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 A 
 
 VIEW 
 
 OF THE 
 
 STATE OF THE NATION, 
 
 AND Of THE 
 
 MEASURES OF THE LAST FIVE YEARS 
 
 SUGGESTED BY 
 
 EARL GREY'S SPEECH 
 
 \ 
 
 iv int. 
 
 HOUSE OF LORDS, 
 
 13TH JUNE, 1810. 
 
 BY 
 
 THOMAS PEREGRINE COURTENAY, ESQ. 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED FOR 3. 3. STOCKDALE, NO. 41, PALL MALL. 
 
 Price 5s. Qd. 
 
 . 
 
 1811.
 
 
 
 
 Benjamin Wright and Co. Printers, 
 31, Little Queen-street, Holborn, Leaden.
 
 Stack 
 
 Annex 
 
 5T 
 
 1 
 
 . . 
 
 
 
 IN presuming to comment upon the Speech 
 of a Lord of Parliament, I am to premise 
 that the Publisher of the Speech has de- 
 clared that the publication was without the 
 knowledge of the Noble Lord himself. 
 
 But I trust that an usage, now of con- 
 siderable antiquity, will permit me to con- 
 sider the publication as the genuine decla- 
 ration of his Lordship's sentiments. 
 
 The same explanation applies to the 
 Speeches of other Members of Parliament, 
 which I have freely cited from the Col- 
 lections of Debates. I have referred, how- 
 ever, to no passage, which bore any ap- 
 pearance of inaccuracy. 
 
 a 2
 
 It is hoped that the length of time which 
 lias elapsed, since the delivery of Lord 
 GREY'S Speech, has not diminished the in- 
 terest which it excited at the moment. 
 
 Many of its topics, indeed, derive a new 
 importance, from the expectation of his 
 Lordbhip's return to Power. From the 
 objections which he has made to the late 
 conduct of affairs, the Public may be in- 
 structed in the methods by which he pro- 
 poses to ameliorate the State of the Nation. 
 
 4 
 
 The great length, into which I have been 
 led by an anxiety to afford the materials 
 for appreciating correctly the Proceedings 
 of the British Government, with regard, 
 especially, to Spain and rortugal, has in- 
 duced me to postpone the Consideration of 
 some of the most important topics of the 
 Speech ; particularly the Orders in Coun- 
 f/7, and our relations with AMERICA ; 
 Constitutional Reforms, and the System 
 of rewarding and encouraging Public Ser- 
 vices.
 
 The topics, of which I have completed 
 the Discussion, I have endeavoured so fully 
 to illustrate, that, if I should fail in im- 
 pressing upon my Readers the opinions 
 which I entertain, I may assist them in 
 forming a more accurate judgment ; it 
 will not be more sincere. 
 
 Lincoln's inn Fields, 
 ad Fcbruarj, mi.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 INTRODUCTORY Remarks, and Analysis of Lord Grey's 
 Speech. . : 1 
 
 I. Alledged Incompetency of the present Administration. ... 8 
 
 II. Concurrence of Lord Grenville in Lord Grey's Motion. 
 Mr. WINDHAM 10 
 
 III. FINANCE , 13 
 
 TV. PEACE with FRANCE 33 
 
 V. MILITARY OPERATIONS 40 
 
 viz. Northern Campaign, 1600-7 Conduct of Lord Grey 
 to Russia and Sweden, p. 43 Expedition to the Dardanelles 
 and to Egypt, 51 To South America, 52 To Calabria, 
 53 Remarks, il. Expedition to the Scheldt, 5G To Co- 
 penhagen, 58 Colonial Acquisitions, 6l Expedition to 
 
 Pomerania, 1807, 64 To Sweden, 1808, 65 SPAIN and 
 
 PORTUGAL; Projected Defence of Portugal, 1806, 70 
 Emigration of the Prince of Brazil ; and Measures of 1807, 
 74 Lord Grenville' s Opinions, 75 Resistance of SPAIN, 
 1808, and Proceedings of the British Government, 77 
 Opinions of Lord Grey, Lord Grenville, Lord Moira, and 
 the Edinburgh Review, 79 Campaign in Portugal, and 
 Convention of Cintra, 82 Resolution to assist Spain ; Opi- 
 nions and Remarks, 83 Campaign in the North, under Sir 
 JOHN MOORE, 89 Results, 104 Campaign of IbOQ; Rea- 
 sons for defending Portugal, 106 Proceedings in regard to 
 Cadiz, 108 Expulsion of Soult from Portugal by Sir An-
 
 VMI CONTENTS. 
 
 THUS WELI-ESLEY, 113 Movement against Victor, in co- 
 operation with Cuesta, 115 Edinburgh Review cited, 117 
 Battle of TALAVERA, 121 Its effects, as to Portugal, 124 
 As to Spain, 126 Conduct of the Spanish Government 
 and Generals; Charges against Sir Arthur Wellesley, 128 
 Projected Attack of Soult, and Retreat across the Tagus, 132 
 Remarks on the Operations in Spain, 135 Edinburgh Re- 
 view refuted, 133 PORTUGAL, 137 Proceedings of Lord 
 Wellington, and the British Government, from the Battle of 
 Talaver-a to the Commencement of MASSENA'S Campaign, 
 140 Motives for persevering in the Defence of Portugal, 
 144 Opinions of Lords Grey, Lansdowne, Moira, and 
 Grenville, 151 General Reasons for opposing France in 
 Portugal, whether with a view to Peace or War, 152 
 Fears of Lord Grenville, Hopes of Bonaparte, Campaign of 
 1810, 162 Disappointment of France, and present State of 
 Portugal, 167 SPAIN, Cadiz, 170 Operations in the ME- 
 DITERRANEAN, Sicily, 174 Greek Islands, 176 and con- 
 cluding Remarks.
 
 A 
 
 VIE 
 
 OP THE 
 
 STATE OF THE NATION, 
 
 &. 
 
 V ARIOUS considerations give importance to Lord 
 Grey's Speech. His history has been connected with 
 that of the Country for more than twenty years. 
 As a nobleman of high character, who has been a 
 minister ,, and who expects to be a minister again ; as 
 the surviving leader of a party once led by Mr. Fox ; 
 as the chosen ally of Lord GRENVILLE ; as the for- 
 mer champion of the Reformers, and the present ob- 
 ject of their hate ; or as the least democratical of the 
 Whigs : Earl Grey has a peculiar right to be heard. 
 " The State of the Nation" is a topic worthy of the 
 speaker ; nothing can be more desireable than a cor- 
 rect representation of " the difficulties with which 
 " the country is surrounded ;" and a dispassionate 
 investigation of the causes which have led to them, 
 and the means by which they may be alleviated or 
 removed. To an enquiry into our situation, thus 
 general and comprehensive, Lord Grey has laudably 
 
 B
 
 ( 2 ) 
 
 directed the powers of his mind, his experience, and 
 his eloquence. We have every reason to be satisfied 
 that the speech now before us contains a summary 
 of his opinions upon all the interesting topics of 
 public controversy ; and not of his opinions alone, 
 but of those of the powerful party with which he is 
 connected. 
 
 The merits of His Majesty's present ministers are 
 by Lord Grey connected with every part of his sub- 
 ject. His speech, in fact, may fairly be considered, 
 not only as faithfully representing the view taken by 
 Lord GREY of the national dangers, but as embody- 
 ing into one grand attack all the various charges pre- 
 ferred by his lordship and his friends, during four 
 sessions of parliament, against those who have admi- 
 nistered the Government since he lost his own power. 
 We may be satisfied, that no point of importance, 
 upon which Lord GREY'S avowed opposition is 
 founded, has been omitted in the general recapitulati- 
 on, which, after solemn preparation, and with the ex- 
 ertion of all his powers, he has delivered in parliament. 
 
 In examining therefore this " celebrated speech */' 
 I am investigating, in the mode most likely to pro- 
 duce full and free discussion, the nature and causes 
 of our alledged danger, and the claims of the minis- 
 ters to public confidence and support. I am taking 
 the most correct view of the state of the nation, and 
 retracing most usefully the events which have pro- 
 duced it. 
 
 The following outline of the speech will introduce 
 us most fairly to the several details. 
 
 I. The speaker first assumes the fact, that the 
 
 Publisher's preface.
 
 ( 3 ) 
 
 country is surrounded by " great and increasing dif- 
 " ficulties * ;" he states his opinion that the measures 
 of the administration have tended to aggravate our 
 danger. He attributes the support which, notwith- 
 tanding the supposed general opinion of its incompe- 
 tency, the measures of that administration have 
 received, to " the apprehension that a recorded dis- 
 t{ approbation of the measures of Government might 
 " multiply and aggravate the distresses of the em- 
 " pire f." 
 
 II. He states his motion to have received the ap- 
 probation of Lord Grenville. 
 
 III. Lord Grey then mentions the great encrease 
 of our expenditure since the commencement of the 
 last war ; the severity of our taxation ; and the 
 statement made by certain individuals, that " taxation 
 tf has nearly attained its utmost limits ." He 
 charges the ministers with having much exceeded the 
 scale of expenditure of the administration of 180(3, 
 and of having met that encreased expence with 
 insufficient provision . 
 
 IV. " What the country stands" consequently 
 " the most in need of" he states to be " repose ;" 
 but he avows his conviction, that " the system of our 
 " policy ||" has rendered peace unattainable; and ne 
 admits that he has no reason to suspect ministers of 
 an indisposition to peace ^[ ; " although he most 
 " strongly feels that their conduct has been such as 
 " almost to remove every hope of that kind." 
 
 V. After some general expressions of abhorrence of 
 
 Speech, P. 1. f P. 3. } P. 7. P. 31-7. 
 
 (I P. 8. - 5[ P. 9- 
 
 * 
 
 B 2
 
 C 4 ) 
 
 the character of Bonaparte, Lord Grey sets forth 
 the great extent of his power, and assumes the pro- 
 bability of his directing his whole force to " the 
 " destruction of this country, the sole aim of his 
 t( policy *," receiving a great accession of power by 
 f{ the subjugation of the Peninsula of Spain f." In 
 this situation he recommends " the provident system 
 ff of husbanding our resources ;" which he con- 
 siders as having been the policy of his own admi- 
 nistration of 1806. After its dissolution, he says, 
 an opposite policy was pursued ; " the merits of 
 " which are to be traced in those fatal expeditions," 
 which (as Lord Grey conceives) " have exhausted 
 " the resources of the country, and covered our 
 " national character with disgrace ." 
 
 Proceeding more particularly on this subject, he 
 adverts to " the folly and the ruin of embarking in 
 "-military operations against France, at a time when 
 " there was no power in existence to give us an 
 " effectual co-operation [)." In relation to Spain, 
 particularly, he charges ministers with improvidence, 
 especially in having embarked in the war " without 
 " ascertaining whether there was a government in 
 <f that country capable of affording such an effici- 
 " ent support to the dispositions of the people, and to 
 " our efforts for their assistance, as was likely to 
 tl bring the contest to a successful termination ^[ ;" 
 and " without enquiring whether there existed re- 
 " sources sufficient to supply -a British army with the 
 (C necessary provisions #*;" and he states, " that after 
 " the experience of one unfortunate campaign, mi- 
 * f nisters risqued another army in Spain, only to pur- 
 " chase misfortune, calamity and disgrace ff ." 
 
 * Speech, P. 11. 
 1! P. 17. f 
 
 t P. 13. 
 P. 20. 
 
 $ P. 14. 
 
 ** Ib. 
 
 P. 15. 
 
 ft P. 21.
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 In the result, according to Lord Grey (( the power 
 " of the enemy, and the dangers which we dreaded, 
 " have materially encreased since our exertions be- 
 " gan, while we have to meet them with diminished 
 '' strength *." 
 
 VI. Adverting then to the lesser Powers, Lord 
 Grey strongly censures the attack upon Denmark 
 in 18O7, which power he states to have been thereby 
 rendered " an enemy much more formidable than it 
 " ever could have become by its unwilling acquies- 
 " cence in the dictation of France -J-." 
 
 VII. He suspects that our policy towards Sicily 
 has been unwise, and hints that " we may with a 
 " lamentable certainty portend its fall under the 
 " dominion of France ;." 
 
 VIII. In regard to America he represents that, by 
 our " Orders in Council," we have destroyed the only 
 Neutral not under the dominion of France, and have 
 thereby transferred the American trade to foreign 
 European flags, so as to establish a nursery of seamen 
 for Bonaparte ; and, that it has only been owing to 
 the departure of the ministers from their own policy; 
 (under the system of licences, which he strongly re- 
 probates,) that our trade has not been ruined in the 
 proportion formerly predicted by the opponents of 
 Government ." 
 
 . IX. Lord Grey then censures the " short sighted 
 " policy" which dictated the restriction upon the 
 Bank in 17Q7, blames the Government for taking 
 no step in consequence of the state of the circulation, 
 and hopes that the payment in specie may within a 
 short time be resumed ||. 
 
 * Speech, P. 22. f P. 23. J P. 24. P. 25. 
 
 (I P. 40.
 
 ( 6 ) 
 
 X. Then adverting to the state of Ireland, Lord 
 Grey gives his opinion, generally, in favor of uniting 
 all classes of people in the defence of their common 
 country *. 
 
 XI. He proceeds to charge His Majesty's ministers 
 with " marked inattention to the just solicitude of 
 et the people for a timely and salutary reform -of 
 " abuses, financial and political -f-." He states that 
 the influence of the Crown has enormously en- 
 creased and ought to be diminished ; he approves 
 of the existence of a fund at the Crown's disposal for 
 rewarding public services, but reprehends the late 
 disposal of a particular sinecure office . 
 
 XII. On the subject of parliamentary reform, 
 Lord Grey states his opinions to have undergone 
 some change ||, though he is still the advocate of a 
 temperate and practical correction of abuses in the 
 constitution of the House of Commons. He refers 
 to his conduct in 1792 ^f, in testimony of his uni- 
 form rejection of theoretical speculations ; and he 
 reprobates the conduct of the modern reformers. 
 
 XIII. He gives his opinion in favour of the privi- 
 leges of parliament lately questioned, insinuating 
 nevertheless that he objects in some degree to their 
 assertion in a recent instance **. 
 
 XIV. He complains of the basest misrepresenta- 
 tions of his own conduct, by which he has been 
 robbed of his popularity f f. 
 
 The noble Lord concludes with a motion for an 
 
 * Speech, p. 40. t P. 43. J P. 4g. P. 51. 
 
 || -P. .5 ' f P. 59. ** P. 65. ft P. 79-
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 address to the Throne, expressing in parliamentary 
 language the sentiments of his speech. 
 
 Although in this address Lord Grey does not spe- 
 cifically represent the necessity of a change of mi- 
 nistry, that result is distinctly to be inferred; and 
 his frequent reference to the administration of 1 806, 
 sufficiently explains his Lordship's opinion of the ex- 
 pediency of recalling to power the persons who com- 
 posed that administration, as the surest mode of re- 
 lieving the country frorri the difficulties under which 
 it is supposed to labour. 
 
 Although therefore it may be fairly conceded, that 
 if the charges preferred against His Majesty's mi- 
 nisters were substantiated, the people might justly 
 call for their immediate removal, in the confidence 
 that their successors could not be less capable of 
 administering the Government, yet the very nature 
 of some of Lord Grey's charges, and the object of 
 his exertions, avowed with sufficient explicitness, 
 renders it unfair, indeed almost impossible, to sepa- 
 rate, in our consideration, the merits of the present 
 ministers, from those of their predecessors, and of the 
 individuals by whom, in case of their removal, they 
 would in human probability be succeeded. 
 
 The weight indeed of some of Lord Grey's ob- 
 jections consists in the departure from the system 
 pursued by Lord Grey himself, and the administra- 
 tion with which he was connected in 1 806 ; in order 
 therefore to convert these objections into criminal 
 charges against the present Government, it is neces- 
 sary to establish the wisdom of the measures from 
 which the deviation has taken place; it must be 
 shewn indeed in the first place, that the system 
 described by Lord Grey as the system of the mi- 
 nisters of i 806, was actually adopted and pursued by 
 them ; and secondly, that, under it, the country \\ as,
 
 ( 8 ) 
 
 on a comparison with the present moment, more 
 prosperous and more safe, more formidable , to its 
 enemies, more useful to its allies, more respected by 
 its friends. 
 
 An investigation therefore of the merits of the 
 system alledged to have been criminally abandoned, 
 becomes essential to the discussion of Lord Grey's 
 subject ; the degree not only of the importance to be 
 attributed to his objections, but of the respect to be 
 paid to his opinions, must necessarily be regulated 
 by our estimate of the system which he extolls, and 
 of the measures which he supported and pursued, 
 when he sustained upon his own shoulders the bur- 
 then to which he considers others as unequal. 
 
 I. 
 
 The general charge of incompetency in the go- 
 vernment to the perils of the moment, with which 
 Lord Grey introduces his detailed accusations, ought, 
 as it would seem, rather to have resulted from them ; 
 but, following his Lordship's arrangement, it may be 
 here observed, that he 'entirely mistakes the nature, 
 or perhaps rather the effect, of the feeling which pre- 
 vails upon this subject. 
 
 It is true, that the conviction of the unprecedented 
 power of our enemy, and of his inveterate hostility, 
 has excited a pretty strong sensation of the necessity 
 of a government, capable of calling forth with spirit 
 and directing with energy the resources of the country. 
 It is strongly and justly felt that the great exertions 
 which the times make necessary, tend also to create 
 a new danger at home. The restless and discontented 
 persons, who must always exist in a country like 
 England, will, in the pressure of the taxes, and in 
 the occasional reverses incident to war, find where- 
 withal to excite to sympathy the immediate interests
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 the feelings of the people. To meet this danger' 
 also, a strong government is necessary. There exists 
 too a party, containing individuals of the first consi- 
 deration in the country, whether for power, rank or 
 talent ; including some, by whom similar dangers 
 have formerly been successfully resisted, and who. 
 have therefore obtained a hold upon the gratitude 
 and good sense of the country ; others by whom- 
 these dangers were at the same time fomented and 
 increased ; who have heretofore inflamed the baser 
 passions of the many, and by such conduct excited 
 a sort of meretricious affection. By the union, (ow- 
 ing to a concurrence of strange circumstances,) of 
 these two descriptions of persons, an opposition i$ 
 formed, not only possessing great numerical strength 
 and great weight, but enjoying an important advan-i 
 tage in the very discordancy of its composition. It$ 
 adherents alternately avail themselves of each cha- 
 racter, appealing sometimes to the memory of onQ 
 great leader, and sometimes to that of his uniform 
 opponent ; sometimes taking credit for the wise mea- 
 sures which led the country through unexampled 
 troubles, and sometimes lamenting the unsuccessful 
 opposition to those measures,, as the cause of our 
 present misfortunes, 
 
 It is natural that a party possessing so much 
 original and artificial strength, should be confident 
 and presumptuous. Hence the refusal of its mem- 
 bers to co-operate in the government with any of 
 those to whom they were opposed, and the sanguine 
 expectations expressed of obtaining power on their 
 own terms ; by the continued existence of the go- 
 vernment not only without their help, but in spite of 
 their strenuous efforts, assisted by many adventitious 
 circumstances, they have been disappointed in pro- 
 portion to their former confidence. The pride how- 
 ever, which preserves their disappointment from sink- 
 
 C
 
 ( 10 ) 
 
 ing into despair, renders it a new incentive to ex- 
 ertion. 
 
 Thus every feeling which can animate a body of 
 men to pursue with eagerness and without regard to 
 means, a favourite object, exists in the present op- 
 position. 
 
 It may be added, that accidental circumstances 
 have given rise to an unusual number of small partiei 
 in parliament, which lend their support to one or 
 other of the great divisions, according to principles, 
 the application of which it is not always easy to anti- 
 cipate. An occasional assistance is thus often given 
 to the systematic opposers, proving nothing as to the 
 confidence reposed in them, but equally useful, io 
 effect, with an encrease of their own numbers. 
 
 It has been often said, that an active and zealouf 
 party in opposition to the surrounders of the Throne^, 
 is almost an essential part of our practical constitu- 
 tion ; but it is a prevalent and just opinion, sanctioned 
 by experience and by the practice and sentiments of 
 all our statesmen, that the government of the day 
 ought to have a very decided predominance in the 
 current proceedings of parliament ; so that although 
 frequent occasions may occur in which the existence 
 of an administration is rendered dependent upon the 
 votes of parliament ; yet, that in the direction and 
 arrangement of public measures, an administration 
 possessing, generally, the confidence of parliament 
 should be seldom thwarted ; and especially, that mi- 
 nisters, satisfied in their own minds upon the more 
 correct view of affairs whieh their situations enabla 
 them to take, that any strong or unusual measure 
 would be essentially advantageous, they should not 
 be restrained from pursuing it by a fearful doubt of 
 the approbation of parliament.
 
 It is not, then, any general disapprobation of the 
 measures of government, nor any distrust of its 
 natural competency to its duties, that has generated 
 the expression of " active and loud complaint" to 
 which Lord Grey refers. The complaint is, of an 
 insufficient power of resistance to the too powerful 
 opposition which I have described, and it is chiefly 
 directed against those by whom that state of things 
 has been created ; without renewing the discussion 
 upon the rejection by Lord Grey and Lord Grenville 
 of the overtures made to them in the autumn of 1 80p, 
 it may be observed, that not to Mr. PERCEVAL and 
 his colleagues, is to be attributed, that balanced 
 state of parties, the true occasion of the call for a 
 strong government, which Lord Grey mistakes for 
 a disapprobation of the public measures of adminis- 
 tration, and even impliedly, for a desire to restore 
 the coalition of 1 806, a desire which Lord Grey 
 himself will hardly represent as existing in much force 
 in any part of the country. But whatever opinion 
 may be entertained of the necessity of an united 
 government, the people of this country feel no dis- 
 position to permit his Lordship's friends to avail 
 themselves of the difficulties which they have them- 
 selves created, towards accomplishing the purposes 
 of their own ambition. 
 
 II. 
 
 Lord Grey's next preliminary remark refers to the 
 " sincere, unqualified, expressed concurrence" which 
 his motion had received from Lord Grenville. Join- 
 ing fully with Lord Grey in lamenting the cause of 
 Lord Grenville's absence (at a moment especially 
 when the. country had been newly visited by the 
 death of Mr. WINDHAM * !) I feel still more 
 
 * And why was Mr. Windham's death the cause of almost 
 general regret ? Had he, as a minister, enjoyed the confidence 
 
 C2
 
 ( 12 ) 
 
 "strongly than his Lordship the deficiency occasioned 
 by the illness of his colleague. The ability and elo- 
 quence of Lord Grey himself are amply sufficient for 
 displaying in the strongest light the views which he 
 entertains ; but it can scarcely be believed that Lord 
 Grenville would have contented himself with second- 
 ing Lord Grey. Had the topics of the speech before 
 us referred simply to recent measures, had the cen- 
 eures of Lord Grey been directed merely against the 
 ministers whom they have concurred in opposing, it 
 ivould have been sufficient for Lord Grenville to 
 support his ally. But inasmuch as it is to " the sys- 
 *' tem of our policy" during the whole period of our 
 contest with France, as well before the peace of 
 Amiens as since it was set aside ; and to the f ' short 
 " sighted policy" which inspired the cabinet of 
 17Q7> that Lord Grey has traced the dangers which 
 now surround us ; it unquestionably would have be- 
 hoved Lord Grenville to have detailed the progress 
 of his own opinions upon these important topics^ 
 
 of the country > Had he, as a popular leader, obtained the affec- 
 tions of the people ? Do we trace to him, constitutional and 
 financial reforms, or new projects of legislation ? Is it as a parly 
 man that we esteem him, or do we love him as the representative 
 of either PITT or Fox ? No. We forget him as a minister, we 
 put him out of sight as a parti zan ; but we remember that he 
 never built his fame upon the applauses of the populace, he 
 <f called a spade a spade 5" HE never pandered to the laser vices 
 of the mob ; he was a man, and he sometimes deceived himself, 
 but he never deceived the people. He felt strongly, that the 
 dangerous encroachments in modern times were those, not of the- 
 Crown, but of the Subject ; these therefore he manfully resisted. 
 Those great men who saw the danger otherwise he duly respected j 
 but he quickly detected, and despised, those whose inclination to 
 the popular side was occasioned by vanity, caprice, or interest. 
 To him, in fact, we looked as almost the only statesman for meet- 
 ing, as they ought to be met, the representations of a Weirdie and 
 3 Burdett, and (melancholy addition !) of a BANKES and a CAN- 
 NING. 
 
 If we are not frightened at words, we must, in short, acknow- 
 ledge that we love Mr. \Yindliaja as a sincere, open, and con- 
 tinent TORY.
 
 ( is ) 
 
 His characteristic manliness would no doubt have 
 likewise induced him to imitate Lord Grey, in ex- 
 plaining minutely the opinions which he held in 17Q2, 
 and the alterations which in the lapse of years they 
 have naturally experienced, so as to bring him in 
 181O to express a sincere and unqualified concurrence 
 in Lord Grey's views of foreign policy, and principles 
 of domestic reform. The history of the gradations by 
 which these two statesmen have approximated, from 
 extreme variance to perfect concurrence, would fur- 
 nish an instructive lesson. It would warn us at least 
 against appreciating the solidity of an argument, or 
 the correctness of an opinion by the strength of the 
 language in which it is expressed. It would teach us 
 to receive with more qualification and distrust, decla- 
 rations of irreconcileableness in political sentiment, - 
 it would perhaps dispose us more favourably to poli- 
 tical compromises, and certainly increase our abhor- 
 rence of political exclusionists. 
 
 nr, 
 
 <e In directing our minds to the difficulties under 
 61 which the country at this moment labours," Lord 
 Grey conceives that " we are in the first place natu- 
 te rally urged to advert to the amount of the public 
 " expenditure * ;" and he is struck with the exorbi- 
 tancy of its encrease from the peace establishment of 
 1792 to the war expenditure of 1810. Lord Grey's 
 statement of this encrease was probably intended as. 
 a sort of oratorical introduction to fix the attention 
 of his hearers. Lord Grey clearly did not mean to 
 assume a fact like this as a proof of our danger, or 
 of our incompetency to the exertions required of us ; 
 he is well aware that it is only by a comparison of our 
 expenditure with our revenues, arid with the resource* 
 
 * Speech, p. 7,
 
 from which those revenues are supplied, that any 
 Useful conclusion can be drawn. But he looks, it 
 seems, to a failure of those resources ; he is (f ap- 
 * palled" by our taxation ; by the grievous and op- 
 pressive means by which our revenue is collected ; 
 and, " ABOVE ALL, by the awful statement, made by 
 " those most intimately conversant with such mat- 
 *' ters, that in this country taxation has arrived at a 
 ** height beyond which it could not well be carried ; 
 k< that it has been extended almost to its fullest 
 * reach ; and that it has nearly attained its utmost 
 " limits *." This " awful statement" has created a 
 strong sensation in the country, and deserves an at- 
 tentive consideration. It is most interesting, in its 
 bearing upon the general state of the country, and I 
 hasten to separate that, from the peculiar respon- 
 sibility of the ministers. For the amount of our 
 taxation, the present ministers are but in a small de^ 
 gree accountable ; that they have but little encreased 
 it, is in fact one of the charges adduced against 
 them. It is true that they have adopted measures 
 for enforcing a more accurate and speedy collection 
 of the taxes, and that some discontent has been oc- 
 casioned thereby. It may, however, be fairly con- 
 tended, not only that the amount of each contribu- 
 tion being fixed by the legislature, it is the duty of 
 the executive government to take care that the quota 
 of each individual is punctually paid, but that the 
 enforcement of punctuality is advantageous to the in- 
 dividual. The postponement of the day of payment 
 is likely to diminish the power of paying, by encou- 
 raging an individual to omit the tax in the calculation 
 of his means ; and an arrear of existing taxes must 
 cause new impositions to fall with encreased hardship. 
 
 The introduction of a more rigid system of col- 
 * Speech, p. 7-
 
 < 13 ) 
 
 tection must necessarily occasion an unusual pres- 
 sure, in the first instance ; and the Government has 
 not lost sight of this obvious inconvenience. Steps 
 have been taken * for mitigating the alledged evils, 
 and removing whatever of rigour was unnecessary to 
 the due collection ; and (as will be seen hereafter) 
 this unusual pressure has been among the motives 
 which have induced a temporary forbearance from 
 imposing new burthens. 
 
 I am' confident that such forbearance has not been 
 rendered necessary by the causes to which it is at- 
 tributed by Lord Grey. If I have formed a correct 
 idea of the grounds of the opinion which he quotes, 
 it is founded upon three considerations. 1st, That 
 every branch of taxation has been largely encreased 
 .since 17Q2 ; 2dly, that one important duty is actually 
 in a state of decay ; and 3dly, that the attempts made 
 of late years to carry through parliament new and 
 productive taxes have been peculiarly Unsuccessful. 
 
 Admitting the fact set forth in the first consider- 
 ation, I disagree widely as to the conclusion drawn 
 from it. So far from considering it as a proof of the 
 exhaustion of our resources, I urge it as affording, 
 on the other hand, the surest pledge of their remain- 
 ing competency. It is perfectly true, that every 
 - principal article of revenue has been taxed once, 
 twice, thrice, or more, since the commencement of 
 the late war. If it can be shewn that these additions, 
 generally speaking, have not produced an encrease 
 of revenue, corresponding or nearly corresponding 
 with the encrease of taxation ; I will admit that a 
 temporary incompetency in the article to a further 
 encrease may fairly be deduced. But it is notorious, 
 that the revenue, previously existing, lias continued 
 
 * By the act 50 Geo. Ill cap. lOfi.
 
 ( 16 ) 
 
 to flourish under the weight of the new impositions. 
 This is true in the aggregate and in the principal 
 details. During- the late war, as we all well remem- 
 ber, recourse was had repeatedly to every one of the 
 most productive sources of revenue, including those 
 vhich are most immediately affected by the internal 
 state of the country, and less liable to the fluctua- 
 tions of foreign commerce. Additions were made to 
 the duties upon wine, tea, sugar, tobacco, salt, beer, 
 horses and carriages, houses and servants. We all 
 remember how regularly Mr. Pitt was warned, upon 
 fcvery occasion of encrease, that he was exhausting 
 the country that two and two, in financial calcu- 
 lations, do not make four. Yet persons conversant 
 in finance must well know that the revenue, which 
 was exposed to these repeated trials, was more pro- 
 ductive at the close of the war than at its commence- 
 ment. The weight of the new burthens in some in- 
 stances, and the celerity with which the encreaseS 
 were repeated, occasioned a temporary diminution. 
 The new taxes seldom became productive at once ^ 
 frightened at the encreased price, the people at first 
 reduced their consumption ; but it, I believe I may 
 say invariably, recovered in one or two years. With-* 
 put following the particular articles, 'it may be suffi- 
 pient to observe, that while, as has been stated, tha 
 taxes which existed before the war had encreased in 
 produce, the additions made to them exceeded, at the 
 end of the war, the amounts at which they had seve- 
 rally bee'n estimated. 
 
 When Mr. Pitt encreased the rate of an existing 
 tax, he grounded his estimate of the produce of the 
 addition, upon the produce of the existing tax, gene- 
 rally upon an average of three years. To prove, 
 therefore, that the encrease had not affected the old 
 tax, or, in other words, that the consumption was 
 not diminished by the new one, it was sufficient to 
 shew th-t the new tax was productive according to
 
 ( 17 ) 
 
 the estimate thus formed. I do not pretend to say 
 that this was uniformly the case; but it was the 
 case in the greater number of instances, and, what 
 is most important, it was true on the whole. The 
 additions made to the revenue, for the purpose of 
 meeting the new charges imposed during the late 
 war, produced more than the estimated amount. 
 This is in itself conclusive, in proving that at the 
 commencement of the present war, no symptoms of 
 exhaustion had appeared. 
 
 The present war commenced with an addition, in 
 the shape of a war tax, upon all the principal articles 
 of customs and excise. This immense addition, 
 coming at once, had for a time the effect that might 
 have been expected ; the increase thereby occasioned, 
 in the produce of the total revenue (permanent and 
 temporary) did not immediately correspond with the 
 estimate. The deficiency, however, was only tem- 
 porary. A permanent addition was also made in the 
 years of the war prior to 1807 to the assessed taxes, 
 the stamp duties, several of the custom duties, salt, 
 tea, and other duties of excise. These have also 
 been upon the whole productive beyond the estimate. 
 
 From this period no important encrease of tax- 
 ation has taken place. 
 
 It appears then that, for a period of eighteen years, 
 the various modes adopted for encreasing our reve- 
 nue have been generally successful ; that large and 
 repeated burthens have been imposed, without dimi- 
 nishing the power by which they are sustained. 
 
 I feel confident that every person conversant in fi- 
 nance will acquiesce in the correctness of my facts * ; 
 
 It may be objected that my financial statements are not veri- 
 
 D
 
 ( 18 ) 
 
 t will not attempt to reason upon them philosophi- 
 cally (nor indeed has it been attempted on the other 
 *ide) but I build upon them a practical confidence, that 
 there still remains in the revenue a capability of con- 
 siderable extension. There is now no reason for 
 apprehension, which has not existed during the whole 
 period of hostility, and which did not on many occa- 
 sions exist in a much higher degree. The minister 
 in 1793 could not possibly have foreseen the immense 
 additions which he should be enabled to make to the 
 revenue ; he would not when proposing the separate 
 additions upon wine, tea or spirits, have ventured to 
 predict that he would in the course of the war be 
 enabled again and again to have recourse to the same 
 expedient. There was in fact, a period about the 
 middle of the war, when a very general apprehension 
 prevailed, and some symptoms appeared of a financial 
 failure. The difficulty was met with new expedients, 
 and in two years the apprehension and the symptoms 
 had disappeared ! 
 
 Let him who is averse from financial details, and 
 has been accustomed to consider the taxes only as 
 they affect the price of articles of his daily consump- 
 tion, call to mind (for instance) the repeated taxes 
 upon wine. He will probably recollect that " Mr. 
 " Pitt has ruined the wine trade," and, " the mid-, 
 " dling classes are beginning to drink ale," were 
 common expressions in the year 17Q5, when a new 
 tax of ten pounds was laid upon a pipe of port. But 
 
 tied by accounts and tables ; but I am satisfied, that, however 
 many persons conversant in finance may dispute my conclusions, 
 it will not be said that I have adduced one doubtful fact. Per- 
 fectly to verify my fads, I must have produced a frightful multi- 
 tude of figures. It is true that I might have easily given more, 
 abridged accounts, but such would have added nothing to the 
 conviction of " the conversant:" while they ought not to have 
 satisfied, and might have deceived, those who are not familiar 
 with financial details
 
 ( 19 ) 
 
 does he find that he has since drank less wine, or 
 that he meets with ale at the tables of his friends ? 
 And yet he may also remember that Mr. Pitt ven- 
 tured to impose ten pounds more in 179. And that 
 in 1803 and 18O4 successive additions were again 
 made to the tax, and consequently to the price of 
 wine. 
 
 That in the course of the contest with France, 
 wine should have again become a resource, no man 
 probably would have ventured in 17 96 to predict. 
 Wine had then reached " the utmost limits of tax- 
 (f ation ;" and so it had, if we are to understand by 
 the expression, only that at that moment the article 
 was not an available, or at least not an adviseable 
 object of taxation. 
 
 Without further details, I would wish the price 
 and consumption of every article in general use to 
 be in like manner considered. It will be found that 
 upon no important article is there any symptom of a 
 decreasing consumption. 
 
 I cannot therefore resist the conviction, that the 
 only foundation upon which the desponders in fi- 
 nance rest their opinion, is quite unsubstantial ; and 
 that the appeal which has been made to the history 
 of our taxation within eighteen years ought to pro- 
 duce a conclusion entirely opposite to that which 
 Lord Grey has adopted. 
 
 It is not contended, that because we have borne 
 much, we can therefore bear any thing 5 but it is 
 denied, that any peculiar reason now exists for doubt- 
 ing of our capability. Every successive increase ot 
 burthen is an experiment of which the success is 
 doubtful ; the attempt would now be at least as aus- 
 picious as at former periods of the contest. The 
 
 D2
 
 ( 20 ) 
 
 success, in fact, of our experiments has in some 
 measure afforded facilities to new attempts. For 
 such is the immense amount of our present revenue, 
 that a very small proportionate addition to its several 
 parts would produce a very large aggregate sum *. 
 And considering that, owing to the system of raising 
 a large proportion of the supplies within the year, 
 the amount of taxes which it is annually required to 
 create or perpetuate, on account of loans, has not 
 encreased in proportion to the encrease of the reve- 
 nue, we might fairly now be considered as having 
 readier means of finance than were possessed at pre- 
 ceding periods. A smaller addition to the existing 
 taxes' would carry us through more years of war 
 now, than at many of these former periods; in which 
 experience now permits us to say, in contradiction to 
 the predictions of the moment, our taxation had not 
 11 arrived at the height beyond which it could riot 
 " well be carried." 
 
 But there are in fact circumstances in our present 
 financial state which would remove us very far from 
 apprehension, although it were admitted that we 
 could not, at this moment, readily encrease our reve- 
 nues. Immense as these are, the unmortgaged pro- 
 portion is great, very far indeed beyond former expe- 
 rience. In this very year, more than twenty-two mil- 
 lions are raised, which might, without even the im- 
 putation of a breach of faith with the public creditor, 
 without neglecting any parliamentary pledge, and, 
 without infringing in any degree upon the system or 
 the sinking fund, be used as funds for raising money. 
 It is not with a view of recommending that the un- 
 appropriated and war taxes should be so employed, 
 that I mention them in this manner ; there are very 
 substantial reasons against such an arrangement. But 
 
 An addition of one tenth would yield about five millions !
 
 ( 21 ) 
 
 I hold that, in a general view, that country can 
 scarcely be said to labour under great financial diffi- 
 culties, which, besides ample provision for its public 
 debts and civil establishments, and having a fund of 
 redemption nearly equal to a fiftieth part of the debt, 
 possesses an additional revenue not far short of that 
 which is so applied. The more.particular application 
 of this important fact is this ; *to shew that we have 
 the means of postponing fresh taxation ; of giving to 
 our resources a little more of repose, if it should be 
 thought that they have not as yet recovered their 
 growth, checked, as it is supposed to have been, bj 
 the measures of late years. 
 
 It might therefore be conceded, that the revenue, 
 was not, in 180Q or 181O, susceptible of a consider- 
 able encrease. The same might be granted during 
 three, five, seven, succeeding years. We have still 
 ample means. of carrying on the war for the lor 
 of those periods ; and if we fear, that at its expira- 
 tion, we could not return to a vigorous system of 
 taxation, so as in a few years to restore our financial 
 prosperity, we mujst shut our eyes to all experience, 
 and especially to the history of the present contest. 
 
 But I am here putting an extreme case ; all I re- 
 quire is, that it be borne in mind, that if a little fur- 
 ther abstinence from taxation be really necessary, we 
 have ample and unprecedented facilities of continu- 
 ing that system of forbearance. 
 
 It may possibly be objected, that in opposing the 
 statement of Lord Grey I have proved too much, 
 and that my reasoning would lead to the conclusion, 
 that the resources of finance arc inexhaustible. 
 
 This proposition I will not maintain, nor in .any 
 view of the subject would it be necessary; but, I 
 Contend that they are as yet unexhausted and copious.
 
 ( 22 ) 
 
 It is riot contended by those who maintain the 
 opinions which I oppose, that the country is in a 
 state of decay ; if indeed it were so, it would be as 
 vain to build upon a continuance of our present re- 
 venue, as upon its encrease. It has, on the other 
 hand, been distinctly asserted* to be in a state of pro- 
 gressive improvement. By this term, I trust, I may 
 understand, that all the sources of revenue are gra- 
 dually enlarging themselves. I may presume that 
 our foreign trade and our manufacturies are expand- 
 ing ; that our consumption of the articles of neces- 
 sity, convenience, and luxury is encreasing ; that our 
 domestic intercourse of every kind becomes daily 
 more frequent ; that our lands are rendered conti- 
 nually more productive ; that our population en- 
 creases. All this I believe to be true, not only be- 
 cause our public accounts furnish ample evidence of 
 its truth, but because the facts which I have men- 
 tioned of the gradual improvement of the revenue 
 during nearly thirty years could scarcely have existed 
 under another situation of the country. I well know 
 that many would oppose to this conclusion the quan- 
 tity of human misery which has during this period 
 been witnessed amongst us ; the encrease of poors* 
 rates and of paupers ; and the severity with which, 
 in a great many instances, the taxes have pressed upon 
 individuals. Some even might be disposed to add, 
 the frequency of commercial failures, though this, I 
 think, is now pretty well understood to be the symp- 
 tom of exuberant prosperity.- For a long series of 
 years the two pictures which are here exhibited were 
 opposed to each other by the sanguine and the de- 
 spondent ; the claims of these two representations 
 Vong puzzled political economists. But since we 
 have all become familiar with the writings of Mr. 
 
 * Mr. Huskisson's Speech in the House of Commons, 
 -1810,
 
 ( 23 ) 
 
 MALTHUS, the difficulty has ceased to exist ; we now 
 .understand the two situations to be so far from in- 
 consistent, that the one is an unavoidable concomi- 
 tant of the other. 
 
 The symptoms of progressive improvement, which 
 1 have described, are every one of them the resources 
 of our taxation ; a state of progressive improve- 
 ment, is in fact synonimous with a state in which 
 taxes can be encreased. I am convinced that nothing 
 more could be meant by those upon whom Lord 
 Grey relies, than that " it was not at this particular 
 " year, or in the last, convenient or easy to impose 
 " fresh taxes." Even this I cannot admit ; but the 
 matter is of little importance, because, in the ge- 
 neral state of finance, and under the circumstances 
 of progressive improvement which have been men- 
 tioned, the inability to point out at once an unobjec- 
 tionable and productive source of revenue, is no 
 proof whatever of a permanent or a appalling" failure 
 of resources. 
 
 But it is understood that the arguments in proof 
 of this failure have been supported by a reference to 
 the diminished produce of an article of revenue no 
 less important than malt, and its several products. I 
 have reason indeed to believe that great stress has 
 been laid upon this circumstance, and shall therefore 
 consider it in more detail than its own importance, 
 (diminished as it has-been by the subsequent im- 
 provement of the produce) might appear to require. 
 
 If the causes of the deficiency in the produce of 
 this duty were merely accidental, or if the deficiency 
 itself were temporary, the fact can have no weight 
 whatever. If, on the other hand, there lias been truly 
 a reduction in the quantity consumed, of an article 
 so important among the more widely extended lux- 
 uries, the fact would materially affect the argu-
 
 ( 24 ) 
 
 ment deduced from the improving state of the coun- 
 try. Now, in the first place, it is scarcely credible, 
 that the pressure of taxation, and the consequent 
 relinquishment of taxable commodities, should appear 
 most strongly and most early in the liquors made 
 from malt. The inconsistence of this fact, with the 
 general habits of the people of England, ought, I 
 conceive, to have led the gentlemen who set it forth 
 to doubt the solidity of their ground. It ought, I 
 conceive, to have put them upon enquiring, whether 
 nothing but a reduced consumption of the article 
 could have occasioned the diminution of the pay- 
 ments into the Exchequer; or, whether the reduction 
 might not be the result of causes unconnectec] with 
 taxation. Such an inquiry would have led immedi- 
 ately to the information that in the period from 
 which their accounts were taken, a greater quantity 
 of malt had been made and charged with duty than 
 in the year with which the comparison was made ; 
 and that the diminution of the duties upon British 
 spirits was the necessary result of the stoppage of the 
 distilleries; the reduction upon beer was very trifling. 
 Jt would have been discovered, moreover, that these 
 diminutions of revenue were accompanied by a nearly 
 corresponding encrease upon the article of sugar, sub- 
 stituted, in the distilleries, for barley. 
 
 This information might have been obtained at the 
 moment in which the alarming deficiency was dis- 
 covered; the accounts of the subsequent year will 
 shew that the deficiency upon malt is disappearing, 
 and that the duties upon foreign spirits and upon 
 sugar have continued to flourish*. 
 
 * What is said above was correct at the period of Lord Grey's 
 speech. It is hardly necessary to add, (because the fact is noto- 
 rious) that tha produce of the three quarters which have been 
 completed since that time, has most amply justified this and every 
 ether statement, which was built upon the flourishing and en- 
 ig state of the revenues.
 
 ( 25 ) 
 
 Respect for the opinion of the reputed authors of 
 the Statement, has induced me to enter into these 
 particulars ; but I apprehend, that, although they re- 
 tain their ideas as to the difficulty of finding new 
 taxes, they waver in their opinion of the growing 
 deficiency of the old revenues. 
 
 The failure of the attempts of the administration 
 of 1806, to introduce new objects of taxation, may, 
 or may not be considered as a proof that no new 
 sources can be found ; according to our estimate of 
 the financial acuteness of that administration. Think- 
 ing the- disco very of new sources neither expedient 
 nor necessary, it is useless to enquire whether it were 
 practicable. The forbearance of the succeeding ad- 
 ministration will be presently explained, 
 r j L 
 
 The grounds of the " awful statement'* upon, 
 which, on account of the importance attributed to it 
 by Lord Grey, I have bestowed, perhaps, too much 
 attention, are not given by Lord Grey himself. But 
 although he only refers us generally to " those most 
 (( intimately conversant with such matters," the ex- 
 pression is pretty well understood to designate Mr. 
 HUSKISSON. It is therefore to the statements which, 
 as I have been informed have been made by that 
 gentleman, that my remarks have been applied. Air. 
 Huskisson's acknowledged talents and experience 
 give him an unquestionable claim to confidence in 
 matters of finance ; from those especially who have 
 been educated in the same school, and connected 
 with the same political measures. But the' friends 
 of Lord Grey and of the administration of 1806 may 
 be disposed to ask for the opinion of their own lumi- 
 naries in finance, some of the denouncers of the. 
 " improvident arid impolitic system" of which Mr. 
 Huskisson was the official promoter. For other finan- 
 cial statements, Lord Grey cites Lord LAUDERDALE
 
 ( 20 ) 
 
 and Lord LANSDOWXE ; the one a very old writer on 
 opposition finance ; the other the ostensible author 
 of the celebrated PLAN. Do these noblemen, does 
 Lord LANSDOWNE especially, concur in the " awful 
 " statement ?" Is Lord G&ENVILLE is Mr. FAN- 
 SITTART " appalled" by our taxation ? If there be 
 no reason for believing that any one of these distin- 
 guished individuals has adopted the views of Mr. 
 Huskisson, the admirers of the coalition and its 
 Plan will probably, for that reason, distrust them. 
 Persons who are accustomed to draw their own con- 
 clusions will reject those of Mr. Huskisson, as to- 
 tally unsupported l>y experience or analogy. 
 
 The preceding observations apply not so much to 
 the measures of government, as to the state of the 
 country ; but in a subsequent part of the speech the 
 financial arrangements of the last four years arc 
 severely censured. As for the want of a " systematic 
 " arrangement of finance," which Lord Grey makes 
 a ground of charge, I must, on the part of the mi- 
 misters, plead guilty. They certainly have not at- 
 tempted to delude the people by opening the budgets 
 of twenty years to come, or by pretending to apply 
 a fixed and permanent arrangement to what is in- its 
 own nature fluctuating and uncertain. 
 
 To the charges founded on the financial arrange- 
 ments of 1807, & more particular answer is required. 
 " In the first year of their administration, the mi- 
 " nister who had the care of the finances carried into 
 " effect the arrangements of his predecessor, so far 
 '* as it served his purpose, that is, he charged the 
 " interest of 12 millions upon the war taxes, without 
 f( adopting the other REMEDIAL parts of the system* ? 
 
 * Speech, P. 32.
 
 ( 27 ) 
 
 By the system here alluded to, the loans of 1 807 
 and of the subsequent years were to have been charged 
 upon, the war taxes ; but, as a sort of compensation 
 for this diversion of the war taxes, a sinking fund of 
 Jive per cent, (redeeming its principal in 14 years) 
 was to have been substituted for the ordinary sink- 
 ing fund of one per cent, (operating in 45 years.) 
 By this arrangement it was calculated the mortgage 
 of the war taxes would continue only 14 years from 
 the period of each loan charged upon them. 
 Charging the loan upon the war taxes, was, primd 
 facie, a departure from the provident system which 
 had been pursued since the commencement of the 
 war ; to remedy this evil, the larger sinking fund was 
 adopted. It was a part of the same plan, to autho- 
 rize, by a prospective enactment, the future appli- 
 cation to purposes other than those to which they 
 then stood pledged, the several sinking funds created 
 since 1786, including that which was to have been 
 created by the plan. The obvious tendency of this 
 provision was to counteract, in some degree, the 
 remedial part of the new system. 
 
 When Mr. Perceval became chancellor of the Ex- 
 chequer, a loan had already been negociated upon the 
 understanding, that the sinking fund should be five 
 per cent, to be charged, with the interest, upon the 
 war taxes; this arrangement, therefore, he completed; 
 but he went no further into the proposed system. 
 The effect of this proceeding was to adopt the pri- 
 mary improvidence of the new plan, to adopt also the 
 remedy proposed, rejecting only the prospective re- 
 gulation for destroying the effect of that remedy, 
 lie mortgaged, fn short, the same amount of war 
 taxes proposed by Lord Henry Petty, leaving the 
 sinking fund, the most striking feature in provident 
 finance, equal in extent and more strict in its limi- 
 
 E2
 
 ( 28 ) 
 \ 
 
 tation. -I cannot enter further into this subject, 
 without running into the mazes of the " Plan of 
 " Finance," which is quite unnecessary, as it is not 
 at all likely to be again brought forward ; but I am 
 confident that any one of the five or six persons, who 
 successfully attempted to understand its bearings, 
 and among these Mr. Huskisson most chiefly, will 
 assure Lord Grey that he has been led into a very 
 complete mistake. 
 
 In arraigning the financial measures of 1 808, Lord 
 Grey is correct in point of fact. It is very true that 
 the sum advanced by the Bank, in consequence of 
 the suggestions of the committee of finance, consi- 
 derably reduced the amount of the loan of that year. 
 It is equally true, that the reduced charge was met, 
 partly by a reduction in the allowance to the Bank 
 for management, and partly by the diminution of the 
 charge upon the consolidated fund, by the expiration 
 of the short annuities. It must therefore be con- 
 fessed, that Lord Grey has satisfactorily proved, that 
 the labours of the minister of finance in 1808 were 
 less than, under other circumstances, they might 
 have been ! A serious and statesman-like charge ! 
 But Mr. Perceval is not only censured, because 
 he neither sought nor created important difficulties ; 
 but because he met those which were unavoidable, 
 by no expedients "very novel and ingenious." What 
 else can be the meaning of the sneer, with which the 
 small encrease of the assessed taxes is noticed by Lord 
 Grey ? Surely, the true and only consideration is, 
 whether the expedients were fit for their purpose ! 
 .Yet, little consonant as this language is, with the 
 gravity of Lord Grey's subject, or with his usual 
 style, the astonishment created by its perusal must 
 encrease, when we recollect that this " expedient" 
 (which was very frequently adopted by Mr. Pitt) was 
 that to which the colleagues of Lord Grey wer<j
 
 driven in 1806, when two new taxes* successively 
 proposed had been rejected by the house of Com- 
 mons. 
 
 As to the measures of 18OQ, Lord Grey states 
 correctly that the loan was charged upon the war 
 taxes, although it is not easy to comprehend what is 
 meant by the " unheard of amount" of this mortgage, 
 seeing that it was rather below the precedent fur- 
 nished by Lord Henry Petty in ISO/. 
 
 The present year 1810, has again passed without 
 new impositions upon the people ; the new charges 
 having been provided for by an unforeseen influx of 
 revenue from the means of a former year. 
 
 It is perfectly true, that on no former occasion, 
 was an excess of this sort made use of in a subse-< 
 quent year; the reasons upon which the measure was 
 adopted in the present instance, are in part similar 
 to those which dictated the mortgage of a portion of 
 the war taxes in 1 8OQ, and in part rest upon facts 
 peculiar to the case. 
 
 With reference to the former, it must be acknow- 
 ledged that there is great difficulty in fixing any 
 amount of war taxes, which may be mortgaged with 
 due regard to the permanent interests of finance ; - at 
 the same time a very general and a just idea has of 
 late prevailed, that in our system of providing for 
 future generations we were proceeding almost too 
 fast for ourselves, and that some relaxation might 
 fairly be allowed -f~. 
 
 * Upon iron, and upon private breweries. 
 
 f The detail into which Lord Grey enters upon the subject of 
 finance, having made it necx-ssary for me to appropriate to that, 
 topic, a larger portion of this tract than I should have wished, I 
 refrain from offering the private opinions which I have formed
 
 ( 30 ) 
 
 The general considerations too, which I have 
 applied to the history of our taxation, strongly recom- 
 mend a temporary rest from imposition, in order 
 that the real state of our resources might be undeni- 
 ably established, by an average of years in which no 
 new taxes had been imposed. An expectation had 
 been held out in 1807, that for three years there 
 were to be no new taxes ; this expectation was an- 
 swered in 1807; in 1808, the amount required, being 
 (for the reasons given) particularly small, an increase 
 of tax took place; 180Q and 181O completed the 
 three years of forbearance. Since, however, many 
 persons objected to the further mortgage of the war 
 taxes, it was considered more adviseable to appro- 
 priate to the charge of the latter year, a very unex- 
 pectedly and unusually large excess which took place 
 in the produce of the stamps, in consequence of the 
 measures adopted in 1808. 
 
 On this subject, Lord Grey has recourse to tlie 
 authority of another gentleman " conversant in mat- 
 
 upon ten years consideration of the subject. But I must be per- 
 mitted to avail myself of this opportunity of expressing my earnest 
 hope and expectation, that in any arrangement -which may be 
 made for relaxing, to the benefit of the present time, the system 
 of taking upon ourselves the burthens which for nearly a century 
 it has been usual to throw upon posterity it may be remembered 
 that the pledge (by which I mean, not a pledge to the Stockholder 
 out to the country gentleman,) which, as well for priority as solem- 
 nity, is most to be regarded is that by which the sinking funds 
 were established; that any inconvenience which according to 
 some, is now occasioned by the sinking fund, may be attributed, 
 as it justly ought, not to the original establishment of the fund, 
 but to the excess to which it was carried by the act of 1 802 : and 
 that the remedy may accordingly be applied only to the evil, and 
 not extended to the destruction of the general system, which, 
 since the period mentioned, has not been disturbed, and which is, 
 that Jwty-Jive years shall be the utmost limit of time for which 
 the revenues of the country shall be mortgaged, and that the pro- 
 vision made for preserving that limit shall not be set aside for any 
 temporary purpose.
 
 ( 31 ) 
 
 l< ters of finance," who has urged as " a strong and 
 <s unanswerable objection, that the public creditor 
 <f has a right to the whole security, because the in- 
 " terest of all stock created by any loan, being 
 tc charged upon the consolidated fund generally, the 
 " surplus of any one duty should go to make up the 
 " deficiency of another *." This is true ; the cre- 
 ditor has a right to expect that the fund upon which 
 his annuity is charged, that is, the consolidated fund 
 generally, should be, as a whole, amply competent 
 to all charges upon it. Having thus stated this 
 principle, of which he sufficiently marks the origin, 
 Lord Grey proceeds to a calculation, furnished, there 
 can be very little doubt, from the same quarter. In 
 this calculation, of course, the whole charge upon 
 this consolidated fund generally, is stated on one 
 side; and the whole revenue applied to it, on the 
 other. No such thing the statement which Lor4 
 Grey has been advised to introduce into his speech, 
 is an account of the new charge imposed, and new 
 increase carried to the fund, within the last seven 
 years; from which statement it appears, that, (allow- 
 ing for the recent appropriation of the stamps) the 
 excess upon the whole would be inconsiderable, and 
 certainly not sufficient to meet the ordinary fluc- 
 tuations. 
 
 There is a disingenuousness in this proceeding, of 
 which it is impossible to suspect Lord Grey. The 
 whole force of the statement rests upon this arbitrary 
 selection of seven years ; looking to " the whole secii- 
 '* rity," it would have been found that the public cre- 
 ditor had a surplus of more ihanfour millions mode- 
 rately calculated, after making every allowance for un- 
 usual receipts. But if this obviously just method had 
 escaped the calculator, it is difficult to conceive what 
 
 * Speech, p. 34.
 
 ( 32 ) 
 
 motive, but the desire to paint a dark picture, could 
 have led him to that which he has adopted. The 
 account from which the sums were taken, is quite 
 clearly the account of the new income and charge 
 for ten years, that being the period during which the 
 accounts in this form are laid before parliament. 
 Why were the first three years of the period, which 
 would have added more than two millions to the sur- 
 plus, carefully excluded from the calculation ? 
 
 Thus much, upon Lord Grey's specific charges ; 
 the general encrease of expenditure since 1806, is 
 readily admitted. But as it is equally undeniable, 
 that the extent of our exertions has proportionally en- 
 creased, the true question which here arises whether 
 these exertions have been politic, will, as a political 
 question, be elsewhere discussed. 
 
 Lord Grey concludes his financial exposition, by 
 an expression of apprehension at the amount of our 
 peace establishment, as compared with our means; 
 Although I am inclined to suspect that he under-rates 
 the probable expenditure, I cannot participate in his 
 distrust of the latter. The mode in which, under 
 such circumstances, it would be adviseable to avail 
 ourselves of the peculiar state of our Finance, must 
 depend upon contingencies, which it is now quite im- 
 possible to foresee. If we can resist hostilities ex- 
 tended like the present, and directed particularly 
 against our commerce and resources of finance, we 
 need npt anticipate difficulties and deficiencies in 
 time of peace. 
 
 But I have said enough on Finance ; I trust that I 
 have shewn that Lord Grey, who was never supposed 
 to give much attention to this subject, has been 
 very badly advised upon it; that in that more im- 
 portant part of the subject which regards the general 
 situation of the country, he has adopted an opinion
 
 ( 33 ) 
 
 formed without sufficient grounds by one individual, 
 whose authority, however great, is insufficient to bear 
 down at once the evidence of facts, and the opinion* 
 of nearly all others " conversant in finance ;" and, 
 that in making his specific charges against the mi- 
 nisters, he has been misled into errors so consider- 
 able, and statements .so suspicious, as entirely to 
 destroy the weight of the accusation. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Although the opinions which Lord Grey has 
 adopted on the subject of finance have created in his 
 mind a strong feeling of the necessity of repose, he 
 has distinctly stated that he conceives a safe and ho- 
 nourable peace to be at present unattainable. In 
 supporting this opinion he has employed more elo- 
 quence and force than in any topic of his speech ; 
 but it is not upon the heads of his opponents that 
 the heavy weight of his oratory must fall ; it is di- 
 rected rather against his chosen friends ; against 
 Mr, PThitbread and Mr. Roscoe*, who have not 
 been convinced even by the experiment of Lord 
 Grey himself, that any thing but the mismanagement 
 of our administration, has averted peace from the 
 country, from the year 1806 inclusive. 
 
 But Lord Grey, disclaiming any disposition to pre- 
 sume an unwillingness in ministers to avail them- 
 selves of a favourable opening for negociation, never- 
 theless, " most strongly feels that their conduct i,(ts 
 " been such, as almost to remove from us even/ hope 
 <{ of peace" To what part of the conduct of Go- 
 
 * This gentleman has publickly censured that part of .Lord 
 f Ircy's speech which relates to peace with France, in " Brief Gb- 
 " scrvations on the address to His Majesty proposed by Earl Grey 
 " in the House of Lords." 
 
 F
 
 ( 34 ) 
 
 vernment Lord Grey here directs his censure, it is 
 impossible to divine. It will readily be admitted, 
 that the opposition which Bonaparte is still encoun- 
 tering in the Spanish Peninsula, has created a diffi- 
 culty in the way of peace, which did not exist in 
 1 806 ; but I believe, that amongst all the loud, va- 
 rious, and inconsistent criminations which have been 
 urged against the conduct of Government upon that 
 "unexpected event, it has not yet been objected that, 
 by assisting in the check given to the ambitious 
 views of France, we retarded the event of Peace ! 
 If, at least, such an objection has been urged, it will 
 scarcely be adopted by Lord Grey, whose conviction 
 of the futility of^attempts at pacification is founded 
 upon the enormous power of Bonaparte, and his de- 
 termination to direct against Great Britain the 
 strength acquired by the extension of his power in 
 every other country in the world. It surely cannot 
 be to the encreased energies that the ministers have 
 exerted in preventing a " great accession of power to 
 " our enemy by the subjugation of the Peninsula *,'* 
 that Lord Grey alludes with censure, as removing 
 the hope of Peace. 
 
 It is as difficult to comprehend, how he can find a 
 similar objection, in the conduct of Government to- 
 wards neutral powers. Lord Grey thinks that neu- 
 trals have been treated with severity ; such conduct 
 may be, in itself, right or wrong : but in his present 
 view at least Lord Grey can hardly allude to pro- 
 ceedings by which Peace, between France and 
 England, is made the interest of every other power 
 upon earth. 
 
 Is it then to the diplomatic communications of the 
 present ministers that Lord Grey objects, as remo- 
 
 Speech^ p. 13.
 
 ( 35 ) 
 
 ving the hopes of peace ? Does he in this part of 
 their conduct discover a criminal deviation from his 
 own system ? Let us review the facts. 
 
 The negociation of 180(5 convinced Lord Grey 
 that the unreasonable demands and expectations of 
 Bonaparte * rendered peace unattainable. This had 
 long been the general feeling ~f- ; nor is it easy to 
 discover in the discussions of 1 806, any very new or 
 striking proof of the difficulty of making peace with 
 France. If we are not to consent to any terms of 
 peace, until Bonaparte has satisfied us that he is no 
 'longer ambitious of universal dominion, or able to 
 pursue his schemes of aggrandizement, it is difficult 
 to justify the motives by which Lord Grey and his 
 friends were actuated in negociating with him upon 
 any terms, or even in opposing the renewal of hos- 
 tilities in 18O3. At that period, Mr. Fox and Lord 
 Grey saw no reason for going to war J ; in 1 806, 
 they thought that peace would have been desirable 
 (C if it could Jiave been obtained without any important 
 <e sacrifices, which should place us in a worse situation 
 " as to the renewal of a war, to which we might be 
 " provoked by the injustice of our enemy ." 
 
 * Some forcible observations upon Lord Grey's altered opinion 
 m this respect were urged by Mr. Canning in his speech of 5 
 Jan. 18O8. [Cobbett's Debates, VIII. p. 374-5.] 
 
 f In this feeling however, (putting out of the question the un- 
 expected turn of affairs in Spaiu and Portugal,) I must be per- 
 mitted to say that I do not concur. The grounds of my differ- 
 ence with that which, I am quite aware, is the opinion of nearly 
 every man to whom I look up with respect, will be stated in the 
 Sequel. 
 
 J Mr. Grey moved to leave out of the address proposed in the 
 House of Commons on the breaking out of the war, the paragraph 
 which referred to the restless spirit of ambition in the enemy, as 
 the cause of the war. [Debates, 25 May, 1803.] 
 
 Lofd Howick's speech in the House of Commons, 5 Jan. 
 F 2
 
 ( 36 ) 
 
 The negotiation, however, which was commenced 
 upon this principle, was brought to an end in conse- 
 quence of the refusal of France to admit the state 
 of possession to remain, in all respects, exactly as it 
 stood, and to satisfy the reasonable demands of our 
 allies in regard more particularly, to Sicily and 
 Dalmatia *. 
 
 * The discussions in which Lord Grey's successors 
 have been concerned, have turned only upon one of 
 the points of the former negociation ; our conti- 
 nental alliances. In April 1807, the British Govern- 
 ment accepted the proffered mediation of Austria, 
 with the proviso that the negociation should be com- 
 mon to all the powers at war f. The matter how- 
 ever dropped, no further (iommunication being re- 
 ceived from the Austrian minister, and that power 
 having shortly afterwards placed herself in a situation 
 so dependent upon France ^, as to render her quite 
 incapable of the character of a mediator. The offer 
 was however renewed in November , without any 
 
 1807. [Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates VIII. p. 306.] From 
 this speech [p. 324] as well as from the papers laid before Par- 
 liament, it appears to have been Mr. Fox's opinion, as well as 
 that upon which the cabinet acted, that the three essential points 
 were Hanover, (as a point of honour) the Russian connection, 
 and Sicily. Surely, all these points might have been conceded by 
 France, without removing that want of security which appears to 
 be, in the opinion of Lord Grey and others, the present obstacle 
 in the way of peace. 
 
 * Lord Howick's speech, and the King's Declaration of 21 Oct. 
 1806, throughout. 
 
 f M-r. Canning's note to Prince Starhemberg, 25 April, 1807. 
 .[Austrian Papers presented in 18O8, No. 3.] 
 
 } See Mr. Canning's speech, 2p Feb. 1808. [Cobbett's D*. 
 bates, X. p. 80S.] 
 
 P. Starhemberj to Mr. Canning, 20 Nor. '[Austrian Pa- 
 peri, Ne.~2 ]
 
 ( 37 ) 
 
 reference to the prior conditional acceptance, 
 under circumstances which rendered the mediatorial 
 character still less applicable than before, to the Em- 
 peror Francis *. 
 
 In August 18O7, immediately after the conclusion, 
 of the treaty of Tilsit *\- 3 the Emperor Alexander also 
 offered his mediation %. His offer was accepted upoiv 
 the condition of " a statement of the basis upon. 
 tf which the enemy was disposed to treat, and a com- 
 " munication of the articles of the peace of Tilsit .**" 
 To this request no attention was paid by Russia, 
 who shortly afterwards became our enemy |j. 
 
 " With the rejection of the Russian offer," (or 
 rather with the conditions by which its acceptance 
 was accompanied,) " Lord Grey was, at the time, 
 " not disposed tojind much fault ^[." Nor, in fact, 
 does the blame which he at the same time imputed 
 to the rejection of the offers of Austria, rest upon 
 grounds which could possibly justify the general im- 
 
 * The Austrian minister made a commurication on the part of 
 the French government, from which, apparent?/, and not from 
 his own court, he had received his instructions. Mr. Canaiog's 
 note, 8 Jan. 1808, [Same papers, No. 6 ] On the 12th, P. Star- 
 hemberg demanded his passports, which were immediately, for- 
 warded. 
 
 f The treaty between France and Uussia is dated ;th JiJy 
 1807. 
 
 J M. Alopeus to Mr. Canning, 1st August 1807- [Russian 
 Papers presented in 1808, No. 4.] 
 
 Mr. Canning's answer, 5th Jan. [No. 5.] auJ His Majesty'* 
 declaration, 18 December 180/. 
 
 \\ Emperor of Russia's declaration against England, 3 1st Oct. 
 1807. 
 
 ^[ His speech in the House of Lords, 1 1 Feb. 1 8O6, [CvbUtt's 
 Debates, X. p. 435.]
 
 ( 38 ) 
 
 putation of which I am now endeavouring to trace 
 the foundation *. 
 
 In October 1 808, a. joint offer of ftegociation was 
 received from France and Russia f ; to which the 
 English government, having recently espoused in 
 the most public manner, the cause of the Spanish 
 nation, naturally refused to listen until it should have 
 been distinctly admitted that the Representative of 
 that nation, (as well as the Courts of Sicily, Portugal 
 and Sweden,) was to be a party in the negociation, as 
 His Majesty's ally .j;. To this proposed acknow- 
 ledgement, the two governments objected , and the 
 discussion was of course concluded jj. 
 
 In the short parliamentary discussion to which this 
 proceeding gave rise, Lord Grey took no part ; nor 
 
 * It is chiefly to the tone adopted by Mr. Canning that Lord 
 Grey objected.- 5 This might have encreased ili-wiil on the part 
 of Austria, but could not have rendered France more averse from, 
 peace. It is impossible to mention the tone of Mr. Canning's 
 diplomatic papers, without recollecting that the language of his 
 public declarations was one of the leading causes of the early 
 popularity which the Duke of Portland's administration obtained. 
 
 f Letter from Bonaparte and the Emperor Alexander, to His 
 Britannic Majesty, dated Erfurth, 12 October 1810. [Erfurth 
 Papers, presented 2O January 1 8OQ, No. 4 ..] 
 
 J Mr. Canning's note to the Russian and French ministers, 28 
 Oct 1808. [Same Papers, No. 9 ] 
 
 Notes from Count Nicholas de Romanzow, and M. Cham- 
 pagny, dated 28 Nov. 1808. [Nos, 13 and 15.] 
 
 || Mr. Canning's notes in reply, dated 0th December [Nos. 17 
 and 19.] The British ministers on this occasion '::ued a decla- 
 ration (15 December 1808) which is at least not inferior to their 
 other state papers. It is very worthy of attention not only on 
 account of the solemn pledge which it publicly renews to Spain, 
 but of the just reasoning which it contains as to tl evil effects of 
 a negociation, continued " when peace has been found to be 
 " utterly unattainable."
 
 were the few observations of Lord Grenville* di- 
 rected against the principle upon which ministers 
 had acted. 
 
 The question then of Peace or War has for the 
 present ceased to exist among those who are not pre- 
 pared to abandon the cause of Spain ; unless, indeed, 
 it be conceived that any offers which we might make 
 to Bonaparte would induce him to secure the inde- 
 pendence of the Peninsula ; an idea, which, I believe, 
 has never been expressed. 
 
 However apprehensive and, as I trust I shall shew, 
 unreasonably apprehensive, is Lord Grey's feeling, of 
 the subjugation of Spain, and however unwilling he 
 may be that the force of this country should be ex- 
 erted towards prev -/Tiring it, he certainly has never 
 expressed his willingness, that Great Britain, at 
 this moment, should become a party to that dreaded 
 consummation, by a treaty acquiescing in the usurp- 
 ation of France. 
 
 Does it not then, on the whole, .appear that the 
 objections formerly made by Lord Grey to the pro- 
 ceedings of his opponents in regard to peace were in 
 their nature occasional, ami have now lost their 
 force ? that those proceedings are not to be con- 
 trasted with his own ? and that, upon the impor- 
 tance of the great obstacle which has newlv occurred, 
 there is no substantial and practical difference ? 
 
 His inculpatory remark upon the conduct of mi- 
 nisters in respect to peace, is not borne out by any 
 one proceeding, to which, in the absence of all ex- 
 planation, it is possible to refer his allusion ; and is 
 
 * 26 Jan. 1809. [Cobbett, XII. p. 169] Even Mr. 
 Iread, in this instance admitted that ueguciatiou was out of the 
 question. [31 Jan. 1809, p. 222.]
 
 ( 40 ) 
 
 therefore to be classed among the specimens of that 
 " vague and general phraseology in which" some 
 speakers " delight.'* 
 
 And, most assuredly the observations upon this 
 topic ought not reasonably to lead to either of th 
 <iesired results of his speech a change of measures 
 or of men. 
 
 V. 
 
 Considering then, that the state of our finances 
 calls loudly for repose, (an opinion which I have en- 
 deavoured to disprove,) but that peace, upon ad vise- 
 able terms, is not to be attained, (a point upon which 
 there is a general concurrence,) Lord Grey recom- 
 mends, as if it were the natural result of his opi- 
 nions, the mode of conducting the war, which shall 
 approach most nearly to a state of peace ; lie depre- 
 cates offensive operations as inconsistent with the 
 " provident system of husbanding our resources ;"' 
 and he illustrates his views by a comparison of the 
 ':H stems of policy of the two administrations, and of 
 the effect of each upon the contest in which we are 
 engaged. 
 
 To every part of Lord Grey's view of our warlike 
 policy, I venture to object. I not only contend that 
 there is no necessity for " Repose," so strong as to 
 induce us to abstain from any military exertions, 
 which appear to be required by the interests of the 
 country ; I deny that a defensive war is the natural 
 policy of a nation wishing for peace, but not able to 
 attain it ; and more especially, when the obstacle to 
 peace is, the great and encreasing, but not universal 
 power, the inordinate, but occasionally disappointed 
 ambition, of an enemy. But the general reasoning 
 into which these considerations would lead, shall give 
 way to a more practical discussion.
 
 Lord Grey, though he delights not in (f vague dnd 
 Cf general phraseology," admits, with Lord Liverpool, 
 that the comparative merits of one political system 
 or another must be determined by the circumstances 
 and situation of the country ; and is therefore willing 
 to join issue in the question*, whether the operations 
 of Government, acting upon what he is pleased to 
 term a " system of vigour," have tended more to a 
 " successful termination of the contest," than " that 
 " provident system of husbanding our resources," 
 Tvhich he assures us, was the policy, " once so reviled" 
 of his own administration. 
 
 Here then is a direct challenge to a comparative 
 investigation. But let us first of all discover and 
 explain wherein really consisted this " reviled" policy. 
 From the " general phraseology" of Lord Grey, 
 which it is humbly conceived may not unfairly be 
 also termed " vague," it would naturally be collected, 
 that it was the first object of this policy to abstain 
 from military operations, to avoid, especially, ha- 
 zarding a British army on. a hostile continent ; and, 
 at least, it would be taken for granted, that none of 
 those prudent operations, which the course of events 
 rendered imperative, could with any plausibility have 
 t>een said to have " covered our national character 
 " with disgrace." 
 
 Yet the recollection of no fess than four distinct 
 proceedings of the cabinet of 1806, compels us to 
 dissent from this representation of its political sys- 
 tem ; and calls for an investigation of every operation 
 undertaken by either government ; an investigation 
 without which, neither the policy of Lord Grey, nor 
 the fatal abandonment of it by his successors, can 
 be known or appreciated. 
 
 Speech, p. 
 
 G
 
 It certainly was the system of the cabinet of 1 806 
 to undertake no extensive operations ; the present 
 ministers, on the other hand, have directed to the 
 purposes of the war a portion of the strength of the 
 country large beyond example *. In so doing they 
 have unquestionably encreased the public expences, 
 and they may therefore, less appropriately than the 
 coalition, be said to have " husbanded the resources 
 " of the country." 
 
 Bat how far this sort of husbandry is meritorious, 
 may well be questioned.' If the merits of a political 
 system are to be appreciated solely by its cost, it 
 would not be easy to justify even that reduced scale 
 of expence which in 18O7 the ministers had per- 
 suaded themselves to consider as sufficient. To 
 measure our exertions exactly by our means, may 
 appear a prudent and a sound maxim, but very little 
 reflexion is necessary to shew that it is in no way 
 reducible to practice. If we are said to exceed our 
 means when we run in debt the most reduced scale 
 
 '* This averment, I trust, will not be disputed. I believe that 
 it would be true, even if we were to leave out of the calculation 
 the other services upon which British troops were at die same 
 time employed, and confine ourselves to the Peninsular war. To 
 the unusual exertions of the present administration, a testimony 
 has been lately borne, by an officer of remarkable intelligence, as 
 will, I apprehend, be acknowledged, not only by officers with 
 ti horn he has served, but by all those members of the House of 
 Commons who attended the Scheldt enquiry. The principles 
 upon which our expeditions have been, and ought to be conducted, 
 have been laid down with great judgement by Captain Pasley of 
 the Engineers, in his " Essay on the Military Policy and Imtitu- 
 " tions of the British Empire." No one, who peruses this book, 
 c.an possibly attribute to Captain Pasley, any party views. He 
 does not exempt the present ministers from his general charges of 
 impolicy in the conduct of the war, but he freely acknowledges 
 that their " efforts in the Spanish war have been greater than any 
 " exhibited t:y our military history in these latter times,"' [p. 1Q5.] 
 Looking only to the numbers of British troops actually employ- 
 ed, we may include in these latter times the wars of Anne, and 
 George IJ.
 
 ( 43 ) 
 
 of war establishment pi; -es us in that situntion ; if 
 on the other hand \v . -nsider or.rselves as living; 
 within our means, unV.ss we are actually ruined, and 
 unable to continue the same exertions, the largest 
 establishments hitherto ndcpted have not reduced us 
 to that extremity. Who then shall fix the medium 
 between " short sighted parsimony" and " unfore- 
 seeing expence ?" * It is beyond the power of man. 
 The establishment of a systematic policy, by which 
 all that we are to do, and the means of doing it, is 
 limited and arranged for many years to corne, appears 
 perhaps to be the part of a great statesman ; it is 
 most consistent with the pride of the rulers of a 
 nation, and with the self-conceit which induces men 
 to fancy that they foresee and appreciate or even 
 regulate events, which are in truth the results of 
 accident and caprice. But whatever degree of weight 
 may be attached to this observation in general, it 
 will surely be admitted that the mutual relations of 
 exertion and expence have never yet been defined by 
 the most systematic politician, so as to appreciate, 
 with any approach to accuracy, the value at which 
 any political object may wisely be purchased, or the 
 degree of risk which may justifiably be incurred in 
 its pursuit. 
 
 With these ideas, I shall not attempt to estimate 
 financially the two systems which, as Lord Grey ima- 
 gines, have been adopted since 1806. Upon the 
 expediency, conduct, and result, of the several mea- 
 sures adopted by the two administrations, I am ne- 
 vertheless willing and anxious to " go to issue" with 
 Lord Grey. 
 
 The most striking feature, however, in the policy 
 
 > Burke. 
 G2
 
 44 ) 
 
 of the cabinet of 18O6, consists not in a service un- 
 dertaken, but in an operation refused to the pressing 
 instances of an ally, supported by a pretty general 
 voice at home. Were it my object to bring promi- 
 nently forward, the most popular topic of crimination 
 against Lord Grey and his colleagues, I might con- 
 tent myself with a simple reference to their discus- 
 sions with Russia; but it is not so much for the 
 purpose of crimination, as of an elucidation of their 
 policy, that I wish to record the History of those 
 transactions. 
 
 After the Peace of Presburgh *, by which an end 
 was put to the war between France and Austria, 
 Russia still continued the contest. But it was not 
 till October 1806, when Prussia f also became tb^ 
 enemy of France, that the war in the North became 
 serious. The King of Prussia's declaration of war 
 
 * 26 December 1605. 
 
 f Prussia does not form a topic of our discussion, but it may 
 be as well to mention, here, that England and Prussia had been 
 at war from the month of April 18O6, [orders in council for 
 laying an embargo on Prussian vessels, &c. 5th and 6th April 
 1806- -King's message announcing the rupture, 21st April] ; 
 in consequence of the latter having taken possession of Hanover, 
 by a proclamation dated 27th January, [Prussian Papers 1606, 
 No 2.] and having on the 28th of March [Xo. 5 ] excluded 
 British ships from the ports in the North Sea. The addresses to 
 His Majesty on this occasion, passed, in both houses, unanimously. 
 Mr.^Fox said in his introductory speech that " the shutting the 
 " ports of Prussia to British vessels was, alone, most clearly and 
 " unquestionably an act nf hostility against this country.'" [Cob- 
 bett's Debates, VI. p. 893.] His Britannic Majesty also issued a 
 declaration on the 25th April, in his electoral capacity. [New 
 Annual Register for 1SOS, p. 165.] The King of Prussia's sub- 
 sequent rupture udth France, appears to have been occasioned 
 principally by the offer of Hanover, made by France to England 
 in the negociations at Paris in the summer of 18O6. [King of 
 Prussia's manifesto, Q\h Oct. 1806, New Annual Register, 
 p. 259.]
 
 ( 45 ) 
 
 was almost instantly followed by a defeat *, the con- 
 sequences of which need not be readied ! Upon 
 receiving intelligence of the unfortunate opening of 
 the Prussian campaign, Lord Howick instructed the 
 King's ministers at the courts of Petersburgh and 
 Stockholm, not only to press most urgently fcr the 
 application of all the forces of Russia and Sweden iu 
 aid of the Continental war, bat to assure those two 
 powers of " His Maje.-.ty's steady determination to 
 f( resist, to the utmost of his power, all pretensions 
 ff inconsistent with the general interests of Rnrope"\ 
 To Sweden, indeed, the British Government said, a 
 little more specifically, that " -I he common dangt-r had 
 " animated His Majesty with cm increased conviction 
 (f of the necessity of using his most powerful effort* 
 "to avert it +."- -The Emperor^ of Russia on his 
 part, after he had brought forward his forces to the 
 Vistula, pressed urgently and continually for the ac- 
 tive co-operation of England. The answer given in 
 London to these representations was, generally, that 
 
 * At Jena on the ] 4th of October. From this period the wnr 
 was uniformly unfavourable to Prussia; an armistice was signed 
 at Charlottenburgh on the 16th ot" November, and a treaty of 
 peace finally concluded at Tilsit on the Qth of July 1807- [New 
 Annual Register 1807, PP- 230 and 272 ] In consequence of the 
 King of Prussia's rupture with France, and the consequent arrival 
 of Baron Jacob! in London on the LOth of October ISOd, an or let 
 in council had been issued, l()th November, f>r coasin^ to molest 
 Prussian vessels ; and on the 23th Jan. 1S07, Poace was concluded 
 at Memel between England and Prussia. [NV,v Ann. Rv'g. iyo/, 
 p. 246 ] Prussia, has subsequently catered again into the hostils 
 measures of France, and h.is broken off all diplomatic communi- 
 cation with us. I do not mention these facts and dates with anr 
 intention whatever of joining in the insinuations, thro\vn out at 
 the time, on the conduct of Lord Grey and his colleagues in re- 
 spect of Prussia. [See the Debate in the House of Commons, 19 
 Dec. J806. Cobbctt, VIII. p. 41, \c.] 
 
 f Lord Howick to Mr. Stuart, 2Rh Oet and 4th Nov. 1805. 
 FRussian Papers, Feb. 160^, Xos. 1 and J.] 
 
 J Lord Howick to Mr. Pierrepcnt, 2Sth Oct. [No. 2.]
 
 ** the same opinion- was entertained there as at St. 
 " Petersburg!!, of the necessity of COMBINED EX- 
 ** ERTIONS to resist the (increasing danger *." 
 
 But the dispatches received from the successive 
 British ministers at Petersburgh, throughout January 
 and February 18O7 t> having continued to represent 
 the extreme anxiety of the Emperor for diversions 
 on the coasts of France and Holland, and his unea- 
 siness at the apparent silence of our Government on 
 the subject, Lord Howick, on the 2Oth of February 
 answered, more distinctly, by referring to " the dif- 
 " faculty and danger of landing in France, where die 
 Ci means exist of collecting in a short time a much 
 fc larger force than any that can be sent against this 
 " country, and from whence there can be no secure 
 " retreat ; but still holding out, that, 4t if a favour- 
 te able opportunity should arise. His Majesty would be 
 " desirous of exerting his UTMOST EFFORTS to distress 
 " the enemy upon any point which may present an 
 * f advantageous opening to assist the general opera- 
 fc tions of the war + ." Russia becoming every day 
 more and more urgent, Lord Howick, on the loth of 
 of March, went so far as to say, that " a more favour" 
 Cf able season (for military diversions) was now ap~ 
 " proaching ; that the British Government was sedu- 
 " lousiy employed in preparing the means of still more 
 t( active co-operation ." " He hoped, too, soon to 
 " be able , to communicate something more specific 
 
 * Lord Howick to the Marquis of Douglas, 4th Dec. 1SO6. 
 [No. 10.] 
 
 f Mr. Stuart to Lord Howick, 1 8th Dec. 1 806 received 22d 
 Jan. J8O7. 2d Jan, received 6th Feb. 14th Jan, received 2/th 
 Feb. Lord Douglas, 2(hh Jan. 4th aud 8th Feb. [Nos. 11 4 12 A 
 J4, 15, J6and 17.] 
 
 t Lord Howick to Lord Douglas, 30 Feb. 1807. [No. 30.} 
 
 It is not clear, to what operation, previously undertaken, this 
 comparative degree is intended to refer.
 
 ** on this subject/' although he thought it necessary 
 to moderate the expectations which these expressions 
 might justify, by reminding the Russian Government 
 " how much the force of which His Majesty could 
 " dispose for continental operations was necessarily 
 " limited, both by the extent of his naval exertions, 
 " and the necessary support of his distant colonies; 
 " and how much the difficulty of employing it ad- 
 f( vantageously was encreased by the then situation 
 " of the North of Germany, where His Majesty 
 " could neither look to the junction of his army with 
 " that of any ally, to any established magazines to 
 " enable it to advance, nor to the possession of any 
 " considerable fortress to secure its retreat*." To 
 the King of Sweden, who, as it would appear, was 
 equally with Russia, " dissatisfied at our supposed 
 " backwardness in assisting his exertions," our mi- 
 nister at Stockholm was on the same day instructed 
 to repeat " the opinion already expressed on the part 
 " of the English Government, that a diversion by a 
 " Swedish force on the side of Pomeraiiia would be 
 '' at that moment of the utmost importance ; and to 
 " discuss with that monarch in person, the addition. 
 " of British troops which would be required ;" and 
 " the amount of subsidy demanded ;" but Lord 
 Howick at the same time required " a general com- 
 '* munication of his plan of operation," of the force 
 destined to execute it, and of the time when it would 
 be ready to act, " and urged His Majesty's" right to 
 expect further details, considering how largely he 
 was expected to contribute his support j\" 
 
 * Lord Howick to Lord Douglas, 10th March. [No. 22.] 
 
 f Lord Howick to Mr. Straton, l6th March ISO/. [No. 2,'J ] 
 There is in this and other papers, too much of an air of supporting 
 an ally, as if for his own sake, instead of co-operating with hiat 
 in a common interest.
 
 43 > 
 
 iThts abstract of the published communications of 
 Lord Grey himself, with respect to military opera- 
 tions on the Continent, is not brought forward with 
 a view of supporting the charges preferred against 
 the cabinet of J 8O6, for riot sending a force to the 
 North of Germany. But it is not by a reference to 
 tJie si/stem of h&slMtldmg our resources that this ac- 
 cusation is repelled, but because it has never been 
 satisfactorily made out, tliut at any specific period, 
 or in any particular quarter, it would have been po- 
 litic to land a British army. It was not, in fact, up- 
 on any new or peculiar ground of prudent policy, 
 that Lord Grey and his colleagues justified their 
 conduct, either to their allies, or subsequently in 
 their own parliament *. The diplomatic pieces which 
 we have just retraced, imply and indeed express, 
 throughout, a determination to contribute largely to 
 tli,e measures of the war ; without which determi- 
 nation, in fact, it would have been almost ridiculous 
 to call upon our allies, in the urgent style adopted 
 by Lord Howick, for their powerful succours, and 
 the application of all their forces, to that we empha- 
 tically styled the common cause. 
 
 - But, in pursuing -this topic further, we do find 
 some traces of the " prudent policy." We find, it 
 is true, no measure, of unquestionable expediency, 
 abandoned lor the sake of " husbanding our re- 
 
 * sources ;" yet we recognize a caution against the 
 occurrence of useless expen.ce, which may not un- 
 fairly be deemed excessive: and which, if the war 
 had taken a turn .which admitted of tiie co-operation 
 
 *' See the speeches of Lord Grey and Lord Moira on the mo- 
 tion of the former for papers relative to Russia, 11 Feb. 1808< 
 [Cubbutt, X. p. 4 3644 1.;
 
 of our troops, might have produced much delay and 
 
 * 
 
 inconvenience 
 
 But, out of the papers which have been cited, 
 a more serious observation arises. Is it possible 
 to peruse the series of dispatches, without conclu- 
 ding that some powerful effort, some combined exer* 
 tion, was contemplated by the cabinet from the very 
 commencement of the campaign ? Was it possible 
 for Mr. Stuart or Lord Douglas to obey the instruc- 
 tions conveyed to them, from October to February f, 
 without imparting to the court of Petersburgh the 
 hope of an important co-operation on our part on 
 the continent of Europe ? a confident hope and ex- 
 pectation, not contingent upon the chance of any 
 great event which: Russia could not influence or con- 
 troul ? Yet, if Lord Moira has correctly repre- 
 sented ^ the views of his cabinet, it was only in the 
 event of the junction of Austria, a power which 
 had made peace a year before, and which is not even 
 mentioned in the correspondence, that the British 
 ministers thought of a continental operation. If the 
 sincerity of Lord Grey is not thus exposed to suspi- 
 cion, the intentions and motives of the government, 
 in 1806 and 18O7, are at least clouded in a mystery, 
 through which its system of policy cannot be dis- 
 cerned. 
 
 Whether the fate of the campaign would have 
 been materially affected by any co-operation on our 
 part, or whether Russia would have been now less 
 
 * There certainly was no appearance, in England, of any pre- 
 parations for a continental expedition. 
 
 t It was not till the 20th of February, that the difficulties of 
 co-operation were stated by Lord Howick. See p. 46. 
 
 % In the debate of 11 Feb. 
 
 H
 
 our enemy, if at that period we had been more at- 
 tentive to her demands *, are questions which it is 
 impossible to solve, and upon which I cannot pre- 
 tend to throw new light ; but, if it be admitted, on 
 the one hand, that the impolicy of this refusal has 
 not been undeniably substantiated, it may be con- 
 tended on the other, that neither can its wisdom be 
 established ; no result of imprudence could well be 
 more mischievous than the events which followed it. 
 Its authors may therefore defend their measure, but 
 they cannot hold it up as a proof of the excellence of 
 their system, or as an example to be followed by 
 statesmen. 
 
 But it is contended that the blood and treasure, 
 which they saved, constitute a primd facie case in 
 their favor ; and, that unless it can be shewn that 
 there was a very strong probability of an advantageous 
 result of their exertions, their forbearance is a ground 
 of praise ;. be it so. But then let not men and 
 money saved be rated at a higher value than men 
 and money lost. We cannot have one measure for 
 Pomerania, and another for South America, Egypt 
 or Constantinople, 
 
 For it must be remarked, that the system of 
 " husbanding our resources," which Lord Grey de- 
 scribes as peculiar to his administration, consists in 
 the abstinence from operations in the north of Eu- 
 
 *-As nothing has been said by Lord Grey of subsidies, I have 
 not adverted to that part of his correspondence with Russia which 
 refers to pecuniary assistance. [Nos. 4. 7- 9- 13 -j It might 
 however, peahaps, be maintained, that although six millions, the 
 sum demanded by Russia, was an enormons sum, yet that,' if we 
 really did not look to any great, and perhaps still more expensive, 
 military measure, it might not have been impolitic to comply 
 with that demand, by way of demonstrating the sincerity of our 
 professions, and assisting our ally by a sacrifice of which die ut- 
 mo*t extent would have been defined.
 
 ( 51 ) 
 
 rope; and in the contraction of the means employed 
 upon those services which were actually undertaken. 
 The occasions of employing troops abroad, which 
 have been taken by the present ministers, were not 
 open to their predecessors, nor can it possibly now 
 be determined whether or not, under similar circum- 
 stances, the conduct of both administrations would 
 have been the same. 
 
 If, on the one hand, the conduct of the Cabinet of 
 180(5, in regard to the northern campaign, gives 
 reason for believing that, under no circumstances of 
 promise, the prudent statesmen who composed it, 
 would have largely ventured upon exertions either 
 pecuniary or warlike ; the expeditions which they 
 undertook or contemplated must satisfy us, on the 
 other, that even in their judgement occasions might 
 arise, in which the fleets and armies of Great Britain 
 might laudably be directed to distant and hazardous 
 enterprizes. How wisely and how advantageously 
 these occasions were selected, let us now consider. 
 
 We need not follow minutely the progress of our 
 arms in the sea of Marmora * or in Egypt. It is 
 sufficient to record the facts : A British squadron 
 threatened Constantinople, with the view of compel- 
 ling the Porte to return to friendly proceedings, or 
 to surrender to us her fleet and naval equipments f ; 
 neither purpose was effected; and our squadron 
 
 * I include this naval service among the " military operations," 
 because, though no land force was employed, it was directed to 
 purposes of a high political character j and the not employing a 
 body of troops in this service, rather than in Egypt, has been one 
 of the alledged causes of failure. 
 
 f Lord Howick's letters to Mr. Arbuthnot, 14th and 2Oth No?. 
 180<3. [Papers on address, 15 Feb. 1808, Nos. ^ and 8.] 
 
 II 2
 
 narrowly escaped destruction * ; in order to sup- 
 port our hostile measures, and still further to de- 
 prive our enemies of the means of annoyance, a Bri- 
 tish army was landed in Egypt, whence it was spee- 
 dily expelled, with no trifling loss, by a Turkish 
 force f. Of these failures, as of all failures, the 
 planners of the expeditions have been ready with pal- 
 liations, But the facts, as I have represented them 
 will not be controverted. 
 
 Neither will it be denied, that in South America 
 in which quarter a succession of troops and com- 
 manders were employed upon services of the highest 
 importance, political and military, the failure was 
 equally complete . 
 
 * Sir John Duckworth's squadron passed the Dardanelles on 
 the. 1 Qth of February 18O7, and repassed on the 3d of March; 
 for the details, see the Gazette of 5th May 1807. According to 
 the admiral, another week would have rendered the possibility of 
 a return doubtful. 
 
 } The orders for taking possession of Alexandria, by a detach- 
 ment of about 500O men from Sicily, in the event of the corn- 
 meucement of hostilities, were given to general Fox, as soon as a 
 rupture became probable. [Lord Howick to the Admiralty, 21st 
 Nov. 18O. Admiralty papers, No. 1. enc.] In consequence of 
 these orders general Mackenzie Fraser took possession of Alex- 
 andria on the 21st of March 18O7. [Gazette, th May.] After 
 several ineffectual and disastrous attempts to obtain a firmer foot- 
 ing in the country, [Gazettes of 13th June and 18th July,] tha 
 British army evacuated Egypt by convention in the September 
 following. [New Annual Register 1807, p. 299,] 
 
 J The original capture of Buenos Ayres on the 2d of July 
 1806 [Gazette 15th September,] was not a measure of Govern- 
 ment ; nor are the ministers responsible for its re-capture on the 
 12th of August following. [Gazette, 27th Jan. 1807.] Their 
 measures commenced with the small force under brigadier-general 
 Auchmuty, dispatched in October 1806 ; and which, in conjunc- 
 tion with the troops from the Cape, obtained possession in the 
 most gallant manner of the fortress and city of Monte Video. 
 ^Gazette, 13th April 1807, and further proceedings in Gazette of 
 6th June and 15th August.] Brigadier-general Craufurd was in 
 the same month of October, 18O6, sent with 4,000 meu to
 
 ( 53 ) 
 
 In no other enterprise were the British troops 
 employed except in the unprofitable descent upon 
 Calabria: a service undertaken without the orders 
 from home *. 
 
 It is not only true then, that in no.one quarter of 
 the globe were our arms successfully employed by the 
 statesmen of 1 806 ; this fact, simply stated, might 
 be the result of a truly " husbanding policy ;" but 
 it is undeniable that of three distinct operations, the 
 most triumphant result was the safe return of a part 
 of the force employed. It has not been urged by 
 the most zealous partizan, that the enterprizes have 
 been attended with the minutest particle of good 
 effect ; neither the equivocal merit of diversion, nor 
 the dear-bought advantage of display, have been 
 attributed to the expeditions to Constantinople, to 
 Egypt or to America ! 
 
 Surely if the recollection of these occurrences be 
 insufficient to convict their authors of incapacity, it 
 at least destroys their claims of superiority. Cam 
 
 possession of the province of Chili, [Mr. Secretary Windham t 
 general Craufurd, 30th October ] 8O6. Appendix to Whitelocke's 
 Trial, No. 9.] on the western coast of South America, but was 
 afterwards directed, in lieu of that operation, to join lieutenant 
 general Wlntdocke, under whom all the forces in that quarter 
 were, in March 1607, united and encreased to the amount of 1O 
 or 12,000 men, with a considerable naval force, for the purpose 
 of regaining possession of Buenos Ayres. [Mr. Windham to 
 general Whitelocke, 5 March 1807, No. 4 } The complete and 
 final failure of all these expeditions, in July 1807, is fresh in everj 
 man's recollection. [Gazette, 13th Sept. IbO/.j 
 
 * The island of Capri in the Bay of Naples had been taken on 
 the llth of May, by a naval force undei Sir Sidney Smith. 
 [Gazette, 29th July.] In July, Sir John Stuart landed in Ca- 
 labria, and beat the French troops under General Regnier, at 
 MAIDA on the 4th of that month, which led to the temporary 
 evacuation of Calabria by the French. [Gaxette, 5th Sept. 16OO', 
 end Supplement] Its pemiuuent occupation by us was out of 
 the qnestioij.
 
 ( 54 ) 
 
 these statesmen be suffered to look down with con- 
 tempt upon those who have defeated the views of 
 our enemy upon Denmark and her fleet who have 
 taken from -him his last colony who have, for the 
 first time during the war, stayed his progress in EU- 
 ROPE ? 3s it for these men to speak of ff sacrifices, 
 " which have only purchased misfortune and calamity; 9 
 or to say that the expeditions to the Douro, and the 
 Tagus, " have covered our national character with 
 " disgrace ?" 
 
 No ; but they will urge that te they have not," in 
 pursuit of their disasters, " exhausted the resources 
 " of the country." It is true, they will allow, that 
 they attempted great objects, and that their failures 
 were in all instances complete ; but they took good 
 care that their disgrace should be inexpensive. 
 
 Was this then, in fact, the policy " so reviled ?" 
 It may be granted that Lord Grey has many followers 
 in his opinion of the necessity of repose it is not 
 difficult to find arguments for the impolicy of foreign 
 operations. Many persons, no doubt, consider such 
 expeditions as disproportioned to the strength of the 
 country, as well in money as in men. Much may 
 be said, on the other hand, for the policy of hazard- 
 ing a great deal for the sake of a considerable object, 
 and even of engaging in enterprises, of which the 
 chance of success is previously foreseen to be the 
 smaller. Without sometimes adopting this policy, 
 a small state could seldom accomplish those great 
 exertions, by which it raises itself to the level of its 
 powerful neighbours. 
 
 The former opinion would naturally lead us to 
 retain no greater force, nor any other species of 
 force, than might be necessary for our own security, 
 or at most for those occasional services to which a 
 large force cannot be applied ; and on which there,-
 
 ( 55 ) 
 
 fore the small state is upon a par with the greater. 
 It would lead us, certainly, to abstain from any en- 
 terprize of doubtful success and large expence. 
 
 But upon neither system should we be induced, 
 having greater exertions in our power, to apply to a 
 desirable object means so small as to encrease consi- 
 derably the chance of failure, merely for the sake of 
 lessening the expence of the attempt. 
 
 Yet this, if we are to credit their own represen- 
 tation, was the policy of the cabinet of 18O6 ; they 
 exposed themselves to failure and they did jail ; 
 in every quarter of the globe, not for want of the 
 means of success, but because they ventured not to 
 apply them. 
 
 It may possibly be denied that this is a -correct re- 
 presentation ; it may be asserted that it was not from 
 their unwillingness to employ great forces, but from 
 the impossibility of their attempting it under the cir- 
 cumstances of each case, that the inadequacy of the 
 force arose. To shew this, in- the cases of Constan- 
 tinople, Egypt, or Buenos Ayres, would, I suspect, 
 be very difficult, but if it were so or if it was the 
 contemplation of greater cnterprizes alone that took 
 from the smaller their chance of success where 
 then, I ask, are we to find the "provident sys- 
 " tern . ? " Wherein consists the difference of the 
 systems of Lord Grey and of his successors, except 
 in the unvaried ill-success of the former ? Both 
 governments, according to this view of the subject, 
 were ready and willing to avail themselves to the ut- 
 most of their power of every opening for exertion ; 
 * but it happened, that, of the expeditions under! 
 by the cabinet of 180(3, not one had the good luck 
 to succeed ! 
 
 Before we come to general results, let us in like
 
 ( 56 ) 
 
 manner consider separately the enterprizes under- 
 taken by the administration of the Duke of Portland. 
 Among these unquestionably there was one great 
 failure, and it is in fact the expedition to the 
 Scheldt alone, that enables Lord Grey to speak with 
 confidence to the people of England, when he sets 
 before them the disasters of the war. The plural 
 number is but a figure of rhetoric, adapted to his 
 intention of magnifying the importance of a single 
 failure. Yet what is it, that has given to this memo- 
 rable enterprize a stronger character of disgrace, than 
 belongs to the numerous reverses of the last war, or 
 to those which we have now been contemplating ? 
 Why is it, that there has been a more general and 
 a more violent disposition to visit with indignation 
 and severity the ministers who planned it ? Is it 
 that the object sought, was more essential to our 
 safety ; -that greater losses were sustained, or that 
 the glory of our arms has been tarnished by the 
 failure ? Not one of these peculiar features can be 
 attributed to the transaction. The peculiarity con- 
 sisted in the magnitude of the attempt ; in the ex- 
 tent of the preparations, the unexampled exertions 
 used, the unheard-of celerity with which the arma- 
 ment was collected and provided. These circum- 
 stances, added to the proximity of the scene of action, 
 and the nature of the loss sustained, attracted to the 
 attempt a very peculiar degree of public attention, 
 and to its failure a very peculiar degree of indigna- 
 tion. Those who are of opinion that having done 
 your utmost towards success is an aggravation rather 
 than a palliation of disaster, will retain this indigna- 
 tion, and will give the preference to the expeditions, 
 or, for they are synonimous, to the failures of Lord 
 Grey. When the historian records them all, he will 
 perhaps find something in each to praise and to 
 blame; but if he should happen to inherit any pre- 
 judice of party, he will not take occasion, from the 
 en umeration of unfortunate expeditions, to inculcate
 
 ( 57 ) 
 
 his preference for the cabinet of 1 806 ! But as I do 
 not intend to deny, that the failure of the Scheldt 
 expedition, though not complete, was considerable 
 and disastrous, I shall not pursue it into its details *. 
 
 * No measure of any government has, in modern times, un- 
 dergone an enquiry and a discussion so severe, as the expedition 
 to Walcheren. The inquiry was instituted in the House of Com- 
 mons, by a majority against ministers; no other proof is wanting, 
 of the perfect freedom under which the decision was made. So 
 impossible was it considered, that any ministry could survive a 
 parliamentary enquiry, that that opposition became the interested 
 and suspected side of the question. Yet, under all these circum- 
 stances, the following resolutions were passed in the House of 
 Commons after the conclusion of the enquiry : 
 
 1. That this House taking into consideration the extreme im- 
 portance of destroying the extensive and increasing naval means 
 and arsenals of the enemy in the Scheldt, where a considerable 
 navy had already been constructed, and was growing with great 
 rapidity and to a formidable extent : and taking also into consi- 
 deration the expediency of effecting a diversion in favour of 
 Austria in the critical state of the war on the Continent at the 
 period at which the expedition was undertaken ; considering also 
 the probability of success arising from the reduced state of the 
 force of the enemy at that period in the neighbourhood of the 
 Scheldt, is of opinion, that His Majesty's ministers were justified 
 in applying the naval and military means of the country in a man- 
 ner which combined a great national object with a prospect of 
 affording essential assistance to our ally ; and in advising the un- 
 dertaking of the expedition, notwithstanding the difficulties with 
 which it was known to be attended ; difficulties which appear to 
 this House to have been increased to a degree which could not be 
 foreseen or provided against, by a state of wind and weather alto- 
 gether unusual at the season of the year, and most unfavourable 
 to the projected operations. 
 
 2. That it does not appear to this House that the failure of thi* 
 expedition is imputable to the conduct of the army or the navy, 
 in the execution of their instructions relative to the military and 
 naval operations in the Scheldt. 
 
 3. That this House sees, with the deepest regret, the loss of the 
 valuable lives occasioned by the sickness of the army in the late 
 expedition to the Scheldt ; yet taking into consideration the great 
 and acknowledged importance of the possession of the Island of 
 Walcheren, commanding the entrance of the principal naval sta- 
 tion of tie enemy, arrd considering all the circumstancci con*
 
 ( 53 ) 
 
 It is nevertheless important to observe, that the 
 effect which the consideration of this enterprise 
 ought to have upon the general argument of Lord 
 Grey, is confined to the proof which its adversaries 
 may suppose it to afford, of an erroneous judgement 
 on the part of the ministers in undertaking it. No 
 failure could' have less influence upon the general 
 political system, or conduct of the war. The question 
 which arises upon it is an insulated question. In 
 parliament, it has been discussed and decided, under 
 unusual circumstances of freedom, in favour of go- 
 vernment ; it may be granted on the other hand, 
 that the " active and loud complaints" among the 
 people, which Lord Grey describes have been excited 
 principally by this failure. But it has effected in a 
 very inconsiderable degree the state of the nation, 
 will very soon be numbered among the ordinary re- 
 verses of the war, and at any rate will never be 
 made a ground for recalling the uniformly unfortu- 
 nate ministers of 1S06. 
 
 To the other operations of the successors of Lord 
 Grey, a very different character belongs : the expe- 
 dition against Denmark, and the war of Spain and 
 Portugal, are to be considered with reference to 
 their political effects, as well as to their military 
 merits. The fonrier being classed by Lord Grey 
 with our measures in regard to Neutral Powers will 
 in its political bearings be treated hereafter ; but it 
 is impossible to deny that as an operation of war, it 
 
 nected with its retention, as they appear in the papers, and in the 
 rvidenoe before the House, this House is of opinion, that no 
 blame should be imputed to His Majesty's ministers for not ha- 
 ving, at an earlier period, advised its evacuation. 
 
 [Commons' Votes, 30Ui March 181O] The details of this ex- 
 pedition, kid before Parliament, are too voluminous for citation. 
 The published account will he found in the Gazettes of "th, 12111, 
 igth, 20th ami 22d of August, 2d of September, igth and 30th 
 December, 130$,
 
 ( 59 ) 
 
 was marked with strong features of ability, both in 
 the plan and in the execution. The object was, 
 simply, to place the Danish fleet, and the naval stores 
 accumulated in her arsenals oat of the power of 
 France. For this purpose a force of about 2O,OOO 
 men, 22 sail of the line, and smaller vessels of every 
 description, most rapidly and amply provided arrived 
 offElsineur on the 12th of August. On the 7th of 
 September the capitulation was ratified, by which all// 
 the objects of the expedition were accomplished *J7 
 the nature of this service, and the very sufficient* 
 means adopted for its success, occasioned a less bril- 
 liant display of warlike talent and bravery than those 
 upon which British troops have been subsequently 
 employed, few occasions have occurred in which the 
 true character of the system which Lord Grey is 
 pleased to call contemptuously " a system of vigour" 
 has been more eminently distinguished. At the pe- 
 riod of this undertaking our disposeable force hap- 
 pened to be unusually large, and nothing appeared 
 in the circumstances of Europe which warranted an 
 expectation of any other demand for it. The object 
 of the expedition to Copenhagen might possibly have 
 been attained by a less powerful armament, and if 
 other calls for our fleets and armies had existed, it 
 might perhaps have been politic to have attempted 
 the operation with a smaller force. But it certainly 
 never occurred to Lord Castlereagh, when he was 
 arranging the force destined for this important ser- 
 vice that by depriving Lord Cathcart of a brigade or 
 two of infantry, and some of his heavy artillery j or 
 by making Admiral Gambier take two trips instead 
 of one, he might possibly husband a part of our re- 
 sources against his next attempt, 
 
 * For the details, see the Gazettes of 5th and jGth.of Septeca* 
 r, and 31st of October, 1507. 
 
 I 3
 
 ( 60 ) 
 
 I introduce these observations, as illustrating what 
 1 have formerly said upon the " husbanding policy." 
 No measure of the Government, however, requires 
 less of posthumous vindication, than the expedition 
 to>Copenhagen. In spite of the powerful opposition 
 raised against it, and of the appeal attempted to the 
 nobler feelings of a brave and just people, the act was 
 generally popular. A more than usual majority in 
 parliament, and a majority in the country .at least 
 corresponding to the representation, gave it their 
 unequivocal approbation, as a wise measure, skilfully 
 conducted, and successful ! In what operation of the 
 ministers of 1806 can these characters be recognized? 
 
 After this operation against Denmark, no field 
 for exertion immediately presented itself ; it did not 
 appear probable that any occasion would soon exist 
 for the employment of a considerable British force. 
 It was not less the duty of ministers, who had 
 witnessed the varying events of sixteen years, to 
 be provided with the means of taking advantage of 
 any unexpected opening, to which our arms might 
 politickly be directed ; considering always as such, 
 not only any operation by which our domestic safety 
 may be immediately preserved, but any service by 
 which the views of our enemy may be frustrated, 
 in any quarter of the globe, Those views consist- 
 ing, according to Lord Grey *, in nothing short of 
 
 "universal dominion:" in his hopes of which, 
 
 and in his " progress towards a more extended des- 
 " potism, he is checked and retarded BY THE POWER 
 
 " RESISTANCE AXD RESOURCES OF THIS COUNTRY 
 
 " ALONE," any operation which occasions to him 
 even a temporary disappointment, which postpones 
 his success in any object (thereby of course ren- 
 dering its attainment more precarious) is a legitimate 
 
 Speech, p, 1 1 ,
 
 ( 61 ) 
 
 and politic measure of the war in which we are re- 
 tained by the " injustice and ambition of our 
 " enemy *." Under these impressions, it has been 
 the uniform policy of the last three years, to keep as 
 large a force as possible disposeable for foreign ser- 
 vice, and to be provided with the means of rapid 
 transport. This policy has perhaps been attended 
 with some expence, and may possibly constitute one 
 of the criminal deviations from the " Plan of Fi- 
 " nance." I say perhaps, because it is not at all 
 clear that the exertions made since 18O7 would not 
 have been more expensive under a different system. 
 
 The only call, however, for a military force which 
 occurred, was the apparent expediency of strength- 
 ening our force in North America, with a view to 
 the possibility of a rupture with the United States. 
 As it has happily turned out, these reinforcements 
 have been withdrawn for the purpose of assisting in 
 the operations of Sir George Beckwith in the West 
 Indies, operations of which the success has been 
 unvaried, and by which our enemies have been de- 
 prived of their last colony -f~, and of every naval 
 
 * His Majesty's Declaration, 2 1 Oct. J 8O6. 
 
 f The only colonial success which occurred under the late ad- 
 ministration was the capture of the Island of CURA$OA, by a naval 
 force under Capt. Brisbane, on the 1st of Jan. 18O7. [Gazette, 
 22d Feb. ISO/.] The subsequent captures have been as follow : 
 The Danish Islands of St. Thomas, St. John's, and St. Croijc, by 
 a naval and military force under general Rwyerand Siry//i j rn</er 
 Cvchrane, on the 2 1st and 25th of December, ISO/, [Gazette, 
 gth Feb. 1808] ; Marie Galante, French island, by captain Pigut 
 of the navy, 2d March ; Deieada, by Captain Selby, on the 3()th 
 March 18O8; [Gazettes, 3d -and 14th May]. The French having 
 landed in Marie Galante from Guudaloupe, surrendered to lieute- 
 nant-colonel BlackwelL on the 3d of September 1 8O8. [Gazette, 
 19 Nov.] Cayenne surrendered on the 12th of January 18OQ, to 
 the British and Portuguese naval force under captain Yeo. [Ga- 
 zette, 15th April.] MARTINIQUE was taken by general Beckicitk 
 and Sir A. Cockrane, on the 24th of February 1809. [Gazettes, 
 of March and 13th of April.] The French troops in <SA,
 
 ( 62 ) 
 
 station * in that quarter of the globe. The public 
 interest his been so much excited by the events in 
 Europe, that very little attention has been directed 
 to the captures of Martinique or Guadaloupe. 
 These successes have been accomplished by the force 
 ordinarily stationed in the West Indies, assisted only 
 by a few battalions from North America, the 
 strongest of which have returned to Europe and are 
 now defending Portugal. Are these and similar 
 operations to be classed among " the fatal expedi- 
 
 Domingo capitulated on the 6th of July 1800, to Sir Hugh Car- 
 wichatl, captain Cumly of the navy, arid the Spanish general JRa- 
 nierei. [Gazette, 5th September.] GUADALOUPE surrendered 
 on the 5th of February 1809, to Sir Georgs Beckwilk and Sir A. 
 Cochrane. [Gazette, 15th March.] The Dutch islands of St. 
 Martin's and St. Eustathius, surrendered on the 15th and 21st of 
 February 1810, to brigadier-general Harcourt. [Supp. Gazette, 
 31st March] 
 
 It may be noticed here, that the French colony of SENEGA*. 
 surrendered on the 13th of July 1809, to a naval and land force 
 from Goree, under captain Columline and major Maxwell. [Ga- 
 zette, 26th August.] Of the capture of the Dutch Island of AM- 
 BOYNA, by captain Tucker of the navy, on the 17th of March 18O9, 
 and the rest of the Moluccas within a few days after : the intelli- 
 gence had not arrived at the period of Lord Grey's speech. [Ga- 
 lette, '25th September.] 
 
 1 he isle of BOURBON, or BONAPARTE, is the latest colonial ac- 
 quisition ; having surrendered on the 2lst of July 1810, to a 
 combined force under commodore Rowley and lieutenant-colonel 
 Keatmge. [Gazettes, 13th February and 26th October 1810.] 
 
 * It is particularly to be noticed, that it is not for their value as 
 
 Sugar Islands, that importance has been attributed by the present 
 
 ministers to Martinique and Guadaloupe, but as the naval stations 
 
 of our enemy. " We are commanded by His Majesty to express 
 
 ' the satisfaction he derived from the reduction of the Island of 
 
 ' Guadaloupe by His Majesty's arms, an event which, for the 
 
 ' jirst time in the History of the Wars of Great Britain, has 
 
 ' wrested from France all her possessions in that quarter of the 
 
 ' world j and which, together with the subsequent capture of the 
 
 ' only colonies in the West Indies which remained in the pos^ 
 
 ' session of the Dutch, has deprived His Majesty's enemies of 
 
 ' every port in those seas from which the interests of His Ma- 
 
 ' jesty or the commerce of his subjects can be molested." [Lords 
 
 Commissioners' Speech to Parliament, 21 June^ 1810/}
 
 ( 63 ) 
 
 " tions" censured by Lord Grey ? or are they not 
 rather to be added to the instances, in which the 
 " system of vigour" is advantageously contrasted, 
 with the " husbanding policy once so reviled ?" 
 
 It is somewhat remarkable, that Siveden is not 
 once mentioned by Lord Grey ; yet the conduct 
 pursued in respect to that unfortunate country enters 
 necessarily into the consideration of both systems. 
 It might indeed perhaps be more correctly described 
 as affording a fresh proof of the inaccuracy with 
 which each has been delineated by Lord Grey. 
 
 To make common cause with Sweden, to ur^e her 
 to the utmost exertions in support of the objects of 
 the alliance, and to promise her the reciprocal sup- 
 port of this country, was the policy of Lord Grey 
 himself * , not less than of Mr. Canning. 
 
 It has been shewn that the administration of 1 80(5 
 had been fully disposed to render effectual assist- 
 ance to Sweden, as well in men as in money ; that 
 this intention had been communicated to Sweden, 
 at the same time that she was urged by the British 
 government to be steady and active in the common 
 cause. 
 
 It has been admitted, that the whole of the diplo- 
 matic intercourse to which I have referred, was 
 marked with a degree of caution, to which Lord 
 Grey would probably refer, as an instance of " pru- 
 " dent government." But it is undeniable on the 
 other hand, that the backwardness of our government 
 in bringing its troops into the field, excited in no 
 
 See pp. 43-7.
 
 respect a stronger sensation of disgust than in respect 
 to the continental dominions of Sweden. That a 
 British force should be directed to an object not 
 immediately connected with the peculiar views of 
 this country, had been, as we have already seen the 
 unceasing demand of R\issra ; that this demand was 
 not complied with,, was. the ground of her reiterated 
 complaints. One of the first diplomatic papers which 
 reached the hands of Mr. Canning, was a formal 
 proposition from the Russian government, for a co- 
 operation of British troops on the side of Stralsund, 
 and the Oder. Of this proposition Lord Hutchinson 
 was the channel ; to whom " it appeared highly ad- 
 " vantageous, and only attended with the ordinary 
 " risqucs of war ; as, in every event, the retreat of 
 " the troops employed upon that service would not 
 "" be a hazardous one *." 
 
 The immediate consequence of this communica- 
 tion, and the first military operation of the new mi- 
 nisters, was the expedition of Lord Cathcart to the 
 Baltic. It is not for a moment apprehended that 
 Lord Grey intends to class among the reprehensible 
 expeditions this offspring of his own diplomacy. 
 Lord Hutchinson's letter is not only an ample justi- 
 fication of the measure, but is decisive of its expe- 
 diency. His observations, indeed, lead to a ' re- 
 mark, applicable not more to the present than to 
 many other topics of our discussion. It might al- 
 indst be laid down as a general rule, that where the 
 total amount of force appertaining to a state is deci- 
 dedly inferior to that possessed by the enemy, the 
 inferior force may, justifiably and wisely, be employed 
 upon any service which carries with it tffrc' probability 
 of any important advantage, provided that the safety 
 of the inferior force be not greatly committed. 
 
 * Lord Hutchinson to Lord Howick, Memel, qth March, 1807. 
 Received 13th April by Mr. Cunning. .Russian papers, No. 24.
 
 Unless therefore it can be shewn that a preferable 
 operation presented itself in another quarter, the 
 good policy of an expedition, such as that now in 
 question, is evinced by its safe return. In point of 
 fact, although the troops under Lord Cathcart pro- 
 duced no influence upon the continental war, they 
 were more readily directed against Copenhagen than 
 if they had formed part of the armament sent from 
 England. Whether, if a large force had been sent 
 at an earlier period, any beneficial effect would have 
 been produced, either upon the war, or upon the 
 disposition of the emperor of Russia *, is a question 
 which can never be solved. 
 
 The expedition which in 1 808 was sent to Sweden 
 under Sir John Moore, had not, like the other, been 
 recommended by a powerful ally, nor was it calcu- 
 lated to influence materially the affairs of the conti- 
 nent. No documents have been made public which 
 furnish any details of this expedition ; but, we have 
 the explicit declaration of Lord Castlereagh, " that it 
 te was undertaken on the requisition, nay, at the 
 4f entreaty, of the SWEDISH minister resident in this 
 " country, who had declared that such a force might 
 sc make the whole difference of the salvation of Swe- 
 
 * The backwardness of our Government in supporting the 
 Continental Avar, was certainly among the assigned causes of the 
 hostility of Russia, in the Emperor's declaration of the 3 1st of 
 October 1807 ; but there is every reason to believe that, previ- 
 ously to this declaration, the emperor Alexander had so completely 
 given himself up to the views of Bonaparte, as to render a rupture 
 with England inevitable; in a declaration of war under such cir- 
 cumstances every cause of dissatisfaction, real or imaginary, would 
 of course be stated, but it would be idle to trace to this manifesto 
 the true causes of Russia's hostility. That she was disappointed 
 and displeased, is beyond a doubt ; the degree in which the dis^ 
 pleasure affected her measures, is and must be a mystery. 
 
 K
 
 ( 66 J 
 
 " den.*" Such a requisition is not conclusive as to 
 the good policy af an enterprize ; but this attempt, 
 like the preceding, is fully justified by the little ex- 
 pense and risk with which it was attended. The 
 instructions under which Sir John Moore acted are 
 not known ; it is however, generally supposed that 
 he wasf invited by the king of Sweden to undertake 
 operations quite inconsistent with them, and with 
 the principles upon which the British auxijiary force 
 was required and furnished. Sir John Moore's con- 
 duct in refusing to regulate his movements by the 
 unexpected demands of the Swedish Monarch, met 
 with the approbation of our government, being, in 
 fact, " conformable to his instructions J." 
 
 It can scarcely be doubted but that Lord Grey 
 and his colleagues could have acted, in respect to the 
 expedition to Pomerania in 1807, as their successors 
 did upon the receipt of Lord Hutchinson's dispatch . 
 
 * Lord Castlereagh's speech in the House of Commons, loth 
 January ISOp. Cobbett's debates, XII. p. 55. 
 
 f See Mr. Moore's account of the campaign in Spain, &c. p. 2. 
 } Ib. p. 3. 
 
 It may be noticed here, that our late connection with Sweden 
 originated in the Years J904 and 1805, with several conventions 
 concluded under the auspices of Mr. Pitt, at the period of the 
 third coalition. [Treaties presented to Parliament 28th January 
 1806; Cobbett's Debates, VI. App. No. 3, 4, 5.] On the open- 
 ing of the session, on the Ipth of December 1806, Lord Howick, 
 being Secretary for foreign affairs, Parliament was informed that 
 " the conduct of the' king of SWEDEN had been distinguished by the 
 "most honourable firmness" [Cobbett, VIII. p. 16'.] On the 
 28th of July 1807, [Cobbett, IX. p. 972.] (after the change of 
 ministry) a message was delivered to both Houses, announcing 
 the progress of subsidiary arrangements with the king of Sweden, 
 and no objection was made in either House. On the opening 
 of the next session, 21 Jan. 1808, allusion was again made to the 
 " firmness and fidelity of tH king of Sweden." [Cobbett, X. 4.] 
 On die 8th of February, th- treaty was signed ; [p. 1054] to the 
 address in approbation, no opposition was made by the Lords ;
 
 ( 67 ) 
 
 But I admit it to be most probable that they would 
 not have attended to M. Rehausen's requisitions 
 in 1808, and as the compliance with it produced as 
 good effect, they would probably argue, from that 
 circumstance, that they would have acted wisely in 
 their refusal. But to this inference I object, upon 
 the general principle which I have already stated, and 
 upon which in fact turns the whole difference between 
 the system which Lord Grey considers as the only 
 prudent system, and that which he sneeringly terms 
 the system of vigour. The former leads to an excess 
 of caution ; it would scarcely permit any enterprize 
 to be undertaken, of which the success was exposed 
 to doubt, or in other words, it would scarcely allow 
 of any enterprize whatever. It would admit of no 
 expense, for which a corresponding value would not 
 certainly be received, and in thus excluding specula- 
 tion and risk, it in fact excludes every military opera- 
 tion which such a country as Great Britain can by 
 possibility undertake. 
 
 Under the other system a scale of values is set 
 
 [p. 1076] ; nor was there, in the House of Commons, any objec- 
 tion to the assistance intended to be given to Sweden, for defers 
 live purposes ; [p. 1160.] In closing the session, 4 July 1808, 
 [XL 1 140] his Swedish majesty's firmness was, naturally, again 
 acknowledged ; and again on the IQth of January 18QQ, with pe- 
 culiar reference to his " concurrence in the propriety of rejecting 
 " any proposal for negociation, to which the government of Spain 
 " was not to be admitted as a party." [XII. 3.] 
 
 After the fatal termination of the Austrian war, and previously 
 to the riext session, Sweden had made peace with France, without 
 opposition or complaint on our part, " His Majesty having uni- 
 *' farmly notified his decided wish, that, in determining the ques- 
 " tion of peace or war with France and other continental powers," 
 (she had also made peace with Russia and Denmark) " she 
 <f should be guided by considerations resulting from her own si- 
 " tuation and interests." [Lords' Commissioners' Speech, 2Ud 
 Jan. 1810.] That she has since declared war against England* 
 will not, I presume, be imputed to our ministers. 
 
 K 2
 
 ( 63 ) 
 
 upon probabilities ; it is not required that the advan- 
 tages to be obtained shall be certain : the same value 
 may sometimes be given ; or, in other words, the 
 same expense and risk may be incurred, for the 
 smaller chance of a great object, as for the greater 
 probability of one less considerable. 
 
 In the instance before us, the adherents of the 
 former system would probably have retained their 
 forces in England, until it should have been made 
 out, almost to certainty, that by sending it to Got- 
 tenburgh they would save Sweden. They would at 
 any rate have required from M. Rehausen a detailed 
 plan of the campaign, and would in short, have made 
 all the arrangements and enquiries upon our coasts, 
 which were actually made upon those of our ally. 
 Now, as the event happened, this would have been 
 just as well ; but, if on the other hand, Sir John 
 Moore had found that by landing his troops he could 
 have accomplished in any degree the object of his 
 expedition, the delay occasioned by the more cautious 
 proceeding dictated by the prudent policy, might 
 have been essentially injurious to the interests of the 
 alliance. It is frequently by promptness alone, that 
 England must succeed in her enterprizes ; and in this 
 instance she had an additional inducement to activity, 
 in the wish of retaining, and attaching more closely, 
 an ally whose means were disproportioned to his zeal. 
 The pecuniary expence therefore, (and there was 
 none o.ther) attending this short expedition would 
 wisely have been incurred, even though it had altered 
 in some degree the computation of the plan of fi- 
 nance. As applied to this particular occurrence, 
 these observations are not very important, but the 
 instance is adopted as affording the means of illus- 
 trating and comparing the systems of the two ac[- 
 ministrations,
 
 Bat of the military operations of the present go- 
 vernment, to all of which Lord Grey applies an in- 
 discriminate character of calamity and disgrace, by 
 far the most important remains to be considered. 
 
 The war in Spain and Portugal, of which we are 
 In the third campaign, will form an interesting feature 
 in the history of the age. The causes and nature of 
 the contest, the political part which Great Britain 
 has acted in it, and the military exertions which it 
 has produced, of a kind to which she has long been 
 unused, will render the Peninsular war memorable 
 to the latest posterity. 
 
 It forms also, the most striking peculiarity in the 
 conduct of the successors of Lord Grey ; it is not, 
 like the expedition to the Scheldt, an insulated and 
 transitory measure, but it is an essential occurrence 
 jn the histories of the world, of France, and of Bo- 
 ETAPABTE. Upon the transactions in Spain and Por- 
 tugal depends, not only the present character of 
 Great Britain, but the rank which she is hereafter to 
 hold in the scale of nations. 
 
 Simply to repel the charges arising out of the Spa- 
 nish campaigns, which Lord Grey has preferred 
 against His Majesty's ministers, would by no means 
 answer the purpose of ascertaining the state of the 
 nation in respect to this momentous war. The very- 
 vague and general manner in which Lord Grey 
 speaks of the misfortunes and calamities and dis- 
 graces which have befallen us in Spain, renders a 
 succinct account of the rise, progress, objects and 
 success of the Peninsular war, essentially necessary 
 to a true understanding of the question. 
 
 The circumstance most remarkable, in Lord 
 Grey's treatment of this interesting topic, is the 
 entire omission of one of the kingdoms, in defence gf
 
 ( 70 ) 
 
 nhich we have been contending against our ambi- 
 tious and disappointed enemy. Lord Grey takes no 
 more notice of Portugal than if she had been in fact, 
 as well as in his own predictions, absorbed in Spain, 
 and both subdued by France 1 This omission ap- 
 pears the more extraordinary, when we recollect the 
 measures adopted or purposed by Lord Grey himself 
 in relation to this very kingdom of Portugal ; mea- 
 sures which in fact formed the natural introduction 
 to those which have been since pursued, by the 
 statesmen whose policy jie describes as essentially 
 different from his own. But let us recall the facts. 
 When the coalition ministry was formed, Spain was 
 at war with England, and had been connected with 
 France, not only by the most intimate treaties of 
 alliance, but by a policy entirely subservient to her 
 wishes ; Portugal was nominally neutral, but had 
 been permitted to purchase her neutrality by consi- 
 derable pecuniary sacrifices to France, to whom 
 therefore, to a certain point, she was to be considered 
 as an auxiliary. 
 
 It had long been suspected, that Bonaparte would 
 not content himself with the sort of dependance to 
 which, by his intrigues and by the fear of his resent- 
 ment, Spain had been reduced; and still stronger 
 apprehensions were justly entertained, that the weak 
 kingdom of Portugal, or at least its European domi- 
 nions, would fall a sacrifice to his insatiable ambition. 
 
 In the course of his abortive discussions with the 
 French government in 18O6, Lord Yarmouth was 
 acquainted, without reserve, with Bonaparte's inten- 
 tion of instantly invading Portugal with thirty thou- 
 sand men*. Upon this information the dctermina- 
 
 * Lord Yarmouth's dispatch to Mr. Fox, Paris, 3.0 July 1805, 
 Received l August. Papers of the Negotiation, No. 28.
 
 ( 71 ) 
 
 tion of our government was taken, with a very laud- 
 able promptitude, to save Portugal if possible ; but 
 at all events to prevent her fleet, or her American, 
 possessions, from falling into the hands or under the 
 controul of France. The measures consequently 
 adopted are of extreme importance to every part of 
 our discussion, although they have never (out of 
 Parliament) been fully discussed or explained. 
 
 Three days after the receipt of Lord Yarmouth's 
 intelligence, Lord Grey himself (then Lord Howick 
 and first lord of the admiralty) dispatched Earl St. 
 Vincent *, with a squadron, to the mouth of the 
 Tagus, with orders to co-operate with the special 
 minister and with the land force destined for the 
 service, in carrying into effect the vigorous determi- 
 nation of the cabinet. ' 
 
 The first and most desirable object pointed out in 
 the, instructions-^ issued upon this occasion, was the 
 arrangement of " sufficient and effectual measures, 
 " by concert between the two courts, for the com- 
 (( plete defence of Portugal" Should this be found 
 impracticable, the court of Lisbon was to be encou- 
 raged to withdraw, with all the ships and every thing 
 else possible, to its American territories ^. 
 
 By the ministers who prepared these instructions, 
 the defence of Portugal, by her own exertions, and 
 
 * Order of the Lords of the Admiralty to the Earl of St. Vin- 
 cent, 4 Aug. 1806. Naval papers relative to Portugal, 22 Feb. 
 1808, No. 1. 
 
 f Mr. Fox to the Earls of Rosslyn and St. Vincent, and Lieut. 
 General Simcoe, 9 Aug. 1806. Papers presented in pursuance of 
 Address of 15 Feb. 1808, No. 1 
 
 J The third head of Instruction is immaterial to the present 
 discussion ; but we shall presently have occasion to resort to it 
 with a peculiar interest,
 
 the assistance in money, troops and ships, which 
 His Majesty undertook to furnish, was thought to be a 
 practicable and expedient operation. On no occasion 
 do the official records of 1 806, furnish any indication 
 of intentions so " vigorous," of a determination to 
 resist France, so positive and unqualified, as upon 
 this of the defence of Portugal * 1 
 
 True it is, that the magnificent offers of Mr. Fox 
 and Mr. Windham were conditional upon the acti- 
 vity and exertion of Portugal herself ; but they are 
 not the less decisive, in proof of the great importance 
 attributed by the cabinet of 1 806, to the resistance 
 of the views of France upon Portugal, and of their 
 opinion of the good policy of directing to that object 
 the forces and the treasures of Great Britain. 
 
 In point of history, it is to be observed that the 
 danger with which Portugal was threatened appearing 
 to be less imminent than had been apprehended, and 
 
 * " His Majesty has thought fit to give directions that the land 
 " force appropriated to this service should receive successive aug- 
 " mentations as fast as the means of transport can be provided." 
 " If Portugal should be willing seriously to engage in vigorous 
 *' and effective measures of defence, the King will approve your 
 " expressing His Majesty's disposition to support them to thejull 
 *' extent of such means 'as His Majesty may le able to apply to 
 " this object." Mr. Fox's letter of pth of August. " Under 
 " such a system" (of vigorous and effective measures on the part 
 of Portugal) ' and with the aid in money, troops, and ships, which 
 " His Majesty would le entirely disposed to contribute to it, if 
 " really adopted and steadily pursued, there can be little doubt 
 " that the attack of a much larger force than that now said to be 
 " assembled at Bayonne might le successfully resisted." " There 
 " is no difficulty in its being explicitly said, that, provided His 
 " Majesty were satisfied that Portugal was taking vigorous and 
 " effective measures for her own defence, THERE is NO EXERTION 
 " IN THE POWER OF THIS couNTKY that His Majesty would not 
 " be ready to make for that purpose, in pecuniary assistance as 
 " u't-ll as in military and naval succours." Mr. Windhnm to 
 Lord Rosslyn and General Simcoe, 12 August, 18O. Same pa- 
 pers, No. 2.
 
 ( 73 ) 
 
 the intelligent officer employed in the mission giving 
 his opinion of the impossibility of defending Por- 
 tugal *, the troops destined for the Tagus were coun- 
 termanded in the beginning of September ; and that 
 it is not known that, during the existence of Lord 
 Grenville's administration, any further measure of 
 importance was adopted with respect to Portugal. 
 
 Keeping therefore in view the sentiments of Lord 
 Grey and the cabinet of 180(), evinced by the pro- 
 ceedings which have just been detailed, let us now 
 retrace the measures of their successors. 
 
 It is probable that the abandonment of the design 
 of invading Portugal by France was occasioned by 
 the events passing, in the North of Europe, and 
 which were not brought to a crisis till the month of 
 July 1807 ; when, by the treaties of Tilsit, Prussia 
 \vas stripped of her territory, and Russia was closely 
 united to France. From that period the danger of 
 Portugal became imminent ; that she would be com- 
 pelled, not only to exclude British ships from her 
 ports, and to co-operate in the measures of Bonaparte 
 in hostility to our commerce, but to place at the dis- 
 posal of France her considerable fleet were objects 
 of rational expectation. The invasion of Portugal 
 
 * On the 2d of September Lord Rosslyn stated to Mr. Fox hia 
 " despair of the possibility of defending Portugal against a French 
 " invasion, by any means to be found there, or that Great Britain 
 " could even with great sacrifices supply." [Papers, No. 5.] Mr. 
 Windham's answer of the 13th of September (No. 6.) referred 
 entirely to the cause stated in the text ; and acquainted Lord 
 Rosslyn that the troops had, for that cause, already been detained. 
 It is however, quite immaterial, whether the abandonment of the 
 enterprize was or was not dictated by an opinion of the impracti- 
 cability of defending Portugal. The importance of the object, and 
 the determination to make the greatest possible efforts for preser- 
 ving it with a chance of success, are fully establiihed by the mea- 
 sures adopted.
 
 ( 74 ) 
 
 by a French force under general Junot, and the first 
 measi/res of the Prince Regent*, appeared unhappily 
 to justify this apprehension. 
 
 The policy of Great Britain in this crisis is scarcely 
 to be distinguished from that which she had adopted 
 in the preceding year. If, previously to the peace of 
 Tilsit, and the consequent liberation of the French 
 force, the defence of Portugal against France ap- 
 peared an impracticable measure, much less feasible 
 did the attempt appear when France had it in her 
 power to direct against that weak state the whole 
 strength which she possessed, or which she could 
 derive from Spain. Not to hazard, under such cir- 
 cumstances, a British force on the continent of Por- 
 tugal, was a part of the safe policy of Mr. Fox and 
 Mr. Windham, which Mr. Canning and Lord Cas- 
 tlereagh thought it adviseable to imitate. But they 
 were equally anxious to effect the emigration of 
 the Royal Family, and prepared, at all events, t 
 save the Portuguese navy f. Happily, both these ob- 
 
 * The Prince had, on the 20th of October 1 807, [Cobbett's 
 Register, XII. 7pl.] proclaimed his intention of " acceding to 
 -" the cause of the Continent j" and had shut his ports against Eng- 
 lan.!. By another proclamation, on the 8th of November, British 
 property was sequestered, and British subjects detained. 
 
 f Before it was certain that the Prince would take the desired 
 xesclution of withdrawing to America, measures had been taken 
 for compelling the surrender of the Portugeuse fleet, as well as 
 of the Hussion squadron which had put into Lisbon, by the co- 
 operation of our squadron with a force of about 7,000 men from 
 iiiciiy under Sir John Moore, who was to be joined at Lisbon bjr 
 a siniii.ir torce under major-general Spencer. See the instructions 
 to Sir JaiM Moore and Sir Charles Cotton, dated 4th and gth De- 
 cember iso/. [Papers respecting Russian fleet, &c. Feb. 180g, 
 I. Xu. 1.] After the departure of the Portuguese fleet, measures 
 vj-re taken for obta-ning the surrender of the Russian ships 
 thjouga distress, which continued in progress when the com* 
 v of Sir A. Welltiley s campaign gave a. -new tura t 
 QSame papers.]
 
 ( 75 ) 
 
 jects were accomplished, in opposition to the schemes 
 and measures of Bonaparte * , and in the manner, not 
 only most " congenial to His Majesty's feelings -J-," 
 but most consistent with the permanent interests f 
 of the country. 
 
 So far certainly there is nothing in the proceedings 
 of his successors to which Lord Grey can with plau- 
 sibility give the character of rashness, to which he 
 can possibly refer, in speaking of misfortune and dis- 
 grace, or in which he traces the fatal departure from. 
 " all those principles of prudent government which 
 t( regulated his own conduct !" 
 
 * It had been said in the Moniteur of the 18th of November, 
 " the Prince Regent loses his throne." For a summary of the 
 transactions in Portugal, at this period, see Captain Eliot's Trea- 
 tise on the Defence of Portugal, &c. ch. XI. 
 
 f Lords Commissioners' Speech to Parliament, 21 Jan. 1808. 
 [Cobbett's Debates, vol. X. p. 3.] The emigration took place on 
 the 29th of November 1 S07 ; [Gazette Extraordinary of the 22d 
 of December] ; and Junot entered Lisbon on the 1 st of December. 
 On the 26th of December, the Island of Madeira was placed under 
 his Majesty's protection, by concert with the Court of Portugal. 
 [Gazette Extraordinary, 21 Jan, 1808.] 
 
 J I cannot find, in the Parliamentary Debates, any thing said 
 by Lord Grey on this subject : Lord Grenville (21 Jan. 1803,) 
 made some forcible remarks on the delusions which had prevailed, 
 as to the extent of the commercial advantages resulting from the 
 emigration. These remarks may be just or not, without at all 
 affecting the policy (of Lord Grenville equally with his successor;.) 
 of encouraging the departure of the Royal Family and Jlect of 
 Portugal, upon terms of intimate friendship with us, rather than 
 permitting both to remain under the controul of France, and ha- 
 ving recourse, ourselves, to force, for the preservation of the Bra- 
 zils from the same controul. [See Cobbett's Debates, X. 22, 3.] 
 Lord Grenville had reason when he said that France, in gaining 
 " LISBON and OPORTO, two of the most important ports, FOR us, 
 " on the whole const of the continent of Europe," (let this opinion 
 be had in remembrance !) got more than we did by the change. 
 But, is not the emigration a necessary link in the chain of mea- 
 sures under which we have, for more than two years, deprived 
 France of her advantages, and retained our own ? 
 
 L 2
 
 ( 78 ) 
 
 It was during the period immediately succeeding 
 the events which I have now related, that the troops 
 of Sir John Moore were sent to Sweden. A force 
 was about the same time assembled, under Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley, of which the precise destination has 
 neither been made public, nor is necessary to be 
 known : the great and unexpected revolution in the 
 affairs of the Spanish Peninsula, which soon suc- 
 ceeded, not only induced the abandonment of the 
 enterprize then projected, but gave an entirely new 
 face to the politics of Great Britain and France. 
 Among the effects of this momentous change have 
 been, a total alteration in the position which Great 
 Britain occupied as a military power ; and so mate- 
 rial a variation of our relation towards Spain, and 
 towards France as referred to Spain, as to destroy 
 the identity of circumstances, under which alone can 
 be compared the two systems which it is Lord Grey's 
 object to contrast. But if, as to Spain, this destruc- 
 tion of identity is complete, it is far otherwise as to 
 Portugal ; or, at least, the variation which has oc- 
 curred, has been such as more firmly to establish the 
 wisdom, and to render more exact the application to 
 circumstances, of just those parts of the policy of 
 Lord Grey, which his successors have imitated, and 
 improved. 
 
 To every part of the discussion which arises out of 
 the Peninsular campaigns, this distinction is of ex- 
 treme importance ; we have seen, nevertheless, that 
 it has been entirely neglected in the speech of Lord 
 Grey ; the effect, and perhaps the probable cause of 
 this neglect, will appear in the progress of our Nar-; 
 rative. 
 
 It were indeed much to be wished, that Lord Grey 
 had been less general in his censures upon the con-, 
 duct of this war. He speaks roundly of " all those 
 (f national calamities and disgraces J' which have be-
 
 i 11 ) 
 
 fallen us, and imputes them to the criminal improvi- 
 dence of the government ; but, leaving us quite in 
 the dark as to his own opinion of the nature or ex- 
 tent of the failures of which he complains, he makes 
 it very difficult to appreciate their causes, or to esti- 
 mate the validity of his objections. This deficiency 
 can only be supplied by a relation of events, in the 
 course of which I shall endeavour to meet, not only 
 the present charges of Lord Grey and those which 
 he preferred in a former session *, against the early 
 conduct of the war, but other censures to which cer- 
 tain of his philosophical adherents have, with no 
 unsparing hand, and no measured language, lavished 
 upon both ministers and generals. 
 
 The first symptoms of a determined and effectual 
 resistance on the part of the Spaniards were perceived 
 in England early in June 1808 ; England was at 
 this time in possession of a disposeable force, equal 
 to more considerable operations than had for a long 
 time been undertaken. 
 
 Putting out of the question, for the moment, th6 
 feelings of enthusiastic sympathy towards the Spa- 
 niards, which prevailed at this time in England, and 
 adverting only to the dictates of political and mili- 
 tary science, it may be observed, that if ever there 
 was a period in our protracted contest with France, 
 in which a vigorous exertion seemed expedient, in 
 which difficult and hazardous and expensive enter- 
 
 * I must, however, take the liberty of observing that the defi- 
 ciency occasioned by the geneial language of Lord Grey in the 
 speech before us, is not fully supplied by his speeches in the for- 
 mer session, as reported in the Collection of Debates. I cannot 
 satisfy myself, for instance, whether it be his lordship's opinion, 
 that, because we had not (as he conceives) a reasonable expecta- 
 tion of success in Spain, we ought not to have attempted to de- 
 fend Portugal under circumstances which should make that ope- 
 ration more feasible than Lord Rosslyn thought it in 1806.
 
 ( 78 ) 
 
 prizes were justifiable and politic, it was the period 
 in which, for the first time, Bonaparte met with an 
 opposing people. The complete success of this peo- 
 ple, in their own views, was unquestionably the re- 
 sult of the new state of affairs, to which the wishes 
 of the people of England were most anxiously di- 
 rected ; but if the enthusiasm and apparent energy of 
 the Spaniards had presented a less reasonable expect- 
 ation of ultimate success than was at that time en- 
 tertained, our military policy alone would have war- 
 ranted us in rendering assistance to operations which 
 promised to give continued employment, and to op- 
 pose important difficulties to a very large proportion 
 of the force of France. 
 
 Of the extensive Peninsula which was destined to 
 become the scene of these unexpected operations, 
 Spain formed a part so much the more considerable, 
 that even, again without recurring to the splendid 
 character of the Spanish insurrection, that was true, 
 at the time of which we are speaking, which has since 
 ceased to be true ; in a military view the interests 
 of Portugal were merged in the interests of Spain. 
 There could be no doubt, but that the rapid extinc- 
 tion of the French power in Spain, would produce the 
 salvation of Portugal ; while it must be admitted on 
 the other hand, that the complete establishment of 
 that power, would replace the defence of Portugal 
 upon the footing of difficulty on which it stood, when 
 that enterprize was abandoned in 1806. And such 
 being the state of the militarv question, I admit that 
 neither our relations with the Prince Regent, nor 
 our peculiar interest in the " two most important 
 " ports of Lisbon and Oporto" dictated at that mo- 
 ment, any other measures with respect to Portugal 
 than such as were most adviscable for the Peninsula 
 in general. We certainly could not more effectually 
 serve Portugal, than by expelling the French from 
 Spain,
 
 ( 79 ) 
 
 This conviction has led others to the conclusion, 
 that operations on the side of Portugal were alto- 
 gether unadviseable ; that we ought to have at once 
 poured our utmost possible force into Spain, the 
 nearer to the Pyrenees the better* ; or, that if we 
 could not do this we ought to have done nothing. 
 
 It must be confessed that Lord Grey has not 
 adopted these opinions ; he has on the other hand 
 distinctly given his opinion against a debarkation in 
 the Asturias or Biscay -f~ ; he has moreover as dis- 
 
 * I refer particularly to the Edinburgh Review, [Oct. 1808, vol. 
 XIII. p. 228.] for an hypothetical contrast, drawn in its most 
 lively and pungent manner, between the policy of BONAPARTE, 
 acting always with an undivided attention, and with his whole 
 force, upon one point, and of English politicians attempting, 
 here and there, various objects, not one of which, nor all to- 
 gether, can influence the main contest. I admit the general prin- 
 ciple here inculcated, as far as it applies to states, possessing equal 
 means, or even, upon occasions in which peculiar circumstances 
 render a great force on one side inapplicable, or give unusual ad~ 
 va'ntages to the smaller force on the other, to states, possessing 
 powers greatly disproportioned to each other. But in the case 
 nov; before us, I take the principle to be quite inapplicable, inas- 
 much as supposing, (which, by the bye, is a great deal to suppose 
 so soon after it had been declared [by Lord Moira, 11 Feb. 180S] 
 that 30,OOO men was the utmost force to be spared by Britain !) 
 that 70,000 men could and have been landed in Biscay, the result 
 would have been nothing but an opposition of the force of Eng- 
 land to that of France, on a field of action, studiously, as it were, 
 selected as one on which our enemy could be most easily re-in- 
 forced and supplied. To urge such a mode of fighting, for us, 
 because it is Bonaparte's, is entirely to overlook the relative state 
 of our population, and means of raising a military force. But for 
 the best answer to the learned gentleman, and for a rcductio ad 
 alsurdum, as triumphant as it is brief, I refer to the Quarterly 
 Review of February ISOp. [Vol. I. p. 15.] 
 
 f Speech, 21 April 1&O|. [Cobbett's Debates. XIV. p. 130.] 
 Whether the Edinburgh opinion was or .was not adopted by Lord 
 Grenville, the report of his speech does not enable me to deter- 
 mine. Having given [19 Jan. 18CK), Cobbett, XIV. 12.] in a 
 style of severe, but not unmerited; contempt of the contrary op!-
 
 ( 80 ) 
 
 tinctly allowed, that an attack upon the French army 
 in Portugal was unquestionably the most adviseable 
 commencement of a general plan of operations J. 
 But it is nevertheless to be gathered from the 
 speeches of Lord Grey, as well as from the writings 
 alluded to, that without a rational hope of the ulti- 
 mate and complete expulsion of the French, these 
 operations ought never to have commenced ; and 
 that inasmuch as neither the state of the government 
 of Spain, nor of her resources, justified a probable ex- 
 pectation of this magnificent result, the whole under- 
 taking, as far as British troops were concerned, was 
 improvident and unwise. Our failure it is presumed, 
 thus consisted in our inability to accomplish, in the 
 first campaign, the great objects of the war ; our ca- 
 lamities and disgraces are traced in the losses which 
 were sustained by the army employed in the attempt. 
 
 In examining as well the correctness of this view 
 of the campaign of 1 808-C), as the charges against 
 
 rion, what appear to _be most convincing reasons against the plan 
 of debarking as near as possible to the frontier of our powerful 
 enemy, be alludes [p. 14.] to the opportunity of " sending our 
 " troops to the port nearest the Pyrenees," as one which, " it 
 t{ might l-e said, did actually occur." Lord Moira was more de- 
 cided. In 1SOG or 180/ he could not spare 3O,000 men, for the 
 purpose of co-operating on the banks of the Oder or the Fistula, 
 with the numerous and highly disciplined armies of Russia and 
 Prussia, because it would be risquing the safety of THE army of 
 England, as he emphatically styled his thiriy thousand men ! yet, 
 in 1808, he thought it " gross mismanagement," and the " loss 
 " of a golden opportunity," not to find and send fifty thousa?id 
 men, to act, in conjunction with a force of native Spaniards, who 
 " would have lew organized and disciplined," as near to the 
 grand dep6t of our opponent, as we could possibly moor our 
 transports ! [See Lord Moira's speech, quoted in p. 46, note *.] 
 On the other side, if any thing on the other side is thought ne- 
 cessary, see the speeches of Lord Liverpool, and Lord Castle- 
 feagh, on the same day. [Cobbett, XJJ, p- 24 and 
 
 | Speech, April 2), p, 132.
 
 ( 81 ) 
 
 the government which Lord Grey has founded upon 
 it it is now necessary to revert to the facts. 
 
 The situation of affairs in June 1 808 was this ; 
 the French had a very considerable force in Portugal, 
 being in possession not only of Lisbon and Oporto, 
 but of the strong fortresses of that kingdom, parti- 
 cularly Elvas and Almeida; a squadron of the Em- 
 peror of Russia (whose intentions with respect to 
 the new state of things had not been declared) was 
 in the Tagus, and a French fleet was in the harbour 
 of Cadiz, which city however was ill-affected to the 
 French ; there was a considerable French force in 
 the province of Andalusia, to the southward of the 
 Sierra Morena ; this was already threatened by the 
 Spanish army. It was from the northern provinces, 
 and particularly from Galicia and the Asturias, that 
 the first communications and requisitions of assist- 
 ance were made to England, but in almost every part 
 of Spain, and particularly in Catalonia, the spirit of 
 resistance displayed itself with great apparent energy. 
 Joseph Bonaparte and the French forces were in pos- 
 session of Madrid, having a free communication with 
 France. 
 
 The first military measures adopted by the British 
 government in this situation of affairs were to direct 
 to the scene of expected action the largest force that 
 could promptly be assembled and transported. Ge- 
 neral Spencer, who was already on the coast, but had 
 an ulterior destination*; Sir Arthur Wellesley under 
 whose command a force had been collected at Cork ; 
 and Sir John Moore who was on his return from 
 Sweden, were without delay destined for service in 
 the Peninsula; and it was resolved that this force 
 
 * See p. 74, 
 M
 
 ( 82 ) 
 
 (augmented by successive embarkations from Eng- 
 land) or any part of it. that might be first brought 
 forward, should undertake any operation that might 
 appear to be best suited to the combined interests of 
 Spain and Portugal. The expulsion of the French 
 from Portugal was, in the opinion, not only of this 
 government, but of the officers employed, and of 
 such Spanish authorities as could be without delay 
 consulted, the most adviseable operation. This was 
 speedily accomplished ; after two brilliant successes * 
 on the part of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and in less than 
 two months from his departure from Cork, conven- 
 tions were made by which the whole French army 
 in Portugal, amounting to upwards of 20,OOO men, 
 consented to evacuate that kingdom and its fortresses, 
 and the Russian ships surrendered themselves to our 
 admiral -~. 
 
 * Sir Arthur H'l-llesley sailed from Cork on the 12th of July -, 
 the whole of his own corps was not landed till the 5th of August, 
 in Mondt'go Bay, and that of general -Spencer, who joined him 
 from the South, en the 8th. On the loth the march commenced ; 
 on the I/th the French general Laborde was attacked and beaten 
 at Hole^a ; on the 2 1st, brigadier-generals Anstruther and Ac- 
 land having joined with their brigades, the whole French force, 
 under Junot, was repulsed and beaten at Vimiera. See the pro- 
 ceedings and report of the Board of Enquiry, and the Gazette of 
 theSd'of September 1808. 
 
 f Military Convention, 3Oth August; and Naval Convention, 
 3d September 18O8. [Gazette, ibth September.] It must be 
 admitted, that such wa* the effect of the capitulation, known by 
 tiie name of the Convention of Cintra; an instrument, of which 
 it has been said, that the conventions of the Helder and Buenos 
 /lyres, by which the British armies -were obliged to evacuate the 
 hostile territory, were brought to mind by it, as Less shameful ter- 
 minatr.ns of a campaign ! However strange and unnatural thfs 
 may be, I admit it to be troe ; and I grant that "complaint" 
 was never *o " loud" and so " active" as that which raised itseh 
 simultaneously throughout Great Britain on this memorable oc- 
 casion. An examination of the justice of this universal com- 
 plaint, would be far beyond an incidental notice. I nm not the 
 advocate of the convention ; but I cannot help observing, that the 
 indignation excited by it, was not dictated by those of its stipula-
 
 ( 83 ) 
 
 These events were known in England on the 1 5th 
 of September *, and it was with little delay resolved 
 that 20,OOO men of the British army thus rendered 
 disposeable, considerably reinforced from England, 
 should enter Spain with the view of an active co-ope- 
 ration with the Spanish armies. 
 
 The policy of this determination remains to be 
 
 
 
 tions and circumstances which were in truth the most objection- 
 able. For the military policy of permitting the French troops to 
 evacuate the exceedingly strong positions which they occupied in 
 Portugal, a great deal more, 1 suspect, is to be said, than the 
 public feeling would permit to be heard at the moment. The 
 political stipulations, and, in particular, the treatment of the 
 Portuguese, I am much, leas inclined to defend. But was it I- if 
 these that the public indignation was called forth ? J am confi- 
 dent that nine out often who were the loudest in their expression 
 of disgust, thought only of their disappointment, in not seeing 
 Junot and his army brought prisoners to Plymouth. As it '<w, 
 the campaign was one of the most successful of oui continental 
 expeditions ; but the novelty as well as brilliancy of its commence- 
 ment had raised " our hopes and expectations" too high, and we 
 were, uo doubt, grievously " disappointed." This measure, by 
 which a hope of yesterday was destroy ed, was in public e.stimatiou 
 not only dishonourable and disgraceful, but calamitous and de- 
 structive, as if, instead of checking our prospect of new aud 
 unexpected blessings, it had brought upon us a suddeu and fright- 
 ful ruia ! 
 
 That the Convention of Cintra, as a whole, will l>e regarded 
 with approbation by an impartial historian, is not to be expected , 
 but I am impressed with a strong conviction, that its effect upon 
 the public mind will be acknowledged to have been (I must say) 
 ridiculously disproportionate to the cause. For a correct picture 
 of the English public on this occasion, see the EJml>1tfgk Annual 
 Register for ISOi, p. 367-8. It must be remembered, that Sir 
 A. Weltedeiii in delivering in the House of Commons a speech on 
 the Convention of Cintra, which Mr. IVindkum characterized as 
 " clear, fair, and manly," distinctly exonerated the VTOvcrnmcnt 
 from the imputation of having occasioned it. [Cobbett, XII. (>J;j.] 
 
 * The Edinburgh Review, No. 2c), says the 4th, but the Ga- 
 zette Extraordinary of the loth announces that dupatche* were 
 received the preceding day. 
 
 Ms
 
 ( 84 ) 
 
 considered, but if we were to allow for the moment 
 that without those prudent precautions which Lord 
 Grey accuses ministers of disregarding, the British 
 army ought never to have entered Spain, it would 
 nevertheless be justly contended that the liberation 
 of Portugal was a service of great importance, and 
 the expedition of 1808 would have been fully justified 
 if not a single soldier had quitted Portugal ; that 
 country in defence of which His Majesty was in 1806 
 willing to make " every exertion in the power of 
 " Great Britain," and to which defence the altered 
 situation of Spain had given a practicability which it 
 had not before possessed, 
 
 But by this defensive policy, we should in effect 
 have given up the cause of Spain,, whose rulers by 
 this time began to discover that the expulsion of the 
 French was a more difficult task than they had ima- 
 gined, and were consequently very desirous of British 
 assistance. This assistance according to Lord Grey, 
 we ought to have with-holden, until we should have 
 ascertained whether there was such an efficient go- 
 vernment in Spain, and such ample resources for the 
 supply of our army, as would be likely to " bring 
 <( the contest to a successful termination " If by 
 " successful termination" Lord Grey means the ac- 
 complishment of the great objects of the war, I deny 
 the soundness of his principle ; according to the view, 
 already given, of the policy of this country, it was 
 quite sufficient, that, while we rendered to the efforts 
 of Spain herself such assistance as our means would 
 permit, we took care that our force should not, in any 
 operation which it might undertake, incur the risk of 
 irreparable and disproportionate loss. As for tlis-, 
 grace, no minister ought evr to contemplate the 
 possibility of its occurring to a British army, unless 
 the term be applied to the ill-success of exertions be-? 
 yond the power of the commander who makes them;
 
 ( 85 ) 
 
 a species of disgrace which we may bear without 1111- 
 happiness. 
 
 According, too, to the former doctrines of Lord 
 Grey *, it was necessary that a general PLAN of the 
 campaign should have been arranged by our govern- 
 ment ; that is, as I understand, that specific objects 
 were to be marked out, to be pursued by specific 
 measures, upon the failure or success of which 
 would depend the fate of the campaign. Here then 
 I again venture to controvert his principle. In the 
 then state of the war, and indeed in every state of 
 such a war, it was impossible to foresee the points 
 upon which our force might most advantageously be 
 brought to bear ; it was impossible to form a correct 
 judgement, either of the force which would be op- 
 posed to us, or of that with which we were to act. 
 The most accurate information as to the numbers of 
 our enemy, and the must perfect knowledge of those 
 of our ally, would have been entirely insufficient ; 
 inasmuch as, though we could estimate tolerably well 
 the strength possessed by a given force of French 
 troops, that of any number of Spaniards remained 
 to be proved. 
 
 All, therefore, that we could do was to assemble, 
 in the most convenient position, either for advance 
 or retreat, the largest British force that could be 
 maintained, to place it under an able general ; to 
 give him from time to time the fullest infonnation 
 that could be collected ; to communicate to him, ge- 
 nerally, the views of the government ; but to entrust 
 him with a verv large discretion, both as to his of- 
 fensive movements, and to the point and period of 
 his retreat, in case it should be rendered necessary. 
 
 See his speech the 21r-t of April, 1800, before cited.
 
 The enquiries recommended by Lord Grey, as to 
 the efficiency of the Spanish government, are in 
 themselves very rational ; but it is not easy to appre- 
 hend what proofs of efficiency Lord Grey would have 
 required. Were we to wait until a Spanish army 
 was produced equal to cope with that of France ? 
 Were we to say to the Juntas, " we will come when 
 " you have shewn that you do not want us * :" or, 
 " we are exceedingly zealous in your cause, but we 
 " will run no risks ; you must satisfy us that we 
 " shall be superior to our enemy, or not one league 
 " will we march !" u we will share in your glory, 
 <c but we decline your danger !" In fact, we could 
 not ascertain the efficiency of the Spanish govern- 
 ment, without giving it every chance of success which 
 it was in our power to afford. What would have been 
 said, if, while we were waiting for proofs, the, Spanish 
 government had shewn just so much efficiency as to 
 convince us, that, by a little le^s caution on our part, 
 their exertions would have been successful ; But, at 
 :my rate, as a crimination of ministers, it must be 
 shewn, that to this neglect are to be justly imputed 
 the losses which in Lord Grey's estimation are " na- 
 * l tiujiui calamities and disgraces." 
 
 And, in like manner, with respect to the resources 
 of the country, the British government is not to be 
 criminated for a disregard of the necessary precau- 
 tions with respect to them, unless it be proved, that, 
 owing to such neglect, the British army was, in 
 movements directed by the government, exposed to 
 failure, or to loss uncompensatcd by advantage. For 
 the entry of the British army into Spain, and for the 
 general plan of the campaign, or rather, for the 
 arrangement of the points of debarkation and assem- 
 
 * See upon thus point Lord Liverpool's speech of the 21st of 
 April, I60y. [Cobbett's Debates, XIV. 151.]
 
 ( 87 ) 
 
 bly of thl? troop?, ministers are unquestionably ac- 
 countable ; for the result of the exercise; of the dis- 
 cretion reposed in the officers emploved under them, 
 those officers are alone responsible. 
 
 What then were the measures adopted by govern- 
 ment with respect to the march of the army into 
 Spain, and its operations in that country ? 
 
 Although it was not thought necessary to wait un- 
 til the efficiency of the central government of Spain 
 should have been proved by experience, yet the ex- 
 istence * of such a government was wisely thought 
 essential. From the beginning of June, succours of 
 every sort, excepting troops, had been sent into 
 Spain, and great pains had been taken for ascertain- 
 ing the state of the country and of the Spanish ar- 
 mies, and the mode in which a British force might 
 most effectually co-operate with them. As early as 
 the 2d of September, the f North of Spain was consi- 
 dered as the most adviseable field of operations, after 
 the expected expulsion of the French from Portugal, 
 This choice appears to have been suggested by the 
 nature of the country and the coasts, which afforded 
 at once an easy communication with England, and 
 safe retreat in case of a reverse. The expediency of 
 assembling our troops in the North appears to have 
 been decided upon at the same time in London by 
 our ministers J, who were in full communication 
 with the Marquis of Romuna, and recommended by 
 
 * See Mr. Canning's speech of lyth January, ISOp. [Cnb- 
 bett's Debates, XII. p. /I, 2.] 
 
 f Lord Castlereagh to Sir Hew Dulrymple. 2cl ' 
 
 [Instructions to tbe commanders, &c. No. 44. IJ ] 
 
 | Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Benlinck, 30th Septem- 
 ber and 1st October, 1808. [Instructions, No, G'4 and Gd.l
 
 ( 88 ) 
 
 Lord William Bentinck * at Madrid, in conjunction 
 with the Spanish authorities, and especially General 
 Castanosy of whose military judgement a high opi- 
 nion had been formed by all those who had commu- 
 nicated with him, or observed his proceedings. In 
 fact, no other plan was urged, either in Spain or in 
 England, for the operations of the British force, after 
 the determination (which was taken from the begin- 
 ning) that we were not to commit them in small 
 bodies "f~. 
 
 It has been said that <( Sir John Moore was always 
 " of opinion that a correct knowledge of the state 
 " of the country, would originally have led the go- 
 " vernment to employ the army in the South'^." Of 
 this opinion, however, no traces appear either in his 
 dispatches, or in the portions of his journal which 
 have been given to the public, until after his arrival 
 at Salamanca. That Sir John Moore entertained 
 
 * Lord William Beutinck to Sir Hew Dalrymple, Madrid, 2d 
 October, 1808. " A line of march, which in the event of misfor- 
 tune shall allow the British army easily to unite, to receive the 
 reinforcements from England, and joined with the Gallician and 
 Asturiau forces, successfully to resist the French in case they 
 should march upon the British force, or to attack the flank and 
 rear of the French in case they should follow the Spaniards 
 towards Madrid." [Communications from officers, S:c. 3d en- 
 closure in B. No. 2.] 
 
 f It should be observed, however, that though a concentration 
 of our forces was the general plan of government, the officer com- 
 manding our troops in Portugal had been authorized to use his 
 discretion in lending occasional assistance to the cause of Spain, 
 without waiting for orders from home. [Lord Castlereagh to Sir 
 Hew Dalrymple, 2d September, 1608, Instructions No. 44, B] 
 The commander of the forces in Sicily, was also authorized to act 
 at his discretion in conjunction with the navy, on the coast of 
 Catalonia. [Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Stuart, llth October, 
 1808, referring to a former letter of 2<jth July, Inductions, No, 
 *7, A.] 
 
 J Edinburgh Review, No. 2Q, p. 215.
 
 ( 89 ) 
 
 this opinion while at Lisbon, there is no sort of 
 proof; he certainly did not communicate it to the 
 government *. 
 
 On the 2()th of September, intelligence' -of the 
 formation of a general government, as well as of the 
 expulsion of" the French from Portugal, having been 
 received in London, the assembling of a British army 
 in the North of Spain was finally determined upon. 
 Twenty thousand men from Lisbon, and about ten 
 thousand from England, Hinder Sir David Baird, 
 were destined for this service -f*. The" command of 
 this force was given to an officer of the highest cha- 
 racter in the service. His instructions were short 
 and simple to assemble his force in GALICIA, or on 
 
 * The first allusion to this opinion is in Sir John Moore's letter 
 of the 24th November from Salamanca. 
 
 f Instructions, Nos. 57, 58, 60. As it is not intended to give 
 a history of the campaign, the successive orders for encreasing 
 this force will not be particularly noticed. It is sufficient to ob- 
 serve, that, early in October, it was resolved to leave no greater 
 force in Portugal than should be necessary for garrisoning the 
 fortresses on the frontiers and on the Tagns. [Instructions, Nos. 
 O'S, SI, &c.] Early in December an additional body of ,5000 in- 
 fantry (under General SherUrooke} was r.ddcd to the force destined 
 for the Peninsula ; [Xo. S/.] and measures were taken tor re- 
 inforcing the cavalry. 
 
 J " It has been determined to assemble this force in the North 
 of Spain, as the quarter where they can be most speedily brought 
 together, and that to which the exertions ot the enemy appear 
 at present to be principally directed " " It will be for von to 
 consider on what points of Galieia or the borders of Leon, (lit) 
 force can be most advantageou.lv a-,-c:n. >!;.;{ and equipped for 
 service, from whence they mity move forwards n<; carli/ as cir- ' 
 ciniittances may fnninit ; and it is left to your judgement to de- 
 cide whether the whole of the infantry or artillery shall be 
 transported from Lisbon by sea to Cof.mna, or whether a pro- 
 portion Shall be sent through Portugal to that destination." 
 [Lord Castlcreagh's h'-:-,t Instructions to Sir John Moore, i>0t!i 
 Sept. 1808. Instructions, No. 58, and Moore's Campaign, p. 2J7.] 
 
 N
 
 ( 90 ) 
 
 the borders of LEON, and thence to advance as cir- 
 cumstances might permit, to co-operate luith the Spa- 
 nish armies in the expulsion of the French*. His Ma- 
 jesty's minister in Spain was at the same time in- 
 structed to keep the commander of the forces regu- 
 larly informed of any political events which could in 
 any degree affect the safety or influence the move- 
 ments of the army f. 
 
 At this period, then, the responsibility of Govern- 
 ment is confined to the expediency of these instruc- 
 tions. 
 
 * The expulsion of the French from Spain, was, of course, 
 stated to Sir John Moore as the desired object of his co-operation 
 with the Spaniards. It was the principle of our alliance, and to 
 have given any other instructions to our commander, would have 
 been treacherous. The mention of this object no more implies, 
 on the part of those who issued it, a confident expectation of its 
 fulfilment, than the order to take, burn, and destroy, all the ene- 
 my's ships implies the same expectation in the lords of the admi- 
 ralty, of a literal obedience to their commands ! This remark 
 would not have been necessary but for an article in the Edin- 
 burgh Review of October 180p, [vol. XV. p. 208-9.] composed 
 apparently by the ingenious writer quoted in p. 7p : it is asserted, 
 on the authority of Mr. James Moore, that " such were the fran- 
 tic hopes of the British Cabinet, that, in the month of Septem- 
 ber, the Spaniards alone arm.' erperled to drive the French across 
 ike Pyrenees ; and at the end of that month, or the beginning 
 of October, Lord IV. Bentinck was directed to concert mea- 
 sure with the junta, for an invasion of the South oj' France, to 
 be performed by the combined armies of England and Spain !" 
 Such is the text of the Reviewer ; he adds, in a note, some ex- 
 pressions implying a degree of doubt as to the accuracy of Mr. 
 Moore's statement. Was it ingenuous, was it honest, thus to 
 make use of a fact, exceedingly important to his argument, of the 
 truth of which he professed to doubt ? and of which, in a labo- 
 rious investigation of documents, he could not find a trace ? But 
 to have admitted his doubts into his text, would have deprived an 
 entertaining Romance of one of its most striking incidents ! 
 
 f Mr. Canning to Mr. Fiere, 6th October, 1608 5 [Papers 
 presented lith April, ISOp, No. }.] No further instruction, or 
 power, -was given to Mr. Frere.
 
 ( 91 ) 
 
 Of the choice of the North as the scene of ope- 
 ration, enough has been said : the instruction to co- 
 operate with the Spanish armies implies some expec- 
 tation of an advantageous result ; we should there- 
 fore investigate shortly the reasonableness of this 
 expectation. As this must in great measure depend 
 upon the efficiency of the Spaniards themselves, it 
 is important to relate, what, up to the end of Sep- 
 tember, had been their success. 
 
 Under the direction of Morla they had, without 
 the assistance proffered by us, compelled the French 
 fleet at Cadiz to surrender*. Under the command 
 of Castanos they had attacked and beaten (at Baylen 
 in Andalusia) a French force of 8OOO men under 
 General Dupont, and compelled them to surrender 
 by a capitulation -f~, in which, another corps of 6(X)6 
 men under General Wedel, (which was marching to 
 his assistance) was glad to be included, without 
 fighting a battle. 
 
 In Valencia, the army of General Moncey, con- 
 sisting of nearly 12,OOO men, had been defeated, and 
 nearly destroyed^. The defence of Saragossa, by 
 Palafox, is in the recollection of every freeman in 
 Europe ; in Catalonia the exertions of the Spaniards 
 were conspicuous , in the defeat of General Du- 
 hesme, and the relief of Gerona. 
 
 * On the 14th of June. [Gazettes of Qth and 12th July, 1808.] 
 
 f 20th July. [Gazette, l6th August, 1808, and B inland's 
 History of Spain, II. p. 470.] 
 
 + 28th July. [Bigland, II. p. 468.] 
 
 See the letters of Lord Collingwood and Lord Cochrane (the 
 latter giving an account of the capture of Montgal) as to the pro- 
 ceedings in the neighbourhood of Barcelona and Gerona. [Ga- 
 zette of 2/th Sept. 1808.] The Edinburgh Annual Register for 
 1808 [p. 399] relates the defeat of General Duhesrne. 
 
 N 2
 
 The importance of these successes was sufficient 
 to induce the French king of Spain to make a preci- 
 pitate retreat from Madrid *, which was immediately 
 possessed by the patriots. 
 
 The alacrity with which the most regular force of 
 Spain, under a general, considered, by Napoleon, 
 {is worthy of a command, emancipated itself from 
 the service of France, afforded a decisive proof of 
 the determined attachment, of those most able to 
 support it) to the cause which we espoused ~f~. 
 
 In the northern provinces of the Asturias, Biscay 
 and Galicia, (where the resistance of the people had 
 commenced, and continued without interruption) 
 the armies of Spain had been less successful. But 
 Cues t (is defeat at Rio Seco ^, though a reverse of 
 considerable importance, was surely not sufficient to 
 destroy the impression, which every other event of 
 th ^ summer of 1808 had reasonably made. It is not 
 to be objected, that the early victories of the Spa- 
 niards were obtained through the superiority of num- 
 bers. This was surely an advantage upon which we 
 had a right to reckon, in a resisting nation. Had the 
 energy of the Spanish government and the talent of 
 the generals been duly proportioned to the enthusiasm 
 of the people, the French armies would, in every pro- 
 vince, have met with at least a respectable opponent. 
 
 * 31st July. [Gazette of l6th August. Big-land, II. 4/2.] 
 
 f Much credit is surelj due, as well to the British governnent 
 as to Admiral Keats, for the liberation of the Marquis of Romana 
 and his troops, which was completed on the 13th of August. 
 [Gazette of 24th August, 1808, and Bigland, II. p. 4?3 ; and for 
 a very good account of all these occurrences, sec the Edinburgh 
 Annual Register, ch. 17 and 1 9.3 
 
 J 14th July. [Edinburgh Annual Register, 1 808, p. 323 ; Big- 
 land, II. p. 40'y.] Cuesta's numbers were superior as to infantry, 
 but his defeat was, at the time, attributed to his want of cavalry.
 
 ( 93 ) 
 
 At the period of which we are Speaking, it 
 represented to the British government, upon the best 
 authority which it was possible to obtain, that the 
 armies of Spain amounted to no less than i4O,OOO 
 men *. From such a force, a considerable part of it 
 recently successful, it was surely n jt unreasonable to 
 expect some efficient support. The armies in parti- 
 cular with which, it was probable, the British force 
 would come in contact, were those of Blake on the 
 left, and Castanos and Palafox on the right. The 
 former was unbroken and well thought of by General 
 Brodrick f, the latter victorious, and its acknow- 
 ledged deficiences did not prevent one of our most 
 distinguished officers J from speaking with confidence^, 
 a short time afterwards, of the event of a battle. 
 
 * Viz. Blake 30,000 
 
 Ilomana 10,OOO 
 
 Andalusia 25,OOO 
 
 Estramadura 1 2 ,OOO 
 
 CastUle 12,000 
 
 Valencia lt>,OOO 
 
 Arragon l6,GOO 
 
 Catalonia - 2O,OOO 
 
 141,000 
 
 Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh, Madrid, 2d October. 
 [Communications B. No. 2. sixth Enclosure.] It is to be ob- 
 served, that those who have objected to the proceedings and re- 
 ports of the officers employed upon special missions in Spain, 
 Iiave uniformly excepted Lord William Bentinck. 
 
 f Letter to Lord Castlereagh, Reynosa, 10th Sept. [Com- 
 munications C. No. 1 .] 
 
 I Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlerea^li, Madrid, 14th 
 November. " This army is also in want ofcluirJnng, ol money, 
 " and of provisions ; its spirit, huitwir, is iY/ji\"icnt..- -I to Zv <.r- 
 " c client ; and Colonel GRAHAM, in whose opinion I ku.u<: great 
 " reliance, speaks very confidently of ths event uf a Lattlv." 
 [Communications B. No. 5.] The Spanish troops had a unu h 
 better reputation, previously to the present contest. The French 
 general Latrille dedicates live chapters ol" his Reflexions on Mo- 
 jiern War, io/lugerctuis Campaign of 1/y 1 in Spain, and declares
 
 ( 0-1 ) 
 
 But without looking to any distinct operation in 
 conjunction with the Spanish armies, great import- 
 ance was attributed, by those of the most competent 
 judgements, to the presence of a British force in 
 Spain. Not only Mr. Stuart, Sir Hew Dalrymple* 
 and Lord William Bentinck f, concurred in this 
 sentiment, but Sir John Moore himself was " aware 
 " of the importance of even the name of a British 
 11 army in Spain ;." 
 
 These events and opinions are adduced to justify, 
 not an offensive movement against the French, 
 that is a consideration entirely separate, but the 
 determination of our cabinet to assemble the British 
 force in a part of Spain, from whence co-operation 
 in advance might be practicable, or a retreat secure. 
 Upon the expediency, as well as the nature of offensive 
 operations, the General was to decide. He found, at 
 a very early period, " a state of things quite different 
 e from that conceived by the British government ," 
 the army of Blake had been separately defeated ||, 
 
 that " he is not acquainted with men more patient, more sober, 
 " better disciplined, or more steady in at. lion, than the Spanish 
 " soldiery, &c. &c." [ch. ;i'2.] The intelligent and candid author 
 of the " Military Character of the European Annies," speaks in 
 terms of admiration of the Spanish troops, which " have leen alle 
 " to u'ittistand the French, in spite of the ignorance and negli- 
 " gence of their officers, and all the defects of their military sys- 
 " tern." [P. 73.] 
 
 * Sir Hew Dalrymple to Lord Castlereagh, Benefico, 2/th 
 September. [Communications A. 2.] 
 
 f Lord William Bentinck te Lord Castlereagh, Madrid, 26Ui 
 September. [Communications B. 1.] 
 
 J Sir J^ohn Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Lisbon, 18th October. 
 [Communications F. No. 2 ; Moore's Campaign, p. 2-1(5.] 
 
 Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Salamanca, 27 November. 
 {Correspondence relating to Spain^ No. 1, Moore, p. 63.] 
 
 |i In a series of actions with the Dukes of BeHuao, Dantzic,
 
 ( 95 ) 
 
 that of Castanos, upon which greater reliance had been 
 placed, sustained itself not much longer *. Upon 
 the information of this last reverse, Sir John Moore 
 determined upon a retreat into Portugal -j~, and or- 
 dered Sir David Baird to retire upon Corunna J. 
 This resolution continued till the evening of the 5th 
 of December, when it was decided to advance upon 
 Valladolid with his united force " to be. in Fortunes 
 " way ;" a determination varied on the 14th into 
 
 and Dalmatia, at Soronosa, Valmaseda, Espinosa, and Reynosa, 
 from the 31st of October to the 12th or 1 3th of November. 
 [Communications C. C), and Papers 14th March, No. a, 10, II ; 
 Edin. Annual Register, 338; Bigland, II. 479 ; first to the fifth 
 French Bulletins, in Cobbett's Political Register, XIV. pp. 928, 
 Q50.] The army of Estremadura under Belvedere had also beeu 
 defeated at Burgos by the Dukes of Istria and Dalmatia on tho 
 llth of November. [Bigland, II. 4/8 ; 2d French Bulletin, 
 Cobbett, 950 ; Moore, p 45 ; Edin. Ann. Reg. 423 ] 
 
 * Being defeated at Tudela on the 2'2d of November by the 
 French forces collected under the Duke of Montebello. [Sir John 
 Moore to Lord Castlereagh, 2;jth November, Communication F. 
 No. 5 ; Moore, p. 268 ; II tli French Bulletin, Cobbett, p/S j 
 Edin. Ann. Reg. 424 ] 
 
 f Sir John Moore arrived on the 1 3th of Nov. at Salamanca, and 
 was soon followed by the several divisions of infantry which came 
 from Lisbon by way of Almeida. On the 24th he wrote to Lord 
 Castlereagh, informing him that he thought ill of affairs, and 
 could not then undertake any thing beyond the assembling of the 
 army. On the 29th, having heard of the defeat of Castanos, he 
 communicated his intention of retreating. On the 5th of De- 
 cember, in the morning, lie wrote more particularly on the samo 
 subject ; but, writing again in the evening, he stated that " con-. 
 ' siderable hopes were entertained, from the enthusiastic manner 
 ' in which the people of Madrid resist the French ; that he had 
 ' not much hope ; but in consequence of the general opinion, 
 ' which was also Mr. Frere's, had ordered Sir D Baird to sus- 
 ' pend his retreat, and intended to continue at Salamanca, to bo 
 ' guided bv circumstances [Communications F. 4, 5, (), / j 
 Moore, pp. 257. 20'S. 270. 273.] 
 
 \ Sir John Moore to Sir David Baird, 28 November. [Moore, 
 P- 09-] 
 
 See Sir John Moore's letter of the 5th above cited, and those 
 of the 8th and 10th December. [Communications F. 8, 9, 10 ^ 
 Moore, 280. Wjl. 2y3.]
 
 the offensive movement against Soult *, on the Cnr- 
 rion, which has heen so much discussed, and which 
 ended in the retreat from bahagun to Corunna. 
 
 It surely will not be denied, that the answers 
 returned by the Secretary of State to the several 
 communications of Sir John Moore, left him, upon 
 every point, to the free exercise of his own judge- 
 ment. Not one expression is to be found in Lord 
 Castlereagh's dispatches f by vvhich the responsibility 
 of the movements of the General can be fixed upon 
 the Cabinet. Neither previously to his arrival at Sa- 
 Jamanea, nor in answer to his communications from 
 that city, did Sir John Moore receive a line of more 
 precise instruction, as to the nature of his operations^ 
 than those which have been given. 
 
 It is not, indeed, pretended that the movement in 
 advance., which Sir John Moore adopted, was di- 
 rected by the Cabinet ; the imputation is more cir- 
 cuitously turned The march from Salamanca is 
 said to have resulted from the advice of the Ambas- 
 sador, whose communications the General had been 
 directed to receive with the utmost deference. In this 
 manner, the Cabinet is made responsible +, directly 
 for the opinion of Mr. Frere, and indirectly for the 
 proceedings of Sir John Moore ; in neither case 
 with correctness. 
 
 * Sir John Moore's letter to Sir D. Eaird, fnnn Alaejos, 14th, 
 and to Lord Castlereagh, from Toro, l(Jth of December. [Moore, 
 J2t> and 297 ; Communications F. 11.] 
 
 f- Sir John Moore's dispntrh of the 24th November \vris ac- 
 knowledged by Lord Castlereagh's of the lOth of December [In- 
 structions, 91] received at Benavente on the 2/th. That of (he 
 2c)th was acknowledged by Lord Castlereagh's of "the loth of I) - 
 eember [Instructions, 5.] And those of the 5th of December 
 by a subsequent dispatch of the same day. It i.s not stated when 
 these of the iC'th were received by Sir J. Muore : possibly not 
 at all. 
 
 J Lord Grey's speech, ISth April 1609. [Cobbett, XIV. /O.J
 
 ( 97 ) 
 
 That Sir John Moore's resolution of the 5th of 
 December, for suspending his retreat, and the deter- 
 mination to advance upon Valladolid, \vhich speedily 
 followed, were very far from proceeding " entirely 
 " from the instigation of Mr. Frere * /' we have 
 the distinct assurance of his own Adjutant General, 
 writing expressly in vindication of his memory. 
 That the communications of the Ambassador, were 
 among the motives which induced the General to 
 alter his determination, is readily allowed ; but it is 
 equally inconsistent with truth, that they were the sole 
 inducements, as that Sir John Moore felt himself 
 under the necessity of receiving them as commands. 
 
 Those are indeed most injudicious friends of Ge- 
 
 * Brig. General Clinton's few remarks, p. 8-10. " From the 
 ' correspondence between Sir John Moore and Mr. Frere, it 
 ' has certainly, with seeming probability, been assumed that Sir 
 ' John Moore yielded his own judgement to the opinion of the 
 ' British Minister's, and that he was induced to form the junction 
 ' with Sir David Baird, and to make the move towards Valla- 
 ' dolid, entirely at the instigation of Mr. Frere. But those who 
 ' entertain this opinion do not recollect what were the circum- 
 ' stances which determined Sir John Moore to retreat upon 
 ' Portugal, and how completely the situation of the enemy's 
 ' force had been changed since that determination had been 
 ' formed. The whole of the enemy's force, which after the 
 ' defeat of the Spaniards at Burgos and Reynosa might have been 
 ' employed against the separated British corps, had been carried 
 ' into Catalonia, or against Madrid ; by this move on the part of 
 ' the enemy, Sir John Moore found himself at liberty to make the 
 ' junction with Sir David Baird, and the column under Sir John 
 1 Hope which had entered Spain by Badajos had by this time 
 ' arrived within a day's march of Salamanca : accounts were 
 ' received from various other channels as well as from Mr. Frere, 
 ' that the Spaniards were resolutely defending themselves in 
 ' Madrid, and, although none of that enthusiasm, of which so 
 ' much had been said, was apparent in any part of Spain through 
 1 which Sir John Moore had passed, it was represented to him 
 ( by British officers upon whose judgement he knew he could 
 rely, that the spirit which had manifested itself at Saragossa, 
 and in other parts of Spain, was by no means extinct." 
 
 o
 
 < 98 ) 
 
 neral Moore, who consider him as having yielded 
 his opinion, upon a military question, to any civil 
 authority whatever. But even were it allowed that 
 he acted in this instance, in contradiction to his 
 known and just principles, the responsibility would 
 still not be fixed upon the ministers, unless this 
 obedience to Mr. Frere's requisitions had been dis- 
 tinctly imposed upon Sir John Moore by their au- 
 thority. By General Clinton, who was acquainted 
 with his Commander's proceedings from hour to 
 hour, no such orders from home are even alluded to 
 by insinuation, as the cause of Sir John Moore's 
 advance ; the motive of which step, he has other- 
 wise satisfactorily explained. The brother of the 
 General has indeed laid some stress upon the instruc- 
 tions * which he had received ; but, that Sir John 
 Moore himself laid very little, may be inferred, nay 
 proved, from the various communications from him- 
 self which are before the public. On the subject of 
 his determination to advance, Sir John Moore wrote 
 letters to Lord Castlereagh, both public and -J- 
 private J ; to Sir David Baird and to Mr. 
 
 * Moore, p. 89. 
 
 f Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Salamanca, 5th De- 
 cember. " I have in consequence of the general opinion, which 
 *' is also Mr. Frere'-, ordered Sir David Baird to suspend his 
 <r retreat, and I shall continue at this place, until I see further, 
 " and shall be guided by circumstances." In the letters of the 
 8th and lOfti December the Ambassador is not mentioned. 
 [Communications, No. 7, 8 and 9. Moore, p. 2/3, 2SQ, 291.] 
 
 \ Private letter to Lord Castlereagh, Salamanca, 12th Decem- 
 ter. " I fear Mr. Frere is infinitely more sanguine upon the 
 " subject of Spain than I am ; this is to be regretted, as it renders 
 * c it more embarrassing for you to come to a decision upon the 
 " measures to be pursued." [Moore, p. 294.] 
 
 From Salamai ca, 5tb, ,6th, 8 th and 12th December ; from 
 Alaejos, 14th December. " This, the resistance of Madrid, 
 " arrests the French, and people who are sanguine entertain 
 " great hopes from it. J own, myself, I fear this spirit has
 
 ( 99 ) 
 
 Frere *, and made an entry in the Journal which he 
 kept for his own use. In not one of his dispatches 
 
 <f arisen too late, and the French are now too strong to be re- 
 " sisted in this manner. There is, however, no saying, and / 
 "Jed myself the more ol-liged to give it a trial, that Mr Frere 
 " has made a formal representation which I received this rnorn- 
 " ig." He therefore orders him to suspend his retreat, and the 
 next morning directs him to return to Astorga. The expression 
 here cited, from the letter of the 5th, is by far the strongest allu- 
 sion to Mr. Frere's requisition, to be found in the whole corre- 
 spondence. [Moore, p. 91, 92, in, 116, 125.] 
 
 * Sir John Moore wrote to Mr. Frere from Almeida on the 
 10th of November j from Salamanca on the l6th, igth and 27th. 
 [Moore, pp. 29. 33. 38 and 63.] In the last, [Correspondence, 
 llth April, IbOa, No. 1.] he describes " the state of things 
 " as quite different from that which had been conceived ;" and 
 refers to Mr. Frere's " Communications with the Spanish go- 
 " vernment," and says, " You are, perhaps, better acquainted 
 " with the views of the British Cabinet ; and the question 
 " is, what would that Cabinet direct if they were upon the 
 " spot to determine ? It is comparatively of very little conse- 
 " quence in whom shall rest the greatest responsibility ; I am 
 " willing to take the whole or a part; but I am very anxious to 
 " have your opinion." Surely nothing like a necessity to abide 
 by Mr. Frere's decision is implied here ; nor, in fact, did Sir John 
 Moore wait for it. On the 2d, 5th and 6th of December, he re- 
 ceived very urgent communications from Mr. Frere (dated Aran- 
 jues, 30th November, and Talavera, 3d December ; Moore, /u, 
 80. 88 and 95.) ; to all of which he replied in language equally 
 inconsistent with any such idea of necessary deference, and indeed 
 most strongly marking the necessary independence of his military 
 judgement. In his letter from Salamanca of the 6th December 
 [Correspondence, No. 5, and Moore, p. 97.] he refers to the in- 
 tention which he had, previously to "Castaros's defeat, of " march- 
 " ing on Madrid to share the fortunes of the Spanish nation ;" 
 and says, that he wished to have that opinion confirmed by Mr. 
 Frere's, which was the reason of his writing to him on the 2/th 
 of November ; but he adds, " had you been adverse to the army 
 1 being committed in the heart of Spain, your opinion upon such 
 ' a subject would, I may say, certainly have decided me to have 
 * altered my intention, with respect to the determination I made 
 ' on the evening of the 28th, after receiving from Mr. Stuart the 
 account of Castanos' defeat. I should, had you been with me, 
 ' have communicated it to you ; but should never have thought of 
 
 O 2
 
 ( 100 ) 
 
 does the General refer to Mr. Frere's communications 
 as imperative ; nor does he in his private Journal re- 
 fer to them at all *. Can it be believed that so ready 
 and correct a writer as Sir John Moore, would in 
 five or six distinct statements of the same operation 
 of his mind, have omitted to mention its predominant 
 motive, and, that upon which, if it should prove 
 erroneous, his justification would principally rest? 
 The idea is so preposterous, that I should not have 
 mentioned it, if, upon any other supposition, the 
 disasters of the retreat which Lord Grey thinks so 
 fatal and disgraceful, could be justly imputed to the 
 British government. 
 
 If it has already been shewn that Sir John Moore 
 did not consider himself as having received instruc- 
 tions to guide himself by Mr. Frere's opinions, it is 
 hardly necessary to shew that the government at 
 home never thought of giving such instructions. 
 It should however be observed, that in the answers 
 returned to the various communications from Sala- 
 manca, Mr. Frere is, in no instance, referred to by 
 Lord Castlereagh, who invariably acquiesces in the 
 determinations of the General, necessarily altered, 
 as they were, according to the frequent change of 
 circumstances. 
 
 The only instruction which has been specifically 
 noticed, in proof of the authority vested in the Am- 
 bassador, is contained in Lord Castlereagh's letter of 
 the 14th of November -j~. This was not received by 
 
 " asking your advice or opinion, as that determination was founded 
 " upon circumstances with which you could not be acquainted; 
 " and was, besides, a question merely military , of which I thought 
 " rnyse(f the best judgs." 
 
 * Moore, p. 1OI. 
 
 . f [Instructions, No. SO; Moore, 254. J See Edinburgh Re- 
 view, No. 29, p. 220] and Moore's Campaign, p. 89. It is cleai
 
 ( 101 ) 
 
 Sir John Moore until the 4th of December. He 
 had previously written several letters on the subject 
 of his intended retreat, both to Lord Castlereagh and 
 Mr. Frere; He wrote to both on the 5th and 6th. 
 Can any thing be more absolutely incredible, than 
 that he considered this instruction as placing him in 
 a situation of new difficulty, unbecoming his cha- 
 racter and command, and yet, not only did not re- 
 monstrate against the innovation, but never took the 
 slightest notice of it, in communicating, either with 
 the persons from whom he received it, with those 
 to whom it gave him a new relation, with those to 
 whom he habitually confided his thoughts, or even 
 (for such is the nature of his journal) with his own 
 mind * ! 
 
 The fact appears to have been, that Sir John 
 Moore was very strongly impressed with the neces- 
 sity of undertaking something, after the army had 
 
 , _ 
 
 that Mr. Moore did not notice the date of the receipt of this dis- 
 patch, which is nevertheless acknowledged by Sir John Moore oiv 
 the 5th of December, as received the preceding day. 
 
 * The facts are even stronger ; Sir John Moore receives tl.is 
 dispatch of the 14th of November, on the 4th of December. In 
 the morning of the 5th he writes to Lord Gistlereasb,' announcing 
 his intention of retreating, but taking no notice of his lordship's 
 dispatch. In the evening of the same day, he writes a'.nin, hs 
 teJJs the minister that he now means to^dv.iuce, and gives hi* 
 reasons, only mentioning Mr. Frem as L-oncvrrm;* in the general 
 
 ' 
 
 opinion. [See p. 98.] The 'concluding and lenst important p:i- 
 tagraph in this letter, is the s'nnpfe ai-.knou ledgemrnt of the dis- 
 patch of 14th November, which is supposed to have put him un- 
 der the direction of Mr. Frcre, and thus mit'iily to {save influenced 
 his determination to advance. But further,- on th ; - sth, ha\!n 
 more maturely wek'h'.'d the purpon c.r Lord Cistlei 
 patch, 6*t writes a manly, sensible and HIM --not, 
 
 however, against the powers with which it i\ -\ have 
 
 rlothed the Ambassador, but againt the superior rank which, in 
 the case of co-operation, which did not occur, hs was to give t 
 the Spanish Generals. [Moore, 23p.]
 
 ( 102 ) 
 
 been collected in Spain *, and, that he thought it 
 adviseable, with this view, to incur any hazard, short 
 of the loss of his army ; that it appeared to be " the 
 " general opinion" on the 5th of December, that an 
 opening; for useful operations was offered by the 
 state of the popular feeling, and the actual resistance 
 which it produced ; that this opinion was very 
 strongly entertained by Mr. Frere, and that the 
 General was on that account the more induced to 
 pay attention to it -f~. 
 
 With these motives, thru, and without any orders 
 from home, Sir John Moore took measures from "the 
 5th to the 1 4th of December, for collecting his whole 
 force at Valladolid, for the general purpose of effect- 
 ing a diversion in favour of the South of Spain J. 
 The first symptoms of advance having drawn upon 
 1he British army the corps of Marshal Soult, General 
 Moore on the 14th changed the direction of his 
 inarch, with the view of attacking this French corps ^ ; 
 but having learnt, previously to his intended advance 
 upon the Carrion, (which was to have taken place on 
 the 24th of December), that the several divisions of 
 
 * "' We have no business here as things are ; but, being here, 
 " it would never do to abandon the Spaniards without a struggle." 
 [Extract from the Journal, Moore, p. 50.] 
 
 f Letter to Sir David Baird, cited in p. QQ ; and Extract from 
 Journal. [Moore, p. c)l and 5O.] 
 
 % " I think it an object with the troops I have to march to 
 if Valladoiid ; from whence, according to the information 1 may 
 ft receive, 1 may move on to Paiencia and Burgos, and thus threa* 
 " ten the enemy's communications, and cause a diversion in fa- 
 " vour of Madrid or Saragossa, or any movement which may be 
 " in contemplation to tht south of the Tagus." Sir John Moore 
 to vr David Baird, Salamanca, 1'Jth December 1808 ; [Moore, 
 p. 116; see also his letter to Mr. Frere of the same date [p. 118.] 
 
 Letter to Sir David Baird, Alaejos, 14 December; to Mr. 
 Frere, Toro, 15 December ; [Moore, 125 and 127] j and to Lord 
 tajtlcreagh, 1 6 December, cited in p. 90'.
 
 ( 103 ) 
 
 the French army, which were marching towards Ba- 
 dajos and the Guadiana, had been recalled by Bona- 
 parte, who was himself about to collect his whole 
 force at Benavente, the British General * perceived 
 that he was no longer equal to the force which was 
 opposed to him ; and accordingly commenced his 
 retreat into Galiciaf , and, subsequently, to Corunna. 
 
 As a diversion however, the movement was com- 
 plete ^. The march of the French to Badajos was 
 stopped, nor was it until the spring of the year 18JO 
 that they penetrated into the south western provinces, 
 which appeared to be their object at the time.. of 
 which we are speaking. 
 
 In order to accomplish the purpose of this diver- 
 sion, Sir John Moore necessarily " risked the loss 
 " of his army ." It was nevertheless preserved ; af- 
 ter a victorious repulse of the enemy, in which its 
 brave Commander gloriously terminated his career )(! 
 The losses, however, in men, stores and money, 
 which in its rapid retreat before a very superior force 
 it naturally sustained, far out balanced, in the esti- 
 
 * Moore, 15p to l6s. Letter to Lord Cnstlereagh, Benavente, 
 28 December j Communications, F. 12, and Moure, 300. 
 
 . 
 
 f I purposely avoid all discussion on the subject of the resolu- 
 tion which was once entertained by Sir John Moore, of halting at 
 Astorga, or Villa Franca, or defending Galicia. 
 
 J Sir John Moore's letter to Lord Castlt-reagh, 28th Decem- 
 ber, and Lord Ca.->tlereagh's speech, on moving for the monu- 
 ment, 25 Jan. 18OC). [Cobbett, XII. p. 141.] 
 
 Letter of 31st Dec. from Astorga. [Communications F. 13, 
 and Moore, 303.] 
 
 || Report from Sir D. Ba'ird and Lieutenant-general Hope, of 
 the battle of Corunna, 10' Jan. 1809- [Gazette, 23d Jan.]
 
 ( 104 ) 
 
 matlon of Lord Grey, the object proposed by the 
 forward movement *. 
 
 The correctness of that estimate I shall not exa- 
 mine, nor shall I discuss the conduct of the retreat ; 
 observing only, that if we ever expect to succeed in 
 war, we must submit to its chances ; we should 
 either make peace at once, or be prepared to hear 
 occasionally of disasters : of sick abandoned, stores 
 destroyed, dollars thrown away, horses and men dead 
 of fatigue- of all the melancholy occurrences, in 
 short, of this memorable retreat, which have been 
 sufficiently painted by others, 
 
 quaeque ipse miserima lidi ! 
 
 A due appreciation of the miseries of war, and a bene- 
 volent sympathy for the sufferings which it produces, 
 may perhaps justifiably give a pacific tendency to our 
 politics ; but if we are confident that we are contend- 
 ing in a just cause, and that it is not in our power to 
 terminate the contest, we must not permit our feel- 
 ings, however praiseworthy in themselves, to interfere 
 either with the direction of our campaigns, or with 
 our estimation of the military proceedings of our 
 Oenerals. If we are disposed to appreciate very 
 highly the disasters consequent upon the march from 
 Salamanca, we ought to recollect that a little too 
 much boldness in advance, is the most pardonable 
 fault which can belong to a Commander. 
 
 But enough of this first campaign of the Penin- 
 sular war ; its general results were, complete success 
 in the very important object of Portugal, from which 
 kingdom, containing two of the most important PORTS, 
 
 * In his speech of 18th of April 180Q, Lord Grey distinctly 
 gnve his opinion against the expediency of die advance from Sala- 
 manca. [Cobbett, XIV. 144.} The Edinburgh Reviewers seem 
 disposed to concur in this opinion. [No. 29. p. 215.]
 
 ( 105 ) 
 
 for us, on the whole coast of the continent of Europe, 
 we expelled the French ; and in \vhich we obtained, 
 through our military and political ex(-rl\:::s. an in- 
 fluence which has daily become more decided find 
 more important. It will hardly be denied, non . -t 
 with respect to the other kingdom of the Penin; 
 our exertions were extremely beneficial ; we certrmiy 
 did not expell the French from Spain, nor did we 
 recover her capital from their hands, but we without 
 a doubt, added most importantly to the resistance 
 which Bonaparte experienced, and which, to this 
 moment, he has not overcome. 
 
 Tr ,, c T , . ,, 
 
 It, therefore, 1 were to acquiesce in the responsi- 
 bility of the ministers for the Convention of Cintra, 
 and for the advance to Sahagun and consequent re- 
 treat, and thus to throw into the balance against 
 them, all the disgraces arid disasters imputed to these 
 proceedings, I should nevertheless ask with confi- 
 dence, whether in any prior campaign, since the se- 
 ven years' war, (excepting, perhaps, that of 1801), so 
 much had been effected by a British army ? 
 
 But the general importance of the assistance given 
 to Spain, as well as the distinct importance of Por- 
 tugal, will be more strikingly apparent in the suc- 
 ceeding occurrences; for we must not regard the 
 operations of 1808, either in Portugal or in Spain, 
 as single operations of war, of which the success or 
 failure could be defined or estimated, as soon as the 
 campaign was over. They constitute the introduction 
 to the measures of 180y and 1S1O, the commence- 
 ment of a new war-like system, or at least of a war 
 conducted under new circumstances, of which the 
 several events cannot be appreciated, until time shall 
 have developed the great result. But let us proceed 
 with Lord Grey.
 
 ( 106 ) 
 
 His Majesty's ministers are warmly censured for 
 risquing, " after the experience of the unfortunate 
 " campaign of Sir John Moore, another army, in the 
 (C same country, in the prosecution of similar ope- 
 " rations *." The only results of this proceeding, 
 were likewise, according to his lordship, " misfor- 
 f< tune, calamity and disgrace." ! This representation 
 of the campaign of 1 80Q, is equally inaccurate as to 
 its objects and its success. 
 
 Although the ultimate view of our measures was 
 assuredly the same, the operations to which the Bri- 
 tish army was directed^ were not similar to those of 
 the preceding year. 
 
 Of the campaign of 1808, Spain was the principal 
 object, to which, Portugal was subordinate ; the ex- 
 perience of that cnmpaign, though it did not, as Lord 
 Grey seems to think, demonstrate the absurdity of 
 all operations in the Peninsula, placed in a strong 
 point of view the inefficiency of the Spanish armies/ 
 it satisfied us that a British army could not with 
 prudence, or with any rational hope of expelling the 
 French, be committed in protracted measures of 
 offence, N in the heart of Spain, because it could 
 neither rely upon the country for subsistence, nor 
 upon the Spanish forces for support. 
 
 But Spain was still unsubdued ; nothing had oc- 
 curred to destroy the expectation, that, on particular 
 points, more distant from the Frontier of France, 
 and better calculated for permanent occupation, the 
 arms of England might be eminently useful in pro-, 
 tracting her resistance. As for Portugal, the less 
 probable it appeared, that the French would be ex- 
 pelled from Spain, the more important it became to 
 
 * P. 31.
 
 ( 107 ) 
 
 carry into effect the unvaried policy of Great Britain, 
 evinced by the ministers of 1762 *, of 1797 ~}~> and 
 of 18O6, as well as of 1808, by attempting the de- 
 fence of that country. If the Spaniards had been 
 completely victorious, the defence of Portugal would 
 have been useless ; had the French been completely 
 victorious, it might have been impracticable 5 but 
 the actual state of things was essentially different 
 from either of these alternatives ; nor was it verging 
 towards either. 
 
 Those who despaired of the expulsion of the 
 French, scarcely expected that their success would 
 be so rapid and complete, as to enable them either 
 to turn against Portugal the resources of Spain, or 
 to neglect Spain, in invading Portugal J. At the 
 
 * For some notice of the campaign of 1762, see the account* 
 of Portugal, by Dumourie% and the Duke of Chatelet, and the 
 Annual Register for 17&2. Of the difficulties with which an. 
 enemy ought to expect in invading Portugal, a pretty high icel 
 will thence be formed. See also Captain Eliot's Treatise, cited 
 in p. 75. 
 
 f A British force was sent into Portugal soon after the rupture 
 with Spain in 1796, and continued there nearly to the end of the 
 last war. None of the annual publications or Histories of the 
 time take any notice of this force. It was commanded by the 
 late Sir Charles Stuart, who had, I have some reason to believe> 
 a very strong opinion of the defensibility of Portugal. 
 
 I Or, if they did expect this, they must now acknowledge ari 
 error. " The French could not have held Por'ugal, if Bonaparte 
 could not conquer Spain, and must get possession of it if he does." 
 [Lord Grenville's speech, 19 Jan. 1809; Cobbett, XII. 14.] This 
 is, owing to two circumstances, a very popular expression ; in the 
 first place, it has the unspeakable advantage of point ; and, in the 
 second, it is favourable to the doctrine of the Edinburgh Reviewers, 
 who measure the wisdom of all military operations by the standard 
 of Bonaparte. In this instance, they have particularly alluded to his 
 disregard of Naples in the great campaign of 1 805 ; which conduct, 
 we ought, they infer, to have imitated, by leaving Portugal to follow 
 the fate of Spain. This would be very well, ithe fate of Spain was 
 likely to be decided in one campaign, or if there were none but 
 purely military reasons for keeping the French out of Portugal. 
 
 P2
 
 ( 108 ) 
 
 time, then, that there remained certainly every 
 motive for defending Portugal which had existed at 
 any of the periods in which it had been contemplated, 
 and the additional inducement of assisting the cause 
 of Spain ; the defence itself was a measure now to 
 be viewed with a very different expectation of success, 
 than at the periods in which Spain was to have been 
 jieuter, or perhaps assisting in the invasion ! 
 
 
 
 Although, therefore, " His Majesty's determina- 
 " tion remained unchanged, not to withdraw the aid 
 " of his forces from the cause of Spain, while there 
 " was any hope of its being usefully employed to re- 
 " sist the designs of the enemy * ;" and England 
 accordingly offered to employ a force in the South of 
 Spain, prqvided that, by admitting a British force in- 
 to Cadiz ~\~ } the Spanish government would give us. 
 
 i 
 
 * Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Moore, 11 Jan. ISOQ. [In- 
 structions, No. 104,] 
 
 -f- Early in December 1308, Mr. Frere had been instructed t 
 make this proposal to the Spanish Government. The discussion, 
 vvhteh continued till February 180p, displays much unreasonable 
 and untimely jealousy on the part of the Junta, which, it is how- 
 ever to be iiopec.', is now removed. [Papers presented 1810. C.J 
 Jn April Mr. Frere was again instructed to otter the army from 
 Portugal, in the event of the evacuation of that country, upon the 
 condition of. the acceptance of a British garrison in Cadiz. [Pa- 
 pers P.]' Some embarrassment was occasioned by the circum- 
 stance of Sir George Smith, who was sent to Cadiz in December, 
 for the purpose of making military reports, having sent to Lisbon 
 for troops to garrison Cadiz, which accordingly arrived under Ma* 
 jor-general Mackenzie, but were refused admittance. I am con- 
 fident tint the open and tempeir.te conduct, on this occasion, of 
 the Bntish Cabinet, and ot Mr. Cunning in particular as its organ, 
 Fit' re, was caJcui< ted to produce, and did produce, a 
 us effect upon me Spaniards. [See, particularly, 
 Mr C..n: in:'s k<.:ters to Mr. 1'iere, of )4(h J:in. a;.d 20' Feb. and 
 }yAi -'<>. C No. 3. 4. and Q. and F. No. 2.] I 
 
 , uce to a remark of the Edinburgh 
 
 ; . [iV>. '2.-J <>. '.'./. 3 ] upon Lor*i Casttereagh's incitdiila 
 
 instruction ui tl-e 1 1 10 Sir John Moo'/f, to follow " the 
 
 f v.ijhes and deteruimation" of tiie Spaiiish Government, that it
 
 ( 109 ) 
 
 as well a proof of confidence as the means of security 
 for our army, yet without this condition,- the Cabinet 
 positively refused to commit a British army, in the 
 pursuit of operations similar to those of 1808 ; 
 and thus, upon the retreat of Sir John Moore from 
 Leon, and the refusal of the condition offered to 
 Spain, the defence of Portugal became the first and 
 immediate object of attention. But, as well with a 
 view to this great object, as in the hope of still ren- 
 dering incidental assistance to Spain, Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley, to whom the command of the forces was 
 again entrusted, was invested with a discretionary 
 power of extending his operations into Spain * ; be- 
 
 refers simply to the question of transporting the army from Ga- 
 licia to Lislon or Cadiz. 
 
 * e< The defence of Portugal you will consider as the first and 
 <r immediate object of your attention .hit as the security of 
 " Portugal can only be effectually provided for in connection with 
 " the defence of the Peninsula in the larger sense, His Majesty, 
 " on this account, as well as from the unabated interest he takes 
 " in the cause ot Spain, leaves it to your judgement to decide, 
 " when your army shall be advanced on the frontiers of Portugal, 
 cr how your efforts can best be combined with the Spanish, as 
 " well as with the Portuguese troops, in support of the common 
 *' cause. In any movements you may undertake, you will, how* 
 " ever, keep it in mind, that, until you receive further orders, 
 " your operations must necessarily be conducted with a special 
 " reference to the protection of that country." Lord Castlereagb, 
 to Sir Arthur Wellesley, 2d April, lbO(>. [Papers presented in 
 1810, I. No. 1.] In a dispatch of the next day [same p 
 No. 2 ] the Secretary of State, referring to the refusal of the Spa- 
 nish government to admit British troops into Cadiz, acquaints the 
 General that " His Majesty does not feel that he can, injustice 
 ' to the safety of his own troops, again employ an auxiliary army 
 ' in Spain, till the Spanish government and nation shall cease to 
 ' entertain those feelings of jealousy, which aru equally incon- 
 ' siitent with their own interests and the effectual prosecution of 
 ' the war. You will therefore understand, that it is not His 
 '' Majesty's intention, in authorizing you to co-operate with the 
 " Spanish armies in the defence of Portugal and of the adjacent 
 " Spanish provinces, that you should enter on a campaign in, 
 ." Spain, without the express authority of your Government ; and 
 " iu any concert you may form with the armies in Spain, you
 
 ( HO ) 
 
 S 
 
 ing at the same time strictly enjoined not to enter 
 upon general operations in that country. 
 
 Lord Grey's censure of the conduct of our mi- 
 nisters in regard to the campaign of 180Q, is equally 
 general with that applied to the former campaign, 
 nor can the deficiency i>e supplied from any former 
 speech -f~. 
 
 Does Lord Grey censure the attempt (which has 
 hitherto been successful) to defend Portugal ? or 
 does he object to the instruction?, by which the 
 Commander of our forces was empowered to accom- 
 plish the purpose of his command by whatever meanS 
 might appear most advantageous ? 
 
 I have not been able entirely to satisfy myself as 
 to Lord Grey's opinion upon the defence of Portu- 
 gal ; but I justify the Cabinet from the charge of 
 rashness or folly, even if these instructions were 
 founded upon some degree of hope^ of a favourable 
 influence upon the cause of Spain. The inertness 
 
 " will cause it to be understood, that it is to be confined to the 
 " specific object in view ; and that the services of your army (u'n- 
 " der the orders you have received) cannot le employed in general 
 " operations in Spain, as the force under Sir John Moore teas in- 
 " fended to have been, tintkout a previous arrangement to that ef- 
 " J'sc.t being settled between the two Governments." Referring, 
 on the 25th of May, to this dispatch, Lord Castlereagh writes to 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley : " in order that you may be enabled the 
 " better to co-operate with the Spanish armies against the com- 
 " mon enemy, I am to authorize you to extend your operations 
 " in Spain beyond the provinces immediately adjacent the Portu- 
 *' guese frontier, provided you shall be of opinion that your doing 
 '" so is material to the success of your operations, and not incon- 
 " sistent with the safety of Portugal." 
 
 t There is, however, in both cases, the same confusion of the 
 distinct responsibilities of the ministers and the generals. I do 
 not lay stress upon this, because, in the present instance, it is the 
 line i/f opposition to identify the two parties, whereas, in the for- 
 mer, they were contrasted.
 
 ( "1 ) 
 
 of the Spanish government, and the inefficiency of 
 the Spanish armies, experienced in 1808, were quite 
 sufficient to authorize our refusal to commit our- 
 selves deeply in their operations ; hut, it must at the 
 same time be allowed that the continually renewed 
 opposition which the French had experienced in every 
 part of Spain *, since the termination of Sir John, 
 Moore's campaign, made it at least possible that we 
 had been too hasty in deciding that the cause of 
 Spain was utterly hope/ess; and at any rate proved 
 that a substantial, though perhaps a temporary relief, 
 must be given to Spain, by the appearance of oppo- 
 sition in any part of the Peninsula. 
 
 It is readily admitted, that whenever a Spanish 
 army had come to action with a French force, though 
 very inferior in numbers, the Spaniards had been 
 
 * Bonaparte has at no period of the war held any part of 
 Spain in subjection beyond those which have actually been occu- 
 pied by his troops. As the difficulties of subsistence, or the de- 
 mand for his forces in other quarters, have caused the abandon- 
 ment of any town or province, the Spanish authority has instantly 
 supplanted that of France. In the middle of January, 1809, the 
 French appeared to have complete possession of Gahcia ; yet, in 
 March, the Galicians, assisted only by two British frigates, re- 
 gained possession of the town and harbour of yigo ; in May re- 
 covered Santiago, the capital of the kingdom ; in June they re- 
 pulsed Marshal Ney with 10,OOO men at the bridge of San Payo, 
 and induced the enemy to evacuate, not only Corunna, but Ferro/, 
 one of the three great naval stations and arsenals of Spain. [Ga- 
 zettes of 26th March, J3th April, 4th and 8th July.] St. And^ro 
 was also recovered by the patriots in June. [Gazette, 24th June.] 
 The Marquis of Romana was unmolested at Villa Franca ; Gene- 
 crals Blake and Reding were occupying the attention of the 
 French in Catalonia, nor was it until June that they were de- 
 feated. Saragossa stood a semnd siege of five weeks, the bom- 
 bardment having begun on the loth of January, and the capitu- 
 lation signed on the K)th of February. On the 22d of the same 
 month the Duke of Albuquerque repulsed the French at Con- 
 guegra. Cuesta, as has been mentioned was defeated in March, 
 end driven behind the Tagus. [NV\v Antunl Register, p. 3-4-1. 
 &c. Bigland II. 499, KC. Buy'e Narrative of the second Siege ojf 
 Saragossa.]
 
 ( 
 
 almost uniformly 'defeated ; but none, of these de- 
 feats appeared to diminish the number of men. in 
 arms, nor to give to' the enemy a permanent occupa- 
 tion of the country in which they were sustained. 
 
 But the nipture between France and Austria, 
 which was by this time no longer doubtful, had given 
 a new character to the war, and was indeed a new 
 circumstance, which rendered inapplicable the opini- 
 ons formed on the experience of the prior campaign. 
 By this rupture, the situation of the French in Spain 
 became avowedly " rather critical *," and the " most 
 " dreadful consequences" were apprehended from it ; 
 surely it was not presumptuous to expect, that the 
 danger of the French position would be encreased, 
 and the dreadful consequences accelerated, by the 
 presence of a British force in Spain f. 
 
 One thing it was, at any rate, important for us to 
 avoid; the charge, on the part of an ally, whose cause 
 we have espoused with unprecedented warmth, of 
 having deserted it with unjustifiable levity. 
 
 I contend, then, on the whole, that ministers were 
 justified, not only in anticipating an operation on 
 
 * General Kellermaris letter to Marshal Soult, Valladolid, 31st 
 March ISOg. [Cobbett's Pol. Reg. XVI. p. 26.] 
 
 t " As Government," says Captain Pasley, " chose to make a 
 *' second effort, I humbly conceive, with all due regard to the 
 ' memory of that great man, (Sir John Moore) that the series of 
 ' important events subsequent to his retreat, has proved, that 
 ' though the army under his command was inadequate for deci- 
 ' ding the fate of Spain, still it was capable of, doing something, 
 ' fully capable at least of maintaining its footing in the Peninsula, 
 ' in u'hick it might have derived considerable assistance from the 
 ' Spaniards ; and as the war between FRANCE and AUSTRIA 
 ' broke out immediately afterwards, such a system would havt 
 ' been not merely practical!?, but highly advantageous to the 
 c common cause ofSpAiK, O/'GEKMAXY, and O/^GKEAT BRITAIN.'* 
 &P. 201-2.]
 
 ( "3 ) 
 
 the side of Spain, and in conjunction with a Spanish 
 force, as possibly the wisest step in the defence of 
 Portugal, but in looking to such a renewed co-opera- 
 tion, as likely still to produce a beneficial influence 
 upon the affairs of Spain, and upon the general state 
 of the war. 
 
 But this view of the subject, although very useful 
 towards estimating the importance of the campaign 
 of 1809, i s not necessary in its justification. Sir Ar- 
 thur Wellesley was not instructed to undertake, nor 
 did he undertake, general operations in Spain. 
 
 In obedience to the instructions which he had ac- 
 tually received, he landed at Lisbon on the 22d of 
 April *. Previously to that period, Marshal Soult 
 had penetrated Portugal from Galicia, and had ob- 
 tained possession, on the 29th of March f, of Oporto, 
 one of the principal objects of the country. On the 
 loth of May Sir Arthur Wellesley attacked and beat 
 his enemy on the Vouga; on the I2tji compelled 
 him to cross the Douro, and regained possession of 
 Oporto J ; followed him to the very frontier of 
 Galicia, with a rapidity which obliged him to throw 
 away his cannon, equipments and baggage, and to 
 evacuate the kingdom, with the loss of nearlv a 
 fourth of his anny. On the 18th of May not a 
 French soldier remained in Portugal. 
 
 * Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlcreagh, Lisbon, 27 April. 
 [Papers I. No. 14.] The force left at Lisbon under Sir John 
 Cradock had been already reinforced. [Eliot, 1(J5.] 
 
 f Eliot, 194 j New Annual Register, 180p, p. 343. 
 
 { Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, Oporto, 12 May. 
 [Papers 1. No. \Q, and Gazette Extraordinary of 25th May.] 
 
 Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, Monte Alegre, 18th 
 May. [Same papers, No. 17. and Gazette, June 3.]
 
 _ 
 
 These facts being undeniable, or, in other words, 
 the expedition having been completely aiul rapidly 
 A7/cc&w/M/, it is unnecessary for me (however grati- 
 fying the task) to expatiate upon the military merit 
 displayed by thcCommander *. Whatever disposition 
 there may be to depreciate the additional fame which 
 
 * Great pains have been taken to depreciate the advantages over 
 SOVLT. The whole is styled " en affair with SOUI.T'S rear guard ; " 
 and the loss sustained by the French is represented as simply that of 
 a few marauding stragglers. Now it might be fairly argued, that, 
 the service upon which an officer was sent being completely per- 
 formed, the enemy having confessedly retreated in haste before 
 him, abandoning to him the objects of contention, he is not to be 
 blamed, although the course of the service should present to him 
 no opportunities of brilliant victory. But I conceive that there is 
 sufficient evidence to prove that SOULT'S retreat was attended 
 with much more precipitance and disaster than Jess judicious and 
 active operations on our part could have produced. The French 
 Btdfotin spates, that the determination to retreat was taken on the 
 JOth of May. On this day the first engagement took place, and 
 it is distinctly stated by the French, that their VAN GAURD was 
 then attacked upon the Fwtga. It thus appears probable, that the 
 determination to retreat was the result of the first attack from the 
 British, but at any rate, it is not true, that the attacks of Sir A. 
 "NVfllesley were upon the rear-guard nf a previously retreating 
 army. Or, supposing that SOULT made up his mind to retreat on 
 the lOth, but Before the action, it would still be quite clear that a 
 retreat ordered when the enemy was almost within gun-shot, and 
 conducted through a country bitterly incensed, must have been 
 precipitate, and consequently disastrous, in a degree, fully war- 
 ranting Sir Arthur's opinion, that Spult lost one lourth of his 
 army. The second action (trifling according to the French) took 
 place, on the Douro, on the 12th. It is upon this occasion that 
 the JFrench speak of, an affair with their rear-guard. But the 
 point is in truth unimportant. The rapidity with which Sir Ar- 
 thur crossed the river was totally unexpected by the French. 
 Soult himself had scarcely escaped from his quarters; every ap- 
 pearance indicated his intention of offering a considerable resist- 
 ance, and his opinion that he should be enabled to conduct a lei- 
 surely and orderly retreat. [See the Bulletin, dated Paris, 22d 
 June; Cobbett, XVI. 23 ]. Soult's arrival in Galicia is at the 
 same time stated to have been " useful in dispersing the bands of 
 " armed peasants, who had endeavoured to take possession of 
 " Santiago and Lxvgo." \Ve have already seen that the marshal 
 filled in this object.
 
 ( "5 ) 
 
 Sir Arthur Welleslev acquired by this operation, it is 
 at least quite certain that neither calamity nor dis- 
 grace were incurred on the Vouga or the Douro ! 
 
 _, , . . 
 
 The French tell us that the superiority of our 
 
 force obliged them to evacuate Portugal ; and, that 
 they were thereby enabled to employ their force in 
 reducing Galicia, where the Patriots had taken ad- 
 vantage of their absence Even this statement is a 
 strong illustration of the efncacy of our exertions, in 
 the general cause of the Peninsula ; yet, in Galicia, 
 we must recollect, the French affairs, from this pe- 
 riod, grew continually worse * ! 
 
 But while the British General was employed in 
 his expedition to the north, Marshal Victor had 
 broken up on the Guadiana, and h;-cl crossed the 
 Tagus at Alcantara on the 14th of May. Although, 
 in marching to the northward, Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 had not been inattentive -j~ to the possible movements 
 of the enemy on. the Tagus, he now judged it e\pe- 
 'dient to direct his force against Victor. He accord- 
 ingly marched bv Braga to Coimbra and Abrantes ^ ; 
 thus protecting Lisbon, and obliging Victor \o retire. 
 Ti;i- French corps, however, still remained " in a 
 " menacing position in relation to the seat of govern- 
 " ment in Portugal and Spain jj ;" and Sir Arthur 
 
 * See p. 1 1 1 j and Pailfy, p. 207. 
 
 f See his letter of the 27th April. He had left 8000 English 
 and Portuguese at Abrar.ies, under Major-general Mackenzie, to 
 watch Victor. See Eliot [p. 196,] for an account of the move- 
 ments of Victor, and of the Portuguese troops, during this early 
 period of the campaign. 
 
 J For these details, see Sir Arthur Wt-llesley's letters to Lord 
 Castlereagh from Braga, 2O May ; Coimbra, 3 1 st May ; 
 7th June. [Paper*, I. No. 48. 2O. 21.] 
 
 ji Letter from Abrantes, llth June. [No. 22.]
 
 ( "6 ) 
 
 Wellesley resolved upon operations which should 
 oblige him to retire from this position. 
 
 It was in pursuit of this object, so essential to the 
 safety of Portugal*, the leading point of his instruc- 
 tions, that Sir Arthur Wellesley necessarily exerted 
 the discretionary power with which he had been 
 invested, by entering Spain, and connecting himself 
 with the army of Cuesta -j-, the 'most effective of the 
 Spanish armies. 
 
 He had been instructed to deliver and to defend 
 Portugal, and he obeyed his instructions. He was 
 empowered to promote this service by a co-operation 
 with the Spaniards, and to connect with it as much 
 assistance to Spain as would be consistent with the 
 safety of Portugal and of his own army. A total 
 
 
 * The probable necessity of this operation against Victor had 
 been foreseen by Sir Arthur Wellesley before he moved upon the 
 Uouro". " I intend to move against Soult and attack him, if I 
 ' should be able to make any arrangement in the neighbourhood 
 ' of Abrantes which can give any security for the safety of this 
 ' place during my absence in the north. I am not quite certain, 
 ' however, that I should not do more good to the general cause 
 ' by contributing with General Cuesta against Victor : and I be- 
 ' lieve I should prefer this last if Soult was not in possession of a 
 'part of Portugal which is very jtrtUf in resources, and of the 
 town of Oporto ; and if the operation with General Cuesta 
 would not. take up time which may be profitably employed 
 against Soult. It is probable, however, that Soult will not re- 
 main in Portugal when I shall pass the Mondego : and, if he 
 ' should, I shall attack him ; if he retires, I am sure that it will 
 ' be most advantageous to the common cause that we should re- 
 ' main on the defensive in the North of Portugal, and net vigo- 
 ' rously with CUESTA against VICTOR." Sir A. Wellesley to 
 Mr. Frere, Lisbon, 24 April, ISOp. [Papers, A. No. '3. End. 1.] 
 
 f Cuesta had been defeated in the end of March at Medellin 
 on the Guadiana by the Duke of Kelluno. [New Annual Register, 
 180p, p. 344 ; Bigland, II. 5O4.] At the present period he was 
 at Llerena ; but advanced again upon the Guadiana upon Victor's 
 moving to the Tagus. [Sir A. Wellesley's letter from Coimbra, 
 31st May, I. No. 20 ; Eliot, ch. XII.]
 
 . 
 misconception of the mode and degree in which Sir 
 
 Arthur Wellesley used this discretion/ in marching 
 to Talavera, has produced the censures with which 
 this campaign has been assailed*. 
 
 It has been supposed, or, at least pretended, that 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley advanced into Spain with the 
 view and with the hope of regaining Madrid, and 
 driving the French behind the Ebro or the Pyrenees; 
 
 * For instance, " Another corps, as insufficient as Sir John 
 Moore's to cope with the French force, was sent into the heart of 
 Spain, when that country was over-run with victorious armies, 
 when the distractions and weakness of its government had in- 
 creased, when the most fanatical of our prophets foreboded the 
 extinction of popular enthusiasm, and the native troops had given 
 new proofs of their utter inability to stand before the legions of 
 France This gallant body of men, after being w eakened, as before, 
 ly DETACHMENTS and SKIRMISHES in PORTUAL, after being de- 
 layed, as before, for want of money and supplies, entered Spain, 
 as before, immediately after three armies of Spaniards had been 
 totally defeated by the enemy, and moved towards the CENTRE of 
 the Peninsula, exactly as before, unthout ONE EARTHLY OBJECT in 
 view, lut to take a look at the country and get near the French 
 The parallel indeed ends here ; for it was only in the plamii-ng that 
 the campaign of the North was copied. The British general was 
 attacked in front by a superior force. A rare mistake of the French 
 general and the extreme gallantry of English soldiers saved him 
 from destruction, and EVEN enabled him to repulse tha enemy 
 but a large army, the very same that he had somewhat whimsically 
 boasted of hiring DESTROYED a few weeks it-fore, came down 
 upon his rear, and he was compelled to fall back upon Portugal with 
 the utmost rapidity. Too happy to escape with any troops at all, 
 he left his sick and wounded to the vanquished French. Scarcely 
 hoping to carry off" the victorious English, he left the " invincible 
 Spaniards" to get one more beating; and was in this plight driven 
 out of the country -which he came to save, by one army whicii he 
 has completely beaten, and another which he had ENTIRELY DE- 
 STROYED !" [No. 29, p. 232.] I need make no further reference. 
 There are not in Great Britain, perhaps not in the world, tii-o 
 works in which it would be possible to find ^> <'reat powers of 
 composition, combined with so utter a di r.-vrd .('justice, can- 
 dour and truth. I wish that every sentence, r!,v:se :>nt! express/a 
 of this compendious history, may be steadily kept in view, while 
 the facts of the campaign are under consideration.
 
 and inasmuch as he never got further than Taluvera, 
 he is said to have been defeated in the object of his 
 expedition, which is accordingly censured as impru- 
 dent, rash and wild.! Yet the fact .is,- that he entered 
 Spain with a specific object, which object he accom- 
 plished. That he was induced, by any consider- 
 ation, to use his discretion in moving into Spain, is 
 a matter of accusation with Lord Grey ; how justly, 
 the motives and the result of his movements must 
 jointly enable us to decide. 
 
 When the British army returned to Coimbra in 
 the end of May, Victor, who (as has been stated *) 
 previously threatened the Portuguese capital, being 
 within a few leagues of the frontiers, and dirertly 6i\ 
 the road to Lisbon, withdrew himself from that po- 
 sition, but still continued between the Tagus and the 
 Guadiana f. To dislodge him from this position was 
 the concern of the Spanish general Cuesta, the scat 
 of whose government was also endangered by his 
 presence, no less than of Sir Arthur Wellesley ; a 
 concerted plan, for this express purpose, was the na- 
 tural consequence of this similarity of interests ; 
 and such was accordingly arranged J between the two 
 commanders. To oblige VICTOR to retire appears to 
 h'jve been the original extent of this combination ; 
 with the limits thus assigned to it, Cuesta was by no 
 means satisfied ; nor ought our astonishment to be 
 excited at his unwillingness to narrow the scope of 
 operations, in which he was materially to assist, to 
 a purpose in which he had only a secondary interest, 
 and which appeared inferior to that to which the 
 
 * P. 115. 
 
 f See Sir Arthur Wellesley's letter from Thomar, above cited. 
 
 % Letter from Abrantes, llth June. [Papers, I. No. 22.] 
 
 Letter of 1 1 th of June.
 
 combined force was fairly competent. Such, appa- 
 rently, were the motives which induced Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley, on the 1 1th of June to " extend the ob- 
 " ject of his co-operation*" with Cuesta ; and not 
 only, as had formerly been its purpose, to oblige Vic- 
 tor to retire, but to gain, if possible, such an advan- 
 tage over that corps of the French army, as should 
 give greater permanence to the security of Portugal, 
 and materially encrea^e the chance of success in Spain. 
 
 i 
 
 But it must be most clearly recollected, that this 
 plan had its limits, and limits assigned to it, in great 
 measure, by the very considerations which gave rise 
 to Lord Grey's objections. 
 
 \t\lLVf. 
 
 Finding it impossible to induce the Spanish Gene- 
 ral f to second, in a mode consistently with his own 
 safety, a movement upon Victor's rear, Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley proceeded to collect the allied force in his 
 front ; and on the 1 1th of July " arranged a plan of 
 " operations upon the French army, which they 
 " were to begin to carry into effect on the 18th, if 
 " the French should remain so long in their position j." 
 For he had, by this time, and before his retreat be- 
 came more than justifiably hazardous, felt the dirfi- 
 
 * Same letter ; and one also from Abrantes, of 17th June. 
 .[No. 23.] 
 
 f It was tire proposal of (he British general, th.it the Spaniard 
 should remain in a strong portion : buch a one as that by which 
 " he had kept in check the French nrrniea so long ;" while the 
 British should endeavour to cut off Victor's retr.'nt by the bridge 
 of Almaraz. Rut Cues?a had not ;\ secure position on the G'.ia- 
 diana, and coulcl not iu- persuaded to draw further Inck. It \va 
 then intended that the bvo armies should join in the G:V: 
 hut Victor's retreat to Talavera induced Sir Arthur (\vitii Cu 
 concurrence) to remain on the north of the Tagus. [Letter of 
 1/th June.] 
 
 \ Letter from Placentia, 15th July. [No. 26. and Gazette ef, 
 the 12th of August, 18Og.]
 
 culty of marching through Spain ; and fixed, accord- 
 ingly, a limit to his operations of offence, acquainting 
 the Spanish Commander, that " he should consider 
 *' the removal of the enemy from the Alberchc as a 
 " complete performance, on his part, of the engage- 
 " into which he had entered on the 1 1th of July *." 
 
 The advance, therefore, to Talavera was a measure 
 adopted for the specific purpose of relieving Portugal 
 from the danger with which she was threatened by 
 Victor ; in which purpose we were to be assisted by 
 the Spaniards, and, reciprocally, to give to their re- 
 sistance every chance of success -f~, which could be 
 derived either from the defeat of a considerable 
 French army, or from the withdrawal of every corps 
 from the distant provinces, in order to fight the great 
 battle on the Tagus ; at a time, more especially, 
 when BONAPARTE'S success against Austria was more 
 than ever doubtful . 
 
 * Letter from Talavera, 24th July, [No. 27 ] inclosing one 
 written on the \Qlh, from Placi-ntia, to Major-general O'Do- 
 noghue, Cuesta's adjutant-general ; " Nothing shall prevent me 
 from carrying into execution the arrangements which I settled 
 with General Cuesta, when I had the pleasure of seeing him, 
 although to do so will be attended with the greatest inconveni- 
 ence, on account of the deficiency of the means of transport, 
 which I then hoped that this country and CiudadRodrigo would 
 have afforded; but I think it but justice to the army under my 
 command, and to His Majesty, to determine that I will under- 
 take 7iu neu' operation, till I shall have been supplied with the 
 means of transport which the army requires ; and but fair and 
 candid to General Cuesta, to announce to him this determi- 
 nation. at the earliest moment." 
 
 f Some objects might be added, directly affecting British inte- 
 rests. The. relief of Galicia contributed materially to the safety 
 of the Ferrol squadron, which was safely conveyed to Cadiz, and 
 has subsequently been placed completely out of danger. Accord- 
 ing to Lord Grey, " a heavy responsibility rested uj on ministers 
 " in respect of the Spanish navy." Speech, 24th March, 1809, 
 [Cobbett, XIII. 799.] 
 
 J Sir A. Wet. 'Lesley had hear.'., at Abrantes, of the Battle of As- 
 pern. Lord Castkreagh's speech, 1 Feb. 1810, [Cobb. XV.
 
 With these inducements, then, neither sanguine 
 of great success, nor confident of approaching 
 glory, Sir ARTHUR WELLESLEY advanced towards 
 the Alberche. After various proceedings * on the 
 part of the Spaniard, little consonant either with the 
 object of beating Victor separately, or with the limits 
 assigned to the advance, (but in which Sir Arthur 
 protected his ally, as far as was compatible with 
 his own security,) the allied arrnies were attacked at 
 Talavera ; not by Victor alone, but by Victor 
 united with all the troops, which, when " the danger 
 t( was imminent, and it was necessary to take decided 
 (f measures," " it was in King Joseph's power to 
 " oppose to his enemy -j~." The attack was never-, 
 theless repulsed ; I have no wish to exaggerate the 
 glories of TALAVERA ; but I cite the words of a Mi- 
 nister of War |, with whom Lord Grey sat in Coun- 
 
 * The two armies having united at Oropesa on the 22d of July, 
 Sir A. We I Lesley proposed to attack Victor, who was then sepa- 
 rately po-ted on the Alberche, on the 23d. This, Cuesta, for 
 reasons which have never been explained, positively refused. In 
 the night, Victor retired with much rapidity, in order to meet his 
 reinforcements. The loss of this opportunity was unspeakably 
 important. On the 24th and 25th, Cuesta, of his own motion, 
 followed the enemy to St. Ollalla, and even to Torrijos, but was 
 attacked at Alcabon and driven back on (he 26th. General Sker- 
 irooke advanced as far as Casalegas, to cover the retreat of Cuesta , 
 who was at last persuaded to take up a very strong position at * 
 Talavera, on the right of the English. In the French report, 
 Cuesta is represented as contemplating, in these forward move- 
 ments, a junction with Vanegas, but his own report shews that 
 he had no such motive ; nor any more precise object than " the 
 " hope of reaching the enemy's rear-guard, or some portion of it. 1 ' 
 [Report made to King Joseph, published at Paris, 2/rh Sept. 
 18Og. Cuesta' s report, Seville, / Sept. ISCX), Cobbett's Political 
 Register, XVI. 559 ; Sir A. Wellesley's letters from Talavera, of 
 the 24th and 29th of July ; Papers I. 27 and 28.] 
 
 f Report to King Joseph. 
 
 \ Mr. WINDHAM. Speech on the Vote of Thanks to Lord 
 Wellington, 1 Feb. IS 10. [Cobbett, XV. 209.] 
 
 R
 
 ( 122 ) 
 
 cil, when I profess that " the arguments I have 
 " heard,'' from Lord Grey and others *, " do not 
 " divest me of the opinion that the battle of Talavera 
 *' fi'fis a GLORIOUS VICTORY." No man, in fact, has 
 denied, that it was a victorious ami destructive re- 
 pulse of a vigorous and well-supported attack. ; that 
 the British army maintained their ground after the 
 battle, while the enemy thought it prudent to retire, 
 or that the enemy himself confessed that " the battle 
 " was doubtful f." But the day was gained, it seems, 
 through " great faults" and " rare mistakes' of the 
 French, and by " the extreme gallantry of British sol- 
 diers r That the bravery of our troops mainly con- 
 tributed to the victory, who can wish to doubt ? who 
 can dare to doubt ? But was this quality displayed, for 
 the first tune, at Talavera ? Was it a chance, which 
 Sir Arthur H'ellesley* of all the Generals on our Staff, 
 ought to have left out of his calculations ? Or, if it 
 
 ~ 
 
 * Lord Grey opposed the Vote of Thanks in the House or' 
 Lords, '2(3 Jan. 18 10 ; Lord Willesley's reply, as well as that of 
 Lord Cnstlereagh to a similar opposition in the House of Com- 
 mons, ought to he read by every person wishing to form a correct 
 judgement of the merits of our General. [Cobbett, XV. 140. 
 145. and 238.] 
 
 f " The battle of Talavera was dmltful. The French con- 
 " ducted their attack badly, and committed great faults. But the 
 " allied army was superior to the French, :.s it consisted of 38,OOO 
 " Spaniards and 20'. (XX) English, whilst the French army amounted 
 " only to 45. QUO men." [Notes of the Moniteur on the Debatei 
 in the House of Lords on thanking Lord Wellington ; Cobbett, 
 Pol. Reg XVIII. 5;o'.] And in a iormer Moniteur (28th Sept. 
 18O9) " The English fought well ; Victory at Talavera was 
 " claimed on both si.'les." In reading the French comparison of 
 Kiiml'en, we should bear in mind the following passages, in the 
 Moniteur last cited : " We do not speak of the Spaniards ; they 
 " may be reckoned for a .great deal in order to plunder isolated 
 " individuals, even to defend themselves behind a wall, but they 
 <c must lx- cour 'fa for Inrdiy r.nv tiling in a pitched battle, as the 
 " English mvy liavs convinced thennseiv&J' A.nd 'Hain ; " the 
 f: Spaniards cannot be reckoned at above one ihird in pitcheti 
 "battle." [S/, llth Octohei-
 
 ( 123 ) 
 
 could be supposed that there really was- at Talavcra, 
 a more than ordinary display of British valour, from 
 what possible circumstance could it spring r Did 
 our soldiers tight for a more than usual stake ; were 
 they enthusiastic in the cause of their allies ; were 
 they more than commonly exasperated against their 
 enemy ? No : if they fought particularly well under 
 General Weileslcv, it was because by General Wel- 
 lesley they were particularly well commanded, and 
 because in him they placed a more than ordinary 
 confidence. 
 
 But even this extreme erallantry,- it is said, would 
 have availed nothing, but for the rare mistahes of the 
 Marshals of France ! Wherein those mistakes con- 
 sisted, I leave to military men to discover ; 1 know 
 nothing but that they attempted successively the right, 
 the centre, and the left of our line,, and failed in each 
 attack. But what if they did commit these " great 
 faults ?" Had French M;:.r:>hals always been fault- 
 less ? Was their superiority so surely established, 
 that it was criminal, in 1800, for a British General, 
 to oppose his own skill to that of a Frenchman ? 
 What thanks, then, do we not owe to him wlio first 
 exploded this pusillanimous error, and Umirht us, in 
 his own person, the absurdity of our distrust * ! 
 
 Even Lord Grey, it appears, considered this battle 
 as a victory, if taken without reference to the prior 
 and subsequent occurrences ; for he would have 
 
 * Captain Pasley says, speaking of tht- French, " their won- 
 ' dcrfuL generalship appears no Jess problematical ; it at least 
 ' produces no great results when they are opposed to resolute 
 
 enemies. Even in their operation-, against the Spaniards," [as 
 we shall presently see] " the French talk mure- often of the er- 
 ' rors thin of the talents of their own general* 5 and whenever 
 ' they have contended with us, they stem td have committed the 
 ' most unaccountable blunders ; &c. &c." [P. 487.] 
 
 R 3
 
 ( 124 ) 
 
 " cordially joined" in the vote of thanks, if he had 
 seen nothing but the report of the battle * ; but he 
 took, it seems, " the general object *pf Lord Welling- 
 " ton's advance into Spain to be ttyat of driving be- 
 (f fore him the enemy's troops, and obtaining posses* 
 ff sion of the Capital of MADRID f !" And, in this 
 point of view, it was natural enough that he should 
 consider Lord Wellington as defeated in his object ; 
 for, assuredly, the battle of Talavera had no such 
 splendid consequence, but was, on the contrary, fol- 
 lowed by a retreat into Portugal. 
 
 Now, I trust that I have shewn, that the view of 
 the subject, which, before Lord Wellington's pro- 
 ceedings had been explained in Parliament, and illus- 
 trated by his correspondence, Lord Grey might pos- 
 sibly be justified in forming, is a view, nevertheless, 
 entirely mistaken. 
 
 Referring, then, to those which were in truth the 
 purposes of the forward movement J, I ask, in the 
 
 
 
 3 * Speech, 26 Jan. [p. 145.] ; Lord Grey might have been con- 
 tented even with the French report, without relying upon the ex~ 
 pressiont. Their own detail of what passed at JOSEPH'S head- 
 quarters, on the night of the 28th and morning of the '2.()th, is de-- 
 cisive of the defeat which they had experienced. Ignorance, 
 among the Generals of Division, of each other's movements ; 
 equal ignorance in the Commander ; confused reports as to the 
 state of the allies ; and as the result of the whole that " Se- 
 " bastiani had fallen back upon the reserve, with the 4th corps, 
 " because the 1st corps was retiring ;" and " there u-as now 
 "no time to deliberate; it was necessary to follow this move- 
 " went." Even this report (which assumed the tone of success 
 much more than the subsequent comments) speaks of the mis- 
 takes of General Leval as occasioning the failure on the left. 
 [SuN, llth, 12th, 13th Oct. 180p .] In the notes it is said, (by 
 the French, who were the attacking party,) the English were- 
 beaten every time they attempted to advance upon the French, 
 
 I P. 141. 
 See P. 120.
 
 ( 125 ) 
 
 first place, whether the danger which threatened 
 Portugal was not greatly diminished by the battle of 
 Talavera ? The attack upon f^ietor singly, which 
 was prevented only by the objections of Cuesta *, 
 would have produced, no doubt, a more complete 
 discomfiture; but it may be questioned whether 
 even that more decisive, but more limited success, 
 would have demonstrated more effectually to the 
 French Marshals, the incompetency of their force, 
 in the then state of Spain and of the war, to the 
 projected invasion of Portugal. No man can pos- 
 sibly ascertain, whether, if the French army had not 
 been repulsed and maimed at Talavera, a combined 
 attack would have been made upon Portugal ; but we 
 may safely pronounce, that if such an attack was in 
 contemplation, it was prevented by the battle of Ta- 
 lavera. Whether, looking only to the interests of 
 Portugal, the anticipation of the attack was preferable 
 to a more defensive policy, is an unimportant ques- 
 tion, unless we leave out of the consideration, the 
 co-operation of CUESTA. For it is certain, that if the 
 British army had remained within the frontier of 
 Portugal, no sense of reciprocal interest would have 
 induced the Spanish Generals to connect their opera- 
 tions with those of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who would 
 therefore have had to cope with the whole strength 
 of France ; now, without estimating highly the value 
 of Spanish troops, in regular battles, I cannot doubt 
 that the. army of Cuesta, when he was at last per- 
 suaded to occupy the strong position on our right, 
 marked out for him by Sir Arthur Wellesley, did 
 contribute materially to the defeat of the enemy at 
 Talavera ~j~. With reference therefore to the safety 
 
 * See P. 121. 
 
 f We need not, perhnps, estimate the Spaniards, for this pur- 
 pose, at more than the proportion allowed by the Monitcur. One 
 third of the force would probably have been sufficient for vender-
 
 of Portugal alone, the effects of the march into 
 Spain, and of the battle of Talavera, were greatly 
 beneficial. 
 
 But it would in fact be quite unfair, thus to narrow 
 our views. Can it be doubted for a moment, that 
 the battle of Talavera was advantageous to Spain ? 
 Can it be supposed, that if the armies of France had 
 not met with the severe check, which they have in 
 fact themselves acknowledged, they would have 
 remained inactive ; that they would have abstained, 
 from the invasion not only of Portugal, but of the 
 southern provinces of Spain ? Or if it should be 
 imagined that they would, but for this discomfiture, 
 as they actually did after it, have remained for the rest 
 of the year strictly on the defensive, and on the 
 right bank of the Tagus ; would they, but for the 
 movement of the British army, have evacuated the 
 provinces of the north, leaving F"igo, Corunna and 
 Ferrol, in the undisturbed possession of the Patriots? 
 The successive and severe defeats * which the Spa- 
 
 ing " Talavera an unattackable post." When alluding to the 
 S;v-Mvsh army at Talavera, I must refer to a remark in Lord Grey's 
 speech of 26 Jan. 1810, [p. 142.] that " the dispatch of the Spa- 
 " imh General gave a very different account of the conduct of 
 " troops, from that given in the dispatch of Lord "Wellington." 
 I venture to aver, that CuestaV report, bearing date, Seville, the 
 /th of September, was, as far as related to the battle of Talavera, 
 translated from that of Lord Wellington, with a little interlarding 
 of praise of his own countrymen. This, I think, was pretty 
 clearly proved, from an accurate foliation, in a series of papers 
 under the head of " Military Operations," published in the 
 Morning Post about that time. The very date proves that the 
 report was not formed upon Cuesta's own knowledge in fact, 
 he had, immediately after the battle, written short and incomplete 
 accounts, for which the report from Seville was afterwards sub.- 
 stituted. [See Papers A. 12. Encl. 8 and 9.] 
 
 * Of the operations of the Spanish armies there are no very 
 particular or certain accounts. Blake, though defeated in Aragon, 
 according to the French, on the 15th of June, [Fiench Bulletin, 
 2()th Junej Cobbett, XVI. 26.] threw succour* into Gcrona in
 
 ( 127 ) 
 
 nish armies experienced in the autumn and winter of 
 1 809, form no exception to my observation, on the 
 inactivity of the French. These disasters, if I may 
 say so, were sought for by the Spaniards, who, against 
 the advice of Lord Wellington and Lord Wellt-^ley, 
 attempted objects far beyond their reach. But even, 
 with the advantage of these successes, it was not 
 until the ensuing year that the French extended 
 themselves in the South, (where they have not, to 
 this f/.??/, accomplished their principal object,) while 
 in the North they have not even attempted to regain 
 the ground, which, for the sake of opposing Sir 
 Arthur Wellesley at Talavera, they abandoned in the 
 summer of 180Q. 
 
 But if it should be admitted that the measures of 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley were in fact productive of con- 
 siderable advantages, it would nevertheless be ob- 
 jected, in this case as in that of Sir John A/uore, that 
 thev were more than counterbalanced by the con- 
 comitant disasters. 
 
 Such is, at least, the opinion of Lord Grey ; but 
 here again I must venture to susp :ct, that as his 
 judgment of the failure, as he terms it, of the second 
 
 October. I am far from subjecting the movements of this army 
 to the general reflexion cast upon the Spanish Commanders. But 
 Arehaga, who succeeded Cucsfa, certainly brought upon himself 
 his defeat at Ocanha in November [French ar.J banish Bulle- 
 tins, Cobbett, XVI. QS8 amfppO; and NJU Anna. 
 353.] Nor can the Duke del Paryac, who h.:d been 
 very usefully successful at Tamarncs against the division o; 
 then commanded in Marchand, [fi, writes, l ' and 28 Nov. , 
 be excused for placing himself in the way of disaster at Mia de 
 Tormes, where he was routed by A": nber. 
 
 [Sun, 3d and 8th Jan 1810 ] I do not pretend to give ? ecu rate 
 accounts of these occurrence^ or even references to them ; 
 were French accounts of still other victories,, but of none which 
 produced any great result, until towards the end of January 1S1O, 
 when Soult passed the Sieira
 
 ( 128 ) 
 
 expedition into Spain, was built upon an idea, per- 
 fectly erroneous, of its motives and object, so his esti- 
 mate of the consequent misfortunes is founded upon 
 a misconception, not less general or important, as 
 well of their causes as of their extent. 
 
 Accurately to appreciate or compare the good and 
 evil of the proceeding, if not impossible, is certainly 
 beyond my powers ; Lord Wellington (for the mi- 
 nisters are surely not responsible) might, I am con- 
 fident, be satisfied to let the advantages gained by 
 the battle of Talavera be set against the losses there 
 sustained, and those of the march which followed ; 
 his character, I am persuaded, would not suffer, 
 although his measures were put to the severest of 
 trials, the Trial by Result : but a recollection of 
 certain other occurrences is necessary, as well for 
 doing perfect justice to Lord Wellington's inten- 
 tions, as for explaining the degree in which he failed 
 in their fulfilment, and the causes and consequences 
 of his partial failure, occasioned or encreased by these 
 untoward events. 
 
 It has already been mentioned that the plan of 
 operations of which the march of the British army 
 to the Alberche formed a part, was arranged between 
 the allied Generals, at Placentia, on the 1 1th of July. 
 It was then settled that Vanegas, with the army of 
 la Mancha, should advance from the province of 
 Toledo, towards Arganaa *, where he was to be on 
 the 22d or 23d of July, so as to draw off the atten- 
 tion of Sebastiaui, ^then occupied according to the 
 French report -j~, in watching his motions) as well as 
 
 * See Lord Wellington's letter to Lord Wellesley, Badajoz, 
 3O Oct. ISOg. [Papers H. 4. p. 15.] Argcmda is about lour 
 leagues from Madrid. 
 
 t Cited in p. 121.
 
 to threaten the capital *. Although F'ancgns was 
 under the command of Cuesta, to whose operations 
 this movement was essentially necessary, the Central 
 Junta countermanded the orders ^ which had been 
 given by Cuesta, and Fancgas occupied himself in 
 an useless cannonade of Toledo. The effect was, as 
 had been foieseen, that the combined armies were 
 engaged with the enemy's concentrated force ^. 
 Thus, in the very outset, was the British Ge- 
 neral deceived and thwarted. Ignorant, however, 
 of this unaccountable proceeding, faithful to his 
 engagement, and willing to accelerate as much as 
 possible the defeat of Victor, he proposed to attack 
 him on the 23 d; the motive of Cuesta's objection 
 to this proposal remains unexplained; but it had, no 
 doubt, a very serious effect, greatly increased by the 
 defection of Fanegas, upon the success of the sub- 
 sequent operations. If SEBASTIANI, and King JO- 
 SEPH, and VICTOR united, could make no impres- 
 sion upon the allied army, it can scarcely be doubted, 
 that Fictor alone would have been utterly discomfited. 
 Although such a victory, would not, as I apprehend, 
 have been followed, under all difficulties, by per- 
 manent operations in Spain, it would have been ac- 
 complished in all probability, with a loss much infe- 
 rior to that sustained at Talavera ; and would have 
 enabled Sir Arthur Wellesley, if the approach of 
 SOULT and his three corps had made an early retreat 
 
 * Sir Robert Wlhon with a corps of 8 or 10,000 Spaniards and 
 Portuguese, was at Escalona, in communication with Madrid; 
 being so placed as either to support the Spanish troops at the 
 passes on the left of the allies, or to favour the movement of 
 Panegas. 
 
 f The orders of the Junta were afterwards withdrawn, but 
 not till it was too late. [Lord Welleslej-'s Speech, p. 14o.] 
 
 J Letter of 30 Oct.
 
 ( 130 ) 
 
 adviseable, to have effected it without the sacrifice 
 which accompanied his passage of the Tagus. 
 
 If. on the other hand, General Wellesley had ven- 
 tured to oppose himself to SOULT, (as he had in- 
 tended, even under the circumstances which took 
 place, had CUKSTA retained his frost at TALAVERA ) 
 there can be little doubt but that he would again 
 have so completely maimed him *, as to have justi- 
 fied the utmost loss which could have been expected 
 on our part. 
 
 On the whole, then, I feel justified in contending 
 that Sir Arthur Wellesley's plans were feasible and 
 judicious, and that they were materially deranged by 
 the conduct of the Spanish Generals. Had his 
 prompt and combined disposition been followed up, 
 the corps of VICTOR would have been separately and 
 .severely beaten ; and the three corps of SOULT, NEY 
 and MORTIEK, united under Soult, would have been 
 defeated and rendered incapable of annoying the al- 
 lies for a considerable time in any further operations ; 
 the corps of SEBASTIANI, and King JOSEPH'S reserve, 
 would have been fully occupied, as long as their 
 movements continued to be important, by VAXEGAS, 
 and the defence of MADRID -\. It would be in vain 
 to speculate upon the further results which would 
 have followed the separate defeat. of Victor, but a re- 
 
 . * Of the force of Soult, after he was joined by -Nay and A/or- 
 llcr, 1 cannot form an exact estimate ; but it is probable that it 
 was not in^rior to that of the French army at Talavera ; the 
 HJnnilfur estimates the whole force opposed to us, at 170 batta- 
 lions, and SO or QO squadrons; of which S6 battalions and 4O 
 squadrons are stated to have composed the 1st and -4th corps and 
 the 'escrvc-, engaged at Talavera. It should also be recollected, 
 tliaf pix'viously to an attack upon Soult, the three brigades of re- 
 inforcement would have joined bir Arthur Wellealey from Lisbon. 
 
 f It must not be supposed that, on this occasion, the French 
 would have -.oted upon the syst&ttirof tactics which has been attri-
 
 collection of times and places will surely satisfy us that. 
 by such a success, the losses ndtirined by the British 
 would have been avoided, or fully compensated. 
 
 ' 
 
 But, leaving these speculations, or rather, I trust, 
 ; just calvula'aons c-i' the result of irusoi 
 
 expectation, I ask, what, after ail, -were th'.-.-c sad 
 misfortunes and disasters, which, in Lord ( rey's 
 mind, appvar to have obliterated every consideration,, 
 either of cause or consequence ? Let us resume 
 our narrative. 
 
 Marshal SOULT had been commanded, indepen- 
 dently of the march of the allied army to the Al- 
 berche, " to march, against the English, seek th.^ni out 
 " wherci^er the might be, aiid engage tlicm \" With 
 this view he was to unite under himself his own 
 corps, which then occupied Salamanca and Znmo r a ) 
 NEY'S, which was in J^alladolid and its environs, 
 and MORTIER'S, which occupied Benavente, Asttfrga, 
 and Leon f. 
 
 It would thus appear, as I must observe in pass- 
 ing, that it did not rest with Sir ART HUH "W ELLKS- 
 LEY to choo.-e a system of mere defence, but that 
 
 buted to them, perhaps rather too generally, by disregarding, for a 
 time, all objects lul one. They certainly would not have risked 
 the possibility of fanegas entering Mud/ id, even though they ex- 
 pected to return to it in a week. 
 
 * Report to King Joseph. 
 
 f " The latter corps," says the Report which I am citing, 
 " had in its front the troops commanded by Romana, and the in- 
 <( snrerents of Galicia and the Asturias." 1 Lave understood that 
 a movement by Romnna, so as to harass this < orps on its march 
 to the Southward, was a part of the I'.mmn nii-nt made at Pla- 
 ' ; but Romana had not left Corunna in the first week of 
 August, 
 
 S 2
 
 ( 132 ) 
 
 these corps from the North would- at all events have 
 sought him out, and, if possible, have brought Inm 
 to action ; VICTOR continuing, all the time, in his 
 " menacing posit !o?i" 
 
 Within a few days after the battle of Talavera, the 
 British General was advised of the movements of 
 Soult*; the intelligence became so serious, that it 
 was agreed between the allied Generals, that the 
 British army should march towards Placentia to op- 
 pose the enemy -f^ while the Spaniards remained in 
 their " uriattackable po?t J" at Talavera, in charge 
 of the sick and wounded of the British, for the re- 
 
 * Letter to Lord Castlereagh from Talavera. 1st August. [Pa- 
 pers, K. 2.] Lord Wellington ha& been blamed for not having 
 calcuiaj:eu sufficiency upon the probability of Souit's advance, 
 and lor not h;.virAj taken sufficient precautions in order to arrest 
 his progress. To this T answer in the first place, that the ad- 
 vance- of this small force, for a specific and limited purpose, 
 neither required nor admitted of that perfect provision tor every 
 point, which onghi perhaps be thought essential, in the com- 
 mencement of general operations against a superior force the 
 question would therefore ^till turn upon the expediency and im- 
 portance of the movemt-ht against factor It was impossible to 
 detach a British force for the occupation of the passes through 
 which the three corps came down upon the Tagus ; but as it was 
 a kind of service to which the Spanish troops had en former oc- 
 casions shewn themselves competent, Sir Arthur Wellesley was 
 justified in expecting that they would offer at least a temporary 
 resistance. He had accordingly, when at Plactntia, taken steps 
 for securing the Puertos de Banos, and Terales, by Spanish and 
 Portuguese troops. [Letter to Marshal Beresford, J /th July. 
 Encl. 1 in K. No. 3.] The former, however, was abandoned 
 by the Spaniards \\ itl out firing a shot, so that the enemy entered 
 Placentia on the 2d of August. [Letter from Deleytosa ; and 
 that of 30th Oct.' to Lord Weifesley.] See also, for this charge 
 and the answer, the speeches ot Lord Lan^downe and Lord Wel- 
 lesley, on the motion of the former, 8th June, 1810. [CoLb. 
 XVII. 472 and 484.] 
 
 f Letter from Deleytosa, 8th August. [K. No. 3. and Gazette 
 of 2d September.] 
 
 $ So styled in the Report to King Joseph.
 
 ( 133 ) 
 
 moval of whom, however, from a situation in which 
 they were certainly too far advanced, CUESTA was 
 requested to take immediate measures *. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley then proceeded as far as 
 Orr pesa, where he found that the enemy had arrived 
 from Placentia at Naval-Moral., whereby they were 
 between him and the bridge of Ahnaraz, At this 
 period CUESTA. without any previous communication 
 with Sir Arthur Wellesley, (who in vain endeavoured 
 to detain him-f-), but upon a professed idea of the in- 
 competency of the British force, left his strong position 
 at Tatavera, thus abandoning our hospital, and leav- 
 ing VICTOR at liberty^ and joined our army at Oro- 
 pesa. 
 
 It thus became probable, that the allied army 
 would have to contend with the whole force of the 
 enemy, ^excepting only such .small portion as 
 should be necessary to watch Panegas} 'without a 
 safe retreat, with short provisions and deficient means 
 of transport | . This would have been an undertaking 
 
 * Letter of 8th of August ; and enclosure, dated Oropesa, 3d 
 Aug. to General O'Donoghue. That knlj of the army should 
 proceed against Soult, was the proposal of Cuesta. Sir A. Wei- 
 lesley offered either to go or stay, with the whole of the British j 
 and on Cuesta's giving him the choice, he preferred to go. 
 
 f Letter to General O'Donoghue, 3d Aug. [Enclosure 7. in 
 No. 3.] 
 
 J Another charge against Lord Wellington (in which Ministers 
 nlso are very unjustly implicated), rests upon his supposed neg- 
 lect ot the means for supplying his army. Here again, as indeed 
 in every step of the enquiry, it is necessary to refer to the limi- 
 tation of his object; and here this reference is more especially 
 just and important, because the fa.ilure of supplies was the very 
 ground of the limitation-. It has been shewn [p. 120.] that as 
 early as the l6th of July, notice had been given to Cuesta, that 
 without further assistance, the British army must cease to co- 
 operate with him. The same conviction was expressed by Sir 
 Arthur Wellesley in every letter to Lhu King's Minister at Seville.
 
 ( 134 ) 
 
 unjustifiably, hazi'/oV > beyoixl the instructions 
 under wire h Sir Arthur Wtllesley acted, and the 
 specific limits of his concert with CUESTA ; lit rh re- 
 fore new determined upon retiring to a derensive 
 line upon the Tagus, which he accordingly cros/ed 
 on the 4th of August at the bridge of /irzobixpo, 
 leaving about 1,50O of his wounded at Talavera *. 
 He continued his inarch, by Dtici/Losa to Jaraicejo, 
 where he remained from the llt/i to the '2Qtk of Au- 
 gust, " with his advanced posts on the Tagus, near 
 " the bridge of Alrnaraz," within gun-shot, almost, 
 of the enemy. But as the " distress for want of pro- 
 f( visions, and the means of transport^," which he 
 liad incessantly arid in vain represented to the Spa- 
 nish Government, continued still to decrease, he 
 w r as at. last induced to act upon the intention which he 
 had from the commencement professed ^, by -with - 
 ' 
 
 [To Mr. Frere, 16th nnd 24th JnV; A. Enc. 1 in N<.. 1J ; and 
 1 in N;.. !.{.] It constitute' I one o* thf reasons for not 
 'i'*tor, which were to be balanced asjainst the 
 'i\ i.ivour of the ;Mh-unce j a iitile more or less 
 vptlght m;iv be Sttfihttt^a tn ci\ii-ir plc 5 '^, \vithout any crimination 
 of Lord vV^il'n^, ; oil's &!cis$>n But the evil effect of the deci- 
 is to the jioim of supplies, h'vs assuredly Ut-en n"u:h fxag- 
 i;< rated. The grcnt deficicno. was in biv:.u, and in t'ie means of 
 transport, and 'the arm; suftl-red, li-ur.i these causes, 
 
 yonie iiiconvenient e, uut ni.-thiM^ like, disaster. .>,> i was the dis- 
 cipline of the troops at all nvjnivd ; Lonj V'- 
 
 / ordered, that while deficient rations v.vre issued, the 
 usuul stoppages from the pay of the men shoni'i not be made. 
 [Lftttr to Lord Weilesley, 30th October, ISOp.] Ncitlii- 
 
 further from my wishes, tlian to exonerate the Admi- 
 '! n at the expence of their General j but I am sure that 
 nt> man who rrads Lord Castlereagh's lciio;b tu Lord Wellington, 
 nt tlie Government dictated his me 1 , cmeuts, or the de- 
 gree ui VkiMch he should rely r.pon the Spaniards. 1 ; i Wel- 
 ;i exercised his own discretion, a:. ;, .0 1 contend, justifi- 
 . sakly; and ad\ antaeously. 
 
 * Ti-.e remaining 2,OOO were brought oif. Letter of 8th Aug. 
 
 - f Letter from Truxillo, 21 Aug. [K. 5. and Gazette, 9 Sept.] 
 
 J See pp. 1 1C), 120, and his letter to Mr. Frerc, 24th July j an3
 
 ( 135 ) 
 
 drawing altogether from Spain. He retrented ac- 
 cordingly to TrnxUlo, whence he retired, after some 
 days, by Merida to Badajoz, on the frontiers of 
 Portugal *. 
 
 In this movement, coupled with the loss of the 
 15OO wounded, consists the " mi? fortune, calamity, 
 " and disgrace" which in Lord Grey's opinion, were 
 
 the only results of our second entrance into Spain ! 
 
 i 
 
 The loss of the wounded was unquestionably an 
 occurrence very much to be lamented, but if we 
 bear in mind the favourable results which were ac- 
 tually produced by the battle of Talavera, or the 
 difficult operations which would have been necessary, 
 and the sacrifices wh.ch would have been reasonably 
 expected, if that battle had not been fought, we 
 ought not to attribute to this, its only lamentable 
 consequence, the character of a severe misfortune. 
 Sir Arthur JVtllesleys march to Talavera, like that 
 of Sir John Moore to Sakagun, was an operation ne- 
 cessarily involving risk ; the retreat from Sahagun, 
 before any battle was fought f, was unavoidably ac- 
 
 a recapitulation of these proceedings in his letter to Lord Wei- 
 ksley, frola Badajoz, 3O October, 18Oy, cited in p. 128. 
 
 * Letters from Truxillo, 21st Aur^t ; and Badajoz, 4th Sep- 
 tember. [\os. 5. and 7-] Tlu- it.uc-s are particularised} in order 
 to counteract an idea which has been sr-j.^'y enough (.-n;jr- 
 tamed, that this retreat was p-\>cit)itats. " it is rather curious/', 
 says Captain Eliot, who was with the army, " to see how this 
 rutiv.u is construed by some of our on Journal.- intoo.ve 
 
 the most rapid and disastrous : the far:* 'is, that with the exception 
 of two or three days, when in an open country, the army 7it*vi-r 
 moved more than eight or t-n HUI<.*> a da", fon 9t half' that 
 
 /re; meat was pleruitul'y jnuvided, but bread the country 
 did not atrbrd. 7'he only time we experienced any great scarcity 
 of the former was during the two ciay.s' ar'ii.n, \ ninds, 
 
 as well as bodies, were too actively einpl-jyeu to itxl tue want of 
 it." [Page 133.] 
 
 f I beg to be understood here as stating facts, and not as giv-
 
 ( 136 ) 
 
 companied with severe losses ; by the battle of Ta- 
 lavera, Sir Arthur Wellesley was enabled to conduct 
 his march from Oropesa * to Jaraicejo, without any 
 of the daily and accumulated losses and mishaps, 
 injurious to the spirit and discipline of the soldier, 
 which are natural in a precipitate retreat ; while 
 on the other hand, he made the one great but 
 definite sacrifice, incident to the sudden abandon- 
 ment of an offensive operation, however glorious or 
 successful. 
 
 In this case, as in the former, I avoid the dis- 
 cussion of military details ; I trust that I have shewn, 
 that the small portion of responsibility which the 
 Ministers incurred in investing their General with 
 a discretionary power of entering Spain, was such 
 as they ought not to have avoided. I trust that 
 I have shewn, that the exercise of this discretion, 
 while as a warlike operation, it has not been unat- 
 tended with misfortune* has produced none which 
 can be designated as calamity, much less any thing 
 which can be stigmatized as disgrace^ ! 
 
 ing opinions. There were very many reasons for fighting at Ta- 
 lavera, which did not exist at any of the periods in which, as has 
 been thought by some, Sir John Moore ought to have risked a 
 battle. Indeed, without going into details, the Austrian war, 
 might perhaps in this, as in many other points, be considered as 
 completely distinguishing the two cases. 
 
 * The movement from Talavera to Oropesa, was not a retreat, 
 nor was the march from Jaraicejo occasioned by the strength or 
 movements of the enemy. From Oropesa to the defensive posi- 
 tion ou the left of the Tagrus the movement was necessarily rapid, 
 but not so as to occasion disaster of any kind. 
 
 f The extraordinary combination of brilliant and dangerous 
 talent, cited in p. 117, should now be re-perused. The reader 
 has now seen the nature of the "detachments and skirmishes in 
 PORTUGAL;" and of the " one earthly ot-ject," something more than 
 that of " taking a look at the country," with which Sir A. Wcl- 
 le-ley moved towards the centra'*' (how artfully managed !) " of 
 the peninsula" He has, possibly, appreciated the good luck of
 
 ( '37 ) 
 
 - 
 
 Those, even, who consider the Castilian cam- 
 paign as an unsuccessful experiment, may b: 
 tisfied that the experiment was called for, by the 
 state of the war *, by the interests of our allies, 
 and perhaps even by the honour of our arms. 
 -Those who admit,, as I have stated it f> the im- 
 portance of the service rendered to Spain by the 
 battle of Talavera, will derive from a contemplation 
 of the events of ISOp, a satisfaction more perfect 
 and unmixed. 
 
 But whik I thus limit and qualify the merits of our 
 operations in Spain, and of the policy pursued to- 
 ward that part of the peninsula, I apply no such re- 
 serve or doubt, to our proceedings in Portugal. 
 
 Talavera. He has certainly convinced himself, that the " loast 
 of having destroyed, a few weeks before, the large army v/iuch 
 came down from the north ;" is INVENTED by the Writer ! He 
 has doubtless seen, that this army from the north consisted, not 
 only of the very same which Sir A. Welle.sley had ^not "entirely 
 destroyed," hut) beaten and expelled from Portugal, but of TWO 
 OTHERS also, with neither of which had the British been engaged. 
 And lastly, he must have ascertained the " rapidity" 
 which Sir Arthur Wellesley fell back upon Portugal. 
 
 J have here only mentioned the gross and glaring perversions. 
 But, in fact, scarcely t-.vo words are put together, without 
 lumnious implication. " Another army," for instar, 
 " into the heart of Spain," as if such had been ti;>- onler uf Go- 
 vcrnmciit. " Invincille Spaniards"' so marked and placed, as if 
 the expression had been used by Lord (I 
 
 
 I could add much on the comparison and contrast of this 
 campaign v.-ith that of I- I presume tiiat where the re- 
 
 lation of one of t. i of comparison is so utterly 
 
 incorrect, it would be thor.?f. xamine the correctness of 
 
 the contrast ; and it is not with laurels torn from the brow of one 
 honoured and lamented soldier that / wish to adorn the temples 
 of another. 
 
 * Seep. 112. t Seep. 126,
 
 To Portugal, not four years ago. Lord Grey was 
 willing to ship our troops, " as fast as the means of 
 " transport could be provided;'' for Portugal, not 
 four years ago, " there was no exertion in the power 
 of this country, in pecuniary assistance, or in naval 
 or military succours*," which, if she would take vi- 
 gorous measures Jor her own defence, Lord Grey 
 would not have advised his Majesty to make. 
 
 * L/r*tffi '" r ft 
 
 Now, then, when reviewing the state of the na- 
 tion, whose protection was thus generously promised 
 to Portugal ; in estimating the power and success 
 of the enemy, against whom she was to be de- 
 fended, in enquiring, how far, by any exertions of 
 England, that power has been diminished, or that 
 success impeded ; in arraigning his successors in the 
 administration for a fatal deviation from his own sys- 
 tem of war, and lamenting over the consequent ca- 
 lamity and disgrace, in what situation does Lord 
 Grey find Portugal? In a careful and systematic 
 representation .of errors and misfortunes, to which, 
 in the conduct of his successors, he cannot discover 
 one exception, what are the blunders which he cen- 
 sures, what the calamities which he bewails, in ex- 
 
 posing their demeanour towards Portugal ? 
 r & j?T3D 
 
 He omits the subject altogether ! But if retaining 
 a portion of his former attachment to this interest- 
 ing country, he had condescended to notice her 
 actual situation, Lord Grey must have thus spoken 
 
 o a J 293n}', 
 
 He must have told his noble auditors, that the 
 views of Mr. Fox, of Mr. WINDHAM, of Lord 
 GREXVILLE, and of himself, in regard to the im- 
 portance of preserving Portugal from France, were 
 
 ' 
 . \- 
 
 * See p. 72.
 
 "!'. . *t i .t r ol lOl Ifk^QLfJhtf^L oTF * 
 
 entertained equally by their successors ; and that, by 
 those successors, PORTUGAL had been defended. 
 
 He would have said, that almost from the day on 
 which Sir Arthur Wellesley first landed in Portugal *, 
 to that on which he delivered his speech, the sub- 
 jugation of the kingdom had been prevented ; by 
 " the aid in money, troops, and ships -J-," which his 
 Majesty has furnished, in conjunction with the 
 " vigorous and effectual measures of defence" 
 adopted by Portugal herself. 
 
 ' * *-' ' *** * -* // v-'vi J i * J ^j (I I JijIlLI Jrf3 III"" ' *' Z 1 [I J J iO I. Oj 
 rr T J- j x J i A*. 
 
 If I were disposed to discuss merely upon the ar- 
 gument ad hominem, the expediency and importance 
 of attempting to defend Portugal, I can hardly ima- 
 gine a topic, which upon that mode, could admit of 
 a more perfect triumph. It is impossible to con- 
 ceive any reason for defending Portugal in J806, 
 which did not exist in 18O8, and 1810. There are 
 new circumstances, it is true ; but how do they 
 operate ? The knowledge, surely, afforded by the 
 treaty of Tilsit, does not render it less important to 
 preserve from the power of Bonaparte, the fleet * 
 and harbours of Portugal ; nor does the revolution in 
 Spain render it less desirable to maintain Portugal 
 
 as a free and friendly state t. 
 
 J + ^R 
 
 
 
 , 
 * See p. 62. --yi^ f See p. 72. 
 
 | As to the new circumstances bearing upon the practicability 
 of the attempt, besides the Austrian \vai which was temporary, 
 see pp. 64, and 1O7 8. It is hardly worth while to notice, as a 
 difference- operating the other way, that the army expected to iu- 
 vade Portugal in 1800, was to consist only of 3O,()00 men ; 
 because it will probably not be contended, that Bonaparte ha .1 
 any other reason tor limiting his force to that am >unt, th'in his 
 opinion that it would be sufficient for his purpose. Or, if it 
 should be said, either that he could not, or would Hot, speedily 
 
 T 2
 
 Yet Lord Grey, in. effect, treats PORTUGAL as oi.<. 
 of the provinces of the Spanish peninsula ; and puts 
 the preservation of that kingdom,, upon no higher 
 ground of expediency and advantage, than that ot 
 Galida or Catalonia, 
 
 This neglect of. Portugal, in a representation of 
 t|ie motives and success of the peninsular war, ren- 
 ders it equally incomplete and unfair. In order to 
 supply the omissions of Lord Grey, it is necessary, 
 in this place, to resume the summary of events *. 
 
 The instructions originally given to Lord Welling- 
 ton f remained in force : " his Majesty had never 
 " ordered, hut bad only permitted him to carry on 
 <c such operation?, in Spain, as he might think pro- 
 " per, upon his o^vn responsibility, and as were con- 
 <f sistent with the. safety of Portugal," " for the de- 
 <f fence of \yhich country the British array had been 
 tf sent to the peninsula ^." ' The confidence reposed 
 by the Spanish Government in Lord Wellington and 
 the British army, certainly encreased after the battle 
 of Talavera, notwithstanding the subsequent aban- 
 donment of offensive operations. General Cucsta^, 
 of whose -proceedings Lord Wellington had made a 
 formal complaint, was permitted to resign his corn- 
 
 augment it, and that in' the mean time we might with good po- 
 sist our ally, the whole case on the other side would by 
 those admissions be given up. 
 
 * From p. 134. f p - 1Q9- 
 
 | S:r A. Welleslev to Lord Wellesley, Mori da, 24 Aug. 1809. 
 (Taper; B. Ere. D in No. 5.] 
 
 General Cce?ta anticipated the Jrnta, by resigning on the 
 12th of August, on account of ill health ; but it appears by Lord 
 "VVellesJey's Setter of the 2 1st August, that the Junta .were well 
 disposed to receive cnr remonrtrcncc-, snd made a merit of their 
 accuieseence. [Papers 1810, E. JSos. 3. and 4. 2d Eccl, 1.]
 
 tnand. The Junta being extremely averse to the with- 
 drawal of the British army from Spain, made great 
 promises of ample and regular supplies, appeared to 
 acquiesce in every su -v-tioii of the British General 
 or Ambassador, and lin:illy offered to Lord Welling- 
 ton a corps of 12,OOO men, under his own- com- 
 mand. But Lord Wellington was of opinion that 
 no specific offensive operation was at that time prac- 
 ticable, or would be useful either to Portugal or 
 Spain, and that general operations in Spain, were, in 
 the relative state of the armies, quite out of the 
 question ; he therefore declined the acceptance of the 
 Spanish force, which might have committed him 
 to a continuance in concerted measures, or involved 
 him in the defence of the Guadiana, (the then ob- 
 ject of the Junta) an operation which he thought 
 not practicable, against a superior force, and which 
 he could not, at any rate, connect with the defence 
 of Portugal *. 
 
 " When Lord Wcllesley was sent to Spain as Ambassador, he 
 was instructed to communicate with Lord iPefRngton on ilie pos- 
 sibility of carrying on offensive operations, with a British array 
 of 3O,OQO. It was left to Lord Wellington to determine upon the 
 practicability of this measure, which, without his concurrence, 
 was not to be mentioned to the Spanish Government ; nor was it 
 to be adopted, unless it should be considered as the best means of 
 saving Portugal. Cadiz was to be demanded, or not, according 
 to Lord Wellington's opinion of its necessity. In case of the 
 British army retreating into Portugal, a garrison for Cadiz was to 
 be offered, independently for the defence of that kingdom. 
 
 The papers which refer to the period between (be battle of Ta- 
 lavera are too voluminous for citation, or for particular 
 but those chieily to be consulted are as follow : Pnj>ers A. from 
 Xo. 14. and Papers B. particularly Lord Wellington's k' 
 Lord Wellesley, from Trtirilfo, '1 1st A cl: 8.] 
 
 from Merida, 2-4th and 31st Aug. and 1st of Sept. [Xo. 5. 
 4. 5, and 11.] and Badajn<s, 3d S^pt. and 30th Oct. before men- 
 tioned. His dispatches to the Secretary of Slate [in Papers 1. 
 and K.] extend to the iCth of November. The instructions to 
 Lord Wellesley, of 12th Aug. [in D.] and his Lordship's dis- 
 patches from Seville, especially those of the 4th Aug. 2d and i ith 
 Sept. [B. Nos. 4, 5, and 6.]
 
 -BA^E3r i 9l_i -To>v : iyv ; *'**--aflMr t^K - 
 
 As long, however, as a compliance with the wishes 
 of the Spaniards, by remaining within their frontier, 
 was not inconsistent with the main obiect of his in- 
 
 ^ fj t( i rf j ~" 
 
 strnctions, he retained his position at Badajos. But 
 early in December, the French, no longer weakened 
 by the war on the Danube, indioatirg a disposition 
 to renew the offensive, and even threatening Ciudad 
 Rodrigo, a point of much importance, Lord Wel- 
 lington took up the position" in the centre provinces 
 of Portugal, north of the Tagus, in which he still 
 remained, at the period of Lord Grey's Speech. In 
 this position, he could most effectually protect the 
 most valuable points of Portugal, while he possessed 
 at the same time the means of an easy and secure 
 retreat, in the event of a reverse *. 
 
 By this time France had no other war than that of 
 Spain and Portugal ; BONAPARTE, whose estimate of 
 Spanish troops and commanders had, from an early 
 period, been very low, had in fact no other enemy 
 than Lord WELLINGTON. So convinced was he of 
 his ability to destroy this feeble foe, that he publicly 
 ridiculed in his Moniteur the attempt to defend Por- 
 tugal, the subjugation of which he stated to have 
 been, up to that time, retarded by the war with 
 Austria *^. Lord ffeUesley, it was sneeringly said, 
 pretended to defend Portugal, Lord Wellington would 
 give him better advice, by adopting the plan of nobly 
 embarking in his transports %. 
 
 In order to accelerate this desired consummation, 
 thus confidently expected at Paris, a new Com* 
 
 , 
 
 * On this subject, see Capt. Eliot's Treatise^, cbnp. 5. and 6. 
 
 t Notes on the Speech at the opening otf the Session, 18JO. 
 [Cobb. XVII. 314.] 
 
 I Notes on the debates on thanking Lord Wellington. [/ 
 661.]
 
 ( 143 ) 
 
 jnanderwas selejpted for the French armies; MAS- 
 SENA collected hid forces on the frontier * : Portugal, 
 which up to that moment, tivAic months Jrom the 
 expulsion of Soult, had not been entered by a French 
 soldier, was now to be overwhelmed and subdued. 
 The time was now approaching when the Imperial 
 Eagles were to be planted on the fortresses of Lis- 
 lon -\. Lord Wellington and his army, constituted in 
 the judgment of Bonaparte, the only obstacle to his 
 success ; and a force, much more than competent 
 
 to his overthrow, was now approaching his lines. 
 
 > rr & 
 
 c u *u 4. i. r *u r> t i i 
 
 Such was the state of the war in Portugal, when 
 
 Lord Grey was lamenting, in anticipation, the ulti- 
 mite failure of our expeditions, and estimating the 
 disasters consequent upon the subjugation of the 
 whole peninsula ! In a mind even less deeply im- 
 pressed than Lord Grey's, with a sense of the mar- 
 tial superiority of France, fear might at such a mo- 
 ment be predominant. But he not only states his 
 doubts and his fears, he reasons as if they were 
 already realized,, he predicts a failure, and argues 
 from his own foreboding as from an accomplished 
 
 fact. 
 
 
 
 * See his Proclamation, on assuming the command, 12 May, 
 1810. [SuN, 25 June.] It had been said in the Monitenr on the 
 18th February, that the favourable state of affairs in Spain not 
 requiring the presence of Bonaparte himself, his journey was in- 
 definitely postponed ; but that the l>ukeof A'-rantes (Juxor) 
 was in the course of a month to enter I'OKTUG \i. with a consider- 
 able artny, to put a period to the war in the peninsula, BY DRIV- 
 ING THE ENGLISH OUT OF THAT COUNTRY. [Suif, 3d March, 
 ISlu] 
 
 f This had been said ns long ago as Sept. 1309, and it was 
 waggishly proposed that Lord Wellington, u-hn, in the course of 
 the winter, would be driven into the T'igus, and forced to evacuate 
 Portugal, should be styled DUK.E ot LISBON. [See Moniteurs of 
 28th and 30th Sept. lb(k). Sux, llth October.]
 
 ( 144 ) 
 
 The crisis was assuredly awful.; it justified much 
 doubt, and anxiety, and apprehension. Nothing 
 but Lord WELLINGTON, with the troops, and the 
 influence, and the character of Great Britain, stood 
 in the way between Massena and success. To one. 
 only point, in the whole region of that empire of 
 which he covets the dominion, was the attention bf 
 Bonaparte directed as an object of his arms ; all the 
 adventitious causes which had hitherto retarded its 
 accomplishment were removed, and it remained only 
 to be seen, whether the idea of thwarting the great 
 conqueror in a favourite. expectation, by the. arms 
 and the counsels of Great Britain, was or was not a 
 ridiculous fancy. 
 
 Up to this period, be it recollected, Lord Welling- 
 ton had accomplished all that had been expected from 
 him, much more than had, (with the single excep- 
 tion of the expulsion of the French from Eg\ pt) been 
 accomplished, for years, by a British force: now, 
 that there remained no effective Spanish army, to 
 arrest the progress of the enemy, and no continental 
 war to divert his attention, Lord Wellington's ability 
 to fulfil the instructions which he had received in a 
 \i-ry different state of affairs, had become the object 
 of a doubtful- experiment, of which, to him, the 
 success would be very highly creditable, and tiic 
 failure not at all disgraceful, 
 
 But Ministers, it may be said, ought not to have 
 suffered the experiment to be tried. Let him 
 who is disposed to acquiesce in this observation, be 
 prepared to name the period^ at which we ought to 
 have abandoned our enterprise. He must be ready 
 to say, whether he censures altogether the. employ- 
 ment of the troops in the peninsula io 1808 ; whe- 
 ther he thinks, that at the commencement of the 
 Austrian war,, in the spring of 18OQ. we ought to 
 have evacuated Portugal ; whether having been
 
 ( 145 ) 
 
 previously justified in attempting her defence, we 
 ought to have left her to her fate after the peace of 
 Vienna ; or, lastly, whether we ought to have re- 
 called Lord Wellington, in 18 1O, at the precise mo- 
 ment in which the fate of the kingdom seemed 
 about to be decided. 
 
 It is easy for a man to say, that, as things have 
 turned out, he wishes that we had not mixed our- 
 selves with the fate of Portugal ; that although Bo- 
 naparte has met with unexpected difficulties, that he 
 is now sensible of them ; and that, as he has done 
 on greater occasions, he will exert himself to sur- 
 mount them, and succeed at last ! The true ques- 
 tions are, whether we ought from the commence- 
 ment, or at what subsequent period, to have let 
 Portugal fall under the dominion of our enemy, with- 
 out any attempt on our part to avert her fate. 
 
 The proceedings of 1806, 1807, and 1808, of 
 which enough has already been said, had perhaps 
 not so committed us with Portugal as to create an 
 imperious call for the expedition of 1 8OQ ; but 
 when that expedition was undertaken, the employ- 
 ment of our troops in the peninsula stood upon 
 a foundation of policy, distinct from, and superior 
 to, that which dictated the defence of Portugal. 
 Had Bonaparte, at that time, been aware of the dif- 
 ficulties of his enterprise, he could not have sur- 
 mounted them without sacrifices and exertions, 
 which would have raised our defence of Portugal into 
 a diversion of incalculable importance in the general 
 war. 
 
 \ 
 
 It has been the usual policy of this country to 
 connect with our measures of diversion in favour of 
 continental allies, such more immediately British 
 objects as might, in case of failure in the larger pur-
 
 ( 146 ) 
 
 pose, compensate us for the sacrifices and expences 
 of our expedition. It has seldom, perhaps never, 
 happened, that we have been able so to connect the 
 two projects, as to satisfy our ally ; nor have we 
 failed unfrequently in the British object. We have at 
 least always been accused, of attending too much to 
 England, and too little to Europe. These imputa- 
 tions have not always been just * ; those who made 
 them have not attended sufficiently to the difficulty 
 of assembling and transporting, in good time for 
 useful co-operation, a force strong enough to en~ 
 sure its own safe retreat in case of a reverse. 
 But I believe it would be difficult to point out a 
 case of continental enterprise with the view to 
 diversion, in which the objections have not been 
 made, as well by our allies, as by the opponents of 
 the government of the day . 
 
 Now, I contend that by no possible direction of 
 our force, could we 'in the spring of 1809 have so 
 well combined the various purposes of a continental 
 enterprise, as by sending it to Portugal. Expedi- 
 tions, more acceptable to jiustria, might doubtless 
 have been devised ; whether any plan could have 
 been executed with great results, is a question of 
 much more doubt ; but immense as was the im- 
 portance of the Austrian war, it was not every thing. 
 If Austria had been more successful than she really 
 was, her success would, perhaps, have been more 
 productive, than the utmost success that could be 
 expected in the peninsula; but it was at no period 
 very probable that the triumph of Austria would 
 have been so complete, as to occasion the aban-^ 
 donment of all the other views of Bonaparte. Yet, 
 by any other scheme of co-operation, we must have 
 given up, for the chance of this stupendous turn of 
 
 See pp. 47, 48, and the notes in 79, 80.
 
 ( 147 ) 
 
 events, all the fruits which had been produced, to 
 us and to our other allies, from the measures we 
 had pursued, and, especially, all the positive advan- 
 tages which we possessed in Portugal, advantages, 
 greatly to be encreased in importance, by an unfa- 
 vourable termination of the German war. For, 
 putting aside, (which I am by no means inclined to 
 do) the great and NEW advantage of successfully re- 
 sisting Bonaparte somewhere, putting aside, (equally 
 in opposition to the doctrines which I inculcate) the 
 superior benefit of a continuous policy, which rather 
 perseveres in one line, than speculates in another,- 
 it will be admitted that every motive of self-preser- 
 vation which induces us to look with anxiety to a 
 French occupation of the coasts and ports of POR- 
 TUGAL, must be heightened in proportion as France 
 triumphs elsewhere over the demand for her troops. 
 
 ( 
 On the mode and degree in which the expedition 
 
 to Portugal was calculated to assist Spain, I have al- 
 ready sufficiently enlarged *. 
 
 From the nature of some of the reasons with 
 which I have supported the measures of 180Q, their 
 validity, it will be seen, does not turn at all upon 
 the question, of the probable duration of our suc- 
 cess in Portugal. In no other contemplated scheme 
 of operation was permanency considered ; if, there- 
 fore, the occupation of Portugal was, upon other 
 grounds, our wisest step in the general contest, as a 
 single operation dictated by the state of the war in 
 Germany, it was at least as likely to be permanent 
 as any other of the projects of diversion. 
 
 I am inclined indeed to believe, that upon some or 
 
 * See p. 1 10, &e. 
 U 0-
 
 othef of the considerations which I have offered, 
 few persons objected to the policy of reinforcing the 
 army in Portugal in 1 80C), excepting those who ob- 
 ject, permanently and generally, to all foreign ope- 
 rations. 
 
 Am I not then justified in this conclusion s-~ 
 unless we had either refused, from the very com- 
 mencement, to interfere in the peninsular war ; or 
 had declined, in 1809, to accept of the advantages 
 afforded by the Austrian war, to our ancient policy 
 and unvarying interests as to Portugal ; or had neg- 
 lected to improve that advantage by strengthening 
 our influence among the rulers and people of the 
 country, we must have found ourselves at the period 
 of the peace with Austria, in the situation with re- 
 spect to Portugal in which we actually stood. That 
 is, we must have had in that country a numerous 
 army ; we must have been in a regular course of 
 measures for forming, training, and maintaining, 
 under our own command, a Portuguese force *; and 
 for acquiring, or retaining, an influence in Portuguese 
 councils. 
 
 aalnino bns usfjj^ 
 
 Ought we then, when the Peace of Vienna wa 
 
 . , , 
 
 t The measure of taking a Portuguese force into British pay 
 had been in progress from August, 1808, when the Lusitanian 
 legion was formed under Sir Robert Wilson and Colonel Mcnjne ; 
 in March, 1 809, General Beresford was sent to organize the Por- 
 tuguese on a larger scale, and in the following year, a Convention 
 was concluded with the Prince Regent, by which a force of 30,OOO 
 men were taken into our pay. [See Sir Robert Wilson's Preface 
 to his Sketch of the Russian Army, p. xxi. ; Capt. Eliot, ch. t>. ; 
 the correspondence with Mr. fritters, laid before Parliament 20th 
 Feb. 1610} and his Majesty's Message thereon. Cobb. XV. 44O.} 
 See also a recommendation of the measure of officering the Por- 
 tuguese, by English, in Earl St. Vincent's speech, igth Jan. ISOp. 
 [Cobb. XII. p. 8.] The utility of this force has subsequently 
 been proved.
 
 hastening the awful crisis, and our hope of the ulti- 
 mate preservation of Portugal, partook more and 
 more of apprehension, to have abandoned our en- 
 terprise once for all ? Ought we, just at the mo- 
 ment of danger, to have shrunk from a participation 
 in the resistance, which, up to the point of danger, 
 we had praised, encouraged, and supported ? 
 
 Let not Lord GREY, turn from these considerations 
 as " chivalrous and romantic *." Let him not put a 
 stop to my enquiries by such general language as this : 
 " Those heroic virtues which shed a lustre upon in- 
 dividual man, must in their application to the conduct 
 of nations be chastened by reflexions of a more cau- 
 tious and calculating cast f ."- I say that it is by cau- 
 tious reflection, and by a calculation of future re- 
 sults, in opposition to what might be at the moment 
 more dazzling, or might appear more immediately 
 to belong to our interests, that our perseverance in. 
 Portugal is proved to be wise. 
 
 mrtioo nwo TJLJO isbnu 
 
 By the evacuation of Portugal, we should hare 
 entirely abandoned the footing, which by a more re- 
 gular and uninterrupted system of policy than can in 
 almost any other instance, be attributed to British 
 diplomacy, had been obtained by Great Britain in the 
 councils of Portugal ; thus rendering it almost im- 
 possible to revert at any more favourable opportunity, 
 to the defence of Portugal, with any hopes of advan- 
 tage founded upon the co-operation of Portugal her- 
 self ; for it would be quite unreasonable to expect 
 that we should again so recover the confidence of the 
 Portuguese, as to provide for the security and main- 
 tenance of our army, or to obtain such a direction 
 of their population and resources as would give us 
 any prospect of success. 
 
 . -,-g,-,,, [-,' . . - l -' ' ' I I 
 
 * Speech, p. 19. f P. i.
 
 ( 150 ) 
 
 We should have thrown away the fairest opportu- 
 nity of advantage which had offered itself to us for 
 years, an advantage which we had been, through the 
 whole contest, seeking in vain, but which in Por- 
 tugal alone we had obtained, because in Portugal 
 alone we had pursued, under successive admini- 
 strations of the Government, one unvaried and unin- 
 terrupted policy. 
 
 But not in Portugal alone would the effects of our 
 evacuation have been felt ; in every country in which 
 at any time hereafter we might land our troops, the 
 recollection of our abandonment of Portugal, without 
 a struggle, would have created an obstacle to our 
 success. Whether the evacuation should be im- 
 puted to perfidy, to pusillanimity, or to a real infe- 
 riority of force, the effect would be the same in de- 
 stroying all confidence in British co-operation. Nor 
 can it be answered, that, to have been beaten out of 
 Portugal would have been equally mischievous to our 
 interests in that country, and elsewhere ; of that 
 result, the only ill effect (at least, if "extreme gal- 
 lantry'''' had, perchance, been displayed by our sol- 
 diers) would have been diffidence in our numbers : 
 but on the occasions, and of such there are many, 
 where character is of greater importance, the recol- 
 lection of a brave, skilful, and protracted defence of 
 Portugal, against the undiverted force of France, 
 will always be equivalent to ten brigades ! 
 
 Statesmen, therefore, who upon the termination 
 oif the German war, had looked with much more ap- 
 prehension than hope, to the success of Lord Wel- 
 lington's expedition, might nevertheless have objected 
 to its recall. 
 
 The considerations, upon which I have urged the 
 inexpediency of giving up the contest, as soon as the 
 Austrian diversion was at an end, tend equally to up-
 
 ( 151 ) 
 
 hold the policy of continuing it, after the fall of 
 Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and Massena's inva- 
 sion ; to the latest period, in short, in which re- 
 sistance is practicable without an enormous risk. 
 
 Within what period, Lord Grey looked in June 
 last, to the subjugation of Portugal, his speech does 
 not explain ; but its tenor rather gives it to be under- 
 stood, that nothing short of ultimate and lasting 
 success will justify, in his Lordship's mind, our exer- 
 tions in her behalf: and this sentiment has been 
 more distinctly pronounced by Lord LA.NSDOWNE, 
 Lord MOIRA, and Lord GKENVILLE *. 
 
 According to this view, it would be argued, that, 
 allowing the force of the reasons which have been 
 offered, against an abandonment of the cause, we 
 have ourselves., unfortunately at least, if not unwisely, 
 created the necessity of perseverance, in a cause, 
 \vhich, in its progress, has become expensive, hazar- 
 dous, and fruitless. >13jn: 
 
 r T - . . , . .'fa ,*lU8i 
 
 This I controvert ; I maintain that neither was a 
 sanguine hope essential to the policy of our exertions; 
 nor ultimate success their only acceptable fruit. 
 
 * In the debate of 22d Feb. 181O, [Cobbett, XVII. p. 532, 
 529, 511.] 1 do not quote particular passages. The whole of 
 each speech ran upon the idea of the utter hopelessness of the 
 attempt to defend Portugal, and of predictions of the speedy and 
 disastrous return of our army ! Lord Grenville, on this occasion, 
 (p 513) made use of some of his strong language in reprobating 
 the comparison of the case before him with that of IbOf) " In 
 the former instance, France iras fully occupied in another quar- 
 ter.'" (Was she not in I BOf) :) " The situation of Europe was 
 far different then." True is then Poland more useful than 
 Spain, to an army invading Portugal ? I should have given more 
 time to an analysis of this speech, if subsequent events had not at 
 Jeast suspended its operation. It is daily becoming a better and 
 better illustration of the impolicy of uttering pivphecieS, when a 
 short-hand writer happens to be near.
 
 Upon several grounds, independent of character 
 and good faith, we ought to keep Portugal as long as 
 we can, even though we have no great expectation of 
 saving her at last. My first ground, I know very 
 well, will be referred to a short-sighted policy ; it will 
 be said to illustrate the distinction between true 
 statesmen, and ministers of expedient. But I must 
 nevertheless retain the conviction of the occasional 
 expediency of trusting a little to the Chapter of Ac- 
 cidents. Admitting that success in Portugal was 
 more than doubtful, it was at any time to be for-* 
 warded by any one of various events, not one of 
 which we could expect with confidence, and not one 
 of which we could pronounce improbable. The un- 
 expected revolution in Spain, saved Portugal in 1 808 ; 
 the unexpected war in Austria, according to the 
 French themselves, saved Portugal in 180Q. It 
 would not therefore have been absurd, in June 181O, 
 to look to the possibility of some other lucky acci- 
 dent, which should still save Portugal. 
 
 Upon these considerations then, it appears to me, 
 that even granting, that without the ultimate esta- 
 blishment of the independence of Portugal, all our 
 efforts will have been useless sacrifices, and granting, 
 that all our efforts are not likely to accomplish that 
 great end, we may yet justifiably persevere, as long 
 as we can, in the hope of attaining it through ex- 
 traneous and unexpected means. 
 
 But, far from resting upon this questionable 
 ground, I ask whether every principle, which ren- 
 ders it desirable finally to expel the French from 
 Portugal, does not make it also desirable to keep 
 them out as long as we can ? 
 
 That the temporary occupation of a fort, or tract 
 of country, obtained only because an enemy has 
 greater matters on his hands at the time, is often a
 
 ( 153 ) 
 
 Weak policy, and one which has, not. without reason, 
 objected to the enemies of Bonaparte, I am 
 well disposed to admit. But the observation is not 
 applicable to the defence of Portugal ; it would not 
 plicable, even if it were by other and greater ob- 
 jects, that our enemy was prevented from expelling 
 us, inasmuch as the o--cupation of the country, and 
 the connection with its rulers and people, is, as long 
 aa it lasts, and the more for lasting the longer, a sub- 
 stantive political advantage, nearly affecting our own, 
 British, defensive, interests. But, still less is the 
 observation applicable, when the country of which 
 the occupation is disputed, is the principal theatre of 
 war ; the quarter, in which " the great battle is to 
 " be fought *," between England and her allies ori 
 the one side, and Bonaparte on the other. 
 
 Do we persuade ourselves, that our anxiety for the 
 preservation of Portugal, has been, dictated by " a 
 "generous magn&nrmtty *\*'?" Do we fancy, that 
 " a high-minded disinterestedness " alone, has cre- 
 ated in every British Cabinet in which Portuguese 
 affairs have been discussed, the desire to preserve 
 from French dominion, the resources, coasts, and 
 ports of Portugal ? We deceive ourselves grossly. 
 Yielding to no people upon earth in " national vir- 
 " tue," we must however trace our interest in Por- 
 tugal to less heroic motives. Our own safetv re- 
 quires the neutrality, if not the possession of' Por- 
 tugal. We are well aware that " LISBON and OPORTO 
 are two of the most important ports, for us, upon the 
 whole coast of the Continent of Jvuropc ?" We are 
 
 not ignorant of the tremendous peril in which Ire- 
 
 1 L 
 
 . 
 
 * See the Edinburgh Review, No. 25. p. 2 M. 
 ) Lord Grey's Speech, p. 18. * P. 19.
 
 ( 154 ) 
 
 land will be placed, if Bonaparte should ultimately 
 succeed in obtaining possession of the Southern 
 Peninsula*. 
 
 But putting aside every consideration which gives 
 us a peculiar interest in Portugal, we have other mo-^ 
 tives, sufficiently strong, for persevering in her de- 
 fence. Whatever it is the object of France to ac- 
 complish, it is ours to prevent. Not merely because 
 we are at war, but because it is by opposition alone, 
 that we can accomplish any of the purposes of war. 
 Whether we look to the possibility of a peace, or to 
 the continuance of the war till England shall have 
 been destroyed, or France humbled, our policy must 
 be the same. 
 
 
 
 Whenever we negociate for peace, the fate of the 
 Continental Powers, will, in all probability, be decided 
 by their actual state. If France should have obtained 
 the dominion, for instance, of Sicily, or of Portugal, 
 we could not hope to restore their independence by 
 treaty ; none but the greatest sacrifices, and possibly 
 not the greatest which we could make, would induce 
 France to relinquish her conquests. But if we negof 
 
 _!^2; 
 
 * " It is now equally needless to aggravate, and impossible to 
 disprove the tremendous peril in which Ireland will be placed, if" 
 Bonaparte should ultimately succeed in obtaining possession, of 
 th Spanish Peninsula. Such is the course which vessels from 
 that part of the world would have to steer to the shores of Ireland, 
 that the very winds which would best serve for their passage, 
 would blow all our fleets from any station where they would he 
 intercepted. And those winds are of such regular occurrence., 
 that one of the highest naval authorities of this kingdom has been 
 repeatedly heard to say, that during a particular period of the 
 year, if he was to carry on a French trade from Lislon to Bantry, 
 he would be -so little afraid of British cruizers, that he would not 
 lay out one half per cent, in insuring against that hazard. It is 
 not easy then io overrate tfie evils of that policy which fends tu 
 encrciisc the hazards of such an invasion." Edinburgh Review,, 
 o. 33. p. 3.
 
 ( 155 ) 
 
 fciate while the fate of a portion of Europe still re- 
 mains undecided, we negociate, as to that unsub- 
 jugated portion, upon equal terms. 
 
 And how is it, if we expect nothing but war ? 
 If we are convinced, that " Universal Do-minion" 
 is the hope of NAPOLEON, and that "he looks to the 
 u overthrow and destruction of GREAT BRITAIN as 
 " his fixed, his most desirable object, as that in 
 " which all his passions are concentrated, and tv 
 " which all his designs are directed*." 
 
 If this be so, if the subjugation of all the other 
 states of Europe, is but accessary, in the mind of 
 our enemy, to his final purpose of destroying Bri- 
 tain, it is most assuredly our policy to impede him, 
 to the very utmost of our strength, in his prepara- 
 tory measures ; to thwart his designs before they ap- 
 proach consummation ; to prevent him from ac- 
 quiring, by the subjugation of other states, that 
 " accession of power and resources," by which alone 
 he hopes to overcome the natural strength of Britain ; 
 and thus to postpone, if not to avert, that anxious 
 day, in which the fate of Britain shall be decided 
 upon British ground. 
 
 Although, therefore, we suppress, as too heroics! 
 for a nation, every obtruding sentiment of compas- 
 sion ; although we respect, as " chivalrous and ro- 
 " mantic," every principle of honour, and every dic- 
 tate- of friendship, which might interest us in the 
 fate of Portugal, there is yt-t one feeling, perhaps 
 the strongest of all, which we may, as a people, 
 borrow from " individual man." If "the sympathy of 
 
 __ - ___^_____________ . 
 
 Lord Grey 'a Speech, p. 11 
 X 2
 
 ( '5(5 ) 
 
 has no influence over our minds, the 
 sympathy of mutual interest must produce the same 
 effect. Although the one might not restrain us 
 from witnessing, unmoved, Lisbon delivered up to 
 the ravages of a second Junot ; the other would 
 give us a foretaste of the sensations which we should 
 experience, if, from Lisbon, with strength and hopes 
 augmented, the ravagers should proceed to L'orL 
 Dublin, or LONDON. 
 
 - 
 
 But there is yet another way of considering the 
 effect of our warlike efforts, which is perhaps more 
 consonant to the views of Lord Grey. 
 
 It may be said, that our utmost efforts cannot 
 avert the great and decisive struggle for independ- 
 ence:, to which the ambition of our enemy will ulti- 
 mately bring us ; and that by the quiet, provident, 
 defensive, " husbanding system," we shall reserve, 
 and encrease '.he strength with which we are to meet 
 that " formidable danger." 
 
 
 
 In opposing this view, I must, in the first place, 
 deny that it is at all clear, that the time will come, 
 when there will be a greater and more immediate de- 
 mand for our exertions, than at present exists. It is 
 at least extremely doubtful, whether our contest with 
 France will ever take a turn, in which our interest, 
 and security, will be more immediately threatened, 
 than they are at this moment. We moy therefore 
 be reserving ourselves for a danger which will not 
 arrive, thus needlessly sacrificing ^dvantages which 
 we actually possess, ai'd withhr;anig from others the 
 benefit of the strength, which we shall never have 
 occasion to use for ourselves. 
 
 
 
 But, granting that we are to expect. an attack, di- 
 rect, vigorous, and undivided, from Bonaparte, with 
 all the resources of France at his disposal, and not
 
 ( 157 ) 
 
 nly of France, but of all the Powers of Europe, 
 whom by the continued and successful progmss of 
 his ambitious exertions, he may reduce to obedience, 
 and enlist under his usurping banners ; granting, 
 that there remains not one point in calculation, nor 
 one turn of chance, which would justify us in re- 
 taining a ray of hope, of the preservation of a single 
 state of Europe ; granting, that it would be foolish 
 and absurd to expect that any one of the devoted 
 countries, whose population and fleets, and treasures, 
 are appropriated, in the imagination of our enemy, to 
 the destruction of Britain, should either by wisdom 
 or fortune, or powerful assistance, be excepted from 
 the general conquest ; I say that it is not by the 
 jneasures recommended by Lord Grey, it is not by 
 what he styles a " provident system," that we shall 
 truly husband the resources by which we are to repel 
 the terrific assault. 
 . 
 
 If monev alone were wanting, if our security were 
 to be purchased for a price, it might be argued, *it 
 least with plausibility, that by carefully hoarding our 
 treasures now, we should render them hereafter mure 
 competent to our deliverance ; but if a regular army._ 
 experienced commanders, and a martial spirit, arc 
 essential to the preservation of our independence, it 
 is not by a defensive svstem, by a conduct of the 
 war approaching to peace *, that we shall husband 
 these our most valuable resources against the time of 
 iieed. 
 
 1 
 
 Neither authorities nor examples are wanting. 
 establish the general principles,, on which I object to 
 a system purely defensive. 
 
 I am not aware of any one writer on political eco- 
 
 _ * 
 
 * See p. 40.
 
 ( 158 ) 
 
 nomy, who has not laid it down, that A Nation 
 cannot be stationary ; that in Military Strength, as 
 in Population, in Science,' perhaps in the Fine Arts, 
 we mast either go backwards or forwards ; that if 
 we do not improve, we must inevitably degenerate. 
 
 
 
 Whether these positions be sound or not, in the 
 extent in which they are held by philosophers, I may 
 assume, upon the grounds of common sense, or of 
 the observation and reflection of every man. that a 
 
 J 
 
 defensive war, or, (for such is the sense in which we 
 now use it) a war tvitftout militari/ operations, is not 
 the system under which our armies can be encreased 
 or improved : I conceive it to be scarcely less incon- 
 trovertible, that we cannot, by pure defence, even 
 preserve our strength, unimpaired, as we now pos-- 
 sess it. Were not the contrary opinion apparently 
 countenanced by Lord Grey, I should say with the 
 confidence of universal assent, (as I do say with the 
 confidence of self-conviction,) that without active \\i\r 
 in the interval, our armies would, ten years hence, be 
 essentially and dangerously deteriorated ; that so 
 far from having husbanded our resources, we should 
 have been gradually and fatally wasting them. 
 
 . 
 But it may be said that it is not to any one great, 
 
 warlike, effort, that we are to look as the consum- 
 mation of the hostility of France towards England, 
 and that I have myself assumed it to be probable 
 mat no such attempt will be made by Bonaparte*; 
 but that we are rather to expect and provide against 
 a system, on the part of our enemy, of protracted 
 warfare, productive of no military danger, but more 
 immediately directed against our financial pro- 
 sperity, and the sources of that national wealth, 
 which now enables us to sustain the contest, but 
 
 Seep. J5(3.
 
 ( 159 )' 
 
 which, if not carefully economized, will fail us be- 
 fore it is brought to a conclusion. An exertion, it 
 may be held, such as that which we are now sustain- 
 ing i& Portugal, exceeds the limit of our strength, 
 and must therefore weigh us down at last, or create 
 a necessity for an inglorious and dangerous termina- 
 tion of the War. 
 
 Upon so much of this consideration, as rests upon 
 the incoinpetency of our Jinances, I have little to 
 add* ; but I must observe, that the principle which 
 opposes a stationary warlike force, is equally adverse 
 to a stationary finance ; and that as a more practical 
 consideration applying to the peculiar constitution 
 and character of this country, it might not unrea- 
 sonably be urged, that to raise, year after year, the 
 necessary supplies for a war of pure defence, would 
 be a work of peculiar embarrassment ; that nothing 
 would be more difficult than to reconcile this rest- 
 less and impatient people to exertions, in which 
 neither glory could be acquired, nor any evident and 
 striking peril averted. 
 
 But granting that it is through our Finance, that 
 Ruin is to reach us, is it to be averted by a de- 
 fen t-m ? Shall we be saved from it by the 
 
 abandonment of Portugal ? 
 
 ~ 
 
 We nre to be afraid, it seems, not of the violence, 
 of the hostilities opposed to us, but of their dura- 
 tion ; it is assu lat j)e-i<v with I 'Vance, during 
 the life-time of Bo;; qu te imr>nctieable; that, 
 therefore, r;s no success v.hicii we can reasonably ex- 
 pect will bring the war to a icniiiruitiou, all our mea- 
 sures ought to be dictated bv the principle of making 
 our war of dei'encc as cheap as we can. 
 
 * See Sect. III.
 
 Now, not disputing here the correctness of the 
 assumption, which makes war co-existent with 
 Bonaparte, I may observe that it rests upon several 
 nilv: assumptions, which, though possibly very ra- 
 tional, are certainly speculative, and dependent upon 
 many contingencies. It is not only assumed, that 
 Great. Britain is, at this moment, the ultimate ob- 
 ject to which the greedy ambition of Bonaparte is 
 directed ; but that it is an object from which nothing 
 ran divert him, and for which nothing can com- 
 pensate him : that he is swayed rather by Passion, 
 than Policy ; and that no considerations of expedi- 
 ency or interest, can at any future time, or under 
 circumstances however varied, induce him to aban- 
 don or compromise his immutable resolve. 
 
 It must be assumed, that HE, in whose politics it 
 was long a prominent feature and a boast, never to 
 have attempted any thing in vain ; who astonished 
 the world more by a single instance of erroneous 
 judgment, than by the repeated verifications of his 
 estimates of success, has excepted Great Britain 
 from the general and wise rule of his policy, and 
 has vowed unremittingly to pursue her, at whatever 
 expence, whatever risk, and with whatever chance of 
 success. 
 
 It must be assumed, that the Politician, wjro has, 
 more often and more rapidly than any other of equal 
 eminence, varied his relations with Princes and States, 
 whose alliances have, less than that of any Prince in 
 modern history, appeared to depend upon ancient 
 connections or national aversions, has eternally for- 
 sworn the friendship of England alone. 
 
 Without all these assumptions, it is evident, we 
 ought not to satisfy ourselves that the duration of 
 the war is not to be shortened by any exertion of 
 our own ; they ought, as I conceive, to be csta-
 
 Wished as facts, before they justify us in acting upon 
 SL system of diffidence and despondency, and in ab- 
 staining from measures of evident expediency, lest 
 they should encrease the burthen of the war which 
 they can never bring to a conclusion. . 
 
 For, unless, by admitting all that has been as- 
 sumed, we pronounced our enemy to be differently 
 constituted from all other men, it would be our na^ 
 tural policy, (as we certainly cannot subdue him) to 
 demonstrate to him the impolicy of his enmity ; 
 to convince him that it is in our power to make it in- 
 convenient to him ; to shew, not merely that we 
 are prepared for his attack, whenever it may happen 
 to accord with his plans, but that we are, in the 
 mean time, formidable and active enemies; and, 
 thus, to render him anxious for peace. 
 
 The utmost that we can do in respect of Com-* 
 merce, is little more than defensive ; our enemy 
 takes care that his Navy shall not feel our power : 
 how then can we act so wisely, towards shortening 
 the duration of the War, as by opposing him in his 
 schemes of Continental Aggrandizement ; by teach- 
 ing him that this despised " Nation of Shopkeepers" 
 this England, which gives him cause to rejoice 
 ivhenever she sets her foot on the Continent *, can 
 turn against him the fortune of a war by land ; can 
 give him more trouble, in the subjugation of one of 
 the smallest kingdoms of Europe, than he has ex- 
 perienced in the ovei throw and humiliation of the 
 proudest monarchies ! 
 
 These considerations convince me, that an obsti- 
 nate perseverance in the defence of Portugal ought, 
 
 * Moniteur.
 
 even to those who look with the greatest apprehen- 
 sion to the duration of the War, to recommend 
 itself as the most safe and provident line of policy. 
 
 I have now considered, in every point of view 
 which was suggested, either by the general observa- 
 tions of Lord Grey, or by the events upon which 
 they were founded, the policy of assisting in the de- 
 fence of Portugal. If any one of the inducements 
 which I hate assigned for perseverance should appear 
 insufficient, and, particularly, if the reasoning 
 grounded upon the nature of the War with France, 
 should be thought inconclusive, it must be borne in 
 mind that it is not upon any one single motive, and 
 still less upon the general expediency of opposing, 
 France, that the wisdom of the measure rests. The 
 inducements arising out of the state of our relations 
 with Portugal, and the situation of Spain, are amply 
 sufficient in justification of the measures adopted, 
 
 and it is enough, if I have succeeded in proving that 
 the husbanding principle which Lord Grey has en- 
 deavoured tc ,h, ought not to supersede every 
 one of the considerations which have dictated our 
 policy in Portugal. But inasmuch as the force of 
 some of these considerations, depends, partly, upon 
 the probable length of time during which we may 
 retain our footing in the country, the question would, 
 be incompletely discussed, without a recapitulation 
 of events subsequent to Lord Grey's Speech. 
 
 His Lordship, it has already been observed, ha- 
 zarded no speculation upon this point, but his friends 
 and former Colleagues, had insisted, from the com- 
 mencement of the campaign, upon the utter hope- 
 lessness* of our attempt ; Lord Grcrivillc had stated 
 
 * See p. 15.1.
 
 ( 163 ) 
 
 ... . 11 r 
 
 me question of the continuance or recall ot our 
 army, to be " neither more nor less than whether or 
 not the army should be SACRIFICED." And Lord 
 MOIRA, the highest military authority in the Cabinet 
 of 1806, had pronounced the plan of defence to be 
 " utterly impracticable" 
 
 These opinions were at least justified by the con- 
 fident expectations of BONAPARTE*. 
 
 And where is now the British Army ? Has Lord 
 WELLINGTON been driven into the Tagus ? Are 
 the Imperial Eagles to be seen on the fortresses of 
 Lisbon ? Has a period been put to the War in the 
 Peninsula ? Has FRANCE, or has ENGLAND, been 
 
 successful in PORTUGAL ? 
 
 - 
 
 The facts, necessary for answering these enquiries* 
 may be very briefly related. 
 
 I need not revert to the fearful suspense that pre- 
 vailed at the moment in which the myriads of Bo- 
 naparte, victorious on the Danube, iinresisteq on the 
 Ebro, were about to consummate their glory on the 
 Tagus. The plan of the campaign was simple ; 
 " the destruction of tJu j BRITISH ARMY, and the Cap- 
 ture of LISBON ;" points of minor importance were., 
 to follow as of course, and the subjugation of Por- 
 tugal would thus be accomplished, and the War con- 
 cluded. What it was MASSKXA'S duty to perform ; 
 it was Lord WELLINGTON'S' to prevent. 
 
 The French Marshal proceeded regularly ; the fall 
 of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida enabled him to pass 
 
 * See p. 143. 
 Y 2
 
 ( 164 ) 
 
 the frontier *. The British Army retired ; and the 
 diffident now began actually to despair. 
 
 Bonaparte had by this time become impatient ; he 
 signified it as his imperial INTENTION that Massena 
 should " attack and overthrow the English Army." 
 It was ridiculous, thought Napoleon -f-, that the Engr 
 lish should keep his armies in check. Still, how- 
 ever. Lord Wellington was between Massena and 
 Lisbon , he was in vain attacked at Busaco ; the 
 bcutle served only to display his own skill, the bra- 
 very of his troops, and the efficiency of the Portu- 
 guese levie? ^ . But with a view to the security of 
 Lisbon, he retired, in October , to the position which 
 he had long before selected and improved, as one by 
 
 
 * The French took up their ground before C'iu.dad Rodrigo on 
 the 2dth of April j invested it completely on the llth of June \ 
 and opened their fire upon it on the 24th. It surrendered by ca- 
 pitulation on the JOth of July. For this, and sprue preceding 
 skirmishes between the French and English, see Lord Welling- 
 ton s dispatches from Viseu, 28th March, and from Alverca, llth 
 July, 1810 [Gazettes, 14th April, and 31st July.] And Itfas- 
 sena's report to Berthier, [Sux, 6th August.] Almeida surren^ 
 tiered on the2/th of August, after a siege of short duration, and 
 other circumstances giving rise to a strong suspicion of treachery. 
 See Lord Wellingtons dispatches from dlverca, 25th July j and 
 Gouvca, 5th Sept. [Gazettes, llth Aug. and <nh Oct.] For 
 the French account of the proceedings immediately subsequent to 
 the fall of Almeida, see the Moniteur of 2.9th ISfov. [Cobh. 
 XVIII. 1141.] 
 
 f Letter from Bertkier to Massena, Paris, ipth September, 
 1810. [SuN, 20th Nov.] 
 
 J Lord Wclksgton's dispatch, Coimbra, 80th Sept. [Gazette, 
 15th Oct.] JVIasfcena's report from Coimbra. [SyN, 26th Nov.} 
 
 Official Bulletin, London, [SuN*. 20th Oct.] Sea Lord 
 "Wellington's subsequent dispatches from this position, viz. 
 Pero Negvo, 20th and 2?th Oct. 3d .ind 10th Nov. 
 20th and 24th Nov.]
 
 ( 165 ) 
 
 which the capital might be preserved*. He was 
 closely followed by the enemy ; Massena, moving 
 
 * Being confident that military opinions are very nearly unani- 
 mous in favour of Lord WELLINGTON'S conduct of this cam-. 
 paign, and not knowing whether his po.itical enemies w'll adopt 
 any contrary sentiment, I have given very little detail. The fol- 
 lov. Ing summary is extracted from " A Slight Sketch of the Cam- 
 paign in Portugal :" 
 
 " Its commencement may be dated from the movement of 
 the French army to invest Ciudad Rodrigo : The force which 
 was assembled for that purpose, consisted of the two corps of 
 $>Jey arid Junot, while that under Hegnier moved from the neigh- 
 bourhood of Badajos, to the right bank of the Tagus, where it 
 threatened the frontier of Portugal, along the course of that river, 
 and communicated- with the main body under Massena, through 
 the mountains to the northward of the Vale of Placentia. 
 
 " In order to oppose this plan of attack, Lord Wellington as- 
 sembled the main body of the allied army hi the neighbourhood 
 of Almeida, and directed General Hill, who watched the motions 
 of Regnier from the vicinity of Elvas, to make a movement to 
 the right bank of the Ta?.u.s, and to cover the road to Lisbon by 
 Castello Branco, which was threatened by the corps of Regtiier : 
 and a reserve ^.vas assembled at Thomar under General Leith. 
 Thus, while the ground taken up by Lord Wellington himself was 
 90 strong as to be secun; from any direct attack, and General Hill 
 was enabled from his position at Elvas to anticipate any move- 
 ment which Regnier might make with a view to turn Lord Wel- 
 lington's right j which accordingly we find that he actually did ; 
 and the moment that the French general entered into direct co- 
 operation with Massena by moving to the rii -fit of the Tagus, Ge- 
 neral Hill, by a corresponding movement, placed himself upon 
 Lord "Wellington's right, and thus socur -d that important point. 
 The position occupied by General Leith at Thomar, enabled him 
 to move either or, his left, to the M'.udego, to tnpport Lord Wel- 
 lington, if he retire;.! along the \ alley of that river , to his front to 
 support General Hill j or on his right to maintain the line of the 
 Tagus." 
 
 " After the fall of Almeida, the French army began to be 
 more decided in its measuiv-s, and Lord Well'oeton soon ascer- 
 tained th?t tbeir objen was to turn his loft, and that in order to 
 support this o'ienU'on, the corps of Regnier had moved by its right 
 to the northward, and advance.! toward* the position occvpie;! by 
 the corps under the immediate command of his Lordship, whilst 
 the remaining divisions of the French army also moved still further
 
 ( 166 ) 
 
 so rapidly that his sick and wounded fell into the 
 hands of the Portuguese *, advanced towards the 
 
 to their right ; Lord Wellington immediately saw the expediency 
 of retiring ; and moving himself along the valley of the Mondego, 
 he directed Generals Hill and Leith to move by their left and to 
 join him on the Alva at the position of Ponte de Marcella. It is 
 generally understood that at ihis point he determined to make a 
 stand ; and the position was one of such strength (which will be 
 obvious on mere inspection of the map) as to give him every reason 
 to hope for a favourable issue, in case it were attacked. The 
 enemy, however, instead of following the British army along the 
 left bank of the Mondego, crossed over, in preference to the 
 course that would have led him to an attack upon the British, to 
 the right, and took the road to Viseu, which is the very worst 
 road in Portugal, and materially impeded the course of their ope- 
 rations. Their object was to avoid, and by avoiding to turn, 
 without risking an engagement, the position of the Ponte de 
 Marcella, by marching upon Coimbra ; by this movement they 
 threatened Lord Wellington's rear on the one hand, and Oporto 
 on the other. But his Lordship penetrating their design, made a 
 rapid and brilliant movement by his left, and placed himself in the 
 powerful position of Busaco, where I believe the enemy never 
 expected to find him, and where, perhaps from ignorance as to 
 the extent of force which had been moved to this point, they 
 made a most rash and fruitless attempt to cany his position. 
 
 " The enemy, however, having succeeded in turning Lord 
 "Wellington's flank by a movement which the intended occupation 
 of Sardao, if it could have been effected in time, might have pre- 
 vented, or at least considerably delayed, rendered the position of 
 Busaro no longer tenable, and Lord Wellington retired behind 
 the Mondego, upon the reinforcements which were marching to 
 join him from Lisbon. This river, notwithstanding the assser- 
 tions in the Moniteur of the 'superb positions of the Mondcgp,' 
 affords, as is well known, no position which, considered with a 
 reference to the defence of Lisbon,, may not be turned ; and con- 
 sequently, when the enemy evinced nn intention of advancing, 
 his Lord?hip, in pursuance of his previous resolution,' determined 
 to retire before him, and not to attempt to make any serious stand 
 till he had readied those positions nearer to Lisbon, which he 
 had before examined, and had caused to be fortified wiih great 
 care, and which he conceived to be of hitch natural and artificial 
 strength, as to iustify his determination thereto await the collected 
 effort of the enemy, and to contend for the ultimate deliver- 
 ance of Portugal." 
 
 * Gazette., 20th Nov.
 
 ( 167 ) 
 
 capital. The decisive moment seemed, at last, really 
 to approach. 
 
 MASSENA already imagined himself at Lisbon ; he 
 assured his impatient master that every thing led him 
 to hope for * that final accomplishment of his pur- 
 pose. 
 
 Yet, after remaining for a month, without any. 
 attempt at an overthrow of the English, the French 
 Marshal retired, with a precipitation which occa- 
 sioned the loss of 4OO men, to a new position, more 
 remote from LISBON -f-. And in that position be 
 now remains, closely watched by Lord WELLING- 
 TON, who, while he preserves his communication 
 with the strong position covering Lisbon, is ready 
 to take advantage of any opportunity of more active 
 success, that may be afforded him by the move- 
 ments of his enemy J. 
 
 With the exception of Almeida, and the tract of 
 country which' is actually occupied or commanded by 
 his troops, not a singlfe point in Portugal is pos- 
 sessed by Massena. Eiuas, OPORTO, LISBON ; the. 
 Donro, the Tagus as far as it is navigable ; the two 
 provinces north of the Douro, the two provinces 
 
 * Paper found upon the Aid-dc-Camp taken in disguise. [Susr, 
 26th Nov.] And see Massena's letter from Alenqucr, 3d Nov. 
 [StlK, 30th Nov.] 
 
 f Lord f Wellington's letter from Cartaxo, 21st Nov. [Gazette, 
 3d Dec.] 
 
 I Letters from Cartazo, 8th, 15th, 22d, and 20th Dec. 18 !O. 
 [Gazettes, 2.5th Dec. 1810 ; 1st and li'.h Jan. 1811.] General 
 Hill has again been detached, south of the Ta#us, with ;i vic\v t> 
 any movement which might bp made towards the si/i-nfrjo and 
 new works have been constructed, from Aldaa Gullcga to Si-tuiHtl, 
 by which the shipping in the Tagus would be secured, in cae of 
 the enemy's being in force on the left bank.
 
 ( 168 ) . 
 
 south of the Tagus ; the greater part of Estremadura 
 and Beira, the whole Coast of PORTUGAL, -are en- 
 tirely free from the Power or influence of France. 
 In the districts of which her armies have obtained 
 the possession, they have found little but an unsub- 
 dued spirit of resistance to France, and encreasing 
 confidence in England, and her General. 
 
 Such are the undisputed * facts and results of the 
 campaign of 181O. I do not wish to build upon 
 these events, any extravagant exultation, or any 
 very sanguine hope. But I venture to ask Lord 
 Grey, with perfect confidence, whether, if there has 
 been a failure in Portugal ', it has been the failure of 
 an English Expedition ? Whether, if disgrace is 
 imputable to either of the contending Powers, it 
 does not rather belong to MASSENA, than to Lord 
 WELLINGTON ? 
 
 It is undoubtedly true that the French Marshal 
 was instructed to drne ike English out of Portugal; 
 that it was considered, when his army was much 
 weaker than at ^resent, that his force was perfectly 
 competent to hit object ; that he has nevertheless 
 hither to Jailed in its accomplishment. 
 
 The failure of France is our success. 
 
 * It mav be said that some objections have been taken to an 
 expression in one of Lord Wellington's dispatches; " the enemy 
 possesses or! - the ground on which he stands." An army, power- 
 ful as Massena's, can of course extend its communications from 
 time to time, for procuring supplies, or other purposes ; hut it is 
 an undisputed Jai t, that no part of Portugal is subject to French 
 influence or coniroul, which is not actually held by military force, 
 that the cou; >ry so held is contracted, as I have stated in the text, 
 and that any attempt at an extension is rendered exceedingly diffi- 
 cult and dangerous, bv the hostility of the natives, and the acti- 
 vity of tne irregular troops, as well as by the presence of the Bri- 
 tish Army.
 
 ( 169 ) 
 
 To whatever cause this success is ascribed, the 
 result is gratifying, and assuredly much more favour- 
 able to my view than to that of Lord Grey. 
 
 Whether all the means of France are insufficient 
 for the conquest of Portugal ; whether Bonaparte 
 has repeatedly miscalculated the means required; 
 whether his Commanders have been ill selected ; 
 vviiether his troops are bad ; whether their mainte- 
 nance has been unexpectedly difficult ; whether the 
 Portuguese themselves have opposed an unforeseen 
 resistance * ; whether the state of Spain has furnished 
 an unexpected obstacle; or whether a combination 
 of some or all of these circumstances has occasioned 
 the disappointment of France, the conclusion is the 
 same. All the assigned causes, with the exception only 
 of the erroneous estimates of Bonaparte, must acquire 
 
 * It will not, I apprehend, be denied, that from the commence- 
 ment of her resistance^ Portugal has constantly improved in every 
 thing which can give to that resistance a chance of success. From 
 June, 1808, when Oporto, and the provinces of silent cjo' and 
 Algarve rose simultaneously against the French, [Edinburgh Ann. 
 Reg. 1&O8, ch. 18. Gazette, 12lh J;.ly, 1 b()B,] the Port;. 
 have been faithful to their own cause ; and, in spite of the Con- 
 vention of Cinlra, have pursued the best means of supporting it, 
 in putting their trust in England ; by giving to her General and 
 her Ambassador an influence in their Government > by plating 
 both troops and skips [6th Aug. 1610,] under the command of 
 her officers ; and, generally, listening to her advice on every 
 point. By the conduct of the regular Portuguese troops at Busaco, 
 and of the Militia and Ordenavza under General Silveira, Colo- 
 nels Trant, Miller, and Wilson, (for which see all our late Ga- 
 zettes) it has been shewn, as well that the natives of Portugal are 
 capable of being brought to a shite of considerable efficiency in 
 the field> as that they understand the mode of harassing an in- 
 enemy in his marches and detachments. In mentioning 
 the Portuguese troops, however, I must add that it is probahlj a 
 very erroneous opinion, thai the i>-iL^,u^5e troops, v/ith the": 
 sm.ul proportion of British officers are in all c-rcumstances and 
 situations to be reckoned wiib British or French trcops by thci: 
 numbers. 
 
 z
 
 ( 170 ) 
 
 strength in the lapse" of time ; and all the causes, 
 without exception, militate against the doctrines of 
 despondency: they all tend to dispel that mischievous 
 and cowardly delusion, under which too many of our 
 Politicians have fancied^ that France must always 
 beat us by land. 
 
 But for my present purpose it is sufficient. and 
 may, I trust, be assumed without argument, that 
 the events of 181O, to whatever causes they be as- 
 signed, tend rather to corroborate than to weaken 
 the opinions which have been advanced, of the prac- 
 ticability and expediency of opposing France in Por- 
 tugal *. 
 
 rno J r, 
 I now revert to SPAIN t- 
 
 Since the termination of the limited co-operation 
 
 * According to MASSED, [Report from Coimlra, SUN, 26th 
 Nov. 1810,3 nothing but a battle can destroy Lord Wellington, 
 or force him to reimbark. Lord Wellington himself apparently 
 coincides in this opinion, and -will not fight a battle except unclei 
 circumstances of great advantage. 
 
 f It may have been observed that I have said nothing upon the 
 ttate of iJDanish or Portuguese America. The omission has by no 
 means arisen from a low estimation of the importance of the 
 evens v/hich have occurred, and which are now passing, in those 
 countries. But as these events could not be related or elucidated 
 without much detail, and have apparently formed no part of Lord 
 <rrnf< con-ideration, I trust that I may be excused for abstaining 
 from the discussion. With respect, howaver, to our relations 
 with PortKifiil, including h^r Transatlantic dependencies, it may 
 be right to refer to the Treat ie? of Friendship 'and Alliance, and 
 of Amity, Commerce, nr.J Navigation, signed at Itio de Janeiro, 
 the 10th Feb. 1SIO, [Cobb. Pol. Her. XVIII. 412 and 246.] 
 and' with respect to the line Adopted in regard to the Spanish Co- 
 Imies, to the instruction from Lurd Liverpool to Brigadier-General 
 Lay-ant, 1'jth Jv.r.e, '1910. [il-\ 3 S '.'..] It surely cannot be 
 doubted, th-1- th-' mc.T-'ures which Ve hare pursued in respect to 
 Spain and J-'ortugal, but m'ore particularly the hitter, tend' very 
 much to forward out interests in South America.
 
 of Lord WELLINGTON with the Spmiish Generals, 
 there had been no British force in Spain, except that 
 which was furnished to\vards the defence of Cadiz 
 in the spring of last year *. 
 
 I am not aware that any objection has been urged 
 to this measure, by which we have assisted in pre- 
 serving, from the power of France, one of .the 
 strongest fortresses, and finest harbours of Spain -j% 
 as well as a considerable division of the Spanish 
 Navy. It is hardly necessary to observe, that from 
 the situation of our land and sea forces, the heaviest 
 misfortune that can befal us at Cadiz, is the return 
 of our Expedition, after an unsuccessful attempt at 
 defending the town. Should such ultimately he the 
 event, I trust that not even Lord Grey would com- 
 plain of Disaster, or Disgrace** ^ oJ Jw; woa I 
 
 The small force of Gdneral GRAHAM-^-, while it 
 contributes materially to the interests as .well, of 
 
 ...... ^ . ' __ 
 
 ... - 
 
 * No documents have been made public, mirieh erHlbtewfeito 
 state the particulars of the acceptance of his .Majesty's.- offers ih 
 regard to Cadiz. [See the references in pp*. 108 and 141,] 
 
 f Lord Holland, in the debate of 8th June r 18 IO, mentioned 
 Cadiz, with Lisbon, as one of the ports which facilitated the iftfc 
 vasion of Ireland, and which it was therefore of importance to 
 preserve from the dominion of the enemy. [Cobb. XVII. 502-3%} 
 
 J A part of thu iorce originally destined for the defence of 
 Cadi/, was witlidVawn fur the purpose of strengthening Lord 
 U'dlington. Of the progress of the Siege, fe\v details have been 
 published ; Scuff, who commands, has not, as is believed, re- 
 ixived any reinforcements, and the strength of hi* army must 
 therefore diminish ; but in the construction of works, and every 
 kind of artificial strength, no pains have been spared. The latest 
 Vrench report of the state of the siege, is in the " Intelligence 
 from the Armies in Spain," dated Pans, 19 Jan. 1811. [Su*, 
 28th Jan.] Our Gazettes have given :io intelligence of the state 
 of affairs at C(idii since the evacuation of Fort Matagvrda, 23d 
 April IS 10. [Gazette, 12 May, IS 10.] 
 
 Z 9.
 
 ( 172 ) 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN as of SPAIX, by the protection 
 which it helps to afford to Cadiz, and to the Regency 
 and Cortes of the kingdom, assembled in the hta de 
 Leon, serves to keep alive in Spain, a due sense of 
 the value of the British alliance *. 
 ' 
 
 For the purposes of this Enquiry, namely, an 
 appreciation of the wisdom and success of our late 
 military enterprises, these observations are sufficient. 
 The British Ministers are responsible only for their 
 own measures. The preservation of Spain is an ob- 
 ject which England has had much at heart, and to-r 
 wards which she has contributed much ; but she has 
 never pretended to furnish, as in Portugal, the great 
 and indispensable means of defence ; her exertions 
 have necessarily borne a small proportion to the ag- 
 gregate resistance; she might have done a little more 
 or a little less, but she could not possibly, as in Por- 
 tugal, make the whole difference of the salvation of 
 the country : if Spain should ultimately succeed} 
 
 .. * In mentioning the Regency and the Corte$ y it may be proper 
 -to reier to the steps taken by the British Government, for .pro- 
 moting the establishment of a general and efficient government in 
 3pain, and the. convocation of the Cortes. See'the correspondence 
 between Mr. Secretary Conning, and Mr. Stuti r t, Mr. Frcre, and 
 Lord JfWfstey, in 1808 and fbO(). [Papers, 1810, E. and N.] 
 For the progress and state of our public relations with Spain, see 
 the Speeches from the Throne, 4 'July 18O8; igth Jan and 2 1st 
 June ISOtf. Treaty of Peace, ike. 14th Jan. 1SO(). [Cobb. XIII. 
 80f>.] Speeches, 23d Jan. and 2lst June, 181O. The language 
 of the last is as follows ; " Portugal, rescued from the oppres- 
 sion of the enemy, by the powerful assistance of His Majesty's 
 arms, has exerted herself with vigour and energy in making every 
 preparation for repelling, with the continued aid of His Majesty's 
 Forces, any renewed attack on the part of the enemy j and in 
 Spain, notwithstanding the reverses which have been experienced, 
 the spirit of resistance against France still continues unsubdued 
 and unabated; And His Majesty commands us to assure you of 
 his firm and unaltere-i conviction, that not only the honour of his 
 Throne, but the best interests of his dominions, require his most 
 strenuous and persevering assistance to the glorious efforts of those 
 ioyal nations."
 
 ( 173 ) 
 
 England will probably have accelerated or completed 
 her success ; yet, if Spain should tall, the failure can 
 never, be ascribed to England, 
 
 On the probability, now remaining, of success in 
 Spain, I therefore say little. I am much afraid, that 
 the state of Spain is daily approaching nearer and 
 nearer * to that which must end in her being " laid 
 waste, depopulated, and conquered -f- ;" but I trust 
 and believe that there are yet many stages in the 
 progress of conquest before we come to the point at 
 which no change of circumstances am give to Spain 
 a new hope of success ; and still more, before our 
 
 ' 
 
 * Yet France proceeds very slowly. . The periodical reports 
 sent to tf(\ris, from, ihe several provinces in Spain, at least prove, 
 that in fe\v or none of the provinces, the spirit of resistance is CK- 
 tinct, or has even ceased to be active. In the very provinces of 
 Alad'tci and Toledo, it is only said that " order a?id tranquillity 
 prevail more and more," GAUCI.Y continues free, and .is there- 
 fore not mentioned ; the Axturias is said to be occupied by Gene- 
 lal Bonnet . In the North-Eastern provinces there has been an 
 interval of twelvemonths between the taking of Geronn by Auge- 
 reau [IO Dec. laOt). Suv, 1 Jan. 18-.O,] and that of TortoscTby 
 Sachet, [1 Jan. 181 \ } These few circumstances, taken from the 
 last French report [Suv, 2mh Jan. 181 l], the notorious difficulty 
 with \vhich Ulassnw communicates with Franco, and the conti- 
 nued existence of General O'l)rir> t 'tl, certainly shew that much 
 yet remains to be done by France in Spain. 
 
 f Paslei/, [n. 2!!.] On this subject, as well as on the policy 
 which we ought to puisne in Spain, I adopt, with very little dif- 
 ference or qualification, the views of Capt. Parley. [P. Jy5to 
 212; and 282 to the end of the chapter.] It is, however, re- 
 iifarkable, that the language of France in re^inl to Spain, and 
 much more in regard to Porte.iral, lias Ixxii m\; dually lowered. 
 The last French Expose f Uobb. XIX. 55. | is silent, nor has any 
 .Monitcnr since the 24th July. [Sux, 2d An^.] spoken with aay 
 degree of triumph, of the pixn* Army of Portugal. 
 
 Yet in the March preceding, . the whole blame ot the failure in, ; 
 been thrown upon tiie Commanders: " Had the war in Spain 
 ' been differently managed, SPAIN would long since liave been 
 " reduced to submission, and Lord \\"KLLINGTON would long 
 " since have leen driven into the j?." [Mvtut-.nr, eked in. p. 
 ^42- note +.}
 
 ( 174 ) 
 
 defence of Portugal becomes utterly impracticable 
 and hopeless. Even alter tliis stage, there must be 
 a considerable interval, before the conquest of the 
 Peninsula can be made directly applicable to our de- 
 struction. 
 
 I have now completed the Narrative of the Mili- 
 tary Operations of the last five years, except those 
 of the Army in the Mediterranean. In Sicily, the 
 sole portion of his dominions remaining to our old 
 ally the King of Naples, a considerable force had 
 been stationed, under the administration of Mr. 
 PITT, with the view not so much of defending: the 
 island, as of being prepared for any opening, which 
 the Coalition then in preparation might afford in 
 Italy, or the maritime dominions of Austria. A con- 
 siderable part of this force remained in Sicily 
 during the existence of the administration of Lord 
 Grenville, and was employed, as we have seen *, in 
 Calabria and in Egypt, 
 
 A considerable part of this force had been with- 
 drawn in 1 8O7 -f~ ; but it having been formally sti- 
 pulated in 1808J, that Sicily should be defended, 
 
 * Pp. 52 and 53. The Island of Capri, which had been taken 
 in 18O6 by a naval force, and subsequently garrisoned frorn Sicily, 
 surrendered by capitulation to the French, on die iCth of October, 
 1808. See Sir /. Stuart's letter to Lord Castlereagh, 31st Oct. 
 1808. [Presented to the JJause of Commons 29th March, 1 SOQ.] 
 
 f See p. /4. 
 
 J Treat)' between his Majesty and the King of the Two Si- 
 cilies, 30th March, 1808. [Cobb. Debates, XI. 845.] .Although 
 it was not till this period that the Treaty was signed, it had been 
 in progress during the preceding Administration ; it was thought, 
 by all parties, that as the King of Naples had been drawn into 
 the War with France in 1 805, (which cost him his Continental 
 dominions) by Russia, then the intimate ally of Great Britain, 
 we were bound to assist him in his defence of Sicily. See the 
 Debates of 13th June, 1808, and particular'}' the speeches ct"
 
 ( J75 ) 
 
 and that for that purpose 1O,OOO men, at the least, 
 should be maintained in the island, a force, including 
 foreign troops, rather exceeding tliat number, still 
 remained in the island in 180Q. 
 
 In June of that year, Sir JOHN STUART, the Com- 
 mander of the forces, in pursuance, as I appre- 
 hend *, of very general instructions from his Go- 
 vernment, and with a view of operating a diversion 
 iii favour ,of Austria, projected a descent upon Na- 
 ples. His success, however, was limited to the tem- 
 j>orary occupation of Isckia and Procida f, the 
 consequent recall of a body of the enemy's troops, 
 which had marched from Naples to the north of 
 Italy. 
 
 It is obvious that the Ministers have no responsi- 
 bility on account of these proceedings, beyond that 
 of retaining the force in Sicily, and giving to the 
 Commander the general instruction to employ them, 
 as he saw occasion, for the advantage of our Ally. 
 
 Subsequent events have unquestionably tended to 
 lessen the probability of the loss of SICILY J. 
 
 Mr Canning and Lord Henry Petty. [Cobb. XL 801-2.] Thus 
 much is necessary in elucidation of our military measures ; the 
 other points of the policy pursued towards Sicily form another 
 topic of Lord Grey's Speech. 
 
 * There are no public documents on this subject. I rather bc- 
 iieve, that, in point of fact, Sir J. Stuart had not, at the period of 
 his undertaking, received any iresh instructions \vhiifievwr. 
 
 f Gazettes ofSth an,] oth S-.-t. :S<)C). An ::-.. tToc:,. i 
 
 was ma"de on S<:ijlla. 
 
 J 
 
 % See Lord Grey's Speech, p. 2*1 r Sir J. Stuart'.* account 01 
 the repulse \)f the enemy on the 8th of Septo-inU-t . ibIO 
 /.ette, 20th Xov.] Gener;iU/ri'/<r'j Keporr, [Cobb. XVIII. S'i/P 
 xind King Juarhim's General Urdor> ut ' 
 Invasion. "/'
 
 ( 176 ) 
 
 Our success in the GREEK ISLANDS has been ne- 
 cessarily limited by the more pressing demand for 
 our forces in other quarters ; but it may reasonably 
 be hoped, that should the relative importance of 
 these islands be encreased, the progress of our land 
 and sea forces *, in that part of the world, will fa- 
 cilitate any further measures which, in such case, 
 may be politic. 
 
 Such, then, is the History of the Military Ope- 
 rations of the successors of Lord GREY ; such the 
 nature and effects of the system, which has super- 
 seded the safe policy of the Cabinet of 1 806. 
 
 Upon a comparison of the " expediency, conduct, 
 " and result f," of the enterprises undertaken by 
 the two Governments, I ask, with confidence, for a 
 decision. The comparison has been studiously avoid- 
 ed by the Ministers of 1806: from their language 
 it would be gathered, not only that THEY sent no 
 Expeditions to disaster and disgrace, that THEY 
 never dreamt of defending a kingdom against BONA- 
 PARTE, of dismembering the Spanish Monarchy, or 
 of intimidating the Turks ; but that they had no 
 Expeditions at all ; and that their policy towards 
 Russia and Sweden was their policy towards the 
 world : that they looked on, with a manly and com- 
 placent dignity, while their Allies were beaten and 
 
 * Zantc, Ccphnlonia, Ithaca, and Cerigo, were taken posses- 
 sion of in October, 1809, by Brigadier-General Oswald and 
 Captain Spr anger, in pursuance of orders from Sir Jo hn Stuart 
 and Lord Collingwood. [Gazettes, 5th and Qtli December.] St. 
 Maura was taken on the 1 6th of April, 181O, by Gen. Oswald 
 and Cant. Eyre. [Gazettes, 23d Jane, and 4th August.] Corfu 
 has been strictly blockaded. [Gazette, 18th Aug. 1810.} 
 
 f See p. 43.
 
 ( 177 ) 
 
 humbled, one after another : determined to convince 
 Bonaparte, that while HE was idly wasting, in the 
 conquest of kingdoms and empires, the vigour ulti- 
 mately destined for the overtHrow of England, Etfc- 
 LAND was more prudently reserving her own strength, 
 so as hereafter to meet him at a greater advantage. 
 
 But their language is deceitful ; this heroic policy 
 was not the policy of the ministers of 18O6; they 
 now assume it to be the best, because it happens to 
 be diametrically opposite to the policy of their oppo- 
 nents, yet it is in truth not less different from that 
 practised by themselves. 
 
 But let the delusion prevail, let us forget all their 
 promises, projects, and failures, and grant that they 
 pursued their " provident system''' I am not the less 
 * f ready to go to issue" with Lord GREY. 
 
 The question is most incorrectly stated, when it is 
 asked, whether under the " system of vigour" our 
 progress is accelerated towards die termination of the 
 war ; or whether our dangers are lessened, and 
 whether the power of France is reduced below what 
 it was, when this country embarked in a military 
 co-operation with the Spanish people ; to the first 
 question, I might object, that it assumes, what I have 
 endeavoured to disprove, that, with a view to a con- 
 tinuance of the war, the husbanding system is the 
 best ; but I contend, without hesitation, upon 
 grounds upon which I have already enlarged, that 
 towards, either a termination of the war, or the, 
 accomplishment of the object of the war, OUR OWN 
 SECURITY, the system of vigorous exertion is daily 
 and hourly accelerating our progress. 
 
 The second question upon which Lord Grey's 
 issue is to be joined, is still more objectionable ; we 
 
 Aa
 
 ( 178 ) 
 
 are at war with the greatest Conqueror of ancient 
 or modern times, with one, who has, year after year, 
 added new kingdoms to his dominion, and thus, 
 year after year, encreafced the means of our destruc- 
 tion : in one instance we endeavour to prevent him ; 
 and we are asked, during the progress of the con- 
 test, in which he has not obtained his object, 
 whether his power is lessened by our resistance ? If 
 our enemy were to attack the Isle of Wight, and we 
 were to oppose him with success, it might quite as 
 fairly be objected, that we had not lessened his 
 power ! 
 
 What would have been his power, the true ques- 
 tion is, but for the resistance of England ? What 
 would have been our danger, if, in addition to all 
 that he had before, BONAPARTE had obtained quiet 
 possession of the Coasts, Ports,, Fleets, and Popu- 
 lation, of SPAIN and PORTUGAL * ? 
 
 Our late exertions have so far exceeded, as well in 
 Success as in Extent, those of any former period of 
 the War, that the Wisdom of those who directed 
 them ought not to be impugned, even though in 
 any particular instance, it may have been proved, by 
 the result, that a more adviseable enterprize might 
 have been devised. 
 
 But, although I have admitted, that in one in- 
 stance, a great force was employed unsuccessfully, it 
 
 * I cannot refrain from making one more extract from Capt. 
 Pasley. " As a nation, in consequence of the encreasing vigour 
 of our late operations, \ve have assumed a more martial spirit j 
 and have by degrees begun to feel our own strength ; so that al- 
 though the comparative pow^r of France, is, in reality, greater 
 than it was at the commencement of the present war, yet in point 
 of public opinion, WE, not the French, have been rising in the 
 scale." [P. 322.]
 
 ( 179 ) 
 
 would not, I believe, be easy to prove that by any 
 other application of our force, or by any different 
 combination of our movements, " the power of 
 BONAPARTE," at this day, would have been materi- 
 ally affected. 
 
 It can hardly be believed, that if the whole force 
 sent to Holland in 180Q, had been employed in the 
 Peninsula, the French would have been expelled. 
 Even if it had been possible to act offensively with 
 such a force, in the heart of Spain, little more could 
 have been done, than to defeud Portugal, and pre- 
 vent the army in Spain from marching to the Da- 
 nube. This was done. 
 
 There has been no other exception to the policy 
 of directing our efforts, as much as possible, to one 
 great object: a policy however, which (owing, per- 
 haps, to the want of a field of operation,) those who 
 now recommend it most strongly, were themselves, 
 of all ministers, the farthest from pursuing. 
 
 Lord CASTLEREAGH and Lord WELLINGTON have 
 shewn us, what a British Army can effect, in EU- 
 ROPE, and in spite of a BONAPARTE. Let the scale 
 of the Experiment be continually enlarged, and we 
 may be assured that the result will be proportionate; 
 but, at this moment, 
 
 Whether compared with the natural result of Lord 
 Grey's imaginary system, or with the actual effect oi" 
 the measures pursued by the Cabinet of 180(), the 
 policy of the present Administration is conspicuous 
 in its success. 
 
 By no government, has so large a force of British 
 soldiers been directed to the objects of war ; by no 
 government, since the seven years war, have British 
 troops been employed with equal success ; and at no
 
 period, not excepting the seven years war, have our 
 successes affected more nearly and unequivocally the 
 just and righteous interests of War. 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 27. line 18. after " pledged" read " of" 
 
 30. line 6 of the note, fur " has," read " had." 
 
 57. line 7 of the note, after " that" dele " that." 
 
 58. line 15. for " effected," read " affected " 
 
 59. line 1 1 . before " the,'" read " If." 
 77- l' ne 1 ! after " censuses" dele " to." 
 79. line 17 of note * dele " and." 
 
 144. line 27. after " disgraceful," fora (,) put a (.) 
 J55. line 10. at tha end, insert a note of interrogation. 
 Id, line 6 from the bottom, for " respect," read "reject. 
 
 Benjamin Wright and Co. Printers, 
 31, Little Queen Street, Holborn, London.
 
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