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 OGEEDINGS OF THE 
 CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY 
 
 THE COLONIAL POLICY 
 OF JAPAN IN KOREA 
 
 F. A. McKI-NZll 
 
 December, 1906 
 
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 LONDON 
 ^fTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 22, ALBEMARLE STREET, W
 
 SRLF 
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 Md."^'76/37 
 
 THE COLONIAL POLICY OF JAPAN 
 IN KOREA 
 
 Lieutenant-General Sir Edwin Collen, G.C.I.E., C.B., 
 was in the chair at a meeting on December 12, 1906, 
 when Mr. F. A. McKenzie read a paper on " The 
 Colonial Policy of Japan in Korea." 
 
 In introducing the lecturer, Sir Edwin Collen said 
 that Mr. McKenzie had acquired much experience and 
 knowledge of Far Eastern affairs as travelling correspon- 
 dent of the Daily Mail. In 1903 he visited Japan, and 
 went on to Korea a few days before the outbreak of the 
 Russo-Japanese War. He was present at the Battle of 
 Chemulpho, adv^anced with the pioneer Japanese scouts 
 towards Manchuria, and joined General Kuroki when he 
 established his headquarters in Northern Korea, remain- 
 ing with the 1st Imperial Japanese Army until the end 
 of 1904. He then returned to Europe, and during the 
 present year had revisited the Far East, travelling 
 through Japan, Korea, Manchuria, and Northern China. 
 In Korea, besides having considerable opportunities of 
 learning the Japanese point of view from the Marquis Ito 
 and his chief assistants, he secured a great deal of 
 information from the members of the old Korean 
 (Government. He also spent some time in the interior, 
 and as far as possible endeavoured to obtain first-liaud 
 knowledge of the results of Japanese administration in 
 Korea.
 
 ( 2 ) 
 ]\Ir. F. A. ^IcKenzie said : 
 
 The past two years have revealed Japan to the world as 
 one of the supreme colonizing nations on earth. In a little 
 over twenty years the population of Japan has risen by 
 25 per cent., rising from 36,000,000 to over 48,000,000. 
 For that additional 12,000,000 fresh territory, fresh busi- 
 ness, and fresh means of earning bread have had to be 
 found. Japan, with its hea\'y proportion of mountain and 
 rocky land, could not easily bear the greater population 
 without some form of expansion. Part of the growing 
 millions has been absorbed in the new industrialism. 
 Others find an outlet in the new colonizing enterprises of 
 the Empire. Dai Nippon ! Great Japan is no longer a 
 figure of speech. In Honolulu and in San Francisco, in 
 the back block of Western Australia and the back-streets 
 of Singapore, Japan's surplus population is settled. 
 There are Japanese commimities to-day all over China, 
 and in Manchuria they bid fair before many years to out- 
 number the Manchus and Chinese combined. 
 
 Korea represents Japan's greatest colonial experi- 
 ment. Here there has been not merely an outflow 
 of people, l3ut an absorption of government. Since 
 February, 1904, Korea has been actually, if not nominally, 
 under Japanese jurisdiction. The story of what has been 
 done in that time in the Hermit Kingdom is of double 
 interest to us. First, it concerns us, ourselves, the 
 greatest of colonizing nations, for it enables us to see 
 how others attempt to solve the problem we have so often 
 liad to deal with. Next, tlie fact that Japan and England 
 are to-day in alliance, and that England has in a sense 
 stood sponsor for the Eand of the Rising Sun to other 
 Western nations, make the external and colonizing policy 
 of Japan a matter of real moment for British people.
 
 ( 'i ) 
 
 Until thirty years ago Korea remained closed to all 
 nations. Japan, its neighbour to the sonth-west, had a 
 little foothold at Fnsan. Between Korea and Manchuria, 
 its northern neighbour, lay the great borderland of the 
 bandit regions, in which no man's life Avas worth an 
 hour's purchase. Time after time Western Powers had 
 tried to break down Korean exclusiveness, but always in 
 vain. The cables of a British ship, hung in triumph over 
 the gateways of Ping-yang, proclaimed to the nation the 
 destruction that aAvaited foreigners who visited there. 
 
 Then in 1876 Japan came and conquered. A treaty 
 of peace and friendship was made between the Empire 
 and the kingdom, by which three ports were opened 
 to Japanese conmierce, and Japanese subjects were 
 given the privilege of travelling within an area of about 
 three miles around each port. The Japanese further 
 secured a right of establishing a Legation in Seoul, the 
 Korean capital. This treaty was followed in a few 
 years by others, with America, with Great Britain, and 
 with various European Powers. Consulates-General and 
 then Legations were established in Seoul, and the West 
 found itself in touch with the quaintest and most fantastic 
 of the peoples of the East. 
 
 The King and autocrat of Korea, living in his 
 wonderful palace underneath the shadow of the mountain 
 at Seoul, heard of the marvels of the West. Even his 
 great dancing-hall, the hall of the hundred pillars, or his 
 wonderful lake of the thousand lilies, or his armies 
 of white-robed singing-girls failed then to satisfy him. 
 He must know of other lands. So he had foreign 
 teachers ; the wives of missionaries made friends with 
 the Empress ; and schemers and intriguers of every kind 
 came and advanced their plans for the progress of the 
 kingdom.
 
 ( 4 ) 
 
 Two nations liad alroady marked Korea out as their 
 own. Japan wanted il to insure the safety of her 
 territories, and to give her people a fiekl for expansion. 
 Russia desired it because here she conhl lind safe and 
 easy open ports For tlie terminus of her ah'eady projected 
 trans-Siberian line. But there was one Power iu the 
 Avay : China possessed a somewhat nebulous suzerainty 
 over Korea. In 1894 Japan declared Avar against China, 
 revealed herself as a military nation, scored her great 
 victory, and ended ('hinese suzerainty once for all. 
 
 Tlie natural result Avas that dapan immediately 
 aeiiuireil supremo authoi-ity in Seoul. The Japanese 
 Minister liad a great and influential part}^ of natives 
 heliiiid him, and he set about a campaign of reform, 
 lie was met at point after point by the resolute opposi- 
 tion of the Queen. She was as strong a character as 
 her husband was weak; she believed that Japan was 
 threatening the independence of her country, and so she 
 met intrigue with intrigue. Coimt Inouye, the Avell- 
 knoAvn Japanese statesman, was the Minister for Nippon 
 at that time, lie returned to dapan, but Ijefore leaving 
 he had an iutervicAV with the Queen, who made offers of 
 friendship which did not meet Avith a A^ery cordial 
 response. Inouye Avas succeeded bj^ Viscoimt Miura, a 
 stern soldiei". Miura determined to solve the Palace 
 dillicidty in tlie quiekc^st way. lie conspired Avith llu^ 
 anti-royal party, and one night a body of disguised 
 .lai)anese policemen and nati\^es l)urst into the Palace, 
 da])anese troops openly supporting them. When they 
 ((uitted the Palace they left a dead (}ueen Ijchind them. 
 
 The Japanese Minister had made a terrible and, 
 api)arently an irreparable, mistake. He Avas recalled 
 and )>ut on trial l)v his ( Jovernmenl. 
 
 His succ(^ssor managed to drive th(^ Korean people,
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 now bitter against the murderers of their Queen, to 
 still further exasperation. The Japanese had not then 
 learned, and apparently have not yet learned, that while 
 3^ou can safely break or make Governments, you must 
 not interfere with personal customs. A nation will stand 
 an income-tax of Is. 6d. in the £1 with a smile, but 
 it will smash the railing of Hyde Park if you try to close 
 the public-houses at ten o'clock. The Japanese did the 
 equivalent of trying to close the public-houses at ten 
 o'clock. Under their direction it was decreed that the 
 Korean man must leave off his top-knot. To the Korean 
 the top-knot is the symbol of manhood and lionour. 
 The day when a boy has his hair made into a knot is the 
 proudest of his life, because it shows that childhood is 
 over. To be without the knot is to be a weakling and 
 an object of contempt. The people rose in anger. The 
 Emperor just about this time escaped from the rebels 
 who were guarding him, and took shelter in the Russian 
 Legation, and the supremacy of the Japanese was for the 
 moment over. 
 
 The spell of Russian supremac}^ Avhicli followed was 
 not very brilliant. The Russian Minister in Korea at 
 the time, M. Waeber, was a wise and conciliatory states- 
 man. He secured the appointment of numerous Russian 
 officials, a Russian bank arose, and Russian military 
 instructors began to appear. His Government thought, 
 however, that he Avas not going fast enough, and so he 
 was succeeded by M. Speyer, who, under orders from 
 above, tried to quicken the pace. The Russians attempted 
 to oust an English official, Mr. McLeavy Brown, who 
 had been given charge of the Customs. Here for once 
 England asserted herself. A British fleet arrived in 
 Chemulpho Harbour, anfl Mr. Brown retained place and 
 power.
 
 ( fi ) 
 
 The Russians proved incapable of holding the great 
 advantage they had gained through the blunder of 
 Viscount Miura. Japan began to win back her old 
 position again, and for some years a close diplomatic 
 struggle was maintained. The Korean Emperor — for 
 he had taken the higher title — a weak and well- 
 meaning man> was noAv pulled one way, now the other. 
 The Customs were under the charge of Mr. Brown, who 
 proved himself an unbiassed and inagnificently able 
 administrator. He employed the methods of Sir Robert 
 Hart, his old chief in China. He considered that it was 
 his duty to maintain the open door and to act as the 
 guardian not only of the particular interests of England, 
 but of the common interests of all white nations. Thus 
 it was that in the Korean Custom Service men of ahnost 
 every European Power Avorked in harmony under their 
 Irish leader. In a coimtry notoriously corrupt, there 
 was in his department no suspicion of corruption or of 
 favouritism. Mr. Brown was for a time given control 
 of Korean finances, but his position there was never so 
 absolute as in the Customs. So far as his power went, 
 however, he effected great reforms. Other departments 
 of the Korean service were also administered by foreign 
 advisers, but Mr. Brown stood alone. Korea was in the 
 Postal Union ; there was a telegraphic service from end 
 to end of the land ; a comfortable railway, built with 
 the American capital, ran from Chemulpho to Seoul ; 
 and in the capital itself the hiss of the electric car was 
 heard. Thus in the early years of this century we 
 would have found in Korea a combination of modernity 
 and of barbarism. A high official might be appointed 
 because of his skill as a sorcerer, and would use a 
 modern Swedish telephone to help him transact his 
 business. The Emperor had his rooms lit with elec-
 
 ( ? ) 
 
 tricity, and sat under the rays of the incandescent lamp, 
 debating liow many devils should be employed at his 
 mother-in-law's funeral. 
 
 All this time Japanese influence and the number of 
 Japanese settlers had been steadily growing. In the 
 early nineties two able diplomats stood face to face, 
 M. Pavloff, the courtly representative of the Czar, and 
 M. Hayashi, a quiet, pleasant, and determined spokes- 
 man for the Mikado. World events had combined to 
 make Korea of greater and greater importance. Russia 
 and Japan both wanted her as never before, and in the 
 closing days of 1903 it became clear that the struggle 
 for supremacy between the two must soon be settled. 
 
 In February, 1904, Japan declared war against Russia, 
 and her troops poured into Korea. At this time she 
 had the choice of two ways before her. She might, 
 making the stress of war an excuse, tear up her old 
 treaties and assume formal control of Korea, or she 
 might elect to regard Korea as her independent ally. 
 Korea itself was powerless to resist whatever was done. 
 
 The latter course was chosen. A policy of- open 
 annexation would have thrown difficulties in the way 
 of the Japanese troops marching through the coimtry, 
 and would further have given an opening for hostile 
 action by European Powers. So a protocol between 
 Japan and Korea was signed on February 23, a fort- 
 night after the landing of the Japanese soldiers. In 
 this protocol the Imperial Government of Japan pledged 
 itself in a spirit of firm friendship to insure the safety 
 and repose of the Imperial House of Korea, and it 
 further definitely guaranteed the independence and 
 territorial integrity of the Korean Empire. 
 
 Most foreigners in Korea at that time, myself 
 among them, heartily welcomed the coming of the
 
 ( H ) 
 
 Japanese. We Avere tired of the corriiptioii aud exaction 
 of the yangbans and high Korean officials ; we knew 
 that here was a nation that had been kept down for 
 generations by the ineptness of its own Government ; 
 and we had daily evidence of the harm a feeble, incap- 
 able, and occasionally cruel administration was inflicting 
 on the workers. We believe, then, that Japan, while 
 dealing possibly stern measures against the corrupt 
 officials, would give justice to the common man, would 
 bring honesty in administrative w^ork, and would oj)en 
 up the country as never before for the benefit of world 
 trade. 
 
 Here was Japan's golden opportunitj'-, the opportunity 
 to demonstrate to the world that she was as mighty in 
 the arts of peace as in her grooving conquests in war. 
 We believed that she would seize the occasion, and show 
 in Korea, as she had shown time after time under other 
 circumstances, that she had in her possibilities which 
 the West had hardty yet begun to fathom. 
 
 The Japanese began well. They were already push- 
 ing ahead a great railway from Fusan to Seoul. Some 
 of the most corrupt Korean officials, including Yi Yong Ik, 
 the greatest and the most unscrupulous of all, found it 
 convenient to retire from politics for a time. 
 
 Large numbers of Korean coolies were employed in 
 carrying supplies to the north for the Japanese soldiers, 
 and they were all paid with a punctuality and liberality 
 Avhich left them amazed. It seemed that Japan would 
 repeat in Korea the strict rectitude which had been the 
 distinguishing mark of her occupation of Southern 
 Manchuria in 1895. 
 
 Even while battles were being fought in the North, 
 Seoul was full of talk of reforjns. The currency was to 
 be altered, new schools were to be built, new railways to
 
 ( i» ) 
 
 be laid, the Palace purified. The soothsayers and 
 fortune-tellers, Avho formed so prominent a feature of 
 Seoul life, were, it was rumoured, to be cleared out. 
 The incapable Korean army, whose officers made up in 
 splendour of uniform what they lacked in courage, was 
 to be almost wholly disbanded. The Emperor was to 
 place himself in the hands of his Japanese advisers. 
 There was to be no more selling of Government posts ; 
 farming was to be transformed ; banking was to be 
 modernized ; and the lazy officials who did nothing but 
 prey off the people were to be swept away. The 
 Japanese were loud in their emphasis of the fact that 
 they were in Korea, not alone for their own benefit, but 
 as a nation doing tlie work of all civilized races in 
 securing the maintenance of the open door and of equal 
 opportunities for all. 
 
 Then came a succession of remarkable Japanese vic- 
 tories, and the tone of statesmen and administrators 
 altered. Schemes were put forward and methods adopted 
 which first amazed and then alienated large sections of 
 the white residents. One of the first of these new depar- 
 tures went by the name of the Nagamori scheme. The 
 Japanese Legation proposed that all the waste land of the 
 country, which meant the greater part of Korea, should 
 be handed over to a certain Mr. Nagamori, a Japanese 
 subject, for the term of fifty years, without payment. 
 Mr. Nagamori was to be free to do what he liked with the 
 lands, to sell or to keep them, and the properties were to 
 be released from taxation for some years. If, at the end 
 of fifty years, the Japanese Government wanted them 
 back, it could have them by paying back all the money 
 which had been expended, together with compound 
 interest. 
 
 The Japanese Legation fought very hard to get this
 
 ( 10 ) 
 
 throngli, but tlie matter excited siicli resentment among 
 the Koreans and the foreigners that it was allowed to 
 lapse. This scheme helped to start a great revnlsion of 
 feeling amongst the Koreans against the Japanese. 
 This revulsion was increased by a still more powerful 
 canse. 
 
 The Japanese subjects, chiefly coolies and small 
 tradesmen, had l)egnn to ponr into Korea by the ten 
 thousand. Square-shouldered, heavily-built, and harsh- 
 jawed as man}^ of them were, they presented the least 
 attractive or desirable section of their countrymen. 
 They had been drawn by the hope of high wages, and 
 their womenfolk came Avith them. They walked with the 
 air of conqnerors, flushed with the knowledge of the 
 victories of their own brave countrymen in Manchuria ; 
 they despised the Koreans as cowards, and began to treat 
 them accordingly. 
 
 These Japanese coolies soon found that there was no 
 check on them ; they could do as they liked. The few 
 Japanese officials established over the country were very 
 much overworked, and had no time to attend to small 
 matters. No Korean magistrate dare punish a Japanese. 
 The Japanese might plunder the Korean coolie whole- 
 sale, as he often did ; he might beat the life out of his 
 body, as he often did ; he might turn him out of house 
 and home without compensation, and there was no 
 redress. If the Korean went to the Japanese Consul 
 to complain, he would often enough be thrown out by 
 some minor official. 
 
 When I returned to Korea this summer, I found the 
 country ringing from end to end with the stories of the 
 cruelty and lack of control of the Japanese settlers. 
 Friends of my own, whom I had known two years before 
 as Japan's most enthusiastic friends, were now bitter and
 
 ( 11 ) 
 
 alienated by the brutalities wliicli had come under their 
 notice, and by the impossibility of obtaining redress for 
 them. No one believed that the leading Japanese 
 authorities approved of the actions of their nationals, 
 but practically everyone blamed them for allowing 50,000 
 or 60,000 of the lowest class of their countrymen to over- 
 run the land without making any provisions for their 
 orderly control. 
 
 The Japanese next excited great resentment by their 
 policy of seizing the best land of the country, under the 
 exciise that it was wanted for military purposes. In 
 many cases the Koreans found that a few weeks after the 
 properties were appropriated lines of Japanese shops and 
 private houses would go up on these so-called military 
 lands. The wholesale seizures outside Seoul and Ping- 
 yang and still further north produced great misery. The 
 Japanese in some cases paid a wholly inadequate sum 
 to the Korean officials to compensate the dispossessed 
 people ; but in many cases known to me the people had 
 not received even the most inadequate compensation, 
 although their land had been taken from them for over 
 a year. 
 
 The avowed policy of the Japanese has been not to 
 interfere imduly in the internal affairs of the country. 
 This seems to have been interpreted in many cases to 
 mean that the Japanese shall only interfere where there 
 is direct profit to he made for their people. This is a 
 hard thing, I know, to say, but what I witnessed in Ping- 
 yang and Sun-Chon forces the words from me. To quote 
 only the case of Sun-Chon, the Japanese who have 
 settled there compel the Koreans to subscribe a monthly 
 rate for the improvement of the town. The administra- 
 tion of this rate is wholly in Japanese hands. Last July 
 I went into the local prison of Sun-Chon. A Japanese
 
 ( 1-' ) 
 
 sentry stood on the opposite side of the roadway, and the 
 prisoners inside had been brought there and handed over 
 to the Korean gaoler b}^ the Japanese. I shall only say 
 that I foimd in it conditions rivalling the worst torture- 
 hole of an old Chinese gaol. 
 
 To turn for the moment to a brighter side of the 
 picture. Mr. Megata, who had come over from Japan as 
 financial adviser, set about the reform of the currency. 
 The Korean currency of the old type was among the 
 worst in the world. Counterfeiting was ahnost a recog- 
 nised business, and a very large part of the coin in 
 circulation Avas admittedly bad. The counterfeits were 
 divided into classes — good counterfeits, mediums, bad^ — ■ 
 and those so bad that they could only be passed off after 
 dark. The reform of such a currency was bound to 
 create great trouble, and it did so. There may be a 
 question as to whether J\lr. Megata effected his reform in 
 the easiest and most prudent way ; but he did carry it 
 through, to the undoubted permanent benefit of the land. 
 
 The railways were also being advanced with the 
 utmost rapidity. The line from Fusan to Seoul, a railway 
 passing over most difficult mountainous country, was 
 opened last year, and has since been running very 
 successfully. The continuation of the line from Seoul to 
 Antung was also completed in rougher fashion as a 
 temporary measure, Avhile a good pennanent line is being 
 now finished. Beyond Antung a mountain railway was 
 built right up to ^lukden, thus making an unbroken con- 
 nection from Flushing to Fusan. I travelled over the 
 line from Fusan to Antung in July. It represented a 
 remarkable opening-up of hitherto inaccessible country. 
 
 The educational policy of the Japanese had not up to 
 the time I left the country been carried verj' far. They 
 have accomplished very much less than might have been
 
 ( 13 ) 
 
 expected iu this direction. They have introduced a 
 number of so-called reforms in other directions which, so 
 far as I can see, do little good, and help to exasperate 
 the people. They have revived in milder manner the 
 effort of ] 895 to abolish the top-knot, and they are further 
 trying by CA^ery means to make the people give up wear- 
 ing white garments, their national costume in winter- 
 time. They have taken over the post and telegraph 
 services from the Koreans, thus clearing out a body of 
 old officials and making room for many new Japanese 
 employes. As yet there has been no marked improve- 
 ment in the service. They have altered the names of 
 towns from the old Korean names to new Japanese ones. 
 They have even altered the time, the Tokio time being 
 officially and imiversally used by the Japanese. So far 
 as my observation goes, these little things, needless 
 interferences with the habits of the people, create more 
 discontent than really big grievances. 
 
 As I went through the country parts this summer, 
 after having heard the official side of the case in Seoul, I 
 was often moved to grief by the stories brought to me in 
 town after town. I had been over the north in the early 
 days of the Avar — the days when men, although living 
 under the dark clouds of battle, yet looked bravely for- 
 ward to a brighter and more hopeful time. Now, hoAv- 
 eA'er, hope seemed largely to have died. In CA^ery place 
 the tales poured into my ears were the same — tales of 
 harsh domination by uncontrolled Japanese soldiers, 
 tales of brutality by irresponsible Japanese peasants, 
 tales of the plundering of land and of home. When I 
 passed through the city of Ping-yang, the missionaries 
 came to me on the mid-day of the SundaA', and asked if 
 I Avould speak to the great congregation of about 1,500 
 people who assembled every Sunday afternoon.
 
 ( 14 ) 
 
 * Why do yoii not have your regular preacher ?' I 
 asked. 
 
 * Our chief native minister was to have taken the 
 service,' they told me, * but yesterday afternoon four 
 Japanese soldiers entered his house. They went towards 
 his women's quarter, and when he tried to stop them, 
 they fell on him and beat him so badly that he cannot 
 move out of the house.' 
 
 This is typical of many other stories, or else I would 
 not quote it. When that afternoon I stood before that 
 great throng, the women to my left and the men to my 
 right, the question seemed to come up from the crowd : 
 ' What can we, a people not skilled in arms and not used 
 to lighting, do with this stern warrior race over us ?' 
 
 The Japanese authorities found themselves greatly 
 hampered by the stolid opposition of the Korean Cabinet. 
 The Emperor and his Ministers could not point-blank 
 refuse to do what Mr. Hayashi demanded, but they could 
 intrigue, delay, and forget, and shelter themselves behind 
 Japan's covenanted promise to maintain the integrity 
 and indej)endence of their country. Their friendship had 
 by this time been turned to dislike, and they adopted a 
 policy of passive resistance exceedingly annoying and 
 hampering to the Japanese. Then it was that the 
 Japanese resolved on a further step. They had by this 
 time concluded the Treaty of Portsmouth and renewed 
 their alliance with England. Now they Avould assume 
 the sovereignty of Korea. Accordingly the Marquis Ito, 
 Japan's foremost statesman, arrived at Seoid in November 
 last year, bringing with him a treaty that would at once 
 sweep Korean independence out of existence. The 
 Emperor and his advisers resolved that under no circum- 
 stances would they consent to sign such a treaty. 
 
 At this stage the Korean Emperor determined to ask
 
 ( 15 ) 
 
 the American Government for aid. In the Treaty of 
 1883 the introductory clause provided : ' If other Powers 
 deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, 
 the other will exert their good offices, on being informed 
 of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, 
 thus showing their good feelings.' 
 
 The Korean Emperor thought that this clause was 
 something more than a pious expression of goodwill. 
 He would appeal to Caesar or, rather, to Roosevelt. The 
 Korean case was carefully prepared, and was despatched 
 by special messenger to Washington. The appeal was 
 of no avail. President Roosevelt refused to interfere, 
 and America was the first Power to withdraw its Minister 
 from Seoul a few weeks afterwards. 
 
 A second memorial was in course of preparation 
 when the blow fell. I have seen this second memorial. 
 It states the Korean grievances so ably that perliaps you 
 will pardon me for quoting from it at some length. The 
 memorial began by reminding the American Government 
 of its pledge in the treaty of 1883. ' Our Govermnent,' 
 it continued, ' at the present time feels forced to inform 
 your Government that Ave are being dealt with ' unjustly 
 and oppressively ' b}^ the Government and People of 
 Japan, and to appeal to the President of the United 
 States of America and your Government to, in accordance 
 with the above-quoted article of the treaty, use your good 
 offices in bringing about an amicable and just settlement. 
 
 ' The actions of the Japanese Government and People 
 that we complain of, and to which we desire to call your 
 attention, are Avell known, and can be more than sub- 
 stantiated, and may be called in part as follows : 
 
 ' First : In Politics. — They have chosen out four or 
 five of the worst officials, those who have previously 
 disturbed the Government and, without regard to life
 
 ( 16 ) 
 
 aud property, have extorted from the people, and have 
 put them in power ; and having placed their own nationals 
 as advisers in almost all the departments, they are con- 
 trolling the Government and oppressing the Emperor 
 and his officials. 
 
 ' Second : In the Dispensing of Justice. — They 
 have by force interfered with the Korean officers of 
 Justice, so that they could not carry on their regular 
 work ; they have been seizing the police power both at 
 the capital and in the provincial towns, and trying both 
 civil and criminal cases ; but if a Japanese subject has 
 been doing injustice to a Korean, they not only do not 
 stop him, but secretly encourage him to the detriment of 
 Korean life and property. 
 
 ' Third : In the Matter of Finances. — At the time of 
 the attempt to reform the money system of Korea, some 
 thirty or more Koreans willingly offered a loan of 
 3,000,000 yen to their Government, to be used in this 
 attempt at reform ; but the Japanese Minister to Korea 
 prevented the acceptance, and forced the Korean 
 Government to accept a loan of 3,000,000 yen fi'om 
 the Japanese Government. 
 
 ' Still later announcing that the currency of the 
 country must again be changed, they presented a new 
 coinage which was not anj better than the old, and thus 
 their profits were ver}^ great ; and when they came to 
 exchange the new for the old, they always claimed a 
 shortage of 2 or 3 per cent., and not only made the 
 people thus suffer great loss, but made it so that 
 the}^ could not exchange their money, the trickery of 
 which scheme is shown in the fact that if the exchange 
 is not made by the end of next year the old money will 
 be demonetized, and the whole country's financial 
 resources will be exhausted.
 
 ( n ) 
 
 * Fourth : In Matters Military. — At the opening of 
 the Japan-Rnssia War, Japan forced Korea to make a 
 treaty whereby Japan was allowed freely to transport 
 her troops and munitions of war through Korea to the 
 seat of war, and in return for this they are about to 
 quarter tens of thousands of their troops in different 
 parts of Korea, and have forced the Korean Government 
 and people to surrender thousands of acres of land on 
 which to quarter these troops in Seoul, Pyeng Yang, and 
 other places, for which land the Government and people 
 are receiving no recompense. In the name of the 
 Military Authorities of Japan large tracts of land have 
 also been staked out, on which in some cases Japanese 
 merchants are building houses, and when the real 
 owners apply for help or recompense they get no 
 redress. 
 
 ' The Japanese asserted that temporary military neces- 
 sities forced them to seize and undertake railroads ; and 
 now, although peace has been declared, they still con- 
 tinue to hold and work them without receiving or seeking 
 any concession from the Korean Government ; and for 
 the property and houses of the people condemned for 
 the road they do not give the worth, but are paying 
 1 per cent, of the value, or give them nothing at all. 
 Not only have they thus seized all the land needed for 
 the immediate road-bed, but at all points where they 
 have decided to have stations they have seized and 
 enclosed large tracts of land on all sides of these stations 
 without recompense to the owners. 
 
 * In sections of land of great importance from a 
 commercial point of view, large tracts of land and 
 thousands of houses have been staked oil" with the 
 Japanese military stakes, as needed for militai'y purposes, 
 and not to be sold, thus x>i'eventing all land exchanges
 
 ( IS ) 
 
 and sales in these sections, and causing great loss and 
 distress to the Koreans and, possibly, great profit to the 
 Japanese.' 
 
 The appeal was of no avail. 
 
 The Japanese had determined that the treaty should 
 go through, and that the independence and autonomy of 
 Korea should cease. They were willing to use as many 
 soft phrases as necessary, and to describe the transfer in 
 any pleasant language that the Koreans liked. The 
 Marquis Ito found, however, on his arrival at Seoul, that 
 the Emperor and his Ministers would not give in. The 
 new treaty proposed first that the Japanese should take 
 control and direct the foreign relations of Korea, thus 
 sweeping awaj'- Korean Ministers abroad and the 
 Ministers of other Powers to Korea, and leaving all 
 diplomatic work to be done through Tokyo. The 
 Japanese were to appoint a Resident-General, who would 
 live in Seoul, and a Resident in every Korean place where 
 they considered necessary. The last shreds of indepen- 
 dence were to be stripped from the countiy. 
 
 When the Emperor was asked to agree to this, he 
 replied that such a treaty could only be made after 
 consultation with the wise men and counsellors of the 
 country. The Marquis Ito urged very strongly that it 
 was absolutely necessary for the preservation of peace 
 in the Far East. The Ministers were warned that if 
 they did not agree to it, their obstinacy would mean 
 the instant destruction of the Korean Empire. 
 
 The negotiations continued for several days. During 
 this time the Japanese had a great body of troops — horse, 
 foot, and artillery — assembled round the Palace and 
 engaged in all sorts of manoeuvres. Everything was 
 done that could be done to awe both the Palace and the 
 people. Then one fateful evening the Japanese repre-
 
 ( 11' ) 
 
 seiitatlves insisted on at once proceeding with the 
 business. There came a conference lasting until long 
 after midnight. One or tAvo Ministers showed signs of 
 yielding, borne down by the fierce methods of the 
 Japanese diplomatists. The Korean Prime Minister, Han 
 Kew Snl, rose and declared that he would at once report 
 their words to the Emperor. As he passed out of the 
 Council Room he was seized by Mr. Hagiwara, First 
 Secretary of the Japanese Legation, and hurried into a 
 side-room, a prisoner. The other Ministers were allowed 
 to believe that he had been murdered. Courage is 
 rarely the strong point of the Korean. At an early 
 hour in the morning the Ministers submitted, a clause 
 being added that ' The Japanese Government guarantees 
 to maintain the security and respect the dignity of the 
 Korean Imperial House.' 
 
 It was an agreement extorted by sheer terror. In 
 giving this account of what happened on that night, I 
 would like to say that I have accepted no second-hand 
 evidence in preparing it. One of the leading partici- 
 pants there told me the story, and I had his narrative 
 confirmed from other quarters. 
 
 The Japanese since then have increased their hold on 
 the country in every w^ay. One of their most successful 
 moves for creating the monopoly of Japanese interests 
 was to make the position of Mr. McLeavy I3rown, the 
 British Commissioner of Customs, so unpleasant that he 
 was compelled to retire. The Customs Service is being 
 more and more manned by Japanese, and a Japanese is 
 noAv at the head of it. The right of giving conces- 
 sions, which formerly lay with the Emperor, has been 
 taken by the Resident-General, and it is perhaps not 
 imnatural that in the distribution of concessions the 
 Japanese occupy the front place. The talk of the ' open
 
 ( 20 ) 
 
 door' and 'equal opportunities,' of wliich we heard so 
 much some time ago, is slackening. 
 
 The removal of ]\Ir. jMcLeavy Brown has brought up 
 many charges of partiality against the Customs officers. 
 This was perhaps inevitable. 
 
 The most hopeful side of the Japanese activity in 
 Korea to-day is the fact that the Marquis Ito has been 
 since the end of last year tlie Resident-General. No one 
 who has even a most casual acquaintance with him can 
 doidjt his sincere desire to do his best for Korea as a 
 whole. Unfortunately he is hampered in his work by a 
 number of incompetent officials, and by the great influ- 
 ence of the militar}^ pj^i'ty, which is in favour of strong 
 measures. It yet remains to be seen if the Marquis can 
 enforce a policy of conciliation and justice. If he can do 
 so, the mistakes of the past may yet be forgotten in the 
 triumphs of the future. 
 
 Here we have a strong, brave, clannish people plant- 
 ing themselves down amidst a race of comparative weak- 
 lings. The Korean is going to the wall. The process is 
 inevitable, and yet one cannot help a passing pang of 
 pity for the man, as one sees him throAvn against rough 
 stones. I, for one, ain by no means sure that Japan 
 would not win for herself greater glory and sounder 
 empire if in the process of the absorption of Korea some 
 respect Avas paid to the rights of the weaker side. 
 
 The Chairman : I think it must have occurred to 
 some of us in the course of this lecture to ask, Where is 
 the connection between a society concerning itself with 
 Central Asian affairs and Korea ? But I do not think we 
 are going out of our province in taking up the question 
 Mr. McKenzie has brought before us when we bear in 
 mind the tremendous interest that the x\nglo-Japanese 
 
 I
 
 ( -n ) 
 
 Alliance of 1902 gave us in the affairs of our allies, and 
 tliat we have thereby undertaken responsibilities in con- 
 nection with the preservation and consolidation of our 
 interests and the maintenance of peace in India and 
 Eastern Asia. The treaty constitutes a guarantee for the 
 maintenance of our territorial rights in India and the 
 East, and hence we as a nation are deeply and immedi- 
 ately interested in everything that concerns the policy of 
 our ally. Mr. McKenzie has dealt with the question of 
 Japanese policy in Korea in a very interesting way, but 
 I think it not unlikely that many of his opinions may be 
 challenged in the discussion which I now invite.
 
 ( 22 ) 
 
 DISCUSSION 
 
 Mr. Valentine Chirol said : I have listened with very great 
 interest to Mr. McKenzie's paper, first of all because I was myself 
 in Korea at about the period from which he began his retrospect 
 of the contest between Russia and Japan in the country, and 
 also because, in the attitude he has taken up towards the Japanese 
 there, I seem to hear an echo of the doubtless equally honest, but 
 equally bitter, criticism which one so often hears from foreigners 
 on our own work in Egypt. There has been one feature as to 
 our position in Egypt which has greatly facilitated our task — we 
 have not had to take our lower classes with us. The representa- 
 tives of the British power and the British name in Egypt are all 
 picked men, of high training and high principle. The Japanese 
 have sent men of high principle and high training to Korea, but 
 amongst their lower classes which have gone there in their tens 
 of thousands there are, as I believe would be the case amongst 
 our own lower classes, many who do not know how to treat 
 aliens properly, and who show towards them not merely want 
 of sympathy, but even sometimes brutality. Consequently 
 Japan has had a diificulty in Korea with which we have not 
 been confronted in Egypt. The whole tone of Mr. McKenzie's 
 observations reminds me of the tone of many foreign critics of 
 English rule in Egypt. Indeed, if you substitute ' the Khedive ' 
 and * the Khedivial Court ' for * the Emperor ' and ' the 
 Korean Court,' and the names of some of our own high 
 officials for the names of high Japanese officials, you would 
 have, I think, almost in the same words the same sort of 
 criticism which is constantly applied to our political relations 
 with Egypt — to relations which have, on the whole, been to the 
 advantage of the Egyptians as well as to ourselves. (Hear, hear.) 
 Like the Marquis Ito, Lord Cromer has the reputation of being 
 a very strong and stubborn man, and one may often hear, not 
 only from the lips of Egyptians like Mustapha Kamel Pasha, a 
 stream of patriotic indignation at the way in which, in his view, 
 the independence of Egypt, under Lord Cromer's despotic swa}', 
 is entirely sacrificed to British ambitions, and the wishes of a
 
 ( i-^ ) 
 
 downtrodden people ignored ; indeed, I have often heard the 
 same line of argument pursued by Englishmen — Englishmen 
 whose honesty is no less and no greater than that of Mr. 
 McKenzie himself. Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, for example, will tell 
 you stories by the hour of atrocities perpetrated in the name of 
 England, and abuses tolerated for our own selfish purposes. 
 Therefore I think we ought to take with certain reservations the 
 stories which Mr. McKenzie has heard in Korea. I do not mean 
 to say that the Japanese have not committed great mistakes. I 
 recognise, for example, the gravity of the mistake made after 
 the Chino-Japanese War, when the Japanese participated in the 
 murderous conspiracy against the Queen of Korea. But, as 
 Mr. McKenzie has himself told us, the Japanese Government 
 dismissed the Minister who had been an agent in the conspiracy, 
 and put him upon his trial. I believe, too, that when, in more 
 recent times, serious grievances have been brought to the know- 
 ledge of the Japanese Government, there has been every dis- 
 position to provide redress. I am glad to note that Mr. McKenzie 
 does full justice to the excellent administrative work done by the 
 Japanese in Korea ; and, for my own part, I feel confident that 
 the Japanese in the end will learn, at some cost to themselves 
 and at some cost also to the people of the country, that the 
 rights and sentiments of the Koreans must be preserved and 
 respected. They have introduced into Korea elements of en- 
 lightenment and progress that have never existed there in the 
 past, and under their own rulers the Koreans have been subject 
 to far lower depths of corruption and brutality than can possibly 
 exist at the present day. (Cheers.) With regard to the pro- 
 posed suppression of the top-knot, that is an exaggerated 
 grievance. After all, the Japanese only tried to impose on the 
 Koreans what has been done in their own country. Considering 
 that the Japanese people, who at first resented it as much as the 
 Koreans, have themselves submitted to what Mr. INIcKenzie 
 calls a degradation, it can hardly be now as a degradation that 
 they seek to impose it upon the Koreans. 
 
 Mr. McKenzie : 1 said that the Koreans regarded it as 
 degrading. 
 
 Mr. Chirol : When the order to cut off the top-knot was 
 first issued, the Japanese thought it degrading, but they soon 
 found it was not so, and accepted it. And this will probably 
 happen also with the Koreans.
 
 ( 2-1 ) 
 
 Mr. W. Crewdson said : I have followed with great interest 
 the paper read to us ; but whilst the lecturer was giving his 
 criticisms I was wondering how a Japanese newspaper corre- 
 spondent would report to his journal his impressions of a visit 
 to the territory we have recently acquired in South Africa. He 
 would have found many difficulties still remaining to be settled, 
 the explanation being, of course, that since the declaration of 
 peace sufficient time has not elapsed to deal with many urgent 
 questions of administration. The Japanese were forced to obtain 
 control of Korea, as the accomplishment of Kussian designs would 
 have added great weight to the traditional sentiment that the 
 geographical position of Korea made that country resemble a 
 dagger constantly pointing to the heart of Japan. The 6,000 
 Japanese settlers in Korea before the war were suddenly 
 augmented by another 50,000, and these not of the governing 
 or cultured classes. In these circumstances, and bearing in 
 mind the state of Korea under its native rulers, it is not to be 
 wondered at that excesses and unfortunate occurrences have 
 been reported. If any foreigner wished at the present time to 
 judge English colonial policy by the state of affairs in South 
 Africa, we should think it unfair, and we should ask the critic 
 to look at other parts of the Empire, telling him that things in 
 South Africa were in a state of transition, and would work out 
 all right in the end. That is our determination, and I believe 
 that the determination of Japan to do justly and well by Korea 
 is just as strong as our determination to do right in South Africa. 
 In proof of this I may refer you to Formosa. In the Consular 
 reports of our own Government you will find what the Japanese 
 colonists and colonial administration have done in that very 
 turbulent island. Not only have they taken an intractable 
 population in hand and produced an ordered system of adminis- 
 tration ; they have gone further than other nations in doing 
 what is right. For instance, they have dealt with that most 
 difficult problem, opium-smoking. This habit was destroying 
 the vitality of the native population ; but the Japanese have 
 grappled with the evil so well that our own Consular reports 
 show that opium-smokers are diminishing at the rate of 1,000 
 per month. Seeing what Japanese colonial pohcy has been 
 elsewhere, where time and opportunity have been theirs, I think 
 it savours of hasty criticism to judge at present of the Japanese 
 policy in Korea. (Hear, hear.)
 
 ( -''^ ) 
 
 Mr. McKenzie, in answer to a question, said that he 
 understood that at the present time tliere were about 1)0,000 
 to 100,000 Japanese in Korea, besides 80,000 Japanese troops ; 
 the number had been rapidly rising of late. Proceeding 
 to reply on the discussion, he said : I must protest very 
 sincerely against any comparison between the great work of 
 England in Egypt and the work of Japan in Korea. I have yet 
 to find that in Egypt we have torn up a treaty with the weaker 
 Power ; I have yet to find that we are administering Egypt for 
 our own good alone, and not for the good of the common people 
 there. When I spoke against certain features of Japanese pro- 
 ceedings in Korea, I was not thinking so much of the grievances 
 of officials ; I was protesting most of all against a state of affairs 
 under which every Korean finds it difficult to obtain justice. I 
 have seen men turned out of their homes and dispossessed of 
 everything, and this has roused my indignation. I cared nothing, 
 and I care little now, for the high Korean who has had to make 
 way for a Japanese official. When I see England doing what 
 has been done in Korea — for instance, acquiring private property 
 wholesale without payment of any compensation — then I hope I 
 shall as heartily protest against England's action as I have 
 spoken against that of Japan. It is a pleasure to hear of the 
 admirable measures Japan has taken, with so much success, to 
 stop opium-smoking in Formosa. Her policy in this respect 
 has, unfortunately, been very difl'erent in Korea. Under the 
 native regime opium was forbidden, and opium- smokers were 
 punished. I have myself seen men in prison as opium-smokers. 
 To-day all over Northern Korea Japanese pedlars are selling 
 opium without restraint and creating a great opium trade. 
 
 The Chaiu:\ian, in summing up the discussion, said : There is 
 evidently considerable difference of opinion amongst us in refer- 
 ence to the conclusions of the lecturer. He is to be congratulated 
 upon the delivery of an exceedingly interesting lecture, one 
 which must have entailed many hours of preparation, besides 
 giving evidence of the intelligence and ability he displayed in 
 investigating the state of affairs in Korea. But I confess that it 
 always seems to me very difficult to arrive at a just appreciation 
 of the administration of a country, however closely one may 
 endeavour to apprehend it, in the course of a few months' 
 residence. I think that perhaps hardly sufficient stress has been 
 luid upon the position of Korea in relation to Japanese interests.
 
 ( 2G ) 
 
 A glance at the map shows what an important strategic position 
 it is for Japan. It is really an outpost, and a very strong out- 
 post, of Japan's first line of defence. It would have been at the 
 peril of her own existence for Japan to have allowed any great 
 Power to acquire a dominant position in Korea. Her own pre- 
 dominance there has now been recognised by all the Powers, 
 being recognised by ourselves first of all in the Treaty of 1902. 
 The first article of that treaty declared that Japan was 
 * interested in a peculiar degree politically, as well as com- 
 mercially and industrially, in Korea.' Almost precisely the 
 same words, if I recollect rightly, were used in the Russo- 
 Japanese Treaty of Peace signed at Portsmouth at the close 
 of 1905. Not only has Japan obtained possession by her victories, 
 but Korea was incapable of managing her own aifairs. She 
 would have been in a very different position if she had had 
 statesmen who could have foreseen what was coming, or who, at 
 all events, had sought to guide the administration in the proper 
 direction. So incompetent was the Government of Korea, that 
 not only were the relations between the two Powers imperilled, 
 but the peace of the world was in danger, and therefore it was 
 absolutely necessary for Japan to become, as she is to-day, the 
 dominant Power in Korea. Japan has been instituting great 
 reforms, and some of them, no doubt, have been very difficult to 
 carry out. We all are acquainted with plenty of instances in 
 which the reformer is by no means a popular person. As to the 
 complaint that the services of foreigners were dispensed with, 
 I may say that my sympathies are rather with Japan. She has 
 acquired by her victories the position she occupies in Korea, and 
 she has plenty of capable men well able to undertake and carry 
 on the administration of the country. Many of the grievances 
 brought forward are from sources which it is rather difficult to 
 sympathize with. I will give an illustration of what I mean. 
 I saw the other day that an American firm had constructed a 
 line of street railways in Seoul, 'already,' said the writer, 
 ' operating at a nice profit,' and with good prospects before it. 
 He seemed to think it an intolerable thing that the Japanese 
 Government should seek to purchase these railways. But such 
 purchase would accord with tlie general policy of the Powers. 
 Korea svill undoubtedly advance under Japanese administration, 
 and we must look for an extension of Japanese control of public 
 works. There are difficulties in the way of progress, prominent
 
 ( :-'? ) 
 
 amongst thera being the fact that there is a semihostile 
 population to deal with. As to the behaviour of the lower 
 classes of Japanese who entered Korea, I agree with Mr. Chirol 
 that it is a misfortune they were allowed to enter without being 
 brought under adequate control. But you must recollect that 
 the Kesident-General himself has complained of the behaviour of 
 those whom he called the ' nationals.' So far from endeavour- 
 ing to hide their shortcomings, he called attention to them, 
 which indicates a desire on his part to do justly. In this con- 
 nection I should like to quote his own words. Speaking only 
 this year, the Marquis Ito said : ' Not only in regard to Korea, 
 but to the whole problem of the Far East, nothing should be 
 done opposed to the sentiment of the Powers. If she forfeits 
 their sympathy, Japan will be laying up for herself misfortunes 
 in the future.' These words of the Marquis Ito, than whom 
 Japan has, I suppose, no more patriotic and far-seeing states- 
 man, show that the need for just government in Korea is 
 recognised. I will only ask you now to permit me to present to 
 Mr. McKenzie our very grateful thanks for his lecture, and to 
 say that, however we may differ from some of the opinions he 
 has put forward, we welcome the opportunity he has given us to 
 hear the impressions he has gained in his visits to Korea. 
 
 The vote of thanks having been seconded by Mr. Chirol and 
 carried with acclamation, the proceedings closed. 
 
 HII.I.INd AND BONA, LTD., PRIMTXR8, Oril.DroRD
 
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