THE 
 
 • P E K A T I N 8 F W A R • 
 
 Tr(rp I j i rii 
 
 EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED 
 
 BY 
 
 LIEUTENANT-GENERAL 
 
 SIR EDWARD BRUCE HAMLEY 
 
 v • i 
 
 K.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.P. 
 
 FOURTH EDITION 
 
 WILLIAM BLAlJKWT)OD AND SONS 
 
 EDINBURGH AND LONDON 
 
 MDCCCLXXXV] 
 
 All Rights n ■ rved 
 

 3*3 
 
 7% 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The Author of this book may venture to think that it is held 
 to be of value by his professional brethren, for, though former 
 editions comprised among them many thousand copies, it is as 
 much in demand as at first, which, in a volume of such size 
 and cost, and of so technical a character, argues an enduring 
 popularity. To the continuance of this the Author has always 
 endeavoured to entitle it, by the most careful revision, with 
 reference both to the changes in military art, and to the great 
 contemporary wars which have occurred at about the time of 
 the publication of each successive edition. The American Civil 
 War, the Austrian War of 1866, the Franco-German War of 
 1870, have all in their turn furnished illustrations and subjects 
 of comment : and, if much matter has not been derived from 
 the campaigns in Turkey and Armenia, it is partly because the 
 volume was already in great part printed while the operations 
 were yet in progress, and more because the war afforded few 
 examples of any but the most obvious facts, such as had already 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 received sufficient illustration. In the course of these wars he 
 has not unfrequently had the satisfaction of rinding prognosti- 
 cations which were put forth in an earlier edition verified : an 
 instance in point has occurred in the campaign just concluded 
 in Armenia (note, p. 441); and a view expressed in a former 
 edition respecting a remarkable episode in the Franco-German 
 War was, some years later, confirmed by the highest foreign 
 authority (note, p. 332). 
 
 New matter which appears to the Author important will be 
 found in this edition, especially on the questions of Supply and 
 of Transport of Troops by Rail (Part I., Chap. III.) ; and on 
 points of Tactics (Part VI., Chaps. III., VI., VIII.) Many 
 considerations that will be found in these latter have occurred 
 to him in the course of the peculiar duties of his late command. 
 For many years he enjoyed, in this respect, an advantage which, 
 to the expositor of military operations, can hardly be overrated. 
 In accordance with the recommendation of a Royal Commission, 
 which came into operation when the Author became Commandant 
 of the Staff College in 1870, it has been a most important part of 
 his duty to direct the exercises of officers studying at the College, 
 on actual ground, and on a supposed plan of continuous opera- 
 tions, as if they were acting under a general in a campaign. 
 Every year a new tract of country was selected for the capa- 
 bilities it possessed of being turned in this way to good account, 
 and the details of the whole series of operations were carefully 
 worked out. It can hardly be doubted that such training was of 
 great consequence to our future staff; and the Author is well 
 
PREFACE. vii 
 
 satisfied to believe that such professional knowledge as he has 
 endeavoured to impart has reached the great body of his com- 
 rades, not merely through this volume, but through a large 
 number of highly intelligent officers who have studied their 
 business under him. He would be glad to think that this is 
 one among many causes of that increasing spread of professional 
 knowledge which renders him conscious of addressing now an 
 audience very different from the readers of his First Edition 
 twelve years ago. 
 
 London, April 1878. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR. 
 
 CHAP. PAGE 
 
 I. INTRODUCTORY, 1-7 
 
 Military history essentially popular, but read chiefly for its romantic interest. 
 — More scientific study demanded. — The difficulties it presents. — Method 
 pursued in this work. — The subject of the First Part of this work necessarily 
 preliminary to the study of military operations. — The advantages of organisa- 
 tion and discipline taken for granted. 
 
 II. THE NECESSITY OF A SECURE STARTING-POINT, . . 8-19 
 
 Military system of the feudal period. — Froissart's account of the military expe- 
 ditions of his age. — The manner in which feudal armies made war. — Change 
 in the military system produced by the augmentation of the power of the 
 sovereign, and the consequent formation of standing armies. — Further changes 
 which civilisation caused in the system of war. — Change in the composition of 
 armies. — Consequent elaboration of the system of supply. — Extract from a 
 review of 'Campagne de l'Empereur Napoleon III. en Italie ' in 'Blackwood,' 
 by the Author. — 'Wellington's Despatches' (1809) on the necessity of a sys- 
 tem of supply. — Sherman's march in Georgia not exceptional.; 
 
 III. THE NECESSITY OF GOOD ROADS FOR THE OPERATIONS OF A 
 
 MODERN ARMY, ....... 20-24 
 
 Carriage-roads indispensable to sustained operations. — M'C'lellan's Report on 
 difficulties from bad roads. — Operations of brief duration may be accom- 
 plished by inferior roads. — Movement of troops by railway. — Proportion of 
 railway transport to infantry, cavalry, artillery. — Time for loading the trains. 
 — Rate of despatch of trains. 
 
X CONTENTS. 
 
 IV. ARMIES OPERATE GENERALLY BY SEVERAL ROADS AT ONCE, 25-32 
 
 Why armies on the defensive operate by several roads. — "Why invading armies 
 do so likewise. — M'Clellan's Report on the difficulties of a single road. — 
 Necessity of good lateral communications. — Compactness of movement on the 
 march prescribed. — Railways do not supersede ordinary roads for manoeuvring. 
 — Eate of marching. — Length of marches. 
 
 V. SUPPLY OF ARMIES AT A DISTANCE FROM THEIR BASE, . 33-41 
 
 Evils attendant on a rude system of warfare. — These evils modified by the 
 establishment of standing armies. — System of supply grows in importance 
 with discipline and organisation. — Templehoff on the supply of Frederick's 
 armies. — The organisation of armies in the 18th century rendered them un- 
 duly dependent on magazines. — Increased mobility of armies brought greater 
 facility of supply, but did not enable them to dispense with magazines. — 
 Supply-trains of a Prussian army corps. — Influence of railways on supply. — 
 Principles of supply unchanged. — Influence of railways exemplified in Sher- 
 man's campaign in Georgia and in the siege of Paris. — Condition of an army 
 Avhose supplies are intercepted. — Matters to be noted on beginning to study a 
 campaign. 
 
 PAKT II. 
 
 THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MUST PRECEDE THE 
 OPENING OF A CAMPAIGN. 
 
 I. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WAR, 42-49 
 
 It is for governments to choose between the offensive and defensive. — Eeasons 
 for choosing. — The advantage of assuming the offensive. — Cost of invasion to 
 the invader. — Advantage of the defensive. — Advantages of an army operating 
 in its own country. — Impolicy of operations absolutely defensive. — Balance 
 of advantage. — Subject of this chapter as affected by railways. — Great pre- 
 parations still necessary for invasion. — Railways facilitate the first operations 
 of the assailant. — Reasons why they subsequently favour the defence. — 
 Influence that railways might have exercised on the Waterloo campaign. — 
 Assailant's choice of a line of operation as affected by railways. — Danger of 
 flank movements by rail. 
 
 II. THE SELECTION OF AN OBJECT, ..... 50-52 
 
 What are generally the objects of military operations. — Conquest of territory. 
 — Occupation of an enemy's capital. — Defeat of the defensive armies also 
 necessary. — Sebastopol an exceptional object. — Intermediate object found in 
 ;i defensive line. 
 
CONTENTS. XI 
 
 III. THE SELECTION OF A THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, AND LINE 
 
 BY WHICH TO OPERATE ...... 53-58 
 
 Several alternatives may offer. — Considerations for selection of a theatre. — 
 Example of selection in Marengo campaign. — Political elements in selection. 
 — Selection of theatre should rest with the government, execution of the 
 campaign with the general. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 OPERATIONS ILLUSTRATING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FRONTS 
 OF OPPOSING ARMIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE LINES OF COM- 
 MUNICATION WITH THEIR BASES. 
 
 I. OBSERVATIONS ON THE MODE OF TREATING THE SUBJECT 
 
 OF THE WORK, ....... 59-62 
 
 General object of strategy. — Kinds of advantage to be attained by strategy. — 
 Particular objects of strategical movements. — Military problems involving 
 obstacles are deferred. — Battles, how treated. — Plan followed in narrating 
 campaigns. 
 
 II. THE EFFECT OF OPERATING ON A FRONT PARALLEL TO THE 
 
 LINE OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE BASE, . . 63-76 
 
 Campaign of 1849. — Disposition of the Sardinians. — Sardinian base and lines 
 of communication. — Austrian front, base, and communications. — Nature of 
 the theatre. — Plans of campaign. — Passages of the Ticino. — Austrian move- 
 ments. — Sardinian movements as ordered, but imperfectly executed. — Aus- 
 trian movements as ordered. — Austrian movements as executed. — Results 
 of the Austrian operations. — Radetzky's movements explained. — General 
 deductions. 
 
 III. CONTINUATION OF THE SUBJECT. — CAMPAIGN OF SALAMANCA, 77-80 
 
 IV. CASE OF BOTH ARMIES FORMING ON A FRONT PARALLEL 
 
 TO THE LINE OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE BASE. 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF JENA, ...... 81-96 
 
 Reasons for operating thus. — Campaign of 1806. — Positions of the French corps. 
 — Possible French lines of operation. — Position of the Prussian forces Prus- 
 sian base and front. — French base and front. — Prussian plans. — Napoleon's 
 
Xll CONTENTS. 
 
 views of the situation. — Prussian movements of concentration and retreat. — 
 Napoleon's anticipations and orders. — Movements in pursuit. — Intercepting 
 movements. — Kesults of the campaign. — Similar case of Chzarnowsky and 
 Radetzky. — Important deduction. — Why Jena was a more critical point than 
 Naumburg for Napoleon. — Napoleon's miscalculations. — Why Hohenlohe 
 occupied the heights above Jena. — Special reference of the campaign to the 
 subject of this chapter. 
 
 V. HOW THE CONFORMATION OF A BASE MAY ENABLE THE 
 ARMY POSSESSING IT TO FORCE ITS ADVERSARY TO 
 FORM FRONT TO A FLANK. — MOREAU'S CAMPAIGN OF 
 1800, ......... 97-109 
 
 Campaign of 1800. — Positions of the French. — Positions of the Austrians. — 
 Austrian communications. — Roads of the Black Forest. — Different plans of 
 Moreau and Bonaparte. — Moreau's plan detailed. — French operations. — 
 Austrian movements. — The armies concentrating towards the threatened 
 point. — Austrians lose one line of communication by Stokach. 
 
 VI. THE CASE OF AN ARMY PROLONGING ITS MOVEMENT 
 AGAINST THE ENEMY'S COMMUNICATIONS BY PLACING 
 ITSELF ACROSS THEM, ...... 110-126 
 
 Campaign of Marengo. — Austrian positions. — Object of Napoleon. — Feints on 
 Turin cover the advance on Milan. — Austrians, threatened in rear, obliged to 
 concentrate. — French astride Austrian communications. — Campaign of 1805. 
 — Austrian base and communications. — Napoleon's object. — Feints on the 
 Austrian front cover the advance against the flank. — March of the French 
 columns. — French form front to the Danube. — Austrians change front to the 
 Danube. — French cross Austrian communications, and close upon the enemy. 
 — Austrians change front to the proper rear. — Austrians attempt to traverse 
 the French communications. — French concentrate round Ulm. — Mack capit- 
 ulates. — Direction of the French march exactly calculated. — Operations of 
 1805 compared with those of 1800. — Consequences if the Austrians had made 
 a concentrated effort on the side of Nuremberg. — Moreau and Kray on the 
 Danube. — Austrian attack on French communications fails. — Austrian line of 
 Ratisbon intercepted. — Kray marches round Moreau's outward flank, and 
 recovers his communications with Ratisbon. 
 
 VII. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FOREGOING EXAMPLES, 127-130 
 
 Direction to be pursued by an army that aims at its adversary's rear. — Neces- 
 sity of closing on the intercepted army. — The intercepting force must not be 
 inferior to the enemy unless immediately supported. — Comparative advan- 
 tages of partial and complete interception. — Best course for the assailant in 
 general. — Best course for the general of the intercepted army. — Concentra- 
 tion indispensable. 
 
CONTENTS. XI li 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 OPERATIONS ILLUSTRATING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FRONTS 
 OF OPPOSING ARMIES, WITHOUT SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 
 COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE BASES. 
 
 I. THE MANNER IN WHICH PART OF AN ARMY MAY HOLD 
 IN CHECK OR RETARD A SUPERIOR FORCE OF THE 
 ENEMY DURING AN OPERATION : THIS MATTER BEING 
 NECESSARY TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE GENERAL SUB- 
 JECT STATED ABOVE, . . . . . . 131-136 
 
 The march of a column may be retarded by a very inferior force.— The retard- 
 ing force must engage only partially, withdrawing when outnumbered. — 
 Example of a Prussian corps retarding Napoleon's march on Ligny. — The 
 advance checked. — French advance checked at Gosselies. — French advance 
 checked at Gilly. — French advance checked at Lambusart. — Subject of the 
 chapter continued. — Operation of a rear-guard. — Only part of an army need 
 pursue. — Comparative strength of pursuing force. — Course of the defeated 
 bodies. — Grounds established for pursuing the subject. 
 
 II. THE EFFECT OF INTERPOSING AN ARMY BETWEEN THE 
 
 PARTS OF AN ENEMY'S EXTENDED FRONT, . . 137-154 
 
 Campaign of 1796 in Italy. — Positions of the French. — French communications. 
 — Positions of the Austro-Sardinians. — Bases and communications of the 
 Allies. — French plan. — Austrian plan. — Austrians extend. — French concen- 
 trate. — Austrian centre broken. — French army, interposed between the 
 Allies, throws its weight against their right. — Sardinians retreat towards 
 Turin. — Austrians move to rejoin the Sardinians. — French mass still inter- 
 poses. — Result. — Bonaparte's instructions. — Reasons for striking at the 
 (cntre. — Massena's circuitous march. — Austrian offensive movement discon- 
 certed. — Why the divided army, though superior, could not attack. — Object 
 of the assailed force. — Necessity of pressing a divided enemy. — Effect of the 
 parts of a separated army having divergent bases. — New combination open 
 to the Sardinians. — Why neglected. — Greater advantage gained by breaking 
 the centre than by turning the flank. — Campaign of 1809 in Germany. — 
 Armies assemble in the theatre. — French bases and communications. — Aus- 
 trian base and communications. — Austrian plan. — Austrians approach the 
 Danube. — Napoleon orders concentration. — Austrians separate. — French left 
 wing joins the centre. — Austrian right wing halts. — Combination against 
 Austrian left wing. — French pursue the beaten wing. — French retarding 
 force interposes. — Combination against the Austrian right wing, which, de- 
 feated, retreats apart. — Movements in pursuit. — Result. — Approximate value 
 of the advantage of concentric over divided action. — Advantage of the con- 
 centric against the divided army not due to the moral effect only. — Different 
 
XIV CONTENTS. 
 
 ways of employing the containing force. — General dednctions. — Necessary 
 proportion of the hostile forces. 
 
 III. THE CASE OF INDEPENDENT AGAINST COMBINED LINES OF 
 
 OPERATION CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN GERMANY, . 155-168 
 
 The hostile fronts. — French base. — Austrian Lase. — Roads from one base to the 
 other. — Passages over the Rhine. — Means of passage by either party. — First 
 object of the French. — Moreau passes the Rhine. — Austrian positions. — 
 French positions. — General Austrian plan. — General French plans. — Num- 
 bers of the hostile forces. — Archduke reinforces Wartensleben. — Jourdan re- 
 treats. — Moreau advances.— Jourdan recrosses the Rhine. — Moreau, in doubt, 
 sends his left across the Danube. — Latour's right crosses. — Archduke assails 
 Moreau's communications. — Moreau retreats. — Austrians manceuvre widely 
 on his flanks. — He defeats them, and retreats through the Forest, and 
 emerges in the Rhine valley. — Archduke concentrates there. — Moreau re- 
 crosses the Rhine. — What constitutes a double line of operation. — Limitation 
 of the containing force. — Transverse lines necessary for combination. — Cir- 
 cumstances in favour of the Austrian combination. — General deductions. — 
 Disadvantage of separation enhanced in the present case. — Archduke Charles 
 on the duties of a containing force. — Railway communications now existing 
 in the theatre. 
 
 IV. SUBJECT CONTINUED, ...... 169-178 
 
 Campaign in Virginia, 1861. — Various lines of operation. — Confederate trans- 
 verse line. — Consequences of losing it. — Johnston, in falling back, covers 
 this line. — M'Dowell advances. — Johnston moves to combine with Beaure- 
 gard. — Confederates combine against M'Dowell. — Patterson recrosses the 
 Potomac. — Campaign in Virginia, 1862. — Federal lines. — Confederate posi- 
 tions. — Jackson defeats Fremont. — M'Clellan advances on Richmond. — 
 Jackson defeats Banks. — The President retains M'Dowell's corps. — Ander- 
 son falls back to Hanover. — M'Clellan seizes Hanover Court-House. — Jackson 
 combines with Johnston. — M'Clellan changes his front and base, and retreats 
 to the James. — The other Federal army advances under Pope. — Jackson 
 opposes Pope. — Lee combines with Jackson. — M'Clellan embarks for Wash- 
 ington. — Pope retires. — Jackson turns Pope's right. — M'Clellan reinforces 
 Pope. — Lee supports Jackson. — Pope, defeated, retreats. — Pope retreats on 
 Washington. — Concentric army generally forms two wings and a central 
 reserve. — Proportion of force on each line. — Minimum of radii of operation. — 
 Radii must be short in proportion to their divergence. — Losses of the retard- 
 ing force also limit its radius. — Advantage of the situation is at least 5 to 4. 
 — Choice of a line for the retarding force. — Swiftness essential. 
 
 V. CASE OF COMBINED ARMIES OPERATING FROM DIVERGENT 
 
 BASES. — CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO, . . . 179-199 
 
 Reasons for assuming the offensive. — Selection of a theatre of war. — Allied 
 bases and communications. — Extension of the Allied front. — Prussian posi- 
 tions. — British positions. — Choice of a line of operation. — Allied plans. — 
 
CONTENTS. XV 
 
 Concentration of the French. — Advance of the French. — Zieten's corps a 
 retarding force. — Prussians concentrate. — British concentrate. — Napoleon's 
 estimate of the situation. — Battle of Ligny. — Retreat of the Prussians. — 
 Battle of Quatre Bras. — British retreat. — French centre combines with left. 
 — French right pursues the Prussians. — Thielemann's corps a retarding force. 
 — Allied armies combine. — French defeated. — French right wing, though 
 successful, retreats. — Disadvantage of divergent bases. — French operate in 
 two wings and reserve. — Reasons for attacking Blucher first. — Cause of 
 failure. — Ney's containing force could not advance alone. — Movements of the 
 pursuing wing. — Advantage of divergent bases to combined armies. 
 
 VI. CASE OF DISLODGING AN ARMY BY OPERATING WITH 
 
 A DETACHMENT AGAINST ITS REAR. CAMPAIGN IN 
 
 GEORGIA, 1864, ....... 200-206 
 
 Federal forces. — Confederate forces. — Bases. — Result. — Separation, when 
 judicious. 
 
 VIE. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FOREGOING EXAMPLES, 207-214 
 
 Risks of separation often incurred. — Causes of this. — Decisive points. — Compari- 
 son of the advantages of turning the flank and breaking the front. — The latter 
 generally best. — Effect of the electric telegraph on military operations. — 
 Mode of using" the field - telegraph. — Kinds of influence exercised by the 
 telegraph. — Influence of the telegraph on defensive measures. — Influence of 
 the telegraph on offensive operations. 
 
 PART V. 
 
 THE INFLUENCE OF OBSTACLES. 
 
 I. GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY OF A THEATRE OF WAR, . 215-218 
 
 Reading of the map. — Features of Italy. — Features of Spain. — Of America. — 
 Nature of obstacles must be appreciated. — Effects of cultivation of land on 
 military operations. — Importance of preliminary study of the map. 
 
 II. EFFECT OF THE CONFIGURATION OF BASES AND FRON- 
 TIERS, ........ 219-228 
 
 Extent of the influence of an angular frontier. — Advantage of commanding 
 an enemy's coasts. — Example of the Peninsula. — Different kinds of angular 
 frontiers considered. — Importance of possessing the issues. — General con- 
 clusions. — Case of a double re-entering angle. — Importance of an extensive 
 base. 
 
XVI CONTENTS. 
 
 III. OF OBSTACLES WHICH DIRECTLY TRAVERSE THE PATH 
 
 BY WHICH AN ARMY ADVANCES, . . . 229-268 
 
 Conditions of a military obstacle. — Its effect in limiting the number of roads. 
 
 I — Defence of a long line of mountains difficult and dangerous. — Defence of a 
 few chief passes equally ineffectual. — Passage to be effected if possible by 
 stratagem, not by force, and not at several distant points. — Continued de- 
 fence of a mountain-chain ought to be turned to the advantage of the assail- 
 ant. — Its real uses as a defensive obstacle. — Case of Torres Vedras excep- 
 tional. — Rivers considered as obstacles. — The defence of rivers safer than that 
 of mountains, but the passages more numerous. — Use of the river to screen 
 the assailant's movements. — Possession of the higher bank at an inward bend 
 very advantageous for crossing, and may insure the passage of the whole 
 army in face of the enemy. — Some rivers indefensible. — The lower bank still 
 defensible if it offers strong points. — Passage in presence of a concentrated / 
 enemy hazardous. — Stratagem usually employed. — Necessity for multiplying 
 the means of passage. — First troops pass at a weakly-guarded point. — Advan- 
 tage of seeing a defensible point on the opposite shore. — First troops that 
 pass aid in the attack on the main passage. — Examples of passing a river on 
 the front of the defensive line. — Moreau's passage of the Rhine, 1796. — Use 
 of a tributary stream. — Feint to deceive the enemy. — False attacks at the 
 moment of commencing the enterprise. — Use of a defensible point. — Assail- 
 ants concentrate fastest. — First troops turn to attack a main passage. — 
 Main passage assured, army passes. — Dispersion of the defensive forces. — 
 Moreau's passage of the Rhine, 1797. — Use of the tributary stream. — Use 
 of a defensible point. — Defenders concentrate fastest, but fail to drive 
 back the assailants. — Assailants strongest at point of attack. — Concentric 
 advance from the river : main passage gained. — Assailants continue to push 
 the defenders apart. — A river frequently affords an opportunity of breaking a 
 defender's front. — Examples of passing a river on the flank of the defensive 
 army. — Passage of the Gave de Pau. — Extent of the French line of de- 
 fence. — Turning force passes, and covers the passage of the main body. — 
 Defenders take position in rear.— Passage of Ticino, 1859. — Preliminary 
 operations. — Feint towards Piacenza. — Advance - guard of turning force 
 crosses, followed by the rest. — Turning force moves upon the main passage. 
 — The front attack is precipitated. — Turning force aids in attack on the 
 main passage. — Turning force not liable to be separated from main body, 
 even if separately defeated. — Real peril lies in the exposure of outward 
 flank. — Examples of the risk incurred by a turning force. — Passage of Bull 
 Run. — Extent of the defensive line. — Direct attack repulsed. — Turning force 
 passes, and descends the bank. — Is opposed in front. — Turning force 
 attacked on its outward flank. — Passage of the Rappahannock and Rapidan. 
 — Turning force passes, and gains other fords. — Defenders attack the exposed 
 flank. — Operation fails. — Disadvantage of a double passage on the flanks. — 
 The line of operation must be covered during the turning movement. — Dis- 
 tribution of the turning and covering forces. — Passage of the Chickahominy. 
 
 — Federals astride the river, are attacked on the left bank. — The most 
 effectual counter - movements open to the defender. — Effect of increased 
 width of the stream. — Improved weapons, in this case, favour the assailant. 
 
 — Effect of fortified passages. — General conclusions. — True uses of obstacles. 
 
CONTENTS. XVll 
 
 — Defensive uses of obstacles. — Example of the use of obstacles to a rear- 
 guard. — Massena's retreat, 1811. — Rear-guard forces the enemy to deploy. — 
 Rear-guard retards the enemy till turned. — Rear-guard repeats the manoeuvre. 
 — Rear-guard suffers for committing itself to an engagement. — Use of a river 
 to secure the communications. 
 
 IV. OBSTACLES WHOSE GENERAL DIRECTION IS PARALLEL TO 
 THE PATH BY WHICH AN ARMY ADVANCES TOWARDS 
 ITS OBJECT, ....... 269-276 
 
 Mountain-ranges of this kind. — Hazard of advancing on both sides of such an 
 obstacle. — To advance on one side necessitates a detachment in rear. — Deduc- 
 tion. — Manner in which the obstacle may screen an offensive movement. — 
 Example from the Leipsic campaign. — French front is at a distance from its 
 nearest passage. — Allies command a neighbouring passage, and break out on 
 Napoleon's rear. — Rivers of this kind. — Campaign of 1859. — Sardinians at 
 Casale check the Austrian advance on Turin. — Austrians at La Stella pre- 
 vent the French from moving on Piacenza. — Assailant requires greatly 
 superior numbers. — Risk of the assailant lessened if the defenders are re- 
 stricted to one bank. — Example of necessity of guarding passages in rear 
 from the campaign of 1809. — Influence of the obstacle not to be evaded. — 
 Consequent importance of the Danube, but only a certain portion of it. — 
 Case of armies each holding a portion of the river. — The army that advances 
 offers an advantage to its adversary. 
 
 V. CASE OF TWO OR MORE CONVERGENT RIVERS, WHOSE GEN- 
 ERAL COURSE IS PARALLEL TO THE PATH BY WHICH 
 AN ARMY ADVANCES TOWARDS ITS OBJECT. — CAMPAIGN 
 OF 1S14 IN CHAMPAGNE, 277-299 
 
 Conditions under which an army advances in this case. — Prussian plan of inva- 
 sion. — Austrian plan. — Allied forces. — French forces. — First dispositions of 
 Napoleon. — Advance of the Allies. — French retreat beyond the Meuse. — 
 Junction of the Allies on the Marne. — Description of the theatre. — Allies 
 still operate on a double line. — Napoleon's general plan. — French communi- 
 cations. — Napoleon pivots on the Marne, to strike the flank of the enemy 
 moving between the rivers. — Blucher evades him by retreating. — Battle of 
 La Rothiere. — Schwartzenberg advances on the Seine and Yonne. — Blucher 
 returns to the Marne. — French left wing retreats. — Blucher's army advances 
 between the rivers. — Napoleon, pivoting on the Seine, attacks Blucher's 
 flank, pierces it at Champaubert, turns on the separated corps of the 
 enemy, and routs them at Montmirail ; then returns on Blucher, and drives 
 him towards Chalons. — Army of the North enters the theatre. — Schwartzen- 
 berg pushes back the French right wing. — Napoleon joins the right wing. — 
 Schwartzenberg retreats. — Napoleon forces the passage at Montereau. — 
 Blucher returns to the Aub. — Blucher again crosses to the Marne, and 
 pushes back the French left wing, which contains him on the Ourcq. — Napo- 
 leon, pivoting on the Seine, advances to attack Blucher. — Blucher crosses the 
 
xviii CONTENTS. 
 
 Aisne. — Napoleon follows him. — Battle of Craonne. — Battle of Laon. — Napo- 
 leon retreats beyond the Aisne. — Schwartzenberg pushes back the French 
 right wing. — Napoleon from the Marne strikes at Schwartzenberg's rear. — 
 Battle of Arcis. — Napoleon's new plan. — Blucher moves on the Marne.— The 
 Allies unite between the Aube and Marne, and move on Paris. — Result. — 
 Points of passage previously known. — Double line compulsory on the Allies. 
 — General plan of the defence. — Difference of advancing between, or beyond, 
 the rivers. — General principles for the defence. — Necessity of transverse com- 
 munications. — Courses improper for the defensive army. — Napoleon's cam- 
 paign estimated by these rules. — Manoeuvring powers of the defensive army. 
 — Advantages for the defence conferred by the rivers. — Case of the assailant 
 considered. — Assailants secure the Marne to Chalons, and throw forward their 
 left to the Seine. — Assailants hold the Seine, and throw their right forward. 
 — Effect of a third convergent stream. — Railways and telegraphs augment the 
 advantages of the defence. 
 
 VI. OF FORTRESSES, ...... 300-310 
 
 Fortresses formerly gave great security to frontiers, but were costly defences. — 
 Modern armies have often disregarded them. — Yet the want of fortresses has 
 often been severely felt. — Their uses. — Selection of positions for fortresses. — 
 Mountains unsuitable. — Best placed on rivers. — Bridge-heads. — Especially 
 important in flat valleys. — Their effect when situated on direct obstacles. — 
 Their effect when on rivers parallel to the line of an enemy's operations. — 
 Archduke's proposed system of fortresses for S.W. Germany. — Jomini on the 
 defence of France by fortresses. — Marmont on the same. — An open frontier 
 best guarded by a few great fortresses. — Importance of fortresses when the 
 issues of a frontier are few. — Importance of fortifying a capital. — Fortresses 
 chiefly useful to aid offensive operations. — Many fortresses rendered untenable 
 by modern artillery. — Fortified towns now liable to be reduced by bombard- 
 ment. — Fortresses on streams should include many bridges. — Principles on 
 which a system of fortresses or intrenched camps should be based. 
 
 VII. CAMPAIGN OF METZ AND SEDAN CONSIDERED WITH REFER- 
 ENCE TO THE FOREGOING CHAPTERS, . . . 311-336 
 
 Delusive belief that France would take the initiative. — First French project. — 
 French inaction. — French railways. — German railways. — Frontier lines between 
 the armies. — Change in the French dispositions. — Description of the Vosges. 
 — Choice of a line for the invasion of France. — Reasons for operating by the 
 Prussian left. — German left takes the offensive. — French right concentrates 
 for defence. — German left defeats French right. — German right defeats French 
 centre. — Problem of double against single line no further illustrated in 1866. 
 — Nor in 1870. — How the French might have contested the frontier. — Cases 
 illustrated by the war. — French operation suggested. 
 
CONTENTS. XIX 
 
 PART VI. 
 
 TACTICS. 
 
 I. GENERAL VIEW OF THE CHANGES THAT HAVE LED TO THE 
 
 MODERN SYSTEM OF TACTICS, .... 337-353 
 
 Deep columns suitable to medieval engagements. — Extended fronts of forma- 
 tion necessary in modern battles. — Armies of Marlborough's time incapable 
 of rapid manoeuvres. — Origin of tbe Prussian military system. — Frederick 
 turns to account the manoeuvring power of his army. — His great tactical 
 stroke. — Organisation and formation of the Prussian army. — Case of outflank- 
 ing an enemy. — Battle of Prague, 1 757. ^— Hostile forces. — Description of the 
 battle-field and Austrian position. — Prussians march to a flank, and turn the 
 Austrian right. — Austrians form front to meet them. — Prussian army con- 
 centrated against Austrian right wing. — Austrians defeated in succession. — 
 Comments. — Effect of a considerable turning movement. — Consequences of 
 throwing back a flank. — The French attempt to turn Frederick's weapon 
 against himself. — Battle of Rossbach, 1757. — Hostile forces and positions. — 
 French march to a flank. — Prussians form across the French line of marcb. — 
 French defeated in succession. — Comments. — Dangers of the attempt to out- 
 flank. — Way of meeting it. — Attempt may be judicious against inferior troops. 
 — Mistake of those who deride the oblique order. — Prussian system becomes 
 general in Europe. — Change in organisation of the Republican armies. — Divi- 
 sions rendered capable of independent action. — Abuses of their independence. 
 — Bonaparte shows that mobility must be combined with concentration. — 
 More massive organisation attempted in Moreau's army. — System of army- 
 corps organised under the Empire. — Introduction of highly - trained light 
 infantry. 
 
 II. FORMATIONS AND COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS, 354-371 
 
 Formations of infantry. — Difficulty of moving in deploj-ed lines. — Use of 
 columns for manoeuvre and attack. — The French modify the Prussian system. 
 — Depth and extent of columns. — Columns of battalions. — Jomini's proposed 
 combination for attack — Effect of columns of attack chiefly moral — Superior- 
 ity of small over massive columns. — Mixture of line and column for defence. — 
 Difference of Prussian and French systems. — Why numbers brought to bear 
 at parts of the line prevail. — Conseq\ient aim in modern battles. — Methods of 
 securing this object : echelon formations. — Prussian order for attack. — For- 
 mations of cavalry. — Debated questions concerning cavalry. — Formation of 
 artillery. — Echelon of guns. — Former relations of artillery - fire to slopes of 
 ground. — More commanding sites now desirable. — Essential points in the 
 training of artillery. — Combination of cavalry and artillery.— Combination of 
 infantry and artillery. — Combination of infantry and cavalry. 
 
XX CONTENTS. 
 
 III. FORMATION OF THE LINE OF BATTLE, AND OCCUPATION OF 
 
 THE GROUND, ....... 372-403 
 
 Proportions of troops to space. — Place of artillery in the line of battle. — Reasons 
 for placing cavalry on the flanks. — Opportunities for squadrons posted between 
 divisions. — Conditions of ground. — Should positions be inaccessible. — Positions 
 which should generally be chosen. — Passages of a river covering a line of battle. 
 — Obstacles partially covering the front. — Relations between the direction of 
 obstacles and the line of battle. — Essential condition of a good position. — 
 Defensible points in front of a position. — Interruptions in the general line of 
 the position. — Obstacles on the flanks of the line of battle. — Formation of the 
 lines of battle at Austerlitz. — Allied plan of operation of the left, right, centre. 
 — Description of the field. — French organisation and force. — French plan and 
 dispositions for operation of the right, centre, left. — Distribution of artillery 
 and cavalry. — Formation of the columns of attack, of the supports, and reserves. 
 — Proportion of troops to ground at the commencement of the battle. — Allied 
 forces. — Formation of the Allied left. — Formation of the Allied right and 
 centre. — Proportions between different parts of the opposing lines. — Employ- 
 ment of the artillery on both sides. — Formation of the lines of battle at Water- 
 loo. — Description of the field. — Occupation of the outposts. — British line. — 
 Distribution and formation of the cavalry. — Distribution of the artillery. — 
 French line. — Distribution and formation of the cavalry. — Distribution of the 
 artillery. — Choice of points of attack. — Dispositions for attack and defence. — 
 Final order of battle of the French. — Formation of the lines of battle at Woerth. 
 — Description of the field. — Bridges. — Lines of retreat. — Prussian position. — 
 French forces. — Their distribution. — Prussian forces. — Commencement of the 
 attack. — General attack.— Retreat of the French. — Comments. 
 
 IV. OF ORDERS OF BATTLE, ...... 404-416 
 
 Two kinds of tactical advantage defined. — Offensive movements must be sup- 
 ported, and the remainder of the line refused or protected. — Hence results a 
 third kind of tactical advantage. — Oblique orders. — How the oblique order is 
 produced. — Necessity of preserving the obliquity. — Battle of Kolin. — Prussians 
 reinforce the head of the attack, and refuse the other Aving. — The attack suc- 
 ceeds, but the refused wing engages the enemy. — The Prussians are defeated. 
 — Battle of Sauroren. — Soult turns the British left, but leaves his own left 
 exposed, and is defeated. — Battle of Leuthen. — Prussians preserve the oblique 
 order, till the moment arrives for engaging the refused wing. — Austrians 
 defeated. — Refused wing must not remain altogether out of action. — Spirit 
 of the oblique order may exist without the form. — Continuity of the line 
 
 essential. — Oblique order inapplicable to the defensive Of the counter-attack. 
 
 — Counter-stroke may be dealt at the attacking or at the refused wing. 
 — The latter more decisive. — Reasons for choosing. — Angular orders.— The 
 salient order. — Attacks of necessity assume the salient form, but without 
 entailing the same disadvantages. — Employment of cavalry in the salient order. 
 — Re-entering order. — Convex order. — Concave order. 
 
CONTENTS. xxi 
 
 V. POINTS OF ATTACK, RETREATS, AND PURSUITS, 417-423 
 
 Selection of points of .attack— when the enemy is in a flank position— when 
 important points lie on his flanks— when his line of retreat is oblique to his 
 front — when the assailant is in a flank position. — Indecisive victories. — 
 Victories only decisive when the enemy is turned or broken.— Tactical reasons 
 generally dictate points of attack. — Advanced posts must be captured.— 
 Strong points in the line to be avoided, except when decisive. — Point to 
 attack when the enemy's flank is supported.— Occupation of ground when 
 a flank is covered by an obstacle.— Case of an army cut from its base.— 
 Conduct of retreats.— Conduct of pursuits.— Summing up of considerations for 
 the defence" and the attack. 
 
 VI. CHANGES IN CONTEMPORARY TACTICS, . . . 423-443 
 
 Former object of tactics to bring columns to the attack.— Prussians, with modi- 
 fications, adhered to columns.— Columns nevertheless must dissolve into skir- 
 mishers. — Necessity for maintaining control over troops in this order. — Prus- 
 sians already prepared for the change.— Change also necessary in the forma- 
 tion for defence.— Front attack in any form costly and doubtful. — Flank 
 attack therefore essential. — Form assumed by contemporary engagements. — 
 Loss tells heavily against assailants. — Frequent minor application of flank 
 attacks.— Of the modes of turning a flank, the Prussians seem to have used 
 one.— Skill in attack of the units trusted to rather than higher manoeuvres.— 
 French defence unskilful.— Higher tactics still applicable.— Independence of 
 companies may render higher manoeuvring difficult.— Modifications in defen- 
 sive dispositions.— Skirmishing line inexpedient.— Shooting line.— Supporting 
 line.— Proportion of men to space.— Place of the local reserves. — Posting of 
 general reserves.— General course of a modern battle.— Effect of artillery 
 comparatively diminished.— Its destructive power has driven infantry to new 
 formations.— New features of its employment in defence— in attack.— Batteries 
 should be massed for concentrated fire.— Probable employment of cavalry.— 
 Opportunities for attacking prepared infantry rare.— Attack on shaken troops.— 
 Pursuit.— Action against retiring infantry, or, in supporting a turning move- 
 ment.— Action against artillery. —Extended order of attack probable.— Should 
 cavalry cover the advance of the army '—Mounted riflemen advocated.— 
 Strength of such a force.— Probable modifications in tactics— on the defensive 
 —on the offensive.— Effect of difficulty of retreating under fire. — Mode of oppos- 
 ing Prussian tactics suggested.— Proper use of camps of instruction. 
 
 VII. DISPOSITIONS FOR THE MARCH THAT PRECEDES A BATTLE, 444-448 
 
 Selection of routes for columns.— Order of march to the front— Position of the 
 cavalry. — Connection of the general front — Subdivision of the columns.— 
 Clearing of routes.— Defects of too wide and too narrow fronts.— Flank- 
 marches near the enemy. — Order of march to a flank. 
 
xxii CONTENTS. 
 
 VIII. MINOR OPERATIONS OF WAR, .... 449-468 
 
 The advanced - guard. — Duty of the advanced - guard. — Its composition. — Its 
 proportion to the main body. — Order of its march. — Its distance from the 
 main body. — Outposts. — Distance of outposts from the main body. — Manner 
 of disposing them. — Patrols. — Occupation of woods by outposts. — Features of 
 ground, in the outpost line. — Calculation of troops for outposts. — Outposts of 
 cavalry. — Artillery with outposts. — Outposts by night. — Convoys. — Manner of 
 disposing the escort. — March of the convoy. — Defence of a convoy. — Attack of 
 a convoy. — Reconnaissance of the enemy. — Reconnaissance of country : roads — 
 fords — rivers — woods — canals — defiles — railways — field-works — inundations — 
 mountains — slopes — fences. 
 
 CONCLUSION, 469-472 
 
 APPENDIX, 473-475 
 
 INDEX, 477-491 
 
MArS AND TLANS. 
 
 Map 1. 
 2. 
 3. 
 
 4. 
 5. 
 6. 
 
 .. 7. 
 
 9. 
 ,. 10. 
 „ 11. 
 
 .. 12. 
 „ 13. 
 „ 14. 
 ,, 15. 
 
 ,, 16. 
 
 Plan 17. 
 
 ,, IS. 
 
 „ 19. 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF SALAMANCA, 1812, . 
 
 THE JENA CAMPAIGN, .... 
 
 CAMPAIGN ON THE DANUBE, 1800, 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF 1800 IN GERMANY, . 
 
 ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS OF 1796, 1800, 1849, & 1859, 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF ECKMUHL, 1809, 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES IN 1796, AND THE 
 
 MARCH OF NAPOLEON TO THE DANUBE, 1805, 
 CAMPAIGNS ABOUT RICHMOND, 1861-64, . 
 THEATRE OF THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN, 
 OPERATIONS OF 1815, . 
 SPANISH PENINSULA, . 
 CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY OF 1849 & 1859, 
 OPERATIONS IN PORTUGAL, 1810-11, 
 CAMPAIGN IN CHAMPAGNE, 1814, . 
 RAILWAYS USED IN THE CAMPAIGN OF 1870, 
 CAMPAIGN OF METZ AND SEDAN, 1870, . 
 FORMATION OF THE LINES OF BATTLE AT AUSTERLITZ, 
 FORMATION OF THE LINES OF BATTLE AT WATERLOO, 
 BATTLE OF WOERTH, ...... 
 
 To face rage 
 80 
 
 96 
 108 
 126 
 144 
 154 
 
 168 
 178 
 182 
 198 
 228 
 250 
 268 
 298 
 336 
 336 
 388 
 396 
 402 
 
THE 
 
 OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 PART I. 
 THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR. 
 
 •^ OP THR 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 No kind of history so fascinates mankind as the history of wars. No Military his- 
 kind of record, other than sacred, appeals at once to the deep sympathies jjJJ ^^ 
 of so wide an audience. Great social, political, or philosophical enter- 
 prises may produce more extensive results than can follow from the 
 conflict of arms ; but a certain amount of acquired knowledge is neces- 
 sary in order to render them intelligible. The contests of philosophy, of 
 art, or of statesmanship, demand from the spectators some of the power 
 which is displayed by the disputants ; but everybody can watch with 
 interest the game of war, for all can feel how earnest is the struggle where 
 individuals stake their lives and nations their territories. Brilliant ex- 
 ploits, deeds of valour and of self-devotion, frequently relieve the weightier 
 course of the narrative ; and all the surrounding incidents, the pomp and 
 circumstance, the actual conflict, the changing scenery, even the horror 
 
 A 
 
THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 but read 
 chiefly for 
 its romantic 
 interest. 
 
 More scien- 
 tific study 
 demanded. 
 
 The difficul- 
 ties it pre- 
 sents. 
 
 and devastation, are so picturesque, that the gravest historian must feel 
 how much of the interest of his work will be centred in those pages 
 which glow with the lurid light of war. 
 
 Very numerous, then, are the readers, both military and civil, of mili- 
 tary history. But many still read it as they read a romance. They read 
 Napier when they are men as they used to read Plutarch when they were 
 boys. They choose a side, drift with the course of the narrative, and 
 accept the opinions of the historian. And formerly an officer who had 
 read much in his way, and remembered it, passed for well-informed in 
 his profession. 
 
 But this is no longer sufficient. The present generation has witnessed a 
 succession of wars, vast in magnitude and in results. The inquiring spirit 
 of the time has been impelled into military channels by the deep interest 
 which the people have felt in contemporary conflicts. It is expected 
 from those who now write about war, that they shall be something more 
 than mere chroniclers; and newspaper writers and others who discuss 
 campaigns still in progress, aim at giving us some of the philosophy of 
 the business ; while the student of military history feels that his reading 
 can be profitable only in proportion to the means he may possess of judg- 
 ing of the events of the past, and deducing from them lessons for the 
 future. 
 
 Any one who has set thus about the study of military history seriously 
 and honestly, will probably admit that he found himself at once involved 
 in great perplexity. The map shows the theatre of any series of great 
 operations to be immense. Of that vast and various complication of 
 roads and rivers, plains and mountains, is he to take all into account ? 
 or, if not, how much, and what can he venture to neglect ? How reduce 
 that seeming confusion to manageable limits ? how deduce from it order 
 and design ? And in a general history of a certain epoch, such as that of 
 Thiers, he finds that not only are events recorded, but opinions are freely 
 given. But on what principles, he asks, are these opinions, generally 
 dogmatic in expression, based? Why was a certain movement judicious, 
 though unsuccessful ? Why did a certain action of a certain leader show 
 him to be a great commander? And, when historians differ, which is 
 right ? 
 
 Clearer prospects are opened to the student in military histories written 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 3 
 
 by experienced soldiers, such as the works of Napier, Jomini, and the 
 Archduke Charles, lie has here a detailed military narrative by aid of 
 which he can follow on the map all the movements of all the troops 
 throughout a series of campaigns ; and so far he has tolerably firm foot- 
 ing. But he does not find the comments and scientific expositions of 
 these historians by any means so easy to understand, for an amount of 
 knowledge greater than he possesses seems always to be presupposed in 
 the reader. These writers had made military science the subject of deep 
 and protracted consideration, and formed theories about it for themselves, 
 and they argue, perhaps unconsciously, on grounds which are, to the 
 beginner, inaccessible. Here too, then, he is often at a loss, and feels 
 that he must by thought and study increase his knowledge if he would 
 thoroughly understand his author. 
 
 Anxious to acquire the requisite rudiments, the student betakes him- 
 self to elementary works. But (unless his experience is very uncommon) 
 lie will by no means find that they greatly diminish his difficulties. 
 For their fault almost always is, that they treat their subject in too ab- 
 stract a form, and become obscure in attempting to be scientific. It is 
 common, for instance, to find military treatises affecting a mathematical 
 precision, commencing with definitions, and illustrated with diagrams, 
 like propositions of Euclid. Now, most military terms are easy enough 
 to understand ; and they do not require to be defined formally, because 
 the solution of military problems does not depend on the exactitude of 
 the definitions. Thus the subject is at the very outset uselessly encum- 
 bered — worse than uselessly indeed, for the definitions are often much 
 more difficult to understand than the original phrase, and are therefore 
 confusing. Everybody knows, for instance, sufficiently well what is meant 
 by the term " Theatre of War." Is anything gained, or rather is not some- 
 thing lost — namely, simplicity and clearness — in defining it (as it is defined 
 in a modern English work on strategy) as "the whole area of ground which 
 it is necessary to take into consideration at any time during a campaign, 
 in order to construct correctly a strategical combination " ? And when in 
 this way plain terms are transmuted into elaborate definitions, no use can 
 be made of them. It is a method which, in exchange for a good shilling, 
 gives you a pocketful of bad halfpence. 
 
 The fault of the diagrams is just the opposite of this. It is that they 
 
4 THE OPERATIONS OE WAR 
 
 affect too much to simplify what is in reality complicated. The student 
 who is presented with a page of simple figures, squares, angles, or semi- 
 circles with a few radii, and told that these are explanations of the art 
 of war, is apt to ask if military problems can really be dealt with in this 
 compendious fashion. He is told, perhaps, that when two strokes repre- 
 senting armies are placed in a certain way within two lines forming an 
 angle, the one army has a great advantage over the other. But when he 
 comes to apply this proposition to an actual campaign, which he follows 
 on a map embracing extensive territories, covered with a network of 
 roads, and diversified with innumerable accidents of ground, he finds 
 (especially if the course of the campaign be not in unison with the prin- 
 ciple laid down) that he is at least as much bewildered as aided by his 
 diagram. Not that the diagram is necessarily untrue ; it may state a 
 fact (though it does not always), and the fact may be valuable ; but the 
 beginner wants the knowledge necessary to understand the fact in its 
 very abstract form — for that form has only been attained by a process of 
 evaporation, by knowing what matters are really superfluous, and may 
 be left out of the complex problem which a military operation always 
 presents. He must be already somewhat familiar with military records 
 and military topography before he can perceive the application of the 
 diagram, just as a deep knowledge of anatomy is necessary to him who 
 would base a theory upon two or three bones of a skeleton. If, on the 
 other hand, he is one of those facile disciples who accept implicitly what- 
 ever they find laid down by authority, it is evident that, in imagining he 
 understands the art of war because he perceives the relations between 
 sets of mathematical lines, he is in a fair way of becoming a pedant. 
 
 The earnest student is then in this dilemma, that he requires a know- 
 ledge of theory to understand the facts, and a knowledge of facts to under- 
 stand the theory. The only mode of extrication would appear to be, to 
 read military history until he can form theories for himself. But what a 
 task is this for one to enter on who does not yet know what it is that he 
 wants to know ! When the works of single military authors extend over 
 a dozen volumes, where shall he begin to enter on the trackless expanse 
 before him ? And it must be remembered that the reading is a small 
 part of the labour compared with the exertion of thought necessary to 
 perceive and generalise the significant facts. It is not to be wondered at, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 5 
 
 then, that when no other inducement was offered to the military student than 
 his own desire for knowledge (as was the case till within these few years), 
 the efforts of those who wished to accomplish themselves in the records 
 and theory of their profession were neither very numerous nor very fruitful. 
 In the question of what authors he shall read, the perplexities of the 
 student have been enormously increased by the directions given to him 
 by his guides. The task of reading all works of authority on a single 
 military epoch is very formidable. The wars of Napoleon, for instance, 
 are narrated by Jomini, Alison, Thiers, Gourgaud, Mathieu Dumas, Pelet, 
 Segur, and many others. The various accounts of the Waterloo campaign 
 alone form a small library. And for Wellington's operations in the 
 Peninsula, we must turn not only to the Despatches and to Napier's 
 History, but to the biographies of Massena, Ney, and Soult, the works of 
 Foy, Jomini, and Marmont. Still, any of these subjects might be fairly 
 mastered in a few months. But most of the writers on w 7 ar who claim 
 to be not so much historians as instructors in the art, sweep over an 
 horizon that includes almost the history of the world. They sketch the 
 wars of the Greeks and Romans, or perhaps still more ancient peoples — 
 they quote Polybius and Xenophon and Csesar, and their modern com- 
 mentators — make their way through Froissart, Machiavelli, Brantome, 
 Sully, and proceed through the chroniclers of the wars of Louis XIV., 
 Marlborough, Eugene, and Frederick, down to the campaigns of our 
 own day ; — leaving it to be inferred that an acquaintance with each of 
 the epochs which were thus illustrated by the genius of great captains is 
 equally valuable to the student who wants first, and above all, to under- 
 stand something of Modern War. Xow, without undervaluing ancient 
 military history, or deeming time to be thrown away when employed in 
 investigating wars which in old days changed the face of the world, it is 
 evident that the facts of importance to be gathered from narratives which 
 are often, from their remoteness, so meagre and obscure, and which relate 
 to systems so different, are few in comparison with the time spent in 
 endeavouring to discover them. When such copious records exist of the 
 wars of the present century, it seems absurd to carry the reader back to 
 times w 7 hen the face of the earth was different, when armies were equipped 
 and organised after another fashion, and when operations w 7 ere conducted 
 on methods Ions ago obsolete. 
 
6 THE OPERATIONS OF WAK 
 
 Taking our stand, then, on modern military history, let us suppose that 
 
 the field were not trackless. Let us suppose that paths were traced on it 
 
 which should all lead to a result. Let us suppose, in fact, that from 
 
 amidst the mass of records certain campaigns and battles should be 
 
 selected which should be representative operations, each involving and 
 
 illustrating a principle or fact, which, when elicited and fully recognised, 
 
 will serve for future guidance. Here we should have the matter at once 
 
 Method pur- greatly simplified ; and this is what has been aimed at in the present 
 
 sued in this W ork. The reader will be required to take no opinions on trust : certain 
 
 operations will be selected, detailed, explained, and what lessons they 
 
 afford deduced, till in this way a theory shall be formed on facts and 
 
 experience which the student may confidently use for general application. 
 
 And these comments and selections are intended to follow each other 
 
 in such order that, with each step, footing may be gained for a further 
 
 advance. 
 
 The subject of But before entering on an actual narrative of the operations of armies, 
 
 the First Part ft j s necessai y to know the conditions under which armies operate. We 
 
 of this work 
 
 necessarily must understand the primary laws of the game before we can begin to 
 
 preliminary follow its progress. Modern armies have gradually become very com- 
 
 o e y j ex machines, and increased complexity has brought with it increased 
 
 of military r _ . 
 
 operations. stringency of the conditions which govern their movements. 
 
 The advan- ^ * s probably unnecessary to insist on the fact that organisation and 
 
 tages of or- discipline confer vast advantages on an armed force. In these days, 
 
 gam&a ion wnen volunteers are drilling in every parish, it is needless to tell any one 
 and discipline ° J r J 
 
 taken for that an organised body of men amenable to the laws of discipline, ac- 
 granted. customed to act together, mutually reliant, trained to perform in unison 
 
 the movements best suited to the march and the battle, and directed 
 absolutely at the will of a practised commander, is an engine of war 
 vastly more formidable than any assemblage of individuals, however 
 numerous and however skilled in the use of their weapons, but in whom 
 this concerted action is wanting. It is true that, in particular circum- 
 stances, in rugged mountains or in pathless forests, untrained warriors 
 may meet disciplined troops on favourable terms. But in all countries 
 which admit of the movements of great bodies, a regular army is 
 immeasurably superior to an armed population. In the tangled wilder- 
 nesses of New Zealand, the Maori possibly counts for as much as the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 7 
 
 soldier. But on the plains of India, the compact small disciplined force 
 advancing on the native hosts easily loosens and dissipates the vast 
 array. In the sierras of Spain the guerillas often held at bay the 
 seasoned warriors of Napoleon. But in open battle the half-disciplined 
 levies of Spaniards, individually not less brave and strong than their 
 adversaries, were scattered almost invariably before the onset of the 
 steady troops of France. Finally, the fate of the enormous levies raised 
 from the French population in 1870-71, after the destruction of the regular 
 armies, has convinced all who needed convincing, how more than ever 
 futile is the attempt to meet discipline with numbers. 
 
 Discipline, in fact, is a union of very different qualities, each of which 
 is an important element in war. It means cohesion of the units and 
 suppleness of the mass — it means increased firmness and increased flexi- 
 bility — it means the most efficient combination of many and various parts 
 for a common end. "A hundred thousand soldiers," says Macaulay, 
 " well disciplined and commanded, will keep down ten millions of plough- 
 men and artisans. A few regiments of household troops are sufficient to 
 overawe all the discontented spirits of a large capital." 
 
 Military Dkpai .nt 
 
 University of California, 
 
THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE NECESSITY OF A SECURE STARTING-POINT. 
 
 The advantages of organisation and discipline are great, but they have 
 not been obtained except under strict conditions. In saying we have 
 a powerful engine in a disciplined army, it must be admitted also that its 
 operations are restricted by certain laws, and these laws were less stringent 
 when armies were less organised — perhaps, indeed, in proportion to their 
 Military sys- degree of organisation. In the wars of the middle ages, no great amount 
 tem of the f preparation was demanded for a military expedition. Feudal chiefs 
 summoned their retainers to the field from the farm or the workshop. 
 Peasants and citizens, trained by frequent conflict in the use of their 
 weapons, took up the bow or the pike and became at once soldiers. An 
 invading army composed of such materials descended on the enemy's 
 territory like a swarm of locusts, spreading itself to pillage, to devastate, 
 and to subsist. For a special purpose, to meet the enemy, or to attack 
 a town, it could assemble, living on the spoils it had collected ; but the 
 necessity of procuring fresh supplies would soon force it to spread again. 
 This, however, it could safely do, so long as the enemy was under the 
 same necessities as itself. Had it been opposed to a force that was always 
 ready to move, and to fight in compact order, it would, in its scattered 
 condition, have fallen an easy prey. But in those days the existence of 
 such a force was impossible. The most powerful feudal sovereign could 
 only make war with the aid of people of consideration and their retainers. 
 The revenues of the Crown would have been insufficient in any country 
 for the maintenance of great standing armies. The taxation of the people 
 for the constant supply of troops was impracticable under the feudal 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 system. In those days, then, the invader counted on living at the cost 
 of the invaded territory ; the defender was often of necessity driven to 
 do likewise, and the unhappy district that was the scene of operations 
 suffered from friend as well as foe. *-^^ 
 
 The army of a feudal sovereign, then, whenever it advanced even one Froissart's ac- 
 or two marches from the city or district in which it had been quartered, count of the 
 
 i /• i i ,1 i> ,i t n military expe- 
 
 and was lorced by the proximity ot the enemy to keep together, was sure ditions of i lis 
 to be straitened for supplies. In Edward IIL's first expedition against age. 
 the Scots, advancing from his rendezvous, Durham, he crossed the Tyne 
 to seek the enemy. He was then between Newcastle and Carlisle, and 
 only a few hours' journey from either town ; yet his army fell at once 
 into distress. Messengers were sent, as Eroissart tells us, to Newcastle 
 to make proclamation in the King's name, " that whoever washed to get 
 money, he had only to bring provisions, wine, &c, for which he should 
 be instantly paid, and a safe-conduct granted him. . . . The next 
 day, the messengers which the lords had sent for provisions returned 
 about noon with what they had been able to procure for them and their 
 households ; but it was not much ; and with them came people of the 
 country, to take advantage of the situation of the arni} r , and brought with 
 them on mules and small horses, bread badly baked, in baskets, and 
 poor thin w r ine, in large barrels, and other kind of provision to sell, with 
 which the army was tolerably refreshed, and their discontent appeased. 
 . . . Thus they had remained for three days and three nights without 
 bread, wine, candle, oats, or any other forage ; and they were afterwards 
 for four days obliged to buy badly-baked bread, at the price of sixpence 
 the loaf, which was not worth more than a penny, and a gallon of wine 
 for six groats, scarcely worth sixpence. Hunger, however, was still felt 
 in the camp, notwithstanding this supply ; and frequent quarrels hap- 
 pened from their tearing the meat out of each other's hands." Hearing 
 tidings of the enemy, they then quitted their first camp, and moved to 
 the foot of a hill twenty miles off where the Scottish army was posted. 
 " The intention of the English lords," says the chronicle, " was to keep 
 the Scots besieged there ; for, as they could not well fight with them, 
 they hoped to starve them. They knew from the prisoners that they had 
 neither bread, wine, salt, nor other provisions, except cattle, which they 
 had seized in the country. Of these they might eat indeed without 
 
10 THE OPEEATIONS OF WAR 
 
 bread, which would not be very palatable." Finally, the Scots decamped, 
 by which time the English were in such a plight that, instead of pursu- 
 ing, they turned homeward the same day. They halted, we are told, in 
 " a beautiful meadow, where there was plenty of forage for their horses ; 
 and much need was there of it, for they were so weakened by famine that 
 they could scarce move." 
 Froissart. When the Black Prince made the incursion into France which ended 
 
 with the victory of Poitiers, his troops subsisted on the pillage of the 
 country. "They found the province of Auvergne, which they had 
 entered and overrun, very rich, and all things in great abundance ; but 
 they would not stop there, as they were desirous of combating their 
 enemies. They burnt and destroyed all the countries they passed 
 through ; and when they entered any town which was well provisioned, 
 they rested there some days to refresh themselves, and at their departure 
 destroyed what remained, staving the heads of wine-casks that were full, 
 burning the wheat and oats, so that their enemies should not save any- 
 thing. They kept advancing and found plenty everywhere, for the coun- 
 tries of Berry, Poitou, Touraine, and Maine are very rich, and full of 
 forage for men-at-arms." 
 
 In such a country, such a system was practicable enough so long as the 
 army acting on it was undisturbed in its depredations by a formidable 
 force. At Issodun, which they took by storm, the Prince's army " found 
 great plenty of wines and other provisions, and remained three days to 
 repose themselves." But " news was brought there to the Prince of 
 Wales, that the King of Prance was in the city of Chartres with a very 
 large army, and that all the passes and towns on that side of the Loire 
 were secured, and so well guarded that none could cross the river. The 
 Prince then held a council, when it was resolved he should set out on his 
 return to Bordeaux, whence he had come, through Touraine and Poitou, 
 and destroy all the country as he passed." Accordingly he marched back, 
 devastating as he went ; and the French army, crossing the Loire at many 
 points, followed hard upon his track. " The Prince of Wales and his 
 army," says Froissart, " were ignorant of the exact motions of the French ; 
 but they supposed they were not far distant, for their foragers found great 
 difficulties in procuring forage, of which the whole army was in extreme 
 want. They repented of the great waste they had made in Berry, Anjou, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 11 
 
 and Touraine, and that they had not more amply provisioned themselves." 
 It is clear that the Prince had no magazines, but was dependent on the 
 country he marched through : and as soon as the pressure, of the enemy 
 drove his army together, it could no longer find means of subsistence. 
 
 "When the same Prince took part with Don Pedro, the exiled King of 
 Castile, and set out from Bordeaux to aid him, he passed with his army 
 through the territories of the King of Navarre. This sovereign was 
 friendly to the Prince of "Wales and Don Pedro, yet the troops pillaged 
 his country. On entering Castile and coming near the enemy, we find 
 " the Prince and his brother were in great want of provisions for them- 
 selves and their horses, as they had entered a very barren country. A 
 loaf of bread — and of no great size — was sold in the Prince's army for a 
 florin, and many were very eager to pay this price wherever they were 
 able to get it." Then crossing the Ebro " they found there a richer 
 country than that which they had left; bat even here they were much 
 distressed for provisions." 
 
 This improvident and barbarous system of warfare is not to be attri- 
 buted altogether to the difficulties of transport in times when both roads 
 and vehicles were of very rude construction. In one of Edward III.'s 
 great invasions of Prance, his march was followed by a train of six 
 thousand waggons, " stretching," says Froissart, " upwards of two leagues, 
 and laden with tents, pavilions, mills and forges to grind their corn and 
 make shoes for their horses, and everything of that sort which might be 
 wanting." But we are presently informed why this unusual provision 
 was made. " The country had been so pillaged and destroyed, that the 
 ground had not been cultivated for the last three years ; and there was 
 such distress and famine in the kingdom of France, that (if corn and 
 oats had not been sent from Hainault and the Cambresis into Artois) 
 Vermandois, the bishopric of Laon, and Piheims, must have perished with 
 hunger. It was upon this account that the King, who had been informed 
 of the poverty and distress in France, had made such ample provision 
 before he quitted England. Each lord had done the same according to 
 his rank, except in the articles of straw and oats, and for that they did 
 with their horses as well as they could." The King's baggage-train was 
 intended to supply his army while passing through the desert which 
 war had created. On reaching a more productive region " his people 
 
12 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 The manner 
 in which feu 
 dal armies 
 made war. 
 
 overran the country to the right and left, and took provisions wherever 
 they could lay hands on them." Arriving at Eheims, the capture of 
 which city was the primary object of the expedition, he besieged it for 
 seven weeks, when "he began to tire ; and as his army found great diffi- 
 culties in obtaining forage and provisions, their horses perished. He 
 broke up his camp and marched off towards Chalons." 
 
 The picture presented by the armies of the feudal period, is that of an 
 assemblage of knights, barons, and squires, with their retainers, all vassals 
 or auxiliaries of the belligerent powers, who made the quarrels of kings 
 the pretext for enriching themselves by plunder. While moving in the 
 enemy's territory they occupied a great extent of it, pillaging villages and 
 farms, sacking cities, and ransoming captives of consideration. Leaders 
 were esteemed according to their inventiveness and skill in making 
 sudden incursions, in attacking castles, devising stratagems, and drawing 
 up their motley forces in order of battle before charging into the meUc at 
 their head. If a rich town, or district affording abundant supplies, were 
 within reach, and unprotected, these were sufficient reasons for leading 
 the army thither. The idea of a highly-organised force, making many 
 long marches in succession, with the utmost rapidity, towards certain 
 points, holding itself always prepared for immediate battle, and aiming 
 to bring the adversary to terms, not by ravaging his territories, but by 
 defeating his armies, and manceuvring, wherever possible, against his 
 communications as his most vital points, could not possibly enter the 
 mind of a sovereign or leader of those days, since the first condition of 
 such a mode of warfare was wanting. The collection of all kind of stores 
 and munitions necessary to an army, and the incessant forwarding of 
 these to great distances throughout a long campaign, was a task beyond 
 the resources of the wealthiest feudal monarch. All he could do was to 
 raise, by mortgaging royal revenues or territories, by loans, or by such 
 exactions as his subjects could be induced to submit to, the sums neces- 
 sary to assemble the army and set it in motion, after which the war was 
 left to maintain itself. 
 Change in the But in the incessant wars of the middle ages it happened that the 
 
 military sys- p 0wer f the nobility which used to stand between king and people 
 
 tem produced 
 
 by the aug- became extinct in some of the great kingdoms of Europe. In others 
 
 mentation of the sovereign had gradually acquired such large territories as placed him 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 13 
 
 beyond the reach of the most powerful coalition of nobles. In either case the power of 
 
 the power of the Crown became absolute ; and the monarch, thus able to the soverei fe'»> 
 
 tax the people at his will for the payment of troops, proceeded to environ scquent for . 
 
 his throne with a standing army — a body of men apart from the general mation of 
 
 population, trained to act in concert, to operate by system, animated by staI1(ln, « 
 ..... . armies. 
 
 a military spirit, and looking to the Crown as the source of reward, of 
 
 honour, and of advancement. And the competition, in warlike efficiency, 
 that of necessity exists between rival states, would have hastened the 
 steps by which the present condition of armies has been reached, had 
 not the surrounding circumstances opposed limits to their progress. In 
 ear bier times the population was sparse, the infertile tracts of land fre- 
 quent, the roads few and bad, while the artillery and trains which accom- 
 panied the march would have been cumbrous and difficult of transport 
 even had the ways been good. Thus many conditions were still wanting 
 to the development of the science of strategy. 
 
 But, in course of time, the change in the features of a country conse- Further 
 quent on the advance of civilisation affected the conditions of war. At changes 
 all periods the population of districts forming the frontiers of bellicose ation cause(1 
 neighbours had been accustomed to seek shelter from the first rush of an in the system 
 invasion in the great towns, which were fortified to resist an attack. So war ' 
 long as artillery was ineffective and difficult of transport, a strong wall 
 was sufficient for defence ; but as roads improved with increasing com- 
 merce, and a formidable artillery was enabled to accompany an army, the 
 art of fortification grew in importance. Great engineers appeared, who 
 turned cities into huge fortresses ; and as these strongholds were certain to 
 be at the meeting of great roads, they became obstacles in the way of an 
 invader that he could not neglect. They were very different from the 
 castles of ancient barons, which, though they might be strong for defence 
 by reason of their position, yet were for that very reason less useful as 
 obstacles to an enemy's progress, since the loftier the hill on which they 
 were perched, the less likely was it that they should command a great 
 road. They differed also from the walled towns of the middle ages, 
 inasmuch as they were calculated to resist for a long siege improved 
 artillery. These fortresses sprang up all over Europe. The richer 
 and more populous the territory, and the more industrious the inhabi- 
 tants, the more numerous were the towns and the greater the necessity 
 
14 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 for fortifying them. From the opposite banks of the Rhine great fort- 
 resses watched each other, and on the open frontier of France and 
 Belgium they were thickly set. An advancing army dependent on its 
 communications could neither pass by one of these obstacles nor easily 
 take it. Therefore, in the wars of Louis XIV., whole armies were for 
 months occupied in besieging towns, and Marlborough's battles bear but 
 a small proportion to the number of his sieges. Territories were thus 
 captured and recaptured bit by bit ; and the conquest of a province, a 
 country, even of a town, was sufficient object and end for a campaign, 
 and great battles were often fought to cover or to raise a siege. It was 
 not, then, because the leaders of those days were less active and enter- 
 prising than their successors, but because they fought under different 
 conditions that their actions were striking and decisive. 
 Change in However, though military movements were still slow, in the composi- 
 
 te composi- ^ on Q f j.i ie arm j es f \] m i time we see a great change from the feudal 
 
 tion of armies. 
 
 period. The French leaders — the Villarses, Boufflers', and Tallards — were 
 very different from the Du Guesclins and Clissons. There were no 
 officers in Marlborough's army answering to the Mannys, the Chandoses 
 and the John Talbots. Officers and men alike were the servants, not the 
 auxiliaries, of their respective governments, and an army was an integer 
 and not an aggregate. As the military machine grew more manageable, 
 and the means of supplying it improved with increasing wealth and 
 population, enterprises became more extensive and operations more sys- 
 tematic. It was discovered that it was more profitable to occupy an 
 enemy's territory than to devastate and plunder it, and that the readiest 
 way to bring him to terms was to beat his armies. Improved roads and 
 vehicles enabled large bodies to move more freely — improved cultiva- 
 tion gave them more abundant means of subsistence. Fortresses were 
 watched, or " masked," by detachments ; and Frederick and Napoleon, 
 preferring manoeuvres in which they were confident of their skill, to 
 the tedious process of sieges, moved deep into the heart of the theatre 
 of war. 
 Consequent As the power of an army on a distant enterprise depended on its 
 
 e a oration o un ^ e( j an( j concerted action, it was necessary to its full efficiency that 
 
 the system of J J 
 
 supply. it should be able to assemble at any time. It must, therefore, be accom- 
 
 panied by everything requisite for its maintenance. Food, ammunition, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 15 
 
 clothing, medicine, .ami recruits, must find free access to it ; and the 
 
 stream of these supplies must be unceasing. The first preparation for 
 war was the establishment of great depots and magazines, and these were 
 collected in places that were secured from the enemy's attacks, either by- 
 natural defences or artificial fortifications. Frontier lines, strengthened 
 for the defence of countries from the aggressions of their neighbours, of 
 course afforded the most favourable points for the establishment of the 
 magazines destined to supply an army of invasion. Thus, if France were 
 at war with Germany, the Rhine offered a natural screen, behind which 
 might be collected the necessary stores ; and when this barrier was 
 further strengthened by a line of fortresses, a French army in Germany 
 could operate in full confidence that the supplies necessary for its main- 
 tenance were safe, and that, if compelled to retreat, it would find amidst 
 the fortified depots both subsistence and protection from disaster. Or, 
 again, if Italy were to be the scene of French operations, behind the 
 barrier of the Alps must be collected the vast stores on which the army 
 would rely. 
 
 It would be of great importance to the military student to know for 
 certain what particular points the generals on each side relied on for their 
 supplies at all the stages of a campaign. But on this matter history is 
 too often silent, and silent of necessity. For it is generally politic, if not 
 imperative, to collect and deposit these supplies in secrecy, otherwise they 
 would indicate the direction of an intended operation ; and though the 
 papers frequently brought to light at the conclusion of a war may reveal 
 the sources of supply, yet such details, which would possess no interest 
 for readers in general, will always be disregarded by the historian, who 
 desires to render his pages splendid and attractive with the description of c , 
 
 marches and battles. Hence such records, if they exist, are generally l'Empereur 
 unattainable by contemporary writers, and of too little value to those Na P°le°n III. 
 
 , c_ a • it • •-!-,, t , , en Italie, redi- 
 
 wno come atter to insure their preservation. But a costly work has „^ e au Dep6t 
 been published in France containing amplest details of the campaigns of de la Guerre, 
 1859 in Italy; and a few particulars gathered from its pages will show d ' a P resles 
 
 . documents 
 
 what enormous preparation is indispensable for the movements of modern officiels &c. 
 armies. 
 
 " On the 1st January 1859, France could produce in arms, without any Extract from 
 effort more than usual, 640,000 men ; a numerical establishment which, a review of 
 
l(j THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 the above in besides furnishing troops for home service and for Algeria, maintained the 
 
 ' Blackwood ' army of Italv from t |j e t i me f t ] ie battle of Magenta to the time of the 
 
 battle of Solferino, at the force of about 130,000 men. Of these about 
 
 10,000 were cavalry ; and the force of field-artillery was, at various epochs, 
 
 from 312 to 400 guns. 
 
 "These guns, nearly all rifled, carried with them ammunition for a 
 great battle. Every corps of the army was accompanied by 110 carriages, 
 containing a second supply of ammunition for artillery and infantry. 
 Finally, a grand park of 430 carriages, organised at Lyons, carried fresh 
 supplies to St Jean de Maurienne, from whence artillery-horses drew them 
 over the Mont Cenis to Susa. 
 
 " The arsenals in France were in full operation, converting the old 
 Napoleon field-gun into a rifled weapon. The whole army was supplied 
 with rifled muskets. Besides the field-artillery, 200 guns and 70 mortars 
 were provided for the siege of the Italian fortresses, each supplied, on the 
 average, with 900 rounds of ammunition. 
 
 " Tents were provided to contain nearly a million of men — almost 
 enough to house the population of Paris, and covering an area much 
 greater than the city. 
 
 " For the necessary supplies of forage and grain the French markets 
 were exhausted, and the vast total was completed by purchases in other 
 countries. The civil bakeries of France were charged with the supply of 
 the troops in the interior, and the Government establishments were thus 
 free to devote all their resources to providing bread for the army of Italy, 
 and to amassing reserves for its future subsistence. But these conversions 
 could not take place in a moment ; and to give time for the organisation 
 of supplies, provisions for 100,000 men and 10,000 horses, for twenty 
 clays, were collected at various towns in Piedmont. 
 
 " Thus far, then, the French soldiery might survey with great satisfac- 
 tion the enormous provision made for its comfort and efficiency. But 
 there is another set of items in the account, very interesting and signifi- 
 cant, though by no means equally cheering to contemplate. For instance, 
 363,000 kilogrammes of lint were provided, being 10,000 dressings a-day 
 for more than three months. About 1000 cases of surgical instruments 
 also figure grimly in the list. Every battalion was followed by a mule 
 bearing surgical instruments and dressings for 200 wounded. Every divi- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 17 
 
 sion, besides instruments, was provided with 2000 dressings. ' In view 
 of ulterior wants,' we are told there was a reserve of lint and bandages 
 representing 2,800,000 dressings. The medical arrangements comprised 
 everything necessary for 15,000 sick for three months. Beside the field- 
 hospitals which first received the wounded and diseased, military and 
 civil establishments were organised in the interior of France, to relieve 
 the army of such encumbrances by accommodating 17,000 patients. Such 
 are some of the colours used in painting the gloomier pictures that hang 
 in the temple of Fame, where the bright eye of glory is covered with a 
 patch, and where the exulting tread of conquest is exchanged for a painful 
 hobble upon wooden legs. 
 
 " At risk of being tedious, we have given some of these details, because, 
 for want of them, readers of military operations are often insensible to the 
 vast preparations required for the commencement of war between great 
 Powers, and to the nature of certain facts which must enter into militaiy 
 calculations, and which, though they seldom appear on the surface of his- 
 tory, form the great elements of perplexity for governments and generals. 
 Sending forth an army is like sending forth a city equal to the capital of 
 a great state, transporting it, with all its means of food and shelter, from 
 place to place at uncertain times and in unforeseen directions, and leaving 
 it all the time entirely dependent on the territory from which it set forth 
 for the maintenance of its numbers and the supply of its daily wants." 
 
 The Duke of Wellington's correspondence after the battle of Talavera 
 sets in the strongest possible light the essential importance of magazines, 
 and the consequences of operating without them. The English army, 
 leaving its depots in Portugal, had moved into the valley of the Tagus to 
 co-operate with the Spanish forces which were opposing the French corps 
 in front of Madrid. The junction of the allies effected, they had engaged 
 and beaten the enemy at Talavera. As the commander of an auxiliary 
 force, acting in conjunction with a native army, in a country which, 
 though sterile in parts, yet afforded ample supplies, Wellington could not 
 have anticipated any difficulty in procuring provisions, for which full 
 value would have been readily paid ; and he had accordingly entered 
 Spain relying on the promises of the Spanish Government to provide 
 ample subsistence and means of transport for his army. Yet, victorious 
 as he was, he speedily found that army crippled for want of food and 
 
 B 
 
18 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 * Wellington's 
 Despatches' 
 (1809) on the 
 necessity of 
 a system of 
 supply. 
 
 Sherman's 
 march in 
 
 forage ; and, after numerous remonstrances, lie was driven to execute what 
 he had frequently threatened, and marched his troops back to Portugal. 
 
 "A starving army," he says to his brother, in narrating the privations 
 of his troops, " is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their dis- 
 cipline and spirit. They plunder even in the presence of their officers. 
 The officers are discontented, and are almost as bad as the men ; and with 
 the army which a fortnight ago beat double their numbers, I should now 
 hesitate to meet a French corps of half their strength. 
 
 " To carry on the contest with France to any good purpose, the labour 
 and services of every man and of every beast in the country should be 
 employed in support of the armies ; and these should be so classed and 
 arranged as not only to secure obedience to the orders of the Government, 
 but regularity and efficiency in the performance of the services required 
 from them. Magazines might then with ease be formed and transported 
 wherever circumstances might require that armies should be stationed. 
 
 "But as we are now situated, 50,000 men are collected upon a spot 
 which cannot afford subsistence for 10,000 men, and there are no means 
 of sending to a distance to make good the deficiency." 
 
 Again he says, " If we had had 60,000 men (British) instead of 20,000, 
 in all probability we should not have got to Talavera to fight the battle, for 
 want of means and provisions. But, if we had got to Talavera, we could 
 not have gone further, and the armies would probably have separated for 
 want of means of subsistence, probably without a battle ; but certainly 
 afterwards." 
 
 And, lamenting the opportunities thus lost, he tells Lord Castlereagh : 
 " If we could have fed, and have got up the condition of our horses, we 
 might probably after some time have struck a brilliant blow upon Soult, 
 at Placencia, or upon Mortier in the centre." " I have no motive," he 
 says to a Spanish minister, "for withdrawing the British army from 
 Spain, whether of a political or military nature, excepting that which I 
 have stated to you in conversation — namely, a desire to relieve it from 
 the privations of food, which it has suffered since the 22d of last month ; 
 privations which have reduced its strength, have destroyed the health of 
 the soldiers, and have rendered the army comparatively inefficient" 
 
 Many preceding passages of this chapter will show that the march 
 of Sherman across Georgia in 1864 is neither a novelty in war nor a 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 19 
 
 refutation of what has been said respecting the necessity of a secure base. Georgia not 
 Like the Black Trince, he marched through the unprotected country of exce P tlonal - 
 an enemy, whom he sought to injure by ravaging the district which he 
 traversed; and like Edward III. he carried with him a great train of 
 supplies, not because the territory did not afford them, but because the 
 appearance of a hostile force, or of a formidable obstacle of any kind, 
 might, by obliging him to assemble his army, deprive him for a time of 
 the power of subsisting by plunder. But the object and duration of the 
 movement were definite and limited. A certain extent of country was to 
 be traversed with the calculated certainty of reopening communications 
 beyond. There is evidently nothing in the operation which can modify 
 existing theories, for it remains as impracticable as before to explain or 
 to conceive how sustained operations can be conducted in the face of 
 an enemy without a secure starting-point, 
 
20 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE NECESSITY OF GOOD ROADS FOR THE OPERATIONS OF 
 A MODERN ARMY. 
 
 Carriage- 
 roads indis- 
 pensable to 
 sustained 
 operations. 
 
 The fortified line of magazines constituting the base being formed, it is 
 indispensable to a sustained and dubious enterprise that good roads 
 should exist between the magazines and the army as it moves away from 
 its base. In mountainous districts where the roads are so rugged and 
 steep as to be unfit for wheeled vehicles, the necessary supplies must 
 be carried on pack-horses or mules. But the quantity which an animal 
 can draw is so much greater than that which it can carry, that the 
 number of animals and the extent of road they occupy must be 
 immensely increased. It is therefore very difficult, almost impossible, 
 to supply a very large army, under such circumstances, for a long 
 campaign ; and roads practicable for carriages are indispensable to all 
 operations, except those which aim at attaining their results in a brief 
 and definite time. And not only must the roads be good in the ordinary 
 sense, but they must be great main arteries of the region, solidly con- 
 structed. Anybody who lives in the neighbourhood of a newly-established 
 brick-field, will see how quickly the parish roads are broken and wrought 
 into hollows by the passage of the heavy brick-carts. The trains that 
 follow an army, laden as they are with ammunition, pontoons, platforms 
 for guns, siege-artillery, and other ponderous materials, soon destroy all 
 but the best roads. In order, then, that the enormous streams of supply 
 may be uninterrupted, it is necessary that the roads should be of the 
 best construction, like our own highways and the great paved chauss&s 
 of the Continent. The proof of this is found in the difficulties under 
 which armies begin to labour directly they are thrown on bad roads for 
 their supplies. Our own experience in the Crimea shows that even 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 21 
 
 seven miles of soft soil interposed in winter between an army and its 
 
 depots, may be almost a fatal obstacle ; and General McClellan, in his 
 
 Report of his campaign in the Yorktown Peninsula, tells us — " On the McClelkn'a 
 
 15th and 16th the divisions of Franklin, Smith, and Porter, were with J e P ort °" llif " 
 
 nculties from 
 
 great difficulty moved to "Whitehouse, five miles in advance ; so bad ^ a( j ro . ul: . 
 was the road that the train of one of these divisions required thirty-six 
 hours to pass over this short distance." And again, speaking of the 
 movement from the York Paver to "Williamsburg, he says — " The supply- 
 trains had been forced out of the roads on the 4th and 5th to allow 
 the troops and artillery to pass to the front, and the roads were now in 
 such a state after thirty-six hours' continuous rain, that it was almost 
 impossible to pass even empty waggons over them." 
 
 But it is not only on account of the supplies that great armies operate 
 by great roads. It is also because the march of the troops and artillery 
 becomes on bad roads so slow and uncertain that all the calculations on 
 which a general bases a combined operation are liable to be falsified, and 
 the rapidity necessary for a movement intended to surprise or foil an 
 adversary is lost, so that the design is foreseen and frustrated by the 
 enemy. An example of the different rate at which troops move over a 
 good and a bad road is afforded by the campaign of Waterloo. Napoleon 
 following "Wellington, and Grouchy following Blucher, both quitted the 
 field of Ligny on the afternoon of the 17th June. The Emperor, march- See Map 
 ing by the great paved chaussdes of Namur and of Brussels, assembled ■ Na 9 * 
 his army that night in the position of "Waterloo, seventeen miles from 
 Ligny. Grouchy, moving by country roads, had great difficulty in bring- 
 ing his 30,000 men to Gembloux, five miles from Ligny, by ten o'clock 
 the same night. And, to quote a more modern instance, General 
 McClellan says : " On the 14th of March, a reconnaissance of a large See Map 
 body of cavalry with some infantry, under command of General Stone- 8> 
 man, was sent along the Orange and Alexandria Eailroad to deter- 
 mine the position of the enemy, and, if possible, force his rear across the 
 Bappahannock ; but the roads were in such condition that, finding it 
 impossible to subsist his men, General Stoneman was forced to return." 
 
 While, however, impressing on the reader the absolute necessity of Operations of 
 good roads for the sustained operations of a campaign, it is not asserted duration 
 
 may be ac- 
 
 that considerable bodies of troops never move by indifferent roads, complished by 
 Many instances of the contrary would appear in a short course of mili- inferior roads. 
 
22 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 See Map 
 No. 5. 
 
 See Map 
 No. 11. 
 
 See Map 
 No. 8. 
 
 Movement of 
 troops by 
 railway. 
 
 Proportion of 
 railway trans- 
 port to in- 
 fantry, 
 
 tary reading. Thus, Napoleon carried 40,000 men from Switzerland to 
 Italy over the St Bernard; but this was for the sake of obtaining by 
 surprise an advantage of position over the Austrians, and, that position 
 attained, he had the great roads of Italy for his future movements, 
 and the territory between the Alps and Po, friendly to him and hostile 
 to the Austrians, was available for supplies. Again, Wellington, fol- 
 lowing the French in 1813 on the great road of Valladolid and Burgos, 
 quitted it to throw his army across difficult mountain-paths ; but he did 
 so for the purpose of shifting his base from Portugal to the northern 
 ports of Spain, with which he presently opened new communications. 
 And McClellan, crossing the Potomac after Lee, subsequent to the battle 
 of Antietam, moved by the road from Harper's Ferry along the foot of 
 the Blue Eidge, which is probably hilly and broken ; but as soon as he 
 reached the Manassas Eailway he came into direct communication by that 
 railway with Washington. Thus each of these movements was of brief 
 duration, and made with the definite object of immediately attaining a 
 new and more convenient communication with the depots of supply. 
 
 Whatever advantages good roads can confer must be immensely in- 
 creased when railways are employed. In using them the first step must 
 be the collection of the rolling stock on the required points of the different 
 lines. To take the readiest example, if an order was issued in London in 
 the evening, this would be accomplished on any of our lines by daybreak 
 next morning, to an extent that would insure the despatch of trains thence- 
 forward without interruption. But in fact a continuous movement might 
 be commenced in about six hours with the stock collected in that interval. 
 
 This preliminary measure accomplished, the following conditions attach 
 to the conveyance of troops of all arms : — 
 
 A train of from twenty-four to thirty-four carriages of all kinds — 
 passenger carriages, cattle-trucks, horse-boxes, and break-vans — can be 
 propelled by one engine ; and a speed of from twenty to twenty-five miles 
 an hour, though lower than what is attainable, is considered most suitable 
 to a continuous movement by lessening the risk of breaking down. 
 
 An ordinary second or third class carriage holds thirty-two soldiers. 
 A horse-box holds three horses, and a cattle-truck six to eight. Taking 
 the effective number of one of our infantry battalions at 1066 men and 
 thirty-one officers, the battalion with its transport and tent-equipment, in- 
 cluding 17 waggons and carts and 65 horses, can be conveyed in 2 trains. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 23 
 
 One train will contain a squadron of cavalry of 120 horses, and four cavalry, 
 trains the regiment. 
 
 Each artillery waggon, or gun, with its limber, occupies one truck. A artillery, 
 battery of horse-artillery, or a field-battery, with its men, horses, and 
 equipment complete, requires two trains of from thirty-one to thirty-three 
 carriages each. 
 
 A battalion of infantry standing ready at the station, and properly prac- Time for load- 
 tised, entrains in a few minutes. Cavalry require twenty-five minutes in ° the trains - 
 to fill the train, and artillery half an hour. If all entrain at the same 
 station, only three trains could be despatched in an hour. But by cre- 
 ating temporary platforms the loading can take place simultaneously. 
 From experiment, a platform 190 yards long, 25 feet broad, and 3^ feet 
 high, made of earth, revetted with railway-sleepers, could be completed 
 in eight hours by about 450 men, if the earth must be brought from 
 elsewhere, and much sooner when made in a slight cutting. Such a 
 platform is sufficient for entraining a squadron of cavalry on war footing, 
 and more than sufficient for an infantry or artillery train. 
 
 Under such circumstances it has been calculated that there would be Rate of de- 
 no difficulty in forwarding, on an English railway, large bodies of troops ^ pa . tch of 
 at the rate of four trains per hour — which, perhaps, is the highest rate 
 practicable where large mixed bodies are concerned.* The transport of an 
 English army corps, according to the latest organisation, might therefore 
 be thus calculated in round numbers : — 
 
 An English Division requires the following : — 
 
 Infantry, 7 battalions, . . . . . 14 trains. 
 
 Artillery, 3 batteries, . . . . . 6 ,, 
 
 Cavalry, 1 regiment, . . . . . 4 ,, 
 
 Staff, engineers, and military police, . . . 2 ,, 
 
 Reserve ammunition-column, . . . . 3 ,, 
 
 2 field-hospitals, bearer company, and ambulances, . 4 ,, 
 
 Commissariat and ordnance-store departments, . 2 ,, 
 
 Casuals from unforeseen contingencies, . . 1 ,, 
 
 Total for a Division, 36 ,, 
 
 * In former editions a higher estimate of the rate was given. It was based on the views of 
 railway authorities, after experience of movements of volunteers by rail. But as these were 
 infantry only, and were entrained without any accompaniment except their arms and personal 
 equipment, this estimate could not be relied on in the case of the three arms accompanied by 
 the necessary material of war ; and that given above is believed (in the absence of experiment 
 on a large scale in this country) to be what we might hope to attain to. 
 
24 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Army Corps : — 
 
 3 divisions, ...... 
 
 1 cavalry brigade (3 regiments, 1 battery, and includ 
 
 ing its commissariat and half bearer company), 
 ( 'orps artillery (5 batteries and staff), . 
 1 company engineers, and engineer field-park, 
 Reserve ammunition-column, . 
 Fontoon troop, ..... 
 
 Half telegraph troop, and troop of military police, 
 6 field-hospitals, bearer company, and ambulances, 
 Commissariat and military-store departments, . 
 Bakery and butchery column, . 
 Staff, chaplains, and veterinary department, . 
 Casuals from unforeseen contingencies, 
 
 Total for an Army Corps, 165 
 
 108 trains. 
 
 17 ,, 
 11 ,9 
 
 2 ,, 
 
 All these, however, though necessary for sustained operations, are not 
 necessary for fighting a battle. For that purpose the combatant forces of 
 the division could be conveyed in about 25 trains, and of an army corps 
 in about 104 trains. 
 
 Supposing the carriages collected, and the platforms made for entrain- 
 ing and detraining, the division complete, of 36 trains, would be conveyed 
 between daylight and dark, during the greater part of the year, to a dis- 
 tance of sixty miles. This supposes that the line used is a double one, 
 and the return line of rails kept always clear. In the case of a single 
 line, half this rate would probably be a safe estimate. The power of 
 maintaining the movement of large bodies must also in most cases be 
 diminished by the necessity of continuing to supply the great towns 
 which depend on railways for food and fuel. Other drawbacks must 
 also be taken into account in estimating the speed of movements by rail. 
 On long journeys intervals of rest are necessary. Men and horses are 
 exhausted by the constrained position, packed closely as they must be, 
 and could scarcely be at once read}'- to march after travelling a great 
 distance without a halt. 
 
 In all cases where short distances are concerned, it is necessary to 
 consider whether time will be saved by using the railway, especially in 
 moving cavalry or artillery. 
 
 The modifications caused by railways in military operations will be 
 noticed as occasions arise in future chapters. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 25 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ARMIES OPERATE GENERALLY BY SEVERAL ROADS AT ONCE. 
 
 The reader, then, should acquire the habit of thinking of an army, not 
 as capable of being moved anywhere in the theatre of war, but as 
 dependent for its efficiency on a line connecting it with points in its 
 rear — the line being a good and practicable road or roads, and the points 
 secure magazines. 
 
 The next step is to consider the army, not as, in general, collected on 
 the main road, but as distributed in parts on several roads. 
 
 When hostilities begin between nations, one of them at the outset 
 almost always finds reason for standing on the defensive, and allows the 
 other to make the attack. Declaring war against Napoleon in 1815," the 
 Allies were induced of necessity to await the attack, because their forces, 
 greatly superior in numbers, were scattered over an immense space. Only 
 Wellington's and Blucher's armies were ready to meet the first onset. See Map 
 They were in Belgium, and three great roads cross the frontier leading No - 9 - 
 from French fortresses upon Brussels, by either of which Napoleon might 
 advance, after concentrating on it, behind the screen of the fortresses, his 
 whole army ; therefore Wellington and Blucher were forced to guard all 
 these avenues to Brussels by placing on them portions of their forces. 
 But these portions were liable, each or any, to be attacked by the whole 
 French army — in fact, only one Prussian corps was assembled at the 
 point where Napoleon's whole force broke in. Under such circumstances, 
 all which that corps, or any of these fractions of the Allied armies, could 
 do, was to take advantage of the fact, that the heads only of the great 
 French columns as they advanced on the roads were available for imme- 
 
26 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Why armies diate attack, and to dispute the advance till the French front should so 
 
 on the defen- g row j n extent, by accessions from the rear, as to be irresistible, and then 
 
 by several to withdraw with as good a face as could be maintained. In this way 
 
 roads. time would be gained for the concentration of the remainder of the 
 
 Allies upon the threatened line. Whereas had any line been entirely 
 
 neglected, the enemy, being unopposed there, might be in Brussels before 
 
 any adequate force could have time to interpose. It is very easy to 
 
 understand, therefore, why an army on the defensive is spread over a 
 
 large front, on lines which radiate from the point they seek to cover, like 
 
 the spokes of a wheel from the nave. 
 
 Why invad- It is not at first so manifest why an invading army operates by many 
 
 mg armies do roa( } s . b u t a brief calculation will suffice to show the reason. 
 
 In round numbers, 30,000 infantry on the march extend over about 
 5 miles of road; adding from one-fourth to one-third for lengthening out, 
 they would extend over 7 miles ; 60 guns with their attendant carriages 
 occupy 2^ miles ; 6000 cavalry, in sections (four abreast), allowing 12 
 feet of space longitudinally to each horse, fully 4 miles. 
 
 If Napoleon's army had entered Belgium by one road instead of three, 
 it would have extended as follows : — 
 
 90,000 infantry, ..... 21 miles. 
 
 20,000 cavalry, . . . . . 14 ,, 
 
 350 guns, &c., . . . . 14 „ 
 
 Total, . . . 49 „ 
 
 irrespective of baggage or stores of any description. According to a 
 recent French authority, by using on very wide roads what the French 
 term the double formation, the length of the column would be reduced by 
 three-tenths, which, in the present example, would leave 34 miles. There- 
 fore, at the best, on a single road the head of the column must have been 
 inarching two days before the rear could have quitted the place of rendez- 
 vous. An army moving thus would manifestly lay itself open to defeat 
 by a very inferior force, which, by enveloping the head of the column, 
 might inflict a succession of crushing blows before the rear could arrive 
 on the point of action. And, in fact, though Napoleon's columns moved 
 by three roads, the divisions in rear, moving from the same bivouacs as 
 those in front, failed to deploy on the field of Ligny till the afternoon of 
 the following day. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 27 
 
 "When General McClellan moved from Washington to attack the Con- 
 federates, who, having defeated Pope, had invaded Maryland, he thus 
 replied to some comments on his method of advancing, addressed to him 
 hy the Commander-in-Chief: "If," he says, "I had marched the entire McClellan's 
 army (about 100,000 men) in one column along the banks of the river Re P or ton the 
 
 J \ J ° ... difficulties of 
 
 instead of upon five different parallel roads, the column, with its trains, a s i ng i e roa d. 
 would have extended about fifty miles, and the enemy might have defeated 
 the advance before the rear could have reached the scene of action." 
 
 It was found in the war of 1866, that a Prussian Army Corps, consist- 
 ing of 42,512 men, 13,802 horses, 90 guns, and 1385 carriages of different 
 kinds, took up, on the march, about 27 miles of roadway, 18 miles being 
 occupied by the combatant forces, and 9 miles by the train. 
 
 Now we will suppose, on the other hand, the extreme case that an 
 army, on quitting its bivouacs, could find separate roads for every brigade, 
 all converging on the point where an engagement might be expected, and 
 all sufficiently near each other for constant communication and concert. 
 The whole army would then be assembled simultaneously on the space to 
 be occupied by the line of battle. In no case, of course (except in limited 
 marches on great plains), are such facilities to be expected, but the illus- 
 tration will serve to show why an army always marches by as many 
 roads leading towards its destination as are sufficiently near to each 
 other to admit of mutual support. 
 
 As the different portions of an army on the defensive must unite as Necessity of 
 quickly as possible on the line by which the enemy advances, it is, of g00(i lateral 
 
 comnv"~~ 
 
 course, indispensable that there should be good intercommunications or tionSi 
 lateral roads, by which they can readily approach each other. And these 
 should be not coincident with the front of the army, but in rear of it — 
 otherwise, if a division of corps were pushed back by the rapid advance of 
 the enemy, the line of intercommunication would be broken. 
 
 Also, if an army were advancing towards the enemy, and using, for the 
 sake of facility, several adjacent roads, these, however near, should not be 
 separated by any impassable obstacle, such as a great swamp, a mountain- 
 ridge, or a river without fords or bridges ; otherwise, one portion of the 
 army might be merely spectators of an attack upon the rest, as happened 
 at Eivoli, where an Austrian column, moving on the left of the Adige, 
 witnessed the defeat of the army on the other bank ; and as occurred 
 
 communica- 
 
28 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAE 
 
 Al ezzane 
 
 Valeggio 
 
Esenta 
 
 towards Solferino. 
 
 Castiglione 
 
 ,, Solferino. 
 
 Castiglione 
 
 ,, Guidizzolo. 
 
 Carpenedolo 
 
 - ,, Medole. 
 
 ]\Iezzane 
 
 ,, Castel Goffredo 
 
 EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 29 
 
 more notably in 1796, when the Austrians, advancing into Italy on both 
 sides of Lake Garda, were beaten in succession by the same French army. 
 Thus the line by which an army moves is not necessarily, nor frequently, 
 a single road, but several roads tending in the same direction, and united 
 by a sufficient number of cross-roads. For instance, the French army 
 moved to Solferino thus : — 
 
 1st Corps, from 
 Imperial Guard, ,, 
 2d Corps, ,, 
 
 4th Corps, ,, 
 
 3d Corps,' ,, 
 
 Sardinians from Lonato and Desenzano j Sco/e^dRiTOltella j on ^zolengo. Pozzolengo 
 
 to Medole, 
 
 And the Austrians reached the same field from the Mincio thus : — 8 miles. 
 
 Stli Corps crossed Mincio at Salionze on Pozzolengo. 
 
 5th ,, ,, ,, Valleggio ,, Solferino. 
 
 1st ,, ,, ,, Valleggio ,, Cavriana. 
 
 7th ,, ,, ,, Ferri ,, Foresto. 
 
 3d ,, ,, ,, Ferri ,, Guidizzolo. 
 
 9th ,, ,, ,, Goito ,, Ceresole. 
 
 11th ,, ,, ,, Goito ,, Castel Grimaldo. 
 2d Corps from Mantua to Marcaria on the Oglio to turn the French right. 
 
 The two armies, each of which was advancing in ignorance of the move- 
 ment of the other, thus occupying on the march the space from flank to 
 flank which was necessary for the formation of the line of battle. 
 
 When armies approaching each other are still many marches distant, 
 as may happen at the outset of a campaign, it is not, of course, necessary 
 that the various columns, as they quit their own frontier, should be 
 within supporting distance. It is when an engagement may be imminent 
 that the lines of intercommunication become of such special importance. 
 Moreover, it then becomes necessary to shorten as much as possible the 
 distance between the head and the rear of each column by widening its 
 front. A narrator of the Waterloo campaign says, that when Wellington 
 retired from Quatre Bras upon Waterloo, his troops moved in the open 
 fields on each side, leaving the road for the artillery and trains. But 
 before the French, following him, passed Genappe, a violent rain had 
 rendered the fields impassable ; consequently their troops were restricted 
 to the road, and the column was lengthened, entailing these consequences, 
 
30 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 that Wellington's compact march was beyond reach of pressure from the 
 enemy, and that, while his troops filed into their destined positions in 
 the line, the rearmost French divisions did not reach the field till long 
 after dark. 
 
 No better illustration of this part of the subject can be found than in 
 
 the orders for the movement of the French army upon Casale in 1859 
 
 when about to cross the Po. They ran thus : — 
 
 Camp, de " As the army is about to operate in a country cut up with canals and 
 
 Nap. III.— r i verSj the troops on the march will be nearly always in column on the 
 
 Compactness . 
 
 of movement causeways, and the heads alone will be at once ready for action. It is 
 on the march essential, then, that one division, for example, shall be so organised as to 
 prescn e . ^ e rea( jy ^ en £ er j n t n ne as soon as possible. To this end a division of 
 four regiments, one battalion of chasseurs, two batteries, and two squad- 
 rons, shall be thus divided into four movable columns — 
 
 " 1. A peloton of cavalry to clear the way. 
 
 " 2. 20 sappers and pioneers with pickaxes to destroy obstacles, and 
 throw small bridges of felled trees over canals. 
 
 " 3. Two guns without waggons. 
 
 " 4. A company of chasseurs to protect and flank the guns. 
 
 " 5. A regiment of infantry. 
 
 " The rest of the battery ; and so for the remainder. 
 
 " In spite of the inconvenience of prolonging the columns, a great dis- 
 tance will be left between them to avoid confusion. 
 
 " When a road is parallel to the railway, the infantry will march on 
 the railway, guns on the road. 
 
 " On arriving at crossings, horsemen will be sent on all the roads to 
 preserve communication with columns that move parallel, and to look out 
 for the enemy. 
 
 " Whenever a halt is made, and the fields at the side of the road are 
 practicable for infantry or guns, the troops will form up on as wide a front 
 as possible, to diminish for the moment the depth of the column. 
 
 " It need not be said that generals will take all the lateral roads which 
 conduct to the same end, provided their columns will not thereby be too 
 much separated. 
 
 " Should a column be attacked, the trains will be parked at once, to 
 leave the road free for troops." 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 31 
 
 (To "park" trains is to form them in compact order in fields or open 
 spaces adjoining the road.) 
 
 It would be a mistake to suppose that the preceding matter of this Railways do 
 chapter depends for its truth on the condition that it must be applied not supersede 
 only to regions where railways do not exist. The districts, even in roadsfifr 
 Europe, are few where existing railways would leave great armies in manoeuvring. 
 any considerable degree independent of the ordinary roads ; and, in fact, 
 the very orders just quoted were given in a theatre of war traversed 
 by railways. But whether the communications of this kind be few or 
 many, one fact alone suffices to prove the point, which is, that an army 
 advancing, or intending to advance, can never trust to railways which are 
 within the sphere of the enemy's operations, even to the most extended 
 line of his outposts, since a few men can, in a very short time, render a 
 railway temporarily unserviceable. In July 1870, a few Prussian lancers, 
 crossing into French territory, blew up a viaduct of the railway by which 
 the communications between the parts of the French army were chiefly 
 maintained. It was partly due to this cause that MacMahon did not 
 receive at Worth the support on which he had relied when he stood to 
 accept battle there. There will always, therefore, be a considerable space 
 between the fronts of the armies where only the ordinary roads can be 
 relied on for manoeuvring ; and it is only in an inconsiderable degree, and 
 for partial movements, that railways can with confidence be resorted to See Chap. III. 
 when opposing forces are so near that collision becomes imminent. Thus " * ■ 
 Louis Napoleon, in the transfer of his army from the south to the north 
 bank of the Po in 1859, for the advance by Novara to the Ticino, only 
 moved one corps (Canrobert's) by rail. In the action at Casteggio, Forey's 
 troops, engaged with the enemy, were reinforced by means of the railway; 
 but that railway lay directly in rear, and Forey was fighting a defensive See same 
 action. Again, in the battle of Bull Pam, the defeat of the Northern cha P- 
 army was mainly accomplished by the attack of a brigade brought on the 
 field by the Manassas Eailway from the Shenandoah Valley. But none of 
 these operations were of sufficient magnitude to render it necessary to 
 treat as peculiar the case of armies manoeuvring in a theatre intersected 
 by railways, which need be regarded only as roads giving greatly increased 
 facilities for movement, at the same time that they afford an extremely 
 precarious reliance when within reach of the enemy's enterprises. 
 
32 
 
 .THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Rate of 
 marching. 
 
 Length of 
 marches. 
 
 In small detached bodies, infantry average 2f miles an hour; field- 
 artillery, 3|; cavalry and horse-artillery, .5, inclusive of halts of a few 
 minutes. 
 
 The rate decreases as numbers increase. A division marching on one 
 road can seldom do more than 2\ to 2^ miles an hour, and a corps not 
 more than 2 miles. 
 
 For a division of all arms, 15 miles is a fair average march ; 15 to 20 
 miles a long march ; and above 20 miles a forced march. 
 
 A large army marching continuously seldom covers more than 10 or 11 
 miles a-day, measured on the map from point to point. The most rapid 
 continuous march on record is that of Napoleon from the Channel to the 
 Ehine in 1805. Three corps d'arme'e marched on three distinct lines, 
 each corps marching by divisions at a day's interval. The average dis- 
 tance was 400 miles and the time taken 25 days. 
 
 In 1870 the Second German army, from Metz to the Loire, averaged 
 12 miles a-day. The IX. Corps, which made the fastest march, averaged 
 13 1 miles for the first 9 days. In consequence of urgent orders received 
 at Troyes it pushed on to Fontainebleau, 76 miles, in 4 days. This was 
 considered almost a forced march. 
 
 One of the best marches on record is that of Billow's corps, in the 
 Waterloo campaign, on the 16th June, from around Liege to Hannut, and 
 thence (on receiving notice of impending battle) towards Gembloux, 
 accomplishing about 35 miles by 9 P.M.; after which the corps marched 
 and fought on the 17th and 18th. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTEATED. 33 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 SUPPLY OF ARMIES AT A DISTANCE FROM THEIR BASE. 
 
 In order to complete the general idea of the conditions under which armies 
 operate, it only remains to consider the manner in which they are sup- 
 plied when at a distance from their original base, frontier, or starting- 
 point. For although a large force might be supplied with sufficient ease 
 and certainty when separated from its magazines by only 20 or 30 miles of 
 good roads, yet it is evident that, with every march in advance, the stream 
 of supply would become more and more precarious, till at length the com- 
 mander would be unable to base any calculations for future movements 
 on so dubious a foundation. And of such importance is this question of 
 supplies, that in a little book attributed to the Prussian General Bulow, 
 which appeared in 1801, on ' The Spirit of the System of Modern War,' 
 the author commences by saying, that he considers the system to be 
 founded on the fact that modern armies are entirely dependent on their 
 magazines. But he speaks expressly of modern war, evidently pointing 
 to the fact which has been discussed in the preceding chapters, that at 
 an earlier period, when armies were not dependent on their magazines, 
 the whole system of war was different. And the change has affected not 
 merely military operations, but the condition of the populations of Europe. 
 
 In the days when armies subsisted of necessity on the pillage of the Evils attend- 
 country they made war in, the rigours of war were inseparable from the ant on a ru(ie 
 fact of war. The theatre of hostilities, like the English lines of invasion . rfa 
 in France, like parts of Germany in the Thirty Years' War, became a hell, 
 the soldiers demons. Any narrative of the time will show that life was 
 to the wretched inhabitants rilled with elements which make no part of 
 
 c 
 
34 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 the existence of any modern European people — terror ending in reckless- 
 ness, the absence of all that provision for the future which hope and 
 security induce, a greedy snatching at any present enjoyment or respite 
 from evil, and a general impression that the world was a scene of injustice, 
 given over to the dominion of devils. These rigours naturally reacted 
 on the character of those who inflicted them : soldiers grew remorseless, 
 indifferent to suffering, fond even of inflicting it ; friends as well as foes 
 were subject to outrage, war was licensed devastation, and the territories 
 which were the scene of hostilities became frightful deserts. 
 These evils "With the establishment of standing armies and the necessity for sup- 
 
 modified by plying them from their own resources, these horrors in great measure 
 mentof stand- ceased. They were no longer inflicted by an army on its own or a friendly 
 ing armies. territory, but were used as a weapon against the enemy. But enough of 
 the former spirit of cruelty still identified itself with war, to cause com- 
 manders of high honour and reputation to commit deeds which from our 
 point of view must always stain their names. Turenne ravaged the beau- 
 tiful cultivated territory known as the Palatinate; and Marlborough, 
 after marching from Flanders across Germany, supplied by the contri- 
 butions of friendly states, resorted, on entering Bavaria, to what he calls 
 " military execution," or systematic devastation, as a means of detaching 
 the Elector from the interests of France, by compelling him to witness 
 the suffering of his subjects and the ravage of his dominions. 
 System of A little later than this, when discipline grew into paramount import- 
 
 supply grows ance, when movements were quicker, and when armies in the presence of 
 
 witTdi'sci 11106 a read y foe found they must be alwa y s P re P ar ed to fight, the question of 
 
 pline and or- supplies came to be a still more considerable element in war. A curious 
 
 ganisation. calculation exists, made by Tempelhoff, a Prussian general, the historian 
 
 of Frederick's wars, which shows how rigorously the operations of his 
 
 master were fettered by the necessity of providing assured subsistence 
 
 for his army. 
 
 Tempelhoff on " A hundred thousand men," he says, " consume daily 150,000 pounds 
 
 the supply of f flour, equal to 200,000 pounds of bread. 
 
 Frederick i u g ^ an( j f ora „ e are se ldom to be had in sufficient quantities on the 
 
 armies. ° 
 
 spot — hence magazines are established along the line of operations. 
 
 " The bread-waggons carried a supply for 6 days — the men for 3 more. 
 "In commissariat-waggons, flour for 9 additional days could be con- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 35 
 
 veyed — 1 waggon to 100 men for 9 da) r s ; thus 1000 waggons supplied 
 the army for that time. 
 
 " An operation of 18 days' duration could thus be conducted without an 
 intervening magazine ; but field-ovens were required to make the flour 
 into bread. But bread for 3 days requires 2 days to bake it. At the end 
 of 6 days, therefore, a halt must be made to bake, or else the ovens would 
 fall behindhand with the supply. So that, advancing into an enemy's 
 country, before magazines could be formed there, 6 days was the extent 
 of march practicable without a halt. 
 
 " But when the ovens were at a greater distance from the magazines 
 than the commissariat- waggons could perform, going and returning, in 9 
 days, the army fell short." Sixty miles was therefore the maximum dis- 
 tance to which the field-ovens could advance from the magazines. If we 
 add to this 40 miles, for the space which the bread-waggons (which held 
 6 clays' rations) could traverse in 6 days, going and returning, we have 
 the full extent to which an army could venture to advance in an enemy's 
 country without forming magazines there — namely, 100 miles. 
 
 As at this time an army, instead of being an assemblage of bands or The orgnnisa- 
 
 companies, each under its own immediate leader, had become an integer tlon of armies 
 
 , . , ,., ,...-■, • • , o in the 18th 
 
 which did not admit ot ready separation into parts ; so the system of century ren - 
 
 supply had also been highly organised in order to maintain this somewhat dered them 
 
 cumbrous machine in working order. Communications, to manoeuvre ° y 
 
 . . . pendent on 
 
 against which scarcely entered into the combinations of the generals of a magazines. 
 preceding age, had now come to be of the first importance, and the cap- 
 ture of a great magazine or a great convoy was a matter serious enough to 
 derange a whole plan of campaign. 
 
 This ultra-methodical method of campaigning continued till the time 
 of the French Revolution. Confronting all Europe, and destitute of all 
 the material of war except men, France poured forth armies half clad, 
 half fed, half armed, but filled with valour, intelligence, and zeal. Old 
 traditions of methodical war, where troops slept under tents and were 
 fed from magazines, were of no value to armies which possessed neither 
 tents nor magazines. A new organisation became necessary to meet these 
 new conditions. An army, no longer itself an integer, was resolved into 
 divisions, each complete in itself in all arms, and capable either of fight- 
 ing alone, or of taking its place readily in line of battle. The amount of 
 
36 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Increased mo- independence thus gained rendered the task of supplying them compara- 
 
 ityo tively easy. Alike in the plains of Flanders and on the summits of the 
 
 mies brought 
 greater facil- Alps, the soldiers of the Eepublic learned to bivouac, and to maintain 
 
 ity of supply, themselves in the country they made war in. "What they lost in method 
 they gained in mobility ; taught by always present and always pressing 
 necessity, they acquired the secret of spreading in order to subsist ; but, 
 being opposed to disciplined troops, they were forced also to preserve 
 a due facility of reassembling for battle. They were at once the most 
 accomplished of marauders and the most intelligent of soldiers. And it 
 was this combination of seemingly adverse qualities that distinguished 
 them from the armies of the middle ages, where the troops were indeed 
 skilful in the art of plundering, but had neither the discipline nor intelli- 
 gence necessary for forming out of the scattered units a combined force 
 that could oppose a regular army. 
 
 Formed by this rough training, the French army became an instrument 
 in the hand of the most subtle, inventive, and audacious leader in the 
 world. The old system of Frederick met the new system directed by Na- 
 poleon, and was shattered to pieces. And at the root of this new system 
 lay the new method of procuring supplies, 
 but did not But it would be a great mistake to suppose that Napoleon, when he 
 
 enable them Decame D0 th chief of the state and head of the army, led on to conquest 
 with mat'a- merely a horde of plunderers, who lived from hand to mouth. No general 
 zines. was ever more careful in accumulating great magazines and in protecting 
 
 his communications. All his precepts prove that he felt more strongly 
 even than the strictest generals of the old school the necessity of holding 
 rt. iii. ch. 4. fast to the links which united him with his base. After Jena, for in- 
 stance, when he had broken in a single day the power of Prussia, his first 
 thought, after providing for the pursuit of the defeated enemy, was to 
 establish a fresh and shorter line of communication with France, and to 
 station on it great hospitals and depots of stores. In what, then, it may 
 be asked, did the advantage of the French system consist, since it did not 
 free him from the restrictions which hampered others ? 
 
 The system of requisition was not new. In the wars of all epochs 
 forced contributions had been raised. But those contributions had been 
 exacted chiefly for the purpose of replacing the stores which the first 
 operations would exhaust. Thus time was given in which to accommo- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 37 
 
 date the burthen to the population. The contributions were made pro- 
 portionate to the resources of each district, and wore drawn from a greatly- 
 extended area. But the French Republican armies, dispensing, in great 
 degree, with the supplies which armies had previously drawn from their 
 own countries, and used in their first operations, seized at once, on 
 entering a territory, on all that they required for daily consumption 
 — bread, meat, wine, cattle, fuel, forage, and transport; thus ruining 
 the country along their line of march, but gaining thereby great facility 
 for rapid and sustained operations ; while the more deliberate and 
 equitable system formerly practised was still resorted to for the rilling 
 of the great magazines, which a lengthened campaign would render 
 indispensable. 
 
 It will be easily seen that this Eepublican system could not be applied 
 by an army acting either in its own or in friendly territory. It was 
 equally impracticable for the British in Spain, and for the Austrians in 
 Germany and in Italy. These armies could only draw their subsistence 
 either from their own countries or from the willing contributions, duly 
 paid for, of the people in whose countries they were operating. But 
 however supplies may be obtained, the storing of them in magazines 
 along the lines on which the army operates is indispensable — and it is 
 therefore necessary to inquire what is the method of forming depots to 
 which all generals must more or less resort. 
 
 The Germans assume that a corps of 35,000 men and 10,000 horses, Supply-trains 
 extending over a front of 5 miles, and a depth of 9 miles, can traverse a of a Prussian 
 moderately fertile and populous territory without aid from its magazines ; 
 because, within the area designated, a day's subsistence for that number 
 of men and animals will without difficulty be found. But this supposes 
 two conditions : 1st, That a body of cavalry, and officers charged with the 
 duty of exacting requisitions, precede the march of the corps and compel 
 the inhabitants to bring the provisions to given points of the lines of 
 march (which could not be done when near the enemy) ; 2d, That the 
 troops advance continuously, day by day, with only an occasional halt. 
 Directly they become stationary, the supplies thus obtained fail. Thus, 
 whenever in presence of the enemy, or whenever stationary for more than 
 a day — that is to say, during a great part of a campaign — they must 
 depend on magazines collected in rear of the army; and the collection and 
 
38 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 distribution of these have been reduced by the Germans to a minutely- 
 organised system, which may be generally described thus : — 
 
 When the army enters an enemy's territory, the first magazines are 
 formed (generally by contractors) on its own frontiers. From thence their 
 contents are transmitted, if possible by rail, to within a safe distance of 
 the front of the army. Some at least of the more advanced magazines 
 are formed, whenever practicable, by obtaining in the enemy's territory 
 both supplies and the horses and waggons necessary to collect them. As 
 the army advances, others are established beyond these, the official in 
 charge of each magazine being responsible that it is always kept full. 
 But it is still necessary that the stores so collected shall be distributed to 
 the troops ; and for the purpose of maintaining constant communication 
 between them and their magazines, large supply-columns are attached to 
 each army corps. These are of two kinds, viz. — 
 
 1st, Those formed of waggons hired, or procured by requisition, in the 
 country, which carry forward the supplies from the magazines : 400 of 
 these waggons are attached to each army corps, capable of carrying 9 
 days' rations for men, or 7 days' corn for horses. In practice, a propor- 
 tionate combination of these supplies, according to the circumstances of 
 the case, is usually found necessary. 
 
 2d. The immediate supply-train, formed of 4-horse military waggons, 
 160 in number for each army corps, and usually carrying 4 days' rations 
 for men only. These, filling up either from the former columns, which 
 move on the principal roads, or, when practicable, direct from magazines 
 near them, convey so much provisions from thence to the troops through- 
 out their extended line. 
 
 Thus, when more than seven army corps were drawn up round Metz, 
 the roads of the district are described by an observer as crowded with 
 thousands of waggons carrying provisions from the great magazines at 
 the railway stations to the troops. 
 
 1 ■ But besides provisions, there are many items to swell the stream of 
 transport : ammunition to replace the expenditure of battle forms a large 
 one, and can only be obtained from the home manufactories ; sick and 
 wounded are sent back to hospitals formed in rear of the army ; and there 
 is a special postal service. 
 
 It may be imagined, then, under what difficulties a great army would 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 39 
 
 suddenly change the direction of its movement if it had not a carefully 
 Organised and administered system of supply and transport : as, for in- 
 stance, when the Crown Prince's army in 1870, in full march towards 
 Chalons, was suddenly wheeled to the right on the discovery of 
 MacMahon's march, when the German intendance proved equal to the 
 sudden strain. 
 
 In order to preserve a sufficient independence of magazines and trains 
 for the execution of sudden manoeuvres, the German soldiers carry in their 
 knapsacks rations for 3 days, made up in packets, which are only to be 
 opened when all other supplies fail ; and, in addition to these, at least one 
 ration of the ordinary kind, for immediate consumption, is commonly 
 carried in the haversack. 
 
 The effect of railways in modifying the conditions of war is in nothing Influence of 
 so important as in the supply of armies. The enormous transport trains rallwa y s on 
 which formerly passed between an army and its base may now be for 
 a great part of the distance dispensed with, and the connection will be 
 maintained with far greater speed and certainty. An immensely-increased 
 area will generally be available for immediate supplies, and particular 
 districts need no longer be subject to exhausting requisitions. The estab- 
 lishment of great magazines at the junction of important lines will be 
 effected with comparative ease, and the operations of army transport in 
 the form of horses and vehicles will be confined to the space between the 
 depots formed on the railways and the front of the army. The sick and 
 wounded, removed with ease and regularity, will no longer encumber the 
 movements of armies to the same extent as before, and the commanders 
 will be lightened of some of their heaviest cares. But the same principles Principles 
 as before must govern the selection of points on which to establish maga- sa PP 1 y 
 
 . . , , . unchanged. 
 
 zines, and the direction of the lines of supply. And as railways are a 
 more vulnerable kind of communication than ordinary roads, the general 
 will be not less solicitous than before to guard his communications from 
 the enterprises of the enemy. 
 
 In the campaign in Georgia, 1864 (described in Part IV., Chap. VI.), the Influence of 
 aid which Sherman derived from his railway was very important. He rallwa y s ex " 
 
 emplified in 
 
 was operating in a country where the obstacles were numerous and the sh ciman ' s 
 roads bad; and he was linked to his base by a single line of railway, 
 
40 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 campaign in conquered bit by bit from the enemy, who frequently broke it in retreat- 
 eorgia, j n g « This main road," he says in his Report, " has been admirably man- 
 
 aged, and has supplied this vast army (100,000 men) so that not a man, 
 horse, or mule, has been for a day without food, and with abundant sup- 
 plies of clothing and ammunition." Not only was the daily supply kept 
 up, but provisions for several weeks were stored at important points of 
 the communications. And throughout the campaign the cavalry on both 
 sides were extensively employed in enterprises against the railway, as the 
 most effectual means of damaging the enemy, 
 and in the In the campaigns of the Prussian army in France in 1870-71 it was 
 
 siege of Pans. f oun( j that, as a general calculation, one train a-day would feed a corps. 
 During the siege of Paris, one railway for some time fed the army of (in 
 round numbers) 200,000, brought up the siege material, and reinforce- 
 ments averaging 2000 to 3000 men a-day, and even at one time fed Prince 
 Frederick Charles's army also, with very slight aid from the resources of 
 the exhausted theatre of war. 
 
 Condition of 
 an army 
 whose sup- 
 plies are in- 
 tercepted. 
 
 It has been thought necessary to dwell so strongly on this part of the 
 subject, because it is absolutely essential as a foundation to any solid 
 superstructure of military theory, and because its importance is apt to 
 be overlooked by those who form estimates of warlike operations. It is 
 extremely difficult to persuade even intelligent auditors that two armies 
 are not like two fencers in an arena, who may shift their ground to 
 all points of the compass ; but rather resemble two swordsmen on a 
 narrow plank which overhangs an abyss, where .each has to think not 
 only of giving and parrying thrusts, but of keeping his footing under 
 penalty of destruction. The most unpractised general feds this at once 
 on taking a command in a district where his troops are no longer sup- 
 plied by routine ; or, if he does not, the loss of a single meal to his army 
 would sufficiently impress it on him. While distant spectators imagine 
 him to be intent only on striking or parrying a blow, he probably directs 
 a hundred glances, a hundred anxious thoughts, to the communications in 
 his rear, for one that he bestows on his adversary's front. Perhaps no 
 situation is more pitiable than that of a commander who has allowed an 
 enemy to sever his communications. He sees the end of his resources at 
 hand, but not the means to replenish them. Is he to spread his troops to 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 41 
 
 find subsistence for themselves ? How then shall they be assembled to 
 meet the enemy ? Shall he combine them for a desperate attack ? How, 
 if that attack fails, are they to be fed ? He will then have no alternative 
 but to make the best terms he can, or see his army dissolve like snow. 
 Even should there be near him large available stores of food, still if the 
 communication with his base be cut, his fate is merely postponed, for he 
 can neither procure cartridges and balls for his rifles, shot and shell for 
 his cannon, nor recruits for his ranks, to replace the waste of battle. All 
 leaders, then, must feel how stringent are the conditions under which 
 they move, and how considerable must be the prospective advantages 
 for which they will venture, even remotely, to risk the loss of their 
 communications. 
 
 It will be necessary, then, for the student who prepares to follow on Matters to be 
 the map the operations of a campaign, to begin by ascertaining the bases, no on e * 
 or points on both sides on^ which the armies ultimately relied for the study a cam- 
 supplies of munitions of war, and for the reinforcements which their r ai g n » 
 respective governments furnished ; constantly to note and bear in mind 
 the main roads by which, moving from their bases, they approached each 
 other ; and lastly, to mark the positions of the fronts of the armies in all 
 their changes. 
 
 Without these preliminaries he cannot hope to acquire a clear idea of 
 the merits, object, or effect of a single movement. 
 
PART II. 
 
 THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MUST PRECEDE THE 
 OPENING OF A CAMPAIGN. 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WAR. 
 
 defensive. 
 
 Eeasons for 
 choosing. 
 
 It is for gov- Before the commencement of hostilities, a belligerent government which 
 ernments to k n0 ws its own resources and those of its enemy must decide whether its 
 
 choose be- . . 
 
 tween the army shall make or await the attack. And though it has sometimes 
 offensive and happened, as in the Italian campaign of 1849 (Novara), that both parties 
 simultaneously advance across the frontier or region which separates 
 them into the territory occupied by the adversary, yet it is far more 
 usual, as might be expected, for one to dispose its forces on the defensive 
 and leave it to its antagonist to commence operations. The considerations 
 which induce a power to choose between a defensive and an offensive 
 attitude may be political, or geographical, or dependent on the relative 
 strength of the belligerents, or on the comparative facilities for assemble- 
 ment afforded by their respective systems of organisation. 
 
 At the beginning of the American civil war the Confederates stood 
 on the defensive. That this attitude was not chosen from weakness is 
 proved by the successes they met with in the first operations. In separat- 
 ing from the Union they had declared that they sought only their own 
 independence, not the subjugation of other states. Had they made war 
 in the North, as the Federals made war in Virginia, Louisiana, and 
 
THE OPERATIONS OF WAR EXPLAINED. 43 
 
 Georgia, they would have falsified the principles for which they took up 
 arms. And it is said that their President prevented them from advancing 
 upon Washington after the victory of Bull Hun, lest an invasion of the 
 North should injure the cause of secession. At any rate, sufficient 
 political reason may be assigned for their defensive attitude. 
 
 In 1812 and 1813 Wellington held the fortresses which closed the only See Map 
 highroads between Portugal and Spain — namely, Ciudad Itodrigo and 
 Badajos. Thus he possessed an impregnable frontier, and also the means 
 of issuing from it. These geographical circumstances gave to him and 
 denied to his adversaries the power of becoming the assailant. 
 
 When Turkey in 1877 was assailed by Eussia, it was out of the question 
 that she should do more than defend her own territory as best she might. 
 The fact of her inferior force reduced her to the defensive. 
 
 In 1870 the French intended to cross the PJiine in an offensive cam- 
 paign. But the superior readiness, for assemblement and movement, of 
 the German armies, enabled them to take the initiative. 
 
 But the reason for introducing this subject is not to discuss the various 
 cases where belligerents have chosen a part, but to point out the condi- 
 tions which attach respectively to offensive and defensive war. 
 
 It is evident that when one belligerent power feels secure behind an 
 unassailable frontier, and holds many issues into the enemy's territory, 
 either by command of the sea or otherwise, it can assemble its forces 
 unknown to its antagonist upon some point selected by itself, from whence 
 to make an irruption into the theatre of war. And if the belligerents be 
 divided only by a frontier line, — a river such as the PJiine or Potomac, 
 or a mountain-range such as the Alps, — the army that passes it will 
 nearly always find itself immensely superior to the force that can imme- 
 diately interpose. For the defender's army has by the conditions of the 
 defensive been spread so as to guard all possible avenues by which the 
 attack might be made. Thus, in the Waterloo campaign, Wellington 
 and Blucher, being on the defensive, were guarding all the roads from 
 the French frontier into Belgium, along a front of a hundred miles. 
 Napoleon suddenly assembled his whole army upon the centre of their 
 line, and, on first entering Belgium, w T as greatly superior to any force which 
 the opposing generals could interpose between him and his object, Brussels. 
 
 In the American civil war, Pdchmond being the point aimed at by 
 
44 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 The advan- 
 tage of as- 
 suming the 
 offensive. 
 
 the principal Northern army, the Federals could, behind the screen of 
 the Potomac, concentrate their forces and advance, either from the upper 
 Potomac down the Shenandoah Valley ; from Washington along the 
 Orange Eailroad to the Kappahannock ; from Acquia Creek, by the 
 Fredericksburg and Richmond Railway; by the peninsula between the 
 York and James Rivers, adopting either stream as a base ; or from the 
 south side of the James River by Petersburg. They used all of these 
 lines, and frequently advanced at first with numbers greatly superior 
 to those which the Confederates could assemble to oppose them. Thus 
 the great advantage conferred by the offensive is the Power of Con- 
 centration. And if this advantage be not neutralised by artificial or 
 natural defences, behind which the enemy can, with such forces as may 
 be at hand, retard the advance of the assailant till the whole defensive 
 army be also concentrated, it entails enormous chances of success. For 
 the defensive cordon being ruptured, and the concerted action of the 
 parts of the army lost, the assailant deals his blows right and left on the 
 scattered fragments, till his road to his object is clear. 
 
 At the outset, then, the assailant, when operating in a country suitable 
 for military movements, and defended only by an army — not by fortifica- 
 tions — has great chances in his favour. Nor does his advantage end with 
 the first onset ; for the defender is obliged to follow his lead, and to parry 
 his blows, instead of actively assailing him ; and while the invader is 
 executing designs already laid down in their minute particulars, and 
 knows what he is aiming at, and what steps the enemy will probably take 
 to foil him, which, being foreseen, may be provided for, that enemy is 
 operating to a certain extent in the dark, and perhaps neglects even to 
 use what power of concentration he may possess till too late, fearing lest 
 the attack should be a feint. Dislodged from his first positions, and dis- 
 concerted by finding that his troops are still scattered in presence of a 
 concentrated enemy, he will probably be too completely absorbed in the 
 essential measure of collecting them in some position between the invader 
 and his object, to devise offensive measures against him. Thus the first 
 success will lead to others, and each will more and more confirm the 
 invader in the possession of the advantage called by military writers the 
 initiative — that is, the power of compelling your adversary to make his 
 movements dependent on your own. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 45 
 
 But it is evident that the power which commences operations in this Cost of inva- 
 decisive way must not only possess great resources, but must also be able sion to the 
 to render them immediately available in the district wherein lies the "" 
 destined starting-point. And great preparations must be made, not only 
 for the collection of supplies, but for causing them to follow the forward 
 movements of the army. The most abundant stores will be of no avail if 
 there be deficiency of transport. The army, checked in its career, must 
 halt to await its supplies, or spread to gather them from the country. In 
 either case the impulse of the advance will be lost, and the initiative w T ill 
 be seized by a ready adversary. 
 
 On the other hand, the defensive army, being distributed over a wide Advantage of 
 area, is much more easily supplied. The resources of each district are tlie defensive - 
 probably adequate to maintain the troops occupying it. The necessary 
 stores, instead of being directed at great cost of transport upon some par- 
 ticular focus, are collected at many central points. The roads by which 
 the army is supplied from the rear are numerous, and transport is thus 
 immensely facilitated ; and when compelled to retire, it falls back amidst 
 its magazines, and the requirements of transport are more likely to dimin- 
 ish than to increase. Thus, comparing the tax which war levies on bel- 
 ligerents, the greater strain evidently falls at the outset on the power 
 that undertakes offensive operations ; and, in modern times, none but a 
 highly- organised system for developing and administering the resources 
 of a state, directed by a paramount and concentrated authority, such as 
 that of a despotic government, can be adequate to begin and maintain 
 them effectually. 
 
 If, however, a belligerent has the means to sustain the offensive effectu- 
 ally, it is evidently the least expensive course in the long-run, since deci- 
 sive success will throw the burden of the war on the conquered territory. 
 Thus Napoleon, in several offensive campaigns, almost without a check, 
 ruined the military power of great monarchies, and imposed on them 
 what terms he pleased. But such rapid successes are exceptional where 
 armies are not very unequal in force, and it is necessary to consider the 
 position of an invader who advances continually from his base against 
 strong opposition. 
 
 An army operating on its own territory is not restricted, like the in- 
 vader, to a single line. It is true that its efforts may all be directed to 
 
46 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Advantages 
 of an army 
 operating in 
 its own 
 country. 
 
 See Map 
 No. 8. 
 
 cover a single point aimed at by the enemy, as the efforts of the army of 
 Virginia had for their grand object to defend Richmond. But to defend 
 a point it is not necessary to interpose directly between it and the enemy. 
 Provided supplies can be obtained in other directions, the defensive army 
 may assume a front on one side of the line by which the assailant is 
 advancing, and parallel to it ; and so long as it is undefeated, it is evident 
 the enemy cannot advance except under penalty of being cut from his 
 base. Thus McClellan advances upon Pdchmond from the Pamunkey at 
 White House, while the Confederates are spread over a front extending 
 from Pdchmond to Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley. But the force 
 in the Valley under Jackson, drawing its supplies probably from Lynch- 
 burg, advances in an easterly direction upon Hanover ; the troops before 
 Pdchmond join it; the front of the Confederates thus no longer looks 
 north, but east ; and McClellan, fearing at the next move to be cut from 
 his base, lets go his hold of the Pamunkey and transfers his stores to the 
 James Eiver just in time to save his army from destruction. 
 
 This mode of operating, then, which is open to the whole defensive 
 army, is also open to a part of it. A single corps drawing its subsistence 
 for a time from points on the prolongation of the flanks of the general 
 line may operate on either side against the roads which connect the in- 
 vader with his base. The enemy must protect these roads either by 
 occupying all the avenues by which they could be assailed with adequate 
 forces, in case those avenues are few ; or should the exposed points of the 
 line of communication be numerous, then by detaching movable corps to 
 guard it throughout its length, and to protect the convoys. With each 
 step that the invader makes in advance, the difficulties of guarding the 
 line increase in proportion to its length, and the force detached for its 
 protection increases also. Nothing except the disabling of the enemy by 
 heavy defeats can prevent these enterprises against the communications ; 
 but the force which can be collected for battle is constantly decreasing 
 with the length of the line, till the defender may find himself, notwith- 
 standing the losses he may have suffered earlier in the campaign, superior 
 in number on the point of collision in the later stages, and, snatching the 
 initiative, may force his adversary to defend himself in retreat. 
 
 A notable illustration of the dangers of a long line of communication 
 is furnished by Napoleon's Russian campaign. During his advance upon 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 47 
 
 Moscow, two Russian corps were moving, the one from Finland, the other 
 from the south of the empire, towards his line of communications. They 
 struck it where it crossed the Beresina, and caused the horrible disasters 
 of that famous retreat. 
 
 If a defensive army were to restrict itself entirely to parrying blows, Impolicy of 
 the enemy, feeling secure in his communications from the inertness of his °P L ' ratlons 
 
 absolutely 
 
 opponent, would be enabled to keep his fighting power undiminished by defensive. 
 detachments in the rear. To pursue such a course, then, even when very 
 inferior in force, is suicidal in a defender; since a detachment judiciously 
 menacing the enemy's communications may hold in check (or let us say, 
 in military parlance, may contain) a much greater number of the enemy, 
 and proportionably diminish the disparity between the main armies. It 
 does not follow, then, that because an army is defending a territory it 
 must confine itself to the defensive ; on the contrary, it will best effect 
 its purpose by actively threatening its adversary, and by taking the lead 
 whenever an opportunity offers. 
 
 Such are some of the advantages and disadvantages which attach re- Balance of 
 spectively to offensive and defensive warfare, and which mainly depend advanta g e - 
 on the question of magazines and lines communicating with them. The 
 offensive confers, at the outset, the power of concentrating on the flank or 
 centre of the enemy's line of defence, and so turning or breaking it. The 
 defender must either oppose the enemy with an inferior force at first, or 
 abandon territory in order to assemble his forces at some point farther 
 back. On the other hand, offensive war demands great resources, and 
 success itself, if not absolute and decisive, entails fresh difficulties on the 
 invader. And when he has penetrated far within the defender's territory, 
 the situations of the antagonists differ greatly, inasmuch as the army on 
 the offensive is bound to its base, be that base wide or narrow, while 
 the defensive forces may base themselves on any part of their territory 
 which will supply them, and which their front protects. 
 
 As facility of transporting troops and material increases, so the power Subject of this 
 of concentrating the military resources of an empire on a distant frontier, °" a P ter as 
 
 /> r • i • affected by 
 
 for entrance on a foreign theatre ot war, increases also, and so far his own ra ii ways . 
 railways are of great help to an invader. But as he cannot count for sub- 
 sequent aid on the railways of districts held by the enemy, nor be certain 
 
48 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Great prepa- 
 rations still 
 necessary for 
 invasion. 
 
 Railways 
 facilitate the 
 first opera- 
 tions of the 
 assailant. 
 
 Reasons why 
 they subse- 
 quently 
 favour the 
 defence. 
 
 Influence that 
 railways 
 might have 
 exercised on 
 the Waterloo 
 campaign. 
 
 See Maps Nos. 
 9 and 10. 
 
 that the course of events will not make districts where there are no rail- 
 ways the scene of operations, he must be dependent on horses and vehicles 
 for further supplies. Thus we find great preparations made by France 
 for transport in Italy in 1859 ; and the railways of the Northern States 
 of America did not prevent a vast expenditure of transport animals in 
 the different invasions of the South. Offensive, compared with defensive, 
 war, must still be enormously costly. But the invader will retain and 
 even augment, by means of his railways, the advantage of making a sudden 
 concentrated advance on part of an extended line of defence ; and even the 
 combined resources of telegraphs and railways could not avail to meet the 
 lirst onset under circumstances geographically unfavourable to the defence, 
 such as will be described in subsequent chapters ; especially when it is 
 considered that the defender must labour under the same doubts as before 
 in divining whether the attack is real or a feint. 
 
 But, on the other hand, the defender, if forced to retreat, will easily 
 destroy for the time the railways in the territory which he is quitting, 
 while preserving the full use of those which he still covers ; whereas the 
 assailant must either content himself with the ordinary roads, or pause 
 to repair the railways and to reorganise the means of supply through 
 those channels. Thus the advantages of the initiative will, in such a 
 case, be much more transient than before, and the defender will con- 
 centrate on the threatened line with far greater comparative facility. 
 
 Taking the example of the Waterloo campaign, let us suppose the theatre 
 covered with the railways that now exist there. Napoleon would have 
 concentrated his troops with great ease in the same space within which 
 he assembled them, by means of the railways from Paris, to Lille and 
 Valenciennes, to Maubeuge, and to Philippeville, and the lines connecting 
 them. His advance, no less unforeseen by the Allies than it really was, 
 would have carried him over the Sambre and on Fleurus. But the 
 Prussian corps which halted at Ligny would have been reinforced by the 
 two corps from Ciney and Namur ; and Bulow's junction could scarcely 
 have failed, as it actually did, of accomplishment in time for the battle. 
 Thus the Prussians would have effected their concentration with more 
 ease and certainty. But there is no apparent reason why Wellington, still 
 doubting if the enemy's advance were real, and expecting their attack on 
 his right, should have assembled his troops on the 16th so much faster 
 
/ 
 
 EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 IFQ% 
 
 than he actually did, as to effect more than to check Ney's progress. So 
 far then, the invading force, supposing it on a fair equality in numbers 
 with its adversaries, would have held the advantage. Granting that under 
 such circumstances it should still be victorious at Ligny, the Prussians, 
 however, would now have had the aid of two lines of rail by which to 
 retire behind the Dyle — that of Gembloux-Ottignies-Brussels, and that of 
 Tilly-Ottignies-Wavre. The movement having been contemplated in the 
 plan of campaign, platforms for embarking and disembarking would have 
 been laid, and rolling-stock accumulated, the heavy baggage could have 
 been kept at a distance, and preparations made for supplying the army 
 for a time through Louvain, by means of the line from Liege to that place. 
 Under these circumstances, not only would the roads have been left unen- 
 cumbered to the troops, but the infantry, at least, of two corps might have 
 been conveyed beyond the Dyle by rail, and the whole army might have 
 passed the stream on the afternoon of the 17th, while part of it would have 
 had ample time to reach the field of Waterloo before night. Napoleon, 
 following Wellington to Waterloo, would therefore have been confronted 
 by the united armies of the Allies. 
 
 This, however, is an extreme case, because Belgium is more thickly 
 intersected with railways than any country in Europe. In the campaigns 
 of 1859 and 1866, the more important movements of troops were not 
 effected by rail — the railways are few, and were chiefly used as lines of 
 supply. 
 
 It would appear from the course of the foregoing argument that an Assailant's 
 invader (supposing other circumstances to be favourable) should direct cnoice oi a 
 
 . line of opera- 
 
 his attack on a part of the theatre where railways exercise small lniiu- tion a ff ecte d 
 ence, since their effect is on the whole in favour of the defender. by railways. 
 
 The movement to a flank, of large bodies, by rail, within reach of the Danger of 
 enemy, must be especially dangerous, because the troops follow each flank move - 
 other in small isolated fractions, and are very defenceless if attacked 
 during their transit. An insignificant detachment may therefore, with 
 little risk to itself, interrupt the movement of a considerable force, and 
 even inflict on it serious injury, by a well-timed and well-directed 
 attack ; whereas the compact march of a large body by ordinary roads 
 could only be impeded by a force proportionately great. 
 
50 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE SELECTION OF AN OBJECT. 
 
 What are 
 generally the 
 objects of 
 military 
 operations. 
 
 Conquest of 
 territory. 
 
 Occupation of 
 an enemy's 
 capital. 
 
 It is clear that offensive operations cannot be conducted with unity, or 
 directed with precision, unless the object to be gained by them is kept 
 distinctly in view by those who plan and execute the campaign. Where 
 territory easily accessible to the power that assumes the offensive is the 
 subject of dispute, the object will generally be to occupy the country in 
 question. Thus Louis Napoleon rested satisfied with driving the Austri- 
 ans beyond the Mincio, and adding the country westward of that river to 
 the dominions of Sardinia. But whether in such a case hostilities will 
 terminate with the occupation of the province must depend on the ability 
 of the other belligerent to continue the struggle. Frederick II. began 
 the Silesian wars by seizing Silesia, the primary object of desire ; but the 
 conflict that ensued thereupon lasted twenty years. Whenever the causa 
 belli is something less definite and tangible than disputed territory, the 
 undeniable superiority of one belligerent and the acquisition of some 
 material guarantee can alone be expected to bring the adversary to terms. 
 That guarantee is generally sought in an enemy's capital. The occupation 
 of its chief city paralyses a civilised country. As all great roads meet 
 there — as it is the centre of trade, the focus of wealth and of civilisation, 
 and the seat of government — its occupation by an enemy is so ruinous 
 that any terms he may impose will generally be less pernicious than his 
 presence. 
 
 But it is not sufficient to enter the capital unless possession of it can 
 be maintained. In 1757 an Austrian general of hussars entered Berlin 
 and levied a contribution on the city, but being forced to quit it on the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 51 
 
 approach of the Prussian King, the incident produced no result. Na- 
 poleon held Madrid for four years, and set up his brother as King of 
 Spain, yet the Peninsular war went on in half the provinces of the king- 
 dom, lie seized Vienna in 1805, and again in 1809, yet in each case a 
 great subsequent victory was necessary to the overthrow of the enemy's 
 power. The mere possession of the capital, then, is not final so long as 
 the enemy can still make head in the field. It is when the seizure of the Defeat of the 
 capital is coupled with such ascendancy over the defensive armies that defenslve 
 
 ,..,,, armies also 
 
 they can never hope to retake it, that further resistance is felt to be hope- neC essary. 
 less, as leading only to national extinction, and that any terms not abso- 
 lutely unendurable are accepted by the vanquished. Eecognising these 
 truths, Napoleon's first efforts were directed to disorganise and ruin the 
 enemy's armies in the field ; his next step, when the way was clear, was 
 to seize the capital, and then with his clutch on the heart of the coun- 
 try, with the public opinion of all nations strongly influenced by his 
 commanding attitude, and with the opposing armies disheartened by 
 misfortune, he advanced to deal the stroke that was finally to lay the 
 antagonist power prostrate. 
 
 It sometimes happens that a point may assume an adventitious Sebastopol an 
 importance, sufficient to make it the object of a campaign. Sebastopol exceptional 
 is a remarkable instance. Situated at the extremity of an obscure and 
 unimportant province, the conquest of which would be no step towards 
 the invasion of Eussia, this city, formidable by reason of its docks and 
 arsenals, was, from its proximity to Constantinople, characterised as a 
 standing menace to Turkey, and as such was of sufficient importance to 
 be the object of the vast efforts made in that war by France and England. 
 
 Such cases are, however, exceptional, and the general course of a cam- 
 paign between two great powers is a series of manoeuvres and engage- 
 ments for the possession of the capital or other specially important town 
 of the power that stands on the defensive. And it is evident that the 
 course of the war must vary with the distance of the invader's frontier 
 from the menaced point. If Erance were to make war upon Italy, the 
 invading army might, as soon as it had secured the passage of the Alps 
 by the Mont Cenis, reach Turin in a single march. But if Austria were 
 at war with Italy, the Italian capital is much more secure from an 
 adversary whose armies must traverse the breadth of North Italy to 
 
52 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 attain it. The proximity of Richmond to Washington caused the Federal 
 Government in each campaign in Virginia to base its calculations on the 
 assumption that the operations of a few days, or at most a few weeks, 
 must wrest from its adversary's hold the city from the possession of which 
 it expected such decisive results. And no doubt early in the war, before 
 the capital was fortified, a single crushing defeat sustained by the Con- 
 Intermediate federates in the field would have given Richmond to the Federals. But 
 
 object found j n cases w h ere a great distance separates the invader from his object, he 
 
 in a defensive . 
 
 line. cannot expect to attain it in a single effort. Thus, if France were at war 
 
 with Austria, she could scarcely expect, in the most favourable circum- 
 stances, to reach Vienna in one campaign. Her first object would be to 
 attain a position in Austrian territory which would form a secure starting- 
 point for a fresh effort. If she were aiming at Vienna through Germany, 
 and a French army could advance between the Danube and the Tyrol, 
 securing the passages of the Danube on the one side and of the mountains 
 on the other, till it could rest on one of the great streams flowing across 
 the space between, such as the Iser or the Inn, it might establish itself 
 there, and collect its strength for a fresh effort in another campaign. If 
 France were at war with Spain, the first object of a French army might 
 be the line of the Ebro — the next, the line of the Douro or of the Guad- 
 arama mountains — then Madrid and the Tagus. Thus the object of an 
 invading army may be either a point from the possession of which it 
 expects decisive results, or a strong defensive line such as will be an 
 important step towards that point. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 53 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE SELECTION OF A THEATEE OF OPERATIONS, AND 
 LINE BY WHICH TO OPERATE. 
 
 When great powers are at war there will generally lie along their exten- 
 sive frontiers many portions of territory by any of which the belligerents 
 can pass towards their object. In America, Eastern Virginia, Western 
 Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and many points on the seaboard, have 
 been entered by invading armies from the North. French campaigns 
 against Austria have been made in Italy, in the Tyrol, in Suabia, and 
 Bavaria, and along the Mayne. Napoleon made war in Spain by the 
 east side of the Pyrenees in Catalonia and Aragon, and by the west side 
 in Castile, Leon, and Estremadura. 
 
 Evidently there is much scope for selection among the regions that Several alter- 
 may become the theatre of war. And each of these regions generally natlves mav 
 affords many lines by which the invader may aim at his object. The 
 main Federal army of the Potomac in various campaigns advanced, 
 or attempted to advance, upon Richmond by the lines Alexandria-Cen- 
 treville, Acquia-Fredericksburg, White House, Malvern Hill, and Peters- 
 burg. And in aiming at the valley of the Danube, the French have 
 penetrated to it by many different routes. In 1796 Moreau crossed at 
 Kehl, and directed his army by the northern border of the Black Forest 
 upon Ulm. In 1800 the same general advanced from the Swiss portion 
 of the Khine along the southern skirts of the Black Forest. In 1805 
 Napoleon crossed the Bhine at Carlsruhe, Spire, and Mannheim, march- 
 ing on Donauwerth. 
 
 "When England sends forth an army, the command of the sea enables 
 
54 
 
 THE OPEEATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Considera- 
 tions for 
 selection of 
 a theatre. 
 
 her to select as her base of operation any part of a coast from which she 
 can reach the enemy. English armies operated during the Peninsular 
 war from Mondego Bay, from Lisbon, from the coast of Andalucia, from 
 parts of the eastern coast, and from harbours in the Bay of Biscay. At 
 the outset of the Eussian war in 1854, the Allies landed at Varna to 
 operate on the Danube ; later, they crossed the Black Sea for the cam- 
 paign of the Crimea. If it is necessary for great Continental nations 
 to make a wise choice between many alternatives when considering what 
 their territorial line shall be, much more is it incumbent upon England 
 to summon her most sagacious chiefs to council before committing her- 
 self to one of the numerous avenues which her maritime ascendancy will 
 offer for her choice. 
 
 Many considerations will commonly enter into this question of selec- 
 tion. The convenience and security of the base — the position of the 
 enemy's forces — the facilities, in the shape of good and practicable roads, 
 for reaching the object — the proximity to the object — the fitness of the 
 topographical character of the theatre to the army destined to operate in 
 it, — will all be elements in the problem. If that portion of the invader's 
 frontier which is contiguous to the territory occupied by the main army 
 of the defensive power be impregnable, that will be good reason for 
 making some other region the theatre of war. If, on the contrary, the 
 invader's frontier be extensive and open, it will generally be expedient 
 for him to base himself on that portion of it which will be covered from 
 a counter-invasion by his advance. Thus the most vulnerable part of 
 the French frontier in 1815 was opposite Belgium ; and had Napoleon 
 crossed the Ehenish or Alpine boundary, making Germany or Italy the 
 theatre of war, Blucher and Wellington could have marched on Paris ; 
 whereas, by advancing into Belgium, and trusting to the strong natural 
 boundaries to keep the enemy from invading France at other points, the 
 Emperor covered with his army, so long as it remained undefeated, the 
 otherwise exposed part of his territory. 
 
 The power meditating the offensive must also consider the fitness of 
 the theatre to its own army. If that army have a preponderating strength 
 in cavalry, an open country will suit it best ; if infantry be its chief 
 reliance, a hilly or wooded region, which may neutralise the enemy's 
 superiority in the other arms ; if artillery, good roads and positions which 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 55 
 
 command sufficient expanse of country, will be indispensable to its most 
 effective action. To determine this point a broad and general survey will 
 suffice. But a more intimate acquaintance with the topography of the 
 theatre, and a knowledge of strategy, are required, in order to determine 
 the further questions of what points in that theatre are most important as 
 steps towards the object, and what are the chances of gaining possession 
 of them. 
 
 As an example of the way in which, after admitting all these various Example of 
 elements of the question of selecting a theatre, a balance may be struck selectlon m 
 
 , Marengo 
 
 and a decision formed, let us take the case of the campaign of Marengo, campaign. 
 
 While Moreau operated from the Ehine on the Danube, Napoleon was 
 to attack the Austrians in Italy. They were besieging a French garrison See Map 
 in Genoa ; they had advanced and occupied the passes of the Alps on the No# 5> 
 Italian side from Lake Maggiore down to the junction of the Apennines ; 
 and they had a considerable force south of the Apennines endeavouring 
 to force their way into France across the Var, which river was defended 
 with inferior numbers by Suchet. Thus the Austrian front extended 
 along the whole Italian frontier of France. 
 
 Napoleon's objects were to deliver the besieged garrison of Genoa, 
 and to strike a decisive blow against the Austrians in Piedmont and 
 Lombardy. 
 
 The Austrian lines of communication with their base and of retreat 
 led from the various points of their front to Mantua and Verona, and, 
 owing to the geographical features of North Italy, all the roads by which 
 they could gain those cities were compressed laterally into the space 
 between Milan and Piacenza. If Napoleon could throw his army across 
 that space, he would effect a double object — he would cut the commu- 
 nications of the enemy, and, by forcing them to concentrate for action, 
 would deliver Genoa. 
 
 The object of his campaign, then, w r as the space from Milan to Pia- 
 cenza; and his first task was to choose the line by which to advance 
 to it. 
 
 North Italy is divided into three unequal portions by the Po and the 
 Apennines. And as it would be manifestly unwise to advance on both 
 sides of either of these obstacles, Napoleon had to determine which of 
 the three intervals of space he would operate in. 
 
56 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 The space between the Apennines and the sea being narrow, was favour- 
 able to an inferior force ; and Napoleon's army was inferior in number 
 to the Austrian. The region was mountainous, and therefore the French 
 army, strongest in its infantry, would there meet the enemy, whose great 
 superiority lay in cavalry and artillery, under the most favourable con- 
 ditions. But successes here must be slow ; the Austrians, when pushed 
 back, would constantly be reinforced through the passes of the Apen- 
 nines ; and, in retiring, they would still cover the siege of Genoa. If 
 beaten they would be driven along their proper line of retreat to the 
 shelter of their fortresses on the Mincio and Adige. 
 
 In the space between the Apennines and the Po three fortresses existed, 
 those of Turin, Coni, and Alessandria, each a stumbling-block in the way 
 of an advancing army. This, too, was the centre of the Austrian line, 
 and the centre of a line can manifestly be reinforced by the rest more 
 easily than either extremity. The fortresses would bar the way to the 
 French long enough to give the Austrians time to concentrate. By hold- 
 ing the passes of the Apennines they would prevent the French force on 
 the Var from advancing to the relief of Genoa ; and, if defeated, they 
 would still, in falling back, cover the siege, and would, as in the former 
 case, retire on their proper line of retreat. 
 
 In both these regions, then, the Austrian army would interpose between 
 Napoleon and his object, and, in the second case, with great advantages 
 for opposing his advance. Moreover, it was a part of his plan that his 
 insufficient numbers should be recruited by a detachment sent from 
 Moreau's army on the Danube. The road from thence to the French 
 frontier of Italy was long and difficult, and the junction of this co-opera- 
 tive force could not be hoped for in time to be effective. 
 
 In the remaining space between Switzerland and the Po, the Austrians, 
 besides being far weaker in numbers than at any other part of their line, 
 were most widely extended ; and no fortresses existed here. This space, 
 therefore, in which lay the most direct road to Milan, offered the most 
 favourable conditions ; and once at Milan, the main army might be joined 
 by the corps sent by Moreau, which, crossing Switzerland, would descend 
 the St Gothard Pass to Bellinzona. But this region was also by far the 
 most difficult of attainment of the three, sheltered as it was by the Alps, 
 the rugged passes of which, though but weakly guarded, seemed to forbid 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 57 
 
 the passage of an army. The other parts of the frontier were crossed by 
 
 the roads which formed the regular communications between France and 
 
 Italy, while in this northern corner the high mountains, covered with 
 
 perpetual snow, and passable only by steep and perilous tracks, seemed 
 
 an insurmountable barrier. But beyond this obstacle Napoleon beheld 
 
 his object ready for his grasp. Disregarding difficulties, he pushed his 
 
 troops over the Alps, and was at Milan almost before the Austrians knew 
 
 of his presence in Italy. Joined there by the detachment from the army 
 
 of the Rhine, he guarded the passes of the Ticino with half his forces 
 
 facing westward, and with the rest crossed the Po and occupied the road 
 
 to Piacenza. He was too late to save Genoa, which had been forced by 
 
 famine to capitulate ; but, on the other hand, the Austrians, unwilling to 
 
 abandon the siege when on the verge of success, delayed the retreat of 
 
 the investing force, which, by a more rapid march, might have held the 
 
 south bank of the Po against the French, and secured the road there by 
 
 which to regain Mantua. Thus the capture of Genoa only assured the 
 
 defeat of the Austrians by depriving them of their one chance of escape. 
 
 Cut from their line, they were forced to fight at Marengo with their faces 
 
 to their proper rear, and, when defeated, nothing remained for them but 
 
 to capitulate. 
 
 But the selection of a line is not decided always on military grounds Political ele- 
 
 alone. Political considerations frequently complicate the problem. That ments m 
 
 selection, 
 which is of most importance is the effect which the war may have on the 
 
 policy of nations whose territories are between, or adjacent to, the fron- 
 tiers of the belligerents. In the wars of the French Revolution, Austrian 
 armies were sometimes forced to hold the line of the Rhine, when good 
 military reasons would have dictated a different course, because of the 
 effect which would certainly be produced on the German powers border- 
 ing on the river — Baden, "Wirteraberg, &c. — by leaving them uncovered. 
 In the campaign of Jena, the Prussian army would have found the Elbe a 
 secure and convenient line of defence, but Saxony and Hesse-Cassel would 
 be thus left unprotected, whereas Prussia, by covering their territories 
 with her army, would secure their co-operation and add their contingents 
 to her numerical force. For that reason she was induced to take up a line 
 which was the cause of all her disasters. At the outset of the war with 
 Russia in 185-4, the first design of the Allies was to engage their armies 
 
58 
 
 THE OPEEATIONS OF WAR EXPLAINED. 
 
 Selection 
 of theatre 
 should rest 
 with the 
 government, 
 
 execution of 
 the campaign 
 with the 
 general. 
 
 in the defence of Turkey south of the Danube ; and when the Turks, 
 single-handed, beat off the invaders, it seemed most natural that all the 
 Allied forces should combine to carry the war beyond the Danube. But 
 in such a case it became of primary importance to consider what side 
 Austria would take, because her position on the flank of what would then 
 be the theatre of war gave her the power of decisive action. Her policy 
 was a question for the Allied Governments to consider, and the result of 
 their deliberations was to transfer their armies to the Crimea. 
 
 Demanding, then, as this question does, diplomatic as well as military 
 sagacity, it will be most effectually solved when the chief of the State 
 combines the characters of ruler and soldier ; and it is not the least of the 
 advantages which a military autocrat, like Frederick or Napoleon, possesses 
 in war, that all the circumstances are apprehended by a single mind, and 
 the decision has all the force and coherence which unity imparts. But 
 when generals are commissioned by their governments to execute warlike 
 enterprises, the questions which depend chiefly on diplomacy must of 
 necessity be solved by statesmen, who, having thus given to the campaign 
 its original impulse and direction, will do well to leave the formation and 
 execution of the military plan in the hands of the general. 
 
PART III. 
 
 OPERATIONS ILLUSTEATING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 
 THE FRONTS OF OPPOSING ARMIES AND THEIR 
 
 RESPECTIVE LINES OF COMMUNICATION 
 
 WITH THEIR BASES. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS ON THE MODE OF TREATING THE 
 SUBJECT OF THE WORK. 
 
 The Theatre of War is the province of Strategy — the Field of Battle is the 
 province of Tactics. All operations must ultimately rely for success upon 
 power of fighting ; for it is of no avail to conduct an army into situa- 
 tions which it cannot maintain in battle. It is the object of Strategy so General 
 to direct the movements of an army, that when decisive collisions occur 0D J ect of 
 it shall encounter the enemy with increased relative advantage. If two 
 armies advance towards each other till they meet, both equally covering 
 their own communications, and equally ready to concentrate for action, it 
 is evident that strategy has no share in the result ; for all that has been 
 done is to bring them face to face, and leave it to force or tactical skill 
 to decide the issue. But when the movements of one of two armies 
 have been so directed as to increase the chances in its favour, by forcing 
 the enemy either to engage at a disadvantage, or to abandon territory 
 
60 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Kinds of ad- 
 vantage to be 
 attained by 
 strategy. 
 
 Particular 
 objects of 
 strategical 
 movements. 
 
 under penalty of worse disaster, there is proof of a power which differs 
 from the mere ability to fight. The purely military advantages to be 
 attained by strategical operations are of two kinds : 1st, The Probabilities 
 of Victory; 2d, The Consequences of Victory. Two armies may incur 
 equal risk of disaster in case of defeat, but the chances of victory may be 
 greatly in favour of one. Thus, of armies whose communications are 
 equally secure, one may be scattered while the other is concentrated 
 within striking distance, and the first may thus be defeated piecemeal. 
 Or the probabilities of victory may be evenly balanced, while the conse- 
 quences of defeat may be much more disastrous to one than the other. 
 For instance, if a French army have placed itself between an Austrian 
 army and its base without relinquishing its own communications, and 
 the Austrian has no alternative but to break through, in the battle which 
 ensues the chances of victory may be evenly balanced (in fact at Marengo, 
 a case in point, the probabilities of victoiy were on the side of the 
 Austrians) ; but defeat will be to the French army merely defeat — to the 
 Austrian it will be ruin. A general may succeed in combining on his 
 own side both these kinds of advantage, and the triumph of strategy 
 is complete when the commander of one of two originally equal forces 
 succeeds, by the combinations of the campaign, in bringing his adver- 
 sary's army into a position where the chances of victory are greatly 
 against it, and where defeat will entail disasters beyond the loss of the 
 battle. 
 
 In the following chapters strategical movements will be considered as 
 having the following objects : 1st, To menace or assail the enemy's com- 
 munications with his base; 2d, To destroy the coherence and concerted 
 action of his army, by breaking the communications which connect the -parts ; 
 3d, To effect superior concentrations on particular points. And as, which- 
 ever mode a general may adopt, it is essential that he should always 
 maintain his own communications with his base, so the part of the subject 
 first discussed will be the circumstances by which the security of those 
 communications will be specially affected. 
 
 It is evident to the least instructed that the presence of rivers, moun- 
 tains, and other obstacles in the theatre of war, must exercise a powerful 
 modifying influence on the operations. A part of the work is therefore 
 devoted to the discussion of Obstacles — the nature of the difficulties 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. Gl 
 
 they interpose, and their effect in various circumstances. It may be 
 
 said, that as no theatre of war can well be devoid of such features, this 
 
 chapter should have preceded the others ; but it has been judged other- Military 
 
 wise, for these reasons : that they greatly complicate and increase the P roljlems 
 
 p involving 
 difficulty of appreciating campaigns, and that campaigns illustrative ot oljstacles are 
 
 the broader principles of strategy may be found which are intelligible deferred. 
 
 without reference to the obstacles; whereas, for the appreciation of 
 
 obstacles, it is quite necessary to have an idea of the relations between 
 
 the fronts of hostile armies and their respective lines of communication. 
 
 These and other relations are therefore discussed first in the simplest 
 
 form practicable — then the obstacles ; and the student ought after that 
 
 to be prepared to enter on the discussion of any strategical operation 
 
 whatsoever. 
 
 Battles, besides being incidents which may occur at any period of a Battles, 
 campaign, bear also in their objects and manceuvres a close relation to 
 the operations of strategy ; and in a course of lectures on military art 
 it is well to treat of both subjects simultaneously ; but in this work it 
 has been thought better to keep them separate, and to give strategy the 
 precedence. In the strategical chapters, therefore, battles will be adverted 
 to merely as incidents in the campaign. 
 
 The plan of arrangement followed in the narrative of campaigns is one Plan followed 
 
 that is recommended to all students of strategy. The circumstances m narratin s 
 
 • • campaigns, 
 
 which it is necessary to know in order to understand the position ot the 
 
 opposing armies at the outset of a campaign, are first briefly recounted ; 
 then the fronts, the bases, and the lines connecting them are defined ; next 
 the plans of the generals on each side are discussed. Then the opera- 
 tions of the campaign are related in the simplest and most methodical 
 form, without comment ; for not only is the course of the operations 
 rendered clearer by keeping the commentary separate, but the student is 
 thus at liberty to exercise Ms own faculties in accounting for the move- 
 ments. Lastly, the situation at each stage is commented on; and as 
 every campaign furnishes examples of many points of war besides that 
 which it has been specially selected to illustrate, these are noted and 
 discussed. Deductions, which seem to be of particularly wide applica- 
 tion, are presented in a definite form for future use ; but nothing is 
 offered in that shape, unless it is so far supported by fact and argument 
 
62 THE OrERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 as to have a title to the reader's assent. Nothing is more common than 
 to find in writings on military matters reference to " the rules of war," 
 and assertions such as that some general "violated every principle of 
 war ; " or that some other general owed his success to " knowing when 
 to dispense with the rules of war." It would be difficult to say what 
 these rules are, or in what code they are embodied ; and an inquirer 
 who is somewhat puzzled, perhaps, to understand how the highest pro- 
 ficiency can be displayed in a science by defiance of its principles, had 
 better resolve to base his own conclusions upon fact and reason alone, 
 when he will probably discover that such criticisms have only very vague 
 ideas for their foundation. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. G3 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE EFFECT OF OPERATING ON A FRONT PARALLEL TO THE 
 LINE OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE BASE. 
 
 Eeverting to the account given in Chapter IV. of the positions of the 
 Austrian and French armies at Solferino, we shall see that their fronts 
 were parallel to each other, and that each covered its own lines of com- 
 munication with the base. Had the French been defeated they would 
 have retired on the roads by which they had advanced, and from which 
 it was not in the power of the Austrians to sever them ; and when the 
 Austrians were defeated they retired to the other side of the Mincio on the 
 roads by which they had quitted the river. There was no exhibition on 
 either side of strategical art ; none of the movements on either side since 
 the battle of Magenta had altered the chances of success ; and the result 
 was altogether due to tactics. To find illustrations of the power of 
 strategy to affect an army through its communications, we must seek 
 elsewhere than in cases where the fronts of the armies are perpendicular 
 to their lines of retreat. 
 
 For convenience of supply nothing can be better than a road which, 
 coming direct from the base, passes along the rear of the army throughout 
 its length. The harbour of Kamiesch, in the Crimea, was the base of the 
 French army, from whence a road was made traversing the rear of the 
 camp. Thus depots might be created at any point, and every part of the 
 army was equally near to its supplies. Had the army changed front to 
 the right upon its centre so as to be perpendicularly across the road, the 
 wings would no longer have been supplied with the same facility as before. 
 
G4 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 So far, then, it is convenient for an army to operate parallel to its com- 
 munications with the base. But is it safe ? Is it a matter of indifference 
 whether the front of an army is perpendicular or parallel to the line in 
 question ? 
 
 The campaign of Novara, in 1849, between the Sardinians, under their 
 king Charles Albert, and the Austrians, under Marshal Eadetzky, has been 
 selected to illustrate this matter, because it was very brief, is clear as 
 an example, and free from any difficulties which a complicated theatre of 
 war would entail at this stage on the reader, since it took place in the 
 space between the Sesia and Ticino, which was equally open to the move- 
 ments on both sides, for the Terdoppio and Agogna streams are incon- 
 siderable obstacles. 
 
 See Map 
 No. 12. 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF NOVARA, 1849. 
 
 • 
 
 When hostilities (suspended after the campaign of 1848) recommenced, 
 the opposing armies faced each other on the Ticino, a deep swift stream 
 about 70 yards wide. On the 12th March the Sardinians gave notice 
 that the armistice then existing was to terminate on the 20th of the 
 same month. 
 
 Their army in the space which was the theatre of operations formed 
 six divisions, with two brigades detached. The King was the nominal 
 leader, but the real command was vested in a Pole named Chzarnowsky. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 65 
 
 Charles Albert had invited several of the best-known French generals, 
 Bedeau, Lamoriciere, Changarnier, and Bugeaud, to take the command, 
 but all had declined. Chzarnowsky was supposed to have been recom- 
 mended from Paris, lie had served on the Eussian staff against the 
 Turks in 1829, and had taken part in the Polish insurrection of 1831, 
 rising from the rank of lieutenant-colonel to the command of a division 
 in a few months. There was nothing apparent in his career to justify the 
 slight thus cast on the claims and abilities of the Sardinian generals, who 
 now commanded divisions under his orders as follows : — 
 
 1st division, 
 
 Durando, . 
 
 Vespolate and Vigevano. 
 
 
 Disposition 
 
 2d 
 
 Bes, 
 
 Cerano and Casalnuovo. 
 
 
 of the Sar- 
 
 3d, 
 
 Perrone, . 
 
 Romentino and Galliate. 
 
 
 dinians. 
 
 4 th, 
 
 Duke of Genoa, 
 
 Trecate and Buffalora. 
 
 
 
 5th, „ 
 
 Ramorino, 
 
 La Cava. 
 
 
 
 Reserve, 
 
 Duke of Savoy, 
 
 Near Novara on the Mortara 
 
 road. 
 
 
 Of the two detached brigades, one under Colonel Belvedere was near Buffalora to 
 Piacenza, guarding the right bank of the Po from an advance in that Pavia > 28 -* 
 direction. The other under General Solaroli was at Oleggio, on the left 
 of the Sardinian line. As the operations were all on the left bank of the 
 Po, Belvedere's brigade may be left out of the reckoning. In all, the 
 Sardinians on the Ticino numbered about 65,000 men and 140 guns. 
 
 The point to which all the operations of the Sardinians must specially Sardinian 
 refer was their capital, Turin. It no doubt formed their real base of tase and 
 supply, though they might also depend in a secondary degree on Alessan- mun i cat j on 
 dria, The roads from their front to Turin were — 
 
 Vigevano-Mortara-Casale. 
 Trecate-Novara-Vercelli. 
 
 The fifth division could communicate either with Mortara through 
 Garlasco, or with Alessandria by Casatisma across the Po. 
 
 We may conclude that their immediate depots of supply were in Vercelli to 
 Mortara and Novara : and that these were in part filled from the produce Novara > 14 - 
 
 Casale to 
 
 of the surrounding district ; that there were more permanent depots with Mortara, 18. 
 reserves of ammunition in Vercelli and Casale, which were at once at 
 a convenient distance, and protected by the Sesia; and that the great 
 magazines were at Alessandria and Turin. 
 
 * All distances are given in English miles. 
 E 
 
66 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OE WAR 
 
 Austrian 
 front, base, 
 and commu- 
 nications. 
 (See Map 
 No. 5.) 
 
 The Austrian army, commanded by Marshal Radetzky, who had been 
 a colonel on the staff at the battle of Marengo forty-nine years before, 
 extended along the other bank of the Ticino from Turbigo on the right to 
 Pavia on the left. Its base was the space between the Mincio and Adige 
 guarded by the fortresses of the Quadrilateral. The roads between the 
 front and base were 
 
 Nature of the 
 theatre. 
 
 Plans of 
 campaign. 
 
 Lonato-Peschiera. 
 
 Milan -Lodi 
 
 Pavia-Lodi £ 
 
 Pavia- Pizzishitone-Cremona- Mantua. 
 
 A great road leads from Milan to Peschiera by Brescia, but the populations 
 of the towns there were very disaffected ; and ten years afterwards the 
 Austrians did not use it in retreating from Magenta. It is therefore 
 probable that Kadetzky did not rely on it. 
 
 For the immediate supply of his right he would depend on Milan ; for 
 that of his left on Pavia ; and Crema, Pizzighitone, and Cremona would 
 form an intermediate line of magazines. 
 
 The country between the Sesia and Ticino is much cut up with canals 
 of irrigation ; and the mulberry plantations, where vines are trained in 
 festoons from the trees, and the deep soft rice-fields, are serious obstacles 
 to the movements of troops, especially of cavalry, who can rarely find 
 there ground on which to act in a body ; hence the columns moving 
 there must chiefly keep the roads, which are bordered with wet ditches, 
 and often pass along causeways raised above the swampy fields. 
 
 By the Sardinian leaders it was considered an object of the first 
 importance to advance on Milan and raise an insurrection there. It 
 was expected that as soon as the advance on the capital should be 
 begun, Eadetzky, as in the previous year, would fall back at once 
 towards his base. Should he halt on the Adda, he was to be attacked 
 at Lodi. But it was considered more probable that he would retire 
 beyond the Mincio. 
 
 On the Piedmontese left, Solaroli's brigade was to operate against the 
 extreme Austrian right in the hilly country about Como and Varese; 
 much as Garibaldi's corps acted in 1859. Five divisions were to move 
 on Milan ; the remaining one (the 5th) at La Cava, was to seize if possible 
 the island of the Ticino opposite Pavia ; if all went well, it was to push 
 on and attack Pavia itself. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 67 
 
 It was expected that these operations would be executed against an 
 enemy who would either retreat or stand on the defensive. There was 
 a third alternative — namely, that he would assume the offensive. This, 
 though not expected, was provided for in the Piedmontese plan. Should 
 the enemy advance by the line Milan-Novara, he would be met by the 
 mass of the Piedmontese army ; should he cross from Pavia, the 5th divi- 
 sion was to fall back either on San Nazzaro or on Mortara, according to 
 the direction of the attack, retarding the Austrian march till Chzar- 
 nowsky, directing his other divisions down the right bank of the Ticino, 
 should attack the Austrians in the difficult intersected country in the 
 angle of the two rivers, while some of their forces might still be on the 
 other bank. 
 
 Eadetzky, confident in the superiority of his troops, had resolved, on 
 his part, on an offensive campaign of the most decisive kind. To this end 
 he had begun before the termination of the armistice to assemble his army 
 (5 corps in all, numbering 70,000 men and 180 guns) about San Angiolo, 
 on the road between Pavia and Lodi, 4000 men being left to garrison 
 Milan and prevent an insurrection in the city. No care was taken to 
 conceal the intention of an advance on Turin, for it was announced in the 
 proclamations of the Marshal ; and no provision was made for converting 
 the offensive into a defensive campaign (as in the case of the enemy), for, 
 except the garrison of Milan, and some detachments left to watch the 
 passages of the Ticino, the whole army was directed to concentrate on San 
 Angiolo, — the point of passage, however, being kept secret. There are Passages of 
 passages over the river at Sesto Calende, Oleggio, Turbigo, San Martino, the Tlcino - 
 Yigevano, Beregardo, and Pavia, Eadetzky meant the main body to pass 
 at Pavia. The detachments along the Ticino moving down the bank 
 were to cross at Beregardo. The march was to be direct on Mortara; on 
 arriving there, the many roads of which the town is the centre would 
 enable Eadetzky to adapt his movements to circumstances, whether 
 against the Sardinian capital or the Sardinian army. 
 
 Both armies, then, were about, simultaneously, to assume the offensive, 
 and to that end each was massed on its left on one of the two great roads 
 to Turin. 
 
 20th March. — At noon the Austrians, who had thrown two bridges of 
 boats over the Ticino below the permanent bridge of Pavia, began to pass 
 
68 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 looking down 
 the stream. 
 
 "Right" (or to the right bank. It was to provide for such a movement that Eamorino 
 "left") bank | m( j rece i ve( j hj s instructions. But that general was no longer opposite 
 
 Q.IWT.'VS 
 
 Pavia. Intelligence had reached him the day before that the Austrians 
 were passing to the right bank of the Po to attack Alessandria, and 
 that any attempt made by the enemy at the bridge of Pavia would be 
 only a feint. Leaving three battalions on the Ticino, he had carried the 
 remainder across the Po to Casatisma to oppose the movement of the 
 enemy. Such was his defence of his breach of orders ; but it did not 
 avail — the court-martial which judged his offence condemned him to 
 be shot. 
 
 At the approach of the Austrians, two of the battalions left by Ptamor- 
 ino followed him across the Po ; the third retired on Mortara. The Aus- 
 trians posted a brigade of the 4th corps at the bridge of the Po to prevent 
 Eamorino from recrossino - . Their other movements were as follows : — 
 
 Austrian 
 movements. 
 
 Pavia to 
 Zerbolo and 
 Gropello, 8. 
 
 The rest of the 4th corps marched on La Cava. 
 The 2d corps marched on . . Zerbolo. 
 
 ,, 3d ,, ,, . . Gropello. 
 
 ,, 1st ,, ,, . . Zerbolo. 
 
 Reserve opposite Pavia, with a brigade at Pavia on the left bank in case 
 of an attack on the Austrian communications on that side of the Ticino. 
 
 The detachments which had guarded the length of the river assembled 
 for passage (two brigades) at Beregardo. 
 
 The same day and hour the Duke of Genoa's division, led by the King, 
 crossed the Ticino at San Martino and the canal at Buffalora, and halted 
 at Magenta. Had Chzarnowsky found an Austrian rear-guard on the 
 Milan road he would doubtless have briskly attacked it. But he found 
 no enemy on that road ; and as was natural in a general new to com- 
 mand and doubtful of his own plan, he grew nervous and halted for 
 information. 
 
 The intelligence which had probably reached him of the concentration 
 of the Austrians on San Angiolo was calculated to confirm him in the 
 belief, which that operation was designed to inspire, that the enemy was 
 retreating beyond the Adda. Fearing to advance, yet unwilling to re- 
 trace his steps without positive reason, he suspended his forward move- 
 ment till at ten that night he heard of the events that had occurred on 
 his right. He immediately ordered — 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 69 
 
 1st division 
 
 through Mortara on Trnmello. 
 — reserve ) ° Novara to 
 
 2d division "j Vigevano, 18. 
 
 3d ,, > on Vigevano. 
 
 4th „ ) 
 
 The 2d division from Cerano, which was nearest to Vigevano, would Sardinian 
 
 arrive first, and was to push an advanced-guard to San Siro. Thus the move ™ en * 3 
 x ° as ordered, 
 
 right wing would bar Kadetzky's path on Mortara, while the left wing 
 would be ready to fall on his flank. Should this cause the Austrians to 
 halt for concentration during the 21st, Chzarnowsky proposed to extend 
 his wings inward till they touched, and so form line of battle from Tru- 
 mello on the right to the Ticino on the left, and then to attack the ene- 
 my, whose columns were moving in a close country where they would be 
 unable to deploy. 
 
 21st March. — The first division, for some unexplained reason, halted but imperfect- 
 just beyond Mortara. ^ exec » ted - 
 
 The reserve was deployed on the Casale road on the western side of 
 Mortara, apparently to guard the line Mortara-Casale from an attack by 
 the San Giorgio road. 
 
 On the left, the advanced-guard of the 2d division met at San Siro, 
 at two in the afternoon, the advanced-guard of the 2d corps marching 
 on Gambolo, and was pushed back on Sforzesca. The brigades from 
 Beregardo reinforced the Austrian advanced-guard. A Sardinian brigade 
 came up on the other side, and an action ensued in which both claimed 
 the advantage. The 3d and 4th Sardinian divisions did not arrive at 
 Vigevano till evening. 
 
 Radetzky's orders for the 21st were these : — Austrian 
 
 _ „ , _, „ , , ,, » movements 
 
 2d corps from Gropello by Trumello, through Mortara. . , 
 
 1st ,, from Zerbolo by Gambolo, on Mortara. 
 
 3d ,, from Gropello by Trumello, to occupy Mortara. Gropello to 
 
 4th ,, from La Cava by San Nazzaro and San Giorgio, on the left of Mortara. Mortara 14. 
 
 Reserve by Garlasco on the rear of Mortara. La Cava to 
 
 S. Giorgio 21. 
 In executing these movements, the head of the Austrian 2d corps, 
 
 leading, came upon Durando outside Mortara. The Sardinian division " m lmn 
 
 ° movements 
 
 w r as badly posted, and the reserve was forced to file through the narrow as executed. 
 
 * In former editions the 2d corps was represented as moving on the same road as the 1st, 
 on the authority of Ulloa, the historian of the war. But the Austrian official account, pub- 
 lished later, corrects it as above. 
 
70 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF AVAR 
 
 Mortara to 
 No vara, 16. 
 Mortara to 
 Borgo 
 Vercelli, 13. 
 
 streets in order to reinforce it. Before that tortuous movement could 
 
 be accomplished, Durando was defeated, and the Austrian corps pushing 
 
 on, drove both divisions out of Mortara on the roads of Eobbio and 
 
 No vara. 
 
 The real positions of the Austrian corps on the night of the 21st were 
 
 these : — 
 
 Two brigades from Beregardo near Sforzesca. 
 
 2d corps in Mortara. 
 
 1st ,, ,, Gambolo. 
 
 3d ,, ,, Trumello. 
 
 4th ,, ,, San Giorgio. 
 
 Reserve, Gropello. 
 
 That night Chzarnowsky, hearing of the disaster to his right wing, 
 resolved to concentrate on Novara. 
 
 22c?. — Sardinians concentrating on Novara. 
 
 Austrian 2d corps towards Vespolate. 
 The rest closed on Mortara. 
 
 2'M. — The Sardinian wings had met and taken position outside No vara 
 in the angle between the Trecate and Vercelli roads. 
 
 Austrian 2d corps, followed at intervals by the 3d and reserve, on Novara. 
 1st corps by Robbio on Borgo Vercelli. 
 4 th ,, remained at Mortara. 
 
 The Austrian- 2d corps attacked on arriving near the enemy. It fought 
 singly with loss till supported successively by the 3d, the reserve, and 
 the 4th corps — the 1st being too far off to take part in the action. The 
 Sardinians were defeated at all points, and pushed off the Vercelli road ; 
 Results of the masses deserted during the night ; and next morning the Austrians, 
 advancing through Novara, pursued along the roads of Monio and Oleggio. 
 The same night the King abdicated, and Victor Emmanuel, the new 
 sovereign, concluded an armistice with the victor as the preliminary of 
 peace. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Austrian 
 operations. 
 
 At the outset the two armies, by the positions of their fronts on the 
 Ticino, covered the two lines which they respectively possessed to their 
 bases. What, then, were the circumstances which so completely changed 
 the relations of their fronts and lines in favour of the Austrians ? 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 71 
 
 Each army concentrated on its own left, the Austrians on the Pavia- Pavia to 
 Mortara line, the Sardinians on that of Nuvara-Milan. The aim f Mortara, 23. 
 Kadetzky was Mortara, the object of Chzarnowsky was Milan, and from 
 their points of concentration they would have about the same distance to 
 traverse to their objects. 
 
 But let us suppose that each had executed his design ; that the Aus- 
 trians had concentrated at Mortara at the same time as the Sardinians 
 concentrated at Milan. The Austrians would have actually been on one 
 of the two Sardinian lines of communication, namely, that of Mortara- 
 Casale-Turin. And they would be within a single march of the second 
 and last line, that of Novara-Vercelli-Turin. 
 
 On the other hand, the Sardinians would still be a long march from The Tlcino 
 the first Austrian line at Lodi, and a considerable distance from the second Milan to ' Lo(li 
 Austrian line of Pizzighitone. or S. Angiolo, 
 
 Thus the circumstances were not reciprocal. If Chzarnowsky were to 20, 
 continue to advance, his own communications would be absolutely lost, 
 while he was still only aiming at the enemy's. In fact, in the first move- 
 ment, by which each uncovered to a certain extent one line to concentrate 
 on the other, the Sardinian communications were compromised in far 
 greater degree than those of the Austrians, and this was owing to the 
 direction of the lines of communication through the theatre of war. To 
 render this more easily intelligible, an abstract of the essential features 
 of the situation is given in the accompanying sketch ; and students will 
 find it useful to make such in other cases, whenever they have ascertained 
 what the essential features are. 
 
 Bnffal<>» MHan 
 
 Vercell 
 
 Fizzighitoiie 
 
 The following points are to be specially noted with reference to the 
 movement of each army against the communications of the other : — 
 
72 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Radetzky's 
 movements 
 explained. 
 
 Beregardo to 
 Pavia, 9. 
 
 1st, Its comparative directness. The Austrians had the shortest pos- 
 sible line from Pavia to Mortara. The Sardinians, on the contrary, must 
 perform a long circuit through Milan to Lodi or S. Angiolo. 
 
 2d, Its comparative security. To secure their flank the Austrians 
 needed only to guard the small angle between the river and the Pavia- 
 Mortara road, in which there was only one avenue whereby they could 
 be attacked, namely, that of Vigevano. On the other hand, in order to 
 secure the Sardinian flank from an attack from Pavia, it would have been 
 necessary to guard the wide angle, of which Milan is the apex, and the 
 roads from thence to Lodi and Buffalora are the sides. 
 
 The Polish general did what generals will always be found to do under 
 such circumstances — he abandoned his designs upon his enemy's com- 
 munications in order to secure his own. To this end the new front on 
 which he wished to place his army was that of Vigevano-Trumello. By 
 so doing he would cover both his lines so long as he could maintain his 
 front. And if his right wing could maintain itself between Trumello 
 and Mortara, while his left defeated the right wing of the enemy, he 
 would actually sever the Austrian communications. If his right held its 
 ground while his left was defeated, still the disaster would not be fatal, 
 since the beaten wing could make good its retreat to the Sesia, while 
 the right held Mortara, and they might reunite behind the river. But 
 the most disastrous circumstance would be that the right wing should be 
 defeated, whether the left did or did not hold its ground ; for, by gaining 
 Mortara the enemy would be nearer to the last line of retreat at Vercelli 
 than the left wing was. In fact, the left wing would increase its peril 
 by maintaining its position. 
 
 The great object of each general must then be that his right should not 
 be defeated while his left should be successful. 
 
 Let us see what steps Ptadetzky took to secure this result. 
 
 It was essential to carry his army as soon as possible to the other bank 
 of the river, lest a part should be attacked while isolated. To this end 
 he threw two additional bridges. Between 50,000 and 60,000 men 
 occupied about fourteen hours in crossing. Had they passed by one 
 bridge the operation would have occupied nearly two days. The detach- 
 ments crossed at Beregardo : 1st, because that was a point which they 
 would reach sooner than Pavia ; 2d, because it gave an additional point 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 73 
 
 of passage; 3d, because they would there be within easy reach of aid 
 from the main army. And they to a certain extent covered the army 
 by menacing the flank of an enemy attacking from Vigevano. 
 
 To hasten the advance it was necessary to use all the roads available, 
 but it was also necessary to keep the columns that moved on them ready 
 to concentrate for battle. One corps, therefore, moved by the line Zer- 
 bolo-Gambolo, and two, followed by the reserve, by Pavia-Mortara. Had 
 all moved by the latter they would have been too scattered to form an 
 effective line of battle, and should the enemy pierce any point of it, say 
 Garlasco, all the troops beyond would be cut off. As it was, it might be 
 expected that the corps and the two brigades on the right would be able to 
 oppose the enemy on the side of Vigevano till the others from the great Garlasco to 
 central road could come up, supposing the enemy were to throw his whole Sforzesca, 5. 
 weight on that side; and, if defeated in a battle there, the Austrians 
 could retreat on Pavia by Gropello and Zerbolo. There was little risk 
 while the four corps were within supporting distance on the two roads. 
 
 But the march on Mortara was further hastened by moving one corps Lomello to 
 by the line San Nazzaro-San Giorgio. That movement, however, entailed Sforzesca > li - 
 a certain risk, for the corps would be too distant to take part in an action 
 between Garlasco and Vigevano ; and should the main army, thus weak- 
 ened by a fifth, be defeated, the corps would be cut off. On the other 
 hand, its advance threatened the line Mortara- Casale ; and should the 
 Sardinians advance to Trumello it would be in a position to cut them 
 from Mortara. This movement, then, probably caused both Durando's 
 halt, and the bad disposition of the reserve, on the 21st. 
 
 The arrangements, then, so far, were very well suited to the object. 
 The advance on Mortara could be rapidly continued, and the right flank 
 was strong against attack. And on the 21st, after the 2d corps had 
 reached Mortara and was engaged there, and the 1st corps had reached 
 Gambolo, still the Sardinian left wing would have found it difficult to 
 penetrate to the Pavia-Mortara road. For in first line it would have 
 encountered the 1st corps at Gambolo, and the brigades at San Siro ; in 
 second line the 3d corps and reserve; in all, 40,000 men. If it had 
 advanced on Trumello, its way would have been barred by the first line, 
 supported, during the engagement, by the second ; if it had advanced on 
 Garlasco it would have been opposed at first by the brigades, which 
 
74 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 would have been supported by the second. line, whilst the 1st corps would 
 fall on its flank. Chzarnowsky could scarcely have hoped to break 
 through these 40,000 men, with the 30,000 which he might have assem- 
 bled at Vigevano on the afternoon of the 21st. 
 
 Nevertheless, as will presently be shown, Radetzky's dispositions for 
 the security of his advance were not perfect ; because he might, in his 
 orders for the 21st, have given a direction to some of the troops on his 
 right which would have been equally good in the actual, and far better 
 in the possible circumstances. 
 
 We have seen that the line which the Sardinians really occupied was 
 that of Vigevano-Mortara. This line is parallel to the line Novara- 
 Vercelli. And when the Austrians had driven the right wing from 
 Mortara, their left was nearer to the Vercelli road than the Sardinian left. 
 Using reasonable speed, the Austrians would reach it first. Thus the fact 
 that the front of the Sardinians was considerably in advance of their last 
 line of retreat did not prevent, but only postponed, the catastrophe. 
 
 It was impossible for Chzarnowsky, after he knew of the loss of 
 Mortara, to continue the offensive movement of his left wing. For not 
 only must he contend with the Austrians in his front, but the corps at 
 Mortara might turn back and hem him in against the Ticino. But a 
 manoeuvre that really was open to a general of unusual readiness and 
 promptitude was to move the left wing from Vigevano direct on Mortara, 
 and break through the Austrian corps there, thus balancing the amount 
 of disaster, and recovering the communications with Casale. And this 
 design, though scarcely to be expected from an inexperienced leader, was 
 said to have been actually entertained by Chzarnowsky. At all events 
 the attempt was practicable, and though the boldest, it was also the most 
 prudent course ; and as such it should have been foreseen and provided 
 for in the plans of Eadetzky. Now his right wing at San Siro, or 
 Sforzesca, did not guard his left from such an attempt. But supposing his 
 Mortara to right wing in Vigevano, it is at once seen how much additional security 
 Vigevano, 8. | g con f erre d upon his position. His wings would thus have been in con- 
 nection by a straight and good road — he would have precluded the enemy 
 from attempting any but front attacks ; and he would have been equally 
 ready to concentrate on Mortara. His 1st corps, therefore, instead of 
 continuing to move on Gambolo during the 21st, leaving it to the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 75 
 
 advanced-guard and the two brigades to oppose the Sardinians, should 
 have been pushed on Vigevano supported by the 3d corps, and, if neces- 
 sary, by the reserve. 
 
 No definitions nor explanations would have availed to prove the 
 superior importance which certain points in a theatre derive from their 
 position, so clearly as the examples of the two towns Mortara and Vige- 
 vano ; the former giving access to all the lines which the enemy could 
 use — the latter giving, while occupied, absolute security to the Austrian 
 advance. 
 
 In a greater degree this is also true of the points Pavia and Milan. 
 When the Austrians were concentrated at Pavia, they occupied a centre 
 from whence to move by short radii to all possible points on the lines of 
 operation, whether for offence or defence. And had the Sardinians held 
 Milan at the outset, it would have afforded them reciprocal advantages. 
 
 On the 23d, Eadetzky knew that the enemy must be either at Novara, 
 or making for Vercelli, but probably at Novara. Therefore he directed 
 three corps thither, and sent one corps by Eobbio to close the road. Sup- 
 posing the enemy to be making for Vercelli, that single corps would be 
 sufficient to arrest their progress till the reserve from Mortara could move 
 to its support, while the other corps, crossing the intervening space, would 
 come on the flank and rear. "When the leading corps found the enemy 
 at Novara, all were directed thither ; but that which had been detached 
 on Eobbio did not arrive to share in the action. Whatever risk there 
 might be in the absence of a fifth of his army from the battle-field was 
 thus incurred by Eadetzky. 
 
 It may be asked, Why did he not direct his whole army on Vercelli, 
 since he would thus effectually cut the enemy from the base without 
 incurring the risk of dispersing his corps ? But had he done so, he would 
 have opened the Novara-Mortara road to the Sardinians, who, crossing his 
 rear, might have passed the Po and gained Alessandria. The risk of this 
 was prevented by moving his several corps along the road to Novara. 
 
 Finally, the Sardinians, to meet the attack, formed on a front parallel 
 to the Vercelli road, with their flank on the road. Beaten in the battle, 
 they naturally and iuevitably retired to their rear; they thus lost the 
 only road that led to Turin, and their defeat was absolute and decisive. 
 
 On the other hand, had the Austrians been defeated in the battle, they, 
 
76 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 retiring to their rear, would have followed the road by Mortara to Pavia, 
 and could either have defended the Ticino, or continued their retreat to 
 the Mincio. 
 General de- With reference, then, to the subject of this chapter, it may be assumed, 
 
 auctions. as a s t e p towards future investigations — 
 
 1st, That when one of two opposing armies is operating on a front 
 parallel to the line communicating with its base, and the other on a front 
 perpendicular to the line communicating with its base, the latter has 
 acquired a great advantage over its adversary. 
 
 2d, The advantage is of the same kind whether the armies are concen- 
 trated or operating on extended fronts. 
 
 3d, The distance of the front of the army from its parallel line of 
 communication, when the front is extended, and when the space between 
 is devoid of defensible positions, does not prevent, but only postpones 
 the catastrophe. 
 
 4th, That it must be a great error to place an army in such a position, 
 without reasonable prospect of a counterbalancing advantage. 
 
 But it will be demonstrated in the following chapter that the disadvan- 
 tage is of a kind that will be annulled by a tactical success, and that it 
 does not necessarily render a tactical success less probable. 
 
 In order to avoid the circumlocutory phrase, " an army operating on a 
 front parallel to the line communicating with its base," let us in future 
 say, " forming front to a flank." The term " flank position " would not 
 answer the purpose, since it properly belongs to an army concentrated in 
 one space, and not extended on a wide front. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 77 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CONTINUATION OF THE SUBJECT. — CAMPAIGN OF SALAMANCA. 
 
 As an instance of success achieved in the position which has been See Map 
 described as so unfortunate, let us take the case of Wellington at No " '" 
 Salamanca. 
 
 The hostile armies in July 1812 faced each other on the Douro. 
 Marmont's line, in case of retreat, lay through Valladolid and Burgos. 
 "Wellington could regain his base in Portugal only by the road from Sala- 
 manca to Ciudad Eodrigo. The French front extended from Toro on the 
 right to the Pisuerga on the left, and was there thrown back along the 
 course of the river. Wellington's right was at Piueda, his left on the Rueda to the 
 Guarena. Thus each army, in the existing position, covered its commu- Guarena » 23 - 
 nications with its base. 
 
 Marmont, on the loth and 16th, suddenly moved his army upon Toro, 
 and began to cross there. Wellington knew of this movement on the 
 16th, and prepared to meet it by uniting his centre and left at Canizal 
 during the night. 
 
 Marmont, then, had turned Wellington's left, and by persisting in an 
 advance from Toro upon Salamanca he would reach that place as soon as 
 his adversary. Wellington must therefore break through or be lost. He 
 would attack the French on the march; they would form in order of 
 battle to meet him, and the fronts of both armies would be parallel to the 
 road from Toro to Salamanca. Both armies would be in a flank position 
 — either would be ruined by defeat. A French victory would cut Wel- 
 lington from Portugal, and throw him back on the Castilian mountains 
 and the army of King Joseph. An English victory would cut Marmont 
 
78 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Toro to Tor- 
 desillas, 23. 
 
 Tordesillas 
 to Nava del 
 Re}', 13. 
 
 The Traban- 
 
 cos to the 
 Guarena, 10. 
 
 from Toro, and drive him back on the Douro, and the difficult hostile 
 country of the Tras-os-Montes. 
 
 It was not Marmont's design to bring matters to such a desperate 
 issue. His movement on Toro had been a feint to induce Wellington to 
 make a corresponding movement, and so leave the bank of the river at 
 Polios and Tordesillas open. He countermarched on the 17th behind 
 the river, crossed it at those two places, and occupied Nava del Bey, 
 where his whole army was concentrated that night. 
 
 Wellington, doubting his antagonist's object, had left his right on the 
 Trabancos, to guard against such an operation as that which Marmont 
 had effected. At midnight the English general, then at Toro, heard that 
 his right wing on the Trabancos was in presence of the French army. 
 As he could neither keep it there till the centre and left could march to 
 its support, nor hope to withdraw it safely to any considerable distance, 
 he adopted the obvious measure of concentrating his army on an inter- 
 mediate line of defence. At daybreak his right retreated towards the 
 Guarena, closely followed by the heads of Marmont's columns : it reached 
 and crossed the river — met there the rest of the army ; an attempt of the 
 French to cross was defeated, and they remained facing each other through- 
 out the 19th. 
 
 Both now covered their lines of retreat. But, on Wellington's right, 
 roads led to the fords of Huerta and Alba on the Tormes, and thence to 
 his line of communication below Salamanca. Wellington did not expect 
 Marmont to attempt to turn his right by that line, because he believed 
 the fort which guarded the ford at Alba to be held by a Spanish garrison, 
 and he therefore remained covering Salamanca, a point which was very 
 essential to his campaign ; for should the French regain it with its forts 
 and bridges, Wellington's first step towards resuming the offensive must 
 be to attack Marmont, thus strongly posted on the river, in order to open 
 the road for a further advance. 
 
 The English leader therefore held his position, covering Salamanca. 
 But Marmont — knowing, what Wellington did not know, that the Spanish 
 garrison had been withdrawn from Alba — concentrated his army on its 
 left, on the 20th, moved in several columns up the Guarena, and crossed 
 it, moving to the Tormes. The stroke was aimed directly at Wellington's 
 communications, and he was constrained to follow the movement, march- 
 
the Guarena, 
 
 EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 79 
 
 ing parallel to his adversary on an opposite range of heights within musket- 
 shot. All the country between the Douro and Tonnes appears to be so 
 open that the columns were not restricted to the roads, but moved freely 
 as they do at Aldershot. The march was conducted by both generals 
 with such regularity, that though on each side vigilant eyes watched for 
 an opening to attack to advantage, neither found it. Such movements 
 can be made only by practised and self-reliant leaders. 
 
 At Cantalpino the British found themselves outmarched and outflanked. Huerta from 
 Finding it impossible to be first on the river, Wellington fell off towards 
 some heights on his right, while Marmont's left reached Huerta. 
 
 Napier tells us that on the evening of this day Wellington was deeply 
 disquieted. He might well be : for the French had proved their superiority 
 in marching power ; and if the parallel march of that day were repeated, 
 they would strike a lower point than Wellington on the Ciudad Eodrigo 
 road, and sever his communications. On the other hand, if he retreated 
 precipitately he would have the mortification of seeing his adversary 
 regain Salamanca. With these menacing alternatives before him, he took 
 position on the hills covering Salamanca on the 21st. 
 
 On that day Marmont began to cross at Huerta and Alba, and placed 
 a garrison in Alba, his leading divisions encamping at Calvariza- Arriba. 
 Wellington met this movement by crossing also, at Santa Marta and 
 Aldea Lengua. On that night Wellington's right was at the village of 
 Arapiles, his left at Santa Marta, where a division remained on the right 
 bank covering Salamanca from a possible advance on that bank by Mar- 
 mont. The French left had been extended, threatening the Ciudad 
 Eodrigo road. 
 
 It may appear that Marmont in thus manoeuvring to his left was to a 
 certain extent uncovering his own communications. But in reality he 
 ran no risk. For though the great road, the only one, back to France lay 
 through Valladolid, yet French armies occupied both Madrid and Anda- 
 lucia, and the King was then moving through the mountains towards 
 Blasco to co-operate with him. Thus supported he might feel confident 
 of regaining the Douro. 
 
 In the series of manoeuvres just described, one skilful general had 
 sought to assail and the other to defend a line of communication. And 
 the strategical advantage remained entirely with the French leader, 
 
80 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 who had pressed his antagonist back from the Douro to the Tonnes, and 
 now compelled him to form front parallel to his line of retreat. But to 
 gather the fruits of his success he must still defeat his enemy in battle. 
 Next day, however, saw Wellington win the battle of Salamanca, and 
 with the victory he not only regained all the ground of which the previous 
 operations had deprived him, but by the mere impetus of success, and 
 without another engagement, his left wing pushed the beaten army back 
 on Burgos, while his right chased the French Court from the Spanish 
 capital. Nevertheless, the disparity of loss between the victors and van- 
 quished at Salamanca was not considerable. Marmont's army, far from 
 being ruined, presently made head again and turned on its pursuers, follow- 
 ing them once more to the Tormes. 
 
 These examples will probably be sufficient to illustrate the case of a 
 flank position in an open country. The general who by manoeuvres or 
 otherwise places, his enemy in such a position, is within one vigorous 
 stride of decisive success ; and if his confidence in himself and his troops 
 be such as to render him eager to fight for an adequate object, he must 
 esteem himself fortunate indeed to be able, at no more than ordinary risk 
 to himself, to force on his antagonist the alternative of victory or ruin. 
 
 On the other hand, an army which is inferior in fighting power to its 
 adversary, will not gain much by forcing that adversary to form front to a 
 flank, for its chance of victory will be as slight as ever. 
 
 And a great superiority in fighting power, such as larger force, or a 
 strong position, may justify a leader in forming front to a flank in order 
 to give battle. 
 
MAP N° I 
 
CAMPAIGN OF SALAMANCA 
 18 12 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 81 
 
 CHAPTEK IV. 
 
 CASE OF BOTH ARMIES FORMING ON A FRONT PARALLEL TO THE 
 
 LINE OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE BASE. CAMPAIGN OF 
 
 JENA. 
 
 It sometimes happens that Loth opposing armies form front to their 
 natural flanks ; for instance, the lines to their bases running east and west, 
 the armies front north and south. This may happen from many causes : Reasons for 
 because both are confident in the issue of a battle, and are more careful operating 
 of assailing the enemy's communications than of guarding their own ; or 
 because one army has established such a superiority as to risk little 
 by the movement, to which the adversary is compelled to conform ; or 
 because of geographical circumstances which will be discussed hereafter ; 
 or because political reasons are paramount in the plan of campaign. 
 
 During the campaign of Austerlitz, in 1805, causes of dispute and 
 hostility existed between Napoleon and the Prussian Government. 
 
 If Prussia had then joined the coalition against the Emperor, her posi- 
 tion on the flank of his line of march down the Danube to Vienna would 
 have enabled her seriously to embarrass, perhaps to destroy, the plan of 
 his campaign. He could hardly have persisted in advancing while a 
 powerful army was descending through Franconia upon his rear. By 
 joining Austria and Eussia at that time, Prussia might have checked at 
 their outset the victories of the Empire. 
 
 But the result of that campaign was to force Austria to conclude a 
 peace on Napoleon's terms. And it was not till the Emperor was leading 
 his victorious troops back to France that Prussia declared war. Nor was 
 this the only error she committed in choosing a time for hostilities. For 
 
 F 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 81 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 CASE OP BOTH ARMIES FORMING ON A FRONT PARALLEL TO THE 
 LINE OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE BASE. — CAMPAIGN OF 
 JENA. 
 
 It sometimes happens that Loth opposing armies form front to their 
 natural flanks ; for instance, the lines to their bases running east and west, 
 the armies front north and south. This may happen from many causes : Reasons for 
 because both are confident in the issue of a battle, and are more careful °P eratln g 
 of assailing the enemy's communications than of guarding their own ; or 
 because one army has established such a superiority as to risk little 
 by the movement, to which the adversary is compelled to conform ; or 
 because of geographical circumstances which will be discussed hereafter ; 
 or because political reasons are paramount in the plan of campaign. 
 
 During the campaign of Austerlitz, in 1805, causes of dispute and 
 hostility existed between Napoleon and the Prussian Government. 
 
 If Prussia had then joined the coalition against the Emperor, her posi- 
 tion on the flank of his line of march down the Danube to Vienna would 
 have enabled her seriously to embarrass, perhaps to destroy, the plan of 
 his campaign. He could hardly have persisted in advancing while a 
 powerful army was descending through Franconia upon his rear. By 
 joining Austria and Eussia at that time, Prussia might have checked at 
 their outset the victories of the Empire. 
 
 But the result of that campaign was to force Austria to conclude a 
 peace on Napoleon's terms. And it was not till the Emperor was leading 
 his victorious troops back to France that Prussia declared war. Nor was 
 this the only error she committed in choosing a time for hostilities. For 
 
 Y 
 
82 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 See Map 
 No. 2. 
 
 Russia had made a treaty of alliance with her, and a few weeks would 
 have brought the forces of this powerful auxiliary on the theatre of war. 
 As it was, with untried troops, antiquated generals and equipments, 
 divided counsels, and a meagre exchequer, she was about to enter the 
 lists, single-handed, with the experienced leaders, the tried soldiers, and 
 the boundless resources of Napoleon. 
 
 It had been the Emperor's policy to cause the several corps of the 
 army returning from Austerlitz to halt along the course of the river 
 Mayne. For at this time he was engaged in forming the Confederation 
 of the Ehine, by which the territories of his German allies were to be 
 increased at the expense of his German enemies, and the eastern bank of 
 the great river, thus in his hands, would give him free admission to the 
 rest of Germany. To spare France as much as possible, he had stationed 
 his army in the territories about to be thus transferred, feeding it by 
 forced contributions. The different corps were posted on the 3d October 
 1806 as follows: — 
 
 
 Corps. 
 
 Commander. 
 
 Station. 
 
 Force. 
 
 Positions of 
 
 1st, 
 
 Bernadotte, 
 
 Lichtenfels, 
 
 20,000 
 
 the French 
 
 3d, 
 
 Davout, 
 
 Bamberg, 
 
 27,000 
 
 corps. 
 
 4th, 
 
 Soult, 
 
 Amherg and Bamberg, 
 
 32,000 
 
 
 5th, 
 
 Lannes, 
 
 Schwein furt, . 
 
 22,000 
 
 
 6th, 
 
 Ney, . 
 
 Nuremberg, 
 
 20,000 
 
 
 7th, 
 
 Auger eau, 
 
 Wurtzburg, 
 
 17,000 
 
 
 Cavalry, 
 
 Murat, 
 
 between Wurtzburg and Kronach, 
 
 32,000 
 
 
 Iinxierial Guard, 
 
 Bessieres and Lefebvr< 
 
 i, . Wurtzburg, . 
 
 20,000 
 
 Possible 
 French lines 
 of operation. 
 
 190,000 
 
 Stationed thus along the Mayne, the French corps, looking northwards, 
 saw before them the hills of the Thuringian Forest, part of the range of 
 central Germany, which extends from the Ehine to the frontier moun- 
 tains of Bohemia. Beyond that range is the great plain of northern 
 Germany, the vast levels of Prussia, Hanover, and Westphalia, merging 
 on the one side into the flats of Poland and Bussia, on the other into the 
 gentle slopes of the Netherlands and France. 
 
 Three roads lead from the Ehine into northern Germany. 
 
 The first, from Wesel across Westphalia and Hanover, by which the 
 mountains would be avoided. 
 
 The second, the main post- road of Germany from Frankfort along the 
 
EXPLAINED AM) [LLUSTBATED. 83 
 
 valley of the Mayne to Ilanau, thence northward by Fulda, Eisenach, 
 
 Gotha, "Weimar, to Leipsic. 
 
 The third, from Mayence along tlie valley of the Mayne to Bamberg 
 and Baireuth, thence by three defiles to the valley of the Saal — namely, 
 Baireuth to llof, Kronach to Schleitz, Coburg to Saalfeld. 
 
 Napoleon's newly-acquired fortress of Wesel gave him admission to 
 the first road ; but, although by traversing it he would, turn the obstacle 
 of the mountains, his path would be crossed by great rivers, which, by 
 the volume of their waters in the lower portions of their courses, would 
 render the passage in the face of an enemy a formidable problem. 
 Moreover, during the long circuit which his troops must perform from 
 the Mayne to Wesel, his design would become apparent, and the enemy 
 would be prepared to meet him on that line. 
 
 The choice of a line of operation seemed therefore to lie between the 
 roads which passed the Thuringian Forest, the one on its western, the 
 other on its eastern extremity. That of Fulda-Eisenach would bring 
 the French and Prussian armies into opposition on the Saal and 
 Elbe, each covering its communications with its base. That of 
 Bamberg would bring the French on 'the upper portion of the Saal, 
 where it is an inconsiderable obstacle, and on the Prussian communi- 
 cations. 
 
 A glance at the map shows that the Elbe forms the great natural 
 defence of Prussia against an attack from the west. The passages of 
 the river are guarded by the fortresses of Magdeburg, Torgau, Witten- 
 berg, and Dresden, closing the principal roads to Berlin and to East 
 Prussia. 
 
 Here, then, Prussia might await the onset till joined by her Russian 
 auxiliaries ; but such was the influence of the traditions of Frederick's 
 exploits on the spirit of the people, that nothing was thought of but an 
 offensive campaign. It was said in Prussia that the success of the 
 Napoleonic system of war was clue to the supineness of his adversaries, 
 who had chosen to await in a defensive attitude the development of 
 his plan, and that by anticipating his attack the most effective weapon 
 in his armoury would be wrested from him. Another and more sub- 
 stantial, if not more potent, reason for taking a position in advance of 
 the Elbe, was that Saxony and Hesse-Cassel would send strong con- 
 
84 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 tingents to the Prussian army if their territories were covered, but not 
 otherwise. Indeed, if Saxony were left defenceless it was possible that 
 she might save herself by submitting to conditions, one of which would 
 be a free passage over the Elbe for the French at Dresden. 
 
 Owing to these considerations the hostile armies now faced each other 
 on opposite sides of the Thuringian Forest. The Duke of Brunswick, a 
 veteran of the Seven Years' War, was commander-in-chief of the Prussian 
 army; but it was divided into two main portions, and the lesser was 
 placed under Prince Hohenlohe, one of the sovereigns who had just 
 been deprived of his territories by the Confederation of the Rhine. He 
 had acquired some reputation in 1792, and exercised a certain inde- 
 pendence of command. 
 Position of The main Prussian army was at Erfurt ; on its right about Gotha was 
 
 the Prussian £] ie Westphalian contingent under General Ruchel ; the advanced-guard 
 was under the Duke of Weimar, whose business was to reconnoitre the 
 denies towards the enemy. Hohenlohe's main body was near Jena on 
 the Saal, and his advanced - guard under General Tauenzein watched 
 the defiles leading to the Upper Saal from Hof to Saalfeld. The 
 numbers were, according to the German authorities (Thiers gives a much 
 higher and probably inaccurate estimate), as follows : — 
 
 Duke of Weimar's force, .... 11,000 
 
 Main body, . . . . . . 51,000 
 
 General Ruchel's Westphalians, . . . 22,000 
 
 Hohenlohe's corps, including Saxons, . . 44,000 
 
 Reserve under the Prince of Wirtemberg, . . 15,000 
 
 forces. 
 
 Total in the field, . . 143,000 
 
 Prussian base The base of the Prussian portion of the army was the Elbe from 
 and front. Magdeburg to Torgau — that of the Saxon contingent was Dresden ; and 
 
 the general front of the army was parallel to the roads from Dresden to 
 
 the Saal. 
 French base Napoleon had collected his supplies at Mayence, making Wurtzburg 
 and front. liis immediate depot ; and the general front of the French was parallel 
 
 to the road Mayence- Wurtzburg. 
 
 In October both sides meditated immediate offensive operations, and 
 
 up to the 7th the Duke of Brunswick believed that Napoleon intended 
 
 to concentrate his army behind the Forest and await the attack. The 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 85 
 
 Prussian generals differed in their plans of action. Hohenlohe wished Prussian 
 to throw his own corps against the French right through the denies of pan8, 
 the Upper Saal. He calculated on surprising and throwing back the 
 corps successively, and forcing the grand army to the Lower Mayne, 
 while Brunswick's corps advanced through the passes in its front to 
 second him. 
 
 The Duke of Brunswick's plan Mas to move Hohenlohe's army by 
 Saalfeld and his own by Gotha, so as to bring them into communication 
 in the Forest, the first at Hildburghausen, the other at Meiningen, on 
 the 12th October. Tauenzein's corps, of Hohenlohe's army, towards Bai- 
 reuth was to cover the left, while Buchel on the right was to move on 
 Eisenach, and, by threatening Fulda, direct the attention of the French 
 to a false point. The main armies were then to fall on the centre of the 
 line of the Mayne, and cut off from Mayence all the French who were in 
 Franconia. 
 
 This movement was to commence on the 10th, and, as a prelimi- 
 nary, the Duke of Weimar's corps was sent into the Forest to recon- 
 noitre and form the advanced - guard. On the 9th, he reported that 
 the French were concentrating about Coburg, and the Prussian general, 
 abandoning his offensive intentions, began to concentrate his army about 
 AVeimar. 
 
 Napoleon had made his dispositions to advance thus : — 
 
 The Eight Column — Soult's and ISTey's corps in advance of Baireuth 
 towards Hof. 
 
 The Centre — Bernadotte and Davout, with the cavalry reserve, and 
 the Foot Guard at Kronach, to move by Lobenstein on Saalburg and 
 Schleitz. 
 
 The Left — Lannes and Augereau, after feigning to move towards Hild- 
 burghausen, were to countermarch from left to right through Coburg 
 towards Saalfeld by Grafenthal. 
 
 The army was ordered to cross the frontier of Saxony on the 8th 
 October. Murat's cavalry in the centre advanced to Lobenstein. The 
 Prussian detachment, observing the denies, made a slight demonstration 
 of resistance and fell back to Schleitz, without disputing the passage of 
 the Saal, which at this part of its course is an insignificant obstacle. 
 Emerging from the defile, the cavalry spread right and left. Towards 
 
situation. 
 
 86 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Hof tliey saw no enemy to stop Soult'a march ; but on the left towards 
 Saalfeld they saw two bodies of Prussian troops which were, in fact, 
 Hohenlohe's advanced-guard under General Tauenzein. 
 
 9th October. — The Centre crossed the Saal at Saalburg, moving upon 
 Schleitz. Tauenzein's corps made a stand here, and were driven in by 
 Murat. 
 
 Napoleon's headquarters were at Schleitz. 
 
 Lannes was approaching Saalfeld. 
 
 Soult was at Plan en. 
 Napoleon's On the 10th the Emperor wrote a letter to Soult, from which we learn 
 
 views of the i,j g v i ew f the situation. He believed that on the 5th the Duke of 
 Brunswick's army had moved towards Eulcla to attack, and that Hohen- 
 lohe, in executing his share of the plan, would attempt to advance through 
 the denies which Napoleon had just traversed. He inferred that Bruns- 
 wick's army had committed itself so deeply to the forward movement 
 that many days must elapse before it could' countermarch to rejoin the 
 Prussian left wing on the Saal. He believed, therefore, that he should 
 have only Hohenlohe to deal with, and he imagined, from the direction 
 in which the Prussians retired (especially after hearing from Soult that 
 the Saxon horse driven out of Plauen had retreated towards Gera), 
 that Gera would be their point of concentration. Whether they should 
 make or await the attack, he was equally confident of victory ; and he 
 intended, if they should retreat by Magdeburg (a contingency which he 
 expected, probably, as the result both of his own manoeuvres to shoulder 
 them off the Leipsic road, and of the necessity they would naturally 
 feel of keeping in communication with Brunswick), to push Soult on 
 Dresden, the road from whence to Plauen he presumed to be clear of 
 the enemy. 
 
 Such were his anticipations, and to realise them he pivoted his left on 
 the Saal, and swung round his right in order to cast his weight on Hohen- 
 lohe, and to sever both him and Brunswick from the Elbe except by the 
 long circuit of Magdeburg. 
 
 10th October. — Lannes attacked Prince Louis (commanding part of the 
 advanced-guard) at Saalfeld, and drove him back upon Jena. Bernadotte 
 passed beyond Auma on the Gera road. Davout to Auma. 
 
 11th October. — Lannes from Saalfeld moved on Neustaclt. Aucrereau 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATE I >. 87 
 
 filled the space between Lannes and the Saal. Soult upon Gera. Ney 
 towards Auma. Davout from Aunia to the right of Lannes, upon the 
 Saalfeld-Gera road. The army was thus concentrated Let ween the Elster 
 and Saal, covering the defiles it had issued from, and cutting the Saxons 
 from Dresden. Immense quantities of their baggage were taken by Soult's 
 cavalry. 
 
 12th. — Napoleon heard that Brunswick, countermarching from Erfurt Kosen to 
 to Weimar, was approaching the Saal. The two principal roads to the ' l ' Iia * 18 ' 
 Elbe from Weimar cross the Saal at Jena and Kosen. 
 
 Lannes and Augereau were ordered to Jena. 
 
 Davout moved north, direct on Naumburg. Bernadotte to Naumburg, 
 going round by Gera, in order to support Murat. Thus the centre became 
 the right. 
 
 Murat on Naumburg, his cavalry patrolling the river between and 
 beyond Jena and Naumburg. Napoleon's headquarters at Gera. 
 
 Soult was at Gera. 
 
 Ney at Auma ready to reinforce either point at need. 
 
 Lannes seized Jena. 
 
 Murat's light cavalry pushed on to the gates of Leipsic. Naumburg to 
 
 At this time the Prussians were concentrating towards the Saal. The Lei P slc > 25. 
 Duke of Brunswick's army, not so deeply committed to the Forest as 
 Napoleon had supposed, assembled about Weimar on the 12th, except 
 the Duke of Weimar's advanced-guard of 10,000 men, which had not yet 
 rejoined it. Hohenlohe's army, assembled between Weimar and Jena, was Weimar to 
 to stand fast and cover the general movement. The main body was to Jena> 12, 
 march through Weimar to the defile of Kosen, on the left bank of the Weimar to de- 
 Saal, but not for the purpose of crossing, for to pass by that road to Leipsic Jj* oi Kosen ' 
 would be to lend an uncovered flank to the attack of whatever force Napo- 
 leon might have assembled on the right bank. He intended to hold the Prussian 
 issue of the defile from the bridge of Kosen on the left bank, and to push movemeilts of 
 
 ° . concentration 
 
 two divisions on to secure the passage of the Unstrutt, a tributary of ail( j retreat . 
 the Saal. He would then feel secure of his retreat on Magdeburg, his 
 march to the Elbe being covered by the Saal, and the two main passages 
 blocked by himself and Hohenlohe. General Ruchel was to remain at 
 Weimar to rally to him the Duke of Weimar, and was then to rejoin the 
 main army. These movements accomplished, Hohenlohe was to follow, 
 
88 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 and the army was then to move entire behind the Saal on Magdeburg. 
 And it would appear that the Prussian generals conceived the French 
 army to be advancing not as it really was, entirely on the right bank, but 
 partly on both banks; for Hohenlohe's front, instead of being towards 
 the river, was parallel to the Weimar-Jena road, as if he expected an attack 
 along the left bank from Saalfeld ; only Tauenzein's corps was thrown back 
 at an angle along the heights above Jena to observe the passage there. 
 
 On the 12th Lannes had not only seized Jena, which is on the left 
 bank, but had pushed his light troops through the ravines on to the 
 heights which overlook the left bank, where they were almost in presence 
 of Tauenzein. 
 
 loth. — Napoleon, hearing that the Prussians were definitely advancing 
 to the Saal to fight a great battle, moved on Jena, followed by all his 
 corps except those of Davout and Bernadotte, which reached Nfaumburg, 
 seizing the bridge of the Saal with large magazines. Ney to Eoda. 
 
 The valley, hitherto enclosed by the Thuringian range, widens at Jena. 
 The right bank is fiat, but behind Jena, on the left, are steep hills 
 ascended by winding ravines. Between Jena and Kosen were two other 
 passages of less importance, because not on main roads — namely, at 
 Lobstedt, three miles from Jena, and at Dornberg. Lannes's skirmishers, 
 pressing on supported by a division, reached the plateau by the ravines. 
 Napoleon followed, and from the highest hill, called the Landgrafenberg 
 then, and since the Napoleonsberg, he saw the undulating plain as far as 
 Weimar, and the Saal running in a deep gorge to Kosen, twenty miles 
 distant. Hohenlohe's army was visible on the road to Weimar; but 
 Piuchel's troops at Weimar were hidden from view, and the valley of the 
 Ilm concealed the march of Brunswick's army towards the defile of 
 Kosen, whither it was moving in five divisions, separated by intervals of 
 three miles. 
 Napoleon's Napoleon, seeing only the troops of Hohenlohe, and unable from the 
 
 anticipations inequalities of ground to estimate their numbers, believed that the whole 
 
 and orders. 
 
 Prussian army was before him, and resolved to fight it next day. Before 
 ascending the hill, he had sent orders to Davout to guard the bridge 
 of Kosen, and to Bernadotte to move on Dornberg, thus closing the 
 passage there. In the night of the 13th, expecting to fight the whole 
 Prussian army next day, and considering that the French force at Naum- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 89 
 
 burg would rejoin him as speedily and much more effectually by the left Naumburg to 
 than by the right bank, he had sent fresh orders to Davout, not merely 13ornl)er g' 13 - 
 to bar the way at Kosen, but to cross the Saal there and come down by 
 Apolda on the Prussian rear. The despatch added, " If the Prince of 
 Poutecorvo (Bernadotte) is with you, you may march together ; but the 
 Emperor hopes that he will be already in the position assigned him at 
 Dornberg." P>ernadotte had joined Davout at Naumburg, but on seeing 
 the new despatch towards morning on the 14th, he construed it to express 
 the Emperor's desire that he should be at Dornberg rather than with 
 Davout, and to Dornberg he marched. 
 
 Murat, ordered on the loth to assemble the cavalry at Dornberg, 
 received a further order in the night to move on Jena. 
 
 Soult, arriving from Gera in the night, was to cross at Lobstedt, 
 debouching on Closewitz, and on the rear of Tauenzein. 
 
 Ney and Murat were to ascend the Landgrafenberg by the route which 
 Lannes had followed. 
 
 Augereau was to move his corps partly on the Weimar road, partly on 
 the Landgrafenberg. The reason for this concentration on the hill instead 
 of on the road was, that the road winded steeply up a hill to the plateau, 
 and being, strongly guarded, was very difficult of access. 
 
 Hohenlohe, still imagining on the night of the 13th that he was men- 
 aced only by Lannes and Augereau, and that Napoleon's main army was 
 moving on Leipsic and Dresden, did not think it necessary to drive from 
 the Landgrafenberg the French troops that had established themselves 
 there, but had contented himself with reinforcing the corps on the left 
 which faced the river. His main body remained as before parallel to the 
 "Weimar road, facing the point from which he still expected the attack of 
 the two marshals. 
 
 Owing to his incorrect estimate of the position of the Prussian army, 
 which he imagined to be assembled before him, Napoleon had massed at 
 Jena a force double the number of the enemy. On the other hand, 
 Davout, advancing in compliance with Napoleon's order with his corps 
 27,000 strong, met Brunswick's army, numbering 51,000, at Auerstedt. Auerstedt to 
 Hohenlohe's army was routed. Brunswick's, notwithstanding its superi- Jeiia > 12 - 
 ority of force, was defeated in a battle more glorious to the victor than 
 any other ever fought independently by a marshal of the Empire. The 
 
90 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Movements 
 in pursuit. 
 
 Weimar to 
 Erfurt, 14. 
 
 beaten army of Auerstedt was retreating to Weimar to join Hohenlohe, 
 ignorant of his fate, when the appearance of Bernadotte's corps at Apolda, 
 where it had arrived towards evening, completed its discomfiture. Find- 
 ing their retreat on Weimar thus intercepted, the Prussians in the greatest 
 disorder turned to the right ; the two streams of fugitives crossed and 
 intermingled, and the country was covered with scattered bands heading 
 towards Magdeburg. 
 
 On the night of the battle, Napoleon, from his headquarters at Jena, 
 directed the following movements in pursuit, with the double object of 
 preventing the enemy from rallying, and of reaching the Elbe before 
 them : — 
 
 Bernadotte by Halle towards Magdeburg. 
 
 Davout back to Naumburg to cover the passage, to be within reach of 
 Leipsic, and to be ready to reach the Elbe before the enemy. 
 
 Soult on Buttelstedt, between Weimar and Naumburg. 
 
 Murat with the reserve cavalry to pursue towards Erfurt and to capture 
 it next day ; then to turn northward and continue the pursuit towards 
 Weissensee. 
 
 Ney's corps to support Murat. 
 
 Lannes and Augereau to assemble their corps before Weimar. 
 
 Imperial Guard in Weimar. 
 
 While Bernadotte, Soult, and Murat pressed the enemy on three roads 
 to Magdeburg, the corps of Davout, Lannes, Ney, and Augereau were 
 allowed to rest till the 17th. Then Ney followed Murat and joined Soult 
 before Magdeburg. 
 
 Lannes moved by Naumburg on Merseburg, observing Halle. 
 
 Augereau followed Lannes. 
 
 Davout through Leipsic on Wittenberg. 
 
 At Halle, Bernadotte found the Prussian reserve under the Prince of 
 Wirtemberg, attacked, and drove it back on Dessau. 
 
 20th October. — Davout seized the bridge of the Elbe at Wittenberg on 
 the highroad to Berlin. 
 
 Lannes passed at Dessau. 
 
 Augereau followed Lannes — all three moving on Berlin. 
 
 Meanwhile Hohenlohe with the remains of the Prussian armies had 
 reached Magdeburg, which on the 21st he quitted, marching for the Oder 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 9 I 
 
 byroads north of Berlin. Blucher acted as his rear-guard; and Loth 
 moved slowly, partly from the necessity of spreading to procure food, 
 partly because they desired to rally to them the Duke of Weimar's corps. 
 
 On the 15th its commander, then at Erfurt, had heard of the result of the 
 battles, and to avoid the French he took the Brunswick road, and on the 
 26th passed the Elbe at Saielow. Ilohenlohe had delayed for him till 
 the 24th, then gave up the expectation of effecting a junction with him, 
 and moved rapidly for the Oder. 
 
 25th. — Davont entered Berlin, and passed through on the Custrin road Intercepting 
 
 to attack the fortresses on the Oder. movemen 
 
 (described, 
 
 Lannes surprised the fortress of Spandau (near Berlin). but not in- 
 
 26th. — Murat's cavalry, followed by Lannes's corps, marched to intercept eluded in 
 Ilohenlohe. 
 
 Bernadotte, from Brandenburg, pursued Blucher by Nauen. 
 
 Soult passed the Elbe to cut off Weimar's corps. 
 
 Augereau held Berlin. 
 
 Ney blockaded Magdeburg. 
 
 Murat and Ney headed Hohenlohe at Prentzlow, beat him, and captured 
 his whole force. 
 
 Blucher, thus cut from the Oder, joined Weimar's corps, and attempted 
 to march back to the Lower Elbe, intending to base himself on fortresses 
 there, and thence operate on the French rear. But, constantly pressed in 
 rear by Bernadotte and on his flank by Soult and Murat, Soult cutting him 
 always from the Elbe, Murat from the ports of the Baltic, he was hemmed 
 in upon the neutral town of Lubeck. Driven from thence, and having 
 in his rear the Danish frontier, he surrendered to Murat, 7th November. 
 
 Stettin capitulated, 29th October. 
 
 Ney took Magdeburg, 8th November. 
 
 The whole Prussian army with its fortresses had thus fallen into the Results of the 
 hands of the conqueror. campaign. 
 
 The movements subsequent to the 14th October have been stated only 
 briefly, because the campaign was in reality decided by the victories of 
 that day, which left the French masters of a line to Berlin and the Oder, 
 shorter than any that was open to the Prussians. 
 
92 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Napoleon's three columns marched with great rapidity to the Saal. 
 They were very little encumbered with supplies, taking only the bread 
 and brandy necessary for the first marches ; and after the defeat of the 
 Prussian armies there was no difficulty in subsisting on the country. The 
 radiation of the several corps of the pursuing army from the neighbour- 
 hood of Weimar insured the supplies. As soon as the victories had 
 opened the direct road to Frankfort by Erfurt, that was adopted as the 
 line of communication with France ; points on it were fortified and pro- 
 visioned ; and as soon as the passage of the Elbe was secured, a bakery 
 and arsenal were established at Wittenberg for present needs, and another 
 at Erfurt in case of retreat. 
 
 In the march to the Saal the principle of concentration is very evident. 
 
 The columns moved as near each other as possible ; they communicated 
 by means of the cavalry at the first opportunity ; and the army was col- 
 lected in a space suited to its numbers with the least possible delay. The 
 Prussian plans for offence were, on the other hand, faulty in this respect ; 
 the project of Hohenlohe, and that of Brunswick, alike entailed the separ- 
 ation of the two Prussian armies during the movement, by the formidable 
 obstacle of the Thuringian Forest. 
 
 When the movement was beguu, the French army at Schleitz left their 
 communications along the Mayne uncovered. It may be asked, then, 
 Why did the Prussian army abandon its own movement against the 
 French left to meet the threatened attack ? Why did it not persist in 
 that attempt, and thus reciprocally sever the communications of the 
 French on the Mayne ? 
 
 It has been said that the Prussian advance was to begin on. the 10th. 
 But on that day the Prussian left was already turned, and the French 
 were on the Dresden road. To persist in the advance would be to 
 abandon the Prussian communications and magazines while engaging in 
 an enterprise against a line which was still distant, and which might 
 never be pierced. It would be an attempt to balance a certainty by an 
 uncertainty. Any general in the situation of the Prussian leader, feeling 
 the whole weight of his enemy either on his flank or his communications, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 93 
 
 will naturally seek rather to meet the danger than to engage in dubious Similar case 
 reprisals. It may be assumed, then (and other instances will hereafter be , Chzaniows- 
 
 . . . ky and Rad- 
 
 cited in confirmation), that when two armies are manoeuvring against each e tzky, chap. 
 
 other s flanks or communications, that army whose flank or communications u - 
 
 are most immediately threatened will abandon the initiative and conform to Important 
 
 the movement of its adversary. The importance of this fact is immense, 
 
 for the commander who finds himself on his enemy's flank or rear, while 
 
 his own is still beyond his adversary's reach, may cast aside all anxiety 
 
 for his own communications, and call up every detachment to the decisive 
 
 point, certain that the enemy will abandon his own designs, in order, if 
 
 possible, to retrieve his position. 
 
 The fact also relates immediately to the subject of this chapter, as 
 exhibiting a modification of the disadvantage of a flank position. The 
 French communications were by their direction even more exposed than 
 the Prussian — certainly more than the Leipsic line ; yet Napoleon, once 
 on the Saal, felt so secure that his adversaries would presently retrace 
 their steps, that he actively continued his own advance though he 
 believed the counter-attack to be more forward than it really was. 
 
 Nothing could prove more clearly how false strategically was the 
 Prussian position in advance of the Elbe at the outset of the campaign 
 than the fact, that before any considerable action had been fought, and 
 though nothing had occurred but what had been foreseen as possible, yet 
 the army was now, by a difficult, complicated, and doubtful movement, 
 and a long circuit, attempting to regain the line of that river at its most 
 distant extremity. 
 
 Napoleon's dispositions, up to the battles, were all of the same general 
 character, being in the form of two wings and a central reserve. On the 
 10th the centre was at Schleitz, the left wing at Saalfeld, the right at 
 Plauen. He then expected to find the enemy assembled at Gera ; there- 
 fore the left is brought into the space between Auma and the Saal, the 
 centre is still at Schleitz, the right is moved from Plauen upon Gera. 
 Finding he had miscalculated, and that the enemy was on the other 
 bank, he resolved to bar both the direct roads to the Elbe. The centre, 
 having rested two days, pushes on to Naumburg, and becomes the right ; 
 the left concentrates upon Jena ; the centre (Ney at Auma, Soult at 
 Gera) was ready to reinforce either wing ; but the left at Jena could be 
 
94 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAP 
 
 Why Jena 
 was a more 
 critical point 
 than Nauru- 
 burg for 
 Napoleon. 
 
 Napoleon's 
 miscalcula- 
 tions. 
 
 far more easily reinforced by the centre than the right at Naumburg. 
 This was because the left was the wing which it was most important to 
 render secure, for the Prussian armies were concentrating in order to 
 recover their lost communications, and this must be done either by 
 attempting to reach the Elbe by Magdeburg faster than the French could 
 by Leipsic, or by a desperate effort to break through the opposing ranks. 
 That effort might be made on either of the two roads — that of Jena 
 or that of Naumburg. If it were made successfully at Naumburg, the 
 French right would be defeated ; but, supported by Bernadotte and con- 
 nected with the main line by the cavalry, it would probably succeed in 
 rejoining the main body ; while the retreat of the rest of the army would, 
 if necessary, be secure. But if it were made successfully at Jena, the 
 defeat of the French left wing would not end the mischief, for the retreat 
 of a great part of the army would be cut off; therefore Napoleon so dis- 
 posed his corps as to concentrate most readily at Jena. 
 
 If he could have known exactly the position and direction of the 
 Prussian armies on the 13th October, he would no doubt have directed 
 Soult and part of the cavalry to join Davout and Bernadotte ; for, as 
 matters really happened, he exposed Davout to encounter single-handed 
 nearly double his force, while Napoleon himself had a preponderance 
 over Hohenlohe much greater than was necessary, and Bernadotte was 
 lost to both fields. But in the absence of such certainty he followed 
 the safest course when he directed the whole of his centre on the side 
 of Jena. 
 
 Historians are fond of ascribing to successful generals such endow- 
 ments as " prescience " and " intuitive divination of their enemy's 
 designs." There will be evidence in subsequent pages that these gifts, 
 in the preternatural extent implied, exist only in the imaginations of the 
 chroniclers, and in this campaign Napoleon had in three days made three 
 erroneous calculations' of the Prussian doings. On the 10th he thought 
 Hohenlohe was about to attack him ; on the 10th also he judged that 
 the Prussians were concentrating on Gera ; and on the 13th he took 
 Hohenlohe's army for the entire Prussian force. Still his plan made on 
 these suppositions was in the main quite suitable to the actual circum- 
 stances. And this, as is mostly the case, was owing to the riylit direction 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 95 
 
 given to his movements at the outset The preliminary conditions of a 
 campaign seldom offer more than three or four alternatives: an attack by 
 the centre or either flank, and some combination of these. If the enemy 
 has made such false dispositions as to render one of these alternatives 
 decidedly the best, the general who has the faculty of choosing it thereby 
 provides in the best possible way for all subsequent contingencies. A 
 right impulse once given to the army, it is in a position to turn events 
 not calculated on, or miscalculated, to advantage ; and this is probably 
 the true secret of the " divination" of generals. 
 
 The Prussians, in contemplating an attack on the French left, were 
 behindhand, compared with the "French, not only in time but in space. 
 Napoleon had massed his troops in his preliminary dispositions so close 
 to the Saxon frontier that a single march carried them to the Saal ; but, 
 judging from the time when the Prussian advanced-guard, which had 
 preceded the main body into the Forest, reached Erfurt on its return, the 
 Prussians would have required several days to arrive in force on their 
 enemy's communications. Hence it may be seen how great are the 
 chances in favour of that army which is nearest its enemy's commu- 
 nications. The least instructed reader will discern in Brunswick's 
 purblind and disjointed movements the anticipation of defeat, and 
 in Napoleon's swift and concentrated march the confidence of assured 
 success. 
 
 Had the Prussian army been all assembled on the Saal on the 9th or 
 10th, it would clearly have been in a much better position by taking 
 post, as Napoleon thought it would, about Gera, for it would thus have 
 had the option of retiring through Leipsic to the Elbe. But Hohenlohe Why Hohen- 
 alone could not take post there, or he would have lost his communications lolie °c cu P u '' 1 
 with Brunswick by a forward movement of the French left. He was a ^ ove Jena 
 therefore obliged to await Brunswick's arrival on the left bank, and it was 
 inevitable that he should occupy the heights of Jena, for nowhere else 
 could he cover the march of Brunswick through Weimar. 
 
 Such are the matters chiefly to be noted in this campaign ; but the Special refer- 
 reason for which it is specially quoted in this place is to show that the ence of tlie 
 
 „ , , , . . . . . , . . . campaign to 
 
 position of an army parallel to its communications with its base is not to be t i, e su i,j ec t f 
 presumed invariably to be disadvantageous, since the relations of the two this chapter. 
 
96 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 armies may considerably modify the effect of that circumstance. The 
 successful assumption of the initiative by one of the combatants relieves 
 him from all anxiety for his communications ; but the campaign also puts 
 in the strongest light the fact, that when an army in such a position suffers 
 a decisive defeat, and surrenders to the adversary the shortest line to the 
 object of the enterprise, it will probably be ruined by the blow. 
 
 
pzzutom 
 
 l<- .ili.. mi 2(1 Mil.s I,, .111 hi.li 
 
EXPLAINED A.\l> [LLtTSTRATED. 97 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 HOW THE CONFORMATION OF A BASE MAY ENABLE THE ARMY 
 POSSESSING IT TO FOKCE ITS ADVERSARY TO FORM FRONT TO 
 A FLANK. MOREAU'S CAMPAIGN OF 1800. 
 
 In former years the base of the Bepublican armies operating in Germany 
 had been some part of the straight course of the Ehine, from its corner at 
 Basle to Dusseldorf. Their eminent adversary, the Archduke Charles, See Maps 
 
 says that the strong line of the Rhine, and the lines of French fortresses No - ^ allLl 
 
 . . ... No. 3. 
 
 behind it, can only be assailed by the Anstrians in circumstances un- 
 usually favourable. All that can be done is to approach and choose 
 a position where the plans of the enemy may be defeated, his advance 
 stopped, and the country behind covered. 
 
 The armies on the Rhine had hitherto been on parallel fronts ; the 
 Anstrians generally on the defensive, since the exceptionally favourable 
 circumstances which could alone enable them to assume the offensive by 
 passing the Rhine had not existed. The French, breaking out at one or 
 other of the bridge-heads which they possessed on the river, would try Bridge-head: 
 to press forward into Germany; the Austrians, drawing together on the a fortification 
 
 . , . nr\r\ securing the 
 
 threatened points, would oppose them : and the result was that, in lbOO, passac , e f a 
 the river still formed the frontier line between them. bridge. 
 
 But in 1800 a new condition had entered into the problem of a cam- 
 paign on the Rhine. The French had occupied Switzerland — an act 
 which, like many of Napoleon's measures, was in itself unscrupulous and 
 oppressive, but which entailed military results such as few generals of 
 that time had the foresight to appreciate. One was to carry the French 
 base onward from Basle, round the angle to Schaffhausen. Thus that 
 
EXPLAINED ANIi ILLUSTRATED. 97 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 HOW THE CONFORMATION OF A BASE MAY ENABLE THE ARMY 
 POSSESSING IT TO FORCE ITS ADVERSARY TO FORM FRONT TO 
 A FLANK. MOREAU'S CAMPAIGN OF 1800. 
 
 In former years the base of the Republican armies operating in Germany 
 had been some part of the straight course of the Rhine, from its corner at 
 Basle to Dusseldorf. Their eminent adversary, the Archduke Charles, Sec Maps 
 
 says that the strong line of the Rhine, and the lines of French fortresses No - 7 an " 
 
 . ... No. 3. 
 
 behind it, can only be assailed by the Austrians in circumstances un- 
 usually favourable. All that can be done is to approach and choose 
 a position where the plans of the enemy may be defeated, his advance 
 stopped, and the country behind covered. 
 
 The armies on the Rhine had hitherto been on parallel fronts ; the 
 Austrians generally on the defensive, since the exceptionally favourable 
 circumstances which could alone enable them to assume the offensive by 
 passing the Rhine had not existed. The French, breaking out at one or 
 other of the bridge-heads which they possessed on the river, would try Bridge-head: 
 to press forward into Germany ; the Austrians, drawing together on the a fortification 
 
 . I'lnrn securing the 
 
 threatened points, would oppose them : and the result was that, in 1800, passa „ eo f a 
 the river still formed the frontier line between them. bridge. 
 
 But in 1800 a new condition had entered into the problem of a cam- 
 paign on the Rhine. The French had occupied Switzerland — an act 
 which, like many of Napoleon's measures, was in itself unscrupulous and 
 oppressive, but which entailed military results such as few generals of 
 that time had the foresight to appreciate. One was to carry the French 
 base onward from Basle, round the angle to Schaffhausen. Thus that 
 
 G 
 
98 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OE WAR 
 
 Positions of 
 the French. 
 
 Sehaffhausen 
 to Basle by 
 the Swiss 
 bank, 55. 
 
 Basle to 
 Brisach, 35. 
 
 Brisach to 
 
 Strasbourg, 
 
 40. 
 
 Renchen to 
 
 Donaues- 
 chingen, 55. 
 
 Positions of 
 the Austrians, 
 
 Donaues- 
 
 chingen to 
 Stokach, 28. 
 
 Austrian 
 communica- 
 tions. 
 
 base, originally straight, was now rectangular, and enclosed within it a 
 part of the theatre of war. 
 
 France held all the places on the Rhine, and three bridge-heads at 
 Basle, Kehl, and Cassel. The different parts of Moreau's force were thus 
 stationed : — 
 
 The right wing, General Lecourbe, 29,000 strong, was posted along the 
 Swiss portion of the Rhine, from Lauffenberg to beyond Lake Constance. 
 
 Next on the left was the reserve, 26,000, occupying the intrenched 
 camp at Basle, and extending from thence to Seckingen on the right, and 
 on the left to Upper Alsace. 
 
 The centre, under General St Cyr, 30,000, stretched from Brisach to 
 near Strasbourg. 
 
 The left wing, General Ste Suzanne, 19,000, occupied Strasbourg and 
 the bridge-head of Kehl on the opposite shore. 
 
 Besides Moreau's army, a force of 30,000 French occupied Switzerland. 
 
 The opposing forces were thus posted : The Austrian right wing, 
 General Starray, 16,000, from the Mayne (where it observed the bridge- 
 head of Cassel) to Renchen, and General Kienmayer, 15,000, the defiles 
 from Renchen to the Hollenthal. 
 
 Main body, under the Austrian commander Kray, 40,000, at Villingen 
 and Donaueschingen. 
 
 Reserve at Stokach. 
 
 On Lake Constance was an Austrian flotilla, and beyond the lake, in 
 the Grisons and Reinthal, was what the Austrians termed their left wing, 
 under the Prince de Reuss, communicating by a brigade in the Italian 
 Alps with the Austrian army in Italy. Bat as this left wing acted almost 
 altogether independently, and the campaign was fought out by the armies 
 on both sides then between Lake Constance and the Mayne, it is not 
 necessary to perplex the subject by further adverting to these forces, or to 
 the French troops occupying Switzerland. 
 
 The Austrians were of course far from their natural base, which was 
 the Bohemian mountains and the Enns river. From thence roads led 
 through Ratisbon along the Danube, while a more southern line lay by 
 Steyer, Munich, Landsberg, Memmingen, Stokach, Engen, to Brisach. 
 
 The initiative lay with the French, who held all the passages over the 
 river. It was for Kray to watch and defeat their attempts. He might 
 
EXPLAINED AND [DtUSTRATED. 99 
 
 have found a much safer position farther in rear; but experience had 
 proved to the Austrians, that to uncover the territories of the small Ger- 
 man powers, such as Baden and Wirtemberg, was not merely to lose the 
 contingents they lent to Austria, but to transfer their resources to the 
 enemy. Kray therefore kept as forward a line as possible, but held his 
 masses together about Stokach and Donaueschingen, that he might be 
 ready to meet an attack on that side. 
 
 His troops were spread along the region known as the Black Forest. 
 The valley of the Bhine, narrow at Basle, begins a little below to widen, 
 till it reaches a breadth of about fifteen miles. Good roads lie along its 
 course on both banks, but the great tumbled barrier of hills on the right 
 seems to forbid all passage to Germany that way ; yet there are fissures in Roads of the 
 the mountain-ranges in which lie roads passable for troops though difficult, Blllck Forest - 
 and which lead through the Forest into the valley of the Danube. From 
 Heidelberg, Bruchsal, Karlsruhe, Bastadt, roads to Ulm pass round or 
 pierce the Black Forest. Opposite Strasbourg the Kinzig valley, opposite 
 Brisach the valley of Waldkirch and the Hollenthal, give admission to the 
 region in which lie the sources of the Danube. These passes it was Kray's 
 business to guard. He had spread his right wing so far, because the 
 French, collecting in overwhelming numbers behind the screen of the 
 Rhine at Mayence, might from thence pass round his right, if there were 
 nothing to observe or stop them. All along the valley of the Bhine he 
 doubtless had his cordon of cavalry posts observing the river — bodies 
 of infantry at the entrance of the different passes — and other bodies in 
 support at points where those passes intersected in the Forest, such as 
 Haslach. Then his main body at Yillingen and Donaueschingen covered 
 the two roads by Bothweil and Mosskirch upon Ulm ; while his reserve 
 at Stokach might either support the main body in opposing an attack 
 from the side of Alsace, or, in conjunction with the main body at 
 Donaueschingen, form front to the south to meet an advance from 
 Schaffhausen. 
 
 Bonaparte, who depended on Moreau's success for the execution of his Different 
 
 own campaign in Italy, wished the attack upon Kray to be made in the p s 
 
 . . Moreuu and 
 
 most decisive manner. He desired to take the fullest advantage of the Bonaparte. 
 
 conformation of the French base by concentrating the army between 
 
 Schaffhausen and Lake Constance, and directing the march straight on 
 
detailed. 
 
 100 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 i 
 the neck of the Austrian communications at Ulm. To this Moreau ob- 
 jected, on the ground that the left and centre of his army must make a 
 long circuit to join the right ; that a movement so extensive would be- 
 come known to the enemy, who would prepare to concentrate and crush 
 the columns as they passed the Ehine, and who, being on the base of the 
 triangle round the sides of which the French must march, would be ready 
 to intercept them. 
 
 Bonaparte responded that the broad stream of the Ehine afforded 
 exactly the kind of curtain that was desired to screen the operation, while 
 the results offered by success would probably be decisive, as the whole 
 French army would be brought against Kray's left, and the forcing of that 
 wing would cut him from his base, and from the secondary point of Ulm. 
 
 Moreau, however, considered the risk too great. Like most generals, 
 he desired at almost any cost to avoid the risk of having to force a con- 
 siderable river in face of a concentrated enemy. His own plan was this : 
 Moreau's plan With his left wing (Ste Suzanne) he meant to cross the Ehine at Kehl ; 
 with his centre (St Cyr) at Brisach ; with his reserve at Basle. Ste 
 Suzanne and St Cyr were to attack the defiles of the Kinzig and the Elz 
 on the same day. This would induce Kray to believe that the French 
 were massing opposite his right ; and he might be confirmed in that false 
 impression by the extension of one of the brigades of the Centre down 
 the valley of the Ehine towards the French left wing, as if to connect 
 the two corps. 
 
 As soon as Kienmayer should be driven into the defiles, and so excluded 
 from knowing what was going on in front or on each side of him, the 
 left wing was to recross at Kehl, march up the left bank, and cross 
 again to the German side at Brisach. 
 
 During this movement, St Cyr was to move the infantry of the centre 
 across the hills to St Blazien, sending his artillery and trains along the 
 highroad on the right bank of the Ehine towards Schaffhausen. The 
 reserve, crossing the river by the bridge of Basle, was to push detach- 
 ments up the valley of the Weiss from Basle to maintain connection with 
 St Cyr, and was then to march along the Ehine to Schaffhausen, where 
 the right, under Lecourbe, was to be assembled on the left bank of the 
 river. Bridges were then to be thrown, and Lecourbe's' corps was to pass, 
 protected by the reserve. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 101 
 
 Thus two corps — namely, the reserve and right — would be in mass 
 between the Lake of Constance and the Austrian main body; while the 
 
 long march of the reserve in the defile between the mountains and river 
 was to be covered and screened by St Cyr's infantry. Lastly, as soon as 
 these three corps should be reunited on the Upper Danube, Ste Suzanne 
 was to pass through the Hollenthal and join them. 
 
 In the meantime, Starray with the Austrian right would be altogether 
 excluded for the present from the sphere of operations. Kray having just 
 been induced by the false attacks of Ste Suzanne and St Cyr to strengthen 
 Kienmayer, would be in no condition to oppose the real advance on his 
 left. The Prince de Reuss would be cut off and left in Switzerland. 
 
 It must always be a doubtful policy to oblige a general charged with 
 the conduct of a campaign to adopt a plan other than that which he has 
 himself originated and matured, even though it be manifestly better than 
 his own. Recognising this fact, Napoleon, who might as First Consul 
 have exercised considerable control over all the military movements, and 
 who was quite convinced of the superiority of his project, nevertheless 
 left Moreau to the undisturbed execution of his own conceptions ; and 
 operations commenced on the 25th April 1800. 
 
 25th April. — Ste Suzanne's corps from Kehl pushed Kienmayer's posts French 
 into the Kinzig valley, and occupied the Rhine valley in front of that °P eratlons - 
 avenue. 
 
 St Cyr simultaneously passed at Brisach. One division pushed down 
 the Rhine valley towards Kehl, as if to connect the two attacks. His 
 other divisions advanced on Friburg, drove in the Austrian brigade there, 
 and occupied the entrance of the Hollenthal. 
 
 2Qth April. — Kray at Donaueschingen heard of this. Kienmayer Austrian 
 reported that he had been attacked by 40,000 men (as he was). Kray movements. 
 believed that the design was to force the Hollenthal and the Kinzig valley, 
 and thus to gain the sources of the Danube. 
 
 Kienmayer's left brigade, under Giulay, occupied Waldkirch and the 
 Hollenthal. The rest of his force was in the Kinzig valley. Kray 
 reinforced him with 9 battalions and 24 squadrons from Villingen. To 
 replace these he drew 9 battalions from Stokach. He drew in his 
 extreme right under Starray by ordering it to move into the valley of 
 the Murg, but it was still at a great distance. 
 
102 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 The two French corps remained in their positions. 
 27th April. — Ste Suzanne repassed at Kehl and marched for Brisach. 
 Friburg to St Cyr from Friburg, ascending the mountain barrier on his right with 
 
 St Blazieii/25. jjj s infantry, followed the paths leading on St Blazien, excepting one 
 
 division which remained to block the entrance of the Hbllenthal. 
 Basle to Lauf- The reserve, directed by Moreau, debonching from Basle by the bridge- 
 fenberg, 24. head there, one division was pushed up the Weiss to give a hand to St 
 Cyr, and the other two divisions were directed on Lauffenberg. 
 
 28th April. — St Cyr came into communication on the mountains with 
 the division of the reserve, which had moved through the valley of the 
 Weiss, and St Blazien was occupied. 
 
 The other two divisions of the reserve forced and turned the passage 
 of the Alle against an Austrian brigade intrenched there, which fell back 
 towards Donaueschingen, halting at Bonndorf. The other Austrian posts 
 along the Rhine, threatened by the French advance, withdrew to a posi- 
 tion about Stuhlingen. 
 
 Kray ordered Giulay to withdraw his brigade through the Hbllenthal, 
 
 but to guard its inner gorge. Thus the present Austrian front towards 
 
 Neustadt to the French was on the line Neustadt-Bonndorf-Stuhlingen, and to support 
 
 Stuhlingen, this advanced line, reserves were moved from Villingen and Geisingen 
 
 15 oo 
 
 to Loffingen and Zollhaus. But Kienmayer was left in the Kinzig valley. 
 
 29th, oOth April. — The advanced-guard of the reserve was at Thiengen 
 — main body about Waldshut — left towards St Blazien, which was occu- 
 pied by St Cyr, whose left prolonged the line in the mountains. On the 
 30th Ste Suzanne entered the Hbllenthal. On the night of the 30th 
 Lecourbe had concentrated his corps on the road which runs along the 
 left bank of the Rhine, a few miles above Schaffhausen. 
 
 1st May. — To cover the passage of the right wing, the reserve ad- 
 vanced towards Schaffhausen. The advanced-guard forced the passage 
 of the Wutach on the Schaffhausen road, while St Cyr, moving east from 
 St Blazien, rested his right on Stuhlingen. 
 
 The reserve finally halted near Schaffhausen.. 
 
 The first battalions of the right wing passed the Rhine in boats, at 
 two points, and moved up the river to Stein, where they covered the con- 
 struction of a bridge, by which Vandamme's division passed, and pushed 
 up the valley of the Aach to the Schaffhausen-Stokach road. The next 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 103 
 
 division that crossed made for an intermediate point of that road, where 
 the Engen road joins it. The third division moved on Schaffhausen. 
 
 Tims Moreau's army, minus Ste Suzanne's corps, was united on the 
 desired routes between the lake and the Danube, opposite the left of 
 Kray. Ste Suzanne's leading- division, having passed the Hollenthal, was 
 at Neustadt. 
 
 2d May. — Moreau, apprehensive that the Austrians in Switzerland 
 might cross Lake Constance and fall on Lecourbe, brought his reserve 
 closer to his right by placing it in the space Thayngen- SchaffhauseD, 
 while the right wing occupied the space between the small bay of Con- 
 stance and the Engen road, and St Cyr's corps extended from Schaffhausen 
 to Stuhlingen. 
 
 On the other side, the Austrian outposts had quitted the banks of the 
 Ehine when Lecourbe crossed, drawing towards the advanced line which 
 stretched from a point north of Thayngen to Steisslingen (near Stokach 
 on the Schaffhausen road) ; Giulay's brigade, pushed from Xeustadt by 
 Ste Suzanne's advance, moved to Bonndorf — the troops at Bonndorf to 
 Zollhaus — the troops at Zollhaus to Geisingen — main body and reserves 
 at Geisingen. Kray meant to unite next day at Stokach. 
 
 3d May. — The French right wing moved on Stokach in two columns, 
 with two brigades on its left in the Aach valley, connecting it with 
 the reserve which moved on Engen. St Cyr to the left of Engen ex- 
 tending towards Zollhaus. 
 
 Lecourbe, with about 20,000, attacked and enveloped the division on 
 the left of the Austrian line, about 9000 strong, driving it through stokach to 
 Stokach,- with great loss, on the roads of Mosskirch and Menmiingen. En S e "> l2 - 
 Immense magazines were taken in Stokach. 
 
 AVhile this passed on his left, Kray arrived with his main body at The armies 
 Engen. The right of the Austrian advanced line near Thayngen was concentratin { 
 
 , . . ^ . •■,„■, towards the 
 
 driven in on Engen by the superior weight of the reserve and the brigades threatened 
 
 in the Aach valley. Kray had now about 45,000 men in position from point. 
 
 Engen to Zollhaus. The French attacked the position before Engen, 
 
 while St Cyr engaged the troops at Zollhaus. The battle was severe 
 
 and well contested, and was not decided at nightfall. But the news from 
 
 Stokach alarmed Kray for his communications, which the capture of 
 
 Mosskirch by Lecourbe would sever, and he retreated. 
 
104 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Austrians lose 
 one line of 
 communica- 
 tion by 
 Stokach. 
 
 4tth May. — Covered by his rear-guard, Kray withdrew his troops on 
 Tuttlingen, Liptingen, Mosskireh. A strong position existed in front of 
 the road Tuttlingen-Mosskirch, behind which the army withdrew to 
 Mosskireh. 
 
 Starray was on the march for Hechingen. 
 
 Kienmayer was moving to join Kray by the left bank of the Danube. 
 
 This day Moreau reinforced his right. 
 
 Eeserve on the Engen-Stokach road. 
 
 St Cyr at Geisingen. 
 
 Ste Suzanne at Donaueschingen. 
 
 oth May. — Kray with about 40,000 men took position at Mosskireh. 
 The remains of his left, beaten at Stokach, had joined him, but his right 
 at Tuttlingen was still distant, and Kienmayer and Starray were still 
 beyond the Danube. 
 
 The French reserve and right (50,000) attacked Kray, who, driven from 
 Mosskireh, retired towards Sigmaringen. Anxious for the safety of his 
 right, which had been left at Tuttlingen, he halted, and throwing forward 
 the right of his line, drove the French from the road Tuttlingen-Moss- 
 kirch, thus reopening communications with his right and with Giulay's 
 brigade, which latter joined him. With his right thus reinforced by 
 these new troops, he attacked the left flank of Moreau and attempted 
 to seize the Stokach road, but he was himself outflanked by one of the 
 rear divisions, and withdrew to another position behind Mosskireh. 
 
 This battle was indecisive and the losses equal ; but St Cyr (who had 
 been called towards Liptingen, to be near Moreau, and to hinder the 
 junction of Kienmayer) was now approaching the main army ; and Ste 
 Suzanne, who entered Donaueschingen on the 4th, came into line on St 
 Cyr's left towards Geisingen; therefore Kray resumed his retreat. He 
 passed the Danube on a line of which Sigmaringen was the centre. 
 
 6ih May. — Kienmayer joined Kray at Sigmaringen, and the Austrian 
 army moved towards Kietlingen. 
 
 1th May. — Austrians to Biberach. This movement, deviating from their 
 object, Ulm, was probably made in order to evacuate the magazines at 
 Biberach and Memmingen. 
 
 Moreau continued to manoeuvre by his right — not to cut the enemy 
 from Ulm, which he could not now prevent them from reaching, but 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 105 
 
 to divide them from Munich and from Reuss's army in Switzer- 
 land. 
 
 Here the campaign ceases to exemplify the particular condition which 
 it was selected to illustrate. For the French front, which up to the 
 battle of Mosskirch had been perpendicular to the roads leading back 
 to Schaffhausen, was now, as it faced the Danube, parallel to the road 
 Biberach-Stokach-Schaffhausen. Hence, not being covered by a river (as 
 the Austrian line to its base was by the Danube, as soon as the army 
 reached Ulm), Moreau's communications were even more exposed than 
 K ray's. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The effect of the angular base of the French is visible on the disposi- 
 tions of the Austrians even before the campaign commenced. Had the 
 French only possessed the straight Rhine frontier up to Basle, as for- 
 merly, Kray, under no particular apprehensions for his left flank, might 
 have posted his main body and reserves at points whence they could 
 with equal facility have reinforced any of the detached bodies guarding 
 the defiles on whom an attack might have been made; but, as the case 
 really stood, he was obliged to dispose his main body and reserves far 
 away to his left rear on the line Yillingen-Donaueschingen-Stokach, in 
 order to be ready to meet an attack on that side, which, if unopposed, 
 would sever his communications. 
 
 The plans of campaign of Napoleon and of Moreau had this in com- 
 mon, that both aimed at the communications of the Austrians by an 
 advance from the extreme point of the angular base ; but in the mode 
 of effecting the common object they differed materially, and the difference 
 was the result of the individual characters of the projectors. When 
 Napoleon's glance was once fixed on the point where decisive success 
 lay, the obstacles in his way lost, in his mind, much of their importance, 
 and were viewed merely as difficult steps to his object. Hence, though 
 he neglected no provision nor precaution which prudence and experience 
 could suggest for overcoming them, yet he never allowed them to assume 
 an importance sufficient to deprive his plan of campaign of its fullest 
 significance. Disregarding, therefore, the fact that he must throw his 
 army entire at one point across a great river which was observed by the 
 
10G THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 enemy, lie looked only to the great results that must How from the 
 advance of that army, concentrated, upon the vital point of an enemy 
 whose forces would still be in greater or less degree dispersed. 
 
 Moreau, cautious and forecasting by nature, saw in his mind's eye the 
 Austrian army assembled opposite Schaffhausen to oppose his passage — 
 baffling the whole plan. All his precautions, therefore, were framed to 
 obviate the clanger of crossing in face of the enemy. Only one corps 
 was to cross at Schaffhausen — another, the reserve, was to cross at Basle 
 to cover the passage ; this entailed the movement of a third through the 
 mountains to cover the long flank march of the reserve along the river; 
 and a fourth was to make a false attack in order to detain the Austrian 
 troops in the defiles as long as possible, and prevent them from reinforcing 
 the left. 
 
 The great objection urged against this combination is the long flank 
 march of the reserve between the mountains and the river ; but this 
 appears to diminish on an inspection of the map, for no road traverses 
 the Black Forest leading into the space between Basle and Waldshut, by 
 which a large Austrian force could move with artillery so as seriously 
 to menace the French. Any attempt against them which the country 
 admitted of would probably be checked by St Cyr, who would also flank, 
 at St Blazien, any attempted movement on Waldshut. It was sufficiently 
 certain, therefore, that the reserve would make good its march on 
 Schaffhausen, would cover the passage there, and would be ready to 
 move forward in conjunction with the right. 
 
 The advantages to be expected were by no means so decisive as would 
 follow the successful execution of Napoleon's plan. For only two corps 
 would be ready at once to operate on the decisive point, and their subse- 
 quent movements must be hampered by the necessity of waiting for the 
 centre and left. Whereas Napoleon would have assembled the whole 
 army ready to fight with a superiority, and a victory would at once open 
 the way into the valley of the Danube. And, granting that the Rhine 
 were safely passed, no French general could desire better than that Kray 
 without Starray should be forced to give battle in a flank position to the 
 whole French army. 
 
 It is probable that Napoleon's plan would have miscarried in the hands 
 of Moreau ; but looking at other achievements of Bonaparte, — his descent 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 107 
 
 on tin 1 Austrian rear in Italy a few weeks later — liis decisive march to 
 the Danube in 1805 on the other side of the present theatre — and his 
 march to the Saal, already described, — it is not to be denied that, executed 
 by himself, the design might have fulfilled all his expectations. 
 
 The false attacks of Ste Suzanne and St Cyr had the effect not only of 
 detaining Kierimayer's 1(3,000 men in the denies, but of causing Kray to 
 move thither 6000 or 7000 additional troops. But they bad no influence 
 in detaining Starray, who was already so distant on the right that it would 
 be impossible for him in any case to join Kray in time for the first opera- 
 tions. We find, then, that at first 49,000 French were employed in de- 
 taining less than half their number ; and when St Cyr had joined the 
 reserve, still Ste Suzanne did not probably neutralise a greater number 
 of the enemy than his own corps. The detached operations of Ste 
 Suzanne appear, therefore, dangerous and fruitless. 
 
 On the 28th April, Kray might have divined the real design of Moreau. 
 He must have known that Ste Suzanne had repassed the river ; that St 
 Cyr was in the mountains ; that the reserve had driven in his outposts on 
 the Upper Rhine ; and he should have learnt from Eeuss that Lecourbe 
 was moving on Schaffhausen. Putting these pieces of information 
 together, the design against his left was apparent. He might have met 
 it in two ways : he might have fallen on St Cyr with his reinforced 
 right, thus utilising the troops which he had falsely moved in that direc- 
 tion ; or he might have concentrated his army between Engen and Stokach 
 before the French left wing could have joined the other corps, — ready to 
 give battle with his whole force, and closing the space between the lake 
 and the Danube by which Moreau desired to penetrate. That he made 
 no counter-attack on St Cyr might be owing to the difficulties of the 
 country ; or it may be a confirmation of what has been already asserted 
 in a former chapter — that a general, threatened in his communications, 
 thinks of protecting them rather than of making a counter-attack on his 
 adversary. But the second plan — the concentration on the left — was 
 quite practicable ; and had it been executed, Moreau, minus Ste Suzanne, 
 advancing on Engen, would have met Kray, minus Starray. And as Star- 
 ray's absence was owing to distance, and not to Moreau's precautions, the 
 French general's combination was a failure, inasmuch as it deprived him 
 of the support of his left without any corresponding advantage. 
 
108 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 As matters actually happened, Kray, not interpreting events rightly, 
 neglected to call in Kicnmayer, and was outnumbered on the 3d May, 
 not on his centre or right, where he fought a drawn battle, but on the 
 vital point — namely, his left, where Lecourbe easily defeated the inferior 
 force opposed to him. In order to turn the situation to the fullest account 
 on this day, Moreau should have borne in mind that the important busi- 
 ness was to reinforce and push forward his own right, for the object of 
 the campaign was to cut Kray from Ulni. Instead, therefore, of drawing 
 troops, as he did, from right to left, the reverse of that process would 
 have been more consonant with the general design. St Cyr should have 
 been weakened to send troops to the reserve, the reserve should have 
 despatched troops to the right, and St Cyr, instead of being seriously 
 engaged on a point where nothing decisive could be effected, should have 
 been kept back, and restricted to the task of covering the communications 
 with Schaffhausen against a counter-attack. Kray, dislodged by the 
 advance of Lecourbe, would have been forced to retreat without a battle, 
 and ought to have been anticipated at Mosskirch, when he would have 
 been in great danger of being cut off from Ulm. As it was, he made good 
 his retreat ; and having gained Mosskirch, while the French centre and 
 left were still westward in the Forest, he was secure of reaching Ulm. 
 
 In this campaign, then, is exemplified the use of an angular base 
 in causing the enemy to form front to a flank. Kray was obliged at 
 Moreau's approach to front southwards parallel to his communications. 
 The French front meanwhile completely covered the line to Schaffhausen 
 and advanced securely and confidently, while the Austrians were hasten- 
 ing, with doubtful purpose and in straggling array, towards the menaced 
 quarter. Though the battle of Engen was indecisive, yet the direction of 
 the French attack compelled Kray to retreat, and the whole of the Black 
 Forest was lost to the Austrians, though they had not sustained a defeat. 
 If such results followed from the imperfect combination of Moreau, it may 
 be imagined how complete would have been the success of Napoleon's 
 plan. And by supposing that the French had possessed a fortified bridge 
 at Schaffhausen, by which they could have passed at once to the other 
 bank with certainty and security, it may be perceived how important an 
 influence may be exercised by the possession of an angular base. 
 
 So far, then, as may be, without reference to Obstacles, the various 
 
Strasbourg • tvy J 
 
 CAMPAIGN ON THE DANUBE, 1800. 
 F 1 R S I I s K R I () I) 
 
 STALK OF SHIES 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 109 
 
 cases have been enumerated in which an advantage of a certain kind is 
 obtained over an enemy by forcing him to form front to a Hank. This 
 may be the result of ma n<> uvres between armies which were originally on 
 parallel fronts, as was the case in the campaigns of No vara and Sala- 
 manca, when the direction of the roads in the theatre enabled one general 
 to assail his adversary's communications without exposing his own. It 
 may be the result of a prompt assumption of the initiative, as at Jena, 
 where the communications of the offensive army were secured by menac- 
 ing the adversary's; and in this last example of 1800, the configure ti<>n 
 of the frontier line was made subservient to the same end. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 109 
 
 cases have been enumerated in which an advantage of a certain kind is 
 obtained over an enemy by forcing him to form front to a Hank. This 
 may be the result of manoeuvres between armies which were originally on 
 parallel fronts, as was the case in the campaigns of Novara and Sala- 
 manca, when the direction of the roads in the theatre enabled one general 
 to assail his adversary's communications without exposing his own. It 
 may be the result of a prompt assumption of the initiative, as at Jena, 
 where the communications of the offensive army were secured by menac- 
 ing the adversary's; and in this last example of 1800, the configuration 
 of the frontier line was made subservient to the same end. 
 
110 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE CASE OF AN ARMY PROLONGING ITS MOVEMENT AGAINST THE 
 enemy's COMMUNICATIONS BY PLACING ITSELF ACROSS THEM. 
 
 In discussing the operations of Radetzky in 1849, it was said to be more 
 judicious in that general to advance as he did upon the road Mortara- 
 Novara, than to throw himself across the road Novara-Vercelli ; because, 
 in the second case, the Sardinian army, being totally intercepted, might 
 take the resolution of marching to the Po across the Austrian communi- 
 cations with Pavia, and would thus not only extricate itself, but inflict 
 some passing injury upon its adversary. But there are cases where a 
 general, having succeeded in turning the flank of the opposing line, has 
 not been content with compelling the enemy's forces to form front to that 
 flank, but has thrown his army across their line of retreat. In two 
 notable instances this was done by Napoleon — namely, at Marengo and 
 Ulm — and once by Moreau in 1800 on the Danube, subsequent to the 
 operations described in the last chapter. "Were these, then, exceptional 
 cases ? or were the French generals, in operating thus, giving the enemy 
 that chance of escape which Eadetzky would, in the case supposed, have 
 offered to the Sardinians ? 
 
 As it is impossible that hostile armies can be operating from the same 
 base, it follows that an army which throws itself across the communica- 
 tions of its adversary cannot directly cover its own. If the two bases are 
 parallel, then the army operating thus must make a complete counter- 
 march, and must ultimately front its own base, with which it can retain 
 communication only' by a circuitous route ; while the adversary, by a 
 flank or oblique movement, can render the interception reciprocal — and 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. Ill 
 
 taking the most favourable case, namely, that the army thus operating 
 starts from a base parallel to its adversary's line of retreat (as the French 
 base from Basle to Lake Constance in 1800), it must, in throwing itself 
 across its enemy's communications, form front to a flank, and so far 
 endanger its own. In that case a great opportunity of improving his 
 position is offered to the adversary, since, by traversing, in a retreat 
 towards his own base, the line by which the enemy's army advanced, he 
 will probably re-establish his own communications by his Hank, while he 
 severs the enemy's, and will thus reverse the position. 
 
 It may happen that the connection of an army with its base is by a 
 single road. If the base be a point only, not a line — as, for instance, a 
 harbour where a landing has been effected — this will, most likely, be the 
 case. And even when a great army is operating from an extensive base, 
 the nature of the intermediate country may be such as to force the prin- 
 cipal routes to meet in some defile which forms the only practicable 
 thoroughfare. Had the Allies in 1813 succeeded in their design of See Map 
 throwing their army across Napoleon's rear, west of Leipsic, he would No - 2 - 
 have had no alternative but to break through or be ruined. For the 
 Harz Mountains on the one side, and the Thuriugian Forest on the other, 
 had narrowed the channel by which he communicated with France to the 
 single road Leipsic-Erfurth-Hanau. 
 
 In general, however, an army thus cut from its base will have two or 
 three alternatives. 1st, It may march directly on the opposing force, and 
 try to drive it off the line or rout it ; 2d, It may march to one flank 
 across the communications of the enemy ; 3d, It may attempt by a march 
 to the other flank to avoid a collision. And it must be remembered that 
 these flank marches entail none of the usual risk, which is, that they 
 uncover the communications ; for an army that has lost its communica- 
 tions is at any rate free to move in all directions, and cannot well change 
 its position for a worse. 
 
 It will generally be very difficult for a commander who aims at his 
 adversary's rear, to know how soon the enemy may be informed of his 
 design, and how promptly steps may be taken to frustrate it. He will, 
 therefore, when practicable, direct his movement so far to the rear as to 
 insure the interception of the enemy. It is to be presumed that he will, 
 on reaching the point aimed at, be ignorant of the movements of the 
 
112 THE OPERATIONS OF WAS 
 
 intercepted army, and must either await its approach, or advance to close 
 with it. The only certainty he can feel will be that the enemy cannot 
 pause or delay, hut must act at once as soon as they can concentrate 
 their forces. 
 
 On the other hand, the intercepted commander must directly experience 
 all the doubt, confusion, and discouragement which follow the loss of 
 communications. If he evades the assailing force by marching round its 
 outward flank, he must undergo the humiliation of abandoning territory 
 without a blow. If he marches straight upon it, a victory may retrieve 
 all, but a repulse will be ruin. If he marches upon its communications 
 and succeeds in anticipating it there, he may reverse the position. 
 
 See Map CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO. 
 
 No. 5. 
 
 Austrian In May 1800, the Austrian army in Italy, numbering 100,000, under 
 
 positions. General Melas, was engaged in three different operations : 1st, A corps 
 
 of 25,000 men under Ott was besieging Genoa ; 2d, Between the Alps and 
 
 See also the sea another corps under Elsnitz was covering the siege from the efforts 
 
 Part ii. cli. 3. which a French corps, 14,000, under Suchet, was expected to make for the 
 
 relief of the place, and an Austrian success there might be expected to 
 
 transfer the war into French territory ; 3d, The remainder of the army 
 
 was spread along the foot of the Alps watching the issues from the 
 
 Apennines to the St Gothard. The Austrian lines of communication 
 
 with the base on the Mincio have been already specified (page 66). 
 
 Object of Napoleon's object was to descend into Italy by the St Bernard, with 
 
 Napoleon. 35^000 men, drive back the portion of the Austrian line north of the Po 
 
 (about 10,000 strong), and enter Milan, where Moncey's corps of 15,000, 
 
 which had left Moreau's army on the 10th May, would join him by the 
 
 St Gothard. If this design could be concealed till he had thrown a 
 
 force across the Po at Piacenza, the Austrian army would be cut from the 
 
 Mincio ; and the concentration of their forces which must precede their 
 
 subsequent movements would relieve Genoa and leave Suchet free to 
 
 form a junction with its garrison. 
 
 Ivrea to On the 24th May the head of the main French column issued from 
 
 Milan, 70. T vrea- Here branch the roads to Milan and Turin. Lannes's division, 
 
 Ivrea to 
 
 Turin 33 forming the advanced-guard, was pushed along the Turin road. 
 
EXPLAINED AND [LLUSTRATED. 113 
 
 Meanwhile, on the 22cl May, the head of another French column, under 
 Thurreau, had shown itself from the Mont Oenis on the Susa road. It Susa to Turin, 
 was iu reality only 4000 strong, but it might be the advanced-guard of 33- 
 the French army; and so the Austrian general judged it to he, while 
 he considered Lannes's division merely as a detachment employed for 
 the purpose of making a diversion. On this false calculation he placed 
 the greater part of the force of his centre, assembled round Turin, on 
 the Susa road, and sent only a division to oppose Lannes on the side 
 of Ivrea. 
 
 26th May. — Lannes drove back the Austrian division and advanced to Feints on 
 Chivasso, where he seized boats as if for the passage of the To. Turin cover 
 
 '27th. — The rest of the French army began the movement from Ivrea ou Mil;i]1 
 towards Milan. 
 
 28th. — Lannes again attacked the Austrian division, and immediately 
 afterwards began to move towards the Ticiuo, on the Pavia road. 
 
 '2Sth to 30th. — The main French army under Napoleon pushed the 
 Austrians from the defensive lines of the Sesia and Ticino. 
 
 29th. — Melas learned the advance on Milan, but believed the Austrians 
 on the Ticino under Wukassowitch would check it. 
 
 31st. — He prepared to advance with the troops of the centre (about 
 20,000), crossing the Po at Casale, and cutting the French communica- 
 tions at Vercelli, while the same movement would isolate Lannes from 
 Napoleon. But on the same day he learned the reverses of Kray on the 
 Danube, the retreat of "Wukassowitch beyond the Adda, and the arrival 
 of the head of Moncey's column on the Ticino. He therefore felt the Austrians, 
 necessity of assembling his forces before attempting to break through the threak ' iml m 
 formidable array opposed to him on the Ticino, and, suspending the ad- to concen- 
 vauce, gave orders for a concentration round Alessandria. Elsnitz was to trate. 
 quit the Yar and march on Asti, leaving rear-guards to close the Apen- 
 nines against Suchet. The forces covering Turin were to wait there till 
 Elsnitz's column should have reached its destination, in order to protect 
 its march from the French on the Mont Cenis, and were then to move on 
 Asti also. Ott was to raise the siege of Genoa, and hasten with his corps 
 to seize the important point Piacenza and defend the line of the Po. But 
 Ott awaited the capitulation then pending. 
 
 2d June. — Xapoleon entered Milan, and there awaited the arrival of 
 
 ii 
 
114 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 French astride Moncey's forces, which, delayed by the difficulties of the route, did not 
 
 Austrian com- a i\ assemble on the Ticino till the 6 th. 
 
 munications. g^ June, — Laimes's and Victor's divisions passed the Po at Belgiojoso. 
 
 7th June. — Lannes and Victor, turning westward, passed Stradella. 
 
 Murat passed near Piacenza, and took the place. 
 
 Duhesme passed at Cremona. 
 
 Meanwhile the movements of the Austrian corps under Elsnitz and Ott 
 were these : — 
 
 3d June. — Elsnitz, executing Melas's orders of the 31st, was retreating 
 on Ormea. 
 
 bth June. — Two of his brigades were cut off by Suchet in the Apen- 
 nines. 
 
 7 th June. — He reached Ceva with only 8000 of his late force of 18,000 
 men. 
 
 On the 4th June Genoa capitulated. 
 
 5th and 6th. — Ott, placing a garrison in Genoa, sent a brigade of in- 
 fantry towards Piacenza by Bobbio, and marched with the rest of his 
 corps on Tortona for Piacenza. 
 
 7th and 8th. — He reached Tortona. 
 
 Qth. — Continuing his march on Piacenza, he encountered Lannes and 
 Victor at Montebello, was defeated, and driven back upon Alessandria. 
 
 10th, 11th, and 12th. — Napoleon awaited the movements of the enemy 
 in the following attitude : — 
 
 The four divisions of Lannes, Victor, Murat, and Desaix, 28,000, were 
 assembled about Casteggio. 
 
 Moncey's force on the other bank of the Po guarded the line of the 
 Ticino from any attempt Melas might make to break through. 
 
 The rest of the French army was also on the left bank of the Po em- 
 ployed in pushing Wukassowitch back to the Mincio, in blockading the 
 garrisons of Austrian forts in Lombardy, and in guarding the communi- 
 cations between the Ticino and the St Bernard. 
 
 12th. — Melas's army was assembled round Alessandria. 
 
 13th. — Napoleon, impatient to learn the movements of the enem} T , 
 crossed the Scrivia, pushed his advanced-guard to the Bormida, and de- 
 tached Desaix with a division to seek intelligence towards Pdvalta. 
 
 1-lth. — The Austrians issued from their bridge-head on the Bormida, and 
 
 Genoa to 
 Tortona, 35. 
 
 Tortona to 
 
 Montebello, 
 
 15. 
 
EX PLAIN I'D A XI) ILLUSTRATED. 115 
 
 fought the hattle of Marengo. The French were at the end of the first 
 period of the battle driven back to S. Giuliano, but the return of Desaix 
 from Eivalta changed the fortune of the day, and the Austrians were 
 driven in rout over the Borniida. 
 
 15th. — Melas capitulated, abandoning the country and its fortresses as 
 lav as the Mincio, but saving his troops. For Napoleon, considering that 
 Melas's army was yet formidable, and might in another effort succeed in 
 breaking through his cordon, permitted them to pass. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Ivrea is an example of the importance of particular points without 
 regard to their capability of defence. The fact that from thence there 
 was a road to Milan, whither Napoleon wished to go, and another to 
 Turin, whither he desired Melas to believe that he wished to go, was of 
 great moment. For, so long as Lannes threatened Turin, so long w 7 as the 
 march on Milan screened. 
 
 Thurreau's force, being entirely separated from the main army through- 
 out the operations, was useful only as leading "the enemy to a false con- 
 clusion. But its value in that respect w r as incalculable. There were 
 sufficient Austrian troops round Turin to check Thurreau and crush 
 Lannes, thus laying bare the rear of the French army. But the road of 
 the Mont Cenis was both more practicable and more direct than that of 
 the St Bernard ; moreover, Thurreau had artillery, and Lannes, at first, had 
 not, for his guns had been delayed by the difficulty of passing the Austrian 
 fort of Bard. It was but a natural error, therefore, for Melas to believe 
 that Thurreau was backed by the whole French army. 
 
 The critical part of Napoleon's movement lay between Ivrea and the 
 Ticino. For, during that march, his communications were by the St 
 Bernard, and an advance, such as that which Melas intended on the 31st 
 May, would have cut off his retreat. But on passing the Ticino, he not 
 only gained the addition of Moncey's force, but a new line of retreat, in 
 case of need, by the St Gothard. 
 
 Next what he had most to fear was a speedy concentration of the 
 Austrians. Against this he might confidently count on the reluctance 
 which Melas would naturally feel to withdraw his forces from Genoa and 
 
116 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 the Var, whereby the fruits of the whole campaign would be abandoned. 
 Moreover, the time which must elapse between the transmission of orders 
 from Turin or Alessandria, and the assemblement of the Austrian corps 
 on the Po, could not be less than five or six days. Melas actually ordered 
 the concentration on the night of the 31st May. Ott probably received 
 the order on the 2d June. Had he obeyed at once he would have reached 
 Montebello on the 7th instead of the 9th. On that day Lannes was 
 across the Po and moving by Stradella. It was therefore a question of 
 a few hours, whether the Austrians should or should not close the line of 
 the Po between Casale and Piacenza against the French, and so secure 
 their own retreat. 
 
 This crisis passed, we find Napoleon dividing his army. One half 
 only is on the south of the Po ; most of the remainder is employed in 
 guarding the communications. And here is seen the danger of this kind 
 of operation." For Melas's army of 32,000, with superior cavalry and 
 artillery, was assembled at Alessandria on the 12th ; on the 14th it might 
 have broken through Moncey's feeble cordon and have reached Milan 
 while Napoleon was seeking it on the Bormida. 
 
 There was a special circumstance in this campaign which should have 
 induced Napoleon to bring his wdiole army to the south bank. For if 
 Melas moved through Milan he would leave the country south of the Po 
 clear for Napoleon to establish another and better communication with 
 France by the south of the Apennines, and, moreover, a junction with 
 Suchet would be effected, and the territory which was to be the prize of 
 the campaign would be lost to the Austrians. But Napoleon could not 
 be satisfied to let the enemy escape even at such a sacrifice of territory, 
 and therefore it was that he left the Ticino guarded. But there was 
 another alternative open to Melas. He might not only retreat by the 
 north of the Po, but by the road from Alessandria to Genoa ; and he 
 actually contemplated the movement, expecting to maintain himself there 
 with the aid of the fortress, of the strong position in the Apennines, and 
 of the English fleet. The prisoners captured by Lannes at Montebello 
 would inform Napoleon that Genoa was now Austrian, and that a retreat 
 thither was offered to the foe. Therefore it was that his eager and grasp>- 
 ing ambition led him to seek a superior enemy in the great plain of 
 Marengo, a field altogether favourable to that enemy, who was stronger 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 117 
 
 in cavalry and artillery ; and therefore it was also that the victory was 
 further jeopardised by the detachment of Desaix towards Eivalta. 
 
 Looking at the position of the French army throughout this short 
 campaign, it is evident that Napoleon might have been obliged to fight an 
 equal enemy in a situation where, in case of defeat, he would have been 
 cut oil' from the St Bernard (which, bad as it was, was the best line of 
 retreat he possessed), and must have retired by the St Gothard at the 
 sacrifice of his artillery. Such must have been the result had Melaa 
 sought and defeated him north of the Po, or had he been beaten at 
 Marengo. His confidence was justified, not by the excellence of his pre- 
 cautions in case of defeat, but by the calculations which assured him that 
 his most critical movements would be unmolested. 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF 1805. 
 
 The Austrians wished to dispose their own forces in Germany on the See Map 
 defensive while awaiting the junction of the Bussian army. No - 7- 
 
 To this end the Austrian army, nominally commanded by the Arch- 
 duke Ferdinand, but really directed by General Mack, and numbering 
 84,000, marched through Bavaria to Ulm. Covered in front and on the 
 right by tlie mountains of the Black Forest, Mack probably expected to 
 maintain his position against any available French force till the Russians 
 should arrive ; and, with Ulm, he would secure the grand primary object 
 in all wars between France and Austria in German}-, namely, the posses- 
 sion of the valley of the Danube. 
 
 Taking the Austrian base as extending from Egra on the north to Steyer Austrian base 
 on the south, the army at Ulm had three main lines of retreat — namely, an( \ commiml - 
 that of Nuremberg north of the Danube ; that of Batisbon along the 
 river ; and that of Augsburg- Munich south of the Danube. 
 
 Napoleon's object was to interpose between Mack and the approaching Napoleon's 
 Bussian army, and to destroy the Austrians while thus isolated. object. 
 
 His different corps were thus directed from the Bhine on the 26th 
 September : — 
 
 The cavalry under Murat, supported by part of Lannes's corps, entered Feints on the 
 the defiles of the Black Forest, pushing through to Freudenstadt, Both- Austrian front 
 
118 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 cover the ad- 
 vance against 
 the flank. 
 
 weil, Neustadt. This was to induce Mack to believe that the French 
 army would advance in that direction. 
 
 Lannes passed the Ehine at Kehl, and with his main body took post on 
 the Stuttgart road to cover the movement of the other corps ; after which 
 he moved through Stuttgart on Neresheim. Napoleon with the Guard 
 followed Lannes. 
 
 March of the 
 
 Ney passed the 
 
 Rhine 
 
 at 
 
 Carlsruhe, 
 
 moved 
 
 on Stuttgart-Heidenheim. 
 
 French 
 
 Soult ,, 
 
 
 ,, 
 
 
 Spire, 
 
 > > 
 
 Heilbronn-Nordlingen. 
 
 columns. 
 
 Davout ,, 
 Marmont ,, 
 
 
 " 
 
 
 Mannheim, 
 Mayence, 
 
 
 Neckar-Els-Oettingen. 
 Wurzburg- ") 
 
 
 Bernadotte, 
 
 
 from 
 
 
 Hanover, 
 
 ,, 
 
 Wurzburg- > Eichstadt. 
 
 
 Bavarian cor 
 
 PS, 
 
 ,, 
 
 
 Bavaria, 
 
 5? 
 
 Wurzburg- ; 
 
 
 Total, 
 
 180,000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 The columns of Lannes, Ney, and Soult were masked by the cavalry of 
 Murat, which skirted the Black Forest, and occupied the defiles leading 
 from Ulm to the Stuttgart-Heidenheim road. 
 The next movements to the Danube were : — 
 
 French form 
 front to the 
 Danube. 
 
 Ulm to 
 Ingolstadt, 
 
 77. 
 
 Right wing, 
 
 Centre, 
 Left, 
 
 ISTey 
 
 Soult 
 
 Lannes 
 
 Murat 
 
 The Guard 
 
 Davout 
 
 Marmont 
 
 Bernadotte 
 
 Bavarians 
 
 Donauwerth. 
 
 Neuburf'. 
 
 Injrolstadt. 
 
 Austrians 
 change front 
 to the Danube. 
 
 French cross 
 Austrian com- 
 munications, 
 
 and close upon 
 the enemy. 
 
 AVhen Mack learned the approach of the French army to the Danube, 
 he changed front to the right on that river — left at Ulm, centre at 
 Gunzburg, right at Rain. 
 
 6th October. — Soult seized the bridge of Donauwerth. 
 
 7th October. — Murat passed there, forced the Lech and seized Rain. 
 
 The Austrian right (lately the rear-guard), under Keinmayer, fell back 
 on Aicha. 
 
 Davout and Marmont issued from Neuburg towards Aicha. 
 
 8th October. — Soult from Donauwerth towards Augsburg. 
 
 Ney up the left bank of the Danube to Dillingen. 
 
 Murat and Lannes moved up the right bank, and at Wertingen de- 
 feated an Austrian corps which was marching to support the right. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. Ill) 
 
 Kienmayer, far outnumbered by the approaching corps, fell back to 
 the Iser. 
 
 9th October. — Soult at Augsburg, 
 
 Marmont at Augsburg. 
 
 Davout moved by Aicha. 
 
 Murat at Zumarshausen. 
 
 The Russian army had passed Lintz on the Danube 180 miles east of 
 Munich. 
 
 Mack now changed front to the right, thus facing his base. Austrians 
 
 Eight towards M emmingen. chan - c front 
 
 _, . „ , t i! tii to the proper 
 
 Centre between Gunzburg and the lller. rear 
 
 Left at Tim. 
 
 French movements : — 
 
 Bernadotte and Davout on Munich. 
 
 Soult by Landsberg on Memmingen. 
 
 Lannes, Murat, and Marmont, under the Emperor, moved on Dim by 
 the right bank. 
 
 Key, on the other bank, was reinforced to 40,000. He was ordered, See Map 
 1st, To close the roads to the Bohemian frontier; 2d, To cover the French No - 4 - 
 communications with Wurzburg against an irruption of the Austrians 
 from Ulm ; 3d, To approach and mask Ulm by closing the issues from 
 that town on the left bank. At the same time, he was to secure his 
 communications with the Emperor by occupying the bridges on the 
 Danube as he moved up the bank. 
 
 In order to give coherence to the forces immediately opposing Mack, 
 and to leave himself at liberty to move towards the Kussians with the 
 rest of the army, Napoleon placed the corps of Lannes, Xey, and Murat 
 under Murat. That general, misconceiving the situation, and the object 
 of his chief, ordered Key to bring his forces across to the right bank. Ney 
 only obeyed so far as to send one division. 
 
 In a council of war the Austrians determined that the Archduke Fer- Austrians 
 dinand, with 25,000 men, should open a passage to the base by the route attem Pt to 
 
 tnivcrsc tlic 
 
 Heidenheim-Nordlingen. Mack held Ulm with the rest to protect the Frenrh com . 
 Archduke's movement, expecting afterwards to be able to throw himself munications. 
 on the other flank into the Tyrol. 
 
 On the day when the Archduke's movement was begun, one of Ney's 
 
120 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Elchingen to 
 Ulm, 7. 
 
 French con- 
 centrate 
 round Ulm. 
 
 Mack capita 
 lates. 
 
 divisions had passed to the right bank, another had left Gunzburg to 
 join it; Dupont's was at Albeck. On the 11th October, Dupont, moving 
 towards Ulm with 7000, met the Austrian corps, and after a long conflict, 
 in which he inflicted great losses on his adversary, he fell back on Albeck, 
 and thence on Langenau. 
 
 12th October. — Napoleon at Augsburg heard of the movement of Key's 
 corps to the right bank, and directed the following movements: — 
 
 The Guard on Gunzburg. 
 * Marmont on the Iller. 
 
 Launes opposite Elchingen on the right bank. 
 
 Soult to Memmingen. 
 
 Mack, learning Dupont's retreat, ordered a corps to pursue him, while 
 another moved on Elchingen to close that issue on the flank of the Arch- 
 duke's column against the French. 
 
 13th October. — Soult captured 5000 men of the Austrian right wing 
 in Memmingen ; and an Austrian division which had come from Ulm to 
 reinforce that point retired by Kempten to the Tyrol. 
 
 The Austrian corps at Elchingen attacked and burnt the bridge there, 
 driving the French to the other bank. 
 
 Ney rallied his two divisions on the right bank, and prepared to lead 
 them back across the river. 
 
 Lannes's corps was to support Ney. 
 
 Marmont to relieve Lannes. 
 
 Soult to Achstetten to close the Biberach road (by which Mack might 
 gain the Tyrol). 
 
 Dupont, who had quitted Albeck, to return thither. 
 
 14th October. — Ney having restored the bridge of Elchingen, forced the 
 passage, and drove the Austrian corps into Ulm. 
 
 15th October. — Lannes and Murat passed the bridge of Elchingen. 
 
 Marmont replaced Lannes on the Iller. 
 
 Soult approached Ulm by the Biberach road. 
 
 The Austrian corps which had fought before Albeck was intercepted at 
 Neresheim by Dupont and Murat, and capitulated. The Archduke, who 
 had joined this corps with 3000 cavalry from Ulm, made good his retreat 
 by the Nuremberg road. 
 
 19th October.— The Austrians in Ulm, 30,000, capitulated. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 121 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The line of the Mayne afforded to Napoleon the rectangular base neces- 
 sary for securely operating against the Austrian flank or rear. The 
 columns advancing from Wurzburg covered the roads on which they moved, 
 and those which came from the Rhine, though they were moving to a 
 flank, could always, if threatened from Ulm, form on the same front as 
 the others, and cover roads which led towards the angle of the Rhine 
 and Mayne. For instance, Ney found at the successive points of his 
 march, namely, Stuttgart, Reichenbach, Goppingen, Heidenheim — and 
 Lannes at Stuttgart, Schondorf, Aalen, Nordlingen — roads leading direct- 
 ly on Mayence or Wurzburg. The whole movement might have been 
 made from those two last-named places ; but to have assembled the army 
 there would have betrayed the design, which was concealed, or rendered 
 doubtful, by the approach of the right wing from the Upper Rhine. 
 
 When Mack changed front to the line of the Danube from Ulm to Direction of 
 Rain the French army was still entirely beyond his flank. Napoleon's tlie French 
 
 ninxcfi cxin *tl v 
 
 movement had therefore been directed exactly on that part of the Austrian ca i cu i a t e d 
 rear where Mack's retreat, had he attempted it, would have been com- 
 pletely intercepted. 
 
 So far, then, the operation had been assured. But now the difficulties 
 began ; for the Austrians might, on finding themselves intercepted on 
 their main line to Ratisbon, retreat either by Augsburg-Munich, south of 
 the Danube, thus evading their enemy, or by the line Heidenheim-Nurem- 
 berg, crossing his communications. It was to guard against both contin- 
 gencies that Napoleon now made the change of front to his right, which 
 was accomplished on the 9th October, by which the Austrians, with the 
 exception of Kienmayer's corps, were completely intercepted. But this 
 was not effected without exposing the French communications, which now 
 lay in the prolongation of the right flank towards Wurzburg and Mayence. Operations of 
 The situation is almost the same as that on the Po, when Napoleon 1805 com - 
 advanced towards Marengo, except that he now possessed a great superi- F t n f isoo 
 ority of force over his adversary. Now, as then, the wings of the army 
 were separated by a great river. By a rapid advance he was trying to 
 close with his adversary, who, as at Alessandria, was resting on a fortress. 
 
122 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Soult's corps, like Desaix's, was seeking to cut off his retreat on one flank ; 
 Ney's corps, like Moncey's, was covering the communications on the other. 
 And in the earlier course of the two campaigns a similarity is evident. 
 The line of the Mayne corresponds to the frontier of Switzerland, afford- 
 ing, with the Bhine, a rectangular base ; the advance from Wurzburg to 
 the march of Moncey; the approach of the right wing towards the Aus- 
 trian front, to the feint of Thurreau, but with the difference that Lannes 
 and Murat were not prevented, as Thurreau was, from joining the main 
 body. This circumstance, joined to the excellence of the communications, 
 and the complete security of the flank march which had been in the 
 former campaign so critical, gave to the later operations a much greater 
 degree of certainty, security, and completeness. On the other hand, the 
 much greater extent of the Austrian base in Germany than on the Mincio 
 rendered the intercepting movements also much more extensive; and, 
 powerful as was Napoleon's army, the effort to bar all the roads by which 
 Consequences the Austrians could reach their base, had so attenuated his line, that if 
 if the Austn- M^k i iac i ma rched on Albeck with his whole force instead of a single 
 
 ans had made 
 
 a concen- corps, he would have broken through the toils. Jomini says of a concen- 
 trated effort trated retreat on that side by the Austrians, " This movement was the 
 
 on tie side of more ^ ij e f earec | s i nC e the enemy, in directing his march on our rear, 
 Nuremberg. * 
 
 would have seized our parks, our depots, and our means of transport." 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF 1800 IN GERMANY. 
 
 See Map The first period of this campaign, which has already furnished an 
 
 lsT °- 4 - example (Part III. chap, v.), ended with the retreat of the Austrians 
 
 into Ulm, and behind the Danube. Moreau now attempted various man- 
 oeuvres to dislodge Kray. On the 20th May he directed the right wing 
 on Augsburg, and retired the left and centre, drawing them southward. 
 Austrian Kray resolved to attack Richepanse's corps, which was posted between 
 
 attack on ^i Q Danube and Iller, to cover the communications with Schaffhausen. 
 
 French com- 
 munications But the enterprise (5th June), badly combined, failed. Eichepanse, rein- 
 fails, forced in time, repulsed the attack, and the Austrians retired into Ulm. 
 Moreau now advanced to the Danube. He was still based on Schaff- 
 hausen, with which he communicated by Memmingen ; and his right, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 123 
 
 moving from Augsburg towards Blenheim, was thrown forward to an ex- 
 tent that would have dangerously compromised his communications under 
 ordinary circumstances. But all Kray's attempts against Moreau's left, 
 the vital point, had been defeated. Therefore Kray was restricted to the 
 defensive, and Moreau could extend his right without imprudence; for he 
 might assume, after late experience, that the attempts of Kray against his 
 left would not succeed. 
 
 To dislodge Kray from the intrenched camp of Ulm, he resolved to 
 throw his right over the Danube. He directed it from Augsburg on the ulm to 
 portion of the river between Lavingen and Blenheim. Blenheim, 35. 
 
 The centre at Gunzburg. 
 
 The left masked the passages from Gunzburg to Ulm, to hinder any 
 offensive movement of Kray. 
 
 Eichepanse's corps was placed at the confluence of the Idler and 
 Danube, to cover the French communications through Memmingen to 
 Schaffhausen. 
 
 Kray's army was about Ulm, except the corps of Starray, which was 
 spread along the Danube as far as Donauwerth, to observe and prevent 
 any enterprise against the communications. 
 
 16th June. — Starray's main force was at Lavingen with detachments 
 at Gundelfingen and Donauwerth. 
 
 Lecourbe with the French right was opposite Blenheim. 
 
 The Austrians had partially destroyed all the bridges down to Donau- 
 werth. 
 
 18th June. — A French attack at Dillingen was repulsed ; also one at 
 Leipheim (above Gunzburg) by the French left. But these attempts, 
 though unsuccessful, had the effect of deceiving Starray as to the real 
 point of attack, and of keeping his troops dispersed. 
 
 Reconnaissances had proved that the bridges of Kremheim and Blen- 
 heim had suffered least, and it was resolved to pass there. 
 
 19th June. — Two divisions of the French right closed in opposite Blen- 
 heim behind a wood. 
 
 Centre moved towards the river. 
 
 Lecourbe's artillery silenced the Austrian guns in the villages. 
 
 A detachment swam across, followed by others on rafts, and established 
 themselves in Kremheim. Sheltered by them, the workmen repaired the 
 
124 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Austrian line 
 of Ratisbon 
 intercepted. 
 
 Park— Great 
 train of car- 
 riages with 
 heavy artil- 
 lery, stores, 
 baggage, &c. 
 
 Kray marches 
 round Mo- 
 reau's out- 
 ward flank ; 
 
 Ulm to Neres- 
 heim, 35 ; 
 
 Dischingen to 
 
 Neresheim, 3 ; 
 
 bridge, and four battalions passed to make head in the villages against 
 the enemy, till the bridge should be practicable for all arms. The 
 divisions passed and captured three Austrian battalions which had come 
 up piecemeal from Donauwerth. 
 
 Starray assembled 3000 or 4000 men at Hochstet. 
 Lecourbe, after passing, detached one brigade towards Donauwerth to 
 cover his rear, and directed the rest on Hochstet. Starray was driven on 
 Dillingen, and, by a second attack, behind the Brenz. 
 
 Moreau passed the centre over during the night ; and the left was to 
 join it on the morning of the 20th by Gunzburg if possible, but, if the 
 enemy should be too strong there, two divisions were to move on Lavin- 
 gen in order to cross with more certainty; one being left to mask Ulm 
 and to keep up communication with Eichepanse, who was then following 
 the general movement to the right. 
 
 Kray left 10,000 men in Ulm, and drew his troops together, assembling 
 them near Elchingen. 
 
 20th. — Kray having resolved to march round the enemy's right and so 
 recover communications with Eatisbon, sent his park to Aalen for Nord- 
 lingen. 
 
 Moreau had moved thus : — 
 
 Lecourbe on the road from Dillingen to Nordlingen. 
 
 Centre on the Brenz. 
 
 Left on Offingen to pass there, having been unable to pass at Gunzburg. 
 
 The detached division at Leipheim. 
 
 Eichepanse towards Gunzburg. 
 
 Moreau was evidently quite unsuspicious of Kray's design, and had 
 posted his troops to receive an attack down the Danube. 
 
 21st. — Kray marched to Heidenheim. 
 
 French right at Dischingen. 
 
 Centre in second line. 
 
 Left — Brenz and Danube. 
 
 22d. — Kray to Neresheim. 
 
 Moreau sent a reconnaissance to Neresheim, and discovered the retreat. 
 
 23c?. — Kray on Nordlingen. 
 
 Lecourbe by Neresheim on Nordlingen, where he engaged the Austrian 
 rear-guard. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 125 
 
 24/7/. — Kray remained at Nbrdlingen, and marched in the night to 
 
 Eichstedt. 
 
 25th. — Moreau followed to the Wernitz. 
 
 26th.— Kray passed the Danube at Neuburg. and recovcrs . 
 
 his coimmim- 
 
 He had thus recovered his communications with Ratisboo and Vienna, cations with 
 
 Ratisbon. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 AVhen the armies fronted each other on the Danube, each was extended 
 in the prolongation of the line by which it communicated with its base. 
 Yet Moreau ventured to make an offensive movement with his right, or 
 outer wing. He had concluded that, the enemy being by former re- 
 pulses restricted to the defensive, the reciprocity of the situation no longer 
 existed. For all the danger of the flank position lies in the risk of the 
 adversary attacking the inner flank or wing. If it can be assumed that 
 no such attack will be made, there is no more risk in operating from a 
 flank position than is involved in the chance of a failure followed by a 
 pursuit ; nor need that necessarily entail the loss of communications on 
 the part of the defeated portion of the army. Such was the reasoning on 
 which Moreau based his operation. 
 
 His mode of executing it was uncommonly bold and hardy. So con- 
 fident was he that Kray would make no counter-attempt on the southern 
 bank against the French communications, after he felt the pressure on 
 his own, that all the army, except Eichepanse's corps and one other divi- 
 sion, were thrown across the Danube, and the road to Schaffhausen was 
 left absolutely uncovered. 
 
 Had Kray attempted to retreat by the southern bank to Munich, 
 Eichepanse and Key's division would have delayed his march till the 
 rest of the army had recrossed. But in the battle which would have 
 ensued, each party would have fought with its face to its proper rear. 
 
 All Moreau's operations on the left bank were based on the assumption 
 that Kray would come directly down the Dillingen road to break through. 
 In that case his dispositions for obtaining the support of his other corps 
 were extremely good. 
 
 Kray evaded both alternatives of action by marching round the outer 
 
12G THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 flank of the adversary. Had Moreau extended his right to provide against 
 such a movement, he would have weakened his line beyond what he was 
 willing to venture. We have seen that Napoleon never hesitated in such 
 a case to throw for the whole stake ; Lut the different modes of action 
 are due to the difference in the characters of the two generals. Expecting 
 Kray to attack in the valley of the Danube, Moreau would have thought 
 it foolhardy to extend towards the Neresheim road. 
 
 By marching his park through Aalen, Kray freed the direct line to 
 Nordlingen from Heidenheim of impediments ; and at the same time the 
 army, moving by that line, completely covered at Neresheim the march 
 of the park. 
 

CAMPAIGN OF 1800 IN GERMANY 
 SECOND TERIOD 
 
 Augsburg] 
 
 s< Al.K OF MILES 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLTKTRATED. 125 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FEOM THE FOREGOING EXAMPLES. 
 
 The operations which have been described supply certain grounds for 
 judging the merits of any enterprise against an enemy's communications. 
 
 First, we learn that it is not sufficient to seize any point in the enemy's 
 rear. The choice of this point is very important. 
 
 When armies are manoeuvring near each other, and the operations are Direction to 
 
 restricted to a narrow space, as in Radetzky's campaign, the assailant can be pursued by 
 
 ■, . -, .-n • an army that 
 
 determine with certainty the small area within which he will come in aimg at itg 
 
 contact with the enemy, and he can so direct his march as, at the same adversary's 
 
 time, to intercept and to close with him. When the Sardinians retreated rear - 
 
 from Vigevano, the Austrian general might feel assured that he would 
 
 find them between Novara and Vercelli. 
 
 But when the turning movement is begun at a distance of several 
 inarches from the enemy, no such exact calculation can be made ; and if 
 the movement were directed straight on the position of the hostile army, 
 the latter might, by a single march to the rear, evade the blow. 
 
 On the other hand, if the movement be directed against a point of the 
 communications far to the rear, the assailant, on reaching it, must not 
 only spread his forces over a space great in proportion to his distance 
 from the hostile army, in order to close the lines which radiate from that 
 army to its base, but must, by the obliquity of his march, leave a long- 
 line of communication open to a counter-stroke. The necessity of secrecy 
 will generally prevent the assailant from making reconnaissances until 
 the desired point is reached, and being therefore almost in the dark as to 
 the adversary's movements, he cannot concentrate his army on any par- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 127 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FOREGOING EXAMPLES. 
 
 The operations which have been described supply certain grounds for 
 judging the merits of any enterprise against an enemy's communications. 
 
 First, we learn that it is not sufficient to seize any point in the enemy's 
 rear. The choice of this point is very important. 
 
 When armies are manoeuvring near each other, and the operations are Direction to 
 
 restricted to a narrow space, as in Kadetzky's campaign, the assailant can be pursued by 
 
 • ^ • ^ i -n • an army that 
 
 determine with certainty the small area within which he will come in aims at its 
 
 contact with the enemy, and he can so direct his march as, at the same adversary's 
 
 time, to intercept and to close with him. When the Sardinians retreated rean 
 
 from Yigevano, the Austrian general might feel assured that he would 
 
 find them between No vara and Vercelli. 
 
 But when the turning movement is begun at a distance of several 
 marches from the enemy, no such exact calculation can be made ; and if 
 the movement were directed straight on the position of the hostile army, 
 the latter might, by a single march to the rear, evade the blow. 
 
 On the other hand, if the movement be directed against a point of the 
 communications far to the rear, the assailant, on reaching it, must not 
 only spread his forces over a space great in proportion to his distance 
 from the hostile army, in order to close the lines which radiate from that 
 army to its base, but must, by the obliquity of his march, leave a long- 
 line of communication open to a counter-stroke. The necessity of secrecy 
 will generally prevent the assailant from making reconnaissances until 
 the desired point is reached, and being therefore almost in the dark as to 
 the adversary's movements, he cannot concentrate his army on any par- 
 
128 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 ticular line with the certainty of meeting the shock there. Meanwhile 
 the pressure on the communications will have informed the enemy of the 
 general direction of the movement, which he may take steps to frustrate 
 by moving in mass in a direction where there is no adequate force to 
 oppose him. 
 
 As an example of the impolicy of aiming a stroke too far to the enemy's 
 rear, Hood's operations against Sherman's communications in 18G4 are 
 notable. When the Federal general began his march from Atlanta to the 
 Georgian coast, Hood was operating against the communications on the 
 Tennessee river, 200 miles off. Sherman's march was thus left unmolested ; 
 whereas had the Confederates, while menacing his communications, re- 
 mained near enough to be aware of his movements, they might have fol- 
 lowed and harassed the march through Georgia. 
 
 To give the greatest effect to such an operation, the movement should 
 be directed not more than a march or two in the rear of the rearmost -point 
 which it is calculated the enemy can reach by the time it is completed, 
 giving him credit for obtaining early intelligence and of retreating with 
 promptitude when his resolution is formed, but also taking into account 
 the motives which may induce him to delay to form that resolution. 
 Necessity of Having reached the point aimed at, it is essential not to await the 
 enemy, but to close upon him with all possible celerity. This will not 
 only relieve the assailant from uncertainty, and give him the power of 
 operating to the best advantage in any case that may occur, but will, by 
 narrowing the arc on which his front is extended, increase his means of 
 concentration, and also enable him to secure his own communications 
 against an effort of the intercepted army to break through. Thus, when 
 Napoleon had drawn his forces close around Ulm, his right under Ney 
 covered the roads to Wurzburg from Mack ; whereas when he first crossed 
 the Danube at Donauwerth, his right wing, in order to protect to an 
 equal degree the communications with Wurzburg and bar Mack's retreat, 
 Donauwerth must have extended from Donauwerth to Nordlingen — an extension which 
 would have so weakened it that the Austrian army could not have been 
 effectually opposed there. The difficulties of the French were in propor- 
 tion to the extent of the space they must occupy between the river and 
 the Ulm-Nuremberg road. 
 
 When part only of the enemy's army is intercepted, it will be better to 
 
 closing on the 
 
 intercepted 
 
 army. 
 
 to Nordlin 
 gen, 18. 
 
EXPLAINED AXh ILLUSTRATED. 129 
 
 close on the intercepted portion than to follow the other. We shall see 
 an example of this hereafter in the campaign of 1814, when Napoleon 
 turned from Champaubert on Montmirail. 
 
 Since to assail an adversary's communications is to challenge him to The intercept- 
 immediate battle, the force which performs the movement must be pro- in « force must 
 portioned to the audacity of the step. An inferior force may menace its to the enemy 
 enemy's rear, as Sir John Moore's army menaced Napoleon's line from unless imme- 
 Madrid to France: or a corps may inflict for a time great damage on an diatcl y SU P- 
 
 , . , . . ported, 
 
 adversary s army by interrupting convoys and destroying roads and sup- 
 plies ; but unless it have a retreat open, it will probably suffer heavily 
 for its presumption. Thus, when the Allies in 1813 were defeated before 
 Dresden, Napoleon sent Vandamme's corps up the Elbe to intercept the 
 retreat of their columns in rear of the Saxon mountains ; but the French 
 force, throwing itself across the path of the retiring army, was enveloped 
 and destroyed. In the same campaign, Wrede's corps, trying to cut 
 Napoleon off from France after the defeat of Leipsic, was swept aside at 
 Hanau without effecting any part of its purpose. An inferior force so 
 engaged must therefore compensate for its weakness by extraordinary 
 advantages of position, or must be certain of immediate and powerful 
 support, such as a close pursuit, by a co-operating force, on the rear of 
 the coming foe, or an advance upon his flank by the main army. In 
 any other case it is imperative that the intercepting force should be 
 strong enough to engage on good terms wherever it may encounter the 
 enemy. 
 
 The operation of throwing an army across an enemy's lines of retreat, Comparative 
 as Napoleon did, is, in appearance, much more decisive and effectual advanta s es of 
 
 partial and 
 
 than that of operating on a front parallel to those lines, as Eadetzky did. com plete in- 
 But it is so chiefly in appearance. The troops, spread over a great space, terception. 
 cannot be strong enough at any point to resist the attack of the enemy in 
 mass. Their front being parallel to their own line of communication with 
 the base, a lost battle w r ould be as disastrous to them as to the adversary. 
 On the other hand, by retaining a front parallel to the enemy's com- 
 munications, the assailant covers his own, and therefore preserves a 
 relative advantage in case of battle; while, if the intercepted army 
 seeks to evade an engagement by using a still enclosed line of retreat, it 
 ought to be anticipated on that line and brought to action, for the assail- 
 
 i 
 
130 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR EXPLAINED. 
 
 ant will almost certainly be nearer to some point of that line than the 
 enemy. For instance, had Napoleon, in 1805, halted on the Danube 
 instead of crossing it, his whole army would have been assembled in the 
 space between the river and the Ulm-Nuremberg road. It would thus 
 have been ready to confront Mack there ; it would have closed the main 
 Ulm to Mu- line of Austrian communication, that of Eatisbon ; and had the enemy 
 inch, 80. sought to escape from Ulm by Munich, the French from Ingolstadt and 
 
 Ingolstadt to 
 
 Munich 45. Neuburg might have arrived there in half the time. 
 
 Best course I" general, then, the better course would be for the assailant, on 
 
 for the assail- attaining the point of the communications aimed at, to move rapidly 
 along them till close to the opposing army, and then to manoeuvre so 
 as to force that army to form front to a flank. It will thus be com- 
 pelled to engage at the greatest relative disadvantage if it determines 
 to fight, and if it escapes by a line still open, the territory it had 
 occupied will be gained without a blow. 
 Best course The commander of an army that feels the grasp of a formidable enemy 
 
 for the gene- on jj. g communications is not in a position which admits of pause or 
 
 ral of the in- 
 tercepted deliberation. His first step must be to concentrate his forces ; till that is 
 
 army. effected he can only attempt to retreat under penalty of sacrificing all the 
 
 troops that have not joined him, and the more extended his front the 
 
 greater will be his danger. But if the concentration be accomplished 
 
 while the enemy is yet at a distance, his hope of safety must lie in 
 
 Concentration the promptitude of his movements. Whatever course he resolves on, 
 
 indispensable. w ] ie tj ier to break through the cordon or to evade it, it is indispensable 
 
 that he should operate with his army entire. To divide his forces for 
 
 any purpose will be to play the adversary's game. And the best course 
 
 will generally be to strike boldly at the communications of the enemy, 
 
 for a success there may retrieve the campaign. Had Melas moved 
 
 promptly to the Ticino he might have been in Milan on the 14th June, 
 
 while Napoleon was seeking him on the Bormida. And Mack might 
 
 have recovered his base without loss of credit had he struck with his 
 
 whole army towards Nuremberg. Still, meet it as he will, a sustained 
 
 movement against his communications must cause a general to lose 
 
 ground in the theatre, and to abandon his enterprises, though he save 
 
 his army. 
 
PART IV. 
 
 OPERATIONS ILLUSTRATING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN 
 THE FRONTS OF OPPOSING ARMIES, WITHOUT 
 SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE COMMUNI- 
 CATIONS WITH THE BASES. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE MANNER IN WHICH PART OF AN ARMY MAY HOLD IN CHECK 
 OR RETARD A SUPERIOR FORCE OF THE ENEMY DURING AN 
 OPERATION : THIS MATTER BEING NECESSARY TO THE DISCUS- 
 SION OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT STATED ABOVE. 
 
 It has been already said that in very few countries can a large body of 
 troops move in order of battle, even for a short march. It must of neces- 
 sity, even when moving in the expectation of an immediate engagement, 
 form lengthened columns on the roads. When in this formation, only 
 the heads of the columns can be deployed for immediate action ; and to 
 bring the army from the order of march to the order of battle is a work 
 of time. Therefore it may, in most countries, be checked for a short The march of 
 time by a force, deployed in order of battle, only a little superior to the a column ma y 
 heads of the advancing columns. And the uses to be made of this cir- b a T in _ 
 cumstance are manifold ; it is not too much to say that, rightly employed, ferior force, 
 it is the most effective weapon in the military armoury ; but only one or 
 
132 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 The retarding 
 force must 
 engage only 
 partially, 
 
 withdrawing 
 when out- 
 numbered. 
 
 two modes of applying it need be adverted to, for the better understand- 
 ing of this part of the subjeet. 
 
 If a body of troops were to remain drawn up to oppose the advance of 
 a superior force, on a plain, where the whole formation was visible, the 
 attempt would be futile and disastrous. The enemy would at once attack 
 with superior force, and compel a costly retreat under penalty of rout or 
 destruction. But skilfully disposed, in a good position, across the path 
 of an adversary advancing in an ordinarily broken and difficult country, 
 the risk is greatly reduced. If the armies have been manoeuvring near 
 each other, with numbers and positions constantly changing, and plans 
 and combinations only to be guessed at, the leader who comes on such 
 an obstacle in his path cannot, at first, know the amount of force which 
 bars his way sufficiently well to begin an immediate battle. He will 
 generally pause, reconnoitre, and feel his way ; and will defer a general 
 attack till he shall be ready to deploy a force sufficient to render him 
 confident of success. 
 
 In the meanwhile the commander of the smaller force must watch 
 carefully the dispositions of his adversary, and combine, in an unusual 
 degree, resolution with prudence. For if he were to engage the whole 
 of his troops throughout the extent of their front, it would be out of his 
 power to withdraw when the adversary had deployed a superior force, 
 and he would be outflanked and heavily defeated. On the other hand, if 
 he were to give way before the enemy had made a considerable deploy- 
 ment, the advance which it was his business to check would not be 
 retarded. He must occupy his ground to the last moment possible 
 without committing himself to a general action, and must then effect an 
 orderly retreat. At the first opportunity offered by the ground he must 
 repeat the manoeuvre. Meanwhile the adversary will have again formed 
 order of march, and, on approaching him, must once more form for 
 battle, — with more or less promptitude in proportion to the confidence 
 he may feel that the obstructing force is still inferior to him. In this 
 way the day's march, which, if unopposed, might have stretched to twenty 
 miles, may be reduced to six or three ; and time may thus be gained for 
 employing to decisive advantage the rest of that army which uses the 
 retarding force. 
 
 " One secret of retiring," says Marmont, " is to move off the army 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 133 
 
 betimes, leaving a strong rear-guard, which delays to march as long as 
 possible without compromising itself, and to take a defensible position 
 at such a distance that the enemy cannot arrive till three hours before 
 sunset. Whatever his ardour for the combat, he will then not have time 
 tn make the necessary dispositions." 
 
 EXAMPLE OF A FORCE RETARDING THE ADVANCE OF A SUPERIOR ENEMY. See Map 
 
 No. 10. 
 
 In 1815 Zieten's corps occupied the line of the Sambre, covering the 
 road from Charleroi to Brussels ; and when Napoleon advanced, it was 
 the business of Zieten to oppose the progress of the French until Blucher 
 and Wellington could concentrate their forces behind him. 
 
 The French columns advanced to the Sambre at three points, namely — 
 Marchienne, Charleroi, and Chatelet. Marchienne 
 
 to Chatelet, 
 6. 
 
 Zieten's 1st brigade was in and around Fontaine l'Eveque ; 
 
 The 2d in Marchienne, Dampremy, La Roux, Charleroi, Chatelet, and Gilly ; 
 
 3d in Fleurus, Farciennes, Tamines ; 
 
 4th in Moustier-sur-Sainbre, nearly to Namur ; 
 Reserve Cavalry about Gosselies. 
 
 "When the French columns approached the Sambre, and the direction 
 of the movement was apparent, Zeiten ordered 
 
 The 1st brigade to Gosselies ; 
 
 The 2d to defend the passages threatened, until the 1st should have traversed its 
 rear, and then to retire towards Gilly ; 
 3d and 4th to concentrate as rapidly as possible on Fleurus. Charleroi to 
 
 Fleurus, 9. 
 
 Thus the weight of the advance was opposed by the 2d brigade, about 
 8000 strong. 
 
 The line of the Prussian outposts had extended on a front from Sossoie 
 to Thuin on the Sambre. These were driven in about four in the morn- 
 ing. The advanced-guard of the left French column attacked the Prus- 
 sian outpost in Thuin, and drove it on Marchienne, which was defended 
 by a battalion and two guns. The bridge was barricaded and held against The advance 
 several attacks, after which the defenders, outnumbered, retired through cIlecketl - 
 Dampremy upon Gilly. In Dampremy was part of a battalion with four 
 guns, which also retired upon Gilly, while the battalion from Marchienne 
 marched upon Fleurus. 
 
134 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 A corps of light cavalry, 2500 strong, supported by the Imperial Guard, 
 formed the advanced-guard of the French centre column, and drove in the 
 Prussian outposts in front of Charleroi, capturing a company in a village 
 on the Sambre. The bridge and dyke of Charleroi were defended against 
 a first attack, but carried by a second, when the defenders (one battalion) 
 retired towards Gilly. By eleven o'clock the French held Charleroi, and 
 Reille's corps was passing the bridge of Marchienne. 
 
 The passage of the French at these points rendered the situation of the 
 1st Prussian brigade, retiring from Fontaine l'Eveque, extremely critical. 
 To facilitate its retreat, Zieten detached a regiment of infantry and a regi- 
 ment of cavalry from the 3d brigade, in reserve at Fleurus, to Gosselies. 
 A brigade of the French cavalry corps approached Jumet while the 1st 
 brigade was still beyond the Pieton, and threatened to cut it off, but was 
 attacked and defeated by the Prussian cavalry. The 1st brigade passed the 
 Pieton, and filed through Gosselies, covered by the detachment from the 3d. 
 French ad- The repulsed French brigade was supported by a light cavalry division 
 
 vance checked f t ne G uar d anc | a regiment of infantry, and again advanced on Gosselies, 
 
 at Gosselies. . . . . . , 
 
 in conjunction with one division of Eeille s corps from Marchienne ; and 
 followed the 1st Prussian brigade to Heppignies, where it formed order of 
 battle, and drove the head of the French attacking column back towards 
 Gosselies. The Prussians then retired on Fleurus. 
 
 About two o'clock the 2d brigade concentrated near Gilly, the right on 
 
 Soleilmont, the left on the Sambre at Chatelet, where a detachment from 
 
 the 3d corps defended the bridge. The nature of the country concealed 
 
 French ad- the extent of the force ; the French generals paused to reconnoitre before 
 
 vance checked attacking ; the Emperor himself made a reconnaissance, and ordered an 
 
 at Gilly. ,,,... • > -i n 
 
 attack, the dispositions for which were completed about six o clock. 
 The commander of the 2d brigade, threatened by overwhelming numbers, 
 withdrew it to another position in rear, but not without considerable loss 
 from the charges of the pursuing cavalry, which, however, was presently 
 French ad- checked by Prussian horse from the reserve at Fleurus. The 2d brigade 
 vance checked t j ien too j, a p OS1 ti on in front of Lambusart, from whence, after again 
 
 at Lambusart. . ° 
 
 checking the French, it retired, protected by cavalry, to Fleurus. The 
 1st brigade reached St Amand about eleven at night ; and the whole 
 corps (four brigades) was at that hour concentrated between St Amand 
 and Ligny. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 135 
 
 In this way two columns — one, the left, of 45,000, the other, the centre, 
 of G-4,000 men — were retarded by two brigades, each about 8000 strong, so 
 that between eleven o'clock in the morning and nightfall they only ad- 
 vanced four or live miles. And this was in a country more than commonly 
 free from obstacles, and affording no marked advantages for defence. 
 
 "When an army makes a compulsory retreat after a defeat, it is not in Subject of the 
 a condition at once to renew the contest. " A beaten army," says the cna I )ter cou - 
 Archduke Charles, "is no longer in the hands of its general." It no 
 longer responds to his appeal. The troops that have been driven from 
 the field will be slow to form front for battle — confusion, too, will be 
 added to despondency, for regiments will be broken and mixed, artillery 
 will be separated, from its ammunition, supply-trains will be thrown into 
 disorder by the sudden reflux, and the whole machine will be for the 
 time disjointed. It is partly to provide for this that generals usually Operation of 
 keep part of their reserves out of action, in order to cover the retreat. a rear -S uard - 
 The enemy must form columns to pursue — the heads of these may be 
 checked, and the pursuit retarded; and time will thus be given to re- 
 store order, and to take advantage of favourable ground to make another 
 stand. 
 
 On the other hand, it is not necessary for the victorious leader to Only part of 
 
 launch his whole army in pursuit. If the enemy's entire concentrated an arju y neeJ 
 
 P ulbUe - 
 force has been engaged, he will naturally follow it with his whole army. 
 
 But if he has fought with only a portion of the enemy, and has other 
 and better uses than pursuit of it for part of his own forces, he may 
 detach a corps to press the rear of the beaten troops. The retreat- 
 ing general will be unable for some time to ascertain what amount 
 of force is pursuing — for all he knows, the whole of the army that has 
 just beaten him may be on his track; he is compelled, perhaps, to pass 
 by positions which he might, indeed, with the troops in hand, hold 
 against the real pursuing force, but which he could not venture to occupy 
 with the chance of being again attacked by the whole weight of the 
 enemy. And if at last he does rally his corps, and turn on the pursuer, 
 the latter must at once take up the part of a retiring force, whose 
 business it is to retard the enemy, and will fall back upon the main 
 
136 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Comparative 
 strength of 
 pursuing 
 force. 
 
 Course of the 
 
 defeated 
 
 bodies. 
 
 Grounds 
 established 
 for pursuing 
 the subject. 
 
 army, which, in the meantime, should have found time to effect its 
 purpose. 
 
 As a rear-guard is seldom more than a fifth or sixth of the total force, 
 especially if it be formed entirely of the troops of the reserve, it follows 
 that the pursuing force, in order to press confidently on the rear-guard, 
 attaching boldly, and augmenting the disorder, need not be more than a 
 third of the beaten army. Thus two-thirds of the victorious force (sup- 
 posing it to have been equal to its adversary at first) will be disposable 
 elsewhere. 
 
 The chance of the defeated general resuming the offensive will then 
 depend partly on the nature of the defeat he sustained in the field, partly 
 on the conduct of his rear-guard. But it may depend still more on what 
 the main body of the enemy, operating elsewhere, may be able in the 
 meantime to effect. If the defeated general fought the action with only 
 part of an army, and is driven by his retreat more and more apart from 
 the rest, his first endeavour will be to effect a reunion ; and if he finds 
 that the other portion of the army has also been defeated, he will feel 
 that the first object of the leaders of both parts must be to recombine the 
 broken host, by anticipating the victor in arriving at some possible point 
 of junction. 
 
 Let us assume, then, that part of an army may occupy a superior force 
 of the enemy, while the remainder strikes a blow elsewhere ; that a 
 beaten army may be pursued for a time by an inferior force ; and that 
 the course taken by parts of an army which have been separately defeated 
 will be to retreat in order to recombine. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 137 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE EFFECT OF INTERPOSING AN ARMY BETWEEN THE PARTS 
 OF AN ENEMY'S EXTENDED FRONT. 
 
 It has been shown in former examples that operations against the com- 
 munications of an enemy with his base, however decisive, are only prac- 
 ticable, except with corresponding risk, under certain geographical con- 
 ditions. If these do not exist, such enterprises can only be undertaken 
 under penalty of a reciprocal exposure of the communications of the 
 assailant. Kegard for these will generally induce commanders, unless 
 unusually confident in themselves and their army, to seek safer methods 
 of obtaining an advantage ; and opportunities must be sought in the 
 relations which the fronts of the hostile armies bear to each other at 
 different junctures of the campaign. 
 
 There are various reasons, as has been already explained, why an army 
 should, and generally does, operate on a front more extended than its line 
 of battle. Thus in the Jena campaign, Napoleon's front from Saalfeld to 
 Plauen extended 50 miles ; the Prussians from Jena to Gotha, and thence 
 towards Hildburghausen, were still more dispersed ; and when the armies 
 were assembled in presence of each other, the parts at Naumburg and 
 Jena were separated by an interval of 20 miles. When, in 1805, Napo- 
 leon marched round Ulm, there were wide gaps between his columns ; 
 and, in fact, the case where great armies move for any distance on a front 
 as contracted as their line of battle is comparatively rare. Under such 
 circumstances opportunities must occur, amid the shiftings of the hostile 
 bodies, for pushing into the intervals of an enemy's front and separating 
 its parts ; the front of a great army in motion being marked by a line 
 passing through the heads of advancing columns. 
 
138 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY. 
 
 See Map 
 
 No. 5. 
 
 Positions of 
 the French. 
 
 Tenda to 
 Genoa, 80. 
 
 French com- 
 munications. 
 
 Positions of 
 the Austro- 
 Sardinians. 
 
 Coni to Mil- 
 lesimo, 35. 
 
 At the outset, the Western and Southern faces of the mountains of 
 North Italy marked the fronts of the opposing armies, the French on the 
 one side, the Sardinians and Austrians in alliance on the other. 
 
 On the Western face, armies of about 20,000 men (the French being 
 under Kellerman) on each side occupied and neutralised each other dur- 
 ing the active operations which took place on the Southern side of the 
 theatre. An English fleet on the coast restricted the French to the land. 
 
 The part of the French army which Napoleon commanded, known as 
 the Army of Italy, was extended along the mountains parallel to the 
 coast between Nice and Genoa. Four gaps pierce this chain, leading from 
 the strip of coast-line into Piedmont. On the left is the pass of Tenda — 
 next that of Ormea — then the defile opposite Savona — and lastly the 
 Bochetta pass, in which lies the road from Genoa to Alessandria. 
 
 The republic of Genoa was considered neutral territory, but, threatened 
 by the French, was occupied by the Austrians. 
 
 On Napoleon's left, two of his divisions, together 7000 strong, held the 
 pass of Tenda. 
 
 Next Serrurier's division (7000) was in and beyond Ormea, possessing 
 therefore the issue of the mountain-chain. 
 
 The division of Augereau (8000) was at Mont San Giacomo, from 
 whence there is a hill-path along the Northern slope communicating with 
 the road of Cadibona. 
 
 The division of Massena (8000) was at Cadibona. 
 
 The division of La Harpe (8000) at Savona, one of its brigades, Cer- 
 voni's, being at Voltri. 
 
 The communications of the French with France were by the road 
 through Savona to Nice. 
 
 The army immediately opposed to Napoleon was under the Austrian 
 general Beaulieu. It consisted of 20,000 Sardinian troops and 30,000 
 Austrians. 
 
 The Sardinians under Colli had their headquarters at Ceva, and extended 
 from the valley of Coni on the right to Millesimo on the left. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 139 
 
 The right wing of the Austrians, or centre of the Allied army, under Maieaimoto 
 Argenteau, was at Sassello. Sassello, 20. 
 
 The left wing at Ovada and Voltagsno was under the immediate com- Sassello to 
 
 maud of the general-in-chief, Beaulieu. Voltaggio, 25. 
 
 The base of the Sardinians was Turin, with which they communicated Bases and 
 
 by Alba, Fossano, and Cherasoo. communica- 
 
 * _ tions 01 the 
 
 The ultimate base of the Austrians in Italy was the Mincio, with lilies. 
 
 which they communicated by the lines — 
 
 Acqui-Casale-Milan 
 
 Aci [iii- Alessandria-Pavia ; 
 
 Novi-Tortona-Piacenza ; 
 
 and, intermediately, their object was to cover Lombardy. 
 
 The issues of the mountain barrier into Piedmont at Tenda and Ormea 
 were in possession of the French. At the Savona pass works were con- 
 structed by the French, but there were no obstacles on the Austrian side. 
 The Austrians held the Bochetta pass ; and the fortifications of Coni, 
 Mondovi, and Ceva, held by the Sardinians, closed the principal valleys. 
 
 The French army guarding the passes leading on its communications 
 was necessarily greatly extended ; but was nevertheless collected on the 
 different points already mentioned. The Austro-Sardinians, occupying an 
 equally extended front, were much more disseminated along that front ; 
 for numerous ridges shoot out from the main chain, which frequently 
 subdivide, and the valleys lie between them. As these ridges are mostly 
 much easier of passage than the main chain, the French, descending from 
 any of their passes, could from one valley pass to another. Therefore 
 the Austrians, pursuing the system common at that time, sought to guard 
 all the avenues by occupying all ; and thus their forces were greatly sub- 
 divided and separated from each other by the intervening ridges, while 
 the French had the Nice-Genoa road (the Corniche) by which to com- 
 municate. The numbers of the Austro-Sardinians in the field were 
 diminished by the garrisons of the fortresses in Piedmont, and were 
 probably about equal to those of the French. 
 
 Napoleon's plan was to continue to hold the passes of Tenda and Ormea, French plan, 
 but to draw together the divisions of Augereau, Massena, and La Harpe, 
 for an attack upon the Austrian centre, and to push in between Beaulieu 
 
140 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Austrian plan. 
 
 Voltaggio to 
 Yoltri, 20. 
 
 Sassello to 
 Monte Legino, 
 13. 
 
 Austrians 
 
 extend. 
 
 Voltri to 
 Monte 
 Legino, 20. 
 
 French con- 
 centrate. 
 
 and Colli. This design was greatly favoured by an offensive movement 
 which Beaulieu commenced, very opportunely for Napoleon. 
 
 The Austrian general, on finding that La Harpe's right was extended to 
 Voltri, conceived that the attack was about to be made on his left against 
 the line Genoa-Novi. Therefore he resolved to meet this by moving his 
 left wing on Voltri to attack in front ; while his centre, under Argenteau, 
 from Sassello, was to advance upon Savona, and enclose all the French 
 eastward of that point, cutting them from Nice, and from their left wing 
 at Ormea and Tend a. 
 
 The pass opposite Savona is double. One path comes from Sassello, the 
 other from Cairo ; and the Monte Legino stands between them. On the 
 topmost ridge of that hill, works had been constructed and occupied by 
 the French to close the road from Sassello. 
 
 10th April. — The Austrians moved thus : Argenteau, with 10,000 men 
 from Sassello, by Montenotte towards Savona; Beaulieu, with 11 battal- 
 ions, in two columns, one by the Bochetta pass, one over the mountains, to 
 Voltri, where the head of the first column attacked the brigade of Cervoni. 
 
 Cervoni held his ground for the day, and at nightfall retired to a 
 position in rear. 
 
 11th April. — Argenteau, resuming his advance, was stopped by the 
 works in the pass occupied by 1200 men. He attacked them unsuccess- 
 fully all day, and at night bivouacked in front of them, detaching a bat- 
 talion to cover his rear in the valley he had come by. 
 
 Beaulieu, still advancing, again attacked Cervoni, but without driving 
 him from his position. 
 
 During the night, Cervoni, retiring from before Beaulieu, joined La 
 Harpe, whose whole division, marching to the Monte Legino, drew up 
 behind the works there, facing Argenteau. 
 
 Massena from Cadibona was directed into the Cairo valley ; then he 
 was to cross the ridge into the Sassello valley, and was then (apparently 
 by the same path by which Argenteau had advanced) to attack the 
 Austrian flank and rear. 
 
 Augereau from San Giacomo was to move on Cairo, and push back the 
 Sardinians there, so as to prevent them from reinforcing Argenteau : this 
 done, he was to turn towards Massena. 
 
 12^7? April. — La Harpe in front, Massena in rear, attacked Argenteau, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 141 
 
 whose force was entirely broken and dispersed, the remnants rallying at 
 Dego. 
 
 La Harpe was directed to move first on Sassello, to drive back any troops 
 there, and then to cross the ridge to a point between Cairo and Dego, 
 
 Massena's division, after the action, was pushed into the valley, occu- 
 pying it from Cairo to the heights looking on Millesimo. 
 
 Augereau, from the Cairo valley, crossed the ridge to Millesimo. 
 
 Serrurier made false attacks from Garessio to occupy Colli. 
 
 Beaulieu advanced again ; but encountering no enemy, and hearing the 
 cannonade in the hills, halted for information. 
 
 13th April. — Augereau's division, and the brigades of Massena on the Austrian 
 ridge, enveloped the Sardinians at Millesimo. centre broken. 
 
 Beaulieu learnt what had befallen Argenteau. He turned back his 
 own columns, and ordered such of the Austrian troops as were then 
 north of the Apennines to concentrate on Dego. 
 
 14:th April. — La Harpe joined Massena's right, and together they drove 
 the Austro-Sardinians at Dego (4 battalions) upon Acqui, defeating also, Dego to 
 next day, four other battalions, directed by Beaulieu upon Dego. Acqui, 20. 
 
 Augereau mastered the ridge between the valleys of Millesimo and of 
 Ceva. 
 
 Serrurier established communications with Augereau. 
 
 Beaulieu changed the point of concentration to Acqui. 
 
 Colli concentrated the Sardinians in the intrenched camp of Ceva. 
 
 loth to 22d April. — Napoleon, posted on the principal spurs of the Apen- French army, 
 nines, had now interposed his division between the widely-separated wings interposed 
 of the Allies. He resolved to throw his weight against the Sardinians. the A]lies 
 
 He posted La Harpe at San Benedetto, where he might watch Beaulieu, throws its 
 and at once prevent an offensive movement against Napoleon's rear, or wel « ut 
 anticipate the Austrians at some point, such as Alba, should they seek to ifTrnt 
 join the Sardinians. And to cover his communications with Savona, he 
 left a brigade at Cairo. 
 
 Augereau then joined Serrurier before Ceva. Millesimo to 
 
 Massena crossed the ridge into the valley of the Tanaro below Ceva. Ceva, 10. 
 
 Colli retired to a position before Mondovi. 
 
 The Sardinian general, after repulsing an attack, retired to Mondovi. Sardmiaas 
 
 retreat to- 
 Pursued and driven thence, he retreated to Fossano. wards Turin 
 
142 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Ce.va to 
 Mondovi, 13. 
 
 Austrians 
 move to 
 rejoin the 
 
 Sardinians. 
 
 Acqni to 
 Alba, 25. 
 
 French mass 
 still inter- 
 poses. 
 
 Alba to Turin, 
 40. 
 
 Result. 
 
 The French communications with Nice were now established by the 
 line Ceva-Ormea. 
 
 23d April. — Colli made overtures of peace on the part of the Sardinian 
 Government. Napoleon, while treating, continued to advance. 
 
 24:th April. — Beaulieu, with the design of joining Colli, moved from 
 Acqui by Nizza towards Alba. 
 
 25th April. — Colli retreated to Carignano. 
 
 Serrurier occupied Fossano. 
 
 Massena occupied Cherasco. 
 
 Augereau occupied Alba. 
 
 Communications were established with Tenda, and the divisions there 
 were ordered to invest Coni. 
 
 26th April. — The French united on Alba, and Napoleon resumed his 
 advance on Turin. 
 
 27th and 28th April. — The Sardinians concluded a separate peace, 
 giving up the fortresses of Alessandria, Tortona, and Coni, and the citadel 
 of Ceva, to the French, who obtained the line of the Mont Cenis for their 
 communication with France in subsequent operations ; and Napoleon 
 now directed his army against Beaulieu, who fell back across the Po, 
 at Valenza. 
 
 Bonaparte's 
 instructions. 
 
 Reasons for 
 striking at 
 the centre. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The instructions given by the Directory to Bonaparte impressed on 
 him "that the most immediate interest of the French Government should 
 be to direct its principal efforts against the army and territories of the 
 Austrians in Lombardy." They go on to say, — " It is easy to perceive 
 that every military movement against the Piedmontese or their territory 
 is in some way indifferent to the Austrians, who, as was shown in the 
 last campaign, trouble themselves very little about the disasters of their 
 allies, and who in moments of danger, far from seeking effectually to 
 protect them, immediately separate from them and occupy themselves 
 only with covering the country which belongs to them, and which fur- 
 nishes them abundantly with the resources of which they stand in need." 
 
 There was, therefore, political as well as military reason for striking at 
 the centre and separating the Allies. But, having separated them, Bona- 
 parte wisely departed from the instructions of the Directory, in turning 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 143 
 
 with his main force against the Sardinians, for, in compelling them to 
 make peace, he secured the communications with France through Pied- 
 mont, which were necessary for a sustained campaign against the Austrians 
 in Lombardy. 
 
 In the first movements, the extension of the Austrian line was greatly 
 increased by the march of their left from Voltaggio to Yoltri. While 
 Beaulieu and Argenteau were thus separating, the Trench forces imme- 
 diately opposed to them were concentrating against the centre. 
 
 Massena at Cadibona might, on the night of the 11th April, have Massena's 
 readily joined La Harpe in directly opposing the Austrians in the Sassello- circuitous 
 Savona route. But by defeating them there by a front attack they would 
 be merely driven back on Sassello. It was always a characteristic of 
 Xapoleon to direct his troops where their action would be most effective. 
 As Argenteau had already been stopped by the garrison of the works on 
 the Monte Legino, it was certain that when La Harpe's whole division 
 had come to the support of that garrison, the defence of the pass was 
 amply secured. Therefore Massena was directed by the western path, on 
 the Austrian flank and rear. 
 
 Upon the defeat of Argenteau at Montenotte, Beaulieu was compelled Austrian 
 
 to pause. For though he was prepared to attack the French in front of ° Fensive 
 
 \ movement 
 
 him, yet it was on the assumption that Argenteau would co-operate by disconcert, a. 
 
 an attack on their flank or rear ; and this was only possible on condition 
 that the French should be concentrating towards Voltri. Therefore, 
 when Beaulieu found they had retired from that point, he knew that they 
 must be either beyond the reach of Argenteau, by retreating westward 
 beyond Savona, in which case he would presently be apprised of it by 
 the advanced-guard of his colleague issuing from the pass — or that they 
 had concentrated for an attack on Argenteau, in which case he might, if 
 he should advance, find himself single-handed in the presence of a vic- 
 torious enemy, as would indeed have been the case. Therefore, as soon 
 as he was certified of disaster to his colleague, he hastened to recover 
 his communications with Lombardy, which he might else find to be 
 endangered. 
 
 Upon the defeat of Colli at Millesimo and his retreat to Ceva, the mass Why the 
 
 of the French was interposed between the wings of the Allies. Deduct- dmded aTm T> 
 
 i i • i -i • • • /rM • though supe- 
 
 ing losses on both sides, Napoleon s four divisions (Serrurier being in 
 
144 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 rior, could 
 not attack. 
 
 Object of the 
 assailed force. 
 
 Necessity of 
 pressing a 
 divided 
 enemy. 
 
 Effect of the 
 parts of a se- 
 parated army 
 having diver- 
 gent bases.' 
 
 Hue on the 14th April) numbered about 30,000 — while Beaulieu had only 
 about 20,000 at Acqui, and Colli about 15,000 at Ceva. Therefore, unless 
 they could concert a simultaneous attack, either allied force, if it assumed 
 the offensive, might, and probably would, find itself opposed by superior 
 numbers. The only course then was a joint retreat with a view to 
 reunion — and this was what La Harpe at San Benedetto was meant to 
 discover and to retard or prevent. 
 
 Speaking of the evacuation of the strong position before Mondovi by 
 Colli, Jomini says, — ■" His only aim was to gain time for the arrival of 
 the army of Beaulieu ; if he were to engage in an unequal conflict he ran 
 the risk of a serious disaster and of being ruined : a methodical retreat, 
 executed in time, seemed to lead most surely to his end." This remark 
 shows very clearly what must be the object of that portion of a divided 
 army on which the enemy throws his weight — namely, to make a retreat 
 which, while it is so slow as to secure the arrival of the other portion of 
 the army at the point of reunion, is also sufficiently prompt to avoid the 
 risk of a general action with a superior force. Whether Colli, in this 
 case, rightly estimated the strength of the position which he abandoned, 
 is not to the present purpose. 
 
 It is not enough to pierce and divide the enemy's army ; the advantage 
 thus gained must be promptly followed up, or a subsequent reunion of 
 the parts may nullify all the previous operations. Thus, while Bonaparte 
 was held in check by the position of Colli before Mondovi, once unsuc- 
 cessfully assailed, we learn that he called his generals to a council of war. 
 "Convinced that the army would be lost," says Jomini, "if the enemy had 
 time to recover, they decided unanimously for a second attack, notwith- 
 standing the fatigue and discouragement of the troops." That is to say, 
 the first stroke must be followed up by successive blows on one or both 
 sides, which shall, at once, keep the enemy asunder, and destroy his force. 
 
 There was no doubt ample time after Beaulieu reached Acqui, on the 
 15th, for him to move behind the Tauaro to the aid of his ally, who was 
 not driven from Mondovi till the 22d. But it is probable that, besides 
 the indisposition to help his ally adverted to in the instructions of the 
 Directory already quoted, he felt hampered by the fact that in thus 
 operating parallel to his communications with his base on the Mincio, he 
 would be dangerously exposing them. This fact — that the Allies when 
 
R. P, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. L45 
 
 separated had divergent lines of communication and of retreat, and that 
 their movements were influenced by the circumstance — is to be noted. 
 
 When Napoleon was advancing on the line Ceva-Fossano, the whole New combina- 
 of the Sardinian forces — namely, those opposing Kellermann and those tlon °P e " to 
 opposing Napoleon — were interposed between the two French commanders. i;llis ' 
 It was therefore possible to repeat against Napoleon the game of combi- 
 nation which he had just played against Beaulieu. A small containing 
 force might have been left before Kellermann, and the remainder com- 
 bined against Napoleon. It was to guard against such a contingency 
 that Bonaparte, on the 25th, from Fossano pressed the commander of the 
 right of Kellermann's army to issue from the Alps towards him. But, 
 besides the w r ant of military skill to perceive and execute this, it is also Why ne- 
 to be observed, first, that, even when thus combined, the Sardinians g lecte( l. 
 would have been inferior to Napoleon in numbers — having been only 
 equal to his single army at the outset ; and, secondly, that the distance 
 from Mont Cenis to Turin is so short that Kellermaun, unless strongly 
 opposed, might reach it in a single march and enclose their armies while See Map 
 he seized their capital. They were influenced by the same reasons which 8 - 
 caused Mr Lincoln to spoil M'Clellan's combination in 1862. The Federal 
 general wanted to combine McDowell's forces from Fredericksburg, where 
 they covered Washington, with his own, at Hanover Court-House, inter- 
 posing between Johnstone at Eichmond and Jackson in the Shenandoah 
 Valley, and concentrating for an attack on the former. But the Northern 
 President, fearing to leave the capital uncovered, retained M'Dowell, and 
 M'Clellan, left unsupported, was defeated. 
 
 Lastly, it is to be noted, that when an army is extended over a space Greater ad- 
 beyond its strength, the most fatal way of attacking it is on the centre, vantage 
 Had Napoleon executed the design which Beaulieu attributed to him of v-Tv y *i 
 
 a ° breaking the 
 
 advancing through the Bochetta pass to turn the Austrian left, however centre than 
 
 successful might have been his first attacks, they could only have insured ])y turning 
 
 . . the ilank. 
 
 that which it was his aim to prevent — namely, the concentration of the 
 enemy. 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF ECKMUHL (1809). 
 
 The maintenance of the war with France by the English in Portugal See Maps 
 seemed to afford Austria an opportunity of effacing the results of Ulni G alul 7- 
 
 K 
 
no 
 n ol 
 
 Ob 
 
 ass 
 
 Ne 
 pre 
 div 
 
 Efl 
 pa; 
 pa 
 ha 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 145 
 
 separated had divergent lines of communication and of retreat, and that 
 their movements were influenced by the circumstance — is to be noted. 
 
 When Napoleon was advancing on the line Ceva-Fossano, the whole New combina- 
 of the Sardinian forces — namely, those opposing KellermanD and those tlon °f K ' n t " 
 opposing Napoleon — were interposed between the two French commanders. iana 
 It was therefore possible to repeat against Napoleon the game of combi- 
 nation which he had just played against Beaulieu. A small containing 
 force might have been left before Kellermann, and the remainder com- 
 bined against Napoleon. It was to guard against such a contingency 
 that Bonaparte, on the 25th, from Fossano pressed the commander of the 
 right of Kellermann's army to issue from the Alps towards him But, 
 besides the want of military skill to perceive and execute this, it is also Why nc- 
 to be observed, first, that, even when thus combined, the Sardinians g lected - 
 would have been inferior to Napoleon in numbers — having been only 
 equal to his single army at the outset ; and, secondly, that the distance 
 from Mont Cenis to Turin is so short that Kellermaun, unless strongly 
 opposed, might reach it in a single march and enclose their armies while See Map 
 he seized their capital. They were influenced by the same reasons which 8 - 
 caused Mr Lincoln to spoil M'Clellan's combination in 1862. The Federal 
 general wanted to combine M'Dowell's forces from Fredericksburg, where 
 they covered Washington, with his own, at Hanover Court-House, inter- 
 posing between Johnstone at Richmond and Jackson in the Shenandoah 
 Valley, and concentrating for an attack on the former. But the Northern 
 President, fearing to leave the capital uncovered, retained M'Dowell, and 
 M'Clellan, left unsupported, was defeated. 
 
 Lastly, it is to be noted, that when an army is extended over a space Greater ad- 
 
 beyond its strength, the most fatal way of attacking it is on the centre. vanta g e 
 
 Had Napoleon executed the design which Beaulieu attributed to him of i; v . y ., 
 1 ° breaking the 
 
 advancing through the Bochetta pass to turn the Austrian left, however centre than 
 successful might have been his first attacks, they could only have insured 1,y turm "S 
 
 . . the flank. 
 
 that which it was his aim to prevent — namely, the concentration of the 
 enemy. 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF ECKMUHL (1809). 
 
 The maintenance of the war with France by the English in Portugal See Maps 
 seemed to afford Austria an opportunity of effacing the results of Ulin 6 alul 7 - 
 
 K 
 
146 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 and Austerlitz, and of breaking the power of Napoleon. So menacing 
 was the aspect of the great German power, that the French Emperor, 
 abandoning the pursuit of Sir John Moore's army to Soult, had returned 
 to France to prepare for the anticipated campaign. 
 Armies as- Early in the year the Austrian armies were behind their frontier lines 
 
 semble in the f ^ e Bohemian mountains and the river Inn ; and most of the French 
 forces were on their own side of the Khine. But when war was imminent, 
 the Austrians, leaving 50,000 men under Bellegarde in Bohemia, assembled 
 most of the troops which they had ready for the field, south of the Danube, 
 on the frontier of Bavaria. On the other hand, the Confederation of the 
 Pdiine, by which compact the German territories along that river were 
 open to Napoleon, gave him free access to the Danube. When the war 
 began, the troops already assembled within the immediate sphere of ope- 
 rations were as follows : — 
 
 The Inn to The Austrian corps on the Inn were those of 
 
 the Isar, 40. Hoheirzollern, 
 
 Rosenberg, 
 
 Archduke Louis, 
 
 Hiller, 
 
 Lichtenstein, 
 
 Kienmayer, Total, 140,000. 
 
 Bellegarde, who was to operate north of the Danube, debouching from 
 Pilsen and Saatz towards Amberg, 50,000. Behind these, great bodies 
 of militia covered Vienna. 
 
 Napoleon's corps were thus distributed : — 
 
 Bavarians, ... on the Isar, 
 
 Davout, .... Ratisbon, 
 
 Oudinot, .... Augsburg, 
 
 Massena, .... Ulm, 
 
 Wurtembergers, . . on march for Ingolstadt, 
 
 Reserve cavalry, . . Ingolstadt, 
 
 30,000 
 50,000 
 30,000 
 30,000 
 12,000 
 15,000 
 
 Total, . . . 167,000 
 
 Behind the front of the French, the roads of Germany were covered 
 
 with columns marching from the Ehine, including the Imperial Guard, 
 
 and with the reserves of the German allies of France. 
 
 French bases Napoleon, based on the Ehine and Mayne, had for communications any 
 
 and communi- or a ]j f ^j ]e roac i s leading from the Danube, between Ulm and Eatisbon, 
 
 cations. 
 
 to Wurzburg, or to the fortresses on the Ehine. Those mainly relied on, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 147 
 
 as most secure, were probably the roads from Strasburg, Mannheim, and 
 Mayence, to Ulm. 
 
 The Archduke Charles had for immediate lines of supply those of Austrian base 
 Steyer - Braunau and Linz - Passau. If he should operate north of the and C0Inmum - 
 river, he must of course rely on the northern portion of his base, Bud- 
 weis-Theresienstedt. 
 
 Napoleon's object was Vienna; but as the Austrians took the initia- 
 tive, his plan must depend on the opportunities which their movements 
 might offer. 
 
 The Archduke's design was to pass the Inn, push the Bavarians from Austrian plan, 
 the Isar, and, crossing the Danube between Donauwerth and Batisbon, 
 cut Davout from the French army, and form a junction with Bellegarde 
 on the northern bank. 
 
 10th to 16th April. — The Austrians crossed the Inn thus : — 
 
 Hiller, \ 
 
 Archduke Louis, \ at Braunau ; 
 
 Kienmayer, ) 
 
 Hohenzollern, below Braunau ; 
 
 Rosenberg, ) 
 
 T . t, , , . at Schardimr ; 
 
 Lichtenstein, \ G ' 
 
 and reaching the Isar on the loth, forced the passage fhus, on the 16th : — 
 
 Hiller at Moosburg. 
 
 Archduke Louis, ) T .. , _, , 
 
 Hohenzollern, [ at Landshut. Moosburg to 
 
 Rosenberg at Dingolfiiig. Dingolfing, 
 Keserves in rear of the centre. ii - 
 
 On the right a brigade (5000) moved on Straubing. 
 
 On the left 10,000 from Wasserburg towards Munich. 
 
 The Bavarians, at Landshut, attacked in front and turned on both 
 flanks, fell back to the Danube behind the Abens, between Neustadt and 
 Kelheim, where they were reinforced by 12,000 AVurtembergers. 
 
 17th April. — The Austrians moved thus : — 
 
 Hiller, . . from Moosburg to Mainburg. Austrians 
 
 Louis, . . . Landshut towards Neustadt. approach the 
 
 Hohenzollern, ~) Danube. 
 
 Lichtenstein, > . Landshut towards Kelheim. 
 
 „. \ Moosburg to 
 
 Kienmayer, ; . 
 
 Rosenberg, . . Dingolfing by Eckmuhl towards Ratisbon. Mainburg, 14. 
 
148 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Napoleon 
 orders con- 
 centration. 
 
 Augsburg to 
 Pfaffenhofen, 
 34. 
 
 Ratisbon to 
 Abensberg, 
 22. 
 
 Rohr to 
 Ratisbon, 22. 
 
 Austrians 
 
 separate. 
 
 Frencb left 
 wing joins 
 the centre. 
 
 Bellegarde was to draw down on Davout' s rear. 
 
 French movements : — 
 
 Massena moved from Ulm to Augsburg, and took command of the 
 right wing. 
 
 Napoleon arrived at Donauwerth from Paris, and ordered the following 
 movements of concentration on the centre : — 
 
 Right wing — Augsburg to PfaiTenhofen. 
 Left wins — Ratisbon to Abensberg. 
 
 18th, — Austrian front— 
 
 ( Hiller, 
 Left, < Louis, 
 
 Mainburg. 
 
 1 -v \ towards Abensben 
 
 { Kienmayer, ( 
 
 „ . \ Hohenzollern, ) „ , 
 
 Centre 'i Liehtenstein, J *** 
 
 Right, Rosenberg — Langquaid. 
 
 French movements : — 
 
 Massena from Augsburg towards Pfaffenhofen. 
 Davout to the right bank at Ratisbon. 
 
 l§th. — Austrian movements : — 
 
 Hiller to Siegenburg, 
 
 Centre, 
 
 Right wing. 
 
 towards Ratisbon. 
 
 French movements : — 
 
 Davout placed a regiment in Eatisbon, and left the highroad along the 
 Danube free for his baggage and trains. His infantry divisions marched 
 in two columns, each of two divisions, one by Teugen, the other by Saal- 
 haupt, by country roads, from whence they were to gain by cross-roads the 
 highroad to Abensberg by Feking. His cavalry protected the movement 
 by advancing on the road Ratisbon-Eckmuhl, and then following, through 
 Dingling, the general direction on Abensberg. 
 
 At the same time the Archduke's columns were moving from Rohr by 
 Hausen and Teugen, and from Langquaid by Schneidart and Saalhaupt, 
 towards Ratisbon. 
 
 The inner flanks of the hostile columns necessarily encountered ; and 
 they sidled round each other, fighting principally with the rearmost 
 
tight wii 
 
 halts. 
 
 EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 14.9 
 
 divisions, while the leading troops continued their advance. Davout's 
 
 two leading divisions made good their communications with Abensberg by 
 
 Feking, and the other two held Teugen. The Austrian march on Ratisbon Austrian 
 
 was stopped, and the Archduke remained facing the French front. 
 
 20th April. — French movements: — 
 
 Combination 
 Davout with hall' his corps to hold Teugen. against Aus- 
 
 The other half under Lannes on Rohr. trian left 
 
 Bavarians on Arnhofen. wins. 
 
 Wurtembergers between Lannes and the Bavarians. 
 
 Massena from Pfaffenhofen on Landshnt by Freisiug and Moosburg. Abensberg to 
 
 Rohr, 7. 
 
 The result of the attacks against the Austrian left wing which fol- pfaffenhofen 
 
 lowed this last combination was, that the French reached Rottenburg — t0 Landshnt, 
 
 36 
 
 the Austrians were driven on Pfaffenhausen — and continued their retreat 
 in the night upon Landshut. 
 
 2lst April. — French pur- 
 
 sue the beaten 
 Part of the Bavarians by Pfaffenhausen, \ win" 
 
 Lannes by Rottenburg, > on Landshut, 
 
 Massena by Moosburg, ) 
 
 where they drove the Austrian left wing across the Isar. 
 
 The Austrian right wing took post across the Eckmuhl road, backed 
 on Ratisbon, facing Landshut. 
 
 Bellegarde took Ratisbon. 
 
 French movements : — French re- 
 
 tarding force 
 Davout from Teugen to Paring and Schierling. interposes. 
 
 Part of the Bavarians and cavalry from Rottenburg to join Davout. 
 
 22d April. — Bellegarde sent Kollow 7 rath's division of the Bohemian army 
 through Ratisbon to join the Archduke, who, leaving his left at Eckmuhl, Eckmuhl to 
 attempted to throw his right to Abach, so as to issue from thence on the Aoacn > 9 - 
 French rear. 
 
 On the French side, Bessieres with two divisions of infantry to pursue 
 the beaten Austrian left wing from Landshut by Braunau. Two divisions 
 moved between the Isar and Danube as a reserve. 
 
 Massena from Landshut, Lannes, and the cavalry joined the French Combination 
 
 forces towards Eckmuhl, and the left of the Archduke's immediate forces a S alnst tJle 
 
 Austrian 
 was attacked and defeated in the battle of Eckmuhl. 
 
150 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 right wing, 
 which, 
 defeated, re- 
 treats apart. 
 
 Ratishon to 
 Straubing, 24. 
 
 Movements in 
 pursuit. 
 
 Ratishon to 
 Cham, 33. 
 
 Passau to 
 Vienna, 140. 
 
 23d April. — The Austrian right wing, covered by Kollowrath, crossed 
 the Danube at Eatisbon. 
 
 Napoleon took Eatisbon by assault, after bombarding it. 
 
 Massena to Straubing. 
 
 24:th to 27th April.— 
 
 Davout to follow the Archduke Charles towards Bohemia. 
 
 Bavarians to occupy Munich. 
 
 Lannes to follow Bessieres by Landshut. 
 
 Austrian movements : — 
 
 Archduke Charles and Bellegarde to Cham. 
 
 Archduke Louis and Hiller from Neumarkt towards the Inn. 
 
 28th to 30th April.— 
 
 Archduke Charles from Cham to Pilsen. 
 
 Davout having seen the Archduke's retreat to Bohemia begun, returns 
 to Eatisbon to follow Massena down the right bank. 
 
 French pursuing columns from Landshut arrive on the Inn and its 
 tributary at Salzburg, Burghausen, Braunau. 
 
 Massena to Passau. 
 
 There were but two bridges between Passau and Vienna — namely, at 
 Mauthausen (just below Linz), and at Krems, by which the Archduke 
 Charles could cross to the right bank, join the other corps, and cover the 
 capital. 
 
 1st to 3d May. — The French columns from the Inn to the Traun. 
 
 Massena at Ebersburg attacks the Austrian rear-guard, and pushes it 
 past Mauthausen, where there was a bridge over the Danube, thus ren- 
 dering it impossible for the Austrians to communicate from one bank to 
 the other above Krems. 
 
 Archduke Charles at Budweis. 
 
 3d to 8th May.— The French columns to St Polten. 
 
 Part of the Austrians were seen crossing to the left bank at Krems, 
 breaking the bridge behind them, part retreating on Vienna. 
 
 Detachments had been left by Napoleon to guard the passages at 
 Passau and Linz. The Archduke Charles had marched from Budweis 
 southward to Freystadt to cross at Linz. Finding the bridge destroyed, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 151 
 
 and the right Lank in possession of the French, lie had marched for Krenis, 
 Lnt, owing to the circuit he had made, he was anticipated there also. 
 
 11th May. — Napoleon pushed the Austrian garrison out of Vienna, and Result, 
 occupied the capital. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Both armies at the outset were operating on extended fronts, their 
 right wings (Bellegarde and Massena) being indeed beyond the sphere of 
 immediate action. Setting these aside, the Austrian front on the 18th 
 from Mainburg to Eckmuhl, and the French from Neustadt to Eatisbon, 
 each covered about the same distance. 
 
 "When the Archduke on the 19th advanced on Eatisbon to attack 
 Davout, he was obliged to leave a strong force on the Abens, for he knew 
 that a great part of Napoleon's army was collected on the other bank ; 
 and had he withdrawn his u-hole force towards Eatisbon, the enemy from 
 Abensberg would have cut him from the line Landshut-Braunau by the 
 single march on Eottenburg. Hence he could only perform the move- 
 ment by dividing his army. 
 
 But while he was making a movement of separation, Napoleon was 
 making one of concentration. On the night of the 18th, Davout hy his 
 own right was connected with the Centre. 
 
 Next day the successful march on Bohr interposed the main French 
 army between the parts of the Austrian front. While Napoleon was de- 
 feating the left wing, Davout was left in front of a very superior enemy ; 
 and it would seem at first as if an attack upon him would have balanced 
 the fortunes of the day. But Davout, if compelled to retreat, would 
 have approached Napoleon, whereas the Austrian left wing, when de- 
 feated, was receding from the Archduke Charles. The result of the Arch- 
 duke pressing back the force in front of him would have been that the 
 main French army, supporting Davout, would have fought on the 20th 
 or 21st the battle of the 22d, without the trouble of going to seek the 
 enemy. 
 
 Having, then, first strengthened his right for a blow against the Aus- 
 trian left wing, Napoleon now diminished the right to the amount of 
 force necessary to pursue the beaten corps, and concentrated on his left 
 
152 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 for a second blow. This successful, the consequent retreat widened the 
 gap in the Austrian front. 
 
 On the 20th, Massena being beyond the sphere of action, the sum 
 
 total of the armies actually in presence of each other was greatly in 
 
 favour of the Austrians by about 140,000 to 110,000. Yet Napoleon 
 
 was superior to the force immediately opposed to him by about 80,000 
 
 Approximate to 70,000. And without Massena, he could still, after detaching 20,000 
 
 value of the j n p Ursu it on Landshut, have made the force on Davout's side next day 
 
 advantage of , , , , mi , t • ti 
 
 concentric superior to the Archduke s. Thus we get something like an approximate 
 over divided idea of the actual equivalent in force of the advantage possessed by the 
 army whose action is concentric over that which is divided. 
 
 All these advantages were on the 18th within reach of the Archduke. 
 If, instead of marching from Rohr on Iiatisbon, he had moved on Kel- 
 heim, for a grand attack along a front extending from thence to Abens- 
 berg, he would have brought a greatly preponderating force against the 
 French ; and if, as was to be expected, they were driven over the river, he 
 would have turned with his mass on Davout approaching from Batisbon, 
 and pushed him back on the lower Danube. 
 
 These operations of 1796 and 1809 also prove how powerful an influ- 
 ence is exercised upon commanders of parts of armies by uncertainty as 
 to what is passing elsewhere. So long as there is constant communica- 
 tion between the supreme directing authority and his dispersed subordin- 
 ate leaders, so long may a coherent impulse be given to all the portions 
 of an army. But when the intervention of a hostile force destroys this 
 communication, the action of every part is checked. Combined action is 
 the aim of a commander-in-chief, and combination is impossible when 
 concert is destroyed. Nor is the apprehension which paralyses a com- 
 mander who is thus separated from his colleague the result merely of 
 uncertainty. For had Beaulieu from Voltri, or the Archduke from 
 Advantage of Teugen, advanced boldly on the enemy, each would have encountered a 
 the concentric victorious and superior army. It would seem, therefore, that, under such 
 againb ie c i rcum stances, the only prudent course is to effect a reunion with the 
 not due to the utmost promptitude, and that the advantages of the concentric position 
 moral effect f ^i ie interposing army are substantial, and are only augmented, not 
 altogether caused, by the moral effect of the situation. 
 
 There is one especial point of difference between Napoleon's operation 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 153 
 
 of 1809 and that of 1796. In the first case the containing force (Da- 
 vont's) was left in front of the Austrian wing. In the second case the 
 containing force (Cervoni's) was altogether withdrawn, and joined to the 
 divisions which attacked on the side of Montenotte. It may be asked, 
 why was not Davout withdrawn like Cervoni ? or why was not Cervoni 
 kept in front of the enemy like Davout ? Very useful questions to 
 consider. 
 
 The answer is. that the sole use of the containing force is to prevent a Different 
 /•« union of the enemy's parts. If it is not necessary to this purpose, it will wa ^ s of em * 
 be better employed at the point of attack. Had the Archduke Charles containine 6 
 suddenly resolved, on the evening after the action of Teugen, to retrace force, 
 his steps and rejoin the left wing, he might, if unopposed, have effected 
 the concentration, and would have had, on the field of Abensberg, a great 
 preponderance of numbers over the united forces of Napoleon and Da- 
 vout, It was to prevent this that Davout was left in front of him. But 
 had Beaulieu suddenly resolved, on the night of the 11th or morning 
 of the 12th, to rejoin Argenteau, he could only have done so by retiring 
 again through the passes and making a circuit round the other side of 
 the mountains which separated them. But, long before he could make 
 this circuit, the action at Monte Legino must be decided ; and if he did 
 make the attempt, Cervoni was powerless to prevent it, for he could not 
 interpose — he could only follow Beaulieu. Therefore Napoleon rightly 
 drew Cervoni towards that point where the action of his force would be 
 most decisively important. We may therefore assume, that when dis- 
 tance alone will -prevent the separated wing of the enemy from joining the 
 other, before that other may he attached and defeated, the containing force 
 should be withdrawn to the point of attack, unless it is required to cover 
 the communications. 
 
 To sum up the effects of a successful operation of this kind, it appears — 
 
 1st, That either part of the separated army which stands to fight may General de- 
 find itself exposed to the blows of the full force of the antagonist, minus Auctions, 
 a detachment left to contain the other part; as is seen by the examples 
 of Millesimo, Ceva, and Eckmuhl. 
 
 2d, That by alternating such blows, the assailant may continue both 
 to weaken his antagonist and to interpose between the parts. 
 
 3d, That as the commander of a separated part of an army will be 
 
154 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 playing the enemy's game if he stands to fight, his best course will be 
 retreat for reunion ; and that this will be best effected by taking ad- 
 vantage of every position to retard the enemy on both lines. 
 
 4th, That a commander who perceives an opportunity for separating 
 the enemy, and overwhelming a portion of his force, need not generally 
 be solicitous to cover his own communications during the operation, since 
 the enemy will be in no condition to assail them. 
 Necessary Lastly, It is necessary to remark that the force which aims at separating 
 
 proportion of ^ Q p ar ^ s f an enemy should be so superior to either part singly, as to 
 forces. preserve a superiority after detaching a force in pursuit of the' portion 
 
 first defeated; and that if the attacking force does not fulfil this con- 
 dition, it will have no right to expect success. 
 
 %- . 
 
3^?!f?*? 
 
 OP THR 
 
 university: 
 
Plaflnuhofei 
 
 SCALE OP Mil ES 
 
 mdshut 
 
 Neiiniarkt* 
 
 U..ls„=s^rt*^ Hum* 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 155 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE CASE OF INDEPENDENT AGAINST COMBINED LINES OF OPER- 
 ATION. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN GERMANY. 
 
 Having investigated the consequences which follow when parts of an 
 army are separated and driven asunder, we come to the apparently 
 different case of two armies allied, or of the same nation, which, when 
 about to act against the common enemy, voluntarily separate, and operate 
 against him by independent paths, and without concert. 
 
 The campaign of 1796 in Germany, besides illustrating this matter, has See Map 
 other advantages ; for it took place in the same theatre as those of 1800, '• 
 1805, and 1809, which have already been discussed ; and it is very use- 
 ful to read in succession several campaigns which have been enacted in 
 the same region, since we thus become aware both of the fixed value of 
 certain points, and of the various methods by which different generals 
 with various means and under diverse circumstances will operate for the 
 same end. Everywhere glimpses are opened of new relations between 
 different features of the ground, till at last we may be said thoroughly to 
 know the theatre of war; that is, to understand all its conditions under 
 every aspect, and to be able to deal with any problem it can offer. 
 
 The Austrians and French confronted each other at the outset on the Hostile fronts, 
 liliine, from Basle to Dusseldorf. 
 
 That portion of the Ehine formed the base of the French when they French base, 
 entered Germany. 
 
 The base of the Austrians, as in other campaigns in this theatre, was Austrian bas& 
 the Enns river as far as the Danube — beyond the Danube, the mountains 
 and the Moldau. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 155 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE CASE OF INDEPENDENT AGAINST COMBINED LINES OF OPER- 
 ATION. CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN GERMANY. 
 
 HAVING investigated the consequences which follow when parts of an 
 array are separated and driven asunder, we come to the apparently 
 different case of two armies allied, or of the same nation, which, when 
 about to act against the common enemy, voluntarily separate, and operate 
 against him by independent paths, and without concert. 
 
 The campaign of 1796 in Germany, besides illustrating this matter, has See Map 
 other advantages ; for it took place in the same theatre as those of 1800, ■ No- '• 
 1805, and 1809, which have already been discussed ; and it is very use- 
 ful to read in succession several campaigns which have been enacted in 
 the same region, since we thus become aware both of the fixed value of 
 certain points, and of the various methods by which different generals 
 with various means and under diverse circumstances will operate for the 
 same end. Everywhere glimpses are opened of new relations between 
 different features of the ground, till at last we may be said thoroughly to 
 know the theatre of war ; that is, to understand all its conditions under 
 every aspect, and to be able to deal with any problem it can offer. 
 
 The Austrians and French confronted each other at the outset on the Hostile fronts. 
 Rhine, from Basle to Dusseldorf. 
 
 That portion of the Ehine formed the base of the French when they French base, 
 entered Germany. 
 
 The base of the Austrians, as in other campaigns in this theatre, was Austrian base, 
 the Enns river as far as the Danube — beyond the Danube, the mountains 
 and the Moldau. 
 
156 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Roads from Two roads unite the extremities of the hostile bases ; namely — 
 
 one base to 
 
 the other *' ®^ Brisach-Memmingen-Landsberg-Munich-Braunaii-Steyer. 
 
 2. Mayence-Egra-Theresienstedt. 
 
 In the centre there is a third great road, by — 
 
 Caxlsruhe-Mannheim-Heilbronn-Nuremberg-Ambeig-Klattau, to Budweis. 
 
 And several roads lead from the Rhine upon Ulm, thence by Donauwerth, 
 Ingolstadt, to Ratisbon ; from whence there are communications with 
 both parts of the Austrian base. 
 
 The plain of the Rhine valley, straightened by the hills of the Black 
 Forest, begins to widen a little below Basle till it reaches a breadth on 
 
 Passages over that bank of ten to fifteen miles. The best passages over the river are 
 
 the Rhine. ^ jj un i D g enj Brisach, Strasburg, Selz (opposite Eastadt), Lauterbourg, 
 Germersheim (opposite Philipsburg), Spire, Mannheim, Worms, Mayence. 
 There are others between Strasburg and Spire, but they have the same 
 issues. 
 
 Before the active campaign commenced, two generals on each side 
 faced each other on the Rhine. The Austrian army of the Upper Rhine 
 from Basle to Mannheim was commanded by Marshal Wurmser, to whom 
 was opposed Moreau. The army of the Archduke Charles extended from 
 below Mannheim to the Sieg river, to which was opposed the army of the 
 Sambre-and-Meuse under Jourdan. The advantage in numbers dispos- 
 able for the field was at the outset on the side of the Austrians, especially 
 in cavalry. 
 
 Means of pas- The French possessed only one fortified bridge, that of Dusseldorf. 
 
 sage by either ^pj ie Austrians had one at Mayence, another at Mannheim. Elsewhere, if 
 
 party. 
 
 either party wished to cross, they must force a passage or throw bridges. 
 
 The Austrians had intended to assume the offensive, advancing towards 
 the Moselle. But the successes of Napoleon in Italy had their influence 
 in this other theatre. Early in June, Wurmser, with 25,000 men, was 
 detached to aid Beaulieu ; and after this diminution of strength, the 
 offensive plan was no longer practicable. 
 First object The French Directory, anxious to transfer the burthen of the war to 
 
 of the French. Germany, ordered their generals to cross the Rhine. The first combina- 
 tion of the French had for its object to secure the passage of the river for 
 Moreau' s army. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 157 
 
 Jourdan, throwing part of his force across at Dusseldorf, pressed back 
 the Austrian right ; and the right bank down to Neuwied being thus 
 opened, he crossed there with his main force, and pushed the Austrian 
 force north of the Lahn, back upon that river. 
 
 This movement was meant to draw the Archduke from Mayence ; and 
 it had the desired effect. Leaving 20,000 men in the intrenched cam}) 
 there, he marched with the remainder of his army to the Lahn and 
 turned Jourdan's left flank. The French general thus threatened, finding 
 that the object of his advance was gained, retired beyond the river. — 
 (19th to 21st June.) 
 
 The thin Austrian cordon from Basle to Mannheim, weakened by the 
 draft for Italy, and deprived of the support of the part of the Arch- 
 duke's army withdrawn from Mayence, now invited an attack. Moreau, Mannheim to 
 after making (20th June) a false attack with his centre and left on the Stras1jur S> 86 - 
 works covering Mannheim, marched 12,000 men up the Ehine, under 
 pretence of aiding Bonaparte in Italy. Near Strasburg they were joined 
 by 18,000 of the right wing marching down the river; and the whole, Moreau passes 
 under the orders of Desaix, passed above Kehl, by flying bridges and tlle Knine - 
 boats, on the 23d and 24th June. 
 
 The Austrian left wing of the army of the Upper Rhine above Kehl 
 was cut off by this movement, and assembled about Friburg. 
 
 The mass of the centre was between Eastadt and Mannheim. 
 
 The right was marching from Mannheim to join the centre. 
 
 The Archduke, with a portion of the other army, began his march from 
 the Lahn to reinforce the Army of the Upper Ehine, when he heard of 
 Moreau's passage, 26th June. 
 
 Pending his arrival, the position was this — 
 
 The Austrian left wing was at Haslach. Austrian 
 
 A detachment under Stein guarded the Kinzig valley. positions. 
 
 A detachment under Starray the Rench valley. 
 
 The defiles to the Danube thus closed, Latour, who commanded in the 
 Archduke's absence, awaited his arrival behind the Murg. 
 
 Moreau, after pushing the scattered Austrians back into the defiles, French 
 waited in the Ehine valley, posted from the Kinzig to the Murg, till the P osltlcms - 
 remainder of his centre and left from Mannheim should cross. A divi- 
 sion of the right wing, under Laborde, was still on the French bank, from 
 
158 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 General Aus- 
 trian plan. 
 
 Frankfort to 
 Pforzheim, 
 
 100. 
 
 Brisach to Basle. It was opposed by a small Austrian corps ; and 
 throughout the advance into Germany, these corps neutralised each other 
 on the side of the Tyrol, and may be left out of the general account. 
 
 On the 10th July, the Archduke having then come up, Moreau attacked 
 him at Malsch ; and having defeated his immediate left in the mountains, 
 the Austrians retired on Pforzheim. 
 
 It was at Pforzheim that the Archduke determined on his general plan. 
 His first object was to regain the Danube, for he had great magazines 
 about Ulm, and he was desirous of recovering communications with 
 his left wing, under General Frolich, then retreating on a separate line 
 through the Forest, followed by Moreau's right wing, under General 
 Ferino. The Danube gained, his next object may be best expressed in 
 his own words : " To dispute the ground foot by foot, without accept- 
 ing battle ; to profit by the first opportunity to reunite his divided troops ; 
 and to cast himself with superior, or at any rate equal, forces on one of 
 the two armies of the enemy." 
 
 The " divided troops " he alludes to are not merely his main body and 
 left wing. He had left, of his own original command, about 30,000 
 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, under General Wartensleben, to oppose 
 Jourdan in the northern portion of the theatre. The French general, 
 considerably superior in numbers, had recrossed the Pthine, and pushed 
 Wartensleben back across the Lahn and Mayne ; and then, with his 
 army considerably diminished by detachments to a corps under Marceau, 
 left to besiege or mask Austrian garrisons in places on the Bhine, he 
 continued to drive the enemy opposed to him along the course of the 
 Mayne. 
 
 The historians of the war have left the numbers on both sides at differ- 
 ent junctures in hopeless confusion ; so that, taking any statement of 
 them at the outset as a basis, it is impossible to reconcile subsequent 
 accounts. The armies on both sides were probably reinforced frequently 
 from the interior of their respective states ; and both were greatly dimin- 
 ished — the Austrians to garrison places on the Bhine, the French to invest 
 them, and to cover their own points of passage. 
 
 It is doubtful whether the French armies, after the first combination 
 fur securing the passage of Moreau had succeeded, were guided by any 
 definite concerted plan beyond the continual advance on both lines against 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 159 
 
 the Austrian armies. Some writers ascribe to them a comprehensive 
 design of uniting the two armies of the Rhine and the army of Italy 
 upon the Inn, for a combined advance on Vienna. But the accomplish- 
 ment of this was dependent on the progressive advance of each of the 
 three armies against all resistance, across a large portion of the theatre ; 
 and a check to any one would destroy the combination. However this General 
 may be, the French generals in Germany appear to have been instructed Freuch P lans - 
 to operate against the outward flanks of the Austrian armies : that is, 
 Jourdan was to turn Wartensleben's right, and so press him out of the 
 theatre ; Moreau on attaining the Danube was to operate between the 
 river and the Tyrol, so as to be ready to combine with the army of Italy. 
 At any rate, this was the course followed, and the Archduke's design 
 of combining his forces for an attack on one army was thereby greatly 
 favoured. 
 
 "Wartensleben's orders (he being inferior to Jourdan by 14,000) were 
 to contest all practicable ground, retiring as slowly as possible, so as 
 to afford opportunities for the projected junction. 
 
 13th to 19tli July. — Wartensleben evacuating Frankfort retired upon Frankfort to 
 
 Wurzburg. Wur/bmg, 
 
 ° 70. 
 
 The Archduke retired from Pforzheim across the Neckar to Cannstadt 
 
 and Esslingen. 
 
 18th July. — Aloreau's centre on Stuttgard — his left on the line of the 
 Austrian retreat. 
 
 The Archduke's retreat on Ulm was now secure. But his army was 
 enfeebled by two causes : 1st, by the garrisons he had thrown into 
 Mayence, Ehrenbreitstein, Konigstein, Mannheim, Philipsburg — in all, 
 30,000 men ; 2d, by the defection of the contingents of Saxony, Suabia, 
 and Baden, which states withdrew their forces when their territories were 
 uncovered by the retreat of the Austrians. His numbers were thus 
 reduced to — 
 
 24,000 infantry— 11,000 cavalry. Numbers of 
 
 Against 45,000 infantry — 5,000 cavalry ; the hostile 
 
 forces, 
 not counting the respective wings of the two armies operating in the 
 
 Black Forest, where the French had also a superiority. 
 
 Eesuming his retreat, he fell back to a position where he covered the Aalen to 
 
 road Aalen -Wurzburg, by which a junction with Wartensleben might Wurzburg, 80. 
 
1G0 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 be effected. But on the 26th, when he took position there, this junc- 
 tion was no longer practicable, since Wartensleben had retired from 
 Wurzburg, followed by Jourdan. on the 22d. The Archduke had there- 
 fore no longer any reason for retaining his strong position in the defiles 
 — in fact, he had good reason to hasten his retreat. For there was still 
 hope of effecting the desired junction by Ingolstadt or by Iiatisbon ; but 
 if he were to linger too long, Wartensleben might be driven quite out 
 of the theatre, when nothing would be left for the Archduke but to fall 
 back to Enns or Budweis. Therefore he recommenced his retreat through 
 the defiles on the north bank of the Danube, till his left rested on the 
 river between Gunzburg and Dillingen, and his line stretched thence 
 by Heidenheim, Neresheim, towards Nordlingen ; and he destroyed all 
 the bridges on the Danube between Ulm and Donauwerth, except that 
 above Gunzburg, left to facilitate his junction with the left wing, then 
 near him on the south bank. 
 
 The two armies faced each other for some days, the Archduke covering 
 the evacuation of the magazines on the Danube ; while Moreau recon- 
 noitred the country (at that time very imperfectly known) before ventur- 
 ing to advance. 
 
 11th August. — The Archduke, seeing an opportunity in the disposition 
 of Moreau's army, part of which was still in the defiles, attacked him at 
 Neresheim. The action was indecisive. 
 
 13th August. — The Archduke crossed the Danube and joined his left 
 w 7 ing. 
 
 14th and 15th August. — He moved down the Danube. 
 
 16th August. — He recrossed the river at several points near Ingolstadt. 
 
 Bamberg to Meanwhile, Wartensleben had quitted Bamberg on the 2d August, 
 
 Nuremberg, sending his baggage to Egra; and being constantly outflanked on the 
 
 right, had taken the direction of Nuremberg. The French followed, and 
 
 Nuremberg to on the 9th, Wartensleben retired towards Amberg, where he arrived on 
 
 Amberg, 38. j-i ie 12th. He had orders from the Archduke, with whom he was now in 
 
 Eichstadt to communication by the line Eichstadt-Neum&rkt, to remain there as long 
 
 Neumarkt, 36. as possible ; and Jourdan, finding himself in a difficult country of woods 
 
 and ravines, and seeing his policy of outflanking the Austrian right 
 
 scarcely feasible, since there was but one road fit to operate by, halted to 
 
 rest his army between Nuremberg and Amberg'till the 16th. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 1 G I 
 
 17 th August. — Jourdan from Amberg towards the Naab. 
 
 Bernadotte with a division at Neumarkt to cover the right flank. 
 
 "Wartensleben retreating to the Naab. 
 
 Archduke, taking with him 20,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry, was Archduke 
 inarching from Neuburg towards Neumarkt. reinforces 
 
 He left General Latour, with 30,000 men, on the Lech to contain be ™ 
 Moreau, who had 00,000. 
 
 Moreau, in doubt as to the Archduke's movements, was still on the 
 north bank of the Danube. 
 
 l%th to 22d Augud.— Jourdan, with 45,000 (9000 of whom at Neu- 
 markt) ; and "Wartensleben with 34,000, faced each other on the Naab. 
 
 22d August. — Archduke attacked Bernadotte at Neumarkt, and drove 
 him towards Nuremberg. 
 
 19^A August. — Moreau passed the Danube at Dillingen, advancing to 
 the Zusam. 
 
 23d August. — The Archduke, sending a detachment to pursue Berna- 
 dotte, and another towards Nuremberg, turned towards the Naab. He 
 ordered Wartensleben to be ready to push Jourdan on the least appear- 
 ance of a retrograde movement ; and in any case to attack him on the 
 24th, when the imperial army would certainly debouch on the right flank 
 of the French. 
 
 That night Jourdan, apprised of the retreat of Bernadotte and the 
 advance of the Archduke, quitted the Naab to take position in rear of 
 Amberg. 
 
 24th August. — Jourdan took position at Amberg. 
 
 "Wartensleben advanced upon him. 
 
 The two Austrian armies joined, numbering in all 62,000, against Jourdan 
 45,000 French ; and Jourdan, after a partial action, commenced his retreat retreats - 
 by Nuremberg, Bamberg, Schweinfurt, whence there was a road to the 
 Lahn north of the Mayne. 
 
 Moreau forced the passage of the Lech between Eain and Augsburg, Moreau 
 with considerable loss to Latour. advances. 
 
 2oth to 2Sth August. — Jourdan retreated to the Rednitz, followed by 
 the Archduke. 
 
 Latour to the Iser followed by Moreau. 
 Austrian ri"ht and French left before Ingolstadt 
 
1G2 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Zeil to 
 
 Schweinfurt, 
 
 IS. 
 
 29th August. — The Archduke detached 10,000 men under Nauendorf 
 to reinforce Latour. 
 
 30th to 31st August. — The Archduke forced the Bednitz, and Jourdan 
 fell back by Zeil to Schweinfurt. The Archduke followed to Bamberg. 
 
 1st Sept. — Latour, reinforced by Nauendorf, attacked Moreau's left at 
 Geisenfeld in an indecisive action. 
 
 Jourdan at Sclnveinfuvt. 
 Archduke advancing on Wurzburg. 
 
 Jourdan re- 
 crosses the 
 Rhine. 
 
 Moreau, 
 in doubt, 
 
 sends his left 
 .across the 
 Danube. 
 
 Latour's 
 right crosses. 
 
 Archduke 
 assails 
 Moreau's 
 communica- 
 tions. 
 
 Moreau 
 retreats. 
 
 2d to 3d Sept. — Jourdan, trying to gain the Wurzburg road as shorter 
 and better to retreat upon, brought on an action, in which he was de- 
 feated and forced to retreat by the north bank. Each army made for the 
 Lahn, the French by Arnstein-Giessen, the Austrians by Aschaffenburg- 
 Frankfort. 
 
 3d to 8th. — The Austrians entered Frankfort. 
 
 Marceau, raising the blockade of Cassel, opposed them with the invest- 
 ing corps. 
 
 Moreau advanced his centre to Freising and Moosburg — wings before 
 Ingolstadt and Munich. 
 
 9th Sept. — Jourdan arrived on the Lahn, and was pushed thence over 
 the Rhine, which he recrossed on the 21st. 
 
 Moreau, ignorant of the fate of Jourdan's army, from which he had no 
 intelligence except rumours, resolved to concentrate his army in a position 
 on the Danube, where he could at once check Latour and be ready to 
 move to the assistance of his colleague. 
 
 11 th to 12th Sejrt. — Moreau moved to his left on Neuburg, sending 
 Desaix towards Nuremberg as a diversion on the chance of favouring 
 Jourdan. 
 
 Latour followed. Nauendorf crossed to left bank. 
 
 13th to 18th. — Moreau halted on the Lech. 
 
 On the 18th, Kehl, Moreau's point of passage on the Rhine, was at- 
 tacked by the Austrian garrison of Mannheim, set free by the Archduke's 
 success. The French force covering the communications with the Rhine, 
 at first defeated, rallied and repulsed the attack. 
 
 19th to 24:th. — Moreau retreated to the Iller, where he took post from 
 Ulm to Memmingen. Latour fronted him on the line Gunzburg- Augsburg. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 163 
 
 Nauendorf -was near Ulm on tlie north bank to prevent Moreau from 
 moving towards the Archduke. Frolich with Latour's left wing was at 
 Memmingcn, and thence to Kempton, to keep Moreau from moving over 
 the Alps towards Italy. 
 
 29th Sept. to 1st Oct. — Moreau in position behind the Lake of Buchau Austrians 
 covering the roads into the Forest. Latour's centre at Biberach. Nauen- manoeuvre 
 dorf from Ulm by Reutlingen to join the troops which had attacked Kehl, J^nks ° n 
 and which were now occupying the defiles of the Forest in rear of Moreau. 
 
 The Archduke, bringing 16,000 men from the Lahn, had crossed the 
 Xeekar, 29th September. 
 
 Thus threatened in rear, Moreau resolved, before entering the defiles, 
 to disembarrass his retreat of Latour, who, by the wide dispersion of his 
 forces, invited attack. 
 
 2d Oct. — Moreau defeated Latour with heavy loss at Biberach. He defeats 
 
 4th Oct. — Moreau resumed his retreat, entering the defiles in three them, and 
 columns at Siegmaringen, at Stokach, and between Stokach and Lake r f treat f , 
 
 through the 
 
 Constance, followed by Latour. Forest 
 
 8th Oct. — The Austrian detachments seeking to close the Yillingen road 
 
 were defeated by Moreau's leading division. The detachments retreated 
 
 into the valley of the Kinzig. 
 
 11th. — The Austrian posts guarding the Hollenthal were driven on and emerges 
 
 Fribur<T m ^ ie ^hi I)e 
 
 valley. 
 
 12th to loth Oct. — The French passed the Hollenthal. 
 
 The Austrian detachments from the Forest, and the Archduke's force, Archduke 
 united in the Rhine valley on the lower Elz. concentrates 
 
 there. 
 
 16/7* and 17th. — Nauendorf and Latour joined the Archduke. Moreau 
 manoeuvred ineffectually to reach Kehl by the Kinzig. 
 
 19/7*. — The Archduke attacked the French at Emmendingen and forced 
 them to retreat. 
 
 21s/. — Moreau threw a bridge at Brisach, and a division crossed the Brisach to 
 Rhine with orders to march to Kehl, recross there, and make a diversion Kenl > 50 - 
 on the enemy's rear, which might still enable the French army to remain 
 on the right bank of the Rhine, and took with the remainder a strong 
 position at Schliengen next day. 
 
 The Archduke advanced and was joined by Frolich issuing from the 
 Hollenthal. 
 
164 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 24th. — The Archduke attacked Moreau's position. 
 Moreau 25th. — Moreau recrossed the Rhine at Huningen. 
 
 recrossea the jj ie Austrians besieged and took during the winter the fortifications of 
 Huningen and Kehl. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 What consti- As the columns of a single army, destined for combined action, are 
 tutes a double ft en separated by considerable intervals while approaching their object, 
 
 line of opera- ...,,,„„ . 
 
 t j on# it is evident that the fact of separation alone cannot constitute a double 
 
 line. It is when the separation is so complete — whether owing to dis- 
 tance, to obstacles, or to want of communication — that no concert exists 
 between the armies, and the action of each is independent, that the case 
 of the double line is presented. The Austrian were nearly as far apart 
 as the French armies ; but when once united under the Archduke, all 
 their movements were directed with a purpose of constant co-operation 
 and ultimate junction. Jourdan and Moreau had equal facilities for 
 communicating and combining their forces against the enemy ; the fact 
 that they did not use them, while the Austrians did, thereby gaining a 
 campaign with inferior numbers, fully displays the advantages of con- 
 certed action, and of interposing between the parts of an enemy's front. 
 
 When the Archduke moved on the 26th June with part of his army 
 to reinforce the army opposed to Moreau, he took with him a force which 
 left Wartensleben inferior to Jourdan, without giving himself a superi- 
 ority over Moreau. Criticising this operation, he says himself that he 
 ought to have left with Wartensleben only a force sufficient to observe 
 Jourdan, and to have transferred to the other side of the theatre such 
 numbers as would have enabled him to drive Moreau over the Ehine 
 
 Limitation of again. In fact, a consideration of the remarks at the beginning of this 
 
 the contain- p ar ^. w jjj show that if an army is not intended to fight, but only to retard 
 ing force. 
 
 the enemy, any increase of numbers beyond what is necessary will only 
 
 serve to embarrass its own retreat rather than the advance of the enemy. 
 For the essence of the retarding operation is, that the force performing- 
 it shall withdraw promptly before it is outnumbered. But with the 
 extent of front occupied the difficulty of withdrawing without a battle 
 increases, and with it the risk of loss. Consequently, if a retarding force 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 1G5 
 
 be only just so inferior to the enemy as to be unable to accept battle, a 
 great part of it will be always in column on the roads, and will therefore 
 be only an encumbrance. The Archduke might have taken 15,000 addi- 
 tional troops from the Lahn to the Neckar, and still have enabled War- 
 tensleben to fulfil his part, especially by leaving him strong in cavalry in 
 that open country. 
 
 For the purpose of combination, good and direct roads between the Transverse 
 Austrian armies were indispensable. Consequently the transverse lines, lme . s neces ' 
 
 sary for corn- 
 
 -brankfort-Heilbronn, Aalen-AVinzburg, Eichstedt-Xeumarkt, Piatisbon- bination. 
 Amberg, became of vast importance. In order to combine, it was neces- 
 sary that both Austrian armies should cover one of these transverse lines, 
 or be in a condition to open it. Hence the difficulty of securing the 
 opportunity of junction. 
 
 It may be said that when the Archduke left Latour on the Danube, 
 the situation merely became reciprocal ; for though he was about to out- 
 number Jourdan, yet Moreau equally outnumbered Latour, and therefore 
 a blow struck on one side might be balanced on the other. But there 
 were two circumstances in favour of the Austrian commander. The first Circumstan- 
 
 was, that Moreau remained for many days ignorant of the Archduke's ces m favour 
 
 J J ° of the Aus- 
 
 design, and conceived himself still to be opposed by the same numbers as tr ; an com . 
 
 before, thus giving the Austrian general time to strike his first blows, bination. 
 
 And secondly, the direction of the Archduke's march menaced Jourdan's 
 
 communications, and compelled him to retreat opart from Moreau ; 
 
 whereas, if Latour were compelled to retreat, he would fall back towards 
 
 the Archduke, giving and receiving support. 
 
 As the Archduke, on arriving at Neumarkt, was already on Jourdan's 
 
 flank, it would at first sight appear that he would have done better 
 
 to retain that advantage by calling "Wartensleben towards him, when 
 
 together they might have anticipated Jourdan at Nuremberg, and cut off 
 
 his retreat. But Jomini suggests two very probable reasons why "\Var- 
 
 tensleben was not ordered to manoeuvre by his flank towards the Prince. 
 
 One was, that apparently no practicable road existed from "SVartensleben's 
 
 left to the Archduke's right. The other was, that "Wartensleben, in 
 
 so manoeuvring, would uncover the direct road to Piatisbon, and that 
 
 Jourdan, despairing of effecting a retreat, might join Moreau on the 
 
 Danube. In fact, he would thereby be resorting to the alternative that 
 
1G6 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 General de- 
 ductions. 
 
 Disadvantage 
 of separation 
 enhanced in 
 the present 
 case. 
 
 Las already been indicated as being frequently the best which a com- 
 mander cut from his base can adopt — namely, to traverse the communi- 
 cations of the enemy. 
 
 As it was, Jourdan, at Amberg, formed front to a flank, and, when 
 defeated, still found the enemy aiming at his base on the Rhine 
 by a shorter road than he possessed himself. It was owing to this 
 that Jourdan's retreat was so precipitate ; fearing to be anticipated on 
 the Lahn, he passed in twenty- nine days over the same distance between 
 the Naab and the Rhine which it had cost him fifty-six days to traverse 
 when following Wartensleben. 
 
 Jourdan once beyond the Rhine, the Archduke, by a march parallel to 
 his own base, struck at the communications of Moreau. And even had 
 Jourdan, on learning his departure, been in condition to recross the 
 Rhine, still the containing force left there, backed on the Archduke, would 
 have kept him beyond the Mayne till the blow against Moreau had 
 taken effect. 
 
 When, therefore, the parts of a combined force are interposed between 
 independent armies advancing from a common base, the advantages of 
 the former consist, 1st, in the power of mutual reinforcement and sup- 
 port ; 2dly, in the ignorance of the enemy as to the side on which the 
 blow will fall ; 3dly, in the direction of the attack which both keeps 
 them asunder and threatens their lines of retreat. And as the best 
 remedy for the disadvantages of the situation is for the forces thus 
 menaced to retire in order to combine ; so the present case will be worse 
 than that of an originally combined force, the front of which has been 
 pierced, inasmuch as the absence of preconcert for such a contingency 
 will render the junction still more uncertain. 
 
 For these reasons, then, it seems that for two armies to operate against 
 a combined enemy by lines where, from distance or want of concert, 
 they are independent of each other, is to confer on the enemy an ad- 
 vantage greater than that ivhich has been demonstrated to follow from 
 interposing between tlie parts of an extended front, and that advantage 
 will therefore be such as to compensate for considerable inferiority of 
 numbers. 
 
 The advantage of concentrating an army whose communications are 
 threatened is displayed in Moreau's retreat ; when the Austrians, seeking 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 167 
 
 to close all the issues, laid themselves open to frequent disasters without 
 
 preventing him from regaining the Rhine. 
 
 The objects to be kept in view by the commander of a retarding or Archduke 
 
 containing force are well explained by the Archduke in his criticisms on Charles ou 
 
 . „ . the duties of 
 
 Latour's operations. " If," he says, " Latour was too feeble to stop his a C ontainin" 
 
 adversary and hinder him by force from advancing, he should have sought force. 
 
 to attain the same end by the direction of his movements and the choice 
 
 of his positions. . . . If, instead of spreading his troops along the 
 
 Lech, he had concentrated the greater part near Rain, and had rested 
 
 always on the Danube without allowing himself to be separated from the 
 
 Archduke, he would have fulfilled perfectly the object with which he 
 
 was detached. If Moreau had advanced upon him, he had only to avoid 
 
 the engagement, retiring upon Ingolstadt, where the bridge gave him the 
 
 power of passing the Danube, establishing himself on the other bank and 
 
 sending a detachment only on the Iser to stop the enemy's parties. 
 
 Finally, there would remain to him the impracticable defile of the 
 
 Altmuhl. 
 
 " In calculating the time which was necessary for Moreau to pass the 
 Danube and arrive on the Altmuhl, it is evident that the conflict between 
 the Archduke and Jourdan would be decided first. If victory remained 
 with the Archduke, he might detach sufficient troops towards the Altmuhl 
 to reinforce Latour — or better still, draw Latour half-way towards him, 
 to undertake, conjointly, an operation agaiust the flank and rear of Moreau. 
 The consequences of a check while so operating would not be disastrous. 
 Latour covering the retreat, the army, composed of all the troops of both 
 corps, might in the last resort retire honourably into Bohemia : might 
 even perhaps steal some marches on Jourdan, and, falling in force on 
 Moreau, beat him, throw him back on Ingolstadt, pass the Dauube there, 
 and thus gain the Iser and the Inn before the enemy." 
 
 While gathering these lessons from the campaign, it is not to be 
 inferred that it was perfect of its kind. The Archduke in narrating it 
 has frankly owned his errors. The Austrian armies were driven to their 
 very last line of possible junction, and had traversed great part of the 
 theatre, before they combined. The retreat of Wartensleben from point 
 to point might have been better timed, and its direction would have been 
 more judicious by being more concentric, for by keeping so distant a line 
 
168 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 he jeopardised the maintenance of communications with the commander- 
 in-chief. And the measure of the force transferred to either wing for the 
 decisive blows was not judiciously estimated. 
 
 Had the French armies operated each against the inner flank of the 
 opposing force, driving the Austrians asunder, without, however, combin- 
 ing or concerting operations against them — Moreau, for instance, aiming 
 to drive the Archduke back upon the Tyrol, Jourdan manoeuvring to 
 hem Wartensleben against the Mayne — the case would have borne the 
 aspect of two distinct campaigns, where each general, on both sides, 
 must have relied on himself for opposing his adversary. But had the 
 French armies, besides interposing, also combined their operations, they 
 would have commanded all the advantages which their actual measures 
 left to their opponents. 
 
 At the moment of separating from Latour, the Archduke said, "Let 
 Moreau go even to Vienna : that will matter little, provided I beat Jour- 
 dan." At first it would seem as if such an advance by Moreau would 
 balance any success against Jourdan. Rut the fact is, that no success of 
 Moreau south of the Danube would deprive the Archduke of his base in 
 Bohemia, or prevent him from forcing Moreau to retreat by falling on 
 his rear. His prevision, therefore, was fully justified. 
 
 Existing railways would connect German armies on the Mayne and 
 Danube, and facilitate their concentration, by the lines, 
 
 "Wurzburg-Donauwertli. 
 "Wurzburg-Donauwerth-Augsburg-Ulm. 
 Bamberg-Donauwerth. 
 Bamberg-Ratisbon. 
 
 A railway also runs through the Austrian base from Prague by Bud- 
 weis to Linz with the lines of supply, 
 
 Prague-Pilsen-Amberg-Wurzburg. 
 Linz-Ratisbon. 
 
E CHARLES IN 1796; AND Till 
 
 one and the ^Austrian base, and the Traii 
 s u< the Danube in 180S. 
 
 ale about .si) ftfiles to an Inch 
 
 30 +<> ."•!> 
 
PLAN To ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGN OV THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES IN 1796; AND THE MARCH OF NAPOLEON TO THE DANUBE IN L805. 
 
 connecting tin- Austrian Armies, in 1796. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 1 G 13 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 A variety of the same problem is offered by the case of an army which, 
 in covering some point, such as the capital of an empire, is assailed by 
 armies whose general aim is to reach that point, and who, so far, act in 
 concert, but who follow distinct paths towards it. 
 
 The great example of this is the campaign of 1814 in France, when 
 Nfapoleon with a single army covered Paris against the Allies, who were 
 converging on the capital by three lines — namely, from the Upper Ehine, 
 from the Lower Ehine, and from Holland. But as that campaign affords 
 also the best illustration of a problem of obstacles, it is reserved for a 
 subsequent chapter. 
 
 CAMPAIGN IX VIRGINIA, 1S61. 
 
 The campaigns in Virginia being directed against Richmond, and See Map 
 generally by more than one line, afford several instances of the case ^°- 8 - 
 under discussion. 
 
 In June 1861 the Confederate capital was menaced by two armies. Various line! 
 One under General Patterson, about 20,000 strong, was on the Upper of operation. 
 Potomac, about Williamsport ; the other under M'Dowell was preparing 
 to advance from Alexandria towards Centreville. Opposed to Patterson 
 was the Confederate general Johnston, with 11,000, at Harper's Ferry ; 
 and General Beauregard was organising a force on the Bull Pun stream 
 to oppose the advance of M'Dowell. "West of the Alleghanies, M'Clellan, 
 

 ■ ° 
 
 - pi 
 pa 
 
 ^-4 £} 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. lGi) 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 A variety of the same problem is offered by the case of an army which, 
 in covering some point, such as the capital of an empire, is assailed by 
 armies whose general aim is to reach that point, and who, so far, act in 
 concert, but who follow distinct paths towards it. 
 
 The great example of this is the campaign of 1814 in France, when 
 Napoleon with a single army covered Paris against the Allies, who were 
 converging on the capital by three lines — namely, from the Upper Ehine, 
 from the Lower Ehine, and from Holland. But as that campaign affords 
 also the best illustration of a problem of obstacles, it is reserved for a 
 subsequent chapter. 
 
 CAMrAIGN IX VIRGINIA, 1861. 
 
 The campaigns in Virginia being directed against Richmond, and See Map 
 generally by more than one line, afford several instances of the case No - 8 - 
 under discussion. 
 
 In June 18G1 the Confederate capital was menaced by two armies. Various Hues 
 One under General Patterson, about 20,000 strong, was on the Upper of operation. 
 Potomac, about Williamsport ; the other under M'Dowell was preparing 
 to advance from Alexandria towards Centreville. Opposed to Patterson 
 was the Confederate general Johnston, with 11,000, at Harper's Ferry ; 
 and General Beauregard was organising a force on the Bull Pun stream 
 to oppose the advance of M'Dowell. West of the Alleghauies, M'Clellan, 
 
170 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Confederate 
 
 transverse 
 
 line. 
 
 Consequences 
 of losing it. 
 
 Winchester 
 
 to Manassas 
 Junction, 60. 
 
 Johnston, in 
 falling back, 
 covers this 
 line. 
 
 Harper's 
 Ferry to Win. 
 Chester, 28. 
 
 M'Dowell 
 advances. 
 
 Alexandria to 
 Fairfax C.H., 
 16. 
 
 Johnston 
 moves to 
 combine with 
 Beauregard. 
 
 with a great superiority of force, was operating against the Confederates 
 under Garnett. 
 
 Beauregard's position covered the junction of two railroads at Manassas. 
 Oue running south-west to Gordonsville, branched there to Richmond 
 and Lynchburg ; the other ran westward into the Shenandoah Valley. 
 And the only safe communication between the two Confederate armies 
 thus separated by the Blue Ridge of the Alleghanies, was up the valley, 
 to Strasburg or Front Royal, and thence by the Manassas Railroad. 
 Therefore, when Patterson, crossing the Potomac, advanced on Martins- 
 burg, he threatened not only to cut Johnston from Beauregard, but also 
 to seize the road leading on Beauregard's flank. Should both Federal 
 armies advance simultaneously, Johnston's force would be isolated, and 
 Beauregard's exposed to their combined attack. Nor was this all ; for on 
 reaching Winchester, Patterson might be joined by M'Clellan. AVinchester 
 and Manassas Junction were therefore points absolutely necessary to the 
 Confederates for mutual defence and support, the occupation of either 
 being dependent on the possession of the other. 
 
 Accordingly, when Patterson advanced, Johnston, on the 16th June, 
 fell back from Harper's Perry towards Winchester. He thus maintained 
 his communications with Beauregard, and prevented the combination of 
 Patterson and M'Clellan. 
 
 16th July. — After various indecisive manoeuvres and movements to 
 and fro in the valley, Patterson, again advancing towards Winchester, 
 paused, and began to extend his left eastward as if to combine with 
 M'Dowell. 
 
 That day M'Dowell, 60,000 strong, advanced from Alexandria to 
 Fairfax Court-house. 
 
 17th. — Beauregard's troops, about 20,000, were assembled at the various 
 passages over Bull Run which might be approached by roads from Fair- 
 fax Court-house. 
 
 18th. — M'Dowell made a partial attack on the line of Bull Run, which 
 was repulsed. 
 
 Johnston, quitting his camp, marched through Winchester to Mill- 
 wood, on his way to reinforce Beauregard ; masking the movement by an 
 advance of cavalry towards Patterson's position, as if menacing an attack. 
 Passing the Blue Ridge at Ashby's Gap, he halted at its eastern base. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 171 
 
 VJ/h July. — Jackson's brigade, of Johnston's force, moved by rail to 
 Manassas. The cavalry and guns marched by the road. 
 
 20th July. — M'Dowell spent this day, as he had spent the 19th, in 
 reconnoitring Beauregard's position. The rest of Johnston's troops were 
 still detained near the Blue Ridge by an obstruction on the railway which 
 prevented transport. 
 
 21st July. — M'Dowell, leaving his left in Centreville, to cover the Confederates 
 road to Alexandria from a counter-attack, threw his centre and right comljine 
 
 against 
 
 forward to the river at various points. Outflanking the enemy by the M'Dowell. 
 extent of front occupied by his superior numbers, his right passed the 
 stream and turned the Confederate left. Beauregard met the onset 
 with his immediate reserves, which, though successful in repulsing some 
 of the continual attacks on that side, were on the whole pressed back. 
 But the railroad being now clear, Johnston's troops began to arrive on the 
 field. The direction of their advance brought them on the flank and rear 
 of the Federal right wing, already stoutly opposed. The result was the 
 well-known panic flight of the Federal army. 
 
 Patterson, on finding Johnston gone from his front, retired on Harper's Patterson 
 Ferry. 
 
 recrosses the 
 Potomac. 
 
 CAMPAIGN IX VIRGINIA, 1862. 
 
 In 1862, Richmond was again threatened on several lines. Federal lines. 
 
 M'Clellan, with the main army, 85,000, landing on the Yorktown pen- white House 
 
 insula, and establishing his depots at White House, on the Panmnkey, was t0 Richmond, 
 
 20 
 advancing on the capital by the roads leading across the Chickahominy. 
 
 On his right, M'Dowell, with 35,000, advanced from Fredericksburg Fredericks- 
 towards the Upper Pamunkey to combine with him. tur S t0 RlLU " 
 
 Sigel was at Manassas Junction, connected by a brigade at Front Royal 
 with Banks, in the lower part of the Shenandoah Valley. hi « t 
 
 Fremont, with the army of Western Virginia, was entering the upper Manassas 
 part of the Shenandoah Valley from Franklin. Junction, 35. 
 
 Norfolk, in Virginia, and several points in North Carolina, were also Franklm to 
 threatened by detachments landed on the coast. Junction l^o 
 
 On the Confederate side, 12,000 men under Magruder opposed M'Clel- Confederate 
 lan's advance. positions. 
 
1 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Jackson de- 
 feats Fre- 
 mont. 
 
 M'Clellan 
 advances on 
 Richmond. 
 
 Jackson de- 
 feats Banks. 
 
 The President 
 
 retains 
 
 M 'Dowell's 
 
 corps. 
 
 Anderson 
 falls back to 
 Hanover. 
 
 Jackson, with 15,000, was in the Shenandoah Valley covering the 
 issues through the mountains from Franklin on the one side, and also 
 fronting Banks towards Winchester and Front Eoyal. 
 
 At Norfolk, and the threatened points in North Carolina, were con- 
 siderable detachments. 
 
 Johnston, with the main Confederate army, was in and around Rich- 
 mond. And a Confederate corps under Anderson faced M'Dowell on the 
 Eappahannock. 
 
 Early in May, and before M'Clellan was established on the Pamunkey, 
 Jackson, concentrating superior forces between Woodstock and Harrison- 
 burg, had defeated successively two of Fremont's brigades, forming the 
 advanced-guards of his columns, as they issued from the mountains, and 
 driven them back on Franklin. Fremont, thus repulsed, remained in 
 Western Virginia. 
 
 22d May. — M'Clellan's army, pushing back Magruder, was assembled 
 on the Chickahominy. At this time the Confederate detachments in 
 North Carolina, and. the garrison of Norfolk, had been called into Eich- 
 mond, and Johnston's main army, reinforced by these troops and by 
 Magruder' s, opposed M'Clellan's further advance. 
 
 23d May. — Jackson attacked, and. destroyed Banks's detachment at 
 Front Eoyal. 
 
 24th May. — Jackson continued his march down the valley to attack 
 Banks. 
 
 25th May. — Jackson attacked Banks at Winchester, and drove him 
 down the valley and over the Potomac with severe loss. 
 
 26th May. — The Federal President, learning Banks's disaster, and fear- 
 ing for the safety of Washington, instead of allowing M'Dowell to con- 
 tinue his movement towards M'Clellan, recalled the troops which were 
 already on the march, and despatched the corps to close the avenues to 
 the capital, by Front Eoyal and Centreville, against Jackson. 
 
 The Confederate force under Anderson, which had been opposed to 
 M'Dowell, under the joint menace of his advance and of M'Clellan's 
 position, had withdrawn towards Richmond, and was this day at Hanover 
 Court-House, where it might still oppose the junction of those generals, 
 and also form a connecting link between Johnston and Jackson through 
 Gordonsville. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 173 
 
 l'7/A May. — M'Clellan, seeing his right thus threatened and his further M'Clellan 
 movements embarrassed by Anderson's position, detached from his Eight seiz,s 1I;m "- 
 a body of troops, under Porter, who drove a Confederate division from 
 Hanover Court-IIouse upon Richmond. 
 
 'Mst May. — Johnston from before Richmond attacked M'Clellan's left 
 wing on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and, after a partial success, 
 was repulsed. Lee succeeded to the command, Johnston being wounded. 
 
 M'Clellan now occupied himself with strengthening his own position 
 on the Chickahominy, and bridging the stream at many points before 
 finally advancing upon Richmond. 
 
 Jackson, reinforced from Richmond, was at Gordonsville, from whence, Gordonsville 
 
 by feints on all sides, he checked Fremont, Banks, Sigel, and M'Dowell. to Klchni01ul > 
 
 74. 
 2lst June. — Jackson's troops began to move along the Virginia Central 
 
 Railroad towards M'Clellan's right. 
 
 25th June. — M'Clellan began his final advance upon Richmond. 
 
 Jackson's advanced troops reached Hanover Court-House. 
 
 26th June. — Jackson, in concert with Johnston, part of whose army Jackson com- 
 
 was transferred from before Richmond to the left bank of the Chickaho- bines Wlth 
 <• ii ^ r ^,i ii i -i Johnston. 
 
 nnny, lell upon M'Clellan s right. 
 
 27th June. — M'Clellan's troops on the left of the Chickahominy were M'Clellan 
 
 thus compelled to form front to a flank. He let go his hold of the York chang,s Ma 
 
 r . ° front ami 
 
 river, and by means of his flotilla established a new base on the James base, 
 river, in rear of both his wings. 
 
 The series of attacks which forced him through seven days of continual and retreats 
 battle back upon the James, now commenced, and lasted till the 3d to the James - 
 July, when he gained the shelter of his gunboats on the river. 
 
 The troops of Sigel (who had also Fremont's corps), Banks, and The other 
 M'Dowell, were now united into an army under General Pope, whose Fetleral arm 7 
 
 advances 
 
 instructions were to advance upon Gordonsville and take the pressure ui1c1l .,. Pope 
 off M'Clellan. On the 18th July his advanced-guard reached Orange 
 Court-House. Opposed there by Confederate troops from Richmond, he 
 halted. 
 
 Meanwhile M'Clellan had been fortifying his position, and meditating 
 another advance by the line of the James, on Richmond, which was still 
 covered by the main Confederate army. 
 
 5th Aug. — Jackson's corps, detached by Lee, approached Tope's front, 
 
174 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Jackson op- 
 poses Pope. 
 
 Lee combines 
 with Jackson. 
 
 M'Clellan 
 embarks for 
 Washington. 
 Pope retires. 
 
 Jackson turns 
 Pope's right. 
 
 M'Clellan 
 reinforces 
 Pope. 
 
 Lee supports 
 Jackson. 
 
 Pope, defeat- 
 ed, retreats. 
 
 and the Federal general withdrew beyond the Rapidan towards Fairfax. 
 His divisions, some of which guarded the gaps of the hill-range in his 
 rear, were spread over a space of 30 miles. 
 
 9th Aug. — Jackson, whose object was to induce Pope to keep a forward 
 position till the main Confederate army should arrive, fell back over the 
 Rapidan to await Lee. 
 
 17 th Aug. — Lee, from Richmond, arrived on the Rapidan. 
 
 M'Clellan 's troops were now embarking for Alexandria. 
 
 Lee and Jackson, together, had 70,000 men. 
 
 Pope, who had 50,000, retired over the Rappahannock. 
 
 25th and 26th Aug.— Jackson with his corps, 18,000, moved up the 
 Rappahannock, and thence along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, by 
 Orleans and Salem, covered by the hills of Bull Run. Having com- 
 pleted his circuit round Pope's right, he descended by Thoroughfare Gap 
 upon Bristow Station of the Orange Railway, in rear of the Federals. 
 
 27th Aug. — Pope, thus menaced, advanced by the Warrenton road and 
 by the railway upon Jackson, to clear the line to Alexandria. 
 
 At his approach, Jackson retired along the railroad to Manassas Junc- 
 tion, destroying a Federal brigade there. 
 
 Pope was reinforced by two of M'Clellan's divisions from Alexandria. 
 
 28th Aug. — Jackson continued his retreat across Bull Run, and held 
 the line of the river. Pope continued to close upon him. 
 
 29th Aug. — Jackson in position, left near Centreville, right towards 
 Thoroughfare Gap, was attacked on his right by Pope's left column 
 which had marched from Warrenton. 
 
 Lee's army, following Jackson's march, began to issue from the Gap. 
 
 Pope's right entered Centreville. 
 
 Wih Aug. — Lee's army, having defiled through the Gap, formed line on 
 Jackson's right, reaching beyond Pope's left. 
 
 Pope formed his right wing obliquely across the Alexandria road at 
 Centreville. 
 
 Lee attacked and defeated Pope, who, with heavy loss, retreated en- 
 tirely on Centreville. 
 
 Two other divisions of M'Clellan's army, 20,000, arrived to reinforce 
 Pope. 
 
 31st Aug. — Both armies remained in position. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 175 
 
 1st Sept. — Jackson, moving by his left along the hills, threatened the 
 
 Centreville- Alexandria road. 
 
 Pope resinned his retreat. Pope retreats 
 
 2d Sept. — The remains of Pope's army, greatly disorganised by retreat- on Washing- 
 
 ing under constant pressure, regained the lines of Alexandria. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Those operations differ from those of 179G only in the fact that there 
 was so much concert between the assailants as resulted from their having 
 a common and definite object. 
 
 But in all these cases the advantage of operating from a common centre 
 against widely separated bodies advancing towards that centre is apparent. 
 Against one line of invasion a retarding and inferior force is used, while 
 on the other a preponderating force is brought into action ; and the first 
 victory is the signal for the general derangement and failure of the 
 enterprise. 
 
 To operate methodically to the best advantage, the covering army, if Concentric 
 assailed on two lines, should place on each of these a retarding force at a ™y S ene " 
 first, considering these as wings, while the mass in reserve is held ready tw0 winff8 
 to give a preponderance to either wing, or to both in succession. In all and a central 
 Napoleon's operations against a divided enemy this principle is apparent rescm> - 
 — at Jena for example, at Millesimo, at Eckmuhl, at Rivoli, and in the 
 cases yet to be quoted of Waterloo, and of the campaign against the Allies 
 on the Seine and Marne. 
 
 If then, in such a case, the covering army were to be disposed on the Proportion of 
 two lines in exact proportion to the hostile numbers advancing on them, it force on eac 
 would be operating on a false principle. For if in total numbers inferior 
 to the enemy, it would be inferior on each line, and would therefore, 
 presumably, be defeated on each : whereas, as already shown, the situa- 
 tion ought to be made to compensate for inferiority. 
 
 As the first movements will generally be in retreat towards the com- 
 mon centre, and as there can only be a limited number of transverse 
 lines which will afford the opportunity of co-operation and combination 
 between centre and wings, it becomes important to inquire to what dis- 
 
176 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 tance from the point covered the parts of a covering army can operate 
 •without risk to the general principle. 
 
 If the parts of the covering army should fall back so far before striking 
 a decisive blow, that the enemy's forces, converging, communicate and 
 form one force, all the advantage of the situation is lost, and the defenders 
 are thrown on their tactical resources. Thus, in 1864, Lee on the Rappa- 
 hannock and Brackenridge in the Shenandoah Valley, opposed Grant on 
 the one side, Sigel on the other ; while Beauregard on the side of Peters- 
 burg confronted Butler. Brackenridge defeated Sigel, and then rein- 
 forced Lee against Grant at Coal Harbour ; and Beauregard successfully 
 opposed Butler. But Grant, by a flank march to the James, came into 
 communication with Butler : henceforward they formed one force ; and 
 Lee, notwithstanding his fortifications, could never subsequently shake 
 Minimumof them off. We can, then, form an idea of the minimum distance at which 
 radii of opera- ^he CO ncentric army can advantageously operate in front of the point it 
 covers — namely, such as will keep the enemy's forces, as they gradually 
 approximate on the converging lines, from uniting. 
 
 The maximum distance is less determinate. Yet it is desirable that it 
 should be fixed in some degree, since a natural wish to protect as much 
 territory as possible from the presence of the enemy might lead an army 
 to operate on a frontier very distant from the capital, or other point 
 specially covered. Space alone, when very long radii are used, may 
 effectually destroy concert between parts of an army, even if those parts 
 Eadii must be be nearer to each other than are the parts of the enemy. Even since 
 short in pro- ^\q introduction of the field-telegraph, co-operation must be more difficult 
 
 portion to . . 
 
 their divert- when the distance which mutual reinforcements must pass over is great, 
 ence. and the chances have thereby proportionately increased that, during their 
 
 transit, unforeseen changes may have taken place in the situation of the 
 
 opposing forces. 
 Losses of the But there is also another reason why the lines of operation should be 
 retarding limited in extent. It has been pointed out that the retarding force should 
 
 force also 
 
 limit its ^ e strictly limited, since a superfluous number would be an encumbrance 
 
 radius. on the one line, while its aid would be vitally important on the other. 
 
 But a force thus retarding a superior enemy performs its duty with a 
 
 certain loss. For the troops which the enemy first brings into action, 
 
 being assured of immediate support from the army in rear, can manoeuvre 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 177 
 
 to a flank with unusual boldness, and may moreover feel confident that 
 no sustained offensive operation will be attempted against them. On the 
 other hand, if the troops on the flanks of the deployed retarding force are 
 slow in withdrawing towards the line of retreat, they are apt to be cut 
 off — or, if they withdraw too soon, they may lay bare the rear of the 
 centre ; and it cannot be expected that on all occasions their movements 
 should be exactly timed. Thus Zieten, in effecting his object of retarding 
 the French columns on the Sambre, lost, in his retreat upon Fleurus, 
 1200 men. Were there not a reserve to make good these losses, the 
 force would in a few days be so reduced as to be unable to make a stand, 
 and could only be driven in perpetual retreat. According to the length 
 of time that the force will probably be called on to act separately, must 
 its numbers be increased ; and on a very extended line, therefore, either 
 the principle of the campaign would be lost sight of by the undue 
 increase of numbers, or else the retarding force would be practically 
 destroyed. 
 
 It must not of course be forgotten that an invading army uses as many 
 roads for its advance as are conveniently near and sufficiently direct. 
 In proportion to the number of these which are available will be the 
 difficulties of the retarding force. For if it were to neglect any of them, 
 the enemy's column on that road would turn its flank and arrive in its 
 rear. Supposing, then, that 50,000 invaders are advancing along two 
 roads ; the example of Zieten shows us that, in an ordinary country, 7000 
 or 8000 defenders should be disposable on each of those roads, with a 
 general reserve, say of 4000, for casualties. Thus 20,000 men will per- 
 form the duty of opposing the 50,000 on that line. Supposing, further, 
 that the invaders are in two armies, 50,000 each ; that, on the other 
 side, 20,000 are at first thrown out to oppose them on each line, and the 
 mass of the defensive army assembled at some central point ; then 40,000 
 reinforcing one wing will give sufficient superiority to insure victory in 
 a battle on that side, and, after detaching a pursuing force, will also bring 
 a superiority on the other, and probably strike also in a fatal direction. 
 Thus 80,000 operating concentrically will be successful against 100,000 Advantage of 
 divided, in an ordinary country ; but of course, if circumstances admit (as the sltua | 1 ° n 
 at Monte Legino and Bull Run) of the whole retarding force being with- t0 4 
 
 M 
 
178 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 drawn, and its weight cast on the other side, this increases the odds in 
 
 favour of the combined army. 
 
 Choice of a It is clear, also, that when one line lies through an open country, and 
 
 line for the ^/ ie (j ier { s difficult, offering few roads to the advance, and many natural 
 
 retarding 
 
 force. obstacles, the retarding force should act on the latter. 
 
 Also, when an invaded frontier is very distant from the object, and the 
 
 defensive army decidedly inferior to the total forces advancing on a 
 
 double line, it will be better, on military grounds, to make no serious 
 
 stand near the frontier, but to direct the first efforts to keep the enemy 
 
 on separate lines, and to fall back to a point where, his forces being 
 
 See Pt. II. diminished by the necessary conditions of invasion, the parts of the 
 
 cl1 - *• combined army shall be near enough to each other to strike concerted 
 
 blows. 
 
 The additional advantages of railway communication between the parts 
 
 of the defensive army, and from these to the point they cover, need no 
 
 comment. 
 
 Swiftness Lastly, it is evident that the situation is of decisive advantage only 
 
 when turned to account by a leader who acts with promptitude and 
 
 resolution. Slowness and indecision will be fatal to the inferior army, 
 
 the commander of which must be swift to perceive and to use his 
 
 opportunity. 
 
 essential. 
 
ll.ur 
 
 sbui 
 
 
 
 
 
 GeMysburjs* 
 
 MAP N° 8 
 
Franklin d 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 179 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 CASE OF COMBINED ARMIES OPERATING FROM DIVERGENT BASES. 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington while at the Congress of Vienna, foreseeing that See Maps 
 
 Belgium would probably become the scene of hostilities, had indicated ^°- 9 aml 
 
 some measures necessary to be taken for the defence of the capital. There 
 
 were many reasons why this territory should be the theatre of war selected 
 
 by Napoleon. On other sides — on the Khine frontier and along the 
 
 barrier of the Alps — France was already strong against invasion, and 
 
 comparatively few troops might, for the present, render her secure there. 
 
 But the frontier adjoining Belgium was open, except for fortresses, which 
 
 had not prevented the advance of a hostile army in the preceding year ; 
 
 and around Brussels lay the forces of Wellington and Blucher, which by 
 
 their proximity were the most menacing to Paris. The advance of the 
 
 Allies on that capital in 1814, and the occupation of the east and south Reasons for 
 
 of France by hostile armies, had so much contributed to produce the state assumin s the 
 
 offensive, 
 
 of public feeling which compelled the Emperor to abdicate, that he could 
 not, when he entered France in 1815, venture to await, as in the preceding 
 year, in a defensive attitude, the chances of invasion. He was compelled 
 to become the assailant ; it only remained to select the point of attack. 
 The Allied armies in Belgium were now unsupported, but a few weeks 
 would enable Russia and Austria to bring overwhelming forces into 
 action. Could he, by a prompt attack, defeat the English and Prussians 
 and gain Brussels, another stride would carry him to the Rhine, and with 
 that great obstacle between him and his enemies, and its passages in his 
 hands, he might, in the most favourable attitude, political as well as 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 17!) 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 CASE OF COMBINED ARMIES OPERATING FROM DIVERGENT BASES. — 
 CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 
 
 The Duke of "Wellington while at the Congress of Vienna, foreseeing that See Maps 
 
 Belgium would probably become the scene of hostilities, had indicated ^°- 9 ani1 
 
 some measures necessary to be taken for the defence of the capital. There 
 
 were many reasons why this territory should be the theatre of war selected 
 
 by Napoleon. On other sides — on the Ehine frontier and along the 
 
 barrier of the Alps — France was already strong against invasion, and 
 
 comparatively few troops might, for the present, render her secure there. 
 
 But the frontier adjoining Belgium was open, except for fortresses, which 
 
 had not prevented the advance of a hostile army in the preceding year ; 
 
 and around Brussels lay the forces of Wellington and Blucher, which by 
 
 their proximity were the most menacing to Paris. The advance of the 
 
 Allies on that capital in 1814, and the occupation of the east and south Reasons for 
 
 of France by hostile armies, had so much contributed to produce the state assuimn s '» e 
 
 of public feeling which compelled the Emperor to abdicate, that he could 
 
 not, when he entered France in 1815, venture to await, as in the preceding 
 
 year, in a defensive attitude, the chances of invasion. He was compelled 
 
 to become the assailant ; it only remained to select the point of attack. 
 
 The Allied armies in Belgium were now unsupported, but a few weeks 
 
 would enable Russia and Austria to bring overwhelming forces into 
 
 action. Could he, by a prompt attack, defeat the English and Prussians 
 
 and gain Brussels, another stride would carry him to the Rhine, and with 
 
 that great obstacle between him and his enemies, and its passages in his 
 
 hands, he might, in the most favourable attitude, political as well as 
 
180 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Selection of a 
 Theatre of 
 War. 
 
 Allied bases 
 and communi- 
 cations. 
 
 Extension of 
 the Allied 
 front. 
 
 Charleroi to 
 Brussels, 35. 
 
 military, prepare for the encounter; while France, rendered by these first 
 successes forgetful of late disasters, would be arming with new enthusiasm 
 for the struggle. It is true he had but 125,000 men, while the opposing 
 generals, exclusive of garrisons, could bring more than 200,000 into the 
 field. But his army of veterans was one of the finest he had ever led ; 
 the French were accustomed to beat the Prussians ; and Wellington's 
 forces, besides being chiefly young soldiers, were made up of mixed and 
 discordant materials. There was sufficient reason, then, for his selec- 
 tion of Belgium as a territorial line; but, looking to the circumstances 
 and position of the hostile armies, he saw other grounds for expecting 
 success. 
 
 The Prussian army drew its supplies from Cologne. Its nearest com- 
 munication lay through Liege. The English were based partly on 
 Antwerp, partly on Ostend ; and from the anxiety which Wellington dis- 
 played for the safety of his communications with Ostend, it is evident 
 that they were essential to him. When both armies met in front of 
 Brussels, their communications stretched right and left almost parallel to 
 their front. If Napoleon, from the frontier between Lille and Eocroy, 
 were to operate by his right, and on the right bank of the Meuse, he 
 would come directly on the Prussian communications through Liege. If 
 by his left, between the Lys and Scheldt (as Wellington expected), he 
 would sever the English communications with Ostend. Therefore the 
 Allies were obliged so to dispose their forces as not only to interpose on 
 the main lines to Brussels, but also to protect the roads which linked 
 them to their bases. 
 
 Three great roads lead across the frontier upon Brussels, from French 
 fortresses, namely — 
 
 Lille-Tournay. 
 
 Valenciennes-Mons 
 
 Beaumont- 
 
 Philippeville- j 
 
 Charleroi. 
 
 Had the Allied armies been both of them based on Antwerp, they 
 would, by forming front on any arc of which these roads were the radii, 
 have covered both Brussels and their base. As it was, their front ex- 
 tended from Oudenarde to Liege, that is, on an immense arc ; and still 
 covered their communications with their bases very imperfectly. 
 
K X I ' I > A I N !•: I > AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 181 
 
 The headquarters of Blucher were at Namur, and his corps were thus Prussian 
 
 posted : — positions. 
 
 Zieten's headquarters, 
 Pirch's „ 
 
 Thielemann's ,, 
 
 Bulow's 
 
 Charleroi. 
 Namur. 
 
 Ciney. 
 Liejre. 
 
 Nam at to 
 Charleroi, 24. 
 
 Namur to 
 Liege, 35. 
 Namur to 
 Ciney, 20. 
 
 Wellington's headquarters were at Brussels. His army, in two corps British 
 and a reserve, was thus distributed — positions. 
 
 Corps. 
 1st. 
 
 2d. 
 
 Reserve. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 
 Divisions. 
 
 2.1. 
 
 Dutch- Belgian 
 
 3d. 
 
 do. do. 
 
 3d. 
 
 British, 
 
 1st. 
 
 do. 
 
 2d. British, . 
 4th. do. 
 
 1st. Dutch- Belgian, 
 Indian Brigade, 
 
 5th. British, . 
 6th. do. 
 Brunswick, 
 Nassau, 
 
 ' Main Body, 
 Brunswick, 
 
 1st brig. Dutch-Belgian, 
 2d. do. do. 
 
 3d. do. do. 
 
 Stations. 
 Quatre Bras, Nivelles. 
 Rceulx to Binche. 
 
 Soignies to Rceulx, Braine, Enghien. 
 Enghien. 
 
 Ath. 
 Oudenarde. 
 
 Road of Grammont to Ghent. 
 Thence to Alost. 
 
 Brussels. 
 Brussels. 
 Brussels. 
 Brussels road to Louvaiii. 
 
 Grammont, Ninhove. 
 
 Brussels. 
 
 Rceulx. 
 
 Rceulx to Mons. 
 
 opposite Maubeuge and Beaumont. 
 
 Enghien to 
 Quatre Bras, 
 24. 
 
 Ath to Oud- 
 enarde, 21. 
 
 The headquarters of the different corps and divisions being at the 
 places indicated, the troops were so stationed between the frontier and 
 the headquarters as to form a chain of posts towards the enemy. Thus, 
 brigades of Zieten's corps observed the course of the Sambre, and the 
 detachments on their right overlapped those of the Dutch-Belgian division 
 whose headquarters were at Nivelles. The Prussian cavalry vedettes were 
 pushed beyond the Sambre ; and their line was taken up and extended 
 by Dutch-Belgian cavalry, till these touched the outposts beyond Mons. 
 In this way a cordon of sentries and vedettes was formed throughout the 
 extent of frontier ; the outposts which furnished and supported them were 
 in neighbouring farms or hamlets ; the supports on which these relied 
 
line of opera- 
 tion 
 
 182 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 were at other central points in rear of them ; and the posts and supports 
 were thus on concentric lines, the headquarters forming the final centre 
 and point of assemblement of each division. 
 Choice of a Napoleon, having assembled the Army of the North behind the screen 
 
 pera- f ^ ie cor( j on f posts extending along the line of the frontier fortresses, 
 had three courses open to him : 1st, he might move from his right into 
 the space between the Meuse and Moselle (which runs to the Rhine east 
 of the Meuse and nearly parallel), aiming at the Prussian communica- 
 tions ; but this would compel the Prussians and English to concentrate, 
 when the French must give battle with their backs to the Moselle, that 
 is, fronting to a flank. Moreover, the roads in the valleys of those rivers 
 were so'bad at that time that such a measure was scarcely feasible. 2d, 
 He. might choose one of the three roads leading directly on Brussels ; 
 this was the course which he actually took, and therefore it need not be 
 discussed in this place. 3d, He might advance from Lille between the 
 Lys and Scheldt, turning Wellington's right, and severing his communi- 
 cations with Ostend; but this would compel the Allies to unite by 
 throwing Wellington back on Blucher, when in an engagement the 
 French must form front parallel to their communications, and with 
 their backs to the sea. And it was a great advantage to Napoleon 
 that Wellington expected him, even after the campaign was begun, to 
 take the third course. 
 
 Napoleon having, then, resolved on the second alternative, it remained 
 for him to choose between the roads already named. Those of Tournay 
 and Mons were closed by those fortresses which Wellington had caused 
 to be put in a condition to resist a sudden attack. The French army 
 advancing on either of them must either have delayed to besiege them, 
 which would have given the Allies ample time to assemble on the threat- 
 ened line, or have detached troops to mask them, thereby weakening the 
 army for battle. On the Charleroi road no such obstacle existed; and, 
 moreover, it led directly on the junction of the English left and Prussian 
 right. If unable to oppose the advance, the Allied armies would, the 
 Emperor calculated, incline each to its own base, and thus leave a gap 
 through which he would penetrate to Brussels. 
 
 But there was yet another circumstance in favour of this line of 
 operation. The lateral communication of the two armies from Zieten's 
 
MAP N° 9 
 
 To c.,, 
 
THEATRE OF THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN 
 
 1 .U.K. OF MILES 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 183 
 
 headquarters to General Perponcher's was by the road Nivelles-Namur. 
 In rear of that road, behind the point of junction, is the country watered 
 by the Dyle : a tract marshy, intersected, and traversed by none but 
 country roads. If the Allies should lose the communication Nivelles- 
 Namur, the next good road by which they could join would be Wavre- 
 Brussels, or Louvain-Brussels, where their fronts would be on the line 
 uniting the two bases Ostend and Cologne. Was it not probable that, 
 rather than seek so perilous a junction, the Allies would retire each 
 towards his own base ? 
 
 Such were the conditions under which Napoleon, with his fine army of 
 125,000 veteran Frenchmen, of whom 20,000 were splendid cavalry, pre- 
 pared confidently to assail two armies — one nearly equal to his own 
 (Blucher had 116,000 men), and the other also formidable in numbers; 
 for Wellington, exclusive of garrisons, could place about 90,000 men in 
 line of battle. 
 
 The general plan of the Allies — the only plan, indeed, which their Allied plans, 
 defensive posture permitted them to form — -was to retard as much as 
 possible the French advance, and then to concentrate for battle on the 
 menaced line. If Napoleon's attack were on the Allied right, Welling- 
 ton must try to detain him on the Scheldt till the Prussians should come 
 into line : if on the Allied left, Blucher must occupy him on the Meuse 
 till the English could come up : if on the centre, the troops of both 
 armies already on that line must combine to delay him till the Allied 
 forces could unite to deliver battle. 
 
 On the night of the 14th June the French army was concentrated on Concentration 
 the Charleroi-Brussels line as follows : — of the French - 
 
 Right wing, . . 16,000, . . Pliilippeville. Beaumont to 
 
 Centre, . . . 64,000, . Ik-fore Beaumont. Charleroi 18. 
 
 Left wing, . . 45,000, . . Leers and Solre-sur-Sambre. 
 
 During the day the Dutch outposts between Mons and Binche, and 
 those on the Prussian right, had observed and reported that French 
 troops had moved through Beaumont towards Pliilippeville. The com- 
 mander of a brigade on the Sambre, reconnoitring on the right bank, 
 apprised Zieten at Charleroi of the concentration of the enemy about 
 Beaumont. Later in the day Zieten ascertained through his outposts, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 183 
 
 headquarters to General Perponcher's was by the road Nivelles-Namur. 
 In rear of that road, behind the point of junction, is the country watered 
 by the Dyle : a tract marshy, intersected, and traversed by none but 
 country roads. If the Allies should lose the communication Nivelles- 
 Namur, the next good road by which they could join would be Wavre- 
 Brussels, or Louvain-Brussels, where their fronts would be on the line 
 uniting the two bases Ostend and Cologne. "Was it not probable that, 
 rather than seek so perilous a junction, the Allies would retire each 
 towards his own base ? 
 
 Such were the conditions under which Napoleon, with his fine army of 
 125,000 veteran Frenchmen, of whom 20,000 were splendid cavalry, pre- 
 pared confidently to assail two armies — one nearly equal to his own 
 (Blucher had 11(3,000 men), and the other also formidable in numbers; 
 for Wellington, exclusive of garrisons, could place about 90,000 men in 
 line of battle. 
 
 The general plan of the Allies — the only plan, indeed, which their Allied plans, 
 defensive posture permitted them to form — -was to retard as much as 
 possible the French advance, and then to concentrate for battle on the 
 menaced line. If Napoleon's attack were on the Allied right, Welling- 
 ton must try to detain him on the Scheldt till the Prussians should come 
 into line : if on the Allied left, Blucher must occupy him on the Meuse 
 till the English could come up : if on the centre, the troops of both 
 armies already on that line must combine to delay him till the Allied 
 forces could unite to deliver battle. 
 
 On the night of the 14th June the French army was concentrated on Concentration 
 the Charleroi-Brussels line as follows :— of the French. 
 
 Right wing, . . 16,000, . . Fhilippevillc. Beaumont to 
 
 Centre, . . . 64,000, . Before Beaumont. L'harleroi 18. 
 
 Left wing, . . 45,000, . . Leers and Solrc-sur-Sambre. 
 
 During the day the Dutch outposts between Mons and Binche, and 
 those on the Prussian right, had observed and reported that French 
 troops had moved through Beaumont towards Philippeville. The com- 
 mander of a brigade on the Sambre, reconnoitring on the right bank, 
 apprised Zieten at Charleroi of the concentration of the enemy about 
 Beaumont. Later in the day Zieten ascertained through his outposts, 
 
184 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 which extended to the borders of the forest surrounding Beaumont, that 
 strong French columns of all arms were assembled in his front, and that 
 everything portended an attack for the following day. 
 
 Meanwhile National Guards had replaced the regular troops in the 
 French fortresses', and had for a few days previous to the assembly of the 
 army made such marches and shows of movements along the line of 
 fortresses from Dunkirk (on the coast) to Maubeuge as might seem to in- 
 dicate an attack on Wellington's right. These movements were seen by 
 the Duke's outposts, especially by those in front of Tournay, and doubtless 
 tended to confirm his opinion as to the direction in which the expected 
 attack would be made. 
 
 Advance of 15th June. — Before daylight the three columns of the French advanced ; 
 
 the French. ^ e right, which reached the river later than the others, on Chatelet, five 
 miles below Charleroi on the Sambre ; the left, on Marchienne, a mile 
 above the town ; the centre, on Charleroi. The Prussians defending 
 these bridges were driven from them, and the heads of the French 
 columns passed the river. Thus the front of the army, which from 
 Philippeville to the Sambre had extended about eighteen miles, was 
 contracted to six miles — not more than enough for the line of battle. 
 
 Zie.ten's corps It was Zieten's business to delay with the troops of his corps the 
 
 a retarding advance of these columns till the Prussians could concentrate. Accord- 
 force. 
 
 ingly he disputed the ground at all favourable points, till at nightfall his 
 
 brigades, falling concentrically back, united behind Fleurus. 
 Prussians During this time, two other Prussian corps had been marching to 
 
 concentrate, concentrate on the previously-chosen field of Ligny. Thielemann, from 
 
 Ciney, reached Namur; Pirch, from Namur, reached Mazy, six miles 
 
 from Ligny ; Bulow had received orders to concentrate his corps, and 
 
 then march, but as he had not been made acquainted with the urgency of 
 
 the case, he had delayed to march. 
 
 Opposite was the head of the French central column, about half of 
 
 which was still beyond the Sambre on the Charleroi- Beaumont road. 
 
 Half of the right wing had crossed, and was between Chatelet and Gilly. 
 Charleroi to The whole of the left had crossed ; the head of the column was at Frasne, 
 Frasne, io. the rear QU t ^ e g am |j re a t Marchienne. 
 
 Wellington, on first hearing of the French advance in the afternoon, 
 issued these orders : — 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 185 
 
 " General Dornberg's brigade of cavalry and the Cumberland Hussars 
 to march on Vilvorde, and bivouac on the highroad near that town. 
 
 "The Earl of Uxbridge will please to collect the cavalry this night 
 at Ninhove, leaving the 2d Hussars looking out between the Scheldt 
 and Lys. 
 
 "The first division to remain at Enghien, ready to move at shortest 
 notice. 
 
 " The second division to collect this night at Ath and adjacent, ready, 
 &c. 
 
 " Third division at Brame-le-Comte, ready, &c. 
 
 " Fourth division at Grammont, except the troops beyond the Scheldt, 
 which are to move to Oudenarde. 
 
 "Fifth division, 81st Regiment and Hanoverian brigade of the sixth 
 division, to be ready to march from Brussels at a moment's notice. 
 
 " Duke of Brunswick's corps to collect this night on the road between 
 Brussels and Vilvorde. 
 
 " The Nassau troops to collect at daylight to-morrow morning on the 
 Louvain road, ready to move at shortest notice. 
 
 " The Hanoverian brigade of the fifth division to collect at Hal, ready 
 to move at daylight towards Brussels, and to halt between Alost and 
 Assche for further orders. 
 
 " The Prince of Orange is requested to collect at Mvelles the second 
 and third divisions of the Army of the Low Countries, and should that 
 point have been attacked this day, to move the third division British 
 upon Nivelles as soon as collected. 
 
 " This movement is not to take place till it is quite certain that the 
 enemy's attack is on the right of the Prussians and left of the British. 
 
 " Lord Hill will be so good as to order Prince Frederick of Orange to 
 occupy Oudenarde with 500 men, and to collect the first division of the 
 army of the Low Countries, and the Indian Brigade at Sotteghem, ready 
 to march at daylight." 
 
 On receiving other information these further orders were issued at ten 
 o'clock at night : — 
 
 "The third division to continue its movement from Braine-le-Comte on British con- 
 Nivelles. centrate. 
 
 " The first division to move from Enghien on Braine-le-Comte. 
 
186 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Napoleon's 
 estimate of 
 
 the situation. 
 
 "The second and fourth divisions from Ath and Grammont and also 
 from Oudenarde, and to continue their movement on Enghien. 
 
 " The cavalry to continue its movement from Ninhove on Enghien. 
 
 " The above to take place at once." 
 
 16th June. — While the heads of the French columns of the centre and 
 right wing passed Fleurus towards Ligny, the rear portions closed on 
 them and came into line. The left wing also, consisting of the corps of 
 Eeille and D'Erlon, began to advance and to close up to its front. 
 Nivellcs to The General commanding the Dutch-Belgian division, the brigades of 
 
 Quatre Bras, w hich were at Nivelles and Quatre Bras, took upon himself, on learning 
 Ney's advance on the evening of the 15th, to concentrate his division at 
 Quatre Bras instead of at Navelles. 
 
 Zieten's corps at Ligny was reinforced at six in the morning by Pirch's 
 from Mazy, and at noon by Thielemann's from Namur. 
 
 Meanwhile Napoleon's views of the state of affairs were thus explained 
 in a despatch to Ney, dated Charleroi, eight in the morning of the 
 16th :— 
 
 " I shall be at Fleurus in person before noon. I shall attack the enemy 
 there if I encounter them, and clear the road as far as Gembloux. There, 
 after what may take place, I shall adopt my course, perhaps at three in 
 the afternoon, perhaps this evening. My intention is that, immediately 
 after I shall have chosen my course, you will be ready to march on 
 Brussels : I will support you with the Guard which will be at Fleurus or 
 Sombref, and I shall expect you to arrive at Brussels to-morrow morning. 
 You will march this evening if I form my plan early enough for you to 
 be informed of it to-day, and to accomplish three or four leagues this 
 evening, and to be at Brussels at seven o'clock to-morrow morning. 
 
 " You can then dispose your troops in the following manner : — The first 
 division at two leagues in advance of Quatre Bras, and if there is no hin- 
 drance ; six divisions of infantry about Quatre Bras, and one division at 
 Marbais, in order that I may draw them to me at Sombref if I want 
 them ; besides, it will not retard your march : Count de Valmy's corps 
 (3d corps reserve cavalry) at the crossing of the Roman road with that of 
 Brussels, so that I can draw it towards me if I want it ; as soon as I have 
 done my part, I will send him the order to rejoin you. I wish to have 
 with me General Lefebvre-Desuouettes's division of the Guard (light 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 187 
 
 cavalry), and I send you Count de Valmy's two divisions to replace it. But 
 in my actual plan I prefer to place Count de Valmy where I may recall 
 him if I want him, and not cause General Lefebvre-Desnouettes to make 
 useless marches, since it is probable that I may decide this evening to 
 march on Brussels with the Guard. However, cover Lefebvre-Desnou- 
 ettes's division with D'Erlon's and Beille's two divisions of cavalry, so 
 as to spare the Guard, and because if there is any warm work with the 
 English, it had better fall on the Line than on the Guard. 
 
 " You perceive thoroughly the importance attached to the taking of 
 Brussels. That will, besides, throw open some chances ; for a movement 
 so prompt and sudden will cut off the English army from Mons, Os- 
 tend, &c. 
 
 " I desire your dispositions may be made so as to march your eight 
 divisions at the first order on Brussels." 
 
 At two o'clock the same afternoon he writes thus to Key through 
 Soult :— 
 
 " The Emperor charges me to inform you that the enemy has assembled 
 one corps of troops between Sombref and Bry, and that at half-past two 
 Marshal Grouchy will attack it with the third and fourth corps. 
 
 "His Majesty intends that you also should attack whatever is in front 
 of you, and, having pressed the enemy vigorously, that you should 
 manoeuvre towards us, to aid in enveloping the corps of which I have 
 spoken. If this corps is driven back first, then his Majesty will manoeuvre 
 in your direction, to facilitate in like manner your operations." 
 
 Ney had also been informed in the morning by the commander of the 
 first corps, Reille, who was at Gosselies, that the Prussian cavalry was 
 still about Fleurus, and that large columns from Namur were advancing, 
 and forming at St Amand. 
 
 He put the left wing in motion, in obedience to the Emperor's orders, Fiasne to 
 and, pushing back the Dutch-Belgian detachment at Erasne, continued to ^ uatre ras ' 
 advance, till at two o'clock the head of his column was in presence of 
 Perponcher's division at Quatre Bras. 
 
 Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras from Brussels between 11 and 12 
 o'clock. From thence he reconnoitred Xey's position, and, concluding the 
 enemy was not in force there, rode off to concert with Blucher, whom he 
 found at a windmill between Ligny and Bry. He then saw the French 
 
188 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF AVAR 
 
 Quatre Bras 
 to Ligny, 8. 
 
 Battle of 
 Ligny. 
 
 Frasne to St 
 Amand, 7. 
 
 Retreat of 
 the Prussians. 
 
 dispositions for attack, and concluded that Napoleon was bringing his 
 main force against the Prussians. To assist tliem the Duke proposed to 
 concentrate a sufficient force as soon as possible at Quatre Bras, march it 
 upon Frasne and Gosselies, and from thence operate against the enemy's 
 Hank and rear. However, on calculating the time that must necessarily 
 elapse before this sufficient force could be concentrated, and finding that 
 Blucher might be defeated in the interval, it was agreed that, in order to 
 save time, the Duke should move this supporting force down the Namur 
 road, and thus come directly to the aid of his colleague. 
 
 About 11 o'clock Napoleon arrived on the field beyond Fleurus. By 
 1 o'clock he had formed all his troops that had then arrived (60,000, 
 with 204 guns) in order of battle. After making a reconnaissance in 
 person, and receiving reports from his generals of the assembling of the 
 Prussians for battle, he still thought that only one corps, that of Zieten, 
 was before him. He directed Grouchy, with two corps of infantry and 
 three of reserve cavalry, to attack it about half-past 2, and thus com- 
 menced the battle of Ligny. The three Prussian corps numbered more 
 than 80,000 men, with 224 guns. About half-past 5, Lobau, bringing the 
 rear of the centre from Charleroi, augmented the French force to 71,000 
 with 242 guns. 
 
 During the battle, Napoleon, becoming better aware of the force he was 
 engaging, sent an order to Ney to direct D'Erlon's corps on St Amand. 
 But Ney, after getting Napoleon's first orders (dated 8 o'clock), had 
 directed D'Erlon on Frasne. He was near that place with the advanced- 
 guard of his corps when an aide-de-camp from Napoleon reached him, 
 who said that the Emperor, hotly engaged, needed aid, and that he had 
 taken on himself to turn the head of the column towards .St Amand by 
 Villers Perruin. D'Erlon, sending to apprise Ney, followed to direct the 
 movement of his corps (20,500 men and 46 guns). He arrived on the 
 flank of the Prussians, and the head of his column had entered into the 
 action of Ligny, when he received from Ney a peremptory recall. Ac- 
 cordingly he countermarched towards Frasne, and reached Ney at night- 
 fall, after the action at Quatre Bras was ended. 
 
 It was almost night when the battle of Ligny drew to a close with the 
 defeat of the Prussians. The corps of Zieten and Pirch retired to Tilly and 
 Gentinnes ; that of Thielemann, which covered the retreat, to Gembloux. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 189 
 
 Meanwhile Ney, approaching Qaatre Bras about 2 o'clock, had in hand Battle of 
 17,000 men and 38 guns to attack Perponcher's division of 7000 men and Qu;ltre Bras ' 
 16 guns. The Dutch-Belgians sustained the first attack made with the 
 head of the French column till half- past 3, when 2000 Dutch-Belgian 
 cavalry which had assembled at Nivelles, in falling back from the country 
 between Roeulx, Mons, and Binche, came on the field at the same time as 
 Picton's division, which, detained for further orders at the junction of 
 Mont St Jean, had been summoned to Quatre Bras by an order of the 
 Duke, who had returned from his interview with Blucher in time to con- 
 front Ney. Brunswick's corps followed Picton's, when the Duke had 
 18,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, 28 guns; Ney, as before, 15,700 infantry, 
 1800 cavalry, 38 guns. 
 
 The next reinforcement was to the French. Kellermann joined Key, 
 who now had 3700 cavalry, 44 guns. 
 
 At 5 o'clock Halkett's brigade of Alten's division from Braine-le-Comte, 
 and Kielmansegge's Hanoverian brigade with two field-batteries, joined 
 Wellington, raising his force to 24,000 infantry, 2000 (defeated) cavalry, 
 40 guns. 
 
 Ney was also then reinforced by Kellermann's remaining division of 
 heavy cavalry and troop of artillery. He now had 15,700 infantry, 5000 
 cavalry, 50 guns. Thus the battle was continued with a sufficiently even 
 balance of force — the French counting 3000 cavalry and 10 guns against 
 the Duke's excess of 8000 infantry. 
 
 At half-past 5, Ney, aware of the last reinforcement to the English, 
 ordered D'Erlon up. Between 6 and 7 he learnt that his general had 
 been directed on St Amand. He sent to recall him. Meanwhile the 
 Anglo - Belgians had been reinforced as follows: — 12 guns of Alten's 
 division, 6 of the King's German Legion, 1 Hanoverian, 2 Brunswick 
 battalions, the 1st British division from Enghien, with 12 guns. Wel- 
 lington now had 30,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, G8 guns. The French 
 remained as before. Ney relinquished the conflict at nightfall. Both 
 sides bivouacked on the ground. 
 
 17th June. — Wellington remained ignorant of Blucher's fortunes all 
 night. But daylight showed him that Ney was still in position in his 
 front, which would hardly have been the case had Napoleon been de- 
 feated. A reconnaissance along the Namur road ascertained that the 
 
190 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Ninliove to 
 Quatre Bras, 
 35. 
 British 
 
 retreat. 
 
 French centre 
 combines 
 with left. 
 
 Hal to Wel- 
 lington's 
 right, 10. 
 
 < ientinnes to 
 Wavre, 10. 
 
 French right 
 pursues the 
 Prussians. 
 
 French were upon it, between Quatre Bras and Ligny ; and an aide-de- 
 camp from Blucher shortly afterwards reached the Duke, having come by 
 a road farther in rear. Wellington sent his ally word that he would 
 fall back towards Waterloo to effect a junction with him; and that, if 
 Blucher would join him with two corps, he would await Napoleon's onset 
 there. 
 
 Uxbridge's cavalry from Ninhove had come in in the night. Covered 
 by it, Wellington began in the forenoon to withdraw his forces from 
 Quatre Bras through Genappe upon Waterloo. This movement was 
 almost completed when in the afternoon Napoleon's advanced-guard from 
 Ligny appeared, and pressed the rear of the British cavalry as it retired 
 through Genappe. 
 
 The British troops from the right, then at Nivelles and Braine-le-Comte, 
 were directed on Mont St Jean. 
 
 From Waterloo the Duke sent the following despatch to General 
 Colville :— 
 
 " The army retired this day from its position at Quatre Bras to its pres- 
 ent position in front of Waterloo. 
 
 " The brigades of the 4th division at Braine-le-Comte to retire at day- 
 light to-morrow upon Hal. 
 
 " General Colville must be decided by the intelligence he receives of 
 the enemy's movements in his march to Hal, whether he moves by the 
 direct route or by Enghien. 
 
 " Prince Frederick of Orange is to occupy with his corps the position 
 between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long as possible. 
 
 " The army will probably continue in its present position in front of 
 Waterloo to-morrow." 
 
 On the side of the Prussians, Zieten and Pirch retired from Tilly and 
 Gentinnes by Mont St Guibert. Zieten's corps crossed the Dyle at Wavre 
 and took up a position ; Pirch's halted on the right bank. 
 
 Thielemann, arriving at Gembloux, found Bulow near that place. 
 Keceiving orders for the general concentration, Bulow's corps moved on 
 Wavre, followed by Thielemann's. 
 
 Napoleon's army remained at Ligny till the afternoon, when Grouchy 
 with 33,000 men was sent in pursuit of the Prussians. His orders were 
 to follow them, complete their route, and never lose sight of them. He 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 191 
 
 followed in the direction of Gembloux, and arriving there at in the 
 
 evening, many hours after the Prussians had left, reported to Napoleon 
 
 at ten that he believed the Prussians to be divided into three columns, 
 
 one retreating to Wavre, one to Perwez, the third to Namur. 
 
 Napoleon quitted the field of Ligny with the rest of his army about the 
 
 same time as Grouchy, and moved by the Namur road to Quatre Eras, 
 
 ■where Ney was still in position. Their combined forces then followed Quatre Bras 
 
 "Wellington's march to Waterloo, where the Duke was in position in front t0 
 
 ° * Waterloo, 8. 
 
 of the junction of the Nivelles and Genappe roads, with his centre across 
 
 the latter. 
 
 ISth June. — Between 11 and 12 the French commenced their attack 
 on Wellington. 
 
 Prussian movements : — 
 
 Bulow at daybreak, through Wavre to St Lambert. "Wavre to 
 
 Zieten at noon, by Ohain towards Frisehermont. Frischermont, 
 
 Firch at noon, through Wavre to follow Bulow. 10. 
 
 At 8 in the morning, Grouchy, who had been reconnoitring on several 
 roads for intelligence, began his advance by Sart-a-Walhain upon Wavre, 
 and at noon his advanced-guard attacked Pirch's rear-guard on the right 
 bank of the Dyle. Thielemann's corps, which was to have followed Thielemann's 
 Zieten, was left on the Dyle at Wavre to oppose Grouchy. cor Pf a re " 
 
 turdiii"* force. 
 
 At 5 in the afternoon Bulow's advanced troops issued on the French ,,. ° 
 
 Allied armies 
 
 right at Planchenoit. combine. 
 
 At 7 in the evening Zieten's advanced troops joined Wellington's left 
 at Frischermont. 
 
 At 7 also Pirch arrived in rear of Bulow, and was directed on Maransart. 
 
 The arrival of the Prussians decided the battle, and their attack being French de- 
 en the French flank and rear, while the Fhiglish advanced on the feate<1> 
 front of the enemy, the defeated army was completely routed, and 
 fled over the frontier by the great road of Charleroi, pursued by the 
 Prussians. 
 
 19th June. — The main French army, almost dispersed, continued its 
 flight. 
 
 Grouchy, who had spent the preceding day in attacking Thielemann 
 on the Dyle, renewed the engagement at daybreak, and drove Thiele- 
 
192 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 French right 
 wing, though 
 successful, 
 retreats. 
 
 Wavre to 
 
 Namur, 28. 
 
 mann's corps towards Louvain ; but intelligence reached him at 11 
 o'clock of the defeat of Napoleon the day before. Masking the move- 
 ment by troops on the Dyle, he at once began his retreat by Mont St 
 Guibert, upon Gembloux, for Namur. 
 
 Pirch's Prussian corps marched on the night of the 18th to intercept 
 Grouchy. It reached a point between Tilly and Gentinnes on the 19th 
 at mid-day, but failed to advance further, or to discover that Grouchy's 
 force was crossing its front. 
 
 Next day Thielemann and Pirch pressed the rear of Grouchy, who, 
 leaving a division in Namur, made good the retreat of his corps along 
 the Meuse by Dinant, and passed the frontier in good order. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Former chapters will have made the reader acquainted with the 
 grounds on which Napoleon framed the design of this campaign, and 
 threw himself with a force very inferior to that of the Allies upon their 
 centre. 
 
 In 1796, as in 1815, the armies opposed to him had advanced from 
 divergent bases till they united ; and when he pierced their centre and 
 destroyed their concert, Beaulieu had retired upon Acqui, Colli upon 
 Turin. It was to be expected, therefore, that if the centre of the Allies 
 in Belgium were pierced, they also would retire towards their bases ; that 
 is to say, Blucher would take the direction of Liege, Wellington of 
 Disadvantage Ostend or of Antwerp. And in their case a far greater difficulty would 
 be offered to reunion than in that of Beaulieu and Colli, owing to the 
 greater divergency of the bases and the lines that led to them. For if 
 Blucher, driven from the line Sombref-Liege, should attempt to rejoin 
 his colleague by that of Wavre-Liege, he would be operating on a front 
 parallel to his line of communication ; and the risk he ran is evident 
 from the fact that, on the 19th, Grouchy, by defeating Thielemann on the 
 Dyle, actually cut him from that line. Supposing, then, that Napoleon 
 had beaten Wellington before Blucher's arrival on the field, the Prussian 
 general would have found himself in the presence of a victorious enemy, 
 with his own retreat cut off. Had lie attempted to recover his communi- 
 cations with Cologne by Louvain-Maestricht, the French from Wavre 
 
 of divergent 
 bases. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 193 
 
 would have been on that line before him, when another lost battle would 
 
 have been ruin. 
 
 Remembering, then, the triumphs of his earlier campaign, and pcrceiv- French ope- 
 
 ing still greater advantages for an attack of the same kind upon the , in tw " 
 ... ... wings and 
 
 Allies in Belgium, Napoleon provided for it from the outset by dividing R eserve . 
 
 his army into two wings, with which to feel the enemy on each side, and 
 a central reserve to reinforce either at discretion. Thus, first, he joined 
 his centre to his right against Blucher at Ligny ; then, leaving his 
 right wing to pursue the Prussians, he joined the main body to the 
 left wing for the attack on Wellington. The recollection of what he 
 aimed at, and of the result which precedents had led him to expect, 
 furnishes a key to the incidents (many of them still disputed and mis- 
 interpreted) of the whole campaign. 
 
 Why did Napoleon throw his weight in the first instance on the Prus- Reasons for 
 sians at Ligny rather than on the English at Quatre Bras ? — the intention T^f^, , 
 
 a J . . Blucher first. 
 
 to do which was made evident by the direction of his centre upon 
 Fleurus before he knew what the proportions of the hostile forces at 
 those points might be. 
 
 The essential conditions of Napoleon's plan were, to keep the Allies 
 from uniting, and also to separate them in such a way as to open the road 
 to Brussels. 
 
 The separation and consequent retreat of the Allies would be accom- 
 plished with equal certainty by seizing either of the two points, Quatre 
 Bras or Sombref. So far it would seem almost a matter of indifference 
 which might be the chief object of attack. But the Allied generals would 
 then seek to reunite on the next available line. If either of them would 
 attempt this movement with greater difficulty and risk than the other, it 
 would be good policy to attack him first, since defeat added to his other 
 disadvantages might render a junction impossible before his colleague 
 should be defeated also. 
 
 The other Prussian corps were marching to join Zieten's by the roads 
 Ciney-Namur and Liege-Hottomont. Pirch from Namur would be the 
 first to join Zieten. Were Pirch and Zieten defeated, or Zieten only, 
 before being supported, they would, by retiring on Hottomont, be 
 separated from Thielemann, or, by retiring on Namur, be separated from 
 Bulow. If hotly pursued, it might be necessary to retreat to Hannut or 
 
 N 
 
194 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Liege. For, as already stated; the course proper for the parts of an army 
 thus separated is to retreat in order to recombine; and Blucher must 
 unite his own forces before he could aid his colleague. But at Hannut, 
 Liege, or even Hottomont, he would still be very far either from Welling- 
 ton or Brussels. 
 
 On the other hand, supposing that Napoleon had reversed the actual 
 order of events, and had first brought his centre to aid Ney against Wel- 
 lington, and, leaving his left wing to pursue the British, had next brought 
 his centre to the aid of Grouchy against Blucher, Wellington, driven from 
 Quatre Bras, would have retreated, as he did, towards Waterloo ; his 
 troops, then on the march to join him, would have been directed, as they 
 were, on Hal, whence Ney could not have prevented them from march- 
 ing to join Wellington. Meanwhile Blucher (who could not have been 
 prevented by the small force in his front from assembling his army), aware 
 of his colleague's retreat, would have marched to W'avre on the 17th, 
 followed by the main French army. Posted on the Dyle, he could have 
 maintained the battle till Wellington, leaving a force to contain Ney, 
 should bring the rest of his army to La Hulpe or Wavre to overwhelm 
 Napoleon. The great battle which was fought at Waterloo would have 
 been fought at Wavre by the Allies united. 
 
 If, then, Blucher were attacked before he could assemble his corps, he 
 would be driven apart from his objects ; if Wellington were so attacked, 
 he would not lose his hold either of Brussels or of his colleague. The 
 general plan of Napoleon was perfectly calculated for success, and it was 
 good policy to attack Blucher first. 
 Cause of But this plan failed in execution. Now we have already seen how 
 
 failure. much depends on promptitude of movement in operations of this kind. 
 
 Napoleon did not attack at Ligny till two in the afternoon, when Birch 
 and Thielemann were with Zieten in line of battle, and when Bulow, but 
 for his delay, should also have been on the field. And the reason why 
 he did not attack sooner was, that only the heads of his columns were 
 before the enemy. Now, as all the French troops started from the same 
 bivouacs, there was no reason why, on those fine roads, the rear of the 
 columns, which marched but did not fight, should not have accomplished 
 the same distance as the heads, which both marched and fought. Had 
 the army bivouacked in order of battle instead of in order of march, it 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 195 
 
 would have been ready next day to defeat Zieten perhaps before Pirch 
 had joined, certainly before the arrival of Thielemann. 
 
 In spite of these considerations, M. Thiers, in his zeal for the character 
 of Napoleon as a general, has not scrupled to assume that the Emperor 
 delayed to attack at Ligny in order that all the Prussians might assem- 
 ble, and thus give him an opportunity of crushing them at once. It is 
 not necessary to point out to the readers of this work, nor to any one 
 acquainted with Napoleon's method of making war, how absurd is this 
 assumption. 
 
 From the same motive the French historian severely blames Marshal 
 Ney for not advancing towards Brussels before the battle of Ligny on the 
 morning of the 16th, and afterwards on the morning of the 17th. It 
 would of course have been extremely rash for Ney to have advanced be- Ney's con- 
 yond the Nivelles-Namur road till Napoleon had reached it with the tauun 6 force 
 
 could uot 
 
 main body, for he would have been exposing his flanks to the British advance alone. 
 from Nivelles, and to the Prussians from Sombref; and had the main 
 French army been defeated at Ligny, his retreat would have been cut off. 
 Under these circumstances nothing but an explicit order from Napoleon 
 to advance at all hazards would have justified him in making the attempt. 
 But the Emperor's orders of eight in the morning of the 16th were given 
 under the supposition that Sombref and Quatre Bras would be occupied 
 with little or no fighting, and that Brussels would be open to the French, 
 and attainable in a single march. A chief in Ney's position must have 
 discretionary power — and he is quite justified in using it when his in- 
 structions prove to have been given on a false theory of the facts. More- 
 over, Napoleon had attached to his orders the condition that "there should 
 be no hindrance" to their execution. On the 16th, then, Ney did all that 
 could be expected from a commander in his position, by preventing Wel- 
 lington from aiding Blucher, and by covering the line of communication 
 with France. 
 
 Whatever excuse may be made for Napoleon's inactivity on the 17th 
 applies also to Ney, whose troops had marched, fought, and suffered in 
 action, quite as much as the centre and right wing. It was the object 
 of the French to unite for the attack on Wellington, and their end would 
 be best answered if the English should remain in their position at Quatre 
 Bras till Ney's attack in front could be supported by Napoleon's in flank. 
 
wine. 
 
 19G THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 As the retreat of the British was concealed till the last moment, Key's 
 best policy, under the apparent circumstances, was to await the Emperor's 
 arrival, rather than risk defeat by assailing a superior enemy who had 
 already proved too strong for him. 
 Movements of The charges against Grouchy, made by various writers, resolve them- 
 the pursuing selyes into these:— 
 
 1st, That he ought to have pursued the Prussians in the direction of 
 Wavre instead of towards Liege and Namur. 
 
 It is a sufficient answer to this, that Napoleon himself indicated the 
 direction of the pursuit. In the first despatch from Soult to Ney of the 
 17th is the following passage : — " The Prussian army is routed. General 
 Pajol is pursuing it on the roads of Namur and Liege." 
 
 2d, That Grouchy ought to have manoeuvred constantly towards 
 Napoleon. 
 
 In giving Grouchy his final instructions on the 17th, Napoleon said, 
 " Communicate with me by the paved road that leads to Quatre Bras." 
 This injunction was consistent only with a movement towards Liege or 
 Namur — not towards Wavre ; and had the Prussians really, as Napoleon 
 supposed, retreated towards the former places, Grouchy, by moving in the 
 direction of Wavre, would have uncovered to them the communications 
 of the main army with Charleroi — to guard which against an offensive 
 return of the enemy was one principal object of detaching the right 
 wing. 
 
 3d, That Grouchy, on the night of the 17th, had reason to suppose, 
 as we learn from his report, that the Prussians were moving in three 
 columns, one on Wavre, one on Perwez, one on Namur ; that he inferred 
 that one of these columns might be intending to join Wellington, and 
 that he should therefore have moved towards Napoleon. 
 
 But this is founded on the supposition that Grouchy knew Wellington 
 would stop to fight at Waterloo, whereas he knew nothing of the sort ; 
 and he thought the Prussians, if they were really moving on Wavre, 
 intended to join Wellington at Brussels. For he says in the same report, 
 "If the mass of the Prussians is retiring on Wavre, I will follow in 
 that direction, so that they may not gain Brussels, and that I may 
 separate them from Wellington." And were they so moving, he, by 
 marching to Wavre, would threaten decisively their communications with 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 197 
 
 their base by Louvain, and so either prevent the execution of their pro- 
 ject or render it disastrous. 
 
 4th, That Grouchy, when he heard the cannonade of Waterloo, ought 
 to have turned towards the field. 
 
 If Grouchy had known that Blucher was moving from Wavre upon 
 "Waterloo — and if he could have marched himself towards that field with 
 a fair prospect of joining Napoleon — he certainly should have attempted 
 the movement ; but his belief probably was, and continued to be, that 
 the march which Thielemann's rear-guard was covering, was on Brussels 
 or Louvain by the highroad, not on Waterloo by country roads. It was 
 in this persuasion that he continued to attack Thielemann on the 19th. 
 When Napoleon detached him to pursue the Prussians, it was with the 
 understanding that the Emperor would engage Wellington with the 
 French main body and Ney's force only, and it was no part of Grouchy's 
 business to combine with his chief for that purpose. And had the theory 
 entertained by Napoleon and himself of the Prussian movements been 
 correct, it was clear that by seizing Wavre he would be in a command- 
 ing position. For should Blucher be moving on Brussels, Grouchy at 
 Wavre would by an advance on Louvain cut him from his last line of 
 communication with his base. Should Blucher be moviug on Louvain in 
 order to cover this his last line, Grouchy would join Napoleon at Brussels 
 after the defeat which Wellington might be expected to sustain in stand- 
 ing to fight alone, and the whole French army would continue to be inter- 
 posed between the Allies. 
 
 In fact, all the criticisms passed on Grouchy have been founded on a 
 false conception of the duties of a containing force, and of Napoleon's 
 general plan, or else have sprung from a failure to appreciate the facts as 
 they presented themselves at the moment of action. As was said in a 
 preceding chapter, for the execution of an operation of this kind it is 
 necessary that the army so employed should preserve a superiority over 
 its immediate enemy after detaching a force in pursuit of the portion 
 first defeated. Grouchy was so detached ; that his operations were 
 ineffective was due to the tardiness of his pursuit, which, as well as its 
 wrong direction, was owing to the false theory formed by Napoleon of 
 the Prussian retreat, and confirmed in his mind by the precedent of 1796. 
 As to the prospect of Grouchy joining Napoleon after he heard the 
 
198 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 cannonade of Waterloo, it is only necessary to remember that Zieten, 
 marching from Wavre at noon, and unobstructed except by the difficulties 
 of the road, only reached the field between seven and eight in the even- 
 ing ; and that Thielemann's and part both of Pirch's and Zieten's corps 
 would have been available to oppose Grouchy's march without divert- 
 ing from the field of Waterloo a single man who fought there. The 
 Prussian outposts extended along the Dyle all round Grouchy's left 
 flank, so that he could not have attempted the movement unknown to 
 the enemy. 
 
 The force with which Napoleon operated was scarcely sufficient. For 
 though he defeated the Prussians at Ligny, and was superior to Welling- 
 ton at Waterloo, yet the absence of Bulow from one field, and of the 
 17,000 men left by Wellington at Hal from the other, were advantages 
 scarcely to be calculated on. No doubt the Emperor counted, and justly, 
 on his own skill and renown to make good the deficiency. But in ordi- 
 nary cases the existing odds — namely, 206,000 against 125,000 — would 
 be too great for the attempt. 
 
 Quatre Bras and Sombref (meaning by the last-named the junction of 
 the Liege and Namur roads) furnish additional examples of points of no 
 special topographical importance becoming decisive by their relations to 
 the forces in the theatre. 
 
 Why did Wellington station at Hal a force which was useless there, 
 and would have been so valuable to him at Waterloo ? This question 
 is only to be solved by remembering what Wellington thought of the 
 facts as they presented themselves to him at a given time ; and by limiting 
 ourselves to his horizon, instead of embracing that which is widened by 
 our knowledge of the real circumstances. Wellington could not know on 
 the 17th or ISth that the French right wing was detached to follow 
 Bluchcr. For all he knew, the entire French army might be following 
 himself. And if a French force had been detached to operate against 
 Wellington's communications with Ostend (of which he was so jealous), 
 by seizing Hal, and from thence threatening even Brussels and the line 
 to Antwerp, it would only be executing against the British a manoeuvre 
 corresponding to that which Grouchy was actually executing against the 
 Prussians. But this, though it may account for the direction of this 
 British detachment on Hal on the 17th, does not satisfactorily explain its 
 
«A /Sj* 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 19.9 
 
 detention there during the whole of the 18th, at only ten miles from that 
 field where it might have afforded such essential aid. 
 
 Having seen what are the disadvantages under which allied armies 
 operate from divergent bases, let us consider what is to be said on the 
 other side. 
 
 "When "Wellington concerted with Blucher at Biy operations against Advantage of 
 Napoleon on the 16th, he proposed to aid him by advancing against j^vergent 
 
 DHS6S lO COni" 
 
 Napoleon's left flank and rear by the Gosselies road. In doing so he 1^4 arm i es . 
 would have covered his own line to Ostend. 
 
 "When Napoleon followed Wellington to "Waterloo, he detached Grouchy 
 partly to cover his flank and rear, which were especially exposed, because 
 if the Prussians should advance towards Quatre Bras or Charleroi, they 
 would still cover their own line to Liege. 
 
 And, lastly, when Blucher approached Waterloo, he attacked Napoleon 
 in the most fatal direction, being himself on a front which covered from 
 the main French army the line through Wavre to Liege. 
 
 Thus the divergence of the bases of the Allied armies enabled them to 
 deliver their blows in the most fatally decisive manner against the enemy's 
 flank and rear ; which, had they operated from a common base, such as 
 Antwerp, they could not have done without exposing their own commu- 
 nications. 
 
 If, then, allied armies, operating from divergent bases, can combine, 
 their operation will be more effective than if they had a common base.* 
 But from the moment that their concert is destroyed by the interposition 
 of an adequate force, the chances are against them. 
 
 The reader will appreciate the loyalty of Blucher to his colleague and 
 to the common cause, in advancing to "Waterloo notwithstanding that 
 Grouchy was descending perpendicularly on his line of communication 
 with his base. 
 
 * The truth of this assertion was illustrated, very soon after the publication of tbe work, 
 by the victory of Kciniggratz, where the two Prussian armies, advancing from different sides 
 of the theatre, combined their attack with fatal effect. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 199 
 
 detention there during the whole of the 18th, at only ten miles from that 
 field where it might have afforded such essential aid. 
 
 Having seen what are the disadvantages under which allied armies 
 operate from divergent bases, let us consider what is to be said on the 
 other side. 
 
 When "Wellington concerted with Blucher at Bry operations against Advantage of 
 Napoleon on the 16th, he proposed to aid him by advancing against < llver s ent 
 
 DtlSGS to corn* 
 
 Napoleon's left flank and rear by the Gosselies road. In doing so he binea armies. 
 would have covered his own line to Ostend. 
 
 When Napoleon followed Wellington to Waterloo, he detached Grouchy 
 partly to cover his flank and rear, which were especially exposed, because 
 if the Prussians should advance towards Quatre Bras or Charleroi, they 
 would still cover their own line to Liege. 
 
 And, lastly, when Blucher approached Waterloo, he attacked Napoleon 
 in the most fatal direction, being himself on a front which covered from 
 the main French army the line through Wavre to Liege. 
 
 Thus the divergence of the bases of the Allied armies enabled them to 
 deliver their blows in the most fatally decisive manner against the enemy's 
 flank and rear ; which, had they operated from a common base, such as 
 Antwerp, they could not have done without exposing their own commu- 
 nications. 
 
 If, then, allied armies, operating from divergent bases, can combine, 
 their operation will be more effective than if they had a common base.* 
 But from the moment that their concert is destroyed by the interposition 
 of an adequate force, the chances are against them. 
 
 The reader will appreciate the loyalty of Blucher to his colleague and 
 to the common cause, in advancing to Waterloo notwithstanding that 
 Grouchy was descending perpendicularly on his line of communication 
 with his base. 
 
 * The truth of tins assertion was illustrated, very soon after the publication of the work, 
 by the victory of Koniggratz, where the two Prussian armies, advancing from different sides 
 of the theatre, combined their attack with fatal effect. 
 
200 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 See woodcut CASE OF DISLODGING AN ARMY BY OPERATING WITH A DETACH- 
 
 on p. 203. 
 
 MENT AGAINST ITS REAR. — CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA, 1864. 
 
 In May, General Sherman commanded the Federal forces assembled at 
 Chattanooga, on the left bank of the Tennessee. He had from 90,000 to 
 100,000 men. 
 
 Federal forces. Macpherson commanded 23,000 on the right. 
 
 Thomas 45,000 in the centre. 
 Schofield 13,000 on the left. 
 Garrard's cavalry, 5000. 
 Stoneman's ) 
 M 'Cook's ( 
 
 numbers not recorded. 
 
 Confederate 
 forces. 
 
 The object was to occupy the enemy's troops in Georgia, and to gain 
 possession of Atlanta. 
 
 Opposed was General Johnston ; at first with 40,000 men, afterwards 
 reinforced to 54,000. His object was to obstruct Sherman as much as 
 possible, and to cover Atlanta to the last moment. 
 
 * In the first edition, the operations in Georgia were imperfectly (though not incorrectly) 
 described, for want of detailed information and a good map. General Sherman saw a copy 
 of the work, and, with a frankness remarkable in one so greatly distinguished in high com- 
 mand, caused a copy of his own report of the campaign to be conveyed to the author, along 
 with a letter containing the following passage : — 
 
 "A good many of the English commentaries and criticisms err, because it is impossible 
 for them to see why well-established principles of war had to be modified to suit the pecu- 
 liar geography and forest nature of our country. Thus, I think, if Colonel Hamley were 
 to visit the ground about Dalton and Resaca, he would modify his chapter treating of my 
 dispositions there. Though I divided my force (generally, but by no means always, a 
 violation of a rule of war), Johnston could not have fallen on Macpherson without doing 
 just what I wanted— viz., letting go forts and parapets, and a natural position that might 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 201 
 
 The whole theatre is generally hilly and wooded. The district between 
 Chattanooga and Dalton is crossed by considerable ridges in the direction 
 of the rivers, penetrated by gaps, in one of which lies the railway from 
 Chattanooga by Dalton, Resaca, Kingston, and Marietta to Atlanta and 
 Macon, with branches from Rome and Decatur. 
 
 The nature of the country and communications made the railway 
 especially valuable to both armies. 
 
 Sherman held the country nearly as far as Dalton, where Johnston's 
 headquarters were, and before which he was strongly posted. 
 
 Sherman's immediate base was Chattanooga. Bases. 
 
 Johnston was bound to the line from Dalton to Atlanta. Dalton to 
 
 The Federal general found the position too formidable to be assailed d ' 
 in front. He therefore resolved to turn it. 
 
 6th to 11th May. — Leaving one of Thomas's divisions entrenched in 
 the hills opposite Johnston, to guard the line to Chattanooga, and to 
 make feints against the front, he pushed Macpherson by Villanow through 
 a gap in the ridge, supporting him by the rest of Thomas's corps and a 
 body of cavalry, in all between 50,000 and 60,000. This force was to 
 threaten the line between Tilton and Resaca. 
 
 Schofield, from the left about Varnells, was, after feeling towards 
 Dalton, to withdraw and follow the flanking movement. 
 
 Finding Resaca too strong for an attack, Macpherson took position in 
 the gap he had issued by, to await the assembly of the army. 
 
 Johnston, perceiving the formidable nature of the menace against his 
 communications, made good his retreat to Resaca. 
 
 11th to 19th May. — Sherman drew his army round Resaca, and threat- 
 ened to pass between it and Rome. Johnston evacuated Resaca, destroy- 
 
 have cost me 20,000 men to have dislodged by a direct attack. Johnston could not make 
 a detachment large enough to endanger Macpherson, who, on the defensive, would have 
 had the woods and range of hills at Snake Creek in his favour, and I had good roads by the 
 rear to reinforce Macpherson in one march." 
 
 This refers to a passage in the Comments on this chapter in the first edition, where it 
 was assumed that Johnston's best chance was probably on the 10th May, when, leaving a 
 garrison in his works, he might have sallied and overwhelmed the turning force under Mac- 
 pherson ; and a deduction as to the proper mode of conducting operations of the kind was 
 made, which was unjust to Sherman's generalship. For that commander had actually 
 operated in the way suggested as the best; and the author, in amending the text, has the 
 s.itisfaction not only of cancelling a wrong, but of quoting, in confirmation of his own 
 views, the practice of so successful a leader. 
 
202 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 ing the railway bridge ; and Sherman advanced on Kingston and Rome, 
 strengthening Eesaca as a depot. 
 
 l§th to 27th May. — Johnston retired behind the Etowa. Sherman, to 
 avoid a strong pass at Allatoona, moved his army to the right across the 
 Etowa on Dallas. 
 
 27th May to 16th June. — Sherman, finding Johnston's left on Lost 
 Mountain too strong for attack, worked round by his own left to Alla- 
 toona, where he occupied and strengthened the pass, and directed a general 
 attack, which caused Johnston to abandon Lost Mountain, and to con- 
 centrate, with his centre, on Kenesaw Mountain, and his flanks thrown 
 back to cover Marietta and the railway. 
 
 27th June. — Sherman attacked the position, and was repulsed. 
 
 1st to 10th July. — Sherman, having resolved to turn the position, and 
 for that purpose to cast loose from the railway with ten days' supplies in 
 waggons, pushed his right, under Macpherson, down the Sandtown road, 
 towards the Chattahoochee, to a point within three miles of the river 
 and five of the railway. This threat against his rear caused Johnston to 
 evacuate his position and cross the Chattahoochee. 
 
 11th to 19ih July. — Johnston, having burnt his bridges, had lost much 
 of his power of offence. Sherman, sending Stoneman's cavalry to cross 
 far up the Chattahoochee and threaten the railway south of Atlanta, 
 caused Macpherson to support the movement by a feint on Turner's 
 Eerry. Meanwhile he seized the passage at Eoswell with Garrard's 
 cavalry supported by Schofi eld's corps, and fortified Allatoona and Mari- 
 etta. He then drew Macpherson's corps from right to left, crossed on 
 the Confederate right between Eoswell and Atlanta, and moved towards 
 the town, his left under Thomas seizing Decatur. 
 
 Johnston was replaced by Hood in command of the Confederate 
 army. 
 
 22d July. — Hood massed his forces on the extreme Federal left, rolled 
 up part of two corps, killed Macpherson, and got into Decatur, but was 
 driven within his lines. Howard succeeded Macpherson. 
 
 24ih July to 30th August. — The Federals intrenched around Atlanta 
 on the eastern side of the defences. The cavalry corps of Stoneman and 
 M'Cook were despatched to the southward by a wide circuit to break up 
 the railways. They were surrounded by superior forces, lost 1800 men, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 203 
 
 and Stoneman was captured. The Federals, however, were reinforced by 
 2500 cavalry under General Rousseau. 
 
 The place being considered impregnable, and attempts to break in 
 having failed, Sherman left a force intrenched before his bridge of the 
 Chattahoochee, and directed the corps of Schofield, Thomas, and Howard 
 upon Jonesboro'. 
 
204 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 1st September. — Hood had moved part of his army to Jonesboro', 
 where it was attacked and defeated. 
 Thereupon he evacuated Atlanta. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Except in attacking the Kenesaw Mountain on the 27th June, the 
 character of Sherman's operations was throughout the same. To protect 
 his main line from a counter-attack, he left a force intrenched across it. 
 He then reinforced his flanking wing to a strength sufficient to cope with 
 the whole army of the enemy, and directed it by a circuit off the main 
 line, upon the Confederate rear. In every case the operation was suc- 
 cessful, obliging Johnston forthwith to abandon his strongest positions, 
 and to retreat. 
 
 The superiority of numbers warranted, therefore, in this case, a sepa- 
 ration of the army, and was turned to account in a manner which may 
 form an example of what is the best mode of operating in similar circum- 
 stances. 
 
 It appears, then, that in certain circumstances, and with great odds, it 
 may be judicious, or indeed inevitable, to separate an army for the sake 
 of dislodging an enemy by threatening his rear. But it is also clear that 
 when a commander, tempted by the promise of a brilliant result, operates 
 in this way, he is at any rate giving so much advantage to his adversary 
 as may consist in the chance of fighting the whole hostile force with a 
 part instead of the whole of his own. And it is evident that, by operating 
 with his entire force on one line, he would deprive the enemy of that 
 chance. Nevertheless, these flanking operations are frequently under- 
 taken. It is useful, then, to consider under what circumstances they are 
 judicious. 
 
 If, as in Sherman's case, the enemy is so strongly posted as to render a 
 front attack on him inexpedient, there will be no other course than to 
 detach a force to turn the position. And if the assailant also possesses 
 a strong position on the main line, it will be best to reinforce the flanking 
 wing till it is equal to the whole numbers which the enemy can possibly 
 bring on that side, and order it not to halt till it has attained the point 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 205 
 
 aimed at ; holding, meanwhile, the aforesaid position with the rest of the 
 army. Should the enemy detach a part only of his forces to meet this 
 attack on his flank or rear, he will be beaten. Should he meet it with his 
 whole army, he abandons the position in which his strength lay. 
 
 "When Wellington advanced from Portugal in 1813, he knew that the 
 French had a strong line behind the Douro, which they might hold against 
 his whole army. But they could only bring to the defence of that line 
 about 35,000 men. Therefore "Wellington sent 40,000 men across to the 
 northern bank of the Douro, within the Portuguese frontier, under Graham, 
 who advanced to the Esla, while with the rest of his forces the English 
 commander moved by Salamanca to the southern bank. Graham, cross- 
 ing the Esla, came on the flank of the French, who thereupon abandoned 
 the line of the Douro, and "Wellington assembled his army on the northern 
 bank unmolested. Had he followed Graham's movement with his whole 
 army, he would have left Portugal, with all his depots and his base, 
 exposed to an advance of the enemy. 
 
 It appears, then, that this separation is judicious : — Separation, 
 
 1st, "When the front of a position is unassailable, and a movement * enju 
 
 x _ ClOUS. 
 
 against the enemy's flank with the entire army impracticable or unsafe. 
 
 2dly, "When the roads do not admit of the entire army advancing in 
 effective order.* 
 
 Thus it was with great difficulty that a Northern army could advance 
 to the Rappahannock by the line of Centreville-Warrenton, even with the 
 aid of the railway ; for the country was so wooded and broken that the 
 troops could rarely move on an extended front, and the difficulties of 
 supply were great and increasing. Consequently the line of march grew so 
 extended that the superiority of numbers was lost. For this reason, if for 
 no other, part of the great hosts assembled on the Potomac were always 
 directed on some other line, such as Fredericksburg or the Shenandoah. 
 
 3dly, "When the superior army possesses divergent lines of retreat to, 
 and communication with, its own frontiers. 
 
 For, as in the case of the allied army of Wellington and Bluchcr, the 
 
 * The above was published in May 1866. In June of that year the Prussian armies 
 invaded Bohemia on a double line, and one main justification alleged by their Staff for the 
 step was, that the entire army could not have advanced in effective order by one set of 
 mountain roads, but would have extended in columns so lengthened that it would have been 
 impossible to form on a front commensurate with its numbers. 
 
20 G THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 risk in case of defeat will be greatly diminished, as compared with that 
 of an army detaching a force from its single line ; and the effect will be 
 greater, for the direction of the combined armies must bring one of them 
 on the enemy's flank or rear. It will depend on the relative proportions 
 of the hostile forces whether the promise of decisive success will compen- 
 sate for the risk of losing the power of concerted action, and being sepa- 
 rately defeated. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 20' 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FOREGOING EXAMPLES. 
 
 That the disadvantages of separating the parts of an army, though fore- Risks of 
 seen, are often incurred, is evident from history. And this may happen se P aratlon 
 from many causes. As at Eckmuhl, a commander ignorant of the exact curre( j. 
 position of the adversary may, in expectation of an immediate result, 
 make a movement which lays him open to the penalty for dividing his 
 army. In 1859, Louis Napoleon would doubtless have preferred to 
 operate entirely from Genoa, where he possessed the advantage of a fine 
 and fortified harbour, and whither his troops and stores could be con- 
 veyed en masse by the easy mode of water-transport. But in the mean- 
 time the situation of the Sardinian capital, imminently menaced, and 
 covered only by a very weak army, afforded a pressing reason for sending 
 part of the French troops by the Mont Cenis. The junction of the French 
 army was to take place in the great plain between the Bormida and the 
 Scrivia ; but till it was effected, the French corps on the two lines were 
 exposed to all the risk of being separately assailed. 
 
 Another fertile source of separation is the attempt, so frequently made, Causes of 
 to cover two distant and divergent objects. Territories, lying apart from tlus - 
 the indispensable line, must perhaps be protected, else they would be over- 
 run by the enemy, or, by revolting, would increase the difficulties of the 
 situation. Or two cities far distant from each other may both be im- 
 portant enough to form an object for the enemy, and both equally urgent 
 in demanding protection. Thus when Sherman, advancing from Savannah 
 in 1865, was concentrated behind the Combahee, he threatened equally 
 Augusta and Charleston ; and by separating, to defend both, the Con- 
 
208 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 federates laid themselves open to a sudden blow dealt against a part of 
 their front. The part to be taken by an army so threatened can scarcely 
 ever be doubtful. It should adopt one point decisively, as its temporary 
 base, and from thence, indirectly, cover the other. Thus the Confederates, 
 if assembled in the fork of the Combahee and its tributary, and based on 
 Augusta by the road through Barnwell, would have been prepared against 
 a direct attack, and the enemy could neither have moved on Augusta or 
 on Charleston without exposing a flank. 
 
 harleston 
 
 Savannah & 
 
 Decisive In fact, what has been called " the principle of interior lines," as well 
 
 points. as man y instances of what are termed "decisive points," are simply a 
 
 concurrence of circumstances which render it practicable to concentrate 
 an army in opposition to an extended enemy. When an army approaches 
 its object by roads which meet and then again divide, the possession of the 
 point of junction or knot of the roads, by either party, cannot but afford 
 opportunities of menacing at once several points, or roads, which the 
 enemy may desire to cover. The possession of points of this kind — for 
 example, Milan and Mortara in 1849, Gera in 1806, Ivrea in 1800, 
 Charleroi, Quatre Bras, Sombref, in 1815 — is of itself an important step 
 in the campaign. 
 
 An instance of the great advantage of possessing several alternatives of 
 action — distinct from other cases already quoted, because that advantage 
 was used by an army on the defensive — is afforded by the military situa- 
 
 ,See Map tion in Portugal in 1810-11. 
 
 No - 13, Massena, recoiling from the lines of Torres Vedras, had fallen back to 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 209 
 
 Santarem. Wellington, following by the roads east of the Monte Junto, 
 found him in a position of great natural strength. Reynier's corps about 
 Santarem was posted on a lofty ridge, its left resting on the Tagus, its 
 front covered by the swamps of the liio Mayor, and accessible only by a 
 long narrow causeway. Junot's corps was posted on the Alviella from 
 Alcanhete to Pernes and Torres Novas. Ney's corps was in reserve at 
 Thomar, with a division watching the Tagus between Santarem and the 
 Zezere. The French held two bridges over the Zezere. A detachment 
 with cavalry was at Leiria. 
 
 The alternatives open to Massena were these : — 
 
 1st, He might retreat, either by Leiria or Thomar, to Coimbra, finding 
 a fertile country and strong line of defence on the Mondego. 
 
 2d, Crossing the Zezere, he might retreat by Belmonte to his fortresses 
 of Almeida and Ciudad Eodrigo. 
 
 3d, He might reach the same fortresses by Castello Branco. 
 
 These were alternatives for retreat ; but he might also take the offen- 
 sive. 
 
 4th, By advancing from Leiria against the western half of the lines of 
 Torres Vedras. 
 
 5th, Crossing the Tagus on his left, for which he possessed numerous 
 boats, he might advance on Lisbon by the south bank. 
 
 6th, From Castello Branco he could concert operations with Soult in 
 Andalucia, by Alcantara. 
 
 7th, Or, by Placentia, with King Joseph, whose army was on the Upper 
 Tagus. 
 
 "Wellington had 70,000 men against Massena's 50,000. Could he have 
 collected these, he might have attacked Junot, routed him and Ney, and 
 hemmed back Eeynier against the Tagus. But he was forced to disperse 
 his forces : — 
 
 1st, To watch the south bank of the Tagus and cover his depots oppo- 
 site Lisbon, and the transports in the river. 
 
 2d, To occupy in sufficient force (two divisions) the western half of the 
 lines of Torres Vedras ; for Massena, by a march from Leiria, would be 
 within a march of the lines there, and might force and turn them before 
 Wellington could arrive by the eastern side of Monte Junto. 
 
 3d, While attacking Junot and Ney, Wellington must leave a force 
 
 o 
 
210 THE OPERATIONS OF WAB 
 
 before Santarcm, lest Reynier should advance on the eastern half of the 
 lines. 
 
 These diminutions of the force available for attack on an enemy 
 who could speedily concentrate, prevented the enterprise ; and Massena, 
 though so inferior in force, maintained his position from November to the 
 following March; and, when he did at last withdraw, gained sufficient 
 start, from the uncertainty in which he kept his antagonist, to effect an 
 organised retreat through a very difficult country. 
 
 Such advantages, then, are frequently open both to the general invading 
 and the general defending a country ; to recognise and to hold positions 
 so commanding, will often compensate for a numerical inferiority. 
 
 Since all strategical successes resolve themselves into the two kinds 
 
 discussed in this and the preceding Part, it remains to inquire under what 
 
 circumstances it may be well to choose one mode of operating rather 
 
 than the other. 
 
 Comparison of Whenever an army, which is so confident in its fighting power as to 
 
 the advan- desire to engage the entire concentrated forces of the enemy, possesses 
 
 tages 
 
 the faculty (by reason either of an angular base, or of such circumstances 
 of obstacles as will hereafter be discussed) of striking at its adversary's 
 flank or rear, it enjoys, in that circumstance, an advantage and oppor- 
 tunity which it might vainly seek in manoeuvres against the hostile 
 of turning front. By a resolute advance it may even combine the different advan- 
 tlie flank, tages of forcing the enemy to form front to a flank, and of separating his 
 forces and engaging the parts successively, as will subsequently be seen 
 in the example of Champaubert. At any rate, it will be highly advan- 
 tageous to engage even his whole force in that situation. 
 
 But if an army be inferior in number, it will manifestly be wiser to 
 seek to separate the hostile forces and engage them separately. For in 
 striking at the flank it may compel that concentration which it should be 
 its great aim to prevent ; as Napoleon would have done, had he turned 
 Wellington's right in Belgium, 
 and breaking And even jf, in the case of an army ready under any circumstances 
 the front. to ] Jr j n g fae enemy to action, the option is offered of breaking his front 
 or striking at his flank, the first alternative will generally be the best. 
 Such a choice appears to have been offered to Napoleon in 1809. On the 
 17th April, when forming his plan, he might have left Davout at Eatisbon 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 211 
 
 and have marched with his centre by Neustadt to combine with Mas- 
 
 sena coming from PfatTenhofen, in order to advance together through 
 
 Mainburg. He would thus have been on the flank and rear of the 
 
 Austrian left wing, cutting it from its great line of supply by Landshut. 
 
 But he would thereby have compelled the concentration of the Austrians. 
 
 Therefore, though his own line to France would have been equally secure 
 
 through Ulm in this flanking operation, he preferred to break in between 
 
 the wings, even with all the risk of Davout's perilous flank-march along 
 
 the river. And as in this case, so in most others, it will be found that to The latter 
 
 break the front is the readiest method as well as the most decisive. generally 
 
 best. 
 
 When the superiority of one army is sufficient, and no more than 
 sufficient, to warrant a detachment against the enemy's rear, the two 
 modes of operation — namely, that of aiming a blow at the communications 
 on the one side, and that of concentrating against a separated force on 
 the other — come into direct opposition ; when victory will remain with 
 the general who best appreciates and improves the conditions of the 
 situation. 
 
 This seems a suitable part of the work in which to consider the effect Effect of the 
 that the Electric Telegraph, whether of the ordinary kind, or specially ^™ ph ° n 
 constructed to accompany an army, may be expected to exercise on p era ti ns. 
 military operations. So long as opposing armies are concentrated, its 
 influence will be confined chiefly to transmitting immediate intelligence 
 and directions between the headquarters and the communications with 
 the rear, or between the general-in-chief and the commanders of wings, 
 and both parties may be expected to derive from it the same advantages. 
 It is when armies are in presence of each other on extended fronts that 
 instant intelligence may affect the result, and chiefly in those cases where 
 concerted action is essential to success, but is rendered uncertain by 
 intervening distance or obstacles. 
 
 The Field Telegraph (which may of course be connected with the Mode of using 
 permanent telegraph lines of a country at any point) is intended to ™e field 
 accompany a force while moving, and several forms have been devised 
 which may be laid almost as fast as troops can march. In the British 
 service two divisions of equipment are proposed: one provided with 
 
212 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 insulated conducting wire, which is unrolled from a drum as the vehicle 
 that bears it moves onward, and lies along the ground, protected from 
 injury by its casing ; and the other with an uninsulated conductor, which, 
 erected more deliberately on poles, in the ordinary manner, is more suit- 
 able for permanent lines of communication. Travelling offices are pro- 
 vided to set up along its course, or a temporary station may be formed in 
 any convenient building ; and as the supply of telegraphic instruments 
 and of wire may be increased to any extent when the belligerent State 
 puts forth its resources, the most extended operations of a campaign 
 would scarcely be beyond the reach of the field telegraph. 
 
 Since a direct line of communication along the front of an army would 
 be constantly exposed to the incursions of the enemy, the telegraph lines 
 between the parts will have some common centre in rear of the whole. 
 When, therefore, a successful descent is made on the enemy's rear, as 
 at Marengo and Ulm, the telegraphic communications may be entirely 
 severed ; and the fact that they may thus be lost to one army, while 
 preserved by the other, must be added to the disadvantages already 
 enumerated in the chapter where the condition of an intercepted army 
 was discussed. 
 
 When armies are manoeuvring on any other than concentrated fronts, 
 
 the telegraph may exercise influence in two ways : — 
 
 Kinds of 1st, It will enable the general to combine in one view intelligence of 
 
 influence what is simultaneously taking place in distant parts of his front. The 
 
 the* telegraph, conclusions he will form of how far his own plan is likely to be 
 
 accomplished, and of what the enemy is seeking to effect, will thus be 
 
 more likely to be correct than if he received, at intervals, information 
 
 of a state of affairs which may already, when he learns it, have ceased 
 
 to exist, or be beyond his power to control. Thus the Austrian official 
 
 account of the campaign of 1866 states that the following telegram came 
 
 to Benedek's headcpiarters, from Josephstadt, about half-past eleven on 
 
 the 3d July :— 
 
 " The 5th Prussian corps appears to be advancing from Gradnitz by 
 Salnei against the right flank of our army. Large columns are passing, 
 some within range of the guns of the fortress, which are firing on them 
 with effect. A patrol of Palffy Hussars has been forced to seek shelter 
 here." 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 213 
 
 Ample warning was thus given, though not turned to account, of 
 the impending fatal onset of the Crown Prince on the right flank of the 
 Austrians. 
 
 2dly, It enables the general to transmit orders for simultaneous action 
 to distant parts of his force, and to impart to the movements of an army 
 on an extended front the decisive and co-operative character of those 
 which are performed under his immediate control. 
 
 In the case of an army spread on an extensive front to meet an Influence of 
 
 expected invasion, the advantages which railways have been said to tele g ra P ,ls on 
 
 ... defensive 
 confer on the defender will probably be increased by the conjunction measures . 
 
 of railways and telegraphs. The assailant's advantage has been explained 
 
 to consist in knowing what his own point of concentration and his own 
 
 line of operation will be ; while the defender, doubtful of these, may be 
 
 unable at once to meet the attack, or, if it is rapidly followed up, 
 
 to combine his forces effectually after its direction is apparent. But 
 
 the advantages which the defender will gain in breaking the railways 
 
 he abandons, and using for concentration those that connect the parts 
 
 of his army, will be augmented by the possession of telegraphs, which 
 
 will enable him more speedily to remedy the effects of his first doubts 
 
 and hesitations. Wellington and Blucher, in constant communication 
 
 by telegraph through Brussels, though they might have failed to combine 
 
 effectually on the front Namur-Nivelles, would have moved with far 
 
 more assured steps to unite at "Waterloo. This disadvantage the assailant 
 
 may, in future wars, seek to remedy by detaching bodies of cavalry on 
 
 enterprises against the defender's communications. 
 
 One of the disadvantages of a general who conducts offensive operations influence of 
 
 on an extended front is the difficulty of imparting unity, both of time telegraphs on 
 
 offensive 
 
 and object, to his movements ; and this will in future be diminished. operat j ons 
 The telegraphic communication between the two Prussian armies in- 
 vading Bohemia in 1866 was not maintained up to the battle of Konig- 
 gratz ; had it been, and had the situation on both sides been fully ap- 
 preciated, their joint attack might have been so timed as to obviate the 
 risk of separate defeat which the premature onset of Prince Frederick 
 Charles's army entailed. And in the similar case of allied armies operat- 
 ing from divergent bases, like the English and Prussians in the Waterloo 
 campaign, the chances that they will be able to combine fur the blow, 
 
214 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR EXPLAINED. 
 
 which has been said in those circumstances to be so decisive, will be 
 greatly increased. 
 
 Lastly, in the case of attempting to dislodge an enemy by sending 
 a detachment round his rear, the telegraph will both diminish the risk 
 of the movement and increase the chances of gaining its complete results. 
 Sherman appears to have made constant use of it in his flanking opera- 
 tions in Georgia. 
 
 One important effect will be felt, on both sides, in the avoidance of 
 hypothetical or conditional orders (always fruitful sources of error), and 
 the correction of those which are misunderstood or fail of being obeyed 
 with sufficient exactness. Had telegraphs existed in 1815, D'Erlon could 
 scarcely have been suffered to remain lost both to Ney and Napoleon, and 
 Bulow's error in delaying to march for Ligny would certainly have been 
 rectified. 
 
 On the whole, it appears that telegraphs will diminish, sometimes in a 
 considerable degree, the disadvantage under which a divided force oper- 
 ates against a concentrated force, and that they will enable a general to 
 divide his army, whether for defence or attack, with more confidence than 
 heretofore. But they will not often remedy, in an appreciable degree, the 
 ignorance of what is passing behind an enemy's front, and its consequences. 
 False theories of his intentions will still be formed, and the false move- 
 ments that spring from them will often be beyond remedy. The errors 
 which led Wellington to expect Napoleon's attack in a different quarter, 
 and to keep a detachment at Hal, and which caused Napoleon minus 
 Grouchy to meet the combined armies of his foes, w 7 ere such as the tele- 
 graph would have failed to avert. Generals will know more of what is 
 passing in view of all parts of their front, but not of what takes place 
 beyond. 
 
 The reader can proceed to apply to any of the situations described in 
 this work the supposition of the joint effects of railways and telegraphs. 
 The instances will not be found to be numerous where the advantages 
 thus conferred on one side are obvious and important ; and there will 
 still be abundant room in all cases for the effectual exercise of sagacity 
 and decision. 
 
PART V. 
 THE INFLUENCE OF OBSTACLES. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 GENEEAL TOPOGRAPHY OF A THEATRE OF WAR. 
 
 The first requisite for following military operations is a good map of the 
 theatre. It is not often easy to find one that is at once minute in neces- 
 sary particulars, and compendious enough to bring the essential features 
 before us at one view. But any good map, however general (sometimes, 
 indeed, the better for being general, as giving the main facts uncon- 
 fused by secondary particulars), will afford a great deal of important 
 information. 
 
 For example, North Italy is seen at once to be a basin almost entirely Reading of 
 surrounded by mountains. From these great watersheds a multitude of tlie ma P- 
 streams pour down to the plain, along the central depression of which Features of 
 the great main drain of the Po, collecting them in its channel, conducts Ita1 ^- 
 their waters to the sea. 
 
 Therefore belligerents operating from the east and west, like Austria 
 and France, will find their paths crossed by a multitude of streams run- 
 ning north and south, while a great river traverses the theatre from west 
 to east. North of the Po the mountains leave a wide plain traversed by 
 
216 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Features of 
 Spain. 
 
 Of America. 
 
 Nature of 
 obstacles 
 must be 
 appreciated. 
 
 many great roads ; hut south of it the Apennines crowd upon the river, 
 leaving space only for a single great road, which lies in a narrow defile 
 between Piacenza and Voghera. On the seaboard are Genoa, which was 
 the chief base of the French in 1859 — a great port, opposite a gap in 
 the mountain-barrier, and giving access to the valley of the Po ; and 
 Venice, where the presence of a hostile force would seriously affect the 
 position of an Austrian army on the Mincio — an element which proved 
 to be of great importance in the negotiations of Villafranca. 
 
 In Spain we see a theatre the very reverse of North Italy in its essen- 
 tial features : for here the land rises from the coast towards the centre, 
 and the line of the watershed traverses the country from the south-west 
 in Andalucia to the north, where it merges in the western extremity of 
 the Pyrenees. From this spinal ridge, ribs of mountain -ranges extend 
 east and west — between these run the great streams thrown off by the 
 watershed, mostly to the westward. 
 
 A French army entering Spain would therefore find its path crossed by 
 barriers of mountains and rivers — which, when mastered, would become 
 successive lines of defence against an enemy coming from the south. 
 But they would form obstacles of a different character if an enemy should 
 operate from Portugal, in the direction of their length ; and this was a 
 mainly important feature in the Peninsular war. 
 
 In the theatre of war in America, the great feature was the line of the 
 Alleghanies intersecting the Southern States, and pouring its streams right 
 and left into the Atlantic and the Mississippi. Thus the rivers crossed 
 the path of a Federal army operating from the Potomac in Eastern Vir- 
 ginia, and the mountains lay on its flank — circumstances the significance 
 of which was exemplified at Bull Bun. 
 
 If we know, then, the precise nature of the difficulties offered by rivers 
 or mountain-barriers, both when parallel and when perpendicular to the 
 fronts of armies, even this cursory survey of a theatre will supply much 
 matter for consideration respecting the chances of a campaign. The 
 influence of these obstacles, under different conditions, will therefore 
 form the chief subject of subsequent chapters. 
 
 More detailed maps and topographical descriptions will afford other 
 important particulars. Bespecting North Italy we shall learn from these 
 what are the passes of the mountains into the country — what fortresses 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 217 
 
 guard them — what are the great roads and railways, and where they cross 
 the principal rivers ; that is, in fact, the relations between the avenues and 
 the obstacles of the theatre of war. 
 
 As to Spain, we shall find that the Pyrenees form a barrier between 
 it and France, forbidding the supply of great armies, except by roads which 
 lie between the extremities of the mountains, and the coast on each side ; 
 that the great rivers, far from marking the lines of the great roads (which 
 in other countries so frequently lie along the banks), flow in broken 
 rocky channels difficult of access ; that the cultivated districts are few 
 and small compared with the extent of the country ; that the frontier of 
 Portugal is so rigid as to admit of only two roads by which Lisbon can 
 be reached from Madrid : and we shall then comprehend the situation of 
 the French armies in Spain, how dependent they were on the one great 
 road on each side of the Pyrenees, how disjointed was their front when 
 it faced towards Portugal, how T difficult it was to subsist on the resources 
 of the country, and how perilous to draw together the scattered parts of 
 the army, separated by rugged defiles which were held by guerillas. We 
 see also the importance of the fortresses of Badajos and Ciudad Eodrigo, 
 the doors between Spain and Portugal, and Burgos, on the main line back 
 to France. To see and provide for such circumstances imparts vigour 
 and unity of action to a campaign — not to see and provide for them is to 
 carry on war by compromises and makeshifts, and to end it in disaster. 
 
 In England the country is so generally cultivated, and the arable and Effects of 
 pasture lands are so intermixed, that the fields are fenced on every side to cultlvatlon 
 keep the cattle from the crops ; and it would be difficult to find spaces of operations. 
 any extent where armies would not be restricted to the road while march- 
 ing, or where they could easily form front for battle. But in large dis- 
 tricts of the Continent cattle are kept in stalls, and the crops are not 
 separated by fences, while the chief causeways are thrice the width of our 
 main roads. In such countries armies move on a large front, the columns 
 of infantry and cavalry in the fields in dry weather, the artillery and trains 
 on the roads. Thus Belgium and the east of France are a succession of 
 rolling plains, where the streams and ditches are the only impediments. 
 In other parts of Europe whole districts are devoted to pasture, as in 
 Hungary and parts of Spain, and these great plains are equally free from 
 obstacles. On the other hand, North Italy is highly cultivated, and 
 
study of the 
 map 
 
 218 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 scarcely any plains are to be found there. The numerous rivers feed a 
 multitude of canals of irrigation ; the rich soil of the fields is too soft for 
 marching on ; olive-groves and festoons of vines add to the difficulties of 
 forming on a large front, and troops on the march are for the most part 
 restricted to the raised roads. 
 Importance of It is evident that a careful and sagacious reading of the map of the 
 preliminary theatre will reveal to a great extent the character of the warfare of which 
 it is to be the scene. Not only may a general plan be resolved on, but 
 the nature of the marches and of the encounters may be foreseen and pro- 
 vided for, and the proportion of the different arms will be adjusted to the 
 country in which they are destined to act. The cavalry, that would have 
 been only an encumbrance in the Apennines or at Eivoli, found fitting- 
 fields at Eckmuhl, Borodino, and Ligny. The powerful artillery that was 
 easily transported and manoeuvred in Belgium, and which almost crushed 
 the British at Waterloo, would have choked the narrow roads of Spain. 
 Not only the army, but the character and extent of its supplies and equip- 
 ments, must depend in great degree on the aspect of the country, its 
 resources, fertility, and climate. These are matters to be dealt with by 
 common-sense, joined to experience of the requirements of armies. But 
 without going into minute details of topography and statistics, the map of 
 the theatre will suggest military problems of a purely scientific kind, first 
 in order among which are those discussed in the following chapter. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 210 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EFFECT OF THE CONFIGURATION OF BASES AND FRONTIERS. 
 
 The effect of an angular frontier in enabling the army possessing it to 
 
 operate against the enemy's flank was exemplified in Tart III., Chapter V. 
 
 But the reader may have observed subsequently, in the American cam- See Maps 
 
 paigns, that the line of the Potomac, and the seaboard, gave the Federals 3 aml 
 
 . . . . No. 8. 
 
 the power of moving an army into Virginia in many different directions, 
 
 conferring, indeed, greater latitude than Moreau possessed in 1800, but Extent of the 
 
 without producing any of the results which follow from obliging an enemy influence of 
 
 r ° . an angular 
 
 to form front to a flank. He may therefore be disposed to inquire why f IO utier. 
 none of the Federal invasions, directed from various parts of their frontier, 
 had the same effect as Moreau's. By investigating the difference between 
 the two cases, the limit of the influence of a frontier of this kind may be 
 determined. 
 
 That difference consists in the fact that, whereas the base of the Aus- 
 trians lay considerably beyond the angle from the side of which Moreau 
 operated, the base of the Confederates on the James lay entirely luithiii 
 the angle commanded by the Federals. Had some central point in the 
 Black Forest, such as Rothweil, been Kray's base, Moreau's advance from 
 Schaffhausen would have been of no more avail, as a menace to the com- 
 munications, than if he had advanced from Strasbnrg. On the other hand, 
 had the Confederates been bound to some points far south of Richmond — 
 such as Augusta — a Federal advance on the line of the James would have 
 forced the enemy either to abandon all that part of the theatre which lies 
 north of the James, or else to give battle on a front parallel to their line 
 of communication with the base. The truth of this was exemplified when 
 
220 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Lee abandoned Richmond. For his aim then was to join Johnston in 
 Carolina ; but Grant, advancing along the James, cut him from the south, 
 hemmed him against the mountains, and compelled him to surrender. 
 
 Again, when Kray had reached Ulm, Moreau's line from Schaffhausen 
 no longer gave him the power of threatening the Austrian communica- 
 tions, except by the exposure of his own ; and that he succeeded in his 
 enterprise against them was due to causes of a different nature. 
 
 Therefore we may infer that, if an enemy's base lies within the angle of 
 a frontier, the only advantage which that angular frontier confers on its 
 possessor is to afford a choice of lines by which to operate. Should he 
 advance from several points too distant from each other for perfect concert, 
 he will do so at all the risk which attends a disjointed, as opposed to a 
 coherent, operation. Should he advance from a single point, he will find 
 that the opposing army's front covers its line to its base. 
 
 On the other hand, if the hostile base lies far beyond the angle, this 
 kind of frontier will confer all the advantage of forcing the enemy to form 
 front to a Hank, so long as his army is within the angle. But as soon as he 
 has retreated beyond the extremity of the angular frontier the advantage 
 ceases, or exists only in proportion to the degree of obliquity which the 
 front of each army assumes in relation to its own line of communication. 
 Advantage of When a maritime power which commands the sea makes war in a 
 commanding theatre largely bounded by a coast-frontier, it evidently possesses great 
 coasts. advantages for the selection of a base ; and if the frontier, besides being- 
 
 extensive, be angular, it will almost certainly confer the power of operat- 
 Example of ing against a flank. Thus, when England made war against the French 
 the Peninsula. j n Sp a i 11} the f orm of t h e p en i nsu i a gave ] ier the choice of numerous 
 
 lines by which to operate. It remained to select the most effective. 
 See Map The Pyrenees, affording no great roads, restricted the French to the 
 
 lines of communication between the mountains and the coast on each 
 side. The main line was that of Bayonne-Vittoria-Burgos-Valladolid- 
 Madrid-Seville. A British army, operating, let us say, from Gibraltar, 
 would merely press back the French along their road to France. But 
 it might easily select another base from which it could force the enemy 
 to form to a flank. By seizing the road from Bayonne, where it passes 
 between the coast and the Pyrenees, it would grasp the throat of 
 the invasion ; and the nearer to that point it could operate, the more 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 221 
 
 effective would be the operation. Thus Sir John Moore, advancing from 
 the north-eastern frontier of Portugal in 1808, struck at Napoleon's com- 
 munications between the Ebro and the Douro. The movement forced the 
 Emperor to quit the capital ; he advanced with greatly superior forces, by 
 the Guadarama, against Moore, who thereupon retreated, not on Portugal, 
 which he could no longer calculate on being permitted to reach, but on 
 the north-west corner of the Peninsula at Corunna. On that corner, 
 then, his operation was based. But he wanted two conditions for suc- 
 cess : first, a secure darting-point, which that part of the coast did not 
 afford — hence, under great difficulties, he was forced to re-embark ; 
 secondly, a force sufficient to contend with the enemy whom he menaced — 
 of the indispensability of which condition this case has already been 
 quoted as an example. 
 
 As the only fortified posts on the northern coasts were occupied by the 
 French, it remained for "Wellington, in subsequent campaigns, to choose 
 another base. Portugal offered one admirably suited to the purpose. 
 It was guarded by a frontier naturally strong; for on the east was a 
 range of mountains, on the north the river Minho and an impracticable 
 hill-country ; and it possessed, besides the great harbour of Lisbon, three 
 rivers navigable for a considerable distance in Portugal — namely, the 
 Douro, the Mondego, and the Tagus — by which to supply the army. 
 And whenever Wellington should advance into Spain, the French armies 
 opposing him must necessarily form front to a flank. Hence they were 
 obliged to appropriate an army, called the Army of Portugal, expressly 
 to cover their line from an attack on that side. 
 
 In 1812 Wellington advanced against that army, then commanded by 
 Marmont. At that time another French force (Army of the Centre) 
 held Madrid ; a third, under Soult, was in Andalucia. The English 
 general defeated Marmont, drove the French eastward from Madrid, and 
 seized the capital. Soult was thus cut off; but, by a long circuit, he 
 regained his communications with the Army of the Centre, and, in con- 
 junction with the defeated army of Marmont, compelled Wellington to 
 retire to Portugal. The substantial result to the English was the libera- 
 tion of the whole of Spain south of Madrid. 
 
 In 1813 Wellington again advanced, and drove the French from the 
 Douro towards the Ebro. But his line back to Portugal was now very 
 
222 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 long, and the French, by withdrawing beyond its effective direction, had 
 deprived him of the advantage of attacking their flank. On the other 
 hand, their retreat, compromising the garrisons of the northern coast at 
 Santander, &c, had left the ports there free. Therefore Wellington, 
 letting go his hold of Portugal, threw his left forward beyond the sources 
 of the Ebro, and basing himself anew on the northern coast, whither 
 his fleet from the Tagus was transferred, came down upon the flank of 
 the French line between the Ebro and Bayonne. To meet the attack, the 
 enemy at Vittoria gave battle on a front in part parallel to that line, — 
 defeated, they only regained the Pyrenees by the road of Pampeluna, with 
 the loss of all their artillery and baggage. 
 
 Thus the chances which the configuration of a base may open, in all 
 stages of a campaign, afford most important matter for the consideration 
 of a government and a general. 
 
 When armies are in presence of each other at the outset, their frontier 
 lines will be coincident ; and thus the angular frontier of one party will 
 be an angular frontier of another kind for the other — that is to say, 
 whereas the angle of the one frontier includes the territory occupied by 
 the enemy, which, borrowing a term from fortification, may be called a 
 Re-entering Angle, the other army is operating in an angle which pushes 
 itself within the enemy's frontier, and may be called a Salient Angle. 
 Let us consider the effects of these positions respectively. 
 Different The late Austrian frontier in Italy was bounded by the Mincio 
 
 kmds of angu- throughout the length of that river, and by the Po downwards from their 
 considered confluence. If Austria were at war with Italy, the Italians, on the one 
 side, would enclose Venetia within their re-entering frontier. On the 
 other, the Austrians would be in a salient angle. And it is evident that 
 if they were concentrated between the Mincio and the Adige, they would 
 threaten Italy south of the Po on the one side, or Lombardy on the other, 
 and be within striking distance of both ; so that, should the Italian 
 army concentrate on one side of the angle, the enemy might invade its 
 territory on the other. Thus, supposing the Austrians capable of cross- 
 ing either the Po or the Mincio at pleasure, the Italians, if they wished 
 to cover all their territory, must divide. But, by dividing, they would 
 be giving the Austrians all the advantage of a concentrated against a 
 separated force ; and if the armies at the outset were equal, the parts 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 223 
 
 of the one would be liable to be defeated successively by the mass of 
 the other. 
 
 Tims, while the advantages of a re-entering frontier are of the kind 
 discussed in Part III., inasmuch as it favours an operation against a flank, 
 those of the salient are of the kind discussed in Part IV., because it tends 
 to separate the parts of the enemy's front. 
 
 But to end after saying so much would be to leave this question of 
 frontiers in a very unsatisfactory state, and the case must be further 
 investigated. 
 
 It is evident that, for the one party or the other to derive the kind of Importance of 
 advantage peculiar to its position in its full extent, it must possess the P 0SSessin S 
 
 01 r . . r the issues. 
 
 means of passing the frontier on both sides of the angle. Now the 
 Austrians * had two fortresses on the Mincio, Peschiera and Mantua, 
 giving them access to Lombardy, and excluding the Italians from Venetia. 
 But the Po is not bridged below the confluence of the Mincio, nor could 
 a bridge easily be thrown ; therefore the Italian army might safely assem- 
 ble in Lombardy to await the attack, assured of being able to arrive on 
 the lower To in time to confront the enemy, should he attempt to pass 
 there. But if the Austrians had possessed a great flotilla, or flying- 
 bridges, on the lower Po, by which to throw their army easily across, the 
 Italians would have been at a great disadvantage. 
 
 On the other hand, reverting to the case of Kray and Moreau, the French 
 could pass the PJiine at Strasburg and Brisach at one side of the angle, 
 ami at Basle on the other — Kray was therefore reduced to the defensive, 
 since he could not cross either side of the enemy's frontier without expos- 
 ing his flank to the other ; and when the passage of Schaffhausen was 
 seized, the situation was altogether against him. 
 
 Thus we find that another element is necessary for the decision of the 
 question — namely, Which party possesses the issues of the frontier, or can 
 most readily seize them ? After ascertaining this, we can proceed with 
 some confidence to decide on the best plan of operation. 
 
 If the army whose frontier is re-entering possesses, or can seize, the 
 issues of that side of the frontier which is parallel to the enemy's line of 
 communication with his base, it should throw all its weight on that side 
 
 * The passages referring to the period when Austria held Venetia are retained because 
 the great territorial changes of 18GC do not render them the less apt as examples. 
 
224 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 in assuming the offensive ; for even if the issues on the other side of the 
 angle are open to the enemy, he cannot advance by them while his com- 
 munications are thus threatened. 
 See Map For example, in the second part of the campaign of 1796 in Italy, the 
 
 No. 5. Austrian army was on the defensive, behind the angle of the Po opposite 
 
 Valenza, with its left towards Piacenza. Napoleon, whose object was to 
 drive them from the Milanese, could cross at Casale, and advance by the 
 Sesia on the one side of the angle, or could strike at the Austrian com- 
 munications by crossing the Po below the Ticino, on the other. Though 
 in following this latter course he was operating on a front parallel to his 
 own line of communication with Prance, which was through Turin, yet, 
 remembering that the successful assumption of the offensive would secure 
 him against counter-attack, he moved down the Po beyond the Austrian 
 front, and crossed at Piacenza, whereupon the Austrians in all haste 
 retreated over the Adda. 
 
 In 1859 the situation was the same. The Austrians, as before, were in 
 the angle of the Po, extending towards Piacenza ; the Sardinians were on 
 the lower Sesia ; the French faced the Austrians on the Po from Valenza 
 to Voghera. But the issues of the Po below Valenza were in the hands 
 of the Austrians ; therefore the Allied army chose to operate by the other 
 side of the angle, and, crossing at Casale, advanced by the Sesia and 
 Ticino. Thus no strategical advantage was gained. The Austrians 
 changed front, covering their line to the Miucio, and their retreat was 
 caused by the tactical success gained at Magenta. 
 
 The question, then, of who holds the issues over the obstacles, is of para- 
 mount importance. The angular frontier may be a line of mountains like 
 that of Bohemia, or a river having a bend like the Rhine at Basle, or two 
 rivers like the Ticino and Po, or a line of fortresses on one or both sides. 
 In any case, what we mean by holding the issues is, possessing the means 
 of certainly and securely passing the obstacle, either by fortified bridges, 
 or fortresses or detachments commanding the passes of mountains. 
 
 For the sake of clearness of illustration, let us take, in preference to a 
 mere diagram, the case of the Austrian frontier in Italy as it was in 1849 
 and 1859 — that is, the line of the Ticino and Po. The Italian army 
 would have a re-entering angle, the Austrian a salient angle, from which 
 to operate. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 225 
 
 The example of 1796 proves, that if the Italian army can cross at Pia- 
 cenza the move is decisive. If, therefore, Italy possessed a fortress on 
 the north bank of the Po, opposite Piacenza, it would be impossible for 
 Austria, with equal forces, to keep her frontier on the Ticino. 
 
 And if the issues over the Ticino were in the power of the Austrians, 
 still the result would be the same. 
 
 And if the issues were not protected by fortifications on either side, but 
 open to either party that could seize them, the successful assumption of 
 the offensive by the Italians on the side of Piacenza would be decisive. 
 
 But in all these cases it is presumed that the Austrians await the attack. 
 Therefore, in addition to the power of holding or gaining the issues, the 
 assumption of the offensive is necessary to secure the advantage of the re- 
 entering frontier. 
 
 On the Austrian side, the disadvantage of a purely defensive attitude 
 being apparent, whatever advantage the salient can confer must also 
 depend on the assumption of the offensive. 
 
 The danger of dividing an army to cover territory defensively on both 
 sides of the angle, is exemplified by the distribution of Chzarnowsky's 
 force in 1849. One of his brigades was posted towards Piacenza to guard 
 against the passage of the Po. On the advance of the Austrians across 
 the Ticino this brigade was beyond the possibility of aiding Chzarnowsky, 
 and was lost to him. — (Page 65.) 
 
 Supposing the Austrians to possess the same frontier, with the power 
 of passing the Ticino at Pavia and the Po at Piacenza, they would threaten 
 Turin on the one side, and the Duchies and the Peninsula on the other. 
 The separation of the Italian army in such a case, or the abandonment of 
 one-half of the territory and resources of the kingdom to the enemy, 
 would seem almost inevitable. The best course in such a case would be 
 for the Italians to take up a position near the angle, at Casale and 
 Valenza, or Mortara and La Stella, when they would threaten the flank of 
 the enemy's advance on either line ; and the power of the Austrians to 
 persist in an offensive movement must depend on their ability, either to 
 defeat the Italians in battle ; or to guard their own flank at Piacenza on 
 the one side, or opposite to Casale on the other. 
 
 In 1866 the Austrians, within the angle of the Bohemian frontier, were 
 expected to assume the offensive (the issues being open to either side), 
 
 p 
 
226 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 See woodcut, 
 Chap. IV. 
 
 rt. V. 
 
 'General 
 conclusions. 
 
 Case of a 
 double re- 
 entering 
 angle. 
 
 and the Prussian armies divided, covering Berlin and Silesia. But the 
 Austrians remained posted between the Iser and upper Elbe, when the 
 Prussians seized the initiative, and their advance on each flank caused 
 the Austrians to quit the angle and concentrate before Koniggratz. 
 
 Generally then, and on the whole, the advantages of either position are 
 conditional on the assumption of the offensive: the chances will be against 
 either party that suffers the other to take the initiative : and the advan- 
 tages will be greatest on the side of the army operating from the salient, 
 provided the enemy be obliged to separate, under penalty of abandoning 
 territory ; otherwise the salient will confer no strategical advantage, un- 
 less circumstances are very favourable to the defence of the flank of the 
 army during an offensive movement. 
 
 It may happen that the frontier line abuts into the territory occupied 
 by the enemy from the middle of a base — thus giving a re-entering angle 
 on two sides. For instance, the mountains of Switzerland and the Tyrol 
 
 . m yk /I^S**' W& 
 
 connect transversely the bases of Austrian and French armies in the two 
 theatres of Germany and Italy. The advantage of the possession of Swit- 
 zerland by the French, against the Austrian armies within the angle on 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 227 
 
 Loth sides, waa fully exemplified in 1800, when Moreau from Schaff- 
 hausen first drove back Kray, and then detached a force over the St 
 (lothard to turn the line of the Ticino and aid Napoleon in enveloping 
 Melas at Marengo. And if an enemy, pushing the Austrians back in 
 Italy, should penetrate into the territory beyond the Adige, the Tyrol 
 would afford them the means of issuing by way of Verona on that adver- 
 sary's flank and rear, and hemming him back against the shores of the 
 Adriatic. Such a frontier confers the double advantage of concentrating 
 against a divided enemy, and of obliging him to form front to a flank. 
 This case has been quoted by Jomini as an example of a salient base — 
 the reader must judge whether it does not more correctly belong to the 
 class in which it is placed here. The configuration is manifestly widely 
 different from that of the salient Austrian frontiers in Bohemia and Italy, 
 and the advantages to be aimed at are different also. 
 
 The lateral extent of a base, without reference to its configuration, is Importance 
 
 also an important matter. It affects the army that operates from it very °f an exten ' 
 
 sive base, 
 considerably, whether the operation be offensive or defensive. For a very 
 
 long base evidently supplies in some degree the place of a re-entering 
 
 base. If an Austrian army were on the Neckar, a French army might 
 
 move on its rear almost as easily from Mayence as from Wurzburg. And 
 
 if this Austrian army were dependent on a very short base, it would be 
 
 easily cut from it. But how difficult it was to cut it from its very long 
 
 base, was shown by the perilous dispositions to which Napoleon was 
 
 obliged to resort for the interception of Mack. And, indeed, the whole 
 
 of the campaigns quoted, on the Danube, prove how great an advantage 
 
 was the extent of the bases to their possessors. 
 
 In the American war, the extent of the Federal base gave the Northern 
 armies a great advantage. Not only had they a variety of lines of inva- 
 sion to select from, but when defeated in Virginia, it was almost hopeless 
 to attempt to intercept them. In 1862, Jackson's bold flanking move- 
 ment cut Pope from the Upper Potomac, but could not prevent him from 
 reaching Alexandria — and, if cut from Alexandria, he could still have 
 retreated on Acquia and the flotilla. And in 1863, when Grant was 
 baffled on the line of the Eapidan, he shifted his base, as he moved round 
 Lee's right, successively to the ramunkey, and to the James. 
 
 The extent of a base is, then, a very important consideration in delib- 
 
228 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 crating on the expediency of adopting it ; and the advantages it offers 
 must be very marked in order to compensate for dependence on a single 
 harbour, or narrow strip of frontier, where the army will be restricted to 
 a single line, and that line precarious in proportion to its length. 
 
 Therefore, when a maritime power is based at first on a single harbour, 
 as soon as its army, in advancing, masters a road which branches to 
 another harbour distant from the first, that second harbour should be 
 occupied and made part of the base. 
 
 And in all cases the depots should extend behind the flanks of the 
 army as widely as is consistent with their due protection by natural 
 obstacles, by fortresses, or by the front of the army. 
 
 "J :. 
 
MAP N° II 
 
 7 y '■ e 
 
 I--I. in:, 
 
MAP N" II 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 229 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 OF OBSTACLES WHICH DIRECTLY TRAVERSE THE PATH BY 
 WHICH AN ARMY ADVANCES. 
 
 An obstacle — in order to be such in a military sense — must present Conditions 
 advantages for defence, and must also prevent the approaching columns ° fan, i lhtl,ry 
 
 ° . obstacle. 
 
 from deploying while passing it. A single defile of any kind, a causeway 
 on a swamp, or a bridge, leading to commanding ground, or a mountain- 
 pass, fulfils these conditions. For an enemy must advance on a narrow 
 front against troops and artillery advantageously posted, and, in the two 
 first cases, deployed. In the case of a mountain-pass the defenders may 
 not be able to deploy any more than the assailants, and their advantage 
 will consist in being screened from the fire from below ; while the advanc- 
 ing troops, besides being imperfectly covered, will, even should they 
 arrive at the crest, be greatly fatigued and scattered by the difficulties of 
 the ascent. 
 
 But the disadvantage, in such cases, is obvious ; and the assailant will 
 at once decide whether to attack or turn the position. It is when the 
 obstacle is to a certain extent continuous, and includes in its range several 
 possibilities of action, that it presents a strategical problem. The only 
 natural impediments that fulfil this as well as the former conditions, are 
 Rivers and Ranges of Mountains. 
 
 In one respect the influence of both these obstacles is the same in Its effect in 
 kind though not in degree. The expense of throwing bridges over a limltin S * e 
 
 r . number of 
 
 wide stream, or of making roads over a high range of hills, causes the roads 
 roads on each side to converge as they approach it, and to merge in a 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 229 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 OF OBSTACLES WHICH DIRECTLY TRAVERSE THE PATH BY 
 WHICH AN ARMY ADVANCES. 
 
 An obstacle — in order to be such in a military sense — must present Conditions 
 advantages for defence, and must also prevent the approaching columns of a Illlhtiiry 
 from deploying while passing it. A single defile of any kind, a causeway 
 on a swamp, or a bridge, leading to commanding ground, or a mountain- 
 pass, fulfils these conditions. For an enemy must advance on a narrow 
 front against troops and artillery advantageously posted, and, in the two 
 first cases, deployed. In the case of a mountain-pass the defenders may 
 not be able to deploy any more than the assailants, and their advantage 
 will consist in being screened from the fire from below ; while the advanc- 
 ing troops, besides being imperfectly covered, will, even should they 
 arrive at the crest, be greatly fatigued and scattered by the difficulties of 
 the ascent. 
 
 But the disadvantage, in such cases, is obvious ; and the assailant will 
 at once decide whether to attack or turn the position. It is when the 
 obstacle is to a certain extent continuous, and includes in its range several 
 possibilities of action, that it presents a strategical problem. The only 
 natural impediments that fulfil this as well as the former conditions, are 
 Eivers and Eanges of Mountains. 
 
 In one respect the influence of both these obstacles is the same in Its effect in 
 kind though not in degree. The expense of throwing bridges over a hmltin S ™" 
 
 r i -n number of 
 
 wide stream, or of making roads over a high range of hills, causes the roads 
 roads on each side to converge as they approach it, and to merge in a 
 
230 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Defence of a 
 long line of 
 mountains 
 difficult and 
 dangerous. 
 
 Defence of 
 a few chief 
 passes equally 
 ineffectual. 
 
 few highways, by which alone can the communications of a great army 
 he maintained. One of their effects, then, is to lessen the number 
 of avenues through a theatre of war. But in many other respects they 
 differ. 
 
 Although the supply of a large army, operating beyond a mountain- 
 range, can only be maintained by the highroads that cross the range, yet 
 in all mountain districts there are numerous paths by which troops un- 
 attended by cumbrous trains, and carrying supplies for a few days on the 
 men's persons and on pack animals, can pass over the crests. But if the 
 defensive army should spread itself to occupy all of these, the commu- 
 nications between the parts of its front must be broken and circuitous. 
 An assailant mastering any of the passes would descend in the rear of 
 the defenders of other points, who, necessarily very sensitive about their 
 communications, could never hold their ground with confidence. More- 
 over, an army spread in this way, in barren roadless districts, on inhospi- 
 table summits, must suffer unusual privations. Evidently a prolonged 
 defence conducted on such a system would be very costly in men and 
 material, and of very uncertain advantage. 
 
 Therefore, whenever the theatre of war is in part mountainous, 
 like Southern Germany or North Italy, though bodies of troops may 
 manoeuvre in the hills, to protect a flank or to threaten an adversary's, 
 yet the main action of the campaign will be in the districts which 
 are practicable for great armies. And what is now the subject of dis- 
 cussion is not mountain warfare, such as is carried on against hill 
 tribes, but the nature of the obstacle interposed by a long narrow range 
 of mountains. 
 
 If, then, the defensive army, seeing the danger and futility of occupying 
 all the passes, concentrates in the chief of them, the enemy would the 
 more easily break through the front at unguarded points and descend 
 upon the rear ; and the fate of a body of troops attacked in front, and 
 dependent on a single intercepted issue in rear, would generally be the 
 same as that of the Austrians at the Monte Legino. 
 
 It is more usual, therefore, and more consonant with prudence, to hold 
 the principal passes — that is to say, those which lie most directly in the 
 line of operation, and have the best communications with the rear — with 
 advanced-guards, keeping the mass of the army disposable at points in 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 231 
 
 rear where many valleys ami passes unite ; thus securing the retreat of 
 the advanced posts, supporting them if necessary, and opposing with a 
 formidable force the first hostile troops that cross. 
 
 If a long line be held by the defender, the assailant, keeping his adver- Passage to be 
 saries dispersed by feints on many points, will generally prefer to pass effecte(l lf 
 at an unguarded issue rather than force a passage, certain of seeing the stratagem not 
 whole system of defence rapidly fall to pieces when the front is broken, ky force, 
 Thus, Frederick of Prussia wished, in 1757, to pass from Saxony to 
 Bohemia, the object being Prague (see woodcut, Chap. IV. Pt. V.) — and 
 the best and most direct road was that of Pirna and Aussig along the Elbe. 
 But it was guarded by strong Austrian detachments ; therefore a column 
 from Chemnitz advanced first towards Egra, the station of an Austrian 
 corps (a second being on the Eger at Budyn), and after feigning to 
 attack, rapidly countermarched on Auerbach, and passed over the ridge to 
 Commotau and Linay. The detachments in the Elbe valley, thus threat- 
 ened in rear, retreated in haste, leaving the road open to the king, whose 
 columns united on the Eger as rapidly as the hostile body from Egra 
 came to Budyn — and the defensive line of the mountains was lost to 
 the Austrians. 
 
 At the same time, on the side of the Eiesengebirge an Austrian corps 
 disputed the advance of a Prussian column at Eeichenberg ; but another 
 Prussian column meanwhile passed at Trautenau, and the hostile corps 
 thereupon retreated in haste. The mountain-chains did not prevent the 
 Prussian columns from concentrating before Prague. 
 
 But the manner in which Frederick's forces passed the mountains and not at 
 
 offered a great opportunity to an able adversary. They were separated several dis - 
 ,,. Tin -pi ^ ant l ,om ts. 
 
 by great distances, and their extended front manifestly gave the enemy 
 
 the advantage of superior power of concentration. Therefore Napoleon, 
 
 in such a case, while making feints on many points to turn or distract 
 
 the defenders, passed his main body, in 1800, at one point. And this is 
 
 doubtless the right way of conducting such an operation. The crests of 
 
 the chain once mastered, it is impossible for the defenders to know what 
 
 is passing behind the mountains. Any of the assailant's columns may be 
 
 the head of the main army. The defenders, therefore, must either fall 
 
 back and concentrate beyond the mountains, leaving the passage free ; or 
 
 if they block all the issues, must expose some part of their line to be 
 
232 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 overwhelmed, and the communications of the rest threatened. Therefore 
 
 a general, whose object is to pass a mountain-range defended by the 
 
 enemy, should make feints at many points ; but the main body should 
 
 pass either in one column, or in columns so near each other, and so well 
 
 connected, as to unite readily. 
 
 Continued On the whole it may be said, that if the crests of a mountain-range be 
 
 defence of a j ie j^ ^y an eneni y entirely on the defensive, the strategical advantage will 
 
 chain ou<dit De w ^ n the assailant, who ought either to turn or break the enemy's 
 
 to be turned front. The advantage of a mountain frontier to the defender will be, — 
 
 to ie a van- ^ , ^ ^ * retarding the enemy's advance, thus giving time to concentrate 
 
 tageofthe > J J J > & n 
 
 assailant. on the threatened line — an advantage which may be increased by holding 
 
 Its real uses the passes with detachments to augment the difficulties of advancing ; 
 
 as a defensive an( ^ 2dly, that of limiting the enemy to a few difficult lines of supply after 
 
 QD&iifliCJjB 
 
 he has 2wsscd it. Unless the mountain-range be of great depth, it will 
 generally be better to hold it only with detachments, and to assemble the 
 army at some point where it will oblige the enemy issuing from the 
 mountains to form front to a flank. Defeat in such a case, driving him 
 back into a single difficult road choked with trains and supplies, or, 
 perhaps, driving him off the line altogether, cannot but be disastrous. 
 Case of Torres It might at first sight appear that the well-known case of the lines of 
 Vedras excep- Torres Vedras held by Wellington entirely on the defensive, is contra- 
 dictory of what has just been affirmed. But there were many circum- 
 See Map stances to make this a case specially favourable to the defender. 1st, The 
 
 No. 13. lines could not be turned, for they rested on one side on the Tagus, on 
 
 the other on the sea. 2d, They had been artificially fortified, so as to 
 ■ be absolutely impregnable for many miles of their length; and all the 
 passes were defended with strong works armed with heavy artillery. 
 3d, The Tagus, the sea, and the roads in rear, enabled the defenders to 
 be easily supplied. 4th, A mountain-chain perpendicular to the line of 
 defence limited the enemy's attack to one side of that chain, since to have 
 divided his forces would have been to offer one wing to the concentrated 
 army of Wellington ; and thus, though the line of defence from the Tagus 
 to the sea was 29 miles, yet only a front of 14 miles could be at one time 
 threatened, and of that length scarcely a half was assailable. Thus the 
 case is reduced from that of a continuous line of defence, to that of an 
 exceptionally strong position. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 233 
 
 A river offers as an obstacle conditions different from these. The de- Rivers con- 
 fenders can deploy, so as to bring an overwhelming convergent fire, both S1(lere,i as ob " 
 of small-arms and artillery, to bear on the columns crossing the bridge ; 
 and these, as they successively pass the obstacle, must still deploy under 
 tire. The detachments of the defensive army along the course of the The defence 
 
 stream will generally have good communications with each other; for as of nvers safer 
 , . . . than that of 
 
 the banks ot a river, especially one that is navigable, are generally fertile mountains 
 
 and populous, good roads often follow its course on both banks. Hence 
 the defenders need not, as in mountain-passes, fear the unexpected appear- 
 ance of an enemy on their flanks or rear. 
 
 On the other hand, as it is easier to throw bridges in a rich populous but the pas- 
 territory than to make roads over rugged and desolate mountains, the sages more 
 i n t .1 i , • -11 „ , . numerous, 
 
 good passages over all but the largest rivers will generally be far more 
 
 numerous than over a corresponding extent of mountain-range. Thus, 
 there are six passages on practicable roads over the Ticino in 36 miles, 
 from Turbigo to Pavia ; while in the whole extent of the western face of 
 the Italian Alps there is but one good road (fit to supply such an army 
 as that of Napoleon III. in 1859), that of the Mont Cenis. And the 
 more numerous the practicable avenues, the greater the difficulties of the 
 defence ; for either some must be left unguarded, or the army must be 
 spread on an extended front. 
 
 When an army approaches a river defended by the enemy, its first Use of the 
 object will be to drive all the hostile troops then in its front to the river to scrce , n 
 
 tllG ISSIlltlTIL S 
 
 further side, and to extend a cordon of posts and vedettes along the movements. 
 
 stream within the limits of possible operations. For, having possession 
 
 of one bank, it can manoeuvre unknown to the enemy ; and as the 
 
 enemy's movements will also be screened, it will be better (instead of 
 
 forming a theory of his doings, which will very likely be false) to follow 
 
 a sound plan — that is, one which will enable the army to cross with least 
 
 risk, and at the same time with the most effective strategical result, 
 
 whether by turning the flank or breaking the front of the defensive line. 
 
 There are two features of the case of special significance — namely, that Possesslon of 
 
 a river is generally winding, and that the higher bank is sometimes on ^ank at an 
 
 one side, sometimes on the other. The object of an assailant will be to inward bend 
 
 pass part of his troops at some point where he possesses the commanding very a(lvan " 
 
 ° tageous for 
 bank, for he can thus, with comparative impunity, drive the defenders crossing 
 
234 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 See woodcut, 
 Chap. IV. 
 Pt. V., 
 
 and may 
 insure the 
 passage of the 
 whole army 
 in face of the 
 enemy. 
 
 See woodcut, 
 page 236. 
 
 Some rivers 
 indefensible. 
 
 from the other shore, and bring his forces, and materials for passing, 
 undiscovered to the spot. And if at that place the river also winds 
 inward, indenting his front, he will, by disposing his troops round the 
 bend, command and enclose the angle of the other bank. 
 
 For instance, in the campaign of 1813, Napoleon wished to pass the 
 Elbe near the village of Priesnitz. The conditions were favourable, for 
 the French bank commanded the other, and the bend of the river there- 
 indented the French front. Three hundred men were thrown over in 
 the night, and established themselves on the further side. They were 
 attacked, in the morning, by superior forces, with artillery ; but the 
 French, bringing 100 guns to bear from their own side, forced the enemy 
 to retreat. During the following night nearly 3000 men crossed, and a 
 work was constructed capable of holding two divisions ; whereupon the 
 enemy retired altogether. 
 
 The conditions may be so favourable as to enable large masses to pass 
 even in face of an assembled army. In 1809, Napoleon, after entering 
 Vienna, and guarding all the bridges of the Danube up to Passau, wished 
 to cross and attack the army of the Archduke Charles, then opposite 
 Vienna, on the left bank. First, the Emperor seized the large island of 
 Lobau, and connected it with the right bank by a long bridge. Then he 
 accumulated on the island the means of crossing, together with a force of 
 more than 20,000 men. The arm of the river is 120 yards wide, and 
 makes a favourable bend ; and by seizing the two villages of Aspern and 
 Essling a space would be enclosed and secured capable of holding a con- 
 siderable force. On the 20th May bridges were thrown, two divisions 
 crossed, and Aspern and Essling were seized. The Austrians, who had 
 assembled on a height twelve miles up the river, came on in line of 
 battle, and a desperate struggle ensued, chiefly for the possession of the 
 villages. But the reinforcements to the French from the right bank 
 came too slowly to maintain the battle ; and the part of the army that 
 had crossed — numbering, when first attacked, 30,000, afterwards 60,000, 
 against 90,000 Austrians — was compelled to repass the branch of the 
 stream to the isle of Lobau. 
 
 When the most important passages on the main line of operation 
 present conditions specially favourable to the assailant, it will be difficult 
 and hazardous to oppose the passage. So important is the circumstance 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 235 
 
 of die hither Lank commanding the further, that the Austrian army drawn 
 up behind the Mincio, in 1859, to await the French and Sardinians, 
 quitted its position and crossed the river to seek its adversaries; "for," 
 said Giulay, the Austrian general, "the enemy, whom it is impossible 
 to observe from the left bank, can mask his movements and bring all his 
 forces suddenly on any point before our troops can be warned and con- 
 centrated." And he had a precedent to justify his opinion, for in 1796, 
 the Austrians being on the defensive from Peschiera to Mantua, Napoleon 
 broke their front by crossing at Yaleggio (see woodcut, page 28). Yet the 
 Mincio possessed otherwise great advantages for defence, being a short 
 line, secure on the flanks, and having two issues over it secured by 
 Austrian fortresses. 
 
 It may be assumed, then, that when the assailant's bank decidedly 
 commands the other throughout its length, or at the points where the 
 roads forming the line of operation cross, the river is unsuitable for a 
 defensive line. 
 
 But it must be observed that the mere command of one bank over the The lower 
 other will not be promptly effectual unless the opposing troops are unable *' anl{ stl11 c,e * 
 
 • -i -r r fensible if it 
 
 to obtain shelter ironi the assailant s fire. It will naturally often happen offers stroIlfT 
 that villages or towns are situated on one or both sides of a bridge. In points. 
 this case, even if the assailant's bank has a moderate command, the build- 
 ings on the other side may, for a time, be defensible. At the battle of See Map 
 La Rothiere, in 1814, the French right rested on the bridge of Dienville, Ko- 14- 
 on the Aube — and the Austrians sought to turn that flank by sending a 
 corps along the other bank. The Austrians bank commanded the other 
 by about 30 feet, rising abruptly to a plateau less than 50 yards from the 
 bridge, which was 95 yards long and 5 yards wide. But at 20 or 30 
 yards from its extremity on the French side was a substantial church, 
 proof against field-artillery, backed and flanked by the houses of the 
 place. This was occupied so successfully that the Austrians were unable 
 to pass the bridge throughout the battle, or even to drive over the river a 
 French detachment on the left bank. 
 
 "When the defender sees that the passage cannot be opposed, his usual 
 course will be to take a position in the neighbourhood of the bridge ; and 
 the assailant, after passing, cannot manoeuvre to turn this position, for by 
 so doing he would uncover the bridge, the sole link in that part of his line 
 
236 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 of operation. He must therefore make a direct attack on the position, 
 which will almost certainly be on commanding ground. After his repulse 
 at Essling, Napoleon accumulated on the island of Lohau such ample 
 means of passage, and so strengthened his communication with the 
 Vienna side of the river, that it was in vain to attempt to oppose his 
 
 ^// WRSt ™ WI 
 
 tyiw 
 
 Passage in 
 presence of a 
 
 landing; the Austrian army therefore took post 6 miles off, on the heights 
 of Wagram, its right stretching towards the Danube. Napoleon, after 
 passing, formed his columns of attack, and was victorious in the battle. 
 
 In 1862, Burnside threw the Federal army on the right bank of the 
 Eappahannock, at Fredericksburg, almost without opposition, covered by 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 237 
 
 his powerful artillery. Lee observed the passage from his position on concentrated 
 the opposite heights, and received the Federals, when they advanced to enem Y liaz - 
 attack him, with so destructive a fire that they were driven in rout over 
 the river. 
 
 If, therefore, circumstances are so favourable as to enable an army to 
 pass a river in presence of the enemy, it must generally advance after- 
 wards to attack that enemy in a strong position. But, in the great 
 majority of cases, circumstances are unfavourable to an open passage. 
 An army, however superior, seeking to force its way over a bridge, against 
 an enemy posted on the higher bank, would certainly experience heavy 
 loss. Thus, in 1810, Craufurd with the Light Division was driven over 
 the Coa by a greatly superior force under Ney ; but when the French 
 attempted to pass the bridge, the British troops, lining the high bank, 
 destroyed the head of every column, till the unavailing carnage caused 
 the French to desist. And if the banks were of equal command, still the 
 task would be too formidable for an equal army ; for the only point at 
 which an attacking column could advance being known — namely, the 
 bridge — provision could always be made for bringing an overwhelming 
 fire to bear on it. And if buildings, woods, or dykes, near the bridge, 
 afford a shelter for the defender's infantry, the passage, in face of their 
 fire, will be still more impracticable ; indeed, such advantages will, as at 
 Dienville, frequently balance the superiority conferred by the commanding 
 bank. It may be inferred, therefore, that the points where a passage can 
 be forced are comparatively few : and we may draw, for future use, the 
 conclusion, that, in the majority of cases, to attempt to p>ass an unfordable 
 river, at a known point, in presence of a prepared enemy, demands a great 
 superiority of force — especially of artillery. 
 
 For this reason commanders generally seek to gain a footing on the stratagem 
 opposite bank by manoeuvring. usually em- 
 
 Having obtained a command of the whole or a large portion of one bank, ° >e 
 the assailant will show the heads of his columns, and make preparations 
 as if to cross, at many points ; while the real bridge will be constructed, or 
 seized, and the first troops thrown across, elsewhere. Unless the defender's 
 bank confers a very extensive and commanding view, he will be doubtful 
 which column will make the real attempt — all must therefore be opposed ; 
 meanwhile, covered by the high or wooded banks, the assailant's troops 
 
238 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Necessity for 
 multiplying 
 the means of 
 passage. 
 
 First troops 
 pass at a 
 weakly- 
 guarded 
 point. 
 
 Advantage of 
 seizing a de- 
 fensible point 
 on the oppo- 
 site shore. 
 
 First troops 
 that pass aid 
 
 will be moving towards the real point. In general, a bridge of some kind, 
 fixed or flying, must be thrown ; and it will be a manifest gain to possess 
 some creek or tributary stream where the materials of the bridge may be 
 prepared unseen, and floated to the point of passage. If time allows, the 
 means for throwing great numbers across at once may be prepared. In 
 his second passage of the Danube, Napoleon placed 70,000 men, with 
 artillery and cavalry, on the further bank in a single night. In 1704 the 
 French had a flying bridge on the Rhine (that is, a bridge or raft passing 
 from bank to bank by means of an anchorage up the stream), by which 
 500 infantry and 140 cavalry crossed at each trip. But, in all cases, 
 success will in great measure depend on the ability of the assailant to 
 augment his force on the opposite bank faster than the defender can bring 
 troops to that point from other parts of the river, and from the reserves. 
 
 Although it is essential to an advance of the army after passing, that 
 the assailant should possess the bridge of a great road on the line of 
 operation, yet it is not necessary that the first troops should pass at a 
 great road. On the contrary, if secrecy is an object, a point of passage 
 will be more likely to be found unguarded elsewhere. All that is essential 
 for the passage of the first detachment is, that the ground on both banks 
 should admit of the manoeuvring of troops of all arms. And it will be a 
 great advantage to find, unguarded or weakly guarded, on the opposite 
 bank, some easily defensible point, such as a village, a church, farm- 
 buildings, or a small wood. For as the necessary preliminary to throw- 
 ing a bridge is to establish a party on the other bank, so some 
 defensible point will enable the first troops to hold their ground, and 
 to protect the construction of the bridge, or the completion of other 
 modes of sending the rest of the troops across, such as the passage by 
 boats or rafts. The seizure of the Portuguese seminary on the further 
 bank of the Douro, by Wellington's advanced-guard, is a well-known 
 example. Even when a permanent bridge is mastered, it will be necessary 
 to throw other bridges at convenient spots near it, so as to concentrate on 
 the other bank faster than the enemy ; and throughout the operation 
 feints should be persisted in at other points, to confuse and deceive the 
 opposing general. 
 
 A force, then, being thrown across sufficient to deal with any that the 
 defender can assemble at that point, it may advance along the bank 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 239 
 
 and assail in flank or rear the defenders of some important neighbouring in the attack 
 
 passage, at the same time that another column makes a direct attack on l e mam 
 r ° _ passage. 
 
 from the other bank on the same bridge. This is the usual method of 
 gaining a footing — and it may be executed either between the extremities 
 of the enemy's line, or beyond one extremity — that is to say, either by 
 breaking his front or turning his flank. The expediency of preferring 
 either of these methods to the other must depend in great measure on 
 the dispositions of the defender. For he must conduct the defence in 
 one of two ways: either he must guard only the passages on the direci 
 line of operation — in which case his front, too compact to be broken, may 
 be turned ; or he will guard all the passages by which the assailant can 
 possibly seek to pass — in which case his front, thus dangerously extended, 
 should be broken. 
 
 EXAMPLES OF PASSING A RIVER ON THE FRONT OF THE DEFENSIVE 
 LINE. — MOREAU'S PASSAGES OF THE RHINE. 
 
 In 1796 it was arranged that the passage of the Rhine (mentioned at 
 page 157) should take place a little above Kehl — the fortifications of that 
 place forbidding a direct passage. 
 
 The river 111 runs nearly parallel to the Rhine past Strasbourg. A 
 canal unites it to the small branch of the Rhine, called the Bras Mabile. 
 
 The materials for the passage were to be collected in Strasbourg, and to Use of a 
 be taken by the canal to the Bras Mabile, where the attacking force was tnbutai T 
 
 stream. 
 
 to embark. 
 
 On the opposite bank the river was watched by the Suabian troops Wilstett to 
 in the camp of Wilstett, the works of Kehl, and along the course of the ' ' 
 Rhine for several miles on each side, 7500 men in all, of which about 
 half were near enough to oppose the passage. The Austrians had about 
 9000 men between the Rench and Murg, and about 4000 extending 
 from above Kehl to Brisach. 
 
 All being ready, a false attack was made on the 20th June on the Feint to de. 
 Austrian camp at Mannheim. ceive the 
 
 1 i • «ii • enemy. 
 
 On the same day the troops for the first embarkation quitted the neigh- 
 bourhood of Mannheim for Strasbourg. The French right wing from the 
 
240 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Upper Ehine also closed on Strasbourg. All the troops were to arrive 
 near there on the 23d June. 
 Strasbourg to 16,000 French, for the main attack, were assembled in Strasbourg. 
 Gambsheim, 12,000 were to make a secondary passage at Gambsheim. 
 
 Between these places, three false attacks were to be made to confuse 
 and distract the Austrians. 
 
 The width of the main branch of the Ehine is from 200 to 300 yards 
 
 See also Map 
 No. 7. 
 
 near Kehl. The numerous islands diminishing the total breadth of the 
 stream — the woody banks, and the dykes along the shores, forming at 
 once lines of defence for the first troops that might cross — were all cir- 
 cumstances in favour of the passage. 
 False attacks 24:th June. — Before midnight of the 23d all the boats for transport 
 at the moment were b r0U ght down the canal into the Bras Mabile, and the first detach- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 241 
 
 ment, 2500, embarked at half-past one. The guns at the points of false ofcommenc- 
 
 attacks then opened. ing the enter- 
 
 i>iisc. 
 The flotilla ascended the Bras Mabile, and got into the main stream ; 
 
 the main body landed on the wooded islands nearest Kehl — a detach- 
 ment of 1500 men seized the bridge connecting the Erlen-Khin with the 
 Kehl shore — another attacked and carried the batteries on the Erlen- 
 Iihin — a fourth attacked the two small islands on the stream ; the boats, 
 having landed all these, returned for fresh troops. 
 
 The Austrians, from their camp at Wilstett, marched to this point in Use of a de- 
 time to oppose the troops first landed, who maintained themselves behind f(3Ilsllll( ' r ,,int - 
 the dykes. 
 
 A flying bridge from the French shore to the Erlen-Ehin was estab- Assailants 
 lished by six in the morning. Infantry passed incessantly there, and by con eentratc 
 
 i . fastest. 
 
 boats. 
 
 Sufficient troops having passed, they moved on Kehl. A detachment First troops 
 attacked the Austrian works, aided by heavy artillery from the Stras- turn to attack 
 bourg bank. The enemy were driven out, on the Buhl road, and had no sa „ e 
 time to destroy the bridges of the Kinzig. 
 
 The bridge of boats opposite Kehl was commenced at six in the evening Main passage 
 and finished next morning. The communications were thereby assured, assured, army 
 and cavalry and artillery passed. passes. 
 
 25th June. — Moreau reconnoitred the enemy. 
 
 26th June. — The French pushed out on Goldschir, Korck, and Wilstett. Wilstett to 
 
 The Austrians, who had been driven back on Wilstett on the 24th, Eenchen, G - 
 retired on Buhl. 
 
 Had Moreau brought Laborde's division from the Upper Ehine, where 
 it was now useless, he might have assembled at. Wilstett, on the 26th, 
 45,000 men — enough to guard the passages, and to crush all the troops 
 between him and the Murg. 
 
 The Austrians after the passage were scattered thus : — 
 
 4000 on the Rench. Dispersion of 
 
 8000 at Buhl. the defensive 
 
 2000 on the Murg. forces. 
 
 About 4000, separated from the rest, moved up the river towards 
 Friburg. 
 
 Q 
 
242 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 The rest of the Austrian army of the Upper Rhine was between Mann- 
 heim and the Murg. 
 
 PASSAGE OF 1797. 
 
 Strasbourg to 
 Kilstett, 9. 
 
 Bodeschir to 
 Diersheim, 4. 
 
 Use of the 
 
 tributary 
 
 stream. 
 
 Use of a de- 
 fensible point 
 
 Defenders 
 concentrate 
 fastest, but 
 
 After the Archduke had driven Moreau over the Rhine in the preced- 
 ing year, the Austrians besieged and took the works of Kehl, and greatly 
 strengthened them. The Bras Mabile was now dry, the canal useless — 
 therefore the passage could not be at Kehl. 
 
 Between Diersheim and the river is a small wood — the dykes there 
 were favourable for defence — and separated from the wood by a small 
 fordable arm of the river, was a large island. Above Kilstett the 111 
 runs into the Rhine, and would convey to the spot the requisite transport. 
 It was resolved, therefore, to pass at Diersheim. 
 
 The Austrians were now in much greater force than in the preceding 
 year, having, in the camp of Bodeschir, and between Kehl and Bischofs- 
 heim, about 20,000 men. 
 
 The troops of the French centre were assembled on various pretexts 
 about Kilstett on the 19th. The divisions, from right and left, were to 
 arrive during the following night and day. 
 
 Forty boats, each for 70 men, a flat boat for guns, and twelve great 
 boats from Strasbourg, were to pass down the 111 to embark the first 
 detachment, which was to land principally on the island opposite the 
 wood of Diersheim, a smaller force at Freystett, and a third between 
 Freystett and Diersheim. 
 
 Two false attacks were to be made near Kehl, a third lower down. 
 20th April. — The boats were obstructed by a sandbank at the mouth 
 of the 111, and delayed till 5 o'clock in the morning. Meanwhile the 
 false attacks had opened and alarmed the Austrians. Their batteries, 
 sweeping the river, obliged all the first troops to land on the island ; 
 300 Austrians were driven from it, and the advanced-guard attacked 
 Diersheim. The French took the village, and, centring on it, extended 
 ■ to Honau on the one side, back to the Rhine on the other, on a front of 
 3000 yards. 
 
 At 11 o'clock, the Austrians from Bodeschir, 4000, formed line from 
 Freystett to Honau. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 243 
 
 At 3 o'clock the French established their flying bridge at Gambsheim, fail to drive 
 which could take only 2.~> cavalry, or 1 gun and waggon, at each trip. back the as " 
 
 Sell 1*111 IS. 
 
 The French had then in line about 8000 men — the Austrians 11,000, 
 with a very superior cavalry and artillery. The Austrians attacked 
 Diersheim and failed. The French took Honau. 
 
 The flying bridge was rendered useless by the enemy's fire ; but a 
 bridge of boats, begun at G P.M., was finished at midnight. In the night, 
 an infantry division, a cavalry brigade, and 12 guns crossed. 
 
 21st April. — Austrians, superior in force, attacked Diersheim and 
 Honau, but failed. 
 
 The French were now reinforced fastest, and at 2 o'clock Moreau Assailants 
 attacked with superior forces. He directed his principal column between strongest at 
 
 point of 
 
 Lings and Hobine, his right on Linzenheim, his left on 1 reystett. The attac k < 
 Austrians were routed, and the French advanced thus : — 
 
 Centre, up the valley of the Kinzig, beyond Wilstett. Concentric 
 
 Eight, on Korck and Eehl. advance from 
 
 Left, on Bischofsheim, witli his advanced-guard on the Rench. the river — 
 
 main passage 
 
 22d April. — French advance resumed. gained. 
 
 Centre, up the Kinzig. Assailants 
 
 Right, up the Rhine valley. continue to 
 
 Left, forced the Rench. push the de- 
 
 fenders apart. 
 
 The Austrian right from Mannheim marched for the Murg. Moreau 
 hastened to anticipate it ; but an armistice between the two countries 
 ended the campaign. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The communications of the assailant, after he has passed on the centre 
 of the defensive line, being thus narrowed to a point, are more than 
 usually precarious at the point of passage ; but an army being fairly 
 interposed between the parts of an enemy's front, will generally, in this 
 as in the cases discussed before, be secured from counter-attack by the 
 anxiety of the hostile forces to reunite before taking the offensive. But 
 as the enemy will concentrate twice as fast upon the centre as upon one 
 flank, the necessity for prompt and vigorous action on the part of the 
 
!44 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 A river fre- 
 quently 
 •affords an 
 opportunity 
 of breaking 
 a defender's 
 front. 
 
 assailant, if he would derive all the advantages from the situation 
 which it offers, is even more stringent after passing a river than in 
 any other case. Moreau's tardiness in advancing after the passage in 
 1796, gave the Archduke time to concentrate his forces, to make his 
 dispositions, and to effect his retreat on Ulm. Had the French struck 
 out with vigour, pushing the Austrian left through the forest, and 
 rolling Latour downward through the valley, the Austrians might have 
 been cut altogether from the Danube, and their wings permanently 
 sundered. 
 
 The apparent defensibility of a river or mountain-chain frequently 
 offers inducements to the defensive army to attempt to guard a longer 
 line than its numbers can adequately occupy ; and in such a case a great 
 opportunity is offered to a skilful assailant, who, inducing the enemy by 
 dexterous feints to maintain or even increase the extent of his front, 
 while his own concentration is concealed by the obstacle, should effect 
 the passage on the centre, or between the centre and a flank of the 
 hostile line, and should then seek, by vigorous attacks on one side, and 
 the employment of a containing force on the other, to secure all the ad- 
 vantages which have been shown in Part IV. to exist in the situation. 
 
 EXAMPLES OF PASSING A KIVER ON THE FLANK OF THE DEFENSIVE 
 ARMY. — PASSAGE OF THE GAVE DE PAU. 
 
 See woodcut, 
 page 245. 
 
 Extent of the 
 French line 
 of defence. 
 
 In 1814, Soult held the Gave de Pau against Wellington. Above 
 Orthez the river spread wide with flat banks. The bridge of Orthez was 
 difficult to force, having a tower in the centre, the gateway of which was 
 built up. The houses on both sides were occupied by the French, and 
 the river there was deep and full of pointed rocks. 
 
 Five miles below Orthez was the broken bridge of Berenx — from 
 whence a narrow defile led up to the main road on the right bank. 
 
 Soult designed to fall in force on the head of the first column that 
 should cross. His line extended from near Baigts on the right, to above 
 Orthez on the left, where, as the river was less defensible, he had placed 
 strong bodies of troops. 
 
 Soult had 40,000 troops, of which 3000 were cavalry, and 40 guns. 
 
EX PLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 245 
 
 "Wellington had 37,000, of which 4000 were cavalry, and 48 guns. 
 Of the seven English infantry divisions, four were massed opposite 
 Orthez, with 5 regiments of cavalry and 18 guns. 
 
 An infantry division, with a brigade of cavalry in front of the broken 
 bridge of Berenx. 
 
 Two divisions of infantry and a division of cavalry under Beresford in 
 front of Peyrehorade. 
 
 Beresford crossed the Gave by a pontoon-bridge and fords, and ad- 
 vanced with the main part of his force on the Pau road, throwing a 
 detachment to his left to threaten Soult's communications with Pax, 
 where he had a magazine. 
 
 Simultaneously a pontoon-bridge was commenced at Berenx. Beresford, 
 halting for the night near Baigts, covered the construction of the bridge. 
 Communications were thus established between the centre and left. 
 
 Soult did not receive intelligence of Beresford's movements till he was 
 near Baigts. By that time two divisions drawn from the right were 
 approaching the bridge of Berenx, and that which had before been posted 
 
 Orthez to 
 Berenx, 5. 
 
 Orthez to 
 
 Peyrehorade, 
 
 16. 
 
 Turning force 
 passes, 
 
 and covers 
 the passage 
 of the main 
 body. 
 
246 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Defenders 
 take position 
 in real - . 
 
 there was about to cross. Thus five of the seven English divisions were 
 massed opposite Soult's right, astride the river. 
 
 Soult now hesitated whether to fall upon Beresford, and the column 
 crossing at Berenx, or to take a defensive position in rear. He finally 
 decided on the latter course. Doubtless he was swayed partly by the 
 strength of that position, but powerfully also by the circumstance that 
 he could not know for certain the proportion of troops at each point. If 
 he withdrew too many troops from left to right, the English right passing 
 above Orthez might strike at his rear ; if he attacked the English left 
 with insufficient numbers, he might suffer losses to no purpose, and lose 
 the Dax road. The screen of the river, veiling in some degree the assail- 
 ant's movements, told against the defender. 
 
 In taking his new position he pivoted on Orthez with his left, and 
 swung his centre and right backward from the river in front of the Dax 
 road. Wellington's divisions, when all had passed to the right bank, 
 attacked the front of the position, dislodging the enemy by main force ; 
 and towards the close of the action, the English right, passing above 
 Orthez, turned the French left, and accelerated the retreat. 
 
 See Map No. 
 12, also No. 5. 
 
 Preliminary 
 operations. 
 
 PASSAGE OF THE TICINO, 1859. 
 
 In the middle of May the Austrians had their right towards the Sesia, 
 near Vercelli, where they had destroyed the bridge, extending along that 
 river to its confluence with the Po. Thence their line stretched along the 
 Po (less than 300 yards wide in this part of its course), watching the principal 
 points of passage as far as Belgiojoso, numerous bridges having been thrown 
 over the Ticino below Pavia, to render the communications easy. The left 
 of the army, the 9th corps, was south of the Po in the defile of Stradella. 
 
 The French divisions also extended along the Po from Valenza to 
 Casteggio, watching the passages, with the division on the right thrown 
 back to guard the issue of the defile. The Sardinians were massed on 
 the left about Casale. 
 
 The French Emperor might aim (like his great predecessor in 1796) at 
 Piacenza, operating by his right — might cross directly from his centre 
 at Valenza, and the other passages between that and the Ticino — or 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. * 247 
 
 crossing by the passage he held at Casale, might prefer to force the 
 Ticino rather than the To. 
 
 The Emperor took the third course. He placed the Sardinian army 
 between Casale and Yercelli, and threw it across the Sesia. This might 
 be preliminary to a passage of the Fo opposite the French centre, there- 
 fore the Austrian line fronted as before. 
 
 Demonstrations were made on the French right as if for an advance Feint towards 
 on Fiacenza, and then a movement from right to left was begun behind P iacenza - 
 the screen of the river. The 3d French corps (Canrobert) was withdrawn 
 by rail from beyond the Scrivia to behind the Sesia, where it crossed and 
 joined the Sardinians. This force was destined to cover the assembly of Vercelli to 
 the army on the line Vercelli-Xovara-Milan. The remaining corps moved Novara > li - 
 along the roads bordering the Fo. Demonstrations were made along the 
 river by troops left for that purpose, as if to prepare for a passage ; and 
 when the 1st corps, last of all, quitted its position near Voghera, it broke 
 up the roads and destroyed the bridges behind it to prevent pursuit, or a 
 counter-advance by the south bank. 
 
 1st June. — The French corps were passing from Vercelli towards the 
 Ticino screened by Canrobert and the Sardinians, who had driven back 
 the divisions forming the extreme right of the Austrian line to Eobbio. 
 
 The Austrian 2d line (three corps) was drawn on to the arc Kobbio- 
 Vespolate-Vigevano, thus fronting the enemy and becoming the 1st line. 
 
 Two other corps were drawn from the Fo and directed on the Ticino at Buffalo™ to 
 Beregardo. Pavia, 27. 
 
 Part of the 1st corps was between Milan and San Martino, covering 
 the passage there. 
 
 9th corps between Favia and Fiacenza. Novara to 
 
 2d June. — French movements for the passage of the Ticino — the object Turbigo and 
 being to reach Milan by a flank march round the Austrians. Trecate, 7. 
 
 1st division of the 2d corps to Trecate, observing the issue of the Ticino Advanced- 
 at San Martino, and thus covering the march of a division of the Guard guard of turn- 
 directed on Turbigo, to force the passage there and cover the establish- mg 
 
 x o crosses, 
 
 ment of a bridge. Five batteries accompanied the bridge equipage. The 
 division passed and occupied Turbigo. 
 
 ?>d June. — The division at Trecate followed, by Galliate, the movement followed by 
 on Turbigo, and reached Ftobechetto. the rest. 
 
248 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Trecate to s. The other division of the 2d corps advanced to San Martino. The 
 Martino, 3J. Austrians in the work covering the railway bridge retired, blowing up 
 two arches imperfectly. Then the French division rejoined its corps at 
 Turbigo, being replaced by another division of the Guard. 
 
 Canrobert between Vercelli and Robbio. 
 
 Sardinians moving from Novara on Galliate for Turbigo. 
 
 The rest of the French about Novara. 
 
 The Ticino here is as wide, or nearly so, as the Thames at Bichmond — 
 quite unfordable — and much more rapid. 
 
 Banks of the river quite low, especially the left, and very woody at a 
 short distance from the shore, concealing movements of troops. 
 
 The Ticino had ceased to be an obstacle further than that the French 
 must cross it at San Martino by a single damaged bridge. The real 
 impediment lay beyond. Standing on the bank at the foot of the railway 
 bridge, the spectator sees before him low fiat meadows, terminated three- 
 quarters of a mile off by a huge mound spreading in a wide semicircle. 
 From the bridge of San Martino three roads diverge, piercing this mound 
 at different points ; one to the left, to Buffalora — that in the centre, raised 
 15 feet above the level, to Ponte di Magenta — the railway road, 300 yards 
 from it, similarly raised — and from a lower point on the river runs a 
 fourth road to Ponte Vecchio, crossing the mound at 1200 yards from the 
 railway. This mound is the retaining wall of a large canal, deep and 
 rapid, 30 yards wide, running between steep bushy banks 30 feet deep. 
 The problem was to file over the bridge of San Martino and attack the 
 four bridges of the canal guarded by the Austrians, aided by the three 
 divisions from Turbigo under M'Mahon, who were already beyond the 
 obstacle. And as the Austrians held the passages of the Lower Ticino, 
 and might attack by either bank, it was necessary to keep a force about 
 Novara to cover the communications with Turin. 
 
 Austrian Movements. — Giulay's design was to carry his army from the 
 right to the left bank, and attack the Allied force that might have crossed. 
 To this end his troops on the 2d had been massed at the two points of 
 passage, Vigevano and opposite Beregardo. He trusted to the bridge-head 
 of San Martino to delay the French till he should have his army assembled 
 across the road to Milan. An emissary from the Emperor of Austria, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. £49 
 
 arriving at this critical moment with instructions, suspended the move- 
 ment, which was delayed for several hours. 
 
 4th June. — The 2d and 7th Austrian corps, covered by the 3d, had 
 crossed at Yigevano — their leading brigades were near the bridges of the 
 canal, from Bobecco to Ponte di Magenta. The remainder of these corps 
 were 5 to 8 miles distant. A division of the first corps held Buffalora ; 
 another at Cuggiono opposed M'Mahon. 
 
 The 5th Austrian corps from Beregardo was at Falla-Vecchio, 12 miles 
 off. The 8th corps from Beregardo had been directed on Milan, and was 
 now at Binasco, 17 miles off. 
 
 Allied Movements. — The division of the Guard crossed at San Martino 
 and covered the repair of the bridge. 
 
 The 3d and 4th corps were put in motion from Novara for San Martino 
 — the 1st was to follow. 
 
 The Sardinians from Galliate to follow M'Mahon. 
 
 In face of the difficulties of forcing the bridges of the canal, it was 
 Louis Xapoleon's design only to threaten them with the division of the 
 Guard, till M'Mahon's advance should have caused the defenders to turn 
 their attention to him ; then the Guard was to assault, and the attacks 
 on the two banks would support each other. 
 
 The Guard was all on the left bank of the river at half-past 11. 
 
 M'Mahon was to leave Turbigo at 10 o'clock. He had 7 miles to march, 
 and might be expected to reach Buffalora about noon. 
 
 The approach of M'Mahon was immediately reported to the Austrian 
 commander-in-chief. Nevertheless, the first reinforcements from the 
 Austrian rear did not arrive on the field till half-past 4 in the evening. 
 
 M'Mahon's divisions were directed on Buffalora and Marcallo. His Turning force 
 right had already approached Buffalora, and his foremost troops were ™ oves UI>on 
 engaged, when he found an Austrian force in the space between his passage, 
 divisions. He recalled the leading troops, deployed his own corps across 
 the space, and once more pushed forward, with the Yoltigeurs in second 
 line. 
 
 But the fire of his advanced-guard had been the signal for the Emperor The front 
 
 to launch his troops at the bridges of the canal. Much hard fighting attack 1S r re - 
 
 10 , cipitated. 
 
 ensued, and heavy loss. At Ponte Vecchio the Austrians were driven 
 
 over the bridge, but blew it up in retiring. 
 
passage. 
 
 250 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 At the railway bridge they were also driven over; and the French 
 passing there turned along the further hank and aided in the attack of 
 Ponte di Magenta, which was also carried. 
 
 Many repulses, however, had been suffered before so much success was 
 
 achieved; for the attack had been precipitated by the first discharges 
 
 from M'Mahon's troops, which, occupied in their deployment, caused no 
 
 diversion at the bridges. 
 
 Turning force At length, M'Mahon's preparations being complete, he assailed the 
 
 aids in attack viUa „ e f Buffalora. Taken in flank there, the Austrians abandoned the 
 
 on the main ° •,.. -i-i^t -i ., t> /*> i 
 
 bridge, falling back to a line in rear — the French passed at Bunalora 
 — and the connection between the separate parts of the army was 
 restored. 
 
 The remainder of the action. was a struggle on the part of the Austrians 
 to make head against M'Mahon on the one side, and on the other to drive 
 the French from ttie bridges. " Brigades arriving from the rear were sent 
 against them by both banks of the'- canal, principally the west side, and 
 with partial success. Qn'th^ot-her hand, troops from the 3d and 4th 
 French corps now begUi ^arrive at the contested points, after crossing 
 from San Martino. Finally, at the close of the battle the French held the 
 bridges down to Ponte Vecchio — the Austrians that of Eobecco. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 In all the foregoing cases the principle is apparent of throwing a force 
 on the opposite bank, at an undefended or unexpected point, to co-operate 
 in clearing a passage on the main line of operation. In neither of the 
 examples of turning a flank is the whole army thrown off the direct line 
 of operation for the sake of passing unopposed, but the advance of the 
 turning force is used to cover or aid the main passage elsewhere. 
 
 The difference between the passage of the Gave and that of the Ticino 
 is, that Soult, being restricted to the right bank, could only attack Beres- 
 ford's force, and had not the option of attacking the remainder of the 
 army : whereas the Austrians, possessing all the lower course of the 
 river from Vigevano to Pavia, could operate by either bank, and the 
 French were therefore detained astride the river. 
 
MAP N° 12 
 
 
 49 AM) U ::.'.) 
 
 .•i) MILES 
 
 fCasatisma 
 
CAMPAIGN OF 184!) AND 1859 
 
 Great Rnads. 
 Good. Roads. 
 Bye Roads . 
 
 Austrian 
 
 QjUriSM 
 
 *y~ti](--\ait\ *^- \Vecchio 
 
 TrumeUo 
 
 '■■J^'c^ 
 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 251 
 
 It is evident that if a force were detached off the main line to make a Turning force 
 circuit round the enemy's flank in a part of the theatre where no consider- not llaljle to 
 able obstacle existed, it would be in imminent danger of being cut off, fl . om maill 
 and an opportunity would be offered to the enemy of interposing between body, 
 it and the main body. But when, in making the circuit, it crosses a 
 river, this risk is in great measure obviated, because the part of the river 
 between its point of passage and the main body is an obstacle to the 
 enemy. The kind of disaster to which it is liable is to be forced back 
 by a superior force upon the river. Thus, had the Austrian army been 
 more concentrated, a part might have held the bridges while a force 
 superior to M'Mahon's attacked him and drove him back on Turbigo. If 
 attacked on a front perpendicular to the general course of the river, it will even if sepa- 
 generally be able to recross without serious losses — for a detachment of ratel y de " 
 troops with artillery crossing in advance of the rest, could in most cases 
 line the further bank and protect the passage ; and the risk would gene- 
 rally be limited to the losses in the action, and those which must generally 
 be incurred in retiring over a river in presence of a superior force. In 
 fact, the point of passage will form a pivot for the operation of the turn- 
 ing force. 
 
 But it is evident that a turning force which advances along the bank Real peril lies 
 with one flank on the river, exposes the other flank to a direct attack. in the ex l'°s- 
 Thus Soult, pivoting on Anion, might have come perpendicularly on wanl flauk 
 Beresford's left and rolled him back on the river where there .was no pas- 
 sage ; and Giulay from the Milan road might have directly assailed 
 M'Mahon's outward (left) flank, and driven him back on the canal and 
 river between Buffalora and Turbigo. This kind of risk is exemplified in 
 the two following instances. 
 
 Though it has no special relation to this branch of the subject, the 
 nature of the movement on Novara, in 1859, should be studied. The 
 reader, already familiar with the very similar case of 1849, will have no 
 difficulty in perceiving the risk incurred by the Allies. Had they moved 
 from the Sesia on Mortara and Lomello, and thence on Vigevano and 
 Pavia, they would have perfectly covered both lines to Turin by Casale 
 and Vercelli ; and the restoration of the bridge of Valenza behind them 
 would have given the means of passing the Po, and would have materially 
 strengthened their line of operation. Such an operation, in accordance with 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 251 
 
 It is evident that if a force were detached off the main line to make a Taming force 
 circuit round the enemy's flank in a part of the theatre where no consider- not lialjle to 
 
 be separated 
 
 able obstacle existed, it would be in imminent danger of being cut off, from nKliu 
 and an opportunity would be offered to the enemy of interposing between body, 
 it and the main body. But when, in making the circuit, it crosses a 
 river, this risk is in great measure obviated, because the part of the river 
 between its point of passage and the main body is an obstacle to the 
 enemy. The kind of disaster to which it is liable is to be forced back 
 by a superior force upon the river. Thus, had the Austrian army been 
 more concentrated, a part might have held the bridges while a force 
 superior to M'Mahon's attacked him and drove him back on Turbigo. If 
 attacked on a front perpendicular to the general course of the river, it will even if sepa- 
 generally be able to recross without serious losses — for a detachment of ratel y de " 
 
 fccitcd. 
 
 troops with artillery crossing in advance of the rest, could in most cases 
 line the further bank and protect the passage ; and the risk would gene- 
 rally be limited to the losses in the action, and those which must generally 
 be incurred in retiring over a river in presence of a superior force. In 
 fact, the point of passage will form a pivot for the operation of the turn- 
 ing force. 
 
 But it is evident that a turning force which advances along the bank Real peril lies 
 with one flank on the river, exposes the other flank to a direct attack. in the ex Pos- 
 Thus Soult, pivoting on Amou, might have come perpendicularly on d » k 
 Beresford's left and rolled him back on the river where there .was no pas- 
 sage ; and Giulay from the Milan road might have directly assailed 
 M'Mahon's outward (left) flank, and driven him back on the canal and 
 river between Buffalora and Turbigo. This kind of risk is exemplified in 
 the two following instances. 
 
 Though it has no special relation to this branch of the subject, the 
 nature of the movement on Novara, in 1859, should be studied. The 
 reader, already familiar with the very similar case of 1849, will have no 
 difficulty in perceiving the risk incurred by the Allies. Had they moved 
 from the Sesia on Mortara and Lomello, and thence on Vigevano and 
 Pavia, they would have perfectly covered both lines to Turin by Casale 
 and Vercelli ; and the restoration of the bridge of Valenza behind them 
 would have given the means of passing the Po, and would have materially 
 strengthened their line of operation. Such an operation, in accordance witli 
 
252 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 the circumstances of the case, would have given the army firm grounds 
 from which to manoeuvre for the passage of the Ticino, with better chances 
 of obtaining a decisive strategical success, and with none of the risk of 
 fatal disaster incurred by the flank march. 
 
 Examples of PASSAGE OF BULL RUN. 
 
 the risk in- 
 curred by a TT • ,,.„ 
 
 turning force. -ti'om Union Mills, on the Alexandria Railway, to Stone Bridge, which 
 Extent of the is °n the highroad from Alexandria to Warrenton, through Centreville, 
 defensive line, there are six passages over the stream. The Confederate army was dis- 
 
 junct ion 
 
 tributed along this space, 7 miles in extent, on the 17th July — a brigade 
 being posted at or near each point of passage, and two in reserve. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 253 
 
 The Federal army had advanced on that day from Alexandria to 
 Centreville. 
 
 18th July. — The Federals attempted to cross at Blackburn's and Direct attack 
 Mitchell's Fords, but were repulsed. repulsed. 
 
 They thereupon paused to reconnoitre the stream in order to turn the Centrenllfi to 
 left of the Confederates, and discovered the road leading on Sudley's Ford. Ford 2 . 
 
 21st July. — A Federal division advanced towards Mitchell's Ford — Centreville to 
 another on the Stone Bridge — a third was directed on Sudley's Ford — the Stone Bridge, 
 Reserve remained at Centreville. 
 
 Two of the Confederate brigades of the Eeserve were in rear of the 
 right and right centre of their line. Jackson's brigade arriving the pre- 
 ceding night, was posted in rear of Mitchell's Ford. Bee's brigade was 
 in rear of Ball's Ford. 
 
 The advanced-guard of the Federal troops passed at Sudley's without Turning force 
 opposition, but were met by part of the Confederate brigade at Stone P asses > and 
 
 ri J r ° descends the 
 
 Bridge detached to confront them. Pressing on, they approached Red b an fc_ 
 
 House, where the rear of the right Federal column sought to pass. It 
 
 was opposed at first by Bee's reserve ; but eventually the right column of is opposed in 
 
 the Federals formed line from the Stone Bridge to 1\ mile from the river 
 
 on the Confederate side of the stream. 
 
 Jackson's brigade, and afterwards one from the right, arrived in support 
 of the Confederate line. 
 
 At this time Beauregard is said to have given an order for a counter- 
 attack, by the three brigades forming his right, on Centreville, threatening 
 the Federal line of retreat — and the brigade at M 'Lean's Ford advanced ; 
 but the order was not executed. 
 
 Supported by reinforcements from the right, including the last brigade Turning force 
 of the reserve, the Confederates maintained the battle till Kirby Smith's attacked on 
 
 .its outward 
 
 brigades of Jolm son's force arrived near the field by the railway. Quit- g^ 
 ting the train, they fell on the flank and rear of the Federals, who broke 
 and fled over Bull Run. The Confederate brigades at M'Lean's Ford and 
 Union Mills, advancing upon Centreville, menaced the reserve there and 
 the line of retreat, and increased the disorder of the flight. 
 
254 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 PASSAGE OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK AND EAPIDAN. 
 
 Falmouth to 21th April. — Hooker encamped opposite Lee at Fredericksburg, based 
 
 Aquia, 12. on Aquia, and aiming at Richmond, broke up his camp. His right wing, 
 
 consisting of the corps of Meade, Howard, and Slocum, moved up the 
 
 Rappahannock to cross above the junction of the streams and turn the 
 
 Confederate left. 
 
 Falmouth to The corps of Sickles, Reynolds, and Sedgwick, under Sedgwick, were 
 Germanna, 22. to cross at t j ie same time De low Fredericksburg, and detain Lee from the 
 true point by menacing his front. 
 
 28th and 29th April. — The right wing having passed the Rappahan- 
 nock, crossed the Rapidan almost unopposed — Howard and Slocum at 
 Germanna, Meade at Ely's Ford — all moving on Chancellorsville. 
 
 Sedgwick's corps crossed below Fredericksburg. 
 
 30th April. — Couch's corps from the reserve crossed at Banks's Ford, 
 Sickles from Falmouth at United States Ford, both on Chancellorsville. 
 
 1st May. — Hooker formed his line and intrenched it : Howard on the 
 right or outward flank, then Slocum and Couch in the centre, and Meade 
 next the river — Sickles in reserve. 
 
 Turning force 
 passes, 
 
 and gains 
 other fords. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 255 
 
 2d May. — Lee, aware of the movement against his left, sent Jackson Defenders 
 by the Spotsylvania road to meet the attack. Jackson, by a road through attack the 
 
 . exposed Hank, 
 
 the woods, moved past and round the Federal right. 
 
 Hooker sent Sickles to reinforce the right. Freaericks- 
 
 Jackson, attacking the right wing in Hank and rear, broke and routed burg to Chan- 
 
 ci'llor.svillt' 
 
 it, and drove it back on the river. 12 
 
 Reynolds's corps, from Falmouth, joined Hooker by United States Ford. 
 
 3d May. — Lee attacked the angle and left face of the Federal line. 
 Hooker was driven entirely back on the river, his right below Eley's 
 Ford, his left below United States Ford. 
 
 Sedgwick attacked the heights on the right bank 'at Fredericksburg, 
 carried them, and pushed along the Richmond road. 
 
 Ath May. — Lee detached troops against Sedgwick, turned his left, and 
 drove him over Banks's Ford. He joined Hooker by United States 
 Ford. 
 
 5th May. — Hooker, who, on the preceding day, had cut roads to the Operation 
 United States Ford, and laid bridges there, retreated over it in the night. falls - 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The point in common in these two cases is, that the forces which had 
 succeeded in crossing beyond the enemy's flank, and which thereupon 
 aimed at his rear, advanced on a front perpendicular to the course of the 
 river. They thereby exposed the outward flank ; and that they escaped 
 destruction in either case was due to the fact that they continued to hold, 
 at the time of the attack, certain points of passage. Had the Federals at 
 Bull Run let go their hold of Stone Bridge, by continuing to advance, 
 without gaining Mitchell's Ford — or had Hooker, moving down the 
 stream, passed by United States Ford without gaining Banks's Ford 
 — they w T ould in either case have been in great peril of being driven 
 not across but into the river. 
 
 "We shall see, in the Part on Tactics, how this peril may be partially 
 remedied by an advance in echelon, retiring the outward flank ; though 
 that method, by rendering the advance on the defender's rear less direct, 
 would also render it less decisive. 
 
25G 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Disadvantage 
 of a double 
 passage on the 
 flanks. 
 
 The line of 
 operation 
 must be cov- 
 ered during 
 the turning 
 movement. 
 
 But the inference may be drawn that, when the defender's forces are 
 entirely on one bank, and the assailant has thrown a force across beyond 
 the flank, the most effective mode of meeting the attack will be to march 
 against the outward flank of that force, with all the troops available for 
 immediate action. 
 
 It is also very useful to consider the circumstances in which these two 
 cases differ. 
 
 At Bull Bun a large part of the Federal force was retained to cover the 
 line of possible retreat. At Fredericksburg the wings were both thrown 
 across the river, and the advance assumed the form of a double passage 
 and double attack. It is evident that a passage on both flanks exhibits 
 at once, in its most disadvantageous form, the case of an army between 
 whose parts the enemy's forces are interposed — since the parts are sepa- 
 rated, not only by the enemy, but by the river, and may be successively 
 overwhelmed and driven on their bridges, while the victorious army, 
 passing a central bridge, may cut both from their lines of retreat, or of 
 possible junction. Another example is afforded by the campaign of 1796, 
 where the Austrians advanced to cross the Adige for the relief of Mantua 
 at three points — namely, above Bivoli, on Verona, and near Legnago. At 
 Verona they were checked ; at the other points they passed. The French 
 massed first on Bivoli, on which line the Austrians had been opposed by 
 a retarding force under Joubert. Napoleon, defeating them at Bivoli, 
 turned southward, and, in conjunction with the retarding force that 
 had retired from Legnago and the troops besieging Mantua, fell on the 
 Austrian left wing and destroyed it. 
 
 It may be held as established, then, that a double passage on the 
 flanks must be wrong unless with a great superiority of force — and that 
 superiority may generally be turned to better account otherwise. The 
 passage of Bull Bun, planned by General Scott, was much less faulty 
 than that of the Bappahannock, planned by General Halleck. 
 
 When Sedgwick was driven to join Hooker over Banks's Ford, the line 
 to Aquia, on which the Federals were based, was totally uncovered. In 
 front of Hooker was Lee's army, which had already heavily defeated him ; 
 in his rear was an unprotected line and base which the enemy, crossing 
 at Falmouth, might assail. These circumstances could not but precipi- 
 tate his retreat. This situation illustrates the impolicy of throwing a 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 257 
 
 whole army off its line of operation for the sake of turning the enemy ; 
 for though the chances of gaining a battle are increased, yet a reverse may 
 be absolutely fatal. 
 
 Considering it, then, as established that the proper way to turn the Distribution 
 flank of the defenders of a river is to hold the passage on the direct line of tllc turnin £ 
 with a covering force during the movement, it remains to consider what f 
 should be the proportions of the covering and turning wings respectively, 
 and their mode of operation. 
 
 The first object of the covering force is to resist a counter-attach; therefore 
 full advantage should be taken of the circumstance that an inferior force 
 can generally, for a time, successfully oppose the passage of a river at a 
 known point. The covering force should therefore be diminished to the 
 utmost extent consistent with safety, and the wing whose action will be 
 most decisive should be reinforced in proportion. To do this it will be 
 necessary, of course, to possess the means, by bridges or fords, of passing the 
 greater part of the army promptly across the river on the enemy's flank. 
 
 If the whole of the defensive army were assembled to meet the flank 
 attack, and the assailant's covering wing were to remain on the hither 
 bank, his chances in the battle would be proportionably diminished. The 
 second duty of the covering force should be to occupy and detain before it 
 as large a number as possible of the enemy, by maintaining a cannonade, 
 fire of infantry, and demonstrations of forcing a passage. Had the Federal 
 force at Centreville advanced to the river and made a persistent attack on 
 the lower points of passage, it would have been impossible to draw troops 
 from thence to meet the flank attack. There should be skilful and in- 
 cessant reconnoitring of the opposite bank ; and when it is evident that 
 the enemy has withdrawn all or most of the opposing forces to meet the 
 flank attack, the covering force should cross at once, multiply its means 
 of passage, and push the enemy on the march. Should the turning wing 
 be defeated before the arrival of the covering force on the field, the latter 
 should retire on the bridges by which it advanced, for the enemy will, or 
 ought to, try to intercept the retreat on that line. But should the main 
 army maintain the engagement, or continue to progress, the covering force 
 should advance and join in the action in a direction still covering its own 
 bridges ; for the example of "Waterloo shows how effective is a combined 
 attack from two divergent lines. 
 
 it 
 
258 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 The risk of failure, so far as it is caused by the difficulty of combining 
 the assailant's movements, will be greatly diminished by the use of the 
 field-telegraph. 
 
 A passage effected on the direct line of operation, and between, not 
 beyond, the extremities of the enemy's front, presents none of these diffi- 
 culties and necessities for skilful combined action. Every man should 
 cross : for the divided enemy will certainly devote all his efforts to re- 
 combination, not to counter-attack ; and in case of the assailant's defeat, 
 he covers his line in retiring. 
 
 When a general throws a turning force off the line of operation, beyond 
 a river, he naturally collects the rest of his army on the road forming the 
 part of that line which is nearest to the turning force, for the sake of 
 concentration. Thus, Louis Napoleon, sending M 'Mahon by Turbigo, col- 
 lects his army on the Novara-Vercelli road, neglecting that of Mortara- 
 Casale, by occupying which his forces would have been dangerously 
 extended on the day of battle. If, then, the enemy, abandoning the 
 defensive, crosses and attacks the covering force, on the hither bank, it 
 may be forced to fight on a front parallel to the last road which connects 
 it with its base while the turning force is beyond the river ; and if the 
 covering force be defeated the whole army may be ruined. We see what 
 the effect might have been had the Confederates crossed the Eappahan- 
 nock at Falmouth or Bull Run at the lower fords ; or had the Austrians, 
 from Vigevano, attacked the covering force at Novara in 1859. This 
 perilous position of an army astride a river will be better illustrated 
 by an actual example. 
 
 PASSAGE OF THE CHICKAHOMINY. 
 
 The stream itself is inconsiderable, forty feet wide, and fordable at low 
 
 water ; but it was liable to sudden floods, when the low grounds on both 
 
 sides were overflowed for a considerable distance. 
 
 White House The Federal army advanced from White House to Bottom's Bridge, 
 
 to Bottom's which had "been destroyed ; the advanced-guard forded the stream and 
 
 Bridge, 10. . 
 
 intrenched itself without opposition. 
 
 The centre and right moved to Mechanicsville, retiring whence, the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 259 
 
 Meadow's 
 Bridge, 13. 
 
 enemy destroyed the bridge, and prepared to oppose the passage from 
 commanding ground. The operations embraced the portion of the river Bottom's to 
 from Bottom's to Meadow's Bridge. 
 
 " The entire army," says M'Clellan, " could probably have been thrown 
 across the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, but this would 
 have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications, or to 
 protect our right and rear." 
 
 On the 30th May, four Federal divisions were on the right bank, be- Fair Oaks to 
 yond Bottom's Bridge ; they were attacked on the 31st in the indecisive Bottom,s 
 battle of Fair Oaks, and kept their hold of the bank. , ' 
 
 > r . . Federals 
 
 The nearest supports were two divisions six miles up the stream, which as t r ij e the 
 crossed by bridges already thrown, to support the assailed wing. river, 
 
260 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 are attacked 
 on the left 
 bank. 
 
 The most 
 effectual 
 counter-move- 
 ments open to 
 the defender. 
 
 Effect of in- 
 creased width 
 of the stream. 
 
 Having completed his bridges over the stream, M'Clellan intended to 
 cross entirely to the right bank and assail the Confederates before Rich- 
 mond, on the 26th June. But on that day he was himself attacked. 
 
 Jackson approached by Hanover Court- House, and part of the Con- 
 federate army before Richmond, which had hitherto fronted M'Clellan, 
 passed the Chickahominy above Meadow's Bridge and at Mechanicsville, 
 to join in the attack on the Federals on the left bank. The advanced- 
 guard of the Federals at Beaver Dam Creek was forced back to Gaines 
 Mill — whence to Coal Harbour a new line was formed by the 5th corps. 
 
 27th June. — The 5th corps was attacked. Part of the 6th and 2d 
 corps crossed from the right to the left bank to support it. Finally the 
 whole Federal right wing, outflanked on its right, was driven over the 
 Chickahominy to the right bank. 
 
 Thus the communications with White House were absolutely lost, and 
 in ordinary circumstances the army would have been ruined. It was in 
 the expectation of such a result that the Confederates had attacked on 
 that side. The army was saved by the fact that M'Clellan had made 
 arrangements previously for transferring his depots by water to the James 
 River ; hence the disaster did not entail ruin ; and the retreat upon the 
 new base was effected by very resolute fighting. But the example serves 
 to show, that when an army is astride a river it may be most effectually 
 attacked on the bank nearest its base, if the hostile forces are already on 
 that bank, or can readily pass to it, and if their own last line of retreat is 
 not immediately threatened by the enemy's movements beyond the river. 
 Reviewing the operations on the Ticino in 1859, it will now be readily 
 seen what an opportunity was open to Giulay had he met M'Mahon's 
 attack with an inferior retarding force, and, massing his troops on the 
 right bank (instead of crossing, as he did, to the left), thrown his whole 
 weight, on the 5th of June, on the side of Novara. 
 
 An increase in the width of the river increases in some respects 
 the difficulties of the assailant, by augmenting the difficulty of throw- 
 ing a bridge ; but without materially altering the case. The first 
 requisite for crossing is to establish some troops on the further bank 
 to cover the passage of the rest. And this object will be greatly aided 
 if artillery from the assailant's bank can bring such an effective fire 
 to bear on the defender's infantry, which may seek to overwhelm those 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 2G1 
 
 troops, as to keep it at a distance and prevent it from manoeuvring, 
 and also crush any batteries which the enemy may attempt to establish 
 to prevent the passage. Thus, under the conditions of artillery up to 
 ten years ago, if a river were only two hundred yards wide, a defender's 
 infantry assailing the first troops that passed over would be liable to be 
 cut to pieces by the fire of the guns on the hither bank. But if the river 
 were eight hundred yards wide, not only would the fire on the enemy's 
 infantry at that range be less certain and effective (since neither case-shot 
 from field-guns, nor grape from guns of position, would reach it), but the 
 defender's batteries established at six hundred yards from the river would 
 play effectively on the head of the bridge and the troops covering it, while 
 their distance — fourteen hundred yards — from the assailant's bank would 
 secure them from being overwhelmed by superior fire. 
 
 These conditions have been altered, on the whole, in favour of the Improved 
 assailant, by the improvement in weapons. For though the relations of wea P ons > m 
 
 this CclSG 
 
 the opposing batteries might remain unaltered, yet the infantry from the f avour t i' ie 
 one bank could now bring an effective fire to the aid of their comrades assailant. 
 on the other ; and thus the largest force — which, by the conditions of the 
 case, it is supposed the assailant would always bring to bear at the point 
 of passage — would prevail. If French troops crossing from Piacenza, 
 and English troops thrown over the Douro at Oporto, in both cases far 
 beyond the range of their comrades' muskets, could by surprise establish 
 themselves and cover the passage, much more would such enterprises be 
 likely to succeed when the first troops should be supported by the fire 
 of the army on the other bank. And another circumstance in favour 
 of the assailant is, that a large river will generally be navigable, and it 
 and its tributaries will in most cases furnish a number of large boats 
 sufficient to throw at once on the opposite bank a force capable of main- 
 taining itself. 
 
 The possession by the defender of fortresses or bridge-heads giving the Effect of forti- 
 command of both sides of a bridge modifies the conditions of passing a fieii r assa g es - 
 river. If they exist on the flanks of a line of operation, it will generally 
 be impossible to pass the river on a flank ; for the force attempting the 
 turning movement must pass completely round the fortified passage before 
 it could aid in the attack on another passage not so guarded. Therefore 
 in such a case the passage will be sought on the front of the defensive 
 
262 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 line. And if the defender be entirely restricted to the defensive, he will 
 still be probably unable to prevent the passage. The possession of the 
 bridge-head of Mannheim did not prevent the French from crossing the 
 Ehine ; and even on the short line of the Mincio the fortresses of Mantua 
 and Peschiera did not prevent the Allies from crossing between them in 
 1859. Their value to the defensive army will consist principally in the 
 facility and support they would afford to it in assuming the offensive 
 against the enemy on his own bank : and the degree of their influence 
 must depend on their position, a question which will be discussed here- 
 after in the chapter on Fortresses. 
 
 From a review of the chapter, the following deductions may be 
 gathered : — 
 General con- 1. Neither a mountain-chain nor a river affords a permanent line of 
 elusions. defence, unless in exceptional circumstances : and it does not balance, in 
 
 any appreciable degree, the disadvantage of decidedly inferior force. 
 
 2. The conclusions formerly arrived at respecting the general questions 
 of turning a flank or breaking a front are only modified, not changed, in 
 the case of the passage of a defended river. For if the defensive line be 
 too extended, it will be best to pass the obstacle on the front ; otherwise 
 to turn the flank. 
 
 3. In case of turning the flank, the risk incurred by the turning force 
 in case of defeat will be lessened by the river; since, to intercept its 
 retreat, the enemy must cross the river between its point of passage and 
 the point held by the rest of the army, where, it is to be presumed, no 
 ready passage will exist. 
 
 4. An army defending a river, on finding its flank turned, does not 
 generally seek to re-establish affairs by itself crossing to the other bank, 
 but rather seeks to concentrate against the part of the enemy that has 
 crossed. 
 
 5. Nevertheless such a counter-stroke, when the defender has the means 
 of speedily crossing, may be the most decisive course ; and the occasion for 
 dealing it will be the defender's best, though very transient, opportunity. 
 
 6. On his own bank, the defender's most effective action will be against 
 the outward flank of the turning force if it advances on a front perpen- 
 dicular to the river. 
 
 7. Lastly — and very important for discussing the subject of the next 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 263 
 
 chapter — iu the majority of cases the passage of a river at points deliber- 
 ately defended is difficult, doubtful, and costly to the assailant in men 
 and time. 
 
 The true uses of obstacles, then, are not, as might at first sight appear, True uses of 
 merely to increase the means of passive resistance. Their best effects obstacles - 
 will be — 
 
 To give their possessor increased power of manoeuvring offensively, and of 
 taking the enemy at a disadvantage. But their defensive uses are vari- 
 ous : — 
 
 To cover a flank movement. — Thus, when Lee, after defeating Pope, Defensive uses 
 crossed the Potomac above Harper's Ferry, and pushed his nain force ° ° s at es - 
 towards the Susquehanna (which was, relatively to the Federal army at 
 "Washington, a flank movement), he held the passes of the South Moun- 
 tain with Hill's corps. M'Clellan from Washington attacked the passes 
 with greatly superior numbers, but did not succeed in forcing them till 
 the main Confederate army had retraced its steps and was assembled 
 behind the Antietam, covering its line of retreat. 
 
 To afford opportunity for rallying a beaten army — as the Mincio did 
 after Solferino, although found to be unsuitable as a permanent line of 
 defence. The impression which so generally prevails, that it must be a 
 mistake to fight with a river in rear, is a popular error. Provided the 
 passages are assured, and sufficiently numerous in proportion to the force 
 of the army, no circumstance can be more fortunate for a defeated host 
 than the existence of an unfordable river in its rear, at such a distance as 
 to leave full space for the retiring troops to file upon the passages behind 
 their rear-guards. The first effective troops and batteries that pass line 
 the bank on each side of the bridge, and give time for restoring order. 
 It is only when those passages are inadequate or precarious, or the river 
 too close to the rear of the troops, that the risk of disaster is increased. 
 
 To enable part of an army to hold a forward line and protect territory 
 till reinforcements arrive : as the Prussians might have awaited the Rus- 
 sians on the Elbe in 1806 ; or to cover a concentration in rear like Zieten 
 on the Sambre in 1815. 
 
 To enable a rear-guard to cover a retreat. 
 
264 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 See Map 
 
 No. 13. 
 
 Example of 
 the use of ob- 
 stacles to a 
 rear-guard. 
 
 Thomar to 
 Leiria, 25. 
 
 Leiria to Tor- 
 res Vedras, 
 52. 
 
 Thomar to 
 rombal, 25. 
 
 Pombal to 
 Redinha, 6. 
 
 MASSENA'S KETKEAT (l81l). 
 
 In March 1811, Massena held Santarem with his 2d corps — the 8th 
 corps was on his right at Pernes and Torres Novas — the 6th corps in 
 reserve at Thomar, with a division under Loison guarding the bank of 
 the Tagus on its left. 
 
 Massena had resolved to retreat by the roads of Pombal and Espinhal 
 to Coimbra. 
 
 His first move was to march the 6th corps and cavalry, under Ney, to 
 Leiria. This seemed to threaten an attack on Torres Vedras, guarded on 
 the side of the Zizambre by two of Wellington's divisions. 
 
 Having sent all encumbrances to the rear, Massena began his retreat 
 on the 5th March — the 2d corps upon Thomar, the 8th corps on Torres 
 Novas. The bridges on the Alviella stream were destroyed. 
 
 6th March. — 2d corps from Thomar on Espinhal. 
 
 The rest of the army, including Key's corps at Leiria, concentrated on 
 Pombal. 
 
 The heads of the British columns followed the 8th corps on Pombal. 
 
 The 3d and 5th English divisions from Torres Vedras on Leiria. 
 
 9th March, — Massena assembled for battle in position before Pombal. 
 
 An English brigade followed the 2d corps on Espinhal. 
 
 10th March. — Wellington formed to attack ; when the enemy retired 
 through Pombal, covered by a rear-guard under Ney on the right bank of 
 the Soure. 
 
 In the night Massena regularly organised his retreat. The baggage 
 and sick, protected by the reserve cavalry, were sent in advance — the 8th 
 corps followed ; the 6th corps, under Ney, covered the movement. " The 
 country," says Napier, "was full of strong positions, the roads hollow 
 and confined by mountains on either hand, and every village formed a 
 defile : the weather also was moderate and favourable to the enemy, and 
 Ney, with a happy mixture of courage and skill, illustrated every league 
 of ground by some signal combination of war." 
 
 12th March. — The head of the British column came upon part of Ney's 
 rear-guard (5000) deployed on a height across the fork of the streams, 
 and coverinfr the ford and bridge of the Eedinha. Behind him was a 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 265 
 
 narrow bridge and defile ; beyond the stream, on heights commanding his 
 position, was a division of infantry with cavalry and guns. 
 
 AWllington, unable to ascertain the real force of the enemy, formed his Rear-guard 
 army for attack. The reconnaissance and deployment occupied some forcesthe 
 
 enemy to 
 
 hours. Ney waited to the last moment — then withdrew his right and j^w 
 centre, covered by his left, through the village, which he set on fire, and R e dinha to 
 over the river. His reserves from the heights on the other bank covered Condeixa, 12. 
 the passage, then the French fell back on Condeixa. 
 
 " There is no doubt," says Napier, " that Ney remained a quarter of an 
 hour too long upon his first position ; and Lord Wellington, deceived by 
 the skilful arrangement of his reserve, paid him too much respect." 
 
 13th. — The British pursued and came on the 6th and 8th corps in 
 order of battle at ten o'clock. Massena, who had intended to pass the 
 Mondego at Coimbra, found the further bank occupied by Portuguese Condeixa to 
 militia and the bridge destroyed, and resolved to retreat by the Puente Coimura > 6 - 
 de Murcella up the left bank of the Mondego to Guarda and Almeida. 
 To insure this change of line, he had occupied Fonte Coberta strongly ; 
 and the approach to Condeixa being difficult, he was confident of effecting 
 the operation. 
 
 Wellington detached a division over the hills to his right, to turn the Rear-guard 
 French left. At three in the afternoon it arrived beyond the enemy's retards the 
 
 enemy till 
 
 flank. Ney, setting fire to Condeixa to impede pursuit, fell back towards turned. 
 Miranda. The British following, cut off from him the divisions at Fonte 
 Coberta on the one side, and opened communications with Coimbra F. Coberta to 
 on the other. The French troops at Fonte Coberta marched round the Mirauda > 10 - 
 British in the night, and recovered communications at Miranda with the 
 main body. 
 
 14th. — The French strongly posted on the heights bordering the left 
 bank of the Deuca, from Miranda downward. Wellington sent a divi- 
 sion by the road Panella-Espinhal to unite with the British brigade 
 on the Esphinal road, attack the 2d corps, and turn the French position 
 by crossing the Deuca. Another division turned the position more 
 immediately, while the division leading the main column attacked in 
 front. Ney held the position until the main column had deployed, Rear-guard 
 and the divisions had turned his flank, then retired through Miranda. re P eats the 
 Massena, threatened in rear by the British troops on the Esphinal 
 
2G6 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Miranda to 
 the Alva, 14. 
 
 Bear-guard 
 
 suffers for 
 committing 
 itself to an 
 engagement. 
 
 road, burnt Miranda and passed the Ceira, leaving Ney to cover the 
 passage. " His whole army," says Napier, " was now compressed and 
 crowded in one narrow line between the high sierras and the Mondego, 
 and to lighten the march he destroyed a quantity of ammunition and 
 baggage." 
 
 loth. — Ney, deploying a large force on the left bank of the Ceira, was 
 attacked and driven into the river with heavy loss. He blew up the 
 bridge, however, and continued to guard the right bank, while the main 
 army took post behind the Alva. 
 
 16th. — The British halted for supplies, and to await the subsidence of 
 the flooded river. 
 
 17th. — Wellington crossed by a bridge thrown in the night, and by 
 fords, and found the French behind the Alva with its lower bridges 
 destroyed. 
 
 18th. — Three divisions menaced the Upper Alva, two cannonaded the 
 passages below. Massena thereupon concentrated on the Moita ridge, 
 thereby forcing Wellington also to concentrate. 
 
 19^. — Massena retreated on Celorico. 
 
 Wellington concentrated on the Moita ridge. 
 
 These operations will suffice to show the manner in which obstacles aid, 
 and are indeed essential to, the efforts of a retarding force, which opposes 
 a superior enemy, whether as a rear-guard or as a body covering some 
 decisive movement of the rest of the army. Wellington, coming up with 
 Ney (who has about 10,000 against 40,000), must choose between attack- 
 ing with the head of his column, with certain loss and with uncertain 
 result — for he could not know, except by experience, what force might be 
 in front of him ; or deploying his whole army for battle, as at Eedinha ; 
 or having recourse to a turning movement : and either of the last two 
 methods cost him half a day in preparation. 
 
 On the other hand, the pursuing force, certain of support, operates 
 boldly to a flank, and the retreating army is exposed to the risk of losing 
 troops, either from being cut off by withdrawing too late, as at Fonte 
 Coberta, or from being overwhelmed by superior forces, as on the Ceira. 
 
 The difficulties of operating by a single road, and the nature of the 
 operations described in Part IV. Chapter L, are well illustrated by the 
 remarks quoted from Napier. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 267 
 
 The latter part of Massena's retreat exemplifies the use which may be 
 made of an obstacle to cover a change of front. The French from Celorico 
 made for the Coa by Guarda and Sabugal. Their position at Guarda 
 threatened the flank of Wellington's line along the Mondego, the head of 
 his column being at Celorico. Had he followed the same road as the 
 French, that of Celorico-Guarda, with his whole army, he might have 
 found his communications endangered ; but by taking advantage of the 
 bend of the Mondego, occupying the heights looking on its upper bridges 
 with his right wing, he brought his left round, and changed the direction 
 of his front in security. 
 
 But besides their value to a defensive or retreating army, rivers may be Use of a 
 turned to account by an army during its advance, in a very important nver to secure 
 
 . . the communi- 
 
 manner, by securing the Line of communication. cations 
 
 "When an army is operating close to its base, and that base is extensive, 
 it can change the direction of its front, or of its line of operation, freely, 
 without endangering its communications. But as it advances, and in- 
 creases the distance from its base, its lengthened communications become 
 more and more open to attack. It can no longer change the direction of 
 its front, or of its line of operation, without laying bare some essential 
 communications. It is hampered by the lengthening chain it drags after 
 it ; and while the enemy, if near his base, or in his own country, can 
 manoeuvre freely on many sides, the advancing army becomes more and 
 more rigid and constrained, till at last, far from thinking of offensive 
 movements, its whole energies are absorbed in covering its precarious 
 communications. 
 
 But if, under these circumstances, it can master some defensive line, 
 strong for defence, and create thereon depots of material of all kinds, 
 collected from the surrounding districts, and transferred from its own 
 territory, it has carried its base forward, and recovers its freedom of 
 mauceuvre. Such a line is afforded by the course of a considerable river. 
 Important passages on it, commanding many roads, are strengthened — 
 recruits are brought thither from the rear, invalids are sent thither from 
 the army, to occupy the works, and diminish the number of effective men 
 withdrawn from active operations. Henceforth, all the roads between 
 
268 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 the base and the river will be secure ; and the relieved general, restored 
 to full activity, will now be solicitous to preserve only his communica- 
 tions with the river. 
 
 Thus, Napoleon in 1813, advancing from the Ehine into Northern 
 Germany, makes a secondary base of the Elbe from Pirna down to the 
 sea. Pivoted thus, and creating a vast depot in Dresden, he directs his 
 movements northward against Berlin, eastward into Silesia, southward 
 into Bohemia, the line to France through Leipsic remaining all the time 
 secure : and it is not till he quits the Elbe that this line is endangered. 
 
 Thus, also, Marmont's Army of Portugal, linked to France by the single 
 road of Bayonne, broadens its base by fortifying the Douro from the Esla 
 to Valladolid, and acquires all the latitude of action displayed in the 
 campaign of Salamanca. 
 
 . - r 
 
 When a general, surveying the map of the theatre, finds direct obstacles 
 in the path he must advance by, he sees in them, if he be confident in his 
 own skill in manoeuvring, increased opportunities for obtaining strategical 
 successes. And the opposing leader will, or ought to, find them illusory 
 aids, if he attempts to hold them entirely on the defensive. To turn 
 them to account he must make of them successively the pivots of offen- 
 sive operations, or employ them as a means of temporarily retarding the 
 enemy. In fact, like any other complications in a game, they offer on 
 both sides additional opportunities to skill and talent, and additional 
 embarrassments to incapacity. 
 
MAP N° 13 
 
 .Uiii.'kIh _ 
 
 C.iuil:nl Rodrig^f 
 
SCAJ.J-; OF Mlt.ES- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 269 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OBSTACLES WHOSE GENERAL DIRECTION IS PARALLEL TO THE PATH 
 BY WHICH AN ARMY ADVANCES TOWARDS ITS OBJECT. 
 
 When French and Austrian armies moving east and west approach each Mountain- 
 other on the Po or the Danube, those rivers form obstacles of the kind ran g es of tlns 
 
 kind. 
 
 whose influence is discussed in the present chapter. And while direct 
 obstacles are at once seen to interpose difficulties and delay in the way of 
 an advancing army, the effect of this other class of impediments is by no 
 means obvious, and requires both thought and illustration to render it 
 apparent. 
 
 When Massena followed Wellington to the lines of Torres Vedras, the Hazard of ad- 
 ridge of the Monte Junto divided lon^itudinallv the space between the vanclD s on 
 
 ° . . . both sides of 
 
 Tagus and the sea. Had Wellington retreated by both sides of the ridge, snc h an b- 
 his wings would have been separated by the obstacle, and Massena, fol- stacle. 
 lowing by one side only, might have overwhelmed a wing with his whole 
 force before the other could by a circuitous march support it. In the 
 same way had Massena advanced on both sides of the ridge, while Wel- 
 lington retreated by one, the whole English army might have fallen on a 
 wing of the French. 
 
 This ridge, ending at the Zizambre, did not penetrate the lines ; Wel- 
 lington, therefore, could extend behind them across the whole space 
 between the Tagus and the sea. The French, on the other hand, were 
 still cramped by it ; and all their interests lying away from the sea, of 
 which England held the dominion, they concentrated between the ridge 
 and the river ; and having once elected to do so, they could not pass the 
 ridge to attack on the other side without the risk of being themselves 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 269 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OBSTACLES WHOSE GENERAL DIRECTION IS PARALLEL TO THE PATH 
 BY WHICH AN ARMY ADVANCES TOWARDS ITS OBJECT. 
 
 When French and Austrian armies moving east and west approach each Mountain- 
 other on the Po or the Danube, those rivers form obstacles of the kind ran S es of tlus 
 
 kind. 
 
 whose influence is discussed in the present chapter. And while direct 
 obstacles are at once seen to interpose difficulties and delay in the way of 
 an advancing army, the effect of this other class of impediments is by no 
 means obvious, and requires both thought and illustration to render it 
 apparent. 
 
 When M assena followed Wellington to the lines of Torres Vedras, the Hazard of ad- 
 ridge of the Monte Junto divided longitudinallv the space between the vancin s on 
 
 ° . . both sides of 
 
 Tagus and the sea. Had Wellington retreated by both sides of the ridge, suc h an b_ 
 his wings would have been separated by the obstacle, and Massena, fol- Steele. 
 lowing by one side only, might have overwhelmed a wing with his whole 
 force before the other could by a circuitous march support it. In the 
 same way had Massena advanced on both sides of the ridge, while Wel- 
 lington retreated by one, the whole English army might have fallen on a 
 wing of the French. 
 
 This ridge, ending at the Zizambre, did not penetrate the lines ; Wel- 
 lington, therefore, could extend behind them across the whole space 
 between the Tagus and the sea. The French, on the other hand, were 
 still cramped by it ; and all their interests lying away from the sea, of 
 which England held the dominion, they concentrated between the ridge 
 and the river ; and having once elected to do so, they could not pass the 
 ridge to attack on the other side without the risk of being themselves 
 
270 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 To advance 
 on one side 
 necessitates a 
 detachment 
 in rear. 
 
 Deduction. 
 
 Manner in 
 which the ob- 
 stacle may 
 .screen an 
 offensive 
 movement. 
 
 assailed while in the act of passing, with the head of their columns 
 separated from the rear by a difficult obstacle. 
 
 When Massena fell back on Santarem, Wellington followed him, still 
 on that side of the ridge. But when the French halted beyond the 
 northern extremity of the obstacle, while he was still cramped by it, the 
 disadvantage was transferred from them to him, and led, as we have seen, 
 to the dispersion of his army ; for while they, from Leiria, could advance 
 directly on Torres Vedras, he, from the Eio Mayor, must make the circuit 
 by Alemquer, in order to reach that point, and it was therefore necessary 
 to leave there troops sufficient to hold the ground till he could arrive. 
 And as the screen of the mountains would enable the French to make 
 their first march undiscovered, their relative proximity to Torres Vedras 
 was thereby increased. 
 
 It may be assumed, therefore, that when, of two armies operating near 
 each other on an obstacle of this kind, one immediately holds a passage 
 over the obstacle, and the other is at a distance from its nearest passage, 
 the former possesses the advantage. 
 
 The manner in which an obstacle of this kind may be used as a screen 
 for a movement against the enemy's communications is exemplified in the 
 Leipsic campaign. 
 
 Che m nit z 
 
 Napoleon had advanced from Leipsic through Dresden and Bautzen to 
 the Bober in Silesia, pushing back the Prussians and Bussians. During 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 271 
 
 this march the mountains of Bohemia lay on his right flank. An armis- 
 tice being agreed on, both parties halted in their positions — the Allies 
 being posted with their left on the mountains west of Glatz, and their 
 right on the Katsbach. 
 
 Over the western face of the mountains (the Erzgebirge) there are 
 several passes, and the Elbe there pierces the barrier. Napoleon had 
 occupied the Elbe from Dresden upward to the Bohemian side of the 
 mountains. Between the Elbe and the Allied position only two passes 
 practicable for great operations existed — namely, from Gorlitz by Zittau Gorlitz to 
 and Eeichenberg — these passes Napoleon occupied. ' 
 
 Thus, when the armistice terminated, Napoleon, minus the detachments French front 
 
 in his rear, fronted the concentrated forces of the Allies. 1S a a „ 1S " 
 
 tance from 
 
 They by their position covered a passage from Silesia over the moun- it s nearest 
 tains into Bohemia. Leaving Blucher in a strong position to cover the passage, 
 roads to the Oder, by which Bussian reinforcements were coming, they scom ; 
 
 inand a neigli- 
 
 marched, with their main body in successive corps, on the 13th and 14th i) 0ur i ng ,, as _ 
 
 August, traversing Bohemia, crossing the Elbe at Leitmeritz, and aiming sage, 
 
 at Dresden. ' 
 
 On the 19th, Napoleon, hearing of the movement, led his detachments 
 
 from the passes of Zittau and Eeichenberg southward ; but finding that 
 
 the Allies were already beyond the Elbe, he left a rear-guard to face 
 
 Blucher, and marched 80,000 men in three days ninety miles back to 
 
 Dresden — the Allies, after moving through the four principal defiles, and and break out 
 
 pressing back the French corps guarding the roadway of the Elbe, being on Na P oleon s 
 
 rear, 
 then assembled before the city. 
 
 In this also is seen another proof of the assertion in Part III. Chapter 
 
 IV., which has received so many confirmations in the course of this 
 
 work, that when armies are aiming at each other's communications, that 
 
 army whose communications are most immediately threatened abandons 
 
 the initiative, and conforms to the movement of its adversary. For 
 
 Napoleon was linked to France by the sole line Dresden-Leipsic-Hanau ; 
 
 and though, when he marched from Zittau into Bohemia on the 19th, he 
 
 was nearer the road by which the Allies had marched, and by which 
 
 they communicated with Blucher, than they were to Dresden, yet they 
 
 were not bound to that road, for, Austria having joined the coalition, 
 
 they might now base themselves on the Danube by Prague and Budweis. 
 
272 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Napoleon, therefore, not being able to deliver an effectual counter-stroke 
 against their communications, was obliged to interpose for the defence of 
 his own. 
 
 Rivers of this 
 kind. 
 
 See Map 
 
 No. 5. 
 
 Sardinians at 
 Casale check 
 the Austrian 
 advance on 
 Turin. 
 
 Austrians at 
 La Stella pre- 
 vent the 
 French from 
 moving on 
 Piacenza. 
 
 We will now turn to the case of rivers forming obstacles of the kind 
 in question ; and the campaign of 1859 at once affords two simple and 
 forcible illustrations of their influence. 
 
 Before the arrival of the French in the theatre of war, the Sardinians 
 held the line of the Dora Baltea, seeking to cover Turin directly against 
 the Austrians, then on the Sesia ; but by the advice of the French Mar- 
 shal Canrobert, they relinquished this line, which was weak in the 
 centre, too extensive for their numbers, and liable to be turned on the 
 left by the road of Ivrea, and took post at Casale on the south side of 
 the Po, holding, by garrisons in works on the left bank, the passage of 
 the river. 
 
 Under these circumstances, if Giulay should throw his whole force 
 towards Turin, the Sardinians would in a moment, by an advance on 
 the road Casale- Vercelli, sever his communications. He must therefore 
 place a force opposite Casale to guard against this peril, while the heads 
 of his columns pushed upon the capital. But what if this Austrian 
 covering force should be too weak to maintain itself — and not only itself, 
 but the whole line between the Ticino and the head of the columns — 
 against a combined attack of the Sardinians crossing at Casale ? In such 
 a case the army would be compromised. Hence it was that Giulay took 
 his steps so cautiously towards Turin, throwing forward successive corps 
 supporting each other, and placing a large force astride of the road 
 Casale - Vercelli ; till finally, caution prevailing over enterprise, and 
 French troops appearing in the works of Casale, he relinquished the 
 attempt, and withdrew behind the Sesia. 
 
 Shortly afterwards the situation was reversed ; for, when the French 
 had joined the Sardinians, the Austrians were thrown on the defensive, 
 and it was manifestly the interest of the Allies to pass the Po beyond 
 the enemy's flank at Piacenza. But the Austrians held, near the junction 
 of the Ticino, & fortified passage over the Po at La Stella, the works on 
 the south bank there forming an intrenched camp capable of holding a 
 large force. Had the French from Voghera passed along the defile of 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 273 
 
 Stradella aiming at Piacenza, the whole Austrian army might, from La 
 Stella, have burst on their flanks, split them asunder, and overwhelmed 
 all eastward of that point ; and this, doubtless, was one potent reason 
 inducing the Emperor to advance by the line, strategically so inferior in 
 importance, Casale-Vercelli-Novara. 
 
 To leave a defended passage of a river of this kind behind, when the Assailant re- 
 defender holds both sides of the bridge, demands, then, a covering force q iul-es gr^tiy 
 
 superior nuin- 
 
 at least equal to the force of the enemy ; and moreover, the next passage, bers 
 which the assailant has just quitted, must, until the enemy's rear is 
 attained, be adequately occupied, lest the enemy should break out upon 
 the rear (as the Allies must have continued to observe Valenza while 
 passing La Stella, and aiming at Piacenza). 
 
 If the defensive army is restricted to its own bank, or if it is not in Risk of the 
 condition to cross and fight, the risk incurred by the assailant in march- ^ ssailant 
 
 , lessened if the 
 
 ing along the river to break out upon the enemy's rear is proportionally c i e f en ders are 
 diminished. It will be only necessary to conduct the movement with restricted to 
 such secrecy that the assailants shall assemble on the further bank, at the 
 point aimed at, faster than the defenders, so as to avoid the risk of either 
 attempting to force a passage in the face of superior numbers, or of being 
 overwhelmed during the passage by the more rapid concentration of the 
 enemy. Thus, in 1796, the Austrians held the Po from opposite Valenza 
 to Belgiojoso ; Napoleon's divisions held the south bank from Valenza to 
 Voghera. He resolved to march down the bank beyond the Austrian 
 front, and pass at Piacenza ; and to this end his divisions marched simul- 
 taneously in that direction, except that at Valenza, which remained both 
 to detain the Austrians and to cover the communications with Turin from 
 counter-attack. Having succeeded in gaining one march on the enemy, 
 he crossed at Piacenza, in boats, faster than they could arrive there, beat 
 their first troops, and drove them apart ; seized the bridge of the Adda at 
 Lodi, and forced the dispersed enemy to seek the shelter of the Mincio. 
 And another instance similar to this has already been cited, in the 
 operations of Moreau against Kray, when he threw his right over the 
 Danube at Blenheim to cut off the Austrians in Ulm. Each of these 
 operations, however, was undertaken against a beaten army, from which 
 a vigorous counter-stroke was little to be feared ; but they serve to prove 
 that, in order to turn the river to full account, the defender must be in 
 
 s 
 
274 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Example of 
 necessity of 
 guarding pas- 
 sages in rear. 
 
 Influence of 
 the obstacle 
 not to be 
 evaded. 
 
 complete possession of points of passage, and this will generally be 
 secured by field-works covering both ends of the bridge. Supplementary 
 bridges should also be thrown to facilitate the assembly on either bank. 
 These conditions fulfilled, the position of the defender is such as to com- 
 pensate for considerable inferiority of numbers. 
 
 Hence it is that, as the Archduke tells us, the first care of a general 
 posted on the Danube should be to establish, at the point he occupies, a 
 double bridge-head — that is, a work at each end of the bridge, and in- 
 suring the passage of the army to either bank. 
 
 To show the necessity of guarding the communications of an army 
 which is about to cross a river of this kind to attack the enemy, even 
 when that enemy does not hold assured passages, let us take the case of 
 Napoleon and the Archduke in 1809. The Emperor had captured Vienna, 
 and was about to cross at Essling to attack the Archduke, who did not 
 possess a bridge between Eatisbon and Vienna, but only the means of 
 throwing one. Yet during this critical operation, when every French 
 soldier was wanted at the point of attack, Davout was retained with 
 30,000 men on the right bank between Vienna and Krems, so as to be 
 able to assemble them at either point in one march, and guard the com- 
 munications with France ; while, further back, Linz was guarded by a 
 corps of Wurtembergers, and Passau by another of Saxons, and a strong 
 garrison was kept in Eatisbon. Aud when Napoleon subsequently with- 
 drew many of these troops to reinforce the main army, he compensated 
 for the want of them by erecting strong works, suitably armed and 
 garrisoned, at all possible points of passage — that is to say, at all points 
 which presented, on each bank, roads suitable for the sustained opera- 
 tions of great armies. 
 
 It might at first appear that, in an extensive theatre, the influence of 
 an obstacle of this kind might be evaded by the assailants advancing on a 
 line far distant from it. But the campaign of 1796 in Germany, already 
 detailed, shows the futility of such an attempt. Jourdan, whose march 
 lay a long way from the Danube, was nevertheless compelled in a moment 
 to pause, and then to retreat, by the advance of the Archduke on the 
 line Neuburg-Nuremberg, perpendicular to the French communications. 
 
 In fact, an obstacle of this kind confers on its possessor all the advan- 
 tages of the angular base augmented, because extending to both sides of 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 275 
 
 the theatre. It presents a succession of points which must either he 
 directly attacked, or turned under protection of a covering force, and 
 either course demands superior numbers. Of the two kinds of obstacles, 
 rivers are best for defence, because it is much easier to pass troops over 
 bridges than over a path in a chain of mountains, and the army that 
 holds the passage has, therefore, readier means of concentrating on either 
 side of the obstacle, or of maintaining communications between the wings 
 if astride of it ; while it is equally serviceable as a screen for movements, 
 and as a means of dividing the enemy. 
 
 Supposing, then, an Austrian army in a war with France to have 
 advanced up the Danube to Ulm, a French army, aiming at Vienna, must 
 either drive the Austrians from Ulm, or, passing that place, must cover 
 its march with a force capable of dealing with the whole Austrian army. 
 Should it, without such protection, continue to advance eastward, the 
 Austrians, descending perpendicularly on its line of communication with 
 France, w T ould force it to form front to a flank. If the French were 
 defeated in this way on the side of Munich, they would be driven on the 
 Tyrol — if on the side of ^Nuremberg, they would be driven on the Maine ; 
 while in either case the Austrians, if defeated, would obtain shelter behind 
 the Danube. And if the French army should hold the river down to 
 Eatisbon, the case would be reversed in its favour, for the Austrians could 
 not pass westward beyond the Isar on one side nor Bayreuth on the other. 
 
 We may now understand what the Archduke Charles meant when he Consequent 
 
 said, "The history of the wars of Southern Germany, since the conquest im P ortance of 
 
 i -r. •, • i , the Danube, 
 
 by the Eomans to the nineteenth century, furnishes a thousand proofs of this 
 
 maxim, that the valley of the Danube is the key to the country. In all 
 times its banks have been struggled for, and the issue of these great con- 
 flicts has always been to the advantage of the side that mastered them." 
 
 But he expressly limits the influential portion of the river to the space but only a 
 between Ulm and Eatisbon ; and the reason is that, above and below, mtam P or * 
 
 tion of it. 
 
 the country does not afford roads by which to operate on both banks, and 
 is unfit, from its nature, for the manoeuvres of great armies. "Were an 
 Austrian army posted on the Danube above Ulm, the French from the 
 Ehine, blocking the defiles of the Forest, might pass round it to Ulm. In 
 fact, the mountains, with their defiles, would neutralise the influence of 
 the river ; and below Eatisbon, down to Passau, the difficulties of the 
 
276 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Bohemian mountains, and the absence of passages, would render the 
 possession of the river of small value. 
 Case of armies It might happen that the French would hold one part of the river, the 
 each holding Austrians the other. The French might be at Neuburg, the Austrians at 
 the river. Ingolstadt. If the French wished to advance, they must either pass by 
 the passage of Ingolstadt or force it. The risk of passing it by has been 
 discussed. If the French advanced to attack it by both banks, the Aus- 
 trians, concentrating on one, and holding the passage with a containing 
 force, would throw their weight on a portion of the French. If the French 
 advanced altogether on one bank, the Austrians, if too weak to accept 
 battle uncovered, might concentrate on the other, still maintaining their 
 communications with Eatisbon ; thus the enemy must force a passage at 
 a known point. For example, in 1796, the Archduke charged Latour, if 
 he were pressed by Moreau, to cross the Danube. And even supposing 
 the opposite bank to that on which the French were advancing should not 
 be defensible at that point, yet the course of the river would be certain to 
 supply ground suitable for the purpose ; for in order to be indefensible, 
 it must be commanded by the opposite bank, and devoid of all advantages 
 for disputing the passage. If the banks were of equal command on both 
 sides, or level on both sides — or if the Austrian bank, though the lower, 
 afforded good points of defence — or if, on that bank, a good position 
 existed within cannon-shot of the bridge — the enemy must attack at a 
 disadvantage. One or other of these conditions would exist in the great 
 majority of cases ; and points of passage where these conditions did not 
 exist, if not capable of being rendered available by fortifications, need not 
 be included in the system of defence. 
 The army Since, then, either to force a passage, or to pass it by, demands superior 
 
 that advances forces, we find that the advantages of a line of defence of this kind are 
 
 offers an ad- 
 vantage to its sucn as t° compensate for considerable inferiority of numbers ; but that 
 
 adversary. these advantages are entirely on the side that holds the defensive, and to 
 
 profit by them, an army must take position near a -point of passage, and 
 
 await the movements of its adversary. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 277 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 CASE OF TWO OR MORE CONVERGENT RIVERS WHOSE GENERAL 
 COURSE IS PARALLEL TO THE PATH BY WHICH AN ARMY 
 
 ADVANCES TOWARDS ITS OBJECT. — CAMPAIGN OF 1814 IN See Map 
 
 No. 14. 
 CHAMPAGNE. 
 
 Great additional complexity is introduced into the question of the influ- 
 ence of rivers of this class, when two or more flow in the same general 
 direction and converge. 
 
 If the operations lie altogether on the outward bank of one of two 
 such rivers, the other river loses all immediate importance. Thus the 
 Isar would have no influence on a campaign north of the Danube. 
 
 But it may happen that the most direct routes lie between such rivers ; Conditions 
 and moreover, in the various windings of the streams, pass from one bank under whlcn 
 to the other. In this case an army, advancing by these routes, must ' ces - m t h{ 3 
 sometimes be under the necessity of forcing the passage at a known point, case. 
 And while moving on the inner bank of one river it will be exposed in 
 flank to the direct attack of an enemy who makes the other river the pivot 
 of his stroke. Thus one great road to Paris from the east passes to the 
 south bank of the Marne at Chalons, and repasses to. the north bank 
 at Trilport. And another road, also from the east, passes the Aube at 
 Dolancourt, crosses to the south bank of the Seine at Tro} r es, and repasses 
 to the north bank at Nogent. An army moving from Chalons to Trilport 
 exposes a flank to the attack of an enemy posted on the Seine ; an army 
 moving from Chaumont to Dolancourt exposes a flank to the attack of an 
 enemy posted on the Upper Marne at St Dizier ; and on again emerging 
 into the space between the rivers at Nogent, it is exposed to the attack 
 of an enemy pivoting on the lower Marne. The ensuing narrative of 
 
278 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 operations will give the reader an illustration of what is perhaps the 
 most complex problem which a theatre of war can present. 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF 1814 IN CHAMPAGNE. 
 
 After the battle of Leipsic, Napoleon retreated to France by way of 
 Frankfort and Mayence, leaving garrisons in many fortresses in Germany 
 (where they were lost to him), in Holland, and on the Belgian and Ger- 
 man frontiers of France. 
 
 The Allied army of Bohemia, under Schwartzenberg, approached the 
 Ehine at Basle. 
 
 Basle to Co- The army of Silesia, under Blucher, approached the Ehine at Coblentz, 
 
 blentz, 220. Mayence, and Mannheim. 
 
 Two corps, Prussian and Eussian, under Bulow and Winzingerode, in 
 a series of operations expelled the French from Holland. 
 
 Prussian plan Blucher wished the united armies of the Allies to cross the Ehine 
 
 of invasion, "between Mayence and Coblentz. If the fortresses of the Moselle should 
 prove to be weakly garrisoned, he proposed to take them — if strong, to 
 observe them ; and then to march by this, the shortest, line to Paris, return- 
 ing if necessary, after overthrowing Napoleon, to capture the strong places. 
 
 Austrian plan. The Austrians wished to turn the line of fortresses which guarded 
 Paris from the east, by advancing from Switzerland. They argued that 
 the investment of the great fortresses, by withdrawing so many detach- 
 ments superior in number to the garrisons, would tell against the Allies. 
 Moreover, they wished, by operating from Switzerland, to separate Napo- 
 leon from his army in Italy. Therefore the Austrians followed this route ; 
 and Blucher moved on the intermediate line of the Moselle to connect 
 the main army with the Allied corps in Holland. 
 
 Allied forces. army of Bohemia, 
 
 Commanded by Schwartzenberg — Radetzky, Chief of the Staff. 
 
 Corps 1 
 
 Austrian 
 
 General Colloredo. 
 
 „ 2 . 
 
 Austrian 
 
 Louis Lichtenstein. 
 
 „ 3 . 
 
 Austrian 
 Wurtemberg 
 
 Giulay. 
 
 Prince of Wurtemberg 
 
 „ 5 . 
 
 Austrian and Bavarian 
 
 Wrede. 
 
 „ 6 . 
 
 Two light divi 
 
 Russian . . . Wittgenstein, 
 sions under Bubna and Maurice Lichtenstein. 
 
 
 In all— 95,000 infantry. 
 21,000 cavalry. 
 468 guns. 
 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 279 
 
 A B M V (IF SILESIA, 
 
 Commanded by Blucher— Gneisenau, Chief of the Stall'. 
 
 Corps 1 
 
 
 
 Prussian 
 
 •2 
 
 
 
 Prussian 
 
 ,, 8 
 
 
 
 Kussiani 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 Russian 1 
 
 „ io 
 
 
 
 Russian | 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 
 
 Russian J 
 
 Corps 6 
 
 
 
 Russian \ 
 
 „ 11 
 
 
 
 Russian ? 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 
 
 Russian ) 
 
 In all— 69,000 infantry. 
 
 19,000 cavalry. 
 
 
 
 
 478 guns. 
 
 York. 
 Kleist. 
 
 Langeron. 
 Sacken. 
 
 To oppose these Napoleon had the corps of Ney, Marmont, Victor, and French forces. 
 Macdonald, and the Imperial Guard under Mortier and Oudinot ; at the 
 outset, about 70,000 infantry, and 17,000 cavalry, with a great number of 
 guns, with which to meet the heads of the Allied columns ; and through- 
 out the campaign he was constantly reinforced from reserves at Paris, 
 and from the Pyrenees. On the other hand, Schwartzenberg had a 
 reserve of 50,000 men at Basle under Barclay de Tolly. 
 
 The Vosges Mountains extend parallel to the Ehine, separating its 
 basin from that of the Moselle, and fall back at an angle opposite Basle. 
 From thence southward the barrier is taken up by the Jura. 
 
 The space between the extremities of these ranges is known as the Gap 
 of Bel fort, which gives admission to the valley of the Ehone, the only 
 obstacles being the weak places, Belfort, Blamont, &c. Thence the road to 
 Paris leads over the Morvan range into the valley of the Seine at Langres. 
 
 At the appearance of the Allies on the Ehine, Napoleon, notwithstand- First disposi- 
 
 ino- the inferiority of his numbers, extended his troops near the frontiers tl0US of 
 ° • i poleon. 
 
 on a wide arc of defence. He argued that the Austrians must leave many 
 men before the fortresses, and it would therefore be possible to close 
 against them the great roads from Alsace ; that Blucher also would invest 
 so many places that Marmont could retard him and fall on his left if he 
 should attack Macdonald, whose corps was on the lower Meuse. 
 
 Therefore Mortier was to bar the road by Langres, Ney by Nancy — Langres to 
 Victor was to hold the Vosges Mountains against Schwartzenberg. Nancy, 70. 
 
 Marmont was to oppose Blucher. 
 
280 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Advance of 
 the Allies. 
 
 Bar to Join- 
 ville, 28. 
 
 French re- 
 treat beyond 
 the Meuse. 
 
 Coblent/. to 
 Dusseldorf, 
 5. 
 
 Macdonald to hold Belgium. 
 
 Augereau to hold Lyons — thus communicating with the army of Italy, 
 and those of Soult and Suchet in the Pyrenees — and was to watch for an 
 opportunity of operating by the Ehone valley against Schwartzenberg's 
 communications. * 
 
 Schwartzenberg's Movements. — Obviously the Gap of Belfort was the 
 point where, by turning both the Vosges and the Jura, it was easiest to 
 pass. The mass of the army of Bohemia therefore passed there. But 
 to secure the flanks, corps were pushed out to the right to invest the 
 fortresses in Alsace (Strasbourg, Kehl, Colmar, &c), to the left to oppose 
 Augereau and to invest Dijon, Besangon, Auxerre, Belfort, &c. 
 
 Giulay's corps moved on Langres, driving back Mortier. 
 
 "Wrede turned Victor's right in the Vosges, and moved on Neufchateau. 
 
 Wurtemberg up the Moselle to Epinal. 
 
 Wittgenstein on Nancy. 
 
 In the middle of January, Giulay from Langres, in line with Wrede at 
 Neufchateau and Wurtemberg from Epinal, together pushed Mortier back 
 on Bar-sur-Aube, and thence through Vandceuvres to Troyes. 
 
 25th January. — Giulay occupied Bar. 
 
 Wurtemberg on his right. 
 
 Wrede between Chaumont and Joinville. 
 
 Sacken (left of Blucher's army), Joinville. 
 
 On the French side, Victor had retired from the Vosges and joined Ney 
 at Nancy. Marmont, retreating before Blucher through Metz, had joined 
 the other Marshals at Nancy ; the three had retired from thence upon St 
 Dizier ; attacked there by Sacken, and turned by the road from Joinville, 
 they fell back to Vitry. 
 
 The French fortresses left in Blucher's rear were blockaded : — Mayence 
 by the troops of Saxe-Coburg ; Luxembourg and Thionville by Hessians : 
 Metz by a Prussian division ; and, until the arrival of the Hessian and 
 Saxe-Coburg forces, they were watched by Prussian cavalry. 
 
 Meanwhile Winzingerode had passed the Khine at Dusseldorf, and 
 Macdonald, observing Blucher, had retired up the Meuse by Liege and 
 Mezieres towards Chalons. 
 
 Winzingerode halted at Namur, but subsequently resumed his march 
 by Avesnes on Laon. For the present he need not be taken into account. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 281 
 
 Such were the movements that preceded the junction of Blucher's left Junction of 
 
 with Schwartzenberg's right on the Marne, and the assembly of the the Allles on 
 
 . . , the Manic. 
 
 French corps on the arc of which Paris is the centre, and the rivers 
 
 Seine, Aube, and Marne (and later the Aisne) are the radii. "With this 
 
 position of affairs the problem under investigation, of the influence of 
 
 convergent rivers, commences. 
 
 The district east of Paris, known topographically as the basin of the Description of 
 Seine, is bounded east, north, and south by hill-ranges. Three streams re ' 
 
 take their rise in the eastern range — the Seine, the Aube, and the Marne 
 — and along their banks lie the great direct roads from the Khine frontier 
 to Paris. These rivers, though of no great width, averaging fifty yards, are 
 deep, and generally impassable except at the bridges. These bridges were 
 now barricaded, and important passages on the main lines, as Troyes and 
 Nogent, Chalons and Meaux, were rendered secure against a sudden attack. 
 
 The country about these rivers is quite unenclosed. Great fields, with- 
 out fence or division, extend across the spaces between them. The roads 
 are few ; the open country would permit troops to move freely in all 
 directions, and to deploy for battle, in dry weather ; but in this winter 
 season the cultivated ground, and the swamps bordering the small streams, 
 would prevent this, and restrict the columns frequently to the roads. 
 Only the great chaussees were suited to sustained operations. The cross- 
 roads were of bad quality, and in many parts waggon-trains could only 
 move on them with difficulty. 
 
 In this theatre Napoleon now prepared to oppose a single line of Allies still 
 defence to a double line of invasion, for Schwartzenberg was bound to °r erate on a 
 
 . . double line. 
 
 the line Langres-Basle by the necessity of keeping open his communica- 
 tions with the troops investing the fortresses ; Blucher to the line Chalons- 
 Mayence, to maintain his communications with Belgium and the Rhine. 
 The Emperor's general plan was to hold the bridges on each side with his Napoleon's 
 wings, and with the main body to manceuvre between them, casting his S ent ' ral F lan - 
 weight on each adversary alternately, while the other wing, aided by the 
 river, contained the other hostile army. And foreseeing that these move- 
 ments from side to side would be frequent, he established his line of main French com- 
 supply on the central road between the rivers, of La Ferte-sous-Jouarre- mnnications. 
 Sezanne-Arcis, and ordered those and other points to be fortified suffi- 
 ciently to secure them against a rush of Cossacks. 
 
282 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Paris to Cha- 
 lons, 100. 
 
 Vitry to St 
 Dizier, 18. 
 
 St Dizier to 
 Joinville, 17. 
 Joinville to 
 Brieime, 30. 
 
 Napoleon 
 pivots on the 
 Marne, to 
 strike the 
 flank of the 
 enemy mov- 
 ing between 
 the rivers. 
 
 Blucher 
 evades him 
 by retreating. 
 
 Urienne to 
 Troyes, 25. 
 Urienne to 
 Chalons, 47. 
 
 Uattle of La 
 Kothiere. 
 
 25th January. — Napoleon went to Chalons to commence operations. 
 Imagining Blucher's different corps to be scattered on the march, he 
 resolved to unite the corps on the Marne at Vitry, and leaving Marmont 
 at St Dizier, and Macdonald then approaching Chalons, to bar the passage 
 of the Marne against Blucher, to turn himself by Joinville on Chaumont, 
 calling up his right wing to him from Troyes and Arcis, and falling on 
 the head of Schwartzenberg's columns. 
 
 Accordingly he moved from Vitry with 35,000 men on the 26th. 
 
 27th. — He drove a Prussian detachment from St Dizier. 
 
 But Blucher on the same day, leaving his right in St Dizier, was 
 moving to join Schwartzenberg on the Aube, and was crossing the space 
 between the Marne and Aube with 30,000 men of Sacken's command and 
 part of Langeron's. Learning this at St Dizier, Napoleon turned to pursue 
 Blucher, in the hope of intercepting him before he could be supported by 
 Schwartzenberg. 
 
 28th. — Sending Marmont along the highroad by Joinville to Brienne, 
 he moved with Ney and Victor, by Vassy, on Montierender across a diffi- 
 cult country, at the same time sending orders to Mortier, then at Troyes, 
 to remain on the Aube. 
 
 29th. — He debouched into the valley of the Aube, near Brienne. 
 
 Blucher, from Bar, had hastened down the Aube to cut Mortier from 
 Napoleon, and crush him singly ; but learning Napoleon's advance, he 
 retraced his steps in time to reach Brienne. Here Napoleon attacked 
 him, and after an indecisive action Blucher retired along the road to 
 Bar. 
 
 Napoleon was now within easy distance of his wings at Chalons and 
 Troyes. With the latter point he was connected by Gerard's division at 
 Piney. Joining Mortier he would have 80,000 men to meet Schwartzen- 
 berg — joining Macdonald he would have 55,000 against Blucher, which 
 he considered nearly sufficient. Posting his own troops across the roads 
 from Bar and from Joinville to Brienne, and joined at Morvilliers by 
 Marmont from Joinville, he awaited events, his right on the Aube, at 
 Dienville, his left at Morvilliers. 
 
 Blucher had halted at Trannes, a few miles from Brienne. Schwartzen- 
 berg's leading corps reinforced him. 
 
 1st February. — The main body of the Allies advanced by the right bank 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 283 
 
 of the Aube upon Napoleon, sending a strong detachment on the left bank 
 to turn his right, and another beyond the Joinville road to turn his left. 
 Napoleon would now have joined Mortier at Troyes ; but seeing the main 
 body of the enemy approaching, he judged that he could not pass the 
 river without fighting, and stood to receive them. Nearly treble his 
 numbers on the field, they broke his centre and captured a great part 
 of his artillery, though his right held fast at the bridge of Dienville. 
 During the night he fell back through Brienne to Lesmont, and passed 
 the river, covered by Ney's corps on the right bank, by Mortier on the left 
 bank, and by Marmont, who, retiring from Morvilliers, had taken post on 
 the Voire. The enemy at first imagined Marmont's corps to be the main 
 army, and sent Wrede's corps to attack it: but the French Marshal, 
 retiring over the Voir, defended the passage, inflicting considerable loss on 
 the enemy, and made good his retreat to Arcis, where he could, according 
 to circumstances, defend the Aube or join Napoleon at Troyes. 
 
 2d February. — Macdonald at Chalons was attacked by the corps of 
 York from Metz. 
 
 The main body of the Allies was now directed by the roads of Vandceu- Schwartzen- 
 vres and Piney on Troyes. On the left, two corps, Giulay's and Colloredo's, terg advances 
 
 . on the Seine 
 
 moved on Villeneuve-l'Archeveque and Sens, to compel Napoleon to and Yonne. 
 evacuate Troyes, and to secure the Yonne. Troyes to 
 
 3d February. — Blucher, as Napoleon had foreseen, had many reasons Sens > 44 - 
 for wishing to return to the Marne. York's corps was now at Chalons, 
 and Kleist's and part of Langeron's were moving thither from Metz; 
 joining these he would have near 60,000 men with which to operate in- 
 dependently, and might be the first to enter Paris. By moving thither at Blucher re- 
 
 once he might cut off Macdonald's direct retreat, and drive him on Eper- turns to the 
 
 .,....., Marne. 
 
 nay. Therefore, and because, also, his impatient spirit rendered him dis- 
 satisfied with the slowness and circumspection of his associate general, he 
 led the troops which he had brought from the Marne to Brienne, across by 
 Eosnay, St Ouen, and Fere Champenoise, to the road Chalons-Montmirail, 
 sending Sacken towards Montmirail. 
 
 5th February. — Macdonald, after destroying the bridge, evacuated Cha- French left 
 Ions, retreating on Epernay. win S retreats. 
 
 York pursued Macdonald to Chateau-Thierry. Macdonald destroyed 
 the bridge after crossing. 
 
284 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Blucher's 
 
 finny ad- 
 vances be- 
 tween the 
 rivers. 
 
 Chalons to 
 C. -Thierry, 
 50. 
 
 Troyes to 
 Nogent, 32. 
 
 Nogent to 
 Sezanne, 20. 
 
 Napoleon, 
 pivoting on 
 the Seine, 
 attacks 
 Blucher's 
 flank, 
 
 Sacken moved by Moutmirail on La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and the rest of 
 Blucher's troops from Fere Champenoise, followed towards Champaubert, 
 while Kleist and Langeron were near Chalons. 
 
 Thus the army of Silesia was spread in lengthened columns along the 
 inner bank of the Marne. 
 
 Napoleon hesitated whether to fall on Blucher, or Giulay and Colloredo. 
 He made a false attack from Troyes on the main body, to ascertain their 
 movements ; and repulsed a counter-attack on the bridge. 
 
 6th February. — Having resolved to strike at Blucher, he and Marmont 
 (from Arcis) joined at Nogent. Mortier remained at Troyes to cover the 
 movement. 
 
 7th February. — Marmont to Sezanne — Mortier, with the Guard, to 
 Nogent — Victor's corps, and Oudinot's division of the Guard, to hold the 
 bend of the Seine from Nogent to Bray. 
 
 8th February. — Ney's corps followed Marmont. 
 
 9th February. — Napoleon followed with Mortier's division of the Guard 
 — in all, 30,000. Blucher had sent some Cossack regiments to occupy 
 Sezanne — these were driven out and retreated on Sacken. 
 
 On this day Blucher's corps were thus situated : — 
 
 York, 
 
 Sacken, ....... 
 
 Olsuvieff (of Langeron's command), . 
 Blucher with 2 corps, Kleist and Langeron, 
 
 18,000, Chateau-Thierry. 
 
 I Between Montmirail and La 
 ( Ferte-sous-Jouarre. 
 3,500, Champaubert. 
 
 15,000, Vertus (from Chalons and Vitry). 
 
 pierces it at 
 Champaubert, 
 
 turns on the 
 separated 
 corps of the 
 enemy, ' 
 
 and routs 
 them at 
 Montmirail ; 
 
 Sezanne to 
 Champaubert, 
 
 13. 
 
 10th February. — Macdonald was at Meaux. Napoleon, from Sezanne, 
 fell on Olsuvieff, who did not know of the expulsion of the Cossacks, and 
 destroyed his corps. Leaving Marmont to oppose Blucher on the side of 
 Etoges, he turned with Ney and the Guard to follow Sacken, passing 
 through Montmirail to the junction of the roads from Chateau-Thierry 
 and La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. 
 
 11th February. — Sacken, who had pursued Macdonald's rear-guard to 
 Trilport, and destroyed the bridge there, warned of Napoleon's approach, 
 and sending to apprise York, moved on Montmirail ; York, who had 
 restored the bridge, holding Chateau-Thierry, sent part of his corps to 
 co-operate with Sacken. Napoleon defeated them with very heavy loss, 
 and drove them on Chateau-Thierrv. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 285 
 
 Vlth February. — Pursuing them, he drove them beyond the Marne. In Champaubert 
 
 retreating they destroyed the bridge. to Montmi- 
 
 • rail, 13. 
 
 12th and loth February. — The bridge was repaired. „ . ., 
 
 J or ^ Montniinul 
 
 Mortier passed it to pursue York and Sacken, who were retiring on to chateau- 
 Chalons by the circuit of Fismes and Eheims, there being no direct road. Thierry, 16. 
 Macdonald from Meaux was sent by Guignes to reinforce Victor. Means to 
 
 Blueher advanced on Montmirail. 
 
 Schwartzenberg attacked the bridges of the Seine. 
 
 1-lth February. — Napoleon joined Marmont, attacked Blueher at Van- then returns 
 champs, and drove him, with severe loss, half-way back to Chalons. ou Blucllcr > 
 Leaving the pursuit to Marmont, he returned to join Victor and Oudinot. nim towards 
 These Marshals, far outnumbered and turned on the side of Fontainebleau, Chalons. 
 had fallen back on a strong position behind the Yeres, where Macdonald 
 joined them. 
 
 This day Winzingerode entered Soissons, expecting to join Blueher at Army of the 
 Chateau-Thierry. ^ enters 
 
 the theatre. 
 
 16th February. — Army of Bohemia was thus situated after passing the 
 Seine : — 
 
 Advanced-guard at Mormant. Schwartzen- 
 
 Wittgenstein at Nangis. , hes 
 
 Wrede at Donnemarie. , ■, .i 
 
 -itt t -* r back the 
 
 WurtemDereers at Montereau. „ . . . , 
 
 n- i ^ t> 4. v French right 
 Giulay at ront-sur- 1 onne. . ° 
 
 Colloredo at Fontainebleau. "' 
 
 Reserves at Sens and Nogent. 
 
 Napoleon had hesitated whether to fall on Schwartzenberg's flank by Napoleon 
 Sezanne, or to march round by Meaux and Guignes to join the Marshals J 0111S tlie ngllt 
 on the Yeres. The alarm of the Parisians at the approach of the Allies 
 caused him to decide for the latter course. 
 
 17th February. — Advancing from the Yeres, he drove the advanced- Schwartzen- 
 guard of the Allies from Mormant on Nangis, and Wittgenstein and bcr S retreats. 
 Wrede retreated to the left bank of the Seine. 
 
 Oudinot was directed on Nogent. Nangis to 
 
 Macdonald ,, ,, Bray. Nogent, 24. 
 
 Victor „ ,, Montereau. Nangis to 
 
 Montereau, 
 
 The Allies held the bridges long enough to cover Colloredo's retreat to i6. 
 the right bank of the Yonne. 
 
286 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Napoleon 
 forces the 
 passage at 
 Montereau. 
 
 Blucher re- 
 turns to the 
 Aube. 
 Chalons to 
 Arcis, 32. 
 
 Blucher again 
 crosses to the 
 Marne, 
 
 18//t February. — Napoleon forced the passage at Montereau (where the 
 right bank, on which the Wurtembergers stood to fight, greatly commands 
 the left), driving the defenders over the river and through the town. 
 Oudinot and Macdonald, relinquishing the attacks on Bray and Nogent, 
 where they had failed to force a passage, filed through Montereau. 
 
 l&th to 23d. — Napoleon had now been reinforced to 70,000, not count- 
 ing Mortier and Marmont. Schwartzenberg, with 100,000 less concen- 
 trated, did not think it prudent to meet him. He fell back towards Troyes. 
 
 Meanwhile York and Sacken had rejoined Blucher at Chalons by 
 Bheims. On the 18th, Blucher, from Chalons, moved with 50,000 men 
 on Arcis. Finding that Schwartzenberg was retreating before Napoleon, 
 Blucher occupied the bridge and town of Mery-on-the-Seine. Napoleon, 
 sending Oudinot to attack him and to secure his flank at Mery, followed 
 Schwartzenberg, who retreated by Bar towards Chaumont. 
 
 24:th. — Napoleon entered Troyes. The Allies now resolved to call up 
 from Bernadotte's Army of the North the corps of Bulow, by Laon, to 
 Soissons. Winzingerode was at Kheims. Blucher, to join them, to draw 
 Napoleon from the pursuit of Schwartzenberg, and to seek an opportunity 
 of attacking Mortier and Marmont, moved towards Sezanne, breaking the 
 bridges of Plancy and Arcis. 
 
 Marmont was at Sezanne. 
 Mortier at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre ; 
 
 and pushes 
 back the 
 French left 
 wing, 
 
 which con- 
 tains him on 
 the Ourcq. 
 
 having returned to the Marne from their ineffectual pursuit of York and 
 Sacken ; throwing a garrison into Soissons after Winzingerode quitted it. 
 
 25th. — Marmont, from Sezanne, retreated before Blucher, by La Ferte- 
 Gaucher, and joined Mortier on the 26th. Napoleon quitting Troyes, and 
 leaving a force once more to oppose Schwartzenberg, moved by Sezanne 
 to attack Blucher. 
 
 27th Feb. — Blucher, on the left bank of the Marne, holding the bridge 
 at La Forte" with his right, threw his left forward to cross at Trilport, and 
 cut the Marshals from Paris. But the Marshals reached Meaux before 
 him, and held the line of the Marne and Ourcq from Meaux to Lisy, 
 holding the bridge at Trilport with a brigade. 
 
 Meanwhile the Allies in council at Vandceuvres, feeling all the difficul- 
 ties of the situation, had formed a new plan. The Grand Army was to 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 287 
 
 remain in observation in the centre, throwing out a wing towards Lyons 
 and securing the line to the Rhine ; while the army of Silesia, considered 
 as the other wing, and reinforced by Bulow and Winzingerode, was to 
 take the offensive on the side of the Marne. 
 
 The Marshals Oudinot and Macdonald, commanding the containing 
 force, pushed Schwartzenberg's rear-guards over the Aube. 
 
 28th Feb. — Napoleon was at Sezanne. He might advance from thence Napoleon, 
 either by Montmirail or Chateau-Thierry, separating Blucher from Bulow P lvotm g 011 
 
 the Seine, ad- 
 
 and Winzingerode, or towards the Marshals, so as to cover Pans. He vauces to at- 
 moved on La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. tack Blucher. 
 
 Blucher, who had crossed at La Ferte, at Napoleon's approach de- Sezanne to 
 stroyed the bridge there, and continued to press the Marshals on the La Ferte-sous- 
 Ourcq, sending Sacken, supported by Langeron, to attack Meaux, and 
 York followed by Kleist to Lisy. 
 
 2d and 3d March. — Napoleon having thrown a bridge, crossed at La 
 
 Ferte, and moved on Chateau-Thierry. Blucher, thus menaced, retreated 
 
 by cross-roads up the Ourcq to Oulchy, for the Aisne, followed by the 
 
 Marshals. Napoleon marched from Chateau-Thierry on Fismes — the Mar- Chateau- 
 
 shals from Oulchy on Soissons, — but were too late to intercept the enemy. Tftlcn 7 t0 
 J ' r J Fismes, 25. 
 
 Knowing, however, that Soissons was held by a French garrison, he hoped 
 
 to overtake the Army of Silesia and bring it to action before it could 
 
 bridge the Aisne. But the commandant of Soissons, threatened on the 
 
 north bank by Bulow, who had just come from Laon, and on the south 
 
 side by "Winzingerode from Eheims, opened his gates. Blucher crossed Blucher 
 
 the Aisne, barred the passage to Napoleon, and received the large rein- crosses tne 
 
 forcements of Bulow and Winzingerode, who, meanwhile, had bridged 
 
 the Aisne at Vailly. 
 
 Thus the Army of Silesia had evaded the blow he hoped to inflict, and 
 
 was stronger than before. But it was beyond the Aisne ; it was separated 
 
 from its proper line of Chalons ; and was at a great distance from the 
 
 Army of Bohemia. Barring the Aisne against Blucher, and descending 
 
 on Schwartzenberg's rear by Rheims and Chalons, the situation was still 
 
 advantageous. But Napoleon wished to inflict some decisive blow on 
 
 Blucher, and resolved to cross the Aisne and attack him — 55,000 against 
 
 90,000. Napoleon 
 
 5th March, — Napoleon seized the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, and crossed follows him. 
 
288 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Battle of 
 Craonne. 
 
 Soissons to 
 Laon, 20. 
 
 Battle of 
 Laon. 
 
 Napoleon re- 
 treats beyond 
 the Aisne. 
 
 Soissons to 
 Rheims, 31. 
 
 Bheims to 
 Chalons, 20. 
 
 there with Victor, Ney, and the Guard, leaving Marmont before Soissons, 
 and sending a detachment to Eheims. 
 
 6th March. — Blucher, watching the enemy from the heights of Craonne 
 (part of a line of high wooded country that extends from Soissons along 
 the Lette to the Eheims-Laon road), resolved to move his army behind the 
 Lette, across the road from Eheims to Laon, covering the movement with 
 the Russian troops on the heights of Craonne. 
 
 Napoleon pushed out Victor and Ney towards the position of the 
 Russians, and ineffectually assailed it. 
 
 1th March. — Napoleon, reinforcing the two Marshals with the Guard 
 (Marmont still on the left bank), attacked the Eussians, and after a very 
 severe conflict they were ordered by Blucher to retire, in order to con- 
 centrate round Laon. The Allied garrison of Soissons was also withdrawn. 
 
 Sth March. — Napoleon moved across the heights to the Soissons-Laon 
 road, sending Marmont from Berry-au-Bac on the direct road to Laon. 
 
 9th March. — Napoleon attacked Blucher round Laon. This town stands 
 on a remarkable hill rising abruptly from the plain to a height of 100 
 yards, with steep sides, and having villages, or faubourgs, around its 
 base. The position is extremely strong for defence. Napoleon sought to 
 dislodge his enemy by directing his attacks on the space between the 
 roads of Soissons and La Fere, while Marmont threw his right forward 
 on that of Avesnes. 
 
 In the night, Blucher, passing corps from right to left behind Laon, fell 
 upon Marmont, and drove him, with the loss of his artillery, back through 
 the hills on the Eheims road. 
 
 10 th March. — Blucher's right attacked Napoleon. After hard fighting 
 the French fell back on Soissons, Marmont taking post at Berry-au-Bac. 
 
 12th March. — Napoleon at Soissons having heard that the last of 
 Blucher's corps from the Rhine (St Priest's) had just arrived at Eheims, 
 ordered Marmont to leave a force to guard the passage at Berry-au-Bac, 
 and make a night march with the rest of his corps on Eheims. Leaving 
 a garrison in Soissons, he also marched thither himself. 
 
 13th March. — Napoleon and Marmont enveloped St Priest's corps, 
 took several thousand, and dispersed the rest. Holding Soissons and 
 Berry-au-Bac, he paused at Eheims till the 17th, to rest his troops and 
 to organise his new levies. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 28.9 
 
 Meanwhile Sehwartzenberg, aware of his absence, had on the 27th Schwartzen- 
 February once more advanced, driving Mortier and Macdonald through U ' T " r nsll(S 
 
 duck fcnfl 
 
 Troyes to Nogent, Bray, and Montcrean. The Army of Bohemia followed, jr rencn right 
 and the heads of its columns occupied the opposite bank. wing. 
 
 17th March. — Napoleon moved towards Sehwartzenberg, Ney on Napoleon 
 Chalons, main body on Epernay. flom the 
 
 Marne strikes 
 
 Mortier was left at Rheims. 
 Marmont at Berry-au-Bac. 
 
 at Sehwart- 
 zenbem's rear. 
 
 Sehwartzenberg having passed the Seine had advanced to Provins. 
 
 ISth March. — Napoleon from Epernay by Fere Champenoise. 
 
 Sehwartzenberg hearing of his presence at Chalons had begun to retreat. 
 
 19th March. — Napoleon crossed the Aube, at Plancy, directing Ney, 
 then on the march from Chalons, on Arcis. He called up Oudinot and 
 Macdonald by Provins, Villenoxe, Anglure, along the right bank to Plancy. 
 Thus, as soon as the movements were completed, with his centre and right 
 wing united, he would be ready to move against Schwartzenberg's rear. 
 
 20th March. — Napoleon with the cavalry moved up the left bank to 
 Arcis ; and hearing from the cavalry advanced-guards that the Allied 
 troops were moving between the Seine and Aube, he called Ney across, 
 and sent the cavalry against them. 
 
 But Sehwartzenberg, who had united his army about Troyes, was Battle of 
 moving between the rivers with 90,000 men, and advanced upon Arcis. Arcis - 
 Napoleon was forced to fight with very inferior numbers, held his ground A I0 ^ eS 1( ? 
 during the day, but fell back next clay over the Aube. 
 
 He had long revolved a project for uniting his immediate forces with Napoleon's 
 the garrisons of the frontier forces on the upper Marne, and pivoted on new l ■ 
 Metz, descending with a united army of above 100,000, on Schwartzen- 
 berg's rear, and finally uniting with the corps at Lyons for a great com- 
 bined movement to drive the Allies beyond the Ehine. He had already, 
 while operating on the Aisne, sent orders to the garrisons on the Belgian 
 frontier, on the Meuse, in the Ardennes, and in the east of France, to 
 sally out, unite, and move together upon the Marne ; for he believed the 
 corps left by the Allies to invest these places were too much weakened 
 by the necessity of recruiting the main armies to be able to oppose the 
 movement. The moment now seemed to have arrived for the execution 
 
 T 
 
290 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Blucher 
 moves on 
 the Marne. 
 
 Arcis to Eper- 
 nay, 40. 
 
 The Allies 
 unite between 
 the Aube and 
 Marne, 
 
 and move on 
 Paris. 
 
 Result. 
 
 of this design. He marched on the 21st and 22d March from Arcis to 
 Vitry, turned that place, which was held by a Prussian garrison, by a 
 ford above it, and assembling his army there in expectation that Schwart- 
 zenberg would hastily retreat as before, he called Mortier and Marmont 
 towards him. But those Marshals were no longer in a condition to 
 join him. 
 
 Marmont had held the Aisne against Blucher till the 18th March ; 
 when turned on both flanks he retreated to Fismes, and called Mortier to 
 him from Eheims, thinking thus still to fulfil the double object of keeping 
 up relations with Napoleon and covering Paris. Blucher then moved on 
 Pdieims and Epernay to regain his communications with the Grand Army. 
 The Marshals then moved to the Marne at Chateau-Thierry. 
 
 Schwartzenberg crossed the Aube at Arcis after Napoleon ; but he did 
 not continue to retreat. Many circumstances proved that the political 
 effect of occupying Paris would counterbalance any disasters that might 
 happen to their line of communication. The Army of Bohemia, throwing 
 forward its right from Arcis, met the left of Blucher extended from the 
 Marne ; and the combined armies, leaving a corps under "Wittgenstein 
 to cover their rear from Napoleon, spread across the space between the 
 rivers and moved onward, crowding the two Marshals on the capital. A 
 last fight ensued on the slopes around the city ; and the capitulation of 
 Paris was signed on the 29th March. 
 
 Napoleon on the Marne, looking on this as a purely military event, 
 was still resolute to disregard it and to carry out his plan ; but the pres- 
 sure exercised on him by his generals and by the voice of the nation was 
 too strong to be resisted. Constrained to abandon his design, he turned 
 towards Paris, hoping to arrive in time to prevent a catastrophe. Moving 
 to the left bank of the Seine at Fontainebleau, he designed to fall from 
 thence on the rear of the Allies and drive them through the capital ; or, 
 failing that, still to fall back behind the Loire and join with Soult, 
 Suchet, and Augereau. But the exhaustion of the people, the arm}'-, and 
 the generals, by his incessant wars, was too complete to admit of further 
 effort. In the visions of ultimate success which still flattered his imagi- 
 nation, he found none to partake. Finding the impossibility of longer 
 maintaining the struggle with officers weary of war, and a country im- 
 patient of his rule, he abdicated on the 6th April. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 291 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Since the main roads to Paris from the east crossed from bank to bank Points of 
 of the rivers, it was necessary for the invading armies to force the passages P assa o e F e - 
 at the points of crossing. Thus we find the defenders disputing the k noW n. 
 bridges of Chalons and Trilport on the Marue — of Dolancourt, Dienville, 
 and Lesmont on the Aube — of Troves, Xogent, Bray, Montereau, on the 
 Seine. These were certainly known beforehand as points for defence ; and 
 the fact that the advance of the assailants would be there checked for a 
 certain time by an inferior force must be an important element in forming 
 a plan of campaign. 
 
 If Blucher and Schwartzenberg had operated (as up to the beginning of 
 February they seemed to intend) entirely on one of the great lines, they 
 would not thereby have deprived Napoleon of the advantages of the con- 
 verging rivers. For, had they selected the Aube and Seine for their line, Double line 
 he would none the less have used the upper Marne at Chalons and Vitry com P ulsor y 
 
 11 ''on the Allies. 
 
 as a pivot from whence to fall on their communications towards Bar and 
 Chaumont ; and had they concentrated on the Marne, he would equally 
 have threatened their rear from the Aube at Brienne or Arcis, and from 
 the Seine at Nogent ; in each case the river on which he pivoted forming 
 a line of defence in case he should be defeated, upon which he could re- 
 treat, still threatening the enemy's flank, and from which he could man- 
 oeuvre to cover Paris. Therefore, as the least of two evils, the assailants 
 were obliged to operate by both lines. 
 
 This granted, the general plan of Napoleon is evident : to place a retard- General plan 
 ing wing on each river to dispute the known points of passage, and to ° 
 join his main body to either, according to circumstances. It only remains 
 to ascertain what circumstances should induce him to join either wing 
 rather than the other, in order to have possession of the broad grounds 
 on which to estimate the general plan of campaign. 
 
 The invading army on each line must adopt one or other of two courses, 
 — either to march in processional order with the principal mass of the 
 army on the main road (as the Army of Silesia was moving on the 10th 
 Feb.), or to send columns along many roads— forming, in fact, a line of 
 columns (as the Army of Bohemia was moving between the 14th and 17th 
 
292 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 advancing 
 between, or 
 beyond, the 
 rivers. 
 
 Difference of Feb., and again in its last advance in March). In the first case the de- 
 fender might (as he did) descend from the Seine perpendicularly on the 
 flank of the column, separate its parts, and throw them asunder across 
 the river ; in the second case, the army must be either moving astride a 
 river, in which case the part on the inner bank might be taken in flank 
 and overwhelmed singly, — or it might be entirely beyond the river. In 
 this last case its flank would be defended by the river, the bridges on 
 which it would, of course, hold or destroy. Thus, Blucher having pushed 
 the Marshals on to the Ourcq, had assembled his army on the right bank 
 of the Marne, guarding the bridge of Trilport, and having broken that 
 of La Forte* ; the river consequently protected his flank from Napoleon 
 advancing from Sezanne. And again in March, when Napoleon was at 
 Eheims, Schwartzenberg, while attempting to pass at Nogent and Bray, 
 held the bridges of the Aube up to Arcis, thereby protecting his flank. 
 
 Of all the various ways of operating for the defence, that of attacking 
 the flank of the enemy's column is most effective, because, by separating 
 and ruining his army, it reduces the odds in material force against the 
 defender, besides recovering ground for him in the theatre ; whereas, in 
 the most successful move against the communications, though the assail- 
 ants may be recalled from their forward positions, yet they may combine 
 in superior numbers for battle, or, if the defender evades them, may 
 renew their advance with undiminished forces. The defensive army being, 
 then, divided into two wings, whose business it will be to retard the enemy 
 on either line, and a main body, this central force will co-operate with one 
 or the other wing generally, according to the following rules : — 
 General prin- 1st, Whenever possible, the main body should attack the flank of an 
 ciples for the en emy moving between the rivers, for which purpose it will pivot on a 
 portion of one river held by one wing. In this case the main body 
 cannot combine directly with the other defensive wing, which will be 
 occupied in stemming the enemy's advance — like Mortier at Troyes, 
 when Napoleon aimed at Bluchers flank at Brienne, and like Mac- 
 donald at Meaux, when Napoleon made his attack on Blucher's flank at 
 Champaubert. 
 
 2d, To join the main body to a containing wing in order to oppose in 
 front an enemy advancing to force a river, who does not, in doing so, ex- 
 pose a flank. Should the enemy seek to turn the defender by advancing 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 293 
 
 on both banks, the latter will have the opportunity of falling on a sep- 
 arate wing — always preferring to attack that which most directly covers 
 the enemy's communications. Therefore, 
 
 To operate thus from side to side at need, the main body must have Necessity of 
 
 free and direct communications between the rivers ; and in this campaign transverse 
 
 . commumca- 
 
 the transverse roads Joinville-Brienne, St Dizier-Bnenne, Vitry-Brienne, t i ous> 
 
 Chalons -Arcis, Epernay-Nogent, Meaux-Melun, become of the highest 
 
 importance — indeed, nothing can be effected without them. 
 
 In order to render the defence complete there should be direct commu- 
 nication with the objective along the outer bank of each river. In this 
 the Marne was defective. For instance, had Napoleon been defeated in 
 his first attack on Blucher at Brienne he must have retreated behind the 
 Marne at Vitry and Chalons. But the only direct road from Chalons to 
 Paris is on the left bank. Thus, to recover commuDications with Paris 
 he must make the circuit by PJieims and Fismes, and the victorious 
 enemy guarding the successive bridges of Chateau-Thierry, La Ferte\ and 
 Meaux, might reach the capital ; whereas Arcis, Brienne, or Troyes formed 
 better pivots, since, forced to retire over the river at either, he would still 
 have direct communications with Paris. 
 
 From the previous deductions it follows that — 
 
 1st, To make a circuit in order to join a wing and confront an enemy Courses im- 
 who, moving between the rivers, exposes a flank : or, ^ r ° rer or 
 
 ° » x ' ^ defensive 
 
 2d, To move against the flank of an enemy operating beyond the river, army# 
 and covered by it ; or, 
 
 3d, To stand to receive battle beyond a river, unless in an exceptionally 
 favourable position ; or, 
 
 4th, To cross a river to attack in front a superior enemy, — 
 Are all violations of the principles on which the defence should be con- 
 ducted, sacrificing the advantages of the situation. 
 
 ■ T , Judged by these rules, the campaign of Napoleon, while it shows how Napoleon's 
 thoroughly he appreciated the situation, nevertheless displays many errors, ca ™^ aig " . 
 the results either of over-confidence or of political exigencies. these rales _ 
 
 His march from St Dizier on Brienne, his defence of Troyes against 
 Schwartzenberg, his march to Champaubert, his descent on the rear of the 
 Army of Bohemia from Chalons, and finally from Vitry, are all illustra- 
 tions of the way in which rivers like these may be turned to account. 
 
294 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 But the battles of La Rothiere and Arcis, where he stood with inferior 
 forces to fight on the wrong side of the river, were terrible errors, leading 
 to heavy disasters, which a more vigorous foe might have rendered fatal. 
 So were those of Craonne and Laon. All he gained to compensate the 
 losses at Craonne was the abandonment of Soissons by the enemy, which 
 would have been effected with equal certainty by an advance on the 
 Laon road from Berry-au-Bac, threatening the enemy's communications. 
 Soissons occupied by a French garrison, and that road to Paris from the 
 Aisne secured, the former system of defence should have been reverted 
 to. The Marshals should have been left to oppose Blucher on the Aisne 
 and afterwards on the Marne, while Napoleon, with his main force undi- 
 minished by the losses of those severe battles, descended on Schwartzen- 
 berg. Blucher beyond the Aisne ; the Marshals on its left bank commu- 
 nicating with the Emperor by Rheims; Napoleon with the main body 
 at Chalons and Epernay ; Schwartzenberg between Provins and Troyes, 
 retarded by Macdonald and Oudinot : here would have been a situation 
 as promising as any that could exist in the theatre ; and it was one that 
 did exist on the 17th March, and might have existed without fighting 
 the costly battles beyond the Aisne. 
 
 Nor did he turn the situation to full account. It was pointed out in a 
 former page that, in aiming at au enemy's communications, the stroke 
 should be dealt so far to the rear that the enemy will not be able to evade 
 it. Moving on Plancy, he found the army of Bohemia beyond his reach. 
 The battle of Arcis was completely injudicious and useless. 
 
 When at Montmirail, after the several defeats of Blucher, he had the 
 option of falling on the flank of Schwartzenberg on the inner bank of the 
 Seine, at Mormant and Nangis, by Sezanne. He sacrificed the advan- 
 tage of the situation in making the circuit by Meaux to Guignes, which 
 brought him on the enemy's front. No doubt the alarm of the people 
 of Paris, and his precarious hold on the nation through the capital, fur- 
 nished good political reason for interposing between it and the enemy ; 
 but, judged on military grounds, it was a mistake. 
 
 The peril incurred by an assailant in attempting a turning movement on 
 one bank of a river while operating with the rest of the army on the other, 
 is illustrated by the position of Colloredo's corps at Eontainebleau, which 
 would have been irremediably separated from the others had the bridge 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 295 
 
 of Montereau not been defended by the Allies against more than one 
 attack. 
 
 It appears to have been a mistake to send a force in pursuit of 
 Sacken and York beyond the Marne at Chateau-Thierry. For not only 
 did the pursuing troops not intercept the retreat, or prevent the reunion 
 of Blucher's corps, but they were unable to perform their proper function 
 of assisting to contain the Army of Silesia on the Marne ; and it marched 
 unopposed from Chalons to menace Napoleon's flank at Mery. That offen- 
 sive movement of Blucher, so soon after his heavy defeats, was the most 
 vigorous act performed by the Allies throughout the campaign. 
 
 Turned to full account, the defender in a campaign like this has not 
 only the usual advantage of a combined against a double line of operation, 
 but also the power of dealing his blows in the most decisive direction. 
 In attacking Blucher from Nogent through Sezanne and Champaubert, 
 Napoleon combined the advantages of causing him to form front to a 
 Hank, and of breaking his front, thereby gaining every point that was 
 possible in favour of the inferior army. And the diversity of fronts 
 he could operate on is exemplified in the different engagements. At Manoeuvring 
 Brienne he fought with his right flank towards Paris, his back to Vitry ^°^ ers ° * e 
 
 ° ° . defensive 
 
 and St Dizier. At La Rothiere and Troyes he covered the direct road to armv . 
 the capital. At Champaubert he had his left flank to Paris, his back to 
 Sezanne and Nogent. At Montmirail he had turned half round towards 
 Paris, still pivoted on Sezanne and Nogent, At Vauchamps his front 
 was exactly reversed. And all the time the Allies were bound immov- 
 ably, each to the line by which he had advanced. 
 
 Manifestly, then, the situation gives the defender greater advantages Advantages 
 
 than anv other that has vet been discussed. If the ordinary case of the ° r l e e " 
 J J * ience con- 
 
 single against the double line renders 80,000 a match for 100,000 (see f elTe d b y t he 
 page 177), this present case renders a superiority of more than five to four rivers, 
 necessary in order to enable the assailant to prevail. In fact, remember- 
 ing that whether he forces a passage or exposes a flank to attack he 
 suffers in proportion, while the containing wing of the defender, strong in 
 position and difficult to turn, suffers less than usual loss in retiring before 
 superior forces, it is evident that, even with such odds at starting, he may, 
 on advancing half-way to his object, find his numbers reduced to an 
 equality with those of his adversary, when success should be impossible. 
 
29 G THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 And it is easy to conceive that two allied armies might each be nearly- 
 equal to the whole force of the defenders, and yet, operating by indepen- 
 dent lines, be defeated and foiled. 
 Case of the Still there must be a mode of operating by which, a certain superiority 
 
 assailant con- }) em g granted, the assailant may prevail. But the reader will best appre- 
 ciate the difficulties of the assailants by trying to devise for them a plan 
 of campaign, by which, without exposing a flank, or laying bare their 
 communications, or either attacking a defended passage, or dividing to 
 turn it, except with sufficiently superior forces, they shall continue to 
 advance upon the capital. 
 
 Considering how this might be accomplished, let us still call the an- 
 tagonists, Napoleon, Blucher, and Schwartzenberg, only supposing them 
 equal in skill; and let us assume that the French army has its left wing in 
 Chalons, closing Blucher's line, its right in Dolancourt, closing Schwart- 
 zenberg's line, and its main body at St Dizier. 
 
 As to cross the space between the rivers while the defender holds a 
 point on the other river, from whence to strike the flank, is the peril 
 chiefly to be dreaded; the first step, before the Army of Bohemia can cross 
 from Chaumont to the Aube, is to dispossess the enemy of the points on 
 the Marne, Chalons, Vitry, St Dizier, from which he may direct his blow. 
 Now, were Blucher to advance directly on Chalons he would expose his 
 communications to a blow from St Dizier. The first point to be aimed at, 
 then, is St Dizier. And in order to direct both armies upon it without 
 exposing them to be separately attacked, the preliminary to all offensive 
 operations should be the establishment of a line of defence between 
 Langres and Verdun, behind the obstacles that traverse that space, where 
 the two Allied armies might form a common base of manoeuvres. Guard- 
 ing the flanks of this line with detached bodies, the central mass, com- 
 posed of the main force of both armies, might be directed on the Marne, 
 from Vitry to Joinville. 
 
 The French army might draw in both its wings upon the centre to 
 defend the Marne, without thereby enabling the assailants to call up their 
 detachments, for these must still continue to guard the flanks of the com- 
 munications, which are not directly covered by the main armies. There- 
 fore, at the outset the assailants, after making such detachments, should 
 still be considerably superior to the total force of the enemy. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 This superiority they should turn to account by mastering the course Assailants 
 
 of the Marne down to Chalons. The end of these operations would f r cure the 
 
 Maine to 
 probably find the French right wing on the Aube at Brienne and Dolan- Chalons, 
 
 court, the left wing retreating down the Marne ; the main body would 
 
 join the right wing for the defence of the Aube. 
 
 Holding Chalons and Vitry with the right, the centre and left of the and throw 
 
 Allies would now cross from the upper Marne to the Aube, force that fo " vard tlu ' ir 
 
 lett to the 
 
 river, and push the defenders over the Seine at Troyes. Seine. 
 
 Now it is evident that, if the Allies continue to advance on this line, 
 directly they cross the Seine, the Yonne comes into the system of defence. 
 They must guard Sens and Pont-sur-Yonne on their left, while in front 
 they approach Nogent, Bray, and Montereau, and must still hold passages 
 on the Aube to cover their rear. If they force the bridges of the Seine 
 down to Montereau and advance towards the Yeres, they offer the flank 
 of their widely-extended line to an attack based on the Marne, and 
 their rear to an attack based on the Yonne. And, at the same time, 
 they cannot advance along the Marne while Napoleon has the Seine for 
 a pivot from which, by Sezanne, to descend on their flank. 
 
 Therefore, it will be better to halt between the Seine and Aube : 
 occupying the passages of Troyes and Mery on the one side — of Anglure, 
 Plancy, Arcis, on the other ; the main body in the triangle, Mery-Arcis- 
 Troyes, with detachments at Lesmont and Brienne. 
 
 Napoleon may either remain with his centre and right wing on the 
 Seine : or, seeing in the position of the Allies a menace to his tranverse 
 line by Sezanne, may move thither his centre, calling up his left wing, 
 for the moment useless on the Marne, and leaving his right on the Seine. 
 
 In the first case, the Allies, issuing from the passages of the Aube, will AssaiLmts 
 
 form front from Sezanne to Anglure, still guarding Mery and Troyes ^ old the 
 
 Seine, and 
 
 with their left ; and will advance towards Villenoxe and Pont-sur-Seine. t]irow their 
 
 Either Napoleon will form front on the line Provins-Nogent to meet the right forward. 
 attack, or will retreat to the Yeres. If he stands to fight, the corps from 
 Mery and Troyes must join in the attack on the bridges of Pont-sur- 
 Seine and Nogent on the left bank. 
 
 In case he takes post at Sezanne, the Allies from Anglure, Plancy, 
 and Arcis will direct their columns thither — calling up the corps from 
 Vitry, and directing that at Chalons to move to Bergeres, and thence, if 
 
298 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 necessary, to join in the battle. Either Napoleon stands to fight with 
 inferior forces, or retreats upon the Marne. In either case the Allies 
 follow to the Marne, force him back on the Ourcq, and occupy Trilport 
 and La Fertd-sous-Jouarre. 
 
 Either the French centre remains to hold, in conjunction with the left 
 wing, the line of the Ourcq — in which case the decisive action is fought 
 there while the Allied left and French right watch each other on the Seine 
 — or the French centre joins the right by Guignes to deal a blow against 
 Blucher's communications with Chalons. In that case the Allies, leaving 
 their right on the Ourcq and Marne, march through Sezanne, to fight the 
 battle on the right bank of the Seine. Pushing the French right and 
 centre to the Yeres with their own centre and left, they fight then the 
 decisive battle. It should be decisive, for the Allies on the two rivers, 
 approaching each other in the narrowing angle, are now united, and can 
 combine in a movement on Paris, holding the passages at Melun and 
 Montereau on one side, at Meaux on the other. 
 
 In executing such a plan the weapons of the defender would in some 
 measure be turned against himself; for each wing alternately of the 
 assailants would stand on the defensive behind a river, while the centre, 
 crossing between the rivers, would join the other wing, in order to make 
 a step forward and deprive the defender of his most effective means of 
 action. But being, as assailants, under the necessity of taking these for- 
 ward steps, they do so at the disadvantage of always attacking a strongly- 
 posted enemy under penalty of exposing a flank to him, and this course 
 demands a superiority in numbers of certainly not less than 4 to 3, and 
 probably greater than that. 
 
 It is of course difficult to draw a satisfactory programme of an imagin- 
 ary campaign, but the main points of what has been just sketched form 
 an intelligible plan. In the actual operations of the Allies there is no 
 indication of any design other than that of advancing whenever they 
 could, on either line, and retreating whenever their rear was threatened ; 
 and but for the peculiar tenure of Napoleon's power in France, and the 
 losses and discouragement of his army in battles that should not have 
 been fought, there seems no reason why on their plan of action they 
 should ever have entered Paris. But by following the systematic method 
 described, of throwing their weight judiciously from side to side of the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 299 
 
 theatre, they might, without retrogression or defeat, have succeeded, with 
 
 their superiority of numbers, in forcing their way to the capital. 
 
 The effects of a third convergent stream, like the Auhe, tributary to Effect of a 
 
 either of the others, and between them, and which is traversed by the line thml conver " 
 
 gent stream, 
 of operation, are — to multiply the known points of attack — to cause the 
 
 assailant to disperse still more — and to oblige him (on whichever side of 
 this intermediate stream he may operate) to expose a flank to the enemy 
 on one of the other rivers. Thus, when the assailant's columns crossing 
 the central river are divided by it, they are exposed to be attacked piece- 
 meal and in flank. " The intermediate line of the Aube," said Napoleon, 
 discussing the campaign, "materially increases the difficulties of the 
 invaders, while it strengthens the defenders' means of resistance ; for the 
 enemy's forces divided between those rivers, sometimes from necessity 
 and sometimes from choice, would present many opportunities of being 
 attacked with advantage." 
 
 When, as in this theatre, a number of rivers converge like radii towards 
 the objective, the assailant's policy evidently is to include as few of them 
 as possible in his front of operations. Directly Schwartzenberg passes 
 the Seine at Troyes, the Yonne, hitherto useless, is brought into the 
 system of defence : and he is forced, as we have seen, for the guarding of 
 his flanks, to disperse his forces so widely as to render them ineffective 
 either for attack or defence against a concentrated enemy. 
 
 So various are the lessons conveyed by this campaign, that the reader 
 who has mastered it must be competent to investigate almost any problem 
 which strategy can offer. And he will doubtless be somewhat surprised 
 to find how great is the importance of obstacles of the kind discussed in 
 this chapter, for their influence is by no means obvious at first view. 
 
 This is a case where to assume the initiative, often so necessary and 
 successful, is not an advantage — since it is the army which advances that 
 offers opportunities to its adversary. 
 
 Eailways, which the retreating army would destroy, while it covered Effect of 
 
 its own lines to the capital and the transverse lines connecting them, ™ Iwa )' s in 
 
 r this case, 
 
 would, in conjunction with telegraphs, greatly increase the advantages of 
 
 the defence by augmenting the power of rapidly throwing the main body 
 
 towards either wing. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 299 
 
 theatre, they might, without retrogression or defeat, have succeeded, with 
 
 their superiority of numbers, in forcing their way to the capital. 
 
 The effects of a third convergent stream, like the Aube, tributary to Effect of a 
 
 either of the others, and between them, and which is traversed by the line thml conver " 
 
 gent stream, 
 of operation, are — to multiply the known points of attack — to cause the 
 
 assailant to disperse still more — and to oblige him (on whichever side of 
 this intermediate stream he may operate) to expose a flank to the enemy 
 on one of the other rivers. Thus, when the assailant's columns crossing 
 the central river are divided by it, they are exposed to be attacked piece- 
 meal and in flank. " The intermediate line of the Aube," said Napoleon, 
 discussing the campaign, "materially increases the difficulties of the 
 invaders, while it strengthens the defenders' means of resistance ; for the 
 enemy's forces divided between those rivers, sometimes from necessity 
 and sometimes from choice, would present many opportunities of being 
 attacked with advantage." 
 
 When, as in this theatre, a number of rivers converge like radii towards 
 the objective, the assailant's policy evidently is to include as few of them 
 as possible in his front of operations. Directly Schwartzenberg passes 
 the Seine at Troyes, the Yonne, hitherto useless, is brought into the 
 system of defence : and he is forced, as we have seen, for the guarding of 
 his flanks, to disperse his forces so widely as to render them ineffective 
 either for attack or defence against a concentrated enemy. 
 
 So various are the lessons conveyed by this campaign, that the reader 
 who has mastered it must be competent to investigate almost any problem 
 which strategy can offer. And he will doubtless be somewhat surprised 
 to find how great is the importance of obstacles of the kind discussed in 
 this chapter, for their influence is by no means obvious at first view. 
 
 This is a case where to assume the initiative, often so necessary and 
 successful, is not an advantage — since it is the army which advances that 
 offers opportunities to its adversary. 
 
 Kailways, which the retreating army would destroy, while it covered Effect of 
 its own lines to the capital and the transverse lines connecting them, y ailwa )' s m 
 
 r this case. 
 
 would, in conjunction with telegraphs, greatly increase the advantages of 
 the defence by augmenting the power of rapidly throwing the main body 
 towards either wing. 
 
300 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 OF FORTRESSES. 
 
 Fortresses At the period when the system of making war was so far organised as to 
 ormer y gave ren( j er arm i es extremely dependent on their bases, but while they were 
 
 great security 
 
 to frontiers, still unwieldy machines, not easily divided, and slow of movement, the 
 establishment of great fortresses on frontiers liable to invasion, and on 
 main roads leading from those frontiers to the capital, was an obvious 
 expedient ; for these slow-moving bodies could not venture to penetrate 
 within a line of ^strong places, exposing to the sallies of powerful garri- 
 sons the long communications and cumbrous convoys which they did 
 not possess sufficient mobility to defend by detached corps. Therefore 
 that frontier was considered (justly, perhaps, according to the circum- 
 stances of the time) the strongest, on which strong places were most 
 thickly set ; and to besiege or to relieve a fortress was the business of 
 a whole campaign. 
 
 but were cost- But fortified places are great drains on the resources of a country. 
 
 ly defences. They are expensive to construct and expensive to maintain. A few of 
 them will swallow up, for their necessary garrisons, armies that might 
 turn the scale of a great war in the open field. Hence it was only neces- 
 sary to show that invading armies could pass them, and, after victories 
 in the field, could make of them an easy and certain prey, to render it 
 apparent that a continuance of such a system of defence must be a costly 
 blunder. 
 
 Perhaps the rudeness of vehicles and the badness of all but great 
 roads may have combined with the cumbrous organisation of the armies 
 of the last century to render them little capable of passing such fortresses 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 301 
 
 as lay in or near their path. But when roads and transport improved, 
 and armies underwent the change already described, resulting from the 
 condition of France after the Revolution, these mobilised machines, Modern 
 avoiding by a slight detour the fortified places in their way, leaving corps armics have 
 complete in their separate organisation to observe or blockade them, and „ ar j C( i t] ^ ui 
 rendering themselves to some extent independent of convoys by contri- 
 butions raised within the enemy's frontier, marched upon those points 
 of the theatre that were of greatest strategical importance, seized them, 
 defeated and ruined the hostile armies, and then, at their leisure, reduced 
 or demanded from the prostrate power the cession of the strongholds in 
 which it had so vainly confided. 
 
 In June 1800 the Austrians held in Italy the fortified places of Genoa, 
 Coni, Alessandria, Tortona, Arona, Piacenza, Ceva, Savona, besides the 
 citadel of Milan, blockaded by the French : but the victory of Marengo 
 gave all these to the conqueror. In 1806 the fortresses of the Elbe did not 
 prevent Napoleon from penetrating to the Oder ; and the capitulation of 
 Magdeburg, Spandau, Stettin, Custrin, was almost simultaneous with the 
 destruction of the Prussian armies. Again, Napoleon, driven out of 
 Germany in 1813, left strong garrisons in fortresses on the Elbe and 
 Oder. As the Allies advanced towards the Pdrine, detached corps were 
 left to invest these places; but, on their surrender, the garrisons were 
 lost to Napoleon, while the investing corps marched to swell the Allied 
 armies invading France. Nor did the triple line of fortresses that guarded 
 the French frontiers of Belgium and the Ehine prevent Blucher and 
 Schwartzenberg from marching upon Paris. 
 
 It was plain, then, that numerous bodies of 6000 to 12,000 each, or 
 even stronger (25,000 French were left in Dresden), shut up in a line of 
 fortresses, might be as utterly lost as if they were buried there, and quite 
 ineffectual in a campaign which might have been decided by their pres- 
 ence in the field. 
 
 But, on the other hand, it was equally plain that fortresses, properly Yet the want 
 distributed, might exercise a most potent influence. If France had too of fortresses 
 many, Germany had too few. Had strong places existed in 1809 on the severe i v f,.} t 
 Inn and the Traun, the defeat of Eckmuhl need not have been so rapidly 
 followed by the capture of Vienna. " All that a great monarchy wants," 
 says the Archduke Charles, "is time to develop its resources." And time 
 
302 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Their uses. 
 
 Selection of 
 positions for 
 fortresses. 
 
 Mountains 
 unsuitable. 
 
 Austria would have gained had she possessed at Linz a fortress or 
 intrenched camp commanding the passage of the Danube and the road 
 to Vienna on both banks, difficult to invest, impossible to leave in the 
 rear. And, in 1814, had Chalons, Troyes, Nogent, been fortresses capable 
 of sustaining a siege, it is easy to imagine what difficulties they would 
 have interposed in the way of the Allies, and what support they would 
 have afforded to Napoleon. In our own day we have seen a small fortress 
 change the aspect of a great war; for had Silistria failed to repel the 
 Russian army, Turkey, not the Crimea, would have been the scene of the 
 campaign. 
 
 Fortresses, then, though without armies they are unavailing, may 
 give to a country defensive power that counterbalances the cost of 
 their construction, armament, and equipment, and the deduction of their 
 garrisons from the active force. And if, besides being impregnable to 
 open assault, they contain within their defences everything necessary for 
 the supply of armies, they may be used as temporary bases, or pivots, 
 round which an army can operate with vastly increased power and lati- 
 tude of manoeuvring. Their value for this purpose will be immensely in- 
 creased by forming round them an intrenched camp — that is, a line of 
 continuous or detached works, placed at about 4000 yards from the 
 enceinte, and thereby inclosing space sufficient for the assembling and 
 manoeuvring of an army. Assuming, then, that fortresses properly 
 placed will confer advantages that vastly more than compensate for the 
 extent to which they tax the resources of a state, it remains to deter- 
 mine the points on which they will be most fitly situated. 
 
 The double object of giving security to fortresses, and of commanding 
 through them points of strategical importance, will be best secured by 
 placing them on natural obstacles, and at the junction of many great 
 roads. If a mountain pass were guarded by an important place, it 
 would be difficult to provision and supply the garrison ; the issues would 
 be easily blocked by a few troops ; and an invading army might turn the 
 place, masking the defiles with numbers less than the garrison, and its 
 capitulation under the stress of the blockade would be a question of time 
 only. Mountain summits, then, are unfit positions for fortresses, though 
 small forts may be judiciously placed where they close a main pass, as at 
 Bard ; even so their influence may no longer remain undiminished, for 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 303 
 
 when a mountain barrier is penetrated by a railway, forts closing passes 
 at other points lose much of their importance. The Germans, in 1870, 
 having possessed themselves of Saverne, were comparatively independent 
 of the roads closed by Bitsch, and contented themselves with observing 
 that hill-fort throughout the campaign. But situated on rivers, at points Best placed 
 where the main communications cross, fortresses not only command both on nvers - 
 banks and open numerous opportunities for attacking the enemy that 
 attempts to pass the obstacle, but are also difficult to invest, since the 
 besieging army, in order to surround the place, must have bridges both 
 above and below it, and will thus be doubly dependent on a kind of com- 
 munication which floods and other casualties render especially precarious. 
 Fortresses on either bank of a river will sometimes command the pas- 
 sage, from the superior power of their heavy artillery ; but great addi- 
 tional security may be given to the army issuing from them by placing 
 them astride the stream, thus protecting the bridge from all risk of assault 
 or cannonade; always provided that no ground commands the works within 
 cannon-range. The same important end may be attained, where fortresses 
 do not exist, by bridge-heads — that is, works demanding only very small Bridgeheads, 
 garrisons, and armed with guns of such calibre as to keep field-artillery 
 at a distance, while at the same time they afford all facility for the issu- 
 ing, and formation on a large front, of troops that have passed the bridge. 
 The fortifications should therefore be placed at some distance — half a 
 mile or more — from the head of the bridge, and may consist either of a 
 single enclosed work, if an isolated hill affords a site from whence it 
 will command a sufficient space, as Mount Valerien commands the pas- 
 sages of the Seine ; or (which will give far greater security to the passage) 
 of several small detached works placed on an arc, heavily armed with artil- 
 lery to keep the enemy's field-guns at a distance, each occupied by two or 
 three companies, and flanked by the fire of a central work placed near 
 the bridge, and completely protecting it from a night-attack. Thus, at 
 the expense of one or two battalions and some heavy guns in the works, a 
 passage may be secured against any partial attack. But in all cases it is 
 essential that the utmost facility should be given for the issue of troops. 
 This was amply proved at Marengo ; for the Austrians had protected the 
 passage of the Bormida by a bridge-head having only one issue: thus 
 the whole Austrian army was forced to defile by it, and their left column, 
 
304 THE OPERATIONS OE WAR 
 
 the action of which, to be effective, should have been simultaneous, was 
 long delayed from taking part in the action, while the troops that passed 
 first suffered enormously in making a front attack on the French. 
 
 It will sometimes happen that the banks of rivers are unfavourable 
 to defences of this kind. At Donauwerth, for instance, a high hill, the 
 extremity of a spur of the Alps, rises from the river on the left bank, 
 close to the town. To cover the passage from an enemy approaching 
 from the Maine, the work constructed to protect the bridge must be 
 itself protected from an enemy who might gain the hill. Therefore the 
 bill must be fortified ; and as the works there could not be protected 
 by fire from the right bank, which is flat, they must be strong enough to 
 maintain themselves : hence a fortress on the hill is necessary to secure 
 the passage at Donauwerth. But a great part of the course of large rivers, 
 Especially such as the Po, the Danube, and the Rhine, lies through wide flat valleys, 
 important in wnere W orks protecting bridges, not being commanded, have full effect, 
 and where they confer immense advantages on their possessors. At Dus- 
 seldorf, Cassel (opposite Mayence), Kehl, Brisach, and Huninguen, they 
 gave a continual superiority to the French in the wars of the Revolution, 
 eivins them free issue to the German bank of the Rhine for the offensive, 
 and affording certain refuge in defeat. 
 Their effect Placed thus astride of rivers which directly traverse the probable lines 
 
 when situated f p era tions of an enemy, fortresses, as the strongest kind of bridge- 
 obstacles, heads, may, according to their position, whether on the centre or ex- 
 tremity of the defensive line, give security to the front or the flank of the 
 army that holds the obstacle. They force an enemy to be more cautious 
 in his approach, and, by rendering him more solicitous to defend himself 
 on his own bank while attempting to cross to the other, they deprive his 
 operations of the vigour and decision in which lie his best hopes of suc- 
 cess. Nevertheless, if a river be held strictly on the defensive, they do 
 not, as has been repeatedly proved (thrice on the Mincio, and often on 
 the Rhine), prevent an assailant from crossing. It may be questioned 
 whether a short definite line like the Mincio would not be better de- 
 fended by a single fortress astride of it at a central point, such as Ferri 
 or Goito, rather than by one at each extremity ; for a French army 
 could not cross on both sides of such a fortress, since it would be volun- 
 tarily separating its front in the most unfavourable manner. It would 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 305 
 
 therefore be limited to one or the other half of the river — that is to say, 
 to a space of 12 or 13 miles. Should it cross the lower portion, the 
 Austrians issuing from the fortress would force it to fight with its back 
 to the Po ; should it cross the upper part of the stream, it must fight with 
 its back to the lake ; and in both cases on a front parallel to its last line 
 of communication with the base. 
 
 To the reader of preceding chapters it will be quite unnecessary to Their effect 
 expatiate on the advantages of placing fortresses astride of rivers which n on 
 
 rivers parallel 
 
 are parallel to the line of operation of an expected invader. Placed on to t h e ii ne f 
 such a river, at the confluence of another stream of which they also com- an enemy's 
 mand the passage, they confer additional advantages on the army resting opera lons ' 
 on them, besides being especially secure from attack, since a besieging 
 army must be dependent on three sets of bridges during the investment, 
 and if any of these were damaged by a flood or other accident, the whole 
 force would be in jeopardy. And if, moreover, they are situated in parts 
 of the theatre where the possible front of operations is greatly narrowed, 
 they combine all the conditions of efficiency. Linz is an example, where 
 the Austrians constructed, after the lessons of Napoleon's wars, an in- 
 trenched camp * commanding both banks of the Danube, with the roads 
 to Vienna and Bohemia, and the passage of the Traun, and where the 
 mountains of Salzburg on the one side, and the Danube on the other, 
 narrow the practicable front of operations to the space from Linz to Lam- 
 bach — about 25 miles. 
 
 Discussing the features of South-Western Germany as a theatre of Archduke's 
 
 war, the Archduke selects the following points as most advantageous for P ro P ose(1 S J S " 
 
 . tem of fort- 
 
 fortresses, placing in the first rank those which require garrisons of 12,000 Tesses f or 
 
 men and upwards ; in the second, those whose garrisons are from 6000 S."W. Ger- 
 
 to 12,000 ; in the third, those between 3000 and 6000. many - 
 
 , P .p See Map 
 
 Taking the Enns and the Moldau as the base, he proposes to fortify No 7 
 
 Enns (1st class). 
 
 Prague (1st class). 
 
 Budweis (2d class), as an intermediate point of inferior importance. 
 
 * The works (32 towers) were considered to afford no protection against modern artillery, 
 and have been suffered to fall to decay. The importance of the site renders it probable 
 that new works will be constructed. 
 
 U 
 
306 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Eatisbon (1st class). 
 Ulm (2d class). 
 
 Ingolstadt (3d class), to connect Ulm and Eatisbon, at tbe junction of 
 many important roads. 
 Heilbronn (1st class). 
 
 Passage of the Neckar near Caustadt (3d class), to command the roads 
 from the Ehine and Maine towards the Danube. 
 
 These he regards as the most important points ; but for increased 
 power of defence he would support these by other fortresses at 
 
 Klattau (3d class), as the most important point between Budweis and 
 Eatisbon, 
 
 Passau (2d class), to connect the two banks of the Danube and cover 
 the bridge of the Inn. 
 
 Ebersberg (a small fort), at the passage of the Traun. 
 Yet he says an enemy might leave on one side the fortresses of the 
 Neckar and the Upper Danube, and descend in force straight on Eatis- 
 bon, separating Ulm, &c, from their base. In fact, the lesson of 1805 
 had taught the Archduke this possibility ; therefore he would add to the 
 system. 
 
 Wurzburg (2d class), closing the best roads from the Maine to the 
 Danube. And, to complete the system, 
 
 Moldau-teyn (a bridge-head), being the only good passage between 
 Prague and Budweis. 
 Steyer (a fort). 
 Amberg (2d class). 
 
 Landshut (3d class), securing the flanks of an army manceuvring round 
 Eatisbon. 
 
 Moskirch (2d class), and 
 Miltenberg (3d class), as outworks of Ulm. 
 .Tomini on the Jomini, while pointing out the errors of the system on which France 
 defence of \ m ^ ^ eerj fortified in Louis XIV.'s time, when, on a third only of her 
 
 France by . J 
 
 fortresses. total extent of frontier, forty fortresses had been constructed, yet con- 
 sidered that each face of her frontier as it existed before the war of 1870 
 (that of Belgium, or of the Ehine, for example) should have three fort- 
 resses in first line, three in second line, and a great place of arms between 
 the second line and the capital. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 307 
 
 But Marshal Marmont, discussing the same question, considers that Marmont on 
 one great place on each frontier would suffice — for example, Lille for the tlie Siinie - 
 Belgian frontier, Metz for that of the Ardennes, Strasbourg for that of the 
 Rhine. But these should be something more than fortresses — they should 
 contain sufficient material for a great army in artillery, firearms, pro- 
 visions of all kinds, workshops, arsenals, hospitals ; in fact, collecting all 
 the raw material which naturally ilows from the surrounding district into 
 a great city, they should be capable of converting it, by means of a large 
 population of artisans, and of extensive manufactories, into the material 
 of war — of turning brass into cannon, iron into projectiles and rifles, wood 
 into trains of waggons, wheat into biscuit, canvas into tents, &c. — so that 
 an army might manoeuvre round such a place either in its own or the 
 enemy's country, secure of all the support which a near base can afford. 
 
 When a frontier is unmarked by any natural obstacles, and has numer- An open fron- 
 ous issues, it is in vain to attempt to close it entirely with fortifications ; tier best 
 
 c i • r i n t guarded by 
 
 ior an enemy, masking one or two ot the strong places, would penetrate a few t 
 the line, and still be superior to the defensive army in the field, deprived fortresses. 
 as it would be of many troops for the ineffective garrisons of the frontier. 
 That the influence of fortresses extends only to a limited radius is seen 
 from the fact that in 1815 Tournay and Mons had not the slightest effect 
 on Napoleon when he was advancing by the line of Charleroi. But, on 
 the other hand, Napoleon may have been mainly induced to select 
 that line by the fact that Mons and Tournay were fortified, and that 
 his fighting force would be diminished by the necessity of masking 
 them, should he advance by the roads on which they stood. On the 
 whole, it would seem that an open frontier will be best protected by 
 a very few strong places, situated on the most direct lines to the cap- 
 ital, whereby an invader will be driven to make a great circuit, or to 
 diminish his fighting force considerably, in order to pass them, while 
 the garrisons drawn from the defensive army will thus be reduced to 
 a minimum. 
 
 If a frontier, naturally strong, have few issues, the strong places that Importance 
 
 guard them become of immense importance. In 1812 the French held of fortresses 
 
 when the 
 Ciudad Eodrigo and Badajos ; they thus closed the doors between Spain i ssnes f 
 
 and Portugal, and the one fortress would afford a base to Marmont, the a frontier 
 
 other to Soult, in offensive operations against Lisbon. 
 
308 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 If, on the other hand, Wellington, masking Badajos, were to take 
 the offensive against Soult in Andalucia, Marmont from Ciudad Eodrigo 
 would in a moment recall him by threatening Lisbon ; and Soult would 
 in the same way, from Badajos, prevent an attack on Marmont. 
 
 The peculiar circumstances under which the French occupied Spain 
 rendered it necessary that they should spread widely, in order at once to 
 obtain subsistence and to keep down the hostile population. The scan- 
 tiness of provisions generally reduced them to the defensive during the 
 winter and early part of the year, till the harvest filled with grain their 
 central depots of supply. At these seasons they could safely disperse 
 their troops, to seek subsistence, so long as the two fortresses kept the 
 English at bay. But Wellington, supplied from the sea, was more inde- 
 pendent of the country ; and, if he could capture the fortresses, he might 
 take the offensive at a season when it was most inconvenient for the 
 French to assemble in masses. Hence it was that the possession of these 
 places was so important to either side, and that Wellington rightly con- 
 sidered it worth the risks and certain heavy losses of the famous attacks 
 by storm. 
 
 On a frontier, then, with few issues, especially if these be distant from 
 each other, fortresses will be especially valuable, by obstructing an invader 
 till the defensive army can place itself on the line of intended invasion ; 
 and the best situations for them will be easily recognised. The interior 
 range of strong places must be situated on points advantageous for defence, 
 Importance and strategically important. Lastly, the defence of the capital by fortifi- 
 of fortifying ca ti ns is a measure of incalculable advantage. "The fortifications of 
 Paris," says Marmont, " assure more powerfully the independence of 
 France against the attacks of all Europe than the acquisition of many 
 provinces, which would only so much the more extend the frontier." 
 The student of the campaign of 1814 will perceive what vast additional 
 power of manoeuvring Napoleon would have gained had Paris been secure 
 from assault. No longer recalled by the fears of the people, or by poli- 
 tical exigencies, to interpose directly for its defence, all his strokes would 
 have been delivered in the most decisive way ; and the nearer the Allied 
 armies approached the capital, the more imminent would be the risk they 
 ran of a fatal disaster. 
 
 Though instances have occurred where, as at Silistria, frontier fortresses 
 
 a capital. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 309 
 
 have, by resisting the besieger, baffled an invasion, yet the strictly defen- 
 sive effect to be expected from these, as from natural obstacles, is only 
 that of delaying the assailant, and thereby giving the generals in the 
 field the opportunity of opposing combinations and enterprises which 
 depended for success on swiftness of execution. But, as with rivers Fortresses 
 and mountain - ranges, the obstructing of the enemy is only a part, cmef 'y usi ' ful 
 
 • • t- • to aid offen- 
 
 and not the most decisive part, of the influence which fortresses may be sive opera . 
 made to exercise on a campaign ; and to turn them to full account a tions. 
 general must employ them as powerful aids for attacking the adversary 
 at a disadvantage. 
 
 Sites formerly eligible for fortresses are so, in many cases, no longer. Many fort- 
 The war of 1870 conclusively proved that, owinp- to the increased ranges ressesren - 
 
 J r ' ° ° deredunten- 
 
 of guns, places formerly deemed strong, such as Toul and Montmedy, are a t,i e \>y mo _ 
 now easily commanded, and consequently untenable. For the same dern artillery, 
 reason fortified towns, which were formerly safe from bombardment while Fortified 
 their outworks were held, are now liable to destruction while the defences ,.°T? S no , w 
 
 liable to be 
 
 are still unbreached ; of which Peronne, Thionville, and Mezieres are reduced by 
 examples. In these cases the surrender has always been compelled, in a bombardment, 
 very few days, by bombardment, after great destruction of property. It 
 follows that, unless fortified towns are surrounded, at a considerable 
 distance, by a girdle of forts on commanding ground, they are worse than 
 useless ; and that the only kinds of permanent fortresses which are 
 admissible are intrenched camps, such as Metz should have been, and 
 hill-forts closing important passes. 
 
 A fortress astride of a river will very imperfectly fulfil its functions Fortresses 
 unless the stream is so thoroughlv bridged within the works as to cease over streams 
 
 sbould in- 
 to exist there as an obstacle. There were two permanent bridges over c i ll( ] e many 
 
 the Moselle in the city of Metz, which, besides the railway bridge outside bridges. 
 
 the w r alls, were at Bazaine's disposal. Yet he attributes his inability to 
 
 transfer his army to the west bank on the 13th August 1870 to the 
 
 destruction by floods of other trestle-bridges thrown for the occasion. 
 
 If these views be accepted, the principles on which a system of fort- riI1K ' 1 l ,lcs 
 
 on which a 
 resses should be constructed are these : — system of 
 
 1. The nature of the frontier must be considered — whether difficult fortresses or 
 
 of access and easily closed by small works, or open. If open, a large ! c . . 
 
 fortress and intrenched camp, at such a distance from the frontier as be based. 
 
310 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 will admit of an army manoeuvring in front of it, yet close enough to 
 form a base for operations in the enemy's country, will be of great value. 
 If, however, the frontier be a great river, the fortress may appropriately 
 be situated on it. 
 
 2. When the distance between the frontier line and the capital is 
 great, a second defensive line should be formed. It should consist 
 of intrenched camps situated on possible great lines of operation, at such 
 points as will combine the advantages of easy communication (by railway 
 if possible) with each other and with the capital, of being at suitable 
 intermediate distance between the capital and the frontier, and of offering 
 facilities for defence. 
 
 3. The capital (or, if it be too near the frontier, some central place of 
 importance) should be fortified. 
 
 In this way the most considerable frontier and line of invasion might 
 be secured by two or three fortresses and intrenched camps, with a few 
 inferior works to obstruct particular defiles or to secure passages of inter- 
 communication ; and the student will appreciate the value of these to 
 the commander of the defensive army, in giving him the option of indi- 
 rectly defending the capital by operating on the invader's flank, and 
 forcing him either to diverge from his line or to divide his forces. 
 
 The student will find it an excellent exercise in strategy, and one 
 taxing his acquirements, to take a map of any country — France, Spain, 
 Turkey — and devise for it an efficient and economical system of fortresses, 
 always remembering that these must be placed where they combine the 
 conditions of security from attack with the command of those points in 
 the theatre which are of chief strategical importance. For to place the 
 fortresses in the most effective situations, he must know well the features 
 of the country, and be able to recognise and deal with the many pro- 
 blems it may suggest, under various circumstances, as a possible theatre 
 of war — problems such as it has been the object of this work to state and 
 discuss. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 311 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF METZ AND SEDAN CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE 
 TO THE FOREGOING CHAPTERS. 
 
 The desire of France for an extension of her frontier, which had been 
 justly ascribed to arrogance and ambition, became, after 1866, the expres- 
 sion of very reasonable apprehensions. Up to that year Prussia had been 
 separated from her Rhenish provinces by an interval occupied with in- 
 dependent States, and her military power was not such as to render her, 
 under the existing circumstances, formidable to France. But the campaign 
 against Austria had changed all this. A great military monarchy, possess- 
 ing an army no less formidable for organisation and discipline than num- 
 bers, was now at the door of the Empire, and the opening of the war attest- 
 ed how real was the peril which the new situation contained for France. 
 
 The circumstances under which war was declared seemed to indicate Delusive 
 distinctly the course which the campaign would take at its commence- belief that 
 
 France would 
 
 ment. From the demeanour of France, and her apparent determination take the ini . 
 to precipitate hostilities, it was justly and generally inferred that her tiative. 
 plans were formed and her preparations made, and that she desired to 
 keep the start she had gained on Prussia. Hence it was believed that 
 she would at once enter on an offensive campaign. Within a week of the 
 declaration of war (15th July) the world was already growing impatient 
 to see her cross the Rhine, and was wondering at her delay ; and expected 
 to see her armies overrun Rhenish Prussia, or interpose between South 
 Germany and the Northern Confederation, while the assemblement of the 
 several Prussian corps was still incomplete. 
 
 The first miscalculation which became evident in the plans of France 
 was exposed by the unanimity with which the whole of the German 
 
312 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 States — -Southern and Northern — threw in their fortunes with Prussia. 
 Though this greatly augmented the force to be arrayed against France, 
 yet it also offered to her a much more extensive frontier on which to choose 
 her point of attack. No longer limited to the boundary which separates 
 Rhenish Prussia from Lorraine, that of Rhenish Bavaria was now an 
 enemy's territory ; and, further, the course of the Rhine from Basle to the 
 Lauter afforded opportunities for an advance based on Strasbourg and 
 Metz. Thus South Germany might be singly overwhelmed, and a 
 victorious aspect given to the first steps of the invasion. With this view 
 it was intended to assemble 150,000 troops about Metz, 100,000 about 
 First French Strasbourg, and 50,000 at Chalons ; all that could be calculated on for 
 immediate action. The enemy being by these dispositions kept in doubt 
 of the intended point of attack, the Metz and Strasbourg armies were 
 to unite rapidly for the passage of the Rhine opposite Garlsruhe, while the 
 Chalons army was to move eastward for the protection of Lorraine. 
 
 In accordance with this design the French corps were assembled thus : — ■ 
 
 project. 
 
 French 
 inaction. 
 
 1st Corps. 
 
 35,000 inf. 
 
 3,500 cav. 
 
 108 j 
 
 ^uns. 
 
 M 'Mahon. 
 
 Strasbourg. 
 
 2d „ 
 
 26,000 ,, 
 
 2,000 ,, 
 
 90 
 
 ii 
 
 Frossard. 
 
 S. Avoid. 
 
 3d ,, 
 
 35,000 „ 
 
 3,500 „ 
 
 108 
 
 >, 
 
 Bazaine. 
 
 Metz. 
 
 4th „ 
 
 26,000 „ 
 
 2,000 „ 
 
 90 
 
 , , 
 
 Ladmirault. 
 
 Thionville. 
 
 5th ,, 
 
 26,000 ,, 
 
 2,000 „ 
 
 90 
 
 >> 
 
 De Failly. 
 
 Bitsche. 
 
 6th „ 
 
 35,000 ,, 
 
 3,000 ,, 
 
 108 
 
 ,) 
 
 Canrobert. 
 
 Chalons. 
 
 7th „ 
 
 26,000 ,, 
 
 1,500 ,, 
 
 90 
 
 >> 
 
 Douay. 
 
 Belfort. 
 
 Guard. 
 
 17,000 „ 
 
 3,000 „ 
 
 72 
 
 , j 
 
 Bourbaki. 
 
 Nancy. 
 
 226,000 ,, 20,500 „ 756 ,, 
 Reserve Cavalry, 6,000 ,, 
 
 One of the three divisions of the 7th Corps was in process of formation at Lyons till 12th 
 August, and the others were below their proper strength. 
 
 The neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, respected throughout the 
 campaign, was guaranteed by both parties ; and the boundary by which 
 France or Germany could be entered by the hostile armies was thereby 
 rigidly defined. 
 
 As the days of July wore on without action on the part of the French, 
 it became apparent that the Prussian assemblement (the time required 
 for which might be calculated with approximate accuracy) would be 
 accomplished before the French would be ready to move forward. It was 
 soon no secret that the French preparations were incomplete in every 
 particular. Their battalions were deficient in men, their transport 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 313 
 
 and cavalry in horses, their trains in material ; provisions, ammunition, 
 and stores, if existing in sufficient quantities,* were not easily available, 
 and the railways of France did not readily lend themselves to a move- French 
 ment of concentration on the frontier. There are only four which, railwa ys. 
 traversing the interior of France, approach the menaced boundary : those 
 which issue by Thionville, Saarguemines (incomplete from Verdun to Map 18. 
 Metz), Strasbourg, and Belfort. 
 
 According to a project prepared by Moltke a year or two before, the 
 assembly of the German armies was destined to take place in Rhenish 
 Prussia and Bhenish Bavaria, on a front extending along the river Saar, 
 and thence to both banks of the Bhine at Karlsruhe. For he argued that 
 the neutrality of Belgium on the one side, Switzerland on the other, 
 limited the theatre of action at first to the area from Luxembourg to 
 Basle, and that (briefly) whatever course of operation France might pur- 
 sue — whether to fall at first upon South Germany, or to advance towards 
 the Main, the German armies thus concentrated on the part of that area 
 which they could most promptly reach, and on the shortest line to Paris, 
 would also be best placed for meeting all contingencies. 
 
 Thus the great question of which side should take the initiative, the 
 aim of both, depended on which army should first be assembled ready for 
 action in the area designated. 
 
 The forces which the Germans placed in motion were these : — 
 First Army — Steinmetz. 
 
 
 
 
 Commander. 
 
 Home Locality. 
 
 I.t Corps. 25,000 inf. 
 
 1,200 cav. 
 
 84 guns. 
 
 Manteufel. 
 
 East Prussian. 
 
 VII. ,, 25,000 „ 
 
 1,200 ,, 
 
 84 „ 
 
 Zastrow. 
 
 Westphalian. 
 
 VIII. ,, 25,000 ,, 
 
 1,200 ,, 
 
 90 ,, 
 
 Goeben. 
 
 Rbinelanders. 
 
 Res. Cav. and Art. 
 
 6,000 ,, 
 
 12 „ 
 
 
 
 Second Army- 
 
 -Prince Fi 
 
 rederick Charles. 
 
 
 Guard, 29,000 ,, 
 
 4,800 „ 
 
 90 „ 
 
 Duke of Wurtemberg. 
 
 
 I I.t Corps. 25,000 „ 
 
 1,200 ,, 
 
 84 „ 
 
 Fransecky. 
 
 Pomeranian. 
 
 III. ,, 25,000 ,, 
 
 1,200 „ 
 
 84 „ 
 
 Alvensleben II. 
 
 Brandenburg. 
 
 IV. „ 25,000 ,, 
 
 1,200 ,, 
 
 84 „ 
 
 Alvensleben I. 
 
 Saxon. 
 
 IX. t „ 23,000 „ 
 
 1,800 „ 
 
 90 „ 
 
 Manstein. 
 
 Schleswig. 
 
 X. ,, 25,000 „ 
 
 1,200 ,, 
 
 84 „ 
 
 Voigts-Ehetz. 
 
 Hanoverian. 
 
 XII. „ 29,000 „ 
 
 3,600 „ 
 
 96 „ 
 
 P. Albert of Saxony. 
 
 Saxon. 
 
 Res. Cav. and Art. 
 
 8,400 ,, 
 
 18 „ 
 
 
 
 * It is said, probably with truth, that a sufficiency of these and of troops of the reserve 
 existed ; but that want of transport, and defects of organisation and direction, rendered 
 them unavailing. 
 
 t Joined after the 6th August. 
 
314 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Third Army— Crown Prince. 
 
 V. Corps. 25,000 inf. 1,200 cav. 84 guns. Kirchbach. Posen. 
 
 VI.* ,, 25,000 ,, 1,200 ,, 84 ,, Tumpling. Silesian. 
 
 XI. ,, 25,000 ,, 1,200 „ 84 ,, Bose. Hessian. 
 
 M „ 50,000,, 5,800,, 192,, j ^on der Tann. ) Bavarian. 
 
 II. J " * " ' " ' ( Hartmann. ) 
 
 Division, 15,000 ,, 1,500 ,, 54 ,, Obernitz. Wurtemberg. 
 
 ,, 12,000 „ 1,800 ,, 54 ,, Beyer. Baden. 
 
 Res. Cav. and Art. 7,200 ,, 24 ,, 
 
 408,000 „ 52,900 ,,1,466 ,, 
 
 German Nine lines of railway were at the disposal of the North and South 
 
 railways. German troops : — 
 
 Map 15. Line 1. Berlin — Magdeburg — Cologne — Coblentz — Neukircben. 
 
 , , 2. Berlin — Cassel — Frankfort — Darmstadt — Mannheim — Homburg. 
 
 ,, 3. Dresden or Leipsic — Bibra — Fulda — Mainz. 
 
 ,, 4. Leipsic or Harburg — Kreiensen — Paderborn — Biebrich. 
 
 ,, 5. Munster — Dusseldorf — Cologne — Diiren — Call. 
 
 ,, 6. Posen — Gorlitz— Leipsic — Wurzburg — Mainz — Landau. 
 
 ,, 7. Augsburg — Ulm — Bruchsal. 
 
 ,, 8. Nordlingen — Crailsheim — Meckesbeim. 
 
 ,, 9. Wurzburg — Mosbacb — Heidelberg. 
 
 Of these 1, 2, 3, 4 were assigned to the Second Army, 5 to the First 
 Army (VII. and VIII. Corps), 6 to the V. and VI. Corps, and 7, 8, 9 to 
 the South German troops. 
 
 Owing to the Prussian organisation and military system, all the corps 
 could be assembled simultaneously, each in its own district, complete in 
 men, material, and munitions ; parts of corps followed each other in 
 succession towards the same points, till all were assembled entire, when 
 their supplies were directed from the same districts on the same line — 
 for in every military district of Germany the regular troops and the 
 reserves form one united corps, complete in the three arms, directed by 
 their own staff, and supplied from their own magazines. But in France 
 the regular regiments were connected neither with particular localities, 
 nor with the reserves which those localities supply ; while the stores, in- 
 stead of being definitely allotted, were collected in a few great depots. 
 Thus it happened that while the French railways were scenes of disorder, 
 obstruction, and false or purposeless movements, those of Germany were 
 acting with the unity and certainty of full rivers flowing onward to the sea. 
 
 The German system, by which corps locally organised and complete 
 were connected by distinct lines of railway with their own districts, thus 
 
 * Joined after the 6th August. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 315 
 
 rendering all Germany the source of supply, came into immediate contrast 
 with the more primitive French system, by which troops from all parts 
 of the Empire, and without previous association, were brought together, 
 and supplied from fortresses converted into depots for the occasion. So 
 defective was the French system that the divisions of the army were at 
 once separated for subsistence, and in the first marches their supplies and 
 transport failed. 
 
 Under such different conditions, nothing but the previous concentra- 
 tion of troops and material on the Ehenish frontier could have sufficed to 
 give France the advantage. And when it became apparent that the 
 French corps were assembling slowly and with difficulty and confusion 
 (with what difficulty and confusion the French official documents cap- 
 tured and published by the Prussians have since disclosed) ; that the 
 want of transport and of provisions had begun to be felt before the 
 organisation of corps was complete ; that the railways were in all 
 directions encumbered by trains moving in disorder or not moving at 
 all, — it became apparent also that the advantage of the initiative would 
 be with the Prussians. 
 
 As soon as there was no longer any chance that the French would Frontier linos 
 
 advance through Ehenish Prussia unopposed, a main element in the betv ^ een tno 
 
 . armies, 
 
 problem of the campaign — namely, the configuration of the lines separat- 
 ing the hostile forces, and the consequent relations existing between their 
 fronts — was ascertained. Those lines form a strongly-pronounced angle, 
 the one side of which divides Ehenish Prussia and Ehenish Bavaria from Map 15. 
 France ; the other ascends the Ehine from the confluence of the Lauter to 
 Basle. In the original French plan of campaign an army had been stationed 
 about Strasbourg, threatening South Germany, and another about Metz, 
 threatening Ehenish Prussia ; and it had been intended that while the 
 attention of the enemy was thus distracted, and their forces divided to 
 protect the menaced territories, the Strasbourg and the Metz armies 
 should move convergently on the Ehine, and crossing it, as already 
 said, separate the South German forces from those of the Northern 
 Confederation. But now, in presence of the forces which the Germans 
 were directing towards the northern face of the angle, it was felt that the 
 Metz army was all too weak to oppose them; breaking in there, they 
 might even cut the forces at Strasbourg from Paris. Wherefore, the 
 
316 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Change in the 
 French dis- 
 positions. 
 
 Description of 
 the Vos«res. 
 
 Map 16. 
 
 Coblentz to 
 Saarbruck, 
 90. 
 
 Mayence to 
 Kaiserslau- 
 tern, 50. 
 
 Emperor, leaving the double frontier line of the Ehine and Vosges mainly 
 to the protection of its fortified places, directed the corps of M'Mahon, and 
 one division of Douay's corps at Belfort, down the Ehine valley to take 
 post east of De Failly, who was at Bitsche, and thus continue the oc- 
 cupation of the menaced front. 
 
 The chief military obstacle which opposes itself to the invasion of 
 France from Germany is the line of the Vosges mountains. Leaving a 
 gap between themselves and the Jura, in which lies the road from Basle 
 by Vesoul and Chaumont to Paris (taken by Schwartzenburg's army in 
 1814), they run northward, nearly parallel to the Ehine, and, parted by 
 a broad flat valley from the river, extend into Ehenish Bavaria, whence 
 they subside into the plain at Mayence and Coblentz. In their southern 
 portion they form a serious obstacle to the movement of troops, for the 
 main roads are few and guarded. That from Mulhouse to Epinal is 
 protected in flank by the fortifications and intrenched camp of Belfort. 
 In front of that, from Colmar to Saint Die\ stands the fortress of Neu 
 Brisach. Another road to Saint Die is closed by the fortress of Schlestadt. 
 Another by the pass of Schimek is guarded by Strasbourg. The greatest 
 width of the Vosges is 42 miles, at Colmar. North of Schimek they 
 decline rapidly in height, and are penetrated by the road from Strasbourg 
 to Saarbourg, closed by the fort of Phalsbourg ; that from Hagenau to the 
 upper Saar guarded by the fort of La Petite Pierre ; that from Hagenau 
 by Ingweiler to Saarguemines, watched by the military post of Lichten- 
 berg ; that from Hagenau by Niederbronn to Saarguemines barred by 
 Bitsche ; while opposite another defile leading by Bitsche stands Wissem- 
 bourg, fortified only by an old wall. About the sources of the Lauter the 
 Vosges entirely lose their mountainous character, and become merely a 
 hilly region. 
 
 German movements : — 
 
 1st to 2>d August — The VII. and VIII. Corps of the First Army (West- 
 phalians and Ehinelanders), readily assembled on the Ehine, were moved 
 from Cologne and Coblentz towards the Saar by Treves. 
 
 The Second Army had come by rail from Pomerania, Brandenburg, 
 Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, and Saxony, and, crossing the Ehine from 
 Cologne to Mannheim, moved towards the frontier by the line of Kaisers- 
 lautern. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 317' 
 
 The Third Army, from Posen, Silesia, Hesse, and South Germany, Germeraheim 
 crossed the Rhine from Mayence to Germersheim, and moved towards ,u ^ lss ""- 
 
 bourg, 25. 
 
 the Lauter by Neustadt and Landau. 
 
 French movements : — Saarlouis to 
 
 Left .—The Guard was brought to Metz. Germersheim, 
 
 J D 70. 
 
 On the 2d, Frossard's corps marched to Saarbrucken, whence it drove a 
 
 Prussian outpost. The town and environs were occupied as advanced 
 
 posts, and the main body of the corps took position on the heights of 
 
 Spichern west of the town. 
 
 Bazaine's corps had moved eastward from Metz to about Boulay, and 
 Ladmirault's from Thionville towards Bouzonville. 
 
 Centre : — De Failly's main body was in and about Saarguemines, with 
 a division at Bitsche. 
 
 Right : — M'Mahon moved a division from Hagenau to Wissembourg ; Bitsche to 
 one was already near Woerth ; and the remaining two divisions of his Woerth > 18 - 
 corps were brought from Strasbourg by rail to join the other at Woerth 
 for the defence of the Vosges. 
 
 Prussia having snatched the initiative from her unready antagonist, it 
 became necessary to choose the line of attack. 
 
 That, of the two faces of the angular frontier, she should choose the Choice of a 
 boundary of the Rhenish provinces to advance from, was almost a neces- hne for the 
 sity. For according to the project already stated, all the German forces Fraucc 
 had been moved in this direction ; and they were now assembled, or 
 assembling, in the space between that boundary and the Rhine from 
 Cologne to Carlsruhe. And being thus on the side of the angle which 
 was parallel to the French communications, they were, as explained in 
 the chapter on the Configuration of Frontiers, in the most favourable 
 position for offence. 
 
 It remained, therefore, to select the portion of the boundary of Rhenish 
 Prussia and Bavaria from which to advance. 
 
 An advance of the Bight from Rhenish Prussia would turn the line of 
 the Vosges, and it would menace most decisively the French communica- 
 tions. But owing to the absence of railways, the Prussian concentration 
 on this side was still incomplete. The corps already assembled there 
 would, in advancing, encounter the mass of the front line of the French, 
 and the second line at Metz and Nancy : the strong places, Thionville and 
 
318 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAP 
 
 Reasons for 
 operating by 
 the Prussian 
 left. 
 
 German left 
 takes the of- 
 fensive. 
 
 Metz, and the fort of Marsal', would be serious obstacles on that side when 
 supporting large forces in the field ; and in case of a reverse the Prussians 
 might be cast back on neutral territory. 
 
 The Army of Prince Frederick Charles was opposite the Centime of this 
 front, but so far from the frontier that no immediate effort could be 
 made with it, though it was well posted to form second line to the First 
 Army, or to defend that district from an advance of the French. 
 
 The Left, under the Crown Prince, was assembled in great force about 
 Landau. The South German Corps had been easily concentrated on 
 Carlsruhe, and those of Frankfort and Hesse, Posen and Silesia, on that 
 and neighbouring points of the Ehine. Only the VI. Corps was still in 
 rear. The greater part of the Third Army was therefore on, and near, the 
 extremity of the French front, which at Wissembourg offered its flank to 
 the enemy's attack. The nature of the country, hilly and wooded, afforded 
 ample means for concealing a sudden advance from the French, whose 
 intelligence was extremely meagre or delusive, and whose outpost duties 
 were shamefully neglected. At this point, then, the whole weight of the 
 Third Army might be brought to bear on a single division, supported at 
 most by a single corps. No disastrous consequences need follow a 
 repulse of the Prussians on this side; while a successful action, fol- 
 lowed by the passage of the Vosges, would place the Third Army in 
 rear of the French line, and force it to fall back under penalty of 
 being hemmed in against the Belgian frontier, with the 1st and 2d 
 Armies assailing it from the side of Ehenish Prussia; while the vic- 
 torious Third Army, by gaining the Eastern Piailway, would sever the 
 communication between Paris and Strasbourg, would deprive the enemy 
 of a main line of supply, and would gain the most direct and least 
 protected line to the capital. 
 
 It was probably on such considerations — but mainly because he was 
 readiest for a blow — that the Crown Prince was ordered to attack. 
 
 4th August. — The corps of Ladmirault and Bazaine were spread by 
 divisions along the frontier from the Saarlouis-Metz road to Saargue- 
 mines, extending about 35 miles, and the entire front of the French army, 
 from the Boulay-Saarlouis road on the left, to Wissembourg on the right, 
 was about 80 miles. 
 
 The heads of the columns of the Third Army concentrated in an attack 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 319 
 
 on Wisserubourg, and drove out the French division, which retreated Wisaembouig 
 towards Woerth. to Woerth, 
 
 13 
 
 5th August. — M'Mahon took position for battle at Woerth. He 
 covered there the railway from Bitsche to Strasbourg, and held the defile mn Mntcsibe8 
 by which the enemy might turn the French strategical line, and strike for defence, 
 at the Paris-Strasbourg railway. 
 
 A division of the 7th Corps from Belfort reached Hagenau by rail, and 
 marched to join M'Mahon. 
 
 De Failly's corps was placed, by a telegraphic despatch from the Em- 
 peror, at M'Mahon's disposal, and he summoned it to join him in the 
 position he had taken. 
 
 The Third Army w T as approaching the Sauer; its advanced - guards 
 were on the east bank of that stream. 
 
 6th August. — De Failly failed to reinforce M'Mahon, except by the 
 late despatch of one division, which reached him only in time to cover 
 the retreat. 
 
 The Third Army (except the VI. Corps and Prussian Pteserve cavalry) German left 
 attacked and defeated M'Mahon. The French right, separated from defeats French 
 the centre by the course of the action, fled through Hagenau, and in part 
 reached Strasbourg. The centre and left, through Niederbronn and Woerth to 
 Ingweiler, reached Saverne in great disorder. The Germans, misled by Saverne > 27 - 
 the line taken by De Failly's division, which retired towards Bitsche, did 
 not immediately pursue M'Mahon in force. 
 
 Frossard, at Spicheren, was attacked by the leading divisions of the German right 
 First Army, supported by part of the III. Corps. Defeated, his corps defeats French 
 
 centre, 
 
 was, bv the direction of the attack, forced to retire towards Saarguemines. 
 
 J . , ,. . . r, • .„ , ■ • „ , S. AVOW to 
 
 Bazames division at Saarguemines was withdrawn to join another at §,,^1^,.^,^ ir , 
 Puttelange. 
 
 The Guard was at Courcelles. 
 
 French movements : — 
 
 7ih to 13th August. — M'Mahon retreated by Saverne, Saarburg, Lune- Saverne to 
 ville, Neufchateau, making for Chalons. Chalons, 175. 
 
 By the actions of the Gth, De Failly found a victorious enemy on each 
 flank and retreated by La Petite Pierre, following M'Mahon at two 
 marches in rear. 
 
 The corps of Bazaine, Ladmirault, Frossard, and the Guard, with part 
 
320 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Mctz to the 
 frontier, 35. 
 
 Metz to Pont- 
 a-Mousson, 
 19. 
 
 Pont-a-Mous- 
 son to Thian- 
 court, 13. 
 
 Pont-a-Mous- 
 son to Nove- 
 ant, 10. 
 
 Bouchy to 
 Pont-a-Mous- 
 son, 13. 
 
 Pont-a-Mous- 
 son to Toul, 
 20. 
 
 Metz to Ver- 
 dun, 40. 
 
 Metz to Mars- 
 la-Tour, 16. 
 
 of Canrobert's corps from Chalons and Paris, and one of De Failly's 
 brigades which followed Bazaine from Saarguemines, assembled before 
 Metz, numbering 122,000 infantry, 13,000 cavalry, and 540 guns. 
 Bazaine took command of this army, which on the 12th was in position 
 before the eastern forts of Metz. His instructions were to withdraw to 
 the left bank for a retreat upon Verdun. 
 
 German movements : — 
 
 The First Army was advancing towards Metz, its leading divisions on 
 the Nied. 
 
 The Second Army moved towards Pont-a-Mousson. 
 
 Its cavalry had seized the passages of the Moselle between Metz and 
 Frouard. Headquarters were established at Pont-a-Mousson. 
 
 The Third Army moved by Saverne upon Nancy, detaching the Baden 
 division to besiege Strasbourg, and small bodies to attack Bitsche, Lich- 
 tenberg, La Petite Pierre, and Phalsbourg. 
 
 Ikth A ugust. — The withdrawal of the French army to the western bank 
 was already in progress, only a division of the 3d Corps remaining in 
 position, when the advanced brigades of the First Army, supported by the 
 nearest troops of the Second Army, attacked. The 4th Corps, then 
 partly across the Moselle, was recalled to meet the enemy ; and at the 
 close of the action the 3d and 4th Corps remained between the eastern 
 forts of Metz. 
 
 A division of Prussian cavalry was at Thiancourt — the advanced-guard 
 of the X. Corps was between Thiancourt and Pont-a-Mousson. 
 
 The X. Corps at Pont-a-Mousson. 
 
 III.) 
 XII. J 
 
 on the road to Pont-a-Mousson. 
 
 XII. 
 
 IX.— Buchy. 
 II.— behind the IX. 
 Guard — Dieulouard. 
 
 IV. — Marbach, connecting the Second with the Third Army. 
 
 Main body of the Third Army was approaching Nancy. The advanced- 
 guard of the IV. Corps summoned Toul. 
 
 15th August — The French Army resumed the march on Verdun, which 
 had been interrupted by the German attack. 
 
 The 2d Corps was to march by Eezonville and Mars-la-Tour, followed 
 by the 6th, the Guard, and the Reserve Artillery. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 321 
 
 The 3d and 4th Corps were to move by Jarny and Etain. 
 
 A division of Eeserve Cavalry accompanied each column. 
 
 The Corps of the first column arrived near the destined points ; but 
 the 3d Corps only reached the plateau late at night — the 4th had not yet 
 crossed the Moselle. 
 
 The retreat of the French being observed by the Germans, their next 
 movement was made with the design of intercepting it. 
 
 The I. Corps remained before Metz. 
 
 VII. and VIII. moved to take up the line from Any to Pommerieux, 
 to cover the passage of the Moselle by the Second Army. 
 
 IX. and II. at first remained in position for the same purpose. 
 
 The remaining corps continued their march to the Moselle. The X. 
 Corps continued the passage, and pushed its advanced-guard to Thian- 
 court. The remaining Cavalry Division and the III. Corps crossed by 
 bridges thrown at Champey and Noveant, its artillery at Pont-a-Mousson, 
 and during the night reached Gorze and Onville. 
 
 The advanced cavalry had continued to precede the movement towards 
 the Metz- Verdun road. 
 
 The IX. Corps was directed to follow the III., and the XII. to follow the X. 
 
 16th. — The III. Corps, supported by the X. (coming up from the line 
 Thiancourt-S. Hilaire), the VIII. (which crossed at Noveant when the battle Noveant to 
 began), and IX., with the two cavalry divisions, attacked Bazaine's army, Vlonyille » '• 
 which formed in the course of the engagement from Gravelotte to Mars- 
 la-Tour, and drove his centre and right off the Metz-Vionville road. 
 
 Vlth. — Three additional bridges were thrown over the Moselle at Corny. 
 The VII. Corps crossed by them, and, resting its right on the Moselle, 
 extended its outposts thence to Gravelotte. The VIII. Corps at Gorze 
 observed the space from Gravelotte to Vionville. The IX. Corps took 
 post south of the road from Gorze to Vionville. The XII. and the Guard 
 marched on Mars-la-Tour. 
 
 The IV. Corps moved on Toul. The I. remained as before. II. to 
 Pont-a-Mousson. 
 
 The French army swung back on its left, and took position from Jussy to 
 Pioncourt, facing nearly west. 
 
 18^/t. — The five corps of the Second Army and the VIII., all pivoting 
 on the VII. (next the Moselle), advanced in echelon to the road from 
 
 x 
 
322 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Gravelotte to Jaray. The French position being ascertained, the Second 
 Army changed direction, advancing on the front from Malmaison to St 
 Marie-aux-Chenes, the II. Corps moving from Pont-a-Mousson to support 
 the right wing. Successively arriving opposite the Trench position they 
 engaged throughout the front. A brigade of the I. Corps took part in 
 the action from the heights on the east bank opposite Vaux. 
 
 The French army, outnumbered by more than two to one in men, and 
 a great preponderance of artillery, and turned on its right, retreated at 
 nightfall, when the long and severe battle of Gravelotte ended, within the 
 forts of Metz. 
 
 German movements : — 
 
 19th to 25th Aug. — Seven corps formed the investment of Metz. 
 
 The remaining three were formed into a Fourth Army under the Crown 
 Prince of Saxony, which moved westward from the Moselle on a front 
 from Metz to Commercy, and made an unsuccessful attack on Verdun 
 with the corps on its right, which, leaving a brigade to watch the place, 
 passed the Meuse above and below it, the positions of the Army on the 
 25th being these : — 
 
 XII. Corps — Dombasle and Lempire. 
 Guard — Triaucourt. 
 IV. Corps — La Heycourt. 
 Headquarters — Fleury. 
 
 The Third Army continued its march towards Chalons, and on the 25th 
 took Vitry with its advanced cavalry, its halting - places on that day 
 being as follows: — 
 
 I. Bavarian — S. Mard. 
 
 1 1 . Bavarian — Charmont. 
 
 V. Corps and Wiirtem- ) TT .,, 
 , -p.. . . \ Heutz. 
 
 berg Division — ) 
 
 XI. Corps— Heiltzd'Eveque. 
 
 VI. Corps — Eclaron. 
 
 Headquarters — Bevigny. 
 
 French movements : — 
 
 M'Mahon had united in the camp of Chalons the 1st Corps from 
 Woerth, De Failly's from Bitsche, Douay's from Belfort, and the newly- 
 formed 12th Corps, with two divisions of Pteserve Cavalry, numbering in 
 all about 120,000 infantry and cavalry. 
 
 Considering the position of Chalons untenable, he moved on the 21st 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 323 
 
 to Bheims ; and thence, urged by orders from Paris to attempt the relief Camp of Cha- 
 
 of Bazaine, to Bethel, where he halted on the 25th. l ™ ahy 
 
 Rheima to 
 26th to 2Sth Aug. — The German leaders became aware on the 25th i< e thel 40. 
 
 of the direction of M'Mahon's march. The Third and Fourth Armies 
 
 then heading west, in an echelon left in front as just described, thereupon 
 
 wheeled to the right, — the Third, which became the rear of the new 
 
 echelon, by S. Menehould and Suippe — the Fourth upon Dun, Buzancy, Vitry to 
 
 and Vouziers ; the general design being that the Fourth Army should Sui PP e » 30 - 
 
 stop M'Mahon's march eastward, by holding the Meuse against him, Clermont to 
 
 ^ T . Buzancy, 24. 
 
 while the Third Army intercepted his retreat on Vouziers. 
 
 M'Mahon had marched from Bethel by Le Chene to Stonne. Mouzon 35 
 
 29th Aug. — M'Mahon moved to Baucourt, and the passage of the 
 Meuse was begun at Mouzon. 
 
 30th Aug. — The Fourth Army drove the 5th French Corps through 
 Beaumont on Mouzon. The 7th French Corps retired before the Third 
 Army, which extended from Baucourt to Villemontry. Under the irre- 
 sistible pressure of the German forces, the movement towards Bazaine 
 was of necessity abandoned, and the whole army retired in disorder 
 down the Meuse. The 1st and 5th Corps reached Sedan. 
 
 31st Aug. — The remaining French corps retired on Sedan. 
 
 The Fourth Army was at Mouzon, Mairy, Carignan. 
 
 The Third extended from Bemilly to the Meuse west of Donchery, 
 where a division crossed. 
 
 ls^ Sept. — The Fourth Army advanced towards Sedan on the east bank 
 of the Meuse. Of the Third Army, the two Bavarian corps advanced 
 on both banks on the left of the Fourth Army. The Wurtemberg 
 division was at Donchery, and the V. and XL Corps, crossing there, and 
 approaching the right of the Fourth Army, completed the circle round 
 Sedan. The battle that ensued ended in the surrender of the enclosed 
 French army. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The angularity of the frontier line, so important at the outset, ceased, 
 when the French front was driven back, to have any significance, for 
 reasons stated in the chapter on the Configuration of Frontiers. 
 
324 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Problem of In the war of 1866, the Prussians had adopted the system of operating 
 
 double against j Q distinct armies, by distinct but convergent lines, against a concen- 
 no farther trated enemy, and their action was no further concerted than that they 
 illustrated in were both moving, with all practicable celerity, to effect a junction in 
 1866, Austrian territory. Whether their superiority of force in that campaign 
 
 was sufficient of itself to counterbalance the objections to the double line, 
 was never put to the proof, because the delays of the Austrians pre- 
 vented them from resorting to the proper mode of action against a 
 divided enemy — namely, to oppose a retarding force on the one side, and 
 a preponderating force on the other, with mutual support and concerted 
 action. No illustrations, therefore, of the problem of the double against 
 the single line can be drawn from that campaign, except that pointed out 
 in the note at the end of Chapter V., Part IV. 
 
 In 1870 a certain independence in the operations of the First and 
 Second Armies on the one hand, and of the Third Army on the other, is 
 recognisable. While the Crown Prince was passing the Vosges his com- 
 munication with the other leaders could only have been by the telegraph 
 lines in his rear; and he continued to move on a distinct line towards 
 Chalons, while they advanced on Metz. It might therefore at first seem 
 Nor in 1870. that the Germans were operating by a double line. But their base — 
 namely, the Pdiine from Coblentz to Germersheim — was common and con- 
 tinuous, and their main lines of advance were never more than from thhty 
 to forty miles apart, so that their flanking troops and outposts must 
 generally have been nearly within a march of each other. These con- 
 ditions are evidently different from those, for instance, in which the 
 Allied armies marched towards Paris in 1814 On the other hand, the 
 French made no attempt to oppose division by concentration. With 
 little more than half the force of their enemies they occupied numerous 
 points of a line at least as greatly extended, and were thus likely to be 
 inferior at every possible point of attack. In the case of this campaign 
 also, then, the strategical problem of the single against the double line 
 receives no further elucidation. 
 
 With the disparity of force existing in this campaign, it must be doubtful 
 whether the French, if in other respects more equal to their adversaries than 
 they proved to be, could have successfully maintained a forward position. 
 But had they been so well informed as they should have been of the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 325 
 
 intentions and movements of the enemy up to the 6th August, they How the 
 might have contested the frontier line with very different results, even if h ™" c Q ™ lg l 
 at last compelled to retire by superior numbers. The unmeaning dis- tested the 
 persion of their divisions, and the movements, fatiguing to the troops, and frontier, 
 without result on the battle-fields, and therefore eminently false move- 
 ments, which took place, were due to the facts, first, that they had intended 
 an offensive campaign, for which they found themselves unready ; and, 
 secondly, that the Government feared the effect on the country of the 
 withdrawal and abandonment of territory necessary for the defensive 
 campaign which the circumstances dictated. Their course, if they were 
 resolved to defend the frontier, seems clear. Nothing but superior con- 
 centration, in conjunction with a proper use of the topographical advan- 
 tages for defence, could avail against numbers so disproportionate. A 
 retarding force on one side of the theatre should have gained time for the 
 action of an army capable of striking a blow on the other. Two circum- 
 stances pointed to the Crown Prince's line of advance as that on which the 
 French retarding force should be placed: 1st, it lay through the most difficult 
 and defensible country ; 2d, the retreat might be conducted for some time 
 without laying bare the communications of the co-operating army on the 
 other line. At the same time, the necessity of covering the railways rendered 
 it desirable that the retarding force should be strong enough to oppose 
 the enemy's march all the way from the Lauter to the Sauer, without com- 
 mitting itself to a pitched battle. The two divisions of which the 7th 
 corps at that time consisted, and one of the 5th corps, joined to his 
 own corps, would have given M'Mahon the means of effective action of 
 this kind, with a probable heavy balance of loss against the assailants. 
 Meanwhile the 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th corps, Guard, and remainder of the 5th 
 corps and the Eeserve Cavalry, would have formed an army of nearly 
 160,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry with which to fall on the heads of 
 the columns of the First and Second Armies advancing on the Saar. 
 Looking at the situation on the 6th, it seems impossible to doubt that 
 their advance might have been roughly checked, and that the French, 
 if compelled by superior numbers to fall back, would have retired with 
 a very different aspect on the prepared line of the Moselle. 
 
 The remarks in Chap. L, Pt. II., on the advantage of assuming the trated b 
 offensive, could receive no more forcible confirmation than in the condition the war. 
 
326 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 of the French armies during the retreat to the Moselle, disorganised and 
 disheartened by the heavy defeats they had suffered in consequence of 
 fighting pitched battles without concert or concentration. 
 
 That the line of lateral communication should be not coincident with, 
 but in rear of, the front of the army, as asserted at p. 27, is confirmed 
 by the case of the Saarguemines-Hagenau railway, which, rendered pre- 
 carious from the outset by the German enterprises, was lost with the first 
 partial defeats. 
 
 A case of separation resulting from the attempt to cover two distant 
 and divergent objects is supplied by the result of the battle of Woerth. 
 M'Mahon committed himself to a pitched battle in the endeavour to 
 maintain his communication with the corps at Bitsche on the one hand, 
 and to cover the Paris-Strasbourg railway on the other. Defeated, and 
 driven on the railway, he never recovered his connection with the army 
 with which he should have co-operated. 
 
 Before the event it would have seemed incredible that regular troops 
 like those of M'Mahon, under a practised commander, should have been 
 unable to pause or exert any influence for good in the theatre of war till 
 an incessant retreat for nine days had carried them 200 miles from the 
 scene of their defeat. With proper discipline and control, there was 
 nothing in the events of the 6th August to prevent the united French 
 forces from taking up the line of the Moselle, with their right across 
 the railway at Frouard, where an intrenched camp and depot might 
 have been formed. The attempt to force this line must have been a dubi- 
 ous enterprise ; to turn it on either flank must have entailed the exposure 
 of the communications of the turning force, or the separation of the turning 
 and covering forces by the Moselle ; in fact, those opportunities which able 
 commanders should desire their adversaries to offer. The abandonment 
 of such a line without a general action was proof of hopeless inferiority. 
 
 A new and striking instance of the retarding of an army by an inferior 
 force during an operation (Chap. I., Pt. IV.) is supplied by the attack on 
 Bazaine's rear at Borny on the 14th August, by the heads of the columns 
 of the First Army, while the Second Army was moving to intercept his 
 retreat. The previous delay in crossing the Moselle was rendered fatal 
 by the action at Borny. 
 
 The German advance on Vionville is an example of forcing an adversary 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 327 
 
 to form front to a Hank. Bazaine's action in the battle was founded on 
 a total misappreciation of the relation of a fortress to an army in the field. 
 Instead of regarding it as a pivot of manoeuvre to be relinquished when its 
 relevancy ceased, he treated it as his actual base. If he had quitted his 
 hold of it, and extended his right with the successive reinforcements to 
 his line of battle, he would have succeeded in forming front across the 
 left of the German attack, and the close of the battle would have left him 
 astride the roads to the Meuse facing Metz. That the enemy should be 
 between him and Metz, was of trifling import compared with their being 
 between him and Verdun. His anxiety for his left was the anxiety of 
 a temporising mind, which prefers postponement of a crisis to vigorous 
 enterprise ; and in clinging to Metz he acted like one who, when the ship 
 is foundering, should lay hold of the anchor. 
 
 Considering the operations from the 16th to 18th August, with refer- 
 ence to Chap. VII., Pt. III., it is evident that, being executed within the 
 radius of a single march, they fall in the class of those which are restricted to 
 a small area, and in which intercepting movements can be directed almost 
 with certainty. Part of the French army being still visible on the field 
 of Borny on the 15th, it was to be expected that the heads of the German 
 columns directed on Mars-la-Tour and S. Hilaire would intercept them 
 on the 16th either on that road or the Jarny road. And though the 
 Second Army on that day, as well as its adversary, formed front to a 
 flank, yet it might do so the more confidently because of the position of 
 the Third Army between Nancy and Bar-le-Duc. The support it would 
 derive thence in case of a reverse, and its own strength, lent assurance to 
 the movement. 
 
 The circumstances under which, on the 18th, it prolonged its move- 
 ment against the enemy's communications by placing itself across them, 
 remove it from the class of those which are described in that chapter as 
 entailing additional risk without corresponding advantage. For the great 
 extension and consequent weakness of the front of the intercepting army, 
 pointed at as so perilous, did not exist, both armies being on a front no 
 larger than their order of battle required. This circumstance in con- 
 junction with the great superiority of force, the strength of the wing next 
 the Moselle, and the relative position of the Third Army, annulled the 
 ordinary risk of the situation of the Second Army in an engagement on 
 
328 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 the left bank. A more doubtful question is the expediency of the attack 
 of the 18th. The tactical advantages of the defence have been of late so 
 greatly augmented that it is more than ever desirable to throw on an 
 adversary the onus of making the attack. The interception of the 
 French was complete, and they could only clear a road to Verdun by 
 becoming the assailants. Attempting to move on Thionville, they would 
 have been headed, or attacked in flank, on the march. As it was, the 
 Germans attacked them, with heavy losses and doubtful issue, in a 
 remarkably strong position. Although the result was to drive the French 
 within their works, and to render the investment easier, yet the ensuing 
 operations were so precarious, so protracted, and occupied a force so vast, 
 that, taken in conjunction with the uncertain issue and certain losses 
 of the attack, the precedent is by no means one to be unhesitatingly 
 followed. 
 
 Looking to the French side of the situation, the course of the inter- 
 cepted army was free from the additional difficulty which the necessity 
 of assembling its fractions would have created. It was already united, 
 and the only problem was the selection of the point at which to break 
 through the enemy. It may be granted that, notwithstanding previous 
 delays, and the possession of the passages of the Moselle by the Germans, 
 the march, as planned for the 15th and 16th, offered reasonable assurance 
 of bringing the army to the Meuse, not indeed unimpeded or unmolested, 
 but without serious disaster. The force already available on the Vion- 
 ville road might fairly be calculated on to repel the commencement of 
 any possible attack, and the successive reinforcements of the French 
 should have arrived faster on the decisive points of the field than those 
 of the Germans. There was a possibility, even a fair probability, of re- 
 deeming the character of the retreat by not only gainiug the Meuse, but 
 gaining it after a successful engagement. The battle of the 16th deprived 
 the French of a line of retreat, but left their adversaries powerless, during 
 the 17th, either to renew the attack or to make reconnaissances. The roads 
 of Jarny and Briey were still open ; two marches would take the Army 
 to Verdun, and supplies of provisions and ammunition from that place 
 might have met them on the road. On the other hand, it could scarcely 
 be calculated on that the Germans, with their superiority, should be 
 unable to resume active hostilities on that day ; and to carry off such a 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 329 
 
 host as Bazaine's by somewhat circuitous marches, on few roads, covered 
 by no obstacle or defensive line, with a powerful and enterprising enemy 
 on the flank of the lengthened columns, must always be an operation 
 full of risk ; and, finally, the Germans were in possession of a road to 
 Verdun shorter than those by which the French would move, thus ren- 
 dering the situation one in which (as said at p. 76) a catastrophe is only 
 postponed by the existence of such lines of retreat in rear of an army in 
 that position. 
 
 After saying so much, however, the facts remain that the German 
 operations extended over a half circle, crossing as one of its radii a great 
 river, and that the French army was concentrated on the chord. It was 
 certain that the Germans could not be in condition to meet the concen- 
 trated attack on one and also on the other side of the river ; either they 
 must be in inadequate force on both sides, or must be concentrated on 
 one at the expense of leaving the other unguarded. That in such cases the 
 boldest course is the most likely to succeed, and what that course is, are 
 points which have already been indicated in this work. Let us see, then, 
 what would have been the chances in favour of an effort to break through 
 by traversing the communications of the enemy. 
 
 That the 17th was a day on which the French were absolutely free to 
 execute their designs without molestation, is shown by the fact that on 
 the 18th the German Second Army advanced for hours in a wrong direc- 
 tion before discovering the French position. 
 
 We will suppose, then, that instead of taking up that position, Bazaine, French 
 seeing that great forces were engaged in intercepting him, had withdrawn °P eratlon 
 
 su^f cstcu. 
 
 his army into Metz, covered only by the division (of the 2d Corps) which 
 was to form the garrison of the place, and extending it mainly on the 
 side of Vaux as the nearest point of contact with the enemy ; and that 
 orders were given for the following dispositions : — 
 
 The Guard to pass the river by the nearest bridges,* and bivouac between 
 Montigny-les-Metz and the railway, its cavalry division at its head. 
 
 The corps of the first line of battle, 3d and 2d (remaining two divisions 
 
 * There were three permanent bridges — two in the city, one where the railway crosses ; 
 the latter was destroyed by the French on the loth. Other temporary bridges had been 
 made for the passage of the Army on the 13th, and might have been still available — while 
 the river transport, and materials to be obtained on the spot, would have furnished the 
 meaus of throwing many more. Although the avenues of the town did not offer the facilities 
 
330 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 of the latter) to cross the river by the southernmost bridges, and bivouac ; 
 the 3d Corps about Le Sablon across the Nancy road ; the 2d in rear 
 of it. 
 
 The corps of the second line, 4th and 6th, to pass by the northernmost 
 bridges ; 4th Corps to bivouac behind Fort Queuleu heading for the 
 Strasbourg road ; 6th in rear of it. 
 
 Three days' provisions and a supply of ammunition to be distributed 
 to the troops during the passage through Metz, and in the bivouacs, there- 
 by obviating one of the French commander's great difficulties — namely, 
 to bring supplies of these from Metz to his army. 
 
 Orders for the 18th : — The cavalry and horse-artillery of the Guard, with 
 a troop of mounted sappers, to move by Augny on Pont-a-Mousson, to 
 observe the passage there, and if possible destroy the bridge. If attacked 
 by superior forces, to retire on Cheminot and Selligny, destroying the 
 bridges. One division of the Guard on Jouy ; the other by Augny on 
 Corny ; to watch the bridges there, and if necessary dispute the repassage 
 by the Germans. Each division, as soon as the rear of the army should 
 be nearly abreast of it, to move off between the Moselle and Seille, 
 either towards the rear of the army, or on the flank of a hostile corps, 
 which might seek to recross by Pont-a-Mousson and Champey; according 
 to circumstances. 
 
 The 3d Corps, followed by the second, to move on the Nancy and 
 parallel roads, bivouacking south of the road from Cheminot to Buchy. 
 
 The 4th and 6th on the Strasbourg road, and parallel roads between it 
 and the Nied, bivouacking from Soigne to Hans-sur-Nied. 
 
 The cavalry divisions of the 3d Corps and 4th Corps to precede their 
 march and cover their front ; that of the 2d to flank the march east of 
 the Strasbourg road. (The cavalry division of the 6th Corps was at 
 Chalons.) 
 
 The 3d and 2d Corps, with the cavalry of the Guard and of the 3d, 
 to fall on any enemy forcing the repassage of the Moselle against the 
 Guard, or to hold the line of the Seille according to circumstances. 
 
 The 4th and 6th to fall on the I. German corps, should it seek to 
 molest the march. 
 
 which should he found in so important a place, it is assumed, therefore, that the supposed 
 movement was not rendered impracticable by defective communications. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 331 
 
 Besides a proportion with the advanced-guards, strong detachments of 
 sappers to march with the rear-guards, and with the columns on the out- 
 ward flanks of the army, to obstruct the communications. 
 
 All bridges on the Seille to be destroyed by the rear-guards as soon as 
 all the columns should have passed beyond them. All roads on both 
 flanks forming communications between the enemy and his base to be 
 damaged and obstructed to the utmost. 
 
 Beginning the march at 3| to 4 a.m., at 8 the main French army Le Sablon to 
 would have its front from Pommerieux to Pontoi, its rear from Pouilly rommeneux, 
 to Frontigny. The division of the Guard at Corny would be in position ; 
 that at Jouy would be preparing to conform to the general movement ; 
 cavalry of the Guard observing Champey and Pont-a-Mousson. 
 
 On the German side we know that at that hour the Second Army was 
 heading for the Jarny road, a long day's march from the nearest passages 
 of the river ; the corps of the First Army three and four hours' march 
 from their bridges on the Moselle ; the II. Corps across the Moselle, with 
 its head many hours' march towards Gravelotte. Eemembering that their 
 order of march and general dispositions were arranged with the expecta- 
 tion of a battle between Metz and Verdun, the reader may calculate for 
 himself the chances of their stopping the march of the French. 
 
 The IV. Corps was marching to Commercy on the Meuse, and crossed 
 there on the 19th. 
 
 The Third Army was marching from the Moselle to the Meuse, no part 
 of it being east of Toul at the end of its march on the 18th, except the 
 VI. Corps, which was on the Moselle, about 20 miles south of Nancy. 
 Consequently, neither the IV. Corps nor the Third Army could have 
 hindered Bazaine's march. 
 
 Ptesuming the march, the French would have found themselves at the Le Sablon to 
 close of it with their right on the Seille at Cheminot, left at Hans-sur- Cheminot . 13. 
 Nied, having entirely traversed the German communications. 
 
 On the 19th Bazaine's cavalry would have been on the Nancy-Stras- Fort Queuleu 
 bourg railway, his army near Chateau - Salins, heading for Saarbourg. to Han ^ slir - 
 Enormous captures of trains would have been made, the roads broken up 
 between the Moselle and the Nied on the communications of the First 
 and Second Armies, and the railway on which the Third Army relied 
 damaged. 
 
332 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 See Jomini's Besides the supplies captured, the French on passing the Nancy-Stras- 
 remarkatp. \ i0UY g railway would obtain others by requisition in an untouched 
 district. Directing their march on Strasbourg, they would, by raising 
 the siege, have imparted a victorious aspect to the movement, while the 
 effect on the German armies may be imagined by students of military 
 operations. It may be safely concluded that they would have been much 
 more solicitous to restore their communications than to follow Bazaine.* 
 
 The promptitude with which the Germans proceeded to the investment 
 of Metz shows that they were only giving effect to a foregone conclusion. 
 Yet they had no precedent for so extraordinary an operation as the 
 enclosure of such a fortress and such an army, and must have been 
 inspired only by confidence in their estimate of the vastly-increased ad- 
 vantages of defence when they determined to maintain so extensive a line. 
 It is a striking case of foreseeing and applying new conditions of war. 
 
 The enterprise of M'Mahon has been generally judged desperate, as 
 being a flank march between a superior enemy and neutral territory. Its 
 peril, however, consisted rather in the uncertainty of the issue, and the 
 irremediable character of a failure, than in the difficulty of the march. 
 
 * The German official account of the wai*, published two years after the above appeared in 
 the 3d edition of this book, contains the following passage. After considering Bazaine's 
 chances of success had he broken out on the westward, the north-westward, or the north-east- 
 ward of Metz, it goes on to say : — 
 
 "Far fewer difficulties were presented by the local conditions to the south of Metz. A for- 
 ward movement on this side would find in that terrain, as on the north-east, a large space for 
 development upon both banks of the Seille, along the three great roads to Soigne, Nomeny, 
 and Cheminot. Should the bulk of the army of the Rhine make a sudden dash along these 
 roads, while a left detachment shaped its course for Courcelles sur Nied, and a second, under the 
 protection of the fortress-artillery, showed front towards Ars and Jouy somewhere in the neigh- 
 bourhood of Frescaty, in order to detain the VII. and VIII. Prussian Corps in the passage of 
 the Moselle, there was, in view of the position at that time of the investing army, a fairly 
 secure prospect of the sortie being successful, and that too without any very severe struggle. 
 It is true that the French leaders would have been forced in any case to abandon their trains, 
 and even then they would have been sooner or later threatened in flank and rear by the for- 
 ward pressure of the Corps of the investing army. But Marshal Bazaine might hope in all 
 cases to find his line of march at any rate open, to sever temporarily the but weakly guarded 
 communications of the Germans, and, although not without considerable difficulties as to 
 supply, to escape with a large part of his army to the southward." 
 
 This opinion refers to a time (31st August) when the Germans had been for twelve days in- 
 vesting Metz. If the chances in favour of Bazaine's supposed attempt were at that time so 
 great, how much greater would they have been on the 17th, when the Germans were scattered 
 and unprepared for resistance on that side ! In other respects, the above description of the 
 operation in the German official account is a curiously exact abstract of that proposed in de- 
 tail in the text. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 333 
 
 At the outset on the 19th he had seven clear days for a movement, the 
 extent of which from the Chalons camp, first upon the front Eethel- 
 Vouziers, and thence to Montmedy, did not exceed 70 miles. Had this 
 been attempted with an assured aim, such as the attainment of a fresh 
 base, or the junction with an army commanding a certain area, there 
 would have been no more risk than has often been justified by the end. 
 But in this case, besides the evasion of the First and Second Armies, 
 success must depend on the breaking of the investment by Bazaine, on 
 the junction with him, and on their joint victory over the Third and 
 Fourth Armies before the First and Second could come up. Failing 
 in either of these conditions, not only would the enterprise be abor- 
 tive, but the army of Chalons would be itself on the verge of de- 
 struction. 
 
 The project was first entertained by M'Mahon on the assumption that 
 Bazaine's army, moving northward from Metz, would be found at Mont- 
 medy, the point indicated in Bazaine's despatches of the 19th and 20th 
 August as in his intended line of march. Moving to Beims, M'Mahon 
 would rest on that railway on which he must mainly depend for supplies 
 during the operation, would be on the flank of the Germans moving west- 
 ward by the Chalons-Paris railway, and would preserve his own com- 
 munications with the capital by the Beims-Soissons railway. Thus far, 
 then, the movement, though circuitous, was yet, on the assumption that 
 the operation was tentative, and contingent on Bazaine's co-operation, 
 not without justification. The next step to the Aisne at Bethel and 
 Vouziers, though circuitous, was undertaken with the same expectation ; 
 it still preserved his hold of the railway, and kept open his line of re- 
 treat by the valley of the Aisne, and there was still time (25th) for him 
 to reach Montmedy unobstructed. But on the 27th the progress made 
 had been throughout so slow, that M'Mahon, hearing nothing of Bazaine, 
 and despairing of accomplishing his march in presence of an enemy 
 which had already turned upon him, decided to retreat upon Mezieres, 
 the last point eastward whence he could be certain to find his communi- 
 cation with Paris still open. But here political motives prevailed to 
 impel his army to destruction. The evil of a Government which rests 
 its defective title on military power is not fully manifest till it has ex- 
 perienced reverses in war. It is then, when the nation should be united 
 
334 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 against the common enemy, that factions tear it, and the necessity for 
 conciliating them pushes military conduct aside. 
 
 The fatal consequences of a disaster being obvious in the case of 
 a forward movement on this side, the student may consider the 
 chances in favour of an attempt to traverse the other flank of the 
 Third and Fourth Armies, with which design Douay's Corps coming 
 from Belfort might have halted at Chaumont (saving it much exhaust- 
 ing travel), the 12th Corps joining it there, and the troops from Chalons 
 passing towards the same point by the roads between the Marne and 
 Seine, and by rail through Paris ; thence to be directed on the German 
 communications at Nancy and Luneville. Having realised the situa- 
 tion, the student may with advantage further consider the effect on the 
 immediate course of the campaign if M'Mahon, after Woerth, had 
 retreated on Chaumont and Langres instead of on Chalons. 
 
 The predominance of the German armies, manifest from the outset, 
 deprives the campaign of much of its value as a strategical study. Per- 
 haps its main lesson is (like one of those derived from the Jena Cam- 
 paign), that to execute a good general plan with promptitude, decision, 
 and conduct, is of itself to establish an ascendancy over a less confident 
 adversary, and to diminish the chances that he will take advantage of 
 such opportunities as over-confidence may offer. That opportunities were 
 offered cannot be denied. If it be a main object of strategy to be the 
 strongest on the decisive points of collision, it seems to follow, that when 
 armies, so superior in the aggregate to the enemy as the Germans were, 
 expose themselves to engagements with a numerical inferiority on their 
 side, there is so far evidence of strategical error. While the Crown Prince 
 was bringing 154,000 men to bear on M'Mahon's force, and afterwards 
 160,000 on the discomfited remnants which were hurrying to Chalons, 
 the First Army, when approaching the Sarr, might have been attacked 
 by superior forces ; the attacks on Spicheren and Vionville were made 
 with a numerical inferiority ; and the forces employed in the intercep- 
 tion of Bazaine, greatly superior on the actual field, were yet insufficient 
 for the security of the operation. Nevertheless, in all these cases the 
 motive was the excess of an invaluable quality — namely, promptitude to 
 seek and resolution to engage the enemy. These instances proved, too, 
 that the confidence in their own ascendancy, shown by the Germans 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 335 
 
 throughout the campaign, sprang, not from superiority of numbers, hut 
 from the excellence of discipline, training, and command which is the 
 proper fruit of the Prussian military system. That system rests on, and 
 confirms, what, before the war of 1866, was enunciated in the last para- 
 graph of this book as the moral which its pages would convey. The 
 Prussians seek the attainment of success in war not by confiding in tra- 
 ditions and in the timely appearance of an inspired leader, but as practi- 
 cal men set about a difficult and important task where the conditions of 
 the problems to be solved are highly complex and always varying, and 
 where the machinery to be employed requires the most careful prepara- 
 tion. Each of the indispensable parts which, when associated, constitute 
 an army, has been the subject of their most patient consideration and 
 prevision. The organisation and training of the fighting element has 
 only been a part of their elaborate preparation for war. The strategical 
 problems offered by the frontiers of States with which Prussia, with or 
 without allies, might be at war, have been thoroughly investigated. The 
 topographical features of her own and her neighbours' territories have 
 been laid down with minute accuracy. The supply and transport of her 
 armies have been provided for with such forethought, that not only were 
 the lines of railway specified, but time-tables for the departure, transit, 
 and arrival at its destination, of every corps employed in the w r ar w ? ith 
 France, were ready, long before the outbreak of hostilities, for transmission 
 to the centres of organisation. The excellence of the German staff, and 
 of the systems of organisation and supply, was conspicuously shown in 
 the promptitude with which the Third and Fourth Armies, heading west, 
 turned on the 26th August northward on M'Mahon. The operation was, 
 however, greatly simplified by the circumstance that they w T ere echeloned 
 left in front. To turn southward (as in the case supposed in the preced 
 ing paragraph) would have been much more difficult, as the lines of 
 supply of the various corps would have crossed. 
 
 The new r frontier line of eastern Prance is similar to that which existed 
 before the war, in being salient and angular. But, if the original line 
 proved disadvantageous for Prance, all her defects on that side are now 
 greatly aggravated. The Germans will now collect their forces on the 
 Moselle covered by Metz or Thionville, more securely than formerly 
 on the Saar, and will be so much nearer both to Paris and to the com- 
 
336 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR EXPLAINED. 
 
 niuniccations of Paris with the east of France. Unless she would exist 
 only by the sufferance of Germany, France must fortify the line of the 
 Meuse ; and should further form an intrenched camp, with bridges 
 connecting it on both sides of the Moselle, across the railway at Frouard, 
 and with a bridge-head (should the ground permit) on the east bank of 
 the Meurthe. As her army, while watching the issues of the Vosges, 
 or intending to cross the Ehine, might be cut from a base westward of 
 the Moselle by the descent of a German army from Metz, some point 
 within the angle, near Epinal, for instance, should be selected at which 
 to form an intrenched camp and arsenal. And it will probably (in view 
 of the disastrous failure of the direct defence of Paris) be found expedient 
 to prepare a base southward (at Dijon and Besan^on, for instance) for 
 armies which, operating thence, would indirectly defend the capital, by 
 forcing the invader -to. form front parallel to his communications. In 
 such a case Germany Would enter on an offensive campaign with greatly 
 diminished chances of .rapid conquest. No longer threatening the com- 
 munications of the French from Lorraine, she might find Southern Ger- 
 many threatened with- an* Invasion by Belfort ; and, before advancing on 
 Paris, she must, with the remainder of her forces, capture the intrenched 
 camp of Frouard, mask that' at Verdun, and beat back the French army 
 southwards to its base. 
 
AMIWICN ()!•' 187(). 
 the French and German. 
 
 MAP 15. 
 
 BERLIN 
 
 eipz iy - 
 
 ^( iiilslii-ini 
 
 ETarcfling'ei] 
 
 o i;> ao so i>> 
 
KAII.WAYS USED [N THE CAMPA1GX OF 1870. 
 Showing the Una of RoShvay used iff tltr Frrmii <m<i Germans 
 in h°,7l> 71, .,,,,1 
 aim' the passes <>/' tin- Yosg\B3. 
 
 — • liKHI.IX 
 
FOR 
 
TOR 
 
 Ml'. 
 
 )& 
 
 Bern* 
 
 jVl. 
 
 Auffivy 
 
 „■//, 
 
 SilltimY, 
 
 , lloilllx 
 
 Jouis 
 
 VARHr.M'fZn'SKS 
 
 ^\4 
 
 LicUti 
 
 SstKREhornuJ 
 
o 
 
 MAP 16 
 
 CAMPAIGN 
 
 OF METZ k SKDAN 1870. 
 
 Kwderbrort 
 
 Lii-htnnlVeiT* • 
 
 ___^V/m/ wilier 
 Petite Pierre~~ 
 
 STKASHOl'RO 
 
PART VI. 
 TACTICS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 GENERAL VIEW OF THE CHANGES THAT HAVE LED TO THE 
 MODERN SYSTEM OF TACTICS. 
 
 If the operations in a theatre of war have undergone great and remark- 
 able changes since the feudal times, no less radical and complete have 
 been the alterations in the method of conducting the movements of armies 
 on a field of battle. 
 
 When soldiers were armed with pikes and axes and shields, the best Deep columns 
 formation in which they could be arranged for action was that of deep "uitaMe to 
 columns. For if opposed by a thin extended line, the columns would by ga „ ements 
 their momentum penetrate it, and make gaps through which the cavalry 
 would pour to attack the enemy in rear. Again, the column, by approxi- 
 mating to a solid square, possessed the formation necessary to resist the 
 charges of the men-at-arms. If suddenly assailed in flank, the column 
 readily offered on that side an impenetrable face, and manoeuvres to turn 
 and outflank an enemy were accordingly little thought of. Even archers 
 drawn up many ranks deep could still use their weapons with effect. 
 The line of battle, then, was a line of dense columns — a formation easily 
 
 Y 
 
PART VI. 
 TACTICS. 
 
 CHAPTER I, 
 
 GENERAL VIEW OF THE CHANGES THAT HAVE LED TO THE 
 MODERN SYSTEM OF TACTICS. 
 
 If the operations in a theatre of war have undergone great and remark- 
 able changes since the feudal times, no less radical and complete have 
 been the alterations in the method of conducting the movements of armies 
 on a field of battle. 
 
 "When soldiers were armed with pikes and axes and shields, the best Deep columns 
 formation in which they could be arranged for action was that of deep 8uitable to 
 columns. For if opposed by a thin extended line, the columns would by ements™" 
 their momentum penetrate it, and make gaps through which the cavalry 
 would pour to attack the enemy in rear. Again, the column, by approxi- 
 mating to a solid square, possessed the formation necessary to resist the 
 charges of the men-at-arms. If suddenly assailed in flank, the column 
 readily offered on that side an impenetrable face, and manoeuvres to turn 
 and outflank an enemy were accordingly little thought of. Even archers 
 drawn up many ranks deep could still use their weapons with effect. 
 The line of battle, then, was a line of dense columns — a formation easily 
 
 Y 
 
338 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Extended 
 fronts of for- 
 mation neces- 
 sary in mo- 
 dern battles. 
 
 Armies of 
 Marlborough's 
 time incapable 
 of rapid man- 
 oeuvres. 
 
 assumed from the column of march ; and requiring, as it did, but little 
 practice or instruction, was best fitted to the motley bodies which the 
 different knights led to the field. The engagement was almost always 
 desultory in its character : here a column would advance victorious, 
 there another of the same army would dissolve into a rabble, ridden 
 down by the men-at-arms or maintaining partial conflicts ; most of the 
 field was broken up into a series of individual combats, and only the ban- 
 ners of the most famous or the most resolute and commanding knights 
 still kept round them patches of array amid the general drift and fluctu- 
 ation. At last, after a struggle generally bloody and protracted, advantage 
 of ground, superiority of number, or of spirit, or of skill in arms, would 
 decide the day. On one side renowned leaders, inspiring special confi- 
 dence and attachment, would still lead orderly bands to the charge ; on 
 the other all would be hopeless confusion ending in general flight ; and 
 the victors would for the most part be too disorganised to pursue. 
 
 A great change ensued of necessity upon the introduction of firearms ; 
 for as only two ranks could discharge their pieces, to form on any depth 
 beyond that was to sacrifice so much of the fire of the line. At first 
 only a part of the troops were armed with muskets, and the diminution 
 in depth was only partial — the front line of battle still standing six deep. 
 But when every man was a musketeer the line was extended in propor- 
 tion — three ranks, however, being still considered necessary ; the third, 
 which could not fire, loading for the others, and being deemed to add to 
 their stability — an idea which prevailed in Continental armies down to a 
 recent period. 
 
 To deploy into extended lines demanded more practice and precision 
 in drill than to move in deep columns ; but the training of armies did 
 not keep pace with their requirements, and in the time of Marlborough 
 and Eugene deployments were still effected but slowly, positions were 
 deliberately taken up and fortified, and the opposing army with equal 
 deliberation drew up and attacked in parallel order. There was little of 
 what we call manoeuvring; that is, the quick orderly change of highly- 
 trained and flexible masses from one kind of formation to another, or 
 their transference from point to point of a battle-field for purposes which 
 might, become suddenly, feasible in the changing course of the action. 
 Generals displayed their skill in choosing a position adapted to the num- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. -339 
 
 bers and composition of their army, and arranging the troops for its 
 defence, and in detecting blots in the opposing line where the hostile 
 leader had made a blunder in his dispositions, and directing thereon the 
 decisive attacks. This was Marlborough's special gift. In the midst of 
 the fight, when officers and men were heated in the meUe, and ordinary 
 generals, perplexed by the turmoil, could do little more than push their 
 reinforcements into the fight, his clear calm vigilance detected a fatal 
 blunder of arrangement, and his ready skill directed a heavy blow on the 
 vulnerable spot. Thus, at Blenheim, the French in position had allowed 
 Marlborough to draw up his forces deliberately and without molestation, 
 though the difficulties of ground were such that Prince Eugene's wing of 
 the Allied army was for many hours retarded in coming into line, during 
 which the English general remained exposed to the possible attack of the 
 full force of the enemy. At length the preparations of the Allies were 
 completed, and they began the action ; and while the French made good 
 their ground at the villages, Marlborough observed how weak was their 
 line of cavalry on the grassy plateaus between. Ceasing to push the 
 futile and bloody attack on Blenheim, he sent cavalry, infantry, and guns 
 over the small marshy stream of the Nebel at the unguarded points, and 
 breaking through the thin line of horsemen, bore all that stood between 
 his successful troops and the Danube back upon the bank of the deep 
 river. And at Bamillies, seeing that one wing of the enemy was posted 
 behind a marsh, where it was at once unassailable and unable to advance, 
 he neglected it altogether, and, bringing the whole of his force against the 
 remaining wing, won easily a decisive victory. 
 
 But it is evident that a great opening was afforded at this epoch for a 
 general who should oppose to the armies of the time another army more 
 elaborately trained, and therefore possessing superior swiftness, precision, 
 and coherence. Such a machine fell ready made into the hands of one 
 able and willing to use it. The character of Frederick "William of Prussia, 
 the father of Frederick the Great, is well known. Eccentric almost to Origin of the 
 insanity, one eccentricity which he indulged in throughout his life was a 1>russian mili - 
 mania for drill. He was the great drill-sergeant of Europe. In his voca- ary yS 
 tion he laboured so persistently, bringing to the task such rigidity of idea 
 and purpose, such severity, so constant an interest, and a scrutiny so 
 minute, that the result, attained indeed by the utter misery of the sol- 
 
340 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Frederick 
 turns to ac- 
 count the 
 manoeuvring 
 power of his 
 array. 
 
 diers, was the most perfect military machine then in existence. The cre- 
 ator of this had neither the opportunity nor the genius to use it himself, 
 but his successor possessed both in ample measure. Crafty, resolute, 
 patient, and sagacious, Frederick had long meditated how to turn to best 
 account the weapon thus placed in his hand ; but it was not till after 
 many trials that he learnt the secret of its power. His first essays 
 taught him only that it w r as, as a mere fighting instrument, admirable ; 
 time and thought, failures and successes, showed him how to treble its 
 efficiency. Old in experience but still vigorous in manhood, he found 
 himself at war with the three greatest military powers in Europe, and he 
 had to solve the hard problem of making head at once against all, with 
 forces inferior to either. He perceived that the secret of success must 
 lie in turning to full and unexpected account that power of manoeuvring 
 which his father's system had imparted to the Prussian troops, and 
 which had been perfected under his own direction in camps of instruc- 
 tion before the Seven Years' "War. Urged by his impetuous spirit 
 always to attack, he found in the Austrians an enemy always willing to 
 await him. They carried the system of selecting and occupying strong 
 positions to its very extreme. To its extreme, too, they carried the 
 pedantry of war, embodied in their blind addiction to arbitrary rules 
 and ancient precedents. Such a foe was, to a dexterous tactician and 
 a highly-trained army, a very whetstone of skill. Moving round their 
 slow inert masses, like a panther round an ox, he found the unguarded 
 part, and cast himself on it with all his force. The secret of his suc- 
 cess lay, not so much in judicious movements in the theatre of war, 
 as in the use he made of the flexibility of his army as compared with 
 the armies of his adversaries. It was by his successes in the fields 
 of battle, rather than by his plans of campaign, which were often faulty, 
 that he finally emerged victorious from the struggle, with a military 
 renown unrivalled in his generation. 
 
 Granting that the superior steadiness and fighting qualities of his troops 
 rendered them, line for line, on equal terms, more than a match for their 
 enemy; and granting, also, that the manoeuvring power of his army enabled 
 it to- form line for battle with unexampled rapidity, to deceive the enemy 
 by feints, to fall on them before they could retrieve a false movement, or 
 to retreat safely after a foiled attack ; still, his most decisive successes 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 34 1 
 
 were due to this fact more than any other, that lie frequently succeeded His great 
 in placing his line within striking distance obliquely across the extremity tactical 
 of his adversary s line. For troops thus attacked and outflanked are ex- 
 posed helplessly to ruin should they remain passive, while the formation 
 of a new line facing the enemy is a work not only of time, but of great 
 difficulty, when attempted under the stress of a vigorous and sustained 
 attack. And as the object of all attempts to outflank an enemy is 
 to obtain an advantage of this kind, and as the necessity of guarding 
 against such enterprises forms a principal motive in tactics, it is ex- 
 pedient here to inquire further into the nature and effects of a move- 
 ment which brings hostile lines into such relations with each other. 
 But first it is necessary to consider briefly how the line of battle was in 
 Frederick's time composed, and how his army was organised. 
 
 The Prussian army was not, like an army of the present day, an aggre- Organisation 
 gate of corps, or divisions, or brigades, all capable of independent action — and formation 
 
 it was an aggregate of battalions : when assembled in the field the army ° 
 
 00 ° J sian army. 
 
 was itself the integer, and any detachment was a fragment of the line of 
 battle. It habitually camped and fought in two lines, each three ranks 
 deep ; the cavalry was on the flanks, and the army was divided, for con- 
 venience of manceuvring, into two wings of infantry and two of cavalry. 
 When required to march, the order was simply to move by lines, if to a 
 flank, when it advanced in two columns; or by wings, if to the front, 
 when it advanced in four columns : — 
 
 Line 
 
342 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Line of Battle oe Encampment. 
 Infantry. Infantry. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Left Wing. 
 
 Right Wing. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 3rn 
 ffft 
 
 Movement to a Flank. 
 Infantry. Infantry. 
 
 I I 
 
 3^ 
 
 
 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
 
 Movement to the Front. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 ii e a i y 
 
 32 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Left 
 
 '1st Line 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Right 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Right 
 
 Wing. 
 
 Wing. 
 
 Wing. 
 
 Wing 
 
 The perfect drill of the Prussian army enabled it alone, of the armies 
 of the time, to move to a flank round the extremity of the enemy's line, 
 marching perhaps two or three miles in this order, with such exacti- 
 tude that it could at any time, by the simple simultaneous wheel of 
 •all ,the fractions, form complete order of battle and advance upon the 
 enemy. The effect of the manoeuvre is exemplified in the following 
 action : — 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 343 
 
 BATTLE OF PRAGUE, 1757. Case of out- 
 
 Hanking an 
 
 When Browne fell back from the Eger before Frederick, and Konigseck cueln ^ 
 from the pass of Reichenberg before Bevern and Schwerin, the Anstrians 
 united at Prague, on the right bank of the Moldau. 
 
 Bridge 
 
 Prossik .,.."~-~;v-» "^4 
 
 rajpetiiiN 
 
 ■^ Wischerari. 
 
 5th May. — Frederick threw a bridge and crossed that stream three miles See page 231. 
 below Prague, leaving Marshal Keith with 30,000 men to cover liis com- 
 munications with Saxony. At that time Schwerin and Bevern were 
 across the Elbe at Brandeis ; and the wings of the Prussian army united 
 by preconcerted signal at Prossik. There were about 62,000 Prussians in Hostile forces, 
 presence of 65,000 Austrians on this field — not counting Keith's corps 
 beyond the Moldau. 
 
 The right bank of the Moldau at Prague is very high and steep. On Description of 
 the hill there known as the Ziscaberg the Austrian left rested — thence t r . h ^, batt 1 le " 
 
 field and Aus- 
 
 their front stretched in two lines and a reserve along a plateau to tr i an position. 
 
 Hloupetin and Kyge, four miles off; thence Konigseck's force was 
 
 thrown back at an angle towards Michelup, and the angle was covered 
 
 by a work armed with guns, and some battalions, at Hloupetin across the 
 
 rivulet. 
 
 6th. — Looking from his equal ground at Prossik across the ravine that 
 separated him from the Austrians, Frederick saw that their left and centre 
 
344 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Prussians 
 march to a 
 flank, and 
 turn the Aus- 
 trian right. 
 
 Austrian.? 
 form front to 
 meet them. 
 
 were difficult to attack. The roads there were narrow and broken, the 
 banks of the intervening rivulet marshy, the slope on the Austrian side 
 steep and scarped, and covered with vines, the crest of the ridge partially 
 occupied with field-works and well garnished with artillery. Schwerin, 
 reconnoitring towards Podschernitz, reported ihat an attack against the 
 right wing was practicable. The plateau, highest on the bank of the 
 Moldau, slopes gently but constantly downward till it subsides in the 
 hollow that forms the basin of the rivulet. A line of fish-ponds arti- 
 ficially formed in the course of the rivulet, and passable by narrow dykes, 
 being overgrown with water -grasses, were mistaken by Schwerin for 
 meadows. 
 
 The reconnaissance finished, and an attack on the Austrian right de- 
 cided on, the Prussians moved by lines in two columns to the left, round 
 the Austrian right, their infantry and cavalry between Podschernitz 
 and the fish-ponds, their artillery by the road through Podschernitz. The 
 movement, begun at half-past seven, was so far completed by nine in the 
 morning that the left wing stood in order of battle opposite the Austrian 
 right. 
 
 As soon as the Austrian commander (Prince Charles of Lorraine had 
 superseded Browne) perceived the movement, he brought the cavalry of 
 the left wing to join that of the right near Sterbohol ; and withdrew 
 infantry from the left to prolong that face of the angle formed by the 
 right wing. 
 
 When these reinforcements to the right wing arrived on their ground, 
 they advanced beyond the original alignement ; and the wing being ordered 
 to dress by the right, the forward movement of its left flank left a gap of 
 several hundred yards near Kyge. 
 
 The battle commenced with the advance of the battalions on Schwerin's 
 left against Sterbohol, which they took, but were driven from immediately. 
 The whole Prussian left wing now advanced on the Austrian right wing 
 — some battalions defiling by the dykes, others wading across the fish- 
 ponds. Several times repulsed, the second line, supporting the first, at 
 last made good its footing beyond the fish-ponds. 
 
 The left wing of Prussian horse, passing at both ends of the last pond, 
 had engaged the Austrian cavalry with varying fortune ; till the Prussian 
 squadrons of the right wing joining those of the left, they drove the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 345 
 
 opposing body from the field southward up the Moldau, pursuing it to 
 the bank of the river at Wischerad, and laying bare the right of the Aus- 
 trian infantry. 
 
 Meanwhile the right wing of the Prussian infantry had attacked and Prussian army 
 carried the post at Hloupetin, and penetrated into the gap, which had been concentratci1 
 
 against Aus- 
 
 widened by the fluctuations of the action to more than half a mile. The trian ri , r ] lt 
 
 whole of the Prussians now bore against the isolated right wing of the wing. 
 
 enemy, their artillery enfiladed it from Hloupetin, their cavalry threatened 
 
 the right and rear, and it broke and fled southward after the horse. 
 
 Not only was the left of the Austrian right wing laid bare and enfiladed Austrians 
 
 by the capture of Hloupetin, but the right of their left wing was in a defeate(i m 
 
 . P1 .p. succession, 
 
 similar predicament. It now formed a succession ot lines, fronting as the 
 
 right wing had fronted, and always drifting rearward, till the advancing 
 
 Prussians crowded it into Prague. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The natural movement (already performed by the Austrians in this 
 example) of an army whose flank is turned, is to throw back that flank 
 as the inevitable first step to ward off a formidable disaster. 
 
 In the case of an action between very small forces, the turning of a Effect of a 
 flank might be comparatively unimportant. A battalion, for instance, considerable 
 could change front to meet an attack in a very few minutes ; a brigade . * t 
 of three battalions might effect the operation without such delay or loss 
 as to entail ruin. But in case of the advance of a formidable line, sup- 
 ported by cavalry and artillery, and calling for the change of front of 
 10,000 or 20,000 troops of all arms, covering miles of ground, to meet 
 the attack, the matter is more serious. The troops nearest the point 
 of attack must necessarily face about and move rearward, exposed all 
 the time to the enfilading fire of artillery, perhaps also to the fire 
 of infantry and the charges of cavalry. Under such circumstances, 
 unless the ground is very favourable to the formation of a new front, 
 and the troops are exceptionally steady, a whole army may fall into 
 disorder and wreck. 
 
 In the present case, however, the Austrians, noting the direction of 
 
346 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Consequences 
 of throwing 
 back a flank. 
 
 The French 
 attempt to 
 turn Freder- 
 ick's weapon 
 against him- 
 self. 
 
 Schwerin's approach from the Elbe, and taking advantage of the cover of 
 the fish-ponds, had already accomplished this operation of throwing back 
 a flank so as to face the enemy on that side. They met the attack, there- 
 fore, under circumstances unusually favourable. Yet the disadvantages 
 of the formation on a salient angle, as exemplified in this battle, are 
 still of the most formidable character ; for instance, — 
 
 1. The whole force of the assailant may be brought to bear on one face 
 of the angle. 
 
 2. The advance of either face causes a gap at the angle. 
 
 3. The face assailed will then be liable to be turned on both flanks. 
 
 4. The fire of the assailant's artillery enfilades one or both faces. 
 
 5. The defeat of the assailed wing compromises the retreat of the other, 
 supposing the original front of the army to have covered its proper rear. 
 
 Add to this that the troops at the angle, exposed to a cross-fire, must 
 crowd on each other in falling back, and so create a weak point in that 
 decisive part of the line ; and we see that the turning of a flank by a con- 
 siderable part of the assailant's line advancing in order of battle is, in 
 general, the prelude to a very decisive victory, and is to be guarded against 
 by every possible precaution. 
 
 Perceiving the value of an advantage of this kind, the French army, in 
 the same campaign, sought to turn the lesson against its great expositor, 
 in the following instance. 
 
 BATTLE OF E0S8BACH, 1757. 
 
 In November of this year, Frederick, leaving a force to face the Aus- 
 trians eastward of the Elbe, had marched across Saxony to meet the 
 combined French and German army, commanded by Soubise, then ap- 
 proaching the Saale. 
 
 1st November. — The Prussians from Leipsic advanced to the Saale at 
 Weissenfels, Merseburg, and Halle, where the French destroyed the 
 , bridges, and, falling back, united at Miicheln, numbering in all 50,000, 
 on the 2d November. 
 
 3d Nov. — Frederick's columns from the Saale unite at Bedra, about 
 three miles from Soubise's position. The King reconnoitred the enemy, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 347 
 
 and finding the direction of their line such as to present and expose their 
 ilank, prepared to attack it next day. 
 
 Mucheln 
 
 FreiTjurg' 
 
 4th Nov. — Advancing before day, by moonlight, he discovered that they Hostile forces 
 had shifted their position, and now stood left at Miicheln, right at Bran- and r ositions - 
 derode, strong on the flanks, and with their front well covered. Judging 
 them too formidable to attack with his numbers (22,000), he fell back to 
 the heights in his rear, left on Eossbach, right on Bedra, intending to 
 await the movements of the enemy, who would, as he expected, be obliged 
 by want of provisions to retreat to a point nearer to his supplies. 
 
 5th Nov. — The ground between the Saale and the French position is a 
 sandy barren plain, devoid of obstacles, highest at and behind Frederick's 
 position, and descending thence by gentle rounded slopes to the level of 
 the river-bank. The French generals, confident in their own superiority, French march 
 imagining Frederick's army, part of which only they could see, to be to a flank - 
 weaker than it was, and construing his retreat of the previous day into 
 a confession of inability to encounter them, resolved to march round his 
 left and intercept his retreat to the Saale. 
 
 About eight in the morning, the Combined army, forming columns of 
 lines to its right, began to move towards Schevenroda ; a body of troops, 
 chiefly horse, under St Germain, advancing towards Frederick's left, and 
 
348 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 making demonstrations of attack, and opening a distant cannonade to 
 cover the general movement. As they had a magazine at Freiburg, the 
 Kino-, thinking they might be moving thither, remained to await the 
 development of their design, merely ordering his cavalry to mount, and 
 his infantry to be ready for immediate movement. 
 
 Moving in the hollow of the plain, the Combined columns, passing 
 Schevenroda, were directed on Pettstadt. At the head of the columns 
 (three in number, two lines and a reserve) marched the German horse ; 
 next, the German and French infantry ; lastly, the French cavalry. 
 
 Before passing his left flank the enemy halted, and the French cavalry 
 
 moved to join the other wing of horse (in all 7000) at the head of the 
 
 columns. An hour afterwards he perceived that they, then past his flank, 
 
 were heading towards Merseburg, and their project of cutting him from 
 
 the Saale was no longer doubtful. 
 
 Prussians The King thereupon ordered Seidlitz to move with all the cavalry 
 
 form across (4000) covered by the rising ground, across the head of the Combined 
 
 the French i„ mns . w hile the infantry, forming columns to its left, and then 
 
 line of march. ^ UiU -" x " > •> ° < 
 
 wheeling to the left by divisions, followed at its best pace m the same 
 direction. Only a body of light-horse under Meyer was left at Ross- 
 bach. 
 
 The enemy, catching glimpses of troops rapidly moving towards the 
 river, imagined the King to be retreating on Merseburg. They therefore 
 pushed forward their cavalry in all haste far in advance of the infantry, 
 in hopes of attacking his rear-guard, and forcing him to an action. 
 
 Reaching the reverse slope of the Polzen mound which screened him, 
 Seidlitz found that he had anticipated the enemy, whose columns were 
 then just beginning to ascend the other side of the slope. Forming line, 
 he at once attacked and enveloped the head of the column, which, unable 
 to form line, was, by repeated charges, dispersed in half an hour, and 
 driven towards Freiburg. The Prussian cavalry then rallied, and re- 
 formed about Tageswerben, in a hollow of the plain. 
 
 During the cavalry engagement the Prussian artillery had brought 
 
 , twenty- two guns into action on the crest of the low mound called the 
 
 Janus Hill ; and the infantry division which had originally formed the 
 
 left of the Prussians at Rossbach — seven battalions in number— began to 
 
 issue through Lundstadt, forming as they arrived on the left flank of the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 349 
 
 Combined infantry. The enemy now attempted to form front, and to French de- 
 extend beyond the Prussian flank ; but, enfiladed by the guns, the head feate(i in suc " 
 
 cession. 
 
 of each attempted formation swept away by the Prussian fire, and the 
 rear assailed by Seidlitz, the whole army gave way and fled in confusion, 
 sweeping St Germain's force (which was at the same time broken by 
 Meyer from Eossbach) with them, losing 3000 killed and wounded, and 
 leaving 5000 prisoners and 70 guns in the hands of the victors. The 
 Prussians lost less than GOO men. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The reader will see that an army moving to outflank another, which Dangers of 
 finds that other drawn across its path, is itself outflanked. And since t ie at *f m P* 
 
 to outflank. 
 
 the army that attempts to turn the flank of another, to which it stood 
 originally parallel, by passing round it, out of range of its artillery, is 
 moving on an arc of which the antagonist commands the chord, it 
 follows that, in ordinary circumstances, and with the same conditions 
 of ground, such an enterprise will be not only futile but disastrous. In 
 general, the way to meet it will be to change front with the threatened Way of meet- 
 wing ; and, disengaging the remainder of the line, move it behind that ing lt- 
 wing into the prolongation of the new alignement. 
 
 Nr — — — 
 
 New line. 
 
 Original line. 
 
 Turning 
 movement 
 
 That an open turning manoeuvre may succeed against inferior troops and Attempt may 
 generals, has, however, been often proved ; and the commander of a dis- be J udlcl0US 
 
 . against infe- 
 
 ciplined force opposed to barbarous troops — a British leader, for instance, r i or troops, 
 acting against a native army in India — would be justified by the supe- 
 rior manoeuvring power of his force (enabling it to defend itself at any 
 
350 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Mistake of 
 those who de- 
 ride the ob- 
 lique order. 
 
 stage of the operation, to outmarch its enemy, or to return on its path 
 without disorder) in attempting openly to turn the flank of his enemy. 
 
 Some writers assuming that by the oblique movement one line is 
 merely brought to bear obliquely on the other, have derided it as a 
 visionary advantage, pointing out that the obliquity of the two lines is 
 reciprocal, thus, — 
 
 A 
 
 Prussian sys- 
 tem becomes 
 general in 
 Europe. 
 
 and that A's relation to B remains unchanged. Their mistake is in not 
 perceiving that the one line, besides being oblique to the other, must also 
 out/lank it. Produce the line B beyond the extremity of A, and the 
 nature of the situation is evident to the reader of the two actions just 
 described. 
 
 Again, it has been triumphantly asserted that Napoleon himself pro- 
 nounced the oblique order of attack to be a fantasy. If he did, he denied 
 the plain facts of several of Frederick's most celebrated and decisive 
 battles. But what Napoleon probably did say is, that an attempt openly 
 to practise the oblique outflanking movement against the skilful leader 
 of a well-trained army, ought, for the reasons just given, to be turned to 
 the disadvantage of the assailant. 
 
 Perceiving all the advantages of the Prussian system of drill and dis- 
 cipline, the other powers of Europe adopted it ; and every civilised army 
 is still strongly imbued with the spirit and the method which Frederick 
 William so diligently imparted to his troops in the parades of Potsdam. 
 As in other cases, the form has been taken for the essence, maxims and 
 traditions have been rigidly adhered to long after they ceased to be 
 applicable, and the pedantic spirit which blindly confides in them, 
 and condemns all innovations, is by no means yet extinct among 
 soldiers. 
 
 The next great changes in tactics took place, along with so many other 
 changes, in the French Revolution. One was in organisation. Brigades 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. :351 
 
 and divisions already existed in armies ; but they were fractions of the Change in or- 
 line, consisting of a number of battalions united under one general for » am - sa 
 
 ° > ° the llepulm- 
 
 convenience of command only. In the great war which revolutionary can armies. 
 France maintained all along her extensive frontier, numerous small 
 bodies, separated by many miles of space, often acted with a certain inde- 
 pendence of each other, though directed by one commander-in-chief — 
 indeed, the nature of the theatre sometimes, as in the Apennines, rendered 
 this inevitable. To make them capable of independent action, these Divisions ren- 
 
 bodies were now rendered complete in all arms ; divisions were organised dere ' 1 ca l' :il,le 
 
 of indepen- 
 of 8000 or 10,000 infantry, 1000 or 1500 cavalry, and twelve guns, under dent action . 
 
 one commander, and trained to manoeuvre in concert. A faculty of 
 independent action was thus acquired ; but it led to diffuseness of move- 
 ment and want of unity in design, as is well shown by a quotation from 
 Jomini's comments on the campaign of 1796 in Germany: — 
 
 " The defensive system, en cordon, had brought with it another not Abuses of 
 
 a whit better, — that of operating offensively with an army parted into t e1 ^ in e ' 
 
 r ° * . pendence. 
 
 many divisions, marching on parallel roads at a great distance from each 
 other, forming thus only a single line of battle, and, for the most part, 
 without any supporting corps — for a reserve of 800 or 900 horse cannot 
 be counted as such. This manner of operating can only be ascribed to 
 the fear of being outilanked, or the hope of outflanking the enemy, in 
 thus extending the line to the utmost. 
 
 " This is the system which many military writers have taken for an 
 enlargement of the scale of the combinations of war. It would be very 
 well in fact, if an army were beaten directly a small body of the enemy 
 appeared on its flank. But if it is true, on the contrary, that this army 
 can, in such a case, concentrate on its centre, overwhelm the division 
 opposing it there, and push it vigorously, what then will become of the 
 two extremities of this front of operations, occupied by divisions moving 
 each on its own errand, without reserves, and not in a condition to sup- 
 port itself? This assumed perfecting of the art of war was, then, only 
 a new error ; and to be convinced of it, it is only necessary to read the 
 operations of Montenotte, Lonato, Ratisbon, and Amberg." 
 
 Such were the errors entailed by the divisional system ; but the Repub- 
 lican armies possessed a tactical method which was an ample compensa- 
 tion. Before the Revolution important modifications in manoeuvring had 
 
352 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Bonaparte 
 shows that 
 mobility must 
 be combined 
 with concen- 
 tration. 
 
 More massive 
 organisation 
 attempted in 
 Moreau's 
 army. 
 
 System of 
 army corps 
 organised 
 under the 
 Empire. 
 
 Introduction 
 of highly- 
 trained light 
 infantry. 
 
 been introduced, which presently proved so successful against troops 
 trained exclusively in the system of Frederick. For mobility and the 
 mutual support of all arms, in which the Prussians had formerly been so 
 superior, were now on the side of the French. 
 
 The reader, already acquainted with the campaign of 1796 in the 
 Apennines, will now see what was the new impulse which Bonaparte's 
 genius gave to the French armies and to war in general. The man, the 
 material, and the opportunity were all met together. The divisional 
 system existed — the Austrians, operating in the way Jomini censures, 
 were widely dispersed — and the young general, bringing La Harpe to 
 back the garrisons of the redoubts at Monte Legino, and sending Massena 
 from Cadibona against the Austrian rear, utilised the independent action 
 recently acquired by divisions, while illustrating the advantages of con- 
 centration ; and repeated the operation again and again. 
 
 Turning to the campaign of 1800 in Germany, the reader will see in 
 the organisation of Moreau's army an attempt to impart that unity and 
 impulsion which were so necessary to the execution of a sound plan, 
 but which were found scarcely consistent with the divisional system. 
 The divisions there are assembled in a right wing, a left wing, a centre, 
 and a reserve, the last under the immediate direction of the general-in- 
 chief. (See Chap. V. Part III.) 
 
 The idea of imparting the necessary concentration and unity of action 
 to an army was completed in the camp of Boulogne in 1804-5, when 
 Napoleon's authority, as Emperor, was supreme, and the army was shaped 
 into the instrument of his vast designs of aggression. It was seen that 
 great masses of cavalry might produce a decisive effect on a field of 
 battle. They were therefore abstracted from the divisions, and these 
 were now united into corps under a marshal or lieutenant-general. These 
 corps consisted of 20,000 or 30,000 men, with a proportion of cavalry and 
 artillery sufficient to render them capable of maintaining independent 
 combats. And a strong reserve, composed of chosen troops of all arms, 
 notably of the famous Imperial Guard, was kept under the Emperor's 
 hand for the decisive moment of the engagement. 
 
 Another change, too, which had taken place, was in the mode of 
 fighting. France supplied great numbers of conscripts, full of intelli- 
 gence and enthusiasm. But, to oppose the vast armies that assailed her, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 353 
 
 she was forced to send these into the field without the instruction and 
 practice in close formations necessary to meet the trained battalions of 
 the enemy ; therefore they were thrown out in the form of skirmishers, 
 where their intelligence and courage were rendered of avail, without the 
 necessity of acquiring precision and coherence. It was soon seen that 
 these lines of skirmishers — " clouds of skirmishers," as writers are fond 
 of calling them, not without reason — might be made eminently useful to 
 cover formations, to deceive the enemy, and to conceal tactical enterprises. 
 Light troops, it is true, had existed before. The Austrians possessed, in 
 Frederick's time, plenty of light cavalry in their hussars and Pandours, 
 plenty of light infantry in their Croats; but these, very useful to 
 harass convoys, to hover round the enemy's march and pick off stragglers 
 or baggage, to plunder territory, or to obtain information, were of small 
 account on a field of battle. Now, however, light infantry were 
 rendered capable of opposing disciplined battalions, and further train- 
 ing enabled them also to take their places in the line of battle. 
 
 Thus far have been briefly traced the changes in the tactical conditions 
 of armies down to recent times, when the system of the present century 
 has received a new element — that of arms of precision — followed by one 
 equally important, that of immense increase in the rapidity of the fire of 
 infantry. Up to the war of 1870 the effect of these changes on tactics was 
 merely speculative, for the first appearance of breech-loading rifles on a 
 European field of battle was in the short and unequal Danish campaign 
 of 1864, when the Prussians alone possessed them. In 1866 the Prussians 
 armed with breech-loaders met the Austrians armed with muzzle-loaders ; 
 and although the superiority of the Prussian arm was abundantly evident, 
 yet the rapid and almost invariable successes of the Prussians left them 
 still confident in the method of attack which they had sedulously prac- 
 tised as the best they could devise under contemporary conditions. That 
 method (described in a subsequent chapter) they took with them into the 
 campaign of 1870 ; when, for the first time meeting an enemy armed with 
 breech-loaders, they perceived that an extensive modification of it was 
 inevitable. 
 
354 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 FORMATIONS AND COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 
 
 Formations of 
 infantry. 
 
 Difficulty of 
 moving in 
 deployed 
 lines. 
 
 Use of col- 
 umns for 
 manoeuvre 
 
 and attack. 
 
 While close formations and regular methodical movements were considered 
 essential, it was clear that deployed lines, because giving the greatest 
 amount of fire, were best adapted for defensive combat. And as a single 
 line, unsupported, and thinned by casualties, would soon cease to oppose 
 an effective barrier, a second was placed in rear to fill its gaps, or to 
 cover its withdrawal and take its place. 
 
 But in advancing on the enemy for any distance over broken ground, 
 long deployed lines lose their order, fluctuate, and fall into fragments ; 
 and as they would, while in motion, be exposed, at a certain distance 
 from the hostile line, to a fire which they could not return, they would, 
 before closing, find themselves in much worse condition to engage than 
 the opposing line that, remaining stationary, had preserved its order. 
 The same troops, however, moving in column would preserve their array, 
 and, moreover, would often obtain shelter, during their advance, from 
 accidents of ground, when they would have been exposed if in line. On 
 arriving near the enemy the columns might either deploy and engage in 
 a conflict of musketry with the hostile line, or, retaining their formation, 
 might charge and seek to break, by their momentum, through the enemy 
 immediately in their front, creating a gap, of which other supporting 
 bodies could take advantage. And if a whole wing or centre could thus 
 be brought to bear on the corresponding portion of the opposing front, it 
 might, after breaking and dispersing it, deploy right or left on the expesed 
 flank of the enemy. 
 
 During great part of the last century a controversy was waged between 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 355 
 
 the advocates of the line and the column formations. "Whether deployed 
 lines should ever be resorted to ; whether columns were at all admissible 
 — -if so, how wide or how deep ; were questions incessantly argued, and 
 often by men who had frequent opportunities of seeing their opinions 
 tested in war. The only evidence that can ever really be of use in forming 
 a judgment on such points, is the result of the practice of good modern 
 generals in forming troops for defence or attack. 
 
 In Frederick's time the Prussians generally attacked in line. So per- 
 fect was their power of manoeuvring, and their steadiness, that they could 
 be trusted to form and advance thus under fire ; and their own fire was 
 so superior to that of any other infantry, so quick, well maintained, 
 and deadly, that they soon counterbalanced in the conflict of musketry 
 what losses they might have suffered in the advance. In one instance 
 Frederick even advanced to attack the enemy in single line ; for at Sohr 
 he was so inferior in force, that in its usual formation his army would have 
 been outflanked on both wings. In single line, then, he won the battle. 
 
 But the attack in line assumed and demauded a great superiority in The French 
 the manoeuvring power and fighting quality of the troops. "Where armies modlf y tnc 
 were equal in flexibility, in discipline, and in weight of fire, it was incon- svstem 
 testable that a body of troops, formed in line, could only advance under fire 
 to attack another line of equal force, at great risk of being defeated before 
 the actual collision could take place. Columns, therefore, were the alter- 
 native ; and to mask their advance, and balance, in some degree, the want 
 of power to return the fire of the hostile line, they threw out skirmishers 
 to ply the enemy with musketry, and to hide with movement, noise, and 
 smoke, the intended attack. This was the great change already spoken 
 of : the Ptepublican and Imperial armies were trained to manoeuvre and 
 attack in column, and hardly ever deployed except when defending posi- 
 tions. But the columns varied greatly in depth and extent of front. At Depth and 
 Waterloo the French formed columns of attack by ranging eight or extent of 
 nine deployed battalions behind each other. The front of such a column, 
 supposing the battalions to be 3 deep and 600 strong, would extend 
 about 120 yards, and its depth would be 24 to 27 ranks. Such a mass 
 would be formidable in appearance, and its first line and skirmishers 
 would afford a considerable amount of fire during the deployment of 
 the rest ; while its momentum, if fairly launched upon a line, would 
 
356 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Columns of 
 battalions. 
 
 Jomini's pro- 
 posed com- 
 bination for 
 attack. 
 
 Effect of 
 columns of 
 
 seem irresistible. But though often successful against Continental 
 troops, it totally failed at Waterloo, where Ney directed D'Erlon's corps, 
 16,000 strong, formed in columns of this kind, against the British line. 
 The defects are, that it is impossible to screen columns so large during 
 their advance ; that they offer a wide mark to the ravages of artillery ; 
 that they are unwieldy, and cannot readily either deploy (and D'Erlon's 
 columns did try to deploy) or change front. 
 
 A more usual formation, therefore, was a line of columns of battalions, 
 formed each on the centre, on a front of two companies. Thus, a British 
 battalion of ten companies might throw out two as skirmishers, and the 
 remainder would form a double column of companies on the centre, 
 eight ranks in depth, easy to manoeuvre, able to form quickly to a front 
 or either flank, and solid for attack. 
 
 For defence, the counter-attack in line by the defensive troops, taking 
 place as it did only over a short space, and showing a large front, which 
 enveloped the approaching columns on front and flank, would generally 
 be the most effective : at any rate, repeated instances at Waterloo, where 
 the French columns broke and fled before the charges in line of very 
 inferior numbers, indicated what was the right course for British infantry. 
 And as an example of columns of attack being defeated by the fire only 
 of deployed lines, Napier's well-known description of the struggle for the 
 hill held by the fusilier regiments at Albuera will occur to most readers. 
 
 Jomini, who had not only thought and written much about war, but 
 had been present in a great number of battles, considered that the best 
 formation for attack he had ever seen (and which seems to have been 
 executed at a review, not in actual conflict), was that of two lines 
 of battalions, formed in double column of companies on the centre. 
 Advancing thus, the first line, on approaching sufficiently near for 
 effective fire, deploys, each of its battalions throwing out the two flank 
 companies as skirmishers. This leaves, opposite the columns of the 
 second line, intervals equal to their fronts ; through which, as soon as 
 the fire of the first line shall have produced sufficient effect, they advance 
 to the charge. Jomini considers that no troops could resist this com- 
 bination of fire and of shock. 
 
 In fact, it is easy to imagine the effect upon a defensive line, already 
 thinned and shaken by the enemy's fire, when through the smoke it per- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 357 
 
 ceived compact columns swiftly advancing upon its shattered array. The attack chiefly 
 influence of the attack in column was chiefly moral in its nature ; it was moral - 
 the solidity, the momentum, the measured tramp of its menacing and 
 confident advance, that scattered the opposing line. " In war," says 
 Jomini, " I have never seen but two kinds of infantry combats : either 
 that of battalions deployed beforehand, which commence firing by com- 
 panies, and then pass, by little and little, to file-firing ; or else that of 
 columns marching boldly on the enemy, who gives way without awaiting 
 the shock, or who repulses the columns before actual collision, either by 
 his firm countenance, his fire, or by himself advancing to attack. It is 
 only in villages and defiles that I have seen actual conflicts of infantry 
 in column, the heads of which fought with the bayonet : in line of battle 
 I have never seen the like." Again he says, " In the late wars, Eussian, 
 French, and Prussian columns have frequently been seen to carry posi- 
 tions with shouldered arms, and without firing a shot ; the triumph is 
 that of impulsion, and the moral effect produced by it." 
 
 As it seems probable, therefore, that columns would never actually Superiority of 
 
 close on a line that stood firm, their natural course would be, on finding the smaU over 
 
 massive 
 enemy did not give way, to deploy and try the effect of their fire ; when, co iumns. 
 
 in an attack such as that described by Jomini, the first line, now behind 
 the second, could form column and try the effect of another assault. 
 Facility for deployment was for this reason, and also for the sake of 
 effective action against a broken enemy, specially to be desired ; there- 
 fore columns of battalions must always have been superior to those of 
 more massive formation. 
 
 "When the French army, covering the siege of Peschiera, expected the Mixture of 
 attack of the Austrians, in 1859, an order similar to that described by hne and 
 
 column for 
 
 Jomini was prescribed for the defence. " As soon as the enemy shows defence- 
 himself," says the Emperor's order in anticipation of battle, "the fire of 
 artillery will commence. The lines of infantry will be disposed, when 
 the ground permits, alternately in battalions deployed and in battalions 
 in double column ; useless fire of skirmishers will be avoided ; and while 
 the deployed battalions engage in file -firing, the others will beat the 
 charge and attack the enemy with the bayonet." 
 
 The points wherein the French system differed from the Prussian were, Difference of 
 then : that long processional turning movements were no longer neces- Prussian aud 
 
358 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 French sys- 
 tems. 
 
 Why numbers 
 brought to 
 bear at parts 
 of the line 
 prevail. 
 
 Consequent 
 aim in mo- 
 dern battles. 
 
 sary ; that obstacles of ground which forced lines to make circuits to 
 preserve their order would not stop columns, which could therefore be 
 directed with much greater certainty on required points ; that, conse- 
 quently, great plains were no longer necessarily fields of battle, since any 
 ground would suit the purpose; that the cavalry, kept in close deep 
 columns beyond the enemy's reach, could move rapidly and accommodate 
 itself to circumstances ; that the defeat of part of a line no longer entailed 
 the crumbling of the rest, since broken troops were easily rallied on their 
 supports. In fact, to use the metaphor of a French general, Baron Am- 
 bert, a flexible chain was substituted for a bar of iron. And, lastly, great 
 reserves were kept in hand for a decisive movement. 
 
 The reader will perhaps say that either two lines of infantry do 
 occupy adequately their ground, or they do not. If they do, the multi- 
 plying of the attacking force ought not to prevail ; if they do not, they 
 should be placed in deeper formation. 
 
 But if in deeper formation, the extent of ground occupied will be con- 
 tracted in proportion. And it is probably true enough that so long as 
 two lines of good troops remain intact, they ought to be as capable of 
 repelling any attack as if their lines were trebled or quadrupled. More- 
 over, a deeper formation, while it diminished the front of fire bearing on 
 the attacking columns, would increase the losses of the defensive troops 
 from the assailant's artillery. In any case, it is evident how, when a 
 battle has been some time in progress, superior numbers assembled on a 
 particular part of the general front will for the most part prevail. For 
 the defensive line is no longer intact : numerous drafts have been made 
 on the second line to fill the gaps in the first ; the assailant's artillery 
 has had its effect ; the attacking force can always feed its line of fire 
 from the supporting columns, and, maintaining a superiority, can either 
 quench that of the enemy, or, when a due effect has been produced, launch 
 its columns to the assault. An attempt to meet the attack by a deeper 
 formation would dangerously diminish the front of the defender's fire ; 
 and would, moreover, generally offer a flank to the assailant's enterprises. 
 
 It will be seen, then, that (granting the open turning of a skilful 
 adversary's flank to be generally a manoeuvre full of peril to him who 
 attempts it) the great object in modern battles is to bring, at a certain 
 point of the battle-field, a superior number of troops to bear upon the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 359 
 
 enemy. The design is screened by false attacks, by features of the 
 ground, by a general advance of skirmishers, and by deceptive formations 
 and manoeuvres. The attacking force must be strengthened at the 
 expense of some other part of the line — to engage that other part would 
 be to offer to the enemy the opportunity of restoring the equilibrium of 
 the battle which it had been the object of the former manoeuvre to 
 disturb. Therefore modern battles have been for the most part partial 
 attacks, where the assailant puts forth his foot no farther than he can be 
 sure of drawing it back again. Thus, at Ligny the French right and 
 Prussian left wings scarcely joined in the action, the efforts being made 
 on the other wings and centre : at "Waterloo the French left first attack 
 Hougomont ; then the right is launched upon La Haye Sainte and upon 
 the English left ; finally, the baffled French make desperate efforts against 
 the centre. 
 
 Very favourable to this non-committal kind of attack is echelon or Methods of 
 stair formation of infantry, where each fraction of the attacking force, securm « tins 
 whether brigade, battalion, or company, advances successively from a Jon f onna . 
 flank or centre of the line, either at full wheeling distance, or, in the tions. 
 case of large echelons, where this would be inconvenient or impracticable, 
 at a certain regulated distance from the next in front. The exposed flank 
 may thus by being retired be secured — line may be formed on any 
 front, or a new front of echelons be shown by a simple simultaneous 
 wheel. The head of the formation may be reinforced for the attack 
 of a post, such as a farm or village covering the line of battle ; if 
 successful, the remaining echelons come up and form line upon it — if 
 strongly opposed, they successively reinforce it — if defeated, they cover 
 its retreat. 
 
 ADVANCE IN DIRECT ECHELOX, WITH THE LEADING ECHELON REINFORCED. 
 
 This formation would have been suitable to an advance like that of 
 
360 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 M'Mahon's from Turbigo (page 251), where a flank is offered to the enemy, 
 since, by a simultaneous wheel of fractions to the threatened flank, the 
 
 echelons front the enemy, and successively support each other, while the 
 imperilled flank, by being refused, is rendered more secure, and the point 
 of passage is better covered. 
 
 The march in oblique echelon was one of the manoeuvres often em- 
 
 Enemy's line. 
 
 \\ 
 
 Original line. 
 
 ployed by Frederick for gaining an enemy's flank. The fractions of the 
 line are wheeled on an arc less than the quarter circle, and then advance 
 each on its new front : when, though appearing from a distance still to 
 be moving in line, they gain ground rapidly to a flank, and by a simul- 
 taneous wheel backwards form line towards the enemy. 
 
 When columns were successful in breaking the opposing line, they 
 deployed right and left, enveloping and rolling up the exposed flanks, 
 while through the widening gap pour cavalry and supporting bodies of 
 infantry to attack the second line and reserves, and prevent them from 
 falling on the victorious columns. In this way a well-supported attack 
 spread confusion through whole corps of an army ; for the breaking of a 
 line which had stood fast to the last moment compromised a large extent 
 of troops to right and left of the gap. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 36 I 
 
 Since the introduction of rifles aud rifled guns into armies, the Prussians, 
 
 perceiving the difficulties of advancing in battalion -columns under the 
 
 fire of those weapons, have sought, by diminishing the size of their 
 
 columns, to offer less mark both in front and depth to the projectiles, and 
 
 to take fuller advantage of the cover which average ground affords. A Prussian 
 
 battalion 1000 strong is formed in three ranks and composed of four com- order for 
 
 ° . . attack, 1870. 
 
 panies, each company of two divisions. In company-column one division 
 
 of each company is ranged in rear of the other, the third rank of both 
 divisions forming a third division behind them. Thus the column, before 
 it deploys, is six ranks deep, and of the breadth of a division. "When 
 the company is to bring its fire to bear, the third division (composed of 
 superior marksmen) passes from the rear to the front of the company, 
 and forms both the skirmishing line and the supports thereto, and the 
 other divisions, at need, successively reinforce it. The formation of the 
 battalion varies according to circumstances : sometimes its four com- 
 panies advance in a line of columns ; sometimes one is singly engaged 
 and is reinforced by the others; sometimes the two flank companies 
 advance and throw out their skirmishing divisions, while the two centre 
 companies form a column of reserve in rear ; with other modifications. 
 
 The further changes which proved necessary in actual war are described 
 in a subsequent chapter. 
 
 As cavalry moving to attack is found by experience to require a space Formations 
 of 300 or 400 yards from its starting-point in order to acquire the neces- of cavalry, 
 sary union of coherence and momentum, it should be stationed at that 
 distance behind any point it may be intended to defend, whether a post, 
 a battery, or the flank of infantry, stationary or in motion. 
 
 The peculiarities of this arm are, first, that the opportunities offered to 
 it of attacking to advantage are transient, and must be seized at once. 
 Secondly, that either success or defeat so far disorders the combatant 
 mass as to place it at the mercy of fresh troops of the enemy. Thirdly, 
 that it commands special opportunities, from the speed of its movement, 
 for attacking the enemy in flank. 
 
 For the first reason, then, it will often be expedient to keep a body of 
 cavalry formed in the order of attack, lest the opportunity should pass 
 during the preliminary formation. 
 
362 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 For the second reason, it is imperative, as lias frequently been experi- 
 enced, not to commit the whole force to a simultaneous attack, especially 
 against cavalry. The first line should be followed by a second, at a dis- 
 tance sufficient to allow the first, if defeated, to pass round the flanks 
 or through the intervals ; and a strong reserve should halt and deploy at 
 400 yards from the point of collision. 
 
 For the third reason, cavalry attacking any troops in line should form 
 on a front as extended as is consistent with the preceding rule of preserv- 
 ing a second line and reserve. But since either cavalry or infantry, on 
 seeing a fully deployed line of cavalry advancing upon it, might take 
 measures to protect the menaced flank, it is well to keep part of the 
 intended first line in column, behind the flanks of the front, till the 
 moment preceding the change of pace from the trot to the charge, when 
 the column on the side where the enemy is to be outflanked, or on both 
 sides, should rapidly deploy. 
 
 Jomini recommends the following formation for cavalry : One-fourth 
 deployed ; one-fourth in column on each wing ; one-fourth in reserve. 
 Thus, of 40 squadrons, 10 would be in line, 10 in column on each wing, 
 10 in reserve in rear of the centre, and at some distance from the rear of 
 the wings. But this formation is preliminary only, as the columns in rear 
 must deploy for the charge. " Cavalry," says Marmont, " cannot and ought 
 not ever to fight in column. This formation will serve to facilitate the 
 march ; but at the instant of approaching the enemy it ought to deploy." 
 
 All other changes of front and of formation should be executed at a 
 certain distance from the enemy. To attempt them when an adversary is 
 advancing within charging distance, is to invite an overthrow. In such 
 a case, the best course a leader can take is to charge in the existing 
 formation. 
 
 Cavalry charging a broken body of infantry ought to render it incap- 
 able of again assembling as a body in that action. 
 
 While improvements in weapons have materially affected the actions 
 of infantry and artillery, science has done nothing for cavalry. In that 
 arm no change of vital importance has taken place since, ceasing to be 
 mere men-at-arms, heavily armed, slow of movement, and trusting for 
 their effect to the power of wielding their weapons which they derived 
 from sitting on horseback, they became formidable from the rapidity of 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 3G3 
 
 their manoeuvring, and the order and momentum of their charge. It was 
 in the second of his Silesian wars that Frederick first showed the world 
 the capabilities of cavalry ; in the third they reached the climax of their 
 discipline and achievements ; and no army has since possessed a cavalry 
 leader or a body of horsemen who could claim any superiority over 
 Seidlitz and his splendid squadrons. In fact, notwithstanding the huge 
 masses of cavalry used in the later wars of Napoleon, their true use and 
 efficiency for combat seems to have been less understood then than in the 
 time of Frederick. In place of the resolute home charge, cavalry began 
 to manoeuvre defensively, to resort to file-firing, and to halt to receive the 
 enemy ; and though, from time to time, gallant charges were made by the 
 horsemen of each European army, yet the combination of impetuosity 
 with determination in the attack was no longer, as it had been in the 
 last half of the last century, the characteristic of the arm. In those 
 wars originated the notion which now more indisputably prevails, that 
 cavalry cannot break steady infantry; though it was clear that in no 
 formation could infantry really withstand a cavalry charge pushed home, 
 and that when horse failed to break foot, it was from moral, not physical 
 causes. Yet the cavalry of the Republic and Empire possessed one ad- 
 vantage over that of Frederick ; for the system of rendering lines flexible, 
 by joining them into manageable portions for facility of manoeuvre, had 
 extended to this arm, and the French squadron, by no means superior 
 to their Prussian predecessors in the line of battle, were much more 
 easily handled. 
 
 Questions have been constantly debated respecting the management of Debated 
 this arm, of which the following seem the most important : — questions 
 
 1st, Whether cavalry should ever charge in close column. — Since cava | 
 Frederick's time the Prussian cavalry has been trained to act in 
 squadrons at quarter distance ; but it is contrary to the opinion and 
 practice of Frederick, the Archduke Charles, and Napoleon. It may 
 therefore be safely concluded that open column, or rather successive 
 lines, is the best deep formation. 
 
 2d, Whether the front line should be formed with or unthout inter- 
 vals. — Seidlitz always wished to see the centre of his line in the charge 
 "jammed boot to boot;" and, indeed, unity of impulse being the grand 
 requisite in a charge, it is hard to see how it can be attained so well as 
 
364 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 by a formation that renders it difficult for any horseman to disengage 
 himself from the moving mass. Intervals imply looseness and fluctua- 
 tion ; nevertheless, considerations of manoeuvre have induced most armies 
 to admit them. In the second line they are indispensable to permit the 
 retreat of the first, if defeated. The British squadrons are separated in 
 line by intervals of one-fourth of a squadron. 
 
 3d, Whether the formation in echelon is judicious for cavalry. — When 
 a charge is executed in this way, a whole line is not exposed to be at 
 once defeated ; opportunities are afforded of retrieving a first failure, 
 and an exposed flank is protected. But, on the other hand, the action of 
 the squadrons (if the echelon be of squadrons), which should be simul- 
 taneous, is thus rendered successive, and loses much of its effect ; and 
 the defeat or unsteadiness of the leading echelon, which is more exposed, 
 and perhaps therefore less confident than the others, would be visible to 
 all, and might have a bad influence. In fact, the success or failure of the 
 charge would in a great measure depend on the success or failure of the 
 leading squadron. Therefore, though cavalry in echelon, within charging 
 distance of the enemy, should advance in that formation rather than 
 pause to form line, yet the line, supported by a second line, is the best 
 formation for attack. 
 
 But, for manoeuvring, the echelon of squadrons at half distance seems 
 specially suited to this arm. Not only is the flank (the weak point of 
 cavalry even more than of infantry) thus protected, but less depth is 
 offered to the enemy's artillery than in column, while, in advancing, more 
 order can be preserved thus than in line : line can be formed, in the 
 simplest manner, oblique to the original front, or on the same front ; and 
 the front can be readily changed to any extent. 
 
 4th, The amount of cavalry that can he effectively used in a single 
 mass. — In his reviews Frederick used to unite 10,000 or 12,000 horse for 
 a charge — Napoleon kept immense masses together. The Archduke 
 Charles says, that unless the ground limits the action of this arm to 
 particular parts of the field, it should be kept disposable in one body. 
 Nevertheless the difficulty of maintaining order in the advance of a very 
 long line limits the manageable front to six or eight squadrons in first 
 line. Marshal Marmont, whose ideas are always carefully considered, 
 and who knew war well, says, " I place at 6000 horse the utmost force 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 365 
 
 of cavalry manageable ; with tins one ought to succeed in all that is 
 reasonable to undertake on a field of battle with cavalry." 
 
 5th, The pace of the charge. — The opinion of Jomini on this point will 
 be to most readers, accustomed to attach high importance to the impetus 
 of the charge, quite unexpected : " When the enemy approaches at a fast 
 trot it is imprudent to advance on him at the gallop, for you will arrive 
 all disunited against a mass compact and serried, which will traverse 
 your disjointed squadrons. It will be only the moral effect produced 
 by the apparent audacity of your charge which will help you; but if 
 the enemy appreciates it at its just value you will be lost, for success 
 ought naturally to attend the compact mass opposed to cavaliers gal- 
 loping without cohesion." He goes on to say, " I know that many 
 horsemen think otherwise, but I know also that the most distinguished 
 generals of this arm incline to the trot. Lasalle, one of the most skilful 
 of these, seeing one day the enemy's cavalry approach at a gallop, said, 
 ' There come lost troops,' and these squadrons were in fact overthrown 
 at a slow trot. Personal bravery has more influence on the shock and 
 the mele'e than the different paces." The only cavalry action of the 
 Crimean war goes to confirm this. The Russian horse bore down upon 
 the heavy brigade at Balaclava at the gallop, but, before closing, drew 
 up to a walk, either to restore lost order, or from failure of resolu- 
 tion. Our regiments (except the 4th Dragoon Guards, which attacked 
 their flank) moved to meet them much more slowly, hampered by 
 impediments of ground ; yet the enemy, thrice their numbers, were 
 defeated. 
 
 6th, Wliether the cavalry should be to a certain degree independent, under 
 their own commander. — In Frederick's battles, while the king directed 
 all the movements of the infantry, we find the chief of the cavalry select- 
 ing his own time for the attack. And when great masses of cavalry 
 were brought on the field in the wars of the Empire, Napoleon permitted, 
 indeed required, that their commander should judge of and seize oppor- 
 tunities for action. These opportunities are, in fact, so fleeting, that it 
 would seem impossible to employ cavalry to advantage if they are to 
 receive their impulses from a distant part of the field. " Cavalry charges," 
 says Napoleon, according to Montholon, " are equally good at the begin- 
 ning, middle, or end of a battle. They should be made as often as pos- 
 
366 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 sible on the flanks of the infantry, especially when the latter are engaged 
 in front." 
 
 But there is great authority for a different course. Baron Muffling, the 
 Prussian commissioner at the British headquarters, urged the commanders 
 of two brigades of English cavalry at Waterloo to charge at a moment when 
 their attack would, as he thought, have been very opportune : they agreed 
 with him, but said they dared not move without orders. Discussing this 
 matter afterwards, Wellington expressed his opinion thus : — " It is of para- 
 mount importance that a general who finds himself in a defensive position 
 should at no moment of the action lose the free disposal of all the troops 
 under his orders. In the battles of Vimieiro, Talavera, Busaco, and Sala- 
 manca, he had allowed himself to be attacked, with the view of assailing 
 the enemy with superior forces as soon as he had laid himself open. For 
 this object it was necessary, 1st, that the commander-in-chief, standing 
 on an elevated point of his position, telescope in hand, should investigate, 
 by his own observation and the reports he receives, the disposition of 
 his antagonist, and discover means of hindering the co-operation of his 
 forces ; 2dly, That the leaders of troops should set themselves in motion 
 the very moment they receive their fresh orders. But this could not be 
 done if they were engaged in their own enterprises, unknown to the 
 general in command. 
 
 "Now, suppose, in the case mentioned, the cavalry had made their 
 3000 prisoners, it remained very doubtful whether they could have 
 returned to their position in half an hour. When cavalry is once scattered, 
 no one can foretell to what that may lead. The charms of pursuit are so 
 great that no trumpet-signal can arrest it. . . . If the enemy should 
 succeed in restoring order and defending himself on a body of cavalry 
 hastening to his support, who can then calculate that the pursuit will be 
 ended at a given time ? who can foretell that a hard fight of long duration 
 will not ensue, during which time the main army will remain paralysed ? 
 Who would expose himself to such accidents ? and for what ? To make a 
 couple of thousand prisoners, which perhaps may have no effect whatever 
 on the decision of the battle. And supposing those prisoners were made, 
 still the troops would have lost their first freshness, and no longer render 
 the services in the battle which they might have done without this 
 interlude." 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 367 
 
 Wellington, then, desired to keep the constant control of his cavalry. 
 But two things are to be observed here : — 1st, That he speaks of defensive 
 battles ; and his arguments are so strong that it may be assumed that a 
 gerieral awaiting his adversary's movements should certainly follow his 
 example. But the tactics of Frederick and Napoleon were essentially 
 offensive ; and when once they had placed the mass of their cavalry in 
 the field where it was destined to act, it was necessary, in supporting- 
 offensive movements, that the immediate commander should be left to 
 his own inspirations. 2dly, That Wellington was comparatively weak 
 in cavalry, whereas the French and Prussian armies were powerful in 
 that arm. 
 
 It appears, then, that when a powerful cavalry is supporting offensive 
 movements, its commander should be allowed considerable discretionary 
 power; but that the cavalry of an army which awaits its adversary, 
 especially if inferior in force, should be constantly under the direction 
 of the commander-in-chief. But this of course does not apply to the 
 bodies of cavalry which, in modern armies, form part of the division. see Appendix. 
 
 The only formation for artillery in action is, of course, that of line. Formation of 
 The leaving of intervals between the guns (nineteen yards from centre artiller y- 
 to centre) is necessary for the limbering up of the pieces, and renders the 
 enemy's direct fire upon them less destructive. 
 
 But in gaining a direction oblique to the enemy's front, a line of guns Echelon of 
 will frequently be exposed to enfilade. A partial remedy for this in open ^ ans - 
 ground is to retire the guns in echelon to the exposed flank. 
 
 The same order is applicable when numerous batteries are for a par- 
 ticular purpose concentrated on a part of the enemy's line. 
 
 The most effective fire of artillery was, in the days of round-shot and Former re- 
 case-shot, that directed down a gentle slope, so equable in its fall that the lations of 
 course of the projectile was nearly parallel to it throughout its extent ; f r s i Q ery '/ 
 or the fire along a plain above which the guns had a certain command, ground. 
 Very commanding positions were ineligible for guns. Generally an 
 elevation of from 20 to 30 feet above a plain gave all the command to 
 be desired. 
 
 But now that, with rifled guns, ranges and accuracy have greatly in- More com- 
 creased, and that the effect of artillery depends on the right bursting of mandin g sit ' 
 
368 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 now desir- 
 able. 
 
 shells, it is unimportant that such a slope should lie in the line of fire. 
 If it does, it is better defended, up to rifle-range, by infantry, while beyond 
 
 Enemy's line. 
 
 
 Essential 
 points of the 
 training of 
 artillery. 
 
 Guns in echelon. 
 
 that range, if it exists, it has ceased to bear its former relation to the 
 path of the projectiles. Loftier sites are now more eligible, as securing 
 a more extensive and searching view. Commanding ground should 
 therefore be selected, but not, as a rule, peaks, which should be reserved 
 for generals. 
 
 Artillery may be perfect in material, drill, and accuracy of practice ; 
 and yet be very far from possessing the kind of efficiency required in 
 modern war. It will still be necessary to add thus to its qualifica- 
 tions : — 
 
 1. To practise on objects representing bodies of infantry and cavalry 
 moving directly across the front, obliquely to it, advancing on it, and 
 retiring from it ; calling for rapid changes of aim and of range. 
 
 2. To ascertain by experiment the effect of the various projectiles and 
 fuzes upon objects representing troops of all kinds, in various formations, 
 and under various circumstances of exposure and shelter, and upon dif- 
 ferent kinds of buildings. 
 
 3. To work in masses in combination with other troops. The com- 
 mander of the divisional and the commander of the corps artillery must 
 be, each in his degree, proficient in recognising the parts of the opposing 
 line on which to bring his batteries to bear, the best positions for the 
 purpose (having reference to the ground occupied by the troops he is sup- 
 porting as well as to his own ground), the readiest means of advancing or 
 retreating from them, and the control of the fire of his various batteries, 
 whether concentrated on one purpose or on several, so as to secure simul- 
 taneous and concerted action, and to impart to the whole the benefits of 
 the experience which any may gain during the action, as to the range, or 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 369 
 
 the effect of the fire on the enemy. To accomplish this, after organising 
 the march of his batteries with a view to their readiest action, comprises 
 an onerous list of duties ; and it will make a vast difference to the artil- 
 lery commander, in the hour of battle, whether he directs batteries which 
 are merely well-drilled individually, or those which are accustomed to 
 act together, and in combination with other troops. 
 
 Seeing that cavalry on the defensive was helpless, Frederick, in the Combination 
 Seven Years' War, organised batteries of light artillery, capable of ° cava ry 
 moving at the pace of squadrons, and intended to support all their 
 enterprises. 
 
 "When cavalry is advancing over a considerable space upon the enemy 
 the horse-artillery gallops out, and, having passed ahead 400 or 500 yards, 
 forms on the flank of the line of advance, opens fire, and continues in 
 action till its front is masked by the horse. In retreating the reverse 
 of this process is executed — the guns halt and deliver fire, and gallop 
 on, overtaking the retreating cavalry, and again, from suitable ground, 
 protect its retreat. 
 
 When cavalry is finally advancing to the charge, the artillery must 
 be always in rear of the prolongation of its flank or flanks — not directly 
 in rear, where its fire would be masked, and where it would be ridden 
 over by defeated horse. 
 
 When a change of front of the cavalry is contemplated before charging, 
 the guns should be on the pivot flank, where they can act during the 
 wheel, and fire transversely on the opposing line ; and should be clear of 
 the flank of the squadrons by at least 100 yards. 
 
 If the sole action of horse-artillery be specially required, as in taking 
 up the prolongation of an enemy's flank, or enfilading a formidable 
 battery, its front, while advancing, may be masked by cavalry ; but as 
 soon as the guns are in action, the cavalry, drawn up as already described, 
 should take post at full charging distance in rear of the exposed flank or 
 flanks. If the horse- artillery be formed on a front perpendicular or oblique 
 to the enemy's line, all the cavalry will be in rear of the flank next the 
 enemy ; if its front be parallel or slightly oblique to the enemy's, the 
 cavalry will be in two bodies in rear of the flanks. 
 
 Though good infantry alone has generally, in the wars of the present 
 
 2 a 
 
370 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Combination 
 of infantry 
 and artillery. 
 
 Combination 
 of infantry 
 and cavalry. 
 
 century, successfully resisted cavalry alone, yet cavalry and artillery 
 together ought to destroy it. For the cavalry, dividing into two or 
 more bodies, and manoeuvring on the flanks of its line of retreat, would 
 force it to form squares, or to show front on various sides, which forma- 
 tion could not long be maintained under the fire of the guns. Unless 
 the ground were broken and favourable to infantry, or shelter very 
 near, the case of the infantry ought to be desperate. In 1811, a 
 French brigade of infantry, attacking the Portuguese militia near 
 Almeida, was assailed by six British squadrons and a troop of horse- 
 artillery. "Military order and coolness," says Napier, "marked the 
 retreat of their squares across the Turones, yet the cannon-shot ploughed 
 with a fearful effect through their dense masses, and the horsemen con- 
 tinually flanked their line of march ; they, however, gained the rough 
 ground, and finally escaped over the Agueda by Barba del Puerco, but 
 with the loss of 300 men killed, wounded, and prisoners." 
 
 It is not desirable to place artillery directly in front of infantry ; for 
 the fire of the rifles would be masked, and the powerful protection which 
 they could afford to the front of the battery against the close fire of 
 infantry would be lost. Probably guns are now best placed in re-entering 
 intervals of the infantry line, or on commanding ground, the steep slopes 
 of which below, and in front of, the guns, are defended by infantry fire. 
 They should, however, take up positions from which it is easy to advance 
 or retreat. 
 
 Cavalry supporting infantry may advance in rear of it ; for the dis- 
 tance that must be preserved between the two bodies, in order to give 
 the cavalry the necessary career, will obviate the disadvantages of a deep 
 formation. It may, by its action at the right moment, convert a doubtful 
 conflict into a success, or check the pursuit, by the enemy's cavalry, of its 
 own defeated infantry. 
 
 The only resource of battalions attacked in flank by cavalry was, 
 formerly, to form square. They would now probably seek to form front 
 partially in a new direction. In any case the front of fire which they 
 would oppose to the hostile infantry would be diminished ; gaps would 
 be caused in the ranks ; and the disorder would be further augmented 
 by the continued manoeuvring of the cavalry round the flanks of suc- 
 cessive formations, followed, if opportunity should be favourable, by the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 37l 
 
 charge. A combination of infantry and cavalry ought therefore still to 
 succeed against a superior body of infantry alone. 
 
 Experience has mostly proved that, in general actions, cavalry charges, 
 except against cavalry, are indecisive unless supported by infantry. All 
 the formidable inroads of Napoleon's horsemen on the British line at 
 "Waterloo availed nothing for the want of infantry support. They inun- 
 dated the field, drove the artillerymen from their guns, careered in the 
 intervals of the squares, and seemed masters of the ground, yet failed to 
 make a permanent impression. At Vionville the Prussian horse spread 
 disorder far into the Franch ranks, but were compelled to retreat with 
 heavy loss. Every great attack of cavalry on a mixed force should there- 
 fore, if possible, be supported by infantry. These latter may advance 
 with, or even before, the former, as they will certainly be left behind in 
 the course of the movement. They should follow in columns, with con- 
 siderable lateral intervals, through which the cavalry, if defeated, may 
 pass ; and the formation of squares of battalions, echeloned on two lines, 
 will offer the most effectual check to pursuing squadrons. At Austerlitz, 
 Kellermann's cavalry, defeated and pursued by the Eussian horse, re- 
 formed between the lines of infantry, and, attacking the hostile squadrons 
 when disordered by the fire of the squares, entirely defeated them. 
 
 Probable modifications in the employment of cavalry will be discussed 
 in a subsequent chapter. 
 
372 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAH 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 FORMATION OF THE LINE OF BATTLE, AND OCCUPATION OF 
 
 THE GROUND. 
 
 Proportions 
 of troops to 
 space. 
 
 A line of battle should be a disposition, on a great scale, of the three 
 arms, for their effective individual action and mutual support. 
 
 A battery of six guns (19 yards from muzzle to muzzle) occupies 95 
 yards ; add 28i yards, or one interval and a half, on each flank, and 
 152 yards is the space for the battery. These intervals are necessary to 
 enable the teams with the limbers to reverse when limbering up. 
 
 Cavalry occupy each man and horse 1 yard laterally ; a squadron of 
 48 file, 48 yards : a regiment of six squadrons (with five intervals of 12 
 yards each), in round numbers, 350 yards. 
 
 Until 1867, foot-soldiers standing in the ranks shoulder to shoulder 
 occupied each only 21 inches of lateral space. Ten men extended over 
 seven ordinary paces of 30 inches, therefore twelve men occupied 7 yards. 
 Thus 3000 infantry in single rank covered nearly a mile ; in two lines 
 two deep this would give 12,000 infantry to a mile in the line of battle. 
 Allowing for the space occupied by officers, intervals between battalions, 
 and space for two batteries, a division of 10,000 infantry with 12 guns 
 would suitably occupy a mile of ground. But part of the force would 
 be employed by sending out battalions as skirmishers, therefore nearly 
 12,000 men would still be needed to occupy the mile on two lines. After 
 1867 each man was allowed 2 feet of lateral space. 
 
 Investigation of the proportions of troops to space in different battles 
 shows that wide latitude has prevailed even in the same epoch and in the 
 same army. It has been much more common to find troops too crowded 
 than too extended. Generals have often seemed to think that depth of 
 formation means strength. The notion, always false and mischievous, is 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 373 
 
 now preposterous. To crowd a position is to suppress so much of the front 
 of fire, and to add proportionately to the losses suffered from the fire of the 
 enemy. On the other hand, a too extensive position may be weak every- 
 where, and must have many weak points ; and the temptation to include 
 too much ground, because it is strong, or because the position would be 
 incomplete or unsafe without it, may be fatal. 
 
 On the basis, then, of the space which the different arms occupy in 
 their most effective formation for battle, should the extent of ground to 
 be occupied by a given force, or the numbers required for "a given posi- 
 tion, be estimated. But this basis has of late undergone a great change. 
 Infantry formed, according to the latest examples, for the attack (a for- 
 mation which will be discussed further in Chap. VI.), occupy an immensely 
 increased extent of front ; there will be a corresponding change in the 
 disposition of the defensive infantry, such as will also be discussed in the 
 same chapter ; and it will be seen that the formation of a line of battle is 
 so completely altered that the former description of it as consisting of two 
 lines and a reserve, if any longer applicable, bears an altogether new 
 signification. 
 
 The change in the nature of the sites which are most eligible for artil- Artillery in 
 lery, renders it often expedient to place it, in parts, behind the infantry ine ° att e# 
 line. It will not, therefore, increase the extent of the line of battle in a 
 degree proportionate to its numbers ; and it will, much more commonly 
 than was formerly the case, be assembled in great batteries, at such parts 
 of the line as the circumstances of ground and of the expected attack 
 may render expedient, and independent of the particular bodies of in- 
 fantry to which it may be ordinarily attached. 
 
 Supposing two or more divisions to be assembled in line of battle, with Eeasous for 
 a proportionate body of horse, if the cavalry were placed between them in P lacin g ^ v " 
 column, it could not deploy for action without overlapping on each side flanks# 
 a large part of the infantry and masking its fire; and if it were de- 
 ployed between the infantry divisions, a large part of the line would 
 thus have no fire to oppose to an attack of infantry. The enemy's 
 battalions might therefore fire with impunity on the central mass of 
 cavalry, who must either retire, leaving a gap in the line, and exposing 
 the flanks of the divisions, or must charge the opposing infantry in front, 
 which will generally be a doubtful enterprise. In any case it must find 
 
374 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 great hindrance to its most effective mode of action — namely, against 
 the flank of either infantry or cavalry ; and its defeat would lay bare the 
 centre of the line. For these reasons, when the ground is suitable, part 
 of the cavalry is disposed in rear of the flanks of the line, where its front 
 is free for deploying or changing direction, and where it covers and 
 watches over the weak points — namely, the flanks — of the line of battle : 
 and when one flank is secure and the ground there difficult, it should 
 generally be placed on the flank, and in rear, of the other wing. 
 Opportunities Such being'the general rule, the course of an action nevertheless often 
 for squadrons „i V es opportunities for cavalry to operate to advantage between the divi- 
 
 posted be- ° Lr ...,., 
 
 tween dm- s i° ns °f infantry. For instance, a hostile column retreating in disorder 
 sions. from an ineffectual charge, or a hostile line engaged in a conflict of rifle- 
 
 fire, the flank of which might be imperfectly covered, or a line of skir- 
 mishers far from their supports, would give openings for a comparatively 
 small force of cavalry to act with decisive effect. It is to perform such 
 services, among others, that a regiment of cavalry forms in our own, and 
 See Appendix, other armies, part of the division ; and this divisional cavalry may there- 
 fore, in the line of battle, be advantageously posted so as to act between 
 the divisions, or brigades ; and its proper place would be sheltered or re- 
 tired points in rear of the infantry. 
 Conditions of However proper and reasonable general rules for occupation of ground 
 ground. mav a pp ear i n themselves, they must often be modified to suit the con- 
 
 ditions of the battle-field. These conditions will now be considered under 
 the different heads of — 1st, Line of the position ; 2d, Obstacles in front of 
 the position ; and, 3d, Obstacles on flanks of the position. 
 
 The object of taking up a position is to meet the enemy's attack in 
 ground so selected as to procure advantages which may compensate for 
 the disadvantage of leaving to him the initiative. 
 
 To this end the slopes over which the enemy must advance to the 
 attack must favour the defenders ; that is, the ground must be relatively 
 strong. The position should not be commanded, especially on the flanks. 
 It should not allow of the enemy's approach, at any point, unseen. It 
 should be of depth sufficient to allow the troops to manoeuvre freely with- 
 in it. It should be suited in extent to the force which occupies it : what 
 would suit a large army might leave a smaller one with its flanks looked 
 into from ground beyond them, or else cause it to extend in a dangerous 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 375 
 
 degree ; while what would suit a small army might cause a great part of 
 a larger one to be ill-posted. 
 
 Ground, then, in order to be worthy of the name of a position, should 
 at least fulfil the above conditions. If it fulfils them all in a very con- 
 siderable degree, it may almost forbid attack. There are cases in which 
 to baffle the assailant's onset is, in itself, all the advantage sought. Such 
 cases are indeed numerous : for instance, that of a rear-guard ; of an army 
 covering an operation, as a siege ; of an inferior army, seeking to establish 
 or regain prestige ; of an army that has thrown itself across an enemy's 
 communications ; of a force covering an important pass, an indispensable 
 part of the strategical front, or an embarkation. In such cases the main 
 object may be to render the position impregnable ; and an important step 
 towards that end will be to destroy or obstruct its approaches. 
 
 But for an army which retains and desires to exercise its manoeuvr- 
 ing power, to take the offensive in its turn, and to follow up a repulsed 
 enemy, such a position is not to be desired. The conditions must be such 
 as to obstruct the assailant, but not the defender. Slopes easy of descent, 
 avenues commanded rather than blocked or destroyed, must form the 
 fea'tures of at least a considerable extent of the position. And a new 
 axiom, favourable to such a choice of ground, is deducible from the condi- 
 tions of modern weapons — namely, that 710 obstacles arc so formidable to 
 troops advancing to attack as a perfectly clear range for the defender's 
 guns and rifles. 
 
 Positions combining many obvious advantages may not always be 
 available ; even if the theatre of war contains such, engagements may 
 take place unforeseen, as the result of manoeuvres, in ground of any kind; 
 and the most valuable knowledge respecting positions is, how to make the 
 best of the ground which must be fought on, whatever its nature. What- 
 ever the natural aptitude of a commander, his promptitude to do this 
 must be vastly increased by the habit of considering the circumstances 
 which render a position strong or weak, some of which will now be noted. 
 
 When the front of an army is covered by a river, the destruction of rassages of a 
 the fords and bridges will entail the same general consequences as the river covering 
 occupation of unscalable heights, except that in this case the conflict ^ attle 
 will be rather one of artillery than of infantry. But by preserving the 
 passages the power of counter - attack is retained, and the river then 
 
376 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 bestows this advantage on the defender, that the points where the assail- 
 ant's columns must advance being limited in number, and previously 
 known, preparations may be made to meet with a concentrated opposi- 
 tion the different attacks. But, on the other hand, if the assailant's bank 
 screens his movements, the chance of being turned, as Soult was turned 
 by Beresford at Orthez, will always exist. 
 Obstacles par- An impassable obstacle, such as a piece of water, a ravine, or a marsh, 
 tially cover- mav ex tend 'partly along the front of a position. To extend the line of 
 troops along the rear of the impediment would be to repeat the fault of 
 the French commander at Bamillies, and to give the enemy the oppor- 
 tunity of falling in full force on the remainder of the line. But though 
 either cavalry or infantry thus posted would be paralysed, yet guns might 
 play across the impassable space with full effect, and would not only be 
 secure from capture, but, if the obstacle were a marsh, would suffer less 
 from an opposing fire, since the projectiles which might strike in front 
 would not rebound from the soft soil, while percussion-shells would fail 
 to explode, or, sinking deep, would explode harmlessly. 
 Relations be- To occupy a position which is perpendicularly intersected by an impas- 
 tween tbe §a y^ e i s i ac i e — a (j ee p rav ine, stream, lake, or marsh — would be to divide 
 
 direction of 
 
 obstacles and the army voluntarily into two isolated parts, and give the enemy the 
 the line of option of bringing his mass against either. Such was the error of Dur- 
 ando's position before Mortara in 1849. But if such an obstacle, after 
 approaching the front of the position, ceases there, it will be of great ad- 
 vantage to the defence, for the assailing forces will be divided by it, while 
 the defenders can bring their main strength to either side. 
 Essential con- However advantageous a position may otherwise be, if its immediate 
 
 dition of a front be thickly wooded, or so broken as to conceal the enemy's move- 
 good position. . , .,, , 
 
 ments, it will scarcely be tenable ; for, not only will the defender s spe- 
 cial advantage, that of firing on the assailants during their advance, be 
 lost, but the enemy may mass his troops on any point he selects, undis- 
 covered ; and he will thus possess the power of attacking that point with 
 superior numbers unshaken by fire. One of the first conditions of a good 
 position is, therefore, that it shall afford a full view of the enemy's move- 
 ments within effective cannon-range, 
 o^nts^infro t Certain defensible points, such as a hamlet, village, farm, church, and 
 ofapositiou. churchyard with its wall, an isolated hill, or a grove, within distance of 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 377 
 
 easy support in front of the line of battle, will generally increase its 
 strength in a very material degree. A feature of this kind will be 
 especially valuable in front of what would otherwise be a weak part 
 of the position. Strong in itself, and its garrison constantly reinforced 
 from the line, while the ground in front is swept by batteries, such a 
 point is difficult to attack directly ; the enemy cannot attempt to sur- 
 round it without exposing the flank and rear of the attacking troops ; and 
 to pass it by in order to reach the position, the assailants must expose 
 their flank to its fire. If several such points exist, they support each 
 other, isolate the parts of the enemy's attack, and force him to expend 
 his strength in costly assaults upon them ; in fact, they play the part of 
 bastions in a line of fortification. But it is important that they should 
 be within supporting distance and easy of covered access from the rear ; 
 failing these conditions, they had better be destroyed, if possible, as 
 defences, and abandoned to the enemy. A remarkable illustration of this 
 is afforded by the Austrian position at Solferino (see p. 28). Their general 
 line stretched through Pozzolengo and Cavriana ; by far the strongest part 
 of that field, taken singly, is the hill of Solferino, commanding all the 
 neighbouring country, crowned with strong buildings, and flanked by 
 precipitous slopes. But the back of the hill is so steep and scarped that 
 it can be ascended only by a single winding path ; and between it and 
 the high ground of Cavriana in rear stretches a width of nearly two miles 
 of broken ground. The brigades that occupied this formidable outpost 
 maintained themselves long against the direct attacks of the French ; but 
 when the assailants turned it, part of the garrison was cut off, and both 
 troops and post were lost. It would have been far better to leave it 
 unoccupied, and place its garrison in the general line at Cavriana; 
 or else, to advance the whole of the line of battle, making the hill the 
 centre, and connecting the wings with it, so that the Austrian left wing 
 would have occupied the ground from Solferino to Guidizzolo. And 
 in all cases, even when no positive advantage is to be expected from 
 holding an advanced post, the consequence of leaving it as cover to 
 the enemy must form a main consideration in deciding whether to keep 
 or abandon it. 
 
 Another case in point is the line of slightly-fortified posts occupied by 
 the Turks in front of Balaklava. Their distance from the army was far 
 
378 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 beyond cannon-range, and they were captured in a moment, with their 
 armament, in presence of the Allies, at the first attack. 
 
 When well placed, points of this kind in front of the line enable the 
 defender to mass his troops there at the proper time for a counter-attack, 
 and launch them, with a comparatively short distance to traverse, against 
 the enemy. And should they, feebly occupied and defended, be captured, 
 they give to that enemy the same advantages for renewing his attack. 
 Thus they form manoeuvring pivots for the offensive operations of either 
 side that holds them. For these reasons most great battles are marked 
 by bloody episodes, where advanced posts like Hougomont, Solferino, 
 Ligny, the two Arapiles at Salamanca, and recently Woerth, are the 
 objects of contention. Yet, because these attacks are so costly, great com- 
 manders like Frederick and Napoleon have avoided them whenever such 
 evasion was possible, preferring to drive out the garrisons by a concentra- 
 ted fire of artillery ; or, if the posts stood far asunder, to push the attack- 
 ing columns in between, masking them meanwhile by demonstrations. 
 Interruptions Whether points of this kind, villages, woods, &c, in the actual line of 
 in the general oa m e are advantageous, must depend on particular circumstances. Unity 
 
 line of the 
 
 position. °f direction is of high importance to the defence, and whatever isolates 
 
 troops and offers obstacles to their concerted action, is so far a disadvantage ; 
 therefore villages difficult of access by the defenders, and woods having few 
 paths and dense undergrowth, though strong in themselves, may yet impair 
 the total strength of the position. Should the enemy gain a footing in 
 them, they give him strong support in his efforts permanently to sunder 
 the line ; while, if the line be broken elsewhere, the troops occupying such 
 points are frequently cut off. Villages, the materials of which are com- 
 bustible, as wood and thatch, will certainly be set on fire by shells, and 
 cause disastrous confusion. On the other hand, the fences surrounding 
 villages and the borders of woods, offer shelter both from view and from 
 fire, and may be easily converted into formidable obstacles, assailable only 
 with heavy loss, and driving the enemy to seek a vulnerable point else- 
 where ; and if so situated that the fire from them protects the intervening 
 ground, they may enable the defender greatly to economise his force. It 
 must be rare to find a position of any extent free from them ; and to use 
 them to the best advantage, and to remedy their defects, must generally 
 be an important part of the problem of the defence. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 379 
 
 Another kind of interruption of the line of a position may be a space 
 of lower ground between the heights forming its general line. If this 
 gap be so wide as to admit of pushing troops into it on a large front be- 
 yond the rifle-fire of the heights on each side ; or if, as in the case of a 
 small army, it occupies a large proportion of the position, — it will of course 
 constitute a weak point, to be strengthened either artificially, or by a 
 commensurate accumulation of troops there. But if the gap be of less 
 width, it need not materially weaken the position. The line of battle 
 should be somewhat retired there, and troops of the reserve stationed 
 behind the heights on each side. An attempt on the part of the assailant 
 either to push directly in, or (the more safe and probable one, as prelimin- 
 ary to the other) to fully engage, if not to drive off, the troops stationed 
 on those heights, will thus be the more effectively met; and a defeat 
 within the gap may, under such circumstances, be very disastrous to the 
 assailant. 
 
 Still another kind is the extension towards the enemy of a ridge of the 
 high ground forming the general position, for some hundred yards before 
 it rounds off into the lower ground. The difficulty it presents is this : if 
 the line be pushed forward to the extremity of the ridge, a salient is formed 
 there much exposed to be attacked and surrounded, and the troops there 
 consequently to be captured ; while, if it be not occupied, the enemy will 
 be able to accumulate troops at its base, and to advance on better terms 
 than elsewhere along the ridge. The disadvantage is much diminished if 
 the base of the ridge is under the fire of the defensive artillery; but, in any 
 case, it will generally be found best to occupy the salient only as a point 
 of observation as long as possible, and to carry the line of the position 
 evenly across the ridge, strengthening it, and placing reserves behind it. 
 
 It might at first sight appear that, considering the importance of the Obstacles on 
 flanks of the line of battle, they would be best secured by resting on tne nanks of 
 
 , t -1.1 the line of 
 
 insuperable obstacles. , . 
 
 For instance, in taking post at Montebello or Casteggio, an army might 
 rest one flank on the Po, the other on the mountains. But (even granting 
 that the army properly fitted the intervening space) a skilful general 
 would find himself deprived of much of the latitude for manoeuvre which 
 it should be one of his chief aims to preserve, and the battle would be so 
 far reduced to a contest of sheer strength. His most effective counter- 
 
380 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 attack may be by a flank; and as he will need space for extension on that 
 side, so limits which neither side can pass will be far less to be desired 
 than strong points which admit of issue from and extension beyond them. 
 Moreover, in case of the front being broken, the fragments of the line 
 would be liable to be thrown back on impassable obstacles and destroyed, 
 as happened to great part of Tallard's army, hemmed against the Danube 
 at Blenheim ; and had the Allies pushed vigorously their success at La 
 Eothiere, Napoleon's right wing resting on the Aube at Dienville might 
 have been compromised in the same fashion.* 
 
 The best supports for the flanks are therefore such as leave them free: 
 defensible posts, like those already described as strengthening the front 
 of the line, will also most suitably protect the flanks ; an isolated hill, a 
 small wood, a strong building, a village, or a field-work armed with heavy 
 guns, will all fulfil the purpose ; and if two such posts exist near together, 
 mutually flanking each other, the flank should be, with ordinary precau- 
 tions, secure. 
 
 Some examples of the actual adaptation of troops to ground will now 
 be given in illustration of this part of the subject. At Austerlitz, not 
 only were the French tactics at the climax of their excellence, but they 
 came into direct collision with the tactical system of Frederick. Waterloo 
 shows us the dispositions made for enabling troops, partly British and 
 partly foreign, to resist the attacks of columns, when the system of attack 
 by columns had reached its extreme development. And at Woerth con- 
 temporary armies contended with breechloaders, in a chosen position ; but 
 the late war affords no good example of the occupation of ground, and 
 the one selected, though as good as any, is far from satisfactory. 
 
 N.B. — In computing the proportion of infantry to space in the two 
 first battles, the former lateral allowance of 21 inches is given to each man. 
 
 Plan 17. FORMATION OF THE LINES OF BATTLE OF AUSTEELITZ. 
 
 The Bussians, approaching from Olmutz to Brunn, found the French 
 army barring their path on the Goldbach. They were under a false im- 
 pression that Napoleon's line of retreat must be the road Brumi- Vienna, 
 and that, cut from that, he would be ruined. 
 
 He, however, did not rely on it, but on the line Brunn-Pilson, through the 
 
 * See also p. 420 on this. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 381 
 
 Bohemian mountains to Ratisbon. Seeing the error of his opponent, he had 
 not hesitated to place the main strength of his army towards the Olmutz- 
 Brunn road, inviting, as it were, an attempt to cut him from Vienna, 
 
 The plan of the Russo-Austrians was, to move their left in three Allied plan 
 columns to Tellnitz, Sokolnitz, and the Chateau. The fourth column, or of operation 
 
 _, of the left, 
 
 centre of the army, in rear of the third, on the road Austerlitz-rratzen, 
 was to cross the Goldbach at the defile of Kobelnitz. The right of the 
 French army being presumed to be thus turned, the columns were to 
 wheel to the right, so as ultimately to occupy the ground between Turas 
 and Schlapanitz. 
 
 Meanwhile, as it was expected that Napoleon would attack along the right, 
 Olmutz road during the movement, the right of the Allies was drawn 
 up across that road ; and as no point of support for the right flank was 
 found nearer, it extended to the heights of Kowalowitz, the left being in 
 Kruh. This right wing, under Bagration, was to co-operate in the general 
 attack that w r as to take place after the expected turning of the French 
 right, by advancing through the defiles of Schlapanitz, Bellawitz, and 
 Kritchen, when the whole allied army would be reunited before Brunn 
 across the angle of the Olmutz and Vienna roads, extending from Kritchen 
 through Latein to the Schwarza, and pushing the French northward on 
 the mountains. 
 
 To unite Bagration's left with the centre during the movement, 82 centre, 
 squadrons under Lichtenstein were to extend from Kruh to Blasowitz. 
 
 The business of the Allied right was then to menace and contain 
 Napoleon on the side of the Olmutz road while his right should be 
 turned ; and then to join in the attack by advancing westwards, while 
 the left wing advanced northward. 
 
 The movements of the Allies were made with so little disguise, that 
 this general plan was evident on the afternoon before the battle, when 
 the columns of their left wing were already approaching Tellnitz and 
 Sokolnitz ; and Napoleon, further certified of their position and intention 
 by several reconnaissances, issued that evening to his army the famous 
 bulletin in which he prophesied the events of the morrow. 
 
 The valley of the Goldbach, low and marshy, is apparently passable for Description 
 all arms only by the roads marked on the map, though no doubt infantry of the field - 
 might find many other points of passage. 
 
382 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 French or- 
 ganisation 
 and force. 
 
 French plan 
 and disposi- 
 tions for 
 operation of 
 the right, 
 
 Low hills, forming advantageous points for defence, crown the undula- 
 tions of the field ; but the highest ground is the plateau around the vil- 
 lage of Pratzen, the faces of which slope downward to the Goldbach from 
 Sokolnitz to Blasowitz, and on which stand the two hills of Stari Wini- 
 bradi and Pratzen. 
 
 Napoleon's infantry was in 4 corps, those of Lannes, Soult, Bernadotte, 
 and Davout, and a reserve of a division of the Imperial Guard, and an- 
 other of grenadiers ; each corps 2 divisions ; each division of 10 battalions 
 (except Bernadotte's, which were 9) — the battalions averaging 550 men. 
 Two battalions formed a regiment ; 2 regiments a brigade of the line ; 
 the other 2 battalions of the division were light infantry. 
 
 The divisions may be taken as 5500 strong. The cavalry regiments 
 were nearly all of 3 squadrons each ; and 100 to 120 men formed a 
 squadron. There were 41 regiments in the field, being 123 squadrons, 
 14,000 in all — about one-fifth of the total force. 
 12 guns were attached to each infantry division; 
 6 to the cavalry of each corps ; 
 12 to the cavalry of the Guard ; 
 12 formed a separate reserve ; 
 15 with the reserve cavalry. 
 
 Soult's and Davout's corps and the Reserve had each a brigade of 2 
 regiments of cavalry attached ; Bernadotte's and Lanne's corps each a 
 division of 4 regiments. The cavalry brigade of Davout's corps was 
 absent. Soult replaced it, and Bernadotte's was attached to Lannes for 
 the occasion. 
 
 There was a reserve of 66 squadrons under the orders of Murat, not 
 counting 18 squadrons detached with Davout on the Vienna road. 
 The proportion of field-artillery was 1\ guns to 1000 men. 
 From the Olmutz road (following the Goldbach) to Tellnitz the dis- 
 tance is about 7 1 miles — far too extensive for the numbers of the French 
 to occupy continuously on two lines, especially as their formation was 
 three deep. 
 
 Prom Kobelnitz to Tellnitz Napoleon only meant to hold the defiles ; 
 therefore here he posted very few troops, viz. : — 
 3 battalions in and around Tellnitz ; 
 2 in the village and castle of Sokolnitz ; 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 383 
 
 1 brigade of cavalry between Tellnitz and Sokoluitz, to watch the course 
 of the stream and assail any troops crossing there ; 
 
 A brigade of infantry before the defile of Kobelnitz in two lines — the 
 first deployed, the second in coluum ; and a battalion behind the defile. 
 
 Thus more than half the line of battle was occupied by 1 division of 
 infantry and 1 brigade of cavalry, to be supported by the other division 
 of infantry and a division of cavalry, then five miles distant on the Vienna 
 road ; when all had assembled, this part of the line would be guarded by 
 Davout's corps and 24 squadrons (for, besides Soult's cavalry, a division 
 of reserve cavalry was serving with Davout), less than one-fifth of the 
 total force. And the business of this part of the army was to be purely 
 defensive, and to retard the columns of the Allied left wins. 
 
 Napoleon's design being to attack the heights of Pratzen, and his whole centre, 
 plan of battle hinging on a first success there, he had placed between 
 Puntowitz and Girzikowitz (2000 yards) the corps of Soult, and backed 
 it by Bernadotte's. 
 
 From Girzikowitz to the Olmutz road, 2000 yards, where the part left, 
 played was to be at first defensive, Lannes's corps was placed by divisions, 
 each on two lines, by brigades, one deployed, and the other in quarter- 
 distance column of battalions at deploying intervals. The hill called the 
 Santon, which covered the left, was fortified, armed with 18 heavy guns, 
 and occupied by a light-infantry regiment. In rear of Lannes was placed 
 one division of the reserve (the Guard) ; the other was behind Girzikowitz, 
 in such a position as to support either Soult or Lannes. 
 
 The divisional artillery of the left wing was in the intervals of brigades. Distribution 
 
 The cavalry of Lannes's corps was in advance of the. left, between Bose- of artlller y 
 nitz and the Olmutz road. 
 
 The reserve cavalry, whose sphere of operation was to be the Olmutz 
 road and the plain on each side of it, was drawn up behind Lannes's 
 corps, all the cavalry divisions being formed by two lines of regiments in 
 column of squadrons, and one division being in reserve. 
 
 But the line of battle could scarcely be considered as developed till the 
 centre had advanced in order of attack. The movement was begun at 
 nine in the morning. Soult's divisions crossed the Goldbach and formed 
 across the space in advance of a line drawn from Puntowitz to Girziko- 
 witz. Each division had a brigade in first and a brigade in second 
 
384 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Formation of 
 the columns 
 of attack, 
 
 of the sup- 
 ports, 
 
 and reserves. 
 
 Proportion of 
 troops to 
 
 line, and both lines were formed in columns of battalions by divisions 
 of a fourth of a battalion, at half distance, and at deploying intervals — the 
 regiments of light infantry, in skirmishing order, covering the advance, 
 and being destined to join the first line at the moment of attack. 
 
 The corresponding formation of British battalions would be either 
 double column of companies, or grand divisions, at company distance, 
 with 4 battalions of light infantry as skirmishers. 
 
 Bernadotte's corps, during Soult's advance, was drawn up in contiguous 
 close columns of regiments (its divisions were of 3 regiments, each of 3 
 battalions) . 
 
 As the direction of Soult's advance would cause a considerable interval 
 between his corps and Lannes's, even though the latter should also 
 advance, Bernadotte was not to follow Soult directly, but in such a way 
 as ultimately to extend in a single line of 18 battalions in column, at 
 deploying intervals, from behind Soult's centre to beyond Blasowitz ; and 
 the divisions of reserve, in contiguous columns of regiments, were to 
 follow Bernadotte. 
 
 At eight o'clock Bagration threw his right forward towards Bosenitz. 
 To meet the movement, Lannes advanced, making a movable pivot of 
 his left, which approached Bosenitz, the space thence to the Santon being 
 occupied by the corps -cavalry (12 squadrons). The movement was 
 masked by Kellermann's 12 squadrons in front of the right division, as 
 the advance of the Russians was by a line of Cossacks. Kellermann 
 advanced in a line of regiments in column of squadrons. 
 
 Two Russian battalions had just entered Blasowitz when they were 
 attacked by 4 battalions of the right of Lannes's corps, whose right flank 
 was covered from Lichtenstein's cavalry by 18 squadrons of the reserve. 
 At the same moment a battalion detached from Soult's left turned the 
 village, which was taken, and a battalion captured in it. 
 
 The 18 squadrons were moved forward to cover Soult's left pending 
 the extension of Bernadotte's corps. 
 
 This hour, then — nine o'clock, when both armies, moving offensively, 
 were ready for the shock — is the proper time at which to review the lines 
 of battle. 
 
 From the chateau of Sokolnitz to Tellnitz, 3000 yards, only 8000 
 infantry and 2600 cavalry, with 24 guns, were destined to oppose the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 385 
 
 advance of 30,000 infantry and cavalry, with thrice or four times the ground at the 
 number of guns. But the duty of the French troops here was strictly commence- 
 that of a retarding force. They were to delay the heads of the columns, Xlxtv" 
 to cause them to deploy, to retreat before they were themselves fatally 
 compromised, and to assume new positions, always leaning on the centre, 
 to which they were linked by the brigade before Kobelnitz. The battle 
 in this quarter was altogether a struggle for the defiles, in which only the 
 heads of the enemy's columns were brought to bear, and a small opposing 
 force, therefore, fulfilled its object. The nature of the ground between 
 Kobelnitz and Sokolnitz would prevent the enemy, however successful he 
 might be on the French right, from falling on Soult's flank. It was one 
 of those cases, already discussed, where an obstacle separates the columns 
 of attack, but not the opposing troops, since the French remained con- 
 nected by the defile of Kobelnitz. During the action Davout brought up 
 his second division, directing one brigade to the south, the other to the 
 north, of Sokolnitz, thus connecting the parts of his first division and 
 enveloping the heads of the Allied columns. The division of cavalry had 
 preceded the infantry. 
 
 On the left the ground was open ; the enemy could bring his force to 
 bear, and his success there would be disastrous to the French ; therefore 
 the ground was carefully occupied. The space from the Santon to Gir- 
 zikowitz is 2000 yards. It was occupied by 11,000 infantry, 24 guns, 
 and 12 squadrons (about 1300 horse). 
 
 11,000 infantry, 3 deep, in two lines, occupy . . 1100 yards. 
 
 12 scpuadrons, deployed on a front of 6 squadrons, . 385 ,, 
 
 24 guns, ...... 480 ,, 
 
 ,- , 1965 „ 
 
 The force, then, was perfectly suited to the space. 
 
 From Blasowitz to Pratzen is 3000 yards. In the proportions of the 
 left, it would have been sufficiently occupied by 17,000 infantry, 2000 
 cavalry, and 36 guns; but into this space were sent 32,000 infantry, 
 with more than 2000 cavalry (18 squadrons and the cavalry of the Guard) 
 and 84 guns. As they pushed on, in the progress of the battle, these 
 troops extended more and more, always resting their right on Kobelnitz, 
 till the two corps of Soult and Bernadotte formed but a single angular 
 
 2 B 
 
38G 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Allied forces. 
 
 Formation of 
 the Allied 
 left. 
 
 line, with the corps of reserve still massed in their rear, and the 84 guns 
 of the three corps placed in great batteries, on commanding ground, in 
 intervals of the line. 
 
 There is great difficulty in estimating the Allied forces at Austerlitz — 
 probably there always will be in the case of a defeated army, unless it 
 wants to prove its decided inferiority ; but it seems to be admitted that 
 the three columns of the left wing numbered 30,000, and that the centre 
 or fourth column was under 15,000. There remain to be accounted for 
 the corps of Bagration, the cavalry of Lichtenstein, and the Russian 
 Guard. These number together 22 battalions and 140 squadrons, 15 
 of which were Cossacks, out of a total of 115 battalions and 172 
 squadrons. 
 
 The fourth column was composed of 27 battalions — 12 Eussian, 15 
 Austrian. The first column, of 30 Eussian battalions, 32 Austrian and 
 Cossack squadrons, was not more than 15,000 strong, admitting it to be 
 double the strength of the second or third. It will be a liberal estimate, 
 then, to assume 550 as the strength of the battalions, and from 80 to 90 
 as the strength of the squadrons, which would give 12,000 infantry and 
 12,000 cavalry for the right wing, and the total force about 70,000, of 
 which 14,000 or 15,000 were cavalry ; in fact, as nearly as possible 
 equal to the French force, counting the Cossacks, who, however, were 
 inferior to the other squadrons in line of battle ; but the Allied artillery 
 was much the more numerous. 
 
 The night before the battle, the first column, under Doctoroff, 15,000, 
 bivouacked between Augezd and Klein-Hostieradek, on the road to 
 Tellnitz. 
 
 The second column, 7500 infantry (according to a Eussian writer), 
 under Langeron, was on the road Austerlitz-Sokolnitz, and was to pass 
 the Goldbach between Sokolnitz and Tellnitz. 
 
 The third, under Prybyzewski, 7500 infantry, was on the road Auster- 
 litz-Pratzen, and was to pass at the chateau of Sokolnitz. 
 
 These three columns formed the left wing. They appear to have 
 marched through the deep hollow paths leading to the Goldbach on a 
 front of subdivisions — say 20 men in a rank, or 60 in a subdivision. At 
 full distance the cavalry would extend over 1400 yards of the road, the 
 infantry over at least 2500 yards, the artillery at least a mile ; so that 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 387 
 
 if Doctoroff marched by one road, as appears on the plans, his column 
 stretched three miles and a half. The second and third columns, with 
 their artillery, would each stretch nearly two miles. 
 
 The fourth column was in rear of the third on the road Austerlitz- 
 Fratzen, and the Eussian Guard behind it on the same road. 
 
 Bagration's corps was between Kruh and Kowalowitz across the great 
 road. 
 
 Next day, at dawn of a December morning, the left and centre resumed 
 their march. Doctoroff, Langeron, and Prybyzewski were to pass at 
 Tellnitz, Sokolnitz, and the Chateau, and to turn northward on Turas and 
 Maxdorf ; the fourth column (Kollo wrath's) was to advance on Kobelnitz, 
 pass there, and form line with the others. 
 
 The great mass of the cavalry had followed Doctoroff; but to fill 
 the gap which the march would leave between Bagration's left at Kruh 
 and the centre at Pratzen, this cavalry, Lichtenstein's, was ordered now 
 to march and take position between Kruh and Blasowitz. One of the 
 incidents which generals should always guard against by their previsions 
 now occurred ; for the cavalry crossed the path of the second and third 
 columns, forcing them to halt, and was then stopped itself by the march 
 of the centre. 
 
 Doctoroff was separated from Langeron by about a mile, Langeron 
 from Prybyzewski by about 1500 yards. There was no communication 
 between them. And when the left wing should have fulfilled its purpose 
 by crossing the Goldbach, the distance from Sokolnitz to Blasowitz, 
 7000 yards, would be occupied only by the central column of 15,000 
 infantry. 
 
 To support Lichtenstein, the ten battalions of the Eussian Imperial Formation of 
 Guard echeloned themselves in his rear on two lines, with the cavalry of *^ e AUled 
 the Guard on their flanks and in rear. 
 
 Bagration, placing three battalions in the villages of Kruh and Holu- 
 bitz, and extending his Cossacks in front, formed his other nine battalions 
 in two lines. He had to fill a space of about 2000 yards. His force 
 would give only 900 men for the front rank, who would fill only 525 
 yards. He therefore placed five battalions in first line, and his cavalry 
 in rear extended beyond the right wing of the infantry. His 18 guns 
 would occupy 350 yards. 
 
388 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 At the moment of collision, then, the Allies extended thus — 
 
 From Kowalowitz to Kruh, 
 
 2,000 yards 
 
 ,, Kruh to Blasowitz, 
 
 2,000 ,, 
 
 ,, Blasowitz to Pratzen, 
 
 3,000 „ 
 
 ,, Pratzen to Sokolnitz, 
 
 4,000 „ 
 
 ,, Sokolnitz to Tellnitz, 
 
 2,000 ,, 
 
 13,000 
 
 ami centre. 
 
 Proportions 
 between dif- 
 ferent parts 
 of the oppos- 
 ing lines. 
 
 Employment 
 of the artil- 
 lery on both 
 sides. 
 
 or seven miles ; and in the central half of that line, far too extensive as 
 it was for their numbers, they had not a third of their troops. 
 
 When Soult attacked the plateau, Kollowrath's column, holding Pratzen 
 with its left and the hill of Stari Winibradi with its right, formed on two 
 lines. Five battalions, being the rear of Langeron's column, hearing the 
 conflict, marched to the plateau, and, extending on Kollowrath's left, were 
 opposed by the French brigade (Levasseur's) advancing from before 
 Kobelnitz. Lichtenstein sent ten squadrons to Bagration to maintain 
 communications between them, and two battalions of the Guard occupied 
 Blasowitz. 
 
 On the left we see 11,000 French containing 28,000 Austro-Eussians, 
 who with varying fortune continued to advance. 
 
 On the centre, 17,000 Allied infantry are opposed by the three corps of 
 Soult, Bernadotte, the Guard, and Levasseur's brigade of Davout's corps, 
 34,000. 
 
 On the other wing, the Allies oppose about 8000 infantry and 11,000 
 cavalry to 11,000 infantry and 11,000 cavalry. 
 
 In the next -stage of the battle, the Allied centre being driven back, 
 the Eussian Guard comes into the space between it and Lichtenstein; 
 and on the French side, Bernadotte extends in first line, while the Guard 
 and Grenadiers in column form second line to him and to Soult; and 
 the superiority of numbers on the centre and wing tells more than ever. 
 
 Finally, the victorious centre (Soult and the reserve) falls upon columns 
 one, two, and three in flank, while Davout attacks their front, and they 
 are forced into and beyond the lakes. 
 
 Though the Allied artillery is said to have been very numerous (Jomini 
 places it at 330 guns), not more than 200 can be accounted for in the 
 action. 
 
PLAN 17. 
 
 KoMulowil /. 
 
FORMATION OF TRK LINES 
 OF BATTLF. AT AUSTERLITZ. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 389 
 
 Bagration brought 20 to 24 to bear on Lannes, who could reply with 
 36 (24 of the infantry, 12 of the cavalry). 
 
 Lichtenstein placed 40 guns in battery, opposed by 39 — viz., 15 guns of 
 the reserve cavalry and 24 of Bernadotte. Altogether, in this quarter, 75 
 against 60 to 64. 
 
 The Eussian Guard appears to have brought only 4 guns into action 
 (though its artillery force may be placed at from 24 to 30), opposed by 12 
 of the Guard in action. 
 
 The fourth column (Kollo wrath) placed 18 guns in battery, opposed by 
 24 of Soult. 
 
 The first, second, and third columns seem each to have brought 12 
 guns into action, opposed finally by 24 of the infantry of Davout, 6 of 
 the cavalry, and 6 of the reserve artillery. 
 
 Finally, at the close of the battle, Doctoroff assembled, from the wrecks 
 of the three columns, 50 guns, opposed by 24 of Soult, 36 of the reserve, 
 Davout' s 24, and 6 of the cavalry. 
 
 It appears, then, that the Allies never brought their superiority in 
 guns to bear in any part of the field, and that a great proportion of them 
 were following the left wing for the anticipated battle beyond the Gold- 
 bach, or placed in reserve behind the centre; and that most of those 
 belonging properly to the columns of the left wing were, from their 
 position in rear of the infantry, only available after those columns were 
 attacked in flank by the French centre. 
 
 Besides the- want of connection, and consequently of co-operation, 
 throughout the Allied line, and the numerous flanks exposed by its inter- 
 vals, the cavalry formed of itself a large portion of the line of battle, and 
 the small reserve was also brought into first line to close the gap between 
 Lichtenstein and the centre. Thus there was no general reserve, whereas 
 on the French side the grand reserve was almost untouched at the close 
 of the action ; for so well had the different arms supported each 
 other that a reverse sustained by any was immediately remedied by 
 the co-operation of the rest, and the centre was brought to bear upon 
 successive portions of the enemy which, together, would have outnum- 
 bered it. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 389 
 
 Bagration brought 20 to 24 to bear on Lannes, who could reply with 
 36 (24 of the infantry, 12 of the cavalry). 
 
 Lichtenstein placed 40 guns in battery, opposed by 39 — viz., 15 guns of 
 the reserve cavalry and 24 of Bernadotte. Altogether, in this quarter, 75 
 against GO to G4. 
 
 The Eussian Guard appears to have brought only 4 guns into action 
 (though its artillery force may be placed at from 24 to 30), opposed by 12 
 of the Guard in action. 
 
 The fourth column (Kollowrath) placed 18 guns in battery, opposed by 
 24 of Soult. 
 
 The first, second, and third columns seem each to have brought 12 
 guns into action, opposed finally by 24 of the infantry of Davout, 6 of 
 the cavalry, and 6 of the reserve artillery. 
 
 Finally, at the close of the battle, Doctoroff assembled, from the wrecks 
 of the three columns, 50 guns, opposed by 24 of Soult, 36 of the reserve, 
 Davout's 24, and 6 of the cavalry. 
 
 It appears, then, that the Allies never brought their superiority in 
 guns to bear in any part of the field, and that a great proportion of them 
 were following the left wing for the anticipated battle beyond the Gold- 
 bach, or placed in reserve behind the centre; and that most of those 
 belonging properly to the columns of the left wing were, from their 
 position in rear of the infantry, only available after those columns were 
 attacked in flank by the French centre. 
 
 Besides the - want of connection, and consequently of co-operation, 
 throughout the Allied line, and the numerous flanks exposed by its inter- 
 vals, the cavalry formed of itself a large portion of the line of battle, and 
 the small reserve was also brought into first line to close the gap between 
 Lichtenstein and the centre. Thus there was no general reserve, whereas 
 on the French side the grand reserve was almost untouched at the close 
 of the action ; for so well had the different arms supported each 
 other that a reverse sustained by any was immediately remedied by 
 the co-operation of the rest, and the centre was brought to bear upon 
 successive portions of the enemy which, together, would have outnum • 
 bered it. 
 
JIM" * <» * v, 
 
 8 •> f | 
 
 390 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Plan 18. FORMATION OF THE LINES OF BATTLE AT WATERLOO. 
 
 Description From the Nivelles road to the lane which runs between Verd-Cocou 
 
 of the field. an( j ^ ie f arm of La Haye, the British position is defined by a ridge, which 
 
 on the British right ends abruptly in a ravine, but on the left loses itself 
 
 in a plateau. A gentle continuous slope descends from the front, and 
 
 again rises to the opposing ridge occupied by the French. 
 
 In front of the British right are the farm and grounds of Hougomont, 
 the rear boundary of which is 200 yards from the British line. La Haye 
 Sainte is 300 yards in front of the centre. 
 
 On the right of the Nivelles road the ground is broken : the hollow 
 road thence to Braine l'Alleud was occupied by skirmishers having 
 supports in rear. 
 
 On the left, where the English ridge, spreading outwards, joins that 
 occupied by the French, are several defensible points — Papelotte, La Haye, 
 and Smohain — from 600 to 800 yards from the line. 
 
 The hollow road occupied by skirmishers, the enclosure of Hougomont, 
 the farm of La Haye Sainte, and the points Papelotte, La Haye, Smohain, 
 are the outposts. 
 
 The line of battle extends from the Nivelles road immediately behind 
 Hougomont on the right, to the extremity of the plan, towards Wavre, on 
 the left, and is coincident with the cross-road from Wavre which traverses 
 that space. Following the line, from the extreme left, to the right of the 
 outposts covering the right, the distance is 3 miles. 
 
 Wellington had 50,000 infantry, 12,400 cavalry, and 156 guns. 
 Occupation of The entire enclosure of Hougomont is about 500 yards square, the 
 the outposts, buildings, garden, and wall being the strongest part for defence. The 
 post was occupied at first by 1200 men. 
 
 La Haye, the enclosure of which has a front of only 80 yards, was 
 occupied by between 300 and 400 men. 
 
 In the buildings in front of the left, Papelotte, &c, and in support, were 
 placed 3200 infantry. 
 
 In the hollow lane from Hougomont to the extreme right, and in 
 support, 1200 infantry. 
 
 The outposts were thus occupied by 6000 infantry. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 university; 
 
 Wellington's reserves were posted entirely behind the right and centre ; 
 and about 13,000 infantry were assembled there. 
 
 Therefore about 31,000 remained for the line of battle, which, from the British line. 
 Verd-Cocou lane to the Nivelles road (a space occupied entirely by in- 
 fautry), is about 2 miles, or 3500 yards ; and as there were 20 battalions 
 in each line, the front line would be 15,500 strong, of which 13,000, being 
 British or Anglo-German troops, would be formed 2 deep, and the Dutch 
 battalions 3 deep. The light companies sent out in front as advanced 
 posts and sentries would reduce the force by one-eighth — which would 
 then require 3700 yards, not counting intervals between the battalions. 
 Therefore the first line must have been intended, either in whole or in 
 part, to stand on a deeper formation than that of two ranks ; and in fact 
 we find the right wing forming 4 deep in the battle. 
 
 On the left, where the ground was level and the flank exposed, two Distribution 
 brigades of light cavalry, numbering 2500 sabres, one-fifth of the force, and forma - 
 were placed. Of these, that on the left was deployed on two lines, one cava i rv 
 of 8 and one of 4 squadrons ; the other was in a line of columns of regi- 
 ments by squadrons. 
 
 Immediately in rear of the right, ready to operate along the Nivelles 
 road, were two brigades, and two regiments of light horse, between one- 
 third and one-fourth of the cavalry. 
 
 Behind the centre, on each side of the Charleroi road, were the two 
 heavy brigades, about 2000 strong, or about one-sixth of the force. 
 
 Four brigades of cavalry, in all about 4000, were held in reserve. 
 
 Most of these brigades were formed in close column of regiments by 
 squadrons at deploying intervals : the brigades immediately supporting 
 the infantry were from 100 to 200 yards in rear of the second line ; the 
 reserve cavalry about 450 yards in rear of that line. 
 
 Of the 140 guns present at the beginning of the battle (16 previously Distribution 
 detached arrived during the action, 6 were with the cavalry brigade on of the artil - 
 the left; 50 others, in batteries of 4 or 6 each, were posted along the J ' 
 downward slope in front of the deployed battalions, or between the 
 columns, but filling of themselves no lateral spaces in the general 
 line; 12 were with the first reserve, posted in rear of the right; 
 38 with the brigades of cavalry in rear of the centre and right; and 
 34 in reserve — or, generally, a third in first line, a third immediately 
 
392 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 in support, and a third (counting the 1G that arrived subsequently) in 
 reserve. 
 
 Part of the first line, and the whole of the second, with all the brigades 
 of cavalry except the two on the left, w y ere screened from observation, and 
 partly from fire, by the reverse slope of the ridge. 
 
 The centre of the French position at La Belle Alliance was 1400 yards 
 from Wellington's centre on the highroad. Following the ridge, the wings 
 approached nearer — the outposts almost touching on the right, and the 
 French left being about 600 yards from the extreme right of the British, 
 and the enemy in front of Hougomont being about 300 yards from its 
 front boundary. 
 French line. Like his adversary, Napoleon placed 31,000 men in two lines along the 
 ridge. The corps on the right extended from the Charleroi road to a 
 point opposite the English left ; and the French being formed 3 deep, the 
 interval was just sufficient for the deployment of 16,000 men in that 
 formation, with 6 yards between battalions and 50 yards between divi- 
 sions. The space between the lines was 60 yards. 
 
 From La Belle Alliance to the Nivelles road the corps on the left, 
 15,000, was drawn up in precisely similar formation. 
 
 On the left of the Charleroi road, 100 yards behind the centre, were 
 two divisions, together 5000 strong, drawn up in mass of battalions, on a 
 front of grand divisions (2 companies). 
 
 Half a mile in rear of the general line, the infantry of the Guard, 11,000 
 
 strong, was drawn up — 24 battalions being disposed in column on a front 
 
 of 2 regiments (4 battalions), the 6 lines of the column being at 20 yards' 
 
 distance from each other. 
 
 Distribution On the flanks of the line two brigades of cavalry were drawn up — that 
 
 and forma- on ^he right, 11 squadrons, 1400 men, having 3 squadrons in front line, 
 
 cavalry. ^ * n secon d, au( l 5 in the third. That on the left, 15 squadrons, 1730 
 
 sabres, having 4 squadrons in first line, 4 in second, 7 in third. 
 
 The French squadrons averaged 110 sabres — those of Wellington's force, 
 from 75 to 100. 
 
 Two hundred yards in rear of the second line of French infantry, 2 
 corps of cavalry were placed, one behind the centre of each wing; 24 
 squadrons on the right, under Milhaud, 24 on the left, under Kellermann. 
 These corps werfe deployed on two lines, 60 yards apart. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 393 
 
 Two hundred yards in rear of these were placed the two cavalry divi- 
 sions of the Guard, also deployed on two lines ; that on the right num- 
 bering 19 squadrons, that on the left 13. 
 
 Alongside the infantry divisions which were behind the centre, and on 
 the other side of the highroad, two cavalry divisions, one of 9, the other 
 of 12 squadrons, were drawn up, each division in mass of regiments on a 
 front of a squadron. 
 
 Napoleon brought 246 guns to the field. Of these, 84 w T ere in the front Distribution 
 line ; 36 with the cavalry, in rear of the wings and centre; 30 with the of the artl1 " 
 infantry, in rear of the centre ; and 96 in reserve, with the infantry and 
 cavalry of the Guard. Each corps of infantry and each division of cavalry 
 had a horse-battery of 6 guns attached — therefore, of the total number, 
 90 guns were of the horse-artillery. Except the batteries with the cavalry 
 on the flanks, the guns were not in extension of the line, but down the 
 slope in front of the infantry. 
 
 It is evident, then, that "Wellington's dispositions were made with 
 special regard to the defence of his right — not only because of his rooted 
 expectation of an attack on that side to sever him from Ostende, but also 
 because he expected his left to be strengthened by the arrival of the 
 Prussians from "Wavre. 
 
 Napoleon, by the massing of his infantry in rear of the Charleroi road 
 and the disposition of his cavalry, holds his forces disposable for the 
 attack of the centre and either wdng. 
 
 His object being to sever "Wellington from Blucher, the centre and left Choice of 
 of the British were the points he designed mainly to attack ; but, with P oints of 
 the strong post of Hougomont so close to his left, it would be manifestly 
 unsafe to cast his weight immediately on the other side of the field; 
 therefore the battle commenced with an attempt to gain that important 
 post. But, first, the inspection of the line by Napoleon being completed, 
 the infantry, which had been deployed, in order to produce an effect on 
 part of the Allied troops, formed columns of battalions ; Kellermann's 
 guns reinforced the front line, where 50 pieces now opened on Hougo- 
 mont and the British right, and 18 guns from "Wellington's right reserve 
 came into front line. 
 
 Eor the attack of the Allied left wing the 46 guns of the French * "^ £** i 
 right wing were reinforced by 16 from the centre and left, and 12 defence. 
 
394 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 from the cavalry in rear, and placed on a rising ground between 
 the hostile wings, 600 or 700 yards in advance of the line. The four 
 divisions of the French right wing formed at first but 4 columns, on a 
 front of battalions ; afterwards, the right column was divided in two 
 for the attack of Papelotte. A division of cavalry was brought from 
 Kellermann's corps to support the attack, advancing along their left of 
 the Charleroi road. 
 
 The Dutch-Belgian troops, in first line of the British left wing, having 
 retreated before the 2 left columns of attack, the British troops from the 
 Charleroi road leftwards formed a 2-deep line, and the English heavy 
 cavalry were brought to the front, and a brigade from the reserve. One 
 brigade attacked the French cavalry, the other the flanks of the columns ; 
 and this other was met in turn by the light cavalry on the right of the 
 French line, and these, again, by the 2 brigades on the British left. A 
 brigade of infantry was brought into second line on the British left from 
 the reserve. 
 
 The French right having been not only defeated but disabled in 
 the repulse of its attack, Napoleon, while still continuing to assail 
 Hougomont, directed his next blow against the centre. But, mean- 
 while, the heads of Blucher's columns appearing from Wavre, the 
 whole force of infantry and cavalry immediately behind the French 
 centre, and in front of the Guard, was directed to the right to oppose the 
 coming foe. 
 
 The squadrons on the left of the French line confined themselves to 
 demonstrations of an advance. Nearly the whole of the infantry of the 
 left wing assailed Hougomont, penetrating the outer enclosures, and 
 extending along the eastern boundary. The two battalions on the right 
 of the British front line were thrown into the post, and Brunswick bat- 
 talions from the reserve were brought to fill their place. 
 
 Two columns from the left of the French right wing advanced upon 
 La Haye Sainte. 
 
 Into the large space between the Charleroi road and Hougomont, laid 
 open by the forward movements of the French wings from their inner 
 extremities, the whole of the cavalry in rear of the right wing, 43 
 squadrons, now advanced. The battalions of Wellington's right wing 
 formed square to receive them. Their repeated onsets failed to break 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 395 
 
 the infantry, and numerous encounters took place between the French 
 and Allied cavalry in the intervals of the squares. 
 
 The whole of the cavalry in rear of the French left wing was added to 
 that of the right, 80 squadrons in all, for a renewal of the attack. All 
 these efforts were preceded by a concentrated fire of the French artillery 
 on Wellington's right. The cavalry was again repulsed. 
 
 Two British batteries from the reserve were brought into front line on 
 the right wing, and two brigades of infantry were brought from the 
 reserve of the right into front line, extending from the rear boundary of 
 Hougomont to the crest of the position. When these troops deployed 
 for action they formed 4 deep. By this change of the line of battle 
 its right now rested on Hougomont, and formed an enclosing angle with 
 the general front. 
 
 In the final grand attack, the French line had assumed the following Final order of 
 
 as p ec t : — battle of the 
 
 French 
 
 The cavalry on the left still merely threatened to advance, as a 
 diversion. 
 
 The left wing, attacking Hougomont with its left and centre, threw 
 forward the columns of its right beyond the eastern boundary. 
 
 The French right wing threw forward its left columns against La Haye 
 Sainte, and captured the post. From thence its battalions, in columns, 
 extended backwards to the original crest of the position ; those on the 
 right fronting towards the outposts on the Allied left, and joining the 
 left of the French troops sent to oppose the advance of Blucher between 
 Smohain and Plancenoit. 
 
 Into the interval between La Haye Sainte and Hougomont the remain- 
 ing battalions of the Imperial Guard, 11 in number (the rest had been 
 sent to aid the force opposing Blucher on the right), now advanced. Two 
 of these were left on the crest of the position as a last reserve : nine 
 formed two columns, one of 4 and one of 5 battalions, drawn up in rear 
 of each other on a front of a battalion. Preceded by numerous skir- 
 mishers, and by a fire of artillery, these last reserves advanced upon the 
 British right wing between Hougomont and the Charleroi road. When 
 they reached the crest of the British position they formed the apex of 
 the French line, which thus presented the general formation of an army 
 echeloned on its centre. 
 
39G THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 The British cavalry brigades on the left were brought along the rear 
 of the second line to the rear of the centre of the right wing ; and when 
 the Guard was repulsed, they supported the advance of the British right, 
 which, joined with the direction of the Prussian attack, decided the 
 battle. 
 
 plan 19 FORMATION OF THE LINES OF BATTLE AT AVOEETH. 
 
 Description The Sauer is about 20 feet wide, and, being swollen by rains, was, on 
 
 of the field, thg gj-h August, about 6 feet deep. It runs through a valley of meadows, 
 from 300 to 1200 yards wide, wet, but passable by infantry. On each 
 side the ground rises by steep slopes to about 300 feet above the valley. 
 The hills form at the summits small plateaus, which round and lose 
 themselves in depressions, forming the heads of ravines that indent the 
 slopes down to the valley of the Sauer. 
 
 The main French position lies between the Sauer and the Eberbach, 
 which flow about 1| miles apart. From Neehwiller on the left to the 
 height above Morsbronn 'where the right rested, is about 4£ miles. 
 
 The centre of the French position is marked on the left by a ravine, 
 commanded by the village of Frosch wilier ; on the right by the wood 
 (Nieder Wald), which, from about 400 yards south of Elsashausen, 
 stretches down the slope till its lower border skirts for some 350 yards 
 the Woerth-Hagenau road. The ground in this part of the position is 
 mostly open, and adapted for the manoeuvring of all arms. The plateaus 
 are nearly level with the opposing plateau of Dieffenbach. Woerth is not 
 seen from the heights on the French side, except from the spur on the 
 right of the ravine between that village and Elsashausen, where there is 
 room only for a battery ; consequently Woerth was only to that extent 
 defended from infantry attack by the artillery on the heights. 
 
 The Nieder Wald hid Elsashausen and Gunstett from each other. 
 
 The left of the French position extended from Froschwiller along 
 heights indented by ravines which open into the valley of the Sulz. 
 These heights had a considerable command over the opposite slopes, 
 which were open and bare. A wood stretches from the left of Frosch- 
 willer over the slopes to the bend of the Sulz valley. 
 
 From the Nieder Wald south the main crests retain their altitude, and 
 
FORMATION OF THE LINES 
 OF BATTLE AT WATERLOO 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 397 
 
 command the heights near Gunstett, till opposite Morsbronn, where they 
 turn hack, and fall, by easy slopes, into the low ground at Hegeney. 
 
 The only standing bridge opposite the centre was that of Woerth. Bridges. 
 There were several over the Sulz at Langensulzbach, and one between that 
 village and the junction of the streams, all leading up to the French left. 
 Opposite the French right there were two issues from Gunstett, one at 
 Brack Mill, the other passing the Sauer and Biber below the fork of the 
 streams. 
 
 The main line of retreat lay from Froschwiller obliquely behind the Lines of 
 centre to Eeichshoffen, and thence by a defile to Mederbronn, whence retreat - 
 mountain-roads led on Bitsche and Saverne. In the valley behind the 
 French left lies a road leading northward from Eeichshoffen on Bitsche. 
 Behind the right, through Gundershofen, is a road which joins the 
 Mederbronn-Saverne road. The road Neiderbronn- Gundershofen joins 
 the road which runs through the Woerth valley, at Hagenau. 
 
 The opposite heights, on which the Prussians advanced for the attack, Prussian 
 stretch from Gorsdorff to Gunstett, whence they decline into low flat P 0SltI ""- 
 meadows opposite the French right, which completely dominates the 
 ground in front and south of it. • The slopes, of 5° to 7°, down which the 
 Germans moved, are smooth and open. At Dieffenbach the high ground 
 advances to the valley ; and separated from this by the ravine at the 
 mouth of which lies Spachbach, is another spur, which approaches the 
 French position above the foot of the Nieder Wald. On the slopes, where 
 not w T ooded, are vineyards and hop-gardens on both sides of the valley. 
 
 The roads were everywhere muddy from the rains. 
 
 The "Woerth-Hagenau road is raised above the meadows, forming a line 
 of defence for infantry. 
 
 M'Mahon had 5 infantry divisions (4 of his own Corps, one of the 7th), French 
 each of 13 battalions, except his 4th division, which had left a regiment forces - 
 ill Strasbourg. The battalions should have been about G70 strong. Three 
 battalions formed a regiment, and 2 regiments a brigade, and 2 such bri- 
 gades, with the addition of 1 battalion of rifles,, a division. The proper 
 strength of a division was about 8700 men ; but one division had suffered 
 at AVissembourg, one was short of a regiment, and one had never been 
 raised to its full strength. His full force of infantry cannot have exceeded 
 30,000. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 397 
 
 command the heights near Gunstett, till opposite Morsbronn, where they 
 turn back, and fall, by easy slopes, into the low ground at Hegeney. 
 
 The only standing bridge opposite the centre was that of Woerth. Bridges. 
 There were several over the Sulz at Langensulzbach, and one between that 
 village and the junction of the streams, all leading up to the French left. 
 Opposite the French right there were two issues from Gunstett, one at 
 Brack Mill, the other passing the Saner and Biber below the fork of the 
 streams. 
 
 The main line of retreat lay from Froschwiller obliquely behind the Lines of 
 centre to Eeichshoffen, and thence by a defile to Niederbronn, whence retreat - 
 mountain-roads led on Bitsche and Saverne. In the valley behind the 
 French left lies a road leading northward from Eeichshoffen on Bitsche. 
 Behind the right, through Gundershofen, is a road which joins the 
 Niederbronn-Saverne road. The road Neiderbronn- Gundershofen joins 
 the road which runs through the Woerth valley, at Hagenau. 
 
 The opposite heights, on which the Prussians advanced for the attack, Prussian 
 stretch from Gorsdorff to Gunstett, whence they decline into low flat P osltlon - 
 meadows opposite the French right, which completely dominates the 
 ground in front and south of it. • The slopes, of 5° to 7°, down which the 
 Germans moved, are smooth and open. At Dieffenbach the high ground 
 advances to the valley; and separated from this by the ravine at the 
 mouth of which lies Spachbach, is another spur, which approaches the 
 French position above the foot of the Nieder Wald. On the slopes, where 
 not w T ooded, are vineyards and hop-gardens on both sides of the valley. 
 
 The roads were everywhere muddy from the rains. 
 
 The AVoerth-Hagenau road is raised above the meadows, forming a line 
 of defence for infantry. 
 
 M'Mahon had 5 infantry divisions (4 of his own Corps, one of the 7th), French 
 each of 13 battalions, except his 4th division, which had left a regiment forces - 
 in Strasbourg. The battalions should have been about G70 strong. Three 
 battalions formed a regiment, and 2 regiments a brigade, and 2 such bri- 
 gades, with the addition of 1 battalion of rifles,, a division. The proper 
 strength of a division was about 8700 men ; but one division had suffered 
 at "Wissembourg, one was short of a regiment, and one had never been 
 raised to its full strength. His full force of infantry cannot have exceeded 
 36,000. 
 
398 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Their distri- 
 bution. 
 
 Prussian 
 forces. 
 
 He had the division of cavalry belonging to his own corps — 3 bri- 
 gades 3500 strong, and Bonnemain's division of reserve cavalry 2000 
 strong. A regiment was 500 strong ; 2 (in one case 3) regiments formed 
 a brigade. 
 
 Each division (except that of the 7th Corps, the artillery of which was 
 left behind) had 2 batteries of guns and 1 of mitrailleuses. The corps 
 reserve consisted of 8 batteries (4 horse-artillery) ; and 1 battery of horse- 
 artillery and one of mitrailleuses belonged to Bonnemain's cavalry divi- 
 sion. Total, 102 guns, 30 mitrailleuses. 
 
 M'Mahon placed Eaoult's division, 13 battalions, in what has been de- 
 scribed as the centre of the position ; namely, the space from the ravine of 
 Frosch wilier to the Nieder Wald, occupying Woerth with about 3 companies. 
 
 Ducrot's division (13 battalions) extended on Eaoult's left from the 
 Froschwiller ravine to Neehwiller. 
 
 Lartigue's division (10 battalions) occupied the Nieder Wald and 
 extended on the heights south of the wood to above Morsbronn. The 
 village was not occupied. 
 
 Dumesnil's division (7th Corps) was behind Lartigue's, near Eberbach. 
 
 Pelle's (from Wissembourg) was behind Elsashausen. 
 
 Ducrot having a strong division, and less space to cover, probably pro- 
 vided his own reserve. 
 
 Each of the 3 divisions in the front line occupied about 1\ mile, being 
 about 5000 men to the mile ; and there were about 14,000 in reserve ; in 
 all, 8000 men to the mile. 
 
 A brigade of light cavalry was between Froschwiller and Eeichshoffen, 
 2 regiments* of Cuirassiers behind the right, and Bonnemain's Cuirassier 
 division behind Eberbach. The other brigade had been detached, and 
 came in later behind the right. 
 
 The ground on the left was unsuitable for cavalry. 
 
 The reserve artillery was near Froschwiller. The divisional batteries 
 came into action with their divisions — those of Lartigue on the Lansberg, 
 those of Eaoult in front of Elsashausen. 
 
 The Crown Prince's army consisted of two Prussian corps, the V. and 
 XL; two Bavarian, the I. and II.; and the Wurtemberg Baden Corps, with 
 its three brigades of cavalry. The Prussian Eeserve Cavalry was too far 
 in rear to come into line. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 399 
 
 A Prussian corps consists of 2 divisions — a division of 2 brigades, a riile 
 battalion, a cavalry regiment (600 strong), and 24 guns. Brigades are of 
 2 regiments — regiments of 3 battalions, each 1000 strong. The reserve 
 artillery of the corps was 36 guns. A Prussian corps numbered 25,000 
 infantry, 1200 cavalry, and 84 guns ; a Bavarian corps 25,000 infantry, 
 1200 divisional cavalry, 1800 reserve cavalry, and 96 guns. 
 
 The V. Corps bivouacked on the 5th with its outposts in Gunstett and Commence- 
 opposite Woerth. A Prussian reconnaissance caused a skirmish, which ment of tlie 
 was taken up by the advanced troops of the II. Bavarian Corps, then ap- 
 proaching Langensulzbach from Lembach ; and the advanced-guard of 
 the XI. Corps, in bivouac on the left rear of the V., was brought up to 
 Gunstett. These movements were made independently by the generals in 
 command of the troops closest to the enemy; and as it was not intended 
 to attack M'Mahon till the following clay, orders were given to the troops 
 engaged to break off the action. But considerable forces had now been 
 deployed. The divisions of the V. Corps were in line of battle behind each 
 other on the Preuschdorf- Woerth road, and the whole of the corps artillery 
 — 84 guns — was in action about Dieffenbach. A division of the XL Corps 
 had deployed on the left of the V., extending through Gunstett to the 
 bend of the Sauer, and the divisional batteries were in position north 
 of Gunstett. 
 
 The other division, as well as a Wurtemberg infantry brigade and a 
 Wurteniberg cavalry brigade, were following in support. The II. Bavarian 
 Corps was bringing a division to attack the French right, and had reached 
 the foot of the slopes on which Ducrot was posted when the order came 
 to stop the fight. At half-past ten a brigade of Dumesnil's division had 
 crossed the streams below Morsbronn and attacked Gunstett, but was 
 repulsed ; and at noon two regiments of the V. Corps, passing the Sauer on 
 temporary bridges, and supported by the rest of the division, had stormed 
 and held Woerth. Under these circumstances, the three corps engaged 
 were ordered to resume the battle, the I. Bavarian Corps was directed 
 on Preuschdorf, and the rest of the South German troops followed in the 
 direction of Gunstett. 
 
 At half-past one the general attack began. The V. Corps advanced General 
 from Woerth to assail the heights leading on Frosch wilier. On its left a attack - 
 brigade of the XI. Corps passed the Sauer, near Spachbach, on extern- 
 
400 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 porised bridges, and attacked the Nieder Wald; the rest of the Corps (after 
 a second counter-attack by Dumesnil had been repulsed) crossed by the 
 standing bridges lower down, and (the left flank being covered by the 
 Wurtemberg cavalry brigade) attacked Lartigue on the Lansberg and be- 
 fore Morsbronn, supported by the corps artillery which had joined the 
 divisional batteries in action north of Gunstett ; some batteries, however, 
 accompanying the advance. Thus the two Prussian corps were now concen- 
 trated in the attack on the French centre and right. The V. Corps made 
 small progress in the attempt to advance up the slopes from Woerth to 
 Froschwiller, and suffered heavily; but the XL Corps, making good its foot- 
 ing in the Meder Wald and on the Lansberg, and repulsing a counter-attack 
 from Morsbronn, cut off great part of the French right wing, where Dum- 
 esnil, as well as Lartigue, were engaged ; and the troops, thus separated, 
 fled in disorder to Hagenau. The right division of the XL Corps, after 
 pushing through the Meder Wald, into which reinforcements from Pelle's 
 division had been brought to support parts of the 3d and 4th divisions, 
 wheeled to its right and touched the left of the V. Corps ; the front of 
 the XL now extending from the hill east of Elsashausen to Eberbach. 
 It was during the advance of the left of the corps from Morsbronn that 
 Michel's cuirassiers and some of Nansouty's lancers, to gain time for re- 
 inforcing Lartigue, charged between that village and the Meder Wald, 
 and were almost destroyed by rifle-fire from the houses and woods. 
 
 The right division of the XL Corps, with part of the troops on the left 
 of the V. Corps, supported by a brigade of Wurtemberg infantry, attacked 
 Elsashausen. The left division of the XL Corps advanced through Eber- 
 bach northwards, surrounding Elsashausen on the south and south-west, 
 and menacing the retreat on Beichshofen. It was now that, to gain time 
 for reinforcements from Pelle to arrive, M'Mahon launched Bonnemain's 
 cavalry (which appears to have been withdrawn from its first position 
 to the rear of Froschwiller) into the fight. The scene of the charge 
 was between Elsashausen and the Meder Wald. It took place over 
 hop-gardens and ground said to be otherwise impracticable, and 
 had no other result than the destruction of great part of the French 
 cavalry. At two o'clock Elsashausen was in flames, and abandoned by 
 the French ; and the two Prussian corps and the Wurtemberg brigade 
 now concentrated their efforts on Froschwiller. It was stormed at 3.30 ; 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 401 
 
 several thousand prisoners were cut off in it, and M'Mahon retreated with Retreat of the 
 the troops he could keep together on Reichshofen, Niederbronn, and Saverne; Freuch - 
 while fugitives from the wings fled into the Jagerthal on the one hand, 
 and towards Hagenau on the other. Two Prussian dragoon regiments 
 (divisional) and the AYurtemberg cavalry brigade pursued to Reichshofen ; 
 a Bavarian brigade and a lancer regiment followed Ducrot's division from 
 Xehwiller through Reichshofen. At Niederbronn a division detached 
 from the corps at Bitsche endeavoured to cover the retreat, but the railway 
 station was stormed by the Bavarians. Night stopped further pursuit. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The great superiority in numbers of the Germans deprives this battle 
 of other value, as a tactical study, than is to be derived from noting the 
 respective dispositions for attack and defence under the changed condi- 
 tions of infantry and artillery fire. 
 
 Compared with the examples of preceding battles, it will be seen that 
 M'Alahon occupied a greatly increased extent of front in proportion to 
 his force. Eight thousand men to a mile would barely furnish two lines 
 two deep, without reserves. Five thousand to a mile would supply one 
 such line, or two lines of single ranks, with a small surplus for the support 
 of particular points, independent of the general reserve. The defence by 
 a single brigade of the slopes in front of Froschwiller against the attack 
 of a whole corps, until success elsewhere rendered that part of the posi- 
 tion untenable, shows that local defence has gained enormously under 
 present conditions, and that such an extension, or even one more con- 
 siderable, is justified in the case of advantageous ground. 
 
 The weak point of the position was the Nieder "Wald, which extended 
 downward to the valley, while the space between it and the Prussian 
 position was narrowed there by the hill north-east of Gunstett. It was 
 thus comparatively easy to advance upon the part of the position in 
 which it was most feasible to gain and to hold a footing. The facts that a 
 wood, when once penetrated, places assailants and defenders on far more 
 equal terms than they meet on elsewhere, that it enables forces to be massed 
 there unseen, and that, once fully mastered, it affords shelter for the organi- 
 
 2 c 
 
402 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 sation of a fresh advance, must always cause deep anxiety to the general 
 who finds such a feature in his position. The smaller wood which clothes 
 the slope below Elsashausen being entered and occupied by a Prussian 
 battalion, also afforded great support to the troops which stormed Woerth. 
 
 M'Mahon was a little superior to the Germans in cavalry ; but though 
 great charges were attempted on the French side, they effected nothing. 
 On the other side, the cavalry appear to have taken no active share in 
 the attack. It is impossible not to note how inferior was the part which 
 the arm played in this battle, compared with its frequent and imposing 
 action on the fields of Austerlitz and Waterloo, and not to infer that the 
 change is due to the increased power of infantry and artillery. 
 
 Considering the tactics of the Germans, it seems as if their greatest 
 losses in the battle, in the front attacks on Froschwiller, might have been 
 avoided, and victory equally secured, by confining the attack on this part 
 of the position to demonstrations and the fire of artillery, until the suc- 
 cess of the left wing and the envelopment of the French centre were 
 secured. The Prussian justification of such front attacks during a turning 
 movement is, that they hold fast the enemy. In the present case they 
 held fast only one brigade, which could in no case have been spared from 
 that part of the position. 
 
 The Prussian artillery acted in masses, and at least 120 guns were arrayed 
 in one great battery on the heights between Dieffenbach and Gunstett. 
 The French batteries came into action piecemeal, without concentration 
 or concert, were speedily overmatched, and their fire, as is always the 
 case with overmatched batteries, grew languid and desultory. The range 
 between the opposing batteries was generally from a mile to 2000 yards. 
 
 In the earlier wars of the century the principle is evident, that when 
 divisions acted together they did not form the one the second line to the 
 other, but that each division formed its own first and second line with its 
 own brigades, while the brigades also sometimes formed partly in each 
 line by regiments, thereby simplifying a divisional or brigadier general's 
 task, since he has much better hold of his troops if his command extends 
 in depth rather than in breadth. At first sight it would appear as if this 
 principle were entirely lost sight of by the Germans, who, as we have 
 seen, deployed all the brigades of their corps in one line. But the fact 
 is, that the principle of giving depth rather than extent of front to the 
 
PLATE 19 
 
 Dififfenbach 
 
 j Uie 
 
 ■ilorl' 
 
 U-tt 
 
BATTLE ()!•' WOKUTII 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 403 
 
 units of a force has been extended till it applies to battalions, half-bat- 
 talions, and even companies. The order in which the Prussians formed 
 their battalions (of 4 companies) for attack was, two company columns 
 in front, supported by a half-battalion column. This was according to 
 design and instruction ; but in the stress of breech - loading fire the 
 companies further dissolved themselves into skirmishers, supports, and 
 reserves — and this disposition, roughly adopted at first from necessity, is 
 now a recognised feature in the Prussian training for the attack. It is 
 evident, however, that the control of corps thus launched into the tide- 
 way of battle remains chiefly with the commanders of companies and 
 battalions. The directing influence of generals of all grades is seriously 
 diminished, and with it, possibly, the power of executing skilful tactical 
 combinations. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 403 
 
 units of a force has been extended till it applies to battalions, half-bat- 
 talions, and even companies. The order in which the Prussians formed 
 their battalions (of 4 companies) for attack was, two company columns 
 in front, supported by a half-battalion column. This was according to 
 design and instruction; but in the stress of breech - loading fire the 
 companies further dissolved themselves into skirmishers, supports, and 
 reserves — and this disposition, roughly adopted at first from necessity, is 
 now a recognised feature in the Prussian training for the attack. It is 
 evident, however, that the control of corps thus launched into the tide- 
 way of battle remains chiefly with the commanders of companies and 
 battalions. The directing influence of generals of all grades is seriously 
 diminished, and with it, possibly, the power of executing skilful tactical 
 combinations. 
 
404 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Two kinds 
 of tactical 
 
 defined. 
 
 Offensive 
 movements 
 must be sup- 
 ported, 
 
 and the re- 
 mainder of 
 the line re- 
 fused or pro- 
 tected. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OF ORDERS OF BATTLE."" 
 
 In the preceding chapters two methods have been discussed of gaining a 
 relative advantage over an equal enemy on a field of battle : first, by occu- 
 pying favourable ground, such as will obstruct the enemy only ; secondly, 
 by so combining the different arms, and so adapting them to the configura- 
 tion of the field, as to obtain from all their full and concerted effect. An 
 army that has secured one or both of these conditions can scarcely fail to 
 beat an enemy of the same force and quality which possesses neither. 
 
 But it was also pointed out that the turning of a flank or breaking of 
 a line may be an important step to victory, by producing new relations 
 between the hostile lines ; and the methods of accomplishing this have 
 been already discussed and exemplified — namely, manoeuvres for turning 
 the enemy, as at Prague ; or measures for assembling a preponderating 
 force on some point of the line, as at Austerlitz. But in all cases, to 
 render such conditions of avail, the remainder of the army must be so 
 disposed as to follow up the first successful attacks by advancing to 
 support the troops that have made them, and to prevent the enemy from 
 executing new plans of battle. 
 
 When an army whose front is coextensive and parallel with that of its 
 adversary moves altogether to a flank for the purpose of turning the 
 hostile line, the conditions produced are reciprocal, — the outflanker is 
 equally outflanked, and no advantage is gained. This might be illus- 
 trated by two equal lines placed thus — 
 
 * The term is used here with a meaning quite distinct from the formation of the line of 
 battle. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 405 
 
 And again, if one of these armies were to reinforce one part of the 
 line at the expense of the rest, it would be exposing other parts of the 
 line to the attack of superior forces, and the result might be merely a 
 partial success on each side, leaving the result still undecided. 
 
 Therefore a general who meditates a blow of either kind at his enemy 
 must secure from counter-attack the part of the army with which the 
 blow is not to be made, either by withdrawing it out of reach, or pro- 
 tecting it by obstacles. 
 
 Hence, in an attempt to turn or break through the flank of an enemy 
 with one wing, it is essential to refuse the other. And again, in rein- 
 forcing part of the line, it is necessary to prevent the rest of it, com- 
 paratively weakened for the purpose, from engaging at a disadvantage. 
 Dispositions must be made accordingly for the reinforcement and advance 
 of some parts, and the protection or withdrawal of others. Hence result Hence results 
 Orders of battle — that is, certain relations existing between the hostile lines a kind 
 
 of tactical 
 
 before or during the encounter. advantage. 
 
 Besides the two methods already mentioned of engaging the enemy 
 with advantage, there is, then, a third — namely, the Order of Battle — 
 which will be well or ill chosen in proportion as it is adapted, according 
 to existing circumstances, to produce such relations between the hostile 
 lines as will ultimately place a sufficient part of one of them in battle 
 array across the extremity of part of the other. And although some 
 authors have enumerated and described a great variety of Orders of 
 Battle, yet these, stripped of pedantic and fanciful distinctions, resolve 
 themselves into the few which it is the object of this Chapter to discuss. 
 
 OBLIQUE OKDERS. 
 
 An army may attack its enemy in front or flank. If it aims at a flank How the ob- 
 
 — say the right— its own right must be refused. Hence when it arrives ll( l ue order 1S 
 
 ........ , produced. 
 
 on the extremity of the enemy's line, the army will be in oblique order. 
 
 And as the head of the column will meet the first shock, and as the suc- 
 cess of the whole movement depends on its progress, it should be strongly 
 reinforced. This is more especially necessary when the assailed flank 
 of the enemy rests on some impassable obstacle, and must therefore be 
 broken through rather than turned. 
 
406 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Necessity of And it is also essential that the refused wing should continue refused 
 preserving the f or a cer t a in time after the commencement of the attack ; the disastrous 
 consequences of neglecting this are exemplified in the battle of Kolin. 
 
 Battle of 
 Kolin. 
 
 On the 18th June 1757, the Prussians, 34,000 strong, were marching 
 eastward from Planian to Kolin. On their right, on a high ridge, scarcely 
 a hill, was ranged the Austrian army, 60,000, in two lines and a reserve, 
 — their right in a wood, beyond which was a 'ravine ; their front in 
 villages ; their left covered by swampy ground. The King, regarding 
 them from a point between Planian and Kolin, judged the left unassail- 
 able, the front dangerously strong ; but considered that by attacking in 
 oblique order their right flank near the wood, he could break in there 
 and roll up their line. 
 
 Zieten, with the greater part of the cavalry, was to march first. Next 
 General Hulsen was to lead 7 battalions at the head of the left wing ; 
 and these bodies of cavalry and infantry we may call the advanced- 
 guard. The army followed in two columns — one on the road, the other 
 on the left of the road. 
 
 Diverging from the road at Slatislunz, the advanced-guard was to form, 
 and attack the village of Kreczor, and occupy the wood beyond, thus 
 establishing itself on the Austrian right flank. During this attack, the 
 head of the left wing was to slant still more, so as to join Hulsen's right, 
 if successful, beyond the village, or to support him if repulsed. The 
 and refuse the right wing, following in the footsteps of the left, was to remain refused 
 other wing, -ixntil the oblique movement should bring it into collision with the 
 
 enemy's line. 
 The attack Hulsen's attack succeeded ; but, pausing beyond Kreczor to re-form, he 
 
 ' u found that the left wing was not following him. 
 
 Prussians re 
 inforce the 
 head of the 
 
 CLL LtlCKj 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 407 
 
 The Croat skirmishers in front of the Austrian line annoyed the Prus- 
 sians in their march. The battalion 7th from the left of the Prussian 
 left wing formed line, without orders, to repel them. Seeing this, all the 
 battalions of the left wing that followed it, and all the right wing, natur- 
 ally conformed to the movement, for the left was the directing wing, the refused 
 Wheeling up, they formed line and attacked, and the oblique order ™ ws engages 
 
 J the enemy, 
 
 disappeared. 
 
 The 6 leading battalions of the left wing continued to advance, leaving 
 a large interval, till, seeing the right wing engaging, they also formed and 
 attacked. Thus the Prussian front was in three disconnected parts — the 
 advanced-guard; the 6 battalions, supported by some from the second 
 line ; and the rest of the army ; and, the whole being now committed, the 
 execution of the original plan became impossible. The isolated central The Prussians 
 battalions were surrounded and compelled to surrender ; the right wing, are defeated - 
 defeated, abandoned the field ; the advanced-guard held its ground, and 
 covered the retreat. 
 
 Again, in 1813, Wellington's army was engaged in covering the sieges 
 of St Sebastian on the left, Pampeluna on the right. Soult, advancing 
 against Pampeluna, forced the British right to concentrate before it. 
 
 .PamjeTuna, 
 
 The position was this : — The English right, drawn up before Pampeluna, 
 was assailed by the corps of Reille and Clausel down the valleys of Lanz 
 and Zubiri. In rear, down the valley of Lanz, followed D'Erlon's corps. 
 At Buenza was Hill's division. 
 
408 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Soult turns 
 the British 
 left, 
 
 but leaves his 
 own left ex- 
 posed, 
 
 and is de- 
 feated. 
 
 Foiled in his attack on the English right, Soult diverted D'Erlon's 
 corps on the march from the Lanz valley by Ostiz upon Buenza, turned 
 Hill's left, forced him back, and threatened to cut him from St Sebastian. 
 
 At the same time Iieille and Clausel were withdrawn from before 
 Wellington to follow D'Erlon by Ostiz. A division under Foy was left to 
 cover the movement. 
 
 Wellington, with his whole right, fell on Foy, drove him apart, and, 
 turning on Clausel and Eeille, assailed their rear. Soult, weakened by 
 the separation of Foy's division and losses in action, retired in disastrous 
 confusion beyond the ridges of the Pyrenees. 
 
 Soult had neglected to refuse his weakened wing. Foy's division 
 should have been withdrawn beyond reach of a counter-stroke, rear- 
 guards only being left before Wellington, to conceal the movement and 
 delay pursuit. 
 
 Therefore it may be assumed that it is dangerous to turn an equal 
 adversary with one wing, unless you refuse or protect the other. 
 
 ■Nypcrn. 
 
 3p 
 
 Pruss: Columns W% 
 
 ,,,:l,, ^ !!T ^Bori^#%#m 
 
 
 Ilk 
 
 •"■*.".'•••... Sagschntz 
 
 Battle of 
 Leuthen. 
 
 The most complete example of the successful application of the oblique 
 order is to be found in the battle of Leuthen, in 1757, where 30,000 
 Prussians defeated 80,000 Austrians. 
 
 The Austrians extended from Nypern, through Leuthen, to Sagschutz, 
 where their left, thrown back, rested on a marshy, impassable stream. 
 
 Taking advantage of some low intervening hills, the King commenced 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 409 
 
 liis march from Borna against their left from Sagsclmtz to the stream, in 
 two lines formed in columns or oblique echelons of companies — a strong 
 advanced-guard marching between the heads of the columns and the 
 enemy's line. 
 
 Clearing Sagschutz, the advanced-guard formed, attacked, and broke the Pruesians pre- 
 Austrian left. The army followed in support, the cavalry, penetrating s f rve tne ob " 
 
 1 pi iic order 
 
 through the gap, constantly turned the left and rear of the broken line, 
 which at length formed anew from Leuthen at right angles to the rest. 
 The right wing sending off reinforcements to the left, the new line stood 
 in very deep formation. 
 
 The Prussians, not ceasing to press on, formed on a parallel front to 
 the Austrian left, with their hitherto refused left extending beyond 
 Leuthen. 
 
 The Austrians now sought with part of their right wing to extend their till the mo- 
 line west of Leuthen. Thereupon the Prussian left wing fell upon the ment amves 
 
 • for en£jainn nP 
 
 flank of this new portion of the enemy's line. The Prussian right con- the re f use( q 
 tinued to attack the Austrian left. wing. 
 
 Throughout, the Prussian guns were directed on the angle made by the 
 retired Austrian left, enfilading both its faces. 
 
 The turning of their right forced the Austrians to abandon Leuthen ; Austrians 
 and after some attempts to stand, they retreated in great confusion to defeated - 
 Breslau. 
 
 Although the rearmost wing must be refused in making an oblique Kefused wing 
 attack, it by no means follows that it should not take part in the engage- must not re " 
 
 main alto- 
 
 ment ; on the contrary, every portion ot the army unemployed, and which „ et j ier out of 
 
 does not neutralise part of the enemy, is a chance lost. It will enter action. 
 
 into the action either when the progressive advance of the line brings it 
 
 into contact with the enemy, or by wheeling up and attacking the troops 
 
 with which the enemy may seek to reinforce and extend his new line. 
 
 The one thing essential is, that it should remain refused till the progress 
 
 of the rest of the army secures it from the counter-attack of superior 
 
 forces. 
 
 Frederick, whose system did not include large disposable reserves, used 
 to reinforce the head of his attack with his advanced-guard and part of 
 the cavalry of the refused wing. His advance in two lines renders these 
 actions perfect examples, in form as well as in fact, of the oblique order. 
 
410 
 
 THE OPEKATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Spirit of the 
 oblique order 
 may exist 
 without the 
 form. 
 
 Continuity of 
 the line essen- 
 tial. 
 
 Oblique order 
 inapplicable 
 to the defen- 
 
 But modern armies need by no means adhere to the oblique form, 
 though adopting in spirit the oblique order. The head of the attack 
 would be reinforced either from the reserve or the second line of the 
 refused wing; the troops intended successively to support the attack 
 would be formed in the manner most convenient for moving them to 
 their destined places ; the whole front would be masked with skirmishers 
 and the fire of artillery ; and a preponderating force of guns would be 
 brought to bear on the assailed wing. Battalion columns in echelon — 
 the head of the echelon reinforced and followed by strong reserves — the 
 outward flank protected by powerful cavalry, with its accompanying 
 horse-artillery, and the field-batteries assembled on the inner flank, so as 
 to support the attack and to enfilade the probable new front of the enemy 
 — would generally be a suitable formation for the part of the army begin- 
 ning an attack upon the enemy's flank. 
 
 The error of the Allies at Austerlitz, and the Prussians at Kolin, suffi- 
 ciently demonstrates the necessity for preserving the continuity of the 
 line throughout the progress of an oblique attack. Not to preserve it, is 
 to multiply the flanks (or weak points) of the line. 
 
 When the lines of operation of hostile armies are identical in direction, 
 it will be a grave error to take position on a front oblique to that line for 
 the sake of advantageous ground, unless the advanced flank is so strongly 
 posted as to defy attack. For every degree of deviation of the front from 
 a direction perpendicular to the line of operation offers, proportionately, 
 a flank to the approaching enemy, and withdraws the troops on the other 
 flank from the points of collision. In fact, the relations of the lines would 
 be those produced by the successful counter-stroke against a turning 
 movement. It will be apparent, therefore, that the assumption of the 
 oblique order is suitable only to the intention to become the assailant. 
 
 \ 
 
 Counter . OF THE COUNTER-ATTACK, 
 stroke may 
 
 be dealt at *-t has been shown that an army whose flank the enemy attempts to 
 
 the attacking turn may, by operating on the chord, like Frederick's at Eossbach, anti- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 411 
 
 cipate the enemy moving on the arc, and secure all the advantages of the 
 situation expected hy its opponent, since it will be oblique to the oppos- 
 ing line, and will also outflank it. 
 
 But when the Allies at Austerlitz sought to turn Napoleon's right, far or refused 
 from moving across their path, he withdrew from it, and aimed his blow wing- 
 at the remainder of their line. And the results were more decisive than The latter 
 those either of Frederick's counter-stroke at Eossbach, or those of the more decisive - 
 manoeuvre, so very similar in design, execution, and effect to the Prussian 
 King's, executed by "Wellington at Salamanca ; for, after defeating the 
 centre and right of the Allies, Napoleon enclosed and destroyed the wing 
 with which they attempted the turning movement. Whereas, in inter- 
 cepting the enemy's turning movement, though his defeat be imminent, 
 yet, as he will be thrown back upon the line by which he advanced, 
 scarcely any result is to be expected beyond that of cheaply gaining the 
 battle — a result greatly to be desired, of course, but not necessarily 
 decisive of a campaign. In fact, we find Marmont's army, beaten at Sala- 
 manca, presently reassembling and opposing Wellington anew; for, though 
 driven in disorder from the field, its broken troops made good their retreat. 
 
 By investigating these different cases, we shall find grounds for deter- Reasons for 
 mining the circumstances which render the one or the other mode of cnoosin g- 
 delivering a counter-stroke desirable and judicious. 
 
 As we have seen, Napoleon's real line of retreat at Austerlitz was not 
 menaced by the turning movement. But Frederick's retreat to the Saale, 
 and Wellington's to Ciudad Eodrigo, were both cut off, should the enemy's 
 manoeuvre prevail. In both these latter cases, then, we find the generals 
 resorting to that counter-manoeuvre which brought them on a front cover- 
 ing the line of retreat. 
 
 Again, in the cases of Eossbach and Salamanca, the parts of the assail- 
 ants' line not primarily engaged in the turning movement were in great 
 degree secured — at Eossbach by distance, for had Frederick descended on 
 the left (or rear) wing of the French, they would have had time, before he 
 reached them, to form front to their left, and bring their forces to bear on 
 him ; at Salamanca hy position, for Marmont's centre and right were so 
 strongly posted as to render their defeat, before the left should have com- 
 pleted its turning movement, very doubtful. Therefore in both cases the 
 victors took the right course. But at Austerlitz the Allies laid bare their 
 
412 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 centre to the entrance of overwhelming forces, and the result was doubly- 
 decisive. 
 
 The attack of a wing, or of a centre and wing, is merely a variety of 
 the oblique order, with the main attack made on a larger scale. Thus, for 
 Napoleon's attack upon the British left at Waterloo, the right was rein- 
 forced with cavalry and guns, and the attacking connected with the re- 
 fused wing by advancing the inner flank of the latter, and placing cavalry 
 between them. The order echeloned on a wing is another variety. 
 
 ANGULAR ORDERS. 
 
 The salient 
 order. 
 
 The disadvantages of forming the front of an army on a salient or out- 
 ward angle have been already discussed at page 346. 
 
 Nevertheless there are cases where such an order may be resorted to 
 without entailing the usual penalties. For instance, the wings may be 
 strongly protected by obstacles, and the apex of the angle may be so 
 placed as to deprive the cross-fire of the enemy's artillery of its full effect. 
 The accompanying sketch of the Federal front at Gettysburg illustrates 
 
 Gettysh 
 
 this. The left wing on the heights overlooks the plain along which the 
 Confederates advanced ; the right wing, also on high ground, is partly 
 fortified, and covered by a stream. The apex of the line rests on the hill, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 413 
 
 which forms the highest and strongest part of the position, and which 
 acted as a traverse or great mound protecting the wings from enfilade. If 
 thus strengthened, this order of battle possesses the manifest advantage 
 of enabling the reserve to reinforce any part of the line with the utmost 
 facility — a circumstance which greatly aided the Federals at Gettysburg, 
 where the corps of reserve was moved from wing to wing to meet the 
 Confederate attacks. 
 
 In the cases supposed or adduced above, this order has been treated of Attacks of 
 defensively. But whenever an attack is made on a central part of a line, necessit y as - 
 
 * sume the sali- 
 
 it is almost inevitable that the assailing force should assume the salient ent f orm; 
 form : for it is no less necessary in this case than in the oblique attack to 
 preserve the continuity of the line. The head of the attack must be con- 
 nected with the parts of the army kept for the moment out of action, and 
 the flanks of the attacking troops must be protected ; hence the assailant's 
 line, or part of it, forms a salient angle. As the assailant cannot, like 
 the defender, choose his position, it is very unlikely that there will be 
 any exceptional circumstances of ground, like those of Gettysburg, to 
 neutralise the disadvantages of this order of battle. The reader may ask, 
 therefore, why attacks necessarily taking this form are ever successful ? 
 
 The answer is, 1st, that these attacks, being unforeseen, are not met by but without 
 a corresponding enclosing angle on the part of the defender, which is the entailin § the 
 only decisively effectual counter-order — they are generally directed against vantages. 
 a straight front ; 2d, this order is merely preliminary, for as soon as the 
 head of the attack breaks the line, the faces form outwards against the 
 broken extremities ; 3d, the attack is disguised by feints elsewhere, 
 designed to weaken the resistance ; and, 4th, provision is made, by rein- 
 forcing the head of the attack, for insuring and following up its success ; 
 supporting troops pour in at the gap, and the effect may be doubly as 
 decisive as the turning of a flank. The sudden assumption of this order, 
 for immediate attack, is, therefore, a very different thing from adopting it 
 to await the enemy. 
 
 It may be noted here, that masses of cavalry may operate with great Employment 
 effect from behind the apex of a salient order, for the objections against ofcavall 7 in 
 
 , . . r ■ t i • Piii the salient 
 
 making them the central portions of a straight line of battle do not apply or j er 
 here, as immediately on issuing from the opening of the faces they find a 
 wide field free for their advance, and form, in reality, the flanks of those 
 
414 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 faces, while the rapidity of their movement peculiarly fits them for filling 
 an interval of the kind. Thus at Austerlitz the two divisions of Lannes's 
 corps, as they advanced, pivoted each on its outer flank, the left division 
 moving against Bagration, the right against Lichtenstein ; and through 
 the widening interval between them (very dangerous if unprotected) ad- 
 vanced the numerous squadrons of Murat. Therefore cavalry (except on 
 ground where it cannot act to advantage) may often follow up successful 
 attacks of infantry on the enemy's front. 
 
 An attack of this kind is especially suitable when the enemy has 
 weakened, by undue extension, part of his front. 
 Re-entering The effect of an order of battle the reverse of the salient — namely, that 
 order. which forms a re-entering or enclosing angle — is exemplified at Waterloo, 
 
 where the Prussians, by the direction of their advance, formed with the 
 British line a front enclosing the front of the French. Not only do all 
 the consequences already described ensue, but, while the guns from the 
 enclosing line can scarcely take effect otherwise than transversely or in 
 reverse — that is, with maximum effect — those of the salient front cannot 
 attempt to fire otherwise than directly — that is, with minimum effect 
 — except by immediately exposing themselves to enfilade. The troops 
 forming the advanced face, or the angle of the salient, are shaken morally 
 and physically by the attack which threatens their rear, and which in 
 fact, if successful, cuts off their retreat. Nothing but darkness saved 
 D'Erlon's wing from being enclosed between Blucher and Wellington. 
 
 Therefore, whenever it is possible to form a front of battle which, while 
 it encloses that of the enemy, preserves the continuity of the line, the 
 chances are in favour not merely of a victory, but of a victory of the most 
 decisive kind. At page 199 it is said that "if allied armies, operating 
 from divergent bases, can combine, their operation will be more effective 
 than if they had a common base." In such a case tactical advantages 
 supplement those of the strategical situation. Hence, too, is seen another 
 advantage of a wide base — enabling an army to throw forward a wing 
 which will still command a line of retreat. 
 
 It is with reference to the advantages of this order of battle that 
 Jomini blames Ney, when approaching the field of Bautzen in a direction 
 which would have brought him on the Allied flank, for diverging in order 
 to form in prolongation of the French line. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 415 
 
 The ill effects of placing cavalry in the centre of a line are at their 
 maximum in this order of battle, where it could not advance without 
 masking part of one or both faces of the infantry. Its fittest field of 
 action will be on the extremities of wings. 
 
 The attack in order of battle echeloned on the centre (sketch below) 
 
 — which is manifestly a variety of the salient order — will generally fail if 
 deliberately attempted on a large scale, for, its object being obvious, it 
 will be provided for by reinforcing the threatened centre, and throwing 
 forward the wings. 
 
 Tlie Convex Order is another variety of the salient ; or rather it may Convex order, 
 be said that there is no such thing as the convex order, since an army 
 would scarcely draw up on an arc, and that what is meant by the expres- 
 sion is, generally, an order echeloned on the centre, or some other angular 
 form. And it may be asked why, being generally so disadvantageous, 
 it is ever adopted ? The answer is, that circumstances sometimes render 
 it inevitable ; after crossing a river, for instance, on an enemy's front, it 
 is necessary to push a part of the army forward to cover the passage and 
 other bodies up and down the stream to prevent the first from being cut 
 from the bridges. Hence a convex or salient front — such as Napoleon, 
 in fact, assumed when, after passing the Danube, he occupied Essling and 
 Aspern on his flanks, and pushed forward his centre, and when, the 
 Austrians having formed so as to enclose his front, he experienced all the 
 disadvantages of the formation. Again, a rear-guard covering the retreat 
 over a river or through a defile must often form in this way. The best 
 remedy will be to post the angle of the salient strongly, or, if possible, 
 fortify it with field-works ; and in case of a river, the flanks may be pro- 
 tected by batteries on the further bank. 
 
 Similarly, the Concave Order is merely a variety of the enclosing angle, Concave 
 or rather it generally resolves itself into the order echeloned on both order - 
 wings. To await in such order an equal enemy formed on a straight front 
 
416 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 would be to offer both flanks to his attacks. In assuming it, it would be 
 indispensable, therefore, that the flanks were rendered perfectly secure by 
 the nature of the ground. In such a case the position would be extremely 
 difficult to assail, whether on the protected flanks or the retired centre. 
 As an adversary would scarcely enter such a trap with his eyes open, 
 the flanks might be connected directly by a thin line of troops form- 
 
 ing an apparent or false front, and veiling the real centre while inviting 
 the attack. 
 
 To attempt to turn an enemy on both flanks, refusing the centre, would 
 produce an order of this kind ; if attempted with equal numbers, it must 
 break the continuity of the line, and could only be justified if the inter- 
 vals or weak portions were rendered, by obstacles or fortifications, strong 
 against counter-attack. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 41' 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 POINTS OF ATTACK, RETREATS, AND PURSUITS. 
 
 "When, according to the order of battle, certain parts of the line are to be 
 refused, the design may be concealed by sending out skirmishers in front 
 of those parts, who, without compromising themselves, induce the enemy 
 to expect that the troops behind will advance rather than retire, espe- 
 cially if the ground conceals the movement. 
 
 In all cases, before deciding on the order of battle, it will be necessary Selection of 
 to fix on the points of attack. On the selection of these will generally P oints of 
 depend the degree of success in case of victory. 
 
 If an army is connected with its base by one flank, the defeat of that When the 
 
 wing may entail the dissolution of the whole force. At any rate, an attack enem y 1S in a 
 . flank position, 
 
 on the other wing, however successful, would generally have the effect of 
 
 forcing the enemy back on his proper line of retreat, and would be so far 
 
 indecisive. 
 
 If an army were connected by its flank with another army, or a fortress, "When import- 
 er other important point of the theatre, that flank would properly be the an ? 0111 e 
 object of attack. Thus the Prussian right at Ligny, the English left at 
 Waterloo, being the points by which the Allies were connected, were the 
 objects of the first efforts of Napoleon. 
 
 If the line of retreat of an army obliquely traverses the rear of one When his line 
 wing, that wing will be the decisive point of attack ; since to drive back of retreat 1S 
 the other would be to rectify the position of the army by rendering its front 
 front perpendicular to its line of retreat. 
 
 On the other hand, if an army in a flank position designs to become the When the as- 
 assailant, it should attack with the wing by which it is linked to its line sail ^ nt ls m a 
 
 ° J flank position. 
 
 of retreat. For as the attacking corps or wing should be reinforced, the 
 
 2d 
 
418 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 reserves will naturally be already on that side which it is most important 
 to secure ; and it would be equally impolitic either to denude that part of 
 the line to strengthen the other, or to reinforce both at the expense of the 
 centre. This applies to all cases in which the army is linked to important 
 communications by one of its flanks. Thus Blucher, taking the offensive 
 at Ligny, reinforced his right to favour the co-operation of his ally. 
 Wellington, by placing his reserves behind his right wing at Waterloo, 
 indicated that he considered his communications with Hal and Ostende 
 especially menaced, and that he was especially desirous of preserving 
 them. 
 Indecisive It is possible to force an enemy from the field without either menacing 
 
 victories. j^g fl an k or breaking his front. This may be effected either by pressing 
 back his line throughout its extent, or by seizing on commanding points 
 of the battle-field, the loss of which renders his position untenable. In 
 either case trained troops, properly commanded, will withdraw in good 
 order; a rear-guard will be organised, defiles defended, pursuit checked, and 
 the army, at the first secure pause, will be reorganised, and, except the loss 
 of prestige and of ground, comparatively little the worse for the encounter. 
 Where an army has been pushed back by a front attack, and there is no 
 immediate pursuit, the victors often suffer nearly as heavily as the van- 
 quished. At Solferino the losses of the French in killed and wounded 
 exceeded those of the Austrians. " A routed enemy," says Marmont, "can 
 always rally when not rapidly pressed at the moment of disorder." 
 Victories only In order to render a defeat decisive, the flank of the enemy must be 
 decisive when turned, or his front broken. It is when troops are cut from their line of 
 
 the enemy is , „ ., ,. , , , , . . . , 
 
 turned or retreat, or thrust off it, that great captures are made ; it is when, to 
 broken. avoid such contingencies, they hurry in disorder from the field, as at 
 
 Waterloo, that a swift organised pursuit forces the fugitive bands, seek- 
 ing safety and sustenance, to wider dispersion, and converts defeat into 
 ruin. 
 Tactical rea- Flank operations, then, being, as we have seen, generally dangerous, 
 sons generally un i ess w {th a sufficient superiority of force, and the breaking of the front 
 of attack producing every result that can be demanded from victory, tactical con- 
 siderations — that is, the opportunities offered by the enemy's immediate 
 position, and his manner of occupying it — become generally of paramount 
 importance in choosing points of attack. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 419 
 
 The importance of advanced posts, like Hougomont, has been already Advanced 
 discussed and illustrated. And they confer a further advantage on their ? 0iits must 
 
 be captured. 
 
 possessor, exemplified at Waterloo, that of enabling him to throw for- 
 ward a portion of the line till it rests on the post, and so to enclose 
 the enemy's columns of attack. l T nless, therefore, they stand so far 
 asunder that the attack can be made between them, beyond the effective 
 range of either, it will be usually imperative to master one or more of 
 these as the preliminary to an attack upon the line of battle. 
 
 If strongly-fortified posts exist in the line of battle, it will be well to Strong points 
 direct the attack elsewhere, seeking rather to master some neighbouring iu tbe . llne t0 
 commanding ground, or to reach the rear of the post, than to incur 
 the certain losses of a front attack. The French left at Austerlitz, 
 avoiding the fortified hamlets of Kruh and Holubitz, occupied by 
 Russian battalions, easily captured them by mastering the surrounding 
 heights ; and, at Woerth, Froschwiller, proof against front attack, fell 
 when assailed in rear. 
 
 When the most commanding ground occupied by the enemy's line except when 
 secures his retreat, it will generally be the point of attack. For while decislve - 
 he holds it, a success elsewhere cannot be decisive ; and since the height 
 must be carried, it is better to attack while the troops are fresh and 
 vigorous than when wearied by the conflict. But if the enemy's line of 
 retreat can be seized or menaced by an attack in another quarter, it will 
 be manifestly well to avoid the costly effort. Had the Austrians pos- 
 sessed no other line of retreat to the Mincio than the Guidizzolo road, 
 the struggle for the hill of Solferino would have been needless. 
 
 If a flank, say the left, of an enemy rest upon an impassable obstacle Poiut to at- 
 — a river, lake, sea-cliff, or precipitous heights — by breaking the line at tack wlien 
 
 the enemy's 
 
 the other extremity of that wing, or in the centre of the army, all the fl an k [ s sup . 
 troops between the point of attack and the obstacle may be thrown back ported, 
 upon it and destroyed, like the Eussian left upon the lakes at Auster- 
 litz. In such a case, as a most decisive victory may be gained in 
 this way, the assailant's dispositions should be made with the design of 
 only occupying and menacing the rest of the enemy's line, while the 
 supports and reserves, and the combinations of the different arms, should 
 be directed to the main purpose of pressing the broken wing back upon 
 the obstacle. 
 
420 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Occupation 
 of ground 
 when a flank 
 is covered by 
 an obstacle. 
 
 Conversely, when an army in position has an obstacle of the kind on 
 its flank, it should by no means rest on it, but should rather leave an 
 interval between the extremity of the line and the obstacle, to invite an 
 attack there, which might be provided for by stationing troops in echelon 
 behind the flank. When Napoleon advanced westward from Montmirail 
 (Map 14) on the rear of Sacken and York, he formed across the angle 
 of the La Ferte and Chateau-Thierry roads. In that angle, and on his 
 right of it, the ground is level and open. But on the left of the La Ferte* 
 road it is difficult and broken, descending steeply to a marshy stream. 
 Napoleon's left was retired along this part of the ground towards Mont- 
 mirail. Sacken threw his right forward, seeking to penetrate to Mont- 
 mirail through the valley ; but the French counter-attack on the centre 
 being successful, all the Eussian wing — more than a third of the entire 
 force — was thrown back on the stream and lost. 
 
 At the Alma, the sea-cliffs were on the Eussian left and the Allied 
 right. The Allies advanced in echelon from the right, close to the cliffs. 
 The Eussians, defeated, retired on Sebastopol with small loss, and hardly 
 any captures were made. Had the Allies, leaving a wide interval be- 
 tween their right and the cliffs, advanced in echelon from the left, the 
 victory might have been decisive of the campaign. And as to a counter- 
 attack by the enemy between their right and the sea, it was evidently the 
 step they should have most desired him to take. On the Eussian right, 
 the river, too, was narrower, the heights lower and more gradual ; the 
 roads to the interior lay on that side — everything indicated it as the point 
 of attack. 
 
 When the lines on which hostile armies are operating meet at an acute 
 angle, that army which operates farthest from the angle obliges its enemy 
 to take a flank position. Therefore such conditions offer a case eminently 
 suited to manoeuvring, where the general and the army who can move 
 with the greatest promptitude and precision force the enemy to receive 
 battle at a disadvantage. To apply this, take the case of Gettysburg. 
 Lee's line of operations lay through Harper's Ferry, Meade's through 
 Washington, and at Gettysburg they met at an acute angle. Lee, being 
 at the point of the angle, attacked, forming front oblique to his line of 
 retreat (his left, indeed, was thrown forward considerably off that line). 
 Whereas, by withdrawing a short distance towards Harper's Ferry by 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 
 
 421 
 
 the Fairfield road, and manoeuvring by his right, he could have forced his 
 adversary either to retreat or to receive battle in a ilank position. 
 
 Gettysburg 
 
 Washington 
 
 "When an army is absolutely cut from its base, it has at least this in Case of an 
 
 its favour, that, having no communications, it can manoeuvre freely to a arm y cut 
 
 _ ( . from its base, 
 
 flank. Yet the Austrians, issuing from Alessandria, continued to fritter 
 
 away their strength in vain efforts against the French front in the village 
 of Marengo and along the brook which flows by it, though their left 
 wing had already succeeded in turning the French right in the plain. 
 As any change in the direction of the fronts must, for them, have 
 been for the better, they should have followed their left with their 
 whole army, covering the march by demonstrations only, on the centre 
 and right. 
 
 When a retreat becomes inevitable, it is well to conceal the design by Conduct of 
 partial attacks. The reserves relieve the fighting line, which withdraws by retreats - 
 alternate battalions or wings of battalions. The artillery should with- 
 draw by parts not less than batteries, as alternate guns, or half batteries, 
 would not command sufficient width of front to open fire after withdraw- 
 ing, without risk to those that had remained to cover the movement. A 
 rear-guard of the freshest troops available is organised as soon as possible ; 
 the victorious army, which cannot long move in order of battle, but must 
 form columns to pursue, is checked till it can again deploy ; the rear- 
 
422 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 guard performs the functions formerly described as proper to it ; at the 
 first defensible line the retreat is stopped, and the army restored to order, 
 and as much as possible to confidence, and again confronts the enemy. 
 Such is the history of a well-conducted retreat. 
 
 Military writers have disputed the point whether retreats should be 
 concentrated or divergent. A beaten army should form numerous divi- 
 sions and retreat on eccentric lines, according to Lloyd : " For," says he, 
 " if the pursuing army forms an equal number of divisions, it cannot act 
 vigorously on any one point ; while, if it pursues in one mass, it can only 
 operate against one division of the enemy, while the others retire without 
 danger ; and this division, being able to move with more rapidity than 
 an entire army, may retire in its turn without experiencing great loss." 
 " But," rejoins Jomini, " an army in retreat is already weak enough with- 
 out dividing itself further ; and though it is true all the divisions can 
 scarcely be destroyed, yet one or two may, and the retreating army may 
 thus sustain a greater loss than the most unfortunate concentrated retreat 
 would entail." 
 
 Now, when the Prussians retired from Ligny, had they retreated in 
 many divisions towards' eccentric points they could never have united 
 to fight at "Waterloo. And had Napoleon possessed several lines by 
 which to reach the French frontier from "Waterloo, he need not have so 
 completely lost his army, since much of its disaster was owing to the fact 
 that it retreated by a single road. Neither Lloyd nor Jomini can, then, 
 be wholly right, and yet both are partly right ; for the truth seems to be, 
 that when an army quits a lost field with the intention of renewing the 
 contest at the first opportunity, it should retreat in the most concentrated form 
 possible ; but when a routed army seeks the shelter of its own frontier, the 
 more roads it can move by the better. 
 Conduct of In pursuit, the great aim should be to strike, not the rear, but the flank 
 
 pursuits. £ ^ e re treating enemy. And as infantry that preserves its array can 
 
 scarcely overtake troops flying in disorder, cavalry and horse-artillery are 
 especially adapted for making circuits by which to cut in on the line of 
 retreat. Cavalry pressing on the rear should not stop to attack firm 
 infantry, but pass on, and increase the confusion of troops and abandon- 
 ment of material. 
 
 To sum up the matter of this and the preceding chapters — the assail- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 423 
 
 ant's order of battle must depend on the points selected for attack, and the 
 selection of those m points must depend on circumstances already discussed. 
 
 A general, taking up a defensive line, or attacked while manoeuvring, 
 should seek to obtain, as far as possible, the following conditions : — 
 
 1st, By the direction of his front, to cover his line of retreat as squarely 
 as p>ossible, without lending a flank to the enemy. 
 
 2d, To occupy ground which cannot he approached within range un- 
 awares. 
 
 3d, To insure free communication between the parts of his front. 
 
 4th, To conceal his movements and force as much as possible. 
 
 5th, To occupy or destroy such advanced p*osts as wotdd be of advantage 
 to the enemy. 
 
 Lastly, he must take up his ground with a view to the action of that arm 
 in which he may be proportionately strongest, or superior to the enemy. 
 
 Viewing the case from the other side, the assailant must first choose his 
 point of attack. In order to do this confidently, he must fully understand 
 his adversary's dispositions, by reconnoitring, if possible, the whole extent 
 of his line. The case of all possible attacks — namely, on the centre, the 
 wings, and the flanks — may be separately estimated. Probably all ex- 
 perienced generals execute, consciously or unconsciously, some such 
 mental process in reconnoitring the enemy. This done, the assailant 
 must make his dispositions — 1st, For disguising his attack; 2dly, For 
 executing it; odly, For supporting it; and 4thly, For refusing the con- 
 taining or defensive parts of his order of battle. 
 
424 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 CHANGES IN CONTEMPORARY TACTICS. 
 
 Former object Fkom the time of the French Eevolution to 1866, the great object of all 
 o ac ics o offensive tactics of Continental armies was to bring a sufficiently impos- 
 
 bring columns . ° J l 
 
 to the attack. i n g infantry column, or number of columns, in good order, up to the 
 position of the defenders. It was to this end that the assailant's artil- 
 lery concentrated its fire, that their skirmishers covered the advance, and 
 that their cavalry prepared to follow the onset. Inkerman and Solferino 
 showed the traditions of the wars of the First Empire to be still in force 
 in this particular. And, except in the case of British troops, it would 
 seem to have been adopted almost as a rule of the game, that when heavy 
 columns did succeed in arriving in good order, and still advancing, within 
 a short distance of the defensive line, the defenders should give way. 
 Their main efforts had been directed to prevent the arrival of the columns ; 
 the columns arriving, resistance at that point collapsed. 
 
 When the need of providing against the tire of rifled arms grew press- 
 ing, the Prussians, going far beyond others in recognising the necessity 
 of shelter, and of the consequent diminution in the size and depth of their 
 columns, to meet the circumstances of average ground, were nevertheless 
 distinct in their views that columns, and columns only, must be relied on 
 for the capture of positions. Accordingly, company columns, supported 
 by half-battalion columns and by denser formations, advanced against 
 the Austrians at Sadowa, and against the French at Woerth. 
 
 But under the pressure of facts, theory and tradition gave way : all 
 reliable eyewitnesses of the war of 1870 testify that the advance against 
 a position once begun, the columns, while under rifle-fire, dissolved into 
 swarms of skirmishers ; and consequently the first line of attack con- 
 
 Prussians, 
 
 with modifi 
 cations, ad- 
 hered to 
 columns. 
 
 Columns 
 nevertheless 
 must dissolve 
 into skir- 
 mishers. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 425 
 
 sisted of, instead of being covered by, skirmishers. This took place not 
 in consequence of design or preparation to that end, but because it was 
 felt by the attacking troops to be a necessary condition of any advance 
 at all. While moving across the space swept by rifle-fire, the pace was 
 of necessity rapid, in order to baffle the enemy's aim, and to shorten the 
 time of exposure to it ; frequent halts to recover breath and order were 
 indispensable, and these were made lying down, either with or without 
 shelter. These evolutions would have been impossible for a line, even 
 could a line have existed under the enemy's fire. So it came to pass 
 that whatever the original formation of the troops — Prussian company 
 columns or^ French battalion columns — this was the order they were con- 
 strained to assume, under penalty of repulse or destruction. And the 
 second line likewise, while moving under rifle-fire, found its dissolution 
 into skirmishers, or small groups where there was partial cover, imperative, 
 as did the reserves which followed. Obviously, this, while it increased 
 the effect of the aggregate fire of the assailants, because of each man's in- 
 dependence in taking aim, also left the fate of the attack more dependent 
 on the impulses of individuals, and diminished the influence by which 
 those impulses should be directed or restrained ; and the maintenance of Necessity for 
 
 control over the troops, under these adverse circumstances, became a con- mamtainm g 
 
 control over 
 sideration of primary importance. The Prussians were, in this respect, far troops in this 
 
 better prepared for the new conditions than the French. For their train- orb- 
 ing in the formation of company columns had already thrown the leader- Prussians 
 
 ship of the troops into the hands of the company officers, who alone, in alread y P re- 
 
 e r r J pared for the 
 
 loose and extended order, and in the stress of battle, could exercise effec- change. 
 
 tive influence. These officers, in the new circumstances of the advance, 
 
 directed the assembly of their companies or parts of companies, on all 
 
 practicable occasions, behind such shelter as the ground afforded, from 
 
 whence, in loose order, again to advance to fresh cover. In this way 
 
 coherence was maintained, the troops were, in the main, directed on the 
 
 intended points, bodies were in hand for the charge at the right moment, 
 
 and the ground won was held and secured by the assemblement thereon 
 
 of solid portions of the second line and reserves. This circumstance, as 
 
 well as the superior influence maintained by the officers over their men, 
 
 made the Prussian attack far more effective than that of the French, 
 
 which in appearance resembled it. 
 
426 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Change also 
 necessary in 
 the formation 
 for defence. 
 
 Front attack 
 in any form 
 costly and 
 doubtful. 
 
 Flank attack 
 
 therefore 
 
 essential. 
 
 Form assumed 
 by contem- 
 porary en- 
 gagements. 
 
 Loss tells 
 
 heavily 
 
 against 
 
 assailants. 
 
 This change iu the form of attack produced a corresponding effect on 
 the dispositions for defence. The assailants, on approaching the position, 
 brought to bear on it a fire so deadly that close ranks could not stand be- 
 fore it. Shelter and extended order became thus necessities of the defence; 
 and that a due volume of fire might be maintained where trenches or simi- 
 lar cover did not exist, skirmishers were thickened by placing them at all 
 available points of the fighting line. The aspect of the opposing fronts 
 was therefore similar, the very important advantages enjoyed by the 
 defenders being, that their cover was artificially improved or more delib- 
 erately chosen, that they were not constrained to advance from it, and that 
 their supports and reserves were generally screened from rifle-fire behind 
 the crest of the position. 
 
 In these circumstances it came to be admitted that in face of a fairly 
 good defence a front attack was a desperate enterprise. Flank attacks 
 were therefore almost invariably resorted to ; and it was generally found 
 that the sudden appearance of a comparatively small body of troops, who 
 opened fire on the flank and rear of the line, was sufficient to produce 
 dismay and rout. For fifty men armed with breech-loaders will produce 
 a much more deadly effect in such a case than five times their number 
 in the days of muzzle-loaders would have exercised ; because of the far 
 greater facility, speed, and concentration with which they will bring 
 their fire to bear. But to insure their success it was considered neces- 
 sary to engage also along the front, since the enemy would otherwise be 
 free to meet and frustrate the flank movements. What the front attack 
 effected was, to hold fast and occupy the enemy before it. This it did 
 with the more certainty, as troops once engaged felt how hopeless was 
 the attempt to retreat in the view of rifled guns and marksmen armed 
 with breech-loaders. The form assumed by the engagement was the col- 
 lision of long loose lines, desultory and fluctuating because of the varied 
 circumstances of ground and the independent enterprises of small bodies 
 on either side, and protracted because of the difficulty of imparting 
 simultaneous movement to a sufficient mass of troops. So the battle 
 went on, at Wissemburg, Spicheren, Woerth, and Gravelotte, till it w T as 
 decided by the turning of a flank. And in all cases where the defenders 
 had not been in any considerable numbers forced back, the balance of 
 loss was greatly against the assailants. Thus, at Gravelotte, the 2d 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 427 
 
 French corps on the left of the position was attacked by two, afterwards 
 three, German corps; and while these suffered enormously, its loss in 
 killed was only 60 men. It is in retreating under the fire of the victors 
 that the beaten troops pay the full penalty of defeat. 
 
 "When it is said that the Prussians are specially alive to the necessity Frequent 
 of flank attacks, it is not to be supposed that the turning of the extremity minor ap- 
 
 rr . . plication 
 
 of the enemy's line is alone meant ; for that is a matter for the direction of flank 
 
 of the commanding general, and concerns only a fraction of the troops attacks. 
 
 engaged. The common application lies in the attack of all occupied 
 
 ground which is wholly or in part disconnected from the general line, 
 
 such as advanced posts, hamlets, farm-buildings, woods, or parts of a 
 
 position which project bastion-like, and are weakly defended in flank. 
 
 There may be a score of such in a line of battle, and in each case the 
 
 troops will combine the attacks in front with an extension round the 
 
 flanks and a rush upon the weak point. 
 
 The turning of the flank of a line of battle may be effected either by Of the modes 
 
 originally directing part of the army beyond that flank — as Bulow's corps ° ^"th^ a 
 
 was directed beyond the French right at Waterloo — or by reinforcing one Prussians 
 
 wing of a direct attack, and deploying the added troops beyond the seem to have 
 
 menaced flank during the engagement. The Prussians always seem to 
 
 have operated in the latter way, engaging at the same time throughout 
 
 the front. The history of the victories of the summer of 1870 is, that 
 
 the German corps march straight for the enemy, that the leading troops 
 
 at once attack, that the rest hurry up to their support, extending and 
 
 deepening the skirmishing line, and that, after a severe engagement, an 
 
 extension beyond a flank renders the position untenable. There is none 
 
 of the higher manoeuvring which aims at an advantage by deceiving and 
 
 perplexing the enemy — no feint to retain him on one point while the 
 
 decisive attack is prepared elsewhere. All is sheer straightforward fight- Skill in at- 
 
 in" successful because of the discipline and training and spirit of the tack of the , 
 °' i units trusted 
 
 units, and, in the end, because of the weight of numbers. Even where t0 rat h er than 
 
 circumstances would already seem to indicate that the real effort must higher man- 
 be made elsewhere, troops are nevertheless sent on in an indiscriminate 
 assault. Thus, the German right at Gravelotte was separated by a ravine 
 from the French left; it rested on the Moselle, and the French could 
 only advance on that bank by forcing the Germans back ; the decisive 
 
428 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 French de- 
 fence unskil- 
 ful. 
 
 Higher tac- 
 tics still ap- 
 plicable. 
 
 Independence 
 of companies 
 may render 
 higher man- 
 oeuvring diffi- 
 cult. 
 
 attack was to be made by the German left ; the ground was excellent 
 for defence, bad for offence ; — all good reasons for the avoidance of un- 
 necessary slaughter and risk of defeat, by slightly engaging, or even by 
 refusing, that wing of the German army. Yet the corps there were 
 hurried to the attack no less earnestly than at other parts of the position, 
 suffering enormous losses — in peril, indeed, of defeat till supported by 
 the II. corps, from Pont-a-Mousson, — and inflicting only the most trifling 
 damage on the opposing corps, which did not withdraw till next day. 
 
 On the other hand, the French, having taken up a position, restricted 
 themselves, especially when the enemy's superior numbers were brought 
 into action, almost entirely to the defence of it, their offensive efforts 
 being desultory and devoid of an important general purpose. Never- 
 theless, in a combat between equal forces, it is demonstrable that the 
 defensive line will bear stretching better than that of the assailants, and 
 that an effective defence will provide, by the slight occupation of 
 naturally strong or indecisive parts of the line, for an accumulation of 
 forces with which to foil the enemy's flank attacks, or to break his front, 
 and assume a strong initiative at the right time. The French, however, 
 attempted nothing of the sort ; and they were beaten, battalion for bat- 
 talion, not because the German system was perfect, but because it was 
 much better than theirs. 
 
 The student, therefore, will learn from these battles nothing of the 
 higher tactics which, originating in the forethought and inventive faculty 
 of the commander, effect great results with small loss, or make skill 
 compensate for inferiority of force. Nevertheless, such tactics must be 
 desirable no less under present than under former conditions. In- 
 deed, the increased advantages to troops on the defensive render the 
 weakening of a wing or other refused (and therefore defensive) part of the 
 assailant's line, for the purpose of bringing an augmented force to bear 
 on a decisive point, more secure and practicable than before ; while similar 
 manoeuvres are even still more feasible on the part of the defender. 
 
 It is probable that the independence of companies may be found to 
 interfere with the execution of an ingenious general plan requiring deli- 
 cate handling. An officer in command of an important mixed force — a 
 division or brigade — is anxious to maintain a reputation for skill no less 
 than valour. But a captain has little chance in a general action of dis- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 429 
 
 playing any quality except that of boldly and dexterously bringing his 
 men into conflict. The rivalry which springs up — and which it would 
 be impolitic to discourage — naturally leads every one to use to the utmost 
 his opportunities of engaging. This spirit, excellent for fighting purposes, 
 may well render manoeuvres difficult which are founded on false attacks, 
 withdrawals from fire, refusals to engage at particular points, and in- 
 direct movements ; indeed, on more than one occasion, general engage- 
 ments were precipitated, contrary to the intention of the commander, 
 by the ardour of company leaders. To control, without repressing, that 
 ardour, seems to be an important step yet to be accomplished, and one 
 which military history shows to be perfectly feasible. The army which 
 takes it, and is led by great tacticians, will carry the science of combat 
 far beyond the point of 1870. 
 
 It is essential to the due execution of this new method of attack that 
 the fighting unit of infantry shall be formed, not on administrative nor 
 traditional, but on purely combative considerations, its strength being 
 limited to the number which a single leader can easily command in the 
 stress of a modern engagement, and which can obtain shelter in average 
 ground during an advance under fire. The unit thus determined, it is 
 not less essential that men and officers shall practise the adaptation of 
 troops to ground while executing the attack, in order to combine ready 
 and intelligent action and prompt movement with the maintenance of 
 direction and control. 
 
 In determining how each unit shall operate, the Prussians have adopted 
 the plan of forming parts of each company into skirmishers, supports, and 
 reserves. Notwithstanding the authority of their example, it may be 
 matter of inquiry whether it would not be better that each unit shall act 
 entirely in one way, altogether extended or altogether in support. For, 
 owing to the difficulty of keeping a right direction in such a mode of 
 advance, supports are apt to find themselves arriving in rear of skir- 
 mishers of companies other than their own ; and the disadvantage of 
 separating captains from their command, and parts of companies from 
 each other, is probably greater than that which any other kind of dis- 
 location entails. Should it be found, however, that this objection does 
 not apply, the advantage of the Prussian method will be incontestable. 
 
 The mode of attack on which the foregoing considerations are based is, 
 
430 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 in the maiu, that which, having been found successful by highly-trained 
 troops in many great battles, and having commended itself to the minds 
 of their most thoughtful and experienced leaders, is now adopted as a 
 system. No theory, however plausible, no tradition, however venerable, 
 can maintain itself against practice, confirmed by success and persisted 
 in from conviction. It is not merely because of its results that the Ger- 
 man military system may claim to be the model of Europe. The world 
 has seen before warlike peoples and victorious armies, but never a people 
 and an army who have sought the secrets of success with study so 
 thorough, zeal so untiring, and self-denial so stern, as those which obey 
 the German Emperor. 
 
 Modifications 
 in defensive 
 dispositions. 
 
 Skirmishing 
 line inexpe- 
 dient. 
 
 Investigating the changes which may be expedient on the side of the 
 defensive, reasoning, not precedent, must show the way. For in the 
 actions of the late war, the French occupied the ground so differently in 
 different actions — in extended order at Woerth, in deep formation at Vion- 
 ville and Gravelotte — that no rule is deducible from their practice, while 
 the defensive actions of the Germans were fought against troops so 
 undisciplined, that it must still be doubtful what order they would adopt 
 against an assailant whom they had reason to respect. 
 
 The first question is, whether the line of skirmishers, which has hitherto 
 generally opposed the assailant's skirmishers in front of the position, is 
 still appropriate. Before a sustained attack in force these skirmishers must, 
 as a matter of course, be withdrawn. But to retire in face of breech-load- 
 ing arms, and in presence of such a force as the skirmishing line of the 
 assailant now comprises, would be a costly process ; and the defender's 
 skirmishers would certainly suffer far more loss than they would inflict, 
 while a brisk advance might bring the enemy almost to the position at 
 their heels; when the fire of the main defensive line must, in some 
 considerable degree, be masked by its own skirmishers. Cases may exist 
 where skirmishers might still be posted with advantage in front of parts 
 of the main line. For instance, it may be possible to place them so that' 
 they shall have under their fire the ground where the enemy will prob- 
 ably range his batteries — a design which they may greatly help to frus- 
 trate. But what is here said to be inexpedient is the covering of the line 
 of the position with a line of skirmishers. 
 
 The troops of the first line must then be those which first oppose the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 431 
 
 enemy, and they must be carefully sheltered in order to derive due advan- First or shoot- 
 tage from the defensive. In defence of hilly ground a shelter-trench * in S line - 
 should be formed not on, but just below, the actual crest, in order that, if 
 lost, it may be of the less advantage to the enemy, and that guns in the 
 rear may fire freely over it. Often the infantry will be better placed 
 lower down the hill if a glacis-like slope exists at its foot. To continue 
 to form the firing line of two close ranks would be worse than useless 
 when such rapidity of fire has been attained, and when free space is 
 necessary for the careful aim which alone can give the rifle its due effect. 
 Recent experiments have shown that a single rank of a man to a yard 
 produces the maximum effect of rifle-fire. To repair casualties and afford 
 support, a second line should be sheltered as close as possible to the first, Supporting or 
 for the space to be passed over under a hot fire should be short, and feeJin g llue - 
 support cannot be too prompt when it is so difficult to read the move- 
 ments of the enemy as in the present form of attack. Thus a shooting 
 line of a man to a yard with supports capable of maintaining it at its full 
 strength throughout the action, will always be sufficient. 
 
 But in good positions there are parts which it would be superfluous Proportion of 
 thus to guard — ground in itself impassable — or broad smooth slopes men t0 s P ace - 
 swept by the fire of artillery, and where the assailants are seen at every 
 step ; a few men behind a strip of trench, or on the flank of a neighbour- 
 ing hill, will suffice here ; while, on the other hand, there will be weak 
 points where ravines run up, where rivulets make their way through 
 bushes, where close ground comes up to the position, or where woods reach 
 down from it to give a hand to the assailant ; and there, behind the shoot- Place of the 
 ing and feeding lines, will be stationed small reserves. Thus the front local res erves. 
 line of battle will be often an interrupted line ; the supporting line will 
 be posted partly to fire across the flanks of the portions of the first line 
 (where the rush will certainly be made), and partly in compact bodies 
 covered and at hand ; while across the heads of ravines, in rear of woods, 
 in low close places where the view to the front is obstructed, and behind 
 parts of the line where the enemy's artillery strikes hardest, will be found 
 the troops which form the local reserves, and whose task will be to prevent 
 small bodies of partially successful assailants from making good their 
 footing in gaps that they may have broken in the front. 
 
 In the shooting line should be placed every man who can fire with 
 
 * See " Hasty Field- Works " in the final chapter. 
 
432 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Posting of 
 general re- 
 serves. 
 
 General 
 course of 
 a modern 
 battle. 
 
 effect. Whether the supporting line should, in any given part, equal it 
 in strength, must depend on the strength of the ground there, and also on 
 the weight of the attack to be anticipated in that quarter. If it is pro- 
 bable that the whole of the shooting line will need to be replaced in the 
 course of the action, the supporting line must of course be equal in 
 strength to it. If the losses are likely to be less severe, a smaller pro- 
 portion will suffice. It will be better to form these two lines of parts of 
 the same battalions than to place a battalion in the shooting line and 
 support it by another — for several reasons : 1st, because undue extension 
 of the battalion will be avoided ; 2d, because the feeding of the front line 
 will be regulated by the commander of both lines ; 3d, because the vary- 
 ing proportions of the lines to each other can be regulated, according to 
 circumstances ; 4th, the mixing-up of battalions, inevitable in the other 
 case, will not take place. On the other hand, the local reserves should be 
 separate and complete bodies. Thus the battalions of a brigade might be 
 so divided as to have four companies in the shooting and four in the sup- 
 porting line, or five in the shooting and three in the supporting line; while 
 a fourth battalion, either kept entire or posted in half-battalions or smaller 
 bodies, might form the local reserve to the brigade. And considering that 
 their function is, in the first place, to defend the position, the action of 
 these troops might be limited to the inside of the position, to avoid the in- 
 convenience and danger of desultory sallies. Offensive action beyond the 
 position must be otherwise provided for ; besides the troops enumerated, 
 there must be the general reserves, whose place will be indicated, first by 
 calculating at what part the enemy's most strenuous effort to penetrate will 
 be made; and secondly, the place whence to issue for the effective counter- 
 attack which should form the final element in all defensive battles. 
 
 If good ground be occupied in this way, the assailant's infantry cannot 
 approach the well-posted shooting line of the defender, unless its fire is 
 kept down. Tor this purpose artillery must be directed on it ; and that 
 would be a very strong line of defence which would enable the infantry 
 occupying it to maintain a thoroughly effective fire when assailed 
 throughout its extent by artillery and infantry. But if the assailant's 
 artillery were so to occupy itself at once, and entirely, the defender's 
 artillery would crush it. Therefore it must first seek, if not to crush, yet 
 to maintain an equal engagement with, the defender's artillery, while still 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 433 
 
 holding batteries available to prepare the way for the advanee of the 
 infantry, by directing a concentrated fire on that part of the defender's 
 line where the effort is to be made. Tims, at its beginning, a modern 
 battle, in clear ground, is almost inevitably a battle of artillery ; and 
 it may be said that if the assailant fails in this prefatory action, he 
 has but small chance of gaining the day. 
 
 The artillery of the last generation was greatly inferior to ours in range, Effect of ar- 
 precision, and the power of its projectiles, and yet the comparative effect tlllei T com - 
 of the smooth bore, on the field of battle, was greater than that of the diminished 
 rifled gun, for two reasons ; first, because infantry-fire has surpassed that 
 of artillery in the degree to which its power has been augmented, and has 
 become formidable even at the former limit of the effective range of guns ; 
 secondly, because the opportunities of effective artillery-fire have dimin- 
 ished as range and accuracy have increased. In earlier wars the artillery 
 of the defenders saw before it a line of ponderous columns, each a bat- 
 talion, a regiment, often a brigade ; that of the assailants beheld lines 
 more or less sheltered, but which often lent a flank to enfilade, and behind 
 these lines were columns. On the one side squares, menaced by cavalry, 
 stood motionless and uncovered ; on the other the deep array of squad- 
 rons offered itself to the projectiles. On causeways, bridges and defiles, 
 troops in processional order were exposed to cannon. And all this while, 
 the occasions when infantry could inflict damage on guns in action were 
 few and brief. 
 
 Now, the batteries of the defence look on the quick irregular advance of 
 a multitude of columns so small as to find frequent shelter in average 
 ground, which are scarcely aimed at before they vanish, and which, on 
 arriving within the outer circle of rifle-fire, dissolve into a spray of skir- 
 mishers. The Prussians assert that their company columns were never 
 kept from advancing by artillery-fire. The guns of the assailants are 
 directed not so much on troops, as on the smoke which indicates the 
 shelter-trench, or the brow of the position. On both sides skirmishers 
 who are scarcely discerned will creep up till they reach with their bullets 
 the men and horses of the batteries. It is precisely within the ranges at 
 which the old guns were most effective — from 800 to 300 yards — that 
 artillery is now itself liable to be disabled by the superior fire of infantry. 
 The effect, therefore, of artillery on infantry — its only decisive effect, and 
 
 ■2 E 
 
434 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Its destruc- 
 tive power 
 has driven 
 infantry to 
 new forma- 
 tions. 
 
 New features 
 of its employ- 
 ment in de- 
 fence, 
 
 in attack. 
 
 the very reason of its existence — is less than it used to be. At St Privat 
 nearly 300 guns were concentrated on the defenders of the post, who 
 nevertheless drove back the Prussian Guard with dreadful slaughter, and 
 held their ground till their flank was turned. 
 
 Nevertheless, though the comparative effect of artillery has diminished, 
 its destructive power has greatly increased. The dread of it forces infantry 
 to adopt new formations and modes of action, and neither the attack nor 
 the defence can afford to neglect the full development of so potent a 
 weapon. On the side of the defence the new features of its employment 
 are, artificial cover, such as gun-pits ; the direction of its fire on skir- 
 mishers, the depth and thickness of whose lines render them a sufficient 
 object for shells, while their own formidable fire calls for every kind of 
 opposition ; and the concentration of fire on the enemy's guns as they 
 come into action, the probable position of the hostile artillery being well 
 considered beforehand. 
 
 On the side of the attack the following modifications in artillery tactics 
 are specially notable : — 
 
 1st, The immense increase in the proportion of artillery brought on the 
 field from the very commencement of the engagement. The object of this 
 is to overwhelm the enemy's artillery, and to pour such a fire upon his 
 infantry as shall aid materially in neutralising the disadvantages under 
 which the attacking infantry advance. This is effected by attaching more 
 artillery to the advanced-guard, by placing the divisional artillery on the 
 march near the head of the main columns, and by forming the immediately 
 combatant part of the artillery columns of guns, accompanied only by the 
 waggons needful for immediate supply of ammunition, the others marching 
 farther in rear. That the artillery can venture to assume so forward a 
 place is due to confidence in the defensive power of even so comparatively 
 small a body of infantry as the advanced-guard generally comprises. But 
 there are topographical circumstances in which this would be dangerous. 
 In North Italy, with its numerous canals and vineyards limiting the front 
 of the advance, in the woods of America or Eastern Europe, and in very 
 broken or hilly ground, to push it forward on the march would be to 
 expose it to destruction. 
 
 2d, The endeavour at once to engage the enemy's guns at a compara- 
 tively short range. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 4.'] 5 
 
 In the case of an artillery superior in range to its adversary, it would seem 
 an obvious measure to bring it at first into action just beyond the effective 
 range of the hostile fire, thus securing for itself comparative immunity. 
 And to engage at shorter range is undoubtedly so far to give the enemy 
 points in his favour. But the Prussian artillery, which claimed a great 
 superiority in range over the French, nevertheless sought to open fire 
 within a mile of the enemy. This, no doubt, they would justify by the 
 necessity of affording to their infantry, at whatever cost to themselves, the 
 most prompt and decisive support. Relying on other elements of superi- 
 ority — accuracy, power of projectile, and endurance of fire — they were 
 anxious to bring these to bear in the most effectual manner, and their 
 practice was generally justified by the result. 
 
 3d, Timely support of the infantry as it advanced, by closing up to 
 shorter ranges. But as changes of a few hundred yards would be ineffec- 
 tive as to increase of power, and would also cause the loss of fire during 
 the advance, these forward movements should not be less than 800 yards 
 in extent. It was also considered of immense importance that the artil- 
 lery should immediately occupy a position carried by the infantry, pro- 
 ducing its maximum effect on the enemy by firing into his retreating 
 masses, and aiding to secure the ground already won. This was an addi- 
 tional reason for engaging from the first at comparatively close quarters. 
 
 Although it is true that batteries posted widely apart can concentrate Batteries 
 their fire, yet the importance of the point to be aimed at is not always sllould ™ 
 apparent from every part where separate batteries may be posted, and concentrated 
 separation is in itself a great hindrance to singleness of purpose and promp- fire, 
 titude of action. It is found best, therefore, on the side of the attack 
 (the rule is obviously less applicable to the defence where batteries must 
 often be distributed for local action), to concentrate the batteries in 
 masses — not necessarily in lines, but near enough to each other to be 
 subject to single direct control, and to give each other the benefit of any 
 experience gained, as to range or effect, in the course of the practice. The 
 choice of ground where they may best aid the advance of the infantry 
 without being masked by it, where some degree of cover will be obtained, 
 and from whence it will be easy to advance at the right moment, ought 
 to form a very important part of the instruction and practice of artillery 
 officers in manoeuvring for exercise with other troops. 
 
436 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Probable em- 
 ployment of 
 cavalry. 
 
 Opportunities 
 for attacking 
 prepared in- 
 fantry rare. 
 
 Attack on 
 shaken troops, 
 
 While the theories formed respecting the action, under present conditions, 
 of infantry and artillery, are sufficiently definite and decided, those pro- 
 mulgated by students of, or actors in, the events of the late war, respect- 
 ing the action of cavalry are by no means so clear. 
 
 It is on all sides admitted that cavalry cannot with hope of success 
 attack the front of prepared infantry in any formation. It can only act 
 efficiently against unshaken infantry when its attack is unexpected ; and 
 to fulfil that condition it must be concealed within such distance of the 
 flank of the infantry as it can pass over in career before the infantry can 
 change front to meet it in adequate force, or within a still shorter dis- 
 tance of their front. Even then, in attacking, in flank, a front line of 
 skirmishers, it will probably be exposed throughout to the fire of the 
 supports, unless these also are included in the front of the attack ; which 
 would imply the presence of such a force of cavalry as would not easily 
 be concealed in ordinary ground. 
 
 These conditions are not new ; what is new is the exterminating nature 
 of the fire from which, if the attack fails, the cavalry will suffer. 
 
 It is evident that opportunities for such attacks can only exist on broken 
 ground, and rarely elsewhere than on the flanks of the line of battle; the ex- 
 ceptions being where infantry, attacking an isolated part of a position, offer, 
 in the attempts to turn its flank, their own flank to counter-attack, in which 
 cases the action of the cavalry will generally be on a small scale. As the 
 flank of a line of battle will usually be protected by its own cavalry, the 
 opportunities of an advantageous charge on unprepared or unshaken in- 
 fantry must be few. Probably the best opportunity for a decisive attack 
 would be in the case when the crest of an enemy's position has been 
 partially carried by infantry, and cavalry, following in support of the 
 attack, and forming on its own side of the slope, passes over it to charge 
 the retiring troops and their supports. There are, however, no examples 
 of such attacks in the campaign of 1870. 
 
 In most hard-fought battles there comes a time when infantry grows 
 dispirited and despairing beneath the stress of combat. Only its braver 
 spirits possess the energy to use their arms ; the rest await but an impulse 
 to quit the field, or are already quitting it. At such times a great attack 
 of cavalry will succeed, and decide the battle. Neither of such, however, 
 does the campaign in France afford examples. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 437 
 
 When an army has been so heavily defeated as to be disorganised, and Pursuit, 
 to think no longer of defence, nor of anything but escape, the pressure of 
 cavalry on the rear will prevent the formation of a rear-guard, augment 
 the disorder, and render a speedy resumption of resistance impossible. 
 
 If infantry alone were retiring before infantry accompanied with cav- Action against 
 
 airy, and in ground affording occasional shelter to the squadrons which Te iring in " 
 
 hovered near threatening a charge, either the retiring infantry must, by 
 
 continuing to retreat, afford opportunities to the cavalry, or must halt to 
 
 oppose it, and expose itself to the fire of the pursuing infantry. In such 
 
 a case the effect of cavalry may be greater than formerly, in proportion to 
 
 the severity of the fire to which the retiring troops will be exposed during 
 
 the time they remain stationary. Supposing a turning operation to be so or, in support- 
 
 far successful as to oblige the enemy on that side to retire to new ground ing a urnin § 
 
 ° •* ~ movement, 
 
 under penalty of being attacked in flank, the cavalry that accompanies the 
 
 turning force may have the opportunity of charging during the movement, 
 or of forcing a halt, achieving in either case decisive results. 
 
 The practice of bringing great masses of artillery into position at an early Action against 
 stage of the attack must, apparently, cause large proportions of the line artlUel 7- 
 of battle to be defended only, or chiefly, by artillery fire during at least 
 a part of the action, because the guns will arrive before the main body 
 of the infantry. The artillery of an army-corps, if formed into one great 
 battery, would occupy nearly a mile of front. There would consequently 
 be a considerable part of this front inadequately, if not entirely, unde- 
 fended by infantry fire ; and in a great battle there would be many such 
 spaces. On the opposite side the position, more deliberately occupied, 
 would offer no such weak points ; and if, as in many battle-fields, the 
 ground between the hostile fronts is undulating without being intersected, 
 or is marked by farms, groves, or hollow ways, there would seem to be no 
 reason why masses of cavalry should not be assembled, in anticipation, 
 opposite the probable posts of the enemy's great batteries, and sufficiently 
 near for a rapid attack upon them. Supposing these batteries to be 
 directed on the opposing line, 1500 yards distant, the cavalry, already 
 posted considerably in advance of their main line, might, in the heat 
 and smoke and absorption of the engagement, pass over the inter- 
 vening space almost unperceived ; in any case, to lay the guns accu- 
 rately on the advancing horse at successive poiuts of their final career 
 
438 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Extended 
 order of at- 
 tack probable. 
 
 Should caval- 
 ry cover the 
 advance of 
 the army ? 
 
 would seem impossible, and even the time for many discharges would be 
 wanting. Important opportunities, then, which recent tactics will afford 
 to cavalry, will be the attack upon masses of artillery. Especially will 
 this be practicable when the corps artillery pushes into action on the 
 flank of the advanced-guard pending the arrival of the main body, or when 
 infantry are defeated and retiring covered by artillery fire. On the other 
 hand, to protect the guns from such attempts it will be necessary to assign 
 bodies of cavalry to remain near them ; and great conflicts of cavalry will 
 ensue when, if the squadrons attached to the guns are worsted, the artillery 
 will experience the fate of the French batteries attacked by the victorious 
 Scots Greys at Waterloo. In such cases it is evident that the security of 
 the artillery must depend in great degree on the efficacy of the cavalry. 
 
 It is probable that in many cases cavalry will find it expedient to 
 follow the general tendency towards more extended formations, and to 
 adopt against infantry or artillery an order for its front line resembling 
 the advance of infantry skirmishers. 
 
 If these opportunities of action are not overstated, the importance of 
 cavalry is still such as to render it expedient to maintain a formidable 
 force of that arm. But the function which in the late war in France it 
 discharged with most evident advantage, and which earned for it the 
 most general repute, was the duty of covering the army. Preceding, by 
 from 20 to 40 miles, the main columns, the cavalry spread a veil over 
 their movements, gained on all sides important intelligence, levied requi- 
 sitions, and took possession of towns. Duties so arduous demanded that 
 the force performing them should be independent of the force required 
 for the field of battle ; and the cavalry of an army thus protected must 
 be greatly in excess of the amount of force of that arm which would be 
 in due proportion, for fighting purposes, to the infantry and artillery. It 
 is important, therefore, to inquire whether cavalry is the species of troops 
 which may be employed for this purpose to most advantage. If, on the one 
 hand, the immense success that attended its operations is urged in favour 
 of the measure, on the other it must be remembered that the abdication of 
 its functions by the French cavalry left the enemy's reconnoitring horse 
 absolutely unopposed. The inability of cavalry to engage with infantry 
 applies quite as forcibly to small as to large bodies ; and a single infantry 
 division spread before the French army in the form of outposts and 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 439 
 
 patrols would have speedily put a limit to the enterprises of the Prussian 
 horsemen. But the slowness of movement of infantry renders the arm 
 inapplicable to the prolonged maintenance of so extended a chain at such 
 a distance from the army. Some force which should combine the celerity 
 of cavalry with the formidable fire of infantry would exactly suit the 
 case; and such is to be found in a corps of mounted riflemen. Nor Mounted 
 would the performance of such a duty by any means exhaust their liuemcn 
 functions. For seizing a post or a defile before infantry could arrive 
 there, and which cavalry would be incompetent to hold — for rapidly 
 turning a flank — for executing distant enterprises against communications, 
 — mounted riflemen seem the inevitable solution of a problem, the con- 
 ditions of which are, speed of movement, with ability to contend with 
 any kind of force. The Prussians propose to meet the case by arming 
 their light cavalry with a better weapon. But this is only to create a 
 more expensive and less efficient kind of mounted riflemen. Size and 
 weight of man and horse are worse than superfluous where celerity, accu- 
 racy of aim, and readiness in obtaining cover, are the requisites. Light 
 men on small horses, steed and rider active and enduring, with excellent 
 weapons and careful training, will compose a description of force such as 
 has not been seen on any modern European battle-field, but which will, at 
 small cost, produce great results. The nature of the service would render 
 it especially popular with the active, the enterprising, and the ambitious ; 
 and (supposing we were desirous for once of devising something in war, 
 instead of copying foreign examples in the way that Chinese artists copy 
 Italian pictures) it would not be easy to lead the way more effectively 
 than by organising a force of mounted riflemen. Its strength should be strength of 
 such as, after providing for the covering of the army on the march in its snch - a force - 
 most extended order, should keep in hand for the day of battle a force 
 which, joined to an equal force of cavalry, should raise the total of those 
 two to the proportion hitherto considered necessary for the cavalry alone. 
 But, indeed, mounted riflemen would be so generally effective, that the 
 only limit to their numbers need be the means of maintaining them. 
 
 Probable 
 
 The fact that any good position, adequately occupied, may now be con- modifications 
 sidered certainly tenable against all front attack until the strength of the in .. , . 
 
 Jo ° on the dufen- 
 
 defenders is exhausted and gives way before the assaults of fresh troops, s i ve) 
 
sive. 
 
 440 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 renders certain modifications in tactics probable. Tims, on the defensive: 
 a position good in itself, and resting each flank on an impassable obstacle, 
 may be considered practically impregnable, and suitable, therefore, in an 
 increased degree, for a purpose purely defensive ; the frequency of flank 
 attacks points to the fortifying by works of an exposed flank, and the post- 
 ing of great part of the reserve there ; a flank liable to be turned should, 
 when the ground permits, be retired in echelon, which will facilitate the 
 assumption of the offensive against a foiled turning movement ; the enemy 
 may, with increased confidence, be permitted to penetrate between a flank 
 and an impassable or difficult obstacle ; well-posted parts of the line may 
 be greatly extended and thinned, for the purpose of accumulating forces 
 on the offen- for an effort elsewhere. On the offensive : points may be seized and 
 held in an intended position, or line of battle, by advanced troops, if sure 
 of support, in presence of very superior forces ; part of a force may, with 
 increased security, be left in front of a strongly-occupied position while a 
 turning movement is made by the rest of the army. And, both on the 
 offensive and defensive, it will generally be more expedient, or at least 
 more justifiable, than before, to run strategical risks for the sake of tactical 
 advantages, because those advantages will be much more essential than 
 formerly to success. It has already been pointed out (p. 214) that the 
 disadvantage under which a divided force operates against a concentrated 
 force is diminished by the electric telegraph. Possibly a bold tactician, 
 acting on the defensive, may see in this fact the true way not only to the 
 defence of a flank, but to the delivery of a counter-stroke as effective in its 
 direction as the attack of the Crown Prince at Koniggratz. Extending his 
 line till it is commensurate with the space which the assailant may be 
 expected to occupy, and providing for the immediate defence of an 
 exposed flank by works, reserves, and echelons, he may detach a force to 
 attack the flank of the enemy on that side when seriously engaged. For 
 instance, if Bazaine, on the 18th August, had posted a division of the 
 Guard (idle in the battle), with artillery and most of his cavalry, in the 
 valley of the Orne, with instructions to await the telegraphic signal for 
 an attack at right angles to his own front against the enemy's left flank 
 and rear, it might have taken place on the repulse of the Prussian Guard, 
 and defeated the final turning movement of the Saxons ; while the troops 
 thus employed, if worsted, would have retired on Thionville. There 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 441 
 
 have been as yet few or no examples of the facilities for new combinations 
 which science has conferred on war.* 
 
 The fact that troops suffer more heavily than before when retreat- Effect of aim- 
 ing under fire, must also have its effects. Detachments, such as rear- cult 3' ofre - 
 
 treating under 
 
 guards or advanced-guards, whose object is to retard the enemy, must nre . 
 be more than ever careful to withdraw before committing any con- 
 siderable portion of their force to an engagement, or so to time their 
 resistance that they may withdraw under cover of night. Advanced 
 posts, however seemingly advantageous, should not be occupied with the 
 intention of finally withdrawing from them. And no manoeuvre should 
 be based on a gradual withdrawal of part of the line under pressure of 
 the enemy. 
 
 It is very evident that the present training of the Prussians is, and their Mode of op- 
 future tactics probably will be, largely influenced by their great and un- P 0S111 S ?rus ' 
 
 11 mi n -i S ' an tactics 
 
 broken successes. Ihey confide m cavalry, because cavalry did so much guested. 
 for them in France; their belief in the virtue of offensive tactics is confirmed, 
 since their onsets on the French always ended in victory. This is a point for 
 serious consideration by a commander who may oppose them in the next 
 war. It is not to be expected that any army will be better fitted for fight- 
 
 * It has been pointed out to the author, that since the above was published in 1873, an 
 action has taken place confirming the prognostication in the text. In October 1877, Mukhtar 
 Pasha was covering Kars from the Russians, who had advanced from Alexandropol, by occupying 
 a line of heights extending from before the city to near Ani, on the Arpa Tchai River. Re- 
 pulsed in their attacks on the Turkish front, the Russians detached a considerable force, under 
 General Lazareff, to march round Mukhtar 's right, pass entirely along his rear, and attack his 
 left, the flank nearest to Kars, thus, in case of his defeat, cutting him from that fortress. 
 The length of LazarefFs destined inarch was 40 miles ; the difficulties of the road caused it to 
 occupy several days, and the operation was such as to isolate him completely from the rest of 
 the army. "A field-telegraph," says the correspondent of 'The Daily News' with the Rus- 
 sian arm) 7 , "had been established with laudable celerity and regularity throughout the length 
 of that circuitous line of operation. . . . Our whole strategic plan was suspended on that 
 thin wire. On its strength depended the fate of this campaign in Armenia, because it alone 
 rendered a harmonious tactical action possible which insured success. . . . The Pasha, 
 either ignoring this state of things, or, in his Turkish prejudice against all innovation, scorn- 
 ing that peculiarly useful modern contrivance, laid no stress on its establishment." Mukhtar, 
 aware of the movement against his left, strongly reinforced it ; and Lazareff, on reaching his 
 goal, found himself confronted with superior numbers. The Russians were thus placed in 
 circumstances which the absence of rapid communications would have rendered deservedly 
 fatal. But the telegraph informed the Russian Commander-in-chief of the position of affairs, 
 and enabled him to combine with Lazareff in a simultaneous attack, which ended in the 
 destruction of the Turkish army. — See also p. 214, where, in a passage also contained in the 
 edition of 1S73, the exact case is supposed. 
 
442 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 ing, by organisation, discipline, training, or spirit, than the armies of Ger- 
 many. Success must be sought elsewhere than in a manifest superiority 
 of this kind ; and will be found mainly in anticipating and preparing to 
 meet the peculiarities of Prussian warfare in its latest developments. An 
 antagonist defending his own territory against them may calculate on 
 finding all their movements at first characterised by audacity, and should 
 seek therein his advantage. He should meet their reconnoitring cavalry 
 with a well-maintained cordon of mounted riflemen. Knowing that their 
 advanced-guards will be eager to engage, he should draw them into attacks 
 on his own, bringing up a force of mounted riflemen to turn the scale 
 against the infantry, and of cavalry to attack the great battery which will 
 presently be seeking to overwhelm him. Except with manifest advantages 
 on his side, he should not at first imitate their tactics by seeking to engage, 
 but await them in position, combining his defence with the offensive action 
 of a detached force, which would manoeuvre for the occasion on a pivot of 
 its own, but which would receive its impulses from the general-in-chief by 
 means of the telegraph.* Should the enemy seek to turn his position by a 
 circuit, he may throw himself across the heads of their columns, confident 
 of finding that their eagerness to engage will have caused them to extend 
 unduly, and that he will be met, in the successive stages of his attack, by 
 numbers constantly inferior to his own. If the intercepting movement be 
 already completed before he can meet it, he may strike boldly at their 
 rear with the certainty of finding there a vulnerable point. When about 
 to become the assailant, he should manoeuvre to base himself anew, and 
 threaten their communications ; for though this may have been foreseen 
 by the enemy, yet the sudden change must derange their plans, compli- 
 cate their movements, and deprive them, for the time, of the initiative. 
 Other operations, in a similar spirit, will suggest themselves to the 
 reader ; and, throughout the campaign, advantage should be taken of the 
 railways, telegraphs, and temporary bases available for an army in its 
 own country, to combine simultaneous operations, on varying fronts, for 
 a common purpose of defence or attack. And though it is not to be 
 doubted that tacticians so sagacious as those of Prussia must have fore- 
 seen how their own tactics may be met, yet it is by no means so certain 
 
 * Also in edition of 1S73. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 443 
 
 that the alternative system which they may devise will be so successful 
 as that which destroyed the armies of France. 
 
 The reader will have noted that all important changes of tactics and of Proper use of; 
 organisation have been made in intervals of peace, and that the place cani l ,s of in - 
 has been a camp of instruction. It was in his Silesian camps that Fred- 
 erick worked out his system, taught it to his generals, and brought it 
 to perfection. It was in the camp of Vaissieux that two marshals of 
 the old regime devised and taught the new methods which the French 
 Republican armies so successfully put in practice against the inheritors 
 of Frederick's tactics. It was in the camp of Boulogne that Napoleon 
 modified the new system, and prepared the French army for the triumphs 
 of Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena. It was in the mimic warfare of their summer 
 exercises that the Prussians were prepared for the triumphs of Bohemia 
 and of France. What they are now specially solicitous to attain is com- 
 pleteness in the necessary details of that system of attack and defence by all 
 arms, which their experience of the late war has shown to be applicable 
 to modern battles. To this end their practice in these multitudinous 
 details is incessant, and the main business of regimental officers is to 
 learn the capabilities of ground, of all kinds, and in all circumstances, 
 and to dispose their men carefully upon it. The word system is appli- 
 cable to their training not as representing fixed methods, but as expressing 
 cultivation of intelligence, and preparation by practice for the innumerable 
 contingencies of war. Not less important than the right instruction of 
 troops is it that as many officers as possible of superior grade should, while 
 yet comparatively young, be practised in general commands, so that their 
 first lessons may not be the costly ones learnt in face of the enemy, that 
 their qualities may be tested, and that those commanders may be known 
 who are to be relied on in future wars. As in the past, so in the future, 
 it must be for armies, before new wars shall find them still fettered by 
 obsolete customs and traditions, to adapt themselves, as the weapons 
 with which States guard their honour, independence, and prosperity, 
 to the altered circumstances in which they must operate. 
 
444 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 CHAPTER YIL 
 
 DISPOSITIONS FOR THE MARCH THAT PRECEDES A BATTLE. 
 
 Selection of 
 routes for 
 columns. 
 
 While an army is at a great distance from the enemy, the chief care 
 of the leaders of columns will be to place their troops in such order as 
 will best insure celerity of movement and convenience of supply. But 
 when an army is moving to an immediate engagement, all its columns 
 must be ready to form line of battle on the shortest notice. 
 
 The first great distinction between a march of this kind and an ordi- 
 nary march is, that whereas, in general, a long train of supplies and 
 baggage must follow the columns, an army moving to battle disencum- 
 bers itself of all that is not essential for feeding and fighting during the 
 day or days of conflict. Men and horses carry with them one or two 
 days' food ; spare ammunition must be at hand ; all else may be for the 
 moment stored in the rear. 
 
 Thus stripped for the struggle, columns, each of an army-corps or 
 division * (see Appendix), advance upon such roads as will, at once, lead 
 them on the enemy, and keep thern within deploying distance of each 
 other. If the commander has been enabled, by reconnaissances and in- 
 telligence of the enemy's dispositions, to determine his order of battle, it 
 will be a great advantage ; for, according as a wing or centre is to be 
 reinforced, the troops can, at the outset of the march, be directed on the 
 
 * The Germans, in the war of 1870, always, when the number and proximity of roads 
 permitted, moved a division on each road. This, however, was not always possible; in 
 the advance from the Moselle, 16th and 17th August, roads were few in proportion to the 
 forces using them, and the columns were very long. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 445 
 
 roads which will bring them to their destined positions in the line. 
 The divisions and the cavalry will be accompanied by their own bat- 
 teries; the corps artillery will generally accompany a central column 
 if the road be good. 
 
 Compactness being now of the highest importance, all the arms of a 
 column will move in close order, and on as large a front as is consistent 
 with leaving part of the road free for the transmission of orders and the 
 going-about of cavalry or guns. 
 
 According to the practice of the Germans in 1870-71, the artillery would 
 now be much nearer the head of the column than formerly ; the in- 
 creased capacity for defence being relied on to insure its due protection 
 by the advanced-guard. 
 
 Supposing the column to consist of a division, at the head of the main Order of 
 body will march a battalion, followed by the batteries composing the n ^ arch to 
 divisional artillery; after these comes the rest of the infantry of the 
 division, followed by such part of the divisional cavalry as is not employed 
 with the advanced-guard, or as flankers ; in rear of all, follow the reserve 
 and supply trains for the day's needs. 
 
 When the nature of the country dictates that masses of cavalry should Position of 
 be on one wing, or on both wings, they will march, accordingly, on one the caval T- 
 or both flanks, in adjoining columns, not intermixed, either laterally or 
 longitudinally, with infantry. Such was the order in Davout's march to 
 Eckmuhl, when his cavalry covered his left flank, his right being pro- 
 tected by the Danube (p. 148). Such was not the order in M'Mahon's 
 march to the aid of Bazaine ; the flank next the enemy being left uncovered, 
 while the cavalry were assembled on the other ; surprise, disorder, and 
 rout being the result. 
 
 In all cases the columns will be incessantly connected by light troops Connection of 
 (cavalry if possible), extended throughout their front ; and advantage tlle e eneral 
 
 front. 
 
 must be taken of all cross-roads to maintain concert and exchange in- 
 telligence during the movement. 
 
 Meanwhile the advanced-guard (to be treated of separately), marching 
 at a certain distance ahead, will, presumably, prevent the heads of columns 
 from being suddenly attacked, or from being separated by an advance of 
 the enemy. 
 
 On approaching a position which the enemy may be supposed to occupy, 
 
446 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Clearing of 
 routes. 
 
 Defects of 
 too wide and 
 too narrow 
 fronts. 
 
 Subdivision of or to be seeking to occupy, the main columns subdivide into other smaller 
 the columns. co lumns, and all strike gut for themselves routes as direct as possible 
 towards their destined positions in the line, endeavouring, at the same 
 time, to procure cover whilst advancing into first or second line, and always 
 maintaining their connection. But as an attempt to move for any distance 
 in columns so small and numerous as to be in order of battle, or nearly so, 
 would create confusion and delay at every impediment, it is inexpedient 
 to separate farther than into brigades, the divisional artillery still accom- 
 panying, if possible, its own divisions. Each column will be preceded by 
 engineers, to clear the road of obstacles, throw planks across ditches or 
 rivulets, repair bad parts of the track, cut away the steep banks or fords 
 for the passage of cavalry or guns, and, under the direction of staff-officers, 
 shorten the routes by levelling fences and cutting paths. 
 
 Of the two extremes, of moving the columns too close to, or too far 
 from, each other, the former, though leading to an accumulation and over- 
 lapping of troops, and consequent diminution of the proper front, would, 
 until lately, have been less dangerous than an extension, which would give 
 the enemy an opportunity of breaking the front. But the long reach and 
 defensive power of infantry fire have greatly diminished the risk of exten- 
 sion ; and, within certain limits of possible concert and mutual support, 
 increased lengthening of columns would now be a greater disadvantage 
 than a too wide front. Avoiding both, an army runs no risk in any 
 country, for an enemy can, at best, only present himself in equally good 
 order. It is only when an army in lengthened columns finds itself sud- 
 denly in presence of an enemy in line of battle, that the situation is 
 critical ; and such a crisis it is for the advanced-guard to prevent. But 
 of the necessity for moving as compactly and as nearly in fighting order 
 as possible, the battle of Solferino is an illustration. Both armies had 
 reconnoitred the country between the Chiese and Mincio; each expected 
 to find its adversary awaiting it behind the river ; neither anticipated the 
 encounter ; but the French army was by far the best prepared for it by 
 the order of its march. The army that marches in the best order for form- 
 ing line of battle, according to the nature of the country, will be certainly 
 best prepared for victory. 
 
 The closer the nature of the country, the more necessary will it be to 
 render different portions of each column complete in each arm. For the 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 447 
 
 order of march on the intersected bank of the Po, in 1859, the reader is 
 
 referred to page 30. 
 
 So far, marches to the front only have been under consideration. But Flank 
 
 an army, or part of an army, must frequently march to a flank — westward, marc]ies near 
 
 . -ii • the enemy, 
 
 for instance, with the expectation of forming a line of battle which will 
 
 front south — as Pirch and Thielemann moved from Namur to Ligny ; and 
 
 if it were to move in the order just prescribed for a march to the front, it 
 
 must make a long wheel of its columns before forming order of battle. To 
 
 avoid this it must adopt an order of march suited to the occasion. 
 
 On perfectly open ground such a movement might be accomplished by 
 marching to a flank in columns which might at once be converted into a 
 line of battle, with an advanced-guard protecting the flank towards the 
 enemy. But the question is of making a march of this kind in an average 
 broken or enclosed country, where very lengthened columns, especially of 
 cavalry and artillery, could not without great risk offer their flank to the 
 enemy. 
 
 The mass of the cavalry, as being least able to fight singly, should not, Order of 
 in this case, move in columns next the enemy. But the movement should marcl1 to a 
 nevertheless be covered by cavalry, extended in observation, with bodies 
 in support at suitable commanding points, both to give information of 
 the enemy's movements, and to prevent the enemy's cavalry from observ- 
 ing the march too closely ; these bodies should successively collect their 
 vedettes and patrols as the army passes them, and move forward to fresh 
 points of observation, while the reserve of the cavalry force which per- 
 forms this duty should also conform to the general movement. If an 
 army-corps were thus moving, either its cavalry-brigade, or a regiment 
 of divisional cavalry, might be so employed, according to the suita- 
 bility of that arm to the ground; supported by an advanced-guard of 
 all arms, which should occupy all defiles by which the enemy might issue 
 on the flank of the columns. The three infantry divisions might form 
 each a column, the divisional artillery at the head or in rear of each, or 
 partly at the head, partly in rear, according to the probable exigencies of 
 the expected engagement. The corps artillery might move, with or with- 
 out the cavalry brigade, in a fourth column; or might accompany the 
 division farthest from the enemy. 
 
 When a corps is moving thus to a flank, it will be of immense import- 
 
448 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 ance to decide whether it is to form line of battle to a front or a flank, 
 relatively to the rest of the army and to the enemy. Thus Bulow's march 
 to the field of Waterloo was a flank march ; but for the attack on the 
 French flank, the order of march to a front was the proper formation for 
 his columns. 
 
 To an English reader, amid our highly-cultivated and strictly-enclosed 
 landscapes, marches such as those described will appear very dubious of 
 execution. But the more enclosed a country is, the more numerous gener- 
 ally will be its roads. Still, such marches may well appear perplexing in 
 England or Italy. A trip to Belgium or the Ehine will, however, convince 
 him of the feasibility of such manoeuvres in countries better suited than 
 ours to military operations ; though there are many parts of England 
 where great operations could be executed, and great battles fought, without 
 hindrance to any arm. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 449 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 MINOR OPERATIONS OF WAR. 
 
 Under this head, as necessary accompaniments to the movements of 
 armies, yet possessing distinctive features of their own, are placed the 
 Conduct of Advanced - Guards, Outposts, the Escort of Convoys, and 
 Eeconnaissances. 
 
 It was the custom of Napoleon to despatch large bodies of light cavalry 
 to the distance of several marches ahead of the army, while it was still 
 at a great distance from the enemy. " And," says Marmont, " when one 
 is far from an enemy strong enough to deliver battle, and is marching 
 upon him, it is necessary to occupy, with advanced -guards and light 
 troops, at least a space of a long march all round the army, to be informed 
 of his movements, and modify our own." 
 
 Measures of this kind, however, the object of which is solely to pro- The advanced- 
 cure intelligence, are not now in question, but the conduct of specially- K uartl - 
 organised bodies moving immediately at the head of armies, to facilitate 
 the march and to guard against surprise. 
 
 While the advanced-guard must, on the one hand, shun to compromise Duty of the 
 itself with a superior force ; on the other, it must not allow the march advanced - 
 
 guard. 
 
 to be delayed by demonstrations made by insignificant bodies. The com- 
 mander, therefore, has need both of prudence and resolution ; according 
 to circumstances, he must dispute the ground, fall back towards the 
 army, or promptly attack. "Never haggle" says Frederick to his 
 generals, "with the enemy's light troops." 
 
 In almost all countries, the advanced-guard should consist of all arms. Its couiposi- 
 The proportions of cavalry and infantry must depend on the nature of tl0U ' 
 
 •2 v 
 
to the main 
 body. 
 
 450 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 the district — the former preponderating in open, the latter in close and 
 hilly, regions. Artillery is required to shell the enemy's posts out of 
 sheltered ground, farms, &c. 
 
 Its proportion If an army is moving on a narrow front, one of its brigades, combined with 
 cavalry and artillery, or one of its divisions, may form the advanced-guard, 
 extending across the whole front. Forey's division at Casteggio formed, 
 
 See Appendix, in May 1859, the advanced-guard of the French army. But where army- 
 corps or divisions are moving each on its own roads, as at Woerth, each 
 will form its own advanced-guard : and these have generally consisted, on 
 the German side, in the war of 1870, of from 2 battalions, 2 or 3 squadrons, 
 and a battery, to a brigade of infantry, with a regiment of cavalry, and 
 2 or more batteries. The functions of the advanced-guard, which formerly 
 consisted chiefly in observing the enemy, obtaining information, and 
 facilitating and protecting the march, have been of late held to include 
 also the task of engaging and holding fast the enemy, and this part of 
 the column has been strengthened accordingly. 
 
 Part of the advanced-guard precedes, as vanguard, its main body. At 
 the head of this vanguard is a squadron of the divisional cavalry, to ex- 
 plore, and bring intelligence ; then a battalion, or part of one ; then two 
 or three guns, without their waggons ; and a party of engineers to mend 
 and clear the road. 
 
 Order of its A small party of horse precedes the main body of the advanced-guard, 
 
 march. j. Q obtain an( j "bring the earliest intelligence. Of this main body, a por- 
 
 tion of the infantry march first ; then the remainder of the artillery of 
 the advanced-guard, followed by more infantry, and most of the divisional 
 cavalry. Neither artillery nor a body of cavalry should enter any defile 
 which has not been first explored by infantry. A road enclosed by strong 
 walls or fences, or a hollow way, or a bridge in a deep valley, or a wood, 
 or the street of a village, would all be situations fatal to horse or to guns 
 attacked by rifle-fire, and unaided by infantry. 
 
 When the Allied army made its flank march round Sebastopol, the 
 head of the column, marching through an extensive and thick wood, 
 was composed of several field-batteries. Fortunately, after proceeding 
 some distance through dense and narrow paths, the head of the column 
 halted for guidance and protection. After a certain interval it was 
 ordered to proceed; and it finally emerged into an open space, close 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 451 
 
 to the rear of a strong Russian column which had just traversed its 
 front. But for the halt, the head of the army would have touched, 
 not on the rear, but on the flank, of this column, when a few companies 
 of infantry might with ease and impunity have destroyed great part of 
 the British artillery. 
 
 No defile should, then, be entered till its flanks, throughout its extent, 
 are occupied by infantry, when the other arms should pass with all con- 
 venient speed. Mounted riflemen would be specially adapted for the 
 seizing and occupyiug of defiles. 
 
 The flanks of the column should be covered to a distance of effective 
 rifle-range by parties of horse ; and a chain of riflemen, at 40 or 50 paces 
 from each other, should extend within the mounted troops. Every 
 neighbouring obstacle which might shelter hostile troops, every wood, and 
 copse, and farmyard, and rising ground, to a considerable distance on 
 each side, should be visited and explored by the flankers, and detach- 
 ments must occupy important defiles on the flanks until relieved by 
 others from the main column ; all, however, without interruption to the 
 march. 
 
 In a halt of any duration, the advanced-guard should place itself in 
 readiness to engage by the suitable occupation of ground, and cover its 
 front and flanks with outposts. 
 
 The considerations which govern the distance between the advanced- its distance 
 guard and the main body are these : — If it were considerable (say half a from tbe main 
 march), not only might it be cut off altogether by a superior force attack- 
 ing it in flank aud rear, but it might frequently be forced to an action 
 while falling back. Other forces must then support it, and thus a battle 
 might be fought inopportunely or in an unfavourable position, and con- 
 trary to the desire of the commander-in-chief. 
 
 On the other hand, were it too close, it would merely be the head of 
 the column, and would very inadequately fulfil its main purpose of put- 
 ting the main forces on their guard, and giving them time to prepare for 
 battle. 
 
 The distance, then, must be such as to give the columns time to deploy 
 sufficient force to meet any probable first attacks, and to cover the de- 
 ployment of the rest. If an army be moving in numerous columns, at 
 just intervals, it will need less preparation than when the roads refuse to 
 
452 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 lend themselves to any but deep columns, and too narrow or too extended 
 fronts. Frederick's advanced-guards observed a distance from the army 
 of from 1 J to 3 miles ; but the Germans, in 1870, relying on the strength 
 and readiness for action of their advanced-guards, reduced it to about 
 half a mile. 
 
 In case of the whole army being covered by an army-corps, it may 
 be a day's march ahead, possessing in itself the means of holding the 
 ground till supported. 
 
 Outposts. Outposts are established to give an army or detachment notice of the 
 
 movements of the enemy, and to guard against surprise when the ground 
 beyond it may conceal his advance. Like advanced-guards, they must be 
 placed at the distance from the main body which will fulfil this purpose 
 
 Distance of without exposing them to be cut off or overpowered. And as they oc- 
 
 outposts from CU py much ground in proportion to their force, 3 miles is as great a space 
 the main . . ^ 
 
 body as should intervene between infantry outposts and the army.* 
 
 Manner of They are usually divided into a line of sentries or line of observation ; 
 
 disposing a line of pickets or line of reliefs ; and a line of supports or line of resist- 
 ance. Within certain limits, the line of sentries should be made the 
 basis of the selection of ground — pickets and supports conforming to it, 
 not it to them. 
 
 The line of supports is a line of bodies of such strength (say one or two 
 companies), and at such lateral distances apart (say half a mile), that, when 
 extended in skirmishing order, they may sufficiently occupy the ground 
 to oppose and retard the advance of the enemy, without compromising 
 themselves with superior forces. The limits of distance between them 
 and the sentries should lie between 600 and 1200 yards ; within those 
 limits the line of supports may be placed wherever the ground affords 
 the most advantageous general line of defence — ground which presents 
 moderately good opportunities for defence throughout being very much 
 to be preferred to a line which possesses some strong features but is un- 
 tenable elsewhere. The pickets, placed at any convenient spots between 
 
 * The subject of Outposts is so full of detail that, if dealt with at length, it would occupy 
 far more than its due proportion of space in this work. It has been treated by the author 
 in a separate essay (" A Chapter on Outposts," 2d edition, 1875 : Blackwood & Sons), the parts 
 of which most suitable for the purpose of this volume are substituted in the text for the para- 
 graphs on the subject in former editions. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 453 
 
 the sentries and supports, besides furnishing three reliefs of the sentries, 
 who are generally double, and of connecting sentries when needed, also 
 provide patrols, which, in thick weather or at night, pass once in each Patrols, 
 relief, along the whole line ; and the supports connect themselves in the 
 same way, parties of cavalry being very suitable for the purpose. The 
 use of these patrols is now greatly developed. Cavalry by day, infantry, 
 or a mixed force, by night, pass at intervals outside the sentries, to whom 
 they may often be superior in obtaining information. 
 
 The most favourable circumstances for the resistance of outposts will 
 be those in which shelter from the view and fire of the enemy is afforded 
 to the skirmishing line, with a good range to the front, and advantages 
 for retreating under more or less cover past the next stand-point, occu- 
 pied by the second line. 
 
 The least favourable will be those where the view and range to the 
 front are very contracted, while the retreat lies for a considerable distance 
 over open and commanded ground. 
 
 Next to being shut up in an enclosure, the worst case in which part of Occupation of 
 
 the outpost line could find itself would be facing a wood, within a short woocls b y out * 
 
 r . posts, 
 
 distance, where the enemy could approach it unseen and unmolested, and 
 
 begin his attack with all the advantages of cover on his side. 
 
 On the other hand, nothing can more greatly favour the temporary- 
 resistance to a superior enemy, and subsequent retreat before him, than 
 a wood of large trees, with slight undergrowth or none, held at first at 
 the edge towards the enemy ; and, moreover, it offers the speediest means 
 of creating an obstacle to his advance, and additional shelter to the de- 
 fenders, by the felling and forming into an entanglement of the front 
 line of trees. From behind these the defenders fire on the advancing 
 enemy almost with impunity ; they retire sheltered, and on as good terms 
 as he, whatever his numbers, since all whom the trees do not protect are 
 exposed — and the assailants will advance but slowly in their ignorance 
 of ground where their view is restricted to a few yards, but which is 
 known to the troops in retreat. Such a wood, therefore, with advantages 
 behind it for a sheltered retreat to the next stand-point, is a strong 
 feature in the outpost line ; and wherever such woods offer themselves, 
 they should be included in the general line, or, in case of echelons, in the 
 retired portions of the line. 
 
454 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 If the further edge of the wood be too far removed to be occupied, and 
 no openings exist within it, the sentries should be placed either on the 
 hither edge of a belt of, say, 20 yards width, cut across it, the felled trees 
 serving as an entanglement, or under some kind of cover at 200 yards at 
 least behind the hither edge of the wood, which must then be frequently 
 searched far to the front by patrols. The worst place possible for the 
 outposts, in such a case, would be along the hither edge of the wood, and 
 close to it, where they could see nothing, and would be shot down by an 
 advancing enemy without the chance of injuring him in return, while he 
 could mass or manoeuvre there, to any extent, unseen. 
 
 If the wood covers so large an area that the outpost line must 
 traverse it, and the troops are unable to make the requisite clearing, 
 the sentries must be very numerous, and very near the pickets, which 
 must be numerous also ; and the patrolling in front must be almost 
 incessant. 
 
 It is obvious that, though single walls and hedges may afford excellent 
 points of defence, outposts should never place themselves in buildings or 
 enclosures from which it would be difficult to issue. 
 Features of Where an obstacle with few passages over it — a stream, canal, railway 
 
 grouud in the cu tting, &c. — runs for any distance parallel to the front of outposts, 
 although pickets, which easily make good their retreat in such cases, 
 may properly be placed beyond it, yet the line of the supports should 
 pass behind it. Bodies so considerable, pressed by the enemy and crowded 
 on such defiles, would be apt to have some of their numbers cut off : even 
 if they should pass, the enemy might pass along with them. But from 
 the hither side they could both secure the retreat of the pickets and bar 
 the passage of the enemy. 
 
 A spur or ridge traversing the outpost line, and extending towards the 
 enemy, is sometimes a difficult feature to deal with, offering a tempta- 
 tion to push the posts forward. If they be so advanced, that saliency of 
 part of the line is caused which has already been described as disadvan- 
 tageous ; whereas, if they be not so advanced, commanding ground may 
 be left to be seized by the enemy, who may perhaps be also enabled to 
 mass unseen beyond the edge. Should the ground round the extremity 
 of the ridge be open to view, and that extremity not too far from the 
 general line, it may be occupied by a sentry, supported by a picket at 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 455 
 
 the usual distance ; otherwise the outpost line had better be carried 
 straight across the ridge, and artificially strengthened. 
 
 If an isolated hill, or other point affording an extensive view, exist 
 within a reasonable distance of the outpost line, it should be occupied 
 by its own sentry or sentries, with sufficient reliefs ; and if the enemy 
 may be expected to make special attempts to occupy it, a support should 
 be placed within reach, sufficient to contest the ground ; for a good view 
 may be well worth the cost of a brisk encounter. But resistance should 
 be limited to opposing isolated attacks — not a general advance — before 
 which the occupants of the ground, having made all feasible use of it as 
 a post of observation, should retire on the general line of the outposts. 
 Communication between it and the outposts, during its occupation, should 
 be by signal. 
 
 It is by no means always necessary or expedient that the line of the 
 outposts should follow the line of the position. A concave position, or 
 one indented with deep angles, is best covered along its front by a straight 
 line of posts, with the extremities thrown back. A convex position will 
 generally, however, be covered by a convex line of posts, though they 
 need not conform exactly to its outline. 
 
 The calculation of the number of troops which an army-corps or divi- Calculation of 
 
 sion should furnish for its outposts will vary according to the place it troops for the 
 
 x . . outposts. 
 
 occupies in the line of battle, and whether it is acting singly or jointly. 
 When it forms the centre of a line, with others on its flanks, its outpost 
 line need not (except for the sake of equalising the duties, or of filling a 
 convenient section of the ground in front) be longer than its own front. 
 If its post be on the flank of a position, its outposts will include its own 
 front and one flank. When acting alone, it will cover its front and both 
 flanks, unless one should be sufficiently protected by an obstacle. The 
 extent to which the outpost line should be carried on a flank must depend 
 on the enemy's means of access to it, and of concealing his march to- 
 wards it. 
 
 If the enemy can only approach by certain avenues, the task of dis- 
 posing outposts to retard him is comparatively simple and much less 
 onerous to the army. 
 
 When the immediate area of operations lies in extensive plains, infantry 
 outposts would generally be out of place — for the enemy could approach 
 
456 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 them on any front, and in any strength ; he could be in no doubt as to 
 their position, force, and object; there could be no special advantage in 
 knowing the ground where all is open and visible ; and resistance to an 
 advance in force would be useless. Infantry, therefore, could only consti- 
 Outposts of tute a line of observation. But in that respect they would be very inferior 
 cavalry. ^ cava i r y j which could push much further ahead, command a wider view, 
 
 and make a more secure and rapid retreat. In such a case, then, the out- 
 posts should be of cavalry. 
 
 It would be unsafe, however, to infer that when, in ground generally 
 wooded, enclosed, or broken, a plain may occur, the portion of the outpost 
 line in that locality might always be altogether of cavalry. For as that 
 force could not maintain itself against a formidable advance of infantry, 
 which might also be supported by the artillery of the advanced-guard, a 
 gap would be left in the outposts by its retreat, and two uncovered flanks 
 thereby created within the line. In such a case the infantry posts must 
 be carried across the open ground to secure the coherence of the whole, 
 and made stronger than elsewhere. 
 
 It may, however, happen, that one considerable section of the ground is 
 woody or enclosed, while another adjoining it is entirely open — that is to 
 say, one part adapted only to infantry, the other only to cavalry. In this 
 case the infantry line, before extending into the open ground, should be 
 retired in echelon, or on an arc, on that side, and the outpost line should 
 be continued by cavalry (with horse-artillery) overlapping the flank of the 
 infantry, and considerably in advance of it. 
 
 In a line which may be fitly occupied by infantry throughout, cavalry 
 may often do important service on outpost by supplementing a defective 
 view. Parties can be pushed forward on main roads, or to high ground, 
 beyond the line which it is considered proper to occupy with infantry, 
 and will send much earlier intelligence of the enemy's movements than 
 could otherwise be obtained. Or, again, a piece of close and woody 
 ground may occur in an otherwise favourable outpost line, where to push 
 forward the infantry posts would dangerously isolate them : here, parties 
 of cavalry posted on the extremities of the close ground, and patrolling 
 across its front, will act as the eyes of the infantry posts which carry on 
 the line of resistance in rear. 
 
 There may exist on a flank of the main position, beyond the line of out- 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 457 
 
 posts, some formation of ground which would favour a turning movement 
 of the enemy on that side — such as a ridge leading from the direction of 
 the enemy past the flank of the army, or a deep valley, or some other 
 natural screen for an extensive movement. In such a case, it will be an 
 obvious measure to station a force of cavalry outside the sentries on that 
 flank, in order, by means of their vedettes, greatly to extend the line of 
 observation onward from the ordinary outposts. 
 
 If artillery can be posted in rear of the first line of infantry posts, at Artillery with 
 such a distance from an important road or defile as to be secure from the out P osts - 
 rifle-fire of the enemy on the other side of the defile, and also beyond the 
 effective counter-fire of the enemy's artillery until his batteries are pushed 
 on in full view, two or three guns may cause considerable delay, and 
 greatly support their own infantry, while preserving the full power of 
 retiring when in any way overmatched. This power will be greatly in- 
 creased if the ground in their rear falls for some distance, so that they 
 can limber up and move off unseen, gaining so much distance before the 
 enemy's advance that they can take up a fresh position in which to cover 
 the withdrawal of the infantry. 
 
 It will often happen that, in ground otherwise favourable to the out- 
 posts, spaces will exist where pickets or supports, in conforming to the 
 general movement of withdrawal, will be likely to suffer especially by the 
 enemy's fire. A couple of guns well posted, and firing at long range, 
 may here do good service ; for though artillery-fire can seldom be destruc- 
 tive against skirmishers, yet a few shells exploding close in front of them 
 will distract their attention, obscure their view, and disturb their aim ; 
 while the retiring bodies will gain renewed confidence in finding them- 
 selves thus supported. 
 
 Also, when a good position for artillery exists within cannon-range of 
 the main position, it may often be advantageously occupied as an artillery 
 outpost. A battery posted there will extend by so much the area in 
 which the outposts will find powerful support, it will give them confidence 
 in making their successive stands, and will enable them finally to assemble 
 their fractions and to rejoin their division or corps without hurry and in 
 good order. Such a protection will be especially valuable in front of the 
 flank of the position, since that is the part of a line of outposts where a 
 concerted retreat will generally be most difficult. When the battery has 
 
458 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 fulfilled its purpose, its own retreat will be protected by the artillery of 
 the main position. 
 
 When a line of outposts is taken up by cavalry which are intended 
 to fight as well as to observe, they should be accompanied by horse- 
 artillery. 
 
 Such are some of the circumstances in which artillery may do good 
 service with the outposts by protecting troops of the other arms. The 
 cases in which it can be employed with them for the purpose of delaying 
 the enemy may be broadly described as those in which it may take post 
 within cannon-range, and beyond rifle-range, of places where the enemy must 
 advance in column ; and, at the same time, beyond cannon-range of ground 
 which the enemy's batteries could reach and take post on unperceived. 
 Outposts "by It is difficult to imagine any more anxious, harassing, and profitless 
 mg ' duty than that of an outpost line maintained by night far in advance of 
 
 the army. The sentries see little, though they often imagine a great deal. 
 The pickets and supports must feel that, while more than commonly liable 
 to surprise, their action in case of attack would be very confused, and 
 their retreat uncertain. And if it be true that the enemy can make no 
 considerable movement except by the roads, the posts which are not on 
 the roads can effect nothing of importance. 
 
 But, let us suppose that the outposts were collected at night upon the 
 main roads, while across the intermediate spaces, in rear of them and not 
 far from the position, pickets were extended (unless the ordinary quarter- 
 guards were deemed sufficient), with sentries on a line close to the 
 pickets. The cordon would be more contracted than by day, and there- 
 fore less easy to penetrate ; and the sentries would be more vigilant, 
 being better looked after. Suppose, too, that the exceptionally strong 
 supports formed by assembling the whole of the outposts on a few points 
 were pushed out farther than before on the roads, with their own pickets, 
 sentries, and patrols in front of them. By such an arrangement it would 
 be more difficult than before for strong bodies to advance by the roads ; 
 it would be more difficult for small bodies to penetrate the cordon ; the 
 enterprise for cutting off a post must needs be futile when the post could 
 no longer be found on the expected spot ; and the safety of the whole 
 force would be better secured with far less worry to the troops. At day- 
 light the outposts would assume their former positions. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 459 
 
 Armies in actual presence of each other cover the front at a short dis- 
 tance with a line of pickets and sentries. 
 
 The escort of a large convoy, except when it is covered by the front Convoys. 
 of the army, is one of the most difficult enterprises which an officer can 
 be called on to conduct ; because, in general, the extent of front to be 
 protected (which is the whole line of road occupied by the convoy) is out 
 of all proportion to the number of the troops ; and because, to reach its 
 destination, it must traverse roads which may be occupied or damaged by 
 the enemy. 
 
 Provisions, ammunition, or other munitions of war, baggage, sick, or 
 prisoners, may form the convoy. The escort should generally be mixed 
 in proportions depending on the nature of the country. 
 
 Before setting out, the commander must inspect the animals and 
 vehicles, and form divisions of convenient numbers. He must obtain 
 precise information of the road he is to follow — places of halt and billet 
 — position of the enemy — points where an attack may be looked for — 
 and the places of refuge to be sought in case of retreat. 
 
 A waggon with four horses occupies in the file 12 yards, counting 
 intervals. Where the road admits of it, the vehicles should form double 
 file, with a yard between the files, and leaving room for drawing aside a 
 waggon that may have broken down. 
 
 On a good road a waggon journeys about two miles and a half an hour ; 
 in a hilly country, a mile and three quarters. 
 
 It is prudent to have a number of empty waggons to receive the loads 
 of those that break down ; and part of their horses may help the rest. 
 Beasts of burden precede waggons, because the latter break up the roads. 
 Five or six yards' interval must be preserved between the divisions for 
 the passage of the troops from right to left. 
 
 The escort is divided into advanced-guard, main body, and rear-guard. Manner of 
 
 With a considerable convoy such as 200 carriages, occupying 2400 yards, dls F osin S the 
 
 tiii escort, 
 where it would be impossible for any but a large force to line the whole 
 
 extent with troops, the main body might be divided into four parties — 
 
 one to form a reserve, one for the protection of the centre, one to march at 
 
 the head, and another at the rear, of the column. 
 
 This reserve is to reinforce any point that may be specially threatened, 
 
4G0 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 March of the 
 convoy. 
 
 Defence of a 
 convoy. 
 
 and should be half of the main body ; the detachment to protect the centre 
 one-fourth ; and for each extremity only an eighth, for the centre will be 
 the most fatal point of attack, and the detachments on the extremities 
 will be aided by the advanced and rear guards. 
 
 Each division of the convoy is preceded by a section of infantry, and 
 some soldiers march on the flanks to watch the waggoners, who, being 
 generally peasants impressed for the occasion, would otherwise linger or 
 halt, or attempt to make off with their teams, especially in case of attack. 
 
 These different bodies do not quit their own places in the convoy to 
 concentrate on a first alarm, because feints will probably precede or 
 accompany the real attack. 
 
 The convoy, harnessing by successive divisions, to prevent unnecessary 
 fatigue to the men and horses, sets out secretly in early morning ; and, if 
 its safety be of vital importance, the space over which it is to pass should 
 have been traversed just before by a movable column. The advanced- 
 guard must precede it by about two hours, for it will be delayed by 
 discharging its necessary functions of scouring the road on each side, 
 impressing labourers, if the roads require mending, levying forage for the 
 convoy, and looking out for suitable halting-places. 
 
 The convoy must not be committed to a defile before it is occupied by 
 detachments from the reserve ; meanwhile the convoy draws together on 
 the largest possible front, and the advanced and rear guards close on it. 
 When the defile is reconnoitred the advanced-guard passes through, and far 
 enough ahead of the defile to allow the convoy to be parked in rear, while 
 the reserve occupies the heights bordering the defile towards the enemy. 
 
 It is not the business of the commander of the escort to engage in offen- 
 sive enterprises against the enemy. He fulfils his duty if he carries off 
 his convoy safely. His artillery should not open on the enemy at long 
 range. Tor he should conceal his whereabouts ; and, if he did so employ 
 his artillery, the enemy would divine that the convoy was not far from it, 
 and would direct his attack accordingly. 
 
 When attacked in force, especially by cavalry, the convoy forms square, 
 the horses facing inward, and the angles and faces are defended by in- 
 fantry. It may thus become a small fort, and, on occasion, a pivot of 
 manoeuvre. 
 
 If the enemy can be checked, the convoy must continue its march, and 
 
EXPLAINED AXD ILLUSTRATED. 461 
 
 the attack should be met at some distance from the waggons ; if unable 
 to defend the ground, the escort should retreat on woods, farms, or other 
 obstacles, and place the park so that the obstacle and the convoy may 
 Hank each other, while the troops extend between them. 
 
 In case defence seems hopeless, part of the convoy must be sacrificed 
 to obstruct the enemy. As a last resort, the carriages may be destroyed, 
 the traces cut, and an attempt made to retreat fighting. 
 
 When an escort of prisoners is attacked it should remain near them, 
 because the assailants will not risk killing their own people by firing. To 
 prevent escape the prisoners should be ordered to lie down, and not rise 
 without orders, on pain of being shot. 
 
 The attack of a convoy is much easier than the defence. The assailant Attack of a 
 can choose his time, and make his dispositions accordingly, while the convo >- 
 escort is always hampered and uncertain. 
 
 Unless the commander of the attacking force knows himself to be 
 superior to the main body of the escort, he should, after a careful recon- 
 naissance to observe the place of the convoy, attack it in an exposed part 
 of the road, with guns from a distance, and an onset of cavalry. If his 
 principal arm is infantry, he should use it to contain the main body of the 
 escort, while the above attack is made elsewhere. 
 
 In case of a convoy succeeding in forming square, as above, the guns 
 fire on it, and it will always be set on fire or opened by a few shells ; but 
 if the assailants have no artillery, and fail to penetrate, they must draw off 
 and await their opportunity when the convoy is again in motion — moving 
 ahead, meanwhile, and breaking up the roads. 
 
 Cavalry alone may be employed with advantage against convoys of 
 baggage, animals, or of prisoners. 
 
 The first step towards a military success is to know where the enemy Recounais- 
 
 is, and what he is doing. And this is not always so easy as might be sanceofthe 
 
 . enemy, 
 
 supposed, for the extent of the operations of great armies confuses inquiry, 
 
 and sometimes a great obstacle draws over the hostile front an impene- 
 trable veil. AVhen, in 1859, the armies fronted each other on the Po, 
 Giulay could devise no better plan for discovering the motions of the 
 enemy than sending a whole corps cVarmtc across the river to make a 
 reconnaissance in force. The great disadvantage of this operation is that, 
 as the troops employed are intended only to unmask the enemy and then 
 
462 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 make good their retreat, they always retire from an action with the air 
 and reputation of defeat. Thus Forey, with very inferior forces, claims to 
 have beaten Stadion at Casteggio; and it is in vain to explain what 
 passes for a defeat by calling it a reconnaissance. Unfortunately, too, for 
 the Austrians, the information they derived from the costly adventure was 
 delusive ; for the vigour of the French defence caused them to believe that 
 the main force lay towards Voghera, and that the great operation would 
 be by the right. Hence they were induced to strengthen their left ; 
 whereas the Allies marched round their right flank by Novara. 
 
 When armies are near each other, outposts serve the purpose of natural 
 obstacles ; and a commander who wants to know what a skilful adversary 
 is doing, must resort to secret or armed reconnaissances. The first kind 
 must depend so entirely on the invention and faculty of enterprise of the 
 conductor of the operation that it would be in vain to lay down any rules 
 for guidance. The second must have for its object to push in the pickets 
 and reach the supports, beyond which it can rarely penetrate without 
 the risk of bringing on a general action. But the number and position of 
 these will of themselves give a great deal of information about the force 
 and position of the main army. 
 
 From commanding ground, or before an enemy who is negligent in 
 covering his front, much may be learned by a practised general without 
 making an actual attack. Napoleon spent part of the day before Auster- 
 litz at the outposts, while, in his front, the valley of the Goldbach, and 
 the opposite slopes, were covered with cavalry skirmishers, amidst whom 
 rode experienced officers, from whose observations, joined to his own, 
 the Emperor deciphered accurately the movements and designs of the 
 adversary. 
 
 In a reconnaissance to observe an enemy on the march, the detachment 
 is hidden, and the officer in charge goes himself to the front to verify the 
 reported approach of the hostile column. He then rejoins his party, and 
 draws it up by the side of the road, where it will at once be concealed 
 and command a view of the enemy. He must be very much on the alert, 
 or it is likely the flankers of the advanced-guard may intercept him ; still, 
 a cool and experienced officer will not be imposed on by an appearance 
 of danger which might deceive a novice. He must aim at discovering the 
 number, composition, and direction of the enemy's troops; their order of 
 
EXPLAINED AXD ILLUSTRATED. 463 
 
 march ; whether they have artillery ; and if they appear ready for action. 
 But before finishing his observations he must send off two mounted men 
 with notice that the enemy is approaching, and that he will in a few 
 minutes make a detailed report. 
 
 When "Wellington, before Badajos, heard that Marmont was approach- 
 ing Ciudad Rodrigo, just captured from the French, he sent an officer to 
 observe the movement. From a well-concealed point of observation the 
 envoy marked the march of the French ; and, entering a town they had 
 just quitted, found they had left the greater part of their scaling-ladders 
 behind. As their siege-train had been captured in Rodrigo, Wellington, 
 who might else have been drawn northward for the defence of his acqui- 
 sition, had no fears for the safety of the fortress, and remained to prose- 
 cute his immediate design. 
 
 A reconnaissance on the rear of a beaten enemy ought to discover what 
 roads the principal masses have taken. Few precautions are necessary ; 
 celerity is the main requisite, and light cavalry are the proper troops. 
 All traces left of the enemy are noted, and his main line may generally be 
 known from these alone, as abandoned guns, baggage, arms, and wounded. 
 Such a reconnaissance made on every road after Ligny might have 
 saved Napoleon at Waterloo. By pursuing on a wrong line under a false 
 impression, Wellington failed to gather the proper fruits of the victory of 
 Salamanca. 
 
 It is necessary to supplement the information given by maps, however Reconnais- 
 
 sood, by an actual deciphering of the country by instructed officers. 
 
 °' J 10 j j country. 
 
 When M'Clellan moved up the peninsula from Fort Monroe, he found 
 his maps untrustworthy in important particulars. One of his columns 
 was stopped by unexpected obstacles; and he was forced to await a 
 complete reconnaissance of the district. 
 
 It is very useful for a staff officer to consider what observations he may 
 with most advantage habituate himself to make, so that, under all condi- 
 tions of ground, he may recognise the essential features, which will now 
 be briefly enumerated. 
 
 Eoads.— Their width ; which ought to be 20 feet, for free and conveni- 
 ent passage of troops. The minimum width for an emergency must be 
 determined by the space required for the passage of a gun. For baggage- 
 trains, hills steeper than T V will be a serious impediment, and those over 
 
4G4 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 i will be impassable. Guns can, however, surmount steeper slopes up 
 
 to±. 
 
 Whether they pass over good or bad bottom ; whether liable to become 
 impassable in certain weather ; whether easily repairable, and if materials 
 for mending them exist near, such as wood fences, stone walls, planks, 
 hurdles, brushwood, straw, furze, or reeds, or, as in the corduroy roads of 
 Canada, small pine-trees. 
 
 Contractions of the roads, such as fords, bridges, and defiles ; whether 
 practicable for all arms ; width, material, and strength of bridges. A 
 bridge strong enough for infantry to pass four-deep will bear cavalry in 
 file, and guns singly. 
 
 The foregoing particulars must be necessary for all movements in an 
 imperfectly known district ; when, for instance, a combination is to be 
 directed from all quarters on a particular point, as in marching to engage 
 the enemy. It is also essential that distances should be expressed in 
 time as well as space. Every staff officer should ascertain, as accurately 
 as possible, the length of his own average paces and those of his horse, 
 and the time in which each accomplishes a given distance. 
 
 If movements are to be made near an enemy, he must also note where 
 the road is commanded; what positions it affords in case the march 
 should be opposed ; what roads and paths fall into it, and their direction ; 
 where it is bordered by trees, hedges, ditches or marshes ; and the nature 
 of the slopes on each side of a bridge or ford, with regard to attack or 
 defence. When other parallel roads are near, the nature of the ground, 
 and communications between them, should be investigated. 
 
 Fords. — Their banks, their bottom, their level at entering and quitting 
 the water. Their position, whether in angles, windings, or straight parts 
 of the stream. The direction of the ford — depth and rapidity of stream 
 — whether the ford is shifting or permanent — command of the banks. 
 Points existing in the neighbourhood of which use may be made to 
 deceive the enemy as to the real point of passage. 
 
 A ford should not be deeper than 3 feet for infantry, 4 feet for 
 cavalry, and 2| for artillery. If the stream be swift these limits must 
 be lessened. 
 
 A bottom of large stones is bad for cavalry, impracticable for carriages. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 4G5 
 
 Gravel is the best bottom. A sandy lord, though good at first, is apt to 
 deepen when many troops pass. It must be ascertained whether the 
 stream be liable to sudden floods, and if so, under what circumstances ; 
 and whether it is affected by tides. 
 
 ElVEES. — First, When the course of the river is in the direction of the 
 line of operations, the object being to ascertain how connection may be 
 maintained on the march or for action, by a force moving on both banks. 
 General nature of the valley in which the river lies ; whether broad or 
 narrow, swampy, rocky, woody, &c. ; proximity of heights on one or both 
 banks. Nature of the stream ; whether tidal ; general direction and 
 sinuosities ; breadth, average depth, rate of current, and liability to flood ; 
 character of bottom and of banks. Tributaries. Bridges, fords, and their 
 approaches. Other points at which passages of the stream are practi- 
 cable, or might be made so, for the different arms. Boats. 
 
 Secondly, When the river is to be used as a defensive obstacle, in 
 which case, the following additional particulars are to be noted : Nature 
 of the approaches and points at which access by them may be barred by 
 troops or obstacles ; command, and distances from the stream, of heights 
 on either bank, within cannon - range ; points and means for effecting 
 inundations ; points on either bank suitable for covering the passage of 
 troops to further bank. 
 
 Woods. — The kind of trees composing them; whether adapted for 
 abatis and entanglements ; whether the trees are wide apart, permitting 
 cavalry to penetrate, or thick and difficult to traverse ; the number of 
 troops they are calculated to hold. Single trees, or other conspicuous 
 objects, should be noted, and their bearings observed, as they may serve 
 for points of alignment, or to give directions to a column. At Magenta 
 the troops under MacMahon were directed through the close flat country 
 on the tower of Magenta, which was the principal point visible among 
 the trees. The nature and direction of the roads through the wood 
 should be noted ; and whether the wood would be an advantage or a 
 hindrance in case of taking position near it. 
 
 Canals. — Whether for navigation, or irrigation, or draining of wet 
 lands ; their width, length, and depth ; slopes of the banks ; locks, how 
 situated, and how to be destroyed or protected. 
 
 2g 
 
466 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 Defiles. — Their length, whether their gorges are open or narrow; 
 mode of occupying them to cover a retreat ; how to distribute troops 
 both to attack and defend them. Whether they can be turned if strongly 
 occupied. 
 
 Eailways. — The direction and present condition of the permanent way, 
 including its bridges, tunnels, viaducts, cuttings, and embankments ; its 
 curves and ruling gradients ; whether a double or single line of rails, and 
 the nature of their construction ; the gauge, whether continuous and 
 identical with that of other connected lines or branches ; the distances 
 between the several stations, and the military positions which would 
 protect the line generally against attack. Details connected with sta- 
 tions, including the number and dimensions of their platforms, and the 
 facilities afforded for constructing additional means of entraining or de- 
 training troops — the sidings, docks, crossings, turn-tables, cranes, work- 
 shops, &c. ; the condition of the telegraph-lines and signals, water-tanks 
 and stores of coal ; the direction of the neighbouring roads, the approaches 
 to the station, and means of crossing the line without impeding the 
 traffic ; the means of sheltering men, horses, and stores, and neighbouring 
 spaces available for forming up or encamping troops ; capabilities for 
 defence of the station itself; quantity, nature, and condition of the rolling 
 stock, especially the proportion suitable for the conveyance of horses and 
 military carriages. 
 
 On abandoning a railway to the enemy it should of course be first ren- 
 dered useless ; but, in view of its possible recovery, the work of destruc- 
 tion should be limited to the necessity of the case : it would in most cases be 
 highly inexpedient to demolish tunnels and long viaducts. The permanent 
 way may be partially destroyed by blowing up a few bridges, destroying 
 the rails, and loosening the sleepers ; stations may be set on fire, and 
 their essential appliances destroyed, particularly the water-tanks, signals, 
 telegraphs, workshops, points, and crossings. Engines and rolling-stock 
 may be generally removed, or, failing that, may easily be rendered 
 useless. On this subject General Sherman says: "My own experience 
 demonstrates the proper method to be, to march a regiment to the road, 
 stack arms, loosen two rails opposite the right, and two opposite the 
 left of the regiment, then to heave the whole track, rails, and ties, over, 
 breaking it all to pieces ; then pile the ties in the nature of cribwork, 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 4G7 
 
 and lay the rails over thom ; then by means of fence-rails make a bon- 
 fire, and when the rails are red-hot, let men give the rail a twist, which 
 cannot be straightened without machinery. Also fill up some of the cuts 
 with heavy logs and trunks of trees and branches, and cover up and fill 
 with dirt." 
 
 Hasty Field-Works. — These are of greatly-increased importance, and 
 will certainly be extensively used in the next war, though in most good 
 positions only parts need be thus strengthened. 
 
 A shelter-trench for infantry, 4 feet wide, 1 foot 3 inches deep, may be 
 made by a single line of men 5 feet apart, in half an hour. 
 
 Gun-pits can be made each by a gun detachment in about an hour. 
 
 In pine-woods, in the American war, a line of shelter-trench and 
 abatis was habitually formed in about an hour by troops taking up 
 a position. 
 
 Strong enclosed works, such as redoubts, cannot be made in less than 
 18 hours. 
 
 Inundations. — A defensive army which cannot find rivers to cover 
 its front sometimes resorts to inundations, by damming up otherwise 
 insignificant streamlets or canals of irrigation, in which case it must 
 be considered how these can be converted back to other channels by 
 dams or sluices, and how to cover or destroy a dam or sluice. 
 
 An inundation must not be looked on merely as a space of water of a 
 certain depth and extent. It must be considered whether it is owing to 
 canals, as aforesaid, or to a permanently wet soil having springs beneath 
 it, or to the overflowing of a neighbouring stream. In all cases, how it 
 may be traversed should be ascertained, or, if impassable, what are the 
 shortest routes round it. 
 
 Mountains. — In reconnoitring a hilly region, the most commanding 
 points should be first taken, and the ravines which spring thence fol- 
 lowed. The water-courses, their volume, rapidity, and direction, should 
 be noted ; and of the roads, those which pass along the crests, as gener- 
 ally the most practicable, should receive most attention, those that often 
 cross valleys being less eligible on account of the multiplicity of bridges 
 requiring to be established to secure free access. Defensible positions 
 should be looked for at proper distances for halts and encampments, with 
 wood and water at hand. 
 
4G8 THE OPERATION'S OF WAR 
 
 Slopes. — Whether all arms can move up and down them ; whether 
 cavalry, after ascending, will be in condition to charge immediately. 
 
 Fences. — In all districts, the nature of the fences in different portions 
 must be considered, — whether easily levelled to afford free communica- 
 tion, as rails, and thin quicksets, and palings ; whether forming ready 
 defences, such as banks and ditches ; whether rendering portions of a line 
 ineligible for the action of certain arms. 
 
 It is evident that, in the performance of these duties, the man who is 
 merely a student, however intellectual, will be very inferior to the shrewd 
 and ready observer who has developed in various pursuits his ingenuity 
 and resource. The staff officer may bring diversified knowledge into 
 effectual play. Some acquaintance with geology may enable him to 
 recognise at once the character of whole tracts of country, discerning 
 whether they are boggy, gravelly, rocky ; what sort of roads may be 
 expected in them ; what resources they will afford ; and whether field- 
 works will be easy or difficult of construction. Without being a learned 
 botanist, he may often recognise the nature of a soil or a ford from the 
 character of the herbage. And he will find a knowledge of the influence 
 of climate upon soil, upon the rise and fall of rivers, and upon crops, and 
 of the signs which indicate storms, rains, mists, heat, or sudden changes, 
 of great value. Staff officers who join acquirements to ability and a spirit 
 of enterprise, are the springs which, directed by sagacious generals, impart 
 order, force, and purpose to the machinery of armies. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 460 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 The foregoing pages were designed to present an image of modern war ; 
 and if they have not failed of their purpose, the reader will be convinced 
 that military science is not mere pedantry, but a reality of vast import- 
 ance. For, granting the preceding narratives to be mainly correct, and 
 the inferences drawn from them just, skill in arms is the equivalent of 
 thousands of good troops, and may again succeed, as it has so often suc- 
 ceeded before, in gaining, against odds, victories which fix the fate of 
 nations. 
 
 Let us imagine that an army in the field is commanded by a general 
 who has fought his way upward from grade to grade, who is valiant, 
 devoted, and practised in war. He is versed in all routine duties, 
 knows the uses and capabilities of the different arms, can choose and 
 occupy a position, make the dispositions for the march of his columns, 
 stubbornly cover a retreat, and save his army, even after a heavy disaster, 
 But not having a mind capable of comprehensive views, or of deep study, 
 he knows nothing of great combinations. Strategy, in the sense of a 
 flexible science, to be adapted to circumstances, is a sealed book to him : 
 the theatre of war is written in a cipher to which he has not the key ; he 
 can deal with the accidents of the country, when they present themselves, 
 as something to be immediately attacked or defended ; but they suggest 
 no large problems by the solution of which a few marches decide a cam- 
 paign. Cautious, from not knowing when he may venture to be bold, and 
 rash from ignorance of what may be attempted against him, he spoils his 
 offensive movements by hesitation, defends himself by makeshifts, and 
 only half understands his own blunders when they have ruined his army. 
 
470 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR 
 
 This is no unfair picture of what has often passed muster in the world as 
 a respectable leader to be intrusted with the fate of hosts. It would do 
 no injustice to some of Napoleon's most celebrated marshals. Such a one 
 will probably acquit himself with credit so long as he is opposed by no 
 qualities superior to his own.* 
 
 But let us imagine that a general of a different stamp enters the field : 
 one who has been taught by study and thought, not merely what has been 
 done in war, and how to conform to respectable precedent (though that 
 may be much), but how to meet new circumstances with new combina- 
 tions. He has mastered the problems of strategy, and can read the 
 theatre of war. He knows not only how to draw from a situation all its 
 inherent advantages, but how to produce the situation. Thus, when a 
 great opportunity arrives he is the less likely to lose it, because it is of 
 his own making ; he seizes it unhesitatingly, because he has confidence 
 in his own knowledge of the game ; and in darkness and difficulty his 
 step is assured, because he is familiar with the ground he moves on. 
 
 When such opponents are matched we have the conditions of startling, 
 brilliant, decisive successes in war. And such were the conditions under 
 which Napoleon met his adversaries. On the one side was respectability, 
 relying on revered traditions. Prussian and Austrian generals were not 
 likely to desert prescribed paths in order to strike out independent modes 
 of military action. But Napoleon was not only a man of vast insight, 
 originality, and power, but had been trained amidst influences adverse to 
 all kinds of prescription. The French Eevolution was sceptical of mili- 
 tary as of political traditions, and asserted in practice the most subversive 
 doctrines. Napoleon, the child and servant, before he became the master, 
 of the Eevolution, was the man to combine with the occasion. From the 
 moment when he first assumed command of a Republican army he began to 
 remodel the system of war. His opponents moved their men on the chess- 
 board according to the rules which they took for immutable principles, 
 and the game went on so long as their antagonists were also guided by 
 them ; but when an adversary appeared who only awaited the development 
 of their methodical movements to play his own secret, profound, and deci- 
 sive game, all equality of chances disappeared, and the only variety in the 
 
 * Had this character not been sketched before the war of 1S66, it might have been taken 
 for a portrait of the unfortunate Austrian commander. 
 
EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED. 47l 
 
 result was in the mode of defeat. In 1796 he concentrated his force 
 against the extended front of the enemy, broke it at Millesimo, and 
 confusion and ruin poured in after him at the gap. At Piacenza he broke 
 out on their line of retreat, and in a moment threw them back beyond 
 the Mincio. Repeatedly, around Mantua, he met and defeated, with the 
 same troops, the desultory dispersed attacks of his adversaries. In that 
 single year, the first in which he commanded an army, he illustrated 
 completely the system of war which deserves to be styled the Napoleonic, 
 since he was, if not its inventor, its greatest exemplar. 
 
 In 1800 and 1805 he descended upon the line of retreat of the hostile 
 armies and enclosed them. In 1806 he aimed the same stroke, cut the 
 Prussian armies from the Oder, and threw them on the coast of the North 
 Sea. In 1809 he varied the stroke, for he broke the centre of the enemy's 
 line, and threw back the fragments beyond the capital. And here ended 
 the unbroken flow of his successes ; and it ended for two reasons — first, 
 because it was inevitable that his constant adversaries should in time 
 come to catch some of the spirit of his own system, and to meet him 
 with his own weapons. The strokes they dealt against his communica- 
 tions in 1812 and 1813 would probably have been impossible for them 
 ten years before. Beaten into proficiency, the terms they engaged on 
 were no longer so unequal as at first. But, besides that, the Napoleonic 
 system is more successful in single campaigns than in protracted wars. 
 It is wasteful of men ; great marches can only be performed, great blows 
 delivered, at a certain cost of material. The immense opportunities for 
 which he laboured existed only for the moment. When he had broken 
 the enemy's front, when he had concentrated superior numbers against 
 them, still, if he neglected to crush them the opportunity would vanish. 
 Hence troops were poured on, effecting with carnage what might have 
 been effected with small loss had time permitted — but time did not 
 permit. The result would be worth a few thousand men — let it be won 
 at the price, since for the enemy the cost would be far greater. When 
 armies are equal in numbers, constant losses of five against three, in 
 thousands or tens of thousands, soon decide a campaign. But when this 
 system is pursued for a series of campaigns, against enemies whose 
 resources are double, it must fail in the end. His own losses crush the 
 victor. Lee, like Napoleon, wins campaigns by making skill compensate 
 
472 THE OPERATIONS OF WAR EXPLAINED. 
 
 for numbers ; but, like Napoleon, he yields at last to the superior 
 resources of enemies who continue to press him to exhaustion. 
 
 Such wars a outrance, and such inequality of resource in the combat- 
 ants, are, however, the exception. And the moral of this book is, not 
 that numbers and wealth must prevail, nor that great generals are 
 heaven-born ; it is, on the contrary, that the conditions of success are 
 attainable and capable of demonstration ; that the preparation of study 
 and thought is essential to skill in war ; and that, being thus prepared, 
 a leader, in order to achieve the most notable successes, need not be 
 gifted with inspiration, but only with the more appreciable, though still 
 rare, combination of sound sense, clear insight, and resolution. It is 
 partly for the sake of pointing this moral that the achievements here 
 recounted have been divested of the glow and ornament with which 
 historians naturally embellish, while they confuse, the record of deeds 
 that form the pride of nations, and that these feats of arms have been 
 dealt with in their logical, not their rhetorical aspect. If, of the many 
 Englishmen who possess the qualities necessary for great soldiers, some 
 few should find that this book has in any degree smoothed the path 
 that leads to honour and achievement, the years passed in studying its 
 subjects, and the many months devoted to its composition, will have been 
 sufficiently fruitful of result. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 ABSTRACT of the FORCES of a BRITISH ARMY-CORPS, to ce taken 
 into Account for the Line of Battle. 
 
 A Regiment of Cavalry (4 squadrons) lias a war-establishment of 480 troop- 
 horses, with an excess of men : deductions made for sick horses and horses of 
 the band, its maximum fighting strength would be 440 sabres. 
 
 A Brigade of Cavalry consists of 3 regiments, and one battery of horse 
 artillery. 
 
 A Battalion of Infantry (8 companies) numbers 1000 rank and file, 96 of 
 whom are pioneers, band, and drivers : deducting 5 per cent sick, the maximum 
 fighting strength would be 850 bayonets. 
 
 A Brigade of Infantry comprises 3 battalions. 
 
 A Division of Infantry comprises — 
 
 2 Brigades. 
 
 1 Divisional battalion, independent of the commanders of brigades. 
 1 Regiment of cavalry. 
 
 3 Batteries of artillery. 
 
 Thus its maximum fighting strength may be taken as nearly G000 infantry, 
 4 40 cavalry, 18 guns. 
 
 An Army-Corps comprises — 
 
 3 Divisions, as above. 
 
 5 Batteries of corps-artillery. 
 
 1 Brigade of cavalry, as above. 
 
 Thus its maximum fighting strength may be taken as nearly 18,000 infantry, 
 2 GOO cavalry, 90 guns. 
 
 The organisation of the German Army -Corps is different in many respects : 
 the maximum fighting strength of a German Division may be taken as about — 
 
 10,000 infantry, 440 cavalry, 24 guns ; 
 and of an Army-Corps, as about — 
 
 21,000 infantry, 880 cavalry, 102 guns. 
 
 The German cavalry brigades, instead of being attached to army-corps, are 
 assembled in independent divisions, with one or two batteries taken from the 
 corps-artillery. 
 
474 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ROAD -SPACES ON THE MAECH. 
 
 Calculation for a division : the combatant portion fit for action being separated 
 from the non-combatant : without tents. 
 
 Combatant Portion fit for Action. 
 
 7 Battalions, each 850 rank and file, with ammunition and 
 
 tool carts, ..... 
 1 Eegiment of cavalry, 440 sabres, with ammunition-cart, 
 3 Batteries of field-artillery (guns and limber-waggons only), 
 1 Field company of engineers, 
 \ Troop of military police (as orderlies, &c. ), 
 \ Reserve ammunition column, 
 1 Bearer company (complete, with ambulances, &c), 
 
 Add 3- for lengthening out on the march, 
 
 Or a little more than 4 miles. 
 
 Total, 
 
 Yards. 
 
 2870 
 492 
 904 
 15G 
 38 
 428 
 480 
 
 5368 
 1789 
 
 7157 
 
 Remainder 0/ Division following according to circumstances. 
 
 7 Battalions \ 
 
 1 Regiment of cavalry > Regimental transport of, 
 3 Batteries of field-artillery / 
 h Troop of military police, 
 ^ Reserve ammunition column, 
 Commissariat, 
 
 2 Field-hospitals, 
 
 Add J for lengthening, 
 
 Or a little more than 2 miles. 
 Total for the division, 6| miles. 
 
 896 
 144 
 228 
 38 
 428 
 860 
 368 
 
 2962 
 987 
 
 3949 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 475 
 
 ROAD- SPACES OX THE MARCH— continued. 
 
 Eor an Army-Corps (without Tents). 
 Combatant Portion. 
 
 
 Yards. 
 
 3 Divisions (at 5368 yards each), 
 
 16,104 
 
 Cavalry brigade, ..... 
 
 1,956 
 
 Corps-artillery, ..... 
 
 1,440 
 
 Corps-engineers, ..... 
 
 1,012 
 
 | Troop military police, .... 
 
 38 
 
 h Bearer company, ..... 
 
 240 
 
 
 20,790 
 
 Add £, 
 
 6,930 
 
 
 27,720 
 
 Or 15§ miles. 
 
 
 Non-Combatant Portion . 
 
 3 Divisional trains, 
 
 
 
 
 8,886 
 
 Cavalry brigade do., 
 
 
 
 
 804 
 
 Corps- artillery do., 
 
 
 
 
 920 
 
 Corps-engineers do., 
 
 
 
 
 184 
 
 \ Troop military police, 
 
 
 
 
 38 
 
 Commissariat, 
 
 
 
 
 3,176 
 
 Ordnance store department, 
 
 
 
 
 480 
 
 Medical department, 
 
 
 
 
 552 
 
 
 15,040 
 
 Add i, . 
 
 
 
 
 5,013 
 
 Or \\\ miles. 
 
 Total for Army-Corps, 27 miles. 
 
 20,053 
 
 ** These calculations were given by Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, Piofessor of Military 
 Administration at the Staff College, to whose very accurate knowledge of that subject the 
 author has been otherwise indebted. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Advaxced-guard, the, its duty and composition, 449 — its proportion, 450— order ol 
 its march, ib. — distance from main body, 451. 
 
 Advanced posts must be captured, 419. 
 
 Albuera, defeat of columns by lines as shown at, 356. 
 
 Allies, the, review of their campaign of 1814 in Champagne, 278 et seq. — the formation 
 of their line of battle at Austerlitz, 380 et seq., 386 et seq. 
 
 Alma, tactical error of the Allies at, 420. 
 
 Alternatives of action, illustration of advantage of possessing, 208. 
 
 American war, why the Confederates at first chose the defensive, 42 — advantages of 
 the Federals for offensive warfare, 44 — the two modes of warfare illustrated from 
 it, ib. — various theatres of operation in it, 53. 
 
 Angles, re-entering and salient, 222. 
 
 Angular base, Moreau's campaign of 1800, as showing its advantages, 98 et seq. 
 
 Angular frontier, extent of its influence illustrated, in the cases of Moreau in lbOO and 
 of the Federals in their attempts on Richmond, 21.9 — different kinds of them, 222. 
 
 Angular orders of battle : the salient, 412 — the re-entering, 414 — convex and concave, 
 415. 
 
 Armenia, advantages of the electric telegraph as illustrated in the campaign of 1877 
 in. 441, note. 
 
 Armies, progressive changes in composition of, 14 — the supply of them at a distance 
 from their base, 33 — their undue dependence on magazines in the eighteenth cen- 
 tury, 35 — effects of their supplies being intercepted, 40. 
 
 Arms of precision, effects of their introduction on tactics, 353, 361. 
 
 Army-corps, British, abstract of the forces of a, 473 — road-spaces on the march, 474, 475. 
 
 Artillery, the formation of, 367 — echelon of guns, ib. — relations of its fire to slope of 
 ground, ib. — combination with cavalry, 369 — these together should overpower 
 infantry, 370 — combination with infantry, ib. — space occupied in line of battle, 
 372 — modern, fortresses rendered untenable by, 309 — rifled, effects of its introduc- 
 tion, 367 — essential points in its training, 368 — proper position of, in the line of 
 battle, 373 — its effect comparatively diminished, 433 — new features in its employ- 
 ment for defence, 434 — and in attack, ib. — should be massed for concentrated fire, 
 435 — the action of cavalry against, 437. 
 
 Assailant, value of rivers as screening his movements, 233. 
 
 Attack in battle, selection of the points for it, 417 — these determined by tactical 
 reasons, ib. — advanced posts to be captured, 419 — strong points to lie avoided, 
 except when on commanding ground, ib. — order of, the Prussians in 1870, 361 — 
 change in the mode of, 424 et seq. 
 
 Austerlitz, the formation of the lines of battle at, as illustrating the principles laid 
 down, 380 et seq. — tactics by which made so decisive, 410, 419. 
 
 Austria, Napoleon's selection of theatre of operations in Marengo campaign, 55 et seq. 
 
478 INDEX. 
 
 — political elements influencing her own selection of scene of operations, 57 — 
 review of Moreau's campaign of 1800 against, 97 et seq. — review of the campaign 
 of 1805, 117— that of 1800, 122— the Italian campaign of 1796 reviewed, 138 et 
 seq. — the campaign of Eckmuhl, 145 et seq. — the German campaign of 1796, 155 
 et seq. — position of, in the campaign of 1866 in Bohemia, 226 — her hases as 
 opposed to France, ib. 
 Austrians, illustrations from their movements in 1859 of importance of holding river 
 parallel to path of advancing army, 272. 
 
 Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, why so important, 307. 
 
 Balaklava, the defeat of the Russian cavalry at, 365 — the Turkish fortified posts before, 
 error regarding them, 377. 
 
 Bank of a river, advantage of holding the higher, 233. 
 
 Base, importance of an extensive, 227. 
 
 Bases of armies, importance of attention to, 41 — and frontiers, effect of the configura- 
 tion of, 219. 
 
 Battle, formation of its line, 372 — space occupied by the different arms, ib. — position 
 of artillery, 373 — cavalry on flanks, ib.— its formation to be regulated by conditions 
 of ground, 374 — passage of a river covering its line, 375 — obstacles partially 
 covering it, 376 — the direction of these and its line, ib. — condition of a good posi- 
 tion, ib. — its defensible points, ib. — obstacles on flanks, 379 — Austerlitz as an 
 illustration of the principles laid down, 380 et seq. — that of Waterloo, 390 — that of 
 Woerth, 396. 
 
 Battle, orders of, 404 et seq. — the oblique order, 405 — it exemplified in the battle of 
 Kolin, 406 — in that of the Pyrenees, 407 — and in that of Leuthen, 408 — the 
 counter-attack, 410 — angular orders: the salient order, 412 — illustrated at 
 Gettysburg, ib. — employment of cavalry in it, 413 — there-entering order, 414 — 
 the convex and concave orders, 415 — preparations for the attack, 417' — use 
 of skirmishers to cover movements, ib. — selection of points of attack, ib. — inde- 
 cisive victories, 418 — when decisive, ib. — points of attack dictated by tactical 
 reasons, ib. — capture of advanced posts, 419 — strong points to be avoided, save 
 when on commanding ground, ib. — where to attack when enemy's flank is sup- 
 ported, ib. — occupation of ground when a flank is covered by an obstacle, 420 — 
 case of an army cut off from its base, 421 — conduct of retreats, ib. — and of pur- 
 suits, 422 — general summary on the subject, 423. 
 
 Battles, relations of, to a campaign, 61 — the aim in modern, 358 — how this to be 
 secured, 359. 
 
 Bazaine, Marshal, effect of deficiency of bridges on his position in Metz, 309 — during 
 the Metz campaign, 319 — takes part at Metz, 320 — battle of Gravelotte, 321, 322 
 — shut up in Metz, 322 — course he might have followed before being shut up, and 
 its probable results, 329 et seq. 
 
 Beaulieu, General, Napoleon's campaign of 1796 against him in Italy, 138 et seq. 
 
 Beauregard, General, his movements in campaign of 1861, 169 et seq. 
 
 Belgium, effect of her neutrality during late war, 312. 
 
 Black Forest, the roads of the, 99. 
 
 Blucher, Marshal, review of the campaign of Waterloo, 181 et seq. — battle of Ligny, and 
 subsequent line of retreat, 188 et seq. — why Napoleon attacked him first, 193 — re- 
 view of his campaign of 1814 in Champagne, 278 et seq. 
 
 Bombardment, reduction of fortified towns by, 309. 
 
 Bridge-head, what, 97 — best forms for them, 303. 
 
 Brunswick, the Duke of, commander-in-chief during campaign of Jena, and review of his 
 movements, 84 — his proposed plan, 85 — his defeat at Auerstedt, 89. 
 
 Bull Run, its passage by the Federals as showing danger of exposing flank in crossing a 
 river, 252. 
 
 Bulow, General, on the system of supply, 33 — remarkable march of corps under, 32. 
 
 Burnside, General, his passage of the Rappahannock in 1862, as showing hazard of cross- 
 ing in presence of a concentrated enemy, 236. 
 
INDEX. 479 
 
 Campaigns, plan followed in narrating, Gl. 
 
 Campaign of 1SGG in Bohemia, as illustrating advantage of combining from divergent 
 bases, 199 and note — justification of the Prussians advancing by a doable line, 205 
 and note — with reference to a position between the Iser and Elbe, 22G. 
 
 Campaign of 186G in Italy, situation of armies with reference to angular frontiers, 222. 
 
 Campaign of 1877 in Armenia, as illustrating advantage of electric telegraph, 441, note. 
 
 Camps of instruction, the great importance and use of, 443. 
 
 Canals, points to be noted regarding them in reconnaissance, 465. 
 
 Capital, occupation of the, as an object of military operations, and its effect, 50 — it must 
 be held, ib. — importance of its being fortified, 310. 
 
 Cavalry, the formations of, 361 — charging broken infantry, 362— debated questions con- 
 cerning them, 363 et seq. — amount that may be used in a mass, 364 — pace of the 
 charge, 365 — whether they should be independent under their own commander, ib. 
 — combination with artillery, 369 — and with infantry, 370 — their charges inde- 
 cisive unless supported by infantry, 371 — space occupied in line of battle, 372 — 
 reasons for placing on flanks, 373 — opportunities for squadrons posted between 
 divisions, 374— employment of, in the salient order of battle, 413 — their probable 
 employment in the new tactics, 436 — attacking shaken troops, ib. — in pursuit, 4:57 
 — action against retiring infantry, ib. — in support of a turning movement, ib. — and 
 against artillery, ib. — extended order of attack probable, 438 — should they cover 
 the advance of the army ? ib. — mounted riflemen, 439. 
 
 Champagne, review of campaign of 1814 in, 278 et seq. — comments on it, 291 et seq. 
 
 Charging pace of cavalry, on the, 365. 
 
 Charles, the Archduke, his military history, 3 — review of his conduct of the campaign 
 of Eckmuhl, 145 et seq. — the German campaign of 1796, 155 et seq. — on the duties, 
 &c, of a containing force, 167 — on the military importance of the Danube, 275 — 
 his scheme of fortresses for S.W. Germany, 305 — on massing of cavalry, 364. 
 
 Charles, Prince of Lorraine, his tactics at battle of Prague, 344. 
 
 Charles Albert, the campaign of Novara under, 64 et seq. 
 
 Chickahominy, its passage as illustrating the risk incurred by an army which is astride 
 a river, 258 et seq. 
 
 Chzarnowsky, General, review of campaign of Novara under, 64 et seq. — object, &c, 
 of his movements, 71 et seq. 
 
 Coa, Crauford's defence of its line in 1810, 237. 
 
 Coasts, advantage of commanding the enemy's, illustrated in the case of the Peninsular 
 war, 221. 
 
 Colli, General, Napoleon's movements against him in the campaign of 1 796, 138 et seq. pass. 
 
 Column, on cavalry charging in, 363 — its for mation and order on march tobattle, 444 
 et seq. — the intervals between them, 446 et seq. 
 
 Columns, deep, suitable to medieval battles, 337 — use of, for manoeuvre and attack, 354 
 — their depth and extent, 355 — their failure against the British in line at Water- 
 loo, 356 — columns of battalions, ib. — their effect chiefly moral, ib. — superiority of 
 small over massive, 357. 
 
 Columns of attack, the Prussian, 1870, 361 — retention of, by the Prussians, 424— these 
 under fire become swarms of skirmishers, ib. 
 
 Combined armies operating from divergent bases, Waterloo campaign as an illustration 
 of, 179 et seq. 
 
 Communications, mutual interception of, 110 — uses of rivers to secure, 267. 
 
 Concave order of battle, the, 415. 
 
 Concentration, necessity of, against an intercepting enemy, 1 30. 
 
 Concentric action, value of, over divided, 152. 
 
 Concentric army, the, how to be formed, 175. 
 
 Confederates, the, at first on the defensive in America, 42 — their advantage from operat- 
 ing in their own country, 46. 
 
 Conquest of territory as an object of military operations, 50. 
 
 Containing force, different ways of employing it, 153 — limitation of it, 164 — the Arch- 
 duke Charles on it, 167. 
 
480 INDEX. 
 
 Convergent rivers, their military influence illustrated by the campaign of 1814 in 
 Champagne, 278 et seq. 
 
 Convex order of battle, the so-called, and its dangers, 415. 
 
 Convoys, how escorted, 459 — disposing of the escort, ib. — order of march, 4G0 — de- 
 fence of, ib. — the attack of them, 461. 
 
 Corps, the system of, as organised by Napoleon, 352. 
 
 Counter-attack in battle, most efficiently dealt against refused wing, 410. 
 
 Covering force, distribution and object of, in passage of rivers, 257. 
 
 Crimea, the position of the French in, as to their base, supplies, &c, 63. 
 
 Crimean war, political elements influencing selection of theatre of operations, 57 — 
 danger of the artillery during the flank march, 450. 
 
 Crown, increased power of the, and change in military system thus induced, 12 et seq. 
 
 Cultivation, effect of, on military operations, 217. 
 
 Danube, Napoleon's passage of it, before Aspern, 234 — his passage of it before Wag- 
 ram, 236, 238 — and its valley, its military importance, 275. 
 Davout, Marshal, his victory at Auerstedt, 89. 
 Decisive points, importance of possession of, 208. 
 Defeat, retreat and pursuit after, how to be conducted, 135, 421, 422. 
 Defence, true uses of mountain barriers for, 232 — employment of obstacles in, 263 — 
 
 necessary change in the formation for, 426, 430 et seq. 
 Defensible points in line of battle, how and when to be used, 376 — best formation for 
 
 attacking them, 377. 
 Defensive, the, its advantages, 45 — offensive operations should be joined with, 47 — 
 
 probable modifications of tactics on, 439. 
 Defensive armies, why they operate on several roads at once, 25. 
 Defiles, points to be noted regarding them in reconnaissance, 466. 
 Definitions, abuse of, in military history, 3. 
 Diagrams, misuse of, in illustrating military history, 3. 
 Directory, the French, their plan of the Italian campaign of 1796 as compared with 
 
 Napoleon's, 142. 
 Discipline, advantages of, 6. 
 
 Divergent bases, disadvantage of, 192 — their advantage to combined armies, 199. 
 Divided action, disadvantages of, 152. 
 Divisions, organisation of, and made capable of independent action, 351 — abuses of 
 
 this, ib. 
 Donauwerth, fortifications necessary at, 304. 
 Double line of operations, what constitutes a, 164. 
 Douro, Wellington's passage of it, as showing the advantage of seizing defensible point 
 
 on enemy's side, 238. 
 
 Echelon formation, the, 359 — advance in direct, ib. — the oblique, 360 — for cavalry, 
 when to be used, 364— of artillery, 368. 
 
 Eckmuhl, campaign of, as an illustration of operating against an enemy's extended 
 front, 145 et seq. — comments on it, 151 et seq. 
 
 Edward III., military system of, 9, 11. 
 
 Edward the Black Prince, the military system of, 10. 
 
 Elbe, Napoleon's passage of it in 1813, as showing the advantage of holding the higher 
 bank, 234. 
 
 Electric telegraph, effect of, on military operations, 211 — mode of using in the field, ib. 
 ■ — kinds of influence exercised by, 212 — influence of, on defensive and offensive 
 operations, 213 — in dislodging an enemy by operating round his rear, 214 — one 
 important effect of them, ib. — application of them to events of the Waterloo cam- 
 paign, ib. — supposition of joint effects of, with railways, ib. — advantages of, illus- 
 trated by the campaignof 1877 in Armenia, 441, note. 
 
 England, the command of the sea as enabling her to choose her theatre of operations, 
 53 — influence of its cultivation on military operations, 217. 
 
INDEX. 481 
 
 F mi.i.v, I reneral de, during Met/ campaign, 31 7, 319. 
 
 Federals, the, Richmond the firsl object of theii attack, 53 — extenl oi influence of theii 
 angular frontier, 21!> — importance to tbem of the extent of their base, 227. 
 
 Fences, their importance in the Line of battle, 378 — points to be noted regarding, in 
 reconnaissance, 468. 
 
 Feudal armies, how they made war, 12. 
 
 Feudal period, military system of the, s . 
 
 Firearms, change in tactics made uec< ssarj by, 338. 
 
 Flank, turning the, when to be attempted, 21(> — danger of exposing, in crossing a river, 
 251 — passage of Bull Run as showing this, m 2~>-2 -and of the Rappahannock, &c, 
 2">4 — the order of march to a, before battle, 147. 
 
 Flank attack, essential with modern arms, 420. 
 
 Flanking operations, when to he undertaken. 204, 205. 
 
 Flanks, danger of double passage of river on the, 256 — of line of battle, disadvantagi • 
 of obstacles on them, 37!) i / seq. 
 
 Forced march, rate of a, 32. 
 
 Funis, points to be noted regarding them in reconnaissance, 404. 
 
 Formation in line, 354 — in columns, ib. — mixed, 356. 
 
 Fortified passages, effect of, as regards defence of rivers, 261. 
 
 Fortified towns, their reduction by bombardment shown in late war, 309, 
 
 Fortresses as military obstacles, security to frontier formerly given by them, 300 — their 
 great cost, ib. — often disregarded by modern armies, 301 — their want often severely 
 felt, ib. — their uses, 302 — selection of positions, ib. — bridge-heads, 303 — importance 
 in flat valleys, 304 — their effect on various positions, ib. — proposed system for SAW 
 Germany, 305 — Jomini and Marmont on defence of France by them, 306, 307 — 
 an open frontier best guarded by a few great ones, 307 — their importance when 
 the issues are few, ib. — importance of fortifying a capital, 308 — chiefly useful to 
 aid offensive operations, 309 — principles on which a system of fortresses should be 
 based, ib. — cases where rendered unsuitable by modern artillery, ib. — those over 
 streams should include many bridges, ib. 
 
 France, probable military policy of, in a war with Austria or Spain, 52 — various theatres 
 of operations in war with Austria, 53 — importance in 1800 of her seizure of Switzer- 
 land, 97 — review of the campaign of that year against Austria, 98 et seq. — her bases 
 as opposed to Austria, 227 — advantages of her fortresses on the Rhine to her, 304 — 
 Jomini and Marmont on fortresses for defence of, 306, 307 — disadvantages of her 
 new frontier line toward Germany, 335. 
 
 Franco-German war, length of road occupied by a corps on march in, 27 — rati- oi 
 marching shown during it, 32 — supply-trains of a German army corps, 37 et seq. — 
 influence of railways during siege of Paris, 40 — unsuitableness of mountain forts 
 shown during it, 302 — illustrations of fortresses rendered unsuitable by modern 
 artillery, 309 — and of fortified towns reduced by bombardment, ib. — review of 
 campaign of Metz and Sedan, 311 et seq. — belief that France would take the 
 initiative, ib. — first French project, 312— French armies, ib. — their inaction,?'/). 
 — French railways, 313 — German armies, ib.— and railways, 314— first movements 
 on both sides, 315 — change in French dispositions, 316— description of the Vosges, 
 ib. — German movements, 316— choice of line for invasion of France, 317 — rea- 
 sons for operating by Prussian left, 318— battles of Wissembourg, Woerth, and 
 Spicheren, 319— subsequent movements, 320— battle of Gravelotte, 32] et seq.- 
 Metz invested, 322— retreat and pursuit of M'Mahon, 323 — capitulation of Sed.m. 
 ib.— comments on these movements, 323 et seq. — how the French might have con- 
 tested the frontier, 325— cases illustrated by the war. ib. et seq. — French operation 
 suggested, 329— results had this course been followed, 332 note— lessons from the 
 campaign, 334 et seq. 
 
 Frederick the Great, calculations on the supply of his armies, 34 -his seizure of Silesia, 
 50— his passage of the mountain barrier of Bohemia, 231— use made by him of the 
 manoeuvring power of his army, 340— his great tactical stroke, 341 — organisation 
 
 2 it 
 
482 INDEX. 
 
 and formation of his army, ib. — his tactics at the battle of Prague, 343 et seq. — 
 battle of Rossbach, 346 et seq. — his employment of cavalry, 363— amount of inde- 
 pendence given bis cavalry, 365 — his tactics at the battle of Kolin, 406 — and of 
 Leuthen, 408. 
 
 Frederick-Charles, Prince, his army and operations during campaign of Metz and Sedan, 
 313 et seq. pass. 
 
 Frederick-William of Prussia, origin of the Prussian military system with him, 339. 
 
 French, unskilfulness of their defence during the late war, 428. 
 
 French fortresses, tbe, disregarded by the Allies in campaign of 1813, 301. 
 
 French Revolution, change in the system of supply brought in by it, 35 — and in 
 organisation, tactics, &c, 350. 
 
 French system, differences between it and the Prussian, 357. 
 
 Froissart, his account of the military expeditions of his time, 9. 
 
 Front, extended, effects of interposing between parts of, 137 et seq. — general necessity 
 for such extension during march, ib. — Napoleon's campaign of 1796 in Italy an 
 example of such interposition, 138 et seq. — comments on it, 142 et seq. — the campaign 
 of Eckmuhl, 145 et seq. — breaking it, when to be attempted, 210 — attack, danger 
 of, with modern arms, 426. 
 
 Frontier, an angular, its influence, 219 — importance of possessing its issues, 223 et seq. 
 — an open, best guarded by a few great fortresses, 307. 
 
 Frontier fortresses of Spain, their great importance, 307. 
 
 Frontiers, security formerly given by fortresses to them, 300. 
 
 Frossard, General, his operations at opening of war, 317 — defeat at Spicheren, 319. 
 
 Gave de Pau, Wellington's passage of it in 1814, 244 et seq. 
 
 German army-corps, supply-trains of a, during late war, 37 et seq. — rates of marching 
 
 during late war, 32. See Franco- Germ an war. 
 Germany, the campaign of 1796 in, 155 et seq. — comments on it, Wietseq. — the want of 
 
 fortresses in, 301 — the Archduke Charles's proposed scheme of fortresses, 305. 
 Gettysburg, battle of, as illustrating the salient order of battle, 412 — tactical error of 
 
 Lee at, 420. 
 Giulay, Marshal, the passage of the Ticino against him in 1859, 246 et seq. — his 
 
 advance on Turin checked in 1859 by the Sardinians holding the line of the Po, 
 
 272 — reconnaissance in force by him in 1859 and its results, 461. 
 Gravelotte, battle of, 321, 322 — comparative losses of assailants and defenders at, 426 
 
 — the Prussian attack at, 427. 
 Grouchy, Marshal, his operations in the Waterloo campaign, 190 et seq. pass. — charges 
 
 against him, by various writers, examined, 196 et seq. 
 
 Halleck, General, his errors in planning passage of Rappahannock, 256. 
 
 Hanau, lesson from the defeat of Wrede at, 129. 
 
 Hohenlohe, Prince, his movements during campaign of Jena, 84 et seq. — his plan of the 
 
 campaign, 85 — his defeat at Jena, 89 — subsequent movements, 90 et seq. pass. 
 Hood, General, error of, in his campaign against Sherman, 128 — his operations against 
 
 Sherman in 1864, 202. 
 Hooker, General, his passage of the Rappahannock, &c, reviewed, 254 et seq. — errors 
 
 of his plan, 255. 
 
 Independent against combined lines of operation, the case of, illustrated from Ger- 
 man campaign of 1796, 155 et seq. — the Virginian of 1861, 169 — and that of 1862, 
 171 — comments on these, 175 — how the concentric army should be formed, ib. — 
 proportion of retarding force on each line, ib. — the radii of operation, 176 — the 
 losses of retarding force, ib. — comparative advantage of situation, 177 — choice of 
 line, 178 — swiftness essential, ib. 
 
 Infantry, their formations, 354 — deployed lines, ib. — use of columns, ib. — depth and 
 extent of these, 355 — space occupied in line of battle, 372 — ought to be over- 
 
INDEX. 483 
 
 powered by cavalry and artillery combined, 370— their combination with artillery, 
 
 ih. — and with cavalry, /'/. 
 Inferior force, how to manoeuvre in retarding a superior, 131— example from the 
 Waterloo campaign, L33 et seq. 
 
 " Initiative," the, what, 44. 
 
 " Interior lines, the principle of," 208. 
 
 Inundations, points to be noted regarding, in reconnaissance, 167. 
 
 Invading armies, why they operate on several roads at once, 26. 
 
 Issues of a frontier, importance of possessing them, 223 et seq. 
 
 Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1859, the possession of the issues illustrated from, 224 
 — of 1859, influence of rivers parallel to path by which army advances illustrated 
 from it, 272. 
 
 Italian fortresses disregarded by Napoleon in campaign of Marengo, 301. 
 
 Italy, the French campaign of 1859 in, details of supplies, &c., for it, 15— arrangements 
 for March, 30 — greater danger of its capital from France than from Austria, 51 
 — Northern, military description of, in connection with Marengo campaign, 55 
 et seq. — campaign of 1796. in, reviewed, 138 — general military description of 
 Northern, 215, 217 — the frontiers of Austria and Italy in, and their mutual 
 capabilities of attack and defence, 222, 223— the possession of the issues there, 223. 
 
 Jackson, General, his operations during campaign of 1862, 172 et seq. 
 
 Jena, campaign of, political elements influencing selection of theatre of operations, 57 
 — as illustrating both armies forming on a front parallel with their communi- 
 cations, 81 et seq. — the battles of Jena and Auerstedt, 89 — subsequent movements, 
 90 — comments on campaign, 92 et seq. — extension of the fronts of the armies in it, 
 137. 
 
 Johnston, General, his movements in defence of Richmond, 1861, 169 et scq.— and in 
 1862, 172— his campaign against Sherman in 1864 reviewed, 200 et seq. — super- 
 seded, 202. 
 
 Jomini, General, the military works of, 3— on the Italian campaign of 1796, 144— his 
 scheme of fortresses for defence of France, 306— on the organisation into divisions, 
 and the abuses of their independence, 351— his proposed combination for attack, 
 357 — on the moral effect of the column, ib. — formation recommended for cavalry, 
 362— on the charging pace of cavalry, 365— error ascribed by him to Ney at 
 Bautzen, 414— reasons urged by him for retreats being concentrated, 422. 
 
 Jourdan, Marshal, his German campaign of 1796 reviewed, 155 et seq. 
 
 Kolin, battle of, as illustrating the oblique order of battle, 406. 
 
 Koniggratz, battle of, as illustrating the effect of armies combining from divergent 
 
 bases, 199 note— illustrating use of field-telegraph, 212. 
 Kray, General, review of his campaign of 1800 against Moreau, 97 et seq.— comments 
 
 'on his movements, 105 et seq.— the second part of campaign of 1800 reviewed, 
 
 122 — comments on it, 125. 
 
 Lateral communications, importance of, in military operations, 27. 
 
 Lee, General, his conduct of the campaign of 1862, 173 et seq.— his use of mountain- 
 passes as a defensive obstacle, 263— tactical error at Gettysburg, 420. 
 
 Leipsic campaign, example from it of parallel obstacle used to screen an offensive 
 movement, 27<>. 
 
 Leuthen, battle of, as illustrating the oblique order of battle, 408. 
 
 Light infantry, their extensive introduction after the French Revolution, 352. 
 
 Ligny, the battle of, 188— reasons which determined the point oi attack at, 418— 
 advantages of the Prussian retreat from it being concentrated, 422. 
 
 Line formation of infantry, its advantages and disadvantages, 354— the 1 russian 
 attack in, under Frederick, 355— and column, mixture of, for defence, 357— the 
 suitable formation for artillery, 367. 
 
484 INDEX. 
 
 Lines, the first, 430 — the second, 431 — proportion of nun to space, ib. — reserves, $.,432. 
 
 Lin/,, fortress constructed by Austria at, 305. 
 
 Lloyd, reasons urged by him for retreats being divergent, 422. 
 
 Luxembourg, effect of its neutrality during late war, 312. 
 
 Macaulay on the advantages of discipline, 7. 
 
 M'Clellan, General difficulties of, from had roads, 21 — on the necessity of operating 
 on several roads at once, 27 — his first campaign against Richmond, as illustrating 
 offensive and defensive warfare, 46 — review of his campaign of 1862, 171 et seq. — 
 — his defeat at the passage of the Chickahominy, 259 et seq. 
 
 M'Dowell, General, his movements in campaign of 1861, 169 et seq. — in that of 1862, 
 171 et seq. 
 
 Mack, General, review of the campaign of 1805 under him, 117 et seq. — course he might 
 have followed in that campaign, 130. 
 
 M'Mahon, Marshal, his movements in campaign of Metz and Sedan, 317— defeat at 
 Woerth, 319— retreat, 320, 323 — movement on Sedan, and capitulation there, 323 
 — disorganised state of his army as shown by his retreat, 326 — examination of his 
 movements, 332 et seq. — his position, tactics, &c, at the battle of Woerth, 396 et seq. 
 
 Magazines, dependence of armies of the eighteenth century on, 35. 
 
 Map, reading of it, as to military obstacles, 215, 218. 
 
 March, rates of, under different circumstances, 32 — before battle, dispositions for it, 
 444 — selection of routes for columns, ib. — order of march to front, 445 — position 
 of cavalry, ib. — subdivision of columns, 446 — clearing of routes, ib. — defects of 
 intervals, ib. — order of march to Hank, 447. 
 
 Marengo, the campaign of, as an illustration of selecting a theatre of operations, 55 
 et seq. — comparative risk of the two parties at, 60— review of the campaign, 112 
 et seq. — surrender of the Austrian fortresses after the battle, 301 — defective tactics 
 of the Austrians at, 421. 
 
 Maritime power, advantage of its commanding an enemy's coasts, 220 — importance of 
 extending its base, 227. 
 
 Marlborough, the Duke of, his sieges, 14 — ravaging of Bavaria by him, 34 — the armies 
 of his time incapable of rapid manoeuvring, 338 — his tactics at Blenheim and 
 Ramillies, 339. 
 
 Marmont, Marshal, review of his movements in campaign of Salamanca, 78 et seq. — use 
 made of the Douro as abase in 1812, 268 — fortresses for defence of France proposed 
 by him, 307 — on the formation of cavalry, 362 — on the numbers of cavalry avail- 
 able in a mass, 364. 
 
 Massena, Marshal, his position at Santarem, as showing the advantage of possessing 
 several alternatives of action, 208 et serj. —his retreat from Portugal, as illustrating 
 the use of obstacles by a rear-guard, 264 et seq. 
 
 Medieval battles, deep columns suited to them, 337 — their general character, 338. 
 
 Melas, General, review of the campaign of Marengo under him, 112 et seq. — course he 
 might have taken in that campaign, 130. 
 
 Metz, effect of want of sufficient bridges in, 309 — investment of, 322— and Sedan, 
 review of campaign of, 311 et seq. See Franco-German war. 
 
 Middle ages, simplicity of the military system of the, 8. 
 
 Military history, scientific study of, and its difficulties, 2. 
 
 Military operations, importance of system of supply, 15 et seq. — necessity of good roads, 
 20 — conducted on several roads at once, 25 — importance of lateral communica- 
 tions, 27 — their objects and selection among these, 50 — selection of theatre of, and 
 line, 53 — reasons determining the selection, 54— the campaign of Marengo as an 
 illustration, 55 — political elements influencing selection, 57 — selection with the 
 government, execution with the general, 58 — carried mi upon front parallel to 
 communication, 63 — campaign of Novara as an illustration of this, 64 et seq. — 
 and that of Salamanca, 77 et seq. — case of both armies forming on front parallel 
 to their communications, 81 — the campaign of Jena as an illustration, 82 et seq. 
 
INDEX, 4S5 
 
 the conformation of a base as enabling an army to force it- adversary to form 
 
 front to a Hank, 97— Moivau'.- canntai^n <if 1 WXt as illustrating this, 98 et seq. 
 comments on it. 105 et seq. —an army prolonging its movement against the enemy' 
 communications by placing itself across them, 110 the campaign of Marengo as 
 illustrating this, 112 ei seq. — Napoleon's campaign againsl .Mack, 117 — that of 
 L 800 in Germany, 122 — direction to he taken in aiming at the enemy's rear, 127 
 — necessity of closing on the enemy, 128 — the intercepting force must be adequate, 
 12!) — partial and complete interception, >b. — best courses for the assailant and for 
 the intercepted army, 130 — the retarding of a superior by an inferior force, 131 — 
 example of this in Zieten's operations against the French in 1815, 133 et seq. 
 — retreat and pursuit after a battle, 135 — effects of interposing between the parts of 
 enemy's extended front, 137 — illustrated by Italian campaign of 1796, L38 
 — and by that of Eckmuhl, 145 et seq. — case of independent againsl combined 
 lines of operation illustrated from German campaign of 179(3, 155 et seq. — the 
 Virginian campaign of 1861,169 — and that of 1862, 171 — combined armies 
 operating from divergent bases illustrated in campaign of Waterloo, 179 et seq. — 
 dislodging an army by operating with a detachment against its rear, 200 — 
 Sherman's Georgian campaign as illustrating this, ih. et seq. — effects of cultivation 
 on, 217. 
 
 Military organisation and discipline, advantages of, 6. 
 
 .Military system, the, of the feudal period, 8 — change in it with the increasing power 
 of the Crown, 12. 
 
 Mincio, the, whether defensible, 235— fortress most suited to it as a military line, 304 
 
 Mixed formation, illustrated, 356. 
 
 Mobility, increased, of the French Revolutionary armies, 352. 
 
 Montmirail, tactics at battle of, 420. 
 
 Moore, Sir John, his Spanish campaign, 129. 
 
 Moreau, General, his campaign of 1800 reviewed, 98 et seq. — his plans as opposed to 
 Napoleon's, 99— comments on his movements, 105 et seq. — review of the continuation 
 of his campaign of 1800, 122 et seq.— comments on it, 125— his German campaign 
 of 1796 reviewed, 155 et seq. — his passages of the Rhine in 1796 reviewed, 239 
 et seq. — and in 1797, 242— his tardiness after the first of these, 244. 
 
 Mountains regarded as military obstacles, difficulty of defending a long line, 230— 
 defence of a few passes ineffectual, ib.— how to be made use of in defence, ib.— 
 pa-age to be effected by stratagem, 231— should not be passed at several distant 
 points, ib.— continued defence of a chain should turn to advantage of assailant, 
 232 — why Torres Vedras exceptional, ib. — unsuitable as sites for fortresses, and 
 why, 302 — points to be noted regarding, in reconnaissance, 467. 
 
 Mounted riflemen, advantage of, 439. 
 
 Napier, the military histories of, 2. 
 
 Napoleon, the historians of the wars of, 5— reasons for bis advance on several roads in 
 the Waterloo campaign, 26— importance of lateral communications shown from 
 his Italian campaigns, 27— his system of supply, 35— his successful use of offen- 
 sive warfare, 45— his Russian campaign as showing the risk of long line of com- 
 munications, 46— his general objects and policy in a campaign, 61— his selection 
 of theatre of .operations in campaign of Marengo, 55— review of the campaign oi 
 Jena, 81 et seq. — his forces for it, 82 — lines of operation open to him, ib. et seq.— 
 his plan of advance, 85— the battles of Jena and Auerstedt, 89— hi- movements 
 in pursuit, 90— comments on campaign, 92 et seq.— his plans asopposedto Moreau'a 
 for campaign of 1800, 99— comparison between them. 105 — review oi campaign 
 of Marengo, 112 et seq. — of his campaign against Mack in 1806, 117 ei seq. — great 
 extension of his line in the campaign against Mack. 128— great extension of his 
 front in the Jena campaign, 137— his campaign of 1796 as illustration of Inter- 
 posing between parts of enemy's extended front. 138 et seq. — and that of Eckmuhl, 
 145 e t 8e q, — reasons why he chose Belgium as the scene of war in 1815, 179 — 
 
486 INDEX. 
 
 review of that campaign, 180 et seq. — plans open to him, 182— comments on his 
 movements, 192 — causes of his failure, 194 — insufficiency of his force, 198 — his 
 campaign against Mack, value of a long base shown in it, 227 — his system in 
 overcoming mountain harriers, 231 — his passage of the Elbe in 1813, 234 — and of 
 the Danube, in 1809, ib. — his passage of it before battle of Wagram, 236, 238 — his 
 strategy against the Austrians at Rivoli, 256 — use made of the Elbe as a base in 
 1813, 268 — the strategic movement of the Allies against him at Dresden in 1813, 
 270 et seq. — review of his campaign of 1814 in Champagne, 278 et seq. — comments 
 on it, 291 et seq. — errors committed by him, 293 — his alleged condemnation of the 
 oblique order, 350 — his use of the increased mobility, &c, of the Republican 
 armies, 352 — his system of army-corps, ib. et seq. — his employment of cavalry, 
 363, 365— amount of independent action allowed his cavalry, 365 — the formation 
 of his line of battle at Austerlitz, 380 et seq. — and at Waterloo, 390 et seq. — tactics 
 by which he made Austerlitz so decisive, 411 — his tactics at battle of Montmirail, 
 420 — his employment of large bodies of cavalry in advance when on march, 449 — 
 his reconnaissance before Austerlitz, 462— his characteristics as opposed to the 
 Austrian and Prussian leaders, 470 et seq. 
 
 Napoleon III., details of supplies, &c, for his campaign in Italy, 15 — objects of his 
 Italian campaign, 50 — campaign in Italy as showing necessity of separation, 207 — 
 his passage of the Ticino in 1859 reviewed, 246 et seq. 
 
 Ney, Marshal, his movement on and after Quatre Bras, 188 et seq. — examination of 
 Thiers's charges against him, 195 — his conduct of the rear-guard during the retreat 
 from Portugal, and employment of obstacles during it, 264 et seq. 
 
 Novara, review of the campaign of, as an illustration of armies operating parallel to 
 their communications, 64 et seq, — comments on it, 70. 
 
 Oblique order of battle, what, and its advantages, 350 — how produced, 405 — necessity 
 of preserving the obliquity, 406 — battle of Kolin as an illustration of it, ib. — that 
 of the Pyrenees, 407 — and that of Leuthen, 408 — its spirit may exist without its 
 form, 410. 
 
 Obstacles, nature, &c, of, and their relations to operations, 60 et seq. — their influence, 215 
 — their nature must be appreciated, 216 — military, conditions of, 229 — limitation of 
 number of roads by them, ib. — mountains as obstacles, and how to be defended, 
 230 — rivers, 233 et seq. — mountain-ranges and rivers, general conclusions on, 262 
 ■ — their use by a retreating army illustrated by Massena's retreat from Portugal, 
 264 et seq. — how regarded by the skilled, general, 268 — parallel to path by which 
 army advances, 269 — illustrations from Torres Vedras campaign, ib. et seq. — from 
 the Leipsic campaign, 270 — fortresses viewed as, 300 et seq. — direct effect of 
 fortresses when situated on, 304 — cases where they partially cover the line of 
 battle, 376 — relations between their direction and it, ib. — on its flanks, their dis- 
 advantages, 379. 
 
 Offensive, advantages of the, as shown in the campaign of Metz and Sedan, 325 et seq. 
 — probable modifications of tactics on the, 439. 
 
 Offensive movements in battle, necessity of supporting them, 404. 
 
 Offensive operations, use of fortresses as aiding, 309. 
 
 Offensive warfare, and defensive, differences between, and reasons for selection, 42 — the 
 advantage of assuming it, 44 — its subsequent dangers, 45 — balance of advantage 
 between the two, 47. 
 
 Order of attack, the new Prussian, 361. 
 
 Organisation, advantages of, 6. 
 
 Outflanking, danger of attempting it shown from battle of Rossbach, 348— its com- 
 parative safety against inferior troops, 349 — dangers of, and how these are to be 
 avoided, 404. 
 
 Outposts, their object, 452 — distance from main body, ib. — how disposed, ib. — occu- 
 pation of woods by, 453 — features of ground in line of, 454 — calculation of troops 
 for, 455 — cavalry, 456 — artillery with, 457— by night, 458. 
 
[NDEX. 487 
 
 Paris, importance of its being fortified, 308 — siege of, influence of railways daring it, 10. 
 
 huk of artillery, what, 124. 
 
 Passes, mountain, how to be held, 230. 
 
 Patrols, 453. 
 
 Patterson, General, his movements on Richmond in 1861, L69 et seq. 
 
 Peninsular war, the historians of it, 5 — theatres of operations selected by England, 54 
 
 — illustrates the advantage of commanding the enemy's coasts, 220. 
 Pickets, their numbers, disposition, &c, 452. 
 
 Pillage, subsistence of feudal armies by, 10 — miseries caused by the old Bystem of, 33. 
 Poitiers, the feudal military system illustrated from campaign of, 10. 
 Pope, General, his movements during campaign of 1862, 17:5 et seq. 
 Portugal, its value to Wellington as a base, 221. 
 " Power of concentration," what, and its advantages, 44. 
 
 Prague, the battle of, as illustrating the tactics of Frederick the < treat, 343 et seq. 
 Prussia, results which would have followed her accession to the alliance before Auster- 
 
 litz, 81 — review of campaign of Jena, 82 et seq. — her errors in it, 95. 
 Prussia, the Crown Prince of, his army and operations during campaign of filetz and 
 
 Sedan, 313 c? seq. 2^ass. 
 Prussian army, its organisation and formation in the time of Frederick, 341 et seq. 
 Prussian fortresses, lost by the campaign of Jena, 301. 
 Prussian military system, its origin, 339 — its general adoption, 350— differences between 
 
 it and the French, 357 — its advantages as shown in the late war, 335. 
 Prussian tactics, mode of opposing suggested, 441. 
 Prussians, length of road occupied by a corps on march, 27— rates of marching 
 
 during late war, 32 — supply-train of a corps, 37 — their order of attack 1870, 301 — 
 
 their position, tactics, &c, at the battle of Woerth, 395 et seq. — their retention of 
 
 modified columns of attack, 424, 425 — their system of attack in the late war, 427. 
 
 See also Franco-German war. 
 Pursuit of a defeated army, the, how to be conducted, 135, 422. 
 Pyrenees, battle of tlie, as illustrating the oblirpue order of battle, 407. 
 
 Quatre Bras, Wellington's retreat and the French advance from, 29. 
 
 Radetzky, Marshal, review of campaign of Novara under, 64 et seq., 127 — explanation 
 of his movements, 72 i / Si q. 
 
 Railways, movement of troops by, 22 — proportion of transport to different arms, ib. — 
 time for loading the trains, 23 — rate of despatch of trains, ib. — data on which 
 the calculation rests, 24— they do not supersede ordinary roads for manoeuvring, 
 31 — movements by rail in Italy in 1859, and at Bull Pun, ih. — influence of rail- 
 ways on supply, 39 — principles of supply unchanged by them, ib. — their influence 
 exemplified in' Sherman's campaign in Georgia, ib. — influence of, during late siege 
 of Paris, 40 — offensive and defensive war as affected by them, 47 — they facili- 
 tate the first operations of the assailant, 48 — reasons why they subsequently favour 
 the defence, ib. — influence they might have exercised on the Waterloo campaign. 
 i5 # — assailant's choice of a line of operation affected by them, 49 — danger of flank 
 movements by rail, ib. — existing railways in the German theatre of war of 1796, 
 168— supposition of joint effects of railways and telegraphs, 213, 214— French, dur- 
 ing campaign of Metz, &c, 313— German lines in relation to late war, 314— points to 
 be°noted regarding them in reconnaissance, 466 — means of destroying them, ib. 
 
 Ramillies, error of the disposition of the French at, 339. 
 
 Rappahannock and Rapidan, Hooker's passage of, reviewed, 254 et s,^.— errors of its 
 plan, 256. 
 
 Rear-guard, formation and duties of a, during retreat, 135. 
 
 Reconnaissance of the enemy, how conducted, 461 — of the country, points to be specially 
 noted, 463 et seq. 
 
 Re-entering order of battle, the, illustrated at Waterloo, 414. 
 
488 INDEX. 
 
 Refused wing, the, in the oblique order of battle, 406, 407 — not to remain altogether 
 out of action, 409 — counter-attack against it, 410. 
 
 Reserves, posting of them on the Held, 431, 432. 
 
 Retreat, increased difficulty of, under fire, with the new guns, 441. 
 
 Retreats, how to be conducted after defeat, 135, 421 — should they be concentrated or 
 divergent ? 422. 
 
 Rhine, Moreau's passages as example of crossing a river on front of defensive line, 239 
 et seq. — advantage given France by her fortresses on it, 304. 
 
 Richmond, necessity for the Confederates covering, 43 — its capture the object of the 
 Federals, 52— the campaign of 1861 against, 169— that of 1862, 171. 
 
 Riesengebirge, the, how passed by Frederick the Great in 1757, 231. 
 
 Rivers, limitation of the number of roads by, 229 — as military obstacles, 233 — their 
 defence safer than that of mountains, ib. — the passages more numerous, ib. — their 
 use to screen the assailant, ib. — advantage of holding the higher bank, ib. — ex- 
 amples of passage by Napoleon, 234 — when indefensible, ib. — circumstances in 
 which the lower bank is defensible, 235 — danger of passing one in presence of a 
 concentrated enemy, 236 — stratagem usually employed for crossing, 237 — seizing 
 defensible point on opposite shore, 238— first troops crossed, how to aid in attack 
 on main passage, ib. — Moreau's passages of the Rhine, as illustrating passage on 
 front of defensive line, 239 et seq. — Wellington's, of the Gave de Pau, as example 
 of passage on defender's flank, 244 — and that of the Ticino in 1859, 246 — com- 
 ments on these, 250 et seq. — passage of Bull Run, 252 — and of the Rappahannock, 
 &c, 254 — comments on these, 255 — disadvantage of double passage on the flanks, 
 256 — distribution &c, of covering force, 257 — passage of the Chickahominy, show- 
 ing the danger of placing the army astride the river, 258 et seq. — effect of increased 
 width, 260 — of improved arms as favouring the assailants, 261 — and of fortified 
 passages, ib. — their use to secure communications, 267 — parallel to path by which 
 army advances, illustrations of military operations as influenced by, 272 — assailant 
 should be superior, 273— his risk lessened when defenders restricted to one bank, 
 ib. — necessit}' of guarding passages in rear, 274 — obstacle not to be evaded, ib. — 
 importance of the Danube in this respect, 275 — when each army holds portion of 
 river, 276 — two convergent, parallel to path of advancing army, 277 — illustrated 
 from campaign of 1814 in Champagne, 278 et seq. — comments on this, 291 et seq. 
 — hypothetical case under such circumstances, 296 et seq. — the most suitable sites 
 for fortresses, 303 — passage of them where covering a line of battle, 375 — points to 
 be noted regarding them in reconnaissance, 465. 
 
 Rivoli, Napoleon's strategy in campaign of, 256. 
 
 Road, length of, occupied by a Prussian corps on march, 27. 
 
 Roads, importance of i, r ood, in modern operations, 20 — employment of inferior for 
 minor operations, 21 — operating on several, 25 — importance of lateral communica- 
 tions, 27 — limitation of their number by mountain-ranges and rivers, 229 — points 
 to be noted regarding them in reconnaissance of country, 463. 
 
 Rossbach, battle of, as illustrating the tactics of Frederick the Great, 346 et s< q. 
 
 Routes, the clearing of, on march to battle, 443. 
 
 ,; Rules of war," vagueness of phrase, 62. 
 
 Sacren, General, error in tactics at battle of Montmirail, 420. 
 
 Salamanca, the campaign of, as an illustration of armies operating parallel to their 
 
 communications, 77 et seq. — value of Wellington's base as shown by it, 221. 
 Salient order of battle, the, 412 — illustrated by Gettysburg, ib. — attacks necessarily 
 
 assume this form, 413 — employment of cavalry in it, ib. 
 Santarem, Massena's position at, 1810-11, 208 et seq. 
 
 Schwartzenberg, Prince, review of his campaign of 1814 in Champagne, 27^ et seq. 
 Sea, importance of the command of, to England, 53. 
 Sebastopol, an exceptional object in military operations, 51. 
 Sedan, the capitulation of M'Mahon at, 323'. 
 
INDEX. Is'. I 
 
 Seidlitz, General, as a cavalry officer, 363 — his formation for them, ib. 
 
 Sentries, their disposition, &c, 152. 
 
 Separation, disadvantages of, shown in German campaign of L796, L66 -when and why 
 
 risk- of, incurred, 207. 
 Sherman, General, his Georgian march as illustrating the system of Bupply, 18 — as 
 
 illustrating the influence of railways, 39 — Bood's movemenl againsl his communi- 
 cations, 128 — review of his Georgian campaign, as illustrating dislodging an army 
 
 by operating with detachment against it.- rear, 200 et seq. — liis reply to the authors 
 
 comments, 200 not* — comments on his movements, 204 — notices of his campaign 
 
 of 1865, 207— his experience in destroying railways, 466. 
 Silistria, effect of its successful defence in the late war, 302, 308. 
 Skirmishers, large employment of, after the French Revolution, 353— their nse in 
 
 connection with columns of attack, 355 — employment of, and its objects in battle, 
 
 417 — line of, now inexpedient, 430. 
 Slopes, points to be noted regarding, in reconnaissance, 468. 
 Solferino, the advance of the French army on, 29 — and of the Austrian, ib. the battle 
 
 of, an illustration of tactics, not of strategy, 63 — hill of, its disadvantages as a 
 
 defensible point in the battle, 377 — victory prepared for the French by their order 
 
 of inarch, 446. 
 Soubise, the Prince of, his tactics at the battle of Rossbach, 346. 
 Soult, Marshal, Wellington's passage of the Gave de Pau against him, 244— his tactics 
 
 at the battle of the Pyrenees, 408. 
 Spain, the campaign of Edward the Black Prince in, 11 — Wellington's difficulties from 
 
 want of supplies in, 17 — military/ description of, 216 — nature of obstacles, ib. 
 Spicheren, battle of, 319. 
 
 Siatf-officers, points to be specially noted by them in reconnaissance of country, 463. 
 Standing armies, want of, during the middle ages, 8 — first formation of, 13- effei ts of, 
 
 on the system of war, 34. 
 Steinmetz, General, his army and operation during campaign of Met/, and Sedan, 313 
 
 et seq. })ass. 
 Stratagem, preferable to force in passing mountain barriers, 231 — how to lie employed 
 
 in passage of livers, 237. 
 Strategy, definition of, and its objects, 59— advantages attainable by it, GO — particular 
 
 objects aimed at in its combinations, Hi. 
 Superior force, how to be held in check by an inferior, 131 — illustration from Zieten 
 
 and the French in 1815, 133 et seq. 
 Supply, increasing importance of the system of, 14, 15— change in system of, induced 
 
 by French Revolution, 35 — effect of its being intercepted, 40. 
 Supply-trains of a Prussian corps during late war, 37. 
 Switzerland, importance of its possession in 1800 to France, 97 — advantage ol its 
 
 possession by France against Austria, 22';. 
 
 Tactics, what, as distinguished from strategy, 59 — changes which have Led to modern 
 system of, 337 — those of Frederick the Greal illustrated by battle of Prague, 343 
 ■ — and that of Rossbach, 34(i et seq. — new system of organisation, &c, brought in 
 with the French Revolution, 350 et seq. — effects of the introduction of arm- of 
 precision on, 353,361 — contemporary changes in, 42 1 — their former object to bring 
 columns to the attack, ib. — the Prussians with modifications adhere to columns, ih. 
 — these must dissolve into skirmishers, ib. — necessity for maintaining control over 
 troops in this order, 425 — Prussians prepared for the change, Hi. — change necessary 
 in formation for defence, 426 — front attack costly and doubtful, and flank attack 
 essential, ib. — form assumed by contemporary engagements, i6. — loss against the 
 assailants, ib. — Hank attacks in minor engagements, 427 — turning Hanks, ib. — 
 absence of manoeuvring, ib. — the French defence unskilful, 428— -higher tactics 
 still applicable, ib. — difficulties in their way, $.— modification in defensive 
 dispositions, 430 — skirmishers and first line, ib. — second, 431 — proportion of men 
 
490 INDEX. 
 
 to space, ib. — local reserves, 431 — general reserves, 432 — effect of artillery dimin- 
 ished, 433 — how to he employed in defence and attack, 434 — massing of Latteries, 
 435 — employment of cavalry, 436 — opportunities for attacking prepared infantry 
 rare, ib. — attack on shaken troops, ib. — pursuit, 437 — action against retiring infan- 
 try, &c, ib. — and artillery, ib. — extended order of attack, 43S — should cavalry cover 
 the advance, ib. — mounted riflemen, 439 — probable modifications, ib. — mode of 
 opposing Prussian, 441. 
 
 Tactical advantages, kinds of, defined, 404. 
 
 Talavera, difficulties from want of supplies after, 17. 
 
 Tempelhoff, General, on the supply of Frederick's armies, 34. 
 
 Thiers, criticisms on his account of the Waterloo campaign, 195. 
 
 Ticino, the French passage of it in 1859 reviewed, 246 et seq. 
 
 Torres Vearas, why exceptional, as compared with ordinary mountain barriers, 232 
 — illustrations from campaign of obstacles parallel to path of advancing army, 
 269. 
 
 Transport, military, deficiency of, during the middle ages, 11. 
 
 Turenne, ravaging of the Palatinate by, 34. 
 
 Turin, its greater danger from France than Austria, 51. 
 
 Turkey, circumstances which compelled her remaining on the defensive in 1877, 43. 
 
 Turning force, on the passage of rivers, its object, &c, 257. 
 
 United States, military description of theatre of war in, 216. 
 
 Vandamme, General, his disaster at Kulm, 129. 
 Victories, when indecisive, 418 — what makes them decisive, ib. 
 Virginia, the campaign of 1861 in, reviewed, 169— and that of 1862, 171. 
 Vittoria campaign, value of Wellington's base as shown by it, 220. 
 Vosges, military description of the, 316. 
 
 War, popular interest of histories of, 1 — its scientific study now requisite, 2 — difficul- 
 ties of this, ib. — principles, rules, &c, of, such phrases unmeaning, 62 — its minor 
 operations : the advanced-guard, 449 — outposts, 452 — convoys and their escort, 
 459 — reconnaissances, 461 et seq. 
 
 Waterloo campaign, the historians of the, 5 — illustrations of good and bad roads from, 
 21 — and of operating on several roads at once, 25, 29 — reviewed as example of 
 combined armies operating from divergent bases, 179 et seq. — failure of the 
 French in column against the British in line, 355 — illustration from it of neces- 
 sity of supporting cavalry charges by infantry, 371 — description of the field, 390 
 — occupation of the outposts, ib. — the British line of battle, 391 — the French, 
 392 et seq. — illustrates the re-entering or enclosing order of battle, 414 — reasons 
 which determined point of attack at, 417 — how so decisive, 418 — value of Hongo- 
 mont as advanced post, 419 — results of the French having only one line of re- 
 treat from it, 422. 
 
 Weapons, improved, advantageous to assailants in passage of rivers, 261. 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, difficulties of, from want of supplies after Talavera, 17 — his 
 position in Portugal after capture of Badajos, &c, 43 — and in Belgium at the 
 opening of the Waterloo campaign, ib. — review of his movements in the cam- 
 paign of Salamanca, 77 et seq. — review of the campaign of Waterloo, 179 et seq. — 
 his orders on the French advance, 184 — battle of Quatre Bras, 189 — his subse- 
 quent retreat, 190 — his error as to the force left at Hal, 198 — his advance from 
 Portugal in 1813 as illustrating a flanking movement, 205 — his position as 
 opposed to Massena's at Santarem, 208 et seq. — value of his being based on 
 Portugal, &c, shown in campaign of 1812 and 1813, 221 — specialties for defence 
 of his position at Torres Vedras, 232 — his passage of the Douro in 1809 as show- 
 ing importance of seizing defensible point on enemy's bank, 238 — of the Gave de 
 Pau in 1814 as illustration of passing a river on defender's flank, 244 — review 
 
[NDEX. -101 
 
 of his advance on Maasena's retreat from Portugal, 2(14 — his just estimate of 
 importance of Badajos and Ciudad Kodrigo, 3<>7 — his reasons for holding cavalry 
 under his own control, 366— these applicable to defensive operations only, 367 — 
 
 the formation of his line of battle at Waterloo, 390 et seq. — his tactics at the battle 
 of the Pyrenees, 407. 
 
 Wissembourg, battle of, 319. 
 
 Woerth, battle of, 319 — both armies contend with breech-loaders at it, 380 — formation 
 of the lines of battle at, 396— description of the field, ib.— Prussian position, 397 
 —and forces, 398— French forces, 397— and distribution, 398— the attack, 399 
 — retreat of the French, 401 — comments on the battle and lessons from it, ib. 
 et seq. 
 
 Woods, points to be noted regarding them in reconnaissance, 4G.">. 
 
 Wrede, General, his defeat at Hanau, 129. 
 
 Zietex, General, example of his retarding a superior with an inferior force in 181o, 
 133 — his position, &c, in the Waterloo campaign, 181 — operations of his retard- 
 ing force, 184 et seq. 
 
 PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLA< KWUOD AND BOMS. 
 

THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
 STAMPED BELOW 
 
 AN INITIAL FINE OP 25 CENTS ' 
 
 WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN 
 THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY 
 WILL INCREASE TO 50 CENTS ON THE FOURTH " 
 DAY AND TO $1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY 
 OVERDUE. 
 
 rn ift-niifhi 
 
 rdo liHoifr 
 
 M 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 7$& 
 
 
 LOAN DEPT. 
 
 NOV 
 
 i\j 241941 
 
 QEO 3 1947 
 
 MAR 8 
 
 mil 
 
 \gtf-^ 
 
 \ 
 
 o^ 
 
 1^ 
 
YD 14268 
 
 U.C.BERKELEY LIBRARIES 
 
 llllll llll Hill llll 
 
 HIM Hill