UC-NRLF 
 
 SB 3b7 ESQ 
 
 
 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 W. TUDOR JONES 
 
WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
WORKS BY DR. W. TUDOR JONES 
 
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WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 BY 
 
 W. TUDOR JONES 
 
 M.A., Ph.D. 
 
 LONDON 
 WILLIAMS & NORGATE 
 
 14 HENRIETTA STREET, CO VENT GARDEN, W.C. 2 
 1921 
 

 
 First Impression November 1921. 
 
FOREWORD 
 
 This small Book deals with a great subject, and 
 its appearance could not be justified if it pretended 
 to handle all the aspects of the subject. Its aim is 
 to serve as an introduction to some of the leading 
 questions concerning the universe and life. 
 
 My extensive and varied experiences during the past 
 seven years, in various parts of the country, have con- 
 vinced me of a growing desire amongst large numbers 
 of people (young and old) to know something of the 
 scientific and philosophical interpretation of the 
 great problems of life and the universe. If the little 
 volume serves to meet this desire I shall feel greatly 
 rewarded. 
 
 I wish to thank my friend, Mr. J. T. Walley, M.A., 
 late Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, for reading 
 the MS. and making several valuable suggestions. 
 
 W. Tudor Jones. 
 
 4 7 bi* 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 FOREWORD .... 
 I. THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY 
 II. KNOWING AND ITS FORMS 
 III. SOME PROBLEMS OF ORIGINS . 
 IV. SOME PROBLEMS OF MIND 
 V. SOME PROBLEMS OF VALUES . 
 
 PAGE 
 
 V 
 
 9 
 19 
 37 
 51 
 61 
 
WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 The main object of Philosophy may be designated as 
 an attempt to obtain a view of the universe and of 
 life more comprehensive than the ordinary naive 
 view. The naive view of the universe and life in the 
 past and the present has been, on the whole, satisfied 
 with things as they are, and with concluding that the 
 most real object of knowledge consists in knowing, 
 through the avenues of the various senses, the 
 objects which surround us in the external world. On 
 the whole, the naive view pays attention to objects 
 in the external world for the immediate, practical 
 purposes of life. If these purposes are sufficiently 
 satisfied there is but little further desire to know 
 anything more about the object or objects. The 
 animal is able to accomplish much in the same direc- 
 tion as the naive mind. It is able to find its food 
 if food is in existence; and this search often shows 
 
10 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 a great deal of ingenuity. For example, mice will 
 burrow holes through mortar and wood in order to 
 procure food for themselves and their young. Bees 
 wander and return to their own hive. Throughout 
 nature we discover remarkable movements and 
 appliances in plants and varied instincts in animals 
 to satisfy their needs. Even on this level, especially 
 as far as animals are concerned, we are obliged to 
 conclude that there is present some amount of 
 knowledge. The energy displayed, the difficulties 
 overcome, and the reaching of the end in view are 
 all evidences of a movement starting with a need 
 and ending with the possession of the object which 
 satisfies the need. 
 
 We see here that at the back of the senses there is 
 present in almost every living creature some force, 
 generally termed instinct, which enables the creat- 
 ure to reach its goal within the compass of its needs. 
 This kind of instinct is also still present in man. In 
 human beings, where cultivation of intelligence out- 
 side the immediate needs of such forces as hunger 
 and sex has developed but little we find certain im- 
 portant knowledge which is prior to intelligence. 
 Physical energy and dexterity are to be witnessed, 
 and these enable the being to discover and utilise the 
 object which will satisfy a physical need of the 
 animal or the human organism. But needs beyond 
 the most powerful physical ones are often entirely 
 absent. In all human beings these latter needs 
 cannot be entirely absent. But the power of such 
 
THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY 11 
 
 needs as hunger and passion is often so strong and 
 persistent as to eclipse almost altogether all other 
 needs. 
 
 What are these other needs ? Doubtless they too 
 have their origin in some vague satisfaction which an 
 object has brought to a subject. This may often 
 mean no more than an after-effect of a neural im- 
 pression made on the animal or on the naive human 
 being. This impression remains when the object 
 which aroused it is no longer present, and this fact, 
 in the case of man at least, forms the nucleus of 
 material which he can utilise in further quests for the 
 satisfaction of his needs from the lowest to the 
 highest levels of his life. Man is able, in a word, to 
 think his experiences of the past. The actual satis- 
 faction obtained from a good meal happened in a 
 particular place and at a particular time. The 
 response of the organism in a fainter kind of way 
 revives the presence of that great meal, and for a 
 long time the meal may be a possession of the 
 memory even when the participator is not conscious 
 of the " watering of his mouth " or of any other 
 physical impression. In this final form of the memory 
 of the meal it is not only the food that was 
 partaken of and enjoyed that is present. The time, 
 the place, the surroundings, the subsidiary enjoy- 
 ments, the persons present, and many other elements 
 are present in the memory. This level of unifying 
 the various elements into a memory of that meal is a 
 possession of the naive mind. This second meal is 
 
12 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 really now more of a mental than of a physical meal. 
 And this proves to us that even the contact of a 
 physical object which satisfied physical human needs 
 leaves behind itself a conscious or mental result. In 
 our consciousness of any event something quite other 
 than the various physical factors of the event are 
 present. We are now able to think the event even 
 after the lapse of years. 
 
 In this example we get a clue to the meaning of 
 Philosophy. It is an attempt to rediscover in terms 
 of thought the various impressions which are made 
 upon us by objects in the external world objects 
 which affect us in all kinds of ways. Some of these 
 impressions pertain to wants of our lower nature; 
 others to wants which are higher in their nature. It 
 has already been noticed that in some mysterious way 
 the objects have ceased to be physical. They were 
 once physical, but in order to gain a kind of per- 
 manency in life they had to become mental. And we 
 can use this mental element as a kind of Standard or 
 " measuring rod " for future events. And the nature 
 of these future events (whether they are physical or 
 mental) has to be read in the light of this Standard. 
 There is thus something growing within us which is 
 greater and more comprehensive than any particular 
 event, and which explains every particular event. 
 We are able to prepare for future events, to plan 
 them, to modify them, and to expand them by means 
 of this growing experience of past events. 
 
 Philosophy then means a love for this wisdom 
 
THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY 13 
 
 which enables us to remain the possessors of the 
 meaning of the events of our lives in the form of 
 thoughts. It is a mistake to think that it deals with 
 things which are beyond this world of space and time. 
 It has its origin in the world of space and time, and 
 by means of objects in the external world man gives 
 a meaning to these objects. J " Now, the naive mind 
 turns its attention almost exclusively to the objects 
 in the external world and to the pleasure or the pain 
 which these objects bring upon the subject. The 
 lover of wisdom also turns his attention to the objects, 
 but he, in turn, turns his attention further into his 
 own mind. He questions the meaning, the value, 
 and the significance which these objects have for 
 him as a being who is mental as well as physical. 
 
 Philosophy is thus a reflection on the meaning of 
 the objects which present themselves to us. We form 
 views in connection with the objects. And we go 
 farther : we are able to connect various objects to- 
 gether objects which were not perceived together 
 at the same instant in our experience and to give a 
 meaning to this connection. We are able still further 
 to view certain aspects of objects, and not the whole 
 of them, and give a meaning to these aspects. And, 
 finally we are able to see the value and trend of these 
 ideas concerning objects, and thus construct for our- 
 selves mental and spiritual objects which might have 
 had their origin in simple events but which have as 
 their culmination, brought about by the human 
 
14 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 mind, the highest ideals which can be presented to 
 the mind of man. 
 
 It will thus be seen that it is possible for man to 
 obtain an ever more comprehensive interpretation of 
 the universe and of life than can happen if no effort 
 is made to step beyond the level of the senses. We 
 have to pass from the conclusions of the senses to the 
 reflective power of the mind, and this process is never 
 to come to an end. Everything that is good and true 
 and noble in the world to-day has been brought about 
 by observation of objects in the world without, com- 
 bined with an ever greater reflection of mind upon 
 what is observed. There is no other way by which 
 the universe and life can become more and more in- 
 telligible to man. 
 
 When we pass from the insufficiency of the con- 
 clusions of the naive mind to the conclusions of the 
 past regarding the universe and life we find our 
 selves in a similar position. The results of the past 
 in many directions are remarkable for the penetra- 
 ting interpretations which they put forth. The philo- 
 sophies of Greece and Rome, to mention no others, 
 have made contributions which have been and still 
 are of incalculable service to mankind. The works 
 of Plato and Aristotle, for example, have thrown such 
 light on some of the dark places of human life and 
 existence that they cannot be discarded. It is well 
 that the history of problems pertaining to the 
 universe and life should be known. It is true that 
 we can possess no more than a lop-sided view of what 
 
THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY 15 
 
 any problem means in the present unless we know 
 how it has come to mean this through its history. 
 This is true concerning everything which is offered 
 as an interpretation of the world or of man. The efforts 
 of the past (as of the present) deal in a large measure 
 with matters of fact and matters of speculation. It is 
 easier for Us to perceive the need of changes in 
 matters of fact than in matters! of speculation. 
 Science and Philosophy have been ready on the whole 
 to revise our knowledge concerning matters of fact, 
 i.e. concerning the nature and behaviour of objects 
 in the external world. More accurate observation 
 and experiment have helped to bring about such 
 changes. With matters of speculation it is more 
 difficult to do this. Matters of speculation have often 
 no bottom to stand upon in the physical world ; they 
 are often entirely pictures of the imagination of 
 man pictures which have but the slightest relation- 
 ship with the material course of the objects of the 
 world or with the workings of the mind upon objects 
 in the external world. It is evident to all who have 
 eyes to see that speculative elements constructed upon 
 slender analogical foundations cannot possess the 
 strength of conclusions framed by means of observa- 
 tion, experiment, hypothesis, and verification. This 
 is the reason that science and the practical side of 
 philosophy have progressed at a more rapid rate 
 than speculative metaphysics and theology. The 
 former have their theories, but their theories have 
 come into existence by a careful examination of the 
 
16 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 facts, and in turn these facts were worked into 
 coherent systems by the human mind. Such systems 
 have always a kind of " touchstone " in the material 
 which they handle. But with speculative ideas the 
 supposed " touchstone " is farther off than the ideas 
 it is in a realm of greater obscurity, and it is often 
 impossible to test if it exists at all. The result of 
 all this is that speculative ideas have a tendency to 
 be accepted "ready-made," without any intellectual 
 effort worthy of the name. Thus the world to-day 
 is filled with speculative ideas which have cost 
 nothing more than a mere assent to those who hold 
 them. Such ideas may have involved a great deal 
 of labour to their authors. The many who accept 
 them are generally strangers to the travail that was 
 endured by their authors. There can be no other 
 result than that two very different views of the 
 universe and life are at work in the world. The 
 speculative view deals with the highest aspects of 
 life with man's origin and destiny but it hardly 
 ever explains, and certainly never attempts to prove 
 the opinions it holds. This kind of view leaves 
 the natural scientific explanation of the universe and 
 of life on one side and looks upon it often as unworthy 
 of consideration. Had it not been that throughout 
 the ages few people have made the attempt to deal 
 with all problems from the side nearest to their hands 
 there could not have arisen any genuine increase of a 
 clearer interpretation of the universe and life. 
 
 Science and Philosophy at the present day begin 
 
THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY 17 
 
 with all problems from the smaller, nearer ends. They 
 do not finish where they begin, but they must begin 
 here with what is tangible to one or more of the senses. 
 Philosophy then though idealistic and even religious 
 in its later stages is obliged to be practical and em- 
 pirical at the same time. We shall return to this 
 matter at a later stage in our investigation. It is 
 touched on here in order to show that we need not 
 attempt to fly to some other world to get sufficient 
 answers for the explanation of things. If Philosophy 
 on one side has such a humble origin, it rises, in the 
 course of its unfolding in every human mind, above 
 the level of its birth. In its development in the mind 
 of man it enables him to read the meaning and value 
 of his own life in relation to the universe from all 
 possible sides; it enables him to scale heights of 
 mind within a world which is other than the natural 
 one. But it is through climbing to the interpretation 
 of the natural world and the natural life that he finds 
 a pathway to the rjeaks of the mental and spiritual 
 world to which it is his privilege to ascend. 
 
 This is the message for our day, for it is a message 
 which can transform human life and make it cultural, 
 moral, and divine. Knowledge is the gate which 
 leads to treasures unobtainable in any other way. 
 Knowledge is the only power which, in the last 
 resort, leads to what is tangible, undeniable, and 
 ever valid. And knowledge as its experience in- 
 creases transmutes its material into fulness, richness, 
 
 B 
 
18 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 and depth of life, far beyond what appeared to be 
 possible in the beginning of the quest. 
 
 This is the reason that the plea is made for the 
 place of Philosophy in Life. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 KNOWING AND ITS FORMS 
 
 It has to be borne in mind that Philosophy has two 
 sides the Theoretical and the Practical. The Theor- 
 etical side deals with questions of knowledge. This 
 knowledge deals with all things in the universe (thus 
 including life) in so far as these can be known at all. 
 The main object of knowledge is to discover what is 
 termed Reality. We are face to face with innumer- 
 able objects which surround us. In connection with 
 many of these we know that they are long before we 
 know what they are. These are not objects we mere- 
 ly imagine to exist; we are certain that they do ex- 
 ist. They are actually in the world around us. We 
 observe them as existing and possessing various kinds 
 of effects on one another and on ourselves. We dis- 
 tinguish such objects from objects which, we imagine or 
 dream about. Such objects, possessing as they do 
 for us, existence, are termed real. Some thinkers of 
 the past and the present have been of opinion that 
 such objects have their reality independently of man 
 perceiving them. Such a theory is termed Realism. 
 
20 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 Other thinkers believe that Reality is made evident 
 to us by means of consciousness. This latter theory 
 is termed Idealism. The truth seems to lie in some 
 kind of union between the object and the conscious^ 
 ness which becomes aware of it. This was Kant's 
 point of view, and, on the whole, it has never been 
 proved to be false. Reality has then two sides or 
 aspects : it has objects in the external world and it 
 has a subject which perceives these objects. We 
 shall see at a later stage that Reality comes to in- 
 clude very much more than this. It comes to in- 
 clude our conceptions or ideas not only with regard 
 to the existence of objects in the world outside, but 
 also with regard to the meaning, value, and signifi- 
 cance of such objects. We are obliged to come to 
 the conclusion then that man, living as he does sur- 
 rounded by objects in the external world, creates a 
 second kind of world in a form, as has just been 
 stated, of meaning, value, and significance. The 
 object which he observes comes to stand for him for 
 something permanent, and as he cannot possibly have 
 many of the objects which he observes remaining 
 constantly with him, he has to be satisfied with the 
 object as it is now in the mind. In this way the per- 
 manency of the object is established for him. He is 
 not now obliged to perceive it in order to know that 
 it is in existence : the existence of the object is now 
 fixed in his mind in the form of meaning. It is true 
 that an object may pass out of its present existence 
 without the subject being aware of the fact. The 
 
KNOWING AND ITS FORMS 21 
 
 tree he was examining in the forest may have by this 
 time been cut down and used for the construction of 
 a boat. In such instances re- verification by means of 
 perception can easily take place. And such re-veri- 
 fication is often necessary. But the most important 
 objects remain in the universe. The earth, sun, 
 moon, stars, and the atmosphere remain. Qualities 
 in them have been perceived and carefully noted. 
 These qualities have become the possession of mind 
 in the form of meaning. And man holds this world 
 of meaning before himself whenever he wishes to 
 think of things or to find an explanation of any event 
 which comes before him. 
 
 In the meaning of the objects he has examined, 
 the individual makes a further discovery concerning 
 things. He now sees not only what things are but 
 what they are for him and for other human beings. 
 Man is a creature of various needs physical, men- 
 tal, moral and religious. He observes at this stage 
 that some objects are helpful for the body, others 
 for the other aspects of his life. And that is what 
 we mean by value. Things can be turned to use. 
 Some things can be made subservient to the susten- 
 ance and convenience of the physical life ; some things 
 furnish us with ideas by means of which we are able 
 to explain portions of the universe and of life. In 
 this manner men are able to attain to certain ideas 
 in connection with the nature and behaviour of a 
 number of things together. We bind together a 
 bundle of facts with one idea, an idea which ex- 
 
22 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 plains something important concerning each member 
 of the bundle. This is a great saving of "time and 
 thought. When our increased knowledge of each 
 individual thing in a bundle enables us finally to 
 think of the bundle as a whole, we are able to econ- 
 omise thought and express something of the nature 
 of each member of the bundle in certain important 
 respects. This result is designated as truth. It is 
 well to bear in mind that only certain aspects of each 
 member of the bundle may be taken into considera- 
 tion. By what is termed a process of abstraction cer- 
 tain qualities only of all the objects are taken into ac- 
 count, and in so far as these qualities are concerned 
 there is agreement between every member of the group 
 of facts we are examining. What is the result of 
 such a procedure as this ? It is nothing less than 
 that the observer is able to view a patch of the uni- 
 verse and life, whilst otherwise he could view noth- 
 ing more than individual things in their isolation. 
 Science and philosophy deal, it is true, with actual 
 objects, but they pass from this level to deal with the 
 relations of objects to one another. As already 
 stated, a whole patch, small or great, is now viewed. 
 Various patches are further viewed, and patches are 
 brought together by the mind precisely in the same 
 manner as the individual facts were brought together. 
 Thus, man is enabled to think ever larger portions of 
 the universe and life under more and more compre- 
 hensive ideas. This aspect of truth has worth or 
 value for man. He finds that many objects have to 
 
KNOWING AND ITS FORMS 23 
 
 bend before the pressure of mind and to yield more 
 and more of the meaning of their place in the world. 
 The same holds true in connection with the moral 
 and religious sides of man's nature, as we shall see 
 later on. 
 
 Besides the meaning and value which objects come 
 to have for man in the form of a togetherness they also 
 signify the path which man has still farther to travel. 
 Significance means something like the light of a 
 lantern on a dark night. The lantern shows us 
 enough of the road to find it and to keep us from 
 perilous places. We are not carried beyond the road 
 by the meaning, value, and significance of the world 
 or of life. But in man's nature, if it is exercised, 
 there are potentialities of passing on from stage to 
 stage of creating ever bigger patches of the universe 
 and life in the form of ideas, of learning how to bring 
 his life into accord with these ideas, and of convinc- 
 ing himself that meaning and value need never come 
 to a terminus but can pass on to an ever greater 
 realisation. 
 
 We thus see that although we are able to perceive 
 reality without a greater effort than the use of one 
 or more of the senses, yet when the attention of the 
 mind is brought to bear upon certain aspects of sev- 
 eral objects we can discern a relation between these 
 aspects. The relation is then expressed in the form 
 of a concept or idea,) It is evident that the concept 
 could not be formed without material from the ex- 
 ternal world; it is also evident that such material 
 
24 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 would remain forever a mere isolated thing without 
 the working of mind upon it. The material itself, as 
 it is perceived by the senses, constitutes one corner- 
 stone which forms one basis of knowledge ; the work 
 of the mind upon the material constitutes the other 
 corner-stone. Things outside us yield us no more 
 than a naive view of what they are unless mental 
 effort is brought to bear upon them. The things, 
 after mind has worked upon them, come to mean 
 more than they seem. We are obliged to attribute 
 to things a certain kind of reality because our con- 
 sciousness convinces us that they exist outside us. 
 As already hinted, the eocistential or empirical side 
 of any thing enables us to know a little concerning 
 what the thing is. The effort of mind enables us to 
 tell much more what the thing is. By means of the 
 reflection which follows observation we are able to 
 frame certain explanations of the thing we are exam- 
 ining, see in it aspects similar to those found in other 
 things. The mind actually selects certain elements 
 in things and retains them for the examination of 
 things in the future. Some principle is discovered 
 which holds true of a number of things. This prin- 
 ciple is designated as a Law. The Law has been 
 discovered by an examination of things and of things 
 in their relations. We find that such principle or 
 law holds true, and use it in observing and describ- 
 ing and explaining similar things in the future. The 
 principle, or law, is bound to be conceived by us as a 
 reality a reality of a higher or more comprehensive 
 
KNOWING AND ITS FORMS 25 
 
 nature than the objects we are examining. The 
 facts of the world outside us and the work of the 
 mind upon the facts have led usi to the formation of 
 such principles and laws. We cannot throw these 
 away, and we cannot look upon them as illusions. 
 Facts and mind then have led us to a reality which 
 may be termed metaphysical. This term meta- 
 physical must not be looked upon as a knowledge of 
 things given to man in some way other than the way 
 of all other knowledge. We have been led to this 
 metaphysical reality by virtue of the meaning which 
 external things in their relations possess for a reflec- 
 tive mind. 
 
 Of course the facts of external things do seem to 
 the naive mind to possess an individuality of their 
 own, and the connection or relation of one fact to an- 
 other is left out of account. The increasing reflective 
 power of mind discovers this connection and ex- 
 presses it, as already said, in the form of concepts. 
 The result of this is that the isolation disappears in 
 a large measure, and things are seen in their relar- 
 tions. Indeed, nothing of value can be stated about 
 any single thing in the universe except in its con- 
 nections or relations to some other things. And the 
 relations of many things can often be brought under 
 the head of one concept. A simplification of a slab 
 of the universe is rendered possible in this way, and 
 this results in great economy of thought. The de- 
 tails of the facts had to be taken into account : they 
 can now (at least many of them) be dropped out of 
 
26 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 account because they are included in the general con- 
 cept which has been found concerning them. And 
 further, slabs, in their turn, can be treated as indi- 
 vidual objects, and they, too, can be brought under 
 a still more general concept. The human mind can 
 proceed in this way indefinitely until it approaches 
 to the point of thinking what the universe and life 
 are absolutely. How this work proceeds, and the 
 domains of the universe and of life which are taken 
 into account will be shown at a later stage of our 
 investigation. 
 
 We see at once that the universe and mind are not 
 aliens to each other. Without the objects we could 
 not work ; without the mind we could not work. Ob- 
 jects and mind are needed in our knowledge of the 
 world and of life. The objects are often physical in 
 their nature : they occupy space. The mind which 
 knows the objects is indissolubly connected with the 
 physical. Elementary physiology and psychology 
 prove this. But physiology and psychology have 
 never been able to show that mind and its object (the 
 body) are the same. We stand here before a problem 
 which has baffled the great minds of the ages, and is 
 still baffling some of the greatest minds of our day. 
 In the long history of the enquiry concerning the rela- 
 tion of mind and body no one has ever succeeded in 
 demonstrating that the former may be reduced to 
 terms of the latter. Certainly more and more inti- 
 mate connections between the two are constantly 
 brought to light, but they still remain connections and 
 
KNOWING AND ITS FORMS 27 
 
 nothing more. The stress, on the whole, in modern 
 times, up to the present has been to emphasise the 
 physical side of mind and mind's dependence upon 
 body. In the newer Psychology, in the forms it is 
 taking in Psycho-analysis and Psycho-therapeutics, 
 the emphasis is being laid on the mental side. Even 
 starting on the level of Biology, we find that Life and 
 Matter, most intimately interwoven as they are, do 
 not mean the same thing, at least by those biologists 
 who have acquaintance with some of the main prin- 
 ciples of Psychology. Connected as closely as they 
 are, the physical world and consciousness are two dif- 
 ferent things. The relation of the two has certainly 
 to be emphasized, and this emphasis is being made 
 by various branches of natural science. But, on the 
 other side, the difference between the two has to be 
 emphasized quite as much. When the relation alone 
 is emphasized mind is dragged down to the level of a 
 thing a mere object in the external world. It is not 
 likely that mind can gain confidence in its own power 
 on this path. It has already been pointed out that 
 in the actual formation of concepts mind was creat- 
 ing a higher grade of reality than was possible at the 
 mere perceptual level. Without the creation of such 
 ever higher and more comprehensive grades of reality 
 no meaning could have been given to the world and 
 life ; no value could have been attached to the innu- 
 merable things which are presented to us ; we should 
 not know what to select and what to reject ; and there 
 would be no possibility of using present knowledge for 
 
28 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 future purposes. We should have to take each suc- 
 ceeding moment as it arrives without being able to 
 use past and present experiences for its interpretar 
 tion. 
 
 The work of Natural Science is confined to objects 
 in the external world, and one of its special functions 
 is to express aspects of such objects in a quantitative 
 way. The relation of mind to its physical vehicle is 
 bound to be emphasized, measured, and weighed, on 
 the physical side. Probably it is not the business of 
 the scientist to do more than this. To deal with the 
 psychical side is left for the psychologist. The psy- 
 chologist, in his turn, does not by any means exhaust 
 the contents of mind. His main object is to deal 
 with the relationship of body and mind and to point 
 out the manner in which mental processes have de- 
 veloped from simple to more complex forms. Much 
 of the work done in this direction deals with the phy- 
 sical aspect of things ; much of it also deals with the 
 psychical aspect. The psychological work shows how 
 such mental aspects as concepts are formed, but it is 
 not its business to deal with the difference between 
 true and false concepts. It deals with mind from all 
 possible sides which cast light over the growth of mind. 
 Healthy and morbid phenomena are both of use to 
 psychology : it is as interested in one as in the other. 
 But it is clear that it would never do to allow all the 
 various growths of the mind to be cultivated with 
 care. We find that certain of these growths are in- 
 jurious to the individual and to society. Indeed, it 
 
KNOWING AND ITS FORMS 29 
 
 is abundantly clear that it is on account of many of 
 these morbid growths that the ills which are in the 
 world to-day have had their existence. Psychology 
 then passes on the question of what should be selected 
 and what rejected to the remaining mental sciences. 
 We shall see later how these remaining sciences take 
 up the question and show what the worths or values 
 of things are. Had it not been for the presence of 
 such mental sciences there would be no justification 
 for emphasizing some things more than others ; there 
 would have been no process of selection whatever 
 possible. Man would flounder in darkness, entirely 
 at the mercy of anything which might crop up from 
 moment to moment. In such a state as this nothing 
 would be possible but a chaos of impulses and low in- 
 terests, and there would be no Standard to measure 
 the different worths or values of the things which 
 present themselves to the individual from his own 
 mind or from the outside. 
 
 Philosophy, then, emphasizes the mental aspect 
 of life. It perceives the limitations of natural science 
 and psychology, with regard to the life of the indi- 
 vidual and of the race. Philosophy does take into 
 account the need of emphasizing the quantitative 
 side of things. Much has been gained in the past by 
 such emphasis. The results of the natural sciences 
 and psychology have to be taken into account. They 
 cast a great deal of light on the physical side of life 
 and of the relation of this side to the universe. But 
 we are obliged to go farther than this. The mental 
 
80 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 life of man has gained a certain autonomy concern- 
 ing the meanings and values of concepts which have 
 unfolded in consciousness. Such concepts have cer- 
 tainly a partially physical and a partially psychical 
 origin. In the course of their development such con- 
 cepts have come to form the meaning of the universe 
 and of life, and it is in this sense that they may be 
 termed autonomous. However much mystery there 
 may yet remain concerning the complete origin of 
 mind, and much mystery does remain, still if we are 
 to construct any meaning out of the universe and life 
 the most comprehensive concepts have to be taken 
 into account and granted a validity which is beyond 
 dispute. Philosophy then does not ignore the phy- 
 sical side of a man's nature, but it is attempting once 
 again to-day to shift a little the centre of gravity to 
 sides of human nature other than the physical side. 
 Mind is now seen to be not only an energy of matter 
 but an energy of life and a vehicle of consciousness. 
 The mind of man, whether conscious or un- 
 conscious of what it was doing, has been led to form 
 conceptual ideas concerning life and the universe. 
 These conceptional notions have taken various forms 
 in the history of human thought. They may be 
 summed up, in the main, under the following heads : 
 materialism, intellectualism, voluntarism, emotion- 
 alism, and idealism. In turn these conceptions have 
 given origin to various sub-conceptions. The reason, 
 or one of the main reasons, for such varied views of 
 the universe and life is due to the fact that the 
 
KNOWING AND ITS FORMS 31 
 
 material of the physical and the mental worlds is so 
 vast that no single mind is able to do exact work in 
 all parts of it. Thus we find men who have been 
 working in a physical corner of the field apt to take 
 up the work from the physical standpoint, and thus 
 express the meaning of the world and life in terms 
 of matter. Many of these look upon mind as merely 
 the flowering of a material product. Although 
 mind has to be recognised in the construc- 
 tion of such a materialistic theory it is in a very large 
 measure ignored and is not conceived as being partly 
 self-subsistent. The limitation of such a theory is not 
 due to its falsity but to its one-sidedness. It is of 
 great value when it is taken as a partial view 
 of things, but it is false when it is taken as a complete 
 view of the universe and life. The naturalist when 
 he becomes a philosopher is only too ready to state 
 that the material results found in his corner of the 
 field apply to all portions of the field. Such a con- 
 clusion is based upon no more than analogy and 
 imagination. It is no wonder that one of our fore- 
 most living thinkers stated that Herbert Spencer was 
 greater as a poet than as a philosopher. 
 
 What is stated here as a grave limitation of the 
 materialistic conclusions is not always confined to 
 that realm but is apt to find its way into all the re- 
 maining theories, esecially if they are viewed by their 
 authors as closed and not open systems. 
 
 Intellectualism is a view of the universe and life 
 from the standpoint of the meaning and value of the 
 
32 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 concept. The stress in such a system is laid upon 
 meaning. This is correct. Man creates meanings and 
 values for the things which are presented to him. 
 Life and the universe are explained in such terms. 
 The conclusion of Intellectualism is that the universe 
 and life mean what is impressed upon the mind after 
 long reflection upon them. There cannot be a doubt 
 that Intellectualism is correct in stating that the 
 universe is bound to mean what observation, experi- 
 ment, and concepts state. If things did not mean 
 what long processes of attention and reflection state, 
 well, the universe and life, in their manifestations, 
 lead us astray. But it is impossible for us to con- 
 clude that the results of the senses, especially when 
 they have been scrutinized and synthesized by mind, 
 are after all mere illusions. The intellectualist is 
 abundantly warranted in passing from the physical 
 to the conceptual manifestation of things. But the 
 intellectualist is not warranted in projecting his 
 meanings and values beyond the universe and life. 
 Such a process has no means of being tested. Specu- 
 lative ideas with regard to what is beyond the 
 universe and life, instead of illuminating the 
 meaning of the universe and life, only tend to darken 
 the meaning of things. 
 
 Just as the intellectualist 's view tends to amplify 
 the naturalistic view, the naturalistic view in its turn 
 modifies the intellectualistic view. The two views, 
 each an open system, tend to supplement each other. 
 
 The two previous views have emphasized, one, the 
 
KNOWING AND ITS FORMS 33 
 
 things and their relations, the other, the transforma- 
 tion of things and relations into concepts. 
 
 The Voluntaristic view deals with the aspect of 
 mind which is termed conation or will. It deals, in 
 the first place, with phenomena of life below man. It 
 sees that on planes of life much below the human 
 plane there is present in organisms a striving toward 
 certain ends. Of some of these ends the creature is 
 conscious (its hunger, for instance). Of other ends it 
 is not conscious, especially in so far as no concep- 
 tual end is present. Yet many useful ends have 
 been reached before the possibility of holding con- 
 ceptual ends had yet appeared. This fact led several 
 great thinkers to the conclusion that the nature of the 
 universe and of life is best explained by positing a 
 blind will which had been unconsciously striving 
 until (probably) man was reached, when such a will 
 became conscious of its own energy, and in its 
 higher stages conscious of conceptual ends. This 
 theory has no warrant to take its place as a complete 
 explanation either of the universe or of life. The 
 passage from a blind to a conscious will is merely 
 stated as a speculative idea, and no proof of it has 
 been produced. That a blind will should transmute 
 itself into the highest possessions which are man's 
 inheritance is a huge assumption. 
 
 But, on the other hand, it is doubtless true that 
 
 the will plays an all-important part in life. There is 
 
 an important sense in which it is present before the 
 
 birth of concepts has taken place. The animal and 
 
 c 
 
34 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 the child are able to reach certain goals for the pre- 
 servation of their lives without a conceptual aware- 
 ness of what they are doing. They have been 
 endowed with organs which can be made to fit into 
 certain moulds and they have profitably used this 
 endowment. 
 
 It is also true that the conceptual life does not 
 connote all the demands and possibilities of life. A 
 cultivated individual may possess conceptual notions 
 with regard to many things which the individual 
 ought to be but is not. Something has to happen 
 before we can become what intellectual conceptions 
 state we should be. Many intellectual conceptions 
 do not deal with what the individual should become, 
 but many also do. Those that do, seem to be capable 
 of becoming actual portions of the individual's 
 personality. This means that some stirring or effort 
 on the part of the individual should take place. A 
 selection of things has to be made, some ground has 
 to be travelled over, some goal has to be reached. 
 The nature, meaning, and value of what all this is is 
 shown in the concept, but a deed on the individual's 
 part is absolutely requisite before he partially realises 
 as a possession of his life what the concept states. 
 There cannot be a doubt that such efforts are 
 required if human personality is to benefit on all 
 its sides. Possessing concepts is absolutely necessary, 
 and these concepts should become more and more 
 comprehensive, covering ever greater patches of the 
 field of life. But it is so easy to deceive ourselves by 
 
KNOWING AND ITS FORMS 35 
 
 thinking that this constitutes the whole development 
 of life. History shows (and perhaps the present day- 
 is no exception) great thinkers who were lamentably 
 deficient in the possession of the concepts they had 
 done so much to illuminate as actual ingredients of 
 their own lives. They had brooded over some of the 
 highest ideals of human life and existence, but 
 there the matter ended. When they came into con- 
 tact with the actual need of setting these great con- 
 cepts in operation the need did not affect them at all ; 
 the high concepts vanished like the mirage of the 
 desert when you come close to the spot where it 
 seemed to be. That is the reason that often in 
 simple-minded people, who are not conscious of any- 
 thing extraordinary about themselves, one finds the 
 realisation of the highest concepts of life revealing 
 themselves with very great power a fact which 
 ought to sting the conscience and will of those who 
 know more concerning the nature of things, but who 
 are much greater in their knowing than in their being 
 what they know. 
 
 Emotionalism, in the newer aspects of its develop- 
 ments does not give us a theory of the universe, but 
 it has a good deal to state concerning life which is 
 not without importance. Its physical aspect has an 
 important place in Psychology, but it is its mental 
 aspect and the influence of this upon the physical that 
 is described in some of the newer works. Emotion 
 or feeling need not be considered as one of three 
 phases of consciousness. On the mental side feeling 
 
36 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 may be looked upon as a vivid form of consciousness 
 with regard to certain intellectual conceptions which 
 are perceived as a need of one's nature or as a great 
 value of life. Feeling (using the term on the mental 
 side) thus means a kind of focussing of ideas by 
 means of attention to them on the line of their satis- 
 faction of a need or of their capacity in conferring 
 some new benefit on life. Emotion (using the term 
 on the neural side) deals with the changes which can 
 be produced in the bodily organism in the presence 
 of the uncongenial, the highly congenial, the unex- 
 pected, and the surprising. 
 
 On the two sides we are helped by emotion and 
 feeling to be awake more and more wide-awake. 
 The material from the unconscious self is brought up 
 to the conscious life, and gives a richness and depth 
 and happiness to life unobtainable in any other way. 
 
 Somehow or other we have to try to unify the 
 various aspects of the universe and life touched in 
 this chapter if we are to possess partial but ever more 
 comprehensive truths of the meaning, value and 
 significance of things, and if we are to cultivate the 
 various sides of our personality. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 SOME PROBLEMS OF ORIGINS 
 
 We have now to enquire what are some of the main 
 problems of science and philosophy with regard to 
 the origin and becoming of the world and of life. It 
 has already been shown that the naive view of things 
 is insufficient for their true interpretation. Reflection 
 of mind working upon the impressions of the senses 
 has often presented a view of things which is quite 
 other than the view offered by the senses alone. 
 Science and philosophy could not have originated had 
 it not been that man was able to pass beyond the 
 realm of sense to the realm of thought, carrying 
 along with him to the realm of thought the impres- 
 sions of the senses, verifying or correcting as the case 
 may be the first impressions of sense. In the history 
 of human thought we find the mind ever at work in 
 this respect, often seeing old problems in new light, 
 often modifying something erroneous which had crept 
 in by means of superficial or false impressions as well 
 as by trusting insufficient evidence and giving way to 
 fanciful and imaginative ideas. Man has not been 
 
38 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 satisfied, when his real interest in a problem has 
 been aroused, to leave the explanation of the universe 
 and of life just where he found it. He knows that 
 things are not always what they seem. He takes a 
 slab of nature or of life, or of both, into considera- 
 tion; he observes and experiments and forms hypo- 
 theses, and he accepts what these are able to bring 
 forth in connection with the problem under consider- 
 ation. Scientific and philosophical thinkers are 
 aware that something more can be said with regard 
 to the nature of things than has been said before J 
 These thinkers perceive that deeper views of things 
 have become the inheritance of man, and they are 
 convinced that the inheritance has not ceased, but 
 can continue in the future as in the past. The 
 meaning of the universe and of life is seen as not ex- 
 hausted, and this conviction gives a new interest to 
 the investigator. He sees that all things unfold their 
 meaning only very gradually, and always under the 
 pressure of the human mind attacking them from old 
 and new points of view. The views of the universe 
 and life already in existence cost much reflection and 
 labour to those who brought them forth. We, the 
 pupils of such thinkers, are able to understand what 
 has been brought forth, and that is the first requisite 
 for carrying such problems farther. It is not suffici- 
 ent for anyone to see the problem with the eye of the 
 observer, nor to be satisfied with what has already 
 been said on the subject. As already stated, it is 
 necessary to understand the conclusions arrived at by 
 
SOME PROBLEMS OF ORIGINS 39 
 
 others; it is also quite as necessary to be dissatisfied 
 with what has now become self-evident and to try 
 and see how far the problem will lend itself to a 
 further handling. Our handling may be clumsy and 
 one-sided at the start and for a long time, but it is 
 quite clear from the history of the great investigators 
 of the past that knowledge of what is must be 
 coupled with the conviction that all has not been 
 said on the subject. When this spirit is present the 
 mind will become more alert ; it will look for solutions 
 in new directions ; it will believe that new results can 
 accrue. It is some form of endowment in this direc- 
 tion which brings creative potential powers into 
 actuality, and which compels the material handled to 
 yield some new secret. 
 
 There are, then, two calls in so far as the interpre- 
 tation of all things is concerned. In the first place 
 a thorough understanding of the work of others should 
 form the first equipment for the further development 
 of the problem. In the second place, when such an 
 equipment is possessed the individual is ready to 
 search for new points of attack. 
 
 The world as it is forms our object of under- 
 standing and attack. We shall take up a few very 
 old problems to which the reflection of ages has been 
 applied. First staring us in the face is the old but ever 
 recurring problem of Causality. It has been already 
 noticed that every thing in the world or in life does 
 not entirely stand alone. It could not exist as it is 
 but in some form of relation or under certain circum- 
 
40 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 stances. We see that any thing is what it is on ac- 
 count of its own individuality united with certain 
 conditions that help to keep the thing in existence. 
 We become aware of this fact when we are often 
 ignorant of the nature of these conditions. It may 
 then be said that Causality is a fundamental concept 
 of thought, and is necessary for an explanation of 
 every object under investigation. How has such and 
 such a thing come to be what it is now ? What has 
 operated upon it to enable it to be what it is ? Such 
 are questions which the reflective mind asks concern- 
 ing all objects whenever it penetrates beneath the 
 naive view of things. Causality then consists in 
 finding what factors have produced the results or the 
 effects which we perceive in the object. 
 
 It is impossible for us to consider the factors which 
 have helped to produce the results as the sole factors 
 which have made the thing what it now i, simply 
 because we leave out, by so doing, the nature of the 
 object itself. The nature of the thing works upon the 
 materials which influence it, and the material works 
 upon the object itself. A reciprocal movement of this 
 kind is ever taking place, and probably the 
 tendency of causality is to come to mean ais many of 
 the factors as possible which bring into existence any 
 object whether that object is physical or psychical. 
 To go back and find some initial cause, which is sup- 
 posed to be the " cause of causes " is not a method 
 adopted by science and philosophy. We certainly 
 do go back : we view as far as possible what objects 
 
SOME PROBLEMS OF ORIGINS 41 
 
 would be without certain factors which have oper- 
 ated upon them, but to state what is at the back of 
 such factors is not (at present at least) the object of 
 science and philosophy. What we require now is to 
 find the factors which have had effect upon the 
 nature of every object under investigation, to show 
 the reciprocal effects of these upon the object, and the 
 various modifications which have taken place on the 
 two sides of external factors and of the nature of the 
 individual object. 
 
 It has been already pointed out that science and 
 philosophy are finding it increasingly difficult to deal 
 in the same manner with objects of sense and objects 
 of thought. That a connection between the two 
 exists and has to be taken into account has also been 
 touched upon. It is necessary for example to em- 
 phasize the material side of life. It is necessary, on 
 the other hand, to place life in a category of its own, 
 in spite of the fact that a great portion of life remains 
 within a material category. 
 
 The matter stands somewhat as follows : Physical 
 elements have an influence upon psychical and mental 
 objects. Psychical and mental elements have 
 an influence upon physical objects. As we 
 are dealing in this volume mainly with the 
 life of man, aspects of life below him, im- 
 portant as they are, have to be left out of considera^ 
 tion. The physical organism of man is affected by 
 physical factors just as the animal's organism is 
 affected. The mental side of man is also af- 
 
42 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 fected by physical conditions, but none the less is 1 it 
 affected by mental conditions. Precisely as physical 
 conditions play upon the object and modify its 
 nature, so various social, mental, moral and 
 religious influences play upon the life of man and 
 modify it. One of the great lessons pointed out by 
 social philosophy is this fact. And this fact is 
 becoming more and more evident. But what is not 
 quite so evident is another question, viz., whether 
 man's whole nature is to remain passive in the midst 
 of all the varied influences which pour upon it. 
 The material which pours in upon human nature has 
 to be sifted, some of it selected, some rejected. All 
 this is a process of activity of mind and will. Man 
 should not be a passive spectator in the midst of all 
 this chaotic material. He has to search to know the 
 causes the vast number of forces which play upon 
 his life. He has to understand what will happen if 
 these forces are allowed to enter, and if no process of 
 winnowing has taken place. And, on the other hand, 
 he has to try and see what will happen when a 
 process of sifting, selecting, and rejecting has taken 
 place. We thus see that the individual obtains his 
 material from the various kinds of worlds which sur- 
 round him. All this is given him as an inheritance, 
 but the evil is given with the good, the false with the 
 true, the petty with the great, and the ugly with the 
 beautiful. Even the plant rejects some of the 
 elements which are injurious to it. It has actually 
 evolved certain traps for these so that the cycle of its 
 
SOME PROBLEMS OF ORIGINS 43 
 
 life may be completed without the occurrence of 
 untimely death. 
 
 Another problem which has engaged the mind of 
 man from time immemorial is that of Mechanism and 
 Teleology. We have here no space to enter into the 
 agelong controversy with regard to the nature of the 
 world and of man. Schools of thought have appeared 
 again and again, especially in modern times, which 
 have insisted that all things have had their origin in 
 the various forms of matter and motion. It has been 
 stated above that full justification should be given 
 to the physical side of all things. But this means 
 not quite the same as saying that there is nothing 
 other than mechanism present, at least wherever life 
 is found. The scientist is making an unwarrantable 
 assumption when he states that life and mind and 
 all they contain can be thus reduced. Philosophy, 
 on the whole to-day, clings not only to the reality of 
 external things but to the reality of the concept and 
 all that it includes. It has a warrant for doing this 
 even from the side of Biology. The recent advances 
 of this science have made clear at least two import- 
 ant points with regard to life. In the first place, it 
 has shown the closest possible connection of all forms 
 of life with material elements in their bio-chemical 
 forms. In the second place, Biology has emphasized 
 the presence of the marvellous in the microcosm of 
 the cell. The working of the cell, chemical through and 
 through though it may be, is still a startling revela- 
 tion of a working towards certain definite ends. It 
 
44 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 cannot be stated that cells are conscious of such ends, 
 but the nature of every living thing seems to possess 
 a power which is not only equivalent but often super- 
 ior to the thought of man. Life does contain won- 
 derful things below the human level. We have to 
 explain it not merely in the terms of the bio-chem- 
 ical changes and tropisms that are at work but also 
 in the terms of its ingenuity, exactness, and previs- 
 ion. Teleology simply means this working towards 
 ends, without emphasizing what is at work beyond 
 the nature of the object itself. We are face to face 
 with such a teleology in the universe at large and in 
 the phenomena of life. It is nothing outside that 
 does the work but the object itself. Thus, we are 
 not dealing here with any kind of speculation, but 
 with facts which point to the presence of a power (for 
 which there is no philosophic name) below man which 
 accomplishes marvels too great to understand from a 
 purely mechanical standpoint. 
 
 When we reach man a teleology of consciousness 
 is discerned. The actual evolution of human society 
 and its changes are a proof of this. As will be 
 pointed out in a later chapter man is able to frame 
 and to hold before himself concepts higher and more 
 comprehensive than any of the achievements of his 
 life. He views such concepts as constituting the 
 meaning of the universe and of life. One of the 
 main messages of Philosophy to-day is to re-affirm 
 the importance of this conceptual teleology a tele- 
 ology which leads man higher than where he stood 
 
^ /Zy^ 
 
 SOME PROBLEMS OF ORIGINS 45 
 
 before although it does not reveal the meaning, value, 
 and significance of life in its entirety. But enough 
 is given to reach a summit, and when that summit is 
 reached more still is possible. 
 
 In all this investigation the natural world, on the 
 one hand, and the human mind, on the other, are at 
 work. The two sides have to be emphasized. If 
 they are not emphasized it is not possible to obtain 
 a comprehensive truth with regard to the nature of 
 the physical universe. And if the physical universe 
 is left out of account in our view of things there is 
 the grave danger of placing fancy and speculation in 
 the place of truth. As already pointed out, the im- 
 pressions of the physical world have to enter into 
 mind, and be there transformed into concepts in a 
 manner which is not in the least understood, but 
 these concepts are interpretations and explanations 
 of a world outside consciousness. The consequence 
 is that we are obliged to take the objects of the ex- 
 ternal world in the way they behave amongst them- 
 selves, so that the conclusions of mind have to re- 
 turn continually to the facts of nature in order to in- 
 crease the meaning and significance of the objects 
 under investigation. This is really an aspect of the 
 work of natural science more than of philosophy 
 proper, and it is a very important work. The his- 
 tory of inventions and discoveries point out to us 
 that these have not come into existence by mere fancy. 
 They have had their origin in observation, experi- 
 ment, and reflection. Thus, the workings of the 
 
46 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 mind and the objects of the physical world are in the 
 closest possible contact with each other. 
 
 But it is not correct to say that no truths can be 
 made explicit without the constant presence of nat- 
 ural objects. Natural objects may have been pre- 
 sent to the mind in the initial stages, and the mind 
 had to work upon these and transform what it ob- 
 served amongst these external objects into the form 
 of meaning. But such objects cannot remain always 
 by the side of the observer in a physical manner. 
 They do remain with the observer in the form of 
 memory and meaning. It can be seen at once what 
 an enormous gain all this is. By its means we are 
 able to bring the past into the present, and are able 
 to be the possessors of a meaning infinitely more com- 
 prehensive than can happen at any particular mo- 
 ment or series of moments in our lives. Philosophy 
 emphasizes this fact, and makes it clear that really a 
 second kind of world grows within the consciousness 
 and becomes an ever greater comprehension of the 
 actual world in which we live. 
 
 The creations of the mind, helped doubtless by re- 
 flection upon the events of the external world, carry 
 us beyond the physical world on the levels of mathe- 
 matics, natural science, and the various branches of 
 philosophy. Creations take place in mind of ideal- 
 istic conceptions which pertain to all the natural and 
 mental sciences. " The origin of these creations is 
 a most interesting question for the psychologist and 
 is buried in the mysterious depth of the mind. An 
 
SOME PROBLEMS OF ORIGINS 47 
 
 interesting account of it is given by Poincare in a de- 
 scription of some of his own creations, to be found 
 in his book, Science et Methode (English Edition : 
 Science and Method). His conclusion may be briefly 
 stated thus : the mind is in a state of evolution of 
 new ideas and new mental forms, somewhat con- 
 tinuously. Of those that come to the front some will 
 have a certain relation of harmony and fitness for the 
 problem at hand, which secures for them keen atten- 
 tion. They may turn out to be just what is wanted, 
 sometimes they may turn out to be unfit, or even, 
 contradictory. There seems little to add to this 
 statement, for it pretty accurately describes what 
 every reflective mathematician has observed in his 
 own mental activity. A little emphasis may be laid, 
 however, on the significance of the fact that some- 
 times the newborn notions are contradictory to the 
 known theorems, because this fact shows conclusively 
 that the mind is not impelled to its acts by a blind 
 causality. In that case the new forms would have 
 to be always consistent. This faculty is analogous to 
 that possessed by the artist." (J. B. Shaw, Philoso- 
 phy of Mathematics, p. 183). 
 
 As in mathematics, so in natural science. Know- 
 ledge is shown here to be possessed by means of ob- 
 servation, experiment, and reasoning. Enriques in 
 his important book on Problems of Science shows us 
 the work of the three in knowledge. It is certainly 
 true as Whitehead points out that it is not sufficient 
 for us to insist that it is the mind that knows ex- 
 
48 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 ternal objects, that " no perplexity concerning the 
 object can be solved by saying that there is a mind 
 knowing it." (Whitehead : The concept of Nature). 
 Whitehead is endeavouring to exhibit the types 
 of relations which hold between the entities which 
 we in fact perceive as in nature. We are told by him 
 that this kind of knowledge is a necessary prolego- 
 mena for philosophy and for natural science. It is 
 important to bear in mind this objective aspect of 
 reality, and to conceive of the relations comprising 
 events as actually existing in a world outside our 
 conceptual knowledge. But it is also quite as 
 necessary to be aware of the fact that this knowledge 
 is a work of mind. Without mind it could not be 
 obtained. " The general relations, taken by them- 
 selves, do not constitute mere sums of crude facts. 
 There is in them an abstraction from or elimination 
 of certain data. The scientific fact takes on the form 
 of a simplified fact, a type of a series of possible 
 facts. And the concrete prevision is accomplished by 
 adding to the type the knowledge of certain elements 
 considered as accidental, which distinguish and place 
 a real fact in the series itself. Now this type takes 
 the name of concept, and thus we may say that 
 scientific knowledge usually takes the form of con- 
 cepts.^ (Enriques : Problems of Science, p. 81). 
 
 When we pass to the mental sciences proper, especi- 
 ally to logic and metaphysics, the nature and function 
 of the concept of the subjective side of knowledge 
 come markedly into the foreground. This is clearly 
 
SOME PROBLEMS OF ORIGINS 49 
 
 seen in the works of such prominent thinkers as 
 Bradley and Croce. Bradley closes his Appearance 
 and Reality as follows : " Outside of spirit there is 
 not, and there cannot be, any reality, and, the more 
 that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it 
 veritably real." Croce in his Logic moves in a sim- 
 ilar direction: "The appearance of the concept 
 transfigures the representations upon which it arises, 
 making them other than they formerly were; from 
 being indiscriminate it makes them discriminate ; 
 from fantastic, logical. . . When from the var- 
 iety of the multitude of representations ... I 
 pass on to enquire as to the truth of them all (that 
 is to say, the reality which does not pass), and rise 
 to the concept, those representations themselves must 
 be revised in the light of the concept that has been 
 attained, but no longer with the same eyes as for- 
 merly they must not [merely] be looked at but 
 henceforth thought. (Logic, pp. 149-150). 
 
 From this it is evident that attention has to be 
 turned in two directions. The events of the exter- 
 nal world have to be viewed with constant care, and 
 be observed as existing and working outside our- 
 selves. The meaning, value, and significance are 
 brought forth by the work of the concept often upon 
 physical material, and the truth concerning external 
 things, as included in the concept, must be held fast, 
 and brought back to the examination and interpreta- 
 tion of every further fact which presents itself to the 
 mind. The two sides of things the objective and 
 
50 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 the subjective run parallel together for a long way, 
 and man has to cultivate both sides and remain loyal 
 to both. It will be shown at a later stage that in the 
 highest realms of the spirit of man the objective, 
 physical side, in a large measure, disappears. But 
 if it had not been operative on lower levels and if it 
 had not made its contribution to the concept it is ex- 
 tremely doubtful whether any "highest realm of 
 mind " would have any value at all. We are thus 
 dependent upon the two sides. Both act reciproc- 
 ally on each other and enable man to live in two 
 worlds at the same time the world of nature and the 
 world of the concept. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 SOME PROBLEMS OF MIND 
 
 The subject of the previous chapter must now be 
 carried farther. We have already touched on the 
 fact that in knowledge objects are presented to the 
 mind. The mind reasons upon the objects presented 
 to it, and forms concepts concerning them. The ob- 
 jects in the external world continue to have their ex- 
 istence after the mind has formed its description and 
 explanation of them. The conclusions which the 
 mind has arrived at concerning such objects also re- 
 main as its possession in the forms of meaning, value, 
 and significance. This possession comes only gradu- 
 ally into the mind, and it ought never to come to an 
 end. The possession, in the form of concepts, gives 
 an account of the actual occurrences of events in the 
 external world as well as of the meaning and value 
 of these events for the mind which perceives them. 
 Such meaning and value is termed truth. Truth 
 takes various forms. In its first stage it may mean 
 but little mqre than an impression based upon casual 
 
52 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 observation. This impression constitutes an opinion 
 with regard to an object. We are not quite sure that 
 the nature of the object is what we surmise it is. We 
 go on farther with our investigation in the light of 
 the opinion. We come at a later stage to a kind of 
 certitude that the nature of the object under investi- 
 gation is such and such. When we verify such a 
 certitude further still we find that what is actually 
 occurring in the object fits with our idea of it. So 
 that finally we pass from a belief that a thing is so 
 and so to a knowledge that it is so and so. 
 
 Truth takes various forms according to the nature 
 of the object under investigation. Truth may be 
 empirical when it deals with an examination of some 
 object or objects in the external world, and when we 
 wish to emphasize some aspect of the events which 
 are happening in such object or objects in space and 
 time. Truth takes an immanent form when we are 
 dealing with a concept which exists for mind for 
 our own individual mind. We leave now out of ac- 
 count the fact of the existence of the object in a 
 world outside ourselves. The object interests us for 
 the time being as it exists in the mind. Truth also 
 has a transcendent aspect. It forms, in the shape of 
 concepts, a state of meaning and value which is be- 
 yond the individual. By " beyond " is meant here 
 an idea which is more comprehensive than the actual 
 life of the individual. The observer now sees var- 
 ious fragments of meaning focussing towards a centre 
 and forming an idea or ideal which is more than can 
 
SOME PROBLEMS OF MIND 53 
 
 be witnessed in any one object or in any one indi- 
 vidual. In transcendent truth an idea has been 
 created which constitutes a principle which applies 
 to the behaviour of a number of objects whether 
 those objects are physical or mental. Truth 
 may be termed formal when it deals with the various 
 ways in which impressions and ideas come together, 
 so as to constitute the instruments which have to be 
 used in order to reach valid conclusions concerning 
 the nature of any object under investigation. For- 
 mal truth informs us how we must proceed, what 
 methods of attack are the best ones for making 
 clearer the nature of the things examined. 
 
 We see in this way how many-sided the human 
 personality that examines the world is, and how 
 many-sided are the forms in which the nature of ob- 
 jects present themselves to us. All these sides have 
 to be taken into consideration, for each one of them 
 casts some ray of light on the object; and it is by 
 such means that some corner of the world and of life 
 is illumined for man. 
 
 Truth has grown by viewing portions of the uni- 
 verse and of life from different standpoints. The 
 field of investigation is infinite, and man, at the most, 
 is only able to view the field from one standpoint or 
 a few standpoints. And each standpoint seems to 
 present innumerable problems so that the material of 
 investigation found in a very limited area of the field 
 can never be exhausted. It is no wonder therefore 
 that we possess such varied interpretations of the 
 
54 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 universe and of life. We shall now turn to some of 
 these interpretations. 
 
 One of the most prevalent standpoints of viewing 
 things is that of Empiricism. The term has many 
 different meanings in so far as it is an attempt to view 
 all things in as natural a way as possible. In view- 
 ing objects in the external world the attention is 
 directed by the empiricist to the objects themselves 
 in their manifold relations. That the mind has much 
 to do with such work is practically ignored from this 
 standpoint. The concepts which are formed by man 
 in viewing the world are looked upon by the empiri- 
 cist as abstractions drawn from concrete experiences. 
 " Experience " is viewed in very different ways by 
 the different schools of empiricists. In the School 
 which approaches the idealistic point of view experi- 
 ence is conceived as the sole source of knowledge, but 
 no attempt is made to investigate what constitutes 
 experience. When empiricism takes a dogmatic 
 form it gives practically a -quasi-material foundation 
 to all knowledge. Critical empiricism is very near to 
 the idealistic point of view in so far as it arrives at its 
 results after an examination of the content of know- 
 ledge and its meaning and value. It may be said 
 that such a critical empiricism is legitimate. It em- 
 phasizes the objective side of things in all its investi- 
 gations; it does not create a gulf between natural 
 and psychical objects. Probably greater emphasis 
 will be laid by the Philosophy of the future upon the 
 physical side of things and their behaviour outside 
 
SOME PROBLEMS OF MIND 55 
 
 the reality of the concept although it is the concept 
 which gives us the awareness of that behaviour as 
 well as of its reality. The standpoint taken by Em- 
 piricism in its view of the universe and life is that of 
 the object, and, in the main, the object as it lends 
 itself to one or more of the senses. The object has 
 problems enough for the time being at least without 
 passing to the problem of the mind and its modes of 
 knowing. To pass from one problem to another of 
 a very different nature would confuse the issues, and 
 the empiricist is abundantly right in recognising this 
 fact. But he is entirely wrong when he ignores the 
 fact that other pressing problems also exist prob- 
 lems of the nature of mind itself, of the nature of the 
 concept, and of the theory of knowledge. 
 
 It is on account of the recognition of other prob- 
 lems besides those of description of physical objects 
 that the standpoint of Idealism in its various forms 
 has taken a pre-eminent place in the whole history of 
 Philosophy. Not only is the observer to view objects in 
 the external world in their manifold relations ; he has 
 also to face as far as possible the still more difficult 
 problems of the nature of consciousness in all its mani- 
 festations from simple awareness to the highest con- 
 cepts which can be formed. Just as the centre of 
 gravity in Empiricism had been placed in external ob- 
 jects in their various external relations so in Ideal- 
 ism (or Rationalism) the centre of gravity is placed 
 in mind and its conclusions. We ask here, what do 
 these objects in the external world in the manifold 
 
r 
 
 56 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 relations mean to mind ? Conclusions are formed 
 concerning these, and these conclusions are concept- 
 ual and have to be conserved in memory and mean- 
 ing for future use. What is found in the conclusions 
 of mind and meaning is absolutely necessary for a 
 progressive interpretation of things. Without the 
 conservation of memory and meaning such progress- 
 ive interpretation of the world and life would be ab- 
 solutely impossible. These conclusions of memory 
 and meaning form universals concerning the particu- 
 lars which are presented to the senses and to the 
 mind. In other words, a conceptual interpretation 
 of things has been achieved, and is at hand to act as 
 a norm or standard so that future particulars may 
 find their meaning, value, and significance within it. 
 The particulars resemble various threads in their 
 isolation. The universal binds these together into a 
 rope. 
 
 It is evident that the conceptual interpretation of 
 physical objects is not a mere copy of these objects. 
 The world of things and their relations cannot poss- 
 ibly mean the same as the world of meaning, value, 
 and significance. Things and Thoughts are not the 
 same. No philosopher would say to-day that an 
 object in the external world is, in every respect, the 
 same as our concept of that object. No amount of 
 manipulation can convert the object into the concept 
 or the concept into the object. The object and the 
 mind with its concepts are both necessary for our 
 knowledge of things. Perhaps the greatest inherit- 
 
SOME PROBLEMS OF MIND 57 
 
 ance of a human being is the power to form concepts 
 concerning the nature of objects, for it is by this 
 means that the world becomes more and more intelli- 
 gible to man. 
 
 The human mind passes through various stages in 
 its relationship to objects. As already pointed out, 
 before knowledge becomes possible subject and ob- 
 ject have to be present to the senses and the mind. 
 The world outside us is composed of innumerable 
 objects, and these enter into brain and mind, in the 
 first place, by means of one or more of the senses. Two 
 radical and mysterious transformations take place 
 after objects have entered. The various physical im- 
 pressions of any object unite so that we are able to 
 view the object as one whole object. Further than 
 this, the various mental impressions unite in some 
 similar manner so that we are able to think parts of 
 objects together, as well as many objects in their re- 
 lations. On the physical and the mental sides we 
 are able to simplify and to clarify the objects which 
 are presented; we are able to perceive and to think 
 patches of objects and groups of simple ideas, and 
 thus obtain views, descriptions, and explanations of 
 ever larger pieces of the world. When such a pro- 
 cedure continues to grow on the physical and mental 
 sides an ever more comprehensive view of the world 
 becomes the possession of man. The meaning of the 
 evolution of mind is that such syntheses should gain, 
 from step to step, in comprehensiveness. 
 
 Philosophy, on the whole, lays emphasis on the 
 
58 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 fact that the material for this development should 
 proceed from the objects of various kinds which sur- 
 round us in the physical world and in human society. 
 There is a constant need of returning to this fact of 
 objectivity a fact which, though entire interpreta- 
 tion of it is impossible, is still a certitude. 
 
 Often the mind does not require the whole qual- 
 ities of an object, and it is capable of selecting what 
 it requires and of rejecting what is irrelevant to the 
 purpose in hand. This process of abstraction has 
 led to many important discoveries in the realms of 
 nature and of mind. Thus selective syntheses are 
 continually formed. A portion of the world is thus 
 transformed, is placed in a new kind of setting which 
 satisfies the demand of reason or imagination. The 
 importance of this kind of work is seen in the realms 
 of science, art, poetry, and religion. 
 
 We are thus led to the fact that the views of the 
 universe and of life are very varied. It is extremely 
 difficult to take all standpoints, but it is of funda- 
 mental importance that attempts should be made to 
 pass from our customary standpoint to other points 
 of view. For every standpoint contains some element 
 of truth which we cannot neglect without some loss 
 to personality. This is the main reason that there 
 are many Schools of Philosophy, and that there is no 
 complete unanimity amongst them. So many indi- 
 viduals in the past and the present have extracted so 
 much meaning out of the universe and life that it has 
 now become an exceedingly difficult task for any 
 
SOME PROBLEMS OF MIND 59 
 
 single individual to occupy all these standpoints. But 
 partial and temporary occupation of standpoints be- 
 sides our own does enable the individual to see the 
 objects from his own standpoint in a new light. For 
 example, the empirical sciences have a message : 
 they call us from our day-dreams and fancies to ob- 
 jects and their behaviour in an external world. The 
 rational sciences of Mathematics and Logic emphasize 
 creations of real and ideal concepts which illumine 
 much of the darkness of the world and which reveal 
 a conceptual world of beauty and glory. Psychology 
 deals with the relations of body and mind, and with 
 the psychical and mental processes which form the life 
 of human beings a life which starts at a level not far 
 removed from that of the animal, but which mounts, 
 step by step, to ever higher conceptual levels. 
 
 These chapters are written for the uninitiated in 
 Philosophy, and have had to leave out of account 
 some of the most important elements of mind, but I 
 hope that enough has been said to show the all-im- 
 portant bearing of Philosophy on Life. How can we 
 use efficiently the weapon of mind unless we know 
 what it is and how it has become what it is as well 
 as what it is still capable of becoming ? Unless great 
 problems of the universe and life press themselves 
 upon the mind and rouse it into activity to obtain 
 portion after portion of a solution there is not much 
 hope of an abler generation in the future. And the 
 sadness of the whole business is that this capacity, 
 though present as a possibility in human nature, 
 
60 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 comes to fruition only in the lives of a handful of 
 people in all the civilised countries of the world. A 
 great uneasiness is required at the present day within 
 the mind itself with regard to its terrible inefficiency 
 and even impotency to realise the possibilities that 
 are imbedded within it. When such a " stirring of 
 the waters " comes to be a new beginning becomes 
 possible for the young generation. Such a new be- 
 ginning will extract meaning, value, and significance 
 from all the material it touches, and will unfold and 
 realise untold possibilities which immensely heighten 
 human personality and carry it upward to the bor- 
 derland of the divine. Philosophy means (or ought to 
 mean) no less than this. If so, it is the immediate 
 business of all individuals who care for a fuller and 
 deeper life to turn to its problems and to struggle 
 with all their might for the solution of these prob- 
 lems. 
 
 In the main, we have dealt with the theoretical 
 side of the subject. Philosophy has also its practical 
 side. It is well for us to know. Many of the ques- 
 tions already dealt with are questions of knowing. 
 We are turning now to the important question of be- 
 coming what we know. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 PROBLEMS OF VALUES 
 
 In the previous chapters we have been dealing with 
 objects that exist. Some of these objects exist in 
 the external world; others are objects of thought. It 
 has been sketched how we come to know these ob- 
 jects and what meaning we attach to them, but al- 
 though the word value has often been used it has not 
 been denned. We have not asked the question what 
 worth or value objects have for us. Here we have to 
 deal with the worth of various kinds of objects for man. 
 Man is not merely a knowing being; he is as well a 
 being with feelings and will. The natural scientist 
 does not look upon man as the apex of creation. His 
 object is to see from a physical point of view how 
 man has come to be what he now is. When the nat- 
 ural scientist speaks of evolution he is not (unless he 
 leaves his standpoint) speaking of a worse becoming 
 a better he only notifies the changes that have actu- 
 ally taken place in man's body. 
 
 Even the psychologist does not proceed much fur- 
 ther. He deals with body and mind, but he deals 
 with both from the point of view of making as clear 
 
62 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 as possible the relations of body and mind as well as 
 of showing all that he sees as happening in body and 
 mind in their relations. Good and bad have no 
 meaning for him from his psychological standpoint. 
 He gains as much (and often more) from an exam- 
 ination of pathological cases as from an examination 
 of normal minds. Certainly the psychologist does 
 not deny a better and worse, a higher and lower, in 
 the minds and bodies he examines. But " the higher 
 and the lower," " the better and the worse " are 
 not subjects of investigation by his psychological 
 science. 
 
 In all the departments of life questions have to be 
 asked concerning the comparative worths of things. 
 It is not sufficient for us to remain satisfied with the 
 results of the existence of objects and of their rela- 
 tions to one another. We have to pass beyond that 
 question, and ask, what is the worth of these 
 objects for the individual and for society ? 
 
 We are here in the realms of theory and practice, 
 and more in the realm of practice than of theory. 
 We cannot answer the question, what the value of a 
 thing is unless we possess an idea concerning the 
 thing. We are obliged to think what is the worth of a 
 thing for ourselves, or for others, or for both. But the 
 idea has to be realised in a more complete way than 
 was the case concerning a knowledge of objects as 
 merely existing. Such objects which we conceive as 
 merely existing exist without anything happening in 
 us more than the idea that they do exist. But once 
 
PROBLEMS OF VALUES 63 
 
 we begin to think of the worth of anything we are 
 thinking of the relation oi that thing as an object of 
 satisfaction to a human being. The thing that ex- 
 ists can be brought into relationship with human life 
 in one way or another. 
 
 The subjective conditions of human life are such as 
 constitute very different needs. In all the needs 
 there is a longing for satisfaction, but this longing 
 may pertain to physical needs, to needs of reason, to 
 the needs of the feelings, to the needs of the good 
 life, and, finally, to the needs of religion. 
 
 In a word, there are, therefore, various types of 
 values. In the first place there are physical values. 
 These, in the form of food, clothing, shelter, and 
 other bodily comforts constitute a satisfaction which 
 the human body is capable of obtaining by means of 
 certain physical objects which are brought into the 
 required relation to the human body. A feeling of 
 want is experienced by human beings in these res- 
 pects. These wants require satisfaction from objects 
 outside ourselves, and the will is set in operation so 
 that such objects may be sought, procured, used, 
 and enjoyed. When the objects then answer some 
 particular need the need disappears and the objects 
 are said to have value, 
 
 But values are not confined to the relation of 
 sensible objects in the external world to some 
 physical need of the body. They mean this, but they 
 mean more. Man has (or ought to have) needs in 
 other directions. The reasoning side of his nature has 
 
64 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 needs. He finds that he is able to gather fragments 
 of knowledge from what is in the world of nature, 
 history, and society, and to weave these fragments 
 into wholes more and more comprehensive. In this 
 way, he is able to understand better and better some 
 new aspect of what the universe and life mean for 
 him. His life in this manner becomes richer; satis^ 
 faction is given to his mental powers, a desire to go 
 still farther arises within the mind, and his whole 
 personality undergoes gradual transformations. He 
 now thinks that he is more through such knowledge 
 than he was before the possession became his. Such 
 knowledge comes then to have a worth or value for 
 him. The feeling that some of his needs are 
 obtaining satisfaction enables him to persevere far- 
 ther on the same intellectual road and to cling with 
 all his might to the intellectual values which have 
 already entered. By such means he is now able to 
 relegate several things, which prior to the quest 
 occupied a primary place, to a secondary place. The 
 ever increasing portions of the truths he has gathered 
 into his mind act, when united, as a kind of judge 
 concerning what particular thing should mean more, 
 what should mean less, and what should be entirely 
 rejected. In this manner he selects his world, and 
 creates very often deep cleavages between ob- 
 jects. Some objects that previously meant much 
 now mean little, others that previously meant little 
 now come to mean much. 
 
 It is astonishing how the intellectual needs of men 
 
PROBLEMS OF VALUES 65 
 
 can be satisfied more and more. They can never be 
 completely satisfied simply because the objects which 
 can be related to human needs never come to an end. 
 The material is inexhaustible, and consequently his 
 need for more correspondingly increases. Without 
 such a possession which comes about through the 
 relations of objects (physical and mental) to human 
 needs no intellectual progress concerning the meaning 
 and value of the universe and life could have taken 
 place. And no progress, either on the intellectual or 
 any other level, does actually occur save in so far as 
 efforts are made to see that some things are better 
 for us than other things and that a perpetual process 
 of selecting, rejecting, and consolidating our posses- 
 sions takes place. The individual in this way creates 
 a second kind of world a conceptual one by the 
 side of an undifferentiated physical world around him. 
 If the question be asked, how far is the value of such 
 a world dependent upon external objects on the one 
 hand and on the individual himself on the other, the 
 answer is that value receives its material from the 
 external world, but the judging of such material 
 depends upon the individual himself. We have 
 already shown that values are related to the indi- 
 vidual, and it is in this sense alone that they are 
 termed relative. When we try to pass from "relative" 
 to " absolute " values we are passing from certitude 
 to inference, and ascribe absolute value to God as the 
 " Ground " of the world and the Source of all values. 
 But in all this it is the subject relating itself to the 
 
66 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 object, working upon the object, and valuing it that 
 enables us to do so. Thus we are back again in the 
 region of relative values. But there is a sense in 
 which values are objective in so far that they are or 
 can be common to all, and in so far as many values 
 consist not only in the connection of the individual in 
 relation to its environment, but also in relation to 
 other individuals. Thus values arise by means of this 
 relation of individuals, and so constitute truths, 
 feelings, and conations which are over-individual in 
 their nature. This over-individual objectivity does 
 not mean an objectivity in the sense that spatial 
 objects are objective, but an objectivity which con- 
 sists in complexes of thought and experience ; and the 
 very essence of such complexes is to be found in the 
 actual relations of human beings to one another, 
 and in their conjoint co-operation with regard to com- 
 plexes of thought and experience which are the work 
 of others who lived before us and which are now in- 
 carnated in institutions, writings, traditions, customs, 
 etc. 
 
 In the life of individuals values may contradict one 
 another higher and lower levels are perceptible in 
 every human life. The individual is able to bring these 
 before a Standard. That Standard consists in the 
 most comprehensive concepts which the individual 
 possesses, and unless this Standard is taken into ac- 
 count we have no means of seeing what is lower and 
 what is higher. 
 
 On the other hand, values further one another. 
 
PROBLEMS OF VALUES 67 
 
 Lower, narrower ones often pass their contribution to 
 the higher and more comprehensive ones. 
 
 When we turn to aesthetic values, we find that the 
 feelings play an all-important part. There is here 
 present a sense of oneness between the subject and 
 its objects in the form of impressions produced in a 
 form of immediacy and which often do not require to 
 be translated into concepts. There is a pure sensuous 
 enjoyment possible without the intervention of 
 language and idea. But some amount of intellect 
 and will seem to be requisite even to possess this 
 enjoyment, so much at least as to keep the feelings 
 from wandering away from the object. These kinds 
 of values are of extreme importance in life. They 
 form a relaxation from excessive toil on the side of 
 the intellect and of the will, and produce a kind of 
 equilibrium and rhythm in life. Moments like these 
 are further of use in enabling the individual to re- 
 start work which demands doing and which deals 
 with an important side of man's nature. There is 
 something akin to a very genuine kind of religion in 
 such a state where man is brought into oneness with 
 some piece of the universe which has been lifted up 
 from all the rest of the universe. 
 
 But such a state of feeling cannot last for any great 
 length of time if for no other reason than that we 
 have to live again in relations with our fellow-men. 
 Life is now seen as fragmentary in its relation to the 
 ever greater completeness of the concepts which have 
 been formed. The most pure concepts point out a 
 
68 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 state of things which dqes not exist in the life of the 
 individual outside the concept. The concept has 
 gained in comprehensiveness. Starting from humble 
 beginnings, with its object lying close to our hands, 
 it has mounted to a new kind of world of meaning, 
 value, and significance. It points out to us a world 
 which ought to be and can be. When the individual 
 contemplates such an ethical world of value, he longs 
 to be what he ought to be and can be. The content 
 of the concept is required at each step in the process 
 in order to make clear to the individual the exact 
 meaning of a possible state of existence which is 
 above him. 
 
 The will has to be present at every step in the 
 process because the content of the concept is seen to 
 be not merely something to think about but some- 
 thing to be. Philosophy is thus theoretical in so far as 
 it deals with the meaning and value of the nature of 
 the concept; it is practical (or axiological) in so far 
 as to insist that effort must take place in order to 
 realise the content of the concept. The theoretical 
 problems of Philosophy deal with our knowledge of 
 what we ought to be; the theoretical problems re- 
 quire valuation and decision at every step in order 
 that the goal of the most comprehensive concepts 
 should be reached. 
 
 The will here means the mind active in its selection, 
 rejection, and conservation of values. The 
 starting-point of all Philosophy of Life lies in the con- 
 cept of an absolute value or ought, and in the 
 
PROBLEMS OF VALUES 69 
 
 acknowledgment of its realisation by means of 
 deeds. Such deeds of the Will are really the 
 carrying out of the highest concepts in all the 
 relations of life. We thus see that Philosophy is in its 
 highest aspect both theoretical and practical at the 
 same time, and the old supposed opposition between 
 the two does not exist. We also see that Philosophy 
 deals with Life and its unfolding. It shows how it 
 is possible by means of the union of thought and deed 
 in all the relations of Life to pass from a world of 
 sense to a transcendental world. Such a transcend- 
 ental world is not any world in space, beyond the 
 present world. It is in this world of ordinary life 
 and matter of fact that the individual can create a 
 second world of spirituality which in its value is far 
 beyond all that is offered in the initial stages to the 
 senses. It is to this world we are called, and 
 Philosophy is the strong handmaiden that is able to 
 lead us along the whole of this difficult path to a goal, 
 which we are absolutely certain is transcendental and 
 spiritual. When such a goal is reached still higher 
 possible goals are perceived in front of us and these 
 in their turn are shown to be possible of realisation. 
 Philosophy leaves, at this level, the whole existential 
 aspect of things to the physical sciences and now asks 
 after the meaning of all existential objects and events. 
 The smaller existential values have now merged into 
 the larger meaning and value of the highest and most 
 comprehensive concepts which pertain to human life, 
 
70 WHAT PHILOSOPHY IS 
 
 And this constitutes in the most real sense the 
 spiritual evolution of life. 
 
 The business of metaphysical value is twofold. In 
 the first place, metaphysics takes up the final 
 concepts of natural science and enquires of their 
 meaning and value in relation to the universe and 
 life. In the second place, it takes up the final 
 concepts of thought and action in their relation to 
 life and enquires of the meaning of those in relation 
 to man's life and destiny. Thus metaphysics con- 
 stitutes a science of principles of the meaning, value, 
 and significance of the widest and highest concepts in 
 their relation to man and the universe. Such prin- 
 ciples ever deepening and expanding in meaning 
 became norms and standards for all individual 
 thought and activity. 
 
 When, finally, we turn to religious values we do 
 not mean any kind whatever of new knowledge be- 
 yond what is revealed in the transcendental concepts 
 as won by mind and will. But such transcendental 
 thoughts and experiences are very far removed from 
 the sensuous world and from the ordinary life of the 
 day. The content, meaning, value, and significance 
 of such concepts of thought, as realised in action, 
 constitute a spiritual world. These are far enough 
 beyond the world as to be designated divine. They 
 constitute the culmination of values a culmination 
 which has been reached by the operation of man's 
 whole nature. It is not the business of Philosophy 
 to ask what lies beyond these in space and time. It 
 
PROBLEMS OF VALUES v 
 
 is sufficient for the individual who has experienced 
 such values, and who continues to experience them 
 more and more, to know that they constitute the 
 highest evolution of the soul, and that space and time 
 has now nothing more to do with them than to give 
 a " night's lodging " to the individual's body which 
 carries them through a material world. And we can 
 close by saying that Philosophy warrants the 
 postulate that such values have their origin and 
 culmination in a Reality akin to themselves a 
 Reality in which all that was, and is, and is to be, 
 live and move and have their being. To such a 
 Reality we give the name of God. 
 
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