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BANCROFT 
 LIBRARY 
 
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 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
OUR REPUBLIC 
 
 A lillill'S-m VIBV FOR TOE COXSIKATBW OF 
 
 MEN OF ALL PARTIES 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN H. STINSON, Esg. 
 
 'i: FIF-TY fI^> Tr 
 
 SAN FRANCISCO: 
 
 M. D. CAEK & CO., PRINTEKS 411 CLAY STREET. 
 
 L 8 6 3 . 
 
OF 
 
 OUR REPUBLIC 
 
 A BIRD'S-EYE HEW FOR THE CONSIDERATION 91 
 
 MEN OF ALL PARTIES, 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN H. STINSON, ESQ. 
 
 SAN FKANCISCO : 
 
 M. D. CARR 4; CO., PRINTERS 411 CLAY STREET. 
 1868. 
 
Entered according to the Act of Congress in the year 1868, 
 
 BY JOHN H. STINSON, ESQ., 
 
 In the Clerk's Office of the United States District Court, in and for thw 
 District of California. 
 
Dangers of our Republic. 
 
 We propose in this little pamphlet to explain, in several 
 points, the philosophy of the system of government which 
 our fathers framed for us, and also to show- how its essen- 
 tial and vital provisions may be evaded, perverted and 
 destroyed. And the manner and esteem in which the 
 provisions, about which we shall speak presently, shall 
 be held and treated by the American people, in the crises 
 which are now upon us, and which must be determined 
 in a few months, so far as to give direction to future 
 events, will, in our opinion, either preserve or ruin our 
 whole political fabric. 
 
 Every Government must have fundamental principles 
 upon which it must stand or fall. And when these funda- 
 mental principles, embodied in the form of government, 
 do not correspond with the principles upon which the in- 
 habitants of the country who can influence politics act 
 and proceed, the government is already virtually sub- 
 verted, and in a short time anarchy and a new system will 
 follow. 
 
 Two sets of principles, therefore, must be investigated, 
 viz : the principles of the Government as expressed in its 
 Constitution, if it have one, and in the manner of making 
 and executing its laws ; and also the principles which are 
 impelling those who can give direction to the political 
 events of the country. If these two sets of principles be 
 in harmony with each other, the politics of the country 
 may be said to be healthy, and the Government to be 
 stable ; but if they are discordant, serious disorders in 
 the body politic may be expected, and fatal consequences 
 may follow. 
 
All governments, indeed, must necessarily undergo 
 modifications, as the impelling principles of society con- 
 flict with the constitution and laws. But there are certain 
 limits beyond which society cannot go, and no further modi- 
 fications be made without destroying the government 
 itself. 
 
 Bad governments have been modified and swept away 
 by the impelling principles of society, and unfortunately 
 good governments are not exempt from a like fate. And 
 if we would reason a priori respecting events before us in 
 America, we must look to these two sets of principles: 
 Many of the governmental principles with us have been 
 settled by a written constitution, and by the adjudication 
 of a high, and in former years at least, a pure tribunal 
 established expressly for that purpose. 
 
 Whether the impelling principles of the people of the 
 United States are in harmony with the governmental prin- 
 ciples, however, is a question, though we think not a 
 very difficult one; as it is admitted on all hands that our 
 Government has undergone and is still undergoing modi- 
 fications. 
 
 And how far this process is to proceed can only be de- 
 termined by examining the force and tendency of those 
 principles in human nature, which are driving us along. 
 And when and where this force shall expend itself, or 
 whether it will increase in momentum, as well as the goal 
 at which it will eventually land us, are questions that can 
 only be determined upon the principles of human nature, 
 as we find them actually existing in the individuals of our 
 political society. 
 
 Forces can only be estimated and tendencies appreci- 
 ated by principles derived from actual observation or ex- 
 perience. And the only sure guide we can have to test 
 the validity of any principle which we may have drawn 
 from human nature is, that old one the experience of' 
 the past. We take man's nature, morally, intellectually, 
 religiously, socially and politically, to be the same to-day 
 that it always has been heretofore. Like causes will pro- 
 duce like effects upon like subjects all the world over. 
 Were it not so, no one could guess the condition of a.> 
 p-eople an hour hence, or be able to devise any govern- 
 
ment and laws, which would anticipate and be sufficient 
 for the ordinary contingencies of society. 
 
 A knowledge of the laws of human nature, therefore, 
 must necessarily precede that of government, with every 
 one who would judge of the utility or durability of gov- 
 ernments. For, from the very nature of man, the ordi- 
 nary and continually repeated history of the past, may be 
 expected to proceed far into the future. The establish- 
 ment of any and every government presupposes a repeti- 
 tion of history. 
 
 In the Bible we read that the first man that was born 
 killed the second one, and murders have occurred ever 
 since. 
 
 No government would provide laws to prevent or pun- 
 ish arson, were not incendiaries anticipated. Men have 
 rights, and they may be wronged. And to protect men in 
 their rights, to secure their lives, their health, their prop- 
 erty, their reputation, their liberty, and their pursuit of hap- 
 piness, our fathers justly concluded that governments are 
 or ought to be instituted. These familiar principles, 
 founded in nature, are easily understood. 
 
 But when we carry our minds away from the ordinary 
 contingencies, for which governments ought to provide, 
 and look into the principles of government itself, we too 
 often fail to find in human nature the true principles upon 
 which all those governments, which were intended to be 
 benefactions to mankind, must be conducted. This, we 
 are compelled to say, for we believe it, is the case now to 
 a great degree in our land, respecting our own beneficient 
 institutions. 
 
 The system of government which our fathers estab- 
 lished, we claim, contains a philosophy, which, unfortu- 
 nately, in our opinion, has been obscured by political 
 aspirants. This philosophy itself is complicated, and 
 may with ease, by the demagogue, be wrongfully applied 
 to men's passion for liberty, and thus lead them blindly 
 on to fatal precipices. 
 
 And in order to make ourselves understood, and to ex- 
 hibit the points which we propose to discuss, we must 
 first clear the way, that the reader may be able to see and 
 mark our steps 
 2 
 
6 
 
 The discussion must necessarily be argumentative, and 
 we shall be compelled to deal in some degree with details 
 and elementary principles, the knowledge of which the 
 reader must be supposed to possess, or of which he must 
 inform himself. 
 
 We will give our views in general principles, and with- 
 out partizan feeling, and without fear, favor or expectation 
 from anybody. And in the first place, taking up the first 
 set of principles, of which we have spoken in the begin- 
 ning, let us consider for a moment who the persons are 
 that are really governed by positive institutions, and what 
 it is that governs them. An institution which does not in 
 any manner control men's actions, cannot with any pro- 
 priety be said to govern them. In an absolute monarchy, 
 in which a certain person dictates whatever regulations 
 he may see fit, that monarch certainly is not the subject 
 of any civil government. If he follow and regulate his 
 conduct by any rules at all, they are only such as he him- 
 self has prescribed for himself. And if he conscientiously 
 and rigidly follow those rules, and they be humane and 
 good, he may then indeed be said to be under a moral 
 government; but his actions are not at all in any manner 
 controlled by any positive institution of his country. 
 And wherever such a government exists among men, it 
 exists not to be governed, but to govern. 
 
 And there is in every government on earth an ungov- 
 ernable something somewhere which governs. And that 
 ungovernable something, and those persons whose ac- 
 tions are controlled by it, constitute the government and 
 the governed. 
 
 Now, the ancients tell us, that among men only three 
 simple forms of government can exist, viz: an absolute 
 monarchy, in which the will of the monarch is the govern- 
 ment; an oligarchy, in which a few powerful individuals 
 bound together by like tastes, sympathies and interests, 
 prescribe those rules of action which may seem agreeable 
 to themselves, for the people to observe; and a pure 
 republic, in which the will of the majority decides all 
 points in controversy, and forces its decisions upon the 
 the minority. Every form of government known to man, 
 they tell us, may be resolved into one or the other of 
 these simple forms; or else it is an admixture or blending 
 
together of the three or two of them. And in each of 
 these simple forms, the principle respecting the govern- 
 ment and the governed is exactly the same. 
 
 When the will of the monarch changes, then the regu- 
 lations of the monarchy immediately change; when the 
 oligarchs take other notions, then the oligarchy assumes 
 a different shape; and when the majority adopt new opin- 
 ions, then new regulations are established in the republic. 
 And it matters not whether the gvoerned be affected by 
 such changes or not, they must submit. 
 
 The government and the governed, in each of these 
 three simple forms, are distinctly marked out in the same 
 manner. And each of these simple forms contains an 
 elementary ungovernable principle of government, and 
 the three together contain all the elementary principles, 
 which we find to exist in any government. And civil lib- 
 erty, the liberty of individuals, or, to use Blackstone's 
 definition, which is approved by the learned in such mat- 
 ters, "natural liberty so far restrained, but no farther 
 than is necessary for the good of the public," never has, 
 and, from the very nature of man, never can exist in either 
 of these simple forms. They are, each of them, absolute 
 tyrannies, of which monarchy is the least oppressive. 
 
 In modern times neither of these simple forms exist 
 among the Caucasian race. Russia, perhaps, comes near- 
 est to a despotism, though pure monarchy is now confined 
 to the Asiatics and Africans. 
 
 Keeping these elementary principles of government in 
 view, let us now carry our thoughts to England, the gov- 
 ernment of which most nearly resembles our own, and in 
 which the liberty of the subject has been better cared for 
 than in any other government of Europe, and in that gov- 
 ernment we shall find all the three simple elements of 
 government spoken of, blended together. The Crown, 
 being a pure monarchy; the Lords, spiritual and tempo- 
 ral, being an oligarchy; and the Commons a republic. 
 
 Within certain monarchial limits the Crown is absolute, 
 it being one of the corner-stones of their political edifice 
 that ' ' the king can do no wrong. " He is not amenable at 
 all for any political or private act, to any law or power in 
 the kingdom. He cannot even be questioned respecting 
 
8 
 
 his actions. And althongh Charles Rex was actually 
 tried, condemned and executed, there is no intelligent 
 Englishman but that will say it was done contrary to the 
 letter and spirit of the British Constitution. It was vio- 
 lence, and not law. 
 
 There is nothing whatever in the British Constitution 
 that looks in the slightest degree towards governing the 
 king; that is, towards making the king a subject. 
 
 But lest a bad man thus situated might do infinite mis- 
 chief to the people, there are certain regulations thrown 
 around him, not indeed to affect in any manner his person, 
 not to make him do any positive act, which he may not wish 
 to do, but to keep his hands off the liberty of the subjects. 
 And these regulations have been won for the most part by 
 the sword, from the prerogative which once approached 
 almost to despotism with the English Crown. For this 
 purpose of protecting the subject is the provision, that 
 the king shall do his political acts by an agent or minister, 
 and that this minister shall be held responsible for his 
 acts; and he may be tried, condemned and executed for 
 them, and in such trial he shall not be permitted to plead 
 in defense the command of the king. If, therefore, the 
 king command him to do an an act not warranted by the 
 laws, he shall not, indeed, disobey, and remain his minis- 
 ter; but his safety is to resign and cease to be the agent 
 of the Crown. 
 
 The king, also, shall not suspend the writ of habeas 
 corpus, without the Lords and Commons in Parliament 
 advising him to do so. 
 
 The Commons, also, may refuse to furnish money lo en- 
 able the king to accomplish any injurious measure, which 
 he may contemplate, and so on. 
 
 But all these regulations respecting the executive power 
 are not instruments put into the hands of the Lords or 
 Commons, or both together, by which they may make the 
 king a subject of civil government, but they are instru- 
 ments which shall be used to prevent the Crown from 
 governing improperly. 
 
 In the mixed government of England, therefore, the 
 Crown is, within certain limits, a true representative of 
 an absolute monarchy; one of the simple elements of 
 government, that of monarchy, is found in it. 
 
If, now, we take a view of the House of Lords, we 
 shall readily determine that it is a true representative of 
 an oligarchy. The Lords only have the privilege by 
 birth of being called to be the advisers of the king. And 
 in more remote times, when the sessions of Parliament 
 were less frequent, the Peers frequently met in conven- 
 tion to consider the state of the realm, and to inform and 
 advise the Crown. A Peer, individually, also, has the 
 right to submit respectfully any information which he may 
 deem of importance to the Crown. 
 
 A Peer charged with treason or felony, or of misprision 
 of treason or felony, can be tried only by his Peers, if he 
 so request. And although the persons of Peers may be 
 attached, in order to make them obey the orders of the 
 Court, they cannot be arrested in any civil suit upon the 
 complaint or showing of anybody. A Peer answers an ac- 
 tion at law or bill in equity, not upon his oath, but upon 
 his honor. And as a witness he need not take an oath in 
 any case, except when before the high Court of Parlia- 
 ment. He cannot lose his nobility, except by death or 
 attainder, and he has various other legal exemptions. 
 And his social privileges and moral influence in society 
 are still greater than his civil powers. 
 
 All this certainly looks like oligarchy, and what else is 
 it ? Within a certain sphere it is a complete oligarchy. 
 A Peer, to be sure, cannot with impunity deprive a com- 
 moner of his life, his liberty, his property, or his reputa- 
 tion. But he himself is independent of the smiles or 
 frowns of anybody except his Peers. He looks only to 
 his Peers and the Crown for promotion of any kind. 
 
 The House of Commons is intended to represent only 
 the purely democratic element in the British Constitution, 
 and to a considerable degree it is a democracy; though it 
 has not heretofore represented a pure republic, so well 
 as the Crown has represented a monarchy, and the Peers 
 an oligarchy. The democratic element, however, is gain- 
 ing strength every day in England. And, upon the 
 whole, the British Constitution is really a blending to- 
 gether of the three simple elements of government, so 
 often mentioned by political philosophers. And in Eng- 
 land, that ungovernable and absolute power which is con- 
 tained in each of these simple elements, and which must 
 
10 
 
 exist somewhere in every government, can exert itself 
 only by the agreement of these three elements. Now, the 
 keeping of these three elements each in its proper orbit, 
 is what the British statesmen call the balance of the Eng- 
 lish Constitution, the aegis of freedom, the paladium of 
 English liberty, and so on. 
 
 And this aegis or paladium, they tell us, is preserved 
 by two efficient causes and arrangements : First, by the 
 distribution of different powers to each of those elements 
 in Parliament, so that the legitimate action of one, if 
 tending to produce mischief, may be opposed by the le- 
 gitimate action of another, or the other two; and second, 
 by the different interests of each of these elements, and 
 of the persons intrusted with their management. The 
 latter consideration, the different interests, seems to me 
 to me to be the foundation of all that is valuable in the 
 former. For although a certain set of men may have in- 
 struments placed in their hands to prevent another set 
 from doing wrong, yet where the design is not opposed to 
 their wishes, they will never use them. And the fulcrum 
 upon which their wishes turn will generally be interest. 
 
 History is full of the quarrels between an aristocracy 
 and their king, between the people and an aristocracy, 
 and between the people and the king. To get rid of an 
 odious aristocracy, the people have frequently joined with 
 the king; again the aristocracy and the people have united 
 and humbled the king; and then again they have separ- 
 ated and warred with each other. This is the history of 
 the internal affairs of the governments of Europe, and 
 these conflicting interests and wishes, according to writers, 
 are made to work in harmony by the British Constitution. 
 We have thus endeavored to bring to view the simple ele- 
 ments of government, and to refer to their blending in 
 the English Government. That Government, in appear- 
 ance, and in some respects in fact, resembles our own; so 
 much so that it might be supposed, if we should discard 
 a few names, pompous shows and parades, the two gov- 
 ernments would be substantially the same ; but that is a 
 mistake, they are very different. 
 
 Now the English Government is a matter of history; it 
 has endured for several centuries, and passed through 
 fiery trials, and our own in part has been taken from it; 
 
11 
 
 we may, therefore, use it, not only to bring the principles 
 of our Government into clear view, but also to gain im- 
 portant information by the contrasts, the similarities, and 
 the identities. 
 
 Coming now to the consideration of the; political insti- 
 tutions of the United States, let us first determine for 
 ourselves what kind of government we have. Did our 
 fathers intend to establish a pure monarchy, an oligarchy, 
 or a pure republic? Or did they intend to unite and 
 blend these three elements ? That they did not intend to 
 erect a monarchy, or an oligarchy, is too obvious to need 
 remark; and that they did not intend to blend together 
 the three elements of government, must become equally 
 clear upon slight reflection. 
 
 There is no functionary above the law in our system. 
 The President is put into power by the people, and is ex- 
 pected, if he live, to become a private citizen again. He 
 is amenable for both his political and private acts. The 
 element of monarchy does not exist in the Presidential 
 office. 
 
 Neither are the Senators to be taken from any class of 
 citizens. They derive their political positions mediately, 
 though not immediately, from the people, and indepen- 
 dently of their tapestry of office for a time, their social 
 influence can be sustained only in a like manner as that 
 of other individuals. It was not intended by the found- 
 ers of our Government that the element of oligarchy 
 should be in it. We then have only the element of de- 
 mocracy left to deal with in the institutions which our 
 fathers delivered to us. 
 
 Yet we have a republic possessing very different phases 
 from any other w r hich has heretofore existed upon the 
 face of tne earth, and to these phases we must now give 
 our attention; and we respectfully request that the reader 
 will give his patient attention while we endeavor to un- 
 ravel in detail, as well as we are able, some of the prin- 
 ciples of the most complicated system of goverment on 
 the earth. 
 
 We shall expose without hesitation what appears to us 
 to be defects,,, or rather insecurities, in order that the 
 reader may see the dangers to which we may be exposed, 
 
12 
 
 and when we shall have the details before us, we will en- 
 deavor to show the dangers now threatening, and give our 
 inferences respecting the probable downfall of our re : 
 public. 
 
 The history of the formation of our Constitution and 
 Government may be learned from the Federalist, from El- 
 liott's debates, and from a recent work by Curtis, in two 
 volumes. The Constitution itself, and these sources men- 
 tioned, shall furnish us with the facts which we will use. 
 We will state these facts in our own language, without 
 quoting; but should anyone fear that we are varying 
 them, he can easily refer to the sources from whence they 
 came. 
 
 And the first fact which we shall notice is, that the 
 founders of our system did not intend it to contain any 
 other element than democracy; a truth which we deduced 
 from the Constitution itself, a moment ago; and yet, in 
 juxtaposition with this, we will place the fact that not one 
 of the founders of our Government had any faith what- 
 ever in a pure republic ; that is, in a republic such as we 
 have described, in which the will of the majority shall 
 determine /ill points which may be brought into contro- 
 versy, and force its decisions upon the minority. They 
 knew too well the inevitable consequences of such a gov- 
 ernment. And hence they formed a constitution which 
 should carry our system away from pure democracy, and 
 shape and limit the effects of the popular will. That was 
 the very intention in framing the Constitution. But to 
 this Constitution itself we will come, for it is the work of 
 our fathers, and the work of an artist shows the artist's 
 designs. And we will first notice that this instrument 
 provides the manner by which our political liberty shall 
 be preserved. But by political liberty we do not mean 
 civil liberty. Eussia enjoys, perhaps, as much political 
 liberty as any other country; that is, her people collect- 
 ively under the government, such as it is, can act with 
 little restraint imposed upon them by foreign powers. 
 Collectively, her people enjoy great liberty; individually, 
 but little. Collective liberty we call political liberty; in- 
 dividual liberty, civil liberty. Our fathers achieved our 
 political liberty when they drove the British from our 
 shores; they then set to work to secure our civil liberties. 
 
13 
 
 At the arrangements in the Constitution for preserving 
 our political liberty, we will not look. Their considera- 
 tion is of no importance to us in our present investiga- 
 tion. 
 
 The Constitution also provides for carrying out any 
 measure under it, which may be adopted for internal 
 safety, for improvements, for the appointment and sup- 
 port of officials, etc. We will pass over all these, and 
 come to the consideration of those provisions which 
 guard and secure to individuals their civil liberties, for 
 these are the ones of the greatest importance to us at pres- 
 ent; and such provisions in the Constitution of every Gov- 
 ernment, which has one, are always negations of the 
 power which governs in the country. They are all ex- 
 pressed in negative sentences, or directly implied in af- 
 firmative ones. In our Constitution they run in this 
 manner; "No title of nobility, etc.," "No bill of at- 
 tainder, or ex post facto law, etc. , " " The privilege of the 
 writ of habeas corpus shall not, etc. , " " Congress shall 
 make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
 etc.," "Private property shall not be taken, etc.," and in 
 affirmations implying negations, such as, "In all criminal 
 prosecutions the accused shall be tried by an impartial 
 jury, etc., "that is, he shall be tried in no other manner. 
 The affirmations respecting the administration of the 
 Government also imply negations. And such provisions 
 in a Constitution are always obstructions, purposely 
 placed in the way of the governing power in the country. 
 What is the governing power in an absolute monarchy ? 
 The will of the monarch. What is it in an oligarchy ? 
 The will of the oligarchs. What in a republic ? The will 
 of the majority. What are these provisions in our Con- 
 stitution for? To obstruct the will of that majority. 
 That is the ultimate design of them all. And by these 
 provisions we are kept away from a pure republic, in 
 which our fathers had no faith. Nor has anybody else, 
 who has read anything of the history of man, any faith in 
 such a government. They have no written Constitution 
 in England they do not need any. Civil liberty, in a 
 country which blends the three simple elements of gov- 
 ernment, as in Great Britain, will be protected by that 
 very arrangement, if these elements be well balanced. 
 2 
 
u 
 
 Now if the negations, expressed and implied, in our Con- 
 stitution, can be sustained and kept up in good faith, our 
 Republic will stand forever; but if they cannot be sus- 
 tained, the Constitution must pass away in effect and in 
 fact, and our Republic, which our fathers established will 
 fall. How, then, are they to be sustained? The framers 
 of our Constitution considered that very question, and 
 here was their great difficulty: They might have put into 
 the Constitution a clause, stating that these provisions 
 shall never be amended, changed or evaded. But by thus 
 elevating the Constitution above every power in the" land, 
 they would have inserted a purely monarchial principle, 
 without a monarch to sustain it. The difficulties here, 
 among an agitating people, are enormous, and our fathers 
 looked over the republics that had lived for a day and 
 passed away, and they examined other governments. 
 The difficulties consist in this, that all the negations in a 
 Constitution have entirely a different effect in a Republic 
 from that which they have in a limited monarchy. We 
 have not room in this pamphlet to take up these negations 
 one by one, and show that each of them is but a bar in 
 effect, whatever may be their ostensible purpose, to the 
 popular will. But we will illustrate our position by ex- 
 amining one of them, and the same principle brought out 
 will apply to them all. Take the suspension of the writ 
 of habeas corpus, for example. Our Constitution says that 
 the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except 
 in certain cases. We propose now to show that this ne 
 gation is a bar placed, in effect, right against the peo- 
 ple's will, and not against that of the President of the 
 United States, as a man holding power in his hands. This, 
 we say, is the ultimate effect of that provision. And in 
 order to make this position clear, let us contract this pro- 
 vision in our Constitution with a similar provision, in ap- 
 pearance, but only in appearance, in the British Govern- 
 ment, in which, as we have shown, there exists the ele- 
 ment of pure monarchy. The Crown, says the British 
 Constitution, shall never suspend the writ of habeas cor- 
 pus without the consent of the Lords and Commons in 
 Parliament. Now what power does this negation bar in 
 England ? It is a bar to the will of a man who is a mon- 
 arch and above the law, and who, from malice or some other 
 
15 
 
 Eersonal motive, may attempt to lay his hands upon the 
 berties of a subject; and for such actions he cannot be 
 brought to account by any power in the kingdom. 
 
 Look now at the President of the United States. He 
 is a subject, and can be reached by law. He must step 
 out of the White House in a little time, if he be not im- 
 peached and turned out, and if from malice or some per- 
 sonal motive he suspend the writ of habeas corpus to im- 
 prison men, so soon as he steps out the prison doors fly 
 open, the prisoners step out, and the President is liable 
 to step in. Without this provision in our Constitution, 
 an unpopular President could merely harrass men a little; 
 and no such President, who possessed any forethought, 
 would dare subject himself to such liabilities. But re- 
 verse the picture : suppose the President to be the expo- 
 nent of the popular will, that the popular will all the time 
 goes with him, then he can suspend the writ of habeas 
 corpus if he see fit, and bid defiance to the true intent of 
 that provision of our Constitution, and there is no power 
 in the land that can sustain the law. This negation in 
 our Constitution, in effect, impinges against the popular 
 will; and so does every other negation in the Constitution 
 of every Hepublic. 
 
 But some one will say, there is no danger that these ne- 
 gations in our Constitution will be destroyed or evaded, 
 or at farthest, the Constitution will only be remodeled to 
 suit the advancement of society. In our opinion not one 
 of the provisions which secure to individuals their civil 
 liberty, can be sustained for ten years longer, unless the 
 tendencies of the past few years be thrown into other 
 channels; and for this reason, because the means which 
 our fathers provided, and upon which they relied to sus- 
 tain these safeguards, unless a change take place, will 
 soon have no power in the country; and we must now go 
 into the elementary principles and details of these means. 
 
 We stated but a little while ago, that in England their 
 statesmen claim that they have in their political system a 
 balance of power and a balance of interests. The bal- 
 I ance of power sustains civil liberty; and the balance of 
 ; interests sustains this balance of power. Now how did 
 our fathers expect to maintain civil liberty in this country? 
 Did they suppose that individuals could be protected in 
 
 
16 
 
 their rights without any constituted power in the land to 
 afford protection ? If they did, there was certainly no 
 need of having any Government whatever. Did they ex - 
 pect that if they should write a Constitution and throw it 
 out upon the ground, by virtue of the very power of its 
 sentences, all men could be protected ? They were, cer- 
 tainly not so insane. And to state the gist of the matter, 
 they endeavored to establish a balance of power and a 
 balance of interest in America, as in England, but by 
 different means ; the one to sustain the Government in its 
 constitutional channel, and the other to maintain civil 
 liberty. 
 
 They discarded the monarch and the oligarchy, and in 
 their room they put an executive and a judiciary. There 
 are three powers in England, viz : a monarch, an oligarchy 
 and the commons; these constitute the balance of power 
 in England. 
 
 There are three powers in America: the the executive, 
 the legislative and the judiciary. These were intended 
 by our fathers to be a balance of power in America. 
 
 Having said this much concerning the powers, we must 
 leave their further consideration for a time, and consider 
 somewhat in detail, the manner in which our fathers in- 
 tended the balance of interest in America to be regulated. 
 
 The old confederation had failed. Its history teaches 
 the same lesson as that of the Amphyctean league of the 
 Greeks; the Hanseatic league, and every other confedera- 
 tion; and when the Convention of 1787 met in Philadel- 
 phia, to take into consideration the formation of a new 
 Government, two plans were brought forward; the one 
 called the New Jersey, and the other the Virginia plan. 
 The New Jersey plan contemplated a stronger confedera- 
 tion of States, while the Virginia plan aimed at a Nation- 
 al Government. The framers of the New Jersey plan 
 desired that each State, however small its territory and 
 population, should have an equal representation in Con- 
 gress; while the others sought a representation according 
 to population. This put the question of the balance of 
 interest directly in issue, and after discussing the matter, 
 they, as it were, split the difference between the two 
 plans, and they made the Presidency and the House na- 
 tional, and the Senate confederate; that is, a certain and 
 
17 
 
 definite population was to have one representative in the 
 House, throughout New York, Pennsylvania and the 
 other States, while in the Senate each State was to have 
 two Senators, irrespective of its population. The Presi- 
 dency also was to be national, each State having as many 
 electoral votes as it might be entitled to Eepresentatives and 
 Senators in Congress. Considering, therefore, the peo- 
 ple of New York as a part of the population of the Gen- 
 eral Government, and in the House they are represented 
 as the rest of the people are, but in the Senate they are 
 not. Considering New York as a State, and in the Sen- 
 ate it is represented as the rest of the States, but in the 
 the House it is not. In this respect, therefore, the Sen- 
 ate is confederate and the House is national. Now let us 
 see what this arrangement accomplishes in the practical 
 working of the Government. 
 
 If New York and Pennsylvania, or should the valley of 
 the Mississippi, contain more inhabitants than all the 
 other States put together, in the House they can carry any 
 measure that they may desire; but when it comes to the 
 Senate, if the other States be more in number, the meas- 
 ure may be defeated. What is the effect of this arrange- 
 ment respecting the balance of interests of the different 
 sections of our country ? It is to prevent the majority of 
 people, if collected in a certain section, from ruining the 
 minority by any measure which they otherwise could 
 carry, and which might not be restrained by any other 
 constitutional bar. Here, then, is one method by this 
 arrangement of the Senate, for balancing sectional in- 
 terests. 
 
 There is another arrangement which is supposed to have 
 some effect upon the balance of interests : a Senator shall 
 hold his office for six years, and a Eepresentative for two; 
 and if by this arrangement the interests of the Senators 
 and Eepresentatives from the same State should be, 
 throughout the United States, opposed to each other, here 
 would be a national balance of interests; but as, in fact, 
 in our day at least, they are not, this arrangement affords 
 no balance at all. The balance of interest, therefore, in 
 our country, is maintained only by the confederate nature 
 of the Senate, and it is vibrated by States. This point 
 of our Government the confederate nature of the Sen- 
 b 
 
18 
 
 ate we consider will be exposed to danger in a short 
 time; because it stands right in the way of the practical 
 results of a doctrine now taught and believed throughout 
 the North; we refer to the doctrine of popular will; that 
 the majority must rule. The President's veto, and the 
 different terms of office of Senators and Representatives, 
 can affect the balance of interests but little. The nature 
 of the Senate is the only effectual arrangement, and in 
 less than ten years more, under the present popular-will- 
 doctrine, the Senate must be changed; for it protects the 
 majority of States from the majority of people inhabiting 
 the minority of States. And it is taught all through the 
 North, and believed, too, to be an axiom in a Republic, 
 that the will of the majority must govern. That this is 
 true in a pure Republic, no one will deny; but that our 
 fathers intended the will of the majority on all points, 
 even under the other provisions of the Constitution, to 
 rule in America, is plainly contradicted by their erection 
 of this barrier in the Senate. They arranged the Senate 
 as it is for no other purpose than to defeat sectional ma- 
 jorities. To illustrate further : Suppose the New England 
 States to-day to contain sixty million of inhabitants, they 
 would then have the majority in the House, and in it they 
 could carry any measure which they might wish; but this 
 measure would be sure to be defeated in the Senate, if 
 distasteful to the other States. Must the will of this ma- 
 jority govern in America ? If it must, then the Senate 
 must be remodeled. 
 
 If the influx of population should continue as heretofore, 
 in a few years the valley of the Mississippi may contain 
 more inhabitants than all the other States put together. 
 If the will of the majority must govern, give them the 
 Government, and abolish the Senate. But the majority 
 in America never can rule under any one General Gov- 
 ernment. Will the Pacific States submit to be ruled in 
 all points under the other provisions of the Constitution 
 by the Atlantic ? I do not believe they will if they can 
 help it. The South would not submit until forced to the 
 will of sectional majorities. But we are told that the 
 reason they would not submit is because they were slave- 
 holders. And the Pacific States by and by will feel like 
 resisting because they are mine-holders; and the north 
 
19 
 
 Mississippi valley States will resist because they are corn- 
 holders. It is a question of interest, and only interest, in 
 each case. 
 
 A Southern planter, certainly, would never have imper- 
 illed his life for a negro in whom he had no interest what- 
 ever. And should the Southern people all be removed 
 from their homes, and people from the North take their 
 place, in a short time a local interest must spring up, and 
 under c the popular-will doctrine that the will of the ma- 
 jority, though sectional, must govern, it will produce the 
 same result as slavery. The will of a sectional majority 
 never can be made to govern a minority nearly approach- 
 ing that majority, without a rupture, where the interests 
 are strong. And the geography of our country plainly 
 indicates that strong sectional interests must arise. In 
 our opinion the popular-will doctrine will be fatal to our 
 Republic. It must destroy the nature of the Senate, if 
 every State be represented there before it can reach its 
 object. And if this balance of interest in our Govern- 
 ment be destroyed or evaded, it must produce war, if 
 there be any power in sections to make war; and where 
 the power to make war is wanting, the people neverthe- 
 less feel that they are subjected to a species of slavery; 
 and hence their national pride and patriotism which are 
 the conservators of republican institutions are des- 
 troyed. 
 
 But in the remarks just preceding, \ve have been en- 
 deavoring to show the arrangement of the balance of in- 
 terest in our Government, and the manner in which it is 
 vibrated. We return now to the consideration of the 
 powers of our Government, and of the manner of pre- 
 serving and adjusting their balance; and we wish to be 
 well understood, respecting these balances of interests 
 and of powers in our institutions. For, we think we will 
 be able to show before we close, that the dangers now 
 threatening these balances of our Government are very 
 great. There certainly must be a balance of power in 
 every Government that maintains civil liberty in the land; 
 an absolute monarchy has no balance of power, and no 
 liberty. An oligarchy is in the same condition, and a 
 pure republic is a tyranny as absolute and more oppress- 
 ive than absolute monarchy itself: and if the people of 
 
20 
 
 America wish to try a pure Republic in this broad land of 
 ours, they may aim at it, but they will wade through riv- 
 ers of blood, and land themselves at last only in anarchy 
 and despotism. Such are our honest convictions, and 
 therefore we respectfully entreat the reader to give his 
 patient attention. 
 
 And in order to make this matter clear, let us return to 
 the mixed government of England, and patiently examine 
 how these balances of interest and power are sustained 
 there; then contrast our own system with that, and I think 
 we will be able to see clearly the points and the dangers 
 which threaten them. 
 
 Men tell us that our institutions are in no danger, be- 
 cause they do not look to the points where the dangers 
 are coming like an avalanche. 
 
 Leaving now the consideration of our own system out 
 of the catalogue, and the manner of preserving the bal- 
 ances of interest and of power in England, has been con- 
 sidered the best in the world, by the greatest statesmen of 
 the world outside of England, such men as Montesqueau 
 and Necker, in France, and Hamilton and Madison in 
 America; and in the present crisis we consider it of great 
 importance to be familiar with these principles, for by 
 them we will become acquainted with our own situation. 
 We have already stated that British statesmen, and oth- 
 ers, too, regard the civil liberties of England to depend 
 upon the adjustment of the balance of interest and of that 
 of power. Our civil liberties, also, we regard as depending 
 upon these two things. And the balance of power will 
 always vibrate when the balance of interest is disturbed. 
 No power among men can be exercised for any considera- 
 ble time without an efficient interest to support it. Now 
 the interests which underlie and support each of the 
 powers in the British Government, are immediate as well 
 as remote, and very clear; while the interests underlying 
 and supporting two of the powers in our Government, are 
 generally remote, and sometimes obscure. And when 
 they are remote and obscure, or obscured by political 
 aspirants, these powers will be unsustained. Let us ex- 
 amine the matter in detail, and let us first look at the im- 
 mediate interests in England and in America. 
 
 What immediate interest underlies and supports the 
 
21 
 
 power of the Crown, the monarchial element in the Brit- 
 ish Government ? 
 
 First. The life of the sovereign, and then the lives of 
 his household. With a king it is, to be a king or die I 
 A king deposed is a king murdered, almost all the world 
 over. And his demise in such manner generally involves 
 the danger and ruin of his household and family connec- 
 tions. And in order to remain a king, he must retain in- 
 tact, within certain limits, all the privileges and prerog- 
 atives of monarchy, its power. The immediate interests. 
 of the king, his household, and relations in the Crown, 
 are exceedingly strong. 
 
 How is it with the immediate interests of the Presiden- 
 tial office ? The President, who holds it, has in it the im- 
 mediate interest of a hundred thousand dollars. He may 
 conclude, and conclude justly, from political phases, that 
 he will hold the office but one term; and he can intrigue, 
 if he be corrupt, with corrupt men in Congress. Suppose 
 now there should be a pressure by the other powers of 
 the Government upon the immunities of the Presidential 
 office, where is the immediate interest to preserve them 
 intact ? The President can sell out without any damage 
 to his immediate interests, and leave our country without 
 a power which our fathers established for our protection. 
 A Mexican President would do so very quickly. A patri- 
 otic President, of course, has an interest in the preserva- 
 tion of the immunities of his office intact; but that inter- 
 est is remote, it is merely that of a patriot for the whole 
 country. We will look into the remote interests by and 
 by. Let us now go to the House of Lords, the next 
 power of the British Government, which we will notice. 
 What are the immediate interests that sustain it ? The 
 fortunes, the political and social positions, the titles, the 
 honors, the exemptions, everything of each Lord in the 
 kingdom, which he holds dear. If the privileges of the 
 House of Lords be attacked, the nobility throughout the 
 land will resist. 
 
 What immediate interests support our Supreme Court ? 
 The salaries of the Judges, the persons who have cases 
 before it to be decided, and innocent persons brought 
 before it to be set free, are all the immediate interests, 
 that there are to support its power. 
 
22 
 
 What immediate interests support the House of Com- 
 mons ? The salaries and privileges of its members, and 
 the interests of the Commons of the country. 
 
 What immediate interests support our Congress ? The 
 same things that support the House of Commons. 
 
 And from the foregoing analysis it must appear, we 
 think, that the immediate interests underlying and sus- 
 taining the power of the Crown and House of Lords in 
 England, are much stronger than those immediate inter- 
 ests which support the executive and the judiciary with 
 us; and that these powers in Great Britain would be able 
 so far as immediate interests are concerned, to withstand 
 a pressure and weather a storm of corruption and fanati- 
 cism, which would irretrievably sink 'the immunities of 
 the Presidency and Supreme Court. 
 
 But we come now to the consideration of those remote 
 interests which support the powers; for they are of great 
 importance in England, and of the utmost importance in 
 America, to civil liberty; and first, we will consider the 
 remote interests which support the powers of the British 
 Government. And after what has been already said, I 
 think we need not tax the reader's patience with many 
 details, or a rigid analysis. You will understand these 
 truths of human nature, which history and philosophy 
 have demonstrated in Europe. A monarch is scarcely an 
 apology of power among a free thinking people, unless he 
 surround himself with a nobility whom he can interpose 
 between himself and the people. Bring him face to face 
 with the people and down he goes. A nobility without a 
 head, without a monarch, cannot stand before an indepen- 
 dent thinking people either. Their own dissensions will 
 destroy their concert of action, and the people will con- 
 sider them but mischief-makers and oppressors, and throw 
 them off. Let us now consider how the principles of hu- 
 man nature work in England. If the nobility and people 
 both attack the king, he must give; but the nobility will 
 never go so far as to abolish the immunities of the Crown 
 for it is their remote interest to preserve them. Their 
 utter destruction only removes an obstruction to the ruin 
 of the nobility themselves. They may be willing to de- 
 pose a bad man, but they want another monarch to take 
 his place. The Crown they must keep intact for their own 
 
23 
 
 defence. Suppose the people attack the nobility. The 
 king may go with the people to humble them if they be 
 arrogant, but he will go no farther; it is his remote inter- 
 est to preserve them. Suppose the people attack both 
 king and nobility, and desire to set up a new form of 
 Government, they must then fight both. But that is 
 not all ; before the Commons of England can by force get 
 a new form of Government, they must first run into an- 
 archy or military despotism ; there is no other alternative. 
 But suppose the people should fail in their attempt, the 
 nobility would not consent that they be destroyed, were 
 it possible to destroy them all, upon the principle that if 
 the Commons were destroyed, the nobility themselves 
 would immediately become the Commons. We must also 
 recollect that the king has an army at his command, the 
 nobility officer that army, and the Commons fight the 
 battles. 
 
 This is the manner in which the remote interests are 
 brought to bear in supporting intact each of the powers 
 in England. They have no written Constitution in con- 
 tradistinction to the rules and laws of the Parliament. 
 They have no Supreme Court to decide upon the constitu- 
 tionality of Parliamentary acts. The plain and unequiv- 
 ocal will of the Parliament has no check in the kingdom. 
 There are immediate and remote interests, which are pow- 
 erful enough throughout the kingdom to support each of 
 the powers of the government. These interests, by the 
 laws of human nature, balance each other, and sustain 
 what is called the balance of power in Great Britain. 
 And for sustaining the Government, the English system 
 has certainly worked admirably well. For the British 
 Government, however oppressive it may have been to cer- 
 tain classes, has stood more firmly and longer than any 
 since the Christian Era, in which freedom of thought, of 
 speech and action, has been tolerated and encouraged. 
 
 Let us come now to the powers of our own Government 
 and consider their balance, and the remote interests that 
 may be brought to sustain this balance, should there be 
 a pressure upon either of the powers by the others. 
 
 Suppose the President and Congress should attempt to 
 remodel and limit the immunities of the Supreme Court 
 in such a manner as would be tantamount to their annihi- 
 
24 
 
 lation, to what interests can the officers of that judicial 
 power in our country appeal for the support of their im- 
 munities ? If I be wrongfully committed to jail, I have 
 an immediate interest in the power of the Court, that it 
 may be able to oppose successfully the bars of the 
 Constitution against the power that is oppressing 
 me. But the rest of the citizens have only a remote in- 
 terest in it, which lies in the contingency that a like event 
 may, in the future, come to themselves. Suppose, too, 
 that the popular will, that ungovernable and only element 
 in democracies which governs, be seeking its immediate 
 interests through the President and Congress, in some 
 scheme which they have in hand. What then will become 
 of the Supreme Court ? Where are the interests to sus- 
 tain it ? The people will do again, as they always have 
 done heretofore, pursue their immediate interests and for- 
 get the remote. Where the former interests appear great, 
 men will utterly neglect the latter, and then the Supreme 
 Court goes down, or loses its independence, and becomes 
 but the servant of Congress. And then intelligent and 
 patriotic men may find dungeons throughout the land. 
 
 If legislation cannot destroy the Court, the President 
 has patronage, and Congress has great facilities, and the 
 will of the majority, too, to aid them in disseminating 
 doctrines and holding illusions before the people, until 
 they gain three-fourths of the States, and then down goes 
 the Constitution itself. 
 
 In the foregoing picture we have made prominent the 
 Supreme Court; we can just as easily show that no Pres- 
 ident, should he desire it ever so much, can preserve the 
 immunities of the Presidency, if they be attacked by the 
 popular will, which can control both houses of Congress. 
 There is no power in the Presidency, nor any sufficiently 
 potent interests in the country to which the President can 
 appeal for the support of these immunities. The Presi- 
 dency and the Supreme Court are sustained in our Gov- 
 ernment only by remote interests, while the popular will, 
 that fundamental and ungovernable element of govern- 
 ment in our system, seeks its immediate interests through 
 Congress. The Presidency and the Supreme Court, tho 
 one after the other, will surely lose their independence 
 
25 
 
 and go down, unless the people take broad and patriotic 
 views. 
 
 In England there are three powerful classes of people, 
 the one having their all at stake in the immunities of the 
 Crown, another in the House of Lords, and the other in 
 the Commons. It cannot be so in America without three 
 powerful parties, each one of which must support a dif- 
 ferent power of our Government. And in such case, the 
 next President would be elected bj the House, and be the 
 popular man of neither party. And in such an event, the 
 President would have power only to look on, and see the 
 factions fight it out on their own grounds; unless he 
 should be able to get an army of desperate men to follow 
 him, and attempt to give us a stroke of Mexican policy. 
 And we think it not unworthy of observation that the 
 President and Supreme Judges are sworn to support the 
 Constitution of the United States, for in our country 
 there may be an insecurity in this. For suppose that af- 
 ter they are sworn in, the Constitution be amended, and, 
 in effect and in fact, another Constitution be put in its 
 place, which of these Constitutions are they sworn to sup- 
 port? They are sworn, say you, to support that one 
 which has been constitutionally provided. Well, then, if 
 this new Constitution contain articles which will utterly 
 crush the civil liberties of the minority, they must sus- 
 tain them, while they themselves may be along with that 
 minority. 
 
 We have perused the analysis of the governmental 
 principles of our system, the first set of principles spoken 
 of in the outset, as far as is consistent with the design of 
 this little pamphlet, which is to give as much information 
 as possible, but in as little space as possible, and in so 
 few pages that the pamphlet may be rolled up and carried 
 conveniently in the pocket of the reader. 
 
 And upon a review of the whole of what has been set 
 forth already, we think it must appear that the balance of 
 power in our Government will not and cannot be sus- 
 tained, unless the balance of immediate and remote in- 
 terests be sustained in the minds of the citizens them- 
 selves. We think that it must be apparent, that a power- 
 ful party, possessing the entire control of the congres- 
 sional halls, and pursuing only what it believes to be its 
 o 
 
26 
 
 immediate interests, can and undoubtedly will drive 
 through the Constitution, and tear away all the provisions 
 contained therein as safeguards of civil liberty, and de- 
 molish or paralyze the powers which our fathers estab- 
 lished to defend them. And we conclude, that if these 
 powers be not preserved, with independence and power 
 to act in their full sphere of action, we are immediately 
 launched into a pure republic, that whirlpool of passion 
 that has provided the guillotine, the block, the dagger 
 and poison, for the pure and patriotic citizen of every 
 country in which it has existed; and upon whose eddies 
 the people of the United States have been jostled and 
 tossed for the last few years. And, we think it must be 
 concluded by every thinking man, that to maintain a bal- 
 ance of immediate and remote interests in the mind, must 
 require in some considerable degree calm reflection and 
 intellect. Can it be supposed that a person without the 
 power of thought, or who has never accustomed his mind 
 to estimate and attribute to remote interests their value, 
 can appreciate and act, in a Government like ours, and in 
 cricises such as are now upon us, in a manner worthy of 
 the institutions which our fathers established, to secure 
 the blessings of civil liberty to themselves and to their 
 posterity. 
 
 But we must now proceed and look into the second set 
 of principles mentioned at the beginning, viz : the princi- 
 ples that are impelling the people, and see if they be in 
 harmony with the principles of our Government. For, if 
 they are not, and they cannot be changed or impeded, 
 the destruction of our institutions is inevitable. And 
 first, we may notice, that Mr. Sumner last February pre- 
 sented in the Senate a petition from a goodly number of 
 citizens of Massachusetts, praying for the abolition of 
 the Presidency, and the appointment of Commissioners 
 from the Senate to administer the laws. By this arrange- 
 ment we should have a republic divided as Rome was, 
 between Caesar, Pompey and Crassus. It is not supposed 
 that many persons sympathize with the petitioners, but 
 the pity is that there are any; and straws show which way 
 the wind is blowing in certain sections, and among cer- 
 tain classes of people. Do such persons appreciate the 
 labors of our fathers ? And we must here notice that our 
 
27 
 
 republic is in danger, because the financial conditions of 
 our country are such, that though office holders and capi- 
 talists are accumulating princely fortunes, the great ma- 
 jority of men are groaning under oppressive burdens, and 
 " oppression makes a man mad," and renders him unfit to 
 act in a calm and discreet manner. Just look at it! The 
 people in the United States, including the territories, 
 have fifty governments to support. Only one of these, 
 indeed, the General Government, has an army and navy. 
 Leaving the army and navy out of the question, for the 
 present, let some financial calculator, better skilled in 
 political arithemetic than we are, make the calculatipn for 
 us, and let him give us the expenses for one year. Let 
 him set down the expenses of the General Government 
 then the expenses of each State in supporting its execu- 
 tive, legislative and judicial departments, together with 
 penitentiaries and other institutions, then the expenses of 
 each county throughout the United States, for jails, 
 county officials and other things, then the expenses of 
 each incorporated town in the Union, then the expenses 
 of each territory, and then add up, and we shall know 
 what the people of the United States have to pay yearly 
 in governing. And if we compare this sum with that ex- 
 pended yearly by England or France, for the same pur- 
 poses, I think that we will be able to see that our system 
 is the most expensive of any on earth. But to have full 
 view of our difficulties, we must add to the former com- 
 putation the expenses of the army and navy, and an 
 enormous national debt, together with the facts that by 
 the ravages of war and the disruption of society, the 
 South has been rendered, to a great degree, unproduc- 
 tive, and that the North and South in money as a medium 
 of exchange, are standing upon an unnatural and inflated 
 basis. In view of all these things, unless something is 
 done to afford relief soon, what must be our fate ? And 
 we may here ask ourselves a very humiliating question, if 
 we have been as capable of self-government as we were 
 flattered to be, how does it come that such enormous 
 financial difficulties have been incurred in governing us ? 
 
 AMCKOFT LIBRARy 
 
 But again, our Republic is in danger, because the safe- 
 guards of constitutional liberty cannot be sustained if the 
 people are resolved to disregard the decisions of those 
 
23 
 
 powers whose province is to decide certain questions 
 brought before them. And is not such the case in our 
 country to-day ? Are not the decisions of our Supreme 
 Court spoken of even by men in high positions as being 
 merely partizan measures? And is it not dangerous to 
 our institutions for men thus to bring so important a 
 power in our political system into disrepute? 
 
 But if it be really true that our Supreme Court has al- 
 ready lost its independence, then is there not danger? 
 The highest officer in onr land has been charged with 
 high crimes and misdemeanors, and tried and acquitted, 
 And although the acquittal can scarcely be considered a 
 partisan measure, yet in the halls of Congress charges of 
 bribery and corruption have been boldly made. If the 
 charges be true, the men against whom they have been 
 made are dangerous; if they be not true, the men who 
 make such charges are dangerous. 
 
 But again, our Republic is in danger, because it is only 
 adapted for a people of sound morality, unflinching in- 
 tegrity, high intellectual culture, and broad patriotism. 
 It is the best Government on earth for such a people, but 
 none others should touch it. The man who would take 
 our system of Government into Asia and expect its suc- 
 cess there, is simply insane. It cannot be conducted 
 successfully among the Asiatics or the Africans, nor in 
 Europe with the present moral condition of the people 
 there. No intelligent European dreams that it can. De 
 Tocqueville understood our system, and so did Miiller, and 
 so did Huniboldt, and they wished its success, that it might 
 be a beacon light, not to make the Europeans throw away 
 theirs and adopt ours immediately, but to lead the people 
 on to elevate themselves morally and intellectually, and 
 render themselves fit for a free government. For they 
 well knew that freedom can only be preserved by men 
 whose minds are free; and yet, notwithstanding the les- 
 sons of history, and the instruction and warning of sages, 
 we have come to the conclusion in America, that every 
 man throughout the world ought to participate in our 
 system of government. Let him come from Asia or Af- 
 rica, or the South Sea Islands, he is certainly a man, and 
 therefore ho ought to be permitted to participate in shap- 
 
29 
 
 ing our republican institutions. Such is our philosophy; 
 is not such our madness ? 
 
 But again, our Republic is in danger because demoral- 
 ization is already spreading throughout the land. The 
 morality of the South is prostrated by the loss of hope in 
 the white man, and the inflamed passions of the blacks, so 
 that pure inspirations of morality, where they exist, are 
 smothered; and in the North, domestic broils, robberies 
 and bad faith among men, is the order of the day, in 
 those sections of the old States where formerly the atmos- 
 phere of society was but seldom disturbed by the relation 
 of a crime, and where the vestal fires of the nation's morality 
 were once preserved and kept burning. These things are 
 natural consequences. Civil wars never mend men's morals. 
 The fathers of the revolution came out with a more de- 
 moralized country than when they went into the strife, 
 that is history. To attempt to mend the morals of a fam- 
 ily by turning husband against wife, brother against 
 brother, and children against parents, is absurd. 
 
 But again, our Republic is in danger because influen- 
 tial leaders of society do not seem to appreciate the insti- 
 tutions which our fathers established. Who, that reflects, 
 does not see that if that provision of our Constitution^ 
 that Congress shall make no law respecting the establish- 
 ment of religion, were set aside, it would be the bayonet 
 to the breast and the knife to the throat throughout the 
 land ! And yet, in the face of that, but last year, a con- 
 vention of Protestant clergymen of various denominations 
 met at Pittsburg, in Pennsylvania, and took into consid- 
 eration a resolution avowedly for that very purpose. Is 
 it possible that intelligent men are so tired of civil lib- 
 erty, for our religious liberty is included in it, that they 
 are willing even to think of wading through blood to gain 
 a theocracy; that old haggard that maliciously grins at 
 the skulls of its victims ? 
 
 But again, our Republic is in danger because the press, 
 tho pulpit and the lecture room have perverted the doc- 
 trine expressed in the Declaration of Independence, and 
 have taught men to believe that all men are born 
 equal, not only before God, as his creatures, and possess- 
 ing tho right to use their eyes, and ears, and hands, and 
 heads for their own benefit, but that they possess equal 
 
30 
 
 capacities for science and government; that in perfect 
 consistency with the laws of nature you may take Herschel 
 from the telescope and put him to the grub, and Sambo 
 from the grub to the telescope, to teach us the philosophy 
 of the stars; a delusion and a lie, and the only effect of 
 which is to place genius in rags, and clothe ignorance 
 and arrogance in scarlet and fine linen. We are not in 
 favor of enslaving any person on earth, however ignorant, 
 much less are we in favor of the ignorant enslaving the 
 intelligent. 
 
 If the intellect and virtue of America must fall, the 
 Republic will go with them. 
 
 But again, our Eepublic is in danger because the public 
 mind is from day to day abused by false doctrines of loy- 
 alty to our Government. The unfortunate event of dis- 
 loyal leaders in the South having misled the people there, 
 and made, as we think, an unnecessary and cruel war upon 
 our institutions, has given a handle and cogency to a fal- 
 lacy, which, perhaps, time only with its sad experience, 
 will be able to dislodge from the mind. All men say 
 they who fought to put down the rebellion are loyal men; 
 the slaves of the South did this, and therefore they are 
 loyal men. This is the syllogism, and its fallacy forces 
 itself upon many an honest mind as incontrovertible truth. 
 When Andrew Jackson was besieged near New Orleans 
 by the British, La Fitte, a pirate, was laying with armed 
 ships on the coast of Texas. He sent a messenger to 
 Jackson to offer his aid in the impending conflict, but was 
 refused. Upon what principle did La Fitte desire to 
 engage in the conflict ? Upon the principle of loyalty to 
 our Government ? Not at all. His immediate interest, 
 that he might make bounty, that was his principle. 
 
 Now we do not at all wish to make the negro, who 
 fought with us against the rebellion, to appear odious by 
 a comparison with the French pirate, but upon what other 
 
 Erinciple did he fight or oppose the Confederacy? Haf 
 e examined the foundations and superstructure of our 
 political edifice and approved of its principles, so that he 
 was ready to maintain them against the world? If he 
 had, in his situation, it affords a remarkable instance of 
 the triumph of speculative philosophy among the Africans. 
 Nobody pretends that he had. One side offered him re- 
 
31 
 
 lease from bondage, he pursued his immediate interest 
 and went with it. We do not blame him for that; he 
 acted fn a natural manner. But does such an act make 
 him a loyal man to our institutions ? Can any man be 
 loyal to our institutions without a knowledge of the fun- 
 damental principles upon which they are based ? But 
 further, is it not possible for the people of the United 
 States to change our whole system of government, and 
 that too in a constitutional manner, and give us a Consul 
 and Chamber of Deputies instead of our executive, legis- 
 lative and judiciary? 
 
 The Constitution may at any time be changed in a He- 
 public at the will of the people, for that is the ungovern- 
 able element of Republics; and in case such a change as 
 we have just spoken of should be made in our country, 
 who would be the loyal men to our present Government? 
 We think that those who favored the change would be the 
 disloyalists. We regard our revolutionary fathers as dis- 
 loyal* to the British Government, for they forsook the 
 fundamental principles of that Government when they 
 sought after republican institutions. And we must ob- 
 serve that a change of rulers is not a change of Govern- 
 ment. An absolute monarch may be killed and another 
 monarch take his place, without any change whatever in 
 the governmental principles. And we must observe fur- 
 ther, that in constitutional governments, many changes 
 in the Constitution may be made without aftecting the 
 fundamental principles, and consequently, often without 
 danger. But remove one of the fundamental principles, 
 and the government will totter, and unless it be restored, 
 will eventually fall. And the man who does not under- 
 stand and appreciate these fundamental principles, cannot 
 be loyal to the Government. And this we believe to be 
 the conditions of the blacks of the South to-day, and, 
 therefore, we regard the African element which has now 
 been introduced by the present Congress, and that, too, 
 most probably against the will of the majority of the peo- 
 ple of the United States, to say nothing about constitu- 
 tional questions, (and which action in itself in such man- 
 ner, on the part of Congress, is a source of danger, ) to be 
 a most dangerous element to our civil liberties. To ad- 
 mit a people who were formerly excluded, to participate 
 
32 
 
 in the Government, to be sure, is not a change of the 
 fundamental principles of the Government itself, but it is 
 a change of the conditions upon which the governmental 
 principles must depend for their success. The Africans 
 of the South can no doubt make constitutions and laws, 
 upon the same principle that men make grammars, com- 
 pile them from the works of others ; but after they are 
 compiled, to make their application in harmony with the 
 principles of justice and liberty, is a very different thing. 
 The African element cannot be loyal to civil liberty and 
 to the institutions which our fathers established to secure 
 it. There is not a loyal Chinaman in our land. To main- 
 tain civil liberty in a constitutional republic, requires the 
 greatest elevation of mind and character that the white 
 man has ever attained. Can the African and Asiatic, 
 under the most favorable circumstances, attain and stand 
 upon such an elevation ? Unfortunately, the white man 
 heretofore has never been able to stand there long, and 
 his civil liberty we regard as too precious and rare a boon 
 to be risked in an experiment with the Africans and 
 Asiatics. 
 
 But again, our Eepublic is in danger because, should 
 the freedom of the press and speech continue (and with- 
 out it liberty is gone), America will, in a very few years, 
 become the great arena in which all the opinions and isms 
 of the world will meet in deadly conflict. This has always 
 been the case in Republics heretofore, and whatever po- 
 litical advantage may be gained, will be grasped at by 
 each set of men, and the pressure of all this Babel will 
 be in Congress, which may be as impassioned a body of 
 men as once surrounded the Acropolis of Athens, and 
 which can be managed only by bold and unscrupulous 
 manipulators, as is the case to a great degree already. 
 And in the view of such certain events already upon us, 
 instead of sustaining the immunities of the Presidency 
 and of the Supreme Court, and making them efficient 
 powers, and a just balance in our country, and firmly an- 
 choring them so that they will not drag their anchors 
 when pressed by the storm, and filling them with men 
 who are not time-serving politicians, with Platonic Re- 
 publics in their heads, but honest lovers of civil liberty; 
 the people are supporting men in Congress now, who are 
 
33 
 
 nightly conjuring how to overthrow the immunities of 
 these powers and balance of our Government, and invit- 
 ing like Juno, ^olus to roll away the stone from the cave, 
 and let the winds sweep and rend the Republic into 
 fragments.