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Sikuratiottd ^aiirliiilogg i^onogratfijx This volume, which is number 19 in the series, was edited by J.- Carleton Bell THE PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY OF ANGER By ROY FRANKLIN RICHARDSON Professor of Education, University of Maine BALTIMORE WARWICK & YORK, Inc. 19 18 -K^"-^ {< ersons who do their work carelessly, es- pecially manufacturers who send out goods of inferior qual- ity. I. has a marked sentiment against acts of cruelty in the treatment of animals. D. reacts rather vigorously against persons who are disloyal to friendship. These sen- timents go back to early experiences in the life of the indi- viduals. B. in talking with X. directed the conversation to minis- ters who preach what they really do not believe. He took Dr. Y. as an example. He had previously seen Dr. Y. drinking beer with the boys and had resented his behavior. He began to vituperate to X. against Y., giving instances and telling his opinion rather vigorously about such men who have a double personality. "Before I was scarcely aware of it, I was in the midst of motor and verbal expres- sions of righteous indignation. I enjoyed it all very much. I always take delight in making myself angry with minis- ters of this sort." B. has reported other instances of his anger against ministers of this type. A case from I. will illustrate further. "I had the same recurring anger for three weeks. A delivery boy who passes about the same time each day goes by whipping and abusing his horse. Anger arises each time the incident occurs. The sight made me pleasantly indignant. I have the image of an old Ger- man, living near my home as a child, who treated his horse so cruelly. The idea of telephoning to the police oc- curs to me, but the boys goes on and the idea is abandoned." BEHAVIOR OF CONSCIOUSNESS CHAPTER TWO BEHAVIOR OF CONSCIOUSNESS Wundt (21) has pointed out that there are two types of reaction to an emotion, what he calls outer and inner voli- tional acts. The first refers to the external bodily expres- sion of an emotion and the latter to the mental behavior. In the study of the emotions, attention has for the most part been directed to the former. Darwin's study of the emo- tions in man and animals, early called attention to the finer physical expressions of each emotion, explaining them as instinctive habits which were formerly useful. Darwin's study partly paved the way for the James-Lange theory, which maintains that what we experience as an emotion is but the sensation of the instinctive physical expression. The aim of this chapter is to study the mental behavior during the conscious period the anger exists. It is recog- nized that the motor and physical expressions is primary and fundamental. For that reason it has served so adequately in the objective study of the emotion. What we shall at- tempt to study is the mental behavior of persons under the influence of anger. Ethics tells us how we ought to act when angry, but psychology has negelcted to find out how in reality consciousness does behave when the emotional ex- citement is on. David Iron's (12) statement is still apro- pos. He writes, "The neglect of the reactive side of human consciousness is nowhere more conspicuous than in the case of the emotions." The anger consciousness is characterized by heightened mental activity. A multiple number of images, attitudes, fluctuations of the emotional and feeling content appear in rapid succession till the emotion disappears. This state- ment is true for even the more tenuous instances of anger. In fact some of the milder experiences have the most marked changeableness of conscious content. Objectively there 31 32 PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY OF ANG«R may be little activity, while simultaneously on the mental side, there is a wealth of processes which must be consider- ed in the psychology of the emotions. After making a rather minute collection of the different kinds of mental reaction to anger, as shown by the intro- spections, it is observed that they fall into three rather clear types of conscious behavior. The first type is in the general direction of the emotive tendency and is the one that most impulsively follows on the stimulus of the emo- tion. It expresses pugnacity in some form. This type of reaction expresses a tendency similar to the basal instinct of the emotion of anger, such as thinking cutting remarks, imagining the offender's humiliation, hostile witticism, jok- ing and sarcasm. This type of a reaction will be called attributive reaction. A second type is contrary to pugnac- ity; the instinctive impulse is reversed. A friendly atti- tude may be assumed toward the offender, an adequate ex- cuse it found for his offense, an over polite attitude may be taken. This type of behavior will be called the contrary reaction. A third type is one that is entirely of a conscious attitudinal character. The subject becomes indifferent to the whole situation exciting the emotion. The offense may suddenly be apathetically ignored and the subject behaves unconcerned and assumes an "I don't care," or a "What-is- the-use" attitude. This will be called indifferent reaction. These three types of behavior are characteristic of the re- active consciousness to anger. The emotion may contain one, or it may contain all three of these types before it fin- ally ends. Going over the results of the observations of all the subjects, about fourteen hundred sixty eight reactions are counted in the six hundred cases of anger studied. Seventy one per cent of such reactions are classified as attri- butive reaction, eighteen percent are the contrary type, and eleven percent are the indifferent. BEHAVIOR OF CONSCIOUSNESS 33 The initial reaction to anger is always of the attributive type. Whatever other reactions may follow in the course of the entire anger period, the attributive reaction in some form is characteristic of the early stage of the emotion. The contrary and indifferent types are secondary in point of time and occur after the initial hostile tendencies have been re- strained. If an emotion of anger is made up entirely of the attributive type, which frequently occurs, and continues for any length of time, it is always noted that some of the reactions are more crude and unsocial and others are re- fined, disguised it may be, covered up, and when the emo- tion is most intense whether it be in the initial stage or else- where, the unsocial attributive tendencies are usually found at those places. ATTRIBUTIVE REACTION The anger consciousness in its development, especially in its initial stage is characterized by restraint. The subject is aware of hostile unlawful impulses that must be controll- ed. Its initial stage is usually reported as unpleasant. The second characteristic of the anger consciousness is reaction of some sort. What takes place on the mental side, is along the line of least resistance for the moment. Mental life is rather versatile in providing subjective reaction to anger. Motor and visual imagery play an important role involving lessened resistance. A third characteristic of the anger consciousness is what the Germans call "Verschiebung." The emotive tendency is inhibited. A substitution follows for the tendencies restrained. It may be purely subjective or only partly subjective. But the subject in the observa- tion of his anger is fully aware that he would behave in some more drastic fashion if the restraint were off. Substitution of Visual and Motor Imagery. With the subjects studied there occurred no real pugnacious attack in which blows were struck except with those persons who 34 PSYCHOI.OGY AND PEDAGOGY OF ANGER have the correction of children; there are also but few real quarrels reported. But the versatility of consciousness in substituting and providing merely mental reaction for other hostile tendencies that the subject really wished fulfilled is quite striking. Visual and motor imagery may take the place of tendencies which are inhibited and allow a suc- cessful expression. An observation from A. will illustrate. "I found myself saying cutting remarks as if speaking direct- ly to X., and I planned a course of behavior toward him that I considered would humiliate him. I finally ended by im- agining myself kicking him down the street, telling him I wanted no more to do with him. The imagery of this act was pleasant. I felt victorious. X. was imagined as peni- tent." The imagery of the pugnacious attack in some form is a quite common characteristic of the mental reaction to anger. It occurs after a period of restraint when there seems nothing else to be done; imagination and fancy ap- pear at such a crisis and assume the role of a surrogate for hostile tendencies, which the subject has controlled. The awareness of the direct end of the initial tendency of the anger may be present in consciousness or the aim may be indefinite. Subject I. observes, "I felt as if I wanted to say something or do something at once that would get even with X. The thing to do was vague, but the impulse to do something in a hostile manner was strong." The aim of behavior may be rather difinitely formed in the early stage of the anger consciousness as soon as the irasible feelings are definitely referred to some object. An illustration from A. follows: — "The impulse to take X. (a child) and shake him, was strong on the first stimulus of the emotion ; sup- pressing this I spoke crossly to him, at the same time there appeared motor imagery of my holding him with both hands and shaking him." Another instance from the same subject: "I had an impulse to punish X., restraint was im- mediately followed by a motor and visual imagery of the BEHAVIOR OF CONSCIOUSNESS 35 act of punishment." Subject C. observes, "The first im- pulse was to kick X., the restraint was accompanied by mot- or images of kicking him, followed by the image of his be- ing hurt in the face." E. states "I felt as if I would like to shake him and imagined myself doing it." G. developed a case of anger from a series of irritating stimuli. Describ- ing his anger, he says, "I felt like I wanted to bite or hit something." B. reports a case when he had been humiliat- ed by some boys along the street. The tendency to anger at the time was controlled, but as he passed on, the emotion arose with greater intensity. "I imagined myself beating one of the boys, I gave him several good punches ; he had no show at all. I came out victor and was enjoying it all." One of the many sorts of mental reactions that H. reports to a case of anger that extended over three quarters of an hour, is, "I imagined myself charging at him and his looking frightened at my behavior." Substitution of Irascible Play. The imagined fight and victory take the place of tendencies which would have a more objective expression. Another sort of substitution of the initially restrained emotional reaction, is first to lessen the restraint by inhibition and react in some less crude man- ner in a slightly disguised form, which gives a feeling of satisfaction in inner victory and at the same time lacks the objective hostility. A. felt humiliated because of X.'s re- mark in the presence of others. "Resenting his familiarity, I went out of my way to pass him ; I grabbed his arm and gave it a tremendous grip, at the same time I smiled play- fully. I really aimed to hurt him and was fully aware that I wished to hurt him worse than I did. What I did was merely a substitution, but now that the act was over, I felt fully satisfied and pleased with what I had done." The playful attack is a rather common sort of reaction to resent- ment with observers A., C. and D. D. observes, "I was angry at X. and was trying to control myself; suddenly I 36 PSYCHOI.OGY AND PEDAGOGY OF ANGER grabbed him and punched him several times in the ribs, at the same time I smiled. I did not want him or the others to know I was angry. I enjoyed pummelling him, as I felt I had demonstrated to him that I could handle him." In such observations the subject's awareness that what he does in a playful fashion is but a substitution of what he would like to do in another manner, is significant. This sort of awareness seems to be ignored in the every-day experience of our emotional life. Attention is directed to the reaction ; we involuntarily seek a place of lessened resistance, but the act of introspection allows the subject to be more clearly aware of the inhibited reaction and the substituted expres- sion which follows. Substitution of Imaginary Invective and Cutting Re- marks. The vocal expression of anger is one of primary significance. Swearing, grumbling, invective, quarrelling, inter jectional obloquy, etc., are very common signs of anger. The results would very strongly suggest that anger rarely, if ever, occurs without its vocal expression in some manner, if not by direct vocalization either by inner speech or voco-motor imagery. Introspection of slight emotions or anger lasting momentarily, show as their most marked sensation, one of tightening of the throat muscles. Defam- atory language or mild swearing is common with all the subjects studied while in the privacy of their own rooms when the restraint is off. The expression of the vocal cords is one of the most successful vents. B. was instructed to abandon himself to vigorous invective and inter jectional obloquy when the emotion first began and note the result. He followed these instructions on three occasions when the emotion from the beginning was unpleasant, developing from a fore-period of irritation. With this sort of volun- tary vigorous vocal expression, the anger soon passed into rather pleasurable excitement. BEHAVIOR OF CONSCIOUSNESS 37 The reaction to anger in its initial stage may be a vocal tendency to express one's anger, referring the emotion di- rectly to some person or to an object. When the restraint is on, either from motives of decency or the absence of the offender, the thinking of cutting remarks may be substituted for the actual verbal attack. The subject is aware that what he says to himself he would like to say to the offender. Methods of procedure are elaborately planned for a future verbal attack, just what he expects to say and wants to say, how he will say it, the inflection of the voice, the emphasis of words and dramatic attitude. He may imagine the ef- fect of the attack on his opponent, the latter may talk back. The imagined verbal combat is usually a one-sided affair and ends in victory for the subject. Drastic remarks and the most cutting sarcasms are planned at times by the subjects studied. However there are wide individual differences which cannot be referred entirely to the difference in intens- ity of the emotional life. Habit apparently plays an im- portant role. D. felt that he had been imposed upon by X. and Y. After the humiliating incident had passed, D. sud- denly found himself in the midst of an anger reaction. "I found myself having a verbal combat with them. I imag- ined I was telling X., *I should think it costs but little to act like a gentleman, but I presume this is an illustration of your piggishness.' Then I imagined Y. beginning to talk. Just what he was saying was not clear, but I was aware that he was helping X. I interrupted by telling him, 'I understand you are from and of course I can't expect anything better of you.' They began to talk back several times, but I got the better of them and felt pleased about it." The cutting remarks are at times crude and abusive. The subject may swear at the offender. Persons who do not swear in actual life frequently do in imagination. In such imaginative verbal attacks the offender's bad qualities are displayed before him, at other times the same subject may 38 PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY O^ ANGER resort to imagery, sarcasm, witticism or joking of a hostile nature. The motivation seems to be to imagine remarks that would humiliate the offender. The visual imagery of the astonished humble opponent is usual in these imaginary attacks. Crude and abusive remarks may at times seem en- tirely appropriate; at others, sarcasm and irascible joking seem more adequate. Sarcasm usually develops rather slowly with a period of restraint preceding it, unless it is ready made for the occasion. When the fitting sarcastic remark is found, it is usually accompanied by pleasantness in some degree. F. observes, "I could get no imaginative remark that would suit me at first, but after the emotion ap- peared several titnes in succession I suddenly discovered one and found myself saying it over and over again. It rather pleased me, I practiced it to get the right inflection and emphasis that I desired." The imaginative cutting remark may be in the second person as if addressed directly to the offender, especially when the emotion is intense. It may be in the third per- son about the offender, his unfavorable qualities are re- called with no plan or intention of repeating his remarks to him. The contemplation of his unworthiness is accompan- ied by an agreeable feeling. B. became righteously indig- nant at X. because of an incident of ungentlemanly con- duct toward a friend. He observes, "A moment later (that is after the first instance of anger) I imagined myself in my alcove in the Library, and imagined some other person, I did not know, who came in and said to me, *What do you think of X?' I replied with a good deal of pleasurable in- dignation, 'I think he is a damned ass.' Three-quarters of an hour later as I was walking along the street, the emo- tion arose again, and I imagined some one asking the same question, I replied the same as before with a like feeling of pleasure. I really wanted some one to ask me what I thought of X. The subject may be aware that what he says BEHAVIOR OF CONSCIOUSNESS 39 to and about the opponent is a little unfair, but at the time that the emotion is progressing, he ignores it and wants to beHeve ill of the offender. The results of this study abundantly show that a make- believe attitude plays an important role in the anger con- sciousness, in both the development of the anger and the reactive consciousness. It is believed momentarily, when the anger is most intense, that the offender is really a bad man. Pausing for introspection in the midst of such emo- tional reaction, it is frequently reported, "I knew very well I would say nothing of the sort and that X. was not so bad as I believed him." While the emotion is most intense, ill reports about the offender which were previously ignored are now believed and assumed as true, and satisfaction is derived by degrading the best qualities of the offender, by believing stories of ill repute, by suspecting or imagining evil of him. The degree in which this tendency is present, depends partly on the intensity of the emotion, and evident- ly in part on the individual habits of reaction to anger. The chronic inrascible gossiper is evidently a characteristic type of person who has specialized in this mode of reaction to anger. Substitutions by Witticism and Irony. Witticism, sar- casm, irony, teasing and joking make up a large class of vocal and imaginal reactions which may take the place of the initially restrained emotional tendency. The crude re- marks, transformed into wit or fitting sarcasm, overcome the consciousness restraint that was initially present in the emotion and lessen resistance. It is accompanied by a pleas- ant feeling and may be keenly delightful. A thrust in a half serious tone accompanied by a smile, the jest and hos- tile joke follow a state of mind characterized by restraint. In the observations of the subjects studied there is evidence supporting Freud's (8) theory of wit. What he calls "ten- dency wit" ; that is, wit with a difinite aim has two divisions. 40 PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY OP ANGlSR the hostile joke and the obscene joke. The first is a reac- tion to irascible anger and the latter to the sexual emotions. The introspection of the reactive stage of anger conscious- ness shows the Freudian mechanism for "tendency wit." The following case will illustrate a crude kind of wit. H. whose husband had stayed out late at night became angry following a period of worry. Fluctuating intensities of anger and periods of worry lasted over an hour. After a number of reactions such as planning verbal attacks ; recall- ing his thoughtless behavior at other times ; crying, assum- ing an attitude of self-pity ; devising some means of making him sorry ; at times trying to assume the attitude that it was no use to be angry ; taking observations of the emotion at a number of places, motivated by a wish that her husband would see the results and feel sorry; imagining herself go- ing to him and talking rather abusively. Finally she found a remark that gave the keenest pleasure of all. **I imagined myself saying, "Petty dear, you have been out pretty late tonight.' " This was a condensed veiled state- ment expressing about all she would like to say. "Petty" is a character portrayed in a current illustrated newspaper as being mean to his wife and flaring up angrily at every lit- tle incident. The character of "Petty" was fully under- stood by her husband. The crude hostile reaction was fol- lowed by a rather condensed acute remark; it was reported as pleasant, "because it seemed so fitting." C. in a discussion with X. became angry and gives the fol- lowing observation, "I noted I was getting angry and want- ed to say something hostile, but instead I turned away sud- denly and laughed, saying in a joking, half-serious manner, *Oh you old bottle head, you don't know anything.' Al- though I laughed, I really meant it. That gave complete satisfaction. He laughed too." Let us illustrate further. A., with four others, was walking along the street, coming from a clinic at the hospital, where a case of flight of ideas BEHAVIOR OF CONSCIOUSNESS 4I had just been observed. X., one of the party, was talking in a manner that seemed to A. a little superfluous. He re- sented his attitude, and turning he said to X. in a joking manner, "What did you say? The malady must be catch- ing,'* (referring to the case observed). X. retorted, "I never have any fixed ideas." A. replied, "No, they do fly away pretty fast." A. observed, "I felt pleased and victor- ious with my remark, my resentment was entirely gone and I entered into conversation with X. in a friendly manner.'* Witticism is one of the more refined modes of substitution for the more directly hostile attack. Sarcasm is cruder. Its mechanism depends for the most part upon the inflec- tion and tone of voice in speaking. The words themselves in sarcasm are innocent enough, but the mode of expression and the meaning involved are the sources of hostility. The following statement represent sarcastic remarks. A. — "I think I will come around to your Club," emphasis on the word "your." A. — again, "You surely must be right," emphasis on "surely." J. — "You are not the boss, then?" — emphasis on "not," with a little sneer and an accompany- ing laugh. Sarcasm is a rather cheap and easy reaction to anger. It is consequently more easily attained than wit. The period of conscious restraint preceding sarcasm is usually less, unless the witticism is already made for the occasion. Its feeling effect is also not so pleasant as of wit. At times sarcasm may be combined with rather crude wit, but wit of a more refined type will exclude sarcasm. The following is a combination of this kind. C, having become angry at X. for his "bragging attitude," says, "I was con- scious of the tendency to say something hostile, but could think of nothing appropriate. In the course of his remarks X. finally said, *I never read anything for an experiment as I fear it might bias my results.' I suddenly found a re- mark that seemed entirely fitting at the time and at once the restraint was off. I said a little sarcastically, 'No, you 42 PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY OF ANG^R never want to read anything, it might hurt your intellect/ As soon as the statement was made I saw I had gone too far and felt a little cheap. I at once noted that he did not take my remark seriously, and felt relieved. My former resent- ment had entirely disappeared." Substitution by Disguise. There are many devices less refined than wit which are commonly resorted to in slightly disguising the hostile attack. The offender may be attacked indirectly and impersonally. The following case will illustrate. F. became angry at a merchant because, when he went to pay for an article, the price was marked more than he had previously agreed to pay. Feeling resentful, he said, "I suppose the bill is all right, the clerk said it would be less, but people in this town don't know what they are talking about anyway." F. observes, "What I really meant was that you don't know what you are talking about." To avoid making the direct attack, the indefinite pronoun is substi- tuted at times for the definite. The use of "some one" or "somebody" instead of "y^^/' i^ talking to the offender blunts the remark. The device is rather cheap affording little pleasure and has but a short fore-period of restraint. It is carried to an extreme when the subject pretends he does not know the perpetrator of the offense and in fact may assume it is some one else, so that he may speak his mind directly to the offender. I. observes, "I was angry, and talked to her about the affair as if I did not know that she did it. I would'nt have had her to know that I knew for anything. I told her what I thought of a person who had acted in that way and noted that she looked cheap. That pleased me." Some gossip and vituperate against their ene- mies and derive a moiety of ill-gotten pleasure if a sympa- thetic hearer is found. One subject states, "I went to tell X., hoping he would be angry too, and felt just a little dis- appointed when he was not." Hints and insinuations often become devices to avoid a too hostile direct attack. BEHAVIOR OF C0NSCI0USNE;SS 43 Imaginary Bxaltation of Self, Another rather important reaction of the attributive type is an idealistic one. Imag- ination and ideational processes are active. Lowered self- feeling has been accomplished in the subject usually by a number of repeated offenses by some one that the subject really respects. The offender is frequently not imagined as degraded, but he is left as he is, and the subject proceeds to imagine, — it may be to fancy or day-dreams that he is the offender's superior. As the reaction to moments of humil- iation, he may later plan to surpass him. An attitude of make-believe may be momentarily assumed that he is al- ready the offender's superior. Fantastic schemes of a suc- cessful career may appear in which he imagines some dis- tant future, in which he has gained renown and the offend- er is glad to recall that he knew him in other days. Some- times he is imagined as seeking his friendship or advice, or favor, and is refused with dignity. At the next moment he may be graciously bestowing favors upon the offender. Such imaginative processes are observed to afford pleasure to the subject at the time and may lead to a new level of self-con- fidence which has important influences on later behavior. Usually idealistic reactions of this character appear in con- sciousness after more directly hostile reactions have failed to satisfy the subject. A few cases will illustrate. A., re- calling an incident of the day before which humiliated him, became angry. At first he began saying in voco-motor fash- ion as if talking directly to X., "You are a conceited fel- low. You are hard to get along with. I will beat you. You are too nervous to get very far." "I imagined myself treating him in a superior, dignified manner." A. then laid plans how he would work, stick to one thing, make himself a recognized authority, and how he would have little to do with X. He imagined X. coming to him for favors when he had attained the success he had planned, and himself taking a rather indifferent attitude toward his requests. A. 44 PSYCHOI.OGY AND PEDAGCXJY OP ANG^R observes thkt his entire reverie was pleasant, although the anger was unpleasant in the beginning. C. reports a case of anger at X. who had taken a rather critical attitude to- ward a problem which he was studying. He observes, "At first there was a slight humiliated feeling. This was dis- placed by resentment. I imagined myself standing before X. and giving him two good retorts which I considered would have their ill effects on him. At this point the theme changed, 'I will leave you alone and have nothing to do with you,' I felt as if this behavior would somehow punish him, and that pleased me a little." But as a third and final reaction C. observes the following. "I planned to do my work so well that X. would feel sorry for what he had said, I imagined X. complimenting me after it was finished." The early stage of the emotion above was reported as un- pleasant, the final ending in which C. imagines X. compli- rtienting him on his success was a point of marked pleas- ure. Subject E. who had felt humiliated by X. whom he considered had underestimated him, observed as a final re- action, "I will show him in the next ten years, I am young and can work, and he will see." Then followed a number of plans for the future. One subject reacts for a moment at times to resentment by day dreams in which he imagines himself a man of wealth and deals out favors to all except his enemy. He even uses his wealth and influence against him. The feeling is rather pleasant in tone till the moment he comes back to a sense of reality. The transition de- creases the pleasantness rather suddenly. Attitudinal Reactions. Attitudinal reactions of a hostile nature are an important part of the anger consciousness. What may be called "resolutional attitudes" frequently oc- cur as one of the final mental reactions in the diminution of the emotion. The resolutional attitude to do something in the future at a more convenient time when the effects will be greater, becomes a convenient substitute for conscious BEHAVIOR OF CONSCIOUSNESS 45 tendencies that require present restraint. The subject defi- nitely settles on a course of action which cannot be carried out at once. The feeling tone of such conscious attitudes is pleasant. It is not unusual to have a settled resolution and come to a definite conclusion in the initial reactive stage of the emotion. Unless the attitude is ready made for the occasion, it appears as one of the final resorts. A charac- ter isticLo£*^owness'' belongs to anger. An attitude that portends to future behavior is secondary, appearing after the possibilities of present reactions are exhausted. Much of the initial restraint in inhibitions is preparatory to the attainment of a settled conclusion; in some cases initial re- action behaves in a trial and error fashion. The results of a number of hostile impulses are imagined and are followed to their end until finally one is selected that seems most fit- ting. The conclusion reached may be temporary. Al- though it may be abandoned on the reappearance of the emotion, there is a temporary satisfaction in having attain- ed a conclusive attitude even momentarily. The following case from C. will illustrate. C. became angry on being told of X.'s behavior. He first recalled a number of previous similar instances; second, he transferred the anger momen- tarily to another person who told him of the offense ; third, he imagined himself cutting oflF all business relations with X. and as a fourth reaction he observes, "I took on a pug- nacious attitude and concluded to fight it out according to the rules of the game, and planned what I would do and say to make him come my way." The attitude of waiting for further developments, biding one's time, being cautious, is a frequent substitute for rising tendencies demanding pres- ent action. Subject E. observes, "I finally came to the con- clusion not to lie in wait for the opportunity to get back at the offender, but to be on guard against a future attack, but even after the conclusion was formed it was not at once car- ried out though it pleased me. I still found myself plan- 46 PSYCHOUKJY AND PEDAGOGY OF ANGER ning what I would say if the thing should be repeated." A. angry at X. and Y., finally came to the following hostile con- clusive attitude, "They had better be doing nothing like that, I will watch them, and when I get a chance they will hear from me. I will be cautious and sure first, with which final conclusion my anger disappeared." THE CONTRARY REACTION The second general type of reaction to anger is what we have called contrary reaction. The subject suddenly reacts contrary to the emotive tendency of the emotion. He be- haves contrary to what he actually wishes at the time. Re- ligion and morals have idealized this type of behavior in its extreme form. "Turn the other cheek," "Love your ene- my," "Do good to those that hate you," are exhortations of more than one religion. As compared with the type de- scribed above, relatively a small percent of the mental reac- tions under the influence of anger, as shown by the observa- tions of all the subjects studied, are classed as the contrary reactive type, eighteen percent as compared with seventy one percent. The contrary reaction is not so rich in versatile behavior as the one just described, in fact it is limited to a few set reactions. The subject suddenly reacts to a state of mind contrary to anger. It may take strong effort to make the change and the attitude is not heartily entered into at first and does not usually occur when the emotion is most intense, but after it is partly diminished, consequently it is usually delayed till a later stage of the emotion. If it ap- pears in the initial stage it precludes a complete develop- ment of the emotion. Subject G. has apparently acquired the habit of championing, in the initial stage of the emotion, the offender's point of view and forestalling the develop- ment of anger against persons. His anger is attained most fully against objects and situations. He considers this due BEHAVIOR OF CONSCIOUSNESS 47 ' • ... to his training in early childhood. E. has developed a par- tial habit of assuming an attitude of foregiveness toward the offender. C. and A. when in a quandary and unable to find other adequate means of expression, suddenly revert to the contrary reaction. It becomes a habitual device toward close and intimate friends or toward persons with whom it is necessary to get along. After the anger has gone so far, the subject suddenly assumes a friendly attitude as if there were no emotion. There are various conditions under which this sort of mental reaction to anger occurs. It is a frequent device in a social situation when there is rising anger and it becomes necessary to adopt a sudden and quick control. It is forced upon the subject to meet a sudden crisis. He may at once assume an over-friendly or over-polite behavior, when in reality he would like to behave in a hostile manner. A little over-solicitude for the offender may be conspicuously dis- played. A few cases will illustrate. B. was met on the stairs by his landlady, who requested him not to write on his machine after ten o'clock, also to put on his slippers on coming home late before ascending the stairs. He observes, "Before she had finished I felt uncomfortable and was vaguely aware of the inconvenience that these limitations would cause me. I recalled that she had said that I could use the typewriter all I wished when I took the room; I found myself becoming angry, but at once I took the attitude of excusing her. I noted that she looked tired while she was talking, and thought perhaps I had kept her awake. I then said with an extra pleasant tone, 'That is all right, I am very glad you speak of it, I wish you had told me before.* The pleasantness was assumed, I did not feel pleasant as I spoke, I was still mildly angry. Five minutes later I re- called what she had said and began to get angry again, but at once imaged her tired appearance and excused her as be- fore." A.'s observation illustrates further. A. was humil- iated and angry at X.*s statement. "I wanted to say some- 48 PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY OF ANG^R thing cutting, several hostile remarks appeared which were inhibited one after the other. I felt extremely confused and unpleasant but I suddenly began to agree with X. I told him in an over-polite manner he was quite right and that I was glad he had mentioned it. In reality I did not agree with him nor was I glad." A. states that on leaving the presence of X. the emotion reappeared many times in the course of the next half day and in no case did he find any excuse for X.'s behavior but blamed him severely. When the contrary reaction is resorted to as a device to gain quick control, it is reported as unpleasant. The emotion reap- pears again and is usually followed by unpleasant feelings, but when it is not forced upon the subject and is entered into spontaneously with zest, as a means of finding some sort of satisfaction for the emotional restraint, it is accom- panied by pleasant feelings. Subject A. sometimes takes keen delight in assuming a dignified attitude toward an of- fender and treating him rather friendly as if he were far above getting angry. He states, "I always feel I am victor, that I am master of the situation, and it is pleasing when I do this." It may be said that whenever the attributive re- action is satisfactory, the contrary reaction is not resorted to. The latter type occurs for the most part when the sub- ject is mentally obstructed and there seems nothing else to be done but to ally himself heartily with the opponent for the moment until the storm of his mental stress is passed. Subject J. in a situation, when it would be rude to display his anger, observes, "Each time I found myself becoming angry at X.'s remarks, I would take a negative attitude to- ward the rising impulse and laugh quite good naturedly at his statement. The laugh was not forced, I entered into it heartily. Subject C. finds himself at times suddenly laugh- ing at the most commonplace remarks when mildly angry at an offence. It is a common device of subject B. to burst out laughing at his behavior when mildly angry, as if he were merely a spectator of his emotion and not a partaker. BEHAVIOR OF CONSCIOUSNESS 49 of it. "I recalled the offensive behavior of X. which had happened two hours before. I found myself in an emotion of slight anger, followed by an explosive, 'Damn that X.' There was present much motor tension in arms and face muscles, then noting my angry demonstrations I laughed outright at myself and felt pleased. The anger disappear- ed entirely with the act. It is frequently reported that a sudden pause in the midst of unpleasant anger to introspect, is pleasant when attention is directed to the behavior, but when attention passes to the situation exciting the emotion, anger tends to be reinstated again. Observations like the following are reported: "Pausing to observe my emotion, my whole behavior seemed so ludicrous that I had to laugh." The subject may suddenly assume his oppon- ent's point of view, find a number of probable excuses for his behavior and at times actually imagine himself as cham- pion for his enemy against himself. He does this heartily at times when there is no outside compulsion and derives a feeling of pleasure in the act. The contrary reaction may be hostilely resorted to in some instances. The subject is aware that his aim is to humiliate his opponent by making him ashamed and sorry ; but it is usually reported that, after he has assumed the over-friendly attitude with its hostile intent, there is a self-satisfaction in the sudden breaking up of the unpleasant conscious restraint. Subject D. observes, "I knew I was doing the favor to make him feel ashamed; watching him, I saw he was not ashamed in the least but I continued my friendliness and felt pleased in doing it. There was no regret 'when I saw that he did not take the matter as I had at first wished." In the contrary reaction, a joke or witticism may be employed, but it has an entirely different aim from the joke discussed in attributive reaction. It lasks hostility. Its aim is friendliness, the theme is con- trary to the situation giving rise to anger and serves to dis- tract the attention from the emotion. 50 PSYCHOI L.^ I«I/19'64-8PM 0CC1619551C l7Aug'56VLf _^^,_ Hem. DK 10 ■82 REC'D LD AUG 1 7 1956 12IVIar'59BB SEP 03 1990 wnK SEP 6 1990 LD 21-50m-8,-32 U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES CD3n7b3TD ^B 4Go98 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY