A CHRISTIAN APOLOGY.
 
 A 
 
 CHRISTIAN APOLOGY 
 
 BY 
 PAUL SCHANZ, D.D., D.Pn., 
 
 PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF TUBINGEN, 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 REV. MICHAEL F. GLANCEY, 
 
 INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS IN THE DIOCESE OF BIRMINGHAM, 
 
 AND 
 
 REV. VICTOR J. SCHOBEL, D.D., 
 
 PROFESSOR OF DOGMATIC THBOLOOT AT ST. MART'S, OSCOTT. 
 
 IN THREE VOLUMES. 
 
 VOL. I: GOD AND NATURE. 
 
 FOURTH REVISED EDITION. 
 
 ^Frederick IPustct & Co. 
 
 Printers to The Holy Apostolic See and The Sacred 
 Congregation of Rites 
 
 RATISBON ROME NEW YORK CINCINNATI
 
 Copyright, 1891, 
 By E. STEINBACK, of the Firm FR. PUSTET & Co.
 
 TRANSLATORS' PREFACE. 
 
 Every Catholic, even moderately acquainted with 
 the course of modern science, must be painfully 
 aware that its professed relations to faith are simply 
 hostile. Weapons are sought in every region of 
 enquiry and speculation, with which to beat down 
 revealed truth, or to assail its defenders. Geology, 
 Palaeontology, Ethnology, Biblical Criticism, and, 
 above all, the new Science of Comparative Religion 
 yield arguments that must be met, and difficulties 
 that must be answered if we would save educated 
 Catholics, perhaps from loss of faith, but certainly 
 from painful perplexity of mind. Questions of faith 
 and science are now in the forefront of our modern 
 intellectual life. They confront us at every turn. 
 To enable our people to cope with them, there is 
 needed a standard work of reference, dealing 
 systematically with scientific questions from a 
 Catholic standpoint. In Germany and France 
 several such works have been published, of which, 
 as regards England, it may be truly said : Graeca 
 sunt, non leguntur. It is strange that England, 
 one of the great strongholds of physical science,
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 should have been so long left almost wholly 
 unprovided with works of this character. We 
 believe, then, that we shall meet a pressing need in 
 giving to the English-speaking world a translation 
 of Dr. Schanz's Apologie des Christenthums. 
 
 The name of its author is an ample guarantee 
 that this work is at once Catholic in tone, and fully 
 abreast of the learning of the day. Dr. Schanz is 
 one of the most distinguished savants of Catholic 
 Germany. Schanz, Funk, and Kepler, whose names 
 now shed lustre on the Catholic Faculty of Tubin- 
 gen, are no unworthy successors of Mohler, Kuhn, 
 and Hefele. The Apologie, which has the Im- 
 primatur of Bishop Hefele of Rottenburg, has been 
 well received in Germany. Both by reason of its 
 matter and manner of treatment, it is admirably 
 adapted to the needs of English readers. Unlike 
 most manuals of the kind, it does not take the facts 
 for granted ; but before propounding solutions and 
 explanations, it presents a clear view of the facts 
 that go to make up the scientific state of the 
 question. 
 
 The present volume, as the subsidiary title indi- 
 cates, discusses the questions raised by the natural 
 sciences The second volume, which is already in 
 the press, and which, it is hoped, will be ready in 
 April, deals at length with the Comparative Science 
 of Religion, and with the main issues raised by 
 Biblical Criticism. The third volume is an apolo- 
 getic treatise on the Church. Thus in three volumes
 
 PREFACE. 111. 
 
 the Catholic student will have to hand a complete 
 manual, up to date, of the Demonstratio Christiana 
 and the Demonstratio Catholica. 
 
 We have had to battle with exceptional difficul- 
 ties in the translation ; yet, while allowing ourselves 
 a certain amount of latitude in language, we have 
 scrupulously endeavoured to adhere to the sense of 
 the author. Instead of leaving the summary pre- 
 fixed to each individual chapter, we have given a 
 consecutive table of contents at the beginning. The 
 notes, which in the original are appended to a 
 chapter en bloc, are here inserted as they occur. We 
 had intended, in each case, to give the references 
 to the English editions of works, which the author 
 quotes in German, but, finding in many instances 
 that the German edition was practically a distinct 
 work and not a translation, and that it was hardly 
 possible to indicate the exact corresponding passages 
 in English, the plan had to be abandoned. 
 
 The third volume will contain a copious index 
 of the whole work. 
 
 St. Mary's, Oscott, 
 
 Feast of the Epiphany, 1891.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS, 
 
 FACMI 
 
 Necessity of an Apology Significance of Religion for man's temporal 
 and eternal destiny The welfare of the individual and of society- 
 Variety of Religions Antagonism between the world and revela- 
 tion Claims of the one infallible Religion Christianity His- 
 torical character of Apologetics Moses The Prophets Jesus 
 Christ The Apostles Apologetic tendencies in Holy Scripture 
 Apologetics and Faith The Metaphysical Absolute, and the 
 God of Religion The object of Faith and knowledge 
 The formal proof from reason of supernatural revelation- 
 Apology and Apologetics Demonstratio Christiana and Catho~ 
 liea. Object of Apology and Apologetics Prseambula fidei 
 Motiva credibilitatis Postulates of historical Religion Natural 
 method of cognition Internal and external facts Division of the 
 work ...! 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 Apologetics as old as Religion Canonical books Septuagint 
 Philo Jewish paraphrases Talmud Christian Apologetics 
 -Division Drey Councils of Nicaea and Trent. 
 
 First Period : Jews and Gentiles Gospel of St. Matthew Epistle of 
 Barnabas Justin's Apologies Proof from Prophecy Apologies 
 philosophical and ethical, legal and political General Apology 
 for Christian faith and morals The Gnostics Scientific Apolo- 
 gies Christianity supreme since the days of Constantino 
 Polemics Apologetic history. . .
 
 CONTENTS. V. 
 
 PACK 
 
 Second Period: Islam Judaism Talmud Cabbala John Dama- 
 scene S. Thomas Italian Renascence Humanism German 
 Humanism The Reformers. 
 
 Third Period : Grotius Huet Pascal Arminian and Socinian 
 Theology Deism in England, France, Italy, and Jermany 
 Nineteenth Century Rationalism Darwinism : France Eng- 
 land Italy Spain Germany . . iS 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 RELIGION AND HISTORY. 
 
 Universality of Religion The history of Religion is the history 
 of mankind Civilized and uncivilized peoples No people with- 
 out Religion Superstition a proof of faith Sacrifice and Praer 
 Belief in immortality Worship of the dead Moral notions 
 Cannibalism Religion in the widest sense Atheism Inde- 
 pendent morality Superstition as a substitute for faith 
 Buddhism . 66 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 RELIGION AND MAN. 
 
 Origin of Religion Religion older than its history External Causes 
 Legislators Priests Heads of Families Shamans Com- 
 pact between rulers, priests, and people Relation of man to 
 nature Climate Fear Sense of dependence Reverence- 
 Ancestor -Worship Idealistic theory Imagination Reason 
 Force of the principle of casuality Religion an innate disposi- 
 tion of soul Moral order in the world Conscience Sin- 
 Evolution Animal instinct Animism Fetichism The his- 
 toric and scientific development of Religion Union with God, 
 the end of all Religion 74
 
 Vl. CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM 
 
 FAGB 
 
 Natural cognition of Cod according to Holy Scripture Creation 
 Providence Conscience External and internal experience 
 Universal belief presupposed Primitive Revelation Necessity 
 of training Jews and Gentiles Revelation of profane know- 
 ledge Vatican Council on Revelation French Traditionalists- 
 Intellectual action dependent on external agency Ontologisra 
 Idea of God Idealism Ideas Plato Arians Philo Gnostics 
 Neoplatonism Augustine Mediaeval Platonists Reformers 
 Descartes Middle course between Sensism and Ontolo- 
 gism Analogous knowledge of God Monotheistic instinct of 
 the heart Inborn idea of God Ontological proof for the exis- 
 tence of God Anselm Descartes Leibnitz Gratry Ecclesi- 
 astical condemnation of Traditionalism and Ontologism . 94 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 BEGINNING AND END. 
 
 Realism and Idealism The teaching of Philosophy on the beginning 
 of things Ex nihilo nihil fit The voice of Religion on the 
 same Thomas Bonaventure Recent philosophers opposed to 
 the temporal existence of the world Experimental science on 
 the beginning of the world Man and Animals had a beginning 
 So had the plants, the earth, the world Primitive matter 
 Ignoramus et ignorabimus Motion and force First cause 
 The end a proof of the beginning No infinite time 
 Natural science on the end of things The second proposition of 
 Clausius Mechanical theory of heat Eternal rotation Re- 
 gressus in infinitum God Cosmological argument Creation . 114 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 LIFE. 
 
 Life fa motion The organic and inorganic in nature Origin of life- 
 Aristotle Schoolmen God the living cause Natural science 
 Omne vivum ex ovo Experiments regarding spontaneous genera-
 
 CONTENTS. viL 
 
 PAGI 
 
 tion No special generative force in the earth Eozoon Cana- 
 dense Haeckel's Bathybius Spontaneous generation still exist- 
 ing, but unrecognizable Animated matter Formation of 
 albumen Artificial organic matter Scientists generally advo- 
 cates of spontaneous generation from fear of the supernatural, 
 and on account of the formal methods of science Postulate of 
 the principle of causality Organic germs carried from one celes- 
 tial body to another Incompetency of science to explain the 
 origin of life The absolute living cause Second stage of the 
 cosmological argument . . . . IJI 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 Wonderful variety of living forms Historical explanation Palaeon- 
 tology on the appearance of living beings Plants Animals- 
 Geology Gradual Formation of the earth Evolution Darwin 
 Variability and its extent Constancy of specific character 
 Germinal disposition Variability in remote times Absence of 
 Intermediary forms Variation per saltus Internal causes of 
 Tariability Heredity Irregularity of the same Fundamental 
 law of biogenesis Correlation Rudimentary organs Limits of 
 heredity Its inexplicable character Natural selection in the 
 struggle for existence Weapons of defence and attack Theory 
 not based upon sufficient experimental proof Survival of the 
 fittest not proved Imperfect and lower animals Initial organs 
 Mechanical Stimulus Adaptation Utility of morphological 
 properties of plants not proved Migration-theory Sexual selec- 
 tion Secondary sexual organs Colour Lower Animals Plants 
 Constant relation of sexes No new species Internal cause of 
 formation Theory of descent, an historical but incomplete recon- 
 struction Notion of species Difference between plant and 
 animal Sensation and spontaneous motion Barrier between 
 Sensation and mechanical motion Psychical Dynamism 
 Theology and Darwinism Third stage of the cosmological 
 argument. , . . . . . .144
 
 VU. CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 MAN. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Man an animal rationale Homo Sapiens Vegetative and sensitive 
 life Physical difference between man and brute Upright posi- 
 tion Head Formation of face Facial angle Skull Brain 
 Microcephali Organization of brain Causes of its development 
 Physical defects Tail Hair Disadvantages in the struggle 
 for life View of the physical differences Ordinary theory of 
 descent from apes set aside Language Its psychological cause 
 Reason Theories on the origin of language The child Vis 
 astimativa Instinct Want of Progress Perfectibility of 
 instinct Instinctive actions of man Thought Dominion over 
 nature Progress Self-consciousness Scientific knowledge 
 Free will Moral sense Anthropophagy Suicide Conscience 
 Heroism Historical proof Fourth stage of the cosmological 
 argument. ....... 196 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 Analytical and synthetical method Efficient and final causes Actual 
 existence of design Aristotle Holy Scripture The Fathers 
 Natural philosophers on design Theory of Kant and Laplace 
 Design in evolution Formation of rings The moons of Uranus 
 and Neptune Mutual interaction of bodies The law of the 
 conservation of energy Purposeness in the effects of heat, water, 
 air Organic nature Internal adaptation Process of nutrition 
 Apprehension of good Instinctive actions Vital force 
 Propagation Biogenetical law Arrangements for securing 
 propagation Purposeness not utility Universal purposeness 
 Anaxagoras and Aristotle The Creator fixes the purpose 
 Man the end of creation Self-consciousness and moral 
 character Social order Evil, physical and moral Curse on 
 nature Metaphysical evil in nature, organic and inorganic 
 The physico-theological proof for the existence of God. . 232
 
 CONTENTS. U. 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 VIRTUE AND REWARD. 
 
 mm 
 
 Analogy taken from the animal and vegetative kingdom Instinct of 
 self-preservation Desire of happiness Absence of internal and 
 external happiness The end of man hereafter Virtue and Sin 
 Retributive justice Postulate of practical reason The moral and 
 anthropological proof for the existence of God. 269 
 
 CHAPTER XIL 
 THE SOUL. 
 
 Nature of Soul knowable from effects only Life in the Vegetative 
 and Animal Kingdom The soul of Brutes Its divisibility It 
 is an active substance innate in the animal germ The soul of 
 man an immaterial simple substance Notion of Simplicity and 
 Unity The Spiritual Ego Identity of Self-consciousness 
 Opposition of soul and body Their union Seat of the soul 
 Soul and Brain Mental derangement, culpable or inherited 
 Dreams Liberty of Will Statistics of morality Soul 
 not a mere force Immortality of the soul Historical proof 
 Doubts Opposition between Philosophy and Belief The 
 Old Testament on Immortality Universal belief not an error 
 Its natural Explanation Dreams Spiritualism No empirical 
 proof for immortality Metaphysical proofs for immortality- 
 Christian View Schoolmen Form Spirituality Desire of 
 happiness The psycho-teleological proof Resurrection of the 
 body Council of Vienne on immortality. 276 
 
 CHAPTER XIIL 
 MONISM. 
 
 Materialistic and Idealistic Monism Historical Survey Christian 
 Theism Gross Materialism Mechanical Monism Its Incom- 
 petency to solve the riddle of the existence of the world 
 Renounces the higher intellectual and moral life Animated 
 matter Pantheism School of reason Psychological school
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 FACE 
 
 Idea of being, logical and objective The Possible not the 
 beginning of things Individuality incomprehensible in Pan- 
 theism Real ideas Higher cause of the really existing things 
 The individual spiritual life only explicable in the supposition 
 of an absolutely perfect cause No unlimited progress Process 
 of thought and progress inexplicable Optimism and Pessimism 
 Insufficiency of every kind of Monism Theistic Dualism 
 Aristotelian and Scholastic Explanation The Vatican Council 
 on Monism 37 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 CREATION. 
 
 Reason demands the doctrine of creation Revelation gives the ex- 
 planation Genesis Meaning of &zr<i=creavit God is Creator 
 from the beginning Absolute and conditioned or communicated 
 being The world made out of nothing by the omnipotent will of 
 God Not caprice, but wisdom The Eternal ideas Time and 
 space Philo Augustine Origen Conservation of things by the 
 Creator The laws and forces of nature The First Cause 
 acting through secondary causes Immutability of God and 
 mutability of created things Notion of Creation Autogony . 324 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 The Mosaic account Its difficulties Opinion of the Fathers 
 Commentaries on the Hexsemeron Leading principles in its ex- 
 planation Inspiration Tradition No literal exegesis Accom- 
 modation to the capacity of the reader Religious object in view 
 of the writer Application of the principles Later Theologians 
 The Schoolmen The modern view of the world and biblical 
 exegesis The various theories on the work of creation Theory 
 of the flood Literal explanation Hypothesis of a restoration 
 Light Concordistic Theory The Days as Periods Second 
 and Third Day Creation of plants , of animals Fourth Day 
 Acts of Creation in general successive, but principle of division 
 only ideal Bishop Cliffotd Opus creationis, distinctionis. 
 ornatus ... 335
 
 CONTENTS. XI. 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE WORLD. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The geocentric system of the Bible System of Copernicus Pythag- 
 oras Ptolemy Scholastics Nicolas of Cusa Copernicus 
 Opposition of Reformers Mathematicians Catholics Galileo 
 Judicial proceedings of 1616 Condemnation explained 
 by the condition of science at the time Second proceeding in 
 1633 Kepler's three laws Newton Law of gravitation 
 Parallax of fixed stars Aberration of light Deviation of 
 falling bodies Foucault's pendulum experiment. . . 366 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 Biblical account of the creation of man No pre-Adamites Inhabi- 
 tableness of other heavenly bodies Unity of descent the 
 necessary postulate of original sin and redemption Specific 
 unity Division of races- Fertile intermarriage Change of 
 colour and figure as determined by clime and manner of life 
 Distinction of higher and lower races unfounded Savages are 
 degenerate races Capacity for culture a proof of specific unity 
 Population of the earth from a common centre in Asia 
 Propagation of plants and animals from several different 
 centres Traditions on the origin of diversity of tongues The 
 Indo-Germanic languages branches of a common Aryan lan- 
 guage Relation to Semitic languages Turanian languages 
 Common origin of the three families History of language a 
 history of decadence Confusion of tongues . . . 393 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 THE AGE OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 Holy Scripture on the age of man No fixed chronology No data 
 from Scripture as to the age of the earth Traces of fossil man 
 in Quaternary strata (Diluvium) No traces of Tertiary man 
 Kitchen-refuse, Lake-dwellings, and palings, of recent origin 
 Stone age, Bronze and Iron Age Ethnography and the study of 
 the comparative science of language Ancient civilization of 
 Egypt and India Relative age : 8,000-10,000 years . . 412
 
 Xli. CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 THE DELUGE. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Biblical account Its sources The jahvistic and elohistic sources 
 Confirmation from cuneiform inscriptions Superiority of the 
 biblical narrative on account of its moral teleology Other 
 traditions of the Flood Age of the Flood greater than that 
 assigned in the Bible The Ice-Age Universality of the 
 Flood Not universal as to earth, plants, and animals, nor 
 probably as to man Undecided by the Church . . . 423
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 
 
 The idea of justification and defence is included in the 
 very idea and nature of Religion. Religion must defend 
 and make good its claims before two tribunals : the mind 
 of the believer, and the conscience of society. For, how- 
 ever divergent may be men's notions of religion, however 
 much moral precepts may differ, it is agreed on all hands 
 that they transcend the limits of sensible experience and 
 overstep the bounds of natural knowledge. All men are 
 agreed that there exists a moral law independent of the will 
 of man. The more man is disposed to make his reason the 
 measure of the universe, and his will the standard of action, 
 the more weighty must be the arguments by which he is 
 induced to submit his mind to a higher intelligence, and to 
 bring his will into subjection to a higher power. Not only 
 the temporal well being of individuals and of society, but 
 also man's future destiny depends on a right solution of 
 religious questions. Nevertheless, in communities that 
 cannot boast of a high order of civilization, the inward 
 contentment and peace of soul, that springs from faith and 
 a religious life, is allowed to do duty for external proofs. 
 Hence the bearing of religion on human happiness and 
 misery is treated more as a matter of sentiment than of con- 
 scious knowledge. Individuals and society, however, in pro- 
 portion to the advance they make in natural knowledge
 
 2 APOLOGY AND APOLUGETICS. 
 
 and morality will grow in the consciousness that religion 
 is of the utmost significance to their welfare. The mind's 
 insatiable thirst for knowledge begets deeper and deeper 
 reflection on the grounds of religious belief. The vast 
 interests at stake make believers anxious to establish har- 
 mony between heart and mind, and between science and 
 faith, in order that their obedience may seem reasonable 
 both to themselves and to others. But individuals are 
 likewise members of society ; man is a social being. Now 
 religion has mightily swayed the thoughts and actions of 
 families, tribes, and states, nay, of the whole human race. 
 On this point the verdict of experience and history is 
 unanimous. The movements that have most powerfully 
 influenced the life of nations have ever been religious. In 
 all undertakings, fraught with consequences, subjects and 
 rulers have regarded an appeal to religion and to the will 
 of the Gods as decisive. All that charms the eye and de- 
 lights the ear in poetry and art, or that gratifies the mind's 
 cravings in science, all has its root in religion, and derives 
 its force and strength from religious enthusiasm. A de- 
 cadence in religion is accompanied by a corresponding de- 
 cadence in art and science. History and ethnography 
 make it quite clear that the decay of religious systems is 
 owing to the action of many (often contradictor)') causes ; 
 e. g. peculiarities of race, historical development, climate, 
 and so on. Comparative philology and the comparative 
 science of religion have now in part lifted the veil that had 
 hitherto hidden the beginnings of religious life among the 
 civilized peoples of ancient times. But it has thereby 
 given birth to the necessity of instituting a comparison be- 
 tween the various religious systems, and of likewise de- 
 fending the faith that is in us. 
 
 Etymologically, religion signifies a bond of union between 
 man and God. Its aim and object is to lead man to God, and 
 to unite him to God for ever. But this implies that some 
 prior union originally existed. All known religions trace 
 their origin to a divine revelation. Religion came down from 
 above in order to set man free from the trammels of this lower
 
 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 3 
 
 world of sense; hence it is arrayed in hostility to this world 
 and its ruler, and to man's lower earthly nature. It stirs up 
 strife in the heart of man, in the family, and in society. It 
 is therefore, all the more incumbent on religion to justify itself 
 in the eyes of the natural man and of a sinful world, by making 
 good its claim to be the legitimate daughter of heaven. The 
 proof advanced in behalf of revealed religion must be so over- 
 whelming as to compel mind and heart to yield a willing assent. 
 Supernatural religion is essentially one and infallible. It lays 
 the same yoke on all without exception or distinction. It is 
 also universal in time. Time and circumstances may bring 
 change of form ; but the truth itself is ever the same. Super- 
 natural religion is not merely one true religion among many, 
 but it alone is true. Compared with it all other religions are, 
 in a greater or less degree, false. They are true only in so far 
 as they are conformable to it: the truth they contain is a 
 borrowed truth. The reasons urged in support of the claims of 
 supernatural religion must be commensurate with the high 
 authority to which it appeals, and with the weight of obligation 
 it imposes on men. In particular, all these points have to be 
 proved in the case of Christianity, the last and most complete 
 revelation of God which, as enshrined in a new divine institu- 
 tion, has renewed the face of the earth. 
 
 The facts of history bear out the antecedent speculations of 
 theory. It can easily be shewn from the history of religion that 
 founders of religions always lay claim to a divine illumination, 
 and that their adherents insist on its truth being attested by 
 miracles. Here, however, it is enough to refer to the known 
 history of revelation. 
 
 When God appeared to Moses he chose a flame of fire in a 
 bush. Moses saw that the bush was burning but not consumed* ; 
 and thus he was prepared to accept the revelation as such. 
 He himself was convinced of its truth. But how could he 
 expect the people to believe in it? They will not believe me, 
 
 Exodus iii. 2.
 
 4 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 
 
 he said to the Lord, nor hearken to my voice, but they will 
 say : the Lord hath not appeared to thee.* And the Lord 
 gave Moses a triple sign : the rod changed into a serpent, the 
 leprous hand, and the water converted into blood, " that 
 they may believe that the Lord God of their fathers, the 
 God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob 
 hath appeared to thee." It was the same with the prophets. 
 Like Moses they too were penetrated with a sense of God's 
 presence and of the truth of revelation ; but they had to 
 give the people evidence of their mission. In the New Law 
 the revelation is made by Jesus Christ himself, the Son of 
 God made man. Whereas God, at sundry times and in 
 divers manners spoke, in times past to the fathers by the 
 prophets, in these days He hath spoken to us by His Son.f 
 Even Jesus did not come without His credentials. The en- 
 tire Old Testament singled him out as the promised Messias ; 
 miracles attended His conception and birth ; at His baptism 
 in the Jordan He was solemnly consecrated to His office of 
 Messias. Nor did Jesus fail to produce evidence in word 
 and work, that He was truly the Son of God and the long- 
 expected Messias. He appeared before the people as one 
 having power, and He deigned to show His power by work- 
 ing miracles. If the Jews would not believe His words, at 
 least they should believe His works. Jesus endued His dis- 
 ciples also with power from on high in order that they might 
 convince the astonished heathen world that the truth which 
 they preached came from heaven, and that shadows and 
 darkness must therefore vanish. And they going forth 
 preached everywhere ; the Lord working withal, and con- 
 firming the word with signs that followed. J 
 
 If the organs of supernatural revelation needed a special 
 proof of the truth of their mission and doctrine in order to en- 
 counter successfully the antagonism of the world, revealed 
 religion itself must both need and be capable of proof. 
 In both the Old and New Testaments the apologetic 
 
 Ibid. iv. i. t Hebrews i. i. t Mark xvi. 20.
 
 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 5 
 
 element predominates to a remarkable extent. It is 
 generally admitted that Holy Scripture subordinates profane 
 things and profane sciences to religious ends. It is equally well 
 known, if not so universally allowed, that this religious end is, 
 as a rule, closely connected with apologetics. The very first 
 chapter of Genesis can only be rightly understood by contrast- 
 ing it with the polytheism and nature-worship that everywhere 
 prevailed. The most prominent feature of the Old Testament 
 belief in the one true God ever calls to mind the false gods 
 of'uie heathen. Adore no strange god have no other god 
 but me, was God's command ; and Israel's observance or trans- 
 gression of this p nmandment had an important bearing on its 
 history. Fidelity to God brought prosperity, but adversity 
 followed in the wake of infidelity. Hence the Old Testament 
 is a grand apology for divine revelation against heathen idolatry. 
 And, as is well known, this apologetic tendency is very strongly 
 marked in the New Testament. In the majority of his Epistles S. 
 Paul has to defend either his office, or his person, or his gospel, or 
 the truth of Christianity against every species of attack. In 
 himself he experienced how a believer must be ready to give 
 himself and others an account of the substance and grounds of 
 his faith. Hence he requires the priest to embrace "that faith- 
 ful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to 
 exhort in sound doctrine, and to convince the gainsayers."* 
 Wherefore S. Peter does not merely strive to comfort the 
 sorrowing faithful by referring to the Christian's hope, but he 
 declares it to be likewise the duty of the believer to be on the 
 alert, and always ready to satisfy every one that asketh a reason 
 of that hope which is in him.f The prologue to S. Luke's 
 gospel and the conclusion of S. John's betray an apologetic pur- 
 pose, which, however, is less perceptible in the body of those 
 gospels. 
 
 But, it may be argued, is not faith a necessary postulate of 
 religion ? Is not natural reason incompetent to prove the truth 
 
 * Titus i. 5. 1 1. Peter iii. 15.
 
 6 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 
 
 of supernatural revelation ? Must, then, the defence, which is 
 acknowledged to be necessary, be set down as impossible or 
 illusory? So it would really seem. For this reason some 
 writers reject external and metaphysical proofs as of no avail in 
 matters of faith. Pascal declares he will not attempt to prove 
 either the existence of God, or the Trinity, or the immortality 
 of the soul, or any other such truth from reason ; and he re- 
 fuses, not merely because he feels unequal to the task of finding 
 any argument in nature forcible enough to convince an atheist, 
 but also because such knowledge without Jesus Christ is barren 
 and unprofitable. What doth it profit a man unto salvation 
 to know that mathematical axioms are immaterial eternal 
 truths, subsisting in dependence on the first truth? 1 Protestant 
 schools of theology are also very sceptical about metaphysical 
 proofs. Positivists and Rationalists take a different route but 
 reach the same goal. But no such stumbling-block besets the 
 path of the sound apologist. He is fully aware that the meta- 
 physical Absolute and the God of religion are not the same, 
 and that their effect on the heart is very different. He 
 knows full well that a religious idea of God, even in its most 
 general form, is unattainable by metaphysics. But deeply 
 conscious of the rights of the human heart, he cannot afford to 
 ignore metaphysical proofs. They are defective, it is true; 
 but all human knowledge, especially religious knowledge, is 
 necessarily imperfect 
 
 The idea of God, S. Augustine has said, is more truly con- 
 ceived than expressed ; and God is truer than He is conceived. 
 Even the advanced knowledge of God obtained from revelation 
 is no exception. Maybe S. Thomas and many of the School- 
 men set too high a value on these proofs ; but they did not 
 thereby dispense with faith. Religious life, in its essence, 
 depends on that exercise of the will which calls forth the Act of 
 Faith. For this reason Albertus Magnus, Alexander Hales, S. 
 
 Vscml. Petuftt tur la rttigio*. tt sur yuelguft autrts mfttf. Amsterdam, 1758. 
 Preface and , ao, i, a.
 
 APOLOCJV AND APOLOGETICS. 7 
 
 Bonaventure, and many others, taught that even those things 
 which are naturally evident can still be the material object of 
 faith. Faith and knowledge may coexist with regard to one 
 and the same object. For, however well a thing is known, 
 there are in its nature unexplored and unknown depths. 
 Apologetic proofs are but the preliminaries of faith. Faith 
 begins where apology ends. In natural science, what is known 
 cannot be believed, Not so, however, in the realm of the 
 supernatural, where man never knows more than a shadow, and 
 a bare outline of the whole truth. Faith alone opens the 
 understanding to the light of the truth ; faith alone brings full 
 conviction. 
 
 But, it will be asked, can the claims of faith clash with the 
 claims of apology ? A collision is possible on one supposition 
 only: if reason were required to supply a formal proof of 
 revelation, and if the fact of revelation and its bearings on 
 man's salvation depended on the success of the proof. This, 
 however, does not lie in the province of an apology, but is the 
 work of a constructive philosophy of religion. A defence pre- 
 supposes the existence of the object to be defended. The 
 bounden duty of the apologist is twofold : to refute objections, 
 and to show that religion is attuned to the chords of man's 
 mind and the beatings of his heart. Revelation was not given 
 to put natural knowledge out of court, or to turn it topsy-turvy. 
 
 On the contrary, revelation, taking natural knowledge for 
 granted, enlists it in its service. As a philosophy of life, 
 Christianity is without a parallel. For not only are its doctrines 
 in harmony with reason ; but it affords comfort and con- 
 solation to sorrow-stricken souls by solving in an intelligible 
 and coherent fashion questions which have at all times stirred 
 the human mind to its depths, and made the human heart 
 surge like a swollen sea ; and it is so sublime precisely because 
 it offers, on revealed grounds, an infallible solution of those 
 fundamental problems in regard to which natural philosophers 
 can offer nothing better than hints and conjectures. As a
 
 S APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 
 
 philosophy of life it rests upon natural knowledge ; but, as tfu 
 one infallible philosophy, it is built on the immovable rock of 
 God's word. Only He, who is absolute truth and sanctity itself 
 can supply that ultimate principle of certitude which places 
 virtue and beatitude on a sure footing. When the Apostle, in 
 the Epistle of the Corinthians,* says that the Lord did not 
 send him to preach in wisdom of speech lest the Cross of Christ 
 should be made void, and that therefore he preached Christ 
 Crucified, unto the Jews indeed a stumbling-block and unto 
 the Gentiles foolishness, he drew a bold and, perhaps, rather 
 rough sketch of the sharp triangular duel between the Gospel, 
 Jewish Faith, and heathen wisdom. But in these words he 
 did but give expression to a thought underlying revelation, that 
 the kingdom of God is not of this world, and that the poor have 
 the Gospel preached to them. He declares war to the knife 
 not against true wisdom, but against the science that puffeth 
 up, that inflates the creature with pride, and makes him turn 
 his back on his Creator. Taking as his starting-point the 
 Gospel, as the power to every one that believes, he proceeds to 
 show how Christianity alone is competent to give a thoroughly 
 satisfactory solution of the momentous problems of life. He 
 grinds the theories of idolatry to powder; he exposes the thread- 
 bare nature of Jewish hopes ; from psychology and experience 
 he demonstrates with touching and telling force man's need of 
 grace and redemption. Yet,in spite of his adamantine faith,in spite 
 of his full persuasion that faith in Jesus is the gate of salvation, 
 he in nowise shuts his eyes to the conditions of heart and mind 
 that must necessarily precede this faith. He demands a reason- 
 able obedience. 8 He adduces facts from our Lord's life to prove 
 the truth of the promises made to Christians. While, therefore, 
 we affirm with the Fathers that it is natural to seek proofs from 
 reason 8 for our belief in Christianity, we re-echo the confession 
 of the same Fathers that we must give an account of the faith 
 
 I Corinthians, i, 17, 33. 
 
 Romans xiL \. Vatican Council 3. 3. 
 
 3 Mofcler Patreltgie (Reithmayr'i Edition) Regensburg 1840 p. 465.
 
 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 9 
 
 that is in us. Revelation and reason, faith and science are 
 not mutually exclusive but inclusive. In origin and end 
 they are, broadly speaking, comparable, although they 
 move in different orbits. And, in order to make the obe- 
 dience of faith harmonize with the rigfets of reason, God 
 has vouchsafeth-etitward proofs in addition to the inward 
 promptings of the Holy Spirit. He has set up before the 
 gaze of men certain divine facts, chiefly miracles and prophe- 
 cies, which clearly show forth His almighty power and in- 
 finite wisdom, and are therefore absolutely safe tests of reve- 
 lation, which all can appreciate. 4 The revelation of God 
 in Creation and Redemption is clear enough to be seen and 
 believed by all who seek God ; but it is also obscure enough 
 to leave room for doubt to men who are not of good-will." 
 Apology is the name given to a vindication of the faith. 
 Besides warding off attack and making false accusation to 
 blush,* it likewise renders an account of thought and ac- 
 tion,! and supplies formal or actual proofs " in the defence 
 and confirmation of the Gospel. "J The life and death of 
 the Apostles, their writings and their preaching were an 
 apology for Christianity as a whole, and for the several 
 truths and practices that go to make it up. Thus, in the 
 Epistle to the Corinthians, S. Paul proves the resurrection 
 of the dead from the fact that Jesus rose again ; from the 
 death and resurrection of Jesus he deduces the importance 
 of baptism ; the works of Jesus establish the certainty 
 of faith. The prophecies of the Old Testament are fre- 
 quently invoked by the Apostles|| in proof that Jesus is the 
 Messias and God. The early Fathers wrote apologies to 
 stop the mouth of the heathen and the Jew. Such apolo- 
 gies were simple or elaborate, deep or diffuse, treated of 
 the prolegomena or explained the truths of faith, according 
 
 4 Mark xvi. ao ; II. Pet. 5. 19 ; Vatican Council 3. 3. 
 
 5 Pascal 2 18. 2. 
 
 * I. Cor. ix. 3 ; Acts xxii. i ; xxv. 16 ; I. Tim. iv. 16. 
 
 t I. Peter iii. 15. 
 
 J Philip, i. 7. 16. 
 
 I. Cor. xv. 
 
 II See Acts of the Apostles.
 
 JO APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 
 
 to circumstances. As a rule, however, they did not look beyond 
 the needs of the hour, and handled no more points than were 
 necessary for dealing with the case in hand. They formally 
 differ from scientific expositions of the faith, by being more 
 general in character, and by being written in an easy style and 
 in popular language. Out of the several treatises in which the 
 main truths of Christian doctrine have been successively treated 
 in apologetic fashion, has been built up the science of Christian 
 apology. 
 
 But, when particular truths recede into the background and 
 Christianity is viewed generally and as a whole, apology is 
 gradually swallowed up in apologetics. ( dw\iry7fri/dj sc. Ttyyi] .). 
 Only in late years has this been recognized to be a systematic 
 branch of theology. Its purpose is to lay out the ground, and 
 to devise the best methods for defending Christianity. But it 
 is not blank methodology any more than dogmatic theology is, 
 or ethics, or aesthetics, or the science of cognition, but it has a 
 scope of its own, positive and defensive. As dogmatic theology is 
 the science of dogma, so apologetics is the science of apology, 
 the scientific vindication of divine truth, and of the rule of life 
 that has been given for all ages and all nations. Its intrinsic 
 connection with dogma has obtained for it the name of general 
 dogmatic theology, because it examines the general grounds on 
 which all dogmas rest. It also goes by the name of fundamental 
 theology, because it investigates the character common to all 
 the truths of faith. It forms no part of its plan to prove that 
 the several doctrines are true; its task is to demonstrate 
 the origin and groundwork of Christianity and to establish its 
 claim to sole authority. Thus Christianity is its own proof; but 
 this alone is not enough. When apologetics is enlisted in the 
 service of any particular Church or Communion, the further 
 duty devolves on it of demonstrating that the doctrines and 
 practices of this particular Church are in accord with revelation. 
 So Catholic Apologetics may be defined as that branch of 
 eccl< ';>:;'! snenre wV^h r '-~ <; -V-i t', > ("ntVi'ic Church is
 
 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. II 
 
 the true Church founded by Christ, and guided and quick- 
 ened by the Holy Spirit ; and furthermore, that the truths 
 revealed by Christ and preached by the Apostles have been 
 preserved in the Catholic Church intact and free from 
 adulteration. Thus the demonstratio Christiana and the de- 
 monstratio Catholica go hand in hand. 
 
 In this way the boundary-line between apology and apolo- 
 getics is clearly defined. But their respective provinces may 
 be mapped out still more exactly. The one, as it were, 
 breaks up the ground for faith by preparing the soul ; the 
 other strengthens faith and makes conviction doubly sure. 
 Or, to adopt the terminology of the ancients, the former 
 comprises the pr&ambula fidei, the latter the motiva credibili- 
 tatis. Apart from the general drift of the science as a whole, 
 the object of the first part may be described as positive, 
 while that of the second is defensive. Faith presupposes 
 reason ; no commandments can be imposed on a being de- 
 void of free-will ; revelation is a superstructure built on cre- 
 ation. Man comes into this world with certain endowments, 
 His only way of gaining heaven is to train his soul to seek 
 the things that are above, and make it obedient to the voice 
 of God, and, on the other hand, to look upon the visible 
 world as the image of a world, spiritual and invisible. Now, 
 it is the duty of the intelligent Christian to show that the 
 preliminary conditions of religion and revelation exist in 
 his own nature and in the world around him. But while 
 apologetics confines its operations to the groundwork of 
 faith, apology, without snapping any links in the logical 
 chain of thought, makes certain questions the subject of 
 special and detailed enquiry ; to wit, the natural knowledge 
 of God, man's future destiny, the immortality of the soul, and 
 the doctrine of creation. Natural revelation is a necessary 
 stepping-stone to supernatural revelation ; the ladder of rea- 
 son is required to scale the walls of faith. For atheists and 
 materialists, naturalists, pantheists and deists, for those, in 
 fine, who reject all revelation, faith in Christian revelation is
 
 I a APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 
 
 of course out of the question. Hence the first and foremost 
 business in both apology and apologetics is to show this denial 
 of all revelation to be against reason, and to prove that the 
 existence of God is the necessary outcome of a reasonable view 
 of the world. 
 
 And now we are brought face to face with the second 
 function proper to Apology and Apologetics. If supernatural 
 revelation really solves the problems of existence and satisfies 
 the heart's longing for peace, then man has ready to hand a 
 most powerful inducement to believe in revelation, even 
 before he has submitted its details to the searching eye of 
 criticism. This is the inner demonstration, but there is also a 
 corresponding outer one. Supernatural revelation, being an out- 
 ward act of God, is equipped with external proofs of its 
 credibility. A bare enumeration and a simple historical expla- 
 nation of these proofs would suffice, had not they, more than 
 all others, been subjected to the dissolving and corrosive tests 
 of criticism. In revelation the divine authority has made use 
 of human organs, and accommodated itself to man's capacity. 
 Revelation has not been communicated to each individual; 
 from many, it is far removed in time and place. Thus a 
 wide range is opened out for the defence. Now the duty 
 of the Apologist is to prove that the Christian revelation is 
 the only true revelation, and that Christianity, in its present 
 form, is clad with the spotless robe of truth, The teaching of 
 Scripture and Tradition regarding the life and character of 
 Jesus, regarding His work and its continuance in the Church 
 show, at a glance, the comprehensive scope of the enquiry. 
 
 Thus the contents of historical religion fix the limits of 
 Apologetics proper. Its sphere of work is bounded by existing 
 religions. Unlike the philosophy of religion, which it takes for 
 granted, it does not start from a blank nothing. The 
 apologist tests all in order to keep the best. But his investi- 
 gations are not blind, or baseless, or prompted by sheer 
 curiosity; rather they move on well-defined lines which are
 
 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 1 3 
 
 regulated by the lines on which the attack on the Christian 
 position proceeds. Hence the apologist and the theologian 
 work on different sets of principles. The apologist's method of 
 demonstration is based on the natural knowledge supplied by 
 reason and the experimental sciences. Apologetics cannot 
 coerce faith, or borrow proofs from faith. True, it leaves the 
 preliminary questions of first principles to philosophy ; but its 
 starting-point must be the general results of the philosophy of 
 religion, since these cannot be obtained without reference to 
 historical development and the religious sense of mankind. 
 Natural and philosophic knowledge must combine with re- 
 ligious knowledge, and the religious sense of mankind ; internal 
 experience must be set side by side with the true philosophical 
 view of the world, and the historical knowledge of external 
 revelation. Doubtless, in recommending the spirit and power 
 of Protestants as the best and surest proof, Lessing was 
 cynical; but anyhow he correctly discerned one essential 
 element in Apologetics. Mere abstractions and the formal 
 processes of the mind are admittedly no adequate guarantee 
 for the reality of ideas. Christian revelation, which forms the 
 keystone of Apologetics, should be regarded in two lights; firstly 
 and chiefly, as a work of redemption, freeing man from the bond- 
 age of error and smjlind secondly, as a manifestation of the 
 Spirit of God, taking possession of man's heart and mind. It 
 should not, however, be forgotten that apologetics is intended 
 for others besides those who have experienced or are ex- 
 periencing the power of the Gospel. The mind is subject to 
 more stringent laws than feeling and fancy, these latter being 
 open to many influences from within and without which place 
 the certitude of the mind in great jeopardy. Were all external 
 proofs set aside, and faith made to rest solely on internal and 
 immanent reasons, it would be impossible to discover a general 
 basis for belief and practice. Belief in the objects of faith is 
 no more dependent on subjective grounds than is the belief in 
 the external facts that are inseparably bound up with revelation.
 
 14 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 
 
 As the rationalist, who makes reason the measure of reve- 
 lation, reduces revealed truth to a minimum, so the be- 
 liever, who throws cold water on the apologetic proof for 
 an external revelation, robs revelation of its guarantees. 
 True, we can only feel and experience, we cannot prove the 
 value of the blessings that Christianity has brought in its 
 train ; still these benefits must be as capable of being ex- 
 ternally recognized as the Christian religion itself. He 
 knows the will of God best who does it ; but he who pro- 
 mulgates it must, to say the least, be able to offer some ex- 
 ternal security.* For this reason the Vatican Council* con- 
 demns those who teach that no external signs can make 
 divine revelation credible, and that each one's internal ex- 
 perience or private inspiration is the only guide to faith. 
 Anyhow, it is necessary to attend alike to the requirements 
 of both. As sensation and feeling precede concept and 
 judgment, so religion melts the heart before it thaws the 
 understanding. The knowledge of God is not the parent 
 but the child of religion. The will reigns supreme from 
 end to end of the spiritual life ; in religious questions espe- 
 cially, its word is law. It may be better, therefore, in prac- 
 tice to enlist the sympathies of the heart before trying to 
 captivate the understanding. As a rule it is easier to prick 
 the conscience than to conquer prejudice. The proofs for 
 God's existence, drawn from nature, are unnecessary for 
 those who see God everywhere in nature ; and, on the 
 other hand, they make but little impression upon the minds 
 of men who view nature in a different light. Although 
 nature is ever dinning this truth into their ears, they are 
 deaf to her voice. 7 Nevertheless the method of science 
 must differ from that of the Catechism and the Homily. 
 If the Catechism says : ' Thou Shalt,' science must give 
 the reason why. The Christian idea of God, and the idea 
 of God derived from nature are as wide apart as the poles. 
 The God of the Christian is a God of love, a comforter ; 
 
 * John vii. 17, 18. 
 
 6 Vatican iii. 3 can. 3. 
 
 7 Pascal z, 20, i, a.
 
 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 15 
 
 He fills the heart and souls of them that possess Him ; He 
 makes man feel his wretchedness and misery, but He is also 
 infinite in mercy and breathes into man's soul humility, 
 joy, confidence and love. But, alas ! how many struggles 
 within and without has the soul to undergo before reaching 
 that blissful haven of religious peace ! How often is the 
 soul tossed to and fro on a restless sea, between fear and 
 hope, faith and doubt ! 
 
 The insufficiency of the anthropo-psychological method 
 becomes still more strikingly apparent when we come to 
 consider the hostile attitude that modern science has 
 adopted towards religion. The heathen Celsus ridiculed 
 Christian doctrines as unreasonable ; modern science at- 
 tempts to solve all the great problems of life and existence 
 independently of Christianity. Empirical science has 
 gained the ascendant over mental science and philosophy. 
 The more the mind pins its faith to external experience and 
 the exact sciences, the more necessary it becomes for the 
 Apologist to draw the lines of demarcation between natural 
 and religious knowledge. The change of front executed 
 by natural science in these latter days has rendered this 
 method necessary. Positivists and Nihilists call existing 
 methods in question, and recognize as valid only those 
 arguments which are drawn from reason. Appeals to au- 
 thority are, in their judgment, insane. Hence the Apolo- 
 gist is bound to show, from the nature of things and from 
 the nature of man, what are the preliminary steps to be 
 taken, and what conditions are required before faith can 
 exist. In a word, the Apologist must follow modern sci- 
 ence step by step. Questions not dreamed of in the philos- 
 ophy of bygone ages have arisen, demanding new methods 
 of treatment. The Fathers first showed the absurdity of 
 idolatry, and then, by a natural transition, led men from 
 the worship of created things to worship the Creator. Then 
 they proceeded to show from the gospels, and from the 
 testimony of the prophets and apostles that the promised 
 Redeemer had come. 8 
 
 8 Orgenes c. Cehum, iii. 15.
 
 1 6 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 
 
 At the outset the modern apologist is confronted by two 
 colossal errors. He finds that science has deified nature, 
 and turned mind into matter. He must, therefore, slay 
 this hydra- headed monster before he can safely begin to 
 build the citadel of positive religious truth. In a certain 
 sense the task of the apologist may be said to be substan- 
 tially the same as it ever was. Like the Gnostics and the 
 philosophers of old, modern naturalism inveighs against 
 the doctrine of creation. In impugning prophecies and 
 miracles modern rationalists are but aping ancient sceptics. 
 In making war on the authenticity of Holy Scripture, mod- 
 ern biblical critics are marching under the banner unfurled 
 long ago by Celsus, Porphyry, and Hierocles. In despis- 
 ing Christian life the modern Epicurean is as rancorous as 
 the old. And yet it is sufficient to mention the physical 
 sciences, and the comparative sciences of religion and lan- 
 guage to see what an impassable gulf separates the ancient 
 from the modern method. On the wise man, according to 
 S. Thomas, devolves the double duty of demonstrating 
 truth and refuting error. But, inasmuch as the several 
 errors are not always clearly set forth, and as, moreover, 
 opponents do not allow any authority to Holy Scripture, 
 the only available weapons are general arguments from 
 reason. As faith rests on the authority of God revealing 
 Himself, a knowledge of Him who bears witness to it must 
 precede faith. But the authority of God will be decisive 
 only for those who already know God and His attributes. 
 Here, it is quite immaterial whether He be considered 
 merely as a necessary condition or an efficient cause. At 
 any rate Apology, setting out from the universal truths of 
 reason, arrives at the particular truths of religion ; and 
 from the general requirements of the moral law it advances 
 to the particular precepts of Christian morality. 
 
 We need not enquire where the line is to be drawn between 
 Apology and Apologetics, as we are not concerned with sci- 
 entific apologetics. Scientific apology and apologetics have 
 the same internal systematic connexion,though,externally,the
 
 APOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS. 17 
 
 connexion is hardly perceptible. Apology takes its stand 
 on the fact of religion. This is the point from which it 
 starts to try and explain, negatively and positively, the 
 origin of religion. The idea of religion, when analysed, 
 resolves itself into three elements : The belief in a Supreme 
 Being, the immortality of the soul, and future retribution. 
 These truths, however, are unintelligible, unless the world 
 is the work of a Creator, whose omnipotence and godhead 
 are manifested therein. Our study of natural revelation 
 will close with a comparison between the biblical account 
 of Creation and the discoveries of science. This will serve 
 as an appropriate transition to supernatural revelation 
 which, of course, centres in the Christian religion and life. 
 In the Holy Scriptures, especially in the life of our Lord, 
 there is abundant food for study, and much to be defended 
 because much has been vigorously assailed. Nowadays 
 this is justly considered the most important part of an 
 Apology. The validity of the Christian religion cannot be 
 impeached by other religions, even should it appear that 
 their stock of truths is larger than has been heretofore sup- 
 posed. The light of Christianity alone enables us to under- 
 stand and appreciate their significance. The third part of 
 our Apology will treat of the institution and endowment, 
 the government and office of the Church. Here apology 
 and dogma are less easily distinguished, as the two sciences 
 cross each other's border. But this part of the subject 
 makes it quite clear that apologetics is not a mere philo- 
 sophical treatise. Apology, however, is not merely the 
 handmaid of Dogma or Ethics, since it has its own distinct 
 province ; it should rather be described as the introduction 
 to, and foundation of both. 9 
 
 9. For the literature on this point see Kuhn, Einleitung in Kath. Dogmatik, 
 ad Ed. Tubingen 1859 p. 201 seq.; Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit 3 vols. 
 Mflnster 1860. p. 304 seq.; Steude, Beitrage Zur Apologetik^ Gotha 1884. 
 F. Duihle de St.-Projet, Les conditions nouvelles de rapolog&ique et de Fexeglse 
 il Fheure presente (La. Controverse 1884 Nr. 68.) Apologie Scientifique de la Foi 
 Ckritienne, Paris 1885. 
 
 B
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 History, we are often told, is a sure and safe guide. As an 
 aid, therefore, to the clear understanding of the scope and 
 method of Apology, it will be profitable to trace the history 
 of Apologetic Science. The further the canonical books of 
 ancient civilized peoples are removed from the source of 
 religion, the more they are occupied in refuting objections 
 and contrary opinions. Greeks and Romans defended re- 
 ligion against scepticism and unbelief. After mythology, in 
 its literal acceptation, had become the butt of scorn and ridi- 
 cule, an attempt was made to prop it up with allegories and 
 moral interpretations in order to make it available for daily 
 life. 1 The Jews, assuredly, were not wanting in zeal in the 
 defence of their religion, as the Old Testament, from the 
 first page to the last, abundantly testifies. When, at a later 
 period, they were unable to arrest the advance of Greek 
 literature, they tried to paralyze its influence by maintaining 
 that the Greeks had borrowed their wisdom from the Old 
 Testament. But as the form often sounded harsh to the ear 
 of the cultured Greek philosopher, they sought to attune it 
 to the refined taste of the age. The Greek translation of 
 the Septuagint may be considered a step in this direction. 
 For, in this somewhat free rendering of the original text, the 
 influence of the religious philosophy of Alexandria is clearly 
 discernible. But to the learning and steady determina- 
 
 i Max Miiller, Essays , a vols. Bcitrage zur vergleichenden Mytholofit ttnd Ethnologie. 
 Leipzig, 1881, p. i seq.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 19 
 
 tion of Philo, the most prominent representative of the 
 Alexandrine School of Jewish Philosophy, chiefly belongs the 
 credit of effecting a reconciliation between religious belief and 
 the philosophic spirit of the age. Although he involved in 
 obscurity the simple idea of creation set forth in the Old 
 Testament, and frequently minimized the contents of the Sacred 
 Books, and sacrificed the substance to the form, he nevertheless 
 gave an impetus to Old Testament exegesis that endured for 
 centuries. In Palestine, the home of Judaism, the orthodox 
 Jews set on foot a similar movement, but on a smaller scale. 
 They paraphrased books of the Old Testament with a view to 
 softening down expressions that seemed objectionable. Anthro- 
 pomorphism was contracted within the narrowest possible limits. 
 The Schools at Jamnia, Tiberias, and Babylon were still more 
 revolutionary ; but instead of making Scripture more intelligible, 
 they encompassed it with a dense forest of jungle, through 
 which only a few privileged scholars can cut their way. 
 Subsequently, in the minds of Jewish theologians, the Talmud 
 took the place of Holy Scripture. Even its advocates, and 
 such as are disposed to see much good in it, must allow that it 
 deviates from the theology of x he prophets, and goes astray in 
 religion and morality. As all these Schools were most hostile 
 to Christianity, the Christian Apologist has little to gain from 
 their works j but the biblical student will need to consult them 
 from time to time. 
 
 We may therefore fix the limits of our historical enquiry. 
 Apologetics is hardly to be met with, in the early ages, as a 
 distinct science; and yet a tendency to Apology may be 
 traced in the writings of the early Fathers. This was in the 
 nature of things. A religion that was destined to develop from 
 a grain of mustard seed into a big tree, and that aimed at 
 nothing short of the spiritual conquest of the world, was sure to 
 come in conflict with powers both material and spiritual. 
 This gives the clue to the chief divisions of Apologetic History, 
 which, in the main, coincide with the periods of Church
 
 20 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 History. Most authors, following Drey,* divide Apologetic 
 history into six periods. The first two fall in ancient times, 
 and are remarkable for their philosophic and historical 
 method. The third period is formed by the Middle Ages, 
 which had to defend Christianity against Islam and Juda- 
 ism ; the fourth includes the struggles against Humanism 
 and Naturalism ; the fifth withstood the assaults of Deism 
 in the eighteenth century ; the sixth and last period exhibits 
 the Church's defences against the Rationalism, Material- 
 ism, and Naturalism of the nineteenth century. But this 
 division is correct only if we abstract from the demonstratio 
 eatholica, and treat the question purely philosophically. 
 
 In subject-matter Apologetics is a positive science, essen- 
 tially bound up with the destinies of Christianity and the 
 Church. For this reason the two decisive turning-points 
 in the history of the Church should be fixed firmly in the 
 mind : Constantine's recognition of Christianity as the 
 State religion, represented by the Council of Nicaea (325) ; 
 and the revolt from the Church in the Sixteenth Century, 
 represented by the Council of Trent (1545-1563). In both 
 periods, the apologist is chiefly occupied with the disputes 
 raging between the various Christian sects. This division 
 is generally allowed. Till the reign of Constantine non- 
 christian powers had persecuted the Church ; from Con- 
 stantine to the Reformation the Church was supreme in 
 the sphere of religion. With the Reformation the strifes 
 between Christians began anew. For this was an attack 
 not merely on the outer defences of the Church, as in 
 the struggle between East and West, but on the inner 
 citadel and the very foundations of Christianity. Opposi- 
 tion to public authority in religious matters must in the end 
 lead to the subversion of the supreme authority. Hence it 
 came to pass that revealed truth had now to be defended 
 against the attacks of Christians ; whereas, in former 
 times, Jews and pagans had been the chief assailants of 
 
 Die Apologttik als wissenschaftliche Nackiveisvng der GSttlickkeit des Christen- 
 tkumt in seiner Erscheinung. Vol. i. p. 36. and Edit., Mainz, 1864.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. SI 
 
 Christianity. Still it is impossible to determine the limits 
 of the two periods exactly, because the first effects of great 
 changes must be regarded as the reverberation of causes pre- 
 viously at work. This is especially true of the first period, in 
 which Christianity began to spread ; but a long time elapsed 
 before the masses were christianized. It will be most con- 
 venient to close this period with S. Augustine. 
 
 The foes of Christianity in the first period were Jews and 
 heathens. To the latter belong in part the Gnostics and 
 Manichaeans, who, under the influence of Eastern religions, 
 utilized stray Christian ideas to build up their systems, while 
 sapping the foundations of Christianity : God's almighty power 
 and goodness, universal redemption and the freedom of man. 
 They went forth from us, says Justin, but they are not of us. 8 
 The New Testament gives a clear insight into the blind and 
 obstinate character of the Jews. Our Lord, the twelve Apostles, 
 and S. Paul suffered persecution at the hands of the chosen 
 people. And the same fate awaited their disciples after them. 
 It could hardly be otherwise. The blood of the Crucified 
 which, in an evil hour, the infatuated multitude had invoked on 
 themselves and their children weighed so heavily on the 
 consciences of the people that only one of two courses lay open 
 to them : either to be converted, or to persecute the new sect 
 unto death. The Jews chose the latter alternative. They 
 strove to stamp out the Galileans not only by brute force, but 
 also by lying and calumny. S. Matthew's gospel can hardly be 
 described as an apology for Christians against the statements 
 officially made by the Jews, yet on one point it reveals their 
 method of warfare. The Pharisees had bribed the soldiers to 
 say that the disciples had stolen the jjody of Jesus : " and this 
 word was spread abroad among the Jews even to this day."* 
 
 The position that Christians had taken up in regard to 
 circumcision and the ceremonial law was favourable to Jewish 
 
 3 See Justin Dialog, c. Tiyphon. c. 35. 
 * Matt. zxviiL i j>
 
 21 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 attacks based on the Law. This may be seen in the Epistle to 
 the Hebrews, and still more clearly, in the Epistle of Barnabas. 
 Notwithstanding the subtle reasonings of the Alexandrine 
 School, an attempt to justify the abrogation of the ceremonial 
 law by allegorical interpretation can only be explained on the 
 supposition, that the Jews tried to frighten the Jewish converts 
 to Christianity, by taunting them with being idolaters and 
 apostates. Justin* gives clear evidence of this Jewish device. 
 He asserts that the Jews sent emissaries for the express purpose 
 of creating a prejudice against the preaching of Christ Crucified, 
 and of representing Christian doctrine as a compound of 
 lawlessness and godlessness. This statement is supported by 
 Tertullian, and confirmed by Eusebius, who declares, on the 
 authority of ancient writers, that the Jews sent a circular note 
 to every village in Palestine, decrying Christianity as a new 
 godless heresy, and warning people against the preaching of the 
 Apostles. This would account for the frequent discussions 
 between Jews and Christians, although, be it remembered, Jews 
 were forbidden to dispute with Christians ; and it likewise 
 supplies a reason why the oldest apologies were written in the 
 form of dialogues. 
 
 The earliest apology of the kind, as far as we know, is the 
 dialogue between a Jewish Christian, Jason, and an Alexandrine 
 Jew, Papiscus. Its date is about the year i4o, 5 but it is no 
 longer extant Justin's dialogue with the Jew Trypho, written 
 about the year 150, is the best known. Justin maintains, in 
 the first place, that the ceremonial law was given to the Jews 
 merely on account of their hardness of heart. Next, he 
 ascribes to the Old Law a purely typical character ; and then 
 he goes on to prove that the lowly son of man, who is also the 
 
 4 L. e. C. 17, 108, 117. Tertull. Ad. Nat. i, t, 14 ; Adv. Marc. 3, 23 ; Adv. Jud. 13 ; 
 
 Euseb. in It. 18, t. 
 
 $ See Hilgenfeld. Zeitsckrift far arissenschafilicht Theologie, 1883, i. Against : 
 . Hamacb, Die Utberliefentng der gritchischen Apologeten des 3. Jakrhundert* 
 
 in der alien Kircht und '** Mitttlalter, 1882. According to Maximus, Aristo of 
 
 Pella was the author. Hilgenfeld identifies him with the Aristion of the Frmg- 
 
 minium Papia.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 3 
 
 Son of God, born of a Virgin, is the Messias, because the 
 prophecies and types were fulfilled in his person. With his 
 coming, the ceremonial law, prophecy and royalty came to an 
 end. The Jews had made their salvation a mockery, and lost 
 their privileges. Now, Christians are the true people of God, 
 and of the Word who had appeared in the Old Testament 
 This detailed apology of Justin is followed by that of 
 Tertullian. We gather from the introduction that it, too, 
 originated in a dispute between a Jew (Jason ?) and a Christian. 
 S. Cyprian 6 likewise proves Jesus to be the Messias from the 
 Old Testament, but less felicitously. Lactantius (d. 330) also 
 had in view an apology against the Jews. Were we to enume- 
 rate in this place all the writings that casually combat Judaism, 
 it would be necessary to continue the history at much greater 
 length, for there is scarcely a writer of note in the fourth and 
 fifth centuries who does not take up arms against Judaism. 7 
 The history of exegesis and of the canon of the Old Testament, 
 shows what demands Jewish controversy made on Christian 
 science. 
 
 The more Christianity freed itself from the trammels of 
 Judaism, and made overtures to the Gentiles, the more urgent 
 became the duty of the apologist to plead its justification 
 before the tribunal of right reason, and conscience. 
 Christianity claimed to be that sovereign truth for which men 
 were everywhere seeking, and it offered the most ample security 
 for the justice of its claim. It purported to be a philosophy 
 that gave a satisfactory answer to all the problems of life and 
 death that perplexed earnest philosophers; but it came as a 
 heaven-born philosophy, bringing its credentials from above. 
 In the long run no philosophy could hold out against such an 
 overwhelming argument. It was this very argument that was 
 ever giving new strength to the utterances of Christian 
 
 6 Testimoniarum libri trts adv. J vd. 11,3. 
 
 7 Htppolytus, Demonstratio adv. Judetot. Athanasius, Gratia de Incarnations. 
 
 Gregory Nyssa, Oratio catechetica magna. Epiphanius, Ancoratus. Chrysostom 
 Hojnilittviii. adv.Jud. Cyril Alexand., Horn, jiasch, i, 4, 8, to, 20, 31, 29.
 
 34 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 apologists. Hence, even under changed conditions, they long 
 clung to this method as the most suited to their purpose. 
 Monotheism, a high standard of morality, and the proof derived 
 from prophecy, ever remained unanswerable arguments against 
 heathen polytheism and corruption. Our Lord's own pro- 
 phecies, and the vigour inherent in the Christian religion did 
 the rest; and thus the victory of the apologist over worldly 
 wisdom was made complete and secure. 
 
 The apologist, too, had to defend Christians in their civil 
 capacity. This course was rendered necessary by the attitude 
 of the Jews, who did their utmost to make the civil allegiance 
 of Catholics suspect. Witness, in proof, the fate of our Lord 
 and S. Paul. The very admonition to obey the higher 
 powers,* given by S. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans, and 
 expressly repeated in the ist Ep. of S. Peter, f suggests the 
 dangers that were threatening Christians from this quarter. 
 Both letters were written before the persecution of Nero. But 
 this persecution only fanned into a flame the smouldering 
 hatred of the -heathen for the Christian. The dark portrait of 
 Christians painted by Tacitus 8 may have received colouring 
 from later times, still it shows that Christians were in bad odour 
 with the vulgar and educated alike. In ancient times the 
 closest connection ever existed between religion and the State. 
 Abstention from public worship was set down not only as 
 atheism, but also as a crime against the State, i.e. as treason. 
 Thus, the retired life led by Christians, coupled with the care 
 they took to keep their mysteries secret, of necessity excited 
 suspicions of crime in a world that had lost the very idea of 
 virtue. Hence the first and chief business of the apologist 
 was to vindicate Christians from all unjust charges, whether 
 civil or religious, and thus to cut away the ground from the 
 further charge of atheism and immorality. 
 
 The most ancient of these apologies are lost The two 
 
 * Rom. xiii. I ceq. 
 
 t I. Peter, ii. 13 *q. 
 
 AmuO. 15. 44-
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 25 
 
 earliest, composed by Quadratus, Bishop of Athens, and 
 the philosopher Aristides, 9 were offered to the Emperor 
 Hadrian (126 A.D.) for the purpose of obtaining his protec- 
 tion for Christians, who were both persecuted and misun- 
 derstood. Only a few fragments have been preserved of 
 the apologies addressed to Marcus Aurelius by Melito of 
 Sardis (about 170 A.D.), Miltiades, and Claudius Apolli- 
 naris, Bishop of Hierapolis. 10 On the other hand, we still 
 have entire the two Apologies of Justin, which are perhaps 
 a continuous work. They furnish a good illustration of 
 the method in vogue among apologists of the second cen- 
 tury. The first, which is also the longer, is addressed to 
 the Emperor Antoninus Pius and his sons, and to the Ro- 
 man Senate and people, and petitions the Emperor to pun- 
 ish nothing but real crime, and to put down tumultuous 
 risings against the Christians. After refuting the charges 
 of atheism, immorality, and treason to the State, he proves 
 from prophecy, and from the moral tone pervading the 
 lives of the Christians, that Christianity is neither an un- 
 lawful innovation, nor an impious error. On the contrary, 
 it is the false immoral religion of the heathen that has been 
 founded and propagated by devils. Christians meet in 
 their religious assemblies solely for the purpose of spiritual 
 edification and consolation. These assemblies are so far 
 from being a secret danger to the state, that prayers are 
 offered up in them for all men, even for the Emperor. Jus- 
 tin concludes by expressing the hope that the people will 
 not bring down on themselves the vengeance of heaven, 
 but will at least give effect to the decree of Hadrian. Ani- 
 mated by a like spirit, Athenagoras, the most distinguished 
 defender of Christianity in the second century, addressed 
 an Apology to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius (177 A.D.). 
 He calls upon the State, which allows so much freedom to 
 others in matters of religion, to show toleration to Chris- 
 tians also, who have been wrongly accused of atheism, 
 
 9 On the recently discovered fragments see Kirchenlcxicon, znd Edit., p. 1298 seq. 
 10 The Apology of Melito in the Syrian translation may be seen in Pitra's Spicilegiutn 
 Solesmense^ Vol. II. p. xxxviii.-lv.
 
 a6 HISTORY or APOLOGETICS. 
 
 Thyestfan feasts, and homicide. In his Apologeticum (about 197- 
 199), addressed to the Roman Governors of Provinces, Ter- 
 tullian demands for Christians equal rights with the other 
 citizens of the empire. In itself Christianity cannot be a 
 crime. Christians refuse to worship the gods, not out of 
 hatred to the State, but because it is wrong. Hence, although 
 they do not offer sacrifice to the Emperor, they nevertheless 
 pray for him, and are more sincerely devoted to him than 
 many of the heathen, who are hypocrites. The moral 
 lives of Christians, both in public and in private, are far 
 superior to those of the heathen. The charges of incestuous 
 intercourse and Thyestian feasts are groundless. In his 
 pamphlet Ad Scapulam, addressed to Scapula, Governor of 
 Africa, Tertullian warns the Governor not to persecute 
 Christians unjustly. In like manner Cyprian's Ad Deme- 
 trianum is addressed to one in power. 
 
 Apart from the special purpose for which they were written, 
 these apologies contained also a general defence of Chris- 
 tianity. Christian faith and morals were contrasted with 
 heathen immorality and superstition; the good name of 
 Christians was upheld against calumny; truth asserted its 
 supremacy over error and misrepresentation. Moreover, 
 occasionally, in answer to friendly enquiries, the apologists 
 defend Christianity at the bar of reason, in order to show 
 why they dissented from Jew and heathen, and to remove 
 the prejudice that existed against Christianity. Heathen 
 philosophy and mythology were shown to be unsound and 
 hollow, and incapable either of improving the morals or giving 
 a satisfactory reply to the momentous questions about God, 
 the world, and man. But Christian truth, with its founda- 
 tions deep down in the Old Testament, is much older than 
 heathen wisdom, and presents far better credentials, inas- 
 much as it is the fulfilment of prophecy. Christianity em- 
 braces all truth, sets up the model of a virtuous life, and 
 displays its power by vanquishing devils. It is as old as the
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 27 
 
 world. All that is true and good, all that gives gladness 
 and strength to mind and heart, has its origin in revela- 
 tion, and is in harmony with man's thoughts and desires : 
 all that is good and true is Christian. Christianity is the 
 only true religion. 
 
 One of the oldest apologies of this character is the letter 
 Ad Diognetum, on the date and authorship of which critics 
 are not yet agreed." It should probably be asigned to the 
 middle of the second century. The superiority of Chris- 
 tianity to the heathen and Jewish religions is pourtrayed in 
 calm and dignified language, and an answer is given to the 
 difficult question, how the world in these latter days was 
 being prepared for the carrying out of the divine plan of 
 redemption. Were the Oratio and the Cohortatio ad Grcecos 
 of Justin undoubtedly genuine, they too would find a place 
 here. In the former, disgust with heathen mythology is 
 given as a reason for conversion to Christianity ; the latter 
 endeavours to prove that all truth contained in heathen 
 writers was borrowed from Holy Scripture. The Oratio ad 
 Groecos of Tatian, Justin's disciple, is certainly genuine. 
 This was formerly assigned to the year 170 A.D., but re- 
 cently its date has been fixed between the years 152 and 
 155, or 165 at latest. Tatian declares his readiness to give 
 an account of the faith that is in him. With bitter sarcasm 
 he lays bare the nothingness of heathen philosophy and re- 
 ligion, which cannot stand face to face with the older truths 
 qf Holy Scripture. All the points mentioned above are in- 
 cluded in this apology ; indeed, it may be said that chapter 
 29 contains, as in a nutshell, all the apologetic theology of 
 that time. 1 " In the third century, the same scornful tone, 
 which is also dominant in Pseudo-Justin, and which was 
 scarcely avoidable in an apology, and still less in an exhor- 
 tation to the Greeks, is adopted by Hermias in his Irrisio 
 Gentilium Philosophorum. Theophilus of Antioch (about 
 180 A.D.), in three books, retorts simply and effectively 
 
 11 For the latest literature on the subject see Kirchenlexicon, and Edit., p. 1774. 
 
 12 See Harnack Dogmengeschichtt:^ i vol. Freiburg, "886, p. 300.
 
 *8 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 on the heathen Autolycus the ridicule he had cast on the 
 Christian teaching about God and the resurrection. In beauti- 
 ful language he describes how God can be known from the 
 works of creation, and how, as Creator, He can raise man to 
 life again. How noble the Christian story of Creation, when 
 contrasted with heathen absurdities 1 It is confirmed, more- 
 over, by the spirit of the prophets, and by its beneficent action 
 on the life of man. Holy Scripture is older than Manetho's 
 tradition of the Egyptians, and is a safer guide in doctrine and 
 precept than poetry or mythology. Lastly, he declares the 
 charge brought against the morality of Christian assemblies to 
 be false. With his wonted vigour, Tertullian, whose method is 
 to fell an adversary with hard blows rather than to win him 
 over by kindness, follows the same line of argument in his two 
 books Ad Nationes : De Idololatria and De testimonio aninut. 
 Minucius Felix, in his Octavius, which was probably written 
 before Tertullian's Apologeticum^ composes a dialogue, 
 modelled on the dialogues of Cicero, between Natalis Caecilius, 
 a heathen, and Octavius Januarius, a Christian, in which he 
 handles many of the more notable accusations brought against 
 the Christians. Thus, in answer to the charge of Christianity 
 being a new religion, owing its origin to rude and illiterate men, 
 he appeals to right reason, which justifies faith in God and con- 
 demns heathen folly. Tales about the scandalous lives of 
 Christians come with bad grace from the devotees of an 
 immoral mythology. It is precisely the doctrines, lives, and 
 hopes of Christians that call into being that wondrous stoic 
 virtue, which enables them to maintain inward peace even 
 amid the severest trials. S. Cyprian in his letter Ad Donatum, 
 and in his treatise De idolorum vanitate^ was also a worker in 
 this field of apology. In the former work he describes his 
 miserable state before his conversion, and his happiness after 
 baptism ; in the latter he walks in the footsteps of Minucius 
 Felix and Tertullian. 
 
 tt See Reck, Tktcl. Qtmrtalfck, 1886, p. 64 seq.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 9 
 
 In the second century, owing to the tactics of the Gnostics, 
 the Christian position was vigorously defended all along 
 the line. The chief errors of the Gnostics centred, indeed, 
 in the person of Christ, but were rooted in erroneous 
 notions as to the relations existing between God and the world, 
 light and darkness, truth and error, spirit and matter, good and 
 evil. With this triple dualism, metaphysical, anthropological, 
 and moral they sought to shake the two pillars of Christianity., 
 the doctrines of creation and redemption ; they established an 
 irreconcilable enmity between the Old Testament and the New; 
 they interpreted various books of the New Testament so as to 
 make them square with their system. Henceforward, the ques- 
 tion as to the origin of evil (unde malum) dominated all 
 controversy till S. Augustine, by his forcible assertion of the 
 existence of will in both man and God, drove Manichseism 
 from the field of science. Only by looking back on the 
 lowering waves of that intellectual flood, can we form a just 
 estimate of the moral energy and spiritual strength of Irenseus, 
 Tertullian, and Hippolytus. Christian foes of heathenish 
 descent were battering the foundations of faith ; the duty of 
 their defence fell to the apologists. This duty they owed 
 alike to themselves and to the general body of the faith- 
 ful. Thanks to their decisive triumph, the Christian Church, 
 at the close of the second century, had won, despite all attacks, 
 a position that commanded respect. 
 
 Once this position was made comparatively secure, Christian 
 Apology became invested with a higher, a more general, and a 
 more scientific character. The great Christian Fathers, who had 
 been formed in heathen schools, employed their talents, after 
 their conversion, in defending Christian truths from a general 
 scientific standpoint The above-named apologists are some- 
 times reproached with substituting Greek philosophy for faith, 
 and with stamping the Christian religion with a Greek 
 character. A still heavier reproach will be hurled at those 
 Fathers who aimed at building it up into a scientific system
 
 30 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 But the truth is that the utter inadequacy of philosophy had 
 driven the earliest apologists into the arms of Christianity. 
 The later apologists, being thrown among heathen philosophers, 
 were compelled to turn their adversaries' arms against them- 
 selves. Divine grace and the moral force of Christianity might 
 suffice for the individual conscience, until the work of reflection 
 began ; but when brought face to face with heathen wisdom, 
 these agencies needed supplementing by a deeper and more 
 philosophic unfolding of the faith. The need became still 
 greater when Celsus, Porphyry, Hierocles, and others, not 
 content with repeating the stock calumnies (no longer credited 
 even by the heathen), assailed Christianity as a religious system, 
 with all the weapons of philosophy. S. Paul's argument in 
 proof of the divinity of the Christian religion, that God had 
 chosen the foolish to confound the wise, was pounced upon by 
 the philosophers as a proof that Christianity was unreasonable 
 and deserving of contempt The danger was increased tenfold 
 when a philosopher mounted the imperial throne and strove, by 
 regenerating the heathen religion, to check the progress of 
 Christianity. And since Christianity contains within itself all 
 that is true in philosophy, and far transcends it in sublimity and 
 certitude, an excellent opportunity was afforded of testing the 
 value of Christianity as a spiritual power. Whilst fully recogni- 
 zing the good work done by philosophy, 1 * the Fathers pointed 
 out that its aim is to ennoble the outward rather than the 
 inward man, and that it can neither inspire right motives of 
 action, nor bring truth and virtue to bear upon eternal life. 
 This point is briefly demonstrated by Clement of Alexandria, 
 (d. 216) in his Cohortatio ad Grcecos. In the Stromata he 
 gives systematic shape to his views. He weaves, as it were, 
 a carpet of many colours, out of the threads of truth scattered 
 up and down Greek philosophy ; and these are united in one 
 web which is held together and made perfect by Christianity. 
 
 4 Daniel, D** itudet cbutifvtt, Freiburg, 1855. Pastor, Gttehichit dtr PfytU tm 
 Ztttmittr dtr Rt*tuisa*ct, p. 7 seq., Freiburg, 1866.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 3 1 
 
 The Xoyoi ffnepf^ariHol of the heathen are like solitary 
 stars shining in the dark heaven, and preparing for the 
 coming sun, the Christian Logos. As the Law was the 
 Jew's preparation for Christianity, so philosophy was the 
 heathen's. When faith and science are united, faith ad- 
 vances to true science, to Gnosis. Clement is a calm and 
 peaceful disputant, but his disciple Origen (d. 254), the 
 founder of Christian Theology, is decidedly aggressive. 
 
 About the year 180 A.D. appeared the " True Word" of 
 Celsus 16 a work containing every objection that can be 
 urged by Naturalism and Rationalism against Christianity. 
 In it, Celsus, in the person of a Jew, makes an all-round 
 scientific attack on the truths of Scripture, and on the his- 
 tory of Christianity. The necessity of an apology about 
 the year 249 shows that the work had stirred the Christian 
 world to its depths. Origen's eight books against Celsus 
 (only the " True Word" has come down to us) are the 
 weightiest and most comprehensive apology for Christian- 
 ity that ancient times produced. Of course, having before 
 his eyes the example of our Divine Lord standing silent 
 before the Sanhedrim and Pilate, Origen recognized the 
 truth of Christianity to be abundantly proved by its own in- 
 ward power, and by the lives of Christians ; nevertheless, 
 lest any one weak in faith* should be staggered by the 
 worldly wisdom of Celsus,f he accedes to the request of 
 Ambrose. Christian faith is not the renunciation of true 
 wisdom ; the Jewish origin of Christianity should not 
 militate against its teaching ; the lowly life of Jesus is no 
 argument against his divinity. The two Testaments con- 
 tain truths about creation and the angels, the resurrec- 
 tion, and the end of the world, which are far grander 
 than the dreams of Celsus. The name of Jesus is more 
 powerful than the whole heathen Pantheon. In spite of 
 hatred and calumny, in spite of persecution even unto 
 death, Christianity, now so much despised, will one day 
 
 15 Keim, Celsus' Wahres Wort. Aelteste Streitschrift, etc., 1873. Funk.T^^/. Quartal- 
 
 schrift, 1886, p. 302 sq. 
 * Rom. xiv. z. + Coloss. n. 8.
 
 32 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 become the dominant religion of the world. 
 
 Celsus was an eclectic Platonist, and nearly all the philo- 
 sophic assailants of Christianity in ancient times were re- 
 cruitedTrom the ranks of the Platonists. " Neoplatonism 
 and Christianity became, as it were, rival religions, with 
 Plotinus and Christ for their respective watchwords. How 
 far the Neo-Platonists, (Lactantius, Porphyry, Magnes and 
 Julian), utilized the "True Word," is a question of no in- 
 terest except in so far as it enables us to gauge the mischief 
 done by this first philosophic onslaught. Methodius of 
 Tyre, Apollinaris the Younger and others wrote against 
 Porphyry ; but their works as well as the fifteen books of 
 Porphyry are lost. Hierocles, an influential politician, and 
 governor of Bithynia (303) wrote a book called " Truthful 
 Words" (Xoyoi (pihaXrfdsis), to which Eusebius replied, 
 combating in particular the comparison Hierocles had 
 drawn between Apollonius and Christ. Then came Julian 
 the Apostate's ill-starred attempt to wrest the supremacy 
 from Christianity, by restoring a refined heathenism. His 
 prohibition to read the classics was a heavy blow to edu- 
 cated Christians, but it drove them to seek compensation 
 elsewhere. The dogged persistency with which the attack 
 was carried on may be seen from the Apology in eighteen 
 books (ten remain), written against Julian by Cyril of 
 Alexandria in the year 433. Notwithstanding Julian's pro- 
 test, Cyril and other apologists often retort on heathenism, 
 by showing how little right Julian had either to proceed 
 against Christianity as a conspiracy of Galileans in favour 
 of a human invention, or to hold up to ridicule the sacred 
 books whence all the world's wisdom, from Homer to 
 Porphyry, had been drawn, or to brand the Christian re- 
 ligion as fabulous, childish, irrational, and as the product 
 of a diseased brain. 
 
 Nothing was now wanting but a scientific victory over Ju- 
 daism and Heathenism to confirm and set a seal on the supre- 
 
 16 Losche, Zeitschrift fiir -wissensckaftlicke TJteologie, 1884, p. 257 seq.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. $3 
 
 macy of Christianity, which, since the days of Constantine, had 
 been officially recognized by the state. For this reason the 
 controversial element now begins to predominate in the 
 apologies. Hitherto Christians had been attacked and per- 
 secuted on all sides; now they sought not merely to retain 
 but also to consolidate and augment the possessions they 
 had won. To this period of transition belongs the Institutions 
 of Lactantius (307 310). By working on a basis at once 
 philosophical and religious, he essayed to bring the true 
 philosophy home to the educated, and the true religion to 
 the uneducated. In this way he hoped to convince un- 
 believers better than by quotations from Scripture. A great 
 deal is taken from Cicero's De Natura Deorum. Of this 
 systematic kind of apology Eusebius (d. 340) may be con- 
 sidered the father. Into his Praparatio Evangelica he has 
 condensed the quintessence of the history of religion, in order 
 to show that the new religion, sprung from Judaism, was 
 the legitimate outcome of all the religions that had gone 
 before, inasmuch as they prepared the way for it His 
 Demonstratio Evangelica is an historical demonstration that 
 the Christian religion is intrinsically true; it traces, too, the 
 real connection between Christianity and Judaism. This 
 external historic treatment, on which apologies continued to 
 be modelled, was supplemented by the more philosophic 
 method of S. Athanasius (d. 373), who proceeds to show, 
 the truth of Christianity from its central dogma. His Oratio 
 adversus Gentes is addressed more particularly to those among 
 the heathen, who looked upon the teaching of Christianity as 
 empty and irrational; the Oratio de Incarnatione Verbi gives 
 the scheme of redemption. In common with the Alexandrine 
 School he traces the founding of Christianity to the Logos,, 
 who was preparing the redemption of fallen man before he/ 
 took flesh (&sraQKOS), but accomplished it in the flesh' 
 (gyongicos), and thereby restored man's dignity. As the 
 divine nature of the Logos is resplendent from his miracles
 
 34 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 and character, so the divinity of Christianity is seen from its 
 effects on society and on the lives of individuals. The 
 apologetic activity of this period ceases with Theodoret's 
 Cutatio affectionum Gracorum in twelve books. With the 
 aid of previous Greek apologetic literature he strove to dispel 
 the many prejudices of the heathen; and he brought together 
 all the points of excellence that elevate Christian faith and 
 morals above worldly wisdom. Even then it could be said 
 with truth: "the Greeks seek after wisdom."* 
 
 As far back as the days of Minucius Felix and Tertullian, 
 Christians had been accused of being the cause of the mis- 
 fortunes that befel the Roman empire. The more rapidly 
 the heathen world was hastening on to its destruction, the more 
 vehemently these charges were preferred. They seemed, more- 
 over, to be justified by the fact that the feebleness of the 
 empire and its approaching disruption became more and 
 more evident after the State had recognized Christianity. 
 From the conduct of the Christians, the older apologists had 
 proved the charge to be unwarranted in particular cases; 
 now it became necessary to review, from a Christian stand- 
 point, the course of the history of the empire and of the 
 whole world, in its entirety; to show the finger of divine 
 providence guiding events that seemed due to chance ; and 
 to show that moral corruption was the real cause of decline. 
 This task was undertaken by Arnobius, Orosius, and Augustine. 
 Arnobius (d. about 325), who from an enemy had become a 
 champion of Christianity, probably wrote his Disputationes 
 adversus nationes in the early years of the fourth century. 
 The first book only is devoted to refuting the charges just 
 detailed; the other books are apologetic and controversial in 
 a more general sense. In them Arnobius displays a better 
 knowledge of heathen mysteries than of the Christian religion. 
 As idolaters made the Christian religion answerable for the 
 
 i. Cor. i. M.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 35 
 
 destruction of Rome by Alaric (410 A.D.), 17 the Spaniard 
 Orosius undertook, on the advice of S. Augustine, to write 
 an historical defence of Christianity. But Augustine's specula- 
 tive mind was not satisfied with looking at the question 
 merely from without. He took the task in hand himself 
 and accomplished it in a masterly manner in his great book 
 De Civitate Dei, written between 413 and 427. The title 
 itself indicates the point of view he takes. In the first ten 
 books he proves that the heathen Roman empire was utterly 
 incapable of making its citizens externally or internally happy. 
 A plurality of gods does not tend to promote happiness on 
 earth (1-5); idolatry can offer no compensation in the next 
 world for the inevitable evils of the present life (6-10). In 
 the twelve following books Christianity, as the city of God, 
 is contrasted, in its foundation and development, with the 
 empire of the world. The book concludes with the prophecy 
 that no power shall prevail against the Church. This part 
 of the work, as it advances, grows into a beautiful Christian 
 theology, and, as a whole, makes such a powerful impression 
 on the mind of the reader, that he unconsciously glides over 
 the weak points that occur here and there in the argument 
 In the great march of the world's history S. Augustine 
 recognized what he had felt so deeply in his own life. His 
 own life is a condemnation of heathen religion and philosophy, 
 an apology for the victorious power inherent in Christian grace 
 and truth, and a proof of the wonderful ways of divine love. 
 This is the only beacon of light visible to the believing enquirer 
 amid the darkness and turmoil of the world's history. With- 
 out divine Providence history seems an entangled skein of 
 contradictions; in the light of that Providence it is the divine 
 education of mankind. 
 
 It forms no part of an apologetic history to narrate the 
 many struggles in which the Church was engaged: struggles 
 with Arians, Nestorians and Monophysites which shattered 
 
 j Rettaqutiones xx. 43.
 
 36 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 the Eastern, and inflicted considerable injury on the West- 
 ern Church ; struggles with the Donatists in Africa, which 
 imperilled the unity of the Church ; struggles with ration- 
 alists who were laying siege to the Christian citadel of 
 grace. These strifes within the Church, however, may not 
 be altogether passed over, because they contributed in no 
 small measure to paralyse the power of faith and weaken 
 the Christian empire, and thus to clear the way in Africa 
 and the East for a still more dangerous foe, Islam. With 
 the advent of Islam our second period opens. 
 
 In the interval science had been wholly occupied in com- 
 pleting the doctrinal fabric of Christianity. Mohammed's 
 appearance on the scene and the swift conquests made by 
 Islam were a signal to Christian Communities to cease war- 
 ring with one another and to unite for the defence of the 
 common weal. Judaism was in alliance with Islam. Both 
 professed a rigid monotheism and rejected the Incarnation. 
 Both were swayed by a certain oriental naturalism. An 
 inveterate hatred of the Christian Church was ingrained 
 in both. But while Judaism fought Christianity with sci- 
 entific weapons, Islam employed brute force and an appeal 
 to sensuality, which last element has always played a 
 prominent part in Greek and Eastern religions. Schools 
 of learning were established in Spain and Persia for the 
 purpose of maintaining and giving scientific strength to 
 the ground already won ; but they were of a later date. 
 
 As Islam and Judaism externally came to an end in 
 Spain in 1492, the close of the fifteenth century would 
 seem to be a correct boundary line. It must, however, 
 be fixed somewhat earlier owing to the long period taken 
 up with the internal intellectual struggle. In the East 
 the case was otherwise. In 1453 the Turks took Con- 
 stantinople, and continued to press onward to the West. 
 The fall of the Greek Church and the Eastern Empire 
 were concomitants of the Turkish advance. Attempts 
 at union had been unable to prevent the fall of Con- 

 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 37 
 
 stantinople. At that time the Western Church was also in 
 a state of ferment. The Renascence and religious differ- 
 ences had in many ways shaken the Christian Church to its 
 foundations. The character of the fifteenth century is 
 stamped by the Councils of Reform. If to this we add that 
 the horizon of ecclesiastical science had been greatly en- 
 larged by the discovery of America, and of the sea route 
 to India, it will be seen that there are ample grounds for 
 fixing the end of this period at this point. It is also clear 
 from history that in this period, more than in any other, 
 the Western Church, and the Roman Church in particular, 
 constituted the great bulwark of Christianity against the in- 
 cursions of its foes, whether from within or from without. 
 The schism, by which the Greeks severed themselves from 
 the universal Church, had no small share in bringing about 
 the spiritual and temporal decline of the Eastern Empire. 
 For it was the power and vigour of the Church that had 
 barred the onset of barbarians and the fanaticism of Islam. 
 The minds of the faithful were so deeply saturated with a 
 sense of the Church's power that even apologists drew from 
 i* their arguments, and cared little for proofs from history 
 and philosophy. But a new order of things set in with 
 the Reformation, which called in question the entire consti- 
 tution of the visible Church. Thus apologetic science re- 
 ceived a new direction. The Council of Trent, which util- 
 ized the results of the science of the Middle Ages to de- 
 fine the faith of the Church, has laid the groundwork of 
 Catholic Apologetics. 
 
 To judge by the numerous apologies levelled at Juda- 
 ism, it must be conceded that it was a living power even 
 at this period. Naturally the Christian argument cul- 
 minated in the proof that the Messias had already come, 
 and that the Law was abrogated. As, however, Jewish 
 doctrines and precepts were now codified in the Talmud 
 (which served as a guide to exegesis), and as, moreover, 
 the Jews regarded their mystic traditions embodied in the 
 Cabbala as a set-off against the mysteries of Christianity,
 
 38 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 the task of Anti- Jewish apologists was rendered proportionately 
 heavier, A fine opportunity was likewise afforded for the use 
 of irony and ridicule, in which, too, the older writers had not 
 been wanting. The brunt of the battle fell on the West From 
 the East should be mentioned Gregentius of Taphra in the 
 sixth century, Leontius of Cyprus in the seventh, Anastasius in 
 the ninth or tenth, and the Emperor Andronicus Commenius in 
 the fourteenth. 18 In Syriac and Arabic, it is true, there grew 
 up a rich controversial and apologetic literature around the 
 quarrels in which Jacobites, Nestorians, and Melchites engaged 
 among themselves, and in which these three sects made 
 common cause against Jews and Mohammedans. But this 
 literature is even now little known. The work of the Metro- 
 politan Elias of Nisibis, (d. about 1049) to prove the truth of 
 faith, has recently been translated into German. The first part is 
 devoted to refuting the doctrines of Mohammedans and Jews. 
 In the West a defence of Christianity was rendered especially 
 needful by the learning of the Spanish Jews, whose influence 
 spread to France and Italy. The name of Isidore of Sevile (d. 
 636), the most illustrious writer of the seventh century, towers 
 above all others. Although himself only a compiler, his works 
 have been greatly requisitioned by later writers. In his De fide 
 Catholica adversus Judceos, he appealed to the Old Testament. 
 Agobard of Lyons (876), in his pamphlet, De Judaicis super- 
 stitionibus, was the first to refer to the Talmud. We have only 
 space to mention the bare names of Rab. Maurus, Gilbert of 
 Westminster, Rupert of Deutz, Peter the Venerable, Walter of 
 Chatillon, and Nicholas of Lyra. 
 
 The apologetic writings of Jewish converts are of special 
 importance, because their authors had been educated in the 
 learning of the Talmud, and were familiar with the life of the 
 Jews. They were most competent to refute the charge made 
 even now by modern Jews, that " the Church of the Middle 
 
 I Di*!egus Ckriitiatti cum Judft. First printed at Basle, 1543. Horst, Dtt 
 Mttrt*Kttn Elias von Niriki* Sue* vom JSfWfU tUr W*krheit da 
 Utttrtttxt mud EvtgtltiUt. Colmar, 1886*
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 39 
 
 Ages was compelled to combat and to destroy the Jews because 
 their whole existence was a silent protest against her doctrines." 
 It is well known that many commentators of the Middle Ages, 
 e.g. Nicholas of Lyra, sat at the feet of Jewish instructors, and 
 studied Jewish commentaries. Conspicuous among Jewish 
 converts, including Samuel of Morocco, Peter Alphonsus and 
 Hermann of Cologne, was Josue Burki, Private Physician to 
 the schismatical Pope Benedict XIII. (Peter de Luna). After 
 he became a Christian he went by the name of Hieronymus a 
 Sancfa Fide. In 1413 he held a series of discussions with the 
 Rabbis at Tortosa, many of whom were converted. One of the 
 unconverted rabbis published a controversial work, in which he 
 explained that all matters were of secondary importance, except 
 the unity of God, the divine origin of the Mosaic law, and the 
 doctrine of future rewards and punishments. In reply, 
 Hieronymus wrote two books : Contra Judaorum Perfidiam et 
 Talmud. His blows were aimed at two points : the Jew's vain 
 hope of a Messias, and his belief in the perpetuity of the law. 
 He passed severe strictures on Jewish exegesis, chiefly on 
 account of its narrow exclusiveness in adhering to the letter, 
 and in killing every spiritual meaning found even in the 
 Talmud. In conclusion, he gave a collection of the foolish and 
 repulsive contents of the Talmud. The rabbis made a savage 
 onslaught on the book. Isaac Abravanel, (d. 1508), the most 
 distinguished Jewish savant of the fifteenth century, entered the 
 lists against it. Another convert and learned commentator, 
 Paul of Burgos (d. 1437), walked in the footsteps of Hierony- 
 mus, in a work entitled Dialogus Sauli et Pauli contra Judozos. 
 Galatinus, the Italian Friar Minor, also a convert, likewise 
 wrote an apology against the Jews. Contemporary with or 
 subsequent to him were Pfefierkorn, Victor a Carbe, Paul 
 Weidner, Paul Ricci, Paul Elhanon, Christian Gerson. 19 
 The East was the first to be summoned to do battle with 
 
 fff See the literature in Werner : GtscMchte dtr apolog. und polem. Literatur, p. 76. 
 Schaff hausen, 1861. Karpelcs. Gtschicktt dtr i$d. Litiratttr. Berlin, 1*56, 
 p. 640 seq.
 
 40 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 Islam. The Eastern Church and State, as described above, 
 were not in a condition favourable to a contest. Often the 
 sects hated one another and orthodox Christians, more fiercely 
 than they disliked the unbeliever. Hence it not unfrequently 
 happened that they wasted all their shafts on Christians, while 
 commending Mohammedans for their toleration, and merely 
 instructing them in the Trinity and other doctrines. It would 
 not be difficult to show that the triumph of the new religion was 
 due neither to its want of external credentials, nor to its fatalism, 
 nor to its moral degradation of woman, nor to religious 
 conviction, but to sheer brute force and sensuality. 
 John Damascene's (d. 756) work, Disceptatio Saraceni et 
 Christiani stamped him as the chief apologist of his time. 
 He was succeeded by his disciple, Theodore Abukara. Of 
 later writers, Samonas of Gaza and John Kantakuzenus, are 
 worthy of mention. The danger did not threaten the West till 
 later. Peter the Venerable (d. 1156), the learned Abbot of 
 Clugny, in his work, Adversus nefandam sectam Saracenorum, 
 was the first Western apologist to take the field. A number of 
 scholastics followed in his wake. Some defended Christianity 
 directly against the Mohammedans, others against Jews and 
 Mohammedans conjointly, others again against unbelievers 
 generally. It is then no exaggeration to say that both patristic 
 literature and scholasticism were called into being by the neces- 
 sity of vindicating the faith. 
 
 1 S. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo proves how loudly men were 
 clamouring in his day for a stern scientific enquiry into the 
 fundamental questions of Christianity. By branding as guilty of 
 negligence the man who did not strive to render to himself and 
 others an account of his faith, the saint plainly declared that the 
 need of an apology is created both by the progressive develop- 
 ment of religion, and by the attacks of infidelity. The very 
 method was forced on apologists by their opponents. The 
 supremacy of Aristotelianism in scholastic philosophy and 
 theology, was owing to the mighty influence wielded by the
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 41 
 
 Moorish and Jewish philosophy in Spain, France, and Italy. 
 Averroism was unbelief disguised as philosophy. Aristotle first 
 came under the notice of Christian teachers in an infidel dress. 
 For this reason the Church at first forbade the reading of his 
 works. Hence arose the necessity of christianizing Aristotle. 
 The chief works of S. Thomas, Albertus Magnus, William of 
 Occam, and others, were translated into Hebrew. 
 
 No one will call in question the apologetic tendency of 
 Scholasticism, who is aware to what an extent even the 
 theological works of the schoolmen are devoted to refuting the 
 Arabian and Jewish philosophers of the time. These refuta- 
 tions are of course mostly found in their philosophic writings j 
 still, the real positive answer is given in the theological summas 
 which present the whole body of Christian doctrine in a system- 
 atized form. Ab uno disce omnes. The two Summas of S. 
 Thomas will sufficiently illustrate the character of the whole 
 class. In the Summa Contra Gentiles the entire Christian 
 revelation is his theme. The first book treats of God, the 
 second of creation, the third of the end and purpose of the 
 universe, the fourth of redemption by Christ. But the method 
 is essentially different from that which obtains in the theological 
 summas. Error had to be combatted by reason, because 
 heathens and Mohammedans do not admit the authority of 
 Holy Scripture. By starting from the principle that reason and 
 revelation must be in agreement, since God is the author of 
 both, he sets apologists a pattern to work upon. The distinc- 
 tion between fatprceambulafidciandi the motiva credibilitatis only 
 means that reason prepares the way for revelation, and shows its 
 credibility. It naturally resulted from the philosophic method 
 that in the first two parts, which stand to one another in the 
 relation of analysis and synthesis, too much attention was 
 bestowed on the formal condition of being, on movens mobile and 
 movens immobile, and that the natura rerum was proportion- 
 ately neglected. But, even in this undue estimate of the formal 
 element, S. Thomas has been largely followed by apologists. .
 
 42 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 At the suggestion of the Kings of Arragon and Castille, 
 Raymund of Pennafort (d. 1275), a man indefatigable in 
 labouring for the conversion of the Moors, in order to train 
 up a race of apologists, established schools for the study 
 of Oriental languages in all the cities of Spain, in which 
 the Moorish population had the upper hand. In the year 
 1250, Raymund Martini, one of the first students sent by 
 the Chapter of Toledo to prosecute these studies, wrote 
 Pugio fidei adversus Mauros et Judaos. The work was so 
 biting that to this very day the Jews label it " Poison." 
 Galatinus, who has been already mentioned, used it largely 
 in his Arcana veritatis catholiccs. The Dominicans, Savona- 
 rola and Turrecremata, also championed the faith against 
 Mohammedanism. The eleventh Canon of the Council 
 of Vienna (1311) decreed : That in the interests of Scrip- 
 ture Exegesis, and to promote the conversion of unbelievers, 
 professors of Hebrew, Arabic, and Chaldaic, two professors 
 to each language, be appointed in Rome, and in the Schools 
 of Paris, Oxford, Bologna, and Salamanca. At this time 
 appeared the Propugnaculum fidei adversus deliramenta Alco- 
 rani, by the Franciscan Ricold. Another Franciscan, Al- 
 phonsus de Spina, a convert from Judaism, published a 
 valuable work : Fortalitium fidei contra Judaos, Saracenos, 
 aliosque Christiana fidei inimicos. The apologist ranks were 
 swelled by Dionysius the Carthusian, Petro de la Cavalleria, 
 Andreas (Abdallah), Cardinal Cusa and others. Their 
 works were collected and published by Bibliander and Syl- 
 burg. M Deserving of special notice is the work of the cele- 
 brated Orientalist, Guadagnoli," 1 written, by order of Urban 
 VIII. as a rejoinder to the reply of a Persian. Politius 
 Speculum appeared against the Verum Speculum of a Span- 
 iard. The conversion of the Persian was the result. 
 
 The improvement in the relations between East and West, 
 
 Syntagma scriptorum anti-muhameticorum. Basil, 1543. Saracenica s. Moham- 
 edica, Heidelberg, 1595. 
 
 Apologia pro Christiana religiont arabice et latine adv. objectiones Achmed ben Zin 
 Altitiit Asaphensis Persee contentas in libra "Politius Speculum''' quod aureis 
 scriptum literis inisit ad Urbanuin VIII, ut et rtsponderi curaret, Romae, 1631.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 43 
 
 which had been effected by the Crusades, had the further 
 result of making the literature of Ancient Greece better 
 known in the West, especially in Italy ; and this literature 
 grew in importance as the Greek empire was approaching to 
 its dissolution. A multitude of scholars, laden with rich 
 literary treasures, fled to Italy, and there propagated the 
 Greek language and literature. Peurbach and Regiomon- 
 tanus were initiated in the mysteries of Greek by Bessarion. 
 Nicholas Cusa mastered ancient science in Italy, and ap- 
 plauded Nicholas V., with whom Humanism mounted the 
 chair of St. Peter, for the zeal he had displayed in opening 
 up the rich mines of Greek antiquity. Copernicus studied 
 Greek in Italy, and, in all probability, Greek literature 
 also. In the cultured circles of Italy more honour was 
 paid to classic philology and to Plato, its noblest repre- 
 sentative, than even to the schools of mathematics and as- 
 tronomy, which were the pioneers of the Copernican sys- 
 tem. Dante, with Aristotle for his master in science, and 
 Vergil as his guide in reason, always traverses the theo- 
 logical ground trodden by S. Thomas. 
 
 Not so, however, Petrarch and Boccaccio, the founders 
 of the Renascence. In them the Renascence branches off 
 into a forked road, the one prong being heathen, the other 
 Christian. Petrarch held fast to the principles of the 
 Church. He set greater store by Christian truth than by 
 the wisdom of the ancients, and entered the arena as its 
 apologist. If he himself yielded to sensual passion, his 
 poetry, at least, was free from frivolity and lasciviousness. 
 He and Boccaccio stand in polar antithesis. Although not 
 an unbeliever, Boccaccio had broken loose from his Chris- 
 tian training, and cast moral obligations to the winds ; and 
 he plunged his readers into the slough of heathen sensual- 
 ity. His most piquant scorn was reserved for the clergy. 
 After his conversion he deplored his errors, and warned 
 people against reading his books." 
 
 It was natural that the sensual school should gradually 
 
 32 Pastor I.e., p. j seq.
 
 44 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 gain the upper hand. The scientific method then in 
 vogue, and the state of politics, gave it an additional 
 attractiveness. It was not in the nature of old Italians 
 to break with the Church or Christianity ; but the attack 
 on fotm, which Humanism was justified in leading, was 
 sure, gooner or later, to rebound on the substance. The 
 Humanist's sense of fine form was shockeu uy the rough work 
 of the later degenerate Scholasticism. Refined philosophic 
 thought would no longer blend in harmony with rigid defini- 
 tions, or barren conceptions, or the fruitless hair-splitting of 
 garrulous dialecticians. The new scientific and literary school 
 turned aside not only from Aristotelianism, but very often from 
 belief also. Its rule of life was naturalistic and epicurean. 
 Valla, in his work " On Pleasure," gives a picture of this 
 school. It extolled Epicureanism above Stoicism and Christ- 
 ianity, and put nature almost on a level with God. The con- 
 sequence to faith and the life of the Church he himself has 
 elsewhere described. Here was an opening for apologists to 
 accommodate themselves to their antagonists' method of attack. 
 It would have been futile and foolish to attempt to bolster up 
 the old form in all its crudeness. Humanism had already 
 taken hold of the educated classes. Progress in culture and 
 science were emblazoned on its banner, and it could appeal to 
 such Fathers as Basil and Gregory Nazianzen to justify its 
 appreciation of ancient culture. 
 
 The Heathen and the Christian Renascence grew up side by 
 side. Thus Marsilius Ficinus 28 (b. 1433), tne restorer of 
 Platonism, and the idolatrous admirer of Plato, tried to explain 
 and defend Christian revelation in a Platonic sense. Yet he 
 could not completely shake off the Aristotelian influence of the 
 mediaeval schools, and in Christian doctrine he often closely 
 followed S. Thomas. His disciple, Pico of Mirandala, sought 
 to enlist both Platonism and Aristotelianism in the service of 
 
 3 Di rtligiont Ckrittiama. it fidti fieta.it ad Laurtntium litdict*. 1478. Voetfl 
 1500. ParUiUijux Pico wrote Htfmflitt and Dt t*t tt MM.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 45 
 
 Christianity. To a knowledge of Platonic philosophy he 
 united wide linguistic and historical accomplishments. To 
 vindicate Christianity on historical grounds was his aim. 
 In substance, he argued, Christianity is as old as religion 
 and man. All the truth in non-christian religions is derived 
 from Christianity. He quoted largely from the Kabbala, 
 which, according to Molitor, obtained its collection of essen- 
 tial Christian dogmas from Jewish and pre-christian tradi- 
 tion. Eugubenus Steuchus and William Postellus took up 
 the same line of argument. Savonarola's (d. 1498) work, 
 Triumphus cruets contra sceculi sapientes, was more practical 
 in character. The Spaniard, Raymund of Sabunda (about 
 i436) 84 treated the question from the scientific side, and 
 constructed, on Baconian principles, a system of natural 
 theology, which was at the same time scholastic in form. 
 His knowledge of natural science was extensive, and his 
 theological learning immense ; by fusing the two he sought 
 to explain Christian doctrines by God's revelation in na- 
 ture. The book of nature has been given to all men with- 
 out distinction, and offers them infallible truth through the 
 medium of their external and internal experience ; the book 
 of Holy Scripture was given to man in the second place, 
 because he could no longer read the book of nature. The 
 same tendency to blend natural science and revealed truth 
 into a system of mystic theology is manifested by Nicholas 
 Cusa (d. 1464). 
 
 The most illustrious apologist of the time was Louis Vives 
 (d. 1540). He was born in 1492 at Valencia in Spain, and 
 studied at Paris. The dialectic squabbles provoked by the 
 Nominalists made him a sworn enemy of Scholasticism. At 
 Louvain he became skilled in all the learning of Humanism, 
 and employed his newly acquired scientific and literary at- 
 tainments to wage war on Scholasticism. As he only knew it 
 
 24 Liber creaturarum sive de homine. Later editions have put for a title the introduc- 
 tion of the Prologue censured by Clement VIII : Theologia naturalis s. liber crea- 
 turarum^ specialiter de homine et de natura ejus in quantum homo, et de his yua 
 sunt ei necessaria ad cognoscendum teipsum et Deum et omne debitum.
 
 46 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 in its degeneracy, his judgment is, of necessity, one-sided 
 and unjust. His one-sidedness was censured even by 
 Melchior Canus, who himself severely condemned scholastic 
 abuses. His work against Henry VIII. showed that he had 
 no intention of battling against the ancient faith itself as 
 well as its form. His apology is evidence of his zeal and 
 ability in defending Christian truth. To intellectual refine- 
 ment and clear judgment he united elegance of style. 26 
 Intimacy with Erasmus brought him in contact with German 
 Humanism. Humanism was late in entering Germany, but 
 Germany revolted against positive belief more rapidly than other 
 countries. While the older Humanism brought about a 
 justifiable reaction against the methods in vogue, the new 
 Humanism turned its arms against faith and morals. It was 
 essentially the forerunner of the Reformation. From this time 
 forward the defenders of Christianity had to take into account 
 the change in taste and the new intellectual movement 
 Nicholas Cusa, Pierre d'Ailly, and John Gerson, are instances 
 in point. Although the Loci Thcologid of Melchior Canus was 
 written a little later, still its method, coupled with its half- 
 hearted defence of scholastic theology, proves that the influence 
 of Humanism had compelled great minds to adopt a more 
 serviceable method in theology and apologetics. This was 
 particularly the case in exegesis, criticism, and archaeology. 
 The Reformers took advantage of the movement set on foot by 
 Erasmus and Cajetan and made it serve their turn. Thus the 
 Council of Trent was induced to fix dogmatically the Canon of 
 Scripture. In the matter of nature and grace, sin and free-will, 
 the Council defined the old doctrine with a luminous precision 
 that at once widened the apologists' range of vision, and laid 
 sure foundations for his science to rest on. 
 
 The Reformers made but scanty contributions to apologetic 
 cience. They were far more anxious to purchase faith at the 
 
 5 His work Dt vtritatt fidti Christiana II. 5. Bas. 1543 was, in accordance with his 
 wish, dedicated by his widow to Paul III. It contains (i) de homing tt deo, (?) dt 
 Jnu Christo, de Trinitate. (3) Dialogus inter Christianum tt Judacutx, (4) 
 Oialogut inttr Ckriilianum it (/Alfaquium
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 47 
 
 price of free-will, and to array theology in opposition to philosophy. 
 Hence, any scientific exposition, even on the most unpretend- 
 ing scale, was at first neither feasible nor desirable. Their 
 biblical criticism, in like manner, was not scientific but dog- 
 matic, and itself rather called for criticism and required an 
 apology. Not only did they solemnly renounce all demonstra- 
 tion and proof of the Christian faith, but they anathematized 
 every attempt to give an account of its contents as 
 scholastic quibbling. The later Humanists went so far as 
 to allow that faith and reason were in conflict, but with 
 the important proviso that faith was to remain in possession. 
 The axiom of later scholastics, that a thing may at once be true 
 in theology and false in philosophy was shorn of its absurdity, 
 when philosophy was put out of court. Melancthon, however, 
 was more far-sighted. He soon bethought him of the 
 rights of reason, remained an Aristotelian, and strove 
 to establish a connection between theology and human 
 science. Zwingli might rank by his side, did not his 
 shallow explanation of Christian truth, and his subversion of 
 the idea of grace rob all apology, at the outset, of its value. 
 For this very reason, the Reformers were all the more 
 instrumental in aiding the development of Catholic apologetics. 
 The rights of reason, the truth of Tradition, authority, and the 
 integrity of Holy Scripture are, it is true, immediately con- 
 nected with dogma, but in their character of fundamental 
 principles they are the property of the apologist. Now, as in 
 the fourth and fifth centuries, theology moved chiefly in the 
 shere of controversy, while apologetics were swallowed up in 
 polemics. Suffice it to say that the entire theology on both 
 sides was laid under contribution. It is hardly worth while 
 mentioning names, but we may recall such names as Andrada, 
 Bellarmine, Gretser, Ebermann, Stapleton, Becanus, Suarez. 
 Catholics, moreover, at this period, were wont to identify 
 pologetics with polemics. 
 
 The later Scholastics, who flourished chiefly in Spain, COD
 
 48 ( HISTORY OF APOLOGETICI 
 
 i 
 tinued to defend the faith speculatively and philosophically. 
 
 In Spain and elsewhere the progress of biblical criticism 
 helped to stimulate the conversion of the Jews. Sixtus of 
 Siena, himself a converted Jew, laid the foundation of a 
 scientific introduction to the Bible. There is a classical pass- 
 age in the Loci Theologici in which Melchior Canus gives an 
 exposition of the main questions and method of apologetics. 
 The arguments on which Theology rests are authority and 
 reason: authority in the van, reason in the rear (pedissequa) 
 Proof of faith is impossible, but arguments from reason are 
 valuable for leading unbelievers to the faith, and for strengthen- 
 ing the faith of them that believe. The theologian's first duty 
 is to explain clearly the teaching of Scripture and Tradition ; 
 the second, to defend the faith against heretics ; the third, to 
 illustrate and confirm, as far as may be, the teaching of Christ 
 and the Church from natural science. The new-born zeal 
 for establishing missions in India and America contributed 
 largely to the cultivation of apologetics against unbelievers. 
 
 For many years all the energy of Protestants was absorbed 
 in controversies with Rome and one another. The first 
 Protestant apologist of note was Philip de Mornay who, in 
 the midst of his campaigns against the Catholic Church, con- 
 trived to find leisure to defend Christianity against the attacks 
 of unbelievers. Excepting only Andreas Abdalla, whose work 
 first appeared in Spain, de Mornay was the first to write an 
 apology in the vernacular. 36 It may have been this circumstance 
 that gained for his apology, written in a truly humanistic 
 spirit, unbounded applause. But the conciliatory apology of 
 Grotius 87 obtained the greatest celebrity. Grotius was a man 
 of many parts, a scholar of extensive erudition, classical and 
 cultured, at once blunt and gentle. He had been cast into 
 prison as a remonstrant for conscience sake. It was here he 
 
 6 L+ vJriU de la rtligio* ckrftunnt. Anven, 1859. 
 
 7 ZV mtritmtt rKgionit Chrittiana. Lugd. Bat. 1*27 Labhadie, S*r la vtriU di / 
 
 religion ckrititntu. Rotterdam, 1864. Pascal, fmtlu ntr I* rtOfi** tt fmtiftm 
 
 attire t tttjtu. Paris, 1669.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 49 
 
 wrote his apology, which was translated into many languages. 
 In reality the work was only a resetting of an existing book 
 of instruction, written in verse, and intended for sailors. By 
 falling back on antiquity and laying stress on what was 
 universal and Catholic he hoped to win his readers to the 
 one Christian Church. For this reason, at the outset, he built 
 a wall of separation between dogma and apology, and confined 
 himself to the one question : "What can give man rest, comfort 
 and joy during his life on earth, and open out to him a happy 
 prospect in the dark and endless future." The first book treats 
 of God, creation, and miracles; the second of Christ, and 
 the excellence of the Christian religion ; the third of Holy 
 Scripture. Books IV., V., and VI., deal with heathenism, 
 Judaism, and Mohammedanism. He bases his proof more 
 on reason and history than on inward experience. The dog- 
 matic parts of Grotius' Apology were continued and completed 
 by Jacob Labaddie. 
 
 On the Catholic side, Daniel Huet, the collaborateur of the 
 illustrious Bossuet, in his classical work Demonstratio Evan- 
 gelica* applied the exact method to the historical proof for the 
 Old and New Testaments. Unlike Grotius he treated the 
 Messianic prophecies as direct, but drew no argument from the 
 intrinsic value and character of Christianity. Like Grotius, 
 however, whose plan and arrangement he kept steadily in view, 
 he conceived that all the heathen religions before Christ had 
 sprung out of the Mosaic dispensation. Thus he is a pioneer 
 of French Traditionalism. 
 
 Pascal, renowned alike as a mathematician, a powerful 
 thinker, and a brilliant master of style, has, in his unfinished 
 Ptns'ecs, enshrined profound thoughts in the guise of aphorism. 
 In his day so great was the homage paid to antiquity, even in 
 matters on which its judgment was least trustworthy, that men 
 appealed to it as an oracle, against whose decision there was no 
 appeal, for every idea, absurdity, or mystery. To such an excess 
 
 Paru, 16*9.
 
 50 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 was this reverence carried, that the mere text of an ancient 
 author was held to outweigh the strongest arguments. Pas- 
 cal was dissatisfied. He was far from rejecting the author- 
 ity of history, but he wished to secure to reason its rights. 
 With keenness of mind and largeness of heart he insists 
 that Christianity has proved a priceless boon to man. But, 
 at the same time, he does not depreciate the value of the 
 external method of proof from the history of the Church 
 and of revelation. Taking man in his present state, with 
 his many contrarieties of thought and will, he shows that 
 no one of the various philosophic sects, nor of the many re- 
 ligions that have existed in all ages, and among all peoples, 
 can satisfy man's desire a desire that grows with his self- 
 knowledge to sift the questions that have reference to his 
 origin and end. Holy Scripture alone can supply the de- 
 sired answer. Its doctrine of creation solves the problem 
 of the beginning and end of things, and its doctrine of the 
 fall casts a lurid light on the misery of sin and the needs of 
 life. But the value of Holy Scripture is enhanced a hun- 
 dred-fold in our eyes, when we see that it alone makes the 
 essence of religion consist in loving the God whom we adore. 
 Such an exalted ideal we seek elsewhere in vain. It is God 
 Himself who disposes and predicts redemption. The New 
 Testament pourtrays the Son of God made man in such 
 unadorned language, and with such simple and yet strik- 
 ing imagery, that only God could unite so much sublimity 
 with such depths of humiliation. From the Church and the 
 Apostles, Christian truth derived still further confirmation. 
 This masterly exposition was not so much intended to work 
 on the understanding as to captivate the heart with a 
 moral proof. For Pascal knew well that the contending 
 passions in the heart are a more formidable obstacle to re- 
 ligion than intellectual doubt. Once a man recognises his 
 own wretchedness, he will sigh for a Redeemer, and find him. 
 Like Pascal, Louis Bastide considered Christian belief to be 
 most completely assured by the fulfilment of the prophe- 
 cies contained in the Bible. As, however, the critical
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 51 
 
 method of Grotras and Richard Simon seemed to pat this 
 argument in jeopardy, Bakus entered the lists against both, and, 
 at the same time, Bossuet came forward as the champion of the 
 Fathers and Tradition against R. Simon. 
 
 Humanism had set the ball rolling and, as soon as circum- 
 stances were favourable, the principle of subjectivity gave it 
 another push forward. The authority of the Bible itself could 
 not for long hold its ground against rationalistic doubt. The 
 principal attack on revelation, and the historical foundations on 
 which it rested, proceeded from the Arminian and Socinian 
 theologians of the latter half of the seventeenth century. The 
 doctrine of grace, our Lord's divinity, and the entire super- 
 natural order were called in question. Platonic philosophy, in its 
 influence on the Fathers of the Church, was discovered to be the 
 source of Christian truths, the very theory now being broached 
 by a serm-rationalistrc school of theology. Against the accusa- 
 tions framed by Whitby, Lederc, and Souverain, the Jesuit 
 Baltus 28 pleaded the cause of the Fathers, and explained at 
 some length the relations in which they stood to heathen philo- 
 sophy and morality. Barbeyraes impugned the morality of the 
 Fathers; Remy Ceillier, Buddeus, Staudlin, and others took 
 up the cudgelson their behalf. Protestants tried to make peace. 
 The morality of Christianity and the Church became the next 
 arena of strife. Thus the way was clear for the inroads of 
 scepticism which, being in itself irreligious, speedily declared 
 war to the knife against Christianity. Bayle and Spinoza 
 opened fire; Bayle contending that reason could not possibly be 
 convinced of revelation or fed its moral force, Spinoza rejecting 
 belief in revelation as inconceivable. In England, distracted by 
 many revolutions in Church and State, Deism was striking its 
 roots deeply and firmly. Hobbes, Herbert of Cherbury, 
 Shaftesbury, Blount, Bolingbroke, and Payne laboured of set 
 purpose to undermine religion. Others, shrinkiag from ex- 
 
 8 Defense (Us SS. Peres accuses de Platonlsme. Paris, 1711. Under another titk : 
 P*rcte du Ckristianistnc ov It Christianize n'a nien tm^ritntt it la philotffhit 
 Lyon, 1838. Cfr. Werner, I.e. 5, i seq.
 
 5 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 treme measures, denied supernatural religion, only to set up in 
 its place a pure abstraction, to wit, the lifeless skeleton called 
 natural religion, a fictitious collection of natural truths which 
 goes by the name of Naturalism or Deism. Deists, such as 
 Toland, characterised Christianity as superstition ; others, like 
 Tindal and Morgan, considered it at best but a pioneer of 
 natural religion. All popular religion was branded as a device 
 of priestcraft. Connor, Collins, Woolston, Bolingbroke, and 
 Hume turned their shafts chiefly against miracles j Craig, 
 Toland, and Collins made an onslaught on the prophecies con- 
 tained in the Old Testament ; all without exception, and Chubb 2 ' 
 most vehemently of all, assailed the authority of Holy Scripture. 
 Chubb's gospel of reason was bounded by natural morality and 
 belief in a future reward. 
 
 The ultimate consequences of his Deism, could only be epi- 
 curean naturalism and materialistic hylozoism. For natural 
 religion, being a mere negative abstraction of a shallow philo- 
 sophy, is incapable of nourishing the moral life. Hence a 
 garrison had to be stationed to defend every side that was 
 attacked. Nearly all apologists make some concession to 
 natural religion by placing demonstrations from reason and 
 history in the front rank. 
 
 Bacon, of Verulam, professed unbounded respect for super- 
 natural religion. In atheism he saw not the child of deep 
 thought, but the offspring of a depraved will. Between faith 
 and reason he admits a conflict, but faith over-rides reason. 
 From this we may gather the meaning of his statement that 
 deep philosophy leads to God although, in its first steps, it turns 
 its back on Him. The apologists aimed at making faith 
 palatable, and modifying it by reason. The doctrines of eternal 
 life, and the soul's immortality were marshalled against agnosti- 
 cism. Christian morality waa weighed in the balance with 
 heathen immorality. ChdstJanity was represented as a divine 
 
 g A discourse concerning {reason with, regard to rcligie* and rcvtlati**, 1730. Ttt 
 tntt G*jxl f/ Jesus Christ *ss*>1td, 1738. Cfr. Weroer, . 45.
 
 HISTORY Of APOLOGETICS. 53 
 
 institution, attested by miracles and prophecy, which proposed 
 to men the same goal as natural religion, but, at the same time, 
 afforded greater facilities for gaining it 
 
 Atheism was the most formidable antagonist with which 
 apologists had to contend. In this struggle a very active part 
 was taken by Robert Boyle (1626-1691), who established a 
 special prize for the best essay against atheism. Famous 
 araong the prize essays thus called forth, were those by Bentley, 
 Durham, and Clarke. They one and all upheld both a natural 
 and a supernatural revelation. And, in proving the necessity of 
 supernatural revelation, they adroitly availed themselves of the 
 very arguments employed by their opponents to advocate natural 
 religion. In part, too, they argued for its utility. This was the 
 course taken by Whitby, Bentley, Clarke, Conybeare, Foster, 
 Watts, Leland, and Berkeley. In this department, so well- 
 suited to their practical character, Englishmen have beea 
 eminently distinguished. The proof from miracles was elabor- 
 ated by Gibbon, Lefcmd, 98 Smalbroke, Pearce, Adams, Lardner, 
 George Campbell, Farmer, Paley, and Addison ; Ditton, Sher- 
 lock, Gilbert West, and Chandler, picked up the gauntlet to 
 defeod the miracle of the resurrectioH ; the prophecies found 
 champions in Chandler, Sykes, Newton, aad Hart The best 
 proof of the credibility of the history of the New Testament is 
 that given by Nathaniel Lardner ;* Humphrey Prideaux and 
 Samuel Shukford extended it to the entire Bible history. 
 Alexander Gerard invoked the style of the books of the New 
 Testament as a proof of their trustworthiness ; Jennings sur- 
 veyed the whole internal evidence from this point of view. In 
 addition to the above there are still other names worthy of note, 
 
 30 Lelandakft wrote the first history of Deism : A viem f the principal ddstical loritert 
 
 thcU leave appeared in England at the last and present century, with ttstrv** 
 tints ufon them, at several letters to a fritnd, 1754 (German, 1756). On th 
 Literature, see Werner, v. 102, seq. 
 
 31 The credibility of the Gospel History. London, 1741-1755, is vote. A supplement 
 
 to tie first book tfPart II. London, 1756, 3 vols. A vindication of three off** 
 Kessed Sttftcmr't Miracles, in ansiocr to the objections tf Mr. Wtolston's fifth 
 discourse, London, 1729. Collection of the ancient Jewish and heathen ttttimoniM 
 to the truth aftkt Christian religion., London, 1764. 4 vols.
 
 54 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 such as Stackhouse, Chapman, and Bryant, and in this 
 century, Porteus, Everett, Haldane, and others. 
 
 Another class of writers based their defence of Christianity 
 on its main doctrines and substance : some, as Hammond, 
 John Locke, Benson, and Bennett, by laying stress on its 
 morality and its conformity with reason ; others, like Rob- 
 inson and Jennings, by showing the inward excellence of 
 its doctrine, or its suitableness to meet the wants of human 
 nature (e.g., Arch, Campbell, and Williamson), or its anal- 
 ogy with nature, like Butler. It is remarkable that, of all 
 these eighteenth century opponents of Deism, Butler alone 
 takes into account the supernatural element of Christianity ; 
 yet he, too, regards natural religion as the foundation and 
 chief part of Christianity. Eternal life is man's last end. 
 But Providence must bring this last end within man's 
 reach ; this is effected by holding out the promise of re- 
 ward and punishment. Thus nature gives us a glimpse of 
 the teaching of faith. Christianity, however, is not a mere 
 promulgation of natural religion, but a revelation given for 
 the purpose of restoring and saving fallen man. This is 
 shown by miracles and prophecies, and also by the effects 
 of Christianity ; for the importance of religion must be in- 
 ferred from its effects. 
 
 In FRANCE also, an array of writers hostile to Christianity 
 had appeared. Montaigne and Charron in the i6th century, 
 and Sanchez and La Mothe le Rayer in the seventeenth, 
 were profound sceptics. Descartes erected philosophic 
 doubt into a principle in order to give stability to self-con- 
 sciousness and the knowledge of God. Many adopted his 
 principle without, however, perceiving that the foundation 
 afforded by the Ego was not more than empirically secure. 
 From the time of Louis XIV., till quite recently, the 
 Cartesian philosophy reigned supreme in France. Then, 
 again, a despotic royalty, the Gallican tendencies of the 
 clergy, the prolonged struggles with heretics, a policy of 
 aggrandizement and conquest that set morality at defiance, 
 these and many other causes were at work to make
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 55 
 
 French soil produce a plentiful crop of English Deism. 
 Beneath a skin-deep surface of Christianity lay a black 
 mould of scepticism and frivolity that was rotting 
 the foundations of faith and morality in the upper 
 classes. 
 
 Refined sarcasm and derision of everything sacred reached 
 their zenith or nadir in Voltaire. He led the attack on the 
 Cartesian School of Theology at a time when Sensists 
 (Locke) and Encyclopaedists were showing signs of life. 
 Rousseau and the Encyclopaedists pronounced a literary 
 panegyric of atheism. The English Deists had already dis- 
 solved the Old Testament in a naturalistic melting-pot ; 
 but Voltaire compressed Moses into a myth, and construct- 
 ed the Pentateuch out of a tissue of Arabian stories. 
 Others saw in Genesis a system of astronomy in the guise 
 of history. The best apologists in the age of Louis XIV. 
 were Bossuet and Fenelon. Both upheld the cause of 
 Christianity and the Catholic Faith, not only by repelling 
 the attacks of the Huguenots but also by building up a 
 good positive exposition of the faith as set forth in Scripture 
 and Tradition. Both favoured the philosophy of Descartes, 
 and with their contemporaries believed that scepticism 
 and materialism would be dashed to bits by impinging on 
 Cartesian Spiritualism. True, if Malebranche's theory of 
 the intuition of all things in God had been the legitimate 
 outcome of Descartes' idealism. Reformers and Catholics 
 made mighty efforts to stem the swelling tide of Bayle's 
 sceptical school. The strength of the Reformers was repre- 
 sented by Abbadie, Leclerc, de la Placette, Pictet, Bernard, 
 Turretin, Lemoine, Holland, and others ; that of the Catho- 
 lics by Hauteville, Dutartre, Tournemine, Lefebre, Bergier, 
 Dubois du Launoy. They plied their adversaries with the 
 usual historical method ; trustworthiness of the sacred writ- 
 ers, miracles, and the fulfilment of prophecies. A serried ar- 
 ray of Apologists was drawn up to defend the Christian cause 
 against Voltaire : Frangois, Gauclat, Nonnotte, Guenee, 
 Pompignan, d'Aguesseau, and others. The apologetic
 
 56 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 writings of Bergier 83 are especially noteworthy both in their 
 matter and form. The plan adopted in his comprehensive 
 work is first to repel attacks on revelation, and then to state 
 fully the doctrine of the true religion, Chateaubriand 38 worked 
 on other lines, weighing Voltaire's sneers in the balance with 
 the religious, moral, and aesthetic excellences of Christianity, 
 and showing its claim on the gratitude of civilization and good 
 sense. This method, so admirably adapted to the taste and 
 genius of the French, has found imitators even in our own 
 times. 
 
 For a long time the heathen school of Humanism continued 
 to bear fruit in ITALY, and the traces of French influence 
 remained. But long and intimate familiarity with the faith they 
 had inherited had made Italians of both schools less sensitive, 
 and hardened them in indifference. For this reason there is 
 little to note in their apologetic history. The controversy 
 which raged round the planetary system of Galileo and Coper- 
 nicus covered the seventeenth century, and yet it touched only 
 one question of science and the interpretation of Scripture. 
 But with it, as Giordano Bruno made clear, extreme philosophic 
 views were often allied. The vials of scorn and sarcasm which 
 Galileo had poured out on Scholasticism helped to bring 
 theology and faith into disrepute. Nor did Galileo's condemna- 
 tion mend matt TS ; and yet we nowhere meet with open and 
 avowed hostility to Christianity. Hence Italian apologies are 
 general in character, being for the most part directed against 
 adversaries in foreign lands or those who had lived in the dim past. 
 Segneri's (d., 1695), Eincrtdulo senza scusa, was a shaft aimed 
 at infidelity. Nicolai, Gotti, Roselli, Tassoni, and others treat 
 of the nature of religion and of Christianity. Conspicuous 
 among philosophic apologists is Gerdil 84 (d. 1802), whose scat- 
 
 3 Trait f historique t dogmatiqite de la vrttie religion, ccvec la refutation des erreurt 
 yui liti ant (U oppostes dans Its different* sticks, Paris, 1780. la vols. See 
 Werner, V. 1x9 seq. 
 
 33 Ctnie dn Ckristianisme, London, 1803. 
 
 34 L'immortalitf d* tame dtmontrfe contrt M. Locke, &c., 1747. Delia. Etistenta di 
 
 Dia t delta itnmatcrialta dellt nature intelligent*. See Werner v., 135 wq. Val- 
 ecchi Dei Jondamtnti delta religion* t dei ftmti dell 'imfUta, Libci tie, 
 Pdiu, .765.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 57 
 
 tered pamphlets were collected into one volume by Valsecchi. 
 His purpose is to demonstrate the existence of God, and the 
 spirituality and immortality of the soul, and to show that religion 
 is an essential factor in human life. He insists that a divine 
 revelation has been given to man, and that the Christian 
 religion is this divine revelation. In proof he appeals to the 
 truth of its doctrine, to its martyrs, its miracles, and its pro- 
 phecies, to the moral regeneration of the human race that it has 
 effected, and to the rapidity with which it spread over the globe. 
 Italian theologians (e.g., Perrone) regard apologetics as funda- 
 mental theology, and weld dogma and apology into one 
 treatise. 
 
 A stream of shallow deism was running through GERMANY 
 also, and that country was gradually swamped beneath a flood of 
 Rationalism and Naturalism. The school of Leibnitz and 
 Wolff admitted both natural and revealed religion ; in his 
 Theodicea Leibnitz eloquently pleads the cause of both. He 
 tried also to bring about a union of the Churches of Christen- 
 dom. But Rationalism was the goal towards which the philo- 
 sophic schools were pressing forward. From the middle of the 
 eighteenth century Rationalism had domineered over all 
 Protestant Theology (excepting that of the Pietists), and had 
 also largely influenced Catholic Theology. Semler and Ernesti 
 applied Rationalism to the study of the Bible. The Wolfen- 
 biittler Fragments of Reimarus and Lessing stirred the country 
 from its inmost depths by storming the citadel of Christanity in 
 its central miracles. Then the day of "enlightenment" dawned 
 on the world. Reason was constituted supreme judge in the 
 matter of religion. Inspiration, supernatural revelation, and 
 the divine foundation and constitution of the Church were 
 mercilessly slaughtered at the shrine of pure reason. Men con- 
 structed a natural religion for themselves by eliminating from 
 Holy Scripture everything that transcended reason, or that 
 smacked of the supernatural and miraculous. From the slender 
 materials that remained they thought to erect a breakwater power-
 
 58 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 ful enough to beat back the swelling waves of infidelity. In 
 this we may see the lines on which apologies of that time 
 moved. An apology, at once deep and convincing, and 
 drawn from the sources of faith was a rara avis. The Leit- 
 motiv of all apologies, even the best, is the intellectual side 
 of revelation. Pfaff, Mosheim, Haller and Zimmermann 
 erected barricades against unbelievers in revelation. The 
 work of Lilienthal " is sometimes put on the same footing 
 with the works of Lardner and Bergier ; but it lacks order 
 and precision. Nesselt, Less, Spalding and Jerusalem are 
 more methodical, but more deeply tinged with Rationalism. 
 Herder and Lessing think that the onward march of the 
 human race to progress abundantly compensates for the loss 
 of that faith in Scripture which criticism had rudely shaken. 
 They wanted to separate the truth contained in the Chris- 
 tian religion from its historic forms, and to temper it into 
 an exquisite harmony with true reason. But such a sepa- 
 ration would be fatal to faith. So Tobler, Doderlein, Less, 
 Michaelis and Semler picked up the gauntlet thrown down 
 by the Fragments, and Liiderwald, Seiler, and Mass en- 
 tered the lists against other works of a similar tendency. The 
 apologies of Seiler, Klenker, Reinhard, and Koppen have a 
 more general drift. As Catholic Theology was not directly 
 assailed, its apologists confined their attention to general 
 questions. Stattler 86 who had drunk deep of the spirit of the 
 Wolffian philosophy, composed a systematic apology for 
 Christianity. He lays the greatest stress on the possibility and 
 necessity of revelation, and on proving that the Catholic 
 Church is its guardian and exponent. Bede Mayr's apology 
 was enthusiastically applauded. In his clear careful treatises 
 he makes good use of the materials collected by Bergier, 
 
 33 Die gute Sache der Offenbarung. Koenigsberg 1750-1782, 16 parts. Less, Beweis der 
 Wahrheit der christlichen Religion, Gottingen 1768. Jerusalem, Bttracktungen 
 uber die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der christl. Religion, Braunschweig, 1768. 5th 
 Edition, 1776. Klenker, Neue PrUfung der Beweise fUr die GBttlichkeit des 
 Christenthums, Riga, 1787 to 1794. 3 vols. Reinhard, Versuch iiber den Plan, 
 etc., Wittenberg. 4th Edition, 1798. See Werner I.e. v. 131 seq. 
 
 36 Demonstratio Evangelica, Aug. Vind. 1771. a vols. Beda Mayr, Vertheidifung 
 der naturlichcn und katholiscken Religion. Augsburg, 1787-1789. Storchenau, 
 Philosofhie der Religion. Augsburg, 1772-1789. n vols.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 59 
 
 Doderlein, Less, Eichhorn, Klenker and others, to combat French 
 and German infidels. Storchenau's work is still more compre- 
 hensive. Veith and Sandbichler came forward as champions of 
 Holy Scripture. But at that time, even Catholics were unequal 
 to the task of producing an extensive apology for Christianity, 
 that viewed the Church as a social power among men and as 
 the visible manifestation of the God-man, Jesus. They enlarged [ 
 on the blessings and civilization that Christianity had conferred 
 on mankind, but they were unable to give a picture of the entire 
 life of the Christian Church, and thus to refute the objections 
 raised against certain phenomena in its development. 
 
 In the nineteenth century the apologist has had to contend 
 all along the line with the after-effects of Rationalism, which 
 continued to subsist in philosophic pantheism and in the so- 
 called historical school of biblical criticism. But the natural 
 sciences proved a far more dangerous foe of revelation. For 
 their exact method and the astonishing progress they have made 
 fascinate the minds of men, even when they overstep their 
 bounds and claim as their own every department of science. 
 The objects of natural science are manifold. On the one hand 
 it aims at extending the sovereignty of the senses; in its 
 positivist character, it challenges all knowledge of the ideal and 
 supernatural, and even preaches rank materialism and natural- 
 ism. On the other hand, in the theory of evolution it offers a 
 positive solution of the enigmas of the universe. This theory 
 however is not limited to natural science, but is gradually en- 
 croaching on the domains of history and philology and the 
 social science. Here, too, the apologist has his work mapped 
 out. Apologetics has been constituted a philosophical and theo- 
 logical science, to arbitrate between the conflicting claims of 
 theology and worldly wisdom, of faith and science. 
 
 In France, at the beginning of this century, a gradual restora- 
 tion of the religion, overturned by the Revolution, set in. First 
 principles had to be inculcated anew. Chateaubriand's plan of 
 drugging unbelieving minds with aesthetic and physiological
 
 60 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 arguments was tried. When the ruins of the revolution 
 were being scattered to the winds before men's eyes, it was 
 easy to galvanize their minds into thinking that Christian- 
 ity was of vital importance to domestic and civil life.* 1 
 Under the legitimist monarchy, royalty and priesthood were 
 united by sacred ties ; under the July monarchy, the Church 
 was applauded as the mother of civilization and progress. 
 Lamennais, the great worshipper of Tradition, and the en- 
 thusiastic advocate of liberty, struck off the fetters of in- 
 difference that had enchained many souls. His pupils re- 
 tained his enthusiasm without adopting his errors. De 
 Maistre, Montalembert, Dupanloup, Barran, Pauvert, La 
 Chadenede, justify faith before the tribunal of reason ; 
 Nicolas reduces the entire Christian Philosophy to system ; 
 Laforet gives a speculative exposition of the teaching of 
 the Church ; Martinet, Louay, Chassay, Deschamps, are 
 formal Apologists. Ravignan, Ventura, Lacordaire, P. 
 Felix, Hyacinthe argued the great questions of the day in 
 conferences, with a brilliancy of diction and an impetuous 
 flow of eloquence that held their hearers spell-bound. 
 
 In the France of our own day Apology has acted a still 
 more prominent part. The injury inflicted by the old 
 and new Revolution has been increased by the havoc 
 caused by Positivism and Darwinism, and by Renan's at- 
 tack on the history of Religion. Christian savants, who 
 still live in hopes of thoroughly healing the grave dis- 
 eases from which French society is suffering, are trying to 
 stave off the crisis by issuing special apologetic periodi- 
 cals, and by holding international congresses with the 
 
 37 Frayssinous, Defense du Christianisme^ ou Conferences sur la. religion, held in 
 1803-1809 and 1814-1822, Edited in 1824 ; translated into German and Italian. 
 These are some of the works referred to in the list: Dupanloup, Le Christianisme 
 trtsente aux hommes du monde par Fenelon, Paris, 1847, 6 vols., 4th Edition. 
 Nicolas, Etudes philosophiques sur le Christianisme. Paris, 1850, i6th Edition, 
 1855. Ckassay, Cattchisme historique des incroyants, and, Preparation tvange- 
 lique du. XIX Siicle, cfr. Werner, p. aai. Lacordaire, Conferences, Paris, 1855, 3 
 vols. The Review, La controverse, Revue des objections et des reponses en matiere 
 de religion, Paris, 1880 ; now under the title La controverse et le contemperain. 
 Annales de philosophie chretienne, Paris, see Theol. Quartalsch. 1883, page 78. 
 La science catholique. Revue des questions historiques. But Revue de /* histoire 
 des Religions is mostly in the hands of rationalizing savants.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 6l 
 
 avowed object of arming and manning the defences of faith. 88 
 The necessity of strengthening the Christian arsenals and fitting 
 out a Christian squadron will not be questioned, when it is con- 
 sidered that, in the College de France, there is not only a chair 
 for the comparative study of religion but that, since 1886, a 
 special department has been opened for these studies with the 
 view of destroying the denominational character of religious 
 instruction. Of apologists in the field of natural science I may 
 mention Moigno, Elie de Beaumont, Quatrefages, Lenormant, 
 Hamard, Bourgeois, Hate, Motais, Janet, Raingeard; and of 
 anti-positivists, P. de Bonniot Fernet, Broglie, Duilhe's, 
 Pressense, Arduin, Robiou, Jacquinot. As the radical school 
 of biblical criticism has, owing chiefly to the labours of Renan, 
 spread its roots over a large extent of France, apologists are 
 trying to revive the study of biblical exegesis which had long 
 been defunct. Faivre, Harlez, Bonniot, Le Hire, Pillion, 
 Camus, and Lamy, are names that rise to the lips at once. But 
 the most distinguished biblical scholar is Vigouroux, who is 
 more constructive than Lenormant. 39 From the evidence fur- 
 nished by recent discoveries in Egypt and Mesopotamia he has 
 successfully vindicated the history of the Old Testament against 
 its numerous traducers. The Revue des questions sdentifiques, 
 published in Brussels, deals mainly with scientific subjects, and 
 gives proof of varied learning and great ability. Sometimes, 
 too, it has occasion to examine the history of religion and of the 
 Church, because Catholic countries are reproached with lagging 
 behind in the march of civilisation. But the glorious history of 
 the Latin nations shows that the blame does not rest with the 
 Catholic Church. 
 
 In ENGLAND, the great agitation for Catholic Emancipation 
 called forth a host of writings, bearing principally on the dcmon- 
 
 38 See Philesophie chrftienae 1866, No. 4. In No. 2 and 3 there are also articles on the 
 
 progress and method of French apologetic science. 
 
 39 La bible et ks dtcouvertcs modtmes en Palestine, en Egypte, et en Assjtrie, 4 vols, 
 
 Paris. La. Cosmag&me tnosaiftte, i vol. Manuel bibliqut, ou court d'tcritunt 
 Steatte, 4 vols. Les Gvres smtnts et I* critique rationaliste, 2 vals, Paris, 1886. 
 Krk, Les orifixa tie la timktatifn mtdent*,, Lonrain, 1880.
 
 6 2 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 stralio catholica, but likewise embracing a defence of Chris- 
 tianity ; to wit, the writings of Fletcher, Milner, Baines, Butler, 
 Moore, Mac Hale, and Cooper. Of eminent importance are 
 the works of Wiseman and Newman, some of which have been 
 translated into German. 40 Murray's work is, in great part, a 
 controversy with the Puseyites. In the cradle-land of Darwin- 
 ism, as elsewhere, the defence of Christianity has latterly centred 
 in controverting the doctrine of descent. The most distinguished 
 writers on the Catholic side, who have dealt with this question, 
 are Professor St. George Mivart and Bishop Clifford. The 
 former has, from a Catholic point of view, treated Darwinism 
 with great freedom, and attempted to grapple with the problem, 
 how k far, with certain necessary modifications, it is admissible as 
 a working hypothesis ; the latter has proposed to remove all 
 difficulties by allowing a very wide margin in interpreting the 
 Hexsemeron. Conspicuous on the Protestant side were the 
 Bridgewater Treailses, which* originated m a foundation left 
 by the Earl of Bridgewater, who died in 1829. Their purpose was 
 to demonstrate the truth of the Christian cosmogony by showing 
 the existence of design in the different kingdoms and orders of 
 nature At present all interest centres in Darwinism, and in 
 attempts to reconcile it with the Mosaic history of creation. 
 Powell, Warrington, Haughton, Woods Smythe, Stanley, and 
 the Americans, Asa Gray, McCosh and Hedge, have written 
 in this sense. 
 
 fci III ITALY the struggle against indifference and unbelief is now 
 more severe than ever. Materialism and the Philosophy of 
 Hegel were poured in from Germany ; Positivism streamed in 
 from France; natural science and the comparative study of 
 religion have been undermining the faith of the educated 
 classes. The work of devastation proceeded apace, as, till 
 recently, apology had moved along the oki beaten track, and 
 theology had to some extent degenerated into formalism. 
 
 40 See Werner v. p. aio, seq. Wiseman. Lectures on tkt C<Htmec& ArfeMWf CMM* 
 M*JtaM*fJU|p(M. Murray. Dt Rctttsim. Ob*, j w*~ Load**, iM 
 
 II vols., 1*36. Translated into German.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 63 
 
 The idealism of the ontologists had led to conflicts with the 
 Church. Only in modem times have things taken a turn for the 
 better. Nardi wrote a demonstrate catholica ; Alberi defended 
 the Christian position against the wild charge of naturalism. 
 Palmieri, Tongiorgi and others attempted to show that the 
 Christian doctrine of creation is compatible with modem 
 science. Secchi 41 took in hand the task of proving scienti- 
 fically the unity of all nature, and thus justifying the Christian 
 theory. In consequence of the recent Encyclical of Leo. xiii.. 
 a network of Thomism is again spread over the whole field of 
 theology. In academies of S. Thomas, and in periodicals 
 (e. g. Cvinltd, Cattolica, and Scienza e lafede), the Scholastic 
 natural philosophy is put forward as the correct solution of the 
 fresh dispute between science and faith. The editor of the 
 Civilta, P. de Caca, has also combatted with success the 
 destructive tendencies of philology and the comparative science 
 of religion. 
 
 SPAIN is in a similar condition. Here also a beginning is being 
 made, and Thomism is represented as the ark into which all 
 must enter who wish to be saved from the deluge of modern 
 naturalism. The works of Baknes 48 were, in their day, widely 
 circulated in Europe. The same seems to be true of later 
 Thomistic writings e.g. : The philosophy of S. Thomas by 
 Gonzalez, and the Apology of Oeti y Lara. The latter was a 
 prize essay which the royal academy of moral and political 
 science ordered to be written in reply to a Spanish translation 
 of Draper's History of the Conflict between Science and Religion 
 (1873) 
 
 41 L'uuita delle forte pkysick*. Also two papers on the grandeur of creation read in 
 1876 and 1877 before a scientific association and received with great applause. H 
 has also written other works on the sun and stars. P. de Cara Esamt Critico de 
 tistema. filologico e lingwistico applicato alia, mittlogia e alia sciema. delle rtligicmi 
 Prato 1884. 
 
 43 Fundamental Philosophy, Letters to a Sceptic, Catklicism and Protestantism corn- 
 fared, were translated into several languages. Oeti y Lara wrote a work to show 
 that science and revelation are in complete harmony. There is also a periodical, 
 Citncia. Cristiana.
 
 64 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 
 
 Various circumstances have combined to give an impetus 
 to the study of apologetic science, and to give it a growing 
 importance in Germany. Kant's Kritik had shaken faith 
 in an objective knowledge of God and revelation. The 
 philosophic development which began with Kant, and led 
 to Pantheism in Fichte and Hegel, and to natural mysti- 
 cism in Schelling could not but exercise a deep influence 
 on theology and faith. The so-called historical school in 
 biblical theology seeks to explain history as the dialectic 
 process of certain ideas, and to put the history of the Chris- 
 tian Religion on the same footing as the mythical religions 
 of antiquity. The feeling of absolute dependence, with 
 which Schleiermacher strove to adjust the conflict between 
 faith and science, makes the religious experience of the sub- 
 ject the measure of judgment, and sacrifices all objective 
 certitude of metaphysical facts and truths. The extreme 
 schools of natural science have likewise found supporters 
 and disciples more rapidly in Germany than elsewhere. 
 This sketch indicates the course apology has taken. The 
 works of Drey, 43 Staudenmaier, Denzinger and Ehrlich 
 are philosophical. Liebermann, Klee, Reinerding, Schwetz, 
 Sprinzl and Hettinger have written fundamental theolo- 
 gies. The apologies of Hettinger and Vosen are more 
 general in their scope. Weiss bases his defence of Chris- 
 tianity on its moral teaching. Against the destructive bib- 
 lical criticism of Strauss, Renan and others, the reader 
 may consult, besides Introductions and Lives of Jesus, 
 the Critiques of Hug, Haneberg, Brunner, and others. 
 
 43 Some of tne principal publications of the above-named authors are the following 
 Drey, Die Apologetik als wissenscha/tliche Nachweisung der Gottlichkeit des 
 Christenthums in seiner Erscheinung. a Aufl. Mainz, 1844. Staudenmaier, 
 Philosophie des Christenthums. Giessen, 1840. Denzinger, Vier Bucher von der 
 religiosen Erkenntniss. Wurzburg, 1887. Ehrlich, Fundament alt keolo^ie. Prag, 
 1859. Sprinzl, Handbuch der Fundamentalthtologie, Wien, 1876, Lehrbuch der 
 Fundamentaltheologie, Freiburg, 1879 Hettinger, Apologie des Christenthums, 
 
 3 Aufl. Freiburg, 1856 Vosen, Das Ckristenthum und Einspriiche seiner Gegner, 
 
 4 edit., Freiburg, 1881. Der Kalicismus und die Einspriiche seiner Gegner, 3 
 edit., 1885 Weiss, Apologie des Christenthums vom Standpuncte der Sittenlehre, 
 4 vols., Freiburg, 1878 Reusch, Bibel und Nat ur, 3 edit., 1870, 4 edit., 1874, Bonn 
 Guttler, Naturforschung und Bibel in ihrer Steliung zur Schoepfung t Frei- 
 burg, 1877 Lorinser, Das Buck der Natur, j vols., Regensburg, 1876 Schafer, 
 Bibel und Wissenschaft. Mfinster, 1881 Pesch, Die grossen Weltrathsel. 
 Philosophic der Natur, Freiburc, 1881. 1884, a vols.
 
 HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS. 65 
 
 To defend Christianity against the batteries of science 
 Michelis established the periodical Nature and Revelation^ 
 which has rendered yeoman's service. Other authors 
 worthy of special mention are Reusch, Huber, Michelis, 
 Weith, Westermaier, Hummelauer, Guttler, Lorinser, and 
 Schafer. Of late the Jesuits Pesch, Dressell, Epping, &c., 
 have been busy discussing the principal questions of natural 
 philosophy. For a long time the influence of Kant, 
 Schleiermacher and Hegel made itself felt on Protestant 
 theology. In the school of Ritschl, Kant is to this day a 
 living power. Speaking generally we may say that all 
 Protestant apologists have agreed not to lay great stress 
 on external proofs for the existence of God and revelation, 
 but to rely chiefly on moral and religious experience. Even 
 in biblical criticisms many concessions have been made to 
 the negative school. Still it must be acknowledged that 
 in recent times they have made great efforts to maintain 
 their ground. Apart from the many lives of Jesus and 
 general exegetic literature, we may mention as authors of 
 apologetic works proper, Tach, Delitzsch, 44 Luthardt, 
 Diisterdieck, Zegschwitz, Voigt, Frank, Ebrard, Baumstark, 
 Dorner. The chief apologist in natural science is Zockler, 
 in whose works are to be found further details on the liter- 
 ature of the subject. He also defends the interests of 
 Christianity in the periodical Beweis des Glaubens. Of 
 naturalists who have written against Darwinism, besides 
 the French Quatrefages, should be mentioned the names of 
 Wigand, Baer and Pfaff, who supply abundant materials 
 for the defence. Max Miiller's writings furnish an intro- 
 duction to the comparative study of religion. 
 
 44 System der christlichen Apologetik. Leipzig, 1869 Luthardt, Apologetische Vor- 
 trage, Leipzig, 1864. Last edition 1883. Diisterdieck, Apologetische Beitrage 
 Gottingen, 1865-1872. Zegschwitz, Zur Apologie des Christenthums nach Ges- 
 shichte und Lehre. Leipzig, 1886. Frank, Systetn der christl. Gewissheit (and 
 edit.) Erlangen, 1881, Ebrard, Apologetik (and edit.) Gutersloh, 1874 Baumstark 
 Christliche Apologetik auf anthropologischer Grundlage. Frankfort, 1872 Dor- 
 ner, System der christl. Glaubenslehre, i \&\.Grttndlegung, oder Apologetik, 
 Berlin, 1879 Zockler, Geschichte der Beziehungen ztvischen Theologie und 
 Naturwissenschaft. Gutersloh, 1877-8, 2 vols., Wigand, Darwinismus und die 
 Naturforschung Neivtons und Cuviers. Braunschw., 1874, 3 vols Baer Studien 
 aus dem Gebiete der Natnrivissenschaften. Petersburg, 1876 Pfaff, Schopfungs- 
 geschichte (srd edit.) Heidelberg, 1882. Die Entwicklung der Welt, 1883 For the 
 history of apologetics it is enough to refer to the works of Werner and Zockler 
 already quoted. Hurter's Nomenclator and Dorner's History of Protestant Theol- 
 ogy are also very serviceable. 
 

 
 CHAPTER IIL 
 
 RELIGION AND HISTORY. 
 
 Civilization, throughout the length and breadth of its history, 
 furnishes no phenomenon so widespread and so far-reaching in its 
 consequences as Religion. The faint light that breaks upon 
 us from the early dawn of civilization shows that human know- 
 ledge and morality originated in religion, that religion is the 
 well-spring from which the first songs of soul-thrilling poetry 
 were drawn, and that religious worship was the parent of the 
 first-born of art In Iranian and Indian documents, in Egyptian 
 hieroglyphics, and in the cuneiform inscriptions of the Chal- 
 deans, religion everywhere asserts its claim to be considered the 
 chief and most influential factor in the life of families and of 
 nations. The history of religion is the history of man. It is 
 the groundwork and the key to the right understanding of all 
 history. 1 Our knowledge of antiquity has advanced by leaps 
 and bounds : yet it offers no explanation of the fact of religion, 
 but merely bears witness to its existence in the remotest ages. 
 Both civilized and uncivilized races tell the same tale. If 
 ancient writers 2 had asserted that belief in a God was universal, 
 and that there existed no people so savage and lawless as not to 
 worship some God or other, the statement might have been set 
 down as a hasty or superficial generalization, due to their com- 
 paratively narrow knowledge of ethnography. Even the Fathers 
 and the learned men of the Middle Ages knew but little of the 
 inhabitants of the various parts of the globe. Now, however, 
 
 i Max Mailer, Essays, and Edit., 1879, Vol. I., p. 19. 
 
 Odyssey, iii. 48, Arest. De tale i, 3, Cicero, Dt N*t. Dtorum i, 16, 17 ; 2, 4, 5. Dt 
 f*f *i 8 - Seneca, Ep. no, HJ.
 
 RELIGION AND HISTORY. 67 
 
 circumstances are altered. The discovery of two continents 
 and numberless islands, and the exploration of the "Dark 
 Continent," have widened to an unforseen extent the circle of 
 human knowledge. And yet all modern discoveries in ethno- 
 graphy and anthropology do but confirm the ancient truth. 
 No nation has yet been discovered wholly devoid of religion. 
 Writers of the Darwinian School, such as Sir John Lubbock 
 and Haeckel, have had the hardihood to assert that there are 
 men in Southern Asia and Eastern Africa, going about in 
 droves, living on the fruits of the earth, unacquainted with fire, 
 using stone weapons and implements, and spending most of 
 their time in climbing trees, like apes of the higher class But 
 even such staunch Darwinians as Hellwald and Caspari allow 
 that this contention smacks more of romance than of history. 
 The alleged tribe is a creation of fancy without a definite abode. 
 It was a favourite dodge of Bayle and the sceptical school to 
 justify atheism by pointing to the existence of tribes with no 
 religion. Of course there have been explorers who have in all 
 sincerity written in this sense. Livingstone asserts that no trace 
 of religion was to be found among the inhabitants of Bechuana- 
 land ; Samuel Baker, Dalton, and Lichtenstein say the same of 
 South African and American tribes ; Messenger Bradley makes 
 a like statement about an Australian tribe. Sir John Lubbock 
 appeals to the testimony of Catholic and Protestant missionaries. 
 In like manner, the Abbe Lesserteur, Professor of Theology at 
 the Seminary of Foreign Missions, maintains that the knowledge 
 of God is not universal. In support of his thesis he cites the 
 Missions Catholiques of 1881, in which 3 P. Berengier says that 
 the Arraconians of Bengal have no idea of the existence of a 
 Supreme Being; but they believe that brooks and trees are 
 peopled by mysterious spirits. Moreover he quotes Mgr. Bour- 
 don, Vicar Apostolic of Burmah, as saying that the Kachyens 
 have not the least notion of an eternal, almighty, and infinite 
 
 9- P. 63 La Cmnaissance tit Din ttt tttt tuuPtrftOtt La Contravtru, 1883, Ma
 
 68 HISTORY AND RELIGION. 
 
 God, the creator and sustainer of the universe, who will reward 
 the good and punish the wicked. In the same category he 
 places the Annamites, who believe in higher orders of spirits, 
 for the most part wicked and terrible j but he insists that this 
 belief cannot be described as a knowledge of God. 
 
 In saying so much, however, Lesserteur has made his meaning 
 clear If for the knowledge of God he requires " the idea of a 
 supreme being who created heaven and earth, and is the 
 sovereign Lord of all things," this exalted notion will not easily 
 be discovered among savages. But it is hardly fair to test the 
 faith of low savages by our own enlightened ideas about God. 
 Nor, again, should it be forgotten that the conduct of a savage, 
 from which alone his belief can be gathered, is often reserved 
 and difficult to understand. For this reason we must observe 
 great caution in receiving the depositions even of travellers and 
 missionaries. Long years of patient observation, thorough 
 knowledge of the country, and familiar and confidential inter- 
 course with the natives are the only security against error. In 
 the presence of white men savages are often reticent, being afraid 
 to mention the names of their gods. In this way many contra- 
 dictory statements may be explained. A little while ago the 
 Zulus were credited with having no religious ideas of any kind ; 
 now, missionaries are often puzzled by their subtle questions. 
 They believe in an invisible God, dwelling in the heavens, who 
 created all things, and guides the destiny of man.* RoskofThas 
 confuted Sir John Lubbock in detail ; Quatrefages has done a 
 similar service to the stories of the missionaries ; 6 Tyler, Peschel 
 and Max Miiller have defended the same thesis with success. 
 In the last instance the pivot on which the whole dispute turns 
 is the question as to how much is essential to the idea of 
 religion. Sir J. Lubbock himself admits that it will be difficult 
 
 4. Max MfllUr, Einltititng, Ac., Strassburg, 1874, p. s, 231 sq. 
 
 5. Roslcoff, Die Religion der rohtsten NaturvSlker, i83o. Gloatz, Speculative Tkf 
 
 fie fit in Vtrbindung mil der Retifionsgesckickit, I vol., 1883, p. 96, seq. Quat- 
 refages, L'espece kumainetad Controvtrst, 1883, No. 51, p. 704. See alto Reville, 
 L* religion dei non-civilisis , Revue de Ihisttire det religions. Juillet ct Aoflt, 
 188*. Gutberlet, Gibt et Vdlker akne Religion t Nmtttr und OJfenbarung, 1885. 
 No. I, a, W. Schneider, Die N*t*rvSlktr, t Part. Padrborn, i8M, p. 347 M*
 
 RELIGION AND HISTORY. 69 
 
 to find any savages without religion, if magic in large or small 
 quantities is allowed to do duty for religion. He grants that 
 religion is common to all men, if religion is made to include a 
 mere dread and consciousness of beings more powerful than 
 ourselves. But he thereby concedes in principle the universality 
 of religion. 
 
 Even superstition and magic, howsoever debased and 
 degraded, are an evidence of faith and of religion. Sacrifice 
 and prayer are constituent elements of both, though the one be 
 repulsive, and the other meaningless and mechanical. Both 
 magic and superstition have for their object union with a superior 
 being ; both are an acknowledgment of man's dependence on a 
 superior power ; both point to the need of reconciliation with 
 the powers above. Inseparably linked with these rites is belief 
 in immortality. Whatever construction we put upon this belief, 
 it is invariably associated with religion, and shows itself in the 
 belief that man is destined to lead a happy life in the world to 
 come in the company of invisible spirits and the ancestors who 
 have gone before. Hence the worship of the dead, which is so 
 common amongst savages that it forms the centre round which 
 their religious ceremonial revolves. 6 Formerly it was said that 
 the negro races stood alone in denying the immortality of the 
 soul ; yet even they believe in it. The various funeral customs 
 that prevail in Africa and the South Sea Islands are, indeed, a 
 disgrace to humanity ; but they serve to show that these tribes 
 believe that there is a life beyond the grave. The African 
 religions have, therefore, long ceased to be classed as fetichism 
 pure and simple. In the obscure creeds of the black races, we 
 can now find distinct traces of serpent worship ; the duty of 
 reverencing ancestors is strongly inculcated ; a gloomy, morose 
 belief m a future life pervades them, yea, through the chinks 
 there dimly shines the recollection, never wholly extinguished, 
 of a supreme God who is equally the Father of white men and 
 of black men. 7 Then, too, the inhabitants of the islands dotted 
 
 6. W. Schneider, Der neuere Geiittrglavbe, Paderborn, 1885, p. a$ Nadajllac, L>i 
 
 trsten Mtnsckttt, Stuttgart, 1884, p. 408 stxj, 
 y. MAX Miillcr, Lc. p. 108.
 
 70 RELIGION AND HISTORY. 
 
 about the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Malays, Papuans, and 
 Polynesians have some notion of sacrifice and prayer, some 
 idea of a Divine Being ; they, too, are buoyed up by hope 
 in a life to come that will never end. And archaeology 
 enables us to discover the footprints of funeral rites even 
 in prehistoric times. 
 
 No people exist in whom the idea of morality has not 
 taken root. Ethics had long been the hinge on which 
 popular philosophy turned. Socrates limited philosophy 
 to ethics. Morality postulates faith, and is at once a proof 
 and a product of faith. The laws of man are founded on 
 the commandments of God, and, in point of time, religious 
 notions are prior to the distinction between good and evil. 
 The moral law is enthroned on a higher pedestal. 8 This is 
 indeed denied by some anthropologists of note, like Taylor 
 and Waitz ; but here again it is a question of defining 
 terms. Morality is often made to consist wholly of the 
 most trivial outward observances ; nevertheless it is found- 
 ed on the distinction between good and evil, as between 
 man and a power above him. With morality were fre- 
 quently bound up the dread of punishment and the desire 
 to be purified and redeemed. Thus religion became an 
 engine of education and a means of ameliorating the con- 
 dition of mankind. 
 
 The picture drawn of the moral life of savages is indeed 
 dark and full of horrors. But were civilized races any bet- 
 ter in the early ages ? Does not the idea of religion rise to 
 the surface of the surging floods ? May it not regain that 
 influence for good which it once had ? Cannibalism origi- 
 nally existed everywhere. It overran Europe and Asia, 
 devastating the fair provinces of Italy and France, Eng- 
 land and Germany. In the opinion of many savants, it 
 can be traced in the religion of the Old Testament. It was 
 flourishing in America when Columbus landed. It is still 
 a power in Africa, Asia, and Australia. 9 At the present 
 
 8 Peschel, Vdlkerkitnde, 3rd Edit., Leipzig, 1876, p. 964. 
 
 9 W. Schneider, Natttrv&lker, I. p. 121 seq., p. 186 seq. Schaaffhausen, Anthrofolo- 
 
 fiicAe Studien. Bonn. 1885, p. 516 seq. Nadaillac, I.e. p. 238 and 394 seq. Revue 
 des Deux Maudes t LXVI. (1884), p. 1405 seq. Max Mflller, Essays, I., 1879, p. 
 58 seq.
 
 RELIGION AND HISTORY. J I 
 
 day five millions and a quarter of men are its slaves. 
 At times men may have been instigated to it by hunger, or 
 a craving for human flesh, or by the desire to kill an 
 enemy out of revenge, and thus make his bravery their 
 own ; but at bottom its motive is superstitious and relig- 
 ious. Men make their gods as cruel as themselves, and 
 strive to propitiate them with human sacrifices. The Mexi- 
 cans offered up to their god a heart " in order to renew 
 the youth of the natural forces that sway the universe ;' ' 
 and they took the heart out of the noblest of living beings, 
 man. The same idea finds expression in the savage cruel- 
 ties perpetrated in the human sacrifices of the Aztecs, 
 cruelties that spread to an alarming extent among other 
 races and cities. The men themselves partook of the sacri- 
 ficial meal. Religion looms behind the ghastly human sac- 
 rifices that take place at funerals. As suicide among Hin- 
 dus has a religious motive, so the variety of views about 
 this life, and life in the world to come, accounts for all such 
 revolting barbarities in family and tribal life, and an ex- 
 planation of many of them must be sought in that love 
 which endures beyond the grave. 
 
 What, then, does religion mean ? In the wider acceptation 
 of the term, religion includes the distinction between good 
 and evil, and a confession that man is weak and dependent- 
 on higher powers who can influence his destiny ; another of 
 its ingredients is the belief that man will live after death. 
 In this sense religion is as old as mankind, or at any rate as 
 old as historic man. These radical constituent elements of 
 religion are visible to the naked eye on every page of history. 
 But, it will be asked, is not modern society saturated with 
 atheism ? Is not independent morality advocated by philoso- 
 phers ? In reply the counter-question might be urged : 
 Has there ever been a time or country in which men of 
 gigantic genius and wide knowledge have not believed in 
 the supernatural ? In presence of this striking fact, Renan 
 feels uneasy in his Deism. Littre felt it to be a rock too 
 firm for him to shake ; before his death it shook his views. 
 This happy result does not always come to pass ; but then 
 external causes block the way. Speaking generally we
 
 y RELIGION AND H'STORY. 
 
 make bold to affirm that thorough-going atheists are fewer than 
 is commonly supposed. They tell against the universal fact 
 of religion just as much and just as little as the existence of 
 unscrupulous men is a proof that no such thing as conscience 
 exists. Occasional cases of atheism are not inexplicable pheno- 
 mena. External surroundings, education, and one-sided studies, 
 bad example and prejudice, perversions and caricatures of 
 religion, and the pernicious effects of pride and evil living, are 
 quite sufficient to account for them. 
 
 But even these men reveal the religious basis within them in 
 the need they feel of providing a substitute for religion. The 
 educated classes, who have emancipated themselves from the 
 thraldom of religion, are, as all the world knows, hot-beds of 
 superstition. Are not the vagaries of modern spiritualism in 
 everybody's mouth ? But infidels look for a substitute elsewhere. 
 "We claim," says Strauss, "for our universe as much piety as 
 our old-fashioned friends demanded for their God. If you ask, 
 have we still any religion ? I answer yes or no, according to 
 what you understand by religion." In these words he has 
 described a heart-string that will never break. Does the new 
 faith, however, satisfy the aspirations of the human heart as well 
 as the old ? The answer to this question is no longer doubtful. 
 What consolation will aesthetic and literary tastes, or the worship 
 of genius bring to a man in the hour of trial ? How many out- 
 side the ranks of the " Upper Ten Thousand " could experience 
 this comfort ? But it is precisely by investigating the condition 
 of the unbelieving masses that we learn how religious feeling 
 must be deadened by distress and wretchedness, by education 
 and bad example, before the creed of atheism can be promul- 
 gated. Then fanaticism, licentiousness, and hatred of religion 
 usurp the throne of religion. The ideas that issue from the 
 human heart are so foul and perverse that they undermine 
 humanity as much as religion. As S. Augustine says : 10 " This 
 
 so. In Joan, tract, 106, 4 ad 17, 6. See Kleutgen, Pkilasophie dtr Voruit, and Edit. 
 Innsbruck, 1872, Vol. I., p. 347 *eq. Fischer, Dt Saluti injidtlium, Essen, i86,
 
 RELIGION AND HISTORY. 73 
 
 is the power of the true Godhead that it cannot be wholly 
 hidden from a rational creature who uses his reason. For, 
 excepting a few whose natures are seething masses of cor- 
 ruption, all men confess God to be the maker of the world. ' ' 
 The term atheism, when applied to whole peoples like 
 the Buddhists, has quite another meaning. Buddhists are 
 not atheists in our sense of the word, although Buddhism 
 began by denying the gods then in fashion. But the God- 
 head was driven from its sanctuary in the heart of man for 
 a time only, and from a moral motive. The abstract notion 
 of religion, indeed, is absent from Buddhism ; but Bud- 
 dhism is a reflexion of older religious ideas that practically 
 lead to religion. 11 Independent morality is even less com- 
 petent to disprove the fact that religion is universal. In all 
 the brighter periods of history the star of religion is in the 
 ascendant ; in the dark epochs it is on the wane. There is 
 no gainsaying the fact that culture and the moral regenera- 
 tion of man are inseparable from the history of Christian- 
 ity. There are men who, after rejecting Christianity, cause 
 the blush of shame to start into the cheeks of believers by 
 their minute observance of the natural law ; even they are 
 influenced by the Christianity that has created modern civ- 
 ilization, and is still, consciously or unconsciously, at work 
 in modern society. For the rest, comparisons do not go to 
 the root of the matter. But it remains to be seen whether 
 independent morality would be on a par with Christian 
 morality, after quenching every spark of Christianity in a 
 whole people. The phenomena of Nihilism and anarchy 
 do not promise well for the success of the experiment. 
 
 ii Max Mfiller, Einleitung, p. 127.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 RELIGION AND MAN. 
 
 Religion is co-extensive with man. Where man is, there 
 is Religion. Religion and man vanish together from the scene. 
 Religion being thus coeval with the human race, the difficulty 
 of tracing it to its source becomes proportionately greater. 
 Language and Religion carry us back to an age of which we 
 know nothing. We can often learn the earliest formation 
 of a language from its primitive roots, but such materials 
 are seldom at hand for a history of Religion. Many of the old 
 temples have disappeared, and the very names of mauy of the 
 ancient gods are buried in oblivion. In journeying, then, to- 
 wards the sources of Religion, the analogy of known religions is 
 our only guide. But both Aryan and Semitic names of God date 
 from historical times, when the human family was united, before 
 the great schism which shivered language into dialects, and 
 parted men asunder in race. The origin of Religion lies further 
 back than the known history of Religion. 
 
 Religion has an external and an internal side. It manifests 
 itself in symbolism, art, and mythology, in culture and in life ; 
 but its home is in the ideas, thoughts, and feelings of man. 
 Just as body and soul unite to form man, so all these 
 elements are necessary ingredients in the one idea. As the 
 soul's activity is dependent on the senses, and finds an outlet in 
 the bodily organs, so the idea of Religion necessarily finds ex- 
 pression in outward worship which, in its turn, is improved and 
 refined by religious life. But man's nature is on the side of the 
 senses, and thus outward motives and forms tend to disfigure
 
 RELIGION AND MAN. 75 
 
 or supplant the internal elements. This will serve to explain in 
 part why the origin of Religion has been sought in external 
 causes. Had we only the speculations of deists and illuminati 
 on this point, we might without further ado pass on to the order 
 of the day. But modern philosophers are not quite so clumsy. 
 They profess to explain by external causes, not so much the 
 origin as the formation of Religion, but they generally arrive at 
 the same conclusions, though in a roundabout way. Again, 
 external causes are of two kinds, according as they lie in 
 man's pride, or in his relation to nature. The form and 
 origin of religion are said to bear the impress of pride, ambition, 
 and that lust of dominion which is ingrained in priests and 
 lawgivers. 
 
 According, to the Sophists, Religion was invented by some 
 shrewd statesman. This theory was doubtless suggested by 
 the close union between Religion and the State, and by the 
 many abuses that were sheltered under the cloak of religion. 
 Moses, Zoroaster, and Numa gave laws in the name of God \ 
 Solon, Lycurgus, and others made Religion the basis of social 
 order. To deny the gods recognised by the State was deemed 
 a crime against the State. 1 As far as history gives any clue, 
 legislators and statesmen used existing Religions for their own 
 ends. How, in any other supposition, could Religion have 
 been held up as the motive of obedience to the laws ? How 
 could the ruler be said to hold the place of God, and to be 
 Prince by the Grace of God, if God Himself were not wor- 
 shipped as the Sovereign Lord ? Then, again, religion is univer- 
 sal. Would all statesmen have hit upon this brilliant idea ? 
 Is" it not more likely that Religion that powerful con- 
 nective which has linked men together in communities in 
 firmer bonds than even nature herself first made political 
 society possible? It would, indeed, have been surpassing 
 strange if all mankind had not only submitted to be enrolled 
 in Religion, but had also conceived a love for it as an affair of 
 
 i MAX TA.\&vc.--I*troditction. t* tkt Comparative Scitnct of Religion, p. 131.
 
 76 RELIGION AND MAN. 
 
 the mind and heart. Men believed in God long before 
 kings or "shepherds of men" had come into being. By 
 propagating belief in God, Religion has welded together 
 peoples and states, and laid a solid foundation for law and 
 jurisprudence. 
 
 With the priesthood, however, the case seems otherwise. 
 In ancient times, priests were often the tools of statesmen, 
 and humoured the whims of tyrants, and at times even held 
 the reins of power, but the antagonism between the two 
 orders was never wholly effaced ; and everywhere we can 
 perceive a tendency to set Religion on a more exalted ped- 
 estal. Here, too, we are confronted by the same dilemma ; 
 priests did not manufacture Religion, but Religion created 
 priests. Religion is a priest's raison d'etre. As an exclu- 
 sive caste they are a phenomenon of history ; but Religion 
 is older than history. The Brahmans, the most powerful 
 caste of priests that ever existed, subjected the Hindus to a 
 religious bondage without parallel in history, and in justify- 
 ing themselves pleaded the authority of the Vedas, their 
 canonical books, that is of Religion. If in the olden time 
 when priests were not, the heads of families be accounted 
 as priests, then it becomes still more perplexing to discover 
 what external causes could have induced them to invent 
 Religion. The idea of a Priest implies the need of media- 
 tion betwixt God and man ; to this need priests minister, 
 but they cannot have created it. In like manner if fam- 
 ily life were the cause of Religion, family life must 
 have existed both before religion and without it. Hith- 
 erto, however, no one has succeeded in proving that the 
 family life of the most ancient peoples was devoid of re- 
 ligion. It has been already shown that the stories about 
 savages living in herds without religion are fabulous. Any- 
 how the question put long ago by S. John Chrysostom" still 
 remains unanswered : Why have animals, that are without 
 religion, never adopted family life ? As far as our knowl- 
 edge goes, families cling to the Religion they have in- 
 herited, and practise the worship in vogue. The heart 
 
 2 Homil 19, i, In Joanncnt.
 
 RELIGION AND MAN. 77 
 
 is admirably adapted to keep alive the fire of Religion, and 
 to test the power of faith. Nowadays many tribes have no 
 priests, for the title can hardly be given to the Shamans. But 
 even a caricature such as this discloses the religious needs of 
 the human heart. Even the Shamans utilized the religious 
 ideas already existing ; they did not invent the principle. 
 
 Some authors steer a middle course by tracing Religion to a 
 compact that priests and rulers struck with the people, or that 
 the people agreed upon among themselves. Thus Religion would 
 seem to have furthered the ambition and ministered to the wants 
 of subjects and rulers alike. But the palpable absurdity of this 
 theory is evident after a little reflection. Such a convention 
 could last only so long as it was necessary. Ambition is too 
 weak a plaster to cement divergent interests. Religion is too 
 deeply rooted in the heart of man to have been created^ by 
 agreement. No individual of himself, could ever have con- 
 ceived a religious idea, unless it had been previously suggested 
 to him ; so it is futile to imagine religious ideas asserting, from 
 within, their ascendancy over an entire people and all mankind. 
 Religion could not have gained a commanding spiritual power 
 over the whole human race if it had been merely an invented 
 device, or the outcome of ambition. 
 
 At first blush, the theory that Religion has grown out of 
 man's relation to nature, seems more plausible. Man is de- 
 pendent on nature ; the earth's products provide him with food 
 and clothing ; climate in many ways determines his character ; 
 the mighty forces of nature tell on his mental disposition. 
 Now, unquestionably, the religious ideas of the ancients, and 
 and the superstitious belief of many peoples, to all appearances, 
 depend on these conditions. The great contrasts between 
 the two lands of Irania and Turania may have contributed 
 iargely to the dualism in the Iranian religion. Perhaps the 
 plains of the Ganges favoured quiet meditation and mys- 
 ticism, and the Arabian deserts invited to contemplation. 
 Mohammed's Religion may have derived its warmth from the
 
 75 RELIGION AND MAN. 
 
 burning Arabian sun. Northern Religions bear a different 
 stamp from those of the South. The Greek mythology recalls 
 the genial climate of Greece. The founders of Religion are 
 sons of the East, and are distributed within a comparatively 
 narrow zone. But, be it noted, we are here dealing, not with 
 the origin of Religion, but with a reformation ; a new form of 
 Religion. Even this latter is but loosely bound up with the 
 physical conditions of the country. The three Monotheistic 
 Religions took their rise in the heart of the Semitic races ; but, 
 says Renan, the tendency to Monotheism was not exclusively 
 an endowment of race. With Phoenicians, Chaldaeans, and 
 Assyrians the case is different. Endowments of race and phy- 
 sical conditions are but the preliminaries, not the causes of Reli- 
 gion. 3 Christianity sprang from a particular Religion, and yet 
 it was established and propagated as a universal Religion. 
 
 Still less satisfactory is the hypothesis that Religion originated 
 in intense dread of the dangers to which life is liable from local 
 and atmospheric conditions. No one denies that the mighty 
 forces of nature strike terror into man and beast What is 
 more obvious than that dread of an unknown power makes man 
 humble and submissive? Necessity, says the proverb, is the 
 mother of invention. Hence, since the days of Lucretius and 
 Petronius, it has often been alleged that fear is the cause and 
 basis of Religion. But the fear of the Lord, not the fear of 
 danger, is the beginning of wisdom. If man recognises the 
 action of a supernatural power in things harmful and useful, the 
 idea of the supernatural must, consciously or unconsciously, be 
 already present to his mind, or he could in no way apprehend it. 
 Anyhow there must be in the soul of man a lurking suspicion 
 that he is dependent on some superior and invisible power. The 
 phenomena of nature only prove forcibly that it exists. This 
 feeling of dependence, so essential to the notion of Religion, is 
 strengthened indeed, but not in the first instance pro- 
 Max MQlltr Essays, vol I, page 336 ; Vol II., p. 426. LoUc MicrKetm** IL, p 
 f S57t
 
 RELIGION AND MAN. 79 
 
 duced by man's experience of his own helplessness in pre- 
 tence of the powers of nature. When noxious or dangerous 
 influences gain the upper hand, they have a more enduring 
 effect, and the fear of the natural man swells in proportion. Is 
 it then surprising that fear should be the first and, in some races, 
 the only religious feeling ? The desire to aid and protect self 
 against evil influences naturally follows. In this way a belief 
 in good and evil spirits may easily arise. But it can arise only 
 where their pre-exists a belief in supernatural beings able to 
 influence the life of man. With more probability we may say 
 with Kant that man was forced to worship great invisible beings 
 by a fear based on the knowledge of] his own impotence. 
 Thus fear would be the occasion ; nevertheless to it must be 
 joined the dread of the unknown and invisible, of the mighty 
 and inaccessible*. Such a dread cannot be purely subjective ; 
 it roust have some foundation in fact. The man of faith never 
 ceases to fear the Infinite and the Holy. 
 
 The feeling of dependence and belief in God must have 
 come from a primitive revelation. Man, whose whole being re- 
 poses in God, who is indebted to God for existence, has a con- 
 scious feeling of being dependent on God, his Lord and Crea- 
 tor. " All men stand in need of the Gods." Man is so 
 fashioned that on every side he feels dependent on something 
 outside himself. In every human breast the words of the 
 Psalmist find an echo : " He has made us, not we ourselves." 
 This is man's first glimpse and sense of the divinity that 
 sensus communis without which all Religion is impossible. 
 
 Without some psychological cause] and foundation Religion, 
 both in its beginning and its development, is inconceivable. 
 The cause and the foundation of all religious ideas, from the 
 lowest and most material to the most spiritual and sublime, 
 is the human soul and its powers. Religious ideas vajry because 
 they are reflex ideas of the visible world, which vary according 
 
 4 Bleek, Vergl*ieh*g dtt s*da.jritniKbtn Sfrathett i86. See Max
 
 00 RELIGION AND MAN. 
 
 to mental capacity and the dispositions of the heart. But 
 their origin lies elsewhere. Between God and the soul of 
 man, between Creator and creature there exists a natural 
 affinity. Supernatural revelation, taking this affinity for 
 granted, completes and elevates it. Without some such 
 primitive natural revelation there is no transition from the 
 phenomena of nature to the idea of God. The idea of God 
 is indeed connected with natural phenomena, but it did 
 not exclusively originate therewith. The wonderful powers 
 of nature were inexplicable to man without the operation 
 of superior beings ; but for that reason not the natural 
 bodies, but he to whom they belong was adored. The idea 
 of God preceded the deification of nature. Light and 
 darkness are symbols of joy and fear ; but the supreme 
 God of the Aryans is Dyaus, Zeus, Jupiter, Tyr, the illumi- 
 nator, brightness*. 
 
 May not the ideas of the supernatural and the spiritual be 
 more successfully explained by Reverence, which is a nobler 
 passion than fear ? Reverence is shown chiefly to the dis- 
 tinguished members of the family or tribe. Owing to the 
 general belief in the immortality of the soul it reaches even 
 beyond the grave, because a mysterious intercourse is 
 thought to exist between the two worlds. This reverence, 
 coupled with fear, first finds expression at the funeral solem- 
 nities, at the funeral banquet, or at the funeral sacrifices. 
 May not religion, then, have been gradually evolved from 
 ancestor-worship ? Worship of ancestors may have had a 
 large share in shaping the formation of Religion ; but it still 
 leaves the origin of Religion unexplained. Religion no- 
 where consists in mere ancestor-worship. Heroes are dei- 
 fied, but they are not gods. Beloved relatives are gathered 
 to their fathers ; but they do not constitute the whole 
 of the kingdom of the next world. Even the crudest re- 
 ligions exhibit some traces of a belief in a supernatural 
 being who is above all men and also above the spirits 
 
 * In the foregoing remarks the author uses language that might easily be interpreted as 
 that of an advocate of an inborn idea. But such is not necessarily the meaning and 
 force of the words. (Tr.)
 
 RELIGION AND MAN. Si 
 
 of the departed. But, with savagery on the increase, the 
 tendency would be to supplant the worship of the gods by 
 ancestor-worship. From this cause many tribes, e.g., 
 Kafirs, Negroes, and Polynesians have been classed as 
 having no Religion. 8 But even here the religious basis is 
 discernible. Ancestors were substituted for gods because 
 they were thought to have greater power. For if Rever- 
 ence be the main cause of the worship of ancestors lately 
 departed, the sense of relationship will grow familiar the 
 further the ancestral line recedes into the dim past, till all 
 distinction is lost and those at the end of the series are 
 identified with divinity. From being conscious of a rela- 
 tive dependence on ancestors, man gradually became con- 
 scious of a tribal dependence on the supreme head of the 
 tribe the eternal god. Worship of ancestors did not 
 originate in dreams, as Darwin supposes ; nor again was 
 worship of the gods begotten of ancestor-worship ; for 
 both pre-suppose objective beings. And was not the sight 
 of the havoc wrought by death throughout the kingdom 
 of nature calculated to destroy the idea that ancestors con- 
 tinued to live and hold the reins of power after death ? 
 
 From this there is but a short step to the idealistic theory 
 of Religion, in support of which two spiritual forces are 
 brought into requisition. Buckle stands sponsor for the 
 imagination, and Peschel for the understanding. Un- 
 bridled fancy is most ill-suited for such a work. How can 
 an idea that meets the wants and satisfies the aspirations 
 of the hearts of all men be the creation of the freaks of the 
 imagination ? Knowledge must give place to scepticism if 
 the grandest ideas and the noblest and mightiest affections 
 have arisen or can possibly arise from the whims of a dis- 
 eased imagination. But with a widespread Shamanism 
 staring us in the face we may with sincerity echo the 
 lament of Peschel : " Amid incessant aberrations of the 
 
 5 Odyssey III., 45. Max Miiller, Lectures on the Science of Language. Vol. II., p. 
 405. Schelling gives the psychological explanation in his introduction to the Philosophy 
 of Mythology. Delff, Grundztige der Entwicklungsgeschichte der Religion. Leip- 
 zig, 1883.
 
 82 RELIGION AND MAN. 
 
 intellect we are well nigh overwhelmed by the melancholy 
 thought that the human mind is a machine which can act 
 in only one way when the motives acting upon it are sim- 
 ilar.'" But Shamanism has reference to the form of Re- 
 ligion, not to Religion itself. A grain of truth is imbedded 
 in Shamanism. It should be borne in mind that moral 
 shortcomings as well as the intellect are responsible for 
 these aberrations. 
 
 Here, again, it is fair to ask : Why do mankind gener- 
 ally transform the products of fancy into objective realities 
 in religious matters only ? Why are not the castles they 
 build in the air made to undergo the same process ? And 
 should not their experience of castle-building have had the 
 effect of guarding them against investing religious ideas 
 with the garb of reality ? If, in daily life, as men grow 
 older, they shelve the fancies of childhood, and test the 
 dreams of youth by the mature judgments of age, why 
 should not the life of humanity run on the same lines ? 
 Otherwise Religion must retire before the advance of sci- 
 ence. History demonstrates, however, that it is precisely 
 the Religions of civilized peoples which are the most per- 
 fect. As a rule the decline of Religion has been accom- 
 panied by a moral decadence and a declining civilization. 
 Now turn the question round : Should we not expect fancy 
 to be most prolific in children and in the infirm ? If, as 
 Herbert Spencer maintains, Religion was generated by the 
 dreams of the savage and his reflections on his own shadow, 
 it must of necessity lose all hold on the educated. In a 
 dream, it is true, the soul is in a manner separated from 
 the body and can roam at large over the universe ; but 
 when a man wakes he knows that it was a dream and noth- 
 ing more. Reflexion on his own shadow will not make a 
 savage think of a being without a shadow any more than 
 imagining a well-loaded table will appease the cravings of 
 hunger. 
 
 6 See S. Thomas, Sumtn. Tkeol., I., p. n, a, i. Peschel, p. 278. Tiele, Compendium 
 der Religions Wissenschaft, p. 19 (Weber's translation). Lippert, Die Religion dtv 
 turopaifc/ien CulturvSlker, 1881, p. 414.
 
 RELIGION AND MAN. 83 
 
 The mind of man is wholly under the dominion of the 
 principle of causality. Philosophy, according to Plato, 
 begins in wonder. The philosophic meditations of every 
 child begin in wonder. " There is," says S. Thomas, " in 
 the nature of man a desire to know the cause of the effects 
 that he sees ; in this way the sense of wonder arises." 
 The Whither and the Whence, the Why and the Wherefore 
 are questions that persistently press the mind for solution. 
 But it is easier to ask these questions than to answer them. 
 All things cannot be successfully traced to their causes. 
 Hence the ordinary mind is disposed to invent causes arbi- 
 trarily. Setting out from its own self-consciousness the 
 mind arrives, as it were by unconscious steps, at the con- 
 clusion that phenomena are caused by a superior spiritual 
 being. It even brings itself to look upon natural objects 
 without life, e.g. stones, earth and water, as endowed with 
 a soul ; in the life of nature and the wondrous movements 
 of the heavenly bodies it recognizes the agency of a power- 
 ful spirit. The need of causality works at first instinctively 
 in the mind ; then it flies boldly forward, ever ascending 
 higher and higher till at length it soars up to the highest 
 cause. " If," says S. Thomas, " the understanding of a 
 rational creature cannot reach at the first cause of things, 
 the desire of its nature will remain unsatisfied." A vague 
 longing for reasons, an effort to transcend human experi- 
 ence, and an instinctive impulse to explain the visible by 
 the invisible are one of the chief sources of mythology. 
 The oldest parts of the Rigveda and Zendavesta are taken 
 up with numerous questions on the Whence and the 
 Whither. 7 According to Hegel and Schopenhauer, the 
 chief cause of Religion is a yearning for metaphysics ; Re- 
 ligion being, in their view, only popular and allegorical 
 metaphysics. And Liebmann concludes there must be 
 faith, as knowledge is impossible. 
 
 It cannot be denied that there is some force in considera- 
 tions of this kind. S. Thomas has been quoted of set pur- 
 
 j Max Miller, 1. c. p. 386 ; Essays, vol. I., p. 27, 219. Gloatz I., p. 187.
 
 84 RELIGION AND MAN. 
 
 pose, because the proofs for the existence of God will afford 
 an opportunity of enquiring more searchingly why the 
 schoolmen laid such great stress on the law of causality. 
 But it is already clear that the inferences drawn from cau- 
 sality are wider than the premisses warrant. How could 
 the principle of causality alone, apart from all idea of the 
 supernatural and the Divine, enable man to attain this 
 solution of the world's enigma ? Unless man first believed 
 in his own soul, he could not think that natural objects 
 have souls ; the world would not appear to him to be the 
 work of God unless he regarded spirit as superior to mat- 
 ter. To such heights of abstract thought uncivilized people 
 could never have climbed ; civilized peoples must have 
 perceived that it was a pure abstraction and rejected it 
 accordingly. Neither does this theory square with the 
 childhood of the human race ; for the writings of civilized 
 nations make it quite certain that Religion nowhere began 
 with the deification of nature. Mythology is not a begin- 
 ning but a deviation from religion, the sources of which 
 are not at present thoroughly explored. A crushing refu- 
 tation of this theory is found in the fact that the Religion 
 of a people grows in refinement in proportion as it advances 
 in civilization. Even the most rigid science, culminating 
 in a general scrutiny of causes, has not succeeded in ren- 
 dering Religion superfluous. Science, in its progress, has 
 dashed to the ground the poetic conception of nature ; 
 mythology lies like a prostrate Dagon before it ; but the 
 only answer itself vouchsafes to the most momentous prob- 
 lems is that the answer is unknowable. The master-minds 
 of all ages have sought the causes of things, and believed. 
 Neither telescope, microscope, nor spectroscope, neither 
 chemical analysis nor experimental physics will ever wholly 
 satisfy the desire, ingrained in man's nature, to know the 
 cause. Reason, however enlightened it may be, cannot 
 unravel the riddle of the universe without the aid of faith. 
 Belief in God, the Creator and ruler of the universe, gives 
 a fresh spurt to science, and stimulates it to deeper en- 
 quiries. Copernicus boasted that his system tallied with
 
 RELIGION AND MAN. 85 
 
 the Divine wisdom better than the fanciful artistic theories 
 and complicated constructions that had gone before, be- 
 cause it exhibited harmony and order prevailing in the uni- 
 verse. Should science succeed in reducing all the forces 
 of nature to one single fundamental force it will proclaim 
 in a more beautiful manner the wisdom of the Creator, 
 which has made this magnificent world from such insig- 
 nificant materials. But it must be insisted that enquiry 
 has its limits. 
 
 Seek not the wherefore, race of human kind ; 
 
 Could ye have seen the whole, no need had been 
 
 For Mary to bring forth. 8 
 
 The foregoing solution of the problem labours also under 
 another disadvantage. It is merely intellectual, and leaves 
 wholly out of sight the important factor of moral conscious- 
 ness. Fear may perhaps have a supernatural origin, still 
 it can only explain the distinction between the useful and 
 the harmful ; but it is not a whit less imperative to fathom 
 the distinction between good and evil, which is as univer- 
 sal as the law of causality. The moral strivings of the 
 whole human race, and its longing for the good, the 
 perfect and the infinite cannot possibly have for their 
 groundwork an intellectual fiction. Self-denial and the 
 renunciation of the world, heroism and martyrdom re- 
 quire stronger motives than a mental illusion ; otherwise 
 morality and civilization, character and culture would 
 always keep pace one with the other and blend in equal 
 proportions. But who would maintain such a proposition 
 as this ? And, what is more to the point, who would under- 
 take to prove it ? God has chosen the weak and foolish 
 that He may confound the strong and the wise. 
 
 Religion, then, is a spiritual force and disposition inherent 
 in all men, and not only independent of sense and intellect 
 but, by its very nature, sharply antagonistic to both. If 
 this disposition were stamped out of the soul, idolatry, 
 even in its most degraded form, would be impossible. All 
 
 8 Dante, Purgatorio, Hi., 35-37. Gary's Translation.
 
 86 RELIGION AND MAN. 
 
 Religions strike a chord in the soul which is in unison with 
 the soul's effort to conceive the inconceivable and to utter 
 the unspeakable ; it matters not whether this effort be 
 denominated a morbid curiosity about the absolute, or a 
 yearning for the Infinite, or the Love of God. 9 
 
 The chief element of Religion consists in the idea that a 
 moral order pervades the universe. Faith itself is an act 
 of the will, and moral obedience a victory of man over 
 nature. The tendency of the finite to develop and unite 
 itself to the infinite is not enough to constitute Religion, 
 unless it be joined to the consciousness of man's own little- 
 ness and infirmity. Thus, the consciousness of sin and the 
 desire of forgiveness will necessarily be awakened. The 
 existence of sin and evil, the desire to account for their 
 existence, and if possible, to obliterate them are, as Hart- 
 mann observes, at the bottom of all Religions. The con- 
 sciousness of sin is founded on conscience, that is, the 
 struggle between the outward and the inward man. Mo- 
 rality and conscience are the weak points in the unbeliever's 
 armour ; here he can be safely attacked.* This is the rock 
 on which all idealistic theories are wrecked. If religion be 
 regarded as a compromise between the feeling of depend- 
 ence on the world and the desire for liberty on the one 
 hand, and the consciousness of dependence on God and 
 independence of the world on the other, then either Re- 
 ligion is being already taken for granted, or we are wan- 
 dering in the maze of a mere mental process, inasmuch as 
 we become conscious of the contradiction that exists be- 
 tween spirit and matter, and thus feel constrained to seek 
 a refuge from the struggle in Religion. But then the idea 
 of morality and the general character of Religion are still 
 unexplained. The truth of Christ makes those free who 
 are not of this world ; but this truth is not a product of 
 human thought, but a power from above. 
 
 9 Max Miiller, Einleitttng, p. 15 ; ssaj>s. Vol. i, p. xxviii, and 218. Liebmann, A nal- 
 ysii der Wirklichkeit. Strassburg, 1880, p. 614. Steude, Ein Problem der allge- 
 mrinen Religions Wissenschaft^ Leipzig, 1881, p. 62. Gutberlet 1. c. p. 98. 
 
 * Voseu, Steude.
 
 RELIGION AND MAN. 87 
 
 The back of the latest idealistic theory, if so it can be 
 called, I mean the theory of evolution in natural and re- 
 ligious history, is broken by what has already been said. 
 The evolution hypothesis professes to explain the general 
 character of Religion in the same way as it explains the 
 intellectual and moral elements. It asserts that Religion 
 has been built up from that same animal instinct which is 
 the stepping-stone to thought and volition. Hence this 
 solution would seem to embody all the internal elements 
 of the previous solutions, and to explain both the origin 
 and the development of Religion by the mutual co-opera- 
 tion of external causes and the internal life of man. It 
 would open out a perspective through the whole doctrine 
 of descent into the vast field of the comparative science of 
 Religion, accounting for the gradual beginning of Religion 
 by the former, and its progressive development by the 
 latter. Both assume that general barbarism was the first 
 stage in the history of the human race, and that man has 
 gradually developed from a condition resembling that of 
 the brute. Such is the line of thought followed by Spen- 
 cer, Tiele, Seidel, Lippert, and many others, who maintain 
 that Religion has a natural origin. Their systems will be 
 examined in detail later on. Here we can merely give an 
 outline of the chief points that tell in favour of Religion. 
 
 First of all, it must be borne in mind that Religion ex- 
 ists among all races of men, even the lowest, and that it is 
 not found in any class of animals, even the highest. Nor 
 is this all. Exalted ideas of Religion and morality are 
 discovered at times even among the most degraded peoples. 
 We have already cited the Africans as an instance in point. 
 Comparatively speaking, the same is also true of the Ind- 
 ians. Existing theories on the ideas of man in his primi- 
 tive state have been substantially modified by recent re- 
 searches among the Papuans. The curious and wonder- 
 ful carvings of New Ireland not only exhibit the artistic 
 sense of that people, but are also a manifestation of the 
 entire range of their mental activity. There is a richness 
 of ideas such as the most civilized races of the two hemi-
 
 88 RELIGION AND MAN. 
 
 spheres, Egyptians, Assyrians, and Mayas have fully ma- 
 tured. 10 The inhabitants of the Solomon Islands are said 
 to show great taste and astonishing ability. The Papuan 
 conception of God is said to attain its zenith among the 
 Fiji Islanders ; even in its cosmogony it is far superior to 
 the crude worship of the God of Heaven that obtains with 
 most African savages. The graduated scale devised by 
 Lubbock, viz., atheism, idolatry, anthropomorphism, cre- 
 ator, has proved untenable. 
 
 The Positivists are equally inaccurate in making all Re- 
 ligion begin with Fetichism. From the beginning Fetich- 
 ism (Portuguese Feiti9o, to charm) has been undefinable. 
 It must rest on historical and psychological antecedents. 
 No Religion is wholly devoid of Fetichism ; no Religion 
 is wholly composed of it. Both are founded on the nature 
 of man. For man, being a creature of sense, desires to 
 have a symbol of the spirit that transcends matter, a God 
 present in visible form. As a created being man is, of 
 course, but too much inclined to confound the creature 
 with the Creator. Nevertheless both artistic and natural 
 Fetichism pre-suppose a higher spiritual being, a creator. 
 Setting out from what is most perfect we transfer some of 
 its qualities to the finite. Man ascribes to God the form 
 of man, and attributes a humanized divinity to nature. 
 Consequently Religion is not man's impress on matter, 
 but the triumphant reaction of the soul on things which it 
 makes participate in its own nature. Animism joined to 
 Fetichism does not, as Tiele contends, explain the origin 
 but the decline of Religion. The more man loses the idea 
 of an absolute spirit, the more he feels the necessity of 
 endowing nature with spirits and devising means of inter- 
 course with them. But to do this belief in spirits must 
 previously exist. Worship of ancestors is little to the pur- 
 pose in explaining this belief. The widespread idea that 
 Fetichism is universal is erroneous. This theory has itself 
 
 10 Bastian, Die Inselgruppen in Oceattien. Berlin, 1883, p. 4 and p. 161, 820. Die 
 heiligf Sage der Polynesier. Berlin, 1881, p. 76. Gloatz, p. 944 and 1008. Na- 
 daillac, p. 235. Schneider II.. p. 355.
 
 RELIGION AND MAN. 89 
 
 become " a sort of scientific Fetichism, which, like most 
 fetiches, owes its existence to ignorance and superstition." " 
 
 The lower the figure at which man's original condition 
 is appraised, the more difficult grows the task of explain- 
 ing the history and development of religion. Hitherto 
 no one but Munchausen has succeeded in lugging him- 
 self out of a bag by his own hair. Now history pictures 
 man as civilized from the very beginning. Modern ethnog- 
 raphy has even made it probable that the civilization of 
 Asia and America was far more extensive than has been 
 supposed. In the middle of the seventh century, A.D., a 
 Chinese Buddhist undertook a journey through Central 
 Asia to India, in order to study Buddhism at its source. 
 He wrote an account of his travels in the Pilgrim s Book, 
 from which it is clear that the races of Central Asia were 
 at that time in an advanced state of civilization. The 
 Tartar hordes, at whose name the modern world shudders, 
 were not barbarians, but well skilled in the chief arts and 
 institutions of civilized society. 12 Whether we consult the 
 Bible or the ancient documents of the East, we find the 
 tribes everywhere represented as being already in posses- 
 sion of a civilization and a developed form of religion. 
 
 The comparative science of Religion has done good ser- 
 vice by shewing that the fundamental elements of religron 
 were common to all ancient civilized races. If we trace 
 back to the earliest period the three forms of religion, the 
 Aryan, the Semitic, and the Turanian, we find a common 
 root for religion ; but the primitive man without religion, 
 the " homo alalus," speechless man, the man who is half an 
 animal, is nowhere to be found. The divinities that are 
 the most ancient are likewise the most spiritual. Nor is 
 the force of this argument weakened by the evolutionists' 
 contention that civilization is the work, not of one people, 
 but of the whole human race. 18 True, all the ages and 
 
 11 Max Miiller, Origin and development of Religion, 1881, p. 89. Controverse (1886), 
 
 p. 171. Schneider II., p. 373. 
 
 12 Max Muller, Essays, vol. I., p. 246. 
 
 13 Schaffhausen, Anthropologische Studien. Bonn. 1885, p. 99, 418 seq.
 
 90 RELIGION AND MAN. 
 
 peoples that had the natural conditions for such develop- 
 ment, have worked to this common end, but the founda- 
 tion must have been already laid, the means already to 
 hand. Neither natural forces working harmoniously to- 
 gether in space and time, nor the struggles of animals to 
 feed and propagate themselves have ever produced a 
 higher civilization or a superior force in nature. What is 
 lowly can be ennobled only by something above itself, 
 and then only if the necessary conditions are present. 
 Who would have separated the first man from the animal 
 world ? Here we are content to pass over the further ques- 
 tion as to the progress or decline of religious development. 
 That it was not gradual is evinced by the history of Chris- 
 tianity. Christianity arrayed itself in opposition to Juda- 
 ism and heathenism, promulgated a new doctrine and new 
 commandments, and thereby set society on a new basis, 
 and renewed the face of the earth. To try to explain the 
 irresistible onward march of Christianity by natural de- 
 velopment would be labour lost. 
 
 Perhaps it will be insisted that the scientific hypotheses 
 of evolutionists are better than their history. What then 
 are the religious instincts of animals ? Evolutionists tell 
 us of love, gratitude, attachment, and so forth. Now a 
 great deal in these hypotheses may be safely relegated to 
 the domain of anecdote or fable : still, a grain of truth 
 remains. The question may be studied from two points 
 of view : the relation of animals to one another and to 
 man. Animals are frequently said to show parental, filial, 
 and conjugal love. Nor is the tendency of many to socia- 
 bility to be denied. But the idea of Religion is still a long 
 way off. A deal of sentimentality is required to perceive 
 human feelings in animals. These instincts serve one pur- 
 pose and one only, viz., preservation of self and of the 
 race. Once this purpose is fulfilled the instinct comes to 
 a standstill. Conjugal love lasts as long as the breeding 
 season ; the love of parents ceases with the maintenance 
 of their young. As soon as the young can feed them- 
 selves, all intercourse between parents and their offspring
 
 RELIGION AND MAN. 91 
 
 is at an end. There is not the faintest trace of offspring 
 supporting their parents, or showing them reverence. 
 The social instinct, or the tendency to congregate, is most 
 highly developed in certain kinds of insects. But can the 
 republic of bees be in any way compared with even the 
 most primitive society or state of man ? Here are nature 
 and instinct, and nothing besides. Without education or 
 training each member of the hive performs the task allotted 
 to it, and the function adapted to its organism. Man must 
 be unduly degraded, and the brute unduly exalted, before 
 troops of monkeys can be put on the same level with sup- 
 posed hordes of savages. But even then Religion cannot 
 be derived from the social instinct. Again, the dog's 
 attachment to its master, its gratitude which can go so 
 far as voluntarily to endure death from hunger, how differ- 
 ent from even the negroes' fetichism ! We look in vain 
 for the essential constituent of Religion, the idea of the 
 supernatural. If Religion were merely the feeling of de- 
 pendence, its analogy might be found in the dog ; but de- 
 pendence is only one element in the idea, and is itself the 
 effect and consequence of the relation existing between 
 man and God, between Creator and creature. For Re- 
 ligion is not a feeling of sense, but a reflex feeling, the 
 expression of spiritual experience. The animal does not 
 rise above sense. It is constant training alone that pro- 
 duces the feeling of dependency. An animal never arrives 
 at abstraction, or a judgment of universal relations ; the 
 dog never regards its master as its God. An animal, then, 
 has no Religion, and no basis for Religion, otherwise we 
 should long ago have caught a glimpse of it in the higher 
 animals, e.g., the dog or the ape. No sign of what we 
 mean by worship has been discovered in animals, although 
 the most degraded tribes are never without it, at least in a 
 rude form. Prayer, that involuntary expression of relig- 
 ious feeling, is wholly wanting in the animal kingdom. 
 Of prayer for the dead, of a presentiment of existence after 
 death, not a trace is to be found. 
 
 Man's Religion, then, is neither the outcome of an his-
 
 92 RELIGION AND MAN. 
 
 torical development of the human race, nor the product of 
 a gradual refinement of instinct. The able rationalistic 
 scholar, Maurice Vernes, has rightly said : To speak of 
 the evolution and growth of Religion is hazardous ; but to 
 presume to throw light on its origin is insufferable. Men 
 are not yet agreed as to the nature of the Vedastic, Bud- 
 dhistic and Egyptian Religions ; yet they pretend to know 
 the origin of Religion itself. The genealogical classifica- 
 tion of Religions a gently sloping ladder too artificially 
 constructed is illusory, and the existence of primitive 
 types a deception. An objective reason in man himself, 
 that is a specific disposition of human nature, must be 
 assumed. Scientists may, if they please, follow Dahl in 
 calling this human instinct. There is no need to quarrel 
 about names. Anyhow this instinct, if so it be called, is 
 the greatest gift God has bestowed on Man. 1 * Without 
 this divine gift Religion is inexplicable and the history of 
 mankind an enigma. Two elements go to make it up ; a 
 subjective disposition and an objective fact. It is as irra- 
 tional to describe Religion simply as a deceit and an error 
 of many years' standing, as to seek its origin in the ordinary 
 endowments of the mind. Religion is intelligible only if 
 it have for its foundation a special objective Being govern- 
 ing all his thoughts and actions, to Whom man is involun- 
 tarily drawn and Who has revealed himself mediately and 
 immediately to him. Religion presupposes a natural foun- 
 dation and disposition, but is not merely evolved there- 
 from. The Religion that generally goes by the name of 
 " Natural Religion" does not exist in history. It is an 
 abstraction of enlightened Deism, a gloomy theory of 
 shallow Rationalism which has drained Religion of truth 
 and life ; or it is a postulate of evolutionists who admit 
 
 14 Dahl, NothtuendigkeU der Religion, tine letzte Conseguenez der darwinistitcke* 
 Lehre. Heidelberg, 1886, p. 100. J. Fritz, A us antiker Weltanschauung. Die 
 Entwicklung des jildischen und griechischen Volkeszum Manotheismus nach den 
 neuesten Forschungen. Hagen, 1886, p. i, seq., t6a M. Mflller, Estays, p. xxviu. 
 
 tion.)
 
 RELIGION AND MAN. 93 
 
 neither what is specifically human nor specifically divine. 
 " Natural Religion" is in the first place a negation of 
 supernatural Religion ; consequently a mere logical func- 
 tion or entity. The promoters and propagators, to say 
 nothing of the founders of almost all Religions have ap- 
 pealed to revelation. The principles of natural Religion 
 alone have never formed a real historical Religion. They 
 only prove that supernatural Religion requires a natural 
 basis in man himself. Gratia supponit naturam. The true 
 Religion must be of greater value than this miserable rem- 
 nant. Religion must be a light for the understanding and 
 a power for the will. It must not only teach man to know 
 God, but also to put himself in the right relation to God. 
 Religion must interpose the grace and benignity of God 
 between man and God, declare the conditions necessary 
 for partaking of it, and give power to make grace effica- 
 cious. The union of man with God, the eternal happiness 
 of man is the highest end of Religion. It is not merely a 
 communication of supernatural truths ; nor pure morality, 
 as Kant teaches ; nor the mere feeling of dependence as 
 Schleiermacher contends ; but it embraces all the powers 
 of man, and lays hold of man's powers and faculties in 
 their utmost depths. Its aim is to lift man above what is 
 earthly and sensible to what is eternal and divine.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 
 
 Only the fool says: "There is no God."* "All men 
 " are vain, in whom there is not the knowledge of 
 " God : and who by these good things that are seen, 
 " could not understand him that is, neither by attend- 
 " ing to the works have acknowledged who was the 
 " workman : But have imagined either the fire, or the 
 " wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or 
 " the great waters, or the sun and moon, to be the 
 " gods that rule the world. "f 
 
 " Because that which is known of God is manifest 
 "in them. For God hath manifested it unto them. 
 " For the invisible things of his from the creation of 
 " the world are clearly seen, being understood by the 
 " things that are made : His eternal power also and 
 " divinity ; so that they are inexcusable. Because 
 " that, when they knew God, they have not glorified 
 " him as God, or given thanks ; but became vain in 
 " their thoughts, and their foolish heart was dark- 
 "ened."t 
 
 " Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things 
 " you are too superstitious. For passing by and see- 
 " in S y ur idols, I found an altar also on which was 
 " written : To the unknown God. What therefore you 
 " worship, without knowing it, that I preach to you. 
 " God, who made the world and all things therein, 
 " seeing He is Lord of Heaven and earth, dwelleth 
 
 * Ps. S a, i. 
 
 t Wisdom xiii, I and a. 
 
 \ Romans I., 19, 20, ai. Compare I. Corinthians, i., 21.
 
 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 95 
 
 " not in temples, made with hands And hath 
 
 " made of one, all mankind, to dwell upon the whole 
 " face of the earth, determining appointed times and 
 " the limits of their habitation. That they should 
 " seek God, if haply they may feel after him, or find 
 " him, although he be not far from every one of us. 
 " For in him we live and move and are."* 
 
 " We also are mortals, men like unto you, preaching 
 " to you to be converted from these vain things to the 
 " living God who made the heaven and the earth, and 
 " the sea, and all things that are in them : Who in 
 " times past suffered all nations to walk in their own 
 " ways. Nevertheless he left not himself without testi- 
 " mony, doing good from heaven, giving rains, and 
 " fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and 
 " gladness. "f 
 
 " For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do 
 " by nature those things that are of the law ; these 
 " not having the law are a law to themselves ; who 
 " shew the work of the law written in their hearts, 
 " their conscience bearing witness to them, and their 
 " thoughts between themselves accusing, or also de- 
 " fending one another."! 
 
 " Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see 
 " God." 
 
 " For we are also his offspring."! 
 
 Such is the language used by the sacred writers in com- 
 bating the intellectual and moral errors of the heathen. 
 These words of Holy Scripture show that the human mind, 
 by meditating on the creation and government of the 
 world, was in a position to recognize God as the author of 
 all things, and the loving father of men. The voice of 
 conscience, too, should have revealed the source of all 
 good, and have brought home the truth that there exists 
 
 * Acts xvii., 22, seq. 
 
 t Acts xiv., 14-16. 
 
 t Romans ii., 14-15. 
 
 Matthew v., 8. 
 
 || Acts xvii., 28.
 
 96 TRADITIONALISM AND OXTOLOGISM. 
 
 one who will judge the conduct of men, who has written 
 his law on their hearts, and who by His power sustains 
 and is present in each one. Thus the natural knowledge 
 of God is declared to comprise an inward and an outward 
 element. It goes without saying that reason is its princi- 
 ple ; but the inner element goes hand in hand with exter- 
 nal experience. Side by side with the visible creation 
 there is the invisible world of the human heart which is 
 described as a book written by God, wherein man can 
 decipher God's Holy Name. And here another remark 
 suggests itself, which is not without its significance. The 
 sacred writers distinctly lay down the principle that God 
 can be known from nature, and that therefore the heathen 
 are without excuse. But their purpose is not so much to 
 establish faith in God, as to contrast the true knowledge 
 of God with false belief, to weigh the one true God in the 
 balance against imaginary self-made gods. The heathen 
 believes in a superior being. Even the fool has only his 
 own denial to offer in exchange. He is a fool, both intel- 
 lectually and morally. The sacred writers fasten on the 
 truth underlying all error, in order to lay bare the error in 
 all its hideous deformity and to show its moral culpability. 
 Time was, when the command was unnecessary : Thou 
 shalt believe in one only God ; Thou shalt have no other 
 gods beside Me. Originally faith found its natural ex- 
 pression in that most simple proposition ; God is God. 
 The wording did not run : There is one God. The very 
 idea of other gods would be an error which, however, 
 proves the necessity of religion. But the contemplation 
 of nature and the voice of conscience furnish abundant 
 means for detecting the error. And we know from his- 
 tory that there is scarcely any religion but contains some 
 truth, quite enough to enable those who seek God to 
 find Him in the hour of need. 
 
 Philo, the Fathers, and many apologists, including Leib- 
 nitz, who walked in their footsteps, traced all that was 
 true in heathen philosophy and religion to the Old Testa- 
 ment. Doubtless their defective knowledge of religious
 
 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 97 
 
 history drove them to fabricate this theory. They were 
 right, however, in rejecting its autochthonous origin. In 
 this the history of religion bears them out. For not only 
 does it exhibit an ever-increasing tendency to make all 
 known religions radiate from a common centre, but it is 
 equally impotent to give a satisfactory account of their 
 origin. Mythology presupposes a reasonable religion, just 
 as a sickly body presupposes a healthy one. An idea of 
 the godhead must have been present to N the minds of the 
 Greeks before they'worshipped the heavens, and the sun 
 and moon as gods. For how could they speak of a plu- 
 rality of gods, unless they first had some notion of the gen- 
 eral attributes that belong to divinity ? If only the " uni- 
 versal primitive religion which God gave direct to man" 
 be looked upon as completing the religious disposition 
 originally implanted in man, and not as a ready-made sys- 
 tem, this explanation will no longer seem out of place in 
 the history of religion. 1 It places the religious basis in 
 man's own nature on a sure footing. To assume, however, 
 a fertilizing element outside the human mind is not to 
 believe in a being who " paints the lily," but to confess 
 that the same God who laid the religious foundation in the 
 heart had previously revealed Himself in creation. As a 
 matter of fact, all religions trace their origin to a revela- 
 tion. Enough of the original revelation remained to en- 
 able enfeebled reason to know God in some measure from 
 creation ; but it was not proof against error. Holy Scrip- 
 ture does not picture Almighty God as waiting to see 
 whether man would develop his powers of speech and 
 rational cognition, and how he would use them, but, we 
 are told, God and man forthwith conversed. Whatever 
 be the interpretation put on this naive and childlike narra- 
 tive, one thing at all events is clear ; that man underwent 
 a course of training similar to that by which children are 
 influenced by their parents, and pupils by their teachers. 
 The traditional element enters strongly into all education, 
 
 i Max Miiller, Wissenschaft der Spracke, vol. II., p. 387. Einleilung in die vergl. 
 Rtl-Wiss. p. 124. 
 
 G
 
 98 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 
 
 as far as we know, without exception. Since, therefore, 
 the first man was perfect in body, he had, of necessity, the 
 use of reason and speech.* It still remains to be proved 
 that man, if left to himself, would by degrees have invented 
 language and attained to the knowledge of religion. 
 
 S. Thomas opens his treatise on God with two prelimi- 
 nary questions : Whether God is known in sf, and whether 
 the existence of God is capable of proof. He takes for 
 granted the notion of God, and explains it as a confused 
 universal notion founded on the natural desire of happi- 
 ness. To the question why truths that can be discovered 
 by reason are also proposed to our belief, he makes answer 
 that, were it otherwise, the knowledge of God would be 
 the exclusive property of a few highly gifted men, whom 
 the attainment of it would cost years of patient toil ; and 
 even at last they would have no security against error. 1 
 Hence faith is necessary to make man absolutely certain 
 of divine truth. But that all men may arrive at the knowl- 
 edge of God by an easy route and without danger of being 
 led astray, God, in His goodness, has commanded us to 
 believe even what can be known by unaided reason. Be- 
 fore the law was written, faith in God, who had promised 
 Himself to their fathers for an inheritance, was kept alive 
 by the patriarchs. Neither have the heathen lost all traces 
 of this inheritance. The vestiges of it would have been 
 still more distinct, if the moral depravity of the heathen 
 had not darkened their reason and rendered it powerless 
 against the assaults of error. There is no lack of learned 
 men of late, Moigno and Secchi for instance, who hold 
 that, without the aid of a previous revelation, man would 
 never have been able to grapple with the fundamental 
 problems of the universe. To us nothing seems simpler 
 than to conceive the earth as a globe moving in space and 
 turning on its own axis. Yet what childish ideas the an- 
 cients had formed about the shape and position of the 
 
 a Kleutgen, Pkilos. vol. I., p. 74. 
 
 3 Summa Tkeol. I., q. i. a. i ; q. a, a. i. Contra Gent. I., c. 4. Kleutgen, Philot. 
 II., p. 21, seq. Secchi, Sch&pfunz, Vol. i, p. 3.
 
 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 99 
 
 earth, and about its motion and rest ! Secchi is unwilling 
 to give human insight and industry credit for our superior 
 knowledge. In his view, this great idea was but a faint 
 echo of that wondrous knowledge which had been bestowed 
 so bountifully on the first man, and which, in course of 
 time, he handed down to his posterity. The heathen had 
 lost sight of this truth. It was preserved only in the tradi- 
 tions of the chosen people, and locked up in a language to 
 which few had the key. But modern science has again 
 revealed it. We will not discuss whether this be not an 
 exaggerated estimate of the first man's knowledge of nat- 
 ural science ; but its importance for the knowledge of God 
 is the more emphatic. He who will come to God must 
 first believe that He is. The vast majority of men first 
 come to the knowledge of God by faith. At this stage 
 they remain, never advancing a single pace beyond. With 
 all men, faith is a business of the heart. Faith embraces 
 the whole man, particularly the will. For the believer 
 proofs have the value of a reflex analysis, by which he is 
 enabled to assure himself of the truth of faith and to make 
 chaff and corn fly asunder, that is to separate the true 
 faith from the false. Even those savages, whose eyes, 
 though dimmed with death's dark veil, suspect the pres- 
 ence of a higher cause in every nook and cranny of nature, 
 have perfect faith only after hearing the gospel preached. 
 But the savage without religion is a nonentity. 
 
 The Vatican Council teaches that man can know for cer- 
 tain that God is the beginning and end of all things, if 
 only he let the natural light of his reason shine on created 
 things. This notwithstanding, God has been pleased to 
 reveal Himself and His eternal decrees to man in a super- 
 natural manner. Thanks to this divine revelation all men, 
 even in the present condition of the human race, are in a 
 position to know with perfect certainty and without any 
 admixture of error divine truths that do not lie outside 
 the domain of reason. Revelation, however, is said to be 
 absolutely necessary, because God, in His goodness, has 
 destined man for a supernatural end, But revelation is
 
 IOO TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 
 
 also relatively or morally necessary for man if he is to know 
 even the truths of natural religion. Then again this nat- 
 ural knowledge, the acquisition of which is said to be 
 within man's reach, supposes the reason to be well-devel- 
 oped to such an extent, at least, that man can actually 
 use it. The Council does not define what conditions are 
 necessary in order that the development may be consid- 
 ered adequate. Only the rankest Traditionalism is out- 
 lawed, which assumes that the use of reason involved in 
 arriving at the knowledge of God can be brought into play 
 by nothing save a positive revelation from God, immediate 
 or traditional.* For supernatural revelation would thus 
 be made absolutely necessary. 
 
 In order to parry the thrusts of Rationalists and Panthe- 
 ists, certain French philosophers and theologians, includ- 
 ing the names of de Lamennais, de Bonald, Bautain, Bal- 
 lanche, Bonnetty, Leroux, and Reynaud, erected faith into 
 the sole principle of knowledge. The universal and un- 
 broken tradition, which is the object of faith, was thus 
 made the source of all knowledge generally, and of relig- 
 ious knowledge in particular. A primitive revelation was 
 assumed to be the necessary forerunner of the whole spir- 
 itual and religious life. Some derived their knowledge of 
 this primitive revelation from universal reason, others 
 from tradition. The former were carried down the stream, 
 and drawn into the rationalistic whirlpool ; the latter 
 drifted into supernaturalism. Lamennais's philosophy 
 starts with the idea of being not the absolute being, but 
 the idea of being which is the highest idea of reason. 
 But as he proceeds he confuses one with the other, and 
 treats the idea of God as the first idea, and as the indis- 
 pensable condition and fount of all knowledge. In dis- 
 tinguishing between the logical entity, the pure ideal en- 
 tity, and the entity of general metaphysics or the objective 
 reality, he steers his course smoothly ; but he flounders as 
 helplessly as Hegel when he discourses on the universal 
 
 4 Session III., chap. 2, De Revclatione. Martin, Die Arbeiten dti Vaticaniscktn 
 Conciii. Paderborn, 1875, P- *<>, seq.
 
 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. IOI 
 
 indefinite entity which reason apprehends in things, and 
 the transcendental infinite being who is the source whence 
 all being flows. The universality of ideas, particularly of 
 the idea of God, is likewise de Bonald's starting-point. 
 But he traces it back, in its source, to an immediate reve- 
 lation from God, with language as the medium of com- 
 munication ; and he considers Tradition to be the only 
 means of acquiring it. In like manner Bautain appraised 
 the reason both of individuals and of the human race gen- 
 erally at a very low figure. He, too, was content to take 
 divine revelation as the source and test of all truth. Tradi- 
 tion, of course, is a legitimate factor in the process of cog- 
 nition ; but by brandishing it as the sole principle and 
 source of knowledge, another equally important factor is 
 ousted, viz., the truth of reason, and the natural capacity 
 of reason for truth. Thus the process of cognition is con- 
 founded with the object of cognition, Logic with Ontology. 
 It may be regarded as certain that no intellectual devel- 
 opment is possible, unless there be a propelling force from 
 without. But, does it thence follow that the mind is 
 nought but a barren waste ? and that all its ideas are im- 
 ported ? Unless a plant be provided with moisture and 
 nourishment, unless light and warmth play upon it, its 
 blossom will be blasted in the bud. But who will say that 
 its life and growth are therefore owing to these external 
 conditions ? In like manner, the human mind needs props 
 and stimulants ; but before receiving these impressions it 
 is already the human mind. The sum of its knowledge, 
 too, exceeds in quantity and quality the sum of their prod- 
 ucts. The reactions of the human mind are far from identi- 
 cal with sensible impressions. The universal ideas with 
 which it enriches itself differ so essentially from the har- 
 vest yielded solely by the sense-perceptions of particular 
 things, that they must necessarily originate in an inde- 
 pendent capacity of the human mind for thought. With- 
 draw this capacity, and straightway progress and knowl- 
 edge (religious knowledge most of all) are buried in the 
 abyss. We have all certainly inherited a rich stock of
 
 102 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 
 
 spiritual possessions. We have inherited language from 
 the Aryans, writing from the Hamites (Egyptians), the 
 divisions of time from the Babylonians, figures from the 
 Arabians, classical culture from the Greeks and Romans, 
 Christianity from the Church, and religious training from 
 Theology. All this we take as a matter of course without 
 reflecting what gigantic efforts it cost our forefathers to 
 acquire these intellectual treasures. But to enter upon 
 this inheritance we must make it our own. If it is to bear 
 fruit we must repeat the process of thought of many thou- 
 sand years. Had thoughts and ideas been transmitted by 
 language we should not have to learn them anew with 
 language. How could man even drink down the ideas 
 transmitted by language unless he had been endowed with 
 an inner capacity for the purpose ? Again, if Tradition 
 were the one source of knowledge the contents of Tradi- 
 tion would be emptied into all men in the same way. But 
 man is free to choose one word and reject another ; he 
 has power to refine and reform his language by degrees. 
 We have only to read the history of language to see the 
 many changes through which it has passed. Traditional- 
 ism and Positivism are very much alike. Both aver that 
 man's intellectual activity is of no avail. Traditionalism 
 refers all things to Tradition, Positivism to sense-percep- 
 tions. The two extremes stand in polar antithesis to 
 Rationalism, but play into its hands. As soon as Tradi- 
 tionalism clearly defines its ideas, it merges into Rational- 
 ism ; and on this ground it shakes hands with its antipodes, 
 Ontologism. It is a cardinal tenet of Ontologism also 
 that all certain knowledge comes from supernatural faith. 
 It sees all things in the idea of God ; from this idea it 
 derives all other ideas. Ontologists 5 agree with Tradition- 
 alists that the soul has no power of generating ideas, or of 
 knowing things by means of ideas created with it ; but it 
 sees all things in God. The idea of God lights up our 
 
 5 Malebranche, Thomassin, Giobcrti, Mamiani, Fabre, Ubaghs, Branchereau, <ftc. 
 See Werner, Gesckichtt der afol. and polem. Liter. ; Vol. V., 59 seq. Dtr Ontolo- 
 gitmus. Wien, 1885.
 
 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 103 
 
 reason, and all things else besides. The ideas of the true 
 and eternal are given along with it ; in it we see all things. 
 The soul immediately grasps God, who is ever present within 
 her as the one perfect being. In this way the two extremes 
 lead by different roads to the same conclusion, viz., that 
 truth (God) is known immediately, not mediately. When 
 called upon to explain the ultimate reason why man accepts 
 tradition, Traditionalists are driven to seek for it in the 
 individual and collective capacity of reason originally be- 
 stowed on the human race. Traditionalism, therefore, 
 ends where Ontologism begins. Both schools are unable 
 to give a satisfactory account of our knowledge ; both are 
 powerless to gain a victory over false idealism. If the two 
 systems were pushed to their ultimate conclusion, the 
 landing-stage on which the passengers of both would dis- 
 embark would be ideal Pantheism.* It is needless to add 
 that their advocates did not draw this conclusion. To 
 place the logical order of knowledge on a par with the 
 ontological order of being, and to make God, who is first 
 in the order of being, also first in the order of thought, is 
 sound reasoning only in a Pantheist. From his point of 
 view the immediate intuition of God is conceivable because, 
 according to him, the soul, in becoming self-conscious, 
 sees God in itself. But just as Pantheism is unable to 
 cope with experience, life, and matter, so Ontologism con- 
 tradicts the facts of experience and empirical conscious- 
 ness. Neither can explain how the conscious is evolved 
 from the unconscious, or how the non-ego exists before the 
 ego. Ontologists and their followers who, in the intuition 
 of God, perceive at the same time something outside God, 
 must needs perforce invest something outside God with 
 divine attributes. God is truly the light that enlighteneth 
 every man that cometh into this world ; but He enlighten- 
 eth man by hanging up in his soul the lamp of reason 
 which enables him to see Creator and creature. 
 
 And yet, like two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of 
 
 * Compart Lamennaii. Gioixrti, and Rosmini.
 
 104 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 
 
 chaff, Ontologism and Traditionalism each contain a grain 
 of truth. In opposition to the Sensist theory, the distinc- 
 tion between simple sense-perceptions and abstract ideas 
 must always be referred to the objective contents of the 
 ideas in the mind. From this it is easy to understand why 
 history is being ever shaded with ontological tints. Ac- 
 cording to Plato, the soul, before being united with the 
 body, had an immediate vision of the divine and eternal 
 ideas. Thus the ideas of all things sleep in its bosom, but 
 the memory can awaken them only by small degrees. But 
 the doctrine of universal ideas, in this shape, is now all 
 but extinct. Such a separation between soul and body is 
 a baseless figment. The mind can never become possessed 
 of what in no way falls under the senses. A blind man 
 can never form an idea of colour, nor a deaf man of sound. 
 Not only do sense-impressions in general set spurs to the 
 soul and determine it to act, but the manner and direction 
 of its action correspond to the sense impressions. The 
 impression made by sight, hearing, taste, and the like do 
 not merely rouse general ideas from slumber, but produce 
 a definite mental activity. 
 
 The immediate knowledge of God was a string on which 
 the Arians never tired of harping. But their theory and 
 Plato's doctrine of ideas were essentially different. For 
 the Arians were devoid of all ideal thought, and, being 
 strict Aristotelians, clung with tenacity to the logical 
 categories. As they made the divine essence consist in 
 ayzvvrfffta they had no difficulty in advocating an abso- 
 lute knowledge of God ; but it was a knowledge void and 
 empty, like all absolute notions torn asunder from the 
 things themselves. When Arius taught that God is incom- 
 prehensible, because ayevvrjffia is His essence, he showed 
 the obverse side of the medal. Philo had argued that the 
 summum bonum is unknowable for quite another reason, viz., 
 because being above reason, no human power can conceive 
 it. The Gnostics were at one with Philo in teaching that 
 nothing can be predicated of God, except that He is. 
 Fathers of the Church could not altogether shake off the
 
 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 105 
 
 consequences of this idea of God. Even for them God's 
 nature is incomprehensible. But the study of Plato's 
 philosophy had landed them in this conclusion.* Platonic 
 mysticism fascinated the heart rather than the mind of 
 believers by picturing God as moving about in obscurity 
 and enveloped in twilight. The Neo-platonists, too, with 
 their semi-pantheistic ideas, refused to include God in any 
 category. 
 
 Ontologists generally number S. Augustine amongst 
 their supporters. No one, conversant with his writings, 
 will deny that his profound speculations are strongly 
 tinged with Platonic ideas. His whole education had 
 taken this course. Now, how does he proceed ? He sets 
 out from the fixed and immutable truths of reasons, the 
 ideas of unity, truth, beauty, and goodness, and thence he 
 arrives at the conclusion that God is the one, the true, the 
 good, the beautiful, and the highest conceivable being. 
 Then he starts from another point, the mutability of cre- 
 ated things (the human soul included), and argues that 
 God is the wise and perfect principle of all. 6 From this it 
 is abundantly clear that S. Augustine was not an ontologist ; 
 neither an immediate intuition of God, and of all things in 
 God, nor even an immediate idea of God enters into his 
 teaching ; and he asserts only that knowledge of God 
 which is derived from things, and some knowledge of 
 truth on the part of the human mind. The doctrine of 
 the Platonists who conceived God as the author of all 
 being, the lamp of all knowledge, and the goal of all 
 action, held him spellbound ; but he modified the Neo- 
 Platonic teaching about ' the intelligible" and the " intel- 
 lectual vision." Eternal ideas causes of things he ad- 
 mits, but plants them in the divine intellect. The soul, 
 by perceiving the unchangeable truth above it, thereby 
 
 * From the author's words, which are somewhat vague and general, the reader might 
 easily be led to suppose that the Platonic Philosophy had exercised an undue influence 
 on the Christian and Patristic doctrine of God. But the Platonic Philosophy was 
 really only the vehicle of thought. (Tr.) 
 
 6 Storz, Die Philosophie des heil. Augustinus. Freiburg, 1882, p. 177, 69 seq. 
 Kleutgen, Philos. I., p. 84 seq. Werner, Ital. Philosoph.it, 1886, p. 200, Seq.
 
 106 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 
 
 sees things in their eternal ideas (in rationibus (Eternis), but 
 it does not see them apart from the perception of the things 
 themselves. Of course, without ideas, ideal knowledge is 
 impossible. Ideas, however, are not fixed in the mind as 
 stars are set in the firmament ; nor, again, are they in- 
 fused ready made into the mind ; but the mind is endowed 
 with the power and the capacity to form them according to 
 innate laws. Both the logical and the ontological method 
 lead to the conclusion that an unchangeable spiritual being 
 exists. 
 
 The doctrine of ideas was drowned in categories, and 
 re son was swamped by intellect,* according as the Platonic 
 philosophy was submerged in shallow or deep Aristotelian 
 waters. When Platonism again rose to the surface it either 
 enrobed itself in a Neo-Platonic Pantheistic garb, or dyed 
 itself with an ontological pigment. Henry of Ghent ex- 
 pounded S. Augustine in a Platonic sense, and derived all 
 knowledge from the immediate intuition of God. The 
 Platonic doctrine was revived by the Humanists. Mar- 
 silius Ficinus, a Neo-Platonist, figures as the chief repre- 
 sentative of the apologetic school. Lutheran theology 
 began by affirming that the human mind was incompetent 
 either to know or to love God ; but when the mind is set 
 on the pinnacle of faith, its capacity for knowledge swells, 
 and it soars up to great heights. It was Luther's own 
 contention that human nature is gifted with a capacity for 
 divine things. Melanchthon was filled with admiration for 
 the old Platonic idea of God. To him God is mind eter- 
 nal, and the cause of all good. He does not hint at an 
 external revelation as the fount of his knowledge. The 
 Cartesian School went a step further. They sought the 
 source of all intellectual knowledge not in innate ideas 
 merely, but in an intuition of divine ideas which are innate 
 and essential to the soul. Descartes assumed innate con- 
 
 The distinction between " Vernunft and Verstand" is unmeaning in English. So far as 
 a distinction can be drawn to correspond with the German and to express the difference 
 Vtween Plato and Aristotle the phrase should be inverted : " intellect .... by 
 ason." (Tr.) 
 
 betv 
 
 reasor
 
 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 107 
 
 scious ideas. Later philosophers assumed unconscious 
 ideas, that is, innate ideas which might be considered as 
 latent. In the judgment of Leibnitz innate ideas are a 
 necessity since, without their aid, there is no accounting 
 for the general truths of logic and metaphysics. Des- 
 cartes' pupil was the first to set the ontological ball roll- 
 ing. 
 
 Between the two polar seas of Sensism and Ontologism 
 one can surely steer a middle course. According to an old 
 never-to-be-forgotten axiom, there is nothing in the intel- 
 lect that was not first in the senses. Sensation is the be- 
 ginning of knowledge. The sublimest scientific theories 
 are compelled to draw on the world of sense for their for- 
 mulae. All language, the language of vulgar and learned 
 alike, to be intelligible, must borrow its symbols from the 
 outside world. But the principles and forms of knowledge 
 are deep-rooted within the soul. Even if we merely re- 
 echo S. Thomas'* words : " Nihil est in intdlectu nisi ipse 
 intellectus," we concede at least that there is in the human 
 mind an aptitude to acquire knowledge. 
 
 Now, if the knowledge of God be tested by this principle 
 it must be admitted that it is not an immediate but an anal- 
 ogous\ knowledge, derived from the rational contemplation 
 of nature. No man has seen God, for He dwells in a light 
 inaccessible. Yet He is nigh unto every one that seeks 
 Him. His dwelling-place is in man's hearts ; the purer the 
 heart, the clearer will be its vision of God. The Fathers, 
 who followed Plato as their leader, teach that the idea of 
 the unspeakable God, the word of God, Xoyo? fycpVTo?, is 
 implanted in the soul ; but they add that it will neither 
 grow nor blossom unless watered by moral uprightness. 
 The ancient apologists, while deriving all truth and good- 
 ness from revelation, looked upon it nevertheless as merely 
 giving clear and definite expression to something that was 
 already within man. In their eyes all truth and goodness 
 are at once Christian and human. Man's soul is by nature 
 
 * The author's words, as they stand in the original, are somewhat obscure. The saying 
 
 quoted is from Leibnitz. (Tr.) 
 t Wisdom XII. s.
 
 108 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 
 
 Christian. 7 From the beginning his soul was blessed with 
 that same consciousness of God which Tertullian tells us 
 is common to Egyptians and Syrians, and the inhabitants 
 of Pontus. He and other apologists were careful to point 
 out a curious universal fact : In the hour of danger the 
 very heathen instinctively call upon God, not this god or 
 the other god, but God. And the most recent discoveries 
 fully corroborate their statement. 8 Even Homer's heroes, 
 the divine Eumceus included, at the critical moment when 
 their heart-strings were ready to break, flung to the winds 
 learned and mythological metaphors and regaled them- 
 selves with the ordinary language of Religion. Thus, in 
 truth, does the Christian doctrine concerning God restore 
 that pure and primitive human teaching which alone satis- 
 fies the aspirations of the human heart. Men are men, and 
 the best sometimes forget, but the human soul can never 
 forget its Father in Heaven for long. Human nature, even 
 in its fallen state is irresistibly attracted to God. A spirit's 
 essence consists in the power to love God, and to think of 
 God. Its being consists in the power of becoming con- 
 scious of self and of God. As the river is purer at its 
 source than at its mouth, so the nearer we sail to the source 
 of the stream of time, the purer we find the ideas about 
 God, though they be clumsily expressed. The Aryans 
 prayed to Dyaus Pttar, Zsv? Ttarrjp Jupiter, the father of 
 heaven, before they worshipped Heaven itself. And 
 although Zeus and Heaven be with them identical, yet 
 when danger is on the wing the human soul, with child- 
 like instinct, runs for help not to Heaven but to Zeus. It 
 only knows of God, simply and purely. To know and to 
 understand aright the God of truth, says S. Athanasius, 
 we stand in need of nothing but ourselves. Of ourselves 
 we can discover the first cause. In ourselves is faith and 
 
 ^ Tertullian Apol. II., 17. De testim. anima, 5. Kleutgen, Philos. Vol. I., page 
 693, scq. Theol. II., page 35 seq. Fischer, De Sal. infid., 66, a, i. Tertul. Adv., 
 Marc I., 10. 
 
 8 Christian Pesch, Der Gotteslegriff, Freib., 1886, p. 41. Max Muller, Essays, vol. II., 
 p. 10, seq. Wiss. der Spracke, vol. ii., p. 393 ; Einleitung, p. 155, seq. Mohler, 
 Neue Untersuchungen der Lehrgegensdtze, and edition, Mainz, 1835, p. 60, seq. 
 Athanasiusder Grosse, Mainz, 1827, vol. i., p. 149, seq.
 
 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 109 
 
 the Kingdom of God. We can speedily discern the Lord 
 of the Universe, and the Word of the Father who bringeth 
 in his hand salvation. The soul can know God in her own 
 self. The atheist has to deny his own soul. Man knows 
 God from God's image : but God has graciously conde- 
 scended to aid the human mind with the visible creation 
 on account of its infirmity. The Fathers are unanimous in 
 asserting that as soon as man comes to the use of reason a 
 certain knowledge of God springs up in his soul. Their 
 explanations, however, differ ; some considering this knowl- 
 edge an immediate idea of God, others requiring for its 
 formation an impulse from without. But all distinguish a 
 spontaneous and involuntary knowledge of God from that 
 acquired a posteriori. The soul begins to know God as 
 soon as it becomes self-conscious and acquires the use of 
 reason. The ideas implanted in the soul i'vvoiai, e'/Jifporoi 
 cannot be mere ideas spontaneously generated by the in- 
 voluntary activity of the reason. 9 There must be an ob- 
 ject to which the faculty of the soul corresponds. The 
 spontaneous activity of the mind is necessary for the ideas 
 to become conscious ; but according to the Fathers, ideas 
 are not the mere product of this activity. If the issue lay 
 between this and the seed of faith, the word of the Gospel 
 which is fraught with salvation, analogy would give judg- 
 ment in favour of the latter. 10 
 
 The one point at which the Fathers are constantly ham- 
 mering is, that the idea of God is not the first idea in the 
 order of knowledge. The tree of knowledge has an upward 
 growth. Knowledge mounts from things below to the 
 heights above. This is the only sense in which Gratry, 
 Staudenmaier, Drey, Kuhn, and others now maintain the 
 idea of God. They treat it not as an immediate knowledge 
 of God, but as a metaphysical principle which strengthens 
 our analogous knowledge of God, and gives a sufficient 
 basis for the logical conclusions drawn from the principle 
 of causality. Thus they supply a bridge on which the 
 mind can pass over from formal thought to metaphysics. 
 
 9 Kleutgen, Pkilos. ; Vol. I., p. 682, seq. 
 
 10 Ep. of S. James I., 21 ; Justin, Apol. II., 6.
 
 110 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 
 
 So this knowledge of God, before being developed by ex- 
 perience, is at most a kind of presentiment of the super- 
 natural, a hidden sense of Godhead so to speak, and thus 
 an anticipation of the existence of God. 
 
 It seems to us that all natural knowledge of God neces- 
 sarily presupposes an involuntary consciousness of God 
 heretofore undeveloped ; or, perhaps it may be better 
 described as a germ and disposition. The knowledge of 
 God is stored up in the nature of the soul ; no importation 
 from without or laborious research is needed. The loveli- 
 est landscape has no beauty for the eye that cannot see ; 
 the sweetest music will fail to enchant the ear that is waxen 
 deaf, like the adder. The sense-organs presuppose sensi- 
 bility. A man with all his senses dead can never become 
 a mathematician, a mechanic, or a physicist. So, too, 
 there must be an eye in the soul. The senses are but 
 channels between soul and brain. To the heathen, who 
 asked that he might set eyes on the God of the Christian, 
 S. Theophilus thus strikingly replied : Show me your man, 
 and I will show you my God. Show me that the eyes of 
 your soul see, and that the ears of your heart are open, 
 and I will show you my God. There are no general fully 
 matured ideas in the soul, nor do all ideas come from 
 sheer sense-perceptions. Between the soul and the outer 
 world harmony must prevail. Without some a priori as- 
 sumption or other, the laws of thought and cognition, and 
 the universal fact of religion are and will ever remain in- 
 soluble puzzles. On this point all can join in chorus with 
 the Fathers even those who hold that the soul is a blank, 
 a tabula rasa, a tablet with no writing thereon. For even 
 they assume that a general confused knowledge of God 
 has been grafted on us by nature, inasmuch as all men 
 have a desire for beatitude, that desire being fixed immova- 
 bly in the will. 11 The " external mirror" of the visible 
 creation implies an " internal mirror," viz., the intellec- 
 tual and moral disposition of the soul. Man fashions his 
 god according to his own tastes. His gods are a reflection 
 
 ii Theophilus, Ad. Autol. I. 2, S. Thomas I., Sumtn. Theol. q. a, a. i, ad. x. 
 Schneider. NatwalvSlker, vol. II., p. 409.
 
 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. Ill 
 
 of himself. Truths which appeal to the conscience are 
 duties before they are evident truths. They appeal to a 
 mysterious instinct that lies deep down in the caverns of 
 the soul, to an intuition that is felt rather than proved. 
 Such an intimation, however, can be felt only by the pure 
 of heart, and by men of goodwill. Assent to an axiom 
 involves an act of faith. Man cannot even contemplate 
 nature in the light of cause and design, unless aided by his 
 will. The moral evidence must be intertwined with the 
 metaphysical. 
 
 The assumption that the soul has an innate idea of God 
 gave birth to a special proof for the existence of God 
 which is consequently known as the ontological proof. 
 Traces of it, more or less clear, occur in S. Augustine. It 
 was the necessary outcome of Platonism. To S. Anselm, 
 a Platonist and the pioneer of Scholasticism, belongs the 
 honour of first throwing the proof into form and shape. 
 As the Supreme Being exists in idea, he argues that He 
 must also exist in fact, because what is supreme in fact is 
 higher than what is supreme in idea only. A supreme 
 being, so supreme that a superior is inconceivable, would 
 be a logical paradox if it did not actually exist. 12 S. An- 
 selm was not always consistent in formulating and pro- 
 pounding his thesis. He assumed that faith begets an 
 immediate consciousness of God in the soul. But his main 
 idea culminates in the conclusion he draws from the neces- 
 sity of thought to the necessity of actual existence. The 
 Aristotelian S. Thomas impugned the conclusion on the 
 ground that the a posteriori knowledge of God can alone 
 lay claim to the force of a real demonstration. This an- 
 swer sealed the doom of the ontological proof for centuries. 
 
 Descartes was the first to restore it to its place of honour, 
 and to make it respected in philosophical and theological 
 circles. Descartes holds that whatever is perceived clearly 
 and distinctly is also certain and true. Now no one will 
 deny that we have an idea of God, that is, an idea of an 
 
 12 Staudenmaier, Die christl. Dogtnatik. vol. II., Freiburg, 1844, p. 76. Kuhn, 
 I'atholische Dogmatik, Tubingen, 1162, vol. I., p. 648, seq. Scheeben, Handbuch 
 der kath. Dogmatik, Freiburg, 1873, vol. I. p. 474.
 
 112 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 
 
 infinitely perfect Being. This idea, however, would in- 
 volve a palpable contradiction if the infinitely perfect 
 Being were not conceived as existing, since existence is a 
 perfection. The certainty of God's existence is therefore 
 inseparately bound up with the idea of God. God cannot 
 be conceived as non-existent, and therefore he must act- 
 ually exist. The point de depart of Leibnitz is the all-real 
 being. The all-real being is actual because it is possible, 
 for it is possible only as a self-existing being (ens a se et 
 per se). According to Gratry the existence of God is as- 
 serted in the proposition ; God is. For predicate and sub- 
 ject are identical. Being is = exists ; which is tantamount 
 to saying : What is is. This " pneumatic" proof has been 
 zealously championed by Staudenmaier and others. Can 
 its conclusiveness be questioned by those who admit the 
 inner facts of consciousness ? It is valid reasoning to argue 
 from the soul of a man to a spiritual Creator. Is it not 
 equally valid to conclude from the idea of God to the 
 author of that idea ? In this way it is sought to rescue 
 the ontological proof from the reproach of being a purely 
 logical operation with only a formal value. It would seem 
 that the cosmological argument runs into the ontological. 
 This is so, however, only when the cosmological proof is 
 stated imperfectly and with a bias, otherwise, even if it 
 held good, its meaning would no longer be the same. 
 For the necessity of the a posteriori proof is admitted once 
 it is conceded (and it can hardly be questioned) that this 
 idea has been transmitted by Tradition or ripened by ex- 
 ternal experience. Solely by the agency of abstraction, 
 and the consideration of the world, the " glimpse" or 
 " faint suspicion" buried in the depths of the soul has 
 grown into the idea of the supreme and all-perfect being. 
 The elements of the idea are furnished negatively and posi- 
 tively, by the objective reality of the world. The real ex- 
 istence of the latter proves that these elements in their 
 united state must exist in reality as well as in thought, if 
 things are to be adequately explained in their totality. 
 Now, the soul of man being part of the totality of things 
 can be at once the subject and the object of knowledge.
 
 TRADITIONALISM AND ONTOLOGISM. 113 
 
 Consequently the knowledge of God is due to the soul's 
 contact with the external world, and to reflection on its 
 own interior. But since learning and discursive thought 
 enter into this process, the soul's innate glimpse of God 
 cannot be said to be independent either of Tradition or of 
 the contemplation of nature. 
 
 Traditionalism and Ontologism have been condemned 
 by the Church. On September the 8th, 1840, Bautain was 
 obliged to subscribe six propositions which teach that 
 human reason can prove with certainty the existence of 
 God ; that faith comes later than revelation, and therefore 
 cannot be used to prove the existence of God against un- 
 believers ; that the use of reason precedes faith, and guides 
 man to faith with the aid of revelation and grace. In 1855 
 the Congregation of the Index, with the approval of Pius 
 IX., ordered Bonnetty to subscribe four propositions which 
 declare that reason can prove with certainty the existence 
 of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the freewill of 
 man. The Vatican Council somewhat tones down these 
 expressions, by substituting certo for cum certitudine, and 
 cognosci posse for probare. Traditionalism is not mentioned 
 by name, but, in its crude form, it is rejected by the defini- 
 tion concerning the knowledge of God derived from crea- 
 tion. This decision tells still more against Ontologism, 
 inasmuch as it states that God can be known from creation 
 as the beginning and end of all things. The conditions, 
 however, are not specified. Previously, on September 
 i8th, 1861, the Congregation of the Holy Office had for- 
 mally condemned Ontologism by affixing various degrees 
 of censure to seven propositions concerning the immediate 
 knowledge of God, the merely gradual distinction between 
 ideas (universals) and God, the knowledge of things from 
 the innate idea of God, the derivation of other ideas from 
 the idea of God, as being modifications of it, the existence 
 of individual things in God as of the parts in the whole, 
 and the explanation of creation from the inner intellectual 
 Act of God. 13 
 
 13 Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum et definitionum (sth edition), Wirceb.^ 1874, 
 No. 1516, seq. Koenig, Schoepfutig und Gotteserkenntniss^ Freiburg, 1885, /. 45. 
 
 H
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 BEGINNING AND END. 
 
 We exist ; the world around us exists. These facts we 
 take for granted. For our present enquiry it matters little 
 whether realism or idealism be the truer theory, whether 
 or no things are in reality what they are in appearance. 
 i>Io dreamer or fanatic will ever succeed in uprooting uni- 
 versal belief in the objective existence of things. A wise 
 man among the ancients said : That is true which appears 
 so to all men. Natural science has indeed dealt a heavy 
 blow at this axiom, but nevertheless its truth is generally 
 allowed. Astronomy, Physics and Chemistry regard 
 things in nature as fixed quantities. Are we then to be 
 blamed for assuming at the outset the objective reality of 
 the world ?* 
 
 In all ages philosophers have racked their brains to un- 
 ravel the knotty problem of the beginning and end of 
 things. Theories as to the world's origin are not lacking 
 in variety. Sometimes the result is ascribed to a single 
 element, sometimes to showers of atoms falling through 
 space and spontaneously grouping themselves. Other 
 philosophers, again, invoked a higher cause, a good or evil 
 being. But the speculations of natural philosophers were 
 barren of result, and never satisfactorily explained how 
 the world began. Even Plato and Aristotle were stopt in 
 mid career by eternal matter, and the eternity of the 
 world. Aristotle certainly did not make the soul revolve 
 in perpetual circular motion ; but his theory as to its cre- 
 ation amounted to little more than a confession that the 
 
 * The reader who wishes to study this question may consult with advantage Mr. St. 
 George Mivart's Nature and Thought (Burns and Oates).
 
 BEGINNING AND END. 115 
 
 origin of the divine element (TO 0iov) in the soul (vov$) 
 was buried in obscurity (non liguet). 
 
 These attempted solutions were fore-doomed to failure, 
 because they sought nature's origin in nature's own prin- 
 ciples. 1 The way was blocked by the axiom : ex nihilo 
 nihil Jit. Philosophers were powerless to shuffle off the 
 coils in which this proposition entangled them. They had 
 not courage to plunge forward and break new ground in 
 search of a higher power as the cause of the world. Their 
 idea of God was too ethereal ; their god himself was too 
 abstract and lifeless, too weak and feeble. They could 
 not conceive a perfect being, who is being and nothing 
 besides. An attempt has lately been set on foot to vindi- 
 cate Aristotle. 'The philosopher,' it is alleged, taught 
 that God has a will, and that the ideas of things are in 
 God. The Schoolmen, however, who were fond of setting 
 a Christian gloss on their favourite philosopher's writings, 
 shrank from drawing this conclusion. Plato's idea of God 
 is the most pregnant, yet even it is overhung with doubt. 
 In his Timaus he certainly paints the world as created by 
 the will of the good God. But Plato's peculiar doctrine 
 concerning the ideas existing outside God, and his doc- 
 trine regarding the non-ens, and the meaning of eternal 
 matter prevent us from attributing to him the notion of 
 creation, in the sense of a free act of God. Even the most 
 favourably disposed critics are averse to seeing in it the 
 idea of creation. Anyhow they confess that its meaning 
 is not clear. 4 
 
 Hesiod once mentions the creation of man. In Homer, 
 Zeus, the father of Gods and men, recalls at least the old 
 doctrine of creation. But here the influence of religion is 
 patent. According to the Iranians, Ormuzd created heaven 
 and earth. Assyrians and Egyptians also believed that 
 heaven and earth had been created.* The ancient civilized 
 
 1 Albertus Mag., De Ceelo II. i. i. See Theol. Quartalschrift 1885, p. 6 seq. 
 
 2 Chr. Pesch, Gottesbegriff p. 50. Commer, System der Philosophie, * vols. Miinster 
 
 1884, p. 33- 
 
 3 Pesch, I.e. p. 9. Max Muller, Essays vol. I. p. 38 seq.
 
 Il6 BEGINNING AND END. 
 
 nations of Mexico worshipped one of the Gods as supreme, 
 and as the creator of all things. The Peruvians held that 
 the world and man had a creator. Belief in creation is not 
 unknown even among the negroes. 4 With regard to man, 
 we make bold to affirm that the groundwork of all religions, 
 be they ancient or modern, natural or supernatural is to be 
 found in the saying : It is He who made us, not we our- 
 selves. But that is all. Even in religions the complete 
 idea of creation is seldom present. So far, not a trace of 
 it has been found among the Chaldeans. On the contrary, 
 the cuneiform inscriptions proclaim that matter is eternal. 
 Perhaps it must be granted that all the ancient cosmogo- 
 nies and all the philosophers of old regarded matter as 
 more or less eternal. In their view God merely set the 
 world in order. 6 
 
 Why is this ? The reason is partly internal, partly ex- 
 ternal. On the one side the way was barred by the prin- 
 ciple of causality, and on the other side there was no idea 
 of God, as a being infinite in power and perfection, to act 
 as a lever against it. Man's nature is so clogged with 
 things visible and sensible that it is unable, of itself, with- 
 out a revelation from God, to grasp the distinction between 
 temporal and eternal, finite and infinite, creature and cre- 
 ator. Even revealed truth is easily shrouded in darkness. 
 Man's progressive sinfulness and his absorbing interest in 
 matter have, more than anything else, tended to confound 
 the ideas of creator and creature. The Fathers, in accord- 
 ance with the doctrine of Holy Scripture, have ever taught 
 that the existence of God can be known from nature and 
 from the soul. Some of them were engaged in deadly 
 strife with the evil principles of Gnostics and Manichaeans ; 
 others had to fight against the bad use made of Aristotle 
 by the Arians. 8 Athanasius pointed out long ago that, if 
 
 4 Schneider, Natvrvolker vol. II. p. 262 seq. Max Miiller, Einleitung in die Ver- 
 
 gleich. Rel-Wiss. p. 233 Wissenscha/t der Sprache vol. a, p. 408. 
 
 5 See Nic. de Lyra In Joan. I. 52 Vigouroux, Die Bitel I. p. 175 Nadaillac, Die 
 
 ersten Menschen und die flrehistor. Zeiten. &*c. p. 227, 337 seq., Edited by 
 Schldsser and Seler, Stuttgart, 1884. 
 
 6 Petavius, Proltgom. III. x. 7.
 
 BEGINNING AND END. 117 
 
 pitfalls are to be avoided, both the analytic and synthetic 
 methods must be used in all these enquiries. 7 
 
 Dualism and Pantheism had entrapped Philosophy in 
 their cobwebs, and Philosophy had never been able to dis- 
 entangle itself wholly from their meshes. It would seem, 
 indeed, as if it were impossible for reason to soar up as 
 high as the first beginning of things. S. Thomas and his 
 school, Durandus, Cajetan, Scotus, Bafiez, Vasquez, and 
 others, made this concession to the Aristotelian and Ara- 
 bian philosophy : that philosophy cannot prove how the 
 world began, and that faith is necessary to show this. 
 Nevertheless they hold that the existence of God can be 
 proved in the theistic sense. This may be possible by a 
 strict logical method of proof. But, is such proof suffi- 
 cient ? S. Bonaventure is not very wide of the mark when 
 he asserts that a contradiction 8 is involved in the theory 
 which says that the world is eternal or was made from all 
 eternity, while all things are created out of nothing. Even 
 if we distinguish the simple position and adduction of things 
 by transitory motion, and thus conceive the eternity of the 
 creature as communicated, 9 at any rate it would no longer 
 be permissible to argue from things moved in time to an 
 eternal unmoved mover, or to distinguish the eternal divine 
 being from the eternal, successive, finite being. The sub- 
 stantial distinction between effect and cause, and between 
 the thing moved and its mover is too easily effaced by 
 mere logical priority that involves no priority of time. If 
 the eternity of motion requires the eternity of the thing 
 moved, the distinction between aternitas and avum no 
 longer holds good. From the distinction between neces- 
 sary and accidental being (Suarez) it is impossible to see 
 why there must therefore be a very great difference between 
 the duration of an immortal creature and the eternity of 
 God. As far as the doctrine of creation is concerned it is 
 
 7 Schwanc, Dogmengeschichte, a vols. Munster and Freiburg, 1869, p. 278. 
 
 8 See Theol. Quartalschrift, 1. c. Storz, 1. c., p. 214. 
 
 9 Scheeben, Dogmatik, vol. ii., p. 10. Kleutgen, Philos. vol. i., p. 551. Commer, vol. 
 
 ii., p. 39.
 
 Il8 BEGINNING AND END. 
 
 perhaps unnecessary to prove that the world cannot have 
 been produced by God except in time ; it may suffice to 
 show that its beginning in time is possible, and that the 
 plea for the necessity of its eternal existence cannot be 
 made good. But with regard to reason the case is differ- 
 ent. It must sail into deeper waters, otherwise it will 
 either be stranded on the shores of logical Pantheism, or 
 strike on the rock of eternal matter. It may be confidently 
 asserted that the Thomistic school would have had a more 
 prosperous voyage if, like Albertus Magnus, S. Bonaven- 
 ture, and others, they had had the pluck to throw Aristotle 
 overboard and put at the helm the doctrine, that it is re 
 pugnant to the very notion of creation not to have a begin- 
 ning in time. 10 For after all the Schoolmen had to argue 
 with a reason that had been enlightened by revelation. 
 
 But are not many master-minds of all ages on their side ? 
 Is it not presumption to pit reason against them ? If they 
 consider anything incapable of proof it will not, of course, 
 be proved with the lucidity and certainty necessary for 
 establishing one of the first and most momentous truths. 
 Some try to prove by reason that the world sprang out of 
 nothing, and admit that its origin in time can be known, 
 not from the nature of things, but only from history, and 
 therefore from revelation. 11 But S. Thomas' answer is 
 ready to hand. The world, he says, by not having existed 
 always is much more clearly indicative of a divine creative 
 power than if it had always existed. For evidently every- 
 thing that has not always existed has a cause ; but this is 
 not so clear in the case of a thing that always was. Still 
 the opposite theory is in fashion with the great majority of 
 modern scientists and philosophers. " The idea of a begin- 
 ning of time, or of limit to space" is to them unthinkable. 
 They hold that we cannot in thought assign the commence- 
 ment of the world to any given point because an absolute 
 beginning of time is unimaginable. 12 But the same writers 
 
 10 Kleutgen, Pkilos, vol. i., page 553. Vigouroux, Controverse, 1183, n. 6a, p. 357. 
 
 11 Kleutgen, 1. c., vol. ii, p. 687 and 172. 
 
 >a Wundt, Philos. Studien, a vols., Leipzig, 1885, p. 499 and 527. Zacharias, U*ber 
 unJ unfit. PrcbUme tier Naturforschuttg, Leipzig, 1885, p. 12.
 
 BEGINNING AND END. 119 
 
 challenge just as fiercely the validity of the proof for the 
 existence of God, and deduce from these premisses the 
 world's eternity. Were this fact to prove that the possi- 
 bility of the world's eternity is not a contradiction in terms, 
 it would likewise prove conclusively that the actual eter- 
 nity of the world is possible. Then reason bound hand 
 and foot would be delivered up to Monism and all its con- 
 sequences. We are insisting on the proof that things had 
 a beginning all the more particularly, because modern 
 science has forged weapons that directly upset the Aris- 
 totelian theory of the eternity of the world. That experi- 
 ence is the foundation of science is a cardinal axiom in re- 
 gard to all the exact sciences ; at all events no proposition 
 that contradicts experience can be admitted as certainly 
 correct. Physics is the mainstay of metaphysics, and the 
 latter is non-suited if it contradicts the known facts of ex' 
 perience. The saying : Cognitio incipit a sensu is true of all 
 knowledge. It is doubly true of knowledge that cover* 
 the whole range of universals. We cannot, it is true, 
 draw an inference from the possible and the logical to the 
 real and ontological, but we may with all the more reason 
 conclude from the real and actual to an actual cause. 
 
 Now what does experience teach about the beginning of 
 things ? It teaches as a fact proved with absolute certainty 
 that some classes of beings have had a beginning. The 
 human race undoubtedly had a beginning. With the 
 Quaternary formation all vestiges of man completely dis- 
 appear, and those in the Upper Tertiary are, to say the 
 least, doubtful. Accidental causes cannot have obliterated 
 all further trace of man, for the strata teem with remains 
 of the forms of life. On this point science speaks with no 
 uncertain sound. Here then is one class of beings on this 
 earth that had a beginning. Here again we must there- 
 fore part company with Aristotle. Again, what is the 
 teaching of science about marsupials, birds, reptiles, and 
 animals generally ? It traces the animal kingdom step by 
 step from its highest to its lowest forms, till at last it 
 reaches the Azoic period, in which no animal remains are
 
 120 BEGINNING AND END. 
 
 found. Thus the animal kingdom also had a beginning. 
 Plants, too, fetch the like shrill echoes from the hollow 
 earth. Their different classes and species come forth in 
 gradual order and succession. Thus plants also began to 
 exist at a definite period. Time was when our planet was 
 wholly destitute of organisms. Who dare challenge this 
 clear proof from experience ? Its bearing on the question 
 of the beginning of things generally is unmistakable. 
 Philosophers sometimes demonstrate how the world cannot 
 possibly be eternal because its eternity would necessitate 
 an infinite number of human souls, of organic beings, and 
 so forth. Such arguments are good in their kind, but 
 experience is more convincing. Palaeontology, again, fur- 
 nishes positive proof that things are limited both as to 
 number and duration. 
 
 But Geology goes a step further. In conjunction with 
 palaeontology it shows that this very planet of ours has 
 undergone a process of development in being gradually 
 evolved from a chaotic mass into a dwelling-place of living 
 organisms. Aided by the spectrum analysis, Physical 
 Astronomy has attached the chain of proof to the planets, 
 in which similar modifications are perceptible. All the 
 heavenly bodies are composed of the same elements, and 
 exhibit similar phenomena. Our solar system, all solar 
 systems, in a word, the whole universe originated in a 
 mass of gaseous or nebulous matter. This is not the right 
 place to discuss the theory of Kant and Laplace as to the 
 world's formation. Here suffice it to note that all the 
 most complete modern theories start with a primitive ele- 
 ment. Nowadays no other theory can be entertained for 
 a moment. The " empirical eternity of the planetary sys- 
 tem, of the earth, and of natural formations"* is, indeed, 
 a "bold" theory since it dares modern science to the 
 death ; more than this, however, it argues either ignorance 
 or bad faith. The theory of Kant and Laplace, the mechan- 
 ical theory of heat, the spectrum analysis, and astrophotom- 
 etry have furnished such incontrovertible proofs ?i a 
 
 * Czolbe.
 
 BEGINNING AND END. 121 
 
 first beginning of things, that any man who denies or 
 ignores them loses all right to be heard. Now we are 
 straightway met by the question : Whence came the primi- 
 tive matter ? As everybody knows, modern science an- 
 swers : ignoramus et ignorabimus. 1S We don't know, and we 
 never shall know. Haeckel, Nageli, and some others have, 
 it is true, started an opposition : " We know, and we shall 
 know." This, however, is a vague promise in the future, 
 not only unwarranted by experience, but contradicted by 
 it. By muzzling our knowledge, and allowing it to roam 
 merely over the small territory owned by natural science, 
 we shall only evade the question without answering it. 
 About the first beginning of things science is silent. As 
 to how and where the primitive matter originated science 
 knows nothing. Before the first beginning and the last 
 end of things a veil is spread, dark and impenetrable, 
 through which the human mind cannot peer. But science 
 presses irresistibly onward and overleaps its bounds. And 
 since it admits that a number of things had a beginning, 
 it must concede that the simple primitive matter must also 
 have had a beginning in time. The eternity of primitive 
 matter contradicts this fact, and does but substitute one 
 puzzle for another. It is clear that primitive matter can- 
 not have originated with matter, or it would ipso facto cease 
 to be primitive. But it is, indisputably, something actual. 
 It does not contain a sufficient reason of existence in itself ; 
 in itself it is wholly indifferent to existence or non-exist- 
 ence. Hence unless science is to stumble over an unsolved 
 problem lying across its path in the first stage of its jour- 
 ney, it must set itself free from the bondage of an infinite 
 chain of causation (which is already broken, as we have 
 said, by some facts of experience), and seek the first link of 
 the chain in an eternal and higher cause. Every effect must 
 have a cause, and therefore we cannot here go on ad infini- 
 
 13 Dubois-Reymond, Ueber die Grenzen des Naturcrkennens, Berlin, 1872, 4th Edit. 
 1876. Die sieben Weltrathsel, Berlin, 1880. See Pesch. Die grossen Weltrdth- 
 sel. Freiburg, 1883, vol. I., p. 22, seq. Nageli, Mechanisch-physiologische 
 Theorie der Abstammungslehre. Munich and Leipzig, 1884, p. 602. Lotze, vol. 
 II., p. n.
 
 122 BEGINNING AND END. 
 
 turn. Through a labyrinth of causes and effects experience 
 has conducted us to the inner shrine of primitive matter. 
 But we cannot stop outside ; we must penetrate into the 
 shrine itself. There is no shirking the question whether 
 or no primitive matter had a beginning. How it began is 
 a further question which we shall examine later on. 
 
 There is no matter without motion and force. No such 
 thing as inert matter exists. Or, in the language of Aris- 
 totle, there is no body but, in the real potentiality of mat- 
 ter, contains also the formal principle of its being as the 
 determining cause of its action. This is borne out by daily 
 experience, and the history of the heavens and the earth. 
 Formerly this perpetual motion (motus perpetuus) was 
 thought to be derived from separate spiritual forms- or 
 forces {forma separatee) pure spirits, in other words, and 
 every earthly motion required contact with them. Or, it 
 was even contended (Heraclitus) that the universe was 
 inexplicable without a world-soul (Panzoism). Now, how- 
 ever, the movement of the heavenly bodies is the prototype 
 of all other movements, as is expressed by a mathematical 
 formula which can be calculated with absolute certainty. 
 The power of motion is immanent in bodies. All bodies 
 remain in the respective state of rest or motion till acted 
 on by an external cause. There is no exception to Galileo's 
 law on the inertia of bodies. Modern science has invested 
 with great probability the theory that the natural phe- 
 nomena of light, electricity, magnetism, heat and the like 
 are due to the vibration of very small particles of ether. 
 Motion is inherent in the primitive elements of all bodies. 
 From the first, matter must have been moved. 
 
 Whence came this motion ? Aristotle (who was ac- 
 quainted with none but external motion), setting out from 
 the movens motum of the second cause, arrived at the movens 
 immobile, the TtpoiJTOv mvbvv aHivrjTOv of the first cause. 
 Newton, the first to discern in gravitation the physical ex- 
 planation of the mechanism of the heavens, attributed to 
 bodies a vis occulta the force of attraction ; but the neces- 
 sary force of contact he could derive from naught else save
 
 BEGINNING AND END. 123 
 
 the anivrfrov HIVOW the first push. Kant, sheltering 
 himself behind the development of the Cosmos according 
 to the general laws of nature, ascribes it to mechanical 
 causes, lest, like Newton, he should be obliged to refer it 
 to the wonderful intelligence and creative power of God. 
 Modern Philosophers and men of science follow suit, but 
 are constrained to admit that all phenomena and all motion 
 need the co-operation of several factors. For if this chain 
 of causes be traced to primeval matter, then the first move- 
 ment must be in primeval matter. How, then, can the 
 atoms act on one another, unless each be endowed with a 
 moving force ? Even those who cannot assign a point at 
 which time absolutely began, will come to a standstill in 
 the causality of events, when they arrive at certain initial 
 conditions beyond which all is hazy and indefinite. The 
 chain of causes goes back indefinitely, if you like, but not 
 endlessly. It is not infinite. In every cosmic system, a 
 beginning must be reached, be the chain of causes never 
 so lengthened out. A definite limit is a necessity. And 
 yet the law of causality itself cannot be broken. In other 
 words, the first movement, which must be assumed as a 
 fact, is inexplicable ; it is, as Wundt 14 observes, " some- 
 thing inconceivable to our ways of thought." It is beyond 
 the jurisdiction of natural science, and must be adjudicated 
 on by a higher court. Natural science assumes it and then 
 proceeds to explain and define the laws, according to 
 which the world, when once in existence, moves. Natural 
 science, therefore, is hemmed in on every side by what is 
 empirical ; it can explain nothing but what is empirical. 
 It busies itself with the mechanism of atoms ; but their 
 constitution, and the inward force that resides within 
 them it passes by, unheeded and unknown. It traces 
 effects to their causes ; but it is powerless to prove the 
 general validity of the principle of causation. Science is 
 rendered possible by the notion of cause and effect ; but it 
 still bears the imprint of a law of logic. We cannot ex- 
 plain the efficiency with which the principle works. The 
 
 14 Wundt, 1. c. pp. 509 and 529. Zacharias, I.e., p. 164.
 
 124 BEGINNING AND END. 
 
 effect is of necessity connected with the cause, but only the 
 outer link is visible to the naked eye of man. We can 
 only reach the inner connection by cutting our way through 
 the intermediary causes to the first cause. But at this 
 point science stops short. At these heights the atmos- 
 phere is too rarified for science to breathe or live. It can, 
 however, discover with certainty that a first cause exists 
 and is at work. That which was moved first must have 
 received the power of movement from a higher cause. 
 The anivrjTOv xivovv, whence come the Htvovfteva, is not 
 a bare abstract idea, but a living absolute force that has 
 caused all particular motion. Even on the theory of Kant 
 and Laplace this conclusion is unassailable. For that 
 theory is bound to assume primitive matter with its forces 
 and movements. Unless then we would abandon all ex- 
 planation as hopeless, nothing remains but an eternal meta- 
 physical cause. From this intermediary causes derive 
 their force. These latter are not causes, in the strict sense, 
 but merely links in the chain along which the first cause 
 passes, and perpetuates its influence. The explanation of 
 the complicated phenomena of nature by the principles of 
 motion, of the transposition and conservation of energy, 
 of gravitation, and the like, seems clearly to indicate the 
 unity of the principle by which matter with its forces was 
 called forth from nothingness into being and life. In the 
 first cause are contained both the beginning and the end 
 of secondary causes. And the end of secondary causes is 
 the purpose of the first cause. But to pursue this subject 
 further would lead us into theology, which cannot be 
 divided from cosmology by a hard and fast line. 25 
 
 The end, however, may be looked at from another point 
 of view, and hereby a beginning may be proved, in the 
 language of the Schoolmen, a parte post. The eternity of 
 the world precludes an end as well as a beginning. If the 
 world is to have an end, it must also have had a begin- 
 
 15 See Knauer, Grundlinien zur aristotelisch-thomisticht* Psyckologie, Wien, 1885, P- 
 24, seq. Secchi, Schoepfung, p. 12.
 
 BEGINNING AND END. 125 
 
 ning. Between endless time, and the actual limitation and 
 measurement of time there is, as S. Bonaventure main- 
 tained against S. Thomas, a glaring contradiction. To 
 add anything to what is endless is impossible. To arrange, 
 measure, or comprehend the endless is equally impossible. 
 All temporal things would have long since come to an end, 
 if they had been in a state of constant transition from not 
 being to being in endless time. Branches cannot be lopped 
 off from endless time and treated as finite. It will never 
 do to regard the motion of the heavenly bodies as immeas- 
 urable, and without beginning or end, and at the same 
 time to assert that there are parts in their ever progressive 
 motion which we both measure, and use for the purpose 
 of measuring others. 16 If, according to Aristotle, the 
 movement of the heavens, regarded as a whole, does not 
 fall in time because it has neither beginning nor end, the 
 course of the stars might still serve as a measure of time ; 
 but its relation to the movement of the whole which is out- 
 side time, forbids its application to the whole. Thus the 
 explanation is but a logical abstraction without any foun- 
 dation. Temporal movement and development are incom- 
 patible with endless time. If time were endless everything 
 must have come to an end. But the necessity of a begin- 
 ning in time, of an act of creation, is shown by the fact 
 that we always enter into relations with the outside world 
 through the senses." 
 
 But, theology apart, what is the verdict of empirical 
 science about the end of the world ? Physical astronomy 
 declares that many of the heavenly bodies are in the dis- 
 solving stage. The moon is unquestionably an extinct 
 uninhabitable planet. The red fixed stars, with their 
 column-like spectra disclosing cinders, and the sun with its 
 
 16 Kleutgen, Philos., vol. i, p. 551. See Quartahchr. I.e. 
 
 17 Kant, Critik der reinen Verminft, p. 338 Kick, Die Naturkrafte in ihrer Wech- 
 
 selivirkung. Wiirzburg, 1869, p. 70 Hertling, I7e6er, die Grenzen der meek. 
 Naturerkldrung. Bonn, iSjsT/ieaf. Quartal. 1885, p. 12 seq. See Bonaventure 
 II. Sent. q. a, a, 2, ad i. Heinrich, Dogmatik, vol. v. 148. N. 2, Liebmann, Anal- 
 ysis des Wirklichen^ 1876, p. 322 Konig, Schoepfung, p. 82 and 98 seq. Secchi, 
 Schoeffung, p. 14 ; Die Stfrne, Leipzig, 1878, p. 335.
 
 126 BEGINNING AND END. 
 
 spots, must be pronounced in a state of decay. However 
 distant the date of their dissolution, it will inevitably come 
 to pass.' 8 The volumes of gas given out by the stars re- 
 veal the powerful activity of those far-distant bodies, in 
 which formerly we were wont to see only the stillness and 
 the repose of death. It is merely a quid pro quo to substi- 
 tute eternity for endlessly distant time, to exchange, that 
 is, the potentially for the actually endless, and to describe 
 the process of the world's formation as an asymptote, which 
 though continually approaching some curved line never 
 actually meets it. This is a logical operation which can 
 but obscure the actual process. It is a fact that some of 
 the heavenly bodies are losing their energy and sinking 
 into a state of rest. And as all the heavenly bodies are 
 similarly constituted and obey the same laws, it is per- 
 fectly valid to draw the inference that they will all come 
 to an end. The mechanical theory of heat furnishes evi- 
 dence in confirmation. Once the whole stock of energy 
 passes into heat, and all the heat acquires an equable tem- 
 perature, no further change will be possible, and the uni- 
 verse will be condemned to eternal sleep. Without the 
 intervention of a special catastrophe, the universe will be 
 transformed into a mass of matter of equal temperature, 
 and then it will be impossible to convert the heat into en- 
 ergy. The world's energy is being scattered more and 
 more, and is passing away in heat. According to the 
 theory of the transposition of energy, all potential energy, 
 without being destroyed, tends to a condition of equilib- 
 rium. But all the phenomena of nature depend on the 
 differentiation of these forces. Hence, when the differ- 
 ences cease the world will come to an end. 
 
 Perhaps it will be asked : Is it not rash to set an abso- 
 lute limit to forces of nature that, as far as we can judge, 
 are practically unlimited in time and space ? Against this 
 
 18 Secchi, Sterne, p. 113 seq.; Einheit^ vol. I. p. 55 ; II. p 342 Pohle, Die Sternweiten 
 und ihre Bewohner, Koln, 1884-5, v l- H. P- 4** seq. Nageli, I.e. p. 574 Clausius, 
 Ueber den zweiten Hauptsat* der mechanischen Warme tkeorie, Bonn, 1867, 2nd 
 Edit. 1876, with the title : Die Mechanische Warme theorit Hertling, p. 26 seq. 
 Tail, Vorlesungrn, 1877, P- '7 **<!
 
 BEGINNING AND END. 127 
 
 proposition various objections have been raised by Carnot 
 and Thomson in their treatises on the conversion of all 
 force into heat, a theory from which Clausius deduced his 
 second law of heat, viz., the equivalence of the transposi- 
 tions. The theory of the dissipation of the world's energy, 
 they object, rests on two suppositions that are mutually 
 destructive : the one, that the stock of energy is limited, 
 the other, that space is infinite. Let therefore an endless 
 time, equivalent to eternity, be allowed for this develop- 
 ment. One who is groping in the " dark backward and 
 abysm of time" can hardly hope to see through every diffi- 
 culty. But the inductive method, which holds good every- 
 where else, certainly gives the force of extreme probability 
 to the above law. The theory of an infinite force is 
 broached in defiance of experience which has decided that 
 it is possible to measure the quantity of force and energy 
 in the universe. But the sum total of all measurable en- 
 ergy will never be equal to infinite energy. There is no 
 need, therefore, for space to be infinite. Even if it were 
 infinite, the same law enacts that there would always be a 
 residue of heat in infinite space, and hence even then the 
 equilibrium of temperature would be restored and chaos 
 ensue. If it be said that the whole infinite universe can 
 never come to a standstill although some systems may, it 
 should be pointed out that such an assumption is a denial 
 of the inductive method, which, in these matters, is alone 
 available. 
 
 Nor do the changes wrought by man in nature place the 
 conclusion in jeopardy. The discoveries in Physics and 
 Chemistry have led to many different interchanges between 
 heat and energy ; but these are likewise parts of the whole. 
 In every steam engine a great deal of energy is lost, and a 
 residue of heat remains. No alterations in these natural 
 relations can be effected by the most ingenious discovery. 
 No physical force produces mechanical force. All changes 
 in nature are dependent on nature's laws. To deny their 
 application to the beginning and end of things is to de- 
 prive the law of Clausius, which applies to things as they
 
 128 BEGINNING AND END. 
 
 now are, of its force. But the right to make exceptions 
 ceases altogether in the case of such an arbitrary assump- 
 tion. It is abandoning experience to say that in the begin- 
 ning the sun and the planets were composed of different 
 elements, which differ also as to condition and position in 
 consequence of the temperature being far lower than it is 
 at present. The same remark applies to the final condi- 
 tion of things which this hypothesis assumes. In spite of 
 these objections there is no denying that the process of 
 equalisation is actually going on. And it will continue 
 either until equal temperature reigns everywhere and the 
 world becomes stiff and rigid, or until the nature of the 
 chemical elements is reversed by liberated heat becoming 
 again latent, and our planetary system returning to the 
 state of gaseous atoms whence it issued. 19 
 
 Why, it will be asked, is such a change impossible ? Is 
 not the opposition between mutability and inertia best rec- 
 onciled by eternal rotation ? Centuries ago Origen, per- 
 haps under the influence of the " hypotyposes" of Clement 
 of Alexandria, believed that in this lay the simplest solution 
 of the problem of creation. In order to safeguard the eter- 
 nity of the creator, he supposed an infinite series of worlds 
 following one another in succession. This, however, as is 
 easily seen, is shelving the problem, not solving it. Kronos, 
 always swallowing his children, is himself a puzzle. Eter- 
 nal rotation has no meaning except on a pantheistic plat- 
 form. Here it cannot be used in explanation, because the ab- 
 solute being must be presupposed as a living force. Being, 
 in general, is a mere abstraction without motion, life or 
 change. With natural science the case stands otherwise. 
 All natural philosophers since the days of Kant, who would 
 not accept creation as a final solution, have taken refuge in 
 the rotation (Kreislauf) of the universe." It is maintained 
 that the theory of heat does not sanction an absolute 
 
 19 Nageli, Mechattischphysiologiscke Theorie der Abstammungslehre, Munchen und 
 Leipzig, 1884, p. 670. Liebmann, Analysis des Wirklichen, 1876, p. 382 Wundt, 
 Lc. p. 536. 
 
 so See the literature in Pohle, Die SternenwtUen und ihre Bewohner. Koln, 1884-1885, 
 Vol. II., p. 48seq. No. 84.
 
 BEGINNING AND END. 1 29 
 
 end of the world, neither does the Kantian ball of nebulous 
 matter represent the absolute beginning of the world. More- 
 over, as regards space and time, they say that the infinity of 
 the world is, for us, a real regres&us in infinitum. But the 
 initial and final condition arrived at by this empirical regressus 
 in infinitum has in reality only a relative importance. Rather 
 it is a regressus in indefinitum. After all, what is the infinity of 
 the world but a mere supposition ? And, if it were infinite, 
 how could it have a new beginning ? Who or what is it that 
 changes the condition of the atoms, by substituting the negative 
 for the positive ? 
 
 All the questions that we have been discussing are ever re- 
 curring. Unless it is proposed to build up the world on chance 
 and accident, there is no loophole by which to escape from the 
 much dreaded conclusion. By seeking to explain all phe- 
 nomena by the terms matter, force, and motion, we are degrading 
 our terms to the level of the merest symbols, and furthermore 
 we are attempting to explain one unknown quantity by a second 
 which is still more obscure. Whence come force and matter ? 
 Whence came the first matter that was moved ? Experience 
 knows not. The answer will ever be a secret. 21 Neither the 
 atomistic nor the dynamic theory has sounded the world to its 
 bottom. Both fail to reach the ultimate reason and essence of 
 things. All our chatter about matter, force and law is but a 
 paraphrase not an interpretation of the phenomena of nature. 
 Nature nowhere gives a sufficient reason why the actual con- 
 dition of bodies is necessary. On the contrary, contingency 
 meets us at every turn. At any rate it entails the necessity of 
 admitting that a higher cause was at work in the beginning. At 
 this point mechanics stop. Of the Whither and the How 
 it knows nothing. The first cause cannot be merely the first 
 link in the long chain of causation ; it is at the same time the 
 principle, and the self-existing cause. Faith gives to this 
 absolute cause the name of God. 
 
 i Dubois-Reymond, l.c, p. 16, Natur und Offienlarunf, 1871, p. 946. Zachariai, I.e. p. 
 31 seq. Nagdi, l.c. p. 584.
 
 130 BEGINNING AND END. 
 
 This first proof for the existence of God, drawn from mo- 
 tion and from things conditional, possible, and imperfect, 
 goes in apologetics by the name of the cosmological argu- 
 ment. In the foregoing pages mere insistence on logical 
 conclusions has been as far as possible avoided, in order to 
 parry the objection that thoughts alone are personified. 
 Nor was it intended to discuss the existence of a cause act- 
 ing all along the line of causality, and thence to conclude 
 that there is a cause underlying the whole chain of causa- 
 tion, and yet distinct from it. It was merely proposed to 
 trace all the active causes empirically to their source. This 
 explanation will, of course, be rejected by all who demur 
 to assign the movement of original matter to a higher 
 cause. Even if the law of causation, as Stuart Mill and 
 Schopenhauer contend, were to refer to the form and not 
 to the matter of things, still the matter, so far as it is 
 moved, would be subject to the law. Of course, exact sci- 
 ence neither knows nor admits the idea of creation, but 
 anyhow it is more in harmony with reason than the theory 
 of a spontaneous origin, or eternal circular motion (Kreis- 
 lauf). It is folly, says Vives, to try to prove creation from 
 the laws of nature, since creation transcends nature. If, 
 however, science shows that the world had a beginning and 
 that it will have an end, and if further it cannot be poised 
 absolutely on beginning and end, then nothing but the 
 theory of absolute life will satisfy the dispassionate mind. 
 This theory will give us an opportunity of subjecting the 
 first cause to a more exact scrutiny.
 
 CHAPTER VIL 
 
 LIFE. 
 
 In Nature there is motion, activity, and life. Without 
 motion nature would be unintelligible. Take away life, and 
 nature is shorn of purpose. What is it that gives to nature its 
 unfading beauty and bewitching charm ? That most subtle 
 and mysterious kind of motion which we call life. Plants of 
 various hues and tints cover the ground with a coat of many 
 colours, and the earth, in turn, extracts from the vital activities 
 of plants the lovely ornaments that deck field and forest. 
 Then, again, how admirably fashioned and endowed is the 
 animal kingdom ! It is from its unceasing activity that the 
 universe derives its greatest beauty. Look at nature where we 
 will, life and motion meets us at every step. The plant or 
 animal that we trample under foot, howsoever vile it appear, 
 because it has the breath of life within it, is as far above all 
 its inorganic surroundings as the heavens are exalted above the 
 earth. The senses instinctively bow down before this truth. 
 The winds and waves of criticism may beat against the dis- 
 tinction between organic and inorganic bodies, but they will 
 never shake it, for it is built upon a rock. 
 
 The same chemical and physical forces are, it is true, at 
 work in both organic and inorganic nature; but the "direction 
 and combination** of the forces is essentially different. In 
 organic bodies there dwells a mysterious " something " which 
 guides all the forces to combine for a different end, such end 
 being always in unison with the nature of the body. The 
 different results are not due solely to the different conditions
 
 132 LIFE. 
 
 under which the forces of organic and inorganic matter re- 
 spectively work. For conditions merely accelerate or im- 
 pede the development of Nature's forces, but do not im- 
 part to them a totally distinct tendency. The organism is 
 compared to a machine, in which the several parts combine 
 to produce a definite effect ; they both, so to speak, have 
 to be fed and kept going, the one by water, the other by 
 steam. But where is the superhuman engineer who 
 makes all matter act like a self-forming, self-guiding ma- 
 chine ? All living organisms, even the simplest and the 
 lowest, differ fundamentally both from mere aggregates of 
 inanimate substance, and from works of human industry. 
 The lowest form of living being stands in closer relation to 
 man than to an inanimate, structureless granule of proto- 
 plasm. 1 Man and the amoeba are substantially the same, 
 for both are alive. It is futile to try and explain life as a 
 "complicated movement of particles of matter," or, as a 
 " special form of co-ordination." Though there be but a 
 simple exchange of matter through the wall of the cell, 
 and a mere beginning of spontaneous movement, organic 
 life moves on a much higher plane than the finest crystal. 
 The plant takes root in the ground, draws its nourishment 
 from the soil, carries the sap to the leaves and deposits it, 
 after it has been decomposed by the sun and mixed with 
 carbon, in its proper place. The animal lays hold of its 
 food, grinds it mechanically with its teeth, moistens it with 
 saliva, and passes it through the gullet into the stomach. 
 The peristaltic motion of the stomach, combined with the 
 action of the gastric juice, convert it into chyme. Then it 
 passes into the intestines, and with the aid of the bile be- 
 comes chyle. Thence the nutritious portions are conveyed 
 by a thousand channels to the several organs. The several 
 forces at play can be detected in each stage of the process. 
 But how comes it that these forces are combined so won- 
 drously in the organic world, and nowhere else ? Whence 
 comes that wonderful force which, in all ages, has been 
 christened Life ? 
 
 i Drcssel, Der belebte u<t unbelebte Staff, Freiburg, 1883, p. 67.
 
 LIFE. 1.33 
 
 Life was commonly supposed to have sprung up out of the 
 bowels of the earth. The Greeks and Teutons believed that 
 the gods were the primitive ancestors of the human race. 
 They believed too, that life, in the first instance, issued from 
 the inexhaustible resources of Mother Earth, who supports and 
 nourishes man. 2 Ancient poets and philosophers not infre- 
 quently sang of man's slimy origin. From Aristotle the doc- 
 trine of spontaneous generation (generatio cequivoca, spontanea) 
 passed into later philosophy and theology. The Schoolmen 
 considered it self-evident, even in the case of the largest 
 animals. To prove the possibility of the transformation of 
 bodies Origen 3 instanced the production of serpents from man's 
 spinal marrow, of wasps from a dead horse, of maggots from a 
 donkey's carcase, and worms from many animals. And, be it 
 noted, he quotes these . as well-known instances. No one 
 dreamed of doubting that the origin of worms and creeping 
 things was to be sought in slime and damp, and in decaying 
 animal and vegetable matter. In a treatise on Natural Science 
 published in the ninth century the mouse is defined : a small 
 animal born of the moist earth ; whence it is called mus (from 
 humus). In a compendium of Theology ascribed to S. Bona- 
 venture, the conversion of the rods into serpents is set down as 
 a miracle prater naturam, because it happened not by a prin- 
 ciple but after the manner of nature. For the same result 
 could have been achieved in the order of nature by the more 
 lengthened process of decomposition, as may be seen from the 
 action of germs (rationes seminales)* 1 Considering the slight 
 progress that had been made in the sciences of Embryology 
 and Physiology, it is not surprising that this theory should have 
 
 Max Muller, Wissenschaft der SpracJte, vol. a, p. 433. 
 
 3 Contra Cclsum, 4, 57. 
 
 4 Fellner, Compendium der Naturwissenschaften aits der Schitle SM Pulda. im Qjahr- 
 
 hundert, Berlin, 1879, p. 139. Compendium Mitts theologia veritatit .... 
 collatum p T fratrem Joannem de Combis, Lugduni, 1569. Friburgi, 1880, C. 98, 
 p. 48. Schwertschlager, Die erstt Enstehung der Organismen nock den PkHo~ 
 sophen des Alterthums nnd des Mittelaltert mit tesondtrtr Rucksichtnahme 
 an f die UrsettguHf. Eichstadt, 1885.
 
 134 LIFE. 
 
 found favour with heathen writers. Even nowadays the 
 unsophisticated will feel disposed to account \>y generatio 
 cequivoca for the flies that crawl out of manure, the worms 
 that swarm in putrefying flesh, the grubs that come forth 
 from the chrysalis, the parasites that feed on intestines, 
 and such like phenomena. Christian writers accepted the 
 supposed facts from heathen philosophers, although they 
 seemed at variance with Christian principles and philoso- 
 phy. But the seeming contradiction did not induce them 
 to modify the doctrine of creation. From contemplating 
 the accidental motion of the earth, and the effects pro- 
 duced on the earth and its inhabitants by the varying posi- 
 tion of the heavenly bodies, notably of the sun, they came 
 to regard the motion of the heavens, so marvellous in its 
 regularity, as the cause of all the motion of the earth. The 
 virtus calestis calls into being the lower forms of bodies. 
 To it are also due generation and corruption. Light is 
 really the medium by which plants and animals are, as if 
 by magic, brought forth from the elements. Light, more- 
 over, plays a part in the production of the higher classes of 
 animals. Thus, having in part mistaken the condition for 
 the cause, they were constrained to admit that the heavenly 
 bodies bore some resemblance to things on earth produced 
 by their influence. Simile sibi simile agit. They did not, 
 however, regard the heavenly bodies as the first and only 
 cause. Far from it ; for they too require an invisible 
 mover. There is only one being who moves others and is 
 himself not moved. Neither are the elements purely pas- 
 sive. Primitive germs were infused into them in creation, 
 which can be roused into activity by light. But the ulti- 
 mate cause of life, the cause of all life, is the living God, 
 in whom all life dwells, who has life in Himself. 
 
 Modern Science has unearthed fresh facts which shed fur- 
 ther light on the enquiry into the origin of life. It is now sci- 
 entifi^ally demonstrated that all organisms, even the lowest 
 fungi are multiplied by generation. The tiny single cell of the 
 torub (yeast), the dimensions of which are as i to 3,000, is
 
 Lira. 135 
 
 formed spontaneously. The countless infusoria in decaying 
 organic substances are in no sense transformed organic particles 
 Many parasites, heretofore a mystery, are fully accounted foi 
 by the doctrine of alternate generation. Research has now 
 verified in every department the principle : Omne vivum ex 
 ovo. Every organism has for its parent an organism like to 
 itself. Some living creatures consist of a single cell, a tube 
 with very little in it ; but even these presuppose a parent-cell 
 from which the others sprang. The microscope has revealed 
 the wonders that lie hid in this little world. But, although we 
 have gained a deep insight into the elements, we are no nearer 
 to discovering a transition from inanimate to animate nature 
 Just as the telescope by decomposing nebulous spots tells us 
 little about the origin of the firmament, so the microscope gives 
 little clue to the origin of life by disclosing an organic world, 
 in a drop of water. Haeckel thought that the moneras were 
 the primordial beings. Nageli informs that the moneras 
 are comparatively highly organised. According to Nageli, there 
 are two earlier stages of formation. The first lies in the 
 synthesis of inorganic matter with albuminous combinations ; the 
 second lies in their organization into micellae, plasma molecules, 
 probia, and protobia. These, in NagelPs opinion, are the 
 beginnings of life. But hitherto we knew as little about them 
 as we know how albuminous corpuscles originated by synthesis 
 outside organic beings. 
 
 Experiments have also shown that spontaneous generation is 
 a figment. The experiments of Pasteur, Tyndall and others 
 have proved, beyond a glimmer of doubt, that no Irving being 
 is ever evolved from inorganic matter, provided all the neces- 
 sary precautions are taken to prevent the introduction of 
 organic germs from air or water. Despite the frequent repitition 
 of the contrary statement, exacter researches have proved 
 Pasteur to be in the right If it be objected that such precau- 
 tions, especially the exclusion of all non-purified air, destroy 
 the conditions of spontaneous generation, the rejoinder is
 
 136 Lira. 
 
 'plain : It has to be proved that these are the conditions of 
 spontaneous generation. In reality these precautions do but 
 expel organic matter from the air. Thus the combined forces 
 of experiment and experience are marshalled against spontaneous 
 generation. Might it not, perhaps, have taken place when 
 Mother Earth was in the full vigour of youth ? The same plea, 
 it will be remembered, was put forward to account for the 
 beginning of being ; now it is urged to explain the beginning 
 of life. The criticism that we gave above is applicable here 
 also. But here the petitio prinripii is more glaringly obtrusive, 
 because experiment has put it out of court. To rely on an 
 appeal to unknown forces is to cut from under one's feet the 
 ground and method of exact research. There is no need, as S. 
 Augustine and the Schoolmen have remarked, to bring miracles 
 on to the stage in the first scene. Since the days of Lyell it 
 has passed current as an axiom that no extraordinary catastro- 
 phes are needed to explain geological phenomena, the forces 
 now at work being amply sufficient. With what front, then, can 
 any one offer to explain the process of life by appealing without 
 proof to forces other than those which now exist ? It may be 
 that life was then more prolific and blessed with greater fecun- 
 dity ; but life was already in existence. And since, too, there 
 was an Azoic period, a period when no life existed, the transi- 
 tion has to be explained. In the primitive rocks (which, from 
 being originally sedimentary, have been changed in form by the 
 agency of heat and water, under immense pressure) there may 
 be traces of life, as is now contended. The question, however, 
 is not solved thereby ; it is only pushed back a step. The 
 doubtful Eozoon Canadense, found in the chalk strata of Canada, 
 and the still more doubtful Bathybius of Haeckel, found at the 
 bottom of the sea, do not show this so-called solution in a very 
 favourable light. The Bathybius may improve on acquaintance ; 
 meanwhile, be it noted, Huxley, its discoverer, has relegated it 
 to the shades. This primordial slime, which is the supposed 
 home of spontaneous generation, is nothing but a precipitate of
 
 LIFE. 137 
 
 not lime. 8 The deep sea bottom, doubtless, teems with life, 
 but not with primordial living matter. As regards the 
 beginning of life, the conclusion is not far to seek. 
 
 The case would have to be tried on other grounds, if the 
 contention were set up that spontaneous generation has been 
 and is always going on, 8 when the requisite conditions are at 
 hand. After what has been said above, all eyes will be 
 turned anxiously towards the proof of this assertion. Anx- 
 iety will give place to astonishment when it is further stated 
 that no such proof is feasible, because the products of spon- 
 taneous generation elude the most powerful microscope. 
 At this point we are reminded that Copernicus justly laid 
 the blame on his instruments when the annual parallax of 
 the fixed stars failed. The two cases are said to be analo- 
 gous ; but in reality the circumstances are very different. 
 In the days of Copernicus, the Ptolemaic system, appear- 
 ances notwithstanding, had very slender probability on its 
 side, and extremely complicated calculations against it. 
 But the doctrine of spontaneous generation is set up in de- 
 fiance of experience and experiment. And therefore posi- 
 tive proof is needed before judgment can be given in its 
 favour. The existence of lower organisms is altogether 
 irrelevant to prove that spontaneous generation is going on 
 now ; for it begs the question, inasmuch as it presupposes 
 the organism. Moreover, in the series of palaeontological 
 fauna, a gradual progress from the lower to the higher and 
 more perfect organism is discernible. From this it follows, 
 of course, that the lowest organisms are also the oldest, 
 which is actually the case. Nor, again, is there any difficulty 
 in understanding that they can subsist through all periods 
 simply by propagating themselves. If lower organisms are 
 now coming forth from inorganic matter, the higher animals 
 are, of necessity, being evolved even now from the lower. 
 And yet no Darwinian, even the boldest and the bravest, has 
 
 5 See Theol. Quartalsch . 1876, p. 407. Secchi, Schof>fung, p. 20-37. Pohle, II, p. 63. 
 
 On the Eozoon Canadense, see Wurttemberg. Jahreshefte, 1876 and 1878. 
 
 6 Nageli, Abstammungslekre, p. 15, 464 Schaaffhausen, Anthropol. Studien, p. no.
 
 138 LIFE. 
 
 the hardihood to enter the lists in support of this conten- 
 tion. If all matter were alive, as is maintained in Panzoism, 
 Panpsychism, Epigenesis, Pangenesis, Peripangenesis,*and 
 other theories, the question of spontaneous generation would 
 be split up into two parts : Whence came the original ani- 
 mal matter ? How have organisms been evolved from it ? 
 Haeckel's Plastidul-perigenesis derives life from the periodi- 
 cal undulations of living particles. But, in the first place, 
 this theory takes movement for granted : then it confounds 
 the part with the whole, and finally fails to distinguish the 
 motion of life from motion in general. Such blind conjectures 
 can hardly be taken seriously. To derive life from matter, 
 by changing the definition of matter, is a proceeding that 
 stands self-condemned. It is like trying to square the circle, 
 or going in search of perpetual motion. Inert matter is 
 credited with having the power to animate itself. Accord- 
 ing to Nageli, even the micellar formation of starch-granules 
 presupposes at least a cellular liquid containing sugar. In 
 like matter, what is called the " spontaneous generation of 
 protoplasm," is simply a product of the properties inherent 
 in molecules of protoplasm. Thus, by tracing spontaneous 
 generation to organic matter, the doctrine of descent is veer- 
 ing round in a vicious circle. A mere combination of mole- 
 cules of protoplasm is unequal to producing even the lowest 
 organism. Albumen, in its liquid form, has been placed 
 under a variety of conditions, and yet, as even the advocates 
 of the mechanical theory of the doctrine of descent allow, 
 organisms never ensue. But what about the formation of 
 albumen itself, which, strangely enough, is taken for grant- 
 ed ? It is something unique in the organic world. The 
 development of germs is appealed to as a parallel case. 
 But the appeal must be dismissed, as germs are already a 
 living force. If, by analogy, the first drop of plasma of the 
 first organic being be endowed with the power for such for- 
 mation, we are still confronted by the same unwarrantable 
 
 * Heraclitus, Leibnitz, Buffon, Harvey, Darwin, Haeckel.
 
 LIFE. 139 
 
 and improbable supposition. There is no escape from this 
 vicious circle so long as the attempt is made to derive like 
 and unlike from the same source. Furthermore, inorganic 
 matter is being changed into organic matter every day under 
 our eyes, not, however, in virtue of its own powers or of a 
 special disposition in the matter itself. Plants (which have 
 life) are the natural intermediaries through which the ex- 
 change between organic and inorganic nature is effected. 
 The amount of " natural" skill required in the process may 
 be gauged by the fact that human art, the most perfect, 
 has never succeeded in accomplishing the feat. It has, in- 
 deed, produced chemically 1 some of the lower organic 
 forms e.g., urine, starch, &c. ; but these are the result of 
 analysis, and, moreover, are devoid of the essential ele- 
 ment, life. Life, it is true, is motion, but motion so pecul- 
 iar in kind that no art or skill of man has heretofore suc- 
 ceeded in imparting this mode of internal motion to chemi- 
 cal products. Even dead albuminates have not yet been 
 made artificially. The attempt to strike the ovule from off 
 the list of organic bodies is an evidence of the kind of suc- 
 cess that is likely to wait on the effort to produce a living 
 organism from dead matter. 8 
 
 How comes it then, in the face of all this rebutting evi- 
 dence, that the majority of scientific men accept the doc- 
 trine of spontaneous generation ? Two reasons may be 
 assigned : the formal methods of science, and a dread of 
 the hyperphysical and supernatural which scientists regard 
 as a cloak of ignorance. In his first epoch-making book on 
 the origin of species by means of natural selection, Darwin 
 recognised the creation of primitive types as a necessity. 
 But his more advanced followers whispered into his ear : 
 principiis obsta. Resist beginnings ; nip the principle in 
 bud. Admit the interference of a supernatural power 
 
 7 Ausland, 1870, No. 40, 1874, No. i. Klein, Entwicklungsgeschichte des Kosmos^ 
 
 Braunschweig, 1870, p. 154 seq. Dressel, p. 160 Natur und Offenbarung, 1883, p. 
 252 seq. Unser Wissen von der Erde. Vol. i, Allgemeine Erdkunde. Leipzig, 
 1885, p. 721, seq. 
 
 8 G6tte, Entmicklungsgeschichte der Unke, als Grundlage einer vergleichenden Mor- 
 
 phologic der Wirbelthiere, Leipzig, 1875. See Liebmann, Anal., p. 344.
 
 140 Lira. 
 
 in one case, and it cannot be eschewed in others. Darwin 
 hearkened to their voice, for their reasoning seemed just, and in 
 his later work, Tlie Descent of Man, withdrew the concession 
 he had made. Others shrank from cutting away the bridge 
 from under them, and stopped short. They merely rejected 
 the common view of creation, according to which creatures were 
 supposed to have come forth ready made from the Creator's 
 hand, and each species to have originally appeared on the scene 
 independently. Natural history, they say, lends no countenance 
 to such a view. If creation, they further say, be considered 
 not merely as a thing of the past, or as a momentary act, but as 
 a coherent divine force abiding in all time, then the doctrine of 
 descent is so far from denying creation that the natural history 
 of evolution alone gives a true idea of creation. 9 But the 
 chorus and many earnest men of science cry down even 
 this scanty concession. On the one hand they are willing to 
 grat that spontaneous generation is not proven, but on the 
 other they insist that it has not yet lost its case. " If," they say, 
 " a supernatural origin of the first organisms be left an open ques- 
 " tion," the principle of causation demands that no miracles be 
 admitted. " It is," they proceed, " not so much a question of 
 " observation and experiment, as a fact that follows from the 
 "law of the conversion of energy and of matter." 10 A fact 
 deduced from laws ! No. The facts that follow from certain 
 laws and that cannot be established by experience or experiment 
 are precisely metaphysical facts. Are we content with analogy ? 
 Analogy declares that only the organic can organize the inor- 
 ganic. From the fact that the telescope reveals no inhabitants 
 of the heavenly bodies, we are certainly not justified in con- 
 cluding that they are inhabited or uninhabited, unless the 
 analogy of the earth being inhabited is to hold good. In a 
 region, however, that cannot be surveyed by the microscope, 
 analogy completely breaks down. How far the comparison is 
 
 9 Alex. Brafln, quoted by Zacharias, I.e. p. 6a and 43. Zacharias himself also, and 
 
 Loire, Mikrokosmos, 4th edition, Berlin, 1184. Vol. I., p. 57 seq. 
 
 10 Unttr Wititn, p. 7**, Nigeli, p. 8>
 
 LIFE. I4T 
 
 valid may be seen from the attempt to use the alleged analogy 
 in solving the question. 
 
 If neither angels nor huntsmen, says St. Augustine, conveyed 
 animals to desert islands, these must have sprung up immedi- 
 ately out of the soil. 11 Nowadays, when spontaneous generation 
 is denied, men have recourse not to the angels of God but to 
 the forces of nature. The earth is but a small island in the 
 vast universe to which living beings may have passed over 
 "natando" from other islands. This conjecture commends 
 itself to many scientific men: Thomson, Helmholz, Sterry, 
 Hunt, and others. Who knows whether or no the heavenly 
 bodies harbour organic beings ? To this question we shall 
 return later. Most astromoners are at one with ancient poets 
 and natural philosophers in thinking that some stars are 
 inhabited. 18 It has been thought of late that meteorites furnish 
 positive proof that organic beings xist in space, inasmuch as 
 these cosmic strangers are supposed to exhibit traces of dead 
 organic matter. Thus the question as to the possible trans- 
 ference of life would be advanced a stage, but the heated 
 condition in which meteors reach our atmosphere, be it due to 
 friction or other causes, is not exactly favourable to the preser- 
 vation of life-germs. They are so parched up in their passage 
 through the realms of space, void of air, that all capacity for 
 germinating is destroyed. 13 Even if it be granted for argument's 
 sake that this grain of evidence is enough to sustain an 
 hypothesis, so wide in its bearings, what follows in regard to 
 the origin of life ? Nothing, save that the problem is referred 
 for solution to another sphere. But, even in the planets, 
 different kinds of forces and a special kind of vitality are not to 
 be assumed without proof, unless the basis and principles of all 
 enquiry are to be cut from under our feet. Then we too should 
 be drawn into tne whirlpool that engulfs all who seek the 
 
 De civitate Dei 16, 7, See Alex, von Humbolt, Kostnos, I. p. 489. 
 is See Pohle, Dit Stemvitlten und ihrt Bewohntr, K5ln, 1884-5 
 13 Unur Wissen, p. 723. Kaunas I p 373. Nageli, p. 84.
 
 142 LIFE. 
 
 solution in matter alone. If we would steer our barque 
 safely to land, we must avoid the shoals and quicksands, 
 and confess that the beginning of life is to be sought not in 
 the sphere of ordinary causes but in the unfathomable 
 ocean of almighty power. It is vain to seek elsewhere. 
 Darwin himself admits that the theory of natural selection 
 is inadequate to explain the origin of life on earth. Specu- 
 lation on this point he deems unprofitable. 14 The most 
 divergent schools of thought end by an honest confession 
 that they are angling in a lake of darkness. Given, how- 
 ever, the beginning of life, natural selection may serve to 
 explain the physical and chemical development of plants. 
 But, there's the rub. This very beginning is precisely the 
 mysterious knot to be unloosed. In the lowest plant there 
 is something incomprehensible besides mechanism and 
 chemistry that presses these last into its service and parts 
 with them only in death. Thus the candid scientist is 
 driven to admit that the mechanics of nature are insuffi- 
 cient to account for the formation of organic beings. To 
 account for physical and chemical phenomena he postu- 
 lates atoms, molecules and ether. On the same principle 
 he is bound to allow the postulate which the origin of liv- 
 ing beings makes, viz. : a force beyond nature. From the 
 standpoint of science he is at liberty to characterize as a 
 relapse into ancient metaphysics any attempt to scale the 
 heights above nature. For our purpose it is sufficient if 
 the man of science defines the limits in which the mecha- 
 nism of nature acts and beyond which it is of no service in 
 explaining phenomena. If he admits as an ultimate fact, 
 the spontaneity of the action that distinguishes so markedly 
 and withal so simply animate from inanimate bodies, and 
 that broadly divides biology from other sciences, then the 
 explanation of the most important natural facts is banished 
 to a province that lies beyond nature. Life dwells in none 
 but living beings ; from them only can it proceed. The 
 first germ did not spring up of itself. 
 
 14 Atstammttng, Vol. I., p. 50.
 
 LIFE. 143 
 
 The cause of life, therefore, must itself be living and 
 actual. The living God, who has life in Himself and is 
 life, is also the sole author of life. This is the goal to 
 which both the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies lead. 
 For the universal ideas that bring individuals and their 
 changes under a uniform system of law, and the " ente- 
 leehia" that are the groundwork of organic development, 
 both converge in an absolute living cause above nature, 
 who gave to life its beginning, and who holds all organic 
 life in the hollow of his hand. So far chemistry has been 
 vanquished in its efforts to produce a germ-cell with a 
 power of development ; so far human industry has been 
 foiled in trying to forge the link, " life-force" as it is called, 
 that couples the disjointed elements into an organic whole 
 and holds their several forces in check. The single thread 
 by which to feel our way out of the maze is the confession 
 that here we stand on holy ground. The foregoing argu- 
 ment from life in nature to a living, life-giving Creator 
 may be considered the second stage of the cosmological 
 proof. In it the author of all being is proved to be living. 
 Our faculties are paralysed when we seek to picture to 
 ourselves an absolute life existing from all eternity, who 
 has in himself the basis of being and of life, and in whom 
 we live and move and are. But as there is no alternative 
 between autogony and eternal life, the choice is simple.
 
 CHAPTER VIIL 
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 Nowhere is the saying that variety has charms more strikingly 
 verified than in the organic creation. Let the student of nature 
 gaze where he will, he is at every step filled with admiration, and 
 his senses are lulled with delight by the wonderful panorama of 
 life that is passing before his eyes. The meadows with their 
 green background and flowers of fairest hue ; the luxuriant 
 vegetation of tropical forests ; the melodious birds with their 
 georgeous plumage and sweet varied notes enchanting every ear ; 
 the very wild beasts that roam through the forest each, in its 
 way, holds the naturalist spell-bound. If, moreover, he is 
 vouchsafed a glimpse of the creatures that people the ocean 
 depths, as he scans these ethereal forms of delicate structure 
 glistening in the bright sunlight, he will stand still wrapt in 
 wonder, and grow astonished at nature's magnificence. But 
 the kingdom of nature is not even yet exhausted. The micro- 
 scope has unfolded to our gaze a world of organism in every 
 drop of water, a world not less wonderful in its kind than the 
 immense worlds revealed by the telescope. A few figures may 
 help the mind to realize nature's prodigality. The number of 
 animals is now computed at two-hundred-and-fifty thousand 
 species. Of plants there are over two hundred thousand phane- 
 rogams, and twenty thousand cryptogams, besides numerous 
 varieties. Then, again, it must be borne in mind that not even 
 individuals of the same species are exactly alike. Children are 
 unlike their parents ; and there is often a notable difference 
 between the young of the same pair of animals, even in tho
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 145 
 
 same litter. In a waving cornfield hardly two stalks can 
 be found in every respect the same. This manifold diver- 
 sity in nature charms the student but perplexes the philos- 
 opher. Given that life is in existence and has started on 
 its career : are the forces and laws of nature equal, of 
 themselves, to bringing forth this countless variety of or- 
 ganic forms ? or are there, here and there, yawning chasms 
 that cannot be bridged over, and which thus point to the 
 action of a higher power ? 
 
 These questions hardly occurred to natural philosophers 
 of the olden time. They knew of no fauna and flora, save 
 those actually flourishing, and their knowledge of these 
 was the narrowest. But on that account these engrossed 
 the attention of philosophers and theologians all the more. 
 The tendency of their thought, however, is evident, since 
 they ascribed the origin of highly developed animals to 
 spontaneous generation. In early times philosophers aimed 
 at reducing the world to a few elements. Epicurus thought 
 that the world had been formed by the chance-groupings 
 of showers of atoms falling through space. In the didactic 
 poem of Lucretius there is a striking though somewhat 
 rough sketch of the theory of descent. To Pliny the trans- 
 formation of species seemed a self-evident truth. Theo- 
 phrastus and others held the same view. It was long 
 believed that according to the letter of Holy Scripture all 
 species were created in the beginning just as they now 
 are. The Fathers taught, on theological grounds, that 
 poisonous plants and hurtful animals had been created 
 after the Fall. Philo had doubts about the literal inter- 
 pretation of Scripture. He distinguished between the real 
 and ideal, and thereby strove to make God's dealings 
 with the ideal world intelligible. S. Augustine, following 
 in his footsteps, broached another theory, based partly on 
 theology and partly on science. He thought it was more 
 in keeping both with the eternal character of the act of 
 creation and with the temporal character of the creature, 
 to limit creation to a single instantaneous act that should 
 coincide with the first moment of time. Thus science 
 
 J
 
 146 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 would have a free hand, and all conflict between science 
 and faith would be avoided. His profound speculations, 
 it is true, bear the stamp of Platonic ideas rather than of 
 scientific research. There is more guesswork than scien- 
 tific results running through them. Nevertheless it was a 
 sublime idea to concentrate the divine creative power in 
 one act, where time and eternity, finite and infinite meet. 
 It was also a sublime idea, to view the whole range of cre- 
 ated beings as the reflection of the eternal divine ideas 
 which were, so to speak, planted in the earth as life-germs. 
 Thus the rationes seminales in God became, in a certain way, 
 living germs in the bosom of the earth which, at the Cre- 
 ator's bidding, were to bring forth fruit in due season. 
 Holy Scripture seems to bear out this view. God said : 
 Let the earth bring forth the green herb ; let the waters 
 bring forth the creeping creatures with life ; let the earth 
 bring forth living beings, each after its kind. Augustine's 
 great name, which has ever been a power in Western The- 
 ology, gave weight to this theory. Isidore of Seville, Bede, 
 and others followed Augustine's teaching on simultaneous 
 creation as on other points. 
 
 The Schoolmen who, in the main, favoured the Aristote- 
 lian and Greek cosmology and view of creation, could not 
 remain altogether outside the circle of Augustine's mag- 
 netic influence, and they allowed as much authority to his 
 theory as to that of the Greeks, according to which each 
 species was created in its present state. Their strict idea 
 of species and their pitiless logic notwithstanding, the 
 Schoolmen were carried by the Aristotelian philosophy 
 further down the stream than Augustine. For while 
 Augustine claimed that germs of all kinds were created by 
 God, the Schoolmen were not indisposed to interpret the 
 doctrine of matter and form in the sense of an organic 
 development, and to attribute all changes to certain germs, 
 entelechia, with a tendency to certain types. Matter craves 
 for form. The simple form aspires to the higher and more 
 complex, the inanimate to the animate, the anima vegetativa 
 to the anima sensitiva, and this last to the anima rationalis.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 147 
 
 The same process is constantly at work in embryonic de- 
 velopment. The human foetus has first the life of a plant, 
 then of an animal, and finally of a man. 1 A purely natural 
 development, however, was far from the minds of the 
 Schoolmen ; their eyes were ever fixed on the virtus cce/estis, 
 the prima causa, and theprimum movens. It is open to ques- 
 tion whether the development they had in view was geneti- 
 cal or merely logical. Some, like Albertus Magnus, cer- 
 tainly advocated the real transformation of species ; but 
 we must not lose sight of the fact that, in the Scholastic 
 theory, secondary causes are but the tools with which the 
 first cause works. It is quite certain that the Schoolmen 
 never dreamed of teaching that the diversity of forms on 
 earth was due to chance ; nay, they often reject this view 
 by an indignant appeal to Holy Scripture. Both the crea- 
 tion, they say, and the distinctio rerum come from God." 
 God differentiated all things by clothing each one with its 
 own proper form. 
 
 Modern Science has at its disposal greater facilities for 
 bringing these theories to the test. The conjecture of 
 S. Augustine is to-day an evident fact. The different 
 species appeared gradually on the earth's surface. Many 
 have passed away, and others have taken their place. 
 Palaeontology makes it clear that the different forms ap- 
 peared only gradually and at long intervals. First came 
 the elementary forms. These have disappeared to make 
 room for others, and the same fate has befallen them in 
 turn. The order in which plants appear is : cryptogams, 
 monocotyledons, dicotyledons. The oldest undoubtedly 
 organic remains are found in the Silurian formation in the 
 form of sea-weed or zoophyte. There are plants likewise 
 in the Devonian beds. In the carboniferous strata we have 
 
 1 S. Thomas, Sumtn. c. Gent., 3, 2 ; 2, 89 De Pot. 3, a. g. See Commer, System, vol. 
 
 II., p. 162, seq. Theol. Quartalschr., 1885, p. 40, seq. Kleutgen, Philos., vol. II., 
 633. 
 
 2 S. Thomas, I.e., 2, 39, 43, 45. On Albertus Magnus see Meyer, Geschichte der 
 
 Botanik. Konigsberg, 1857, vol. IV., p. 47 and 63. On the Greeks see Zeller, Ueber 
 die Griichischen Vor ganger Darwins, Berlin, 1878. Pliny, Hist. Nat. ai, n : 
 Convolvulus tyrocinium natures lilium for mare discentis.
 
 148 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 the age of the cryptogams ; here the earliest traces of 
 conifers are found. In the Dyassic or Permian rocks there 
 are numerous fossilized remains of ferns, palms and coni- 
 fers. The Mesozoic or Secondary formations are not much 
 in advance of their predecessors. The Triassic formation 
 (red-sandstone, muschelkalk and keuper) contains gigantic 
 calamites, cycads and conifers. In the coal found in Hun- 
 gary and the Alpine districts are enclosed cryptogams, 
 conifers and cycads. Dicotyledons and foliated plants 
 appear for the first time in the chalk formation, in com- 
 pany with conifers, cycads and cryptogams. The Cainozoic 
 or Tertiary formation brings us considerably nearer to our 
 own time. A genuine tropical fauna is found in the Eocene 
 or older Tertiary formation of Central Europe. Palms, 
 bamboos, laurels, fig trees, poplars, elms, birch, magno- 
 lias, &c. appear in the Miocene formation. In the Anthro- 
 pozoic or Quaternary formation we find the present flora 
 distributed geographically and according to climate.* 
 
 The animal kingdom exhibits a similar gradation. Mol- 
 lusca (cephalopoda and brachiopoda) crustaceae, fishes, 
 arthropoda, reptiles, birds, and mammals follow one an- 
 other in regular order and succession. Trilobites, arthro- 
 poda and radiata make their first appearance in the Silu- 
 rian rocks. Corals, sea-weed and mollusca come next, 
 and then we get a first glimpse of the cuttle-fish. The ex- 
 traordinary pterichthys is unearthed in the upper strata of 
 the Devonian beds. In the Carboniferous beds trilobites 
 disappear, and the brachiopoda are represented by the 
 productus. Spiders and insects first come on the scene in 
 the upper division. The Dyassic (Permian) deposits con- 
 tain the first amphibia and reptiles, besides numerous 
 ganoids with heterocercal tails. In the Red Sandstone are 
 found frogs and the first traces of birds. The muschelkalk 
 contains new encrinites, ceratites, the first long-tailed 
 
 3 See Unser Wissen von der Erde, p. 560 seq., 610 seq. Quenstedt, Epoche* der 
 Natur. Tubingen, 1861, p. 388 seq. Probst, Fauna und Flora der Molasse in 
 Oberscktuaben Wilrttetnb.Jakreshefte, 1879, p. 221 seq. ; iS8i, p. 1x4 seq. ; 1184, 
 p. 65 seq. Fraas, Vondtr Siindfluth, Stuttgart, 1866, p. 128 seq.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 149 
 
 crabs, and marine saurians (enaliosauria). Genuine am- 
 monites have been discovered in the Alps, and crocodiles 
 in the Upper Triassic (New Red Sandstone). 
 
 The Dolomite mountains in the Rhaetian Alps (Secon- 
 dary Formation) lay claim to the oldest marsupials. Be- 
 lemnites, ammonites, saurians and marsupials are entombed 
 in the Jura, and tortoises, flying lizards, birds, corals in 
 the so-called upper white Jura, and land-saurians (Dino- 
 sauria) in the peat formations. The belemnites and am- 
 monites that characterize the Jura disappear in the upper 
 chalk strata. The Tertiary is the formation proper to 
 mammalia. Unlike the implacentalia, monotremata and 
 marsupialia of the Triassic formation, the monodelphia or 
 placentalia appear for the first time in the Eocene and in 
 Europe, without intermediate forms. Almost all classes 
 of extant mammals are represented here ; hoofed beasts, 
 semi-apes and apes. In the Miocene and Pliocene we see 
 the second great mammal formation. Here the mastodon, 
 the dinotherium and others, apes too, and gigantic sala- 
 manders found their last resting-place. The Quaternary 
 formation opens out a third great mammal world which 
 includes the mammoth, bear, reindeer, rhinoceros, musk- 
 ox, horse, stag and others. Here we come in contact with 
 existing fauna. 
 
 Such is a brief digest of the evidence that palaeontology 
 offers in regard to the various forms of life. But before 
 judgment can be given, evidence must be collated from 
 other cognate sciences, e.g., geology and geognosy, which 
 explain the formation and succession of the strata. One 
 thing is quite clear ; the earth's crust has been formed 
 and transformed by slow degrees. The order of succession 
 is, in general, tolerably certain, but it is exceedingly diffi- 
 cult to determine how much time the process has occupied. 
 The services of mineralogy, botany and zoology are, it is 
 needless to say, indispensable. Nor can physiology be 
 ignored, since embryology plays an important part in all 
 speculations as to modes of life. It should also be borne 
 in mind that, when historical evidence is wanting as to the
 
 150 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 transformation of species, the decision must rest with 
 physiology. 
 
 The earliest attempts in modern times to account for the 
 various forms of life were purely speculative. Herder and 
 Goethe were of opinion that the forms of animal and vege- 
 table life had come forth very gradually from an original 
 type. Camper and Oken gave too subservient a berth to 
 natural philosophy to obtain lasting results. Buffon's 
 theory, that species arose from the degeneracy of funda- 
 mental types, gives the lie direct to experience and palaeon- 
 tology. The teaching of Benoit de Maillet, 4 who held that 
 perfect organisms spring from the imperfect, is as opposite 
 to that of Buffon as the antipodes are to us. In Benoit de 
 Maillet's view the development is brought about by exter- 
 nal conditions and changes in the mode of life. Lamarck* 
 went even greater lengths in applying this theory to the 
 animal kingdom. The infusoria and the worm, he says, 
 originated in spontaneous generation, and from these two 
 primitive types, molluscs, fishes, reptiles, birds, mammals 
 and man have been gradually evolved. Use and disuse of 
 organs, change of circumstances necessitating change of 
 life, and the tendency of lower forms to become higher 
 and more perfect, are the factors that have effected this 
 development. Thus, he remarks, the giraffe's neck is long 
 because it used often to be stretched into the air to reach 
 the high branches of trees ; in like manner, the long 
 tongues of the woodpecker and ant-eater are due to their 
 peculiar mode of feeding. Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire, an ad- 
 mirer of Goethe, applauded Lamarck to the echo, laying 
 the utmost stress on the change in external conditions that 
 marks the geological epochs. But as all these theories 
 lacked both a solid foundation and exactness of method, 
 botanists and zoologists had no difficulty in exposing their 
 threadbare and illusory character. Linnaeus, unsurpassed 
 
 4 Telliamed, ou Entretiens tTun fhilosophie indien avec un millionaire franfais^ 
 
 Amsterdam, 1748. 
 
 5 Pkilosophie zaologique, Paris, 1809, and edition, 1830. Hisloirt naturfllt tlfsanimaux 
 
 tans vertlbres^ 7 vols., 1815-1823.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 151 
 
 as a systematize!*, made fixity of species the groundwork 
 of his system ; to explain the totality of the species he 
 called in the aid of creation. 6 De Candolle and Agassiz 
 gave this theory a push forward. Jussieu and Cuvier 
 quitted the beaten track, but Jussieu in his botany and 
 Cuvier in his zoology entered the lists against Geoffrey 
 Saint-Hilaire and upheld the doctrine of the constancy of 
 species with such marked success that in France it was, 
 till quite recently, deemed impregnable. Cuvier's knowl- 
 edge of comparative anatomy enabled him to construct a 
 complete skeleton out of a few bones and teeth found in 
 the Tertiary formation. His admirable experiment was 
 calculated to stop the mouths of those who asserted that 
 development might be due to chance or external causes. 
 He, too, like De Candolle and Agassiz, denied that there 
 had been a general gradation. The supposed grades are 
 fallacious, because they apply to the whole creation prin- 
 ciples that hold good only on a small scale. They are but 
 tableaux, not continuous grades. As the entire living 
 world had been destroyed by great catastrophes, there was 
 free scope for a new creative act. De Candolle completely 
 ignores grades of perfection. Agassiz allows their exist- 
 ence, but denies their simplicity. He also concedes that 
 the highest representatives of a given group are nearly 
 always superior to the lowest representatives of the group 
 immediately above it. Of evolution, in the proper sense 
 of the word, he knows nothing, and despite his gradation 
 from imperfect to perfect he holds fast to the doctrine of 
 the constancy of species. Hence the pivot on which his 
 system turns is subordination of character, not affinity of 
 descent. On this principle he drew up a plan of creation. 
 In the several types and classes, orders and families, in the 
 several genera and species he sees embodiments of the 
 divine ideas. Modern science, he thinks, has in the main 
 confirmed the old idea of creation that was set in a poetic 
 and religious light in the Old Testament, and subsequently 
 
 6 See Korner, Die logische Grundlage der Systematik der Organismen, Wundt, 
 Philos. Aufsatze, a vols., 1885, p. aij, seq.
 
 152 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 expounded philosophically and theologically by Fathers 
 and Schoolmen. Thus the dictum of Bacon is ever fresh 
 and ever true : A deep study of nature leads man's mind 
 to God. Agassiz lived to hear his theory branded as a 
 " scholastic fallacy" that confused ideas with things. 
 
 But now thought began to bend its course in an opposite 
 direction. By and bye geologists like Lyell, and palaeon- 
 tologists of the stamp of Forbes, Heer, and Goppert grew 
 convinced that the formation of the earth's crust and the 
 accumulation of organic remains had all along proceeded 
 slowly and steadily, without the intervention of great catas- 
 trophes. It was natural to apply the principle to the or- 
 ganic world also, because at that time artificial gardening 
 and cattle-breeding, in England especially, had been car- 
 ried to such a pass of perfection. Several English natural- 
 ists, Wallace and Darwin included, essayed to introduce 
 this method into the kingdom of nature. Brilliant success 
 awaited Charles Darwin, with whose name the doctrine of 
 descent is henceforth inseparably linked. In his work on 
 the Origin of Species? he diverted the doctrine of descent 
 into quite another channel. Within the last decade it has 
 found so much favour that the great majority of natural- 
 ists are evolutionists if not Darwinians. True, he passes 
 over the problem of the origin of life. He allows also 
 original forms, which may have been four or five or even 
 one in number. But, as was remarked at the time by 
 Professor Bronn, the translator of the work Into German, 
 only time was needed to extend the principle both in a 
 forward and a backward direction. Haeckel and other 
 German Darwinians volunteered to perform this congenial 
 duty. And Darwin, in his later work on the Descent of 
 Man, overtook his vanguard. He denies the constancy of 
 species, and flings to the winds our very notion of species. 
 Descent is the key with which he unlocks the mystery of 
 the manifold variety of living forms. The new and fas- 
 
 7 The Origin of Speciei by means of Natural Selection, London, 1857 (German Edi- 
 tion. Stuttgart, 1860.) A nimals and Plants under Domestication, London, 1867 
 (Stuttgart, 1868.) The Descent of Man, London, 1870 (Stuttgart, 1871.)
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 153 
 
 cinating element that he introduced into the doctrine of 
 descent is an agency with the power to change species, 
 which he derived not from fancy or philosophy, but from 
 nature herself. He solves the problem with three agents : 
 variability, inheritance, and natural selection in the strug- 
 gle for life, or the survival of the fittest. Variability 
 shows how parent types disappear ; Inheritance explains 
 how changes are propagated ; finally, Natural Selection 
 tells how useful variations are transmitted. In the flora 
 and fauna of to-day we see the outcome of the process 
 which can have worked only by slow degrees, and during 
 vast periods of time. 
 
 Nature is, in truth, full to overflowing with variety. 
 No one disputes this ; nay, we gave special prominence to 
 this truth at the beginning of this section. We have only 
 to use our eyes to see nature's variability daily in action. 
 There is no doubt that variability can be artificially pro- 
 moted by external agency. Every gardener knows, for 
 instance, how to change the colour, size and shape of the 
 leaf. Need one enter into the feats that natural selection 
 has accomplished in horses and dogs, sheep, pigeons and 
 the like ? But variability is at work everywhere in nature 
 herself. The same plant will show differences in character 
 according to the nature of the soil in which it is set. Much 
 will depend on whether the soil is rich or poor, damp or 
 dry, sand or chalk. Sometimes plants have all the colours 
 of the rainbow. On high mountains they are smaller in 
 size, but firmer in texture ; they likewise take deeper root 
 and are more highly coloured ; but if set in the plains they 
 will lose these properties. Animals, indeed, are more 
 easily acclimatized ; still, as to size, colour, hair and the 
 like, they are capable of endless variation. Variability, 
 then, as a principle is in general indisputable. Opinions, 
 however, will differ as to how far the principle is to extend. 
 Variability is assuredly limited in both artificial and nat- 
 ural selection. Even the advocates of an unlimited capac- 
 ity for change are forced to restrict it to a " certain sense," 
 and to assign to it a " definite character." They must
 
 154 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 needs allow that it is far from being demonstrated by 
 present experience, and that, without a knowledge of all 
 the earlier forms, complete certainty cannot be had. In 
 this way the scientific question is merged in the historical, 
 and an exact solution becomes impossible. Both in nature 
 and in artificial breeding variability is, as a matter of fact, 
 confined within narrow limits, and in nature it is merely 
 transitory. It does not act in a straight line or on one, 
 side only, but it moves on a plane in every direction. 
 Like a pendulum it oscillates to and fro round its centre, 
 one swing succeeding and neutralizing another, the centre 
 being determined by the character of the species. Accord- 
 ing to locality and nourishment, plants change their colour 
 from a dark blue to a dazzling white ; the circumference 
 of the leaf varies in the ratio of 3 to 7 ; petals are trans- 
 formed into anthers and vice-versa till the time of full 
 blossom. But never yet has variability been known to 
 break through any definite species in the animal or vege- 
 table kingdom. It is easy to see the typical character in 
 every variety. Compared with the fundamental charac- 
 teristics, individual differences are insignificant and of 
 secondary importance. In the same way, morphological 
 and physiological properties undergo no change, be they 
 never so long under the influence of food and climate. 
 The shape, rim and position of the leaf are apparently of 
 little or no moment, yet they are throughout constant. 
 Similarly the biological properties (e.g. the time of blos- 
 soming) can never be permanently changed by external 
 causes. Even in such variable families as the hawk-weed 
 (Hieracium), the rubus and the rosa with their unnumbered 
 varieties, the specific type stands out prominently in indi- 
 viduals that are hardly distinguishable, and the varieties 
 are constant in character. No matter how many and varied 
 the intermediate forms may be, no genetic transition has 
 yet been found.* 
 
 With domestication, however, the case seems otherwise. 
 
 8 See Nageli, Afrstammungslehre, p. 136, seq., p. 187 and 310 Wigand, Darwiniitnus, 
 vol. I., p. 53, seq.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 155 
 
 Thus, there is little doubt that our kinds of wheat have 
 arisen from a wilder species. Our numerous breeds of 
 dogs, sheep and pigeons may have sprung from one type. 
 Still even here there is a fixed limit beyond which varia- 
 bility cannot pass, although its handiwork is deeper and 
 more permanent. All varieties preserve the primitive 
 type. Neither pigeons with big crops, nor sheep with 
 bandy-legs and fat tails, nor hornless cattle nor hairless 
 dogs belie their species, although they are abnormal speci- 
 mens. The most refined natural selection has not suc- 
 ceeded in producing a new species, and it has been equally 
 unsuccessful in changing a fox into a dog, or a rose into a 
 lily or a tulip. Even the crossing of wild species (by which 
 many a garden-variety has been produced) is limited to 
 species that are near of kin. To pretend that the breeder 
 can mould an animal or vegetable organism to his will, as 
 if selection were a magic wand for raising every possible 
 form of life, is to turn a deaf ear to the teaching of experi- 
 ence. In truth the breeder's sphere of operations is 
 bounded by the qualities he finds in nature, and nature 
 brings forth only such varieties as are well-defined and 
 exactly suit the species in question. No breeder would 
 lay heavy stakes on producing a variety not sanctioned by 
 nature, e.g., a cock without a tail, a pigeon with spurs, a 
 poppy with yellow blossoms, a blue pumpkin or a blue 
 orange, a yellow grape or a yellow centifolium. And even 
 if it were possible to obtain these results under domesti- 
 cation, nature in her free state, would rise in rebellion 
 against the pressure put upon her, and, tearing away her 
 borrowed finery, would again clothe herself in her native 
 colours and resume her old habits. The Darwinian theory, 
 as Nageli remarks, was not hatched in a philosopher's 
 study, but, although it has ransacked every stable and 
 pried into every dove-cote, its view of nature, especially 
 of the vegetable kingdom is, to its shame, most narrow. 
 A breeder, ignorant of the principles of descent, may at 
 times imagine that his experiments have issued in a new 
 species. Such a mistake, however, would not prove the
 
 156 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 need of re-adjusting the definition of species. For the 
 notions of variety and species will ever fluctuate. Not 
 every systematic species, it should be noted, is a natural 
 species. Many homologous species, e.g., hoofed-beasts, 
 insects in the Molasse or soft sandstone (Miocene) found 
 in Switzerland coincide with common prehistoric forms 
 and must be explained as mere varieties or polymorphisms. 
 Although systematic species will have to be greatly re- 
 duced in number, variability will not thereby be invested 
 with unlimited powers. 
 
 The apple falls not far from the tree : here is a saying 
 that holds good in the teeth of all variability. Permanent 
 qualities are always inherited. Every new living being 
 necessarily existed beforehand in the germ. Variation 
 cannot be the normal condition of growth. There are 
 monsters in the animal kingdom, and many a bird has 
 hatched a cuckoo's egg. But a cuckoo laid the egg, and a 
 cuckoo came out of the egg. The ducks hatched by a hen 
 are ducks still in spite of the hen, and make for the water. 
 Monsters are caused by obstacles in the path of develop- 
 ment, and pass away. The marvellous metamorphoses 
 that take place in the insect world are subject to the same 
 law. Out of the egg, whether laid on a leaf, on fruit or 
 on an animal, crawls the larva which passes into the 
 chrysalis state before becoming a perfect insect. Plants 
 are even more fettered by their characteristics. Men do 
 not gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles. The leaves 
 of oak and elm always differ ; an acorn is never the same 
 as the root of the oak. The organization of a plant in- 
 variably depends on the parent stem, and the specific 
 nature of the growth is determined by descent. The in- 
 ternal conditions of that growth are fixed, and are written 
 in history. It is impossible to trace uniformly to a proto- 
 type the ultimate structure of the tissues that characterize 
 certain systems ; they are determined by the species. 
 Slight varieties (e.g. the full blossoms of the chestnut, the 
 slit leaves of the beech) which do not change the species 
 can also be traced to internal causes. Indeed it is ex-
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 157 
 
 tremely difficult to point to any external specific conditions 
 in the embryos of plants and animals. Still, according to 
 a scientific axiom, founded on the law of causation, general 
 facts must be referred to a common principle. The larvae 
 of molluscs and worms are similar, but their development 
 is very different. The species, as a disposition, is contained 
 as fully in the egg as in the hen. The difference between 
 a hen's egg and a frog's egg is as great as the difference 
 between a hen and a frog During the three weeks of in- 
 cubation the contents of a hen's egg are changed into a 
 chicken without any notable increase or diminution in the 
 matter contained in the egg. Consequently all the prop- 
 erties of the fully developed egg must be potentially pres- 
 ent in the egg-cell, although the microscope fail to detect 
 them. We need more light to find this dark problem out. 
 The attempt to establish a complete identity of embryos 
 has signally failed. Professional Darwinians exposed and 
 tore into shreds Haeckel's clumsy scheme in which the 
 embryos of the tortoise, the hen, the dog, and man were 
 drawn to one and the same scale. Haeckel apologized. 
 He had drawn up the scheme, he said, on purpose to bring 
 out the points of agreement into bolder relief ! The 
 breath of such an excuse will hardly resolve his deceit into 
 dew ; it cannot but awaken mistrust. Such is the progress 
 of development in organic beings. The matter changes, 
 but life and form remain the same. The same plan of or- 
 ganization pervades all species of plants and animals. 
 Running through them all is a uniform law of formation 
 peculiar to the species. The life of plants and animals 
 unfolds the eternal generic idea that lies hid in germs, 
 " entelechia." All living nature therefore is governed by 
 this law : the germs of organisms have a specific character 
 which keeps variability within narrow bounds. 
 
 Was it always so ? Had not variability a freer hand 
 when the earth was younger ? The answers of Darwinians 
 to this question, though variously shaped, are all in the 
 affirmative. Variability, they say, has now all at once been 
 arrested in its course ; formerly it was free to roam at large.
 
 158 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 The gaps that formerly separated parent and child have 
 now been filled in. Species, even in their organic struc- 
 ture, are now recognised as fixed ; but, it is contended, 
 they have arisen historically in the same way as fixed or 
 relatively fixed conditions have been brought about by 
 human agency. Hence they are variable only at a certain 
 evolutionary stage in their long existence. Here we are 
 again confronted by precisely the same manoeuvres as in 
 the question on the origin of life : a supposition not proved, 
 incapable of proof, and incompatible with scientific meth- 
 ods, coupled with the admission that science cannot solve 
 the question in the manner desired ! History is a province 
 altogether foreign to natural science, and cannot even sup- 
 plement it except by showing forth the past and present 
 history of organic beings. History, however, has filed an 
 affidavit that the animal and vegetable worlds have ever 
 been the same as they now are. The drawings of animals 
 on old Egyptian frescoes leave no doubt that these same 
 animals have peopled both ancient and modern Egypt. 
 The barley-corns found in the pyramids produce the 
 same fruit as even now grows in Egypt. Many ani- 
 mals and plants have undergone absolutely no change 
 even since the ice age. Palaeontology supplies forms 
 without making any disclosures as to their origin. 
 From its raw materials it is impossible to decide with cer- 
 tainty to what extent variability has been at work, since 
 the descent of palaeontological deposits, unlike that of ex- 
 tant organisms, cannot be traced. The intermediate forms, 
 which could throw light on the question, are very often 
 missing. The hypothesis that attempts to supply the miss- 
 ing links by alleged variations inside the egg, has but few 
 supporters.* For the variations in the colour of plants, 
 which seldom pass from blue to red or white, are too in- 
 considerable. Natura non facit saltum is an axiom of both 
 ancient philosophy and modern science. Nor is meta- 
 
 9 Sec de Lestrade, Ltt tMorits de la viejugjet dans Fceuf. Paris, 1886. Contravene, 
 1886. June, p. 303. Nageli, p. 184 seq. On the other side see Sthaaflhausen, 
 p. 147.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 159 
 
 morphosis, with its evolution by leaps, a case in point, 
 since it is not subject to variation. The new short-legged 
 breed of Anconian sheep, whose progenitor was born at 
 Massachusetts in 1791, 10 only shows that there are sudden 
 variations in race formation which art alone can keep con- 
 stant. In nature such abnormal qualities are effaced by 
 competition and crossing. The missing links in the palae- 
 ontological chain are too numerous to be replaced by a 
 chance hypothesis. This hypothesis, like the theory of 
 selection, postulates a net-work of organisms, whereas 
 palaeontology and the kingdoms of life show forth only a 
 gradation of classes. 
 
 And now, having reviewed experimental facts, let us 
 probe the internal theoretical reasons. What then is vari- 
 ability ? Its nature and essence are an unknown quantity. 
 Darwin himself cannot explain the origin and cause of 
 development. We are still in the dark as to its nature. 
 The whole process of evolution reveals a power that human 
 nature cannot fathom. Food, light, temperature, climate 
 and the like are, of course, external causes of variations. 
 But who shall lay bare the internal physiological cause ? 
 External influences are, on the whole, unimportant and 
 have only an external effect." They are, indeed, an indis- 
 pensable condition of evolution, but they are powerless to 
 bring about any substantial change in the formative prin- 
 ciple. Excessive heat or cold is equally injurious to or- 
 ganic life ; but small variations do not become constant. 
 Anyhow there is no explaining why the slight variations 
 of recent organisms are reproduced by an internal affec- 
 tion of the system of reproduction. Here again Darwin- 
 ism starts with a fact unascertained by science. It has to 
 be admitted at the outset that there are sexual differen- 
 tiating influences in animals and plants that cause like 
 parents under like circumstances, to produce offspring 
 
 10 Zacharias, Probleme, p. 64. 
 
 11 Nageli, Sitzungsbericht der mathematisch-physikalischen Klasse der layer. 
 
 Akademie, Munich, Nov. 18, 1865; Feb. i, 1873. Abstammitngslekre, p. 7 ; 13 
 seq. ; 102 seq. See also Schaaffhausen, Antkropol. p. 138 seq. on the other side.
 
 l6o THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 which is, to a certain extent, unlike. Now we are stand- 
 ing in the presence of the unknown. Here the variations 
 are no longer effected by purely mechanical causes, but by 
 an internal tendency and disposition. The determining 
 factors must lie in the organism itself. The organism is 
 the efficient cause that summons new forms into being. 
 That part of the protoplasm which contains the life proper 
 must be endowed with an hereditary disposition for cer- 
 tain organs (Idioplasma* h and be at the same time suscepti- 
 ble of external stimuli. All the properties and forms that 
 develop later are already latent as dispositions, and are 
 transmitted by propagation. The idioplasm is variable, 
 since it is both dependent on internal and external influ- 
 ences, and moreover acts as a formative principle (nisus 
 formativus). Thus we are again happily brought face to 
 face with the Pangenesis of Darwin and the Plastidul- 
 perigenesis of Haeckel the only difference being that 
 these last are arbitrary hypotheses for explaining a sup- 
 posed evolution, whereas the former, while admitting the 
 active element within, seeks to derive it, in the last in- 
 stance, from an inorganic source. To appeal to the molec- 
 ular forces inherent in the substance is again to plead igno- 
 rance. Whether the power of producing forms be ascribed 
 to the smallest particles (micelli) or to matter in general 
 comes to the same thing in the end. So far this is the best 
 hypothesis, for it sets out from the certain fact that the 
 nature of the organism, on which the propagation and 
 specific development of the individuals depend, is to be 
 sought in the constitution and disposition of the smallest 
 particles of the substance. This, however, is stating a 
 fact, not explaining it : the real cause has still to be found. 
 For the present we are leaving the main issue aside. Mean- 
 while Nageli owes it to the public to give some positive 
 reason for assigning an endless variety of dispositions to 
 idioplasm. If this endless variety is contained in minute 
 drops of idioplasm too minute to be detected by the 
 
 xa NSgeli, Atttant. p. 184 seq. Unttr Wisstn von der r<te, p. 689, 704-5.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. l6l 
 
 microscope or any physical or chemical action their origin 
 is a still greater mystery. The fact that the ontogenetical 
 growth of the idioplasm is vertical and its phylogenetical 
 growth horizontal may serve, in some measure, to illus- 
 trate Professor Nageli's system, without, however, afford- 
 ing any clue to the problem of life. Nature is replete with 
 wonders ; but the subtle ramifications of idioplasm in its 
 wanderings from the first cell to the souls of men throw 
 all nature's wonders into the shade. 
 
 Inheritance is not a brand-new invention, but it seems 
 out of place in company with variability. Variability aims 
 at changing, inheritance at retaining existing properties. 
 How then can inheritance hold an important place in the 
 theory of evolution or transmutation ? But the importance 
 of these two principles lies precisely in their union. It is 
 a question, forsooth, of the inheritance of variations. 
 Varieties are frequently propagated in certain races. In 
 many families certain peculiarities become stereotyped. 
 Breeds of domestic animals arose in this way. All these 
 forms are now fixed, but they have not ceased to be sub- 
 ject to the law of variation. Nor is this all. Characteris- 
 tic features and peculiarities are transmitted to the offspring 
 in the same historical order, at the same time of life, and 
 in the same parts of the body as they appeared in the 
 parents. From Atavism, too, we learn how one peculiarity 
 of grandfather or great-grandfather or of some remote 
 ancestor, after a length of time, re-appears. The dark 
 stripes of many horses recall their descent from the zebra. 
 The pelonites or regular flowers of the dandelion are also 
 invoked as a proof of descent. But Atavism tells more 
 against than in favour of heredity, for it shows that the 
 principle is often at fault. This is allowed even in Dar- 
 win's Pangenesis, according to which the qualities are in- 
 herited from the cells of germ-corpuscles, but do not come 
 into action till generations have passed. Nageli smooths 
 away many difficulties by supposing many inherited quali- 
 ties to be latent. Thus it becomes strictly true to say that 
 the offspring is merely the resultant of the matter and
 
 162 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 force of the parents. What is not present is latent ; what 
 is more strongly marked than heretofore was formerly 
 latent ! Not all characteristics, and variations least of all 
 are inherited. Gardeners and cattle-breeders, wishing to 
 preserve or increase a particular stock, must take measures 
 to banish all strange influences and to keep competition at 
 arm's length, or the variety will soon be lost. Nature has 
 no such resources, and hence individuals are exposed to 
 every wind of influence. -The animals again draw nearer 
 to the parent type. Varieties in the colour and formation 
 of the leaf, and the like, disappear, as a rule, with the indi- 
 viduals, and re-appear by accident, it would seem, in other 
 individuals only to vanish again. Alpine plants which, 
 during many years' growth on the mountains, have ac- 
 quired a new character in size, colour or aroma, or in the 
 formation of the leaf or hair, lose this character when they 
 are transplanted to the plains either from the seed or in 
 shoots. The species remains without the variations. If 
 these last have disappeared, the numerous individuals in 
 which they were ingrained must have perished likewise. 
 But if generation among like follows a definite type into 
 which small variations gradually creep, these facts would 
 seem to tell against the inheritance of variations generally. 
 Inheritance is so irregular, so uncertain, that on scanning 
 the facts he had himself gathered together, Darwin, from 
 the crown of his head to the sole of his foot, was all aston- 
 ishment at the freaks of the law of heredity. 18 Haeckel's 
 fundamental biogenetical law gives a curious insight into 
 ontogenesis ; still it is very doubtful whether it has more 
 than the weight of a pretty analogy for turning the scale 
 in favour of phylogenesis. It would be more than won- 
 derful if the law of inheritance were so complicated. In 
 the beginning every individual, even in the highest class, 
 is a single cell, a simple ovule. Even after fission the 
 germ or embryo proper is barely distinguishable. All the 
 bodily organs of mammals are developed from the folds of 
 
 13 Abstantniung, vol. i., p. 132 ; vol. a, p. 109.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 163 
 
 spheroidal embryos by the differentiation and multiplica- 
 tion of the cell. The marrow-bone is at first pointed at 
 both ends, as in the brainless and skull-less lancelet (am- 
 phioxus) ; in other vertebrates the front end is changed 
 into brain. At first the extremities of the different classes 
 are hard to distinguish. Gills are the beginning of the 
 breathing organs. At first all fishes have an heterocercal 
 tail like the shark. Recent observations on the embryos 
 of sharks show that the fins develop from the post-oral 
 parts. The beginning of a tail is perceptible in the human 
 embryo, nor are the cilia wanting. Several rudimentary 
 organs (e.g. the pineal gland, six or seven fingers, bones in 
 the hand and foot) are a memento of primitive times. In 
 animals, including reptiles, birds, and mammals, certain 
 characteristics (e.g., spots, longitudinal or cross stripes, 
 &c.) frequently succeed in order in individuals. Are these 
 really heirlooms from the distant past ? Is this successive 
 ontogenesis a revival of conditions that had long been in 
 abeyance ? Is ontogenesis a second edition of phylogene- 
 sis, or race history ? We are weighing the facts of onto- 
 genesis, just as we dealt above with the facts of palaeontol- 
 ogy. The facts are correct, but the explanation is arbi- 
 trary. In autogony we have to do with an actual develop- 
 ment of a living germ which cannot be explained in itself, 
 but which is essentially bound up with the question of life. 
 A fact in itself inexplicable is ill adapted to prove the his- 
 tory of a race that no longer exists, and that has left no 
 foot-prints behind it. Barring monsters which betray the 
 presence of other influences, every embryo, unshackled in 
 its growth, constantly develops according to the species of 
 the parent. This circumstance militates against success- 
 fully applying ontogenesis to phylogenesis. No embryo 
 can live that has not mounted this step in the ladder of 
 development. Neither bird nor fish ever issued from a 
 mammal embryo, nor has a human mother ever given 
 birth to a beast. It is only a question then of inheriting 
 small changes in themselves inexplicable. These changes, 
 however, are referred to other causes only by the law of
 
 I 6 4 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 correlation, according to which different organs (e .g., ant- 
 lers, hair, sexual organs) are modified in the same way. 
 Rudimentary organs that serve no ostensible purpose (e.g., 
 the vermiform appendage to the alimentary canal, divided 
 toes in the horse, teats in males) and the pedigrees restored 
 by palaeontology (e.g., in the hoofed beasts) may be easily 
 set down as legacies bequeathed from the remote past. It 
 has even been attempted to apply this biogenetical law to 
 lower living forms in order to explain those phenomena 
 amid which the principle of utility leaves the enquirer in 
 the lurch. Pointed reference seems to be made to the 
 ammonites of the Jura, because in no other class of animals 
 do we see the evolution of the external form ab ovo, i.e., 
 from the very beginning of the cell. 1 * There is, however, no 
 escaping the glaring petitio principii. Descent is unex- 
 plained, and yet it is preferred as an explanation of inher- 
 itance. Ontogenesis itself is a mystery. Its application 
 to the history of species has no value beyond that of anal- 
 ogy. Even the analogy is faulty because it has to be estab- 
 lished in the first instance by falsifying the nature of onto- 
 genesis. Method may be the gainer by the transaction, 
 but the principle and method of science should not be con- 
 founded with the principle of existence and growth. 
 
 Inheritance, moreover, is narrowed within the same 
 limits as variability. Only that which exists can be in- 
 herited. Inheritance is a result, not an agent. Like the 
 principle of variability, it hurls defiance in the teeth of 
 those who would explain it. Inheritance is a mechanically 
 inconceivable quantity " one of those words which by 
 reason of their simplicity and clearness are admirably de- 
 signed to throw dust in the eyes of the unwary." 1 ' Haeckel 
 himself, by taking refuge in the " memory of plastidules" 
 and in the " unconscious memory of living matter," thereby 
 acknowledges that the phenomena of inheritance and propa- 
 
 14 Wurttemberger, Ausland, 1873, No. i. Natur und Offtnbarung^ 1884, p. 503, se Q- 
 
 Schlichter, WUrttemb.Jahreskeftt, 1885, p. 95, seq. In the same periodical, i88, 
 see Eimer, Utbtr gesetzm&ssige Zticfinung der Reptilien^ speciell dtr Eidechstit, 
 p. 114, seq. Ueber die Ztichnung der Vdgel und SaugtAiere, 1883, p. 56, seq. 
 
 15 Max Miillcr, Essays, Vol. II., p. 494.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 165 
 
 gation cannot be explained mechanically. How can in- 
 heritance by a mechanical, chemico-physical process, repro- 
 duce in the individual the gradual unaccountable accumu- 
 lations of an endless succession of former races ? Not even 
 Nageli's idioplasm can rise to the height of accounting for 
 it. For its vertical and horizontal growth needs setting 
 on a physiological basis. If its slight variations are at 
 first latent and are only visible after attaining a certain 
 tension, it will be necessary to prove physiologically a law 
 of perfectibility as well as a strict law of inheritance. 
 Idioplasm can give no reason for the pranks played by in- 
 heritance, and itself outstrips the law of inheritance in its 
 amazing power of reproduction. There is no alternative 
 but recourse to a certain " sense" of the various disposi- 
 tions of the idioplasm. The dynamic influence is indis- 
 pensable both for ontogenesis and phylogenesis. 
 
 The element that gives a character to the Darwinian 
 theory of descent is the principle of natural selection in 
 the struggle for life. Here we have the real basis of the 
 facts that variability and inheritance bring to light. It 
 accomplishes in nature what the gardener and cattle- 
 breeder compass by means of artificial selection. Nay, its 
 action is even more widespread. For domestication does 
 not travel outside the species on which it operates. But 
 natural selection has an indefinite period of time at its dis- 
 posal, and breaks down every barrier by its progressive 
 accumulation of small steps. The very phrases " natural 
 selection" and " struggle for life" have acted like a magic 
 wand, and given a fresh impulse and aim to the entire 
 study of nature. Look where we will, everywhere the 
 struggle for existence is raging. Plants dispute the soil 
 with one another ; they battle with heat and cold, and en- 
 gage in strife with the elements. Water-plants, when the 
 waters retire, grow on the sea-shore, and sea-shore plants 
 make themselves at home on the land. The plant that 
 grows on the mountain keeps close to the ground, and has 
 a coat wherewith to protect its leaves and stalks against 
 the cold wintry blasts. When transplanted into the plain
 
 166 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 it is free to spread out its organs in order to enjoy to the 
 full its share of air and light. Animals, too, are ever at 
 war with nature, climate and the elements. Land-animals 
 and water-animals, each in turn, have to do battle with the 
 fickle elements. Not even the nests of birds are spared. 
 Hence those organs are the strongest and most frequently 
 in action which have to cope with the elements and lend 
 themselves to circumstances. Fins are best suited to the 
 fish, wings to the bird, and feet to the animal. For breath- 
 ing purposes, gills answer better in water, lungs on land, 
 and so on, with the other organs of sense. Conversely 
 those organs deteriorate which are less easily adapted to 
 new circumstances. A change in the elements will conse- 
 quently retard their growth and cause them to degenerate. 
 When insects are driven on an island, their wings are their 
 destruction. If they are bold enough to try their power 
 of flight, they are in danger of being blown into the water. 
 Those which sauce their valour with discretion will have 
 the best chance of surviving. The more prudent they are, 
 the less they will use their wings. Then by degrees the 
 wings are shrivelled up and refuse to do their work. They 
 are no longer equal to the task of flying, but the rudiments 
 that remain prove that the wings formerly existed. In the 
 common procrustes coriaceus there are veined rudiments of 
 wings, and shell-like wing-covers which have grown into 
 each other, but easily divide at the seam which still re- 
 mains. Many beetles are in the same category. The eyes 
 of animals that live underground, the mole for example, 
 have fallen into disuse. The eyes of the proteus anguineus, 
 found in the Adelsberg cavern, are under the transparent 
 skin : it has also lungs and gills. Is not this a case in point 
 of deterioration brought on by disuse ? May not the same 
 be said of the back toes on a horse's foot ? of the pineal 
 gland ? of the teats of males ? and of many other rudimen- 
 tary organs whose functions have ceased ?"* 
 
 * Such organs are technically described as " dysteleological." 
 
 16 Dahl, Die Notkwendigktit der Religion^ etc. Heidelberg, i8S6 Zacharias, p. 41. 
 
 Polybiblion, Paris, 1885, p. 392 Unser Wissen, p. 732 Bastian, The Brain as an 
 
 or fan of 'Mind, 1881.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 167 
 
 Animals likewise make war on one another. They not 
 only compete with one another for the possession of food, 
 but they devour one another. They go in search of prey, 
 and employ craft and violence to catch it. The less there 
 is to plunder the more determined are their efforts, and 
 the more likely are the small and weak to fall into their 
 clutches. The stronger and more cunning the animal the 
 greater its chance of passing safely through the struggle 
 for existence. Conversely, the marsupials most noted for 
 being cunning and swift of foot, have least difficulty in 
 escaping the beasts of prey. Thus the animals whose or- 
 gans of offence and defence are most perfect will be best 
 able to survive and multiply. The prolonged struggle, on 
 the other hand, will cause the organs most adapted for 
 pursuit or flight to be largely developed and transmitted 
 to posterity. The antlers of the stag, the horns of cattle, 
 the horses' hoofs, the teeth and claws of beasts of prey, 
 the long feet of the roe and hare, the piercing eye of the 
 bird of prey are instances in point. But the means of 
 defence are not yet exhausted. The insect that is coloured 
 and shaped like a leaf or flower is less easily detected by 
 the bird. The bird that has the same colour as its sur- 
 roundings in field and forest, and the hunted animal that 
 resembles its place of resort are already strongly protected 
 against hostile encroachments. Suchlike phenomena are 
 of frequent occurrence in nature, as anyone can see for 
 himself by a little painstaking observation. He has only 
 to compare the insect with the plant on which it feeds, 
 and to note that the colour of the birds of the field is grey, 
 and that of the animals of the wilderness sandy, to be 
 quite convinced that mimicry does play a part in the strug- 
 gle for life. The colour even varies with climates and 
 seasons. Nay, it is even pretended that the longitudinal 
 stripes of the old animal world were protective because 
 they agreed with the lines of the monocotyledon flora, and 
 furthermore that the transition to spots is connected with 
 the origin of dicotyledons, the shades of which are spot- 
 like. What more natural than to treat these phenomena
 
 l68 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 as resulting from natural selection ? The individuals least 
 favourably coloured were the first to fall victims to the 
 pursuer, and in the end only those survived whose colour- 
 ing was in harmony with their environment. 
 
 These facts have, undeniably, a certain force. Still it 
 must be borne in mind that we are examining a theory 
 which professes, without empirical proof, to explain the 
 present order of nature as the outcome of a development 
 produced by the struggle for life. If our criticisms of vari- 
 ability and heredity are correct, natural selection and the 
 struggle for life are inadequate to account for the entire 
 gradation of fauna and flora, and to trace all animals to a 
 common type, and all plants to a few tiny specks floating 
 in water. Nothing short of omnipotence would be re- 
 quired to make animals, cast on shore, grow accustomed 
 to life on land, or to form the original animals cast ashore 
 into birds, and make ichthyophagi cleave the air. It is 
 taxing the resources of the sea-shore too heavily, to make 
 it responsible for the great divisions of zoology. 
 
 Let us now subject this fundamental principle of Dar- 
 winism to a more searching scrutiny. In effect it may be 
 summarised as follows : What is useful is preserved and 
 improved in the struggle for life : What is useless or hurt- 
 ful perishes or deteriorates. Mr. Herbert Spencer's phrase, 
 the survival of the fittest, puts the matter in a nutshell. 
 But, at the outset, a serious difficulty presents itself which 
 is calculated to shake faith in the principle. The lower, 
 imperfect animals, with which the graduated scale begins, 
 fit very badly into the theory of selection. The utility of 
 natural selection and its biological adaptations are out of 
 place in creatures uniformly similar. What reason can 
 there be for the formation of higher organisms which are 
 in no way needed ? Then, there is another difficulty which 
 recurs at the beginning of every fresh organ. The lower 
 organisms have not disappeared. Far from it ; for they 
 exist in countless myriads side by side with more highly 
 organized beings. The first change is effected within a 
 very narrow compass. How then can it be of service in
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 169 
 
 the struggle for life ? The beginning of an eye is not 
 adapted for sight ; the beginning of a horn is valueless as 
 a defence ; the beginning of a tail serves no purpose under 
 heaven : they are therefore meaningless in the struggle for 
 life. Utility, therefore, is the cause neither of their origin 
 nor of their inheritance. If the variety were accidental, it 
 would be lost by crossing before it could become useful. 
 It would be far more plausible to plead that animals, with 
 no organ of defence properly developed, had used some 
 existing organ for defensive purposes. Thus the flathead 
 or monk-stags have nothing in the way of antlers but 
 lumps overgrown with skin ; but they use their fore-feet 
 to such advantage that, as a rule, they win a victory over 
 their horned suitors. Maybe the antlers are developing 
 by slow degrees, but the evidence is not forthcoming. 
 Although the struggle has been continuous, the beginning 
 and the transitions are nowhere to be found. If the differ- 
 ent species had really arisen and were still arising solely 
 through repeated selection in the struggle for life, the 
 forms of the two organic kingdoms would necessarily be 
 blent in such vast confusion that all attempt at systematic 
 grouping or division into genera and species would be 
 pre-doomed to failure. But the precise contrary is the 
 case. This fact alone suffices to brand natural selection as 
 inadequate. 
 
 Mechanical stimulus, as Nageli calls it, is something over 
 and above the survival of the fittest, but it is equally un- 
 able to explain the disposition for a new organ. It is best 
 confuted by the fact that mechanical means have never 
 succeeded in producing a new organ either in the human 
 or animal body. Corns certainly prove nothing to the 
 contrary. Why should the reaction of the epithelial cells 
 on the continued stimulus in former times be different 
 from the present reaction ? The eyes of insects are, in 
 their construction, most artificial. Imagine the power of 
 mechanical stimulus that would have been needed to con- 
 jure up thousands of facets ! Our best diamond cutters 
 might here profitably take a lesson. The eyes are, it is
 
 170 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 true, immovable, and must therefore be spread over a 
 larger surface. But why has this class retained immovable 
 facet eyes, when its development has been in other respects 
 in proportion ? A few eyes suffice for the spider. Why 
 would not a few suffice for all ? Neither does adaptation 
 help us over the difficulty. The origin of the eye is clad 
 with mystery, and Leydig, Ranke, Zacharias, Spencer and 
 Bastian do not pluck the heart out of the mystery by con- 
 tending that the eye, like the other senses, is but a differ- 
 entiated sense of taste, which is a means of seeing but is 
 not ordained for seeing. Not even adaptation can tell 
 why an eyeless animal is transformed into an animal with 
 eyes. We are utterly in the dark as to how a cluster of 
 epithelial cells can be converted into an organ adapted for 
 the perception of light. Talk about adaptation between 
 skin and sunlight ! Why, then, is the eye formed only in 
 certain parts of the body ? Why is the eye so strikingly 
 symmetrical in its whole organization ? The same may be 
 said with truth of the other organs, but the differences are 
 not so strongly marked. No reason can be given, for in- 
 stance, why ruminants have horns nowhere but on the 
 head ; why the horns are only two in number, and why 
 other animals have no horns at all. 
 
 The organisms and organs in nature must have been 
 arranged in mutual harmony and correlation from the very 
 beginning ; they must likewise have been adapted to their 
 environment at least to the extent that they could easily 
 exist and be brought into action. The adaptive charac- 
 ters, too, must have reached a certain stage of development 
 before they could be useful. The organization of the sev- 
 eral individuals is perfect and to the purpose ; they are 
 even better equipped than man.' 1 The trilobites of the 
 Silurian strata, it is said, were not provided with such a 
 perfect outfit as the later crabs ; but the assertion is backed 
 by no proof. Equally unfounded is the statement that the 
 saurians of the Jura were less adapted to their environment 
 
 17 S. Augustine, De Hat. ban., c. 8 Storz, Pkilot. Jet kl. Aufttftinits, p. 234 eq. 
 Seech i, Si/iL>e/>fuii, p. 26. Nageli, p. 14.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 171 
 
 than the modern lizard. The bird is certainly more highly 
 differentiated than the earth-worm, but it fulfils its office 
 in life no better, nor is it better adapted to its conditions 
 of life. Every organism in relation to its suitableness for 
 its aim in life is equally perfect. In this respect the one- 
 celled plant is as perfect as the apple-tree, the radiates as 
 the lion. A more perfect adaptation is neither necessary 
 nor useful. In a larger class, viz., the Ammonites of the 
 Jura, we find a series of minute variations that are appar- 
 ently of little or no utility. These Ammonites can be 
 traced in regular succession from the under Lias to the 
 upper White Jura. The size of the shell, the number of 
 coils, the formation of the skeleton, the division of the 
 ribs, the branching of the lobes and the like offer interest- 
 ing points for study of variability and inheritance. But 
 how can it be shown that one or other of these properties, 
 or all of them together, have rendered substantial service 
 to the animal in its struggle for life ? Did perchance the 
 Ammonite in the Jura Sea with its inflated back and rich 
 rib formation find and retain its food more easily than the 
 later compressed Ammonite which has no ribs at all and 
 an angular back ? It is well-known that the Ammonites 
 Capricornus is smooth in youth ; in middle life it is cov- 
 ered with lumps which again disappear in old age. What 
 can the principle of utility have to do in this matter ? 
 But, it is said, all coexistent organisms mutually strive to 
 attain an ever-increasing height of perfection. Conse- 
 quently all the organisms that come forth together are 
 equally highly developed. Whether they be highly organ- 
 ized mammals or simple globules of protoplasm they must 
 have advantages to counterbalance the advantages of other 
 animals. 18 The pike in a carp pond is an instance in point. 
 As soon as there is a notable decrease in the number of 
 carp, the rations of the pike are cut down, and in conse- 
 quence there is a heavy fall in their muscular strength. On 
 the other hand some few pike find good food, increase in 
 numbers, and are again benefactors to their species. Cir- 
 
 18 Dahn, p. 24.
 
 172 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 cumstances are in no way materially changed. Pike and 
 carp again recover their equilibrium. Many similar in- 
 stances, some even more striking, could be given. It will, 
 however, suffice to mention how destructive insects and 
 their foes hold each other in equilibrium. The bees that 
 fertilize the clover in the meadow are chased by field mice. 
 The domestic cat, the raven and the crow persecute the 
 field mice, and thereby promote the welfare of the clover. 
 The efforts of bees and mice, of cats, crows and clover are 
 all directed to preserving the balance of power. In an 
 enclosed carp-pond the pike might easily destroy the carp 
 root and branch, especially if the stronger pike drove off 
 the weaker and then united their forces to make a common 
 onslaught on the few remaining carp. The disappearance 
 of entire families and species is not unusual in the history 
 of animals. Trilobites and ammonites, belemnites and 
 sauriansof the Lias, bears and mammoths, and many others 
 have been swept off the scene. When America was discov- 
 ered, not a horse was to be found throughout the length 
 and breadth of that vast continent, although palaeontology 
 has since unearthed its remains. Nevertheless, it must be 
 granted that whole classes are not so rapidly annihilated 
 in the struggle for existence ; there is a certain balance of 
 power subsisting between beasts of prey and their victims. 
 What bearing has this fact on natural selection ? Plainly, 
 that each animal must have been perfect in its kind from 
 the very beginning, and hence the reason of serial succes- 
 sion lies elsewhere. The lower animals of to-day are not 
 one jot or tittle better or more perfect than their ancestors, 
 as the globules of protoplasm abundantly testify. That 
 mutual impulse to higher perfection, of which we were 
 speaking, is neither actively nor passively suited to the 
 lower animals. At any rate the improvement should be 
 mutual, whereas selection cannot but make it one-sided. 
 If mutual influence is at work in the present, it cannot 
 have been dormant in the past. 
 
 We have not yet, however, reached the limit to which 
 equilibrium and mutual accommodation stretch. They
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 173 
 
 extend to the animal kingdoms in the mass as well as in 
 the individual. Animals, it need hardly be said, feed on 
 plants. But the conclusion from this fact has still to be 
 drawn : Plants exist for the sake of animals. Palaeontol- 
 ogy now steps in and proves that animals and plants come 
 on the scene about the same time. Here we will call atten- 
 tion to some of the special circumstances attending this 
 mutual dependency. Insects, as is well known, live for 
 the most part on the flowers of plants, and many insects 
 are restricted to certain particular plants. The Larvae 
 require special leaves which the butterfly knows exactly 
 where to find. If these leaves cannot be had, because the 
 tree is injured or the buds are frost-bitten, the caterpillar 
 will die out. The same result will ensue if the caterpillar 
 is transported to a country where these leaves do not grow. 
 It never occurs to them to try and accommodate them- 
 selves to other kinds of leaves. Now, is it at all probable 
 that caterpillars would have cut off their supplies by grad- 
 ually accommodating themselves to certain plants to the 
 exclusion of others ? Surely selection should have widened, 
 not narrowed the supply of food. For experience teaches 
 that those fare best who are least selective. Thus insects 
 have certain plants for their dowry. Another equally 
 curious fact, only recently discovered and appreciated at 
 its true worth, is that insects do good to plants. 
 
 In a large number of plants the male and female flowers 
 are distributed on different individuals (dicecious), or on 
 different branches of the same plant (mon&cious) . For this 
 reason neither of these two classes of plants can immedi- 
 ately fertilize themselves. By a wise provision of nature 
 the grains of pollen are, as a rule, blown on to the stigma 
 by the wind ; but in many cases this device is hardly suffi- 
 cient. In the hermaphrodites too, either the stamens and 
 pistils mature at different times (Dichogamy), or the struc- 
 ture of the plant is such that the pollen can fall out of the 
 anther on the stigma only with great difficulty, if at all 
 (Heterostyle). In some flowers the style is longer than the 
 stamens, or vice versa (e.g. the dimorphic primula offidnalis
 
 174 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 and the trimorphic Lythrum Salicaria). In these cases 
 fertilization is legitimate, if effected by organs that are 
 equal in height ; that effected otherwise is illegitimate and 
 frequently sterile. Insects coming in quest of honey and 
 pollen do the work of fertilization. They can easily de- 
 posit the pollen on the stigma, because the shade of the 
 perigonium is usually such as to compel the insect to strike 
 the anthers while reaching its food. This fact is well illus- 
 trated in the case of the orchis and asclepias. As a rule 
 certain insects are partial to certain plants (e.g-, humble 
 bees to clover), because the organization of each is suited 
 to the other. Still it is generally true that insect-fertiliza- 
 tion is necessary as a means of cross-fertilization. Noth- 
 ing can be clearer than that many plants have a natural 
 disposition for developing in their flowers contrivances 
 that make self-fertilization very difficult. If this is so, 
 surely the animal world must have been ordained for this 
 office. There is no reason for supposing that the disposi- 
 tion was different in former times. As long as the psychic 
 element is ignored there is no explaining how the dimor- 
 phic or trimorphic arrangement can have arisen from ab- 
 horrence to self-fertilization. It is nothing to the purpose 
 to plead that the majority of hermaphrodites are equal in 
 height, and that stamens and pistils of equal height are 
 the most favourable to fertilization. It is equally unlikely 
 that the organization of insects was in the first instance 
 owing to corresponding contrivances in plants. Thus it is 
 improbable that the proboscis has been developed by ex- 
 tracting honey from the nectary of the flower, and that, 
 conversely, the flower has been altered in form by the 
 proboscis. Nor yet again is there any probability in the 
 suggestion that insects are attracted by the scent and colour 
 of flowers, and therefore the propagation of the most beau- 
 tifully coloured flowers is ensured. We will not here re- 
 peat the question as to the first commencements of the 
 proboscis and calyx, which must have been adapted to one 
 another at the outset. We will not dwell on the circum- 
 stance that insects do not uniformly frequent the most
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 175 
 
 beautiful and the most fragrant flowers, as colour and 
 smell have but slight influence. But for this reason we 
 are entitled to lay all the more stress on their mutual adap- 
 tation. The insect depends on the plant, and the plant on 
 the insect, and their organizations are shaped to meet the 
 requirements of this mutual dependency. The nectary 
 secretes the sweet juice of the flower, and the bee gets at 
 the juice with its proboscis. Is it not just as likely that 
 the nectary was ordained for the bee, and the bee for the 
 nectary, as that nectary and proboscis have mutually de- 
 veloped each other ? The first alternative is a fact, the 
 second a theory. Here also selections would be one-sided, 
 and could never explain why development has come to a 
 standstill. The separate development of proboscis and 
 nectary would destroy the adaptation, and hence be harm- 
 ful ; selection, on the other hand, will never be able to 
 account for simultaneous development. If, as the mechan- 
 ical doctrine of descent teaches, the repeated application 
 of the stimulus of the insect has caused the leaf to grow, 
 and the leaf has, in turn, stimulated the growth of the 
 proboscis, some proof from experience should be forth- 
 coming. Those who maintain that both flower and pro- 
 boscis are limited in development, ip so facto shake the dust 
 of the empirical explanation from their feet. And further 
 to limit this limitation to certain species would be equally 
 strange. 
 
 Still more surprising is the universal adaptation of the 
 plant and animal kingdoms to each other. They are not 
 only in many ways ordained for each other, but the same 
 fundamental conditions are requisite for the life of both, 
 light and air. The animal breathes oxygen, the plant a 
 corresponding quantity of carbonic acid. Conversely, the 
 animal exhales carbonic acid, the plant, oxygen. Thus a 
 brisk invisible trade is ever going on between the two 
 kingdoms. But the imports and exports are so well-regu- 
 lated that the percentage of nitrogen, oxygen and carbonic 
 acid in the air remains the same throughout, and thus life 
 continues to thrive. Each process fosters life in both
 
 176 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 kingdoms. By the influence of light the kinetic energy in 
 the plant becomes potential, and vice-versa the potential 
 energy in the animal is made kinetic. Did the struggle 
 for existence first create this equilibrium ? The coal-meas- 
 ures are alleged in proof, because they suppose an atmos- 
 phere strongly charged with carbonic acid, and the lower 
 animals, water-animals almost without exception, need but 
 little oxygen. But, on the other hand, the advanced vege- 
 tation would have caused a prodigious discharge of oxygen. 
 So the difficulty of an unstable equilibrium still remains. 
 The conclusion, then, is that certain fixed relations must 
 have been established between the two kingdoms from the 
 beginning. It is for Teleology to draw further conclu- 
 sions. But the question as to the utility of organs is far 
 from being exhausted. In this connection the vegetable 
 kingdom deserves special consideration as it, least of all, 
 fits into the Darwinian scheme. The most formidable 
 opponents of Darwinism are botanists. Wigand thinks 
 that this theory would never have been propounded, if the 
 vegetable kingdom had been duly considered by its authors. 
 The Monistic Nageli has forcibly shown how miserably in- 
 sufficient is Natural Selection to account for plant life." 
 The morphological characters of plants are the least vari- 
 able. They are very important for the system but wholly 
 useless to the plant. The plant may be whole or divided, 
 feathered or plain, sawed, notched or toothed, circular or 
 oval, kidney or lancet-shaped ; the leaves may be front to 
 front, or back to back, or crossed ; the petals may be three, 
 four, five, or more in number ; the positions of the flower 
 in relation to the female pistil may be hypogynous, perigy- 
 nous or epigynous ; all this and much more is of the high- 
 est morphological importance, but of no appreciable physi- 
 ological value. It is hopeless to find an explanation of the 
 origin and inheritance of these morphological peculiarities 
 in natural selection. To take refuge in former unknown 
 utility is the merest quibble. A theory that confesses its 
 impotency to account for the commonest phenomena in the 
 
 19 See Siebtn Griinde grgtn dtH Dar-winismus ; Abitammungslehre, p. 290.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 177 
 
 vegetable kingdom, is condemned out of its own mouth. 
 We grant that " the most tenacious morphological phe- 
 " nomena in which no appreciable advantage or purpose 
 " is describable, are as a rule inherited." But this fact is 
 not accounted for by saying that former living beings 
 " could with advantage have acquired this organization." 8 * 
 This is a mere jingle of words, not only without proof, but 
 also illogical and at variance with experience. Thus it is 
 no rhetorical exaggeration to say that all botany is up in 
 arms against the doctrine of descent. The vegetable king- 
 dom both past and present is equally stubborn and unyield- 
 ing in its resistance. Its strictly morphological character 
 is proof against all assaults. Plants are very properly 
 classed according to structure, food and locality. The 
 chalk plants are usually bluish-green and hairy ; the leaves 
 are more deeply divided or sawed ; the flowers are gener- 
 ally large ; but the colours are dull. The flowers of the 
 flint plants, on the other hand, are smaller but brighter ; 
 the leaves are grass-green with the rim either slightly 
 toothed or quite even. These differences, however, do not 
 always occur. Moreover their origin through external 
 causes is doubtful, because plants from the chalk and flint 
 formations are strictly tied down to the soil. Anyhow the 
 utility of such slight morphological differences is not 
 proved. 
 
 Moritz Wagner was so overpowered by the difficulties 
 that beset the theory of selection, especially the contradic- 
 tion between variability and inheritance, that he was em- 
 boldened to float a new hypothesis. 81 But, in presence of 
 the manifold diversity of living forms, his migration theory 
 is equally impotent. It supposes what is scientifically im- 
 possible, and in this way serves to show the untenableness 
 of the theory of selection. The fauna and flora of South- 
 western America, South Africa, and Australia are very 
 
 20 Unser Wissen, p. 703 21. 
 
 ai L.c. p 702, seq. M. Wagner in the Augsb. Allg. Ztg. 1873. Beil. No. 317-320. 
 Eimer, Wurttemb. Jahreshefte, 1883, p. 78 seq. Dixon, Evolution -without natu- 
 ral selection, or The Segregation of Swedes without the aid of the Darwinian 
 hypothesis^ London, 1885. 
 
 L
 
 I?8 THE VARIOUS FORMS OK LIFE. 
 
 different, although the conditions under which they live 
 are extremely similar. Even on the two coasts of South 
 America the difference is considerable. The ornithologi- 
 cal, mammalian and other fauna of America have striking 
 peculiarities, as seen, for instance, in the green parrot, 
 the long-bill or pepper-pecker, and the colibri. Pachy- 
 derms are represented by the tapir, camel, and lama. 
 Apes are now classified as apes of the old and new world, 
 or as small-nosed and flat-nosed (Catarrhine and Platyr- 
 rhine). Clawed apes belong to South America, semi-apes 
 to Africa. The edentata are very feebly represented in 
 the old world. America and Australia are the home of the 
 sloth and armadillo. The strange ornithorhynchus or 
 duck-bill inhabits New Holland. One species of the eden- 
 tata, the scaly ant-eater, is especially interesting, since ac- 
 cording to recent researches it supplies the missing link 
 between mammals and birds, and thereby forms a pendant 
 to the mysterious archeopteryx that has been discovered 
 in the Oolitic slates of Solenhofen." Quite recently, how- 
 ever, Dames has shown that it is a genuine bird of the 
 Carinatos class. The ant-bear is the only mammal at pres- 
 ent known to lay eggs. It digs a hole, fences it round 
 with leaves and twigs, and therein makes its nest. The 
 eggs when laid are in an advanced stage of development, 
 and need no hatching. The young live before their birth 
 on the yolk of the egg. Marsupials are found nowhere 
 but in America and Australia. The kangaroo is peculiar 
 to Australia ; it is the Australian substitute for the rumi- 
 nants. America and Australia are not less rich in special 
 kinds of plants which, particularly in Australia, are often 
 abnormal in their formation (casuarines). The deposits in 
 the tertiary beds lead us to suppose that isolation has been 
 mainly instrumental in preserving till now these relics of 
 the tertiary period. Similar phenomena, though not on so 
 grand a scale, may be observed in other parts of the same 
 
 21 Sec Natw ttnd Offtnbarung, 1885, p. 189, seq. The Archeopteryx. See Ausland, 
 1871, No. 14, Natur und Offcnbarung, 1886, p. 1761 Unstr Wisten.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 179 
 
 continents. Hence development might be due in great 
 measure to isolation or separation. 
 
 But it is not all plain sailing. There are rocks ahead, 
 on which the migration theory will inevitably strike. For 
 the isolation was not complete and constant, nor was cross- 
 ing excluded. On the contrary, changes were not infre- 
 quent. The earth's surface had its full share of changes. 
 Lofty mountains and spacious plains, cold winds from the 
 north and warm winds from the south, the ice-age and the 
 deluge have had a hand in the formation of isolated areas. 
 They joined islands to the mainland and separated the 
 mainland from the sea. Thus complete isolation is a 
 dream. Then, again, what would be the special effect of 
 separation ? Surely to preserve not to change existing or- 
 ganisms. Change of locality cannot be a more powerful 
 factor than the struggle for existence. Nevertheless some 
 plants (e.g. Alpine roses), notwithstanding changes in local- 
 ity and circumstances, have remained unchanged since the 
 glacial epoch. The rules as to local modifications are as 
 fixed and as fickle as laws relating to the weather, being 
 honoured more in the breach than in the observance. The 
 influence of food and climate is not strong enough to pro- 
 duce permanent characteristics. But Darwinism was still 
 reeling under the reproach that it applied the laws of arti- 
 ficial selection to a free state of nature. The migration 
 theory was invented to parry this thrust. Separation, it 
 contends, is Nature's substitute for the breeder's art. But 
 it gives no deeper insight into principles, nor does it pluck 
 up by the roots the difficulties that are ever cropping up 
 anew. As the first colonists vary but slightly from the 
 parent type, the only course open to them is to retain the 
 parent type. If they largely increase and multiply, or if 
 there is an influx of new colonists, we must fall back on 
 the theory of selection. 
 
 Estrangement, not change, is the goal of separation. It 
 is matter of recent observation that animals, which were 
 transported many years ago from the Old to the New 
 World or vice-versa, guinea pigs, for example, will no longer
 
 180 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 pair with individuals of the same species, and in this fact 
 the transmutation theory is supposed to score. Alas, the 
 way is wearisome and long from this estrangement to a 
 new species. A substantial change has not yet ensued. 
 It was also noticed that the axolotl (Siredon Liehenoides), 
 when in the aquarium, discarded its gills. Forthwith a 
 rush was made to the conclusion that the change was 
 owing to changed conditions of life. It has, however, been 
 since ascertained that axolotls thus metamorphosed abound 
 in the neighbourhood of the Mexican Gulf. Thus the 
 reason of the change lies not in the circumstances but in 
 the species, as is the case also with the frog. Different 
 breeds of dogs are often estranged from one another. But 
 here the certain difference in race comes to our aid. Hence 
 European cats and guinea pigs will not pair with those of 
 South America, nor the European rabbit with its descen- 
 dants in Madeira." The migration theory may, in truth, 
 throw a flood of light on the unequal geographical distri- 
 bution of organic beings, but as an element in the theory 
 of evolution it is almost sterile. There is a notion abroad, 
 which gains in strength and probability day by day, that 
 the fauna and flora gradually spread over the earth from 
 the North and South Poles. Still it might be rash to argue 
 from this to a single original creation by which the world 
 was gradually peopled. For, however scanty our knowl- 
 edge of the greater part of the earth may be, it is quite cer- 
 tain that the highly organized animals were late in appear- 
 ing on the scene. Every species of animal and plant has 
 appeared once only, and that in its own centre or area ; 
 but all did not appear at once. Migration has changed 
 much, and separation has retained much ; but the entire 
 race has not been evolved by these two agents, nor has it 
 been spread broadcast by migration. Isolation may tell 
 favourably on the formation of species, still it has no more 
 right than the rival Darwinian principle of utility to be 
 considered the most essential or, as Wagner will have it, 
 the only cause of the origin of species. Nay, the very fact 
 
 93 Unser Wissen, p. (xysPolybiblion, 1885, p. 391 Schaaffhausen, p. 143.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. l8l 
 
 underlying the migration theory, namely the existence of 
 different fauna and flora, proves that no internal power of 
 transmutation (Idioplasma) is present. It would be neces- 
 sary to suppose that the principle has been working so 
 slowly and so silently as to leave no visible trace for sev- 
 eral geological epochs. This, however, is to withdraw the 
 case from the jurisdiction of science. There's small choice, 
 as the saying is, in rotten apples ; still, if the choice lay 
 between the two, preference should be given to Elmer's 
 genepistatic theory, according to which the origin of species 
 rests on the permanent forms which living beings have 
 acquired in the various degrees of natural development. 
 Every species would then, at least, be circumscribed within 
 definite limits. 
 
 Thus natural selection, neither alone nor in conjunction 
 with any other purely external cause, can account for the 
 many various forms of life. The objections urged by 
 Wagner, Wigand, and Nageli forced Darwin himself to 
 admit that he had attached too much importance to natural 
 selection. 24 He therefore supplemented his theory with 
 sexual selection.* Mating for breeding purposes is com- 
 mon among many of the higher genera of animals. As the 
 sexes are distinguished in the later formation of the em- 
 bryo, the distinction into sexes must be due to sexual selec- 
 tion. Sexual selection operates in two ways. In their 
 rival struggles during the breeding season the secondary 
 sexual characteristics of the males serve as weapons of 
 attack and defence. Such are, for instance, the horns of 
 the stag, the spurs of the cock, the huge mandibles of the 
 stag-beetle, and so forth. Other secondary sexual charac- 
 teristics are useful for attracting the female. To this latter 
 kind belong the glandular sack of the musk-deer, the rich 
 plumage and sweet singing of many birds, the mane of the 
 lion, the goat's beard, and the like. As the strongest and 
 best-armed males get possession of the females, and as the 
 
 24 Abstamm., Vol.. I, p. 132, 225. 
 
 * Mr. Herbert Spencer has now declared that all these are insufficient. See Nineteenth 
 Century, 1888.
 
 182 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 preference is given to the most beautiful in the case of 
 both male and female, the strongest and most perfect indi- 
 viduals are mated, and leave a strong and goodly offspring. 
 
 Sexual selection, however, takes for granted that these 
 secondary sexual characteristics always exist. Now, as a 
 rule, this is true only in the higher genera, and even here 
 the two sexes often share these characteristics alternately. 
 But there is absolutely no foundation for the theory in the 
 case of the lower animals, with whom, be it noted, evolu- 
 tion should begin. Here the secondary characteristics are 
 either quite unimportant or barely perceptible. The pair- 
 ing is almost casual, just as the sexes chance to meet. 
 The physiological act of reproduction, however, in spite of 
 its gradations, is so essentially similar in the entire animal 
 kingdom that no principle can be found elsewhere to ex- 
 plain it. The origin of these secondary characteristics is 
 quite as problematical as the origin of new organs. Before 
 they can take effect they must have attained a certain 
 measure of progress in their formation. Again a sufficient 
 reason for the first beginning is wanting. 
 
 Their existence being granted, it is still very doubtful 
 whether they have played a prominent part in animal de- 
 velopment. The selection of the males by the females is 
 more in the nature of a hypothesis than that of a fact. It 
 is, however, correct that the females, especially in certain 
 families of birds (e.g. gallinaceous), owing to their small 
 size and dull colouring, are exposed to fewer dangers in 
 the struggle for existence than the males, who, in form and 
 colouring, are more strongly marked. As a rule youthful 
 characteristics cleave to the female, whose development, 
 therefore, remains on a lower grade longer than that of 
 the male (Law of male preponderance). Consequently, 
 according to the law of the struggle for existence, males, 
 like white ravens, should long ago have vanished off the 
 face of the earth. It would, indeed, be surpassing strange 
 if sexual selection exposed them to greater dangers by 
 reason of their charms and ornaments, while natural selec- 
 tion was arming them against these dangers. Anyhow the
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 183 
 
 selection of the female must be limited to a few males. 
 But the females are perfectly passive. During the fierce 
 struggle between the rival males they look on in unmoved 
 and listless indifference, shewing favour to neither com- 
 batant, not rejoicing in the triumph of the one nor sorrow- 
 ing over the defeat of the other. The battle over, they 
 march off with the victor, unresisting, not consenting. No 
 physical or aesthetical considerations enter into the bargain. 
 If, as was said above, the theory of natural selection was 
 hatched in the dovecote and the stable, that of sexual 
 selection may be said to have been excogitated in the 
 family parlour. It applies human ideas to animals, with 
 the important difference that mankind regard the female 
 as the sex of beauty and the object of selection. This 
 fact should have saved Darwin from the pitfall. Besides, 
 all the lives of animals, down to the minutest details, are 
 developed according to fixed and absolute laws, and this 
 simple fact tears into shreds the notion that animals are 
 fascinated by gorgeous colours. 
 
 In the vegetable kingdom sexual selection is without aim 
 or purpose. There are, it is true, secondary sexual char- 
 acteristics at work among some orchids, and in the flowers 
 of the cupulifer and betulaceae (oak, birch, hazel-nut, 
 alder), which are dissimilar in formation. But of sexual 
 selection there is not the faintest glimmer. It is an im- 
 possibility. How then can the organs have originated 
 from it ? As it cannot even explain sexual differentiation 
 in the vegetable kingdom, how shall it account for the 
 evolution of the whole ? Even in insect fertilization the 
 secondaiy sexual organs are unimportant. The strongly 
 marked properties of flowers in size and colour are de- 
 pendent on the perigonium. Thus the sexual organs are 
 relatively insignificant. 
 
 Secondary sexual characteristics are, therefore, proved 
 to be founded on sexual organism. Some are correlated 
 to the whole disposition. Castration brings about a great 
 change in all. Hence these characteristics are developed 
 in direct proportion to the activity of the males in the
 
 184 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 breeding season. The enormous vital energy displayed in 
 movement, song, and foolhardy passion cannot but quicken 
 physiological activity. This may have caused and intensi- 
 fied the bright, beautiful colours of male butterflies." Still 
 there are well-defined limits to their action. Moreover if 
 we pass from the attractive to the indifferent males we find 
 that these latter are by no means rare (e.g., whitings ; 
 black beetles). As the altitude of the locality tends to 
 produce intensity of colouring in plants, so it probably ex- 
 ercises a like influence on insects, molluscs, and other ani- 
 mals. Even if sexual selection were so far-reaching in its 
 consequences, the proportion of sexes, which is a constant 
 and regular quantity, would still be unexplained. Selec- 
 tion does not alter this proportion even among mankind, 
 in whom it undoubtedly exists. It is computed that the 
 proportion between male and female is as 28 to 29. There 
 are 105 births of boys to 100 of girls. On the other hand 
 155 boys die in the first year, compared with 100 girls. 
 Such regularity would be more than curious if the differ- 
 entiation (which sets in late) were, so to speak, dependent 
 on the shot of accident, or the dart of chance. What an 
 untrue compass chance is for measuring the regular course 
 of the processes of nature ! Unless a primitive disposition 
 for the several parental types be assumed, sexual selection 
 and differentiation are themselves hidden in Egyptian 
 darkness, and therefore can throw no light on the dark 
 problem of evolution. The action of external causes is 
 progressive or retrograde ; but, unless controlled by or- 
 ganic laws, they can neither perpetuate nor develop the 
 type. 
 
 We still stand in the awful presence of nature's mystery. 
 Variability, heredity, adaptation, selection and all such 
 stock phrases stand convicted, both in themselves and in 
 their actual effects, of incompetency to sound the depths 
 and shoals of the sea of organic life. Even in domestica- 
 tion the active cause lies deeper than ever plummet of man 
 sounded. How, then, can we hope to reach it in the bot- 
 
 5 Natur und Offtnbarung, 1886. Nos. i and 3.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 185 
 
 tomless ocean of natural selection ? The problem attaching 
 to the commencement of new organs and new organisms, 
 and their onward march to perfection, is not pricked even 
 skin-deep by the theory of utility in the struggle for life. 
 Utility, perfection and constancy are three quantities, unlike 
 and unequal. From the very first, classes and orders stand 
 out as well-defined groups. The myriads of alleged transi- 
 tion-forms that one would expect to find, have vanished in the 
 sunbeams. Even if the history of development could tell 
 how things have become what they are, the Why and the 
 Wherefore would still be hidden. To allege an endless 
 accumulation of slight variations extending over an in- 
 definitely vast period of time is to appeal blindly to the 
 unknown. All quantitative and mechanical explanations 
 of the qualitative variations in a new organism, or in the 
 differentiation of vegetables as to leaf and axis, or in the 
 determinate formation of an indifferent organ, must be set 
 down as blank failures. No naturalist can point to the 
 origin of a decidedly new species. The theory of descent 
 may present facts in a new light and reconstruct the his- 
 tory of the organic world, but it can never give a satisfac- 
 tory account of the causes that have made this organic 
 world what it is. At most Darwinism can lift but one 
 corner of the veil. It can, for instance, show how, in the 
 keen competition for life, certain individuals and species 
 have gone to the wall ; it can explain how certain rounds 
 in the organic ladder have been broken or removed ; but 
 it can furnish no positive clue to the forms of life, or as to 
 why the fittest and most perfect survive. At this point 
 some internal principle must be summoned to the rescue, 
 whether we call it with Schaaffhausen and Askenasy a for- 
 mative impulse, or with Nageli a " perfecting impulse." 
 As this impulse of self-forming idioplasm is being pushed 
 stealthily into the groove of mechanical necessity, it is 
 gratifying to hear the inventor of the " Idioplasm theory" 
 confessing that there is not the least foundation for a 
 mechanical solution, and that therefore he does not pro- 
 pose to offer one. Here, then, we may cross the frontier
 
 l86 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 of teleology. Eimer's confession is also noteworthy. 
 Such absolute regularity, he says, pervades animal forms 
 that he cannot trace them either to immediate usefulness, 
 or to any causes which would gradually transform the or- 
 ganism in a definite direction, independently of the organ- 
 ism itself. Constitutional causes, he thinks, are the essen- 
 tial principle of the transformation of forms. Utility, 
 though a power, can but modify what already exists. 
 With this last statement we can entirely concur. Little as 
 chance has to do with the government of the world, it 
 wholly regulates the transformation of forms. 
 
 The theory of descent does not even give a complete 
 history of the organic world. It has not yet succeeded in 
 grouping the facts in regular, unbroken order. Geology 
 and palaeontology prove only that, on the whole, there has 
 been progress ; but the details are often far from clear. 
 There are some facts, however, which seem to render the 
 alleged progress somewhat doubtful. Thus the lower ani- 
 mals never disappear ; only the species change. Indeed, 
 many forms (e.g. Gasteropoda, Acephala) have remained 
 constant since the Age of the Upper Tertiary. Then, 
 again, the highest forms of the previous generation are 
 more perfect than the lowest forms of its successor. The 
 disappearance of species, too, is another drawback. The 
 sea-lion, the dodo, and certain species of the ostrich in 
 New Zealand, the gigantic Irish stag, the German ' Auer- 
 ochs ' have disappeared in historical times without be- 
 queathing their place to a higher species. 86 Many others 
 are entombed in the earth's strata, whose exit from the 
 scene cannot be proved to have been gradual. Darwin 
 himself allows that some (e.g. the ammonites at the end of 
 the Secondary Epoch) were spirited away as if by magic. 
 Often the disappearance is sudden and abrupt ; and yet 
 there should be a gradual series in the succession. One 
 generation follows immediately on the other ; on its first 
 appearance its outfit is complete, and it is armed cap-a-pie ; 
 
 26 See Schaafthausen, p. 131. Darwin, Origin of Species. Nadaillac, Die Ersten Men- 
 tchen und dit fir&hiitorischen Zeiten. Stuttgart, 1884, p. 488, seq.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 187 
 
 yet it should have been gradually evolved from its pred- 
 ecessor. Neither existing nature nor palaeontological re- 
 mains supply a clue to the missing transitional varieties. 
 So far no success has waited upon the attempt to prove 
 from palaeontology the transition from the fins of the fish 
 to the feet of the salamander. In the lowest petrified 
 strata of the Silurian formation in Bohemia, the so-called 
 primordial fauna include many more highly organized 
 forms (trilobites, for example), in great variety that belong 
 to the crustacese ; whereas lower organisms, such as coal 
 and lower molluscs, are found only in the upper strata of 
 the same beds. This " surprising fact" is most certainly 
 not explained away " in a very simple manner," by the re- 
 mark that organic remains in the primordial and Cambrian 
 strata were formed in the deep sea, the fine slime of which 
 accelerated petrifaction." The degenerate eyes of some 
 of these animals may show symptoms of the deep sea ; but 
 this does not warrant the conclusion that the blind but 
 highly organized trilobites of the primordial fauna were 
 degenerate forms of fresh-water species with developed 
 eyes, and not the original and most ancient animals of 
 this formation. It is exceedingly improbable that this 
 fresh-water species would have vanished like hailstones, 
 leaving no trace in the chalk and detritus of the low sea- 
 formation. For in other formations (e.g. the Jurassic) 
 numerous fauna of these animals are found imbedded in 
 the chalk. It is a still more improbable fiction that the 
 eyes alone degenerated, while the rest of the body was 
 becoming more highly organized. Other geological epochs 
 present similar phenomena. Doubtless it is pretended 
 that there are certain intermediate extinct forms to hand, 
 e.g. those of the horse, ass, ape (Coebochcerus, Doliochoe- 
 rus, Paleochoerus), and of the mammoth, mastodon, and 
 elephant ; but they are few and uncertain. If (as is main- 
 tained in contradiction to the theory of development in the 
 struggle for life) they were less able to offer resistance and 
 to bear the brunt of the fray, they must have been far 
 
 27 Horner in Unser Wissen, p. 719.
 
 l88 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 more numerous than the forms that survived. Our knowl- 
 edge of the local diffusion of organisms in the earlier 
 periods may still be at only a few degrees above zero, but 
 at all events it is high enough for us to read therein that 
 progressive development had ceased in many places. The 
 matter is not simplified by the constant physical change in 
 the habitat, or by the variability of the inhabitants being 
 brought to bear on it. For in spite of enormous changes 
 in these two directions many forms have remained intact 
 since the Glacial or even Tertiary periods. Chronological 
 data may explain when and where different organisms ap- 
 peared, but they lend no support to evolution. If all the 
 present fauna and flora of earth were buried in the sea, 
 and if a palaeontologist of the future were to hold an in- 
 quest on them, what would be his verdict ? He would de- 
 cide that the fauna of Australia belong to a much more 
 remote epoch than those of the old world, because the two 
 differ more widely than those of any succeeding forma- 
 tions. Were our palaeontological coroner a transmutation- 
 ist also, with a leaning towards the migration theory, he 
 would without fail seek to derive the higher fauna of the 
 Old World from the lower fauna of the New. Now this 
 imaginary case faithfully describes the position in which 
 modern palaeontologists are placed with regard to the 
 older formations. One solitary fact has this defective and 
 broken system brought into prominence, viz., that nature's 
 march has, on the whole, been a progress in perfection. 
 It has no claim, however, to be considered genetic. 
 
 The old system undoubtedly compressed the idea of 
 species into too narrow a compass, and was likewise over 
 solicitous about the constancy of species. Even the essen- 
 tial marks of species are uncertain and undefined. A 
 glance down the list of species catalogued since the days 
 of Aristotle will show that the original meaning of the 
 terms genus and species is lost, because naturalists consid- 
 ered external marks alone as essential. Genus (yivo<?) is 
 the generation ; species (fidos) the outward appearance 
 apart from the generation. When the theory of develop-
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 189 
 
 ment stepped forward and proved many of these marks to 
 be of only secondary importance, little was left but the 
 genus. The one sure and safe element in the natural sys- 
 tem is a common descent. It matters little whether the 
 individuals are classed as genus or as species. This prin- 
 ciple, if applied to the vegetable kingdom, would enable 
 us to disregard the inconstant modifications wrought by 
 food and climate. A difference of species can be recog- 
 nised only when the distinguishing marks remain constant 
 under similar external conditions. Species is accordingly 
 defined by Quatrefages and van Baer as " a collection of 
 " individuals more or less resembling each other, which 
 " may be regarded as having descended from a single 
 " primitive pair by an uninterrupted and natural succession 
 " of families ;"* or by Leunis Frank as the " collection of 
 " those individuals which show no greater differences with 
 " each other than those of similarity of origin." Thus the 
 fact or the possibility of a common descent is proclaimed 
 to be the basis of the notion of species, and mutual cross- 
 ing is the sign by which we may know it. Crossing be- 
 tween animals that are far removed is difficult. Hybrids 
 both in animals and plants are only slightly if at all fer- 
 tile, and they easily revert to the parental type. This rule 
 has indeed many exceptions, e.g., hares and rabbits ; hens, 
 pheasants and geese ; goats and sheep ; bulls and zebu ; 
 but they are due to the close relationship subsisting be- 
 tween these species. Fertile bastards or hybrids are more 
 easily produced in the animal kingdom, precisely because 
 the variability of the families mostly inclined to cross is so 
 great that distinction becomes very difficult. 
 
 Sometimes reproduction can be effected by every part 
 of the individual. In such cases it is hardly a theme for 
 wonder that such overflowing life should assert and pre- 
 serve itself with tenacity in crossing. Hence the notion of 
 species should not receive a too highly objective colour- 
 ing ; nor, on the other hand, should it be pared down to a 
 mere logical function, or a subjective product of thought. 
 
 * Quatrefages, The Humqn Species, London, 1879, p. 36. .. J
 
 19 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 The whole system cannot be banished as a mere abstrac- 
 tion into the twilight of theory. Natural development re- 
 quires a world-wide area for its operations. Still the blend- 
 ing of a vast multitude of forms in harmony and variety 
 must rest on a solid foundation. To discover this founda- 
 tion is the work, not of experiment but of philosophy. 
 Filiation is not denied point blank ; but it is neither demon- 
 strable nor probable to the extent required by the theory 
 of descent. Scarcely one existing species can be proved 
 to be descended from another. One thing at least is cer- 
 tain : the proof of the correctness of the monophyletic 
 theory is yet to come. The polyphyletic theory alone 
 squares with facts, 28 and therefore nothing remains but to 
 admit a great number of distinct and independent species. 
 It is, indeed, hard to strike the exact mean between 
 Lamarck and Quatrefages, but on this point Christians 
 need not be solicitous. 
 
 The main division of the organic world into plants and 
 animals has still to be considered. Till now it has always 
 been thought that the two were divided by the essential 
 difference expressed in the formula : Plants live, animals 
 feel (planta vivunt, animalia sentiunf). In this pithy state- 
 ment is boxed up the main-spring of the whole question. 
 Sensation and sensible consciousness are so characteristic 
 of animals, that they alone amply demonstrate that the 
 abyss between animals and plants cannot be bridged over. 
 A certain spontaneous movement is, in a sense, proper also 
 to the lowest types of animals that are bred on rocks. But 
 this is an internal act in nowise analogous to the mechani- 
 cal movements which contact (touch) produces in plants. 
 The animal desires enjoyment ; it runs after things agree- 
 able, and shuns the disagreeable ; it is especially fond of 
 pleasure. All these acts betray a sensible perception that 
 is wholly absent from plants ; for these last have never to 
 hunt for their food. By a figure of speech we sometimes 
 describe Nature as thirsting and languishing for dew and 
 
 98 Nageli, p. 353 and 468 Polybiblion, 1885, p. 389, and p. 391 on Hybrids. See Schaaff- 
 hausen, p. 143.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 191 
 
 rain ; but no poet ever personified trees and shrubs in 
 sober earnestness. No animal has a differentiated brain ; 
 every animal has a specific alimentary canal, and an aper- 
 ture. Some, like the amoeba, can take in food at any point 
 of the body, and digest it in the empty space. Its whole 
 activity cannot consist in alternate expansion and contrac- 
 tion. Feeling is never wanting ; here life is identical with 
 feeling. The feeling of pleasure and pain regulates even 
 the most primitive animal existence. To draw to a nicety 
 the lower boundary line between animal and plant is cer- 
 tainly not easy. Biologists agree that no hard and fast 
 line can be drawn, and that the lowest forms of both king- 
 doms constantly overlap. 29 But this last contention, be it 
 noted, is not a certain fact, but a deduction born of the 
 difficulty biologists experience in drawing a distinction. It 
 may at times be doubtful in which kingdom the minutest 
 organisms should be classed. Surely, however, it is hardly 
 valid reasoning to argue from this doubt that the two king- 
 doms have a common origin. Spontaneous movement and 
 sensation are in almost all cases marks of animal organism ; 
 whereas the seemingly spontaneous movement of the spores 
 of algae is explained by the mechanical action of the celia 
 with which they are endowed, however much they seem to 
 resemble the infusoria that have celia. Anyhow no doubt 
 exists as to the distinction in the case of organisms that 
 are more or less developed. It is, however, open to doubt 
 whether cellulose is the material groundwork for the 
 division of organisms into animals and plants. A plant is 
 that union of cells in which the idea of unity is expressed 
 in the correlation of cells to a definite form ; whereas an 
 animal is a union of cells in which the idea of unity has 
 found material expression in the nervous system. 30 The 
 plant germ can retain its germinal force for a thousand 
 years independently of external conditions, although its 
 development is essentially dependent on such conditions. 
 The animal germ, on the contrary, dies if its activity is 
 
 29 See Zacharias, Probleme, p. 78 Dressel, Balebter Staff, p. 35 seq. Bastian, p. 6. 
 
 30 Getammtergetniss des Naturerkennens, 1886, p. g8 seq.
 
 Ip2 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 suspended for a long period. Plants feed on inorganic 
 matter ; animals require organic food. In the develop- 
 ment of plants, cell joins cell in accordance with physical 
 and chemical laws ; in the animal this result is substan- 
 tially modified under the influence of a guiding principle. 
 Thus animals and plants differ essentially in their begin- 
 ning and in their development, and their characteristic 
 differences remain throughout constant. 
 
 Thus the feeling animal and the unfeeling plant are 
 divided by a yawning chasm, over which nature herself 
 has thrown no bridge. To cross from one side to the other 
 we need a new agency, a specifically distinct force. There 
 is no jumping across. We might be tempted to appeal to 
 the old adage : Natura non facit saltum. There are no jumps 
 in nature : but we are mindful that general propositions 
 prove either too much or too little. Naturalists too are 
 divided on this point. Thus one says : " The metamor- 
 phosis of plants shows that the great leaps are the most 
 frequent." But these great leaps do not take us to the 
 other side of the chasm. They move in a narrow orbit 
 within the species. They are part of the regular course of 
 nature, and nature guides them in their path to their right 
 end. Of herself, then, nature did not make this wide 
 jump. Neither the conditions of organization nor the 
 ever-active forces of matter could make vaulting nature so 
 overleap herself. Psychic phenomena baffle all physical 
 and chemical laws. The laws of nature do not brook ap- 
 plication to psychic phenomena. In this case even the law 
 of the conservation of energy hangs fire. No rack can 
 stretch quantitative differences into the qualitative differ- 
 ences that mark psychic operations. We can examine the 
 movements and material changes that take place in the 
 organs of even those lowest animals whose psychic activity 
 is bounded by the feeling of pleasure and pain ; but the 
 sun of science cannot throw a single ray of light on the 
 action of the sensation that has its seat in the soul. Feel- 
 ing cannot be explained or derived from movement, al- 
 though itself is a reflex movement. The substance under-
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. IQ3 
 
 lying phenomena must be explained psychically as well as 
 physically. Sensation and spontaneity cannot be kneaded 
 into the purely mechanical action of atoms : their two 
 natures are so widely different." It is as difficult to ac- 
 count for psychical phenomena by chemical forces as it is 
 to convert them into heat or electricity. Only the giddy 
 fancy of a giddy spirit can describe them as a secretion in 
 the brain similar to the secretion of the nerves. In the 
 one case the effect is physical, in the other metaphysical. 
 The natures of gravitation, electric attraction and chemical 
 affinity are beyond our grasp, although they are forces 
 moving on the same plane. Atoms and psychological 
 phenomena are incompatible. Mere nervous excitement 
 is no key wherewith to unlock the complex facts of sensi- 
 ble perception. Complex experiences are explicable only 
 by elements of the same order. As such they can be 
 neither weighed, nor measured, nor counted. Here we 
 stand on the upper confines of natural knowledge. In the 
 brain we discover only the movement of material particles. 
 But movement can produce naught but movement in any 
 sphere of existence. A mechanical cause can produce 
 neither sensation nor movement. Science will ever be at 
 a loss to understand how it is that a few atoms of carbon, 
 hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen are not perfectly indiffer- 
 ent to the mode or place in which they lie or move. How 
 can their fusion beget sensation ? The answer is by no 
 means self-evident. 38 Even Darwin is obliged to acknowl- 
 edge " that it is as hopeless a task to inquire into what 
 manner the spiritual faculties have been developed in the 
 lowest organisms as it is to inquire about the origin of 
 life. These are problems for future solution if man can 
 ever solve them at all." 
 
 The naturalist's only safe course is to confess with the 
 poet : 
 
 31 Liebmann, Analysts, 1876, p. 255. Pesch, vol. I., p. 535. Kleutgen, Pfttlos., vol. II., 
 
 p. 297. 
 
 32 Dubois-Reymond, p. 29 Huber, Der alte undneue Glaube^ p. 60. Tail, Vorlesungen, 
 
 p. 20. Tyndall in Zacharias, p. 51 and 68. Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 
 1862 Controverse, 1882, p. 738. Darwin and Wundt, vol. II., p. 305. 
 
 M
 
 194 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 O, I am ignorance itself in this ! 
 
 In discussing the origin of life we criticised the hypoth- 
 esis of modern psychic dynamism that all matter is ani- 
 mated. Leibnitz sought a mathematical formula for the 
 soul. Haeckel is still engaged in the same fruitless search. 
 The plastidule theory refers the actions of the soul to the 
 material phenomena of motion in the plastic molecules. 
 It is consoling to know that this theory has been set down 
 as unintelligible by its author. Nageli's theory is but a 
 generalization from natural phenomena. He maintains, 
 forsooth, that life does not begin in man or animal as a 
 new principle, but that the elements of life pre-exist both 
 in the plant and inorganic matter, though in simpler com- 
 binations. Still the reaction of inorganic bodies is many 
 miles asunder from animal sensation. Chemical affinity 
 works mechanically, and is measurable ; but the life of the 
 soul is incalculable. The requirements of the case would 
 not be met even if it were granted that the inorganic world 
 contains not the dispositions, but only the materials out 
 of which dispositions on a higher scale are welded into 
 instruments of cognition. For new dispositions appear 
 with the organism, and still newer degrees of disposition 
 with the animal. 
 
 Theologians are beginning to look upon the Darwinian 
 theory with a more favourable eye. Were it proved, Catho- 
 lics could accept it without changing a dogma of their 
 faith.** Others, especially free-thinking Protestant theo- 
 logians, go the length of maintaining that Darwin's theory 
 of evolution (which in many points resembles the view of 
 Copernicus) gives a grander idea of God's eternity and 
 omnipotence than the common theory of creation. What 
 can be imagined more magnificent, more sublime, more 
 divine than this principle, beautiful in its simplicity, but 
 bearing the inexhaustible resources of nature in its bosom ? 
 To a philosopher the system of many creations seems 
 
 33 Haffner, Katholik^ 1873, No. I. Hcinrich, Dogm. vol. v., p. 275. Palmieri, De Deo 
 Creante, p. 220. Corluy, Contravene, 1885, p. 78 seq. Broglie, A nnaiet de Phil. 
 1887, p. 343. See also Hertling, Grenzen, p. 56.
 
 THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE. IQ5 
 
 puerile when set side by side with the theory of evolution. 
 Only people in their childhood, they say, could imagine a 
 special cause at the back of each phenomenon. 3 * Catho- 
 lics and Protestants alike have spoken in a similar strain." 
 They believe that in adopting the Darwinian theory lies 
 the surest way to convince opponents that it does not con- 
 tradict faith. Darwinism, they declare, is contrary to faith 
 only when it is misinterpreted and misunderstood. Far 
 from excluding a first cause, they say, Darwinism impera- 
 tively demands it. My view is not quite so optimistic. I 
 think I have shown that Darwinism would exclude a first 
 cause if it could. By all means let narrow-mindedness be 
 driven from our midst. But the presence of a new force 
 must be recognized in the animal. Thus the first cause is 
 shown to be spiritual as well as living, for it must be higher 
 than the conscious animal. The manifold psychic phenom- 
 ena we have been considering bring out in all its freshness 
 the truth that in God is life. This result joined with the 
 preceding may be set down as the third stage of the cos- 
 mological argument, the transcendent importance of which 
 is not commonly appreciated. 
 
 34 Girodon, Expose" de la doctrine catholique, Paris, 1884, vol. II., p. 230. Revue des 
 
 questions scientifiques, Bruxelles. See Contravene, 1886, p. 300 seq. Poly- 
 biblion. 1876, 1885, Nov. Schmid, Die Darwinischen TJieorien, Stuttgart, 1876. 
 Zockler, I.e. differently. 
 
 35 Secchi, Schopfung, p. 22, 24, 37. See Natur und Offenb., 1871, No. 9. Gaudry, Les 
 
 enchainemtnts du monde animal dans les temps gtolog.^ 1883, Polybiblion, 1885, 
 Braun and Zacharias, p. 62 seq. Pfaff., Schopfungsgeschichte^ and edit., Frank- 
 fort, 1878, p. 349.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 MAN. 
 
 Man is the highest and most perfect of living beings. 
 Following Aristotle, Fathers and Schoolmen defined man 
 as a c5ov koyinov rational animal, an animal gifted with 
 intelligence and reason, a reasonable living being. 1 In 
 weighing him in the balance, however, with other living 
 beings, their comparisons were not drawn to a fine scale. 
 Man, says S. Thomas, is more perfect than other ani- 
 mals. The saint is, moreover, of opinion that intellect does 
 not constitute the specific difference between man and ani- 
 mals since, if it were so, babies would cease to belong to 
 the human family.* Nevertheless their pronouncement 
 that man's superiority lies in his rational endowments is 
 so emphatic that it throws into the shade the physical dif- 
 ferences betwixt man and animals. Cyril of Alexandria 
 styles reason man's essential characteristic. Being at once 
 rational and an animal, man is both mortal and capable of 
 knowledge and understanding. In the afore-mentioned 
 compendium of natural science, published at Fulda in the 
 ninth century, man is not recognised as a member of the 
 animal kingdom. Modern zoologists go on another tack. 
 
 i Irenaeus, Adv. Hares. 5,1. Cyril, Alexandr. Opp. vol. VI., p. 583, vol. VII., p. 821. 
 See Schwane, Dogmengeschicfite, vol. II., p. 536 and 546. Storz, Philosofk. p. 99, 
 119, 128. Petavius, De Incarn. 6, i, 8. De Opif. 2, 4, i. S. Thomas, Sutnm. Theol. 
 i, 30, a ad. 3. Contra Gent. 2, 59, 7, 8. 
 
 * The meaning of S. Thomat inc. 9. II. 59 is that "actual understanding," as distinct 
 from the power or faculty of understanding, does not constitute the specific differ- 
 ence. (Tr.)
 
 MAN. 197 
 
 In their classification, mammals are a primary division of 
 vertebrates, and are again sub-divided into animals with 
 toes, with hoofs, or with fins. Animals with two hands 
 stand at the top of the first class ; next come those with 
 four hands. The homo sapiens L. is the solitary species of 
 the first division. This classification of the lord of animals 
 seems, at first blush, objectionable. But, we are not dis- 
 posed to quarrel with zoologists, as recent treatises on ani- 
 mal psychology have shown what little advantage accrues 
 to apologetics from judging psychic phenomena by the 
 standard of natural science. As the body is the connecting 
 link between man and the animal kingdom, it seems ex- 
 pedient to begin with the lower part of his nature. 
 
 Vegetative and sensitive life is common to man and ani- 
 mals. For this reason man's organization is very similar 
 to that of the animal. The organs and the method of 
 nutrition, respiration, and propagation are the same in 
 man and the higher mammals. Neither is there any essen- 
 tial difference in the action of the senses. Thus, the sense 
 of touch, the yellow speck of the retina, the iris in the 
 apple of the eye, and the ear-lobule, are shared by man 
 with the anthropoid ape. a Nevertheless the physical dif- 
 ference between man and the highest animal (the anthro- 
 poid ape) is greater than the physical difference between 
 any two closely allied animals. Man's entire build and 
 habitus are essentially different from those of the animal. 
 If man was not created in his present fully-developed con- 
 dition, then he is a product of historical evolution in every 
 organ and system of his complex body, and in the uniform 
 spiritual development that has accompanied the corporal 
 development. In several animals this or that organ or 
 sense is more perfect than in man ; but no animal can 
 compare with man's organization as a whole. One chief 
 difference in the entire build is man's erect attitude and 
 gait. " Man alone," says Aristotle, " among living beings 
 " walks with head upright. To make his upper parts light 
 
 2 See Schaafhausen, Anthropol. Stud., p. 162 seq. and 428 ; and p. 306 seq. on Aris- 
 totle.
 
 198 MAN. 
 
 " and easy to carry, nature removed the weight from above 
 " and placed it below. Hence his thighs and haunches and 
 " the calves of his legs are covered with flesh, and he is 
 " without a tail. The nutriment goes in the direction of 
 ' ' these parts, in order to clothe them with flesh. ' ' A ristotle 
 is undoubtedly right in making man's upright bearing the 
 keystone of his entire organization. The lower extremities 
 were lengthened, and their supports strengthened, while 
 the upper extremities were dispensed from locomotion, 
 and fitted up into an organ of all work. The hand, that 
 organ of organs, as Aristotle calls it, with its thumb turned 
 inwards, has a suppleness and daintiness of sense unrivalled 
 by any organ in the animal kingdom. Apes have, it is 
 true, four hands ; but as all four are locomotory they have 
 none of that nimbleness and flexibility which are peculiar 
 to the human hand. Anthropoid apes occasionally lay 
 hold of stones and clubs in self-defence ; but this is the 
 highest use to which they put their hands. There is also 
 a considerable difference in the relative lengths. The arm 
 of the ape is disproportionately longer than the human 
 arm. Neither has any man a prehensile foot, although 
 savages are sometimes credited with it. But the story is 
 just as fabulous as the fiction which represents men with 
 tails. Vogt, Haeckel and Huxley gazed with loving fond- 
 ness on the prehensile foot of the negro ; but when they 
 hugged and embraced it, it melted away, for it was only 
 such stuff as dreams are made of. Anthropology and eth- 
 nography 3 have no information of man's capacity to turn 
 his toes inwards like an ape. Man can, it is true, in excep- 
 tional circumstances, write or paint with his feet ; still, 
 the foot never becomes prehensile. The relations of the 
 several parts (e.g., toes) are very different in men and apes. 
 The proportion of the shin-bone to the foot is as 82.5 to 
 52.9 in man, and as 80 to 72.8 in the chimpanzee. 
 
 Connected with man's upright bearing is his facial and 
 cerebral formation. The position of the nose and jaw de- 
 
 3 See Schneider, Nnturvolker i, p. 7, seq.
 
 MAN. 199 
 
 termines the form of the face. The more the jaw pro- 
 trudes, the greater the animal tendency to sensible pleasure 
 which, on the contrary, is in inverse ratio to the frontal 
 and nasal projections. The high forehead, too, stamps the 
 human face as something more than material. Since the 
 days of Camper the relation between forehead and jaw has 
 been regulated by the facial angle, the lines of which pass 
 over the highest part of the forehead and the middle of the 
 orifice of the ear and meet in the upper front teeth. 4 In 
 normal skulls the facial angle varies from 75 to 85. 
 
 In the Caucasian race 90 is not infrequent, while in 
 races low down in the scale and in idiots the average falls 
 as low as 70. These lower numbers, however, are uncer- 
 tain. In any case the lowest outside limit must be set 
 down at 64. The facial angle averages 35 in a full-grown 
 chimpanzee and 30 in the orang-outang. When these 
 apes are in their youth their facial angle comes much 
 nearer to that of man. Then it reaches 60 and 64, but 
 youth cannot be taken as the standard, because the jaw is 
 only fully developed as age advances. 
 
 But the forehead is also part of the cerebral hemisphere. 
 The most important part of the organism, to wit the brain, 
 is encased in the skull. The size of the skull and the or- 
 ganization of the brain give a more distinctive character to 
 the human body than the facial angle. Aristotle again 
 says : " In proportion to his size man has more brain than 
 all living beings ; and men have more than women." 
 Aristotle's words still hold good. In size and richness of 
 convolution man's brain is superior to that of all animals, 
 apes included. The size of the brain may be determined 
 by measuring either the upper surface or the inner space 
 of the skull, the latter being the easier and surer method. 
 Then an estimate is made of the weight of the contents. 
 To obtain a sure result many measurements have to be 
 made. According to Morton, 6 the maximum size of the 
 
 4 See Natur und Offenbarung, 1815, p. 428, seq. 
 
 5 See Rauch, Die Einheit des Menschengeschlechts. Augsburg, 1873, p. 146. Pressense, 
 
 Die Ursprunge det Menschen. Halle, 1884, p. 227, seq. Nadaillac, p. 435, seq. 
 Schaaffhausen, p. 154. Bastian, vol. I., p. a6g. Vol. II., p. 39.
 
 200 MAN. 
 
 skull varies between 112-5 (Finns) and 77 (Polynesians) 
 cubic inches ; whereas the minimum size oscillates between 
 91 (English) and 58 (Peruvian). The mean is 96 and 75*3, 
 and the average ranges from 93-5 (Caucasians) and 80*3 
 (Americans). According to Vogt's calculation in centi- 
 metres the maximum size is 1572-95 (English), and the 
 minimum 1228-27 (Australians). But the calculations, al- 
 though too uncertain to be of much use in establishing 
 race-differences among men, justify us in classifying man 
 apart from the animal kingdom. Thus Canaks measure 
 1470 centimetres, Irishmen 1472, negresses of Dahomey 
 1249, English women 1222, Indians, 1376 with a minimum 
 of 1137, Esquimaux 1539, Parisians 1588. Cuvier's brain 
 weighed 1831 grammes. A skull found in the American 
 War was estimated to weigh as much as 1842. This is 
 very remarkable because, as a rule, the skull capacity of 
 North and South Americans, both now and in former 
 times, is very small. Dante's brain hardly exceeded the 
 mean ; Gambetta's weighed merely 1165 grammes. If we 
 allow the limit of 63 cubic inches assigned by Morton, 
 man's skull has still the very considerable balance in its 
 favour of 34-5, as compared with the largest gorilla skull. 
 Some of the great mammals have absolutely a far larger 
 brain than man, but in proportion to the weight of his body 
 man scores a decided advantage. Man's brain compared 
 with his total weight is as 2 to 47 ; the dolphin's is as i to 
 66 ; and the elephant's i to 500. The importance of this 
 fact should not be overrated, since in birds the proportion 
 is even smaller than in man, being as i to 14 in the green- 
 finch ; still it is not wholly devoid of significance as regards 
 man and apes. A full-sized gorilla or orang-outang is 
 nearly doubly as heavy as a bushranger or as many a Euro- 
 pean woman, but his brain is at least one-third lighter than 
 the smallest human brain. Even the lowest human skulls, 
 those of the Papuans, are far ahead of the skulls of the 
 highest apes, even morphologically. History also bears 
 witness to the distinctive character of the human skeleton 
 in general, and of the human skull in particular. Modern
 
 MAN. 201 
 
 peoples are branded with the characteristic peculiarities of 
 their forefathers. Not a single skeleton that has been dis- 
 covered differs from our own in formation. Nowhere are 
 we on the trail of an abnormal formation or impeded de- 
 velopment. Doubtless strange specimens existed then as 
 now, and were as exceptional in olden times as they are 
 now. The skull capacity is the same in all. There is an 
 analogy even between the Neanderthal and Caithness 
 skulls and certain modern types ; but all such are only 
 unhealthy specimens. And yet they are far in excess of 
 the maximum capacity of the ape's skull. So far the con- 
 necting link is missing. Facts are so few that any conclu- 
 sion may be grafted on them. Nadaillac, not without 
 irony, observes : "If four or five thousand years hence the 
 " bones of a hunchback were found in the ruins of Paris, 
 " might we conclude that all Parisians of the ipth century 
 "were humpbacked?" The skulls with flattened fore- 
 heads found in Lower Austria were referred to the micro- 
 cephali of Hippocrates and certain Indian stocks, and were 
 declared to belong to an extinct race of men. It is now 
 proved that the disfigurement was artificial. 
 
 For this reason Vogt sheltered himself behind the micro- 
 cephali, and represented the defective skull-formation of 
 the Cretins, as an atavism, or reversion to apedom. The 
 brain of the microcephali weighs, on the average, less than 
 the brain of an ape. At the Anthropological Congress 
 held at Stuttgart in 1872, Professor Luschka exhibited the 
 brain of an eighteen year old microcephalous girl. Its 
 weight was only 450 grammes, whereas the brain of the 
 gorilla weighs 600 grammes. Vogt, who confessed that he 
 had never examined a microcephalous brain, was quick to 
 draw a conclusion that has been generally repudiated. 6 
 Not sickly skulls, it was stipulated, nor skulls stunted in 
 their growth, but only normal skulls should be compared. 
 
 6 See A usland, 1872, No. 42, and Die Reden und Berichte der dritten Versammlung 
 der deutschen anthropologischen Gesellschaft. On the history of the skull, see 
 Nadaillac, Die ersten Menschen, Stuttgart, 1884, p. 30, 337, 523 seq. Peschel is de- 
 cidedly opposed to evolution. Volkerkunde^ 3rd Edition, 1876, p. 41.
 
 202 MAN. 
 
 Not content with taking up with a merely negative atti- 
 tude the defence produced positive evidence to show that 
 even the worst parts of a diseased brain retain the charac- 
 teristics of a human brain, though in a lower stage of de- 
 velopment. A reversion to the ape-type is therefore here 
 out of the question. Privy Councillor Ecker, a specialist 
 in the study of the brain, went the length of declaring 
 that the fetus of the human brain bears from the first a 
 distinctly human imprint. The present state of science, 
 he said, allows that microcephalous phenomena are always 
 intensely human. Schaaffhausen pointed out that the 
 notion which pictured a creature as in part purely human 
 and in part purely bestial was a very monster of unnatural- 
 ness. The microcephali, he says, are human by the law 
 of heredity, nor is there any evidence of reversion to an 
 animal state. The microcephali have, therefore, won their 
 case and established their claim to citizens of the human 
 race, while Vogt has been convicted of a gross libel. Con- 
 sequent upon this verdict, the theory of man's immediate 
 descent from a monkey is being gradually shelved among 
 musty records, although the theory of evolution itself has 
 not yet been consigned to the waste paper basket. And 
 yet the case of the microcephali is the strongest argument 
 that has so far been advanced by those who advocate the 
 similarity of the brain of man and the ape ! The convic- 
 tion has been gradually gaining ground that the human 
 brain possesses something besides size and weight, viz., a 
 specific organization. 
 
 A keen practised eye, it is true, will often fail, after the 
 closest scrutiny, to detect any difference between its organi- 
 zation and that of other embryos. But among animals, 
 curvatures do not always express capacities. In respect 
 to the convolutions and windings of its brain the donkey 
 may be at the head of the animal kingdom and still be a 
 donkey, as Galen has remarked. Nevertheless, organiza- 
 tion cannot be a cipher in the problem. We know too 
 little about the animal's soul to form any certain judg- 
 ment as to its life. But a serried phalanx of modern ani-
 
 MAN. 203 
 
 mal psychologists are drawn up in battle array, ready to 
 measure swords with Galen in behalf of the donkey's 
 rights, and to avenge his insulted honour. In their eyes 
 the donkey is a most estimable being. They have bound 
 the laurel wreath of wisdom about his brow, and decreed 
 him a place among the " philosophers" of the animal 
 kingdom. If these men can go into such ecstatic raptures 
 over a donkey's brain, it is surely permissible to indulge 
 in a little sober enthusiasm over the brain of man, which 
 differs more widely from that of the anthropoid ape than 
 is commonly represented. Of course the cells and fibres 
 are the same in both. A searching chemical analysis be- 
 trays no differences ; but the higher functions are not 
 under the bondage of chemical combinations. Man's per- 
 fect organization is conditional on the number, arrange- 
 ment and inter-crossing of the nervous passages. Gall's 
 skull theory is again in fashion, because the brain is proved 
 to be the seat of the several faculties. Thus Broca thinks 
 he has discovered a definite point, situate in the left cere- 
 bral hemisphere, on which the faculty of speech is poised. 
 Anyhow man's brain is more developed than any other. 
 Its many intricate windings serve to enlarge the surface 
 and to increase its capacity. The highest grade of devel- 
 opment does not lie in the number, but in the perfect finish 
 and formation of the parts. The brain of the negro and 
 of lower races is always human, although of course it 
 is less perfect, if not also smaller on the whole than that 
 of higher stocks. 
 
 May not this difference, however, be a symptom of grad- 
 ual transformation ? 7 In answering this question we shall 
 not repeat the objections already urged against evolution, 
 nor allude, except in passing, to the fact that no historical 
 evidence is forthcoming of an ape's brain being trans- 
 formed into that of a man. Here we propose to examine 
 the special reasons that govern the development of the 
 brain. Sensation is said to be the determining agent. It 
 
 7 Schaaffhausen, p. 358, 428. Zacharias, p. 91.
 
 204 MAN. 
 
 is certainly the first inexplicable action in physiology. If 
 this fact be assumed, it must hold good of man as well as 
 of the brute. But surely the evolution of a brain power 
 equal to Goethe's or Newton's cannot be merely a ques- 
 tion of time ! Perhaps it will be said that the thinking 
 organ is not for purposes of thought, as the eye was 
 said not to be ordained for purposes of sight. The ques- 
 tion can hardly be decided on scientific grounds. Still in 
 point of fact it is certain that those alone see who have 
 developed eyes, and that those alone think who have a 
 developed human brain. The theory that the thinking 
 organ and thought are correlatives must be considered as 
 certain and in harmony with facts, until thought is proved 
 to have been gradually evolved from the thinking organ, 
 or until better traces of thought are found on the confines 
 of the animal kingdom. As man did not give life to him- 
 self, so neither has thought created its own organ. In his 
 unending struggle with wild beasts and the elements, 
 primitive man prevailed not because he was stronger or 
 better armed, but because his instruments were more per- 
 fect ; he had a brain to give the word of command, and a 
 hand to execute it. Anaxagoras had said that man is the 
 most prudent of animals because he has hands. Aristotle 
 rebuked him : Rather, said he, man has hands because he 
 is prudent. As a flute is given to a player, not the art of 
 playing to a man with a flute, so the organs are given to 
 man who is capable of thinking. Alone of all animals man 
 stands and looks up to Heaven, because he alone shares 
 the divine nature. Thought and labour are works of a 
 divine being. They would not be easy if the weight of 
 the body had been forcibly pushed upwards, for a heavy 
 weight clogs thought and renders perception unwieldy. 8 
 
 The drawbacks to the human organism tell as little in 
 favour of selection as the advantages. To begin with, the 
 most striking is the absence of a tail. For this deficiency 
 no sufficient reason can be assigned, as man is quite singu- 
 
 8 Depart, an, 4, c. 10. De an., 3, 8. Petavius, De of-if. a, 4, 7.
 
 MAN. 205 
 
 lar in this respect. The incipient tail in the fetus shows at 
 most a disposition, without giving any clue to its deteriora- 
 tion. Want of use is insufficient to account for it. The 
 coiling tail could be dispensed with, if the animal had 
 gradually exchanged its climbing propensities for walking, 
 but many monkeys still climb and use their tails. Evolu- 
 tionists, to be consistent, must hold that the coiling tail 
 was transformed into a walking organ. Many land ani- 
 mals, in spite of living on land, walk on all fours and yet 
 have a tail which renders good service in other ways be- 
 sides climbing. This change in their mode of life would 
 have either destroyed or improved the tail, as may be 
 seen from the ape's clumsy walk on level ground and the 
 waddle of the gorilla, supporting himself on his bended 
 hands. Take again the want of a hairy coat. It is ad- 
 mitted that selection could not have dictated its abandon- 
 ment, since the man without hair has less chance of with- 
 standing the climate, and enduring wind and weather. If 
 it be universally true that the organism which is simple 
 and developed all-round is better adapted for the struggle 
 for life than the organism which is complex and has only 
 a one-sided development, then the want of a fur coat can- 
 not be explained on the principles of selection. On such 
 principles it would indeed be most surprising if a hairy 
 oating were not formed, since the disposition is already 
 aiere (the embryo being covered with down) and individ- 
 uals have a luxuriant growth of hair in various parts. 
 Then, too, what a bulwark it is against the subtle encroach- 
 ments of climate ! Sexual selection does not lift us out of 
 the bog. How, if hairiness were universal, could a stray 
 male with less hair be an attraction to a female, or vice 
 versa ? But, letting that pass, we would further ask, how 
 this fashion was enabled to gain the ascendant and to ex- 
 tirpate all hairy individuals in the teeth of the fact that 
 hairiness is useful in the struggle for life ? We are credit- 
 ing our great animal-ancestors with advanced aesthetic 
 tastes that are hardly to be found among modern savages. 
 Nor can the beard, which occurs in animals also, be ex
 
 206 MAN. 
 
 plained in this way. For it would be too exacting to ex- 
 pect aesthetic females to renounce the beard as well as the 
 hairy coating. Each race, as Darwin says, has a predilec- 
 tion for those characteristic peculiarities which have been 
 gradual in their growth. And Wallace rightly thinks that 
 a hairy race would have admired great hairiness as much 
 as modern bearded races admire a fine bushy beard. Thus 
 a liking for partial hairlessness would have been as rare 
 and as abnormal as a preference for partial baldness, or 
 for the few straggling hairs of which women can boast. 
 No effect could follow from an individual having a taste 
 for such an abnormal peculiarity. But it is in the highest 
 degree improbable that such a fashion should have become 
 a general favourite with our semi-human forefathers and 
 resulted in total hairlessness. Such a phenomenon is 
 without parallel in the history of the animal kingdom. 
 The " porcupine" men, the descendants of an Englishman 
 of Euston Hall, Suffolk, who was covered with warts half 
 an inch long and as thick as string, died out in the third 
 generation. Extinction is the lot of all monstrosities. To 
 base a calculation on them is to build science on the ex- 
 treme edge of hazard. The abnormal succumbs to the 
 normal. 
 
 Man is not, on the whole, so well accoutred for the bat- 
 tle of life as the animal. He is more sensitive to wind and 
 weather, and a prey to many maladies. His diet is lim- 
 ited. When he first comes into the world, he is more 
 helpless than any other organic being. He needs the sup- 
 port of his parents longer. Is this the outcome of the 
 struggle for existence ? Surely this cannot be the goal of 
 its ambition ! Man can provide himself with food and 
 raiment from animals and plants, says S. Thomas, since he 
 presupposes both. Hence nature leaves him naked, be- 
 cause he can clothe himself. Nature supplies him with no 
 food but milk, because he can procure other foods for him- 
 self. Supposing the difference between man and animal 
 to be as represented above, this is the simple explanation 
 of man's present condition. For man has, indeed, the
 
 MAN. 207 
 
 power to set nature at defiance and bid her do her worst. 
 He can procure for himself the best of food and clothing ; 
 he can till the ground and make fire his servant ; he can 
 make his armour proof against all nature's shafts, and can 
 forge for himself weapons that enable him to hold the field 
 against all comers. But the need in itself is not enough. 
 Man must have had also the capacity to use them. It is 
 arguing in a circle to say that the needs of living organisms 
 are gratified for the same reason that they exist.* There 
 is a recognized limit to the needs of animals. Many facul- 
 ties which seem to supply a need, are really born of instinct 
 and desire. The spider weaves its web from pleasure, not 
 from hunger, and the bird sings from sexual excitement. 
 Hence we are led to suppose the existence of a spiritual 
 element in man. 
 
 The physical differences between man and animals should 
 not, however, be exaggerated. Nor again should they be 
 underrated in such a statement as the following : " In 
 " form, in build, and throughout his organic tendencies 
 " man is an ape." 10 For not only is the similarity not 
 proven, but the spiritual activity for which the organism 
 is destined involves physical differences. It cannot have 
 been, in the first instance, the product of education. Edu- 
 cation can work wonders, but it cannot change the nature 
 and peculiarities of the human species. Physiology and 
 morphology have not yet succeeded in laying hands on 
 the parents that gave birth to the first human being. The 
 scouts of science have explored the whole earth, but they 
 can find only men and animals. Their search for a being 
 half man and half animal has been fruitless ; they were 
 never even on the track. Even the Bushrangers are men, 
 and not semi-apes. So far, as Wallace, Huxley and Vir- 
 chow allow, the excavations of science have brought to 
 light no fossil ape-skull or skull of a man-ape that can have 
 
 9 See Pfluger, quoted by Pesch, Vol. I., p. 393. Secchi, p. 25. 
 
 10 Broca agrees with Pressens6, p. 229 See on the other side Quatrefages, The Human 
 Species; Nadaillac, p. 453 Pfaff, Schoepfungsgeschichte, 2nd edit. Frankfort, 
 ^77, P- 7 22 Tylor, Anthropology.
 
 208 MAN. 
 
 belonged to a human being. Even the oldest skulls that 
 have been found are human. " Dolicocephalic or brachy- 
 " cephalic, large or small, orthognathous or prognathous, 
 " quaternary man is always man in the full acceptance of 
 " the word. Whenever the remains have been sufficient 
 " to enable us to form an opinion, we have found the hand 
 " and the foot which characterized our species ; the verte- 
 " bral column has displayed the double curvature. . . . 
 " The more we study the subject, the more are we con- 
 " vinced that every bone of the skeleton, from the most 
 " massive to the smallest, carries with it in its form and 
 " proportions, a certificate of origin which it is impossible 
 " to mistake."* The crude theory of Vogt, according to 
 which man is descended from one of the extant kinds of 
 anthropoid apes, must be set down as obsolete. For the 
 human body has but few similarities with the highest rep- 
 resentatives of this class, that is, with the Asiatic orang- 
 outang, the gibbon, the African chimpanzee and the gorilla. 
 If, as Huxley contends, man is more like a gorilla than a 
 gorilla is like a lemur, and if there are greater differences 
 between the several species of apes than between man and 
 certain apes, his contention, while failing to prove the 
 descent of man, throws a doubt on the descent of apes from 
 a common ancestor. There are as great gaps in the gene- 
 alogy of apes as in that of other classes of animals. Nor, 
 again, is it legitimate to compare sickly, deformed men 
 with strong and healthy apes. Given a proportionate dis- 
 tribution of air and light, the gap is so wide that direct 
 descent is out of the question. Man's origin, then, must 
 be traced further back to a tree, from whose trunk sprang 
 two branches man and the anthropoid ape. The hairy 
 Pithecanthropes primigenius is accepted by Haeckel and Dar- 
 win as the common progenitor of man and gorilla. Both 
 male and female wore beards. Their ears were probably 
 pointed and movable. A tail hung from the body. Veins 
 and nerves took a different course. Our first parents had, 
 
 Quatrefages The Human Specif \ p. 294.
 
 MAN. 209 
 
 too, prehensile feet, climbed trees, and inhabited a warm 
 well-wooded country." At a still earlier period they must 
 have been water-animals, for the lung is a modified swim- 
 ming bladder. Monthly and weekly periods point to the 
 strand washed by the waves as our first birth-place. The 
 organization of our forefathers must have been as simple 
 as that of the amphioxus with its notochord (chorda dor sails], 
 Hence the traces of our primitive forefathers lie not on the 
 earth but under the earth. Africa is the spo- selected by 
 Darwin and Huxley ; Haeckel prefers Southern Asia, but 
 suggests the Indian Ocean as an alternative. In this ques- 
 tion palaeontology allows the greatest latitude, because it 
 says absolutely nothing about primitive man. It may still 
 be convenient to leave man's cradle in the sea, if we except 
 a few remnants of islands like Madagascar and Ceylon. 
 Link, Sklater and Haeckel christened this part of the world 
 Lemuria from the lemuridae which, they pretended, were 
 found only in these parts. Meanwhile lemuridae have been 
 discovered in tropical America, and fossil remains of an- 
 thropoid apes both in Europe and America. So this 
 hypothesis, alas ! has tumbled overboard into the sea. 
 Hence Darwinians are forced to admit that the animal 
 forms, to which they ascribe the origin of the human race, 
 have long since perished. Not even a bone has yet been 
 found. Neither physiology nor history furnishes a proof 
 for this alleged descent. As to the factors in the trans- 
 formation nothing at all can be said. Here we need dwell 
 on one only, which is the stile by which we pass over to 
 the spiritual domain. 
 
 Articulate speech and man's erect attitude are said to be 
 the chief proof that the human organism has undergone an 
 essential change morphologically. These two physiologi- 
 cal functions ought to have produced great morphological 
 changes, and to have given a spurt to the development of 
 the powers of the soul. From speechless or pithecoid man 
 
 ii Abstammuttgslehre, srd edit. 1875, vol. i., p. 67 Mohnike, Natur und Offenlarung^ 
 1884, Nos. 8-10 Oscar Schmidt, The Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism (Inter- 
 nal. Scient. Series) Schneider, i., 6, 27. 
 
 N
 
 210 MAN. 
 
 to rational man a complete transition has been effected, 
 owing, it is said, to the acquisition of language as the artic- 
 ulate expression of words and concepts. 11 But \htpetitio 
 principii is so shining and so evident that it will glimmer 
 through a blind man's eye. Surely the upright position 
 and language must themselves be accounted for before 
 they are made a stepping-stone to evolution. The upright 
 position is universal among men, and universally absent in 
 apes. If the perfection of brain and larynx is dependent 
 on the evolution of speech, then a properly developed 
 larynx and brain must be the companions of speech that 
 already exists. But how did these arise ? The " gradual 
 acquisition of the upright position' ' is not proved, nor has 
 it anything whatever to do with the organs of speech. 
 However, even if this unwarranted assumption be let pass 
 unchallenged, it has still to be explained how vocal organs, 
 intended originally for the production of rude inarticulate 
 sounds, have been made capable of speech. If this change 
 was preceded by a partial formation or transformation of 
 parts of the brain, the puzzle has veered round to its first 
 position. Not the faintest ray of light breaks through the 
 mysterious darkness. Man is man only by speech ; to have 
 speech he must be already man.* How comes it that only 
 this branch of the original tree has " luckily" been able to 
 adapt itself to this development ? One would suppose now 
 that it would be much easier for the other branch to grow 
 to the same height, since in man who walks erect and 
 speaks it has before its eyes a fine model and an excellent 
 instruction. But all the efforts of selection and education 
 have been unavailing to train man's first cousin to walk 
 upright or to talk. He is and remains a climber, in nowise 
 a homo alalus but a simia alala. 
 
 In speech lies the broadest and most powerful distinction 
 between man and the brute. No brute has speech ; no 
 properly developed man is without it. Man speaks, but 
 no animal has ever uttered a word. Speech is our Rubi- 
 
 12 Schaaffhausen, p. 175 seq. 
 * Alex, von Humboldt.
 
 MAN. 211 
 
 con, and no animal will dare to cross it. 13 Speech is the 
 great distinguishing feature of man.* The sounds of ani- 
 mals are inarticulate, although highly serviceable for ex- 
 pressing a feeling or an instinct, and they are always the 
 same in the same species. The mechanical prattle of par- 
 rots can no more replace human speech, than a machine 
 or automaton will enable us to dispense with the human 
 body. It is certain too that the speechlessness of animals 
 is not to be referred to their organic structure, to their 
 anatomy, or their physiology. Its cause is rather psycho- 
 logical and intellectual. Animals are speechless because 
 they are thoughtless. For our present purpose it is of 
 little moment whether language is marching upwards 
 towards unity, progress and perfectibility, or is on the 
 downward path to dissolution and decay ; for both tenden- 
 cies move within a human sphere, and neither gives a hint 
 as to the origin of speech. Where man is, there is speech. 
 History tells us that speech has attained various degrees 
 of development which have existed and still exist side by 
 side ; it shows how language, with its combinations and 
 distinctions has been formed ; it exhibits its grammatical 
 and syntactical rules. But in regard to the origin of lan- 
 guage the voice of history is as silent as a stone. 
 
 Language, it is true, is connected with the development 
 of the brain. The Cretins do not acquire speech. An 
 injury to the brain may entail loss of speech. Is language 
 therefore a function of the brain ? If it were, it would 
 prove nothing over and above what we have said about the 
 human brain ; the function would stand on a much higher 
 level than the organ. But in admitting that speech de- 
 pends on the brain, we pass no judgment on the causal re- 
 lation between the two. How can there be such a relation 
 between a material brain and speech, which is spiritual in 
 its nature ? Speech is but the expression of thought, the 
 word within the mind. There is no speech without reason. 
 
 13 Max Muller, Vorlesungen iiber die Wissenschaft der Sprache, 1863, vol. i, p. 303 ; 
 
 Schneider, I., 50. 
 * Huxley, Cuvier.
 
 212 MAN. 
 
 Reason and speech are correlatives. In man there is a 
 hidden force which when conceived as an internal activity 
 is called reason, and when conceived as something external 
 goes by the name of speech. We cannot penetrate into 
 the mind's secret workshop where abstract thought is glid- 
 ing noiselessly and stealthily through piles of intuitions. 
 But of conscious thought it is ever true to say : all thought 
 is speech, all speech is thought." There is no reason with- 
 out speech, nor the converse. Man originally means a 
 thinker. The first process of thought is the word. Logos 
 the thought, and Logos the word are indissolubly wedded. 
 Our words are not mere sounds out of which language has 
 grown. As touching the origin of language, even Darwin 
 attaches no importance to the conclusion drawn from the 
 various sounds emitted under different psychic states. 
 Noir6 has expressly retracted the theory he had built upon 
 the lucubrations of Schopenhauer and Geiger. The idea 
 would never strike a sagacious animal to utter, say a cry 
 of alarm as such, nor could it convey any meaning to other 
 animals. The interjection and imitation (Pah-pah and 
 Bow-wow) theories also break down. No language is 
 formed in this way, as the roots of language amply dem- 
 onstrate. Otherwise it would be quite inconceivable how 
 animals, that give vent to natural sounds and interjections, 
 never became possesssed of speech." Popularity has been 
 courted of late by the theory of sympathy which explains 
 sounds as a sort of reaction against the internal disturbance 
 caused by muscular exertion. This theory carries plausi- 
 bility in its train, because many words may be derived 
 from roots signifying primitive acts ; but after all it rather 
 describes a fact than explains the origin of language. Phy- 
 siological impulse is the sole agent. Words are signs, 
 freely chosen, by which the thought-object derived from 
 
 14 Tertullian, Advtr. Prax. C, 5 Kuhn, Trinztatslehre, p. 191. Max M filler, I.e. vol. 
 
 II., p. 6. Essays, II., viii. p. 400 seq. Ausland, 1873, No. 3. Knauer, Psychol., p. 
 176 seq. Kleutgen, Thtol. II., p. 51, Fltilos. I., p. 74 Secchi, p. 49. 
 
 15 Max Mflller, Essays, vol. II., p. 441, 447 seq. Wiss. der Spracke, vol. I., p. 307 
 
 Lotze, II., p. 233.
 
 MAN. 213 
 
 external perception is formed into a concept and out- 
 wardly expressed. 
 
 No inward connection exists between ideas and the sym- 
 bols of language except in so far as the name expresses 
 some quality of the thing ; e.g. y horse = speed. But 
 plainly the inward connection lies not in the symbols but 
 in the ideas, in the concepts which are finger-posts ever 
 pointing towards reason. The word always issues from 
 the reason (procedens ab intellectu), exists in it (in intellectu 
 existent), and is the image and likeness of the thing con- 
 ceived (ratio et similitude rei intellects] * With the aid of 
 abstraction and generalization reason joins subject and 
 predicate, and invokes the principle of causation in the 
 verb. Every sentence contains a judgment, and all the 
 judgments combined are the natural logic of reason. No 
 one ever becomes possessed of speech who cannot think, 
 count or calculate. What vast mental labour is enshrined 
 in a system of numeration, which implies the abstract idea 
 of quantity and the power of classification ! But the ani- 
 mal's lessons in arithmetic never get as far as the number 
 one ! It utters natural sounds not words ; it has some- 
 thing in the sense, but nothing in the intellect. The word 
 proper, full of spiritual contents, is the verbum cordis, and 
 the verbum oris> or word of mouth, is its expression. Rea- 
 son is not an offshoot from speech, but speech is the off- 
 shoot of reason. Speech comes from within, not from 
 without ; it is a natural gift characteristic of the race, in- 
 grained in the constitution of man. 
 
 But does not every child learn to speak before it can use 
 its reason ? Is not then the order followed by the child of 
 necessity the natural order ? As there is no example of a 
 man teaching himself religion, so no one has been known 
 to teach himself a language. There is no need to enquire 
 into the genuineness of alleged instances of want of speech 
 in people who have been cut off from all educational and 
 
 16 See S. Thomas, Sutttm. Thtol. 2, q. no, a. i Knauer, p. 180. Richard Simon, 
 With St. Gregory of Nyssa. Histoire Critiqut du Vieux Test. p. 484, 83 seq. 
 Pesch, vol. ii., p. 183.
 
 214 MAN. 
 
 social influences since their childhood." The fact that 
 every child has to be coaxed into speaking goes far to con- 
 firm their truth. The "mama" and "papa" cries are 
 assuredly no instance to the contrary. The child repeats 
 the words it has heard without understanding their mean- 
 ing. At first its utterances are indistinct and incorrect ; 
 then it gradually pronounces the words more clearly ; but 
 the sense of the words dawns on the child comparatively 
 late. When children speak, they neither discover lan- 
 guage, nor master its meaning, but learn both language 
 and meaning from others. There is no historical record 
 of any language being discovered in this way. Which lan- 
 guage would the child hit upon ? It is infallibly certain 
 that no German child, if left to itself, would ever begin to 
 babble in German. According to the scholastic philosophy 
 the child's budding powers are unfolded by the balmy 
 breezes and sunshine of the external world. Since human 
 society exists in every corner of the earth, we cannot of 
 course prove from experience that men would never think 
 at all without instruction, nor again that the internal word 
 must be acquired through the external. Neither does ex- 
 perience lend any countenance to the contrary assertion, 
 on which the burden of proof first lies. The same rule 
 must in consistency be applied to all peoples. Still it does 
 not follow that all knowledge rests on tradition, or that 
 speech is merely a set lesson to be learnt. The string 
 sounds only when struck, and it is the string alone that 
 sounds, but every string has its own peculiar tone. No 
 wood, says a common proverb, no pipe. Theologians who 
 refer language to God are not in good odour. Perhaps 
 theologians deserve as much blame as their adversaries 
 for not distinguishing the form of the Bible narrative from 
 its psychological meaning. God did not infuse language 
 into man, but with reason He bestowed the faculty of 
 
 17 Raubcr, Homo sapiens ferus, oder Die Zustande des verwilderten Menschen, Leip- 
 zig, 1885. See Grenzboten, 1885, No. 43. Natur und Offenb., 1885, p. 424 seq. 
 Kuhn, Trinitdt. p. 632. Pascal, PensSes, 25, 17. Max Mflller, Wt'ss. dfr Sfracke, 
 vol. I., p. 293. Tylor, p. 152, 178 On the Schoolmen, see Kleutgen, Pkilos., vol. I., 
 p. 180, 387 seq.
 
 MAN. 215 
 
 speech. God was not as a schoolmaster giving man les- 
 sons in spelling, but he gave man an opportunity of bring- 
 ing his faculty of speech into action. It is related that the 
 Lord God brought the beasts of the earth and the fowls of 
 the air to Adam to see what he would call them. What 
 else does the narrative mean but that Adam was bidden by 
 God to exercise his faculty of speech ? " For whatsoever 
 Adam called any living creature, the same is its name."* 
 Do philosophers make the mystery as clear as founts in 
 July by evolving language from speechlessness ? Man 
 must needs learn speech ; but how shall he learn it with- 
 out the disposition thereto, namely reason ? 
 
 Reason, then, is the chief distinguishing mark between 
 man and brute. Reason and intelligence have set their 
 seal on the human soul that soul which exalts us above 
 the brute, and invests us with the majesty of man. 18 Has 
 the brute, then, no psychic and spiritual faculties ? When 
 S. Thomas says that man's superiority over the brute is 
 due to his reason and understanding, he seems to attribute 
 something of the kind to animals. Animal consciousness 
 and the appreciative faculty (the vis cestimativa of the 
 Schoolmen) cannot well be denied of animals. According 
 to Aristotle, animals, besides having the sensitive and 
 appetitive faculties in common with us, have also some- 
 thing analogous to reason a shadow limping behind the 
 substance. In what does it consist ? It includes, firstly, 
 simple consciousness, or a kind of feeling that the action 
 is right and proper, and secondly, the almost instinctive 
 deliberation that as a rule immediately precedes the action. 
 This latter it is which raises instinct above blind natural 
 force ; it alone can account for the limited variability of 
 animal actions. How is this vis cestimativa combined with 
 instinct ? Herein lies the difficulty. In itself it must not 
 be identified with the understanding. But the apprecia- 
 tive faculty, if stripped both of reason and of all particular 
 
 * Gen. II., 19. 
 
 18 S. Augustine, In Joannem, No. 49, g (ad. 10, 18). See Epist. ad Diognttum, 8, a. 
 Controverse, 1882, No. 50, 51. S. Thomas, 1. c., I. q. 3, i ad 2.
 
 2l6 MAN. 
 
 judgments, will be but a hollow empty box. Reason is 
 not necessarily implied in a simple judgment, which often 
 bears merely on the action and passion of the sentient 
 agent. The Theory of Descent not only derives our intel- 
 lectual properties from animals, but with similarity of 
 action as the mainstay of its argument, it represents the 
 intellectual difference as merely one of degree. Quatre- 
 fages thinks that intelligence unmistakably exists in ani- 
 mals, and that therefore most stress should be laid not on 
 intelligence but on religious and moral character. 19 Fliigel 
 and others draw a distinction between reason and under- 
 standing. Many others, on the contrary, think this is 
 standing on too fine a point. We have no wish to exagger- 
 ate the intelligence of animals, nor, on the other hand, can 
 we shut our eyes to the facts of experience. There is no 
 need either to make the animal more animal than he is, or 
 to make him a man. The abyss between animal conscious- 
 ness and human self-consciousness is quite broad enough. 
 No further landslip is needed to widen the breach. 
 
 The stories told of animal knowledge are merely the 
 outward expression of an instinctive cognition, which differs 
 in different classes but always remains the same in the 
 same class. It revolves in a narrow circle, and occasions 
 reaction in the same and similar cases only when influenced 
 from without. Or it is limited to a sort of deliberation 
 whose target seldom lies outside the short range of sensi- 
 ble pleasure. Sometimes animals seem to take certain aim 
 at nobler game ; when, for instance, they surmount or cir- 
 cumvent unforeseen obstacles, or show that they know 
 how to encounter danger methodically. But in these 
 cases, either a sufficient reason is wanting for the action, 
 or the motive is merely apparent. All appearances to the 
 contrary notwithstanding, that unconscious and unknown 
 impulse which we call instinct is the centre in which the 
 radii of animal psychology meet. Who will explain with- 
 out instinct the bird's handicraft in building its nest ? the 
 
 19 Contravene, 1880, p. 108 seq. ; 1882, p. 604 seq. Literar, Rundschau, 1882, No. a. 
 Fliigel, Das Seelenleben der Thiere. Langensalza, 1886, and edit.
 
 MAN. 217 
 
 skill displayed by ants and bees in the construction and 
 government of their hive and home ? the cleverness with 
 which insects provide for their young ; the ingenuity of 
 the bird of passage during the long voyage ? the craftiness 
 with which beasts unfailingly secure their prey ? the in- 
 stinctive recognition of hostile animals ? the sense of space 
 and direction possessed by birds, bats and insects ? The 
 non-progressive character of these habits stamps them as 
 instinctive. The nests of the swallow and weaver, the 
 architecture of the beaver, and the cells of bees are the 
 same to-day as they were four thousand years ago. Occa- 
 sional exceptions and modifications are to be met with, but 
 they were brought about by the special difficulties the ani- 
 mals had to encounter in the locality or other causes, 
 against which their instinct fought and prevailed. As the 
 bird lays again when its eggs are robbed, so it repairs its 
 nest when damaged, or rebuilds it when destroyed ; but a 
 diminution of physical power is consequent on both actions. 
 It seems to be really a fact that birds, contrary to their 
 usual practice, sometimes choose high ground for their 
 nests, when an inundation would have destroyed the nests 
 in the following summer had they been built on the flat 
 level. This is clearly not a deliberate act, for the reason 
 of an intelligent being would be unequal to such a feat. 
 However we explain it, whether we fall back on a faculty 
 of presentiment, or suppose a mysterious connection be- 
 tween the animal world and nature, the fact is of no use 
 to establish the claims of animals to higher intelligence. 
 For the animal's intelligence would have to be placed 
 above man's reason, 20 since it works for a purpose without 
 deliberation. Besides, how few are the animals saved 
 from destruction by such foresight ! 
 
 The same reflection applies to the animal's care for its 
 young. The black beetle lays its egg on a dead mouse, 
 and buries the mouse ; the butterfly lays its egg on a cer- 
 
 20 Altum, Der Vogel und sein Leben, 4th edit., 1870 Von Binzer, Instinct, Verstand 
 und Geist bet Menschen und Thieren. Heilbronn, 1884 See also Natur und 
 Ojfenb, 1885, p. 294 seq.
 
 2l8 MAN. 
 
 tain leaf, and the ichneumon fly in a living grub which 
 keeps the creeping larva supplied with fresh food. How 
 can such modes of procedure be the outcome of reflection ? 
 The insect is mindful, it is said, of its own early larva 
 state. If lower animals remember their early days so well, 
 and use their memory to such good purpose, then to the 
 face of every human being there should rise a blush of 
 shame crimson enough to thaw the consecrated snow. 
 The " unconscious memory" of matter or of the animal is 
 an imaginary quantity. The puny beetle artist, when 
 building a home for its eggs and larvae, sets to work with 
 an air of professional assurance that would astonish a 
 skilled workman.* 1 Beetle buildings, it has been recently 
 shown, are constructed according to mathematical laws. 
 Oddly enough the beetle's skill seems to decrease, not to 
 increase with practice. In like manner the bird that pairs 
 a second time seems to forget the prettiest melodies of its 
 first nuptial song. Neither memory nor practice, whether 
 of the individual or of the race, can unfold the philosophy 
 of things so strange and withal so common. Again we 
 stand in the presence of an unknown power instinct. 
 
 As the senses and the human brain co-operate with men- 
 tal activity, so the animal's senses and nervous system 
 enter into partnership with its instinct. Yet there is no 
 explaining how they work together without assuming a 
 certain disposition in the faculty of perception, and a 
 regular natural inclination in the appetitive faculty. As 
 the motory and sensory organs have a fixed aim, so it is 
 the business of the psychic faculties to employ them as 
 means to an end. This psycho-physiological adaptation 
 of the organism, the feeling of pleasure and pain, the im- 
 pulses re-acting on inward states and outward impressions, 
 all postulate a basis other than material. The certainty 
 and clockwork regularity of its action give to the animal 
 the appearance of a machine ; but it is only such when 
 
 21 Wasmann, Der Trichtenaickler. Nat. vnd Offenb. 1883. Pesch, i, p. 571 and 415 
 seq. Bonniot, La raison ckez let insectes. Revue du monde catholique, 1882, p. 
 in seq.
 
 MAN. 219 
 
 contrasted with the free-will of man. The mechanism of 
 a machine differs from that of a natural event, because the 
 motive cause lies in the machine itself, and is not insepa- 
 rably bound up with irrevocable laws, however limited its 
 line of action may be in other respects. Though the feats 
 of memory and deliberation performed by domestic ani- 
 mals be greatly exaggerated, they still attest the presence 
 of a vis czstimativa, a certain power of calculating chances. 
 The cunning and sagacity of the elephant, fox and wolf 
 are proverbial. The ingenuity of ants in using wood-lice 
 as milch cows does credit to their economic arrangements. 
 Even if these actions, as being essentially connected with 
 the senses, are put down to the memory and imagination 
 of the sensitive soul, there is still a certain surplus of prog- 
 ress or development. If we allow our fancy to wander 
 free as air we may come to regard the external acts of the 
 dog and ass, for example, as signs of imaginative activity. 
 In addition to the change in bodily habits, the instinct also 
 is changed and perfected. The different breeds of dogs 
 may be traced to a common stock. Yet how varied are 
 their instincts ! The sporting dogs, trained to scent and 
 follow game and birds are, from their birth, fitted for their 
 task not only by outward organization but also by an in- 
 ward disposition. As in the case of variability so here 
 also the gradual change in specific psychic conditions is 
 circumscribed within certain narrow and well-defined 
 limits. The wondrous achievements of domestic animals 
 are the result of training : there is not even a mangled 
 shadow of mind in them. In a free state of nature such 
 changes are rare and small in compass. On the whole the 
 animal is stationary. Many levers have been applied to 
 lift him up, but he is still down. Now as heretofore he is 
 governed by an instinct essentially the same. Sense-per- 
 ception is the sole guide and support of his intelligence. 
 He conceives and remembers, judges, ponders and foresees 
 at the beck and call of an inward impulse, which lacks dis- 
 tinct consciousness. Instinct is at once the highest and the 
 lowest psychological function : highest in virtue of its
 
 22O MAN. 
 
 "demoniacal infallibility," lowest by reason of its blind 
 fatalism. 
 
 With man it is not so. Instinct certainly lies at the bot- 
 tom of his being. Not only are there many involuntary 
 semi-conscious acts in the play of everyday life, but a 
 divine unerring instinct is often a safe guide on the giddy 
 heights of spirituality. Many a creation of genius has 
 been due to an unconscious inspiration shooting across the 
 soul at the right moment. Still such results are possible 
 only when there is a spiritual basement to build upon. In 
 man the vis cestimativa is governed by reason, not by fixed 
 laws. Free deliberation follows on the involuntary sug- 
 gestion. Unless the normal activity of the spirit goes in 
 advance, genius is impossible, and the thought cannot be 
 carried out. Man is made to think. Herein lies his dig- 
 nity and his superiority to the brute. I can conceive a 
 man without hands and feet ; I could conceive him even 
 without a head, did not experience tell me that he thinks 
 with his head. Thought, says Pascal, 58 is the crown of 
 man's being. We cannot imagine man without it. This 
 is the key to the feeling of abhorrence with which men re- 
 gard the idea of being descended from an animal and an 
 ape. Men may think to daunt us by dinning into our ears 
 that it is nobler to be descended from a highly organized 
 animal than to be formed from a lump of clay. But they 
 cram these words into our ears against the stomach of our 
 sense. For we shall not lightly forego a divine for a bes- 
 tial origin. The Fathers of the Church dwell on the shame- 
 lessness of the Platonists in placing the souls of men and 
 brutes on terms of equality. The devil, thinks S. Chrysos- 
 tom, sought to convince himself through these men that 
 our race stands no higher than irrational creatures. Some, 
 he says, must have eaten of the insane root that takes the 
 reason prisoner to have the face to maintain that the irra- 
 tional and the rational are all one. S. Augustine says it is 
 rebellion against the Catholic faith to hold that the irra- 
 
 99 Ptnsdes, xxiii., 93, i.
 
 MAN. 221 
 
 tional animal soul is transformed into the rational soul ot 
 man. Even the disciples were ashamed of their master's 
 philosophic frivolity, and excused him by saying he had 
 been misunderstood. 23 By his specific action of thinking 
 man is lord of nature, and capable of great progress in art 
 and science. By his skill and power of invention combined 
 he has made the soil and the beasts of the field his ser- 
 vants. He understands more and more how to subdue the 
 forces of nature and bend them to his will. Machinery, 
 steam, magnetism and electricity have been pressed into 
 his service. Who can count all the inventions that have 
 been called into being to minister to man's wants and 
 pleasures, to provide him with food and clothing, and to 
 further the general good of the race ? The animal has had 
 no hand in promoting this general advancement. His part 
 is purely passive. Man alone is progressive. The begin- 
 ning of all civilization is the use of fire. Its use is known 
 even to the tribes of New Guinea, but to no animal how- 
 soever advanced. 34 What an immeasurable interval sepa- 
 rates the primitive uses of fire from its employment in 
 machinery, where the heat of the sun that has been pent 
 up for centuries in the coal is transformed into kinetic 
 energy, and sets the engine in motion ! The telegraph 
 has almost annihilated space and time. The spectrum 
 analysis has revealed the secret of stars, many thousand 
 times further off than the sun. No struggle for existence, 
 no manner of natural selection, no gradual inheritance of 
 collected experiences, as Mr. Herbert Spencer will have it, 
 can break down the barrier that separates man from the 
 brute. 
 
 And yet we are still lingering in the atrium of the human 
 mind. There are still higher steps to mount. Self-con- 
 sciousness and the power of abstraction may be considered 
 the two topmost turrets of man's intellectual activity. 
 
 23 De Gen. vi., 9, 13. Chrysost. Homtl.^ 4, 4, in Act. App. Homil., 663, in Joan. 
 
 Basilius, Hexameron, viii., 2. See Weiss, Die Kappadokier als Exegtten, p. 59, 
 seq. 
 
 24 Gloatz, II., p. 916. See Schneider, I., 58.
 
 :.<2 MAN. 
 
 Man alone can distinguish himself from all things else, can 
 alone form a clear and distinct idea of his own personality, 
 and thus, as it were, split himself up into subject and ob- 
 ject Thus he knows that he is the subject and cause of 
 his own activity. He also knows himself to be one in 
 being, and individually independent. At the same time 
 he can in a measure fathom the being and existence of 
 other things. For abstraction enables him to separate the 
 nature and essence of things from their natural environ- 
 ment, and to distinguish cause from effect. What fathom- 
 line shall touch the ground of this capacity ? Not Posi- 
 tivism, which compresses all enquiry into causality ; not 
 English Associationism, which uncoils causality from the 
 association of ideas ; not Criticism, in fine, which hangs 
 comprehension on moral intuition. Man could not rise 
 from sense to the things above sense, before he had 
 mounted the ladder of self-consciousness and soared as 
 high as the idea of a spiritual unity. That man's spiritual 
 nature transcends the world of sense seemed to S. Augus- 
 tine to be best proved by the fact that there are in his 
 mind thoughts, which mere sense and knowledge could 
 never have generated. Such thoughts, he argued, are 
 possible only in a simple being who clearly conceives him- 
 self to be the cause and subject of his own activity. No 
 causal connection can be established between the move- 
 ment of atoms in the brain, and that consciousness which 
 manifests itself in pleasure and pain, and begets conviction 
 of ' Self.' The physical acts are but the occasion for the 
 higher psychic activity. The external half of human 
 nature becomes itself an object of consciousness. Con- 
 sciousness cannot possibly be merely the sum of myriads 
 of atoms. For its manifestations show it to be absolutely 
 one. Amid all the material changes of the brain, it clings 
 to its unity and identity. The changes in the brain are, 
 indeed, a condition of the soul's activity, but not the activity 
 itself. The highest act of self-consciousness, namely, the 
 immediate recognition of our own existence as expressed 
 in the formula : Cogito, ergo sum, proves also that there is
 
 MAN. 223 
 
 in the mind such a thing as necessary thought, which is 
 independent of all external surroundings. 
 
 Man is, therefore, endowed with the power of abstract- 
 ing the general from the particular ; he can rise from 
 things of sense to things above sense ; he can form ideas 
 and concepts of the very nature and essence of things. 
 Thereby he puts a girdle round the whole universe of ex- 
 isting things. Thus he is enabled to create a genuine 
 science of the nature and essence of things. Science is 
 proper to man. Who ever heard of a science among ani- 
 mals ? Thus man has unexpectedly created a new spiritual 
 world, which has always been the ideal paradise of the 
 pure and noble-minded. All other progress and knowl- 
 edge glides only on the outer rim of human nature. Ad- 
 mirable though it be in itself, when compared with the 
 noble conquest of the spirit it is as glittering tinsel to the 
 pure gold. The boon conferred on the whole civilized 
 world by the study of language in Southern Asia ; the 
 wise maxims enshrined in the sacred books of ancient re- 
 ligions ; the profit accruing from the speculations of Greek 
 philosophers on matter and spirit, all these accumulated 
 piles of wealth form such a rich storehouse of spiritual 
 treasures that all things else seem as dirt. Of the treasures 
 locked up in the Bible we make no mention, as they be- 
 long to the supernatural order of revelation. Here we 
 must repeat the truth we inculcated above when treating 
 of man's natural religious disposition. Man alone tramples 
 under foot things earthly and temporal ; he alone soars to 
 the height of speculating on the eternal and the infinite. 
 The apparent endlessness of space and time may stimulate 
 thought ; the contemplation of the boundless firmament 
 and of the unchanged and harmonious movements of the 
 heavens may suggest the thought of the immeasurable and 
 the eternal. But the fact that man alone rises to such 
 speculation, that he alone rises above his surroundings, 
 proves that the spirit of man is exalted above all that is 
 visible in the realm of the material universe. 
 
 Nor is man's moral life of less importance. Free-will is
 
 224 MAN. 
 
 the noblest gift that the Creator has bestowed on man for 
 his journey through life. Without the will the life of the 
 intellect can be but half understood ; for there is much in 
 the intellect over which the will holds sovereign sway." 
 In the moral and religious life the will is supreme. On the 
 will man's worth and salvation depend. In truth the world 
 considers the reproach of wickedness preferable to that of 
 folly. God, says the Apostle, has chosen what is foolish 
 in the eyes of the world that he may confound the wise. 
 If man's dignity arises from his power of thought and in. 
 tellect, clearly only right thought can safeguard it. Now 
 right thought is the principle of morality. 8 ' Here it is not 
 our purpose to discuss free-will, or to enquire into the 
 merits of Determinism and Indeterminism. It is sufficient 
 to show that man's moral life and advancement in good 
 entitle him to be considered essentially distinct from the 
 brute. Animals have no moral life. They are governed 
 by their instincts which have for their end naught but 
 nourishment and propagation. Only external force can 
 prevent them from gratifying their instincts. Nature is 
 not to be thwarted. The stories of love and hatred, sym- 
 pathy and antipathy in the animal world may be reduced 
 to one common denominator impulse. 77 The love of their 
 kind and the love of parents and of children are begotten 
 of the impulse to propagate, and are largely the creatures 
 of circumstance. Many a bird fondles the young cuckoo 
 it has unwittingly hatched as much as its own offspring. 
 A hen is not more solicitous for her own chickens than for 
 the young ducks that come out of the eggs on which she 
 has been sitting. The few exceptions among domestic ani- 
 mals are far removed from moral actions. The pride or 
 shame manifested by the sporting dog, according as it has 
 booty or not to lay at its master's feet, is certainly due to 
 training : they are, in fact, a reaction on the reception ac- 
 
 25 Pascal, xxv., 10, Kahl, Die Lehre vom Primat des IVillens bei A ugustinus Duns 
 
 Scotus und Carfesius, Strassburg, 1886. 
 
 26 Pascal, xxiii., 5, 6. 
 
 27 See Hertling, p. 97. Gloatz, p. 95. Cathrein, Die Sittenlehre ties Darvuitiismits, 
 
 p. 34, Freiburg, 1885.
 
 MAN. 225 
 
 corded him by the hunter. We might, perhaps, with the 
 Scholastics, regard it as a faint echo (obscurant resonantiam) 
 of morality, 28 but nothing more. Wedlock and family life, 
 care for the dead and dying, the ethic and aesthetic sense, 
 good behaviour all, indeed, that usually marks the begin- 
 ning of civilization will be sought in vain in the animal. 
 Animals neither laugh nor cry. They evince neither moral 
 shame nor repentance except as accompaniments of the 
 whip. Even anthropophagy, that blank moral aberration 
 and rude excrescence of superstition, is a standing argument 
 against a conscious free morality in animals. Only in the 
 direst need will they eat their own flesh and blood. Such 
 an act they regard with singular abhorrence. Suicide, 
 again, is unknown in animals. The impulse of self-pres- 
 ervation is the only law. Occasionally instances of self- 
 sacrifice are recorded of dogs, but they come of long and 
 deep attachment to man and his belongings. Again, ani- 
 mals in a free state, owing to their defective liberty, are 
 usually more limited in their diet than man, and conse- 
 quently more exposed to hunger. 
 
 Moreover the character of human actions reveals a still 
 more pronounced difference between man and the animal. 
 Man acts with deliberation and with the full consciousness 
 that he is responsible for his actions. Man alone knows 
 the reasoning of the words : " thou shalt," and " thou 
 shalt not," which impose on the conscience the duty of 
 doing or abstaining from some action. Conscience hath a 
 thousand tongues ; its voice, sounding within the chambers 
 of the heart, ceases not to cry aloud until its behests be 
 done. If a man turns a deaf ear or disobeys its orders, the 
 worm of conscience will ever gnaw his soul. Heroic acts 
 of penance, and numerous acts of despair often ending in 
 suicide, alike bear witness to the terrible, overwhelming 
 power of this incorruptible monitor. Man alone can fight 
 against nature, and repudiate from a higher motive, the 
 claims of self-preservation. He alone can sacrifice, for vir- 
 
 28 Pesch, vol. i., p. 771. See Origen, c., Cels 4, 81. Max Muller, Wissenschaft der 
 Sprache, vol. i., p. 302. 
 
 O
 
 226 MAN. 
 
 tue's and honour's sake, the highest earthly good life. To 
 the heart, whose aspirations are heavenward bound, life is not 
 the highest good. Heroism and martyrdom are as wonderful 
 and elevating in the moral life, as the noble creations of 
 genius are in art and science. Both alike are foreign to 
 the animal world ; neither can be worked by machinery. 
 Eternal causes and circumstances undoubtedly exercise a 
 powerful influence on the moral condition of nations and 
 individuals ; but they alone cannot weave a moral action. 
 A man's life and character are frequently determined by 
 his poverty or riches, by his education, by the good or bad 
 example given him. War, famine and pestilence have an 
 unhappy effect on the moral life of mankind. Neverthe- 
 less, although a strong plea for extenuating circumstances 
 be allowed, there is no denying that individuals have the 
 power to resist these baneful influences and to overcome 
 temptation, since many have already resisted and tri- 
 umphed. The records of all ages chronicle noble instances 
 of virtue in evry condition of life, even among the most 
 degraded peoples. How many, whose names are obscure 
 or unknown, have kept their virtue in spite of temptation 
 and persecution ! Criminal statisticians may correctly 
 maintain that it is possible to strike the average of crime, 
 but this contention only bears out the word of Holy Scrip- 
 ture, that no man is without sin, and that the senses of 
 man are prone to evil from his youth. Otherwise our 
 penal code would be an injustice, which the struggle of 
 society for existence would alone justify. Our prisons, 
 too, would be replaced by lunatic asylums. Civilization 
 and culture would be at an end. Of course Darwinians 
 assent to this conclusion, although contrary to their prin- 
 ciple. There is no real internal progress, they say : prog- 
 ress is only external. Man does not improve in the sense 
 of perfecting himself. For a thousand years there has 
 been merely development, not progress, in humanism, rea- 
 son and morality.*' Nevertheless, even those who hold 
 
 09 Hellwald, Caspar!, Moleschott, and others. See Ausland, 1873, No. 49 ; 1878, No. 46. 
 On the other side see Hertling, p. 102, seq. Cathrein, p. 76, seq.
 
 MAN. 227 
 
 these naturalistic views make certain moral demands (vary- 
 ing with the times) on man and not on animals. They 
 likewise give certain rights to man, but not to animals. 
 The animal is slaughtered for man's benefit, but anthro- 
 pophagy is universally branded as cannibalism. We have 
 no need to defend existing moral and social relations 
 through thick and thin. Frequent relapses may be unre- 
 servedly admitted. But the fault lies in the abuse of free- 
 will, not in fate or a mere law of nature. The possibility 
 of moral progress and restoration is abundantly proved by a 
 comparison of early Christianity with heathenism. Neither 
 can progress be denied in the history of the Church itself, 
 if only the herculean labour spent in shaping the barbarian 
 converts of Christianity be dispassionately considered. 
 The achievements of our ancestors are not lost on us. 
 Only the animal has always to make a fresh start. 
 
 So far we have been comparing civilized man and civilized 
 society with brutes and brute associations. And most 
 rightly so ; for, as Aristotle has said, the true nature of a 
 being lies in its perfection. Our line of argument would 
 indeed be open to objection if we had pitted the lowest 
 animals against the most highly civilized man. Such, 
 however, has not been our mode of procedure. The high- 
 est brute, both intellectually and morally, is infinitely 
 below civilized man ; and we may at once add, the normal 
 man, even of the lowest race, is far above the most highly 
 organized animal. Historically it is not probable that 
 man, intellectually and morally, is a psychical evolution 
 from the brute. Ethnography has blown to atoms Rous- 
 seau's ideal child of nature. But the Darwinian substi- 
 tute, namely speechless primitive man, the brutal savage, 
 has also been mercilessly battered and mangled. Little as 
 the savage is an ideal of innocence, from his birth he is 
 and remains a man. 30 Every man has something of the 
 animal in his nature ; the savage has a greater quantity 
 and a grosser kind, but he is still a human animal. Char- 
 so See Schneider, I., 3. seq. La civilisation prthistorique. Contravene, 1881, p. 129, 
 seq. ; 1882, p. 620, secj. Nadaillac, Die Ersten Menschen^ p. 25 and 50.
 
 228 MAN. 
 
 acteristic peculiarities crop up at every turn. Australians 
 and Tasmanians, Botocudos and Pescheros in South Amer- 
 ica, Bushmen in South Africa, are all men, whichever is to 
 have the device " Lowest Race" emblazoned on its banner. 
 So little was known of the earth in the days of Lucretius 
 that there is some excuse for his hazarding the hypothesis 
 that aboriginal man was a semi-animal, using neither fire 
 nor clothing. Now, however, the earnest student cannot 
 plead the backward state of knowledge. Darwin's blun- 
 der in relation to the people of Tierra del Fuego, which 
 first brought home to him the idea of man's animal origin, 
 was corrected long ago. No people is destitute of certain 
 abilities and capacities, which are the sign of a free intelli- 
 gence. To this even prehistoric science bears witness. 
 The carved bones of wild animals found in the South of 
 France and in the cave of Thainger reveal a fairly devel- 
 oped aesthetic sense, and a delicacy of artistic skill for 
 which we seek in vain among modern savages (Schaff- 
 hausen). The same thing may be observed in America. 
 The old mound-builders were more civilized than modern 
 Indians, who were more civilized at the time of the Span- 
 ish Conquest than they are now. The Indians are a degen- 
 erate race. The arms and implements used by men in the 
 Stone Age were doubtless rude and primitive ; but to this 
 day no animal has attempted to manufacture or use such 
 weapons, rude as they were. The ideas that form the basis 
 of social and moral life are familiar to all peoples. A cer- 
 tain social organization and tribal divisions obtained even 
 among the most primitive races. The drawings above 
 alluded to (which are modelled from nature) are sugges- 
 tive and significant. So far only one small detached fig- 
 ure, representing a sort of Venus impudiea, has been discov- 
 ered. In Museums generally closed to the public may be 
 seen crowds of such objects that have come down to us 
 from the Greeks and Romans, whose advanced civilization 
 is beyond question. Savages have the ideas of meum and 
 tuum, and of good and evil, although they both steal and 
 work evil. A little while ago an effort was made to forge
 
 MAN. 229 
 
 an intermediate link between man and animals out of the 
 Mincopians of the Andaman Islands, who were represented 
 as cannibals and wholly devoid of moral and religious 
 ideas. It has, however, since transpired that they have a 
 horror of human flesh, believe in a life to come, devoutly 
 worship their ancestors, and are superior to many civilized 
 nations in morality. 31 The same may be said of the inhab- 
 itants of the Nicobar, who were visited by the Novara Ex- 
 pedition. Many wild and uncivilized peoples are no doubt 
 sitting in darkness, but the darkness should not be artfully 
 intensified. Their ignorance and moral depravity are piti- 
 ful and harrow up the soul, but the traces and germs of 
 civilization must not be passed over and ignored. The 
 responsibility of savagery, then, need not rest with man's 
 animal origin ; for savagery must be regarded in great 
 measure as a degradation and a decadence. This will be 
 apparent when it is shown that the different races of man- 
 kind have a common origin. History states that many 
 nations, Egyptians, Syrians, Persians, and other Asiatic 
 tribes have actually relapsed into barbarism from a high 
 state of civilization. The ruins of Egypt, Mexico and 
 South America, and the monuments recently discovered 
 at Yukatan, are a clear proof that the career of some na- 
 tions has taken a downward course. In the seventh cen- 
 tury the barbarians of Central Asia were highly civilized. 
 The Redskins have retained a fairly pure notion of religion, 
 but among other races in the same part of the globe civili- 
 zation has given way to idolatry and human sacrifice. 
 Faith and science both declare that man's condition in the 
 beginning was purer and nobler than at present. Thus 
 races degenerate, although progress is the general law. A 
 backward and a forward movement may be seen going on 
 side by side. The organic connection is often wanting, 
 but it is of no moment in universal history. But the mere 
 power of man is inadequate to explain this progressive 
 tendency even in the remotest periods. Thus the differ- 
 ence between palaeolithic and neolithic is considerable. 
 
 31 Quatrefages, Journal des Savants, Juin et Aofh, 1882. Contravene, 1882, p. 704. 
 Schneider, vol. ii., p. 75, seq.
 
 230 MAN. 
 
 Domestic animals have taken the place of cave animals ; 
 the nomad has become a settler, and the huntsman has 
 turned husbandman. Shapeless arms and implements 
 have been cast aside for polished axes that would do credit 
 to a modern artificer. Dolmens (stone erections) and 
 Menhirs (monoliths) were erected as temples or sepulchral 
 monuments ; nets were plaited, garments woven, and 
 houses more securely built. What is the cause of this vast 
 difference ? Such advanced culture was not within the 
 unaided reach of the cave men, and of those whose re- 
 mains have been found in the Quaternary strata. In many 
 places immigrations were frequent. Whence came the 
 new settlers ? Whence their civilization ? Palaeontology 
 can give no answer to these questions. The Science of 
 Language comes nearer the mark, but it also halts before 
 arriving at the beginning. 
 
 Holy Scripture itself records progress alongside of sinful 
 depravity. In its pages we find chronicles of the Stone, 
 Bronze and Iron Ages, as far as they are really distinguish- 
 able. Civilization began, it tells us, when our first parents 
 clothed themselves with the skins of animals after being 
 driven from Paradise. The Stone Age lasted from Cain to 
 Tubalcain, and the civilization of bronze and iron began 
 with Tubalcain, the first smith. Revelation itself is an in- 
 stance of progressive instruction, the preparation for re- 
 demption being gradually completed in several thousands 
 of years. 82 This would be an appropriate place to treat of 
 man's religious development, but as the subject has already 
 been treated at length, this passing note will suffice. 
 
 And now we may safely leave the reader to draw his 
 own conclusions in regard to the essential difference be- 
 tween man and brute. For our part we prefer to draw out 
 a concluding argument in favour of the cosmological proof of 
 the existence of God. Man alone is self-conscious ; he 
 alone, unlike the whole of irrational nature, knows himself 
 to be a personal being ; he alone is conscious of moral 
 obligations and responsibilities which he often fulfils in 
 
 3 See Hipler, Die christlicht Getchichtsauffassunfr 1884, p. 13, seq.
 
 MAN. 231 
 
 opposition to his own nature and to the world around him. 
 By being born with head erect he is destined to gaze up- 
 wards from earth to heaven. Nor is this all. In his soul 
 there is a presentiment of the Infinite, a desire of the super- 
 natural, supreme good. Whence comes this divine element 
 in man which illumines his soul with light from above ? 
 Whence, but from the Infinite, from God Himself ? All 
 other causes have been weighed in the balance and found 
 wanting. Thus, for the fourth time, we stand face to face 
 with a first cause. But nothing short of absolute intelli- 
 gence, liberty and personality can be the cause of a con- 
 scious, free and personal being. Intelligence in man 
 proves the spiritual nature of his absolute first cause ; 
 conscience in man proves that the first cause is absolutely 
 good, loving and holy. The personality of the human soul 
 forbids us to conceive the absolute spirit as impersonal. 31 
 Such a mode of contemplating God may be inexact and 
 imperfect like all our knowledge of God, but it cannot 
 be false if human knowledge, which is ad modum cognoscentis, 
 can lay any claim to truth. We are fully aware that 
 knowledge of this sort needs to be modified-; but modifica- 
 tion is not negation. When we refer the organic world 
 back to God we infer, not that God has a vegetative and 
 sensitive life, but that God, being the giver of life, must 
 have life in Himself and be life. Nay more, we insist that 
 God's life is of a more exalted kind, since the cause is higher 
 than the effect, not in degree merely but specifically. The 
 saying causa cequat effectum holds good only of natural forces ; 
 but this is not a question of natural force. The same is 
 the case in regard to man. In investing God with an ab- 
 solute personality we are far from intending to represent 
 God as a magnified man. Here also the cause is specifi- 
 cally above the effect. It does not hence follow that the 
 word " person" when applied to God and man is taken in 
 precisely the same sense (univoce) in each case. God is a 
 person in a more eminent sense than man. Nevertheless 
 the analogy is quite correct. 
 
 33 Secchi, Einheit, vol. ii., p. 356, seq., Schopfung, p. 28. Pohle, p. 121, seq. Kleutgen, 
 Phil., vol. ii., p. 774. Kuhn, Gotteslehre, p. 680. Storz, p. 159.
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 Design and Purpose dog man at the heels through life. 
 In all his actions man has a definite aim, and selects means 
 proportioned to the level of his aim. The attainment of 
 the end he has in view is the purpose of his actions and of 
 his life. Purpose is the final cause (causa finalis) which de- 
 termines man to do an action or to leave it undone. Hav- 
 ing in the last chapter learnt to know God as the absolute 
 reason, we might feel tempted to apply this principle also 
 to Him. For the supreme reason must needs act ration- 
 ally, that is by design. This course of procedure seems all 
 the more commendable, as it will fulfil the two laws of 
 human thought in the junction of the analytic and syn- 
 thetic methods. S. Athanasius joined analysis with syn- 
 thesis in this way in order to avoid one-sidedness, and to 
 strengthen the proofs for the existence of God on both 
 sides. But, for the Apologist, the other course seems 
 preferable. As human reason is not vouchsafed an actual 
 insight into the inward being of God, it must, in the ques- 
 tion of finality and purpose, have recourse to the synthetic 
 method and to a posteriori proofs. The two arguments 
 often run in parallel lines, but each has a different aspect. 
 Hitherto we have been enquiring whence came this uni- 
 verse and its several parts. We now pass to the question, 
 wherefore it exists. Naturalists and philosophers share the 
 work between them. The former merely searches for 
 causes, the latter aims at connecting the phenomena that 
 unfold God's power and wisdom. The naturalist is not
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 233 
 
 on the lookout for purpose and design, as they lie beyond 
 his horizon ; but they grow out of his work as naturally 
 as the fruit grows on the tree. 1 Darwinism completely 
 ignores final causes, but by its theory of adaptation it has, 
 quite beyond its intention, rendered yeoman's service to 
 the doctrine of design. Natural philosophy applies it to 
 Teleology. Of course the philosopher may not overlook 
 or deny the efficient causes. Efficient and final causes nec- 
 essarily pull together. Final causes by themselves can 
 only construct an ideal world without explaining the real 
 one. To thrust one or other into the background is to be 
 as biassed as the materialist who sees the material world 
 and shuts his eyes to the world of spirit. By neglecting 
 the efficient and exaggerating the final causes, the School- 
 men, especially their inferior representatives, made the 
 real world difficult to understand and brought finality into 
 discredit. 2 Materialists, on the other hand, by cutting de- 
 sign to pieces have stabbed civilization with laughter. 
 
 It is idle to enquire whether the design in nature is real, 
 or a phantom that we have conjured up by reading our 
 own thoughts into things. As empirical facts must be 
 judged in accordance with the laws of thought, the design 
 must be real. Look where we will, the star of purpose is 
 in the ascendant. It lights up the beauteous structure and 
 harmony of the heavens, the ingenious contrivances by 
 which animals and plants feed and propagate themselves, 
 and the world of wonders that the telescope discloses in 
 the firmament, and the microscope in every speck of mat- 
 ter. Through all nature there shines a purpose of dazzling 
 brilliancy, beside which art is as a rushlight compared to 
 the sun. Aristotle had endeavoured to clothe this truth 
 with light. The human mind, being an orderly faculty, 
 is bound to unravel nature's riddles. At all times nature 
 intends the best. All that is most perfect and answers the 
 purpose she utilizes ; all that is purposeless and useless 
 she rejects. She has, moreover, the faculty of pressing 
 
 i Kleutgen, Phil., vol. ii., p. 381. Pesch, vol. i., p. 354, seq. 
 a See Commer System II., p. 96.
 
 234 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 things accidental into her service and assigning them a 
 place in the world's economy. Nature's foresight propor- 
 tions the parts to the whole, adjusts the relations between 
 bulk and quantity, stocks the egg with food for the animal, 
 provides the mother with milk, and implants in animals 
 the impulse to rear their young.* Job, the Psalmist, and 
 other sacred writers love to dwell on the beauty and design 
 in nature, and are loud in the Creator's praises. The 
 authors of the Sapiential Books extol the glory of the 
 heavens, the splendour of the blazing stars, the harmony 
 of the spheres. The beneficent light of sun and stars, the 
 majesty of the storm, the change of the seasons, the beasts 
 of the forest and the flowers of the field were ever inspir- 
 ing these holy seers to sing the praises of Him who made 
 them. Our Divine Lord Himself loved to borrow His 
 most beautiful and instructive similitudes from nature. 
 The lilies of the field that neither labour nor spin and yet 
 surpass Solomon in his glory ; the birds of the air that 
 neither sow nor reap nor gather into barns, and yet are 
 provided by nature with food these are simple but telling 
 instances of the intelligence and goodness that reign in 
 nature. The fate of the seed that is sown, the cockle 
 among the wheat, the good and bad fishes enable us to 
 picture and understand higher truths that are overhung 
 with mystery. It were an endless task to give in detail 
 the noble descriptions of nature with which the contem- 
 plation of the external world inspired S. Basil and other 
 Fathers who in their lives were so unworldly. 4 
 
 The progress of discovery has tended to deepen this idea 
 of purpose. The discovery of America disclosed to the 
 wondering gaze of the astonished European entirely new 
 fauna and flora ; the marvels of the tropics greeted him in 
 Southern Asia ; in Australia and its cluster of islands he 
 encountered strange forms which gave a finish to nature's 
 picture. The Copernican system set the unity and sim- 
 
 3 See Hertling, Materie und Farm, Bonn, 1871, p. 96. Nat. und. Offenb. 1879, 1885, 
 
 PP- 99. i?3. 221. 
 
 4 See Zoeckler, Bezichungen, 2 vols. Lorinser, Das Buck der Natttr.
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 235 
 
 plicity of the universe in a new light. The telescope re- 
 vealed to the astronomer new worlds in the vast ocean of 
 the heavens, new constellations in the nebulae, new evolu- 
 tions in the stars. From the spectroscope we learn that 
 the unity of the system and of the moving forces is founded 
 on the unity of the elements. The microscope showed a 
 drop of water to be peopled with minute animalcules, and 
 gave geologists a clue to the formation of the rocks. Man 
 now stands on the verge of two precipices the infinitely 
 great and the infinitely little. He stands in awe of both 
 infinity and nothingness, and he is equi-distant from both. 
 What is man in nature ? Compared with the Infinite he is 
 nothing, compared with nothingness he is everything. 6 
 Poets and religious writers admire nature ; naturalists, by 
 exploring the laws and forces that govern things great and 
 small, are nature's panegyrists. The works of Copernicus, 
 Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Linnaeus, Cuvier, Alex, von Hum- 
 boldt would form a bouquet of nature's choicest flowers. 
 The hymn of praise which these men sang to the Creator 
 of the universe added lustre and dignity to their pioneer- 
 ing efforts, and set a consecrated seal on the works of their 
 genius. Let us now enter into their reasons and learn 
 their results. 
 
 Many a poetic utterance has been choked by the scien- 
 tific research into nature's phenomena ; but nowadays the 
 public ear is deaf to all things else. For we have no longer 
 to deal with Ionian philosophers, who denied finality in 
 nature, nor with Descartes and Bacon, who transferred it 
 to a being outside the world. But our wrestling is with 
 men of profound earnestness and immense industry, who 
 strive to explain all finality in nature mechanically. Con- 
 scious purpose and design are to be superseded by an iron 
 law of nature, a mechanical necessity, determined solely 
 by the forces in matter. Thus the universe is set down as 
 a machine whose wheel and axle are ever revolving and 
 working out their end by blind necessity. 
 
 5 Pascal, Fences, //., 22. Lotze, II., 63. Zoeckler, Gaffes Zeugen itn Reiche tier 
 Natur, 1881.
 
 236 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 Here, as in the cosmological argument, we must retrace 
 our steps awhile. The great original nebula, with its 
 matter, force, and motion is supposed to be the substratum 
 from which the world has been evolved. But the question 
 is : Was the world evolved according to a pre-arranged 
 plan ? Or has its present form emerged from the process 
 by the sheerest accident ? Has accident so formed this 
 world alone out of millions of possible worlds, whose 
 chances were equally great ? According to the theory of 
 Kant and Laplace the present universe has come forth 
 mechanically from an original mass of matter having the 
 property of motion. The speed of the rotating mass was 
 accelerated by the radiation and condensation of the heat, 
 and thus the centrifugal was in excess of the centripetal 
 force. By degrees some parts of the mass were detached. 
 The force of gravitation imparted to these a similar motion. 
 The same process was repeated until at last the solar sys- 
 tem with its planets and moons, nay the entire universe 
 with its myriads of stars was formed if, indeed, it be yet 
 formed. Maybe evolution is still going on in the vast 
 heaven. At first the masses were an incandescent gas, 
 and then an incandescent liquid. When the masses grad- 
 ually cooled a crust was formed. Eruptions often burst it 
 open again, but finally it set, and the surface acquired a 
 permanent solidity. Experience seems to bear out this 
 theory. For the earth's surface has been materially 
 changed by the revolutions of the earth. 8 The earthquake 
 that levels mountains, the catastrophes in the Indian and 
 Australian archipelagoes that form new islands and swal- 
 low up old ones, the smouldering volcanoes that are fanned 
 into fresh fiery activity, these are some of the results due 
 to the earth's revolution. Then, again, water has been a 
 mighty force in the configuration of land. In historic 
 times, rivers and seas have been spread over wider areas, 
 and have changed their course ; some lands have been 
 raised above the sea level, and others have been sunk be- 
 
 6 See Controverse, 1886, p. 511.
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 237 
 
 low it ; some islands have been severed from the mainland, 
 others have been joined to it ; in some places the sea has 
 encroached on the land, in others the land has driven back 
 the sea. When the earth was in a liquid state fire and 
 water struggled for the mastery. In this duel between 
 Pluto and Neptune the earth was knocked into its present 
 shape. Everywhere mechanical forces are doing their 
 deadly work. Analogy would lead us to conclude that the 
 other planets, the moon, and the sun itself had undergone 
 a similar process ; and the spectroscope establishes the 
 truth of the analogy. Formerly the sun was thought to 
 be a solid dark nucleus with a luminous atmosphere (Nic. 
 de Cusa). The discovery of sun spots seemed to bear out 
 that view. But it is now believed that the sun is a glow- 
 ing gaseous body, a gas ball only a little heavier than 
 water. The metals revealed by the spectrum must be in 
 a gaseous state. In former times temperature was higher : 
 this fact points to a wider extension of the gaseous mass. 
 At present there is nothing fixed and constant in the sun ; 
 all things are in a state of flux and formation. With the 
 moon it is not so. Here motion has come to a standstill ; 
 there is no water, no atmosphere. Repose and death 
 reign supreme. The moon is like an extinct crater, a ruin 
 of the olden time. The earth with its firm crust and rest- 
 less interior holds a middle place between the two. It has 
 long since lost all light of its own and, like other planets, 
 borrows light from the sun. But the inflamed state of its 
 bowels points back to an earlier period, although the part 
 of the original incandescent mass which they have retained 
 has been gradually cooling. Thus in the sun, earth, and 
 moon we have three links in the chain of solar evolution. 
 The proof, however, is not so easy in the case of the other 
 solar systems. But the evolution hypothesis best explains 
 the different spectral colours of the fixed stars. Modern 
 science is no longer afraid to maintain the unity of ele- 
 ments, atoms and matter as well as of the physical forces 
 of nature. A real distinction used to be drawn between 
 solid and liquid elements and pure gases, but the so-called
 
 238 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 permanent gases (oxygen, hydrogen, &c.) have since been 
 converted into fluids. Moreover, the direction of planetary 
 motion can be deduced far more naturally from the motion 
 of the primitive mass, than from Newton's theory of an 
 initial impetus given to each individual body. To the 
 mathematician Laplace this seemed an all-sufficient reason. 
 But while he confined his attention to our solar system, 
 the natural philosopher Kant extended the theory to the 
 whole universe. If too, as was shown above, all order and 
 harmony are to be buried in final chaos, it would seem 
 that there cannot have been design or purpose in that part 
 of creation which has always called forth the admiration 
 of mankind. There is a story told that the first Napoleon 
 once asked Laplace if he had found God while exploring 
 the heavens, and that Laplace answered : Your majesty, 
 there is no need of that hypothesis. The anecdote, how- 
 ever, is said to be false or at least inaccurate. Shortly 
 before his death Laplace besought the editor to suppress 
 its publication. 1 Still it was believed at the time, and 
 moreover it was found to tally with Laplace's principles. 
 
 But in truth it is not so. The mechanical theory, even 
 in this its stronghold, is insufficient to explain the finality 
 of evolution. The Kantian theory (which in its main out- 
 lines is found in Buffon) is at one with Newton's theory 8 
 in the matter of efficient and final causes. Laplace exam- 
 ined it mathematically and applied it to the solar system. 
 It should not, however, be forgotten that it is only an 
 hypothesis. True, it is highly probable, but for all that 
 it is still wrapped up in the swaddling clothes of an hypoth- 
 esis. 9 Geologists and mathematicians are not wanting who 
 look askance at it. Even those who regard it with an eye 
 of favour do not disguise the fact that it is still handi- 
 capped by serious difficulties. Thus the two main forces 
 could not have produced the direction from West to East. 
 
 7 Contravene, 1885, p. 361, No. i. 
 
 8 See Liebmann, Anal., p. 356, seq. 
 
 9 See Pohle, vol. ii., p. 74. Pfaff., Die Entiaicklung der IVelt auf atomisticke Grund- 
 
 fage, Heidelberg, 1883. Braun, Natur und Offenb., 1884-5, Epping, p. 49.
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 239 
 
 There is no reason why that direction more than any other 
 should have happened to ensue. In the beginning attraction 
 was the only force at work, otherwise the mass would have 
 been scattered into infinite space. Somehow, perhaps by 
 heat, the force of repulsion was paralyzed. Again, if all the 
 atoms were in the same condition, how came there to be 
 centres of condensation ? Yet only condensation could 
 raise the heat to white heat, and prepare the way for the 
 separation of luminous bodies. The formation of rings is 
 exceedingly hard to explain physically by the two forces, 
 whether with Laplace we consider them as the transition 
 stage in the evolution of the several planets, or with Kant 
 we look upon them as nothing extraordinary but as akin 
 to comets an opinion which would be fatal to the theory. 
 Hence scientific men no longer regard the formation of 
 rings as necessarily a transition stage. They are content 
 to take the simple fact that masses were thrown off by the 
 aerostatic propulsion of gas." What caused the masses to 
 be detached ? It is difficult to assign any cause. The 
 centrifugal force could not possibly have gained the upper 
 hand in the rotating mass. On the contrary, the ball must 
 have become more and more concentrated, finally settling 
 down into a large body, spherical in form, firm in consis- 
 tency and flattened at the poles. How could these masses 
 lose their equilibrium, and tear themselves asunder from 
 the grip of that all-powerful major force ? Epping's expla- 
 nation falls short, according to which the tangential motion 
 was increased when the outer strata condensed by radia- 
 tion. Descartes' circular motion rather supposes than ex- 
 plains rotation, which consists in a whirling movement. 
 Thus one of two courses is open to us : either to assume 
 a further impulse, or to retreat behind an explosion of gas. 
 The maintenance of the direction of movement is as easily 
 explained by the law of gravity as by the continuance of 
 rotation. Yet even on this point there is room for dissen- 
 
 10 Braun, p. 519. Forster, Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte ifes Sonnensystems, 
 Stuttgart, 1885. Rethwich, Der Irrtlium der Sch-werkraft Hyfothese, 1884. 
 Isenkrahe, Idealismus oder Realismus? Leipzig, 1883, p. 60, seq.
 
 240 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 sion. According to Kant and Laplace the most distant 
 planets are the oldest ; in the opinion of Faye and Forster 
 they are the most recent. 
 
 The latest news from the moons of Neptune and Uranus 
 is that no persuasion will entice them into the theory. 
 The moons of Mars, one of which revolves round Mars in 
 less time than Mars revolves on its own axis, have also 
 joined the strike. And yet in their case, just as in that of 
 the earth and moon and sun and planets, it is clear that it 
 is but a repetition of one and the same fact that took place 
 at the time of the original separation. Of course the 
 comets have their own paths. Nevertheless they may be 
 of cosmic origin, and some chance may bring them into 
 our solar system. Some of them are known to have periods. 
 There may be no doubt as to their connection with shoot- 
 ing stars, but this only shows that it is not all plain sailing 
 with the mere fact of gravitation. An effort is now being 
 made to prove that the retrograde motion of the satellites 
 of Uranus and Neptune is due to the direction in which 
 the planets around which they revolve move. According 
 to the second and third laws of Kepler, the embryo-nebulae 
 of these planets must from the beginning have been en- 
 dowed with dissimilar motion in proportion to the distance 
 of the parts. In the process of condensation the further 
 and slower portions fell from the centre of the potential 
 nebulae a little to the West, the others to the East. Hence 
 arose the backward rotation of the new star. 11 The other 
 satellites move forwards because there was scarcely any 
 coherence between the particles of gas ; but in Uranus and 
 Neptune the particles were already somewhat united, and 
 followed one another as in our atmosphere. Our planetary 
 system includes two distinct regions : the one stretching 
 from the centre to Saturn, the other from Saturn to Uranus, 
 Neptune and onwards. To these regions correspond two 
 periods of formation. In the first the planets with their 
 satellites move forwards. When these were formed the 
 
 ix Faye, Sur torigine du monde, Paris, 1889. See Controverse, 1885, p. 225, eq. For 
 Laplace's expression, see Introduction it la Theorie des Probability* p. Ixxii.
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 241 
 
 matter was still scattered and in a condition of circular 
 rotation ;* the sun was not yet a fixed central mass. In 
 the second region the planets with their satellites have a 
 retrograde movement. These were formed, says Faye, 
 when the sun was finally constituted. It is easier to under- 
 stand the difference in the time of the revolutions of the 
 planets and their satellites, if we allow with Braun that 
 the planets were thrust off as centres of condensation ; but 
 in this case the explanation of the system as a whole loses 
 its unity. Neptune's furthermost ring would help to ex- 
 plain the retrograde motion of its moon. Laplace built 
 his theory on the supposition that the planets move in the 
 same direction and in approximately the same plane. It 
 is an exaggeration to say that Laplace offered to bet thou- 
 sands of milliards against one that any new planet discov- 
 ered would move forward. He merely wished to show 
 that, according to the laws of probability, the oneness in 
 direction of the planetary motions known to him could 
 not be the work of chance. 12 Now it was precisely the 
 strict unity of movement that formed the groundwork of 
 his system. The law of probabilities tells most distinctly 
 in our favour. The probability of chance imparting a 
 similar position and direction to two-hundred-and-seventy 
 planets is in the proportion of i to io 270 . By leaving the 
 satellites out of the question, the theory has the advantage 
 of not being complicated by exceptions, but then a legiti- 
 mate doubt may be raised as to the validity of the prem- 
 isses. The possibility of some other influence is thereby 
 admitted. 
 
 Granting, however, that the theory is highly probable, 
 and a substantially correct account of the origin of the uni- 
 verse, we still must insist that mechanical causes are inad- 
 equate. It may have been a matter of perfect indifference 
 what direction motion originally took. But the separation 
 of the several masses, the unity in direction and the simi- 
 larity of position that obtain throughout our solar system 
 
 * See Descartes. 
 
 n Exposition du systtme du monde, p. 343. Controverse, 1815, p. 785, No. I. 
 
 P
 
 242 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 cannot be work of chance. Sometimes the rotation is 
 accounted for by several balls of gas instead of one. These 
 are supposed to have rushed one on the other and, as they 
 did not always meet in the centre, to have given an impulse 
 to rotation (Braun). On this supposition, however, the 
 similarity in direction of the whole is still more puzzling, 
 for it would rest on a most improbable assumption, viz., 
 that the several balls of gas had united into one. Had 
 this taken place, on the falling of new balls or nebulae, no 
 cause would exist for the stronger movement of the outside 
 strata and their final separation from the mass. The sim- 
 ilar direction of movement will ever remain a mystery if 
 the slow rotation of the sun (25 days) and the greater rota- 
 tion at the equator can only be explained by the introduc- 
 tion of such nebulae. Gravitation would have brought it 
 to a dead stop. We must therefore conclude that the mass 
 was endowed with rotation, and that the direction and 
 terminus of its motion was pre determined. . 
 
 Mechanical forces and the unchangeable laws of nature 
 are, it is true, the only factors with which we have to deal 
 in Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry and Geography. Could 
 the whole universe have been evolved by these simple nec- 
 essary laws and mechanical forces ? In modern mechanics 
 the term " living force" is used to denote the potential 
 energy and the capacity for work of a moving body, meas- 
 ured by its mass and velocity. The expression, though 
 figurative, is founded on analogy. It shows how several 
 bodies moving at different velocities interact on one an- 
 other according to their mass and distance. Elements and 
 bodies act only in conjunction with other elements and 
 other bodies, and in a manner suited to their different ex- 
 ternal conditions. Interaction alone gives actuality to 
 force. Attraction and repulsion, pressure and counter- 
 pressure, action and re-action are reciprocal. The effect 
 is modified, accelerated or retarded, as the case may be, 
 by circumstances. In every mechanical process the recip- 
 rocal relation between the distance and the intensity of 
 the accelerated forces must be taken into account. And
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 243 
 
 the energy of moving bodies is produced, increased or de- 
 creased accordingly. No mere relative change of place 
 will explain a phenomenon like this, which transcends the 
 simple necessary motion. Under the same circumstances 
 the same phenomenon always recurs, although mechanics 
 can give no reason for the ever-recurring regularity an 
 inability all the more significant as the same regularity 
 prevails throughout the universe in things both great and 
 small. Amid thousands and tens of thousands of possi- 
 bilities one effect would in all likelihood counterbalance 
 the other, if all were under the sway of chance. To ensure 
 permanent and regular action in a definite direction, an 
 arrangement from the first start is indispensable ; the ele- 
 ments must be co-ordinated and mutually dependent on 
 one another in a manner suited to their different natures. 
 It is preposterous to suppose that all the elements would 
 subordinate themselves to an internal connection, unless a 
 higher force had instilled such a disposition in their nature. 
 When any part of a machine is out of order, it is either 
 cast away or withdrawn till repaired ; otherwise the machine 
 is damaged and ultimately breaks down. What is the best 
 appointed machine compared to an universe governed by 
 one inexorable law of motion, which all bodies, great and 
 small, far and near, are bound to obey ? Laplace once 
 observed that with any other arrangement in our planetary 
 system a collision would have been inevitable. In 1847 
 Le Verrier proved the existence of a more distant planet, 
 merely by forming a calculation based on the received laws 
 of astronomy. Shortly afterwards the discovery of Nep- 
 tune brilliantly verified his calculation. Assuredly it is 
 putting too tight a strain on our credulity to ask us to see 
 the work of chance in this wonderful mechanism of the 
 heavens which, by reason of its mathematical exactness, is 
 the model of all mechanics. As the universe is inconceiv- 
 able without an efficient cause, so it is equally unintelligi- 
 ble without a purpose or final cause. In themselves and 
 in their being, the forces of nature are unknown to us. 
 The laws of nature are abstractions of the mind founded
 
 244 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 on the regular march of events. Some like Marriotte's 
 law about the pressure of gases have been swept away by 
 recent discoveries ; others have been greatly modified ; 
 others again have been so diluted with exceptions that their 
 strength is gone. 18 Still, even if these weak points did not 
 exist, laws of nature would be but mental formulae for ex- 
 pressing natural phenomena formulae, too, obtained by 
 an incomplete induction, and not wholly free from a priori 
 statements. They leave the why and the wherefore in a 
 total eclipse. They are hollow words and sounding names, 
 though they be systematized and welded into a logical 
 whole. Their sole raison d'etre is to be means to an end. 
 They serve to work out the ideas that underlie things and 
 govern their development. " If we always required to 
 " know why things are as they are, no astronomical or phys- 
 " ical knowledge would be possible." 14 
 
 Modern Science has confirmed the conjectures of the 
 ancients. The active substances that work together in 
 nature, and the laws that regulate nature's course are so 
 disposed that the most admirable adaptation to purpose is 
 visible in their normal results. The elements (about 68) 
 form, as it were, a periodic system, from a theoretical ex- 
 amination of which Dr. Mendelejeff was led to suppose the 
 existence of other elements hitherto unknown. Already 
 there have been discovered : Gallium in 1875, Scandium 
 in 1879, and Germanium in 1886. Even the law of the 
 conservation of energy that greatest triumph of empiric 
 philosophy can but serve to increase our admiration. 
 Every force in nature's storehouse, even the smallest, must 
 do its share of work in one form or another, whether as 
 mechanical motion, or the motion of heat or light, elec- 
 tricity or magnetism. The matter and force of the uni- 
 verse have been fixed once for all, both as to quantity and 
 quality. How can chance or necessity have caused all the 
 forces of nature to work together for a common end ? An 
 unbroken chain of mechanical causality stretches as far as 
 
 13 See Schneider, Geisterglaubt, p. 337, seq. Liebmann, Anal., p. 248, seq. 
 
 14 Nageli, Akstamm., p. 581.
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 245 
 
 the eye can see ; but we see only the outer connection not 
 the inner reason why all the agents pull together. 
 " Chance" ; .s a synonym for ignorance ; necessity finally 
 leads to purpose ; for that which works from necessity, 
 works according to its nature for some predetermined end. 
 The necessity of causality need not therefore prove a stum- 
 bling-block. Before necessity begins, a force with a pur- 
 pose is already at work, which links the necessities into a 
 chain and sets them in motion. The coupling is correct, 
 and the end is surely attained ; therefore chance is ousted 
 and necessity is proved to be the handmaid of purpose. 
 The events due to mechanical causality, when linked to- 
 gether, give still greater prominence to purpose. For their 
 union postulates a mechanician who so apportioned the 
 forces of matter as to produce an harmonious world. How 
 the Ideological and mechanical principles are to be com- 
 bined is merely a matter for explanation. That such a 
 principle, however, underlies all motion and machinery no 
 one will deny but those who have stared so long at the 
 mere outer effects that they are blind to the working of 
 the machinery as a whole. The workman who toils from 
 year's end to year's end at the same part of a machine 
 loses sight of the bearing of the parts on the whole, and 
 at last comes to see himself as part of a machine in nature's 
 workshop. So it is with the discoverer who is ever gazing 
 too steadfastly on the external side of natural phenomena. 
 He holds the several parts in the hollow of his hand, but 
 is too short-sighted to perceive their unity as a whole. As 
 the watch presupposes a watchmaker, so this wonderful 
 world presupposes a maker. Even Voltaire could not gain- 
 say the justice of this trite comparison. The great Creator 
 showed His wisdom by making the several forces work for 
 the common end according to fixed laws. When once set 
 going, there was no need for God to be always at hand to 
 steer them. Thus the Creator's wisdom shines forth more 
 resplendently in the theory of Kant and Laplace than in 
 other theories which require the constant interference of 
 the Creator in each separate planet and at each stage of
 
 246 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 development. This truth, Braun thinks, should be pro- 
 claimed from the house-tops to those men of overflowing 
 faith who are always imagining some new interference. 1 * 
 
 A stream of purpose runs through the action of the bene- 
 ficial forces of nature even in the smallest details. What 
 a power is heat in nature's household ! The motion of 
 air and water, the state of rivers and lakes at different sea- 
 sons is regulated by heat. A second striking exception 
 has recently been discovered to water attaining its great- 
 est density at 215 (4^) ; but we do not marvel the less at 
 the admirable manner in which rivers and lakes are thus 
 prevented from being completely frozen. Nor is this 
 peculiarity of ice-formation less wonderful in its effects on 
 soil and on arable land. By its action even unhewn rocks 
 are gradually made accessible to cultivation, and the clods 
 of earth open out to its benignant action. Not only for 
 cultivation, but also for man's clothing and nourishment 
 heat is all-important. Water, too, is likewise indispensa- 
 ble for plants, animals and man. It regulates temperature, 
 returning from the sea as vapour where it had fallen as 
 rain. And this vapour is restored to the earth through the 
 agency of plants. For the coolness in the atmosphere req- 
 uisite for the formation of clouds is produced by the evapo- 
 ration that is going on in the forests. Thus a connection 
 is established between water and the atmosphere. Of the 
 service rendered by the air to organic life we spoke above 
 when treating of adaptation in general. Does adaptation 
 account for the composition of the atmosphere ? Just as 
 much and just as little as it accounts for the air-passages 
 on the lower side of leaves, and for the different breathing 
 organs in animals, ranging from the tubes (trachece) of in- 
 sects to the lungs of man. To deny purpose here is to 
 abandon all hope of fathoming the reason of things. 
 
 But the rightful home of purpose is organic nature. 
 The very word organism, now so current in speech, is itself 
 suggestive of purpose. For it signifies a structure whose 
 
 15 See Natur und Offenbarung, 1885, p. 172. On Mendelejeff, ibid. 1883, 1887, p. 55.
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 247 
 
 parts or " organs" work together in harmony to fulfil the 
 purpose for which the organism exists. The delicate 
 structure of the plants both gives the needful consistency 
 and permits the sap to circulate freely. The flexible 
 skeleton of the animal is supple or firm according to its 
 habits. It supports fibres and muscles, sustains and sets 
 the whole body in motion, and, in spite of apparent dis- 
 advantages, admirably satisfies the varied needs of living 
 beings. All the parts work together for the common good. 
 The greater the insight we gain into the exact sciences, 
 the clearer the truth grows that we must look to the ani- 
 mal organism for the most perfect application of the laws 
 of mechanics. The principle of the lever is seen in the 
 animal body only, and that in an act of the animal pecul- 
 iarly and distinctively its own, namely, external and in- 
 ternal motion. The animal's motive organs are perfect in 
 structure and unsurpassed as a model for machinery. In 
 the symmetrical build of the skeleton, Cuvier discerned 
 the model of architecture. Now it is known that plants 
 and animals are constructed on mathematical laws. The 
 arrangement of the boughs and leaves on the tree follows 
 the law of the "golden mean." The same law is the 
 formal principle which regulates the limbs in man and 
 animals. The formation of the organism unconsciously 
 determined the formation of the artefacta, and these in 
 turn have thrown a light on the formation of the organ- 
 ism. 16 The same idea, with gradual modifications, per- 
 vades all structures. Few elements comparatively have a 
 share in the formation of plants and animals. The founda- 
 tion is piled on four elements : oxygen, hydrogen, carbon 
 and nitrogen. As all words and sentences are made up 
 from the twenty-six letters of the alphabet, so in the or- 
 ganic kingdom the combinations of the elements are count- 
 less. And, it may be added, as no chance could ever suc- 
 ceed in producing from the 26 letters an 7/zWoran Odyssey, 
 
 16 Reising, Neue Lekre von den Proportionen des menschlichen Korpers^ Leipzig, 
 1854. Der goldene Schnitt^ Leipzig, 1884. Pfeiffer, Der goldene Schnitt, 1885. 
 See Pohle, II., p. 195. Natur und Ojfenb., 1885, p. 628.
 
 248 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 so neither could chance shake these elements into an or- 
 ganic being. 
 
 A close examination of organic life will show that neces- 
 sity in nature is always subservient to purpose. Inorganic 
 nature has to supply the plants with food ; the cell-wall, 
 roots and leaves have the power to seize and retain the 
 food. The plant that grows on gravel requires different 
 food to the plant that grows on chalk. The soil, however 
 drenched with rain, has the property of retaining the req- 
 uisite materials ; the roots suck up the materials in solu- 
 tion that are most adapted to the nature of the plant. The 
 animal, in like manner, provides itself with congenial 
 food. The food having been ground down and kneaded 
 by appliances with which the animal is furnished, when 
 moistened with saliva is carried down the oesophagus into 
 the stomach. The mucous membrane of the stomach 
 secretes the juice (pepsine) which converts the food into 
 chyle, while the food is thoroughly mixed and churned by 
 the peristaltic movement of the stomach. The nutritious 
 matter passes through the stomach and, with the aid of 
 the gall and the juice of the pancreatic gland, is formed 
 into chyme. Then it is sucked up by innumerable pipes 
 and vessels and conveyed to the blood. Only the indi- 
 gestible remnant passes through the abdomen. Thus a 
 complete set of complicated apparatuses is working har- 
 moniously for the purpose of nutrition. Similar provision 
 is also made for the processes of respiration and reproduc- 
 tion. In contemplating the several organs and functions 
 one by one, we see the general laws of chemistry and 
 physics in action ; but they are so admirably connected, 
 and follow one another in such perfect order that they 
 must be held together by a mysterious bond of union. An 
 invisible hand seems to lead them along their path and 
 marshal them in order. This is the case with every indi- 
 vidual of the animal kingdom after its kind. And, in an 
 analogous way, it is true of the vegetable kingdom also. Is 
 this a mere machine ? In truth a wonderful machine, that 
 works true of itself, is self-supporting and self-winding !
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 249 
 
 that can provide a change of mutter to repair and strengthen 
 its levers and joints ! Every one is familiar with the old 
 comparison of the lighted taper. The flame of life is kept 
 burning by the fuel that mouth and stomach supply. In 
 a burning taper oxygen and heat convert carbon into car- 
 bonic acid. There is nothing in this operation that is not 
 constantly going on in our lungs, with simpler means. 
 But this does not explain even the arrangement of the 
 breathing apparatus, to say nothing of the greater and 
 lesser circulation of the blood. The chemical process ex- 
 ists indeed, but in a system of living forces where it serves 
 as a means to an end. So, again, the inertia and the com- 
 pound forces of bodies work mighty results in the inor- 
 ganic world ; but they are immeasurably inferior to the 
 simple functions of life which enclose in their bosom the 
 principle of motion and the end of their action. 
 
 This peculiarity is chiefly conspicuous in those actions 
 which are connected with spontaneous movement. Cer- 
 tain plants seem destined to be the food of certain insects. 
 The insect flies to them, although it may have never seen 
 them before. The water-animal at once rushes to the 
 water ; the land-animal roves on land. Herbivorous ani- 
 mals go in search of grass and vegetable food ; the carniv- 
 orous lie in ambush or go on the chase. How wonderful 
 in many cases are their expedients for obtaining their food ! 
 the artful cauldron, for example, in which the ant-eater 
 catches its prey, or the web which the spider spins to 
 catch the buzzing fly. Pleasure and need go hand in 
 hand. It may be that the spider is but following an im- 
 pulse when it draws the threads from its glands and twists 
 them into the finest web. Is it not, however, wonderful 
 that, when gratifying its sense of pleasure, it at the same 
 time displays great artistic skill and spins organic con- 
 trivances fo^catching its prey ? The mere feeling of pleas- 
 ure might be satisfied by the mere spinning of the threads 
 without art and without contrivance. But the artistic web, 
 which is different in different kinds of spiders, can be 
 understood only in the light of a specially prearranged
 
 250 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 disposition and purpose. That the spider is prepared for 
 the purpose is shown by the fact that it lurks in the back- 
 ground ready to spring forth like a robber, as soon as a 
 passing fly is carelessly entangled in its meshes. A bite or 
 two deprives the prisoner of all power of resisting, and the 
 prey is then safely stowed away. The actual purpose is 
 undeniable. Are we not justified in concluding that there 
 is also an ideal purpose ? And yet this is but one out of 
 countless facts in the insect world that shadow forth a 
 purpose. This is the key to unlock the mysteries of insect 
 life. No mechanism or adaptation will account for instinc- 
 tive actions. A sublime purpose shines through them all. 
 
 The life of the individual is designed to preserve the 
 species ; the species answers the same purpose towards the 
 family, the class, and the entire kingdom. Through all 
 the processes of animal and vegetable life there runs a 
 law which guides them towards the highest degree of per- 
 fection allotted to the species. In inorganic nature acci- 
 dental causes are everywhere set up for the rise or fall of 
 individuals. The stone remains unchanged till acted upon 
 by external causes. Water scoops it out or rolls it away ; 
 acids dissolve it. The triple alliance of atmosphere, heat 
 and cold loosens its parts. In like manner chemical and 
 mechanical forces are changing the face of the earth. In 
 crystallization some kind of inward activity is perceptible. 
 In the different sorts of crystals the elements have to be 
 specially arranged. But, after all, the result is mechani- 
 cal. Everything depends on juxtaposition, although the 
 kind of crystallization may be at times determined by the 
 intensity of the heat in the molecules (Dimorphism and 
 Trimorphism). Another and a deeper reason lies in the 
 condition and attractive force of the atoms and molecules. 
 Purpose cannot be easily banished altogether from inor- 
 ganized nature, as any one will allow who reflects on the 
 different forms of carbon, coal, graphite, and the diamond. 
 
 Organic beings, too, are at every moment exposed to 
 the impressions and influences of their environment. But 
 they have the power of resistance and defence in them-
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 251 
 
 selves. The changes in their condition are wrought by the 
 vital force within them. They grow, develop and perish, 
 but they have not existed in vain. The plant germinates 
 and grows, blossoms and bears fruit in due season in order 
 to impart its life to others. From an invisible embryo the 
 animal passes through a series of stages of growths. The 
 higher it gets the more slowly it propagates its like. Then 
 when this end of its existence is fulfilled, it vanishes from 
 the scene sooner or later, and sometimes at once like many 
 insects. Birth and death, generatio and corruptio, are ever 
 the goals of organic life ; they are founded not on adapta- 
 tion, but on an unalterable immanent law." Then again 
 every species follows its own law of development. The 
 organization of every creature struggles on bravely and 
 persistently till it has climbed to the summit of the species. 
 This persistent struggle reveals a plan stretching far and 
 wide beyond the present actual limits of nature. On every 
 step of the journey from germ to blossom and fruit, new 
 possibilities arise, which are none the less wonderful be- 
 cause we know the intermediate stages. For the species 
 and manner of the growth, and the certain law that gov- 
 erns it, cannot be explained by the slow process of develop- 
 ment. No chemical or physical force can give the organ- 
 ism an opposite tendency. All changes affect the parts, 
 not the form of the whole, which endures after the life of 
 the individual. The germ forces the elements taken from 
 its surroundings to enter into certain combinations with 
 one another so as to produce a structure similar to itself. 
 This law, to mechanics a stumbling-block, is in force 
 throughout the organic world. No reason whatever can 
 be given why living matter should assume different ele- 
 mentary forms : why it should shape itself at onetime into 
 leaves and twigs, blossoms, fruit and thorns, and at another 
 into muscle, nerve and bone, hair and nail. Nor do we 
 know why these should blend with other groups of cells 
 into an harmonious unit. On any other theory it is aston- 
 
 17 Weisman, Ueber Leben und Tod, Jena, 1884.
 
 252 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 ishing, nay incomprehensible, how a species has never ap- 
 peared twice, even in the most distant times and climes. 
 In the development of every species there is a beginning, 
 a zenith, and a nadir. The biogenetical law, so much in- 
 sisted upon in the doctrine of descent, merely shows that 
 one and the same plan underlies the evolution of species 
 and individuals. In this very fact, so thoroughly in keep- 
 ing with the general character of the Cosmos, we admire 
 the Creator's wisdom in forming individuals and species 
 according to the same idea, and in combining unity and 
 variety for the same end. By forming species into families 
 and tribes, orders and classes, we may pursue this train of 
 thought through the entire organic world. The " natural 
 system" that is to embrace both the animal and vegetable 
 kingdoms has not yet been invented. But it is universally 
 felt that artificial systems are only a makeshift till a nat- 
 ural system is found. Nevertheless we can see a grand 
 common plan peeping through the chinks of even artificial 
 systems. Thus the Linnaean system of Botany is a spacious 
 mirror reflecting the guiding hand of purpose in nature's 
 tendencies. The succession of nineteen great classes from 
 monandrists to syngenists, is admirable in spite of the 
 many variations. There is, too, a parallelism running 
 through the orders. How could there be any system at 
 all, most of all a natural system, if there is neither plan 
 nor purpose in the organic creation ? 
 
 Propagation being the end, and preservation of the 
 species the chief task of the individual, it is not surprising 
 that nature has made abundant provision thereto. On 
 the fertilization of plants we have already spoken. The 
 seeds also are well cared for. Hairs, lashes, cilia and 
 crowns of flimmer facilitate their diffusion by the wind. 
 Some are so strongly guarded that they retain their ger- 
 minating power after passing through sea-water and the 
 stomach of a bird. Capsules and husks are furnished with 
 elastic bands which open the pods and scatter the seeds 
 when they have come to maturity. Equally wonderful 
 are the contrivances in the animal kingdom. Here the
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 253 
 
 insect drives its sting into an apple, pear or cherry blos- 
 som ; there a wasp lays its eggs on a caterpillar, or on the 
 branch of the oak or hawthorn. Just when the caterpillar 
 is expected to emerge in a chrysalis, a whole army of living 
 worms is at hand to spin small cocoons. And yet no one 
 will describe these creatures as highly intelligent ! Their 
 own nourishment is quite different from that which they 
 give the offspring they are never to see ! What does the 
 insect know of the purpose of the egg, or of the needs of 
 the larva ? Following its instinct, it does its work and 
 then dies. Many a caterpillar crawls from the tree to the 
 ground or to a wall to end there its chrysalis life. The 
 chrysalis waits patiently till it can cast off its integument. 
 Then it passes a brief but happy existence as abutte'riy 
 and lays its eggs on a leaf. We do not now ask whf.nce 
 the living creature derived the power to do these things. 
 But we are bound to ask, how comes it that the creature 
 invariably takes the right turn on an unknown road ? How 
 comes it that it always attains its end so surely unless 
 some external obstacle besets its path ? Are not necessity 
 and purpose here joined in the closest bands of wedlock ? 
 Does not this conformity to purpose under the pressure of 
 necessity far surpass the greatest efforts of human genius ? 
 We must not, however, be so narrow-minded as to im- 
 agine every minutest detail alive with purpose. We must 
 also beware of confusing purpose with utility. It is not 
 easy with Galen to see a special purpose in every muscle, 
 nerve and ganglion. The precise function of some organs 
 (e.g. the spleen) has not even yet been determined with 
 certainty. Many mammals (horses, stags, elephants, cam- 
 els) have no gall, and yet their digestion, as far as we 
 know, takes no hurt. Monists allege rudimentary organs 
 in proof that nature is often purposeless. But nature is 
 not a niggardly hostess. Rather she is prodigal with blos- 
 soms, pollen and germs. The majority of new organisms 
 perish. Do these facts prove that there is no purpose in 
 nature ? Yes, if purpose is to be tried before the court of 
 niggardly parsimony and inexorable utility. But nature
 
 254 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 spurns them from her threshold. The man that has no 
 ideal or aesthetic motives in himself, nor is moved by the 
 concord of art and symbolism will never be fit to under- 
 stand nature's manifold diversity. But he who sets a value 
 on these ideal motives will see beauty in the flowers that 
 stand out from the green meadow ; he will admire the con- 
 trast between the blue-eyed grass, the red poppy and the 
 waving corn ; he will be struck by the harmony that sub- 
 sists between the birds of the air and the trees of the forest. 
 Such a man will not measure purpose by a two-foot rule 
 of utility, but will be glad at heart to feast his eyes on 
 nature's beauty. Often, however, nature's so-called prodi- 
 gality is only apparent. How many insects, failing to find 
 food in the overstocked world of flowers, try in their little 
 way to establish the equilibrium in nature's household ! 
 All refuse becomes fresh food for the plant. Individuals 
 and organisms have a wider scope in a ideological than in 
 a mechanical conception of nature. As all the organs, 
 though relatively independent, work together for a common 
 end, so an indwelling purpose must be in the organism as 
 a whole. The whole, as Aristotle truly said, comes before 
 the parts. The several parts of plant or animal are thor- 
 oughly in accord with the entire disposition and function 
 of the organism. The whole determines the parts, not 
 the parts the whole. Design not chance differentiates the 
 egg-cell. Elementary parts grow because the whole is one. 
 If the determining force mean no more than the resultant 
 of the individual elements of the living unit, then the living 
 unit or the individualizing principle would even so be the 
 formal principle. Call it by whatever name we will, " in- 
 stinct of preservation," " iron necessity," " governing prin- 
 ciple," " idea," " perfecting principle," " constitutional 
 cause," or aught else, unless these are empty names for an 
 inexplicable thing, they will necessarily both imply and 
 lead to purpose and design. In the order of execution the 
 efficient cause is first and the final cause last, but in the 
 order of intention, these are reversed. The determining 
 stage comes last ; all others are but necessary stages of
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 255 
 
 transition. Those Darwinians who admit an internal final- 
 ity suppose a plastic tendency, a nisus formativus, in organic 
 beings. To this no exception need be taken, provided it, 
 too, be not explained by mere mechanism. Nageli's idio- 
 plasmic dispositions may be made very serviceable. It is 
 said that they are an ontogenetical repetition of phylo- 
 genesis and that they produce, in the same order, the same 
 formation of leaves up to the pistil. They, however, lose 
 all real value if idioplasm means merely the result of inher- 
 itance begun with spontaneous generation and continued 
 through all the periods. If, apart from accidental and ex- 
 ternal influences, the change of idioplasm in all individuals, 
 is a necessary change ; if the tendency, growth and division 
 of the plasma-cells is free from outer influences and effected 
 by inner causes ; if, moreover, higher species manifest new 
 phenomena, besides repeating the phenomena of lower 
 species ; then we have a progressive series, with an object 
 worked out from the beginning. To this we give the name 
 of teleological development. The name matters little. 
 Von Baer's proposal to substitute the word finality (Ziel- 
 strebigkeit tendency towards an end) for " design" or 
 " purpose" seems to be generally approved. The change 
 has for its object to divest the term of all anthropomorphic 
 meaning, and to safeguard the rights of mechanical neces- 
 sity. As time goes on it will probably be shown that na- 
 ture's laws are far simpler than has been supposed. Per- 
 haps, too, natural science will succeed in explaining mechan- 
 ically much in the organic world that a more " sentimental" 
 theory has hitherto deduced from a teleological principle. 
 Beyond this it cannot go. Men are so dazzled by the mag- 
 nificent results of empirical science that they propose to 
 surrender unconditionally to Monism. But this is surely, 
 to say the least, premature since the depths of organic life 
 are admitted to be at present inscrutable. Aristotle com- 
 mended Anaxagoras for being the first philosopher to assert 
 that " an intelligence is the cause of order and beauty in 
 living beings, as in all nature." In these words he laid 
 down a principle against which there cannot be an intelli-
 
 256 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 gent reaction. Still, of course, the same fate may often 
 befall men nowadays that overtook Anaxagoras of old. 
 He admitted, indeed, an ordering intelligence, but all his 
 particular explanations were purely physical. For this 
 inconsistency Aristotle takes him to task. In these days, 
 however, there is more justification for such a course, be- 
 cause the physical explanation rests on a solid basis, and is 
 the necessary groundwork of Teleology. Mechanics shows 
 the means that nature uses to attain her ends. The end 
 lies outside the province of mechanics ; it is not, however, 
 supernatural, but founded on the nature of things. A cor- 
 rect physical explanation, therefore, will mirror forth 
 events, without resolving them into a game of chance 
 played by the brute and unruly forces of nature. Even 
 Darwin could never get rid of an intelligent principle gov- 
 erning nature. Chance gives no intelligent reason either 
 for beginning or development, since it is not a causa / nor 
 could it possibly create the actual objective order that is 
 admitted to exist. Anomalies present no difficulty : for 
 the abnormal merely bears witness to the normal. Like 
 monstrosities, they prove that external hindrances may 
 push the intended development of individuals off the lines ; 
 but they have no effect on the whole species. They perish 
 as they sprang up. Countless combinations of existing 
 elements were possible. From such a chaos only an intel- 
 ligent being could have made the best selection ; none but 
 an intelligent being could have brought the conditions of 
 development into the dependency necessary to lead up to 
 the end. In his mind the struggle for life would be a plan 
 for assuring the survival of the perfect in preference to the 
 imperfect ; it would be a means designed to throw light 
 on each step in the ascending scale. 18 Hence this conse- 
 quence of the Darwinian theory is now obtaining wide 
 acceptance even among those who reject the theory itself. 
 As far as we are concerned it is a matter of indifference 
 whether immanent causes that work for a purpose are 
 
 18 Herding, p. 69 ; Dressell, p. 101.
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 257 
 
 called ideas, or rationes seminales (St. Augustine and the 
 Platonists), or forma substantiates (Aristotle and the School- 
 men). We need only insist that idea and reality, matter 
 and form are not opposed to one another, but are the con- 
 stituent principles of things. Throughout the length and 
 breadth of nature there is an intimate connection between 
 mechanical causes and design, which forces us, not to im- 
 port finality from without, but to regard it as inherent in 
 the nature of material things. Things have an appetitus 
 naturalis for their own perfection. 
 
 This inherent finality, far from ousting the Creator who 
 fixes the purpose, calls the more imperatively for his pres- 
 ence. In whatever light we view the question, order with 
 purpose points to an ordering spirit ; wonderful regularity 
 proceeds from an intelligent lawgiver ; organisms built up 
 with artistic skill are the work of a great artist ; the aes- 
 thetic beauty of form in the whole creation and in all its 
 parts is the product of a master-mind. 19 Such is the con- 
 clusion drawn by reason and intelligence as well as by 
 sentiment. The ideas faintly pencilled in things below 
 foreshadow eternal unity, beauty and goodness ; the har- 
 monious unity, beauty, order and goodness in created 
 things show forth the Creator of the one first principle of 
 beauty and goodness. All things exist in form, measure 
 and number. Out of these comes forth beauty. Unity, 
 proportion and order are resplendent in all the elements ; 
 without them the elements would sink into nothingness. 
 He is the source of this order who made all things in num- 
 ber, order and measure. Created things are a mirror that 
 reflects God's wisdom, beauty and goodness, because in 
 their form, order and measure they emanate from those 
 divine attributes. s 
 
 It was a striking thought of the nature-loving Fathers 
 to describe man as the goal of creation. Without man 
 there would be no eye to feast on the wisdom of God re- 
 vealed in the beauty of nature. What would the lovely 
 
 tg See Pohle, Katholik, 1883, p. 337, seq. 
 20 Augustine, SeeStorz, p. 175, seq.
 
 258 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 landscape avail without the eye of man ? Of what use is 
 the softest, silver-sweet music but to charm the ear of 
 man ? In man the purpose of nature attains its zenith. 
 He can reflect on the thoughts of creative reason, and see 
 and feel God's majesty and beauty. Every man, who 
 normally develops, attains self-consciousness and a moral 
 character. When man acts rationally, as a man, experi- 
 ence and logic tell us that he thinks and acts according to 
 certain laws. And when he acts otherwise, he is gibbeted 
 for acting irrationally, and he is himself conscious that he 
 is so doing, whether he admit it or no. To reflect and cal- 
 culate is to determine the end and to apportion the means. 
 Even knowledge, in the last instance, is under the reign of 
 law. The will may assert its suzerainty by fixing atten- 
 tion on certain objects, and by giving a direction to 
 thought ; but the regular course of thought it cannot 
 alter. The laws of cognition can only be the offspring of 
 the fundamental and eternal laws of intelligence. These, 
 though unattainable by experience, set a rule and an aim 
 to our thoughts. It would be difficult to affirm or to deny 
 that the intellectual thought of the human race, as a whole, 
 is tending towards a definite end. We might be tempted 
 to deny it when we consider that all our spiritual knowl- 
 edge reposes on Greek philosophy, and that Plato and 
 Aristotle are still accounted our instructors in all knowl- 
 edge. Theology, though dependent on revelation, is still 
 a progressive science, especially when it allies itself to pro- 
 fane knowledge, and strives to harmonize faith with reason. 
 But even here the present is upborne on the shoulders of 
 the past ; nay, more, in principle it has not advanced a 
 single pace. As Plato and Aristotle are the goliaths of 
 heathen wisdom, so SS. Augustine and Thomas are the 
 unsurpassed coryphei of Christian philosophy. Neverthe- 
 less, the Christian philosopher will not despise or be indif- 
 ferent to the teaching of modern science. The immense 
 progress made by the " exact" sciences has laid a deeper 
 and surer foundation for intellectual science, and has also 
 given a better insight into the works of nature and the
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 259 
 
 human mind. Man's knowledge will always be a piece of 
 patchwork. Still, in spite of its numerous shortcomings, 
 it is ever drawing nearer to its final purpose and end. 
 
 In the moral life, which is of special moment, two facts 
 stand face to face : liberty and moral obligation. Man 
 may be overpowered by brute force and chained down by 
 circumstances ; but his freedom peers through compulsion 
 and moral force. He may be swayed by desires and mo- 
 tives, by passions and habits ; he may act against his better 
 knowledge and aspirations ; but he is conscious that he 
 can, or at least that he should, act otherwise. This very 
 consciousness of weakness is a powerful incentive to prose- 
 cute that higher aim which is at the root of his moral life. 
 He hears the categorical " Thou shalt" resounding within 
 him, and he feels that the command is pregnant with 
 authority. He knows that a higher aim has been proposed 
 to man and, if he fall short of his aim, that more, to say 
 the least, is to be exacted from man than from other 
 beings. Of this higher destiny even evil is a proof. For 
 the individual is conscious that all is not right, and is thus 
 distinctly reminded that he has a moral duty to discharge. 
 If the ego feels both free and subject to an inner law, there 
 must be a superior will to whom it owes allegiance. So 
 surely as this inner experience of conscience exists, it re- 
 quires the higher world, to which man is destined, to be 
 real. To the consciousness of moral obligation burnt in 
 the human soul it is chiefly due that men are not actuated 
 by savage selfishness, and that every man's hand is not 
 raised against his neighbour. Not only is finality ingrained 
 in the very nature and essence of man, but it is also the 
 essential groundwork of morality. A powerful moral law- 
 giver, higher than man, is a necessary postulate of moral- 
 ity ; in his will the end of creation is identified with the 
 end of man. 21 The various moral convictions that actually 
 exist, though the result of training and of outer and inner 
 influences, have their roots fixed in the nature of the soul, 
 
 21 Kant, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der natiirl. Vernunft, Opp. Ed., von 
 Hartenstein VI. p. 98 seq.
 
 260 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 to which a moral ideal is law. Ideals may vary with indi- 
 viduals. But the fact that moral ideals always come to 
 the front and clamour for realization, points clearly to a 
 supreme ideal of perfection that man cannot reach. The 
 words of our Lord : " Be you also perfect as your heavenly 
 Father is perfect" are characteristic of human nature at 
 its best, and indicate the goal for which every man is to 
 strive. The moral sense is a truer test of the nature of 
 the spirit, and marks out the end of man more exactly 
 than intellectual knowledge. In the life of man, moral 
 feeling is a tower of strength. The countless heroes and 
 martyrs of Christianity, the religious who practise self- 
 denial and forsake the world, the angelic in innocence and 
 sincere in piety, Christians loving their neighbour de- 
 votedly, and sacrificing themselves for the love of God, 
 all give testimony to the truth deeply engraven in the 
 human heart that man was made for a better and a nobler 
 end. Individuals constitute society as the parts go to 
 make up the whole. No society can exist without law and 
 order. But pains and penalties would be powerless to en- 
 force an irksome law, were not the better members of soci- 
 ety prompted by a sense of duty, and penetrated with a 
 firm faith that to fulfil the moral law is to do God's will. 
 Then punishments have, in the first place, a vindictive 
 character, and are intended for the protection of society. 
 Justice demands that wrongs should be redressed ; the 
 public conscience demands the reform of abuses. But 
 the redress and the reformation are rooted in the universal 
 persuasion that the well-being of individuals and of society 
 rests on a higher order of right, and on doing the behests 
 of a holy will. How far the end is actually attained can- 
 not be gathered from statistics. Much is withheld from 
 the public eye ; evil usually thrusts itself forward, while 
 good is screened from sight. But since man is free to 
 choose right or wrong, wrongful actions cannot obliterate 
 moral aim and purpose. 
 
 Evil is an engine with which men have thought to grind 
 the wisdom and goodness of the Creator to powder ; a
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 261 
 
 battery with which they have tried to sweep the purpose 
 in creation out of existence. Misery and want are every- 
 where rampant both in the physical and moral spheres. 
 This thought is eloquently expressed in many passages of 
 Holy Scripture. Man, born of woman, lives for a short 
 time and dies. Here, in a nutshell, is the history of every 
 man's life. Frightful misery and suffering are the lot of 
 many. Man, at his entrance into life, is more helpless 
 than any other living being. His life, from the cradle to 
 the grave, is beset with countless dangers. Ills of every 
 sort lie in ambush for him. He is torn to pieces by savage 
 beasts, and poisoned by noxious herbs. The elements 
 vent their fury on him. He is tortured and put to death 
 by his own flesh and blood. For man is man's bitterest 
 foe. Homo homini lupus. Disease undermines his frame, 
 and gradually plucks out life by the roots. And when 
 death's forerunner has done his deadly work, death itself 
 often seems a release. For the majority of mankind pov- 
 erty and hunger are inseparable companions through life. 
 They rise in the morning anxious where to find their daily 
 bread. Through the heats of summer and the biting 
 frosts of winter heavy toil and hard labour are their lot. 
 In all ages, individuals, families and nations, yea the whole 
 human race have been overwhelmed with an amount of 
 physical evil and suffering that no one can contemplate 
 without a shudder. But the moral wretchedness is often 
 greater and always more disastrous. In his degradation 
 man sinks far below the brute, and in this is clearly dis- 
 tinguished from the brute. The horrors of war and per- 
 secution, the outbreaks of hatred and enmity, the cruelty 
 of tyrants and savages, human sacrifices and cannibalism, 
 sins against nature, and all kinds of impurity reveal such 
 a slough of vileness in the human heart that we can only 
 exclaim with the poet : 
 
 The horror of horrors 
 Is man in his madness. 
 
 What now remains of purpose ? Is there a remnant of 
 rags and tatters ?
 
 262 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 Had all these evils been ordained from the beginning, 
 the question would be difficult to answer. But a tradition 
 still lives among the most varied races that from the begin- 
 ning it was not so, neither shall be for ever. The belief 
 in a past golden age has never wholly died out. Individ- 
 uals are often overtaken by physical and moral misery 
 through their own fault. The two often go hand in hand. 
 The different sorts of immoderate enjoyment usually sow 
 the seeds of physical and spiritual decay. Certain wide- 
 spread vices infect whole peoples and plunge whole gen- 
 erations into misery. Man is a social being, and he must 
 take the losses as well as the gains of his position. The 
 chief source of human misery is the abuse of free-will. 
 Man deviates from his prescribed end which, if pursued, 
 would conduce to the health of soul and body. Not all 
 sickness, however, arises from personal sin. The inno- 
 cent, it must be confessed, often suffer more than the 
 guilty. But we know too, that the trials and sufferings of 
 this life are sent to many for their greater good. Still 
 this, though true of many, is not true of all. Besides 
 there is a primary end underlying this secondary end of 
 evil. Man's understanding cannot sift to the bottom the 
 reason for the fate that thus weighs heavily on the human 
 race. Such universal misery, however, as the general con- 
 science of humanity testifies, must have been created by 
 universal guiltiness. For a full and proper solution of the 
 mystery of evil we must go to Revelation, which shows 
 how little sin and its consequences militate against the 
 wisdom and goodness of the Creator. In the beginning 
 God ordained it otherwise, but the free will of man broke 
 through the ordinances of God. Thus even man's physi- 
 cal nature assumed an unnatural aspect, and had to take 
 its share of the consequences of sin. Had not spiritual 
 death intervened, man's physical life would have been 
 more cheerful. Still, sin and death notwithstanding, man 
 has not been wholly forgotten and forsaken by his Creator. 
 From the beginning God lit up the darkness and the 
 shadows of death with the bright hope of redemption.
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 263 
 
 He could not bestow on man the noble gift of freedom, 
 without permitting its abuse. But He reveals His infinite 
 wisdom precisely by twisting evil into His own designs, 
 and by making it serve as a corrective in preparing man 
 for redemption. Pessimism, as will be shewn in the fol- 
 lowing section, would be the true philosophy only on the 
 supposition that this life were the end of all things. 
 
 The foregoing principles explain, in part at least, the 
 physical evil that oppresses the world. To set down the 
 present course of nature in its entirety as the product of 
 sinful corruption would, doubtless, be a mistake ; but 
 there is no shirking the conclusion that the influence 
 wielded by sinful man over nature is great. How much 
 truth there is in the poet's words : Nature is beautiful in 
 every spot untrodden by man. Forests are recklessly 
 felled, and a change comes over the climate and fertility 
 of the country. Streams and lakes are dried up, or canals 
 and watercourses are cut ; thus commerce spreads, and the 
 configuration of the land is altered. Man's handiwork has 
 changed the face of the earth in its fauna and flora.* Sav- 
 age and civilized peoples act on nature in different ways. 
 If man had retained his original dominion and lordship 
 over nature, the case would have been different. If man, 
 in his present state, can change so much for better or for 
 worse, how much greater must have been his power ac- 
 cording to his first destiny ! Aristotle saw clearly that the 
 " higher order of nature" had been disturbed. 22 The 
 Fathers were often too realistic in their ideas about the 
 " course of nature." By viewing purpose from the van- 
 tage-ground of utility, they imagined that wild beasts and 
 poisonous plants were specially created after the Fall. 
 
 * " Let a new land be discovered with a peculiar fauna and flora full of scientific 
 interest, and straightway the European purposely introduces his thistles, his sparrows, 
 his rabbits, or his goats, and the harmonious balance which has resulted from the 
 organic interplay of ages is at once destroyed. Downright evil is often the result. 
 Forests are recklessly felled, and arid, rainless wastes, or dismal, fever-laden swamps 
 ensue. How has not the South of Europe been devastated by the axe ! When the 
 woods are left, their birds are killed, and destructive insect swarms are the con- 
 sequence." Nature and Thought by St. George Mivart, London, 1885, p. 5-6. 
 32 See Knauer, Psychologies p. 59.
 
 264 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 Nevertheless it is certain that no one can understand the 
 universe and man who ignores the fact of sin, and leaves 
 original sin out of his calculations. But let us waive that 
 point, and grant unconditionally that the curse pronounced 
 on nature does not affect the original state of nature dis- 
 closed by Geology. The order of nature, as a whole, can- 
 not be upset even by man's far-reaching and persistent in- 
 terference. Are then existing physical evils of such a kind 
 as to disprove the wisdom and goodness of the Creator ? 
 Is there really no alternative but to shake hands with 
 Gnostics and Manichaeans by having recourse to an inex- 
 plicable evil principle ? Or must we admit with Stuart Mill 
 that the first cause was limited in power, and had to strug- 
 gle from the outset against an eternal existing matter ? 
 
 The Creator alone can be absolutely perfect. Relative 
 perfection includes a certain imperfection in its very notion. 
 Metaphysical evil, as Clement of Alexandria rightly ob- 
 served, is inseparable from things finite. The imperfec- 
 tion, however, is often represented to be greater than it 
 really is. Everything, in its kind, is perfect and propor- 
 tioned to its end. The gradations in perfection are a 
 proof of orderly thought. The imperfections are an ad- 
 vantage to the whole. The very elements, that are so 
 destructive of man's handiwork, are the scavengers and 
 washerwomen of inorganic nature. Shipwrecking storms 
 and direful thunders, when they pour down refreshing 
 rain, come as a boon and a blessing to fields and crops, to 
 man and beast. It is the excess that does the harm. But 
 their regular action is quite in keeping with a useful or 
 serviceable purpose. Contrary purposes are inextricably 
 bound up with things finite ; only in the absolute are all 
 contrarieties swallowed up. In the irrational organic 
 world, too, evils are less than they seem. I am not one of 
 those who set down animal suffering as moonshine, and as 
 existing only in man's imagination. Neither can I agree 
 with those who hold that the pain, though real, is deadened 
 by the want of self-consciousness. To me it seems that 
 the German proverb still holds its own : " Never torment
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 265 
 
 an animal in fun, for it feels pain as much as you."* Still, 
 the sensibility of the animal must not be put on the same 
 level as that of self-conscious man. Nor should it be for- 
 gotten that sensibility, besides being a necessary element 
 in the world's constitution, is a fruitful source of pleasure 
 as well as of pain, and that it promotes the end of the 
 organism. 3 * Sensation, even as pain, by setting spurs to 
 prudence and fear, becomes a helpmate in the struggle for 
 life. The feelings of pleasure and pain produced by agree- 
 able or disagreeable impressions stimulate the animal to 
 obtain things that are useful, and to ward off what is harm- 
 ful. And if the sensitiveness of animals to pleasure and 
 pain be taken into account, this relation of their organism 
 to the external world will be seen not to be devoid of pur- 
 pose. Men fight, and animals devour one another. The 
 hurt of one is the good of another. The mouse destroys 
 the nest of the humming-bird, the cat eats the mouse and 
 restores the equilibrium between the bees and the clover. 
 The bird feeds on destructive insects, and itself falls a 
 victim to the bird of prey ; the bird of prey, in its turn, 
 is shot by the sportsman. Thus the struggle is mutual, 
 and has an equalizing tendency. It preserves the balance, 
 and thereby does good. But this mutual onslaught is a 
 blessing to many animals, to whom sudden death brings 
 less pain than death by sickness, old age, or starvation. 
 That there are refinements of cruelty in nature no one will 
 doubt who has seen a cat play with a mouse, though the 
 mouse is already stunned by fright. It is said that at the 
 sound of the rattle the victim of the rattlesnake stands 
 motionless. As long as wild beasts take pleasure in eating 
 live food, a sort of cruelty is, so to speak, legalized by 
 nature. But the cruelty seems greater than it really is. 
 As a rule every species instinctively adopts a special mode 
 of killing or stunning its victim, immediately it is cap- 
 tured. The tiger's skill in opening jugular veins is with- 
 
 * " Quale nie ein Thier im Scherz, denn es fiihlt wie du den Schmerz." 
 23 Fischer, Das Problem des Uebels und die Theodicee, Mainz, 1883, p. 155. Zacharias, 
 p. 79.
 
 266 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 out a parallel. The bird of prey deals its victim a deadly 
 blow on the head with its beak. The lion makes the sheep 
 unconscious by shaking it well in the air. Livingstone 
 relates how one day a lion seized him, lifted him up from 
 the ground, and shook him like a cur shakes a rag. While 
 in this critical position he was wholly unconscious of his 
 danger, for a refreshing delirium had taken possession of 
 him. Then he completely lost consciousness and, had the 
 lion swallowed him, his death would have been painless. 
 A bullet from a comrade's rifle, however, saved him from 
 this fate. 84 
 
 Teleology is one of the proofs for the existence of God. 
 This proof is called physico-theological because God, who 
 is the centre of faith and theology, is made known in the 
 natural order. It is called teleological, because it reveals 
 the all-wise and all-good Creator in the purpose that is in- 
 herent in all things. It is at once the oldest and most con- 
 vincing proof, because it combines most beautifully the 
 external world of nature with the internal world of mind 
 and spirit. Inner and outer experience, nature and spirit, 
 combine their forces to reveal to man his last and highest 
 end. Between the human mind and outward nature there 
 is a connection, otherwise no human knowledge would be 
 possible. For this reason human knowledge is real and 
 true. The existence of a Creator who has stamped his 
 design on all things is but the logical deduction from the 
 facts of the outer world and the inner consciousness, a 
 deduction to which the tribunal of science must allow as 
 much validity as to any other necessary consequence of 
 the law of causality. For the validity of the laws of 
 thought is either absolute or nil. The teleological view 
 of the world includes a material and a spiritual element, 
 but it considers both under one aspect the idea of pur- 
 pose. Thus the physico-theological proof appeals to man's 
 intellect, and almost strikes a chord of sympathy in his 
 heart. It has a living interest for both heart and mind. 
 
 34 CoHtroverst, 1884, p. 439.
 
 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 267 
 
 The superior wisdom in which the universe is moulded 
 leads his understanding captive ; the diversified harmony 
 and matchless beauty of nature wins his heart, while his 
 will is fascinated by the infinite goodness pervading all 
 things. This is the proof on which Aristotle and Plato, 
 Fathers and Schoolmen chiefly loved to dwell. 25 Even 
 Kant treated it with respect. It seems doubtful whether 
 this proof from the mere idea of order and purpose suffices 
 by itself. For it would seem to prove a maker and organ- 
 iser of the world merely in a platonic sense. This is the 
 drift of the instances generally given in illustration. Aris- 
 totle says : " God is to the world what the helmsman is to 
 the ship, the driver to the chariot, the chief singer to a 
 concert, the law to the state, the general to an army."" 
 But as Aristotle firmly believed in the eternity of the 
 world, God is, in his eyes, only the unmoved mover towards 
 whom all things move. Hence neither the cosmological 
 nor the physico-teleological argument would have been 
 sufficient to prove to Aristotle the existence of a Creator. 
 But once we start with facts and realities and not merely 
 with ideas, it becomes perfectly plain that there is no 
 sharp dividing line between the two arguments. It is the 
 same as with the actions and attributes of God ; neither 
 can be wholly separated from the other. When God 
 works, He is by one and the same act the efficient and the 
 final cause. In like manner the cosmological and the 
 physico-teleological arguments run into each other. The 
 same foundation is common to both. As our study of the 
 origin of the wonderful gradations in nature led us to the 
 conclusion that an absolute, intelligent and personal first 
 cause exists, so also the inner finality in all nature, espe- 
 cially in the human mind and will, points to an intelligent 
 and holy being who created this purposeful world. The 
 most faultlessly perfect heart pales before the inherent, 
 inborn purposeness of nature. God is manifested as the 
 
 25 Petavius, De Deo I., i, 5. Moehler, Athanasius, I., p. 15, seq. Kuhn, p. 684. 
 
 26 Pesch I., 860. See Mohler I., 153 seq. and Cicero, De natura deorum 3. Also 
 
 Petavius I., i, 6 seq.
 
 268 DESIGN AND PURPOSE. 
 
 supreme artist, but as the artist who has sown art in things 
 themselves. Finality is not an idea hovering over the uni- 
 verse, like the spirit moving over the waters, but an idea 
 grafted into the nature of things, a real idea wedded to a 
 mechanical cause. So far, indeed, we have proved the 
 existence of an intelligent Creator. But we have gained 
 only an analogous knowledge of His nature. Analogy is 
 but a makeshift that is useful with our defective modes of 
 cognition. From the form which our ideas take we can- 
 not conclude that they must of necessity be predicated of 
 the object itself in that same form.* Thus when, after the 
 manner of men, we ascribe intelligence to the author of 
 this world because he works with order and purpose, we 
 do much more than merely testify to the fact that such is 
 our mode of cognition. We know full well that we are 
 making a leap into another genus, and that we are falling 
 into a sort of anthropomorphism. 87 Nevertheless we are 
 thereby not merely following the necessary laws of thought, 
 but are proceeding the only way in which it is possible to 
 solve the riddle of the universe. Either scepticism is the 
 only true philosophy, or this knowledge of God is true, if 
 not the whole truth. We do not contend that we thor- 
 oughly understand the nature of God, but that this knowl- 
 edge is a necessary stepping-stone to the higher knowl- 
 edge of God. Hence Philo said : To prove that God exists 
 is easy, but to know what He is, that is almost impossible. 
 The Fathers openly avow the same thing. They lay stress 
 on the imperfect character of our knowledge of God, when 
 combating the errors of the Aetians who thought that they 
 had found an adequate conception of God in ayevvrfffia. 
 Even the light of grace cannot enable us to know God's 
 nature thoroughly. All our knowledge is piecemeal. 
 
 * The author is merely epitomizing the doctrine of analogical cognition. The reader will 
 find a fuller explanation in books of logic, and in Franzelin's Dt Deo Uno (Thesis. 
 10-13). The author means that we must distinguish between the form and the 
 contents of the idea. What we call "wisdom" is, in form, human and finite (a 
 quality), but the thing so named (res concepta not tnodut concipiendf) can also be 
 in God. (Tr.) 
 
 37 Kant, I.e. p. 160.
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 VIRTUE AND REWARD. 
 
 Within every living being there beats an impulse which 
 prompts it to preserve life and to gratify its wants. The 
 plant-germ, as though aware of the conditions under which 
 it can live, unconsciously and mechanically fixes its tiny 
 roots in the soil and turns its first shoots towards sky and 
 sun. The young plant, as it were, revels in this continued 
 beneficent influence until it can wave its opening capsules 
 in the sunlight, and greedily drink in the many-coloured 
 rays. At night the plant either inclines its flower or closes 
 it up altogether. By a vigorous reaction it protests against 
 any injury done to its organism, and often reproduces the 
 part injured. If light is shut out, it lengthens its stalk in 
 order to carry its leaves to the nearest opening through 
 which light can enter. What natura naturans does uncon- 
 sciously and mechanically, that the animal does con- 
 sciously, though the consciousness be but instinctive. The 
 instinct of self-preservation is the law that governs all 
 movement in the animal kingdom. The satisfaction of 
 that impulse is regulated by the feeling of pleasure and 
 pain. The animal arms itself against all hostile attacks. 
 Even the worm, when trodden on, curls itself up in the 
 dust. But every animal feels pleasure, whether good food 
 or the gratification of the instinct of propagation be the 
 cause. 
 
 There is something of the animal also in man. The in- 
 stinct of self-preservation is as inborn in him as in the
 
 270 VIRTUE AND REWARD. 
 
 animal. Nature has planted the desire of pleasure and 
 enjoyment in his breast. But even thus far man is essen- 
 tially distinct from the brute. The animal has, indeed, the 
 instinct of self-preservation, but is wholly unconscious of 
 its being and end. It knows nothing of birth, life, and 
 death. But man reflects on his being and existence. He 
 sees death afar off. He knows that his whole life is really 
 a slow death. The fear of death is in direct antagonism 
 to the instinct of self-preservation. How often it saddens 
 and embitters our sweetest joys and casts a dark shadow 
 over the sunniest hours of life. The rich man says to his 
 soul : " Take thy rest, eat, drink, make good cheer. But 
 " God said to him : Thou fool, this night do they require 
 " thy soul of thee ; and whose shall those things be which 
 " thou hast provided."* In this, man is worse off than the 
 animal. He knows of death's fell approach, and sees it 
 ahead. He is daily reminded of death, and the thought 
 fills him with a constant fear and trembling. This alone 
 would suffice to make him repute all earthly happiness 
 and pleasure as nothing. Even man in his prime is like 
 the fragrant flower to which the worm is drawing near. 
 Whether he will it or no his fate is always staring him in 
 the face. He knows that he is unhappy, and he is unhappy 
 because he feels and knows his unhappiness. Man, as we 
 saw above, has a larger share of sickness and suffering 
 than the animal a fact that acquires a new significance 
 because man is fully aware of this circumstance. He is 
 dissatisfied with his lot. The feeling of discontent is ever 
 smouldering in his breast, ready to burst out into a flame. 
 And yet the yearning for happiness can never be uprooted 
 from man's soul. His whole life is a piteous chase after 
 happiness. All men seek happiness, though each one 
 chooses his own route. One places his happiness in war 
 or politics. Another's happiness is at the highest amid 
 science and art. The happiness of a third is seated in 
 virtue or pleasure. All man's efforts have happiness for 
 
 * Luke XII., 18.
 
 VIRTUE AND REWARD. 271 
 
 their object. Even the suicide hopes to better his lot. 
 By annihilation he seeks to banish want and care and to 
 be rid of hardship and suffering. How few attain the hap- 
 piness they seek ? How many who attain it are allowed 
 to enjoy it without let or hindrance ? A confession that 
 many desires are unfulfilled may be read in the eyes of all. 
 Rulers and subjects, generals and soldiers, learned and 
 unlearned, artists and artisans, merchants and labourers, 
 rich and poor, old and young, men and women must ac- 
 knowledge that happiness is strangled in tears. All must 
 confess that scalding salt tears, brewed in sorrow, have 
 trickled down their cheeks into their cup of pleasure. 
 Nothing in this world can give full, complete and perma- 
 nent happiness. The Sultan in an Eastern tale was advised 
 that he would be restored to health if he wore the shirt of 
 a happy man. The Sultan's messengers scoured the coun- 
 try but could not find any one, high or low, who would 
 own that he was really happy. At last they found a poor 
 shepherd who said he was happy. But the shepherd could 
 not be prevailed upon to consent to part with his shirt. 
 Then, the messengers tried to take it from him by force ; 
 but it turned out that he was not blest with a shirt ! 
 
 Does man perchance find happiness in his own inner 
 self ? Can he despise the outer world, and renounce its 
 possessions ? Can he encase himself in the armour of in- 
 difference and apathy, and thus steel himself against its 
 allurements ? The Stoics thought so. Anyhow their doc- 
 trine was better than the hedonic principle of ancient and 
 modern Epicureans, whose summum bonum lies in the plea- 
 sure denied to the majority of men, and not vouchsafed 
 to the upper classes unmixed with pain. But the Stoics 
 desired the impossible, an impossible, too, that could not 
 have satisfied man's aspirations. Man has feeling and is 
 a social being.* Nolens volcns, he is tempted by the outer 
 world, and thus his apathy is endangered. He cannot 
 completely deaden his feelings and remain indifferent to 
 
 * Society, saith the text, is the happiness of life. 
 
 (Love's Labour's Lost, IV., 2.)
 
 272 VIRTUE AND REWARD. 
 
 all influences. The enemy, from whom there is no escape, 
 lurks within him in alliance with the outer foe, and sur- 
 renders the fortress before the holder becomes aware of 
 the treachery. There is no shirking the struggle of reason 
 against passion, of the superior will against the lower appe- 
 tites. I do not what I will but what I hate. I do not the 
 good that I will, but the evil that I will not, that I do. 
 Unhappy man who shall deliver me from this body of 
 death ? For a time man may delude himself with regard 
 to this inner warfare, and may be the dupe of his own 
 weakness. In the whirl of sensual pleasure and aesthetic 
 enjoyment he may drown the memory of the schism within 
 that is driving him asunder, but the struggle will rage 
 again with redoubled force. Man can labour for the moral 
 improvement of himself and others ; he can try to restore 
 the moral order. He can find spiritual delight in the proud 
 and stoical exercise of virtue for its own sake. He can 
 seek his happiness in morality. But experience shows 
 that the strength of unaided man fails, and that his efforts 
 in this direction are merely spasmodic ; neither do they 
 beget full contentment. Whatever be the boast of inde- 
 pendent morality, it is certain that the average man will 
 make no stand against passion and sensuality, unless his 
 efforts are rewarded by something more than the satisfac- 
 tion he feels in making the effort. Virtue charms us with 
 the reward that it holds out to our successful efforts. 
 With it God has linked courage, and the hope that an un- 
 fading crown will be the prize of victory in a short but 
 severe struggle. 1 Sometimes, indeed, virtue is practised 
 without any view to an eternal reward ; but this is an ex- 
 ception to be dealt with in psychology. The sort of virtue, 
 too, would have to be enquired into. Virtue can only be 
 happy in the true good that is never found on earth. The 
 moral man aims not at practising one or other virtue, but 
 at weighing all his actions in the scale of virtue. A moral 
 disposition for its own sake is, indeed, still more remark- 
 
 x See Irenxus in Schwane, Dogmentschichte, vol. i., p. 444, seq.
 
 VIRTUE AND REWARD. 2'/3 
 
 able. What a mighty power it is in the heart of man ! 
 For it raises man so far above his many wants that he is 
 prepared to sacrifice them, and to adjudge himself un- 
 worthy of life if, for the sake of the enjoyment he craves, 
 he were to transgress the law of reason. 2 But, as universal 
 experience teaches, it is incorrect to suppose that reason 
 issues mandates unaccompanied by promises or threats. 
 This delusion is not the outcome of the teaching of the 
 heart, but a philosophical abstraction. The Apostle speaks 
 of the thoughts that accuse and justify, and of the law 
 written on the heart that upholds the judgment passed on 
 works done without the law. Rewards and punishments 
 are held out by the positive law, and also, though not so 
 clearly, by the natural law. Let us even suppose that 
 " this incomprehensible moral disposition, stamped with 
 the mark of a divine origin, might fill man's mind with 
 ecstasy, and nerve it for the sacrifices that the love of 
 duty may require." Still, as a matter of fact, it will work 
 a general and lasting effect on most men only when joined 
 to religion and God and brought into relations with happi- 
 ness as a reward. The heart will not forego this noble 
 " egotism."* 
 
 Virtue is often unrewarded in this life ; it is even de- 
 spised and persecuted. Virtue and earthly prosperity sel- 
 dom go together. " But my feet," says the Psalmist, 
 " were almost moved, my steps had well-nigh slipt, be- 
 " cause I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the 
 " prosperity of sinners." Moral effort and the inborn ten- 
 dency to happiness are contrary one to another. If the 
 virtuous man has no hope after death, if he has no worthy 
 end in the next life, then he has no end at all. He is 
 more unhappy than the brute that, knows of no end and 
 
 Kant, Religion, etc., vi., p. 143. Lotze, ii., p. 216, seq., 319, 348, seq. Pfleiderer, 
 Zur Ehrenrettting des Eudazmonismus, Tubingen, 1869. 
 
 These remarks of the author are singularly appropriate and happy. " Egotism" is 
 a very current objection, especially in England, against the Christian system. The 
 objection is, however, piteously shallow. God is, indeed, lovable and ought to be 
 loved for His own sake. But we could not love Him, unless He were also our good. 
 Such a love would be a psychological impossibility. (Tr.) 
 
 R
 
 274 VIRTUE AND REWARD. 
 
 follows its own impulses. If then there be an end and 
 purpose in the moral law, if man is not chasing a will o' 
 the wisp, his goal must lie beyond the grave. Happiness 
 must be in store for the man who lives up to the moral law 
 according to the lights of his conscience. The created 
 mind can find happiness only in the absolute mind, the 
 finite personal spirit in the absolute spirit. Love, truth 
 and goodness are the exclusive property of a person. Nor 
 can they be possessed in their fulness apart from a per- 
 sonal union with the absolute truth, love and goodness. 
 Man is great because he knows his misery to be that of a 
 being destined for better things. None but deposed kings 
 or princes who are heirs to the throne are unhappy because 
 they are not kings. No one complains of having but one 
 mouth, but all feel it a grievance if they have only one 
 eye. 8 Nothing but the hope of reward in the life to come 
 can satisfy this feeling which vividly recalls man's first 
 destiny, and saves man from despair. The thought of his 
 lowliness gives wings to man's propensity, and sets spurs 
 to his efforts to reach this higher end. The greatness of 
 that end saves him from the degradation of the brute. 
 
 Man alone is the repository of virtue and sin. In the 
 rest of nature morality has no place. Sin, though com- 
 moner than virtue, is nevertheless an aberration, a fault 
 against order, and an infringement of the rights of others. 
 Shall the manifold wickedness go wholly unpunished that 
 gives the slip to the avenging hand of justice ? Shall the 
 life-and-death struggle between sin and virtue be but the 
 outward manifestation of that same power in the soul 
 which ripens evil and breeds iniquity ? No. The moral 
 conscience of mankind will never smother the conviction 
 that a supreme judge presides over human actions, to re- 
 ward the good and punish the wicked. If any universal 
 feeling exists, it is surely that justice will equalize all 
 things. The blood of the just cries for vengeance to the 
 heaven to whom vengeance belongs. The groans of op- 
 
 3 Pascal, j, 3, 4.
 
 VIRTUE AND REWARD. 275 
 
 pressed widows and orphans, and the waitings of perse- 
 cuted innocence rend the clouds and ascend to the throne 
 of the Just One. Unless compensation be assured in the 
 life to come, man's moral conscience rests on the shifting 
 sands. The future life is, to say the least, a postulate of 
 practical reason. But it is incomprehensible and ineffec- 
 tive without that moral disposition and finality which God 
 has instilled in the soul. As a moral system, " Natural 
 Religion" postulates God as the moral originator of the 
 world. It demands also that the duration of man's exist- 
 ence should be in proportion to the whole plan and pur- 
 pose of creation. Morality, according to Kant, is a purely 
 practical concept of reason, which, though most fruitful, 
 supposes a minimum theoretical power of mind. Hence 
 it can be brought home to anybody and everybody as a 
 practical duty. If this were so, morality would be ground- 
 less and inexplicable. That cannot be foreign to the the- 
 oretical reason which presses with such force on the prac- 
 tical reason. Our conclusion, therefore, may be justly 
 valued not merely as a postulate but as a necessary conse- 
 quence of the theoretical reason. 
 
 This is known as the moral or anthropological proof for 
 the existence of God. It is a continuation and a necessary 
 consequence of the physico- theological proof. The ques- 
 tion of the purpose and end of morally free beings like 
 man finds its complete and proper answer in the consider- 
 ation which regards the troubles of earthly life as merely 
 the jarring discords of life, and not as in any way at vari- 
 ance with the Creator's goodness. Thus the condition of 
 man again draws nearer to what it was in the beginning. 
 But man's troubled heart can nowhere find complete rest 
 and peace but in the blissful teaching of Christianity. It 
 is the truth and grace of Christianity that quicken the 
 moral proof with living force.
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE SOUL. 
 
 In considering organic beings we have repeatedly touched 
 the brink of that great chasm which science vainly strives 
 to span with the law of causation. To experience the 
 origin of life remains a riddle ; sensation and animal con- 
 sciousness are shrouded in darkness ; and man's conscience 
 and self-consciousness break the ground of new problems. 
 Hitherto we have been dealing with facts as they stand, 
 and enquiring into their origin and end. But now it is 
 imperative on us, without diving deeply into psychology, 
 to answer the question : What is the proper seat of this 
 organic activity ? The effects of a thing are our only clue 
 to its nature. Our very knowledge of God is fettered in 
 the manacles of this all-building law of cognition. God is 
 known to us by His work in nature and His action on the 
 soul, i.e. by analogy. Hence it is truly said that His 
 inmost nature is hidden from our natural view. It is the 
 same with the being of the soul. The soul is, indeed, our 
 own self, our principle of life, thought and action, but we 
 know it only by its actions. Our actions tell us it exists, 
 but we can gather its nature and manner only by analyzing 
 the character of these actions, just as we take a machine 
 to pieces and explain its complex action by analyzing the 
 forces and action of the several parts. We admit, how- 
 ever, that the several parts and forces are given quantities, 
 though we cannot define them closely or explain their joint 
 action. We imagine we have a deep insight into them, 
 because experimental perception and intuition come to
 
 THE SOUL 277 
 
 our aid. But closer observation will convince us that our 
 knowledge of physical events is only skin-deep. Hence 
 we must not be surprised if we flounder, while exploring 
 the soul, and casting plummets to sound the mystery of 
 the mutual co-operation of soul and body. For intuition 
 leaves us in the lurch, and it is difficult to extract a clear 
 idea from the heap of definitions that psychology has given 
 of this unknown force. We can never grasp this wonder- 
 ful thing in its inmost nature, nor make the reciprocal 
 action of the heterogeneous components transparent. 
 
 What is life ? We daily encounter life at every turn, and 
 yet we are embarrassed when asked to say what is the 
 secret of life. Attached to external conditions and mechan- 
 ical appliances, we find a series of activities which cannot 
 originate in either the appliances or the conditions. One 
 thing only is clear : life has its seat within the organism. 
 Organization and vital actions proceed from it as their 
 principle and cause. But what sort of a thing is this prin- 
 ciple and inward cause ? It might, perhaps, at a stretch, 
 be just possible to explain the phenomena of vegetative 
 plant life by the mechanism of atoms and the informing 
 plastic principle of individualization, although, be it noted, 
 this would also imply a special force of organization. But 
 such a principle (the word is very ambiguous) could not 
 possibly embrace all organic evolution, man included. 
 Organic life, it is true, always begins with the lowest 
 grade, but its principle is one in all forms. The plant 
 never has its balmy slumbers waked with the strife of 
 desires that stimulate self-motion. It is moved solely by 
 mechanical stimulants. It shows no trace of a free deter- 
 mining power, a will animated by a soul. But the spon- 
 taneity of animal movement is a sign of sensation ; and 
 sensation, even in the lowest animals, is the index of a 
 soul. What is this animal soul ? Etymology tells us that 
 its original meaning was life as manifested by breathing. 
 In the simple story of Genesis it is recorded that God 
 breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life. Herein 
 lies the kernel of the question. But Genesis says nothing
 
 278 THE SOUL. 
 
 of the souls of animals. It pictures living beings as such, 
 as produced by the elements. The animal soul is so 
 closely bound up with the body, that the two are produced 
 and perish together. It is well known that when some of 
 the lower animals are torn asunder, the several parts live 
 on. From this fact the philosophers of old argued that 
 the soul is divisible, and hence material. The lonians, 
 Bacon, and others supposed the soul to be a special kind 
 of body. Gnostics and Manichaeans also taught that it is 
 material. After much brain-racking Augustine and other 
 Latins at last grasped the notion of things immaterial. 
 Modern science teems with proofs of the soul's divisibility. 
 It has demonstrated that many-celled organisms split up 
 into new individuals, as in the remarkable fresh-water 
 polyp (Hydra viridis). It has further shown that each part 
 of a rightly divided cell develops into new cells. Botanists 
 can divide many-grained plant-cells. The one-celled in- 
 fusoria have lately been successfully multiplied by cross 
 and vertical section. 1 Hence the egg-cell represents many 
 individuals in potentia. Each energy unfolded by the cell 
 is attached to a visible substratum. Individual cells can 
 be divided and potentially mutiplied at all times, and not 
 merely when nature is the agent. 
 
 But this certainly warrants no materialistic conclusion, 
 if, indeed, it warrant any conclusion whatever as to the 
 material condition of the soul. For since the living cell 
 differs specifically from an inorganic molecule, so the 
 divisible living principle cannot be one with the atoms. 
 The divisions effected prove that the nervous power is 
 diffused throughout the cell. Hence the soul is present 
 in the individual cell as a whole, and has, at the same 
 time, a capacity for existence in the several parts. It is 
 clear, too, that the several parts of the whole soul are per- 
 vaded by an organic unity, from the fact that the cells, 
 when artificially divided, revert to one cell, and that two 
 animal organisms, originally separated, coalesce into one. 
 
 I Natur undOJfenb., 1885, p. 316, seq. Hertling, Grenzrn, p. tai. Pesch, Weltratk- 
 /, vol. I., p. 137. Comraer, System, vol. II., p. 150. Bastian, vol. I., p. 140.
 
 THE SOUL. 279 
 
 For this reason many modern Scholastics follow the older 
 Schoolmen in explaining the animal soul, which was con- 
 sidered substantia simplex incompletely as a material substance. 2 
 Others incline to regard it as a simple immaterial substance 
 which differs from the human soul in two points only : its 
 knowledge and will are sensible and not rational, and 
 hence it can have no higher end than to animate the animal 
 body during this material life. 3 These writers are enabled 
 to palm this doctrine on the Schoolmen by interpreting 
 their definition of body as a quantitative compound, in- 
 stead of a compound of two substantial principles, viz., 
 matter and form. In this, as it seems to us, they interpret 
 the Schoolmen wrongly ; but that does not concern us 
 here. At any rate the episode shows the difficulty of ex- 
 tracting animal psychic phenomena from matter, even 
 when it is acted on by a higher cause. It seems doubtful 
 whether the scholastic idea is adequately rendered by con- 
 ceiving the animal soul as a mere forma substantiate non 
 subsistens, and as the actuality of the animal. 4 For S. 
 Thomas speaks of the animal soul as derived from the soul 
 of the parent. Thus, in the annulosa (which survive fission) 
 there is one soul in actu and many in potentia. The soul 
 belongs essentially to the entire organism. It is one with 
 the body in activity, and therefore is certainly not an inde- 
 pendent substance. As soon as life ceases, it ceases to be 
 an animal. But, is it not the same with man ? Can a 
 corpse be called a man ? If we must ultimately explain 
 the animal soul as an actus materice produced by external 
 causes, i.e. in the last resort by God as the creator of the 
 typical forms of nature, then we are again confronted by 
 this unknown something. As the actus materioe operates 
 solely on animate matter, matter as such cannot be its 
 substratum. The " resultant of the forces," " the un- 
 known forces of nature" and such-like hollow sounding 
 
 2 Pesch, 1. c. Hertling, p. 122. Kleutgen, Philos. I., p. 42 ; II., p. 304. 
 
 3 Hettinger, Fundamentaltheologie, vol. I., p. 62. Dressel, Staff, p. 78. Girodon, 
 
 Exposd de lafoi, vol. I., p. 255. 
 
 4 Knauer, Psycholo&ie, p. 70, 171. Girodon I.e.
 
 280 THE SOUL. 
 
 phrases leave us quite in the dark as to the specific nature 
 of the organism. The resultant of the forces is dangling 
 in mid-air if it is not enthroned inside the organism. The 
 forces themselves must be organic if the resultant is the 
 principle of life. 
 
 It must be conceded, it seems to me, that the animal 
 soul is propagated by generation, and not produced by 
 creation or any analogous agency. Like the body it is 
 bounded by generation and corruption. In contradistinc- 
 tion to corporeal substances it may be called material, by 
 reason of its essential dependence on matter. In the lower 
 animals life is equally distributed among all the nervous 
 centres ; in the higher animals the seat of psychic phenom- 
 ena is the brain. Between the souls of the two there can 
 be no essential difference. Therefore no other course is 
 open but to regard the animal soul as an active substance, 
 implanted in the germs, communicated by generation, and 
 diffused over the gradually evolving organism. It may be 
 compared to the magnet which attracts the whole piece of 
 iron by polarizing its particles. There still remains, how- 
 ever, the essential distinction, that the one force acts by 
 necessity, the other by impulse. Natural force is not a 
 substance, whereas the soul cannot be conceived as any- 
 thing else. Modern psychology loves to distinguish be- 
 tween what is called a substantial and an actual notion of 
 the soul. The former may be said to include all the the- 
 ories that conceive psychic facts as emanating from some 
 hypothetical substratum, whether material or immaterial. 
 The latter includes the theories that make the spiritual 
 element consist in pure actuality, or in the immediate 
 manifestation of spiritual life. 6 To this last concept the 
 animal soul can lay no claim. Neither, however, can the 
 first be rejected as unconscious materialism, on the plea 
 that psychology, unlike the physical sciences, requires no 
 metaphysical concept beyond the actual fact of inner per- 
 ception. For from this it only follows that the substratum 
 
 5 Wundt, Philot. Au/saetze, vol. ii., 1885, p. 483 seq. ; vol. i., 1883, p. 319.
 
 THE SOUL. 28l 
 
 must be different in character. " What we call soul is the 
 inner being of the identical unit that we externally regard 
 as the body belonging to it." But this definition takes 
 into account the being of the soul apart from its nature. 
 As the simple principle of life the soul is spread over the 
 whole organism. It is (at least virtually) present every- 
 where in the cells, and produces a new organism when 
 external circumstances are favourable. 
 
 Whatever be the " life-force" of plants and animals, the 
 human soul, at all events, must be conceived as an imma- 
 terial simple substance. Its physical origin is unthinkable. 
 Spiritual production, too, is disallowed because spirit is 
 not propagated by generation. By reason man can explore 
 the secret recesses within him. After proving, from the 
 nature of his intellectual and moral life, that the intellect 
 cannot be material, he shows positively that it must be im- 
 material. The soul instils consciousness into sense-percep- 
 tions, forms ideas, passes judgments, and controls the 
 body and its desires. The eye can only see, and the ear 
 only hear ; but the soul knows what is seen and heard, 
 and passes judgment on the same. A mere sensitive fac- 
 ulty, inasmuch as its capacity is limited to sense-percep- 
 tions, can never acquire a knowledge of things simple. 
 Even if the simple could in any way become the object of 
 sense-perception, a sensitive faculty, being itself com- 
 pound, could not perceive it as simple. The idea of unity, 
 which is the basis of number, is beyond the animal ; neither 
 does it ever learn to count. If all sense-perceptions be 
 added together, the total or resultant will yield nothing 
 specifically higher. But man soars high above the realm 
 of sense-perceptions. His thoughts are unconfined by 
 space or time. He treads down extension and divisibility. 
 He glides through solid matter and sensibility. He cuts 
 his way to the truth that lies at the root of all things. 
 Thought resolves the composite, divisible and changeable 
 objects of sense into their simple elements, and resolves 
 these into the unity of the thinking soul. The activity of 
 the reason, as such, is independent of matter. Nay, as a
 
 282 THE SOUL. 
 
 rule, it grows in intensity the further it withdraws from 
 matter, and fixes its gaze steadily on what is immaterial. 
 It alone, therefore, can conceive itself as a simple being. 
 The process of thought demands a spiritual and immeasur- 
 able unity, a unity gathered up in a point. Amid all the 
 changes of matter the soul remains the same, as is shown 
 by the relations of its activities and conditions to the ego, 
 as distinct from its own body and the external world. In 
 contradistinction to the non-ego the soul knows that it is a 
 self-subsisting being, and is conscious that it is absolutely 
 and certainly different and distinct from the world. The 
 road to self-consciousness may be long ; the external in- 
 fluences at work to further or hinder development may be 
 manifold ; but amid all the changes there looms always 
 the same background of personality. It is a debateable 
 point whether the soul undergoes any change during the 
 development of self-consciousness, in its active or passive 
 state. On the one hand such an admission would seem to 
 imperil its spirituality ; on the other it would gain in flexi- 
 bility by removing that unbending rigidity and statuesque 
 immobility which belong to the soul if it remains ever the 
 same. The mind is surely conscious that one and the 
 same ego is the subject of consciousness, however changed 
 its state and conditions may be. Its remembrance of its 
 previous states and the provision it makes for its further 
 development prove the unity of the spiritual substance 
 quite as much as they prove the unity of development. 
 From the unchangeableness of the soul's substance the 
 Schoolmen argued that by knowledge it is capable of 
 drinking in all things, not only in their phenomena but 
 also in their essence.' 
 
 The unity of consciousness, without which our inner 
 states could never become collectively the object of self- 
 observation, compels us to assume a supersensible simple 
 being as the subject and cause of the phenomena. 7 The 
 mere fact that man can pourtray his own self, and become 
 
 6 Kleutgen, I., p. 47, 523. 
 
 7 Ltze, Microcostnos, Vol. I., p. 170 and 256 ; Vol. II., p. 175, seq.
 
 THE SOUL. 283 
 
 the object of his own thoughts, is enough to stamp the 
 soul as supersensible. The unity of consciousness tran- 
 scends every other earthly unity. For the mind knows 
 how to knit its states into one collective act. It can also 
 unite the manifold impressions of sense into a connected 
 whole, and make them into a picture modelled on its inner 
 unity. It could never picture the universe as one, were it 
 not conscious of its own unity. It knows itself to be the 
 one identical subject of the perceptions imported into it 
 from different times and places. This substantial unity of 
 the soul, however, is not sufficient for its inner activity. 
 By association and reproduction, by winnowing like from 
 unlike, the mind also solders and welds its inner states 
 into unity. Its ideas of space and time fly far away from 
 things of sense. Ideas are not imprisoned in space, nor 
 are recollections blurred by time. But out of them the 
 human soul constructs a world in time and space, and is 
 thus mounted on high above time and space. 
 
 The soul, therefore, must be a substance, because the 
 consciousness of all acts centres in the ego ; and memory 
 shows the unity and identity of the ego. In its nature this 
 unity is not logical and abstract, but real and substantial. 
 As the subject, the soul acts independently in itself, and 
 on itself, and on the external world. Every activity has a 
 substantial basis and hence, as ancient philosophers argued, 
 the soul is a substance that lives, feels and perceives, thinks 
 and wills. The idea of substance shows the principle of 
 the activity and stability of its being ; the idea of cause 
 shows the principle of life ; and the idea of purpose shows 
 the principle of intellectual life. The intellectual life, 
 whose existence is undeniable, is a pure actuality, and con- 
 sists immediately in the phenomena and manifestations of 
 life. Activity, however, should be distinguished from the 
 substantial subject. And this substance is immaterial and 
 spiritual. 
 
 Are we, however, justified in arguing that material things 
 have no unity, because they are divisible ? or in inferring 
 the immaterial nature of the soul or ego from its indivisible
 
 284 THE SOUL. 
 
 unity? It may be urged that this is pure "dialectical 
 clap-trap." For, firstly, the theory of the continuity of 
 substances has as good a leg to stand on as the atomistic 
 theory ; and secondly, our ideas and concepts require, in- 
 deed, an actual and undivided unity, but not a geometrical 
 or metaphysical simplicity. 8 This is true of the inferior 
 life of the soul, but not of its rational activity. The life 
 of reason is the strongest spiritual bulwark against mate- 
 rialism. In so far as the soul is the entelechia corporis (actu- 
 ation of the body), it is one with the body, and forms part 
 of the human species. In itself, therefore, it is not an in- 
 dividual substance, hypostasis, or person, but it is put 
 ever the body, and fights against the body. So the higher 
 principle of the intellectual functions must be immaterial. 
 According to Aristotle the rov? is only divisible in the 
 same way as the eternal is divisible from the temporal. 
 Augustine stigmatized as a self-delusion the opinion that 
 the soul is corporeal. Man has only to turn the mirror of 
 reflection on himself, and he must see that inner psychic 
 phenomena and the nature of the soul can be known only 
 by the intellect, and not by the bodily senses. Hence he 
 must also see that the inner states are not sensible but in- 
 telligible objects, and that therefore the nature of the soul 
 delineated in them must be intelligible and not sensible. 
 The images of sense are corporeal, and contained in a 
 framework of space ; but these two distinguishing marks 
 are wanting in the internal acts of life. The ideas of 
 truth, beauty and goodness serve to judge the world of 
 sense, though they are not of it. The intellect is above 
 sensible images because it judges and reproduces them. 
 
 The difficulty of explaining the union of soul and body, and 
 their mutual action on each other, grows in direct propor- 
 tion to the intensity of the contrast that is set up between 
 the ideas of the material and the immaterial. The whole 
 soul, says St. Augustine, is in the whole body, and is 
 whole and entire in every part thereof. The soul perceives 
 
 8 Licbmann, Anal. p. 301. Hertling, p. 121, Materie und Form, p. 142, seq. Storz, 
 Aug. p. no.
 
 THE SOUL. 285 
 
 where it sees, and sees where it perceives, and is where it 
 lives. It is a trite saying that a thing acts only in the 
 place in which it is. In the case of the soul, however, the 
 order is reversed, for the soul is where it acts. Being im- 
 material it is not chained down to one dungeon. But 
 being one with the body, its action must be dependent on 
 the body, and be greater in one place than another. 
 
 All attempts to define the seat of the soul, and to specify 
 the link that joins it to the body, have failed. Wherever 
 life is, there is the soul. A thousand living threads inter- 
 weave it with the organism. The soul acts on the body, 
 and the body on the soul. The mysterious skein of con- 
 tact is too entangled to be unravelled. Ancient philoso- 
 phers sought the soul in the blood, the moderns in the 
 brain. Anyhow the nervous system joined to the central 
 organ is the most essential organ of the soul's activity. 
 Some have even tried to point out the precise spot in the 
 brain from which thought might flow in the ordinary proc- 
 ess of motion. Hitherto physiology has failed to hit upon 
 the central point in the nervous system. Indeed its suc- 
 cess is impossible, if the soul is the animating principle of 
 the whole body, and if self-consciousness pervades the 
 whole ego and not merely a part. Descartes thought the 
 seat of the soul lay in the pineal gland. This is now looked 
 upon as a rudimentary organ that in times past fulfilled 
 certain functions. Perhaps it served as a sense of heat. 9 
 Nor can it be shown that the soul resides in any particular 
 substance of the brain, e.g. phosphorus. For the depen- 
 dence of thought on this substance, if established, would 
 not even prove a causal relation to subsist between them, 
 let alone an identity. The brain is only the soul's organ, 
 albeit a necessary organ. As the most skilful and accom- 
 plished pianist cannot play without a piano, so the soul is 
 powerless to do its functions if the bodily organs are 
 destroyed or deranged. 
 
 In man and animals the life of the soul corresponds to 
 
 9 Zacharias, Probleme, p. 91, seq. Bastian, vol. i., p. 119, 128.
 
 286 THE SOUL. 
 
 the structure of the brain. If the brain is injured, the life 
 of both suffers ; but this is far from establishing identity 
 between soul and brain. Even the virtuoso cannot pro- 
 duce high artistic results on a bad instrument. The devel- 
 opment of the brain keeps pace with the development of 
 intelligence. Physical formation and spiritual activity 
 run on parallel lines. The vital barometer rises or falls 
 with the bodily temperature, as may be seen in different 
 individuals, and also in the same individual at different 
 ages. Still difference of brain will not always account for 
 the different degrees of intelligence in different individ- 
 uals, or even in the same individual at different ages. 
 Sometimes the mind comes to maturity in childhood. Old 
 men are often sharp-witted. Many men, distinguished in 
 art and science, have enjoyed vigorous health in mind and 
 body till a ripe old age. Some, owing to a defect in the 
 bodily organism, never arrive at actual self-consciousness ; 
 others lose it through an injury done to the brain. But 
 the power of self-consciousness exists in both, and becomes 
 actual as soon as the obstacle is removed. If certain 
 definite parts and convolutions of the brain correspond to 
 certain spiritual faculties, this only shows that there is a 
 general dependence between the two. The perceptive 
 centres of the two cerebral hemispheres stand in the closest 
 connection with the imagination : but fierce opposition 
 awaits any attempt to localize spiritual acts on the lines of 
 Dr. Gall's phrenology. 10 No one, if we may again use the 
 musical instrument as an illustration, imagines that the 
 strings play a tune of themselves, although they sound 
 each and every note when a musician strikes them. It is 
 now known that the eye and ear nerves are each suscepti- 
 ble to a distinct colour and sound, although they neither 
 see nor hear unless stimulated by the soul. As, generally 
 speaking, the consciousness of nerve-impressions is an in- 
 tensive act, it cannot be occasioned by mere local impres- 
 
 10 Schaaffhausen, Antkrof. Aufs., p. 480. Commer, vol. ii., p. 156. See Les localisa- 
 tions cerebrates. Annales de Phil, dirtf,, Paris, 1886, p. 336. Lotze, I., p. 347, 354. 
 Bastian, vol. ii., p. 198, 393, seq.
 
 THE SOUL. 287 
 
 sions. In every act, besides nervous irritation, there must 
 be some other characteristic determinant exclusively cor- 
 responding to the exact spot on the surface of the organ of 
 sense, that is irritated by the external stimulant. Hence, 
 were a different point touched, the determinant would 
 also be different. 
 
 There is nothing absurd or opposed to true mental philos- 
 ophy in speaking of the organs of the soul, except the 
 phrase be understood in a gross Cartesian sense. It is as 
 foolish to identify artist and machine as to look for the 
 artist inside the machine. On one point, indeed, Material- 
 ism is vigorously outspoken. The brain, it says, is the 
 agent, and thoughts, perceptions and feelings are its acts. 
 "This simple relation," says Lotze, "we understand;" 
 but this does not throw the least light on the intellectual 
 and spiritual process. The converse theory that the soul 
 feels, thinks and wills through the brain is not so simple, 
 but it accords better with the distinction between matter 
 and spirit. Vicarious action is possible between the differ- 
 ent parts of the brain. One can do duty for the other. 
 When an apoplectic stroke paralyzes the left side of the 
 brain, and thus deprives the body of speech and move- 
 ment, it not infrequently happens that the evil is in part 
 remedied by these functions being gradually transferred to 
 the other cerebral hemisphere. But self-consciousness is 
 not dovetailed into the several parts of the brain in this 
 way, for it is lost if any one part is injured. Hence it is 
 above the parts. That peculiar mental phenomenon known 
 as the " fixed idea" might seem to be an instance to the 
 contrary. It is to be noticed, however, that it is either 
 something abnormal, or a disease in the process of thought, 
 or a canker gnawing the activity of the will. A continued 
 series of defective perceptions in the same direction may 
 give rise to a similar series of false judgments, which 
 finally handicap the mind in forming a right judgment in 
 this direction ; whereas the action of the consciousness is 
 normal in every other direction. Hence a fixed idea is 
 sometimes cured by a startling effect of an opposite ten-
 
 288 THE SOUL. 
 
 dency. Or, again, it may be caused by the perceptions, 
 memory or the like, being defectively reproduced, owing 
 to a flaw in the brain. But consciousness may also be 
 considerably influenced by passion and the abuse of the 
 will. Certain fixed ideas (e.g. ambition, the thirst for 
 glory, dipsomania, &c.) may thus arise in the same way as 
 diseased conditions of the brain, and as the spiritual and 
 moral condition generally sinks lower and lower to a semi- 
 animal level. 
 
 Griesinger's theory that all diseases of the soul are sim- 
 ply brain diseases is not yet proved with any certainty. 
 A diseased soul may, of course, make the brain diseased. 
 Madness and mental disease, like other properties of the 
 soul, are often hereditary. This is particularly the case 
 with spiritual qualities that depend so much on the organi- 
 zation of the brain, that they almost lead one to suppose 
 every action to be determined by psychic connections. 11 
 The judgment passed on the suicide is toned down if dis- 
 section shows the brain to be diseased or abnormally de- 
 veloped. But even heredity and close connection are not 
 without exception. Children, whether sickly or healthy, 
 are not in every respect intellectually like their parents. 
 Here the rule is honoured more in the breach than in the 
 observance. The organization of the brain is silent on 
 this point. There is, indeed, a constant interplay between 
 the mind and the organ of thought, but we cannot in any 
 one case draw a certain conclusion as to their identity. 
 Men whose minds are diseased, or who have been stunned, 
 not infrequently recover consciousness before death. Then 
 periods of life long past often come back to memory. 
 
 These remarks derive confirmation from dreams, which 
 are often described as the increased activity of the soul 
 during sleep. They rather indicate a decrease in that 
 activity. The intelligence slumbers, and the vegetative 
 activity is up and doing. Sleep freshens the psychic forces 
 generally, and the brain in particular. For this reason 
 
 H Herbert Spencer. See Contravene 1882, p. 747. See also S. Thomas, Summa 
 Tlieologica, i, 2, qu. 51, a. i.
 
 THE SOUL. 289 
 
 dreaming is largely dependent on such external circum- 
 stances as food, digestion, posture of body, the bodily or 
 spiritual exercises gone through during the day, and so on. 
 Special kinds of sickness often give rise to definite and dis- 
 tinct dreams. So there is no need to thrust altogether 
 aside the notion that a sick man may learn the true nature 
 of his illness in a dream. The delusion in dreams is due 
 to the fact that the imagination continues at work during 
 sleep. It resembles true perception in its effects, and it 
 strives to excite a corresponding activity in the mind. But 
 as thought is suspended, and the judgment fettered during 
 sleep, the result does not tally with the perception. In a 
 dream unpleasant occurrences take place ; the dangers 
 that seem to environ us are wonderfully vivid and realistic. 
 But, as they are powerless to set the soul in motion, the 
 danger seems inevitable and resistance hopeless. Hence 
 we become so affrighted that we wake. Then, once the 
 consciousness is set free, we recognize that we have been 
 labouring under a delusion. But this very consciousness 
 that we have been deceived by our dreams proves that 
 during sleep the consciousness slumbers. For the wires 
 that connect it with the outer world are cut, and the brain's 
 activity (which is not a mere function of the brain) is 
 diminished, though not destroyed. The soul survives the 
 temporary suspension of its wonted activity, which it after- 
 wards resumes. On awaking, the soul becomes, as a rule, 
 vividly conscious of the thoughts that occupied it before 
 sleep. Here also space and time are annihilated. 
 
 The freedom of the will furnishes still stronger evidence 
 than the intelligence in favour of the immateriality and 
 spirituality of the soul. For it shows that the body is de- 
 pendent on the soul, as well as the soul on the body. As 
 the unity of the consciousness proves that the soul is one 
 and simple and not a compound, so free-will arrays it in 
 conscious opposition to all that is mechanical and material. 
 Even the intelligence is governed by the will. An unfeel- 
 ing act of intelligence can never stir the will. Mental rep- 
 resentations and the feelings connected therewith are the
 
 290 THE SOUL. 
 
 engines that set the will in motion. It is chiefly the qual- 
 ity and strength of the feeling that determines the will. 11 
 But we have already seen that the conscious act is also 
 determined by the will. The science of moral statistics 
 boasts of having discovered a natural law that regulates 
 moral actions. Thus it hopes to prove the statement of 
 Celsus that evil is always a fixed quantity. 1 * Origen, in 
 reply to Celsus, urged, on the contrary, that an increase 
 in vice was undeniable. Still it may be granted that vice 
 is, to a certain extent, a regular and stable quantity, and 
 that it fluctuates only within certain limits ; but a great 
 deal of good and evil is beyond the ken of statistics. Statis- 
 tics come too late into the field to turn the flanks of inde- 
 terminism by proving the absolute regularity of human 
 actions. The will is neither absolutely free nor absolutely 
 powerful. It depends on the immanent laws of mind. It 
 has its limitations like every other creature. It may be 
 inclined to good or to evil, but it is determined by neither. 
 Some sort of regularity is quite compatible with freedom. 
 It only shows that the law of an intelligent lawgiver can 
 preserve its regularity, without destroying individual free- 
 dom, even in the phenomena that are most swayed by 
 chance or caprice. Man can override his better judgment 
 with the principle, stat pro ratione voluntas ; but he can also 
 heroically do battle with his natural inclinations. He is 
 free to take independent action even against his own 
 nature ; his freedom is unshackled by necessity ; he exer- 
 cises dominion over his own body all these can only be 
 the acts of an immaterial spiritual substance, that is, of a 
 soul. The will could not be free unless it were seated in 
 an immaterial principle having activity within itself. Lieb- 
 mann defines free-will as " the consciousness made possible 
 
 12 Wundt, vol. i., p. 337, seq. Lotze, vol. i., p. 286, seq. 
 
 13 Origenes, c. Celsum, 4, 633. Gutberlet, in Natur u. Offenb. 1886, pp. 1-97, 641, seq. 
 
 On the other side, Q\icte\et,PAyst<?ueS0ciate; Drobisch, Die Moralstatistik und 
 die menschliche Willensfreikeit, Leipzig, 1867 Rumclin, Redtn und Aufsdtze, 
 1875, p. i, 370, seq. Lange, Geschichte des Materialisntus. and Edit. vol. ii., p. 
 401. Liebmann, Anal. p. 600, seq. Gtdanken und Thatsachen, p. 6, seq. See 
 also Presscnse, p. 284, seq.
 
 THE SOUL. 291 
 
 "by the stable identity of the ego, and brought home to 
 " us by the sense of moral responsibility, the conscious- 
 " ness that man under precisely similar circumstances and 
 " under the action of precisely similar motives (i.e. at dif- 
 ferent times of life) can both will and act diffeiently, 
 " and is not compelled to will and act in the same way." 14 
 This definition leaves both the fact and the principle of 
 freedom unexplained. The identity of the ego and the 
 sense of responsibility can evoke this consciousness only 
 in the supposition that they themselves are immaterial. 
 Dualism (i.e. matter and spirit) follows from the recogni- 
 tion of freedom, as surely as its denial is the outcome of 
 mechanical monism. The greater the thought we bestow 
 on moral consciousness, both in its dependence, in its free- 
 dom, in its dominion over the material world ; the more 
 closely we watch it in its secret workshop of mind and 
 heart ; the stronger will grow our conviction that a stone- 
 blind whirlpool of events, in which freedom is swallowed 
 up in necessity, cannot represent the sum total of all 
 realities. 
 
 The freedom of the will tells quite as much against the 
 materialist who holds the soul to be a mere force, as against 
 the materialist who regards it as matter. Many natural 
 philosophers have conceived a prejudice against " vital 
 force" on account of its analogy with natural forces. For 
 they are puzzled how to reconcile with the law of the con- 
 servation of energy this mysterious something which pro- 
 duces novel effects outside the natural chain of causation. 
 But the vital force is hardly touched by the objection, 
 inasmuch as it always acts in conjunction with the forces 
 of nature. The objection, however, applies with far more 
 force to the will. For the will has no resemblance what- 
 ever with natural forces and their effects, although it is 
 governed by an ideal and regular law, and gives effect to 
 its decisions through the bodily organs. All natural force 
 is necessary and unchangeable, and acts in one definite 
 
 14 Liebmann, Anat- p. 60*.
 
 292 THE SOUL. 
 
 direction ; under similar circumstances it constantly pro- 
 duces the same effects ; it is enclosed within definite bar- 
 riers by space and time ; nowhere can it be recognised as 
 a whole or as an individual. It is a mere name for an un- 
 known property of matter that manifests itself in a certain 
 kind of movement. In its nature and operation it is in- 
 definable, although it may be defined quantitatively accord- 
 ing to the laws of mechanics. Now free-will can neither 
 be weighed nor measured. Though not wholly arbitrary 
 it baffles all human calculation. With wings swifter than 
 thought it can fly across the ocean of things sensible and 
 material. It is, therefore, a force only in the sense in 
 which the one soul has many powers, e.g., feeling, imagi- 
 nation, memory, thought. 
 
 All these do but represent the many-sided activity of 
 one and the same immaterial spiritual substance. They 
 should, however, be judged solely according to their spir- 
 itual character, not by analogy with the forces of nature. 
 Human thought and will are indeed subject to laws, but 
 laws of the spirit not of nature, laws of freedom not of 
 necessity Like laws of nature they are unlimited in dura- 
 tion. But, being laws of liberty, they allow change amid 
 regularity, and diversity in the midst of stability ; there is, 
 too, an ebb and a flow in the tide of the life of the individ- 
 ual and of society. This truth is taught by Alexander 
 Hales, when he represents the soul as simple, but with 
 different powers, to correspond to the four elements of 
 which the body is composed. The parallelism between 
 the material body and the immaterial soul, though naive, 
 is well expressed " Nay, empirical laws themselves cry 
 aloud in our favour. For no empiricism has succeeded in 
 tracing to a physical cauSe the evident facts of intellectual 
 and moral agency. Therefore to deny the immateriality 
 of the soul is to impugn the simplicity, harmony, causality, 
 and conservation of force. 16 Not that the soul itself creates 
 
 15 Pfeifcr, Die Contravene iittr das Beharren dtr Elemente in den Vtrbindungen 
 
 von Aristateiei 6is zur Gefen-wart, Dillingen, 1879. P- X S- 
 
 16 On the influence of faith and atheism upon modern physical science, see Ceniroverse, 
 
 1883, May, in connection with La physique modern*, Paris, 1883.
 
 THE SOUL. 293 
 
 force and energy ; but it imparts an impulse to the appli- 
 cation of the forces that lie in a direction different from its 
 own. But in the physical world of causality only like acts 
 upon like. Hence, however firmly the soul is cemented to 
 the body, and however real its action upon matter, it is 
 not a physical or material force. It does not decay and 
 perish like matter, for it is immortal. 
 
 Belief in the immortality of the soul, like religion gener- 
 ally, has been the common property of mankind in all 
 places and times. No religion is possible without it. With- 
 out belief in personal immortality religion is like an arch 
 resting on one support, or a bridge that runs into a preci- 
 pice. 17 Hope in a future and better life is the priceless 
 pledge that belief in God gives to man. This hope, this 
 belief in immortality, is not wholly wanting even among 
 tribes that stand lowest in the religious scale. A human 
 spirit, that is other than the body and survives after death, 
 is confessed, in one form or another, by the people of all 
 lands. 28 Even the men of the Stone Age, the companions 
 of the cave-bear, who are usually supposed to have de- 
 voted all their attention to this life, manifest in their care 
 for the dead their innate yearning for immortality. 
 " Here," says Quinet, " I think I have hit on the corner- 
 " stone on which things, divine and human, are built. From 
 " this beginning all the rest easily follows." The impor- 
 tance of the historical proof cannot therefore be gainsaid. 
 Cicero says that, in studying the doctrine of immortality, 
 the most ancient authors were the best to consult ; for, he 
 said, the more closely their lives bordered on the first be- 
 ginning and divine origin of things, the more likely they 
 would be to get at the truth. He found that all the peo- 
 ples of the ancient world were unanimous in proclaiming 
 their belief in immortality ; and the practical expression 
 
 17 Max Mfiller Essays, I., p. 46. 
 
 18 Peschel, VSlkerkunde^ p. 270, seq. Knabenbauer, Das Zeugniss des Menschen- 
 
 geschlechts fur die Unsterbl. der Seete, Freiburg, 1878. Max Mflller I.e. and Vil. 
 II., p. 246. Lotze, II., p. 456. Nadaillac (and Quinet), p. 408. Cicero, Tuscul., 
 I., 12, 26. Cyril Alexandr., Ep. I. ad man. orient. T. X., p. 17. Mohler, Athan.^ 
 I., p. 150.
 
 294 THE SOUL. 
 
 of their faith was their hope in a future reward, and their 
 dread of future punishment. Cicero sees a proof of this 
 faith in the custom of funeral rites. This belief seemed so 
 self-evident to the ancients that they thought it impossible 
 for any one to be in earnest in denying it. Thus S. Cyril 
 of Alexandria asks : " Does any man, who has not eaten 
 " of the root that takes the reason prisoner, hold that the 
 " soul perishes with the body ? I don't think any one has 
 " so broken down the pales and forts of reason." S. Atha- 
 nasius, indeed, thought that by sin souls were made like 
 unto the body, and ruined themselves by losing the knowl- 
 edge of God. But, in giving the complete proof that God 
 is distinct from the world, he tries to show that the soul 
 is distinct from the body. Consequently he sets out with 
 the clear conviction that the two are distinct. He thought 
 that idolaters did not confess a reasonable soul, because 
 they worshipped soulless idols. The denial of a rational 
 soul seemed to him the logical conclusion of denying the 
 true God, as the soul's consciousness of God would other- 
 wise necessarily lead to God. 
 
 The historical proof has met with two classes of assail- 
 ants : those who challenge the alleged universality, and 
 those who contend that universality is no proof of validity. 
 The arguments already advanced against atheism apply 
 here also ; for to deny God and to deny immortality are 
 correlatives. Both rest on the same foundation, and are 
 buoyed up on the same motives. Belief in immortality is 
 wedded to the consciousness of certain duties, against 
 which the sensual man rebels. By passion the human will 
 is easily turned aside from its course, and then it in turn 
 influences the understanding. Thus the belief in immor- 
 tality, as Socrates pointed out, hangs tottering in the bal- 
 ance of moral consciousness. Socrates was the first to put 
 philosophy on a practical basis. Perhaps he is the only 
 one of the ancient philosophers who gave clear and beauti- 
 ful utterance to the belief in immortality. All the others, 
 as Cicero says, though lapped in proofs, wavered. Even 
 Aristotle is doubtful. The Fathers, with one concerted
 
 THE SOUL. 295 
 
 voice, impeach him for denying the soul's immortality. 19 
 The YOV? continuing to exist in itself will always be an 
 enigma. Moral consciousness is the chief prop that sus- 
 tains the belief in immortality among men. As long as 
 conscience lasts this belief cannot be uprooted generally 
 and for ever. Multitudes may be made practical pessi- 
 mists by passion, poverty and corruption ; but the universal 
 moral consciousness will cause a reaction. The Buddhists, 
 a religious community numbering several hundred million 
 souls, preach atheism and declare against belief in immor- 
 tality ; but it is more than questionable whether the people 
 believe in total annihilation, in the Nirvana preached by 
 the philosophers. It is utterly impossible for four hundred 
 millions of men to embrace such a pessimism. But, in 
 point of fact, Buddha's nihilism welled forth from later 
 sources. Buddha's sacrifices and the self-denial of his dis- 
 ciples are barely conceivable without the thought of con- 
 tinued existence. The people pictured Nirvana as a 
 Mohammedan paradise no poverty, and a continuous 
 round of perfect sensual enjoyment. 110 In this, as in all 
 religious questions, there is a sharp antagonism between 
 the speculations of doctrinaires and the belief of the com- 
 mon people, which tells in favour of natural religion and 
 primitive revelation. Belief always goes before specula- 
 tion, and is independent of it ; nor does the moral side of 
 religion, as a rule, gain by one-sided speculation. 
 
 It may be urged that the doctrine of immortality is not 
 clearly set forth in the Old Testament. Earthly rewards 
 and prosperity, temporal inheritance in the promised land, 
 the outward dominion of Israel are said to be the only 
 inducements that God holds out to those who keep His 
 law. The recoil with horror from death, which seems the 
 destruction of life a shadowy existence in Scheol seems 
 but to intensify the gloom that shrouds man's fate after 
 death. Voltaire and his disciples, Deists, and Rationalists 
 
 19 Werner, Geschichte, &c., vol. i., p. 459, seq. ; v., p. 38. Mach., Die NothwtnJigkeit 
 
 der Offenbarung Gottes, Mainz, 1883, p. 68 and 89. 
 30 Max Muller, Essays, vol. i., p. 212, 289. Schell, fhilos.Jahrbuch^ 1886, p. 7, 12.
 
 296 THE SOUL. 
 
 from Kant to Schopenhauer, stoutly maintain that the 
 Hebrews did not believe in the immortality of the soul. 
 Twice has this subject been recently debated in the French 
 Academy, Derenburg and Renan taking the negative, 
 and Hale"vy the affirmative side. Halevy appealed to the 
 invocations of the dead, and to the valley of the sons of 
 Hinnom (Gehenna). Rabbins and Christians have local- 
 ized hell in this latter, because it served as a passage to the 
 lower world. But we need not hesitate to cross the Rubi- 
 con. These temporal promises have a double aspect : one 
 looks to earth, the other to heaven. By earthly rewards 
 the earthly-minded man was both won over to the law of 
 God, and directed to raise his thoughts above the things 
 of earth. Behind the letter that killeth stands the spirit 
 that quickeneth. The spiritual sense lay in the background 
 of the earthly sense. This truth was the hammer with 
 which the prophets closed up the rivets when the people 
 grew lax. In the Messianic prophecies they paint in vivid 
 colours the glories of the kingdom of the Messias, but they 
 are mindful to demand a new spirit and a new heart. 
 These clear passages are the key to ascertain the figurative 
 expressions current among the Semitic race. Thus even 
 the promise of earthly rewards can be understood aright 
 only when viewed through the spectroscope of belief in 
 immortality. The Jew hoped for things visible. This 
 hope supplied a tangible basis to his thought, which with 
 difficulty flew an eagle's flight, and gazed steadfastly on 
 the supernatural sun. Then, too, God's mercy and jus- 
 tice, when clad in earthly hopes, assumed a pleasing 
 shape. The Psalmist's reflections on the prosperity of the 
 wicked point to a future compensation, that is, to life after 
 death. The patriarchs hoped to be gathered to their 
 fathers, and to find rest and joy in Jehova ; and this hope 
 formed the luminous centre of the Israelite's faith. The 
 body will return to the earth whence it was, and the soul 
 to God who gave it.* Without this ineffaceable belief in 
 
 Eccles. xii., 7.
 
 THE SOUL. 297 
 
 immortality the Old Testament in its entirety is incom- 
 prehensible. 
 
 The Comparative Science of Religion, too, extends a 
 helping hand to this belief. It is certain that the Semitic 
 Phoenicians and Assyrians believed in the soul's immor- 
 tality. The Egyptians manifested their belief in works 
 that to this day excite our wonder. The dread of death 
 and dark forebodings of a lot cast among the shades, are 
 easily understood in an age that looked to the future for 
 light and grace. 81 The abode of departed souls in Hades 
 does not convey a complete notion of immortality, but it 
 discloses a belief in the soul's existence after death. The 
 faith of the Jews in our Lord's time may be gathered from 
 the parable of Dives and Lazarus, and from the discussion 
 about the resurrection. The doctrine of the New Testa- 
 ment and of the Church is as clear as crystal. " Fear not 
 " them that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul ; rather 
 " fear him who can destroy both body and soul in hell." 
 Matth. x., 28. These words of our Lord are the well- 
 spring from which the early Christians drank their heroic 
 courage and contempt of death. Some fathers, indeed, 
 explain immortality in a fantastic fashion, but all keep a 
 firm grip on the doctrine itself ; even Tertullian, Melito, 
 Lactantius and others who followed the Stoics in thinking 
 that the soul is in a manner corporeal. Justin derives im- 
 mortality, not from the soul's simplicity, but from its 
 potentiality to an eternal existence a potentiality made 
 actual by a special influx of the providential grace of God. 
 Similar theories were advanced by Theophilus, Arnobius, 
 and others ; but the faith in immortality was not shaken 
 by philosophic scepticism. 
 
 This universal belief in immortality cannot be an error 
 or a delusion. Who shall count the paths of error, or the 
 aberrations of the human heart ? Who, on the other hand, 
 shall find an error so universal, and so fraught with con- 
 
 21 Controverse, 1883, April, p. 390, seq. Kleutgen, Theologie, III., p. 920. Scholz, Thto- 
 logie des Alien Bundes, II., p. 79. Knabenbauer, p. 162. Riehm, Handworter- 
 buch des bibl. Alterth., 1884, p. 628. Schenkel, Bibelltxicon, II., p. 566, seq.
 
 298 THE SOUL. 
 
 sequences to the destinies of mankind ? Belief in the 
 Ptolemaic system, it will be retorted, was not less general, 
 and yet it is proved to have been an error. Exception, we 
 reply, may be taken to the universal belief in the Ptolemaic 
 system, for scientific astronomers knew that it was only a 
 plausible theory, not an established truth. With this sub- 
 ject, however, we shall deal later on. For the present it 
 will suffice to ask the counter-question : How comes it that 
 mankind have rejected the Ptolemaic System and not im- 
 mortality, if one be as erroneous as the other ? But there 
 is really no parallelism between the two cases. All appear- 
 ances told in favour of the geocentric system, but against 
 immortality. Birth and death are everywhere the order 
 of the day. In all things there is a constant ebb and flow. 
 Corruption devours even our own bodies. It is like hoping 
 against hope to believe that we still live after we seemingly 
 die. Appearances jeer and flout this belief in the teeth. 
 But nothing can tear it from the hearts of educated or un- 
 educated, the civilized man or the savage. To call such a 
 belief a chimera is to despair of humanity. 
 
 Natural causes are alleged to be an all-sufficient explana- 
 tion of the belief in immortality, as they were of the origin 
 of religion. It was thought that the facts and phenomena 
 of dream-land supplied the golden key to unlock this won- 
 derful psychological problem. Cicero seems inclined to 
 adopt this theory. Modern ethnographers and psycholo- 
 gists have repeatedly favoured its pretensions. " By what 
 magical skill, we may reasonably ask, could the human 
 mind be led captive by dreams which, on awaking, it rec- 
 ognises to have become delusions ? How could such a 
 delusion become universal, unless the human soul were 
 predisposed to receive it ? The contrary theory, to say the 
 least, is quite as reasonable. Such a delusion could not 
 possibly have found a home in man, had not the belief and 
 yearning for an immortal life beyond the grave been inborn 
 
 22 Tuscul., I., 13, 29. Peschel, p. 273. On the other side Schneider, Geistergtaube, 
 2nd Edit. 1885, p. 23, seq. Mohler, Athanasiut, [1., p. 150. Knauer, Psychologie, 
 p. 280.
 
 THE SOUL. 299 
 
 in his soul. As the soul's power in a dream of cutting 
 itself adrift from space and time is proof of its spirituality, 
 so its remembrance of and intercourse with the dead in 
 dreams is not the origin of the belief in immortality, but 
 the expression of a belief already in existence. A mortal 
 soul could not, when dreaming, grasp the thought of im- 
 mortality any more than a mortal, perishable body. 
 
 Does not the spiritual intercourse with the unseen world 
 authorize us to conclude that the dead can appear and 
 have actually appeared to the living ? Such a fact, if well 
 authenticated, would be a crushing argument in favour of 
 the immortality of the soul. The belief in such possible 
 and actual appearances is almost as old as the belief in 
 immortality itself. The sensual man is ever seeking a 
 tangible proof for his belief. To this morbid craving mod- 
 ern spiritualism owes the millions of adherents it has re- 
 cruited from among men who have lost all real faith. It 
 imagines that its media, like exorcists, can call the spirits 
 of the dead from the vasty deep. There are not wanting 
 honest-minded men who are firmly persuaded that spiritual- 
 ism is a positive proof of immortality. 23 We, certainly, 
 have no wish to condemn spiritualism root and branch, 
 and to resolve it into an airy nothing. Men of science, 
 indeed, go bail for the genuineness of its manifestations. 
 But the unmasking of different media, the mysterious ar- 
 rangements for holding dark sessions, and the silly trifling 
 answers given by the spirits when questioned, engender 
 doubt and distrust. These phenomena have an affinity 
 with the wonders of magnetism, clairvoyance, hypnotism, 
 and the like, which men have come to regard as a higher 
 mode of the soul's existence. Proof, however, has been 
 forthcoming that their phenomena are in part morbid, and 
 in part deceitful and tricky. We can, therefore, hardly 
 be expected to set great store on them as positive proofs 
 of the soul's immortality. In saying so much, however, 
 we in no way intend to give judgment against the possi- 
 
 23 Controverse, 1885, January and June.
 
 300 THE SOUL. 
 
 bility of such manifestations. One thing at all events is 
 clear : living men cannot have it in their power to make 
 the spirits actually appear. If they appear at all it must 
 be in order to minister to the higher ends of God's provi- 
 dence, and not merely to gratify a morbid curiosity. As 
 a rule, too, God employs ordinary means to carry out His 
 designs. As Abraham said to the rich glutton : " They 
 " have Moses and the prophets ; let them hear them. For 
 " if they will not hearken to Moses and the prophets, 
 " neither will they believe if one rise from the dead." 
 
 An empirical proof is even less feasible. For empiricism 
 is barricaded on every side by motion and mechanism. 
 It cannot grasp the spiritual and moral life. Experience 
 is deaf and dumb to all appeals either against or in behalf 
 of immortality. Empirical psychology may explain the 
 facts to a certain extent, but not in their entirety without 
 overstepping its bounds. Some have thought that the 
 atomism of the macrocosmos is fairly analogous to the 
 monadic hypothesis of the microcosmos. But the petitio 
 principii is too glaring to be hid. No bridge can span the 
 wide gulf that divides matter from spirit. Spirituality 
 lies outside the sphere of empiricism ; but an hypothesis 
 has been started to make clear the connection between 
 spiritual life and corporeal phenomena. Empirical psychol- 
 ogy deals with the world of sense and with the spiritual life 
 as manifested within the world of sense. But the monadic 
 theory puts the soul on a level with material agents. Its 
 indestructibility is, indeed, safeguarded by conceiving it 
 as a material atom. Thus its real nature is sacrificed to 
 save its eternity. Eternal life, according to Herbart, is 
 " an idea floating with infinite softness, an infinitely weak 
 vestige of what we call life." 24 
 
 Hence metaphysics alone can furnish a scientific proof 
 of the immortality of the soul. Only those who allow no 
 force to metaphysics can argue with Scotus that the soul's 
 immortality is unproveable." As the chief arguments 
 
 24 See Wundt, vol. i., p. 371;, seq. Erics, Der UmterblichkeitsglaHbe^ Karlsruhe. 1885. 
 
 25 Stockl, Geschichte der PAtfos., ii., p. 843. Schwane, Dogmtngeschichte^ vol. iii., p. 77.
 
 THE SOUL. 301 
 
 were drawn out in the discussion on the soul's nature, they 
 need now only be applied. Later philosophers have gen- 
 erally followed Plato, who was the first to rivet attention 
 on the subject. Thus Cicero urges four reasons from 
 Plato : (i) the nature and force of the soul as a self-moving 
 principle ; (2) the pre-existence of souls, as shown in mem- 
 ory, demands as its corollary a continued existence after 
 death ; (3) the other forces of the soul ; (4) the simplicity 
 of its nature. And he holds that philosophy, by thus 
 strengthening belief in immortality, teaches man how to 
 die. The Neo-platonists combated Aristotelians and 
 Stoics ; but they in turn shattered the dual principle by 
 their doctrine that all things emanate from God. Hence 
 the Christian Fathers, in spite of their predilection for 
 Plato, viewed with misgiving the indefinite relation in 
 which he placed the soul toward God, and rejected the 
 emanationism of the Neo-platonists. They adopted Plato's 
 reasons in substance, but supplemented them with other 
 and better reasons drawn from Christianity. The ideas of 
 goodness, beauty, truth and eternity, they say, could 
 spring up nowhere but in an immortal soul. The body is 
 brought into subjection by the mind and the will, and this 
 dominion, they point out, necessarily supposes that body 
 and soul are contrary one to another. In its thoughts the 
 soul rises above space and time. Thought travels more 
 swiftly than the electric spark to the utmost bounds of 
 space ; it joins the present with the past and future, and 
 wings its flight into regions beyond the present. The 
 soul often lives in the body as though it were absent ; it 
 peers beyond the earth, holds intercourse with angels and 
 saints, and, when pure and unclogged by earthly slime, 
 flies up to heaven. It is surely natural that the soul should 
 have a clearer vision of immortality, when its eyes are no 
 longer dimmed by the black veil of the body. For if it 
 can be like an angel when locked in the embraces of the 
 body, its life, when severed from the body, will be more 
 completely absorbed in God who made it through His 
 Logos, Jesus Christ. In Him its thoughts and feelings
 
 302 THE SOUL. 
 
 are immortal and eternal, because He is immortal. Thus 
 prettily Mo'hler sums up the argument of that profound 
 apologist, S. Athanasius. 1 " From the several thoughts con- 
 tained in former paragraphs on God and man, a proof of 
 personal immortality may be easily constructed. 
 
 The teaching of Christianity regarding man's original 
 destiny and the origin of evil have brought out in bold 
 relief the antagonism between God and the world, between 
 the soul's present condition and last end. If man is des- 
 tined to enjoy the vision of God, the soul must, of neces- 
 sity, be immortal, and the heir to eternal life. This con- 
 tinued existence must likewise be personal, because of the 
 personality of God and man. The Schoolmen, who did 
 not follow Scotus in denying the possibility of proving the 
 soul's immortality, based their proof chiefly on metaphysics 
 and the Aristotelian theory of cognition. Intellectual 
 activity, say the Schoolmen, proves the soul to be imma- 
 terial, and therefore indestructible and immortal. The soul 
 is a simple and imperishable form. The scholastic philoso- 
 phy, however, created special difficulties for those who 
 followed S. Thomas in admitting matter to be the individ- 
 ualizing principle. From this it would seem to follow 
 that without the body there is only one soul, or that all 
 souls are alike ; either they form one spiritual substance, 
 or they are as undistinguishable from one another as so 
 many drops of water. But, even apart from this, the con- 
 tinued existence of the soul is made hard to understand by 
 the doctrine that body and soul are united as matter and 
 form. Body and soul are part substances of one and the 
 same being. Form cannot exist without matter. Knowl- 
 edge is dependent on sense-perception. Without flJiantas- 
 mata no memory is possible. Alexander Hales was so im- 
 pressed by these facts that he admitted the soul to be a 
 compound of matter and form. The form of the soul, 
 S. Thomas explains, is not dependent on the body, but 
 created by God. Such spiritual influences as dreams and 
 
 26 Mohler, Athancuius, i., p. 151. Kleutgen, P/tilos., i., p. 723.
 
 THE SOUL. 303 
 
 ecstasy supply a higher class of thought than sense-per- 
 ceptions. Acts of knowledge and will (intelligere et velle] 
 are also proper to the soul alone, but memory not wholly 
 so. In this the New Scholastics re-echo his teaching." 
 The following is given as the pith of the Aristotelian doc- 
 trine : "In part the soul animates matter, and in part itself 
 " is alive, and the subject of the functions of life. When 
 " the body perishes, the soul perishes with it in part only, 
 " and is replaced by other forms. The part not tied to 
 " matter is not affected by the death of the body but, as 
 " an incomplete substance, will continue to live by itself 
 " for ever." Death is not a release for the soul in a pla- 
 tonic sense, but a rending asunder of parts made for each 
 other. Another difficulty, connected with the former, 
 beset the path of the Schoolmen, viz., their conception of 
 a compound. For the elements while forming the com- 
 pound were supposed to undergo a substantial change. 
 Hence we cannot, as it has been the fashion since the days 
 of Descartes, deduce the soul's immortality from the notion 
 of the simple or non-compound, for in that case the ele- 
 ments also must be unchangeable. 28 In our own day this 
 consequence holds good both logically and physically. 
 Modern science, in opposition to ancient teaching, not only 
 assumes but demonstrates from Physics and Chemistry 
 that the unchangeableness of the elements must be re- 
 garded as an axiom of science. If, therefore, the elements, 
 as at present known, are simple substances, the physical 
 simplicity of the soul will not amount to a proof of its im- 
 materiality. Nevertheless we are quite justified in infer- 
 ring therefrom the continuation of the soul's existence, espe- 
 cially if its existence is certain from other arguments. We 
 have as much right to argue that the soul is immortal 
 because it is simple, as modern science has to maintain 
 that the elements are eternal. Augustine agreed with 
 Plato in thinking the soul simple ; but, in comparison with 
 
 aj S. Thomas, I., qu., 87, a, 8 ; qu., 89, a, j. De Aniina, a, 15, 19, 20. See Knauer, p 
 
 367, 259. Schwane III., p. 348. 
 28 Kleutgen, Philos,, II., p. 562, seq.
 
 304 THE SOUL. 
 
 the boay, he conceived its simplicity as relative only. 1 ' 
 The soul is indeed a living unit, but its substance is dis- 
 tinct from the accidents. Metaphysical composition is not 
 excluded. The Council of Vienna in 1311 defined the soul 
 to be forma corporis in the scholastic sense. Inasmuch as 
 it is a special form created by God, it must be conceived 
 as a substance ; but its relations with the body make it a 
 part substance of man. Its union with the body notwith- 
 standing, it is in itself a spirit, incorporeal and simple. 
 By its very essence this spirit is the form and substance ; 
 but a being which is nothing but form must be self-subsist- 
 ing, and, according to Aristotelian principles, annihilation 
 alone can stamp it out of existence. 
 
 The soul's spirituality, therefore, as explained just now, 
 is the chief ground of personal immortality. The mind is, 
 in a sense, illimitable ; it is ever in quest of the spiritual 
 and the divine, and of higher knowledge. Spiritual and 
 moral progress and an undying struggle for perfection are 
 incompatible with a being that bears in its bosom the 
 germs of dissolution and death. The soul may indeed be 
 checked in its pursuit after perfection ; it may lag behind 
 or turn back. But it cannot disown its inward tendencies, 
 or die out like a flame that lacks oil. The body is not food 
 for the soul, but merely supplies it with matter for spiritual 
 activity ; and spiritual activity has its own laws even after 
 the body has crumbled into dust. Here also we may apply 
 what was said, in the moral proof for the existence of God, 
 about the soul's yearning for truth and bliss. This unex- 
 tinguishable yearning, which never reaches maturity and 
 cannot be wholly satisfied here below, is practically the 
 strongest argument for personal immortality. Kopila, an 
 Indian philosopher, when writing against Buddha who 
 contended that the unhappy man's bliss lay in annihila- 
 tion, says : " Man wishes to be free from suffering for his 
 " own sake, just as he desires his share of happiness even 
 " in this life. In order to satisfy the cravings of the human 
 
 39 Petavius, De fniarn., 4, 13, 9, seq. Schwane, I., p. 79 ; II., p. 229. Storz, p. 118.
 
 THE SOUL. 305 
 
 " heart the soul must continue to exist. If you dispute the 
 " existence of the soul you may not speak of the highest 
 " end of man." 80 The soul's desire to exist for ever was 
 brought forward by the Schoolmen also as at least a sec- 
 ondary proof of immortality. Alexander Hales, Bonaven- 
 tura and others were debarred by their view of the soul's 
 composition of matter and form, from appealing to its 
 simplicity and immateriality ; but they attached all the 
 more weight to the proof from man's last end. The eter- 
 nal possession of the summum bonum alone gives 'rest and 
 happiness to the human soul. This psycho-teleological 
 proof lies at the root of all proofs of immortality. Faith 
 in immortality everywhere springs from truth and happi- 
 ness, from the slacking of the mind's thirst for truth, from 
 satisfying the heart in its yearning for sorrowless bliss. 
 Without this belief the longing for perfect truth and virtue 
 would be a delusion, conscience a monster, and the dread 
 of retribution an absurdity. It would, too, always remain 
 an insoluble puzzle how this belief came to be universal 
 and to acquire stability, how it grew into an indispensable 
 reality attested by the consent of all peoples.* 1 
 
 This point of view also postulates the resurrection of the 
 body. In this life body and soul have been partners in 
 weal and woe ; it is reasonable, therefore, that they should 
 share the same fate in the next life. The soul can, indeed, 
 subsist of itself, but, since it was created to be united to 
 the body, it cannot be separated from the body for ever. 
 S. Thomas, however, considers this proof only a signum, 
 that may be presumed. It derives its full strength from 
 faith and revelation, to which province the doctrine of the 
 resurrection of the body wholly belongs. Here it need 
 only be noted that the body is by nature mortal, although 
 by a special gift of God, it was primitively endowed with 
 immortality. Hence it will rise from death, not in its 
 present or in its ordinary natural state, but as a glorified 
 body. Physiologists assume that the matter of the body 
 
 30 Max Muller, Essays, Vol. I., p. 212. 
 
 31 Schneider, p. 42, sg. Knabenbauer, p. 157, 164. Girodon, Exposd, Vol. II., p. 213.
 
 306 THE SOUL. 
 
 changes from every three to seven years. This change 
 may serve to show that the form and nature of the body 
 are above and independent of the individual atoms and 
 elements. The body, therefore, that will rise again will 
 not necessarily be identical with the constituent particles 
 that now compose it. The resurrection of the body has 
 been the great stumbling-block of ancient and modern un- 
 belief, and of the old and new rationalism. It will always 
 be difficult for the human mind to grasp it, but science 
 cannot demonstrate its impossibility. He who believes 
 that the living God created man, will not question His 
 power to raise the dead to life. Christ overcame death 
 for Himself and for us. As Christ rose again, so we also 
 shall rise again. 
 
 The proofs for the immortality of the soul and for the 
 existence of God lead us across the frontier of faith. They 
 breathe the air of faith. Immortality is such an obvious 
 and necessary foundation for all faith and religion that 
 there was no special need to give it a prominent place in 
 either Scripture or Tradition. But, in order to stop the 
 mouths of Italian philosophers who contended that Aris- 
 totle denied the immortality of the soul, the Council of 
 Vienna made it an article of faith. No decision, however, 
 was come to respecting Aristotle's attitude in the ques- 
 tion. 3 ' A similar opportunity presented itself to the Later- 
 an Council in 1512, which, however, merely condemned 
 certain philosophers who asserted that pure reason has no 
 right to say that the thinking soul is not mortal. In the 
 decisions against Traditionalism, the knowledge of the 
 soul's immortality was enumerated among those things 
 that can be attained by natural reason. Lastly the Vati- 
 can Council, by rejecting every form of Monism, and by 
 drawing a sharp distinction between matter and spirit, in- 
 directly sanctions belief in the immortality of the soul. 
 
 32 Kleutgen, TAtot., iii.,*p. 905. Schwane, iii , p. 376, seq.
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 MONISM. 
 
 If there is any force in the arguments advanced in the 
 foregoing sections, Monism in all its ramifications is 
 already condemned. If the proofs are not so convincing 
 as we would fain imagine, the fault lies not in the proofs 
 but in ourselves. Nevertheless we cannot shrink from the 
 task of subjecting the principles and consequences of the 
 Monistic hypothesis to a special examination. Monism is 
 set on deeper foundations than it seems to be. Tossed 
 about on a sea of changes, and distracted by the manifold 
 forms that are to-day, and to-morrow are not, the human 
 mind, like a ship before the wind, flees irresistibly, as to a 
 happy haven, to the theory that assigns a common origin 
 and end to all things. The one cause and end of all being 
 is the goal we are making for, when we argue back from 
 effect to cause, or from the conclusion to the reason, or 
 when we seek a point of rest and unity amid ever-shifting 
 phenomena. Unity follows from the idea of the absolute, 
 and from the idea of supreme power and intelligence. 
 Unity is the methodological principle of empirical research. 
 Our knowledge of God, with monotheism for its basis, 
 embodies the principle. Were we even to distinguish 
 between the God and God, our " henotheism" would betray 
 a monistic and monotheistic stamp. 
 
 It is always difficult, more especially in theorizing on 
 the world, to strike the golden mean. In the world and 
 in man two principles are striving for the mastery, the 
 material and the spiritual. Unless we can successfully
 
 308 MONISM. 
 
 blend the two into a higher unity, truth will suffer loss. 
 For we shall fall into one extreme or the other the mate- 
 rialistic or idealistic view of the world. Materialistic Mo- 
 nism evolves everything from dead matter, atoms and mo- 
 tion. Even the intellectual and moral life it considers the 
 product of material causes. Idealistic Monism makes the 
 absolute, in its most general signification, the source of all 
 things, mind being the highest point in the evolution of 
 universal being. Both theories efface the specific distinc- 
 tion between matter and spirit. Both regard thought as 
 identical with being. Materialism drags down thought to 
 the level of matter, by making it a mechanical movement 
 of material particles. Idealism raises matter to the dig- 
 nity of thought, by making it play an unconscious part in 
 the intellectual process. Materialism degrades man to a 
 level lower than the brute, and becomes in its practical 
 form Epicureanism and Egotism. Idealism makes man a 
 god indeed ; but a god who, during an eternal evolution, 
 appears as a wave on the surface of the ocean, that speedily 
 disappears in the flood, and is absorbed in the unfathom- 
 able and unconscious absolute. 
 
 The two Monistic systems have a long history, of which 
 we cannot give even a brief epitome. A few hurried notes, 
 a brief outline of their progress, must suffice. The atomis- 
 tic, the hedonistic and materialistic theories owed their 
 widespread diffusion in antiquity to Empedocles, Dem- 
 ocritus, Epicurus and Lucretius. The Eleatic school, with 
 their absolutist notion of unity, strove to satisfy the human 
 mind in its innate tendency towards Monism. The Stoics, 
 with their universal substance and absolute conception of 
 morality, gathered under their banner the better classes of 
 a corrupt society. Philo aimed at reconciling supernatural 
 revelation and natural reason, but distilled Theology into 
 a sort of Pantheism. The divine Logos, as the impersonal 
 reason of God, is, in his view, the logical unity of the 
 world. The ideal world is far above the real world, but 
 the final explanation of both is to be found only in Plato's 
 Monism. The Neo-Platonists pushed Platonism to its
 
 MONISM. 309 
 
 ultimate conclusions, and strove by semi- pantheism to 
 overcome Christian objections. Even strict Dualists, like 
 Gnostics and Manichaeans, could not altogether tear them- 
 selves asunder from Monism. They, indeed, represented 
 the two principles as sharply antagonistic, but in the long 
 run made them emanate from one principle. In their 
 theory God is not above the turmoil, but is actually drawn 
 into the struggle, and forms part of the evolution. Neces- 
 sity ousts freedom from things material. One end is the 
 goal of separation and redemption. The entire process by 
 which matter and evil are destroyed points towards the 
 same goal. A common beginning and end is recognized 
 even by the Iranian Religion, the mother of Dualism. 
 The Christian theory is a tempered Dualism. It admits 
 that soul and body, God and the world, are specifically 
 distinct, but it holds fast to unity amid distinction. It 
 denies identity, but reconciles rival interests. But Monism 
 has always been a power outside Christianity. In non- 
 christian philosophy, Pantheism, too, has ever played a 
 part. Scotus Erigena and many one-sided mystics bear 
 witness that it has gained a footing even among Chris- 
 tians. Some have even gone so far, unjustly no doubt, as 
 to impute to the Schoolmen a leaning towards semi-panthe- 
 ism. Modern philosophers have mostly adopted the spir- 
 itualistic philosophy introduced by Descartes. But the 
 names of Spinoza, Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling are an 
 ample guarantee of the widespread dominion of Pantheism 
 down to the most recent times. Its empire was in part 
 broken and in part extended by the mechanical Monism 
 which Bacon, Descartes, Gassendi, Hobbes and Locke 
 planted, and which has firmly taken root in modern sci- 
 ence. Monism in this form has dug deep down into the 
 strata of society. It is a watchword echoed even in the 
 ranks of believers. 
 
 Mere materialism is too gross to need refutation here. 
 However gorgeous be the attire in which it is paraded, it 
 cannot captivate any thoughtful mind. The degraded 
 masses and the riotous liver find in it a religion congenial
 
 310 MONISM. 
 
 \o their tastes. The former are thrown into the arms of 
 this melancholy creed by destitution and every kind of 
 misery ; the latter see in it a justification of their manner 
 of living. With the spiritual and moral life these men are 
 either wholly unconcerned, or treat them as careless trifles. 
 If a tree is still to be known by its fruits, the character of 
 this Monism will deceive no one. It opens wide the door 
 to sensuality and selfishness, loosens the ties of family, 
 and leads to the disruption of state and society. If by any 
 chance it ever attains universal dominion, religion and 
 morality will be a heap of charred ruins. 
 
 Mechanical Monism is also materialism in its conse- 
 quences, but tries to ensconce itself behind the fortifica- 
 tions of reason, by laying down general laws to compass 
 all events. Philosophers of old distinguished in things a 
 constant element, the substance, and a fleeting element, 
 the accidents. The former was the type that stood firm 
 and unmoved amid the general flux ; the latter were 
 washed away, changed or devoured by the blind waves 
 and surges. They knew not how the accident inhered in 
 the substance, but they accepted the inherence as a fact. 
 Nor did they drawback from admitting substantial changes 
 also. Modern science, however, has blown accidents to 
 the winds, by blending the notions of substance and mat- 
 ter, and by viewing the changing properties of things as 
 effected by the corroding action of the material substance. 
 To account for effects produced on the subject, ancient 
 Natural Philosophy ascribed qualitates occultce to the things 
 themselves. Modern science regards these qualities, not 
 as something absolute and real with an existence of its 
 own, but only as relations of things to one another. Thus 
 colour, sound, taste, and the like, are merely states of 
 consciousness, effects on the organs of sense. Ancient 
 natural philosophy found the essence of the soul in the 
 immaterial psychic substance that was the subject and 
 cause of the several faculties. Modern science finds the 
 essence of the soul in " a general total state resulting from 
 " many previous conditions and their relations, in which the
 
 MONISM. 311 
 
 "general state becomes the law of thought, feeling and 
 " tendency. So there is no soul before there is under- 
 " standing, taste, and character." The soul is the interior, 
 the body the exterior of one and the same thing. Bodily 
 and mental acts are merely different effects of the same 
 cause. In all the spheres of being and life, both conscious 
 and unconscious phenomena are regarded as effects of 
 matter, viewed either materially or dynamically. Or, 
 again, phenomena are different complications and blend- 
 ings of the elements which come together according to 
 their position and inclination, and separate again to form 
 new combinations. 
 
 In spite, however, of its fascinating appearance, its 
 stately strut, and the solemn imposing airs it assumes, 
 Monism cannot unlock the world-puzzle, or even unravel 
 the microcosm. It is incompetent to explain the begin- 
 ning of being, the origin or the various forms of life, the 
 unity in variety, or the variety in unity. Without assign- 
 ing any reason, it handcuffs the spiritual life with mechani- 
 cal laws. To the question : what is sensation or feeling ? 
 it says it doesn't know. When questioned about con- 
 sciousness and self-consciousness, it gives the same satis- 
 factory and soothing answer. When, in despair, we put 
 the further question : what are will, freedom, and duty ? 
 it whispers confidentially into our ears : Ignoramus et igno- 
 rabimus. Thus the entire range of life and humanity is 
 doomed to be wrapped in a winding sheet, and nailed 
 down in a coffin of ignorance, for all eternity. Positivism 
 modestly limits our knowledge to the finite, and supposes 
 the finite cannot be considered otherwise than monistically. 
 But it must confess that our knowledge of this finite, ac- 
 cording to our mental and natural condition, is and will 
 ever remain infinitely small (Nageli). Science must not 
 ignore the soul-elements, unless it is to confess its own 
 incapacity, and renounce all satisfactory explanations. 
 To explain atoms dynamically does not help us much, for 
 the dynamic theory cannot make a bridge from mechanics 
 to consciousness. Mental life has snatched from the jaws
 
 312 MONISM. 
 
 of monism the concession that animated matter isunprove- 
 able. Besides, it only puts the problem a pace further 
 back without solving it. Spaceless atoms, and an inner 
 spiritual life pervading all matter 1 lie outside the orbit of 
 exact science, and can never be made intelligible to the 
 mind. If all things have souls, and if animated bodies 
 stand in contrast to the indivisible soul, a sort of Monism, 
 in spite of consciousness, is indeed preserved, but all under- 
 standing of the soul and the corporeal world is sacrificed. 
 In that case there would be two parallel developments, 
 but not the development of spirit from matter. There is 
 no explaining how the unity of conscience results from the 
 diversity of soul-elements, and their unconscious percep- 
 tions. The resultant of spiritual forces is just as little able 
 to dispense with a starting point, or to change the kinds 
 of force, as the resultant of physical forces. Mechanical 
 Monism is really fraught with the same consequences to 
 the moral life as gross materialism, but it is not so open 
 and cynical in avowing them. No adequate motive can 
 be assigned for moral obligations unless the soul have a 
 specifically higher life than the body. As this Monism is 
 the view embraced by the educated, the actual conse- 
 quences may be, perhaps, less crude and revolting. But 
 the lower strata of society will explain the " new faith" of 
 the cultured classes in their own way. 
 
 From Monistic Animism to Pantheism the way is short 
 and easy. In one form or another Pantheism lies at the 
 root of modern systems. New Pantheism differs from the 
 old more in method than in substance. Nowadays the 
 a posteriori method alone is possible. A system of meta- 
 physics that does not rest on a fair physical basis, is laughed 
 to scorn as a castle in the air. A priori constructions have 
 been thrown overboard, and metaphysics are viewed with 
 distrust, precisely because the immoderate a priori specu- 
 lations of Pantheist philosophers of this century contra- 
 dicted the certain results of science. Kant's Kritik, by 
 
 i Lotze, Microcosmos, I., p. 405, II., 47.
 
 MONISM. 313 
 
 separating the substance from the phenomena, and with- 
 drawing it from cognizance, shook the foundations of 
 knowledge. By pushing Kant's principles to their extreme 
 conclusions, Pantheists obliterated the real world, and 
 constructed a world of their own from idea and thought. 
 In their view, all being is dependent on thought ; the inner 
 world is the cause of external phenomena, the universal of 
 the individual. As a necessary consequence they deny 
 the reality of the world. The " School of Reason" (Cousin, 
 Saisset, &c.) profess to give a more exact analysis of the 
 contents of consciousness. But by starting from a rational 
 intuition and constructing being from thought a priori, it 
 cuts the ground from under its feet, and has nothing to stand 
 on when accounting for nature and being. Even if it 
 transfer its starting-point from consciousness to internal 
 experience (Frank, Janet, Boullier, Caro, &c.), the mate- 
 rial and external world is still undreamt of in its philoso- 
 phy. The psychological school, which has lately picked 
 up many recruits, is wrecked on the same rock." If the 
 existence of the soul be assumed, that, at any rate, is 
 something real and perfect, a centre from which philosophic 
 speculations may radiate. Thought is the best thing in 
 nature. Its ultimate reason lies in the absolute perfection. 
 The soul is understood in God, and nature in the soul. 
 Thus we may vanquish materialism by contemplating all 
 things in the human soul, but there matter ceases and 
 becomes mere force. The ultimate consequence of this 
 spiritualism is idealistic and pantheistic. Finally, if Pes- 
 simism be enthroned, and the " will" or " the unconscious" 
 be made the chief factor, the spiritual and moral life totters 
 and falls. There can be no longer any question of giving 
 a reasonable account of the world and its inhabitants, for 
 they are an insoluble enigma. 'Twere better for them not 
 to exist. 
 
 Pantheism, as this form of Monism has been called since 
 the days of John Toland, sets out with the idea of being, 
 
 2 See Elie Blanc, Un spiritualising sans dieu. Contfoverse, 1885, June and July, 
 Pressens6, p. 26, seq.
 
 314 MONISM. 
 
 without distinguishing between the different kinds of 
 being. Thus there is the purely ideal logical being, and 
 the general objective and physical being ; the universal 
 and indefinite being which reason recognizes as underlying 
 all things ; and the transcendental infinite being which is 
 the cause and author of all things that are ; all these the 
 Pantheist conceives as one. The Traditionalist's point of 
 departure is also the idea of being, but it is the absolute 
 being, God. Others hold that the rational idea of the ab- 
 solute is the real principle and foundation of our knowl- 
 edge of God. Both these schools, however, are loud in 
 declaring that being cannot be deduced from thought, nor 
 the absolute from the indefinite being. But the Panthe- 
 ist's first being is the possible not the real. With him the 
 unreal and the non-existent is the absolute beginning. 
 He makes the unconscious the cause of the conscious, and 
 the general the cause of the particular. Thereby he aban- 
 dons all hope of explaining the laws of causality, and of 
 the conservation of energy, as well as the beginning of 
 things, or rather of being, which is at the same time non-ens. 
 Thus universal being becomes the beginning of develop- 
 ment. Although it is nothing it can become everything. 
 If we try to fix the idea of ens purum, it is, indeed, shown 
 to be identical with nothing. This, however, is not the 
 true concept of the absolute being. Ens purum is a pure 
 abstraction, a logical creation, with no corresponding 
 reality. Is this concept of universal being to be the cause 
 of all other being ? Why should this being become every- 
 thing ? How can it be individualized in divers things ? 
 It mocks our frustrate search for a reason. For if ens is 
 identical with non-ens, the further idea of " becoming" 
 (fart) can arise only in the heat-oppressed brain of the 
 philosopher. But the process of becoming, so far as it has 
 been observed in nature, is never a transition from nothing 
 to something, but from one mode of being to another. 
 The cause, at the very least, must be on a par with the 
 effect. A cause can produce an effect lower but not higher 
 than itself. Therefore indefinite can never develop into
 
 MONISM. 315 
 
 definite being. Individuals as such can never exist if they 
 are but the phenomena of one and the same thing. In 
 Pantheism individualization is inconceivable. And yet, as 
 we everywhere see, individuality is the basis of nature. 
 The union of forces originally separated begets higher 
 knowledge and higher realities. Were there no monads, 
 says Leibnitz, Spinosa would be right. Either the Panthe- 
 ist regards individuals as parts of the Infinite, or he must 
 admit a substance distinct from the phenomena. In the 
 former alternative, many finite, dependent and contingent 
 parts added together will never yield an infinite and uni- 
 versal, much less an absolute being. If he embrace the 
 latter alternative, he cannot know or predicate anything of 
 the absolute, since its phenomena alone are real. Nothing 
 now remains for the Pantheist but to say that the real 
 world alone is finite, and that the idea of it, the " will," 
 and " the unconscious," are simple, perfect, and infinite. 
 In the absolute these ideas have consistency and meaning. 
 But as long as the universal in the abstract is the starting- 
 point they are empty sounds. The distinction between 
 real and ideal being, and the real and the ideal world is 
 right and just, but it has a real basis only when the idea 
 itself is real, the truly existing and all real. The ideas 
 of the world and of individual beings existed from all eter- 
 nity, and were realized in time ; but they were actual and 
 effective ideas, not hollow abstractions. They can exist 
 in a spiritual subject only. Truth, indeed, has its principal 
 seat in knowledge, but the thing known does not owe its 
 existence to knowledge. If things did not exist in them- 
 selves, thought could not represent them. That is true 
 which is, says S. Augustine. But man can arrive at the 
 knowledge of the truth only by establishing a correspond- 
 ence between mind and object. That alone which is the 
 absolute being can, by its mind and will, give existence to 
 all. Natural causes can produce one effect only, and that 
 must pre-exist in them potentially. The cause of many 
 and divers things must be essentially distinct from the 
 things themselves.
 
 316 MONISM. 
 
 As Pantheism is at a deadlock in regard to individuali- 
 zation in general, so it is at still greater loss to explain the 
 individual life of the soul and spirit. It is easier for Pan- 
 theism than for Mechanical Monism to assume a basis for 
 the soul's acts ; but it always remains a still-born assump- 
 tion. " Everything is reasonable, and whatever is reason- 
 " able is real." This is tantamount to saying that matter, 
 the individual consciousness and self-consciousness, are 
 enigmas of which no solution can be given. If the world 
 is no more than the idea of the non-ego (other being) we 
 must fall back on the world-soul of the ancients. But 
 this, again, blocks the way for the individual conscious- 
 ness. If thought and being are identical, the soul must 
 be both corporeal and absolute : corporeal, because it 
 knows the body ; absolute, because it knows the absolute. 
 All souls, too, would be identical. As the distinction be- 
 tween soul and body, between particular and universal 
 being is wiped away, so there would no longer be any 
 distinction between soul and body. By what manner of 
 means is the individual, conscious, and self-conscious being 
 to be evolved from universal unconscious being ? What 
 causes this striking evolution ? What is the reason that 
 this individualization is more complete in one part of uni- 
 versal being than in another ? Experience shows that the 
 march of the individual towards self-consciousness is de- 
 pendent on external influences. Yet, even if it were not 
 so, there would be no analogy between this and the devel- 
 opment of the universal and unconscious into individual 
 consciousness. As a matter of fact self-consciousness is 
 attained only by those particular beings which from the 
 first were disposed as human beings. All other theories, 
 as was shown above, have no sufficient raison d' ttre. They 
 are built not on the rock of experience but on the shifting 
 sands. It is a general truth of experience, which holds 
 good here also, that the real and the perfect go before the 
 possible and imperfect. What happens in the individual 
 has its principle and cause in the universal. The infinite 
 cannot have evolved itself from the infinite. It must be
 
 MONISM. 317 
 
 considered as something absolutely real from the begin- 
 ning. Conditional self-consciousness and a relative per- 
 sonal being in a number of individuals are conceivable in 
 the supposition of an absolute self-consciousness and a 
 personal absolute : but they cannot be conceived as ema- 
 nating from an universal unconscious being. 
 
 Why, however, should universal being stop short at 
 human self-consciousness ? Is not the whole universe to 
 be conceived as capable of endless progress ? Individuals 
 are carried down and submerged in the stream of time ; 
 but once a general progressive development is admitted to 
 be necessary, the whole should make unlimited progress. 
 But natural science shows that this universe is slowly but 
 surely coming to an end. Pantheism is wholly unable to 
 explain the process of thought in design and purpose. 
 Were the unconscious the cause of thought and being, 
 then the will could not play so important a part in the 
 sphere of action, nor purpose in the universe. A con- 
 sciousness of voluntary activity pervades the psychic proc- 
 ess, from the first desire of a result till its complete reali- 
 zation ; and this consciousness is at its strongest in the 
 creations of the mind. 3 Sense-perceptions may be half 
 unconscious, although, as we know by experience, even 
 the strongest, if no attention is paid to them, pass by un- 
 noticed. But to rise from sense-perception to a concept, 
 a positive act of thought, which involves attention and 
 determination of the will, is necessary. But if the uncon- 
 scious and unfree will, such as it exists also in instinctive 
 acts of men, is so productive, then not only must con- 
 sciousness proceed from the unconscious, but it must also 
 infallibly and uniformly either attain or miss its end in 
 every case. Then Optimism or Pessimism would be the 
 only true theory. Relative good and evil can find no 
 place in Pantheism. Limited, imperfect, and defective 
 being, which is proper to the real world, would be impos- 
 
 3 Staude in Wundt, Philos. Au/satze, vol. I., p. 175, seq. Kahl, Die Lehre vom 
 Primat des Widtns b i Augustinus, Duns Scot us und Descartes. Strassburg, 
 1886.
 
 318 MONISM. 
 
 sible, if all things were the result of a necessary develop 
 ment of universal being, and were not freely caused and 
 destined for higher ends. Mechanical Monism has, per- 
 haps, a claim on us, inasmuch as it makes imperfections 
 and defects a motive of development. But Pantheism 
 can plead no such justification, for it begins, not with 
 force and matter, but with ideal being. Unless we are to 
 draw goodness into the whirlpool of natural phenomena, 
 and thus deny moral good, there is no alternative but to 
 include nature in the realization of good. 4 All being, all 
 that goes by the name of form and figure, thing and event, 
 i.e., nature in all its fulness, is but a postulate for the 
 realization of good, and a declaration of its infinite value. 
 How little this theory squares with facts, is shown by the 
 confession, that it is a matter not of cognition but of con- 
 viction. From this point of view there yawns " an abyss, 
 " separating the world of reality from the world of forms, 
 " that human reason cannot or at least never has filled in." 
 It is in vain that the new faith seeks in nature the good 
 that the old faith sought above nature in spirit. 
 
 Monistic Pessimism, in its turn, finds a mystery in rela- 
 tive goodness. To deny it altogether would be rash, and 
 in manifest contradiction with everyday experience. Such 
 a denial would argue either subjective bias or mental dis- 
 ease. To poise the older Gnostic and Manichaean Pessi- 
 mism, the Fathers placed in the other scale the goodness 
 and beauty that undeniably exist in men and things. The 
 world, they said, was not so bad as the Pessimists painted 
 it. Look where we will, in the heavens above or on the 
 earth below, whether we contemplate man or any other 
 living creature all, with one concerted voice, proclaim the 
 goodness of the creator. The Fathers found their chief 
 delight in steadfastly gazing on the beauties of nature, 
 and in contemplating the heights to which human thought 
 and will ascend. Were it not so, however, and were we 
 even to suppose this to be the worst of worlds, we should 
 
 4 Lotze, Vol. I., p. 447 ; II., p. 454.
 
 MONISM. 319 
 
 be no nearer to its origin and condition. After all, Opti- 
 mism and Pessimism are merely two aspects of the same 
 principle. They are two opposite consequences arising 
 from the unification of individual being. As the opposi- 
 tion between being and not-being has to be surmounted at 
 the outset, so antilogies arise in the process of develop- 
 ment, that have to be reconciled into a higher unity. If, 
 however, a misapprehension of being and unity lies at the 
 root of the unity of being established by the opposition 
 between being and not-being, then such a unity would 
 obliterate all opposition between opposites, and the reason- 
 able would be identical with the unreasonable, the good 
 with the bad. Pantheism transfers to the whole world 
 that identity of being and thought which exists in God 
 alone, and shuffles on the absolute 5 the processes of thought 
 and of becoming (fieri), which are proper to the finite. It 
 makes the absolute finite, and the finite absolute. It slurs 
 over the actual difference between good and evil. Hence 
 it is now frankly admitted that the paths struck out by 
 Kant's disciples end in a cul de sac. 6 Pessimism ripened 
 in the sunshine of popular favour, not because it was Pan- 
 theism, but because it gave utterance to the general misery, 
 and moved the murmuring lips of discontent. In times of 
 religious indifference and moral decadence the absurdest 
 views, as a rule, are most relished. Now, however, that 
 Mechanical Monism is pronounced inadequate to account 
 for the spiritual and moral life, it follows that no kind of 
 Monism can be satisfactory, except to those who, with 
 Lotze, consider all explanation hopeless, in spite of their 
 sneaking regard for Mechanical Monism. Anyhow, at the 
 chief turning-points of existence, Monism leaves unex- 
 plained the principles of simplicity and multiplicity, of 
 harmony in diversity, of constancy in change, of causality 
 among infinitely numerous effects. 
 
 In this way we again veer round to that Dualism which 
 
 5 Kleutgen, Philos. II., 2, 34, 401, 447, seq. ; I., p. 536, seq. Pesch, II., Weltrathsel^ 
 
 p. 25, seq. 
 
 6 Liebmann, A /., p. 223.
 
 320 MONISM. 
 
 preserves unity in the midst of distinction. To be intelli- 
 gible the world must be conceived as the effect of an abso- 
 lute cause, as the work of a personal Creator. Can, then, 
 this Dualism, which lies at the root of Theism, be traced 
 in every minutest detail ? This is quite another matter. 
 Aristotelian Schoolmen made the attempt by resolving all 
 created things into two partial substances, distinct but 
 mutually dependent, matter and form. This is not the 
 place to discuss these terms and their application. 7 This 
 one point, however, may be noted : matter, unable to ex- 
 ist in itself, but destined to be real and capable of becom- 
 ing everything, is in itself quite as inconceivable as the 
 Pantheistic universal being, which is nothing. Naturally 
 the possibility or potentiality in a compound being must 
 be real, but it eludes experience and baffles evidence. 
 The form is equally unable to exist in itself. It, too, must 
 be educed from non-existent matter. The principle of in- 
 dividuation, though recognised, is still unknown. If, 
 again, as the Thomists maintain, matter is the principle of 
 individuation, 8 the individual is capped with a still denser 
 mist. But the flaw lies more in the theory than in the 
 principle. In point of fact nothing exists that is not com- 
 pounded of matter and form. The two have been blended 
 together ever since the first being set foot on earth till 
 now. Neither is it necessary to assume that in the physi- 
 cal and chemical processes, there has been a continuous 
 change of form. It is very probable, according to modern 
 physics and chemistry, that all phenomena may be ex- 
 plained by the condition and motion of atoms and ether. 
 No further hypothesis is needed even for crystals. But 
 with life an essentially new factor appears on the scene, 
 which imperatively calls for a higher form. At this junc- 
 ture Mechanical Monism can no longer appeal to the ex- 
 isting forces and laws of nature. It matters little whether 
 this new form be called forma substantialis or anima vegeta- 
 tiva, or vital force, or plastic tendency, or any other name. 
 
 7 See Theol. Quartakchrift, 1885, p. 20, eq. 
 
 8 See Glossner, Philos. Jahrbuck, 1886, Nos. I and a.
 
 MONISM. 321 
 
 There is this advantage in the Scholastic theory : the form 
 never assumes the semblance of anything external and 
 accidental. The Schoolmen agree with modern science in 
 enshrining the cause of life in the essence of the thing 
 itself. Thus every living being is clearly one and whole, 
 and all vital functions must flow from the whole. The 
 form is the active principle which governs the material 
 elements, and subordinates physical and chemical processes 
 to its own ends ; but it is so in virtue of being a partial 
 substance of the whole being. In like manner, the Scho- 
 lastic theory of knowledge stands midway between the 
 two extremes. Sense-perception, not thought, is its start- 
 ing-point. It assumes neither the identity nor the abso- 
 lute diversity of the grades of being, but only their unity 
 of resemblance. The thing known is determined by the 
 manner of the mind that knows (ad modum cognoscentis). 
 Hence thought is not identical with the being of things ; 
 and yet the two are connected by the correspondence be- 
 tween mind and object. Thus analogy has a wider range 
 in natural and divine knowledge. That knowledge is 
 possible must be allowed even by the man who doubts, if 
 he have faith in his doubt. But it is possible only on the 
 supposition that object and subject are referred to each 
 other. Again, this relation requires God to be related to 
 the world, as its cause and end. From the first there 
 must have been mutual relations between the world and 
 the thinking ego. They did not emanate from the abso- 
 lute, but were created. They are both limited. They are 
 not manifestations of the absolute, but are subject to it as 
 their aim and end. This gives us an insight into the struc- 
 ture of the material and spiritual world, which involun- 
 tarily moves man to worship the almighty and all-wise 
 Creator. Monism is a comfortable creed for all who deny 
 a future life, who set up immortal matter instead of the 
 immortal soul, who dethrone God and crown man as the 
 only being in whom the infinite attains self-consciousness. 
 But Buddhism shows into what straits man may be driven 
 by reliance on his own strength, The high-blown pride,
 
 322 MONISM. 
 
 that almost unconsciously peeps through his thoughts, 
 brings him to the brink of the precipice over which Buddha 
 fell. His only hope of redemption from the miseries of 
 life is in Nirvana, the gloomy and cheerless nothing. Such 
 a Nirvana, however, as experience teaches, has no practi- 
 cal hold on the mind and heart of man, which thirst for 
 the living God as their true end and happiness.* 
 
 The Vatican Council was induced by the widespread 
 prevalence of Monism in modern society to confront it 
 with the old doctrine of the natural knowledge of God. 
 The first chapter of the Constitution on Faith treats of 
 God, the Creator of all things. In the original draft of 
 the Schema, the title had express reference to Rationalism. 
 Rationalism in all its Protean forms is to be rejected. 
 There is the gross rationalism, which denies the existence 
 of God ; the ordinary rationalism, which admits natural 
 knowledge only ; the semi-rationalism, which admits super- 
 natural revelation but makes reason the measure and judge 
 of its contents : all are to be shunned. The first is the 
 only kind with which Monism is concerned. The first sec- 
 tion of the first chapter aims a blow at this form, by ascrib- 
 ing to God such attributes as are in direct contradiction 
 to Pantheism. God is there defined as an absolute, self- 
 conscious, free spirit, " who, as being one, sole, absolutely 
 " simple and immutable spiritual substance, is to be de- 
 " clared as really and essentially distinct from the world, 
 " and ineffably exalted above all things which exist, or are 
 " conceivable, except Himself." In the Canons subjoined 
 
 " What was the original meaning of Nirvaa may perhaps be best seen from the ety- 
 mology of this technical term. Every Sanscrit scholar knows that Nirvana 
 means originally the blowing out, the extinction of light, and not absorption. 
 The human soul, when it arrives at its perfection, is blown out, if we use the 
 phraseology of the Buddhists, like a lamp ; it is not absorbed, as the Brahmans 
 say, like a drop in the ocean." Although "annihilation" and not "union and 
 communion with God, or absorption of the individual soul by the Divine 
 Essence" was the original meaning attached to Nirvana by the first disciples of 
 Buddha (of Buddha himself?), yet it would seem to have soon given way to the 
 second meaning. From the earliest times Buddhist philosophers and Buddhist 
 teachers have " propounded every conceivable opinion as to the orthodox inter- 
 " pretation of this term." See Max Muller, Chips from a German Workshop^ pp. 
 280-291. Tr,
 
 MONISM. 323 
 
 the several kinds of Monism are condemned. Firstly 
 Atheism, as the common principle pervading all Monism, 
 is condemned. In the second canon anathema is launched 
 against those who do not blush to assert, that nothing but 
 matter exists. The condemnation of this gross material- 
 ism would be superfluous, were it not the ultimate out- 
 come of Darwinism. The third Canon is directed against 
 ontological Pantheism, which makes the being of God and 
 the world substantially identical. The fourth Canon deals 
 with the various forms of this Pantheism, which is at the 
 bottom of atheism : for if everything is God, there is no 
 God. Some make finite things, both corporal and spiritual, 
 or certainly the latter, emanate from the divine sub- 
 stance ; others contend that the divine being, by manifes- 
 tation or evolution, becomes everything ; others, again, 
 contend that God is the universal indefinite being, which 
 by self-determination divides all things into genera, species, 
 and individuals ; all are included under the same ban of 
 condemnation. Brahmanism, Neo-Platonism, Gnosticism, 
 and Eastern religions generally taught emanation and evo- 
 lution ; modern Pantheism teaches the self-determination 
 of the universal and indefinite being. To all these un- 
 tenable hypotheses, which are in a greater or less degree 
 atheistic, the Vatican Council opposes the teaching of 
 Holy Scripture as the only true doctrine : the world, and 
 all things in it, both spiritual and material, according to 
 their whole substance, have been created by God out of 
 nothing. Of His own free-will, without any necessity, 
 God created the world for His own honour and glory.
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 CREATION. 
 
 Although the course and drift of our previous enquiries 
 has forced upon us the idea of creation, the explanation of 
 that idea belongs more to theology than to science. Sci- 
 ence shows its necessity and, like a finger-post, points out 
 the road. But it cannot cross the frontier unless provided 
 with a religious passport. Genesis, the oldest religious 
 document, opens with a brief but majestic narrative of the 
 creation of all things the universe, organic life, and man. 
 " In the beginning God created heaven and earth." 
 This first verse of the Bible, so short and so simple, con- 
 tains the grandest and deepest truth about the world that 
 philosophers have ever conceived or uttered. With one 
 stroke it hews down and fells the knotty and cross-grained 
 problems that are rooted in Oriental religions, Greek 
 philosophy, and human life. 1 All things, in heaven and 
 on earth, were called into being by God's almighty power. 
 There is one self-existing, all-powerful God, unconfined 
 by time and space, who has given existence to things that 
 before were not. Heaven is not God, but a work of God. 
 Father Heaven and Mother Earth were created by the 
 Almighty. Such is the gist and weighty import of these 
 few words. 
 
 Does the verb bard, enoltjCfBv, creavit, mean creation 
 from nothing ? Or is it indeterminate ? Jewish and Cab- 
 balistic commentators, R. Kimchi and others interpret it : 
 creavit ex nihilo. Aben Ezra declares against Kimchi, be- 
 
 x See S. Ephrem, Gen. I., n. 4.
 
 CREATION. 325 
 
 cause the same word means formavit in verses 21 and 27, 
 and has yet another meaning in Numbers xvi., 30. In 
 Josue xvii., 15, 1 8, bard, as later writers have pointed out, 
 is used in the sense of " felling trees." Here, however, 
 it should be noted that the verb stands in Piel, and thus 
 retains the primitive signification to " cut" or " cut out." 
 In the meaning of " create" it is used of God only, and 
 no material out of which the object is made is ever speci- 
 fied. In verses 21 and 27 it stands for the creation of man, 
 and of the monsters of the deep. Their creation, however, 
 included a vital principle as well as formation from earth. 
 Nevertheless we are debarred by the asdh of verse 25 from 
 extracting the idea from the word alone. The idea itself 
 is foreign to human thought. But with the aid of Biblical 
 teaching about God's nature and action, it will be seen 
 that this interpretation did not merely start in opposition 
 to Greek Alexandrine philosophy, but was intended by 
 the sacred writers. From this time forward it is a Scrip- 
 tural characteristic of God, that He is not powerless like 
 the gods of the heathen, but created heaven and earth in 
 the beginning. Certain expressions in the Sapiential 
 Books* relative to Greek philosophy, seem to darken the 
 clear idea of creation, by laying stress on the designer 
 rather than the creator of the world. These few passages 
 of later writers, however, even if thus weighed, cannot 
 turn the scale against the clear and universal teaching of 
 Holy Scripture. Ambiguous expressions are to be checked 
 by clear and certain teaching. The oldest account of 
 creation, however, clearly distinguishes two stages in God's 
 act of creation. " And the earth was void and empty," 
 says the second verse of Genesis. This much-discussed 
 Tohu Va Bohu dispenses us from the necessity of having 
 recourse to external matter, as it provides the shapeless 
 matter from which God formed the earth. 4 
 
 The mode of creation, however, is still unexplained. 
 The human mind naturally inclines to assume a material 
 
 * Wisdom, XI.. 18. 
 
 a See II. Mack. VII., 28 ; Hebrews xi., 13.
 
 326 CREATION. 
 
 connection between the Creator and the created thing. 
 But as the absolute, immaterial, and spiritual being of 
 God is thereby imperilled, the connection, though real, 
 must be conceived as metaphysical. Any explanation of 
 the world that is to withstand the beating waves and winds 
 must be built on the absolute self-existing being. All 
 relative being is communicated, is being by participation 
 (esse participatu ni) . It derives its being from the absolute 
 being, and exists only so long as it is preserved and sus- 
 tained by the absolute. If the absolute were to withdraw 
 his supporting hand from the finite, all creation would 
 crumble to pieces and fall into nothing. This is a princi- 
 ple common alike to Theists and many Pantheists. The 
 Pantheist also says that if all finite things are mere crea- 
 tures of the eternal, their fate is determined by the whole. 
 Those things, which by their nature and purpose are a 
 necessary link in the chain of the physical order will last 
 for ever ; all that have not this saving value will perish.* 
 The Theist speaks more clearly and concisely when he 
 says that the will of God is both the reason why things 
 are, and the measure of their duration. This theory has, 
 indeed, been roughly handled and mauled by modern sci- 
 ence. The law of the conservation of energy, and the con- 
 stancy of atoms or elements is thought to give it the lie 
 direct. As nothing comes from nothing, so something 
 can never sink into nothing. But the contradiction is 
 more apparent than real. Both Holy Scripture and an- 
 cient philosophy are agreed on the principle : ex nihilo 
 nihil fit. When they teach that God made the world out 
 of nothing, they in nowise set up a causal relation between 
 the world and nothing, but merely deny that the world 
 was formed from pre-existing matter, or from the divine 
 substance. Before the world there was nothing. The 
 world came after nothing. This purely formal doctrine is 
 materially completed by the further doctrine that God 
 created the world by his will. The essential element in 
 
 3 Lotzc, Micrecosmos, I., p. 439.
 
 CREATION. 327 
 
 the notion of creation, which heathen philosophy ignored, 
 is the sovereign will of God. Ipse dixit et facta sunt ; ipse 
 mandavit et creata sunt. He spoke and they were made, he 
 commanded and they were created. The man of faith 
 may, but the man of science cannot, tear down the veil, 
 and penetrate into the inner court of the act and process 
 of creation. Here, however, we cannot forbear to sum up 
 the results of our previous investigations. By comparing 
 nature with the life of the soul we come to the conclusion 
 that an absolute, self-conscious free spirit must be the 
 cause of the world. By comparing the achievements of 
 the absolute cause with those of man's limited will (which 
 is dependent on the organs of sense for the execution of 
 its behests), we are justified in concluding that the sole 
 will of the absolute, independently of all things outside it, 
 carries out its own wishes. The artist who chisels his 
 ideas in marble is but a pale figure of the sovereign artist, 
 originator of human art, whose idea calls into being that 
 on which his ideas are stamped. The artist is improperly 
 said to create. The work of the Creator is a creation in 
 its plenitude, the first model of all artistic creations. 
 
 The will of God is not arbitrary or capricious. The 
 skilful artist reproduces the ideas which he has drunk in 
 from nature, and churned in his mind. God is also a 
 skilful artist. In Him wisdom and almighty power are 
 one. Is not this, some one will ask, an argument from 
 analogy ? And are not arguments from analogy the weak- 
 est of all arguments ? We would put the counter-ques- 
 tion : Would not thought come to a deadlock if analogy 
 were forbidden fruit ? or if language eschewed all sym- 
 bolism ? If God is a personal spirit, we surely have a 
 right to assume that there are ideas in God, which em- 
 brace the universe as a whole, and every individual. 
 Whence came these ideas ? Not from nature, or anywhere 
 outside God, for before creation there was nothing out- 
 side God. Hence they were in God from all eternity. 
 This is what Augustine meant by rationes seminales, the 
 eternal ideas made real in creation. Creation is a copy of
 
 328 CREATION. 
 
 the life of the divine spirit, a mirror reflecting the eternal 
 ideas. S. Thomas defines creation as an emanation of 
 being from the universal cause, that is God. By this he 
 wishes to give a more vivid picture of creation from noth- 
 ing. The Pantheistic doctrine of emanation (which he 
 expressly rejects) is far from his thoughts. The intelligi- 
 ble world is the idea of the world in God. Emanation is 
 the realization of this idea outside God. 4 
 
 Were not the phrase open to misconstruction, one might 
 be tempted to say that the eternal ideas have been realized 
 in time. What is time ? What is eternity ? Where is the 
 crossing from the sea of eternity to the stream of ever- 
 flowing time ? It is not our province to treat these ideas 
 exhaustively, but merely in their connection with creation. 
 Every one has the idea of time, both objectively and sub- 
 jectively, but no one understands it. Aristotle paraphrases 
 the idea without explaining it when he defines time : motus 
 secundum prius et postertus. The latest empiric and idealis- 
 tic theories have failed to disprove the saying of Petavius 
 about time and motion. It is flowing and fleeting, and 
 without firm footing. For this reason time and motion 
 are a hard and gnarled problem. The ablest philosophers 
 shrug their shoulders when questioned as to its nature and 
 bearings. Eternity is a still harder nut to crack. The 
 idea of the infinite is, indeed, current in speech, and enters 
 into mathematical calculations. Is there an actual infinite 
 outside God ? On this point philosophers and mathemati- 
 cians are at loggerheads. We may, if we will, conceive it 
 merely as an indefinite infinite ; or we may leave mathe- 
 maticians in peaceful and blissful enjoyment of their in- 
 finitely great and infinitely small quantities, for which 
 there is some foundation. Anyhow their infinite is but an 
 abstract quantity, which brings the knowledge of the 
 actual infinite being no nearer. If time be hammered out 
 ad infinitum, so as to stretch to the sides of the world ; if 
 the beginning be removed to an immeasurable distance 
 
 4 Knauer, Ptyckolofie, p. 60. See Tertull. Adv. Prax, c. 5-7. M6hler, Atkana- 
 sius, I., p. 49.
 
 CREATION. 
 
 3 2 9 
 
 from the end, what is the upshot ? Merely an indefinitely 
 long time ; not eternity. Eternity is only reached per viam 
 negationis ; that is, by cutting off beginning and end, elimi- 
 nating succession, and sweeping into oblivion past, present 
 and future. Eternity is the absolute present. Whether 
 time be objective in things, or only inherent in our percep- 
 tions, our mental acts at any rate are successive, and our 
 thought discursive. Hence we cannot get a firm grip of 
 the present now (nunc]. From the analogy of our own 
 ideas we may infer eternity, but not properly conceive it. 
 The perception of sensible phenomena requires absolute 
 space, absolute time, absolute motion. For us these ideas 
 have a transcendental meaning ; they are bound up with 
 the peculiar organization of our intuitive intelligence. 
 They must be regarded as absolute ideas. Although specu- 
 lative reason be incompetent to argue from the transcen- 
 dental ideal to the transcendental real, the analogy of 
 human thought justifies it. An absolute intelligence, for 
 whom there is no time, for whomflrius, simul, and flosterius 
 are not walled out from one another, is possible and must 
 be real.* Nevertheless it is difficult to explain the tem- 
 poral world from the eternal ideas. And yet we must de- 
 fend the eternity of ideas against Materialism, and the 
 existence of the world in time against Monism. We must 
 say, therefore, that God did not create in time, but that 
 He created things, which are subject to the law of tem- 
 poral succession. He created a spirit, tied to succession 
 in its acts, which can only distinguish things successively. 
 With the world, as Philo, Augustine and others have said, 
 God created time also. This is the only way to swim 
 across the surging notion of creation. The Manichaeans 
 used scornfully to ask the Christians : What was your God 
 doing before creation ? S. Augustine rightly put this 
 
 5 Liebmann, Analysis^ p. 126, 184. Gedanken und Tkatsachen, p. 75, seq. Dubois- 
 Reymond, Allgemeine Functionentheorie^ 1882, vol. i., p. 190. See ibid, the doc- 
 trine of the infinitely little, p. 72. It is especially defended by Gutberlet and 
 Cantor. See Natur u. Offenb., 1886, p. 46 seq. On the other side : isenkrahe, 
 Das Unendliche in der Ausdehnung. Zeitschr. fitr Phil., 1885, vol. Ixxxvi. p. 
 73. On the Aristotelian and Scholastic idea of space and time, see Schneider, in 
 \hzKatholik, No. 2, 1886. Petavius, De Inc. t 6, i, 2.
 
 33 CREATION. 
 
 down as a silly question. For, as there was no time, but 
 only eternity, neither was there any before. Of course 
 this is no explanation ; but it is a necessary conclusion 
 from the contingency of things. Augustine sought to rec- 
 oncile the eternal creative act with creation in time, by 
 conceiving the eternal ideas in God as objective and real, 
 and thus distinguishing the eternity of the world in idea 
 and in its temporary nature in creation. His are not the 
 Platonic ideas which existed in themselves from all eter- 
 nity, apart from things, and outside God. But they are 
 divine ideas, real and operative by God's almighty will, 
 and well adapted to serve as a medium of human knowl- 
 edge here and elsewhere. To split the divine act of will 
 into two halves, one eternal and the other temporal, would 
 destroy God's simplicity. The act of will is eternal, but 
 its product is temporal, because it is a product distinct 
 from the divine nature. The temporal character of the 
 thing to be created by the will is included in the ideas. 
 There is no other way to escape being tossed on the horns 
 of Kant's dilemma. If, he argues, the world had a begin- 
 ning, a void of time must have preceded in which nothing 
 existed and nothing was done. But the origin of the 
 world, as something that is made, implies succession, and 
 therefore one portion of the void of time is not void. If, 
 on the other hand, the world existed from endless time, 
 the totality of times would have already run out ; that is 
 an eternity would have passed. Thus Kant. But the 
 eternal ideas are the answer to the first branch of the 
 dilemma, and the Creator's act of will to the second. The 
 idea of a " temporal creation willed from all eternity" can 
 throw a gleam of light on the dark abyss of the beginning. 
 Moreover Augustine, again following Philo, tried to sim- 
 plify the problem by assuming that creation was one mo- 
 mentary act. To support his view he appealed to a mis- 
 understood text (Eccles. xviii. i compared with Genesis ii. 
 4). But he was chiefly induced to make the " Alexandrine 
 Discovery" of simultaneous creation, by the philosophical 
 and theological difficulties which lay in the way of pre-
 
 CREATION. 331 
 
 serving God's eternity and immutability in Creation. The 
 idea of succession, indeed, is thus all but eliminated ; but 
 a tincture of mystery remains at the bottom of that one 
 act. The thoughts of the conservation and government of 
 the world, and the uninterrupted activity of the Father 
 and the Son, will always point back to the other explana- 
 tion of the creative act. Thoughtful natural philosophers 
 now incline to efface every point of time, and to conceive 
 creation as a continuous and ever-present divine efficiency. 
 Unless this conception of creation bears an Aristotelian or 
 semi-pantheistic sense in favour of the eternity of the 
 world, it can only mean that from eternity God conceived 
 the world as temporal, and that its temporal existence be- 
 gan in time. The temporal existence of things, as Hugh 
 of St. Victor observes, is eternally included in the eternal 
 will of God. Origen attempted to reconcile the eternal 
 act of creation with the temporal existence of the world 
 by the converse method of assuming an ever-revolving 
 eternity. This solution, besides contradicting experience, 
 is after all only apparent. 
 
 Again, all created beings occupy space, but the Creator 
 is infinite and immeasurable, and uncontained by space. 
 What is space ? We know as much and as little afrout 
 space as about time. We cannot realize space either by 
 mere rigid bodiless extension, or by the sense of external 
 and objective perception. The Aristotelian definition 
 makes place and space identical : terminus continentis immo- 
 bilis primus. This definition, however, merely states a 
 known fact. Modern psychological, physiological, em- 
 piric, and idealistic explanations only show that in this 
 concept the objective is inseparably interwoven with the 
 subjective. Space everywhere accompanies all things. 
 The mind is nailed down to the law of juxtaposition as 
 well as to that of succession. It can never tear itself 
 asunder from the three dimensions, even were Spiritual- 
 ism to explain its wonders by a fourth, or Geometry were 
 to prove that four or more dimensions obtain in its own 
 sphere. We are driven, therefore, to suppose that space
 
 332 CREATION. 
 
 like time is, objectively and subjectively, a condition at- 
 tached to our knowledge. With time it was implanted in 
 things ; and mental cognition is dependent on things. 
 Everywhere we are confronted by the idea of absolute 
 space, and of the Creator, uncontained by space, as the 
 cause. Even space demands the free-will of the Creator. 
 
 Created things, as we have already remarked, last only 
 so long as God wills. In other words, the universe has a 
 definite time allotted to it. The more we emphasize God's 
 free will in creation, the more also are we bound to take it 
 into account in the conservation of creatures. There is no 
 denying this conclusion although, on closer inspection, it 
 may be substantially modified. Chance and caprice have 
 no place in the world, being excluded by the absolute 
 wisdom of God's will. God's wisdom has marked out an 
 end for all things, and it has both the power and the will 
 to lead them by the hand to their end. Everything con- 
 tinues to exist till it has attained its end. Though God 
 might repent that He had made man, He could never frus- 
 trate His own designs in creation. The plan of salvation 
 is as eternal as the plan of creation. God could not repent 
 creating an unoffending world. It also might be cursed 
 on man's account, but it could not be doomed to annihila- 
 tion. The whole world is governed by unchangeable laws, 
 in accordance with which the forces of nature work with- 
 out fail. This proposition, far from jarring with the right 
 idea of creation, thoroughly harmonizes therewith. There 
 is no need for God to be perpetually interfering with the 
 world's course. The idea of creation requires God's will, 
 as the only real power in the conservation and government 
 of the world. It does not, however, by any means require 
 the first cause to work except through secondary and in- 
 termediate causes. The government of the world cannot 
 be explained without reference to its creation. The being 
 communicated to things has now become their own. Where 
 they are placed, there they exist and work. Thus God's 
 dominion over the world does not contradict His eternity 
 and immutability. It is finite things that change in their
 
 CREATION. 333 
 
 relation to God. Omnipotence is, indeed, first known to 
 us by its works in creation ; but we need not for this reason 
 follow Origen, Hermogenes and others in supposing a cir- 
 culating eternity. In God creation produced no change ; 
 but it established a relation on the side of the creature to 
 God. Even had God not revealed Himself, He would 
 still be Almighty ; but, as the Fathers declared against 
 the Gnostics, he can become Lord, only in and by crea- 
 tion. Not that by creation He became more than He was 
 before, but because creation called subjects into being. 
 Lord is an epithet drawn from time, in the same way as 
 God, without change of substance, became our Father in 
 regeneration. Provided naturalists do not trespass beyond 
 their own borders, they may continue to write the " His- 
 tory of Creation," although they declare the idea of crea- 
 tion to be scientifically inadmissible. Empiric science and 
 astronomy are as little able to find the Creator in their 
 calculations, as the anatomist is to find the soul by dis- 
 secting the body. They reckon with number, weight and 
 measure. Their operations are hemmed in by things acces- 
 sible to the senses. Empiricism, therefore, may be neutral 
 towards the idea of creation, but it should refrain from 
 taking up arms against it. Once we leave the domain of 
 Empiricism, and what rational being would be content 
 to grope in it alone for ever ? we find that creation alone 
 solves the world-puzzle. Both creation and autogony are 
 impervious to exact science. There can be no doubt as to 
 the result, if the issue lies between these two. Besides 
 satisfying the requirements of thought and causality better 
 than autogony, creation alone gives full and complete sat- 
 isfaction. Although it is indispensable, no one must ex- 
 pect it to lead him into God's inner laboratory. Imagina- 
 tion repels the idea. To pure thought, the Schoolmen 
 held, it presents no difficulty. Without going quite this 
 length, we are safe in saying that the difficulty is not in- 
 surmountable. It involves no contradiction. " The oldest 
 " book in the world" gives this advice : " ' Learn, by shut- 
 " ting thyself up within thine own soul, that the works of
 
 334 CREATION. 
 
 " God are unknowable. For God will not allow them to 
 " be known.' Speaking of human curiosity, the Talmud 
 " says : ' He who meditates on the things that lie beyond 
 " heaven or under the earth, or on what was before (the 
 " creation of the world), or will take place after (the end 
 " of the world), does not deserve to have been placed in 
 " the world.' "" Jerome thinks that the Jews were forbid- 
 den to read the beginning and end of Ezechiel and Genesis 
 before their thirtieth year, because they are so difficult to 
 understand. 
 
 6 Chagiga, II. ta See Gratz, Gnosticisntus, 1846, p. 13. S. Jerome, Ep. ad Pauli- 
 tium. On the scholastic idea of creation, see Commer, System II., p. 23, seq.
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 There was a revealed before there was a natural history 
 of Creation. Moses gave to the Jews a positive history 
 long before man was able to read the book of nature, to 
 decipher the inscriptions in the heavens, or to interpret 
 the historical records engraven on the rocks. Ancient peo- 
 ples have, indeed, preserved their own traditions about 
 creation, but they are either boiled down to fables, or are 
 too thin and slender to form an historical foundation, or 
 are too closely linked with the biblical story to weigh, 
 except here and there, as independent corroborative testi- 
 mony. Genesis is, therefore, the only history of creation. 
 At first sight its story is simple and clear ; but it is diffi- 
 cult to sound all the depths of its scientific meaning. The 
 believer and the apologist have ever to bear in mind that 
 they are dealing with a revelation which has to be brought 
 into harmony with science. They must know and faith- 
 fully apply the true principles of exegesis, lest an exegeti- 
 cal error be trumpeted to the world as a revealed truth. 
 They must, moreover, be able to appraise the results of 
 science at their true value, and to gauge their bearings, 
 lest the teaching of Genesis, when based on solid inter- 
 pretation, be surrendered or weakened, without reason or 
 necessity. 
 
 In every age interpreters have felt that the biblical nar- 
 rative bristles with difficulties. To Theophilus the story 
 of the six days seemed so majestic and so laden with wis- 
 dom, that no man, even were he gifted with ten thousand
 
 336 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 tongues, and vouchsafed twice ten thousand years of life, 
 would be able to do justice to its sublimity. The apolo- 
 gists who championed Christian doctrine against Gnostics 
 and Manichaeans, were disposed to regard the Mosaic cos- 
 mogony as the most precious pearl of Christianity. The 
 first chapters of Genesis, when their light was contrasted 
 with heathen shade, seemed to shine as the quintessence 
 of all wisdom. And yet neither Tertullian nor Irenseus 
 has underrated the difficulties in which the problem is en- 
 veloped. Writing against Celsus, who virulently attacked 
 the doctrine of creation as taught by Jews and Christians, 
 Origen admits that the question of creation and God's 
 subsequent rest are deep and mysterious, and hard to un- 
 derstand. 1 Jerome, indeed, in spite of his remarks on 
 Genesis quoted above, thinks its account of creation, and 
 of the beginnings of the human race, clear. This well- 
 known fact, however, does not materially help us over the 
 stile. The great difficulty of the text lies precisely in the 
 clearness of its wording. Hence most of the Fathers have 
 hazarded some explanation. It is not unlikely that Justin 
 wrote a commentary on the Hexaemeron. Origen, how- 
 ever, is in the van. For the most part he treads in the 
 footsteps of Philo, but most commentators acknowledge 
 him for their leader. Among the Greeks, Chrysostom 
 delivered eight discourses on Genesis, without, however, 
 discussing the first chapter in detail. His commentary on 
 Genesis is, on this account, pregnant with significance. 
 As the purpose in all his homilies is chiefly moral, so here 
 also he is addressing a wider audience from a moral point 
 of view ; but the skill of the trained interpreter peeps 
 through the lattices. His exegesis is, when possible, lit- 
 eral. Basil's homilies on the works of the six days are 
 brilliant sapphires. He is orator, philosopher, commen- 
 tator, and student of nature in one. Scarcely any writer 
 in ancient times has left such charming pictures of nature, 
 which must have been as refreshing as the morning dew 
 
 i Theophilus, Ad AutoL, II. 12. Origen, C. Celt., V. 59.
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 337 
 
 to an age parched and shrivelled up with barren specula- 
 tion. Gregory Nyssa wrote a treatise on the Hexaemeron 
 as a supplement to the work of Gregory Nazianzen. On 
 all exegetical questions he and Origen are more kindred 
 spirits than the other two. Ambrose was the first among 
 the Latins to write homilies on the six days. His exegesis 
 has a strong Greek flavour. Jerome says he made a com- 
 pilation of Origen's Hexaemeron, but that his train of 
 thought is that of Hippolytus and Basil. He seems, in 
 fact, to have been little else but a compiler from Origen 
 and Basil, although he frequently changes the order of 
 the words. Augustine is more independent. His writings 
 on Genesis are numerous. Against the Manichaeans he 
 wrote two books interpreting Genesis allegorically, because 
 he did not dare to explain such great mysteries of nature 
 literally. In other words he did not see his way to an his- 
 torical explanation. In the unfinished Genesis ad litteram 
 he again wrestled with the gigantic task ; but despite his 
 nice fence and clever thrusts he was overpowered. Once 
 again he took up the cudgels, in the twelve books of De 
 Genesi ad litteram. In it, as he himself has confessed, he 
 asks more questions than he answers, but he leaves the 
 unfinished commentary far behind. It is saturated with 
 Origen's Alexandrine ideas. Thus Augustine, in contra- 
 distinction to the Greeks, floated the theory of simulta- 
 neous creation. 
 
 In laying down the principles of scientific exegesis the 
 patristic exponents of the history of creation are more 
 unanimous.* First and foremost, they all agree that all 
 parts of Holy Scripture are inspired, whether they be 
 closely or only distantly related to faith. In their eyes 
 Moses is a prophet, like other prophets, but he was priv- 
 ileged by the Lord of all things to recount what was cre- 
 ated before he was born. It was the spirit of God who 
 breathed into him this knowledge. God spoke to the Jews 
 by his mouth. The Logos, who was present when all 
 
 3 See Theol. Quartalschrift, 1877, p. 636, seq., where the question of the patristic inter 
 pretation in matters of natural science is specially treated. 
 
 V
 
 338 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 things were created, used Moses as his mouthpiece. In- 
 spiration guarantees the Hexaemeron to be superior to all 
 heathen cosmogonies. After a spirited panegyric on 
 Moses, Basil continues : " This man, then, who like the 
 " angels was privileged to see the face of God, imparts to 
 " us the words that God spoke to him." Those men, he 
 says, are foolish, who, fancying themselves wiser than the 
 Holy Ghost, in the plenitude of their wisdom, rebuke the 
 Scriptures, and obtrude their own thoughts under the 
 mask of an explanation. For the Fathers, therefore the 
 Hexaemeron is inspired. They hold, moreover, that Moses 
 did not draw his knowledge of the events of creation from 
 the traditions of his ancestors (to whom it was imparted in 
 vision), but from the immediate revelation of God. The 
 thought that Moses owed his knowledge to his own re- 
 searches never crossed their minds. How, indeed, could 
 he, in the then state of natural science ? Such a supposi- 
 tion would not in itself be incompatible with inspiration, 
 if it were said that the spirit of God had aided him in his 
 speculations ; but Moses* own account contradicts it. Not 
 only does the categorical and apodictic "fat" tell against 
 it (whatever allowances we make for Semitic poetry), but 
 the contents also are such that no mere natural science 
 could have enabled him to set them down so clearly and 
 with such calm assurance. 
 
 Genesis, it may be argued, is an historical book. Should 
 not, therefore, the Hexaemeron be viewed in the same 
 light as the other historical books, the materials of which 
 were supplied by oral or written tradition ? In these cases 
 inspiration merely preserved the writer from error, and 
 aided him to select the materials. Much may be said for 
 the theory that God in some way, perhaps in vision, re- 
 vealed the several acts of creation to Adam who, in turn, 
 handed on the account to his descendants. The various 
 heathen cosmogonies point to a common revelation. A 
 common family likeness runs through the sagas of all peo- 
 ples. None, indeed, approach the biblical narrative in 
 grandeur and boldness of conception, but they have many
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 359 
 
 features in common. The Jews, it is true, had a tradition 
 to this effect. The Sabbath precept, too, which is demon- 
 strably older than Moses, bears it out. This, however, 
 may be reconciled with the teaching of the Fathers, pro- 
 vided their words are not taken literally, nor pressed too 
 closely. Even granting that the Patriarchs guarded old 
 traditions most faithfully and brushed aside current gen- 
 tile errors, still, without external organization, the primi- 
 tive revelation could not have been preserved for centuries 
 as intact as a document locked up in state archives. Even 
 the best tradition has preserved only the main outline, 
 not the details. To take a parallel case, how would the 
 details of Jesus' life have fared in the second and third 
 centuries, had the gospels and apostolic letters not been 
 in existence ? The answer to this question is not far to 
 seek, if we consider that outside the Bible nothing sur- 
 vives but the apocryphal gospels, a few quotations in 
 Clement, and a couple of passages which Eusebius plucked 
 from the work of Papias of Hierapolis. In Clement's 
 time, even the years in which Jesus was born and died 
 were not known with certainty. 
 
 The Fathers, though strongly insisting on direct inspira- 
 tion, are far from requiring interpretation to be literal. 
 Inspiration or divine suggestion is not a mechanical proc- 
 ess. It lays a spiritual hold on the mind. It is a mysteri- 
 ous communication which, while leaving divine truth par- 
 tially veiled, goads on the soul to make further enquiry 
 and effort. God shows his servants the way, but brings 
 them to the higher peaks of knowledge, only after slow 
 and toilsome climbing. Revelation is addressed to the 
 mind of man, and the mind has first to grasp it. Hence 
 the inspired narrative must be adapted to man's compre- 
 hension. This was doubly necessary in the case of the 
 Jews who, from constant grovelling on the earth, found it 
 hard to lift up their eyes to the heaven they could not see, 
 or to raise their thoughts above the things of sense. Thus, 
 much in the Hexaemeron is left to man's understanding. 
 Chrysostom thinks Moses' condescension excessive in omit-
 
 340 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 ting, for instance, of set purpose, the story of the creation 
 of the angels and archangels. For as the bird, whose 
 wings are smeared with lime, cannot wing its flight upward, 
 so the Jews, whose thoughts were rivetted to the earth, 
 had no relish for spiritual things. Hence Moses leads 
 them step by step from things visible to the invisible Cre- 
 ator of all things. Doubtless expressions are used that 
 are harsh and grating. But they are used in condescen- 
 sion to man's infirmity ; for how can unspeakable myste- 
 ries be understood or expressed without them ? Basil con- 
 cedes less and Augustine more to form. In spite of the 
 unfavourable judgments he has passed on philosophy, 
 Augustine speaks of profane science more approvingly 
 than the Greek Fathers. He allows science a voice in 
 these questions, and therefore he dwells more at length on 
 its divergencies from the Bible. The unwary, he says, are 
 so easily deceived, because they are solicitous about the 
 letter of Holy Scripture and neglect its spiritual meaning. 
 But the order in Genesis is so simple that even little ones 
 can understand it. The names of things visible are given 
 to things invisible, because little ones are too weak to 
 understand what is invisible. 
 
 But the sacred writers have a further and a deeper reason 
 for thus accommodating themselves to man's understand- 
 ing. This reason lies in the end and purpose for which 
 they wrote. Leaving profane things to science, they press 
 forward towards their goal, the religious education and 
 salvation of man. The purpose of revelation is to sanctify 
 not to praise those instructed in it. Gliding swiftly past 
 all other problems that transcend human reason, Moses 
 aims, firstly and chiefly, at instructing and educating the 
 soul. The size of the earth, the extent of the atmosphere, 
 the eclipses of the moon he passes over in silence, because 
 they profit man nothing towards his salvation. But Moses 
 relates the creation of heaven and earth, in order to pro- 
 claim this truth in the face of those who did not confess 
 a Creator in " heaven and earth," or who reviled His good 
 work because they understood it not. Even the creation
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 34! 
 
 of sun and moon was relegated to the fourth day, that no 
 one should presume to say that the earth could not have 
 brought forth without the agency of the sun. Not even 
 the day was to be ascribed to the sun, as its cause. From 
 first to last man is put forward as the end, both of the nar- 
 rative and of the entire creation. All things are made 
 ready, so that when man enters on the scene, he rides in 
 triumphal procession as the king and lord of creation. 
 The Fathers are often tempted to speak disparagingly of 
 all things else, and even to brand them as untrue. We 
 must pass over and not pry into things not found in Scrip- 
 ture, for it surpasses our comprehension. The worldly 
 wise talk loudly, and with many words on the nature of 
 heaven. But their words are but wind. One says one 
 thing, another, another. The most persuasive in speech 
 attacks others, upsets their theories, and sets up his own 
 which, in their turn, are knocked down by others. As 
 these men pluck one another by the nose, we may calmly 
 look on and appeal to Moses. We must cast away the 
 wisdom made foolish, if we are to receive the teaching of 
 truth. Truth is indeed rude in speech, but its bosom 
 swells with unerring knowledge. These phrases were 
 called for by the bankrupt philosophy of the time. It 
 would be a gross injustice, on the strength of them, to 
 charge the Fathers with neglecting or despising profane 
 science. Basil, from whom these phrases are taken, thinks 
 that many things were omitted on purpose to set the mind 
 enquiring. He regrets he cannot find out more about the 
 size and distance of the sun and moon. He demurs to 
 have to draw a final conclusion from a few words. For 
 we should not marvel the less at the whole, did we know 
 the detailed process by which these wonders were called 
 into being. 
 
 Augustine indicates clearly and concisely the standpoint 
 from which the interpreter is to view scientific questions. 
 As the sacred authors certainly wrote solely for a religious 
 purpose, they wisely refrained from touching on topics not 
 conducive to man's salvation. Thus there lies beyond an
 
 34 2 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 extensive prairie, in which human science may roam at 
 large. In its own sphere it may obtain results indepen- 
 dently of Holy Scripture. Things in nature, since they 
 are produced by an almighty Creator, are shrouded in a 
 thick darkness, which simple statements cannot break 
 through. Nothing is easier than for a crop of different 
 views to spring up. Hence great tact and prudence are 
 required, and it is necessary also to hear the judgment of 
 experts. Reason and experience will enable a man who 
 is not even a Christian, to acquire a solid knowledge of 
 things in heaven and on earth. Augustine praises, unde- 
 servedly indeed, the scientific men of his day, for having 
 obtained the best information and certain results on these 
 points. Hence, he says, we must make a careful distinc- 
 tion. The records of Holy Scripture that bear on faith 
 are as immovable as the pillars of heaven. The more they 
 elude the grasp of sense, the more necessary is faith. But 
 in the parts that bear on nature or are connected there- 
 with, exegesis can lay no claim to unlimited sway. Here 
 the interpreter must beware of thrusting his own views 
 forward as the teaching of Scripture. For thus Holy 
 Scripture is exposed to scorn and derision, and unbelievers 
 are supplied with arguments for challenging its authority 
 even in matters of faith. Augustine himself concluded 
 that there is no appeal against the certain results of sci- 
 ence. Of course the Fathers were thoroughly convinced 
 that Scripture can never contradict these results. This 
 would be a self-evident truth, even if the Fathers had not 
 given eloquent expression to it. 
 
 These principles may be found stated in most of the 
 Fathers. Here they have been discussed with special ref- 
 erence to the natural sciences, but it would be easy to 
 widen their application. In those days natural science 
 was merely a branch of philosophy, of profane science in 
 general. Generalizations would be met by the objection 
 that it is unusual to consider results as sure in the so-called 
 rational sciences. For all practical purposes, as far as we 
 are concerned, it will be enough to investigate how far
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 343 
 
 the Fathers applied these principles to exegesis. We shall 
 confine our attention to natural science, which, as a rule, 
 was grafted on commentaries on Genesis. Moreover, we 
 shall, as far as possible, eschew details. For there cannot 
 be an agreement in detail except in so far as the state of 
 natural science at the time would permit. The strangest 
 and most weird opinions are often expressed. But there 
 is agreement on the main points. An overwhelming 
 majority interpret the narrative of the six days literally ; 
 whereas Origen, Athanasius, Procopius, Gregory of Nyssa 
 and Augustine advocate a simultaneous creation, the pro- 
 gressive development of which is recorded in the several 
 days. 3 These ways of viewing the Hexaemeron are essen- 
 tially different ; but they only prove how much latitude 
 the Fathers allowed themselves in applying their own 
 principles. This remark applies to the Fathers generally, 
 especially when they are interpreting the Old Testament. 
 The elder Jansenius, in the preface to his Concordance, 
 complains bitterly because the Fathers indulge in such 
 endless dissertations. When, says he, shall I be able to 
 wade through these piles of treatises, this heap of opin- 
 ions, all different and mutually destructive one of another. 
 The opinions are as many and various as the writers. East- 
 ern and Western writers, the schools of Alexandria and 
 Antioch ventilate glibly and with a light heart the most 
 contradictory opinions. They had run wild with freedom, 
 and hence, for a time, the allegorical sense numbered more 
 partisans than the literal. The prospect before him, no 
 doubt, stirred up Jansenius' ill-humour, and made him see 
 things through a magnifying glass. But it requires long 
 and patient study to realize how widely the greatest Fathers 
 differed on the principles of hermeneutics, and how reluc- 
 tant they were to reject any new explanations that did not 
 call in question the fundamental truths of faith. Being 
 men of superior intelligence, they were never afraid to 
 illustrate faith with the discoveries of reason. Thus a 
 
 3 See Petavius, De sex primorum mundi dierum opificio i, 5, i. Schwane, ii., p. 284, 
 seq.; p. 556. Zoeckler, Geschiclite der Beziehungen i., p. 113.
 
 344 THE HISTORY OK CREATION. 
 
 French savant reproaches his too narrow-minded colleagues, 
 in order to defend Lenormant, who had done good service 
 to the study of the Old Testament history. 4 The appeal 
 to the Fathers is correct, and does not contravene the de- 
 cree of the Council of Trent which makes it obligatory to 
 interpret Holy Scripture according to the unanimous voice 
 (unanimis consensus) of the Fathers. " Matters of faith and 
 morals" remain untouched. 
 
 Later theologians are at one with the Fathers, both as to 
 matter and form. When the age of compilers had more 
 or less passed away, theologians began to shield principles 
 from abuse by encasing them in the armour of rigid for- 
 mulae and close enunciations. As a body the Schoolmen 
 embraced the same exegetical principles as the Fathers. 
 The few with platonizing tendencies tread on the heels of 
 Augustine. Abelard finds temporal succession in the cre- 
 ative act as hard a nut to crack as Augustine had found it. 
 The majority, however, give their suffrage for the literal 
 sense. Albertus Magnus, thinks nothing can be truer than 
 Augustine's contention. But, in the natural sciences, he 
 prefers to pin his faith to Aristotle, who was so well versed 
 in them. In theory and in practice he loyally followed 
 Aristotle. Phenomena, he says, are not yet sufficiently 
 investigated. But once they are investigated, experience 
 is a surer guide than speculation, which is reliable only in 
 so far as it accords with phenomena. Albertus himself 
 gave a spurt to scientific investigations. In the principles 
 of exegesis S. Thomas agrees with Augustine. To him it 
 seems very unlikely that God imparted to Moses and other 
 sacred writers truths that human reason can itself com- 
 pass. Consequently, he says, not every possible sense is 
 the sense intended and expressed by the author." He 
 draws a distinction between truths that belong directly 
 and indirectly to faith. Those truths belong directly to 
 faith which, if denied, entail something contrary to faith, 
 
 4 Amelinan, Revue du Monde Catholique, 1883, No. 112, p. 644. 
 
 5 De Potentia, 4, i. Summa Thtol. I., qu. 32, a I. See Theol. Quartalschrift, 1878, 
 
 p. 3, seq. Albert, M. De gener. an. 3, 10. See Wolff, Geschichtt der Astronornie, 
 MQnchen, 1877, p. 43 ; Meyer, Geschichte dcr Bttanik, n. 29.
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 345 
 
 or some conclusion that endangers the immunity of Holy 
 Scripture from error. A wide margin was allowed in inter- 
 pretation, so long as men had not fully realized the conse- 
 quences involved. S. Thomas ranges himself on the side 
 of the Greeks, but he repeatedly and in so many words 
 orders quarter to be given to Augustine's ideal explana- 
 tion. The most distinguished commentators, Nicholas de 
 Lyra and Raymond for instance, hold fast to the same 
 principles. Peyrere, a great commentator on Genesis, is, 
 on the whole, in alliance with Augustine. Augustine's 
 influence was considerable till the star of Cajetan rose. 
 Then Petavius steps forward, and with a brazen voice 
 assures us that men in his day thought Augustine's theory 
 was exploded, because the letter is dead against it. 
 
 The question was not hotly debated till the new world- 
 system was first broached. This fact is as intelligible as it 
 is significant. Astronomy set the natural science ball roll- 
 ing. Not by mere speculation, but by dint of painstaking 
 researches (imperfect, indeed, at the time), it attained a 
 result which was in formal contradiction with the letter of 
 Holy Scripture. It was natural, therefore, for theologians 
 to be up in arms. Their appeal to the Fathers also was 
 intelligible, as long as the bare fact and not principles 
 formed the theme of discussion. For, as far as principles 
 went, the Fathers voted solid for the Ptolemaean system. 
 It is likewise significant that the opposition should have 
 waxed stronger, simultaneously with the great awakening 
 of scientific enquiry. Not much harm was done, while 
 men merely took their intellects for an airing, and indulged 
 on a holiday in a little guess-work about another system ; 
 but when the question assumed a bodily and tangible 
 shape, the situation was altered. The Reformers, who 
 stood by the letter of Holy Scripture, saw in the perform- 
 ances of Copernicus an attack on Holy Scripture, and 
 they accordingly scouted him as an idiot. Catholics did 
 not boil over with opposition to the new system till Galileo, 
 by his discoveries in the heavens, also unsheathed his 
 sword against the entire natural philosophy of Aristotle
 
 346 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 and the Schoolmen. It was Galileo, the contemporary of 
 Kepler, who sought to make tradition the dividing line 
 between theology, especially exegesis, and natural science. 
 He appealed to the principles laid down by SS. Augustine 
 and Thomas. He re-echoed the opinion of Augustine that 
 Holy Scripture should take the lowest place in mathemati- 
 cal enquiries. No fact of nature, he contended, ascer- 
 tained by experience or based on evident and necessary 
 proof, ought to be questioned because it seems in conflict 
 with passages of Holy Scripture, which contains thousands 
 of words with different meanings. For the works of 
 nature, unlike the words of Holy Scripture, are governed 
 by fixed laws. Truth cannot contradict truth. Hence 
 wise commentators should make it their business to ex- 
 tract the true meaning from Holy Scripture, and to bring 
 it into harmony with the evident and certain conclusions 
 of science. No mere consensus of the Fathers can avail 
 here. For their interpretation has a theological value 
 only in the supposition that the questions in point were 
 then debated and argued on both sides. As this, however, 
 was not the case, they had no reason to depart from the 
 common literal opinion. Considering the times in which 
 it was broached, this view was astonishingly bold, for it 
 seemed to reverse the relations between science and the 
 Bible. Consequently Galileo met with scant courtesy 
 and favour from the theologians of the time. It was his 
 misfortune that this difficult question was mooted in an 
 age seething with turmoil and discontent. It was an addi- 
 tional misfortune that the question centred in a point 
 about which profane science and theology, the letter and 
 the traditional interpretation of Scripture were all but 
 unanimous. 6 In a recently discovered letter (April i2th, 
 1615), addressed to the Carmelite monk Foscarini, Bellar- 
 mine thus writes : The Council of Trent forbids any inter- 
 pretation that goes against the interpretation commonly 
 
 6 Sec Tkeol. Quartal., 1877, p. 639, seq. Schanz, Galileo Galilei, Wfirzburg, 1878. 
 Grisar, Galileistudien, Regensburg, 1882. On Kepler see : Zeitschrift /tir Katfi. 
 Tkeol., 1887, p. i, seq.
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 3^7 
 
 agreed on by the Fathers. But not only Fathers but also 
 modern commentators on Genesis, Psalms, Ecclesiasticus 
 and Josue are agreed on the literal interpretation. There- 
 fore the Church cannot tolerate the opinion of those who 
 impute to Holy Scripture a meaning which is at variance 
 with that assigned to it by the Fathers, and all the Greek 
 and Latin commentators. The Council, indeed, mentions 
 only objects of faith and morals. There are, however, 
 doctrines ex parte objecti and ex parts dicentis. The world- 
 system is one of the latter. To this Galileo retorted with 
 force : it is not said " in omni verbo Scripturarum sequenda est 
 " expositio,'" but " in REBUS fidei et morutn." Hence the 
 Council of Trent had in view only res fidei et morum ratione 
 objecti. And, indeed, Bellarmine was forced to make this 
 concession in theory. For Holy Scripture may be aban- 
 doned in deference to scientific results that are certain ; 
 but a mere doubt is not a sufficient reason for abandoning 
 the explanation of Holy Scripture given by the Fathers.* 
 
 In practice, however, he wcutd hardly concede that it 
 was possible for certain scientific results to contradict the 
 letter of Holy Scripture ; still, as an hypothesis, it was an 
 acknowledged principle that, in such cases, Holy Scrip- 
 ture was to be explained according to science. The dis- 
 tinction drawn by the Councils of Trent and the Vatican be- 
 tween matters that are and that are not of faith and morals 
 would be meaningless and futile, did matters of faith and 
 morals include everything that is contained in Holy Scrip- 
 ture. It is the shallowest sophistry to argue that the dis- 
 tinction is good in itself but no good to believers, because 
 all things in Holy Scripture are God's word. But the 
 question is precisely this : How is God's word to be inter- 
 preted ? God's Word is written in human language, and 
 brought within the compass of man's rude powers. This 
 is a point which demands the earnest attention of all inter- 
 preters. Let us take a parallel case from religious history. 
 
 * In other words, only those results of natural science which are undoubted and certain 
 are a canon for interpreting Scripture. They alone justify a departure from the ob- 
 vious, literal, and traditional meaning. Tr.
 
 348 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 Buddha's earliest disciples called the founder of the Indian 
 religion by the name of the All-knowing. Later on it 
 became manifest that in many things Buddha had merely 
 spoken after the manner of his contemporaries. When, 
 for instance, it was seen that he shared the errors of his 
 contemporaries in regard to the form of the earth and the 
 revolution of the heavenly bodies, the Buddhists straight- 
 way limited his omniscience to the chief points of his teach- 
 ing. He is now considered All-knowing in those points 
 only which he knew by contemplation. His omniscience 
 or infallibility is bounded by faith and morals. In the 
 domain of sensible and intellectual knowledge it has no 
 place/ In Holy Scripture the writer must be carefully 
 distinguished from the inspiring spirit ; the parallel applies 
 to the writer only. Galileo's principles are correct, and 
 are nowadays commonly accepted as such. The Church 
 stands aside while the learned are disputing as to what is 
 the boundary-line between the two provinces. The chief 
 point is to determine which results of natural science are 
 undoubted. Till this point is settled profane science can- 
 not be allowed a higher office than that of a welcome hand- 
 maid to exegesis. But in any case the truths of faith must 
 remain untouched. The human envelope and environment 
 have no permanent value. As the Apostle says : " The 
 letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth." The words of 
 the Lord are spirit and life. Only in this spirit can we 
 search the deep things of Scripture. It is not a little re- 
 markable that in modern times, especially in France and 
 Italy, there have not been wanting learned men, such as 
 Cuvier, Ampere, Moigno, Foville and Secchi, who see a 
 proof of Moses' inspiration in the geological disclosures of 
 the first chapter of Genesis ; but the majority of learned 
 men and theologians think decidedly otherwise. The nar- 
 rative, howsoever it be explained, has certainly sketched 
 the drama of creation in bold outline ; but it may be ques- 
 tioned whether the several acts exactly correspond to the 
 
 7 Max Mfiller, Vcrgleich. Rel. Wiss., p. 117.
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 349 
 
 event. Perhaps this discussion of the principles of ex- 
 egesis may seem somewhat out of place. It will, however, 
 serve as a solid foundation on which to build our interpre- 
 tation, and it will, moreover, set limits to our enquiry. 
 We have now to pass in review the literal interpretation, 
 the restitution hypothesis, the concordant and the ideal 
 theories. 
 
 The discovery of petrified animals and plants in moun- 
 tain strata made learned and unlearned rub their eyes and 
 gape with wonder. Some thought they were freaks of 
 nature (lusus natura), others saw in them a confirmation of 
 the biblical story of the deluge. Stones either entirely 
 scooped out by the water, or lying in juxtaposition with 
 shell-animals, if found on the mountains at a distance from 
 the sea, were held by mediaeval scientists to constitute a 
 proof of the great Noachian deluge. 8 Neither of these 
 theories will hold water. The freak-of-nature hypothesis 
 is non-suited because petrified remains are found in count- 
 less numbers. The deluge, again, did not last long enough 
 to cause the gradual succession described in a previous 
 chapter. Petavius insisted that there would never have 
 been any doubt about the six days, if men had walked in 
 the simple laws of thought instead of running after an 
 ingenious theory. He urged this as an argument against 
 simultaneous creation. Philosophic reasons, like words 
 written in water, quickly fade ; but scientific reasons un- 
 failingly produce an impression that lasts, as words en- 
 graven on brass. Now a change has come o'er the scene. 
 To expend words in discussing the deluge-theory or in 
 explaining the six days literally were nothing but to waste 
 night, day, and time. A few authors there are, Keil, 
 Veith, Laurent, Bosizio, Oeti y Lara, stranded on a desert 
 island, who still cling to the old theory either in defiance 
 or in ignorance of facts. Sea and fresh-water formations 
 alternate in every direction. The many and various petri- 
 fied remains, firmly imbedded in the rocks, are separated 
 
 8 Fellner, Compendium dtr Naturwissenschaften an der Schule von Fulda im 9. 
 Jahrhundert. Berlin, 1879, p. 21.
 
 35 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 from one another by thousands of yards. Any man seek- 
 ing to account for all these phenomena by a single deluge, 
 which lasted barely a year, can hardly expect to be taken 
 seriously. To take refuge behind God's almighty power, 
 as if God created the imbedded strata from the beginning, 
 is to substitute a lusus Dei for a lusus natura. As a sneer 
 at science it is tolerable, but as a serious hypothesis we 
 may, without further ado, unceremoniously relegate it to 
 the shades, a fate it richly deserves. Sound theologians 
 will resent such a caricature of theology as eagerly as 
 geologists will administer a well-merited snub. The the- 
 ory which maintains that God completed creation in six 
 days of twenty-four hours, is wrecked on every reef and 
 rock of geology and palaeontology. 
 
 The Restitution hypothesis seeks to retain the literal ex- 
 planation without incurring its condemnation. It assumes 
 that the petrefactions belong to an earlier creation, which 
 was destroyed consequently on the fall of angels. There 
 is a pause between the first and second verses of Genesis II. 
 to denote the catastrophe. The Talmud so far favours the 
 theory as to interpret " the earth" in verse i to mean the 
 earth in a finished state. Here then there is no Tohu Va 
 Bohu. Between the two intervenes a great gap which has 
 to be filled in, among other things, by the fall of the angels. 
 But exegesis, dogma, and science concur in pronouncing 
 the theory untenable. Exegesis shows that the words 
 " heaven" and " earth" in verse i mean the whole undi- 
 gested and unformed lump, that was merely the founda- 
 tion of all the individual creations that follow. Perhaps, 
 however, this verse may be considered the heading of the 
 whole narrative. It would be impossible to indicate better 
 the original nebula of the Kant-Laplace theory. Again, 
 verse 2 says not that the earth was becoming, but that it 
 was chaos. In the following verses this chaos seems quite 
 naturally to be differentiated. Dogma has its own reasons 
 for denying that the fall of the angels exercised the alleged 
 influence on the development of creation. Moses lets fall 
 no hint to this effect. The spiritual nature of the angels
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 3J1 
 
 tells against it. Thus this hypothesis makes a wholly un- 
 warrantable assumption at the outset. No eye not blinded 
 by looking through a philosophical camera obscura, or 
 jaundiced by unhealthy theological assumptions, could pos- 
 sibly see in verse 2 the outcome of a struggle between 
 spirit and nature. If creation results from the finite oppo- 
 sition between spirit and matter, if natural phenomena are 
 but the development of matter, and if this development is 
 due to the disturbing effect which the fall of the angels 
 produced on creation, 9 what would follow ? We must 
 ascribe to the Bible the doctrine that the fall of the angels 
 thwarted the all-wise Creator's plan. We must, moreover, 
 request science to confess that the irrational world is noth- 
 ing more than a caricature. But scientific men will never 
 allow that " the disturbance in the equilibrium of matter 
 on which phenomena rest" can only be made intelligible, 
 by supposing that the equilibrium was disturbed by the 
 conflict between spirit and matter, in other words by orig- 
 inal sin, that is, by the fall of the spirit. It is not at all 
 easy to see what good will accrue to theology from this 
 hypothesis, unless we are prepared to grant that the spir- 
 itual and material world were derived from one and the 
 same principle, and differentiated in this particular man- 
 ner. Then the specific distinction between the two would 
 be wiped out. Then the flood-gates are opened, and the 
 waters of Monism rush in. The Schoolmen, the Aristo- 
 telian distinction notwithstanding, were right in assuming 
 from verse i, not that the two worlds, but that the matter 
 of heaven and earth was one. In the next place, what 
 would geology gain by the hypothesis ? For this prior 
 creation it would require the whole succession of organ- 
 isms and cataclysms about which the Bible is silent. Will 
 the restitutionist account for the silence by saying that 
 there was no reason for mentioning former creations and 
 destructions ? Then how comes it that they agree so re- 
 markably with the narrative of the Hexaemeron ? How 
 
 9 Michelis, Das Gesammtergebniss der Naturforscftung. Freiburg, 1885, p. 68.
 
 352 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 was such excellent order preserved in that great catas- 
 trophe ? The whole hypothesis is made up of factors that 
 are both unknown and hard to conceive, and thus it lies 
 outside the pale of probability. Among its advocates may 
 be named Chalmers, Buckland, Wiseman, Hengstenberg, 
 Kurtz, Schubert, A. Wagner, Keerl, Westermaier, Michelis, 
 Vosen, and (in part) Scheeben. It should be noted that 
 these men belong for the most part to the pre-Darwinian 
 period. 
 
 Day is first mentioned in verse 5. Thus the time allowed 
 for what precedes is not measured. The progression from 
 the original nebula to light is explained by the movement 
 and contraction of the great masses. From verse 2 on- 
 wards, the writer has the earth solely in view. Light 
 reached the earth when the rays from the central mass 
 penetrated the surrounding vapour, which enveloped all 
 things in darkness. The earth, when separated from the 
 central body, began itself to rotate. But there was no 
 palpable distinction between light and darkness till after 
 the intervening vapour had been scattered. From this dis- 
 persion we date day and night. Thus far the Bible and 
 science are in perfect harmony. For the wider meaning 
 given to God's creative word will surely be a stumbling- 
 block to no believer. Light does not cease to be a crea- 
 tion of God because it was gradually formed, or because 
 we no longer attach to the easy-flowing Scripture narra- 
 tive the meaning that God suddenly lit up the solar system 
 as a man hangs a lamp in a room. Light causes motion 
 and life. It is the most indispensable and beneficial factor 
 in all being. The moment that light first appeared on the 
 earth is surely, then, the most fitting time to introduce 
 the words : " And God saw the light that it was good." 
 Chaos and differentiating light form a majestic introduc- 
 tion to the particular accounts in the narrative. The super- 
 ficial student will, on first thoughts, be inclined to think 
 it would have been more natural if the earth had been first 
 created as it now is. Greek and Eastern philosophers 
 tried to show how the earth developed from matter, or
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 353 
 
 from an absolute, and invested light and fire with consid- 
 erable influence. But when a simple explanation is given 
 of a deep truth, men stand rapt in wonder. 
 
 From this point onwards, adjustment becomes more 
 difficult. Only two alternatives remain : to regard days as 
 general designations of time, or as the symbol of an idea. 
 The concordistic theory chooses the former alternative. 
 From it we shall gain a good idea how far we can stand 
 by a grammatical and historical interpretation. Every 
 unbiassed reader will, in the first instance, give the word 
 day (yoni) its ordinary meaning, and treat the narrative as 
 historical. Probably the sacred writer also shared this 
 opinion or, at all events, intended to convey that impres- 
 sion. 10 Thus only could he fulfil his purpose of modelling 
 the Jewish week and Sabbath on creation and God's rest. 
 Nevertheless he did not slam the door in the face of all 
 our scientific interpretations. Exegetically, yom may mean 
 day as opposed to night, or day and night together, or 
 even time in general. Thus in Isaias* the word stands for 
 the time at which an oracle is fulfilled. It is also often 
 used in adverbial phrases for : at this time ; at that time ; 
 from the time, &c.f Time in general, time of life, and 
 years are still more frequently expressed by the plural. 
 Moreover, it should be borne in mind that we are here dis- 
 cussing an action of God that cannot fall in time. The 
 Apostle echoes the Psalmist's words : " With God a thou- 
 sand years are as one day ;" meaning that God's works 
 are not to be measured by time. God required no time 
 whatever for creation. Hence the expressions used chiefly 
 for our sake in Scripture should, with all the more reason, 
 be applied not to creation, but to the formation of things, 
 for which length of time was required. In like manner we 
 learn from the cuneiform inscriptions that there was a long 
 interval between the births of the different gods. If these 
 parts of the narrative are analogous to those other parts 
 
 10 Petavius, Praef. de opit. 
 * xlviii. 7. 
 t Gen. ii. 4, 7. 
 Ps. xc. 4 ; II. Pet. iii. 8. 
 
 W
 
 354 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 which indicate the intervals that elapsed between the pro- 
 duction of the various creatures, we shall have to hand 
 further confirmatory evidence that yom may signify a 
 period. 11 According to the Parsee Zend-Avesta, the world 
 was created in six periods, and each period lasted a year.'* 
 There need, therefore, be no hesitation in giving to the 
 word yom this extended signification. Exegesis has no 
 objection to lodge except, perhaps, the phrase : " It was 
 evening and morning, one day." But this phrase was 
 used to meet the exigencies of the narrative. It was neces- 
 sary to indicate the alternations of day and night, in order 
 that the several works of each day in a typical week might 
 appear complete. It was intended to set a limit to the 
 works of creation that follow, not to sanction the Jewish 
 custom of beginning the day with the evening. For this 
 custom, by the way, was of no avail except in the ecclesi- 
 astical year. S. Augustine interpreted evening and morn- 
 ing as referring to the knowledge of the angels, i.e., their 
 knowledge of things in God and in reality. This figurative 
 interpretation is as farfetched as Abelard's decree and 
 execution ; but his other idea is sublime, in which he ex- 
 plains morning and evening as transitus ab informitate ad 
 speeitm. Thus there is no reason for excluding this phrase 
 from the form of the narrative. We may, therefore, under- 
 stand by the day an indefinitely long period. Now, how- 
 ever, the difficulty comes from another quarter. If the 
 long period of development is accounted for in this way, 
 it has to be still further considered whether the successive 
 order of works on the six days corresponds to the periods 
 of geology and palaeontology. 
 
 The second day's work, the division of the waters by a 
 firmament in the middle of the waters, is not properly a 
 creation but only a continuation of the process already at 
 work on the earth. Hence the words are not added : 
 " God saw that it was good." By the waters some under- 
 stand the clouds above. Secchi ingeniously interprets 
 
 11 Vigouroux, Die Siief, I., p. 177. 
 
 12 Max Mfillcr, Essays, Vol. I., p. 145.
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 355 
 
 them to mean the hydrogen which the spectrum analysis 
 has proved to exist in the stars. In either case we are 
 confronted with the result of a physical process. 
 
 The third day is divided into two parts. In the first, 
 one process of development, viz. the separation of the dry 
 land from the sea, was completed. The earth was now 
 ready to receive organic beings. Both land and water 
 were in a fit state to be beautified. Here it is again said : 
 "And God saw that it was good." And forthwith yet 
 another creation is related on that day : " Let the earth 
 " bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed, and 
 " the fruit-tree yielding fruit after its kind, which may 
 " have seed in itself upon the earth. And it was so done. 
 " And the earth brought forth the green herb. . . . 
 "And God saw that it was good." Here the sacred 
 writer, following the natural order, proceeds from the 
 general to the particular, from the imperfect to the more 
 perfect. Having recounted how the earth had been differ- 
 entiated into land and water, he now mentions for the first 
 time the earth's vesture, the plants, which are in part one 
 with the earth, and thus, as it were, hold a middle place 
 between the organic and the inorganic worlds. The earth 
 also supplies the animal world with matter for its organi- 
 zation. In verses 29 and 30 special reference is made to 
 this function of the vegetable world. It does not, how- 
 ever, thence follow that all animals were originally grami- 
 nivorous. For it is proved beyond a doubt by palaeontology 
 and anatomy, that beasts of prey existed long before man 
 stepped on the scene. But these verses merely indicate 
 the fundamental relations that subsist between the two 
 kingdoms. Directly or indirectly, the animal is dependent 
 on the vegetable kingdom. 
 
 Details, however, are not so clear. The creation of 
 plants, that is the entire flora, is here narrated, once for 
 all. The oft-repeated phrase, " according to its kind," 
 though certainly not to be taken as a technical term of 
 botany, denotes, nevertheless, that the several kinds of 
 plants have a specific character. From Petrography we
 
 356 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 learned that animals and plants appeared on the earth's 
 surface at the same time, and by slow degrees. In the 
 higher forms this is always the case, although the two 
 kingdoms do not march in strictly parallel lines. It may 
 be granted that the more delicate plants perished more 
 easily in the formation of the strata. Allowance must also 
 be made for disturbances in the geological epochs. The 
 presence of the same kind of plants and animals in two 
 similar strata, in places far removed from one another, 
 does not prove conclusively that the strata were formed 
 simultaneously. It is not an easy task to determine the 
 age of the so-called " leading fossils" in the several strata, 
 or to mark them off clearly from those above and below. 
 Animals and plants can be propagated only by degrees. 
 In different places the formations to which they belong also 
 differ. 13 These, however, are minor details that hardly 
 touch the main question. The territory, as a whole, is 
 definite enough, although the exact boundary-line cannot 
 always be drawn. The sea, which offered fewer obstacles 
 to formation and propagation, was the home of the first 
 organisms. Regular layers may determine the irregular. 
 This is by no means moving in a circle. Palaeontology 
 and petrography have given a substantially accurate ac- 
 count of the beginning and progress of the organic king- 
 doms. The business of exegesis is to try and reconcile the 
 two accounts. As the sacred writer set out from the flora 
 then in existence, and merely intended to note the fact of 
 creation, his interpreters may reasonably suppose that his 
 story takes in the whole flora, which then began to be 
 gradually differentiated. He says : " Let the earth bring 
 forth." This expression, derived from the development 
 of individual plants, is put for the development of the whole 
 family. But this development may have stretched over 
 and lasted through the periods that follow. 
 
 This somewhat free construction put upon the words 
 does not, however, give well-defined periods, in the geo- 
 
 13 See Natur und Offenb., 1885, p. 125. Secchi, SchSpfung, p. ao.
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 357 
 
 logical sense of the term. By a period geologists under- 
 stand the time necessary for the formation of several 
 groups, e.g., the azoic, palaeozoic, mesozoic and cainozoic 
 periods. The subsequent creation of animals enhances 
 the difficulty. No mention of animals occurs before the 
 fifth and sixth days. And yet animals and plants entered 
 on the scene at the same time ! The fourth day has noth- 
 ing to do with the question in hand. The work of the 
 fifth day extends from the beginning of the third day till 
 beyond the fifth day. Another beginning must, there- 
 fore, be assigned to it. What remains then of the geo- 
 logical period of animal creation ? or of its several periods ? 
 Perhaps some one will say that Moses merely intended to 
 give a rough sketch, or broad outline of creation. This 
 conjecture, however, affords only an apparent outlet to the 
 difficulty. If we ascribe the simultaneous appearance of 
 plants and animals to the smaller power of resistance pos- 
 sessed by the plants, we are not entitled to execute a 
 change of front and use the same argument (argumentum 
 ex silentio) to prove the existence of immense numbers of 
 plants before the animal creation. Palaeontology proves 
 the contrary. Countless animals (trilobites) swarmed in 
 the sea before the luxuriant flora of the carboniferous 
 period had appeared. At first blush it would seem more 
 plausible to argue with Reusch, Vosen and Rheinstadter 
 that the first plants only were created on the third day, 
 the first animals of the air and sea on the fifth, and the 
 first land animals on the sixth. On closer examination, 
 this rendering seems to do violence to the text, without 
 satisfying the claims of petrography ; for it expressly 
 makes animals and plants begin at times far apart. Peri- 
 ods complete and definite seem to elude the grasp of the 
 Concordantist, and to melt in his hands. All he can lay 
 hold of is a bare outline or a logical skeleton. 
 
 The fourth day looks like a most awkward intrusion 
 between the plant and animal creations. If it be regarded 
 as a period by itself, the two creations are separated by a 
 great interval, and the third and fifth days cannot possibly
 
 35 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 overlap. Unless the word day be here taken to mean a 
 period, the principle on which the explanation rests can- 
 not hold. This is a difficulty for the concordistic theory 
 only. But the fourth day forges yet another difficulty, 
 which occasioned much head-racking to the men of old. 
 Three days had passed by since the creation of light, when 
 lo ! on the fourth day, sun, moon and stars are said to be 
 created for the purpose of dividing the day and the night, 
 and of being for signs, and for seasons, and for days and 
 years. The original light is explained to be a mass of 
 light, confused and general. Before the sun was created, 
 the extension and contraction of this mass is said to have 
 regulated the alternations of day and night. It is more 
 correctly argued that the days preceding the fourth day, 
 on which the sun is first mentioned, are not to be com- 
 puted astronomically. Day and night are necessary for 
 higher animal life which alternates between sleeping and 
 waking. Higher plants also require the change of year, 
 as shown by their rings which chronicle the years. Neither, 
 however, can the author have intended the days that fol- 
 low to be taken as astronomical days. This further con- 
 clusion has slipped out of sight. For the " period theory" 
 the whole explanation is meaningless. 
 
 Does the fourth day, however, treat of the creation of 
 the heavenly bodies ? or merely of their relation to the 
 earth ? May it not be urged that the narrative radiates 
 from the geocentric standpoint ? and that the heavenly 
 bodies are being viewed solely under this aspect? The 
 chief point lies in the arrangement of the heavenly bodies. 
 The words that follow will strictly bear this explanation. 
 " Let there be light made in the firmament of heaven. 
 " . . . . And God made two great lights. . . . 
 " And he set them in the firmament of heaven to shine 
 " upon the earth." Furthermore it has even been thought 
 that this interpretation brings the Bible into harmony with 
 the Kant-Laplace theory. The light on the first day was 
 the light of the central mass, which was gradually differ- 
 entiating into the respective heavenly bodies, until the
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 359 
 
 solar systems were formed. Meanwhile the dense atmos- 
 phere of the earth may have shut out the sunlight. But 
 as the sun's mass became more and more concentrated, 
 the light was gradually diffused. Light, too, was less 
 necessary. The older cryptogamic vegetation needed less 
 light. A luxuriant carboniferous vegetation thrived in an 
 atmosphere impregnated with carbonic acid. The trunks 
 that have been discovered exhibit a colossal growth, but 
 no annual rings. Respirative animals are rare. Every- 
 where there is luxuriance and strength rather than variety. 
 The high temperature was favourable to this result. 
 Warmth, heat and shade are the efficient factors in pre- 
 solar vegetation. The insects are mostly night-insects. 
 The eyes of trilobites show that light was wanting. The- 
 odoret's solution is still more simple.* Plants, he says, 
 were created before the sun because, not having eyes, 
 they need no light. Moses, say the Fathers, delayed 
 naming the stars till the fourth day on purpose to deal a 
 blow at sun-worship. This explanation only proves that 
 they thought it preposterous to saddle Moses with such 
 ideas as to the significance of light. 14 There is no need 
 for modern commentators to lay so much stress on this 
 religious point of view, since science has abundantly proved 
 that light existed before the sun. We will not here enquire 
 whether this furnishes a proof of Moses' inspiration , but 
 we must confess that, in great part, it meets the objections 
 raised by Bishop Clifford, who finds the chief argument 
 against the concordistic theory in the fourth day. The 
 theory, however, is not thereby justified, because the 
 " period," so far as it concerns the fourth day, is thus 
 abandoned. Simply the gradual result of the develop- 
 ment is given or indicated. Thus the relation of the stars 
 to the earth was not finally fixed. We lay stress, not on 
 this circumstance, but on the fact that their development 
 ran parallel with the first three days. Apart from the 
 
 * Gen., Q. 14. 
 
 14 Theophilus, Ad Autolycum, 2, 15. Origen and others. See Controverse, i86z, p. 
 753, seq.
 
 360 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 religious purpose, viz. the divine Sabbath week, we see no 
 cogent reason for mentioning here this particular relation 
 of the heavenly bodies to the earth. 
 
 The two following days offer no special difficulty. It 
 should be noticed that, as already remarked, the word 
 bard is used in verse 21 for the creation of the great sea- 
 animals, whereas Asdh stands in verse 25 for the creation 
 of the land-animals. In both instances the narrative re- 
 lates the fulfilment of the order God gave to the elements 
 to bring forth living beings. In the main, too, the suc- 
 cession tallies with that set forth by natural history. No- 
 where, however, is there a question of complete creations. 
 
 If the period-theory be abandoned, and the works of the 
 several days be regarded as so many divine acts to which 
 special prominence is given, in order to emphasize the fact 
 that all things without exception were created, and in 
 order to set an example for religious life, there need be no 
 hesitation in admitting a successive creation. The meta- 
 physical reasons brought forward by Augustine and his 
 followers, and the modern reasons drawn from natural 
 history are alike insufficient to do away with succession. 
 Augustine found himself unable to adhere strictly to si- 
 multaneous creation. In the different periods he allowed a 
 temporal development springing from the forces and germs 
 that the Creator had instilled in created things. He 
 brushes aside the ordinary explanation ; but, without 
 doing violence to the text, he cannot refuse to admit that 
 successive formations were spontaneously produced by the 
 laws of nature, in intervals longer than twenty-four hours 
 in duration. He feels himself constrained to leave scope 
 for development. The eternal ideas, realized in creation, 
 constitute so many interferences in nature on the part of 
 the Creator ; but they are also the types regulating all 
 subsequent information of matter, which takes place 
 without any immediate interposition of God. Thus 
 S. Thomas adopted Plato's theory as amended by S. Augus- 
 tine, and strove to bring it into harmony with Aristotle. 
 The Scotists, indeed, thought S. Thomas was somewhat
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 361 
 
 tainted with Nominalism. The Thomists, in turn, re- 
 proached the Scotists with being steeped in Platonic errors. 
 Some modern Catholic savants, discarding all further 
 action on the part of God, hold that development is due 
 to the power of variation with which the original germs 
 were endowed. Other scientific men explain development 
 by a transformation effected by God in the ovules. Thus 
 God's interference is, in principle, conceded. It is not 
 easy to see how nature, which is actually successive in its 
 manifestations, is to be understood without successive acts 
 of creation. These acts, however, must not be considered 
 temporal in their cause, but only in their effect. 
 
 The further this train of thought is pursued, the greater 
 grows the difficulty of taking our stand on the concordistic 
 theory. All else has vanished, save the one fact that God 
 created in a series of progressive acts. These acts, how- 
 ever, did not follow one another in unbroken succession, 
 nor (except in a general way) in periodic days. In the 
 supposition that creation was successive, Moses based his 
 division on an ideal and religious principle. The creations, 
 as they lie before him in their completeness, are his start- 
 ing-point. While wishing to set forth the beginning and 
 origin of things, he contrives to make God appear ever 
 afterwards as being absolutely at rest ad extra. Thus 
 Moses embodies in his narrative a religious idea which 
 originated perhaps in a vision vouchsafed to him or to 
 Adam, as is contended by Kosmos Indikopleustes, Vosen, 
 Scheeben, Martin, Molais, Hummelauer and Schafer. 15 
 Lately the ideal theory has gained a widespread accept- 
 ance. At first blush it may seem to stand in glaring con- 
 tradiction to the words. An historical narrative robed in 
 a religious idea may excite surprise. Nevertheless it is 
 quite certain that ancient writers generally, and above all 
 Semitic writers, judged the historian's task by a different 
 standard from that now in vogue. The sacred writers are 
 very free in their treatment of profane subjects. 1 * Being, 
 
 15 Contr averse, 1883, p. 154. 
 
 16 See Schafer, Bibel und Wissenschaft.
 
 362 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 moreover, Semites, they were accustomed to see abstract 
 ideas take a concrete shape. Again, the ideal theory alone 
 can fix accurately the limits of theology and natural sci- 
 ence. While admitting an analogy with historical devel- 
 opment, it requires no agreement in detail. Content to 
 uphold a divine cause in the whole and in the main, it 
 hands the earth over to the discussions of the learned. 
 S. Augustine's theory, says S. Thomas, is more sublime, 
 and better calculated to defend Scripture against scoffing 
 unbelievers, but the explanation of the other Fathers is 
 clearer and more conformed to the letter. Neither, how- 
 ever, contradicts the truth of faith. 17 
 
 For this very reason, however, it behooves the defenders 
 of the idealistic theory to bring out in strong relief the 
 idea and purpose underlying the Mosaic narrative. In 
 regard to the main purpose, the matter is so clear that but 
 few words are needed. In the most solemn and impressive 
 manner, Moses weighs the almighty creative power of God 
 in the balance against heathen myths. He wishes to bring 
 home to the Jews the great contrast that obtains between 
 the creation of all things by one God to whom alone wor- 
 ship is due, and the worship of nature and of idols made 
 by human hands. Beginning, therefore, with the creation 
 of all things, he gradually proceeds to the creation of the 
 various kingdoms. But God's creation also must be copied 
 from the divine idea. God's activity must be the type on 
 which human activity is formed. The end for which the 
 earth and all things therein are created is to unite man to 
 his Creator, and to lead him to eternal salvation. What, 
 then, could be more natural than to sketch a religious 
 week modelled on the divine week of creation, and thus 
 inflame man with zeal for the faith and stimulate him to 
 live religiously ? 
 
 Bishop Clifford construes the first chapter of Genesis 
 (which he thinks but loosely connected with the historical 
 narrative), as a religious hymn, composed by Moses for the 
 
 17 De Potent., 4, a.
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 363 
 
 purpose of destroying idolatry root and branch. The 
 bishop gives point to this theory by observing that among 
 the Egyptians the days of the week were dedicated to the 
 planets, and the days of the month to different gods. 
 This he considered the hinge on which Egyptian idolatry 
 turned. This new modification of the ideal theory has 
 met with considerable opposition. Nevertheless it has 
 gained greater prominence and increased appreciation for 
 the poetic element in this sacred poem. It seems, indeed, 
 a noble introduction to the story of God's dealings with 
 the human race, and a spirited picture of the scene that 
 God was preparing for man's activity. But the proof for 
 the number six is not yet forthcoming. Heretofore no suc- 
 cess has waited on the attempt to prove the existence of 
 such a cultus among the Egyptians. Even if the Egyp- 
 tians were acquainted with the seven planets, it is still an 
 open question whether their week had generally seven 
 days. Dion Cassius traces this division of the week to an 
 Egyptian source ; rather it was discovered by the Jews or 
 Babylonians. According to the cuneiform inscriptions, 
 the Assyrians observed the Sabbath as a day of rest. 18 The 
 Chaldeans reputed it an unlucky day, but held it sacred 
 to God. They consecrated every day of the month to 
 some god or other. We are still, however, as far as ever 
 from understanding the work of the six days : for such an 
 institution merely necessitates a leap from the week to the 
 month. The only religious ideas left are Monotheism and 
 the Sabbath, which latter is supposed to be connected in 
 some way with the worship of the stars. 
 
 Perhaps the famous fourth day may supply the clue to 
 the division. In Genesis ii. i it is said : " So the heavens 
 " and the earth were finished, and all the furniture of 
 "them." From this passage the Fathers have concluded 
 that the stars are the furniture of heaven, and the plants 
 and animals the furniture of the earth, sea and air. 29 Ac- 
 
 18 Vigouroux, p. 181. See Amos v. 26. Reuss, Geschichte der heil. Schriften des A. T 
 
 1881, p. 81. 
 
 19 Juvilius, Instit., 2, 2. See Kihn, Theodor von Mopsuestia, Freiburg, 1880, p. 496.
 
 3^4 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 
 
 cordingly Peter Lombard, an authority with all School- 
 men, drew a distinction between creatio, distinctio and orna- 
 tus. Creatio is antecedent to the work of the six days. 
 The distinctio was the work of the first three days, in which 
 the light was separated from darkness, the lower waters 
 from the higher, and the dry land from the water. Here 
 we see the distinction into the four elements : light, air, 
 earth and water. The three following days are devoted 
 to furnishing or adorning the elements. On the fourth day 
 the earth was adorned with sun, moon and stars ; on the 
 fifth day the air was adorned with birds, and the water 
 with fishes and sea-animals ; on the sixth day, the earth 
 was adorned with land animals. The ornaments of heaven 
 are mentioned first, because the species of the other ele- 
 ments, and in part of light and heat, is determined by 
 heaven. SS. Thomas, Bonaventure and others lay stress 
 on the movement of which the adornment of the several 
 elements is made up. Hence the creation of moving 
 things, both in heaven and on earth, belongs to the opus 
 ornatus. This gives a hint as to how the third day is to be 
 explained. The creation of plants on the third day, which 
 is apparently out of place, indicates that these organisms 
 occupy a middle place. They have no voluntary motion, 
 but their roots are fixed in the earth whose garment they 
 are. Cicero sings the praises of the round solid earth, 
 placed in the centre of the universe, and clad with herbs 
 and flowers, trees and fruit. To the Copernican the stars 
 are not the furniture of heaven. For that which we call 
 heaven is in reality non-existent, and its movement is in 
 great measure merely apparent. The formation and adorn- 
 ment of the heavenly bodies must have been gradual. 
 Hence the two triplets of days that go to make up the dis- 
 tinctio and ornatus are not to be separated in time, but 
 should be conceived as parallel. Thus the first and fourth 
 days run in parallel lines, inasmuch as light, the property 
 common to all heaven, is now said to be diffused from the 
 several illuminating bodies, after their separation from the 
 primitive nebula. So the common luminous matter may
 
 THE HISTORY OF CREATION. 365 
 
 be said to have been differentiated on the fourth day. And 
 all differentiation serves the purpose of ornament. In like 
 manner the second and fifth days, and the third and sixth 
 are pervaded by a similar parallelism. So, at a stretch, it 
 may be said that the earth's elements were differentiated 
 in the old sense. But it is preferable and more exact to 
 say that the elements were peopled by concrete living in- 
 habitants, which feed in and on them. The Cosmos (mun- 
 dus), as it is called, is perfectly formed only when the ele- 
 ments are differentiated and animated. Hence the princi- 
 ple of division, though aesthetic and religious, is not un- 
 natural. Though ethical it is not in reality arbitrary. It 
 harmonizes, moreover, with the course of creation. Crea- 
 tion culminates in the creation of man. One feels tempted 
 to survey the whole creation from this point of view, and 
 to say that Moses' set purpose was to depict the earth as 
 the dwelling-place prepared for man." The dark mass was 
 first lit up. Then the house was roofed in ; a concrete 
 floor was laid, and carpeted with plants. Next came the 
 actual lighting-up, then the servants, and lastly the lordly 
 tenant. The lights are necessary from the first. The 
 lighting of the mass will not account for day and night 
 before the fourth day. This fourth day is proof against 
 all other explanations. 
 
 20 Scheeben, Dogmatik, vol. ii., p. 100.
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 Although Genesis makes no express declaration in re- 
 gard to the system of the universe, it evidently takes the 
 geocentric system for granted. The earth and man ap- 
 pear as the centre and end of creation. The same supposi- 
 tion also underlies other parts of Holy Scripture : " He 
 " hath set his tabernacle in the sun : and he as a bride- 
 " groom coming out of his bride chamber hath rejoiced as 
 " a giant to run the way : His going out is from the end 
 "of heaven, and his circuit even to the end thereof."* 
 " Who hast founded the earth on its own bases ; it shall 
 " not be moved for ever and ever, "f " Who shaketh the 
 " earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof tremble. 
 " Who commandeth the sun and it riseth not."J " One 
 " generation passeth away and another generation com- 
 " eth ; but the earth standeth for ever. The sun riseth and 
 " goeth down, and returneth to his place ; and there rising 
 " again, maketh his round by the south, and turneth again 
 " to the north. "|| This language would not be out of place 
 in the mouth of a nineteenth century poet. The ordinary 
 mode of expression has remained ever the same. It rises to 
 the lips of learned and unlearned alike. We cannot easily 
 break through the entrenchments with which phenomena 
 have circumvented our views and ideas. Nevertheless 
 
 * Ps. xviii. 6, 7. 
 
 t Ps. ciii. 5. See Ps. xcii. 5 and xcv. 10. 
 
 t Job ix. 6, 7. 
 
 | Ecclcs. i. 4-6. See Proverbs viii. 29.
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 367 
 
 these express allusions to the immovable foundations of 
 the earth argue more than a mere adaptation to current 
 ideas. The mote the firm stability of the earth is con- 
 trasted with the moving heavens, the stronger grow the 
 reasons for believing that the sacred writers were inwardly 
 convinced that the heavens move and the earth stands still. 
 This last point is brought out still more clearly in Josue 
 x., 12 and IV. Kings xx., n, "Then Josue spoke to the 
 " Lord, in the d y that He delivered the Amorrhite in the 
 " sight of the children of Israel, and he said before them : 
 " Move not, O Sun, towards Gabaon, nor thou, O Moon, 
 " towards the valley of Ajalon. And the sun and the moon 
 " stood still till the people revenged themselves of their 
 " enemies. ... So the sun stood still in the midst of 
 " heaven, and hasted not to go down the space of one day." 
 Isaias gave the sick king Ezechias a sign from God. " And 
 " Isaias the prophet called upon the Lord, and he brought 
 " the shadow ten degrees backwards by the line, by which 
 " it had already gone down in the dial of Achaz." Here 
 a distinction may be drawn between the fact itself and the 
 mode of expression, which is accommodated to our mode 
 of perception ; but the distinction would be a little far- 
 fetched. Doubtless it would be silly to expect of the 
 chronicler a scientific statement from the Copernican stand- 
 point. To his readers such a statement would have been 
 as bewildering as an unknown tongue. And yet we can- 
 not shake off the thought that the narrative is pervaded by 
 a conviction that the Ptolemaic system is true. So much 
 may be granted without detriment to inspiration, for there 
 is here no question of a matter of faith.* Faith comes 
 
 * To say that a physical theory of the system of the universe, which really underlies the 
 words of Scripture, may be false and not inspired, because it is not of faith, is clearly 
 to beg the question. We have no means of deciding whether a thing is inspired or 
 not beyond the fact of its being contained in Scripture. Moreover, as S. Thomas 
 explains, whatever is contained in Scripture is an object of faith either per se or per 
 accidens. It would be better, therefore, if the author had stated the case thus : The 
 Ptolemaic system commonly prevailed, and was borne out by appearances ; the sacred 
 writer may also have been privately convinced of its truth. Nevertheless the Holy 
 Spirit, who inspired the sacred writer, borrowed from him merely the modus log uendi. 
 as being admirably adapted to the main purpose. In this way it may be safely 
 affirmed that no approbation or sanction thereby attaches to the theory itself. Thus
 
 368 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 into play only in the last two passages, and then only in 
 reference to a miracle wrought by divine power. The 
 miracle remains whichever system, the Ptolemaic or Coper- 
 nican, is taken as the foundation. In neither case is it 
 necessary to contend that God interfered with the move- 
 ments of the sun and moon. It is sufficient for the pur- 
 pose, as Kepler holds, to have produced this impression on 
 the parties concerned ; and assuredly such an effect could 
 not be other than miraculous. In olden times these pas- 
 sages were considered a proof of the Ptolemaic system. 
 Hence the tenacity with which later theologians, taking 
 their stand on the Bible, clung to the Ptolemaic system ; 
 hence, too, the conflict which we now proceed to sketch. 
 
 In all ages there have been men who, in the teeth of 
 appearances, have essayed other theories in explanation of 
 the world's motion ; but they were few and far apart, and 
 their speculations were unnoticed. But as their physical 
 explanations were exceedingly faulty, and as their argu- 
 ments were merely philosophic and not astronomical, they 
 were utterly unable to overthrow a system that, to all 
 appearances, was solidly built on mathematics and astron- 
 omy. The Ionic School held that the earth's disc floats 
 on the surface of the water. This naive notion the older 
 Pythagoreans repudiated. With Pythagoras they taught 
 that the earth is a sphere moving freely in the centre of 
 the world, and against Pythagoras they also taught that it 
 revolves on its own axis. According to the received inter- 
 pretation of the Ttmceus, Plato explained the earth's diurnal 
 motion ; perhaps he also stood on the brink of the helio- 
 centric system. Aristarchus of Samos (280 B.C.) cham- 
 pioned a twofold motion, diurnal and annual. Though 
 assailed on every side he boldly stood his ground. Herac- 
 leides of Pontus (about 330 B.C.) had taken up the same 
 position. Nor were these opinions unknown to Cicero and 
 later writers. A central position is mentioned by Mar- 
 
 we may say with truth that the false theory held by the sacred writer is no hindrance 
 to inspiration, not because it is not an object of faith, but because it is no part of the 
 inspired writings, Tr,
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 369 
 
 cianus Capella as having a place in the Egyptian system. 
 According to this system the earth indeed rests in the 
 centre of the universe, but the inner planets, Mercury and 
 Venus, are made to revolve round the sun. It seems open 
 to question whether this system was ever really broached. 
 It may have originated in misunderstandings. Coper- 
 nicus, however, was aware of its existence. Tycho Brahe, 
 on biblical grounds, sought to use such a system as a 
 helm wherewith to steer a middle course between Ptolemy 
 and Copernicus. Hipparchus (160-125 B.C.), one of the 
 greatest of ancient astronomers, did not make bold to set 
 up a system of his own. Ptolemy (125 A.D.), having com- 
 pleted the observations made by Hipparchus, utilized 
 them to build up a system that should be in accord with 
 astronomical requirements. Setting aside the Egyptian 
 system, and philosophic views relative to the earth's mo- 
 tion, he declared in favour of a system based on the move- 
 ment that the heavenly bodies appear to have. In the 
 state of astronomy at that time this was the only theory 
 that had a chance of success. In his view the earth is the 
 immovable centre of the universe ; the stars are set in 
 motion by a primum mobile ; and, on a lower scale, this 
 motion round the earth is communicated to the planets. 
 The eccentric circle of the epicycle was adduced to explain 
 the complex movement of the planets. But Ptolemy was 
 well aware that his system did not rank higher than an 
 hypothesis. In answer to those who urged that his system 
 must be wrong because it was complicated, he pointedly 
 asked whether all the movements of the earth are simple. 
 The preference should be given to simple motions ; if, 
 however, they do not serve the purpose, it is allowable to 
 seek other solutions more in accord with observed phenom- 
 ena. For thirteen centuries Ptolemy's system reigned 
 supreme. The Arabs, indeed, made more correct observa- 
 tions and more accurate measurements, but even they 
 deemed the system impregnable. To keep pace with accu- 
 rate observations modifications were introduced ; and in 
 those days astronomers were as liberal with cycles and 
 
 x
 
 370 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 epicycles, as modern geologists are with the thousands of 
 years they allow for the formation of the earth's crust. 
 In consequence of this astronomical prodigality, the courses 
 of the planets become in time so complicated that Alfonso 
 of Castille (d. 1284) declared that, had he been consulted, 
 he could have furnished the Almighty with a better design 
 for the construction of the world. 
 
 For the rest it is not likely that Ptolemy and his school 
 intended to endow the several heavenly cycles with a real 
 existence. All they required was a geometric explanation 
 of the phenomena of the heavens. Men cared little as to 
 how the machinery of epicyclic motions was set going. 
 Again, the Pythagoreans were alone in hitting the truth. 
 For, according to them, the heavenly bodies trace out 
 their courses by their own inherent force. The Physicists, 
 whose horizon is for the most part bounded by experiment 
 and observation, essayed a different explanation. The 
 lonians had a predilection for crystal spheres. According 
 to Plato the planets resolve themselves into eight fixed 
 spheres, whose axis passes through the earth. Plato's dis- 
 ciple, Eudoxus, basing his calculations chiefly on the in- 
 equalities of planetary motion, assumed that every planet 
 has three or four homocentric spheres ; but these had prob- 
 ably no place outside mathematical formulae. Calippus 
 added seven to the twenty-seven spheres of Eudoxus. 
 Aristotle described the sphere-system as machinery. The 
 earth is in the centre of a series of spheres or homocentric 
 circles, which include the sun and the planets. These are 
 set in motion by spirits, and move round the earth. The 
 stars are firmly fixed in a vault that moves round the earth 
 independently of the other planets. In this form Ptolemy's 
 modified conception of the firmament as a series of nine or 
 ten crystal spheres forms the main feature of all mediaeval 
 cosmogony. At first Aristotle's influence was at low- 
 water mark ; but since the i2th century it has assumed 
 the volume of a cascade. Christian thinkers had drunk so 
 deeply of this view that, as in other matters, they supposed 
 it to have been derived from the Old Testament. Am-
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 371 
 
 brose, 1 for instance, thinks that the philosophers copied 
 David (Ps. cxlviii.), when they introduced in the place of 
 sun and moon and five stars a harmony of spheres (globi) 
 to whose cycles or rather spheres various movements were 
 ascribed. This, in his opinion, is the origin of that har- 
 mony of spheres of which David speaks in the Psalm : 
 Laudate Dominum de ctzlis ; Laudate eum sol et luna, &c. On 
 this point, as well as in Aristotelian philosophy generally, 
 the Arabs forestalled the natural philosophy of the Middle 
 Ages. Nine spheres, four elements, and four fundamental 
 forces formed the basis of Arabian ideas on the Cosmos. 
 Hence it is not surprising that, in the hey-day of Scholas- 
 ticism, the Aristotelian theory of spheres was everywhere 
 in the ascendant. To the physicist, a heavenly body 
 freely revolving in space was as unthinkable as circular 
 motion without a moving substance. To his thinking the 
 stars revolved and were firmly fixed in material spheres. 
 Aristotle's nine spheres formed the groundwork of Sacro 
 Bosco's (1220) text-book, which was for centuries, even 
 long after Copernicus, the standard work on astronomy. 
 The earth lies in the centre of the world ; around the earth 
 is water ; the water is surrounded by air ; and the atmos- 
 phere as far as the moon's orbit is encompassed with fire. 
 The spheres possess a twofold motion : the motion from 
 East to West, which is that of the firmament around its 
 axis, and that of the lower spheres, which move round the 
 poles, and are distant from them about 23, 33'. Even the 
 great reformers of astronomy, Peurbach and Regiomon- 
 tanus, found this theory indispensable, but they tried to 
 simplify planetary motion to some extent by making the 
 spheres hollow. Long after the i6th century, professors 
 of mathematics like Mastlin, Reinhold, Wursteisen, Cas- 
 telli and others were committed to this system in public, 
 although in private they may have been disciples of Coper- 
 nicus. 
 
 It was hard to swim against the stream, nevertheless dis- 
 
 i Hexeemeron^ II., a, 6. Zoeckler, Geschichte der Beziehungen^ I., 121-160, 173, 209.
 
 372 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 tinguished thinkers, dissatisfied with the system, were 
 never wholly wanting. The embers of Pythagorean influ- 
 ence were still smouldering, although it was long before 
 they were fanned into a flame. Albertus Magnus swelled 
 the chorus of Aristotelians who blamed the Pythagoreans 
 and Italian philosophers for teaching the motion of the 
 earth, when appearances were dead against it." Mayhap 
 the memory of the Pythagoreans had not died out in 
 Southern Italy. Perhaps, too, this supplies a clue to the 
 fact that enthusiasm for the new system was first evoked 
 in Italy. Even Aristotelians, however, were swayed to 
 and fro when passing judgment on the certain teaching of 
 astronomy. For S. Thomas* says that the hypothesis 
 framed by astronomers need not be true, since the evi- 
 dence to hand concerning the stars may perhaps be ex- 
 plained in a way hitherto undreamt of by human philoso- 
 phy. Theologians looked askance at the building up of a 
 new system from the shattered fragments of an old theory. 
 The disordered state of the calendar made theologians 
 look round for a remedy, if only for the sake of the Church's 
 festivals. Cardinal Nicholas de Cusa (d. 1464) had been 
 led to conjecture that the error lay not in the calculation, 
 but in the entire system of the world, and that the world's 
 centre and circumference needed readjustment. Nicholas, 
 who had studied mathematics and astronomy in Italy under 
 Toscanelli, was present at the Council of Basle, and there 
 delivered a discourse on the reform of the calendar, that 
 is still preserved.* Passing from obscure tradition to cer- 
 tain teaching, he marks the turning-point in the history of 
 astronomy. For he was the first to utter the great truth : 
 " The earth is a star like other stars." He put aside the 
 objections from the old theory by pointing to the uniform- 
 ity of the whole universe, which allowed no barrier to sepa- 
 rate earth from heaven. Of course he could give no mathe- 
 
 9 Arist. Metaph., I., 6. Albertus M., de calo, II., 4, i. Cfr. Theol. QuartalscJtri/t, 
 1885, p. 50. Werner, Ital. Philos., I., 79, 146. 
 
 3 Lect. xvii. 1. ii. de c<elo : see Hipler, die Vorlaufer des Nicol. Copernicus \ 1882. 
 
 4 Schanz, Die Astron, AnsckauuHgett des N. v. Cusa und seiner Zeit, Rottwcil, 1873.
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 373 
 
 matical or physical proof ; but what proof had other sys- 
 tems to offer ? When theory is matched against theory, 
 the palm should be awarded to the one that is simpler, 
 and that is more suited to explain phenomena. Another 
 advocate of the new system, but only recently known to 
 fame, was Calcagnini, professor at Ferrara. Speaking of 
 Cardinal de Cusa he says : "I hear that my view was 
 " patronized in the last century by Cusa, a man of profound 
 " learning and keen intellect, who was illustrious by the 
 " purple, and still more by his writings. Oh ! that I had 
 " his commentaries ! for aided by his ability I should have 
 " been spared the trouble, or at least have been provided 
 " with more solid proofs." 5 From this it would seem im- 
 probable that Cusa imported his theory from Constantino- 
 ple. True, the doctrines advanced by Pythagoreans and 
 Platonists may never have wholly died out in the Byzan- 
 tine empire. Nevertheless the suggested importation is 
 still unlikely, because Peurbach and Regiomontanus (who 
 was intimate with learned Greeks) are silent as to the 
 Pythagoreans. 
 
 Thus the ball was set rolling, and a survey was made of 
 the ground, and the foundations were laid for a scientific 
 proof of the system that is associated with the name of 
 Nicholas Copernicus (Coppernicus). In the dedication 
 prefixed to his book, Copernicus, in order to clear his sys- 
 tem from the charge of novelty, scrupulously enumerates 
 the views of the older philosophers. But of Cardinal de 
 Cusa he makes no mention. From this silence we may 
 certainly infer that he was unacquainted with Cusa's writ- 
 ings. But it by no means follows that Cusa's ideas were 
 wholly unknown to him. Giordano Bruno, who was en- 
 tirely influenced by Cusa's views and gained much of the 
 credit that was due to the Cardinal, in his pompous way 
 declared it to be self-evident that Copernicus had boldly 
 proclaimed what Cusa had timidly suggested a hundred 
 years before. Copernicus, he says, assumed a bold front 
 
 5 Copernikanische Mittheilungcn, 1812, p. 78. Natur u. Offenb. 1879 an< ^ '877, ? 741. 
 Also Kirchenlexicon, and Ed., III., 1079.
 
 374 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 in order that the true theory, which was better adapted 
 for astronomical calculations, might gain toleration, even 
 if acceptance were withheld. The spread of the doctrine 
 in Italy is proved, independently of Calcagnini, by the fact 
 that Dominicus Maria, Copernicus' tutor at Bologna, was 
 thereby persuaded to assume a different latitude for cer- 
 tain towns. Italy indeed was the soil on which the seed 
 of the new system grew up ; but two Germans trained the 
 growing plant and brought it to maturity. They were 
 the men who first grasped the idea in its full significance. 
 
 Nicholas Copernicus was born at Thorn on Feb. 19, 
 1473. His father was an emigrant from Cracow. His 
 mother was a German named Watzelrode. He studied at 
 Cracow from 1491 to 1494, and in the autumn of 1494 he 
 went to Bologna to study Canon Law. The registers de- 
 clare him to be a German citizen. His uncle Watzelrode, 
 Bishop of Ermeland (1470-1473) belonged to the same 
 nationality. At Bologna he studied Greek, mathematics 
 and astronomy, and took astronomical observations with 
 his tutor. In the year 1500 he went along with his brother 
 Andrew to Rome. Here Rheticus brought him forward 
 as a mathematical professor. According to the custom 
 then in vogue he lectured in public. Meanwhile he had 
 become a member of the Chapter of Frauenburg. That 
 he might prosecute his medical studies, the Chapter of 
 Frauenburg granted him in 1501 a further leave of absence. 
 From Rome he betook himself to Padua. In 1503 he grad- 
 uated in Canon Law at Ferrara. About the year 1505 he 
 returned to his native land, and lived in Heidelberg as 
 medical adviser to his uncle. He did not, however, dis- 
 continue his astronomical studies, though his instruments 
 were of a primitive sort. Want of exact information com- 
 pelled him to answer in the negative a question put to him 
 by the Lateran Council in 1514, in regard to the reform of 
 the calendar. For he considered that the length of the 
 months and the year, and the movements of the sun and 
 moon had not yet been determined with sufficient exacti- 
 tude. His further observations and the " Prutenical Tables"
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 375 
 
 of E. Reinhold served as the basis for the reform of the 
 calendar in 1582. 
 
 Meanwhile Copernicus was labouring indefatigably at 
 the great work of his life, the laying of a new foundation, 
 for a new system of the universe. It was begun as far 
 back as 1509. In 1530 it was nearly ready. From all sides 
 came earnest entreaties to publish it. High dignitaries in 
 the Church like Cardinal Schomburg and Bishop Giese 
 were most urgent in their entreaties. Still Copernicus 
 was unwilling to accede to their wishes, as he thought 
 further corrections were needed. Dread of ecclesiastical 
 censure was out of the question. Till the end of his life 
 Copernicus was engaged in correcting the MS., as the 
 autograph discovered in 1854 bears witness. The most 
 recent discoveries in Vienna and Stockholm afford con- 
 vincing proof that he had previously published but once 
 on the new system. At length, when life was drawing to 
 a close he was prevailed upon to send his great work to 
 press. Osiander and Schoner, two friends of Rheticus, 
 the Wittenberg professor of mathematics who had be- 
 friended Copernicus, were entrusted with the publication. 
 The work was published at Niirnberg in 1543 under the 
 title : De revolutionibus erbium ccelestium Libri vi. When 
 Copernicus, stricken down by a stroke of apoplexy, lay on 
 his death-bed, he held a copy in his hands. The work was 
 dedicated to Pope Paul III. For the Pope was held in 
 such high esteem even in the remote spot in which the 
 author lived that, as Copernicus thought, he could easily 
 by his authority silence slanderous tongues. This indi- 
 cates pretty clear the quarter from which Copernicus ex- 
 pected the storm to blow. His language is plain and 
 straightforward : " If hair-brained babblers, ignorant of 
 " mathematics, shall sit in judgment on my work and pre- 
 " sume to censure and condemn it on the score of a pas- 
 " sage in Holy Scripture which they maliciously distort to 
 " their own ends, I shall not be troubled by their verdict 
 " but rather despise it as rash and prejudiced. Lactantius, 
 " a writer in other respects distinguished, but no mathe-
 
 376 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 " matician, as all the world knows, discoursed like a child 
 " about the shape of the earth, and ridiculed those who 
 " taught that the earth is spherical in form. Let not sci- 
 " entific men therefore wonder if men of this calibre rid- 
 " cule me. None but mathematicians can understand 
 " mathematics." 
 
 Following the dedication to Paul III. is a preface which 
 is wholly out of keeping with the firm conviction expressed 
 by the author, in the dedication and in the body of the 
 work. This preface, however, was substituted for the 
 original preface by the publisher Osiander, who, in the 
 hope of meeting the objections raised by the Reformers, 
 designated the theories of Copernicus as new and wonder- 
 ful hypotheses that might possibly be false. Bishop Giese 
 and the friends of Copernicus were up in arms. They 
 raised an indignant protest against this dishonorable pro- 
 ceeding. But their protests were of no avail to prevent 
 the teaching of Copernicus being regarded till recent times 
 as an hypothesis. The genuine preface only came to light 
 with the original manuscript. It is as far removed from 
 the clumsy forgery as the poles are asunder. The true 
 preface shows that Copernicus united in a charming de- 
 gree genuine scientific research with a true religious sense. 
 He recognized astronomy as a science more divine than 
 human, because it proclaims God's honour and glory. If 
 any one spoke of his system, he at once broke in : " Not 
 my system, but God's arrangement." It was this arrange- 
 ment that had decided the point for him. He says : " After 
 " assuming the motions ascribed to the earth in the follow- 
 " ing work, I found after years of painstaking research, 
 " by referring the movements of the other planets to the 
 "earth's circumference, and by calculating them accord - 
 " ing to the revolutions of each star, that not only would 
 " observed phenomena be thereby explained, but also that 
 " the series, magnitude, and orbits of all the stars in the 
 " firmaments are arranged in such wonderful harmony. 
 " that no part can be displaced without throwing the whole 
 " universe into confusion."
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 377 
 
 Copernicus had, indeed, no direct proofs to offer. He 
 knew the objections that could be drawn chiefly from the 
 parallax of the fixed stars and the apparent repose of the 
 atmosphere. But he had laid a mathematical foundation 
 for his system which subsequent calculations have verified. 
 Nevertheless nothing short of a direct proof could con- 
 trovert the accuracy of the minutely developed system of 
 the ancients. Here, too, we have a key to the opposition 
 raised by theologians and philosophers. Mere sense-evi- 
 dence was their accepted criterion. The Ptolemaic system 
 was, in their opinion, indisputably the basis of the Chris- 
 tian view of the philosophy of the universe. Now Coper- 
 nicus gives the lie direct to this sense-evidence, and con- 
 tradicts the letter of Holy Scripture. Moreover, he 
 deprived the earth of its prestige as the centre of the uni- 
 verse, and degraded it to the rank of an ordinary heavenly 
 body ; nay he represented it as being one of the smallest 
 that revolve round another centre. Some thought the doc- 
 trine of redemption was in danger. The Reformers were 
 the first theological opponents to lay siege to the new sys- 
 tem. Luther in his usual coarse way held up to scorn the 
 fool in Frauenburg who wanted to revolutionize astronomy. 
 Holy Scripture, says Luther, tells us that Josue bade the 
 sun not the earth to stand still. Melanchthon was in even 
 greater dread of the principle involved and its conse- 
 quences, and he urged the authorities to persecute with all 
 their might and main such wicked and godless teaching. 
 Not till a long time had elapsed, did the learned men of 
 Wittenberg dare to hazard the theory of the earth's motion 
 even as an hypothesis. Neither were mathematicians in a 
 hurry to go against the current. In 1579, Galileo wrote to 
 Kepler that the vast majority of mankind had rewarded 
 Copernicus with naught but scorn and derision, because 
 he had not made known his reasons for supposing that the 
 earth moved. Bacon of Verulam, the founder of inductive 
 science, sneers at Copernicus as a man who, without taking 
 thought, would revolutionize all nature to save his calcu- 
 lations. The opinion of Copernicus which, he says, still
 
 378 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 held good, could be impugned not on astronomical grounds, 
 because it does not contradict phenomena, but by the prin- 
 ciples of natural philosophy correctly applied. These 
 words of the celebrated Bacon, written in 1620, are worth 
 emphasising because, in the trial of Galileo, we shall hear 
 the same principles enunciated by less eminent philosophers 
 and naturalists. 
 
 The attitude assumed by the dignitaries of the Church 
 in the lifetime of Columbus was not without its influence 
 on after- times. By far the great majority of Catholic the- 
 ologians and philosophers stood loyal and true to the old 
 system, and invoked the letter of Holy Scripture in its 
 defence. But opposition properly so called sprang into 
 being only when the question began to be debated from 
 another point of view, and the authority of Holy Scripture 
 itself seemed in jeopardy. Such was the case in Galileo's 
 time. Galileo was born on February i5th (i8th) 1564. 
 He received his first lessons at Florence. In accordance 
 with his father's wishes he went in 1581 to Pisa University 
 to study medicine ; but by preference he gave himself up 
 to mathematical studies. To this period belongs the dis- 
 covery of the isochronism of the pendulum, which was 
 suggested to Galileo as he stood in the Cathedral of Pisa 
 watching a lamp swinging to and fro. In 1586 want of 
 means compelled Galileo to return to Florence. Never- 
 theless he continued to prosecute his studies in mathe- 
 matics and physical science. The hydrostatic balance and 
 the fundamental principles of modern mechanics were the 
 result. During his sojourn in Florence he discovered and 
 verified by experiment the laws of falling bodies, which 
 are named after him. Thus, as Copernicus had under- 
 mined astronomy, so Galileo cut the ground from under 
 Aristotelian physics. Not Aristotle but the book of nature 
 was Galileo's standard. Nature promulgates true laws 
 which, when reduced to mathematical formulae, leave no 
 doubt about the truth. In 1592 Galileo became professor 
 of mathematics at Padua. From this time date his im- 
 portant declarations in favour of Copernicanism. Of its
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 379 
 
 truth he was quite convinced, but he did not think his 
 proofs convincing. The invention of the telescope in 1608 
 changed all. After hearing the telescope described, Galileo 
 straightway constructed one, and pointed it to the heavens. 
 His labours were crowned with many brilliant discoveries. 
 Universal astonishment greeted the announcement that 
 there are mountains and valleys in the moon ; that the 
 milky way and the nebula in Orion and others, are studded 
 with countless stars ; that the Pleiades number not seven 
 but more than forty ; that Jupiter has four revolving satel- 
 lites. Nor did a long time elapse before Galileo discovered 
 the rings of Saturn and the phases of Venus. Natural 
 philosophers stood aghast at these discoveries. Their only 
 defence lay in denying the alleged facts. They distrusted 
 the mysterious glass and branded its revelations as illu- 
 sory ; nay, they proved a priori that these must be illusory. 
 Meanwhile events marched as usual in the duel between 
 natural philosophy and exact science. In the long run 
 definitions and theories are no match for evident experi- 
 mental facts. Galileo was the doughty champion of right. 
 In 1610 he was appointed to the first mathematical chair 
 in the University of Pisa, but was dispensed from lecturing. 
 But the conclusions drawn from the observations stood 
 on a different footing. The Aristotelian axiom of the un- 
 changeableness of the heavens was shaken to its founda- 
 tion, but the Aristotelians would not surrender it. For to 
 surrender would have been to accept the Copernican sys- 
 tem. Jupiter's moons prove that the motion of the moon 
 round the earth furnishes no argument against the earth's 
 motion round the sun. Again, the phases of Venus admit 
 of no other conclusion than that the planets revolve round 
 the sun. Hence there was nothing to choose between the 
 Egyptian system and Copernicanism. In 1611 sun-spots 
 were discovered almost simultaneously by Fabricius, 
 Sheiner and Galileo. This discovery dealt another blow 
 at the doctrine of the unchangeableness of the heavens, 
 since the sun'itself was no longer pure and intact. In his 
 work on sun-spots (1612), Galileo declared that his convic-
 
 380 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 tion of the truth of Copernicanism amounted to an abso- 
 lute certainty. His declaration encountered a storm of 
 opposition from academies of learned men, the force of 
 which was broken by the enthusiastic applause from others, 
 even the highest dignitaries of the Church. Philosophy 
 and theolcgy were at that time so closely connected that, 
 once the threshold of theology was crossed, the struggle 
 would be rife with danger. Here lay the temptation for 
 adversaries who were no match for experiment. It is not 
 surprising that they were soon discomfited. Galileo was 
 perhaps too sharp and merciless in following up his advan- 
 tage. These skirmishes prompted him in 1612 to ask his 
 friend Cardinal Conti, who resided in Rome, what would 
 be the attitude of theologians towards the new system. 
 Holy Scripture, he replied, was more adverse than favour- 
 able to the peripatetic principle that the heavens are inde- 
 structible. But the doctrine of the earth's motion, taking 
 the words in their accepted sense (and only necessity could 
 authorize a different usage), was another matter. External 
 circumstances prompted the celebrated and important let- 
 ter of December 21, 1613, to Castelli, professor of mathe- 
 matics at Pisa, in which Galileo laid down the above prin- 
 ciples of exegesis. In 1614 a Dominican, Caccini by name, 
 brought forward the subject in the pulpit at Florence and 
 gave information to the Inquisitor, Lorini. Caccini's 
 master sent a denunciatio to the prefect of the Roman Con- 
 gregation of the Index, enclosing a copy of the letter to 
 Castelli. Galileo, hearing of these proceedings in Rome, 
 enlarged upon his letter to Castelli in a letter addressed 
 to the grand duchess Christina. The principles are cor- 
 rect but the conclusions are too far-reaching. Theology 
 is so closely imprisoned that it ceases to have any bearing 
 on the other sciences. 
 
 In December, 1615, Galileo went to Rome. Again he 
 received the same hearty welcome as had been extended 
 to him in 1587 and in 1611. He was thereby emboldened 
 to push on his cause with more zeal than discretion. On 
 February ipth, 1616, two propositions were submitted to
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 381 
 
 the consultors of the Holy Office : " The sun is the centre 
 "of the world, and consequently has no local motion." 
 " The earth is not the centre of the world ; nor, again, is 
 " it immovable, but it moves round itself with a diurnal 
 " motion." The consultors expressed their opinion as fol- 
 lows. The first proposition is philosophically silly, and 
 formally heretical, inasmuch as it directly contradicts many 
 passages of Holy Writ, taken in their literal sense, and as 
 they were commonly understood by the Fathers and theo- 
 logians. The second proposition lies under the same philo- 
 sophical ban, and is at least theologically erroneous. The 
 Holy Office, in the session held on February 25th, adopted 
 this judgment. Thereupon the Pope commissioned Bel- 
 larmine to intimate to Galileo that " he must absolutely 
 " refrain from propounding or discussing such a doctrine, 
 " and that he would be thrown into prison unless he com- 
 " plied." On the day following (February 26th) Bellar- 
 mine delivered the message to Galileo in his own private 
 apartments. The tenour of his communication was : 
 " Galileo must abandon once for all the opinion that the 
 " earth moves, and that the sun is the centre of the world, 
 " and immovable ; he must not teach or defend it by word 
 " or writing, or maintain it in any way ; otherwise the 
 " Holy Office would institute proceedings against him. 
 " Galileo listened to the order with composure and prom- 
 " ised to obey." This was duly reported by Bellarmine to 
 the Inquisition in the session held on March the 3rd, under 
 the presidency of the Pope. On the decree being laid 
 before the congregation of the Index, the works of Nicholas 
 Copernicus on the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, the 
 writings of Diego of Stunica on Job, and those of the Car- 
 melite Foscarini on the earth's motion were put on the 
 Index. This decree of March the 5th proscribed the works 
 of Copernicus and Diego until they should be corrected. 
 But Foscarini's work was forbidden altogether, because 
 the false Pythagorean doctrine that the earth moves and 
 the heavens are immovable (which is in absolute contra- 
 diction to Holy Scripture) had already gained wide accept-
 
 382 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 ance. The decree was subscribed as usual in the Pope's 
 name by Paul Sfondrati, Cardinal of S. Cecilia and Bishop 
 of Albano, and by Francis Magdalenus, Secretary. 
 
 To form a just estimate of this decision it is necessary 
 to keep steadily in view the state of exegesis, philosophy, 
 and natural science at that time. The entire school of 
 exegesis was opposed to the surrender of the literal mean- 
 ing.* The authorities of the Church grew more and more 
 anxious as dangers were fast thickening round the old 
 faith. The Reformation had tried to gain a footing even 
 in Italy. Many learned men favoured the false Renascence. 
 Philosophy was then Aristotelian. To gain an idea of the 
 tenacity with which philosophers clung to old names and 
 ideas, one should read Galileo's dialogue on the system of 
 the universe. Natural science was closely allied to philoso- 
 phy. Galileo had, indeed, dug deeper foundations for 
 Copernicanism, but the proofs, on the whole, were little 
 better than arguments from analogy. Tycho Brahe's sys- 
 tem, which made the sun and the planets move round the 
 earth, explained observed phenomena quite as well, though 
 not so simply. Galileo made no use of Kepler's laws, and 
 never quite surmounted the atmospheric difficulty. So it 
 may be truly said that a scientific proof of Copernicanism 
 was not yet forthcoming ; nor did it appear till long after- 
 wards. Hence it is easy to see how theological judges, 
 ever breathing an Aristotelian atmosphere, arrived at their 
 decision, however much we may regret that decision. The 
 decrees of the congregation had certainly no dogmatic 
 
 * The reader who desires to master this question must never lose sight of this canon of 
 interpreting Scripture The Church cannot abandon the literal sense of a passage of 
 Holy Scripture, unless forced thereunto by real evidence to the contrary. Hence 
 theologians are bound to act in the same way. Thus, in a scientific question like the 
 present, theologians and commentators are necessarily guided by the evidence of 
 scientific men. But their testimony must be nothing short of evidence; and until it 
 reaches the level of evidence they are bound to ho'd fast to the letter of Scripture. 
 In this sense science is a negative canon for interpreting Scripture. To form a just 
 judgment on the present case requires a large acquaintance with the organic constitu- 
 tion of the Catholic Church, and its complete action as guardian and interpreter of 
 the revelation entrusted to its keeping. Moreover the substance of the case must be 
 carefully distinguished from its accidental surroundings. In the Galileo case there 
 may be points that even a good Catholic may regret, but no substantial blame attaches 
 to the Church or its authorities. Tr.
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 383 
 
 force. Then, again, it was allowable to use the system as 
 a "hypothesis;" and this left a loop-hole for science to 
 escape. For, since Copernicus himself had published a 
 Commentariolus de hypothesibus motuum ccelestium, the " cor- 
 rected' ' Copernicus, as we understand the term, might ren- 
 der yeoman service to science. For the rest Galileo was 
 not further molested. On May the 26th, Bellarmine ex- 
 plained that he had not been obliged to abjure his teach- 
 ing, but had only been admonished not to defend and 
 maintain his doctrine that the earth moves. In order to 
 prove the acts spurious it is alleged that this is in contra- 
 diction with the events of February 25th and 26th. But 
 these inferences must now be regarded as groundless. 
 
 Galileo was now obliged to be more reserved. In Ebb 
 and Flow, and the Gold Balance (II Saggiatore, 1623), the 
 latter directed against the Roman Jesuit Grassi, he covertly 
 advocated the new system without giving offence. In 
 1623, when his friend Cardinal Barberini became pope 
 under the title of Urban VIII., he tried, without success, 
 to make the Pope a partisan. He now set to work to re- 
 vise the Dialogue that he had been preparing for twenty 
 years. In 1630 he asked and obtained permission to print 
 it in Rome, on condition that the printed sheets, the pref- 
 ace and conclusion were submitted to the board of censors. 
 In the end, however, he was allowed to print it at Florence. 
 It was published on February the 22, 1632, bearing a double 
 Imprimatur, although the Roman Imprimatur held good 
 only in Rome. 6 The book created an immense sensation, 
 but opposition was fanned into a flame anew. Some have 
 imputed personal motives to Urban VIII. He felt hurt, 
 they say, at the clumsy defence of the Aristotelian natural 
 philosophy which Simplicius, a character in the Dialogue, 
 puts into the mouth of the Pope. And again he is said to 
 have been angry with Galileo for countenancing the super- 
 
 6 The title is : Dialogo di Galileo Galilei, dove nei congressi di quattro giornate si dis- 
 corre sopra i due massimi systemi del mondo, Tolemaico e Copernicano, proponendo 
 indeterminatamente le ragioni philosofiche e naturali tanto per Tuna parte che per 
 1'altra. For further details see Schanz, Galileo Gal. und sein Process, Wiirzburg, 
 1878. Kirchenlexicon, v. 18
 
 384 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 stition of astrological births. Then also the attitude of 
 the Roman Jesuits was hostile to Galileo. But apart from 
 all these considerations the interference of the ecclesiasti- 
 cal authorities is not difficult to understand, when the 
 negotiations of 1616 are borne in mind. A special com- 
 mission forthwith came to the conclusion that Galileo had 
 transgressed the order laid upon him. For he had main- 
 tained absolutely, and not as an hypothesis, that the earth 
 moved and the sun was at rest, and had falsely referred the 
 ebb and flow of the tide to this cause. Moreover he was 
 said to have deceitfully suppressed an order of the Holy 
 Office of 1616. Galileo, now in his ;oth year and broken 
 down with age and infirmity, was summoned to Rome, 
 where he arrived after many delays on Feb. 13, 1633. He 
 took up his residence with the Toscan ambassador. Every- 
 where he was respectfully treated. He resolved, however, 
 to make matters as smooth as possible. His scientific con- 
 viction was as firm as his faith. After the first examina- 
 tion he was detained in the palace of the Holy Office, occu- 
 pying three spacious rooms in the Fiscale. But he was 
 never in prison. Having been persuaded in private to 
 give up his teaching as erroneous, he put forth on April 
 the 3oth a confession couched in terms of deepest humility. 
 He even volunteered to continue the Dialogue and write 
 his own refutation. Leave was now given him to return 
 to the ambassador's house. On May the loth he produced 
 his apology and the original attestation of May the 26th, 
 1616. On June the i6th the Pope, in a session of the 
 Congregation, ordered Galileo to be interrogated under 
 threat of torture. If he persisted in his views he was to 
 be made to solemnly abjure his teaching before the Holy 
 Office, and to undertake not to spread it any more ; and 
 then he was to be imprisoned. To all these terms Galileo 
 agreed on June the 2ist. Torture never passed beyond 
 the domain of a threat. Galileo returned to his apart- 
 ments in the Fiscale. On June the 22nd Galileo had to 
 abjure his doctrine in the Church of Santa Maria sopra la 
 Minerva. The decree sets forth that Galileo, by maintain-
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 385 
 
 ing a doctrine contrary to Holy Writ, had drawn upon 
 himself the suspicion of heresy. All pains and penalties, 
 however, would be remitted if he would honestly and sin- 
 cerely abjure and execrate the said heresies. Galileo knelt 
 down and made his abjuration. He confessed that he had 
 disobeyed the injunction of February the i6th, 1616, and 
 rendered himself suspect of heresy. And he abjured the 
 " aforesaid errors and heresies, and all other errors, and 
 " every sect that is hostile to the Holy Catholic Church." 
 The exclamation E pur si muove* which he is alleged to 
 have uttered when rising, must be relegated to the domain 
 of fable. The hair-shirt, too, must be consigned to the 
 same ignoble fate. Imprisonment was commuted into 
 free confinement, firstly in the Ambassador's house, sec- 
 ondly in the Archbishop of Siena's palace, and lastly in 
 his own villa at Arcetri near Florence. Here, blind and 
 feeble, Galileo died at a ripe old age on January the 8th, 
 1642. 
 
 This much -to-be-regretted trial was consequent upon the 
 proceedings taken in 1616. Decision and trial may be ex- 
 plained substantially in the same way. Individually Galileo 
 was harshly treated ; but his treatment, viewed in the 
 light of the penal enactments then in vogue, was exceed- 
 ingly lenient. The position of affairs rendered an adverse 
 judgment inevitable. Galileo's violence and imprudence 
 brought matters to a crisis. Later on he became quite 
 disheartened. The new system had received a check from 
 the condemnation, and it was prevented from spreading, 
 especially in theological circles. But the advantages accru- 
 ing therefrom cannot be too highly estimated. The de- 
 cree, like that of 1616, had not the Pope's signature, but 
 was an ordinary Congregational decree. It was officially 
 promulgated, but not rigorously enforced ; neither did 
 people take it much to heart. Astronomers continued to 
 prosecute their studies assiduously, as Galileo's correspond- 
 ence proves. As we shall see presently, the direct grounds 
 
 * " And still it moves."
 
 386 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 only came to light later. It would have been well if, on 
 both sides, judgment had not been clouded by passion. 
 In no case like the present has the virus of critics and the 
 easy-going credulity of apologists so effectually succeeded 
 in diverting the main point at issue from its natural and 
 historical channel. 
 
 The third in the trio of the coryphei of the new system 
 is Kepler. Born on December 2yth, 1571, at Weil, a town 
 in Wiirtemberg, he went to Tubingen University in 1589, 
 to study theology in the Protestant Seminary. Mastlin, 
 the mathematician, an advocate of the Copernican system, 
 soon gained great influence over the talented young student. 
 In 1591 he took his degree, and crossed over to the theo- 
 logical faculty for his three years' course. But the " fright- 
 ful intolerance" that the professors of theology displayed 
 in their zeal for a formulary of faith (concordia), and in 
 maintaining that Christ's body was everywhere, was not 
 to his taste. 7 His predilection for the new system made 
 him still more disliked. The theologians pronounced him 
 unfit for the ministry. In 1594 he went as a mathematical 
 professor to Gratz in Steiermark. Here it was his duty to 
 teach mathematics and to draw up the calendar. In this 
 latter work he felt constrained to make large concessions 
 to prevalent astrological superstitions. In the Prodromus 
 published in 1596 he foreshadowed his grand idea : the 
 organic unity of the planetary system. The proofs of the 
 thesis were still unsound and inadequate. He sought to 
 solve the Mysterium Cosmographicum, the position and mo- 
 tion of the planets, by the five regular bodies. His stay in 
 Gratz was cut short by the counter-reformation. The 
 Jesuits obtained permission for him to stay, but he found 
 his position too uncomfortable. As Mastlin could find no 
 suitable opening for him in Tubingen, and the ministry 
 was closed against him in Wiirtemberg, he applied to the 
 Emperor for a situation. In 1600 he became Tycho Brahe's 
 assistant in Prague. Tycho wanted Kepler to work out 
 
 7 Wolff, Gcschithte der Astronomie, p. 283. Zockler, Zeugen Gottts, I., 165 seq.
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 387 
 
 the planetary tables he had drawn up. Shortly afterwards 
 Tycho died. Thereupon Kepler was commissioned to 
 work out the Mars theory with the aid of Tycho' s observa- 
 tions. It was while engaged in this task that he first hit 
 upon the correct inductive method. He defined as many 
 points of Mars as he could, and joined them together. 
 The result was an ellipsoid, which presently developed into 
 an ellipse, with the sun in one focus. In this way Kepler's 
 first law was discovered. The second law resulted from 
 the position the sun occupied with regard to the planets. 
 It lays down that the " radii vectores" traverse equal areas 
 in equal times. Both laws were published by Kepler in 
 his Astronomia nova demotibus stellce Martis (1609). In the 
 dedication to the Emperor Rudolph II., he thus writes : 
 " Astronomers were powerless against the god of war. But 
 " that splendid field-marshal Tycho, after twenty years 
 " of night-watching, found out all his warlike devices. 
 " And I, following the course of mother earth, have cir- 
 " cumvented him in all his tortuous paths." On the death 
 of Rudolph he went to Linz, religious bigotry again bar- 
 ring his return to Wurtemburg. Subsequent investiga- 
 tions on the harmony of the spheres led in 1618 to the dis- 
 covery of Kepler's third law which states that the square 
 of a planet's periodic time is proportional to the cube of its 
 mean distance from the sun. This third law was published 
 in 1619 in the Harmonices Mundi Libri V. In 1620 and 1623 
 he went to Leonberg to prove his mother guiltless of witch- 
 craft. Then the dangers of the counter-reformation in- 
 duced him to settle at Ulm. Here in 1627 he issued his 
 third great work, Tabula RudolphinK. In 1630 he died at 
 Regensburg, whither he had gone to lay his claim for 
 arrears of pay before the Reichstag. Galileo corresponded 
 with Kepler from 1597, and the two exchanged works. 
 And yet Galileo makes no reference to Kepler's laws. 
 Galileo cannot possibly have been ignorant of them, nor 
 would he be likely to undervalue them ; but they could 
 not have been much help to Galileo in his physical astron- 
 omy. They were formal laws that corresponded exactly
 
 388 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 with observed phenomena. But they barely affected physi- 
 cal astronomy for two reasons : Most planets deviate but 
 very slightly from the circular orbit, and astronomers had 
 already fixed on the three points in the circle that, as it 
 were unconsciously, gave the idea of the ellipse. The 
 character of the two astronomers was so different, and 
 their methods so diverse, that it would be unreasonable to 
 expect either to be enraptured with the laws or discoveries 
 of the other. By this we may gauge the practical bear- 
 ing of the laws on the controversy then raging as to the 
 system of the universe. It was far easier, than in Galileo's 
 case, for the advocates of the ancient natural philosophy 
 to offer opposition to these theoretical laws, so long as the 
 physical causes regulated by these laws were absent. 
 
 To Newton belongs the merit of discovering the physical 
 causes that gave to Kepler's laws their full significance. 
 Thus the reformation in astronomy was accomplished. 
 Isaac Newton was born January 5th, 1643, at Woolsthorpe, 
 near Grantham, in Lincolnshire. At Cambridge, whither 
 he repaired in 1660, he had Barrow for his professor in 
 Mathematics and Optics. When a school-boy he busied 
 himself with the problem of which Copernicus, Kepler, 
 Bouilliau, Borelli and Pascal had had faint glimmerings, 
 viz. the force of gravitation. In 1666 he was pretty sure 
 of the main points. The story goes that the sight of an 
 apple falling to the ground led him to enquire whether the 
 force that makes the apple fall also retains the moon in its 
 path round the earth. But as the data were incorrect the 
 calculations were wrong. When, however, practical as- 
 tronomers furnished true measurements, he found that the 
 calculation tallied. He was now enabled to enunciate the 
 law of gravitation : " Every planet is attracted by the sun 
 " with a force which is in direct proportion to its mass, and 
 " in indirect proportion to the square of the distance." In 
 Principia mathematica philosophic naturalis he proved mathe- 
 matically that this law lay at the foundation of astronomy 
 and of the whole universe. Madler and Wolf say " that 
 " all the true and correct discoveries hitherto made in ref-
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 389 
 
 " erence to the motion of the heavenly bodies were now 
 " conclusively demonstrated. Their general bearing was 
 "established, and their inner foundations surely laid." 
 Was all doubt removed ? For astronomers, but not for the 
 lay public. For gravitation, being something theoretical, 
 is always open to the objection that it cannot be proved. 
 To this day its nature has not been successfully determined. 
 On the other hand, many are now beginning to call it in 
 question. It is at once strange and beneficial that doubt 
 as to the truths of natural science is not silenced till the 
 most rigid proofs are forthcoming. Without direct proof 
 the claim of those truths to respect will always be called 
 in question. However overwhelming the weight of indi- 
 rect proof, direct proofs are still wanting. 
 
 Copernicus found it necessary to prove his system 
 directly by the annual parallax of the fixed stars. For the 
 earth's annual motion must give a maximum of latitude to 
 the star at the time of opposition, and a minimum at the 
 time of conjunction. But as his instruments were im- 
 perfect he failed. After countless observations Bradley 
 (d. 1762) at length noticed slight annual divergences. But 
 the fact that their extreme values coincided with their 
 squares made it clear that these divergences did not affect 
 the parallaxes, but were owing to the aberration of light. 
 By this means, however, another proof, though not the 
 one directly sought after, of the earth's motion round the 
 sun was unexpectedly obtained. For this motion alone 
 can explain why the stars do not lie exactly in the spot 
 indicated by the ray of light, but in the direction indicated 
 by the resultant of the motion of light and of the earth. 
 This action is usually illustrated as follows. A cannon 
 ball fired at a train in motion is supposed to make two 
 holes, one at the side it enters, and another on the side it 
 goes out. A line drawn between the two holes will give 
 the direction in which the cannon ball is moving, but it 
 will not indicate exactly the place of the gunner, because 
 the train was moving onwards while the ball was passing 
 from one side to the other. When Olaf Romer in 1675
 
 390 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 observed the darkness of Jupiter's moons, the theory that 
 light was instantaneously transmitted had to be aban- 
 doned. And the velocity of light being found to be about 
 40,485 miles, this aberration of the light proved to a cer- 
 tainty the earth's motion. It proved likewise that the 
 earth moves in an elliptic path. For the apparent motion 
 of the stars has an annual period, and in its course de- 
 scribes a small ellipse whose great axis is 40' 5* in all. 
 
 The long sought for parallax of the fixed stars was at 
 length determined. Bessel, after a series of three years' 
 observations, noticed a slight parallax of the fixed star 
 6 1 Cygni ; others followed. The solution of the question 
 is still attended with the greatest difficulties, the delicacy 
 of our instruments notwithstanding. The contention put 
 forward by Copernicus must now be urged with double 
 force, viz., the fixed stars are so far off that they show no 
 parallax even for the earth's immense path of forty mil- 
 lions of miles. The few stars of which the parallax has 
 been detected are the nearest, and yet they are distant 
 more than twelve billions of miles. Nevertheless so many 
 parallaxes have already been demonstrated that the fact 
 must be regarded as certain. 
 
 Nor was the earth's diurnal motion to remain without 
 direct proof. Riccioli in his Almagest had raised against 
 this revolution the objection that a freely falling body 
 must decline slightly to the west. Newton, on the other 
 hand, contended that the declination must be towards the 
 east. This is clear from Galileo's law of falling bodies. 
 Every body contains its own original velocity. But a body 
 at a greater elevation has a greater velocity than the earth's 
 surface, because when a ball revolves the velocity increases 
 with the distance from the centre. Since therefore the 
 earth moves from west to east a falling body must decline 
 to the east. Repeated experiments showed Newton to be 
 tight. More tangible than these subtle processes are the 
 experiments with the pendulum which Foucault, the French 
 physicist, first performed in the Paris Pantheon in 1851. 
 The floor was strewed with sand and a pendulum swung
 
 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 391 
 
 in the dome. The pendulum, which, according to the 
 laws of physics, should retain its plane of motion un- 
 changed, showed a declination to the west, that corre- 
 sponded exactly with the latitude of the place (per hour 
 15 sin 0, = latitude). At the pole it would be as much 
 as 15 per hour. The truth of this result was confirmed 
 by many other experiments. 
 
 Any doubt that still lingered as to the earth's twofold 
 motion was dispelled by this ocular demonstration. The- 
 oretical astronomy could not fail to extort admiration 
 from the educated when Leverrier, in 1847, to account for 
 certain declinations in the planetary system, fixed on a new 
 planet, Neptune. Now even the uneducated cannot but 
 marvel at the results of science. None but the eccentric 
 can, wilfully or unwilfully, close their eyes to its wonders. 8 
 For the apologist the foregoing enquiry has, for other 
 reasons, a special interest. When we reflect how many 
 years of painstaking and laborious research passed before 
 the new system was clearly proved, we should be lenient 
 in judging the philosophers and theologians who lived 
 more than two centuries ago. They were prejudiced in 
 favour of the old system, and had no direct proofs of the 
 new. All the world knows, too, that new ideas are not 
 propagated at once. There is ingrained in the human 
 mind a disposition to carry on guerre ct entrance against 
 new theories.* But in this case scientific prejudice was 
 allied to a powerful theological prejudice. The conserva- 
 tism, that was so potent a factor in ancient legislation, 
 made its power felt here also. As a rule, ordinances dis- 
 appear only when they have grown impracticable. So it 
 fared with the decree of 1616. On May the loth, 1757, the 
 Congregation resolved to remove from the Index the de- 
 cree prohibiting all books that taught the motion of the 
 earth and the stationary character of the sun. In 1758 
 
 8 Schoepfer, Die Wider spriiche, etc. [Contradictions in astronomy arising from the 
 Copernican system, but disappearing in the opposite system.] Berlin, 1869. 
 
 * New practical discoveries share the same fate, as the history of the introduction of 
 Railways into this country abundantly proves. Tr.
 
 392 THE SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 the work of Copernicus was no longer named on the Index, 
 although the works of Galileo, Foscarini, and Kepler re- 
 mained. A work of Professor Settle, setting forth the 
 motion of the earth, received the Imprimatur in Rome on 
 August the i6th, 1820. On September the nth, 1822, the 
 Holy Office declared that it no longer forbade the publica- 
 tion in Rome of works that teach that the earth moves and 
 the sun stands still, juxta communem modernorum astrono- 
 morum opinionem. The names of all works bearing on this 
 subject were expunged from the catalogue of the Index 
 published in 1835. The number of i8th century Protestant 
 theologians before Knack's time who combated the new 
 system on Scriptural grounds was not small.' 
 
 9 SeeGrisar, Galilei, p. 68,cq. Stahelin./aAnJwrA fiir Protest. Theol. 1884, p. 368, 
 $eq.
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 Holy Scripture tells us that God made man to His own 
 image and likeness. As male and female He created 
 them. In Chapter II. the event is described more fully 
 and more precisely. God formed man's body from the 
 dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils the breath 
 of life. But Eve, Adam's consort and the mother of the 
 living, was formed from a rib of the sleeping Adam. It is 
 not our present purpose to offer a theological or an exegeti- 
 cal explanation of these passages ; they are merely cited 
 to prove that Holy Scripture teaches the unity of the 
 human race. 
 
 The simple, easy, and childlike strain in which the nar- 
 rative is written is patent to all. No one, however, will 
 dream that Almighty God took clay into His hands like a 
 potter and gradually gave it shape and consistency. " It 
 is really too childish," says S. Augustine, "to suppose 
 " that God formed man from clay with bodily hands." 
 " And as God did not fashion him with bodily hands, 
 " neither did He use throat and lips to breathe on him." 
 " God is said to breathe into man's face, because the fore 
 " part of the brain, from which all the senses take their 
 " rise, is located in the forehead." 1 S. Augustine, indeed, 
 does not dare to decide whether man came forth from the 
 prima ratio causalis in a full-grown state, or by a process 
 of gradual development. Subsequently he declared in 
 favour of the perfecta moles membrorum. Every reader, 
 
 z De Genesi^ 6, 12. 71, 2., 17, 23.
 
 394 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 however will glean from the narrative that man's body comes 
 from the earth, and his soul from heaven. This truth, accen- 
 tuated elsewhere in Holy Scripture, found frequent ex- 
 pression in the literature of the Aryan nations. Man is 
 conscious of his double descent, from heaven and from 
 earth. He claims relationship with a father in heaven, 
 although his origin lies in the dust of the earth." To ask 
 whether man has one rib less than woman is to trifle with 
 the subject. Rather it behooves us to recognize the deep 
 thought underlying the simple narrative, that man is by 
 creation the lord of woman, and the principal, representa- 
 tive and head of the human family. Thus only is it possi- 
 ble to establish Adam's physical, spiritual and moral head- 
 ship. The whole human race, then, according to Holy 
 Scripture, is descended from one physically united pair. 
 Pre-Adamites are impossible. Apart from Adam there has 
 been no race, at least on earth. An exegetical difficulty 
 arises out of Genesis iv., 14-16 ; but it affords as little 
 ground as Romans v., 14 for Isaac Pereyre's contention, 
 that Genesis represents Adam as the progenitor of none 
 but the Jewish race. The Old and New Testaments re- 
 peatedly proclaim that the human race is one, in the strict 
 sense of the word.* To other planets Holy Scripture pays 
 no heed. Genesis deals with the earth and its people. 
 As far as Genesis is concerned, matters that have no bear- 
 ing on these are non-existent. Nor is it at all clear that 
 later writings take a wider view. 
 
 What does faith teach in regard to the question whether 
 the other heavenly bodies may be inhabited ? In answer- 
 ing this question the conclusions drawn from other funda- 
 mental dogmas must not be ignored. The Incarnation 
 and Redemption were advanced against the Copernican 
 system ; they are made to tell still more against the heav- 
 enly bodies being inhabited. Nevertheless, when it is said 
 that Christ died for all men, it means after all the men on 
 
 a Max Miiller, Wissenschaft der Sprache, vol. 2, p. 425. 
 
 * " And hath made of one all mankind to dwell upon the whole face of the earth." Acts 
 xvii., 26. See Heb. ii., n.
 
 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 395 
 
 earth and no other. About other beings nothing is said. 
 Again, the Schoolmen taught in opposition to Anselm, that 
 the Incarnation was not an absolute necessity. Some, 
 however, held that even apart from sin the Incarnation 
 formed part of God's eternal plan ; nor did several Incar- 
 nations seem to them impossible. 8 Why then strain the 
 words of Holy Scripture ? Why not rather admit other 
 possibilities for rational beings in other planets ? Per- 
 chance they did not fall in their progenitor and head ; may 
 be they fell and were redeemed by an Incarnation of their 
 own, or in some other way ; perhaps God in mercy re- 
 stored them to favour. But, on the other hand, it may be 
 asked, why should we be so eager to people the stars, 
 when we are absolutely without information respecting 
 them ? The answer is easy. We merely wish to draw out 
 the consequences of what has been already said. If the 
 earth and the whole universe have been formed in the 
 manner described ; if elements and movements are proved 
 to be similar, analogy warrants the conclusion that similar 
 inhabitants are living where the conditions are similar. 
 The fancies and conjectures with which poetry and folk- 
 lore for centuries delighted learned and unlearned alike, 
 are demanded by modern astronomy as a hard conclusion 
 from general laws. If other planets, Mars for example, 
 can be demonstrated to have physical conditions similar to 
 those of the earth, they too will be inhabited. Then, 
 again, there are other solar systems which have likewise 
 their own planets. Surely no man, save him that would 
 measure the universe by a two foot rule, will argue that 
 the distant starry worlds, which existed thousands of years 
 before light reached the human eye, were made solely and 
 wholly for this tiny earth and its people. 
 
 Nevertheless, since no direct proof on this point is or 
 hardly ever will be forthcoming, we must limit our enquiry 
 to ascertained facts and realities. The individuals that go 
 to form the human race on earth are one in descent. The 
 
 3 Pohle, Die Sterntmvelten und Hire Bewohner. Coin 1884, 1885. Katholik 1886.
 
 396 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 doctrines of original sin and redemption are based on this 
 community of descent. By one man sin and death, and 
 by one man grace and life have come into the world. This 
 intimate connection between unity of race and the dogma 
 of redemption prompted Augustine, Lactantius and others 
 to deny the existence of the Antipodes. Ethnographers, 
 too, were obliged to be somewhat circumspect. Man is 
 by nature so conscious of the unity of his race, that this 
 unity is traditional among all nations that have preserved 
 any account of man's origin. Nor is man now, in point of 
 scientific knowledge, isolated as he was in ancient times. 
 We no longer confine our attention to the thoughts and 
 wishes of individual men, with their sense of power and 
 duty, but take a more comprehensive view. Our theme is 
 humanity ; the human race is our study. As the vast 
 universe, with its forces and laws, and its manifold plans 
 and developments is one in work and design, and came 
 forth from the hand of the one all-wise Creator, so the 
 various races of men that have lived in different ages and 
 climes form one great family that sprang from the same 
 ancestors, from one stock. The distinction between 
 Greeks and Romans, Jews and Gentiles, slaves and free- 
 men has been obliterated, for all men are brothers. Chris- 
 tianity was the first to beat down the hateful wall of sepa- 
 ration that egotism and pride had set up. Christianity 
 shewed that all men are the children of one father, and 
 the heirs of one house. Science, too, has been compelled 
 to acknowledge this common humanity. The discovery 
 of America unexpectedly brought to light a new race. 
 The learned were as much perplexed as Pliny of old, when 
 he set eyes on the black Ethiopians. Their convictions 
 were shaken. Naturalists and missionaries assigned the 
 Redskins to another Adam, or denied that they were cre- 
 ated by God. Pope Paul III. had to issue a Brief, assert- 
 ing that the Indians had equal rights with other men. 
 Later on selfish slave-dealers, egged on by the learned, 
 tried to widen to the uttermost the rift between Whites 
 and Blacks, by declaring dominion and slavery to be their
 
 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 397 
 
 respective birthrights. This, however, notwithstanding, 
 proofs of the common origin of all races are now coming 
 in thick and fast. Some Darwinians, in direct antagonism 
 to their own principles, obstinately maintained the stability 
 of the various races. But, despite all obstructions, mod- 
 ern naturalists have marched forward towards the goal of 
 unity. Polygenists are fast sinking into disrepute, and 
 the unity of the species is coming to be recognized. 4 Philol- 
 ogists have likewise grown in prudence and discretion. 
 The physical and spiritual differences existing between 
 men still present many difficulties ; there is, however, no 
 danger to faith so long as a common origin is allowed to 
 be possible. 
 
 However much people differ in size and colour and hairi- 
 ness, in the skeleton, in the formation of the skull and so 
 forth, still common characteristics are to hand that unite 
 the several groups into races. The very name of race indi- 
 cates the meaning of the principle of division. For it was 
 chosen on the supposition that all races form one species. 
 The fact that all races cross and are fertile, affords one 
 among several verifications of this supposition. Cross- 
 breeds are often more fertile than alliances in the same 
 race. As long as this common characteristic holds good, 
 the unity of the human species is a necessary consequence. 
 Clearly therefore the differences of race are not essential 
 nor absolutely unchangeable. The characteristics of each 
 race are found in isolated and exceptional instances in 
 other races. Differences of race are as old as history, yet 
 no classification has been generally accepted. Linnaeus 
 classified races according to their respective countries : 
 (i) Red Americans. (2) White Europeans. (3) Yellow 
 Asiatics. (4) Black Africans. Blumenbach, whose system 
 has found most favour, prefaces it with the remark that 
 
 4 Polygenists : Agassiz, Burmeister, Oken, Carus, Vogt, Schaaffhausen, Giebel, 
 Hamilton, Smith, Baker, Nott, Gliddon, Scott, and others. Defenders of Unity : 
 Alex. v. Humboldt, Blumenbach, Prichard, Linneeus, Buffon, Cuviir, Geoffrey St. 
 Hilaire,}. v. Miiller,Retzius, Baer, H. v. Meyer, Burdach, A. and R. Wagner, 
 Quatrefages, Owen, Flourcns, Peschel, and others. See Schneider, Naturvolker, 
 I., IS-
 
 398 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 the innumerable varieties imperceptibly pass into one an- 
 other. He then distinguishes five varieties : (i) Caucasian. 
 (2) Mongolian. (3) European. (4) American. (5) Malay. 
 Worthy of note also is Peschel's modern classification : 
 (i) Australian and Tasmanian. (2) Papuans of New Guinea 
 and the adjoining Islands. (3) Mongolian tribes, i.e., 
 Asiatics of the Table-lands, Malays, and Polynesians, and 
 the aborigines of America. (4) Dravidian, or the inhab- 
 itants of Eastern India not of Aryan descent. (5) Hotten- 
 tots. (6) Negroes. (7) Inland tribes (Caucasian). This 
 classification has the advantage of attempting to give the 
 races in an ascending scale. The bulk of the population 
 of Central Africa are generally designated as Negroes, 
 and it is usual to characterize the negro type by black 
 woolly hair, prominent cheek-bones, pouting lips, and 
 black skin. Later researches, however, have shown that 
 this type exists in only a few of the wild stocks on the 
 Slave Coast. At length these characteristics get so toned 
 down, that this race forms a transition to the inhabitants 
 of Melanesia and the other islands. The same is true of 
 the Mongolians. It would seem therefore that race-differ- 
 ences were not formed till the tribes had migrated and 
 settled, and that they now remain constant unless interfered 
 with from without. 5 Once the type has set firm through 
 hundreds and thousands of years, individuals easily lose 
 all capacity for variation. Even change of abode and of 
 climate is unable to revive it. 
 
 Nevertheless the experience gained in America during 
 three hundred years has shown that the colour and facial 
 expression of negroes are undergoing a slow change. And 
 the change would have been still more marked, had not 
 slaves been constantly imported from Africa. It is very 
 striking in those who have mixed with other races. No 
 special reason can be assigned why in the Caucasian race 
 
 S Bastian, Das Bestdndige in der Menschenrassen und die Spielioeite ihrer Ver&nder- 
 lickhtit. Berlin, 1868. On the whole anthropological question see Rauch, Die Ein- 
 heitdes MenchengeschUchtes. Ausburg, 1873, p. 413, seq. Gflttler, Naturforschurg 
 und Bibel, p. 201, seq.
 
 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 399 
 
 the hair changes from the fairest auburn to a dark black. 
 The shades of colour vary among the several peoples of 
 the same race. Thus by comparing Germans, English, 
 Greeks, Italians, Spaniards and Armenians, who all belong 
 to the Caucasian race, a great variety of colours will be 
 obtained. These people are all known to history. Doubt- 
 less climate and mode of life were great factors in bringing 
 about these changes. Doubtless, too, the first immigrants 
 were endowed with an unusually large capacity for accom- 
 modating themselves to circumstances, because men were 
 still in their childhood, and uninfluenced by long estab- 
 lished usages. The same remark applies to their dwell- 
 ings. Then, again, the influence exerted by the special 
 climatic conditions of each country was demonstrably very 
 different in those early times. Race is the gradual out- 
 come of the mutual action and reaction of people and coun- 
 try on each other. 6 
 
 In nothing is this brought out so clearly as in colour. 
 Colour is not merely external. Its foundations lie deep 
 down in the organism. It supposes a greater change than 
 is usually ascribed to the power of the sun. Colour is 
 caused by the carbon pigment found in the Malpighian 
 cells. These cells are also found in the coloured places of 
 the white man's skin. The sun cannot suddenly effect 
 this transformation, but it may further it in the course of 
 time. A change in the colour of the skin may have easily 
 been caused by the sun acting in conjunction with mois- 
 ture, temperature, manner of living, and other climatic 
 factors. The physiological explanation is that respiration, 
 being retarded by heat, fails to change all the carbon into 
 carbonic acid. The light playing on the surface materially 
 aids the process. Parts not exposed, like the sole of the 
 foot and the palm of the hand, are less dark even in the 
 negro. Arabian women, who go about well wrapped up, 
 are as white as Europeans. Even in the same country 
 and climate this influence acts in different degrees, although 
 
 6 Naiur und Offenb. 1885. p. 109, 354. Schneider, I.^ia.
 
 400 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 the skins are generally darkest in hot countries. Anyhow, 
 side by side with secondary and accidental causes, light 
 and climate will always be regarded as the chief factors in 
 producing the change. Equally certain is it, as may be 
 seen by observation, that the sunlight affects the colours 
 of animals and plants. The case would be somewhat dif- 
 ferent were it supposed, not that the dark races have been 
 derived from the fair, but the fair from the dark. 1 Such 
 an assumption, however, being utterly at variance with 
 the commonly received view, is not yet ripe for discussion. 
 Other differences, in the skeleton and formation of the 
 skull for example, are less important. Occupation, and 
 manner of living, and malformations, intentional or other- 
 wise, may have had their share in producing a clear but 
 variable type in a short time. Anyhow, such deviations 
 in the animal world do not hinder the various races from 
 forming one species. In man the difficulty is even less.** 
 For as the races are generally fertile, intermediate forms 
 are everywhere possible, and these act as links and trans- 
 mission agents. Blumenbach has pointed out that tran- 
 sitional forms grow more and more numerous. Humboldt 
 considers that the many intermediate stages in skull forma- 
 tion and in the colour of the skin are a strong plea for 
 unity. 8 The transition of races is made still clearer by 
 modern researches. The American stock is the connecting 
 link between the Caucasian and the Mongolian ; the Malay 
 bridges over the Caucasian and the Negro.* The differ- 
 ence between the highest and the lowest types may well 
 be greater than that between the lowest human and the 
 highest animal type ; but, as in the species of animals, the 
 intermediaries equalize the difference and leave the human 
 type unaffected. The orang-outang is brown like the 
 Malay ; the gorilla and the chimpanzee are black like the 
 Negro. But neither all Malays nor all Negroes have the 
 
 7 Lippert, Culturgeschichtc der Mtnschheit in ihrem organischcn Aufbau. Stuttgart, 
 
 1886. Lotze, Vol. II., 10. 
 
 8 Kostnos. Vol. I., 370. Schaaffhausen, A nthrof. A uftdtze, p. 165, scq. 
 
 9 Gloatz, S/ecul. TAeologie, Vol. II., 722. Natur u. Offtnb.^ 1885. P- 230, 495. 
 
 Schneider, Vol. I., 16, 19, 22.
 
 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 401 
 
 same intense colouring. Similar climatic influences may 
 have been at work to produce similar results in both man 
 and apes. Whether the orang outang has a round skull 
 like the Malay, and whether the chimpanzee's skull is 
 elongated like that of the Negro, are points still hotly de- 
 bated by the learned ;' in any case the identity would not 
 be sufficient to establish descent. 
 
 Nor, again, is the distinction into higher and lower races 
 justified by Anatomy. The Caucasian has no claim to the 
 highest place, for other races are equally complete, not to 
 say adapted to their environment. The Negro can endure 
 heat and cold, and withstand fatigue better than the Cau- 
 casian and American. And in this respect the Malay, 
 climate notwithstanding, is superior to the European. In 
 intellect, however, the case is altered. No one denies that 
 the very lowest races are still human. But there is a wide- 
 spread opinion that some races are, and have been low, 
 and will never rise. Darwin could hardly believe that the 
 inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego were men. Similar stories 
 are told of Australians and Polynesians, and in the case of 
 the Negroes have passed current as an axiom. Intellec- 
 tual inferiority is regarded as a specific characteristic of 
 the Negro race, especially of those stocks that are the 
 typical representatives of the race. It is likewise pre- 
 tended that the ape approximates to man in the formation 
 of the brain. With the physical differences we have already 
 dealt, but speech and reason clearly demonstrate that the 
 intellectual difference between the ape and the Negro is 
 specific ; whereas there is a difference of degree only be- 
 tween the Negro and other races. The intellectual inferi- 
 ority of the Negro and other savage tribes has been grossly 
 exaggerated. Even Darwin was subsequently obliged to 
 reconsider his verdict on the people of Tierra del Fuego. 
 Owing to the praiseworthy efforts of missionaries notable 
 results have already been achieved. This proves that they 
 possess a great capacity for education. The Indians often 
 display great shrewdness and intelligence. Thanks to 
 
 10 Schaaffhausen, p. 634.
 
 402 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 Jesuit influence, a new and able nation has sprung up in 
 Paraguay, Colorado and elsewhere." Children educated 
 in Europe easily learn. A return to their old haunts and 
 associates not infrequently causes a relapse. But this 
 only shows that habit is second nature. If we reflect on 
 the length of time that elapsed before ancient civilization 
 attained its intellectual eminence, we shall not expect in- 
 ferior races to perform impossibilities in a few hundreds of 
 years. All peoples, in their earlier stages, were, in a 
 sense, " savage," as, for example, the universal prevalence 
 of cannibalism proves. Nor is it at all likely that Negroes 
 are still in their childhood ; it is quite certain the Ameri- 
 cans are not. The Negro's freedom from want, like his 
 laziness and incapacity, now swell the ranks of exploded 
 fables. Negroes belong in part to an older civilization. 
 They are strong and healthy, and their limbs are symmetri- 
 cal. True, if Egypt be excepted, no proof is to hand that 
 Africa was the home of a higher civilization. But its in- 
 habitants emigrated in ancient times from Asia. Since, 
 therefore, they are not indigenous, it is probable that they, 
 like the Polynesians, once stood on a higher level. 
 
 The scanty remnants of the sort of civilization still found 
 among savage races afford evidence, that they shared in 
 the intelligence that was originally the common property 
 of all mankind. Naught but a common origin, or a com- 
 mon and therefore necessary error can explain the substan- 
 tial agreement that pervades the customs, manners and 
 superstitions of the most widely different peoples. As 
 regards mythology, similar myths may be assumed to indi- 
 cate similar phases of thought. Still the various customs 
 attending funerals, family life, and the rest can hardly 
 have arisen spontaneously. Among Tartars, Kampschat- 
 kans and Sioux Indians a superstition is rife that fire may 
 not be touched, nor a burning coal fetched out of the fire 
 with a knife. 1 * The half-insane custom of what is known 
 
 11 Hcllwald, Ausfantf, 1875, p. 814. Schaaffhausen, p. 229,366. On the Negroes, sec 
 
 Munch. Allgem. Zeitung; 1887, No. 85. 
 
 12 Max Muller, Essayi, vol. ii., 271. Peschel, Votkerkunde, p. 227.
 
 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 403 
 
 as La Couvade^ which prevailed extensively in ancient and 
 modern times, can only be accounted for by the idea that 
 repose and quiet are necessary for the child during the 
 time of confinement. This explanation, though sufficient 
 for the educated, would hardly satisfy the savage. We 
 will not dwell on the use of fire, which could hardly have 
 been discovered by each nation separately. But anthro- 
 pophagy, the universal use of intoxicating drinks, similarity 
 of tastes and habits, of ideas and tendencies, similar tales 
 and legends proclaim that all peoples are knit together 
 with a most indissoluble tie. That which is but prehistoric 
 in the language of Aryan tribes is often actual and his- 
 toric in that of the Turanian stocks. It is surprising to 
 find Finns and Laplanders, Zulus and Maoris, Shans and 
 Karens deeply in accord with Aryan traditions. The 
 whole world is studded with the same prehistoric antiquities. 
 Everywhere there is the Stone Age and the Bronze Age. 
 Arms, tools and ornaments, tombs and temples everywhere 
 abound. The Old and New Worlds, both past and pres- 
 ent, are cumulative evidence that the human race and 
 human civilization had a common origin. 18 
 
 Whence came the tribes that peopled Europe ? From 
 modern geography and ethnography it appears extremely 
 probable that Central Asia was their cradle-land ; whereas 
 Eastern Asia and the Malay Archipelago were the original 
 home of the inhabitants of Australia, Polynesia and 
 America. The relations between Central Africa and Mela- 
 nesia also point to a common home. Why the Papuan 
 should resemble the Negro is still a riddle ; but as the 
 Australians have affinities with both Mongolian and Cau- 
 casian stocks, the presumption distinctly favours a common 
 origin. The Semitic race, as is well known, occupied 
 North Africa. Population spread from one centre. With 
 but few exceptions all the islands of Oceania were discov- 
 ered uninhabited. Historical traces of the north-east pas- 
 is Gloatz, ii., 515, 774. Worsoll, Stein u. Broncezeit in der alien und neuen Welt, 
 
 1182. Max Miiller, vol. ii., 250, 417. Nadaillac, p. i. Revue des deux Mondes, 
 
 1884 (t. 66), p. 412 seq. Controverse, 1882, p. 762 seq.
 
 404 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 sage to America still remain. The geographical distribu- 
 tion of plants and animals, which points to a distinct home 
 for each, enables us to trace the direction in which the 
 human race spread. Here ethnographers join hands with 
 Darwin, Huxley, Haeckel, Hellwald, Caspari and others, 
 only, however, to part again when the point comes to be 
 more closely defined. On all hands it is agreed that Asia, 
 or its neighbourhood (Lemuria), is the centre whence men 
 went forth to fill the earth. Nor is it a mere empty phrase 
 to say that Asia is the cradle of the human race. Even if 
 prehistoric research succeeded in proving the existence of 
 Tertiary man, the view embodied in this phrase would not 
 cease to be tenable, as immigration would still be prob- 
 able. But as there are no prehistoric proofs for man's 
 appearance in prehistoric times, all deductions drawn 
 from this hypothesis are merely visionary. Since the 
 autochthonous origin of man and the higher animals is 
 not probable, more caution will be requisite in explaining 
 the few cases that still present any difficulty. 
 
 Nevertheless the spread of man, and the spread of ani- 
 mals and plants are not convertible terms, except in the 
 case of the domesticated animals and plants. On this 
 point there will be widely divergent opinions. The same 
 phenomena are met with in places far apart. Thus the 
 tortoise is found in the Galapagos Archipelago, and at the 
 Mauritius ; the tapir in the South American Cordilleras 
 and the Indian Archipelago. The Lemuridae are mingled 
 with other races in Africa, and have blood relations in the 
 Eocene strata of Utah in North America. Fossil remains 
 of anthropoid apes (Laopithecus) have been unearthed 
 both in Europe and America. These can hardly have 
 been indigenous. We can still trace the footprints left by 
 beasts and plants in their sojournings from the mainland. 
 Why should not wind and waves have also promoted their 
 diffusion in ancient times ? Climate is no longer the 
 same. Change has been at work on the earth's surface. 
 Still difficulties that may not be passed lightly over bar the 
 way to hasty generalizations. Not the variety of the pres-
 
 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 405 
 
 ent continents, but the similarity of the past flora and 
 fauna create the greatest difficulties. An equal tempera- 
 ture reigned almost throughout the Tertiary age. Flora 
 and fauna were everywhere subjected to the same condi- 
 tions. The Tertiary flora shows traces of plants from all 
 parts of the earth. Its special characteristics are still un- 
 defined. It would seem that the seed was equally dis- 
 tributed. For this reason many like Heer," throw their 
 weight in the scale of the radiating theory, which teaches 
 that plants went forth from the poles like rays. Thus de- 
 velopment attained its zenith in the Miocene age. Then, 
 as the geological epochs rolled along, owing probably to 
 the upheaval of the mountains, a change in climate took 
 place over a large part of the earth's surface. 
 
 The comparative study of language is a safer guide into 
 the realms of intellect. From it we learn of developments 
 that had taken place before history had dawned. Lan- 
 guages are in fact as numerous as independent peoples, 
 and history tells us that language and customs were the 
 great barrier that separated tribe from tribe. Some people 
 have, indeed, changed their language. One original lan- 
 guage may not be an absolutely certain proof that the 
 human race is one. Still language is a sure-footed guide, 
 and the original language is at least a negative proof, and 
 affords a strong positive presumption in favour of unity. 
 Whence comes it that languages differ ? This question, 
 though scarcely ever broached formerly, seems now to be 
 coming to the front. Outside the Old Testament there is 
 scarcely a record of any nation busying itself with the 
 problem why languages should be many instead of one. 
 Grimm can recall but one Esthnish legend, and Max Miiller 
 has raked up two other stories. Such a tradition exists 
 among the Tschinkithians of what used to be Russian 
 America. None of these however, bear a striking resem- 
 blance to the Mosaic narrative. But the Indians of Cen- 
 tral America have a saying, very much like the words of 
 
 15 Probst, Beschreibung der fossiler Pflanzenreste^ 1884. Unser Wisen von der Erde t 
 p. 816, seq. Zacharias, p. 124.
 
 406 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 Scripture, that all men had one speech and one religion, 
 but that when the town of Tulan worshipped false gods their 
 speech was changed. 10 
 
 This vexed problem has been pushed to the front by 
 modern philology. The comparative study of languages 
 brings out in bold relief the peculiarities of kindred lan- 
 guages ; but so far its efforts to discover the original tongue 
 have not been crowned with certain success, and the 
 attempt to prove that several original languages existed 
 has resulted in failure still more glaring. The only path 
 to certainty is to trace the various elements of language to 
 their source. For the grades of development are numer- 
 ous, even in the advanced languages of peoples who are 
 undoubtedly akin. Often expert linguists do not disdain 
 to take refuge in chance. If, however, we bear in mind 
 the modifications to which the Romance languages, or 
 languages derived from the Latin, have been in course of 
 time subjected, we shall not be so much at a loss to under- 
 stand how the Indo-Germanic languages (Celtic, Teutonic, 
 Roman, Greek, Slavic, and Zend) have been derived from 
 one Aryan stock. Heretofore Sanscrit was thought to be 
 the mother tongue of the Indo-Germanic family ; but 
 modern research has shown that Sanscrit is only the eldest 
 sister. Thus the whole Aryan family was at one time 
 united by one common Aryan language and probably led 
 a peaceful life, far away from the sea, at the foot of the 
 Himalayas. 17 
 
 Moreover, the Aryan and Semitic stocks were at one 
 time united. We will not tread debatable ground by 
 insisting on the relationship between Indo-Europeans and 
 Semites on the one hand, and between Australians and 
 Africans 18 on the other. At all events this controversy has 
 shaken the axiom, that from the three-lettered Semitic 
 roots to the two-lettered Indo-Germanic roots no transition 
 
 16 Max Miiller, vol. i, 326. 
 
 17 Max Miiller, II., 17. 
 
 18 Controverse, 1883, p. 56. Max Mflller, Wisstnschaft der Sprache, i., 237. Tylor, 
 
 Anthrop.^ p. 192.
 
 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 407 
 
 is possible. The two families of languages flow from the 
 same source, although their forms are different. Origi- 
 nally both had the same material elements ; both presup- 
 pose a ready-made grammatical system that preceded the 
 division into dialects. The Aryan and the Semitic are, as 
 it were, two streams, and the branches thereof represent 
 the varieties of two specific modes of speech. At an earlier 
 period, owing to political or personal influences, the gram- 
 matical elements amalgamated and fused instead of com- 
 bining in pure agglutinative fashion. This " dialectic 
 age," as it is called, must have been preceded by an age 
 when agglutinative speech was general. This may still be 
 seen in the Turanian languages which holds sway in one 
 form or another from China to the Pyrenees, and from 
 Cape Comorin to Lapland. The family likeness, however, 
 is not strongly marked. So the " keen penetrating eye of 
 " the antiquarian and the philosopher" peers into the dark 
 vista of a " rhematical" age, in which there was no gram- 
 mar but only the necessary words used in every-day life, 
 such as pronouns, prepositions and numerals. By affixing 
 and inserting particles in the Birmanic, isolated relative 
 expressions became imbedded in the roots. When this 
 method is extended to prepositions, polysynthetic construc- 
 tions are produced. Thus monosyllabic speech contains 
 the germs of both inflective and agglutinative languages, 
 and is the key that explains the difference between them. 13 
 Agglutinative languages (Turkish) are not wholly devoid 
 of inflection. Notwithstanding the fixed and conservative 
 character that belongs to national languages, there was a 
 time when every inflected language was agglutinative, and 
 every agglutinative language was monosyllabic. A com- 
 mon origin is certainly compatible with the radical, ter- 
 minational (agglutinative), and inflective forms. So far 
 unity has not gained much from the latest Assyrian and 
 Chaldaic discoveries ; but the bilingual tablets, forming 
 as they do the borderland of the Turanian, Semitic and 
 
 19 Gloatz, vol. ii., 793. Max Muller I.e., p. 279. Vigouroux, vol. i., 304. Reuss, p. 37.
 
 408 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 Indo-Germanic languages, hold out a promise of some- 
 thing better. They are supposed to be written either in 
 Accadian or Sumeric ; anyhow it is some Turanian lan- 
 guage. Thus they form a stepping-stone to the Indo- 
 European. Hence also all linguistic research points to a 
 common agglutinative speech from which the elements of 
 all languages are derived. These elements must have 
 been common to all languages, since no new language has 
 ever been constructed. It is not the words but only the 
 combination of the elements that is new. The subsequent 
 development, however, is often retrogressive, not progres- 
 sive. From the first the history of the Aryan and Semitic 
 tongues shows more decline than growth. Compared 
 with the Latin, the Romance languages show signs of de- 
 composition and phonetic corruption. The Turanian lan- 
 guages, having no political or national bonds of union, 
 were easily split up into dialects without a grammatical 
 backbone. Certain peculiarities, however, are common to 
 many words with a conventional meaning. 
 
 Comparative philology, as such, is not called upon to 
 explain the confusion of tongues. Its attitude towards 
 Holy Scripture is the same as that of Natural Science to 
 Biblical Cosmology, an attitude that is rather hostile or 
 reserved than friendly. External motives aside, science 
 has a severe and formal method, is guided by exact laws, 
 and swayed by external influences. A miracle has no 
 place in the scientific system. Nor is a miracle necessary 
 as an aid to scientific enquiry, provided the limits of scien- 
 tific competency are recognized. When Philology has 
 elminated the " mysterious element" from the problem of 
 the original language, the human mind still seems power- 
 less to penetrate it even in its simplest form. In the nth 
 chapter of Genesis the earth is described as being of one 
 tongue and one speech. When the people removed from 
 the East they came to a plain in the land of Sennaar and 
 dwelt therein. And lest they should be scattered abroad 
 in all lands they desired to build a city and a tower, 
 whereof the top should reach to heaven, in order to make
 
 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 409 
 
 their name famous. And the Lord came down to see the city 
 and the tower that the children of Adam were building. 
 And he said : " Behold it is one people and all have one 
 "tongue ; and they have begun to do this ; neither will 
 " they leave off from their designs till they have accom- 
 " plished them indeed. Come ye, therefore, let us go 
 " down and there confound their tongue, that they may 
 " not understand one another's speech." And so the Lord 
 scattered them from that place into all lands. This is the 
 confusion of tongues that was created at the building of 
 the Tower of Babel. God had commanded men to people 
 the earth. Instead of fulfilling God's command men were 
 grouping round one centre, and seeking strength in union. 
 Now, taking the above words in their literal meaning, it 
 is here said that God frustrated the designs of men in a 
 wonderful manner, by confounding their speech, and thus 
 obliging them to separate. Now we cannot conceive this 
 confusion to have been produced by a change in the organs 
 of speech, since these are substantially the same in all 
 men. But the clue must be sought in the connection 
 between reason and language. After the Deluge men 
 began to turn away their minds from God. Their thoughts 
 centred in ambition and self-seeking. And thereby they 
 lost their spiritual centre, their point of unity, which is in 
 God. Now confusion of speech was the outward expres- 
 sion of spiritual disunion. As their minds were unable to 
 understand one another, so they could no longer make 
 their speech understood. Such a sudden change, however, 
 is inconceivable unless God is supposed to have worked 
 miraculously on the mind of man. The tower-builders 
 were punished in that in which they had sinned. They 
 had forsaken God, their spiritual centre, and God com- 
 pletely disunited their minds. To say that the confusion 
 and subsequent division of tongues was brought about 
 merely by an estrangement of hearts, is to unduly strain 
 the words of the text. It is, indeed, said that men were 
 of " one tongue," and not merely of one speech, or that 
 they used similar words. Speech may, indeed, be put for
 
 410 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 discourse or disposition ; but still the narrative lays great 
 stress on the fact that men could not understand one an- 
 other." 
 
 The History is more difficult than the Exegesis. History 
 relates that people spoke different languages. Now if the 
 Deluge, according to the usual chronology, is placed at 
 2500, the confusion of languages will fall within historical 
 times. And yet it is historically inexplicable. The date 
 must therefore be put considerably further back. By 
 making the confusion of speech prior to the Deluge, and 
 assigning it to the early days of the human race, the diffi- 
 culties apparently diminish. But, on the other hand, it is 
 hardly reconcilable with the Scriptural account of the 
 building of the Tower. And, again, the partial character 
 of the Deluge, with regard to mankind, would have to be 
 considerably extended. Reserving for the next chapter 
 our justification for departing from the received biblical 
 chronology, we may say here that we claim both for the 
 Deluge and for the confusion of tongues a higher antiquity 
 than is usually accorded to them. There is, however, no 
 need to fling aside all limits. The documentary evidence 
 does not cover 3000 years. If another thousand years be 
 allowed for the necessary changes to take effect, the de- 
 parture from the biblical chronology is not excessive, and 
 yet it is sufficient to account for the growth of language. 
 As the Romance languages were evolved from the Latin 
 in a very short time, it seems unnecessary to require long 
 periods for the evolution of the Aryan and Semitic and, 
 indeed, of all language. At this point Comparative Phi- 
 lology has no exact standard to guide it. It cannot define 
 how much time was required for this gradual division and 
 separation. No scholar can say definitely whether Hindus 
 and Greeks, starting from the same point, would require 
 several generations, or hundreds or even thousands of 
 years to make their common language as diversified as 
 
 zo Kaulen, Die Sprackenverwirrunt zu Bate/, Mainz, 1861. Strodle, Din Ensiehung 
 der Volker, Schaaffhausen, 1868. Nat*r u. OJfcnb. 1874-1877.
 
 THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. 411 
 
 Sanscrit and Homer. 21 One thing, however, is certain ; 
 the formation was gradual. God's action was not a sud- 
 den revolution, but an impulse produced in man whereby, 
 since his soul was divided, his language was also divided 
 beyond hope of recovery. For it is alike self-evident and 
 historically proved that the several languages were not 
 created perfect. In its main features, its materials and its 
 elements, language is ever the same. The change once 
 begun was rapidly completed in new settlements. 
 
 The doctrine that the human race is one has, therefore, 
 both anthropologically and philologically, a high degree of 
 probability in its favour. This is sufficient for the justi- 
 fication of faith. For we cannot hope to clear up all the 
 darkness that has settled over the first beginnings of the 
 human race and human civilization. 
 
 21 Max Mfiller, vol. II., 253. O. Schrader, Sprachvergle ichung und Urgescktchte, 
 Jena, 1883.
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 THE AGE OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 Holy .Scripture furnishes no dates which enable us to 
 determine the exact age of the human race. In the first 
 place considerable discrepancies have crept into the sev- 
 eral texts. Take for instance the period from Adam to 
 the Deluge. According to the usual computation, the 
 original text and the Vulgate make this period cover 1656 
 years ; whereas the Samaritan text assigns 1307 years, and 
 the Septuagint 2242 (2262) to the same interval. From 
 Noe to the birth of Abram the numbers respectively given 
 are 353, 943, 1133. As to the sojourn in Egypt the several 
 texts not only differ from one another, but the same text 
 is at war with itself ; the Vulgate fixing its duration at 
 400 years in Genesis, and 430 in Exodus. Consequently 
 the sum total is also uncertain, and the whole length of 
 time that elapsed between Adam and Christ appears about 
 4,000 years in the Vulgate and 6,000 in the Septuagint. 
 Corrupt texts are clearly responsible for a great deal of 
 the mischief, as the ancients employed letters of the alpha- 
 bet for numerical signs. This, however, is not the whole 
 account of the matter, as all the discrepancies are not 
 traceable to this head. The large numbers given in the 
 Septuagint betray too clearly an intention to lengthen the 
 periods, to be accounted for by mere errors in transcrip- 
 tion. S. Jerome was so impressed by this fact that, de- 
 spairing of fixing the chronology of the Old Testament, 
 he abandoned the task to thoughtful men, in order to
 
 THE AGE OF THE HUMAN RACE. 413 
 
 divert his researches into a more profitable channel. 1 
 Theophilus of Antioch enumerates 5698 years. With mod- 
 ern Jews the year 1887 is the year 5648. 
 
 Of the hundred and fifty chronological systems devised 
 by modern archaeologists and chronologists to explain 
 biblical chronology not one has found general acceptance. 
 Many incline to follow Jerome's example, and think, since 
 God has allowed such discrepancies to find their way into 
 the texts, that nothing higher than human certitude can 
 be claimed for the chronology of Scripture, which is thus 
 arrayed in the careless attire with which profane science 
 loves to enrobe it. That the sacred writers were wholly 
 indifferent to chronology is a proposition that cannot for 
 one moment be allowed to pass muster, but with the lim- 
 ited resources at their command it was wholly impossible 
 for them to give in every instance the exact date. Reve- 
 lation on this point forms no part of inspiration.* It is 
 well known how quick the sacred writers were to choose 
 sacred or round numbers. The first kings are said to have 
 reigned forty years, but this number is not in harmony 
 with the dates given. The numbers three and seven recur 
 at every turn. The Chaldean chronology, it is true, agrees 
 in the main with the Bible. Thus, for example, from 
 Adam to Noe it enumerates ten kings, who correspond to 
 the ten patriarchs 2 of the Bible ; but since the ten kings, 
 like the ten patriarchs, must stand for whole generations, 
 the coincidence merely shows that Semitic writers gener- 
 ally are swayed by similar tendencies. To fill up a gap in 
 genealogies sacred writers, like other writers, insert names 
 which make the ages of each, and the length of the period, 
 uncertain. If the chronology be computed in this fashion, 
 Noe would have been alive in the time of Abraham. In 
 
 i Ep. 75, 5. Mohler, Patrologie, p. ago. 
 
 * This may be granted ; but it might be objected that the author's remark does not seem 
 to cover the whole question. For it may still be asked : was it not, at any rate, a 
 part of inspiration to preserve them from mistakes in their dates and numbers ? To 
 this the author answers that the sacred writers never meant to give perfectly accurate 
 dates. Tr. 
 
 a Vigouroux, Bible I., p. 205 ; iv. p. 24. Controverse, Sept. 1886, p. 87. Kirchenlexicon. 
 III., p. 310.
 
 4M THE AGE OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 determining, therefore, the age of the human race, we 
 must take the chronology of the sacred writers as our 
 guide, but only for the purpose of fixing the chief land- 
 marks. A great age may with safety be taken for granted ; 
 but in defining its extent science is likely to go wider of 
 the mark than the Bible. 
 
 Since Holy Scripture nowhere tells the age of the earth, 
 the apologist is not directly called upon to deal with the 
 random calculations of palaeontologists. As long as it 
 was customary to interpret the days of creation as ordinary 
 days, the earth and the human race were naturally sup- 
 posed to be coeval ; now, however, that it is fashionable 
 to lengthen the days into periods, or to take them as 
 merely formal determinants, the partnership is dissolved. 
 And yet palaeontology has still some voice in the calcula- 
 tions. The swollen figures given by geologists and palae- 
 ontologists are still pregnant with mischief. Moreover, it 
 should not be forgotten that palaeontological explorations 
 brought to light the first traces of man by unearthing 
 human fossil remains, and by giving an insight into pre- 
 historic man's mode of life. Human fossil remains were 
 first discovered at Canstadt in 1701, part of a human skull 
 being found in the clay, imbedded in mammoth remains. 
 In 1774 the cave of Gailenreuth yielded a human jaw-bone 
 and shoulder-blade. In 1835, three human skeletons were 
 discovered in the cave of Enghis on the Meuse, and many 
 others were found in a cave of Enghioul on the opposite 
 bank of the Meuse, with the bones of the mammoth, rhinoc- 
 eros, great bear, and other such ancient animals as their 
 companions. A skull was found at Neanderthal near 
 Elberfeld in 1856, and the right half of a human lower 
 jaw, with its row of teeth, in the sandpit of Moulin-Quig- 
 non, near Abbeville, in 1863. Many other discoveries fol- 
 lowed, especially in France. In 1866 the district of Solutr6, 
 in the Ma9onnais Department, so bristled with discoveries 
 that it was nicknamed the " charnel house." The position 
 in which the skeletons here discovered lay, indicated that 
 they have been buried. In Germany there were many
 
 s 
 THE AGE OF THE HUMAN RACE. 415 
 
 discoveries worthy of mention : the skulls of Lahr and 
 Eggisheim which, together with that of Neanderthal, carry 
 us back to the time of the mammoth and the bear ; the 
 skull of Stettin on the Lahr, and of Hochal near Frankfort 
 (dolichocephali) ; skeletons from Mecklenburg-Schwerin ; 
 bones from the caves of Schillerhohle, Erpfing-Hohle, 
 Holerfels near Blaubeuren, Ofnet near Utzmemmingen, 
 and Moor near Schussenried. Nor are other countries 
 behind in the race. All these discoveries are supposed to 
 form a cumulative argument that man inhabited Europe 
 at a time when the cave-bear and the great feline species 
 represented the great carnivorous animals, and the mam- 
 moth and the rhinoceros the pachyderms.* But accept- 
 ing as a starting-point the one admissible distinction of 
 the Stone Age these animals belong to the palaeolithic 
 period. Of course it cannot be concluded with absolute 
 certainty that primitive man lived on the earth with these 
 animals, but the bone implements seem to suggest that 
 man killed these animals for food. All the remains, it is 
 quite clear, cannot be referred to this distant date. The 
 age of the Canstadt skulls is still a bone of contention. 
 Then, again, the bones, in many instances, have not th* 
 characteristics of great age. A more recent date is ren- 
 dered highly probable, owing to volcanic agency e.g. at 
 Le Puy in the Department of Loire, and Calaveros in Cali- 
 fornia, for these volcanoes were active in the fifth century 
 of our era. Still, all this notwithstanding, we have to 
 face the probability that man and beasts were contempo- 
 raries. And now another difficulty looms in sight : to de- 
 termine the period at which these animals of the Lower 
 Quaternary Epoch (Diluvial) lived. It is all very well to 
 invoke the aid of a higher temperature, to appeal to the 
 beginning of the Ice-Age, and so forth ; but these climatic 
 conditions set up only a relative standard of measurement. 
 Eminent geologists, like Pfaff and Graas, have declared 
 with unmistakable emphasis, that man did not appear on 
 
 3 Nadaillac, Die Ersten Menschen, p. "60. Unser Weissen, p. 587, Quenstedt is more 
 cautious : Epochen, p. 762, 783.
 
 416 THE AGE OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 the scene till after the Ice-Age. The Ice-Age and the 
 Quaternary Epoch coincide in their beginnings, and man 
 must certainly be referred to the second glacial Epoch. 
 It has still to be ascertained whether there have been one 
 or more Ice-ages. Now historical proof is forthcoming 
 that the temperature has been on the increase in many 
 countries since the days of Herodotus, and that the glaciers 
 generally have receded. Hence there is no necessity to 
 suppose that glacial man has been in existence for an im- 
 mense number of years. 4 When the fact is grasped, that 
 within the last hundred years several species of animals 
 have perished in Australia, and that the buffalo and the 
 auerochs are even now on the point of dying out, it will 
 be more clearly understood how, in an earlier age, when 
 no quarter was given, sets of fauna were, owing to climatic 
 action, completely swept away. 
 
 So far the Tertiary epoch has been sterile in fossil bones. 
 Of no single bone that has been found can it be predicated 
 with certainty that it is of the same age as the tertiary 
 deposits from which it was taken. 5 Other footprints of 
 Tertiary man have proved equally illusory. The Abbe 
 Bourgeois set the ball rolling by labelling the many flints 
 he had found in Thenay as the workmanship of Tertiary 
 man. At first he succeeded in enlisting several men of 
 science on his side ; but the matter, on investigation, 
 became so thickly enveloped in the mists of doubt that it 
 vanished at last in utter improbability. The reputed 
 works of art, with indented surfaces, are much liker shape- 
 less works of nature. Again, other flints, lances, arrow- 
 heads, spears and such like found in St. Prest, probably 
 belong to a later formation. To determine the age of ob- 
 jects found in mud or sand deposits is most difficult, as 
 these may easily have been buried subsequently at a greater 
 depth. In like manner man's handiwork in conjunction 
 with natural causes may have shifted the deposit. More- 
 over no standard is to hand for gauging the time of the 
 
 4 Controverse, 1886, NOT., p. 340, seq. 
 
 5 Nadaillac, p. 158, 513. Schaafhausen, p. 154. Unser Wisetn, p. 586.
 
 THE AGE OF THE HUMAN RACE. 417 
 
 deposits in the several periods. Recent researches, even 
 in the much belauded Somme Valley, have shown that the 
 layers of sand were formed in historic times. 6 Further- 
 more, it was alleged that drawings, which none but the 
 hand of man can execute, adorned the bones of some Ter- 
 tiary animals. Bones, too, had been produced which had 
 been fractured, so it was said, by the hand of man. Col- 
 oured impressions were also said to be distinctly percepti- 
 ble on the bones of a petrified Hipparion recently discov- 
 ered in Greece.' How transparently fragile these reason- 
 ings are, he who runs may read. On enquiry it turns out 
 that the holes and indentures were made by contemporary 
 animals. Many of the alleged marks and drawings are 
 accidental chinks wrought by mechanical causes. 
 
 These remarks bear also on other remains of human life 
 and industry found in the lower strata. Heaps of refuse, 
 mussels, crabshells, bones, pots, and stone implements 
 have been found in every country and on every coast. 
 The edible mussels, oysters and snails cannot be a natural 
 deposit, but are a heap of the refuse of man's meals, 
 whence they are called kitchen-refuse or Kjdkkenmdddings 
 (in Denmark Steenstrup). This opinion is borne out also by 
 the remains of ashes, coals and wood (beech, oak, pine) 
 with which they are mingled, and by the fire-places that 
 have been discovered. But it is unsafe to assume that 
 these were contemporary deposits, and unsafer still to com- 
 pute their age. The deposits in the deltas proceed at a 
 slow rate, but historical times can point to a great change. 
 The configuration of lands and continents is other than it 
 was. Elevations and depressions, upheavals and subsi- 
 dences have likewise had their share in effecting the 
 change. Alluvial deposits, peat formations and stalag- 
 mites often attain a considerable thickness, but, as is well 
 known, such formations are most irregular. The sur- 
 
 6 Bourgeois, Revue des Questions Scientifiques, Louvain, 1887. Controvtrse, 1882, Nos. 
 
 50 and 52, and 1886, p. 169. Nadaillac, p. 468, 508. 
 
 7 See Humboldt, 1885, p. 363. Nadaillac, p. 501. Concerning Schussenried and Of net, 
 
 see Wurttemb. Jakreshefte, 1866, 1877. Contravene, 1886, p. 515. 
 
 Z I
 
 418 THE AGE OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 roundings of the Quaternary epoch were totally different 
 from ours ; the causes at work to transform the earth's 
 surface throbbed with such fierce abnormal intensity, that 
 their duration cannot be measured by their results. Com- 
 pared with the thickness of the deposits, their duration 
 must have been short. On this point geologists are agreed. 
 So far the assumption of vast numbers of years lacks con- 
 firmatory evidence. 
 
 As recently as 1854, first in Lake Zurich, then in Neu- 
 stadt, Constance and some other Swiss Lakes, then again 
 in Schussenried, in North Germany, Austria, Italy, France, 
 England and other countries, palings were discovered 
 which proved to be the remains of lake dwellings, and 
 which had been set up as a protection against wild beasts. 
 Three hundred have been found in Switzerland alone. At 
 first the discovery created universal astonishment, and the 
 wildest conjectures were hazarded as to the age of the 
 human race. Now the palings are regarded as evidence 
 of the slender antiquity of the builders. For it has tran- 
 spired that pile-builders dwelt near most lakes, even in 
 historic times. Readers of Herodotus will recall the story 
 of the Pannonians on Lake Prasias. Hippocrates speaks 
 of pile villages on the Phasis, at the foot of the Caucasus. 
 Similar erections have greeted the eyes of modern travel- 
 lers in Celebes, New Guinea, Java, Ceram, Mindanao, the 
 Caroline Islands and elsewhere. The Schussenried pile- 
 builders belonged to the Stone Age, and were chiefly 
 famous for their pottery. Their flint implements betray a 
 certain amount of skill, but they are far inferior to those 
 found in Denmark, Belgium and England. 
 
 Tertiary man being thus put out of court, all the more 
 efforts were made to gather the age of Quaternary man 
 from the gradual formations of the earth in which the rem- 
 nants of his art lay buried. For this purpose the material 
 out of which the arms and implements are made, and the 
 condition in which they were found have been pressed 
 into service. Hence three ages have been distinguished : 
 The Stone Age, the Bronze Age, and the Iron Age. This
 
 THE AGE OF THE HUMAN RACE. 419 
 
 division, though correct in the main, sets up a merely 
 relative standard, admitting of many exceptions, which 
 varied according to circumstances. As already stated, 
 these three Ages are mentioned in Holy Scripture. Now 
 it is allowed on all hands that the Stone Age was the 
 cradle of the earliest civilization. In days gone by, flints, 
 thunder-bolts and meteorites were supposed to be wrought 
 by superhuman agency ; but in the days of Mercati 
 (b. 1593), private physician to Clement VIII., they began 
 to be considered the arms of antediluvian man, to whom 
 the metals were unknown. Latterly the search for stone 
 implements has become a craze. Natural products have 
 been mistaken for works of art, and, what is worse, regu- 
 lar stone beds have been quarried for flint implements.* 
 Meanwhile we may in general divide the palaeolithic from 
 the neolithic period. The former is the age of the cave- 
 dwellers, when the stone arms and implements consisted 
 of simple splints and roughly-hewn lumps. The neolithic 
 is the age of the valley-dwellers. The cave-bear and the 
 mammoth had disappeared ; the reindeer had found its 
 way into the north, and the antelope into the east of 
 Europe ; the ice-age was past, and domestic animals had 
 gladdened the scene. This age has yielded polished axes 
 of hard stone, beautifully and delicately carved, and as 
 artistic as a nineteenth century workman can produce with 
 the aid of all his modern appliances. Neolithic man built 
 the dolmens and menhirs ; netting and weaving were 
 familiar to him ; the tenements he erected were as solid 
 as circumstances required, and the sites he chose were 
 more secure and protected. To fix a limit to the Stone 
 Age is no easy task. The Guanches of the Canary Islands, 
 the Hottentots and others in various parts of the globe, 
 are even yet in their Stone Age. The Mexicans at the 
 time of the Conquest were accustomed to slay the men 
 they offered in sacrifice with stone knives. To this day 
 such knives are used for shaving. Even civilized nations 
 
 * Mure de Barr^z apud Aveyror,.
 
 420 THE AGE OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 retained stone instruments, in their religious rites, long 
 after they had become acquainted with the metals. The 
 Jews used a stone knife for circumcision, and the priests 
 of Cybele for self-mutilation. The Italians employed 
 stone instruments in the worship of Jupiter Latiaris, in 
 the fetial rites, and in solemn sacrifices. Even now the 
 wand of the Albanian augur is of stone. The ancient 
 Egyptians used stone knives in the process of embalming. 
 On the battle-field of Alesia, where Caesar conquered Ver- 
 cingetorix, there were found arms of stone, of bronze, and 
 of iron. The English carried stone arms at the battle of 
 Hastings (1066), and the Scots in 1298. Heavy stone ham- 
 mers were, till quite recently, in use in Irish smithies. In 
 Japan the Stone and Bronze Ages lasted till the nineteenth 
 century. 
 
 These facts will suffice to show how difficult it is to say 
 definitely when the Stone Age ended and the Bronze began. 
 Some go so far as to say that it would have been next to 
 impossible to produce bronze implements without iron 
 tools. Anyhow a wide margin must be given also to these 
 ages. We assume that iron was known in Egypt four 
 thousand years before our era ; but it was not known in 
 Scandinavia before the Christian era, and in Gaul only 
 eight hundred years before. It is also very probable that 
 iron was wholly unknown in America until Columbus' dis- 
 covery. This is all that need be said on the boundaries of 
 the Bronze Age, that is, as far as the unreliable data war- 
 rant any conjecture at all. Of the Swiss pile-builders 
 some, like those at Schussenried, go back as far as the 
 neolithic period, although their villages continued to be 
 inhabited throughout the Bronze Age, while others lived 
 in the Iron Age, and even in historic times. Thus the 
 three-period theory does not always work. For what is 
 successive in theory is often contemporaneous in fact. It 
 sets up an essentially relative standard, and in many cases 
 we await further information. If six or eight thousand 
 years be fixed as the maximum, there will be ample scope 
 for the widest speculation.
 
 THE AGE OF THE HUMAN RACE. 42! 
 
 Philology and ethnography furnish, on the whole, far 
 safer data for determining the age of the human race. 
 Although particular cases are attended with special diffi- 
 culty, a relative limit may be fixed. The history of an- 
 cient civilized nations is far-reaching, and their language 
 refined. Whether we contemplate Egyptian civilization, 
 or feast our minds on the history and literature of the 
 Indians, we cannot but marvel at the intellectual eminence 
 to which these ancient nations attained. The pyramids 
 alone bear witness to such a high theoretical and practical 
 knowledge of art, that its development must have occupied 
 several thousand years. The theory that it was imported 
 from Paradise seems to us to exaggerate the purpose and 
 sphere of that state of primitive happiness. Here, again, 
 the secular sphere must be marked off from the religious 
 and moral. The refined written language, which the 
 Egyptians possessed three or four thousand years before 
 Christ, presupposes much study, thought, and observation, 
 and a people whose minds had been trained to unravel the 
 subtlest phases and combinations of thought. In defining 
 Manetho's dynasties, Egyptologists hesitate between the 
 years 6117 and 2182 B.C. The latest date at which the 
 Egyptian kingdom began is given by Lepsius as 3892, by 
 Lauth as 4157, by Brugsch as 4455, and by Mariette as 
 5004. Unquestionably the greater pyramids are not later 
 than the year 3000. Now it is precisely the history best 
 known to us, viz., that of Egypt, that compels us to assign 
 a more remote date for the beginning of the human race 
 than that hitherto received. The history of the Indo- 
 Europeans also carries us back to a time, when the several 
 stocks of the Aryan family lived in the Himalayas as one 
 people. Of this, history tells us nothing, but philology 
 steps forward and submits to our gaze a highly cultivated 
 language. Although written documents reach no further 
 back than 1400 B.C., still a long tradition must necessarily 
 have preceded. Fabulous as are the statements of the 
 Chinese regarding their ancient history, critics are still 
 obliged to allow them a comparatively high antiquity.
 
 422 THE AGE OF THE HUMAN RACE. 
 
 Nevertheless there can be no question of absolutely fixing 
 the time. 
 
 In dealing with history and philology, no less than with 
 geology, we must take care not to lose our heads over big 
 figures. All apologists of note now agree in allowing that 
 the antiquity of the human race is somewhat greater than 
 it had been commonly supposed. The lowest estimate 
 varies between 8,000 and 10,000 years, but even the high- 
 est is not double the Septuagint computation.
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 THE DELUGE. 
 
 The sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters of Genesis are 
 occupied with the story of the great Flood which destroyed 
 the whole human race, save only eight souls in Noe's 
 family. The Flood, which is described as overtopping 
 the highest mountains, is made to appear as an extraor- 
 dinary manifestation of God's vengeance on the human 
 race for its wickedness. The account is in some respects 
 peculiar. It is surprisingly diffuse, and abounds in repe- 
 titions, the same fact being stated and restated in differ- 
 ent words. In chapter vi. God's action is declared to be 
 due to the universal wickedness of mankind, and Noe and 
 his family are said to be spared in reward of their right- 
 eous conduct in the midst of universal corruption. Then 
 Noe is charged to build the ark, and to take into it two 
 animals of each kind. In chapter vii. Noe is ordered to 
 enter the ark, and to take therein seven pairs of clean and 
 two of unclean beasts, and also of the fowls of the air, 
 seven and seven, male and female. The execution of the 
 order is then related, and it is noteworthy that two pairs 
 of both clean and unclean animals entered the ark. This 
 fact of the animals and Noe entering the ark is again men- 
 tioned when the Flood burst forth. That this is an addi- 
 tional narrative, such as was usual with Semitic writers, 
 appears from the use of the Pluperfect. At length the 
 waters of the swollen Flood rose to their full height, over- 
 topping the highest mountains by fifteen yards, and de-
 
 424 THE DELUGE. 
 
 stroying all living creatures under heaven. In forty days 
 the Flood reached its height, and for one hundred and 
 fifty days it so stood. Chapter viii. describes the end of 
 the flood. One hundred and fifty days after the Flood 
 began, the ark rested on Mt. Ararat, and seventy-three 
 days later the tops of the mountains came in sight. Forty 
 days after, Noe sent forth a raven, and on every seventh 
 day he thrice sent forth a dove. On removing the cover- 
 ing from the ark, he saw that the surface of the earth was 
 drying ; but fifty-seven days more elapsed before it was 
 quite dry. At length God bade him quit the ark, in which 
 he had abode one year and ten days, whether a solar or 
 lunar year is not clear, but probably, according to the 
 latest Hebrew calculations, the latter. Absolute accuracy 
 in regard to numbers is hardly possible. 
 
 Why, it will be asked, is the story told with such circum- 
 stantial details, and with such laboured chronological pre- 
 cision ? The answer must be sought in part in the purpose 
 for which the narrative was written, and in part in the 
 sources of information that Moses had at his command. 
 Moses intended to give a vivid picture of the greatest catas- 
 trophe that had ever burst upon the living creation, and to 
 old up in terrorem, before the eyes of the people, the heavy 
 chastisement which God once inflicted upon the sins of 
 mankind. In regard to the sources, a theory has recently 
 been built on internal grounds, that two distinct sources 
 at least are clearly discernible, which were not made into 
 a consecutive narrative till a later date. The chief argu- 
 ment on which this theory rests is the change in the names 
 for God. Thus the name Jahve is used in chapter vi. as 
 far as verse 8, but Elohim is introduced with the history 
 of Noe, and is retained throughout the chapter. In chap- 
 ter vii. Jahve is used till v. 9, and Elohim from v. n to v. 
 16 ; in v. 16 both Jahve and Elohim occur. Elohim reap- 
 pears in chapter viii. (1-15), but is interchanged with Jahve 
 in v. 20. As the narrative proceeds, the respective char- 
 acteristics of the two documents are disclosed. Thus in 
 the Elohistic, ego is used with am (v. 17), in the Jahvistic
 
 THE DELUGE. 425 
 
 with anoki (vii. 4). Hence, it is said, the narrative in 
 chapter vn. (1-5) is parallel to that of the Elohist in chap- 
 ter vi. (13-22). In like manner chapter ix. (1-17) is 
 merely a prolix Elohistic version of chapter vn. (20-22). 
 The contradiction between c. vi. (19-20), and c. vn. (23), 
 and between c. vii. 12, and vii. 24, is accounted for 
 by supposing that the two documents tell a different 
 story. 
 
 The Divine names are interchanged throughout Genesis. 
 By way of explanation it may be affirmed generally that 
 Elohim mirrors forth God as the Almighty Creator and 
 Lord of the world, while Jahve pictures him as the God of 
 the covenant. Thus Elohim is used in chapters vi. and 
 viii., because the beginning and end of the catastrophe 
 give special prominence to God's omnipotence, whereas 
 Jahve is most appropriate to c. vii. which deals with the 
 salvation of Noe, from whose family the future race, the 
 people of the covenant, was to spring. Consequently the 
 distinction between clean and unclean animals, which was 
 uncalled for in c. vi. 19, is laid down in c. vm. 2. Simi- 
 larly more precise orders are given about the birds in c. vn. 
 3, because clean beasts and birds are declared to be fit for 
 sacrifice (c. vm. 20). Hence Noe was ordered to take a 
 larger number of the clean kind into the ark. Jahve re- 
 appears at the sacrifices in v. 21. Both reasons go hand in 
 hand. The compiler must have proceeded with the utmost 
 wariness and circumspection, as the result cannot be due 
 to chance. Chapter vn. 16 is a case in point. Elohim 
 gives Noe the command, and Jahve closes the door of the 
 ark. It is hardly conceivable that the compiler set the 
 two names side by side accidentally, and for no other 
 reason except that they were in the sources whence he 
 drew. Nevertheless we are not concerned to take up an 
 uncompromising attitude, and to contend a entrance that 
 Genesis is not based on any older source, written or oral. 
 The pertinent question, however, is whether they were 
 known to Moses, and whether the accounts destroy, or 
 complete and sustain each other. These internal reasons,
 
 426 THE DELUGE. 
 
 since they are liable to many exceptions and often cut 
 both ways, will never give any decisive result. 
 
 Fortunately, as in the case of creation and the fall, we 
 possess, independently of the Bible, an account of the 
 Deluge in the cuneiform inscriptions, which sheds a flood 
 of light on Genesis. The clay tablets are, it is true, only 
 copies from the seventh century, B.C.; but the originals 
 are pronounced by competent critics to be as old as the 
 year 2000 B.C. 1 The two accounts are of such a kind that 
 they must have been drawn from different sources. In 
 the Chaldean story, which Abraham had brought with 
 him from his own home, Noe is wrongly represented to 
 have been near the sea (Persian Gulf), whereas Genesis 
 and the " Ark" presuppose the mainland. The Chaldean 
 also would seem to have been conversant with two narra- 
 tives ; for he records the two episodes in Gen. vii. 16, 
 with this difference, that it is Hasisadra and not God who 
 shuts the door of the ark (ship). The Chaldean legend 
 also bears traces of the two passages at the end of c. vin. 
 and the beginning of c. ix. It also tells how Hasisadra, 
 after landing from the ship, offered acceptable sacrifices 
 to the gods ; wherefore they loaded him with favours. 
 Here, then, are the Elohistic passages on the beginning 
 and end of the catastrophe, and the Jahvistic passages in 
 regard to the animals and the offering of sacrifice. Nor is 
 mention wanting of the three birds sent out in succession. 
 External confirmation such as this is more valuable than 
 myriads of internal arguments, and shows conclusively 
 that the story told in Genesis is not a subsequent fortuitous 
 compilation from unknown documents. Moses learnt the 
 points of the story, and handed them on intact and un- 
 altered. In reading the biblical story we are struck, not 
 by the blending into one of two narratives, but by the 
 lofty design, the moral teleology that pervades it. In this, 
 indeed, the finger of God is manifest. 
 
 George Smith. See Zeitschrift far Kath. Tkeologie, 1877, p. 128 ; 1815, p. 624. 
 Vigouroux, Die Bitel, aio. E. Schrader, Die Keilinschr if ten und das A lie Testa- 
 ment. 9 ed. Giessen, 1883, p. 46.
 
 THE DELUGE. 427 
 
 Other traditions concerning the Flood need not now 
 occupy our attention. They are to be found in almost all 
 nations. The tradition concerning the Flood, says Lenor- 
 mant, is the universal tradition par excellence among all 
 nations that have preserved the memory of the history of 
 primitive man. 2 In these sagas, however, the Flood loses 
 for the most part its penal character ; and in this is seen 
 their inferiority to the Mosaic narrative. The Chaldeans 
 conceive the Flood as resulting from the battle of the 
 gods, and fail to recognize that moral purification was its 
 purpose. Greeks and Indians have forgotten that the 
 Flood was a chastisement. The Avesta says nothing of 
 the Flood ; but as the Zend is closely connected with San- 
 scrit and the Veda, this ignorance can only be accidental. 
 The story of the Flood is known also to the Iranians. In 
 the Rig-veda the Flood has left no trace, but it is once 
 mentioned in one of the later Brahmanas ; whence the sur- 
 mise that the Indians borrowed it from their Semitic neigh- 
 bours. So far, however, no proof of its Semitic origin is 
 forthcoming. 3 The Chinese story agrees in chronology 
 with the supposed biblical chronology in assigning the 
 Flood to the year 2597. Despite its many fanciful details, 
 the Greek story of Deucalion, as told by Ovid, approxi- 
 mates very nearly to the Bible. In the New World the 
 Flood Saga found a home in Mexico and Peru. Egypt is 
 the only country in which all memory of the Flood seems 
 to have completely died out, for the simple reason that to 
 the inhabitants of the Nile country the Flood must ever 
 seem not a curse but a blessing. In earlier times, if we 
 are to believe an inscription, there was a vague remem- 
 brance that the gods had once destroyed the human race. 
 More than this is very doubtful, for subsequent confirma- 
 tion is of little value in tracing ancient Egyptian history. 
 Whether the Flood is known to the African tribes is still 
 in dispute. From recent researches it would seem likely 
 
 y Apud Vigouroux, I.e. See Lucken, Die Traditionen des Menschengeschlechtes, Mfln- 
 ster, 1869. Fischer, Heidenthum und Offenbarung, Mainz, 1828, p. 218, seq. 
 Schafer, Das Diluvium in der Tradition der } 'olker, Frankfurt, 1888. 
 
 3 M. Muller, Essays, I., 148. Vigouroux, I., 212, seq., 238.
 
 428 THE DELUGE. 
 
 that the story had penetrated into the African continent 
 and Madagascar. 4 Even Australia has nursed the tradi- 
 tion, a fact which may tell in favour of the antiquity of 
 the African legend. Still it most probably originated with 
 Islam or Christianity, the balance of probability being 
 in favour of this assumption, since no traces are found 
 before the Blacks came in contact with other nations. So 
 far all the sagas agree in the main with the Bible : man 
 was saved in a tub or ship ; the animals were saved ; the 
 tub landed on a high mountain ; but the moral purpose 
 recedes into the background, and the war of the gods 
 throws everything into confusion. 
 
 Genesis nowhere states directly the time at which the 
 Flood broke over the world, unless the remark that Noe 
 was then six hundred years old be taken as such. This 
 tallies with the age of the patriarchs given in Genesis, but 
 it cannot serve as a basis on which to fix the exact date, 
 since the age of the person and the generation are mingled 
 in one without distinction. The year 2,500 or 2,600 would 
 be the approximate relative date. According to Gen. vii., 
 n and viii., 13 the Deluge began in the autumn, in October 
 or November, for the civil not the ecclesiastical year is 
 meant. With the exception of the Chinese Saga, all non- 
 biblical accounts relegate the Flood to a hoary antiquity, 
 concerning which we are without information. With the 
 Flood history and civilization take their rise. This fact 
 alone would place the Flood several thousand years earlier 
 than is usually supposed. Many difficulties on this head 
 would disappear, if only we might assume that the Flood 
 had not extended to the whole human race, because it 
 could then also be assumed that the development of peo- 
 ples had proceeded without interruption from one centre. 
 
 Apart from this, however, there still remain data for the 
 age of the human race, on which to build a calculation. 
 According to these data man belongs to the Quaternary 
 epoch ; but from this it by no means follows that the 
 
 4 Gloatz, Speculative Tkeologie, 289, 549, 681.
 
 THE DELUGE. 429 
 
 Quaternary epoch is the outcome of the Deluge. 8 Such 
 an assumption would be tantamount to a denial of the 
 Ice-Age. Though there are many points concerning the 
 Ice-Age which science has not yet cleared up, as, for 
 instance, whether there was one Ice-Age or several, whether 
 the ice covered the two hemispheres simultaneously or 
 successively, whether the last Ice-Age saw the beginning 
 of the human race, or whether palaeolithic man preceded 
 it, one thing at any rate is quite clear. The equable 
 semi-tropical temperature that prevailed in the Tertiary 
 period was violently disturbed, and was forced to give 
 place to cold ; and consequently the climate in various 
 zones and lands underwent a change. But in explaining 
 the fact geologists are divided into two camps. With the 
 majority a cosmic explanation finds most favour." The 
 phenomenon, they say, is owing to the variable position of 
 the vernal point on the earth's orbit, in conjunction with 
 the variable eccentricity of the orbit itself. The vernal 
 point completes its course of retrogressive motion in 
 21,000 years. And thus the perihelion falls successively 
 into four quadrants, which answer to the four seasons. 
 And as it now falls on December 3ist, the winter quarter 
 is shorter than the summer quarter (June to August) by 
 five days. In times gone by, too, the eccentricity of the 
 orbit was greater. From this we might expect the Ice-Age 
 to return in both hemispheres, in every period of 11,000 
 years. The last occurred from 7,000 to 11,000 years ago, 
 and was most intense 9,000 years ago. As the whole dura- 
 tion i-fi-Q. would be 5,250, it ended in 4,480. This would 
 be the beginning of the human race. 
 
 The cosmic explanation of the Ice-Age in this form is 
 not generally received ; nay, it is utterly impossible. Geol- 
 ogy insists that the Ice-Age is older. Nor does this view 
 of the platonic year satisfy the astronomer. For the sun's 
 heat was less at that time, because it travelled beyond the 
 
 5 Gainet, Deluge de Not et le terrain Quaternaire des GMogues, Besangon, 1883. 
 
 Bibliographic Catkoligue, Paris, 1884, p. 466. 
 
 6 Natur und Offenbarung^ 1886, p. 363 seq.
 
 43 THE DELUGE. 
 
 orbit of Mercury. When the earth's warmth was grad- 
 ually being exhausted, the sun came to the rescue, and 
 then only was it possible for ice to form at the Poles. In 
 this way it will be possible to admit before millions of 
 years a geocosmic Ice-Age, either at the end of the Ter- 
 tiary epoch, or during the Deluge, that shall not block the 
 way to a later astronomical one. But really these divisions 
 are too ingenious. How have these slight displacements 
 succeeded in producing such mighty changes ? All the 
 evidence points to a great Ice-Age, covering with its in- 
 crustations a great part of the mainland, and leaving its 
 detritus and stray blocks all around. The physical condi- 
 tions of the earth, and the vertical structure of the main- 
 land were probably the causes that brought about this 
 Ice-Age. 7 In accordance with what has been said before, 
 this would necessitate an earlier date for the Deluge. 
 Only, be it once more noted, the changes of the Quater- 
 nary epoch are not to be measured by the standard of 
 to-day. Moreover, the question still remains, whether the 
 ice was forming everywhere at once. Anyhow, owing to 
 the elevation of mountains, it gradually spread over a 
 wider area. Falb, who explains earthquakes by the theory 
 of ebb and flow, has quite recently calculated that the 
 Deluge took place in 4100 B.C. 
 
 The question as to the universality of the deluge may 
 be regarded from three points of view : in relation to the 
 earth, to animals, and to man. Nowadays there can be 
 no manner of doubt that the Flood did not overspread the 
 whole earth. This old view now numbers adherents only 
 among those who wilfully shut their eyes to all collateral 
 knowledge, and blindly put their trust in the literal sense 
 of the text (Keil, Lamy). An inundation of the whole 
 earth to the tops of the highest mountains would require 
 a volume of water so immense as to defy calculation. First 
 of all, imagine a zone of nine or ten thousand metres in 
 diameter girding the earth ; then compare it with the sea, 
 
 7 Probst, Natilrl. Wartmvassrrheizung ah Princif der klintatiscken Zustartde der 
 . Formatonen, Frankfurt, 1884.
 
 THE DELUGE. 431 
 
 which has a mean depth of from two to three thousand 
 metres ; this will give some idea of the mass and weight of 
 water required. It would require some 20 figures to ex- 
 press the number of cubic metres. This mass would have 
 collected as quickly as it dispersed. To exclude the high 
 peaks of the Himalayas and Cordilleras because, being 
 covered with eternal snow, they could afford no shelter to 
 the animals, is to abandon the letter, and to concede 
 in principle the right to explain the text otherwise. 
 The physical difficulties involved in a partial inundation 
 that covered Mt. Ararat, a height of 5,000 metres (if this 
 mount, and not the whole mountain chain, may be exegeti- 
 cally considered the resting place of the ark), are, consider- 
 ing the configuration of Central Asia, far less than for 
 the inundation of the whole earth. Modern palaeontology 
 supplies many instances of the sea covering mountain 
 ranges, and depositing animal remains at the height of 
 4,000 or 5,000 metres. Hence a partial Flood presents no 
 physical difficulties. 
 
 By the story as told in Genesis we are not irredeemably 
 pledged to this universality. The waters, it is said, inun- 
 dated the earth, destroyed all things on the earth's sur- 
 face, and submerged all the high mountains under heaven. 
 But it argues a very imperfect understanding of the man- 
 ner of speech adopted in Holy Scripture, to imagine that 
 the sense is bounded by the letter. Naturally this inter- 
 pretation was upheld until the catastrophe was looked at 
 from its physical side. But once the question is viewed 
 from a scientific standpoint, it becomes imperatively neces- 
 sary to examine how far this explanation is a necessity. A 
 little study of Holy Scripture soon makes it clear that the 
 sacred writers understood by "the earth," "the whole 
 earth," the country in which they or their informants hap- 
 pened to be.* Palestine is the whole earth, and Jerusalem 
 the centre of the world. Semitic writers delight in rhetori- 
 cal generalizations,! in magnifying the part into the whole. 
 
 * Deut. ii. 35 ; iv. 19. 
 
 t Gen. xli., 54, 57 ; III. Kings x., 23, 24. See Matth. xii., 42 ; Is. xiv., 7, 26 ; Jerem. iv., 
 23 seq. ; xv., 10 ; Matthew xxvii., 45 ; Acts ii., 5.
 
 432 THE DELUGE. 
 
 Many is put for all, all stands for many. From the infor- 
 mant's standpoint all seemed inundated ; and we are per- 
 fectly justified in viewing these expressions from his stand- 
 point. Nor do we thereby detract from God's wonderful 
 work. For the waters of the deep, and the floodgates of 
 heaven (i.e., the waters of the ocean, on which the land 
 rested, from the earth's cavities, and from the clouds 
 above) form so immense a volume that their aggregation 
 for the purpose of inundation cannot have been a mere 
 natural event, even if terrific water-spouts and tempests, 
 with earthquakes and volcanic phenomena to boot, be 
 dragged in as auxiliary forces. 
 
 From the Chaldean story, which makes the Persian gulf 
 the scene of the Flood, it has been argued that a local 
 earthquake, with a whirlwind at its back, was the primary 
 cause of the inundation of Mesopotamia. That the waters 
 have burst forth from the deep is a well authenticated fact, 
 and the alluvial land of the Euphrates and Tigris is favour- 
 able to such an outburst. 8 Still, this would not account 
 for a flood so violent and so prolonged, even in the valley 
 of the Euphrates, to say nothing of the whole mountainous 
 tract. The story, for the most part, would have to be 
 relegated to the domain of fable. Perhaps we may infer 
 that the narrator sought, by introducing these events, to 
 impart life and colour to his picture of this extraordinary 
 occurrence. The same thing is observable in the Chaldean 
 story, especially in the substitution of a ship for an ark, 
 which has its sides coated with bitumen, and is entrusted 
 to a pilot. Moses, to whom an Egyptian education had 
 imparted some knowledge of shipping, did not allow him- 
 self to be beguiled into thus colouring the authentic story. 
 Hence his narrative is of a more genuine and faithful 
 stamp. In the physical explanation the disturbances that 
 are known to have convulsed sea and land should be taken 
 into account ; nor should it be forgotten that the changes 
 in climate and in the configuration of the earth's surface 
 
 8 GCnther, Geophysik^ vol. I., p. 379. Stuttgart, 1884. See Pfaff, p. 750.
 
 THE DELUGE. 433 
 
 during the Quaternary epoch were considerable. As the 
 idea of water newly created, and afterwards annihilated, 
 is not to be entertained, so neither is it possible to har- 
 monize the narrative without the intervention of the first 
 cause. The rainbow did not appear for the first time after 
 the Flood, but it was then set by God as a sign that He 
 would never again destroy the world with a Flood. 
 
 How does the case stand in regard to the animals ? As 
 to their fate the Bible seems to leave no loophole for doubt. 
 God had set Himself to make an end of all flesh under 
 heaven, in which breathed the breath of life. All on earth 
 were to perish. Of beasts, and birds and creeping things 
 only two of each kind were to be saved. Noe did God's 
 bidding. The Flood came, and birds, beasts and cattle 
 and all creeping things, all flesh that moved on the earth, 
 was destroyed. The breath of life became extinct in all 
 the living creatures of earth. The writer never wearies of 
 emphasizing over and over again the universality of the 
 destruction, in order thereby to bring out more clearly 
 the universal character of the chastisement. If this ten- 
 dency renders it proportionately difficult to challenge the 
 universality, still on the other hand it will suffice to ex- 
 plain the choice of words. There can hardly be a doubt 
 that the animals alluded to are those only which were 
 known to Noe, and dwelt in Noe's land. Thus the writer 
 adopted the standpoint of the eye-witness, Noe. 
 
 Unless this view be admitted, the consequences must be 
 faced. In the Tertiary epoch, it is a certain fact that 
 numerous animals, great and small, filled the earth. In 
 the time of the great mammals animal development had 
 attained its zenith. Palaeontological discoveries lead us 
 to believe that the number of animals was immense. We 
 are playing with edged tools by trying to beat down the 
 number on the plea that science, being in the dark as to 
 the formation of species, is utterly incompetent to say 
 from how many pairs the species at present existing have 
 been derived. The Darwinians allow that the Tertiary 
 
 Z a
 
 434 THE DELUGE. 
 
 epoch is rich in fauna, which bear a great resemblance to 
 the present animal world. Geologists, like Pfaff, state 
 very decisively that, in the hypothesis, 2,000 species of 
 mammals, and 6,500 species of birds must have entered 
 Noe's ark. This estimate, far from being the " ridiculous 
 absurdity" Keil is pleased to style it, is well within the 
 mark. It is sheer folly, in a mistaken and misapplied zeal 
 for exegesis, to shut one's eyes to such palpable facts, and 
 then to invoke Darwinism, which is otherwise held up to 
 discredit, in behalf of the fewness of species. How was it 
 possible to procure one pair of each species ? Augustine, 
 indeed, has remarked that the animals, following a divine 
 impulse, came of their own accord. From the ends of the 
 earth ? Augustine, as we all know, did not admit the ex- 
 istence of the antipodes. Then, again, the Bible says that 
 Noe was to take one pair of each kind into the ark. Going 
 in, consequently, does not preclude being led in. We may, 
 however, reasonably explain by natural instinct the flock- 
 ing together of the animals of that country to the place 
 where the ark stood. Scenting danger from afar, they fled 
 whither they hoped to find shelter. Supposing, however, 
 that one pair of all these animals had travelled from the 
 ends of the earth, what must have been the dimensions of 
 the ark that was to hold them all ! Its size cannot be abso- 
 lutely determined, as the exact measurement of the cubit 
 is not known ; but it was certainly considerable. Still any 
 conceivable dimensions would be childish if room had to 
 be found for all the great graminvorous and carnivorous 
 animals, for domestic animals and beasts of prey. How 
 could they be stowed away together ? It answers still less 
 to suppose they were separated, by putting an artificial 
 gloss on certain phrases. How were the animals to be 
 fed ? Where was the food to be stowed away ? Think of 
 the quantities of vegetables devoured by the ungulates ! of 
 flesh devoured by the beasts of prey ! To suppose that the 
 animals, while in the ark, abstained from food and propa- 
 gation is a triumph of ingenious credulity over common 
 sense.
 
 THE DELUGE. 435 
 
 A comparison of the wording of God's declaration, of 
 the execution, and of its fulfilment reveals a variety of ex- 
 pression. The decree of death is issued against all flesh ; 
 all flesh is said to have perished, and yet one pair of each 
 kind is saved. The enumeration of the animals varies 
 considerably, and does not justify us in assuming that a 
 special distinction was always intended. Here, too, the 
 ever-recurring distinction between prophecy and history 
 holds good. Prophecy deals largely in hyperboles ; his- 
 tory, careful not to construe hyperboles into facts, shapes 
 itself accordingly. Hence, as S. Augustine says, 9 Holy 
 Scripture usually puts the part for the whole. Other 
 Fathers express themselves in like manner. No cogent 
 exegetical reason, therefore, debars us from explaining the 
 Flood in a partial sense. On the other hand, many paral- 
 lel expressions in Holy Scripture favour this view, which 
 renders the Flood simple and intelligible. We may go 
 further and say that it is the only view which makes it 
 intelligible. But is not the whole history of exegesis 
 arrayed against it ? Till the seventeenth century, it is 
 true, the Fathers and theologians were almost unanimous 
 in explaining the Deluge as universal ; and for obvious 
 reasons. The Fathers, being acquainted with only a small 
 portion of the earth, hardly perceived the bearings of their 
 own explanation. Science had not yet probed the earth's 
 depths to learn its antecedents. Opinions differed even as 
 to its spherical shape. The antipodes did not square with 
 the views then in vogue. So it is not to be wondered at 
 if the Fathers interpreted the story of the Flood literally. 
 But it is quite unjustifiable to consider such a consensus in 
 matters not appertaining to faith, but depending on human 
 science alone, as an infallible utterance of the Church. As 
 a rule, when the Church has given no formal decision, 
 such a claim has no locus standi. Science is in its place in 
 
 9 In Ps. 77 and ep. ad Paulin. 149. De civil. Dei 15, 27. See also Pseudo-Justin, Quaes- 
 tiones ad Orthod. 34. For the historical survey, see Reusch, Bibel und Natur, yA. 
 edit., p. 291. Diestel, Geschichte der Auslegung, p. 483.seq. Schafer, Das Diluvium 
 der Bibel. Guttler., p. 253 seq.
 
 436 THE DELUGE. 
 
 investigating how a given result of exegesis bears on faith 
 and morals. If Vossius' work De ^Etate Mundi was and 
 still is on the Index, it may be safely asserted that its re- 
 striction of the Deluge to countries inhabited was not its 
 only fault. The experience gained by Theology in rub- 
 bing against Copernicanism should prove a salutary warn- 
 ing, and serve as a reminder that even the Congregation of 
 the Index is not infallible. 
 
 A less confident tone is perhaps becoming in discussing 
 the partial character of the Flood in its effects on the 
 human race. Genesis declares over and over again that 
 the eight souls in Noe's family were alone saved. The 
 Legends, too, attest its universality. The Fijians" have a 
 tradition that eight, the Aztecs, that one or two survived. 
 Deucalion and Pyrrha, according to the Greek tradition, 
 Manu according to the Indian, were the sole survivors. 
 The very claim of being autochthonous implies this ver- 
 sion. Is it, then, permissible to look at this part of the 
 story from the narrow standpoint of the eye-witness, which 
 the narrator has made his own ? From the partial destruc- 
 tion of the brute creation, may we infer a partial destruc- 
 tion of the human race ? It seems to be a natural infer- 
 ence, since the animals were punished on man's account. 
 Such a solution would greatly simplify the difficulties, on 
 which we have already touched, as to the unity and age of the 
 human race. The absence of all tradition in Africa concern- 
 ing the Flood seems to give strength to this supposition. 
 
 Early this century the theory was mooted that, even if 
 the deluge were universal, there might have been several 
 vantage-grounds on which men were saved. 11 Still more 
 recently ethnographers, philologists, and palaeontologists 
 have advanced reasons for a limitation. Schobel, Omalius, 
 d'Halloy, Quatrefages, Lenormant, Jean d'Estienne, 11 
 
 xo Gloatz ii., 1010. Lucien Biart, Les Aztlques, kistoire, moeun, coutumes, Paris, 1886- 
 
 La Science, 1886, p. 124. I.P. 
 ii Dursch, Le Deluge de Molse, Ehingen, 1829. 
 13 Controv. 1881, p. 2, 9, 10 ; 1883, p. 575 seq. ; Revue des questions scienti/ffues, 
 
 Bruxelles, Octobre, 1883-1885. Motais, Le deluge biblique devant la foi,Miriture 
 
 et la. science, Paris, 1885. For the literary feud between the two Reviews see 
 
 Revue, 1886, i, and Contravene, 1886, 3.
 
 THE DELUGE. 437 
 
 Dubor, Clifford, Motais and others hold either that the 
 Flood affected human life only in its centre, or that the 
 negroes were exempt, or that some only, probably the de- 
 scendants of Seth, were destroyed. Harlez is not un- 
 favourably disposed to this opinion, and the Jesuits, Bel- 
 lynck and Delsaux, consider it, to say the least, compatible 
 with faith. A quarrel has broken out in France and Bel- 
 gium on this very point. The Brussels Revue complains 
 that the Controverse (which was once more liberal) has 
 grown intolerant ; the Controverse, fluttering with trepida- 
 tion, appeals to the principles of faith. Here, as above 
 also, the question is merely exegetical. No dogma not 
 even the dogmas of original sin and redemption crosses 
 the threshold. Again, therefore, it is allowable to follow 
 a freer scientific exegesis. Though the survivors be ex- 
 actly numbered, and the phrase omnis homo recur four times, 
 still the familiar modus loquendi of Holy Scripture is equal 
 to the task of reducing both facts to their proper propor- 
 tions. The matter is more pregnant with difficulty, when 
 the avowed end and aim of the Deluge is steadily kept in 
 view, viz., an universal punishment which none should 
 escape. Nevertheless the purpose may still be explained 
 as moral, that is, to save the just from contamination, lest 
 the knowledge of God should wholly perish. Hence the 
 Sethites, not the vicious Chamites, were destroyed, because 
 the better members of that stock were still to continue to 
 be the depositaries of the knowledge of God. 
 
 Nor is this view at variance with the genealogical tables, 
 or the confusion of speech. In both cases the question 
 centres in Noe's descendants, in whose regard, it must be 
 admitted, the God of the covenant exercised, from the 
 beginning, a special providence. Rambouillet 1 * has lately 
 been vigorously belabouring the now defunct Motais, and 
 he bids fair to continue the fight. He strenuously main- 
 tains that, according to Moses, the Cainites had long since 
 gone forth from the land of Nod to settle in more distant 
 
 13 Revue des sciences eccttsiastiques, 1886, p. 319 seq. See Zeitschrift filr Kaht, 
 Theolpgie, 1887, p. 23, seq.
 
 THE DELUGE. 
 
 countries ; that none but Sethites were destroyed ; that 
 only Noachians are enumerated in Moses' table of peoples ; 
 that there were none but Semites at Babel. But, even 
 critical questions aside, these are caverns too darksome to 
 be ever exposed to the full light of day. Nor do Acts 
 xxvn., 26, and Romans v., 12, tell against his position. 
 The Apostle is merely teaching that the human race is one 
 in descent ; the Deluge he does not even mention. The 
 question becomes more complicated in dealing with pas- 
 sages in the New Testament that contain a special refer- 
 ence to the Flood. In Luke xvn., 27, Jesus compares the 
 time of His second coming with the time of Noe. Noe's 
 contemporaries tossed all warnings to the winds, and lived 
 jauntily and heedlessly until the Flood came and destroyed 
 all. The same expression occurs in the parallel verse 29, 
 which narrates the destruction of all the people of Sodom, 
 save Lot. In both cases the "all" (ontavtaf) must, it 
 seems, be construed literally. Nevertheless, in dealing 
 with quotations or with historical dates, we should not lose 
 sight of the well-known exegetical canon, which says that 
 they should, if possible, be interpreted, according to the 
 sense they bear in the original text. After all, the parallel 
 passages just named only prove that all the people, on 
 whom the Flood came, perished, except Noe's family. In 
 i. Peter, in., 20, it is distinctly said that eight souls were 
 saved by water ; but they are only contrasted with the un- 
 believers around Noe. The same remark applies to n. 
 Peter n., 5, and to Hebrews XL, 7. In n. Peter in., 6, it 
 is said that the world " that then was, being overflowed 
 with water, perished ;" it does not, however, follow that 
 heaven and earth were destroyed. In neither text nor con- 
 text is there reference to the living world. Sophonias I., 
 2-4, as a biblical and prophetical phrase, is well worth 
 noting. The Lord therein declares that he will gather 
 together all things from off the face of the land : man and 
 beast, birds of the air, and fishes of the sea, and that He 
 will destroy men from off the face of the land. But, in 
 spite of the apparent wholesale destruction, it is quite
 
 THE DELUGE. 439 
 
 clear that the inhabitants of Judaea and Jerusalem were 
 alone aimed at, and again those only who were " ungodly," 
 and had fallen into idolatry. 
 
 On exegetical and dogmatic grounds, as it seems to me, 
 this restriction of the Deluge is fully allowable. Not that 
 I wish to declare myself absolutely in its favour. For the 
 idea of an universal chastisement has undeniably pene- 
 trated into the very bones and marrow of Christianity. 
 Nor do ethnography and anthropology imperatively de- 
 mand its adoption. The exigencies of science can be met 
 by dating the Flood one or two thousand years further 
 back. Still it should be clearly understood that the other 
 theory is consonant with the Faith. Faith is untouched 
 by the limitation of the Flood as regards the earth and 
 the animals ; for as I have already pointed out, the earth 
 teemed with animal life before Noe was created. The 
 end God had in view was sufficiently compassed by the 
 inundation of the part of the earth inhabited by man, and 
 by the destruction, at the same time, of the animals known 
 to man. 
 
 Although these biblical questions are on the borderland 
 of revelation, it has been deemed expedient to discuss 
 them in this volume, in order to give a more satisfactory 
 finish to this part of the work. The great questions on 
 revelation and biblical criticism are reserved for the second 
 volume. These, when expounded, will form a bridge be- 
 tween the doctrines of creation and redemption. 
 
 END OF VOLUME I.
 
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