•'in 
 Hi' 
 
 THE DUAL ALLIANCE 
 
 ■vs. 
 
 THE TRIPLE ENTENTE 
 
 GERMANY'S CASE 
 
 IN THE 
 
 SUPREME COURT 
 OF CIVILIZATION 
 
 DR. KARL HELFFERICH, GERMAN 
 SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 
 REVIEWS THE "WHITE," "YELLOW," 
 AND "ORANGE" PAPERS, AND 
 REACHES A DIFFERENT CONCLU- 
 SION FROM THAT OF JAMES M. 
 BECK, HOLDING THE ALLIES 
 RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR 
 
 THE FATHERLAND CORPORATION 
 
 1123 BROADWAY 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
The Dual Alliance 
 
 vs. 
 
 The Triple Entente 
 
 Germany's Case in the 
 
 Supreme Court of 
 
 Civilization 
 
 Dr. Karl Helfferich, German Secretary of the Treasury, 
 
 Reviews the "White," "Yellow," and "Orange" Papers, 
 
 and Reaches a Different Conclusion from that 
 
 of James M. Beck, Holding the Allies 
 
 Responsible for the War 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 The Fatherland Corporation 
 
 1123 Broadway 
 
 1915 
 
'y^ 
 
 Dr. Helfferich's brilliant analysis of the world 
 situation was published first by George Stilke, 
 Berlin, under the title of "The Genesis of the 
 Great War." It appeared in the N. Y. Times 
 under the title under which it is here reprinted. 
 
 \ 
 
 O^, 
 
The following is a translation from the semi-official Nord- 
 deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of Jan. 26 of an exhaustive compara- 
 tive study hy Dr. Karl Helfferich of the diplomatic documents 
 published hy the various warring countries concerning the origin of 
 the world war. Dr. Helfferich, whose accession to the office of Im- 
 perial Secretary of the Treasury was hailed with satisfaction 
 throughout Germany on Jan. 16, was then only 43 years old, hut 
 was considered the leading financial authority in Germany. At that 
 time the German newspapers pointed out that Dr. Helfferich^s ap- 
 pointment spelled the end of the bureaucratic system theretofore 
 regnant in the Treasury Department, and was auspicious for the 
 efficient and, thorough-going management of the office in the enor- 
 mous work that would he thrust upon it when terms of peace and 
 final international settlements would he made. 
 
 Dr. Helfferich at the time of his appointment to the Secretary- 
 ship of the Treasury was Director of the Deutsche Bank and Wirk- 
 licher Legationsrat, {Actual Councillor of Legation,) with the title 
 of Professor. It was he who introduced the recent Reichstag hiidget 
 for 1915 in the Federal Council and Reichstag. 
 
 306122 
 
GERMANY'S CASE IN THE SUPREME 
 COURT OF CIVILIZATION 
 
 By Dr. Karl Helfferich. 
 
 The Governments of England, Russia, and France thought, 
 through the publication of the exchange of diplomatic writings of 
 the days before the beginning of the world war, they could furnish 
 a proof in the eyes of their own peoples and of the entire civilized 
 world that the blame for the most gigantic shedding of blood which 
 the world has ever experienced falls only upon "war-lusting 
 Germany," and that they for their part did all in their power to 
 avoid the catastrophe. England has published a "Blue Book," 
 Russia an "Orange Book," and France a "Yellow Book." A series 
 of indications argue that these publications, which profess an 
 appearance of completeness, show important gaps, and particularly 
 in the case of the French "Yellow Book" the proof can be regarded 
 as furnished that certain documents there republished w^re belatedly 
 fabricated. [Note 1.] Nevertheless the publications deserve a 
 careful comparative study. 
 
 No attempt will be made here to follow in all their details the 
 extraordinarily tangled diplomatic windings and cross-windings that 
 
 i I 
 
 [Note 1. — Thus the ** Yellow Book/' in its first chapter, entitled 
 Avertissements," contains a series of documents which, beginning 
 from March, 1913, are intended to prove a growing war sentiment in 
 Germany. Among them, designated as No. 5, dated July 30, 1913, is a 
 note of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which is said: 
 
 ''M. von Kiderlen fut I'horame le plus hai de I'Allemagne, I'hiver 
 dernier. Cependant il commence a n'etre plus que deconsidere, car il 
 laisse entendre qu'il prendra sa ravanche. " ('*Herr von Kiderlen was 
 last Winter the best-hated man in Germany. At present he is beginning 
 to be only disliked (instead of hated,) for he allows it to be under- 
 stood that he will take his revenge (for Morocco.") 
 
 Secretary of State von Kiderlen, who, according to this, began to 
 meditate vengeance in July, 1913, had already died in December, 1912, 
 a fact which was manifestly not realized by that official of the Quai 
 d'Orsay who belatedly fabricated this ''Yellow Book" document. 
 
 A similar misfortune happened in the case of a note which, accord- 
 ing to the English "Blue Book," M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador 
 to London, ostensibly handed on July 30, 1914, to the English Secretary 
 of Foreififn Affairs, and the contents of which deal with the German 
 
•G Gernnmif § Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 prec^xled the beginning of the war. Rather, it is here pertinent only 
 to present to the world merely the most important happenings that 
 brought on the war, by means of the evidence offered by the Triple 
 Entente powers themselves. 
 
 For this purpose, only those steps will next be ascertained which 
 directly caused the outbreak of the war. Pursued from this point 
 the threads will be followed backward and untangled as far as 
 possible. 
 
 The Firebrands. 
 
 There can be no doubt about the direct cause of the war. The 
 cause was the general mobilization of the Eussian fighting forces 
 on land and sea ordered by the Czar early on the morning of July 
 31, and the refusal of Eussia to rescind this measure as demanded 
 by Germany. 
 
 It is important to establish right here the fact that the Eussian 
 Government was fully clear in its knowledge that the ordering of 
 general mobilization and the maintenance of this step must make 
 war with Germany inevitable. In official and unofficial wavs it was 
 made clear with all empliasis to the Eussian Government in good 
 time that a Eussian mobilization meant the same as a German 
 mobilization and a German mobilization meant the same as w^ar. 
 [Xote 2.] 
 
 military preparations on the Alsace-Lorraine border ("Blue Book,'^ 
 No. 105, Annex 3.) Through the dating of this note on July 30, the 
 impression was to be created that at that time, and even in the days 
 preceding, the German troops had already stood close to the border 
 and had even crossed the border through patrols. The note begins, 
 in the wording of the third edition of the ''Blue Book:" "L'armee 
 allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontiers, hier par deux f ois 
 des patrouilles allemandes out penetre sur notre territoire" (''the 
 German Army has its advance posts on our border: yesterday the Ger- 
 man patrols twice penetrated upon our territory.") 
 
 "Yesterday," in a note transmitted on July 30, naturally means 
 July 29. The 29th of July was a Wednesday. "^In the first edition of 
 the "Blue Book," however, it read "hier, vendredi" ("yesterday, 
 Friday"); the "vendredi" was stricken out only afterward, when the 
 inconsistency was noticed. From this it appears that the note osten- 
 sibly transmitted on July 30 could at all events have been framed only 
 on Sunday, Aug. 1, quite aside from the fact that no trespass across 
 the border took place either on July 29 or July 30.] 
 
 [Note 2. — According to the German "White Book" the German 
 Ambassador in St, Petersburg was instructed on July 26 to hand to the 
 Kussian Government a declaration in which it was said: 
 
 "Preparatory military measures on the part of Eussia will compel 
 us to take similar measures, which must consist in the mobilization of 
 the army. But mobilization means war."] 
 
Germani/'s Cose in the Supreme Court of Civilization 7 
 
 * The reasons are patent and decisive. Germany, in view of the 
 danger of a war on several fronts, could not possibly forego the 
 advantage of time which was assured for it by the more speedy 
 mobilization of its own forces, as soon as the situation shaped itself 
 to a general Eussian mobilization. For this compelling reason of 
 self-maintenance. Germany could not for a moment entertain the 
 question of a mutual mobilization and then a state of expectant 
 facing of one another. 
 
 As a proof that this view of the case was also admitted by the 
 allies of Eussia as quite self-evident, attention should be called to 
 the report of the English Ambassador in St, Petersburg, Sir G. 
 Buchanan, on July 25 ("Blue Book." No. 17) Buchanan reports 
 about an interview with the Eussian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonof : 
 
 I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, and warned him that if Eussia mobilized, Germany would not 
 be content with mere mobilization, or give Russia time to carry out 
 herSj but would probably declare war at once. 
 
 Even at the last hour the German Kaiser in person, in his tele- 
 gram of Julv 30 at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, called the Czar's 
 attention to the ''dangers and heavy consequences of a mobilization." 
 
 The Eussian Government and the Czar, therefore, in the order 
 of general mobilization that followed on July 31, must have been 
 quite clear in their minds that this order meant war. 
 
 If hereby the direct cause of the outbreak of the war is estab- 
 lished, there arises the question through what reasons the general 
 Eussian mobilization was occasioned. 
 
 "We owe it to those who are responsible for the decisive steps to 
 examine next the reasons which they themselves allege. 
 
 Let us first listen to the Czar. 
 
 In his teleofram to the German Kaiser, of Julv 30, at 1 :20 
 o'clock in the afternoon, there is no suggestion of an impending 
 general mobilization, but only a reference to the steps that had been 
 taken ao^ainst Austria-Hunaarv : 
 
 '&* 
 
 The military measures now going into force were already decided 
 upon five days ago, and that for reasons of defense against the prepara- 
 tions of Austria-Hungary. 
 
 This telegram crossed in transit the telegram of the Kaiser 
 mentioned above, which called attention to the heavy conse- 
 
8 Germany^ s Case in tli£ Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 quences of a Russian mobilization and which moreover expressed 
 the fear that even a mobilization directed exclusively against Aus- 
 tria-Hungary would endanger, if it would not make impossible, the 
 role of mediator which the Kaiser had undertaken at the request 
 of the Czar. The Czar replied on July 31, at 2 o'clock in the 
 afternoon, at an hour in which the order of general mobilization of 
 the entire Russian fighting forces had already been issued : 
 
 It is impossible, for technical reasons, to stop our military prepara- 
 tions which have been made necessary by the mobilization of Austria- 
 Hungary. 
 
 Either through the expression ^^our military preparations" there 
 is meant only the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary; 
 in which case the Czar in this telegram ignores the already com- 
 pleted general mobilization directed against Germany, which to be 
 sure, would be the simplest method of saving all efforts to find a 
 justification; or, on the other hand, "our military preparations" 
 means the general mobilization ; in which case the Czar was able to 
 allege only the military measures of Austria-Hungary as justifica- 
 tion for this decisive step. 
 
 Now let us listen to the Russian Minister of Foreis^n Affairs. 
 
 Concerning the reasons alleged by the latter, the French Am- 
 bassador at St. Petersburg on July 31 reported to his Government : 
 
 En raison de la mobilisation generale de PAutriche et des mesures 
 de mobilisation prises secretement, mais d'une maniere continue, par 
 I'Allemagne depuis six jours, Pordre de la mobilisation generale russe 
 a ete donne. (For the reason of the general mobilization of Austria 
 and measures of mobilization taken secretly but in a continuous manner 
 by Germany for six days, the order of general Russian mobilization 
 has been given.) ^ Yellow Book," No. 118.) 
 
 On the same day the English Aml^assador in St. Petersburg 
 reports to Sir Edward Grey ("Blue Book," ^o. 113) that the 
 general mobilization was ordered in consequence of a report of the 
 Russian Ambassador at Vienna that Austria-Hungary was de- 
 termined not to tolerate an intervention of the powers and that 
 it was setting its troops into motion not only against Serbia, but 
 also against Russia. There is added: 
 
 Eussia has also reason to believe that Germanv is making active 
 military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start. 
 
Germany* s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 9 
 
 In the Eussian "Orange Book" itself one will seek in vain for 
 the reason for the general mobilization. The communications con- 
 cerning this decisive step, which without doubt were made to the 
 Russian Ambassadors abroad, are not repeated, and the reader 
 learns about the fact of the Eussian mobilization against Germany 
 only through the circii^ar telegram in which Sazonof informs the 
 chiefs of the Eussian legations about the demand of Germany for 
 the rescinding of the mobilization. 
 
 What, now, are the reasons for the general Eussian mobilization 
 that are given in the English and French Ambassadors' reports and 
 the telegram of the Czar to the German Kaiser? 
 
 Russian Mobilization. 
 
 1. — The Generai. Eussian Mobilization as a Eeply to the 
 Military Measures of Austria-Hungary. — In order to provide 
 protection against the alleged military preparations of Austria- 
 Hungary against Eussia, thirteen army corps had already been 
 mobilized by Eussia on July 29, (report of the French Ambassador 
 at St. Petersburg on July 29, "Yellow Book,'' No. 100.) The 
 mobilization in the districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan 
 was announced through the Eussian Ambassador in Berlin to the 
 German Government, with the justification that this measure was 
 the reply to the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against 
 Serbia, which had taken place on the day before, and to the 
 '^mesures de mobilisation deja appliquees a la plus grande partie 
 de I'armee austro-hongroise." (^TTellow Book," No. 95.) As a 
 matter of fact, Austria- Hungary, until the time of the general Eus- 
 sian mobilization, had mobilized only eight army corps. Contrary 
 to the assertion of the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg of 
 July 31, ("Yellow Book," No. 118,) (see Note 3,) a general mobili- 
 zation in Austria-Hungary had not yet been ordered at the moment 
 of the Eussian general mobilization. Such an order, indeed, 
 followed more as an answer to the Eussian general mobilization in 
 the course of July 31. The mobilization of thirteen army corps 
 
 [Note 3, — This false assertion, which was never maintained by the 
 Eussian side itself, of the general Austrian mobilization that was said 
 for its part to have induced Eussia to make a general mobilization, 
 reappears at various points in the French ** Yellow Book'*; thus, in 
 the circular note of Viviani of Aug. 1 (No. 127) ^'PAutriche a la 
 premiere, procede h. une mobilization gen6rale" ('* Austria was the 
 first to proceed to a general mobilization.")] 
 
10 Germany* s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 ordered by Eussia on July 29 was, as a counter-measure to the 
 mobilization of eight Austro-Hungarian army corps, in itself 
 excessive and challenging. Nothing had happened on the part of 
 the Danube Monarchy after July 29 that could have offered Russia 
 occasion to proceed from the very extensive partial mobilization to 
 the general mobilization which made the war inevitable. 
 
 2. — The Alleged Military Preparations of Germany 
 Against Russia. — The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in that 
 critical time repeatedly saw and spoke to the German Ambassador 
 each day. If the Russian Government thought it had knowledge of 
 measures of mobilization which Germany was alleged to have made 
 as long as six days before, that is to say, since July 25 ('^Yellow 
 Book,^' No. 118,) then nothing would have been more natural than 
 for M. Sazonof to* ask Count Pourtales for explanation concerning 
 this alleged mobilization, or to have called his attention to the fact 
 that such measures could not remain without counter-measures on 
 the part of Russia. An indication by Sazonof concerning these 
 alleged German preparations would have been given all the more 
 because Count Pourtales in those days repeatedly "balled attention 
 to the dangers of the Russian military preparations. So, on July 
 29, with the result that Sazonof confined himself to replying 
 thereto : 
 
 Que les preparatifs russes sont motives: d'une cote par I'intran- 
 sigeance obstinee de I'Autriche d'aiitre part, par le fait que huit corps 
 austro-hongrois, sont deja mobilises (that the Eussian preparations are 
 motived on the one hand by the obstinate intransigeance of Austria, 
 and on the other by the fact that eight Austro-Hungarian corps are 
 already mobilized.) (''Yellow Book,'' No. 100.) 
 
 On July 30 also Count Pourtales reverted to the Russian prepa- 
 rations without SazonoFs feeling himself called upon to ask a ques- 
 tion in turn about the alleged German measures of mobilization. 
 ("Yellow Book,'^ No. 103.) The Czar, too, in his telegram to the 
 German Kaiser, at no time and no place mentions anything what- 
 ever about the German military measures, which, according to the 
 presentation of the facts offered by his Government, furnished a 
 reason for the Russian general mobilization. 
 
 German Preparations. 
 
 The falsity of the justification of the Russian general mobiliza- 
 tion by means of the German measures is fully exposed by the 
 
Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 11 
 
 fact that the French "Yellow Book" confirms the fact (No. 102) 
 that the Russian Chief of the General Staff on July 29 gave his 
 word of honor to the German Military Attache that the military 
 measures of Eussia were directed exclusively against Austria- 
 Hungary and not against Germany also. If Eussia believed it 
 knew of military measures taken by Germany, would the Eussian 
 Chief of the General Staff then have had any occasion to give such 
 a word of honor? And if information had belatedly been received 
 by the Eussian Government concerning threatening German mili- 
 tary preparations — as M. Sazonof, to be sure, asserted to the French 
 and English Ambassadors, but never to the German Ambassador — 
 would not the Eussian Chief of the General Staff then have had the 
 most urgent occasion, because of the word of honor he had given, 
 to speak to the German Military Attache about the changed situa- 
 tion presented as a result of such information, and to do this, too, 
 before the irremediable step of general Eussian mobilization had 
 been taken? Nothing of all this happened. Eussia has justified 
 its general mobilization only to third powers, by the alleged German 
 measures ; but to the German Kaiser, the German Ambassador, and 
 the German Military Attache, however, it never uttered a word of 
 inquiry, much less of complaint against the alleged German prepa- 
 rations, but rather gave calming assurances constantly. 
 
 3. — The Eefusal of Austria-Hungary to Permit an Inter- 
 vention BY THE Powers. — This attempt at justification, trans- 
 mitted by the English Ambassador to London, is almost grotesque 
 in its effect, in conjunction Avith the fact that a new proposal for 
 mediation emanating from Sir Edward Grey had already been 
 transmitted once by the German Government to the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Government on the preceding day, and that the reply of 
 Austria-Hungary to this proposal had not yet been given; that, 
 furthermore, on the afternoon of July 30, a conversation had taken 
 place in Vienna between Count Berchtold and the Eussian Am- 
 bassador, which the French Ambassador in Vienna at once tele- 
 graphed to Paris as an interview of great importance, ("Un 
 entretien de haute importance,") and which, in his opinion, per- 
 mitted the belief to be entertained that not every prospect of a 
 localization of the conflict was lost, ("Permettait de croire que toute 
 chance de localiser le conflit n'etait pas perdue.") ("Yellow Book," 
 No. 104.) 
 
 The proposal of mediation made by Sir Edward Grey on July 
 
 »• 
 
12 Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization ^ 
 
 29 suggested: Austria-Hungary should undertake, after the occu- 
 pation of Belgrade and the Serbian territory at the border, not to 
 advance further, while the powers would try to bring it about that 
 Serbia should give to Austria-Hungary a satisfaction adequate for 
 that monarchy. The territory occupied by the Austro-Hungarian 
 Army should be evacuated again after the satisfaction had been 
 rendered. Sir Edward Grey conveyed this proposal on July 30 to 
 the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and added : 
 
 I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, 
 and if it can be obtained I would earnestly hope that it might be 
 agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides. ("Blue 
 Book,'' No. 103.) 
 
 This proposal was transmitted and recommended by Germany 
 to the Austro-Hungarian Government; similarly by the English 
 and French Ambassadors to the Eussian Government ("Yellow 
 Book," No. 112.) The proposal was not yet answered by Austria, 
 and Eussia, too, had not yet taken any attitude concerning it, when 
 the general Eussian mobilization ensued. The assertion that the 
 Eussian general mobilization had been made necessary because 
 Austria-Hungary declined all intervention by the powers, ("Blue 
 Book," No. 113,) is thus in strict contradiction to the state of 
 affairs as pictured in the English and French documents. 
 
 Much more important than the fact that Eussia played out 
 the card of general mobilization, while an as yet undisposed of 
 English proposal of mediation lay before its Government and that 
 of Austria-Hungary, is the direct conversation which took place 
 on the evening before the general Eussian mobilization between the 
 Eussian Ambassador at Vienna, M. Schebeko, and Count Berchtold. 
 Let it be recalled that after Sir Edward Grey's first proposal of 
 conference had encountered difficulties, Sazonof himself had taken 
 the initiative toward direct negotiations with Austria-Hungary and 
 that this initiative had at first been rejected in Vienna. ("Blue 
 Book," No. 74.) In the conversation of July 30 the difficulties in 
 the way of the direct exchange of views were obviated. According 
 to the cited report of the French Ambassador, ("Yellow Book," No. 
 104,) who was informed of it by the Eussian Ambassador as was 
 his English colleague immediately after the conversation, M. 
 Schebeko and Count Berchtold examined the terrible difficulties 
 that were present, with the equal good will to find solutions that 
 
Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 13 
 
 might be acceptable to both sides, (avec une egal bonne volonte d'y 
 adapter des solutions reciproquement acceptables.) The Russian 
 Ambassador declared that the military preparations of Russia had 
 no other purpose than to safeguard against the Austro-Hungarian 
 measures and to announce the intention and the right of the Czar 
 to have a voice in the settlement of the Serbian question. Count 
 Berchtold answered with the declaration that the Austro-Hungarian 
 preparations in Galicia likewise emanated from no purpose of 
 aggression whatsoever. On both sides it was agreed to labor toward 
 the end that the measures should not be interpreted as hostile steps. 
 The report of the French Ambassador then continues: 
 
 Pour le reglement dii confiit Austro-Serbe il a ete convenu que les 
 pourparlers seraient repris a Petersbourg entre M. Sazonof et le Comte 
 Szapary; s'ils ont ete interrompus, c'est par le suite d'un malentendu, 
 le Comte Berchtold croyant que le Ministre des Affaires etrangers de 
 Russie reclamait pour son interlocuteur des pouvoirs qui lui permet- 
 traient de modifier les termes de 1 'ultimatum autriehien. Le Comte 
 Szapary sera seulement autorise a diseuter quel accommodement serait 
 compatible, avec la dignite et le prestige dont les deux Empires ont 
 Edward Grey proposait de confier aux quatre Puissances non directe- 
 et reduite aux deux plus interessees q 'aurait lieu I'examen que Sir 
 Edward Grey Proposait de confier aux quatre Puissances non directe- 
 ment interessees. Sir M. de Bunsen, qui se trouvait chez moi, a 
 aussitot declare a M. Schebeko que le Foreign Ofiice approuvera 
 entierement cette nouvelle procedure. (With regard to the settlement 
 of the Austro-Serbian dispute, it was agreed that the pourparlers shall 
 be resumed in St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary. 
 Their interruption was due to a misunderstanding, Count Berchtold 
 believing that the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs demanded that 
 his interlocutor should be given powers enabling him to modify the 
 terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count* Szapary will only be author- 
 ized to discuss what arrangement would be compatible with the dignity 
 and the prestige of the two empires, which are to both of them an object 
 of equal care. For the moment, therefore, it will be in this direct 
 form, confined to the two most interested parties, that the examina- 
 tion of the situation will take place, which Sir Edward Grey proposed 
 should be undertaken by the four not directly interested powers. Sir 
 M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once told M. Schebeko that the 
 Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new procedure.) 
 
 The Kaiser's Telegram. 
 
 On the following day the Russian Ambassador in Berlin received 
 the communication that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. 
 Petersburg confirmed the declaration of Count Berchtold to M. 
 
14 Germany's Case in tlu Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 Schebeko, with the explanation that his Government was ready to 
 discuss with the Russian Government the note to Serbia, even con- 
 cerning its material content ("que son Gouvernement etait pret a 
 discuter avec le Gouvernement russe la note a la Serbie, meme quant 
 au fond'') ("Yellow Book/' No. 21.) 
 
 The Austro-Hungarian Government had thus on July 30 taken 
 a decisive step on the road of compliance, in resuming the direct 
 negotiations with Russia, and thereby declared itself ready to enter 
 upon a till then stubbornly declined discussion of the material con- 
 tents of the note addressed to Serbia. The reason for this decisive 
 compliance on the part of Austria-Hungary, which for the moment 
 was bound to remove the acute character of the crisis, appears 
 forthwith if one examines the German "White Book." On July 28 
 the German Kaiser had telegraphed to the Czar: 
 
 Remembering the cordial friendship which has long united us two 
 with a firm bond, I am therefore exerting all my influence to induce 
 Austria-Hungary to strive for an open and satisfying understanding 
 with Russia. 
 
 And in the telegram to the Czar on July 29 the Kaiser said : 
 
 I believe that a direct understanding between your Government and 
 Vienna is possible and desirable, au understanding which, as I have 
 already telegraphed to you, my Government is laboring with all its 
 power to further. 
 
 The Kaiser added, as may here be emphasized : 
 
 Naturally military measures on the part of Russia that could be 
 interpreted by Austria-Hungary as a threat would hasten a misfortune 
 which we both wish to avoid, and would also undermine my position 
 as an intermediary which — as your appeal to my friendship and help — 
 I readily assumed. 
 
 This sequence of facts is confirmed by a telegram of Sir Edward 
 Grey to the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 31, 
 (Blue Book No. 110,) according to which the German Ambassador 
 in London communicated to Grey "as a result of suggestions by the 
 German Government," that an expression of views had taken place 
 in Vienna between Count Berchtold and M. Schebeko, and that the 
 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been in- 
 structed to get into communication with the Russian Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs, to give the latter explanations concerning the 
 
Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 15 
 
 Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia and to discuss all the 
 Austro-Hungarian-Russian relations concerning suggestions and 
 questions. Sir Edward Grey added that he had taken cognizance of 
 this resumption of direct conversations between Russia and Austria- 
 Hungary with great satisfaction. 
 
 Contrary to the assertions of the French "Yellow Book" that 
 Germany at no stage of the proceedings seriously counseled in 
 Vienna toward a spirit of conciliation and mutual concessions, it is 
 thus established firmly that upon the intercession of the German 
 Kaiser the Austro-Hungarian Government on the afternoon of July 
 30, yielded to the Russian wish, till then consistently rejected, for a 
 discussion of the note to Serbia. It is further shown by the French 
 "Yellow Book" that the Russian Ambassador in Vienna attributed 
 the greatest importance to the conciliatory declaration of Count 
 Berchtold and immediately instructed his French and English 
 colleagues about this declaration. It is further established through 
 the French "Yellow Book" that the French Ambassador in Vienna 
 based the hope of a localizing of the conflict upon the conciliatory 
 stand of Count Berchtold, and that the English Ambassador, with- 
 out first inquiring back in London, expressed the complete agree- 
 ment of the Foreign Office in the procedure discussed between 
 Count Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador. 
 
 But it is furthermore a fact that the Russian "Orange Book" 
 shows not a trace of this decisive attitude of concession on the 
 part of Austria-Hungary, and finally, that this attitude of con- 
 cession on the part of Austria-Hungary was answered by the Rus- 
 sian Government with the general mobilization which made the war 
 inevitable. 
 
 Blames Russian War Party. 
 
 To this is to be attributed the fact that the general mobilization 
 came as a complete surprise to the two Entente associates of Russia 
 who, according to their own documents, had welcomed the con- 
 ciliatory spirit of Austria-Hungary with great aotisf action as a 
 hope of peace. Proof of this: On July 31 at 7 o'clock in the 
 evening, the German Ambassador at Paris spoke to the French 
 President of Ministers and Foreign Minister, M. Viviani, to inform 
 him that Germany was compelled by the general mobilization of 
 Russia to proclaim the state of threatening danger of war, and to 
 demand that Russia demobilize. 
 
16 Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 To this M. Viviani replied: 
 
 That he was in no way informed of the alleged mobilization of 
 the Eussian Army and Navy (nullement renseign6 sur une pretendue 
 mobilisation totale de I'armee et de la fiotte russes,) ("Yellow Book/' 
 No. 117.) 
 
 The English Ambassador at Paris, too, reported late in the 
 evening of July 31 to the Foreign Office that his colleague Iswolsky 
 was not in the slightest aware of a general Russian mobilization. 
 ("Blue Book," No. 117.) 
 
 If, therefore, the reasons alleged by Russia for the sudden 
 general mobilization were merely transparent pretexts, and if 
 Russia broke the momentous measure in question across its knee, 
 without even informing England and France at that moment, when 
 an English proposal for mediation that was full of hope had been 
 spread out, and when the compliance of Austria-Hungary effected 
 by Germany must have obviated the acute danger of war, then there 
 remains only one explanation for this : 
 
 The personages who had the deciding voice at that moment in 
 Russia, in view of the compliance of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment that w^as manifesting itself as a result of German efforts, 
 desired to break off all the bridges that led to peace and to make 
 the war inevitable. 
 
 If this patent conclusion needed a further corroboration, that 
 would be provided by the attitude of Russia after the transmission 
 of the German ultimatum. 
 
 While Germany, which had heretofore designated the Russian 
 mobilization as a casus belli, was content for the time being to pro- 
 claim the state of threatening danger of war, which is not yet 
 equivalent to mobilization, and left the Russian Government twelve 
 hours (ending at noon on Aug. 1) in which to rescind its mobiliza- 
 tion, Russia left the German Ambassador without any answer 
 whatsoever, and made no attempt whatever to avert the utmost 
 extreme by the intermediation of a third party; but, on the other 
 hand, in the night of Aug. 1 to 2 opened hostilities at three points 
 on the Prussian frontier. 
 
 In the face of this indisputable state of facts, the French 
 Government dares to offer the following presentation of the case 
 (Circular note of the French Government of Aug. 1, "Yellow 
 Book," No. 120) : 
 
 Austria-Hungary has at last allowed itself to be found ready to 
 
Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 17 
 
 discuss materially the contents of its ultimatum to Serbia. Russia 
 is ready, on the basis of the English proposal, to enter into negotia- 
 tions {"le Gouvernement russe est pret a entrer en negociation sur 
 la base de la proposition anglaise/') Unfortunately, these pros- 
 pects for a peaceful solution are destroyed by the ultimatum of 
 Germany which demands demobilization of Russia. The ultimatum 
 is unjustified, since Russia has accepted the English propositioi? 
 which includes a stopping of military preparations ("puisque la 
 Russie a accepte la proposition anglaise qui implique un arret des 
 preparatifs militaires de toutes les puissances.") Germany's atti- 
 tude proves that it wants the war. 
 
 History in the making can scarcely be falsified more light- 
 heartedly than this. 
 
 It is true, to be sure, that Austria-Hungary showed itself to be 
 compliant and thereby gave all justification to hope for peace. But 
 the French circular note keeps quiet the fact that this compliance 
 is to be traced to the influence of Germany; the French Foreign 
 Minister had even the face to assert in the Chamber of Deputies 
 on Aug. 4 that Germany — from July 24 until its ultimatum handed 
 in on July 31, under the pretext (!) of the general mobilization 
 ordered by Russia — had not participated by any positive actions in 
 the pacific conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente ("Yellow 
 Book," No. 159.) 
 
 It is false that Russia accepted the English proposition which 
 included the cessation of military preparations by all the powers 
 and that thereby it deprived the German ultimatum in advance of 
 all justification. 
 
 In the second place,^the English proposition above mentioned 
 ("Blue Book," No. 103) did not contain the condition of the 
 stopping of all military preparations, but rather only the earnest 
 hope was expressed by Sir Edward Grey that with the acceptance 
 of his proposition the military preparations would be halted by all 
 sides. Furthermore, Russia did not accept the English proposition, 
 neither before nor after the transmission of the German ultimatum ; 
 the circular note of Viviani, ("Yellow Book," No. 120,) which in 
 its fifth paragraph asserts the completed acceptance of the English 
 proposition, itself states in its fourth paragraph that the Russian 
 Government was "pret a entre en negociation sur la base de la 
 proposition anglaise," and certainly there is a difference between the 
 acceptance of a proposition and the willingness to negotiate on the 
 
18 Germany' s Case in the Suprerrle Court of Civilization 
 
 basis thereof. But, as a matter of fact, Eussia's Foreign Minister 
 did not even declare himself ready to enter upon negotiations on 
 the basis of the English proposition; rather, he made a counter- 
 proposal to the English Ambassador, which differed essentially from 
 the English proposition, as the following comparison shows : 
 
 Eussian Counter-Proposition, 
 (''Orange Book/' No. 67.) 
 
 Si PAutriche consent a arreter 
 la marche de ses armees sur le 
 territoire serbe, (If Austria con- 
 sents to halt the advance of its 
 armies on Serbian territory,) 
 
 et si, reconnaissant que le conflit 
 austro-serbe a assume le caractere 
 d'une question europeenne, (and 
 if, recognizing that the Austro- 
 Serbian conflict has assumed the 
 character of a European question,) 
 
 elle admet que les Grandes Puis- 
 sances examinent la satisfaction 
 que la Serbie pourrait accorder au 
 Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie, 
 (Austria admits that the great 
 powers may examine the satisfac- 
 tion which Serbia could accord to 
 the Government of Austria-Hun- 
 gary,) 
 
 sans laisser porter atteinte a ses 
 droits d 'Etat souverain et a son 
 independence, (without injury to 
 its rights as a sovereign State and 
 its independence,) 
 la Eussia s 'engage a conserver son 
 attitude expectante, (Eussia en- 
 gages to maintain its expectant 
 attitude,) 
 
 English Proposition, 
 (''Blue Book," No. 103.) 
 
 Austria, after taking Belgrade 
 and Serbian territory in region of 
 frontier, to promise not to advance 
 further. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey had not asked 
 for this recognition, and the 
 Austro-Hungarian Government had 
 steadily declined to permit its con- 
 flict with Serbia to be treated as 
 a European question — 
 
 while powers endeavored to ar- 
 range that Serbia should give 
 satisfaction sufficient to pacify 
 Austria — 
 
 this conation which, moreover, 
 had already been fulfilled by the 
 declaration of the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Government, did not figure 
 in the English proposition, but 
 rather there was therein provided 
 that Austria-Hungary, after satis- 
 faction had been received, was to 
 evacuate again the occupied Ser- 
 bian territory. ("Territory occu- 
 pied would of course be evacuated 
 when Austria was satisfied.") 
 
 — which expectant attitude heretofore had consisted in the progress 
 of the warlike preparations up to the general mobilization. 
 
Germany'' s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 19 
 
 Such a counter-proposition, which is marked by an almost classi- 
 cal naivete, the French Government before its diplomatic repre- 
 sentatives, its Chamber, and the civilized world calls : the acceptance 
 of the English proposition which included the stopping of military 
 preparations. 
 
 That Russia, moreover, did not even think of stopping its 
 military preparations is confirmed by M. Sazonof himself very 
 emphatically on July 31, on the occasion of the presentation of his 
 counter-proposition to the English Ambassador, in declaring to him 
 "it was of .course impossible to stop a mobilization which was al- 
 ready in progress.'' 
 
 No distortion, no matter how unabashed, can obscure the fact 
 that after the Austro-Hungarian attitude of conciliation induced 
 by Germany had given anew ground to hope for the maintenance 
 of peace, Russia, without notifying either its opponent or its allies, 
 precipitated the general mobilization that sealed the war, whilst 
 Germany refrained with its counter-measures to the very limit of 
 self-preservation. The authoritative circles of Russia wanted the 
 war, and wanted it with redoubled brutality when the prospect of 
 a peaceful settlement showed itself. 
 
 The Accomplices. 
 
 If the foregoing deductions, which one and all are based solely 
 upon the documents of the Triple Entente Governments, show the 
 incontrovertible certainty that the authoritative circle in Russia 
 wanted the war and forced it, there arises the question how this 
 determination, so universally momentous in its responsibilities, 
 came to be adopted. 
 
 The compelling reason of self-preservation will not hold, for 
 Russia was menaced by no one. 
 
 The protection of Serbia also will not hold, for, aside from the 
 fact that Serbia stood in no relationship of protection that imposed 
 protection, morally or politically, upon Russia as a duty, Austria- 
 Hungary had pledged itself to the various great powers to preserve 
 the integrity and sovereignty of Serbia. 
 
 Even the maintenance of the Russian prestige in the Balkans 
 was, after the attitude of conciliation shown by Austria-Hungary, 
 no longer an issue that could justify an appeal to arms. 
 
 The bringing on of the war was, therefore, for Russia a question 
 pure and simple of opportunity. In lack of compelling reasons, 
 
20 Germany* s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 the decision for the war could only be brought about by the convic- 
 tion: the opportunity is favorable for forcing down those great 
 powers which appeared to the authoritative Eussian personages as 
 obstacles in their course. 
 
 Left to depend upon itself alone, Eussia would have risked the 
 war with Austria-Hungary and Germany only in an extreme case 
 in the defense of national vital interests, but never as a result of 
 weighing the probable result. Only the assurance of the active co- 
 operation of other great powers could therefore have made possible 
 the determination of the leading circles of Eussia for war. The 
 attitude of the two other powers of the Triple Entente must there- 
 fore be of decisive influence for the Eussian determination. 
 
 Of this the documents of the Triple Entente Governments con- 
 tain the corroboration. 
 
 The co-operation of France was by no means assured a priori, 
 much less the co-operation of England. The Franco-Eussian 
 treaty of alliance did not pledge France to an unconditional ac- 
 companiment of Eussia in war, and between Eussia and England 
 there existed no sort of precise agreement. In the Austro-Hun- 
 gari an- Serbian conflict that arose out of the assassination of the 
 Austro-Hungarian heir apparent and his wife, the sympathies of 
 those not directly concerned could only be on the side of Austria- 
 Hungary. On that point they were clear also in Eussia, and this 
 clearness of view was shown by the fact that the Eussian Govern- 
 ment, after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum 
 to Serbia, displayed a certain caution for a time. 
 
 French Circular Note. 
 
 Thus the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg wired to his 
 Government on July 24 ("Yellow Book," No. 31,) after Sazonof 
 had received cognizance of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, 
 that the dispositions of the Czar and his Ministers were of the most 
 peaceful; and on July 25 ("Yellow Book," No. 38) : 
 
 M. Sazonof garde toute sa moderation: II faut eviter, m'a-t-il dit, 
 tout ce qui pourrait precipiter la crise. J'estime que, meme si le 
 Gouvernement austro-hongrois passait a Paction contre la Serbie, nous 
 ne devrions pas rompre les negociations (M. Sazonof maintains all his 
 moderation: It is necessary, he told me, to avoid everything that can 
 precipitate the crisis. I am of the opinion that even if the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government should pass to action against Serbia we should 
 not break off negotiations). 
 
GerTuany's Case in the Supreme Court of CiviUzation 21 
 
 On July 26 the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in a 
 circular note ("Yellow Book," No. 50) : 
 
 De P^tersbourg nous apprenons que M. Sazonof a conseille a la 
 Serbie de demander la mediation anglaise. Dans le Conseil des Ministres 
 du 25, tenu en presence de TEmpereur, la mobilisation de treize corps 
 d'armee 6ventuellement destines a operer contre TAutriche a ete 
 envisagee; cette mobilisation ne serait toutefois rendu effective que si 
 TAutriche contraignait la Serbie par la force des amies, et seulement 
 apres avis du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a qui le soin incorabe 
 de fixer la date, liberte lui etant laissee de continuer les negoeiations 
 meme dans le cas ou Belgrade serait occupee. (From St. Petersburg 
 we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Servia to ask for English media- 
 tion. In the Council of Ministers of the 25th, held in the presence of 
 the Emperor, the mobilization of thirteen army corps, eventually 
 destined against Austria, was envisaged; but this mobilization is to be- 
 come effective only if Austria does violence to Serbia, and only according 
 to the advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom shall be left 
 the fixing of the date, in which he is at liberty to continue the nego- 
 tiations even in the case of the occupation of Belgrade.) 
 
 That this moderation was not genuine appears even from the 
 fact that M. Sazonof as early as the 24th of July declared to the 
 English Ambassador (''Blue Book," No. 6) : "that Russian 
 mobilization would at any rate h-ave to be carried out," from which 
 it appears that the Russian mobilization was already in progress on 
 July 24, the day on which the Austro-Hungarian note was an- 
 nounced, whilst the French circular note of July 26 ("Yellow 
 Book," No. 50) has the partial mobilization against Austria-Hun- 
 gary "envisaged" only on July 25, and makes its going into force 
 contingent upon the Austrian force of arms against Serbia and 
 the advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is nevertheless 
 important, however, that the Russian and French Governments at 
 that time still wished to call attention to the outward moderation. 
 
 The reason is manifestly that the Russian Government at that 
 time was not yet. sure of the co-operation of the English Govern- 
 ment, and even of that of the French Government. In the conversa- 
 tion which Sazonof at his request had on July 24 at the house of 
 the French Ambassador with the latter and Sir G. Buchanan, 
 ("Blue Book," No. 6,) Sazonof demanded that England should 
 declare its solidarity with Russia and France, whereupon Buchanan 
 very shrewdly replied : 
 
22 Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Govern- 
 ment, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of 
 solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an uncon- 
 ditional engagement on their part to support Eussia and France by 
 arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf 
 of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. 
 
 How the French Ambassador acted towards M. Sazonof cannot 
 be established absolutely, for the French "Yellow Book'' signifi- 
 cantly contains no report about this important conversation, and 
 Sir G. Buchanan confines himself in his report to saying that his 
 French colleague had given him to understand ("gave me to under- 
 stand'') that France would fulfill all duties imposed by its alliance 
 with Eussia. Such an attitude left open the neutrality of France 
 in a Russian war of aggression. As a matter of fact, as we shall 
 see later, France gave to the Russian Government its consent to 
 unconditional armecl help only at a later stage of the case. 
 
 We shall now consider how the attitude of France and England 
 developed. 
 
 France. 
 
 The French Government manifestly found itself in ^ heavy 
 dilemma. On the one side its entire policy for decades was based 
 upon the closest junction with Russia; on the other hand, there 
 weighed heavily the responsibility to take a stand unconditionally 
 with Russia in the bad Serbian matter and to risk alone with Russia 
 a war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
 
 Therefore the French statesmen were moved by a double fear: 
 the fear of awakening distrust in the Russian Government, and of 
 isolating France by a loosening of the Franco-Russian relation ; the 
 second, the fear of standing alone with Russia in a war against 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
 
 The effect of the first fear was that the French Government 
 refused to attempt any influence in St. Petersburg in a pacific 
 sense, which might there be interpreted as a defection of France 
 from Russia. The various urgent steps taken by the German 
 Ambassador in Paris after the handing over of the Austro-Hun- 
 garian note to Serbia, in order to impress upon the French Cabinet 
 the gravity of the situation and to point out how necessary a 
 moderating influence of France was in St. Petersburg, were al- 
 ways received with the greatest distrust and suspected of being 
 attempts to drive a wedge between France and Russia. 
 
Germany\s Case in tlie Supreme Court of Civilization 23 
 
 When, after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian ulti- 
 matum to Serbia, the German Ambassador in Paris gave to the 
 French Government the correct and faithful explanation that the 
 German Government regarded the matter as one that should be 
 settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and de- 
 sired urgently the localization of the conflict, since every interven- 
 tion of another power might, by the natural play of the existing 
 alliances, bring on incalculable consequences, the echo of this com- 
 munication was an article in the "Echo de Paris," the intimate 
 relations of which to the Quai d'Orsay are well known. In this 
 article, the step of the German Ambassador was branded as a 
 "menace allemande.'' ("Yellow Book,'' No. 36.) 
 
 When, two days later, on July 26, the German Ambassador sug- 
 gested to the French Government to interfere with the Russian 
 Government in a pacific sense, and added that Austria-Hungary, 
 according to the declarations given to Russia, was seeking neither 
 territorial aggrandizement nor impairment of the integrity of 
 Serbia, but only to safeguard itself, the answer was that Russia 
 had done nothing that could cause apprehension concerning its 
 moderation ; but that Germany should intervene in Vienna in order 
 to prevent military operations against Serbia ('^Yellow Book," No. 
 56.) And wlien the German Ambassador, warned by the attitude 
 of the "Echo de Paris," made the proposition to issue a notice to 
 the press concerning the conversation, in which notice it should 
 be said that he had in a new conversation with the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs examined in a friendly spirit and with the feeling 
 of pacific solidarity the means of preserving peace, then the thought 
 of the public announcement of a "solidarite pacifique" with Germany 
 awakened a veritable terror ("Yellow Book," No. 57,) and the 
 notice suggested by the German Ambassador was finally issued to 
 the press without the suspicious expression concerning the solidarity 
 and the friendly spirit: "Cette redaction, volontairement terne, 
 evitait une solidarite I'Allemagne qui pourrait etre mal interpretee 
 ("this purposely colorless editing avoided a solidarity with 
 Germany which might be falsely interpreted.") So to be read in 
 a circular note which the French Foreign Office addressed to its 
 foreign embassies concerning this important case. ("Yellow Book," 
 No. 62.) The same circular note adds that the probable explana- 
 tion of Herr von Schoen's step was that he was seeking to compro- 
 mise France in the eyes of Russia ("a compromettre la France au 
 
24 Germany's Case in the Swpreme Court of Civilization 
 
 regard de la Eussie/') The French Foreign Minister, p. i., announces 
 in a further circular note of July 29 his pride that the German 
 Ambassador had sought in vain to draw Germany into a Franco- 
 German action toward solidarity in St. Petersburg, (^^^a vainement 
 tente de mous entrainer dans une action solidarie franco-allemande 
 a Petersbourg.") He repeats the assertion that the Kussian Govern- 
 ment had given the greatest proofs of its moderation and that 
 Eussia in no way threatened the peace, but that on the other hand 
 negotiations must be conducted in Vienna and that all danger 
 emanated from Vienna. (^'Yellow Book," No. 85.) 
 
 From no document of the French "Yellow Book," and as little 
 from the Eussian "Orange Book" and the English "Blue Book," 
 does it appear that France at any stage ventured to give the Eussian 
 Government an earnest counsel in a pacific sense, unless it be con- 
 sidered that the expression of the wish that Eussia might avoid 
 measures which could give Germany a pretext for mobilization 
 ("Yellow Book," No. 102) be regarded as a sincere mediation for 
 peace, while as a matter of fact such wishes are more properly to 
 be regarded as tactical hints to detain Germany until the assurance 
 of armed help from England, toward which France was at that 
 time working with all means at its disposal, should be attained. 
 
 The unconditional safeguarding of the English alliance, not 
 any mediatory activity whatsoever, was in those critical days the 
 goal of the labors of French diplomats; and as long as this goal 
 was not attained, the decisive word to Eussia was also not uttered. 
 No matter if the impression is given a hundred times in the French 
 "Yellow Book" that French assistance of Eussia was axiomatic, 
 so axiomatic that a special declaration on this point to Eussia — 
 which one seeks in vain in the French "Yellow Book" — was not at 
 all necessary — ^but the Eussian "Orange Book" knows better. In 
 this there is contained a telegraphic statement of Sazonof to 
 Isvolsky, printed as of June 29, ("Orange Book," No. 58,) and that, 
 too, as the last of the ten documents dated July 29, so that we 
 may assume that this telegram was dispatched only late in the 
 evening of July 29. In the statement Isvolsky is authorized 
 
 d'exprimer au Gouvernement frangaise notre sincere reconnaissance 
 pour la declaration que TAmbassadeur de France m'a faite en son 
 nom en disant que nous pouvons compter entierement sur I'appui de 
 notre alliee la France (to express to the French Government our sin- 
 cere gratitude for the declaration which the French Ambassador has 
 
Germany^ s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 25 
 
 made to me in its name, that we may count upon the full and complete 
 support of France as our ally.) 
 
 Sazonof added: 
 
 Dans les circonstances actuelles cette declaration nous est particu- 
 lierement precieuse (under the present circumstances this declaration is 
 especially precious to us.) 
 
 From this it appears that France on the evening of July 29, 
 not earlier and not later, gave to Russia expressly and without con- 
 ditions its declaration of armed assistance. 
 
 Why not earlier? And why did France on July 29 find the 
 ability to make up its mind to this decisive step? 
 
 The key lies with 
 
 England. 
 
 The relation of France to England bears, since 1905, the official 
 name of the '^entente cordiale." A good understanding, not an 
 alliance. In the English Parliament, the Ministers responsible for 
 the foreign policy have always declared that there existed no treaty 
 obligation whatsoever for the cordial good understanding between 
 the two nations; for England there was said to be no binding 
 obligation; Parliament's power of decision was said to have been 
 encroached upon in advance in no way. 
 
 Today we know more. 
 
 Between Sir Edward Grey as Secretary of State of the British 
 Foreign Office and M. Paul Cambon as Ambassador of the French 
 Republic letters were exchanged on November 22 and 23, 1912, of 
 which the letter of Grey — w^iich Paul Cambon merely confirms in 
 approximately the same words — may here be inserted. (^'Blue 
 Book," No. 105, Annex 1:) 
 
 Foreign OflSce, Nov. 22, 1912. 
 
 My dear Ambassador: 
 
 From time to time in recent years the French and British naval 
 and military experts have consulted together. It has always been 
 understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either 
 Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the 
 other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between 
 experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that 
 commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not 
 arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the 
 
 m 
 
26 Germany^ s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not 
 based upon an engagement to cooperate in war. 
 
 You have, however, pointed out that if either Government had grave 
 reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might 
 become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon 
 the armed assistance of the other. 
 
 I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an 
 unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the 
 general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both 
 Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve 
 the peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take 
 in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the Gen- 
 eral Staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the Govern- 
 ments would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, 
 &c. E. GREY. 
 
 This liistorical document shows that the British and French 
 army and admiralty staffs had worked out and agreed upon plans 
 for joint action hy land and sea. There could be no doubt as to 
 who was the sole opponent against whom these plans were to be 
 directed. The plans made in common were kept alive by regularly 
 recurring conferences between the English and French military and 
 naval authorities. The details for effecting joint action of the land 
 and sea forces of both sides were not formulated, but the decision 
 of the question whether or not there was to be such joint action was 
 left for the moment when an emergency should arise. 
 
 Thus the English Government was justified in maintaining 
 that she had made no actual alliance with France. But it is clear 
 that the arrangement of operations in common between two great 
 powers and the continuous consultation regarding such plans of 
 operation cannot be a mere way of passing the time. Even if 
 nothing else is taken into consideration but the intimate knowledge 
 which each must obtain of the strength of the other, it is clear that 
 such conduct can be possible only if both sides are seriously con- 
 sidering acting together. To throw more light on the actual mean- 
 ing of the correspondence — in itself not binding — attention may 
 also be called to the fact that France, trusting to the plan of 
 operations agreed upon with England, concentrated her fleet in the 
 Mediterranean and left the protection of her channel and Atlantic 
 seaboard to the English fleet. Was not England at least morally 
 bound by this very definite fact? 
 
Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 27 
 
 Grey's Early Moves. 
 
 Sophists try to deceive not only others but themselves. Sir 
 Edward Grey, at the beginning of the conflict, seems to have tried 
 to make himself believe that he possessed a freedom which he really 
 did not. Only by bearing this in mind can one explain his taking 
 upon himself tlie role — foredoomed to failure — of wishing to be a 
 mediator in a case to which he was in reality a party. 
 
 Whether he wished it or not, this dual attitude was bound to 
 lead to insincerity. 
 
 All one has to do is to refer to the English "Blue Book/' No. 1 7, 
 in order to see how Sir G. Buchanan, on July 25th, answered Mr. 
 Sazonof's urging that England make clear that it stood with France 
 and Eussia : 
 
 I said that Euglaud could play the role of mediator at Berlin and 
 Vienna to better purpose as a friend who, if her counsels of modera- 
 tion were disregarded, might one da^ be converted into an ally, than 
 if she were to declare herself Kussia's ally at once. 
 
 Such a mediator can certainly not be called an "honest broker." 
 In addition to the fact that Sir Edward Grey, on account of 
 his entente position toward France and also toward Russia, had 
 not the impartiality and inner freedom which alone could have 
 qualified him for the role he desired of mediator and judge in the 
 Serbian dispute — a role which he had already played in other dis- 
 putes — he was, granting the sincerity of his peaceful inclinations, 
 in a difficult position toward his colleagues in the Cabinet, whose 
 attitude toward the question of peace or war was not unanimous, 
 as was proved later to the entire world by the retirement of the 
 three friends of peace. 
 
 At first Sir Edward made some resistance to the urging of 
 Russia and France for an immediate declaration of solidarity. He 
 thoroughly approved of the explanations given on July 24 by 
 Buchanan to Sazonof, of which the most important was the one to 
 the effect that England could scarcely agree to being unconditionally 
 bound to give France and Russia armed support, because public 
 opinion in England would not sanction a war on account of Serbia 
 ("Blue Book," No. 6.) In fact, he expressly states: 
 
 I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanc- 
 tion our going to war over a Serbian quarrel. ("Blue Book,*' No. 24.) 
 
28 GerTTiany^s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 England^s position had a most disagreeable effect in St. Peters- 
 burg and Paris, as was shown, not in the documents made public 
 at that time, but in the statements of the press. 
 
 Kussian and French diplomacy sought to influence Sir Edward 
 Grey by the assertion that the peril lay in the fact that the German 
 Government might consider it a foregone conclusion that England 
 would not intervene ; that, as soon as England should determinedly 
 support Russia and France, Germany would bring pressure to bear 
 on Austria-Hungary, and, in this way, the danger of war would 
 be averted ("Blue Book," No. 17.) Even as late as July 27 Sir 
 G. Buchanan answered Mr. Sazonof on the subject of this ever- 
 recurring line of argument, in a thoroughly pertinent manner, by 
 saying that he was mistaken if he thought such a course would help 
 the cause of peace ; that, by such a threat, Germany's attitude would 
 merely be stiffened. ("Blue Book," No. 44.) 
 
 While the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg was stating 
 only what was self-evident, namely, that an English threat against 
 Germany would both fail of its intended effect and make the 
 critical situation even worse, London began to yield to the pressure 
 of France and Russia. 
 
 First, Sir Edward Grey lent ear to Paul Cambon's plan of a 
 conference, expressed in the following form : the British Cabinet 
 was to request the German Government "to take the initiative in 
 offering at Vienna mediation between Austria and Serbia by the 
 four powers not directly interested. ("Yellow Book," No. 32.) 
 This project was futile from the very start, since it not only pre- 
 supposed Germany's taking an initiative toward her ally which 
 France had refused with alarm to take toward Russia, but also 
 ignored the fact that Austria-Hungary was known to have taken 
 the stand that intervention or mediation of third parties in her 
 conflict with Serbia could not be accepted. Austria-Hungary, 
 moreover, by accepting the Grey-Cambon proposal, would thereby 
 have recognized Russia as a power directly interested in the con- 
 flict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which was diametrically 
 opposed to Austro-Hungarian conceptions and intentions. Paul 
 Cambon, however, by luring Sir Edward Grey onto this thin ic^ 
 succeeded, in view of the fact that Germany's refusal of the pro- 
 posal was beyond doubt, in making the attitude of the English 
 Cabinet toward Germany more unfriendly. 
 
 Besides, a certain amount of encouragement to France and 
 
Germany^ s Case in the Supreme Court of .Civilization 29 
 
 Russia emanated from the British Government. What influences 
 were at work there is shown by the agreement between two telegrams 
 ("Yellow Book/' Nos. 63 and (j(S) which the French Charge d' Af- 
 faires in London sent to his Government on July 27th. 
 
 No. 63. 
 
 London, July 27, 1914. 
 
 The German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors give it to be 
 understood that they are certain that England will observe neutrality 
 if a conflict break out. Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that Prince Lich- 
 nowsky, however, after the conversation he had with him today, could 
 not preserve any doubt as to the liberty of intervention which the 
 British Government intends to keep, should it deem intervention 
 necessary. 
 
 The German Ambassador cannot have failed to be struck by this 
 declaration, but, so as to bring pressure upon Germany, and so as to 
 avoid a conflict, it appears indispensable that Germany should be led 
 to hold it for certain that she would find England and Eussia by the 
 side of France. 
 
 No. 66. 
 
 London, July 27, 1914. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey this morning told the German Ambassador that if 
 Austria invaded Serbia after the Serbian reply, she would prove that 
 she was not merely seeking a settlement of the questions mentioned 
 in her note of July 23, but that she wished to crush a small State. 
 ''Then," he added, ''a European question would be raised and a war 
 would ensue in which all the powers would take part." The attitude 
 of Great Britain is defined by the stoppage of the demobilization of 
 her fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty on Friday already discreetly 
 took this step on his own initiative. Tonight Sir Edward Grey and 
 his colleagues decided to publish this news. This result is due to the 
 conciliatory attitude of Serbia and Russia. 
 
 Attention is called to the nuances in the statements of Grey 
 and Nicolson to the French Charge d' Affaires: Nicolson claims to 
 have given the German Ambassador explanations which should have 
 left no doubt in the latter's mind that England reserved her free- 
 dom to interfere. Grey claims only to have spoken '^other powers" 
 might also take part in a war. (Note 4.) 
 
 [Note 4. — The French Government had an English translation made 
 of its ''Yellow Book" by The London Times and declared explicitly 
 on the title page that this translation was "authorized." In this 
 translation the following: 
 
 "une guerre a laquelle d 'antes Puissances seraient amenees a prendre 
 part, ' ' 
 
30 Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 But of more importance than this difference between the more 
 emphatic tone of Nicolson, known as one of the fathers of the 
 Russian-English rapprochement, and the milder tone of Grey, is 
 the fact that the First Lord of the Admiralty, on his own initiative, 
 and early as July 24, postponed the dispersal of the fleet which had 
 been gathered for maneuvers; and still more important is the fact 
 that, on July 27, Sir Edward Grey felt called upon to announce 
 this measure, kept secret up to then, to the French Charge d' Af- 
 faires, as a consequence of the good relations between Russia and 
 Serbia, Grey also informed the Russian Ambassador of this on the 
 same day, and communicated the following on the subject to 
 Buchanan : 
 
 I have been told by the Kussian Ambassador that in German and 
 Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand 
 aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression 
 must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be 
 dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is 
 concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for maneuver 
 leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference 
 to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic 
 action was promised. (''Blue Book," No. 47.) 
 
 One can imagine what inferences the Russian and French 
 Governments drew from the continued state of mobilization of the 
 English North Sea fleet, and from the announcement of this 
 measure, despite the reservation with which Sir Edward Grey 
 deemed it best to impart the information. The action of the First 
 Lord of the Admiralty and the sanctioning and announcement of 
 that action by the British Cabinet carried more weight than all 
 cautious statements. 
 
 During the following two days the war party in the English 
 Cabinet must have won the upper hand even more; for, on July 
 
 is translated: 
 
 "a war in which all the powers would take part"; 
 
 Thus, the original French version, ''a war in which other powers 
 might be led to take part," 
 
 was translated, with the authorization of the French Government, 
 into: 
 
 "a war in which all powers would take part." 
 
 By this retouching, and for obvious reasons, a clearness of speech 
 is attributed to Sir Edward Grey on July 27 which in reality he did 
 not find until later.] 
 
Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 31 
 
 29, Sir Edward Grey took a step which could leave no doubt as to 
 England's being on the side of her associates in the Entente. On 
 that day Grey had a conference with Prince Lichnowsky concerning 
 which he himself informed the English Ambassador at Berlin 
 ("Blue Book/' No. 89) : 
 
 After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the 
 European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite 
 private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situa- 
 tion was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present 
 actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Ger- 
 many became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so 
 great that it would involve European interests; and I did not wish him 
 to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation — which I hoped 
 would continue — in thinking that we should stand aside. 
 
 This announcement left nothing to be desired so far as clear- 
 ness was concerned. 
 
 Now clearness in difficult situations may be an advantage and 
 lead to disentanglement. But if that was the object of Sir Edward 
 Grey, what evil spirit prompted him to say to the French Ambas- 
 sador on the morning of July 29 that he would summon the 
 German Ambassador and make this "quite private and friendly" 
 announcement to him ! 
 
 Die Cast for War. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey himself informs the English Ambassador at 
 Paris that he had acted thus ("Blue Book/' No. 29) : 
 
 After telling M. Cambon today how grave the situation seemed to 
 be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador today that 
 he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into 
 any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts 
 to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with 
 Germany, failed. 
 
 With that France must have felt sure that she could count on 
 the armed support of England, in case she might in any way be 
 drawn into the conflict. One seeks in vain in the French "Yellow 
 Book" for a dispatch from Paul Cambon concerning this most im- 
 portant negotiation during the entire critical week; one also seeks 
 there in vain for the instructions concerning it given in Paris to 
 St. Petersburg. But the bullet shot from London on July 29 
 appears on the evening of the same day in St. Petersburg, in the 
 telegram wherein Sazonof commissions Isvolsky to express to the 
 
32 Germany^ s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 French Government the sincere gratitude of the Eussian Govern- 
 ment for the declaration of unconditional armed support. 
 (''Orange Book/' No. 58.) 
 
 Now the die had been cast for war. As early as July 25 
 Sazonof had declared to the English Ambassador: "If Eussia 
 feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of 
 war," ("Blue Book/' No. 17.) Matters then had come to this 
 pass, thanks to the certainty, reached at last, that the entry of 
 France into the war would cause England to break loose, France 
 had promised armed support to Eussia, and, in connection there- 
 with, doubtless observed that English aid could also be counted 
 upon. (Note 5.) 
 
 To his report to Paul Cambon regarding his contemplated 
 announcement to Prince Lichnowsky, Sir Edward Grey added some 
 statements which at first sight seem to be somewhat analogous to 
 the reservation made by him when he announced to the Eussian 
 Ambassador the continued state of mobilization of the English 
 fleet. He pointed out that public opinion in England looked upon 
 the difhculties of that time in a different way from that in which 
 they had looked upon the Morocco crisis. Then it had seemed as 
 if Germany wished to crush France on account of a question which 
 was the substance of a special agreement between England and 
 France. But now the question dealt primarily with a question be- 
 tween Serbia and Austria-Hungary, perhaps also with one between 
 Eussia and Germany, and England felt no call to interfere. And 
 even if France were drawn in on account of her duties as an ally, 
 England had not as yet decided what was to be done; the matter 
 was one that must be reflected upon; England was untrammeled 
 by obligations and must decide what was to the advantage of British 
 interests; that he had felt it necessary to say this in order not to 
 let Cambon harbor the belief that a decision had been arrived at 
 regarding this point. 
 
 [Note 5, — A report captured in Germany after the outbreak of war 
 from the Belgian Charge d 'Affaires at St. Petersburg, M. de I'Escaille, 
 dated July 30, contains full confirmation of this interconnection. This 
 report reads: ''England first gave to understand that she would not 
 allow herself to be drawn into a conflict. Sir G. Buchanan said this 
 openly. Today (on July 30) St. Petersburg is firmly convinced, and 
 has even received assurances thereof, that England will line up with 
 France. This help is of decisive importance and has contributed 
 materially to the triumph of tfce war party."] 
 
Germany* s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 33 
 
 How Cambon took this is shown by his answer. Sir Edward 
 Grey himself wires concerning this to the British Ambassador at 
 Paris, ("Blue Book," No. 87) : 
 
 M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. 
 He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for 
 supremacy between Teuton and Slav, we should not feel called to 
 intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France 
 become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of 
 Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. 
 
 In fact M. Cambon fully understood Sir Edward Grey, even 
 regarding that which he did not state, viz. : the English Cabinet, 
 in view of public opinion, needs another reason for interference 
 beside a Serbian- Austro-Hungarian or Eussian- German conflict; 
 such reason can and must be provided. At all events England 
 looks upon a conflict in which Germany and France are also arrayed 
 against each other as a question involving the hegemony of Europe, 
 in which the decisions still to be made by the English Government 
 become clear. 
 
 The intelligent M. Cambon did not delay then, after assurances 
 of French armed support to Russia had been given as a result of 
 this interview with Sir Edward Grey, in seeking other issues for 
 the spreading conflagration. On the next day, July 30, he pre- 
 sented to Sir Edward Grey the correspondence of November, 1912, 
 accompanied by a notice of the Paris Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 regarding alleged German preparations for war on the German- 
 French frontier, (Note 6) and with his characteristic penetration 
 he foresaw that Germany would now attack France, either by de- 
 manding the cessation of French preparations for war, or by de- 
 manding a declaration of neutrality from France in the event of a 
 German-Eussian war. France would have to reject both of these. 
 ("Blue Book," No. 105.) 
 
 Criticises Sir Edward Grey. 
 
 Thus a threatening attack on France and an imperiling of 
 European peace, the two assumed situations in which, should they 
 
 [Note 6. — This notice, in the form in which it has been made public 
 in the English ''Blue Book," must have been fabricated subsequently, 
 for the reasons stated hereinbefore in Note 1.] 
 
34 Germany^s Case in the Suprerne Court of Civilization 
 
 occur, England and France had agreed to decide whether or not 
 they should act jointly with land and sea forces, had indeed arisen, 
 according to the view of the French Government. After the inter- 
 view on July 29 between Grey and Cambon the decision of the 
 English Cabinet could no longer be in doubt. 
 
 Did Sir Edward Grey know that on July 29 the French Govern- 
 ment offered Kussia her unconditional support, with which Russia 
 was resolved to run all the risks of a war? If so, had he any 
 thought of succeeding when, on July 30,. he telegraphed to 
 Buchanan that he urgently recommend to the Russian Govern- 
 ment the project for mediation emanating from the interview with 
 the German Ambassador? If Sir Edward Grey was in earnest 
 here in his attempt to reach an understanding at the last moment 
 on this basis, and if he really sincerely welcomed the admission 
 secured from Count Berchtold through the intervention of the 
 German Emperor that he would discuss with Russia the ultima- 
 tum to Serbia, what feelings must have been aroused in him by 
 the fact that the Russian Government, in spite of the possibilities 
 of peace yet existing and of his own urging, ordered general mobili- 
 zation on July 31, thus making inevitable a war to which, in accord- 
 ance with all that had gone before, England must also be a party? 
 
 If the sudden and unprecedentedly grave step by Russia aroused 
 any feelings at all in Sir Edward Grey, one must acknowledge that 
 he was able to master them. At all events there is no trace, of any 
 such feelings in the ''Blue Book,'^ nor any trace of remonstrance 
 against Russia's step which spoiled everything, nor of any endeavor 
 to plead with Russia that she cease the mobilization which had 
 been ordered or make satisfactory explanations to Germany. 
 
 On the contrary Grey made the attempt, hopeless from the start, 
 of continuing the negotiations and keeping mobilized Germany 
 quiet. This last was refused by Germany. Secretary of State von 
 Jag-ow declared to Sir E. Goschen that Russia said that her 
 mobilization did not necessarily mean war, since Russia could well 
 remain some months in a state of mobilization without waging war, 
 but that this was not the case with Germany, that Germany's ad- 
 vantage was speed, Russia's numbers, and the security of Germany 
 forbade her to allow Russia to collect her masses of troops from all 
 parts of her great Empire ("Blue Book," No. 138.) 
 
 Moreover, now that the die had been cast. Sir Edward Grey 
 concentrated his endeavors upon playing his cards in such a way 
 
Gerviany'' s Case in tlie Supreme Court of Civilization 35 
 
 tliat an occasion should be provided for the immediate entry of 
 England into the war, which should appear conclusive to the still 
 reluctant part of the English Cabinet and of English public 
 opinion. 
 
 The "Blue" and ^'Yellow" books together show that Grey, who 
 had been as closely bound morally as it is possible to be to Paul 
 Cambon since the 29th of July, found some difficulty in persuading 
 the Enorlish Cabinet that the mere entrv of France into the war 
 was sufficient reason for the active participation of England. It was 
 clear that there was not sufficient support in the English Cabinet 
 for Cambon's view that a war in which France and Germany were 
 involved meant a light for the hegemony of Europe to which Eng- 
 land could not remain indifferent — :a view to which Grey had not 
 demurred (see above.) 
 
 The embarrassment of Grey was increased by very far-reaching 
 assurances which Germany held out for tlie event of a declaration 
 of neutrality by England. On July 29, when the ^'friendly and 
 private" statements of Grey to Prince Lichnowsky were as yet un- 
 known in Berlin, the Imperial Chancellor made a proposal to Sir 
 E. Goschen which was calculated to make British neutrality possible. 
 C^Blue Book," Xo. 85.) The Chancellor pointed out that a Russian 
 attack on Austria-Hungary would probably lead to a European 
 conflagration, since Germany was bound to give armed support to 
 her ally. The Chancellor added that it was clear to him that 
 England would not view with indifference any possible conflict 
 in which France was to be destroyed, but that the destruction of 
 France was not Germany's aim, and, provided that English neu- 
 trality were assured, all possible assurances could be given the 
 British Government that Germany contemplated absolutely no ter- 
 ritorial increase at the expense of France, even if Germany emerged 
 victorious from such a war. The Chancellor refused, after a request 
 by Goschen, to make a like assurance regarding the French colonies, 
 a refusal which later was not maintained. The Chancellor declared 
 further that Germany would respect the neutrality of Holland so 
 long as it should be respected by others, and, as for Belgium, what- 
 ever operations Germany might be obliged to undertake there would 
 depend on how France acted, but that, after the war, Belgium's 
 integrity would be respected, provided that Belgium had not taken 
 up arms against Germany. 
 
 This offer was most peremptorily rejected by Sir Edward Grey, 
 
36 Germany's Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 ("Blue Book/^ No. 101.) Goschen was instructed to inform the 
 Chancellor respecting the assurances regarding France : 
 
 It would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany 
 at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this 
 country would never recover. 
 
 He added that it was likewise out of the question that England 
 should bargain regarding her duties and interests in connection 
 with Belgian neutrality. 
 
 The vehemence of expression in the refusal of the German pro- 
 posal is significant: Sir Edward Grey looked upon himself as an 
 ally of France who was to be tempted to break faith. But he was 
 determined to make of Belgian neutrality the issue which he needed 
 in order to bring the Cabinet and public opinion into the war. 
 
 No. 113 of the "Blue Book" contains the telegram from St. 
 Petersburg concerning the order for general mobilization of 
 Russians forces. 
 
 No. 114 of the "Blue Book" contains a telegram, of Sir Edward 
 Grey to the Ambassadors at Berlin and Paris, reading as follows : 
 
 Foreign Oflace, July 31, 1914. 
 
 I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of pros- 
 pect of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to his Majesty's 
 Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (Ger- 
 man) Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Bel- 
 gium so long as no other power violates it. 
 
 Thus Grey's answer to the Russian mobilization was not a step 
 in St. Petersburg but the raising of the question of Belgian neu- 
 trality in Berlin — in Paris the question was self-evidently a farce — 
 in order to create the pretext for England's intervention. 
 
 In fact, it was high time for something to happen in this direc- 
 tion, for the French Ambassador, who had acted immediately upon 
 the fateful statement of Grey on July 29, and irrevocably committed 
 France, and who had presented the correspondence of November, 
 1912, to Sir Edward Grey on July 30, and asked for its acceptance, 
 became impatient when Sir Edward, forced by a Cabinet decision, 
 made excuses. Grey telegraphed on July 31 to the English Am- 
 bassador in Paris ("Blue Book," No. 114) that Paul Cambon had 
 shown a telegram of Jules Cambon from Berlin — evidently a put-up 
 job — according to which Germany had been encouraged by the 
 
Germany*s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 37 
 
 uncertainty as to England's intervention. Sir Edward protested 
 and told Paul Cambon that he had, on that same morning, definitely 
 refused in the presence of the German Ambassador to make any 
 declarations of neutrality and had even stated that, if Germany 
 and France became involved in a war, England would be drawn 
 into it ; but that this, however, was not to be construed as meaning 
 an agreement with France. He told Paul Cambon further that the 
 Cabinet had decided that it could not bind itself in any way at that 
 moment. ^'Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public 
 opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country 
 were involved." But, he added significantly, further events might 
 change the situation and convince Government and Parliament that 
 intervention was justified. Belgium's neutrality might be, in de- 
 termining England's attitude, "I would not say a decisive, but an 
 important factor." 
 
 On the Eve of War. 
 
 How little Paul Cambon was satisfied with this answer is shown 
 by his own report on the interview, ("Yellow Book,'^ No. 110.) He 
 asked Grey whether England would wait before intervening until 
 Germany attacked France. 
 
 I insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our 
 frontier by Germany revealed intentions of approaching aggression, 
 and that if Europe's mistake in 1870 were to be avoided, it behooved 
 England to consider from this moment under what conditions she would 
 give us the help on which France counted. 
 
 But Grey stuck to the Cabinet decision. On the other hand, 
 Sir Arthur Nicolson, whom Cambon met when he left the office 
 of the Secretary of State, gave this much consolation: that the 
 Council of Ministers would meet again next day, "and confidentially 
 he gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs would not fail to reopen the discussion." 
 
 It is hardly necessary here to read between the lines. 
 
 Before the meeting of the Council of Ministers announced for 
 the next day by Nicolson, answers arrived from Paris and Berlin 
 to Grey's question as to Belgian neutrality. Naturally, the French 
 Government emphatically promised to respect Belgian neutrality. 
 In Berlin, on the other hand, the Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs stated to the English Ambassador that he must first consult 
 the Emperor and Chancellor. 
 
38 Germany* s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might 
 give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign 
 in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful 
 whether they return any answer at all. (''Blue Book/' No. 122.) 
 
 This dispatch of Goschen left Berlin late on the evening of 
 July 31, and, according to a note in the English "Blue Book/' was 
 received at the Foreign Office on Aug. 1. 
 
 The English echo followed promptly. The very next number in 
 the "Blue Book" (123) contains a telegram from Grey to Goschen 
 dated Aug. 1, according to which Sir Edward told Prince Lich- 
 nowsky that the answer of the German Government regarding 
 Belgian neutrality was for him a matter of very great regret, since 
 the neutrality of Belgium affected the feeling in England. If 
 Germany could answer as France had done, this would contribute 
 materially to lessening the anxiety and tension in England. On the 
 other hand, if one belligerent should violate the neutrality of 
 Belgium, while the other respected it, it would be extremely diffi- 
 cult to control public opinion in England. Prince Lichnowsky 
 inquired in his turn whether, in case Germany bound herself to 
 respect Belgian' neutrality, England would bind herself to remain 
 neutral. Grey evaded this, maintained that the hands of the Eng- 
 lish Government were still free, and that it was about to consider 
 -what it was going to do. He said that all he could say was that 
 its attitude would be determined largely by public opinion, which 
 deemed Belgian neutrality of great importance, but that he believed 
 that England could not promise to preserve neutrality solely on this 
 condition. Then, Prince Lichnowsky urgently inquired whether 
 Grey would not state the conditions under which England would 
 remain neutral. "He even suggested that the integrity of France 
 and her colonies might be guaranteed." But to this Grey replied: 
 ''I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on 
 similar terms, and I coTjld only say that we must keep our hands 
 free." Thus reads Sir Edward Grey's own report on this interview 
 held on the morning of Aug. 1. 
 
 Germany went even further in the concession by which she 
 wished to make English neutrality possible. On Aug. 4, 1914, the 
 Imperial Chancellor announced in the Eeichstag that he had offered 
 to the English Government "that, so long as England remained 
 neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France" ; he 
 added "that, so long as England remained neutral, we also were 
 
Germany* s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 39 
 
 ready, provided reciprocal measures were taken, not to engage in 
 any hostile operations against the French merchant marine." 
 
 The English "Blue Book'^ makes no mention of these conces- 
 sions. The question arises as to whether this concession was ever 
 brought to the knowledge of the English Cabinet by Sir Edward 
 Grey. That the omission cannot be laid at the door of the German 
 Ambassador in London is shown l)y the French "Yellow Book" 
 (No. 144,) wherein Paul Cambon reports under date of Aug. 3 
 that the German Ambassador had made a commanication to the 
 press stating that, if England remained neutral, Germany would 
 forego all naval demonstrations and not use the Belgian coast as a 
 point of support. 
 
 Thus Germany offered, in exchange for the neutrality of Eng- 
 lan(i, to respect tlic integrity of Belgium, and of France and her 
 colonies, and also to forego all naval operations against the French 
 coast and the French merchant marine, but English neutrality was 
 not to be obtained at that or any other price, as Sir Edward clearly 
 stated. "England wishes to keep her hands free," was the transla- 
 tion from the language of cant into that of sincerity of : "England 
 is already bound to France." 
 
 On the day of the formal and categorical refusal to remain 
 neutral under any conditions (Aug. 1,) Sir Ed'ward Grey made the 
 following announcement to Paul Cambon: 
 
 That he would inform the Cabinet of the unsatisfactory answer 
 of Germany regarding Belgian neutrality and request to be em- 
 powered to say on Monday (Aug. 3) in the House of Commons 
 that the British Government would not tolerate a violation of Bel- 
 gian neutrality. That, moreover, the British squadrons were 
 mobilized, and he wished to suggest to his colleagues a declaration 
 to the effect that the British fleet would prevent the German fleet 
 from passing through the Channel, or — should they pass through — 
 from making any sort of demonstration on the French coast. 
 
 It cannot be assumed that it is customary in England for the 
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to impart beforehand to the 
 representative of an interested foreign power matters of world- 
 historical scope which he contemplates bringing up in the Cabinet 
 council, and in this way to commit his country to a policy before 
 the Cabinet has spoken. Such procedure is all the more remarkable 
 when it has to do with decisions against which successful resistance 
 had already been made by members of the Cabinet. If, notwith- 
 
40 Gerinany* s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 standing, Sir Edward Grey imparted this information on the morn- 
 ing of Aug. 1, thus forestalling the Cabinet, he at least could 
 excuse himself by saying that he thereby bound himself no more 
 deeply to France than he had already done. 
 
 At any rate, it is significant that the English "Blue Book'' has 
 no report from Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador at 
 Paris on this interview with Paul Cambon, whereas Paul Cambon 
 did not fail to report on it at once to his Government. 
 
 England and Belgium. 
 
 Paris had become so alarmed on account of the opposition in the 
 English Cabinet that the English Ambassador there telegraphed to 
 London on the evening of July 31 that the French Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs was 
 
 urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the 
 circumstances and begs an answer may be made by his Majesty's 
 Government at the earliest moment possible. (''Blue Book/' No. 124.) 
 
 The answer was the unusual announcement of Sir Edward Grey 
 to Paul Cambon on the morning of Aug. 1. 
 
 Now France was- quieted and, without awaiting German mobili- 
 zation, the French Government ordered, on Aug. 1 at 3 :40 P.M., 
 the general mobilization of the French Army. ("Blue Book," No. 
 136.) 
 
 On the next day, Sunday, Aug. 2, Sir Edward Grey made an 
 announcement to the French Ambassador, which he repeated on 
 Aug. 3, in the following more precise form: 
 
 In case the German fleet passes through the Channel dr traverses 
 the North Sea for the purpose of rounding the British Isles in order 
 to attack the French coasts or the French Navy, and to alarm the 
 French merchant marine, the English .fleet would intervene and lend 
 the French Navy its full protection, so that from that moment England 
 and Germany would be at war. ("Yellow Book,'' No. 143.) 
 
 When he first made this statement Sir Edward Grey felt bound 
 to add this explanation: The English Government was obliged to 
 take into consideration far-reaching questions and difficult issues 
 and felt that it could not bind itself necessarily to declare war on 
 Germany, in case war should break out between France and 
 Germany, but that it was important for the French Government, 
 
Germany^ s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 41 
 
 • 
 
 whose fleet had been concentrated for a long time in the Mediter- 
 ranean, to know what steps it was to take for the protection of its 
 entirely unprotected northern coast. For this reason the English 
 Government had considered itself bound to make the announce- 
 ment mentioned. This did not bind England to enter into the 
 war against Germany, unless the German fleet acted in the manner 
 described in the declaration. 
 
 This comment shows to what a degree the agreements between 
 France and England, though not formally binding, really consti- 
 tuted actual obligations. Merely on the basis of the plans of opera- 
 tions agreed upon between the French and English military and 
 naval authorities which, in case of war, were not to impair the 
 freedom of action of the two Governments, the French fleet had 
 been concentrated in the Mediterranean. And now the British 
 Cabinet felt itself obliged by this concentration to take over the 
 protection of the French northern coast and merchant marine, and, 
 on account of this, to enter possibly into a state of war with 
 Germany. 
 
 Therefore, if during the time between Aug. 2 and 4 German 
 warships had passed through the Strait of Calais or the North Sea, 
 a state of war would immediately have arisen between Germany 
 and England, since such an operation would have been immediately 
 taken by the English to mean that the French coast or fleet was to 
 be attacked or, at least, the French merchant marine to be alarmed ; 
 and this would have occurred solely because of the obligations which 
 the English Cabinet felt to be imposed upon it by the entente with 
 France, which, on its face, bound England to nothing; all this, 
 moreover, quite irrespective of Germany's attitude toward Belgian 
 neutrality. 
 
 But Belgian neutrality remained as a possible reason for war, 
 which the majority of the English Cabinet felt must be entered 
 upon, but for which an excuse must now be constructed and held 
 in reserve. To be sure. Grey spoke to Cambon on Aug. 3 only 
 about the sailing of the German fleet as a casus belli, whereas he 
 did not even mention Belgian neutrality. On the other hand, he 
 had expressed himself in the interview of Aug. 2 to the effect that 
 the Cabinet was still considering what it was to say next day in 
 Parliament, and whether it was to declare the violation of Belgian 
 neutrality a casus belli, ("Blue Book." Xo. 148.) Thus Grey had 
 not yet put through in the Cabinet his proposal, announced to the 
 
42 Germany^s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 > 
 
 French Ambassador on Aug. 31^ that England was not to tolerate 
 the violation of Belgian neutrality. 
 
 One must now deplore that in those days the German fleet did 
 not come out and cause hostile action on the part of the English 
 fleet. Then the fairy tale that England was forced to enter the war 
 solely by the violation of Belgian neutrality at the hands of Germany 
 could never have come up. 
 
 As matters developed, the second pretext for war, held ready by 
 the leaders of English policy, became acute. The German Govern- 
 ment found itself obliged, on account of the state of affairs which is 
 already but too well known, to ask from Belgium permission for 
 German troops to march through its territory. The King of the 
 Belgians asked the King of England for diplomatic support for the 
 protection of Belgian integrity. Thereupon the English Govern- 
 ment demanded from the German Government an immediate decla- 
 ration as to the respecting of Belgian neutrality. ("Blue Book,'* 
 Xo. 156.) The German Ambassador made a final attempt by im- 
 parting to the English Government the text of a telegram from the 
 Foreign Department asking him to reiterate most emphatically that, 
 even in the event of armed conflict, Germany would under no cir- 
 cumstances annex Belgian territory. This telegram continued: 
 
 Please impress upon Sir Edward Grey that German Army could not 
 be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned ac- 
 cording to absolutely unimpeachable information, ("Blue Book," No. 
 157.) 
 
 This final attempt likewise failed. The English Government, 
 as late as the evening of Aug. 4, presented an ultimatum to expire 
 at midnight, at a time when German troops had already crossed 
 the Belgian frontier. The war with England had begun ! 
 
 That England would have entered the war even if Germany 
 had not in any w^ay violated the neutrality of Belgium needs no 
 further proof after the development shown above of the French- 
 English-German negotiations during the critical week. The re- 
 sponsible directors of the British policy had so strongly committed 
 England to an immediate armed intervention on the side of France 
 during the days tliat elapsed after the handing of the Austro-Hun- 
 garian note to Serbia, arid done so entirely on the basis of the 
 entente with France which did not bind them formally to anything, 
 that war could have been prevented only at the price of the fall of 
 
Germany^ s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 43 
 
 the British Cabinet, and of the reproach to England of having acted 
 perfidiously. 
 
 That those who had brought England to this pass profited by 
 working to the utmost the pretext of the violation of Belgian neu- 
 trality — which, as they admitted, they expected to influence public 
 opinion strongly — in order to hide their responsibility is another 
 matter. How insincere this pretext was has often enough been 
 pointed out. In this connection attention may be called to the doc- 
 uments, captured in Brussels by German officials, which showed the 
 existence .of an agreement between English and Belgian military 
 authorities similar in every way to the French-English agreement 
 regarding joint action by the two general military and naval staffs. 
 If, with regard to the English-Belgian military understanding, 
 England maintains that the measures taken dealt exclusively with 
 the possibility of a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany, and 
 that they were not in themselves binding in any way on the policy 
 of the two Governments, this pretext is worth exactly as much as 
 the similar one continually brought forward during a decade by 
 English statesmen in Parliament and before public opinion regard- 
 ing the character of the French-English entente. But in the case 
 of Belgium the relationship is made particularly clear. Among the 
 captured documents there is a record in the handwriting of Count 
 von der Straaten, Director in the Belgian Foreign Office, of a con- 
 ference between the English military attache in Brussels, Lieut. 
 Col. Bridges, and the Belgian Chief of the General Staff, General 
 Jimgbluth, on April 3, 1912. In this conference, according to the 
 record of Count von der Straaten, Lieut. Col. Bridges stated : 
 
 The English Government during the recent events (Morocco crisis) 
 would immediately have undertaken a landing in our country (Belgium), 
 even if we had not asked for help. 
 
 The General objected, the record continues, that for this our 
 consent was necessary. 
 
 The Military Attache answered that he was aware of this; but, 
 as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans from marching 
 through our country, England would have landed her troops in 
 Belgium anyhow. 
 
 There is nothing in Count von der Straaten's record to show 
 that Belgium made any objection or reservation regarding this. 
 
 Thus England, in 1912. had decided to throw overboard Belgian 
 
44 Germany'' s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 neutrality on account of which she ostensibly has gone to war, with- 
 out the quiver of an eyelash. Belgium herself had most seriously 
 compromised her neutrality by her military agreements with Eng- 
 land. If England, despite this, wishes to make the world believe 
 that she drew her sword to protect Belgium's neutrality, then she 
 is playing the role of a seducer seeking to protect the innocence 
 w^hich he himself has seduced. 
 
 The document published by the Governments of the Triple 
 Entente, then, provide the following outlines for a history of the 
 beginnings of the European war : 
 
 1. Russia caused the war by the general mobilization ordered 
 by her on July 31, which, as the Russian statesmen knew perfectly 
 well, made war inevitable for Germany. 
 
 2. All the pretexts adduced by the Russian Government for 
 the mobilization are weak. Neither Austro-Hungarian nor German 
 military measures can be advanced as reasons for the general Rus- 
 sian mobilization. Instead, the Russian Government gave the order 
 for general mobilization immediately after Austria-Hungary, 
 through the efforts of the German Emperor at Vienna, had decided 
 upon a decisively amenable attitude on the Serbian conflict, and 
 had made known this resolve to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna. 
 Thus Russia brought on war by her general mobilization at a 
 moment when the hope of preserving peace had been resuscitated 
 by a conciliatory step on the part of Austria-Hungary. 
 
 3. Russia, by her own statement, was resolved from the begin- 
 ning of the crisis to face all risks of a war provided she were sure 
 of help from France. The promise of unconditional armed support 
 from France was received by Russia on the evening of July 29, 
 coupled in all probability with the announcement that France would 
 have England on her side. 
 
 4. France gave her promise of unconditional armed support of 
 Russia only when the French Government considered itself assured 
 of the cooperation of England. The French Government received 
 the assurance of armed support from England through the an- 
 nouncement which the English Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs made on the morning of July 29 to the French Ambassa- 
 dor regarding the defiant statement which he intended to make to 
 the German Ambassador. 
 
 5. Those responsible for England's policy were closely bound 
 from the start by the entente with France, and made up their minds 
 
GervmmSs Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 45 
 
 during the critical week, if not before, to take part in the war if 
 France should become involved. 
 
 6. Those responsible for England's policy were moreover very 
 ricrhtly of the opinion that a war on account of the Serbian ques- 
 tion would not meet with public approval. For this reason they 
 bent their efforts to find a pretext for war which would meet with 
 En-lish public approval. This was provided by the violation of 
 Bel-ian neutrality, which had been jeopardized years before by 
 Beloium, and which was not to be respected should emergency arise 
 by the English General Staff, according to the statements of the 
 English Military Attache in Brussels. 
 
 8 That the violation of the neutrality of Belgium by Germany 
 was merely a pretext for the English Cabinet, is shown by the fact 
 that before the sending of the English ultimatum to Germany 
 regarding Belgium, the English Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs had formallv declared to the French Ambassador that Eng- 
 land would consider passage through the Channel or the North Sea 
 bv the German fleet as a casus belli. 
 
 Triple Entente Held Responsible. 
 On account of these indispiitahle interrelated facts, confirmed hy 
 the official utterances of the Governments of the Triple Entente, 
 the contention that Germany desired and caused the war will be 
 adjud-ed worthless before the Court of History. Kussia is adjudged 
 the iiu-endiarv, France and England the fellow-criminals. 
 
 It does not lie within the score of this recital to delve mto the 
 depth'^ of the fateful concatenation of isolated happenings and 
 negotiations between July 24 and Aug. 4 which caused the greatest 
 and bloodiest of wars. Let it suffice to point out that these isolated 
 happenings and negotiations— the words of a Grey, a Cambon, a 
 Sazonof, the negotiations of the First Lord of the British 
 Admiraltv and the Kussian Commander in Chief, which m them- 
 selves appear insignificant before the great tragedy of humanity- 
 are merely manifestations rising to the surface at the decisive 
 moment of the forces whose rule makes up the world history of our 
 
 time. These are : -r. x i i.i 
 
 In Russia, the ambition to dominate in the Near East, doubly 
 strong since the defeat suffered in the war against Japan, and de- 
 termined, when there is prospect of success, to break down by force 
 any resistance from the Central European Powers. 
 
46 Germany^ s Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization 
 
 In France, the fateful direction of the entire national policy 
 toward the negative goal of irreconcilable thirst for revenge, which, 
 allied with fear, culminates in the continual readiness to attack us 
 in conjunction with every strong foe of Germany. 
 
 In England, commercial envy" against every rising regime, 
 coupled with instinctive hostility toward the strongest Continental 
 power and the tradition that every Continental ambition for sea 
 power must be forcibly crushed. 
 
 These heterogeneous forces spun the net of the Entente, which 
 became the frightful tool of the small minority ardently desiring 
 war, and in which the great peaceful majority of the Eussian, 
 French, and English nations became hopelessly entangled. Russia's 
 attitude toward Austria-Hungary in the Serbian question placed 
 the burden of decision on the Entente. There can be no doubt that 
 one word of refusal from France would have sufficed to hold back 
 the Russian war party. It is at least very probable that a word of 
 refusal from England would have held France back. It is abso- 
 lutely certain that every word of encouragement from England 
 must necessarily give the upper hand to the war parties in France 
 and Russia. On the other hand, it is equally true that, had France 
 and England stood aloof, no matter how such a step may have 
 been formally authorized by treaties and agreements, the triple 
 understanding would have been destroyed, and a new direction 
 given to the policy of all Europe, which necessarily would have led, 
 not to the hegemony of a single nation, but far more to a state of 
 affairs in which every power could have had its due. 
 
 Confronted with the choice of preserving the entente or preserv- 
 ing the peace of the world, the statesmen at the helm in Great 
 Britain and France, who had by their own acts and words in reality 
 lost their freedom and become entangled, sacrificed the peace of 
 the world to the Entente, under pressure from the cliques desiring 
 war, and swept in their wake by far the greater part of the public 
 in their countries by appealing to the sanctity of written and un- 
 written treaties. 
 
 To make clear the details- of this complex web of guilt and fate 
 will some day be the great task of the historians of our time. 
 
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