name that is indicative of its powders and of its constitution. I do not say "states council." A "states coun- cil " is entirely a different thing from a " council of the states," which can exist only in a federal form of government ; and it is indicative of the fact that that coun- jcil of the states is composed of represent- atives from the different states. When the framers of the Constitution of Switzer- land formed their new Constitution they had before them not only their own long experience in different forms of confederate government, Ijut also the experience of America for fifty or sixty years, and they delilserately altered the name " senate," which w^as in use in America, to " council of the states," which is the term wliich is now applied to the upper chamber in Switzerland, and they vised that term to indicate exactly what they meant. They used that term to indicate that the people of Switzerland were represented in that upper chamber by states — that the people who formed that council of the states were the representatives of the states. It is indicative of the federal idea, and I be- lieve that it is a much better term than " senate." I admit that it has objections. It has two. In the first place, it is a little bit too long, although not longer than {Mr. BaJcer. "house of representatives." In the next place, it contains the term "council," which some hon. members seem to think is not a term which is particularly beloved by the people, and some confusion may arise from the use of that word in the name; but when the term is " the council of the states," it seems to me to perfectly cleai'ly express that whicli will be the body representing the states in this federal constitution. Sir GEORGE GREY: I think the arguments used by the last speaker are forcible, so far as that name goes. Why not let that name stand, and call the other chamber the " house of commons," as re- presenting the commons — everybody in the country 1 Mr. BAKER : I shall first propose to strike out these words, and when they are struck out I shall propose to insert the words " council of the states," as the name for one branch of the legislature, and I understand that some other member of the Convention will ask to insert other words to indicate the name and nature of the second branch of the legislature. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : There are two quite different questions involved in this amendment — one whether the name of the two houses shall be a senate and a house of representatives, and (he other whether we shall settle that matter now, or leave it to a committee. An Hex. Member : Leave it ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : If Ave are going to leave it we had better simply say that there shall be two chambers ; but it will be very hard for a committee, not knowing the views of the members of the Convention, to fix on any two names. On this point I do not suppose there is any settled division of opinion amongst hon. members. Each probably has his own idea as to wdiat will be the best name. The question is, whether we should settle it now or afterwards. Hex. Delegates : Afterwards ! Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1891.] Resolutions. Ol o Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : What will the Committee have to go upon then ? An Hox. Delegate : They can recom- mend ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: Yes, they can recommend. "We shall then have another discussion upon it. An Hex. Delegate : Settle it now ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I am dis- posed to settle the question now. Mr. Gillies : Let the words stand. To alter the resolution may necessitate a series of amendments ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The reso- lution might be passed as it is on the understanding that the words used here are merely provisional names. In substance one house will be what is generally known as a senate and the other as a house of re- presentatives, and I think these terms may be accepted for the present. These words may stand unless some other words very strongly commend themselves to the meni- bers of the committee or the Convention. Amendment negatived. Dr. COCKBURN : I think that we ought to leave out the word " province," and use the word which has been already mentioned in the foregoing paragraplis. I move : Tliat the word " jnovince" lie omitted witli .i view to tlie insertion in lieu thereof of the word "colony." Amendment agreed to. Dr. COCK 15 URN : I cannot help think- ing that it would be better not to refer principles to the committee, but to hjavc the committee to work out detiiils only. Wc have a blank as regards the nundjcr of years for which the senate shall be elected, and I think it would bo well to leave tlio question open, and to insert the ■words " proportion of members" instead of ♦' one-third." We ought not to fix the i)ro- portion, as tliat may be a debatable point. An IIox. Me.mdeu : Say " periodical re- tirement" ! Dr. COCKBURN : Yes, I would insert the word " periodical" before the word "retirement," and leave out the words, " every years." Sir Hexry Parkes : Why ? Dr. COCKBURN : I think it better, as far as possible, to refer only questions of detail to the committee. The hon. member has admitted that by leaving a blank as to the number of years I would leave open the whole question of the peri- odical retirement of members. Mr. Gillies : Another important point is whether the senate are to be elected by the electors or the states legislature ! Dr. COCKBURN : I take it that these words mean tliat it has to he done by the electors, not by the houses. The words go on to say, " with definite responsibility to the electors," and as long as there are any nominated houses in any of the colonie?,. there cannot be said to be definite respon- sibility to the electoi's. Mr. Gillies: Who are the electors 1 We must determine that ! Dr. COCKBURN : It cannot be the local legislatures, because there are certain of them with nominee upper Jiouses, the members of which cannot be said to have any definite responsibility to the electors. l!uL I will not press that point at present. I move : That the word "periodical" be im,crted before the word "retirement. ' Mr. GILLIES : Before the amendment is put, sir, may I draw attention to a question which must be rai.sed and ulti- iiiai<'ly dclcniiined'? I do not desire to raise the (juestion now, if it is understood that it will 1)0 considered piobably liy a select committee, ami bo determined on their reconnnendation. It is an important point, namely, whether tlie members of the senate shall be clrcteil by tlie parlia- ments of the various colonies or by the general electors of the colonies under a franchi.sf, perliaps under the franchise of Ol i Federal Constiliaion : [IG March, 1891.] Resolutions. the legislative assembly! I believe there is a strong opinion among lion, members that the elections to the senate should be made by the parliaments of the colonies. ' Dr. CocKBUKN : ISTominee houses ! Mr. GILLIES : I do not desire to raise the question now ; but if it is understood that it will be brought up subsequently I am quite willing to allow the resolution go now with the amendment suggested. Amendment agreed to. Amendment (Dr. Cockburn) proposed : That the words " one-third " be omitted, with a view to insert in lieu thereof the word "por- tion." Sir HENRY PARKES : I am not quite sure that I understand what is aimed at by these amendments, It is quite certain that they make the matter more indefinite and confused, whereas our object is to make it more definite and more clear, and whether we will or no, if we go on with this work we must come to precision, not to indefinite- iiess. After these amendments are passed we shall have to retrace the ground, and try to come to some definite conclusion, and some precise meaning. I certainly cannot understand the wisdom of loosening things, of making them more scattered than they were, instead of trying to compress our meaning, and bring it to a point on which we can all agree, or at least express our reasons for disagreement. By proposing that it shall be a periodical retirement of a proportion of the members we really say nothing at all. We put the thing behind us again, instead of keeping it steadily before us. "What we want to arrive at, if we agree to this mode of refen-ing the members of the upper chamber to the people, is the definite number to retii'e periodically, and the definite period at which they shall retire. We must arrive at those two points. Do what we will we can but put it off". We may delay it, but we must come back to it. I do not know that this should be determined by a com- ■ [Mr. Gillies. mittee. I think it should be determined one way or the other by the Convention itself. I really cannot see that the amend- ments will help us in any degree what- ever. Mr. CUTHBERT : I think we ought to relieve the committee as much as pos- sible of the heavy duties which will de- volve upon it. I suppose the senate will be appointed for a term of, say, six years. In A^ictoria, a third of the members of the upper house x'ctire every two years, so that in the event of any difiiculties arising be- tween the tv.'o houses, a fresh batch of members is brought in every two years. If we lay down the rule that a third of the members of the senate shall retii-e every two years— assuming, of course, that the term of their appointment will be six years — I think we shall be travelling in the right direction. However, as regards the number of years, a blank is left in the resolution. It may be very well left to the committee to say whether the period for which the senate shall be appointed shall be for six or nine years. I think the resolution is framed on proper lines. I shall be very glad to support it as it stands. I think the hon. member, Dr. Cockburn, will be wise if he withdraws his amend- ment, because I think we ought to relieve the com. mittee as much as possible from any embarrassmoTit. Mr. BARTON : It might save time to point out that we have, to a certain ex- tent, detei'mined this matter ah'eady. We have inserted the word " periodical " — that is to saj", we have made the resolu- tion to read as follows : — A parliament, to consist of a senate and a house of representatives, the former consisting of an equal nimiber of members from each colony, to be elected by a system which shall provide for the j^eriodical retirement of It might, of course, be advisable to leave the words "a third," or in.sert the words "a proportion "; but the number of years to Federal C'onsfihUion : [10 March, 1891.] Resolution^' OIO elapse before the periodical retii'ement is evidently now a thing with which we have nothina: to do. 'SVe cannot go back unon the word " periodical "' withont going throucrh a cumbrous form. Tlie insertion of the word is, so fai", a direction to any sub-committee to fix the period at which the members are to retire — to fix the meaning of the word "periodical." Amendment negatived. Mr. BARTOX : Consequent upon the amendment which has just been carried — it appears to me necessary — and I do not observe that any one else is prepared to do so — to move another amendment. I move : That the words "every j'ears " be omitted. Their retention would be repugnant to the decision to which theCommittee has already arrived. Amendment agreed to. Mr. :MUNR0 : I desire to call the at- tention of the delegates from Tasmania — the hon. member who suggested the amend- ment, ^Ir. Bird, is not here — to an amend- ment of V. hich I myself do not quite ap- prove. But unless the amendment be moved now, they will be unable to bring it forward subsequently. I refer to the words "so securing to the body itself a perpetual existence.'' It was contended, I understaml, that if tlie.se words were rc- taitied there would be no power of dis- solving the body under any circum.stances. Mr. BuuGESS : It was only an individual opinion ! Mr. GiLMKS : When the bill is brought up it will be quite possible to make an amendment of that kind ! Mr. CUTIIBERT: I should like to know if it is understood by the gentlemen present that the retention of the words "combined with definite responsibility to the electors " will leave it an open question for the com- mittee to say how the senate is to be elected, whether by the electors or by both houses of parliament? Mr. Playford : That will have to be provided for in the bill ! Mr. CUTHBERT : If it be left open to the Committee to deal with the matter, I see no objection to the words ; but if the committee will be bound by them to say that the elections shall be made by the electors of each particular colony, I cer- tainly object to tlicm. I think it should be left to each particular colony to say in vrhat manner the elections for the senate shall take place, and that viev/, I am sure, will be in accordance with the view of the majority of members present. I under- stood that to be the tone of the debate ccenerallv. Mr. Fitzgerald : There is no doubt about that ! Mr. Baker : Let it be left open ! Mr. CUTHBERT : So long as it is left an open question to the committee, and they are not bound hand and foot by these words, I have no objection to tliem. Mr. FITZGERALD : I apprehend that the only object of inserting these words is to declare that the Committee is opposed to nominee houses. The senate may be elected either by the houses of parliament or by the people. In both cases they will be re- sponsible to the electors, and that is all the paragraph says. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : x\s a mem- ber of the Committee, I should interi^ret the word "electors" as being .synonymous with the word " constituents." The words mean, in effect, "a definite responsibility to the constituents" — at least, that is what I understand them to mean. Mr. CuTiiHERT : Might they not mean the parliament? Mr. Deakin : They relate to anything! Sir JOHN DOWNER : I move : That the words "and aiiiciuliiig" he omitted. My object in moving the amendment is with a view to insert afterwards a power of veto in whole or in part. 376 Federal Constitution: [IG JMakcii, 1891.] Resolutions. Mr. Barton : But not a power of in- creasing burdens ! Sir JOHN DOWNER: No; a power of veto simply. ^ Mr. MUNRO : Would it not be well to leave that question in abeyance until we know what the constitution of the senate is to be 1 If we fix the question definitely now, it may have a serious effect upon what we are going to do. I think the resolution should be left as it now stands, with the understanding that the matter will be discussed after the constitution of the senate is determined. That would be the better course to take. The results might be serious if the matter were settled now without our knowing what the consti- tution of the senate is to be. Mr. Fitzgerald : Leaving the words as they are would be a direction to the com- mittee which we do not want to give them. I think the question should be left open. Mr. MUNRO: That is what I am contending for. What I understand the amendment to mean is this : that what- ever the constitution of the senate may be, it will have the power to amend money bills. Sir Joiix Downer : I do not propose that ! Mr. Baker : The hen. member does not say that ; he simply omits the words ! Mr. MUNRO : I understand the reso- lution as it stands to give to the house of representatives the sole right to originate and amend all bills appropriating revenue or imposing taxation. The taking out of the words "and amending" will deprive that house of the sole powers to amend such bills, and will give the power of amending to the other chamber also. That is what it means. Mr. Baker : Not necessarily ! Mr. Gillies : It indicates that ! Mr. MUNRO : If it does not mean that — and I will take the advice of the legal gentlemen of the Convention upon the \Sir John Dov)ner. point — if it does not necessarily mean that, I will sit down, and will not say another word on the subject. If the words do mean what I contend, I think it is imprudent to move the amendment at the present stage, or until we know how the senate is to be elected. Mr. WRIXON : I would ask my hon. frienil, Sir John Downer, not to press the amendment, because there can be no doubt that it raises the whole question. Sir John Downer : Hear, hear ; I in- tend to raise it ! 1\x. WRIXON : I submit that it" would be better to raise such a serious question at a later stage. I have given notice of two resolutions that will raise the whole ques- tion, and which, I think, present what may be a solution of the difficulty. I do not at all despair of a solution, and I should be veiy sorry indeed if hon. mem- bers on either side were to take up such a position as to defy a settlement. But that is a greater reason why the question should not bedecided upon this bare point of omit- ting the words '• and amending." It would really be a direction to the committee before we have gone into the whole question. I think it would be better, therefoi'e, to allow the resolution to pass, and to raise the ques- tion upon the two resolutions of which I have given notice, which may be found to contain a solution of the difficulty. It is too serious a matter to be passed in a hurry. Upon this question, no doubt, de- pends an important feature of the whole movement. Mr. BAKER : Therecanbenodoubtbut that the amendment does raise the whole question ; but I would j^oint out to the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, that he cannot move his two amendments until the words " and amending " are struck out, because if the words are allowed to remain my hon. friend's first proposition is unneces- sary. Therefore, I think it will be con- sistent with the wishes of the hon. mem- Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1891.] liesolutions. ol ber himself if the amendment of Sir John Downer be agreed to. The whole ques- tion can then be raised on the amendments to which the hon. member refers. There can be no doubt whatever that this is the question upon which members of the Con- vention differ, and it is, moreover, a ques- tion which will have to be discussed and decided. Mr. MuxRo : The question as to wliether we are to have federation at all will be settled by the decision of the Committee upon the question raised by the hon. mem- ber's amendment ! Mr. Clark : Do not say that ! Mr. BAKER : I would point out to the Committee that if we strike out the words " and amending ' we do not affirm any- thing at all — we simply refuse to affirm that the senate shall not have the power to amend. We do not come to any posi- tive conclusion ; we come to a negative conclusion, the conclusion being that these words be struck out, thus leaving the mat- ter open for further discussion. Sir J(JHX DO WXER : I may say that the amendment which I shall afterwards propose is not exactly in the form in which it appears as printed. T do not propose that the senate or upper chamber .shall have authority to amend money bills. I only propose to give them what is called a veto in detail. Lefore the hon. member, Mr. Baker, ro.se it occurred to me that the striking out of the words as proposed would not be in the slightest degree incon- sistent with the amendment the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Wrixon, himself proposes, while the retention of them would be incon- sistent. If the amendment of the lion. member, Mr. Wrixon, is to be carried, tlie words ouglit to be struck out. If the clause were to simply stand as amended it might oitcn a fruitful source of conflict between the two liouses by analogy with what has occurred in other colonics, and with what is contained in the Canadian statute as to whether or not, by denying the upper chamber the power of originating money bills, you do not by implication reserve to them the power of amending such bills. But, of course, I did not move that these words be struck out with no in- tention of proposing the insertion of other words. I intended to ask the Committee to insert at the end of the clause the words, " and the senate shall have power to reject in whole or in part any such last- mentioned bills."' Whether the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, or the suggestion made by myself be adopted, the pro[)Osed amendment will be inconsistent with the retention of the words which I have moved should be omitted. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The hon. member, Mi*. Munro, asked what would be the effect of leaving out these words — would it give the senate the power of amendment 1 That raises a very nice question. Most of the conflicts that have occurred between the two houses of legis- lature in Australia have arisen from the use of exactly that form of words — " the sole power of originating all bills appro- priating rev'enue or imposing taxation." Those are the words in the Queensland Constitution. We have always maintained there that notwithstanding the use of those words, with no expressed reference to the powcrof amendment, ourLegislative Coun- cil had no power of amendment, or that if they had the technical posver, they had no right which they should be allowed to ex- ercise. That position we maintained very strongly. The question was finally settled as regards (,)uecn.sland by a decision of the Privy Council, who held — tlioy did not give their reasons — that notwithstanding the use of this form of words the Legis- lative Council had not the right of amend- ing money bills. Proljalily they decided on the ground that the Queensland Con- stitution was framril exactly ujion the analogy of the Englisli Constitution — an 378 Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1891.] Resolutions. elective lower bouse and a nominee upper Lonse. That very likely was the reason ; but as they did not give their reasons, it is not of much use speculating as to the grounds which influenced them. But it is quite certain that in framing a federal constitution wo cannot afford to leave any question of that kind to be fought out between the two houses, or to be referred to the Privy Council. We must make np our minds here what we mean, and say it, so that there shall be no question about it. If we leave in the Avords "and amending," there is nothing further to be said ; there is no room open for any meeting between the two conflicting views expressed during the debate on these re- solutions, and I think it would be a great misfortune if, at this early stage, we were to preclude that possibility by insisting upon the retention of these words. We all agree that only the house of representa- tives should have th.e power of originating money bills. If we approach this sul)ject in a spirit of compromise, as was urged by the President andotherspeakersduring the debate, I am sure that amongst the minds present some means will be found of giving effect to a view that will be satisfactory to all parties. I am sure that is not beyond our efforts if we seriously set ourselves to the work. Various suggestions have al- ready been made. It is difficult to know what will be the one ultimately accepted ; but I counsel lion, gentlemen to allow these words to be omitted at the present time. Let us consider various possible bases. Whether or not we come to the result of absolutely excluding any inter- ference by the senate — and I do not think anybody insists upon the absolute exclu- .sion of interference — we shall be in a posi- tion to frame the conditions, if any, upon which interference may be allowed with what maybe technically termed money bills, although in substance they may be matters affecting great questions of public policy. [Sir Samuel Griffith. Mr. DEAKIN : While cordially agree- ing with the hon. member, 8ir Samuel Griffith, in his last remarks, I would point out that even if the present amendment of the hon. member, Sir John Downer, does not preclude discussion, at any rate, tlie amendment with which he proposes to follow it immediately will absolutely pre- clude discussion. Sir John Downer : That is not before us ! Mr. DEAKIN : That is true, but if the understanding were arrived at that the hon. member, Sir John Downer, would not at this stnge move his amendment, and that my hon. colleague, Mr. Wrixon, should have an opportunity of moving his tv.ro resolutions at the conclusion of this series of resolutions, then we should be prepared to devote the whole of our at- tention to this subject singly, having then disposed of all other questions. If Sir John Downer would agree to forego his second amendment and discuss it in con- nection with the resolutions of tlie hon. member, Mr. Wi'ixon, we could pass the remainder of the resolutions, even with the omission of these words, and consider the whole question upon those two reso- lutions. I suggest this as a simple method of arriving at an issue. Sir JOHN DOWNER : I am, of coui'se, entirely in the hands of the Com- mittee in this matter. If these words are struck out, nothing will remain in the resolution, on the face of it, to which I could refuse my assent, so that it could not be said afterwards that any of us agreed to something to which we did not aii^ree. At the same time, we .shall have to take this discussion at some time or other. The question was cntei'ed into at considerable length in the very interesting debate that took place in the Convention, and I am not sui-e that there will be any material ad- vantage in sending it to a select commit- tee, and then having to thrash it out after- wards. Federal Constitution : [IG March, 1891.] liesolutiGns. 379 Sir Samuel Griffith : No one pro- poses that ! Mr. Deakix : No ; take the discussion of the resolutions of Mr. "NVrixon as soon as we have finished the others ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : I have no ob- jection, if these words are struck out, that the further consideration of the resolu- tion should be postponed until the others are discussed, if that is the sense of the Committee ; but I did not understand that .such was its desire. :\Ir. DEAKIN : If these Avords are struck out, then the resolution, the hon. member says, will contain nothing that he does not agree with, and it may be allowed to pass. Nos. 2 and 3 of these sub-sec- tions may then be dealt with, and we shall be face to face with the resolutions to be proposed by the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, ■which directly raise the question. Then, if Sir John Downer does not agree with those resolutions, he can move an amend- ment, so as to bring the two views — that which he represents and that which Mr. Wrixon represents — directly before the Convention when we have settled every other question. Sir JOHN BRAY : I v.ould point out auotlier view that might be taken. I am one of those who feel that the people's house mu.st liave the ultimate power to ^\^M\ witli money bills. Mr. Bmckr: ^^'hicll is (lio people's hou.se 1 Sir JOHN BRAY : The people's house I take to be the one that represents the pfople. ]\rr. Dkaiux : Directly ! Sir JOHN BRAY : The one which Hk; hon. member, IMr. Baker, desires to call the " council of the states" I should not rail the people's hou^e. The point I take is tills : I do not think Ave shall be able to give the senate the ab.solule power to nmr-nd money bills; at the same time, I think we ought to make some provision such as I suggested when I spoke in the main debate : that is to say, we should pro- vide that no matter shall be included in any money bill — not simply an appropria- tion bill — which the senate shall declare should, in the interests of any one of the colonies or of all of them, be dealt with in a separate measure. That is the view I shall brine; before the Convention at a later .stage. In the meantime I think the Committee should strike out the words "and amendincc." But I think it would be unwise on the part of Sir John Downer to proceed at the present time with the other amendment which he has indicated. The resolutions of the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, do not appear to me to meet the case sufficiently. Sir JOHN DOWNER : What the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, proposes is this : that we should strike out the words " and amending," then pass the resolution as a matter of form, and go on with the other resolutions, and that then the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Wrixon, should move his resolu- tions, to which I should move mine as an amendment. I would ask the hon. mem- ber why should not Mr. Wrixon bring his resolutions forward by way of amendment to mine ? It seems to me that we arc simply asked to postpone a discussion that must inevitably take place, and that wo shall be in no better position to consider the question when we have disposed of the other resolutions than we are at the pre- sent time. I am (]uite in the hands of the Committee ; but it appears to me that it is open to the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, to have his resolutions discussed on the amendment I intend to move, and this can be done now more conveniently than at a later stage. Mr. Deakin : It would not be so con- venient, because in the other case they could be Ijrought in as sfparate resolutions! Sir JOHN DOWNER : For my part, I can .see no difficulty whatevor in putting 3S0 Fedei-al Constitution : [IG March, 1891.] Resolutions. the amendment of Mr. Wrixon. Tlie hon. member can move that certain words be omitted from my amendment with the view of inserting his own. It is more convenient to discuss tliis question at once,, as it arises properly now, than to postpone it. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : A diffi- culty has arisen from the hon. member's connecting the present amendment with another which he intends to move after- wards, and which is not necessarily con- nected with it. No member of the Con- vention will go against any opinion he has expressed by agreeing to the omission of these words. Many hon. members cannot agree to the other amendment which the hon. member wishes to move. It is un- fortunate that the two matters should be mixed up, because the omission of these words is a necessary preliminary to the discussion of the whole matter. Amendment agreed to. Sir JOHN DOWNER : I beg to move : That the resolution be amended by adding the following words: — "The senate to have the power of rejecting in whole or in part any of such last- mentioned bills." Sir HENRY PARKES : I would ap- peal to the hon. member, Sir John Downer, not to press his amendment now. The matter is one of great seriousness, and, if dealt with in this manner, may have an effect which the hon. member does not foresee. I am extremely strong in op- position to the amendment, and for that reason I want to see the matter dealt v/ith with as much deliberation and circumspec- tion as is consistent with economy of time. As this is certainly one of the most vital provisions of the whole intended scheme, we can well afford to think twice before we do anything in the matter. I am extremely anxious for the union of these colonies — I do not think any man living is more anxious^but I am by no means clear that I could set my hand to two houses of parliament having co-equal powers in deal- \Sir John Downer, ing with money bills. I think it Avould lead to the utmost confusion, anarchy, and the disruption of the union sooner oi' later. I should be willing to safeguard the rights of the senate to the fullest extent consis- tent with the maintenance of what ap- pears to be sound principles of govern- ment ; but I do not see how two bodies can have equal power in dealing with mat- ters, which, viewed however they may be viewed, are admitted to be the most vital questions of good civil government. There must be somebody to decide, and the great constitutional struggle in England, as I ob- served the other day, has been to see who shall decide, and they have decided that the people of England as represented in Parlia- ment shall decide. With regard to the equally representative character of these two houses, I am at a loss to conceive how any hon. gen- tleman can calmly reason and come to the conclusion that their representative char- acter will be equal. One will not represent the people at all, except indirectly ; it will represent in fact the states, and we should have to get a good definition of what the meaning of state is before we could say to what extent the members of this senate — or call it what you will — would have a re- J presentative character. I remember read- ing some six years ago, I think, a definition of what constitutes a state by a very illus- trious Oriental scholar and a great judge — the late Sir William Jones. He says that the only thing that can constitute a state are men — high-minded men, who can see their rights, and, having a just concep- tion of them, dare maintain them. It is not acres of area ; it is not any species of property ; it is not towered and orna- mented cities, or even courts or armies, but a free people alone who can constitute a state ; and that is my view of a state. I do not admit that there is any other clement of national growth except an in- telligent population. There can be no other element, and there ought to be no other I Federal ConstiUUion: [IG Mauch, 1891. j Resolutions, 381 element. AVhen we give to South Aus- tralia — aud South Australia, it must be remembered, has been one of the slowest of the colonies, although she has long had responsible government ; from some cause or other, although we have been accus- tomed to regard the social strata of South Australia as better balanced, moi'e happily constructed, than some of the other colo- nies, she has been extremely slow in the progress of the Australian peoples, and she stands now with a very small proportion of our population — I say if Ave are prepared to "ive to South Australia — leaving out of sight the youngest colony, because we cannot deal with her in the same free way as we may fairly deal with the old colo- nies — I, for one, and those who think with me, are prepared to give to South Aus- tralia just the same representation in the senate as we ourselves have. We are quite prepared to give her equal power in the general legislation of the country ; but we say, " Some one authority must decide as to how the people are to be taxed, and as to how the product of the taxes is to be ap- propriated in the interest of the people.' The issue of the great conflict in the mother country has been to leave this vast power exclusively with the representatives of the nation. What I ask for now is, that this discussion may take place, and take {)lace as tlioroughly as i)0ssible. I am raising no objection to any man's view, or to the force of his argument. I jnofer to hear his view fully stated, and liis ai-gu- ment put at its liighest force ; but do not let us decide tlio matter in a hurry. There will be time enough to-morrow, wlion tlio resolutionsof thclion. member, Mr. Wri.xon, of which notice has been given, come on. We .shall tlien know exactly what we arc doing. I appeal to the hon. mcnd>er, Sir John Downer, to let tlm discu.ssion take place on ]\rr. Wrixon's resolutions. Mr. WRIXOX : Quite acquiescing in tvhat the hon. member, Sir Henry Parkes, has said, I should be happy to move as an amendment on the amendment of the hon. member, Sir John Downer, the resolutions of which I have given notice, and that will raise the question at once. The sooner we discuss it, the sooner shall we be likely to arrive at some conclusion. I, therefore, move : That the aniendment be amended by omitting all the words after the first word "The " with a view to insert in their place the following : — ■ ( 1 . ) Tlie senate shall have equal power with the house of representatives in respect to all bills, except money bills, bills dealing with duties of customs and excise, and the annual appropriation bill, and these it shall be en- titled to reject but not to amend. (2.) The act of union s'lall provide that it shall not be lawful to include in the annual ap- propriation bill any matter or thing other than the votes of supply for the ordinary service of the year. I shall not detain the Committee very long. Sir Henry Parkes : The hon. member is not moving the amendment now 1 Mr. WEIXON : Yes, as an amendment on the amendment of the hon. nicmber. Sir John Downer. Sir He\ry Parkes : I think it will be far better to leave it till to-morrow ! Mr. WPtlXON : The question will be before the Committee as an amendment on the amendment of the lion, member, Sir •Tohn Downer. Sir IIe.nkv Parkes : It had fur better be submitted as a new clause ! Mr. WPJXON : Of cour.se if the hon. mciiilier, Sii- Juliii Downer, will witlidraw his amenilment, I shall be happy to with- draw mine. Sir John Downer : Why ? Sir ITeniiv Pahkes; I understood tliat the lion, member. Sir John Downer, had \\\\ li(h';i,\\ii lii ; uiiifnilniciit ! Mr. W i; I XON : If it is the wisli of (lie Committee to deal with the subject l)y ;ui iixlepondcnt resolution, 1 shall be very hnpjiy ; but if it is desired to deal with it now in the form of an amondinont, I am 3S2 Federal Cuiistifution: [16 Maucii, 1891.] llcsolutions. prepai'ed to go on. "We need not decide the matter to-niglit. We can discuss it now, and decide later on. Dr. COCKBUllN : I would remind hon. members that Ave are now in the third week of our sitting, and we have had ample time to consider the issues. The whole issue before us now is whether we shall or shall not have federation. Mr. MuNRO : Tliat is quite true ! Dr. COCKBURN: Unless something in the form of the amendment moved by the hon. member, Sir John Downer, is agreed to, there will be no federation. Mr. MuNRO : And if it is carried there will be no federation ! Dr. COCKBURN : The whole principle of federation is to recognise the co-ordinate power of the population and of the states. There can be no federation if you give all the powers to the popular assembly. Sir Henry Parkes : If the amendment is carried there will only be federation be- tween South Australia and Western Aus- tralia ! Dr. COCKBURX : And if it is not carried there will be no federation at all. Mr. MuNRO : Yes, there will ! Dr. COCKBURN : It is not the spirit of federation to say that the only thing is federation of the people. Sir Hexry Parkes : If the amendment is not carried there will be federation be- tween Xew South Wales, Victoria, Queens- land, and Tasmania. Dr. COCKBURN : That is very ques- tionable. It would have been well if we had discussed a fortnight ago whether we should have federation or unification. It is no use giving representation to the states house if you emasculate that house by placing all power in the other house. That is not federation ; and those who argue that that is what should be done are not arguing in favour of federation, but in favour of unification. But we have been sent here to discuss the question of [J/;-. Wrixon. federation — not the question of unifica- tion ; and unless the amendment of the hon. member. Sir John Downer, or some- thing to the same effect, giving the coun- cil of the states, or call it by what nr.uie you will, some sort of power of veto in detail, as well as in the whole, is carried, you place the whole power of the purse in the house v.hich represents population, and you can have no federation Avhatever. If you give to that house which, irrespec- tive of the boundaries of the states, repre- sents only the people, you establish unifi- cation, and not federation. This question has been thrashed out in general debate, and why postpone it longer 1 If avo have come here to discuss not federation, but unification, then the verdict of this assem- bly will be a negative one, though I hope it will not be so given. I think Ave have come here prepared to draAv up a scheme of federation, in Avhich the essential point is that the house Avhich represents the states shall have some real power — not a mockery of power — and that the whole purse, Avhich is government, shall not bo taken from it. I do not think Ave should any longer refuse to deal with the question. Do not let us be afraid of the issue, Avhich is : Are Ave going for federation or unification t If Ave are to have unification the sooner we get back to our homes the better. Mr. DEAKIN : First of all, I avouI.I say to the lion, member, Dr. Ccckburn, that our mission is to frame an adequate scheme for federation. Dr. CoGKBURN : Not for unification ! Mr. MuNRO : Just to all the colonies ! Mr. DEAKIN : The hon. member, I take it, was not entitled to interpret that phrase in the strict and narrow manner Avhich he has attempted. Speaking for myself, Avhat I, at all events, took as thf meaning of the mandate, Avas that Avliilc the Australasian colonies recognised tlia; they had not yet reached — and probably never Avill reach — a condition in Avhieii Federal Constitution : [10 Maucii, 1891.] Resolutions, 383 tliey desired absolute amalgamation, they tlieir resources developed by means of a had reached a condition in -which they de- customs tariff and a customs union — ou sired a closer union than has hitherto ob- these questions there are no longer state tained. The hon. member, admitting so rights and state interests to be guarded in much, contends that this closer union was the constitution, but the people's interests never on any subject, at any time, or in are one, and they call upon us to deal with any manner, to sink what may be termed them as one. Do wc need to repeat the the individuality of the states; whereas commonplaces of every federation speech at the contention I would maintain would be, every federation gathering, and every fes- that while the colonies declared most dis- tive gathering, for many years, which re- tinctly and with an emphatic voice, which mind us that we are one people, living has found its echo in the first resolution under similar forms of government, that moved by the hon. member, Sir Henry "«"e speak the same language, and that we Parke.s, that they would not part with have the same general interests, bearing their powers of local self-government on sway quite as much in one part of Aus- ali matters with which local self-govern- tralia as in another 1 Are we to say that ment was competent to deal. But they while we are here for union, and to declare were prepared to part with their powers for union, we shall never have more union in relation to certain sul)jects on which than can be obtained by the maintenance they believed tliat the interests of each of our separate state rights in every particu- were tlie interests of all, and that the in- lar ; so that it shall not be possible for the terests of all were the interests of each. union to deal with any question, except by They believed that on certain special sub- means of the states, and through the states jects there were no longer two interests — of wliich that union is composed 1 By the that there were no longer state interests, resolutions that is not intended. Is it but only national interests. They believed to be contended that union upon these that on those special subjects it would be particular subjects, within this narrow possiljle to safeguard all state interests, Held, as it may be termed when compared and to commit to a new parliament, to be with the broad field of general legislation, entitled the federal parliament, the power is not to be consummated, and that wc aro of dealing with particular subjects within here to draw uj) proposals for a constitu- certain linos, as tlic people were in reality tion which shall not only retain the state on tliosc subjects one people with one rights, but retain them in an absolute destiny and one interest. The argument supremacy? AVe may feel perfectly certain which I liavc endeavoured to maintain from the outset that such preservation of from the beginning of this debate has been conflicting authorities cannot work satis- that, while there are certain state rights factorily to the people of the country, to be guarded, most of those rights, if not Arc we now, in the very inception of our all of tliem, can be guarded by the division undertaking, to endeavour to create on tho of powers Ijetwefu the central government one side an irresistiljln force, and on tho and the local goverriment.s. Tho states will other side an immovabln object ? Arc wo retain full powers over the greater part of to place within the popular hou.se, with all thcdonuiin in whicli they at present enjoy tlic authority wliich attaches to those who those powers, and will retain thorn intact directly represent the people, responsible for all time. But in national issues, on ministers, who are to hold their seats only the subject of defence, as people who desire so long as they can justify their actions to to have their shores defended, and to sec that chamber? 384 Federal Constitution : [IG March, 1891.] Resolutions. Mr. Playford : The hon. member, Sir John Downer, does not propose that ! Mr. Baker : You are assuming that we are going to have responsible government ! Mr. DEAKIN : The request of the hon. member, Mr. Munro, that these questions should be settled first, so that we might approach the proposal of the hon. member, Mr. "SVi'ixon — knowing exactly what the senate was to be, and what the form of government was to be- — -was refused ; and although I admit that it is not settled yet, I am prepared to argue as if these contingencies were admitted, because tlaey are at least most probable. The resolutions of the hon. member. Sir Henry Parkes, propose to adopt responsible government ; and it is natural to assume, for the pur- poses of argument, that they will be ac- cepted until they have been rejected. There- fore, if we are to create a house, with all the traditions, so far as responsible govern- ment and its authority is concerned, of the representative chambers which exist in these colonies and the mother country, and are then to introduce on the other side, clothed with equal power, a body entirely foreign to the British Constitution, and to which there is no sufficient parallel in the Australian colonies, we shall be creating at the outset certain conflict and inevitable deadlock. Sir Samuel Griffith : Why ? Mr. DEAKIN : I will tell the hon. gentleman why. The popular chamber receives, or believes it receives, a man- date from the electors to carry a certain measure, which we will suppose affects finance ; or it may be an ordinary mea- sure, but we will take it to be a finan- cial measure. It is carried in that chamber by a large majority ; it is sent to the upper chamber, which, Ave will take it, for the purpose of argument, does not represent the people directly, however much it may represent them indirectly. The second chamber rejects the measure. The popular [3/r. Deakin. chamber, through its government, passes the measure for the second time, and the upper house rejects it a second time. The government advises his Excellency to dis- solve the pop>ular chamber, in order that they may appeal to their constituents. They appeal to their constituents ; they come back with a renewed mandate, given perhaps with stronger A'oice than before, directing them to pass the measure. They cannot pass it. They can never pass it, because the senate may always stand in the way. Mr. McMillan : How could that affect a money bill 1 Sir Samuel Griffith : Or any other bill! Mr. DEAKIN : They come back with a stronger mandate than ever from the country to carry the proposal into law, and the second house rejects it again and again. Mr. CuTiiBERT : But would they do that? Mr. DEAKIN : Well, if you will make a provision to the effect that they shall not be able to do it, if hon. members will propose a means by which we shall see an issue to the conflict, we shall be proceed- ing on proper lines, and we shall have something to assist us. But as the resolu- tion at present stands we are to create a second chamber which may defy, for all time, the will of the people of the country. Mr. Clark : Nobody wants that ! Mr. DEAKIN : I hope nobody does want it. Mr. Barton : Cannot you make your check apply to all bills as well as money bills 1 An Hon. Member : A body without any power ! Mr. DEAKIN : Hon. members are surely guilty of a fault which they would be only too ready to attribute to myself, when I say that this interjection is remark- ably extreme. To say that the chamber which you are perfectly willing lo endow Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1S91.] Besolutions. 385 As'ith the power of rejecting a measure, or, if it be anything but a monetary measure, of amending it at need, of negativing for some years the direct mandate of the popu- h^r chamber, and that you only require own protection must also be conceded to them. What I contend is, that it is not necessary, in order to obtain the adequate protection of all state rights, in order to secure absolute justice to all the smaller them to cease to oppose the popular will colonies, to endow the upper house with when that will has been definitely and the power to amend money bills, or to pro- deliberately declared, — if you say that is nounce an absolute veto on all bills. There not endowing them with power, then I say are numbers of gentlemen present suffi- there is not a representative chamber in ciently experienced in constitutional go- the world which possesses any power. It vernment to be able to devise a means by is only in a chamber like that of the United which the wishes of the senate, as repre- States Senate of America, which stands so senting the states, should be given all the far above the reach of popular opinion effect which can possibly be given to them, expre.s.sed through the ordinary channels, without bringing the constitution to dis- that such a course of conduct is possible ruption. It is perfectly possible to endow without a revolution. And why is it pos- that chamber with the power of revision sible ? It is possible, because the executive and review, to place them in such relation in that case is separated from the legisla- ture ; because the executive is independent of the two chambers, and because the people look to the executive to carry out their will as far as administration is concerned. But in the constitution we are about to with their constituents that they may be in time of conflict sent back to them, who- ever they may be, in order to receive from them a fresh and further direction. It may be possible to propose half a dozen schemes, with none of which I will at propose the executive will be mainly in the present delay the Committee. It ought popular chamber of the legislature, and to be possible to propose one which should bound to obey the directions of that cham- ber. Therefore, you will have the popular chamber, guided by its government, and supported by the great majority of the people of this country, entering into a con- flict with tiiat house which you propose to make the guardian of state right.s. I say that those wlio arc taking this course, be- lieving they are conserving state riglits My hon. co-delegates from Victoria havt and conserving the union, are, to my mind, been accused of introducing into this cham- be acceptable to all reasonable men, which should endow the senate, or states house, witli all the powers with which a second chamber can bo endowed, without bring- ing the progress of legislation absolutely to a standstill — that is to say, without render- ing it, not only possible, but probable, that legislation wiil be brought to a standstill. under a most serious misapprehension. I can conceive nothing more antagonistic to tlie continuance and i^jaintcnance of union than to .set the l^ulk of the pojtula- ition, their rcpre.sentatives in Parliament, and their responsible government, in per- petual conflict with an upper liou.'^o sup- bcr tlic party conflicts that have been waged in that colony ; but we should have been fal.sf! to our oliligations, not only to our own colony, but also to this Convention, if we had not warned lion, nienibens of the rocks upon whi(;h we have been nearly ship- wrecked. ^\■|lat we say is tliat to endow posed to represent the .states. I say that the an upper house with these excei)tional privi- equal representation which the .states de- leges and powers, and to provide no means Diand must be conceded to them, that thf; for a solution of their difliculties with the power wliich the states require for their jiopular chamber, is to invite contention 2 B 386 Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1891.] Resolutions, and prolong deadlocks. We say at the same lime tliat it should be possible to constitute an upper house so intimately in relation with public opinion and composed of men so highly qualified that it should exercise a veiy large and salutary power indeed in controlling legislation, and in controlling even the executive government. We say that all this is possible, and we admit that all this should be done ; but what we do say is that this bald proposition of the hon. and learned member, Sir John Downer, commits us to the other extreme — to the absolute veto, to the equal control of money bills, which will lead to twofold discussion of the estimates in the second chamber — which will lead to the discussion of the minutest points of the administra- tion of the executive government in a cham- ber to which that government is only in- directly responsible. If you are about to make this change you should go further. You should either not make this change, which is out of harmony with our existing institutions, and cannot be brought into harmony with a constitution in which there is responsible government rooted in a popu- lar chamber ; but if you do take this step, you should at once, and boldly, adopt bodily those foreign constitutions to which you have gone for precedents. If you want the Swiss Constitution, take the Swiss Consti- tution ; if you want the American Consti- tution, take the American Constitution ; but do not attempt to mix them with the British Constitution. ]\rr. Baker : Why cannot we have an Australian constitution ? Mr. DE AKIN : I have not the slightest objection to having an Australian constitu- tion ; but an Australian constitution that was begun by setting aside the political experience of the civilised world would have a poor chance of doing any good. Any constitution that is built up must be built on the experience gained of other constitu- tions in other parts of the world. [J/r. Deakin. Mr. Barton : To what experience of federal constitutions is the hon. member appealing 1 Mr. DEAKIN : I am appealing in the first instance to the fact that there are radical distinctions between the American Constitution and those of these colonies. The radical differences are, that in America the executive is separated from the legis- lature ; that the two chambers and the ex- ecutive work all three independently ; that, altliougli the whole three are often, if not at war, entirely at issue, there is provision for carrying on the government notwith- standing. There is no such provision in the constitution which is sketched here. Here your responsible government is to be made responsible to the representative chamber. Mr. Baker : We have not agreed to re- sponsible government yet ! | ]\Ir. DEAKIN : It is in this sketch ; and if hon. members depart from the sketch let them do so on rational grounds. If they are about to take a new constitution, let them take one of which we have some experience, and not a hybrid — something from the Swiss, something from the British, and something from our own. They are taking irreconcilable elements that cannot be made to work in harmony. If hon. members desire to adopt the Swiss Constitution, let them adopt it. There they have no dissolution of the popular chamber, the government is elected from the two chambers, and the system forms a consistent whole. It may be worthy the consideration of the Convention whether we should or should not adopt that con- sistent whole. It may be worthy of con- sideration whether we should not adopt the American Constitution with perhaps a little amendment. But what I wish to sav, in answer to the hon. and learned member, Mr. Barton, is that to introduce the American Senate into the British Con- stitution is to destroy both. Mr. Baker : It is not proposed ! Federal Constitution: [16 March, 1891. J Resolutions. 387 Mr. DEAKIX : There would be an in- evitable conflict. Either the responsible government and the popular chamber must rule, as in most English-speaking coun- tries, or the senate of state nominees must rule, as the senate, in most respects, prac- tically rules in the American republic. "We should beware of combining irrecon- cilable elements, and should not seek to import into this British Constitution a por- tion of another constitution, and expect it to work smoothly. Our experience teaches us that the dangers which we have run in the past have arisen entii-ely from the fact that we have created upper houses that claimed more authority than ■was their due, and have endeavoured to exercise it. The propositions which my hon. colleague has submitted are not pro- positions which any hon. member can honestly say take away too much from the senate of this country. Hon'. Members : Oh, oh ! Mr. DEAKIN : They propose that the senate shall have equal power with the house of representatives in respect of all bills, except money bills, so that in every other matter that comes before the senate it stands as well equipped for dealing with legislation as does the popular chamber. There should be a tribunal to which it would not be toodiflicult to appeal in case of differences between the two houses on those measures ; but, allowing that to pass, my hon. colleague excepts from the con- trol of the senate money bills, bills deal- ing with customs and excise, and the annual appropriation bill. He does not aay these may not be rejected, but ho says that they must not be amended ; he believes that the second chamber should only exercise its power with regard to money bills in such extreme cases as those in which it will be prepared to reject the whole proposal put before it, but should not meddle with the financial affairs of the country by entering into the details of those proposals. The 2nd resolution says : The act of union shall provide that it shall not be lawful to include in the annual appropri- ation bill any matter or thing other than the votes of supply for the ordinary service of the year. What this means is that every money bill which may be a bill involving a question of policy shall come to the second chamber independently, and the second chamber shall, if it please, be entitled to reject that measure, to challenge the opinion of the country upon it, and to say that until the opinion of the country is pronounced, that measui-e shall not pass into law. Are not these large and sufficient powers 1 Mr. Adye Douglas : No ! Mr. DEAKIN : If not, show us how we may broaden them without taking the perilous leap to the other side of the stream, proposed by the hon. and learned member, Sir John Downer. Surely there is some via media between the gift of these excessive powers and that of powers which should be sufficient, without making the senate equal with the house of repre- sentatives by clothing it with the same authority, although it has not the same mode of election, nor the same constitu- ents at its back. Surely there is some via media to be found. Because we think the upper houses in our own states do not possess sufficient powers — that the new senate .should possess more powers than the upper houses of our present states possess — and because we believe that state rights ought to bo protected : surely we will not go to the other extreme, and say that the senates are to be all in all, and the majority of the population, no matter how great, is to be capable of being ignored on all questions of policy and the smallest detail on the annual estimates of the year. Mr. Baker : No one proposes such an absurdity ! Mr. DEAKIN : It could be done. What we ask the hon. member, who says 388 Federal Constitution : [IG March, 1891.] liesolutions. that it is an absurdity, is to join -svitli us in drawing a constitution that shall pre- vent that absurdity. He cannot deny that the amendment proposed by the hon. and learned member, Sir John Downer, admits of the possibility — I say it admits of the probability, if not the certainty — of that absurdity. I believe we are all at one in the object we seek to gain, which is the efficient protection of state rights, and surely they can be efficiently protected without allowing the senate to enter into the consideration of every .£10 which it may be proposed to spend on a post-office or every £5 increase of salary proposed to be given to a civil servant. Surely there are a number of questions which can be dealt with by the popular chamber without trenching; on state rights. AVill the hon. members who consider that these proposals . of the hon. and learned member, Mr. "Wrixon, do not give sufficient power to the second chamber join ns in endeavour- ing to frame a constitution which shall give them sufficient, but not absolute power — which shall say, as the hon. mem- ber, Sir John Bray, said in his most care- fully reasoned-out speech, that, " In the last resort, and after the fullest considera- tion and delay, the will of the majority must rule"? Will thev admit that cai-dinal principle 1 Mr. Baker : We have always admitted that! Mr. DEAKIN : AYell, if hon. members admit it, will they take care to provide for it, because it is indisputable on the face of it that the proposal of the hon. mem- ber, Sir John Downer, allows the minority to rule in everything, if they please. We all know that minoritie-s, as well as majori- ties, will be composed of reasonable men, and that what I suggest is not likely to take place frequently : but it is not our province, as the hon. member, Mr. Gordon, said, to rely too much on good-feeling without other guarantees. We must draw [J/r. DeaJcin. a constitution that is fair upon the face of it, and to be fair on the face of it it must provide against any abuse of authority by a minority. If the hon. member. Sir John Downer, will join us in providing against the abuse of power by a minority I believe he will find every member of the Conven- tion with him. Let him give the states all just power, but let him for once protect the nation. Let us not frame a scheme of government expressly designed to pro- vide for the rule of the minority, instead of that of the majority. If we are all agreed on that principle we can soon arrive at an agreement ; but in its present foi'm it is certain that Sir John Downer's proposal goes too far. Let us see if we cannot find a means of protecting state rights, and the rights of the majoritiy of the nation at the same time. Mr. Mc^MILLAN : I think most hon. members will agree with me that the atmosphere which has predominated here since the beginning of our business has been an atmosphere of compromise — com- pi'omise, as long as we do not give up any .j vital principle. It seems to me that we ought, instead of getting into the absolute corner indicated by some members at the present time, to try and go, step by step, and see whether there is a possibility of agreeing, and whether, even if with our apparent disagreements upon prin- ciple, there may not be some machinery that can be adopted, say, in a select com- mittee, which may practically bring about what members on both sides of the ques- tion require. I find a little ambiguity in the amendments of the hon. member, ]\Ir. Wrixon. I should be willing to allow the first amendment to go to a select commit- tee with one alteration. It reads : The senate shall have er[iial power with the house of representatives in respect to all bills, j except money bills, bills dealing with duties of i customs and excise, and the annual appropria- tion bill, and these it shall be entitled to reject but not to amend. Federal Constitution: [16 March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 389 I slioulcl be willing to leave out money bills, and make it read thus : The senate shall have equal power with the house of representatives in respect to all bills except bills dealing with duties of customs and excise. Mr. Deakin : Leaving out the annual appropriation bill ? Mr. McMILLAX : It depends upon what the appropriation bill is. To show my meaning I will read the next section : The act of union shall provide that it shall not be lawful to include in the annual appropri- ition bill any matter or thing other than the rotes of supply for the ordinaiy service of the ^'ear. But that does not do away with the ques- tion as to Avhat money bills are. Further- more, in your annual appropriation bill, be- sides dealing with the amount of revenue at ^our command — supposing certain changes :ook place in the constitution — you might ileal with a larger amount than you had at j^our command, thus leading up to a further i:)olicy, which might be a fair ground for de- bate in the upperhouse. I do not think that fion. members who represent the smaller states would for a moment attempt to in- terfere with the ordinary appropriation bill >f tlie year — that is the bill covering the mlaries of clerk.s, and other necessaries for carrying on the government of the country, riiit I say, in spite of the opinion of my Lion, friend at the head of the Government jf New South Wales, from whom I am sorry to difTer, that when we give to the people's house — first, the power of origin- ating, which is a gi-eat power in itself ; and secondly, the jiowor of dealing with the ordinary finances of the year, we put them in a very superior jtosition, and it seems to me that it would be a very cum- bersome piece of machinery if, whilst the upper liou.se had the right to reject certain nils, it could not by any possibility sug- ;est an alteration in a bill. 8u]ipose a lystem of taxation were introduced which would affect all the states connected with the federation ; suppose any large question were introduced which involved money mat- ters, surely it might be fair on the part of the senate to say, " At any rate, your taxa- tion shall be less," even if it should not say that it should be more, w-ithout going through the indignity of having to veto a bill altogether, or having it thrown aside in the lower house and then sent back, causing a certain amount of irritation. Surelv there ought to be some mode of deal- ing with this class of money bills outside the ordinary appropriation bill. I am anxious that the discussion now should re- fer only to the ordinary appropriations for the year, leaving it to the finance commit- tee to thrash out the question whether some machinery could not be employed to do away with the friction between the two houses. As far as the argument of the lion, member, Mr. Deakin, is concerned, that applies to every bill, and the only way of ending disputes of that kind is by the exercise of common-sense on the part of individuals. I do most earnestly press upon the hon. gentlemen from Victoria, and also upon my colleague, Sir Henry Parkes, the necessity of not drawing too strict an analogy between the position of the House of Commons in contra-distinc- tion to the king and the House of Lords, in its historical episodes, and the position of a house of representatives or an assembly in contra-distinction to a state senate with the bicameral principle in a chamber not made uj) of nonentities or accidents, but a chamber imlircctly responsible to the people. Mr. MUNRO : I do not know whetlier there is intended to be any coinpronii.se on the present occasion. H there is wo had better understand it, and know where wo are. I feel that if there is to be no com- promise there must be a dissolution. There mu.st be an absolute break up if there is no comj)romi.se. We received no mandate 390 Federal Comtitution : [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions, from our Parliament to come here with the view of enabling the minority of the people of the colonies to ride rough-shod over two-thirds of the population. It is necessary to go into figures. The colonies of New South Wales and Victoria contain 2,250,000 of population. Leaving out New Zealand, which has about 600,000, the other colonies combined have about 900,000. And the proposal is that Victoria and New South Wales shall have two votes in regard to the finances, and that the other colonies shall have four votes — so that in dealing with finances, 900,000 people shall have twice the voting power of 2,250,000 people. An Hon. Member : You are forgetting the assembly ! Mr. MUNE.0 : If the senate has this power to prevent a bill from becoming law, it is the master of the situation. It does not matter what power the assembly has, if it has not the power to carry its wdll into law. I am sure that we are acting very liberally towards the smaller colonies when we say that in the senate with regard to ordinary legislation, in connec- tion with which great injury can be done to the people, the colony of New South Wales, with its population of 1,120,000, shall be on an equal footing with Western Australia, with its population of 45,000. It is an enormous concession. But at the same time, you say these 45,000 persons shall be at liberty to join with the 150,000 persons in Tasmania, and have double the voting power of New South Wales on the question of taxing the whole people of these colonies. Such a monstrous propo- sition as that was never before submitted to a free people. The proposition at the present time is that Tasmania and Western Australia, with less than 200,000 people, shall have double the voting power of New South Wales, with its population of 1,120,000 pensons. Mr. McMillan : No ! [J/r. Munro. Mr. MUNRO : That is the proposition. Sir Henry Parkes : Hear, hear ! Mr. MUNRO : And if you call it just or equitable, I call it by another name. Mr. McMillan : The hon. member for- gets the strength of the lower house ! Mr. MUNRO : It does not matter what the strength of the lower house is if the upper house has power to veto it. ^ Mr. McMillan : They have power to veto it now ! Mr. MUNRO : I did not interrupt the hon. member in his speech, and I think we should get on better if there were not so many interruptions. Mr. McMillan : I apologise, Mr. MUNRO : We will take this state of affairs : supposing a proposal is made by the ministry of the day, supported by the lower house, containing the repre- sentatives of all the colonies, to raise £8,000,000 by taxation through the cus- toms, and a minority of the people equal to 900,000 says, " No ; we shall not allow you to tax in that direction." Well, you are compelled to get the money, and, there- foi'e, you must tax in another direction^ What is that but giving them power to tax the people ? I do not care in what form you put it, so long as you allow them to amend in detail you put into their hands power to say what the taxation of the people shall be ; and the result will be, as I said be- fore, that the minority of the people will have power to tax the majority. I, for one, have "received no such authority from the parliament of which I am a member. I have received no authority to come here and agree that the people of the larger colonies shall be taxed by the votes of the smaller colonies, who will pay about only a third of the amount. Dr. CocKBURN : Not necessarily. Sup- pose the tax is on land ; you have no land to tax in Victoria, whereas we have 3,000,000 acres ! Federal Constitution: [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 391 Mr. MUNRO : The hon. member need not try to draw a red herring across the path. The hon. member knows that we have already passed a resolution which prevents the federal government from touching the land. Hex. Members : No I Mr. MUNRO : But we have. Hon. Members : Where 1 Mr. MUNRO : Have you among these proposals any proposal that authorises the federal government to tax the lands of the colonies ? I say if you propose any scheme of that sort I, for one, will oppose it, be- cause I do not believe that the federal go- vernment ought to have the right to tax the land, Mr. Fitzgerald: They will have full power of taxation ! Mr. MUNRO : They will not. If the hon. member has read the Constitution of Canada he knows that the Dominion Senate has no such power. The constitu- tion prevents them from having any such power, and I do not think we ought to give that power. I think we ouglit, and I, for one, want to limit the power of the federal parliament to a certain cla.ss of taxation, and not to allow them to intrude upon the various colon ifs and take away their means of taxation. I do notthink that is intended; I do not think it oujrht to be done. I am as anxious as any hon. member to preserve state rights. I want federation only for i)urposes which we cannot carry on as well separately as we can combined. Although I came to New South Wale.s most entliusia.stically in favour of federation, I am not going to sacriBce the interests of the community ' ven for federation, and if tlii.s Conven- tion is not prepared to act fairly and justly to the whole community then we had better remain as we are. Mr. Adve Douglas : Much better ! Mr. MUNRO : Because if we are to form a constitution which, when it is ex- amined into by the people of the various colonies, will not be accepted, we may as well say now we cannot accept it. We may as well at this stage say, " Oh, you are goinor to form a constitution which will be unjust to the majority of the people ; we may as well stop atonce and go no further." We have here an example of what will hap- pen under the new constitution ; we have here the representatives of the minor colo- nies joined together, with one or two ex- ceptions, against the representatives of the larger colonies — Hex. Members : No ! Mr. MUNRO : That is what is being done. Mr. Adye Douglas: Look at New South AVales ! Mr. Burgess : Look at Victoria ! Mr. McMillax : Look at the members for your own colony ! Mr. MUNRO : Yes ; the members of the Legislative Council. I know what that means. We have experienced already the state of things which you are asking us to experience again. We are here, as well as in Victoria, the guardians of the rights of the people, and we are prepared to stand by them against every senate or legislative council. If you find the members of the le'M.slative councils of New South Wales and Victoria going against the interests of the community that is not our business. It is our duty to protect the people. You have here, I say, an instance of what will ha|tpen if you give this power to the senate. You would have the minor colo- nics joining together and im[»osing taxa- tion on the larger colonies, for government must he carried on ; and if the ministry of the day cannot get a penny in one direc- tion, and they are forced to go in another direction, then the minority rules. That is a thing to which we cannot con.sent. I )92 Federal Constitution: [16 March, 1891.] Resolntio7is. am quite as -svilling as any man to assist in taking stops to protect the smaller colonies, or the less populous colonies, from any injury being clone to them by the majority ; but at the same time I will not S.0 in the other direction and allow the smaller colonies to ride roughshod over the larger colonies. The best thing we can do is not to pass any resolution now ; but to see how far we are prepared to meet each other. We are quite prepared — and I said so from the commencement — if you can show us an instance of injustice to the smaller colonies, to remove that in- justice. But when we come forward and say we are prepared to give the same re- presentation in the senate for 45,000 pei-- sons as for 1,120,000 persons, surely you cannot charge us with unfairness. Surely we are acting as liberally as we can be ex- pected to act. But when you ask us to allow the smaller colonies to join together and defeat the larger colonies you are going too far. I think you ought to halt and consider the situation. If you are pre- pared to deal fairly with us we are en- thusiastically in favour of federation ; but we are not prepared to sacrifice the in- terests of the community for the sake of federation. Sir JOHN" BBAY : I think we are all extremely desirous of doing what is fair to Victoria and New South Wales, and if the wish to be dealt fairly with is the only thing which stands in the way of my lion, friend, Mr. Munro, I am quite sure that we shall be glad to meet liim. But this is too important a question to be decided off- hand in this v.-ay. I quite agree with the susfsestion that the amendment to strike outthe words "and amending" having been carried, the other might fairly be left to the Committee, who probably will be able in some way to meet the difficulty ; for there is not the lea.st doubt that it is a difficulty. On the one hand, we have those who say that the senate should hare power to \_Mi: Munro. amend all bills ; while on the other hand we have those who as strongly contend that it should not have that power. I would point out that the hon. member, Sir Henry Parkes, simply defines in the i^esolutiou tlic povv'cr of the senate in reference to bills imposing taxation and appropriating revenue. But the hon. member, Mr Wrixon, goes a good deal beyond that, and includes all money bills, and most of us know that a large number of bills come under the category of money bills. We may depend upon it that no form of feder- ation for Australia will be permanently successful unless it provides for the rights of the people. I quite agree with the hon. member, Mr. Munro, that inasmuch as Victoria and New South Wales contain two-thirds of the population of Australia, the people of those colonies will have to pay something like two-thirds of the taxa- tion, and it only stands to reason, as re- gards the manner in which they shall pay it, and the items on which it shall be paid, that their voice must prevail, and as popu- lation increases in other parts of Australia no doubt the division will be more equal. But I take it — speaking from my point of view — that we do not want the senate to determine the exact items that shall be subject to taxation ; we do not— at least, I do not, and I do not think any one seri- ously wants — the senate to determine the exact amount that shall be paid to each officer of the federal government. But we ask that they shall have the general right to say that no form of taxation, that no form of raising revenue, detrimental to the interests of any one or more of the colonies shall be carried. Although the suggestion I made the other day was per- liaps an imperfect one, yet I believe the Committee mi2;lit be able to thiash some- thin" out of it. I do not move it now But I feel the difficulty of getting the Convention to agree to many of these pro- posals until we have them definitely before Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1891.] Eesolutions. 393 us, and Tsee what effect they will have iu counection with other parts of the consti- tution that will have, at the same time, to be considered. My suggestion is in these terms : Provided that no matter shall be iucluded in any money bill which the senate shall by resolu- tion declare should, in the interests of the colonies, or any of them, be dealt [with]" in [a separate measure. And in case the senate shall pass such a resolution vrith reference to any matter included in any money bill such bill shall be returned with a message to the other house and such bill shall thereupon be laid aside. That would be with a view to ensure the bringing in of one or more bills to deal with certain subjects if the senate thought fit. I would ask hon. members, however, to postpone their amendments now, to allow the resolution to pass in its present shape, giving to the house of representa- tives alone the power to originate bills im- posing taxation or appropriating revenue. J. think that after the discussion that has taken place, the Committee who will be intrusted with the duty of framing reso- lutions will see that it is necessary to provide some middle course between those who advocate the giving of full powers to the senate and those who advocate the giving to them of restricted powers. But 1 do .say to hon. members who have come here to discliarge an undoubtedly diflicult task, that, although we may ultimatily bo unable to agree upon important details, we ought not to rusli too rapidly to the point when thesefeaturcsmeetus. Let us rather see whetheritisnot possible, without citlni- sidogivingup the entire point in (lis{)ute, to take some middle course that will protect the interests of the people of th'iicolony or colonies. Mr. IjAKEH : I feel as niucli as does any member of tlie Convention the gravity of the situation, and I venture to suggest that we might do well to consider the course adopted by the Philadelpliian Con- vention when a similar sot of circumstances arose. When in that convention of great men, the members came to antagonism on, I think, the very point we ai'e are now considering, and were equally divided, the whole convention being on the point of breaking np, the difficulty was met by the appointment of a committee of com- promise consisting of one delegate from each state, whose duty it Avas to bring up some scheme which would endeavour to reconcile the antagonisms of the two par- ties. AYould it not be a good thing for us to take that step now 1 Let one dele- gate from each colony be appointed to a committee to consider the matter, and let us see if they are not able to frame some scheme, or to come to some agreement or a settlement of the difficulty. I merely throw out this suggestion. I do not know whether it will commend itself to the older and more experienced members of the Con- vention. I do not move any amendment, or make any motion on the subject ; but I hope that the suggestion I thi'ow out will meet with the approval of the Convention. I would suggest that if any such course were adopted, it would be well to appoint the delegates by ballot. Sir THOMAS McILWRAITII : The Premier of Victoria says that he has a mandate from his constituents, and that lie cannot go beyond it. Mr. MuNKO : No; I said from the Par- liament ! Sir THOMAS McILWRAITII: Well, from the Parliament. If that mandate be expressed in tin; speech the hon. member delivered to-day, I think there is a very dismal prospect so far as the federation of these colonics is concerned ; becau.se, if the hon. member lays down such straight lines, if he persists in saying that he will not stand such and such a thing, and others, perhaps a majority of the Conven- tion, were to take exactly the same stand, a compromi.se wouM be impossible. ]\Ir. JNIu.VRO : I oflcred a compromise ! 394 Federal Constitution: [16 Marcu, 1891.J Resolutions. Sir THOMAS McILWRAITII : A com- promise has been made since the Conven- tion mot, because Sir Henry Parkes, in the propositions he put before us, took the whole power of initiating and amending money bills out of the hands of the senate, and put them exclusively in the hands of the house of representatives. The hon. member's colleague made a most graceful concession, which I thought would have concluded the whole matter so far as the representatives from New South Wales were concerned, when he told us distinctly that he beliBved in taking away from the senate power of initiating money bills, and that he would be perfectly satisfied with that concession. I myself would be perfectly sat- isfied with it. I think it is going about as far as we can go. But what does the hon. member, Mr. Munro, ask us to do 1 We had betternotfurtherpostponetheconsideration of this question. Let us understand what we mean. If it be the fact, perhaps it is better that we should know it at once — that in the present state of feeling through- out the colonies, as expressed by delegates, federation is impossible. Let us know what is meant. The hon, member, Mr. Munro, has strongly put his point of view as a Victorian delegate — let me put my point of view as a representative of one of the smaller colonies. I was invited to come here by the Premier of Victoria. I was not invited as a representative of a small colony which had only a population of 400,000. I was invited as one of six delegates to come iiere to meet delegates in the same number from every colony in the group. If I had been asked to come down on any other terms I should not have come, and I think no other colony would have re- sponded to the invitation — and why 1 Be- cause at the present time each colony has entirely within itself the power of legisla- tion, and if it is to give up that power it must obtain something in exchange for it. With regard to the tariff, Mr. Munro coolly [Sir Thomas Mcllwraith. proposes that we should hand over the whole consideration of that subject finally to a majority of the gross population, to a chamber in which we should be represented, not as a state, but in proportion to our population. So far as this matter of tariff is concerned, we are at the present time in this happy position : that we can ourselves make a tariff as we like, and unless we can see some advantage in federation — federation involving the giving up of that right — we will not come into the federation at all. That is the position we take up. Having come to this Convention, we feel that we ought to obtain something in ex- change for the power we are asked to sur- render, and we could not be present on any other terms. Now, the hon. member, and, in fact, all the Victorian representatives, have persistently told us only one thing — that federation is a means to the expan- sion of the big Victorian Government. "Just let it expand," say they, "until it covers the whole of Australia." The idea of Sir Henry Parkes is pretty much the same, only his starting point is from Sydney, and the Government of his colony is also in its turn to cover the whole of the continent. We do not want that. We do not want to come in on the basis of population. AVe in Queensland have de- finite views of our destiny as a nation — as a part of a federation — not indepen- dently of it. I do not believe with one hon. gentleman that we should not take pride in our different colonies. I think we should all consider our interests as Aus- tralians. But in spite of all that is said, I take pride in being a Queenslander, and I shall endeavour persistently to for- ward her interests so long as I am identi- fied with the country. When I see that her interests are about to be sacrificed, and to be put under the heel of the Victorian big majoi-ity, I shall decline to come into a federation. Mr. MuxRO : So will we ! Federal Constitution : [16 March, 1891.] ResohUions. 395 Sir JoHX Bray : Let us see whether there is not some middle course ! Sir THOMAS McILWEAITH : The middle course of the hon. member is, I be- lieve, to postpone the question to the popu- lar majority. I do not believe in postpon- ing it to the popular majority at all. What I have advocated has been the equal power of the two houses, because both of them represent the whole population, and each ought equally to be considered. The ques- tion had not arisen from the point of view now mentioned by the Victorian delegates. It has never come before us in the way in which it comes before us now. Those who brought the matter before us in our invita- tion to come here requested that we should meet together upon some common ground upon which each state should rank as a unit. We have met them on those terms, and are perfectly prepared to carry out those terms. But we must insist upon our right to an equal representation on the ground on which we came in, namely, that we should have exactly the same power as the great colony of Victoria, and that, as part of the whole nation, we should have equal repre.sentation in the upper chamber. It is useless to bring in the population argu- ment, and say that because Victoria has a population of 1,100,000 as against Queens- land with a population of 400,000 or 500,000, therefore Victoria should have larger representation in the .senate. That would be all very well if you carried out the idea of a big national government that would spread out from Victoria and cover the whole land. But that is not what we are going to have, and the point is con- ceded by those who brouglit us together by the fact that tl)ey allow equal powers to the .senate in everything except money bills. Why is this ? There arc a great many matters of considerable importance besides money bills in regard to which the power of the senate ought to be circum- scribed if it is logical to circumscribe their power in relation to money bills. Why are these other powers given when the power to deal with money bills is denied ? What are the reasons advanced 1 Every reason given has been one that has applied to the peculiar relationship of the lower house and the upper chamber in the dif- ferent colonies; but not one of those reasons has been applicable to the relationship of the house of representatives and the senate, which we propose to create. In the latter case both houses represent the people and ought therefore to be equally considered. The Premier of Victoria strongly enforced the doctrine, which had the acquiescence of all the Victorian members and everybody else, that the majority must rule. That is a proposition which as applied to the present case I do not think the delegates will concede. We say, not a majority of the people, but a majority of the people, and a majority of the states. We cannot accept the hon. gentleman's definition of popular government in that sense. And I must insist upon his trying to regard the senate, not simply as representating the wealth and property of the colonies, but as representing the population of the colonies. I do not like the suggestion made by the hon. member, Sir John Bray. I believe that what we refuse in the strongest way to concede here, we shall very likely be obliged to agree to in consequence of an agitation which will be carried on until the senate is deprived of the rights now asked for. The only compromise we ought to make — and I do not see the use of federation at all unless it is on something like that basis — is to give to the house of representatives the power to initiate money bills. There is one view of th(; question we ought to consider. I do not think from what I have read in the newspapers — and I have been accustomed to read the Victorian newspapers for a long time — that the Premier of that colony speaks the will of the people of Victoria. Hex. Members : Oh, yes ! 396 Federal Constitution : [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions. Sir THOMAS McILWRAITH : He speaks the will of the majority who havenot thought iiuich about the subject ; but even these when they commence to see how their interests are afFected, Avill turn round and rend the lion, member. They will not un- derstand the case at all from his point of view. I believe the lion, member could make such a speech as he has made and be applauded right throughout ; but when the people of Victoria begin to realise that the carrying out of those ideas will have the eflfect of blocking Victoria from further intercourse with New South "Wales and Queensland, they will not allow the hon. member to be Premier many months longer. I would caution hon. members to remember that we have a w'ork before us perhaps more difficult still than than that on which we are now engaged. It is a very difficult thing to effect a compromise. I have a notion to-day that very likely we may come to a compromise. But the most difficult task before us will be to get our constituents to agree to the constitu- tion we may frame. I do not disguise • from myself the fact that most of us — and I include myself in the number — do not agree with the majority of our constitu- ents on this point. I believe that on the point I have insisted upon my con- stituents — I speak of course of Queens- land — go a great deal further than I do myself, and that even the compro- mise to which I have yielded will not be accepted without a great deal of work on the part of those who are interested in seeing federation brought about. I be- lieve that the delegates generally ai'e ahead of the constituents, and I am quite sure that the outside colonies will look with great suspicion on any proposal that is made. We are taunted sometimes with having suspicion of one another's mo- tives. Susjiicion is not a bad element in an affair of this sort. It is an ugly word to use, but perhaps it is the proper word [Sir Thomas Mcllwraith. after all. We have to regard the interests of the colonies we are here to represent. "We ai'e bound to do that and, call it sus- picion or anything else, in looking at those interests we may of course be considerably biassed. W^hat I wish to draw attention to is this : "We ought to try to frame some- thing that will be accepted by the different constituencies that we represent. I claim to understand Victoria a great deal better than the Premier of Victoria can possibly understand Queensland, and I am much astonished at the attitude which has been taken up by the Victorian delegates. The immediate advantages to Victoria and New South "Wales are so plain to everybody that I cannot understand why a dead legal tech- nicality, only kept alive by the strong fights which take place between the lower and upper houses in Victoria, should have been introduced as one of their principal argu- ments. I believe myself that they will give way ; but when the constituents un- dei'stand that it is only a fight as to the constitution of the upper and lower houses, as to whether their manufactures shall spread over the whole of Australia, they will demand a different mandate from that which the hon. member, Mr. Munro, gave us just now. Colonel SMITH : I should have been very glad if the hon. gentleman who has just resumed his seat had answered one point which was made by my hon. colleague, Mr. Munro. That hon. member pointed out that New South Wales and Victoria, with two-thirds of the population of Australia, are oflering to the other four colonies the same representation in the senate that they claim themselves ; in other words, if there are nine representatives from each colony, New South "Wales and Victoria, with two- thirds of the population, will have eighteen members, and the other colonies combined, Avith one-third of the population, will have thirty-six members. The doctrine has been laid down by the hon. member, Sir Federal Constitution : [16 March, 1891. J Resolutions, 397 John Downer, and those who support his view, that in the senate which is to be placed over the house of representa- tives the thirty-six members sliall govern the eighteen who represent two-thirds of the population of the whole group. If that is to be so ; if this body is to be ci'eated, having greater power tlian was ever exercised by an upper house in any individual colony ; if its hands are to be strengthened, and deadlocks made inevit- able, I shall be very much surprised. The hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, did not explain to the Convention the difficulty he recently had with the Legis- lative Council in Queensland ; and the hon. member, Sir Thomas Mcll wraith, also failed to give any information on the subject. How do ho and his colleagues propose to get over difficulties of that de- scription, if there should be a deadlock be- tween the senate and the hou.se of repre- sentatives 1 The house of representatives, ix'presenting the bulk of the people, might, by an overwhelming majority, pass a cer- tain measure. This ]io\verful senate, how- ever, might say, "We shall not pass this measure, no matter how large the majority in favour of it may be. We shall overrule you." I am not ]»repared, and I am cer- tain the colony of Victoria is not prepared, to strengtlicn the hands of the senate and make it more powerful than the Legisla- tive Council of that colony is at present, iJather than do that it would be better for us to pack up and go away to-morrow. It is perfectly useless for this Convention to go on unle.ss some fair and reasonable con- cession is made with respect to this sub- ject ; for instance, th.it a measure should bo as.sentf'd to by the senate if passed l)y a majority of two-third.s of the house of re- presentatives. The Legislative Council of Victoria now represents a very large con- stituency — 130,000. The lower hou.se re- presents 200,000, Even now we have con- llicts between the houses. Yet we arc coolly asked to-day to strengthen the hands of the senate, so that it can defy the deci- sion of the people and reject a measure, no matter whether it be a money bill or any other bill. Mr. Fitzgerald : No one denies the legislative councils that power ! Colonel SMITH: The hon. member knows what took place in Victoria, and I will not be a party to creating a more powerful body in the federal parliament than the Legislative Council is in Victoria. If this proposal be carried. New South Wales and Victoria will have to endeavour to reduce the representation of the smaller colonies in the senate. Otherwise they can overwhelm us and do as they please. If we propose a tax which they do not like they may say, " We shall not have that tax " ; and we shall have created a body which will really be an oligarchy, inde- pendent of the wishes of the people. You will create a body more powerful than the representatives of the people in the lower house. I was astounded to find the hon. member. Dr. Cockburn, supporting this proposal. If we could be certain that the senate would act as the Legislative Coun- cil of South Australia acted when a diffi- culty recently occurred there — that is, meet in committee with the lower house and settle the difficulty — it might be all right. We have no guarantee whatever that sucli a thing would be done. If the smaller colonies, to whom we give twice our re- presentation in the senate, want to over- i-ule the representatives in the lower house, so far as Victoria is concerned it will prefer to run alone. It will be wise for New South Wales to run alone. The speech delivered to-day by the hon. mondjcr, Sir Ileiny Parkes, completely covered the ground, and 1 was astonished when his Colonial Trea- surer, the hon. member, Mr. IMcMillaii, got up and diffii-rcd with him on that point. Wc might as well dissolve at once, and go back to our homes, if we are going to 398 Federal Comtitution: [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions. decide that -we shall create a body to over- ride the representatives of the people. The hon. member, Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, was good enough to say that he knew the colony of Victoria better than its Premier did. Sir Thomas McIlwraith : No. What I said was that I knew the colony of Vic- toria better than the hon. member, Mr. Munro, knew Queensland. Colonel SMITH : I believe that is the case, and that the hon. member, Sir Thomas IMcIlwraith, was originally a Vic- torian. I find that the hon. member is not the only member of the Convention who represents another colony, but who began his career in Victoria. I am very sorry, however, to say that when hon. members leave Victoria their sympathies do not always remain there. I can assure the hon. member. Sir Thomas McIlwraith, that the people of Victoria are thoroughly conversant with everything that takes place within these walls, and they are just as capable of forming a sound judgment on any public question as most hon. members are. I am certain that I am expressing the sound convictions and honest senti- ments of the people of Victoria, when I say that they will not submit to having the senate made so strong that it can overrule the popular chamber, or to make the senate stronger than are the lesrislative councils in the various colonies. If this resolution be carried in its present form, without any modification providing that the people, as represented in the lower chamber, should ultimately prevail after reasonable delay, our labours will be perfectly useless. See- ing that the smaller colonies are to have an equal representation in the senate with that of the large colonies, it is not fair, just, or equitable to expect that the great colony of Xew South "Wales, or that the smaller colony of Victoria, with its large population, will assent to the proposal now before the Convention. I ask the representatives of the smaller colonies in [Colonel Smith. common faii-ness that they will agi'ee to some proposal giving a guarantee that the will of the people shall ultimately pre- vail. There is no such power given here. The hon. member who has made this pro- posal has shown us no way out of the difficulty which I refer to. If this proposal be carried, there will possibly be a dead- lock between the two houses. But the hon. member who has moved this amend- ment has shown us no way out of such a difficulty. I feel surprised at the atti- tude taken up by gentlemen who hold lead- ing positions in the different colonies, who know the difficulties which have arisen from time to time between the various legislative assemblies and legislative coun- cils. I am not surprised that members of the Convention who are representa- tives of upper houses, should advocate this proposal. They have always advocated it, and probably always will advocate it. How often has it taken place in Victoria, that the members of the Council have sent the lower house to the country to be pun- ished, for no fault of their own ! Time after time have the Council had the lower house dissolved, and they have come back by the voice of the people at the ballot- box in overwhelming numbers, and then, because they cannot be punished, the hon. gentlemen in the Upper House have thrown the measure out again. If the hon. gentle- man had said, "Dissolve the upper house if it rejects a measure a second time," the case would have been different. Mr. Gordon : But the decision would not be altered. The same state representa- tives would come back ! Colonel SMITH : In Victoria these hon. gentlemen would not come back, because we have not a nominee house there. It is an elective house. If the upper house are put in a position in which they can be punished, if they can be sent to their constituents in the various colonies, and if the body is given a liberal character, I Federal Constitiction : [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 399 venture to say that they -will hesitate a member, Dr. Cockburn, should come here lonw time before they will throw out a and propose an extremely conservative popular measure. It will be a long time measure of this kind. I thought he was before they will submit themselves to a man of a diflferent character — that his punishment by throwing out a measure instincts were liberal, and, in fact, almost that has the sympathies and the approval democi-atic and socialistic. But the hon. of the entire body of the people. They gentleman is now backing up the most in- will rather meet the popular will, accept tense conservatism that could possibly be it, and make the best of it. I regret very conceived and proposed in this chamber, much the indisposition shown by the smaller Dr. Cockburx : It is quite the other colonies to meet us in a magnanimous way 1 way, when we offer them equal representa- Colonel SMITH : I know that the hon. tion with us, so that they can outvote us gentleman thinks so ; but I am satisfied in the senate. They could do so if they that if he had gone through the conflicts were only in a bare majority ; but we give which I have witnessed, and taken part in, them a majority of two-thirds. It comes in Victoria, he would not talk as he has with not altogether a good grace from done. I hope hon. members will meet over hon. members representing those colonies this point. I am sure that the hon. mem- to stand up here and to propose to give to ber. Sir John Downer, does not mean his the body with whom we propose to deal amendment to be so extreme as it is, and I so liberally the power to veto the unanim- think he Avill be prepared, and I hope the ous voice, it may be, of the whole of New hon. delegates from Queensland will also South Wales and Victoria. That is the be prepared, to endeavour to meet this power proposed to be conferred, and I am difficulty as it ought to be met, so that the very glad the proposal did not come from will of the people, after it has been pro- either of the larger colonies. I came to perly ascertained at the ballot-box, and this Convention, as did my hon. colleagues, from their representatives in the lower with a thorough determination to bring chamber, may prevail, about federation if it were possible to do Mr. A DYE DOUGLAS : As a delegate soon anything like fair terms ; and the from one of the smaller colonies which have resolution which the hon. member, Sir been referred to, I am astonished at the Jlonry Parke.s, proposed in the conference arguments used by the hon. member from at Melboiirne, asking us to federate in a Victoria. We never knew Victorian dele- way that would be just to each and all of gates, either here or elsewhere, to enter the colonies, carried out the views of all. into any arrangement that did not suit But I .say tliat this is a proposition that their own particular purpose, and their own is not ju.st or equitable. It gives to a sec- particular pockets, and upon the present tion what ought to belong to the whole ; occasion their conduct is the same as that it gives to one part of the population — no which thoy liave pursued licrotofore. What doubt the wealthier part — tlio power of does the hon. niembor, Colonel Smith, mean vetoing the decision of tlie representatives by making a comparison between the logis- of the people in the lower assembly, and latures of the several colonies, and the I must say tliat I am intensely surprised ])roposed legislature which this Conven- to find hon. members who are members of tion is trying to bring about ? Wlien any lower chambers in the varioiis legislatures proposal in the slightest degree objection- advocating anything nf this description ; it able is made to the hon. delegates from, surprises me above all things that tlie hon. Victoria, they turn round with an extra- •100 Federal Constitution: [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions. onlinavy amount of effervescence, and tell us that if we do not come round to their views and ideas they will give up the thing altogether. Mr. MuNRO : The hon. member said the same thing ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : We say that we are anxious to come to some arrange- ment, if possible. Colonel Smith : If the hon. member and his friends get what they want ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : It would be very easy to meet the opposition that is being created here with regard to the senate by carrying out the rules that are carried out in America when a deadlock arises. Hon. members say that the feder- ated colonies are to have no power in the senate. But will they have any power in the house of representatives 1 They will be deprived of all power, because a colony like Western Australia would, in all probability, have only about two votes to fifty or sixty in the house of representa- tives. Mr. MuNRO : That has not been settled ! jNIr. Wrixox : The contrary has been said ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : I say that in the house of representatives they will have no power. ]\Ir. "Wrixox : Y^es, every power ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : They must have power somewhere, and the only place where they can have it is in the senate. "Why do you have an equal number of re- presentatives from each colony in the senate if it is not simply to balance the over- whelming power of the large and unequal representation in the house of representa- tives ? But why do you call that body the house of representatives ? The woi'd is inexplicable and inappropriate. The senate is just as representative as the house of representatives, or whatever you choose to term the popular house. Hon. mem- bers are talking of the people. They are [.I//-. Adye Douglas. afraid to do anything that does not concur with the will of the mob. That is the principle hon. members adopt. They are afraid to go and speak their real opinions if they do not suit the mob. Mr. MuNRO : "We have no mob in Vic- toria ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : I have known Victoria longer than the hon. member. I was there before they had representative institutions at all, and when the hon. mem- ber comes to talk here he must not think that he is going to win us over by his blar- ney. The hon. member thinks that the vox 2J02ndi is the vox Dei. Colonel Smith : So it is ! Mr. ADY^E DOUGLAS : Ko doubt it is in Ballarat. Colonel Smith : It is in Tasmania, too ! Mr. ADY^E DOUGLAS : We have re- presentatives in Tasmania who care very little about what is termed popular opinion. Are the several colonies to have no power at all in the senate, or whatever you may choose to call that body ? Each member will represent the whole of his colony, not a mere section of the people, while in the lower assembly the smaller colonies will only be represented by a few people. There must, in order to create a union of the colonies, be a counter-balance some- where. Otherwise, why not limit the senate to representatives in proportion to population ? You are only creating'^one thins to smash it down with another: and you are saying, " You may appear there ; but we will clip your wings and give you no power in any shape or form, excepting that which the larger colonies will allow." It will be much better for us to know exactly the position in which we stand. The position taken up by the hon. mem- ber, Sir John Downer, is only one link, as it were, of the chain. It can easily be met by providing that if a bill is carried by a certain majority in the house of represen- tatives, and also by a certain majority in Federal Constiiutioyi : [IG March, 1891.] Besolutions. 401 tlie other house, it should become law It is not, however, at all applicable to us. without further delay. To say, however, AVe cannot ioiitate the House of Commons, that the colonies represented in the senate That is a term which cannot be applied to are to have no power to deal with, say, a us ; there is only one House of Commons bill to construct a railvray — because when proper. In ISTew Zealand they term the you use the phrase money bills, I take it members of the lower house " represcn- that bills providing for the expenditure of tatives," becau.se the members of their money on railways and other works are upper house are nominees ; but in South included — will be to create a despotic go- Australia the upper house, or Legisla- vernmeut. There can be no doubt that the tive Council, is elective. Therefore, the difficulty is one which can be easily met, and word " representatives " is not applicable thereisnooccasionfor the display of all this to what may be termed the house of the violence on the part of Victoria. One hon. people. The senate will represent the member has even said that they will not people just as much as the other house, join the federation — that they will pack find the senate must have some counter- up and go away without trying to come balancing influence against the power of to some arrangement. I am astonished the large colonies in the house of representa- that gentlemen repi'esenting a colony like tives. I trust we shall be able to carry Victoria should talk in this manner, that out some scheme of federation, at any rate they should not appeal to the reason, but to submit some scheme to the various to the fears and cowardice, of those who colonies, knowing that it rests with those represent the smaller colonies. We know colonies afterwards to accede or not to what ■\ery well what Victoria is ; we know very may be placed before them. We are only well what faith we can place in her Go- asked to draw up a scheme of federation, vernment ; we know what faith we can and I have no doubt that it will be drawn place in her people. They have got the up in some shape or other, especially in start, and they have been so long in getting view of the fact that we have gentlemen it that they want to stick to it. We shall present who have been in the habit of ex- be very careful, I hope, not to allow one pressing their views and opinions on con- colony, because it has a large population, stitutional government. I feel sure that to take advantage of another colony which we can safely place the formation federa- Iias not so large a population. We know tion of Australia in their hands, without the difficulties attached to what is termed necessarily adopting any particular consti- " responsible government. ' Those dillicul- tution now in existence. Wc cannot ties can be easily met without this noise follow the Dominion of Canada ; we can- and bustle. Federation can be carried out not follow the United Stales ; wc cannot if wc arc determined to carry it out, if wc follow the Constitution of England, be- are each inclined to yield to a certain ex- cause it is a continually changing one, and tent; but wc must not b(; browbeaten by it is necessary that the gentlemen corn- representatives from Victoria saying they posing this Convention should in some way are not going to liave anything to do with or other devise a plan which would be ap- it unless their particular views are carried idicable as far as possible to the interests into effect. If we are moderate in our of the people of Australia, views, federation can be carried out. It is .Mr. TIIYNNE : Wc have had some said that we arc to adopt the English Con- warm discussion this afternoon amongst : tution. Why? Because it seems to mc various representatives; and it seems to ij meet the views of the people of Victoria. me that we might now, after the heated 2 c 402 Federal Constitution : [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions, debate which has taken place, advan- tageously hark back a little, and cast about to see whether we are really pro- tectincr the interests that we have been sent here to protect. We are present as representatives of various parliaments, and I may be permitted in all humility to suggest that it is our duty to preserve as far as possible, not only the functions, but the interests of those parliaments, ex- cept in regard to those matters which we must give up to a federal government. If we look across the water to the United States of America, we find a very rigid constitution as originally framed, and we find the position of the states and the states legislatures very strongly guarded accord- ing to the written Constitution • and yet we find that even that rigid protection which they have received has not been sufficient to protect those states in the complete ex- ercise, not merely of their functions, but of their influence on the bodies attached to them. In the states we have found, first of all, some of the powers taken away by judicial decisions, and vested in the federal government on the oneside. Wehave found them taken away under stress of excep- tional circumstances — statutes passed and adopted limiting the powers of the states ; and now we find, on the other side, that the influence of the states is being gradu- ally diminished and taken away by the growing influence and powers of the local bodies — by what we may call the muni- cipal government, until at the present time the position of the states is far different to what it was originally in- tended to be. If that is the case in a constitution like that of the United States of America, where there is a popular re- presentative house, and where there is also a senate having all the powers which extreme advocates of a senate here have advocated — of amendment of money bills — if, with these precautions, we see the Btate influence decaying, what can we ex- [3/r. Thynne. pect here 1 If we constitute a house o f representatives with great power, and re- duce the protecting power which is given to the states through their representatives in the senate, the effect will be that in the course of a few years even the Parliament of Victoria and the Parliament of New South Wales will be shorn and stripped of their power and influence ; and instead of having the representatives direct from the people, enabling them to legislate effec- tively for their own affairs, they will be sent from their state parliaments for the most important matters to the uni- fied parliament, which would undoubtedly grow from the great power which the hon, member, Mr. Munro, and other hon. mem- bers from Victoria, advocate giving to the house of representatives. I do not like quotations veiy much, but I will give a few lines from a recent publication upon the relative position of the state govern- Caents in America and the federal govern- ments, and I do so because I think the words are words of warning which hon. gentlemen here ought to bear in mind in relation to their functions as to their in- dividual parliaments : The coinraonwealth government is now but a sort of middle instance. Too large for local go- vernment, too small for general, it is beginning to be regarded as a meddlesome intruder in both spheres — the tool of the strongest interest, the oppressor of the individual. This' has been its history in other lands and other times, and the mere fact that it professes to be popular here, whilst it has been princely and aristocratic else- ^ where, will not save it from the same fate, ' I ask the hon. gentleman, the Premier of Victoria, is that the condition to which he wishes the Pai'liament of Victoria to de- scend ? Does he wish to promote the strip- ping of the Parliament of Victoria of its power and influence over its own people ? I ask the hon. members for New South Wales, do they wish to see the Parliament of New South Wales in the same way stripped of its power and influence, and Federal Constitution: [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions, 403 relegated to the position which is merely accorded under the present system to local municipalities 1 I think that this is a veiy important matter, and one to which I trust I am not out of place in calling the atten- tion of the Convention. Mr. KINGSTON : I think we must all recognise that we are approaching a very critical stage in our deliberations, and that we have arrived at a time when it behoves us to act mth the utmost cirumspection, lest our efibrts in the direction of federation should prove a failure ; and I trust that nothing that I may feel it my duty to say will even in a slight degree tend to dissi- pate that atmosphere of compromise to which reference has been made by one hon. delegate, and which at the present moment does not appear to lead to any very practical result. I have listened with a very great amount of attention to the arguments which have fallen from the various hon. delegates from Victoria, and it appears to me that those arguments, if pushed to their legitimate conclusion, amount to this : that we have made a very great mistake in providing in the resolu- tions which we have carried for a bi- cameral sy.stem — for a system consisting of two houses, one representative of the people and the other of the states — and that we should rather adopt a single chamber constitution, in which the people only will bo represented, and the will of the majority will rule. Colonel Smith : None of us have said that ! Mr. KINGSTON : None of the hon. dele- gates from Victoria said it in so many words ; but it seemed to me, listening witli the greatest attention to their utterances, that that was the logical result of the arguments wjiich they advanced. I i-e- member particularly the utterances of the hon. member for Victoria, 31 r-. Wrixon, who is now, in common with other members who think similarly with him, striving to limit the powers of the senate on the subject of finance, whilst he tells us at the same time that finance is government and govern- ment is finance. I hfiA'e come here with every desii'e to assist in bringing about a fair and reasonable scheme of federation ; but I thought that the idea that underlay the federal scheme likely to be proposed was that though of course we were only to confer on the federal government the power of dealing with national questions, still, as regards national questions, it was not to be simply that the will of the ma- jority of the people should prevail, but that in order that there should be federal legis- lation on any particular subject, there should be a cctesensus of opinion in two chambers — a majority of the people and a majority of the states. I venture to think that it is a principle which will commend itself to most of us ; and, speaking particularly of the colony which I with others have the honor to represent, I know that in South Aus- tralia there is a pretty general feeling that whilst willing to join in a scheme of federation conceding due weight in the shape of extra representation to extra population, we are not prepared altogether to sink our state individuality, but we think tiiat there should be two chambers — one in which the claims of extra popu- lation to extra rei)resentation will be fully recognised, and the other in which each state will be regarded as an individual unit entitled to equal representation. I go further ; and I put the matter in this form : that the system to be effective must concede to the senate practically co-ordi- nate powers with the more popular branch of the legislature. What is the good of erecting a senate in which the states are equally represented if you are not going to give them any powers worthy of the name 1 What is the good of giving equal representation to dilFerent states in a body which, according to the utterances I have already quoted, will have practically no 404 Federal Const if u/lon: [IG March, 1891.] Resolutions. power at all in matters cf finance — in matters which are really the essence of the covernnient of the whole of Australia"? Mr. Beakix ; Power of rejection, but not power of amendment ! Mr. KINGSTON : Power of rejection is some power, no doubt. Is the extra re- presentation which is conceded to extra population in the lower chamber no ad- vantage ? Is it not a sufficient advantage in favour of the populous states'? Is the power of initiation of no importance whatever 1 Mr. Baker : I thought it was enormous ! Mr. KINGSTON : Does it not go to the whole gist of the matter as regards the origination of the more important mea- sures ? Confining the powders of the senate simply to rejection is all I am contending for — rejection in detail. It seems to me that if we are going to have a senate which, whilst nominally created for the protection of state rights, is really and practically shorn of all powders in that direction, we should be dealing more fairly with the states them.selves if we were to say : "We require that the majorities of the people should rule — that there should be prac- tically one chamber — and we do not pro- r)0.se to have a .senate at all." I would in- finitely prefer, in order that it may be fairly appreciated by those whose duty eventually it will be to judge of the advisability of this scheme, that we should go back and propose to them onechamber rather than be charged with the duty of recommending to them the aioption of a system which, whilst calling into existence a senate charged nominally with the pi'otection and preservation of state rights, has no real power or influence in that direction, but is simply a sham, a delusion, and a snare. I hold strong views on the question of the propriety of giving the senate the power of rejecting money bills in detail ; but at the same time I recognise that there is a very sirong difference of opinion on the question, and that we should strain every effort for the [J/a Kingston. purpose of arriving at some compromise agreeable to all ; and I do trust that in this matter — a matter of the most vital importance — we shall continue the prac- tice we have successfully adopted hitherto, of avoiding all divisions — of avoiding the necessity of taking the sense of the majo- rity of the Convention on the subject. I am satisfied also that there is such a de- sire to come to a compromise that we shall be able to do something in that direction. As laid down in the resolutions carried by the Melbourne Conference, and since re- peated in our instructions by our various legislatures, we are charged with the duty of arriving at a conclusion just and fair to the several states, and I am sure that we are all here actuated by the one desire. 0£ course, it is difticult to say what is fair and right underthe circumstances. At the same time, I am very much impressed with the mode in which the matter is sought to be dealt with by the amendment indicated by the hon. member for South Australia, Sir John Bray. The senate is created for the purpose of protecting state rights. Bef use, if you like, to the senate the power of amend- ing money bills generally ; but when state rights are involved, and matters dealing with them are mixed up with others in money bills, let the senate have the right by resolution to require that the matter shall be dealt with in a separate bill. And if it is so dealt with the simple result will be that the senate by the rejection of that pai'- ticular measure will accomplish all that is sought it should have the power to accom- pjlisli by giving it the right of veto in detail. I am .satisfied that whatever may be the strength of our opinions on the subject we shall do all that we can to come to a fair arrangement. Undoubtedly it would re- flect the highest discredit on all of us should we spare any pains to come to an amicable understanding on the matter, and I cannot contemplate the possibility of such a dis- astrous result. Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1891.] Eesoluiions. 405 Captain KUSSELL : If we are anxious for a compromise, it is a great pity that we did not adopt the suggestion made by an hon. member, to adjourn an hour ago, because we find in e^'eryday life that when the atmosphere is sultry it is an advantage to change our locality, and get the fresher breeze. There has been a great deal of warmth imported into the debate this afternoon, more particularly by the Premier of Victoria — more warmth tlian licfht. I confess that at the end of that lion, gentleman's speech I had found out much that he Avould not do, much that should not be done, and that he was in- clined to pack up his portmanteau unless his particular wish was given effect to. But that is not compromise. "We are advanced no further by it. "SYe do not know what Victoria wants, except that her whole wish -hould be conceded. I think it would have been a good thing if we had adjourned. But whilst I am on my feet, I will say a few words on the subject. Here I would allude to the impression which was made upon me l)y Colonel Smith when he spoke of the magnanimity with which the senate was to be treated, inasmuch as the smaller colonics were to be given equal representa- tion therein. But the hon. momljor did not carry hi.s magnanimity much further. It was to have the nominal power of two votes, but it was not to exercise them. Tiic lion, member's magnanimity stopped there. Colonel .Smith : Not on money bills ! Captain BUSSELL : I think that the Convention is rather setting up a wooden imago — an image in which tlierc is really nothing. There is ample room for com- promise, and wlien we go carefully into the matter we shall find that we shall apparently give up a great deal, while, in reality, we sacrifice nothing at all. "What is this great power of amending money bills? I venture to .say that, by giving the senate power to amend money bills, we should take power away from it. That may seem paradoxical ; but I believe it is the case. In former days, no doubt, there was a great deal in the power of vetoing money bills. It originated in the old days, when the Crown was the sole power, and when the Ci-own and the House of Lords really taxed the people and spent the money as they chose. All that has passed away. It is the people now who say how the taxes ai'e to be raised, and how they are to be expended. They put governments in, and turn them out, on questions of finance witli the utmost ruth- lessness, and there is no danger that any power you give to the senate will affect the financial policy of the federation. I said just now that though it may seem para- doxical, I believe that to give the senate power to amend money bills would be in reality to take power from it, because the general opinion ajjparcntly of the Conven- tion has been that the senate shall have a perpetual existence and a right of veto. If you give the senate the right of perpetual existence and the veto, you will be giving to it absolutely autocratic power which it would not put into force. If you give it the power of amending money bills, because its existence is perpetual, and its power of saying " no " also perpetual, you jdacc in the hands of a comparatively irresponsible body, a much greater power than that of amending a bill. I do not think there is any reason why an amendment similar to this jjroposed by Mr. Wrixon, .should not be "iven effect to. To me it seems a matter of little consequence whether the senate has the ])Owcr (o oi'iginate money bills or not, or whether it has the power of amend- ing them. I maintain that tiie question of the financial policy is not now what it used to be, that the people themselves arc more interested in social questions than formerly, that the whole legislation of the next ten or twenty years will be, not upon £ s. d., but on the social rights of the people. It will be general social legislation. 40G Federal Constitution: [IG March, 1891.] Resolutions. These are questions that the people are projierly jealous of ; these are questions Avhich they will watch with the greatest iutorest, and the power of expenditure is as nothing in their eyes compared with the labour and other social problems which will have to come before the parliaments of the various colonies. Therefore, on that point I maintain that the amendment of money bills is a matter of comparatively little moment. But are we sincerely anxious for federation ] Do we want to bring about the unification of Australia? Do Ave wish to bring the detached colo- nies of Australia into a federation ? Be- lieve me that unless you leave absolutely autonomous powers to those outlying dis- tricts, and allow them to believe that their representatives in the senate will be real entities and not nonentities, it is hopeless to talk on the subject. It has been said that the delegates are far ahead of their constituents in their knowledge of the sub- ject, and their desire for federation, and I say that unless you give to the dele- gates such a position that they can go back and show to their colonies that they will not surrender any autonomous powers — unless you can show to them that there will be a distinct gain by joining the federa- tion — unless you can show them that the state representatives will not be mere nonentities — it is hopeless to talk any more on the subject. I believe there is as strong a desire throughout the Con- vention as there will be throughout Aus- tralia that there shall be a federation of the colonies. But it will commence by the adoption of the spirit of compro- mise, not by our trying to insist that we shall have everything we desire for our- selves; but by sitting down with a reso- lute determination that we will not leave Sydney until we have brought about feder- ation. If we once set to work in that spirit, with the hope and belief that genuine work will be done, we shall have accom- [CaiJtain Russell. plished a great deal. It cannot be done by lengthened sittings, and heated debate, but only by calmly discussingamongstourselves, perhaps outside, the points on which we can compromise. Mr. RUTLEDGE : If I were inclined to take a pessimist view of things, after the debate which has taken place this evening, I should be disposed to think that federation had received a serious blow. After the speeches of Mr. Munro and Colonel Smith, it seems as if we should accomplish no- thing at all. We must approach the con- sideration of the great question that is en- gaging our attention in a different spirit from that in which it has been dealt with by those two gentlemen. I do not think it is the way for hon. membei's who have strong convictions to endeavour to secure the adoption of their views, and effect any- thing like concessions from those who with equally strong convictions, hold different views, by saying, " I am prepared to take this stand, and I shall not budge an inch from the ground which I now occupy." INIr. Munro : Who said that ? Mr. RUTLEDGE: The hon. member did not say so in so many words, but un- less I misunderstood him very greatly, that was the effect of what he said. Mr. MuxRO : Oh, no ! Mr. RUTLEDGE : Unless the hon.mem- ber had his views given effect to in regard to the rights of the popular branch of the legislature, he was prepared to pack up his traps and go back to Victoria to-morrow. Mr. Munro : I said nothing of the sort ! Mr. RUTLEDGE : I do not think we ought to approach the discussion in a spirit of that kind. We are here, as the Presi- dent admirably stated in the course of the speech in which he moved the resolutions, to endeavour to give and take. I certainly caimot understand how any hon. gentle- man can expect the Convention to arrive at any de6nite conclusion at all unless we are prej^ared to give as well as to take. Federal Constitution: [16 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 407 Colonel Smith : We are to give every- be. I do not think we can do better than hing and get nothing ! adopt the suggestion made early in the Mr. RXJTLEDGE : It is unfortunate afternoon, namely, to appoint a select com- that hon. gentlemen should endeavour to mittee, consisting of, say, the premiers of pit the house of representatives against the the several colonies, and probably the ex- senate, and to suppose that there will neces- premiers — two members from each colony sarily be a spirit of antagonism existing be- — for the purpose of reconciling, as far aa tween the two bodies. I do not think there possible, the difierences which at present is any likelihood of a spirit of antagonism separate hon. members on this great ques- existing between those two bodies as such, tion, and of suggesting to the Convention They will not be two bodies animated by a the most suitable form of compromise which, spirit similar to that which now animates in their opinion, ought to be adopted. the two branches of the provincial legis- SirJOHN DOWNER: Before the Com- latures. That was pointed out at very mittee adjourns I wish to say a few words great length by the various speakers who on what appears to be a misapprehension discussed the question in open Convention as to my motive in moving the amend- the other day; therefore, I need not refer ment. Many hon. members, particularly to the subject again. But there is all the the hon. members for Victoria, have corn- difference in the world, as was pointed plained of the unprecedented character of out, between the constitution of the senate, the motion. These hon. gentlemen appear as we hope to frame it, and the constitu- to have entirely forgotten that it is not tion of the upper house to which we are the motion, but the antagonism, which is accustomed in the several colonies. Why unprecedented. No confederation has ever should there be any antagonism between been formed on substantially any other those two bodies 1 The hon. gentleman principles than those which we are advo- seemed to assume, and it strikes me as eating now. The very essence of federa- being very fallacious to assume anything tion is the enunciation and enforcement ■of the kind, that on any great question of principles such as those which we seek which comes before the federal parliament to set up — the preservation of the entity there will necessarily be a ranging up of of the states as well as the recognition of all the smaller colonies on the one side. the voice of the individuals in the whole Why should that bo so ] Many questions federation. An hon. gentleman who comes may come before the senate for considera- from Victoria endeavoured by a falso tion wliich may have the greatest ])0s- analogy — which, by the way, does not sibie interest for, say, Tasmania, and wliich seem to have worked very well — to show the representatives of that colony may that because in Victoria, for instance, the like to veto; but in which they will not upper house has no power to alter money liave the sympathy of Queensland or the bills, therefore no such power should bo sympathy of Western Australia ; and. given to the representatives of an utterly thenforo, it strikrs me as being wrong different character, of the ditrerent states, altogether to assume that on every great Even in Victoria, where tlie franchise financial question that comes Ix'fore the is so low that the Legislative Council senate all the small colonies will necessarily represents not merely tlie richer clas.sefl, go together like a flock of shof-p, and all but all the worthy of the poorer classes, their representatives will vote oneway. It one would have thought that there ought is a very poor estimate, I think, to form to be much greater power in the legislative of a body such as we hope the senate will council than it posses.ses at the present time. 408 Frichral Constitution: [IG March, 1891.] Eesolutions. But whether that be so or not, it is clear that the analo^ries wliich tlie hon. frentlenien who have objected to the amendment have endeavoured to draw between the motion and the ordinary responsible government in force in the colonies really do not exist at all. I do not now propose to address the Committee at any length. It is to be regretted, I think, that any hon. members should have said that, unless their views are carried out, federation, as far as they are concerned, is at an end. IS^either do I think that any hon. member is in a posi- tion to make any such declaration. I am certainly not in a position to make any such declaration myself, nor do I believe that any of my colleagues are. I am also equally willing to believe that the Premier of Victoria does not altogether speak the voice of Victoria when he states that un- le.ss his extraordinary and unprecedented condition is introduced into the federation — a condition such as has never been known in any body of the same kind — Victoria will stand out, and this Conven- tion will break up. Colonel SiiiTH : The hon. member is pro- posing the extraordinary condition, not we I Sir JOHX DOWXER : That is where the misunderstanding comes in. The con- dition when the present American Consti- tution was formed Mr. !MuxRO : Does the hon. member propose to have a similar constitution 1 Let us understand what we are doing ! Sir JOHX DOWNER : It was formed on what is known as the Connecticut com- promise. Under that compromise, in which the smaller states thought they had con- ceded so much, there was not merely the power of vetoing, either in block or in detail, but the power of amending money bills, as well as other bills — of amending by increasing, as well as by reducing. Although it was said by an early writer that an arrangement was made which seemed to be illogical, so far as our finite \Sir John Dov;ner. intelligence can be applied to the sub- ject, still the logic of history and subse- quent events is much more convincing than the intelligence we can bring to bear on any given subject at a moment's notice ; and we know as a fact that instead of the object being to preserve the co-ordinate power of the two chambers, that authority has been preserved by the method adopted, and that instead of the most extraordinary and itnsatisfactory result, coupled with universal discontent, which ought to have logically followed, as the hon. member, Mr. Baker, said at an earlier stage, the body in the state legislature which is admired and revered by the people of America is not the people's house — the House of Representa- tives, as it is called — but the Senate, which is supposed to be raised to a lofty sphere, which the people can neither see nor under- stand. Another misunderstanding runninit through this debate is this : it has been said that the voice of the people must be heard. Of course it must be heard. The voice of the people will be heard in the senate as well as in the house of representa- tives. It will be as powerful, practically, in one chamber as in the other. The electoral body that will return one will practically be the same as the bodv returning the other, with this diiFerence : that whereas the whole federation returns the house of representatives, it will be the body of elec- tors in each state that will return members who will represent them in the senate. The American experiment, which, as I have said, was a compromise, has worked won- derfully well. Now, the smaller colonies which have been so much reflected upon, and who are supposed to be endeavouring to arrogate to themselves powerand author- ity to overwhelm the larger colonics, ask for less than the smaller states of America asked for in their time. They ask for the power of veto in detail instead of in the whole, without any reference to the power of making amendments by way of increase Address. [17 MakcHj ISOl.] Fed'rral Constitution. 409 or reduction. I can only say, as Clive said on a celebrated occasion, " I am astonished at our own moderation."' I think that the more my hon. friend, Mr. Munro, comes to think the matter out, the more he -will disabuse his mind of false analosries, and the more he Mill come to the conclusion that he was mistaken in the somewhat hasty and impetuous view he expressed in hisutterancesof thisafternoon, when he said that he spoke for the people of Victoria. Mr. BARTON : I move : That the Chairman do now leave the chair, report progress, and ask leave to sit again to- morrow. Motion agreed to ; progress reported. Convention adjourned at o"35 p.m. TUESDAY, 17 MARCH, 1801. Address — Federal Constitution. The President took the chair at 11 a.m. ADDRESS. The Secretary read the following tele- gram : — To Sir Samm.1 (Iriliith, Vice-rresident, Federal Convention, Sy(hiey. Copy of resolutions posted by tlie Committee of the Brisbane Cliamber of Commerce. 1. That tlic Australian Fcileral Convention, now sitting in Sydney, is a marked event in the unfolding of Australian national life. 2. That "one people, one destiny " is the ideal of a noble aspiration, wliich in the hands of n»cn already distinguished bygrcat public services, in- I tires a loyal confidence that it will find practical xpression in a lasting Australian constitution. .*?. Th.it these resolutions be signed by the hairman of the committee, and transmitted to Sir Samuel fJriflTith, with the request that he will be good enough to hand them to the veteran statesman and President of the Convention. J. P. De Wintox, Vice-President, Brisbane Chamlwr of Commerce, .ind Chairman of the Committee. IG March, ISCtl. FEDERAL COXSTITUTIOX. In Committee : The Chaiemax : The question, as amended, is : (1.) A Parliament, to consist of a senate and a house of representatives, the former consist- ing of an equal number of members from each colonj-, to be elected by a sj^stem which shall provide for the periodical retirement of one- third of the members, so securing to the body itself a perpetual existence combined with defi- nite responsibilitj' to the electors, the latter to be elected by districts formed on a population basis, and to possess the sole power of originating all bills appropriatuig revenue or imposing taxa- tion. The hon. member, Sir John Downer, pro- posed to amend this question by adding the following words : — The senate to have the power of rejecting in whole or in part any of such last-mentioned bills. It has since been proposed by way of amend- ment by the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon : That the amendment be amended by omitting aU the words after the first word " The" with a view to insert in their place the following : — " senate shall have equal power with the house of representatives in respect to all bills, except money bills, bills dealmg with duties of customs and excise, and the annual appropriation bill, and these it shall be entitled to reject but not to amend. The act of union shall provide that it shall not be lawful to include in the annual appropriation bill any matter or thing other than the votes of supply for the ordinary service of the year." Mr. EARTOX : I was much struck by the quotations from Mr. Gladstone made by the President the other day. Speak- ing of the English Constitution, the Presi- dent quoted him as saying : More, it must admitted, than any other, it leaves open doors which lead into blind alleys, for it presumes more boldly than an}- other the good sense and the good faith of those who work it. Sir Henry Parkcs went on to say : The success of any constitution frameil by man, the success of every constitution, call it what you may, must depend upon the good sense, self- restraint, and good faith of those who work it. 410 Federal Constitution : [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. That is the interpretation — it is, of coarse, the only fair interpretation — which the President has put on the words of Mr. Gladstone. That quotation struck me when I read it. I did not hear the address, but I read it as .soon as possible afterwards. In relation to this question of the powers of the senate, that quotation has appeared to me to be an argument which applies with singular force to the whole of the views which are held on each side of this question. If the British Constitution itself, so elastic as it is, is only a workable and smoothly working machine, in proportion as those who work it are self-reliant, self- restraining, and discreet, of course it is not to be expected that any other constitution labouring, as any subsequent constitution must labour, under the misfortune of being partly written, will work with thorough satisfaction unless subject to the same — shall I call them — lubricating influences. But I take it that there is a great deal more than that in the meaning of this quotation, becau.^e, turning again to what the President said : Whichever way we frame our constitution the rule of discretion and good sense that guides us must inevitably be tlie same. Although the argument appeared to be put forward mainly in laudation of the British Constitution and to a cei'tain extent in disparagement of the propositions that have been made — that is, which had been then made in debate and which have now taken a more specific form in this Com- mittee — still the force of the argument ought to be the same whichever way we frame our constitution, and the "sv ords them- selves uttered, I think I may fairly say, the strongest rebuke to all those, whichever place they may come from, who have made threats that they will leave us in our deliberations. Surely if that is the rule under which constitutions are to be worked, it is the rule under which thay are to be made. According to the prescience [J/>". Barton. which the experience of Mi'. Gladstone, as here denoted, gives us, it is with that prescience we know that, however we may err in allotting too much or too little power to this or that body, we still have the good sense of an English-born race to carry us through, and we ought, at any rate, to exhibit that amount of good faith in each other which should forbid us from saying if you do not accept this or that proposition we will leave the Convention. It does seem to be scarcely a worthy, and scarcely a dignified, position for any body of representatives, sent here for the pur- pose of assisting to frame a constitution, to take up, to resent, as some appeared to resent, the investigation of their argu- ments. Surely it is for the investigation of arguments that we are here before we decide. And when gentlemen tell us, when we investigate their arguments somewhat rciore closely than is agreeable to them, that the next thing we shall have to investigate will be the appear- ance of their carpet bags, it does seem that they are, not making too large a demand on our patience ; but exhibiting a spirit at variance with that spirit of compromise which they have all professed to have so much at heart. Colonel Smith : The compromise is all on one side ! Mr. BARTON: It is like the Irish- man's reciprocity — it is all on one side. Colonel Smith : We are to do all tlie compromising ! Mr. BARTON : The hon. member says he does all the compromising. I do not think that is so ; but he may have com- promised his case to some extent yester- \ day by his speech vrith which I will deal presently. Any other idea of compromise does not seem to have entered his head. If we are to start on what has been called the do ut des, or give-and-take principle in forming our constitution, I venture to say to this Convention we are beginning to Federal Constitution : [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 411 make threats a great deal too early, and T, for one, having the great confidence that 1 have in our hon. friends from Victoria, and other hon. members from elsewhere, have not the least expectation, until the Convention has done its labours, of see- ing the pattern of their portmanteaux. Now, there was another portion of the President's address which seemed to me to throw a good deal of light upon the manner in which the adjustment of the powers of the two houses of the general government should be proceeded with. The President told us that in the senate we seek to create as lofty, as dignified, an upper chamber as we can, and we seek to create it as nearly on the British model as we can. Whether the latter portion be entirely accurate or not, I shall not undertake to say for the moment, because I see certain amendments on the business-paper as to which I may have to express an opinion at a later stage, and which may throw some doubt on the statement. We are also told that a senate ought to possess the "elements of a moral and just con- servatism," and the President interpreted those elements in this way. He said that they were those elements arising from experience, from matured judgment, from public probity, from steadfastness of purpose, and from the trust wliich is imposed in certain individuals as the growth of time. Tliat i.s a collocation of a large numl)or of the very highest attributes that could re- pose in legislators, and it being the high ideal which our President has, what struck me as being, at any rate, the subject of some Hpeculation, was this : Why, after having created such a body as this for tlic avowed object of conserving state interests among other things, .should we propose to degrade this body by refusing them in the greatest emergencies the right to stand by those very interests ? If you do this, you 'will have cither an altogether degraded senate — a senate which will not be the object of any man's ambition — or, if you call to that senate, if you succeed in getting into it men such as the President has so worth- ily and eloquently described, what will be the result ? If they are a body of mature judgment and experience, if they are a lofty and dignified body, is it a spectacle for a free constitution that we should at any time see them sitting with folded arms while the interests which they were elected to guard are passing away for ever] Surely it is not making a consti- tution if we proceed in that way. If we proceed to work up to and to realise an idea of this kind, and then having created almost the summum honum of lesrisla- tive power, knock the very power out of its hands by a couple of words in a federal constitution, surely we rather mock than make a constitution. That is the view which struck me as one which was, at any rate, tenable from the remarks made by the President. After all, it comes back to the quotation from ]Mr. Gladstone. The working of any con- stitution will depend upon the discretion and good sense of those who frame it, and live under it, and it is not because that discretion and good sense have had to be invoked countless times for the pre.serva- tion of a constitution — I use the term with the utmost reverence — of the loo.se character of the English Constitution, that we are to argue, that when we make a con-stitution of a more defined character that good sen.sc will lly away if you im- port a federal government. Surely tha is not a good deduction from a knowledge of the race to wliich we belong, or from tiie work which we ourselves have done in the making of constitutions. Hut we are told that we are now attempting to create two hou.ses having an equal power to deal with money bills as they think fit. I venture to say, however, that none of us are in any way seeking to confer with 412 Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1S91.] liesolutions. respect to money bills, an equal power on the two bouses. Those who Iiave been strongest in their advocacy of this conser- vation of state interests to the mutual satisfaction of the parties to this compact have admittedall along that there is an ulti- mate power which will vest in the hands of the people. They begin with the power of origination, which in itself, as any one's experience of parliamentary procedure will tell him, as a sole power involves j^racti- cally the ultimate control. But it has not been contended by the strongest advocate of state rights here that under all circum- stances and in all events the veto which the senate may impose in whole or in part is to be immovable and unchangeable. Mr. MuxRO : Yes ! Mr. MoORE : No ! Mr. BAETOX : It has not been con- tended. ]\Ir. MuxRO : Yes, by every one on that side ! Mr. BARTON : I say that it has not been contended — at least that is my view. E\'ery one of the speakers, so far as I can understand his meaning, seemed to couple his strong assertion of the necessity of guarding these interests with the allowance that when matters came to a deadlock or a crisis, there must be some mode of settle- ment, and most of them concurred in say- ing that in the ultimate resort there must be some method provided by which the people could decide either directly or other- wise. Mr. "Wrixox: That was said only by the hon. member, Sir John Bray ! Mr. BARTON: It is the impression wliich I have gained from the debates, and I think that if the hon. member, Mr. Munro, had listened to and read these debates with, perhaps, a little lessof the idea that hon. gentlemen opposite were attempt- ing to make some fixed and immovable thing which would be as hard to get rid of as one of Cleopatra's Needles, if he thought \^Mr. Barton. for a moment that those who were op- posed to him were nearly one and all con- ceding that there must be at any rate some means of removinfr friction and ter- minating deadlocks, I think we should not have had this recourse to carpet bags in- stead of argument. It is a very great mis- take to say that we are attempting to con- stitute two co-equal houses. There is no one here whose remarks I can interpret in that sense at all. Certainly, strongly as I en- deavoured to express myself on the sub- ject, I have no consciousness of having attempted to assert that any such unalter- able position should be taken up, nor have I gathered the same from the remarks of any one else who has taken part in the debate. And now I would ask those who have given utterance to something like ex treme intentions on a su2'>position such as I have described, to pause a miniite to see whether there is not amongst us some means of arriving at a reasonable conclu- sion which will not be all giving on one side or all taking on the other. It is not, as it has been described, a newfangled pro- posal that has been made. It is not, as it has been described, something entirely un- English and utterly opposed to the develop- ment of constitutional government, be- cause, although I, for one, agi-ee with the President in saying that we are not here to make any mere transcript of the American Constitution, I think that we must concede that it was a highly English population which framed tlie American Senate ; and we must all concede that that constitution was framed with an intimate knowledge of the constitutional history of the country from which its authors had sprung and with, so far as it might bo, a desire in what they considered safe limits to imitate the model that existed for their emulation and their wonder. But it is not proposed to set up the American Senate as part of the con- stitution now to be framed. The American Senate has powers very much wider and Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 413 very mucli larger than any that are at- tempted to he given hy any proposal that has been made in this Convention. To begin with, the limitation of the co- ordinate rights of the American Senate is purely with regard to bills for raising re- venue, that is to say, taxation bills ; and with regard to bills of appropriation of the expenditure — as far as the Constitution is concerned, there is absolutely no limit upon their originating or co-ordinate powers. That has never been proposed or suggested for a moment, nor has it been suggested that the senate should be the depository of these very large powers which accom- pany its existence in the American Con- stitution. I refer to certain rights with regard to impeachment, and to certain other executive rights which here there is no intention and no dream of conferring upon such a body. But it is sought to be shown that where the citizen has to be represented, first through the national as- sembly, and next through another cham- ber, that where his representation in those two bodies is the sum total of his repre- sentation, to take away any portion of that full sum of representation is not in furtherance of the spirit of democracy, but it is a lopping down of the representation to which the democracy ought not to con- sent. That is tlic position — and it is not an " extremely conservative" position — which those who contend for a fair measure of power in the .senate are now occupying. If a citizen is to be repre.sented — and wc liave it on higli authority — the authority quoted the other day, of Sir William Jones that tlie only men who can constitute ;i state are liigh-minded men, who can sec their rights, and, having a just conception of tliem, dare maintain them — if that is the definition of a state, tlien the repre- sentatives of such a state are representa- tives of sucli men, and if the representatives of the state in the senate are the repre- sentatives of such men, and such a body as the President has described them, then it is wresting some of the citizen's power of representation out of his hands to say, " As much as the house of representatives may do anywhere else, it shall do and may do here ; but, as much as under any other federal constitution you know of the other chamber may do, it shall not do." That is not giving his full sum of representation ; it is taking something away; so that, af terall, the whole process that is proposed has nothing un-English about it, because it is an at- tempt to confer a full measure of repre- sentation, instead of taking any of it away. That also lets some light upon another branch of the question, because it has been said that there is some analogy betw^een the senate proposed and other upper cham- bers ; and my hon. friend, Mr. Deakin, said something about the experience of constitutions in British countries. Now, the experience of constitutions in British countries, with the exception of Canada, is not the experience of federation at all, and so far as it applies to Canada there are provisions in the Canadian Constitu- tion which tend at present, and may tend strongly ultimately, to convert that con- stitution more into an amalgamation than a federation, to minimise the powers of the states, and to exalt those of the general body. Now, it seems to be an accepted concession on all hands that the powers to be given to the federal body by this Con- vention, so far as it can induce the concur- rence of the respective parliaments, are to be, without speaking of the American or Canadian system at all, rather those powers wliich are expressed as necessary and incidental to thopurposesof federation, and not those which come within the largo range of powers included in such a clause as exists in constitutions giving the residuary power to tlie general l^ody. If that is tlie intention, you cannot carry it out without giving adequate power to both your houses, because, by so much as you 414 Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] JiesohUions. depart from that, if you give too much power to the senate, you tend to exalt the federal idea to the suppression of the national idea ; and if you do the converse, as the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, I am afraid, wishes to do, you tend to exalt the national idea in the direction of unification or amalgamation, to the destruction of the federal idea. That, I am sure, is not the mandate which hon. members bear from their respective parliaments ; it is not the mandate which any one of our parliaments has given us. We are told in that man- date — reading behind the words in which that mandate is couched— ^we are told that the kind of federation which Australia will tolerate, the kind of federation which I hope it may grow to love, is that which does not suppress or tend to minimise the powers of the several states beyond those matters which are expressly taken away from them. Then, I submit that by so much as you diminish that portion of the sum of repre- sentation of a citizen which lies in the senate, you will exalt the national and diminish the federal principle ; by so much as you topple over on the other side you are doing precisely the converse. Then, what you have to do is to see that you do jus- tice, and to do justice in this matter can never be consummated by bringing about such an engi-ossment of power into the hands of a national body as would result in the minimising of the states who have never given any such mandate to their repi-esenta- tives. On that ground we are entitled and bound to reportastrong senate to ourparlia- ments as a desirable provision in the consti- tution. I submit that if we take away from the senate the power of vetoing money bills, unless they veto them altogether, we shall so cripple that body, that we shall not be able to report to our parliaments that which I believe they want. It is all very well to talk about the struggles that have taken place. It has been said that the whole of the struggle in England has [J/r. Barton. been " to wrest from irresponsible power the right to deal with taxation and the revenues of the country." There is no en- deavour to give to an irresponsible power the right to deal with taxation and the re- venues of the country. If there is anybody who doubts that I would refer him to the resolution which we are considering, and which, referring to the senate, says : So securing to the body itself a perpetual ex- istence combined with definite responsibility to the electors. The doctrine of the denial of interference in any way with money bills springs out of the maxim that taxation and representa- tion shall go hand in hand. Where you have two representative bodies, then to the extent of the proportion of representation which you give the second chamber, you are entitled, having faith in that maxim to give it the power of interference with money bills. Now we are told that such a provision as this cannot be grafted on to any constitution in a British land. I would ask the hon. member, Mr. Clark, what he thinks of that, because, if I remember rightly, there has been a power of amend- ment in the Constitution of Tasmania ; and although there may have been little tiffs, as there are sometimes between mar- ried prople, still, the constitution of that country on the whole has worked well. There has been no deviation from the prin- ciple of responsible government, and it ex- ists with a power in its upper chamber — too large apower, perhaps, to confer on an upper chamber under the circumstances — which has not tended to the subversion of re- sponsible government, and which has cer- tainly not been any impediment to the smooth and constitutional working of it. Therefore, if we appeal to experience, we have, at any rate in this direction, one clear experience. Mr. Burgess: It has been for the general good ! Mr. Fysu : South Australia also ! Federal Comtitution: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 415 Mr. BARTOX: In South Australia there is a degree of experience in the same direction ; but I am not going to enter into that matter. In Tasmania there is a perfectly well-defined experience in the same direction, that is, as connected with the working of responsible government, and that of itself seems to solve a great many of the difficulties which hon. gentle- men have felt when they have suggested that the giving of powers of amendment or veto in detail to a second chamber is incompatible with the working of respon- sible government. It cannot be so. We have proved that it is not so in the work- ing of the matter. Mr. MuNRO : Would the hon. member say that the South Australian upper house can alter the details of an appropriation biin Mr. BARTOX : I was not saying any- thing of the kind. I was appealing to the Constitution of Tasmania which contains the power of amendment. Sir Jonx Bray : Does the hon. member say that it expressly contains the power of amendment? Mr. BARTON : I believe that there is some power in that direction. Sir JouN BuAY : Does the hon. member say that the constitution expressly vests the power of amendment in the council in Tasmania ? Mr. BARTON : In Tasmania, if I re- collect, Mr. Fysu : The power is an implied one, but the practice is such ! Mr. BARTON : The point is not a very important one, because the question is as to the working of responsible government where the power of amendment is exer- cised, and if the upper chamber in Tas- mania has been in the habit of exercising the power of amendment — sometimes the ujiper house have done it even lierc, and have survived, notwithstanding all they have heard by way of withering denuncia- tion of themselves Colonel Smith : That is the worst of it — they do survive ! Mr. BARTON : That is a matter of opinion. I always notice that the time of practical politicians generally comes when they have done representing such places as Ballarat, and take a seat in the nominee or upper chamber ; and we always find that on those occasions there is a singular silence on subjects of this kind. Colonel Smith : We have no nominee chamber there. It is elective ! Mr. BARTON : I know it is, and I re- collect that a very popular leader, under whom my hon. friend served, has found occasion of late years to sigh for a nominee chamber in the interest of democracy. Mr. MuxRO : I would not allow him ! Mr. BARTON : I know that my hon. friend, Mr. Munro, would not allow him if he could help it. My hon. friend, Mr. Munro, when we were yesterday discuss- ing, and he was saying something on the subject of those powers, said, " We have the representatives of the larger colonies joining to insist on this." Some one made an interjection with reference to the dele- gates of New South Wales, and his answer was, " Those others are members of the Legislative Council." Mr. MuNUG : In Victoria ! Mr. BARTON : I thought with regard to New South Wales too, Mr, ]\IuNRO : I said nothing about New South Wales ! Mr. BARTON : It does not matter whether it applies to New Soutli Wales or to Victoria. But I should like to know whether my l)on. friend, Mr. Munro, is under the impression that tlic argument of a member of this Convention, duly sent here under powers which he recognises, is weakened by the fact that he belongs to cither a nominee or an elective upper house. If he thinks that the argument 416 Federal Constitution : [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions- is weakened, and thinks less of it for that reason, I ask wliether he imputes a motive to those who belong to nominee chambers 1 Mr. MuKRO : I was not talking of nom- inee chambers at all ! 3rr. BARTON: I w'ill say with regard to elective chambers. Has the lion, member found that the advocacy of the principle of representation of the states in fair strength in the federal senate is confined to members of the elective house in Victoria 1 Has he found that in his reading, or that the large body of authorities who have dealt ably with this question, and whom one cannot read too closely, are strongly in favour of the granting of such powers to second chambers where the federal principle pre- vails, and have added their own meed of admiration of the ability, the vigour, and the touch kept with the people on the part of ihe Senate of the United States. With- out talking of making any mere transcript, let us look at this one fact — that, with a people perhaps the most democratic in the world, we find that their veneration and respect for that chamber, their confidence in it, is not only as great as it is for what is called the popular chamber, but is even greater. That is a sufficient answer by itself to any argument based on the mere question of the support of a certain conviction by a member of an elective upper house. But, going back from that, I come now to what was said by my hon. friend. Colonel Smith. My hon. friend expressed a great deal of dread as to what would happen if the smaller colonies were intrusted through their representatives in the senate with the powers here claimed ; and he pointed out that, w^ith respect to other matters, he was in accord with the resolution, which ofFered them equal re- p^resentation on the senate ; but he wished to confine their powers with regard to money bills. Well, if he has confidence in their patriotism in this regard, and if he admits that under the resolution to [J/r. Barton. which he has assented, or a portion of which, at any rate, may be said to have passed its second reading, they are to be representative bodies — representative of the states which send them there — why should he for a moment decline to place in their hands with regard to money legisla- tion some modicum of the power which he would give them with regard to general legislation 1 Colonel Smith : A modicum, but not the whole ! Mr. BAPtTON : The hon. member is walling to give them that which is practi- cally of no effect. I may as well point out now what is so frequently the result. I am not going to argue from what I am about to say that upper houses elsewhere should have these powers of amending or vetoing in detail money bills, because that is beside the present question. But we have found that where that power is denied the friction is greater than where the power is granted, and the necessity of the case points out "vvhy the fric- tion is greater — because, where the power is denied, the immense probability in a large class of cases of money bills is that, wdiere there is a matter of principle in- volved, aflfecting rights which they think should be conserved — this is a very im- portant matter when you come to con- sider it with regard to a federal senate — the result of confining the power of veto to veto en bloc is this : either a good mea- sure of public policy is lost, because with- out rejecting it the second chamber cannot preserve the rights which it has in its keeping, or the measure of public policy is passed for the sake of its policy ; and in passing it, the right or principle which should be conserved for the public safety is utterly sacrificed. That result cannot be good, for in seeking federation there would be sacrifice either of the public policy of the nation or of the interest of the state, and if there is a way out of Federal Constilution: [17 March, 1891. j Hesolutiotis. 417 the difficulty by which that sacrifice need not occur, why should we not adopt it ? I do not say any more than the hon. mem- ber, Sir John Bray, says, that this power of veto should be final and conclusive. Let us set our ingenuity to work ; let us appoint a committee on that subject, if need be, to find out some means of accommoda- ting this conflict. But do not let us talk about packing our portmanteaux tlie first difficulty we see. When people see lions in the path the best thing for them is to drop tlieir portmanteaux and not to pack them. Colonel Smith : The hon. member can- not get over the carpet bag I :Mr. BARTON: I cannot. When I have heard my genial friend, Colonel Smith, speak of his enjoyment of his stay in Sydney tlie idea of his taking flight in that way causes me more astonishment than I am prepared to express. There is one thing I should like to instanceasthrowingconsider- ableliglituponthisquestion. Supposingthat some of the threats we have heard were ful- filled. Supposing, for instance, that a jot too much power in the estimation of my hon. friend, Mr. Munro, and his coUeagues, were conferred on the federal senate — that jot which was a little bit too much for them — and tliat this exodus did take place, and we were unable to form this federation from the want of our hon. friends. What wouli] be the result of that ? It cannot bo sup[)0sed that these colonies would keep apart always. T am not going to threaten my hon. friend, Mr. Munro, as a certain other colony was threatened yesterday, with the formation of another and an out- side federation. i»ut I am going to sup- pose this case : that thinking better of the policy of entire isolation some fivo or si.x years hence — I hope, of course, he will still be in olhce, and that there will be a coali- tion ministry including my otlicr two hon. friends — Victoria has alway.s been sup- j posed to be the colony most eager for ' federation ; and supposing that it became 2 D again ready for federation with New South Wales, after the sudden death of the principle in its heart, after the space of five years, what would happen then? By that time, at the present rate of increase in the population of the respective colo- nies, the j^opulation of Victoria would be 1,250,000, and that of New South Wales, as nearly as possible, would be 1,500,000. A popular assembly, formed at the ratio of one member to every 25,000 persons, would give sixty representatives to New South Wales and fifty representatives to Victoria. Now, supposing the two colonies came to terms, and had a little convention of their own, just as we are holding oui' Convention to-day, but on a much smaller scale. We should then have the question of the powei'S of the senate taken into consideration. It would, of coui'se, be conceded by New South Wales, as it is conceded to-day, that the representation in the senate should be equal ; but if my hon. friend, Sir Henry Parkes — supposing him then still to be leading the cause of federation, as we all trust he may be if it is not accomplished in the meantime — said, as he would say to-day, "Your senate may have the power of rejection. The senate in which we are equally repre- sented may have the power of rejection ; the house of representatives shall have the sole power of origination, and there shall be no power of amendmont," what would be the retort of Victoria? "Your sixty representatives in the lower chamber would swamp our fifty, and where should we be?" I imagine, whether my hon. friend remained in oflicc until then or not, we .should ha\ e a very prompt recognition — not only a recognition, but a very prompt and sturdy assertion -of the jirinciple of state rights as far as it is involved in giving the power of veto in detail. Mr. Munro : Not a bit of it! Mr. BARTON : My hon. friend thinks not. Let him wait until he comes to that 418 Federal Constitution : [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. position, if ho ever doos. T would suggest to him that instead of raising that diffi- culty, he should accept a reasonable solu- tion of this question. Let us appoint a select committee Mr. MuNRO : Let us have it ! Mr. BARTON : Let us inquire calmly into the matter, and let us have no more talk of catching the express in a hurry. Mr. MuNRO : No one talked about that but the lion, member and the colonel ! Mr. BARTON : I have not the least doubt that the colonel is a remarkably faithful representative of his colleagues. I therefore submit, taking this matter as a whole, that while reasonable compromise should be acceded to, there should still be preserved that in one of these chambers. of a number of propositions which might well engage the attention of the Commit- tee, and that, therefore, vre ought not to bo keeping our backs too stiff upon this matter. Sir, we ought to entertain a reasonable probability, when we are tak- ing this matter a step further, which "we may well very soon do, that a compromise will be effected which will enable us to deal with other lions in the path, and will not force us to go back to those who have sent us here to tell them that we have falsified their hopes and met with a failure disastrous in itself, and all the more ignominious because it arose from mere irritation and jealousy. Mr. ^VRTXON : I think the Conven- tion is very much indebted to the hon. and learned member, Mr. Barton, for his I which will represent the federal principle some power of dealing with money bills to temperate and able speech, and I shall cer- such an extent as will arrest the course of tainly endeavour to emulate him in his legislation, if need be, in favour of state interests, and in the coui'se of arresting it will not cause the friction, the irritation, and the jealousy which will result from the temper. I thoroughly agree with him that we should all be covered with dis- credit if we were to go back to our differ- ent parliaments without arriving at a solu- losing of large measures of policy for the tion of the difficulty which is now prc- sake of an amendment. I do not throw sentcd to us. I think I can assure the this out as a suggestion ; but suppose that hon. and leai-ned member that he has the power of veto in detail were not exer- taken somewhat too seriously the allusions cisable after the specific matter on which it was exercised once had been made the subject of a general election, so that after the ascertainment of the popular will a bill were sent up again involving the same matter. I do not suggest it as the best way of settling the difficulty, but it is one suggestion which no doubt will present itself to a committee. Suppose it to be accompanied also by some provi- likely to depart. If it was seriously sion of this kind : That lest the non-inter- said, all we can say is : "Brothers, we have vention of a general election should cause both been in the wrong." I think we ai-e continued friction there should be no all agreed that we must come to some sol u- veto in detail for a greater number of tion of the question. The anxiety which times than twice. I do not say that would has been shown by my hon. colleagues from settle the question. I do not say that, on Victoria on the question of finance and thinking it out, it is a proposition to which state rights, I hope the Convention will I should be ready to accede. I say it is one excuse when it bears in mind the fact that \Mr. Barton. that were made, if they were made, to portmanteaux. I am not aware that tliey were seriously made on one side ; but if they were seriously made on one side, I certainly have some little recollection of a similar reference on the other side, and that some hon. membeis on both sides seemed to say that unless their particu- lar views were secured they would be Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] Itesolations. 419 v.liile we represent the states or the colo- nies of Australia, we do not in this Con- •\ention really represent the peoples. The smallest pi'ovince in Australia sends to this Convention precisely the same num- ber of representatives as does the largest, and, therefore, if we think we notice, or if v/e fear we see any tendency to ignore the views of great masses of men, we must be excused when it is remembered that those great masses of men are not adequately represented here. I am sure that will not in the least detract from the fairness and consideration which every hon. mem- ber will give to the problems submitted to the Convention. But we are now sitting like the senate of the future constitution, as opposed to the house of repi-esentatives. A very different tone and a very different complexion of thedifficulties presented tous would prevail here, I imagine, if we had liere 100 representatives representing all the peoples. Therefore, our anxiety is that we are liere, as it were, merely representing the states. We should not run away too much witli the one view and ignore the other, be- cause we Tiiust Ijear in mind that we can- not carry this tiling, as we are resolved, I trust, to do, unless we have behind us the support of the masses of the people. No support of large territories will do it. We must bo supported Ijy tlie masses of the people in this country. Tf we display any heat at all it is bccau.ne we arc anxious that we .sliould not now come to a conclu- sion or settlement wliicli afterwards would not be approved by the public generally, and which, therefore, would not be carried through. Now I thoroughly agree with the hon. mem1)('r,^Ir. Barton, that we mustscttlo this question, and 1 think lie left open a very important avenue for settlement when he made this concession which I must beg leave to say all the advocates on that side have not made — that lie admitted that the final power in all matters must rest witli the house of representatives. I think if that position be taken, if it be accepted, there can be but little difficulty in our being able to work out a solution. Because that is all that we say. We do not claim that the house of representatives should be able at once, and in a hurried way to enforce its view even in the case of money bills ; but all Vv-e say is that the ultimate decision upon all bills — money bills of course included — must rest with the representative house ; and in so say- ing I claim the opinion expressed by the hon. member, Mr, Barton, as bearing out that view. Kow, the difficulty into which v.e are led, with regard to the claims of the senate to amend money bills, arises from the fact that we do not sufficiently recognise the difference between money bills and general legislation. You will obserA'e that it is agreed on all sides that we are not about to adopt the American Constitution. That is not proposed. If it were proposed, one result, of course, would be that the government of the day would be elected directly by the masses of the people, and in such a case you may do as you like with legislation between the two houses. In such a case you will ob- serve that the states, for whose rights many of us are now so anxious, would have com- paratively little to say in the election of the government, because they would be elected by the masses of the people. If you do not propose to adopt that form of government, you propose to keep to the English forni — the system of responsible government, and when you talk of giving an equal power to the upper hou.se with regard to money and other bills we think you do not recognise the difference between finan- cial and general legislation. It has in fact been denied by an eminent authority that finance is legislation at all, because it is concerned with the carrying on of evcry-day government. It cannot wait ; the govern- ment must go on. Money must bo found, and the body that really controls finance 420 Federal Constitution : [17 Mauoji, 1S91.] Resolutions. \inqucstional)Iy controls the government. Our difficulty is that if you give up to your upper house uniler this English system the right not merely to reject any money bill — a right to be exercised in some great emergency — but also the right to eliminate items, you arc giving them a right that -svill be inconsistent with the carrying on of the system ; because, by so doing, you would make the upper house really masters of the government. I put it to any hon. frentlemen who have held office in their own colonies -whether they would be willing to carry on government with a similar right, on the part of their upper houses, a right you will observe, specially given by the proposed bill to your senate for the purpose of vindicating the rights of the states 1 It would be not merely the right, but tlie duty of the senate, to exercise their power of revising the appropriation act, or any money bill, in every case in Aviiich they thought the interests of any state were concerned. I ask hon. gentle- men who have carried on government in their provinces, whether they would be willino: to carry on the English svstem of government with the same powers in re- gard to money bills on the part of the lower and the upper houses. Mr. GoRDOX : There is no analogy ! 3Ir. WPtlXON : There is an analogy if you attempt to woik the English form of government ; because what I say is this : that if you attempt to cany on that form of government, it will be impossilile to re- tain this power on the part of the senate. In the proposed dominion act you would go out of your way to give special power to the senate to eliminate any item from a money bill — say it was a customs bill — to which it objected. I ask whether you could carry on government sati-sfactorily upon such a footing? AVould not the house having that power really control the govern- ment ? Remember, it is to have the power of finally saying what shall be done [Jl/>-. Wrixon. as to this and that item — items all of which may be necessary for the carrying on of every-day government ; and I ask again — could government be carried on satisfactorily by a body of men responsible to tlie lower house, and yet liable to have their financial measures dealt with in such a way by the upper house 1 The scheme would not work. We heard just now about Tasmania and South Australia. All I can say is that I am not aware that any such right as this has been exercised, and it undoubtedly will be exercised if it bo given in this instance. If you give to the senate under your new constitution the power and right to protect the states, as it is suggested, it will unquestionably be exer- cised frequently and freely, and I do not say that it ought not to be so exercised, if given. I am not aware, I repeat, that sucli a power has been exercised in South Australia or Tasmania : but even if it has, I doubt Avhother although it may be exercised h\ smaller communities, it would be followed in the case of the big government and community formed under our new consti- tutions. Therefore, I think we ought to be slow to seek to grant final powers of this kind to the senate. Here, I find my- self coming very near to the hon. member, Mr. Barton, because if he admits that this power of checking on the part of the senate whether it be by eliminating or amending — however you like to put it — if he admits tliat that power is to be exer- cised only temporarily, and that final power is to rest with the house of representatives — if he admits that, it is only a matter of detail as to how we shall work the matter out, because we do not claim for the house of representatives power to pass anything it likes at once and without demur or hesita- tion. What we want is some assurance that the final powder of control with regard to finance shall not be vested in a house which certainly Avould not represent the people of the connnunity, for however you Federal CoiistUalion: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 421 may put it, however you may desire to J reserve state rights, you must recollect that state rights can only be the rights of the people living in the state. ^Vhen you have Queensland and Western Australia — as you will probably liave them — cut up into smaller states, you will have a large number of small states represented in the senate, but their representatives will, at the same time, represent a very small proportion of people indeed. There- fore, if you are willing to give them this control over finance, which is the engine of government, you will be handing over the control from a large majority of the people to a very small minority. Now, I will not go into the question of whether the suggestion thrown out bv the hon. member, Mr. Barton, would be the best to adopt. I think it is a very valuable sug- gestion. I may say that, in consultation with some of my friends from Victoria, the idea had occurred to us, although I think there is not merely that way, but many other ways which I need not now particularise, in which we can come to a solution, if we would only accept the platform of the hon. member, Mr. Barton, that finality must rest with the Jiouse of representatives. If we accept tljat plat- form, I think the machinery can bo easily worked out, for wc never contended for any- thing more than that tlie liouse of rej)re- sentative.s should have its way as to these matters after a decent and reasonable in- terval. With regard to the ordinary ap- propriation bill rcfjuired for every year's service, that of course docs not ailmit of delay. I will ivA ihlaiii the Convention, but 1 ask lion, gentlemen, who^wish for stale riglits, and who arc anxious to see tliem carried out, not to insist too far or too strongly upon views such as sonic of their advocates have ptit] forward. You ought to take either one course or the otiier. If you are not satisfied with the English system of responsible govern- ment and boldly profess to adopt the Amei'ican svstem, then I can understand the position — and I think there is a great deal to be said for that ; but if you do not propose to do that, I submit it is a mistake to seek to get greater control for the states by giving them power to interfere irrevoc- ably and perpetually with the finances of the day. I would venture to repeat the suggestion I made before, that you ought to look for strength for the small states — and I would not wish to see them over- borne by the lai'ger states — but there are directions in which you can get greater weight and authority for the states than by following the American model, which would not suit and would not work with our constitution. For example, I would be quite with you in giving the smaller states a larger proportion of representa- tion in the lower house — of course, up to a certain limit. With a large number of smaller states, having a considerable repre- sentation, you would soon have constituted in the lower house an important party which no government could afford to disre- gard ; because the position in the dominion parliament would be that of a government seated on the ministerial benches, anxious to retain office, anxious to carry on success- fidly, and how could they do that except by acting justly to the people of the whole do- minion ? Theie would lie an important party representing the smaller states — though, of course, not .so large as that representing the larger states — and the idea that the two larger states would be united together against the smaller states is evidently erroneous, because the two larger states would have their rivalries between them- selves which would prevent them from uniting and liarassing the others. J, for one, though I have heard many disapprove of the idea, should not be sorry to see .some pro[)Osal adopted to the effect that not more tlian a certain number of ministers should be chosen from the larger states, 422 Federal Constitution : [17 March, 1891.] liesolutions. so as if possible to secure in the ministry tljo presence of representatives of the smaller states. But if we are going to retain the responsible system of govern- ment, I would urge lion, members not to insist upon this power of finance which has been claimed by some delegates, though not by the hon. member, Mr. Barton. I would ask them not to insist upon that, but to join in meeting us in a compromise of this dililculby which will do what Mr. Barton has said he is willing to do — leave the ultimate pov.-er in the hands of the house of representatives. Sir GEORGE GREY : I listened with very great pleasure indeed to the speech made by the hon. member, Mr. Bti,rton, but on some points I thought he v/as - hardly sufficiently diffuse. He pointed out to us very strongly that it would be unjustiiiable under any circumstances to say that any members should leave this Convention in a state of hopelessness of achieving anything. But he admitted one point. He himself raised a question the other night vvdiich made it very doubtful whether members would not be justified under certain circumstances in withdraw- ing. I understand from him that it is, in his opinion, extremely doubtful if we have any power to provide a federal constitution for the states. We were distinctly told that we were to provide a federal consti- tution generally, and in addition to that we are told by our own resolutions that we are to provide a federal parliament — to really constitute a separate federal legis- lature — and that there our powers end, and that in point of fact the various states are to be left under their present constitu- tions to achieve such form of government as those constitutions Avill permit them to attain. That is nothing more or less than to say that we are forbidden to give to Australasia at large a federal constitution suited to the states and to the federal go- vernment. If we have no power to give [Mr. Wrixon. such a constitution to the states, I say we have been deprived of the most essential power of all, for it must be admitted, 1 thiidc, that the majority of the states, at least at the present moment, are under constitutions which arc not of such a liberal character tliat their people have a fair hope of achieving such a constitution as is their right, unless we in this Con- vention have the power of recommending — because that is our sole power — -what the federal constitution of the states should be ; and to say that vre are not to be permitted to recommend such a thing as that is to say virtually that we ought not to sit here, and that we have no power at all, for I am sure that no one but an enemy to what I should call human free- dom, such as the world sighs for at the l)resent day — no person but an enemy to that freedom would contend that v.'e ought to insist upon setting up a federal constitution of a kind which excludes the consideration of the states. I think that the great error we are making throughout is this : that we have not sufficient confi- dence in o]ie another, and in the work to which we are called. If we have confi- dence in one another, then, I say that we should not fetter the coming legislature by any conditions that we can possibly avoid; we should simply give them an entirely free constitution, freer, perhaps, than has ever before been given, and then leave them to work out the details of the con- stitution under which they find they can properl}^ fulfil their duties. Can any one believe that in the present state of the world, when one of the greatest move- ments v^hich has been in existence since the time of the reformation is sweeping in vraves over every country — can they be- lieve that a time has not arrived in which men should arise to lead that movement forward, to make it beneficial to man- kind, and not to incur the least risk of letting contests, feuds, and wars arise Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 423 from the movement which is iu existence? the legislature in some of our colonies and It is iu our power now to give an ex- in other places will avoid quarrels of this ample as to what should be done in this kind ; that they will feel a new epoch has respect. It is in our power by having arisen ; that new laws are required ; that confidence in ourselves, in our ability to nevv customs should prevail ; that they do achieve a work of this kind, to do that not wish to follow the English system ; which may really benefit the whole human that they do not wish to follow the race ; and I would remind hon. gentlemen American system ; but that they wish to of this, that it has been invariably found, create an Australasian system suited to iu times of great movements of the public a new country, a new climate, with a new mind, such as I speak of, that there do raceof men made up of many nations. Such ai-ise men, and I believe such men sit here, is the case with the inhabitantsof this coun- who are capable of guiding and directing try who have obeyed laws of a new nature a movement of the kind. A nobility seems and new kind, and who have given ex- to be given to human nature, a greatness amples to the older nations of the world, to human thought, a persistency to human Let us give to the men who are to repre- labour, which breeds up and brings out sent such a people, called together in such men fitted to meet great waves of move- times, every power that we possibly can, ment of the kind which are now going on and trust and believe — I am sure our iu the world. If we attempt to fetter the trust and belief will be justified — that the federal parliament which we arc creating, coming men will use the powers given to by depriving them of any powers what- them wisely, and we shall only do harm ever, we shall be dealing unjustly with if we try to fetter them in the way I have them, and we shall be dealing unjustly heard proposed by many. I, therefore, with ourselves, for we shall not be fulfill- shall vote for those who will give all powers ing those great duties to which we have to the coming federated 'parliament, and been called. I say, let us not attempt who will do their utmost iu no way to iu any way to define their powers where fetter them or control their line of action, we can avoid doing so. Let us not at- Mr. PLAYFORD : If we give all powers tempt to impo.se any fetters upon them to the members of the senate because wc where wc can possibly avoid doing so. believe that they will act fairly and do Let us with generosity trust that in this their duty to the state, cannot the same new federal parliament which wc wish to argument be applied to the house of repre- call into existence there will be found sentatives ] Cannot we say that wc shall those natural leaders of men whom the cir- e(|ually trust them, because they will be cunistances of the time will undoubtedly men who will do their duty, and do their call forth. I, therefore, certainly .shall, as best for the interests of this great country? far as my vote depends, give it in favour With regard to the amendment now bc- of giving to the .senate all powers which fore us — that of the hon. member, Sir John arc proposed to be given to them now. Downer — hon.meuibcrsliavearguedas if he not to limit them in any respect what- intended to coujjIo responsible govcrument ever, and to believe that amongst that with his amendment, lie proposes that the senate will be found men of sufiicicnt senate .should have powers almost equal to nobility and greatness of character to use those of the house of reprcsentjitives ; Ijut their powers solely for the public good ; he docs not propose that these two houses that they, benefited by the examjilcs given shall be worked by an executive under by quarrels between the two branches of respouf-ible government. lie proposes to 424 Federal Const ihU'ton: [17 March, 1891.] liesolutions. adopt tlie Swiss system in framing the con- stitution, and, therefore, the arguments brought forward, that he is proposing some- thing that cannot be worked under respon- sible government, falls to the ground, be- cause he does not propose any such foolish thing. He considers that if we give two houses coequal powers, "we must have another kind of government in place of the British constitutional form of government — the responsible form of government. The hon. member, therefore, proposes that, nnder the federal constitution, we shall have an executive elected by both houses, and then ifc may possibly work. In my first speech on the resolutions as a whole I pointed out that it appeared to me almost impossible to work responsible government with two houses practically coequal in power ; that the ministry of the day wonld be bound to obey and be responsible to one house only. We have trouble enough now to carry on work for any length of time with responsibility to only one house. If we had responsibility to two houses, the ups and downs would be m;ich more fre- quent. I have heard nothing to shake my belief that if we have two houses practi- cally coequal in power, we shall not be able to work responsible government with them. It is said that the houses will not be co- equal, because money bills can only be in- itiated in the house of representatives. I would point out that that is a very small power indeed. In carrying on the govern- ment of the country, money bills must be introduced, money must be got somewhere, and although the money bill originates in the lower house, it must, as a matter of course, go before the senate. If the senate has the power of amendment, it has prac- tically the power of deciding what shall be the form of taxation under which we shall live. Therefoi-e, the argument that the two houses will not be coequal, be- cause the power of initiating money bills will be confined to the lower houseamounts [J//-. Playford. to nothing. It has been said that we have been working under a system of re- sponsible government in the little island of Tasmania, and also on the mainland in South Australia where the legislative councils have the right to amend money bills. I do not know what is done in Tas- mania, but I know that in South Aus- tralia the Legislative Council has no right to amend money bills, and the Legislative Assembly has never allowed them to do it under any circumstances. I believe the same words are in the constitutions of both colonie.s, and also in the Constitution of Canada at the present time — that is that only in the lower house shall money bills be initiated — nothing more is specified. But whathasbeenthepractice? We contend that under the constitutional form of govern- ment which we bring from the old mother country, although all money bills must be initiated in the lower house, and alchough it may be argued that that does not take away the riglit from the upper house to amend money bills, yet the analogy of the House of Lords and the House of Commons must be carried out in this country. The lower house has denied the right of the Council to amend money bills, and there was a very severe struggle over it. The result was a com2:)romise. The Assembly said, " If you (the Council) feel strongly that you would like to amend any particu- lar bill which comes before you, you can senda message tothe Assemblystatingwhat vou desire, and suggesting the amendment which you would like to .see made ; and the Legislative Assembly will then say whether or not they agree with the suggestion." Mr. GoRDOX : If they do not agree, what happens? Mr. PLAYFORD : Then the Council generally pass the bill, and do not trouble themselves much about it. Mr. Fysh : What provision does your special act of Parliament make if such cir- cumstances arise ? Federal Constitution: [17 Makcii, 1801.] Resolutions. 42.5 Mr. PLAYFORD : It is simply a stand- ing order, and not an act of Parliament. Tliere is a special standing order providing the mode in wbicli these measures shall originate in one house and be sent up to the other. Mr. Fysh : Here is the act of Parliament ! Mr. PLAYFORD : This has nothing to do with amending monev bills. It is sim- ply an act to issue writs for the election of members. We have a provision that when in two sessions of Parliament the Legisla- tive Council refuse to pass bills which the lower house has passed, we can dissolve a certain portion of the Council, and send them to their constituents. jMr. Fysii : This act was passed because of their interference with money bills ! Mr. PLAYFORD : AVe have the power, when the lower house for two sessions run- ning pass a measure which is rejected by the upper house, if an election has inter- vened, of dissolving the whole of the Legis- lative Council, and sending them to their constituents, or of dissolving a part of that liouse, or of asking the constituencies to elect eight new members. ^Ir. Fvsii : That relates to money bills, as well as to other bills ! Mr. PLAYFORD : Tiiat is not the point. The point upon which I am argu- ing is that we do not allow the Legislative Council to amend money bills. We only allow them to make suggestions, which is a very diflerent thing, indeed, from the right of amendment. Ml'. CuTiinEitT : Would the hon. mem- bor allow the senate to make sufrj'e.s- 'ons ? Mr. PLAYFORD: Y'es, I .should not have the slightest oVyection to the senate making suggestions to the house of reprc- •ntatives — in fact, I know that a l»ill has brru draftccl by the hon. member, Mr. Kingston, in which the right cf the senate to make suggestions if they like is pre- •^•"rved. But there is one point wliich we must not overlook, and which it would be well to decide before we consider the powei'S to be given to the senate, and that is, who ai"e to elect them 1 Mr. Mlxro : Hear, hear ! That is the serious point ! I\Ir. PLAY'FORD : It is a very serious point, because if they are to be elected in the way in which I think they ought to be elected, and that is, not directly by the people but by the elect of the people, I believe that we cannot follow a better course than that which has been adopted by the Americans with regard to their Senate. In the election of members to the American Senate, each state by their own legislators elect their representatives. Dr. CoCKBURX : Those elected by nomi- nee houses could not be elected by the elect of the people ! Mr. PLAY'FORD : There is a little trouble thei'e, but even in that case we must leave the colonies themselves to decide whether they will or will not have nominee houses. If the great mass of the people are opposed to the principle of nominee houses they can soon get rid of them ; but if they ai'e willing to put up with them, I do not know that it is for us to dictate to any colony the form of local government which it shall adopt. Therefore, if we say that we will give the states the power of electing, through theirlocal representatives, the representatives to the senate, we sliall have to give the nominated hou.ses in New South Wales and in Queensland a share at all events along with the house of assembly in the election of tliose meniber.s, as we .shall give to tlie elective upper liouses in the other colonies, tlieir riglit to elect them. But I contend that if they are to be elected by the people and l>y districts you may almost woik your federal government with ono jionsc, because the one house would simply be a reflex of the other, and you do not want an absolute reflex in your senate of the house of reiircsentatives. I think, I2G Federal Conslitution: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. therefore, tliat we had a great deal better decide how the senate is to be elected be- fore we decide what powers we shall give it. If its members are to be elected directly by the people in the various states, they will only reflect to a very consider- able extent the people's voice, and you may give them more power than you would if they were elected by the state legisla- tures. If they are to be elected by the state legislatures, I think you might give them less power. My own idea is that the resolution moved by the hon. member, Sir Henry Piirkes, so far as state rights and state interests are concerned, gave all necessary power to the senate, except that it did not provide against that most objec- tionable practice by which upper houses have been attempted to be, and sometimes have been, coerced — that is, the tacking on to money bills a number of measures to which the lower house knew that the legislative council very seriously objected, and of which they would not otherwise approve. I think that if we protect the interest of the states by giving them equal representation in the senate, no matter what their population is, and if we give the senate the right to reject any money bill they may receive from the lower house, surely, with the majorities which they will have there, the rights of the smaller states throughout Australia will be sufficiently protected. If we give larger rights to the senate than have been proposed by the hon. member, Sir Henry Parkes, we shall make the difficulty of re- sponsible government greater and greater in proportion to the extra powers that Ave give, until we make the upper house co- equal, or practically co-equal. I can tell hon. members that we shall not be able to work the ordinary form of responsible go- vernment with two houses having such powers. I think if something in the shape of the suggestion made by my hon. col- league. Sir John Bray, were adopted, it [^fr. rimjford. would meet the case. That is, if the senate say that in the introduction of certain measures something is joined to them which they would like to consider separately, apart ^frora these measures, they can pass a resolution stating that, in their belief, it interferes v.-ith state rights and interests, and they can ask that the matter be introduced in a separate bill. That will prevent the tacking on, it may be to a loan bill, of a number of heavy items Yv^hich would have to be expended in different parts of the dominion, and some of which might trench somewhat upon state rights and state interests. The senate will have the right to say, " We desire that a certain portion of this bill should be sent up to us as a separate mea- sure," and that measure will be considered upon its merits without any connection with the other portion of the loan bill. I contend tliat so long as you preserve the senate from the liability of having to con- sider an appropriation bill or any other measure on to which are tacked certain objectionable matters which they would like to consider separately, and so long as you give them the right to say, "We should like to consider these matters separately," they have all the right, and ail the power for which they ought to ask, and which they ought to expect, unless the Commit- tee are prepared to go the whole length of the proposition of the hon. member. Sir John Downer, and to say, "Give them all rights, do away with responsible govern- ment, and work the government on the lines of the Swiss Confederation." And, mind you, there is a great deal to be said for the Sv/iss Confederation. It has worked well since 18-18. They elect the ministry from the members of Parliament after the general election. It has a life of three years, and no two members of it are to be taken from one state. Mr. MuNRO : They have altered it very much since then ! Federal Constitution : [17 MArx'n, 1891.] Resolutions. 427 Mr. PLAYFORD : They liave altered it in one or two directions, but not very much. It has been altered more in regard to the referendum. In the first instance, a referendum was only allowed with le- gard to the alteration of the constitution, and not with regard to general subjects ; but they have enlarged the power of refer- endum, and they have given some powers of initiation v.hich were not in existence before. But the main features of the executive and legislative were there be- fore. They have two houses, which when they meet together after a general election choose a ministry for three years. These ministers retire from Parliament and form v.-hat, I think, is called the general coun- ciL Other men are elected in their place. Ministers have the right to speak, though not to vote, in either of the two branches of the legislature. Tiic ministers meet together and decide upon the measures v/hich they will introduce ; and, consider- ing the diiference in race and in religion which there is amongst the members of that federal state, the constitution has worked admirably. They have v/orked it exceed- ingly well, and to the admiration of every writer I have read who has written on the subject; and there is agreatdeal to be said in favour of the projto.sal of the hon. mem- ber, Sir John Downer, in that direction. I believe, however, that tlie people of this country are not prepared for that ; they will be more likely to give their adhesion to a constitution upon old and familiar lines, in preference to one upon lines with whicli tlicy arc not so familiar, I only trust that wc .shall bo able to arrive at .some compromise l)y which the people, through their representatives, will be, as they ou"ht and must be in every democratic country, the final arbitrators in any conflict between the two houses. I understand tliat the lion, member, Mr. Barton, is quite pre- pared to allow the people, in the long run, to decide. He has given w.ny to that ex- tent ; therefore, I do not see why we should not be able to arrive at some com- promise by which we shall preserve, on the one hand, the rights or the individual states, so that they shall not be ridden over rough-shod by any combination of larger states, and on the other hand pre- serving for the populous states rights and powers in the lower chamber in which they will be more largely represented. I feel certain that, v.'hatever form of constitution in that direction will be devised, some system of compromise will prevail, and that we shall find that what appear to be difiicult problems will be more easily solved than we at present imagine. We shall also perhaps find, as the Americans found in connection with their constitution, that those parts of it which were regarded with the greatest pride, and as the most perfect — that of the principle of electing the pre- sident, for example — will, in their working, turn-out to be those about which we shall be least proud. I certainly trust that we shall arrive at some arrangement Avhereby we shall preserve, on the one hand, the rights of the stale.s, so that they shall not be trampled upon, and on the other hand, the rights of the people, so that they shall not be curtailed. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The hon. gentleman who has just sat down referred to what he understood to be a suggestion by the hon. member, Mr. Barton, to the effect that in the case of a conflict between the two houses, the difficulty should be .settled, in some way or other, in accord- ance with the wislus of the hou.se of representatives. I did not understand tho hon. member to make any such suggestion. I understood him to .say that any question of that sort must ultimately be decided by the people. Of that there can be no doubt. -Mr. Plavford : That will be by the people's representatives ! Sir SAMUEL GIUFFITH : Who are the people ? The jjcople are the people of 428 Ftderal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] llesohdions. the whole of Australia. In the event of there being sucli :i strong divergence of ojMnion between the people of the smaller and the larger states that they cannot agree, and no compromise can be arrived at, there -will only be one alternative ; they will sepai-ate. jNIr. Gillies : That is not what the hon-, member, Mr. Barton, conveyed to the Committee ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: If the settlement of that question is left entirely to the majority, in the sense in which the lion, member uses it, that is, to a majority consisting of the people of the larger colo- nies, it means that in the event of a con- flict, the opinion of the larger colonies is to prevail. Mr. Playford : Not necessarily ; they may be antagonistic ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : It means that. That is, of course, equivalent to saying there is to be a revolution. ISTo system of constitution which we can frame will provide against a revolution, or against the colonies being so unfriendly that they Avill not work harmoniously together. We must face that difficulty. As has been pointed out by the hon. member, Sir Henry Parkes, all difficulties must be settled by mutual goodwill. I am afraid we are at present at cross purposes ; and I am anxious to know what are the differences of opinion between us. I think the confusion has arisen very much from talking about money bills. There is no doubt that this idea of money bills is a fetish peculiar to Australia. It is a fetish which is not worshipped in any other part of the world; it is not wor.shipped even in the United Kingdom. The circumstances there are of course quite different to what they are here. The House of Lords is a very j^ecu- liar institution — it is peculiar in its consti- tution and in its history ; and there is every reason in the world Avhy it should not interfere with the taxation of the [6'i> Samuel Griffith. people. There is no similar house in the whole world. This fetish about which we have been talking for so long a time is peculiar to Australia. How many consti- tutions are there in America 1 There are forty-two different states which have A'ari- ous constitutions ; but they all agree in giving the senates or second chambers power to deal with money matters. There is no such fetish worship there. They have the English system in Canada ; their upper house is as nearly as possible a re- production of the House of Lords, and there the powers of the senate are natur- ally and properly restricted. We find responsible govei'nmjent working with two equal houses all over the continent of Europe. It is only in Australia that this fetish has been set up and worshipped. It reminds me of a story I once heard about a celebrated New Guinea fetish, which the Hon. John Douglas had great difficulty in discovering. It was found to be in an outer wrapper as large as a good-sized carpet bag. After a great many unwindings, it was found to consist of an extremely small pebble. Nobody had ever seen it before or knew what it was. I wish to get at the heart of this trouble in regard to money bills. The term "money bill,"' is a most confusinG: term. Colonel Smith : Would the lion, mem- ber allow the senate to alter an appropria ■ tion bill 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Is it the annual appropi'iation bill, containing the ordinary supplies of the year, which is _ sought to be withdrawn from the senate 1 1 Mr. Playford ; That is one 1 Colonel Smith : Would the hon. mem- ber allow them to alter a customs bill 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : If it is the annual ajipropriation bill which is sought to be withdrawn from the senate, I do not think the matter is worth discussing. No- body would want to alter it, unless the house of representatives were to attempt Federal Co mi it alio n : [17 March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 429 to coerce the senate by putting in improper or unusual items. I want to get at what we are quarrelling about. So far as the ordinary items of an appropriation bill are concerned, I do not think the subject is woi'th half an hour's discussion. But those who have had experience of conflicts be- tween the two houses know how the lower or representative liouse refuses the right to the upper house to deal with money bills, to make amendiuents, to alter the duration, incidents, or conditions of a tax or charge, even in the smallest degree. They may not even improve the machinery or correct obvious errors in the method of collecting a tax, or the expenditure of money. Sir Joiix Bray : The ruachinery ought to be contained in a separate bill I Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : But the macliinery is not always contained in a separate bill. Xo advantages are gained by this restriction, so far as I can see. Even a very useful amendment is not al- lowed to be made. Why 1 Because, under our Constitution, the upper house haveonly certain powers, and they have been trying to exceed them, and friction has arisen, not because they were exercising powers whicjj tlioy pos.sesscd,but because they were trying to exercise powers which they did not po.s- sess. This discussion lias proceeded to a great ex tent on the assumption that if second liouses had these powers, they would al- ways 1>e exorcising them, and always bring- ing tilings to a deadlock ; but the Iiistory of all the world, without a single excep- tion, shows that that is not what happens. The only deadlocks that liave occuiTcd liave been deadlocks in Australia when the upper liouses liave been trying to exercise powers that they did not possess. Where i'per liouses have been exercising powers that did exiat, there have been no dcad- I locks, or if there ha\e been deadlocks, it ■ as been because things had become fit for revolution. I am anxious to know what are the points on which such power should be withheld from the senate 1 Colonel Smith : Would the hon. mem- ber allow them to alter a customs bill ? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : With re- spect to altering a customs bill, I can see great inconvenience in allowing them to alter a customs bill. On the other hand, there might be inconvenience in pre\ent- ing them from doing it. Sir Thomas McIlavraiiii : A great deal more ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: As far as the ordinary appropriation bill is concerned, I do not think that the matter is worth fighting about. Most of the argument used has been made to apply to money bills generally — a class which none can describe in a few words, for almost any sort of bill can be made into a money bill. Most of the argument has been applied to these in order to show that the ordinary machinery of government could not go on if the senate could interfere with money bills. Why % If that means that the ordi- nary machineiy of government could nob go on, if the senate interfered with tlie appropriation bill, I could understand the argument. But it must be remembered that it is not pi'oposed to deny the senate the power of veto. Surely if tlic senate wanted to stop tlie machinery of govern- ment the way to do that would be to throw out the appropriation bill. That would enectually stop the machinery of govern- ment. I, for my part, am much inclined to think that the power of absolute rojectiou is a nuich more dangerous power than tlu^ power of amendment ; yet it is a power that must be conceded. Wo all admit that ; and in a federation there is much more likelihood of that power of rejec- tion Ijeing used than there is of the power of amendment being used. It is said that the upper houses in the Australian colo- nies are coerced by putting things in the apjiropriation Itilh So they are in the 430 Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. United Kingdom. Wliy? Bccaiise they are part of the same comnaunity, living in the same place, and elected by or chosen from the same class of people ; but let it be borne in mind that in the federal constitu- tion the members of the senate would come from different parts of Australia, and be charged ^Yith the duty of protecting the rights of their own states, and if they saw that those rights could be protected only by rejecting a measure absolutely, and not by any smaller or milder action, I am sure that they would not hesitate to reject it and take the consequences. Dr. CoCKBURN : You could not bi'iiig any public oj^inion to bear on them ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Asthe lion, member implies, the only public opinion that you could bring to bear on them would be the public opinion that approved of their action. So I think that the power of rejection, al- though a much greater power, ismore likely to be used to the detriment of the general welfare of Australia, than is a reasonable power of amendment. I have no objec- tion on my part to restrict the power of amendment on certain lines, but hon. mem- bers who represent the other view must bear these facts in mind. In respect to making both houses finally amenable to public opinion, that will of course como about ; but, still, you cannot lose sight of the fact that the public oj^inion to which the two houses would be amenable would not be the same public opinion. The pub- lic opinion of the majority of the house of representatives Colonel Smith : Contains the whole ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The pub- lic opinion of the majority of the liouse of representatives is the whole, and is the public opinion of the majority of the whole. The public opinion of the other house is of the majorities of different parts of the whole, which may be quite a different thing. There is, however, no danger of the senate being out of touch with the people of its [Sir Samuel Griffith. own state, at any rate not for long, unless you make their term of office too long, because, as has been pointed out, suppose the senators retire one-third every two years, by the time any serious difficulty has been going on for two years there will be a fresh election, and the men that come in will represent present public opinion — there will be one-third representing the latest phase of public opinion, and another third will be soon going for re-election, and they will at any rate trim their sails to what they believe to be public opinion. So there will always be two-thirds of the senate working in direct touch with public opinion. There is, therefore, I think, no danger of its being irresponsible or unim- pressionable in that respect ; but to pro- vide for anything like dissolution, or its being coerced by a majority of the other house, would amount to v/hat I said just now-— the largest states would be in a posi- tion to coerce the smaller ones. Mr. DEAicm : No ! Colonel Smith : The very reverse ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : They can do that only if they are strong enough, and if they ai'e strong enough vis ultima ratio — force is the last resort in all matters. Our business is to frame a constitution that will work without resort to force — at least, I think so. Mr. MuxRO : Tellushowthatistobedone ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : How what is to be done ? Mr. MuNRO : How we are to have a constitution so framed as not to cause col- lision between two houses. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : It is abso- lutely impossible to frame a constitution that will not allow of conflict between two houses. Every constitutional government consists of two or more parts, each one of which can put the machine out of gear. That is the essence of constitutional go- vernment. The only means of avoiding collision is to have autocracy. Constitu- A Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 431 tional government includes a gi'eat many forms. Any sort of government in Avhicb different bodies act as a check on olliers is constitutional government. Constitutional government is not by any means tlie same as responsible government, and responsible government is quite a different thing from party government. Constitutional govern- ment simply means the existence of the checks of the different bodies on one ano- ther. Responsible government practically lias come to mean a government ^Yhich is turned out of office when it does not com- mand the support of the legislature ; and party government is a thing of which we have had some experience in Australia, but which I am afraid is becoming some- what discredited. There are one or two colonies, in which party government, as de- scribed in books on the subject, has almost ceased to exist. This is a digression. From what my hon. friend, Mr. Munro, has said, I take him as perhaps an extremist on this particular point. I thei'efore ask him what are the particular subjects in detail which he wi.shes to withdraw from the senate ] Mr. Muxp.o : The appropriation bill and the customs bill ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: For my part, if that is all we are quarrelling about, 1)0 and 1 would not be very long in coming to a conclusion. Mr. Diuus : That is surrenderin!? some- thing ! Sir SAMUEL GPJFFITII : Wc arc all here to surrender something. The general term " money bill " Sir John' JJn.vv : Sir Jlenry Parkcs does not say " monr-y Ijill," but "appropriating revenue or imposing taxation " ! Sir SAML'EL GRIFFITH : Rut bills ajjpropriating revenue include a large number of bills. Taxation bills include a large number of things besides customs. IMr. Playford : Very few billrj appro- priate revenue except the ordinary appro- priation bills ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: Many bills besides the annual appropriation bill ap- propi-iate revenue. Mr. Playford : Not in our colony ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : If we knew the contention on the other side, we should be closer to a solution of the diffi- culty ; but when arguments are applied in different senses, and when an hon. mem- ber, speaking from one point of view, is answered by another hon. gentleman using the same words in a diffei'ent sense, we are not likely to approach the termination of the argument ; but if we can narrow the matter down we may very soon come to a conclusion. Mr. MACROSS AN : I am not at all sur- prised at the great difference of opinion that has arisen amongst the members of the Con- vention on the subject now under discus- sion. It has arisen very much through a m.istaken idea, of the hon. members from Victoria, chiefly, and of the Premier of South Australia. They cannot get out of their minds the idea of a legislative council such as they have in their own colonies. They do not seem to appreciate, or to realise thoroughly the conditions under which we are here to try to form a federal constitu- tion. We ai'e not here, in any way, to re- produce a constitution exactly like the con- stitution under which the different colonies are now working, and, indeed, we could not do so in carrying out a federal constitution. We are here, representing different states or colonies, and our mission is to federate these colonies into one united body, to exer- ci.se power over the whole of Australia. We cannot do so on such lines as we aroworking on at present in our several colonics, and if hon. members will simply get rid of that idea I think we shall very soon arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. There is another matter also Avhich has helped to confuse the minds of hon. members, and that is the idea of small states and large states. Now, wc are not here as small slates and large 432 Federal ConstltvAion: [17 March, 1891.] ResohUions. states. We arc liero as representing sovereign and independent colonies— inde- pendent and sovereign froni eacli other as much as we are from any other portion of the worhl. If hon. members would simply realise that fact, they would much sooner come to an understanding with each other than they seem likely to do now. AVe are here, as I say, representing independent and sovereign communities, and in repre- senting those communities Ave expect, of course — in fact, we shall be obliged — for the purpose of forming a federal constitu- tion, to sui'render certain sovereign rights ■which we now possess. But we are here to adopt a federal constitution, and surrender as few sovereign rights as possible in doing so, and all we can be expected to do in reason is to surrender as much as Avill be necessary to carry out federal government in Australia. This idea of small states and large states is not a democratic idea. It is purely an aristocratic one. It does not exist in any federal democracy in the world. If we begin with the great federal democra- tic states of America, and look at the popu- lations of the states there when tliey adopted their present constitution, we shall find that two states actually dominated eight others as far as population was con- cerned. The states of Pennsylvania and A'irginia had more population than eight other states had, and the question there arose of small states and large states, but it was amicably settled by the method wliich is proposed here — by the senate represent- ing equally every state. As far as my read- ing of American history goes, the question has never arisen as to small states domi- nating large states in the Senate They have always worked amicably together, being reasonable men, and, as many hon. members say, we must expect to have reasonable men elected as our senators. Well, having worked together under cir- cumstances which have been more difficult I believe than any v.^e shall have to work [J/r. Macrossan. under in Australia, I think it is reason- able to expect that with people springing from the same I'ace, and having exactly ihe same traditions, and having the same ex- perience of the British empire to go by, we shall work equally as amicably and without friction between the two houses. Mr. MuxRO : There were none of them as large as ours, or as small as ours ! Mr. MACEOSSAN : I beg the lion. gentleman's pardon ; there are some of them as small as ours now. Mr. MuNRO : Not one ! Mr. MACR08SAN : The hon. gentle- man is not thoroughly acquainted with the subject. Mr. MuxRO : I am. I challenge the hon. member to cite a single state at the com- mencement of the Union as small in nurit- bers as Western Australia, or as large as New South Wales. Mr. MACROSSAN : One speech at a time. The hon. gentleman will have an opportunity of speaking afterwards. But it really does not affect the question in the least whether any state in the American Union had a few thousand more or a few thousand less than Western Australia has at present ; the principle is the same ex- actly. We cannot get states that are equal in population and equal in area unless we cut Australia up, which we do not intend to do. We intend to retain the autonomy ^ of the states as they exist at the present time. Therefore, the population of, say, Fihode Island, or Maine, or Vermont, or any of thosesmall statesat that timehas nothing vv'hatever to do with the question now. But there is a state now in the American Union, which has two representatives in the Senate. It has not had for years m enough population to entitle it to one repre- sentative in the House of Representatives ; still, it sends two members to the Senate, and its population is smaller than Western Australia's at the present time. Ml-. Moore : That is a territory ! Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 433 Mr. IMACROSSAX : There are several other states which are only a little above that. But at the present time there is one state in. the American union which has actually more population than twelve or thirteen states. That state has never raised the question, as far as 1 have heard or read, of being afraid of being injured in any way by the power which has been given to the senate ; I refer to the state of New York. I picked out this morning from the "American Almanac," fourteen states that have less population than the state of New York. There are now forty- four states in the Union, and those four- teen states send twenty-eight members to the Senate, out of a total number of eighty- eight members. Surely they can dominate New York and other states if they choose to do ! But they arc reasonable men, as we, I hope, are hero, and as we expect our senate and our liouse of representatives to be. I need not follow that ai-gument, as far as America is concerned, any further. The same thing exists in Switzerland. In S\vitz(;rland one canton — Berne — actually liasdouble thepopulationof eight other can- tons. Each canton sends twomcmbers to the council of thestatcs. Koquestion has arisen there tlie same as it has arisen here with us. "\V(j arc actually fighting a shadow, I be- lieve. Wo must rcTiicinbcr that there is no country in the world whore democracy rules .so jicrfcctly and so uniutcrru])tcdly ns it does in Switzerland, and has done for a very long time. Therefore some lion. members are not carrying out the demo- cratic idea at all, as they think they arc doing, by arguing in the sense in which they have boon arguing. They have been carrying out the aristocratic idea far more than the democratic. I would like those lion, gentlemen very fairly to undertake the question from the democratic idea, and not from the aristocratic one. INIr. Plavford : Democracy and state ji'^hts are .synonymous terms ! 2 E Mr. MACEOSSAX: We are here to preserve our state rights. "We are not here to make a senate which shall be a counterpart of the House of Lords, Colonel Smith : Hear, hear ! Mr. MACKOSSAN : The hon. member from Ballarat says, "Hear, hear"j but that is what he really wants. Our differ- ent constitutions, as far as the legislative councils are concerned, have been framed more or less upon the lines of the House of Lords, and upon the idea which has prevailed in England for the last thirty or forty years, or probably longer, that the House of Lords shall have no real power in the Constitution whatever. If the hon, gentlemen from Victoria and the Premier of South Australia want a counterpart of the House of Lords, I think that that would be a constitution for the senate which would never be adopted by the people of Australia, It is a well under- stood fact that the leading members of the two historic parties in the House of Com- mons in Great Britain have ao;reed Ion;; ago that the House of Lords ou£;ht to be reconstructed, A third party, which is coming into existence very rapidly, promises that when it does come into existence as a party it will reconstruct the House of Lords out of the world altogether. Is it these that tliese hon. gentlemen want us to adopt ? Mr, Plavfoud : Certainly not ! Mr, MACROSSAN : It certainly is, Mr, Playford : Certainly not ! Mr. ]\r ACROSS AN : I say we would resemble the House of Lords if we adopted a constitution for the senate such as has been advocated here. It would resemble the House of Lords in nothing so much as its feebleness and want of authority. That would be the i-eal result of it. Now, tho question, I think, has been very well put by my colleague, Sir Samuel Grillitli, as to veto in part and in whole, or a veto in part alone. Hon. members from Victoria and the Premier of South Australia are quite 434 Federal Constitution : [17 March, 1891.] liesolutions. ■willing to give the senate the power of re- jecting the v,-hole bill. Tliey are quite will- ing to give to that body the jjower to throw the whole legislative and administrative gear of government out of action ; but they are not willing to give to it the power to cut out one or two lines to which they may object. Is there not an absurdity in that? The Premier of Victoria went so far as to deny that the greater included the less — we all know that he meant only politically. These gentlemen are quite willing to give to the senate the power to deal with questions which, in my opinion, are much larger and of much more import- ance than the question of cutting a .£10,000 or £20,000 line out of a loan or appropria- tion bill. There are a great many ques- tions which are coming to the front not only here, but everywhere else in the woiid — important questions that will soon come to the front as questions of practical poli- tics. Yet these gentlemen are Avilling to give to the senate the power to deal with these questions — I mean the labour ques- tion, and social questions — compared Avith which the mere question of amending a money bill sinks into insignificance. Here then is another absurdity in the arguments of hon. members. I myself think that we are in reality splitting straws. One of the delegates from Queensland has pointed out that the senate as constituted would be far more likely to reject bills as a whole than are the present legislative councils. That being so, it Avould be amenable to public opinion in the particular district in whicli the senate held its sittings. I think, therefore, that gentlemen who are opposed to its exercise of the powers of veto in part are really splitting straws, and that it would be more judicious on their part, if there is to be a compromise, to give way upon that point. For my part, I do not see how a compromise can be effected. I do not believe in any compromise which gives up the power of rejection in part. [JAr. Macrossan. If it can be brought about in some other way which will render the proposal more acceptable to gentlemen from Victoria, who object to it in its present form, I shall raise no objection ; but I do object to any compromise giving up the power of amendment in part by the senate. I think it is an indispensable power for them to possess, not only in the case of money bills, but in the case of all other bills. Then there is a question which I think lion, gentlemen have overlooked, which will in a great measure modify the action of both the senate and the house of representa- tives. Do not let us forget the action of party. We have been arguing all through as if party government were to cease im- mediately we adopt the new constitution. Now, I really do not see how that is to be brought about. The influence of party will remain much the same as it is now, and instead of members of the senate voting, as has been suggested, as states, they will vote as members of parties to which they will belong. I think, there- fore, that the idea of the larger states being overpowered by the voting of the smaller states might very well be aban- doned ; the system has not been found to have that effect in other federal constitu- tions. Parties have always existed, and will continue to exist where free men give free expression to their opinions. Parties exist in the American Senate, and if there were any disposition on the part of the smaller states in America to com- bine in any way to act unfairly towards the more popular states, party influences would intervene, and the same thing will take place in our senate, and it will take place also in our house of representatives. I have not the slightest fear of the two more populous colonies — New South Wales and Victoria — combining to do anything to injure the less populous states as such ; neither have I any sympathy with the idea that ministers should be selected from Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 435 any particular state or group of states. I think that the member of the house of representatives who is called upon to form a ministry should be at perfect liberty to select what members he pleases, no matter from what state they may come ; and I am quite certain they would act as they do now under our present constitutions ; they would act fairly towards each part of the federal union, just thesameas ministries act now towards each part of the colonies they govern. In this matter we have for- gotten entirely the action of party. It will act as a powerful solvent to prevent un- fairness either in the house of representa- tives by the more populous colonies, or in the senate by the less populous colonies, and I hope lion, members will not forget that. A question has been raised on this particular subject as to the nomination of senators. I believe entirely in the Ameri- can system of nomination — nomination through the legislature. I know that my hon. friend. Dr. Cockburn, from South Australia, has an objection to this, because certain houses are nominated instead of being elected. That is an objection which exists in my mind also ; but, nevertheless, I do not think it is one which should stand against the election of senators by the legislatures, because the senate above all things is supposed, and will be supposed, to rei)resent the states. The colonies as they exist now, or tlie states as they will be in the future, arc represented in their sovereignty at present by their legis- latures. Whether the upper house is a nominee or an elective house makes no dif- ference. It is the legislature that repre- sents the sovereignty of the state, and that which represents the sovereignty of the state, in iny opinion, should have flio power of nomination to the senate. I hope, therefore, that tlie idea of electing senators from the body of the electors will be given up. It is not a sovereign idea at all — quite the reverse. Besides there are objections equally as strong as that of which I have heard some hon. mem- bers speak. As to the ministry being re- sponsible to both houses, I think that is an utter impossibility^ I do not see how a ministry can be held in any way to be responsible to both houses of parliament, especially as one of those houses is to have a continuity of existence. If the senate was to be placed on the same footing as the house of representatives, and was to be dissolved on the same occasions, there might be something in the proposal. But as it will have a continuous life, and as whatever definite responsibility it may have will be through the nominations of the legislatures of the different states, I do not see how a federal ministry can be responsible to any house but the house of representa- tives. Then comes in the question of public opinion. Hon. members are afraid, seemingly, that the senate will get beyond the opinion of the people of Australia. I have no fear of that whatever. I do not believe that the senate, which will be elected by the different legislatures, will ever get very far beyond the force of public opinion in Australia. They may probably do so on some questions for a short period ; but as has been pointed out by the hon. member. Sir Samuel GriHith, the continuity of existence applies to the house, and not to the members of that house. The members of the house will be continually renewed, and they will be acted upon, I have not the slightest doubt, by the public opinion which they repre- sent ; and whatever objection they may have to certain measures or to the policy of ministries who are rcsponsil^lo to the lower house, public opinion will liavc a frtfiin force upon them, and compel tliciii ultimately and without any statu- tory enactment whatever to give way to the force of public opinion through- out the colonics when it is properly ex- pressed. I trust that wc shall make onr 436 Federal Constihaion: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. senate a strong and a powerful senate — a senate which will liave dignity and author- ity, and one which -will not only be re- spected by the states whom it will repre- sent, but respected also by the people whom it will represent in a second degree. Because it is not true to say that they Avill not be representatives of the people. The Senate of the United States of America and the States Council of Switzerland represent respectively the people of those two countries as much in a secondary sense, and in some cases more in a primary sense, than does the lower house. The Senate in America is looked np to with the greatest respect ; in fact, it is the ambition of capable and eminent men to become mem- bers of the Senate ; and I hope a similar am- bition will exist in Australia owing to the power and dignity which our senate will pos- sess. I have no fear of the senatenltimately becoming the master of the house of i*epi'e- sentatives as it has become, to some extent, in tiie United States. In the United States ifc has other powers and authorities delegated to it, entirely apart from legislation. It is as much a part of the executive as is the President himself. This has given an amount of influence to the Senate in America which our senate can never hope to possess. Therefore, I do not think we need be at all afraid of the senate over- bearing the house of representatives by its superior influence. But I hope it will tend in that direction by its superior ability, being the elected of men who ai'e themselves elected for their ability by the different states. I hoard a proposal mooted this morning by an hon. delegate from Victoria, Mr. Wrixon, which rather astonished me. That gentleman is so much opposed to giving a veto in part in re.spect to money bills to the senate that he would prefer to destroy the very root and basis of the representation of the people by giving a greater number of re- presentatives to certain individual states \_Mr. Macrossan. which do not possess a large population at the present time. I hope the members of this Convention will not agree to any such proposition. The smaller states, such as Tasmania, "Western Austi'alia, Queens- land, and South Australia, will be so thoroughly protected in the senate that it will be a crime against the proper represen- tation of the people to give them additional representation in the house of representa- tives beyond what they are entitled to. Each state must stand upon the basis of its own population as far as the house of represen- tatives is concerned ; but in regard to the senate the states will be thoroughly pro- tected by the equal number of representa- tives that each will have in that house. The idea of the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, is a most undemocratic one, and strikes at the very root and basis of popular repre- sentation. Just fancy 40,000 or 50,000 people in Western Australia having five or six representatives, when the same num- ber in Victoria or New South Wales would only have one or two representatives ! It is right enough to do that in representing the sovereignty of the state where all are equal, but in the representation of the people each unit of the people should have his full and equal share. I trust that no such proposal as that mentioned will be entertained. I am quite satisfied that we shall come to a satis- factory conclusion on this question. I am not at all afraid of the Convention resulting in disunion, and members going back to their difterent colonies without having done anything. I do not mind very much the ex- pression made use of by the Premier of Vic- toria, or by others, and to which Mr. Barton this morning made a jocular allusion — I allude to the reference to " carpet-baggers." IMr. MuNRO : I never said anything of the sort ! Mr. MACROSSAN : I know the hon. member did not say that he was a "carpet- bagger"; but the hon. member, Mr. Barton, said as much. Federal ConstiOd ion: [17 ]\lAr.cir, 1891.] Resoh'.tlons. 437 Ml'. MuxRO : It was the lion, member, colony which I have tlio honor to repre- Colonel Smith, who said tliat — I did not ! sent is separated by an immense distance Mr. MACROSSAN : I do not mind from the other colonies. She has no manu- that very much. When 1 recollect the factures, and I have been considering history of this very question in the Phila- during the last few days how I can urge delphia Convention, I am thoroughly con- upon the people of Western Australia vinced that we are arriving quickly at a that she will gain anything by federation, satisfactory conclusion. The discussion of I have bean unable to sec how she will this particular question occupied five weeks, gain anything, although my sympathies from the beginning of June until the mid- are entirely with the desire that she should die of July, in that convention. We have be an integral part of a united Australia, almost arrived at a satisfactory conclusion jMr. Gordox : What about defence 1 in two days. Therefore, I liave every con- Mr. J. FOIIREST : I cannot see that, fidence in the ability and wisdom of the even with regard to defence, she will bo members of this Convention to thoroughly a gainer by federation. We are separated thrash out this crucial question, so that from the other colonies by 1,000 miles of members on each side may be thoroughly unoccupied territory. That part of Aus- satisfied with the conclusion we arrive at. tralia has no naval defence, and for many Even if the hon. member.^ from Victoria years to come we must look for our defence did take up their carpet bags and go, I do to the power of Great Britain, which is not believe that they would stay away. I the only power able to defend us from believe that the public opinion of their enemies coming across the sea. colony would drive them back again, be- Mr. Munro : The federal government cause I have come to the conclusion that, will have a navy ! although fedei-ation is a very desirable Mr. J. FORREST : It may have in thing for Australia, there is no colony in many years to come. Those hon. members the group fur which it is more desirable or who have spoken with i-eference to the necessary than the colony of Victoria. constitution of the two houses have been Mr. J. FORREST : I should like to too apt to look at the matter from the make one or two remarks with reference point of view of the colonies which they to the speech of the hon. member, Mr. represent. As has been said by several ^lacrossan, who would deny to the laigo other hon. members, the constitution of colonics having a small population a larger the two houses under a federal form of amount of representation than they would government will be very difl'erent from be entitled to according to population. I the constitution of the two houses in any would rcjnind him that the proi»osaltodcal colony. Under a federal form of govern- with such colonies in an exceptional way ment there v>ill lutt be so many local in- is no new idea. When British Columbia tcrests and feelings as there are in the joined the Canadian federation she liad parliament of a colony of limited arcn, only a population of 00,000, but she was where popular feeling runs high. AnoUici' allowed six representatives, which was a point has been overlooked which is cer- larger number than slic would have been tiinly an argiiiiKiit in favour of the pro- entitled to on the basis of population. ])Osition that the senate should not have Unless you can give .some special aingle, and that there is no beaten path to follow. It will be as great an experiment as it is possible for us to try, to apply the responsible system to a federation in which the two branches of the legislature will represent the whole of the people grouped in a difTerent manner. I am very sorry that we have to try the experiment. I am one of those who are ex- ceedingly loath to tryex[)criment.s; I believe that any political system ought to be of gradual growth — that the idea ought to be engrained in the minds of the people, and that, if it has grown up with the people, its chances of success are very much greater than they would otherwise be. I am, therefore, one of those who are ex- ceedingly loath to try experiments, and more especially so in this case, because if vv^e try an experiment which fails, that failure will be put down to the system of federation, and the whole system will be discredited. If I could be convinced that we are not ti-ying an experiment by grafting on to the federal form of government the British form of executive, I, for one, should en- tirely agi-ee with the President upon the point. But it seems to me that this is an experiment, and that the two things are entirely inconsistent with each other. And I will quote the opinion on that point of a writer who is celebrated not only as a man of letters, but also as a politician and a statesman — Mr. J. R. Lowell, who was the American Ambassador in Great Britain. In the Forlnhjldhj Revieio of February, 1888, he wrote an article on " English and American Federalism," in v.hich he con- trasted the aspirations of a portion of the British people for imi^erial federation with the aspirations of some Americans to abandon their present form of executive, and to adopt the British form of respon- sible government. Having first niade some observations about the American form of executive, and the idea that the English form of executive could bo grafted on to American institutions, he says ; If a strong ami responsible government be es- tabli.slieil, individual and local rights will dis- appear, and a highly centralised reprcsentativo democracy will arise upon their ruins. There arc some members of this Conven- tion who want a highly centralised repre- sentative democracy to be framed to start with. iSIr. Lowell continues ; In England the case is precisely rcverseil. A highly centralised representative democracy ex- ists already, .".nd it is desired to import into this 440 Federal Constilul'wn: [17 March, 1891.] Itesoluiions. form of government some of the advantayes of a federal constitution, and some safeguards for individual rights and privileges, to adapt some of the modern conveniences of a -nritten consti- tution to the stately old fabric that has been building ever since the dawn of history. The attempt is utterly useless. The former building must be pulled down, and the new building begun at the foundations. I entirely agree with those sentiments. And in commencing this new building at the foundations, let us build those founda- tions in such a way that we can erect upon them a superstructure that will be con- sistent within itself. If we are to try an experiment, and I think we must do so, let us try that experiment in the form that is mostlikely towork. Ina quotationconcern- ingtheBritisli Constitution, which wasmadc by the President the other day, and which has already been quoted to-day, Mr. Glad- stone having referred to the fact that without good sense, discretion, experience, and statesmanlike qualities in those who Avorked the British Constitution, it would be utterly unworkable, goes on to say, that " this boasted Constitution of ours is nothing more nor less than a heap of absurdities." Well, why should we adopt a heap of absurdities with the sole view of calling out those qualities to v/hich the President so eloquently alluded as neces- sary to the success of any form of govern- ment which relies upon the discretion of the members of the two branches of the legislature 1 It has been said that sensible shareholders and a sensible board of direc- tors can work any deed of settlement ; but is that any argument why a deed of settle- ment should be badly drawn ? Let us draw up our deed of settlement, wliich we are here to draw up, as well as we possibly can. I am perfectly willing to admit the argument which has been adduced to the effect that unless we assume all those qualities which have been alluded to as existing, not only in both branches of the legislature, but in the executive in whatever fonn it may be [J/>-. Baker. appointed, the form of government we are about to frame will be entirely unwork- able ; but do not let us advisedly leave more to their discretion than is absolutely necessary. I hope I am not departing from the point undsr consideration, because it seems to me that this idea that Ave must take either the English or the American form of executive is totally unwarranted. There is another form of executive which has been alluded to once or twice — the (Swiss form, in which the executive are chosen for a fixed period by the two houses. Why should not we adopt that form ? It is a form admirably suited for a federal form of government. The ministries now- adays are appointed nominally by the Crown, but we all know that they are really chosen by one branch of the legis- lature, and why is it impossible to work out the representative form of govern- ment by both branches of the legislature directly choosing the executive, who will be responsible to them, and who will not be turned out at a moment's notice on some party question 1 Has this system of party government worked so well that we cannot improve upon it '? Mr. Gillies : That is dealt with in tlie next resolution ! Mr. BAKER : I know it is ; but it seems to me to be so intimately connected Avith the question under discussion, and the assumption so often made, that we must adopt the responsible form of go- vernment, has been so mixed up with the question of what shall be the relative powers of the two houses, that it is perti- nent to refer to it now. I, for one, think that the people of these colonies — I am not now talking about the parliaments — would hail with satisfaction a departiu'e from the system under which ministries are now appointed. If there is one thing with which the people of these colonies find fault in our existing forms of govern- ment, it is the fact that two-thirds or one- Federal Constitution: [17 I\Iaiicii, 1891.] Resolutions. 441 half of the time of parliament and the house of representatives. If lion, gentle- ministry is taken up by the quarrels be- men are still impressed with that idea, I tween the "ins" and the "outs"; and think I may well make the suggestion if anything could do away with that state Avhich I have submitted to several of my of afiliirs — if ministries were enabled to friends, and who desired me to mention it devote tlie whole of their time and atten- this afternoon. It is this : that if either tion to carrying on the business of tlie house of jDarliament should, by a specified country, and the framing of wise measures, majority, pass any measure in two succes- if they were not obliged to fight day after sive sessions, and tlie other house should day simply to retain their seats, and were refuse to pass it, a simple mode of settling not obliged to bring in measures whicli the question would be to refer it to the they would not have bi"oiiglit in were it direct vote of the people in the same way not for party pui'poses — the people would as measures are submitted in Switzerland ; be much better satisfied with that form of and if the answer is given in the athrma- executive than with the form under which tive by a majority of the w]iole of tlie we now live. peojile and also of a majority of the states, Mr. Gillies: That could be done by that the bill should become law. 1 do not abolishing the " outs " ! think my hon. friends from Victoria can o Mr. BAKER : Well, if the hon. gentle- question the proposition as being one not man was one of the " outs " he would not framed on sound democratic lines. like to be abolished. I apologise for having, Mr. Deakin : Hear, hear ! in the opinion of some hon. members, re- Mr. Gordon: It does not matter whether ferred to a question which will come up you snufi" out the states by a vote of the for discussion at a later stage. As I said people, or by a vote of their representa- before, it seemed to me that the two ques- tives. It is as broad as it is long. tions were so dcjjendent on one another Mr. THYNNE : A bill under such cir- tliat I might appropriately say a few words cumstances would not become law un- upon them now. less adopted, first, by a majority of the Mr. THYNNE : I think the question whole of the people, and, secondly, by a whether tlic executive should or should majority of the states, not be responsible to parliament is one Sir Thomas IMcIlwraitii : Not a ma- which we can leave for full debate after- jority of each of the states ! wards. In passing, I may say that it Mr. THYNNE : A majority of the seems to mo to bo right that parliament, Avhole of the states. The answer should wliich l)a.s tlie power of the selection of be received from a majority of the separate ministers, should also have the power of states ; in fact, it is the old democratic dismissing them. T did not rise, liowever, principle of a niajority of the whole of tho to enter into any long discussion on this people and a majority of individual states, (picstion, but to make a suggestion which I think that is a suggestion well worth occurred to mo this morning while tlie considering, and one which should relievo debate was proceeding. There seems to those gentlemen, wlio arc so very inuch bo a dispo.sition on the part of a good ojjposed to the proposal to give tho senato many members — e.spccially tho members such large power.s, from any great difli- for Victoria and one or two others — to culty. I ,UUO miles of coast. It might be that Victoria would require an expenditure reasonably neces- .sary in her case for the protection of her commerce and of her dense population on that short stretch of coast ; but it might be that Western Australia, with her .'3,000 450 Federal Constitulion: [17 Makch, 1891.] ResoJut'ions. miles of coast-line, and South Australia, with hei' 2,000 miles of coast-line, might cabal together, which would be very easily effected in the senate, and i-efuse any bill, unless a similar expenditure in proportion was carried out in those colonies. I have seen much more unreasonable things than that, I have seen much more unreason- al)le cabals than that, even in the Imperial Parliament, and certainly much more un- reasonable cabals than that in the Con- gress of the United States ; and knowing what human nature is, nothing would be more likely than some egregious attempt at downright injustice being inflicted by the power of the'smaller colonies. I, for one, am anxious — and I think there is an evidence of that in my voluntary proposal to give the smallest colony the same re- presentation as that of this great colony in the senate — to extend every considera- tion whatever to the smaller colonies; but we cannot extend a consideration to the smaller colonies which involves a state of things which may result so unjustly, so disastrously, to the whole of the colonies who have done their share in the civilisa- tion of this part of the world. It is then, because I believe that it is absolutely necessary for the effective government of any state under parliamentary government that the power of dealing with all mea- sures of this chai'acter — measures for im- posing taxation and expending revenue — should be left to one authoi-ity, and one alone, that I oppose the amendment of the hon. member. Sir John Downer. I do not believe that a constitution embodying that principle could be by any possibility adopted by the people of this country. It is scarcely likely that the great popula- tion of New South Wales and Victoria, accustomed to jealously watch every posi- tion of freedom they have, would consent to the adoption of a constitution which placed them at the mercy of a cabal of the weaker and less important colonies. \Sir Henry Parkes. What is our position '? As far as I know the people of New South Wales, and 1 think I know them as well as my col leagues do, our position is that we are ready to enter into this union ; we are ready to enter into it without making any condition ; but we are not ready to enter into it on any basis of principles which are inconsistent with the British Constitution, which we hold ought to be transplanted into this new dominion. I shall be very glad indeed if by aiiy explanation, or any legitimate compromise, we can come to an agreement ; but I have seen all along, zealous as I have been to bring about the union of the Austnilian colonies, the possibility of failure ; and the causes of failure were pretty clearly seen by me, too, before this Convention met. All I desire to say now in conclusion is this : that, dear as the cause of union is to me, and to those who think with me, anxious as we are to give to the Australian people a oneness of action, a collectivcness of effort, and an unmistakable national iden- tity in character ; anxious as we are for that, there are to us some things dearer. We cannot, and so far as I -am con- cerned we will not, be tacked to any con- federation of states who will not meet us with the same just views as we take of their condition. We are willing to make any possible surrender that is defensible ; we are willing to enter into this federation without stipulating for one single condi- tion. As far as I am concerned, I do not even venture to say what will be the fiscal policy of the dominion parliament ; but I have said at all times that whatever it may be, while I shall not give up my own, opinions, I shall, as a patriot, bow to its decision. I have never attempted to force my opinions upon this Convention, or upoi anybody which I have addressed, except ii the light in which I now express them ,- but I, for one, will never consent for New South Wales to be linked to a federa- Federal Constitution : [17 March, 1891.] Itesohdions. 451 tion of states, unless the object is to make the Australian people a nation, under one broad federal government, modelled on the plan of the British Constitution. Mr. GORDON: I should not have troubled the Convention with any remarks this afternoon, had it not been that the mover of these resolutions, in coming to the defence of them as against the criti cisms which have been dii'ected against them, has done me — shall I call it the honor? — to somewhat pointedly refer to the small contribution which I made to- wards this debate. He accuses myself and another lion, member of this Convention first of all of being provincial. Well, I am prepared to plead somewhat guilty to the accusation. I admit that the sweep of mv mind does not enable mo, as does that of the hon. delegate, to take under its wings her Majesty the Queen, the House of Lords, and the Briti.sh Constitution. I come from the small colony of South Au.s- tralia, and my interests are somewhat centred there, because I love better the things I have seen than the things I have not seen. I plead somewhat guilty to the charge of being provincial, because, when the thing is boiled down in the crucible of common-sense, this is merely a commercial treaty whicli wo are considering. We are not here only to raise a national standard, but to enter into a bargain, colony with colony, on terms which we think advan- tageous to each. I am hero to promote federation, but also to see that the terms on which the colony of which I am a humble representative is a.sked to come into the federation are advantageous to her inter- ests. But whon my views are stigmatised as monstrous, witli very much respect, I protest— and with the greatest respect, owing to the distinguished position which the lion, the President occupies, not ordy here, but also throughout the colonies — I protest that these are not terms, although directed against the humblest member of the Convention, which will tend to pro- mote the spirit in which we are supposed to meet. I wish to make every allow- ance for the evident physical disability under which the hon. member labours and the irritation which must result from it — and he has no greater admirer than my- self — but seeing that my position has been stigmatised as monstrous by the hon. gen- tleman, I beg leave in a A^ery few words to support my views. I shall not keep the Convention more than five minutes. Yes- terday I advocated a definite arrangement, which undoubtedly implied a looser federa- tion than that contemplated by the reso- lution. I admit it, Imt I was not prepared to let that view stand in the way of any view which the Convention might choose to take. But surely I have the right to contiibute my small jot to the considera- tions of the Convention. But, if it comes to that, I willingly plead guilty to the charge that I do favour a looser con- federation, and in a few words, I will say why. I am not blind to the commercial advantages which federation will bring to this great country. They are patent ; but 1 do not calculate the happiness of a coun- try, or view its welfare, entirely through fi nancial spectacles. There are many reforms which to be effected at all must be general, and which can be easily accomplisiieil in small communities, but which are ex- ceedingly dillicult to bring about in large connnunities. Federation of the kind con- templated by the resolution means cen- tralisation, and centralisation tends to maintain the statK, (p'<>, and retards social rcfurui. The hon. member has cliallenged tli(! I'eprc.sentatives of the smaller colonies in this group wilii the importance and dignity of New South Wales, and with the sacrifice she is making in joining tlie smaller colonies — but let us have a word upon that. I admit that New South Wales is very much more wealthy, and is greater than the other colonics. 452 Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. Mr. Muxuo : It is not more wealthy tlian Victoria ! Mr. GORDON: Well, we will place New South AVales in juxtaposition to the little colony of South Australia. It is greater, wealthier, and more important than South Australia, and has moreover the hon. the President as its Premier. But there are many points in which South Aus- tralia is immensely superior to New South Wales. In point of social reform and legal reform — in the law courts and in legal sta- tutes they are a hundred years behind South Australia, and the only point in which they ai-e up to South Australia in this respect is in the statute which they copied from us — the Land Transfer Act. And, coming to the question of local government, the whole of New South Wales, with respect to her improvements and public works, is man- aged from a central olfice here in Svdncv. They are behind even the mother country, England, in that, and years behind every other colony in the group; sothatif we joined New South Wales, with all her wealth, her importance, and her Premier, we should have a vast mass of inertia to bring along with the little colony of South Australia. And I do not know that our advancement in legal and social reform does not counter- balance the wealth, the importance, and the Premier of the older colony. I admit that in addition to commercial advantages there is something to be said ior the addi- tional grandeur which the Australian flacj will derive from federation, and the addi- tional theatres of distinction and of action whicli the talented representatives of these colonies will have in which to figure; but the mass of our people are mucli too busy in getting their daily bread to have the time or ambition for such distraction.. I do not desire to see what the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, in the brilliant address which he gave us, pictured, agovernment as strong as a fortress and as sacred as a shrine — that is, a great central powerdwarfingall others. \_Mr. Gordon. Rather than have a government like a fort- ress, beneath whose frowning walls the people must either remain or go unsheltered to the wilderness, I would have a tent which they might carry with them in their march of progress; and rather than have a government as sacred as a shrine, guarded by jealous priests, I would have an open door through which the people might come and go without fear and with- out superstition. Sir GEORGE GREY : I confess that it is with feelings of sorrow that I have heard the deeds of the British nation at large so thoroughly undervalued for the purpose of the glorification of one or two bodies in Great Britain. Any one who re- flects upon what the British people have achieved under great dithculties in past years, with no fair chance atibrded to emerge from them, will say that we deserve a better character than was given to us. Why, we were told that nothing hatl taken place in Great Britain which could be compared with the Sumner affair in the United States ; but I say that no greater scandal has ever fallen upon any deliberative body than the dragging out of a representative of the Bi-itish people from the House of Com- mons across Palace Yard, upon his back through the mud, because he had tried to take an oath which subsequently all admitted ought never to have been re- quired from him, and of which he ought to have been relieved. But why should these things be raked up against the British race? Why should they not be allowed to slumber ? I contend that the patience and the endurance of the people of Aus- tralia have been perfectly wonderful, and they deserve that the great reward of free- dom should now be given to them. Have they in any one of the colonies had in past years the freedom of British subjects ? Mr. INIuxRO : Yes ; every one of them ! Sir GEORGE GREY : What, with nomi- nated councils ? Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 453 INlr. MuxRO : There are no nominated councils ! Sir GEORGE GREY : No nominated councils ! There are three in Australia at tlie present day. How can the lion, gen- tleman deny that ? Mr. ]N[uxRO : We have none in Yic- toi'ia ! Sir GEORGE GREY : Is Yictoria all Australia? Is that an answer to what I have said ? If the people of Yictoria have not a nominated council, have they not plural voting to an extraordinary degree, which shuts out the poor from all chance of competition at the elections? Mr. MuNRO : "We have plural voting, certainly ! Mr. CuTHBERT : But to a very limited extent ! Mr. MuKRO : We are going to aholish it altogether ! Sir GEORGE GREY : Going to abolish it I Why ? Because the tempest thunders at your doors. That is the fact. Such is the progress made in the human mind at the present day that these things can no longer continue. But have you proposed to do it in the resolutions which have been laid before this Convention. No proposal at all is here made to secure the liberties of the people at large, as .should hiivn Ihou made in the first instance. I contend that any one who reflects upon the great colo- nies which have been founded by tiie British jteople, upon the wars in whicli they have been engaged, upon the number of soldiers who have laid down their lives, and the number of sailors who have done the same in every part of the world, and who ob- tained little or no reward for it, upon the number of explorers who have risked their lives and have got no great grants of land in return — I say that the sufl'ering.s that liavebeen undergone to make the.se colonics, the deeds that have been performed by the people who have created them, deserve a better return than has been given to them to-day. I contend that, here, we are em- powered to give a great gift to the people of Australasia. That gift is placed in our hands to ofter to them, to solicit them to take; and I saj' that squabbles of the kind that have taken place upon this question ought not to divert us from that great object. The matter, I think, is really little understood by the Convention. Nothing could be kinder than the proposal that was made for a settlement of this difficulty, namely, that if the two branches of the le2;isla- tnre could not agree upon a bill, and if the bill were twice passed by one of them, an appeal should be made to the jieople. But that ought to be unneces- sary, because the body created by you, if they desire that law, could make it them- selves. Tliese are not the points to which we should direct our attention. Our atten- tion is, I think, dropping, to a great de- gree, from the consideration of the resolu- tions as they stand. Our proper duty is to commence to lay the foundation of the edifice we are to build up ; to do, as has been done in other countries, other great federal communities — to begin with the lower .stratum, and to see that the state.s have power given to them to make their own laws exactly as they like, to frame thc'ir own state constitution exactly as they please, and to vary it from time to time. When we have provided for that, we should proceed to the consideration of the federal parliament, and nothing will be easier llian itsconstruction. I ask lion, gentlemen, how- ever, in trying to work this out, to dismiss from their minds all idea of the incapacity of the British race in these colonies to deter- niiiie for themselves what their constitution shall be. There are men in these colonies who have gone through great difiicultios, )uaiiy of wlioin liave travellrd into other countries, many of whom have come from or through the United States, and have seen other forms of government than ours; and J ask tlicin to trust to the people to 454 Federal Constitution: [17 Marcu, 1891.] Besolutions. adopt a form of government for themselves, to give them that greatest and best Loon which can be given to men, and to leave to those who have worked out what are the capabilities of these counti'ies, what is the best form of settling them, in what ■way they can be best occupied — to leave to those persons, with all this experience, the power of doing that which the great nation of Britain authorises us to confer upon them. And whilst they dismiss from their minds all idea that any one of us has con- templated throwing blame upon the British Parliament, whathon. member in this Con- vention will complain that there is any want in the House of Peers of goodness or capa- city or any other quality, that they should be extolled in this way above ourselves ? Which one of us complained of the conduct of the House of Commons, so as in any way to necessitate the declaration that we were not equally competent with the members of the House of Commons to determine what should be done 1 I say that rather the subject-matter of our addresses should be to admit what has been done great and good in this country ; and having done that to stir the people up to go on in the line of goodness, the line of greatness, and to form this great confederation; and havingformed it, they will call into existence virtues now almost unknown, of patriotism, of desire to serve the country ; wdll call out a class of men who really can confer great benefits upon it ; and that they can do if they please within a week from this time. Leaving aside all quarrels upon minor details, let us take any one of the. federal constitutions which are in existence, and, without at- tempting in any way to servilely follow it, let us trace out in how far the lines of that constitution are applicable to this country, and upon any one of the existing constitutions we may build up a new one, fitted to make Australia a great nation, and we may leave the result to be sent to the diflferent states, to be considered there. I \Sir George Grey. believe that in every instance, if founded upon true principles of freedom, it would be adopted with shouts of applause, with great thanksgiving, with gratitude from all hearts; and all this might be done in a week or ten days from this time. I earnestly ask that we should be allowed to get on with the resolutions, if they are to be pei'sisted in, with the least possible delay, and having done that, let the other resolutions be put. When that lias been done, let the draftsman be empowered to draft the system of federation which we choose to recommend. That is what I earnestly desire to see done. I con- fess it is with sorrow that I have found that we have been compelled to hurry on this matter, to speak with greater heat than perhaps was necessary ; but I think that no man who really, loved his fel- low-men — who for years had been a com- panion with them in their difficulties of every possible kind — could sit patiently and hear so far iindervalued what they had done, and the merits of a distant coun- try so greatly extolled as far surpassing everything of our own that we can pro- duce or show, without feeling a mortifica- A tion in his heart which it was difficult for him not to express. I have mourned over the number of explorers who have died^ I have mourned over the lack of rewards given to those who have survived. I have seen my friend, Sturt, die almost neglected and unrewarded. I have seen others in the same state ; no loud plaudit* have gone forth to recognise what they have done. I have seen great statesmen amongst you, and I have seen few of them obtain rewards. Of necessity, from having command of small parties, I have known men in humble life, and have seen perfect heroes amongst those who were really work- ing men in the colonies ; but I have never yet seen fair openings given to men of that class, such has been the nature of the in- stitutions here ; and what I have hoped Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 455 and desired, was that the time had now come when justice at least would be done, when every avenue Avould be opened to greatness and worth in every class of life, when a constitution such as the world has not yet seen, would be given to a free people ; and when I heard the language to-day, and began to think that there really was some conception coming upon the minds of hon. members that the Con- vention might be broken up, and that nothing should be done, then the heart began to sink, and the hopes that seemed so near realisation appeared to be fading away. But I still hope and trust that we will persist in the task given to us, and, from what the last speaker said, I believe that he and others will rise superior to the difficulties surrounding us, and lielp to complete the great work for which the whole of Australasia are looking, and upon which I believe the eyes of the whole civilised world at the present moment are hxed. Let us not disappoint them. Let us show ourselves worthy of the duty we are called upon to perform, and blessings will for ever follow the men who helped in that consummation. :Mr. McMillan : I think it will be agreed by most hon. members that we have gone as far with this important sub- ject — the most important of our delibera- tions — as general discussion can biing us. We have already had the resolution of the Hon. Sir Henry Parkes excised and amended so that it read.s, " the sole power of originating all bills appropriating re- venue or imposing taxation." That lays down a very imjiortant principle ; l»ut it commits us to nothing mon>, and it does not pix'vent us from putting in more when we go into Committee. I should, with all respect, propose to my lion, friend. Sir John Downer, and to the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, that they Vjoth withdraw their amendments, and that we pas.s this reso- lution with the one amendment or excision that has been made, and then, when we go into Committee — either into one comnut- tee or into separate committees — say, a separate committee dealing with this finan- cial matter — we may be able to crystallise the general opinion of the delegates, and to frame some kind of phraseology that Y.'ill meet Avith general approval, because we have got very near one another. We have got this far, that I think, generally, Ave agree that the upper chamber should not interfere by Avay of amendment with the appropriation bill for the ordinary services of the year. Then Avhen we come to that, the question simply is, what out- side that should be considered money bills, or Avhether oA\ bills outside that should be open to amendment ; and here Avhile I am speaking I may as well say, as a matter of my own opinion, that this is a question in- volved not merely in the matter of a state house for state rights, but thiit it is in- volved, as far as my opinion is concerned, in the Avhole principle of bicamei'al govern- ment. My hon. friend, Mr. Wiixon, said that if the upper house had the right con- tended for they Avould always exercise it. Nothing of the kind folloAvs. In the lower house among ourselves Avhen avc have the estimates put before us Ave do not debate more than one out of every 100 of the items ; in fact, very often the debate on the estimates is only on about half a dozen n)atters, often trivial, but still of an im- portant character, as connected with the circumstances of the case. Mr. MuKiio : Cenerally lasting very long ! Mr. McMillan : T should like to .say before the debate concludes that 1 cannot see where the power of the lower house is so much contravened wIkjh tlie upper house has the power to alwolutcly veto. Hurely when the veto takes place Avith re- gard to any great measure of finance, it is oidy Avith regard to one or two items in the Avhole ; and iloes it not seem ab.surd •156 Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] Eesolutlons. to eliminate all tlie machinery by wliicli any su2:s:estioii whatever could come from the upper house with regard to the par- ticular matters to which they objected 1 But these arguments have been put before the Committee, and I do not intend to take up its time. I do not want to intro- duce the ordinary debate of our houses of parliament. I do not v-ant to refer to any hon. member, or to cast any asper- sions ; but I would now suggest that it is only due to the hon. member. Sir Henry Parkes, who placed these I'esolutions before the Convention, that as far as we can, ^^ith certain verbal amendments, so long as they carry out the main principles upon which our bill will ultimately be framed, we should pass them ; and then I take for granted that tlie committees will bring up a series of more scientific resolutions which, as the hon. member, Sir Henry Parkes, has said, will be the soul of the bill itself. But it seems to me that we have now got as far as general discussion can bring us on a very delicate and intri- cate question, and it would be far better if those hon. gentlemen would withdraw their amendments, and if, with the ex- cision which has already been made, we pass this resolution, which still leaves us open to the broadest possible compromise. Sir SAMUEL GPtlFFITH: If the dis- cussion is to close, I think it right before it closes, for my own part, to express the very great regret I felt in healing the speech lately delivered by the President. We all meet here, I believe, without exception, firmly determined to do our best to estab- lish a federal constitution, and I think it is moit unfortunate that either intentionally or unintentionally anything should be said to tend to disturb the good feeling Avliich now exists amongst us. The hon. member, Sir Henry Parkes, informed us, in part of his speech, that the intention of the.se re- solutions was to establish in Australia somethinof analogous to the British Con- [J/r. McMillan. stitution. If that is so, of course all the discussion which has taken place to-day and yesterday has been wasted. If we were going to reproduce the British Consti- tution, vv'ith a house of commons and a house of lords, it would be idlefor ustotalk about the powers of the House of Lords or an upper chamber ; but I wish to point out, and I am sure that the hon, mem- ber, Sir Henry Parkes, will agx-ee — for there is no one with a larger knowledge of constitutional history or practice — that it is absolutely impossible to reproduce the British Constitution in Australia. The circumstances of the country will not per- mit of it. The British Constitution is not a federal constitution. It is quite differ- ent from a federal constitution : so that to attempt to do that is to attempt to make two things work together which cannot work together. What we have to do is to follow the British Constitution as nearly as its principles are applicable to a fedez'al constitution. Sir Henry Parkes : That is absolutely all I ever said ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: lam sorry if I misunderstood the hon. gentleman, but certainly the greater part of his speech led to that impression. It seemed to me that if his arguments were carried out, it was absolutely impossible to proceed • Sir Hexky Parkes : I think it will be convenient for me to explain. I liave said in every speech I have addressed to this Convention that it is impossible to reproduce the British Constitution. I have said that repeatedly, and it certainly is not my fault if the Convention has not heard me. What I have said in addition was that, so far as my individual opinion went, I was seeking to follow on the lines of the British Constitution, to work out the spirit of the British Constitution, or words to that effect. But I have never once been so foolish or so ignorant as to announce to this body of eminent men Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1891.] Besohitions. 45^ that I thouglit of reproducing the British Constitution. I hope my hon. and learned friend will accept my explanation ; he must have heard me himself at diS'erent times. Sir SA]\[UEL GRIFFITH : I am very sent time. I think we have only to see what is the best way of meeting the differ- ences that are at present between us. These are not very many, I am quite satisfied that, with two or three exceptions glad indeed that my few words have been —and I doubt whether there are so many th.e occasion of drawing this explanation from the hon. member. But I am sure that I -svas not alone this afternoon in understandiny leaving the resolution as it stands, neither on one side, nor on the other, will it be assumed that we have said all we have to say in regard to money bills 1 What we have said we have said definitely : that the lower house shall have power to originate ; but we all admit that there is more to be said than that. In the present state of things in the Convention it is absolutely impossible to get anything like a unanimous decision on the question. We all want, if pos- sible, to get something like a unanimous decision. It is no use here, as it would be in an ordinary parliament, to attempt to pass anything by a bare majority. We feel that the best thing we can do is to thrash the whole thing out, and see if, after all, there is not some possible course to be adopted that will, if not jjlease, at least satisfy, the members of the Conven- tion generally. I do trust, therefore, that both hon. members will be disposed to let the matter stand where it is, as far as this re- solution is concerned, on the distinct under- standing that it will have to be subse- quently dealt with by a committee, whol will elaborate some scheme — perhaps ouej of the schemes suggested by the hon. members, perhaps some other scheme — J which M'ill efiectually carry out the wisheSJ of the delegates present at the Convention. Federal Constliution: [17 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 459 Sir JOHX DOWXER : When I sug- gested just now that these resolutions should be at once sent to a committee, it was because I felt that it was quite im- possible to consider the 3rd resolution until the 1st resolution was disposed of ; because I thought that to put off the consideration of the relative powers to be reposed in the two houses until we constituted the execu- tive was to put the cart before the horse, and to create your tribunal without first de- fining its jurisdiction. I have not altered my opinion on that subject, and cannot bring myself to alter it in any shape or form, and when I suggested that all these reso- lutions should go to a committee at once — which the hon. member. Sir Henry Parkes, said was unreasonable — I really thought — and I tell the hon. gentleman so — that I was rather acting in accordance with his views than in antagonism to them. Cer- tainly a conversation I had with the hon. member, Mr. ]SIcMillan, led me to enter- tain that view. I certainly have no wish or anxiety to shelve a question which has been so much considered. I am quite willing to fight the resolutions out now, or to refer them all to a committee for con- sideratiou, so that we may discuss them again when the report is brought up. I btill say that I feel just as anxious as does my hon. friend. Sir John Bray, to be as conciliatory us pos.sible, and not to say one word which would momentarily oflend, or which might afterwards leave a sting in the mind of any one present. 1 have great esteem for all who are here, and my sole anxiety is to bring about the one re- sult we have been sent hero to promote. I do, however, ask members of the Com- mittee to say whetlier Ihoy do not think we ought to settle resolution Ko. 1 before we settle resolution No. 3 ] Sir John Bray : "VVe .shall not settle either until we get a committee ! Sir JOHN DOWNER: Is it worth while to discuss resolution No. 3 before we have settled resolution No. 1 ? Is it worth while to mix up the strong opinions, the strong prejudices in the minds of all of us ■ — prejudices which perhaps were born in us, and which have become stronger through association and usage — is it worth while to mix up this question of constitutional government with a question of what shall be the relative powers of the senate and the house of representatives 1 Mr. MuxRO : They naturally mix them- selves up ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : Surely not. Mr. MuxRO : They do indeed ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : I think they unnaturally mix themselves up. What I am endeavouring to urge is that they mix themselves up through no process of reasoning, but entirely through prejudice. Mr. MuxRO : No I Sir JOHN DOWNER: They mix themselves up because many of us, and per- haps most of us, are so prejudiced in favour of the form of government to which we have been so accustomed, that we are un- willing to embark in any fresh venture at all. But, first of all, surely we ought to say what the governing body is to be; what, for instance, the senate is to be, or whether we are to have two houses at all ? Mr. Playford : We have said that ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : That being the case, the next thing we have to determine is, what shall be the powers of the two houses, jointly or differentially 1 When we have settled the absolute and the relative power of the two houses it will then be time to settle what the executive is to be — the body whicli has to carry out tlio wishes of the two houses. Mr. MuNKO : That is the only way in which it can be done ! Sir JOHN DOWNER: Perhaps hav- ing been brought up in an arbitrary pro- fession I am accustomed to look at these matters from an arbitrary point of view ; but I cannot sec any reason at all for ■4G0 Federal Constitution : [17 March, 1891.] Eesolutions, proceciliiig to resolution Xo. 3 until \vc sitting in parliament," no opinion -would have settled resolution No. 1, because when bo expressed upon the point at issue, we cct to No. 3 we shall have to consider and I should not have the slightest objec- the whole question as to whether we are tion to the resolution being agreed to in to have constitutional government or not, that form. and to discuss the question as to whether Mr. GILLTE)S : I have purposely re- or not the new federation is to be upon f rained from joining in the general debate, old lines, which, in my contention, are because I felt assured from the sentiments absolutely inapplicable — upon lines which which many of us have heard expressed Sir Henry Parkes, and those who think among hon. members that there was a with him, are of opinion ought to be fol- general desire that this question should, lowed almost absolutely, or as closely as if possible, before being finally determined possible. We cannot avoid mixing up the by the Convention, be discussed privately executive with the ultimate authority, and by a select committee. I do not join in we may possibly sacrifice the liberties of the opinion which has been expressed this the federation to some prejudices exist- afternoon that things look rather black ; ing in our minds and arising from past in fact, I am inclined to think that they association, from heredity, or from other look very well indeed, and the reason I causes. It is from that point of viev/ form this opinion is this — that I have that I suggested at once — and certainly spoken to scarcely an hon. member of the I thought from what had been said to Convention who has not expressed a me that it would meet the wishes of strong desire and hope that we may be the mover of the resolutions — that hav- able to come to some reasonable agreement ing discussed the matter to its present upon the difficulty which has arisen. I stage, it would be expedient to send reso- believe that hope is greater this afternoon lutions 1 and 3 to one committee, sending than it has been before. We notice that No. 2, which deals with quite another mat- as soon as there is a little storm the at- ter, to another committee, and in this way mosphere cools very readily, and' the hope have all three resolutions considered to- is generally expressed all round that we gether. By that means, I thought, we shall do credit to the Convention and to might discover whether an arrangement, those who sent us here. I confess that per- in which we all expect to give away some- sonally I should feel ashamed if I had to go thing could not be arrived at. I still back to the colony of Victoria and con- think, in reference to the suggestion of the fess that the gentlemen who have met hon. member. Sir John Bray, that it would here for such an important purpose, com- be better, if we are going to have this missioned as they are by the parliaments matter fought out in public, and settled by of the different colonies, have been com- voting on this floor, that we should settle i^clicd to separate without being able to resolution No. 1, and afterwards settle solve what is undoubtedly a difficult No. 3, or agree to refer both resolutions question, but which certainly is not one to a committee. that i.s insoluble. I think we can pass Sir John Bray : Let us take a vote ! the resolution that we have been dis- Sir JOHN DOWNEPt : Then I object. cussing as it stands ; and taking the view Mr. Gordon : Strike out the latter part of the proposal made by the hon. member, of No. 3 ! Sir John Bray, I have no doubt whatever Sir JOHN DOWNER : If resolution that we shall meet upon this point. I have No. 3 ended with the words " such persons heard so many suggestions of amendments, \Sir John Doioner. Federal Constitution: [17 March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 461 many of tbem very reasonable Avitliin them- selves, that I have no doubt we shall be able to adopt or modify some of them when hon. members are in consultation. "With regard to the other proposition referred to by the hon. member, Sir John Downer, I believe the resolution can be so amended as not to commit the Committee to any absolute or strongly expressed opinion which it might afterwards see fit to alter, and that we might at the same time enunciate the principle which is in reality contained in the resolution. I hope we shall see our way to pass the resolution under discussion on the understanding that that and the 3rd resolution be referred to a .select committee, when we may be able to ascertain whether it is not possible to come to a satisfactory understanding upon the difficulty in the minds of hon. members. Mr. WKIXOX : I think the sugsjestion of the hon. member. Sir John Bray, is a very good one, and if both amendments are withdrawn for the present we shall be in a position, after the report from the selecC committee, to discuss the question with better effect, and I shall be very happy to fall in ^\ilh the arrangement, becau.se I think it will lead to a peaceful solution of the difficulty. Sir JOHN DOWNER : If resolution No. 1 is to stand as it is, and No. 3 is to go with the words to which I have be- fore refcried struck out, so that we shall not commit ourselves to any principle, I am quite willing that the course proposed should be adopted. That is what I wish to sec done ; and I would suggest that some hon. member .should move that the further consideration of resolutions 1 and 2 be postponed. Sir S.\MLEL GniFFiTii : Wc must deal with No. 1 ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : We may pass No. 1 on the undei-standing to which I have referred : postpone No. 2 ; and con- sider No. 3 simply with the view of putting it in such a form as to leave the whole question open. Mr. DEAKIN : I do not see any objec- tion to that course except one, which I should have thought might have suggested itself to Sir John Downer, and this is that those who desire to strike out the words in resolution No. 3, referring to re- sponsible government as we now have it, will sui-ely desire to ventilate their views, or else the question will go to the com- mittee without any guidance whateverfrom the Convention. The committee will be left with a perfectly free hand, it is true ; but it might suggest itself to those hon, members who do not approve of the proposal in resolution No. 3, but favour some other proposal, that it is incumbent upon them to lay their alternative before the Convention as a whole, if they expect the committee to deal with the subject in any way. Therefore, I would suggest that Ave should pass resolution No. 1, and take No. 3 next. Sir Hexry Parkes : Why not finish them all to-night? Dr. CocKBUKX : Because there will be a debate upon resolution No. 2 ! I\Ir. Gillies : The words proposed to be omitted from resolution No. 3 do not affect the ower, and I maintain that it isab.solut(;ly necessary for the individual states, Avjien they come into the federation, to have the power of varying in whatever way they think lit the forms of legislation 4S0 Federal Constitution : [18 March, 1891.] Resolutions. under wliicli they are governed. If this is understood, well and good ; but if it is not to be understood without a resolution, I shall support the contention of the hon. member, Sir George Grey. Many of us are not in favour of bicameral legislation at all. I think that the state legislatures might well consist, as in Ontario, of single houses, with the power of referendum to the people. The Chairman : The hon. member is out of order. He must discuss the point whether this resolution is or is not within the scope of the Convention. Dr. CocKBURX : I humbly submit that it is within the scope of the Convention to decide what power of from time to time varying the constitution of the state legis- latures should lie with the states. At present we cannot change our constitu- tions without reference to the Imperial Government. Mr. Clark : Leave things as they are ! Dr. CocKBURN : What are we to under- stand — that the present condition of things is to obtain ? Sir Henry Parkes : Is this on the point of order 1 Dr. CocKBURX : Most decidedly. I main- tain that the hon. member, Sir George Grey, is in order in raising this question — that the local legislatures are part and parcel of the compact — a point that from time to time seems to be ignored. The state legislatures are just as much part and parcel of the bargain of federation as is the central legi-slature. It is not a one- sided affair, but essentially a bargain be- tween the two — the local legislatures, as they exist now and are to exist, and the central legislature, and the powers of the local legislatures, as exei'cised from time to time, and the powers of the central legis- lature. I humbly submit that it is per- fectly in order for the Convention to deal with the question, which is second to none in importance, as to what the powers of the [Z>r. Cockburn. state legislatures, which are to form a great and most important part of this federation, are to be. As I understand that the mover of the resolution considers that the point of order ought to be settled first, I refrain from saying anything further now. I thought it would have gone without saying that the resolution is in order. Mr. Gillies : Personally, I do not sup- pose that any one would have any ob- jection to an abstract discussion on so im- portant a point as that raised by the hon. member. Sir George Grey. But while I would have no objection to discuss on any other occasion a question of this import- ance, the question raised is : constituted as we are here, delegated to do certain duties, is a portion of those duties the setting out of what the various states ought to do, or how far they shall be competent to alter their forms of government 1 Mr. Clark : "May do"! Mr. Gillies : I said, "May do." Mr. Clark : The hon. member said, " Ought to do " ! Mr. Gillies : Well, " Ought to do." Mr. Clark : That is a very different thing ! Mr. Gillies : It is not necessarily a dif- ferent thing. I thought at first the hon. membei^ Dr. Cockburn, was indulging in somewhat of a joke. Has any one colony authorised this Convention to deal with its constitution ? Not one. Dr. CocKBURX : In the future ! Mr. Gillies : The hon. member need not interrupt. He has had his say, and will have a further opportunity to say what he thinks proper. As far as we know, not a single colony has authorised this Conven- tion to deal with the question of its con- stitution. Sir Henry Parkes : Hear, hear I Mr. Gillies : Or recommended that in any way we should interfere with its con- stitution. Sir Henry Parkes : Hear, hear ! Federal Constitution: [18 March, 1891.] Besolatlons. 481 Ml'. Gillies : And I venture to say if you appeal to any of the colonies they ■would consider it gross impertinence for tliis body to deal with a question attecting their rights and interests, which has not been remitted to us to deal with at all. I venture to say that I can speak confidently with reference to the colony of Victoria. The colony of Victoria has not asked this Convention to deal with its Constitution, or to make any recommendation at all with reference to it. The colony of Vic- toria can very well deal with its own Con- stitution. Sir Henry Parkes : Hear, hear ! Mr. Gillies : And it can amend that constitution in any way it thinks proper. It has amended it from time to time, and, although at one time there was a provision that amendments could only Ije made by a clear majority of both branches of the legislature, this having been once amended amendments now come under the ordinary law of legislation, which merely requires a simple majoi'ity. I believe that the only thing now left in the Constitution of Vic- toria the amendment of which requires a clear majority, and to be reserved for her ZMajesty's assent, is portion of schedule D, which lias not up to the present time been amended, Mr. MuxRO: And the GOth clause itself ! ]Mr. Gillies : All they have to do is to repeal ihat portion of the Constitution Act which refjuires an alteration of that section to be reserved for her Majesty's assent. Once repeal that section, and you do away with everything. We have dealt with our Constitution from time to time, making njost important amendments without the advice of gentlemen from the other colo- nics — without the advice of gentlemen in this Convention not belonging to Victoria. We take for granted that we are able to alter our Constitution in the way we think proj)er, and we decline to be dictated toby a body not authorised to deal with that 2 II question. Whatever abstract resolutions they think of passing, it appears perfectly clear to me • Mr. KiXGSTOX : This is not a point of o)xler ! Mr. Gillies : Yes; it is a most im- portant point of order, namely, that this subject cannot be dealt with by this Convention. It was not a question sub- mitted to the Convention, and we have no power to deal with it. Sir George Grey : I submit that the lion, member is not speaking to the point of order. There has been no proposal made to interfere with the constitutions. Mr. Gillies : I am afraid the hon. gen- tleman has forgotten his own resolution, which says : Provision shoukl therefore be made in the federal constitution which will enable the people of each state to adopt by the vote of the majority of voters their own form of state constitution. The lion, gentleman asks that in the fede- ral constitution, which we are authorised by our respective colonies to frame, pro- vision should be made by which an im- portant alteration shall be made in the local constitutions. I say the local legis- latures have never asked the Convention to do that, and it is out of the scope of the Convention to do that unless author- ised to do it. Dr. CocKBURX : One word in c.\[)lana- tion. I, and I am sure any hon. mem- ber, would not be guilty of the inqierti- nence of suggesting to a neighbouring colony what the form of their constitu- tion should be, nor did I understand the hon. member, Sir George Grey, to do so. .Mr. Gillies : It is in the resolution ! ])r. CocKiiUKX : The question is not what the details of the constitutions are now ; but what power of change there sliall \)C in the future, for the power now- given to change constitutions cannot ob- tain in the future. We cannot now make inq)ortant alterations in the Constitution •182 Federal ConstiliUion: [18 Makcii, 1891.] Resolittions. •without tlie consent of the legislature and the Crown. But nobody supposes that when ■sve are federated we shall have to go beliind the federation to the Crown for a change of constitution. It is quite com- petent for us to consider, not what the pre- sent details of any constitution are, but ■what the power's of change from time to time should be. It is necessary to fix this, because we know that the present powers of change cannot obtain in the future, and surely wemusthavesomeguideinthefuture. "We should agree to the great principle that in future, after the federal constitution is framed, the powers of changing their con- stitutions as they please shall re.side wholly and entirely in the various state legisla- tures. That is a most important principle and is, I maintain, entirely in order. Mr. MuNRO : The contention of the hon. member. Dr. Cockburn, clearly indicates that this Convention should make a change in the constitutions of the colonies. Dr. Cockburn : Clearly not ! Mr. MuNRO : It clearly indicates that. Take the Constitution of Victoria. Section 60 provides the mode in which we can alter the Constitution ; and, so far as the provisions of the Constitution liave not been altered, the mode is by a majority of the members of both houses. But the pro- position nov/ is that the majority of the people can alter the constitution of a colony. That, I submit, is a departure entirely from the provisions of our Constitution. We are not here authorised to do anything to enable this Convention to alter the pro- visions of our Constitution. I think we are entirely precluded from doing any- thing of the sort. The proposal of the hon. member. Sir George Grey, clearly is that section 60 of the Constitution of Vic- toria shall be so altered, and that instead of a majority of members of both houses, a majority of the people may alter our Con- stitution. That, I contend, is not within the province of the Convention. [Z>/-. Cockburn. Mr. Thynne : I think the discussion has raised two questions. A good deal of the speech of the hon. member, Mr. Gillies, went into the merits of the proposition of the hon. member, Sir George Grey, which^ there can be no doubt, is within the scope of this Convention. I think we might just as well, in a legislative assembly, pass an act saying that the mode, or the selec- tion of the electors who are to appoint the members, is a question which is outside their consideration. In this confederation it is proposed to have a senate represent- ing the states, whether state legislatures or otherwise. But at present I take it that the senate will be elected by the states- legislatures. Is not everything affecting the states legislatures a matter for the Convention to take into consideration 1 That one ground is, I submit, sufficient to entitle an hon. member to introduce a re- solution dealing with the question of the constitution of the states, because in that respect they aflect the constitution of the federation as regards the election of the members of the senate. Mr. Kingston : It will be a great pity if any decision is given which may tend to unnecessarily stifle discussion, and I do trust, sir, that any ruling which you may feel it your duty to give will be irk favour of the fullest right of free discus- sion on matters on which there may be any doubt. But it appears to me that there is no room for doubt — that we are entitled to discuss and deal with this reso- lution. "We are here for the purpose of framing an adequate scheme for a federal constitution, and there is no doubt what- ever that for that purpose we shall have to deal with the local constitutions and to alter them. At present the local legisla- tures have power to deal with a variety of subjects which they will be asked to sur- render to the federal government. Is not that an alteration of the local constitutions? Mr. Clark : Of course it is ! Federal Conslitutioyi: [IS March, 1S91.] Resolutions. 483 Mr. Kingston : Then, if we are entitled to deal with the local constitutions, so far as relates to the surrender of powers, surely we are similarly entitled to deal Avith the local constitutions as regards the component parts of the various legislatures. I think it would be perfectly within our province if we saw fit to provide that local legisla- tures which are constituted in a certain way, or in which the upper brancli is of a nominated character, shall not be admitted to the federation. Dr. CocKBURN : Of course it would ! Mr. KiNGSTOX : If it is within our power to adopt a course of that sort is it not within our power to provide that the people of the various provinces shall have certain powers either with reference to the making or altering of their constitutions ] I do not see how it is possible to deal with the ques- tion of a federal constitution, without at the same time dealing with and altering the various local constitutions. It seems to me that the resolution proposes to lay down the principle— and a most import- ant px'inciple as affecting the local con- stitutions — that the people of a colony shall have the opportunity by their own votes of deciding the form of constitution under which they will live. I agree to a very great extent with the remarks which have fallen from the hon. member, iJr. Cockburu ; but I go further than he does. ]Io puts it that we have no right to deal with the details of the various local consti- tutions. I say we have the right ; and we must exercise it in various ways, nota- bly as regards the constitutional powers which arc to be reserved to the local legis- lature and the powers which have to be surrendered to the federal jiarliament. Wo .shall have to exercise that power for the ]»urposc of defining the relationships which shall exist between the lieutenant-governor of a jiarticular province and tlie federal go- vernuK-nt. We Iiavc a riglit, undoubtedly, to deal with the question so far a.s it is essential to the establishment of an ade- quate schemefora federal constitutioninthe very minutest detail. I simply put that position because it appears to me to be the correct one. This is not a matter of detail. It is a matter of the most important prin- ciple. It is a question of confiding to the people of a province the power of framing their constitution, and I do think, under all the circumstances, that we have the right to discuss the resolution, and, in view of its great importance, it will be a great pity if we refrain from exercising that riglit. I do trust that we shall shortly have an opportunity of listening to the hon. member. Sir George Grey, who, no doubt, will introduce to our notice a sub- ject of the most vital importance. Sir Henry Parkes : I submit that the ai'gument of the hon. member who has just sat down cannot for a single moment be sustained. The hon. member argues that because certain surrenders must be made by the state constitutions in the work which we are intrusted to do, therefore we can tra\'el over the whole ground and re- model those constitutions. I contend that we are Ijound to act within the strict de- finition of our commissions and instruc- tions. The resolutions as passed by the several legislatures define the constitution wliich — and tlieir ojiinion confirmed the oi)inion of the conference held in Mel- bourne — ought to be brought into exist- ence in this country ; they definitely ap- point persons to frame an adequate con- stitution for federal purposes, and they do nothing else. Now, for us to travel outside what is necessary in framing a federal constitution would 0])en the doors to the consideration of an entire recon- struction of tlu! government in the several states. Certainly that is no ]i!ir(^ of our business, and if we proceed in so loose a w.'iy in transacting our business as that, why then there is no telling what province wc may enter upon, because the whole 484 Federal Constitution : [IS Makcii, 1891.] Resolutions. theory of government for any part of Aus- tralia would come under the range of our operations. Now our commission is very definitely laid down. The resolutions passed by the parliament of this country, which are identical with those passed hy the other parliaments, are to this effect as to the constitutioii which, in the opinion of the conference formed by the several parliaments, should be brought into exist- ence : That in the opinion of this conference And I here interpolate the words "con- firmed by the Parliament" — • the best interests and the present and future prosj^erity of the Australian colonies will be promoted by an early union under the Crown under one legislative and execu- tive government, on principles j-:st to the several colonies. Here is a complete definition, and we can- not travel outside it. Then follow the words that the persons sent to this Con- vention are empo\\'ered to consider and report upon an adequate scheme for a federal constitution. That is,afederal constitution in conformity with this definition. No doubt, in pre- paring and reporting upon an adequate scheme for a federal constitution, certain powers to be withdrawn from the state legislatures mis^ht be suscjested. But that in no way implies that we should go, or in the slightest degree justifies us in going, beyond Avliat is necessary for that one federal purpose. It is on those grounds that I submit we cannot entertain the re- solution now before the Committee. It is idle to say that any one desires to stop dis- cussion. All that we desire to do is to confine it within the legitimate channel of the business we have to transact. Mr. Macdonald-Patekson : I must say — and I say so respectfully— that I en- tirely disagree with some of the obser- vations of the last speaker. I hold most strongly the view that it is quite within the scope of the resolution, from which [.Sir Henry Parhes. the hon. gentleman has just quoted, em- powering us to take steps to fi'ame a constitution just to all the colonies, that we should consider this point. The hon. gentleman has spoken of a surrender of certain powers of local government ; but I would remind him that if our labours ai'e to have a successful conclusion the im- perial authorities will also liaA^e to make a certain surrender. If I understand the hon. member, Sir George Grey, correctly, he intends his resolution — which I respect- fully say is a little verbose, and which might with advantage be made to read in the form I will presently suggest to the Committee — to mean that the imperial authority .shall surrender to the federal authority its right to reject any amend- ment by any colony of its constitution, and that the federal 2:)arliament shall ab- sorb that authority. As has been asked by the hon. member. Dr. Cockburn, are we to go behind the federal parliament and ask the assent of the Imperial Parlia- ment 1 That is not intended. Dr. CocKBURX : "We shall have to pro- vide for something else ! Mr. Macdonald-Patersox : That is what I am arguing. And surely if we ask that the right of appeal to the Privy Council shall be abolished, and that we shall have recourse to our own Supreme Court in all matters relating to Australia — surely if we go so far as that in one direction — it is not too much to ask that the governments of Australia, in making amendments in their constitutions, shall not have recourse to the imperial autho- rities, but to their own local court, the federal parliament, if indeed any further assent than that of its own legislature be considered neces.sary to establish any modi- fication of its constitution. I think the resolution of the hon. member, Sir George Grey, might be so amended as to read in this form : That provision he made enabling each state to amejid or vary its ov,-n stat;e constitution. Federal Consdtution: [IS March, 1891. J Resolutions. 485 That, I tliiiik, would meet witli the ap- government, and that no scheme will be proval of all the delegates here. I do not adequate that does not deal with the ques- wish to prolong this discussion, but I de- tion of the constitution of each colony, .sire to express my approval of the hon. That, shortly, is the hon. gentleman's ar- member's views, and to assert my belief gument. Let me give one illustration, that it is quite within the scope of our Not so very many years ago the colony of duties here to make some such simple af- Jamaica had constitutional government by firmation as that which I have just sug- two houses ; it surrendered its constitution gested. and took the form of government by one Mr. Adye Douglas : It appears to me nominated legislative chamber, becoming, that the resolution of Sir George Grey in fact, a Crown colony. Surely if some is clearly within the jurisdiction of this of those Australian colonics now proposing Committee, providing he strikes out the to federate, were to become Crown colo- words " by the vote of the majority of nies, it might be a serious question as to voters," and simply provides that each whether they should be allowed to con- colony should be free to adopt its " own tinue in the federation, and the effect form of state constitution." The resolution might be to break up the whole constitu- simply says that any of the local constitu- tion. We cannot, therefore, give the go- tious may be altered subject to the sane- by to the matter. Certainly an adequate tion of the federal parliament, taking away scheme of federal government must insist from the Crown in England the reserved that the constituent parts of it shall not power it possesses at this moment, and entirely change their nature. I do not vesting it in the federal parliament. Our think, therefore, that the question is whole proceedings ai'e, 1 take it, upon this foreign to the subject of our discussion — principle — that we are striving to estab- an adequate scheme of federal govern- ILsh a constitution that will relieve us as ment. far as possible from any local jurisdiction Sir John Bray : I would ask the lion, in England ; and if that is the principle member. Sir Henry Parkes, to withdraw upon which we are acting, I think that his point of order. There is no doubt before objecting to the resolution of the a good deal of division on the question lion, member, Sir George Grey, upon a as to whether or not it is strictly witliin point of order, wo should fir.st hear what the scope of our instructions; but the ho lias to bring before us. ^V]len the hon. members of the Convention would like member has given us his rea.sons for the to have the fullest possible discussion, resolution, a i)oint of order may, if neccs- and I think, therefore, we might give the .sary, be taken. It .seems to me, however, hon. member, Sir George Grey, an oppor- that the resolution, as it appears upon the tunity to show that it is within the scopo l)aper, is clearly within the scope of tin- of oui- powers, and also to hear what may duties before us, and that it would be an be said against it. As there is such a act of grace to allow the hon. member to division of opinion on the point, I would proceed. ask the ln;ii. incinber. Sir Henry Parkes, Dr. CocKBUU.v : Not an act of grace— not to press his objection, it is the lion, member's right ! Sii- IFkniiv Parkes : My object in ri.sing Sir Samuel Grifi rni : I desire to to this point of order was to prevent say a few word.s. I understand Sir George the Convention — and I think I am acting Grey to suggest tliis : that wc arc directed in the interests of the Convention in .so to frame an adequate scheme of federal doing — from wandering into subjects with 486 Federal Constitution: [18 March, 1891.] Hesolutions. which they have really nothing to do. That was my object and my point of view. But (rentlemen will recollect that I raised my point without saying more than ten words in support of it. And I was quite prepared that it should at once be decided by the Chairman. If, however, it be the desire of the Convention, I am quite willing to withdraw my point of order. I raised it in support of the orderly conduct of the business of the Convention, and from a desire to confine it to the object for which, I am quite sure, it was brought into exist- ence, and with no other purpose whatever. It is rather unjust to me for even Sir George Grey to venture to say that I de- sire to stop discussion. I simply desire to confine discussion within its legitimate limits — nothing more. Sir GEORGE GREY : Sir, since I pro- posed the resolution which you have put to the Committee, an attempt has been made to prevent me from doing so upon a point of order. That objection, however, has now been withdrawn. But I owe itto myself and to the Committee to say this : that it was clearly withdrawn because it would not have been sustained by the Committee, and it was certainly the opinion of this Conven- tion, as far as I could understand their expressions on the subject, that you had an undoubted right to put the resolution. Therefore, in proposing it now in a dilTer- ent form from what I did before, I wish to guard myself against having done this from any desire to make the resolution more in order than it was before, when it was perfectly in order ; but simply to nar- row the point of discussion, because I understand that if it is carried by the Committee, it will be sent to a select com- mittee, and there be fully and properly considered. I therefore propose to put the resolution now in this form : That provision should be made in the federal constitution which will enable each state to make, vary, or annul its constitution. \_Sir Henry Parkes. The Chairman : In order to allow the proposed alteration to be put to the Com- mittee, it will be necessary for the Con- vention to give leave to withdraw the motion now before it. Motion, by leave, withdrawn. Sir GEORGE GREY : In moving the motion which I have just read, I wish now to remark that I believe the decision to which the House has come on this subject is one of the most important decisions that perhaps any chamber has ever come to — that is as afiecting the whole future of the continent of Australasia. I now feel quite satisfied in my own mind that this Convention will arrive at a definite recommendation, which will be made to the various states which it desires to see enter into the federation which it is now attempting to form. I feel further satisfied that if such a federation be en- tered into it will, under the system which we shall be able to establish, last for all time. That is, perhaps, from period to period the difierent states may vary their constitutions, perhaps almost destroy one constitution and put another in its place ; but upon the whole such satisfaction and contentment will prevail throughout the entire federation that it will be lasting, and of the utmost durability. Now, the object which I had in view in preparing the resolution which I submitted to the House, and of which this is really a rejje- tition in a shorter form, was this : that in every other federal constitution which I have seen or known, the first thing done was to form the states, and to assign to them their powers. In the case of the United States, that was unnecessary, for they already had full powers and almost the same form of government ; and they have retained very nearly that form of government ever since, with slight varia- tions from time to time, perhaps ultimately in the course of years amounting to con- siderable changes. I believe that exactly Federal Constitution: [IS March, 1891. J Hesolv.tions. [87 the same thing will take place in Aus- tralasia. And unless this were done, which I now propose, I do not believe that for many years there would be a firm federation established on this continent. And for this reason, that undoubtedly in some of the constitutions of the states, antiquated forms have been introduced without the consent of the inhabitants having been obtained ; which antiquated forms were, in many cases, opposed, as, I believe, to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of the states, and which it would have been impossible almost to have altered without great ditficulty, owing to the form in which their legislatures were constituted. That is, by either having a nominated upper house, or by the upper house being fettered by conditions now unknown absolutely in other countries — such, for instance, as a money qualifica- tion in the members. In England that bas been absolutely abolished. In my youth no man could take his seat in the House of Commons unless he liad £600 a year if he was a member for a county, or £400 a year if he was a member for a borough ; and that qualification in the case of counties was required to be in land. Now, the result of that was that a large number of persons who had no such quali- fication really got into the houses of par- liament. But thf-y got in in this way : that, being the sons or relations of very wealthy men, their relations conveyed to them the day before the election an estate in land of the required value. That estate was held until the election was over, and then it was roconveyed to the person who liad made the conveyance in the first in- stance. The result of that was neces.sarily that many avenues of U8efulne.s.s in po- litical life were closed against everybody but those who were either wealthy them- .selvos or who had wealthy relations who were inclined to help them. I was sur- prised, indeed, when I found that with that experience staring them in the face, they had in some colonies of Australia — certainly in one — gone back to the old system and established a property quali- fication. I have no doubt that under the terms of this resolution, the recommenda- tion of this Convention will go in this direction, that is, that they will require no qualification at all in the member, except to be a voter ; that they will approach, in point of fact, very nearly to what is the present rule in Great Britain, which is, or was, regarded as a most aristocratic coun- try. If that is done throughout Austral- asia, the result will be, if the people at the same time have the power of electing their lieutenant-governors, that every great post but one in the whole of Australasia will be open to every man of ability, or of such ability or of such force of character, or occu- pying such relations of public life, as will secure him the votes of a large constitu- ency; and an immense amount of talent that under other circumstances would be shut out from serving the state will have a fair opportunity open to it, and there can be no doubt that numbers of able men will, under such a system, be found who other- wise would have remained undiscovered, useless to their country, and probably many great measures will hereafter be carried which could not have been carried under any other system than that which I am convinced will be recommended for adoption. I cannot help thinking that the advantage of getting this amount of ability and energy into play is almost wholly over- looked, and but very little conception is as yet formed of tiio spur that will bo given to enterprise and energy, and all that can make men happier and better off by opening all these places of great im- portance to every single citizen of each state in the confederation. This was lately very forcibly impressed upon my mind. I will just give an exanjple of what I mean, and what I think, perhaps, the future ■18S Federal Constitution: [18 March, 1891.] Resolutions. legislature will agree to. When I went to South Africa I found that in some of the towns there were consitlerable portions of valuable town land which hadnot beenmade away with, and anxious some forty years ago to establish something like the system of getting at the unearned increment which w'C wish to establish here, or at least which a great number of people desire, by vestinsr those lands which had not been sold in the corporation, subject to trusts for improvements, for the benefit of the in- habitants of the city, and subject also to the condition that they should only be let for forty years. The result is at the present time that I saw that -when Sir Henry Loch A'isited Port Elizabeth, one of the towns in which this was done, the people boasted that formerly, when I had visited them years before, I found there one of their citizens — a man of great in- fluence and of great energy — and that I got him to act as the person to bring the events about that I desired, and that the results were almost incredible. They showed Sir Henry Loch the magnificent building in which they entertained him, and they told him that next day they "R'ould surprise and astonish him by the multitude of establishments for the benefit of the citizens which had been created throughout their entire district. I will only just put it to hon. gentlemen what the efifect of such a thing must be. Imagine for one moment that the whole rental of Sydney at the present time was the pro- perty of the corporation for the use of all the citizens ! Is it possiVjle to estimate the benefit that would result under such cir- cumstances to the inhabitants of this place 1 I firmly believe that if once into the hands of the great majority of the people passes the power of electing their own members freely, without being fettered by any of the obligations of the old times, there are yet great cities to arise in many parts of Australasia, every one of which will rise {Sir George Grey. upon the plan I speak of, that the lands' are disposed of simply upon lease and sub- ject to a rental, which may be renewed every forty years, or at some lesser period. There is no reason why such a thing should not be done, injuring nobody, but bless- ing countless thousands of people who will occupy this country in the next century or half century of time. Unless the states clearly have their representation founded upon a system Avhicli enables every man to give his vote — some people go further, and would give a vote to females ; I will not say anything on that now, but there is a great deal to be said for the proposal — but I believe that at once, after such a number of intellects are set to work, at once after such anumberof persons havebecome inter- ested in political considerations, such a great improvement as I speak of will be carried out, and hundreds of others will follow. I believe a time will come wheii^ under such circumstances, the government maintaining the command of their railways, people will travel at an insignificant cost and move their produce at an insignificant cost to every part of the countiy, and that many properties now almost absolutely valueless, on account of the distance at which they lie from the market, the owners being unable to bring their produce on cheap termsto the best and greatest market in these seas, perhaps I may call it — that is, either Sydney or Melbourne — I think that, when that advantage is given, numbers of per- sons now in comparative poverty will be enriched by the value that will be given to their properties and holdings. I could follow this subject out into numerous branches ; I could show how the intellect of a vast number of people would be im- proved and enlarged, from young men reading, and carefully studying to embark into political life, and to distinguish them- selves at the bar of their country ; because I believe the profession of the law will be thrown far more open than it is now, and Federal Constitution: [IS March, 1891.] Resolutions. 480 that people "will be nmcli more easily able to become practitioners in the Supreme Court. For example, we should have had no Abraham Lincoln unless the rule had been that an examination in law and in the En£;lish lancrua^e Avas suffi- cient to admit any man to the bar; so that the splitter of shingles could carry law books up into the forest, study law, come down, be called to the bar, earn money enough to go into public life, and then, as if Providence had really almost designed the thing, at the very moment when the great man was required, forth he stepped, untrusted at first by large numbers of people ; so much so that when he came into ISTew York an enormous crowd was assembled, but not one hat was lifted, except very few, to the president ; not one voice cried " God bless you "'; there was not one cheer, because the citi- zens of New York were opposed to the party which he represented ; and yet, wlien he died, he was admitted to have been one of the gi-eatest men of the times, and his death was deplored, not only in the United States, but also in many other nations. It was only by opening all these ofiiccs to their great men in America that such men as Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, Garfield, Cleveland, every one of them, were brought forward, and without these chances they never could have attained to the positions which they occupied. I think, tlierefore, that we, in arriving at the conclusion whicli, I am certain, will be adoptfd of referring this to a committee, have cnsurrd to the future of Australasia a prosperity which it could never other- wise have enjoyed, and I believe that if tills motion of mine had unfortunately been ruled to l^e out of order, if the matter had been stopperl, discontent would have arisen from one end of the country to another, that it would be understood that the wrong thing had been done, that a mistake had been made. There would have been general regret, and the Constitution vrould have been sent back to be amended in that direction in which we are now taking it — that is, the Convention would again have had remitted to it what will probably now pass. I cannot tell the exact form in which it will pass ; but I have no doubt what- ever that it will be of great and un- doubted utility, and will be received with latitude. Last nii;ht when I received an invitation to the banquet that is to be given to the members of the Convention when our sittings are over, I actually trembled to think that perhops we shall not deserve this festivity, and that we shall have to go back without anything satis- factory being concluded, or any great scheme sketched out. Now, I feel sure that by giving and taking, by joining to- gether to get the best possible thing we can we shall succeed in giving to Austral- asia a federation which will be an honor to this Convention and a blessing to the people of this country, and it is in that hope that I move that the resolution be adopted by the Committee. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I think that the proposal brought forward by the lion, member. Sir George Grey, deserves much more considei'ation than will be given to it if it is put to the vote at once. The constitutions of the dilTerent states in the confederation may be of very great import- ance to the permanency of the federation, I do not think that any of us desire to hanil over to the federal parliament the power to interfere with the constitutions of the (lilTerent states ; but at the same time the federal govenunent, the confederation generally, is most materially interested in theconstitutions of the states. As I pointed out this morning, a .state might cease to have representative government, and might no lonirer bo entitled to have a voice in the confederation. I am not sufficiently familiar with tlir* details of the consti- tutions of the dillerent colonies at the 490 Federal Constitution: [18 Marot, 1891.] Resolutions. present time to remember precisely wliat are the conditions under which they may be changed; but, so far as I know, each colony has the power within its constitution to change that constitution, except, of course, that they cannot change it by throwing off their allegiance to the Crown ; and they cannot get rid of her Majesty's repre- sentative. That would be a revolutionary act. Dr. CocKBURN : And that bills are re- served for her Majesty's assent ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : It may be so in some cases, and we know that several bills have been reserved in practice ; but that has been not because the constitution required them to be reserved, but because they contained provisions to which the Governor was not authorised to consent. Dr. CoCKBURX : I think it is laid down in the constitution acts ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The con- stitutions vary in that particular. I cer- tainly agree with those who have said that after the establishment of a federal consti- tution in Australia there should be no necessity to refer to the British Parlia- ment to do anything for Australia, either in changing a constitution or in anything else. I think the constitution will be by no means an adequate one for the purpose for whicli it is to be designed if we shall have occasion to refer to the Parliament of the United Kingdom to do anything for us. The matter of changing the state constitu- tions, however, is, I think, only remotely connected with the work we have in hand. I do not think it is our business to insist upon any particular method by which those constitutions may be changed. The Ameri- can theory is — and I believe that in the abstract the theory is right — that all consti- tutions are the act of the individual mem- bers of the community, and that they dele- gate their power to the legislature, and that legislature can only work within the au- thority given to it. The English theory, of \Sir Samuel Griffith. course, is different. The Parliament, no matter how it originated, is a sovereign body, and can do what it likes, and we in the Australian colonies have proceeded up to the present time upon the English theory. We give to our parliaments their legislative powers, and included amongst them is the power to change their own constitutions, I do not think we need in- terfere with that. The federal constitution ought to contain provisions prohibiting any state fx'om changing its constitution under its existing powers in particular direc- tions, in such a direction, for instance, as to make it unfit to be a member of the commonwealth of states. I do not think that the framers of the constitution ought to be called upon to lay down any particular lines to be followed by a state desiring to change its constitution ; but any provision of that kind should be of a negative rather than of a positive char- acter. I have little doubt that before long the constitutions of many of these colonies will be changed, and very likely they will be changed in the direction indicated, but not put into so many words, by the hon. member, Sir George Grey, by the American system of having a convention, elected by the people for that duty only, and dissolv- ing after it has performed its duty. But that is not the question at the present time. The only question before us is whether an instruction of this kind should be adopted now to guide the committee which is to bring up resolutions. I feel some difficulty about adopting it in its present form. But, at the same time, I am sure that the com- mittee cannot bring up an adequate scheme without dealing with the matter in some way. It is rather unfortunate that we have not had the proposal in its present form before us in print. It is that provision should be made to enable the states to make, vary, or annul their constitutions. They have constitutions now, and they have also the power in one way or another Federal Constitution: [18 March, 1891.] Resohitions, 491 to alter them ; but it seems to me that the general rulins: direction which should be given is this : that provision should be made in the fedei'al constitution to enable the federal parliament to exercise with respect to Australia those powers with respect to individual states which, at the present time, can be exercised only by the British Parlia- ment. That might not cover all the ground, but I think it would cover the ground so far as regards this point. It would be en- tirely inconsistent with the whole theory of what we pi'opose to do if a state of Australia, desiring to alter its constitu- tion, had to go past the federal govern- ment to the British Parliament for the ratification of that alteration. That must be borne in mind. I suggest, for the con- sideration of the hon. member, Sir George Grey, whether the proposal is worth in- sisting on in its present form. I think, after the discussion which has taken place that it must be manifest that the members of the committee, whoever they may be, will have to deal with this subject, and I think they niay be trusted to deal with it in an adequate manner. Mr. McMillan : It may have been very well, as a matter of courtesy to the delegate who moved this resolution, to al- low a certain amount of discussion ; but it .seems to mo that we arc now brought face to face with the po.ssibility of leaving only a short time within whicli to complete our labours; and it seems to me, wlien we have such an enormous amount of labour to com- plete, that the introduction of extraneous matter such as thisproposal .seems to consist of, moans the entoring upon matter which will delay the work of the Convention, i would remind hon. members that to-mor- row week will be the day before Easter, and it is probable we may have to complete the whole of our labours in the next few days. It seems to me that it would be far better if tlie hon. gentleman would with- draw the resolution alto''ether after the discussion which has taken place, and let us go on, immediately, with the appoint- ment of the committee. Sir JOHN BRAY : I presume the hon. member. Sir George Grey, will have no ob- jection to withdraw the amendment if it is understood that the committee will give their attention to the point raised by him ; but I agree with the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, that we must, to some extent, contemplate the possibility of the altei'ation of the constitution acts of the different colonies for the purposes of federa- tion, if for nothing else. It has been not only hinted at, but deliberately stated, that there can be no possible objection to the people of the difTerent colonies electing their own lieutenant-governors, and if wo are going to do that there ought to be some provision to that eflfect in the federal constitution act. I do not wish to press the matter too harshly if it is understood that the Committee will agree to the sug- gestion. To save time, I would ask the hon. member. Sir George Grey, if lie objects to accept an amendment to strike out the words which he proposes to insert — to make, vary, or annul their form of constitution, with the object of substituting the words : to make such amendments in tlicir constitution acts as may be necessary for the purposes of federation. If the hon. meuiber, Sir George Grey, will agree that provi.sion should be made to enable the people of each state to make such amendments in their constitution act as may be necessary for the purposes of federation, it will be the means of bringing i\\i\ matt<;r immediately under the notice of the committee which will frame the resolutions, or whatever they may be, with regard to the paili;i)ii<'nt or executive. The matter will thus not be overlooked. I think the federal constitution act ought to ])rovi(le — if we think that sucli a pro- vision shouhl be )nade — that each colony sliould elect its own governor. 492 Federal Constitution: [IS March, 1891.] Resolutions. Mr. McjNEillan : That is in contraven- tion of our pi*esent arrangements ! Sir JOHN BRAY: Some alteration must be necessary. It is clear that the governor of each colony cannot occupy the same position under federation which he occupies now. The governor-general will have to discharge some of the duties now intrusted to the governor, and whether we provide for it or not, it is clear that some alteration will have to be made which will change the duties of the lieu- tenant-governor of each province, and make them different from what their duties are as governors of a province at the present time. If it is understood that the committee will consider this matter, it might answer all the purposes required if the lion, member would withdraw the motion. If he does not, I shall be happy to support it, if some such amendment as that which I have indicated is agreed to, by which the federal constitution act will only provide such authority as may be necessary to enable the different colonies to alter their constitutions for the purpose of giving effect to the federation proposals. Mr. WRIXON : I think the hon. mem- ber, Sir George Grey, ought to attach weight to the view which has just been presented, and to accept the more general form in which the last speaker asks him to put the proposal. There are many reasons for that ; but there is one reason in par- ticular. I think the lion, member will be satisfied if the subject is considered by the Committee, and is afterwards dealt with by the Convention. If we were to adopt it exactly as he proposes it, Ave should be tied to the particular means which he suggests, namely, that the majority of voters Mr. Deakin : That has been dropped ! Mr. WRIXON : Well, then, I think that what has been proposed by the hon. member, Sir John Bray, embraces every- thing which Sir George Grey wishes. It \Sir John Bray. will leave the matter open for the con- sideration of the Committee, and we shall not tie our hands in any way. Mr. MACDONALD-PATERSON : Tliat is not the point at all — that is not the object we had in view in discussing the matter before the luncheon hour. The amendment of the constitution acts of the different colonies is not for the purposes of federation ; it is for the purpose of working their own several and distinct governments. Surely the hon. member, Sir John Bray, is under a misapprehen- sion, or I am under a great cloud of mis- apprehension myself. Mr. J. FORREST : I should like to point out that we have already agreed to the 1st resolution : That the powers and privileges and territorial rights of the several existing colonies shall remain intact. ISTow it is proposed, it seems to me, and for the first time during this Convention, that the distinctive states shall be subordinate to the central government. I have not heard, during the debates which have taken place, any mention of the subordi- nation of the states to the central govern- ment, and this proposal would, I think, make them altogether subordinate so far as their constitutions would be in some way dependent upon the action of the dominion government. I notice, in the Canadian Constitution, that power was given to the municipal governments to amend their constitution. One of the powers reserved to the provinces was "the amendment from time to time, notwith- standing anything in this act, of the con- stitution of the provinces, except as regards the otiice of lieutenant-governor." That was, no doubt, necessary in the case of tlie Canadian Constitution, because all the powers that wei'e not given specially to the province were reserved to the central government. But in our case the opposite is proposed. AVe propose that specific Federal Constitution: [18 March, 1891.] Resolutions. 493 powers shall be given to the central go- I have no doubt can be worked out. Other- vernment, and that all the other powers wise I can .see nothing in the resolution shall remain in the states or provinces. In which gives us anything more than at any most of the colonies I believe power is rate tlie colony I represent has already ; given already to amend their constitu- that is, the power to amend its Constitu- tions in any way which may be desired. tion in any way it chooses. In the colony I represent we have power Sir GEORGE GREY: Iwi.sh to answer to amend our Constitution in any way we the last lion, member, who has made a like by an absolute majority, and the Go- very interesting speech, but who, I think, vernor has power to assent to the amend- has misunderstood the subject in part. In ment of the Constitution, with the excep- point of fact, Avhat I am aiming at is this: tion of one or two particulars in respect I believe that in the old constitutions, and to which he has to reserve bills for her in some of the new constitutions, a machin- Majesty's assent. Those particulars have ery has been set up which virtually takes reference to the civil list and to the abo- all liberty from the people, or at any rate rigines. In all other matters we can amend takes a very great amount of liberty from our Constitution in any way we choose, the people. We are told that in Western without any reference to the Imperial Go- Australia they have the power of altering vernment. As evidence of that, I may men- their own Constitution. But they can do tion that during the last session — tlie that only with the consent of a council first session under our Constitution — we nominated for six years. That is no liberty amended the Constitution by a simple at all to the people. I believe that in statute in the same way as we would any this colony there is a nominated upper other law. house and plural voting. There is, prob- Mr. KiXGSTOX : Was it not reserved ? ably, plural voting to a great extent in Mr. J. FORREST : It was not reserved. Western Australia. It will take, perhaps, There was no occasion for reserving it. a term of many years to work off those There is no objection, as far as I can see, burdens which are imposed upon the people to the introduction of the resolution of — a term of very many years I should think he lion, member, Sir George Grey; but — whereas at the moment when you are f cannot see tliat it carries us any furtlior framing a new constitution, seeing that in than we are at present. We have the every federal constitution certain provi- ]»ower already, and, as far as I know, wo sions arc made for the government of the do not wish to give up tlio power, to states, I ask that a similar provision should amend our constitutions in any way we be made for the government of the states ject, I will leave the resolution as it stands, and withdraw my amendment. Mr. Dkakin : Before the hon. monibfr •withdraws his resolution, I should like to suggest The Chairman : Perhaps the hon. gen- tlemen had better move hi.s resolution, so that I can state the question, and thus enable the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, to address the Committee on the subject. Question proposed. Mr. DEAKIX : The subject appears to me to be one of so much importance as to merit, not reference to a general com- mittee, but the appointment of a separate committee for its special consideration ; and I would suggest that when the hon. member, Mr. Suttor, moves for the ap- pointment of the tAvo committees already indicated, one of which is to deal with finance, taxation, and trade, and the other with the questions of constitutional ma- chinery and the distribution of powers and functions, he should at the same time move the appointment of a third com- mittee, which might consist of the attor- ney-generals and other legal members of the Convention, which should specially consider this most important question. It seems to me to be of such magnitude as to deserve a special legal committee for its consideration, instead of being dealt with merely as one question among many referred to two committees which have not this subject specially mentioned in the reference proposed to be made to them. Resolution, by leave, withdrawn. Resolutions reported and agi'eed to as follows : — Tliat in order to estal)lisli and secure an en- during foundation for tlie structure of a federal government, the principles embodied in the re- solutions following be agreed to : — (1.) That the powers and privileges and terri- torial I'ights of tlie several existing colonics shall remain intact, except in respect to such surrenders as may be agreed upon as necessary and incidental to the power and autliority of the National Federal Govern- ment. ('2.) No new state shall be formed by separation from anotlicr state, nor sliall any state bo formed by the junction of two or more states or parts of states, witliout the consent of the legislatures of tlic states concerned, as well as of tlic federal parliament. (.3.) Tliat the trade and intercourse between the federatefl colonies, whether by means of land carriage or coastal navigation, shall be absolutely free. 500 Apj^ointment of [18 March, 1891.] Committees. (4.) That the jiower ami authoiily to impose customs duties and duties of excise upon goods the subject of customs duties and to otYer bounties shall be exclusively lodged in the federal government and parliament, subject to such disposal of the revenues thence derived as shall be agreed upon. (.").) That the military and naval defence of Australia shall be intrusted to federal forces, under one command. (G.) That provision should be made in the Federal Constitution which will enaV)le each state to make such amendments in its constitution as may be necessary for the purposes of the federation. Subject to these and other necessary con- ditions, this Convention approves of the fi'aming of a federal constitution which shall establish, — (1.) A parliament, to consist of a senate and a house of representatives, the former consist- ing of an equal number of members from each colony, to be elected by a system which shall provide for the periodical re- tirement of one-third of the members, so securing to the body itself a perpetual ex- istence combined with definite responsibility to the electors, the latter to be elected by districts formed on a population basis, and to possess the sole power of originating all bills approjiriating revenue or imposing taxation. (2. ) A judiciary, consisting of a federal supreme court, which sliall constitute a high court of appeal for Australia. (3.) An executive, consisting of a governor- general, and such persons as may from time to time Ije appointed as his advisers. APPOINTMENT OF COMMITTEES. Mr. SUTTOR rose to move : (1.) That a committee be appointed to deal v.ith the finance, taxation, and trade regulations, with power to report its conclusions as soon as X>racticable to this Convention. {2. ) That each colony choose its own memljer for such committee — one member from each colony. He said : Understanding that it is the wish of the Convention that the various matters embodied in the resolutions which have been passed should be dealt with by committees, I have placed this and the following resolution on the paper in order that the different matters may be so dealt with. I think both resolutions might be taken as matters of form, seeing that the Convention is unanimous in the object de- sired. I understand that the hon. member, Mr. Barton, intends to move an amend- ment with the view of giving more com- plete powers to the committees. Mr. ABBOTT : I second the resolution, but I would like to point out that I think the names of the committee should be men- tioned, so that there might be a record in the Convention as to who the committee were. Question proposed. ]\rr. BARTON : It struck me in reading the resolution which has been moved by the lion, member, Mr. Suttor, that perhaps it was not sufficiently specific for the pur- pose, and I thought it just as well to sketch out some resolutions which might more expressly define what the object and work of these committees is to be, and which might be adopted as an amendment upon the resolutions, though some hon. members will, perhaps, be able to suggest something more definite. It seems to me that two committees, as suggested by the hon. mem- ber, will be necessary, though I have heard some hon. members say that four commit- tees will be required, but I think that it Avill not be a wise thing to multiply the number of committees. It would be a good thing that a committee should be ap- pointed which will have the special work of drafting a bill, and it would also be a good thing, though perhaps it is not neces- sary to specifically provide for it, if each delegation in sending its quota of mem- bers to that committee sent some member to be eligible as a member of a sub-com- mittee, or in the main committee, to be . able to take part in the drafting of the ^ bill. But I think we have enough ground- work laid down in the resolutions which have been passed for any committee which Aj)2)ointment of [18 March, 1891. J Committees. 501 takes into consideration the whole drift of the debate, and the general opinions ex- pressed, to be in a position to draft a bill with which we could deal without any intermediate resolutions ; that is, we might take the suggestions which they will make in the form most familiar to lawyers, tliat of a bill, in which, if the committee are good draftsmen, they will be quite as intelligible as any resolutions would be. Then it a.\)- peared right that some committee should Ije appointed upon matters involved in the resolutions affecting trade and intercourse, customs and excise duties, and I thought with the hon. member, Mr. Suttor, that a committee consisting of one member from each delegation, would be sufficient to deal with these matters for the purpose of col- lecting all necessary information, and of coming to a conclusion as to what provi- sions would be necessary in the bill to cover the ground of the resolutions, and all subsidiary matters. They might place their conclusions in the hands of the larger committee, from which a drafthig com- mittee might be selected. For these rea- sons, I drew up the following resolu- tions : — (1.) That the resolutions reported to this Con- vention by Coniinittcc of the AA'liole 1)e referitil to two coniiiiittecs, the one for consideration of constitutional macliinery and the distribution of functions and powers, the other for considera- tion of provisions relating to finance, taxation, and trade regulation ; tlie first-named coinmitlec to consist of two members from each of the several delegations, the last-named committee to consist of one niendjer from each. Tlie niendjcrs to be chosen by the several delegations. (2.) Tliat the last-named committee be in- structed to specially consiiler resolutions Xos. .3 and 4, on traile and intercourse anrl on cus- toms taxation, witli a view to their being carried into efTcct uj)on lines just to tlie several colonies, and tliat it be a further instruction to the said committee to lay its conclusions before tlic com- mittee on constitutional machinery, functions, and powers. (?,. ) Tliat upon the result of the deliberation of the said committees the committee on con- stitutional machinery, functions, and powers, do prepare and submit to this Convention a bill for the establishment of a fedei-al constitution, such bill to be prepared as speedily as is con- sistent with careful consideration. ' In submitting these resolutions, I wish to point out that it has been suggested that a committee upon the question of judiciary should be appointed. That committee has suggested itself to several very experi- enced and able members of the Conven- tion ; but the committee upon the constitu- tional machinery, functions, and powers will no doubt, since they will liave the prepai'ation of the bill in hand, include sufficient members of the legal profession to be able to throw all the conclusions on constitutional machinery, including the judiciary, into proper form. It seems to me that itwould be encumbering the matter to appoint more than two committees. Sir Joiix Bray : Three ! Mr. Playford : The hon. member had better have a committee upon the judi- ciary, and let them draft the bill ! Mr. BARTON : I should like to hear what is to be said about that ; but if a connnittec is appointed upon the judiciary, I do not see why it should not be appointed as a sub-committee of the large committee on constitutional machinery ; and if it wen' an understood thing that that largo committee .should appoint a committee on the judiciary, we might have a com- mittee consisting of treasurers and ex- trcasurers to deal with the questions of finance and taxation, who would get all necessary information, and frame what might seem to them the necessary resolu- tions, and these they oould place before the large connnittec. Upon the reports of tlieso committees a bill might be prepared, which, I think, n)iglit bo dealt with witli- out the preliminary discussion of any re- solutions, and we should then have the lions of federation in so narrow a path that we should be able to concentrate our energies upon their destruction. 502 Appointment of [18 March, 1891.] Committees. Mr. PLAYFORD : I raise no olijections "to these resolutions ; but I would suggest that another conimittee be appointed to deal with the subject of the judiciary. Sir JOHN DOWKER: I also think that the constitutional committee will have jdenty to do, and that it would be a great assistance to them if they had another com- mittee to help them on this question of the judiciary. The President : I understand that the hon. member, Mr. Suttor, is willing to ac- cept the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. Barton, in lieu of his own resolutions ? Mr. Suttor : Certainly. The President : I shall then submit the amendment as the resolution. Question proposed. Colonel SMITH : Whilst concurring with the proposals generally, I should have been glad if there had been more committees. Both the proposers of the resolutions, the hon. members, Mr. Barton and Mr. Suttor, agree to the appointment of two commit- tees, which simply absorb twenty-one mem- bers of the Convention out of forty-five. I think we should give the remaining twenty- four something to do. The object, as I understand it, is to apjDoint upon commit- tees those who are best likely to iinder- stand the subjects with which they have to deal. I find that twenty-four members of the Convention, I do not know for what length of time, will absolutely have nothing to do, whilst the other twenty- one will be sitting on committees, and deciding the questions which are brought before them. I have thought it would have been wiser if we had divided the whole body into committees to consider the various branches of the subject which have to be dealt with, and if their vari- ous reports could be submitted to the Convention. How long are these twenty- one members appointed upon committees, fourteen upon one, and seven upon tlie other, to be occupied in their delibera- tion ? I venture to say that the considera- tion of one of these questions will occupy a very considerable time. Are hon. mem- bers who are not included upon those com- mittees to wait whilst the reports are being drawn up, and whilst questions, the consideration of which may occupy several days, are being determined 1 I think it would have been wiser to have divided the Convention into more committees. T in- tended to have brought forward a proposal ■with regard to finance ; but as I find the unanimity of the Convention is so thorough on the subject, I do not think it is neces- sary. It was my intention to propose the appointment of a committee to deal with that subject. We have the ques- .tion of finance, taxation, and trade regu- lations to be dealt with by one committee. I do not know who the gentlemen are who are prepared to deal with those three sub- jects ; but I think it would have been wiser if we could have separated them, if we could have classed finance and taxation together, and divided, the remaining sub- jects amongst other committees. For in- stance, I submit, with all due deference^ that the question of drawing up a consti- tution ought to be settled in Committee ; that the question of the Privy Council^ which the hon. member, Sir John Downer, ventured to solve, ought to be a separate subject dealt with, wholly and solely, by members distinguished in the particular profession which has to deal with it. Sir Samuel Griffith : No ! Colonel SMITH : I thought the hon. gentleman would have been one of the first, knowing so much about the subject^ and being connected with a distinguished profession, to agree to a proposal of that description. Sir Samuel Griffith : I think we want the assistance of laymen ! Colonel SMITH : 1 am sure, so far as this Convention is concerned, that we shall be satisfied if the whole body is divided Appointment of [IS March, 1 891.] Committees. 503 into committees, of which the President and Vice-President should be ex-officio members, so that we might have tlie bene- fit of their advice upon the whole of them, I certainly hope that over one-half of the members of the Convention will not be left to look on or idle about when they might, in some way, assist to bring up reports on various subjects. I have no desire to press the matter unduly, but it appears to me that two committees of twenty-one members out of forty-five are altogether insufficient. I have no desire to move an amendment ; I only throw out the suggestion because I think that the duties ought to be divided amongst more committees. In my opinion it would be a wise thing if every member of the Con- vention was appointed upon a committee of some sort or other. We desire to get througli the work, and to have done with it ; but if you give one or two committees too much to do they will have various difficul- ties to contend with. If the Convention is not di\'ided into committees w^e shall have those members not included in the commit- tees engaged in criticising the work done, and that will load to long debates. If, how- ever, the vaiious subjects are decided and dealt with by different committees, our proceedings will be considerably shortened. ^Ir. DEAKIX : I understand the hon. member from Tasmania, Mr. Clark, intends to move an amendment. Mr. Clakk : Yes! Mr. DEAKIX : If the hon. member is .prepared with an amendment with refer- ence to the judiciary committee, I will leave l)im to propose it, and to urge anything that may be necessary on its behalf. I would point out, however, tliat we liavo in this Convention a considerable number of gentlemen versed in the law, and it is quite possible that their services on the judiciary committee would be of material service not only in settling the questions connected •with the judiciary, but al.so in aiding the general committee on the constitutional machinery in drafting the bill which, under the resolution, they arg asked to bring up. I trust, therefore, that the hon. member. Mi-. Barton, will see his way to accept the amendment which the hon. member, Mr. Clark, is about to propose, giving us a third committee dealing with that most important branch of the future federal government which will come under the control of its judiciary. Sh- SAMUEL GPtlFPiTH : Before the proposal is formally made with regard to the judiciary committee, I wish to offer my opinion on the subject, I do not concur in what has been said by the hon. mem- ber, Colonel Smith, to the effect that the matter ought to be left entirely to lawyers. In my opinion the right of appeal to her Majesty-in-Council, is a gi-eat constitu- tional matter upon which lawyers are not better fitted to express an .opinion than other persons. In my humble judgment they are less fitted in some particulars to express a sound opinion on the subject. I think also that it will be very difficult to dis- entangle this subject from the other consti- tutional subjects to be considered by the general committee. I think, therefore, it would be found to be a more practical and speedy manner of getting through business if we intrusted that subject, as has been suggested by the hon. men)ber, Mr. Barton, to a sub-committee of the general commit- tee, with the understanding that tliey can call to their aid any of the other legal members of the Convention whom they may think able to give them assistance, I api)rehend that these committees, al- though appointed in this formal manner, will not be hard and fast committees. They will consult with one anotlier and with their colleagues ; and, practically, all the members of the Convention will know what is going on, and will be able to give their assistance in bringing matters to a conclu- sion. My opinion is that the employment 501 Appointment of [18 March, 1891.] Committees. of a third committee, so far from tending to expedite proceedings, will tend to retard them. IMr. PLAYFORD : My opinion is the opposite to that expressed by the last speaker. I think that the appointment of committees will tend to quicken our movements a little. I have thought the matter out, and I quite agree with the proposal of the hon. member, Mr. Barton, that if we meet together, and, instead of bringing up ordinary formal resolutions as the result of our labours, bring them up in the form of a bill and go through them clause by clause, we shall expedite busi- ness. If we bring up from the committees ordinary resolutions which will be instruc- tions to draftsmen, we shall have a full debate on all the resolutions so brouc'lit up, in the same way as we have had upon the resolutions which have already been submitted to .the Convention, and we know what the result has been already. We shall have the debate over again, and it will be repeated when the bill is brought up. I think the suggestion of the hon. member, Mr. Barton, an exceedingly wise one. I consider that if we appoint on this committee to consider the j udiciary question a number of able men learned in the law, although it may be a question upon which every hon. gentleman might be able to form an opinion equally as well as mem- bers of the legal profession, we might get able lawyers to help us in the drafting of a bill. I think that with two com- mittees we shall have rather too few to choose from. The committee dealing with the machinery of government will have a great deal of work to do, and we shall not be able to spare out of that com- mittee hon. members for the purpose of drafting the bill. The committee that will have to look after matters connected with trade and commerce will find their hands exceedingly full before they have donewith that question, and they will not be able to \Sir Samuel Griffith. spare any of their number. But I think that the gentlemen appointed to consider this small question will not take long in coming to a conclusion as to what they will recommend ; and out of that commit- tee we might be able to choose a few ex- cellent draftsmen, who will help the other committees, as fast as they arrive at con- clusions, as to what should be included in the bill ; and in a short time we shall be prepared, I hope, to pass a bill embodying what we unitedly believe to be best in the \ interests of the community at largo. Mr. CUTHBERT: I should' be very j glad if the hon. member, Mr. Barton, could see his way to extend the constitution of thecommittees. I understand that he pro- poses to limit the number of committees to two — one dealing with constitutional ma- chinery and the distribution of powers and functions in connection therewith, and the other dealing with finance and trade. I think that a committee dealing with trade and finaijce will have quite enough to do, and that the seven gentlemen upon whom it is intended that duty shall devolve will find their time completely occupied. So, also, as regards the committee on the constitution question. Why should not the question of the appointment of a judiciary, which is equally as important as the other two, be referred to a separate committee ? Then, while the twenty-one gentlemen are engaged on the two committees, surely out of the remaining members of the Conven- tion, seven can be selected to deal with that other subject. I do not agree with the hon. the Premier of Queensland, that it is a question which would be better dealt with by non-legal gentlemen than by legal gen- tlemen. Sir Samuel Griffith: Ididnot say that; 1 am in favour of a mixed committee ! Mr. CUTHBERT: A fusion, perhaps, of the two elements would be most advan- tageous. Sir Samuel Griffith : Just what I said! Appointment of [IS March, 1891,] Committees. 505 Mr. CUTHBERT : If a third committee to this time there has been no agreement be ai:)pointed, consisting, say, of seven mem- on any one principle presented to us. We bers, to deal with the composition and ap- were told that we were just discussing this pointment of a judiciary, I think to that matter in a very informal mannei-, and committee might also be intrusted the that committees would be appointed who, duty of drafting the bill. I believe that having in view the various opinions of the gentlemen who will be selected for that hon. members who have spoken, would committee will, in all probability, be most sit and bring up reports embodying cer- fitted for that work, and with three com- tain principles to be thoroughly discussed mittees the whole of the work would be here. I know that other hon. members well apportioned, and we should be able to besides myself have refrained from taking bring our deliberations to a conclusion far part in the discussion because we looked sooner than if the work were distributed forward to the time when certain resolutions between two committees. For these rea- would be the outcome of the labours of the sons I support the opinion of the hon. mem- Committee — certain cardinal points and ber, Colonel Smith, namely, that instead principles laid down, on which there would of there being two committees, the work be a common agreement. I think it is quite ought to be divided between three. time to talk about having a bill framed Mr. WllIXON : I think there ouglit when the Convention, in Committee of to be a committee of lawyers— call it jadi- the Whole, shall agree on certain prin- cial or whatever term you wish to apply to ciples which shall be brought out from the it ; but I quite agree that lawyers should labours of the committee who will report, not determine matters. In his proposal the hon. and learned mem- Mr. Clark : They should report to the ber, Mr. Barton, is departing from the other committees ! tacit agreement arrived at, which was that Mr. WRIXOX : There are many ques- we were to say as little as possible when tions connected with this subject which these matters were put in an informal only lawyers understand, and they alone manner before us, and were to wait to have really know what it means. Therefore, I them thrashed out wlien reports of commit- thiiik it is important that they .should Ijo tees were submitted to us, and we could specified in a committee, so as to collect agree on principles which would be a guide information and make recommendations for tlie committee wlio ultimately would to the other committees. With regard to frame the bill. It is apparent to those the drafting of a l)ill, as the hon. and who are looking on that there is a desire learned member, Sir Samuel Criflith, said, to hasten the proceedings of this Conven- any of us could be called in to give an tion. We liave sat here patiently for three opinion ; but I tliink that the work will weeks ; but if we want to make good and be better performed if you organise a permanent work, and to accomplish the ob- sniall committee of lawyers, on whom you joct for which wc met, we mu.st be prepared cast tlie duty of reporting, to whichever to go slowly and surely, and make a very coramittee will have the final settling of .sound structure as the result of our labours; the bill, on the difficult legal matters but the proposition of tlie lion, and learned which are involved. iininber, Mr. Barton, is taking away from Mr. DIBBS : I should like to point out us the agreement entered into, which was to the Convention that for tlie last three tliat certain lines .should be drawn up in or four days we have Ijeen discussing, in committee, and that afterwards we should a very loo.se way, certain principles, and up discuss the bill itself. If we had started 50G Appointment of [18 March, 1891.] Committees. in the first instance with the bill, howevex' loosely drawn or informal — a mere skeleton of a bill on which we might have built up something — we should have been further on than we are now. In the intense anxiety to close the labours of the Convention there is a risk of our not making a per- manent structure ; and I say again, that if these committees reported on certain leading principles, and put before us cer- tain conclusions upon which we could agree, having agreed upon those points we should liave material largely ready for the framing of a bill. The picture would to a large ex- tent be painted, and it would only require the framing of the bill in the necessary legal language, to make a tolerably perfect measure upon which we could agree. With regard to the remarks of the hon. and learned member. Sir Samuel Griffith, I think it well to have lawyers to deal with the judiciary question, but well also to have a fair mixture of the victims of lawyers to watch and see that the result of their labours will not be to inflict burdens on the people. Lawyers are all very well in their places, but I never knew a lawyer to advocate any legislation to reduce the cost of litigation to the people of the land. Let the lawyers by all means give the benefit of their legal knowledge ; but let the laymen who know something about law, and who support the legal establish- ments in the various colonies, have a little voice in the common-sense part of the business. Mr. MUNRO : I think my hon. friend, Mr. Dibbs, has forgotten that life is short. We only live a certain number of years, and during those years we ought to do all the work we can. The hon. member makes two complaints, one of which certainly does not coincide with the other. He says that if a bill had been introduced in the first instance, no matter how loose it was, ■we could have worked on that ; but now, after we have dealt with a series of re- [Mr. Dibbs. solutions in detail, and are about to re- fer them to committees, he wants those committees to bring up separate reports before we deal with a bill. Surely that would extend the discussions too far 1 I think the suggestion that has been made is a very good one. Possibly we ought to have three, or perhaps four, committees — I do not care how many ; but if the com- mittees deal with, the principles which are submitted to them, surely it will save time if they embody their conclusions in a bill with which the Convention could deal directly, instead of through the medium of a series of indefinite resolutions which would have to be dealt with again in the form of a bill. I entirely agree with the proposal that the work of the various committees should be submitted to the Convention in the form of a bill. At the same time, I think we ought to have more than two committees ; two committees are too few to deal efiectually with the work they have to do. Mr. CLARK : If I am in order, I desire to move : That the motion be amended by the insertion of the foUowiug resolution, to stand as resolution No. 3 : — " That in addition to the committees above-mentioned, a committee be appointed to consider the question of the establishment of a federal judiciary, its powers and its functions, and to report to the Committee on Constitutional Ma- chineiy in the same manner as the Committee on Finance is directed to report ; such committee to consist of one member from each delegation." Amendment agreed to. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : 1 desire to say a few words w^ith respect to directing the committee to bring up the result of their deliberations in the form of a bill. I should like that matter to be left open, i Those who are familiar with drafting, of course, know that it is no more trouble to them to put their conclusions in the form of a bill than in the form of resolutions ; pro- bably it is less trouble. However, speaking from another point of view, I doubt very Apjjoinlmeni of [IS March, 1891.] Committees. 507 much wbether the general public, who, after all, are the persons who will have to understand the recommendations of the committees, will be able to foUow them in the form of a bill so well as they would in the form of resolutions. Speaking for myself, I should say that it would be much less trouble to me to put the conclusions of the committee in the form of resolutions than in the form of a bill, because I am familiar with that kind of work. But I am quite certain, from my experience, that the public will understand resolutions more easily than they will imderstand a bill. That being so, I think it might be a mistake to instruct the committee to put their conclusions in the form of a bill. It should be left to the committee to consider which course will be the most likely to make their work " understanded of the people." Dr. COCKBURN : I think there is very sound sense in what the hon. mem- ber, Sir Samuel Griffith, has said. We all know that very simple principles which can be embodied in a very few lines may take several clauses of intricate drafting to give effect to in a bill. Mr. Clark : It will have to be done sometime ! Dr. COCKBURN : All the members of the Convention are not lawyers, and yet they have very strong views on general principles, and it may bo very difficult, as tlie bill is being passed througli Couiuiittce clause by clau.sc, for tho.se who have not had the advantage of a legal training to submit their amendments exactly in legal form, as a skilful draftsman would do. it would be placing the laymen of the Con- vention at a di.sad vantage, I think it would be very easy for the committees to bring up resolutions in the same way as was done in Canada. There, I believe, the resolutions were not brought up in strictly legal form, but actually covered the wliolc ground, and although not drawn in strictly legal phraseology, yet they really were drawn just as a bill would be drawn in something like popular language. Mr. MuNRO : They were sent home with- out being put in the form of a bill at all. "We are not'going to do that sort of thing I Dr. COCKBURN : When we have agreed to everything that is necessary, the putting of it into legal phraseology would be the work of only a few minutes. Mr. Barton : If the work be so com- plicated, how is it to be done in a few minutes 1 Dr. COCKBURN : This is a matter of even greater importance than anything we have to consider in our local parliaments ;. and hon. members desiring to give expres- sion to a principle may not be able, on the spur of the moment, to draft a clause in legal phra,seology. I would ask the hon. member, Mr. Barton, to point out how we are to overcome the difficulty, putting him- self, not in the position of a skilful drafts- man or lawyer, but in that of a layman 1 IMr. BARTON : I do not think any great difficulty exists ; and I would ask the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, not to insist upon an intermediate stage. Sir Samuel Griffith : I merely threw out a suggestion for the consideration of the Committee ! Mr. BARTON : I do not think the effect would be to facilitate our proceed- ings. We arc now in our third week, and in pi'oportion to the value and importance of the assistance of a great many of the members of the Convention to us, is the strength of the calls daily made upon them liy their own colonies. Among the strongest men here, if I may make any distinction at all, are those who hold ex- ecutive ofliccs, and whoso colonies want them back as soon as possible. These are calls they can resist for a time; but I should be very .sorry indeed if a time should come when they could no longer resist those calls, and when, consequently, the Con- vention would be deprived of their assist- 50S Appointment of [18 March, 1891.] Committees. ance. The interposition of an intermedi- ate stage might lead to that difficulty. ■\Ve are not exactly in the position of re- presentatives commencing a session of parliament which might last' four or five months. We have to do the best we can in the time at our disposal, and we have, I admit, at the same time, to take care that the propositions we formulate lose nothinc; whatever on the score of haste. I would ask the hon. member. Dr. Cockburn, to consider that this is a con- vention of legislators. A large majority of those present are men of long parlia- mentary experience ; and it is scarcely competent for any one of us to contend that we have not had sufficient experience to know what legal phraseology is as de- veloped in bills. It would be an extraor- dina-v confession for the majority of the memb j of this Convention to make, that they find any difficulty in dealing w^ith the clauses of a bill. I think we all suffi- ciently understand the phraseology gene- rally used in acts of pai'liament to find no ■difficulty in placing a reasonable interpre- tation upon any clause in a bill. There need be no difficulty about the matter of amendments. Those who desire to make amendments will be found to have had, probably, many yeai's' experience of that kind of work ; and, so far as the hon. member, Dr. Cockburn, is concerned, he possesses such remarkable facility for ex- pressing his precise ideas in the requisite language that the framing of any num- ber of amendments will not present the least difficulty to him. I think I might say that of nearly every member present. Many of us, I regret to say, have grown grey in the service of these colonies. That is more or less the case with all of us ; and there is no reason why we should con- fess to the world that which would not, if made, be a true confession — that we did not understand the ordinary jjhraseology of bills. I anticipate no difficulty in this [J/r. Barton. matter. The bill will be in the hands of hon, members a sufficient time to enable them to understand every detail, and they will have at their disposal time which, owing to the great pressure of work in their own legisla- tures, they cannot ordinarily have. When engaged in their various colonies, they have multitudinous duties to discharge, and it may often happen that a bill will come be- fore them at a time when they ai'e not pre- pared with amenendments. The time now at their disposal, however, free from the trammels of their ordinary duties else- where, will enable them to give attention to the clauses of the proposed bill, and will place them in a position to move any amendments they may desire to move. As the matter is one of some urgency, I would ask the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, not to urge the interposition of another stage. Our time is growing short ; we have to do the most important of our work in a short time ; but when the bill is brought forward, the important matters which we have been debating will be put in a formal way, and upon the amendments moved will depend that which will ultimately go to the several parliaments. We are now about to reach the most important part of our work, and if we appoint a committee merely to draw up resolutions, and have afterwards to put those resolutions in the form of a bill, we shall be sacrificing valuable time. If it be intended to appoint committees to frame resolutions alone, and allow our work to stand at the passing of those reso- lutions, we shall necessitate a second con- vention. I think that if our labours can possibly be concluded without the inter- vention of another convention we ought not to interpose this second stage, as a matter of certainty, seeing that there is everypossi- bility of a second stage being avoided. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : lam afraid that in my desire to save time I did not make myself clear. I did not suggest a series of short resolutions which would re- Appointment of [IS ]\lARcn, 1891.] Committees. 509 quire subsequent amplification into a Lill. "What I suggested was that the phraseology in which we embodied our conclusions should be the phraseology of ordinary re- solutions, instead of the phraseology of clauses of bills. I did not mean that we should omit any detail that would be ex- pressed in a bill ; I referred only to the form in which it should be expressed. Mr. WRIXOX : I suggest that we should allow the committee to bring up a bill, if it see its way to do so. The hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, appeared to think that the public might possibly be of opinion that they had not sufficient infor- mation if it were brought before them in theshapeof a bill ; but I do not think there is much weight in that objection, and for this reason : that the points in which the public are interested — the prominent points in dispute — have during the last three weeks beendebated several times; andotherpoints which have not yet been debated will be fully debated when the bill is before us, and wlien the attention of the public will be fully called to them. The bill will be the machinery lying Ijy to carry out our con- clusions when we finally arrive at them, and, as I pre.sume we really wi^sh to arrive at some result, I think thecommittee should have a bill ready for the Convention when we meet again. Resolution, as amended, agreed to. (1.) That the resohitions rcporteil to this Con- vention Ijy Committee of the Whole be referred to two committees, the one for consideration of constitutional machinery ami the distrilmtion of functions ami powers, tlic other for considcia- t ion of provisions relating to finance, taxation, .111(1 trade regulation ; tlie first-named commit- tee to consist of two members from each of tlic several delegations, the last-named committee to insist of one member from each. The members ■ be chosen by the several delegations. (2.) That the last-named committee be in- ructcd to specially consider resolutions Xos. '■'• and 4, on trade and intercourse and on cus- t oms taxation, with a view to their being carried into effect upon lines just to the several colonics, and that it be a further instruction to the said committee to lay its conclusions before the Com- mittee on Constitutional Machinery, Functions, and Powers. (3.) That in addition to the committees above- mentioned, a committee be appointed to con- sider the question of the establishment of a fede- ral judiciary, its powers, and its functions, and to report to the Committee on Constitutional Machinery in the same manner as the Committee on Finance is directed to report, such committee to consist of one member from each delegation. (4. ) That upon the result of the deliberations of the said committees the Committee on Con- stitutional Machinery, Functions, and Powers,. do prepare and submit to tliis Convention a bill for the establishment of a federal constitution, such bill to be prepared as speedily as is con- sistent with careful consideration. Mr. DEAKIN : I would suggest that the President request that the diff'erent delegations make their nominations to the committees to-night so that the n^mes may be handed in before we leo,. , and that arrangements may be made for the hour at which the committees Avill com- mence their labours to-morrow. ]Mr. BARTON: I would suggest that the President leave thechairfor,say,ten minutes to permit of the nomination of delegates. The President left the chair for ten. minutes. The Pkesidext : I have received the following returns, giving the names of the several committees as elected by their re- spective delegations : — Kcv South n hA'.o.— Cut we may be abl(! to give the Convention more definite information then. On the other h;ind I think tlioro is little doubt that on Tues- day morning tlie committee will Ijeablc to make a complete report on tlicir laliours. iSlr. BAKF'Ml: Will it not be possible, sir, for the committee, when their report Mr. THYNNE : I rise to move, 1)y way of amendment, that the Convention do ad- journ until Tuesday next at half-past 2 o'clock. Mr. ABBOTT: I am quite willing to withdraw iii\' .'imcmlmenL and to | I'opose ill liiMi thereof the rul jouniineiit of the ('onvention iiiilil Tuesday ;i ft enioon at is ready, to send a copy through tin? post half past 2 o'clock. If the Convention to each member of the Convention, so tiiat adjouni.s until Tuesday afternoon, hon. lie may be able to study its contents, and members will be able to get a co]>y of be ready to go on with its considei-alion tlu! report as soon as it is brougiit uj). I when the Convention meets again % If wo do not think it is desii-able that the report.s K 514 Federal Comtitution: [24 March, 1891.] Adjournment. should be made public until they are sub- mitted to the Convention. Hon. members •will have Tuesday afternoon and Tuesday evening to consider the reports, and the Convention can meet on Wednesday morn- ing. Therefore, with concurrence, I with- draw my motion, and move in its stead : That the Convention at its rising do adjourn until Tuesday next at half-past 2 o'clock. Mr. DIBBS : I desire to say a word or two as to tlie suggestion made by the hon. member. Sir John Bray. I submit that as soon as the report of the Constitutional Committee is prepared, and finally adopted, it should be handed to the press. An Hon. Member : No, to the Presi- dent ! Mr. DIBBS : It is all very well for the hon. member to say, "No"; but he repre- sents only a part of the public out of doors. The moment the report leaves the hands of the committee it must come before the Convention. I want to point out that ■we, as representatives of the public, have a right to give the people of Australia the earliest possible intimation of what we are doing. Now, if the report is laid on the table on Tuesday, the public will know its contents through the press on "Wednesday morning, and if they can get that infor- mation on Tuesday morning, why should we attempt to keep it back for one hour or twenty-four hours? What we are doingwill be fully criticised throughout the country. The public have a right to this informa- tion at the earliest moment, and it is almost reducing our proceedings to a farce to withhold the knowledge after the re- ports have finally left the committees. It is far better to give the press a fair and true copy of the report than to have a garbled edition published in Tuesday's or Wed- nesday's paper.s. I think that if that idea is embodied in the motion it will meet with the approval of hon. members here. I am quite certain unless we do that people out of doors will say that by our YMr. Ablott. action we are depriving them of the right of knowing what we are doing to the fullest possible extent. Sir JOHN DOWNER: As regards the confidential circulation of the report at any reasonable time before Tuesday, I en- tirely agree with the suggestion ; but as re- gards its publication in the press, I think my hon. friend, Mr. Dibbs, forgets that pro- bably when the committees present their reports they would like to give a short explanation of the reasons for the con- clusions at which they have arrived before submitting their reports baldly to be com- mented upon by others. I think it is only a reasonable thing that the committees, through their chairmen, should have an opportunity of explaining their reasons before their reports are made matters of public comment. Mr. BARTON : I think that there is a great deal of cogency in what has been said by the hon. member, Sir John Downer. Any measure which is brought up by a committee and laid before the public with- out such explanation as the committee will undoubtedly give at the hands of their chairman is liable to misconstruction. Moreover, we are proceeding according to the riiles of Parliament. Certainly our standing order applies only to debates, but by analogy we are proceeding in all re- spects, I hope, according to the rules of Parliament, and it would be an unheard- of thing that a committee instructed to report should place their report in the hands of members, and so necessarily in the hands of the public, because the experi- ence of the last two or three days shows that thetwo things are one and thesame, tosome intents and purposes at any rate. It would be a mistake that these reports should be handed about at all until the committees come forward in an authoritative way and explain the reasons for adopting the con- clusions at which they have arrived. I am sure it will not do hon. members any good Federal Constitution: [24 March, 1891.] Adjournment. 515 to have the report put in their hands, not being themselves cognisant of the proceed- ings of the committee and of the manner in which the conclusions were arrived at, until the various reasons which actuated the committee one way or the other are fully explained. That will be done when the bill is introduced, and no doubt a statement will be made when a report is brought up by the chairman of the com- mittee. I think we might well, for the pur- pose of adhei'ing to a rule which has worked out well, and which is the result of long experience, possess ourselves in patience until we in the ordinary and proper way get the reports of the committees. That can be done, we are assured, by Tuesday next. I am quite sure the President can scarcely know, unless this debate develops the sense of the Convention as a sort of insti-uction to him, what to do with the report when it reaches him. He will not know whether he ought to have the report printed and circulated amongst hon. mem- bei-s or whether he ought to wait until the committees, through their chairmen, move the adoption of the reports. I think he is entitled to have the sense of the Convention on that point. I would suggest that unless grave reason can be given for tlie course, the ordinary parliamentary procedure should not be in- termitted. Mr. J. FORREST : The oidy objection I have to the ordinary parliamentary pro- cedure in this instance is that it will in- volve delay. ]f we receive the report of the committee on Tuesday afternoon, it will be necessary to adjourn until Wednes- day or Thursday, so that hon. members may consider the report and bill, whereas if the bill were ready on Saturday it miglit be in the hands of hon. members by Satur- day evening, thus giving them a day or two to consider it before the Convention reassembled. It seems to me that how- ever convenient it may be to tliose gentle- men who are resident in Sydney, and who are able to carry on their own business at the same time that they attend to their duties at this Convention, and to those gentlemen who can go home and return in a day, to follow the ordinary parliament- ary procedure, it will be inconvenient for those who come from a long distance. Speaking for myself, I can only say that I should be very glad to remain here for a considerable time, but the exigencies of the public service will not permit of my doing so. I may say that T and my colleagues have taken our return passages to Western Australia by a steamer leaving Adelaide on the loth April, and that it will be impos- sible for us to remain here longer than that. INlr. Clark : The labours of the Con- vention will be completed by that time ! Mr. J. FORREST: I think the pro- posal of the hon. member, Mr. Barton, will cause several days' delay. Of course we all regret the appearance in the press of garbled reports of the deliberations of the committee. At the same time I see no reason whatever why the report of the committee should not be submitted to members of the Convention confidentially at the earliest moment. I therefore move : That a copy of the report of the Committee on Constitutional Machinery, so soon as pre- pared, be forwarded l)y the President to the delegates of tliis Convention. Mr. BAKER : I second the motion. Mr. !MUNRO : I presume that this is an amendment which cannot be moved upon a motion for the adjournment of the Convention 1 The President : I have no doubt the hon. member, ^Mr. Abbott, will witlidraw his motion of adjournment. !Mr. ABBOTT: I am quite willing to withdraw my motion, although what I had moved was not that the Convention do now adjourn, but that it should at its rising adjourn until Tuesday next. 516 Federal Constitution : [24 March, 1891.] Adjournment. The PuESiDENT : Before putting the motion of the lion, member, Mr. J. Forrest, I do not know whether I shall be deemed in order if I make two or three observations. Hon. Members : Hear, hear ! The President : I think the lion, mem- ber, ^Vlr. J. Forrest, and others who agree with him, will see at once that if the report be not ready before the end of the ■week it will be impossible for it to reach him in Western Australia, or even in South Australia, or in Victoria, in time to be con- sidered before the Convention meets on Tuesday next. Mr. J. Forrest : I shall be here ! The President : I understood the hon. member's first argument to be this : that the course proposed by the hon. member, Mr. Barton, was all very well for persons on the spot, but that those at a distance were ditferently situated. I understood that argument to imply that the hon. mem- ber would be leaving Sydney. Mr. J. Forrest : ISTo ! The President : If the hon. member remains in Sydney that argument is not of much use. But it would be hardly proper for me to say much on that aspect of the question. I do wish, however, to impress upon members of the Convention that while this proceeding would be very irregular it would be productive of scarcely any good whatever. It is hardly right for a i-eport to be considered, as proposed, until it is produced in the Convention with such lifjlit as its authors can throw upon it, and I doubt very much whether the mode of proceeding with this report and the bill attached to it, when it is forth- coming, will not be of a character very similar to that of the second reading and consideration in detail of an ordinary bill in Parliament, and whether, therefore, the proceedings will not be of a character that would render it extremely difficult for the public to understand the matter until it has been, to some extent, debated in the Convention. I think, therefore, that it would be an inadvisable course on all grounds — quite irregular, according to the proceedings of any legislative body — and that it would be really productive of no good. Beyond expressing that opinion, I have nothing further to say, except that I am very glad the motion has been made, so that, if the course of distribution, as proposed, be followed, it may be under the strict orders of the Convention. Question proposed. Mr. MUNRO : I agree with you, sir, that the proposed course is quite irregular. I may say also that it would be quite in- effective. I am assured by delegates upon the committee, that the time at their dis- posal for the preparation of a draft con- stitution, and for the submission of it to their own body, will be quite short enough, supposing the Convention reassembles on Tuesday afternoon, and considering that the holidays intervene. If that be so, of what use will it be for us to pass a reso- lution which is not only contrary to tlie standing orders we have already adopted, but which in itself would be ineffective. Mr. Baker : It is not contrary to the standing orders ! Mr. MUNRO : We have agreed to be guided by the standing orders of the House of Commons, and those orders certainly do not permit of copies of bills being sent to members of the House of Commons be- fore they are brought before the liouse itself. That, so far as I am aware, is not done by any deliberate body, and it would be contrary to all precedent to adopt the course on this occasion. I am as anxious as is my hon. friend, the Prime Minister of AVestern Australia, to save time, and I am sure that the proposed course will not save time. But I would like to point out to hon. members the way in which I think it can be saved. What Federal Constitution: [24 ]Marcii, 1891.] Adjournment. 517 I would su"£re3t is, that when the bill is submitted to us on Tuesday afternoon next we should thenceforward make up our minds to refuse all entertainment, and to meet in the evening, as well as during the day, until we have completed our con- sideration of the bill. Our whole atten- tion should be directed to dealing with the bill, and if that be done we shall all get aAvay by the 15th April. That is the proper way to proceed — to let every- thing else go, and when we have got the bill before us, to pay attention to nothing else until we have done with it. To carry this motion v/ould be subversive of all the rules and precedents of Parliament. It would be absolutely useless to the com- mittee, and it would not be right to send a copy of the report or of the bill to mem- bers before it is submitted to the Con- vention. Mr. DOXALDSOX : I am as desirous as any hon. member can be to see the report as soon as possible. At the same time I think we should be adopting a very wrong course if we ordered it to be distributed member of the Convention. I trust the hon. member, ~Sl\: J. Forrest, will not persevere with the motion. Sir JOHN BRAY : If we were meet- ing from day to day it would be exceed- ingly objectionable for the report to be made liublic before it was handed in to the Convention; but as, owing to the Easter holidays, Ave propose to adjourn for a week, it is the height of absurdity to imagine that if this report be agreed to on Saturday night, and the delegates remain in Sydney, they will be satisfied to wait until Tuesday to know what that report is. We ought to adhere to parliamentary pi'actice as far as we possibly can, and if we were meeting every day I should be quite willing to wait for the report until it is presented to the Convention. But we know very well that if the report is agreed to before Tuesday no delegate will rest satis- fied until he gets a copy, and the sooner every member gets a copy and the public know what the report is the better it will be. Therefore I think that my suggestion, which has been supported by the hon. before it is presented to the Convention member, Mr. Dibbs, is really the proper in the usual way as is done in Parliament. There will probably be a discussion on Tuesday afternoon, and it will be well to have the debate, which then takes place, published in the ncw.spapers simultane- ously witii the report and bill. If tlie report be circulated before the debate one. If the report cannot be drawn up before Tuesday then no harm will be done. If it is agreed upon before Tuesday, liow- cver, it should be handed to the President and copies furnished to members and to the press. The lion, member. Sir Samuel Grillith, has not said that immediately ho takes place it is more than likely that it brings forward the bill on Tuesday he v.ill will bo published in the newspapers. The be prepared to explain it. newspapers may make adverse comments U[»on it, and it would probably take a great deal of time and trouble for us to eradicate the effect which such comments will liavc on the piiblic mind. It will bo far better for us to wait patiently for the Sir Samuel Griffith : I should be sorry to do so before members are furnihlu'd with a copy of the report itself ! Sir JOHN lUlAV : I .pute agree with the hon. member that it would not be rea- sonable to expect such a thing. Well, if report. It sliould be considered fully by the rejiort is brought up on Tuesday after- the committee before it reaches the Con- noon, (he press will publish it and make vention, and we sliould not try to hurry comments upon it before it is considered the committee in any way whatever. Such by the Convention, It seems to me that a course would be far better for every it would be more convenient if the report 518 Federal Constitution : ■ [24 March, 1891.] Adjournment, were handed to the press and the public as soon as it was agreed upon. I agree that until tlie report is definitely agreed upon the less said about it the better; otherwise I think we shall save time by publishing the report as soon as possible. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I hope that the hon. member, Mr. J. Forrest, will withdraw the motion. It must be remem- bered that the members of each delegation are in communication with their colleagues. I presume th?y consult each other. I know that I consult my colleagues from time to time — not only those on the committee but also those who are not on the committee. If this committee proceeds as other com- mittees do there will no doubt be three or four drafts of the report submitted before it is finally agreed upon. The nature of these drafts will no doubt be communicated to the members of each delegation so that they will know what is going on. They will not know the exact terms of the final report of course, because no one will know that until the report is agreed upon. I do not see any possibility of having the report drawn up in a complete form before Tuesday next, unless indeed all the mem- bers of the committee are willincc to sit on Good Friday and Easter Monday, and possibly Sunday. Mr. Loton: Does the hon. member mean the draft report or bill 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I mean the report in the form of a bill. The com- mittee wish to bring up a bill that will com- mend itself to the Convention, and that will not require verbal amendment. It is a case in which the more haste the less speed. The careful revision must be done by a small committee, not by a large one. I hope the hon. member will withdraw the motion, and, as I have pointed out, he can ascertain all that it is desiraV)le to know by other means. He will know what is going on, and he will be able to make suggestions to his colleagues on the committee. [Sir John Bray. Sir GEORGE GREY: Before the motion is withdrawn I would like to ex- press my own opinion that I really believe this difliculty has arisen entirely from the rule laid down that the committees should be secretly conducted. The more I think upon that subject the more satisfied I am that it was a mistake. Now, presuming that the argument was used that many members would be unwilling that the crude ideas which they had held should be made known to the public, they having altered them after argument in the com- mittee. That very reason it seems to me would show that we have made a mistake. Again, an hon. member has said that it is quite possible, if this report were pvxblished before being submitted to the Convention, the press would publish adverse comments upon it, the effect of which we should never afterwards be able to get out of the public mind, or, at all events, not for a considerable time. That appeared to me to be a conclusive argument against the committees being conducted in secret ; for if hon. members meeting in committee did in the first instance take mistaken views upon a subject, and then the rea.soning in committee convinced them that they were wrong, so that they withdrew their opposition and adopted other views, if that were made known to the public, the public would have the same advantage of having wrong views confuted by proper argument. The public tliroughout the whole of Aus- tralasia would read those views on both sides of the question. The probability is that the particular wrong arguments which it is anticipated the press would use would have been discussed in Committee, and would have been confuted there ; and the press therefore would never have instilled into the public mind ideas which members of the Convention could not afterwards eradicate. It seems to me that the whole subject would have been fairly discussed, as it were, in the presence of the whole of Adjournment. [31 MARCn, 1891.] Death of a Delegate. 519 New Zealand and Australasia ; that owing to the telegraphic communication to every part, the whole public of Australasia might really, as it were, have sat in the committee ; and would have known every view that had been proposed ; that certain views were confuted, and others adopted. Such infor- mation must have done the greatest pos- sible good in educating the public mind with regard to tlieir future constitution ; and to deprive them of an advantage of that kind was a true misfortune to the public. Anything that might still bring the matter under discussion would be an advantage to the whole of Australasia, to every man, woman, and child in the coun- try; and we .should rather try to promote the .spread of information of that kind than to keep back most necessary information to enable the public to make up their minds ultimately on the form of the constitution recommended for their adoption. All in- formation which could enable them to do that .sljould be freely and fully given now, as it ought to have been from the first. !Mr. J. Forrest : As it appears that the members of the committees may com- municate freely with their colleagues, my l)oint will be gained in another way, and therefore, a.s it appears to be the wish of hon. members that the motion .should not be put I desire to withdraw it. ^lotion, by leave, withdrawn. Motion (l>y Mr. Abbott) agreed to : That the Convention at its rising do adjourn until Tuesday next at 2 30 p.m. Convention adjourned at 1 1 i'T .v. m. TUESDAY, .31 MARCH, ISOl. Address— Death of a Dclcfrate — R'^port : ConstUutionfil Comniittec — Ounnioiiwijalth of Auatralia Bill — Ad- journment. TIicPresidknt took the chairat.3-30p.m. ADDEE8S. The following address was read by the secretary : — To Sir Henry Parkos, G.C.M.G., President, and the hon. members of the Federal Conven- tion. May it please the members of your honorable Convention :— 'SVe, tlie members of the United Licensed Victuallers' Association of New South Wales, approach your honorable Convention with senti- ments of the deepest respect. We desire to give expression to our sincere congratulations upon the assembly in Sydney of a bodj' of such eminent statesmen to consider questions so fraught with momentous issues to the Australian nation as are involved in the great work of federation. We also express a hope that, whatever deci- sions may be arrived at by your honorable Con- vention, they will be designed for the best in- terests of the people of the whole of the colonies ; and that from the foundation being laid to-day tliere may arise a superstructure which shall give practical effect to the now historic aspira- tion — one people, one destiny. Signed on behalf of the members of the United Licensed Victuallers' Association of New South Wales : Frederick Albert At-lex, President. J. H. Hlnt, Vice-President. J. H. Keary, Vice-President. James H. Ratnford, Vice-President. James P. Kavanagh, Vice-President. F. F. Sweeney, Treasurer. F. Bevill, General Secretary. DEATH OF A DELEGATE. Mr. McMillan : I am sure it must be a matter of deep regret to every mem- ber of this Convention that, after the short adjoiiriinicnt whit'h we have made, upon reopening the proceedings we are over- shadowed by the sorrow of the death of one of tlie ablest men in our midst, the Hon. John Murtagh Macrossan. It is not likely that I can s]teak in as full terms of the hon. member wliose roposod by tliis bill, in Australia or in tlic Pacific wliich are T should say a word before I sit down as not fit to be admitted to the full rights of to tlie mode in which tliis constitution a state. I may mention, by way of illus- should be adopted. There are two ways tration,the north-western partof Australia, of adopting a constitution like this. One and also Fiji, and New Guinea, which is for the Parliament of the United King- 532 Commomomlth of [31 JMarcii, 1891.] Australia Bill. tlom to pass a bill creating a constitution, and then to leave the diflforent colonies one after the otlier to come in and give their adhesion to it, so that when a certain pre- scribed number have given their adhesion, the confederation shall be constituted by the Queen's proclamation. Tliat is one way, and it was the plan adopted in the case of the federal constitution of Aus- tralasia, and, as far as legislation was concerned, in the case of the South Afri- can Confederation, which did not come to anything because the states never came in. The otlier way is to frame a consti- tution, and let it be adopted by the colo- nies, or a certain number of them, and then for the Parliament of the United Kingdom, at the request of those colonies^ to constitute them a confederation. That is the course we propose to follow. This constitution has been framed as an instru- ment of government which may be ac- cepted by a state or not. If a sufficient number of states give their adhesion to it, then the powers of the Imperial Parlia- ment, which are the only powers at pre- sent existing for the purpose, should be exercised and a confederation established. That is what, technically, I think we wei^e directed to do, though, no doubt, we should not have hesitated to suggest another plan if we had seen anything to recommend it. The adoption of this constitution, with such amendments as the Convention may make, should be followed by a recom- mendation — it can be no more — to the diflferent parliaments to make provision for submitting it for the adoption of the people in such a way as the Convention may direct, with the recommendation also that when tliree of the states shall adopt the constitution their governments shall be authorised to request the Government of her Majesty in Great Britain to intro- duce the necessary legislation. This will, however, of course form the subject of sub- sequent and substantive resolutions in tlic \Sir Samuel Gnffilh. Convention after the adoption of t]i(^consti- tution. I have endeavoured to explain the Ijill as briefly as I could, and in conclusion I have only to say that we have given it our best attention ; we have endeavoured, witli what success it is for others to say, to form a plan which, so far as regards simplicity of structure and language, will not be unworthy of the English tongue ; and as regards the more important matter, the substance, we have endeavoured, with what success it is again for others to say, to lay down a broad and just foundation upon which a commonwealth may be estab- lished in the southern seas that will domi- nate those seas, of which any man may be proud to be a citizen, and which will be a permanent glory to the British empire. Mr. WRIXON: I do not know whether it is the desire of the Convention to con- tinue the discussion on this motion to- night. If it is not, I beg to move : That the debate be now adjourned. Mr. McMillan : This might be the proper stage at which to decide whether the discussion should be continued prac- tically as a second reading debate, or whether we should go into Committee at once. I think it will be well to decide this evening as to the course which it is intended to pursue. As far as I have been able to ascertain, the general view is that we should go into Committee at once. Mr. DONALrjSON" : I have not had an 0[)portunity of reading the bill, and I do not think that hon. members who have not been members of the committees have been able to form an opinion upon it. Therefore, I think it will be far better to adjourn the debate now, and to let the dis- cussion of the whole bill take place before we go into Committee, because in Com- mittee a member is supposed to speak only on the clause before the Committee. If we }iovv discuss the bill as a whole any amend- ments that are to be proposed can be made Commonwealth of [31 March, 1891.] Australia Bill. 533 in Committee afterwards. It will be far more convenient to have a second readins; discussion of the bill as if it were before pai'liament. Hon. Members : No ! Mr. DONALDSON : That is my oi)inion, and I would strongly support Mr. Wrixon's motion. Mr. BAKER : I would point out tliat it is extremely unfair for members of the Convention who have not been on the committees, and who have just seen the bill for the first time, not to be allowed to discuss the measure as a whole. The various points are so inter-dependent on €ach other that when we get into Com- mittee—if we are confined to the parti- cular clause under discussion — w"e cannot properly give publicity to our opinions. There are a great number of members of the Convention who have been on the committees, and who have had opportuni- ties during the last fortnight of studying all these points. But we who have not been members of the committees think it only right that we should have an oppoi'- tunity of placing on record our opinion of the scheme as a whole. I strongly object to being debarred from discussing this im- portant measure so far as it is a whole scheme. Sir JOHN BRAY : None of us would uish to prevent the full di.scu.ssion of the bill ; })ut I trust that we shall not each consider it necessary to give our views on the scheme as a wliole, before going into Committee and again afterwards to go into every detail. If we do that we shall find, after we have gone through the details of the bill, that we shall have a desire to go into a rliscussion on the whole scheme as it comes out of Committee. Tliat is the most important .stage at which we shall arrive, whatever wo may say on the bill as it stands now. It is not a bill to every detail of which the Committee themselves arepledged. Certain alterations will be made in it in Committee of the "Whole, and it will be far more important for us, and for the people of Australia, to know the opinion of the delegates upon the bill as it comes out of Committee than to know their opinion of it before it goes into Committee. I, for one, will not agree to prevent members from giving full ex- pression to their opinions ; but I ask mem- bers not to consider it necessary to express their opinions at too great a length on the bill as it stands now. I can soon express my opinions upon the bill. I do not quite like it altogether, but I can say all that I have to say wdien we get into Committee. Although I feel confident that no one would wish to debar Mr. Baker, or any other member, from giving full expression to his opinions, I ask him to consider the importance of letting the people know what we think of the bill after it comes out of Committee. Mr. MACDONALD-PATERSON : I cordially support the motion of the lion. member, Mr. Wrixon, that the debate be adjourned, and for these reasons : I think it was suggested — and not only suggested, but really declared and \inderstood by every member of the Convention — that when this bill came before the Convention it would be treated as a bill that was before us for the second reading. Hon. members have only to refer to what transpired some ten days ago to clearly recollect that that Avas the common understanding. The next reason is that nearly half of the members of the Convention were not on any of the committees at all, and under the circum- stances it is liut fair that the request of the lion, member, Mr. leaker, should bo acceded to at once, and that we should have an opportunity of going through the bill, which wc have only for the first time seen a little while ago, in order to decide whether we shall speak on it. If we do speak, I am certain that the same quality of compression will characterise the obser- 534 Co.nmonwealth of [31 March, 1891.] Australia Bill. ■vations to be made on tliis draft bill wliicli has been displayed by every member of the Convention. I sincerely trust that mem- bers of the Convention who think that we are looking to the public opinion in our separate colonics on the bill as it may come out of Committee, will not prevent hon. members from speaking at the present stage. Question resolved in the affirmative. Convention adjourned at 4"52 p.m. WEDXESDAY, 1 APRIL, 1891. Commonwealth of Australia Bill— Adjourmnent. The President took the chair at 11 a.m. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA BILL. Debate resumed (from 31st March) on motion by Sir Samuel Griffith : That the draft bill to constitute the common- wealth of Australia, brought up by the Consti- tutional Committee, be referred for the con- sideration of a Committee of the Whole Conven- tion. Mr. WRIXON : I desire to ask the attention of the Convention for a short time to the consideration of this bill be- fore it goes into Committee. I think that is the best course to shorten proceedings and to save time, for I have generally found in parliamentary procedure that where a bill is allowed to go without dis- cussion on the second reading, on the understanding that it is to be discussed in Committee, more time is lost than saved. I wish to point out certain features in the bill which I should be glad to see amended ; and I prefer to give notice of the points upon which I think the bill requires amend- ment rather than bring them forward at a moment's notice when we are in Com- mittee. I desire to say that 1 think our thanks are due to the Constitutional Committee that has so carefully and ably discharged [J//-. JIacdonald- Pater son. its duty in framing the principles of the bill, and are also due to my hon. and learned friend, Sir Samuel Griffith, for the effijctive manner in which he has embodied those principles in the bill. So much am I impressed with the value of the bill as it stands, that if I could get no other form of federation than this I would be pre- pared to take it even as it stands. But^ nevertheless, I think there are certain points in which it requires amendment, and which it behoves us to endeavour, if possible, to get amended ; because we must observe that Avhen we go back ta our different provinces we hope to get the bill adopted in those provinces, and adopted without further amendment on their part. It is, therefore, very important for us to see v.'hat principles we settle upon here. Also I notice, on referring to the bill itself, that whenever it comes into operation it will be exceedingly difficult to amend it. There must be an absolute majority of the do- minion parliament in the first place, and then there must be a vote of conventions in all the states, giving a majority thereto in each separate state, before any amend- ments can be made in the bill. We, there- fore, are engaged in a very seidous matter, and it behoves us to look carefully to the principles of the bill of which we are asked to approve. I think the plan of the bill is good. I think it carries out what we agreed to in certain resolutions in the Con- vention. It is not proposed by us, and it is not proposed in the bill, to make a unified government. Certain powers are given to the federal parliament which are specified in the bill, and every thingoutside those powers is left under this scheme of constitution to the states. That is the scheme which we have had before us, and that is the scheme embodied in this bill. I do not think there need be the slightest fear on the part of those who represent states — I do not think thei-e need be the slightest fear as far as that portion of the bill goes — of the rights Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 535 of the states being entrenched upon. The of responsible government known to the different subjects which the federal parlia- English Constitution. I do not see how ment is to legislate upon are carefully the two would very well work. An elected specified, and I think it would be hard, in governor would, no doubt, be the most going over the list, to point out any topics powerful politician whom his party could which do not properly belong to the federal produce, and they would take care to run parliament. If, however, there are any, — as the American phrase is — for this office if any hon. member of the Convention of governor the strongest political man thinks there are any, that, of course, will that they could get. That is all very well be matter for full consideration in Com- if you are in America, and if you ai'e mittee, and we can eliminate any power dealing with the American form of con- which we do not think ought to be given stitution ; but if you are going to have the to the federal government. Therefore, so English form of responsible government, far, I think the bill faithfully carries I do not see how the two would fit to- out our view, and may command our ap- gether. It seems to me a genuine case of probation. But there is a portion of the putting new wine into old bottles. I ap- bill, namely, the latter portion, which is prehend that under such arrangement the devoted to the states, chapter v, headed vast prerogatives of the Crown, and they "The States," which seems to me to depart are very vast, would revive and become a from this principle upon which we have reality in this prominent politician who agreed, and to interfere with the states in would be in the governor's chair, and who a manner not consistent with a unified thus would not merely reign, but so- government. For example, I find in chap- vern. He would naturally feel bound by ter v, a provision arranging for the states a spirit of allegiance to the party who put having power to appoint or elect their own him there, so that if he had a ministry governors. Now, I am not aware of how for the time belonging to another party that comes within our Convention, or of I apprehend, without any imputation on how it comes within the scope of this his honesty, or the slightest reflection on federal government which is not a unified his general integrity, that he would be government. It is not a matter concerned very apt to lean towards facilitating the with our federation, it is not analogous party to which he belonged rather than to the case of Canada, where the different the party of his responsible ministers. In states were presided over by deputies ap- truth, the two things are incompatible, and pointed by the governor-general. Here are if you mean to keep up the English Con- vast d(tpendcncies, whose position is not to stitution, you had better not take the be interfered with, except in regard to ccr- American system of electing governors. I tain specified topics of legislation, and wo merely point that out to sliow the difficulty arc asked to go out of our way and provide you have when you go out of your way for them power to elect their own go- to intorf(a-e in a matter which seems to vcrnors. That .seems to me an instance of rao not within our function, and wliich is our gratuitously interfering with what is a matter entirely for the states to detcr- the business of the states, and importing mine as they think proper. Another point into our ta.sk — which, I am .sure, is ditli- in which it seems to me tliat this bill cult enough already — a new dilficulty. I departs in chapter v from the principle witli doubt whether a majority of people will which it started is where it provides that approve of this proposal to enable us to all references to the Queen from any pro- have an elected governor, with the system vince or state must be made through the 536 Commomoecdth of [1 Apkil, 1891.] Australia Bill. governor-general. That would be very well if yoi; had a unified government ; but with our vast territories, with our vast state.s, I apprehend it would be found highly in- convenient. Suppose, for example, that the attorney-general in any state desired to convey advice to her Majesty — that would, of course, be to her responsible adviser at home — with regard to any bill which was in the province, or with regard to any proceeding in which the province got involved, he would be in this somewhat awkward, and, I think, humili- ating position, that he would have to send his advice and all his papers through the governor-general of the dominion. That seems to me to be going out of our way to unify, contrary to the principle on which we started in the bill, which is not to unify, but to pick out certain matters which we give to the federal go- vernment, and as to the rest to leave the states untouched. Another power which, I think, transgresses the principle on which the bill starts, and which is also contained in chapter v, is a power given herein to the federal parliament to annul the state laws in certain cases. That seems to me a A^ery serious power, and an inadvisable one. If the state law has exceeded its functions, there is no need to annul it, because it is void in so far as it goes beyond its func- tions, and any person affected by it can raise the question in any court, and have it determined by a competent legal tribunal, whether or not the law which the state has passed is within its functions. That is the course taken in the United States, A state there may pass a law which it is quite incompetent to pass, but the central government never thinks of annulling it, or of interfering with it, but leaves it to the operation of the law, and that is found to work satisfactorily. If a law touches and affects nobody, no harm is done ; if it does touch or affect anybody, he can go to a competent tribunal and have the law de- [J/r, Wrixon. clared invalid; but in this case, if we retain such power as this, we shall put the federal parliament in the position of sitting as a sort of master over the provincial or states parliaments, and taking on itself to judge whether or not a law should be annulled. I think this is a case in which we are ex- ceeding our power, and are departing from the principle with which we started, I think also that the provision contained in another part of the bill, enabling the fed- eral parliament at any time to confer with regard to any matter original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, and thereby to oust the jurisdiction of the states courts, is exceedino; the lines which we have sketched out for ourselves, for at any time we might find that the federal parliament would step in and take away some im- portant function which the states courts had been discharging. No limit is placed to it — no bounds are assigned. I think that that is a case in which we are de- parting from the principle of not having a unified government. I am afraid, sir, that you will find, if we adopt these provisions, that not alone are you impairing the prin- ciple on which I understand we go, but you are creating a feeling of alarm in the states as to how far they are giving over their rights, privileges, and liberties in submitting to this federation. Therefore, to tliat extent I would be happy to see the bill amended, and I would be glad if those in charge of the bill would consider these points before we get into Commit- tee, because I know from experience Iiow unfair it is to any one in charge of a bill to start points and endeavour to make amendments at the legislative talile ; nothing can be more unfair. If amendments are to be made, they ought to be made on deliberation and considera- tion, and I therefore hope that this view which I have presented will be considered, and that the clauses which I have indi- cated in chapter v will not be insisted Commonwealth of [1 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 5'37 upon when we get into Committee. Tlie tives of the very few a great power over next point to which I would ask the at- the government of the majority. That is tention of the Convention is the question the importance of this whole question. I of state rights and finance. Hon. mem- sympathise with the efforts which the Con- bers, sir, are avv'are how this question stitutional Committee have made to get arises. It is a very important ques- over this difficulty. I am quite aware of tion, and it is wortli thinking over for a the difficulty which it presents, and I do moment how we come to be faced with not wish to pose as simply raising objec- it. Of course it arises in this way : AVe tions, and not being in a position to appre- have already agreed when the House was ciate the question with which they had to sitting in Convention to the principle of grapple, and with which they grappled in giving every state, however small, the the manner which lion, members see in the same representation in the senate as has bill. They set out that money bills are to any state, however large. Thus Western originate in the house of representatives, Australia, with 40,000 or 50,000 inhabi- and they go on to make certain provisions tants, has precisely the same voice in the which are limitations on the ancient rights senate with New South Wales, with of lower houses under the English system, 1,250,000 inhabitants. It thus becomes but with which I quite agree, and which a very serious question what sort of body arc- perfectly reasonablelimitations, namely, this senate is to be, because if you make that a tax bill is to bo confined to one ob- the senate a very powerful body and give ject, and that the appropriation bill is to it a very controlling position, then most be confined to the expenditure for the certainly you are providing for the govern- year ; and then they go on to what we are ment of the mass of the population by a asked to believe is to be a settlement of very small proportion of the population, this financial difficulty between the two and the fact that they live in certain houses, and they provide, in a paragraph districts, or states, does not get over the which is before hon. members, that with difficulty. If you make the senate strong, regard to those bills wliicli the senate may you enable a few to govern the majority, not amend it at any time may send a nies- and, in particular, if you give the senate a sage to the house of representatives asking controllingvoicoinfinancf',you undoubtedly it to strike out any particular item, and enable it to govern the government. For that thereupon the house of repre.jentativcs nothing in more certain under our English may eliminate it if it likes. The difficulty system of government, wliereyou liave the which I feel about accepting this as a solu- administratiou of the day in parliament, tion of the question is first the ambiguity than that the legislative power which as to the meaning (>f the clause, and dominates finance will really control the secondly, tlif! fact that it makes no provi- govci'iiment. Any of us may know that sion for finality. As to wjiat the clause from our experience in our own province. means, I confess that that is undoubtedly Wo know what would happen if an upper a difficulty, and there cannot be a better liouse were able to control the financial proof of the difficulty than tlie fact that operations of the government. And un- wc ourselves here now interpret it difilr- doubtcdly in this case of tlie senate, whicli ently. Of course it may be useful, I admit, will be a more pennanent body than tho if you simjtly want to get a tiling passed, liouse of representative.s, and a more select because in that light you can put the provi- body perhaps, if you give the senate power sion in two aspects. If you address a over finance, you give to the representa- people's rights man you can say, "True, 538 Commonivealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill, that provision is in the bill, but it moans nothing; it is only providing that that may be done which may be done now. Any upper house may lay aside any bill, or send a message down to the lower house, and request it to be amended, and if the lower house chooses to amend the bill it may. Therefore, my people's rights friend, you need not be alarmed — it is nothing but the ordinary law." If, however, you want to satisfy a state rights man, it can be put in a different light. You can say, *' The mere fact that this new provision is there shows that something is intended. This clause makes ari-angements for the senate scrutinising the details of the esti- mates, -which function does not properly belong to an upper house now ; but it pro- vides for so doing, and it provides the machinery for it objecting to any item of which it may disapprove. If the house of representatives will not accept that machinery, and will not act upon it, then, according to the plain meaning of this bill, the senate is entitled to fall back on its right to reject, and that not a right such as now belongs to upper houses — a right to be exercised in an extremity, but a right to be exercised in the ordi- nary vindication of its undoubted privi- lege under this bill to scrutinise items in money bills and in the appropriation bill." In fact, this power of rejecting in toto money bills, which is now only the occasional medicine of the constitution, under this bill will become its daily food, and whencv^er the upper house finds that the house of representatives refrains from respecting its wishes it is clearly entitled under that clause to throw out money bills altogether. The difficulty, I feel, is in our accepting as a solution a pi'oposi- tion which is two-faced, and which you may read in one way or in another way, reminding us, in fact, of what we learnt in our school days of the oracles of old, who, whenever they had to give a reply to \_Mr. Wrixon. some i^owerf ul jwtentate, whom it was dis- agreeable to offend, pi'oduced a reply in w^ords which might be read in one way or in another Avay— in one way giving him complete satisfaction in regard to his wishes, and in the other way being quite contrary to his intentions. That is the sort of oracular deliverance Sir John Downer : The words are clear enough ! Mr. WRIXON : But the meaning is not. I confess that at first when I read the pro- vision I said, "Oh, that is nothing; it can be done now ; we need not trouble about it." Sir John Bray : Can it be done now 1 Mr. WBIXON : Certainly. Sir John Bray : In Victoria 1 Mr. WRIXON : Unquestionably. An Hon. Member : No ! Mr. W^RIXON : Of course I do not say in so many words what is contained here, but the same result can be accomplished. The upper house may at any time lay aside a bill. Sir John Bray : And send a message afterwards ' Mr. WRIXON: I do not say when they send their message. Sir John Bray : The hon, member did just now ! Mr. WRIXON : It was a slip of the tongue. It is a matter of indifference to me when the message is sent. The point is that it can be done now under the ordinary parliamentary procedure in I'e- gard to any bill, and it has been done. Colonel Smith : Asking for a committee ! Mr. WRIXON : Asking for a confer- ence, or for a committee. Apparently with a view of strengthening the state rights man's idea of this question, I notice in clause 54 that the old verbiage of all acts of Parliament, I think, with regard to money bills is dropped, and that they are not called money bills any more, but laws. Mr. Clark : Proposed laws ! Commonwealth of [1 April, T891.] Australia Bill. 539 Mr. WRIXON : Ko ; it says laws— " laws appropriating any part of the re- venue ' Mr. Clark : They are not laws until they are passed ! Mr. WRIXOX : "Or laws imposing any tax " ; and indeed it goes so far as, in clause 57, to fall into a manifest slip such as, of course, might occur in drafting any bill, because it says : Vrhen a law passed by the parliament is pre- sented to the governor-general for the Queen's assent. Mr. Clark : Tliat is a slip ! Mr. WEIXON : Of course we all know that a bill is not a law until it gets the Queen's assent. But apparently with the object, I say, of strengthening the state rights man's view, and of showing that really some new power is to be given, these bills are called laws, which, I apprehend, is an inaccurate term. For example, in the case of an appropriation bill, the preamble shows that it is different from an ordinary law. Financial grants are grants by the mass of the taxpayers to the government : they are different from ordinary legisla- tion, and they are subject to different con- ditions. If I could get nothing better, rather than see federation defeated I would take this bill. But I am bound to point out that I think we are only postponing the difficulty. I think we are creating a difliculty with regard to the large states, and to our getting the people of those states to assent to this bill. I think that if the bill is assented to, and should become law, you are only postponing the difhculty of this Convention to the federal jiarliament, and that the question will still have to be fought out as to what is the meaning of this clause, for un- doubtedly a conflict of powers will exist. There will be the states-right party in the federal parliament anxious to make their weijrht felt, and there will be the masses of the people represented ia the lower house anxious to govern, and in this clause I am afraid you only provide a platform for the fighting out of their differences. It is, in short, a cul de sac — leading nowhere. There is no solution. There- fore, I think that if you did retain this clause, the least you could do would be to add to it a proviso or sub-clause to the effect that where this did happen, that is to say, that where the senate sent down a representation with regard to a certain item, and the lower house would not eliminate it, the two houses should meet together and vote in common. You would then have some end to the question. At present there is none. You lead us up to a certain point and there you leave us. You guide the legislative bodies up to a point of antagonism and there you bid them good-bye. You ought to go further, and if you keep this method of procedure you ought to provide either for the two houses voting together, or, if you like, make a provision that after a general election the voice of the lower house .shall pi'evail. That, of course, will not apply to the appropriation act, which must be kept separate, and which cannot afford to wait. The next point to which I ask the attention of the Convention is the establishment of constitutional govern- ment, and this is a question which I ad- dress rather to my learned fi'iend. Sir Samuel Grillith, and to my other learned friends who may be here. There is a por- tion of this bill establishing constitutional government, and I think it was truly said yesterday that the effect of that portion would be to establish in this federation in its orJinary working responsible govern- ment. But the form in which ministers are to be appointed, 1 think, wants a little consideration, because it involves a very serious point. In clau.se 4 of chapter ii, page 13, it is provided : For the administration of the executive go- vernment of the common weal til, the governor- >40 Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. general may, from time to time, appoint officers to administer such departments of state of the commonwealth as the governor-general in Coun- cil may from time to time establish, and such officers shall liold office during the pleasure of tlie governor-general, and shall be capable of being chosen and of sitting as members of either house of the parliament. Kow, the point I wisli to draw attention to is that I do not think the provision will convey to those officers thus appointed by the governor the great power and author- ity which, under the English system of go- vernment, belongs to a responsible minis- ter of the Crown. That is something dis- tinct from the position of an officer ap- pointed to administer a department. My learned friends present will remember the remarkable case of Buron versus Denman, ill which the captain of a ship of war had illegally destroyed certain property of a trader. After that had been done Lord Palmerston wrote a letter saying that he thoroughly approved of what the captain had done. An action was brought by tlie owner of the property which had been illegally destroyed, and it Avas held by all the judges at home that the mere fact of a minister of the Crown writing a letter expressing approval embodied the appro- bation of the Sovereign herself to that act, although it was admitted, of course, that she knew nothing whatever about it. That is a very great power, but it is a very essential power if you are to have every day government satisfactorily carried on. It is a vast power ; but it is necessary that it should be given to a minister of the Crown under the system, and I am convinced that if the cpiestion were raised hereafter as to whether one of these offi- cers appointed to administer a depart- ment really stood in the shoes, to use a common expression, of one of her Majesty's responsible ministers, the courts would ];old that he did not. They would say, " Here is a statutory provision as to what tlie position is ; notliing is said about re- [J/r. Wrixon. sponsible minister ; nothing is said about minister of the CroAvn eitlier. The officer is appointed to administer a department." Mr. Clark : Read the last line. The clause provides that the officers shall be members of the federal executive council ! Mr. WRIXON: It does not connect them with the Sovereign. Mr. Clark : It makes them ministers ; it is done in Canada ! Mr. WRIXON: In Canada the act says ministers shall be meinbers of the Queen's Privy Council. Mr. Clark : It is the same thing here ! Mr. WRIXON : I apprehend it is not the same. At any rate, the question has never been raised in Canada ; but I think the question certainly would be raised here ; and, according to my view, I think there can be little doubt but that the courts would hold that ministers so appointed did not inherit all the great powers of the Queen's ministers, and which powers are yet necessary for tlie carrying on of the government. If a few words will meet this point, I think it is most important that it should be met. I will now say a few words about the question of appeal to the Queen- in-Council. I observe that the bill provides practically that that appeal shall be taken away in all cases except where the public interests are concerned. That is practically the effect of the bill. I must say that I consider that a mistake. I do not think we should take away the right of appeal to the highest legal authority in the realm. It is said that this limitation of the bill is based upon the view which the Privy Coun- cil have taken of the proper reading of the Canadian act, and that it merely embodies that view. If that be so I w-ould suggest that we take the terms of the Canadian act also, and leave the Privy Council, as they doubtless would, to take the same view of them. That would meet the difficulty. But as the matter stands you are in this position : you hold yourselves out to the Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill, 541 Avorld as saying that you will not allow an appeal to the highest legal tribunal in the realm unless there be some great pub- lic question involved. But there are vast industrial interests between England and these colonies ; a vast amount of English capital is invested in these colonies, there are vast mercantile negotiations and busi- nesses going on, intertwining one with the other, and I apprehend that the owners of capital and the projectors of business in the old country will view Avith anything but satisfaction a determination on the part of these colonies to prohibit them in the case of a conflict involving large interests on their part from having the opinion of the best judges in the land upon the question involved. I would here remark, with reference to the judicial part of the subject, that I otjigerve an ap- peal is given by the bill to the federal court in criminal cases. That, with great respect, I think a mistake, and I should be glad to see the provision omitted. I am not aware that it has been asked for by any of the provinces, and the eficct of an appeal to the federal court in criminal cases, seeing that the court might be sit- ting at uncertain times, would neccssarilv be to cause great delay, and to give a great handle to [icr-sons who could command means in some cases to render it almost impossible to carry out the criminal law. I am aware of the popular and plausible argument, that wlicn you give an appeal as to a small amount of property, you ought also to give it in regard to a man's life. To that I can only reply that tli'; neces- sity of the thing is that the crimin.il law should be promptly administered, and I believe you will impede the administr.ition of the criminal law, and not assist it, if you leave that provision in the bill. These are the principal paints to which I wish to call attention at this stage. I notice that a point which was mentioned in the Convention, namely, that the federal go- vernment should have some power of con- trolling the railways of the states, so as to prevent a war of ra,ilway tariffs, has not been dealt with at all in the bill. It is a point that deserves attention, because if we are to have perfect f rcedomof tradebetween the different provinces it will be important to enable the federal government Mr. Deakix : It is in the bill. It comes under the general powers, chapter i, clause 52! Sir JoHX DowxER : Look at clause 12, j)age 18 ! Mr. WRIXON : If it is intended to cover that by the regulation of trade and commerce among the several states, a question might arise as to whether it is really covered by that provision. Mr. Deakix : Then there is the other clause referred to by the hon. member, Sir John Downer — page 18, clause 12 ! Mr. WRIXON: I am glad that the question has been considered, because it is undoubtedly an important point if we are going to have free-trade between the states. The language does not seem to me to be as precise and definite as coukl be wished, and it may be a matter for con- sideration in Committee whether we should not more definitely point to the question of controlling railway freights. So long as we are satisfied that the matter is dealt with, it will meet the views of the Con- vention generally. Mr. Adye Dou(iLAS : That was not taken into consideration by the committee ! Mr. WRIXON: Several members of the committee seem to consider th.it it Avas, and certainly those clauses to which my attention has been drawn may possiljly meet the case. They do not meet it ex- pressly, but they may cover it. As long as it is intended to cover it, that is the im- portant point. It is a mere matter of verbiage how we do it. There is another point I wish to refer to. I do not gather from the bill that the federal government 5:12 Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. \\\\\ liave sufficient control overtbe revision of the electoral rolls for its own electorate. There are clauses -which give it power with regard to the conduct of the elections, but I think the federal government should also have the power of controlling and revising the electoral rolls, so as to be able to ensure the purity of the rolls by which the members of the federal parliament will be retui-ned. It is a matter which I hope will eniraire our attention in Committee. There is only one other point which I will mention — it is perhaps more a matter of verbiage than anything else — that is, the clause which provides that a convicted criminal shall not be entitled to sit in the new parliament until he is discharged or pardoned. That is rather an unhappy clause. It is not a cardinal principle of the bill ; but it is an unhappy provision, and I should be glad to see it omitted altogether. These are the chief points to which I will direct the attention of the Convention. I feel that at this stage the more we com- press our observations the better it will be, so as to bring the bill as soon as pos- sible into Committee, so that we may press it forward there with all reasonable speed. The subject is a great and a vast one ; it is too great to allow of any small, petty, or provincial feeling intervening to cause de- lay or prevent our united wish that we may be able to make this bill as perfect as possible, so as to command the assent of the provinces and the assent of the people of the whole of this community. I thi'ik all our eflforts t-i"" ^'^ 'i.v^^fo-^i +r, -t-i ■- e^fi^ and I hope . ^ .suggested will have consideration, so as to avoid the necessitv of making amendments when we actually get into Committee. IMr, BAKER : I understand that it is the wish of hon. members, and I am sure it is my own wish, that this debate should be as short as possible. Therefore I am not going to address* ^ly remarks to any subject which I mysel "o not believe is of [J/r. Wrixon. the utmost importance. I agree with a great deal that has fallen from the hon. membei", Mr. "Wrixon ; but I do not intend to follow his example by criticising the whole of the bill, because I think it will shorten my remarks and meet the wishes of hon. members if I do not adduce any arguments which may be better adduced on matters of detail in Committee. There is only one point to which I will address my remarks — that is, onr old friend, the question of state rights and state interests. Mr. MuxRO : Our old friend ? Old trouble ! Mr. BAKER : It may be our old enemy ; but I look upon it as an old friend. We are sent here to form a federal government, and with all deference and humility, it seems to me that the bill which we are now disc Uj ^ing is not a bill to form a federal government. The quintessence of federation is left out, for this reason : that so far as the states themselves through their representatives are concerned, they will have no voice in matters of federal legislation. It is quite true that equal re- presentation is afforded to the smaller states in the senate. But what is the good of equal repre.sentation in one branch of the legislature if you deprive that branch of the legislature of all its powers % I quite agree with the President in his disapprobation of paper constitutions. I hold that ex- perience, wherever we can get it, is a far safer guide than theory, and we cannot in a^^ federal questions obtain experience exce^it from one or two countries. But we have in America a people practically of our own race, speaking our own lan- guage, brought up under the same cir- cumstances as ourselves so far as polit' cal institutions are concerned, and we should be wanting in wisdom if we were to i^efrain from learning lessons from the experience which they have gained. I would first of all point out that accord- ing to the experience of America the Commonivealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 543 federal constitution, although it is reduced to writing, yet is an exceedingly plastic document — that although the form may re- main, the substance is entirely changed by the mighty force of human nature acting on political institutions. I crave leave of the Convention to give one or two quota- tions from two celebrated American writers in support of that proposition. Mr. Wood- row Wilson, whose name is very well known to all the members of the Conven- tion, tells us that there has been a constant growth of legislative and administrative practice, and a steady accre- tion of precedent in the management of federal afifairs, which have broadened the sphere and altered the fimctions of the Government with- out perceptibly affecting the vocabulary of our constitutional language. Ours is, scarcely less than the British, a liviug and fecund .system. He tells us further on that the central government is constantly becoming stronger and more active, and Congress is estab- lishing itself as the one sovereign authority in that government. In constitutional theory and in the broader features of past practice ours has been what Mr. Bagehot has called a composite government. Besides state and federal author- ities to dispute as to sovereignty thei-e have been within the federal system itself rival and irreconcilable powers. But gradually the strong are overcoming the weak. If the signs of the times are to be credited we are fast approaching an adjustment of sovereignty quite as simple as need be. Congress is not only to retain the authority it already possesses, but is to be brought again and again face to faca with still grciitcr demanils upon its energy, its wisdom, and its conscience — is to have ever-widening duties and responsibilities tlirust upon it, with- out being granted a moment's ojiportunity co look Ijack from the plough to which it lias set its hands. And Mr. Clason, in a book called tlio *' >S(;vcn Conventions," a history of seven 'ish whatever to take this par- ticular task upon myself, and I very much regret that the chairman of the Constitu- tional Committee, Sir Samuel Griffith, was absent during the whole of the time that the hou. member, Mr. Wrixon, addressed the House ; but, in his absence, I took a number of notes of Mr. Y/rixon's speech. I concur with the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, that it very often saves time in [J/r. Baker, Committee to ventilate some matters of detail in general debate, so as not to spring amendments or objections upon hon. members in Committee. I listened with very great pleasure to the careful and intelligent criticism of the bill by the lion, member, Mr. Wrixon ; and I think I may say for every member of the Con- stitutional Committee that we shall each and all be onl}^ too happy to listen to any number of speeches of the same kind as his, showing such a careful study of the bill, such an intelligent appreciation of its pro- visions, and containing so many suggestions for our consideration v/ith regard to the pos- sible improvement of the measure as it did. But I think that my hon. friend, Mr. Wrixon, misconceived the purport and eiTect of some of the clauses to which he referred. He devoted his attention par- ticularly to chapter v, which deals with the states, and he seemed to think that the whole of that chapter was out of place because it did not deal with the question of federal government at all, but was an attempt to interfere with the internal af- fairs of each state. But I would like to put before the hon. member and before this Convention what appears to me to be a very important consideration with regard to this bill, and with regard to the future federation which we hope will arise under it, and that is, that every resident of the commonwealth of Australia, after this bill becomes law, Avill be a citizen of two distinct governments, and he has a right to look to each of those governments for the protection of certain fundamental rights and privileges ; and this chapter dealing with the states only attempts to interfere with the action of the states in so far as the federal government thinks it ria;ht to do so for the protection of its individual citizens. I think if hon. members will read through all the provisions which ap- pear to interfere with state action, or which do deliberately prohibit such action Cornmomcealth of [1 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 547 in certain subjects, they will see that it is for the protection of certain funda- mental rights and liberties which every individual citizen is entitled to claim that the federal government shall take under its protection and secure to him. So much for chapter v as a whole. Coming to the clauses in particular which the lion, member, Mr. Wrixon, criticised, I will refer first of all to the clause which says that the states shall adopt what mode they like for the appointment of their governors. It appeared to me that the iion. gentleman had come to the conclusion that this clause directly invited the differ- ent states to adopt the system of popular election for their governors ; but I think that no such reading as that can be given to the language used. It simply leaves the states to decide for themselves in what manner their governors shall be ap- pointed. We know that each and all of them can nov/ obtain an amendment of their constitution from the Imperial Par- liament, enabling them to alter the mode of appointing their governors, and this clause simply says that, without having to go to the Imperial Parliament, they shall have that right secured to them from the date of federation. It does not follow that they Avill go in for the popular election of their governors at all. In all probability most of them will continue for a long time to come to have their governors appointed as at present ; and so far from being in any way an interference with the right of the pooi)lc to say in what mode their governors shall be appointed, this clause leaves them absolutely free to do as they like. ]Mr. CuTiiBKKT : "What necessity is there for it ? It is only a saving clause ! Mr. Deaki.n : Do not argue it now 1 Mr. CLAilK : I am only replying to the criticism of the lion, member, Mr. Wri.von, who seemed to think tliat this clause was a direct invitation to the people to adopt the system of popular election. The next clause to which the lion, gentle- man objected was that which provides that references to the Queen shall go through the governor-general. I think we are all agreed that the object of federa- tion is to make us one nation or one com- munity vv'ith regard to the outside world, and if we are to be one nation and one community with regard to the outside world we surely ought to have only one channel of communication with the cut- side world. That is the sole object of that clause. It has no intention whatever of interfering with the executive government in the several colonies, or to give the governor-general or his ministers any power whatever to interfere with the ex- ecutive affairs in the several colonies. If hon. members believe, and can show, that this method of communicating with the Queen will cause irritation and produce unforeseen results of a disadvantageous nature, I am sure every member of the committee will only be too happy to hear criticisms of that kind, and, possibly, on reflection, to alter their opinions with re- gard to the utility or necessity of this provision. On one subject to which the hon. delegate from Victoria referred I am entirely in accord with him. I refer to the clause authorising the federal parlia- ment to confer original jurisdiction on the supreme court in additional cases. Of cour.se it is well understood that every member of the committee reserved to him- self the right in Convention to diller from any of the details of the bill. It is not to be expected that fourteen members would be al)Solately unanimous on every ])oint. Therefore I do not think I am guilty of any breacii of decorum when I say that personally in the Judiciary Com- mittee and in the Constitutional Committee I strenuously fought against this provi- sion ; but I was outvoted. I shall, there- fore, be happy to join tlie hon. member, Mr, Wrixon, in attempting to get the 548 Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Aiistralia Bill. dause excised. Then my lion, friend ap- pi'oached what is perhaps the knottiest and most difficult question in the whole bill, and that is, the relations of the senate and the house of representatives with re- gard to money bills and the question of finality with regard to legislation in gene- ral. I thought that the Convention had substantially adopted the compromise which is now embodied in the bill. Mr. Wrixox : Oh, no ! Mr. CLARK : But if I am wrong in that impression, of course I must only wait to hear what other objections can be urged against it when the bill gets into Committee. I will not attempt to discuss the question now. But I will say with regard to the question of finality that if there is to be any system proposed by which finality .shall be arrived at in all matters of legislation, so that the senate may be ultimately outvoted on any mat- ter whatever, then it certainly ought to be put on a perfect equality with the other house with regard to money bills, so far as the right of amendment is con- cerned. It is, therefore, a choice wdicther you will accept this compromise with re- gai'd to amendments, or give the senate absolute power of amendment, and pro- vide some system of obtaining finality on any matter, whether it is a money bill or not. The reference which the lion, member, Mr. AVrixon, made to the use of the word " law " instead of " bill " I believe is perfectly correct in regard to the use of the word in several cases. I believe it has been a mere slip on the part of the draftsman. Sir Samuel Gpjffitii : No ! Mr. CLARK : In clause 57 it is evi- dently a slip, because a measure is a bill when it is presented to the governor- general ; it is only a law after it has been assented to. Sir Samuel Griffith : The word moy be wrong, but it was used deliberately ! [Mr. Clark. Mr. CLARK : One of the most impor- tant points touched upon by the lion, dele- gate from Victoria Avas the question of constitutional government. He seemed to think that the clause providing for the ap- pointment of officersin charge of the vai-ious departments of the state did not provide for constitutional government as we under- stand it, with the very large and necessary powders which a minister of the Crown always possesses in a British community having responsible government. I inter- jected at the time that I thought the lion, member had overlooked the last line of clause 4, chapter ii, wdiich says that such officers shall be members of the federal executive council ; and I think the lion, gentleman will find, upon reflection, that the words that I have quoted constitute those officers what we ordinai^ily call min- isters of the Crown, and that, being min- isters of the Crown, they will have all the powers which the officers called minis- ters of the Crown at the present time in the constitutions of the several colonies by law possess. With regard to appeal to the Privy Council, I understand that the only objection the hon. member takes to the clause dealing M'ith that question is that it attempts to set out the interpretation which the Privy Council has already put upon the language contained in the British North America Act reserving the right of appeal to her Majesty-in-Council. If it is simply a question as to whether we .should use the lan2;uage of the British North America Act, which was at one time doubtful, and a subject of great argu- ment, but which has now been intcu'i^reted, or whether we should use the very lan- guage used by the interpreting authority, I do not think there ought to be much hesitation in choosing the direct interpre- tation given by the constituted authority of that which before was doubtful and arguable. That is our justification for adopting that method, instead of repeating Commonwealth of [1 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 5i9 the lanut I do hold that social ties and social questions of the strongest possible kind require that the governor-general should be elected by the people of the con- federacy. Take the case of a widowed mother, lierself well educated, perhaps brought up as a teacher in one of your public schools, and possessing great ability ; imagine her with her orphaned children, -deprived of a father, night after night teaching those children, with a hope that the highest offices of the state of every kind maybe open to them all. Is not that a social question — a social gathering of the highest and noblest kind ? And hundreds, I may say thousands, of such social gather- ings would be witnessed every night in this great commonwealth, if all the highest offices of state were filled by election by the people. If you follow it out, you will find that in all social relations of the family— fathers, mothers, children, brothers, sisters — this question is intimately con- cerned as being something which binds the whole family together for common objects, and opens paths of distinction to every one of them, if they prove them- selves great and deserving men. Why -should you say to all tliese 4,000,000 of people, " No one of yon, nor any one of the other millions who are to occupy this •country, shall have the slightest chance of ever attaining to an honor of that kind " — that it shall always be open, as it cer- tainly, or almost certainly would be, to distant persons Avith no claim whatever upon the inhabitants of this country, all of whom would be shut out from so great an opening as that of which I speak % It is more materially necessary that we should consider this point now, and that we should come to a just decision upon it, because I will shov/ hereafter, as the discussion on the bill proceeds, that in every instance all hope is shut out from the groat, masses \_Sir George Grey. of the colony to succeed to any one of tlie iniportant [losts which under this bill will be open to the people of Australia. I say that, looking to our duty to our Sovereign, we owe it to her to select the svorthiest man we know to represent her here — to be certain that the man so chosen is worthy to represent her; and in no other way than by his being chosen by ourselves from people whom we know can we be certain that the worthiest man will be chosen to represent the Queen within the limits of the great confederacy which we are about to constitute. Considering the openings that would be given to every inhabitant of Australasia under such a system as I propose, with so many families, as will necessarily do it, directing their every exer- tion and effort to raise up children worthy of the great opportunities laid open to them, I ask whether this is rot to us a greater social question than a few balls and dinners given at Government House, at which none but those in the immediate vicinity can be present % I ask what com- parison is there between these two things — one gi'eat and far-reaching, extending to millions, the other a mere sham, as it were, representing what passes in another jilace, as if one were looking through the wrong end of a telescope at some jiroces- sion that was going on ? All matters con- nected with Government House are dimin- ished here as compared with Great Britain and the influence exercised there. There it is the influence of an hereditary monarch descended from a long line of ancestors. There it is the influence belonging to cer- tain professions — the army and navy — who look to receiving honor from the hands of such a sovereign. Here there are no ties whatever of that kind ; and yet for a n)ere imaginary show, or what is called the performance of social duties — enter- taininsf strangers and also citizens imme- diately surrounding the vice-regal court, which are the only benefits that arc abso- Conimonicealih of [1 Apeil, 1891.] Australia Bill. 563 lately gained — all those benefits that I speak of are lost. Let us look at it in another way, wliicli is also worthy or our consideration. What is the necessary con- sequence of having a governor-general of this kind, Avith an enormous salary, and vast expenditure upon various subjects — nominated by the Crown. I ask is it just whilst so many poor people have to be taxed to ])ay their share of that salary, to deprive them of the honor, and, I may say of the just pride, of themselves electing some worthy man, known throughout so great an extent of country as Australia, to occupy a salary more than adequate to the duties that honorable post, with the certainty that to be performed ? You will find set down such an example will operate upon every in this bill a salary of j£ 10,000 a year. Tiie VicK-CiiAiRMAN : I ask the hon. member not to discuss that matter, as the question of salary is dealt with in the next clause. Sir GEORGE GEEY : I find a diffi- culty in separating the two questions. They may be separated in clauses ; but the one argument will hardly carry the full meaning of what it is necessary for me to say so that tlie matter maybe understood. individual of the community, stirring noble faculties in many men, giving hope, per- haps, to some thousand or more of the people that they may possibly attain to such an honor ? Is it right to make the people pay such sums of money, and to deprive them of honors to v.hich they ought justly and rightly to look ? And when, as 1 sliall prove by-and-l)y, as we go on with the bill, each office is closed by some restriction or other to all chance of fair competition in the I hardly see liow it is possible for me to country, let us, at the very first, indicate in divide the subject, because if I admit that tliis clause that this great office shall be tlie governor-general should be appointed open at all times to that man in Australia !)y the Crown, what is the use of my after- who is deemed the greatest, and worthiest, wards arguing about the salary? If, whilst and fittest to hold so noble a post, and to I am arguing upon what must follow upon satisfy his fellow-citizens that they have the appointment of governor-general, I can- wisely chosen one who will be an honor to not refer to the salary, how can I make the the whole community. Can any of us matter thoroughly understood? I would believe that if at the time of the disturb- fiubmit, sir, that this is a case in which ances in the United .States in regard to •clearly it is impossible to separate the two. slavery a man had to be chosen by the !Mr. Fvsii : r!o on ! JJritish ministry of the day in London, Sir GEOIIGE GUEY : Well, I can al- there was the slightest hope that such a lude generally to the subject of powers and niau as Lincoln woidd have come to the functions. Limiting myself, then, to the front to achieve the great and nol>h! olj- «se of tlie term large salary, may I say, jects which lie accomplished? I am sure without naming the exact amount, that the tlie universal admission must l)e that there President of the United States, until but lately, received £0,000 a year for his salary for ruling 40,000,000 peoj)le, ajid at the present time I believe his salary is £10,000 a year for ruling 00,000,000 people, and daily augmenting in number. I fere we are expected to pay at least as large a salary as is paid to the President of the United States for ruling 00,000,000 people, and to pay a governor-general would have been no hope of such a thing. Yet from the forests of the United States there came one who had been a men; splitter of timber, worthy justly and rightly to exercise th(! highest power for a (inie in the United States and to accomplish this great ends at which lie aimed. Arc we iu Australia to be told that we can find no man worthy to succeed to a post of that kind ? Are we to be told that we must 564 Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. forego the chance of selecting a man of that sort, and that some thousands a year must bo expended unnecessarily, -when the money might be applied to great and good objects '? And if it should be so expended Avill it be for the benefit of the people? No. I say it will be to their detriment, by depriving them of such just objects of ambition — objects just in themselves, and which would soon be dear to the hearts of all. To my mind, to subject the people of this new federation to a rule of this kind is to degrade, and not to ennoble ; is to lower them in their own estimation, in- stead of raising them in their own estiraa- tion ; is to say that they are not worthy to com|)ete with their fellow-men in other parts of the world. As far as it rests with myself, I know that I am venturing upon dangerous ground. I know that I must raise enmity in many minds by what I am doing. Hon. Members : No ! Sir GEORGE GREY: But 1 feel it my duty to run this i-isk in order to tell what I believe to be impregnable truths, and to try to lead this Convention to do that which I am confident will scamp great- ness upon every man who assists in obtain- ing that benefit for his country. I believe that those Avho force this clause into this bill, instead of not having done good to Australia, will virtually have conferred a great benefit upon the country by creating a necessity for a discussion of this question. If, now that the question has been raised, it is decided in favour of the people of Australasia — if they are told that this great boon is open to them ; if this night w^e send a thrill from one part of the country to the other with the news that this great object has been attained, I say it will have been for all those who have aided in it one of the happiest days in their lives, and that they will be benefactors to countless generations yet to come in having obtained so great and good an object for them. xVnd [Sir George Grey. further than that, I say that to attain this object, to gain this principle will be to en- sure for a long period of time the love of Australasia for England ; to remove to a greater distance all chances of separation between the two countries, and to lead me, and I believe many others, to rest assured that a step of the strongest kind has been taken to strengthen the great union of Aus- tralasia for yet centuries to come, instead of endangering it, as I am certain will be the case, by blocking that union with the disastrous admission that we must take from Great Britain such governor-generals as she may please to send out, and that none of the citizens of this country may hope to obtain that great and, shall I call it, magnificent office. Actuated by these sentiments, I have felt it my duty to raise this question, and I trust that I shall have some support, if not a majority of the Con- vention, in favour of that which I ask for. Amendment proposed, Mr. MUNRO : I am rather surprised at the lion, member. Sir George Grey, bring- ing this question forward at the present time. Dr. CocKBURN : He mentioned it in the foi'mer debate ! Mr. MUNRO : The hon. gentleman was a member of the committee Avhich drafted the bill. Was not the matter thrashed out Ijy the committee % Sir Samuel Griffith : We are not bound by the report ! Mr. MUNRO : I do not say we are ; but the hon. gentleman told us that the argu- mentsmadeuseof in the committeewere suf- ficient to convince him that he was wrong, and I thought the same course mioht have been followed on the present occasion, be- cause if he was Avrong in his views then most assuredly he is wrong now. The hon. member tells us that one of the great effects of electing our own governor-gene- ral would be to put him in the position of Abraham Lincoln — to give him similar CommonioeaJlh of [1 April, 1891.] Ausiralia Bill. 565 powers and a similar position. Under our form of government that position is occu- pied by the Prime Minister, and no mat- ter whetlier the governor-general were elected or not, he could not under consti- tutional government exercise the functions which Abraham Lincoln exercised. ISTo governor-creneral could undertake that re- sponsibility, whether appointed by the Crown or not. If the hon. member's argument were carried out to its legiti- mate issue the people of England ought to elect their sovereign. That is really what it means. The governor-general is to ap- pearhereas the representative of the Queen. Under our constitution the Queen is to be in some sense present among us. The only way in which we can have her present is through her representative, and if her re- presentative is to be elected by us, and not by herself, he will be not her representa- tive, but ours. To carry the hon. member's argument to its legitimate issue, therefore, he ought to say that the people of the em- pire .should elect their own monarch. That is what it means. If the hon. member is not prepared to say that, he ought not to go to the extent to which he wishes to go. I do not think, however, that this is a matter to which we ought to devote much time at this stage ; because, since we have already agreed — and we liave done so — that wc are to have a form of constitutional government under the Crown, we must allow the Crown the power of being repre- sented in the union. If we carry out the proposal of the lion, member, the I'esult would be that we must abandon the pro- posed union, and have a union in adifterent direction, certainly not under the Crown. The hon. member .said the result of his firoposal would bo to strengtlien the union with England ; but I think few persons will agree with him in that respect. \ think the people of Australia will agree with me that the result of his ])roposal would be to weaken the union. We should, in fact, begin to ask why we were con- nected with England at all. If we could appoint our own governor-general, if we could carry on all our legislation, and do the whole of our business, the question would soon be asked what we had to do with England, and then where would the connection be ? I do not see the necessity for considering the hon. membei-'s pro- posal at the present time. I am proud of being a citizen of the great British empire, and shall never fail to be proud of that position. I have no desire to weaken a single link binding us to that empire, whether as regards the appointment of a governor-general or anything else. I desire to hold those links sacred, and if possible to sti'engthen them, and I am satisfied that in making his proposal the hon. member is not consulting the feelings of the people of Australia. Sir GEORGE GREY : I wish to an- swer a few of the arguments raised by the hon. member. I understood him to say that Abraham Lincoln would not be wanted here. Mr. MuxRO : I did not say that. I said that our governor-general could not do what Abraham Lincoln did in America ! Sir GEORGE GREY : And that in that way he would have been unnecessary. Mr. Muxuo : That he would be unable to do what Abraham Lincoln did ! Sir GEORGE GREY : But the hon. member has not touched upon this point : What would be tlie effect of opening this great office to all, of raising up Abraham Lincolns as ministers to advise the gover- nor-general ? That is tlie point. By raising such men, the governor-general would ob- tain better advice than he would bo likely to obtain if the offices were not open. I liave no doubt whatever that this is a com- ]ilctc answer to that question — that the one thing is to raise many Abraham ]>infolns in the state. Should we be the worse for it ? They might not be necessary to-day or 566 Commonwealth of [1 ApniL, 1891.] Australia Bill. at any particular moment, but undonbtedly it woulel be a great object. There is an- other phase of the question which the hon. member raised — that it would amount to severance from the empire if the Queen did not appoint the governor -general. The Queea does not appoint the governors now. Ministers advise the Queen as to who should be appointed ; but I say that you should rather allow the v.hole people to give the advice. Why cannot the united people of Australia be capable of choosing a man, and advising the Queen as beneficially as a person who knows nothing about us, and who niay be in the hands of colonists at home who ai'e spending large fortunes in an endeavour to cret into lii^h life in England, and who may possibly mislead official persons there as to what the de- sires of the colonists are. I have heard no single reason advanced that would in- duce me to change my mind in the least degree. Let me hear some good and con- clusive answers given to my argument, and I will deal with them ; but do not let the subject be dismissed without any reply being made. Let us fairly argue out one of the greatest questions that can occupy our minds in connection with this bill. I am ready to answer anv arguments that may be brought forward ; but I cannot see that there is any weight whatever iu the argumeiits of the last speaker. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I am, to a great extent, in sympathy with the ob- ject desired to be attained by Sir George Grey. I believe the highest offices of the state ought to he open to its own citizens ; but I do not think it follows that the necessary way to bring about that result is to provide that the governor- general shall be directly elected by the people, Prol^ably the greatest difficulties which have arisen in the United States are owing to the manner in which the president is there elected. If you have a direct election of the president by the [Sir George Grey. people, or such an indirect election as has been substituted for it there, the practical result would be that at &\qty election of the governor-general there would be a can- vassing throughout the whole dominion or commonwealth by the representatives- of respective parties, and the governor- general, when elected, would regard him- self as the nominee or head of a party, and would devote a great part of his time and attention to securing his re-elecLion. These are not the objects which the hon. member,. Sir George Grey, desires to attain. I am inclined to think that this is one of those matters that will work out by itself. I am much inclined to think that before- many years are over not only the governor- general, but the governors of the different Australian colonies, will practically be appointed, not, perhaps, by the direct elec- tion, but with the full consent and con- cuj'rence, known in advance, of the people of these colonies. I believe the tendency is strong in that direction at the present time. I know that other members of the Convention are of a different opinion. I am now expressing my individual opinion. I believe it will be to the interests of the Government of England to appoint the best men, men acceptable to the people of the commonwealth, and that they will exercise all proper care to bring about that result. I have no doubt, especially considering the greatly altered conditions- of the commonwealth, that great wei"ht will be paid to the wishes of the people,, and that some means will be found of nominations being made, if not directly by the Australian commonwealth, yet under such circumstances as to secure appoint- ments which woukl be known to meet with the concurrence of the people of these colonies. I am of that opinion ; I cannot say how it will work out in detail. I believe, also, that when the people of Aus- tralia are of opinion — and surely an opinion may be shown in other ways than by Commonwealth of [1 April, 1^91.] Australia Bill. 5G7 an act of parliament — that it is desirable that a distinfCULshed Australian should be appointed to the oilice of governor-genera), some instances will be found — if, indeed, the course is not invariably adopted — in which distinsruished Australians will be appointed to the position. That, I take it, is all that the hon. member. Sir George Grey, desires to attain ; and it can, com- patibly with the retention of our relations with the Crown, be attained by leaving the appointment as it is proposed to be left, in the hands of the Queen. Mr. KINGSTON: I cannot help sharing the sentiments which have been expressed by the hon. member, Sir George Grey, as regards the desirability of our possessing the power of at least altering the jiresent practice with reference to the appointment of governors. \\'e need not go veiy far back in our history to recollect occa- sions when the public mind was profoundly agitated on this question, and a desire was very generally expressed in some of the colonies, at least, that the people of Aus- tralia should exercise a much larger power in connection with the appointment of governors than tliey do at present. Look- ing at the bill, I find that this growing sentiment is recognised to a certain extent. It is recognised so far as the various states are concerned by provision being made in the bill endbling th« state parliaments to alter the practic as they may sec lit. We should be ])roc('eding wisely ami in a way which we should be able to defend, if we conferred tlio same power on the federal parliament. Sir Samuel Gridith lias said that in the natural order of things sonietiiing will be done to give clFcct to Australian aspirations in this direction. Someliiing ha.«j been done so far as the states are concerned ; and surely it is only a logical sequence that tho same power should be given to the federal parliament. Mr. MuxKO : We have not yet given that power to the states ! Mr. KINGSTON: The committee have recommended that we should I'ecogni.se the principle that the people should decide the question through the medium of the local parliaments. It is quite logical that we should urge that the same power should be given to the federal parliament. I do not think that the hon. member. Sir George Grey, will be able to secure a majority at this stage to aliirm that in future we should elect our own governor-general ; but I think he can fairly claim a most substantial sup- port for a proposition to enable the federal parliament from time to time to deal with the question, and to make such provision on the subject as will be in accordance with Australian sentiment. If he proposes to amend the clause in the direction I in- dicate, providing that the present practice shall continue until otherwise altered, I shall be h;ippy to support him. Cajjtain RUSSELL : It is extremely difficult to follow with any chance of suc- cess an address so impassioned, so eloquent, and put in such charming language, as that of my hon. colleague. Sir George Grey. I dissent absolutely and entirely from the whole tone of his speech. I feel that I shall be only doing my duty ])y ex- pressing the opinion that if his jiroposal is carried it will bring a great evil on Aus- tralia, lie gave us a great deal of declam- ation ; he. told us about the unnumbered IjrntllLs which were to come to the rising generation of Australia ; Ijut what they were he did not expl.iln. He led us to understand that we ha\e now no men ia our colonial parliaments who are men of note, of ability and independence, or worthy of public support, lie told us that we had no Abraham Lincolns amongst us. If I may use such a word, I would say that that is all nonsense. We have lots of men who have not ho c:v tensive an arena a.s Abraham Lincoln had, but who have de- voted tho whole of their time, ability, and intelligence to the .service of the country. 5G8 CommomveaUh of [1 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. They only need a wider arena to perform deeds equal to those of any statesman. We have every inducement to make us aspire to the high positions of premiers and responsible ministers. So long as tliat is the case the mere desire to be elected go- vernor of Ids own state, or of Australasia, will not deter any man from coming into public life, and serving the country to the host of his ability. But let us go a little further. If the proposition of my lion, and venerable colleague be given effect to, Ave had better at once tear up the bill we have prepared, because it will be useless for any ])urpose whatever. Although I was a mem- ber of the committee which prepared the •bill, I will not say that I agree v.ith the whole of it. But the whole basis of the bill is responsible government. And what do we propose to do if we resolve that the governor-general shall be elected by the whole people of Australasia 1 We intend either to make him an absolute dummy, an absolutely useless man under the thumb of the ministry of the day, or we intend to confer upon him such absolute power that the ministry of the day will be abso- lutely useless and effete. He must be either an autocrat or a useless image set up to represent the governor-genei'al, which, I venture to say, is not what we desire. Further than that, what are his powers and functions? That seems to be forgotten. And hei'e I will point out to the hon. member, Mr. Kingston, that we are not by any means agreed on the question of elect- ing the governors of the states. The divi- sions in the select committees on that ques- tion were very close. It yet remains to be proved that this Convention will by a majority agree with the principle of elect- ing the governors of the states. It seems to have escaped the observation of hon. members who have spoken on this point that the functions of the governorof a state, and pre-eminently the function of the go- vernor-general of Australasia, is that he \Captain Itussell. represents not alone the state or people of Australasia, but that he is the type of and represents imperial interests — the connec- tion which binds the whole British empire together. Are Ave to destroy that 1 I be- lieve that my colleague, Sir George Grey, desires that there shall be separation from the Imperial Government. The hon. gentle- man says that it is not his desire. I can only say that the impression upon my mind is that such is the case. The hon. gentle- man says that it is not so, and I accept his statement from the bottom of my heart. But the ineAitable result of the election of the governor-general must be to declare that the people of England shall have no power whatsoever in connection Avith Aus- tralasia ; that they shall have no poAver of dealing Avith any imperial matter, I believe that Avould be an injury to Australasia, and if it Avere on that ground only, I avouIcI object to the governor-general being elected by the people. Sir GEOEGE GEEY : I feel it neces- sary to reply to some of the things that have been said. From the bottom of my heart I believe that those men Avho do not Avant to have an elected governor are them- selves likely to bring about a disruption between this country and Great Britain. I believe that the hon. member. Captain Russell, is the man likely to do that, and not myself. There are two classes of men in the country. There are the men Avho for a long time under the system of plural voting have exercised a A-ast influence — men Avho will by their wealth exercise a vast influence as long as there is not an elected governor here. Honors might, perhaps, be obtained from home. I said " honors," but I should have said " decorations," be- cause the meaning of honors is something given for great services performed. So long as there are gOA'ernors-general sent here from England, so long, I belieA^e, there must inevitably boAvhat is called an aristo- cratic British party resident inxVustralasia, Commoniixahli of [1 April, 1891.] Aihdralia Bill. oG9 wlio-aever will cease attempting to carry out their objects. Such is almost a neces- sity of the case, and I firmly believe that those who say that the people here are worthy to choose their own governors, and ought to have the power, are those who are fisfhting for the cause of Great Britain and for the union of the colonies with Great Britain for a long period of time. How can it be said that there will be no tie to bind the colonies to England unless wc have a governor-general appointed from home ? Is there not a sufficient tie in the fact that we have to send every one of our laws home for the Queen's approval? We place ourselves so absolutely under the power of the British Crown that every law has to be sent for her Majesty's ap- pi'oval. "What stronger tie can there be than that 1 An Hon. Member : We do not send all our laws home ! Sir GEOEGE GBEY: Yes we do. The hon. member does not know what he is saying. Every one of our laws goes home for the Queen's approval. Tlie hon. gentleman who denies that knows nothing of the Constitution. Although our laws are assented to here, they go home to the Queen. Assent being given to them liere oidy brings them into immediate opera- tion, lion, members are entirely ignorant of wliat they are talking about. Full power is given to the Queen to allow or di.sallow our laws. Tiiere can be no stronger tie than that binding us to Great Britain. Just fancy 1,000,000 people going to the Queen as soon as tlif-y have an opportunity to make thoir own constitution, and saying, "Wo will still send every law we make to that Sovereign whom wo — I was going to say almost adore — in order that she may assent to or dissent from tlie measure." What stronger tie than that can bind us to Great Britain] What stronger proof can Ave give of our devotion to the British interests? AVliat will a few balls at Government House, or the presence of a governor here, do to alter that 1 The very gentlemen who argue in that way say to me: First you make a governor-general something that he ought not to be ; he is advising his ministry instead of his min- istry advising him. Then immediately afterwards they say, You must \itx\Q a governor-general appointed by the British ministry in order that he may let them know what the British interests are, and look after them. The two things are ab- solutely contradictory. Tf hon. members will fairly consider the subject they will see that I ask nothing but what is just, nothing but a right which the people have, nothing which derogates from the powers of the Crown, nothing which docs any evil to the country, but something which would confer blessings in every direction. We are told that there are many Abraham Lincolns here. Now, I accept that. Sup- pose the country is in such a blessed state that it has a number of men of that kind, how many more would it have if new ob- jects of just and legitimate ambition were opened to them to rouse their faculties in a way in which they have never been roused until the present day, to make llioni feel their dignity as men, and not to go home, as I shall to-night if this is carried, feeling that no fair opportunity is given to me, not of becoming governor general, but of exercis- ing my ordinary faculties when j'ou tell me that I have no chance of having great offices open to me, that T am standing on a lower level than my fellow-countrymen in Great Britain, for they have the chance there of obtaining by iniluence good appointments wliich the whole of the 1,000,000 of Aus- tralasia can never know anject, an enormous majority would be found to agree with me, and I only hope yet that if this mode of appointing tlie governor-general is deter- mined upon, petitions will come to parlia- ment from this country, and I believe that tho.se petitions will be so largely signed that parliament will feel that the great strength of Australian opinion is in favour of the election of the governor-gonoral by the people, and that parliament will yield to what it finds to be the belief of the people, and that that will ultimately be- come law if a constitution is to be given to us; for however hon. gentlemen may persuade themselves that they have the opinions of the people with them, I am satisfied from my knowledge of the per- sons in various parts of the country with Avhom I have been in correspondence that a totally diSerent opinion really does subsist, and that a much larger majority of the people than they believe hold the views that I have expressed to-day, and "wdiich I have done my very utmost to get approval given to by this Convention. I am sorry naturally that I have failed in my object ; but I cheerfully submit to what is the will of the majority. I will endeavour to render everything they do successful for Australia in every form, though adverse to my own views. But feeling all that, at the same time I feel that I have wisely, and, I believe, justly, advised the Convention this afternoon. Question put — That the words, " The Queen may from time to time," proposed to be omitted, stand part of the clause. The Committee divided : Ayes, 35 ; noes, 3 ; majority, 32. Ayes. Atkinson, Sir Harry Cordon, .Mr. Ikiker, !Mr. (jriflitli, Sir Sainuol I'arton, Mr. Hacketf;, Mr. Bird, Mr. Jennings, Sir Patrick Brown, Mr. Loton, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Macdonald-PatcrsonMr. Clark, Mr, Mannion, Mr. Cuthbert, Mr. Moore, Mr. Deakin, Mr. Mnnro, Mr. Dibbs, Mr. Parkes, Sir Henry Donaldson, Mr. Playford, Mr. IJonglas, Mr. Adyc Bus.sell, Captain Downer, Sir .lolin Kutlcdgc, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Smith, Colonel Forrest, Mr. A. Suttor, Mr. Forrest, Mr. J. \\'riglil, Mr. Fysh, Mr. \\rixon, .Mr. Cillies, Mr. NOKS. Cockburn, Dr. Kingston, Mr. Crey, Sir George Question so resolved in the aflirmative. 574 Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Amendment (by Sir Samuel Griffith) agreed to: That the words "her Majesty's," line 5, be omitted witli tlie view of inserting the words *' the Queen's." Mr. BAKER : I move as an amend- ment: That after the word "functions," line 7, the following words be inserted: — "as are con- tained in schedule B hereto, and such other powers and functions not inconsistent there- with." It will be seen that we are deliberately raakina: the instructions ci^'<^n to lier Majesty's representative part of our Con- stitution. Mr. Clark : Ko ; subject to the Consti- tution! Mr. BAKER : I admit that no instruc- tions can be given which are inconsistent with the constitution, but instructions can be given which are additional to the con- stitution, and which cover grounds not mentioned in the constitution. Sir Samuel Griffith : Hoav 1 Mr. BAKER : Why, under the provi- sions of an act a despatch was sent from the Government of Queensland, I think it v.'as, to England, in which it was stated that the royal instructions to the governor are part of the constitutional law of the colony. I believe that is undoubted, and we are affirming that in this particular clause. Why should we go to Downing- street for any part of our constitution whicli we can put into this act ? Mr. Deakin : What do you propose to put in, then? Mr. BAKER : Well, I am not prepared to put in the whole of the powers and functions v.*hich are to be expressly set forth as having to be performed by the Go- Ternor ; but I want to affirm the proposi- tion that they shall be, as far as possible, contained in our constitution. Here is one matter to which I wall allude. In 1878, after the Dominion of Canada had been formed, they objected to the instructions given to the Govternor-Gen- eral of Canada. They said that they did not consider that he was sufficiently amenable to his advisers, that a good many of the matters upon which he had instructions from the home government were matters upon which he ought to have followed the advice of his constitutional advisers, and Mr. Blake, v/ho was the Minister of Justice, wrote several able despatches on tiie matter, and proceeded to England, I believe, twice. He certainly proceeded to England once, and after a great deal of trouble, and a great deal of friction the home Government gave way, and they erased from the former instruc- tions an immense number of instructions which had formerly been contained in them. Among other things I will men- tion one matter which, 1 think, certainly ought to be inserted in the schedule of this bill, and that is as to the manner in whicli the governor-general is to ex- ercise the prerogative of pardon. We know very well that, according to the in- structions now extant, which have never been altered, our colonial governors have the right of exercising their own discretion; and we also know that whenever Dov/n- ing-street has been appealed to to uphold a governor in carrying out the powers which they say he ought to possess, they have shuffled in the matter. In Canada it has been provided that the power of the prerogative of pai-don is to be exercised by the 'governor-general : 1st. As to capital cases, with the advice of the Privy Council. 2nd. As to other cases, v.ith the advice of at least one of liis ministers. 3rd. As to cases in whicli pardon or reprieve might directly affect the interests of the empire, or any countrj' or place beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of the Dominion, the Go- vernor-General is, before deciding, to " take those interests specially into his own personal consideration, in conjunction with such advice as aforesaid." Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 575 That is clearly laid down, I think. The last portion — the third subdivision — is quite proper, because he acts in matters relating to the interests of the empire as an officer of the Imperial Government ; l)ut in all other cases it is expressly laid down that he is to act on the advice of liis responsible ministers. That is only one point. I should like to see in the schedule to this bill all the powers and functions of the governor-general which it is possible to define and to reduce to writing, so defined. I do not wish that we should have to go to Downing-street from time to time to find out what the powers of our constitution are. Mr. DEAKIX : The first question that arises might be as to whether this is the best means of accomplishing the end which the hon. member has in his mind. If the hon. member proposes to define the powers of the governor-general so far as they can be defined, I am cordially with him. The matter, indeed, received some attention at the hands of the committee, though the question as to the method of definition to be adopted was felfc to be surrounded with difficulty. Tlie solution which I wish to suggest to the lion, member who has now moved his amendment is that it would be better to embody in the bill itself any- thing that we have to .say on this suliject ; and for my own part, I cannot conceive that it will be necessary to do anything more — if I may repeat what I was urging Ji few minutes ago in connection with another subject — than to insert in this bill, and to state on the very face of the con- filitution, that the governor shall irnari- ably act on the advice of his responsible ministers, that every act of his sli;ill be countersigned by a responsible minister who shall make himself responsible by his signature for tliat particular act. That will n])ply even to circumstances under which a govprnor general changes his ministers. Sir 8.\.mi;i:l Griffith : lie has got to turn out the first lot on nobody's advice ! Mr. DEAKIN": Exactly; but, as the hon. member is perfectly well aware, hav- ing gone through the process so often him- self, the incoming ministry invarialdy take that responsibility upon their shoulders. Sir Samuel Griffith : That is not act- ing on advice, though ! Mr. Playford : It is acting on his own responsibility ! Mr. DEAKIN : Not at all. However, the question is one of phraseology. If we are agreed on the principle, we can easily embody it in language ; and I would sug- gest to the hon. member, Mr. Bakei", that it would meet all the purposes of the schedule which he proposes, and do away with what seems to be an indirect method of dealing with the matter, to say directly that the governor's powers shall be limited by the n(!cessity on his part of obtaining the signature of a responsible minister to every one of his acts. Mr. V7EIX0N : It seems to me, sir, that if we take care, when we come to the portion of the bill dealing with the executive government, to thoroughly es- tablish responsiV>le government, wc may let this clause go as it is, because what- ever functions arc vested in the governor- general will then necessarily come under the operation of responsible government, and we need do nothing further. It is just like the case of the Sovereign herself. Siie has vast prerogatives, great powers ; but however vast or great they are does not signify to the people of England so long as there is responsible government established. Tlierefore, instead of .seeking to limit the powers which the Sovereign may depute to the governorgenei-al, or to schedule the acts which he may or niivy not do, we have to takecaio to tiioroughly establish rcsponsiljle government, and, if we do that, the rest will take care of itself. For exam[)le, take tlie very point which the lion, member, Mr. Ilaker, puts al)Out pardon. I maintain that the prerogative 576 Commomoealth of [1 April, 1891.] AustralicLBill. of panlon is now, in all these communities where we have responsible government, just as much under the operation of re- sponsible government as is any other pre- rogative, and the thing works in this simple way : Supposing that the head of the executive — the governor — desires, we will say, to hang a man whom the government of the day think should not be hanged, they walk out of office, and Avill not accept the responsibility. It is all a question of whether they are or are not prepared to take the responsibility of any action of the governor. Dr. CoCKBURN : Is it not absurd to have a crisis on such a matter as that 1 Mr.WKIXOISr : It is all a matter of con- sideration in each case. I do not say that in every case the ministry will go out of office — not at all ; but I say that that is the way in which the thing works, and it works for itself. You want no detiuition or enumeration of the powers. All you have to take care is that you thorougldy establish responsible government, and I think that a few words ought to be added to the bill when we come to that portion. Di-. COCKBURN : I agree with the remarks of the lion, member, Mr. Deakin. In fact he has put in the most succinct language what 1 was trying to bring under the notice of the Convention. I think it is agreed that the exercise of all power should be responsible, and I do think tluit after the debate which we have had on the former portion of the clause it will be all the more necessaiy to clearly point out that tlie governor-general shall not exercise any powers without the distinct advice of his executive, because if any one suffered in the debate which has lately taken jDlace it is the future governor-general. . It was pointed out that his highest function would be to be a dummy, and that although he was the only link between us and tlie Crown, in being that link he was less than the least in the whole of the colonies — a [Mr. Wrixon. useless image and a bauble — and as the vote subsequently taken rather p)roved that this high conception of theoffice of the governor- general was the opinion of the vast majority in this Convention, and that his election by the people would be to create him a real person instead of an imaginary one, I think it is all the more necessary, as we have decided to have this imaginary func- tionary, that his powers should not be real, and certainly no powers of life and death should be vested in such an officer as the majority of the Convention wish to see the governor-general reduced to. I think that in every way the voice of the people should prevail, and I certainly think that we should have had nothing to fear, even if the hon. member, Sir George Grey, had been successful in carrying the amendment which he moved a little while ago, and in regard to which I had the honor of voting with him. I am much obliged to the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, for having suggested a manner in which the wishes that I had expressed may be carried out. Mr. PLAYFORD : There is one point on vv'hich I think you cannot say that the governor-general shall act with the advice of his ministers for the time-being, and that is where his ministers ask for a disso- lution of the house. Mr. Deakin : But then he gets some- body else to advise him not to dissolve the house ! Mr. PLAYFORD : The hon. member now says that he would act with the approval of some other persons. Mr. Deakin: Yes, responsible ministers I Mr. PLAYFORD : But he commits the act of refusing a dissolution to the ministry of the day before other ministers are there at alb Mr. Deakin : He finds some one to take the responsibility ! Mr. PLAYFORD : He must act on his own responsibility. I CommomoealtJi of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 577 Mr. Deakin : ISTo, never. " The Crown can do no wrong ! " Mr. PLAYFOED : He must act on his own responsibility. Dr. CoCKBURX : To whom is he respon- sible ? Mr. PLAYFOED: He is, I imagine, responsible to her Majesty the Queen. I can entirely understand the position, and I say that under ordinary circumstances, and in the great majority of instances, he must undoubtedly act with the advice of his ministers ; but there is that one case in which he cannot act with the advice of his ministers. Mr. Deakin : That is only a matter of expression — either with the advice of his responsible ministers for the time-being or with that of some others who accept the responsibility. Mr. PLAYFOED : If the hon. mem- ber likes to put it in that way it does away with my objection; but in the granting or refusing to grant a dissolution the governor- general must act on his own responsibility, and not on anybody's advice. Mr. MuNRO : The Queen does not do that ; Mr. PLAYFOED : The Queen has tlie power to do it whether she has or has not done it. I know tJie Governor of South Australia exercised tlie power only a short time ago against the lion, member who lias asked that the power shall not be allowed to be exercised. Mr. Deakin : He evidently found some ono ready to support him ! Mr. PLAYFOED: Undoubtedly he did. All T have to say in the matter is that we liad better leave it as it is. There is no ', necessity to define the governor's powers, \which appear to me to be small enough at the present moment. Mr, Deakin- : We want to niake them < lear, not small I :Mr. PLAYF(JiiD: Wehave notfolt any inconvenience with regard to the powers 2 given by the Queen in letters patent to the governors, and I think that we shall not find any ditBculty in the commonwealth. Dr. COCKBUEIsr : I am arguing simply what I have always argued ever since I have been in politics — that is to say, that the exercise of power should be vested in those directly responsible to the people ; and I say that the punishment of ministers who dare to bring about a dissolution of parliament, unless the voice of the people is with them, is sudden and fatal, and that any men who brought about a dissolution of parliament unless they had the voice of the country behind them would be politi- cally ruined, if not for ever, at least for a considerable time ; and I think it better to sheet home the responsibility as far as possible to the ministers themselves. It is all very well to say that they are respon- sible. The governor, of course, is respon- sible to the Queen for the exercise of his authority. I think that the exercise of such a large power as that of dissolving the house of representatives should be vested in those directly responsible to the peo- ple, and not in some one responsible to a distant authority. In advancing the views I have put forward, I have not been guided by any recent events in politics, but have simply expressed the views I have held ever since I first had the honor of oitering parliament. Sir SAMUEL GEIFFITH : I would point out, sir, that the discussion is rather departing from the amendment before the Committee, which is to define the powers of the governor-general. I should like to ask the hon. gentleman, Mr. Baker, if ho has attempted to make out a list of the ex- ecutive functions of the governor-general ? I think he would find it a difilcult task, and would have to introduce general words which would mean no more than the words now in the clauso. Mr. BAKEPv, : I am willing to admit that it would be impossible, and most 578 Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Aibstralia Bill. impolitic to try, to define all the powers of the goveruor-genei'al ; but I would point out to the lion, and learned member, Sir Samuel Griffith, that, as draftsman of the bill, he has partially done what I am ad- vocatincf. In clause 57 he has defined the powers of the governor-general in refer- ence to assenting to bills, and why should we not do the same in regard to any other matter which is capable of being defined 1 Take, for instance, the exercise of the prerogative of pardon. Is there any sound reason why the duty and the power of the governor-general should be defined in reference to giving the royal assent to bills, and not in reference to the exer- cise of the prerogative of pardon 1 I can see none. I would ask leave to withdraw my amendment, because I think there is a good deal of force in what the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Deakin, said, that perhaps this is not the best way to attain my object. I shall, if I am allowed to withdraw the amendment, consider whether I can draw one or two clauses, which will come in after clauses 57 and 58, and be a sequence, as it were, to the example therein set, of definingthe powers of thegovernor-general. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendment (by Sir Samuel Griffith) agreed to : That the words "her Majesty may deem necessary or expedient " be omitted with a view to insert in lieu thereof the words " the Queen may think fit." Clause, as amended, agreed to. Clause 3. The annual salary of the governor- general shall be fixed by the Parliament from time to time, but shall not be less than ten thousand pounds, and the same shall be payable to the Queen out of the consolidated revenue fund of the commonwealth. The salary of a governor-general shall not be diminished during his continuance in office. Mr. BARTON : I propose to omit the words " the same " as being quite unneces- sary. The alteration will, I think, im- prove the bill, [il/r. Baker. Sir HARRY ATKINSON : I should like to see all the words after " from time to time " omitted, for I do not see why we should fix the amount at £10,000. I therefore move : That the words ' ' but shall not be less than _ ten thousand pounds " be omitted. Mr. GILLIES : I should like to know from the hon. member the object of omit- ting the words. Is it that there shall be no salarv at all 1 Sir Harry Atkinson : No ; it is that the federal parliament shall be left per- fectly free to deal with the question of salary itself. An Hon. Member: I suppose the hon. member would do the same with the ministers 1 Sir Harry Atkinson : I should do exactly the same with the ministers ! Mr. MUNRO: I feel that the hon, member. Sir Harry Atkinson, cannot have considered what he proposes to do. The governor-general must be appointed before the parliament is called into existence, and does the hon. member think that any one will take the ofiice without some assurance that he will get a salary of some sort ? Surely the governor-general ought to know somethins: about the oflSce he is to fill and the emolument attached to the position ! If the amendment be made the result will be that the appointment will be made without any assurance as to the emolument which the holder is to receive. The hon. member says he will make a similar proposal with regard to the ministers of the Crown. I venture to say that the two proposals are really unwise, and that we ouglit now to attach some decent salary to the ofiice giving pov/er to the parliament to vary it, but not to reduce it during the term of office of the gentleman appointed afterwards. My con- viction is that a salary of £10,000 is alto- gether inadequate for the office. My feeling is that the gentleman to be appointed ought Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 579 to be equal to the gentleman appointed as governor-general of India. He ought to be a gentleman capable of being a cabinet minister in England, and for that purpose the salary ought to be very much larger than what is proposed. I do not think it is to the advantage of the colonies to hawk this position about in such a way that no man of good standing or portion will take it. When the Constitution of Vic- toria was agreed to many years ago, I think the population of the colony was about only 250,000, and yet they fixed the governor's salary at £10,000,' with an allowance of £5,000, making it £15,000 in all. Since then it has been reduced to £10,000 a year, but a house is provided furnished, so that practically the emolu- ment comes to £15,000 a year now. Now, this Convention, representing the whole of Australia, is going to give the governor- general a salary equal to what is given to the Governor of Victoria at the present time. ]\Ir. Clark : You will reduce yours ! Mr. ]\IUNPtO : No, we do not intend to reduce ours. Wc think the Governor of Victoria is entitled to the salary, and perhaps more, if we could afford it. At nny rate, I think that instead of striking out these words, and making the amount indefinite — in fact, making no provi.sion at all — the words ought to be struck out with the view of increasing the amount very considerably. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: Another reason why the words should not be struck out is not only the importance of the first governor-general knowing how much he is to get — a very important consideration in choosing him — but that the federal parlia- ment might simply by reducing the salary cut the connection with Great Britain al- together. Supposing that it were to reduce the salary to £ 100 or £1,000 a year ! That is the reason why in all the constitution acts there has been the reservation of a fixed sum, which is made payable to her Majesty, so that she has always money to pay her governor-general, and therefore can always secure the appointment in the country of her representative with an ade- quate salary. I agree with the hon. mem- ber, Ml'. Munro, that the salary is too small, having regard to the salary given to the Govei'nor of Victoria. Sir JOHN BRAY : I think it is desir- able to fix the salary of the first governor- general. The clause says that the salary shall not be less than £10,000. It is very possible, I think, that that expression may lead to very serious misunderstanding. It is an intimation to the governor-general that he shall get £10,000 a year, and pro- bably a good deal more than that. He ought to know when appointed what his salary is to be, and I think, therefore, that the salary of the first governor-genei'al should be fixed in the bill. The words " but shall not be less than " should there- fore be omitted. Sir Samuel Griffith : That would en- able the federal parliament to reduce the salary to £1,000 ! Sir JOHN BRAY : No, because the clause provides that the salary shall not be diminished during the governor's continu- ance in office. But I am astonished to hear it suggested that the federal parlia- ment would be so supremely ridiculous as to iix a nominal salary for a governor- general. It is to my mind utterly out of the question to imagine that such vvould bo the case. If we leave the clause as it stands wo say to the federal parliament, " We cannot trust you to fix the salary ; we will fix it at not less than £10,000, whatever the circumstances of the federal government may be." Surely if we giyo the federal government the powers which it is proposed to give thenj we can trust them to see that proper provision is made for the salary of the governor-general. I think we should fix the salary of the first 580 Commomvealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. governor-general at £10,000, leaving it to the feiloriil government to tix the salary subsequently. Sir SA1\IUEL GEIFFITH : The hon. member, Sir John Bray, surely could not have 'heard my argument. Does he sug- gest that the framers of the constitutions of the various colonies did not understand their business % This reservation in re- gard to the salary of governors is made in the whole of the acts. Sir John Bray : But there is power to alter the act ! Mr. Gillies: Onlybya certain majority ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The salary cannot be diminished unless by an amend- ment of the act, and that is the object of tlie reservation. The idea is to secure the means of providing a representative of the Queen in the colony with an adequate .salary. I will put this illustration. If you give to the federal parliament absolute power to reduce the salary, some persons may be constantly endeavouring to eai'n a little cheap popularity by proposing reduc- tions. You will have continual agitations for the reduction of the salary to £8,000, or <£G,000 or less. It would, perhaps, be regarded as a very popular move on the part of some persons. Dr. CocKBUEN : Is that not rather a serious reflection upon public opinion 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I have heard of persons who, in order to gain a little cheap popularity have been capable of that sort of thing. I think the proposed amendment would be a great mistake. The salary of course couid be altered as part of the constitution ; but then it would be only by the deliberate action of a majority of both houses, and with the approval of the states. Sir John Bray : Why not leave the salaiy to the federal parliament 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : It might then be determined by an accidental ma- jority perhaps at the end of the session. \_Sir John Bray. I understood the hon. member to suggest that the salary should not be cither in- creased or diminished during the governor's tenure of office, and to argue that if the words "but shall not be less than" were retained, the governor would perhaps ex- pect more th^in £10,000. I hope, for the reasons I have given, that the Committee will not omit the words. Mr. DEAKIN : There is another con- tingency possible, if the hon. member. Sir John Bray, feels that there is force — and there is force — in the remarks of Sir Samuel Griffith as to the necessity for pro- tecting the salary of the governor-general against hasty reduction, allowing it to be reduced only by the machinery provided for an amendment of the constitution. The hon. member can yet press — and very properly — an amendment omitting the words "not less than," because while this renders it impossible to diminish the salary without altering the constitution, it leaves it perfectly possible to increase it by means of an ordinary bill. Sir Samuel Griffith : That is as the clause stands now ! Mr. DEAKIIT : If it Avere desired to provide £12,000 or £15,000, the extra amount could be appropriated by an ordin- ary act of parliament, because it would not alter the constitution. I think, therefore, that the hon. member. Sir John Bray, is justified in pressing his amendment to the point of rendering it necessary to alter the constitution, if it be wished to raise or diminish the salary of the governor- general. Sir Samuel Griffith : "Why for the purpose of raising it t Sir GEORGE GREY : I entirely differ from the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, in thinking that the power of reduction would be exercised for the sake of popu- larity. It is to suppose that a majority of thefederal parliament would make an altera- tion from an unworthy motive. It might Commonicealth of [1 Apkil, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 581 be thought that the salary was much too large, and that it was injurious to the in- terests of the colony to pay such a large salary. The salary of the governor-general should be reduced whenever Parliament so desires, and should be increased at any time parliament may see fit to increase ifc, I think parliament ought to have the fullest power in fixing the salary. Sir JOHN BRAY : I understand that if the amendment of the hon. member, Sir Harry Atkinson, is put, and it is deter- mined that the words shall stand, the amendment I desire to move cannot be put. The Chairmax : That is the case. Sir HARRY ATKIXSOX : With the permission of the Committee, I should like to withdraw my amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Sir JOHN BRAY : I move : That the words "but shall not be less than," line 3, be omitted with a view to insert in lieu thereof the words ' ' and until so fixed shall be. " Sir Samuel Griffith : That is exactly the same amendment ; it strikes out the minimum ! Sir JOHN BRAY : It is not the same. !My proposal isthat the salary of the go- \ ernor-gencral shall be £10,000 until it is fixed by the federal parliament. Surely we ought to intrust the federal parlia- ment with the power of making proper provision for the salary of the governor- gf-neral, and ought not to make it neces- sary to alter the constitution act in order to alter tlic salary paid to that ofiicial. If we have any faith wliatevcr in the federal parliament, we ought not to hesitate to em- power them to either reduce or increa.se the salaryas mayappoar tothcm to be necessary, Mr, (JTLLIES: I should liavc been pleased if the lion, member, Sir John Bray, liad replied to the statements made on the other side by the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, in reference to what has been the universal practice. Tlie lion, member mu.st surely know that the salaries of judges and other high officials are fixed by act so that they may be generally known; but this does not j)revent parlia- ment from altering them. If the pro- posed words are inserted the federal par- liament may consider it its duty, as soon as it met, to consider the whole question of salary. If we are to have a suitable per- son to occupy the position of governor- general both he and we ought to know what salary he is to receive. Sir Harry Atkixsox : It vrill be fixed permanently for his term of office ! Mr, GILLIES : I beg pardon ; we have not yet gone far enougli in the clause to decide that question. The proper thing for us to do is to adhere to the practice in all constitutional colonies by which the salary of the governor is fixed. It can be altered by parliament, as has been done in Victoria, in the proper way, px'ovided by the constitution. As my hon. colleague, ]NIr. Munro, has said, it was fixed at £10,000 a year, and £5,000 a year for allowances. But the salary could not be altered except in the way provided by the constitution. That is the case not only with the salary of the governor, but with the salaries of other high officials, such as the judges. That is a rational pro- ceeding. This course is not proposed be- cause there is any fear or doubt as to the honor or uprightness of tlie federal parliament. It is only proposed because it is desirable in the public interest that every person wlio is called upon to occupy a very high position iii tho state should know what his salary and emoluments are. If it is found desirable afterwards in the public interest to reduce or increase that salary it can be done by the legislature; but it must be done in the way provided by the constitution. If we pass the clause including the words which prevent tho salary from being altered so long as the gentleman wlio first fills it occupies tho position, but leaving it open to the parlia- 58: Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill, ment to resolve that the salary shall be reduced immediately he ceases to hold that position, I venture to think that vf hat the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, has indicated miglit happen. There might be a gentleman extremely anxious to be popu- lar, or who might honestly believe that the salary could be reduced without disadvan- tage, and he might take steps to reduce the salary forthwith. Why should we not leave this question to be dealt with by the federal parliament, but make it necessary to carry out the alteration in the same way as other important alterations in the con- stitution have to be made 1 Why should we leave it to a chance vote of the legisla- ture to decide this question ? I believe that it would be a mistake to do so— not because I have any fear of the federal par- liament, but because I think we should adhere to the practice hitherto followed in constitutional colonies. If it is desired to alter this provision, let it be altered in the same way as other fundamental provisions of the constitution are altered. Mr. KINGSTON : I understand that the contention of the hon. member, Mr, Gillies, is this : that if in future there is a desire to alter the salary of the governor- general it should be passed in the mode prescribed in the last part of the bill — that is, a convention should be called to consider the question, and there should be no power whatever to give effect to the desire of the federal parliament, unless by a reference to conventions of the vai-ious states its action was approved. I utterly fail to see the necessity for the course sug- gested. I am in sympathy with the amend- ment proposed by the hon. member. Sir John Bray, to give power to the federal parliament to deal with this matter as from time to time they may think fit. In the first instance, the amount has to be fixed some how or other, and I have no objection to the amount now proposed, and it is also rendered impossible to alter [J/?-. Gillies. the salary which is payable to a governor- general during his tenure of office. Some- thing has been said with regard to the practice that obtains in other colonies with refe^enee to the alteration of salaries of this description. So far as Canada is concerned, It appears to me that section 105 ^of the British North America Act gives to the Canadian Parliament the power to do what is proposed by the hon, member, Sir John Bray, The provision is : Unless altered by the Parliament of Canada, the salary of the Governor-General shall be £10,000 sterling. Dr. CocKBURN : And they did alter it — they reduced it ! Mr, KINGSTON: With regard to Canada, hon, members who have referred to the practice of other colonies will find from the passage I have quoted that they are not consistent in their contention. Similarly, with reference to our own little colony, no doubt we have a provision that certain clauses in our Constitution Act cannot be altered unless the bills for the alteration are assented to by specified ma- jorities. So far as South Australia is con- cerned, this restriction of the powers of the legislature only applies to alterations in the constitution of the two houses, and we have the fullest power by any act of Par- liament—subject, of course, to the royal veto — to deal with this question of the salai'y payable to the governor in such manner as we think fit. It appears to me that the precedents referred to support the ^ contention of the hon. member. Sir John Bray, Why, then, should we proceed to |j tie the hands of the federal parliament and prevent them from dealing with this question as they may think Ml I am not going to take exception to the amount of salary pi'oposcd. I have listened with a great deal of interest to the arguments which have been advanced on the subject of the position of the governor-general, and a late division in this Committee Commonwealth of [1 App.il, 1891.] Australia Bill. 583 proves that a very large majority of the Convention are impressed with the idea so eloquently urged by various delegates, that the position of governor-general is utterly unfit for, and unworthy of acceptance by, every citizen of the Australian common- wealth. Under these circumstances, there is reasonable ground for doubting whether or not we are not erring on the side of ex- cessive liberality in fixing the amount to be paid to the first occupant of the office at .£10,000 per annum. There is no fair ground either in precedent, or point of principle, for insisting on the necessity of tying the hands of the federal pai'- liament in fixing the salary to be paid to the governor-general. There are much more important questions with respect to which they have a free hand. It is incon- sistent to give them the fullest power to deal with those important questions while we refuse to do so with regard to this question of the salary of the governor- general. Subject to the qualifications that the amount in the first instance shall be specified, and that it shall not be altered during the continuance in office of any go- vernor-general, I shall do my utmost to give the fullest power to the federal parliament to deal from time to time with the salary. Sir SAMUP:L GRIFFITH : I would call the attention of the hon. member, I\Ir. Kingston, to this con.sideration — does he or does he not intend to make the Queen a permanent part of this parliament? Doe.s he intend tiiat tlio commonwealth of Aus- tralia is to be presided over by the Queen? If he does, I ask, docs he intend to provide that distinctly by the constitution, and does lie wi.sh it to be a real connection, or that it may, Ijy a passing wliim of the parliament, be made merely a nominal one? This guarantee of XI 0,000 a year is the only tiling reserved to the Queen under this constitution. We say that the Queen is part of the parliament, that she is the head of the commonwealth. "We wish her to exercise this function in the common- wealth ; but we leave it entirely to the parliament to say whether we shall give her any allowance for doing so. I main- tain that that is wrong in principle. If the Queen is to be part of the parliament, and to exercise authority in the common- wealth, we must have a deputy, and we are bound to say that we intend to make pro- vision for the payment of his salary. That must be part of the constitution, otherwise there need be no salary, and the governor- general may be a mere shadow. Mr. KINGSTON : I decline to recognise the connection between Australia and the mother country as resting on such a slender thread as the payment or non-payment of a sum of £10,000 as the salary of a go- vernor-general ; and I say, wdth all respect to the hon. and learned member, that it is unfair to put the position in a contrary light. The maintenance of the connection with the mother country was not in the slightest degree endangered by the provi- sion which we find in the Constitution of Canada. Sir Samuel Griffith : Yes ! Mr. KINGSTON : I have quoted the clause. Sir Samuel Griffitu : 1 believe they tried to reduce the salar}', and the act was disallowed ! Mr. KINGSTON : The connection was not in the slightest degree endangered by the insertion in the Canadian Constitution of the provision which we seek to have embodied in this bill. Sir John Bray's amendment seeks to give ell'ect to the same principle, and ther power reserved to her Miijersty to assent or withhold her assent to Canadian acts, will apply equally to acts pass( d by the federal parliament of Aus- tralia. Sir Samuel Griffith : lias the hon. member considered what a serious thing that is — disallowance ? 584 Commomvealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Mr. KINGSTON: No doubt it is a serious thing, and it would be a serious thing if the federal parliament were likely to disregard the obligation to provide a suit- able sum for the gentleman selected for the otlice of governor-general. But I say we^ have no right to consider it probable that they would disregard that obligation. We have had no experience which will warrant such a supposition. We have no experi- ence to warrant the suggestion that they will lightly disregard the obligations im- posed on them. We have had power in our colony to make any regulations on the subject which we might think fit, and I am sure that the discretion observed in that colony, as in other places where similar laws prevail, will be sufficient to rebut the suggestion that the power is likely to be abused by a legislature which should be trusted with it. Question — That the words pi'oposed to be omitted stand part of the clause — put. The Committee divided : Ayes, 24 ; noes, 12 ; majority, 12. Ayes. Baker, Mr. Griffith, Sir Samuel Barton, Mr. Hackett, Mr. Brown, Mr. Jennings, Sir Patrick Burgess, ^Ir. JMacdonakl-Patersou Mr Chirk, Mr. McMiHan, Mr. Cuthbert, Mr. Munro, Mr. Diljbs, Mr. Parkes, Sir Henry Donaklson, Mr. Russell, Captain Douglas, Mr. Adye Rutledge, Mr. Downer, Sir John Smith, Colonel Forrest, Mr. A. Suttor, Mr. Gillies, Mr. "\^'rixon, Mr. Noes. Atkinson, Sir Harry Gordon, Mr. Bird, Mr. Grey, Sir George Bray, Sir John Kingston, Mr. Cockburn, Dr. Loton, Mr. Deakin, ^Ir. Moore, Mr. Fysh, :Mr. Playford, Mr. Question so resolved in the affirmative. Amendment (by Sir George Grey) nega- tived : That in line .3 the word " six " be substituted for the -word "ten." [J//-. Kingston. A,mendment (by Mr. Barton) agreed to : TlUt in line 4 the words "the same" be omitted. Amendment (by Mr. Deakin) proposed : That in line 7 the word "altered" be sub- stituted for the word " diminished." Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I am under the impression that the first federal IDarliament will think £10,000 too small a salary for the governor-general, especi- ally if Victoria continues to pay its gover- nor £10,000. But I do not see that we should interfere in this matter, since it is strictly the business of the federal pai'- liaraent. It is the business of the Queen, and of the whole of the colonies before tliey come into the federation to see that the Queen shall be paid a sufficient sum to enable her to be represented in the commonwealth ; but I do not see that we should prevent the federal parliament from increasing the amount if they think proper. Mr. DEAKIN : We say, '•' During his term of office." There will be nothing to prevent the federal parliament from rais- ing the salary of the next governor, though, if it is improper to reduc.e the salary of the governor during his tenure of office it is equally improper to increase it. Sir JOHN BRAY : W^e have left a very important question still unsettled, and that is, what is to be the salary of the first governor-general The clause says that it is not to be less than £10,000, though it implies that it may be more. I do not know why we should not intrust the federal parliament with the power of in- creasing the salary, if it thinks proper. Why should we say that it must not be raised or diminished 1 Mr. Gillies : It will be contradictory 1 Mr. Deakin : The clause is imperfect, not contradictory ! Sir JOHN BRAY : We say it may be more ; but, at the same time, we say it shall not be altered. I sugforested that we Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 585 sboukl fix the salary of the first governor- general at £10,000 until the federal par- liament alter it. Mr. Deakix : That is the proper thing to do! Sir JOHX BRAY : But I am billing now to leave it to the federal parliament, and I object to the amendment proposed by the hon. member, Mr. Deakin. Mr. Deakin : "We have got the word " diminislied " ah'eady ! Sir JOHN BRAY : That is to prevent any injustice to the governor-general ; but surely wo can intrust the federal parlia- ment with the power of increasing the salary. Let us leave a little to their dis- cretion, and give them a little power, in- stead of tying up their hands in the way proposed. ]\Ir. Gillies : I should like to ask for a ruling upon the subject. We have de- cided to retain the words "not less than," and I should like to ask you, Mr. Chair- man, if an amendment can be moved which would be contradictory to these words % Mr. Deakix : It is not contradictory in any sense. The one is a negative limita- tion, and the other simply refers to the salary when fixed. I confess that the clause is quite imperfect ; but it is cei'- tainly not contradictory to say that though the salary cannot bo reduced it shall not bo altered during tlie governor's term of office. The CiiAiUMAX : The amendment is quite in order. Amendment negatived. :\rr. IIACKETT: I observe that the last lino and a half is a virtual adoption of part of a clause in the American Con- stitution ; but tlie President there is prac- tically never aljsent from tho scat of go- vernment. This clause, however, would allow tlie governor-general to draw liis full salaiy dunng a year's leave of ab- sence ; and I would point out that that leave of absence rests with the authorities in Downing-.street. The clausf, therefore, would allow the Colonial Ofiice to arrange that the governor-general should draw his full salary during a year's absence, when an administrator would have to be ap- pointed in his place, who would have to be paid a large salary for doing the work. Who would pay him 1 An Hex. Member : The governor- sjeneral ! Clause, as amended, agreed to. Clause 6 (Governor-general to fix tunes and places for holding sessions of jmrliament — Power of dissolution of house of representatives — First session of Parliament). Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I wish to call the attention of the Committee to a point raised by some hon. members as to whether six months is long enough to enable provision to be made by the dif- ferent local parliaments for the representa- tion of their respective colonies in the federal parliament. Clause agreed to. Clause 8. The privileges, immunities, and powers, to be held, enjoyed, and exercised/ by the senate and by the house of representatives respectively, and by the members thereof, shall be such as are from time to time declared by tho parliament, and until such definition .=;hall be those held, enjoj'ed, and exercised by the Com- mons House of Parliament of the United King- dom and the members thereof at the date of the establishment of the commonwealth. Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS: I suggest tliat in the first line of this clause the word "powers" should be omitted. Nobody in- tends, I presume, that the powers of the House of Commons shall be vested in tho senate or house of representatives. Mr. Deakix : Not in the senate ! INIr. ADYE DOUGLAS : Nor in tho house of representatives. Nobody knows what tho powers of the House of Com- mons arc; but we know what itr, privileges are. I bei; to move as an amendment : Tliat the word "and" be inserted between the words "privileges" and "immunities" wilii the view of afterwards striking out the words "and powers." 586 Commomoealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I \voukl point out that this is a phrase which has been used in so many constitutions that it has come to have a regular recognised meaninfr. At the same time, this is not dealing with the powers of parliament, but with the powers of the houses of j^arlia- ment. One of the most important of those powers is, I presume, to keep order, and to summon persons before the house, and to give evidence before select committees, and that is not a power which falls within the word " immunities"; nor does it, I think, fall within the word " privileges." " Au- thorities" might do if the word "powers " is thought to be too large. Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : It is well un- derstood that the powers of the House of Commons are just what they choose to de- clare them to be. There is nothing fixed nor definite; and a parliament such as ours ought not to have power to declare w^hat its powers are, and to extend those powers as the House of Commons may do. Mr, BAKER ; As the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, says, these are well known words. No doubt they are ; but we are establishing a different form of government altogether. We are establishing a foi'm of government in which the federal parlia- ment shall have certain specified powers, and the states parliaments shall have cer- tain specified powers, and I confess that this word " powers " puzzled me when I first read it. I understood the intention to be as stated by Sir Samuel Griffith, but I do not think it is at all clear. The word " powers " should either be left out altogether or the word " authorities " sub- stituted. There should be something to show that it is not intended, as w^ould ap- pear from the clause as at present worded, to give to the senate and the house of re- presentatives power to declare that they can do anything they like. Mr. Deakix : Drop out the " senate," then it will be all right ! Mr. BAKER : Perhaps the house of repre- sentatives might be dropped out too ; that would be the best way, and let the clause read "the members thereof." I do not think the wording of the^clause is satisfac- tory, although I agree with its intention, Mr. WRLXON : It §eems to me that it would be better if we followed in this case the formula adopted in more than one of our constitution acts, and defined the privileges, immunities, and powers by say- ing they shall not exceed those enjoyed by the Commons House of Parliament. Then you have a limit ; you know what you are doing, and you define the extent of the powers and privileges which you are con- ferring. Mr. Deakix ; "Why should we tie our own hands 1 Mr. WRIXON : I think it would be unwise to leave it perfectly open to the federal parliament to claim anything and call it a privilege. Ample privilege is now vested in the House of Commons for every legislative purpose, and I think that this would meet the view of the hon. member who raised the point. Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : No, it does not. You have now simply the rules of the House of Commons as defined up to the present time ; but the House of Com- mons could to-morrow declare its present powers extended in any way it wished, and by the clause as now worded we would give to the federal parliament all the powers of the House of Commons, and surely that is not the intention. Mr. Deakin : Yes ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : I see no ob- jection to giving the fedei'al parliament all the powers of the House of Commons as defined up to the present time ; but this clause would give to the parliament all the powers of the House of Commons at any time, Mr, Wrixon : It would give to the par- liament anything they liked to claim ! Commonwecdtli of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 587 Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : Tliere is no legislative limit to tlie powers of tlie House of Commons ; they may extend them as they please from time to time. I think it would be suffix:ient if we gave to the federal parliament only the privileges and immunities of the House of Commons. Sir JOHN DOWNER : I confess that I had grave doubts as to whether or not we ought to give to either the senate or the house of representatives unlimited autho- rity with respect to what they might be pleased to consider their privileges, im- munities, and powers, and if I knew of any intelligent way of limiting the powers of the federal parliament, I should be glad to limit the powers of both houses. But after consideration, I have come to the same conclusion as that arrived at by some members of the committee, namely, that if we limit the authority of the fede- ral parliament ultimately to the analogy of the House of Commons, we shall have the greatest difficulty in finding out what that limitation really is. I think it would be as well to let the clause stand as it is, and trust to the good sense of the com- monwealth as sufficient to guide us, with- out adopting an analogy with reference to the House of Commons which we do not understand, and cannot define. Amendment negatived. Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS: There ap- pears to be a clerical niistake in the sixth line of the clause. Instead of the words "until such definition," I think it should read "until so declared." Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: The hon. member is correct ; the word " definition " is a mistake. The word originally used in the .same line was " rkfincd," but it was altered to *' declared." Amendment (hy Sir Samuel Griffith) agreed to : That the words " such definition " be omitted with tlic view of inserting in lieu thereof the ^vord " declared." Mr. BAKER : I may state that this clause is copied almost verbatim from the British North America Act. An act was passed — 38 and 39 Victoria — repealing that section which we are now going to adopt, and which act says : And whereas doubts have arisen with regard to the power of defining by au act of the Parlia- ment of Canada, in pursuance of the said sec- tion, the said privileges, poM-ers, or immunities ; and it is expedient to remove such doubts, be it therefore enacted It then goes on to say what the clause really meant. As there were doubts about this clause, and it was necessary to pass an imperial act to remove them, surely it is not wise for us to adopt it. Mr. Deakix : Read the amendment ! Mr. BAKER : First of all they repeal that clause, and then they say : The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, and exercised by the senate, and by the House of Commons, and by the members thereof respectively, shall be such as are from time to time defined by act of the Parliament of Canada ; but so that the same shall never exceed those at the passing of this act, held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons House of Parlia- ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and by the members thereof. Mr. Deakin : That is no better ! Mr. BAKER: I do not know the reasons which actuated the Imperial Par- liament in repealing this clause which Ave are now seeking to adojjt, and in inserting the other, but there must have been some rea.sons. I believe this act was passed at the suggestion of the Canadian Parlia- ment. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I think there is no difference in the point raised from the one raised a few moments ago. The Parliament of Canada never had power to take any more privileges than were en- joyed by the British Hou.se of Commons in March, 1SG7, and thoy did not know how to go to work in 1875 subject to that condition. Clause, as amended, agreed to. 588 Commonwealth of [1 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Part II.— The Senate. Clause 9. Tlie senate shall be composed of eight members for each state, directly chosen by the houses of the parliament of the several states during a session thereof, and each senator shall have one vote. The term for which a senator is chosen shall be six years. Mr. WEIXON" : With regard to this clause, I wish to say that I will not pro- pose that it bo postponed, because that •would lead to inconvenience with regard to other clauses ; but I would observe that, when we come to determine the posi- tion and powers of the senate, if there should be a majority in the Chamber to give the senate large powers — certainly any larger than are now contained in the bill — we must go back upon the clause and reconsider it ; because it will never do to give equal representation to the smallest, as well as to the largest states, if the senate is to be a large and determined power in the constitution. In passing the clause now without challenge, I wish to observe that we leave it open to go back to it after we have settled the constitution of the senate. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I have an amendment to propose in the clause. There is no mode of returning the names of the senators as chosen by the governor-gen erah Certainly a provision of that kind must be inserted. Mr. MUNRO : I should like to know if the Convention have fully considered the proposals made in this clause, first, ■with regard to the number of senators, and, second, with regard to the term for which they are to be elected. A number of our friends are continually telling us to look back to the grand Constitution of the United States ; but we find that in the United States they have only two senators for each state. At the time the Constitu- tion was framed there were only thirteen states, and two senators for each state, or twenty-six senators altogether. Kow, we propose to have eight senators for each of the seven states to start with, amounting to fifty-six senators. I consider that that number is too large, and that w^e ought to reduce it. I think at the outside that six senators for each state would be quite sufil- cient. They ought also, in my judgment, to be elected a,t times different from those proposed in the IgiUer portion of the clause. I think it is too long to leave a period of three years between each appointment or election, or six years altogether. In the event of any difficulty arising there ought to be powder to make the appointments at least every second year. In order to test the question, I move : That the word "eight," line 2, be omitted with a view to inserting the word " six." Mr. CLARK : The hon. member, Mr. Munro, appears to object to the number " eidit," because he thinks the senate will be too large a body. He also says that we calculate on having seven states to commence with, which will give fifty-six senators. Although we all hope that we shall have seven states to commence v/ith, we have to face the difficulty that w^e may have only six or only five to commence with. If we only have five states to com- mence with a senate of forty members will not be too large a body. Another matter which we must remember is that the number of states in the commonwealth of Australia will never be anything like the number of states in America. The conditions are altogether so different that, I think, although it is generally considered very unsafe to prophesy, we may rest as- sured there will never be more than about a dozen states in the commonwealth of Australia. We may, however, have such a population in the whole commonwealth as will ultimately raise the number of representatives in the house of represen- tatives to the number in the House of Representatives in America. It may so happen that we may have 300 members in Commonwealth of [1 April, ISDL] Australia Bill. 589 the house of representatives, and if we should have anything like that number the senate should bear its proportion. Mr. Deakix : Hear, hear. It is easy enough to increase ! Mr. CLAE;K : It is easy enough to in- crease, but we shall have to increase by an amendment of the constitution, and I think it is a very bad thing to tinker with a con- stitution to meet contingencies as they arise. I think the constitution ought never to be amended, excepting upon the dis- covery of some radical defect which experi- ence has proved to exist, or to provide for some totally unforeseen contingency. If you can possibly provide for probable con- tingencies, provide for them at once, and do not devise a constitution with the de- liberate intention, or with the certainty in the natural evolution of events, that it will require amendment. I should like to point out to the representatives of the smaller states — and I represent a small state my- self — that we may only have four or five representatives in the house of representa- tives. Take tiie colony of Tasmania, or the colony of Western Australia. If we have only four representatives in the house of representatives and eightrepresentatives in the senate, it will only be a total repre- sentationof twelve niembcr.s,andsurely that is not too large for either of those colonies. I say dolibenitely that twelve members are not at all too many to represent Tasmania in the commonwealth. If Western Aus- tralia is to be entitled to four members in the houf.e of refjresentative.s, twelve mem- bers will not be at all too many to repre- sent that colony. On that ground alone I would ask lion, members to consider seri- ously before they cut down the ropro.sonta- tion. Mr. BAPvTON : If there is any force in the objection that there might bo a large number of states, and therefore too large ascnate in the course of tinio. — though I do not think there is anything in the objection — that could be provided for, not by diminishing the number, eight, now proposed, but by making other provision in case the states should reach a certain number. If, for instance, we were to have twelve states — and I think it will be a long time before we do — it might pos- sibly be worth considering whether we should not have, only six members in the senate for each state ; but probably we shall begin with five states, and not have more than six or seven states for a num- ber of years, and surely we shall not con- sider that forty members in the senate will be too many, seeing that the house of representatives will begin with 115 or IIG members. Mr. HACKETT : If all the states of the continent send members to the senate there will be 48 members, and if the present pro- portion, the present unit of election, is re- tained at 30,000 for the house of repre- sentatives, by the time this constitution comes into force its membership will rise to as many as 120. That will make alto- gether IGS members in the senate and houseof repi'esentatives. Owing tosuperior inducements to natural ambition, and also of a more material character, it is quite certain that a large number of the best men in the states will gravitate towards the federal ca])ital, and it is provided by section 10 of chapter v of this constitution that no member cither of the senate or of the house of representatives shall occupy a scat in the local legislature. Mr. Clark : That is not decided yet ! i\rr. IIAOKETT : If that is carried, it means that there will be IGS of our best men taken away from tlie .states for ser- vice in the central legislature. Tliat is a very serious consideration for the states. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : If the number is eight, it cannot be di\ ided by three. I am ill. Doe.s it not strike hon. members that there is room for considerable difference of opinion as to what is the best course ; and why, under these circumstances, should we deny to the various states power to decide the question for themselves in such a shape asmay seem to them best? Thesoleargumcnt used agiinst it has reference to uniformity. We do not obtain uniformity in the clau.sc before us. Why, then, should we reject the amendment wliich gives to each colony an opportunity of solving the problem as re- gards the mode of election of senators 1 2 p What have the other colonies to do with the question so long as the state is satisfied 1 If we carry this clause the result will be that although future experience may prove to us that a different plan might be adopted, and one estate might be particularly desirous of adopting that plan, still no effect could be given to its wish except by an amendment of the constitution, involving the passing of certain laws by specified majorities and appeals to conventions of all the states on a question in which only one state might have a particular interest. We have had it urged at various times that we should not interfere unnecessarily with the self- governing capacities of the different states. Surely in this matter, simply referring to the mode in which they should elect their senators, they ought to have the opportun- ity of exercising their powers to the very fullest extent in such manner as they think best. It is with that object only that I propose the amendment. Mr. MUNEO : When I first read the- amenchnent I did not agree with it; but after looking carefully at the 1st and 2nd clauses I think the amendment is a proper one, because it leaves to each state the power of making its own arrangements for electing its senators. Why should we dic- tate to the states on that subject ? There is no provision made in the clause of the Ijill as to the mode in which the houses of parliament arc to carry out the election. Tlie Ist clause says: 'i'lic senate shall be coniposcd of eight mem- bers for eacli state, directly clicsen by the Iiouses of the i)arliam('nt of tlic several states during a session thereof, and each senator shall have one vote. That dons not provide how it is to be done. The next clause says : Tiie parliament of the commonwealth may make laws prescribing a uniform manner of choosing tlie senjitors. Sid)ject to any sticli law the parliament of eacli state may determine the time, place, and manner of clioosing the senators for that state by the houses of parliament thereof. 594 CommomoeaUh of [2 April, 18D1.] Australia Bill. Surely that is sufficient if we strike oat the words the hon. member, Mr. King- ston, desires to strike out. The 2nd clause makes provision for the first election, and then afterwards the parliament of each state can make its own arrangements. Sir John Downer : How could we get the first senate 1 Mr. MUXRO : By an addition to the 1st clause, after striking out the lines pro- posed, that the local parliaments of the vai'ious states shall make provision for the first election. Mr. PLAYFORD: This is a point on which we can consult the experience of America, where exactly the same clause has woi'ked for 100 years. I have never learned that they desire to alter their mode of electing senators. It is a great deal better that we should say distinctly that the parliaments of the colonies should elect the senate in the way they have said it in America, than that we should leave it to the different states to decide the manner and mode of elections. If the states decided the question we might have a cousidei'able amount of difference in the mode. We know that the American sys- tem has given eminent satisfaction ; but we have no means of knowing whether the system proposed by the hon. member, Mr. Kingston, would give equal satisfac- tion. If the hon. member wishes to carry out his idea, certainly he should not strike out the words he proposes to omit, for this reason : you must provide some mode of election of the senators so as to give the different states an opportunity of deciding how they will elect them, because through some obstinate lower or upper house in •some of the states a deadlock might occur, and they might not be able to decide in time for an election on any particular lines. Consequently there would be no persons chosen to represent the state. The hon. member would, therefore, do better to leave the words as they are, fixing this • \_Mr. Munro. mode " until the states otherwise direct." I would very much like to give the states the power to decide as to the manner and med^ of electing senators if I thought it would be productive of good results ; but with the experience of the United States before us I do not think we can do better than to adopt their form of election. Mr. FITZGERALD : I quite agree with the remarks which have been made by the hon. member, Mr. Playford. Our chief consideration should be which method is likely to give to the senate the very best men that each colony can send. I appre- liend that this clause does not limit the choice of the states to the members of their parliaments. They can go outside for the best men ; and, undoubtedly, if they feel the importance of the senate to this new common wealth, they will seek the very best men, wherever they are to be found. We can credit the various parliaments with thatpatrioticfeeling. Undoubtedly, if you take the power of choice from the parlia- ments and give it to the people you have no security of the same value as to choice of the best men. If the senators were ap- pointed by a popular vote, that vote would have to be given either by the colony as a whole or by subdivisions. Does the hon. member, Mr. Kingston, consider that the very best men in any of the colonies would subject themselves to the worry of a canvass over such an enormous area? With the election of senators by the colony as a whole you could not have the same confi- dence in their choice as you would in the choice of a parliament. I do not say that the choice of the people would not be valu- able. Butfortheparticularf unction which the senate has to discharge in the consti- tution, there would be much more security in having the senators chosen by the repre- sentatives of the people than there would be by the adoption of any other coui'se. It is not because I think that the people would make a bad choice, but because I Commonv;ealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 595 think the parliaments would make a better one that I shall vote for the clause as it stands. ;Mr. GILLIES : It strikes me that some of the hon. members who are supporting the motion of the hon. member, Mr. King- ston, have for a moment forgotten the object of establishing two houses in this constitution. The house of representatives will be elected directly by the people in the various states ; the senate is intended to be a house not directly elected by the people of tlie various states, but elected indirectly by those people. Some hon. members, perhaps, may entertain the idea that it would be a wise thing to have the two houses elected on exactly the same basis. I very much doubt that, so far as our experience goes. I more than doubt it. The frequency of the chances of collision would be much more likely to be numer- ous than very few. The house of repre- sentatives, directly elected by the people in the various states, having granted to it great power.s, especially in the direction in which a popular house of parliament is most powerful, and being looked upon by the general community as truly represent- ing the whole community, not merely a part of it, we must not forget that it will be very powerful indeed. I do wonder that gentle- men who have been speaking of state rights should be among those who advocate leav- ing it to the vai-ious states to determine whether we should not have two Iiouses exactly similarly representing the people. I venture to say that that would be ex- tremely unwise. Here we have endea- voured as nearly as possible not only to have a Iioukc of roprosentatives represent- ing the whole of the peo])le, but also a second branch representing the legisla- ture of each colony. I do not know whether my learned friend here would like to say, in the election of members to the senate by any state, that that should be done by plebiscite, or that the whole of that state should be con^'erted into one electorate for the purpose of returning the whole of the members to represent it. Yv'^hat might i-esult ? You might have a state with aconstituencyof 250,000electors represent- ing the whole of the people, and the whole of the members of the senate might have to be returned by one" electorate, and they might be able to return the whole of the representatives by a majority of a few dozen or a few thousands. "Will any one tell me that that would be a true re- presentation of the people in the senate, a true representation of the whole people ? Why, it might be a representation by a simple majority of only one interest and one section. I say that no community could live under such a representation as that. There would arise from one end of the colony to the other a howl of indigna- tion at the idea of one section only being represented, whilst an enormous minority would not have a single representative. All the great colonies, as far as the popu- lar assem):)lies are concerned, are naturally divided into districts. Why 1 Because it is the desire of the people as a whole to see that every class of the population in their respective districts are fairly repre- sented. ]3y that means you secure the most true representation of the people as a whole that you can get, instead of having the whole of the colony iis one single dec- torate returning the whole of the members to the federal parliament. This would be perfectly possible uiuk r the system which my hon. frioiid propo.ses. lie .says it should be left to each state to say how it proposes to I'eturn its representatives. The original idea was that we were to have two branches of tiie legislature, not to be elected exactly from the same source — the people to elect the house of representa- tives, and the parliament to elect the other, representing, as they do now, substantially the people as a whole. I concur with my hon. and learned colleague, Mr. Wrixon, 596 Commomveallh of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. that after all we have nothing to say as to liowanyone branch of the legislatui'e of the colony is elected. That is their business. They have deliberately chosen in some cases to be content with houses of assem- bly elected from the people, and a second house, the legislative council, in some cases elected by the people, in other cases nominated. If the people of the colony ai"e content with having a nominated upper house, that is their business and not ours, so that to use that as an argument against allowing the two houses of any state to jointly, or in any such way as they may determine, elect members of the senate appears altogether unsound. I do trust hon. members who have, I may say, sud- denly started this view, because it was not sei'iously advocated in the Constitutional Committee, will take to heart what the hon. member, Mr. Playford, said. It is not an unlikely thing that if it was de- termined by po2)ulation instead of by the legislature that it should be a plebiscite that a whole colony should be formed into one constituency, the second branch of the legislature would never consent. I say we should be proposing in this case to create difficulties which ai'e wholly unnecessary. If any one said that we should not get a true representation of the opinion of the people in any colony by allowing parlia- ment to elect members of the senate as they think proper, I think they are in error. I believe that if the legislature in each of the states were permitted to select their representatives in the senate, their selection would fall upon gentlemen who, as a whole, would satisfy the people. I think that the proper thing to do is to allow the second branch of the fede- ral parliament, to be elected on a different basis and under different circumstances from those under which the members of the popular branch are elected. I venture to say we shall make a mistake if we at- tempt by any means to elect an upper [Mr. Gillies. house of parliament or senate on almost- exactly the same basis as the popular bralich. The two are intended to exercise different functions — functions in some re- spects, not in all, equal. And I desire to see maintained, not only in the federal parliament, but also in all the states on the continent, the principle that the two houses of parliament shall not be chosen from exactly the same individuals, but each on some different basis. Mr. KINGSTON: In regard to the mode in which the amendment is intro- duced, it is my desire to meet the wishes of those delegates who are chiefly respon- sible for the framing of the bill. I have moved to amend clause 9, and propose, if the House affirms its desire to strike out the words in question, to amend clause 10 so as to provide for a certain system to be adopted until tlie legislature of any state provides otherwise. As to the remarks of the hon. member, Mr. Gillies, as to the merits of indirect election, I confess that I do not recognise the system of indirect, election as having any particular virtue. What I understand we are endeavouring to do is to provide for the creation of two houses of the federal parliament, in one of which the people at large will be repre- sented, and in the other the state interests shall be particularly conserved. And it seems to me thatunder these circumstances, as long as the state itself is satisfied as to the mode in which the custodians of its interests are appointed, we have no reason to interfere, and further, as to the refer- ence made by my hon. colleague to the system which obtains, and has obtained for a considerable period, in the United States, I think lie somewhat overlooked the fact that the system of uniformity that was adopted has been subjected to very considerable criticism ; that there is by no means that unanimity of senti- ment on the expediency of maintaining it which his remarks would suggest. In CommoniceaJth of [2 April, 1S91.] Australia BUI. 59Y this connection I -n-oulcl like to refer to a note which occurs in "Bryce." It is as follows : — A proposal recently made to amend the fede- ral constitution by taking the election of sena- tors away from the legislatures in order to vest it in the people of each state is approved by some judicious publicists who think that bad candi- dates will have less chance with the party at large and the people than they now have in bodies apt to be controlled by a knot of party managers. A nomination made for a popular election will at least be made publicly, whei'eas now a nomination for an election by a legislature may be made secretly. Giving the fullest force to the arguments which have been advanced in favour of the system which is prescribed in the bill, it seems to me that they simply amount to this : that at the present there is a strong feeling in favour of the system which is suggested, and it is unlikely that it will be altered ; it is probable rather that it will give satisfaction to all the states. That seems to me to amount to this : that even if we give power to the states to provide a different mode of election, they will not exercise it. But is that any reason why we .should prevent them if they should hit upon a better plan of giving effect to their Avishes in such a manner as would be most expedient ? It seems to me that the argu- ment does not warrant the further con- clusion which is suggested, and I trust that the decision of the Committee will be to give the states the fullest power to deal with the question as they tliink fit. No doubt, in the first instance, it will bo neces- sary to lay down and provide for a system of election whicli shall be uniform. It is liii,'hly probable that a system of the character which we now find containeil within the four corner.s of the bill will commend it.sclf to the majority of tho .states ; but if that be so, it simply points to the improbability of the power of altera- tion being exerci.sed Ijy each state. It certainly does not warrant the contention that no power should be given to the state to alter the system by which it elects its senators, however strongly it may feel on the subject. Sir GEORGE GREY : I desire to state that I feel quite convinced that the pro- posal made by the hon. delegate, Mr. Kingston, is one that recommends itself for our adoption. His proposal is simply this : that the states themselves shall have the power of deciding the manner in which the election of senators shall be made. All the suppositions that have been made that we should not give this power because it might be wrongly used, and all the sup- positions made that it is desirable to give it because it would be wisely exercised, ought not to influence us. What we do is not to prescribe any one mode of choice, but to leave to the states themselves the power of deciding how the elections shall be conducted. I shall certainly support that, and for an additional reason, that I am convinced that the great danger in these elections is that the power may fall almost entirely into the hands of capital. I think in the bill, as it stands, we are in some instances absolutely legislating to obtain that end. I think that must be the case where there are nominated upper houses, which there will be great dilhculty indeed of getting rid of, because a nominated upjier house is not likely to destroy itself. The existence of a nominated upper house is no proof, as it has been argued, that the people are contented with it. Personally I am absolutely discontented with a nomi- nated upper hou.se, and I have for years struggled in vain to see it put an end to ; and I believe that that is the case with a very large ninnl)er of persons in the whole of Australasia. I shall therefore certainly support the proposal of the hon. member, Mr. Kingston, which I think is perfectly justified, giving as it does full liberty to tho people of each state to determine from time to time, as they think fit, the manner in which the senators siiall be chosen. 598 Commonioealth of [2 April, 1891.] Atistralia Bill. Sii- HENRY PARKES : The lion, and tlistinguislifd delegate -who lias just sat down spoke under a misapprehension, into which I fear other hon. members have fallen. He distinctly stated that he desii-ed to leave to each state the manner of electing its delegates. So do we all, and that is distinctly provided in the bill ; but what the motion of the hon. delegate, Mr. Kingston, says is quite a different thincr. He is not dissatisfied witb the provision made in the bill for the manner in which each state is to elect its mem- bers ; but he does a thing which I think was never proposed before — he leaves to each state the power to create the consti- tuency. Now, in every constitution act that I ever heard of the constituency is created by the act itself. This bill does that ; but it leaves the manner of the exercising of the rights of that constituency entirely to the states. It follows as a logical sequence, I think, that if you leave the creation of the constituency in regard to the senate to the states, you must also leave the creation of the constituency in regard to the assembly to the states. I cannot see why you should leave the states to create one of these constituencies • unless you go and leave it to them to create the other constituency also. The hon. member would 'divest the bill of all intimation as to what the constituency of the senate should be, and the states would severally have to create their own consti- tuencies. 1 am entirely in favour of leav- ing to the states the fullest possible liberty in saying how they will elect their dele- gates ; but that ^is quite a different thing from leaving them to create the consti- tuency from which those delegates are to be elected. I do not know whether it is worth while to say a word in reference to this argument against nominee houses. Nominee houses exist, and as they exist for all the high purposes of legislation — they have never existed with my consent or vote — surely they may exist for the purpose of electing members for the senate of federated Australia. The incapacity of nominee chambers to elect members of the senate when they are given full power to make all laws whatever hardly admit of argument. Eor my part I am satisfied with the clause, though it does not exactly represent my own wishes. Mr. KINGSTON: I do not wish to trespass upon the time of the Committee, except for the argument advanced by the hon. delegate who has just sat down. He argued that if it is in the power of the legis- lature of a state to create the constituency for one house it ought also to have the power to create the constituency for th& other. Now, clause 25 gives this power to the legislature of the state as far as the house of representatives is concerned. It gives it a power to define the qualifications- of the electors, which certainly amounts to the creation of the constituencies. Sir Henry Parkes : Certainly not ! Mr. KINGSTON : It certainly appears to me that, under the circumstances, the argument of the hon. gentleman tells iii favour of the proposition I have advocated. Question — That the words proposed to be omitted stand part of the clause — put. The Committee divided : Ayes, 3-4 ; noes, 6 ; majority, 28. Ayes. Atkinson, Sir Harry GiUies, Mr. Baker, Mr. Barton, Mr. Bird, Mr. Bray, Sir John Brown, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Clark, Mr. Cuthbert, Mr. Dibljs, Mr. Donaldson, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Adye Downer, Sir John Fitzgerald, Mr. Forrest, Mr. A. Forrest, Mr. J. Fysh, Mr. Griffith, Sir Samuel Hackett, Mr. Jennings, Sir Patrick Lotou, Mr. Macdouald-Paterson Mr Marmion, Mr. McMillan, Mr. Moore, Mr. Parkes, Sir Henry Playford, Mr. Bussell, Captain Eutledge, Mr. Smitli, Colonel Suttor, Mr. Wriglit, Mr. Wrixon, Mr. Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 599 Noes. Cockburn, Dr. Grey, Sir George Deakin, Mr. Kingston, Mr. Gordon, ilr. ilunro, Mr. Question so resolved in the affirmative. Amendment (by Sir Samuel Griffith) proposed : That lines 6 and 7 be omitted with a view to the insertion of the Avords " The senators shall be chosen for a term of six years. The names of the senators chosen in each state shall be certi- fied by the governor to the governor-general." Sir JOHX BRAY : I should like to ask the hon. gentleman whether he thinks the latter portion of the amendment is neces- sary ? Sir Samuel Griffith : I do really ! Sir JOHN BRAY : It seems to me to be unnecessary. Is pi^ovision made for the absence of a governor for any length of time? Sir Samuel Griffith : Y'es ; provision for his deputy to act is contained in the bill ! Sir JOHN BRAY : If the hon. gentle- man undertakes to provide for it I am satisfied. Amendment agreed to ; clause, as amended, agreed to. Clause 10. The parliament of the common- wealth may make laws prescribing a unifonn manner of clioosing tlio senators. Subject to any such law tlic parliament of each sUite may (letcnniiic the lime, i)lace, and manner of clioos- ing the senators fur that state by the houses of parliament thereof. SirSAMUKL GRIFFITH: My lion, and learned friend, Mr. Barton, has made a suggestion, which, I think, is of great value — that is, to otnit the words, " tlio parliament of the commonwcaltli," whoro- ever they occur in tlie bill, and to put in " the commonweal til," because, as he points out, the ]»arlian)ent is only tlie instrument V>y whifh tiie commonweal tli makes the laws. If the suggestion does not commend itself to hon. gentlemen generally Iwill say nothing further aljout it. An hon. member, I think Sir John Downer, yesterday sug- gested that the expression "subject to any such law" might be misunderstood, and might be taken to indicate that there must be a law of that kind. I think that the w^ords are sufficient ; but they are not quite clear, and it would be better, there- fore, to say "subject to sucli laws, if any." There could be no possible doubt then as to what is meant. I think that any doubt that arises and is pointed out ought to be met at once. This instrument ought to be perfectly free from ambiguity. I therefore move : That the words "any such law," line 4, be omitted with a view to insert in lieu thereof the words " such laws, if any." Amendment agreed to ; clause, as amended, agreed to. Mr. DEAKIN : I trust that the mem- bers of the Convention will take a little time to consider the proposal which has emanated from the hon. and learned mem- bei', Mr. Barton, which appears to me a most excellent one, both as regards abbre- viation, for which it oilers another oppor- tunity The Cuairmax : The clause is passed. Mr. DEAKIN : I hope the question will be raised again and considered. The Chairman : We can recommit the bill. Clause 12. As soon as practicable after the senate is assembled in conset^ucnce of the first election the senators chosen for each state sliall be divided liy lot into two classes. I'ho places of the senators of the first class shall be 5 \a(atecauso an appointment wouldonly be made if there were some urgent necessity for the colony having its full representation. Mr. BARTON : I think there is a great deal in what has been suggested by tho lion. in(!mber, Mr. Fitzgerald. Tho nomi- nee principle is not entering into tlie QOi Commomoealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. composition of the senate in general, and it would seem to be rather an unwise thing to mix up the operation of two principles in this way. It would be far better to put up with the occasional loss which might be suffered by the absence of one senator out of eight than to have a nominee exercising the important functions in- trusted to an elected senator. In order that the matter may be fairly considered, I move : That the clause be amendcLl by the omission of the following words : — "the governor of the state, by and with the advice of the executive council thereof, may appoint a senator to fill such vacancy until the next session of the par- liament of the state, when." Sir JOHN BRAY: It seems to me that the amendment will hardly accom- plish the object of my lion, friend, Mr. Barton. But I do think it is necessary to have some provision for filling these vacan- cies. It seems to me that we ought not to allow a senator possibly to be appointed by the government and to have some per- son chosen in his place immediately after- wards to represent the colony. Under these circumstances, it is far better, I think, that the parliament, if necessary, should be immediately called together to choose a senator, or the matter could be delayed if the senate is not likely to meet. I object altogether to the governor ap- pointing a senator to fill a vacancy. If the amendment be carried it will only apply to filling a vacancy that occurred during a recess of parliament, which of course is not what my hon. and learned friend means. His idea is that if a vacancy occurs whether parliament is in session or in recess it should fill the vacancy. There- fore it is necessary to strike out the words "during the recess of the parliament." Mr. Barton : They should go out, I omitted to include them ! Sir JOHN BRAY : If the hon. mem- ber will move the omission of those words I shall support him. [J/r. Barton. Mr. Barton' : I accept the suggestion of my hon. friend. Mr. FITZGERALD : I would suggest that it would be better to alter the clause to read as follows : — That Avheu the place of a senator Ijeconies vacant during a session of the pailiament of the state which he represented such vacancy shall continue until the next session of the parliament of the state. Mr. DEAKIN: The vacancy would con- tinue if you do not make any provision for it. Whythis ex traoi'dinary alarm and dread of the action of the executive 1 What is a senator under the constitution as proposed 1 Pie is to be elected by the two houses of parliament. And what is the executive ? The executive is the acting committee of those houses of parliament which represents, at all events, a majority in one of them, and usually a majority in both of them. AVliat more fitting can it be than that the tempor- ary committee which acts for parliament in every other matter when it is not sit- ting, which takes upon its shoulders enor- mous responsibilities in the discharge of its duties out of session trusting to parlia- ment to approve of its action — what possible objection can there be to the com- mittee taking the responsibility before par- liament meets of appointing a man to fill a temporary vacancy 1 The house has the power, and the necessary power if it likes, to afterwards reject the nominee of the government. Any advantage that the go- vernment may gain is given to its nominee by the fact of his appointment for a short time, and the claim he might be considered to have on the consideration of his fellow- members on that account. That is the only possible circumstance which can be alleged against the proposition. Surely that is a small circumstance. What other proposition can be made which can equal the representative character of an appoint- ment by the permanent executive of parlia- ment, which parliament can itself speedily Commonwealth of [2 April, ^891.] Australia Bill. 605 reverse if it so please. The opposition is rathej' curious, coming as it does from members of governments who enjoy and exercise many similar prerogatives by the permission and with the authority of par- liament ; and, surely if a ministry cannot be trusted to make temporary nominations to a house which is to represent its state temporarily and in emergency, what is a government competent to do 1 Sir JOHN DOWNER : This clause is no new-fangled idea of the committee ; but they took it from the most illustrious commonwealth which theworld has known, and adopted it practically A-erbatim as nearly as it could be adopted. In the United States of America a temporary vacancy is filled by the executive in iden- tically the same way which is proposed to be followed here, and certainly no country that we have ever heard of insisted more on the popular voice in the selection of representatives ; but still they thought on the other hand it would be far bettor to have some mode of election for a little while, which was not quite the best that they would like, tlian be for a time absolutely unrepresented. I can see no objection to the clause. Mr, GILLIES : Might I make a sng- gestion to those who appear to object to the clause ? I confess I do not see any abjection, under the ciicumstanccs, to leav- ing the nomination to the governor-in- 20uncil. I would suggest, however, that the matter is of no importance if the fede- al parliament is not in .session, and the ihances are that botli the local ])arlia- iK-nts and the federal [tarliamont will bein iession a.s nearly as possible at one and llic ;amc time. If the governorin-council were mly called ui)on to make an appointment ;o enable a representative of a state to e present when the Federal Parliament as doing work, we might at once meet lie case by providing that in the event of he federal parliament being in session and a vacancy occurring, a nomination might be made bv the governor-in-council. Mr. BARTOX : I would mention that if an amendment of this kind is to be made, it had better come in at the end of clause 20, which provides for the notifica- tion of vacancies. In that case, it would be better to omit this clause altogether. The 20th clause reads : Upou the happening of a vacancy in the senate, the president, or if tb.ere is no president, or the president is absent from the common- wealth, the governor-general shall forthwith notify the same to the governor of the state wliich the senator whose place is vacated repre- sented. And we might add the words: and the houses of parliament of the state siiall in their next session choose a senator to fill tlio vacancy. Amendment negatived ; clause, as read, agreed to. Clause 15. The qualifications of a senator shall l)e as follows :^ (1.) Hemustbeof thefuliageofthirtj' years, and must, when chosen, be an elector entitled to vote in some state at theelec- 5 tion of members of the house of repre- sentatives of the commonwealth, and must have been for five years at the least aresidentwithinthclimilsof tliecommon- v.calth as existing at the time when he 10 is chosen ; (2.) He must he cither a natural born sub- ject of the Queen, or a subject of the (Jueen naturalised by or under a law of the Parliament of the United Kingdom 15 of fircat Ihitain and Ireland, or of tlie parlii'.ment of one of tlie .said colonics, or of tlie parliament of the common wcaltii or of a state. Mr. MACDONALD-PATERSON : I observe in this clause an important quali- fication — namely, that an aspirant to tlio position of senator shall have been for at least five years a resident within the limit.s of the commonwealth. As an Australian of sometliing like thirty years' .standing, I feel that this period is too short. I think most delegates will admit that you cannot convert a ncv/ chum into an Australian, 606 Commomoealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. that you cannot thoroughly tincture him with Australian sentiment and knowledge within a period of five years. Our anti- cipation is that we shall have purely Australian action, sentiment, and know- ledge in the federal parliament, and if hon. members think they will find all these qualities in an individual who has lived in Australia only five years, then I much misapprehend what I have heard during the last thirty years. I respectfully urge hon. members to think the matter over, and with a view to bring it to an issue, and to liear a little discussion on the part of those who are older than myself, I move : That tlie won! " five," line 8, be omitted with a view to insert in lieu thereof the word " ten." Mr. J. FOEREST : I altogether dis- agree with the amendment. I think the clause should contain no qualification of this sort, and that we should trust the various leijislatures to do what is beneficial and right in the interests of their respec- tive colonies. The matter would be per- fectly secure in the hands of the legisla- tures. Is it likely that a legislature would elect an unfit person — a person having no knowledge whatever of the state he repre- sented 1 So far as I am able to judge, no such contingency is likely to arise. In the case of members of the house of repre- sentatives no period of residence within the commonwealth is prescribed as a qualification ; and if you can trust the people to elect fitting persons to the house of representatives without such a qualifi- cation, I can see no reason why you should not place equal trust in the par- liaments of the respective colonies. There is another point. We propose to form a commonwealth of Australia, and are we to prohibit people of our own race, born in other portions of the British dominions, from becoming senators until they have been resident in the commonwealth for a certain period ? No such prohibition is [il/r. Macdonald-Paterson. placed upon Australians residing in the old country. Any Australian, resident in England, can at once, if the electors desire, become a member of the House of Com- mons, and I see no reason why a dis- tincjuished Englishman coming to these colonies should not at once be eligible for the position of senator if the legislature of one of the colonies desired his appoint- ment. I am entirely opposed to the amend- ment, and if I had my way I would place no more restriction upon the elegibility of senators than we place \ipon the eligi- bility of members of the house of repre- sentatives. Mr. AD YE DOUGLAS: When the amendment now before the Committee has been disposed of, I propose to move the omission of all the words of the 1st sub- clause after the first word, " common- wealth." The Chairman : The hon. member can- not move such an amendment, unless the amendment now before the Committee be withdrawn. Mr. MACDONALD-PATERSON : I am willing, for the purposes of discussion, to withdraw my amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Mr. AD YE DOUGLAS : I begto move: That the words " and must have been," lines 7 and 8, be omitted. My object is to leave the option of choos- ing a senator on the same ground as it is left in the case of members of the house of representatives, whose only qualification is that they shall be of full age. It has been admitted by nearly all hon. members that the house of representatives is to have charge of all financial business, and therefore it will be the most important branch of the legislature. Why should a member of that house be admitted without any restriction, while you impose this absurd qualification of five years' resi- dence? I presume it must be continuous residence, so that if a man leaves the Commonvjealth of [2 April, 1891.] Atistralia Bill. G07 colony for two or three years, still having property in it, when he returns he will have to serve a sentence of five years' re- siJence before he is eligible. Cannot we trust the states legislatures or the people to choose the senators 1 This is a most absurd restriction, without sense or meaning. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The ques- tion deserves consideration. Personally, I confess I do not like the idea of this quali- fication. I am inclined to agree with the hon. member, Mr. J. Forrest, that the legislatures should be trusted to elect the best men they can find. "What is the ob- ject of this restriction? To keep out new chums, I hoar an hon. member suggest. Why not elect new chums if the states wish to have them as members 1 I believe in trusting the states as much as possible ; surely they are fit to be trusted to select a man, even if he has only been four and a half years in the country, if no better man can be found. Mr. RUTLEDGE : I think there ought to be some such qualification. The argu- ment used by the hon. member, Mr. J. Forrest, was that it is wrong for us to institute a qualification which does not exist in the case of a person going from Australia to Great Britain. The circum- stances are entirely different. We depend in Australia, as the American common- wealth has dcpcTuled, on immigiation. Wo must have immigration on a very exten- sive scale before we can fully develop our resources, and accomplish all we hope for as the result of establishing this constitu- tion. We liavc all kinds of nationalities coming here. There are fairly good men among all nationalities, but if the clause is passed without this (jualification a man might come here and, without any know- edge of, or any particular sympathy with, )ur institutions, would be eligible as a ember of the senate. I do not think ;hat that is quite right. I agree with the on. member, Mr. Macdonald-Paterson, that a man without a short term of resi- dence does not become sufficiently familiar with the habits of Australians, with our ways of thought and modes of action ; and we have a particular kind of feeling in which certain characters who come here with new ideas find very suitable oppor- tunities for carrying out their particular projects. We ought not to allow Austra- lia to be a field for exploitation by foreign adventurers. To a great extent we welcome all foreigners, but we ought not to allow persons who perhaps have made themselves rather objectionable in the countries where they have lived to come here, and under the cover of this very liberal provision seek to give effect to the views which they w ere not ableto carry into effect elsewhere. We cannot do better than follow the example of the United States in this respect, which have provided that a man must be 30 years of age before he is eligible as a senator. That is very properly coj)ied in this bill. But it is further provided that a man must be nine years a citizen of the states before he is eligible as a senator. Mr. J. Forrest : That is with respect to foreigners. This deals with our own race ! Mr. BUTLEDGE: We .shall have to depend to a great extent upon foreign immigration. Sir Samuel Griffith : Are Englishmen to be foreigners to us ] Mr. RUTLEDGE : I certainly think thac we ought to require some guarantee from foreigners who come here that they should be qualified for a scat in the senate. Mr. MAIUIION: The hon. member, Mr. Kutledge, has alluded to the noces.sity for immigration from the outside world to this young country. In adopting the line of action which that hon. member seemed inclined to suggest, we should be placing a protective barrier on immigration of the best character, and we would say to men from the outside world of talent and COS Commoniveallh of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. political ability, that they must reside here for a long period of years before they could hold tliat position to which their ability entitled them. Under the consti- tutions of most of the Australian colonies, a man cannot become an elector until he has resided in the colony for six or twelve months. Until he becomes an elector, he is not eligible as a senator, therefore some period of residence must elapse be- fore any newcomer is eligible. As to the danger or fear of foreign adventur- ers being selected by the various parlia- ments to fill the high position of senators, surely we have more confidence than that in those parliaments. Surely we would not give th(?m such large powers, unless we thought they would be exercised discreetly. Do we imagine for a moment that they would place the great powers given to the senators under the act in the hands of ad- venturers and strangers ? May we not be accused of endeavouring to impose a sort of protection on the introduction of men of genius, talent, and political ability 1 May we not give in exceptional cases to men of ability those chances that each and all of us who happen to be natives, or to have resided many years in Australasia, will have of attaining to high positions in the federal legislature] It would be by far the best to strike out the woi'ds as sug- gested by an hon. member, and wipe out what seems to me a little blot upon this bill, wliicli we are endeavouring to make as perfect as possible. Mr. CLAIIK : The only valid argument which has been urged in favour of the amendment is that used by the hon, mem- ber, Mr. Marmion, that we ought to trust the legislatures. If the Convention is prepared to accept the application of that principle in its entii'ety, I am silenced ; but it is not prepared to do that. We have already said that there shall be one qualification, namely, that a man must be 30 years of age before he is eligible for a \_Mr. Marmion. seat in the senate. If we are going to trust the state legislatures absolutely let us take away that restriction. There are many men of genius and talent who are under 30 years of age, "We know that one of the most brilliant statesmen Eng- land has ever had was prime minister at the age of 27, and that we may have very brilliant men 25, 26, or 27 years of age, but you will not allow them to be elected members of the senate. We have already put a limit to the discretion of the state legislatures, therefore the hon, member's argument is gone, Mr, MARMION: Hardly, because it is generally considered that age gives stability and steadiness of character, though it may not always give a greater amount of wis- dom. There may be reasons for imposing a restriction as to age. Therefore, that argument does not apply. Sir GEORGE GRE^ : I desire to say that I agree with the hon, member, Mr, J, Forrest, Mr, MuxRO : For the first time in your life! Sir GEORGE GREY : The hon, mem- ber who said that knows very little of our previous meetings, I think there is very little in the argument that was used by the last speaker, that, because you provide for one qualification, you should there- fore impose another. That is, ha\ing made one mistake, you should go further. How- ever, whether it is a mistake or not, it would be no argument. You might say that the qualification which was put in was a good one, and therefore you must put in another ; but you have to prove it to be good, first of all, I think it is quite a mistake to put these conditions into the bill, I cannot imagine what necessity there is for them in this young country. Amendment negatived, Mr. JNIACDONALD-PATERSON : I hope hon, members will excuse my not replying to the arguments which have been Commonwealth of [2 April, 1S91.J Australia Bill. 609 adduced, as I am suffering from an affec- tion of the throat. I will content myself by moving : That the word "five," line 8, be omitted with tlie view to insert in Heu thereof the word "sevei3." After consulting with several hon. dele- gates I have come to the conclusion that the substitution of the word " seven" will meet the case. Captain RUSSELL : I hold that five years is decidedly a long time. "We should have some evidence that a man is a bond fide Australian before allowing him to be- come a senator ; but we ought not to fix such a long period of residence in Aus- tralia as seven years to make him eligible. I suggest that the word " three " be sub- stituted for the word " five." Sir GEORGE GREY : I propose what I think will be a fair test. I understand hon. members to require that a person shall have a fair knowledge of Australian affairs before he is eligible for election to the senate. Well, then, constitute a boax'd be- fore which all immigrants can be examined. Then you will not act unjustly to those who have that knowledge. I shall propose what I have suggested as an amendment. Sir JOHN BRAY : I would point out that wc have already a board appointed to ascertain whether a man lias been three or five years in the country before ho is eli- gible Ijy his having been a member of one of the state legislatures. A man ought to have some experience in the country before he is appointed a senator. ]\rr. BARTON: I intend to vote for the omission of the word '^'^ ^ivq^^ because I think five years too long a period. I think that it ought to be reduced to three years. If a legislature cannot find out in three years whether a man is fit to be trusted they will never find it out. Mr. LOTON : As far as I am concerned I shall have very much pleasure in voting for the clause as it stands. Wc have had 2 Q a lot of argument about foreigners and strangers, or people who may have lived in Australia only a few years, not being eligible for election to the senate. If this privilege is denied them, because they have been in the colony only a year or two, what other courses are open to them ? The parliaments of the states are open to them, and the house of representatives is open to them when they have been in the colony a very short time. In my opinion we want as senators men who have some practical knowledge of Australia. Let them gain that practical knowledge if they desire to enter either the state parliaments or the senate of the federal parliament. I do not think that five years is too long a term durinsr which a man should be in Australia before he is eligible for election as a member of the senate. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendment (Mr. J. Forrest) negatived : That the word " five " be omitted with the view to insert in lieu thereof the word " three." Mr. CUTHBERT : I wish to suggest that at the end of the clause the words " for the space of five years " be added. Under the different constitutions which have been recognised a foreigner does not stand in the same position as a British subject, even though ho take out letters of naturalisation, and I think it would be very desirable if the same princijilc were recognised in the federal constitution, namely, that a man is not, because he takes out Icttei's of naturalisation to-day, en- titled to sit in the senate to-moi'row. I venture to submit for the consideration of hon. members the desirability of making some limitation such as I suggest, namcl}', that for a period of five years after taking out letters of naturalisation a foreigner should not be entitled to a scat in the senate. This restriction is carried to a much greater extent in the Victorian Con- stitution, because a foreigner is not allowed to sit in the Lomslativo Council there until GIO Commonwealth of [2 Apuil, 1891.] Australia Bill. ten years have elapsed since he took out let- ters of imtui-alisation, and inasmuch as it is provided that a person must be " either a natural born subject of the Queen,"' or a subject of the Queen natural- ised by law, svho has resided in the com- monwealth for tive years, and who is 30 years of age, before he is eligible for elec- tion as a senator, T think we should make this limitation with regard to naturalised subjects. 1 believe that the hon. member in charge of the bill will see that the pro- posal is not an unreasonable one, and I hope he will see his way clear to accept it. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I think there is a great deal iu the suggestion of the hon. gentleman, and that it ought to be adopted. I therefore move : That at the end of tlie clause the following words be added : — " at least five j'ears before he is chosen." Mr. CuTiiBERT : I accept that ! Amendment agreed to. Mr. WRIGHT : May I ask the reason of the words, " or of a state," at the end of the clause 1 It appears to me that they are not necessary. Sir SAIMUEL GRIFFITH : They have been inserted because, although it is pro- posed to give the federal parliament power to legislate on this subject, yet, as an inter- val may elapse before that power is exer- cised, the states may continue to amend their laws with regard to naturalisation, and the clause provides that naturalisation under their laws shall be equivalent to a law passed before the establishment of the commonwealth. Clause, as amended, agreed to. Clause 16. The senate shall, at its first meet- ing and before proceeding to the despatch of any other business, choose a senator to be the president of the senate ; and as often as the 6 office of president becomes vacant the senate shall choose another senator to be the i^resi- dent ; and the president shall pi-eside at all meetings of the senate ; and the choice of the president shall be made known to the go- 10 vernor-general by a deputation of the senate, [Mr. Cuthbert. The president may be removed from office by a vote of the senate. He may resign his office; and upon his ceasing to be a senator his office shall become vacant. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The hon, member. Sir Harry Atkinson, has pointed out to me an inaccuracy in this clause. It occurs in the sixth line, in the words^ " shall choose another senator to be presi- dent." The retiring president may cease to be a member of the senate during a recess and be re-elected before the next session ; but these words might indicate that he could not be reelected. I propose to make the clause read, " shall again choose a senator to be the president," and I therefore move : That in line 6, after the word "shall," the word " again " be inserted. Amendment agreed to. Amendment (by Sir Samuel Griffith) agreed to : That in line 6, the word "another " be omitted with a view to the insertion in lieu thereof of the word "a." Mr. LoTON : How is the president to resign his office 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I do not know of any instance in which that is ex- pressly provided. The manner in which I have known the resignation of a speaker to be communicated to the house is by letter informing the clerk. In this case the pre- sident would be appointed by the house. Mr. LoTON : In most of the colonial legis- latures the president of the upper house sends his resignation to the governor! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: That is because he is appointed by the governor. Sir JOHN BRAY : I should like to ask what is the necessity for saying that the clioice of the president shall be made known to the governor-general by a deputation of tha senate ? I know that it is the practice upon hi.s election to office for the speaker of the assembly, accompanied by such members as care to go with him, to go to Govern- I Commonvsealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Gil ment House to acquaint the governor that he has been chosen speaker ; Ijut this looks a more formal affair. Is this depu- tation to be specially appointed, or is the president to say that he is going to the goveiTior-general, and request hon. mem- bers to accompany himl The words, "by a deputation of the senate," make it ap- pear that a formal deputation will have to be appointed for the express purpose of in- forming the governor-general of the election of the president. I, therefore, move : That in line 10 the words "by a deputation of the senate " be struck out. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: The in- tention of the committee in using those words was to crystallise the existing prac- tice. The practice in the colonies varies. In the houses of some of the colonies a de- putation is appointed; in others the whole body go, or as many as please. I appre- hend that the manner in which ]iractical effect will be given to this clause will be by the house directing that the choice of the president be made known to the go- vernor general by the president, with so many members as may think fit to accom- pany him. Sir John Buay : Take out the word "deputation "! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : No. If you leave it "by the senate" it must be done by written communication, becau.se the senate can only act by means of some written document. Another point which I have omitted to mention i.s, that it oc- curred to the committee that it would be more respectful to the governor-general to make the choice known by members of the senate attending personally upon him. Amendmentnegatived; clause agreed to. Clause It) (Disquahfication of senator by absence). Colonel SMITH : I desire to ask why it is necessary that leave of ab.scnce siiall be entered on the journals of the parliament? I tliink that is superfluou.s. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: It was thought by the committee that there should be a formal record of leave of absence. It is a serious matter. It might be said, " The senate unanimously agreed that a member should be allowed to be away ; they all took it for granted." These matters, however, ought not to be taken for granted. Clause agreed to. Clause 22 (Quorum of senate). Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I think it right to call attention to the condition that the presence of one-third of the whole number of senators shall be necessary to form a quorum. I believe, in most con- stitutions, excepting those of Great Britain — in which term I include those of the Briti.oh possessions — the rule is that a ma- jority of the members of the house shall be necessary to be present in order to consti- tute a quorum. There is a great deal to be said in favour of that view ; but the committee, after carefully considering the matter, thought it would be safe, in the meantime, to say that one-third of the number of senators should form a quorum. Clause agreed to. Clause 23 (Voting in senate). Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I desire to say a word upon this clause. It will be ob.served that we have not used the ex- pression, " The president shall in all cases have a vote." It was thought that, in many cases, lie might not wish to vote ; and if it had been stated that he sliould have a vote, it might have been taken to mean that he was bound to vote in every division, and this might not be dcsiral)h'. If we only gave him a casting vote, a (juestion might be carried to which he was opposed, and in which liis state took a great interest, because there might be a majority of one without his vote. In that case his state would be deprived of its due influence. Therefore, we have drafted the G12 Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. clause in its present form. He may vote against a question, and wlien there is a tie the question passes in the negative. Clause agreed to. Purf III. — The Horise of Representatives. Clause 24. The house of representatives shall be composed of members chosen every three years by the people of the several states, according to their respective num- 5 bers ; and until the parliament of the com- mon-wealth otherwise provides, each state shall have one representative for every thirty thousand of its people. Provided that in the case of any of the 10 existing colonies of New South Wales, New Zealand, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, and the province of South Australia, until the number of the people is such an to entitle the state to four .15 representatives, it shall liave four representa- tives. Mr. BAKEIl : Before this clause is de- cided I should like to ask the hon. mem- ber, Sir Samuel Griffith, whether the atten- tion of the committee was carefully directed to the provisions of the Constitution of Canada in reference to this matter 1 The committee has copied the provisions of the American Constitution, and they have still further copied the provisions of the American Constitution in clause 30, where they say : The number of members of the house of repre- sentatives may be from time to time increased or diminished by the parliament of the common- wealth, but so that the proportionate representa- tion of the several states, according to the num- ber of their people I think it will be found that that cannot be worked out. Where you have a cer- tain number of people entitled to a repre- sentation, you can never have proportion- ate representation, because in the states there will always be a fraction over, some- times more, and sometimes less. That has been found to be the case in America, and great difficulties have arisen in thatcountry in working out this problem. As a matter of fact, it is stated by all the writers on the subject that thei'e never has been pro- [Sir Samuel Griffith. portionate representation according to the number of the people in the respective states. The matter may not be a very im- portant one now, when there is one repre- sentative for 30,000 i^eople; but supposing that, by-and-by, as we all hope and believe will be the case, the inhabitants of the states increase largely in number, and we only give to each 1.50,000 people one re- presentative. In that case the fraction which is unrepresented may be very great indeed. It seems to me that they have adopted a very much better provision in Canada, a provision which is self-acting, and which has another great advantage, namely, that it has a tendency to curtail a too great number of representatives. They have, for instance, fixed that one of the provinces — Quebec — shall be entitled to a specified number of representatives, and that all the other provinces shall be entitled to the same proportion of representatives as their population bears to that of Quebec. Mr. Clark : That will not get rid of fractions ! Mr. BAKER : It does to a far greater extent than does the American Constitu- tion, and it is self-acting, and it does not call for the interference of the federal par- liament from time to time to alter the number of people who are entitled to a representative. I do not desire to move an amendment, but I wish to ask the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, whether the committee carefully considered the two systems, and what are the reasons why they have adopted the American system? Mr. Playford : Because we could not get a good basis ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: The answer is that no state in Australia at the present time corresponds to the position which was occupied by the province of Quebec at the time of the establishment of the Canadian Constitution. Quebec was a thoroughly Avell settled state, in which the population scarcely increased at all. Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 613 excepting by the natural increase of births over deaths. Tliere is no state in Aus- tralia Mhich you may say is in that en- tirely settled condition. Supposing we had taken, for instance, the state of Vic- toria, which, being the smallest and the most densely populated so far as its area is concerned, may be said to be the most settled state. It is quite likely that Vic- toria may increase very largely. If you gave a fixed number of members to Vic- toria the result would be to reduce the number of members of any other state which did not increase so fast. If you can find a state which you are quite sure will increase most slowly you might adopt that principle ; but whilst the matter is quite uncertain you would run the great risk of reducing the number of representa- tives for difierent states, which, I think, would be very unfortunate. Clause agreed to. Clause 2.3. The qualification of electors of members of the house of representatives shall be in each state that which is prescribed by the law of the state as the qualification for electors of the more numerous house of the parliament of the state. Mr. DEAKIN : Do I understand that it is proposed to ar. Cockhurn. plain. I understand him to mean that. If he does not, I should like to know what he does mean. Would it not be an absurdity again, if, in choosing members of the lesser house, they were to adopt a conservative principle, and in choosing members of the greater house, they were to adopt a more liberal one 1 The two things could not run together in one country. The hon. gentleman must see that at once, and if the hon. gentleman wishes to put the mat- ter to a practical test, it would be better to say that the house shall be elected in a certain manner, and that would settle the question once and for all. Throughout the whole of the discussion the idea has prevailed that the rights of individual states should be preserved with regard to their constitution. Dr. CoCKBURX : Except on any vital principle ! Mr. MARMION : Surely this is a vital principle in the election of the bodies politic. Dr. CoCKBURX : That is their look out ; this is the look out for all the colonies ! Mr. MARMION : Pehaps it is ; but if you interfere in the one case you might interfere in all. At the present time in the majority of the states of Australia manhood suffrage is the rule. However, one man one vote is not the rule through- out Australia, but only in one state at the present time ; and why should the other states of Australia, because one state now adopts that principle, be compelled within the four corners of this bill to adopt it 1 I think the suggestion is far too radical a one for this assembly to carry out. Dr. CoCKBURN : Not too radical for Australia ! Mr. MUNRO : I confess, first of all, that I cannot agree with the hon. and learned member, Sir Samuel Grifiith, that it will not be necessary to have a separate roll and registration for these elections. There must be, for this reason : that you Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia BiU. 615 have not ia any colony right through the same principle as is proposed here. We only propose to give the electors one repre- sentative for every 30,000 people, and there is not one colony where the representatives number more than one to every 10,000 or 15,000 persons. Mr. Playford : We could group the districts ! Mr. MUNRO : If you do that you must have a special roll for each. Mr. Playford : Ko, use the rolls of two or three districts ! Mr. MUNRO : Thehon. member knows that when you prepare a roll you say it is t!ie electoral roll or the ratepayers' roll for a certain electoral district, giving its title. If you group three districts together you must have a different title and say that it must be the electoral district of so-and-so. You must use the roll as you mix them together. Mr. Playford : No ! Mr. MUNRO : The question that the lion, gentleman has raised now is that we are intei'fering with the right of the states if we say that an elector for the federal parliament shall have no property qualifi- cation. I say that we do not. We leave the elections for the local parliaments ex- actly a.s they are now, and in this bill it is provided that the people of the states are to Vjc the electors. If the people of the states are to be the electors, surely we ought to give them power !Mr. J. FoRRK.ST : Where is that said ? Mr. MUNRO : In this bill. Dr. CoCKBURN : It is implied! Mr. MUNRO : If it is implied we ought to carry it out honestly. Dr. CocKBURN : It follows on the other prnposition ! Mr. MUNRO: If thepeoplc of the state it follows, of course, that the election is not by the people. Only those who have pro- perty can vote. Mr. Clark : How about women 1 Mr. MUNRO : The sooner women are enfranchised the better for all concerned. If the hon. member is prepared to move that women shall be allowed to vote, I shall be quite willing to support him ; but at the present time we are only dealing with the question of whether or not the electors of the house of representatives should have a property qualification. I say the>y ought not to have a property qualifi- cation, and that they ought not to have more than one vote. That is the true posi- tion to take up in a fair and proper system of representation. Mr. MARMION : I do not think the hon. gentleman has rightly considered the question. I do not see how an elector could have more than one vote ; because if the various electorates are treated as one, how can a man have a vote for more than one constituency 1 Dr. CocKBURN : He can vote four or five times ! Mr. MARMION : That is, for various districts. Mr. MuKRO : There will lie various dis- tricts ! Mr. MAR:^II0N : Tiie whole colony, I take it, will be one district. Mr. IVFuNRO : No; the hon. gentleman is wrong I Sir GEORGE GREY : This is the most important question probably that we have to consider in this bill. I think there can be no doubt whatever that a clear ca.se can be made out for the absolute necessity of giving only one vote to each man, and giving every man a tight to vote on the question of returning repre.sentative.s to the central parliament. If hon. gentle- are to elect the members of the hou.se of men will lellect over the circumstances of representatives, and if you say that unless the case, they will find that the original they have property they cannot vote, then idea I believe in every one of these colonies G16 Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. %va3 that there should only be one vote possessed by each man. That was the oviginal conception. That undoubtedly was the conception in New Zealand. But it was soon found that the words used might possibly be so extended that a man could get a vote for each district. The first steps made in that direction were not contested, and people began by obtaining a qualification for a second district, and then a third district, and so it spread until Avhat was really a great abuse came into existence. The colonies are all dif- ferently circumstanced. "We had a hardy set of people to deal with in South Aus- tralia, who knew precisely what their rights were, and who were determined to get them ; and they succeeded in obtaining, I believe, a more liberal constitution than is possessed by any other part of Aus- tralasia. That was the result. The other colonies are in various conditions. Some, like New Zealand, have one vote per man, but a nominee upper house. Then we have other colonies, like New South Wales, where plural voting prevails to a con- siderable extent, or the power of plural voting, and where also there is a nomin- ated council. Then you have a colony like Victoria, where the right of plural voting exists also to a considerable extent. Thei'e they have an elective upper house ; but burdened with a property qualifica- tion, which has altogether been abolished in Great Britain, and in almost every British country. That is the position of our representation here. I contend that it is absolutely necessary to comply with what I believe to be the desire of Great Britain, Every one of our constitutions was made by the Parliament of Great Britain, and fre- quently made either without the people being consulted, or even if they were con- sulted, some provisions were put in con- trary to their wishes. In the British Par- liament we had no representation what- ever, and the result is that Great Britain \Sir George Grey. has drifted into a difficulty with its colo- nies — that is, it does not know how to give the people liberty — full liberty, and the only way in which it could do it at first apparently is this : to pass an act to say that every one of the colonial constitutions should terminate from and after a certain date, that the act of parliament should prevail no longer than that time, and that the populations of the different countries must pi'ovide their own constitutions so as to be prepared to meet the difficulty when their existing constitutions die out. But in the case now of Australasia, with extraordi- nary generosity Great Britain virtually says to this country, " Make at once the consti- tution which best pleases yourselves. Send that home for our consideration." And in point of fact, there is that which amounts almost to a promise, or, at all events, to an understanding, that if we send home nothing extraordinary or wrong, the desires of the people will be acceded to ; and I have no doubt v.hatever that, looking to the pre- sent state of public feeling on the subject of representation, the general opinion in the minds of British statesmen is, that wo shall establish a constitution in which one man will have one vote. Now, what do we propose to do in this bill ? We pro- pose to evade carrying out what really are the instructions from Great Britain — that is, the framing of a complete constitution for ourselves, by saving at once that we adopt the colonial constitutions as they exist, and that we give those constitutions to the states, and that they shall carry them out. And we are told then that they are to have the liberty of altering those as they like. But I say that we give them no fair opportunity of altering them as they like — none whatever. Mr. CuTHBERT : Why % \ Sir GEORGE GPvEY : On account of plural voting. The minority rule the majority. Colonel Smith : How 1 I Commonicealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. G17 Sir GEORGE GREY: By plural voting; of the states, and taking from them a pri- by the power of voting for several dis- vilege. I say the only privilege taken tricts, so that while most of the voters of away will be the right of the minority to the country have but one vote, the favoured oppress the majority. That certainly will few have many votes, one in each district, be taken away ; but if the people choose and they exercise a corresponding influence to have a constitution of that kind they in parliament, and that parliament so can instantly restore it. It requires but elected virtually chooses the upper house. one vote simply to say we shall have our old The upper house is not fairly chosen in constitution back again; a single clause will this colony, nor is it, to my mind, fairly do it, and they may go on then as they are chosen in Victoria. Therefore, it is pro- goingonnow. But if the privilege forwhich posed absolutely to cut off all freedom from we now contend be not granted, I feel sure us, and we are told it is to preserve the that many years will in some cases elapse privileges of the states. "What is the pri- before that boon will be won and gained vilege 1 The privilege is that the minority which now can be instantaneously given, should oppress the majority if they please. I hope, therefore, that the Convention, That is what it comes to, and that is the rising to the present emergency, will re- onus from which we ought to relieve them. lieve the parliament of Great Britain from Now an opportunity is given to us so to the difficulty that it has, knowing the relieve them. "We have only to put the manner in which it has legislated for the provision proposed into this bill — one which colonies, sometimes without their know- I was so glad to hear one of the dele- ledge, sometimes without their consent, gates from Victoria support. I never felt sometimes in direct violation of what they greater pleasure. I feared opposition, and asked for, as was the case in New Zealand, to my great surprise and delight, I found because one ministry — I forget the name that there was a voice given in favour of the premier at the time, but I believe of what I believe to be truly just and it was Sir Robert Peel — promised that we righteous. But I do hope that this Con- should have an upper house elected by the vention, rising to the occasion, will say to councils of the provinces ; but the new the people of Australasia, *' "We, having ministry which came in disapproved of placed in our hands a noble gift for you, that, and at the dictation of a single man — if we please to give it, or to diminish it, a member of the British mini-stry — altered will say that we will not diminish it ; we it into a nominated hou.sc. Some of us will take notliing from the great boon we have struggled for years to change that, have the power to bestow upon you, and and we have struggled in \ ain ; wc have we give you the right in your federated not accomplished it. But give us this parliament of having your representatives boon now ; put us in the same position as elected under the system of one man one South Australia is ; give all the coloniestho vote." Now, if that is done we may remedy right of getting into that bles.sed haven of almost everything, because everything do- rest, as I may call it, that they have got, and pends really upon the central Iiouse, and then I see before the future of Australia I feel certain that if that is done then we a rapid advance in all that they can justly shall feel it our duty to introduce a clause desire, and a future far brighter than what which will give to the states the power of w-ill be given to them if the bill, as it is starting with one man one vote. You will proposed, is allowed to pass. I, therefore, be told, hon. gentlemen, that this will be earnestly press on hon. gontloincn that in making an alteration in the constitution justice to Australasia, and in justice to 618 Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Great Britain, the boon we now pray for on behalf of the people of Australasia should be accorded to those who are seek- intj to frain it. Sir JOHN DOWNER : T entirely be- lieve in the principle of one man one vote. The only colony in which it prevails is by no means one of the largest colonies in the elieve, and which I believe, to be entirely a correct one, are to insist that there shall be no federation of Australia until the larger colonies and the greater portion of the population adopt that particular view. I think it w^ould defeat all federation if we endeavoured to impose any such limita- tions. I am sure it is against every prin- ciple of federation which has ever been successful, and we have before us the ilhis- trious precedent of the one great demo- cracy of the world, which thought itself safe in its creation in adopting the method suggested here, and whicli has proved by its ■working that no injurious results can come from it. Mr. BARTON : I would ask hon. members who support the amendment ■wliether there may not be a better way of obtaining what they desire] If the prin- ciple of one man one vote is one that we should adopt, it will assert itself, as time goes on, throughout the continent, and if it doe-s that, it will impre.ss itself upon the parliament of the commonwealth. Is it not worth our while, tlierefore, to consider whether the proposition we are discussing should not be only a temporary one — that is to .say, whether the views of the states in prescribing the qualification of electors of members of the house of representa^ tives should operate any further than the first election, and until the parliament of thecommon wealth have other wise provided? If the proposal be a good one the common- wealth may be relied uj)on to adopt it. I am in favour of it myself ; I think tlie principle is a good one ; and I have the utmost confidence that the parliament of the commonwealth will adopt it. But whether that be so or not, the decision should be left to that parliament. It is not for us to try to dominate matters in any way in a question of this sort. It is for us to give the parliament of the com- monwealth, so far as we can do so, the widest power to execute all that is neces- sary, and if we do that we shall prescribe merely what is convenient in regard to the first election — that is to say, we shall leave this clau.se as it is, subject to a slight amendment at the commencement, requir- ing that the clause shall operate for the first election, and until the parliament of the commonwealth otherwise provides. Mr. Gillies : Will the hon. member explain more pi-ecisely what he means 1 31r. BARTON : I mean that the pro- visions of the bill shall operate for the first election, until something else can be done ; but that when the first election is secured, and when the parliament of the common-wealth meets, it shall be compe- tent for it to take its own course as to this matter. Mr. Gillies : To declare who shall be its electors ! Mr. BARTON : Precisely— who shall be its electors. Mr. Gillies : And whether there shall be a high qualification or no qualification ! IVIr. BARTON : To fix its own fran- chise. It does seem to me that if you arc going to trust the parliament of the commonwealth at all, you must trust it to fix its own franchise. Mr. Gillies : But it will consist of the states 1 Mr. BARTON : It cannot help consist- ing of the states and of the people of the states. But one liouse will consist of the statrs in certain proportions. I refer to the house which wc are told is the nation- ally representative house. And surely the G20 Cvmmomoealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. franchise upon -whicli tlie whole Lody po- litic -will send its representatives into that national house is a matter that should be fixed by the house itself, just as the elec- toral laws for the legislative assemblies or Louses of representatives in the different colonies are fixed. We have these powers in our respective colonies ; and I suppose we think we have used them well. Surely it is not contended that in the course of time it will not be a wise and necessary thing that the franchise of every citizen of Australia to the national house shall be an equal franchise 1 Mr. Gillies : That would be very de- sirable ! Mr. BARTON : It is very desirable in- deed that there should be one national franchise, and that would be the inevitable result of leaving it to the parliament of the commonwealth to fix it. If there be any doubt uj)on the point, if the parlia- ment of the commonwealth is not likely to fix a uniform franchise, the only reason for that course would be a desire to leave things as they exist in the various states. If that were so, there would be no de- parture from the provision of the bill. But if there is to be a departure, it is de- sirable that it should be taken by the par- liament of the commonvv^ealth, because it is a matter that belongs more properly to them. I suggest, therefore, that instead of our agreeing to import the principle of one man one vote here — although I myself quite agree with the principle — it is a matter which should be left to the parlia- ment of the commonwealth itself. If room be made for me to do so — if I might venture to ask for an opportunity to do so, for I was not present a little while ago — I would test the sense of the Committee upon an amendment, inserting before the first word of the clause some such words as these : " For the first election, and until the parliament of the commonwealth other- ■wise provides." \_Mr. Barton. Mr. DEAKIN : This involves the ques- tion raised by me in the first instance when the clause Avas brought forward, and I would point out now, in one sentence, to the lion, member, Dr. Cockburn, that in any case he must adopt some addition to his own amendment. It will be absolutely impossible to make provision for the first election of the house of representatives being held in certain of the colonies, under the restriction he proposes to add to the clause. To move the amendment without some addition would be to prevent the first election taking place in certain colonies, and to defeat federation. Dr. COCKBURN" : My hon. colleague. Sir John Downer, instanced what had been done in America. As far as I can read history, the several states sought out that which was best in the constitution of each state, and put it into their model constitu- tion, and it was only because they did that, because they chose all that was best in the constitutions of the various states, that they were able to frame a document which has been the veneration of all people since its first enactment. The result is that the Constitution is looked upon as a model for other constitutions, and to make a mistake in this-respect would be in my opinion, to make a fatal mistake at the very com- mencement of our federation. I cannot agree with those who say that the proposal that manhood suQ'rage should find a place in this constitution is in advance of the times, nor can I agree that to argue that the principle of one man one vote should find its place in this constitution is to argue in advance of the times. I think that those who hold other views have yet to come up to the line upon which the colony of South Australia stands. I think we should be making a great mis- take if we allowed either the first election to the federal parliament, or indeed any election, to take place upon any other prin- ciple. Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 621 INIr. Deakix : The hon. member cannot rule, while he at the same time proposed help it ! to dictate and rule. What we have to Di*. COCKBURN : I do not agree with do is to constitute a totally new legis- the hon. member. The different colonies lature, and we have to call it into exist- will have to frame electoral machinery, ence with all proper limbs, head, and they will have to divide their colonies up body, to enable it to act, and act well and into electoral districts for the election of wisely. "We have a perfect right to frame members of the house of representatives ; the best and most perfect machine that and to abandon this amendment would be we can. When hon. members tell us a distinct Tiolation of the principle already that we ai'e not authorised to dictate to affirmed — that the house of representatives Australasia, I reply that we are not the shall be chosen by the people. It has been people who are dictating, but it is those very well pointed out by an hon. member who say this shall not be done who are that we should not begin our constitution dictating to us. Undoubtedly the people by putting into it an inconsistency. If of Australasia have a right to start at we are going to frame a constitution which once on the principle of one man one vote ; is to be a benefit to ourselves, and to pos- and it is our business to allow them to terity, we must be consistent to vital prin- enter into that right. The whole of the ciples, and I feel that I cannot give way arguments used to the contrary are of no or accept a compromise. avail whatever. With those hon. gentle- Sir Samuel Griffith : The amendment men who argue against this, the argument of the hon. member, ]\Ir. Barton, comes always is, " We perfectly agree in the before the hon. member's amendment ! principle ; but do not introduce it now. Dr. COCKBURN : That may be ; but Let the states do it for themselves." To so far as the principle of my amendment is which I say : I do not want, as far as I am concerned, I feel that I cannot give way. concerned, that the states should do it for I take it that the house of representatives, me, or help me, or the state I am in, to do it. even the first house, is to be of the people ; Mr. Baker : Does New Zealand intend that our government is to be of the people, to join the federation ? and that being so, our house of representa- Sir GEORGE GREY : New Zealand tives must not be chosen by any other than wishes the power to be retained to enter thepeoi)le. To provideothcrwise would bn cheerfully into a combination of which it acontradiction in terms which would not be approves. This constitution is intended a credit to this Convention. The posse.ssors to take in all Australasia, and it should of other constitutions have had to fight for be so framed. We have no wish to have their freedom. The freedom of the com- this done for us by other people, but our monwcalth of Australia sliould be simul- desire is to do it for ourselves. Why tancous with its birth ; it should be free- should the men who have so long kept us born. I am of course willing to withdraw out of these rights still .say, "Wait, wait my amenrlment to enable the hon. mem- a little longer ; we will ultimately do it ber, Mr. Barton, to move hi.s amendment. for you ; you shall ultimately carry what Sir GEORGE GREY : Before the you wish," when wc can get what we wish amendment is withdrawn, I think tliere now? That is our right ; let us struggle are several arguments used by various hon. for it, and ask this Convention to agree members wliidi should be replied to. I that that should be done. An hon. mem- understood the hon. member, Mr. Barton, ber said that Australia was not prepared to argue that we were not to dictate or for it and did not desire it. 622 Commoniveailh of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Sir John Downer : I said that many of the larger states were not prepared for it ! Sir GEORGE GREY : I maintain that all the larger states are prepared and wish for it. I am sure I speak the universal wish of Australia when I say they do want it. Sir John Downer : Why have they not got it ] Sir GEORGE GREY: How could they? That is the very point. How long did it take \is to get the single vote in New Zealand ? For how many years was the bill on the order-paper in vain 1 For how many years have we desired to have an elected legislative council instead of a nominated one 1 Because we had no power to get it. Now we are asked to continue to deprive the people of the power of ob- taining these things for some time longer. They say, " We will grant it to you." Who will grant it to us ? Those who have kept it from us so long. Mr. J. Forrest : AVho are they 1 Sir GEORGE GREY : Why evade the point by a question of that kind 1 Every one knows that they ai-e the existing legis- latures, in which the people have never been fairly represented. Who can deny that plural voting has existed and has ex- ercised a very great influence? Who can deny that nominated councils prevented many things from being done ? It is im- possible to pass any bill without having to consider whether or not another house will approve of it. No statesman is cer- tain of carrying in its integrity that which he desires. We wish now to be allowed to do for ourselves that which we think necessary for the good of the country. I feel satisfied that almost every man in Australia would say that that is his wish. On every ground I conceive that we are en- titled to have this thing done. Not a single argument used on the other side has the least weight or potency, and I am certain that the arguments used again.st the pi'oposal can be answered by many hon. members. \_Sir George Grey. Mr. FITZGERALD : I apprehend that this Convention is not the arena in which a question of this importance should be thrashed out. We are not here to decide whether or not the principle of one man one vote should be adopted by the various legislatures. I am not favourable to that principle ; but I do not intend to go into the arguments. My reason for supporting the clause as it stands is that in the first place I regard it as an intrusion upon the domain of the rights of the various states for this Convention to dictate to them the principle on which the election of their re- presentatives should be governed. In the ]iext place, if we were unwise enough to do so, it would jeopardise very seriously the adoption of the measure which we hope to send to the states, because of the resentment which we should naturally give rise to if we were impudent enough to attempt to dictate to the states and tell them that we as representatives went entirely outside the mission we were charged with, by laying down a hard and fast rule that they were to elect their I'epresentatives on a principle which they had not yet seen fit to adopt. I cannot con- ceive how hon. gentlemen of the experience of Sir George Grey, and others who sup- port him, can go in such a direction. We are all anxious to see some scheme of feder- ation adopted. Surely we are not going to hamper that with difficulties by propos- ing what would have no chance of accept- ance, and what would involve, as far as this Convention is concerned, a dispute which would very likely prevent our agree- ing upon other and more important prin- ciples ! If the states of Australia prefer to defer the adoption of this system, which may or may not be inevitable, surely it is not for us to hurry them forward. Their rearard for their own interests will lead them to it in the fullness of time if it is for their interests. Why give them a fillip? Why urge them in a direction in which, Commonweahh of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 625 surely, their democratic spirit is sufficiently advanced to enable them to travel without any spur of ours ? 1 hope we shall not spend much more time on this discussion. Hon. members who have strong opinions on this subject have aired their opinions and, no doubt, have also done so on many occasions in their various colonies. They have satisfied the end for which, no doubt, this discussion has been raised. As a matter of principle, as a matter of prudence, as a matter of duty, I hold that we cannot adopt it. As a principle, we are not agreed upon it ; and, if we were, it has nothing to do with federation. As a matter of prudence, I hold that it would endanger the whole scheme by giving rise to resentment in the vai'ious states at our having interfered in a matter which con- cerns them but which does not concern us, which is outside our commission, which we have no right to touch, and which, as a matter of legislation, is one of very doubt- ful expediency. I hold very strong opinions upon the subject ; but I hold that it would be a wrong policy to give expression to those opinions now. I am not one of those towliom thehon. member, Sir George Gi-ey, ha-s alluded, who say, " I agree with it ; but do not think this the time for it." I do not agree with it ; and I think that this is not the time to deal with it. Mr. IJAKTON : If the hon. member, Dr. Cockburn's amendment is witlidrawn I intend to move mine, so as to give the parliament of the commonwealth power to legislate on the suVjject — a power similar to that which is given in clause 10. My amendment coidd be carried subject to any restriction wliich that of Dr. Cockburn might place upon it. If Dr. Cockburn's amendment should be negatived, my amendment would still pave the way to the adoption by the federal parliament of the principle of one man one vote. Mr. PLAYFOKD : It appears to mo to be a matter of principle that wc ought to adopt a uniform constituency for the election of our members. Whether we can adopt that uniform mode of election at first is another thing ; but certainly it should be adopted in the long run. We said not long ago when it was proposed to give the various states the right to vary the mode of choice and the election of membei-s of the senate, " We want uniformity throughout the vai'ious states with regard to these elec- tions." I think we ought to carry that fur- ther, and say w-ith regard to the houseof re- presentatives, " We want ultimate unifor- mity in the matter throughout the various colonies." Therefore, it appears to me that one of two courses are now open to us. Either the course suggested by the hon. and learned member, Mi. Barton, or that proposed by Dr. Cockburn. One is that for the first election it shall be as provided by the clause now under consideration, but that afterwards the commonwealth parliament shall decide and make laws dealing with the subject, or we may takeDr. Cockburn's proposal to fix it at once, which, however, I think, we cannot very well give effect to. It would be very troublesome at all events, to have the constituencies and the electoral rolls ready to give effect at once to the principle of manhood suffrage and one man one vote. Of the two ])roposal3 I think that of the hon. and loarned member, Mr. Barton, is the best. We can very well say that until the federal parliament makes a uniform law dealing with tlie constituencies which shall elect the house of representatives wc will act under this clause. That the federal parlia- ment should have the power to make that uniform law ought to be admitted on all sides. It should certainly have the power to do it. It might be advisable for us to doit even now, Ijut that is doubtful. That the commonwealth parliamctnt sliould have the power is,! think, advisable. Under the cir- cumstances, I shall sup[)ort the proposal of the hon. and learned member, Mr. Barton. C2-t Commomoealth of [2 April, 1891.1 Australia Bill. Mr. DIBBS : I am in favour of the principle of one man one vote, and the sooner we establi.sh that principle the better. I look upon the proposal of the hon. and learned member, Mr. Barton, as being one purely of an experimental charac- ter. Mr. Barton : The hon. member does not understand it ! Mr. DIBBS : I understood the lion. member to say that for the first election the hon. member, Dr. Cockburn's prin- ciple should stand, and that it should be altered afterwards. An Hex. Member : No; the other way ! Mr. DIBBS : Then I misunderstood the Lon. and learned member. With regard to what was said by the hon. members, Mr. Fitzgerald and Sir John Downer, I may state that the principle of one man one vote has been affirmed in the legisla- ture of New South Wales. In our last session it was affirmed in a bill to give effect to it. That bill was read a second time. But owing to the natural jealousy of the Government in regard to it the matter was shelved, the Government pro- mising to bring in a new electoral bill in which the principle should be given effect to. If we are to establish federation at all, uniformity in regard to these elections ought to be one of the principles of that federation. From one of the clauses of this bill we find that there are some thirty-one matters which we are supposed to federate on for the purpose of obtain- ing uniformity, and why in regard to the house of representatives of the federal par- liament we should not have uniformity of election I fail to understand. As I have not understood the remarks of the hon. and learned member, Mr. Barton, I will say no more in regai-d to his amend- ment at present. I wish to point out that the principle of one man one vote is al- ready recognised in some of the colonies, and that in the largest of the states — New South Wales— the principle has been affirmed, and the present Government are pledged to introduce a measure during the ensuing session to carry it out, and no doubt the bill will be carried. Under the circumstances, why should we not now in starting this larger scheme affirm a prin- ciple which is a principle of democracy in its purest form 1 Mr. GILLIES : I confess that now and again I have some difficulty in following the views of some hon. members. I imagined that we all understood in the formation of this federation that it was not such a federation as would be a com- plete legislative federation — federation as in the case of older states. It is only a partial federation. It is originated with the object of enabling the whole of the co- lonies on this continent to join together in a union for the purpose of accomplishing work which could not otherwise be pro- perly accomplished by the states separately. We started with that idea, and we really did believe that on this continent the colo- nies of Australia would be able to do a large amount of good if they were able to join together in a federation of that kind. We are gradually getting beyond that idea, and we are forging ahead to such an extent that we propose to join together on a basis wholly different from that on which the people in the various states joined together amongst themselves for the purposes of carrying on legislation and government. I confess that the view submitted by the hon. gentleman sitting below me is not new to the public, or to the Convention, nor was it altogether new to the commit- tee who considered the constitution j but as a proposal in practical politics in rela-j tion to this federation, I believe it is new. We are here, I presume, as practical! men, to do practical business. The prac- tical business which we are called upon to perform, each delegate representing his individual state, is to lay a foundation CommoniceaUh of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 625 and to prepare a bill for the purpose of of the states. But what is the proposal now? carrying federation into effect — to draft We are to depart from the constitutions a constitution. Lines were laid down for in existence in the various states, enabling our consideration by our President when electors to vote for representatives in the he submitted his resolutions to us, and popular house, and to place in the hands the idea which they indicated was that so of the federal parliament the power to say, far as the constitution was concerned, it We shall completely subvert these consti- was to be framed on such lines as would tutions. With what object 1 Is it with bring the various states to join in this the object of having these states repre- federation on grounds which we all pretty sented, or is it with the object of practi- well understood. Xow, what were some cally altering their constitutions altogether of the most important of these grounds ? so far as their representation in the federal We believe that in drafting the constitu- parliament is concerned ? In my judgment tion, and obtaining persons to represent that is altogether apart from the original the states in the house of representatives object with which we started, namely, to and in the senate, in order to facilitate have the states represented in the federal matters, it would be the wisest thing to parliament practically as they are repre- take the legislative powers possessed by sented in their own. the several colonies in their constitutions, Mr. Fitzgerald : And in the manner and we believe that the basis upon which that they themselves think best ! we propose to frame these bodies is the Mr. GILLIES : With only this differ- most natural and simple possible. Take ence : that with respect to the senate the re- all the colonies — Victoria, New South presentation is to be of adifferentcharacter, Wales, Queensland — each of them have a because the parliaments of the various representation based on a franchise to states are asked to send representatives to which in nearly all cases up to the present the senate in order that that body may be- time has there been scarcely any serious representative of the states. But with re- objection. The one question conflicting spect to the popular branch of the federal with it is the " one man one vote" prin- parliament, namely, the house of repre- ciplo. I am not going to discuss the sentutives, that is to be based upon the grounds upon which I believe that "one re[)resentation given to each elector of the man one vote" would be more .satisfactory various states in thelegislativeassembliesofi to the people as a whole than the present thosestates. And why 1 Because itis true franchise ; but I say that the existing that in each colony the jjopular branch of franchi.sc here is marvellously liberal. It tin- legislature is representativeof the great is scarcely exceeded in liberality in any Ijulk of the people. If they conceive that country in the world. We possess under for their own interest and welfare their the respective constitutions of the .several suffrageis based exactly in the way that can colonies the greatest possible liberty that best promote their prosperity, they will one can conceive that a man might have consider it an improper interference with under any constitution. What is the result? their lights to be called uiton to elect Wecanmakeourown lawsandnodifhculty members to the house of representatives has occurred, except in a few instances upon a franchise different from that upon ■where an honest difference of opinion has which they elect their representatives to existed betv/cenmenholdingoppositc views, their own house of assembly. And are they but who have been sufficiently liberal to pre- not to be the judges ? Who else are to be vent any serious trouble from arising in any the judges, if they are not 1 As I said at the 2 R G2G Commonwealili of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. beginning, if we were to liave a complete legislative ftnleration, and all tlie states were abolished except for merely municipal purposes, I could understand this body agreeing to a totally different franchise from that at present existing in any of the states. But may I, for a second, remind lion, gentlemen that only the other day we were told by some hon. members that they liad it in contemplation to submit to their own houses of parliament a bill for the enfranchisement of women, and if the amendment be carried we may have the federal parliament passing a bill, not only based upon the most liberal franchise that exists in any of the states, but even intro- ducing a new element altogether, the politi- cal effect of which, I venture to say, no man within these walls can foresee — namely, the enfranchisement of women. Mr. Playford : Cannot the lion, mem- ber trust the federal parliament ? Mr. GILLIES : We are not speaking of trusting the federal parliament. We might as well say, " We need no provisions in the constitution that will limit their power or tie their hands in any way." What the hon. member practically con- tends for is that the federal parliament shall be given a constitution in blank, so that it can do what it likes, without any limitation whatever to its powers. That is the meaning of his interjection. iMr. Playford .• They will represent the people ! Mr. GILLIES : We will trust the federal parliament on the grounds and on the provisions contained in the constitu- tion. What is the meaning of the words " state rights" if they do not mean that certain provisions are to be inserted in the constitution v/hich will control the federal parliament, which the hon. gentleman would have us trust implicitly 1 His idea is that we should absolutely pass over to the federal parliament the i-ights of all the states individually, even of the smallest \_Mr. Gillies. of them. If that were done, we could swamp them to-morrow simply because we had a majority. But this is not the object which we have in view in fram- ing the constitution of the federal parlia- ment. We desire to see that every indi- vidual state, whether it be large or small, shall be protected under the provisions of the constitution. It is in common justice to the states coming into the federation that these provisions are inserted in the constitution. Are we to give them no rights ; are we to give them no claims'? If they come into the federation they will come in iinder certain conditions, and we have carefully provided that these condi- tions shall not be changed at the ijyse dixit of a simple majority. We take care that the rights of each of the states, even the smallest of them, shall be preserved, and that when they have voluntarily come within the federation upon certain well- known lines, those lines shall not be de- parted from unless they have an oppor- tunity of protesting. We provide that a change shall only be made by an absolute majority of the federal parliament, and at the same time that their decision, whatever it may be, shall be referred to a convention of the electors in each state which must sup- ])ort the majority of the federal parliament. So that talking of submitting everything and leaving everything to tbe federal par- liament, is not reasonable. That is the reason why I say that we are making a proposal which, I contend, is in contraven- tion of the distinct understanding upon which gentlemen came here, representing the various colonies — what to do % To see that justice wasdone to all. Now there is a new departure. We are to submit new proposals to be embodied in the constitu- tion which completely alter the representa-, tion of the most popular branches of th< legislatures in the whole of the states. The sufjgestion has been made that the federal! parliament, under this proposal, would be Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 627 in a position to so completely cbange the franchise for the election of members to the federal parliament as to extend the franchise to women. I assert that, although I have paid great attention to the con- sideration of this question, I have not, up to the present hour, been able to learn from any one who has supported these proposals what the consequence of such a violent change would be in our political institutions. I am not going to say at this moment that I would condemn a pro- posal of that kind if I were convinced that it was one that would promote the interests of the whole community of men «,nd women ; but I say that up to the present hour not one solitary state on this continent has ever attempted to submit for legislative decision a proposition of that kind. I object to arbitrary power being given to the federal parliament to deal with the franchise of the whole of the people in the way to which I have re- ferred. If we are to be practical men, if we Iiocestly believe that it is our duty to carry ■a rational constitution for a federal parlia- ment, we must, I say, abandon these fads. Fads they are, at any rate up to the present hour, and I say we must almndon them. Dr. CocKiJUUN : Which fads? Mr. GILLIES: Tii.- lion, gentleman's proposal is a fad. Dr. CocKBL'RN : What ! Manhood suf- frage a fad ! Mr. GILLIES : No, it is not manliood suffrage; we have manhood suffrage, and we are prepared to stick to manhood suf- frage. I claim for our Pavlijimont, the Parliament of Victoria, the power to frame its laws a.s it thinks proper with reference to the right of electors, or any man in the community to vole. Mr. Plavfoud : Have you women's .suf- frage in Victoria 1 Mr. GILLIES : The lion, gentleman cannot keep quiet ; he is bound to speak. Interruption can do no good, because it is not ai'gument. In the colony of Victoria we claim the right to frame our electoral laws as we think proper — to admit every person to the suffrage. We claim the right to frame our laws so that there shall be one man one vote. No doubt that principle may be delayed for a time ; but I believe that in all the colonies it will come by-and- by. But why should we rush this question at the present hour 1 W^hy should we draw a herring across the track, and try to prevent — as I believe will be the case if a proposal of this kind is carried — the federal parliament making such laws as it thinks proper ? I deny that right ; I do not think it is desirable. I believe that if we are going to do real practical work, and to form a federation, we must be prepared for the present to abide by the laws on electoral subjects which are made in each of the colonies; that the colonies, in return- ing men to parliament, shall return those men elected on the popular basis to the popular branch of the legislature ; and we must be prepared to abide by those laws so long as they exist. To say that we are to insist on the colony of Victoria, or the colony of New South Wales, or the colony of Queensland, or indeed any other colony, electing persons to the popu- lar l>ranch of the federal parliament under totally different laws and conditions to those appertaining to the individual colo- nies, has never before been contended; and I am sorry that the question has been raised at present, because I am confident we are raising difficulties in tlie path of federation which are wholly unnecessary. I venture to say that there are some matters contained in the bill now before us whicli, if persisted in, will rai.se new difficulties and now troubles. For what pur[)0se — with what object? Surely not f jr the purpose of preventing fed(M'ation ! I say, however, that they will hclj) to ])re- vent federation. This proposal for federa- tion will naturally encounter, in conse- G2S Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. quence of natural diversities of opinions in the various colonies, sufficient opposi- tion, without our raising new difficulties wliich it is not necessary to raise. The man who raises new and unnecessary diffi- culties in our path at the present moment is not a man, in my opinion, who is truly favourable to federation. Dr. COCKBURN : The arguments of the lion, member, Mr. Gillies, were so en- tirely directed against the proposal of the hon. member, Mr. Barton, and not against mine, that I think it is for the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Barton, to answer them, and not for me. I concur in almost the whole of the remarks made by the hon, gentleman who last spoke. I think that the greatest diversity should be left to the legislatures in everything but things essential. With the exception of the question of one man one vote I would leave all the remainder of the realm of diversities to the legisla- tures, I agree that it would be a mistake to cramp the individuality of the different states bypassing a generallawarrangingtlie franchise in every detail. Just a word with regard to the statement that any one who advocates that manhood suffrage and the one man one vote principle should find a place in this constitution is standing in the way, to some extent, of early federation, I maintain that it is quite the opposite. Unless you do this, those colonies which already possess manhood suffrage and the one man one vote principle will have to think very seriously before they surrender their liberties and make a retrograde step. It is a well-known saying that in democracy there is no step backward. Mr. Fitzgerald : What addition will one man one vote give to the people? Why, it is a bagatelle ! Dr. COCKBURN" : It gives a great deal in principle, and something in practice, and to ask those who for many years have enjoyed the principle of one man one vote to delegate any portion of the functions [Mr. Gillies. they now exercise to a body which is not founded on so fair a basis, would be to ask them to do something which I ques- tion very much whether they would will- ingly undertake. Instead of my proposal standing in the way of federation, I am inclined to think that it will stand in the way of federation if it is not carried. These communities are progressive, and they can easily advance ; but it is very difficult for them to go back, and I do not think they ought to go back. I should be sorry to see any colony which possessed these privileges surrender them in any re- spect whatever. On the other hand, I sliould be very glad to see the other colo- nies standing in the back rank come up and take their places in the rank of free- dom ; and that is what they would do. I consider that those who are advocating the insertion of this fundamental principle of democracy in our constitution are smooth- ing the way to federation, and are not placing obstacles in the path. Mr. Bartox : Is the hon. member pre- pared to withdraw his amendment, to make room for the other one to be discussed 1 Dr. COCKBURN : I have already stated that I would allow my amendment to be withdraw in order that the hon. gentleman may introduce his amendment. I would point out that the hon. member's amend- ment introduces an entirely different prin- ciple, and that it will in no way qualify the addition of the words afterwards. As it does not really touch the question, I feel bound in courtesy to withdraw my amend- ment, in order that the hon. member may move his amendment first. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn, Mr, BARTON : I move : That the clause be amended by inserting at its commencement the following words :— " The J parliament of the commonwealth may make] laws prescribing a uniform qualification of elec-j tors of members of the house of representatives^ Until the parlianientof the commonwealth other- wise provides " Commomoeallh of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill, 629 As I said a little while ago, I have adopted some words parallel with those in clause 21, referring to the senate, so that the parliament may with reference to the house of representatives, as well as to the senate, .have the power of prescribing a uniform manner of choosincf members. In dealint;' with this matter before, I did not make myself sufficiently clear to my hon. friend, Mr. Dibbs. What I mean by this amend- ment is this : The clause as printed in the bill pi-escribes the qualification of each state to be adopted as the qualification for electors of members of the house of repre- sentatives. To that I object, because, what- ever opinion may bo held from time to time by the majority in the commonwealth, I see no reason why the majority, as ex- ercising their functions through the par- liament of the commonwealth, should be deprived of the opportunity from time to time of expressing that opinion by pre- scribing the franchise. I believe that, al- though we are giving to the various states, in the first instance, the power of sending members to the house of representatives, elected upon tlie franchise for the time- being of the more numerous house, still that is a power which ouglit never to be intended to be perpetuated in the con- stitution, because there can be nothing more desirable than that there should be a uniform basis of election for members of the house of representatives, and there cer- tainly can be nothing more undesirable than that members of the liouse of repre- sentatives, being elected upon different suf- frages in (lillerfMit states, should bo met •with the argument that they arc either more conservative or more democratic in the manner of tlieir election than those who represent otlior parts of the common- •wealth. We have to recollect tliat, with respect to tlie house of the commonwealth that whicli may be more accurately de- scribed as the main house of the common- wcaltli, the national assembly — we should endeavourtorepresentuniformlythenation. I use this word " nation " without in any sense implying that it is a nation indepen- dent of the British emj^ire. Well, if it is a sensible thing that there should not be an opportunity left for argument between hon. members coming from one state and those from another as to the basis upon which they are elected by the people — if it is a desirable thing that the people of the whole commonwealth, being fellow- citizens, and being equally fellow-citizens for that purpose, should vote equally — then there can be no question, I take it, tliat the sufi'rage throughout the common- wealth should be uniform. It has been very stoutly and warmly ai-gued by the hon. member, Mr. Gillies, that we should leave things as proposed in the bill ; but I cannot see my way to assent to that, as anything but a temporary proposition, because I do not see how we can well say that we have constituted a free parliament for the commonwealth unless v/e give that parliament power to choose the fran- chise upon which the parliament shall be elected. Mr. DoxALDSOX: And interfere with state rig] its ! Mr. BARTON : I do not see why the hon. gentleman should say " and interfere with state rights" unless this franchi.se is an uneven, and in that sense a rugged one. I do not see why the hon, member should assume that a parliament elected on a uniform basis as prescribed Ijy tlie common" wealth would be more likely to interfere with the interests of the states than would one elected on a totally uneven basis. What is the reason for the fear? Mr. DoN'ALDSox : The states of America never insisted on this ! Mr. BARTON : What have I to do with that ] Are we building an American constitution ? Mr. Donaldson : We are taking a copy from it where advisable ! 630 Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill Mr. BARTON : We are taking a copy from it where advisable ; but we are exei'- cising our own judgment as to wliat is advisable. It is no argument to say that a certain provision is in the Constitution of the United States ; but if I lind that it is applicable to the condition of this country I have no hesitation in taking the form of words, if they are fit words, in which it is embodied in the Constitution of the United States. However, it is no argument to say that a certain prin- ciple or provision is in the constitution of one country or another. What we are concerned about is whether a provision is adapted to the needs of this country. Then there can be no harm in adopting the words if they are fit words. There is no plagiarism, as suggested, for if cer- tain words have stood the test of time, and are adapted for carrying out our wishes, we should take them, unless we can find better ones. Our adopting those Avords does not imply any superiority in the con- stitution from which we adopt them, unless the idea contained in those words has fii'st commended itself to our judgment. Mr. J. Forrest : Why did not the hon. and learned gentleman do this in com- mittee 1 Mr. BARTON : I did express my views on this question in committee. From the beginning I have held the opinion that if we constitute a free parliament in a free country, we must give the house most directly responsible to the people the right of fixing the franchise. You must allow not only that house, for that is a mere form of words, but the people, to fix their franchise. We must therefore look to the people of the commonwealth to constitute a franchise upon which they shall be represented in the house of representatives. If we do not, we are not adding to the liberty of the states or people ; but are taking something away. There is no inconsistency between this position and the strongest advocacy of [J/r. Barton state interests where they are concerned. There is another house— an elected one — that is to directly represent the states, and it is a reasonable and consistent thing to give to the legislatures of the states, if they are adopted as the electoral body, the right of choosing their representatives in the senate in the manner they deem best. But that does not affect the argument a» regards the house of representatives one bit. It is the house directly representing the people, directly representing the com- monwealth itself, and is expected to work, as we hope it will, with the house wliich represents the federal principle. Mr. Gillies: And form one homogene- ous state 1 Mr. BARTON : Yes ; and form one homogeneous state. He who says that they will not form one homoajeneous state to- gether might as well argue that, where there are two houses, one with manhood suffrage, and another with a property quali- fication, you cannot form a honiogencous state. There you have class representation ; but here you have not ; that is the differ- ence. Mr. Gillies : But there are six or seven colonies to come in ! Mr. BARTON : What have I to do with the number of colonies 1 The prin- ciple, if good, is good for six or sixty. What certainly did not appear to me to- be clear in an argument on my proposal^ addressed to the Committee by one hon. member, is this : upon what form of reason it was contended that, although we might constitute a house of parliament directly representing the people elected on popular suffrage, and allow the people, as repre- sented in that parliament, to make their laws, so far as the form of the constitu- tion alloAvs them, and to present them to the other house for concurrence, we should refuse them permission to make their own laws as to a franchise which shall be satisfactory to the whole people. Commonwealth of [2 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 631 It seems to be suggested that any one who thinks that state interests should he pre- served in the senate is also compelled to abandon any idea of equal democratic re- presentation. That is not so, and I feel as strongly my principle in this matter as I feel strongly my principle with reference to election to the senate, and I trust that this amendment will be adopted, and that we shall not seek to fetter the hands of the commonwealtli in any way, that we shall not seek to take away from the par- liament of the commonwealth the power of prescribing, as the representatives of the people, how the people shall elect members to that house. I have already said that this amendment, if adopted, will not inter- fere with the amendment of the hon. mem- ber, Dr. Cockbui-n. If the amendment is adopted, and the clause as it stands follows it, and then the amendment of Dr. Cockburn is proposed, the result will be this : the amendment of Dr. Cockburn, if adopted, will qualify the whole of the clause, and introduce the principle he wishes to intro- duce, whatever system of election ensues; if, on the contrary, the amendment of Dr. Cockburn is rejected, it will not prevent, and it ouglit not to prevent, the parliament of tlie commonwealth from legislating if it chooses in the direction of one man one vote, or in the direction of any other popular refurm ; and, therefore, instead of fettering the proposal of Dr. Cockburn, if he sliould chance to lose his amendment, the amendment which I suggest will leave a way by wliich tliat popular principle can be proi)0.sed and fought out in the com- monwealth. Aiiifiidincnt prnpo:-0'l. Mr. BAKEU: What is the good of raising unnecessary difficulties ? We shall have quite enough difficulties to overcome without ])]acii)g any unnecessary iin[iedi- ments in the road of federation. I wish to remind hon. members of what has taken place in Canada with reference to this matter. The clause in the Canadian Con- stitution wdiich deals with this question is in somewhat similar words to those now proposed by the hon. member, Mr. Barton. And what has been the result? For a considerable time the Canadian Parlia- ment did not exercise the power of insti- tuting a uniform system of election, and as long as they so refrained everything went well, and the people were satisfied. But in an evil hour they exercised their powei-, and nothing else they have done has given rise to so much ill-feeling and so much fric- tion. The peo[)le in the different provinces of Canada turned round and said, " Yv^hy should you deprive us of that system of election to which we are wedded, and to which we are accustomed 1 "Why should you force upon us something we do not want? What has it got to do with you how we elect our representatives to the national assembly, if we elect them, and that election satisfies us V I wish to point that out to hen. members, because, inevit- ably, when we go back to our different colonies and ask them to assent to this con- stitution, we shall meet enemies at all hands ; and, undoubtedly, what has hap- pened in Canada will be raked up against u.s, and it will be said, " See how the people in Canada have had their privileges and rights interfered with unnecessarily by a provision such as this ; and now you ask us to give power to the federal parlia- ment to enact such a law, which has worked so detrimentally in Canadii."' I think we ought to take warning by what has hap- pened in that country. Mr. WRIXON : I shall be unable to vote for the amendment of the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Barton. It .seems to me that wo are lo.sing sight somewjiatof the object we liad in view. We are not now forming a unified nation. We are only forming an arrangement by which a number of states can come together for the accomi)lishment of certain objects that arc common to all. 632 Ccmmonwealth of [2 ArniL, 1801.] Australia Bill. I think the less we intrude into the ar- rangements which each state makes for being represented in the common parlia- ment, the better. If it is right that we should so intrude, and should inquire how they arrange to be represented, then I think we have just as good a right to go to the upper house as to the lower house, and I do not see why we should not object in some cases to nominee ujDper houses. New South Wales, for instance, has a nomi- nated upper house, of which my hon. friend, Mr. Barton, I believe, is a member. Well, if we want to scrutinise the ma- chinery which each state provides for re- turning members to the federal parliament, we might raise an objection to colonies re- turning them through a nominee upper house, on the ground that many of lis do not agree with such an institution. But we do not propose to interfere with any colony having a nominee ujiper house. We leave it full and equal power with the colony that has an elective upper house ; and just in the same way, I think, we should leave it to each state to determine for itself by what electoral machinery it will return the men whom it chooses to represent it in the house of representatives of the federal legislature. I think there is truth in what the hon. member who pre- ceded me said, namely, that Canada has got into difficulties by this very step, and by taking upon itself to interfere with the electoral machinery and arrangements of the different provinces subject to the Do- minion Government, and I have no doubt that we should give dissatisfaction if we took a similar step. Mr. KINGSTON : I think it is rather a pity that some arguments which we ha^'e heard addressed to the Convention in con- nection with this clause were not ad- vanced at the time when we were discuss- ing the propriety of e.stablishing a uni- form system in connection with the elec- tion of senators, because I am satisfied \3Ir. Wrixon. that had they been put with the force with which they have now been put, the small minority who were found recording their votes in favour of allowing each state to settle the matter for itself as it thought best would have been converted into a large majority. I thought, and still think, that it is just as well to refrain from interfering with the states in the decision of these questions for themselves, and I cannot see my way to support the amendment moved by the hon. member, Mr. Barton, which would have the effect of giving the federal parliament power to remove the subject from the jurisdiction of the states. Of course there must be some limitation as to the powers of the states in connection with the decision of the ques- tion. We are surely justified in laying down some rules for their guidance, and when the 2:)roper time comes I shall be found recording my vote in favour of the amendment indicated by my colleague. Dr. Cockburn. The two questions are, of course, involved in this amendment — the one as to the propriety of insisting upon a property qualification as portion of the electoral franchise for the national assem- bly, and the other the expediency of pro- hibiting any elector having more than one vote in connection with the return of a member to the lower branch of the federal parliament. These two propositions have been referred to in a variety of ways. One hon. delegate, who, I believe, will find one of the principles at least embodied in the legislation of the country of which he i.s a distinguished statesman, has referred to them as "fads." I do not propose to enter into a discussion of their merits, for I imagine that we all have precon- ceived ideas on the subject which we are not likely to alter during the short argum.ent which can take place on the floor of this Convention. I have a strong belief in the propriety, when we are estab- lishing a constituency for the return of Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 633 members to a national assembly, of insist- maintenance of democratic government in ing on the right of each individual to one connection with this federation. For these vote in virtue of his individuality, of re- reasons I shall be found voting in favour cognising that right and conceding it to of the embodiment within the four corners him on that ground, and denying it to of the constitution of the principles which him on all other grounds ; and it is for are contained in the amendment of which that reason that I shall record my vote my hon. colleague has given notice, in favour of the amendment. But, sub- Sir SAZ^LUEL GRIFFITH : I think, J€ct to those qualifications which appear to so far from there being any inconsistency me as sufficient to mark out the nature of in the bill as it is framed, it is perfectly the constituency which is to be intrusted consistent with respect to both houses, with the privilege of returning members With respect to the senate, we have pro- to the national assembly, I would leave vided that the electors for the senate shall the matter in the hands of the states them- be the persons who are appointed by the con- selves to settle as from time to time they stitution of the state to make law^s for the think fit. At the same time, does it not state ; and with respect to tlic house of re- strike those who have recorded their votes presentatives, we say that the constituency at a ])revious stage of this debate in favour shall be the persons who arc appointed by of establishing a uniform system for the theconstitution of the state to elect the law- choice of senators, that it is rather incon- makers for the state. The two principles sistent to lay down within the four corners are identically the same : there is no incon- of this bill a rule for establishing unifor- sistency. I rose, however, to say that I mity to the extent of depriving the people had entertained a little doubt in listening of all right of direct choice of senators to to the arguments as to which is the sounder represent them in the upper house, and at view. But there is one aspect of the ques- the .same time to refer to proposals to lay tion which I think has not been considered down a few broad lines on the subject of by the advocates of the amendment of the the nature of the qualifications to be pos- hon. member, Mr. Barton. If we give the sessed by the electors for the national as- parliament of the commonwealth power to sembly as an unwarrantable interference fix a uniform qualification, who is to say with state rigiits, and an impudent iiitru- that Ihoy may not limit tlio qualification sion on the riglit.s of each separate colony instead of extending if? That is l)y no to settle the matter for itself? Surely means an improbable contingency, if we liad a riglit to interfere as regards Mr. PLAYFonD : That is very impro- scnators, we have an equal right to inter- bable ! fere with reference to tlic other branch of Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Just sup- tlie national parliament. Isyraijat]iisewit!i pose a sudden wave of fright passing over the arguments wliich liave been advanced Australia in con.sequence of laljour troubles against unnecessary interfcrence,andl shall or something of that kind, and the federal resist the amendment wliich proposestoput parliament saying that it would not allow under the control of the federal parliament itself to be elected by such i)(ered in regard to their fu(u:o actions. Mr. IJIBBS : 1 was prepared in the first instance to vote for the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. Barton ; but after liearing the various speeches which have l)((;u delivered, I think there would bo some danger in giving to the senate of the federal jjarliament power to reduce tho 636 Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. franchise, althougli no doubt if such an attempt as has been suggested were made, it would lead to revolution. It is our place to make the bill as clear as possible with regard to the powers of the federal parliament. While I propose to vote against the amendment of the bon. member, Mr. Barton, I hope the hon. member, Dr. Cock- burn, will push his amendment to a vote. Amendment negatived. JJr. COCKBURN : I now move : That there be added to the clause the follow- ing woi'ds : — " But no property qualification shall be necessary for electors of the house of representatives, and each elector shall have a vote for one electoral district only." I do not think it is necessary for me to say anything further, except to express the hope that hon. members will see that this necessary provision is inserted in the con- stitution. Sir HENRY PARKES : I shall give my vote against this amendment. One objection I have to such an amendment being submitted is that it places persons who entertain views such as I do in a false position. At a proper time I should be pre- pared to deal with the question embodied in the hon. member's amendment ; but I say that this is not the proper time. All that we have to do in this constitution bill is to bring the federal parliament into existence, and that parliament will find the means of giving due shape to its own electoral system. I think it is almost pre- sumptuous for us to declare what shall be a principle in that electoral system. When the federal parliament is in existence, it will, like other similar bodies, soon find out the proper system under which its members are to be elected. All that we have to do is to bring the parliament into existence. I have under.stood all through these discussions thatone opinion concurred in by all sides was that there should be as little interference with individual states as possible. I have adopted that view, and [Mr. Dihhs. have sought to carry it out in good faith throughout our proceedings, interfering in no way whatever, except in so far as it is necessary to do so, to bring into existence a federal constitution. When that is once in existence, it can cut any knot that it is necessary to cut, and can shape its own course, as every other political body in the world has done. I shall vote against the amendment ; but I do not desire to be understood as in any way expressing my view as to its policy. That I will do at the proper time ; but this, in my judg- ment, is not that time. Dr. COCKBURN : It seems to me that the proper time to lay the foundation is before you erect the fabric, and no efibrt should be spared to make that foundation firm and secure. As for bringing the federation into existence being our only aim, I think our aim should also be to bring it into existence in such a way as shall secure for it a healthy life. Sir HENRY PARKES : There is a principle in the hon. member's amendment which he does not appear to see : that is, the principle of prescribing what shall be the basis of the federal electoral system. If he is I'ight in introducing this subject now, according to his view any other hon. gentleman would be right in introducing the principle that the qualification should be a property qualification for the electoral body. It would be just as consistent, just as logical, as the course he has taken. Mr. Fitzgerald : Or that the system of voting should be propoi^tionate ! Sir HENRY PARKES: Precisely. The course I take cannot be disputed ; it is simply to bring the federal parliament into existence with the least possible distui'b- ance of the several states, and then leave that parliament to shape its own course and to say what its electoral system shall be. jNlr. DIBBS : I believe that the people of New South Wales will be more alarmed by the speech just delivered by the hon. Commoyiwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 637 Bieinber, Sir Henry Parkes, than by any- thing which has yet occurred. The hon, member says that all that it is our duty to do is to bring the federal parliament into existence, and that it will cut the knot of all these difficulties. But before powers are given to the federal parliament by the people of New South Wales, they will want to know on what foundations the fabric is to be built. When this par- liament is brought into existence every colony will have to make a concession of some of its liberties. Mr. Gillies : Xo concession of liberties ! Mr. DIBBS : We are asked to create a federal parliament that will do all the work afterwards. We have a right to lay the foundation first, otherwise we shall create a federal Frankenstein. Before the people of New South Wales consent to create such a parliament they will want to know on what terms it is to be consti- tuted, and what powers are to be given it. If we carry out the views of the hon. member, Sir Henry Parkes, and other hon. members who have spoken, we shall call the parliament into existence, and then it can do wliat it likes with i-cgard to the various states. Mr. GiLLiKS : We do not say that ; quite the contrary ! Mr. DIBBS : That is the drift of what was said. Sir IIcNRY Parkes : I said exactly the contrary ! Mr. DIBBS : All our business, the lion, membor said, is to call into existence a federal parliament which will do all that Ls required. I do not believe that New South Wales will be prepared to call a federal parliament into existence on such terms. Question — That the words proposed to le added be so added — put. The Com- ittee divided : Ayes, 9 ; noes, 28 ; majority, 19. Ayes. Atkinson, Sir Harry Grey, Sir George Cockburn, Dr. Kingston, Mr. Deakin, Mr. Munro, Mr. Diljbs, Mr. Smith, Colonel Gordon, Mr. Noes. Baker, Mr. Griffith, Sir Samuel Bird, Mr. Hackett, :Mr. Bray, Sir John Jennings, Sii- Patrick Brown, Mr. Loton, Mr. Clark, Mr. ilacdonald-Patersou Mr Cuthbert, Mr. Marmion, Mr, Donaldson, Mr. Moore, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Adye Parkes, Sir Henry Do-ttTier, Sir John Playford, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Paissell, Captain Forrest, Mr. A. Rutledge, Mr. Forrest, Mr. .J. Suttor, Mr. Fysh, Mr. Wright, :\Ir. Gillies, Mr. AVrixon, Mr. Question so resolved in the negative. Clause, as read, agreed to. Clause 26 (Provision for case of persons not allowed to vote). Dr. COCKBUEN : I think that some alteration is needed in this clause. As far as I can see, this clause, like clause 24, was framed with the idea that the house of representatives would be elected by the people, and that all the peoitle, that is, those who arc usually electors, should have a vote. The clause seems to have been framed with the idea of ex- cluding only alien races, and it provides that a deduction shall be made in the num- ber of repi-esentatives each state i;i to have on account of those races. It will be as well, therefore, to make a reduction on account of those of our own people who, by tlie negativing of my amendment in a former clause, will be precluded from ex- eixising their votes. By negativing my amendment that each individual should have a vote in virtue of his manhood, wo disfranchi.se a certain nundjcr of tho.se who otherwise would have been electors. I ask the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, whether it would not be fair to make a deduction here, and to strike off the 638 Commonicealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. number of the disfranchised persons from the population entitling each state to a cer- tain number of representatives 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : In reply to the lion, member, I was about to say that if a clause like that were put in, it would have the effect of compelling West- ern Australia at once to do away with its property qualification — a very good result. But we have already agreed to give them four members in any case, so that it would not have that effect. The hon. member is quite logical. In the American Constitu- tion it is provided in words somewhat f^imilar to these that when the right of any free man 21 years of age is denied he .shall not be counted in the number of the ])opu- lation. I recommend the Committee to pass the clause as it stands. Clause agreed to. Clause 29 (Periodical reapportiomnent). Captain RUSSELL : There is no time prescribed in this clause as to when the ■apportionment shall be made. I think it is necessary to prescribe the time in order to avoid confusion. The clau.se says after ■each census, but that would not suit the ■case, because there might be an election before the apportionment could be made. In New Zealand a date has been fixed when the apportionment shall take place. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : When it ought to be made is as soon as possible. It will probably be about a year. It might be six months. We might be able to make it in three months. Captain Russell : I think it is three months in Xew Zealand ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I am cer- tain that the returns of the census could not be got in in Australia in three months. Sir JOHN BRAY : Who is to make the apportionment 1 Captain Russell : We appoint commis- sioners in New Zealand ! Sir JOHN BRAY : I do not think it ought to be necessary to make a law to [/)r. Cockhurn. carry out these apportionments. It ought to be carried out in a simpler way than that. Mr. Clark : It would complicate the clause to do it ! Sir JOHN BRAY : We ought to do it. It may be that a whole session will pass before the apportionment takes place. I would ask the attention of the Consti- tutional Committee to this matter. We ought to provide that it shall be done as soon as possible after the census, and there ought to be some mode of doing it provided. Mr. J. FORREST: There is no doubt that the smaller colonies will labour under a great disadvantage if they have to wait ten years before they get their proper representation. In the colony which I re- present we shall have a larger representa- tion in the beginning than we are entitled to. But if the colony progresses, as we believe it will, great dissatisfaction will be expressed if we have to wait ten years be- fore we get our proper proportion of repre- sentation. It is not likely that there will be another census throughout the empire for another ten years, so that it is rather a hard and fast line to draw. If, however, members representing the other colonies are satisfied, I am not prepared to propose an amendment. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : With re- ference to the suggestion of the hon. mem- ber, Sir John Bray, as to the mode of declaring the result of the census, that will be merely a ministerial function. The census will be officially taken, and will be made public. I agree that there ought to be some official mode of declaring it, and I would suggest that these words be in- serted, " and shall be declared by the governor-general after each census." Mr. BAKER : There are a few words in the American Constitution which would get over the difficulty pointed out by Sir Samuel Griffith, namely, that " the Con- Commonioealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 639 gress may by proper legislation provide " for the matter. I believe the insertion of some such words would be the best way to meet the case. Undoubtedly the federal parliament will have to pass a law dealing with the subject. It is one of the lirst things that they will have to deal with. I think we had better leave the clause as it is. Sir Samuel Griffith : I will not move any amendment. Clause agreed to. Clause 32. The qualifications of a member of the house of representatives shall be as follows : — (1.) He must be of the full age of twenty-one 5 years, and must when elected be an elector entitled to vote in some state at the elec- tion of members of the house of repre- sentatives ; (2. ) He must be either a natural born subject 10 of the Queen, or a subject of the Queen naturalised by or under a law of tlie Par- liament of Great Britain and Ireland, or of the parliament of one of the said colo- nies, or of the parliament of the common - 1.3 wealth or of a state. Mr. DEAKIN : Although the majority this morning took a contrary view, it ap- pears to me that we should be only con- sistent if we inserted in the qualifications of a member of the house of representa- tives a parallel qualification to that which was affirmed by a large majority of the Committee in the case of a member of the sf-nate. I think we should insert in this clause the words " and must have been for three years at the least a resident within the limits of the commonwealth." In the case of a member of the senate, it was five years, but I fancy that three years Avould suffice in the case of a iiiomher of the house of representatives. I therefore move : That in line 8, after the word " represcnta- bives," the following words be inserted : "and must have been for tlircc years at least a resi- ient within tlic limits f>f tlie commonwealth, M existing, at the time when he is elected." Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I hope liis is not going to pass as a matter of course, ^'hy should we limit the electors of the states in choosing their members in the federal parliament any more than in choosing their representatives in their own parliaments ? What reason can be given for doing this except that we choose to do it. I confess I cannot see any argument at all in favour of the amendment, and I should like to hear one. If no argument is given I hope the amendment will be negatived. We shall not live always, and why should we jjut our dead hand upon the rights of the electors of the states which wall exist after we are dead and gone ? Surely they can be allowed to choose the men whom they like best. They will choose the men whom they know, though I believe a case occurred in New Zealand lately where the electors were glad to avail themselves of the services of a gentle- man of large experience in the English Parliament who had ju.st arrived there. Why should not they be allowed to elect such a representative here if they choose ? Mr. J. FORREST: It seems to be thought by some lion, members that no one is eligible as a member of the federal parliament unless he has had large experi- ence in Australia; but the matters that will come before the house of representa- tives, or that come before any parliament, are not all local questions requiring local knowledge. There are many other ques- tions that have to be considered, and we often find that men who have had no ex- perience in Australia are very valuable members of parliament ; at least, that is my opinion as the result of my small par- liamentary experience. Although they are deficient in matters requiring local know- ledge, in other matters their knowledge and experience is very valuable indeed. It seems to me that there is a marked dif- ference between admitting as a member of jiarliament one of our own race and admitting a foreigner. Therefore, I would not at all object to put a restriction upon 640 Commomoeallh of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. those who become naturalised, and who wish to enter parliament. I shoukl not object if they were forced to live a num- ber of years in Australia before they be- came eligible to be members of pai'liament. But it seems to me unfair, and altogether improper, to place a restriction upon one of our o\Yn race who chooses this part of the world as his home, and to say that he must remain so many years in the colony before he can take part in the federal go- vernment. If we did so, we might find the strange anomaly that a man who was occupying a distinguished position in the legislature of one of the states — it might be that of prime minister of one of them — was ineligible to be a member of the house of representatives. I hope this narrow and selfish view, if I may call it so without giving offence to any one, will not find any place in the bill. It seems to me that .since we are only a small number of people — not more than 4,000,000, and oc- cupying 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 square miles of territory — we should not say to our fellow subjects in other parts of the woi'ld, "You can come to Australia; but, if you come here, you will be under dis- abilities, and you will not be able to take part in the government until you have re- sided here for five years if you wish to be- come a senator, or for three years if you wish to become a member of the house of rej)resentati ves. " Question — That the words proposed to be inserted be so inserted — put. The Com- mittee divided : Ayes, 20; noes, 18; majority, 2. Ayes. Fysh, Mr. Hackett, Mr. Loton, Mr. Macdonald-Paterson Mr Moore, Mr. !Muiiro, Mr. I'arkes, Sir Henry Rutledge, Mr. Smith, Colonel Wrixon, Mr. Baker, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Clark, Mr. Cockburn, Dr. Cuthbert, Mr. Deakin, !Mr. Dibbs, Mr. Donaldson, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Forrest, Mr. A. \_Mr. J. Forrest. Noes. Atkinson, Sir Harry Grey, Sir George Barton, Mr. Griffith, Sir Samuel Bird, Mr. Jennings, Sir Patrick ' Brown, Mr. Kingston, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Adye Marmion, Mr. Downer, Sir John Playford, Mr. Forrest, Mr. J. Russell, Captain Gillies, Mr. Suttor, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Wright, Mr. Question so resolved in the affirmative. Mr. DEAKIN : There will naturally be a consequential amendment in the next part of the clause. My hon. colleague, Mr. Cuthbert, will move an amendment, in order that the provisions with regard to naturalised citizens may be the same as those with regard to other citizens. Amendment (Mr. Cuthbert) agreed to : That the following words be added to the clause: — "at least three years before he is elected. " Clause, as amended, agreed to. Clause .37. The place of a member of the house of representatives shall become vacant if for one whole session of the parliament he, without permission of the house of representatives entered on its journals, fails to give his attend- ance in the house. Mr. GORDON : I move as an amend- ment : That the words "one whole," line 3, be omitted with a view to the insertion of the words "four consecutive weeks during a." It appears to me that as members are to be paid ^500 a year it is not right to allow a member the opportunity of nursing his seat during a whole session without the leave of the house, and in defiance, perhaps, of the wishes of his constituents. Mr. DEAKIN : Surely four wrecks is a little too short. A member who neglects his duties will certainly be brought to book by his constituents. I am in sym- pathy with the hon. member, but I would suggest that he should increase the period to eight or ten weeks. Sir JOHN DOWNER : I entirely agree with the amendment. It appears to Commonwealth of [2 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 641 me tliat wlien a man is paid £500 a year lie should not be absent from his duty for ^our weeks without giving some reason for it. Any reasonable explanation which he can give will always be accepted. That system has existed in the South Aus- tralian legislature for a long time. Mr. FITZGERALD : This is really a very small matter. I hope the feeling which will actuate members of this highly responsible body will be such as to induce them not to be absent, and that considera- tion of pay will have no influence with them. I think the clause may be safely allowed to jjass. We might very well trust that no member would be absent v/ithout good and sufiicient reason. To tie a member down to two, three, or live week.s, appears to me to be a reflection upon the characterof this future parliament which is unworthy of the Convention. Mr. MUXRO : It appears to me that hon. members wish to make an exception in regard to members of one chamber, and not of another. Surely, if the representatives Avho have not to go to the trouble and ex- pense of an election, are to be allowed to remain away a whole session, without being interfered with, it is not fair play to those who have to go to the trouble and expense of an election, to declare their seats vacant, if they are absent for a month. Mr. Gillies : It is state rights ! Mr. MUNRO: Well, it is personal wrongs. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITJI: I should like to know whether this provision is in force in any parliament in the world ? Mr. Playford : Yes, in South Australia! Mr. Gillies : That is the most excep- tional country in the world ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I remem- ber that a session of parliament was onco called in Queensland. Two members were absent the whole of the session, and of course they lost their seats. They never lieard of the session until after parliament 2 3 had been prorogued, although they were in the country. That may happen in tliis in- stance. Who knows but that a session may be held, and a member may be away at the other end of the world, and who is to say that parliament will give him leave of ab- sence 1 Let his constituents deal with him. Sir HARRY ATKINSON: I shall vote for the limited time, but with the view of recommitting clause 19, and putting the same restriction in that. Dr. COCKBURN" : I shall vote for the excision of these words, for I think that a whole session is far too long a period for a member to be absent. On the other hand, in voting for the excision of these words, I do not bind myself to vote for four weeks, which I think is rather too short. I think that we might very well say two months. I hope that my hon. friend, Mr. Gordon, will accept this suggestion. Mr. BAKER : Either eight or four weeks might be longer than a session. Parliament might be suddenly called to- gether, and the session might not last a week, and as the hon. and learned mem- ber, Sir Samuel Griffith, pointed out, some members might never have heard of it. Amendment negatived; clause, as read, agreed to. Clause 38. Upon the happeningof a vacancy in tlie house of representatives, the speaker shall, upon a rcsohition of the house, issue his writ for llie election of a new nicinbcr. In the case of a vacancy bydeatli or resigna- 5 tion li;ii)pening when the parliament is not in session, or during an atljf)urninent of the liouse for a period of which a part longer tlian seven days is unexpired, the speaker, or if there is no sjicaker, or lie is absent from the 10 commonwcaltii, the governor-general shall issue, or cause to bo issued, a writ without such resolution. Dr. COCK BURN : I woidd ask the hon. and learned member, Sir Samuel Griffith, what is the meaning of the words " upon a resolution of the house "? It seems to me that that is unnecessary. I think the fact of a vacancy occurring G42 Commonwealth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. should, without any intervention of a dis- tinct resolution, cause the speaker or the president, as the case might be, to issue a ■writ for a fresh election. I think that any delay in this matter might be very serious to the smaller states, who have only a small number of representatives, and, without liking to suggest that party considerations or state rights considerations might interfere so as to delay a resolution, I would suggest that it would be better to strike out those words, and, as I know is the case in South Australia, and, I be- lieve elsewhere, let the speaker, directly a vacancy occurs, proclaim it, and issue a writ for a fresh election. I do not think it is well that any unnecessary delay should occur even in regard to our state legislatures ; and it is all the more neces- sary that no delay should occur in the case of members of the house of representatives, who would have a double duty to per- form — to look after not only the people of Australia as a whole, but also to a certain extent the special privileges and rights of the states they represent. I move : That the clause be amended by the omission of the words " upon a resolution of the house," Ime 3. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I would point out to my hon. friend that he has omitted to consider that vacancies in the house might occur by a great many means, and that there must be some judge as to whether the vacancies have occurred. It is provided, for instance, in clause 44 : If any question arises respecting the qualifica- tion of a member, or a vacancy in the house of representatives, the same shall be heard and de- termined by the house of representatives. If those words were left out the speaker would be the judge. Some one might come and tell him, " So-and-so has become insolvent " ; that might or might not be true. Some one might tell him, " So-and- so has become a government contractor." How is the speaker to know whether that is true or not ? [Dr. Cockhurn. Mr, Ftsh : That would be a very awk- ward question for the house to decide ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : If a mem- ber had either taken the oath of allegiance to a foreign power or had been convicted of a crime, how would the speaker know that ? Mr. Gillies : What is the meaning of the words, " upon the happening of a va- cancy " 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Whenever the seat of a member becomes vacant. Mr. Gillies : Who is to determine it 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The house. Mr. MuNRO : That would not do ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Is the hon. member aware that every constitution provides for if? The stereotyped words are, " Upon a resolution of the house de- claring such vacancy." When a member of the house becomes either agovernment con- tractor or a bankrupt, does the speaker exercise the power of declaring that mem- ber's seat vacant 1 I have known instances where serious questions have arisen as to whether the writ should or should not be issued — in cases of bankruptcy, for in- stance. Suppose a man is adjudged a bankrupt, and lodges an appeal against the adjudication, would not the house, under those circumstances, decline to issue the writ until it knew the result of the appeal 1 Of course it would. Some one must exercise that discretion, and it cannot be left to the speaker. In every parliament of which I know this is the practice. Dr. COCKBURN : The exceptional cases that the hon. and learned member mentions — such as members becoming go- vernment contractors — are already pro- vided for in clause 48, where it is laid down that in those cases either the senate or the house of representatives are to ba^ the judges. I take it that this clause] applies more to vacancies such as those caused by death. Sir Samuel Griffith : No ! Commomvecdth of [2 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. G43 Dr. COCKBURN : In clause 44 it is laid down that where the question re- specting the qualification of a member, or a vacancy in the house of representatives, is debatable at all, it is to be determined by the house of representatives. I think that in all cases where the fact of a vacancy can be called in question there should be an adjudication either by some tribunal of justice or by some resolution of the house. But in the case of a vacancy occurring in consequence of death it is not necessary to declare the vacancy by a reso- lution. I am speaking of the time when the house is in session, and legislation is in active operation. Mr. Fitzgerald : No harm, then ! Dr. COCKBURN : There might be harm. One vote might make all the dif- ference ; and there might be a certainty that when the vacancy was filled up it would be known on which side the vote would be given ; and that might make all the difference in the world. I say, leave it to the speaker to act on his own motion, and not on a resolution which might be brought forward for party purposes ; and we know very often that pai-ty feeling does run very high. Mr. Fitzgerald: ITow would it be when the facts wore disputed ? T)r. COCKBURX : Wliero there is any dispute, it would )>e governed by clause 44. I think it is a mistake to retain the words to which I object ; but, if the feeling of hon. members is against me, I do not wish to occu[)y their time. I think the woi-ds are superfluous ; and it would be Ijettcr if thf'V were left out. But, alt}iou''h I have irioved that they Ije struck out, 1 will not divide the Committee on the question. Mr. DONALDSON : T think there is a great deal of force in the contention of the lion, gentleman. There will lie largo constituencies represented in the federal parliament, and it will take a considprablo time before a member can be returned, and several more days might elapse before he could attend in his place in parliament, and during that time very important ques- tions might be hanging in the balance. I do not believe in any state being practi- callv disfranchised through not havinc: an opportunity of returning a member in a case where he would lose his seat through insolvency, or perhaps through treason, or through being convicted of an infamous crime. All these disqualifications are pro- vided for in clause 44, and I do not think there can be the slightest objection to pro- vide for them in this clause ; in fact, I think there can be no doubt that words should be added to the clause to provide for a case in which a man is convicted of either treason or an infamous crime. I can understand that when a man either resigns or dies the speaker has power to issue a writ to have the vacancy filled ; l)ut I know that in Queensland, in a case of insolvency, a vacancy once existed for some time after the meeting of the House. It was reported to the House early in the ses.sion, of course, but before the writ was issued and returned some three or four weeks elapsed, and I believe that a longer period than that will be required in connection with the federal parliament. I have no strong feeling on the point, but I believe we would be acting fairly by in- serting these other provisions in the clause. Amendment negatived; clause, as read, agreed to. Chiuso'tl. Every house of rcprcscntativo.s.sliall continue for tliree years from tlie day appoiiiteo put upon it. I say tln,t the man who has broken the law of the land to such an extent as to be convicted of a felony ought not to be allowed to make laws for a free people, and for that reason I strongly sup- port the amendment of my hon. friend. It would make the clause correspond to 2 T the law of Victoria at the present time- We are very proud of that law, and we should be very sorry to see it repealed. Mr. CLARK : The last speaker seems to think that because a certain provision is law in Victoria that is quite sufficient reason for its embodiment in the federal constitution. But all the wisdom of the world is not concentrated in Victoria now any more than it has been concentrated there in years gone by. There has been im- pi-essed upon the laws of the colonies from time to time the mark of their local and social origin, and we know very well that this particular clause wa.s introduced into the Victorian Constitution with regard to special circumstances in the past history of Australia. I think it would be a great pity to preserve such a record in the consti- tution of the commonwealth, and so revive what I am sure all free-born Australians would rather bury and forget. I think the argument put forward by Sir George Grey is all-sufficient to condemn the proposed amendment. It is an attempt by antici- pation to affix to particular crimes a greater punishment than the parliament of the commonwealth may, in its wisdom, affix to them. We are attempting to tie the hands of that parliament, and to say that, in addi- tion to whatever punishment they think suf- ficient to impose for these particular crimes in the future, we will add this ])unishm('nt and render it impossible for them i;o alter it. The hon. member talks about this being a disgrace to the constitution. Surely it woidd bo a disgrace to our constitution if beforehand we said that every punishment hereafter inflicted shall be intensified by something which had no relation what- ever to the particular circumstances under which the man committed the offence The hon. member, Mr, Wrixon, him.self admits that there ought to be exceptions to the jiarticular rule laid down. lie says we should make exceptions with regard to men who receive free pardons. The hon. 658 Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Ausi7'alia Bill. gentleman's experience in Victoria will enable him to recall many cases where the Executive had good reason to believe that the convicted person was innocent, but there was not suthcient evidence to justify the Executive in going through the form of granting a free pardon, although he has been allowed to go free. Other cases have occurred where men have served their full term, after which evidence has been dis- covered showing that they were innocent. The hon. member, Mr. Munro, says that once a man is convicted he should never thereafter be allowed to associate with honest men in making laws. Does he wish us to infer from that that we can guarantee that every man who will sit hereafter in the parliament of the commonwealth will be absolutely free from all dishonesty ? Mr. MuxRO : Until he is convicted ! Mr. CLARK : Simply because he has not been convicted he is to be treated as a man superior to another man, who, per- haps in his youth, twenty or thirty years before his election, has been convicted of some oflfence. The only way to carry out that principle in its entirety would be to add the words " has been, or ought to have been, convicted," and to make the speaker sole judge of the moral qualities of every candidate for parliamentary honors. We should then, certainly, be a model nation, and we should set a high standard before our young men such as no nation ever erected, or would attempt to erect. Br. COCKBURN : I do not believe in eternal punishment ; therefore I shall vote against the amendment. If a man were wrongly convicted, and afterwards par- doned, this provision would exclude him. An Hon. Member : No ! Dr. COCKBURX : I understood that that was intended. Take the war of seces- sion in America. I do not know whether any of the seceders were convicted of trea- son, but they could have been, and the re- sult of a provision such as this would [Mr. Clark. have been the exclusion from the Congress- and Senate of some of the very best men in America. Take, again, the fathers of the United States Constitution. I think we had better leave this alone. Mr. DIBBS : There is one thing which will easily adjust this difficulty. We must have some regard for the common-sense of the people who have to give their votes for members of parliament. It is a strong ground to take, that we should not pass a restrictive law of this character to further punish a man who has already paid the full penalty inflicted by the law for, per- haps, a minor offence. We should simply admonish him to " turn from his wicked- ness and live." We may very well trust the electors to do what is right. Mr. MuNRO : But the electors will not know anything about it ! Mr. DIBBS : In Victoria, of course, they would know about it. I could go to Victoria and name people who sat in par- liament and in the government, and yet who were previously convicted of treason. I could go to Queensland and find people- who have occupied seats in parliament Mr. Fitzgerald : And afterwards in the House of Commons ! Mr. DIBBS : Who were previously ac- cused of treason. Mr. Fitzgerald : And who were con- victed ! Mr. DIBBS : I could mention instances of members of parliament there who were previously Irish rebels, who struggled for home rule. The hon. member. Dr. Cock- burn, says he does not believe in eternal punishment. I quite agree with him, and I think that when a man has once paid his debts, either to individuals or the state, he should be allowed to go free, and he should be regarded as having given full satisfaction. We must leave everything to the intelligence of the electors, who will have the aid of the press, which, in New South Wales, is particularly searching in Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 659 its mode of action. No man will venture to seek to be a senator of the common- wealth of Australia if there is any charge against his charactei", because he can rely ujDon the press stirring the thing up from the bottom. Let us do what is fair and right. When a man has once paid his debts, let us say that they shall not be cast up in his teeth. I of ten notice that in the criminal courts when an unfortunate wretch has been found guilty by a jury the judge asks an officer of the court, " Has this prisoner been convicted before 1"' I maintain that •when once a man has served his punish- ment it is not right to ask such questions. Mr. Gillies : It is a question of habit and repute ! Mr. DIBBS : No, it is simply a ques- tion as to whether a man has been con- victed previously, and the unfortunate man probably pays twice over for some insigni- ficant crime. I .shall vote against the pro- posed amendment, because I am prepared to rely upon the common-sense and intel- ligence of the electors, aided as they will be by a powerful, and I was going to say, unscrupulous, but I prefer to say searching press, which will not allow any man to occupy a public position without probing his character to the bottom. :\rr. J. FORREST : I wish to ask the hon. tnc'iiil)er, Sir .SaiiiUpHJriffitli, whether the last part of this clause miglit not be struck out ? It has a significance which I do not like. One would imagine that we are likely to have a lot of jK-rsons attainted with treason, or guilty of felony, a.s meml)ers of jjarliament. It seems to me that the clause would be equally as good if the words " by a grant of dis- charge, or the expiration of the sentence, or a pardon, or release or otherwise" were struck out. I (juite agree with the hon. member, Sir Samuel Cjlriflith, that there is a aood deal to be said on both sides of this question, and tiiat we do not want such people to be members of parliament. But at the same time we do not want to shut out altogether those people who may have done wrona;. I feel considerable diffi- culty about it ; but I think the clause should be allowed to pass if the w^ords I have referred to are struck out. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Of course the Committee can strike out those wordy if it likes. But the result will be that nobody will know exactly what the clause means. That is the only objection to it. Question — -That the word proposed to be omitted stand part of the question — put. The Committee divided : Ayes, 27 ; noes, 9 ; majority, 18. Ayes. Atkinson, Sir Harry Griffith, Sir Samuel Bird, Mr. Bray, Sir John Brown, Mr. Clark, Mr. Cockburn, Dr. Deakin, Mr. Dibbs, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Atlye Downer, Sir John Forrest, Mr. J. Fysh, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Grey, Sir George Hackett, Mr. Kingston, Mr. Marmion, Mr. Mc^SIillan, Mr. Moore, Mr. Parkes, Sir Henry Playford, Mr. Russell, Captain Rutledge, Mr. Smith, Colonel Sutter, Mr. Tliynne, Mr. Noes. Loton, Mr. Macdonald-Paterson Mr Munro, Mr. Wrixon, Mr. Cuthbert, Mr. Donaldson, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Forrest, Mr. A. Gillies, Mr. (..)uestion so resolved in the affirmative. Amendment (l)y Sir Samuel Guiri-iTn) agreed to : That the words "or remission " be inserted after the word "expiration," line 16. Clause, as amended, agreed to. Clause 48. Any person wlio directly or in- direetly himself, or by any person in trust for him, or for liis use or benefit, or on his account, undertakes, executes, holds, or en- joys, in tiie whole or in part, any agreement 5 for or on account of tlic ^ulilic service of the commonweal til, shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or mcmher of the liou.se of representatives wliile ho executes, GGO Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill, 10 holds, or enjoys the agreement, or any part or share of it, or any benefit or emolument arising from it : If any person, being a senator or member of the house of I'eprcscntatives, enters into 15 any such agreement, or having entered into it continues to hold it, his place shall be de- clared by the senate or the house of representa- tives, as the case may be, to be vacant, and thereupon the same shall become and be 20 vacant accordingly : But this section does not extend to any agreement made, entered into, or accepted, by an incorporated comijany consisting of more than twenty persons if the agreement is 23 made, entered into, or accepted for the general benefit of the company. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : An lion, member yesterday called attention to tlie repetition in this clause of words that ■svere not necessary, having regard to the provisions of clause 38. I move : That the following words be omitted, lines 1 6 to 20 : "be declared by the senate or the house of re- presentatives, as the case may be, to be vacant, and thereupon the same shall become and be vacant accordingly," with a view to insert the words, "thereupon become vacant." Amendment agreed to ; clause, as amended, agreed to. Clause 49. If a senator or member of the house of representatives accepts any office of profit under the Grown, not being one of the offices of state held during tlie pleasure of 5 the governor-general, and the holders of which are by this constitution declared to be capable of being chosen and of sitting as members of either house of parliament, or accepts any pension payable out of any of the 10 revenues of the commonwealth during the pleasure of the Crown, his place shall there- upon become vacant, and no person holding any such office, except as aforesaid, or hold- ing or enjoying any such pension, shall be 15 capable of being chosen or of sitting as a member of either house of the parliament. But this provision does not apply to offi- cers of the military or naval forces who are not in the receipt of annual pay. Mr. DIBBS : I shall propose the omis- sion from this clause of any words that would debar any person holding a pension from having a seat in parliament. I do not see why a gentleman who has a pen- sion which he has legitimately earned should be prevented from having a seat in either house of the legislature. Having in view the discussion which took place on the 4Gth clause, why should we exclude any one lawfully enjoying a pension which he has honestly earned % I should like to hear some explanation of the matter. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: It applies only to pensions during pleasure. Theobject is to prevent persons who are dependent for their livelihood upon the go<^ernment, and who are amenable to its influence, from, being members of the legislature. There is no reason that 1 can see why a man who has served his country, and to whom a permanent pension has been al- lowed, should not be permitted to sit in the legislature. But a " pension during pleasure " might be given ; and the holder of such a pension should certainly not be allowed to become a member of parlia- ment. Sir John Bray : Why should we con- template the possibility of such things ? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I cannot sympathise with the hon. gentleman in thinking that our forecast at the present time includes all possible contingencies. T do not think that such a thing is likely to happen ; but, so far as I know, human nature has not changed much in the last 300 or 400 years, and such a thing might happen again. Sir JOHN BRAY : I agree with the hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, in thinking that these words should be struck out. It does not seem likely to me that the common- wealth will provide for pensions during pleasure, and I do not think that the words are necessary. I would, however, ask the hon. member whether it is not necessary to except in this clause the speaker and president 1 Sir Samuel Griffith : They are not under the Crown ! Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 661 Sir JOHN BRAY : They liokl offices shall be entirely a citizen army, I think of profit under the Crown, though they are not appointed by the Crown. I shall sup- port the proposal of the hon. member, Mr. Dibbs. Mr. KINGSTON : Although it seems improbable that there will be a case of a pension created during the pleasure of the governor-general, still it seems to me highly desirable to provide against such a con- tingency. To permit a member to sit in the federal parliament whilst he was liable that both noncommissioned officers and men should be dealt with in this clause. I, therefore, beg to move : That in line 18, after the word "officers " the words "or men " be inserted. Mr. Clark : Say "members" ! Mr. THYNNE: Yery well Then I shall move : That in lines 17 and 18 the word " members " be substituted for the word " officers." Mr. BURGESS : I think it would be to be controlled by the governor-general ^'^^^ *o ^^^^'^ this point cleared up. In my by the withdrawal of his pension, would ^^"^^ colony I unfortunately suffi?red from be a great mistake, and, as provisions ^''"^ operation of a similar clause. Under similar to this are contained in the various ^^^ Constitution no member of Parliament, local constitutions, I trust that this will be except those holding office as responsible retained. ministers of the Crown, can accept any Sir GEORGE GREY: We must all ad- salary or emolument from the Govern- mit that what has been may be again, and ^^cnt. I was an officer in the defence there can be no doubt that not very many years ago pensions held at pleasure did exist force, and Parliament passed a bill pro- viding for the payment of all the officers to a considerable extent in England, and ^^ ^^^^^ force, and I was then compelled by were a vast abuse. Now, one object in *^e Attorney-General to retire from my putting these words in is that they would scat in the House, resign my commission make it impossible to resume this practice ^^ an officer, and afterwards submit my- here without due warning that an illeo-al self to my constituents for re-election. act was about to be done. We thus stamp illegality upon the proceeding. Sir HARRY ATKINSON : I do not quite see the effect of the clause with re- gard to naval and military officers. Would it not exclude officers and privates belong- That being so, I think it would be well if tliis point could be cleared up, so that there may be no mistake about it. Mr. THYNNE: I think my llr.st pro- posal is the better one. I therefore ask to be allowed to withdraw my amendment, so ing to what are called the partly-paid that I may insert after the word "officers" forces, who are receiving a .small payment ^'le words " or men." of £6 or £7 per annum] Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Mr. THYNNE: I think that the hon. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I think member. Sir Harry Atkinson, has touched ^'^'C criticism directed towards this clause a very important jioint. The clause, as I ^s sound; tlie clause is not nearly suffi- read it, is intended to exempt from the ciont as it stands, and I have with me a disability created, men who are receiving only a small remuneration, perhaps for a certain number of days duiiiig each year, but not permanently en)ploycd in tlie de- fence force. The exception, however, ap- plies only to oflicers. As one looking for- ward to the day when our defence forces similar clause in tlio Queensland Constitu- tion Act, whicli iiicludos several cases not lierc dealt with. It reads thus : Tliis section sliall not apply to any person in receipt only of pay, half-pay, or a pension, as an officer of Iicr Majesty's navy f)r annj', or who sliall receive any now or other commission in the navy or army respectively, or any increase of G6: Commomoealth of [3 Apkil, 1891.] Australia Bill. pay on auy suoU commission, nor to any person who is in receipt only of daily pay as an officer or member of the defence or volunteer force of Queensland, and is not employed permanently, or at an annual salary. There is no doubt that the clause requires amplification, and it would be convenient if it were postponed. Clause postponed. Part V. — Powers of the Parliament. Clause 52 (Legislative powers of the parlia- ment). Mr. GORDON : It appears to me that we oujjht to take the sub-clauses which enumerate the powers of the parliament separately. It would be impossible to dis- cuss the whole of the clause at once, and to make our arguments, covering the whole ground, to be appreciated by hon. mem- bers. I would like to ask whether the clause could not be put in sections, so that each sub-clause could be treated by itself ? The Chairman : That cannot be done with a clause ; but hon. members can pur- sue the well-knowai practice of moving an amendment in one part of the clause, and then sroino; on to the next. There is an unwritten practice, too, for one hon. mem- ber to give way to another who wishes to move a prior amendment. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : It is the practice in some parliaments, when a clause is very complicated, as this is, to put it to the Committee in sections, and it would be convenient to do that now. I do not know that we are bound by any hard and fast rule of parliament. The Chairman : I am quite willing to adopt any course which will suit the con- venience of hon. members. Preamble postponed. Sub-clau.se 1. The regulation of trade and commerce with other countries, and among the several states. Mr. BAKER : I should like to know from the hon. member in charge of the bill whether the question of the advisability of \Sir Samuel Griffith. giving powers to the federal government to alter, for federal purposes, the gauge of railways in any one or two states, was con- sidered by the committee ? Sir Samuel Griffith : No ; it was not ! Mr. BAKER : I desire to ask whether tlie hon. gentleman considers that this sub-clause is wide enough to cover that matter 1 Sir Samuel Griffith : I do notthink so ! Mr. BAKER : I would point out that by-and-by, when the different states con- tain much larger populations, when they come much closer together, and when the inter-communication between them is much greater, this question of railway gauges will assume very large proportions, and it seems to me that it would be advis- able to give the federal parliament power, at the federal expense, to alter the gauge of any line of railway where it is con- sidered advisable that it should be done. Of course I do not say that the parliament would do it, and I dare say it would not be done for a great many years to come ; but it mighi, and probably will, in years to come, be advisable, if not to adopt a uniform railway gauge for the colonies, at all events to alter the gauge of certain specified intercolonial lines, so as to make them of one gauge. This is a matter, I think, of considerable importance. Per- haps this is not the proper sub-clause in connection with which to deal with the matter. I will, however, take an oppor- tunity, before we get to the end of the clause, of inserting a sub-clause to the effect I have mentioned. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: In answer to the hon. gentleman, I would point out that sub-clause 29 is the only one in the list which the committee considered covered a matter such as that which he has men- tioned. The committee, however, had not the matter under their attention specially. It would require a mutual agreement of states before it could be carried out. Commoyiiceahh of [3 April, 1891. J Australia Bill. 663 Mr. GORDON : I would suggest that the point raised by the hon. member, Mr. Baker, would be more likely to come under sub-clause 6. The subject has already been raised in connection with the question of the defence of Australia. I should like to ask the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, whether he thinks the sub-sec- tion will confer on the federal parliament sufficient authority to regulate railway tariffs on intercolonial lines'? Sir Samuel Griffith : I do not think so ! Mr. GORDON : Which clause will ? Sir Samuel Griffith : The chapter on finance and trade contains a provision, in section 12, which was considered very care- fully by the committee in connection with that subject. Mr. GORDON : Then I shall move, subject to further criticism of the sub- clause, the postponement of its considera- tion, with the view of inserting words which will cover that condition. Sir Samuel Griffith : It should be a ■separate paragraph, then ! Mr. GORDON : It may be argued that the subject will Itc covered ; but the hon. gentleman who is principally responsil)lf' for the bill thinks it is doubtful. Sir Samuel Griffith : It is not covered by this sub-clause ! Mr. GORDON: And it is not clearly and .specifically covered by the other. It is important that it should be covered. I shall move an amendment later on. Mr. CLARK : I have already expres.sed the opinion that undf-r this clause the federal parliament would liave power to control railway tarifl's to a certain ext(!iit. I do not know whether i Ik' hiiiguage I used overstated the case I meant to put before the Convention ; but I remember that what I .stated was disptited at the time l)y cer- tain hon. moiiibers. In the first instance, I would say that this subclause is about the very widest one in the whole of the clause. It contains the widest pow-er which we propose to give to the federal parliament. Under a similar power conferred upon them, the Congress of America have from time to time introduced very startling legislation, which the Supreme Court has sustained ; and it is very hard to say what legislation will yet be enacted under that power by the Congress of America which the Supreme Court of that country will not sustain. The most startling and revo- lutionary act passed by the American Con- gress under that power is known as the Inter-State Commerce Act ; and although that act sets out by stating plainly that it refers only to common carriers carrying goods from state to state, or from territory to state, or from foreign countries to several states, yet the historical origin of that act points to the control of commerce within the state. The state of Illinois passed a law to regulate the tariffs upon the rail- ways, within its own borders, and a case under that act was brought before the Supreme Court. The law was declared to be unconstitutional, although it purported to regulate tariffs only within the state, on the ground, as stated by Judge Miller, that the regulation of commerce as a whole throughout the whole of the Union was transff'rrcd from the states to the federal government. That is a vei-y strange fact in connection with the history of that act. Immediately after that judgment was de- livered the Intcr-State Commerce Act was passed, and up to the present time it has gone thus far : it prohibits any one railway company from running at lower rates even within a state on one line or another, if the line upon which they are taking the goods for a lower freight is jiart of a line, of com- munication lunning o>it of the state. I would say that, on parallel grounds, if any colony in Australia attomjits to reduce the rates on its own lines when those lines arc connected with the lines of other states, and reduces the rates for 6G4 Commonwealth of [3 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. the purpose of drawing traffic from out- side its own borders — bringing goods from another state within its own — it would come within the provisions of an inter- slate commerce act similar to that now in force in America ; but so long as any state shall carry goods absolutely within its own boundaries, and does not attempt to attract traffic over its border, it could not, of course, be touched. How far the Inter- State Com- merce Act of America will be interpreted by the Supreme Court of that country, and how far legislation under this sub-clause would be sustained in Australia, is, of course, a matter of speculation. It is impossible to say definitely what the power is. I only know from the history of the act in America that it is one of the widest powers given to the federal government, and its future developments are altogether unfore- seen and immeasurable. Mr. GORDON : It appears to me un- desirable that we should leave anything to the interpretation of this sub-clause which, being admitted to be an important principle, ought to be laid down in it. If, Avhilst we are drafting this bill, we can possibly state specifically an important point such as this, it is very much better than to leave the interpretation of it to the court, and I think that course will save a great deal of trouble. I shall move an amendment to the sub-clause. Mr. DEAKIN : I hope the hon. mem- ber will not move an amendment immedi- ately. The question is evidently one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, and will re- quire to be approached with the greatest caution. I am so thoroughly in sympathy with the hon. member in the object he has in view that I think the clause merits, by its recommittal — if it is not possible to post- pone the sub-section — the fullest attention of the Convention. It is perfectly clear from what the hon. member, Mr. Clark, has said that these words have an undefined signifi- cance in America, which is valuable in one [3/r. Clark. direction, but perilous in another. I ara sure that the states will jealously resist any attempt to interfere with their manage- ment of their own railway.s or their own affairs. Therefore, if we desire to impinge \ipon that in any way for federal purposes, we should make it perfectly clear where the federal control begins, and where it ends, and for what purposes it may be used. To do this, I think, will necessitate an amendment of perhaps some length, or, at all events, consideration of the subject in all its parts with the greatest care ; and I would suggest that the hon. and learned member who is in charjce of the bill might see his way to put this suggestion in a form which will fit in with the other provisions of the bill. The sense of the Committee should be taken genei-ally upon the matter; and, if it be in favour of the views of the hon. member, Mr, Gordon, it might suit him just as well to leave the particular form, which the amendment should take to the hon. member who has drafted the bill. Mr. FITZGERALD: I quite concur in the remarks which have just fallen from my hon. and learned friend. I think that, considering the magnitude of our railway systems and the importance to the various states of the revenue from their manage- ment, no point would be more fiercely con- tested and opposed than interference by the federal government in their manage- ment, unless on such broad and patriotic ground that the justice of it would be re- cognised by every state. I apprehend that it is of the utmost importance that there should be no possible doubt in the minds, not only of every hon. member here, but also of any one outside, as to the extent to which any interference in the management and control of therailways could be brought to bear by any federal authority. Mr. MOORE : I think that as far as this sub-clause is concerned the difficulty could be met by the excision of one word and the insertion of anothei' — bv striking Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 665 out " among " and inserting *' between," sufficiently precise to meet this ijarticular whicli will leave it perfectly clear what is case, especially if we bear in mind that to be understood by the sub-clause. Then the only reference to railways is in sub- it would read : "The regulation of trade division 28 of this clause, which gives con- and commerce with other countries and trol of the railways for one particular pur- between the several states.'"' That would pose, and has nothing to do "with the ques- not allow any interference with the inter- tion of border freights. There is that one nal management of railways in any of the point which we want to reach — to prevent states, but simply regulate the commerce hostile tariffs on the railways, and rivalry between the several states. I think that between the particular states ; and I think we ought to jealously guard the autonomy it is a matter for consideration whether it of the several states, and therefore this might not be better to put in an amend- clause requires very careful consideration. ment of that alone — the particular thing I think the suggestion I have made would we want — rather than go into general meet the case. words. Mr. Fitzgerald : It would not be broad Sir JOHN DOWNER : So far as the enough ! internal control of railways is concerned, Sir JOHN DOWNER : No doubt we we do not want to interfere in the slight- ought to carefully conserve the autonomy est degree, and sub-clause 28 was put in of every state, but we ought also to be in order to give a limited control over the equally careful that the main principle of railways in matters where the interests of this federation is carried out. This matter the commonwealth were concerned — in when before the committee was thought to war questions, and things of that kind, be sufficiently met by clause 12, page 18. Mr. Wrixon: It does not touch this I suggest to my hon. friend, Mr. Gordon, point ! that he should carefully consider that Sir JOHN DOWNER : No, neither by clause, and on that move any amendment extension nor by limitation, and I do not that may occur to him to be necessary, for think it will need to be interfered with, that Avhich is under the heading "equality Mr. GORDON : I shall move the post- of trade " is tlie proper branch of the sub- ponement of the sub clause. Looking at ject in which to deal with this matter. On the matter from the point of view of the questions of doubt we ought to be as specific colony of South Australia, it appears to as we can ; but as a general rule in framing me that unless we have specifically stated 1 constitution it is much better to use large here the right given to the federal parlia- ^f-neral words which are all-embracing, and mcnt to control railways on certain lines we take in every branch of certain subjects, shall very likely miss the whole commer- than to come down to detail, and so limit cial benefit of this federation. I would ask the operation of the general words. I fancy the hon. and learned member. Sir Samuel tliat the words in clause 12, page 18, are Griffith, and tlie Committee, whether if I sufficient; but if the hon. member wlio has move the postponement of this sub-clause Ijrought this matter before the Connnitteo they will consider tlic question ? Iocs not til ink they are, I would suggest to i\li\ rLAYFORi) : I do not think this is liiiii that that is the place in which lie the place to put it ! should make any necessary amendments. ^Mr. GORDON : In this sub-clause, Mr. WRIXON : I think there would dealing witli the regulation of trade and be doubt as to whether the words of the commerce, such an amendment would clause to which my hon. friend refeis are naturally fall in with the scope of this 666 Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. clause more clearly certainly than with the scope of the clause which the hon. and learned member, Sir John Downer, pointed out, under the heading, "equality of trade." There is no question of equality of trade. It is a specific point which did not arise in America, but which arises here, because of the peculiar circumstances of these colonies. It is a difficult question to determine right off, and if the Com- mittee will consider the question I will move the postponement of the sub-clause. Sir HENRY PAEKES : I trust the hon. member will not move his amend- ment right away. Clearly if he desires to have this question submitted to the Com- mittee, he ought to move his amendment in the distinct shape of a sub-clause by itself. There is nothing to prevent his taking that reasonable course, and he would be liable to do something which he does not really intend if he were to mix it up with this sub-clause. Let the hon. member frame a sub-clause to come in at any place he has thought of, and submit his view in a distinct form at a subsequent stage in our consideration of the clause. There can be no objection to that. Mr. GoRDoy : I accept the hon. mem- ber's suggestion ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I should like to know, as far as possible, what it is the hon. gentleman is driving at ? This matter has received the anxious consider- ation of committees during the last fort- night, and of the drafting committee speci- ally in the choice of words. There were long discussions in committee on this point. Does the hon. member wish that the federal parliament shall have general control of railways ? Mr, Gordon : No ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The hon. member does not want the control of tariffs in the states at all. An Hox. Member : Yes, he does ! YMr. Gordon. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Well, what does he want ? Before you can attempt to formulate an idea, you must know what the idea is. Mr. GORDON : I will put my proposi- tion in a concrete form. Broken Hill, which belongs to the colony of New South "Wales, is on the South Australian border. We will assume for the purposes of this argument that to reach the sea-coast, we have to travel 300 miles from Broken Hill. The trade there is very valuable to us. I have heard some New South Welsh- men say that it is very valuable to them. If, notwithstanding that 300 miles of rail- way carriage to reach the coast in South Australia, the New South Wales Govern- ment chose to build a line which would take 800 miles to reach the sea-coast, and to run upon that line — — Sir Henry Parkes : I knew it was some broad federal thing ! Mr. GORDON : And to run upon that line at a rate lower, or as low, as South Australia maintained on their 300 miles of line, it would absolutely do away with the whole of the benefits of free-trade. It is a simple proposition. The hon. mem- ber sees it as clearly as possible, and what I am aiming at is that the federal parlia ment shall have power to prevent the im- position of cut-throat railway rates, so that each colony shall have the benefit of its own geographical position as a port of ship- ment or a depot. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Now I know the hon. member's idea, I may tell him that I considered it in consultation with, amongst others, our lately deceased colleague, Mr. Macrossan, months ago, and we came to the conclusion that the only form of words that would express it was " control of railway tariffs." You will not find any shorter words to do it, if that is what is meant. It is a fair issue for us — do we intend to give the federal par- liament control of railway tariflfs ; or do Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill 667 I intend to let the states do what they e 1 We must mean one or the other ; I cannot mean both. The two ideas are ite opposed to one another, and there is middle course between them that I can !. We have tried at various times to d expressions to indicate the control of •tain tariffs only ; for instance, the con- il of lines of railway communicating im one colony to another, leaving the ites, of course, absolute power with re- rd to local railways — and we have had ry great difficulty in defining the mat- I do not think you will be able to 3 any words except " control of rail- ly tariffs." Well, the committee did t see their way to recommend any such neral proposal. The extent to which they 1 see their way to make a recommenda m is contained in clause 12 of chapter and it is not by absolutely prohibiting ything of the kind from being done, but giving the parliament of the common- sal th power to make a law to annul any V made by a state which would really terfere with freedom, which would be ohibitive of trade going thi-ough a state its natural port. That is the only extent wliich we could see our way to go. Mr. GoKDOX : If you give the colonies e power, why not say so 1 8ir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : We have van them the power in those words. I n assure the hon. gentleman that this :tion of chapter iv occupied tlie com- ttee for some hours, and I think tliat if will look at it he will find that it will ar very close scrutiny. Mr. DONALDSON : I think this dis- ssion touches upon one of the most iin- rtant matters that could be considered the Convention. 1 have long held tlie inion that we cannot have complete fedcr- ion unless the whole of the deVjts of the ustralian colonies are taken over by the leratioii, and also the ])ublic works. I 1 confident that the more this is looked into the more will the fact impress itself upon the minds of the Convention. I think the federal parliament should have full power to take over these debts and assets. What has been the greatest cause of friction bet ween the different colonies up to the present time 1 Nothing has caused more friction than. the practice of imposing differential railway rates, and so filching trade from a neighbouring colony. That has been done for years past, and the ill-feeling engendered has been intensified year by year, until it has become very strong in- deed ; in fact, I know of no other cause of strong feeling between the people of these different communities than that which has arisen from commerce. If we attempt in the way suggested to interfere with the tariffs of the various colonies, we shall at once interfere with state rights, because the colony owning the railway will immediately say, " We wish to run our lines on such commercial principles as will enable them to pay interest on the cost of construction." Some railways, if they were unduly interfered with in regard to tariff, would not be able to command any trade at all. Take, for instance, the railway that runs from Sydney to Bourke, about 500 miles in extent. If the rates upon tliat railway were not low, nearly all the traffic would go down the lJ)arling, because every one knows that carriage by steamer is nmch cheaper than carriage by railway. At the present time very low rates are charged on this railway for the purpose of bringing the trade to Sydney. I need not, of course, go into particulars now, but I question very much whether, owing to the very low rates pn>vailing, this railway is made to pay. Then, again, take tlx; rail- way running down the Murrumbidgoe to Hay. We know that the rates are very low upon that railway, and that itisworked at a dead loss to the state. But at the sanio time a railway has been constructed, and if we were to insist upon a uniform rate 668 Commonwealta of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. per mile tliroughout the whole of that dis- lia, that large benefits are given to th( trict the railway would have hardly any capitals at the expense of the country traffic at all, and the result would be agreat If the whole of the railways were unde: loss to the state. That, I maintain, would the control of the federal governmen be unduly interfering with the interests that would not be the case, because they of the state, and would, of course, cause would be worked for the common good very great friction. Let the federal par- and so as to bring trade to its nearesi liament have power to take over the port. Although this matter has been con whole of the railways, and also the debts sidered by many members of the Conven of the colonies, and things will go on much tion, I know they are not prepared at th€ smoother. While I agree with the prin- present time to consent that the colonies ciples of the bill before us, and must give should give up their railways. But ] credit to the sub-committee for the great venture to say that in the future this ques- care they have exercised in its preparation, tion will be a great bone of contention be- I am of opinion that it does not go far tween the various colonies, and I fear that enough. Some of the colonies think their federation, if it takes place, will not have railways are such good property that they the good eflfect we desire on that account, would be doing an injury to themselves if Whilst on the subject of railways, I might they allowed them to be taken over by say a little more, I think there is not a the commonwealth. But I maintain that colony in the whole of the Australasian nothing of the kind will occur. They group that has not got to its limit so far would not lose anything, because they as rail way construction is concerned. There would not have to pay the interest on the is no part of the world which, for its popu- debt, for which they have to provide at lation, has such an extent of railway com- the present time, and the amount of money munioation as exists in Australia. The they would receive in the shape of customs progress that has been made in this respect. and other revenue would be exactly the during tlie last few years has been enor- same as under the present proposal. For mous. But all the railways have been some years, at all events, accounts would constructed out of borrowed money. Tew be kept between the states, and the surplus of the lines of late years have paid interest revenue would be distributed in the way on the cost of construction. There is not proposed under this bill. This would in- a colony at the present time in which tlie elude railway revenue as well as customs taxpayers have not to find a considerable revenue, and I am sure the system would amount over and above the receipts from have a good effect upon the community their public works to pay the interest on generally. Why should we wish to bring the debt, trade to any particular port by running Mr. Playford : Yes ! railways to the borders of another colony, Mr. DON ALDSOiST : If South Australia and there levying a differential railway is an exception, she is the only exception, rate ? For whose benefit 1 Merely for Mr, Munro : And Victoria ! the benefit of the persons who send their Mr. DONALDSON : Victoria does not goods by that line, and a few persons at pay all the interest on the loans, the seaport to which the goods go. This is Mr. Munro : She has done so ! the way some of our cities are built up at Mr. DONALDSON : Can the hon. gen- the cost of the country. The complaint tleman tell me in what year she did it ? can be made with regard to nearly all Mr. MuxRO : A couple of years ago — • the country distiicts throughout Austra- there was £34,000 to the good ! \_Mr. Donaldson. Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 669 Mr. DONALDSON" : And strong ques- Dr. Cockburn : Only a ring formed — tions have been asked since about the way that is all ! in which those accounts were kept. I have Hon. Members : Question ! been given to understand that some charges Mr. DONALDSON" : I am speaking to were not made against the account which the question quite as much as tlie hon. should have been properly placed against gentleman who preceded me. Of course it, and I know that strong exception has if the Chairman says I am out of order, been taken to the correctness of the balance- I am quite prepared to sit down; but sheet. I do not wish to make any charge, I think considerable latitude should be or to say anything offensive about this allowed upon this subject, which is a very matter, but I know that for the present wide one. It is certainly not contained year tlie railways have not been a success within the four corners of this bill, and it in Victoria. should, I think, be included, in order to Mr. Munro : How does the hon. gentle- make the federation perfect. I do not man know ? desire, however, to express my opinion in Mr. DONALDSON : I follow tlie ac- such a way as to offend the representatives counts closely enough to know that the of any colony. Railway construction, I railways are not paying the interest on the repeat, has been going on very rapidly, cost of construction. and all this has deen done with borrowed Mr. MuxRO : They are coming right ! capital. "We have been spending alto- Mr. DONALDSON : And I venture gether, I suppose, in Australia from- to say that if Victoria goes on in the way £6,000,000 to £10,000,000 per annum, it has been doing or proposes to do, she Colonel Smith: Notallborro\ved capital! will be greatly behind in the next fewyears. Mr. DONALDSON: Nearly all. I Mr. Gillies : Do not discuss the action am aware that some of the Victorian rail- of the different colonies — they will do as ways have been constructed out of receipts they think right ! from land sales. Are we aljle to spend at Mr. DONALDSON : It is quite right this rate in the future ? I know perfectly that they should, while things are in their well thedifficultytherehasbeenin restrain- present condition. But, taking all the ing the construction of railways. ] Iiave colonies in a group, I venture to say that had sufficient experience of that. ]!iiigs tlie colonies have gone to the limit of are formed for the purpose of getting rail- tlieir boiTOwing powers, or very nearly so. ways built, and I question if sonic of Hon. Mkmhehs : No ! the railways are going to be ])rolitable to Mr. DONvVLDSON : Thatismy oi)iiiion, the states. Tf the railways are placed under to which I am going to adhere, notwith- the control of the federation T am sure standing the great number of noes I hear. that a good cas(! will have to lie made out Mr. MuNUO: They have only started ! bcfom the construction of any railway is ]Mr. DONALDSON : They have only undertaken — and it will, I believe, be for fitartffl, but they will have to give a bet- the salvation of Australia generally. Tf ter account in the future for some of the we go on expending million after million works they carry out, or el.se the English of money on railwayswhich will not be pro- money-lender will close his pocket against fitablo, we shall land ourselves in such a them. At the present time there is con- position that the burdens (jf the taxpayers siderable difliculty in floating loans, ami I will have to be increased to an enormous ex- am sure the difficulty will be greater in the tent in order to meet the loss on tln' nnder- Rext few years. takings. My purpose will be perfectly G70 Covimonwealth of [3 April, 18'Jl.] Australia Bill. served by a discussion of the question, Avhether or not the whole of the railways should belong to the federation ] I am in a minority, but I venture to say that be- fore a great number of years are over our heads the opinion will strongly prevail that the whole of the public works of the colonies, along with the public debts, should belong to the federation. See another advantage that we would have in regard to present as well as future debts : The federation will, I am sure, be able to borrow at a much lower rate of interest than the colonies can borrow at now. There would be a considerable saving in the percentage, as the hon, mem- ber, Mr. McMillan, showed the other day. If we interfere largely — and we are unduly interfering, I maintain — with the states by taking away their customs revenue, a great deal of that money will be spent on the cost of government, and the states will have no control over that money, except thebalance which they will getbackfrom the federal parliament. The federal govern- ment may be extravagant, for my experi- ence is that nearly all governments com- manding large surpluses are extravagant ; they may have the control of £8,000,000 or £10,000,000, and need spend only £2,000,000, but what is to prevent them from spending £3,000,000 and distribut- ing only £7,000,000 amongst the various states 1 That is going to be a real bone of contention in the future ; and it would be far better, therefore, to give the control of the railways to the federal parliament. I feel that I am in a delicate position, inas- much as the railways of Queensland are not paying as well as the railways of other colonies ; but at the same time there would be a small sum to be paid back to that state, because it would be deducted from the customs levenue. However, I believe this question has been considered in a cursory way by hon. members. I feel that they have made up their minds [J/r. Donaldson. on the question, and that the railways are not going to become the property of the federation. Of course, as an individual member, I accept that position ; but at the same time I take this opportunity of saying that I do not believe the federation will ever be complete until the public works of the various colonies are handed over to the control of the commonwealth. Sub-clause agreed to. Sub-clause 3. Raising money by any other mode or system of taxation ; but so that all such taxation shall be uniform througliout the commonwealth . Sir HAERY ATKINSON : Do I un- derstand that the Convention is prepared to give to the federal parliament the power of levying taxation, without at the same time taking over the debts of the colonies ?. I venture to say that, if you do, there must of necessity be several bankrupt colonies before long, because you take away the power of taxation which each colony possesses. I want to know, if you take away the power from our state par- liament to levy customs duties, how the. ■ state can raise sufficient revenue to pay its way ? If any one can tell me, I shall be happy to hear the answer. Mr. McMillan : Direct taxation ! Sir HARRY ATKINSON : The charge now imposed upon all property in New Zealand is Id. in the £. I say we could not tax property to any greater extent than that without driving a large poi-tion of our movable capital into other colonies where it would receive much better interest for jiresent investment. That is a serious point; which I venture to say will apply to other colonies in the same way. I do not wish to raise any unreasonable discussion ; but I should not be doing my duty to my colony if I did not point out at this time that, unless we are prepared to take over the liabilities when we ax'e taking over the power of taxation, we can never have a satisfactory federation, because, I say, ast Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] A'ustralia Bill. 671 one with every desire to raise the money in the colony, it cannot be done ; and I speak with some authority on the question. If we are not ripe to take over the respon- sibilities of the colonies, then we cannot possibly take over the right of unlimited taxation, because it would take away the power of a colony to fulfil its obligations with the outside world. Sir JOHN BRAY : I think there is a great deal in the point raised by the hon. member, Sir Harry Atkinson. I think we ought seriously to consider whether we shall give this power of additional taxation unless we are prepared to say that the federation shall take over a good deal more of the responsibilities of the different colo- nies than we suggest they should do at the present time. There is no doubt w^hatever that the difficulty will be great in the ap- propriation of this money. At the present time we do not propose to impose on the commonwealth the duty of appx-opriating more than about a third, at the outside, of the revenue which they will receive from customs duties, I think we are rather premature in authorising the common- wealth to impose unlimited taxation in any manner they please in addition to im- posing customs duties. It seems to me that we ought to withhold this power un- til we are prepared to give them some duties to discharge in connection with it. I am not prepared to adopt the suggestion of my hon. friend, ^Ir. Donaldson, that the railways of the different colonies should be taken over entirely by the commonwealth ; but I do say that when we are proposing to authorise the collection of customs duties amounting in all probability to £7,000,000 or £8,000,000 a year, we ought to impose on the federal government the duty of spending that money for the benefit of the commonwealth. We ought not for a moment to entertain the idea of giving tlie power of collecting so much larger an I amount of revenue than is required, with the intention of afterwards returning it to the several colonies by some unscientific method. I shall be glad to hear from any member of the Constitutional Committee why they have proposed this general power of imposing taxation. It seems to me entirely unnecessary. Personally, I feel that we ought not to give the federal par- liament this power unless we know to a greater extent than we do at the present time the purposes to which the revenue is to be applied. Mr. McMillan : It seems to me that if you are about to create a federal body with sovereign power, it cannot be limited in its power of taxation. It is part and parcel of the case that you cannot dictate in any sense or particular the class of taxation that shall take place in the future. We have given over the customs revenue, and no doubt there will be a surplus. It seems to me, however, that you may go too far, and do too much as well as too little. In framing this constitution, I think the power to deal in the future, say, with the railways or with the national debts of the colonies, and all these other matters, ought to be left to the possible evolution of the constitu- tion, for no doubt when it is framed all the elements of public life in these colonies will be brought into one focus. Those questions which we see from a local aspect, will have a more general aspect, as far as the whole of Australia is concerned; and to limit the greatest and necessary power of any state, the power of taxation, which lies at the bottom to a certain extent of all govern- ment, would be to at once stultify the whole constitution you bring into exist- ence. Notwithstanding the many fears which may possess tiio.se re[)resenting cer- tain colonies, it seems to me tiiat we are going into this federation with tiie hope that the central power will Ik; animated by a sen.so of justice to the whole of the colo- nies, and it would certainly be a step back- ward.s,and we .should at the same time prao- 672 Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. ticallj stultify the whole of our work, if we were to stop short of the sovereign power necessary to the creation of a state. It also occurs to me that we are liable in this case if we omit powers of direct taxation to enunciate a policy which has no right to he enunciated at the present stage of our pro- cedure. I am not sure that we should not by our very silence enunciate the policy that there should be no direct taxation in the sovereign state. Sir Joiix Bray : Strike out the words ! Mr. McMillan : The matter is one upon which I see no possibility of unan- imity of opinion, and to strike out the general power of taxation would, to my mind, be practically bringing these pro- ceedings to a close at once. It is an abso- lute necessity thai this power should be vested in the sovereign state irrespective of the consequences. Mr. BAKER : I would remind the hon. member. Sir John Bray, that every power ought to be commensurate with its object, and that there onght to be no limitation of power to effect an object which is in itself incapable of limitation. Who can pretend to say what the result of this federation will be in time to come? We may have to spend our last shilling or to sacrifice our last man in our own defence. We do not know what the expenditure of the federal government may be. and to limit the power of taxation would be to alto- gether misunderstand a fundamental prin- ciple of government. It is utterly impos- sible in a federal form of government to attempt to limit the power of taxation in any way whatever. Captain RUSSELL : I think the last two speakers have failed altogether to appreciate the point raised by my hon. col- league, Sir Harry Atkinson. I did not by any means understand him to say that he did not approve of a system of direct tax- ation forming part of the taxation of the <;ommonwealth. But he did raise the [J/r. McMillan. practical question as to what would be- come of individual states if you took away from those states one of their chief means of raising revenue 1 If you take away this means of raising revenue, you deprive cer- tain colonies of the means wherewith to discharge their liabilities. How is it pos- sible to get away from the fact that in this clause it is proposed to grant to the com- monwealth power to take away from the colonies every penny of the revenue they now derive from customs 1 There are enor- mous responsibilities resting upon every colony, and they must be met. What my hon. colleague wanted to point out was not that the commonwealth should not have absolute power in the matter of taxation ; but that having that power, it should also take over proportionate responsibilities. If, in other words, you take away from the several colonies the means of paying their debts, it is evident that you put them in a position of being unable to meet their lia- bilities. Being unable to raise taxation sufficient to pay the interest on the money they have borrowed, they will, as my hon. colleague suggested, be reduced to a posi- tion of bankruptcy. Mr. PLAYFORD: We are not con- sidering, at the present moment, what re- sponsibilities we will take over from the several colonies. The question we are con- sidering is the power we will give to the parliament of the commonwealth in the matter of taxation ; and so far as my read- ing extends, no commonwealth in the world has existed, or can exist, without possessing unlimited power of taxation. It is so in the case of the United States, in the case of Canada, and also in the cases of Germany and Switzerland. If you take away the general power, and draw the line at customs and excise duties, then those who believe in a free-trade policy will have no hope whatever of being able to give effect to that policy. We want the people of these colonies to be perfectly free so far • Commonwealth of [3 April, 1S91.] A ustralia Bill. G73 as taxation under the commonwealth is concerned to decide what form or mode of taxation they will adopt for the raising of the necessary revenue. If you limit the power of the commonwealth in the Avay suggested, those who hold free-trade views will never be able to give effect to them, Mr. THYXXE : It seems to me that the point raised by the hon. member, Sir Harry Atkinson, does come within this clause, for there can be no doubt that in jjivinfrto the federal parliament these powers we must necessarily give to it the power to take advantage of every resource of the colonies when it may become necessary to meet the stress of times. We must, at the same time, consider that we ai-e by one of these sub-clauses taking away from the several states their principal sources of revenue. I would remind the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Playford, that this source of reve- nue is now pledged by each colony to its debenture holders, and we are pro2iosing to take away from the debenture Jiolders a security pledged to them, and to hand it over to a body which will not be under the control of the several states. Mr. FrrzGKnALiJ : "We are giving a first mortgage ! Mr. TilYXNE : Since the hon. member refer.s to mortgage, I would say that we are postponing to an unlimited extent, at the pleasure of the fed(;ral parliament, a first charge, which the debenture holders liavo >ipon a portion of our revenues. Mr. McMillan: There is no such charge; the credit of the state is involved ! Mr. THYNNi':: Jf the credit of the state is pledged its revenue is pledged, and in many loan acts I thiid< the expression "first charge upon the revenues of the colony'' is usc(l. 3rr. ^McMillan : Only in out; act ! !Mr. TIIYNNE : The colonics are now ))ropo.sing to give away this .security, and the consequence will be, as suggested by the hon. member. Sir Harry Atkinson, that any one of the colonics being unable 2 u from misfortune to meet its engagements with its creditor, the federal parliament will of necessity and duty be bound to come to the rescue and take the responsi- bility upon itself. Mr. Playford : There is no liarm ii> that ! Mr. THYNXE : That may be ; but it is very much better that we should make provision for it now, and not after tlio- crcdit of any one of the states has been injured. Mr. Playford : It will come in later- on in the bill ! Ml-. THYNXE : At this stage, when Ave- are discussing the jiowers of the federal parliament, every portion of the bill comes more or less under our review. I take Mb that we can now refer to any portion of" the measure, and that we can compare with this, its central clause, any other pro- vision. If we take away from the colo- nies their principal sources of revenue, Ave must also take upon ourselves the respon- sibilities of those colonies. Mr. BIRD : Although it be quite true^. as the hon. member, Mr. Playford, has- l)ut it, that we are not now discussing directl}^ the responsibilities we are going to hand over to the federal government^ yet the question is so intimately associated w ith the powers of taxation wc are going to confer upon that government, that it has been very properly raised by the hon. member, Sir Harry Atkinson. If w^e wero going to limit in this particular bill tho responsibilities which the federal goveru- iiient are to have thrust upon them, it. might be well to limit tlieir powers of taxation ; but inasmucJi as their respon- sibilities are not limited, and m.ay be, I hopi', far in excess of anything whidi this; bill indicates, it becomes a fiucstion for consideration whether w(> ought not to d^t. what has been done in every other federa- tion that I know of— that Is, to confer ou the federal body full powers of taxation. G74 Commonioealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. It would be a weak and helpless thing if it had not the power to raise all that is required for the fulfilment of its obli- gations. I hold strongly that, together with this power of taxation proposed to be given in this clause, there should be thrust upon the federal government the whole obligation for the debts of the colonies. No doubt some arrangement will have to be made to give compen- sation to those colonies whose debts are smalh Unless we take that course, we are proposing to give to the federal go- vernment far more revenue than we need give to it. We shall only want about X2,000,000 for federal expenditure, while -we shall be giving the federal government about £10,000,000. It seems absurd to give the federal government power to collect £10,000,000 that it may have the pleasure of handing back £8,000,000. ■ Until full provision is made for the work- inw of a uniform tariff and the fulfilment of all the obligations which shall eventu- ally be permanently thrust upon the fede- ral government, I should prefer that the federal revenue should be secured by a contribution levied upon the various colo- nies. If we pass this clause, we can only reasonaVdy do so in view of our intention to impose upon the federal government •the obligation of discharging the liabilities of the colonies with regard to their public debts. I trust that the clause as now be- fore us will be agreed to, and that in that we shall have to some extent an indication of the determination of the Convention to impose upon the federal government be- fore we have done with this bill the obli- gation of the debts of the colonies. Mr. DEAKIN : It is useless for the Convention to impose upon the common- wealth any duties which the several states are not prepared to surrender. What the lion, member a.ssumes as the premiss of his argument is, that the several colonies will be only too willing to hand over their [iVr. Bird. railways and other public works to the federal government. Mr, Bird : No ; that they should hand over their debts ! Mr. DEAKIN : The proposition, as amended by the hon. member, is much simpler and much more tempting to the colonies. That is, they should keep their assets and hand over their liabilities. The proposition would be much more tempt- ing to the colonies than to the federal government. Mr. Clark : Figures show that it is quite practicable ! Mr. DEAKIN : I did not rise, however, for the purpose of entering into these ques- tions, because, although they are related to the, matter in hand, they do not ap- pear to be very pertinent. The special purpose for v/hicli I rose was to protest against the inadvertent use of language which even, in the course of debate, may lead us into serious difficulties. Not one, but several hon. members, have used thr phrase that this clause would "take away" the power of taxation at present possessed by the several states. I can imagine nothing more calamitous than that such an idea should be adopted by any of the communities that compose Australasia. This clause could not possibly, except in the narrowest and most restricted meaning of the word, take away any power of taxa- tion from any colony. Suppose this clause is passed, the same unlimited power of tax- ation as is possessed at the present time by the colonies will be retained by them in every respect, except as regards duties of customs or excise. With regard to direct taxation, which we are more particularly discussing, the colonies will possess in future every power which they now possess. Con- sequently, no power is taken away except the power of imposing duties of customs or excise. Neither is it fair to say that the creditors of the colonies are losing the priority of their mortgage on the assets of Commonwealth of [3 Ai 'RIL, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 675 the colonies. There is nothing in this clause which will give the federal tax- gatherer any priority over the state tax- gatherer. On the contrary, in the natural order of things, owing to the transference ■of the customs revenue to the central go- vernment, the several colonies, or some of them, may be brought face to face with the question of direct taxation long before such a question is likely to l)e raised in the parliament of the commonwealth. Con- sequently the direct taxation will be in existence in the colonies before it can be imposed by the commonwealth. The com- monwealth will find, therefore, that the priority in time will have been gained by the states. In no part of this clause is priority given to the federal government in the matter of the right of levy. All that ■can be said is that necessarily there is a certain point at which the taxable resources •of the community will cease, and that when powersof taxation are possessed by the com- monwealth there will be less revenue for the ■colony which at present has the sole power of taxation. That is undoubtedly true ; but that is a point at which we are never likely to arrive. What is proposed to be given in this clause is that unlimited power of taxation which mu.st accompany the un- limited responsibilities of the common- •wealth. One of the foremost of its duties, that in fact which created this Convention, ■was to provide for the common defence of Australasia, and it niay be necessary to devote not only the last ship, but the last shilling to that object. It is impossible to cast thp duty of defence on the govern- «nentof the commonwealth without giving them unlimited taxing power. An ]Iox. Mkmiikk : In the case of a blockade, there would not be much in- CDme ! Mr. DEAKIN : All the more reason for granting unlimited powersof taxation, ilf one source of revenue is cut off, they should certainly have another, Plowever much force there may be in Sir Harry Atkinson's contention that it will be neces- sary for the federal parliament, if it gets the revenue of all the colonies, to consider the question of taking over their liabilities, it does not follow that we in this Conven- tion should attempt to determine what are the liabilities which the commonwealth should accept. We are bound to prepare such a constitution as will enable the com- monwealth to come into existence on terms fair to all the colonies ; but we are not authorised to go one step further. We are not called upon to undertake what will be the duty of the federal parliament, or to discover what particular expedients should be resorted to. We provide hereafter one source of revenue of which the colonies are to be deprived — the customs revenue ; and we provide a certain method by which any surplus remaining after the payment of the obligations of the commonwealth may be disposed of so that the several colo- nies will be justly dealt with. Whether the particular proposal in the bill is or is not the best, the fact remaiiis that vve have provided a safety-valve so that in the rather unlikely event of there being a surplus for a length of time we can deal with it. In the con- stitution there already exists not only special powers with which the commonwealth is endowed, but there is the power of refer- ring other matters to the commonwealth by the colonies. 1 hope we shall secure the privilege to the several colonies of request- ing the federal parli.iment, with tiie con- sent of all the states, to take over their railways or other public works, or do any other matter or thing which all the states may agree is desirable in the interests of the whole people. AH that should be pos- sible. Under the bill the federal parlia- ment should be able at the instance of the states to undertake any or all such obliirations. It is a much wiser course to give that wide latitude of choice, than to attempt now to forecast the future, and G76 Commomveallh of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. to cliiteruiiuc what it shall or shall not niouwealth, who are also the people of the take over. We were not sent here for several states whose lot we are asked to that purpose, and the federal parliament commiserate. of the future will not thank us for at- Mr. Fitzgerald : And when you have tempting to anticipate what they should an upper house to control it 1 do. "What will the federal parliament be ? Mr. DEAKIN : I think it is unkind, It will not be, as some members seem to when struggling with one misfortune, to infer, a foreign body, taxing the people of be reminded of another. The dilBculty of the colonies without regard to their obli- dealing with taxation cannot be mitigated gations or the debts already incurred. The by remembering that we have an upper same constituents who return the members liouse. I rose simply to f>oint out that if of the local parliaments will be the people these debates are, as they will be, criticised who will retui'n the members of the house by the enemies of federation, it is desirable of representatives, which will have the that our language should be as accurate as sole right of initiating taxation. And are possible, and we should hasten to explain we to suppose that the people having once even apparent misconceptions which may taxed themselves thi-ough their several arise from the language of lion, members, legislatures will again wish to impose taxes I rose to show that we are not taking any- for the mere pleasure of taxing] Have thing away from the colonies, not injuring we ever found any of our constituents so their credit, and also that this alarm as to anxious to increase their burdens that wc the exercise of the power of taxation by should expect to liud them insisting upon the commonwealth is greatly dissipated Ijy their representatives laying heavy taxes the I'ecollection that it is the people of the upon them for purposes not clearly and states who will compose the commonwealth, absolutely defined ? and who will tax themselves. We may An Hex. Member: One kind of rely, therefore, in giving them these amph' taxation might suit one colony, and not powers on their not using them againbc another ! themselves. Members Iiave spoken of tln^ Mr. DEAKIiN : That is possible ; but connnonwoalth as if it was outside Aus- there can be no difference as to the tax- tralasia ; but the commonwealth will Ije payer.s' interests as between one colony and the people of Australasia. The power of another. It can never be the interest of a taxation will only be exercised with tin man to pay more taxes than he can help. consent of the people of Australasia ; am^ If the hon. member thinks that because we need not fear its exercise. It will only > a citizen belongs to a community with a be enforced when such an imperative need larger area he is more ready to put his hands arises as will commend it to the people of into his breeches' pocket, his experience has the country, who will return representatives been limited in respect to taxation. to parliament for the purpose of imposing i Mr. Marmion : What I say is that one .special taxation for the special ends wLich kind of taxation might suit one state, and they have in view. We have not topi'otect that another kind might suit another state ! the people of the federated states against Mr. DEAKIN : That is true ; but it is themselves, and there is certainly no one foreign to the issue. Surely we need feel else to protect them against in this regard, no alarm in endowing the commonwealth The commonwealth consists of the people : with these large powers of taxation, since and this power of taxation can only be they can only be exercised when the need exercised by and with the consent of the commends itself to the people of the com- people. [J/i\ Deakin, Covimonicealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. G77 Mr. THYNNE : Before the clause is some further obligations than those that passed I would like to reply to the argu- are proposed. At the present time the nient of the hon. member, Mr. Deakin. federal government takes upon itself simply He stated that in certain circumstances the cost of the civil government and the power of taxation by the local state finance, and for that purpose they have parliaments would be imdoubtedly affected placed at their disposal a sum based upon by the provisions of the bill. In clause 3, what might be called a protective tariff, chapter v, it is provided that when the I think it would be absolutely necessary law of the state is inconsistent with the to enforce such a tariff if ever we were law of the commonwealth, the law of the to have federation of the colonies. This commonwealth shall prevail. It is quite would place in their hands a sum of over easy to realise circumstances under which £9,000,000. Now, we know that all colo- a tax, say upon land, might be imposed by nial governments, and I presume that the the state, and made a first charge upon same remark would apply to the federal property, and a similar impost might be levied by the commonwealth ; but the state law would have to come second, and the commonwealth would, therefore, have the first helping out of the fund for providing that particular tax. ]\Ir. Deakix : That is quite possible I Mr. THYNNE: It is quite possible, and of course, in theory, it is quite feasible. There is another matter to which I in- tended to refer a little earlier. It would be a great pity if we had in the bill any provision which would tend to raise oppo- sition to its provisions when going through the Imperial Parliament, and I am quite sure that unless we make some provision liere by which the rights of our sevei'al states' creditors arc sufficiently protected, government, having such an enormous surplus as tluu-e would be under such cir- cumstances, and not being tied down in any way, would certainly be liable to be- come extravagant, and it would, there- fore, be wise and well on our part to, as far as possible, guard against that extra- vagance. I think we can well guard against it, and I believe that the objection to which the hon. member, Mr. Thynne, referred can be removed if, in connection with this matter, we authorise the federal government to take over tiie various re- sponsibilities which we have in connection with our colonial indel)tedness. If any one will take the trouble to look into the subject as the memljors of the Finance Committee diil, they will find that the jum the Imperial Parliament will be inclined, at the disposal of the federal government, and I think justified, in taking some .steps to i)rocurn the necessary security. My own oi)inion is that tlie federation couM very well take over the debts of the seve- ral states, looking to the customs for the means of paying them without interfering with the state management of the rail- ways. Mr. BURCJESS ; I must confess that I think it is very expedient that full provi- sion should be made in coniu'ction with our finance matters — and, mark you, tiiisclausr' really touches upon finance -and that the federal government. should take upon itself after making full provision for all ordinary expenses, will fully cover the amount of interest that would be payable upon the total indebtedness. At all events, I am quite convinced that it is so within av(!ry small sum indeed, and it woidd then be merely necessary on the part of the federal government to state what should lie flio mean imlil.tedness of the colonies which it should takeover, and then either to debit or to credit those colonies, according to the amount of their sjiecific indebtedness. In matters of this kind wo cannot be too care- ful. Lctus recollect thatoncoftheprincipal 678 Commomjcealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. objections that \\\\\ possibly be raised by some of our fellow-colonists in connection ■with this movement will be, that we are calling upon them for an additional sum for general government, and they -will naturally ask, " What are you going to give us in return for this ; if we are to be called upon for extra taxation, what are you going to give us in return T And un- less we can show, as we ought to show, that there are some distinct advantages to be gained, I think that in many of the colonies strong objections will be raised. In connection with this matter, the re- marks of Sir Harry Atkinson must not be overlooked. Taxation through customs is the sheet-anchor of all our colonial finance ; and if we hand over all rights in connection witb customs and excise, it will be a matter of extreme difficulty, to put it in mild language, for some of the colonies, more particularly those colonies that have al- ready had to resort to direct taxation, to carry on their respective governments. I trust, therefore, that whilst we are con- sidering this sub-clause, hon. members will bear in mind the very great importance of the subject, and that if we do not make provision for it now, special care will be taken to do so later on. Mr. DONALDSON : This is a subject that is worthy of the fullest consideration and discussion. It would certainly be ab- surd to try to limit the powers of the federal parliament. We cannot do that. Any parliament to beeflectis^e in the future must have the full power to be able to levy whatever taxation they require to carry on the government of the country. We have not the slightest idea now what will be required in the future. Therefore, we mu.st trust all these powers to the par- liament. Looking at the matter in regard to the immediate future, we have to bear in mind that, according to the proposals a.s we are now dealing with them, the federal parliament will collect from cus- [J/r. Burgess. toms from £8,000,000 to £9,000,000 ; and according to the information we h.ave ob- tained the total expenditure will be only about £2,.500,000. Of course that would mean that a large surplus would have to be- handed back to the states in proportion to the amount which had been contributed by them. That is fair enough, so far as it goes ; although I fear that in the future it will cause some trouble, and, as the lion, mem- ber, Mr. Burgess, has pointed out, any parliament having such a large surplus a.s. that is very likely to be extravagant. AVe know that the states have no control what- ever, nor should they have control, over the- expenditure of the federal pailiament. The federal parliament should do whate\ er they jdease with the monej', although there is an understanding that any surplus should be handed back. But not having obliga- tions, as all the states have at present, of providing interest on loans, how do we- know the position the federal parliament may take up by-and-by 1 Supposing the feder?,! parliament were dominated by- free-traders. They might say, " There is- no necessity to levy large customs duties ; we will reduce them one-half." At the same time they might submit a scheme embodying a direct form of taxation. As was pointed out by the hon. member, Mr. Thynne, they might go in for a land-tax. The states will then be left in this posi- tion : That, getting back a smaller amount than they anticipated from the federal par- liament, they will not have sufficient to j)ay the interest on their loans. They will therefore be cut olT, in the first in- stance, by not being able to levy custom;* and excise duties ; and if they are com- j)elled to raise money 1)V other means they will probably have to double or treble the direct taxation of the people of the state. That is an awkward position in which ta be placed, and it is one that is worth}' of the gravest consideration. I do not think any form of federation will be complete or Commonweallh of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. G79 satisfactory, unless the debts at least of the whole of the states are taken over by the federal government. Mr. DIBBS : I move as an amend- ment : That after the word "money," line 1, the words "if required for defence purjjoses in time of war " be inserted. I move this amendment for the purpose of limiting the power of the federal govern- ment. Where the customs and excise revenue will provide ,£8,500,000 a year, and where the probable expenditure in time of peace is £2,500,000 a year, there is no necessity to allow the indiscriminate power provided in the sub-clause. Mr. MUNRO: Perhaps if I call the attention of the hon. member to another clause in the proposed constitution bill, he will see that his amendment will not only not be required ; but that it will really act against the intentions of all those gen- tlemen who wish the federal parliament eventually to take over the debts of the various states. It is stated in clause 13, chapter iv : The parliament of the commonwealth may, with the consent of the parliaments of all the states, make laws for taking over and consoli- dating the whole or any part of the public debt of any state or states, but so that a state shall be liable to indemnify the commonwealth in re- spect of the amount of a debt taken over, ami that the amoimt of interest payable in respect of a debt shall be rleducted and retained from time to time from the share of the surplus reve- nue of the commonwealth which would otiier- \\ isc be payalde to the state. Therefore, if the hon. gentleman conlines this power to raising money by any other mode of taxation only in case of war, all that is intended to be done in the clause 1 liave referred to will be defeated. I think the best plan is to allow tiie ku1>- clause to stand as it is, and if ajiy further atnendiiient is required it can be made in the 13th clause of chapter iv. The inten- tion of the framers of the constitution has been to make the constitution as flexible as possible, so that arrangements can be made between the various states and the commonwealth when the time comes to make them. Amendmentnegatived; sub-clause agreed to. Sub-clause 4. Borrowing money on the public credit of the commonwealth. Colonel SMITH : I purposely abstained from addressing myself to the last sub- clause because the whole question of the new dominion is involved in their borrow- ing power, and this sub-section deals with that point. I thorougldy concur with what fell from the hon. member, Mr. Bird, the Colonial Treasurer of Tasmania, and from the other hon. members sitting behind him. I think we should take power in this sub- clause to enable the dominion government to borrow sufficient to consolidate the whole of the debts of all the colonies. I venture to say that if that power is given they will raise quite sufficient money from customs and excise, without touching one penny of the railway revenue of any one of tlie colonies. They will be ena,bled to do what is required by a system of taxa- tion from customs — a plan that has been adopted by every federal government that has ever been formed in the world up to the present moment. Mr. Burc;ess : And excise ! Colonel SMITH : It has been done in the case of (Jerinany. When their revenue was less than £0,000,000 a year they in- creased it from that .source alone up to £-20,000,000 per annum. What was the result 1 All the states were brought into the Union without any pressure, without any special taxation, being placed upon them, and they came into it in the pleas- antest possible manner. The various colo- nics, I suppose I am within bounds when I .say, are now paying on an average 4 j)er cent. If we allow the dominion parlia- ment to take sometliing like £9,000,000 for the purpose of paj ing back £7,000,000, G80 CommonivcaUh of [3 AritiL, 1891. J AuslraUa Bill. asfree with some lion, niombcr who said it is the most clumsy way of doing it. I think that with the money which tlioy receive they should have the obligation of consolidating the whole of the debts of the colonies. If they consolidate the whole of the debts of the colonies, I agree with the hon. menibei-, Mr. McMillan, that they will be enabled to borrow very advantageously upon the whole territory y the amend- ment to establish. I might also emphasise the fact that this is simply a proposal to confer upon the federal parliament power to legislate with reference to the establish- ment of these courts, and though no doubt the terms of the amendment show that a federal court having jurisdiction to deal with the entire commonwealth is contem- plated, it may be contended that will hardly be a federal court in the ordinary accepta- tion of the provisions contained in the sub- sequent portion of the act dealing with the ostablislimentof afederal judicature. How- ever, as I understand the lion, and learned member much prefers that the amendment should })(i deferred to a subsequent stage, I shall be liappy to meet his wishes and ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, witlidr.iwn. Sub-clause 23. Tnunij^ration ai.d cmij/r.ilidi. Colonel SMITH : I should like to a.sk ISir Samuel Griflith, the exact m(;aniiig of these two words, " immigration " and "emigration"? The colony which I re- present objects to immigration unless the immigrants come at their own expense. For many years we have abandoned the 2 X system of assisted immigration. I should like to know, therefore, if power is to be conferred upon the dominion parliament to override the local parliament in refer- ence to this matter? Sir SAMUEL GEIFFITH : The words as they stand are as general as they can be, and should be read with the introduction : The parliament shall, subject to the provisions of this constitution, have full power and au- thority to make all such laws as it thinks neces- sary .... with respect to immigration and emigration. That is wide enough. Colonel Smith : Eather too wide ! Sir SAMUEL GEIFFITH: It will enable them to keep out Chinese, Hindoos, or other aliens — even English, if iieces- sary. It will enable them to impose con- ditions, if found necessary, such as America has imposed to prevent pauper and other undesirable immigration. It may under some circumstances be a very useful pro- vision. Sub-clause agreed to. Sulj-clause 27. lliver navigation with respect to the common 2Jur2)oscs of two or more states or parts of the commonwcaUli. Mv. McMillan : This is a subsection that I think requires some kind of elabora- tion, which probably tho.se who have drawn the bill may be able to undertake. The sul)-section means morn than the river navigation. Wc want the control of the rivers as regards the use of the water, and, furthermore, it is necessary to have some control over (lie tributaries. As Ave know in connection with tlie Murray, there may be tributary streams to check the flow of water from which might havo such an eflect as to render tiu; river useless. It seems to mc — although T do not propose now to indicate any actual amendment- — that there ought to be some very general powers \\'\\\\ rcg.'ud to the control of the river, not merely for navi- gation purposes, but also for purposes of G90 Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. ii-risration and the conservation of the water. That I look upon as one of the most important matters in connection with the whole scheme of federation. We have large rivers which are absolutely essential to future schemes of irrigation and the conservation of water. These run through diflferent colonies, and if economically man- aged by one power, equitably dealing with all the rights of the different states, they may be great sources of wealthin the future. Consequently, it seems to me that a clause oufdit to be introduced into the bill which will give the central government general powers to deal in some equitable way Vv'ith the different rights of different states, and with the general conservation of all rights with regard to these rivers. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The hon. member's observations certainly demand attention. The subject was considered pretty fully by the committee, and a form of words which was suggested, and which at one time we were disposed to. adopt, was, if I remember rightly, " I'iver naviga- tion and the conservation of water, with re- spect to any purposes, (fee." I think myself that it would be an improvement to have these words. The delegates for colonies bordering on great inland rivers, however, know more about the subject than I do. I move : That, in line 1, after the word "navigation" the words "and conservation of • water" be in- serted. Mr. CuTilBERT : And disti'ibution ! Mr. Deakix : That would belong to the states ! Mr. GILLIES : I should like to ask whether the meaning of the amendment is to give to the federal parliament the con- trol of the conservation of water ] Mr. Deakin : It is only " with respect to tlie common purposes of two or more states " ! Mr. GILLIES : The question of the conservation of water would scarcely be [^rr. McMillan. raised between two states. Any question as to local conservation, however, might be seriously affected by the legislation of the federal parliament with respect to conservation. The control of water con- servation belongs to the individual states, and they undertake it ; but if there were legislation with respect to conservation generally that would affect the tributaries of any particular river, I am afraid that we should get too deep into the subject, and that there would be trouble. Some- of the colonies deeply interested in water conservation might decline to join this federation if they thought that the whole- of their conservation schemes might be in- terfered with by the federal parliament. I think it should be made perfectly clear that their schemes will not be interfered with. Mr. Deakix : It does not apply ! Mr. BART0:N" : I would suggest to the- hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, that he should withdraw the amendment. Sui-ely it is not intended to transfer to the federal parliament the power of legislation for the purposes of the commonwealth with re-^ spect to the general conservation of water. That is a matter for the taking away of Avhich from the individual states there is- no reason whatever. Matters relatina to irrigation and so on, which are intimately connected with property a,nd civil rights,, and which we are all prepared to leave to the several states, ought certainly not to- be dealt with by the federation. I can see no reason why control with respect to these matters should be transferred from the states to the commonwealth, and I think that the idea of the commonwealth being given power to take over control with regard to them will cause very great alarm. I trust that the amendment will be withdrawn. Mr. PLAYFOKD : What I understand the amendment to mean is that, supposing by any water conservation at the source of a river, navigation on that river might be Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891;] Australia Bill. 691 stopped, the parliament of the common- wealth would have power to step in and conserve the rights of the states which were injuriously affected. I think that the clause will give full effect to this intention without putting in the words " and con- servation " at all. Conservation on the upper branches of the river Murray might tend in the future to make that stream uunavigable, since the water taken for irrigation might never find its way back to it, and what we are now proposing to do is, I understand, to give over to the dominion parliament the charge of the navigable rivers, and, therefore, the con- servation of the interests of those colonies which require to have the rivers kept open. Mr. McMlLLAX : As I see by sub- clause 29 matters generally may be re- ferred to the federal parliament, this mat- ter miglit probably, I think, be referred by the states concerned to the parliament. No doubt if the amendment were carried it would place a very large power, which might be abused, in the hands of the fede- ral parliament, and which would cause irritation in the different local parliaments. I therefere urge my hon. friend to with- draw the amendment, and leave the matter to be settled under sub-clause 29. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I moved the amendment, because it was suggested in the committee, and I knew that mem- bers of the committee would be familiar with it. I admit that I do not like the term myself. The hon. member, Mr. Bird, has suggested another expression which I think it would bo a great improvement to use; tljat is, the words " navigation and use." Sauth Australia, Victoria, and New South Wales are, however, more interested in this matter than is the colony which I represent, and their delegates will know more about it, Mr. Gillies : I am afraid of insertinf? words which might be so wide in their meaning as to cause trouble ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : There was not a single line in this clause which gave the committee so much trouble as this did, and the result of all our trouble, w hich was very great, is the phrase before the Committee. Mr. DEAKIN : It may be as well to point out one circumstance in connection with this matter — namelv, that conser- vation may be absolutely essential to navi- gation, and it may, therefore, be taken to that extent to be implied in the words already used. As a matter of fact, even upon the magnificent streams of America, steps are now being taken to conserve water at the heads of the rivers to pre- serve a regular flow in the summer sea- son. The idea that the hon. member, Mr. Playford, had in his mind is, therefore, so far, provided for in the clause as it stands. For my own part, I think that some such words as those suggested by the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, would be very advantageously added in this place. The introduction of the word "conser- vation " would have permitted the con- servation of water for the purpose of irrigation. Mr. Playford : Leave that to the states ! Mr. DEAKIN : It may very well be left to the states ; but it is an indisputable fact that water conservation will be abso- lutely necessary to the future of one or two of the states, and it will be a matter of great didictilty for them to cope with all tiie dilliculties of the question by any of the legislative powers which they now pos- sess. Each state can legislate within its own borders ; but that is a different tiling from pa-ssing a measure which will exactly dovetail in with the legislation of {mother colony, so as to permit of joint action and joint responsibility. If the matter cannot be dealt witli Ijy its reference to tfie federal parliament, what ought to be a national question will become a local question ; whereas if you introduced the words sug- G92 Commonwealth of ['S April, 1891.] Australia Bill. gested, you would cnaLlc all these issues to be dealt with fedei-ally as occasion arose. JNIr. McMillan : With respect to the remarks of the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, suppose there were an extensive scheme of locking these rivers for the purpose of navigation, would that be covered by the sub-section 1 Mr. Deakin : It depends on whether it is for the common purposes of two or more states ! Mr. McMillan : Perhaps the best thing to do would be to allow the sub- clause to pass as it stands, and to consider very carefully the whole question, with a view to the adoption of some amendment afterwards. It is a very difficult matter to deal with, and I do not think it can be dealt with ofT-hand at the present moment. The best thing to do would be, taking note of the debate, to allow the sab-clause to pass as it stands, and, perhaps to introduce an- other sub-clause afterwards. Sir JOHN BRAY : I may state that the Finance Committee recommended, on this point, as follows : — That the federal government should be em- powered to legislate on the following subjects : — Intercolonial rivers, and the navigation tliereof. We felt, and it is clear from what has been stated that most hon. members feel, that there is something more than the navigation of the rivers with which the federal parlia- ment ought to be empowered to deal. The words I have quoted, hovv^ever, did not meet Avith the approval of the Constitution Com- mittee, and consequently they were aban- doned. Still the Finance Committee were strongly impressed with the idea that there was something besides the navigation of the rivers which required to be controlled by the federal parliament. Mr. Deakix : Infinitely more important than navigation ! Sir JOHN BRAY : It is true, as has been pointed out by the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, that by leaving the words as they [i/r. Deakin. stand, you may do more than is intended and may prevent people taking water from a river at all by saying that it is necessary for the purposes of navigation. The subject is a veiy important one ; and it will re- quire most careful consideration before it is finally dealt with. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Sub-clause agreed to. Sub-clause 28. The conti'ol of railways with respect to transport for the jiurposes of the com- monwealth. Mr. GORDON : I move : That the following words be added to the sub- clause :— " and the regulation of traffic and traffic charges ixpon railways in any state in all cases in which such regulations are required for freedom of trade and commerce, and to prevent any undue preference to any particular locality within the commonwealth or to any description of traffic." The amendment attempts to meet a patent difficulty which, if not met, may upset the whole of the commercial ad vantages of feder- ation. If, notwithstanding intercolonial free trade, it is possible for any colony to run a competitive line which will deprive an ad- joining colony of the advantages of its posi- tion, then intercolonial free trade is a mere fiction, so far as the colony which is de- prived of its geographical position is con- cerned. Wemustcertainlyhave some power in the federal parliament to regulate differ- ential rates on competitive linos, that is to say, upon lines open simply for the purpose of competition. Mr. Barton : Will not sub-clause 12, chapter iv, meet the difficulty 1 Mr. GORDON : I think not. At any rate, it is open to doubt wdiether it will or not. If we mean to do this, Avhy should we not say so specifically 1 It is possible that subclause 12 of chapter iv may meet the difficulty ; but the matter would have to be left pretty much to the interpreta- tion of the law courts to give it that dis- tinct application, and the constitution will be sufficiently legalistic as it is without rely- ing too much upon the interpretation which Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 693 tlie courts of law will place upon the general ■words. It seems to me that this is an im- portant matter; it certainly is important to some of the colonies. If we mean it, we had better say so, and if we do not mean it, we had Letter say we do not mean it, so that the colonies may fairly understand the terms upon which they come into the fedex-ation, and so that they may under- stand the dangers they may have to face, and the contingencies which may exist in the commonwealth. The amendment em- braces a large proposition, and it may be possible to cut it down to meet the exigen- cies of the case. I have, however, made it as large as possible, and I think it ought to be made as large as possible to cover what is required. I hope that it, or some amendment of it, will meet with the ap- proval of the Convention. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I should like to ask who is to be the judge as to whether the charges were required or not? !Mr. GouDOX : Parliament of course ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Then all the words of limitation are mere surplu- sage. If the regulation of traffic charges is to be made in all such cases as parlia- ment thinks nece.'^sary for certain purposes, we may as well leave out the words of limitation altogether and .say, "the regula- tion of traffic cliarges \i\)On railways." Mr. GoitDON : They arc not federal traffic charges, but state charges ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Exactly, tliey are for a limited purpose. If par- liament i.s to be the ab.solute judge, what is the use of the words of limitation ? Mr. McMillan : I think it is as well to face thi.s question at once. I d'j not think the parliatnentsof tlie country under existing circumstances would bind them- selves to absolutely do away with diffi-ren- tial rates at the present moment. There may be a great many contingencies to bring about diffi;rential rates. Ido notsay thatthe question of free-trade between the colonies is bound up with that of the differential rates. "NVe may have keen competition be- tween the different colonies in the way of carrying on their respective businesses, and at the same time we may have free-trade across the borders as far as customs duties are concerned. I will take a case. Sup- posing the central power has the right to the navigation of the rivers, and suppos- ing, by a further power we may give them, they have the right to lock them and to create a large traffic in a certain direction away, say, from New South Wales ; and supposingNew South "Wales had .spentsome millions of money in constructing a rail- way right to the edge of those rivers. Do you ujean to say \ve are bound to accept any regulations on two totally distinct matters — the regulation of the river traffic and the regulation of the railway traffic — both from the central government, although there may have been millions of money spent upon the one and very little money spent upon the other, or vice versa ? It seems to me that if we are to allow any- thing like this at all it must be in regard to the taking over of the whole of the railway systems, the unification of the railway sys- tems of the colonies; but we have not got so far, and it would be very dangerous for us to get so far. Starting, as we did, at the early stage of our proceedings, with an anxiety to give very little to the central government, we arc now, it seems to me, running the danger of giving too much and leaving too little for that central go- vernment to do in the evolution of its political life. As far as railways are concerned, and speaking with regard to the debt too,' some hon. delegates seem to imagine that the two matters are absolutely intertwined with one another. I may say to tlioso delegates who seem to me to be a little misty in their view of tliis question, that you may liave a con- solidation of all the debts of the colonie.s under the central power, and you need G91 Commomcealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. not necessarily have anything to do witli the particular assets which make up those debts. Well, if the states are liable for their debts and for the interest on those debts, and if they are, as it seems to me they must be to a certain extent, the authority for deciding where their lines of railway should run, you cannot, at any rate at the present stage of our Australian existence, where the conditions are so very different in the various colonies, attempt t^ takeaway the control of those railways. And if you do not take the control of the railways, each railway system must be go- verned according to the particular con- ditions that surround it. Personally, as a matter of principle or theory, I should like to see the abolition of differential rtites, when the time comes when it is pos- sible to abolish them, and to have a mile- a,ge system throughout the whole of the continent ; but we are dealing with each state at the present moment on the supposi- tion that each state retains its own railway system, and has to pay the interest upon the debt incurred in bringing the rail- ways into existence. Consequently if the experts of those railway systems say that, in view of river navigation, of competing colonies, and of steamers going along our coasts, they must have some system of differential rates in order to secure a general result, it would be madness on our part to introduce any hard and fast principle in this constitution which would practically override the opinions of the rail- way experts of the different colonies. It seems to me that these are matters which it is far better for us toleave to the general evolution of things, which will come about in due time, than to deal with them by this general sub-clause introduced into these powers by which certain things can be rele- gated by the different parliaments to the central parliament. A great deal that we are trying to introduce now will, no doubt, be ultimately carried out. \Mr. McMillan, Mr. BIRD : I quite agree with a great deal of what has fallen from the hon. member who last spoke ; but I think it should go without saying that if the states are to keep their railways in their own possession they should have control of the tariff of those railways ; and if we adopt the amendment now before us, it would necessitate the adoption of a similar re- striction with regard to other state action. For instance, it might be that a state would own or charter a fleet of steamers, and lay thera on to the ports of some neighbouring colony for the purpose of bringing the traffic from those ports to ports of its own, and thus bring about the very thing which it is feai'ed by the hon. member, Mr. Gordon, would be brought about by differential railway rates ; so that if we ado])ted the hon. member's proposal we should be compelled to prevent the states not only from imposing differential rail- way rates, but also from takinw action in regai'd to any other mode of communica- tion by which the same result would be brought about. I think we should reject the amendment, and leave the states en- tirely free to regulate their own railway traffic so long as the railways are in their own hand.s. Dr. COCKBURN": From another as- pect of the case, I think arguments can be advanced in favour of the amendment of the hon. member, Mr, Gordon. I think free-trade is bound up with the question of differential rates. A remission of railway rates onthemanufactures of any state might be equivalent to a bonusgiven to the manu- facturei's. Take the case of two adjoining states, in one of which manufactures are established, and a large capital invested in them, whereas in the other manufactures are just in their struggling infancy. The tendency is for the large manufacturers to attempt, by underselling, to crush out the smaller manufacturers, and if the state, by making large ierais.sions in the railway I Commonwealth of [3 Apuil, 1891.] Australia Bill, 695 rates, are allowed to carry the products of the manufacturers of the one state,, so that they will be practically free from charge, it is equivalent to giving a bonus to the manufacturers, and diminishes that actual protection wliich free-trade always ac- knowledges is due to mileage. This prin- ciple is protection in the best possible way commercially. XJnlesswe abolish the possi- bility of differential rates, we might destroy the only protection which acts thi'ough mileage against distant manufacturers. I think that free-trade without disallowing tlifferential rates, will fall short of its object, and will tend in an indirect way to bring about the granting of bounties by states. Mr. DEAKIN : If the contention of the hon. member. Dr. Cockburn, be cor- rect, there would be no necessity for his hon. colleague to move this amendment. If, as he contends, any differential rates are equivalent to an interference with freedom of trade, there can be no question that ■clause 12 of chapter iv does definitively and absolutely prohibit any such inter- ference. For my own part, taking sub- <:lause 1 of clause 52, which we have pa.ssed, together with the clause which we are ap- proaching, it does appear to me tliat a very strong case could be made out under the bill as it stands for arguing that the authority is already vested, in the com- monwealth, to deal Avith the ca.se the hon. member proposes. The argument, how- •ever, which he might fairly urge is, that on a question of this delicate and difficult nature it is very desiraljle that there siiould 1)6 no possible room for doubt, and that the lion, mpmber, the chairman of the fVmstitu- tion Commit toe, has already indicatfd there is doubt in hi.s mind as to the sufficiency of the present provisions. Under these ■circumstances, followinjj his colleacue's argument, I would sugge.st to the hon. member tliat any amendment made would ■come very much better in clause 12, chap- ter IV. If, for instance, it read that " the ])arliament of the commonwealth may make laws prohibiting or annulling any law or regulation or differential rates made by any state or authority constituted by any state," it then appears to me that he would be tak- ing as absolute a power as he could desire. The only question is whether that power would not be too absolute. I do not sup- pose that any one can dispute the argument of the hon. membei', Mr. McMillan, that the imposition of differential rates under many circumstances would be perfectly If^gitimate. There can be no desire to in- terfere with them, and there should be no authority in the commonwealth to interfere with them, except, in so far as their action interfered with the federal principle. But, that would need a much narrower and closer definition than the amendment, which does not err either in its explicitness or scope. It embraces all the hon. member desires, but also a good deal more than is neces- sary, and, if moved in the form he has adopted, might give rise to a good deal of doubt and suspicion in the several parlia- ments. Sympathising with the hon. mem- ber, and with the end he has in view, I question whether this wide amendment, if accepted by the Convention, would be ac- cepted by the parliaments of the different colonies. Mr. FITZGERALD : I suggest to the hon. member, Mr. Gordon, that if he ham- pers the states in their control over their own railways, he will certainly interfere very materially with what may hereafter be, in their wisdom, considered a proper and wi.se policy, namely, the leasing of those railways. If any of the states determine to lease thfir railw.ays, surely tho imposition now of conditions which might allect the terms which could be obtained under such leasing would be a very serious infliction upon tjjo.se states. I apprehend that unless the Convention .see that it is absolutely necessary that .some restriction should be placed upon the fullest power over the raiU 696 Commonwealth oj [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. way system of each state, they will be very cautious indeed in imposing any such re- striction. The railways represent a large sum of money, the policy of governing the railways is one which requires men of con- siderable power to direct it, and I think the Convention would act very unwisely if it interfered in the slicrhtest degree with the fullest and most absolute discre- tion in the exercise of that control. ]Mr. CLARK : I sympathise very much with the object that thehon. member, Mr. Gordon, has in view in moving the amend- ment. But I believe the criticism offered by the hon. members, Sir Samuel Griffith and Mr. Deakin, is well founded, namely, that the amendment expresses in language much too wide the particular object which he has in view. I think the hon. member, Mr. Gordon, must agree that the argument of the hon. and learned member. Sir Samuel Griffith, in particular, was well founded. At any moment it chose the central govern- ment could pass an act regulating the rates from one end of the commonwealth to tlie other. All the hon. member and his col- leagues want is power to prevent some particular wrong being done, or what they regard as a wrong, and I think that object would be more definitely and successfully achieved by an amendment of this des- cription : And the prevention of discrinihiating rates being charged for railway services by any state, company, or person, so as to give any prefer- ence or advantage to any particular person or class of persons, or any locality, or any particular description of ti'afBc. Those are very much the words that are used in the Inter-States Commerce Act of America. There they legislate only with regard to private railways, none of the states owning railways. I can conceive at once that a number of difficulties might arise as to how this law should be enforced against the states. We could easily enforce a law against a private person by saying that he shall be guilty of an offence and prosecuting him if he breaks the law. [Mr. Fitzgerald. Sir Samuel Griffith : In the case of a state we could declare the state law to be invalid ! Mr. CLARK : But whatever difficulties there might be in the way of administer- ing the law, I think the amendment I sug- gest definitely points to the evil which the hon. gentleman desires to cure, while it does not go beyond the particular object aimed at. It does not give the federal parliament power to do anything more than prevent the specific evil we wish to provide against. Mr. BAKER : I do not think the amendment just proposed would meet the case. Take, for instance, the railway be- tween Melbourne and Geelong. The Vic- torian Government spent a considerable amount of money in making a railway from Melbourne to Geelong, and why should we give the federal parliament power to prohibit them from so fixing the rates on that railway as to enable it to compete with the steamers running between Mel- bourne and Geelong 1 I believe the Vic- torian Government lowered the rates on that line for the express purpose of com- peting with the steamers, and enabling the railway to pay the interest on the cost of construction. Mv. CLARK: The Inter-States Com- merce Act in America is managed by a com- mission who have very lai'ge discretionary powers as to whether or not they will allow a departure from the strict lines of the act, and that might meet the particu- lar case to which the last speaker has referred. Mr. KINGSTON" : It has been sug- gested that the amendment of the hon. O member, Mr. Gordon, would have the effect of enabling the federal legislature to deal with the question from time to time as it thought fit, and to usurp to itself powers which it is not intended should be conferred upon it. The decision of the matter will not rest with the federal legis- Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 697 lafcure. It will rest "with tlie federal courts, which it is expressly provided will be charged with the interpretation of the constitution, and which by their decisions will control anything in the shape of the improper exercise or assumption of power on the part of the federal legislature. Therefore the suggestion that the amend- ment will enable the federal legislature to deal with the question, uttei'ly irrespective of the principle laid down by the hon. member who moved it, is not well founded. Question — That the words proposed to be added be so added — put. The Committee divided : Ayes, 11 ; noes, 21 ; majority, 10. Ayes. Baker, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Bray, Sir John t-rey. Sir (ieorge Cockburn, Dr. Kingston, Mr. Deakin, Mr. Playfortl, Mr. Dibbs, Mr. Smith, Colonel Downer, Sir John Bird, Mr. Burgess, Mr, Clark, Mr. Cuthbert, Mr. Donaldson, Mr. Noes, LotoD, ^Ir. Marmion, Mr. McMillan, Mr. Munro, Mr. Parkes, Sir Henry Russell Captain Rutletlge, Mr. Suttor, Mr, Tliynne, Mr. AN'rixon, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Ayde Fitzgcralil, Mr. Forrest, Mr. A. Forrest, Mr. .J. Gillies, Mr. Griffitli, Sir Samuel Question so resolved in the negative. Amendment (by Mr. Clakk) negatived That tlie sub-clause be amended by the addi tion of tlie following wonls : — " Ami tlic pre ventioti of discriniinating rates being chargei for railway services by any state, company, or person so as to give any preference or advantage to any particular person or class of persons, or any locality or any particular description of traffic." Mr. I5AKER: I move: That tlic sub-clause be amemJcd by tlic addi- tion of tiie following words : — "Tlic altering of the gauge of any line of railway, and the cstab- " lishing a uniform gauge in any state or states." I do not say that at the jiresent time there is any great reason why such an addition should be made ; but we must look ahead a little, "We know that the railway sys- tems of the different states are gradually drawing clos(3r and closer together. We do not know what the mineral resources of any colony are ; it is possible that at any moment enormous mineral treasures may be found in different parts of the in- terioi', and an enormous traffic may spring up. It is only right and proper, therefore, I think, to give the federal parliament the power of dealing with this question. Mr. MuxRO : At the cost of the federa- tion ? Mr. BAKER : Of course, Mr. Munro : Then say so ! Mr, BAKER : That is assumed, Mr. Gillies: Has the hon. member any idea how much it will cost 1 Mr. BAKER : I shall come to that di- rectly. Of course I admit it must be at the cost of the federation, because I presume that the federal parliament will not pass such a law unless it thinks it is necessary for the good of the whole counnonwealth. The inhabitants of the states of Victoria, New Soutli "Wales, and Tasmania, are per- haps not very familiar with this question, and it has not been so plainly brought before them as it has been brought before the inhalntants of South Australia. In South Australia wc have two railway gauges. We have already met the Vic- torian system with a .') feet 3 inch gauge ; we are extending our railway north to meet the Queensland system with its 3 feet iiK-h gauge, and wo .sliull r.ipidly meet the New South Wales system with its 4 feet S.l inch gauge. It has been proposed in our Parliament — even by the Covcrn- nient, I think — that we sliould pull up some 300 miles of our railways and relay them with a 4 feet 8^ inch gauge, in order to meet the railway system of the great colony of Now South Wales. ]\Ir. Pl.wkoud : Never I IMr. KixcHTOx : Not by any government! €98 Commonwealth of [3 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. Mr. BAKER : It has been seriously proposed and earnestly discussed. I bring the question forward to show that it is tound by-and-by to become an im]:>ortant •<]uestion. Any hon. member who has travelled in America knows what an im- portant question it has become there. He knows that railways with different gauges istarting from diflerent points have gradu- ally met, and that the different gauges have involved an enormous annual expense. Mr. Playford : No such state of things -exists in America. The lines that go from the coast on one side to the coast on the ■other are all of one uniform gauge ! Mr. BAKER : I think the hon. meni- hev is mistaken, and if he has travelled on the Ohio to Denver line, he must know that there are two different gauges, and ihat one of the burning questions of the •day in America is the establishment of a oiniform gauge. The question may not arise here at the present time ; but it is very possible that it will arise in the not far distant future. It may be that for de- fence purposes a line of railway will be required to connect the capitals of the •colonies ; or it may be that a railway on "which there is an enormous goods traffic passing through two states will require to 1)6 of a uniform guage. I think it is advis- able to give this power to the federal par- liament. The expense of doing the work all at once may be too great, and therefore I put it in the form that they can establish a uniform gauge in any state or states, so that it may be done by degrees. I hope the amendment will be carried, because it is a power which we might safely trust the parliament of the commonwealth not to •exercise unless it were necessary for the ■common good. Amendment negatived. Sub-clause ,30. The exercise within the commonwealth, at the request or with tlie concurrence of the parliaments of all the states concerned, of any legislative powers with 5 respect to the affairs of the territory of the [J/r. Baker. commonwealth, or any part of it, which can at the date of the establishment of this con- stitution be exercised only liy the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by the Federal Council of Australasia, hut always subject to 10 the provisions of this constitution. Mr. BAKER, : I desire to know whether it is intended by this clause to take from the Parliament of Great Britain the power to pass laws for this country 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: We do not take anything away from the Parlia- ment of Great Britain. We say that the parliament of the commonwealth shall have the same powers as the Parliament of the United Kingdom in respect to cer- tain matters. Sub-clause agreed to. Mr. THYNNE : I move : That the following stand as sub-clause 3 : — " The appropriation of any moneys raised by the commonwealth for any purpose authorised by the constitution," The object of the provision is to limit the power of the commonwealth to borrow money, or to raise money strictly for the purposes with which it is authorised to deal under the constitution. It is a pro- vision which I think is necessary for the protection of states, Mr. CLARK : I thoroughly sympathise w^itli the object which the hon. member has in view, namely, to confine the federal parliament strictly to the powers conferred upon it by the constitution, and not to let it in any indirect way, by the appropria- tion of money, exercise a power which is not directly conferred upon it. But I am of opinion that the constitution has al- ready sufficiently protected the people, be- cause, although the parliament might at- tempt to do what I have just described, I am very sure that the supreme court would very soon declare any such law in- valid. Therefore, the only object which we could gain by inserting the provision would simply be to plainly and legibly place before the federal parliament this Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill C99 prohibition upon its powers. I do not given. I submit that there is nothing in think we need do that when we know the bill from end to end limiting the power that this prohibition upon an undue ex- of the commonwealth to appropriate money tension of powers does positively exist, for any purpose it thinks desirable for the and will be interpreted by the proper benefit of the community. In this way I tribunal when the time comes. Surely say you give to the federal parliament a we do not require to state the prohibition power which is a danger, and I wish to in so many words, to use an old cxpres- avoid that danger. The hon. member, Mr. sion, so that a child may understand it. Clark, evidently agrees with me that it is Mr. Thyxne : Where is the prohibition proper that a limit should be observed, and in the bill now ? if that is so, it is better to express the Mr. CLARK: It is in the fact that limit, than to depend upon a judicial de- only certain distinct powers are speciti- cision which we cannot foretell will be cally delegated to the federal parliament, made in the direction we now desire. It and that they cannot exercise anv powers i^ better that we should render reference other than those which are specifically to a court upon such a subject unnecessary, delegated to them. If the hon. member I trust, therefore, that the amendment can show me any general words in any will be adopted. part of the bill which appear to go beyond Mr. Gillies : Do I understand the hon. the intention of delegating specific and member to contend that the federal par- limited powers to the federal parliament, I liament could appropriate £1,000,000 for shall then feel compelled to support the hon. Mr. Parnell, for instance ? member's amendment, because I thoroughly Mr. THYNNE: Possibly it might ap- sympathise with his object. But I do not propriaie the sum of £1,000 a year to re- want to burden the constitution with any munerate Mr. Gillies for the services he is unneces.sary provisions. If the hon. mem- supposed to have rendered to the colonies Ijer has discovered any general words of o^ Australia. I think the pov/er of the the nature I have indicated, I should feel parliament should be limited, particularly pleased if he will direct my attention to i'l ^'if^w of such a possibility, and that it them. should not have the power to go outside ]\Ir. TIIYNNE : The general words are the strict limits of the constitution in any in sub-ciau.se 4 : expenditure it may make. Otherwise we borrowing money on the puldic credit of the shall have no confidence in it. commonwealth. Sir SAMUEL GIMFFlTll : T entertain No restriction is placed upon the purposes considerable doubt as to whether words of for which th'; money may be borrowed. the kind suggested by the hon. member Although the hon. n)ember has, in connec- should not be inserted. The question was tion with sub-clau.se 1, shown very clearly considered very fully in committee, and and distinctly the way in whicli the powers at the last moment it was agreed to leave of the I'Vdoral Government of the United the words out; l)ut it does not follow that States have been extended from time to the committee were right, or that there is time underthev/ordH"tradeandcommerce," not a serious doubt upon the subject. I I say that the extension of powers which entertain great doul>t still ; but my doubt might Ije made under that sub-clause aie is occasioned only by subclause 4. While, nothing as compared with the extension of on the one hand, the parliament is not ])Owcrs which might take place if this un- empowered to ajiproiiriate money for any controlled power of borrowing money were other purposes than those indicated, the rOO Commonioealik of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. appropriation of money is incidental to the borrowing of it, and to that there appears to be no limit. Mr. Playfoed : The amendment will place no limit upon it ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : If we were to make the -Ith sub-clause read, " Borrow- ing money on the public credit for the pur- poses of the commonwealth," it might meet the case. Mr. Kingston : The hon. member will find a general provision as to appropria- tion in clause 3, page 16 ! Mr. MUNRO : These are questions which legal gentlemen will have to interpret for us. We laymen naturally want to know what the words mean. What I should like to ask is whether, if this amendment is in- serted, and parliament deals with the ques- tion of the consolidation of the loans of the various colonies, it would be empowered to borrow money to deal with those loans 1 The borrowing in that case would not be for the purposes of the commonwealth, and I should like to know whether the limita- tion contained in the hon. member's amend- ment would interfere with such a course. I do not know whether it would or not. Mr. CuTHBERT : Certainly not ! Mr. MUNRO : It must be borne in mind that the borrowing would not be for the purposes of the commonwealth, but for the benefit of various states. A clause we are going to deal with by-and-by provides that the federal government may consoli- date the loans of the various states in order that money may be borrowed at a cheaper rate, and in order that the states may be put in a better position. But the states will still be liable for the amount, and as long as they are liable the borrowing must be held to be for the benefit of the states and not for the benefit of the common- wealth. That being so, I should like to know to what extent the limitation sought to be introduced by the hon. member would affect the question ] [.Sir Samuel Griffith. Mr. DEAKIISI' : The remarks of my hon. colleague are an illustration of the innumerable difficulties that will arise if you commit yourself to this proposition, which is on first presentation very taking and seems legitimate. Unfortunately, how- ever, the result would be to bring into exist- ence for those purposes a rigid constitution. You would have the appropriation acts of the federal parliament scanned through and through to ascertain if the pai'liament had not, to meet some pressing need, or in some unforeseen contingency, stepped outside the strict powers given to it. To provide against such a case it would be necessary for us to go through this measure from the first line to the last to see that every conceivable purpose legitimately belonging to the com- monwealth was included within its four corners, so that every appropriation might be justified. Othex'wise, in case of a sudden emergency, the federal parliament would find itself compelled to go back to the constitution to discover whether by good fortune the contingency could be brought within the scope of any particular section. Why should we not trust the federal par- liament in the making of appropriations ? Do hon. members suppose that the elec- tors will not eagerly watch every expen- diture of money raised by their taxation 1 Should we not trust the representatives, who will go to their constituents and re- ceive a mandate at their hands? If you cannot trust them to make appropriations in Avhat can you trust them ? Why should you make your constitution in its financial aspect so rigid as to render the government liable to be frequently called upon to justify befor'e the courts an appropriation which has been agreed to by both houses of par- liament 1 The result must be that the dis- covery that the constitution has not been so drawn as to meet all possible cases of appropriation. Mr. THYKNE : The speech just de- livered by the hon. member is a strong Commonwealth of [3 April, 1801.] Australia Bill. 701 argument in favour of having every provi- sion in the bill so loose and elastic as to allow the federal pai-liament to do in all matters exactly as it chooses. Sir Henry Parkes : How can we pre- vent it 1 Mr. THYNNE : By placing stringent limits on its powers in this constitution. Sir Henry Parkes : We cannot do that ! Mr. THYNXE : What is the use of our devoting days to the specification of the particular powers which are to be conferred upon the federal pai'liament if wc, at the same time, admit words which will enable it to do anything it chooses ? Mr. MuNRO : Will the hon. member kindly answer my question ? Mr. THY^s^NE: With regard to the consolidation of the public debts, that would not be interfered with, because the appropriation of money received by the commonwealth for the consolidation of the debts of the states would be a purpose authorised by the constitution. Therefore, the operation of the section to which the hon. member, Mr. Munro, refers, would not be interfered with by the amendment which I propose. It appears that the ques- tion of the appropriation of money is be- coming a vital part of the whole of tliis constitution. If it will ha necessary, as the hon. member, ^Ir. Deakin, says, to go over the whole bill again to see that we liave given the federal parliament all ne- ce.ssary powers, then let us do so ; but I strongly ohject to any constitution which will give the federal parliament power to oversiiadow and crush out the operation of the local parliaments. The argument offered is not a good answer to the absolute necessity that exists for having the power of the federal parliament strictly limited on the important matter of finance. Mr. CLAPvK : It is only fair to the hon. member, Mr. Thynne, to say that he has drawn my attention to a clause which has a much wider and more indefinite operation than I imagined it would have. With regard to that clause, I think his pro- posed amendment would be useful. I do not sympathise with the speech of the hon. member, Mr. Deakin. It is not an answer to the argument of the hon. member, Mr. Thynne, because the hon. member, Mr. Deakin's argument was in favour of abso- lute power being given to the federal par- liament, to which this Convention says it will not commit itself. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I would ask the hon. member, Mr. Thynne, to with- draw his amendment. He will see, on consideration, that it is not really a power, but a restriction of a power, which he proposes. Mr. Thynne : I intend it to be such ! Sir SAMUEL GPtlFFITH : Then this is not the proper place for it. It was in the clause as the drafting committee prepared it; but I think it is in the wrong place — it should come in in clause 3, chapter iv. Mr. THYNNE : I accept the sugges- tion of the hon. member, because I see that the words would come in much more ap- propriately in the clause he has referred to. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clau.se, as amended, agreed to. Clause 5.3. Tiic ])arliameut shall, also, sub- ject to the provi.sions of tliis constitution, have exclusive legislative power to make all such laws as it thinks necessary for the peace, order, and good government of tiie 5 commonwealth with respect to the following matters : — (1.) Tlie afFairsof people of any race \\i til re- spect to whom it is (leemcd necessary to make special laws not ai>plical)lo to the 10 general community ; but so that this power sliall not extend to authorise legis- lation with respect to tiie aboriginal native race in Australia and the Maori race in New Zealand ; 1.') (2.) The government of any territory whicii may by surrender of any state or states and the acceptance ol the parliament become tiic scat of government of the 702 Commomoealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 20 commonwealth, and the exercise of like authority over all places acquired by tlie commouwealtli, with the consent of the parliament of the state in which such places are situate, for the construction 25 of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, quarantine stations, or for any other pur- poses of general concern ; (3. ) Matters relating to any department or departments of the public service the con- 30 trol of which is by this constitution trans- ferred to the executive government of the commonwealth ; (4.) Such other matters as are by tliis consti- tution declared to be within the exclusive 35 powers of the parliament. Amendment (by Sir Samuel Griffith) agreed to : That the word "legislative," in line 3, be omitted. Mr. THYNNE : I was unable to attend the committee when this clause was dis- cussed. We purport here to give exclusive power to the federal parliament to make laws with respect to the affairs of people of any race with respect to whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws not applicable to the general community. It seems to me that that will conflict with the powers reserved to each of the several states under clauses 25 and 26, chapter i, of this bill, where the states have reserved to them the power of excluding from the franchise any particular race or class of people whom they think it is undesirable should be intrusted with the franchise. "We give the states power to make a special law, while in this clause we give that power exclusively to the federal parliament. I do not know whether the hon. member in charge of the measure has given this point full consideration. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I do not think there is any inconsistency. Each state is allowed to prescribe who are to be its electors — it may say anything it pleases about that. I do not think that an elec- toral law saying that only British subjects shall vote can be said to be a special law applicable to the affairs of the people of any race for w horn it is thought necessary to make special laws not applicable to the general community. I think that would be rather a far-fetched construction of the provision. Mr. THYNNE : If a law were passed saying that the natives of the South Sea Islands would not be permitted to exercise the franchise, that would be a special law dealing with the affairs of that race, and not applicable to the general community. The state is given power to do that in one part of this bill, while in this part that power is reserved exclusively to the federal par- liament. I think there is a conflict be- tween the two provisions. Mr. DEAKIN" : There is another point I think the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, should look into. That is, whether the exclusive power contained in the 1st sub-clause would not prohibit any indi- vidual colony from dealing with such a question in the interim until the common- wealth thought it necessary to take actioa in the matter 1 Would it not be as well to leave power to any state to deal with such questions until the commonw^ealth undertook to legislate, as in other cases 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I think this should be an exclusive power on the part of the federal parliament. Mr. Deakix : But only when the com- monwealth exercises it ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Then it \vould not be an exclusive power. Mr. Deakin : It would become exclu- sive so soon as tlie commonwealth thought fit to exercise it ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : So it will be with every other power which the com- monwealth takes into its hands. The in tention of the clause is that if any state by any means gets a number of an alien race into its population, the matter shall not be dealt with by the state, but the commonwealth will take the matter into its own hands. Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891. j Australia Bill, 'O; Mr. DEAKIX : There is great force iu the hon. and learned member's argument as to that being the proper thing to do ; but, until that is done, will the state have power to take action 1 Suppose the com- monwealth does not interfere, will it be said that the states shall be prohibited from doing that which they can do at present ? I agree with the lion, and learned member that the commonwealth should possess the exclusive power if it chooses to exercise it ; but is it not undesirable in a bill for the constitution of the commonwealth to impose a disability on the states? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: What I have had more particularly inmy ownmind was the immigration of coolies from British India, or any eastern people subject to civilised powers. The Dutch and English governments in the east do not allow their people to emigrate to serve in any foreign country unless tliere is a special law made by the people of that country pro- tecting them, and affording special facili- ties for their iroinir and cominir. I am not sure that that applies to Japan. It might apply to the Government of China, but I do not know whether it does. I maintain that no state should be allowed, because the federal parliament did not choose to make a law on the subject, to allow the state to be flooded by such people as I have referred to. Mr. Gillies : Would tlii.s clause pre- vent any state from making a law on the subject until the federal parliament did so 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Yes, and I maintain that it ought to be so. !Mr. GiLLlKS : W'lio, except the federal parliament, is to determine to what x'ace this applies 1 Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : It seems to me that in giving this exclusive power you are doing what you do not intend to do. Su])po8e that people of an alien race from India or China went to Queensland, ami the commonwealth did not choose to pass a law dealing with the matter, not being in- terested in that particular question, is the- state parliament not to make a law to exclude those aliens ? It seems to me that by putting in the word "exclusively " you are doing what you do not intend to do^ and you are giving no power to any state,. when invaded by a foreign race, to protect itself. It cannot do so, because the exclu- sive right rests with the commonwealth. Mr. WRIXON : I do not think that the point put by Mr. Deakin has beea sufficiently met. He has no objection whatever to the federal parliament dealing with this subject. The point is whether until the federal parliament touches the- matter the hands of the states are to be tied altogether. Mr. Gillies : I do not think they are !.' Mr. WRIXON: Exclusive legislative power is given to the federal parliament. That would exclude the states. Mr. GILLIES : The hon. member has not noted the point which I made. The clause says : The afi'airs of peoi>Ie of any race witli respect to whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws not appUcable to the general community. I say that, until the federal parliament- deals with that, and determines the race to whom it is applicable, you cannot tell what race it is. They have to make a special law to deal with the matter. ]\Ir. WRIXON : The practical result of that is, that the state can do nothing until the federal parliament acts. Tliat ought to be met by giving the state power to act, tlie matter to be taken out of the Jiands of the state the moment the federal i)arlia- ment takes it up. Mr. CLARK : The argument is the other way. This exclu.sive power can only be exercised with regard to a race respect- ing wliom it is deemed necessary to make si)ecial laws. Who is to deem it neces- sary? The federal i)arliament; and it must 704 Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. give evidence by legislation tliat it has deemed it necessary, and until it does that the exclusive power does not exist. The state can proceed to legislate on the mat- ter until the federal parliament gives evi- dence that it has considered the subject and come to a conclusion upon it. Mr. Fitzgerald : Is that conclusion agreed to by the hon. and learned member in charge of the bill ? Sir Samuel Griffith : I am disposed to think that that is right. I did not think so a few minutes ago, but I am impressed by the argument ! Mr. DEAKIN : It is at least open to contention. The words — The affairs of jjeople of any race with respect to whom it is deemed necessary to make .special laws not applicable to the general community — might as well apply to the colony as to the federal parliament. The clause deals with the parliament of the commonwealth throughout, but in this particular part it •uses the impei'sonal reference " to whom it is deemed necessary." If that is amended by saying "to whom the pai'liament of the commonwealth deem necessary," I shall be satisfied, as it will remove all doubt. We ought to make the intention clear. Clause verbally amended by the insertion of the words "aflfairs of the" before the ■word "aboriginal" in the 1st sub-clause. Clause, as amended, agx'eed to. Clause 54. Laws appropriating any part of the public revenue, or imposing any tax or im- post shall originate in the house of representa- tives. Mr. WRIXOX : I would suggest a trifling amendment in this clause. I think that the word " laws " is not a very happy expression as applied to measures appro- priating public revenue. I think it better to keep to the old phraseology of " bilk" It is quite true that a money bill is a law. Mr. Clark : It does not appropriate till it is a law I [Mr. Clarh. Mr. WRIXON" : There is a difference betAveen money bills, when they become law^s and other bills, as we all may see by the preamble of an appropriation act and the preamble of different bills granting money. They are, in fact, grants of money by the taxpayers to the government. There is an awkwardness in using the word " law^s" instead of " bills." It may give a certain force to the contention that money bills are like other bills, and are to be dealt with in the same way ; but except for that I do not think it is the best term to use, and I should prefer to have the word " bills " inserted instead of "laws." I move : That the word " laws " be omitted with the view to insert in lieu thereof the word " bills." Mr. CLARK : The hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, will admit that this is only a verbal criticism even at the best, and as we have used the word " law" all through, I think it would be well to have the bill consistent with itself. It is only a matter of habit that we have "ased the word '■' bill" heretofore in our local legislatures, but the people of the commonwealth will soon ac- quire the habit of reading the word " law." I shall, however, have no objection to in- serting the word "proposed " lower down. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I hope the hon. member will not press the amend- ment. He does not propose to make the alteration throughout the bill. Mr. Wrixox : Yes, I do. I would make it in clause 55 ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: Would the hon. member go right through the mea- sure and use the technical term " bill," which scarcely any one but members of parliament understands, instead of a word with which every one who reads it, whether layman or politician, is acquainted? Mr. Gillies : Why did not the hon. member use the word " laws " after the word "money "at the heading of the clause 1 Amendment negatived. Commonwealth of [3 Apkil, 1891. J Australia Bill. 705 Mr. BAKER : I beg to move : That in line 1, after the Mord " apprppria- ing," the words " any part of ihe piiblic revenue " be omitted with a view to the insertion in lieu thereof of the words " the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual services of the govern- ment." If hon. members turn to clause 55 tliey will see that the words whicli I propose to insert here are the words used there. I have moved this amendment for two rea- sons. The first, and perhaps the least im- portant, is for the purpose of facilitating the conduct of public business. Every important bill, and nearly every bill, which is introduced, contains some small clause that appropriates part of the pub- lic revenue, and the consequence, at all events in the colony from which I came, and I believe in other colonies, has been that nearly every bill has to be introduced in the lower branch of the legislature, which takes up nearly the whole of the ses- sion in considering the bills, and towards the end of it they are rushed up to the other house, which must either reject them, or consider them in a very imperfect manner. That has been the result of the law in South Australia, and the consequence has been that the Legislative Council there have felt compelled to summarily reject a great many bills— bills of hundreds of clauses - which they have been asked to pass in jl few hours, because each of them appro- priated a portion of the public revenue, and had therefore to be introduced in the lower branch of the legislature. This has not been at all beneficial to public leginla- tion, and as the words used in the claust; arc exactly the same as those conf.iiiu'd in the Constitution of South Australia, I presume tliat the same thing will ocfur in the federal parliament. My second and more important reason for moving the amendment is this : I am not going to fight over again theqnestionof the relative powers of the federal senate and the house of representatives ; but, as we know, the effect of the bill will be to render the powers of the federal senate very much less than those of the federal house of re- presentatives, and I do not wish to un- necessarily curtail those powers as they are curtailed by these words. The words, "any part of the public revenue," contradict the provisions of clause 55, which says : The senate shall liave equal power with the house of representatives in respect of all pro- posed laws, except laws imposing taxation and laws appropriating the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual services of the government. But if the same words were used in both clauses they w^ould be consistent with one another. If, however, clause 54 stands as it is, clause 55 will contradict it, because it says that no bill may originate in the senate which does not impose taxation or appropriate the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual services of the govern- ment. Mr. Clark : The two clauses must be read together ! INlr. BAKER : Yes, but they are abso- lutely contradictory. One says one thing and the other another. I do not know whether it was intended to put in these words in clause 54 for the express purpose of contradicting clause 55, but that is what they do, and I cannot help thinking that in dealing with this clause the Con- stitutional Committee followed the rules which apply to ordinary upper houses, and which have no application to the federal .senate, and therefore put in these words ; and when they came to consider tlu; (|ues- tion dealt with in clau.se 55, they used words that had another significance. I am not going to discuss the matter over iigain ; but I desire to jilace my opinion on record by moving this amendment. Sir SAMUI'L (iRIFFITll : The in- tention of the clause as framed is that all laws for the expenditure of money, whether for tlie annual services of the government, or for the construction of railways, arsenals, I 2 Y 706 Commonwealth of [3 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. ships of war, or anything else, shall origin- ate in the house of representatives ; and I think that is what the words mean. ]Mr. Baker : Why are ditFerent woixls used in clause 55 ? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The hon. gentleman thinks that because all such laws must originate in the house of representa- tives, the senate will not have equal power ■with the house of representatives with respect to all proposed laws excepting those in respect of which their power is limited. The restriction, however, does not apply until the proposed law has been intro- duced ; so that there is no inconsistency. Mr. BAKER : I understand that the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, draws a distinction between a law and a proposed law. First of all he uses the word "law" when he really means something which is not a law but a bill, that is, a law in its incipient stage ; and then he uses the words " [)roposed law " to refer to a bill after its introduction^ — that is, to mean a law in its second incipient stage. I should rather say that a bill was a proposed law before it was introduced than after it was intro- duced and had passed one stage. I con- fess I may be dense in understanding the two clauses, but I did not draw any dis- tinction whatever between thewords "pro- posed law," in clause 55, and the word "law," in clause 51, nor do I think that anybody else would, unless he happened to have been a member of the Constitutional Committee, who may have considered the matter, and have drawn some subtle dis- tinction. However, I am not going to argue the question over and over again. We have argued it all out, and I have no doubt we have made up our minds upon it. Question — That the words proposed to be omitted stand part of the clause — put. The Committee divided : Ayes, 24 ; noes, 7 ; majority, 17. [•S'ir Samuel Griffith. Barton, Mr. Bird, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Clark, Mr. Cdithbert, Mr. Deakiii, Mr, Dibbs, Mr. Donaldson, Mr. Forrest, Mr. A. Fitzgerald, Mr. Gillies, Mr. Gritfitli, Sir Samuel Ayes. Jennings, Sir Patrick Kingston, Mr. Loton, Mr. McMillan, Mr. Moore, Mr. Munro, Mr. Parkes, Sir Henry Playford, Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Smith, Colonel Suttor, Mr. Wrixon, Mr. Noes. Gordon, Mr. Hackett, Mr Thyn'ie, Mr. Baker, Mr. Cockljurn, Dr. l^ouglas, Mr. Adye Forrest, Mr. J. Question so resolved in the affirmative. Clause, as read, agreed to. Clause 55. (1.) Tiie senate shall have equal power witii the house of representatives in respect of all proposed laws, except laws im- posing taxation and laws appropriating the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual ser- 5 vices of the government, which the senate may afiirm or reject, but may not amend. But the senate may not amend any proposed law in such a manner as to increase any proposed charge or burden on the people. 10 (2. ) Laws imposing taxation shall deal with the imposition of taxation only. (3.) Laws imposing taxation, except laws imposing duties of customs on imports, shall deal with one subject of taxation only. 15 (4. ) The expenditure for services other than tlie ordinary annual services of the govern- ment shall not be authorised by the same law as that which appropriates the supplies for such ordinary annual services, but shall be 20 authorised by a separate law or laws. (5.) 1\\ the case of a proposed law which the senate may not amend, the senate may at any stage return it to the house of repre- sentatives with a message requesting the omis- 25 sion or amendment of any items or provisions therein. And the house of re})resentatives may, if it thinks fit, make such omissions or amendments, or any of tliem, with or without modiiications. 30 Mr. WRIXON : I would now call the attention of hon. members to the new sub clause which I propose to add to this clause, with some verbal amendments which th i Commonwealth oj [3 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. ro7 lion, member, Sir Samuel Griffith, has sug- gested, and which I am quite agreeable to accept. The new sub-clause which I pro- pose to move would be numbered 6, and it would read as follow^s : — If the house of representatives decline to make any such omission or amendment, the senate may request a joint meeting of the members of the two houses, which shall thereupon be held, and the question shall be determined by a ma- jority of the members present at such meeting. !Mr. BAKER : I desire to move an amendment before that is put. I move : That all the words in paragraph 1, after " laws," line 3, be omitted. That, I admit, is going straight to the point. This is the most important ques- tion in the bill, and it has already been often discussed. It is a question which will determine whether we are goinjc to have a federation, or whether the bill will be one for the annexation of the smaller states by the large populations of Victoria and New South Wales. That is what it ■will resolve itself into, and that is what will be the effect of the bill. As I have already stated, I am not going to discuss the matter over again ; but I think it is only right and fair that I and those who agree with me should have an opportunity of placing our viesvs on record, so that, when we go back to the colonies that have sent us hero, they niay know what view •we have taken of this matter. Dr. COCK BURN : I Hiipp<.rt the amend- ment. I think the fraraors of tiiis clause lind themselves in a dilemma. The clause is one of two things. It either decides that the houses have not co-ordinate powers, that is to say, that the senate is, in the first place, placed in a position of distinct inferiority to tlie house of repre- sentatives ; or if, in an indirect manner it gives those powers to the senate wliich it appears to have taken away from it, it is a flimsy texture of words, and a mass of ambiguity, wliich will form no proper foundation for a lasting constitution. If it really takes away the important powers of veto in detail from the senate, then it strikes at the very root of the principle of federation, because the principle of federa- tion is that there should be houses witii co-ordinate power.s — one to represent the population, and the other to represent the states. We know the tendency is always towards the central authority, that the central authority constitutes a sort of vor- tex to %vhich power gradually attaches it- self. Therefore, all the buttresses and all the ties should be the other way, to assist those who uphold the rights of the states from being drawn into this central autho- rity, and from having their powers finally destroyed. The whole history of federa- tion in America, whether it be the United States or Canada, has proved this : that the tendency is towards centralisation, and away from that local government which is inseparable from freedom. I have heard it said that those who advocate state rights are taking a conservative view of the question. I would like to know since what time have centralisation and demo- cracy been associated ? Those who advo- cate state rights advocate local govern- ment, under whose shadow alone democracy can exist. There is nothing in common between centralisation and democracy, and if you handicap a housi', whicli is erected, to preserve state rights, what have you to prevent the establishment, in this huge island of Australia, of a strong central government which is local only to one portion of the continent, and as far as the rest of the continent is concerned is distant and central ? I maintain that a central government, just inasmuch as it never can be associated witii the power of the people, is inseparably associated with tyranny, arising either from ignorance or design — frequently fioni ignorance — be- cause a central ami distant government can never properly appi-eciate the local conditions for which it is to legislate. I 708 Commonwealth of [3 AnuL, ISOl.] Australia Bill. am surprised that anv one in this Con- vention shoukl for one moment say that to strengthen in every way the rights of the states, as such — to protect in every way the local institutions — is the con- servative mission. The whole history of federation has proAed it is otherwise. It was in the name of state rights, when the question of the Constitution of America was being discussed, that the most fervent appeals to liberty that ever stirred the human In-east were made, and all those •opposed to state rights were the conserva- tives, the monarchists of tliat time. The strongest upholders of state rights from time to time have been those in fa vour of go- vernment by the people, and it is only when you have state rights properly guarded, and safeguard local government, that you can have government hy the people. Oovernment at a central and distant part is ■never government by the people, and may be just as crushing a tyranny under re- publican or commonwealth forms as under the most absolute monarchy. I do hope that hon. members will not allow them- selves to be hoodwinked in this matter. It seems that the crushing majority in favour of the state rights that are es- sential to federation, which we had at the commencement of this discussion, has 'dwindled away. I maintain that unless the state rights are in every way main- tained — unless buttresses are placed to onable them to stand up against the con- stant drawing towards centralisation — no federation can ever take root in Australia. It will not be a federation at all. It will be from the very start a centralisa- tion, a unification, which, insteadofbeing a •guardian of the liberty of the people, will be its most distinct tyrant, and even- tually will overcome it. I do hope that we shall find that those who took a clear view at the commencement of our meetings have not been seduced from the views thoy then held, and that, as at the com- [Dr. Cockhurn. niencement of the debate, there will be a majority to vote with the hon. member, Mr. Baker. IMr. DEAKIN : The hon. member, in his impassioned harangue, did not define state rights, nor define the difference that will exist between the bodies which will, in his opinion, guard state rights — that is, the local legislatures — and the legis- lative body that will represent the com- monwealth. Surely the hon. member need not be reminded once more that the same body of people who will elect the state representatives on the one side will elect the representatives of the commonwealth on the other. The only difference is in the bundles in wliicli these people are made up. The hon. member has chosen to base the whole of his argument on democracy and democratic rights. Will he proceed to show us how it is less democratic to intrust to the whole body of the people of Australia the control of their destinies than to intrust it to the same people, bound up in different liundles] Dr. Coc'KBURN : One is central and the other local government I ]\[r. DEAKIN : That is no answer as re- gards democracy. In almost every state the popular chamber represents manhood suf- fraue ; but in no less than three states on the continent of Australia there are nomi- nee upper houses. Is there to be any nominee upper house in the new legisla- ture of the commonwealth ? Where there are not nominee upper houses in Austra- lia, there are iipper houses elected on a limited franchise? Is a house in the com- monwealth to be elected on a limited franchise] I maintain that the constitu- tion of the commonwealth, as drawn in the bill, is more democratic than obtains in any state at the present time. We shall have the people's house elected by the whole body of the people, no nominee upi^er house, and no house elected on a limited franchise, except so far as the Coiiiinonii-ealth <>f [o Arr.iL, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 709 chambers Avith limited franchise may have votes in the difierent states in tlie elec- tion of senators. The legislature of tlie commonwealth will be more democratic than that of the states, and the constitu- ents of the comraon\vealth will be exactly the same as those of the states. The hon. member said that in the course of liistory we should find one division of parties — the democratic rancrcdon the side of state rights, and the conservative ranged against them. Will he tell us then that, in the United States of America during the recent dis- astrous controversy which rent that nation from side to side, the representatives of the southern states, who claimed the state rights he claims to-day, were the democrats of America ; and will he tell us that Abra- liam Lincoln, and the states of the north, who resisted disunion, and the extreme and extravagant doctrine of state rights, ■svere the con.oer\"atives of America 1 Will he tell us that the democratic population of America was to be found ranked on the side of those who claimed the right of secession and absolute privi- leges of the states, or will he tell us, as he must, that it was the democracy of America whichgaveits verdict for union, andagainst any extravagant doctrine of state rights. In the history of Switzerland, to which he is so fond of rcferi-ing, the hon. member can find precedents that miglit justify him in .sonjc of his suppositions were they not balanced by precedents in an opposite direc- tion. Switzerland has tried botli plans — has tried unification, and rejected it, and trying federation, which he considers demo- cratic, lias found it equally a failure. Dr. Cockijuun: And lias now what I am contending for ! Mr. DEAKIN : And has found at last that it wa.s neces.sary to adopt some .such hajipy medium as I .shall show Is adopted in this bill. Dr. Co( Kiii i!\ : Exactly what the lion, member, ]\Ir. Uaker's, amendment is ! Mr. DEAKIN : I will come to that in a minute. One more argument. Cherish- ing, as I do, quite as warm a feeling to- wards local government, and quite as great a reverence for the powers of local go- vernment as the hon. member himself does, I give my next illustration with some reluctance ; but it will at all events show what I am only at present concerned to show — that is the erroneousne.ss of the hon. member's claim that history proves the democratic character of state ri!,dits as against the riglits of centralisers. I ask the hon. gentleman to turn to the republic of France, and note what has been the policy of all its democratic leaders since Gambetta first laid his policy before its parliament. I do not say that the policy is a light one ; but I do say that the hon. gen- tleman's history is all wrong if he neglects the centralising tendency of the policy which from the time of Gambetta until now has been handed on from leader to leader of the Left, and been embodied as the first principle of the democratic policy of France. Without approving of thai doctrine, I say that the lion, member's his- tory is incomplete, and that there can be shown as much democratic precedent for centralisation as he can show for state lights. ])ut the hon. member, returning to his former argument with groat force, says that in Switzerland the two houses are co- ordinate, and therefore he desires the two houses in this new commonwealth to be co-ordinate. But what I wish to point out to the hon. member although in that case, and in the case of the United States, I can only reply to liis former illustration by my former arguments — is that there he is speaking of a government not respon- sible in our sense of the term a govern- ment that is shaped upon entirely diflei' cut lines. There are many liko myself, wlio would be perfectly prepared, if wo were bound to change our present con- stitutions altogether, to adopt the Swiss- 710 Commomoealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. system, with its co-ordinate houses, its elective ministry, and its referendum, by M-hich the electors themselves were made masters of the situation ; but while we Avould be prepared to consider a proposal of that kind, the Swiss relation of the two chambers has no analogy whatever to a con- stitution such as ours, in which it is pro- ])0sed to retain responsible government, and and in which the goveniment must be re- sponsible to the people's chamber. Respon- sible government, so far from being less de- mocratic than Mr. Baker's proposal would make it, is more democratic by far — not more democratic than the Swiss Constitu- tion, if you take it as a whole, but cer- tainly more democratic than this constitu- tion would be w^ith an upper house co- ordinate with the popular chamber. We have had the ex^ierience of several cen- turies on some points, and one century at least to warn us of the danger of endea- vouring to establish anything like co- ordinate power between two houses when the responsible government has its chief seat and authority in one. To do so w^ould be to shift the centre of gravity of our political constitution. It would be to alter the balance of pow-er to such an extent as to render the constitution strange to us, something of which we have no knowledge, as to which precedents would offer us no guide, and as to which we could form no idea of the future ]\Ir. Baker : We have no knowledge in the present case ! Mr. DEAKIN : We have quite suffi- cient knowledge of the kind of federation we are about to establish. If you estab- lish two co-ordinate houses with equal powers as regards all legislation, and equal authority in the transaction of business, and place a responsible government in one of those two houses bound to answer to the demands of its constituents, the whole body of the people, and {)it it against the house wliich draws its representation from [J/r. Deakin. tlie legislatures of the several states, you will sim])ly provoke an internecine conflict on a more colossal scaletbananythingwhicli has ever been witnessed in a constitution- al) v governed country. But I am not con- cerned in answering arguments which have gone to some length in this direction. I am only concerned at the present moment in following up the contention of the hon. member with reference to democracy. How can he justify his argument for intrusting co-ordinate rights to a house which is not o directly elected by the people, which is elected in part by nominee cliambers and by members elected with a limited fran- chise — how can he intrust to such a cham- ber an equal authority with a chamber elected by the whole body of the people ? He says that his anxiety is democratic. How is it possible for any one wath those words upon his lips to contend that a con- stitution which checks and limits the power of the people, as he would have it do, which ])laces an absolute veto in its path — a veto not coming from the people directly, is a de- mocratic constitution 1 Those w-ho argue ■for constitutional government find them- selves in a somewhat strange position when they see the extraordinary combination in the last division of reactionary radicals and iconoclastic conservatives sitting together on the same bench. To see men whose avowed object is to place all authority at once and unreservedly in the hands of the electors sitting cheek by jowl with gentle- men who will adopt any motion, no matter how circuitous, no matter how vague, how hampered, and how inconsistent, so long as it defeats universal suflTrage • Mr. Hackett : Name! Mr. DEAKIN : I could name one or two if I desired to enter into a personal argument, and certainly the gentleman who has interjected would be one of the first. Mr. Hackett : As an iconoclast or a reactionary ? Commonwealth of [3 April, 18D1.] Australia Bill. 711 Mr. DEAKIX : I should say that the hon. sreutleman is a combination of both. I will not enter into reminiscences as to the lion, gentleman's opinions ; but I will say- that a gentleman who in Australia, in the nineteenth century, deplores the loss of the personal power of the monarch, and the loss of the power of the English Lords, as compared with the power of the Commons, is to my mind an anachronism, I do not wish to be diverted by any of these pleasant passages with an old personal friend and associate of mine from the point, which was that of the constitutional bear- ings of democracy. I am not concerned at present with any other question. No other has been raised. I should like the hon. member. Dr. Cockburn, to ask him- self how he would submit to the people of South Australia — shall I say the fierce democracy of South Australia — a proposi- tion such as has been embodied in this clause — a propo.sition which would give them in the constitution of the common- wealth far less power than they now enjoy under their own constitution — a constitu- tion which would emlirace them, it is true, within a federation, \mt wliich would leave them in that federation less trusted than they are in their own colony 1 I would a.sk the lion, gentleman to recollect that we are not liere for the mere exer- ci.se of our own opinion as to what might he aUsolutely tlie most perfect constitu- tion that could lie framed. Jf we were, there are certain important amendments vvjiich, for my own personal satisfaction, I should like to see introduced even into this bill. Btit th'^y would be amendments in exactly the opposite direction to those wliich the hon. mcmljer desires to make; and the reason wliy I should wi.sh to make thf-m in an exactly opposite direction to those of the hon. member would be to com- mend this bill, oven more than I believe it is already conimfiidcd, to the democracy of Australia; l»ecause I believe that if we in- dulged in any scholastic exercises of the kind proposed in order to meet imaginary state riojhts we might as well consign the l)ill at once to that limbo of political forget- ful ness which is bounded by the boai'ds of a blue-book. We should place this bill in vain before the democracy of Australia if we presented it with a provision on its forefront for the establishment of two co- ordinate houses, one of which, though not elected by the peojJe, would have power to negative all that was done by the house directly elected by the petjple. Of course, if this were ageneral argument, I should be pushing that point too far. I am perfectly prepared to accept this constitution as it stands in the bill. I believe it to be a good and workable constitution, and one which the people themselves can shape under its own provisions hereafter into any form they may desire it to take ; and I believe import- ant reforms will be carried in the early future under this constitution by means of thepowersof amendmentwhich it affords. I am only pressing the argument in an extreme form now, because I am replying to the still rnore extreme utterances of the hon. mem- ber, Dr. Cockburn. I .shall be quite con- tent to let the question between us be de- cided by the verdict of the masses of the people, given by their own vote, on this constitution as against the amendments which the hon. member has suggested. As far as I know the people of my own colony, at all events, I venture to say that they would accept a constitution nf this kind, while for democratic rea.sons tluy would indignantly rfjoct a constitution which contained a jiroposal for the extra- vagant embodiment of state rights, and the elevation of a co-ordinate senate as a rival to the chandler wliich they th(>mselvrs created to express their will. Dr. C0CK15URN : First of all I would like to say that in using the word " demo- cracy " — and I think it might be as well that we should come to an understanding 1: Cominoniveahh of [3 AiMUL, 1891.] Audndia Bill. as to what wo moan by the term — T meant government by tlie people, the one form of government oiily under which freedom is possible. The lion, member who last spoke asked if I would trust such large powers to a senate not directly representa- tive of the people. I use, in reply to that, the old argument wdiich has been used over and over acfain — that there is no I'eason whatever why the senate should not be made just as representative of the people as the house of representatives. The hon. gentleman asks if I w^ould intrust such powers to a house partly elected by nomi- nee members 1 I protested also against that. But you must take the constitution as it is, if it is passed ; and, as against the iiaw which the hon. gentleman has detected in the senate, I set up the flaw which we have found in the house of representatives, and 1 would ask him, would he agree to intrust freedom to a house partly based on the exclusion of manhood suffrage, and elected by plurality of votes'? Is not that as fatal a flaw in regard to the house of representatives as is the other in regard to the senate ? It is far worse. Mr. Deakin : The house of representa- tives will soon alter that ! Dr. COCKBURN : I am astonished to hear my hon. friend talk of centralisation as a system under which the government of the people can flourish. It is the first time I have ever heard any statesman of repute give utterance to such an extra- ordinary statement. Mr. Deakin : Gambetta ! Dr. COCKBURN : I consider that the whole question was summed up at the con- ference at Melbourne last year by 8ir Jolin Hall, when he said that democracy, which is government by the people, de- mands that the government should be Avithin sight and hearing of the people. Surely the hon. gentleman will not attempt • — surely the English language was never meant to be so twisted as to say that cen- \^Dr. Cockhurn. tralisation can in any way be compatible Avith democracy or with the power of the people ! Mr. Deakix : Gambetta ! Dr. COCKBURN : Local freedom and government by the people arc inseparable. Mr. Deakin : IIf>ar, hear ! Dr. COCKBURN: Surely the hon. member does not mean for a moment to assert to the contrary ! Now, a very in- genious argument — an ar2,ument which I foresaw at an early stage of the debate and partly antici2:)ated then — was raised by the hon. member in regard to the War of Secession. I was speaking of the old parties — the party which w^as headed by centralisers such as Hamilton, and the party, headed by Jefferson, for local go- Aernment or state rights. After a time, as I mentioned in a former debate, the party questions got confused, and by nothing so much as the War of Secession, because then, very strangely, that party which had always made for liberty and state rights claimed, by a curious irony of fate, as a part of their right under their claim of state rights to establish and main- tain slavery. The party of liberty became the i^ai'ty of slavery, and the party for centralisation became, by most curious historical irony, the party in favour of freedom. It was that confusion of thouglit that entirely abolished the old lines of parties in America, and as a matter of fact, the parties in America no longer exist. They vv-ere destroyed ; all the reason of their existence was destroyed by the War of Secession. Liberty and slavery got so mixed up that no one knew where they were. The centralisers were for liberty, the people for local freedom were for slavery, and the result has been, as has been well stated by Mr. Goldwin Smith, that the issues are so confused that the two casks representing the old parties, the federalists and the democrats, no longer retain the odour of the liquor with which C ominonv:ealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. ' 1 ""^ they were once tilletl. So that any argu- ment taken from that source is very in- genious, but is entirely opposed to fact. The v.hole issue lias been traversed and destroyed by that miserable war in which for once the states rights men happened to be wrong ; and, although they were the exponents of freedom from the very com- mencement of the Constitution, they set themselves against the very essence of free- dom and personal liberty. I think the hon. gentleman will not attempt to press that. Mr. Clark : That version will stand correction yet ! Mr. McMillan : There is another view I Mr. Deakix : Quite another view ! Dr. COCKBUPtX : Well, history is capable of very different interpretations. However, T think nothing is clearer than that the parties destroyed themselves over that business, and nothing which, has oc- curred since can be traced to the old parties. There is no doubt that this con- fusion of thought in America, this destruc- tion of the states rights party by allowing them.selves to be besmirched with the in- famy of slavery, has been fraught with very disastrous results to the Government of America as a government by the people. What with the constantly eating power of the central government taking away from their powers on the one side, and what with the growth of municipal powers on the other, the area of action for the state governments has become extremely limited — ha.s become .so limited that we can no longer look to America as that great Held in which the problems, social and indus- trial, of the future are to Ijo worked out. Wjiy, the local parliaments in America meet only once iu two years as a rule. I maintain that the great function that Aus- tralia has to perforin among nations is to work out the great social and industri.d problems with which we find ourselves face to face. That can only be done with all the prestige that a government can secure. It can only be done — and I know my hon. friend agrees with me in this — with local governments. It cannot be done by cen- tral influence ; it can only be done in experimental plots. That is the reason why I tremble at the thought of the pres- tige of state governments being sapped, because it is nece.ssaiy that they should have all possible prestige in order to have an authority adequate to work out these problems. I am afraid if from the first you handicap the states rights, seeing that the tendency is all the other way, — if from the first you remove those but- tresses whicli are necessary to maintain those states rights, it w ill be oi:e declivity from the present local governments down to centralisation. I can see nothing to stand in the way but states rights, which, I maintain, all those who believe in go- vex'nment of the people by the people ought to the very utmost of their power to uphold. Sir Samukl Griffith : What are the buttresses ? Dr. COCKBUrvN : You take away co- ordinate powers as to everything. Sir Samuel Guiffitii : As to what \ Dr. COCKBUEN : As to money bills. Except as to the introduction of measures the two houses have co-ordinate powers in the two great federations of the world. What is tiie central government to do? It is, lirst of all. to have the collection of £8,000,000 or £9,000,000 riglit away, and to have the right of imposing any other taxation. We all know tJiat tlic tendency of all governments, and rightly so, is to augment their own importance and to act uj) to the full extent of their authority. We give the federal parliament all the money and wc give them powers which arc simply enormous. Under tlic heading of military and naval defence of thecommon- wealtli, they can do almost everything. They can make roads ; they can build rail- ways ; they can lay submarine cables; they Tit Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Aitstralia Bill. can erectenormouspublicworks. You give them the power under that one heading of spending nearly the whole of the money. Sir Samuel Griffith : What about the buttresses 1 Dr. COCKBURN : I say that unless ^ve give full power to the senate to veto «ppropi'iations in detail, and unless we give them that power without the slightest ambiguity, then we i-eraove the only but- tress which state rights have. I said at the commencement of ray remarks that those who framed this clause were in a dilemma. In America the constitution was not based on ambiguity. The men there who earned credit for themselves for all time saw distinctly what they were aiming at, and then expressed their thoughts in the most nervous English possible, v/ithout the slightest trace of ambiguity. This clause is, I say, ambiguously expressed, and either really gives to the senate the power of veto in detail, or it takes away from the senate that power. It takes away the only safe- guard which the state rights have to avoid this machinery, which is being started ^^nder the name of federation, from be- coming a central government; a unification of the whole of Australia; a government so central and so distant from many parts of Australia, that I maintain it is incon- sistent with the continuance of our local government, especially with the mainten- ance of our separate states as experimental plots in which we can work out the pro- blems of the future, and in which the new ■world may be looked to to redress the wrongs of the old. I do hope that the state rights party have not shown them- selves at the very comn)encement to be of such a character that after a few days they can be seduced from the views which they so rightly held at the commence- ment of our proceedings, and which they strengthened in every way by precedents gathered from every confederation which Las stood the test of time. [Dr. Cockburn. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I believe I am one of the persons referred to by my hon. friend. Dr. Cockburn, as the state rights party. I expressed my opinion very ])lainly some weeks ago on this subject. I do not think the principles I then main- tained are in the least degree dei)arted from in this clause as it now stands ; but I have always felt in dealing with this matter that where there are two strongly opposed opinions in this Convention, unless we dealt with the subject in a spirit of compromise, there would be no chance of arriving at a conclusion. Mr. DiBBS : The majority have some- times given way to a small minority ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I do not think so. I think a reasonable compromise has been effected. I do not intend to make a long speech ; still less do I intend to in- dulge in any declamation. But I should like to answer one observation made by the hon. member, Dr. Cockburn. He tells us that this clause is ambiguous. It is not ambiguous ; it expresses exactly what it means — exactly what is to happen in every case where there is a difference between the two houses. Where it fails in expres- sion is this : it does not profess to prophesy what will be the result of its working under the constitution we propose to establi;ih. In that sense there must necessarily be clauses in a constitution which are ambiguous. Who can say what will be the development in the course of some thirty or fifty yeai's of some of the clauses we are now passing? Who can tell what will be the precise man- ner in which these provisions will work out 1 AVho can tell what will be the practical ojieration of them 1 What we propose to do is perfectly plain. As to all laws, except two classes, the rights of the two houses are completely co-ordinate. As to the ordinary annual appropriation bill, the senators have to express their wishes in a manner different from that in which they exjiress them in regard to other Conimonvrecdth of [3 Afkil, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 15 bills. The same with regard to taxation bills. And with these exceptions the powers of the two houses are co-ordinate. I tliink it is a very reasonable compromise, and that all those in this Convention who really desire to see a federation of Aus- tralia brought about might fairly accept it, or something like it. Because, remem- berinsr the old maxim — I do not know who first used the words — "that those who want the end must want the mean.s," it is of no use for hon. members to profess to want federation while they refuse to accept the means necessary to obtain it. I am quite certain that unless a compro- mise something like that proposed be ac- cepted, federation cannot be brought about. Mr. McxRO : Hear, hear. It will be utterly impossible ! Dr. CocKBURX : That is to say, that those who want unification will not aban- don their aim ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I do not want unification. I strongly object to it. I am perfectly satisfied that under this constitution there will Ije no unification, because state rights will be perfectly pre- served. That is my opinion, at any rate. I do not propose to make any further ob- servations. I will merely repeat that if members of the Convention really desire a federation they will not vote against tlie only possible means of obtaining it. Sir JOHN DOWNER : I do not think any one can doul»t that my desire is to see federation brouglit about. With me it is not at all a new-fangled notion. From the very initiation, within my parliamentary experience, of federation proposals I have been always found a strong supporter of them. Upon this question I scarcely think that tho.se who take the view I take of this matter — because they sincerely entertain Icertain views as to the lines upon wliich a ■true federation can be permanently main- Itained — .should be necessarily sulyect to "the reflection that they are not sincere in the cause of federation. Sir, I think that if we are to have a federation of a per- manent nature it must, on its initiation, be founded upon a perfect understanding, and on the most complete good faith. If there be any ambiguity in the language or in our intentions which is capable of being interpreted by one portion of the dominion in one direction and by another portion in another, the true basis of federation has not been arrived at, and instead of founding our arguments on mutual good- will and a perfect comprehension of each other's intentions, we are at the very out- set sowing discord, and I am sure will not be able to appreciate the results which may follow. One reads the views which are expressed by newspapers upon this question from time to time, and one also hears the vieAvs expressed here on the subject by various delegates. We are told by one branch of the public press — which, if it does not always represent, does sometimes to a large extent direct public opinion — that the basis of this bill is the recognition of the inferiority of the upper house of the legislature proposed to be established — the recognition of certain linos, which, in my opinion, are absolutely inap[)licable, although well known to the English people, and which have been here in efiect faithfully preserved, the only vari- ation in substance from old constitutional lines in the bill now before us being that the senate is authorised legislatively to do what it now does without legislative authority. The law of the constitution, as was well said by Bourinot in his essay on Canadian federation, consists, not merely of the letter of the law, but also of what he calls the convention of the law — under- standings superadded to the law wliicli in strictness he says are not the law at all ; l)nt which still liave all (lie force and authority of law, because they are the basis on which the law is made. Our under- standings superadd<'d to the law have all '16 Commonwealth of [3 Apuil, 1891.] Australia Hill. the force of public opinion to back them uji, and ill this instance I say we ought to have a most complete and perfect under- standing as to what we intend by this new departure in legislature. We ought not only to settle whether or not, if it comes to the bitter end, the senate repre- senting the states will have the practical power of substantially expi-essing its voice in matters upon which the legislative councils of the different colonies are pro- hibited from expressing theirs; but whether in addition to that it is the general under- standing of delesjates here in the first in- stance, and beyond that altogether, whether it is the general understanding of the people of Australia, that that is to be the position of aflfairs. Now, if the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Wrixon, in the very able speech he delivered the other day, directly ex- pressed what this law is intended to be, and in so speaking expressed the views of the delegates here and of the people of Australia, I have very little to say. If we were now for the first time making a constitution, if we had no precedents to guide us, no traditions to influence us, it would matter little whether we gave this power of amend- ment, if afterwards we gave a power to substantially bring about the same result, although in a different way. But if this constitution is to be interpreted by analogy and relation to constitutions that have pre- ceded it, with those with which we are most familiar, and if this power of making a request is, after all, to be merely an ad laisericordlam appeal from the senate to the house of representatives to oblige them by making this or that amendment, the senate telling them in effect in the same breath that if they will not make it they, the senate, will not insist upon it, then this provision, clear as it may be in the letter, is nevertheless a delusion and a sham, and will bring about in no way what the words would express. That is the ground which I take. I had some notions, which I have \Sir John Dovmer. expressed in the course of the debates which we have had, as to the kind of executive that ought to exist. I am will- ing, on reflection, to leave those altogether out of consideration, pi'ovided that the two branches of the legislature are estab- lished in proper relation to each other. I am quite satisfied to leave it to what has been constantly termed the natural evolu- tion of things to determine what shall be the test of the durability of the executive, so long as we have first settled the basis on which the two branches of the legisla- ture are to co-exist. If in effect we have denied the senate the power of amend- ment, though we mean them to have it in substance, then we are not ingenuous. If, on the contrary, we mean to make it appear that we are giving the power o-f amendment in effect, while in substance wc do not intend it, then we are more dis- ingenuous. My objection is simply tbis : | That the foundation of all true federa- tion should be in perfect sincerity and in perfect mutual understanding, and I object to the mode which has been adopted here, ' in which you either give the substance, assuming not to give it, or in which you adopt the converse of that proposition. That is practically all I wish to say about it. With the senate as it ought to be, and I believe will be, and as we have made eveiy provision for making it, the only true aristocracy, to use the words of the hon. member, Sir Henry Parkes, an aristocracy of ability, of worth, and in the general estimation of the public — if that body, selected fi-om the very best of the people, surrounded by safeguards to insure the best selection, is not fit to have power given to it co-ordinate with the power of the other branch, selected more indiscriminately and less carefully, I fail to see any logical reason for the difference in their authority. All the analogies which have been drawn, both with the House of Lords and the House of Commons, have no application CommomreaWi. of [3 April, 1891.] Av.slraUa BUI. '11 whatever. The analogies with reference to the legislativecouncils and legislative asseni- blieshave more relation, hut still thosebodics are hv no means analosrous. At all events, we have surrounded in our bill the elec- tion of the representatives in the upper branch of the legislature with every means to ensure their worthiness. "We have in- sisted upon their being resident in the dominion for five years, whereas in the case of members of the house of repre- sf-ntatives we have only insisted that they sihould have resided tlu'ee years. We have insisted that the senators shall be above 30 years of age, whei'eas for the house of representatives manhood has been con- sidered to be a sufficient qualification. We have insisted upon the senatoi's being selected by the elected of the people, "whereas the others arc elected by the people themselves indiscriminately. "We Lave taken every means following the analogy of the United States to ensure our senate being as eminent in its per- sonnel as that remarkable l>ody has always been eminent. For what could we have been surrounding this body with all these precautions if it were not with the oliject of recognising the states as entities with co-ordinate rights, acting togetlier with the other branch of tlic legislatui-e, and as a result taking care that tliose who represented them sliould be endowed witli every fpialilicatioii to fit them for so onerous a position ? In this bill I think AVf are making a mistake. 'I'he powerful senate, as I believe tlie first .senate will Ik-, will no doul>t prove that the .statements of the lion. mend>er, INIr. Wrixon, are abso- lutely accurate, and the result will be a conflict amongst the states immediately arising from misunderstanding, for which we, placed here to bring about mutual understanding, cannot say for a moment that we are not to some extent responsible. It is on these grounds that I support the amendment. Mr. McMlLLAX : I do not know whether it is the desire of the Committee to take a vote on this matter to-night. My own opinion is that we ought not, and, as I wish to move an amendment, which I should like to have put in perhaps better phraseology than I can command myself, I would much rather that the debate should be adjourned now. Mr. Deakix : The hon. membor, Mr. Munro, is prepared to speak ! Mr. McMillan : In that case, I will give w'ay. Mr. MUNRO : We have now arrived at the point where we have to decide whether or not our labours shall be in vain. Mr. Adye Douolas : No ! INIr. MUNRO : Surely I have as much right to express ni}' opinion to that eSect as the hon. member has to say " no." I confess that if there were no other con- sideration than my personal view, I should at once i-eject the compromise we have arrived at, because I am entirely in favour of responsible government, and responsible government can only exist by the power of the government to control the finances. I say that the compromise submitted on the present occasion is one whieli, if T were only to consider my personal view, I would at once reject as utterly unworthy of a free l)eople to accept. I have, however, to take into consideration the vii'ws of tho.se op- posed to me, and I have a right to respect those views. Seeing that tliose views go altogether contiary to mine, T am willing to yield largely in order to have those views given efiect to. Ihit T do know this, that if the clause is carried as now proposed it will take all the power that we posscs.s, and all our influence, to get our people to accept it. I also know that if it Ite amended in tlic direction propo.sed, it will be absolutely impossible to get the people of Victoria to accept it. That being so, I feel the re- sponsibility of the position which I occupy. I have come to the colony of New South 718 Commonioealili of [3 April, 1S91.] Auslralia Bill. Wales on the present occasion with the tie- termination to do everything in my power to secure federation. I avu not going to take up much time. I want to know ex- actly how we are placed. I say that J am prepared now to accept the compromise ar- rived at by the Constitutional Committee, because I wish to respect the views of others. But if we are to depart from that compro- mise, I am satisfied that it will be utterly impossible for me to ask the people of "Victoria to accept it. I know what their views are ; and I say that I should not be justified in asking those people, wlio have the absolute riglit now to make their own laws, to tax themselves as they think proper, to pay their debts as they think proper, and do whatever they can as a free people — to give up their rights and give up their privileges and to be put in a position in which a minority is to rule. The concession we are making in accepting this proposal from the Consti- tution Committee is a concession which, as I have said, it will be all we can do to justify. Being heart and soul in favour of federation, 1 am willing to accept a com- promise ; but I tell hon. members seriously that if they want to have federation, and ■want the larger colonies to be included, they will not accept the amendment, be- cause if that amendment is accepted, it will be utterly impossible for us to agree to it. I do not think it will be of any use for me to go into the question as to what the effect of the amendment will be, or what the effect of the clause as it is will be ; all I have to do at present is to deal with the matter from a practical point of view. 1 ask myself, and my brother delegates here, are we or are we not in favour of federa- tion 1 If we are in favour of federation, we shall concede as much as we can. The utmost that I could possibly concede is what is contained in the clause as it stands. Mr. Wrixon : With the amendment of which I gave notice ! [J//\ Munro. Mr. MUNPtO : I say most distinctly that the clause as it stands does not accord with my views at all. The clause as it stands is a restriction upon public liberty, upon the rights of the people to tax them- selves. If I had my o\\ n way, I should ha\ e a totally different clause ; but under the circumstances, and to give way as far as 1 can to the views of other people, I am willing to accept it. But I say in all earnestness, that if the amendment of the hon. member for South Australia is carried, as far as the colony of Victoria is con- cerned, it will be utterly impossible for us to attempt to federate. Mr. McMillan : I think I had better make now the few remarks which I in- tended to make, and indicate the kind of amendment which may possibly be a com- promise for both parties. We have had some language of a rather peculiar and drastic character during the last couple of hours, and it has been said that some of us have been perverted from the faith with which we started in the Convention. I am no pervert from the faith with which I started, but, like other hon. members, I must accept the fact that compromise is necessary when such divergent interests, appear to be concerned. I do not pretend to be a profound student of constitutional history, but I have had the honor of listen- ing to many speeches in this Convention, and inapractical way,andwithmyown com- mon-sense I have tried to dissect the views put forth by hon. members, and with all aue deference to those high constitutional authorities — and I am particularly sorry to differ from my hon. colleague. Sir Henry Parkes, and that very able man, the ex-pre- mier of Victoria, Mr. Gillies — men whose lead I can follow, I think, on almost all political matters — still in spite of their opinion I hold that it would be far better, and would work better in the future, if we allowed the senate, outside the appropria- tion bill for services of the year, to have Commonwealth of [3 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 719 power to amend money bills. I do not hold for one moment that that senate, attract- in" the best men of Australasia within its four walls, would be of that pettifogging character that it would interfere with every little jot and tittle connected with the expenditure sanctioned by the house of representatives. I am reminded, and I only quote from memory of years ago, of the saying of a man from whom we glean a great deal of our political wisdom, that great and acknowledged power is not in- jured either in appearance or in fact by an unwillingness to exert it. The men who compose that assembly will deal very care- fully with all matters connected with the people. They will know that the lower house will have an appeal to the people — an appeal which they cannot resist, and they are not likely to lower their dignity by continual jealousy of and wrangling with that assemVjly representing the whole of the country. I do not take up the posi- tion which some hon. members take with regard to the upper house as representing the different states of Australasia. I know that that is one of the prominent features connected with its functions, but at the same time we are trying to erect a kind of government on the basis of previous constitutions. We, for good or for evil, say that it i.s neces.sary to have two houses of parliament ; and I want to know, if you have two houses of parliament, what is the j;ood of the second house unless it lias the power of review, the power of suggestion, and tlie power in every way of co-ordi- natifly d»;aling with legislation ] Now, let us look at the progress of events. When our new con.stitution comes into force the iirst thing that will engage the federal par- liament will be a tariff bill, a taxation bill for the whole of the colonies ; and will any- body say that there will be any difficulty in a new drparture like that, in the very first great act of the new legislature, with the uj)per chamber of that legislature, not a nominee chamber, not an upper chamber like the House of Lords, but an upper chamber, if not itself directly drawn from the people, at least elected by those who are drawn directly from the people 1 There is no doubt that between the divergent views of the two parties there must be some compromise ; but it is possible to make- a compromise w'ithout at the same time giving up every portion of the principle. I must say that I would sooner see this- constitution not come into effect than see anything done that would, to any extent, lower or degrade .that properly co-ordinate branch of the legislature. There are two ways of doing everything, and the proposed mode of sending suggestions from the pro- perly co-ordinate chamber to the other chamber is, to my mind, the most clumsy, the most undignified, and the most humili- ating procedure that could ever be enacted. Talk about following the lines of the British Constitution ! Why you introduce here a new principle which was never heard of before. It has been heard of in South Australia, but I do not believe it has ever been enacted. Mr. Playford : It has worked for years ? Mr. McMillan : In South Australia. Mr. Playford : Yes ! Mr. jNIcMILLAN : But it has not been enacted. I\Ir. Playford : No, but it has been in operation. It has been agreed to ! Mr. McMillan : lam speaking of an enacted constitution. As my hon. friend oi)posite said, the senate will not come ta the lower house in the dignified position of a chamber offering advice, and giving suggestions by riglit of its legislative jiowcr. Mr. Playfoki) : Tlicy would if it were so enacted I Mr. McMillan : They would come,, as has been properly said, with an ad miueri- cordiam appeal, asking the other chamber 7-20 Commomoealth 0/ [3 April, 1891. J Australia Bill. to be gracious and kind enougli to take their sii£:£restions into consideration. Mr. Playford : No I Ml'. ]\IcMILLAN : We must remember that we are making what is called a paper constitution. It may be well enough for us, in the liberal spirit of our debate, to say that we do not intend this to be an un- dignified procedure ; but once it is crystal- lised into an act of parliament you will have the lawyers throughout Australia dealing with it as a paper enactment, and would it not be a fair inference for any member of the house of r'epresentatives to say, " This upper chamber has no right to dictate to us ; the constitution only gives them the ritrht to make ad misericordiam I'cpresentations ; they are not in any way equal to us "2 I use this very strong lan- guage to show that I am still of the opinion with which I entered the Conven- tion with I'egaid to the judiciousness on our part, with the view of cai'rying out federation, of givinii; both houses co- ordinate powers. Still, there must be some compromise, if we are to bring about federation at the present time. What I should propose would be this : Of course, it is allowed on all hands that it would be very inconvenient for the upper house to interfere with the different items in the appi'opriation bill, which simply appro- priates revenue and carries out a settled jjolicy involving no new departure ; but no upper house would care to interfere with such a bill, because there is no doubt that the executive authority would be more or less represented in the lower house. However, we now come to deal with the question of a new policy, with the question of taxation, which naust be one of the more radical questions in any federation of this kind. What I should jn'opose — and it is not essentially different from the present proposition, but, to my mind, will main- tain the dignity of the upper house — is that the upper house, when it receives these [Mr. McMillan. money bills, should have a right to discuss them, and to amend them in the same way as they do any other bills. Sir Hexuy Parkes : Ko ! Mr. McMillan : Then their amend- ments will go down to the lower house, not as suggestions, but in the ordinary constitutional way. Supposing the lower house accepts half of the amendments and rejects half of them, we can make it abso- lutely necessary when the bill is returned to the upper chamber for that body to either accept or reject it. Mr. Playford : It is the same thing, only in different words ! Mr. McMillan : You get the same thing ; but you do not introduce a miser- able subterfuge, which degrades and lowers the dignity of the upper chamber. Sir Henry Parkes : It in no way de- grades it ! ]\rr. McMillan : Let us look at the question a little further. Anybody would think that this power of veto was to be dormant ; but surely if you give the power of veto, you give one of the strongest and most powerful motives for the rejection of the whole measure. Colonel Smith : A great deal too strong! Mr. McMillan : Tlie hon. gentle- man would give the upper house nothing at all. The means which I propose would to a certain extent bring about finality. There can be no finality between bodies of this kind, except by compromise and mutual concession, or, in the case of the lower house, by ultimate appeal to the people. By adopting the proposal I sug- gest, you do not strain the constitution ; you do not put within the four corners of this enactment something w-hich by infer- ence may be said to show clearly that the upper house is on a lower status than the lower house with which it is to be co-ordi- nate. It seems to "me that if my pi'opo- sition is adopted, you allow the members Commonioeo.lth of Australia. [3 April, 1891.] Adjournment. 721 of the upper house to go through the hill touching in any way bills appropriating in the ordinary way upon the ordinary revenue, or imposing new burdens upon lines, and instead of their amendments the people, going down as suggestions, they go down Progress reported, in the first place as amendments — as in- dications of what they require to be done, ADJOURNMENT. if they are to pass the bill. Of course Motion (by Mr. McMillan) proposed : at all times, as now in the case of every That the Conventiou do now adjourn, ordinary bill, they are quite open to agree Mr. BROWX : On the motion for the to a compromise, even upon their own adjournment of the Convention, I take the amendments. And Avhen the bill comes opportunity of expressing my very great back, I suggest that it should either be regret that urgent private business will accepted or rejected, so as to bring about compel me to leave Sydney to-morrow. I to a certain extent finality. This, I be- need not say that, having taken the interest lieve, Avould be a much more acceptable I have taken in this important subject, it form of carrying out what I can only con- is a matter of great i-egret that I am com- ceive is a very clumsy device, and it in no pelled to leave before the work of the Con- way derogates from t]ie dignity of the vention is comj)leted, as I hope it will be. upper house ; but at the same time keeps I rise more for the purpose of expressing together the ordinary form of our consti- now — as I shall not have the opportunity tution, and will, I believe, in every way of expressing it at a more fitting time here- cffect what is attempted to be effected by after — tlie obligation which I, in common the clause. The reason I asked for an with other members of the Convention, adjournment was because I would rather feel that we are under to the Govei-nment have my own views put into .shape by a and people of New South Wales for the legal member of the Committee, and I shall manner in which we have been received on thenbeverygladtoseea vote upon the ques- this important occasion. I do most sin- tion. I cannot vote for the sweepingamend- cerely hope that the difl'erence of opinion rnent of the hon. member, 'Mr. Baker, be- that has arisen amongst the vai'ious dele- cause I still think that the appropriation gates will be an-anged, .so that when the bill should be left entirely in the hands of ^^^ork for which this Convention was called the lowf-r house for convenience more than together is completed a measure will be for anything else. It deals with the ap- placed l)efore the citizens of Australia propriation of revenue to be raised on a ^vhich will meet with their appro\al, and policy to wliich the upper liouse lias pre- ti,at we shall find that our work hcie has viously agreed, and it does not stand on ^q^ only „ot jjcon in vain, but that wrs any analogous footing whatever with the jjjj^^.^ contributed to tlie l)uildiiig up to new policy adopted with regard to money ^]^^ g^cat Australian union whicli we are bills. That is all that I have to say, and .^n desirous of seeing established. I rc- I should like very much to be able on ^j.^^.^^ y,.^t X am compcll.-d to leave. I Monday to test the feeling of the Commit- f^^^.^ ,^Qt ^^^l-cn any very actives part in tee on the subject. ^,,^ debates of tlie Convention because I SirllENPtY PAIlKlvS : 1 oidy rise to ij^vc found from time to time tliat the say that if an amendment of the character idena I should have been inclined to ex- which is suggested is moved, I shall feel pi-gj-jj i,ave been taken up by others. There- at my duty to submit another amendment foj-g I did not think it necessary to tres- •estricting the .senate from amending or p.^j^j. on the time of the Convention. I 2 z 722 Address. [6 April, 1891.] Covimonwecdth of Australia. have, however, followed the debates very carefully, and I think those who estimate the work of the Convention by the mere number of the hours during which it has been sitting here formally would form a very inadequate idea of the work which has been accomplished. Very much work has been done by the committees, to whom we are very much indebted, and very much more work also, I am satisfied, has been done by the private consultations of hon. members with one another. I desire, as I have stated, to take this opportunity of returning my sincere thanks to the people and the Government of New South Wales for the manner in which we have been re- ceived here, and to congratulate you, sir, on the success so far achieved. Question resolved in the affirmative. Convention adjourned at 6"17 p.m. 2WNDA Y, G APRIL, 1891. Address — Commonwealth of Australia Bill — Adjournment. The President took the chair at 1 1 a.m. ADDRESS. The President : I have received a letter from Tuckurimba, which I request the sec- retary to read. The secretary read the following letter: — Tuckurimba, 27 March, 1891. The Hon. Sir Henry Parkes, President of the Federal Conference. Sir,— As secretary of the Tuckurimba Pro- gress Committee, I feel very much gratified to have to forward to you the following resolution, which was unanimously adopted at our meeting, very largely and representatively attended, on the 24th instant : — That this committee desire to convey to the Federal Conference, through its president, the hope that its de- liberations may result in the forming of a united Australian nation ; and that this resolution be sent by our secretary to the President of the Federal Conference now sitting at Sydney. I have, &c., Henky M. McCaughey. \_Mr. Brown. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA BILL In Committee (consideration resumed from 3rd April) .• CHAPTER I.— THE LEGISLATURE. Part V. — Powers of the Parliament. Clause 55. (1.) The senate shall have equal power with the house of representatives in respect of all jiroposed laws, except laws im- posing taxation and laws appropriating the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual ser- 5 vices of the government, which the senate may affirm or reject, but may not amend. But the senate may not amend any proposed law in such a manner as to increase any pro- posed charge or burden on the people. 10 (2. ) Laws imposing taxation shall deal with the imposition of taxation only. (3.) Laws imposing taxation, except laws imposing duties of customs on imports shall deal with one subject of taxation only. 15 (4. ) The expenditure for services other than the ordinary annual services of the govern- ment shall not be authorised by the same law as that which appropriates the supplies for such ordinary annual services, but shall be 20 authorised by a separate law or laws. (5. ) In the case of a proposed law which the senate may not amend, the senate may at any stage return it to the house of repre- sentatives with a message requestingthe omis- 25 sion or amendment of any items or provisions therein. And the house of representatives may, if it thinks fit, make such omissions or amendments, or any of them, with or without modifications. .SO Upon which Mr. Baker liad moved, by way of amendment : That all the words in sub-section 1 , after the first word " laws," line 3, be omitted. Mr. THYNNE : I think this ques- tion deserves a little more consideration, than is proposed to be given to it by some hon. gentlemen who wish to see it disposed of immediately. We have now come to one of the clauses of the bill to which a great deal of importance is at- tached by, I think, every member of the Convention. It is a clause the effect of which may have such an influence in directing the operations of the common- wealth and its parliament in the future that I think it would be unwise for us to pass over this important matter without Conunonwealth of [6 Apkil, 1S91.] Australia Hill, 723 giving it the very fullest consideration we are capable of giving it. In dealing with this question I propose to occupy the time of the Convention for a few minutes, and to enter into a very careful consideration of some of the matters which have arisen in tiiis debate. The line of thought which has urged me to get up and speak has been suggested by an observation which was made on our last meeting day by the hon. delegate, Mr. Deakin. He then, no doubt, introduced into the debates a new style of argument compared with what had been adopted in this Convention, in the manner in which he criticised the action of certain members of the Conven- tion in taking their seats in a particular division that took place. The words which lie used struck me very much at the time ; first of all, because of the very forcible con- demnation with which the hon. gentleman uttered them, and, in the next place, they struck me with surprise that of all the mem- bers of this Convention the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, should be found the one man in it who would ventui'e to attack any members of the Convention for the posi- tion they took on that occasion. The words the hon. gentleman used were something to tliis edect, so far as I can recollect them. He said, " The extraordinary com- bination in the last divi.sion, reactionary radicals and iconoclastic conservatives sit- ting together on the same bench, Avas enough to startle any member in any house in a constitutionally governed country." Colonel Smith : That is quite right ! Mr. THYNKE : That the hon. member, Mr, Deakin, should have been the person in this Convention to make that attack upon any member of it, is a matter that struck me with great sur[)rise, because, in the histoiy of these colonies if there lias ever been a union of " reactionary radical- ism and iconoclastic conservatism," that hon. member and his colleagues in Victoria have proved it in hi-stoiy. Mr. MuNRO : What has that to do with the business before us now 1 Mr. THYNNE : It has a good deal to do with the business, and the hon. gentle- man will, I think, see before I conclude that it has ; at any rate, in some minds it has a very important bearing on the business before the Convention. In political mat- ters one may see these violent conjunctions of opposing parties and these strange com- binations. They are justifiable in the face of extraordinary crises. They are only justified when something arises which over- shadows all the leading points of the party organisations of the country. Then, and only then, it is that statesmen are at liberty with credit to themselves to post- pone the advocacy and the enforcement of their political principles when it amounts merely to a temjDorary withdrawal of them to allow the danger of the crisis to pass by. But we have seen these gentlemen who are so ready to attack the motives or the position of other delegates — we have seen for seven long years what I may call an extraordinary connection of radicalism and conservatism living and thriving under the powerful influence of my hon. finend, Mr. Deakin ; thriving to an extent which I think is absolutely without precedent in any part of the British dominions. I do not refer to these matters for the sake of making a retort or an attack upon those hon. gentlemen ; but the train of thought which was suggested by that hon. gentle- man's remarks has led me to question what ought to be the influence which these delegates should have upon the members of the Convention in dealing with the im- portant question of the relative jiosition of the several states to the federal parlia- m(;iit. Now, .'Uiy set of men advocating seriously and entertaining strong opinions upon political matters, and who forsome un- known reason will abandon their views for such a long term as seven or eightycars can- not but undergo some deterioration. They kV, 24 Commonivealtli of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. must suffer some deterioration iu their po- litical pi-estige and principles by what cannot I think under any circumstances be justi- fied; and the people who have not been, as tlie hon. gentleman says, startled by the extraordinaiy sight of these two opposing elements sitting, not merely on the same bench in a casual division, but sitting in ■the same ministry, conducting the affairs of the colony for seven or eight years — a period, I think, almost without precedent in these colonies — the people whose sense of political propriety and of the correct conduct of political affairs has not been startled by that extraordinary combina- tion, and have submitted to it, must also have suffered some of the deterioration which their leaders underwent. I think these extraordinaiy combinations of re- actionary radicalism and iconoclastic con- servatism — I like the sound of those words — really have an effect which is not good either for the members of the com- binations or for the men who follow them in their political career. Another senti- ment which has been expressed by hon. gentlemen has struck me with a great deal of surprise. The hon. gentleman professes to be a great leader of democracy, and yet he is incapable or professes himself to bo incapable of accepting the position which the hon. member. Dr. Cockburn, so clearly laid down : that it is necessary to pro- tect the real rights of the people, as far as possible, by having a strong local government. The hon. gentleman goes in for advocating complete centralisation. I must say that I am very much astonished to find that the democracy of Victoria, of which I take the hon. gentleman to be the leading representative, is of that descrip- tion. And when I look back upon the history of popular thought in Victoria ; when I look back iipon the great victories •which, in times gone by, democracy has Avon, I am afraid to say under other leaders, I cannot but think that they have for a [3/r. Thynne. moment forgotten the object for which they combined originally, and have now descended from being a democracy for the establishment of liberty to a democracy seeking some less worthy object. I would again for a moment, sir, ask to be per- mitted to refer to the working of this com- bination. I was very much interested some time ago in reading of a traveller in Russia being pursued by the fierce wolves that infest the steppes, and who in terror of his own destruction from their teeth sought to gain a short respite by throwing overboard one of his own children. I do not say that my hon. friend, Mr. Deakin, or any of his colleagues, have adopted the extreme course which the unfortunate traveller felt himself, in his terror, obliged to do. But I think that these combina- tions, these unholy associations for a moment, have sustained their existence by casting behind them witli a very profuse and liberal hand — not exactly the children who were coming after them, but certainly the means of sustenance, the life-blood of their existence, by those extraordinary cx- jienditures of which the Victorian people are now so strongly complaining. ]\[r. MuxRO : Question ! Mr. Gillies : What has the hon. mem- ber to do with that ? Mr. THYNNE : T do not say that Vic- toria is the only colony in the group which has pursued this course, but I think I am justified in alluding specially to that colony, because of the extraordinary posi- tion which its delegates take up in the Con- A'ention. The representatives of no other colony take up the position here which they do. The members of the Assembly from Victoria present one solid phalanx in this Convention. "With two notable ex- ceptions, which I will mention presently, I think there is practically no member of the Convention who advocates the extreme view which they do. I cannot but ex- press, if the hon. member will allow me, i Commonwealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. (1^ my great sympathy ^vitIl the Premier of Victoria in having to succeed in the management of its affairs. The Chairman : Order. I have allowed the hon. member to go on now for some time ; but I must call his attention to the (question before the Convention, whicli is a proposal to omit all the words in the 1st sub-clause after the word " laws." It appears to me that the hon. gentleman is not discussing that question, but the policy of certain Victorian politicians, which, I think he must see, is irrelevant. Mr. THYNNE : I bow to your ruling, sir. My object was not to discuss Vic- torian politics, which I do not profess my- self to be capable of doing with much effect ; but I tliouglit that on this clause I should be justified in arguing with my col- leagues in this Convention against what seems to me to be the stand taken almost alone by the representatives of Victoria. I have endeavoured, in the remai-ks I have been making, to explain, as far as it is pos- sible to do .so, the reason why the repre- sentatives of Victoria have taken in this Convention an almost isolated course. Th. is the crucial clau.se of the bill. Upon the provisions wo make with respect to the legislation of the federation depends its very existence. Di'. CoCKDURX : The question is whether we are to have federation or unification ! Mr. THYNNE: Quite so — wliether wc arc to have federation or unification. The whole case depends upon the course tlie Convention take witli I'cferencc to this clau.se, and for that reason I am venturing to speak somewhat fully, and I will now add a few remarks which may, perliaps, be held to bear a little more directly upon the point at issue. I think T am within tlic; rules of debate in referring to the attitude a certain section of the Victorian delegates have taken in this Convention. Was there any feature in our proceedings which struck members of this Convention at the com- mencement of our sittings so forcibly as the peculiarly selfish position we all thought the representatives of Victoria took up in what was called their claim for a guaran- tee 1 That claim was argued very strongly by the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, and that hon. member was supported by the hon, member, Mr. Munro. Mr. MuNEO : No ! Mr. THYNNE : I understood so. Mr. Munro : But I say no ! Colonel Smith : That is passed and settled ! Mr. THYNNE : I think the delegates of Victoria, coming somewhat hastily to this Convention, mistook the real interests of the people of Victoria in taking up the position that they did, and having been once mistaken Mr. Munro : Surely there is nothing of this in the clause ! i\[r. THYNNE : I am sorry the hon. members from Victoria seem to feel sa keenly the remarks I am making. Mr. Munro : ^Ve feel that the hon. member is not talking upon the subject before the Committee ; that is all ! Mr. THYNNE : I am sorry these gen- tlemen are so sensitive to a little criticism. I have surely not been unduly Severe. Colonel Smith : Oh dear, no. ^Ve are quite enjoying it ! Mr. THYNNE : 1 would point out this : that if the Premier of Victoria felt it necessary to repudiate one portion of their claim lie might find it equally neces- sary, before the Convention is over, to Avithdraw from the position whicli he and his colleagues ought not to luive taken up on the question of state right.s. ]\Ir. Munro : We eacli express our own judgment ! Mr. THYNNE : I am afraid my hon. friend, Colonel Smith, feels a little sore at my remark.s. Colonel Smith : Not at all. I am quite enjoying them ! 726 Commonit'eaUh of [G April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Mr. THYNNE : I havo, liowevor, to make to the lion, gc^ntleman something in the nature of an apology. I regret that the hon. and gallant gentleman, for whom I have a great deal of respect, and whom we are all veiy glad to see in this Conven- tion, was so ready to talk of packing up his portmanteau and running away from us. I at first thought the hon. gentleman was not taking up a position which a gal- lant gentleman ought to occupy ; but I have changed my views with regard to the hon. gentleman's object. Colonel Smith : 1 have also changed mv mind ! Mr. THYNNE : I think the hon. gen- tleman has been playing the part of an able tactician, and that he has been making merely a feint to retire, that his feint has beeu nearly successful, and that even gen- tleman from Yictoi'ia, and many other members of the Convention, are on the brink of being led into a ti'ap which the hon. gentleman, in his able generalship, has laid for them. In other respects, if the hon. member has not converted very many mem- bers in the Convention to his own way of thinking, he has certainly advocated the ■claims of Ballarat very extensively. Colonel * Smith : A very fine place is Ballarat ! . Mr. THYNNE : I have nothing more to say with reference to the hon. member. With regard to my hon. friend, Mr. Wrixon, another delegate from Victoria, "we find that it has hitherto been almost the invariable rule in Australian politics that distinguished statesmen who have left the colonies for a short time, on business howsoever important, have found it neces- sary to undergo on their return some period of political quarantine before re- turning to political power. I do not hesi- tate to express my own feeling that the gentlemen comprised in this particular section of the Victorian delegation do not express here the better thought of the [J/?-. Thynne. Victorian people. If they do express that better thought, if the Victorian people have really taken up in their hearts the position these gentlemen represent, the question arises in my mind as to whether, under those circumstances, they have yet risen to the federal atmosphere — to an atmosphere entitling them to come into this Convention. I should not feel very much aggrieved if they had not come in, because I feel that it will not be very long before they will be made to ask for admission to the federation, which I hope will be brought about sooner or later as the result of our discussions. Apart from the hon. gentlemen of whom I have already spoken, there are two prominent and able members of the Convention who, to a cer- tain extent, support the views to which I have referred. One of these is our very highly respected and venerated President, Sir Henry Partes. I have listened care- fulh- to every woi'd that has fallen from him ; I have sought in his words for some guidance and assistance in coming to a conclusion on some of the most important questions w^ith which we have had to deal ; but I must say I have not heard fall from him any clear description of the form of government we shall have to adopt hei'e, because at one time w^iile the hon. member has spoken of a federal government in terms to which I cannot but give my hearty adherence, he has, at other times, spoken of following the example of the British Constitution as far as it is pos- sible to do so. Up to a recent period I have been left in some doubt as to what would really be the hon. gentleman's definition of what our federal parliament should be. I have not heard in his many able speeches that clear definition, that clear di\-ision of the points at issue for which I had hoped, and which I still hope to receive at his hands. I speak, of course, with the very greatest respect for the hon. gentleman ; and I will now pass on to Commonwealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 727 another exception to the general rule in this Convention. I refer to the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Play ford. He has, I think, put forward in this Convention the most im- portant objection to giving the senate and house of representatives coequal powers. His objection is that if we give the two houses coequal powers, we cannot have responsible government. I am not very much afraid of that, although it seems to me — and I have at the same time great respect for the opinions of a gentleman who has had such a large experience in the working of responsible government — that responsible government is one of those things that will adapt itself to almost any circumstances which may arise. It has «volved itself from a system of govern- ment in which there has been practically coequal powers between two houses at one time or other, and I think it may be trusted still toestablish itself among English-speak- ing people in these colonies. It is a thing which it is extremely hard to define. You cannot lay down lines upon which it may or may not act; but I think, even under coequal houses, with a little forbearance and common-sense whicli we will expect to find in tho.se two houses, a system of responsible government will not only exist, but it will exist in a bcjttcr condition than it does at present. I would ask tlie hon. member, Mr. Playford, with his great practical experience and practical mind, whether he prefers to preserve responsible government for the federation at the risk of its destruction in the state.s, or whetlier he prefers to have njsponsible government prfiserved in the states at the risk of .some slight modification of it in the federal par- liament? Jn t lie scheme, as it stands at jnesent, it is proj)Osed that a very large; and most important section of the revenue of each colony shall be iiandiMl over to the federal government. Jn looking over some figures last night 1 found that from Vic- toria something over £3,500,000 of their revenue will be taken away by the federa- tion, and I dare say it will be the same in proportion in the other colonies. I would ask the hon. member, Mr. Playford, how he will explain the future working of re- sponsible government, which, if it does any- thing, places upon the administration as its greatest duty the financial management of afiairs in each colony. How can responsible government be maintained in these colonies when they have no means of ascertaining how much of their revenue is to come back to them, and when they have no means of influencing eflTectually the expenditure of the money taken into the federation 1 Next year, or the year after federation has been accomplished, how can the trea- surer of any colony prepare with any con- fidence a financial statement ? How can he tell how much money he is likely to get, or what his revenue is to be? It will be very difficult for the treasurers to do so for many years until, with our usual adap- tability to circumstances, we get accus- tomed to the new current of afiairs. Dr. CocKBURN : They need not count on getting much back ! Mr. THYNNE : My small contribution to the discussion on this point is this : That unless the parliaments of the colonies have by their representatives in the senate an eHoctive voice in preventing extrava- gance in the federal parliament, those par- liaments will never be able to count upon their revenue, or as to what their means of su.stenance will be. The federal parlia- ment will be like the hunter sitting at his fable with his hounds around him, waiting to iiave cast to them the bones which are left after he has had his meal. The states will indeed be in a subordinate, a degraded ])Osition ; and they will never be ;ilih' to maintain their influence or the power whieh I at least am desirous they should maintain. Dr. CocKUUKN : They will exist on charity ! 728. Commonwealth of [G April, .1891.] Australia Dill. Mr. THYNNE: On charity, or whatmay that, instead of going to church, like a be worse, on favouritism, or, at any rate, on good Christian, and listening to a sermon principles which will not be likely to con- from a minister, he has spent yesterday in duceto the self-respect of the parliaments^of preparing a sermon for Victoria in general the different states or of the people whose and the representatives of Victoria and some affairs they administer. With regard to other lion, members in particular. Hov.-- tlie clause itself, I think that these words, ever pleasant that sermon may have been to " The ordinary annual services of the go- deliver, I do not think it will produce more vernment,"' form one of those elastic terms effect on those who listened to it than which mean nothing at all, which will form was produced by many of the sermons de- no restriction. It is certainly a very poor livered yesterday on those who went to hear sentence upon which to distinguish the them. I performed the good Christian's lines according to which one house of pai'- part, and went to church twice ; therefore, liament may act under certain circum- I have had no time to prepare such a ser- stances and may not act under other cir- mon as that just delivered, which travelled cumstances. There are two distinct parties over a field wider than that which the in this Convention upon this question. One question before the Convention would per- party says, " With the clause as it stands mit. But I feel bound, in view of the now we ai'e practically getting all that we vote I intend to give on this question, to ask." The other party says, "We are say a few words in justification of that vote, making concessions, and we are, at any rate, In speaking on this question on a former preservingthepower of one housesomewhat occasion in this Convention, I expressed at the expense of the other."' If this clause strongly my belief that the senate ought is intended by one party to unduly curb the to have co-ordinate powers with the house power of the senate, I think that the clause of representatives. More particularly I in its present form ought not to appear in then said it ought to ha^e co-ordinate a constitution act framed in Australia. If, powers if it were elected, as it ought to be on the other hand, it is intended to operate, elected, directly by the people. Now, we as I am afi-aid it will, inimically to the in- have altered somewhat the constituency of terests of the states composing the federa- the senate, or, rather, we have not adopted tion, it is not one that ought to appear in that constituency which I believe would our constitution. In any case, it is really have been the best. But, under the circum- only a form of regulation of parliamentary stances, with a senate constituted as it is procedure between the two houses and one to be constituted under the clause we have which I think we ought to leave entirely already agreed to, I still feel that there to the capacity and good sense of the two could be no harm whatever, but only the houses which we hope to see elected under conferiiag of a right — and a proper right this constitution. I am afraid I have tres- — upon the senate, if we gave to it those passed on the feelings of some hon. gentle- powers which we are asked to give to it by men, Ijut I have been obliged to do so in the amendment of the hon. member, Mi\ order to explain as well as I could the reason Baker. I cannot understand why there is why I give my support to the amendment such a great fear expressed on the part of moved by the hon. member, Mr. Baker. several members of the Convention as to 3Ir, BIRD : I hope the members of the giving the senate such powers as those. I Convention generally have spent Sunday think it must arise very largely on the part more profitably than, I think, the hon. of those hon. members from their having member, Mr. Thynne, has done. I think had no such experience as some of us [J/r. Thynne. Commonu-eahh of [G April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 729 have had in other colonies as to the woik- uig of similar powers when possessed by the upper houses. As is well known, in Tasmania the upper house has a consider- able power in dealing with money bills ; but, beyond the annojance naturally felt by the lower house when their measures are seriously amended by the upper house no great evil, if any, has resulted in the long run. And so in South Australia ; I understand that a practice which runs very much on the lines proposed in this bill has been in opei'ation there, and has worked fairly well. Tlierefore, with such experi- ence as we have had in South Australia and Tasmania of partial or complete power in regard to money bills being possessed by the upper house, it seems to rae exceedingly strange that there should be so much hesi- tation and unwillingness to give to the senate more power in regard to money bills than is possessed by several upper houses in the colonial legislatures. Con- sidering that we shall have in the senate as good men certainly as we shall have in the house of representatives, men as well able to judge upon the various matteis brought before them as any in the house of rei>resentatives, does it not strike lion, members as strange that they should not have the right oven to express their opinion upon matters of expenditure or taxation in the way in which some hon. meudjers would ■wish to prevent them from doing ? If we acknowledge lliat those who are to be mem- bers of tJie senate are men of good standing, men of good judgment, men chosen by the elect of the people, together with some who are nominated by the governments of the various colonies who are supposed to nominate those who are in many respects rejjresentative men — if wc arc going to have men of tliis class, why hesitate to give them the jiower claimed for them by some to deal with Ijills of all kinds ? But whilst I hold strongly that the amendment ought to be carried, and that the senate ought to have this power, yet knovving, as I do, that Victoria and New South Wales are hardly likely to join the federation if any greater concession is made than is already in the bill in regard to the powers of the senate, and desiring, as I do, most strongly that we should not insist upon pro- visions which may possibly — or, I should say, probably — have the effect of excluding such colonies as Victoria and New South Wales from the federation, I feel that, however strong one's views are in regard to the powers which the senate ought to possess, we ought to have consideration for the interests of the federation as a whole, and not to push our principles so far as to exclude colonies like those. Mr. Donaldson : E.ather sacrifice all the other colonies ! Mr. BIRD : No. I do not consider that by the proposal now before us all the other colonies are being sacrificed, but that there is a large concession made to them. The concession made in the bill is perhaps a larger concession than some hon. members appear to think it. I do not know really whether, if they had the power to amend money bills and send their amendments to the lower house embodied in a bill, the senatcwould have any more power than they will have under the concession now placed before us. There is just this dill'erence : Instead of embodying their amendments in the bill and sending it down to the represen- tative chamber, their amendments will be embodied in a message and sent down for the consideration of the house of i('))resen- tatives, the message accomi)anying the bill. Tiierefore, in the house of rei)resentatives there would be the same consideration given to the pi'0i)0sed amendments (jf the senate as if they were in the bill iuid sent back in the ordinary way. Mr. Advk Dol(;las : If clause 5 is struck out, what then? Mr. CuTiiUKUT : There is no danger of tliat ! 730 Commomoealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Mr. BIRD : I am going to argue for tlie clause standing in the bill as it is, be- lieving the concession made there to those 'svho want to have co-ordinate powers given to the senate is one that gives more than some members appear to think. I feel that whatever the views of tlie senate are, they can be expressed in the shape provided for here, and will receive due consideration from the house of representatives when brought before it — as due and full consider- ation as if they were stated in the bill in the ordinary way. I am so finxious that without great sacrifice of pi'inciple we should secure the federation of the colo- nies — and by no means should we pass a provision that would exclude Victoria and iNew South Wales — that I am quite prepared to agree to the concession proposed in the bill and not to press for a further amendment giving a larger concession, as is proposed by the hon. member for South Australia. I felt it right to say this in justification of the vote I shall give, as, having spoken as I did on a former occasion, I might have been for the sake of consistency compelled to vote for the amendment. But considering the expressions of opinion that we have had, and particularly the statement from the premiers of New South Wales and Vic- toria that neither of those colonies can join the federation if the senate is to have powers equal to those of the house of representatives, I am disposed to vote against Mr. Baker's amendment, and thus agree to a compromise for the sake of the federation of the whole of the colonies. Mr. AD YE DOUGLAS : The speech which the hon. member has just made is •one I might liave expected from him, that is to say, that he would argue one day in one way and vote in the opposite direction the next day. Either the senate ought to maintain its position or it ought to give it up at once without any condi- tion whatever. Is the senate to have any powers at all, or is it to retain such powers [Mr. Bird. as it was intended to give it ? When we started it was proposed to give the states equal representation in the senate, be- cause they had virtually no power in the house of representatives. Therefore, you say you will make it up by giving them power in the senate. The 5th portion of the clause gives a most extraordinary method of providing ways and means to do nothing, because any legislature at present has power within itself to do what that clause expresses, and hon. members must have been aware of it. When this clause was agreed to in committee, it was understood that it was merely put in the bill in order that it might be debated in the Convention. The amendment of Mr. Baker for striking out these exceptional matters puts the senate in its proper posi- tion — it gives it power to exercise a right which they possess in taxing their several provinces in ,the way in which they think they are justified in taxing them. How are we to get on in the smaller colonies simply because Victoria and New South Wales said something on the subject ? On the last occasion we heard that those colonies were divided. It is not because the Presi- dent and the Premier of Victoria have said that the colonies which they represent will not agree to this provision that we are to assume that those colonieswill not accept it. And why should not the smaller colonies say, " We will not agree to the bill "'? If they do so we shall have a very fine arrange- ment between Victoria and New South Wales, which, we know, cannot agree u})on any subjectwhatever, and are therefore sure to come to grief in this matter. It is a well- known fact, and we had experience of it on Friday last, that these colonies cannot agree. Immediately any question arose between them it had to be set aside. They could not agree on river navigation, upon railway management, or upon any other subject. Mr. MuNiio : They agreed upon every- thing ! Commonicealth of [G April, 1S91.] Australia Bill, 731 :Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : They agreed upon everything ! Yes, they agreed to carry a bill which will not be satisfactory to the other colonies. The majority of the re- presentatives of the smaller colonies have stated that the proposed arrangement is not suitable to them ; but they are to be left out of consideration because some of the representatives of the two big colonies have said that they will not agree to the amendment. I say that a bill must be passed which will be accepted in all the colonies, not one by which one or two of the colonies will be able to domineer over the rest. The big colonies will have sufficient power without being permitted to domineer in that way. You might as well say that Victoria and New South Wales are to settle the laws of the whole of Australia as pass this clause as it is. That is the meaning of it. Colonel Smith : No ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : Then what is the meaning of it, if Victoria and New South Wales are to have a representation of nine-tenths in the house of representa- tives, and the house of representatives is to control the senate ] Mr. MuxRO : They will pay nine-tenths of the taxes ! Mr. ADYEDOUGLAS : What has that to do with it] The individual citizens will not pay more taxes, though conjointly they may pay more. ]^lr. Mu.VKO : Taxation and rfprosfi Na- tion must go together ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : Have we not taken the United States Constitution as our fxamjile in framing this bill ; but what docs it say ? Does it not say that tlic small- *>st states .shall liavo the same representa- tion as the larger states, and did not many of the small states at first remain out of the Union until it was arranged that they should have equal power ? Colonel Smith : They were not oflTfTcd the same conditions as are offered now ! Mr. Moore : No I Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS: Well, you can make a constitution between New South Wales and Victoria ; but you will not have Tasmania, Queensland, and South Australia in it. We know what Victoria has done in the past. She has tried to cripple the smaller colonies, and has put her foot down ujion us, and a big foot it is. But we are not to be dragged into this federation whether we like it or not. I am surprised that the hon. member who told us about the sermon he heard yester- day, should turn round and go back upon himself, and jump Jim crow in this Con- vention. In Tasmania his conduct will be reprobated, and we shall know how to treat him when he gets back there. We understand these things thei'e, and we ai'e not to be domineered over,notwitlistanding this talk about the big colonies. The hon. member, Mr. Munro, happens to be at the head of affairs in Victoria just now ; but a few months ago the hon. gentleman opposite was in his place, and at the next election the hon. member will probably be moved out again. First, we say that the senate and house of representatives shall be equal, and then we try to clip the wings of the senate, and prevent them from doing anything ; but I hope the delegates from the smaller colonies will not yield to this oppression, to this domineering, to these thieats of the packing up of carpet bags and going away. Those who make them might as well go away, bccau.so the other colonies will not join them in the federation they propose. 1 trust that the delegates from the smaller colonics will not 1)0 de- terred frojn doing their duty towards those colonies l)y anything which has taken place here, or by the attempt which has been made to put down argmnent by force and threats that " we will take off our traps, and remain no longer amongst you." I say that the smaller colonies liave justice on their side. They ought to be rej)re- scnted in the senate as was agreed upon 732 Commonivealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. at the starting point, and tliey should not be prevented from exercising the same rights and privileges there as the larger colonies exercise, without regard to tlieir population. Mr. J. FORREST : My object in rising is not to tell hon. members that I have changed my opinion, but to say that I in- tend to vote, as I said I would vote at first, for the amendment of the hon. mem- ber, Mr. Baker. It seems to me that this is the only clause in the bill which would give security to the colonies with small populations, and I feel certain that it would be very difficult indeed to induce those colonies to join the feder-ation if we told them that both of the great colonies, Victoria and New South Wales, would have more representatives in the lower house than the whole of the other colo- nies put together, unless we could at the same time tell them that the various colo- nies would have equal representation in the senate, and that the powers of the senate, and of the house of representatives, would be coequal and co-ordinate. It seems to me that the senate which will be chosen under this bill will be very different in its composition from our present upper houses, and will not be imbued with local politics and local disputes, but will be an august and experienced body, and I hope will be thoroughly representative. If they will not be thoroughly representative, all I can say is, that I hope that some other means will be devised by which they will become as thoroughly representative as the lov/er house, and that no occasion will be left to those who are opposed to having any upper house to taunt them with not representing any one but them- selves. It seems to me that the proposal to make the lower house superior to the senate can only result in lowering its prestige, in making it appear to the people of Australia an inferior body — a body Avith a disability upon it. Can any one say that [Mr. Adye Douglas. the upper house, as it is proposed to create it under this bill, will be less experienced, less wise, less patriotic, and less able than the house of representatives'? I believe that they will be, if anything, a superior body, thoroughly representative, wise, and patriotic, and I see no reason why we should be unwilling to give them full power to deal with all matters connected with the legislation of the continent in all classes of bills. We have heard a great deal, during our rather protracted delibera- tions, fx'om the delegates representing the larger colonies which we have never heard from those representing the smaller colo- nies. We have heard no threats that they will pack up their carpet bags, and that their colonies will not accept the bill, from those representing smaller populations. We heard one hu'ge colony say, through its premier : " Victoria will not have the bill," and a little later we heard that " New i South Wales Avill not have it." I think it will be time enough to say that these colonies will not accept the measure after it has been referred to them in the proper • manner, and surely before we separate some means will be devised for referring this mat- ter to the people of the colonies. But can any one at present say that the colony which he represents is prepared to accept the bill when we pass it 1 I say that no one here has authority to make such a statement. Equally the rule applies that if they can- not say the colony will accept it they can- not say that the colony will reject it. We have been sent to the Convention to frame a constitution in the best way we can, and when Ave have arrived at our conclusions Avill be the time to say Avhether the bill is one Avhich the peojole can accept or not. We have come to the Convention, I main- tain, on perfectly equal terms, although some of us have come froui colonies con-« taining small populations. We do not come here to be threatened ; Ave, Avho re- present small populations, have our duty i Commomcealth of [6 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 733 to perform equally with those who repre- would not possess coequal j^owers with sent large populations. We heard har- the representation of other colonies. I anofues the other day as to what the demo- think the best course to pursue is to pass cracy of Australia would receive, and as the hill in the best way w'e can, and in to what the democracy of Australia would accordance with the views of the majority not receive. I suppose tliese sentiments of members present. I hope, however, came from those who would be leaders of we shall have no more threats as to this this great democracy. It seemed to me or that colony not joining the federation, that a considerable amount of jealousy was Mr. MuxRO : That is what the hon. imported into the debates by the rival can- member has done ! didates — those who wish to be the sole Mr. J. FOEKEST : I have never said leaders of what they call the democracy of that the colony of "Western Australia will Australia. I can only say that, as far as not join, nor am I in a position to say so ; I am personally concerned, I have a duty neither am I in a position to say they will to perform to the Pai-iiament which sent join. I am, I think, exactly in the same me here, equally to that of the Premier of position as the hon. member for Victoria, Victoria, and I shall have to answer for Mr. Munro. Let us pass the 1)111 in the my vote when I return in the same way best form we can, whether we gain our as he or any other member of the Conven- own ends or not, but let vis have no more tiou will have to do. How can I, then, threatening, because I do not like it ; be- go back to the colony I represent, and tell sides, this is not the place for threatening. tlie people that, by my vote, I left them Mv. PLAYFOPtD : I have been very to the coini)lete mercy of the lai'ger popu- much astonished in listening to the views lations? They would naturally say, "Why put forward by some hon. members. We you are going to annihilate us, and to leave ha^ e been deliberately told that unless we us entirely at their mercy." I might reply, give equal powers to the senate we go for " They are magnanimous, generous people; unification, and that if we do give equal they will not do anything that is wrong powers to the senate we go for federation, or harsh." The answer would bo, " Ee- That is a most absurd statement. Hon. member that wo arc now an autonomous members Avell know that it depends upon state, and we do not wish to be left at the the power which you give to parliament, mercy of any one." It would be no argu- whether you take power from the senate inent for me to say, " You must trust or not, and not as to the distribution of to the magnanimity or generosity of the that power between the two branches of people of the larger colonies." It .seems the legislature. It is not a question as to to mo that if union is to exist it must lie whether you distribute powers this way or on temis just to ;ill the people of Aus- that as regards state rights ; but it is a tralia. question as to whether you take from the I\Ir. ]\ruNno : Hear, Jiear ! states certain powers and give them to (ho IMr. J. FOllREST : It would Ije ridicu- pailiament. We are now discussing, not tlic Ions for any one of us, representing .small taking of powers from thf states, but as to colonies, to return to our homes and to how we intend to distribute the legislative tell the people that they would be repre- ])0wers of the commonwealth V)etween the Isented in a house containing nearly 100 two houses — the senate on thf one li.-md members by four members, and that they and the Iiouse of representatives on the would have equal representation in the other ; and the question of unification or ippcr house ; but that that representation federation does not come in. It will be 734 Commonwealth of [6 AnuL, 1891.] Australia Bill. just as mucli a unitication, even if tlie senate have very small powers compared with the other house, if you take away the powers from the states, and give them to the central parliament as a whole ; and it will be as much a federation if they have large or small powers. The ques- tion of unification has nothing to do with the point at present under discussion. The hon. member, Mr. Thynne, asked me one question which I will attempt to answer. Responsible government, he as- serted, could adapt itself to any circum- stances. I will ask the hon. member does he know wdiere responsible govern- ment has ever adapted itself to the cir- cumstances of two coequal houses'? Ko- where in the world. I suppose the hon. member has read history sufficiently to enable him to know that in England we never obtained responsible government until the coequal power was taken from the House of Lords. At one time, in fact, that House had greater power than the Commons ; but w-e never obtained re- sponsible government in the mother coun- try until the power of the House of Lords was taken away and lodged in the House of Commons. I hold to the opinion I have previously expressed on this point, that I believe you cannot carry on re- sponsible government satisfactorily w^ith two absolutely coequal houses. That is an opinion which I have expressed from the fii'st. I have also expressed myself to the efiect that personally I have not the slightest objection to ask the people of this great continent to agree to a common- wealth in which the two houses shall be coequal, and in which the executive shall be elected by the two houses in the same way as is done in Switzerland. I find, however, in speaking to hon. mem- V)ers on this subject, that there are very few who agree with me. Even a number of those who are in favour of coequal powers being given to the senate will not [i/r. Play ford. go in for doing away with responsible government. Therefore, so far as this ques- tion is concerned, it seems hopeless to argue upon it. I hold to the opinion that respon- sible government cannot work satisfactorily with two houses coequal in power. An- other point, upon which I wish to say on& or two words, has reference to the state- ment which has been made to the eHecfe that without equal power the small states will be ridden over rough-shod by the larger states ; that, as the last speaker stated, the smaller states will be practi- cally at the mercy of the larger states. Will any intelligent man take up this proposed constitution bill and examine the proposals contained in clause 55, and tell me that the smaller states will be at the mercy of the larger states ? First, they have equal representation ; secondly, they have equal powers on all matters, except- ing money bills, relating to the ordinary annual expenditure on the ordinary service of the year, and dealing with taxation. They have the power of amendment in regard to all but two classes of money bills— the power of absolute amendment coequal with that of the other house. With regard to those two particular classes of bills, they have a right to suggest t» the other house amendments in any clause or parts of a clause. The Constitutional Committee have adopted precisely the mode adopted in the colony of South Aus- tralia, where it has been in force for between twenty or thirty years. We have worked under that system for between twenty or thirty years. The upper house have the light to make suggestions, and those suggestions — taking the case as showing how the system would work if it w^ere adopted for the commonwealth — have been as respectfully treated and considered by the lower house as any amendment which has ever been made in connection with any bill. They have been quietly and intelligently debated in the lower house; they have been I Coinmoyucealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. a^TeeJ to either with or without amend- ment, or disagreed to, as the case may be, and they have been sent back to the legis- lative council precisely in tjje same way as is proposed here. Ever since we made the compact in consequence of the claim of the Legislative Council in South Australia to coequal powers with the House of As- sembly in dealing with money bills, exce^jt as regards initiation — ever since we entered into that compact, nearly thirty years ago, we have never had the slightest trouble with regard to the working of the compact. It has worked in the most harmonious manner, and, so far as the Legislative Council is concerned, I have never heard a single member of that body — and I have been in the Parliament since 1868 — utter a wish that the compact should be broken in any way, though in the Lower House a late treasurer brought forward a motion only a year or so ago to the eflFect that we should break the compact between the two houses because it gave the Legislative Council too much power. With the right on the part of the senate, in the first instance, to veto any measure brought before it ; with equal powers in respect to all proposed laws, except tho.se impos- ing ta.xation, and appropriating the neces- sary supplies for the year, which the senate may aflTirm or reject ; with a right to insist that any bill dealing with new taxation shall be so subdivided that only one subject at a time can be dealt with — with the senate possessing all these powers, and witli the immense preponder- ance of votes which the smaller colonics will have in the senate, how can any man in his senses say that the smalhr colonies need have any fear whatever of being overridden in the legislation of the country if this proposal is adopted ? I fail to see any such danger. I try to look at the matter with a dispassionate eye. I try to look at it from the standpoint of a smaller colony, being myself a repres'.'uta- tive of a small colony. I think I can foresee as well as any member here what the course of legislation is likely to be, and I have come to the honest convictioa that if these clauses are carried the senate will have all the powers they ought to have, and that to give them any more power would be injurious to the interests of the commonwealth. The people of th& community as a whole must rule. You can- not get away from that, and if you do not provide that this shall be to some degree, at all events, the effect of your legislation I fail to see how it will be possible to induce the larger colonies to come into the feder- ation. I shall support the clause as it stands in preference to the amendment. I desire to say that I do not agree with the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon. As to the bugbear that has been, raised, that the smaller colonies are going to be overridden, and their influence de- stroyed by the larger colonies, if we do not give the senate equal power with the house of representatives, I contend that that is a mistake. It is a myth ; it does not exist, and will not exist if the constitution is adopted in the form now proposed. JNIr. KINGSTON : I shall be found re- cording my vote against the amend ment, and as the position which I now intend to take, may at first sight appear to be some- what inconsistent with the sentiments I have previously expressed, I should like to give my reasons for the vote I intend to record. My reasons are shortly these : that the senate, as it will bo constituted under the provisions of tlie bill which we have before us, will be entirely different from the senate as I hoped it would have been constituted under the measure which recommended itself to the adoption of the Convention. A good deal was made dur- ing the course of the initiatory debate of the rcsenibl.'inco which it was sujtpo.sed might exist between the senate and the upper branches of legi-blature as wc are generally 736 Commomveallh of [G April, 1891.] Australia Bill accustomed to them; but emphasis was system of reiiresentation. We have befoi'e laid, and it appears to me most pi'operly, us the case of the great colony in which. on the probability that there would be we are at present assembled. Here the little or no resemblance between the two popular voice is in no sense or degree exer- chambers, but that the senate, as created cised in the election of members of the by the constitution of the commonwealth, upper chamber. A similar rule obtains in would be simply a body elected by the Queensland and New Zealand, and also, I same electors voting in different constitu- understand, for a limited time in "Western encies. Now, I would venture to ask if Australia. Is it fair, I ask, under all these this is the position under the bill 1 I hold circumstances, when the senate, as it ap- that it is not ; that it is altogether differ- pears to me, is simply created for the pro- ent. Instead of the senate representing tection of state rights and state interests, to the same body of electors as those who say that we will permanently — or at least will return members to the house of repre- until an alteration is made in the constitu- sentatives, it will represent a much more tion — deprive the electors of the different limited class. We have provided that the states of the opportunity of settling this senate shall be chosen by the two houses matter for themselves as they think best 1 of the various local parliaments. We have I would have been perfectly agreeable — distinctly prohibited the people of the and I have hitherto argued in favour of various states from the exercise of any giving the senate large powei's in the power which they might desire to possess direction of the protection and preserva- as regards the direct choice of their repre- tion of state rights and state interests — if sentatives in the senate. The sense of the the senate were constituted by the direct Convention was taken on a direct motion voice of the people ; but I am not prepared affecting the question, and we now find it to advocate any such course when I find declared as the deliberate will and purpose that instead of a senate of the character of the Convention that the people as a which I had hoped would be constituted whole shall be deprived of any direct vote under the constitution that we propose to in the choice of senators, and that the adopt, we have altogether a different body power of election shall be confided to the — one in which there is no guarantee that two branches of the local legislature. the voice of the people will prevail — and What does that amount to 1 It amounts that an equal vote in the decision of the to this : That an equal voice will be ac- election of senators is coilfided to sections coi'ded in all cases which are most favour- of the community in some colonies, and in able to the exercise of popular rights other colonies to those who may simply to a limited class, representative not of happen to be the nominees of the govern- the general body of the people, but of per- ment that is in power. A great deal was sons possessing a property qualification. previously made of the improbability of That, I say, will be the case in the most a deadlock, and, of course, if the electors favourably situated colonies. In all such were the same, though divided into differ- colonies there is a provision requiring a ent constituencies, as was well pointed out, property qualification in the electoral fran- there would not be much probability of chise for the upper house ; but, further, any such lamentable occurrence ; but we there are cases in which it can hardly be have had some experience of deadlocks in said that the members of the upper house other colonies, and, although we need not are in the slightest degree brought in touch fear them if the people to whom the senate with the main body of the electors by any were responsible were the same people as [J/?*. Kingston. CommonweaUh of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 737 those to AvLom the house of representatives any particular measure which was sent up Avas responsible, yet when we notice, and to them, I should be found voting in favour must notice, that they are not the same, of it. But the way in which we have got but altogether a diffei'ent constituency, and it at present is that the senate — a body there is no power given to the local legis- which appears to me to be constituted in a latures, however much tlioy desire to alter highly objectionable manner, out of touch the provisions on this score, then it seems with the people, removed by the expres3 to me that there is great risk of a dead- provisions of this constitution from the lock. I, for one, have no faith in a senate possibility of popular control — in a great that is constituted without direct election many cases are given unlimited powers by the people — over which the people have of amendment — a power of amendment no control, or over which the people have whicli they could exercise whether state only the control, to the most limited extent, rights or state interests w^ere or were not which is pi'ovided here — and I will never involved. I think it is a bad thing that give a vote either in this Convention or else- they should have these powers, and, as re- where for confiding larger powers to such a gards the matters which we are now dis- senate than are proposed within the four cussing, having no faith in a body so con- corners of the bill. Rather should I be stituted, I shall do whatever I can to pre- found supporting any amendment which vent their having the larger powers which miglit have the effect of confining the atten- it is sought to confer upon them, and I do tion of the senate to matters with which hope that I shall have an opportunity to vote they are properly charged. I lia\e always for a limitation of the authority which even undei'stood that the object of calling the this clause proposes to confer u])on them, senate into existence was the preservation Mr. SUTTOR : Witli regard to the of state rights and slate interests. I tho- senate, it is my intention to "\ote for the roughly sympathise with the suggestion whole bill, and nothing but the bill. I which daring another period of this debate desire to compliment the sub-committee was made, that within the four corners of who drafted the biil on the able manner in tho act which we propose to pass we shoulil wliich they dealt with this important ques- for the guidance of the senate lay down tion — on the veiy able compromise which the principle which we hope and expect they liave brought about. It appears to ■will direct them in tho discliai-ge of their me that this compromise might be described senatorial dutifs. So far as I can under- as what is known in mechanics as the re- stand that principle, it is that the will of suit of a balance of forces. We began this the people as expressed in the hou.se of debate with extreme views on all sides, representatives should prevail, and sliould We had tlic lion, .iiid learned member, Mr. not be interfered witli liy the senate in Deakiii, on the one side, and the lion, and tho slightest degree, except in cases where learned nunnber, Mr. Darton, on tlu; otlier, state rights and state interests areinvolved. whom I descriljed, in the address which I ]Ioldiiig these views, if an opportunity jiad the honor to deliver to the Convention were given me to vote on an amendment on the; resolutions, as being the two poles such as that whicli was indicated, liy wliieli of thi; discussion. 1 am convinced that tho the senate's power of amendment was to more wc di.scus.'i the question the more we be confined to cases in which l>y tlnir own .^li.ill Ii'' satisfied that the sub-committee, deliberate resolution they ailirmed that it wliich perhaps consisted of the most able was necessary for them for the protection members of tho Convention, Iiave, in their of state rights and .state interests to amend deliberations, made a happy compromise, 3 A •38 Commonwealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill which all the colonies should accept. I confess that I cannot but express my sur- prise at what was said by the hon. mem- ber for Western Australia, Mr. J. Forrest. He is one of the pets of this Convention. His colony has four representatives to commence with, when, so far as population is concerned, it is only entitled to one member and a half. Mr. Hackett : How does the hon. mem- ber make that out ] Mr. SUTTOR : There is to be a mem- ber for every 30,000 people, but Western Australia will start with four members, although it has a population of only 40,000. Mr. Hackett : The hon. member should wait for the census ! Mr. SUTTOR : The hon. member will not say that the population is 60,000, and if it were 60,000, Western Australia would be entitled to only two members, but it is to get double the number that it is entitled to. Western Australia will also have the same representation in the senate — eight members — as is given to the population of the larger colonies. Seeing the eminent gentlemen who were on the sub-committee, I am willing to put myself in their hands and to vote for the bill as brought down by them. Mr. LOTON" : The question before the ■Convention at the present time with re- gard to the powers that the senate shall have in tlie federal parliament, I think is worthy of a little more consideration. The hon, delegate from South Australia, Mr. Kingston, put before us the fact that we have given the senate equal powers with the house of representatives on a veiy great number of subjects — on all subjects, in fact, as Avas pointed out by the Premier of South Australia, with the exception of appropriation and taxation. I think that the hon. member, Mr. Kingston, also pointed out that the senate, as constituted, would not be worthy of the same amount of confidence, because of the manner of its [Mr. Suttor. election, as it might otherwise have been. At the same time, if he can afford to give the senate the same power as is as- signed under about thirty clauses in this bill, how is it that the hon. member can- not go a little farther, and give them the same power under the other two clauses ] Now, in considering the question of the power of the senate and of the house of representatives, it is very important to my mind to see exactly what powers it is pro- posed to confer on the federal parliament. What are the powers? The powers are contained in thirty-one clauses ; but we have been told on sevei'al occasions that finance means government, and govern- ment is finance. Well, the very subject on which it is intended to limit the power of the senate is the very question of finance. One of the first subjects, I suppose, to engage the attention of the federal parlia- ment would be the question of the tariff". What would be the relative proportions and powers of the different states when the question was considered 1 Take the four smallest populated colonies at the present time. Their representation in the house of representatives would notequal the repre- sentation of either Victoria or New South Wales at the present time. I leave out New Zealand, because I suppose they are too large at the present time to think of join- ing the confederation. But, taking the four smallest colonies, their power in the house of representatives would not equal the power of Victoria or New South Wales. And the same in regard to the amount which they would be taxed. The taxpayers will have to pay equally; the tariff is to be uniform. Mr. MuNRO : The larger colonies will pay the larger amount ! \ Mr. LOTON : Not exactly. They are to have a uniform tariff^, and Victoria, supposing New South Wales stands out, would be able to dominatethe four smallest populated colonics, by imposing a tariff 1 Commonwealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. ■39 against the outside world. "We are to have, I suppose, an extraordinary state of things when we enter the federation be- tween A^ctoria and New South Wales. Victoria is quoted as a highly protection- ist colony. Mr. MuNRO : You could throw out the bill, could you not I Mr. LOTON: New South Wales, on the other hand, boasts of being a free- trade colony. Mr. DiBBS : What's that 1 There is no boasting about it ! Mr. LOTON : I have noticed for some time time past, in looking down the cus- toms tariff, that New South Wales im- poses against an outside colony a duty of a penny in the !b. on br.ttor. That is not free-trade, at all events, for the working men of New South Wales. Mr. DiBBS : Our free-trade is a sham ! Colonel Smith : A good deal of it is ! Mr. LOTON : However, I suppose we shall have an extraordinary state of things between Victoria and New South Wales, find if they join the federation, as no doubt they will, they can easily dominate the tariff of the commonwealth. Mr. Muxuo : But the others can throw it out ! Mr. LOTON: What will 1)0 the im- portant question that will arise in the first instance? It will be the question of im- posing a protective tariff against the out- side world, and Victoria, there is no doubt in the world, will say, " We want, we must have, and we shall have, if it is possible, a high protective tariff against the outside world " ; and New South Wales possiljly will follow her because she can afford to do so ; but at the present time the other states are not, I say, in a position, and will not be in a position for a long time to go in for a policy of that kind. I shall ! not follow that argument further than to I state it ; but that is my opinion. Now, I take the other side of the question. What can these four outside colonies with the smallest populations do, even if you give them co-ordinate powers on these particu- lar questions, against New South Wales and Victoria combined 1 Mr. Bird : Veto them ! Mr. LOTON : Very little ; they have not the power. Sir John Bray : They can reject ! Colonel Smith : The domination is all the other way ! Mr. LOTON : They can reject the whole of a bill, whatever power you give them, but not a portion. What would the voice of the thirty-five members for these outside colo- nies be in a senate of 130 members 1 What would be the use of their voice in the senate unless you give them some power? I maintain that unless you give equal power to the members of the senate on the ques- tions of appropriation and taxation you may as well do away with the second house altogether. If they are simply to register the edicts of the house of representatives we may as well do away with the senate. Sir PATRICK JENNINGS: I feel bound to make an explanation. In dis- cussing the constitution of the senate in the debate on the main question, I ex- pressed the opinion that we ought to have a .strong and powerful senate. I believe we ought to have a variety of distinct opinionsas to what the measure of strength should be of that senate. I may plainly say that after reflection, and looking over the mode by which the committee to whom the task was given of endeavouring to re- concile these conflicting opinions, I am im- pressed with the conviction that they have decided in a wise and moderate manner. I shall not refer to any ebullition of feel- ing on the part of that remarkably stal- wart stripling of a new colony in the shape of Western Australia, who comes forward and asserts itself with the most manly vigour. I feel that the exuberant patriotism of those who have come so far ought to be 740 Commoniccaltit of [G April, 1891.] Australia Bill. admired if we cannot all agree with them. But I think tliov have really inverted the propo.sition. I think this is not a case of the larger states domineei'ing over and dominat- ing the smaller states. I am very mnch in- clined to think that the smaller states are in the position of lecturing and hectoring and domineering over the larger states. We know that the representation in the senate is perfectly equal in each case ; and we know, moreover, that this idea that ISTew South Wales and A^ictoria will Ije always united to oppress the other colonies, is about the most unlikely thing in the world. I think they are very likely to split ; and if they disagree, then our friends from South Australia can form a coi'ner on the one side, and our friends from Queensland- can form a corner on the other, and they make common cause with whichever state they think is right. But I do not believe there will be a tendency to split up between colonies having all the same opinions. There will be parties in the senate, as there will be parties in the house of repre- sentatives, and that party feeling will Le the solvent of the questions before them, and will prevent one mass vote being given by tlie senators. We cannot follow the model of the United States Constitution, because our constitution is totally ditierent. We cannot, as a senate, perform executive functions when we have responsible go- vernment and aministry respcuoible to the house of representatives. Therefore, I think any allusion to the constitution of tlie United States Senate Avould be alto- gether in vain ; and believing, as I do, that a happy mean has been arrived at, I shall not be inclined to support any amendment of this clause. Mr. HACKETT : I hope the Conven- tion vvill allow me a few words in order to explain my position, as I find myself, I regret to say, differing from a majority of my lion, colleagues from the colony we represent. In fact I find myself in the \^Sir Patrick Jennings. smallest minority possible — a minority, I think, of less than the number of repre- sentatives the hon, member, Mr. Suttor, would allow us, according to our popula- tion, in the senate. But perhaps hon. members will allow me, in the first in- stance, to say a word as to some indignant remonstrances that fell from the hon, member, Mr. Deakin, in debating this clause on our last day of meeting. I might explain that the vote I gave on that occa- sion was given in consequence of a com- parison of language, and solely for that reason — not with any idea of altering the powei's of the two bodies, but solely from a comparison of the language of clause 55 with that of clause 54. I was under the impression that the Avords in the 1st sub- section of clause 55 and the words in clause 54 were meant to cover the same subject, and from long experience we all know how highly disadvantageous it is, and how greatly it conduces to friction and trouble if the selfsame subject be referred to and defined in different lansfuaiie. If it were intended to attach to the words " appi-o- priating any part of the public revenue," a meaning different from that attached to the words " appropriating the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual service of the government," it is not explained. I was left under the impi-ession that they were meant to cover the same ground, and on that conclusion I voted to bring them into harmony, and consistency. I must say that I remain, to a great extent, unconvinced by the many arguments used by advocates of what may be called the popular view- — • tliat is to say, I do not share the appre- hensions of many hon. gentlemen that if you endow these two bodies with coequal powers, there is any fear of an absolute stoppage of government, as is, I suppose, meant by the use of the word " deadlock." There is almost certain to be a little fric- tion at the commencement ; but after a wliile each bodv will find that it is of no \ Commonwealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 741 use attempting to coerce a body which stands on as sti'ong ground as itself, and ultimately the order of the day \x\\\ be concession and compromise. Still less am I moved by reference to the power of the people. The power of the people, it is said, will be lodged in the house of representa- tives. But go round the question as you may, put it into any shape or form you like, it remains the same thing — for many years to come the house of rejjresentatives will be the house of two states, while the senate will be the house of all the states. i!^ew South Wales and Victoria, as is well known, will outvote the other states in the house of representatives by at least three, and pei'haps four, to one. There- fore, I ."should not accept this compromise if I believed the clause would take away any of the essential powers of the senate in asserting the manifest rights of the smaller states. But does it mean such an inroad upon their powers and privileges ? Is it worth our while to accept an amend- ment rejecting this comprorai.se — a course which, to put it in plain words, will have the effi.'ct of wrecking the whole scheme of federation. Mr. J. Forrest : Who says so 1 Mr. HACKETT : We are assured by gentlemen who speak in the name of a majority of the people of Australia that that will 1)0 .so. Sir JoirN' Downer : We liail lietter go without federation than have it on tlieir j)rinci])le I iMr. IIACKI<:TT : For my part, I think it would be less cumbrous and more satis- factory if the right of amendment were given in the same form as that in which it is given in the South Australian Con- stitution, and in which it is given and ixercised in Tasmania. This compromise goes as nearly as possible towards giving the senate the real power as anything that can j)ossib]y be produced in default of the American .system. Sir John Downer : Does it give them the real power ] Mr. HACKETT : Above all, I protest against it being said that we are accepting a degrading compromise — tliat this compro- mise, if acted upon, would put the senate in a degraded and undignified position. How can that be so ? What difference is there between the course proposed and tilings as they now stand in some of the colonies 1 In those colonies in which the upper house possesses the right of amendment if it de- sires to make an amendment it sends down the amendment in the bill. Under this compromise it would send down the amend- ment with the bill. If this Convention is to break up upon such a ground as that, upon such mere straw-splitting as the ques- tion whether bills shall be sent down with amendments in themor tackedon to them, the sooner we give up all ideas not only of federation, but of political self-government, the better, because we are unfitted for either. Sir, something of this kind has been and is in operation in at least two colonies in the group. The lion, member, Mr. ]\IcMil]an, seemed to think that the arrangement by which an amendment in a money bill could be communicated by mes- sage to the lower house, though nominally in force in South Australia, was not opera- tive. All I can say is, that in the first assembling of our two houses in Western Australin, when this very question came up, we carefully studied mutters in South Australia, and we were convinced, fiuin the frequent, the cfTective, and the con- ciliatory application of the system, that it was a course of procedure that deserved consideration. The result was that in the very first fpiestion that arose between our two houses we adopted the South Australian mode of procedure, and in consequence an amendment of a highly desirable character was made in legislation relating to finance. Therefore, I look upon the practice as the established practice of 742 GotnmoniveaUh of [G April, 1891.] AuaLralia Bill. Western Australia as well as of South Australia. This power, so far from being degrading, is really a power whichis lodged in another branch of the parliament. I refer to the governor representing the Queen. Under most of our constitutions, he can communicate — I do not say as to money bills, but as to other legislation — by message any amendment he thinks it desirable to make in a bill after it has passed both houses. And the same pro- cedure would be adopted as to dealings between the senate and the house of re- presentatives in regard to financial legis- lation. I am prepared to vote for this com- promise, and mainly on these two grounds. We have already decided that bills dealing with money questions — bills imposing a tax or appropriating any part of the re- venue — shall originate in the house of representatives. That clause was carried unanimously. What is now proposed ? Not only that bills dealing with money questions shall originate in the house of representatives, but that all amendments dealing with money bills shall also origi- nate in that house. I say that the advo- cates of this compromise are entitled to press that parity of reasoning to its utmost andmoststringent logical consequences. In fact, the relationship that will exist between the senate and the house of representatives as to amendments will be almost the same as that which exists between the governor and the house of representatives as to money bills — that is to say, the governor may and does suggest a money bill for the consideration of the house of representa- tives. The senate is to do almost pre- cisely the same thing. It is to send amendments in money bills to the house of representatives for its consideration. Therefore, if we look to mere logical con- sistency, the pi'oposal to allow the amend- ment of money bills to originate in the lower house as well as the bills themselves, recommends itself to the most favourable {Mr. Uackett. consideration of the Committee. The second reason why I shall vote for this compromise is that it leaves the door open for evolution. It is quite possible that in years to come the senate may prove itself to be the more trusted, the more able, and the more patriotic body. If so, it will be the most popular body, and nc number of constitutional shackles which you can devise will take away from it its power, or reduce it one scintilla. On the contrary, however you may bind and fet- ter it, it will discover means to make its wishes known and to enforce them ; and the people also will find ways to support them. This compromise rather indicates than determines the balance of political forces in the constitution. It leaves their ultimate adjustment and readjustment ta time. Time, and time alone, can show us where the political equilibrium will lie ; and it is no small credit to the framers of this compromise that they have borne that so clearly in mind and have allowed within certain limits the senate to exert the power which its own conduct will make apparent and effective. For this reason I shall have great pleasure in supporting the clause as it stands. Mr. BAKER : At the request of the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, I ask leave to withdraw my amendment in order to pro- pose another. If my amendment, as I first proposed it, is negatived, the amendment which the hon. meinber, Mr. McMillan, wishes to move will not be admissible. 1 would like to say a few words in reply to what has been said on this question. We have heard a great many arguments which were used before on this subject ; but we have had the matter put in a somewhat new form by two of ray colleagues from South Australia. The hon. members, Mr. Piayford and Mr. Kingston, both put it that they are prepared to make sacrifices. Mr. Playford : I never used the word ! Mr. Kingston : I did not! Commonive:dth of [G April, 1891.] Australia Bill. •43 Mr. BAKER : The hon. member, Mr. Playford, did not use that word, but he said he was prepared to make a compro- mise ; he did not advocate that which he himself thought absolutely the best, but he was prepared to give way in order to bring the matter to a conclusion. Mr. Kingston : I did not say anything of the sort ! Mr. Playford : Nor did I ! Mr. BAKER : T understood the hon. member, Mr. Playford, to put it that re- sponsible government must exist ; and, in order that this fetish of responsible go- vernment should exist and be carried out, he was prepared to sacrifice the interests of South Au.stralia. Mr. Playford : No ! Mr. BAKER : 1 have heard of people who were prepared to sacrifice themselves on the altar of their country ; but I never before heard people talking of sacrificing their country on the altar of responsible government. Mr. Playford : That is unfair ! Mr. BAKER : I do not think it is at all unfair. " The hon. gentleman has a right to liis own opinion. Mr. Playford : The hon. member has no right to put words in my mouth which I never used ! Mr. BAKER : The hon. member did not use tliose very words ; but that was, as I understood him, the effect of his argu- ments. Tlie hon. member, Mr. Playford, lias told us that tJiis system of suggestion wliich i.s propo.sed in this bill has been in force in South Australia for twenty years, and it has always worked well ; that all the suggestions made by tlie Legislative Council liavc been respectfully treated. As a matter of fact, the Legislative Coun- cil never does make any suggestions at all with respect to tariff or appropriation bills. They never think of making a suggestion with regard to an appropriation h'xW. They never make any suggestion in the case of a tariff bill. Mr. Playford : Yes ; they have done so ! Mr. Kingston : And also in the case of loan bills ! Mr. BAKER : I do not remember any suggestion having been made. If the hon. member says tliat ignoring suggestions is treating them respectfully, he is quite right. That is the usual treatment they meet with. Mr. Playford : No ! Mr. BAKER : AVhen a bill comes to us which is technically a money bill, but which is really a bill dealing with a question of general i^olicy, and containing a few money clauses in it, when we make suggestions that do not deal with the money clauses, they are generally respectfully treated ; but if we venture to make suggestions on money matters, they are ignored. Mr. Playford : Nothing of the sort ! Mr. BAKEPv, : I assert that they are. I and those who think with me are afraid that the same practice will be carried into effect with reference to any suggestions made by the senate if the clause is passed as it now stands. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendment (by Mr. Baker) })roposed ; That the word "except," liue 3, be omitted. Sir JOHN BRAY : I do not think I should liave troubled the Convention with any remarks on this subject, but for the fact that an hon. member from South Australia, Mr. Baker, has displayed such lamentable ignorance of what is going on in the Parliament of that colony. The lion, member, to my knowledge, has been a member of the Legislative Council for a great number of years, yet he tells us, who know more about it than he does him- self, that this power of suggestion, exercised by the Legislative Council of Soutli Aus- tralia, is in fact a myth, — tliat when sugges- tions are made, they arc, generally s[)eak- ing, ignored. JMr. Baker : T did not say so ! '44 Commonioealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Sir JOHN BRAY : The lion, member said that suggestions were made, and, generally speaking, were not respectfully considered. Mr. Baker : I did not ! Sir JOHN BRAY : And the lion, mem- ber took the lion, member, Mr. Playford, to task for having said that the sugges- tions of the Council were always respect- fully considered. He cannot deny that. Mr. Baker : I do not deny that ! Sir JOHN BRAY : I say it is a mis- take. I am sorry that the lion, member said that. If we are going to question what each member likes to think, and to put our own interpretation on any explan- ation that he chooses to give, that is not the way to forward the business of this Convention. Our business is to detemiiine what we shall do to meet an undoubtedly very difficult question. I will point out to hon. members as a recent instance of what took place in South Australia, that, in 1887, a tariff bill was passed by the Legis- lative Assembly. I have here a copy of the joroceedings of the Parliament of Soutli Australia. The Legislative Covincil made certain suggestions with respect to that tariff bill Mr. Playford: Twenty-five altogether! Sir JOHN BRAY : I will not trouble the House by reading them all ; but they suggested that men's boots and shoes. No. 6 and upwards, should be charged .33s. per dozen pairs, glass bottles at certain rates, bags, sacks, and so on, that between twenty and thirty different items should be in- cluded in the tariff. A message was sent to the Assembly, and a day or two after- wards it was resolved that the suggestions of the Legislative Council should be ac- cepted. Mr. Playford : Every one of them ! Sir JOHN BRAY: Thatis as clear proof as possible that this practice of the Legis- lative Council making suggestions has woiked well in South Australia, and the [.Sir John Bray. Legislative Council have not hesitated to exercise their power to make sugges- tions. Mr. Playford : And they were always respectfully considered ! Sir JOHN BRAY : Nor has the Assem- bly, on the other hand, hesitated to consider their suggestions fairly and respectfully, and, where possible, to agree to them. 1 must say, as one who tries to take a fair and impartial view of this question, that I be- lieve both sides are making too much of this particular matter. I do not think this is the crucial question in the bill. I have sufficient confidence, not only in the parliaments of the different colonies, but also in the people of Australia generally, to believe that they have no desire to do a wrong. Even if it were possible, and I do not think it possible, that the govern- ments of New South Wales and Victoria were both anxious to do wrong to the people of the other colonie.s, I do not be- lieve that the people of Victoria and New South Wales would follow their govern- ments in attempting such a cour.'^e. I say, speaking as an Australian, that I believe the Australians desire federation. I. be- lieve they have confidence in each other, and I believe that the 1,000,000 of people — speakinsx in round numbers — in the other colonies have perfect confidence in the 2,000,000 people in New South Wales and Victoria having the same object.s, the same interests, and the same desire to maintain the pro.sperity and advancement of the whole of the colonies. I say on the other hand that I shall be quite satisfied to give the senate fall power with respect to everything excej^t the ordinary appro- priation bills. I think it would be a lamentable thing to give the senate power to interfere with the ordinary annual sup- plies of the government. It would pos- sibly clog the whole of the work of the government, and the senate would not be directly responsible to the people. I Commonwealth of [G April, 1891.] Australia Bill. -45 do not want to go into the question of what is federation, or unification, or any- thing else ; but I take it that it is the desire of every Australian who wishes to see free government in Australia to have the go- vernment of the people by the people, and not by the states, and whether I repi*esent a small state or a large state I will be no pai-ty to giving any authority or any government for the time being the right of nominating persons who shall exercise a power superior to that exercised by the people themselves. The question now be- fore us as to the mode of adjusting the differences between the two houses will settle itself in the course of time as the two houses proceed with their work, and I, for one, would deprecate the tying down too tightly in a bill, and saying too definitely what the powers of each house are to be. I am not going to pro- nounce a definite decision on the mat- ter, however, until I hear clearly what the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, really is ; but whatever form the government may take, I, as one of those elected by the people, claim that the jjeople of Australia must in tlie end make their will prevail. It is impossible for any cf us, whatever the colony from which we came, to suppose that the 2,000,000 people in New South Wales and Victoria would consent to be dictated to by the senate a.s to the amount of ta.xation tliat tliey are to endure, or as to anything more than the disposal of that taxation for tlio purposes of the federal government. It appears to mo tliat the really important part of the bill, that relating to finance, has to be decided later. T do not pro[)Oso to go into this matter now, although to a certain extent it is connected with this clause, because it really provides Jiow taxation measures arc to be dealt with; but I ask hon. members on either side not to attach too much importance to this ques- tion. I say that anybody wlio talks about one colony making a sacrifice for the sake of another does not understand it, and will have to begin at the beginning before he can know anything about it. There is no sacrifice whatever. The senate is com- posed of an equal number of representa- tives from each colony, and the people have the right to elect a certain number of members to the house of representa- tives, and I have the fullest confidence that those who are elected to the house of representatives will deal justly with the whole of the people of Australia. I think we ought to ridicule the idea that the people of New South "Wales and Victoria would be so utterly wrongheaded as to combine together merely for the purpose of doing an injustice to the other colonies. I do not believe that it is possible that the governments of these colonies could com- bine for this purpose, and I ridicule the notion that they could get any consider- able portion of the people to follow them if they adopted such a cour.se. I ask lion. members to consider the question reason- ably. I should like representatives from the smaller colonies to con.sider whether the people of Australia are to have a full voice in the disposal of taxation. No form of government should deprive them of the full opportunity of exercising proper influence in tho raising and dLsposal of taxation. It appears to mo that the most imi)ortant provisions in the bill are those relating to the disposal of the revenues of tlie federal executive council, and I trust tliiit we shall make up our niiiuls not to leave them as they arc now. The sur[)lus revenue \\1I1 pidhiiKIy lie returned to tho people ; but 1 quite agree with the hon. member, Mr. Tiiynne, that the uncertainty as to tlie amount to be returned, or as to the time at which it will be returned, must endjarrasH the treasurerandthegovernment of each particular colony, if there is any doubt whatever about it. If we make up our minds to place in the hands of the 716 Oummomvealth of fG April, 1891.] Australia Bill. federal government a considerable I'evenue, Ave should also make up our minds that they shall have full use for that revenue. I shall listen with care to the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, but in the meantime I ask hon. members not to insist on anything so unreasonable as that the senate which represents the states shall have the power of overriding the representatives of the people in the taxa- tion of the people, and the mode of dis- posing that taxation when raised. Mr. BAKER : I am glad that the hon. member. Sir John Bray, has called the at- tention of the Committee to the particular suggestions made by the South Australian Legislative Council to the House of Repre- sentatives in 1887, because they entirely prove the statement which I advanced, that suggestions when made on matters of detail, and unsubstantial, were considered and agreed to ; but that they would not be considered at all, if they materially affected the provisions of a money bill. Sir John Bray : Show it by the records ! Mr. BAKER : I shall show it by the record of a motion moved by the hon, member. Sir John Bray, in the very case Avhich he brought before the Committee this afternoon. First of all, the ruling of the Speaker was called as to whether it was in the power of the Legislative Coun- cil to make the small sugojestion which they had made. The Speaker ruled that it was in their power, and the hon. mem- ber. Sir John Bray, then moved : That the ruling of the Deputy-Speaker be printed and taken into consideration on some future day, and that in the meantime the sug- gestions of the Legislative Council re the Tariff ReAnsion Bill, not being such as materially affect the policy of the bill That is to say, being trivial amendments, be considered in Committee. Does not that prove that in substance I was right, although I admit that my memory was at fault, and I apologise, for [Sir John Bray. saying that the Legislative Council never made any suggestions in a tariff bill % Sir Henry Parkes : It does not much matter whether they did or not ! Mr. BAKER : ISTo. However, these suggestions were agreed to because they did not affect the policy of the bill. Mr. Playford : The policy of the bill was protection — they would have thrown the measure out if they did not believe in its policy. Mr. BAKER : The House of Assembly said it does not matter at all in these small questions, inasmuch as they do not materi- ally affect the policy of the bill. Mr. McMillan : I think at this stage I had better let the Committee know the character of my amendment. The Chairman : This amendment must be dealt with first. Sir John Bray : The hon. member, Sir. Baker, has withdrawn his amendment, and only proposes to strike out the word " ex- cept." We want to know how that would fit in with the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. McMillan % Mr. McMillan : I shall not refer to my amendment if it is not in order. I simply wish to say that when the amend- ment of the hon. member, Mr. Baker, is disposed of — I hope in the negative — I shall propose my amendment. Mr. Munro : The hon. member had better go on with it at the right time ! Mr. McMILLA.N : I understand that, although we are working under the rules of the House of Commons, some amount of latitude is allowed us. Mr. Munro : We shall not be allowed to speak on thehcn.member'samendmentnow! The Chairman : I would point out to the Committee that if I allow the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, to do what he proposes, I shall have to adow every hon. member a similar privilege, and I think that would lead to a great deal of irregu- larity, which is undesirable. Gommonweallh of [G April, 1891.] Australia Bill. •47 ]\Ir. McMillan : I understand that the hon. member desires to omit the word " except," in order that a sweeping amend- ment may be brought forward, giving the upper house the right to interfere with the ordinary appropriation bill. From that I absolutely dissent. As I said before, there is a very great ditference between the two cases. In an appi'opriation bill we simply appropriate money on a policy which has been previously agreed to ; and it is with regard to the appropriation, and not with regard to the details of the bill, that I desire to give the privilege to the xipper house of dealing with it ; conse- quently, I wish to say that, notwithstand- ing the amendment which I intend to move, I am utterly opposed to the upper house amending an appropriation bill. Sir JOHN DOWNER : If the views of the hon. member, Sir John Bray, were adopted and met with general acceptance, I think it would be absolutely unnecessary for us to bother about a senate at all. I understood the hon. gentleman to say, with great emphasis — certainly he was speaking in a manner in which he did not speak previously — that, so far as federa- tion was concerned, the voice of the people of Australia, that is, of the individual units, must be predominant ; and for that reason, and, as I understood the hon. gen- tleman to say, for that reason alone it would be impo.ssible to think of giving the .senate powers co-ordinate and coe(jual with those of the house which directly re- presented the people. I can only say that if those are the views of the hon. gentle- man, let him carry them out to their legiti- mate issue, and the colonies will cease to exist as entities; the unilication of the empire, so far as it relates to the colonies, "will be complete, and our individuality as colonies will be absolutely destroyed. It is quite impossible to talk of the voice of the people being absolutely predominant, and in the same breath to state that there shall be a senate which is to have authority which may not necessarily work in the same direction as the general voice of the people. I agree with the hon. gentleman that the voice of the people must prevail, but with those safeguards in respect of each colony which are absolutely necessary to preserve them in their present inde- pendence ; and it is from that point of view that, throughout, I have maintained that, to make this exception in respect of money bills or in respect of taxation bills, was, at the very start, to indicate the inferiority of the senate, whilst all the provisions of the bill go to show what a superior body we intend to create. The hon. gentle- man says no constitution could possibly exist with coequal authority in the senate and the house of representatives ; and at the very same time he has before him the only enduring democracy that the world has ever known, in which for upwards of 100 years that authority has existed, at least co-ordinate, or, where they were not co-ordinate Mr. Gillies : Not nearly co-ordinate ! Sir Henry Parkes : Where is that? Sir JOHN DOWNER : America. Mr. Playford : There is no responsible government there ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : I will say a word about responsible government in a minute, but I take it, the government is for the people, and not the people for the government. So far as America is con- cerned, the power of the senate is not merely co-ordinate with that of the house of representatives, but in some particulars it is absolutely supreme ; and yet iio one will admit that the senate has lost re})ute or has been lessened in (he opinion of the people. On the contrary, we know ])er- fc^ctly well that the very humljlest of the people look with veneration to the .senate, whilst they arc extremely critical about the body wiiich, if this argument were fol- lowed out, would more completely repre- ■48 Commonwealth of [6 Apkil, 1891.] Australia Bill. sent their own voice. I come now to the remark of the hon. member, Mr. Playford, that they have no responsible government there. Colonel Smith : They have a revolu- tion there every four years ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : That is no argument either way. If their govern- ment is a perfect government without a responsible ministry, so much the worse for the responsible ministry argument, be- ■cause it shows that a responsible govern- ment may well exist without a responsible ministry. To follow the argument of the hon. member, Mr. Playford, to its legiti- mate end, there should be no second house at all. The argument of the hon. gentle- man is, " You cannot have a responsible ministry if you have two houses with equal authority." I contend that the argument of the hon. gentleman is no argument at all, because the question is not whether we are to have a responsible ministry, but •whether or not we are to form a govern- ment which shall preserve the entities of the states, and yet, at the same time, bring about federation on proper terms in respect of matters which the states choose to hand over to them. Supposing respon- sible government will not coexist with this it is a matter which I in no way care about. Wiiat I am certain of is that if this be a good thing the government will l}e equally good, and will adjust it- self to the exigencies of its circumstances. But, as a matter of fact, in some coun- tries of Europe two coordinate chambers exist, and yet responsible government exists. The government always must be responsible ; the only question is as to whom the government is responsible. The government, says the hon. member. Sir John Bray, must be responsible to the people. Whom does he mean by the people? He means the people represented in the popular house. Sir John Bray : Not necessarily ! [Sir John Downer. Sir JOHN DOWNER : He means t people in the popular house, either as exists at the time when some questic arises, or as it exists after a general ele tion. The hon. gentleman means thai and what he is endeavouring to do in coi nection with this attempt which we ai making, not at all to give up our own Iocs government, not at all to sacrifice th liberties of our colonies which have woi'ke so excellently for all of us — at the ver time that he asserts that there will be n federation unless we very carefully safe guard the liberties which we as colonie: individually possess, he, in almost evenj matter of vital moment, proposes to banc over each colony to a general body ir which, so far as the smaller colonies an concerned, they will have no practical repi'esentation at all ; and whilst he wants to preserve the figment of a body which will seem to treat the states as states, and give them equal representation, he wants to absolutely take away the substance which we are seeking for, and to divest the senate of all substantial authority. I say now, as I said at an early stage of our de- bates, that if one house can make and un- make governments alone, that house will, as a necessary corollary, absolutely rule the country. That body which governs the executive must necessarily govern that which the executive have to execute. Mr. Gillies : This amendment does not touch that question ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : This amend- ment deals with the whole question, or is intended to do so. Of course, it all de- pends whether these money bills are of any importance at all. If the money bills have the importance in legislation which the hor. member, Mr. Gillies, attributes to them ; if legislation is finance and finance is legislation, which I do not be- lieve ; if this matter is of such super- eminent importance, that it will be abso- lutely impossible to legislate without 1 I Commomoealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 74!) takinrr verv great care about it ; if these views are true, then I say it is absolutely absurd that we can preserve the rights of every colony at the same time that we hand over to the general population of Austx'alia the whole government. If, on the other hand, it means very little, if other questions in which their rights are preserved are of so much more importance, why make so much fuss about the matter 1 I care not which way you take it. If money is everything, and everything is money, then the senate ought to have as great a voice as any other body. If it is a matter of secondary importance, then why do the larger colonies make so much trouble about it 1 Colonel Smith: It is not the larger bat the smaller colonies that make all the trouble ! Sir JOITX DOWNER : Of course, they are making all the trouble. They are tak- ing the trouble which the humblest of us would take to preserve that which is his own, and to resist the aggression of an invader. Mr. MuN'RO : You are the invaders. You want to take away our privileges ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : Wo wish to take away no privileges whatever. On the contrary, we say we are going into rather a speculative venture Mr. IMuxno : And you want to get the plunder from us ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : It is unworthy of the lion, gentleman to say that. We an; all anxious to enter upon a new ven- ture. The only question is as to the terms on which wo should initiate tlio agree- ment, and with regard to that we have two instances which have not work(;d well and only one instance which has worked well, and all the arguments about the go- verniiu-nt of the majority by tlie minority, and about the larger states being made subordinate to the smaller, and the more C.xaggorated language which demeans itself to sucli a word as "plunder" — all tli?so arguments, I say, are dragged in when the light of experience shows that no such re- sult folloAvs. I agree with Sir John Bray that in the end the people must rule. Mr. Gillies : W"ho are the people 1 Sir JOHN DOWNER: Why, the senat3 and the house of representatives. The hon. member, Mr. Kingston, holds the view that had the senate been elected in the way he desired, it should have co- equal autliority with the other branch of the legislature ; but because the majority here have come to the conclusion that it will be better to have some different mode of election by the people in the first in- stance from the ordinary mode of election, my hon. friend says that he would rather see the powers of the senate curtailed than extended, and that no great authority should be given to persons so elected. In putting forward that argument, the lion, gentleman has given us proof of tlie strength of his own views, which, when worked out, come to this : that rather than take care that his colony and other colonics should have an adequate representation in the senate and an adequate voice in national concerns, unless the senate is constituted in the precise method of which he approves he would rather sacrifice the liberty of his colony than forego his own individual views. Whether the senate is elected by the local legislatures or by the people,, whom do the members from a ])articular state in tliat body represent ? IMr. KiXGSTOX : It depends iqion how they arc elected ! Sir JOHN DOWNEK : They represent their own colony, and they arc a power in their own colony. Mr. Deakix : Tiioy represent classes — that is all ! Mr. Kingston : The class tliut return thf-ni : Sir JOHN DOWNER : They represent all classes, whereas the hon. member, Mr. Kingston, only wants one class i-epresented. •50 Commonwealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Every portion of the community is tho- roughly represented. Colonel Smith : They only represent the money bags ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : Even as far as the election of the senate is concerned the local legislative assembly would have much larger power than the legislative council. Who can question that 1 And how can "anybody say that a body so elected will represent the classes, and not the com- munity generally 1 Mr. Kingston : What was our experi- ence in South Australia last year in regard to the Federal Council Bill ? Sir JOHN DOWNER : I am not talk- ing about the Federal Council, which I always held in high estimation. Mr. Kingston : Did not the Legislative Council wreck that last year ? Sir JOHN DOWNER : As a matter of fact the Legislative Council never cared very much for the Federal Council at any time. Mr. Kingston : They wrecked it last year on class representation ! Mr. Playford : They wanted the pro- pertied classes to have as much voice as the masses of the people ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : If that matter wants adjustment, let it be adjusted; but do not let a man who comes from any particular colony say that because the election of the senators is not in the pre- cise mode that he would like, he will sac- rifice the rights of his colony in regard to representation rather than not carry out his own views. Mr. Kingston : I did not say anything of the sort ! Sir JOHN DOWNER : I have taken the same position in this matter ever since the question was first initiated. I can understand no federation that would bring success or be lasting — and in this I am sure Sir Henry Parkes will agree with me — unless founded on what is just and \_Sir John Doioner. right ; and I cannot understand anything being founded on justice and righteous- ness which will put the minor colonies in the position of being liable to be entirely overwhelmed by the larger populations of certain colonies. Hon. Members : Question ! Question ! Sir GEORGE GREY: Hon. gentle- men seem to be very anxious to prevent the voices of members being heard. I think the whole of this debate has been a great mistake. Hon. gentlemen have been talking of preserving the liberties of the people, the liberties of the house of repre- sentatives, the liberties of the senate. They have been talking of imaginary thinos. There are no liberties at all. Let us follow out the question. How is the house of I'epresentatives to be created? By fair voting? No voice can answer yes. All know in their hearts that no fair vot- ing is to be allowed. What of the plural voting % I am told that in one colony of Australia so far does plural voting go that it is exercised by paper votes being sent ; that is, one man, if there were twenty-five electorates, would have twenty-five votes. He would vote in as many districts as he could personally, and vote by proxy in the others. Is that fair voting 1 Mr. Macdonald-Paterson : There is no voting by proxy ! Mr. Playford : That is not the question ! Sir GEORGE GREY : I believe it is the case in V/estern Australia. Mr. MuNRO : Unhappy Western Aus- tralia ! Sir GEORGE GREY : Unhappy West- ern Australia, yes ; but, in truth, unhappy Australia altogether under that system. I say that the house of representatives would in no way represent the people, but would represent simply the landowners of the colonies. That is the usual way, except in South Australia and in New Zealand. If New Zealand becomes a member of the confederacy, excejit in those two places any- Commomcealth oj [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 751 thing like fair voting would be absolutely unknown, and the house of representatives would not represent the people but would represent capital. The state legislatures are not allowed to represent the people, but are forced by the present laws to re- present capital, and, that being so, hon. members say that the state legislatures shall elect the senate — that is, a constituency un- fairly and unjustly created is to return the senate — and then hon. members debate as if it were a matter of the greatest conse- quence to the liberties of the people of this country whether the senate or the house of representatives shall have the greater power. "What care we for their power 1 It is the power of capital alone, and squabbles between two parties of capitalists little interest the people at large. That is how the question stands. I say, therefore, that the debate is really useless, and what will follow from this] I fear thr.t what will follow is that, when the question comes of this constitution being accepted by the people, it will be said that it is the state legislatures who are to vote as to whether it shall or shall not be accepted — that is, that upon that great all-absorbing question the people of Australasia and New Zealand shall have no power to determine what tlieir fate is to be. ^Ir. MuNRO : We will take care of that! Sir GEORGE GREY : How can it be taken care of 1 Mr. Ml-xro : We will send it to them ! Sir GEORGE GREY : But, tlien, how will the peoi)lo vote? Mr. Playfokij : Yea or nay ! Sir GEORGE GREY : How will the people vote with plural votes against them] You refused to let them have the power of voting man by man. ]Mr. MuNRO : I voted with the hon. member ! Sir GEORGE GREY : Yes, tlie hon. gentleman did ; but I am speaking of the House. I was grateful to the lion, mem- ber for the vote that he gave, and I be- lieve that his name will stand high in Australia for having given it. We may be few in number ; but the time will come when it will be thought the more honoi'- able that we, as few in number, should have fought this great question, and at last brought it to a successful issue ; for if fair voting is not given to the people, I feel certain that from one end of Australia to the other the people will resolve upon petitions to the parliament in England, and expose the true state of things, and be saved from a constitution beins; im- posed on them which is merely a sham constitution, as is the proposed constitution that we are calling into existence. It is not worth our while further to debate this subject, and I shall say no more upon it ; but I simply reaffirm absolutely — and I know that I am speaking the truth, which can- not fairly be contradicted — that under this constitution there is no fair voting wliat- ever allowed to the people of Australia, in any part of it, and that the only persons who do exercise it are those who have obtained it in former days, by struggles in some cases protracted through years, and that if this constitution is imposed upon them it will ultimately lead to such contests amongst the people themselves that I feel certain that disorder, distre.ss, and discom- fort will exist yet for many years in Aus- tralia, which would lie totally avoided if this Convention would at once do that jus- tice to their fellow-citizens to which they are entitled. When we are told, as I heard an hon. gentleman say just now, that wo are taking an example from America as to what we Bhould do about the senate, I say that that has no relation whatever to us, because in America there is the .system of every man having one vote. Their in- stitutions are based upon that, and if ours is based on this system of plural voting, in which one man may exercise, perhaps, more than twenty votes against one of his 7o: CommoniceaUh of [G April, 1891.] Australia Bill. fellow- citizen's, then I say tliere is no justice in tins conntiy, that it matters not to us what the constitution is, that we are simply governed by a few persons, who will naturally look to their own interests, INIy hon. friend opposite said it absolutely was, and should be, kept a government of the people, for the people, and by the people ; but I say that it is not a govern- ment of the people, it is not for the people, and it is not by the people. In not one of those respects does such a government exist here, and in not one of those respects will a government exist which is established under the absolute resolutions which we have adopted in the act Avhich we are about to try and force on the country. I think we might drop all consultation on the subject. To us it is indiSerent whether it is the senate tliat Las this power, or whether it is the house of representatives that has the power. The one thinir that we have to do with is that the people of Australasia have not the power, and yet they are the persons in whose hands it should exist. Mr. DIBBS : When the debate on the main question took place in the early days of this Convention, had a vote been taken I think the question would have been de- cided in favour of the principle laid down in the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. Baker, in the pi'oportion of something like 10 to 3. One naturally asks, what has the Convention done ; what mysteri- ous influence has been at work in the star chamber of the select committee to cause thirty men to come round to the vievrs of ten. When we first started, this question would have been so settled as to create a senate that would have been worthy of the federation. The hon. member. Sir Henry Parkes, who held certain views before the sub-committee was appointed, seems to have talked the select committee round to what the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, calls a wretched compromise. It is an absolute \_''^'ir GeoTfje Grey. compromise, as wretched as wretched can be, for it is laying the axe to the root of an independent senate upon which, as in the case of America, the people, the demo- cracy, would look with confidence, and upon which they would rely for the good of the country. So far there has been no speech which answered that made since luncli by the hon. member, Sir John Downer, who, 1 think, put the matter very clearly. As he says, there is the experience of America for more than lOOyears, with apowerful senate, and democratic America to-day believes in the senate as therein constituted. What we are asked to do by this clause, as it is printed in the bill, is not to follow the lines of the British Constitution ; but the framers of the bill, and those v,-ho sat in the sub-committee upoii it, have followed the lines of the American Constitution. When it is proposed to give the senate the power of the Amevican Senate, hon. mem- bers go back to the worn-out theory of the British Constitution as regards the House of Lords, or any nominee chamber. I for a long time have believed in the existence of a nominee upper house. To-day I do not. Today I believe in an elective upper house, and looking at our colony — for that one's ovvii colony is the place where Ave get the most experience — and seeing the appointments made from time to time by ministers in power of men utterly unfit to be senators or legislators, I think the time has arrived when that power should be taken out of the hands of ministers, and in some form left in the hands of the people. From what is ])roposed here one would imagine that the people would have no voice in . the election of the senate. The people will elect their representatives, and the house of representatives will elect the members of the senate. Surely that is elec- tion through the people by the mouths of their representatives, who are responsible to their constituents for their election to the senate. I do not know a more re- Gommonxoealtli of [0 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 753 fined process l>y which you could make a jibbed on the business? Who has turned more perfect, and independent, and pro- traitor on the principles which they bably intelligent senate than that. It is advocated here in eloquent speeches, for that reason that I hold that the senate and which misled young men like myself to be of any power at all must be framed to permit my mind to believe that a on the direct lines of the American Senate, strong senate was good for the country? and have coequal powers with the house But now we have this maudlin proposition of representatives. All the arguments put forward for the senate to make sug- which can be used in regard to respon- gestions to the house of representatives, sible government and the house of repre- We know perfectly well in nine cases out sentatives have been fairly stated by the of ten in what manner the suggestions hon. member. Sir John Downer, and I would be received. Our great desire for have heard nothing yet in reply to them. the future good of this country should be The house of representatives will decide to create a powerful senate, llemember we the fate of a ministry, and, after all, there have no property qualification for the will be responsible government by theaction senate. The qualification in the bill for of the house of representatives. Now we a senator is that he shall have reached a know perfectly well that the feeling has certain advanced age, and shall have resided arisen in England, and that even some of a certain time in the country. Beyond the most distinguished statesmen in Eng- that, money or capital is in no way repre- laud are endeavouring to reform the consti- sented in the senate, and the humblest man tution of the House of Lords, and I hope who may be fit for the position may be they may succeed. We know perfectly well elected through one of the various state that there has been no attempt on the part legislatures to the highest position in the of the democracy of America to lessen the land — to the senate. As you have made influence or power of the .senate ; but that the qualification so slight for the position of as time rolls by, with] the experience of senator, there are men in the democratic 100 years, the senate still holds the afiec- classes who will aspire, and who will un- tions of the people. Why, we should at- doubtcdly reach, by reason of their talents tempt — and I borrow the words from my and character, the highest position whith hon. friend, Mr. McMillan, again — to de- the country can confer on any citizen — a grade the senate of federal Australia is a senatorship. Why should wc ask the senate matter beyond my conception. Tliat is tho to be a mere recording house ; why should second point where I cannot realise my we give the senate absolutely less power position. I was led away by tho speech than a nominee house — less power than of the hon. member. Sir Samuel Grilfith, the nominee house of New South V.'aKs and those who s|)okc with him on the main possesses to-day, and less than other nomi- debato. IMymind was then made perfectly nee houses possess? We know that from clear that when the time arrived for me time to time — and we shall hear of it when to record my vote it would be in favour our Parliament meets — some very curious of creating a powerful senate. But what appointments are made, even in our own is the my.sterious influence that has been colony within the last few weeks — appoint- at work with lion, members that thirty ments which clearly convince those Avho should bow the knee to ten ? I shoidd liave given the sliglitest thought to the like lO hear the history of that .secret question that a nominee liouse is not good conclave, that select committee, where for the interests of either the states or tho thirty men gave way to ten. Who has federal parliament. 3 u r54 Commomvealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Mr. Playfoud : That is nothing to do ■with us ! Mr. MuNRO ; They will take a part in the election ! Mr. DIBBS : They will ; but you have your senate elected by the states, and give them coequal power, as I would, then you would find that in the states, where the nominee chamber exists, and where it has been used so disgracefully as it has been in times past, if not lately, the people would insist upon changing the state con- stitution and introducing the elective prin- ciple. For my part, I am beginning seri- ously to change my mind upon the old nominee system, and lam coming gradually round, and with very good reason, to be- lieve that an elective upper chamber is necessary for the states, even if we adopt the proposal in this bill, even if the hon. member, Mr. Baker's amendment be carried, of having the members of the senate elected by the various states through the state parliament. Now, what we are trying to provide for is how to get over the possibility of a deadlock, constituted as the senate will be. An idea has got into the minds of hon. members that the smaller states will rule the larger, or that the larger will rule the smaller. A way to get over the difficulty is to adopt to a large extent the Norwegian system, which, in its working, prevents the possibility of a deadlock in the carrying out of the func- tions of the two houses. Under the Nor- wegian system, as hon. members know, in the event of a deadlock occurring and a bill being sent back from the house of re- presentatives to the senate, and refusing to acknowledge the senate's amendments, both houses meet as one house and the question is there thrashed out and settled on one vote. If that system be adopted without any referendum to the people, or without anything of the kind, the whole question of a deadlock falls to the ground. That is the form of parliament which it [Mr. Dibhs. appears to me hon. members are trying tc bring about. Mr. Playford : That settles the senate straight ! ]\lr. DIBBS : Never mind if it did. It would bring a fiinality to the question, for, after all, we must assume that the members of the senate will be as intelli gent as the members of the house of repre- sentatives. If we were proposing to put the inmates of the various lunatic asylums in the senate, then you might wish to create the senate in the way you are seek- ing to do under the bill. But if we wish to fill the senate with the nominees of some corrupt government, then fence their powers round in every possible form in order to safeguard the liberties of the people. But where the senate is elected from the house of representatives, which may be just fresh from the hustings, and where the house of representatives is re- sponsibleto the constituencies, I say that by the adoption of that refined process you will have a chance of getting a more intelligent, and better educated, and a senate of such a character aiS may with safety be trusted with coequal powers with the lower house, provided that there is, however, some mode such as is contained in the Norwegian Con- stitution of settling a deadlock which may occasionally occur by one united vote. For my part, I shall give my vote in favour of the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. Baker. I shall then give my vote in favour of the principle to which a majority agreed three weeks ago. I shall give my vote in the direction in which my mind was influenced b}' the speeches which I heard three weeks ago, for nothing has been said since the committee reported to the Convention to change my mind or the minds of hon. members. If the hon. member, Mr. Baker, fails in carrying his amendment, then the next best course open is the pro- posal of my hon, friend, Mr. McMillan, which we shall have to take as a sort of Commonwealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. I 00 via media between the extreme view of the boa. member, Mr. Baker, and the con- stitution as proposed in the bill. But at the present time I shall give my vote to make the senate worthy of what Australia shall become, not a degraded institution, not a senate whose members may be the most inferior, instead of the best men the country can produce, but a body of men whose weight, whose experience, and whose intelligence will be felt throughout the country ; a senate which, as in the case of America, will command the full confidence and respect of the people. Question — That the word proposed to be omitted stand part of the clause — put. The Committee divided : Ayes, 22; noes, 16 ; majority, 6. Ayes. Bird, Mr. Kingston, Mr. Bray, Sir John ^lacdonald-Paterson Mr Clark, Mr. Mcllwraith, Sir Thomas Cuthbert, Mr. McMillan, Mr. Deakin, Mr. Munro, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Parkcs, Sir Henry Fysh, Mr. Playford, Mr. Gillies, Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Griffith, Sir Samuel Smith, Colonel Hackett, Mr. Suttor, Mr. Jennings, Sir Patrick Wrixon, Mr. Noes. Baker, Mr. Forrest, Mr. J. Burgess, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Coekbuni, Dr. Grey, Sir George Dibbs, Mr. Loton, Mr. Donaldson, Mr. Marmion, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Adye Moore, Mr. Downer, .Sir Joliu Kussell, Captain Forrest, Mr. A. Thynne, Mr. Question so resolved in the afhrmativc. Amendment negatived. Mr. :\rcMILLAN: I shall say very little in placing my amendment before the Committee. I propose to retain sub-clause 1 down to the word "government." It will be necessary to jjropose tiie amend- ment ill a certain way, because I do not want the excision of sub-clause 4. I .shall propose an amendment to follow on after the word "government," and then, if my amendment be carried, I shall propose the excision of sub-clauses 2 and 3, allowing sub-clause 4 to stand, and moving after- wards the excision of sub-clause 5. The clause, as amended, would read as fol- lows : — (1.) The senate shall have equal power with the house of representatives in respect of all pro- posed laws, except laws imposing taxation and laws approjiriating the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual services of the government. (2.) In respect of laws appropriating the ne- cessary^ supplies for the ordinary annual services of the government, the senate shall have the power to affirm or reject, but not to amend. (3.) In respect of laws imposing taxation, the senate shall have the power to amend ; but if any proposed law imposing taxation is amended by the senate, and is afterwards returned to the senate by the house of representatives, the senate shall not have the power to send the pro- posed law again to the house of representatives with any amendment in it to which the house of representatives has not agreed, but shall either affirm or reject it. The only matters to which I intend to refer in putting this amendment before the house are : first, the question with regard to the bearing of the senate on state rights ; and, secondly, its bearing with regard to responsiljle government. Now, as far as the question of state rights is concerned, I do not argue that the upperchamber isabso- lutely and essentially intended to conser\'e those rights. If I have any feeling at all in the matter, I think that, personally, I tend more towards the pi-inciple of unifica- tion than of federation, and the action I take now I would take if we were assembled here to declare the unification of Aus- tralia under one political government. I stand up for the rights and liberties of the upper chamber, which, I believe, would be a solid bulwark of the liberties of the people of this country, and when that chamber is elected, if not directly, at any rate indirectly, by the people — that is, elected by those who are directly elected by the people — I hold that any analogy ■5G Commonxoealih of [6 April, 1891.] Australia BUI. sought to be drawn between that chamber and the House of Loi'ds or a nominee chamber is utterly out of phice. Further- more, with regard to responsible govern- ment, I do not hold that the question of responsible government is touched at all in this matter. It has been said here that the most important matters coming imder the view of a legislature are not connected with finance at all ; and we know that most of the questions upon which govern- ments stand or fall have nothing whatever to do with finance. If the upper house has the power not only to veto but to amend bills involving great questions of public policy, affecting the whole social interest of the people — surely if constitutional and responsible government can exist under such a state of aflfairs in regard to these subjects, it is absurd to fear that consti- tutional and responsible government are going by the board because we allow the upper house the power of amendment. I simply reiterate these views in order — as I am taking upon myself a heavy responsi- bility — that I may be free from misappre- hension. I do not consider the question of an appropriation bill is at all analogous to a bill creating a new policy. The ap- propriation bill simply covers the expendi- ture based upon a policy previously agreed to, and upon which the upper house, ac- cording to my amendment, would have a perfect right to record its decision by way of amendment. I believe that this is a fair and reasonable compromise. I believe it is an improvement on the mode suggested for exactly the same purpose, and to bring about the same results, by hon. gentlemen of the Constitutional Comirdttee, and it is with the full confidence that it will be accepted as a compromise that I now sub- mit it to the Convention. I move : That the words "which the senate may affirm or reject, but may not amend. But the senate may not amend any proposed law in such a man- ner as to increase any proposed charge or burden on the people," be omitted. [Mr. McMillan. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : My hon. friend, Mr. McMillan, is quite right when he says that he assumes a very serious re- sponsibility in proposing this amendment, because this subject after several days' de- bate in the Convention, received the anxious attention of the committee for several days and from every point of view ; and they did not adopt this form of words without carefully choosing every word, and con- sidering how the proposed scheme would work out in practice. I shall be able to show in a very few minutes that what- ever merits there may be in this amend- ment of the hon. member's, he has not only not given it half the consideration which the committee gave their proposal ; but, also that, while I believe he brings it forward with a view to strengthening: the power of the senate, he is distinctly weakening the power of that body, and taking away the most beneficial powers proposed to be given to it under the sug- gested compromise. I will deal, first of all, with the case of appropriation bills. The hon. member does not propose to leave out the 4th paragraph of the clause, which provides : The expenditure for services other than the ordinary annual services of the government shall not be authorised by the same law as that whicli appropriates tlie supplies for such ordinary annual services, but shall be authorised by a separate law or laws. Supposing the senate were of opinion that there was a violation of that provision, that there was something in an ordinary appropriation bill violating that rule, and which, no doubt, the house of representa- tives would take out if its attention were called to it by the senate. The amend- ment of the hon. member would prevent the senate from doing so. In fact, while the 2nd, 3rd, and 4tli paragrajjhs of this clause carefully guard against tacking, the hon. member would actually facilitate tacking, while at the same time he shuts the mouth of the senate, compelling them either to Gommonicealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 757 swallow the Avhole bill or to throw the once an amendment goes back to the house public service into confusion by rejecting of representatives, there is no chance offered it 1 Does the hon. member mean to do for a conference. that 1 Surely he has not thought out the Mr. McMillan : Nothing of the kind ! subject or he would have drawn up the Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : That may amendment in a better form. These ob- not be what the hon. member means, be- jections with I'egard to appropi'iation bills cause the proposal is so preposterous that occur to me at the moment. On the other I do not believe that the hon. member hand the hon. member proposes to give would deliberately make it. I am, how- the senate the power of increasing taxa- ever, criticising the amendment as it is tion, which was not proposed before. Then placed before hon. members. As soon as there is this extraordinary proposal : In- an amendment is made — and it must take stead of the senate making a i-equest that that form — it is sent back to the house an item in a bill which they regard as ob- of representatives, and if it is not accept- jectionable should be omitted, which re- able to the house of representatives, all quest would be considered by the house of compromise is at an end, except by representatives, no doubt in conference dropping the bill. Surely that is not an with the senate, so that they might come improvement on the proposal contained in to an amicable conclusion, the hon. member the bill. I entreat hon. members in. con- absolutely prohibits a conference. Pie says sidering this subject to bear in mind what that if once an alteration is made in a "was pointed out by the President at the taxation bill it must be made in the form beginning of the Convention. We shall of an amendment, when it is to go direct never arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, to the house of representatives, and unless unless we meet in a spirit of compromise, they instantly adopt it the thing is at an Some hon. members seem to liavc disre- end. garded that .sj)irit altogether. I do not Mr. McMillan : My amendment does think the clause in the bill is by any means not provide necessarily that there shall in the best possible form, but I believe it is not be a conference ! in the best attainable form, which is a dif- Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Yes ; be- ferent thing. It may be that being in the cause if the house of representatives say best attainable form, it is really in its best they will not agree to the amendment there form, because we are liere to do tlic best is an end of it. All the facilities that are we can for Australia, and if this is tlie offered by this compromi.se, which was best thing that can be doin; witli a chance carefully thought out, for allowing the two of securing the assent of the people of hou.ses to come to an understanding, are Australia, we ought to adojjt it, although swept away. They are at once to be our own individual opinions wouhl have placed at arm's length. The senate is led us to cast the clause in a different really to liave no alternative but to reject form. I hope sincerely that hon. members the whole measure, or accept items which will regard tlic c|uestion froTu that ])oint they consider objectionable, and which the of view, and lliaf (Iir Imn. nicmbcr, I\Ir. other house might be willing to omit. Mc^Iillan, will luil press his amendment. Mr. McMillan: The clause, as it f-tands, iMr. FJTZflERALD : I think that it does not provide for a conference any more was incumbent upon the hon. member, tlian my amendment does I ]\Ir. ]McMillan, to explain in what way Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Tlieamend- this amendment of liis could be more in ment prohibits a conference, because, if accordance with the dignity of the senate. 758 Commomoealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. and, therefore, more in accordance witli the immediate object he had in view, than the clause he wishes to expunge. Judging from a long experience in the upper branch of a parliament in not one of the smallest of the colonies, it appears to me that if the upper house had the power to amend in the first place, and return the bill with an amendment to the house of repre- sentatives, the house of representatives fully knowing that if they refused to ac- cept the amendment, and sent the measure back to the senate, they could force the senate to reject or to accept the measure, the house of representatives would regard it as tantamount to an invitation not to consider any amendments made by the senate, so placing the senate in the posi- tion in which tliey would have been if they had had no power to alter the measure in the first instance. I do not see how it en- hances the dignity of any branch of the parliament to give it power to amend a bill, while at the same time you place it in the power of the other branch of the legis- lature to send back a measure to the senate a second time, and force that branch to say " aye " or " no " without the power of amendment. I say that, in the spirit of compromise, which is the raison d'etre of this Convention, it is far more dignified and more in accordance with the value which the upper chamber should have in the legislature of the proposed common- wealth, that the senate should not make an amendment in a measure, but should signify their desire to meet in a friendly spirit with the house of representatives. If they could give a manifestation of their desire as to the direction in which an amendment should be made, .surely that would place them in a more dignified posi- tion than to do as the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, proposes. I think the hon. member has entirely mistaken the effect his amendment would have. It would tend to lower the dignity of the senate, it [J/r. Fitzgerald. would be practically suggestive of alterca- tions between the two houses, and it is at variance with the spirit which has led so many of us to yield our sincerely held opinions as to the importance of giving the senate power over all legislation. I do not think that this Convention, after affirming that principle in a spirit of com- l^romise, will be led away from that spirit and adopt a course which, instead of in- creasing, would lower the dignity of the senate, which would be suggestive of alter- cation and dispute, and would invariably, in case of a dispute, lead to the senate taking a lower place in the respect, not only of the world, but of the people of these colonies. Mr. PLAYFORD : It is astonishing to me that a gentleman should get up and say that he is figliting for the rights and privileges of the senate, and at the same time propose to take away the rights and privileges which we in committee agreed that they should exercise. The principle of tacking, of including in one bill two separate subjects, will be allowed if the amendment is adopted. The hon. member proposes to strike out paragraphs 2 and 3, which distinctly prevent the tacking on to a taxation bill of any other subject than the one subject of taxation. It pre- vents two subjects of taxation from being mixed up together, so as to give the senate power to throw out any bill without interfering with any other subject what- ever. The hon. member, Mr, McMillan, appears to have altogether misunderstood the position. I have no doubt he be- lieved that in proposing his amendment he was conserving the rights of the senate, but he is not conserving the rights of the senate in any sense ; and so far as the matter of form is concerned, the difference between sending down amendments from the senate, and sending suggestions is the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. The practical result will be Commonwealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 759 the same whether amendments or su"2:es- CO tions are sent from the senate to the house of representatives. The hon. member pro- poses that the amendments shall not be dealt ■with Vjy the senate in the ordinary way ; but if the house of representatives disagree with the amendments made by the senat«^ in the bill, then there shall be no option for the senate but to accept or reject the bill in in toto. If we make a difference in substance, why not have a different form to mark that difference in substance 'I It would be a great deal better to say to the senate : "Send down your suggestions, and we will agree with them or disagree with them," than to say, " Send them down in the form of amendments," because in deal- ing with them in the form of amendments you alter the substance of the amend- ment altogether, and insist that they shall deal with the question in a totally differ- ent manner. I would ask the Committee to agree to the clause as it stands. It was most carefully considered by the mem- bers of the Constitution Committee. Time after time the question came up, and it was considered from the standpoint of cor- serving the rights and privileges and giv- ing as much power as we consistently could to the senate. I contend that the amendment will have precisely the oppo- site effect. Mr. THYNNE : As a member of the Constitution Committee, I did not approve of tins clause as ])ropo8ed, because I believe that the senate should have coequal powers in all these matters with the house of repre- sentatives ; but that principle has not been adojjted Vjy the Convention. I will, therefore, support the clause which has been brought up by the Constitution Com- mittee as Vjeing, as I think, the next best provision that can be made. Amendment negatived. Mr. WIITXON : I wish to ask the at- tention of the Committee for a moment whilst I propose a new sub-clause to stand as sub-clause G. I will not detain the Con- vention long, but hon. members Avill see the position in which the question now is. We have arranged to give the senate the right to send down proposed amendments to the house of representatives. Those amendments the house of representatives may or may not accept as they think proper. This proposed power extends to the appro- priation bill as well as to every other bill, and I am afraid that in working it will be found to beproductive of confusion and con- flict. I am convinced that a similar power, if exercised with regard to the appropria- tion bill in any of our provinces, would lead to such confusion that the govern- ment could not be carried on unless you had some means of secui-ing finality, and I am afraid that in passing this now and postponing any means of settling a difference if it arises — a difference on such a critical measure as an appropriation bill — we are only postponing the difficulty from this Convention to the future do- minion parliament. We are not agreed as to how it will work ; as to whether the house of representatives will be com- pelled under moral pressure to accept the suggestions of the senate, or whether the house of representatives would be just as free as any lower house now is to disre- gard any proposal made by tlie upper house to interfere with its appropriation act. Some think the clause will give the senate some new powers ; others think it will not. Whatever we think, avo jrave th that kind — the fisheries at Western Au tralia, North- western Australia, and Torr( Straits — tliat there is likely to be an trouble. The people specially concerne are entitled to be heard. When their view have been placed before her Majesty's G( vernment in England the imperial author ties will want to know the views of th Australian government ; and it does no follow that the first communication o: either side will say all that is to be said o the subject ; and if you insist upon the tin; being limited to one year, you may be in sisting upon a very important thing bein; done hurriedly. In the particular case t which I refer the question was finally de cided by telegram. Mr. Gillies : If you do not give then time, the chances are that they will dis allow ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Yes. In the case referred to the time allowed was twelve months, and the communications were carried on hurriedly. The twelve mouths were on the point of expiring, and the measure had to be disallowed or as- sented to. In that case the time was found to be too short in which to do tlie woi'k satisfactorily. That was a comparatively small matter, but the matters in respect to which any question would be likely to Commomvealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 765 arise under this constitution would be of much greater importance. I would suggest that the words should be allowed to stand. Mr. MARMIOX : The hon. member, Dr. Cockburn, said that in questions of domestic legislation it was not advisable that the Queen should have the power of disallowance, and the hon. gentleman in- stanced a case which he considered to be one of domestic legislation. But it struck me that a difficulty might arise as to what were questions of domestic legislation ; and I do not think the hon. gentleman was particularly happy in quoting the case of the salary of the governor-general being cut down by the local legislature. So long as we give to the Queen the power of ap- pointing the governor-general, we ought to allow her some exercise of discretion as to the salary her appointee shall receive. Under this bill the connection between the British Crown and Australia generally is so very slight, that we ought not to do anything calculated to weaken it. The time will possibly arrive quite soon enough for the connecting link to be cut altogether, and we should at any rate do nothing in this Convention to hasten that time. Amendment negatived. Amendment (by Dr. Cockburn) nega- tived : That the following words be added to tlie lause : — " Provided tliat .such disallowance shall be exercised on such auljjects only as aflect ini- ocrial interests and are specified in schedule B." CHAI'TEU II.— TIIK KXIX'ITIVE GOVICUS.MKXT. Clause 4. For the administration of the executive government of the commonwealtii, the governor-general may, from time to time, appoint officers to administer such dcpart- 5 nients of state of the commonwealth as tlie governor-general in council may from time to time est;il>lish, and such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the governor- general, and sliall be capable of being chosen and of sitting as members of either house of the parliament. !>uch officers shall be members of the federal executive council. Sir JOHN BRAY : It seems to me that if we want to preserve the power of the senate this is where we should do it. I therefore propose : That after the word "governor-general," line 9, the following words be inserted : — "and not less than two of such officers shall be mem- bers of the senate." I think we ought to provide that some of the executive officers of the government should sit in the senate, and not leave the matter entirely open, as it is at present. I think we should i^rovide that they should be all members of parliament, and not merely that they should be capable of being members of parliament. As a matter of practice, we know that they will all be members of parliament. I do not think there is any doubt about that. But if the senate is to exercise a proper influence in the management of the executive afiairs of the country, we ought to provide that at least some of the executive officers of the government shall hold seats in that branch of the legi-slature. I shall proj)ose also that the words, " capable of being chosen and of sitting as members of either house of the parliament," be struck out, so as to provide that the remainder shall be mem- bers of the house of representatives. Mr. GILLIES : I would suggest that the hon. member ought not to press his amendment. We have not said in tliis bill that anv member of tlie government shall sit in parliament ; but we know it will be necessary that they should do so. We have .said it is not necessary, though recognising that the practice has been for members of the executive government to sit in j)arli;uii(Mit. I will (ell the lion, member a circumstance that arose in Vic- toria. Tliere was an occasion on wliich a government was formed for the tiiiu'-being, and that government could not olitain a representative in the Jiegislativc Council. If a provision such as lie suggests liad been in force, the government would have been r66 Commonwealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. obliged to retire from office. Although I ■was a political opponent of that ministry, I have no hesitation in saying tliat at that time it unquestionably possessed the con- fidence of a majority of the people, and had a large majority in the Assembly. I ask the hon. member whethei', because it could not just for the time-being obtain a representative in the upper house, a go- vernment should be compelled to retire from office 1 The government to which I refer did afterwards succeed in getting a gentleman to represent them in the Coun- cil. While we do not insist that members of the government shall sit in the assem- bly, I think it would be a mistake to pro- vide that they shall hold seats in the senate. Mr. MARMIOX : I should like to ask the last speaker whether there is anything in the Constitution of Victoria which re- quires that there shall be a member of the Legislative Council in the ministry 1 IMr. Gillies : No ; but four of the min- isters must be members of parliament ! Mr. MARMION : The case is not quite analogous, because if we inserted the pro- vision proposed the government would take care to have some one in the senate to represent them. Mr. FITZGERALD : I think the amend- ment is hardly required. Any minister WLshing to conduct the business of parlia- ment satisfactorily would find the senate quite capable of guarding its own honor, and he would not be so ill-advised as to put a marked slight upon the council by having no member of the government with a seat in that chamber. I think we may safely leave these things to adjust themselves. The good sense of the parliament is the best protection we have that they will work without friction. Amendment negatived, Mr. WRIXON : There is one point with regard to this clause to which I wish to call the attention of the hon. member [l/r. Gillies. in charge of the bill, and with regard \ which I propose to add a few words at tl. end of the clause. This clause may I said to constitute responsible governmer in the dominion. It provides that tl governor-general may appoint officers t administer departments of state, and i declares that such officers shall be men bers of the federal executive council, have no doubt that the effect and opera' tion of that will be to constitute a systen of responsible government in the dominion , but the question which I think requireii some consideration, and some slight addi tion to the clause, is whether it will cloth* them with all the vast constitutional powers which, under the system of the English government, belong to responsible ministers of the Crown. I myself do not believe that it will. The greatness of these powers, and how vast is the authority which any responsible minister of the Crown exercises in binding the Crown and the Sovereign, is well known, of course, to all my legal friends, and was well illus- trated in the old case which I mentioned to the Convention before, namely, the case of Buron and Denman. The Supreme Court of Victoria has held that similar words in our Constitution Act do not carry with them any such implied authority to the minister who holds any such office, on the ground that the statute that created the office and defined his duties is not held to carry with it the larger powers to which I have adverted. Sir Samuel Geiffith : There are no words like those in your Constitution ! Sir John Downer : Nor in any consti- tution ! Mr. WRIXON : The words, " such offi- cers shall be members of the executive council " % Mr. Clakk : All that the hon. member wants is in that ! Mr. WRIXON : Of course that is the matter which I am mooting. In my opinion Commonwealth of [6 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 767 it is not ; but it is a matter for considera- tion ; and, whatever opinion may be taken of it, I myself think that the matter should be put beyond doubt ; for, unquestionably, in carrying out responsible, every-day go- vernment, it is highly important that the ministers of the Crown here should, in re- gard to all Australian matters, be invested with exactly the same presumptions of authority and ratification from tlie Crown as apply to the English ministers with regard to all English matters. Sir John Downer : That does not arise out of responsibility ! Mr. WRIX0:N' : I think it does, or, at any rate, it is a question of how we should express the idea. I myself would propose that we add to the last sub-clause " and responsible ministers of the Crown " ; and I believe that then the court would inter- pret that with reference to ordinary consti- tutional usage, of which they would take judicial notice, and it is well known, of course, in England what a responsible minister is. It is kno'svn as a matter of fact and constitutional law. The courts recognise that, and if we declared that these officers were responsible ministers of the Crown I believe the court would import to that definition the knowledge which they would get from reading in the light of ordinary constitutional law. I point out this difficulty, and to meet it •would propose, as an amendment : That the following words be added to the clause : — " and responsible ministers of tlie Crown." Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : It seems to me that what the lion, gentleman wants to arrive at is already very clearly laid down in the bill. "Responsible ministers 3f the Crown " i.s a term which is used in ;ommon conversation to describe the form )f government that we have. It is really epithet, but a bill is not the place for epithet. What we should put into he bill is a definition of the powers and functions of the officers — not call them by names. We might as well say that they shall be called "Honorable." The executive government is vested in the Queen. The Queen cannot act in person. She, therefore, by her governor-general, appoints officers to administer departments of state. Is not that exactly expressing the real theory of government — the head of the state, through her officers, adminis- tering departments of state 1 The com- mon name by whicb they are called is " ministers of the Crown," and because they hold office during pleasure, which pleasure is exercised nominally by the head of the state, but in reality by parliament, they are called responsible, because, if their conduct is such as not to give satisfaction, they have to answer for it by going out of office. The whole theory of responsibility is contained in clauses 1 and 4r. To say that they shall be called ministers of the Crown would not make them so more than they are already. The powers of officers are not vested in them because they are called responsible ministers, but because they are ministers, and the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria, as I understood it, was that the Constitution of Victoria did not confer upon the colonial ministers of state the same powers as are held under the English Con- stitution by the English ministers. Mr. Gillies : Nor do any of the other Australian constitutions ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : No. ]Mr. Deakin : Does this, in the hon. member's opinion, convoy it ? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I do not know any other form of words that would convey it more clearly. The Queen is the head; .she appoints different ministers of state, and they are responsible, and we define the extent of the executive power wliich they arc to administer. Wjiatmore could there be ? I think it is absolutely complete. Sir JOHN BRAY : I think that there is a good deal in the suggestion thrown ■GS Commomcealth of [G April, 1891.] Australia Bill. out by tlie hon. and learned member, Mr. "Wrixon. The officers are meant to be called " ministers of the Crown," and no doubt the hon. and learned member, Sir Samuel Griffith, intended to provide for it ; but I do not think that tlie clause does provide for it. " For the administra- tion of the executive government of the commonwealth" — that is what they are appointed for. Mr. Wrixox: They are heads of depart- ments ! Sir JOHX BRAY: Xottoadministerthe government as provided by this constitu- tion ; but they are appointed to administer certain departments of state, and the ques- tion might arise whether they were really responsible ministers or simply officers ad- ministering such departments of the state as the governor in-council may from time to time establish. It is true that the clause goes on to say that they shall be members of the executive council, and I think it is as right to assume that as to assume that they are responsible ministers of the Crown. I am quite willing in any way to assist the hon. member to carry out the idea that prompted the drafting of the bill, so as to make it read properly ; but I do say that we ought to provide that they shall be something more than officers administer- ing departments of state. They will be officers administering the entire govern- ment of Australia. Sir Samuel Griffith : Clause 4 begins with those very words ! Sir JOHX BRAY : For the admmistration of the execiative go- vernment of the commonwealth the governor- general may from time to time appoint officers, not to administer the executive government, but to administer certain de- partments of state. Each minister when appointed is responsible for the adminis- tration of a certain department ; but there is nothing in the clause to indicate that ministers are to administer the entire [Sir John Bray. government of the commonwealth. I think that in order to make the meaning clear, we ought to insert the words proposed by the hon. member, Mr. "Wrixon. Mr. CLARK : I think that both the hon. members. Sir John Bray and Mr. "Wrixon, have been officers of state in their respective colonies, and have been in the position of responsible officers of the Crown. I would ask them to consider, when they held office, what made them responsible ministers % Was it the fact that in one case the hon. member was ad- ministering the treasury department, and in the other case the Attorney-General's Department ; or was it not the fact that in addition to being officers of state they were also members of the executive council? That is what made them responsible ministers. If the officers under the commonwealth are both officers appointed to administer de- partments of state and also members of the executive council they will be in the exact position that both hon. members have been in in their respective colonies when they have been called responsible ministers, and nothing else which can be put in the bill can make them more so. Mr. DEAKIX : I wish to point out to the hon. member, Mr. Clark, that he has not, in my opinion, exhausted the situa- tion by the definition he has given. He has brought to his aid all that part of the clause which would render these min- isters the heads of departments, and the other part which makes them also members of the executive council. But there are two points to be considered in that connec- tion. First of all, in Victoria a man re- mains an executive councillor after he has ceased to be a minister, after he has ceased to be the head of a department of .state. Mr. Clark : And in Tasmania, too I Mr. DEAKIX : There is no distinction here between those who are executive coun- cillors and not ministers, and those who are executive councillors and ministers. And Commonioealth of [6 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 7G0 then, in the second place, it might be con- tended tliat the authority here given to the federal executive councillors is an authority which is vested iu them as a whole, sitting iu council. It is a body which advises the governor, and on whose advice the governor acts ; but it does not clothe the ministers individually with that power and authority which ministers in Great Britain possess as responsible ministers of the Crown. Sir Samuel Griffith : They act as the Queen's ministers, and in the Queen's name I 3Ir. DEAKIN : But there are numer- ous acts in the administration of depart- ments every day, and occasionally impor- tant acts, whi'jh are undertaken on the authority of a single minister, which do not necessarily come befox'e the executi^•e council as a whole. Mr. Clark : What words in the Vic- torian Constitution give that power ? Mr. ]jEAKIX: We have not the words in our Constitution. Mr. Clark : Nor in any other consti- tution ! ^Ir. L»EAKIN : Xor in any other con- stitution. As my lion, colleague, Mr. Wrixon, interjects, it was held that we wore acting illegally because we exercised, and claimed to exercise, such a power. Mr. Clark : We are all alike ! Mr. DEAKIN: Certainly; but it is not our desire that ministers under the com- monwealth shall be in the same position as ministcis under colonial constitutions. If ;here is a doubt as to theuuthorityof astate Minister, there should be no doubt as to the authority of a mini-ster under this consti- ution. Surely it is a reasonable thing to ilaim. 'J'he hon. member, Sir Samuel Grif- ith, for instuncf, in his statement, which Iras perfectly ch-ar, proceeded to construe he words of this clause by very considor- Ible implications by a knowledge of the sys- |em of government as we have it, and of its working; and with that knowledge in his 3 c mind, by means of this clause, he certainly made a consistent statement. But it is ex- ceedingly dangerous to trust to these impli- cations which have been challenged in the past, and which may be challenged in the future on so vital a point as this. In fact, I do not know any point in the bill which is more vital than the questionwhetherthose whom the governor calls to his councils to undertake the administration of the state- are really responsible ministers of the Crown in every sense of the terra. In the first instance, the power of the Crown itself is nowhere dedned, and cannot be defined under this constitution. It is vast and vague ; but all the power which the Crowrt- exercises ministers must be able to exercise when the need arises, and it can scarcely be possible even in this constitution, ex- cellent as it is in most respects, to embody all possible contingencies. It is quite open for ministers of the commonwealth in the discharge of their duties to undertake actions which it would be impossible to define within the four corners of the bill — to undertake actions which it may be were not departmental actions, which wei'e out- side any department which had been con- stituted up to that time ; and which, there- fore, they had received no authority from the governor-general to deal with, and tlien we should have ministers referred to this limited and rigid constitution for the title-deeds of their authority ; whereas it would be indisjDutable in the same cases in Great Britain that the Crown had power to meet such contingencies, and that having such power, the re.sponsiblo ministers of the Crown were able to exer- cise the authority of the Crown in this very respect. Let the linn, member choose what words he will — and I am sure my colleague is no stickler for a particular phrase — but surely he will admit that just as the powers of the Crown are vast, vague, and undefined, .so are tlie powers which responsible ministers are at times required I i Commonwealth of [G April, 1891.] Audndia Bill. to exorcise. Let liim use any form of being one person, cannot do everything words lie pleases which will convey to the himself. He, therefore, has ministers, ser- ministers of the counnonwealth the same vants nominally of himself, hut really of power of acting with that vast and vague the people, to do that work for him. They authority, under any and every circum- are called ministers, hut it is the power stance, which is possessed by ministers of of the head of the state which is being the Crown in Great Britain. Let the lion. exercised all the time. What more words member do that, and he will meet the can you use for the purpose of saying that ^ wishes of my colleague. I am perfectly He shall appoint proper officers to do it. certain that if we accept anything less than Mr. Deakin : Hear, hear ! this for the ministers of the common- Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : That is wealth we shall be failing in our duty, what we have said. The power is vested and we shall in a sense even limit the in the Queen. For the administration of power of the Crown itself, since we shall that power, officers shall be appointed, provide no machinery by which it can work What more can you say 1 Can you go on out its will in any particular emergency. and say that when they are appointed they Why should we limit the power of the shall have poAver to do their duty, or say Crown ; why should we limit the power that they shall exercise such functions as of the people ; why should we diminish are usually exercised by officers of state 1 the authority of ministers of the Crown, It is all reasoning in a circle. The officers who act for the Crown, and in the name of state will exercise the functions of offi- of the people 1 Why should we not put cers of state, and the officers of state are in the clause any phrase the lion, member the same in England as anywhere else, prefers, so long as it conveys without a The more you reason about the matter, the scintilla of doubt to the ministers of the more you will find yourself getting into a commonwealth all the powers which are circle, and coming back to your starting- possessed by ministers of the Crown in point. What additional power is there? Great Britain 1 If the hon. member will point out any Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I am try- power which can be exercised by the so- ing to get at the ideas which are under- vereign authority which is not expressed lying the argument of hon. gentlemen. I by the words, I shall not only be willing, confess I have not got at them yet. The but anxious to supply the defect. But I hon. member, Mr. Deakin, talks about the cannot see the defect he is pointing to. powers exercised by the ministers of the He assumes that English ministers have Crown in Great Britain. They do not peculiar and extra powers. I should like differ in any respect from the powers ex- to know what they are 1 They exercise the ■ercised by ministers of the Crown in any prerogative powers, of course, and the hon. other country. gentleman, I think, has confused the argu- Di'. CocKBURN : They are much su- ment used in Victoria as to whether colonial perior to the powers of ministers here ! ministers have power to exercise the pre- Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Not in the rogatives of the Queen with the question «ast. whether they have power to exercise the Mr. Deakin : The powers of our min- functions conferred upon them by the con- isters are limited, and theirs are unlimited ! stitution. The argument in the Victorian Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : What is court was whether a certain royal preroga- the power to be exercised ? The sovereign tive could be exercised by a colonial govern- power of the state. The head of the state, ment. We cannot propose liy a sweeping [J/?-. Deakin. Commonwealth of [6 April, 1891.1 Auatralia Bill. 71 provision to say that all the royal preroga- be put forward in our constitution, we shall tives shall be exercised by the governor- have taken and be taken to have accepted general-in-council. That seems to me to something less, and we shall be always be the nearest to what the hon. member liable to be challenged with having ex- is driving at. If that is what he means, ceeded the authority of the Constitution then it is a question for fair consideration with which her Majesty has been jjleased whether we ought to put such a provision in the bill. But nothing short of that vs-ill cover all that he has been arcuine: for. Mr. DEAKIN : I would say briefly, in answer to the hon. gentleman, that in to endow us. Why should Ave leave the matter open to doubt 1 Why should we leave the ministers of the commonwealth liable to be challenged in the exercise of their duties to the people they rej)resent 1 the very case to which he has referred, the Why should we not now put forward the Supreme Court of Victoria held that the claim of ministers of the commonwealth to words " responsible minister of the Crown " ^ct for her Majesty and for the people of •appeared in certain statutes passed by the ^^'^ commonwealth as if they were her Victorian Parliament since the passing Majesty's imperial ministers, excepting, of of the Constitution ; but that they did not course, in cases where imperial interests appear in the_ Constitution Act, and a ma- ^^^ concerned, which would necessarily jority of the bench declared that if they attach to the British Government and the had been inserted there they would have Imperial Parliament 1 The hon. member, made a very great difference in the way Sir Samuel Grifiith, seems to have con- in which they would have regarded minis- terial authority in the colony. Sir Samuel GiiiFFixn : But the Privy •Council said that was wrong ! Mr. DEAKIN : As far as I am ac- <|uainted with their judgment, the Privy Council did not enter upon that particular issue at all. They have not even con sidered the point, to say nothing of giving -an opinion upon it. The judgment, there- fore, remains for what it is worth as a judgment of the Supreme Court, If the words my hon. colleague desires to intro- duce had been inserted in the Victorian sidered a phrase that would be acceptable, and if, especially after this debate, we were to fail to adopt some such words, we shall be taken to have admitted and accepted at the outset a limited authority %\Iii»'li, I am sure, the commonwealth would never willingly accept. Mr. FITZGERALD : I sl.nuld like to ask Sir Samuel (iriflilh whether, in hi.-- opinion, the elTt'ct of tiic insertion of tliese words would be to enlarge the Hcopc of either tlie duties or j»rerogative.s of respon- sible ministers'? Sir SAMUEL CKTFriTlI : In my Constitution Act, the ministers of Victoria opinion, they would not; imd I fliinK-, nt "Would liave had greater jjower than they now po.s.sess. The words the hon. gentle- man has just suggested, conveying sover- eign power to ministers, would be amply «ufficient. Tliose words should b<; emlKjdied in this constitution. fSir S.^MUKL GitiFFlTll : That is to say, at all the royal prerogatives should be ercised by the govci-nor-in-council ! Mr. DEAKIN: Exercised by him the .same time, that (hoy nreexlraonlinnry words to put in an net of parliament. N»» otiier word.s 1 know of would rover (Imt for which (ho hon. member in nHkiufr, aufl it i« nitlier a Kiiiguhir thing to a»lc the Imperial PnrlJament In do for Auf- (ralia a thing which it ha» never done for its.-lf. IMr. I)i:aiu.n' ; Of course not. Thoy havo no need ; tliey have a vtwt ivHervc of power. Theirs is an unwritten constitution I 772 Commonwealth of [G April, 1391.] Australia Bill. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : To ask the Crown in one short sentence to surrender, in respect to Australia, all its prerogatives is rather an extraordinary thing to do. At this moment I believe no one knows what they all are. No one could at once en- umerate them all ; and lion, members may rely upon this, that the enumeration would be carefully gone through, and that if there were one prerogative concerning which there was the slisfhtest doubt — that is, with regard to its inclusion — parliament would not pass it, and it would be quite right, too. We might ask for it ; but would it not be a pity to lose the constitution because one point could not be granted ? For instance, one of the royal prerogatives is to declare war. What about that 1 Mr. Fitzgerald : That is what the hon. membei*, Mr. Deakin, would like ! Mr. Deakix : No, I would declare peace ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The mere mention of that one instance is sufficient to show that such sweeping words cannot bo in.serted. Mr. Deakin : We can make an excep- tion in favour of imperial interests. We have no desire to interfere with the imperial prerogative in matters of war and peace ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I take it that the proper place for such a clause would be the enacting part of the bill. Mr. Deakix : No ; when we are deal- ing with the executive government. The governor-general has power for every- thing, and delegates it ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : No ; in this case there would be a surrender by the Queen, which would have to be in the enacting part of the bill, which applies to all the Queen's dominions. Mr. Fitzgerald : Canada did not ask for it 1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: At all events, I would ask lion, members to pause before they determine upon asking the Queen to surrender all her prerogatives [Sir Samuel Griffith. in Australia. For my part, I believe that all the prerogatives of the Crown exist in the governor-general as far as they relate to Australia. I never entertained any doubt upon the subject at all — that is so far as they can be exercised in the com- monwealth. Certainly the putting in of such a phrase as has been suggested ought not to done without very grave considera- tion. Mr. THYNNE : I think the two con- tending parties might be reconciled without any material addition to the clause, but Avith only a slight rearrangement of it. I would ask the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, to follow me while I read the clause as I propose to leave it : The governor-general may, from time to time, appoint such officers as may be necessary for the administration of the executive government of the commonwealth. Such officers shall hoLl office during the pleasure of the governor- general, and shall be capable of being chosen and sitting as members of either house of par- liament. Such officei's shall be members of the federal executive council, and shall administer such departments of state of the commonwealth as tlie governor-general-in-council may from time to time establish. Sir Thomas McIlwraitii : That would not do ! Mr. THYNNE : As the clause stands it encourages the idea that ministers are dissociated from the combination to which 1 we are accustomed, and that they would be appointed to administer certain depart- ments, but not to generally advise the go- vernor. Mr. DEAKIN : I trust the question will not be allowed to pass before the Con- vention has fully considered it. The ob- jection of the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, to the amendment of my hon. col- league is really an objection to the phrase " responsible minister of the Crown." The hon. member says it is an " epithet," but nevertheless it points in two very valuable | directions. It points, in the first instance, 'J to tlie exercise by ministers of all powers ll Commonwealth of [6 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 773 in the Crown, and, in the second instance, these clauses the claim of ministers of the to the responsibility of those ministers to commonwealth to exercise all the prero^ja- parliament for every action they take in tivcs of the Crown which may be neces- their ministerial capacity. In both of these sary in the interests of the commonwealth. respects the phrase, although it may be I would ask the hon. member, Sir Samuel called an epithet, is an extremely valuable Griffith, to himself suggest a phrase, and one. Why not meet the case by striking in default of that to accept my hon. col- out the word " officers," and make the league's amendment I would suggest clause read : words claimini; that as regards the in- The governor-general may from time to time terests of the commonwealth, ministers of appoint responsible ministers of the Crown. ^^^3 q^.^^.,^ j^^^.^ gi^^^^jj j,.^^.^ ^j^^ ^^^^^ Sir Hexry Parkes : The hon. member powers as have ministers of the Crown would not find such a phrase in any Eng- ia Great Britain, distinguishing Great lish lavr ! Britain of course from the empire at large. Mr. DEAKIN : It is used in a number Sir Samuel Griffitu : Ko more than of our acts. the ministers of France, Germany, or the Sir Samuel Griffith : It has been used United States ! by inadvertence in Victoria ! Mr. DEAKIN : In Great Britain there Sir Jonx DowxEE : Is the hon. member ig the peculiarity that, living under an un- sure the words are in the Victorian act 1 written constitution, it is never known Mr. DEAKIX : They are not in the what new departures may be taken. Constitution Act, but they are in several Sir Samuel Griffith : It is absolute other Victorian acts. They are not re- power to administer the sovei'eignty of the quired to be used in Great Britain, where state ! the constitution is unwritten ; but since Mr. DEAKIN : Exactly ; surely all we are trying to reduce a constitution to the limits that we want of that absolute word.s, since we are setting down in black power in the commonwcaltli is, so far as and white what the executive relations of it relates to the commonwealth, tooxchido the government are, I think we should be all prerogatives relating to the empire out- definite. Complete as is the skeleton of side tl»e commonwealth. Tlicro is no pre- constitutional government which the hon. tencc to claiming titc power of proclaiming member, Sir Samuel GriHith, has given us peace or war, or of exercising power out- in these clauses, 1 maintain that it is, after side our own boundaries ; but let us hu\ o all, only a skeleton, and that the life which it stated plainly in the constilutinji tliat isimpliedby its being administered by re- the officers here, called Inads of dcpart- sponsible ministers has yet to be iniparted mcnts, HJiall be absolutely nunist^'i-s of the to it. We do not desire to introduce Crown. Wc know what tlint incanu, Tvords which n.ight seem to claim for Sir Hknuy Paukks : That is oxuctly Australia royal prerogatives ; but wc do what wc do not know ! wish to introduce word.s claiming all the Mr. DEAKIN : And (h.r- i^ tin k'- •'•( prerogativesof the Crown directly relating advantage: wo do not know what the toAu.stralia. What wc say is that these royal prerogative in. Wo have not ox- clauses, as they stand, do not with suffi- ha.isted iln meaning. Hud wo not b- n. r cient distinctness n.akc that claim, an.l take wor.l« which arc used in connnon that we .should seize every opj.ortunity of speech, the moaning of wliich wo have not placing points of this in.portance beyond exhausted, when wc are nil at one m all di-spute, that wc should embody in making the claim for the iKsoplo r,f tho 774 Commonioealih of [0 AnuL, 1891.] Australia Bill. coramouwealth that tlieir parliament and ministers sjiall have all the powers necessary to administer the afiairs of the common- wealth ? No one has argued for this more strongly than thehon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith. If he is convinced that the clause oives that power, while other members of the Committee are convinced that it does not, would it not be better to carry out the princi[)le which we have followed throughout, and let us have no doubt on tlie point 1 Let us make the most exjdicit, indisputable, unmistakable claim to this power. Sir John Bray : The hon. member's susijestion will not do that ! ]Mr. DEAKlISr : By calling these officers responsible ministers of the Crown, they will be empowered to meet all unantici- pated contingencies. Sir Samuel Griffith : The words do not convey tliat meaning to my mind ! j^Ir. DEAKIN : They did to the Su- preme Court of Victoria. We had a num- ber of judges stating that if these words were contained in the Constitution Act of Victoria they would adopt a different atti- tude, and hold that ministers had greater power than they now have, those words not being in our Constitution Act. Why not employ those words in this constitution, and place our meaning beyond doubt ? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : It is diffi- cult to know what is our meaning which it is desired to put beyond doubt. I agree that in this bill our meaning should be placed beyond doubt, but we must first find out what is our meaning. The hon, member uses the word " responsible," which simi)ly means this : that ministers take the brunt of the advice which they give in the exercise of sovereign power of any kind. That does not give them any additional power. The word " responsible " only means in that case that the ministers take the blame. It is not a question of giving authority, it is a question as to who [i/r. Deakin. is to be punished for the improper exer- cise of authority. The word " ministers" means no more than " officers of state." It is only another epithet. Ministers of the Crown means officers of the Crowii where there is a Crown, Mr. Deakin: The words mean some- thing more than that! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The argu- ment is becoming so refined that it is im- possible to distinguish the differences. Sir John Bray : You do not call them officers of state ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Clause 4 says that for the administration of the ex- ecutive government there shall be officers to administer such departments of state as the governor may prescribe, and he is^ to act on their advice. These are expres- sions that have been used so often that they have become stereotyped; but I think the only authority for using in an act the- words "responsible ministers of the Crown"' is an error on the part of a draftsman ia Victoria. It has not been followed by any of the other colonies. In some cus- toms act somebody or other used the words " responsible minister," and the Victorian, judges thought that having been so used, there was something defective in the Con- stitution Act. I do not draw that infer- ence ; I think that the defect was in the- subsequent act. Mr. WE/IXON : I am convinced that the Convention is making a serious mis- take. We are asked to pass this clause in exactly the same terms that would suit a Crown colony. Every word in this clause would apply equally to ministers and offi- cers in a Crown colony which was about to be founded. I would be happy if any better phrase could be obtained than I have suggested. I think these amendments should be drawn up by the gentleman in charge of the bill. The words "responsible ministers of the Crown" were used in Vic- toria, not as the hon, member, Sir Samuet Commonwealth of [6 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. I I o Griffith, tliinks, bj mistake, but are used repeatedly, and T think most justly, be- cause no principle is better understood than tliat the courts take judicial notice of all things — mercantile, political, and so on. And the political meaning, under the Constitution of England, of "'responsible minister of the Crown," is perfectly well known. "What is desired is this ; that a minister in Australia shall have the same position with regard to the Crown in all matters Australian, as a minister in Eng- land has with regard to all matters Eng- lish. We desire to have that object carried out. I am sorry the Convention does not attend to it, because I am sui'e we are making a mistake. Mr. KINGSTON : We are very much indebted to the hon. membei', IMr. Wrixon, for calling attention to thi.s matter. There is no hon. member who has had more prac- tical experience, in view of recent events, of the necessity for making some provision of this kind. His attention has been drawn to the matter by the litigation which has lately taken place on a very nice constitu- tional question. A decision was pronounced by some, at least, of the Victorian judges which forms the position for which the hon. member contends, namely, that it is necessary to make an amendment in tin; bill in order to give ministers of the Crown in Australia certain prerogative rights which are exeicised by ministers in Eng- land for the benefit of the community. When we are Iciii.slating for the creation of a constitution for the commonwealth which we hope to establish here, wofihould at least profit by the experience of pn.st years in order to clotlie the ofiicers of the commonwealth with all the powers which may happen to be nece.ssary for the pre- servation of the rights of the coninnniity. There is no more important power tlinn the one wliich was in issue in Ih'' liti- gation to which T have referred ; that if, the right of the representatives of tlie executive ministers to act without re- course to parliamentary authority in order to pi-event aliens from effecting a landing on our shores. We should render our- selves liable to be accused of ne^liijence if we did not make every effort to see that this question was perfectly clear, so that in future we should have the power which was questioned in connection with the late litigation, and which at present there is some doubt whether the colonial govern- ments possess. We have the decision of .some at least of the Yiotorian judges that the power is not possessed by Victorian ministers ; but that if certain phraseology had been employed, they would possess the power. We do not know to what extent that decision may have been qualified by the judgment of the Privy Council; but it seems from the telegrams that it is doubt- ful as to whether or not that decision has in any respect been qualified. There is some room for objection to the employ- ment of the word "responsible." We know what we wish to do. Wt; desire to con- fer on the executive niinistor-s the riglit to exercise this prerogative as far as (he commonwealth is concerned ; but 1 do not think we de.sire to expressly perpeltmto the system of responsible government. 1 am certainly an advocate fur tlu- continu- ance of that syHtcni ; but in view of tho discussion which took phico at ii jin-vious sta"e, I think we have done well liitlierto in avoiding the use of the term " rcHpon- sible," in avoiding the uhc of ftny oxpres- sion which it might l»e tirgc-d woiiM hnvo the efiVrt of provontiiig uk from altering our practitM' with refut the anjcndment will give a positive BlAtement as to what they aro to bo. I move : Tliat in lino 2 oil the wonU ftfl4?r llic wonl« "extenil to" 1 8CI tion in lieu lias been arrived at, it seems to me that ^j^,, „f t|,c provision* of lliiii connlilutlon, nny Sir Saml'kl Guikfitii) i agreed to : Tliat in line 6, the words "ftll or" 1>f omittoil. Amendment (Mr. Adve Douglas) nega- tived : That in line '.), tlie woi'l- "r..-l. .'.u.l Lie graphs" be omitted. Amendment (by Mr. A dye Douglas) negatived : That in lines 11 and 12, the words " Oceaa beacons and buoys, and ocean lighthouses and lightships," be omitted. Clause, as amended, agreed to. Clause 11. All poM-ers .nnd functions which are at the date of the establishment of the commonwealth vested in the governor of a colony with or without the advice of his executive council, or in any officer or person 5 in a colony, shall, so far as the same con- tinue in existence and need to be exercised in relation to the government of the common- wealth, with res^icct to any matters which under this constitution pass to the executive 10 government of the commonwealth, vest in the governor-general, with the advice of the fed- eral executive council, or in the officer exer- cising similar powers or functions in or under the executive government of the common- 15 wealth. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I under- stood that the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, intended calling attention to this matter. Amongst the memoranda with which that hoiL gentleman has favoured me, made by Mr. Shiels, it is pointed out that in some instances power is vested, not in an indi- vidual, but in a board. For inst>ince, ujat- ters aflecting ocean lighthouses arc dealt with by marine boards. 1 therefore move : That in line .">, tlie word "person " l)c oniitt< d with tiic view to the iiiscilion of tlie muI "authority." Amendment agreed to. Amcndnu-nt (by Sir Samuel Uitirmii; atrrced to : That in lino 13, after tho word " olTjocr," tho words " or authority " lie iniwrtfd. Clause, nH amendecl, agni-*! to. cn.MTKR in. TIIK FKOKHAL JUDICATUIIE. ClnuNO I. Tlio iMirliampnt of tho common- wealth Hhall liavo iKjwcr to « will' ll n\\.i" tr.'ili.i, all 1 many other justicwi, not Iom Uun four, m lh<- parliament from time to i |.aili.nni«iit in.iy alito from ;.. Uj tlie provisions of this constitution, wtal ' other courts. 780 Commonwealth of [G April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Mr. KINGSTON : At an earlier stage in the discussion of this bill I withdrew an ainendnient which I then moved in favour of giving legislative powers to the federal parliament for the establishment of courts of conciliation and arbitration. I did this because it was pointed out by the lion, member, Sir Samuel Griffith, that it would be more convenient to effect any amendment the Convention might desire in the clause which we are now discussing, dealing with the federal judicature. I propose to move now the addition of words to this particular clause, which will give the federal parliament power to establish federal courts of conciliation and arbitra- tion for the settlement of industrial dis- putes. Tlie amendment I desire to make consists in the addition to the clause of the following words : — inchTcIiug courts of conciliation and arbitration for the settlement of indiistrial disputes. I am not going to travel over ground upon which I have previously touched. This simple fact remains — that in view of the extent of the organisations which take part in these industrial disputes, having ramifications throughout the whole of Australia, it is impossible for any one colony to legislate for the creation of a tribunal which can deal satisfactorily with them. Under these circumstances, it re- solves itself into this question : whether we shall sit idly by and allow the contend- ing parties to settle the matter for them- selves, disregarding the disastrous results which invariably accrue from the prolon- gation of these disputes ; or whether we shall do what we can for the purpose of creating facilities by which these disputes maybe avoided or their duration shortened? I do not think it possible for the question to be answered in any other way than by a recognition of the duty which it appears to me is imposed on us in the creation of this constitution to make provision for the erection of courts which will satisfactorily deal with questions of the magnitude of those involved in industrial disputes. A federal judicature is proposed to be created. Various branches of jurisdiction will no doubt be conferred upon it ; but I make bold to say that there is no more important branch of jurisdiction which can be given to it than the necessary jurisdiction for the investigation of troubles of the char- acter to which I refer, and their decision, according to the substantial justice of the case. At the present moment various schemes are occupying the attention of the different local legislatures having for their aim the supply of facilities for the prevention cf these disputes ; but I am sure that every one who has felt it his duty to consider the question will i-ecog- nise the force of the argument, that local legislation cannot satisfactorily deal with the question. I do not propose at this stacje to indicate on what lines I venture to consider legislation should proceed ; but I think that if at the time of the late labour troubles we had had something in the shape of a federal tribunal, having the con- fidence of entire Australia, having for its sanction Australian legislation, public sen- timent would have been of such a character that the disputing parties would practically have been forced to refer their disagree- ment to this tribunal for settlement, and to abide by the result. All I ask in sub- mitting this amendment to the notice of the Convention is this : that we may re- cognise that it is a question with which the federal parliament should have power to deal. If we do not take the power now, it can only be obtained by an amendment of the constitution. Surely it is a power which should exist, however much room there may be for difference of ojnnion as to the pre- cise way in which it should be exercised. I merely refer in the amendment I move to the establishment of courts of concilia- tion and arbitration. The first duty of the proposed tribunal would no doubt be Commonwealth of [6 ApraL, ISO].] Australia Bill. •SI to endeavour to reconcile the parties. The second -would be, in default of success in the endeavour to bring about a reconcilia- tion between the contending parties, to pronounce a decision according to the ju.s- tice of the case, which decision should bind the contending parties for a limited period, and which should be capable of enforcement. Courts of conciliation and arbitration appear to me to be highly de- sirable of establishment in view of the matters to which I have called attention, and it is with the sole purpose of ena})ling the federal legislature, when it sees fit and in such mode as it deems most expedient, to call these tribunals into existence that I move this amendment. Amendment proposed. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I .should like for my own satisfaction, before voting on this question, to know how the hon. •("^ntleman n»akes out that his amendment not an interference with property and civil riglits ? That is the difficulty I fed. If courts of conciliation can be establi.shed, if anything can be done to settle labour di.sputes, I think it is a power the federal parliament might very well have. But I liave been trying for the last three montlis to sfe liow it could be put witliin tlieir function without interfering with the pro- per function of the states, and I have not bsen able yet to answer that question. Mr. DEAKIN: The hon. member, porliaps, might answer another dilUculty which has suggested itself to me. I am cordially with him in all lie desires to ac- coinplisli, and believe that mucli could bo achieved in tliis direction by such legisla- tion as he has outlined ; but I fail to fjce that it can possiljly become, for a very long time to come, a proper subject for federal legislation. On tlic contrary, I fear that if thi.s power were given to the federal legislature, it might be cxerci.sed less satisfactorily than it would be by the individual colonics. There must be in such a matter as this, a certain amount of ex- perimental legislation. The colonies, left to themselves, may take different, ami, to some extent, diverse paths ; and from the knowledge then gained, the federal parlia- ment may legislate in the futuri'. The hon. members amendment, I take it, would not prevent the exercise by the several colonies of their present power of legisla- tion on this question. Mr. Gillies : It would ! Mr. KiXGSTOX : Not at all ! Mr. DEAKIN : I imagine tliat the be- stowal of this power on the federal parlia- ment would not operate to the exclu-sion of the power at present possessed by the several colonies, until the federal parlia- ment did actually legislate. If this pro- vision would operate as a prohibition to the local parliaments I .should be com[)ellcd to vote against it. But I thiidc it siuqily gives the power to the federal parliament in the future, and possibly there cannot be much objection to that, unless it l)e on the ground suggested by the lion, member. Sir SanuH'l Grilhth. I certainly think wa should do nothing to prevent or oven dis- courage the .several colonies from dealing with this problem each in its own way, be- cause only after the patii has been trmhh'U by the several colonies, and trodden in dif- ferent way.s, will it bo probuldo that (ho federal parliament will ever be moved to bring into existence so immeiisc nn organi- sation as would be nccesKnry to copo with the industrial disputes of AuHtralin. Mr. hir.r.S: I think Iho idea of the mover of tli(' amendment w to give pow«'r to the federal parlimnont to cKlablihli hu;iK|ut« with a view (o a Hotliemetit of tho ques- tion. Already the subjeet hoH been intro- duced into the Parlininent of Now s;,.i,(J, 1 ; '82 Coniinonweahh of [G April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Wales and favourably received, and tlie lion, member, Mr. Kingston, lias, I be- lieve, introduced it into the Parliament of South Australia ; and I have no doubt that when the minds of the people are brought to bear on the advantages of con- ciliation, legislation will be passed in various •colonies which will pave the way to a law of conciliation being ultimately passed by the federal parliament. I see no harm in the insertion of words giving the federal parliament power to establish such courts if it thinks necessary. Mr. KINGSTON : Referring to the re- mark which fell from Sir Samuel Griffith, if I understand thehon. gentlemen I'ightly, his objection is to the establishment of any •court of conciliation or arbitration. Sir Samuel Griffith : No ! Mr. KINGSTON : Then I fail to com- prehend the argument of the hon. dele- gate. I understand him to say that the •estalilishment of these courts by the fede- ral leirislature would be an interference •with civil rights. Sir Samuel Griffith : With property and civil rights ! Mr. KINGSTON : Does the hon. dele- gate object to it on the ground that state matters should be regulated by the states themselves '? Sir Samuel Griffith : Certainly ; pro- perty and civil rights are left to the states ! Mr. KINGSTON : Then I understand that the objection of the hon. delegate is not as to the propriety of the establish- ment of courts of conciliation and arbi- tration ; but as to the expediency of leav- ing these matters to be dealt with by the states themselves. Sir Samuel Griffith : Yes, that is the point which I take ! Mr. KINGSTON : The position that I ventured to take was that the states could not deal with these questions to the extent of the creation of a federal tribunal — could not deal with them to the extent of [Mr. Dibhs. calling into existence a court competent to pronounce a decision having furce not only in tlie particular state, but also throughout the commonwealth ; and taking, as 1 be- lieve I am justified in taking, the hon member's argument to amount to this — that he adjiiits the propriety of legislation on the subject, but thinks the authority to legislate should be confined to the states themselves — I venture to say that it is wanting in force, because he does not recog nise the strength of the position that the states have no power to legislate for the creation of a federal tribunal. With refer ence to the remarks of the hon. delegate from Victoria, Mr. Deakin, if I thought that the amendment which I indicate would prevent the states from legislating within their own boundaries or that it would affect the free exercise of their powers within their limits with regard to the creation of tribunals of this sort, I would not for a moment dream of movins the amendment ; but it cannnot have any such effect, and I am sure that the hon. member will see it. The amendment I moved does not place even the same re- striction which, as i-egards a great variety of subjects, is placed upon the action of. the states in matters of very considerable moment. There are cases in which the commonwealth and the state will have concurrent powers of legislation. Even in those cases it will be necessary to any re- striction of the state rights that the federal power shall be exercised ; but in this case it is not a question of concurrent legisla- tive powers. The state has no power whatever for the creation of a federal tri- bilnal, and with the view of giving the federal parliament a power which other- wise neither commonwealth and state will possess I ask the Convention to consent to the amendment. No doubt a variety of arguments might be advanced as to t ^ mode in which fedei'al legislation should proceed — as to the precise direetion CommonweaWi of [6 April, ISOl.] which it should take — as to the details of the scheme that would commend itself to the good sense of the federal parliament, but having listened to the criticisms to which my suggestion has been subjected, I confess that I cannot see any valid rea- son why the federal parliament should not have the power to deal with the question. Why should we at this early stage in the constitution of the commonwealth resist the proposal to give the parliament autho- rity to deal with it when the occasion arises, and Avhen a scheme is propounded M-hich will commend itself to the sood I sense of the majority 1 Mr. Gillies : Does this amendment give the parliament that power? INIr. KINGSTON: The amendment which J now propose would give the fed- eral parliament the power of legislating with reference to the establishment of courts of conciliation and arbitration in •such a way as they think fit. Mr. Gillies : In what clause? Mr. KINGSTON: The clause now under consideration. As I have previously Dointed out, I move the amendment at this ige of the bill, as no doubt the judica- . ture, if created, would have most impor- : tant functions. If we do not assent to an ■amendment of the character now indicated, the federal parliament, shortly after its constitution, might be desirous of dealing with this question, and a scheme might Ijc propounded which commended itself to the good sense of a large majority of both houses, but it would be utterly powerless. It could do nothing, and the states thcm- s< Ives would be similarly situated. Under these circumstances it does appear to mo tliat the force of the arjiruincnts is aito- Atistralia BUI. 7S3 gether in favour of giving the power, however much the federal parlinmeni, may deliberate, and whatever room for diflTcr- -ence of opinion there may bo as to tlio pre- cise way in whicli it should subgerpior Jy be exercised. :\Ir. GILLIES : I should like to have the attention of the hon. and learned member, Sir Samuel Griffith, for a minute. There is a proposal made here that the parliament should be able to establish cer- tain courts, and that these courts shall be able to deal with laws having reference to conciliation and arbitration. I want to know if, in the event of these words boinf' added, there is in the bill any power given to the parliament to deal with this sub- ject? Sir Samuel Griffith : I do not quite understand the hon. member's question ! Mr. GILLIES : In this bill we have dealt with a series of provisions giving the parliament of the commonwealth power to deal with certain questions ; but this ques- tion is not included. I desire to know whether merely giving the courts of law power to deal with a question of this kind necessarily involves the power of the legis- lature to legislate on the subject ? Mr. FITZGERALD : I should like to sui)plement the remarks of the hon. njem- ber, Mr. Gillies : Suppose tlie federal court gave a decision which was at variance with that of the courts of the various states, which would rule ? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFiril : The ques- tion whicli the hon. iiH-nibcr, .Mr. Eitz- gerald, asks is rather a dlHicult one to answer. Jn America the Kuprcme court in each state is supremo in its own liuiitH, and so is the federal supronie court hu- prcme in its limits, and the Kniiic point might l)o dccidcii in two (lillercnt wayK, and both decisioiiH be executed in tin- wiiu*^ state. In rcjily to th(! lion. iiu'iiilM-r, Mi-. (Jillies, 1 think that the hiHt panij^'rapli in clause fiL' would give the lc;;islatnn' power to legislate on the subject. The wonUarfi : Any in(iltert, Mr. Dibbs, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Ailye Fitzgerald, Mr. Forrest, Mr. A. Forrest, Mr. J. Question so resolved in the affirmative Clause, as read, agreed to. Clause 7 verbally amended and agreed to. Clause 8 (Original jurisdiction. Additional original jurisdiction may be conferred). Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : There is a mistake in this clause, which does not express the intention of the drafting com- mittee or of the other committee. The last two lines — The parliament may confer original jurisdic- tion on the supreme court of Australia in sucli other cases as it thinks fit — read much more widely than M-as intended. Tliey were intended to be read in connection with the liht in the preceding .section. Of course within that list it is quite right. are not going beyond what has been done There is no reason why the supreme court before. Although many of us may think should not liave original jurisdiction in we are doing less tlian we are disposed to them if parliament agrees to give it. do ourselves, at all events thei'e will be few of us who will not consider we ought to liave gone at least as far as we have gone in tlie bill. Question — That the words proposed to be omitted stand part of the bill — put. The Committee divided : Ayes, 19; noes, 17; majority, 2. Ayks. Jennings, Sir Patrick KingHton, Mr. Mcllwraitli, Sir Thomas McMillan, Mr. Barton, Mr, Bird, Mr. Clark, Mr. Cockburn, J^r. Dcakin, Mr. DnnaldHon, Mr. Downer, Sir .Jolni Fysii, Mr. Grey, Sir George Griffith, Sir Samuel I'arkeH, Sir Henry I'ifiyford, Mr. Kutiedge, Mr. Smith, Colmicl Thynnc, Mr. Mr. Wuixo.v : Concurrently witii the other courts ? Sir SAM UEL CHI FF 1111: Yes. 1 move that the last panigruph l>c amended to read as follows : — The parliament may confer original juriwlit'- tion on the supreme court of AuHtrftlia in n i !. f.tlicr of the cases entimointfn of nnif'Tm dutif* of ( uslonifl by the parhnnuiit of the cominoif wealth all lawH of the «cvcr*l utatm imiK>(iinf( ... t i ' ♦ ' *• • 1 .. 1 % diituH of Cll«t' thoMubjcctct offei ing boiintlcii m|K)» tho prtxhiction or ex- port of goodn, whall < • '• Tlic control .and c<.:. of CIUI- toniH and cxcinr an' ■ tablinhmenl of tl ■ ,1.1. «1, 790 Commonwealth of [7 April, 1891. j Australia Bill. Colonel SMITH : I should like to ask they will bring them into effect suddenly, the framers of the bill how they propose There will, therefore, be no time for piling to meet the difficulty which arises in the up large quantities of goods in the manner 3rd paragraph, which states that, upon referred to by the hon. member. The hon. the imposition of uniform duties there member will see what would happen on the shall be free-trade amongst the colonies ? other hand. Supposing the federal parlia- I think some time should be fixed after ment comes into operation on the 1st Janu- the imposition of the duties, because it a^'j. of any year, and you fix that this part will probably take something like twelve of the law shall only come into operation months for those duties to be brought into twelve months afterwards. In that event, effect, and it may happen that the mer- up to the 31st December, all that possibly chants, especially of some of the colonies, could be piled up would be piled up, be- may import goods in very large quantities, cause the importers would know the exact and virtually swamp the market for some- day upon which they would be shut out ; thing like two years. It w^ould be much whei-eas, under the other arrangement, "wiser if some limit were fixed, after the they would be in doubt, and would not imposition of the duties, before free-trade know exactly can come into operation amongst the dif- Colonel Smith : But for twelve months ferent colonies. Otherwise we may have they could not send their goods across tho one colony swamping the others by rush- border without paying duty. That is my ing goods into their markets to the injury point ! of the existingmanufacturers. Iwould sug- Mr. MUNRO : The hon. member must gest to thehon. member, SirSamuel Griffith, see that if the new duties come into effect to allow the word " Upon," in the first line twelve months after their imposition a time of the 3rd paragraph to be struck out, is fixed, and that would be an indication as and that the words "twelvemonths after," to wiien they could send the goods in. be inserted in its place. By this means Colonel Smith : I do not see the point free-trade will not come into existence for at all ! twelve months, and the stocks which have Mr. MUNRO : The hon. member must been taken in hand with the view" of swamp- see the point when others see it; and in" the various local markets will be some- when those who have had to feel the o what exhausted. With the view of testing effect of it in former times also see it. the feeling of the Committee, I move : The hon. member will remember wdiat did 'o That in fine J2 the word "Upon" be omitted happen in Victoria when a similar thing with a view to the insertion of the words was proposed. It was projiosed in one " Twelve months after." session of parliament to alter the law with Mr. MUiSTPiO : This question was very regard to certain goods, and the tariff fully discussed by the Finance Committee, failed that session ; but a hint was given and I confess that I arrived at the conclu- to the public as to what the tariff was sion that the effect would be exactly the likely to be, and the result was that free reverse of what my hon. friend proposes. goods were brought into the colony to I will point out to him how it would be swamp the market for the next two years, the reverse. When the new parliament The proposal of the hon. member would meets, and makes arrangements for im- act in that direction, for a date would be posing customs duties, the day .and hour fixed on which the tariff would come into upon which they will come into operation operation, and the result would be that will only be known to the executive, and people would be piling in goods until that Commomceahh of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 791 day, whereas svhen the date is in doubt on a date to be fixed by the federal j^ar- they cannot do it to the same extent. The hon. membei' and everybody else must know that those smart enough will take advantage of clianges and be prepared to make the most profit they can make out of them ; but they cannot take the same ad- vantage when the time is in doubt as when it is fixed. Mr. McMillan : I do not think that the hon. member, Mr. Munro, sees the drift of the arguments, neitlier do I, my- self, agree Avith the hon. member, Colonel Smith ; but if the hon. member, Colonel Smith, wants to carry out his ideas, he will have to make his amendment a little diflfer- ent, because it would create an absurdity. He says, " One year after the imposition of uniform custom duties by the federal parliament," but the moment the federal parliament imposes uniform duties, they must come into operation ; therefore, the hon. member, if he wishes to give a breath- ing ti me of twel ve mont hs, will certainly have to alter the clause a little more thoroughly than by the insertion of the words "twelve months." Whilst I am on my feet I may say from practical experience that I do not care when a tariff comes into opera- tion. It makes very little difference ; liament the intercolonial duties should cease. I do not tliink that we should fix twelve months ; but on the other hand, is it right to absolutely say to the federal parliament, " Immediately you impose cus- toms duties the customs duties of the several colonies shall cease " ? IMr. Gillies : You do not want two sets of customs duties ! Sir JOHN BRAY : I admit that. But the point to which the hon. member, Colonel Smith, refei-s is, that if we had f lee-trade to-morroAv we should have goods in one colony which had been imported free of duty competing with goods in. another colony upon which duties had been paid ; and the amendment to some extent removes the inequality. Mr, MuxRO : How can we do it ? Sir JOHN BRAY : The question i.s whether we should leave the federal par- liament to see if they are able to do it, or say to them, " You shall have no di.scrc- tion in the matter; but iuimediutcly you make these uniform cu.stoms duties, all other customs duties on gcoiKs shall coa80 to have effect." I think it will be desir- able to give the federal parliament a litth? people will go on trading very much as power in this matter. It may be, and I before ; and as long as there is an inter- val of doubt with regard to future duties to be imposed, men will generally take their cue from the debates of a parliament, •such as the federal parliament that will be created then, and will act accordingly. When once the parliament has decided on tliink it would be, true tliat it would bo found that you could not Imvo two cus- toms tariffs in forco at tin- wnnu timr, «in" ' conHid*'!-^ •''■♦ 'I"' 1''''"li of th«'(' \v< ilth 1 not lied by tU*' 794 Commonwealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. clause. That is perfectly true as regards either the fraiiiing of the tariff, or the date on which it shall come into opera- tion. But there is no indication of any further power being given to them, if it can be civen — and I consider that is a matter ■of grave doubt. But the point of the hon. member, Sir John Bray, is surely worthy of great consideration in view of the grave importance of the issue as to whether it would not be possible to add words to the clause, indicating that it is in- tended to endow the parliament of the •commonwealth with every liberty of deal- ing with this question so as to be just to the several states. What we desire to ilo is, knowing that there must be some- thing like a commercial revolution when a uniform tariff is imposed throughout Aus- tralia, to render that revolution as easy of acceptance and assimilation as possible by the industries of the various colonies — not to expose those who have invested their -capital in manufactures to any greater shock than may be absolutely essential. This risk is not peculiar to Victoria — it pertains to every colony in the group which possesses any duties, and under ■v\-hich industries have grown up. Is it not possible, I would ask the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith — to introduce some words to indicate that this Convention ■contemplated the commonwealth parlia- ment taking into consideration all the cir- ■cumstances of the case, when imposing a uniform tariff, of which, of course, it could give no warning without in- creasing the danger? It should be indi- •cated that power is given to devise any -expedient, if expedient be possible, to mitigate this temporary industrial crisis which must occur when a uniform tariff is imposed ? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I should like to know what the hon. member is driving at a little more in detail before I answer his question, [i/r. Deakin. Mr. PLAYFORD : There is only one point on which I should like some infor- mation from the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith. This clause says the exclusive power of levying duties of customs and excise shall not come into force until uni- form duties of customs have been imposed by the parliament of the commonwealth. Now, we cannot wait for them. Directly the treasurer of the commonwealth an- nounces to the federal parliament his tariff it will be at once telegraphed to the various colonies, and the duties will be collected on that basis. The only point, therefore, is, will these words cover that case ? It will be seen at a glance that, unless the duties are at once collected, the importers will be clearing goods under the old tariff wherever it suits them, all through the commonwealth. Will these words, I ask, give power to the treasurer of the common- wealth to instruct the various customs officers throughout the commonwealth to collect the duties which he has presented to the parliament of the commonwealth to consider ? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The hon. member no doubt is aware that, although that is done in the case of every new tariff proposed, it is done contrary to law, and the parliament afterwards indemnifies the treasurer. The only way is to give the tariff a retrospective effect. The tariff will come into operation in the same w-ay as tariffs do now. I doubt myself, however, very much whether in the case of the first tai-iff it will be so. I doubt whether parlia- ment itself would think it desirable that it should be retrospective in its effect. That, however, is a matter for them to determine. Mr. Playford : They will lose revenue if they do not most fearfully ! Mr. GILLIES : In the event of a pro- posal on the part of the treasurer to in- crease the duties, the increased duties will be collected, and in the case of a proposal to decrease the duties a bond will be taken, Commonvjealth of [7 April, 1891] Australia BiU. 795 as is usual in all the colonies, so that in every individual case where a duty is in- creased in a particular state, and left as it is in another state, the increase in that particular state will be collected from the time the treasurer announces his proposals. Mr. DONALDSOX : That is the prac-' tice; but we must bear in mind that we shall then be dealing with one tariS, although previously we had four or five tariffs. Sir Samuel Griffith : Oh, no ! Mr. DOXALDSOX : Yes ; the tariffs of the various colonies. Mr. MuNRO : Only one new tariff! Mr. DOXALDSOX : There has not been much difficulty in the past where only one tariff was being altered ; but here is a new tariff coming into o[)eration to take the place of all the tariffs in existence at the present time. I say there will be very great difficulty in the case. Of course where the proposal is to reduce the duties the revenue will be collected on the lower rate, and a bond given in the case of the bill not being passed. But there are a great many inequalities about this. The more you look into it the greater the diffi- culties which present themselves. If we were to put restrictions in at the present time, I fear they would act adversely as far as the federal parliament is concerned. Mr. MuNRO : The federal parliament will be able to manage it ! Mr. DIBBS : The hon. member, Colonel Smith, .sees a difficulty, but has not sug- gested a remedy to meet the case. AVc all know that the commercial clement in the whole of these colonies is particularly keen. Commercial men are in the habit of keeping their eye to windward, in view of any po.ssible change in the tarilF. As tlie prfsont Colonial Treasurer of New South Wales know.s, when any alteration in the tariff is pending, his shadow i.s liaunted py a variety of comiiiercial men wlio on- leavour to glean from him the direclinn the change will take. T, inyself, have known of large fortunes being made in Xew South Wales by men engaged in the wine and spirit trade. They have suc- ceeded in ascertaining, from the utterances of the colonial treasurer of the day, the direction of the contemplated change be- fore the delivery of the budget sj)eecli, and on one of these occasions a large quantity of rum was taken out of bond, and com- mercial men were the gainers by that ti'ansaction to the extent of some thou- sands of pounds, while the revenue was the loser. But let us take our experience; let us take the actual facts. Within the last three or four years a government in this colony succeeded in carrying through Parliament a tariff bill imposing ad va- lorem duties of 5 per cent. That bill was denounced by the free-trade party as being the rankest protection, but when that party came into power they gave twelve months' notice of their intention to take off these particular duties, with a result exactly similar to that which the hon. member. Colonel Smith, has in his mind. The free-trade party, who objected to the 5 per cent, duties, and called them the rankest protection, iniported goods, and put them into bond until the twelve months' notice had expired, tlius making a haul of £70,000. That was perfectly le^'itimate commercial work ; but I think some words should be put into this clause to ])revcnt a contingency of that kind. A simple remedy occurred to my mind when the hon. member, Mi. I>i-akin, was speaking. Why not iiisiTt words to the efTect that (ho new tariff of the coiutimn- wcalth should l)e the taiiff of Victoria ? y\r. MiNRO : That is too (hin ! Mr. hir.r.S: What did the hon. mem- ber tell the int«M-viewing roporterH in Mel- l.ourni' (hfi nthf-r or(nnt (hingH. TIm'V weing approved of by the people of irrangement ! New South Wales. At present all that '98 Commomvealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. we know is the statemont of tlie press, made on the authority of the lion, member, Mr. Munro, which leaves some of the New South Wales members in the unenviable position of having to make an explanation. "While they are making their explanations I will write out an amendment expressing my views. Mr. McMillan : The hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, is always a curious mixture of humour and assertion. Now, there has been some misapprehension — and of course by the enemies of my own party this misapprehension has been circulated very broadly — with regard to the proceedings in the secrecy of the Finance Committee ; and perhaps it is better to make a clear explanation of what actually did occur, because some figures will be used in the course of this debate which may increase the misunderstanding. When the dele- gates particularly connected with finance operations came to Sydney, they required certain figures to be worked out on cei'tain bases, and I told them that the Government Statistician of this colony would be very glad to work out — of course in a mechanical way — anything they desired that might illustrate the subject in any way whatever. In doing that, I think I only showed the ordinary courtesy which I might expect to be shown to myself by the government statistician of another colony. When the Finance Committee met, they thought it was well to have all the suggestions of all the members of the committee woi'ked out purely pro formd with a view to the w^hole question being thoroughly discussed. Of course, as hon. members know, in a com- mittee of that kind many subjects may come up for discussion, many views may be put forward, but it is only the crystal- lised report of the committee that has any right to go before the world. Now, the hon. member. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, de- cided that a certain calculation should be made up for all the colonies on the basis [^fr. Dihhs. of the Yictorian tariff. That was entire! his own suggestion. The Governmei Statistician worked it out for him in l)urely mechanical manner, and I believ that the desire of the hon. member, S; Thomas Mcllwraith, to have those figure before him is entirely answerable for tl whole of this rumour. But it is very ui fair and ungenerous to deal in this wa with any of the figures that came befoi the committee. All that the coramitte are answerable for — all that I am persoi ally answerable for as the free-trade Troi surer of New South Wales — is the absolut report that was furnished to the Conver tion. That is a clear explanation of th: whole matter. Of course the desire of thj hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, in this debate i; to practically commit this Convention ti a tariff against the woi'ld upon a protectiv; basis. We all know that there must be j customs tariff, but certainly we are goinj far beyond our province if for one moraeni we attempt to dictate what shall be thj fiscal policy of the future. The free-tradeii of New South Wales have gone so far—: that is, myself speaking for others, and m] chief at the head of the Government — w| have gone so far that we say it is absoluteli necessary in order to have any union thai we place in the hands of a federal parlitij ment the whole question of the tariff Cij the future. Then, if we as free-trader! fall, we fall. li Mr. DiEBS : You have fallen already ! i Mr. McMillan : We shall have tj give way to a majority of the whole of thi colonies, because we simply recognise th, rule which guides us in our own parliii ment, which guided the hon. member, MiJ Dibbs, the leader of the opposition, whe^ he gave way to the present Government ci this colony, although it might only havi had a majority of two or three. That ruli must guide us all in this case if we ai'e t come under a union. Consequently it i very unfair that this rumour should b Commonwealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 79^ circulated, and it is very ungenerous on and they will be struck by the fact that the the part of the hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, only important part of that documentisone to try to fix this Convention to vote on any respecting which there is not a single table resolution referring to the fiscal policy of pubHshed or any proof given as to'the con- the future. elusion arrived at. At the same time, a lot Sir THOMAS McILWR AITH : I de- of useless tables, about twenty in number, mur entirely to the explanation just given ' are given, although no reference is made by the hon. member, Mr. McMillan. I to them in the report: Now, why were want to refer first to the real point that the tables to which I refer suppressed ? the hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, brought It is useless for the hon. member, [Mr. against the hon. member, ]\Ir. Munro. I McMillan, to say that they were sup- read the account of the interview when I pressed because the committee were afi-aid was in Brisbane. When I came down that the rumour would do harm. The best here, finding that nobody had made men- way was to give the whole of the informa- tion of it, I thought it was a burlesque. It tion, and there was no reason whatever is a burlesque, because it is so far from for suppressing it. The hon. member j\Ir. the truth, and I did not think it was McMillan, is wrong when he says that this worth while to waste the time of the was information got at my suefestion ani Convention by bringing it up. But I do obtained by me from the Government not want an explanation of how the Statistician I would recall to his mind rumour came about to be made by the the fact that the Government Statistician hon. member, Mr. McMillan. I want to was called before the committee, and the hear a denial from the hon. member, Mr. committee,throughthechairman, instructed Munro,'that he said such a thing to a re- him to work out certain calculations on the porter, or that he was the origin of such a Victorian tariff. It was ]iot I who per- report ; because I give my testimony that sonally instructed him. ■the subject of fixing the tariff for the Sir John Bkay : I thought the hou. Ifuture was understood to be left to the member did ! ral government, and there was not one Sir THOMAS ^IcILWllAITH : It wa.* 1 ever said about it up to the day that the chairman. The facts of tlie u)utter uro ft. I consulted my colleagues after- these : certain calculations biisod on an .....ds, and they .said it was not mentioned imaginary tariff liad been miule up l>y the bn the only day I was absent. I want to Government Statistician. The hon. iiumu- r that denial. I now come to another ber, Sir John Bray, •|Ut'stionod the iiccur- loiiit which was referred to by the hon. acy of the imaginary tariff, and of couino uber, Mr. McMillan. It is a point on as long as it was known to be an iina^in- •h, 1 think, the Finance Committee ary tariff we oidy want<'d to gi-t the rt-MiIt d most egrc'giously in the performance of it. Itoldtlnrcommittccthiitwhiit I wantod : their duty. Tlio hon. member, Mr. to prove could liecstjilib.ilifd by t-iiUing any nIcMillan, hints that there might be some tariff and workiiigout the Baine calculation. nformation put before the committee which I offered the hon. njcmber, Sir .Fohn Uray, t was right should be furnished to them ; to take thr tariff of South AuHlr.iliii. ut, that having given their report, they Mr. MrMiM,AN : Woh not the infonna- ^ere not bound to give the information tion obtained by the hon. mcmbor Inforo n which the report was based. Now, any tin- cotiimittfr met? ne looking at the report of the committee Sir 'JHO.MvVS McI I/.\ UArril : That Jill see at once what a bald thing it wa«, in a very diffrrent Uiingnlt^gcther. What 800 Convnomcecdth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Hill. I say is this : that I asked the hon. mem- ber, J\lr. Munro, to tell the Government Statistician plainly what to do. But I had been getting the information for my- self privately, and it was the committee who ordered the Government Statistician to jirepare the information. jMr. McMillan rThat was afterwards ! Sir THOMAS McILWRAITH : I did not tell the committee. All that I told them was that I was getting some informa- tion, and I offered to take any tariff. The hon. member, Mr. Munro, asked that we should take the Victorian tariff, and the whole of the committee aOTeed to that as an experiment. That table is suppressed, and not only that table, but other impor- tant tables bearing on the matter. Ts it not an absurd thing to take evidence and then to hand in a report omitting the prin- cipal part of the evidence 1 We have not the whole of the evidence suppressed, but only a portion of it, and that the portion dealing with a vital part of the report. Mr. MUNRO : This is one of the things which always arise from having secret meetings. We ought to have done all our business publicly, so that everybody would know what we were doing. The chai-ge made by an hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, that I said we had all agreed that the Victorian tariff should be the tariff to be adopted, is not true. I said nothing of the sort. What I did say was that we took a calculation on the Victorian tariff to ascertain what the effect upon the revenue of the various colonies would be, and we found, what does not appear in any of the tables, as the hon. member. Sir Thomas Mcll wraith, says, the effect to be marvellous, that the actual im- port duties received altogether in Victoria is only 1 1 per cent. ; in South Australia, 21 per cent. ; in Western Australia, 2-1 per cent. ; and in the other colonies, 18 per cent. So that the actual amount raised by means of import duties in Victoria is the lowest of that of all the colonies ex- [.b'ir Thomas Mclluraith. cept New South Wales. That is the re- sult of the tables that were calculated for us on the basis of the Victorian tariff. That is the information which I gave ; that if we wanted the import duties levied in any of the colonies we must accept either the free-trade tariff of New South Wales or the protectionist tariff of Victoria. There is no getting away from that, be- cause they are the lowest. Sir Thomas McIlwraitii : That is only the hon. member's opinion. It is not ex- pressed by the committee ! Mr. MUNRO : I am talking of the re- sults of the calculations. The result of the calculations was that one was 5 per cent, and the other less than 11 per cent., and the rest very much higher. I am not expressing an opinion, but making a state- ment of fact. If the future parliament wants to levy import duties they must take one or the other of those tariffs. To say that I said that the Finance Committee or anybody else had come to any arrange- ment about the adoption of any tariff is altogether wrong. I said nothing of the DO O sort, as every one knows that not one of us may be a member of the federal par- liament, and that parliament must make its own arrangements. The statement as to these tables being calculated, as the hon. member. Sir Thomas McUwraith, said, is absolutely true. The calculations were made. I should have wished that all the calculations should have gone among the appendices to the report. I did all I could to get that done, but there was an objection on the part of the com- mittee, and as I had been going for com- promise, I yielded to that objection and agreed that the tables should not be pub- lished. Mr. BURGESS : I think it a matter of regret that the hon. member. Sir Thomas McUwraith, was not present on the last day when the Finance Committee met. We had the advantage of his presence Comnionioealth of [7 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 801 it every meeting except tlie last when [ think IMr. Donaldson took his place IS a representative of Queensland. In ustice to tlie hon. member, Mr. McMillan, [ must confirm what he has stated with ■eference to the way in w^hich the calcula- ion about the Victorian tariff was brouiiht ibout. It was very necessary that the j'inance Committee should have some idea, )ased upon some fixed tariff, as to what he result of any alteration in our customs [uties would have upon the sums which he colonies have hitherto derived from -hat pai'ticular soui'ce of revenue. The ion. member, Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, ia\-ing intimated that he had previously isked the Government Statistician to pre- )are a return, based upon the Victorian ariff, and the Government Statistician lavinfj stated that he had that work in land, we thought that it would be well hat it should be completed and brought )efore the committee, and that was, per- laps, the reason why the Victoi'ian tariff vas taken as the basis of our calculations. Later on — on the last day — when it Ije- ;ame necessary to decide which tables hould form the appendices to our report, he hon. member, Mr. McMillan, very pro- )erly brought under our notice the fact hat it might give colour to the rumour hat he was in favour of a protective tariff )eiiig estaljlished, if we put in the Vic- orian tariff alone as the basis of our cal- ulations, and it was for that reason, and hat reason alone, that that particular able wa.s not inserted in tlie appendices. Sir Thomas McIlwraitii : That is only me. There were three others ! Mr. BURGESS : That is only one. 'here were three others which, upon con- deration, it was thouglit were not rc- uired ; and I tliink tlic committee were erfectly juHtiliod in submitting those ibles, which they thought had .some bf-ar- ig upon tlie report. It will be our duty more carefully inquire into this matter 3 E when we come to sections 9, 10, and 11. I merely rose to say that we simply took the Victorian tariff because, as a matter of fact, it was in course of preparation. The probability is that, if that tariff had not been suggested and the work partly done, some other tariff would have been taken in lieu of it. Colonel Smith : I will, with the pei*- mission of the Committee, withdraw my amendment. Amendment, by leave, v.-ithdrawn. Amendment (by Mr. Dibbs) proposed : That the following wordsbe omitted : — "Upoa the imposition of uniform duties of customs by the parliament of the commonwcaltli all laws of the several states imposing duties of customs or duties of excise upou goods the subject of cus- toms duties, and all such laws ofifcring bounties upon the production or export of goods, shall cease to have efifect," with the view to insert iu lieu thereof the following words : — " That upon the constitution becoming law and the common- wealth being established, the tariff now existing in the province of Victoria shall be the tariff of the commonwealth until otherwise dealt with by the parliament." Mr. MARMION : I would ask the hon. member why he proposes the tariff " now"' existing in Victoria should be atlojited ? Amendment negatived ; clause, as read, agreed to. Clause 5. Upon the estiiblishment of the com- monwealth, all officers employed by the govern- ment of any state in any dt piirtnicnt of tlic pubhc service the control of \\liii;li is by tliif constitu- tion assigned to the connnonwealtli, shall l>ccomo subject to the control of the executive govern- ment of the conimonwenlth. Hut all existing rights of any such ofliccrs shall bo prcucrvcd. Mr. GOllLXJN : I siiouM lik.' to ask the hon. gcnthnian in cliargo of tlio bill wJi-it will bo the jio.sitioii in regard to othccrs who arc ontillrd to pcnsionH ? An Hon. Mkmimck : The clause proviclca. tliat tlicir rights Khali bo preserved ! Mr. GORDON: J5ut on wliich govern- ment will the rcHpon.sibility rest — tho btato governincnt or tho federal government ? In some colonies tiicre is a jieiision list, amounting to X30 tlie separate states m proportion to the uuinhcs of their people" be inserted. Hon. delegates will see that in thi.s part of the clause the drafters of the bill liavo de- parted from the rcconinu-ndation of tlie Finance Committee, though I ill, as it at iircHcnt stands, however, woultl iiiako thnn pay Hoinothing cpiit*^ difTorcjd to that amount. I have hud a ralruliition ni.'uh' out, Im.sod on tho undrrstaiKlijiL,' that the Victorian S06 Cuinmoniceallh of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. taritf blioiiUl be universally acloi>ted, and the result is tliat instead of New South "Wales paying lis. 5d. per head of her population she would pay 13s. Id. ; that instead of Victoria paying lis. 5d. she would pay 1 2s. -Id. ; that instead of Queens- land paying lis. 5d. she would pay 15s. 4d. ; that South Australia would pay only 8s. 4d. instead of lis. 5d. ; that Western Australia would pay 12s. 2d. instead of lis. 5d. ; that Tasmania would pay 10s. 6d. instead of lis. 5d., and that New Zealand would pay 9s. Id. instead of lis. 5d. I should like to see some very good reason given why one colony is more difScult to govern than another colony, according to population. The principle was affirmed by the Finance Committee, without demur, that the cost of government should be charged according to population ; but the manner in which it is now proposed to be charged will, unless my amendment is carried, have the effect I have stated. Why should that be ? Can it be shown that there is that difterence in the cost of the government of the various colonies to which I have referred 1 I can see no reason why it should be so. If there is any reason to be given it ought to be given by some member of the Finance Commit- tee. The principle that the cost should be in proportion to the population was not demurred to by the committee, and why it should have been altered I cannot under- stand. That is all I have to say at pre- sent in reference to the amendment. Of course, I shall have to refer to the methods alluded to by the hon. member, Sir John Bray, at a later stage. Sir John Buay : We do not require the words proposed to be inserted by the hon. member at all. The commonwealth col- lects the revenue ; they expend what they want for the purposes of the common- wealth, and they return the balance. Sir THOMAS McILWEAITH : Quite so ; but I have given reasons, I think, [Sir Thomas Mcllwraith. why the words are required. I have shown that the provision in the clause will fali very unequally upon the different colonies, and that it will not carry out the recom- mendation of the Finance Committee. Take the converse proposition. Supposing the committee had met, and the Conven- tion had not previously decided that the^ federal parliament was not to have the administration of the whole of the cus- toms, would any proposal have been arrived at other than that each colony should con- tribute to the general government accord- ing to population ? That is all I want them to do — to contribute accordincf to population, and not according to the- amount of revenue raised. Supposing we had taken another course and had said^ '' We will place the revenues from the pastoral lessees of the colonies in the hands of the general government," would that have been fair 1 I should think that the pastoral lessees are pretty well worked out in Victoria ; but the rents from pastoral leases form an important part of the revenue of Queensland ; and if a course of that kind had been adopted, and it had been decided that general expenses should be paid out of this kind of revenue, we should find that Queensland, through her pastoral lessees, would have to pay th& great j^art of the expenses of the govern- ment of the country. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The hon. member. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, has asked why so great a departure was made from the recommendation of the Finance Committee, and, no doubt, the matter re- quires explanation. I will endeavour to state the arguments as they presented themselves to the Constitutional Commit- tee when they had to deal with this mat- ter. The drafting committee took the re- port of the Finance Committee and em- bodied it in the bill exactly in the terms- in which it was brought up. By that pro- posal all the surplus revenue over thft Commonwealth of [7 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. so; expenditure of tlie commonwealth after that all knowledge is with us. I think the imposition of a uniform tariff was to that only limited knowledge is with us be paid back to the several states in pro- and that we must, at least, admit the pos- portion to the numbers of their people. sibility of our successors being as wise, or That course involved that the expenditure wiser, than we are. should be in the same proportion, because what is retained would be in the same pro- portion as that which is given back. There is no doubt about that. If you define the principle upon which the return is to be made you also define the principle upon which the expenditure is to be borne. That recommendation of the Finance Com- mittee, however, dealt only with the cus- toms and excise duties. When we came to deal with the matter in the Constitu- tional Committee we found that, having pro- Mr. MuxRO : They will have more in- formation before them ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : That is so. This is the difficulty which met us. It being clear that, as to some portions of re- venue, at any rate, the return should be in proportion to the amounts in which it is received — in proportion to the contribu- tions of the different states — we felt it hard to justify charging the cost of go- vernment at per head. I do not know that this point was very much considi-red ; posed to give parliament absolute powers but it certainly appeared to be an anom- of taxation, we were bound to deal with ally that you should return the money the possibility that they should raise re- upon one basis and charge the expenditure venue from other sources than customs ; upon another. In those colonies from and the only way in which we could see which the contribution per head is great- it was fair to return direct taxation was est the cost of government is usually in proportion to the amount raised. It greatest too, for very much the same state was pointed out, in reference to some par- of society as induces a larger contribution ticular branches of taxation, that the bur- per head — certainly of customs — involves den would fall almost wholly upon certain an increased cost of government per head, states. My hon. colleague has given the I am indicating the arguments that oc- case of revenue from pastoral properties. We took the case of a stock-tax or a gold- tax, which are burdens which would fall very unequally on different colonies. It curred to the Constitutional Committee. We had a great deal of dilliculty in coming to any satisfactory solution of the matter ; but at last we modified the recommenda- is quite fair, therefore, that these would tions in the report of the Finance Coin- not be returned according to pc»pula- tion. Sir Joiix Bray : It would not be fair to raisf,' them for federal purposes ! Sir SAMUEL GIIIFFITII: Still, it might be necessary to raise them for ft'deral purposes. The hon. member will see that we have to face contingencies. Tlic hon. memV^er a.ssumes that we are going to live on a protective tarifF. Tiiat is very likely ; but it is equally conccivaljh; that our huc- ces.sors may be of a difl'erent opinion to us, and may resort to other mcthodH of taxa- tion. I object to argue on the assumption mittee which had been embodied in tlio bills before us by making a more gene- ral provision with respect to all rcvcMiue. The Finance Committee tlH'Uin«'lvcH wore of opinion tliat tliiH was the proj>er rule until there was a uniform tariff. Then, \slivdoesit ceji«e to bo fair nfterwnnlH ? I recogniHO that it will Ik* very incon- venient afterwardrt. Mr. IWkckk.s : ( )n ai'<r they bear so directly on tlic nrgumont jfore U.S. It is a remarkable thing that every table that bears on that has been suppressed. It is called table " H," and the heading of it is " Revenue which would be derived from each province if in addition to duties on alcoholic drinks, tobacco, opium, itc, duties equal to 13 per cent, ad valorem were levied on foreign produce imported." I think these calculations are the idea of the Colonial Treasurei- — at all events, they ■were worked out by the Government Statis- tician. The way they got a geneial ad valorem duty of 1.3 per cent, was this : they put fixed duties on all such things as spirits, opium, tobacco, and so forth, and they chose a tariff which would, on tlie general importations, give the full amount of the contributions through customs for the previous year. That they found to be 13 per cent., and if they had the whole of that there would be a universal tariff of 13 per cent. This is how it works out : If the principle of the bill, so far as regards the clause that I am seeking to amend, is carried out, and the colonies pay for the general government according to their con- tributions through this tariff, and not ac- cording to population, New Soutli Wales, instead of paying lis. r)d., would pay 12s. Gd. ; Victoria, 13s.; Queensland, 1 Is. ; South Australia, 5s. 3d. ; Western Australia, 18s. Id.; Tasmania, 8s. Gd.; and New Zealand, lis. 4d. ]\Ir. Douglas : On what calculation is that based 1 Sir THOMAS McILWKA ITil : On the tariff they have e.\i»laincd. Sir John IJuay : An inmgiimry tariff I Sir THOM.\S McHAVK.MTH : An im.'iginary taiill"— n tariff of tho aolual existing fix«'d duties on KpiritH and lobncco and an imaginary tariff of 13 per cent, en the importntioHR, which will bring it up to the tarilTs ax tlioy oxiHt now. I know well that you got different roHuItH from different tariffH ; but it i» inipnsHibli- to mnk" a tariff of gcnernl nppliiMtion in tho colonies tl''* "'" '""'t come out with llio 810 Commonxcealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. same results, and that is to prove that mak- under her tariff, while New South Wale! in" the colonies contribute to the general raises only £1,900,000. It would be, there e.xpenditure according to tlie amount of fore, very unfair to say that at the presen their customs revenue is a wrong prin- time, with varied tariffs — tariffs showin< ciplo, will be unequal, will depart from that in one colony you collect only £1 14s the principle of payment according to 6d. per head, whilst in another colony th( population, and will fall very heavily on amount is over <£4 per head — the unex some of the colonies, for instance, on pended balance should be returned to eacl Queensland and Western Australia. Hon. colony in proportion to its population members say it is an imaginary tariff when The committee thought that after th( I use the Victorian tariff, and it is an im- federal tariff had come into operation i aginary tariff when I take a tariff made up would then be fair not only to charge th( by the Government Statistician. I should whole of the expenses of the federal go like to know liow they can get at the effects vernment against the customs and excis( or results unless in this way It We have to revenue, but also to distribute the balanc( fancy something that will be done, and see on the basis of population. I think that ai W'hat the result will be. That is clearly the lion, member. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith proved as far as this part of the clause is has referred to the way in which Soutl concerned. 1 do not want to go into the Australia would be benefited, it woulc facts referred to by the hon. member. Sir be well to look at the other side of th( John Bray, because that would lead very question. Let us deal with the questiox likely to a longer debate. But this is a we have absolutely before us. The hon much simpler matter. The simplicity of member proposes that the expenses shal it is that each colony shall pay according be charged at per head of the population to its population, and after its proportion If we do that, what shall we find 1 W( of the general expenditure is deducted, the shall find that South Australia, in connec actual balance of its contribu^tion shall be tion with her postal and telegraph servic( handed back, and not an average be made alone, will be giving up a revenue of ovei of all the colonies. £30,000 per annum, whilst Queenslanc Mr. BURGESS : The hon. member, Sir will be benefited at the expense of th( Samuel Griffith, asked the Committee just federal government, on that service alone now why the committee recommended a to the extent of over £113,000. That ii different course being taken, when we not much, the hon. gentleman says ; but i had a federal tariff', from that which we he will just take the trouble to look int( recommend at the present time. If the the figures on the basis of a population o: hon. member will refer to the table that 422,000 persons, he will see that it meani has been printed showing the incidence of something like 5s. per head of the popula thecustomsdutiesnow levied in Australasia tion of Queensland, the payment of whicl he will at once see tliat it was absolutely will be taken over by the federal govern necessary, as a matter of justice, until the ment, and the inhabitants of the colonj federal tariff came into operation, that the will be relieved to that extent. And so i balance, after the payment of the general is with other colonies in other ways. Th< expenses, should be returned in proportion average cost of defence, I find, is to b( o the amount raised. Now, for instance, 3s. 3d. per head. In some of the colonie; let me take two colonies. New South Wales — in Victoria, for instance — the defenc( and Victoiia, practically with the same force costs now Gs. 3d. per head, so thai population. Victoria raises £2,890,000 there again that colony will be relieved t( [.S'l'r Thomas Mcllwraith. Commonicealth of [7 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. SU the extent of 3s. per head in connection with its taxation. Take, again, the postal service of that colony. I think the pre- sent loss is something like £50,000 per annum, and the committee calculated in their estimate that, with the reduced post- age to the United Kingdom, that amount " would be increased to over £80,000 per annum. In considering all these matters, the committee thought that, while they were prepared to recommend that the vari- ous colonies should be relieved of those charges, on the other hand, they should share in the general benefits which would be derived from the establishment of a uniform tariff. These, sir, were the rea- sons which actuated the committee in making the recommendations which they did ; and I maintain that if you decide that, after the federal tariff is estab- lished, the expenses shall be charged on one basis, and the balance returned on an altogether different basis — I maintain that if you dej^art from the recommendations of the Finance Committee, you will act in defiance of the resolution of the Conven- tion, that trade and commerce between the federated colonies shall be absolutely free, and you will altogether intensify the an- noyances and embarrass trade more than it has ever been embarrassed in the past. I think that, viewed as a matter of absolute fairness to all the colonies, it is right that, if we are prepared to take over the whole of the responsibilities by whicli we relieve some colonies, we should be equally pre- pared to distriliute the unexpended bal- ance, and po.ssibly benefit those that have been injured in some other way. Sir JOHN DOWNER: It is rather dilli- 3ult to deal with tlie proposal now before us, withoutdealiug with the wliolc question. Jt is quite impo.ssible to consider the question Wto the distribution of the expenditure of ihe government, without also d Jiavo any feih-rutiou at ull. 1 hav(( heard ni.my li<»n. nienilierK, and par- ticularly th(! hon. member, Sir Jlenry PurkcH, Hpeak inoHt Htron;;ly of the U-rriblo position in whi»:h the colonieH were pluecul through th(! interference b«>tw('en tlieni creatt'd l>y tlio cUMtonm housen on tiieir borders. TIioho cu»toniK lioUMeH nmy l»o a.s groat a cufHc to the colonicM oh hon. 812 Commonicmllh of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. gentlemen Lave described them to be ; but, at all e%'ents, they are established only for the purpose of each state pro- tecting itself against individuals, possibly within its own boundaries, and possibly in other states. Now "we are asked to agree to something still more invidious than the custom-houses to Avhich hon. members ob- ject, inasmuch as each state would have to protect itself, not against individuals within its own borders, or in other com- munities, but directly against the other states. We should initiate this feder- ation, the basis of which is to be a kindly and friendly feeling throughout Australia, Avith states having mutual distrust of one another, and having to impose barriers far more mischievous in their operations than the custom-houses which now exist. The representati\es of the larger colonies who take this view also forget Mr. MuNRO : We have not expressed our views ! Sir JOHN DOW^NER : I do nob know what view the hon. member, Mr. Munro, takes ; but I do know thattlie hon. gentle- man has certain views upon the mattei', and as far as eacli of the larger colonies is concerned, if they object to the just and •equal method recommended by the Finance Committee, and if they can show that in its immediate incidence some loss or inequality might arise, so far as a par- ticular colony is concerned, I would ask them to recollect one other thing, that is, the strong disposition to centralisa- tion everywhere — the strong inclination ©f every one to go to the largest centre of population. When these customs barriers are removed, undoubtedly, as the hon. member. Sir John Bray, has said, the smaller colonies will obtain their goods, to a much larger extent than at present, from the larger centres. Therefore, a large por- tion of the benefit of this arrangement must be reaped by the larger colonies ; so that, even if they sustain some incidental [u;,'|ily agree with the; Imii. member, Sir .John Downer, that if wo are going to fedcin(jin'h.s«M|. Ion. members will ask, huw docs this It is very intcn-sting. ithliowH tlio *'ri'- ome al)Out ? It is cjuitc easy to see how vcnuo which would be di*rivod from eacli comes about. The South Australian )irovinc«' if, in addition to ihilicK on alco- vriff, considering the amount of duties (in holic drinks, toliacru, opium, itc, duticH jecific articles and ad val»rciii 'hil'icH, is equal to 1. 'J per cent. ««/ t' avernjifo I am not quite sure about New Zealand, amount raised l)y tin* wholr of tlie Au«- have not given lier tarilF very mucli atten- tralian colonicH is £2 Oh. id. pcrinlialiil^int. on; but then it does not juoduce any- Dcilucfing 12h. from thai, the amount con- ling. What is the use of putting a duty tributi-d by the dillVrcnt colonicN in vrry 3 F 818 Commonwealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. unequal. New South "Wales contributes £2 8s. 5(1. ; Victoria, £2 10s. -Id. ; Queens- land, £2 lis. 2d. ; South Australia — this is the cause of the enthusiasm — £1 3s. 4d.; Western Australia, £3 9s. lid.; Tasma- nia, £1 12s. lOd.— there is a little mild enthusiasm in that quarter too ; New Zea- land, £2 3s. 8d. That makes an average of £2 6s. 4d. If we deduct from the amount raised per head by the different colonies the sum of 12s., the cost of the federal government — lis. 5d. is the actual amount, but I have taken a lump sum ; it does not affect the argument — the result is an average amount to be returned out of the surplus of £1 14s. 4d. per head of the population. The full amount to which New South Wales is entitled — that is, if she gets back the real balance due from the amount she has contributed to the cus- toms — is £2 8s. 5d., which, less 12s., would leave£l 16s. 5d., instead of £1 14s 4d. She contributes therefore a bonus to South Australia and Tasmania of 2s. Id. per head of lier population. Victoria con- tributes about double the amount. She ought to get back £1 18s. 4d., and accord- ing to population she only receives £1 14s. 4d., or 4s. less than she is entitled to. Queensland, according to the principle agreed to by the committee, ought to get back £2 2s. 2d., instead of which she only receives, according to population, £1 14s. 4d., or 7s. lOd. per head less than she is entitled to. South Australia actually gets back all her customs and £1 3s. per head of the population in addition. Mr. Playford : The figures must be wrong. South Australia cannot get back £1 3s. per head in addition to the £600,000 which would be raised from customs re- venue ! Sir THOMAS MclLWRAITH : If the hon. gentleman will wait until I have finished the table, I will allow him to reply. There is no doubt whatever about South Australiagetting this money back. Western [Sir Thomas Ilcllwraith. Australia will raise £3 9s. lid. per head of her jjopulation, and she ought to get back £2 15s. lid. ; but, as she only gets back, under the proposal of the hon. member. Sir John Bray, £1 14s. 4d., she will contribute £1 Is. 7d. to the defaulting colonies. Tas- mania would contribute £1 12s. lOd., and she ought to get back £1 Os. lOd, ; but as she would get back £1 14s. 4d., she woull be presented with a bonus of 13s. 6d. An Hon. Member : If these figures ari- printed, why cannot the hon. member dis- tribute them 1 Sir THOMAS MclLWRAITH: No, these are the suppressed papers. Now, I have offered to apply this principle to every imaginable tariff, and surely if it applies in every case I have proved it thoroughly. If the hon. gentleman thinks it is such a splendid argument to say that it would only apply to an imaginary tariff why doe^ he not bring forwai'd a tai-iff to which it would not apply 1 Sir John Bray : I want to base my argument on facts ! Mr. Playford : The hon. member has taken the worst year of all in dealing with South Australia — the year when we had a 3-bushel per acre harvest ! Sir THOMAS MclLWRAITH : Thai! is another thing, and we will give the re- presentatives of South Australia every latitude with regard to it. I did not know until the hon. gentleman told me that I had taken a bad year for South Australia. If I had known, I should have picked another year ; but if I had gone further back I should have had to give reasons for doing so. Mr. Macdonald-Paterson : We had a bad year in Queensland, too ! Sir THOMAS MclLWRAITH : At all events, I have taken the latest statis- tics. The hon. member, Mr. Playford, asks how it is that when South Australia contributes £1 3s. 4d. they will actually Cominonweallh of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill 819 get back £1 3s. more than that amount. It is simply because the average amount to be returned, if it is returned per capita, will be £1 14s. 4d., which will leave £\ 3s. to be handed back, if the amendment of the hon. member, Sir John Bray, is carried. By their mode of distribution Queensland will get a great deal less than she ought, and New South "Wales and Victoria will be in the same position, while New Zealand will be dealt with very well, and Western Australia will be the biggest victim of all, though South Australia and Tasmania will actually get back the whole of their customs, and a large bonus in addition. Those are the facts that came before the committee. What are the facts that have come before us since ? I have here a, table which was made out this morning ind which I would have had put before ;he Committee days ago had I known that ihese tables were suppressed ; but I did lot know it until last night. It shows srhat would be the result, if, instead of .dopting this imaginary tariff, we should .dopt the Victorian tariff. New South Vales would then have to contribute to he expen.ses of the federal government, istead of U.S. 5d., 14s, lid., supposing the istribution were made according to the mendment of the hon. member, Sir John iray; Victoria, instead of contributing Is. 5d., would have to contribute 13.s. 1; Queensland, instead of lis. .5d., would ive to pay £1 3s. Id. ; and South Aus- alia, instead of paying anything, would ceivea bonus of £1 Is. 3d. per head of the •pulation. Western Australia is the Jy colony that would be .square. She juld have to pay lis. 6d. instead of 3. .5d., or Id. more than slio ought to y; Tasmania would pay Gs. 5d., and 5W Zealand is. Gd. I use 11. s. r)d. in- lad of 123. because the Government itLstician in comytiling this table lias :en the latost returns. The effect of I flying a uniform tariff to the varioim colonies would be to punish all the large consumers of goods. Those who contri- buted most would be mulcted to benefit those who contribute least. But that is not an equitable system of distribution. ^ I now want to illustrate another argument advanced against my amendment by the hon. member. Sir John Bray. He said that we had enough trouble at the present time to ascertain the amounts to be paid at the customs, and if we were to keep up the existing system we should get no advantage from the federal government. I differ entirely from the hon. member, Sir John Bray, as to what it would cost to ascertain the amount paid in the shape of duty on articles actually consumed in the different colonies. I do not think there would be any great difficulty in regard to the matter at all. Quite independent of that, however, the matter is one which ought to be faced, so that our statistics may be placed on a proper basis. No one has a higher appreciation of the talents of Mr. Coghlan and Mr. Hayter in getting up the statistics of the various colonics than I have. These gentlemen are worthy of all praise, and the books they issue are a credit to the colonics. I ari.scd on looking at the tcrrilily large niiiount of imports of tli.'it colony in proportion to tho jxipuliition and to the known trade ; but when we take into conKideration llio fact that the wiiole of tlio Hilver and th<* lead which comeH from I'ldken Hill ligurcs twice in tlio Htatistics of the colony — finit, on going into the colony at the Broken 820 Commonwealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Hill boundary, and then on going out at Adelaide, or whatever other port it is shipped from, we can understand why the figures are so large. Another fact in re- card to South Australia is that all the wool that comes down the Murray figures as an import of that colony, when it comes into port from the river, and then it figures as an export on going out. With regard to New South "Wales, all the gold coming from Mount Morgan figures as an import, and as an export, too ; and, possibly, it figures also as an import and export of Vic- toria. All these statistics, therefore, are misleadinar, and I contend that we ought to go to considerable ti'ouble and expense in having them correct. There can be no trouble whatever in arriving at what I want to arrive at, and that is the amount of money paid by the different colonies on the goods consumed in those colonies. The matter is not one which should be put on one side ; let it be referred to practical men who are acquainted with business and with statistics, and I will guarantee that they will furnish a report that it will cost less to obtain the statistics properly and cor- rectly than the Queensland Government alone will have to hand to South Aus- tralia for these bonuses, through the pecu- liar mode of distribution they advocate, simply because it is the only i)i-actical mode. It is not the only practical mode ; it could be done perfectly well otherwise. With regard to South Australia there is very little difficulty and with regard to the other colonies there is very little difficulty ; and the difficulty would be far more than counterbalanced by the advantage to the colonies in knowing, thoi-oughly, the extent of their business, the extent of their manu- facture.s, the amounts imported and ex- ported, and other information which we do not possess at the present time. Hon. delegates seem to imagine that there is some kind of symmetry between distri- buting the .surplus according to population, [Sir Thomas Mclhcraith. and chai'ging the different colonies for theiir government according to population. I do not see at all where the symmetry is obtained in establishing a system of that kind, because the one question has nothing whatever to do with the other. The twO' propositions, that each colony should con- tribute according to population, and that the surplus should be distributed, as nearly as possible, according to the amount actually contributed to the revenue, are perfectly consistent. We give the colonies back what belongs to them after having charged them with their share of what it costs, to govern the country. Is there anything at all to show why it is going to cost to govern Queensland, federally, double what it is going to cost to govern South Australia] I cannot give any reason. The hon. mem- ber, ISlr. Burgess, says that all the disad- vantages will be far more than counterbal- anced by the advantages which are going to be given to Queensland financially. He instances the fact that we would make a. profit out of the po.st-office of South Aus- tralia, and that a very heavy loss would bo incuri'ed by undertaking the post-office arrangements of Queensland. There is something in that idea, and if it had been In'ought before the Committee, I, for one, would have said, " Adjust the methods at once ; I have no objection whatever that it should be adjusted ; but remember that you will be adopting something like a dif- ferent principle." The South Australian Postal Department is profitable, I believe, because it is a bad one, and is administered for revenue purposes. The Queensland Postal Department is a good one, and is ad- ministered for the accommodation of the public, and we know perfectly well that we may lose by it. I have no doubt that when the new policy comes into operation, and the federal government takes charge of the postal departments, a good system of man- agement, and greatly increased accommoda- tion will be adopted, and that the postal Commonwealth of [7 April, 1891.1 Australia Bill. S21 department of South Australia will cost mation in connection with this matter. I as much as the postal department in Queensland. The difference entirely arises from the want of postal accommodation in South Australia. I know from ex- perience that the accommodation to the people who write and receive letters is worse in that colony than in any other, I can therefore understand why they ob- tain a profit from their postal department. "When matters are assimilated, I have no doubt there will be no occasion for grumb- ling. At all events, I, for one, would at once agree to handing over our proportion, so that there should not be any loss. But why raise a question of that kind here? The time to di.scu.ss questions of that kind was at the committee meetings. I was prepared to discuss the question, but it was put before the committee and was passed over with the whole of the facts before us as to the revenue and expenditure of the postal systems in the different colonies. Why was it not brought up ? It was certainly think that if that information had been universally distributed amongst the dele- gates we would have had a far more thorough understanding on the matter. It looks, as some hon. member has character- ised it, as though there hnd been secret meetings of the Finance Committee. I have no intention of making anything secret in connection with that committee myself, and all this information ought to have been distributed broadcast. It is information on which we are bound to act. The information contained in all those tables is true. It is made up by one of the cleverest men in the colony, and it is information that we can thoroughly trust. It is perfectly reliable. I say that it ought to have been disseminated broad- cast. We ought to know the ground on which we stand. How could we possibly accept an amendment such as that of the hon. member. Sir John Bray ] We should either have to acknowledge, when not brought up on the understanding that we go back to our constituents, that wo a proposition such as that which is to be moved by the hon. member. Sir John Bray, would be accepted by the Conven- tion. The hon. member, Sir John Bray, says that unless wc act in a wide spirit it will be hopeless to expect that we can obtain federation, I would tell him that I Lave been as keen an advocate of federa- did not understand the matter when the facts were put before us, or, what would be a great deal worse, that we were knaves and did not make use of the information in order to get justice for the diHeront colonies. I can fjuite approciatethomotivcs that actuate the hon. nicuibers, Sir Joliu Bray and jNIr. Playford, in standing up for tion as any one in the country, and that theirowncolony. Irenieniborthoblanklook the only way to obtain federation is to make it reasonable to the people who have sent us liere. Unless we do that we liavc no chance whatever of federating, and it is to remove any blocks of that Icind that I insist on fair play being given. of one of tho.se lion, gcntlenicn when t(ibh> E was put before liiiii. 1 know tiiat ho must advocate the cnu.scof lii.s colony, and for that I Avas prepared ; but T .iiii per- fectly satislifMl tliat when Soutli Australia understandH the facts sluj will bo as glad to Unless we can show that fair play has been come into tho fc'dcnition on (ho propoKnls allowed, and that we have stood up for the interests of our various colonies, wo .shall aavc to defend ourselves before our con- jtituents. I deprecate exceedingly the ittempt which has been made by the hon. nember, Mr, McMillan, to suppress infor- that wo made as on any oIIht fair lerniH, Mr .M.'Mir.T.AN: I think that my hon. friind ims been very Kovcr<* on nic, and rallHT unfair. If lio hns done any- thing at all to «liiy ho Iioh proved (liat tho Victorian tarifTisinjpowiiblc in the future; S22 Commoniceallh of [7 April, 1891.] Auatralia Bill. and I would remind him that although he has selected one tariff, it is by no means a model one, and is not a tariff upon which any determinate results can be based, be- cause, as very few people perhaps know, the Victorian tariff is a very curious one. I understand that about one-half of the articles come in free in a so-called protected colony. To take a tariff' of that kind, which is adjusted for purely local wants and exi- gencies, and to bring outany general results, may, of course, be useful as being approxi- mate, but cannot be reliable for the future. It seems to me that, as we are in the spirit of compromise, a very fair compromise can be considered which would practically restore the spirit of the recommendations of the Finance Committee, if we pass the amendment moved by the hon. member. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, and then, after the word " shall " in line 3 of the clause, insert the words " until the parliament otherwise provides," thus making the clause read, "and the surplus shall, until the parlia- ment otherwise provides, be returned to the several states in proportion," &c. That was really the intention of the Finance Committee. We knew that we had a veiy difficult thing to deal with at present — that there was an absolute injustice staring us in the face according to present con- ditions — but we did hope that in the new tariff, and under different conditions, a simpler and more symmetrical principle could be applied. The hon. member, Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, is not fair in his argument with regard to the respective colonies. He says, why should each colony not get back its pro[>ortion of its customs duties 1 But when we federate, all the formal and merely provincial boundaries that divide us will be done away with, and we shall be restored to our geographical boundaries. Who will for one moment say that if these colonies were parcelled out again, Victoria would not probably have up to the Murrumbidgee 1 I should [Mr. McMillan. bo very sorry ever to yield her an inch of territory more than she has, aS' we have got the territoiy ; but does anybody shut his eyes to the fact that the trade of that region is almost entirely absorbed by Victoria. And if it is absorbed by Vic- toria, when she has heavy duties with drawbacks and all the possible restrictions of trade, surely the great bulk of goods that will be imported into Riverina will come through the Custom house of Victoria, and according to the argument of my hon. friend, those are really the customs duties of New South Wales. The whole spirit of this is entirely anti-federal. I allow that there is a tremendous difficulty. I allow that my hon. friend, in going back to his own colony and putting those figures before the people there without very broad explanations and without a very liberal spirit attached to them, would have a very difficult task. But I hold that those figures^ although absolutely correct on the basis- upon which they are made out, are not fair figures in this debate. I am willing to go- so far as to accept those figures as the pre- sent condition of things. But if I accept them as the present condition of things, I do not admit that any one has a right tO' say that that will be the condition of things- in the future. All the existing tariffs have been made out with a view to local exigen- cies. They have been made out with a. narrow, provincial eye, and my hope for free- trade, as I have said before, is that when the unification, to a certain extent, of the colonies is complete, and when one common tariff' is decided upon, it will not be a tariff" to suit exactly either Victoria, or Queens- land, or South Australia, but will be a tariff" fair to all ; and if that tariff is fair to all, allowing for certain differences that must always occur, it ought to work out very differently, on a symmetrical basis, from the Victoria tariff instanced by the hon. member. Therefore, I give notice now^ if the Committee will allow me, though Commonicealth of [7 April, 1S91.] Australia Bill. 823 it is a little out of oi-der, that when my Lon. friend's amendment is moved and passed, which I trust it will be, I will move to insert after the word " shall," in line 3, the words " until the parliament otherwise provides," thereby giving the parliament, when it has come together in its true con- ~ stituted federal spirit, a chance of dealing with the thing on the only lines upon which it can be dealt with — the broad lines of federal union. Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : It is difficult to follow the hon. member for Queensland, Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, in his argument. He is like an unfortunate juryman who has all the rest of the jury against him. I understand that he was willing to adopt the opinion of the committee; but directly that was advocated by the hon. and learned member, Sir John Bray, he at once receded from that position. He then, in order to carry out, as it were, the position which he maintains, says that everybody is wrong except himself. The committee is accused of suppressing documents, the hon. member, Sir John Bray, is accused of misstating facts, and so we get into this abominable position. If anybody will take up the document that the hon. mem- ber was so exceedingly anxious this Con- vention should see, they will observe at once the fallacy of the whole of his argu- ment. The argument is founded upon the supposition that the Victorian tariff is to be adopted. If any one will take the trouble to look at the figui'es tliey will find that Queensland would have to pay £GG5,000 more than South Australia. Of 30ursc such a tarifT would not Ijc adopted, riie commonwealth would take care, as mentioned by the hon. memljer, ^Ir. McMillan, that the tariff should operate? cairly amongst all the colonics. There is I most remarkable thing again with re- jpect to the position of South Australia ind Queensland. South Australia has ipparently a very sober poi)ulation, but on the other hand Queensland is a most in- temperate country. Queensland goes in for .£564,000 worth of intoxicants, and South Australia for only £207,000 worth, being a difference of £357,000 sjient upon intoxicants. On the general revenue also, according to Victoria, Queensland would pay £G79,030, and South Australia £327,000,makingadiiierence of £351,000, showing how fallacious is the foundation upon which the hon. memlcr. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, insists upon his argument. I think that we here should take the opinion of the Finance Committee as being the cor- rect one, and we should endeavour at once to bring our labours upon this particular point to a close, instead of debating it as we have been doing for some thi"ee hours. The hon. member, Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, will try to disguise or keep back this great fact that, in respect to the federal govei-n- ment taking over the postal arrangements, £112,000 at the least is saved to the one colony, while £30,000 is lost to the other, making the difference in the figures just about even on that point. Again, we find in reckoning the revenue that the amount per head for the whole of the inhabit- ants of Australia should be £2 Gs. 5d. I imagine that the federal government will try and make these figures correspond as nearly as po.ssible willi respect to the general arrangements. The hon. member talks of Quecn.slHnd, but tlu! amount for Queensland at the present time is £3 7h, lOd., whereas if that colony comes into tho federation it would be only £2 Gs. M. How he is so persistent in carrying on this argu- jueiit 1 am at a loss touiiderHtand. No doubt in any federal arnuigemcnt the whole of tliise mattcr.s will be carefirily considered, and the oidy plan to adopt iH, it .ippenrHto me.tiiat the whole of the revenue Khull form one pool out of which the rxpeiihes hIiuII be paiil, and tlu; balance hhall l>e returned to tlio H(;veral colonics occordinn to popu- lation. If tlmt i« done it will save all 824 Commomveallh of [7 April, 1801.] Australia Bill, trouble. The clause in the bill will get rid of none of the difiiculties existing .it the present time. A man who travels from Sydney to Melbourne would be liable to have his portmanteau examined, and a man jroinsr there from Tasmania would have to go through the same ordeal if there hap- pened to be a disagreeable customs officer. I understand that one great object is to do away with these difficulties and the expense as well, and we can only do that on the principle of paying the revenues of the fedei-ated colonies into one pool, pay- ing the expenses of government out of that pool, and dividing the balance amongst the several colonies according to population. I hope that that system will be carried out, and that the proposal of the hon. member. Sir John Bray, will be accepted. Sir THOMAS McILWRAITH : The hon. member, Tsli\ McMillan, has offered a compromise, and offered it in a spirit which, I think, is quite worthy of this Conven- tion, namely, the spirit of conciliation, for the purpose of bringing about federation. I do not want to say a single word that would detract from the high trust that I have in the federation working well. I believe in remitting a great deal to them, and so far as the hon. member's suggestion is concerned, I have that trust in the federal government as to be satisfied to refer the whole matter completely to them. I do not want to have my ideas so fixed that it will require an alteration of the constitution to bring about an exact adjust, rnent of the finances. I have the most full confidence that the federal parliament will work so well that they will do justice to all, and in that spirit, therefore, I am perfectly prepared to accept my hon. friend's sugges- tion. Mr. BIRD : I am very glad that the hon. member, Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, has been induced under pressure to state his intentions with regard to the amendment to be proposed by the hon, member. Sir [Mr. Adye Douglas. John Bray, for if he had not done so, ] should have been somewhat disposed tc sui)port his amendment, because I desire that the expenditure of the common wealtl shall be borne pro rata, according to the population of the various states. Bui while I hold that view, I certainly hoM that the revenue, after a uniform tarifl has been established, should be regarded as having been contributed equally in the same way by the populations of the states or, as it has been put, that we should have simply one purse into which the whole oi" the revenue contributed to the common wealth shall go, and out of which the federal expenditure shall be paid, the balance being distributed according to the population of the states. Since the hon, member has stated that he intends to op- pose the amendment of the hon. member, Sir John Bray, T cannot help feeling that, the adoption of his amendment would introduce into this clause a larger mea- sure of inequality, and, to use a phrase of his own, of political iniquity than it now contains. For I feel sure that the adoption of his amendment, which would spread the expenditure of the common- wealth equally according to the population of the various states, would produce that inequality in the federation which I hope we are all desirous of avoiding. I do not like this clause at all ; to my mind it is the worst clause, or, perhaps, I should rather say it is the only bad clause in the bill, for it introduces that principle of in- equality which is to be deprecated, and certainly deprecated above all in a body which we are going to term a common- wealth. I trust that the principle of hav- ing one purse, out of which the whole of the expenditure shall be paid according to the population of the various states, will be adopted either in one form or another. It is just possible that the amendment sug- gested by the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, as a compromise, may be the best way out Commomcealth of [7 April, 1891.] Ausfralia BUI. 825 of the difficulty at the present time ; for I should certainly have felt that the parlia- ment of the commonwealth would be dis- posed to act upon that principle of fairness which was embodied in the recommenda- tions of the Finance Committee, And, if we are not likely to agree either to the amend- ment of the hon. member. Sir John Bray, or to that of the hon. member, Sir Thomas Mcll wraith, probably our wisest course would be to consider carefully, and per- haps adopt, after such consideration, the amendment suggested by the hon. member, Mr. McMillan. I could not help feeling, while listening to the remarks which fell from the lips of the hon. member. Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, that we have hardly become possessed yet of the true spirit of federation. I could not help asking my- self, while he spoke. Has it really come to this : that such a pettifogging, parochial spirit of selfishness is to be embodied in a clause of this bill constituting a com- monwealth as to take into consideration the question whether Queensland drinks a little more whiskey than South Australia, or whether the populations of some of the larger and more settled states clothe tliomselves in costlier raiment, or perhaps spend their wealth on plate, and jewelry, ami so forth to a larger extent than some of tlie populations in outlying jdaces far remote from tho.se centres where the world of fashion congregates ? Surely, if we are going to federate at all we must learn to lose si^ht of all the.se trifling dif- fercnccs, and feel that we are all one ; that in the federation we arc going to have a customs union in the truest and best sense of the word ; a union for postal and teln- ^apli jnirposos ; a union for (h-fenco pur- )Oses ; and that all exi)endituro in con- oection with carrying out those purpo.scs ihall be borne equally by tlic various jtates in j)roporlion to their popula- ion after a uniform tarifl' is estub- ished. Of course, until a uniform tarilT is established, there must be some provision such as is set out here, and such as was indicated by the recom- mendations of the Finance Committee for distributing the surplus revenue to the vari- ous colonies, after meeting the expenses of the federal government for the first year or two. Therefore, I felt that when the hon. member. Sir John Bray, indicated his amendment in the first instance, it was de- fective in leaving the bill without a provi- sion for that interim action; but he has now suggested, as an amendment of that, that the clause which was in the draft bill, and which truly embodied the recommendations of the Finance Committee, should be sub- mitted to the Committee. I shall feel it my duty, if we go to a division on that, to support an amendment which will restore the clause as originally jjlaced before tlie Constitutional Committee, and if, on the other hand, the Committee shall think it more desirable to leave the whole matter to the parliament of the commonwealth, I shall then doubtless feel it to be best to adopt the suggestion of the hon. mem- ber, Mr. McMillan, in that respect. But I do trust that in all these matters wo shall show somewhat more of the true federal spirit, and that we shall lose sight of the trifling losses and (rifling gains of one colony or the other, and that wo sluill all agree that in all these respects we are, and mean to be, tliDrouglily one. Mr. BAKE1{ : There is one htatoment made by the lion, membrr, Sir Thomoii Mcllwraith, that I cannot allow to go un- contradicted. Ho OHKerled that the p(i«t- ofTice service of South AiiRtnilia woh car- ried on for the i)urpo8o of raising' rovmue, and not for thr piirposi- of alVonling facili- ties to the puljlie. I do not know what opportunities tlio hon. nieuilM-r han had (»f asccrluining in what manner the |HiH(al service of South Australia is carrie«l on, but I give lii.H oKMrrtion tlio mont cmiihntic di-nial. T snv that there is no col""v in tlii^ 826 Commonwealth of [7 Apeil, 1891.] Australia BUI. group in which the postal service is Letter luaiiaged than it is in the colony of South A.ustralia, or in which it offers greater facilities to the public. I have known of instances in which persons who have taken up runs in the far interior, where they have been separated from the rest of the colony by long distances, without any water carriage, have applied to the Government of South Australia to establish a postal service for their particular stations, which applications have not been granted, but that is no reason whatever for asserting that the postal service of South Australia is not managed for the benefit of the public, and that it is not well managed. I say that it is, and I think I have had greater oppor- tunities of forming an opinion than has the hon. member, Sir Thomas Mcllwraith. Sir THOMAS McILWRAITH : I never made the assertion that the postal service of South Australia was not well managed. What I said was, that it was managed for the purposes of revenue, and not for the purpose of affording the greatest degree of accommodation to the public. I made no reflection whatever upon the Government of South Australia. Mr. Playford : The hon. member cer- tainly did. He said the postal service was not managed for the convenience of the public ! Sir THOMAS McILWRAITH : Cer- tainly I did ; but that is a question of policy. It is not a reflection upon the Government. Captain RUSSELL : We have got into a x'emarkable position. As a matter of fact, we are debating one of the most im- portant clauses in the bill, and, together wdth it, three or four amendments the wording of which we do not know, and some of which are not before the Commit- tee at all. There is, of course, one amend- ment before the Committee ; but allusion is repeatedly made to amendments that are to be moved ; and until they are absolutely before us, we scarcely know what we are [Afr. Baker. discussing. Unfortunately for all of us, how- ever, I think we are drifting further and fur- ther away from federation. Whatever else we may be aiming at, we are certainly nol aiming at that. I, at any rate, came here in a loyal and honest endeavour to support^ federation. There are two principles, it seems to me, which may be fairly discussed — one is a federation of Australasia, and; the other is a unification of Australia. Whatever may be said in eulogy of com- promise, I am afraid we may carry our desire to compromise so far that we shall have rather a unification of Australia than a federation of Australasia. We are getting into this absurdly anomalous posi- tion — that although we call what we are adopting federation, we are, in reality, drifting into unification. We have not, however, the courage of our opinions to go for either federation or unification. If there is to be a unification of Australia — and that, I am afraid, is what we are drift- ing into — it can be accomplished only byj realising that we are one nation, and thatj the people of Australia are one people.; All this talk about customs-houses, and the contributions of one and another por- tion of the colonies to the general revenue, must at once be set aside. Hon. mem- bers argue, it seems to me, as though we were for ever to remain as we are — that Victoria and New South Wales having a preponderating influence on the continent of Australia, are to remain with that preponderating influence for all time. Now, I venture to say that although New South Wales undoubtedly has from, many circumstances an enormous lead, and may possibly retain that lead for many years, perhaps for centuries, to come, the day will yet come when, I will not say all, but many parts of Australia will be as populous as those portions which are now the most populous. Therefore, if we are endeavouring to create a constitution not for to-day, but for people unborn, we ought CummoniceaUh of [7 AppaL, 1891.] Australia Bill, 827 not to look upon tlie subject from the narrow point of view as to which of the colonies produces most revenue or con- sumes the greatest quantity of dutiable articles ; but we ought so to frame our constitution that it shall apply to all parts of Australia without unnecessary interfer- ence with the various constitutions in the immediate future. I venture to say that the lines upon which we are proceeding will satisfy no one. I myself believe that unless we take more time to deliberate upon what we are doing the bill we shall pass — for of course we shall pass a bill — will be so many waste leaves and nothing else. Hex. Members : No ! Captain RUSSELL : Hon. members may say, " Ko," and to a certain extent I agree with them ; but I look upon the measure as the bringing together of a great mass of material, which, to use the meta- phor of the builder, has yet to be shaped before it can be erected into an edifice, or which, if you regard it as food, has yet to be assimilated; and the conclusion to which I have arrived is that we, as a body, are not fitted to come to a decision upon these points. Delegates who have listened to the addresses delivered since the com- mencement of these debates, must realise at once that we have all most materially modified our opinions since we first came here. And it is desirable that we .should do so. Jjut if, in the crude, undigested state in wliicli our views are at tlie present time, we are found materially changing our iopinions in so short a space of time, will Hany one say tiiat in tlio course of si.x (['months we shall not still further have ililtered lliem ] I venture to say that ':by that time many of us will Ijo founhicli I call attention, tiny are liable to he criticism to which I have iv\t it my uty to .subject them. ISIr. DoxAi.D.sON : Where is thecriticiHUi? Mr. KINGSTON: That to ba.sc a en 1- ulation as to what will be the contribu- ion of tlie whole of Australia uncl(;r a niform tariff on facts and figures relat- foundation to whicli I have called atten- tion, or they are matters of pure- specula- tion, which can afford us no reliable guide in the course which we propose to lay down as to the distribution of suiplus revenue. Sir JOHN ERAY : Tlie amendment before us is not the one which I intend to move. I ask hon. meml)ers to vote against this amendment, with tlir view of substi- tuting a clause included in the draft bill by the Constitutional Connuitteo on tho reconiniendation <»f the Finance Coinmittco. :\lr. ML'NKO : I understand that if thin amendment is carried the ("oionijil Trea- surer of N(!W South Walrs will move. another which will leave it open to tlio I'arliamfnt to nudco future arrangrniontH which will be satisfactory to nil piirtieK, instead of malving the claUK<« hard and- fast, a.s it is now. Aiu I to understand that that is agreed to ? Mr. .M. Mii.i.AN : Ych! Sir SA.MI I.I. CKIFIII'II : Tho efH-ct of this nnwndiiient, if carrieower to mitko a frcHh arrangement if tliey think 832 Commonwealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. fit, and the necessity for such a,n arrange- ment is bound to be thrust upon them if there is any inequality or injustice exist- ing, because the representatives from those parts of the commonwealth where it exists will bring it forward. But to compel the parliament to make this arrangement be- fore it lias had time to go into the matter carefully, and ascertain whether there is any injustice or inequality is to cause un- necessary trouble and friction. I should like to vote for the amendment of the hon. member. Sir John Bray, if I could ; but I think that the amendment of the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, is moi*e just and equitable, and likely to be more satisfac- tory to all. Mr, THYNNE : It seems to me that the hon. member, Sir John Bray, lias for- gotten some of the clauses which we have already passed. He now proposes that the mode of distributing the surplus shall accompany the bill imposing the federal tariff; but we have already provided that a taxation bill shall contain only one sub- ject of taxation, so that practically his pro- posal now is that the federal parliament shall not pass the tariff until they have first of all passed a bill by which the sur- plus is to be distributed. That increases the difficulties in the way of passing a federal tariff at all, and I think would make them so great as to leave in per- petuity the present system of taxation in each colony. Mr. AD YE DOUGLAS : I presume that the object of the hon. member. Sir John Bray, is to have something of a final character. The amendment proposed by the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, leaves everything just as it is. The colonies of Xew South Wales and Victoria will retain their tariffs as at present, and nothing can be done in the federal parliament to bring about a uniform tariff; and so we shall go on as we are now for the next ten or twelve years. That is not the object of [ifr. Munro. this Convention. The object of the Con- vention is to have a uniform tarifi" of some kind as speedily as possible. Mr. Munro : The amendment of the hon. member, Sir John Bray, will prevent that ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : The amend- ment of the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, will postpone the day as long as possible. Sir Samuel Griffith : No ; but the amendment of the hon. member, Sir John Bray, will do so ! Mr. ADYE DOUGLAS : The amend- ment of the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, leaves the matter entirely open. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : It seems to me that putting the sub-clause in the form proposed might lead to the most serious con- sequences. I anticipate that there will be very little difficulty in framing a uniform tariff. I anticipate also that there will be- a great deal of difficulty in determining how to distribute the proceeds. If the par- liament agrees to a uniform tariff, either one or two things must happen ; it must either, in the same session, by another bill, pro- vide for its distribution, which they may not agi'ee upon in that session, or there will be a large surplus in the hands of the federal government which cannot be dis- tributed at all. Serious difficulties may thus occur. Mr. DEAKIN : The amendment of the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, says that " after the imposition of duties" this question may be considered by the federal parliament ; and the amendment of the hon. member, Sir John Bray, has the effect of rendering it imperative, that after the imposition of duties, the federal parliament should undertake this question. Mr. Fitzgerald : And coincidentally ! Sir Samuel Griffith : Immediately ! Mr. DEAKIN: Neither the word "co- incidentally" nor the word "immediately" is used ; and as I read the amendments they have neither the effect of requiring the federal parliament to "immediately" nor Commomvealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 833 vet "coinoidentally " undertake this task. Tlie only word indicating the time at which it has to be undertaken is the word "after," which is surely indefinite enough for all purposes. I do not wish to occupy time if I am under a misapprehension, but I^ think the point ought to be made clear, be- cause any concession which can be made to meet the views of the large and important minority who voted in the last division should be made ; and when that conces- sion is in the direction of giving greater liberty to the federal parliament, of allow- in cr the commonwealth to settle its own affairs, it has behind it another strong argument to which we are bound to pay attention. I v/ill say nothing more until the exact words of the amendment are read. Sir Thomas McIlwraitii : It is circum- scribing the action of the federal parlia- ment I Mr. DEAKIN : I think that is a wrong word to use. It is requiring action from the federal parliament, but it is leaving tlie federal parliament thoroughly free as to the direction which that action shall take. Sir Thomas McIlwkaith : They must take action ! Mr. DEAKIN : They must take action, and the only word which implies time is the word "after." If there is any such im- )lication, as the hon. member. Sir Samuel Gridith, fears, I am sure the hon. member. Sir Jolin Bray, will be perfectly willing to liter his amendment. As I understand it, ill that is desired is simply to require the !Ommon\vcaIth to deal with this question 18 soon as it conveniently can after tlio )assing of a uniform tarifl'. It will bo .n easy matter to adopt the necessary wonls remove any further implication from tlio mendment, and V)y that means we sliould ave the great advantage of rf ndering this Ilause acceptable to the Committee as a 'hole. I 3 a Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The hon. member, Mr. Deakin, has lost sight of this point, that we have laid down a tixed rule so long as there are various customs tariffs. But as soon as there is a uniform taritf we wish to let the federal parliament make any rule it pleases. We must, howeser, pro- vide for the intervah The amendment of the hon. member. Sir John Bray, leaves no interval but it leaves the surplus incapable of distribution until the federal pai'liament has made a new law on the subject. Mr. DEAKIN : As I understood the hon. member, I did not think ho intended that. Amendment upon the amendment nega- tived. Amendment agreed to ; clause, as amended, agreed to. CUuise 11. Preference sliall not be given l>y lac(! from which she is coming she luis had to pay her ordinary dues, and she will havo colonial free-trade is to simplify trade to jiay in the place at which she arrives. in every possible shape, and ships should This clause has come liown rciilly as the result of some of theoppn-ssivf nuvigution regulations of llic old time in the L'nit4'J States. That is no doubt Ihe ori^jiii of it, and witli the hon. mcmlier, Mr. Dayford, I have every respect for the opcmtion oflhJM clause as preventing what Iiiih liappetiod iu the paht, iinn- wcultli limy, with i' ■ nl of llip ptirlii llMlltHrif nil lllPHt^.' c |n«n frir ULih,- «>vor ftiiil noiiiMilidiitiiiff ihc wholo or any jmi t of the puMic tlcla "f rtiiy •Uto or liatci, Imt 5 be allowed to go from one port in the colonies to another without having to lake out clearances or make entries each time. Mr. ML'NRO: I understand that the reason why the amendment was proposed was that it dofs not bind tin; fcdci-a- tion to a certain course, but loaves tiit; federation to make its own urrangementH. That is really what it does ; it does not 30mpel them to do anything. Mr. TIIYNXK : I sym|)athise with tho ion. member, Mr. I'layford, in liis respect lor this clause, because it has been takf-ii rem the United States Constitutirtn. I think we ou'dit to hesitate; before we Jiminatc the latter part of it. The hon. 836 Commonioealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. so tliat a state shall be liable to iiuleranify the commoinvealth in respect of the anioinit of a debt taken over, and that the amount of interest payable in respect of a debt shall be 10 deducted and retained from time to time from the share of the surplus revenue of the commonwealth -which would otherwise lie payable to the state. Sir JOHN BRAY : With reference to this clause, hon. members will be aware that I intimated a short time ago that in my opinion we ought to throw on the commonwealth immediately the responsi- bility of the debts of the various colonies. It is quite true that so far as relates to the colonies themselves it will be neces- sary to make some adjustment of the amounts that have to be borne by the commonwealth ; but, still, in order that the states of Australia may reap the bene- fits to which they may fairly look forward, from federation, it seems to me abso- lutely necessary that we should provide that the commonwealth shall undertake theresponsibilities that have been incurred. I therefore propose to move in substitu- tion for this clause, a clause which has been handed round, in print, I believe, to hon. members, and which reads as follows : — The commonwealth shall be liable for the public debts of each state existing at the time of this act coming into operation, and each state shall be liable to the commonwealth for the amount (if any) by which the public debt owing by the state shall exceed the amount of pounds per head of the population of sucli state. It has been, susrgested that it would be well to make each state liable for thefull amount of its debts, and not to provide, as I pro- pose to do here,thata certain fixed amount of so much per head of the population should be intrusted entirely to the common- wealth. I think, however, it is preferable that we should do it in the way which I suggest here, and should distinctly say to the commonwealth, "We intend to saddle you with the responsibility of paying the interest on these debts, and the debts them- selves up to a certain amount to be agreed upon, at per head of the population." If we do not do that we shall, as has been indicated by several hon. members through- out this discussion, be intrusting the com- monwealth with a revenue which will largely exceed their requirements, and which will cast upon them the very diffi- cult and delicate task of determining how it is to be returned. It seems to me it would be far better for us to say at once, " You have to undertake not simply the collection of a certain amount of revenue, but you have also to undertake a certain amount of liability in connection with that revenue. We shall leave you to determine how you can fairly do this best in the in- terests of all the states." In carrying this amendment, I would point out that we do not in any way interfere with the right of each state to borrow what it requires for its own purposes. I, for one, would not be inclined to do that. I feel that each colony has its own future to work out, and must be allowed its own way of work- ing it out, and that the federal government is not to say to all these different states, " You have borrowed so much money, and you must not borrow any more." But I say that we ought to pi'ovide that the federal government shall undertake the responsibility of the debts of the various colonies at the time this bill comes into operation, and if any other clauses may be necessary to adjust this more definitely than my amendment, I trust they will be agreed to. But I do ask hon. gentlemen to consider the fact that, if we trust the commonwealth with the collection of a large amount of revenue, the least we can do, in order to place the treasurers of the different colonies in a fair position to cal- culate their revenue and expenditure, is j to say that, while a certain amount of their revenue is taken from them, at the same time they shall be relieved of a cer- tain amount of their expenditure, which amount can be calculated so as to act Commonweahh of [7 April, 1891.] Australia BUI. 837 fairly and equitably between the various colonies. In my opinion, if we ne^^lect to take this opportunity to do this we shall fail in the duty we have under- taken. I am quite willing to admit, as has been stated by the hou. member. Sir Thomas Moll wraith, that when the Finance Committee were considei'ing this matter, I was not prepared at once to ask the federal government to assume this respon- sibility. But I was one of those who suggested that we should include a clause in our report — the clause which is now before the Committee — which would em- powerthe federal parliament at some future time, with the consent of the different state parliaments, to take over our debts and liabilities. It seems to me, after fully considering the matter, that in simply empowering them to do tliis we are not doing all that we ought to do — that we ought not to empower them, but that we should require them to do it as far as we fairly can in the interests of the states and of the federal government itself. As between the commonwealth and the out- .side public, the commonwealth will be liable for all the debts, and as between the commonwealth and the states, each state will be liable for an amount which exceeds so much per head of the population. The commonwealth is to look to each colony for its portion of the debt, and for its propor- tion of the interest on the debt, and so far as the treasurers of the diflerent states are concerned they will know that not merely a large amount of their revenue is taken away, but that a largo portion of their liability is removed from tlieir shoulders. It will save a great deal of confusion if wo can agree to some such .schemf. I trust the Committee will agree to some such scheme as that indicated by my amend- ment, because I am one of tijose who feel that we ought not simply to leave it to the federal government to detorniine how tlify shall spend the large amount with uhi.h they are intrusted ; but that we shall, as far as we can, form an equitable mode of distribution at the same time as we intrust it to them. I therefore move, in the first instance : That the clause be amemled by the omission of the words "The ix\r)iameiit of," line 1. Sir Samuel Griffitu : Are we to under- stand that the whole question of taking over the debts is to be discussed on this amendment ? Sir Joiiy Bray : Yes ! Mr. DiBBS : Why not move to omit the whole clause for the purpose of putting something else in, so that we may discuss the whole question ? The Chairman': The parliamentary course would be to negative the clause and to propose a new clause subsequently. Amendment proposed. Mr. DEAKIN : The extreme gravity of the proposal which is now before tlie Com- mittee is scarcely likely to be undervalued. This is a deliberate proposal to saddle the commonwealth at the outset of its career with a debt of considerably over £100,000,000. Mr. McxRO : £180,000,000 ! Mr. Baker: £11. 3, 000, 000, excluding New Zealand I ]\rr. DEAKIN : W ith a debt of nearly £1 50,000,000, even excluding New Z.-u- land. Then, sir, it is perfcitly clear, and I take it that the lion, mcnibi-r, Sir Jolm Bray, is seized of the fact, that liisninond- ment, if carried as a whole, would only be the first of a series of clauses which would be required to ileal with this «|U«'s(ii)ii in its consequential aHjicc (s. NeverthclrKH, it raises the financial \sh\w at once. Tim prospect is one from which, liko tho lion, member, Sir .I<.lin Ihuy, I inURt coiifi-HH, I would have hhnink at an oarlior iitogo of our procecdingK ; but in lihleninf? to the <|rlmt«H whidi have Inkrn place on the (inanrial qurstioiiH in connection >»ilh (h-' < iiiKPiiwcnllli. r-prcittlly in lihtening 838 Commonwealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. to the discussion to clay in connection with the surplus, the disposal of which has proved so great a task to the Comniittee, I must confess myself prepared to take a very much more favourable view even of this startling proposition than I should have done a few days ago. The more we con- sider it, the more I think we shall agree that the plan which we submit to the people of the various colonies, by which their governments are deprived of an im- mense source of revenue, and by which the commonwealth is endowed with an enor- mous surplus from the very day on which it comes into existence, is certain to be used against us by all opponents of this bill It will be said that the several states have a poor guarantee of receiving any- thing if you intrust the commonwealth with such powers as are embodied in this measure — if you intrust it with this amount of money, and require it, before returning anything to the colonies, to discharge any and all of its oblicrations. We shall be told again and again by those who desire to oppose the commonwealth that the colonies will, in the course of a year or so, see nothing of the customs revenuethey arenow asked to surrender. Upon this point I think the remarks of the hon. member. Sir Harry Atkinson, a day or two ago were extremely pertinent, as they were also the chief cause of modifying my own opinion on the subject. The position he put is one that will recommend itself to those friends of the commonwealth who desire at the outset that its policy shall be one of strict economy. Perhaps it would be premature to pass too positive an opinion at the present moment ; but, assuming that calculations were sufficient to assure us that we were not undertaking too extreme a step, it certainly would be an enormous advantage in commending this measure to the people of the various colonies if, instead of their being asked to surrender an immense revenue, without any defi- [J/r. Deakin. nitely determined return, they were shown that the revenue taken from them is at once applied to purposes in which they are immediately interested — that if, on the one hand, we deprive them of that source of revenue which keeps their coffers full, we, on the other hand, deprive them of liabilities which empty their cofi'ers. I believe that certain calculations have been prepared which tend to show that it would be possible, even with a customs revenue based upon a tariff such as that of Victoria, for the federal parliament to discharge the whole, or almost the whole, of the interest on the debts of the colonies of Australia, if not of Australasia. That being the case, the question is certainly worthy even at this late stage of our deliberations, of the most careful consideration of the Com- mittee, whether on the faith of such calcu- lations Ave might not take a bold step that would put us before our constituents in quite a different position — in the position of recommending a commonwealth that from its commencement will have liabilities requiring from those who may be intrusted with its direction the strictest scrutiny of every particular of public expenditure, and thus imbuing them at the outset of their career with habits of close economy. This would be a great recommendation from both 1 points of view — as relieving the states im- i mensely, and as, in another sense of the I term, relieving the commonwealth of that i surplus about which we have had such a warm debate. It may be necessary, be- fore we finally commit ourselves to the proposal that other clauses, to make the scheme complete, should be adopted. But the difficulties we have had to encounter upon the floor of this chamber with re- gard to the surplus are trifles compared with the difficulties we shall have to en- counter on the hustings when we are face to face with our constituents and with the opponents of federation. This question of the finances will be used against us to the ComynomveaUh of [7 April, 1891.1 Australia Bill. 839 utmost extent, and I think vre should have a good answer if we were to adopt this proposal, and that we should at the same -time be giving to federation a great mo- mentum. The desire of being relieved of a large measure of liability will operate as powerfully with the colonies in favour of federation as a design to deprive them of customs revenue may meet with resistance. If this proposal can be justified, I take it that this bill will go commended to the various colonies much more than it would in its present aspect. I rose in default of other hon. members, who did not appear this dangerous ground we shall open for ourselves a battery of opposition on the part of some of the colonies which it will be absolutely impossible to silence. In dealing with this question as a whole, what I take it we have to do in regard to salient questions of great importance in connection with the future is to see tliat the federal parliament has power to deal with them. But these questions, which it may be necessary to deal with in the future, are great bones of contention at the present time, and it would bo foolish for us, in view of the necessity to make willing to debate the question at so early this bill palatable to our parliaments to a stage. I trust the treasurers of the various colonies will give us the benefit of their experience, because if this proposal be as feasible as it now appears, it will be & most advantageous one to adopt in the interests of the commonwealth. Mr. McMillan : I should like to •explain my position in this matter, because it is perhaps rather a curious one. I thoroughly believe in the consolidation of enter upon new departures which may receive the utmost opposition. Colonel Smith : Who is to oppose them? Mr. McMillan : I am endeavouring to explain in the most ordinary English I can adopt. Take the position of New South Wales as compared with that of Victoria. Victoria is a comparatively con- solidated colony ; it has a railway system which, at any rate for certain purposes, the debts of the colonies ultimately; but I has practically opened up the whole of its think we have just reached that stage of territory ; but New South Wales and our proceedings when we are liable to go Queensland are practicjilly only beginning too far. I believe we are going beyond to open up theirs. They have done n great the principles we ought to lay down for deal. We, in New South \\'iilos, Imve •ourselves in dealing with the question of done a great deal ; but wo have in linnd federation. My hon. friend, who has just at tlie present moment Hchenies with ro- resunied his seat, .sees very clearly, as ference to our railway .system wliich will po.ssibly do other hon. members, tliatif we involve loans, and the very policy wo aro take over the debts of the colonies, and now adopting may be looked upon in (lie make ourselves liable for the interest we «hall get rid of this dangerous surplus. I am quite willing to confess that in the hands of some treasurers that surj)lus would be a very great danger indeed. JJut there are a great many consequences •arising out of such a course as is pro- posed. In the first place, if you take over all the debts you must regidate the borrowing in the future, and with colo- nies under stjcli different conditions it seems to me that if we now enter upon future as an anti-f«'deml policy. Cotiso- (piently, if you altrtainl>. iM-cnuho you cannot have t wo cIuhhoh of debUi. Mr. Dkakin : Why not 1 Mr. MrMII.LAN: Sunly the hon. nifnibf-r, if he luw any pnt4'iihion to a knowledge of linnnco, docf» not Ixilievcthat 840 Commonwealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. we should have a consolidated common- wealth debt in respect of works already carried out, and that we should have new debts, at the same time, on the part of the various provincial parliaments. Mr. Deakin : We are bound to have that in any case ! Mr. McMILLx^N : The only advantage of consolidating the debts of the colonies is that all borrowings for large undertakings may be under the auspices of the federal sovernment. The lion, member does not surely propose for one moment that we should consolidate these debts, amounting in the aggregate to £181,000,000, and that we should then allow Kew South Wales to expend £4,000,000 or £5,000,000 of loan money borrowed under different con- ditions and guarantees. Let the lion, mem- ber consider what that would open up, and lie will see that it is absolutely impossible. I appeal to any financial man. The whole beiietit arising from the dealing with this question consists of the unification of stock. Of course, there will be municipal loans, guaranteed by the provincial governments or raised in other ways, but for all large undertakings, if once the federal parlia- ment takes over the present debts, it must nes;otiate and control future loans. Mr. Deakix : Why ? Mr. ]\IcMILLAN : If I am liable for certain debts, if I am liable for money bor- rowed for certain undertakings, surely I must have control of those undertakings more or less. Surely, before a loan would be projected by one colony, it should have the recognition of the federal government. Then look at what you would open np. Kot that I say it may not be opened up in the future — but it will be a very debatable question in the different colonies. You open up the question with regard to the great public undertakings of the different colonies being canvassed in the federal pai'liament. I do not say that it will not come to that ; but the federal spirit will [Mr. McMillan. have to be in existence some yeai-s, ar/d Avill have to grow beyond its present pro- portions, before that will be assented to. Mr. DiBBS : If we agree to this clause, we may as well procure a hundred weight of dynamite and blow the whole thing up! Mr. McMillan : That would be a veritable bomb-shell. If we simply give, as this bill gives, to the federal parliament the right to negotiate with the other par- liaments — and I believe a great deal will be done in future by negotiation, and that a great deal will be undertaken by nego- tiation that is not provided for in the four corners of this constitution — and if we imply by this clause that such a thing may be a benefit in future to all the parties concerned, we shall go as far as we pos- sibly can. I warn lion, members who are anxious to see this federation carried into effect, that if they vote for the amendment they will agree to a proposal which will do more to shatter the whole fabric we have been trying to erect than almost any other point of contention we have had before us could effect. ]Mr. Deakix : Y/hy ? Mr. McMILLAiSr : I even go so far as to say that I hope the loans will be con- solidated, and that some arrangement may be maile in the future which will be con- sonant with the views of the different colonies. But, at the same time, I see that that very project is surrounded with enormous difficulty, and that it is not we who have to thrash out that difficulty. It must be a matter for the futui'e. I cer- tainly think that those who are in favour of a bill which will be acceptable to all the parliaments of the different colonies should negative the amendment now before us. Colonel SMITH : I confess I am some- what surprised at the remarks of the hon. member, Mr. McMillan. At the Melbourne Conference, and in the opening debate at Commonwealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. Sil ■his Convention, the hon. gentleman was might say, " On certain conditions we strongly in favour of some course of this will guarantee that loan for you."' That and being adopted. would make a difference of at least i per Mr. McMillan : In the future, cer- cent., and possibly more on the amount ■^"^ly • borrowed, and the expenditure would do Colonel SMITH : He stated at Mel- more to open up that enormous territory journe that he had not the slightest doubt than anything else that could be done. I :hat in the course of time the dominion hope hon. members will not be led astray jarliament would be able to borrow money by the hon. member, Mr. McMillan bc- lot alone in London, but on any of the cause he blew hot at Melbourne, and he courses of Europe at from ^ to 1 per blows cold here. >ent. less than the price at which in- Mr. McMillan : No ; I am quite con- lividual colonies can borrow now. That sistent ! vould ultimately result in a very large Colonel SMITH : He has given us no saving. It is intended to hand over to reason whatever in support of his views. ;he federal parliament a revenue of He says that all this may be done by and £9,000,000, while the expenditure of the by, but when we open the door for him he federal government would only be about wants to close it. Such a proposal would £2,250,000. The balance would have to be of advantage not only to the larger tie refunded to the different states. I con- colonies, but to the whole group, and I ;end that each colony might retain uU its hope hon. members will not hesitate to railways, while the customs revenue, if prepare the way by adopting the amend- aroperly applied by the dominion parlia- ment of the hon. member, Sir John Bray, aaent, would not only pay the working so that the federal parliament may have expenses of the dominion, but would also the power to do this if Ihey tliink it i.s pay the whole of the interest on the public desirable. Thehon. member, Mr. McMillan, lebt. If the hon. gentleman had said that talked about opposition to this proposal, sve ought to divide the loans which have Who will oppose it? AVill any of tlio been expended on reproductive works from parliaments oppose a proposal that tlio the loanswhich have been expended on non- colonial debts should be taken over and reproductive works, I could have under- consolidated? Not a single parliament in jtood him. It might be necessary to divide the whole group would do ho. I am sur- the loans in that way, and let the various prised that tlie hon. member, Mr. McMillan, lolonies be responsible for the monr-y ex- who is a financial man, should nil.se ob- pendeduponthcnon-reproductiveworks. I jections to this proposal after speak ing so quite agree with the hon. member. Sir John strongly in favour of it iit Mell.ourno. Bray, tliat W3 ought not to a.sk the federal -Mr. Mc'Mmj.an : Perimps the hon. niem- parliament to refund any of the revenue ; ber will allow mo to explain that whut \ but it should take over obligations from the 8aiy he paper in my hand.s to be j£7,54r),000, nth loans amounting to .£181,847,271. An Hon. Memher : That includes New U Commonioealth of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bid. united as the United States of America have united, our public debt will be more saleable in the markets of the world where the money comes from. But then thewhole thing would have to be changed to accom- plish that. At present we are dealing with a federation which is not to be a union, but only a loose form of federation, and, in addi- tion to that, it is proposed that the common- wealth should take upon itself a most ex- traordinary responsibility in regard to our debts, whilst it is given no control over the assets. To my commercial mind, if you assume liabilitiesyou must have the control of the assets. Say what you will, if the liabilities are pooled the assets must be pooled too. I may, by w^ay of warning, say, that if you want to excite the anti- pathy of the whole of New South Wales towards federation, the idea of handing over our liabilities to the commonwealth, and with them the assets of the country, will produce that result. Mr. Clark : No ! Mr. DIBBS : The people in England w'ill look at the matter with a clear eye. They will say " These colonies are pool- ing their debts for the purpose of getting cheaper money. What assets and what security have they T We will reply that we offer the security of the whole of Aus- tralia ; therefore the commonwealth if it takes the liabilities must take also the assets. I remember a friend of mine, wdio ■was an Irishman, going once to a gentle- man in charge of one of the English banks established here, and wanting to satisfy him that he was entitled to borrow from the bank a loan of £40,000. The banker very naturally asked him for a balance- sheet showing his assets and liabilities. He brought a list of his assets, and the banker at once said, " Now I want to see a list of your liabilitie.s," and the Irish- man turned round and said, "Do you want to insult mef We should insult the people of England if we attempted to [Mr. Dihhs. consolidate our debts and did not sho%\ them that the assets were there attachabh to the liabilities. Any consolidation o: debts must be accompanied by a consolida tion of assets. The people of New Soutl Wales will be no parties to allowing theii assets to be thrown into one common poo - — at least at the present stage. Mr. BIRD : Nothing that has takei place since the Convention met has aston ished me so much as the position noAH taken up by the New South Wales delegates ]\Ir. McMillan and Mr. Dibbs. Prior t< the light thrown upon Mr. Dibbs' opposi tion to the proposal to take over the whoh of the debts, which he indicated in his be lief that the assets of the colonies must g( with the liabilities thus taken over, I wai really wondering on what grovmds eithe: he or Mr. McMillan could raise any objec tion or have any fear in regard to the con solidation of the debts. Mr. McMiLLAX : I never said that th( assets and the debts should 2;o toc;rether. '. said that future expenditure would hav< to be controlled ! Mr. BIRD : If the hon. gentleman ob jects on another ground than that of Mr Dibbs, I can only say that I am still mori surprised that he takes up the position hi does ; because it seems to me that then is some gi'ound of objection to handins; over all the liabilities of New South Wale, if all the assets are to go w^ith them but on Avhat ground objection can b( raised to the liabilities being taken over i tlie assets are to be held by the colon;; itself, I am at a loss to see. Nothin< but gain can accrue to New South Wale; or any other colony by allowing the com monwealth to take over all 'the liabili ties. Surely, as soon as it is possible t( convert the existing loans from the some what high I'atos w^hich some of them now bear to lower rates — a process which maj be taken in hand even before some of tli( bonds mature, and which certainly can take P Commonwealth of [7 April, 1891.! Australia Bill S45 place as the obligations fall in — as soon IS that can be done, there is no doubt ;hat the commonwealth will be an infinite gainer. In the course of time we shall lave, in the matter alone of interest on the lublic debts of the colonies, sufficient to ;over the whole of the expense of the "ederal government, apart from the services md outside matters of that sort belonging X) the conduct of the federal government. Surely the prospective gain of £.500,000 )r £750,000 — or it may amount in the course of time to nearly .£1,000,000 — in the matter of interest alone, is a saving in connection with the debts of the colonies that ought to lead every member who has to do with the financial affairs of any colony, to jump at once at the proposal to liand over the debts to the commonwealth, riie 1)011. member, Mr. McMillan, seems to fear that this will interfere somewhat R'ith the future borrowing of the various jolonies. Icannot see howdifficully is going to arise even there. If, a few years after the debts existing at the time of federation were taken over, the hon. gentleman, as the treasurer of New South Wales, desired to borrow £4,000,000 or £5,000,000 for public works, and knew that by getting the Guarantee of the federal government he could secure that loan at | per cent, less ban by going into the market on his own iccount, surely the people of New South iVales would raise no objection to the lederal government being asked to borrow le money, Mr. McMillan ; Yes, but under this roposal you could not borrow at all with- ut their leave ! Mr. BIRD : Under the ])roposal as it ow stands provision is simply made for iking over the debts. Mr. McMillan : The present debts! Mr. iilllD : Yes. Mr. McMillan : It would be ab.surd to .ke over tlie present debts without also >kinfj over future debts I Mr. BIRD : I quite agree with the hon. gentleman that the words seem to indicate a necessity for something further, and we shall have to insert a clause which will provide for dealing with debts of states which may come in afterwards, for the consolidation of those debt.s, and also for securing further loans for the states already in the federation who may want to increase their indebtedness for the purpose of ex- tending their public works. That is an additional clause which, I think, wo will all agree to insert. That being so, I fail to see on what ground the treasurer of any colony in the group can object to the commonwealth taking over the liabilities as now proposed. The hon. member. M r. Dibbs, appeared to be unable to see, not- withstanding the interjections that were thrown out while he spoke, that the lia- bilities of the colonies could be taken over while the assets in the shape of rail- ways and other reproductive works wt-re not taken over. If we hand over to the commonwealth sutficicnt revenue for the purposes of the general government, and of paying the interest on all the debts, surely in a sense we give it a.ss«'t8 enough. It needs notln'ng more. It lias boon stated by two or three hon. menibr-i-s that ligures can be produced showing that if wo hand over the wliole of tiie ciistnnis rpv«'nu<' to the coinuionwealtli, it will not only Ituvo ample funds to pay intere.st on ihf di-btH now existing, but also suflicii'nt for tho purpo.ses of federal govcrnJiirnt. I'rrhnim J may be allowed to refer to mhiio (if^urfM whiili I have taken the trouble t<> j.n'iwuo in oi , »«* various colonies nn«l to the c<»mmoiiwojilU» como toa concluHionon thiiiqu«*ti<.n with. out taking time to oonnidcr i' ' '. <«n«i to work out nil the delnih ji. . '.i.nf the nfvcrnl states are not by this constitution fnil.i.Mi n t j exercise, are reserved to I think that that expression is not a«lo- quate. A great many of tlieir powcrB which they are not forbidden to «'Xt'roii»o mialit be withdrawn from them by i\w exercise of similur jiowrrs l>y the purlia- ment of tho commonwealth, and llu-cUuiio woidd bo more nccuratu nnd Icrb jiablo to criticism if it read, " and which iin' not by this constitution exoluHivfly vchUhI in Uie parliament of tho «(.mm<>nwfjillh, or with drawn from ih.- parliiuii- m(- "f »''.- h.M-rttl HtatoH." I move : 'I hut the woriU " fttid nil j-.wcri which." linM 5 ami 0, l»o omittwl wilh t ' •»» their plft<«' tli«! word* "or vnti Mr. CILMKS: Sny it ii. , cl- moiit. TIk- Ii<-ii. uml loArnod mrmlKT, Hir Samuel (Jrifllth, will, prHiap, remember that a htntemcnt wan niwlo t«y an hon. member of the Convention to the offoct 850 Comtnotiioealth of [7 Apkil, 1891.] Australia Bill. that the power of borrowing money having l)eoii orranted under this bill to the federal parliament will exclude the local legisla- tures from being able to borrow money. I believe there is no foundation whatever for that statement. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: None what ever. Words like " express enactment " do not mean anything. Amendment agreed to. Amendment {by Sir Sajhuel Griffith) agreed to : That the clause be further amended by omit- ting the words "are not by this constitution forbidden to exercise." Clause, as amended, agreed to. Clause 5. All references or communications required by the constitution of any state or otherwise to be made by the governor of the state to the Queen shall be made through the governor-general, as her Majesty's representa- tive in the commonwealth, and the Queen's pleasure shall be made known through him. Mr. GILLIES : I propose to ask the Committee to omit this clause. I do not desire to make many observations. I be- lieve that we were not called upon by our respective colonies, who gave us authority to come here, to interfere in the slightest degree whatever with the governments of the states. In addition to that it is not necessary. The mere fact that a local par- liament passes a bill, and that that bill, if it has to be sent home, must be sent throu2;h the governor-general, and not through the governor of the state, I feel confident will create a great deal of irritation in the various colonies. Sir Samuel Griffith : Not at all ! Mr. GILLIES : I can say to the hon. gentleman that it has created a great deal of irritation in some of the colonies already, and I have contended constantly that where a provision is not necessary to the creation of the constitution it ought not to be in- serted. It is far better to err on the safe side. It is a mere piece of imagination that [Mr. Gillies. se seL there is anything inconsistent in creatin, a governor general, and in allowing a gO' vernor to communicate with the Crown. There is no inconsistency at all, and in my judgment it is not necessary that a clause of this kind should be inserted, becaus* unquestionably it interferes with the pr sent position of state governors, and I con sider that ought not to be done. We ougt not to create anything likely to beget au tagonism to any portion of this bill. W< shall have trouble enough without that and I confidently believe that everythini of this kind that we insert in the bill wil beget opposition elsewhere, where we dc not desire opposition. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: In m; opinion this is a very important provision but I doubt very much whether this lata hour of the day is a good time to go inti the matter. What the hon. member, Mr Gillies, maintains is thatafterthe establish ment of the commonwealth, the govern ments of the different states should be ii direct communication with the Queen'i government in London, each pulling ii different directions, as they have don before. Mr. Gillies : No ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: That is what the hon. member proposes. Mr. Gillies : Certainly not ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Well, th( hon. member j^roposes to leave that statt of things existing. I have always main tained that one of the principal reason; for establishing a federation in Australif was because the governments were always pulling in different directions. Australi; speaks with seven voices instead of witl: one voice. Now, the hon. gentlemai wishes that Australia should continue t( speak with seven voices instead of witL one voice. Mr. Gillies : Only on matters apper- taining to themselves I Commonweallh of [7 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. I f Dr. CocKBURN : On matters appertain- ing to themselves they should not want to •communicate with the Imperial Govern- ment at all ; Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I main- tain that ministers in Australia are tobethe Queen's ministers for the commonwealth, and any communication affecting any part of the commonwealth which has to be made to or by the Queen, should bo made with their knowledge. Without that we shall not have the voice oi one common- wealth in Australia. I maintain that this argument is quite indisputable. The hon. member's argument amounts to this : some- body will not like it ; some people object to it, and it is not absolutely necessary. 851 this matter, but I consider that it is onlv important in the way in which the j^eople in the various colonies will look upon it, and, in my opinion, they will look ujx>u this as being another instance in which they give up a great deal more than tlie circumstances of the case re(juire. I t;ike it that we came here under jtractically the samecommission, with instructions toconfer together as to the surrendering of such powers as were necessary to create the commonwealth, but with the strict^.st in- junctions to retain to each colony all the powers not absolutely necessary for the commonweallh. We all agree that in every matter which relates to the coninion- wealth and the Crown, the govenior- I admit that it is not absolutely neces- general shall be the only medium of coiu- sary ; but I say it is necessary if we are munication between the peoj/ie and the going to establish a real commonwealth in Crown. But as to matters which are in Australia. I think the idea is that there no way committed to the commonwealth, is to be but one government for Australia, which are to proceed in precisely the same and that we shall have nothing more to do fasliion as they did before, and as to which with the Imperial Government except the the commonwealth is expressly cxcludf' sjijierfltious to put vernmentsof Australia all trying to attract in a clause which gives the api>oamnce of tlie attention of the Secretary of State in limiting the authority tliat is intended to Downing street. remain uidimited, and to give the govcr- Mr. Gillies : We cannot prevent them nor-general an apparent iiuthority, which from having agents-general ! many of the colonies and nmny of tJ«o Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : Certainly not ; but the a^j^ents-fceneral will be limited to their functions as commercial agents. Mr. GILLTE.S : Will they ] Sir SAIMUEL GRIFFITH : They will no longer be diplomatic agent.g. I main- tain that Australia is to have only one diplomatic existence, and, therefore, only one diplomatic head, and one dijilomufif mouthpiece in any other part of tlie world. Those are my reasons. I hope the matter ■will not be considered a light one. I think lit is very important indeed. Sir JOHN DOWNER : I agi-ee with |tiie hon. and learned member, Sir Samuel rriffitli, in attaching great importance to ])eople of the colonie.s will think a n-al authority, to interfere in nuitlorH which exclusively roncorn the Klnt4ii lhc>inM>lvni. There are a f'W mn(te. culiarities in different states of society. If we aim and aspire to be one Australian people, we must try to look upon Au.s- tralia as a whole, and I think I can take to myself some credit for having taken this i of Australia, and not seven separate inde- view from the very first. No person has heard me speaking of New Soutli Wales, and I must say the delegates from Now South Wales have been pretty free from this local feeling. Sir Thomas McIlwraith : Oh ! Sir HENRY PARKES : So much is that the case that at times I have found from my hon. friend, Mr. Baker, to which myself with no support wliatevor from \\\y I entirely respond. I cannot understand fellow-delegates, showing that we Imvo not pendent states, acting in seven different manners, even so far as Great Britain is concerned. It is a matter, I think, of very great importance, and I quite agree that the clause ought to be retained. Sir HENRY PARKES : It really does one good to hear so sound a sentiment for the very life of me, how we can aspire to be one Australian people under the Crown, and have several channels of com- munication with the Crown. We must either be a nation or we must be a chain of unfederated states. I have been sur- prised at the attitude taken up by my hon. friend, Mr. Gillies, because I look to him almost for guidance in thi.s Con- acted together. In some of tlio most im- portant steps taken by my fellow-dt'logatos I have not even been consulted, so tliat wo have not banded together ns against tho rest of Australia; nor am I awaro that tho name of Now South Wali's lias boon voiy often on our tongues. For myNolf, \ »(iy tliat throughout tho proceedings of tlii.s C'onvoii. tion I Jmvo dosirod to keep my oyoH Htomlily vention, and I have been .surpri-sed that ho upon the Australian pooplo, nii(ii»orit3r M I very prominent part in the di.scus.sions of am in roHpoct of thono nmttpm in our own this Committee, because I have alway.s colony, and I cannot undemtan.l how wo found that some member or other to some degree, sometimes more and somotimos less, had fully expressed my sentiments, and I was not desirous of delaying the procoed- ings. But there has been one feeling throughout our discussion.s, especially of can rJHC to tho h'vel of a f<- ' OH tho lion. niouilxT, Mr. 1^ insist on Iw-in^^ known to the world by only one rhannol. If >«r hiivn n. govonior j?onorul he will Im tho rhirf loprosotitativo of tho Crown, and an micU 854 Commonwealth rac-e in the net, not only large (piestiuns of policy, which ho admits should procc«-d through tho Ro- vernorgeneral, but also the niiii«>r <|ii«- tioMs, which, in the liinguam* of I ho lion. meml>er, Sir John Downrr, are of cselu- sivcly local eonerrn, whuf ihinrv will l.r> done to matt4TK of ex» 1 cern if tiny are m-nt through onr cliannni, inston*! of numv ? An the hon. member, Mr. Uuk.r, hiu* naid, it ia not a Iom of p.,w.r on tin- purl of ' ' ''". K" in favour of tlio proposal of my hon. frien«l, Mr. (Jillies, and that is, that it will llattor the self esteem of the colonic* by allowing then) to have direct conimunicntioii with the home governnifnt, and to thnt extent it nmy facilita*- •' ■• -'■•.;'!>'-' "f t'"-""- sanctiontothe pi . I admit that it wouhl have thai fWrcX, tho arguments on tho other iii«Ie »' ^«'«"- wlielming tlint 1 can hnnllv !• Convention can be itifl-i fiidr-ration, whihion of dimip- jiroval liy the federal giivi'rnnirnt, (IiaI appears to nio to bo a near approach to confirring on the federal f;overmiiout iho IK)\vcr of veto, without Hinting i( terniH within tlie f">" ' I hIihII be glad indo <■ tion to that. If V ''" power to thr f<'d« I ing the nctH of ft ' but do n'-» h « ' ' *" 862 Commonwealth of [S April, 1891.] Australia Bill. tliat which is now proposed, which, it appears to me, will have the effect of doing what I do not think there is any one in this Committee would attempt to justify. I\Ir. GORDON : I have been unable to follow the arguments of hon. members who Jiave advocated the retention of this clause. The hon. member, Sir Henry Parkes, who gave, perhaps, the most solid reasons for its retention, argued that it was desirable because it was necessary that Australia should speak with one voice on matters affecting its concern. Quite true, on matters affectiniT the concerns of Australia ; but this clause touches purely local matters. On the question of an alteration, say, of the electoral laws of New South Wales, and the number of the members of its houses of parliament, it is absurd to say that the united voice of Australia is i^e- quired. That is beside the question alto- gether. The true sentiment w^hich lies behind the retention of this clause was shown by the hon. member, Mr. Deakin, when he gave the analogy of the lieuten- ant-governors of India, some of whom are required to communicate to the Queen through the governor-general. That is the sentiment lying behind the retention of this clause — to make the governors of the colonies lieutenant-governors, and that is just what the colonies will not put up with. It may be a matter of sentiment ; but, after all, sentiments govern politics, and politics are largely sentiment. I am certain that the colonies will not permit their governors to be placed in the position of lieutenant-governors, and to be subsi- diary in local concerns to the governor- general. I should be disposed to go further. I fail to see why the colonies should be required to make any reference to the home Government at all upon such purely local matters as a change of their consti- tution, and I think an amendment upon that point would save the necessity of further argument. With that view, and \^Mr Kingston. without detaining the Convention any longer, I may say that it is my intention to move the following clause : — That notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the constitution of any state, it shall not be hereafter necessary to refer to the Queen any proposal to change such constitution. Dr. COCKBURN : I should like tc justify the vote that I shall have to giv( on this matter, because it will be rathei dissonantwith the votes I have been givins throughout the sittings of the Convention. I shall vote for the clause as it stands, ant also for the amendment intended to be pro posed by the hon. member, Mr. Gordon because I take it to be essential to federa tion. It is the very definition of a federa tion that, as regards external affairs, th( federation shall be one state, and only hav( one means of communication, and in regarc to internal affairs the federation should b( many states Mr. GoRDox : These are not interna affairs ! Dr. COCKBURN : These are interna affairs, and it is one of the principles o; federation that, in internal affairs, ther< should be complete autonomy. In loca affairs, why do you want to go outside th<' state at all ? For the alteration of thi constitution of a state, why should you g< outside the boundary of that state 1 Mr. Kingston- : That is another thing Dr. COCKBURN : It is all wrappec up in the same thing. External communi cations should only be made on question concerning the commonwealth generally and the proper vehicle of communicatioi for them is the governor- general. In ques tions of local affairs, such as the amend ment of the constitution, to which the hon member, Mr. Gordon, has alluded, electora laws, and so forth, or even the abolitioi of the two chambers — as in the ca.se o Ontario, where they are starting with on chambei' — external authority has no con cern whatever. Mr. Gillies : How would the bill b assented to 1 Commomoeahh of [8 April, 1S91.] AustrdUa Bill. 8G3 Dr. COCKBURX: It would be as- sented to, of course. Mr. Clark : By the governor ! Dr. COCKBURIS" : The practice in the United States is that the states have sovereign power, and have absolute con- trol over their own constitutions. The only authority to which they are subject is that of the judiciary, which interferes, and besides that, the states have reference to any of those authorities in framing their constitution which properly remain with the federal government. In Switzerland the states have complete power to change their constitution, only they send for rati- fication to the cental government. In Canada, which is parallel with our case, the states have power to change their con- stitutions. There is no reference to any central power. It is essential in local matters that you should have autonomy without reference to external authority. In Canada, where, in addition to the tie of federation, there is also the bond under the Crown, there is no reference whatever to Downing-street if the state wishes to change its constitution. There the federal authority have power of veto, but it is recognised now in Canada that the power of veto is vexatious, and it is falling into disuse, and I do not think the power of vfto will be exercised there much longer. Colonel Smith : You arc giving the power of veto under this clause ! Dr. COCK BURN : Just as it is necos- «ary, in every principle of federation, that there should only be one channel of com- munication to the outside world, so it is also necessary, in regard to strictly local matters, there should bo complete auto- Qomy. Therefore I shall vote in favour rf tlie clause with the intent also of huj)- jorting the amendment of tho hon. mem- )er, Mr. Gordon. Mr. Cl.vrk : Vote for both ! Dr. COCKBURN : Yes, vote for both -that is the proper thing. Tlif-y arc both essential principles of federation, and in my opinion they are the very principles on which federation should be founded. "With regard to what has been said, that you may have interference on the part of the executive if all communications have to go through the govi-rnor general on their way to Downing-street, I will ask whether you may not have that inter- ference whether those communications so through that channel or not? If a stato government does anything that the fede- ral parliament does not like, will thoy be silent as regards Downing-street, and who will have the greatest voice — tl»e governor of an individual stato or the authority speaking in the name of all Aus- tralia] If hon. members think that tln*y are going to get rid of friction in this way they are making a great mistake. They will certainly have a slender thread by which they can communicate with tlie im- perial authorities ; but on the other hand the federal authorities will have a nuich stronger tie, and if there is any dusire on the part of the central parliament to tyran- nise over the states, they will be ablo to speak to the authorities in Downing street in a voice so much superior (hat in any caso there will be friction. ^Vllat we lind In'tttT do logically is to pass tluH clause oh it in, as being absolutely necefuuiry if w«« nn? to frame a solid frderation— that in to My, there should 1k« only one voice n» n'ganU external aflairu— and proccctl furthrr to say, what is hIko oMentia! to f n, that, as regards local afFrtins tlnr' ■ haii l« complete autonomy. Sir (JKOIUJK (JKKY : I would nuBgriil to the Convention tlint tlip (run moilo of ])roceeding in to innort ft clttunr in (lie bill whirh Khali enact that the only law* which it shall l»e ' V to MibmJl f Oucen's i" niudl Ik> thcmr> wl. general 1' '" ">nk«ni. Hon. in- may Im? ' t*'*^ wo nlmll not giro offence to the homo Govomrocnt Tlirro 864 Commonwealth of [8 Ai'ril, 1891.] Australia Bill. is a provision, in the case of New Zealand, Avliicli exempts all laws from the Queen's assent except those passed by the General Assemhly. I think that if we did that we shouki preserve the power of the federa- tion in the highest possible way. I feel certain that our great object is to avoid all possible friction with the houie Go- vernment, and every act witlidrawn from their supervision — the people here being enabled to pass it without sending it home for approval — is really removing one stumbling-block in the way of non-inter- ference with the affairs of this country. A clause to that effect could be inserted in a very few words indeed ; and the clause we are fighting about need not be considered at all. Question — That the clause as read stand clause 5 of the bill — put. The Com- mittee divided : Ayes, 22; noes, 16 ; majority, 6. Ayes. Atkinson, Sir Harry Hackett, Mr. Baker, Mr. Jennings, Sir Patrick Barton, Mr. Mac(lonald-Patersou,Mr Clark, Mr. Mc^SIillan, Mr. Cockburn, Dr. Moore, Mr. Deakin, Mi'. Munro, Mr. Dibbs, Mr. Parkes, Sir Henry- Donaldson, Mr. Playford, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Grey, Sir George Suttor, Mr. Griffith, Sir Samuel Thynne, Mr, Noes. Bird, Mr. Fysh, Mr. Bray, Sir John Gillies, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Kingston, Mr. Cuthbert, Mr. Loton, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Adye Marmion, Mr. Downer, Sir John Russell, Captain Forrest, Mr. A. Smith, Colonel Forrest, Mr. J. Wrixon, Mr. Question so resolved in the affirmative. Clause agreed to. Clause 6. Suhject to the provisions of this con- stitution, the constitutions of the several states of the commonwealth shall continue as at the date of the establishment of the commonwealth, until altered by or under the authority of the pjar- liaments thereof, in accordance Avith the provi- sions of their respective constitutions. [*S'ir Georcje Grey. Mr. GOrvDON : I rise to move : That the following words be added to the clause: — "But it shall not be necessary to re- serve any proposed alteration of the constitu- tion of any state for the Queen's pleasure to be made known." This position has been so eloquently ar- gued by the lion member, Sir George Grey, and other hon. delegates, that I do not intend to labour it now. I simply pro- pose the addition of these words. Sir GEORGE GREY : I want to move a further amendment, to the effect that it shall not be necessary to transmit any lav^r made by a state for the Queen's approval. The Chairman : The hon. member can move that after this question is decided ; whichever way it is decided the hon. mem- ber can propose that. Question — That the words proposed to be added, be so added — put. The Com- mittee divided : Ayes, 11 ; noes, 27 ; majority, 16. Ayes. Atkinson, Sir Harry Dibbs, Mr. Baker, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Bird, Mr. Grey, Sir George Bray, Sir John Kingston, Mr. Clark, Mr. Playford, Mr. Cockburn, Dr. Noes. Burgess, Mr. Loton, Mr. Cuthbert, Mr. Macdonald-Paterson Mr Deakin, Mr. Marmion, Mr. Donaldson, Mr. McMillan, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Adye Moore, Mr. Downer, Sir John Munro, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Parkes, Sir Henry Forrest, Mr. A. Russell, Captain Forrest, Mr. J. Rutledge, Mr. Fysh, Mr. Smith, Colonel Gillies, Mr. Suttor, Mr. Griffith, Sir Samuel Thynne, Mr, Hackett, Mr. Wrixon, Mr. Jennings, Sir Patrick Question so resolved in the negative. Sir GEORGE GREY : I rise to move: Tliat the clause be amended by the addition of the following words :— " But it shall not hi necessary to reserve for the Queen's pleasure any law made by a state." I wish to point out that we are asking for nothing which has not been done, and which has not been assented to unani- Commomoealth of [S April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 8(i5 mously by both bouses of the Imperial Parhament. This provision is taken from the Xew Zealand Constitution Act, in point of fact, not in these very words or exactly this form, but lion, gentlemen will see that is all that is necessary, because we have not to reserve any power to the general legislature of the commonwealth. They have the power under previous clauses, so that the thing which is brought about is this : there are fewer subjects ujDon which differences can arise between Great Britain and the commonwealth of Australia. It will remove a great number of acts entirely out of the way of disputes taking place upon them, and, as I say, we are not asking for anything which has not been accorded cheerfully and willingly on a former occasion, and I feel sure that the greatest guarantee we can have of peace among ourselves, and peace with Great Britain, is by assuming powers which par- liament will undoubtedly confer upon us if we apply for them in the proper form. Question— That the words proposed to 36 added be so added — put. The Connnit- ee divided : Ayes, 9 ; noes, 30 ; majority, 21. Ayes. Vtkinson, Sir Harry Dibbs, Mr. Jaker, Mr. Gordon, Mr. iJird, Mr. Grey, Sir George lark, Mr. Kingston, Mr. 'ockburn. Dr. Noes. »ray, Sir John Loioii, Mr. urgess, Mr. Macdonald-Paterson Mr Uthliert, Mr. Mannion, ^fr. •eakin, Mr. Mcllwruith, Sir Thomas 'onaldaon, Mr. McMillan, Mr. •ougla.s, Mr. Adyc Moore, Mr. owner, Sir .Jolm Munro, Mr. itzgerald, Mr. I'arke.s, Sir Henry orrest, Mr. A, I'iayford, Mr. Oirest, Mr. .J. iJussell, Captain jrsh, Mr. Kiitledge, Mr. illies, Mr. Smith, Colonel riffith, Sir Samuel Suttor, Mr. ackett, Mr. Thynne, Mr. amings, Sir Patrick Wrixon, Mr. Question so re.solvcd in the negative. Clause, a.s read, agreed to. 3 I Clause 7. In each state of the commonwealth there sliall be a governor. Sir JOHN BRAY : It occurs to me that there is no necessity whatever for this clause. AVe retain the constitutions of the different colonies, and every one of these constitutions says that the governor is to exercise certain duties in regard to it. Why, then, should we say in this act that every slate shall have a governor 1 I think it is exceedingly inadvisable to in- clude the provision. We recognise that the constitutions are to remain as they are unle.ss the various colonies themselves, alter them. Why include in this bill a provision which might possibly prevent the colonies from altering their constitutions 1 Every constitution provides for a legisla- ture and for a governor. Why, then, should we say tliat each state shall have a go- vernor 1 If we say that there shall be a governor, why should we not also say that there should be a legislative council and a house of assembly 1 The governor is, at the present time, part of the several con- stitutions, and it is absolutely necessary to carry out the provisions of any constitu- tion act in Australia, that there should be a governor. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: T do not remember the history of this clause in tlie Constitutional Connnittee. I am trying to recollect it ; but I cannot remember that there was any particular discussion about it. Sir John Downeu : There was ! Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : One rea- son for the clau.sc, howevei', occurs to me. It is desirable tluit the states should know that the heads of the states are to be; called governor.s, and not lieutenant-governors or administrators. There is a great deal of diflercnce between them. Here we are now accustomed to the term " govcjiior," but in olden days that was not tlie case. In Tasmania the governor was formerly called lieutenant-governor, while the go- S6Q Commonwealth of [S xVpril, 1891.] Australia Bill. vernor o£ New South Wales was called the governor-general of Australia, all the other governors being, more or less, .subordinate to him. My hon. friend, Mr. Kingston, reminds me that the govei'nor in South Australia was formerly called lieutenant-governor. There is a consider- able difference between the two things. It may be thought by some hon. members merely a matter of words, perhaps ; but I have heard of a controversy going on of late when the question arose as to whether an admiral would take precedence of a lieutenant-governor when a lieutenant- governor is administering the govern- ment of a colony. That is a point that occurs to me now, and it may be of importance. We indicate by this clause that there are to be governors of states, and I think that that is the proper term to indicate that the states are sovereign. Clause agreed to. Clause 8. The parliament of a state may make such provisioBS as it thinks fit as to the manner of appointment of tlie governor of the state, and for the tenure of his office, and for his removal from office. Mr. GILLIES : In the Constitutional Committee we had a lengthy discussion upon this question. As a reason for the insertion of this clause, it was contended that the people of any state or colony should have an opportunity to determine whether the governor should, or should not, be elected. It was argued, on the other hand, that there could be no objec- tion to the insertion of this clause, because it did not lay down the provision that there should be an election, but merely gave power to the various states to determine whether a governorshould be elected or not. This clause does a little more than that, No doubt the concluding portion may be said to be a corollary of the first portion : The parUament of a state may make such provisions as it thinks fit as to the manner of appointment of the governor of the state, and for the tenure of his office, and for his removal from office. [•S'tV Samuel Griffith. I say that if that be done in any colony it completely changes the relations hither- to existing between the colonies and the Crown. The Crown at present appoints the governor and detex'mines his tenure oi office ; it also determines, if necessary, his removal from office. The Crown may re move a governor from office whenever il thinks proper ; but it is proposed to limit the power and authority of the Crown tc do that. If the Crown once permitted any colony to adopt a provision such as is contained in this clause, that is, if an} colony were to pass a law providing that the governor should be elected by the people, and the Imperial Parliament wert to assent to that law, and the Queen',' assent were also given, what would hap peni As was pointed out on several occa sions in the Constitutional Committee, the position would be a most inadvisable one. The party which for the moment was predominant in the province would sup port the election of a governor who Ijc longed to their side. The governor wouk at once become a strong partisan, or Ik would not be elected. In addition to tluu the whole colony would be his conatitu ency, and he would require to canvass i1 from one end to the other and solicit votej in the same way as they would be solicitec l)y any gentleman seeking a seat in f legislative assembly. Now, for a gentle man proposing to take up the independem position of a governor, to see that fair pla} is given to both parties in the state, thai is an extraordinary proceeding. A gentle man sitting below me contended the othei day that if a premier asked a governor tc dissolve parliament, thegovernor wasbount to dissolve it at that minister's request. That would mean of course that if the go vernor Avere a friend of the ministers — who had absolutely helped to put hin: there — he would be under such obliga- tions to them that he would naturally take sides with his ministers, and would Commonwealth of [8 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 867 •give them as many tlissolutions as he de- cently could. That would be an unfor- tunate position for the governor; nay, worse than that. As I have already told the hon. member. Sir Henry Parkes, without disrespect to him, if I were a citizen of a community which proposed to elect its governor I would do all that I possibly ■could to prevent his election as governor. That hon. gentleman occupies a public position in this country which would make Jiim far too powerful for the place of governor. Sir Henry Parkes : We have not reached that stage yet ! Mr. GILLIES : It is a stage we are asked f Independence, to be quite consistent yitii loyalty to the Crown. Hon. mciu- Kjrs seem to think that the instances that lave come under their own notice are tlin »nly instances in history ; but liistory ihowH us that loyalty does not depend upon he form of government. Loyalty is a sen- linient wliich will exist quite irrespective »£ the form of government, so long as there 8 connection between us and the Crown. ?or these reasons I say that the const i- ution would be incomplete without a pro- vision of this kind, because it would be necessary to have recourse to the Parlia- ment of England to provide a change. Mr. FITZGERALD : Notwithstanding what the hon. member. Sir Samuel Giithth, has said, I consider that it would be dia- metrically opposed to the best interests of this country if we sanctioned or invited, as we do by this clause, the parliaments of the various states to elect their own governors. I do not think it necessary, to gentlemen of com m on -sense, to gi ve at length the reasons why danger would follow that method of appointment. We all know that the case which has been referred to is an ex- ceptional one which ought to be a warning to us. The American republics and the American states are on a different platform to that of these colonies. We know that powerful families exercised commanding in- fluence in those states. We know that the representatives of those families, ashas been stated by the hon. member, Mr. Clark, really keep the governorships as heirlooms. There is really little danger to popular rights so long as aj)pointments of that kind are made. Here, however, we absolutely give an invitation to the various states to alter their method of the appointment of governors, and to jiroceed at once to election. Election by what ? By popular vote ! Elec- tion at certain recurring periods, to throw the whole country into confusion, fur the ajv pointment of whom 1 For the appointment of agovernor-general,whooughtto be above ])arty politics, whose best efforts ought to be devoted to reconciling party divisions, who ought not to be, as in the case to which tli(! lion, member, IMr. Munro, re- ferred, a man who came down from his lofty position, and, enamoured of the ap- ))Iau.se of the people, became, during a wave of cyclonic fury whicli swept over the country at the? timr, instead of a governor, a partisan. The iionie Govern- ment recognised in a just manner tlie grave fault which that governor committed, and 176 Commonioealth of [S April. 1891.] Ax'&tralia Biil. removed him from his high position. The ut I think we under- stand that we are dealing with all the existing colonies of Australia. That all will accept the constitution at onc(! is not to be expected. I recognise the force of what the hon. member says; but if it i.s desired to impose a limit, we liad bc^tter say ten years, or something like that. Mr. Gillies : And impose new condi- tions? Sir SAMUEL GKII'FITH: An.l im- pose new conditions. 1 think it would Ito a mistake. Clause agreed to. Clau.se 4 (Alteration of limits of states) verbally amended and agreed to. 884 Commoni'-eaUh of [8 April, 1891.] Australia BUI. CHAPTER VIII.— AMKNDMEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION. Tlie provisions of this Constitution sliall not be altered except in tlie following manner: — Any law for the alteration thereof must be passed by an absolnte majority of the senate 5 and house of representatives and shall there- upon be submitted to conventions, to be elected by the electors of the several states qualified to vote for the election of members of the house of representatives. The conveii- 10 tions shall be summoned, elected, and held in such manner as the parliament of the com- monwealth prescribes by law, and shall, when elected, proceed to vote upon tlie proposed amendment. And if the proposed amend- 15 ment is approved by conventions of a majority of the states, it shall become law, subject nevertheless to the Queen's power of disallow- ance. But an amendment by which the pro- portionate representation of any state in either 20 house of the parliamoitof the commonwealth is diminished shall not become law without the consent of the convention of that state. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: Some doubt has been expressed whether the words, "proportionate representation of any state in either house of the parlia- ment of the common%vealth is diminished," sufficiently cover the case of the minimum number of members for any state. lam not quite sure that they do. We say that the minimum number for any state shall be four. The point should not be left open for argument. It may be advisable to put in the words, " or the mininuim number of representatives of a state in the house of representatives." I suggest, however, tliat the words, " or minimum number of re- presentatives of any states in the house of representatives," be inserted after the word *' commonwealth," line 20. Mr. MUNRO : I should like to call at- tention to the manner in which the con- stitution is to be amended. First of all, there must be an absolute majority of the two houses. That is right enough ; but when the matter is referred to the conven- tions it is a majority of the states. That gives the states on two occasions the power of vetoing the action of the representatives of the people. The people are represented as a whole in the first chamber only. The states in the senate can veto the action of the house of I'epresentatives, and when you go into conventionsyou treat them as states again. I do not think that that is a proper principle. I think that in a matter of that sort numbers ought to have some weight in the federal convention. According to this clause it will not be so. My attention has been called to the matter by a com- munication from my learned colleague in Melbourne, wlio points out that by this proposal a minority will have the power of veto twice. Mr.GILLIES: Thequestion asdiscussed in the Constitutional Committee was that an amendment of the constitution was a very serious matter. Each state comes into the constitution on a basis contained in the constitution to be agreed to by the various colonies, and subsequently passed by the Imperial Parliament. Any altera- tion of that constitution may be a very serious thing to one or more of the states, and the states would naturally contend that as they had made a bargain, entered into an agreement — a written agreement without which they would not have entered the federation at all — no part of that agree- ment ought to be lightly set aside, and that it ought to require the greatest con- sideration, not only of the majority of the people as represented in the conventions, Ijut a majority of the state rej^resentatives as representatives, otlierwise a state miglit say, " You are proposing an amendment to the constitution of such a serious and im- portant character affecting us, that we never would have joined this federation if we had known that such a course would have been taken." I think that amending tlie constitution is a most serious matter, and that no state ought to be compelled to submit to an amendment of the con- stitution when it has not a right to with- draw from that constitution, certainly not Commonwealth of [8 April, 1891.] Australia Bill, 885 to amendments wLicli would really press improperly upon its state rights. The committee felt every precaution ought to be taken that before an amendment, it may be of a fundamental character, afiect- ing two or three states, was permitted, the sanction should be obtained of a majority of the states which had come into the convention under a certain written agree- ment — that that agreement should not be overturned without a majority of the states affected concurring in the course adopted. Tliat was the view which obtained in the Constitutional Committee, and I think it is not unfair. Mr. :\[UNRO : Whilst it is not unfair to give the states power of veto in this direction, under this clause we ai'e giving them the power twice. Mr. Baker ; Each state gets the same power twice ! Mr. MUNRO : Yes. But the people as a whole only get the power once. Sup- pose that an amendment of the constitu- tion is proposed in the house of representa- tives, and by a bare majority, which hap- pens to be the number that is present at the time, a certain amendment is carried. An Hex. ^Member : It must be an abso- lute majority of the House ! Mr. MUNllO : They may have an abso- lute majority of the meml)ers present. An l£ox. Memuer: Xo ; of the whole house ! Mr. MUNRO : What I want to point out i.s this : Suppose that an amendment which seriously afFects the larger colonies, is made inadvertently. Tlioy Iiavo no power to protect themselves, becau.se once the amendment goes to the other cham- ber a majority of the states decides the matter, and then when it comes to lie re- ferred to the people it is referred tf some hon. members may be now, tlify ivill find that when they propose this con- ititution in their parliaments and to tlieir >eople, the pf?oi)le will insist on this right, am inclined to think tliat, just as they vill insist on this right in the establish- nentof the constitution, so they will in re- gard to any alteration of the constitution. Nhdii possible objection can there be to eferring the issue directly to the people ? There can be no objection unless we are afraid of the verdict of the people. Sir Samuel Griffith : AVhy should the people not make laws direct ? Mr. DoNALDSOX : What is the use of parliament at all ? Dr. COCKBURX : One thing is certain : in America the conventions were estab- lished for the one purpose which I have mentioned. Sir Samuel Griffith : I deny that. They were established for a directly oppo- site purpose ! Dr. COCKBURN : I only take the authorities that we have. Take Bryce. Sir Samuel Griffith : Does he say that? Dr. COCKBURN : He says that the conventions were established as a check on the popular will, and democracy has ridden right over them. I say that you can im- pose what barriers you like ; but you will, sooner or later, find the popular will pre- vail. Sir John Downer : That is no argument against it ! Dr. COCKBURN : It is, and I say that it is no iise trying to thwart the popular will. Sir Joiix DowNEu: That is another matter ! Dr. COCKBURN: You cannot stop its current, and it is well not to attempt to divert it. By making the i)eo[)I(', either in approving of the constitution at its initiation, or in approving of any altera- tion, pronounce tlieir opinion tlirougli any mediator whatevei', you confuse the i.ssue. It is better to go direct to tlic people and ask them to say aye or nay ; that is go- vernment by the j)eople. ^Ir. Gillies: AVhiit does tlie hon. imni- liir mean l)y going to the people of tho commoiiweaUh and asking them to say aye or nay ? Dr. C0CKI5URN: I mean going to each elector individually, and asking Iiiin, "Are you in favour of thi.s proposed consti- 894 Commonwealtk of [8 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. tution, or of this proposed amendment of the constitution mader -which 3'ou live'? — say 'yes' or 'no' directly, without any confused issue — without saying whether you wish this man or another to be your exi)onent.'' The doctrine of the wise man elected to the convention and exercising his judgment cannot altogether be depended on. The people will take care, no doubt, in most instances to know h,ow he is going to vote before they elect him, and if they could do so in every instance it would be all right; but you only defile the stream by diverting its direction. Anything that stands in the way of the popular will I take to be a misfortune in government by the people. It can only be a check which causes the waters to accumulate, and what is a gentle flow becomes a torrent. As the hon. member, Mr. Playford, with whom I agree, does not propose an amendment, I move : That the words "conventions to be elected by " be omitted. Mr. Gillies : What does the lion, mem- ber mean by the electors of the state ? Dr. COCKBURN : I certainly do not mean such a pure body of democracy as I should have liked to see when first we started with this constitution. Mr. Gillies : What does the hon. mem- ber mean ? Dr. COCKBURN : I mean what I say — the electors of the several states. Colonel Smith : By a majority of each state ! Dr. COCKBURN: By a majority of the people of each state, from whom this constitution originated. I mean that they and no others shall be consulted ; that the appeal shall not be to the convention, but to the people themselves. Colonel Smith : I wish to ask the hon. member, Dr. Cockburn, if he carries out his amendment, whether it will not mean, in fact, a majoiity of the majority of the states 1 Dr. Cockburn : Hear, hear ! [Z)r. Cockburn. SirS AMUEL GRIFFITH : The amend ment fairly raises the question of convcn tions as against a plebiscite. I certain]}! challenge the accuracy of the hon. mem- ber's statement as to the history of con- ventions. I do not believe the historic^] view is correct as to the object for which conventions were introduced ; but cer- tainly the purposes for which they have been used have been absolutely in the in- terests of democracy. It is an institution thoroughly used in America. No amend- ment of the constitution is made without a convention. The people of that country, who are practical people, recognise that millions of people are not capable of dis- cussing matters in detail ; they deal with general principles, and select men whom they trust to deal with details. That is the principle of conventions. That is why I think they are far preferable to a plebis- cite. If the question were to be simply a kingdom, or a republic, there might be a plebiscite upon that. But suppose the question were settled in favour of a king- dom, what wouldbe thebasis % How many other questions would you have to put ? You must have a complicated document^' and in order that the electors may exercise an intelligent vote they must be thoroughly familiar with every detail. Is that a prac- ticable state of things 1 Will you ever get the electors to vote under those cir- cumstances? I think not. Those are the reasons why I think a convention is better than a plebiscite. I should like person- ally to see it left to the federal parliament' to determine in what way the question shall' be submitted, but I am quite content that the clause shall be adopted. I believe that on the whole it is the best way, and I re- commend the Committee to take that view. ' Mr. DEAKIN : I do not propose to enter into this question at length, because I have had an opportunity already of ar- guing: it in the Constitutional Committee, where the advocates of the referendum were Commonwealth of [S April, 1891.] Australia BiU. 895- in a comparatively small minority. But surely the hon. member, SirSamuel Griffith, has misled the Committee in the view which he has put forward with reference to conventions. What does this clause say ? It says that for any proposed amend- ment of the constitution to become law a majority of conventions or the conventions of a majority of the states must agree to it. How? Sir Samuel Griffith : By vote ! Mr. DEAKIN : Will they agree to it as deliberative bodies, one amending it in one particular, and another amending it in another particular 1 Sir Samuel Griffith : Ko ! Mr. DEAKIN : Exactly. The conven- tions are simply to be called together to say yes or no. The hon. member says that the electors themselves cannot say yes or no to these complicated propositions, or to the complicated propositions which may pos- siVjly be proposed as an amendment of the onstitution ; but they can elect men who svill only be able to say yes or no, with just IS little reason, or with just as little oppor- ;unity of amending, or shaping a particular proposal to their wishes, as the original elec- ors. Surely the conventions, wdth their lands tied as they are tied by this clause, nfl as, in ray opinion, they ought to be tied, i they are there at all, can only give ex- ctly the same answer as the electors. For ly part, I would much prefer to go to the lectors in the first instance. Tlie amenrl- lents of the American Constitution have een made on such broad lines, they have volved such simple propositions that they ave come rearlily within the grasp of fery elector who has been called upon to ve judgment on them. I believe this 11 which the hon. member has drawn, is iflBcicntly comprehensive to form the basis id the framework of the future constitu- on of the commonwealth for generations come, and that any amendment which .y require to be made in it will be made in short, succinct propositions for an altera- tion of its principles, which can be sub- mitted with ease to the people of the- country, and on which the people of thfr country can give their judgment witli certainty and with knowledge. The inter- mediary conventions, such as the hon.. member proposes, gives none of the ad- vantages of a deliberative body. They can only say aye or no, and therefore you simply introduce between the amendment of the constitution and the people, a body of men who are elected to say simply yes or no, and not to exercise their reason in any way. I ask the Committee in what respect is that any better than asking the electors themselves, in the first instance^ to say yes or no ? The electors will only- vote for a man who says yes, if they wisli yes, or for a man who says no, if they wish no, and there is an end of the business. Why cannot the electors write yes or no on ballot papers'? Toenterinto the whole ques- tion of the proper relation of the referen- dum to representative government would be to unduly trespass on the attention of the Coiinnittee. But I protest altogether against the doctrine that the referendunv in any way interferes with representativo government or lessens the dignity of par- liament. In Switzerland the people hava the power of demanding a referendum and obtaining it when they .so desire; but in the majority of cases it is exercised after the houses have already legislated, and a.s- a check upon the houses. On the floor of this Chamber T have not licsitatcd to state again and again that (liougii .-is be- tween tilt; two chambers I ain glad (o seo- any jiroposal wliidi strengthens tiiat in, wiiicli th(r people are best represented, still as between the chambers and the i)eoplo there is no choice, and the jtower of general review and of general judgment should bo left as far as po8HiI)le willi llie people as- it is now l)y our general elections, by send- ing ministers to tlieir constituents, by our 89G Commonwealth of [8 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. adoption of the principle in local option clauses. We are adopting the principle of the popular vote more and more into the present framework of representative and responsible government. It is not in the least foreign to it, but can be grafted upon it as an assistance to Parliament if they desire to obtain distinctly and without the introduction of foreign matter the vei'dict of the people on any particular question. I shall vote for the amendment, and trust ■\ve shall see this clause so amended as to substitute in each case a direct referendum on all proposed amendments of the con- stitution so as to obtain the opinion of a majority of the people in the majority of the states. Mr. BAKER : The lion, member, Mr. Deakin, has asked what is the use of the people electing persons to say "yes" or "no" to any proposition when the people themselves may say "yes" or "no" without having an election at all, I will tell him one use, at all events. If people have to be elected to these conventions they will go before the electors and explain both sides of the question to them. For how otherwise ai'e the people to understand the question 1 Mr. Deakin : That will be done in any case ! Mr. BAKER : Why will it be done 1 Mr. Deakix : It will be done by those who desire the amendment and by those who oppose it ! IMr. BAKER : Who are the persons who will take the trouble to canvass the country from one end to the other and ex- plain to the people the object of the pro- posed amendment ? Mr. Deakix : Their representatives in parliament ! Mr. BAKER : It is all very well to say it will be thrashed out in parliament; but how many persons go to parliament to hear the debates 1 \_Mr. Deakin. Mr. Deakix : It will be thrashed out before the people ! Mr. BAKER : By whom % Mr. Deakin : By those who are advo- cating and are responsible for the sugges- tion ! Mr. BAKER : What I understand by a referendum is this ; The federal parlia- ment will pass a bill to alter the constitu- tion, and the alteration will not come into force imtil it is referred to the people. If it is to be referred to the people, whose duty is it, whose interest is it, to go before the people all over the colony, in different localities, and explain directly to them the object of the proposed amendment % Mr. Deakin : The interest of the party that brought it in ! Mr. BAKER : The members of the federal parliament will not do that. Mr. Deakin : Yes they will ! Mr. BAKER : If they do then, I say their nature will be different from the nature of ordinary members of parliament. They will not do so. But if there is a direct election one party will take one side and one party the other side, and under the stimulus of a contested election both sides of the question will be put to the people, who will be able to understand it, and thus be in a far better position to say to their" representatives in the convention, " You shall or you shall not vote for this proposi- tion. It appears to me to be one of the fundamental objects of conventions to in- duce persons to come forward and make the round of the constituencies, explaining tc the people that which they are asked to vote upon. If that course is not pursued, I do not know of any other persons who would carry out the duty. We are told that if, we pass this amendment we shall agree to the Swiss system of referendum. But that is not correct. Under that system the question is, in many cases, referred to the people twice. There are two referendums, so far as an altex'ation of the constitution Commonwealth of [S April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 897 is concerned. First of all, the people, bv Those words provide for any amendment referendum, say to parliament that it is being approved by a majority of the people. Dr. CocKBURN: Does that mean a majority of the people who vote? desirable to make the alteration Mr. MuxRO : That is the initiative — not the referendum ! :\rr. BAKER : What I say is, that so far as an alteration of the constitution is concerned, there is often a double referen- dum. The initiative is not necessarily Sir Samuel Griffith : No. Mr. MuxRO : It means a majority of the population of the states, apart from the conventions ! Dr. COCKBURN : I do not think it is connected with it. There is a compulsory necessary to make the amendment ; be- causelthink popular majorities can always take care of themselves. Amendment agreed to. Mr. KINGSTON: I would ask the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, whether it is intended by the bill to provide that an assent on the part of the Queen's repre- sentative shall be necessary to an amend- ment of the constitution if it receives the approval of the various conventions? As the clause stands, it provides that the pro- posed amendment, if approved by the con- ventions, shall become law, subject nevertheless to the Queen's power of disallowance. The words would warrant the suggestion that no royal assent was intended,, and I should like to know if that is really the intention of the hon. member in charge of the bill ? Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The words in the clause are not the right ones, and the hon. member's criticism is quite cor- rect. I move : That the words, lines Hi, 17, and IS, "l)ccoine law subject nevertlielcsa to tlio Queen's power of disallowanto," be omitted with a view to insert " be presented to the gDvenior-ycncral for tlic Queen's assent." Amendment agreed to. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : A doubt lias been raised as to whether tlio con- cluding words of the clause an; suniriently explicit as to the iiiiniinuni number of re- presentatives, and T doubt whether tlir-y are. I move : That after the word " conimonwcalth," lino 20, tlic following words be inserted :— "ortlio initiative so far as an alteration of the con- stitution is concerned, and there are two referendums. If we adopt the Swiss sys- tem we shall have to go a great deal further than the amendment goes. I shall vote for the clause as it stands. I prefer it to the proposed amendment of it. Question — That the words proposed to be omitted stand part of the clause — put. The Committee divided : Ayes, 19 ; noes, 9 : majority, 10. Ayes. Jennings, Sir Patrick Loton, Mr. Wacdonald-Paterson,Mr McMillan, Mr. Munro, Mr. I'arkcs, Sir Henry- Russell, Captain Rntledge, Mr. Wrixon, Mr. Bilker, Mr. Bird, Mr. Clark, Mr. Donaldson, Mr. Downer, Sii- .John Forrest, Mr. A. Tysh, Mr. illies, Mr. riliith, Sir Samuel ackett, Mr. Jray, Sir John lockbum, Dr. )eakiD, Mr. Jibbs, Mr. rey, Sir George Question so resolved in tlu Noes. Kingston, Mr. riayford, Mr. Smith, Colonel Suttor, Mr. ailiniiati^'c. Amendment (by Sir Samukl CiiUFFiTii) grf!ed to : That the word " the " be inserted after tlic 'ord " by," line 15. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I move : Thatthc following words be inserted in jilaceof le word " it," line 16 :— "and if the people of le states whose conventions approve of the nendment are also a majority of the people of le commonwealth, the proposed amendment " 3l 898 CommonweaHh of [8 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. niininmm number of representatives of a state in the house of repi-eseutatives. " Ameiidiueut agreed to ; clause, as amended, agreed to. CHAPTER I. -THE LEGISLATURE. Part IV.— Provisions relating to both Houses. Postponed clause 49 (Place to become vacant on accepting office of profit). Sir SAMUEL GKIFFITH : It was pointed out when we came to this clause that the proviso excepting officers of the military and naval forces is insufficient, and in fact it is. I move : That the proviso, " But this provision does not apply to officers of the military or naval forces who are not ui receipt of annual pay," be omitted with a view to the insertion in its place of the following proviso :— "But this provision does not apply to a person who is in receipt only of pay, half -pay, or a pension, as an officer of the Queen's navy or army, or who receives a new commission in the Queen's navy or army, or an increase of pay on a new commission, or who is in receipt only of pay as an officer or member of the military or naval forces of the commonwealth, and whose services are not wholly employed by the commonwealth. " Mr. DIBBS: I would ask the hon. member why naval and military officers should have a special privilege which is not proposed to be granted to officers of the civil service of a colony who may have rendered good service to the country, and have retired on pensions % Why should they be debarred from becoming senators or representatives 1 I do not think that the hon. member has in this amendment followed the direction of the consensus of opinion manifested by the Convention a few days ago. He proposes to make the clause clear so far as naval and military officers are concerned, but he ignores alto- gether the undoubted right which the civil servants of the various states should pos- sess when they leave the service if they can find constituencies which will elect them. I should like to make an amendment in the clause in the direction I have iudi- \Sir Samuel Griffith. cated, if I could see a chance of obtaining the support of hon. members. If hon. members are tired of discussion, I would let the matter go ; but it is rank injustice to our own people to disqualify them, while we are conferring favours on im- perial officers. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : The hon. member asks me why it is so ; and my answer to him is that it is not so. The hon. member asks why a distinction is made ; and my answer is that a distinc- tion is not made. There is nothing in the clause to disqualify civil servants who have retired on pensions. Mr. DIBBS : I believe that the hon. and learned member proposes to omit only the last two lines of the clause ; but the other portion disqualifies our own people. . Sir Samuel Griffith : No ! Mr; Thynne : They hold pensions under an act, not during pleasure ! Sir Samuel Griffith : The only pen^ sioners during pleasure are military pen sioners ! Mr. DIBBS : I want to know why a civil servant who has served his country for twenty years and honestly earned hi^J pension should lose his civil rights % Sir Samuel Griffith : He will not ! Mr. DIBBS: Under the clau.se as I read it a civil service pensioner is debarred . from the privilege of becoming a member k of the parliament. Amendment agreed to ; clause, as amended, agreed to. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I intend i to propose a new clause, dealing with the' mode of reckoning the population. The: clause was in the bill as prepared by the drafting committee, but the general com- mittee struck out the clauses to which it referred. Those clauses having been re- inserted, it is necessary that this clause also should be reinserted. I move : That the following new clause be inserted, to stand clause 3 of chapter vu :— ' ' In reckoning Commonwealth of [8 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 899 the number of people of a state, or other part of the commonwealth, the aboriginal natives of Australia shall not be counted. " Xew clause aoreed to. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I will now move, sir, that you leave the chair, and report the draft bill to the Convention witli amendments. There are verbal amend- ments required in some of the clauses, however, and the bill will have to be re- committed for the purpose of dealing with them. Bill reported with amendments. Motion (by Mr. Abbott) proposed : That the report be now adopted. Amendment (by Sir Samuel Griffith) agreed to : That all the words after " That " be omitted with a view to insert the following :— " the bill be recommitted for the reconsideration of clause 8 ; chapter i, clause 52, paragraphs 21, 22, 29, and 30 ; clause 53, and chapter vii, clause 1." In Committee (Recommittal) : The following clau.ses were verbally amended : — Preliminary clause 8 ; chapter I, clause 52, paragraphs 21, 22, 29, 30 ; clause 53. CHAPTER VII.— MISCELLANEOUS. Clause 1. The seat of government of the jommonweulth shall be determined by the par- iament Mr. DIR13S : I move : That the words " determined Ijy the parlia- nent" be omitted with a view to the insertion in heir place of the words " Sydney, New South Vales." am perfectly satisfied that this Conven- ion has no right to close its proceedings .'ithout giving an expression of opinion as where the capital of the future commoii- a-alth should be. I should fail in my uty as a representative of New South Vales if I did not ask tlie Convention to nanimously record tlieir vote in favour 1 the amendment. Hon. memljers made ery light of the matter when they heard lis notice of motion being given, and the hon. member, Mr. Munro, made the remark " We want it in Melbourne," and another hon. member said, " We want it in South Australia," and soon. There is one place alone which the people of New South Wales will accept as theeapital. If they are togive up all their privileges and a large portion of their liberties, -which this bill will take from them, they must, at least, have some regard to their antiquity, and their natural advantages, to the fact of their being cen- trally situated, and, above all, to the fact that New South Wales is practically the mother of all the other colonies. I will divide the Convention on the matter. Those members who represent New South Wales will be traitors to their colony, and the representatives of the other colonies who vote against me will be ungrateful to the colony from which they sprang, and will be neglecting the interests of the whole of the commonwealth, if they do not give me the full measure of tlieir support on this motion. Sir GEORGE GREY : I understand that in order that a division may be taken it is necessary that a seconder should be found for the motion. I am so desirous that every possible consideration should be bestowed on any claim that the colony of New South Wales may put forward that I have undertaken on this ground to second the motion. I take this opportunity of saying that in former days, when all was at stake in New Zealand in the dan- gerous position in wliich the native war liad placed us, tlie first colony to give us assistance was New South Wales. The Governor, Sir Gciorge Gipps, hclixd by the people of Now South Wales, gave us every assistance in his power to bestow in the shape of money, troops, arms, and amiiiunition — in fact, all the nuuiitions of war ; and, in addition to that, by his own advice and counsel, he alForded great assist- ance indeed to the colony of New Zealand. Now, I have an ojiportuuity, to some 900 A Plebiscite. [8 April, 1891.] A Plehiscite. extent, of repaying the debt of gratitude that I contracted so long ago. I shall always feel grateful in the extreme. I second the motion. Question — That the words proposed to Le omitted stand part of the clause — put. The Committee divided : Ayes, 26 ; noes, 4 ; majority, 22. Ayes. Baker, Mr. Jennings, Sir Patrick Clark, Mr. Kingston, Mr. Cockburn, Dr. Loton, Mr. Cuthbert, Mr. Macdonald-Paterson,Mr Deakin, Mr. Mai'mion, Mr. Donaldson, Mr. McMillan, Mr. Downer, Sir John Munro, jVIr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Parkes, Sir Henry Forrest, Mr. J. Playford, Mr. Gillies, Mr. Eutledge, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Suttor, Mr. Griffith, Sir Samuel Thynne, Mr. Hackett, Mr. Wrixon, Mr. Noes. Atkinson, Sir Harry Forrest, Mr. A. Dibbs, Mr. Grey, Sir George Question so resolved in the affirmative. Clause, as read, agreed to. Bill reported with further amendments. A PLEBISCITE. Sir GEORGE GREY rose to move : That previously to the bill " to constitute the commonwealth of Australia" being laid before the British Parliament, it should be submitted to and adopted by a majority of a plebiscite of the people of Austi'alia, at which each voter should give a single vote. Hesaid : I maintain that where agreat event is to be brought about in a country, the greatest probably which can ever occur inits history, it is right that before such a new form of constitution as lias been proposed is forced upon the colony of New South "Wales a plebiscite of the people should be taken for the purpose of determining whether or not a majority of those who vote on the occasion are in favour of that constitution being adopted by Australasia. It is needless, sir, for me at present to \_Sir George Grey. press on this motion at great length. I believe it is a self-evident proposal that I am making, and that probably it will be assented to without difficulty — -that at least is my hope. I shall Lave an opportunity of replying to any arguments urged against it. Saying, therefore, simply this — that I believe every man, especially every head of a family, has an absolute and just right to givea vote upon so great and momentous a question — I submit the motion to the Convention. Question proposed. Dr. COCKBURN : I move : That the question be amended by the inser- tion after the word "Australia," line 5, of the words "and a majority of the people of the several colonies." We require not only a plebiscite of the people as a whole, but a plebiscite of each colony. This provision I think the hon. member has omitted from the motion, which. I shall have much pleasure in supporting as proposed to be amended. Sir GEORGE GREY : I believe that when a plebiscite is taken it is a majority of the whole voters which is considered. If hon. gentlemen desire it in the way pro- posed I shall raise no objection ; but I understood that the other is the usual way. Mr. GILLIES : This amendment will defeat the motion, because it will be a ma- jority of the people of the states instead of a majority of the people. Dr. Cockburn : A majority of both ! Amendment proposed. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I think it is consistent, at any rate, with the view we have taken throughout our labours on the constitution to hold that it should be adopted by the states separately, and not by the people of Australia as a whole, be- cause a majority of the people of Australia as a whole might be comprised within two states, so that the motion in the form in which it is moved would certainly be entirely inconsistent with the whole lines A Plebiscite. [8 April, 1891.] A Plebiscite. 901 which we have adopted from the beginning of our proceedings to the end. With re- spect to the adoption of the constitution bj a plebiscite, that matter was discussed at an earlier period of the day in the Com- mittee, and the conclusion then adopted was that, with respect to amendments of the constitution, they should be submitted to conventions. I gave notice just now of a motion for to-morrow proposing that the mode in which the different colonies sliould adopt the constitution be left to them. I have my own idea as to which is the best way ; other people may have different ideas as to which is the best way. I am disposed for my part to think that it would bo wiser either to leave it to the states themselves, by their parliaments, to say in what way they will take the opinion of their people, or else to adopt the plan of conventions. But I do not think a plebiscite of the people is the best way of ascertaining their opinion upon a complicated matter like this. I do not know any instance where so com- plicated a matter as a new constitution has been submitted to a plebiscite. I do not .propose at any length to give the reasons for coming to that conclusion, but it is sufiicient, I think, to jjoint out that a very large proportion at least of the electors would nothavemade themselves thoroughly icquainted with the constitution before they voted upon it. There would be no one Dccially interested in making them ac- uainted with it. The ordinary influences lat operate and secure a full vote on natters of moment would l>o to a great ,ent wanting. There would bo wanting ;he personal interest of candidates. For ;hese reasons I believe that a plebiscite «rith respect to a con.stitution like this flrould not result in obtaining the deli- Derate opinion of the majority of the people )i the continent, and being of tliat opinion jf course I cannot vote for asking tluir pinion in that manner. Mr. DEAKIN : So far as the affirma- tion of the principle goes, I should be compelled to vote for the motion, if it were possible to give it effect consistently with the constitution to which we have already agreed. I simply wish at the outset to indicate a difference of opinion from my hon. friend. Sir Samuel Griffith, believing, as I do, that the electors would be made fully acquainted with the merits or demerits of the constitution, and feeling certain that there would be no want of representatives of the people holding views favourable and unfavour- able to the constitution, who would come forward on public platforms and in the press to discuss it. But my difficulty is that agreeing with the amendment, I can scarcely see my way to agree to the motion, cordially as I indorse its principle, for this reason : the Constitution as it stands con- tains a provision that it is to be adopted if any three colonies will consent. We may not unreasonably suppose that the legis- latures of all the colonies would be willing to remit tlie question of the acceptance or the rejection of the constitution to a vote of their people. The consequence may easily be that four states may agree by majorities to accept it, and three states may agree to reject it, and yet if this mo- tion were carried the fact that there was a majority of voters in tlxise three states which had decided to remain outside the union, would operate as a bar to the four states which desired to take advantage of the constitution, and would thus directly defeat the object which we have in view. T am perfectly well aware that tliis reso- lution is only an expression of opinion by the Convention, and that we have no means of enforcing it. But it involves tliis in- consistency. I am thoroughly with the hon. gentleman in the opinion that this constitution should bo submitted to the poople, and that it should be suV>niitted by plcbi.scitc or referendum, and that each 902 A Plebiscite. [8 April, 1891.] A Plebiscite. voter slioulcl give a single vote. Upon all people, be very desirable, and one clause these matters, I am in accord with tlie might be very undesirable. Is it suggested lion, gentleman. As the resolution stands, that the whole scheme of federation should it mic^ht seem to indicate that a majority be thrown aside, because there is a singL- of the people in the colonies which do not point in it which does not receive the sup- intend to join in the federation might pre- port of a majority of the people 1 It ap- vent its adoption by the people of the pears to me that the answer given to the colonies willing to accept the constitution. resolution by thehon. member, Mr. Munro, I am sure that is not the hon. member's is complete. We are here to do a specific intention ; but, as the resolution stands, it work which we have accomplished. And it does seem to involve that inconsistency, is not for us to dictate to the various par- and, unless it be removed, I shall feel uu- liaments what action they should take to able to vote for it. ascertain the feeling of the people of the Mr. MUNFtO : It appears to me that respective states. I apprehend, with the there is another and still more fatal ob- hon. member, that in so doing we should jection to the resolution than that just be going outside the limits of oi;r commis- pointed out by my hon. colleague. We sion. A plebiscite may be a very desirable received from our various parliaments a thing in the abstract ; but I fail to see why mandate to come here for the purpose of on every possible occasion those who favour considering and reporting upon a constitu- that principle of ascertaining the people's tion ; consequently when we have done that will should advocate its adoption. In my our mission is ended, and for us to say in opinion we should be making a great and what way the colonies are afterwards to signal blunder if we were to adopt this deal with the matter appears to me to be resolution. a piece of impertinence. We are sent here Mr, DIBBS : I intend to vote for the to do a particular work. I am happy to resolution, and to endeavour so to amend say that that work has, to a large extent, it that it will more clearly express the been done, and that it has probably been views of the mover. Hon. members arei done successfully. But for us nowto dictate probably aware that a plebiscite is the fair- ■ to our masters who sent us here would be, est way in which the people of these colo- it appears to me, to make a great mistake. nies could be asked to express their opinion I shouldobject to any resolution of thekind, upon the question. Before this constitu- no matter how much it might be in accord tion is finally adopted, it will have to go with my views. My desire is that we should before the people. not exceed the authority given to us. Mr. Munro : Through the parliaments! Mr. FITZGERALD : I presume that Mr. DIBBS : It will have to go before if this question were submitted to the vote the people. of the people at all, it would have to be Mr. Deakix : It will be adopted through upon the broad question as to whether we both the parliament and the people ! should have federation or not. It is op- Mr. DIBBS : It will have to go before posed to all common- sense to ask for a the parliaments first, and if the parliar vote of the people upon a constitution in- ments accept it, it will be necessary to as- volving complicated details such as are certain the opinion of the people. No- contained in this bill. How could a simple thing can be more simple than to ask " yes" or " no" apply to such a constitu- the people, the plain question whether tion as that we have adopted 1 A por- they are in favour of the constitution as tion of it might, in the opinion of certain passed by their parliament or not. Where [J/r. Deakin. A Plebiscite. [8 April, 1891.] A Plebiscite. 903 is the complication, as suggested by the hon. member, Mr. Fitzgerald ? What com- plication can arise in asking the people this simple question 1 Mr. MuNRO : Parliament will decide in what way the matter is to be put before the people ! Mr. DIBBS : They will decide by ap- proving of, disapproving of, or amending the constitution. Mr. MuxRO : Why dictate to the par- liaments as to what shall be done 1 Mr. DIBBS : It is merely an expression of opinion. Mr. Deakin : Hear, hear ; it is not linding ! Mr. DIBBS : And it will liave the effect of showing to the people of the various colonies the fairness of this Convention — that its members are anxious that the people should honestly join with them in €staljlishing a federation. Kow, if the question of federation or no federation be submitted to the various constituencies — I speak now of New South Wales — the question AviJl be mixed up with the ques- tion of free-trade and protection, or with some sectarian cry, and the people will not honestly and clearly express their opinion with regard to federation. No- thing can be more simple or easy than for the various jiarl laments to deal with ;he constitution as it has Ijeen framed bere. If it be approved of by the various parliaments then let a plebiscite be taken, et the people be asked wliethcr tJicy are n favour of or against the federation as pproved by their parliament. I have no iesii'e to complicate the question, and 1 ibould like to move an amenduient to tlic ffect that tlin constitution should be sub- nitted to and adopted by a majority of Hebi.scites of the ])POple of the several olonifS. Dr. COCKBURN : I ask leave to with- Hraw my amendment. T Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Mr. DIBBS : Then I move : That all the words after the word " by " be omitted with a view to insert the words " ma- jorities of the plebiscites of the people of the several colonies." Mr. Fitzgerald : What does the hon. member mean by " majorities of the plebiscites " ? Mr. DIBBS: That there shall be a plebiscite in each colony. Sir George Grey : I accept the amend- ment of Mr. Dibbs. Motion amended accordingly. Mr. GILLIES : It appears to me that, notice of motion liaving been given by the hon. member. Sir Samuel Griffith, to con- sider this question tomorrow, it is scarcely fair that we should be forced to consider it to-night. It is a very important ques- tion, and we ought not to hurry it. It will require all our consideration to enable us to arrive at a conclusion which will l)e satisfactory to all the colonies as to the way in which this question is to be sub- mitted, and I think we are scarcely pre- pared to decide upon an arbitrary motion of this kind, and, so far as the amendment now projjosed is concerned, we have had no notice of it. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I think we ought to adopt the constitution our- selves before we decide upon the manner in which that constitution is to be accepted by the states, and before we ask the par- liaments to adopt the constitution in a certain way. Sir GEORGE GREY, in reply : This molioii has been on the order-paper for a long period of time, and whatever may be the form of constitution which we adopt to-morrow, it will not in the least inter- fere with tiiis resolution. It is almost es- sential l»efore we adopt the proposal to be made to us to-morrow, that we should know the exact manner in which the ])eoplo will have an opportunity of deciding this question. This is a step preliminary to 904 A Plebiscite. [8 April, 1891.] A Plebiscite. the other, instead of one that ought to follow it. I feel that my proposal is so fair, so just, that I cannot imagine any ob- jection can be made to it in its present form. I fear myself that the proposal which will be made will be that each state shall be made to adopt the constitution by the legislature of each colony adopting it. I fear that is the intention, and I say, in point of fact, that the legislatures of the several colonies at present in no way represent the people. We have here a very anomalous form of constitution put upon us by the British Parliament without any of us being heard — at least that was the case in most instances — or without our being represented in the Par- liament which gave us those constitutions. I think that now we should affirm that we will not accept any constitution except upon the condition of its being submitted to the people in the manner proposed in this motion. We have a perfect right to i)i-opose that. If any other form be adopted it would be a great injustice to New Zealand ; that is to say, if it is left to the state legislatures to decide whether or not the constitution shall be adopted, because the constitution is to my mind absolutely unfair to the people of New Zealand. We have not provided any fair form of representation for the people which is at all consistent with the ad- vanced views of the present time. I feel certain that it would be an unjustitiable act on our part to attempt to force this constitution on New Zealand by resolving that the question of the adoption of the constitution is to be settled by the parlia- ments of the several colonies as they now exist. I shall, therefore, press the resolu- tion, and I think I am dealing justly with the whole of the people in proposing that if they desire to have this constitution at all, every man who pleases may vote upon that ques- tion upon the principle of one man one vote. I feel certain that if that is not acceded [Sir George Grey. to, the probability is that the people of New Zealand will absolutely reject the constitution. Let every man express his opinion. That would be a means of edu- cating the people on political questions. I believe that the discussions which have taken place here have exei'cised already a very great influence upon the people of Australasia. They begin to look at matters in a very different light from what they formerly did. I feel confident that if allowed to express their opinion upon the constitution from one end of the country to the other, the people will become fully instructed on every question connected with it, and they will, in fact, be better able to judge as to what will be for their own interests than we possibly can be. Unable as we are to sympathise with many of their views, ignoi'ant as we are of many of their sufferings, their wants, and the troubles which they have to undergo, I say we are not fair judges whether they ought to be subjected to a certain consti- tution or not. It is our duty to obtain for them such privileges as I now stand up to claim. Question put. The Convention divided :. Ayes, 8 ; noes, 21 ; majority, 13. Ayes. Atkinson, Sir Hairy Gordon, Mr. Cockbiirn, Dr. Grey, Sir George Deakin, Mr. Smith, Colonel Dibbs, Mr, Suttor, Mr. Abbott, Mr. Baker, Mr. Clark, Mr. Cuthbert, Mr. Downer, Sir John Forrest, Mr. A. Forrest, ]\Ir. J. Fitzgerald, Mr. Gillies, Mr. GrifSth, Sir Samuel Noes. Jennings, Sir Patrick Loton, Mr. Macdonald-PatersoDjMr. Marmion, Mr. Mclhvraith, Sir Thomas McMillan, Mr. Munro, Mr. Playford, Mr. Pvutledge, Mr. Thynne, Mr. Hackett, Mr. Question so resolved in the negative. Convention adjourned at 5'17 p.m. Addresses. [9 April, 1891.] Commonwealth of Australia. 905 THURSDAY, APRIL, 1801. Addresses— Commonwealth of Australia Bill (Adoption of Committee's Report) — Adoption of the Constitution — EstabUshment of the Constitution — Report of the Pro- Iceedinjjs and Debates — Votes of Thanks — Officers of The President took the chair at 11 a.m. ^ ADDRESSES. The President : I have received an address from the Sydney Chamber of Com- merce. I should explain that this address is dated 11th March last; but I have no recollection of its being received. A copy of it has been made, which the secretary will now read, and also an address from the Chamber of Commerce at Suva. The following addresses were read by the secretary : — Sydney Chamber of Commerce, Sydney, 11 March, 1891. The Hon. Sir Henry Parkes, G.C.M.G., Presi- dent, Australasian Federation Convention, Sydney, New South Wales. Sir, — I have the honor to inform you that at the first meeting of the committee of this con- vention, since the opening of the Australasian Federation Convention (held this day) tlie fol- lowing resolution was unanimously adopted : — That the .Sydney Chamber of Commerce cordially wel- comes the delegates of the Australasian F'ederation Con- vention, watches with profound interest their delibera- tions, and hopes their labours may eventuate in the in- creased commercial prosperity of federated Australasia. I have, &c., Henry Ciias. Mitchell, Secx'ctary. Chamber of Commerce, Suva, Fiji, 1 April, 1801. (Jentlemen, — I have the honor, on belialf of tlic Suva Chamber of Commerce, to offer my id their sincere congratulations to you, as Imembers of a convention assembled, for a jmr- Ipose so important to the welfare of tlie whole of |thc Australasian group. Although Fiji has no representative among jrou, yet no less is she included amongst the |:olonics of Australasia. My chamber, cognisant id proud of that fact, desire therefore to add keir testimony to that of the other colonies U> ie importance of the work you have under- taken, and to mark its sense of the efficient manner in which it is being conducted. Wishing j-ou all success in your onerous undertaking. I have, &c., Hexry H. Marks, Chairman, Suva Chamber of Commerce. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA BILL. ADOPTION OF committee's REPORT. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH : I rise to move ; That the draft bill reported from the Com- mittee be adopted by this Convention. I do not propose to make any lengthy speech in support of this motion. In bringing up the draft bill from the Con- stitutional Committee, I had the o])por- tunity to explain briefly its provisions, and they have since been very fully con- sidered in the Committee of the whole Convention ; but the alterations made in the bill have not in any way affected its principles. They have left me nothing new to add, and I do not feel disposed to make a speech merely for the sake of speaking. I only desire, if I may, to offer my con- gratulations to the Convention upon hav- ing proceeded so far in their work. I, for one, believe that the constitution which we have framed, although it probably docs not meet exactly the views of any member of the Convention, will probably coinincnd itself to a large majority of us. Indeed, the probability is that it is the best constitu- tion that could be framed with any chance of acceptance by the people of the colonics. I am satisfied tliat the more it is considered by them the more they will V)0 inclined to tome to that conclusion. Without further preface I submit the motion to the (.\m- vention. (^)iiC8tion proposed. :Mr. DII'.I'.S: I do not rise with tlio view of oH'ering any lengthy roinarks, but to elicit certain information. I would liko the lion, genlleiiian wlio lias lia been adopted, so that wo shall all form ono people. I ,sli;ill not feel, for iuNtancM', in voting fur representatives to the federal parliaujent, that my power is ]iiiiit«'(l liy the Murray on the one side aiul tlie sea on the other. I hliall frcl that the power of that vote cxtcndrt to Carpentaria in one ilirection, and, if WcKtern Au.stralia joins us, to I'Veeniantle in (Iif other. If that be 80, surely, instead of giving away our 91 1 Commonwealth oj [0 April, 1891.] Australia Bill rights and pi-ivilegea, we are enlarging them. We ai-e enabling our friends in Western Australia, who are at present cooped up in one-third of the continent to vote in such a manner that their power will extend from one shoi"e of Australia to the other, and enabling them to feel that instead of being part of a small colony they ai-e part of a powerful commonwealth, of which we may well be proud. I have great pleasure in supporting the adoption of the report. Mr. DEAKIN : Wliile I do not desire to detain the Convention, it yet appears possible to add one or two words of a general nature upon the final stage which we have now reached. It is rather too early for us to separate ourselves from our work and its details so as to be able to regard it dispassionately as a whole. The task on which we have been engaged for the last six weeks has been onerous and arduous to an almost unparalleled degree. Critics who look to the record of our debates, admirably rendered as they have been by the Hansard staff of this colony, will not derive even from that excellent statement a full view of all the circumstances which have been operating upon the minds of hon. members. There is much unstated in that record, because the delegates to this Convention have practically lived together for six weeks in private as well as in public intercourse, and from the natural action and reaction of mind upon mind have been gradually shaping their thoughts upon this great question. The bill which we present is the result of a far more intricate, intel- lectual process than is exhibited in our debates ; unless the atmosphere in wliich we have lived as well as worked is taken into consideration, the measure as it stands will not be fully understood. And now the hour has struck for our departure, and the work, so far as we can shape it, is about to leave our hands. The time for construc- tion lias passed, and the time for criticism [J//\ Munro. has begun. So far from presenting our- selves as a phalanx resisting criticism from the public outside, we have courted it from the outset. Every important step, and every practical step in shaping the consti- tution lias been taken in the full light of day. We send it to the people of Australia, not only informing them of the reasons in favour of the particular provisions we have adopted, but with information contained in the record of all the reasons that could be urged against them. If there are enemies of federation, if there are hostile critics, I undertake to say that none of them will be able to present arguments against these proposals which may not be found ia some form already embodied in our debates. We come before the public, not in an atti- tude of resistance, but of confidence. The whole process of constitution-making has, as far as possible, taken place under their eyes, and they will form their judgment on the whole of the facts. Those who turn to the pages of this Haoisard, recollecting the report of the meeting held in Melbourne twelve months ago, will surely be struck by one important circumstance, and that is, the immense distance which has been travelled since the conference of 1890. A reader of the speeches delivered on that occasion must be struck by their obvious and their necessary generality. Federation was then in the aii', and only in the air ; even after the conference it still remained to a large extent with but a phantasmal existence. To-day it has taken form, and shape, and substance. It is reduced to type ; and one form of federation, at all events, is presented for the criticism of the whole continent. Every member who was present at that JNIelbourne Conference, with the solitary exception of Sir John Hall, an able representative of New Zealand, is a member of this present Convention. One other, whose presence we were fortunate enough to enjoy at both meetings, whose ability we all appreciated, and whose up Commonwealth of [9 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 915 right public spirit we all revered, the late Ml". Macrossan, has been unfortunately taken from us during our proceedings. But, with one exception, the whole of the mem- bers who took part in the Melbourne Con- ference have joined in this Convention, and although they may be supposed to have exercised a natural influence on the course of the debates, yet the actual pro- duct — the actual result of the practical working of this Convention is something very different from what even the wisest of those persons dreamed of twelve months ago. You, sir — and who more competent to pass a judgment ? — have said that the celerity with which this movement has advanced has taken even you by surprise, and those who feel called upon for historical and political purposes to gauge it by its public records will re-echo and reiterate your verdict when they compare the excel- lent but shadowy work done by that con- ference twelve months ago with the solid practical outcome which we are presenting to-day. I take it that we may remit this '. to our constituents with some confi- dence, since it is a natural outgrowth of the constitutions already existing in Aus- tralia, of which we ourselves have had ex- perience, striking its roots back to that British Constitution from which the free institutions of our race have sprung. It does not present tlie same features as the constitution of the mother country, nor yet is it identical, by any means, with any ringle constitution which can be found in Australia; but it ought to be a source of jonfidence to note that it has proceeded an the same well-grounded lines and well- oroved methods which have received the Kinction of our people in all these colonies, rhis constitution will not present itself iO them as sometliing straiigr;, foreign, or ibnormal ; but as something which their >wn experience will have prepared them » understand and appreciate. The work rour hands, although it will bear traces of the study of the constitutions of the United States and of Canada, and of con- stitutions even more remote, is yet dis- tinctly an Anglo-Saxon, saturated through and through with the spirit and confidence of self-government, which has been char- acteristic of the race. This may encourage us to hope that our constituents wall extend to it the same consideration which they require to give to all political expedients. They will not have expected as the outcome of our deliberations a scheme which any particular section or party would consider perfect; without deifying compromise, they should admit that the very fashion in which it has been shaped offers one of the best guarantees for its future harmonious work- ing. If those who occupy the proud posi- tion of representing the people of Aus- tralia under this neAv constitution meet and deliberate on the many dilHculties left for their solution, and to which we have only opened the doors, in that same spirit of moderation which has been exhibited in these discussions — with the same tolerance, fairmindedness, and anxious disposition to arrive at a reasonable compromise — and surely we are entitled to expect more ratiier than less from them — then the people of these colonies need feel no hesitation what- ever in setting their seal to the draft bill which we have had the honor of preparing. Without entering upon details, which have been suiiiciently dealt with fur practical purposes during the debate, let me add that for my own part 1 should have preferred to see the second chamber no antithesis of the first in any respect, but simjily a body for the securing of that permanence and stability which arc necessary for good go- vernment, gifted with aiithorilj to diKcuss and powers to delay sulhciont to make it certain that no popular measure could lind its way to tlie statute-ljook uidess it wero proved to have been well reasoned upon and .'ijiproved of by the penph^ in the maturity of their judgmfnt. Though I should have 91G CommoniceaUh of [9 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. jjrefenvd to see tlio ujipcr eliamliei' more strictly limited to functions of that kind, yet I cannot conceal from myself the fact that it "will 1)0 elected by select constituencies — constituencies which will keep the cen- tral government in touch with the local governments of the A'arious states, and which should produce harmony between the working of the state parliaments and the central parliament. A body of this dignity, and charged witli such important functions, nioy reasonably be av.arded a higher position than that of the upper house of any single colony. I should have preferred to see the fiscal question dealt with in a different fashion, not by way of imposing any policy on the future parlia- ment of Australia — I am perfectly satis- fied as to what that policy will be — but by way of giving confidence to those who have invested capital in our manufacturing industries. Although I should have pre- ferred this, yet my confidence is unabated in the ultimate result of the fiscal liberty conferred. I do not believe that there is any real danger to protection from that source. What I desired to do was to allay the fears — not altogether unreason- able, if not sufficiently well founded — of those Avho look forward with apprehen- sion to the passing of a uniform tariff", possibly a lov/er tariff tlian that at pre- sent in force in some colony upon some ai'ticles. And, finally, on the question of the amendment of the constitution, it appears to me that the proposition which I think the hon. and learned member. Sir Siimuel Griffith, had in his mind when he spoke of preparing amendments of the constitution by conventions — the practice which obtains in the separate states of the American Union, where the question of the amendment of the constitution is re- mitted to conventions, and the several amendments prepared by them are then submitted to a direct vote of the electors. That would, in my opinion, have been a more [J/r, Deakin. satisfactory manner of providing for future changes of the constitution than that which has found its place in the bill, and which bears a closer analogy to the provisions in the Constitution Act of the United States Central Government. These are, however, comparatively minor points, and I think we should all be prepared to defend this constitution before our constituents on the ground that in its spirit, its form, and its character it is thoroughly liberal and thoroughly democratic. The hon. member who appeared to fear the electoral provi- sions of this constitution most, the hon. member from New Zealand, Sir George Grey, has, I feel sure, not yet sufficiently acquainted himself with the accurate facts with regard to plural voting and its in- fluence in these colonies. Neither in this colony nor in Victoria does the influence of that vote exist to the extent which he supposes. I am confident that in our own colony, out of its ninety-five seats, not more than ten seats are materially aflfected by plural votes. For all that, I am cordially and thoroughly at one with the hon. gen- tleman in his opposition to the principle and practice. The Victorian Assembly has already passed a measure for the abolition'f of the system. That measure forms part of the Government programme for next session. I believe it stands an equal chance of being adopted in the great colony in which we now are. Consequently, the pro bability is that in the two most populous colonies of Australia the j^rinciple of " one man one vote" will be established at a very early date — long, I trust, before the founda-' tion of this constitution. That being so, I fancy that the fears to which the hon member. Sir George Grey, has given ex-'^'- prcssion in many ways in regard to this '^ subject, are not well founded. South Aus-''' tralia and New Zealand have already^'' adopted the principle, and I believ thal"^ New South Wales and Victoria, ' not*' Queensland as Avell, are on the to oi- i Commomcealth of [9 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. 917 adopting it. The bill as it stands does not not be able to secure for their state all the embody all that some of us desired in the just consideration which is its due in eveiy matter of powers. In the Constitutional matter in which its interests are affected. Committee it was contended that under They di.sparage themselves in the fii-st in- the heading of statistics there was suiEcient stance if they put forward any such plea of authority to establish an agricultural de- personal feebleness, and they also disparage partment, such as exists in the United the people of the neighbouring colonies States ; and it was thought premature at if they contend that they are not equally this stage to endeavour to take any federal fitted with themselves to enter into the step in the all-important question of water discharge of the duties devolving upon the supply, or in the equally important subject citizens of a free commonwealth. "What of the consolidation of the debts of the is the fact at the present time with regard colonies. It was thought inadvisable to to the political condition of these colonies, attempt to make any movement in these entirely independent, as they have been, directions, although there are, I believe, a of oiie another 1 Is it not manifest and large majority of the members present who remarkable, that though each colony has trust and believe that in the early future been left to follow its own course, Avithout the federal parliament will see its way, any regard to its neighbours, the laws of svith the consent of all the colonies, to all are governed by exactly the same prin- idd these to the list of powers which this ciples ? One of the most familiar features constitution confers. It might be possible, of colonial politics is that any law which has rvere it necessary, to attempt to answer by been passed by one colony is almost imme- mticipation some of the contentions which diatcly afterwards adopted by its neigh- iire certain to be urged against this bill by hours, if it is found to be successful in its he opponents of federation. That is a task working; and the consequence of this luis o which we shall probably have many been that though some may have been tpportunities of addressing ourselves in quicker and some slower, every colony has ither places. It may reasonably be said, advanced upon the same road. Their in- lowever, that imperfect as this measure is, stitutions have been shaped in the same t contains within itself the essential prin- spirit and iu the same direction. Taking iples of popular government; it contains statute-book by statute-book, and compar- rithiu itself the power which will p'.'rniit ing one wiili the other, the dillcronccs sink lie people to modify and shape it in accor- into insignificance, while the main general ance with their future needs ; it provides features of likeness assert themselves on 3r that free and full discussion of public every page. Do we need a stronger demon- ffairs, that reasonable consideration of stration tiian this of the natural unity of bcm by the public at large and that close the people of Australia with regard to all riticism of them Ijy the chambers charged the political questions which iiavc agitated 'ith that sp(!cial duty, which is the best tli< m in tli«- past, a!i J shall not come to, that it is nut my duty to advo- cate this constitution, I sliiill be placing myself in a false position. ])r. COCKIiURN : J join willi the hon. gontlenicn who have already spoken in my appreciation of the wmv in whiili the 020 Commonwealth of [9 April, 1891.] Australia Bill. ■work of the Convention has been done, reflecting as it does great credit upon those i^sponsible for its management. No doubt the bill represents the "svill of a large majority of the Convention, though, as one "who lias pretty generally been found voting Avith a minority, I cannot join in approval of all its provisions. On the other hand, I recognise that it has very valuable features, though I fear that it has also very great faults. It appears to me to tend more to unification than to federation, and, to a great extent, to be founded on a distrust of the popular will. However, I can only say that I hope a calm and dispassionate view of the whole of the events may lead me to the con- clusion that these flaws may not be of so vital a nature as at present I am bound to regard them. Mr. J. FORREST: I should like to .congratulate the Convention, and also you, Mr. President, upon the result of our labours. Although this draft bill may not meet with the approval of all of us — in fact, some portions of it have been car- ried by very narrow majorities, when, I believe, the result would have been the re- verse in some important instances had all the members of the Convention been pre- sent — still, I feel that it is a very valuable production, and one that cannot but be of great benefit to those who are to consider this question ; and it seems to me that a fair result has been obtained. I quite agree with you, sir, that the federation of these colonies must come sooner or later, and the question arises in my mind whether this is the most favourable time, or whether some future time would not be more favourable. I unhesitatingly say that, .so far as I can judge, the difficulties which surround the question now will not be less as time goes on ; and there- fore, if any one is of opinion that the federation of the colonies is necessary, I am convinced that no more appropriate \_I)r. Cocklurn. time can be chosen for it than the present, because, as the colonies grow larger, and as our interests become more diverse, the diffi- culties now existing will be increased many fold, and no more opportune or convenient time will be found in the future than ia the present. Our work is about completed. It will be for the people of the different portions of Australia to say whether they will accept or reject the constitution whicli has been framed. It will be my duty to place the bill before the people of the colony I represent in its proper and true light. It will be my duty, and the duty of those asso- ciated with me, to explain the features of the bill to the people of Western Australia. It is not for me, at the present time, to say what their decision may be. As far as I can judge, the terms of the bill are, to the larger colonies, which are connected by several means of communication, and especially of railway communication, suffi- ciently good. Even if the bill does not meet with their entire approval, the con- ditions laid down in it are sufficiently fair and just to those colonies to enable them to federate. As far as I am able to judge, the colony which I have the honor to re- present seems to be in the worst position, the principal reason for this being that we have no means of communication with the other great colonies. Before we can have communication, excepting by sea, with any part of these colonies, 1,500 miles of rail- way will have to be constructed over a coun- try at present uninhabited. | Mr. MuxRO : Federation would hasten that ! Mr. J. FORREST : The one great ob- , stacle which I see in the way of our join- 1 ing the federation, the one great obstacle which it will be difficult for us to over- come when we place the matter before the || people of Western Australia, will, I hope, soon be removed. I sincerely congratu- late the Convention on the result of our labours ; and I especially thank those gen- i Commonwealth of [9 Apbil, 1891.] Australia Bill. 921 tlemen who have given so much time to the preparation of the bilh Foremost amongst them I must mention the name of the hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith. I feel sure that without his assistance, and the able and williug assistance of other legal gentlemen, we should not have been in the position in which Ave find ourselves to day, of having passed the bill through the Convention. I also desire, before con- cluding, to thank you, jNlr. President, and the hon. member, Mr. McMillan, and the Government of New South Wales, for the extreme hospitality and kindness which have been extended to us during the Con- vention. Although our labours have been arduous, and we have had a great deal to do, and have been kept very closely at work, they have been very much lightened by the great hospitality and kindness which we have received from you and members of your Government, and, in fact, from all the people with whom \n wron^', I m-e ii I Lave endeavoured to .set in this re.spert, saw in liim <|iialitii'H which wnuM nropo^ed that this Convention should be held i)roposed that whatever the resultof theCoiivenlion miglit be, an appeal should be made to the people to enable tiiem to .say whether there should be federation or not. It was never supjiosed in our legislature that tlie Parliament exist- ing at t]i(' present time sliouUl be a.sked to accept the bill prepared liy this Convention, and I am K!!.\']'KS. Ji'esolveJ (motions by Mr. INICiMii.L.w) .• That the Prcjidciit forward copies of the Pro- ceedings and Debates of the Convention to his 938 Votes of Thanks. [9 April, 1891.] Votes of Thanhs. Excellency the Governor of New South Wales, for transmission to the Right Hon. the Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies. That the I'resideat forward copies of the re- port of the Proceedings and Debates of the Con- vention to the representatives of the colonies at this Convention, for presentation to their respec- tive parliaments and for general distribution. VOTES OF THANKS. !Mr. MUNRO : Our duties being now ended, I have been requested to propose a very important resolution wliicli I have not the least doubt will be carried not only unanimously, but with enthusiasm : That the thanks of the Convention be given to the Hon. Sir Henry Parkes, G.C.M.(4. , President ; the Hon. Sir Samuel W. Gritfith, K.C.M.G. , Vice- President ; and the Hon. Joseph Palmer Abbott, Chairman of Committees of the Whole, for the services rendered by them to the Convention. I am quite sure that all the members of the Convention will agree with me in say- ing that we are under a great obligation to those gentlemen for the attention which they have given to the business, and the manner in which they pre.sided over our meetings. I had the pleasure and the honor of proposing you, sir, for the posi- tion of President, and I am quite sure we all feel that you have been the right man in the right place. I do not think it would be wise now to dwell on these mat- ters, for we all know and appreciate the services which have been rendered. Mr. PLAYFORD : I second the resolu- tion with very great pleasure. Question i-esolved in the affirmative. The PRESIDENT : It seems to me that it is my duty at this stage to express my acknowledgments, and it will be the duty of the other two gentlemen named in the resolution to express theirs. I feel my- self very sensibly the compliment paid to me. I accepted my nomination to the office of President, not, perhaps, with much misgiving, but I can say safely with no de- sire for that office to tlie exclusion of any more acceptable member of the Convention. Since I have occupied the chair I hav* received such uniform courtesy, so muc! kindness, so much consideration for anj failings of mine, and so much appreciatioi of my small services, that I am more thai gratified. It is, of course, a great distinc tiou to preside over a body so distinguishet as this Convention. We have amongst us. I think, no fewer than fourteen or tifteerl gentlemen who either are prime minisi ters, or have occupied that post ; and it must be assumed, even if we had no per- sonal knowledge, that the colonies would only send as their representatives their best men. The Convention is composed of men whose names are historically known already, and it is a great distinction in- deed to be promoted to the high station of presiding over the deliberations of these distinguished men. I appreciate that my- self very deeply, and I return my sincere thanks for all the courtesy and kindness I have received, with the assurance that I shall not soon forget the many acts of con- sideration which have been shown to me by lion, members. I can say nothing more, except again to express my grateful acknow- ledgments for the distinction conferred upon me, and also for the various acts of kindness and courtesy extended to me dur- ing the time I have occupied the chair. Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I desire also to offer my acknowledgments to thei Convention for the compliment paid to me in including me in this vote of thanks. My duties as Vice-President of the Con- vention have not, I am happy to say, been very arduous, as you, sir, have been able to perform the functions almost throughout the whole of our sittings. The functions which fell to my lot as chairman of the Constitutional Committee were more ardu- ous. In respect to them I desire to ex- press my special acknowledgments to the "entlemenwho were on the committee with me for the help which they gave me, and especially with respect to the difficult work Votes of Thanks. [9 April, 1891.] Officers of the Convention. 939 of drafting tlie bill, or being responsible for the drafting, which fell to my lot as chair- man. I desire to express mj thanks, as an individual, to the hon. member, Mr. Clark, Attorney-General of Tasmania, and to the hon. membei', Mr. Kingston, lately Attorney-General of South Australia, who were originally associated with the draft- ing committee, and also in no less degree to my hon. friend, Mr. Barton, of New '■ South Wales, who took Mr. Clark's place when he Avas laid up, and who devoted himself to that work as strenuously and as industriously as any man with whom I ever had the pleasure of working, and I venture to say that I have done a good deal of hard work in my time. I have also to express my acknowledgments to the Convention for the uniform courtesy and consideration w ith which they have treated me. I have felt sometimes that I was, perhaps, a little too insistent on my views; but I hope they will pardon me. T, for my part, shall leave this Convention with the most pleasurable feelings. I had the pleasure of knowing nearly all the members personally before — I think there were only three members whom I did not know before; old acquaintances have been renewed, and I feel, as my hon. colleague from Queens- land .said this morning, it is impossible to go away from a meeting of this kind with- out profiting very greatly by intercourse with so many minds. I hope that what will follow on our woik will be as satis- factory as it seems to us at the present time. ,Mr. ABBOTT: 1 have to return my thanks to the Convention for the lionor which they did me in electing iiHi (Chair- man of Committees, and J have to thank hon. members for tiio very little tronlilo which they gave mc in tiio discharge of those duties. I hope that in the future, occupying the position which I do in this legislature, I shall have as little trouble in maintaining law and order as I have had during the discussions of the Convention in Committee. It is an honor to be associ- ated with such a Convention, and I am quite sure that, whatever the result may be, tlie bringing together of so many public men from the ditierent colonies will be of lasting benefit to every one of the colonies. Again I thank hon. members. OFFICERS OF THE CONVENTION. Mr. MUNRO : I beg to move : That the thanks of tliis Convention be given to Fi-ederick \Yilliani Webb, Esquire, secretary, and to his assistants, and also the members of the Parliamentary Reporting Staff of New South AVales, for th>'ir services to the Convention. I wish simply to say one word in support of this motion, and it is that the mem- bers of the Convention feel that these gentlemen have dischai-ged their duties in an admirable manner. As one who is always complaining of the slowness with which the Hansard of Victoria is pub- lished, I highly appreciate the smartness with which the members of the Hansard staff of this colony have performed their work. I was perfectly surprised to find a proof copy of Hansard at our hotels each morning, containing the previous day's debates ; and looking through the reports from time to time, I was equally surprised to find so few mistakes. I am sure that Mr. Webb has discharged his duties in an equally satisfactory manner, and that his assistants are also entitled to our thanks. I am sure hon. members will unanimously join in passing this vote of thanks in the most hearty n)anner. Mr. DIlii5S : Bcifore the motion is put from the Chair I should like to say that I indorse every word uttered by the hon. member, Mr. Munro, with regard to the officers who have given tli«ir time and services to tlie Convention. As a reprc- Hfiitative of New Soutli Wales, I should like also to make a suggestion, audi know that it has oidy to be made to receive at your hands, bir, a generous and hearty 910 Officers of the Convention. [9 April, 1891.] Dissolution of the Convention. response. AVe should Lear in mind that these gentlemen are civil servants of New Sontli Wales, and that they have not only given us the benefit of their services during the last six weeks, but have devoted a large amount of time, out of what is really their vacation, to their duties in connection with the Convention. I feel that the Government of New Soutli "Wales should recognise the value of the services of these gentlemen. I refer not only to the Parliamentary Reporting Staff, but I in- clude the secretary to the Convention and other officers down to the humblest officer employed in these buildings, and who might, but for this Convention, have been enjoy- ing a holiday. I hope the whole of them will receive at the hands of the Govern- ment that generous recognition of services which is characteristic of the colony of New South Wales ; and I have no doubt tliat the suggestion once made — even if ifc should not already have occurred to your mind, sir — will receive from you a generous and hearty response. The PRESIDENT : The hon. member, Mr. Dibbs, having so lively a sense of the justice and propriety of the present Government, may rest assured that his suggestion has only to be made to be fol- lowed. If it be not out of place, I may state that the Government have very few pleasures amid the arduous duties they liave to perform, and that the keenest pleasure of all is to adopt any suggestion coming from so amiable a quarter. Question resolved in the affirmative. The PRESIDENT : Perhaps I may be l*ermitted to say, on behalf of Mr. Webb and the other officex's that from a long per- sonal knowledge of these gentlemen, I feel assured that they would spare no effort, and that they would drawvery largelyupon their capabilities of endurance in order to give satisfaction to this Convention. I think I may thank the Convention on behalf of Mr. Webb and the other gentle- men referred to in the resolution for the kind manner in wliich it has expressed its sense of their services, and I believe I may acU, that although the performance of those services has diminished much of the time for enjoyment which during the parlia- mentary recess they would have had, they still have felt a sincere and high-toned pleasure in rendering their services to the Convention at this important epoch of our history. I thank you on behalf of Mr. Webb and the other gentlemen for the manner in which the resolution has been carried. DISSOLUTION OF THE CONVENTION. The PRESIDENT : I think it would be the most becoming course not for any motion of adjournment to be made, but for me to declare that this Convention having done its work is now dissolved. Of course it will meet no more. I have no doubt its work will be heard of, and it would be unbecoming in me to indulge in any words at this stage, or to do more than declare that the proceedings of the Convention have come to an end. I now ask the delegates to rise in their places and to give three cheers for her Majesty the Queen. Hon. members risunj hi their places gave three cheers for the Queen. At the instance of Colonel Smith, cheers v)ere also fjiren for the hon. the President of the Con- vention. [Mr. Dihhs. APPENDIX. Commonwealth of Australia Bill. Draft of a Bill as adopted by tlie National Australasian Convention, 9tli April, 1891. HENRY PAEKES, ]? resident. E. ^\. WEBB, Secretary. DRAET OE A BILL To Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia. WHEREAS the Auslralasian Colonies of [liere nayne the Colonies Preamble tcJiich have adopted the Constitutioii] have by \_here describe the mode hi/ tchich the assent of the Colonies has been expressed^ agreed to unite in one Pederal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kinp;dom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution hereby established: And whereas it is expedient to make provision for the admission into the Commonwealth of other Australasian Colonies and Possessions of Her Majesty : Be it therefore enacted by the (Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Sjjiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in the present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows : — 1. This Act maybe cited as "The Constitution of tbe Common- Short title, wealth of Australia." 2. The provisions of this Act referring to Her Majesty the Queen ;^j;j;''^^/,;"" "' •xtend also to the Heirs and Successors of Her Majesty in ihc '•(•fcriinsf to the .Sovereignty of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. lIi^'C"- Consfiliiiion of the Commonwealth of Australia. 3. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the advice of Her i;"«er to pro- -i t • - ' -»» 1 ir II Ti • /-I -1 J 1 1 in 1 i- ^ate ; Paet III. — The House of Eepeesentatives ; Paet IV. — Peoyisioxs eelati^'g to both Houses ; Part V. — Powees of the Paeliamext : CHAPTEH II.— THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT : CHAPTER III.— THE FEDERAL JUDICATURE : CHAPTER IV.— FINANCE AND TRADE : CHAPTER v.— THE STATES : CHAPTER VI.— NEW STATES : CHAPTER VII.— MISCELLANEOUS: CHAPTER VIII.— AMENDMENT OP THE CONSTITUTION. COMMOXWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. 9J=5 CHAPTER I. THE PAELIAMEXT. Part I. — Gekeeal. 1. The Legislative powers of the Commonwealtli shall be vested in Legislative a Federal Parliament, which shall consist of Her Majesty, a Senate, i'^^^*^"^- and a House of Ecpresentatives, and which is hereinafter called " The Parliament." 2. The Queen may, from time to time, appoint a Grovern or- General, Governor- who .shall be Her Majesty's Eepresentativc in the Commonwealth, and "^^'^'^ ' who shall have and may exercise in the Commonwealth diu'ing the Queen's pleasure, and subject to the provisions of this Constitution, such powers and functions as the Queen may think fit to assign to him. 3. The Annual Salarj- of the Governor- General shall be fixed by the Salary of Parliament from time to time, but shall not be less than Ten thousand General?" pounds, and shall be payable to the Queen out of the Consolidated Eevenue Fund of the Commonwealth. The Salary of a Governor- General shall not be diminished during his continuance in office. 4. The provision of this Constitution relating to the Governor- Aiipiication of General extend and apply to the Governor-General for tlie time being l-ei"aVin.Mo or other the Chief Executive Officer or Administrator of the Govern- Oovcnror- ment of the Commonwealth, by whatever title he is designated. enera. 5. Every Member of the Senate, and every Member of the House of <^ 'tii of Ecpresentatives, shall before taking his seat therein make and sub- •^"''''*"*^''- scribe before tlie Governor-General, or some person authorised by him, an Oath or Affirmation of Allegiance in the form set forth in the Sciiciiuio. Schedule to this Constitution. 6. The Governor-General may appoint such times for holding the r;,°\ofix'ti!ncr first and every other Session of the Parliament, as lie may think fit, »'"' i>i;ues for . . fT> • J J- ji 1! 1 1 £ J.' J. J • 1 lioldiii;,'- Sossion givmg sufBcient notice thereof, and may also from tunc to time, by of rariiuinent. iiroclamation or otherwise, prorogue the said Parliament, and mav in •'""'•'•of J^ "^ "*^''' fives, the Speaker shall, upon a resolution of the House, issue his writ for the election of a new member. In the case of a vacancy by death or resignation happening when the Parliament is not in Session, or during an adjourmnent of the House for a period of which a part longer than seven days is unexpired, the Speaker, or if there is no Speaker, or he is absent from the Commonwealth, the Governor- General shall issue, or cause to be issued, a writ without such resolution. 39. Until the Parliament otherwise provides the presence of at J'/^y^'^f^' least one-third of the whole number of the ^[embers of the House of Kcprcsentativcs. Eepresentatives shall be necessary to constitute a meeting of the House for the exercise of its powers. 40. Questions arising in the House of Eepresentatives shall be J,',",*!"^^" determined by a majority of votes other than that of the Speaker ; Hipicscntativos. and when *b^ votes arc equal, but not otherwise, the Speaker shall have a casting vote. 41. Every House of Eejjresentatives sliall continue for three years Dnrationof from tlie day a])poiiited for the first meeting of tlie House, and no longer, Kcprcsentativcs. subject, neverllieless, to be sooner dissolved by the Governor-(!eneral. The Parliament shall be called together not later than thirty days after the day appointed for the return of the "W^'rits for a General Election. 42 , F(jr the ])urpose of lujlding General Elections of Mend)crs towiitsf.ir serve in the II. .use of Eepresentatives the (Jovernor-CJcneral may ^"'■■'"'"'■'*'^'"^'°"- cause Writs to be issued by such person.s, in such form, ami addressed to such Eeturning Officers, as he thinks (it. 43. Until the Parliament (if the Gonminnwoalth otherwise pmvides, J^^^Ii;;^;!.',^,^,;.;^^^^^ the laws in force in the several States f(jr the time being, relating to Laws until Uic the following matters, namely: The manner of conducting Elet^ions J^';',^!.';^^;;;^^^'* for the more numerous House of the Parliament, the proceedings at i.rovidcs. such elections, the oaths to be taken by voters, the Returning Officers, their powers and duties, the periods during which Elections may be 050 THE CONSTITUTION OP THE Questions as to qualifications and vacancies. continued, the execution of new "Writs in case of places vacated other- wise than by dissolution, and offences against the laws regulaling such Elections, shall respectively apply to Elections in the several States of Membei's to serve in tlie House of Eepresentatives. 44. If any question arises respecting the qualification of a Member or a vacancy in the House of llepresentatives, the same shall be heard and determined by the House of Eepresentatives. Pakt IY. — Provisions eelating to i30tii Houses. Allowance to ^g^ Each member of the Senate and House of Eepresentatives shall receive an annual nllowanee for his services, the amount of which shall be fixed by the Parliament from time to time. Until other provision is made in that behalf bv the Parliament the amount of such annual Disqualifications of Members. allowance shall be five hundred pounds. 46. Any person- Place to become vacant on happenintf of certain disquali- fications. Disqualifying contractors and persons interested in contracts. (1) Who ha:=i talxcn an oath or made a declaration or acknowledg- ment of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a Poreign Power, or has done any act whereby he has become a subject or citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or a citizen of a Poreign Power ; or (2) Who is an undischarged bankrupt or insolvent, or a public defaulter ; or (3) Who is attainted of treason, or convicted of felony or of any infamous crime ; shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a Senator or Member of the House of Eepresentatives until the disability is removed by a grant of a discharge, or the expiration or remission of the sentence, or a pardon, or release, or otherwise. 47. If ^ Senator or Member of the House of Eepresentatives — (1) Takes an oath or makes a declaration or acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a Poreign Power, or does any act whereby he becomes a subject or citizen, .or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or citizen, of a Poreign Power ; or (2) Is adjudged bankrupt or insolvent, or takes the benefit of any law relating to bankrupt or insolvent debtors, or becomes a public defaulter ; or (3) Is attainted of treason, or convicted of felony or of any infamous crime ; In's place shall thereupon become vacant. 43. Any person who directly or indirectly himself, or by any person in trust for him, or for his use or benefit, or on his account, undertakes, executes, holds, or enjoys, in the whole or in part, any agreement for or on account of the Public Service of the Commonwealth, shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a (Senator or Member of the House of Eepresentatives while he executes, holds, or enjoys the agree- ment, or any part or share of it, or any benefit or emolument arising from. it. If any person, being a Senator or Member of the House of Eepre- sentatives, enters into any such agreen ent, or having entered into it continues to hold it, his place shall thereupon become vacant. CO:»rMOXWEALTH OF ATJSTEALIA. 951 Eut tliis section does not extend to any agreement made, entered into, Proviso exempt- or accepted, by an incor])orated company consisting of more than twenty "rfjii't'^o^"! °^ persons if the agreement is made, entered into, or accepted tor the panies! general benefit of the company. 49. If a Senator or Member of tlie House of Representatives piace to become accepts any oliice of profit under tlie Crown, not being one of the a^gepUn^office offices of IState held during tlie pleasure of the Governor- General, and of profitr the holders of which are by this Constitution declared to be capable of being chosen and of sitting as INIembers of either House of Parlia- ment, or accepts any pension ])ayable out of any of the revenues of the Commonwealth during the plt-asure of the Crown, his place shall thereupon become vacant, and no person holding any such office, except as aforesaid, or holding or enjovinof anv such pension, shall be capable of being chosen or of sitting as a Member of either House of the Parliament : But this provision does not apply to a person who is in receipt only Exceptions. of pay, half-pay, or a pension, as an Officer of the Queen's jSavy or Army, or who receives a new Commission in the Queen's Navy or Army, or an increase of pay on a new Commission, or who is in receipt only of pay as an officer or member of the Military or Naval Forces of the Comnionweallh and whose services are not wholly employed by the Commonwealth. 50. If any person by this Constitution declared to be incapable of Penalty for fitting in the ^enate or House of ]{epresentatives sits as a (Senator or disqualified.* IVlember of the House of Eepresentatives, he shall, for every day on which he sits, be liable to pay the sum oL' oiie hundred pounds to any person who may sue for it in any Court of competent jurisdiction. 51. Tlie Senate and House of Jvepresenfatives may from time to s-i'idin? Rules ,• 11 1 .. T i> 1 T /^ 1 ■ anil Orders to be time prepare and adopt such btandiug iuilcs and Orders as may appear m^de. to them respectively best adapted — (1) For the orderly conduct of the business of the Senate and House of l{ej)resentative8 respectively : (2) For the mode in wiiicli the Senate and House of Representa- tives shall confer, correspond, and communicate with each other relative to "N'otes or proposed J^aws adopted Ijy or pend- ing in tiie Senate or House of Representatives respectively: (3) For the manner in which Notices of proposed Laws, Resolu- tions, and other business intended to be submitted to the Senate and House of Representatives respectively may bo published for general infm-ination : (1) For the manner in w])ich proposed Laws are to be introduced, passed, numbered, and intituled in the Senate and House of Representatives respectively : (5) For the proper presentation of any Laws ])aHscd by the Senate and House of Representatives to the Governor- General lor his assent : and (G) Generally for the conduct of all busines.s and profcrnlings of the Senate and House of Jiepresentatives severally and coUcctivelv. 952 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE Part V. — Powers or the Pabltament. Lcgisiatiye 52. The Parliament shall, subject to the provisions of this PariiamcntJ^ Constitution, have full power and authority to make all such Laws as it thinks necessary for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth, with respect to all or any of the matters following, that is to say : — • 1. The regulation of Trade and Commerce with other Countries, and among the several States ; 2. Customs and Excise and bounties, but so that duties of Customs and Excise and bounties shall be uniform throughout the ConnnonAvealth, and that no tax or duty shall be imposed on au}^ goods exported from one State to another ; 3. Eaising money by any other mode or system of taxation ; but so that all such taxation shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth ; 4. Borrowing money on the public credit of the Commonwealth ; 5. Postal and Telegraphic Services ; G. The Military and Naval Defence of the Commonwealth and the several States and the calling out of the Forces to execute aud maintain the laws of the Commonwealth, or of any State or part of the Commonwealth ; 7. Munitions of War ; 8. Navigation and Shipping ; 9. Ocean Beacons and Buoys, and Ocean Light-houses and Light- ships. 10. Quarantine ; IL Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits ; 12. Census and Statistics ; 13. Currency, Coiiiage, and Legal Tender; 14. Banking, the Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money ; 15. Weights and Measures ; 16. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes; 17. Bankruptcy and Insolvency ; IS. Copyrights and Patents of Inventions, Designs, and Trade Marks ; 19. Naturalization and Aliens ; 20. The Status in the Commonwealth of Foreign Corporations, and of Corporations formed in any State or part of the Commonwealth ; 21. Marriage and Divorce ; 22. The Service aud Execution throughout the Commonwealth of the Civil and Criminal Process and Judgments of the Courts of the States ; 23. The recognition throughout the Commonwealth of the Laws, the Public Acts and Eecords, and the Judicial Proceedings, of the States ; 21. Immigration and Emigration ; 25. The influx of Criminals; 2G. External affairs and Treaties ; 27. The relations of the Commonwealth to the Islands of the Pacific ; 28. River Navigation with respect to the common purposes of two or more States, or parts of the Commomvealth ; COMMO^S'WEALTII OP ArSTRALIA. 95$ 29. The control of Eailways witli respect to transport for the pur- poses of the Commonwealth ; 30. Matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth by the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States, but so that the Law shall extend ouly to the State or States by whose Parliament or Parliaments the matter was referred, and to such other States as may afterwards adopt the Law ; 31. The exercise within the Commonwealth, at the request or with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the States con- cerned, of any Legislative powers Avith respect to the afi^airs of the territory of the Commonwealth, or any part of it, which can at the date of the establishment of this Constitu- tion be exercised only by the Parliament of the L^nited Kingdom or by the Pederal Council of Australasia ; 32. Any matters necessary or incidental for carrying into execu- tion the foregoing powers and any other powers vested by this Constitution iu the Parliament or Excutive Govern- ment of the Commonwealth or in any department or officer thereof. 53. The Parliament shall, also, subject to the proWsions of this Exclusive Constitution, have exclusive power to make laws for the peace, order, Pariia,ueiit''° and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to the follow- ing matters : — 1. The affairs of people of any race with respect to whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws not applicable to tlie general community ; but so that this power shall not ex- tend to authorise legislation with respect to the affairs of the aboriginal native race in Australia and the Maori race in New Zealand ; 2. The government of any territory which may by surrender of any State or States and the acceptance of the Parliament become the seat of Government of the Commonweal tli, and the exercise of like authority over all places acquired by the Commonwealth, with the consent of the Pai'liament of the State in which such places are situate, for the construction of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, quarantine stations, or for any otlier purposes of general concern ; 3. Matters relating to any Department or Departments of the Public Service the control of wliich is by this Constif ulinii transferred to the Executive Government of the Connnou- wealth ; 4. Such otlicr matters as arc by this Constitution declared lo bo within tlic exclusive powers of the Parliament. Moncij Bills. 54. Laws a])|)r(ii)rla1ing any ])art of tlie public revenue, or im- Money Uills, posing auy tax or impost sliall originate iu the House ol" Jiepresen- tatives. 55. (1) The Senate sluill have eiiii.il power witli \hv ITouso of Ai'j'i"i''mti""- Itcpresentatives in reapect or all proposed Laws, exc{'j)t Jvaws nnjxising taxation and Laws a])propriating the necessary HU]i])lics for the (jnlinary annual services of the Government, which tlie Senate may allirm or 951 THE COXSTITUTIOX 03? THE Recommenda- tion of money votes. reject, but may not amend. But the Senate may not amend any pro- posed Law in such a manner as to increase auy proposed charge or burden on the people. (2) Laws imposing taxation shall deal with the imposition of taxation only. (3) Laws imposing taxation except Laws imposing duties of Customs on imports shall deal with one subject of taxation only. (4) The expenditure for services other than the ordinary annual services of the Government shall not be authorised by the same Law as that which appropriates the supplies tor such ordinary annual services, but shall be authorised by a separate Law or Laws. (5) In the case of a proposed Law which the Senate may not amend, the Senate may at any stage return it to the House of Eepre- seutatives with a message requesting the omission or amendment of any items or provisions therein. And the House of Representatives may, if it thinks fit, make such omissions or amendments, or any of them, with or without modifications. 56. It shall not be lawful for the Llouse of Eepresentatives to pass any vote, resolution, or Law for the appropriation of any part of the public revenue, or of the produce of any tax or impost, to any purpose that has not been first recommended to that House by message of the Governor-General in the Session in which the vote, resolution, or Law, is proposed. Koval assent to Bills. Jioyal Assenf. 57. When a law passed by the Parliament is presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent, he shall declare, according to his discretion, but subject to the provisions of this Constitution, either that he assents to it in the Queen's name, or that he withholds assent, or that he reserves the Law for the Queen's pleasure to be made known. The Governor-General may return to the Parliament any Law so presented to him, and may transmit therewith any amendments which he may desire to be made in such Law, and the Parliament may deal with such proposed amendments as it thinks fit. 58. When the Governor- General assents to a Law in the Order in Council Q^pgf^'g jjame he shall bv the first convenient opportunitv send an of Law assented ^ ,, ,. , .t r\ j ■£ j^i /-» -A 'i " -n ■ x to by Governor- authentic copy to the Queen, and it the Queen m Council within two General. years after receipt thereof thinks fit to disallow the Liw, such dis- allowance being made known by the Governor- General, by speech or message, to each of the Houses of the Parliament, or by proclamation, shall annul the Law from and after the day when the disallowance is so made known. Signification of 59. A Law reserved for the Queen's pleasure to be made known ^^e^"'s Pleasure with rospect to it shall not have any force unless and until within two ' years from the day on which it was presented to the Governor- General for the Queen's assent, the Governor- General makes known by speech or message to each of the Houses of the Parliament, or by proclamation, that it has received the assent of the Queen in Council. An entry of every such speech, message, or proclamation shall be made in the journal of each House, and a duplicate thereof duly attested shall be delivered to the proper officer to be kept among the records of the Parliament. Disallowance bv COMMONWEALTH OF ArSTEALTA. 955 CHAPTSS, II. THE EXECUTIVE GOVEEXMEXT. 1. The Executive po^\'er and authority of the Commonwealth is Executive power vested in the Queen, and shall be exercised by the Governor- General the'^Queen!'^ '° as the Queen's Representative. 2. There shall be a Council to aid and advise the Governor-General constitution of in the government of the Commonwealth, and such Council shall be di^for Commoir-* styled the Federal Executive Council ; and the persons Avho are to be ■wealth. Members of the Council shall be from time to time chosen and summoned by the Governor-General and sworn as Executive Coun- cillors, and shall hold office during his pleasure. 3. The provisions of this Constitution referring to the Governor- Application of General in Council shall be construed as referring to the Governor- rin"'^ to Governor- General acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council. General. 4. For the administration of the Executive government of the Ministers of Commonwealth, the Governor-General may, from time to time, ^^^^^' appoint Officers to administer such Departments of State of the Com- monwealth as the Governor- General in Council may from time to time establish, and such cfficers sliail hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General, and shall be capable of being chosen and of May sit in sitting as Members of either Hou^e of the Parliament. Parliament. Such Officers shall be Member.^ of the Federal Executive Council, and shall be the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth. 5. Until other provision is made by the Parliament, the number of Nuni^^'',*** such Officers who may sit in the Parliament shall not exceed seven, ^ who shall hold such offices, and by such designation, as the Parliament from time to time prescribes by Law, or, in the absence of any such Law, as the Govern or- General from time to time directs. 6. Until other provision is made by the Parliament, there shall be Salaries ot j^ayable to the Queen, out of the Consolidated licvcnue Fund of 'the Commonwealth, for the salaries of such Officers, the sum of fifteen thousand pounds per annum. 7. Until other provision is made by the Parliament, the appointment ch.^'i^.sirvants^^ and removal of all other officers of the Government of the Common- Avealth shall be vested in the Governor-General in Council, except officers whose appuiiitment may be delegated by the Governor-General in Council to some other officer or persun. 8. The Executive power and authority of the Commonwealth shall ^"'^^';"r''?', °' extend to the execution of the provisions of tliis Constitution, and the Laws of the Commonwealth. 9. Tlic Command in Chief oF all IMilitary and Xaval I'^ircos of the fommami of Commonv.ealtli is lioreby vested in the Governor-General as the Nuvai Fortes. (Queen's liepre-scntative. 10. The control of the following Departments of the Public Service imniofiiitc 1 11 I i. • J i. 1 1 1 i 1 1 ji ii'"i""t">*"'t3- 950 THE CONSTITUTION OE THE sliall assume tlic obligations of any State or States with respect to such matters, that is to say — Customs and Excise, Posts and Telegraphs, Military and Naval Defence, Ocean Beacons and Buoys, and Ocean Lighthouses and Lightships, Quarantine. rSlm'^Law to 11« ^^^ powers and functions Avhich are at the date of the establish- b'e exercised by ment of tho Commouwcalth vested in the Governor of a Colony, with or JlaMTith iwTvice without the advice of his Executive Council, or in any officer or of Executive authority in a Colony, shall, so far as the same continue in existence and need to be exercised in relation to the government of the Common- wealth, with respect to any matters which under this Constitution pass to the Executive Government of the Commonwealth, vest in the Governor-General, with the advice of the Eederal Executive Council, or in the officer or authority exercising similar powers or functions in or under the Executive Government of the Commonwealth. Council. CHAPTER III. Supreme Court of Australia and Inferior Courts. Tenure of office. Appointment and removal of Judges. Appellate •Jurisdiction. THE FEDERAL JUDICATUEE. 1. The Parliament of the Commonwealth shall have power to establish a Court, which shall be called the Supreme Court of Australia, and shall consist of a Chief Justice, and so many other Justices, not less than four, as the Parliament from time to time prescribes. The Parliament may also from time to time, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, establish other Courts. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court of Australia and of the other Courts of the Commonwealth shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall receive such salaries as may from time to time be fixed by the Parliament ; but the salary paid to any Judge shall not be diminished during his continuance in office. 3. The Judges of the Supreme Court and of the other Courts of the Commonwealth shall bo appointed, and may be removed from office, by the Governor- General by and Avith the advice of the Eederal Executive Council ; but it shall not be lawful for the Governor- General to remove any Judge except upon an Address from both Houses of the Parliament praying for such removal. 4. The Supreme Court of Australia shall have jurisdiction, with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as the Parliament from time to time prescribes, to hear and determine appeals from all judgments, decrees, orders, and sentences, of any other Eederal Court, or of the highest Court of final resort now established, or which may hereafter be established, in any State, whether such Court is a Court of Appeal or of original jurisdiction, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Australia in all such cases shall be final and conclusive. Until the Parliament makes other provisions, the conditions of and restrictions on appeals to the Queen in Council from the highest Courts of final resort of the several States shall be applicable to appeals from such Courts to the Supreme Court of Australia. COMMONAVEALTH OF AUSTEALIA. 957 5. The Parliament of the Commonwealth iB ay provide by ^''^"' that Appeals may be. any appeals which by any law have hcretobefore been allowed from any cases. judgment, decree, order, or sentence, of the highest Court of final resort of any State to the Queen in Council, shall be brought to, and heard and determined by, the Supreme Court of Australia, and the judgment of that Court in all such cases shall be final and conclusive. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of the two last preceding sections, Po"'«' of tiic ^^ or of any law made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth in pur- appeal to Her- suance thereof, the Queen may in any casein which the public interests cases" '^"'^"^ of the Commonwealth, or of any State, or of any other part of the Queen's Dominions, are concerned, grant leave to appeal to Herself in Council against any judgment of the Supreme Court of Australia. 7. The Parliament of the Commonwealth may from time to time Ext?"tf'fi^""'*'' define the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Commonwealth, other than courts. the Supreme Court of Australia, which jurisdiction may be exclusive, or may be concurrent with that of the Courts of the States. But jurisdiction .shall not be conferred on a Court except in respect of the following matters, or some of them, that is to say: — (1) Cases arising under this Constitution ; (2) Cases arising under any Laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth, or under any treaty made by the Common- wealth with another country ; (3) Cases of Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction ; (4) Cases affecting the Public Ministers, Consuls, or other Eepre- sentatives of other countries ; (5) Cases in which the Commomvealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, is a party ; (6) Cases in which a Writ of INIandamus or Prohibition is sought against an Ofiicer of the Commonwealth ; (7) Controversies between States ; (8) Controversies relating to the same subject matter claimed under the laws of dift'crcnt States. 8. In all cases affecting Public INIinisters, Consuls, or other Eepre- on^inai jmis- sentatives of other Countries, and in all cases in which the Connnon- wealth, or any person suing or being sued on behalf of the Common- wealth, is a party, or in which a AVrit of INIandamus or Prohibition is sought against an Officer of the Commonwealth, and in all cases of controversies between States, the Supreme Court of Australia shall have original as well as appellate jurisdiction. The I'arl lament may confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme A.iditionM Ctjurt or Australia in such other oi the cases enumerated in tiic last tion may be ecu- preceding section as it thinks fit. fcned. 9. Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to a iiiliorisc Actions against any Hint in law or equity against the Commonwealth, or any person wealth or against sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, or against a State, or any i)erHon ai^tate. sued on bciialf of a State, by any individual person or corporal ion, except by the consent of the Commonwealth, or of the State, as the ease may be. 10. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, or of any other xiinibcr of Court of the Commonwenlth, may be exercised by sucli number of'"'*''^ Judges as the Parliament prescribes. 958 THE CONSTITUTIOX OE THE Trial by jury. 11_ The trial of all indictable offences cognisable by any Court established under the authority of this Act shall be by jury, and every such trial shall be held iu the State where the offence has been com- mitted, and Avhen not committed within any State the trial shall be held at such place or places as the Parliament of the Commonwealth prescribes. CHAPTES IV. ConsolidateJ Kevenue Fund. Expenses of collection. Money to be appropriated by law. The Common- wealth to have exclusive power ■to levy duties of Customs and Excise and offer bounties after a certain time. Transfer of officers. Transfer of land and buildings. EINAXCE AND TEADE. 1. All duties, revenues, and moneys, raised or received by the Executive Grovernment of the Commonwealth, under the authority of this Constitution, shall form one Consolidated Revenue Eund, to be appropriated for the Public Service of the Commonwealth in the manner and subject to the charges provided by this Constitution. 2. The Consolidated Eevenue Eund shall be permanently charged with the costs, charges, and expenses incident to the collection, manage- ment, and receipt "thereof, which costs, charges, and expenses shall form the first charge thereon. 3. jSTo money shall be drawn from the Treasury of the Common- wealth except under appropriations made by law. 4. The Parliament of the Commonwealth shall have the sole power and authority, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, to impose Customs duties, and duties of Excise upon goods for the time being the subject of Customs duties, and to grant bounties npon the production or export; of goods. But this exclusive power shall not come into force until uniform duties of Customs have been imposed by the Parliament of the Commonwealth. Upon the imposition of uniform duties ment of the Commonwealth all laws of duties of Customs or duties of Excise Customs duties, and all such Jaws offering bounties upon the pro- duction or export of goods, shall cease to have effect. The control and collection of duties of Customs and Excise and the payment of bounties shall nevertheless pass to the Executive Govern- ment of the Commonwealth upon the establishment of the Common- wealth. 5. Upon the establishment of the Commonwealth, all officers employed by the Government of any State in any Department of the Public Service the control of wdiich is by this Constitution assigned to the Commonwealth, shall become subject to the control of the Executive Government of the Commouwealth. But all existing rights of any such officers shall be preserved. 6. All lands, buildings, w^orks, and materials necessarily appertain- ing to, or used in connection with, any Department of the Public Service the control of which is by this Constitution assigned to the Commonwealth, shall, from and after the date of the establishment of the Commonwealth, be taken over by and belong to the Common- wealth, either absolutely, or, in the case of the Departments controlling Customs and Excise and Bounties, for such time as may be necessary. of Customs by the Parlia- the several States imposing upon goods the subject of com:\ionwealtii of austealia. 959 And tlae fair value thereof shall be paid by the Commonwealth to the State from which thev are so taken over. Such value shall be ascertained by mutual agreement, or, if no agreement can be made, in the manner in which land taken by the Government of the State for public purposes is ascertained under the laws of the State. 7. Until uniform duties of Customs have beeu imposed by the Par- ^^.".^P*^'f " °^. liament of the Commonwealtli, the powers of the I'arliaments of of Customs and the several States exi&tiug at the date of the establishment of the E>icise. Commonwealth, respecting the imposition of duties of Customs, and duties of excise upon goods the subject of Customs duties, and the offering of bounties upon the production or export of goods, and the collection and payment thereof respectively, shall continue as theretofore. And until such uniform duties have been imposed, the Laws of the several States in force at the date of the establishment of the Com- monwealth respecting duties of Customs, and duties of excise on goods the subject of Customs duties, and bounties, and the collection and payment thereof, shall remain in force, subject nevertheless to such alterations of the amount of duties or bounties as the Parliaments of the several States may make from time to time ; and such duties and bounties shall continue to be collected and paid as theretofore, but by and to the Officers of the Commonwealth. 8. So soon as the Parliament of the Commonwealth has imposed ^^ estabiiBh- uniform duties of Customs, trade and intercourse throughout the duties of cus- Commonwealth, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navi- trade^wuiiin'^tlfe gation, shall be absolutely free. Commonwealth to be free. 9. The Revenue of the Commonw^ealth shall be applied in the first Apportionment instance in the payment of the expenditure of the Commonwealth, rcvc"mi"^ which shall be charged to the several States in proportion to the numbers of their people, and the surplus shall, until uniform duties of Customs have been imposed, be returned to the several States or parts of the Commonwealth in proportion to the amount of lievenue raised therein respectiveh^ subject to the following provisions : — (1) As to duties of Customs or Excise, provision shall be made for ascertaining, as nearly as may be, the amount of duties collected in each State or part of the Commonwealth in respect of dutiable goods which are afterwards exported to anotiier State or part of the Commonwealth, and the amount of the duties so ascertained shall be taken to have been col- lected in the State or part to which tlio goods have been so exported, and shall be added to the duties actually collected in that State or part, and deducted from the duties collected in the State or part of the Commonwealth from which tho goods were exported : (2) As to tho proceeds of direct taxes, the amount contributed or raised in respect of incoTiio earned in any State or part of tho Commonwealth, or arising from property situated in any State or part of the Commonwealth, ant to nit in .State I'arlia- inent. 11. If a member of a House of the Parliament of a State is, willv Member of state his own consent, chosen as a member of cirlicr IFousc of the P'li'lia- {|;"j'!;'"j^,|i',".'^'*^^j men! of tlie Commonwealth, his idacc in the first mentioned House of ti"' i-ariiumcnt 1} 1 • , J. 1 11 1 J. of t lie (Common- rarliaiiient snail hecoine vacant. weiitii. 12. I lie Parliament of a State may at any time surrencbr any part a stnte m.iy of the Slate to the Commonwealth, and U|)i)n such surrender and the •j'i.J.pitory.''' '*''* acceptance thereof by the Commonwealth such part of the State shall become and be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pai-liainent of the Comtnonwealtli. 962 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE states not to 13. A Stato shall not impose any taxes or dutiea on imports or levy iiupert or expoi'ts, except such as are necessary for executing the inspection laws export duties, ,.'10 i i ^ p n 1 i • • except for 01 the btate ; and the net produce or all taxes and duties imposed by a certain purposes, ^^r^^^ q^ imports or exports shall be for the use of the Commonwealth ; and any such inspection laws may be annulled by the Parliament of the Commonwealth. .Nor leTj- duty of 14. A Stato shall not, without the consent of the Parliament of the tonnace, nor tax ^s^ ij_1- jj.i!j. • ■ j_ • theund<.fthe L otTimonwealth, impose any duty or tonnage, or raise or maintain any Commonwealth, nor .,., i r •' . •' '='' , , . , •' maintain forces. military or naval force, or impose any tax on any land or other from taxation!"'" property belopgiiig to the Commonwealth; nor shall the Common- wealth impose any tax on any laud or property belonging to a State. state not to coin 15. A State shall Bot coin money, or make anything but gold and money. silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts. Nor prohibit any Jg A State shall not make any law prohibiting the free exercise o£ religion. ■,. . j ± o any religion. Protection of 17. A State shall not make- or enforce any law abridging any citizens of the privilege or immunity of citizens of other States of the Common- Commonwealth. ro .- .,....,.. wealth, nor shall a State deny to any person, withm its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws. Recognition of 18. EuU faith and credit shall be given, throughout the Common- various Itates^' ""'f^lf'1^5 to the Laws, the Public Acts and Eecords, and the Judicial Proceedings of the States. Protection of 19^ The Commonwealth shall protect every State againRt invasion hivasLn!""^ and, on the application of the Executive Government of a State, against domestic violence. Custody of 20. Every State shall make provision for the detention and punish- ofltenders against ,..,■'. n. '- , • i t r re • j. laws of the meiit ill its prisous or persons accused or convicted ot otiences against Commonwealth. ^|^g jg^^g ^f ^]^g Commonwealth, and the Parliament of the Common- wealth may make laws to give effect to this provision. CHAPTER VI. NEW STATES. Admission of 1. Any of the existing Colonies of [name the existing Colonies which t"the"c^mmon* have not adopted the ConsfitutioJt^ may upon adopting this Constitu- weaith. tion. be admitted to the Commonwealth, and shall thereupon become and be a State of the Commonwealth. New states msy 2. The Parliament of the Commonwealth may from time to time t'he^common-" establish and admit to the Commonwealth new States, and may upon wealth. such establishment and admission make and impose such conditions, as to the extent of Eepresentation in either House of the Parliament or otherwise, as it thinks fit. Provisional 3 -pho Parliament may make such laws as it thinks fit for the firovsrnnicnt of . » . m Territories. provisional administration and government of any territory surren- dered by any State to and accepted by the Commonwealth, or any territory in the Pacific placed by the Queen under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth, or otherwise acquired by the CO^IMOXWEALTH OE AUSTEALIA. 963 Commonwealtli, and may in any such case allow the representation of such territory in either House of the Parliament to such extent and on such terms as it thinks fit. 4. The Parliament of the Commonwealth may, from time to time, Alteration of with the consent of the Parliament of a State, increase, diminish, or '"""' °^ ^*=''^'- otherwise alter the limits of the State, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed to, and may, with the like consent, make provision respecting the effect and operation of any such increase or diminution or alteration of territory in relation to any State affected by it. 5. A new State shall not be formed by separation of territory from savinar of rights a State without the consent of the Parliament thereof, nor shall a o* states. State be formed by the union of two or more States or parts of States, or tho limits of a State be altered, without the consent of the Parliament or Parliaments of the State or States concerned. CHAPTER VII. MISCELLANEOUS. 1. The seat of Grovernment of the Commonwealth sliall be determined Seat of Govern- by the Parliament. _ _ "^'="*- Until such determination is made the Parliament shall be summoned to meet at such place within tho Commonwealth as a majority of the Governors of the States, or, in the event of an equal division of opinion aoaont^st tho GrOveruorB, as the Grovernor-G-eneral shall direct. 2. The Queen may authorise tho Grovernor-General from time to Power to Her time to appoint any person or any persons jointly or severally to be auuiorisecov- his Deputv or Deputies witliin any part or parts of the Commonwealth, ernor-oenerai to and in that capacity to exercise during the pleasure of the Governor- Deputies. General such of the powers and functions of the Governor- General as he deems it necessary or expedient to assign to such Deputy or Deputies, subject to any limitations or directions expressed or given by the Queen, but tho a])])ointmcnt of such Deputy or Deputies shall not affect the exercise by tho Governor-General himself of any power or function. 3. In reckoning the numbers of tlic people of a State or other part Aboritrines of of the Commonwealth aboriginal natives of Australia shall not bo be com 'tecUn counted. utu.T."'^ ^'°''"" CHAPTER VIII. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 1. Tho provisions of this Constitutiuu shall not be altered oxcoi)i. Modo of amend- I r. ,,' • inir thj Coiistitu- m the tollowing tnanner: — tion. Any law for tho altera! if)n thereof must bo passed by an absolute majority of tho Senate and House of Jlepresentatives, and sliall there- upon be submitted to Conventions, to bo elected by the eleclora of the several States qualified to vote for the election of Members of the J[ouso of Eepreeentatives. 9Gi THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTEALIA. The Conventions shall be summoned, elected, and held in sueli man- ner as the Parliament of the Commonwealth prescribes by law, and shall, when elected, proceed to vote upon the proposed amendment. And if the proposed amendment is approved by the Conventions of a majority of the States, and if the people of the States whose Conven- tions approve of the amendment are also a majority of the people of the Commonwealth, the proposed amendment shall be presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent. But an amendment by which the proportionate repres^entation of any State in either House of the Parliament of the Commomvealth, or the minimum number of representatives of a State in the House of Peprcsentatives, is diminished, shall not become law without the con- sent of the Convention of that State. THE SCHEDULE. T, A.B., do swear \^or do solemnly and sincerely affirm and declare] that I will he faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, her htirs, and successors, according to law. (Note. — The name of the Kbi(j or Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland for the time being is to lie substituted frovi time to time.) Sjdncj" : George Stephen Chapman, Acting Government Printer, Pliillip-strcet. — 1891. fX UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. Form L9-Series 444 1 /VA 000 515 501 5 I