Pj Reports of the Belgian Representatives in Berlin, London and ^OS ^^^^ *^ ^^^ Minister of Foreign Affairs in Brussels, 1905-1914 UC-NRLF j»J ' ^^^"^^^ liPrOM THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE C 23t, flbT EUROPEAN POLITICS DURING THE DECADE BEFORE THE WAR AS DESCRIBED BY BELGIAN DIPLOMATISTS '/^w Documents Issued by the Imperial German Foreign Office 19 1 5 PRICE 25 CENTS GIFT OF Reports of the Belgian Representatives in Berlin, London and Paris to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Brussels, 1905-1914 EUROPEAN POLITICS DURING THE DECADE BEFORE THE WAR AS DESCRIBED BY BELGIAN DIPLOMATISTS Documents Issued by the Imperial German Foreign Office 19 15 ^So ^^^ ^ t r:^ AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REPORTS TO THE BELGIAN MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE BELGIAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES AT LONDON, PARIS AND BERLIN 1905- 1915 THE titanic drama to-day being enacted in Europe invests with tragic interest the de- tails of diplomatic history during the decade in which the storm was gathering. Each of the Powers has given out an edition of official docu- ments representing its version of the events imme- diately preceding the outbreak of hostilities. But the genesis and explanation of the war lie further back, nor are they to be sought in the White Books or Blue Books, or Red or Gray Books, with what- ever honesty and sincerity, or the lack of it, pre- pared. To attain any degree of understanding of the cause of the tragedy it is of course necessary to go back at least to the beginning of the century and to seek contemporaneous records, spontaneously made and innocent of design. The historians of the war will scrutinize innumerable documents and re- construct the political and social life of Europe from the beginning of the century, studying in particular the diplomacy of the period, and listening to the gossip of the courts and chancelleries and parlia- ments where, for a dozen years, the guardians of Europe's fate sought, consciously or unconsciously, some to provoke, and some to prevent, the catas- trophe which at last has fallen. Among the sources to which . the historian will resort, the documents which are herewith presented to the world will rank high. They consist of re- ports made to the Belgian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Baron de Favereau and M. Davignon, by the Belgian Ministers at the chief European Capitals — Count de Lalaing at London ; M. A. Leghait and later Baron Guillaume at Paris ; Baron Greindl and then Baron Beyens at Berlin — from the year 1905 to 1914. The correspondence was found in the archives of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the occu- pation of Brussels by German forces. It is printed in this volume in its original French and in an Eng- lish translation. A few facsimile reproductions ex- hibit sample pages of the manuscripts. These papers provide a running commentary on European history during the past decade, throwing light which, once shed, could by no means ever be spared, on the causes of the cataclysm through which Europe is now passing. All is here. Early testimony of a decade ago of the growth of anti- German jealousy, soon amounting to hatred, in into certainty, of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement and the Anglo-Japanese alliance; the inclusion of Italy in the Anglo-French plans; the return to power of Delcasse, the election of the chauvinist Poincare, the institution in France of the three-years' military service law, the exchange of the Barthou for the Ribot Cabinet — all is here. But it is the peculiar interest of these reports, voluminous as they are and coming as they do from a half dozen distinct sources, that they coincide pre- cisely in the account they give of the causes of Europe's unhappiness. The picture which these Ministers unite in draw- ing is that of the sinister figure of England moving with ever malevolent purpose among the courts and chancelleries of Europe, everywhere fomenting sus- picions and inspiring hatred of the Power which it has set its mind to destroy. In the pursuit of this purpose we see King Edward in the closing days of his reign devoting himself to the dissipation of the long-standing Anglo-French antipathy and the crea- tion of the rapprochement which Lord Lansdowne and Sir Edward Grey strengthened into an alliance. We see the British Government intervening at Paris again and again, with suggestion, innuendoes, de- mands, always calculated to misrepresent German policy and induce the French Government to assume in every international discussion an attitude of irrec- oncilability toward the most ordinary German sug- gestions. The calendar of the years 1905-1914 is unrolled by these diplomatic diarists, and the story of the British influence on French internal affairs during the decade, of British influence on French foreign policy at the Algeciras Conference and in Morocco, and in the successive Balkan crises, is recounted. Though the chronicle does not include any narra- tive from St. Petersburg, there are ample glimpses of the contemporaneous progress of English machi- nations in that capital, tending to make impossible any confidence between the Government of the Czar and of the Kaiser, and, finally, the creation of a Triple Entente bound together by the single motive of hatred of Germany. That British foreign policy during the last ten years has had as its central motive the isolation of Germany is of course no secret either to diplomatists or to laymen ; but the extreme degree to which this motive ruled, the never-sleeping assiduity with England; the retirement of Delcasse; the Algeciras ^hich it was pursued, the Machiavelian ingenuity Conference; the mcidents of Scutari and Nancy; the with which every occasion to forward it was taken early and the later Balkan crisis ; the ripening of the advantage of, will hardly have been recognized by Anglo-French Entente; the first rumors, gathering any who have not perused the documents in which these detached and disinterested spectators of the game recorded it as it went forward. Every report, every paragraph of every report, reveals the fact that the neutral diplomatists recog- nize that it was the never-forgotten aim of Great Britain to raise up enemies to Germany on every hand, to frustrate her every endeavor, no matter how innocent of harm to others; and that in pur- suance of this aim England never hesitated to jeop- ardize the peace of Europe. Such is the story which these pages spread be- fore us. It is away back in 1905 (September 23) that we find the Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, writing in this wise: "The unheard-of efforts made by the English press to prevent a peaceful settlement of the Moroccan affair and the probably insincere credulity with which it receives all calumnies aimed at the German policy show how ready pub- lic opinion in Great Britain is to acclaim any combination hostile to Germany." As to the attitude of Germany, writing on the last day of the year 1905, the Belgian Minister at Berlin tells his home office that it has been "the highest ambition of his Majesty (the German Emperor) to preserve peace during his entire reign." The peculiar tactics historically characteristic of English foreign poHcy are recognized in the memo- randum of October 27, 1905, by the Minister in Berlin in these words : "An insurmountable mistrust of England is pre- valent here. A great number of Germans are convinced that England is either seeking allies for an attack against Germany — or which would be more in conformity with the British traditions — is endeavoring to stir up a war on the Continent in which she would not take part and of which she would reap the benefit." In the sam.e memorandum the Minister goes on: "Are the people in England who profess fear of a German attack, which would be impossible, quite sincere ? Do not they rather feign such ap- prehensions in order to bring about a conflict which would exterminate the navy, the merchant marine, and the foreign trade, of Germany? While England is safe from attacks, Germany on the contrary is very vulnerable. In attacking Germany simply to annihilate a rival, England would only follow her old tracks. She destroyed successfully the Dutch fleet in accord with Louis XIV, subsequently, the French fleet and, finally, even the Danish fleet, in the midst of peace and without any provocation, simply because it repre- sented a respectable naval force." What is the reason for the English hatred of Ger- many? It is again and again set down by each of the Belgian Ministers. Thus Baron Greindl, Bel- gian Minister at Berlin, writing to his Minister of Foreign Affairs from Berlin, February 18, 1905: "The real cause of the hate of the English for the Germans is the jealousy produced by the ex- traordinary development of the merchant marine, the commerce, and the industry, of Germany. This hate will continue until the English will have come to realize that the commerce of the world is not a monopoly belonging by right to England. It is, moreover, carefully nursed by the Times and quite a number of newspapers and magazines which do not shrink from calumny in order to cater to the tastes of their readers." Count de Lalaing, writing from London, June 23, 1906, says: "The English press has so consistently indulged in attacks against the Emperor, his government, and his people that the public remains suspicious. Germany is the great commercial, military and, in future perhaps, naval, rival ; for this reason every good citizen considers himself under obligation to detest her, because he tells himself that for the present she is the only nation of which he has any- thing to fear since the weakening of Russia and the entente with France." Writing from London May 24, 1907, Count de Lalaing gives his government some pertinent infor- mation respecting the activities of the British press: "A certain category of the press, known here as the 'yellow press,' is to a great degree responsible for the hostility between the two nations. What, indeed, can one expect of a journalist like Mr. Harmsworth, to-day Lord Northcliffe, editor of the Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror, the Daily Graphic, the Daily Express, the Evening News, and the Weekly Dispatch, who in an interview to the Matin exclaims : 'Yes, we detest the Ger- mans, and cordially, too. They are making them- selves odious all over Europe. I shall not permit the slightest thing which might offend France to be printed in my paper, but I would not have any- thing whatsoever inserted in it that might be agreeable to Germany.' "In 1899 this same editor attacked the French with the same violence, wanted to boycott the Paris Exposition, and wrote : 'The French have succeeded in convincing John Bull that they are his bitter enemies. England hesitated for a long time between France and Germany, but she always respected the German character whereas she has come to regard France with contempt. An En- tente Cordiale cannot exist between England and her nearest neighbor. Enough of France, which has neither courage nor political sense.' "It is these journalists, editors of cheap and widely read papers, who pervert at will the spirit of an entire nation. "It is evident that official England is pursuing a policy of stubborn hostility which aims at the isolation of Germany, and that King Edward did not disdain to use his personal influence in the service of this idea, but it is clearly dangerous to poison public opinion as openly as the irresponsible press in question is doing." This estimate of the source of English hatred of Germany is coincided in by the Minister at Berlin, for instance, in that of May 30. 1907, in which he says : "England is jealous of the prodigious prog- ress in the industry, the commerce, and the mer- chant marine of Germany. Accustomed to be without a rival, she considers any competition as an encroachment on her domain. "She affects to feel alarm, the sincerity of which seems more than doubtful to me, in regard to the development of the German navy. She ought to know, however, that even in a very distant future, an attack by Germany would be practically impossible. It is Germany, on the con- trary, who has everything to fear. For centuries England has applied herself to the destruction of the foreign naval forces as soon as they acquired a certain degree of importance. France experi- enced this after Holland had done so. Then it was the turn of Denmark, whose vessels were de- stroyed without the shadow of a pretext by Ad- miral Nelson, who had entered the harbor of Copenhagen as a friend." A week later (June 8, 1907) the same Minister, expressing his skepticism regarding the effect of the approaching visit of the Lord Mayor of London to Berlin, writes: "As Count de Lalaing rightly says, the King of England is personally directing a policy the ultimate aim of which is the isolation of Ger- many. His action corresponds with the senti- ments of the nation, misled by an unscrupulous press, the sole interest of which consists in a large circulation, and which is therefore only anxious to flatter the passions of the populace. It is not only the cheap papers that lower themselves to such a part. For years the Times has pursued a campaign of vilification and slander. Its Berlin correspondent, who has every opportunity to be well informed, nourishes the hatred of the Eng- lish against the Germans by imputing to the Imperial Government ambitious schemes the ab- surdity of which is self-evident and by accusing it of shady maneuvres of which it has never a thought." Of affairs in Paris, while the Entente is being strengthened and the purpose of England imposed upon the RepubHc, the reports of the Belgian Min- ister give vivid pictures. M. Leghait, writing home March 6, 1906, of the visit of King Edward to the French capital, declares that "France is being dragged against her will into the British policy. In short, it is felt that a symptom has manifested itself here of a desire which England may have to en- venom the situation to a point of rendering war inevitable." April 5, 1906, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, writing of the Algeciras Conference, declares that : "There is no indication that the British Am- bassador had made the slightest effort at Alge- ciras in order to find a solution conciliating the views of Germany and France. It was of course expected that England would support the French policy; but the obligations which she had con- tracted need not have prevented her from exer- cising a moderating influence." In this connection Baron Greindl gives the fol- lowing interesting exposition of British policy : "It can no longer be doubted that it has been the King of England who independently from his government drove M. Delcasse into a bellicose policy and who gave him the promise, which he would not have kept, to land 100,000 British sol- diers in Holstein. "The invitation extended by the King to M. Delcasse at the time of his passage through Paris can only be interpreted as a provocation. "If any doubt could still have existed, the singu- lar step taken by Colonel Barnardiston with Gen- eral Ducarne would have dispelled it." The singular step taken by Colonel Barnardiston with General Ducarne was revealed to the world in the publication November, 1914, of secret docu- ments found in the Brussels archives, detailing a series of conversations early in 1906 between the Military Attache of the British Legation in Brussels, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, and the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major-General Ducarne, over a certain British proposal. A plan was dis- cussed for the landing of two British army corps in France to be transported into Belgium for use against Germany in case of war. The English fur- ther proposed the establishment of a Belgian espion- age system in Germany, but there is no evidence that that part of the English suggestion was acted on by the Belgian Government. The British offer to land troops was accepted, and a plan for their use was elaborated. The acceptance of the British proposal would appear to have been unknown to Baron Greindl. Baron Greindl's report to his Government repeat- edly referred to the Barnardiston-Ducarne episode ; for instance, writing April 18, 1907, he says: "This zeal in uniting Powers whom no one is menacing for alleged purposes of defense, can with good reason seem suspicious. The offer of 100,- 000 men made by the King of England to M. Delcasse cannot be forgotten in Berlin. We our- selves have to record the singular overtures made by Colonel Barnardiston to General Ducarne, and who knows if there have not been other similar intrigues which have not come to our knowl- edge?" The reports of the Belgian Minister in France sketch the unwillingness of a timid minority of pa- triotic Frenchmen to see their country brought into England's orbit. He observes the invention by King Edward and his Ministers of constant irritations designed to reawaken and fan the French spirit of revenge. To create enemies for Germany, this is the deliberate and persistent aim of all British states- manship and diplomacy. It was reluctantly that France allowed herself to be hitched and dragged at the cart-tail of British purposes, if the observations of the Belgian Minister at Paris were well founded. Reporting to his Government February 10, 1907, M. Leghait writes : "I believe that the French Government would rather have avoided this last English visit and that it is aware that it is taking upon its shoulders too much of the responsibility for the Anglo-German antipathy. .... "France, who sincerely desires to maintain peace and to improve her relations with Germany, will have to make great efforts of diplomacy if she wishes to demonstrate at Berlin that the En- tente Cordiale need not be obnoxious to Germany and that it was not concluded to put obstacles in the way of her expansion. "It is realized here so well that France is in a delicate situation and has been dragged into a dangerous game, that all the semi-official organs and other serious papers are keeping silent on this occasion and that none of them dares to show pleasure in this new demonstration of English friendship." In view of the unspeakable calamities which have fallen upon the French Republic and the Kingdom of Belgium in consequence of her implication in the British plot against Germany, it is sadly interesting to note that as early as June 17, 1907, the Belgian Minister to France, M. Leghait, was writing solemn warnings to his Government in this fashion : "England is preparing her ground admirably, but has France, who is joining her in her policy, all the necessary guarantees that she will not be the victim of this policy one day? The uncer- tainty which prevails in regard to this subject justifies the supposition that there exists between her and the British Government a more complete agreement than that of the Entente Cordiale, but which will remain latent until that day when events zmll demand that its stipulations be made public. "In order to arm herself for the moment against perils which are perhaps illusory, or in order to strengthen the position of the directors of her internal policy, France is contracting a debt of gratitude zuhich ztnll seem heavy to her on the day when England zmll rez'eal the purpose for which she zvants to use the influences which she had grouped around herself." These words were written seven years before the day which they prophesied broke in sorrow over France. Great Britain's rapprochement with Russia was becoming a possibility in 1905. As early as Octo- ber 14 of that year Baron Greindl, the Belgian Min- ister at Berlin, writes to his Minister of Foreign AiTairs : "England at the present time shows no interest whatsoever in the fate of Turkey, whose preserva- tion has for such a long time been the leading principle of her policy. She may leave Russia a free hand in Asia Minor. Such a combination would, moreover, have the advantage of embroil- *ing Russia with Germany, whose isolation is at present the principal aim of the English policy." The persistent wooing of the Hyperboreans by England seemed to puzzle the Belgian observers. Baron Greindl, writing July 16, 1906, remarks: "One can see very well what Russia can gain by the friendship of England, but it is much less clear what good the Russian friendship could do England. What can they aim at in London ex- cept at making enemies for Germany ?" It is clear to this disinterested observer that Eng- land can gain nothing from Russia by winning Rus- sia's friendship ; he knows well enough that to gain Russia's friendship England must make substantial concessions, though probably his imagination never reached the point of supposing that the successors of Beaconsfield and Gladstone would have cam- paigned against Constantinople for the purpose of turning it over to the Muscovite. Encouraged by England and conscious of the growing probability that the Entente Cordiale would become a Triple Entente, France early in 1907 be- gan to assume the aggressive attitude which Eng- land had long sought to impose upon her. In his report on the state of the Morocco affair at the period of March 28, 1907, Baron Greindl writes: "French arrogance is becoming again what it was during the worst days of the second Empire and the cause of this is the Entente Cordiale. It has increased still more since it appears that the negotiations between London and St. Petersburg, to which without doubt France has not been a stranger, are going to lead to an Entente. "If the points in question only concerned mat- ters to be treated officially between the cabinets — as in the case of Egypt, Morocco, the New Heb- rides, the fisheries of Terra Nova, Persia, Af- ghanistan, Thibet — we could only congratulate ourselves to see the causes of conflict disappear between the great Powers ; but at the bottom of the arrangements concluded, or which are going to be concluded, we always find the hatred of Ger- many kept alive — in Paris by the deep-rooted memory of the humiliation of 1870, in London by the jealousy inspired by the industrial, commer- cial, and maritime development of Germany, in St. Petersburg by nothing at all unless it be preju- dice and the wound inflicted on the boundless Slavic pride by the comparison between German civilization and Muscovite barbarism." By the middle of the year 1907 a network of in- ternational understandings had been brought about by England among Powers whose interests were supposed to be at one point or another in conflict with those of Germany. England's alliance with Japan, and her Entente with France and with Rus- sia were followed by the understanding of Italy with France and England on the Mediterranean question, by the agreement over Egypt and Morocco, by negotiations with Russia over respective spheres of influence in Asia, and by an understanding with Spain. Commenting upon the last two enterprises, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, writing to his Govern- ment June 22, 1907, remarks that they do not re- spond to any demands of political necessity. What, then, was their purpose, he inquires. "If they do not conceal some hidden motive, they might be described as of purely ornamental character." "Japan is strong enough to guarantee the integ- rity of China alone until the day when it will silit her to violate it herself. It would be hard to ad- mit that England needs Spain's assistance in order to defend her position in Egypt, Cyprus, Malta, and Gibraltar. Who is thinking of attacking it and who, moreover, would have the material means to do so ? France is no less secure in Algiers and Tunis. The danger could only come from one of the signatory Powers, if the friendship existing between them at present were to break. In such an event the present treaties would become null and void ipso facto. "If they do not contain any secret clause, they seem to have been concluded only for the pleasure of leaving Germany outside once more during the regtdation of the interests of the world. These precautions taken against imaginary perils are bound to awaken and to foster among the nations the idea that Germany is the aggressive Power against the enterprises of which the other coun- tries must unite. Matters would not be so bad if the treaties were merely superfluous, but they positively compromise the cause of peace which they pretend to serve, because they nurse a be- lief in anti-German circles that the moment is ap- proaching in which their schemes can be realized." Seven months later, on January 25, 1908, we see Baron Greindl writing : "The policy directed by King Edward VII un- der the pretext of guarding Europe from the imaginary German peril, has created a French danger which is only too real, and which is a menace above all to us." From this period on, the communications of the Belgian Minister at Berlin not infrequently advert to the dangers to Belgium involved in the outbreak of a European conflagration. In the report last quoted, the Minister, defending German policy from the aspersions cast upon it by an ex-French Minister of Foreign Affairs, exclaims : "Where did M. Delcasse see that Germany was endeavoring to impose her supremacy on other nations? We are her close neighbors, but for twenty years I have never observed in the Im- perial Government the slightest desire to abuse its strength and our weakness. I wish that all the other great Powers had used the same considera- tion toward us." February 2, 1908, the Belgian Minister at Berlin thus summarizes his view of the rivalry between England and Germany : "No one here ever cherished the absurd and impracticable idea of an attack against England ; but everybody fears an English attack." . In the middle of the year 1908, the veteran who had served Great Britain as its Ambassador near the Kaiser's Government was recalled. The Belgian Minister at the same capital thus reports to his Gov- ernment concerning the reason for Sir Frank Las- celles' removal: "I must still speak to you. Sir, of the approach- ing retirement of the British Ambassador, who left Berlin some time ago and who will only re- turn here in autumn in order to present his letters of recall. His retirement is voluntary only in form. It was forced by the British Government on Sir Frank Lascelles, who had a great desire to remain at Berlin and in favor of whose stay an unsuccessful request was also made at London by the Imperial Government. "Sir Frank Lascelles is a diplomat of rare intel- ligence, very sound judgment, and perfect loyalty, who has neither physically nor intellectually felt the signs of age and who enjoys the highly merited confidence of the Emperor, the Imperial Govern- ment, and all his colleagues. If the British Gov- ernment deprives itself of the services of a diplo- mat of such merit, who has not yet reached the age limit, it is only because Sir Frank Lascelles worked for fifteen years, without permitting him- self to be discouraged by numerous checks, to bring about a rapprochemeyit between Germany and England. The zeal which he displayed in or- der to dissipate the misunderstandings which he considered absurd and detrimental in a high de- gree to the two countries does not correspond rvith the political liezvs of his sovereign." We come now to the period of the Morocco crisis. We see the Belgian Minister at Paris, Baron Guil- laume, writing home July 28, 191 1, in the darkest hours of that affair : "France does not and cannot desire that mat- ters should be irretrievably spoilt. ... I have on the whole less confidence in the desire for peace of Great Britain, who rather enjoys seeing others devour one another." August 10, 191 1, Baron Guillaume informs his Government that : "At first England proposed to France that the two Governments despatch without delay two men-of-war each to the waters of Agadir. The Cabinet, in Paris strongly objected to this, and there the matter stands.' Supporting the statement of his colleague at Paris regarding the English designs against Ger- many in the late summer of 1907, Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, reported that he had been informed, "through reliable sources, that the officers of the active army had suddenly been called back from their furloughs, that horses had been bought for the cavalry, and that the North Sea squadron had swiftly been put on a war footing." The Belgian Minister quotes the statement made by a Member of the House of Commons that : "War had been avoided, thanks only to the per- sonal intervention of the German Emperor, to whom King George and the Czar had written." In the autumn of 191 1, the Belgian Minister at the Court of St. James's reports to his Government a number of circumstances of extreme interest in the light of events of 1914. The Morocco crisis did not come to an end without provoking a serious discussion in Parliament regarding the secret part which his British Majesty's Government had taken in the business; and Sir Edward Grey made one of the greatest efforts of his life to conceal what he could not defend before the nation, and to defend what he could not conceal. Count de Lalaing reports on November 28, 191 1, that Sir Edward Grey made the categorical state- ment that: "There was no secret treaty with France." The Count quotes significantly in a dispatch dated November 30, 1908, the declaration made by Lord Lansdowne in the House of Lords to the effect that : "In his opinion, the Entente Cordiale had emerged from the crisis strengthened, and was destined, as was the Anglo-Russian Entente, to be permanent." Lord Lansdowne was the father of the Entente Cordiale. Count de Lalaing continues in this report : "Lord Courtney of Penrith, a Liberal and friend of Germany, attacked the policy of the Government, because it had been aiming at the isolation of Germany (it is rare to hear that truth expressed in the British Parliament) and because it had not upheld the Act of Algeciras." The Belgian Minister adds: "These disagreeable truths were not to the liking of the House of Lords." X Count de Lalaing noted particular significance in one passage in the speech of Lord Lansdowne : "It is the one in which he spoke of the secret clauses of 1904, recently made public. He admit- ted that in such a case the promise simply to give diplomatic support to another Power might lead to the obligation to furnish assistance of another kind {videlicet military and naval). An Entente Cordiale established close relations between two countries, and they could not remain indifferent. If the one found itself in a different position -with- out any fault of its own, it would expect to re- ceive assistance from its friend. "You only have to read between the lines," ob- served the Belgian diplomatist, "to see that, ac- cording to Lord Lansdowne, one of the authors of the Entente Cordiale, such an arrangement can, without being an alliance, produce under certain circumstances all the effects of a defensive treaty between the two nations." The Belgian Minister in Berlin, reporting home about this time (December 6, 191 1), sees matters precisely as does his colleague in London : "Everybody in England and France considers the Entente Cordiale as a defensive and offen- sive alliance against Germany. That is the char- acter which the late King of England wanted to impart to it. The Entente Cordiale was founded not on the positive basis of defense of common interests, but on the negative basis of hatred against the German Empire. ... It is the Entente Cordiale that revived in France the idea of revenge, which had already abated consider- ably. It is the Entente Cordiale that causes the state of unrest and uneasiness in which Europe has been writhing for seven years." Baron Greindl takes up particularly the suspicion that England had had in preparation a military ex- pedition on the Continent. He refers to the fact that Sir Edward Grey refrained from denying the truth of the charges to this effect, and he says : "In default of other information it must be considered as an established fact that the plan had been discussed in London of aiding France in a war with Germany by landing an English corps of 150,000 men. There is nothing in this which ought to surprise us. It is the continuation of the singular proposals which were made a few years ago to General Ducarne by Colonel Barnardiston as well as of the Flushing intrigue." Baron Greindl comments sarcastically .on the fact that: "A hue and cry was raised because a German cruiser had cast anchor on the roadstead of Agadir, whereas England had not moved a muscle when watching the progressing conquest of Mo- roccan territory by France and Spain and the over- throw of the Sultan's independence. "England could not do otherwise. She was bound by her secret treaty with France." In short, the unanimous opinion of the Belgian Ministers in Europe's chief capitals is to the effect that the Moroccan question had been used through- out by England deliberately to the end of commit- ting the Triple Entente to a settled policy of hos- tility to Germany. At the close of the year 191 1 this is the report which the Belgian Government received from its representative in Berlin : "There is no more harmony between the people than there is between the Governments. The Eng- lish continue to be jealous of Germany's expan- sion. The Germans who six months ago were by no means hostile to England have become so now." The disinterested, but complete and absolutely unanimous, as well as continuous, testimony which the successive occupants of the three chief Belgian legations in Europe bear to the innocence of Ger- many's policy and the persistent and malicious hos- tility of England's policy is astounding. Writing February 13, 191 2, Count de Lalaing notes the oppo- sition to Sir Edward Grey rampant in the English press. The Daily News was in the lead of those who "deplored the results of the action of the Minis- ter who had set up a Triple Entente in opposition to the Triple Alliance, hampered the expansion of Germany, and brought the country within 'an ace of war during the past year. The policy of Sir Edward Grey was logically bound to lead Great Britain to adopt compulsory conscription for the army." Early in the summer of 1912 a new Belgian Min- ister appeared at Berlin, in the person of Baron Beyens. His first published communication to his Government is concerned with asking whether the new German Ambassador at the Court of St. James's, Baron von Marschall, will succeed in what is understood to be his aim at London, namely, to efifect better feelings between the German Imperial Government and the British Government. Baron Beyens observes : "Without doubt, nobody desires it more than the Emperor; and in justice to His Majesty it should be said that he hardly neglects a single occasion in order. to say in public some amiable or laudatory words about the English. The re- cent races at Kiel twice offered him a pretext for praising the British navy. The Emperor never allows himself to be discouraged by the disap- pointments which the British friends cause him. I have been told here that -after the death of Ed- ward VII the Emperor as well as the Crown Prince were convinced, when returning from England, where they were very courteously re- ceived, that the coldness existing in the relations between the two Courts during the preceding years would give way to an intimate cordiality and that the causes of misunderstanding between the two peoples would vanish with the past. The Emperor's surprise must have been cruel when he saw the Cabinet of London last year range itself with so much resolution by the side of France. But the Emperor is tenacious, and he has not given up reconquering the sympathy of the Eng- lish, just as he has succeeded in winning the con- fidence of the Czar, by the charm of his seductive personality. As he cannot act himself at London, he has charged with this thankless task the most distinguished of the German diplomats." Baron Beyens makes an acute analysis of the causes of ill-feeling between Germany and England, the result of conversations with his friend, the Brit- ish Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, and German diplomatists. He notes : "Sir Edward Goschen passed over in silence an- other, perhaps deeper, cause of the aversion of the English for the German nation ; their industrial and commercial rivalry. England observes with a very natural jealousy how an European people is gaining ground every year in the economic struggle of the world and how, in this respect also, it is threatening the supremacy which Eng- land had secured for herself. The German prod- ucts, though still inferior in quality, are tending to become equal to similar English goods, the price of which has remained higher. The mark of origin 'Made in Germany' imposed by the British Cabinet, seems to have had the result that the German products, because of their cheaper price, are to-day being preferred in the British Colonies to those of the mother country." On October 31, 1912, the Belgian Minister at London recounts to his Government the continuing progress of the anti-German propaganda in Eng- land, dwelling particularly on the part played by Lord Roberts, whom he describes as the enfant ter- rible. On the other hand, in Berlin every influence was being exerted for tranquillity. Baron Beyens, writ- ing home from Berlin November 30, 191 2, regard- ing the visit to the German Capital of the Austrian Heir Apparent, records : "The Archduke said at Berlin that the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy had reached the limit of the concessions which it was in a position to make to its neighbor. The Emperor and his advisers have nevertheless not been sparing with counsels of moderation, which William II when speeding his guest at the station summed up, with a famil- iarity of speech which is his custom in the words : 'Above all, no follies.' I can on the authority of Ambassadors who repeated it to me vouch for the authenticity of this advice, which escaped the in- discretion of the newspapers." The Belgian Minister remarks: "There is no doubt that the Emperor, the Chan- cellor, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Af- fairs are passionately pacific." In the spring of 191 3 events in Paris again be- come interesting. Baron Guillaume writes of the beginnings of the presidency of M'. Poincare, whose popularity he ascribes above all to a rebirth of that "old French chauvinism" which had disappeared for years, but had gained fresh life since the inci- dents of Agadir. "M. Poincare," the Belgian Min- ister notes, "is from Lorraine, and misses no occa- sion to mention it. He was the collaborator and the originator of M. Millerand's militarist policy." The events which Baron Guillaume now describes include the swift increase, under the influence of England, of French chauvinism. It soon becomes the general belief that an early war with Germany is inevitable. A fever of agitation takes possession of the country, and the demand for an overwhelm- ing increase of the army is raised on all sides. The entire press, with the solitary exception of the social- ist and extreme radical papers, demand a law calling upon every Frenchman for three years' army serv- ice. At first reluctant, the Cabinet, then the Dep- uties, are carried away. On June 12, 191 3, Baron Guillaume writes to Brussels : "Thus it is certain to-day that provisions are going to be introduced in the French legislature which the country will probably not be able to bear for a great length of time. The burdens of the new law will be so heavy for the population, the expenditure which it involves so exorbitant, that the country will soon protest, and France will be confronted with this alternative; renunciation (which is insuflferable to her) or war within a short time. "The responsibility of those who have brought the country to this pass will be heavy. The peo- ple are following them in a sort of madness, in a frenzy, which is interesting but lamentable. It is forbidden to-day on pain of being considered a traitor, to utter the slightest doubt of the neces- sity for the adoption of the three years' service. Everybody realizes that the nation as such is far from being in favor of the reform which is in preparation ; everybody comprehends the danger which threatens the future ; but one closes one's eyes and goes on." At the beginning of the fatal year 1914, the Bel- gian Minister at Paris, writing January 16, says: "I have already had the honor to tell you that it was MM. Poincare, Delcasse, Millerand and their friends, who invented and followed the na- tionalistic, militaristic and chauvinistic policy, the revival of which we are witnessing. It is a dan- ger for Europe — and for Belgium. I see in it the greatest peril which is menacing the peace of Europe to-day : not that I have the right to sup- pose that the Government of the Republic intends to disturb it deliberately — I am rather inclined to believe the contrary — but because the attitude which the Barthou Cabinet has assumed is in my opinion the principal cause of the growth of mili- taristic tendencies in Germany." In the latter part of April, 1914, the King and Queen of England visited Paris, met with a brilliant reception, every incident of which was seized upon to promote the popularity of the three years' service law, with all its consequences. Baron Guillaume notes that there was no mention of a likelihood of giving the relations between France and England a more formal character by treaty. He remarks, writ- ing on April 25, 1914: "Great Britain dislikes formal conventions, and the agreements already concluded between the two Governments as they are to-day established suf- fice for the realization of the aims aspired to." So late as May 8, 19 14, Baron Guillaume reports that the three years' military service law, imposed upon the country by the military party, "will have to be given up, or war will have to be waged before two years from to-day have elapsed." It was less than- two years, it was less than three months, before Baron Guillaume's apprehensions were realized. On June 9th, the Belgian Minister, reporting it to his home Government, asks : "Is it true that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg imposed on France the adoption of the three year^ law, and that it is to-day using all its weight in order to secure its maintenance ? "I have not been able to obtain any light on this delicate point, but it would be all the graver be- cause the men who guide the destinies of the Em- pire of the Czar must know that the effort which is thus being demanded of the French nation is excessive and cannot be sustained for a long time. Is the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg based on the convic tion that events are sufficiently near at hand to use the tool which it intends to put into the hand of its ally?" Thus closes the unhappy narrative of Belgium's representative in the French Capital. However, at the same time, or to be accurate, two days later, his London colleague is writing the Brussels Govern- ment regarding the relief felt in England at the in- stallation in France of the Ribot Cabinet committed to the enforcement of the three years' service law, which alone, observes Count de Lalaing, "can put the Republic in a position to fulfill the agreements which tie her to her ally, Russia, and her friend, England." One of the most interesting communications in the dossier is that from Baron Beyens, Belgian Min- ister at Berlin, dated April 24, 1914, in which he comments on the official visit of the King and Queen of England to Paris and the political relations be- tween France and Great Britain at that particular time. As the world now knows from Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3, 1914, in Parliament, Great Britain had been for several years secretly allied to France by a "gentlemen's agreement" the existence of which was unknown even to the majority of the members of the British Cabinet. The world knows further from the famous minutes of a conversation on April 23, 1912, between General Jungbluth, Chief of the Belgian General Stafif, and Colonel Bridges, British Military Attache at Brussels, that "at the time of the recent events" (viz., the Morocco crisis) "the British Government would have imme- diately efifected a disembarkment in Belgium even if we (Belgians) had not asked for assistance." Baron Beyens was, evidently, familiar with those conversations, though he ignored Great Britain's secret "gentlemen's agreements" existing then with Belgium as well as with France. He writes to his Government : "For us, the most interesting point in connection with the visit of the Sovereigns of Great Britain is to know whether the British Government would be as inclined to-day as three years ago to range itself by the side of France in the case of a con- flict of the latter with Germany. "We have had the proof that a co-operation of the British army and the despatching of an ex- peditionary corps to the Continent have been con- sidered by the military authorities of the two Gov- ernments (England and France). "Would it be the same to-day, and should we still have to fear THE ENTRY OF BRITISH SOLDIERS INTO BELGIUM IN ORDER TO HELP US DEFEND OUR NEUTRALITY BY FIRST COMPROMISING IT?" It can surely not be necessary to dilate upon the meaning of the narrative set forth in these luminous, but disheartening, pages. These are not the words of German apologists. They are the words of dis- interested expert observers — the considered words, though set down in the very midst of events as they pass. They register the convictions of five profes- sional students of contemporary international his- tory, living in the three chief capitals of Europe, and possessing unparalleled access to the facts, with the advantage of being detached and unprejudiced with regard to them. And their convictions are identical. A more complete indictment of English statesmanship as the enemy of the peace of the world, a deliberate and persistent conspirator against an unoffending neighbour, could not possi- bly be framed. The indictment stretches through- out the nine years. There are no palliations, no extenuations. It is a record of a monstrous crime. DIRECTION POLITIQUE N° /^.i _.-.'- ^V/.^..... ENTRE LE ...v^Z. ;^fM^ ^U^ K^ ^ ^Vv- ^. 'S i>M^i^ w^ .V^ ^' r/^ v^ A" ...«^ v> ,y/ ■y^' ,^ ^ ^^^y^v^/l/^/] exM4/- ^VU /^^^ "^ 1. {^•t ;; t) v,/^ ^/Vl.d (^^i/U- n/vv VVM^ i/-e/i. ^ l-^t^ 1/U ' ^ 2xL 2,^^ ;viV>^ X^'/M diAM. / Page 6 of Report of ' ^ 6 ^' 9o^u^ -i^ty^iy^ April 5, 1906 ^''2^^ H/^^ e/^ ^VL l^ {Jc ^ vl^ '^ ^ ^ 1^ iA^i txu, ^L^ M/^t i ' ^ -yUiA/- ^ u? ^^' Mr exi^ /id vw^vu l-vi/j - JvmjA vw?i ^M^^il Page 8 of Report of April 5, 1906 DIRECTION POLITIQUE N' ...__^ D" ' dr^ ENTRE LE / A^a'^jl i f/UovMlW „AWtAA^' ^ V. Page 4 of Report of May 24, 1907 Page 5 of Report of May 24, 1907 'j'^CA^^VKveW '^W ^^A/NTv^k ol^ (oMe. La)^, ^*^^^^ d ^ c^ ^ iV^^ O'ouVl- Mi^iAAAjy^ r^cz/cay^ e:^ ^...^^^^ca^c^-e^ \f 'J DIRECTION POLITIQUE ctv<^ 6Ln'yn^C^(- I GUI. dc^ djt^^^^ aJcc^ ^Ucu ^^^ (la^Oc£j^_^ ifTt.'iZUX-c^^ -(>juty ^: V . — XIX — Page 8 of Report of June 17, 1907 Page 9 of Report of June 17, 1907 # 198^795. Paris le ZO mars I9I4- i;i V 2£DnSi«vir le Ulnlftre, C^ le retour de la Donno saison ,M.le Pr^slAont de la R^pUbliqiua va reprandre le ohemln des divers depart ements de la Tranoe oil l*on r^elaioe sa vislte .Sans toutes les regions du pays ,on I'lixrlte et 11 se rend prnsque toujours k ces appeis qui le flattent et serrent la politique .11 eonnalt le oUarme qu* 11 r^pand autour de lul ;11 a aons- oleiiee du sueo^s oontlnu de ses diseours .8a parole est toujours &sk. bile et t>rlllante :11 prepare oonsoeneleuaement ses alloeutlons qui Page 3 of Report of March 10, 1914 pas m^prls sur sa slgnlfloation, ayant par f alterae nt comprls que o'^talt sa propre personnalite qui 6talt en Jeu. L'obllgatlon o\x 11 a'est trou- v^, grace k la d^feotlon de quelquee perfionnalites polltlquea eur lea - queues 11 oroyalt pouvolr oompter .4e oonTler le pouvoir k U. Calliaux tout en I'attrlDuant nomlnalement a U. Dovimergue,l»a profonl^meni InAls- pos^.La personnailt^ du Ulnlstre des Finances dont 11 oonnalt le m^rltei mala axiasl toutes les falDleases ,l\il est profondentent antlpathique . 11 y a vu un ^oneo pour la politique mllltaire et natlooallste qu*ll poursult syst^matlquement depuis le Jour d^Jk oli 11 avalt ^t^ place k la tete du Gouvernemsnt oonime^Pr^BidAnt du Conaell , Avec M.M. Deloass^.Mlllerand et quelquea autrea^ll pr^eoniaa inlaa- saMement I'oeuvre du rel^ement politique et mllltaire de la Prance , ooiKbln^e arec des relatlona plus ^troltes et plus conflantes aveo la Hxissle .11 est all6 k Pdters'bovu'g oomme President du Conselljll y retour nera .dans quelques molS/Oomme President de la R^pUblique II y a envoys r^cemment M. D^lcass^ auquel 11 ayalt confl^ la mla- Blon de cheroner par tous lea moyens. k exalter lea tolenfalta de I'alllan oe franoo-russe et k amener le grand Empire k accentvier ses preparatlfa mllltalres . On pretend aujourd'hui que M. DftlcasLse auralt quelque peu foroe la note, que sa mission n»a guire riusal.qu'll a Indispose par cea inataneea lea hautes spheres mosooYltea.et que son retour ,un peu premature, quo l- qu? I'on en dlse .seralt en partle motlv^ par le peu de sucoea de aa Page 5 of Report of March 10, 1914 Des son arrlvee a 1 'Ely see, le President a ciierche un rapprochement avec son plus dangereux adversaire ,M. Clemenceau -.mais cnacun salt que oette tentative n'a point reussi .Le redacteur en cHef de 1»" Horn me Litore" ne manque pas un Jour de pourauivre sa campagne Vlolenteet perflde centre M. Polncare .11 a deja demoli durant sa longue carri©- re un grand nomtore de minlsteres -.aujourd'iiul 11 vise plus haut . Je suls, Monsieur le Ministre,avftc un prorond respect, votre tr^ oDelssant servlteur . P r/I7 ,^^13/447 A propos de la vi»ite des Souverains Anglais k Paris. 4 24 . Ayr.il... /P 14 Uonsieur le Ministre, \ La presse,coiifflie le monde politique de Berlin, s 'est oc- cupee necessairemem; de la visite des Souverains Anglais h. Paris et il n'a faliu rien moins que les derniers evenements du Mexique pour distraire leur attention de ce spectacle. 6n s'est accorde ici a trouver tres maladroits les efforts de certains publicistes francais en vue d'amener le Gouverne- ment britannique a transformer 1' entente cordiale en allian- ce effective; les joumalistes berlinois, tant liberaux que — XXIV — Page 3 of Report of April 24, 1914 de conseiller des ^crivains framjais avec une insistance intempe stive? N'est-ce pas aussi un reste du vieil esprit presDv'terien qui survit dans les classes inf^rieures de la soci^t6 anglaise, composees surtout de non-conformistes? Get esprit a ^t^ de tout temps hostile auz id^ea et k la civilisation frangaises. L'antipathie des radicaux anglais pour la R6publique voisine est sans doute un effet de ces diverses causes et un produit de ces differents elements. Pour nous, la question la plus int^ressante qui se pose a 1' occasion de la visite des Souverains de la Grande Bretagne e*t celle de savoir si le Gouvernement britannique serait eujourd'hui aussi enclin qu'il y a trois ans k se ranger du cot^ de la France, dans le cas d'un conflit de cettfc derniere avec I'Allemagne. Nous avonseu la preuve qu'une cooperation de I'arm^e anglaise et I'envoi d'un corps exp^ditionnaire sur le continent avaient 6t6envisag6s par les autorit^s militaires des deux pays. En serai t-il encore de meme aujourd'hui et aurions nous toujours a re- douter 1' entree en Belgique de soldats anglais pour nous aider a defendre notre neutralit^^ en commengant par la compromettre? Si la question n'est examinee que du point de vue allemand, le seul ou je puisse me placer, une r§ponse negative n'est pas douteuse. II semble a un observateur vivant k Berlin que les liens de 1 'Entente Cordiale se sont quelque peu d<§tendus. que la pointe de cette arme de- fensive n'est plus tournee exclusivement centre I'Allemagne, comme elle" le fut du temps du Roi Edouard, et que la Triple Entente est devenue plutot un concert qu'une Union de Puis- sances, agissant ensemble dans certeines questions d^termi- nees pour la poursuite d'interets communs. Mais cette fa5on de voir pent etre fausse ou influenc^e par la lecture Page 4 of Report of April 24, 1914 d^ Merits politiques dus k des plumes allemandes. II serait fort int^ressant pour moi d© savoir ce que pensent du ca- ractere qu'a pris 1 'Entente Cordiale mes Collegues de Londres( et de Paris. Veuillez agr^er. Monsieur le Ministre, les respectueu- ses assurances, de ma plus haute consideration, /3^ /3cy< INDEX No. Name of Writer Place and Date of Writing 1905 London, February 7 . Berlin, February 18. . London, April 1 Paris, May 7 London, June 8 Berlin, August 5 Berlin, August 22 Berlin, September 23 Berlin, Sept. 30 Berlin, October 14. . . Paris, October 24. . . . Berlin, October 27. . . Berlin, November 18. Berlin, December 31 . 1906 London, January 14 Paris, March 6 Berlin, April 5 London, June 23 Berlin, July 16 London, July 28. . . . 1907 Paris, February 4. . . Contents Count de Lalaing. . . Baron Greindl Count de Lalaing. . . M. A. Leghait Coimt de Lalaing. . . Count d'Ursel Count d'Ursel Baron Greindl Baron Greindl Baron Greindl M. A. Leghait Baron Greindl Baron Greindl Baron Greindl M. E. van Grootven M. A. Leghait Baron Greindl Count de Lalaing. . . Baron Greindl Count de Lalaing. . . M. A. Leghait Anti-German sentiment in England State of Anglo-German relations. Speech of Mr. Lee Visit of German Kaiser to Tangiers Visit of the King of England to Paris. Morocco. Retirement of M. Delcasse Anglo-German relations Visit to German ports by English fleet Rumors of impending negotiations concerning a rapprochement between England and Russia. The possibility of a new grouping of the Powers The impression of the Anglo- Japanese al- liance in Berlin The impression of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance in Russia. British attempts at a rapprochement with Russia Franco-German relations Toast of the Kaiser, in which His Majesty gives utterance to his belief that efforts are being made to form a coalition against Germany Project of naval increase; the navy has be- come popular in Germany because of the fear of an English attack Baron von Richthofen on the relations of Ger- many with England and France. The Kaiser told the Marquis de Laguiche that he wished to preserve peace '. Conference of Algeciras Visit of the King of England to Paris. Invita- tion to M. Delcasse for luncheon State of the Anglo-German relations Anglo-German relations The meeting of the German Kaiser and the King of England will probably not take place. The Bagdad railway affair Limitation of the navy Journey of King and Queen of England to Paris No. Name of Writer Place and Date of Writing Contents Page 22 Count de Lalaing London, February 8 . . . The Anglo-German relations 26 23 Baron Greindl Berlin, February 9 In Berlin no one gave a bellicose interpretation to the Kaiser's address of February 5 27 24 M. A. Leghait Paris, February 10 Visit of the British Sovereigns in Paris. Re- lations between Germany, France and Eng- land 27 25 M. E. de Cartier London, March 28 Anglo-Russian rapprochement 28 26 Baron Greindl Berlin, March 28 Morocco. The new grouping of Powers im- pairs the security of Europe 29 27 Baron Greindl Berlin \pril 8 France's Moroccan policy 31 28 M. E. de Cartier London, April 12 Visit of King Edward VII to Carthagena 33 29 Baron Greindl Berlin, April 18 Meeting of the King of England with the Kings of Spain and Italy 34 30 Count de Lalaing London, May 24 Anglo-German relations 35 31 Baron Greindl Berlin, May 30 Visit of the English journalists. Political speeches of Mr. von Miihlberg and of the British Ambassador 36 32 Baron Greindl Berlin, June 8 Visit of the English journalists. It is to be feared that it will not produce any lasting result 40 33 M. A. Leghait Paris June 17 French and English agreement with Spain Agreement between England and Spain 41 34 Count de Lalaing London, June 19 42 35 Baron Greindl Berlin, June 22 The Franco-Japanese and the Anglo-Franco- 43 36 Baron Greindl Berlin, July 1 The reception which M. Etienne received from the Kaiser is a noteworthy symptom 45 37 M. E. de Cartier London, August 10. . . . The events in Morocco 46 38 Count de Lalaing Baron Greindl 47 39 1908 Berlin, January 27 Paris, January 27-30. . . Berlin, January 29 Delcasse's chauvinistic speech 48 40 49 41 Morocco. Semi-official telegram on the oc- casion of the speeches of Delcasse and Pichon 51 42 Berlin, February 2 Reduction of term of service of the war-ships — a symptom of the relations with England. . 52 43 Berlin, March 28 The voting of the credits for the navy shows the real state of the Anglo-German relations 52 44 Baron Greindl Berlin, May 6 Germany is losing patience in face of French procedure in Morocco 53 45 46 Berlin, May 10 Berlin, May 13 The envoys of Mulai Hafid in Berlin; bitter- ness between France and Germany. The 54 56 Baron Greindl Statements of the envoys of Mulai Hafid ..... 47 Baron Greindl Berlin, May 30 Berlin, June 12 Visit of President Fallieres to London 57 48 Baron Greindl Impression in Germany of the meeting at Reval 59 No. Name of Writer • Place and Date of Writing Contents Page 49 Berlin July 4 It is hoped in Berlin that the Macedonian question will not lead to a conflict between the Powers 60 50 Baron Greindl Berlin, July 18 England has attempted to tighten the bonds of the entente against Germany. France did not agree to it 61 51 M A Leghait Paris July 20 Visit of M. Fallieres to the Emperor of Russia and to the Kings of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway 63 52 M A Leghait Paris, October 8 1909 Russian proposal of a conference 64 53 M. A. Leghait Paris, January 19 Berlin, February 13. . . . 64 54 Visit of the King of England to Berlin. WiU it produce a relaxation of the tension? 66 55 Berlin, February 17... . Impression produced in leading circles by the King of England's visit 67 56 Baron Greindl Berlin, March 22 The distrust between Germany and England shown at the debate concerning the navy. . . 68 57 Berlin, March 31 The question of the limitation of armament discussed in the Reichstag and in the House of Commons 69 58 The ill-feeling evoked in Paris and London by the manner of solving the Balkan crisis 70 59 Baron Greindl Berlin, April 17 Prince von Billow and M. Tittoni. Despite the alliance one scarcely counts on Italy any longer in Berlin and Vienna 71 60 61 Baron Greindl Count d'Arschot Schoonhoven Berlin, June 21 Paris, August 3 Politicial significance of the meeting of the German Kaiser with the Czar of Russia The Emperor of Russia in Cherbourg 72 73 62 63 1910 Berlin, November 7. . . . 1911 Berlin, March 3 The political significance of the visit of the Emperor of Russia in Potsdam Delcasse's appointment as Minister— a bad symptom, the significance of which should, however, not be exaggerated 74 76 Baron Greindl . 64 Baron Gui.laume Paris, March 4 Franco-German relations 78 65 Baron Greindl Berlin, March 20 Sir Edward Grey's speech on the relations with Germany 79 66 Baron Greindl Berlin, April 21...:.... Pourparlers between Berlin and Paris on ac- count of the Morocco crisis 81 67 Baron Guillaume Paris, April 29 Morocco , 80 68 69 Baron Greindl , Count de Lalaing Berlin Mav 1 The attitude of the German Government in the 83 1 I 85 London, May 9 Morocco 70 Baron Greindl Berlin, May 10 The Moroccan question takes a less favorable turn i 1 86 71 Count de Lalaing London, May 22 The Kaiser's visit to London 87 No. Name of Writer Place and Date of Writing 7? Berlin, June 17 7S 74 Count de Lalaing London, July 5 75 Baron Guillaume Paris, July 8 76 Count de Lalaing London, July 8 77 Baron Guillaume Paris, July 24 78 Count de Lalaing London, July 24 7«t Baron Guillaume Paris, July 28 80 Baron Guillaume Paris, August 10 81 Baron Greindl . . . Berlin October 12 82 Count de Lalaing. . London, November 18 . 83 Count de Lalaing London, November 28 . 84 Count de Lalaing London, November 30 . 85 Baron Greindl Sfi 1912 87 Count de Lalaing London, January 15.... 88 Count de Lalaing London, February 9 . . . 89 Count de Lalaing London, February 13 . . 90 Count de Lalaing London, February 16. . ttl Berlin, April 26 Berlin, June 28 Berlin October 18 Oo Baron Beyens 0? Baron Beyens CH Berlin, October 24 London, October 31 ... . 95 Coimt de Lalaing Ofi Baron Beyens Berlin November 30 97 Baron Guillaunie 1913 Paris, February 14 98 Baron Guillaume Paris, February 19 Contents The attitude of Germany in the Morocco Af- fair remains an expectant one Despatch of a German man-of-war to Agadir. . Morocco - • Attitude of the French Government in face of the German procedure in Morocco Morocco Franco-German pourparlers on account of Morocco. The attitude of England Morocco The international situation. England's at- titude England's attitude in the Morocco question. . Conclusion of the Franco-German agreement, in so far as it applies to Morocco. Diffi- culties to be foreseen in the question of territorial compensation Morocco Sir E. Grey's speech Lord Lansdowne's speech Charges of the German people against Eng- land. The Chancellor's answer to Sir Ed- ward Grey Despite the settlement of the Morocco crisis, the relations with England have grown worse. Satisfaction felt in England at Caillaux's re- tirement : Lord Haldane's journey to Berlin Sir E. Grey and the Daily News Lord Haldane's journey to Berlin First reading of the bills proposed for the in- crease of the army and navy and the aboli- tion of the brandy contingent The mission of Baron von Marschall at London. Anglo-German relations Franco-German relations Russia and the Balkan crisis Anglo-German relations The Balkan War and European politics M. Poincare The Bulgaro-Roumanian conflict. Franco- German relations No. Name of Writer Place and Date of Writing Contents Page 99 Baron Guillaume Paris, February 21 The imminent nomination of M. Delcasse to the post of Ambassador at St. Petersburg... 119 100 Count de Lalaing Baron Guillaume London, February 24.. . Paris, March 3 119 101 Franco-German relations. Statements of the German Ambassador and of M. Pichon. . . . 120 i02 Berlin, March 18 The Balkan War and the Great Powers. Rus- sia's attitude. The Scutari question 121 103 104 The war between Turkey and the Balkan States. The incident of Scutari 123 124 Baron Guillaume Paris April 16 The incident of Nancy 105 Paris April 17 The incident of Nancy. Chauvinism in France Marriage of Princess Victoria Louise. Rap- prochement between Germany and England. The Belgian Congo 125 106 Baron Beyens Berlin, May 26 125 107 Paris, June 12 The law of three years' service 127 108 Count de Lalaing Count de Lalaing 128 109 The new French Cabinet 129 1914 110 Baron Guillaume Paris, January 16 The policy of MM. Poincare, Delcasse and Millerand. Morocco. M. Caillaux's in- fluence 130 111 Baron Beyens Berlin, February 20 Franco-German agreement concerning Asia Minor 131 112 Baron Guillaume Paris, March 10 M. Poincare, his friends and his opponents 133 113 Baron Beyens. Berlin, April 24 Wish of certain French publicists to see the entente cordiale transformed into an alliance. Attitude of the English Radicals. Question of the co-operation of the British Army on the Continent 135 114 115 Baron Guillaume Paris, April 25 Paris, May 8 The visit of the British Sovereigns to Paris. The Franco-British relations . . 137 138 116 117 Baron Guillaume Count de Lalaing Paris June 9 The Ministerial crisis 139 140 London, June 11 Berlin, June 12. Berlin, July 2 The French crisis. . 118 The Ribot Ministry The demarche ol the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment in Belgrade 119 L 143 BELGIAN DOCUMENTS 1905-1914 No. 1. No. 1. Le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre de Belgique k Lon- dres, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Londres, le 7 Fevrier 1905. Monsieur le Baron! L'inimitie du public anglais pour la nation alle- mande n'est pas de date recente. Elle est fondee, semble-t-il, sur la jalousie et la crainte. Sur la ja- lousie, en presence des pro jets economiques et com- merciaux de TAllemagne ; sur la crainte, en voyant que la suprematie navale, la seule que I'Angleterre puisse revendiquer, pourrait peu-etre un jour lui etre disputee par la flotte allemande. Cet etat d'ame est fomente par la presse anglaise, sans souci des complications Internationales; et un coup de patte centre I'ambitieux Empereur et les sourdes menees de son chancelier ne manque jamais d'obtenir les applaudissements de la foule. L'attaque produit la riposte et on constate une aigreur correspondante chez les ecrivains et les jour- nalistes germaniques. L'autre jour, le Dr. Paasche jetait un cri d'alarme en apprenant que I'amiraute anglaise voulait concentrer dans la mer du Nord I'escadre qui jusqu'ici avait son point d'attache dans la Mediterranee et y trouvait la preuve que pour le Cabinet de Londres il n'y avait d'autre ennemi a redouter en Europe que I'Allemagne. La semaine derniere, dans un banquet, Mr. A. Lee, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, a loue les recentes reformes intro- duites par le Gouvernement, qui permettent de don- ner le premier coup avant que I'adversaire ne soit pret, avant meme que la guerre ne soit declaree. II a ajoute que c'est du cote de la mer du Nord que la vigilance de I'amiraute doit s'exercer surtout. Ce langage a eu un grand retentissement en AUe- magne. Aussi essaie-t-on de replatrer les choses, et on dit ici que le langage de Mr. Lee a ete mal inter- prete, car les deux Gouvernements sont et veulent rester en bons termes ; mais I'esprit chauvin se donne libre cours dans le public anglais et les journaux peu a peu faussent I'opinion qui en est arrivee a trouver que I'Allemagne n'a pas le droit d'augmenter ses forces navales et que son budget de la marine con- stitue une provocation a I'egard de I'Angleterre. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] Cte. de Lalaing. London, February 7, 1905. Sir:— The enmity of the English public towards the German nation is long standing. It seems to be based on jealousy and fear ; on jealousy, because of the economic and commercial plans of Germany ; on fear, in the thought that British supremacy at sea, the only supremacy to which England can lay claim, may one day be disputed by the German fleet. This state of mind is being fostered by the British press, regardless of international complications, and a slap at the ambitious German Emperor and the secret intrigues of his chancellor never fails to gain the applause of the masses. Attack produces a counter-thrust, and thus a cor- responding bitterness may be observed among Ger- man writers and journalists. Dr. Paasche (*) sounded a warning the other day when it was re- ported that the British Admiralty was going to con- centrate in the North Sea the squadron hitherto sta- tioned in the Mediterranean. He sees in this a proof that the cabinet in London fears no other enemy in Europe but Germany. Last week, at a banquet, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. A. Lee, praised the reforms recently introduced by the Government which would permit the British to deal the first blow before the adversary was ready, even before war could be declared. He added that the vigilance of the Admiralty would have to be directed chiefly towards the North Sea. This speech has caused a great stir in Germany, and efforts are being made here to gloss things over by saying that the language of Mr. Lee had been falsely interpreted, for the two governments are on good terms and determined to remain so. But the chauvinistic spirit is spreading among the English people, and the papers are slowly misleading public opinion, which has already been influenced so far as to think that Germany has no right to increase her naval forces and that her naval budget consti- tutes a provocation for England. Accept, etc. [Signed] Ct. de Lalaing. (*) Vice-President of the Reichstag. ■W^;2. Le Barori' (^'rernil,' ' Miriistre -de' Belgique a Berlin, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Af- faires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs : Berlin, le 18 Fevrier 1905. Monsieur le Baron! Les sept voyages que j'ai eu a faire depuis le 15 Novembre et les nombreuses affaires urgentes dont j'ai eu a m'occuper pendant le peu de temps que j'ai pu passer a Berlin dans les intervalles, m'ont force a reduire ma correspondance au strict necessaire. C'est pour cette raison que je ne vous ai pas parle, malgre le retentissement qu'elle a eu, de I'entrevue du chancelier avec le journaliste anglais M. Bashford publiee il y a trois mois. En faisant savoir au pu- blic anglais que I'Allemagne n'a aucune idee d'agres- sion centre I'Angleterre, le Comte de Bulow n'a rien dit qui ne soit connu de quiconque est de sang froid. L'Allemagne n'aurait rien a gagner a un conflit. De plus elle n'est pas preparee pour la lutte. Malgre les progres maritimes de I'Allemagne ses forces na- vales sent encore tellement inferieures a celles de I'Angleterre que ce serait folie que de provoquer une guerre. La flotte allemande a ete creee dans un but purement defensif. La petite dimension des soutes a charbon de ses vaisseaux de haut bord et le petit nombre des croiseurs prouvent d'ailleurs que la flotte n'est pas destinee a s'eloigner des cotes. J'ai cru pouvoir d'autant mieux me dispenser de vous parler de cette entrevue que tous les journaux I'ont publiee et que je n'en attendais pas un meilleur succes que des nombreuses tentatives de rapproche- ment qui I'ont precedee. La vraie cause de la haine des Angleiis contre rAUemagne est la jalousie in- spiree par le developpement extraordinaire de la marine marchande, du commerce et de I'industrie de I'Allemagne. Cette haine persistera jusqu'a ce que les Anglais se soient penetres de I'idee que le commerce du monde n'est pas un monopole qui appartient de droit a I'Angleterre. Elle est d'ailleurs soigneuse- ment entretenue par le "Times" et toute une serie de journaux et de revues qui ne reculent pas devant la calomnie pour flatter les gouts de leurs lecteurs. On dit le RoiEdouard Vllprofondement pacifique ; mais un Roi d'Angleterre n'a qu'une influence tres limitee sur la direction politique de son pays. Le gouvernement anglais partage jusqu'a un certain point le sentiment public ou du moins il est incapable de resister au courant, puisqu'il depend exclusive- ment de la chambre des communes a laquelle le pou- voir executif est de plus en plus subordonne. Une des raisons principales du recent arrangement entre la France et I'Angleterre insuffisamment ex- plique d'apres moi, a ete sans doute le desir d'avoir a main libre du cote de I'Allemagne. Mais quelque fiit leur pensee intime, les ministres anglais avaient toujours ete corrects dans la forme. II etait evident que la nouvelle organisation de la flotte anglaise visait I'Allemagne. Si le centre en est maintenant dans la mer du Nord, ce n'est certaine- ment pas contre la Russie dont le materiel est en grande partie detruit et dont la marine vient de don- ner des preuves eclatantes d'incapacite ; mais il etait inutile de le proclamer. Le discours de M. Lee a fait une impression d'autant plus penible en Allemagne Berlin, February 18, 1905. Sir:— The seven journeys which I have made since November 15th, and the numerous urgent affairs with which I was occupied during the short inter- vals I could spend in Berlin, compelled me to con- fine my correspondence to what was strictly neces- sary. It is for this reason that I have not reported to you, despite the sensation it created, concerning the interview, published three months ago, which the Chancellor gave to the English journalist, Mr. Bashford. In informing the English public that Germany harbored no aggressive intentions against England, Count von Biilow said nothing that is not known to people who keep their heads cool. Ger- many would have nothing to gain by such a con- flict. Moreover, she is not prepared for the strug- gle. Notwithstanding her maritime progress, her naval forces are so inferior to those of England that it would be folly for her to provoke a war. The German fleet has been created purely for de- fensive purposes. Furthermore, the small bunkers of the ships of her high seas' fleet and the small number of cruisers prove that the fleet is not in- tended to leave coastal waters. I thought that I might dispense with speaking to you of this interview, all the more because all pa- pers published it and because I did not expect any better success for it than for the many attempts at at rapprochement which have preceded it. The real cause of the hate of the English for the Germans is the jealousy produced by the extraordinary devel- opment of the merchant marine, the commerce, and the industries of Germany. This hate will continue until the English realize that the commerce of the world is not a monopoly belonging by right to Eng- land. It is, moreover, carefully nursed by the "Times" and a great number of newspapers and magazines which do not shrink from calumny in order to cater to the tastes of their readers. It is said that King Edward VII is profound- ly pacific; but a King of England has only a very limited influence on the policy of his country. The British Government shares to a certain degree the opinion of the public, or is at least not in a position to swim against the current, since it is de- pendent exclusively on the House of Commons to which the executive power is becoming more and more subordinate. One of the principal reasons for the recent agree- ment between France and England, which to my mind has been but insufficiently explained, is un- doubtedly the desire to have a free hand against Germany. But whatever may have been their ulterior mo- tives, the British Ministers have always been for- mally correct. It is evident that the new organiza- tion of the British fl^et is aimed at Germany. If its centre is now in the North Sea it certainly has not been transferred there with any intentions against Russia, whose material has in great measure been destroyed and whose navy has only recently g-iven complete proof of its inefficiency. But it is superfluous to mention this. The speech of Mr. que le lord civil de Tamiraute a dit que I'ennemi en- tendrait les canons de la flotte ^glaise avant d'avoir eu le temps de recevoir par les journaux la nouvelle de la declaration de guerre. Dans sa pensee il s'agit done d'une agression de la part de I'Angleterre. M. de Miihlberg m'a dit que I'Empereur a parle en termes tres severes a I'ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Berlin de I'incartade de M. Lee. Celui-ci a public depuis une rectification du compte rendu de son dis- cours corrigeant ce quil y avait de blessant pour TAllemagne. On ne parait attacher ici qu'une foi mediocre a ce dementi. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. Lee made an all the more painful impression in Ger- many because the Civil Lord of the Admiralty de- clared that the enemy would hear the guns of the British fleet before he received, from the news- papers, the news of the declaration of war. To his mind, then, it is England that will be the aggressor. Mr. von Miihlberg told me that the Emperor had spoken in very severe terms to the British Ambas- sador at Berlin in regard to the invectives of Mr. Lee. The latter has since published a correction of the report of his speech, rectifying the points which had offended Germany. It does not seem that much faith is being placed here in this denial. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 3. No. 3. Le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre de Belgique a Lon- dres, k M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Londres, le 1 Avril 1905. London, April 1, 1905. Monsieur le Baron ! Sir:- Vous n'ignorez pas que I'Empereur d'Allemagne est impopulaire en Angleterre surtout depuis son telegramme historique ,et vous savez le pen de sym- pathie que la nation eprouve pour I'Allemagne. La visite de I'Empereur a Tangef n'a pas manque de susciter des articles desobligeants dans la presse, heureuse d'une occasion de deverser sa mauvaise hu- meur contre le Souverain d'un pays qui est une rivale commerciale de I'Angleterre, qui veut se creer une marine de guerre de premier ordre, et qui a present encourage les Marocains dans leur sourde resistance aux entreprises de la France. On apprehende de voir I'Allemagne insister sur le maintien de la porte ouverte a Tanger, et soutenir I'independance du Sultanat contrariant ainsi la po- litique de "penetretion pacifique" entreprise par la France, avec I'assentiment de I'Angleterre. On parait persuade 'qu'en se rendant a Tanger, I'Empereur a voulu non seulement donner une legon a la France, mais aussi a son amie. Cette susceptibilite britannique vis a vis de Berlin existe depuis longtemps, mais il n'est pas rassurant de constater qu'elle augmente au lieu de diminuer. Jusqu'ici le Cabinet anglais n'a pas eu a exprimer ses vues, et la question n'a pas ete soulevee a la Chambre ; mais d'apres une rumeur qui a cours dans le public on repondrait a I'attitude de I'Empereur Guillaume par une demonstration Ahglo-Frangaise, sous forme de visites reciproques des escadres des deux nations dans le courant de cet ete, a I'instar de ce qui s'est passe en 1893, lorsque la flotte russe est venue a Toulon pour affirmer I'amitie franco- russe. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] Cte. de Lalaing. You are acquainted with the fact that the Ger- man Ernperor is unpopular in England, especially since his historic telegram, and you know what little sympathy the English nation entertains for Ger- many. The visit of the Emperor to Tangiers has not failed to evoke unfriendly articles in the press, which is happy to have occasion to give vent to its ill-feeling towards the sovereign of a country that is a commercial rival of England, that wants to cre- ate for itself a navy of the first order, and that at present is encouraging the Moroccans in their mute resistance to the activities of France. It is feared that Germany will insist on the main- tenance of the open door in Tangiers and uphold the independence of the Sultanate, thus going counter to the policy of "peaceful penetration" inaugurated by France with the consent of England. The conviction prevails here that in proceeding to Tangiers the Emperor wished to give a lesson not only to France but also to her friend. This British susceptibility in regard to Berlin has existed for a long time, but it is not reassuring to have to state that it is increasing instead of di- minishing. Up to the present, the British Cabinet has not had" to express its opinion and the question has not been brought up in Parliament ; but according to a rumor current among the public the answer to the attitude of Emperor William will be an Anglo-French dem- onstration in the shape of reciprocal visits of the squadrons of the two nations during this summer, just as in 1893 the Russian fleet appeared at Toulon in order to emphasize the Franco-Russian friend- ship. Accept, etc. [Signed] Ct. de Lalaing. No. 4. M. A. Leghait, Ministre de Belgiue k Paris, a M. leBaron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. M. A. Leghait, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, le 7 Mai 1905. Monsieur le Baron ! La presence du Roi d'Angleterre a Paris, dans un moment ou I'atmosphere est toute vibrante encore des evenements de Tanger, a une signification qu'il y a lieu de constater avec une serieuse attention mais a laquelle il ne faudrait pourtant pas accorder une importance exageree. Le Roi n'avait nul engage- ment qui I'obligeait a faire maintenant un sejour a Paris et, s'il I'a fait, c'est evidemment pour donner en ce moment a la France un nouveau temoignage d'amitie et accentuer, en presence de circonstances speciales, la solidarite qui existe entre les signa- taires de I'accord du 8 Avril 1904. Cette solidarite a en efifet ete nettement et fortement affirmee, mais sans ostentation, sans toasts et sans demonstrations publiques. Le Roi ne s'est pas borne pourtant a exprimer ses sentiments et ses vues a M. Delcasse et aux hommes politiques frangais, il a tenu a ce que la cour de Berlin en fut informee et il a eu a cet eflfet, apres le diner a I'Elysee, un long entretien avec I'ambassadeur d'Allemagne auquel il aurait parle, parait-il, en termes fort precis. La teneur de cet im- portant entretien a ete communiquee a M. Delcasse, mais les termes en sont tenus secrets. Le silence que continue a observer I'Allemagne, malgre I'oflfre de M. Delcasse de causer pour dissiper tout malentendu, maintient ici I'etat de nervosite qui regne et on se demande quand et comment on sortira de la situation fausse dans laquelle on se trouve. Hier encore le Prince de Radolin a ete regu par M. Delcasse, il a fait beaucoup de frais d'ama- bilite mais il n'a pas aborde la question marocaine. On se plait a supposer que la visite de I'Empereur Guillaume a Tanger ayant ete une demonstration d'initiative personnelle on attend a Berlin le retour de Sa Majeste pour en regler les consequences. On me dit que I'idee de reunir une conference pour poursuivre et completer I'oeuvre de celle de Madrid en 1880 serait abandonnee parce qu'aucune puissance ne s'y est montree favorable et qu'il n'est pas a sup- poser que le Sultan du Maroc veuille prendre I'initia- tive d'une telle proposition. Dans les spheres gouvernementales on pretend que par les conventions franco-anglaise et franco-espac;- nole on ne s'est pas ecarte de I'esprit de la convention deMadrid, qu'on a fourni a ce sujet d'amples explica- tions et que Taction de la France au Maroc, d'accord avec I'Angleterre, I'Espagne et I'ltalie, est sur des bases parfaitement correctes tandis que I'attitude de I'Allemagne ne pent etre basee que sur des craintes et des suspicions, qu'aucun fait ne justifie et qui sont blessantes pour la France. Quoique tons les chefs de parti se croient actuelle- ment obliges par les circonstances de soutenir la po- litique marocaine de M. Delcasse, il n'est pas a dire pour cela qu'ils I'approuvent et bon nombre d'entre eux I'avaient prevenu qu'il ne fallait pas toucher a cette question que de longue date on avait etudtee et Paris, May 7, 1905. Sir:— The presence of the King of England in Paris at a time when the atmosphere is still vibrating with the events of Tangiers has a significance which de- serves serious attention but which, on the other hand, should not be considered as of exaggerated importance. The King had no engagement oblig- ing him to visit to Paris at the present time and, as he has done so, it is evidently for the purpose of giving to France at this moment a new proof of friendship and of emphasizing under special circum- stances the solidarity existing between the signa- tories to the understanding of April 8, 1904. This solidarity has, indeed, been clearly and forcibly af- firmed but without any ostentation, without toasts and without public demonstrations. The King has, however, not confined himself to expressing his sen- timents and views to M. Delcasse and to the French politicians, but has taken care that the court at Berlin should be informed thereof and to this end, a long conversation took place with the German Ambassador, after the banquet at the Elysee, dur- ing which the King seems to have spoken in very precise terms. The tenor of this important con- versation has been communicated to M. Delcasse, but the terms of it have been kept secret. The silence which Germany continues to observe despite the offer of M. Delcasse to hold conversa- tions in order to dissfpate the misunderstanding, is sustaining the state of nervousness prevailing here, and the question is being asked when and how France will emerge from the wrong situation in which she finds herself. When M. Delcasse re- ceived Prince Radolin yesterday, he said many pleasant things, but he did not touch, however, upon the Moroccan question. The attitude taken here is that, since Emperor William went on his journey to Tangiers on his own initiative, Berlin is awaiting the return of His Majesty in order to determine the consequences of that visit. I am told that the idea of calling a conference in order to continue and complete the work of the Con- ference of Madrid in 1880 will be abandoned because no Power has shown itself in favor of it and be- cause it is not to be presumed that the Sultan of Morocco is willing to take the initiative in such a proposition. In governmental circles it is maintained that in the matter of the Franco-English and the Franco- Spanish conventions, no departure has been made from the spirit of the convention of Madrid, that ample explanations on this subject have been fur- nished and that the action of the French in Morocco in agreement with England, Spain, and Italy is on a perfectly correct basis, while the attitude of Ger- many can only be based on fears and suspicions that are in no way justified by facts and are resented in France. Although all the party leaders believe that the present situation demands that they sustain the Mo- roccan policy of M. Delcasse, this does not mean that they approve of it and a considerable number of them warned him not to touch this question which had been studied for a long time and the dont on avait toujours constate les dangers. M. Delcasse a cru que I'accord avec I'Angleterre avait ecarte ces perils et que le moment etait opportun pour developper I'influence frangaise dans cette par- tie de I'Afrique. On lui dit aujourd'hui que I'atti- tude de I'Angleterre a ete fallacieuse et que I'accord impose avec I'Espagne en a ete la premiere preuve. On sait en effet que les clauses secretes de cet ac- cord laissent a I'Espagne des avantages pour I'orga- nisation financiere et monetaire et que dans la repar- tition eventuellement prevue des zones d'influence la France a ete ecartee de Tanger et de la partie la plus importante des cotes. L'accord franco-espagnol a ete communique par les deux pays interesses aux puissances comme corol- laire de I'accord franco-anglais. L'Allemagne ne pouvait done pas ignorer ces arrangements et I'atti- tude qu'elle a prise dans la suite ne peut etre basee que sur des considerations politiques d'un ordre ge- neral ou sur la crainte que les negociations entamees a Fez n'aboutissent avec le consentement tacite de I'Angleterre a un resultat depassant les proportions avouees jusqu'ici. II resulte de renseighements puises a des sources autorisees que Ton ne croit pas qu'il y ait des clauses secretes annexees a I'accord du 8 avril 1904 mais on suppose qu'il y a une certaine entente tacite par la- quelle I'Angleterre laisserait une asssz grande liberte d'action a la France au Maroc, sous la reserve des clauses secretes de I'arrangement franco-espa- gnol, clauses sinon imposees du moins fortement sou- tenues par le cabinet de Londres. Si Ton est tente d'attribuer des intentions quelque peu machiaveliques a la politique bienveillante de I'Angleterre envers la France dans la question maro- caine, on ne va pas pourtant jusqu'a croire que les vues et les aspirations anglaises aient ete formulees dans un ecrit en precision de complications gene- rales. On est plutot tente de croire que les diffi- cultes actuelles ont surpris les cabinets de Paris et de Londres et ont cree une situation que Ton n'avait pas prevue et en prevision des consequences ge- nerales de laquelle on n'aurait par consequentpas pris d'engagements. C'est surtout cette imprevoyance que Ton reproche a M. Delcasse et ses adversaires politiques qui ne lui avaient pas menage leurs aver- tissements ne manqueront pas, quelque soit Tissue de la crise actuelle, d'en profiter pour exiger sa retraite. La prolongation anormale de la situation troublee et inquietante dans laquelle on se trouve ne fait qu'accroitre I'instabilite de la position du ministre des Affaires etrangeres et c'est peut-etre la ce que Ton veut a Berlin. On est tres anxieux de connaitre les paroles que I'Empereur Guillaume prononcera a Gravelotte le 11 de ce mois et le caractere purement civil qu'il a voulu donner a cette ceremonie laisse esperer qu'il profitera de cette occasion pour attenuer I'eflfet de sa descente a Tanger. Quoiqu'il en soit, la confiance qui s'etait retablie dans les relations franco-alle- mandes s'est evanouie et on en est revenu au point oti Ton en etait il y a environ vingt ans. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] A. Leghait. dangers of which had always been pointed out. M. Delcasse believed that the understanding with England had removed these dangers and that the moment was favorable for a development of French influence in this part of Africa. Today he is told that England's attitude was double-faced and that the agreement with Spain, forced on France, was the first proof of this. It is actually known that the secret clauses of this agreement give Spain ad- vantages in regard to the organization of finances and currency and that in the proviso made for an eventual re-distribution of the zones of influence, France has been eliminated from Tangiers and the most important part of the coast. The Franco-Spanish agreement was communi- cated to the Powers by the two interested countries as a corollary to the Franco-English agreement. Germany, therefore, was cognizant of these arrange- ments, and the attitude which she subsequently adopted can be based only on political considera- tions of a general nature, or spring from a fear that the negotiations, begun at Fez, might with the agreement of England lead to a result of con- siderable greater bearing than has hitherto been admitted. According to inquiries made at authoritative quar- ters, it is not believed that the understanding of April 8, 1904, contains any secret clauses, but it is supposed that a certain tacit understanding exists according to which England would allow France sufficient liberty of action in Morocco within the limits of the secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish arrangement which, if not dictated by the Cabinet at London, were at least strongly supported by it. Though one may be inclined to suspect somewhat Machiavellian intentions behind England's pro- French policy in the Moroccan question, one would hardly go so far as to assume that the English thoughts and plans were formulated in writing with a view to general complications. One would rather be inclined to believe that the present difficulties have surprised the Cabinets of Paris and London and created a situation which had not been foreseen and for the possible general consequences of which no arrangements had been made. It is chiefly this lack of foresight for which M. Delcasse is being re- proached ; and his political opponents, who were un- sparing in their warnings to him, will not fail, what- ever may be the outcome of the present crisis, to utilize it in order to demand his retirement. Should the present perplexing and disquieting situation last unreasonably long, the uncertainty of the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs can only be aggravated and that is perhaps what is de- sired at Berlin. The words which Emperor William is to utter at Gravelotte on the 11th of the present month are anxiously awaited, and the purely civil character which he intends to give to this ceremony admits of the hope that he will take advantage of the occa- sion to attenuate the impression of his landing at Tangiers. However that may be, the confidence which had been reestablished in the Franco-German relations has disappeared, and matters are back at the point where they were about twenty years ago. Accept, etc. [Signed] A. Leghait. No. 5. No. 5. Le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre de Belgique si Londres, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Londres, le 8 Juin 1905. Monsieur le Baron ! La nouvelle de la retraite de M. Delcasse a etc recue avec regret par les organes du Gouvernement Britannique La politique anglophile de I'ancien Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, si energiquement se- conde par I'ambassadeur de France a Londres, avait about! a une entente dont les evenements recents ont prouve toute I'utilite et I'incertitude qui regne quant a I'orientation que donnera son successeur a la po- litique frangaise, n'est pas sans preoccuper I'opinion. Tout en felicitant M. Delcasse de la grande oeuvre accomplie, le "Times" reconnait, qu'en ce qui con- cerne le Maroc, il a neglige de considerer les circon- stances qui pourraient resulter d'une defaite de la Russie en Extreme Orient et par consequent donner a I'Allemagne une opportunite d'intervenir en en- courageant le Sultan dans sa resistance aux projets de la France. II est vrai que I'Allemagne avait semble d'abord ne se preoccuper nullement de I'arrangement anglo- frangais et avait eu soin de ne pas laisser deviner le parti qu'elle devait tirer de la passivite forcee de la Russie dans les affaires Europeennes. La faute n'en reste pas moins a M. Delcasse d'avoir cru pou- voir se passer de I'assentiment de I'Allemagne dans le reglement d'un question d'un interet commercial tres important pour elle. Le Journal de la Cite exprime I'espoir que M. Rouvier, le successeur designe de M. Delcasse, con- tinuera I'Entente cordiale devenue, plus qu'une po- litique de Gouvernements, une veritable union entre deux peuples, et il assure le Gouvernement frangais, en ce cas, de la continuation de I'attitude de loyale cooperation adoptee par I'Angleterre. Sans vouloir prejuger ce que fera la France, I'organe conservateur declare que, si le Gouverne- ment de la Republique refuse de prendre part a la Conference proposee par le Sultan du Maroc, I'An- gleterre en fera autant et que, sur ce point comme en tout le reste, le Gouvernement britannique suivra fidelement la politique sur laquelle est base I'ar- rangement qu'il a conclu avec la France et I'Espagne. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] Cte. de Lalaing. London, June 8, 1905. Sir: — The news of the retirement of M. Delcasse has been received with regret by the British Govern- ment organs. The Anglophile policy of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs which received such active support from the French Ambassador at Lon- don had led to an entente, the usefulness of which has been clearly proven by recent events ; and the uncertainty prevailing here concerning the direc- tion which his successor may give to French policy is filling the public mind with anxiety. Although the Times congratulates M. Delcass6 on the great work which he has accomplished, it confesses that in regard to Morocco he neglected to consider the circumstances which might result from a defeat of Russia in the Far East and which consequently might give Germany an opportunity to interfere by encouraging the Sultan in his op- position to the French projects. It is true that in the beginning Germany seemed not to feel any concern about the Anglo-French agreement, and that she took care not to betray how she would utilize the enforced inactivity of Russia in European affairs. It is none the less the fault of M. Delcasse to have believed that he could dispense with the assent of Germany in settling a question which was of very important commercial interest to her. The City Journal, expressing the hope that M. Rouvier, the prospective successor to M. Delcasse, will continue the Entente Cordiale, which from a mere policy of the governments had devoleped into a veritable union of the two peoples, assures the French Government of the continuation of the atti- tude of loyal co-operation hitherto observed by England. Without wishing to anticipate what France is go- ing to do the conservative organ states that, in case the Government of the Republic should refuse to participate in the conference proposed by the Sultan of Morocco, England would do the same and that on this point, as on all others, the British Govern- ment would faithfully adhere to the basic policy of the agreement which it had concluded with France and Spain. Accept, etc. [Signed] Ct. de Lalaing. No. 6. No. 6. Le Comte d'Ursel, Charge d' Affaires de Belgique k Berlin, k M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Count d'Ursel, Belgian Charge d'affaires at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 5 Aout 1905. Monsieur le Baron ! Deux journaux allemands, !e "Reichsbote" et le "Staatsbiirger," d'ailleurs depourvus d'autorite, avai- Sir:- Berlin, August 5, 1905. Two German newspapers, not as a rule speaking rith authority, the Reichsbote and the Staats- ent cru devoir attirer I'attention de leurs lecteurs sur le peril qui pourrait resulter pour TAllemagne des manoeuvres projetees de I'escadre anglaise dans la Baltique et suggeraient I'idee que les puissances riveraines en interdisent I'acces aux flottes etrangeres. La Gazette de Cologne, dans un article officieux paru le 30 Juillet, avait pris la peine de faire remarquer que I'alarme manifestee par les jour- naux dont il s'agit etait depourvue de toute raison d'etre: que si I'escadre britannique jugeait a propos de s'approcher des cotes allemandes, elle y recevrait I'accueil courtois qui lui est dii d'apres les usages in- ternationaux. L'emotion de la presse anglaise ne s'explique guere et si celle-ci persistait a s'alarmer des suggestions de quelques journaux allemands, on pourrait lui faire remarquer que jadis la visite d'une escadre allemande a Plymouth avait donne lieu dans la presse anglaise aux commentaires les plus pessi- mistes. Recemment encore, les declarations d'un lord civil de I'amiraute temperees il est vrai, par des explications donnees en haut lieu, constituaient une nouvelle preuve des sentiments peu bienveillants de I'opinion anglaise vis-a-vis de TAllemagne. La "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" reprodui- sait dans son No. d'hier un article du "Fremden- blatt" congu dans le meme esprit. Le journal vicn- nois ajoutait que I'Allemagne et I'Angleterre pou- vaient se faire concurrence au point de vue econo- mique sans que cette rivalite ait necessairement son contre-coup sur le terrain politique. La "Nord- deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" faisait suivre la repro- duction de I'article du "Fremdenblatt" de cette phrase: "Nous esperons que ces idees seront ac- cueillies de I'autre cote du canal comme elles meri- tent de I'etre." II est a craindre que le voeu reste platonique. La rivalite entre I'Angleterre et I'Allemagne a des causes trop profondes pour qu'il suffise des declara- tions de gens bien intentionnes pour les ameliorer. Les Anglais n'admettent pas que leur commerce et leur puissance maritime puissent etre mis en peril. Or les progres gigantesques de I'Allemagne consti- tuent pour I'Angleterre une menace permanente et tous les moyens lui sont bons pour faire echec a cette expansion. L'entrevue recente de I'Empereur d'Alle- magne et du Czar, la visite de I'Empereur Guillaume. a Copenhague, la presence d'une escadre allemande dans les eaux danoises tout est pretexte a la presse anglaise pour se repandre en recriminations et en in- vectives contre I'Allemagne. Partout oil I'Angle- terre pent lui susciter quelqu'embarras, elle s'em- presse de profiter de I'occasion. L'assistance ouverte donnee par les Anglais aux insurges de la colonie allemande du sud-ouest africain en leur reconnais- sant la qualite de belligerants et en interdisant le transit par la colonie du Cap des vivres et des muni- tions destines aux troupes allemandes est significa- tive a cet egard. II est question depuis deux jours d'une entrevue entre I'Empereur d'Allemagne et le Roi d'Angleterre sur territoire allemand. II est permis de se montrer sceptique quant aux eflfets qui pourront en resulter au point de vue de I'amelioration des rapports entre les deux pays. burger, have thought it necessary to draw the at- tention of their readers to the dangers which might result for Germany from the intended manoeuvres of the British squadron in the Baltic, and have sug- gested that the littoral Powers forbid foreign fleets entering that sea. The Cologne Gazette, in a semi- official article published in the issue of July 30th, has taken the trouble to declare that the fears ut- tered by the above mentioned papers are without any foundation whatever, and that if the British squadron should decide to visit the German coast, it would be accorded the courteous reception to which it is entitled according to international cus- tom. The excitement of the English press can hardly be understood. If it should continue to get alarmed at articles in some few German papers, one might point out to it that on a former occasion the visit of a German squadron at Plymouth gave rise in the English press to most pessimistic com- ments. Only recently the remarks of the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, although subsequently tempered by explanations from higher quarters, gave fresh proof of the unfriendliness of British public opin- ion towards Germany. The North German Gazette in its issue of yester- day reproduces an article from the Fremdenblatt conceived in the same spirit. The Viennese paper added that Germany and England could compete commercially without necessarily allowing this rivalry to evoke a counter effect in political mat- ters. The North German Gazette, which reprinted the article from the Fremdenblatt, commented on it by saying : "We hope that these ideas will meet with the reception on the other side of the Channel which they deserve." It is to be feared that this wish wrill remain a platonic one. The causes of the rivalry between England and Germany are too profound to be ameli- orated by declarations of well-meaning people. The English are not willing that their commerce and power at sea should be placed in jeopardy. The gigantic progress of Germany is a perpetual men- ace to England, and she will not refrain from using any means in order to put a stop to this expansion. The recent meeting of the German Emperor and the Czar, the visit of Emperor William at Copen- hagen, the presence of a German squadron in Danish waters, all this gave the English press a pretext for indulging in recriminations and invectives against Germany. Wherever England can cause Germany embarrassment she at once seizes on that occasion. Significant in this connection is the unconcealed assistance which the English lent to the rebels in German Southwest Africa by acknowledging them as belligerents, and by prohibiting the transit of foodstuffs and munitions for the German troops through Cape Colony. For two days a rumor has been abroad concerning a meeting between the German Emperor and the King of England on German territory. It is well to be sceptical as to the effect which such a meet- ing might produce in regard to an improvement in the relations between the two countries. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] L. d'Ursel. Accept, etc. [Signed] L. d'Ursel. No. 7. No. 7. Le Comte d'Ursel, Charg6 d' Affaires de Belgique a Berlin, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre dcs Affaires Etrangeres. Count d'Ursel, Belgian Chcirge d'affaires at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 22 Aoiit 1905. Monsieur le Baron! J'ai eu I'honneur de vous entretenir par mon rap- port du 5 de ce mois du cri d'alarme jete par quel- ques journaux allemands a la nouvelle que I'escadre anglaise se preparait a venir manoeuvrer dans les eaux de la mar Baltique. Ces journaux ne proposai- ent rien moins que de fermer aux flottes etrangeres I'acces de la mer Baltique. Des declarations officieu- ses sent venues mettre les choses au point. On faisait remarquer qu'une escadre allemande avait relache sur les cotes d'Angleterre sans que celle-ci en prit ombrage et que la courtoisie internationale reclamait qu'on fit le meme accueil aux vaisseaux anglais. Cette meme note se fait entendre dans I'article officieux ci-joint que public la Norddeutsche Allge- meine Zeitung dans sa revue hebdomadaire d'avant- hier. II y est dit que la flotte anglaise touchera au cours de ses manoeuvres dans plusieurs ports etrangers et notamment dans des ports allemands ; qu'il est du devoir de la population dc ces villes de reserver aux officiers et aux marins anglais le meme bon accueil que les Allemands ont regu en Angle- terre ou les autorites se sont efforcees de rendre agreable aux etrangers le sejour dans le pays. L'article exprime en terminant le souhait que la visite de I'escadre anglaise contribue a renforcer la consideration reciproque que se doivent deux grands pays civilises. II est a craindre que ce voeu officiel reste pla- tonique; les excitations de la presse anglaise dans I'affaire marocaine, I'accueil exagerement enthou- siaste fait aux marins fran^ais en Angleterre, I'at- titude a peine polie du Roi Edouard VII venant faire une cure a quelques kilometres de la frontiere alle- mande sans manifester le desir de se rencontrer avec son neveu sont autant de symptomes de mauvais vouloir de I'Angleterre vis-a-vis de I'Allemagne. Aus- si serait-il extraordinaire qu'on se montrat plus que strictement poli vis-a-vis de marins anglais. La municipalite de Swinemiinde a donne I'exemple de la reserve en refusant de voter des fonds pour la reception de I'escadre. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] L. d'Ursel. Berlin, August 22, 1905. Sir:— On the 5th inst. I had the honor to report concern- ing the alarm which was sounded by some German papers when the news was received that an English squadron was about to hold manoeuvres in the Baltic Sea. These papers proposed nothing less than to forbid foreign fleets to enter the Baltic. In the meantime semi-official statements have made the situation clear. They point out that when a Ger- man squadron anchored off the English coast, Eng- land did not take umbrage thereat and that interna- tional courtesy demanded that a similar reception be accorded to the British vessels. The same note is struck in the enclosed semi- official article published the day before yesterday by the North German Gazette in its weekly review. There it is said that in the course of its manoeuvres the British fleet was going to touch at several for- eign and especially at German ports; that it was the duty of the population of these towns to prepare for the English officers and men as cordial a recep- tion as the Germans had enjoyed in England, where the authorities made every effort to make their stay in the country pleasant for the strangers. In con- clusion the article expresses the wish that the visit of the British squadron will contribute to strengthen the reciprocal esteem which two great civilized countries owe to one another. It is to be feared that this official wish will re- main platonic ; the excitement in the English press on the occasion of the Moroccan affair, the unduly enthusiastic reception of the French marines in England, the scarcely polite attitude of King Ed- ward VII in taking a cure only a few kilometers from the German frontier without showing a desire to meet his nephew, all these things are so many symptoms of England's ill-will towards Germany. It would be out of the ordinary as well ,to show more than strict politeness to the English marines. The municipality of Swinemiinde has set an exam- ple of such reserve by refusing to vote the funds for the reception of the squadron. Accept, etc. [Signed] L. d'Ursel. No. 8. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique k Berlin, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Af- faires Etrangeres. No. 8. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 23 Septembre 1905. Monsieur le Baron ! Depuis des annees on mene dans des journaux an- glais a la tete desquels se trouve la "National Re- view," une campagne pour preconiser un rapproche- ment entre I'Angleterre et la Russie. Apres la con- clusion de I'accord anglo-frangais, la diplomatie frauQaise s'est activement employee dans ce sens. D'apres des bruits persistants les negociations con- tinuent. Certains symptomes me portent a croire Berlin, September 23, 1905. Sir:— For years a campaign has been conducted in the English newspapers, headed by the National Re- view, in favor of a rapprochement between England and Russia. Since the conclusion of the Franco- English agreement, French diplomacy has been making active endeavors in this direction. Accord- ing to persistent rumors the negotiations are still progressing. Certain symptoms cause me to be- Ju'il faut leur accorder une attention particuliere. 'ai appris que dans la haute finance de Londres on ne repousse plus I'idee d'emettre en Angleterre un emprunt russe. II y a peu de temps encore, les banquiers anglais n'auraient pas meme consenti a en discuter la possibilite. J'ai demande hier a M. le Baron de Richthofen ce qu'il fallait penser des rumeurs qui circulent. II m'a repondu qu'il y a certainement en Angleterre un courant favorable a un rapprochement avec la Riis- sie, surtout dans les spheres elevees et en tres haut lieu. J'ai interrompu le Baron de Richthofen pour dire qu'on prete en eflfet au Roi d'Angleterre un pro- jet semblable dont il aurait meme fait part a I'Em- pereur lors de leur derniere entrcvue. Le secretaire d'etat ne m'a pas contredit. Continuant M. le Baron de Richthofen m'a dit que meme depuis la chute de M. Delcasse, il y a encore en France un fort parti qui veut continuer la po- litique de I'ancien ministre des affaires etrangeres. Enfin dans toutes ces combinaisons I'hostilite centre I'Allemagne joue son role. Toutefois le secretaire d'etat ne croit pas que le danger soit bien grand. La base manque pour une entente entre I'Angleterre et la Russia. Elle serait en contradiction avec I'alli- ance conclue le 12 aout dernier entre I'Angleterre et le Japon. Contra qui cette alliance serait-elle dirigee, sinon contre I'Empire du Czar? Un pareil projet ne cadre pas non plus avec le langage tres sympathique pour I'Allemagne que vient de tenir M. Witte a Paris. Le president du conseil des ministres de Rus- sie va rentrer a Saint Petersbourg et y aura sans doute son mot a dire. Si un accord entre I'Angle- terre et la Russie etait proche M. Witte aurait cer- tainement ete a Londres. II se borne a visiter Paris et Berlin et ne verra pas d'autre chef d'etat que M. Loubet et I'Empereur d'Allemagne. J'ai replique que malgre I'immense service que vient de rendre M. Witte a la Russie il passe pour etre toujours assez mal vu a la cour. M. le Baron de Richthofen m'a repondu que M. Witte est plu- tot mal eleve et dit sans menagement tout ce qu'il pense. C'est pourquoi il n'est pas aime des grands- ducs ; mais c'est un homme dont I'autorite s'impose et de I'opinion duquel il faut tenir compte. A notre point de vue il est a souhaiter que le se- cretaire d'etat ait raison. La triple alliance dirigee par I'Allemagne nous a donne trente ans de paix europeenne. Elle est maintenant afFaiblie par I'etat de decomposition ou se trouve I'Empire austro-hon- grois. La nouvelle triple entente de la France, de I'Angleterre et de la Russie ne la remplacerait pas. Elle serait au contraire une cause d'inquietude per- petuelle. On en a si bien le sentiment ici qu'au com- mencement de I'annee derniere, lorsqu'on savait que d'actives negociations se poursuivaient entre Paris et Londres sans etre exactement informe de I'objet sur lequel elles portaient, I'Empereur croyait a une agression imminente de la France alliee a I'Angle- terre. Malgre les tres grosses difficultes d'un rap- prochement entre Londres et Saint-Petersbourg la possibilite n'en est plus exclue. Vous remarquerez que le secretaire d'etat la considere seulement comme improbable. L'entente entre la France et I'Angle- terre etait plus improbable encore et pourtant elle s'est realisee. Elle a ete ratifiee par les deux peuples parce qu'elle est I'expression de la haine commune contre I'Allemagne. De meme le Russe bait I'Alle- mand parce que I'Allemagne est le pays voisin qui lieve that they demand the closest attention. I have learned that the idea of putting a Russian loan on the market in England is no longer rejected by the great financiers at London. Only a short time ago the English bankers would not have consented even to discuss such a possibility. Yesterday I asked Baron von Richthofen what was to be thought of the rumors that were abroad. He replied that there certainly existed in England a current favorable to a rapprochement with Rus- sia, above all in the upper circles and in high places. I interrupted Baron von Richthofen to say that the King of England was actually credited with having such a plan and that he was even said to have spoken about it to the Emperor at their last meet- ing. The Secretary of State did not contradict this. Continuing, Baron von Richthofen told me that even after the fall of M. Delcasse there was still a strong party in France which wished to continue the policy of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the bottom of all these combinations was hos- tility against Germany. Nevertheless the Secre- tary of State does not believe that the danger is very great. He considers that the basis was lack- ing for an Entente between England and Russia, which would be in contravention of the Alliance concluded between England and Japan on the 12th of August last year. Against whom could such an alliance be directed if not against the Empire of the Czar? Neither would such a project fit in with the Germanophile language which only recently M. Witte had used in Paris. The President of the Russian Council of Ministers would go back to St. Petersburg where, no doubt, he would have a word to say. If an agreement between England and Russia were pending, M. Witte would certainly have gone to London, whereas he had confined his visits to Paris and Berlin and was not going to see any other heads of states but M. Loubet and the German Emperor. I answered that in spite of the immense service which M. Witte had just rendered Russia he was reported as being somewhat badly received at court. Baron von Richthofen answered that M. Witte had rather bad manners and was in the habit of saying, without reserve, what he thought. It was for this reason that he was not liked by the Grand Dukes ; but he was a man whose authority carried weight and with whose opinion one had to count. From our point of view it is to be hoped that the Secretary of State is right. The Triple-Alliance under the leadership of Germany has given us thirty years of European peace. It is now weakened by the state of disintegration in which the Austro- Hungarian Empire finds itself. The new Triple En- tente between France, England, and Russia could not supplant it. It would, on the contrary, be a case of perpetual unrest. This feeling is so pro- nounced here that when, at the beginning of last year, it was known that active negotiations were going on between Paris and London without being exactly informed of their object, the Emperor be- lieved an attack by France in alliance with England to be imminent. In spite of the great difficulties that are in the way of a rapprochement between London and St. Petersburg, the possibility thereof is no longer ex- cluded. You will remark that the Secretary of State considers it only as improbable. The entente between France and England was still more improbable, and yet it came into being. It was sanctioned by the two peoples as the expression of their common hate against Germany. In the same way the Russian hates the German because Ger- sert de point de comparaison et dont la civilisation superieure humilie son orgueil de barbare. _ Ce n'est un mystere pour personne que les rela- tions personnelles de I'Empereur et du Roi d'Angle- terre sont franchement mauvaises. La nouvelle repartition des forces navales de I'Angleterre est evidemment dirigee centre I'Alle- magne. Si Ton en avait doute, le discours impru- dent du lord civil de I'amiraute M. Lee aurait ouvert les yeux. En choisissant la Baltique pour le theatre des manoeuvres de la flotte anglaise, le gouverne- ment britannique n'a fait evidemment qu'user de son droit. L'Allemagne aurait ete mal venue a s'en of- fenser et elle a fait aux marins anglais I'accueil le plus courtois; mais ce n'en etait pas moins une demonstration dont le but etait de faire toucher du doigt au peuple allemand I'ecrasante superiorite nu- merique des forces navales anglaises. Le tele- gramme oblige de I'amiral anglais a I'Empereur etait glacial et Sa Majeste a repondu sur le meme ton. Les efforts inouis qu'a faits la presse anglaise pour empecher le reglement pacifique de I'affaire du Ma- roc et la credulite probablement pas tres sincere avec laquelle elle accueille toutes les calomnies dirigees contre la politique allemande, montrent combien I'opinion publique dans la Grande-Bretagne est pre- paree a accueillir favorablement toute combinaison hostile a I'Allemagne. Enfin la principale cause de dissentiment entre I'Angleterre et la Russie est provisoirement ecartee. C'etait I'ambition malsaine de la Russie d'etendre in- cessamment les limites d'un empire deja beaucoup trop grand. Les desastres militaires de la Russie et ses embarras interieurs la forceront a renoncer pour longtemps a la politique de conquetes. II est vrai que d'un autre cote I'Allemagne a pro- fite du conflit entre la Russie et le Japon pour ame- liorer notablement ses relations avec I'Empire voisin. On lui a su gre a Saint-Petersbourg de la neutralite bienveillante qui a permis a la Russie de concentrer toutes les forces disponibles vers I'extreme Orient; mais ni les peuples ni les gouvernements ne se piquent de gratitude. Combien de temps la recon- naissance durera-t-elle apres que le danger est passe? La Russie toujours aux abois et qui a sature la France et I'Allemagne d'emprunts russes restera-t- elle longtemps insensible a la tentation d'ouvrir a son profit un nouveau marche financier? _Je n'ai, bien entendu, aucune raison de croire qu'un resultat positif quelconque ait deja ete obtenu ; mais il y a une possibilite dont il faut tenir compte. Les constellations politiques ne sont pas eternelles. II se prepare peut-etre un nouveau groupement des grandes puissances qui diminuerait la securite euro- peenne et qui s'accomplirait par consequent a notre detriment. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. many is the neighboring country which serves as a comparison and whose superior civilization is humil- iating to the Russian's barbaric pride. It is a secret to none that the personal relations between the Emperor and the King of England are exceedingly bad. The new distribution of England's naval forces is evidently directed against Germany. If anyone had any doubts on this head, the imprudent speech of the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Lee, will have opened his eyes. In choosing the Baltic as the theatre for the manoeuvres of the British fleet the British Government evidently does not go beyond its rights. It would have been unwise on the part of Germany to take offense thereat and she has given the English marines the most courteous re- ception; but it was, nevertheless, a demonstration the purpose of which was clearly to show the Ger- man people the crushing numerical superiority of the British naval forces. The customary telegram of the British Admiral to the Emperor was icy and His Majesty answered in the same tone. The unheard-of efforts made by the English press to prevent a peaceful settlement of the Moroccan affair and the probably insincere credulity with which it receives all calumnies aimed at the German policy show how ready public opinion in Great Britain is to acclaim any combination hostile to Germany. Another point is that the principal cause of the differences between England and Russia has been removed for the time being. I mean the unhealthy Russian ambition incessantly to extend the bound- aries of an Empire which is already too big. The military disasters of Russia and her internal embar- rassments will force her to give up for a long time her policy of conquest. It is true that, on the other hand, Germany has profited by the conflict between Russia and Japan in improving her relations with her neighbor con- siderably. They have been grateful to Germany at St. Petersburg for her benevolent neutrality which permitted Russia to concentrate all the forces at her disposal in the Far East; but neither peoples nor governments can pride themselves on their grati- tude. How long will Russia's gratitude last when the danger is over? Russia is always in straits; she has flooded France and Germany with her loans; will she be able much longer to resist the temptation to open a new financial market for her benefit? I have, be it well understood, no reason to believe that any positive result has thus far been obtained ; but there is, a possibility which one must take into account. Political constellations are not eternal. Perhaps a new grouping of the Great Powers is being evolved which would diminish the European security and the realization of which would con- sequently be to our detriment. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 9. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, k M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangdres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 30 Septembre 1905. Monsieur le Baron ! _ Depuis que je n'ai plus a ma disposition le cour- rier anglais, je me trouve tres souvent gene dans ma Berlin, September 30, 1905. Sir:— Since the English courier is no longer at my dis- posal I very often find myself hampered in my cor- correspondance. J'ai du plus d'une fois supprimer des informations ou des reflexions qu'il cut ete im- prudent d'expedier par la poste. Je profite du depart de M. de Benin qui a la com- plaisance de se charger d'un pli a votre adresse, pour parler du traite d'alliance conclu le 12 aoiit der- nier entre I'Angleterre et le Japon et qui vient d'etre public? Commentant cet acte diplomatique la Ga- zette de Cologne dit que les deux puissances se ga- rantissent mutuellement leurs possessions en Asie,en tenant compte de leur position speciale en Coree et au Thibet ; qu'elles assurent le status quo* dans I'ex- treme Orient et reconnaissent le principe de la porte ouverte. Ces deux derniers points tiennent compte des interets des tiers et repondent aux aspirations de I'Allemagne. La Gazette se montre done satis- faite. C'est sans doute la note officielle qui sera donnee au departement Imperial des Affaires etrangeres; mais je sais que I'accord intervenu y a cause une im- pression desagreable. II est tres peu probable que la Russie soit capable d'essayer une revanche pendant les dix premieres an- nees qui suivront sa defaite, c'est-a-dire pendant la duree du traite meme, si elle se releve plus vite qu'on ne le pense, I'alliance est superfine en ce qui la con- cerne, au moins pour le Japon. II peut etre fort agreable et fort utile a I'Angleterre d'obtenir le con- cours de I'armee japonaise pour defendre I'Hindous- tan, mais on ne voit pas bien comment elle pourrait venir en aide a son alliee si ce n'est sous le rapport financier. Elle n'a pas un seul soldat a mettre a la disposition du Japon et celui-ci n'a pas besoin des vaisseaux anglais. La flotte russe est aneantie. La Russie peut a la verite se procurer assez rapidement un materiel nouveau. C'est une question d'argent mais on ne forme pas en un tour de main des amiraux et des matelots. Le personnel de la marine russe a fait preuve d'une effroyable incapacite. Le Japon est maitre de la mer de Chine pour de longues annees. Si le traite n'a pas pour but de prevenir une ag- gression russe, contre qui serait-il dirige sinon contre I'Allemagne? Ce n'est certes pas pour Kiautschau lui-meme que I'Empire en a pris possession. II voulait avoir une base d'operation pour s'assurer une part du butin a une epoque ou le partage de la Chine paraissait im- minent. L'alliance anglo-japonaise signifie que I'Al- lemagne doit renoncer a toute velleite semblable. La precaution est d'autant plus blessante qu'elle est inu- tile. Depuis les victoires du Japon chacun doit savoir que toute idee de demembrement de la Chine est desormais exclue. J'ajouterai comme reflexion personnelle que le traite n'a pas meme I'avantage d'empecher un rap- prochement entre la Russie et I'Angleterre. L'alli- ance de ce pays et du Japon est purement defensive. Lord Lansdowne a done pu dire sans s'ecarter de la verite qu'elle n'est pas dirigee contre la Russie. Cette derniere puissance doit panser ses plaies avant de recommencer sa politique de conquetes. Le moment est done plus favorable que jamais pour une limita- tion provisoire des spheres d'influence. L'alliance ne serait anti-russe que si la Russie nourrissait des pen- sees d'agression et pour longtemps encore elle en est incapable. Le ton general de la campagne de presse menee en Angleterre montre que le rapprochement avec la Russie y est desire non dans un but d'apaisement, mais dans une pensee hostile a I'Allemagne. II est k craindre que le Roi d' Angleterre ne partage ce sen- timent. J'ai eu I'honneur de voi's ecrire recemment respondence. More than once I have had to sup- press information or reflections because it would have been unwise to send them by mail. I make use of the departure of M. de Bonin, who is good enough to take charge of a despatch ad- dressed to you, in order to tell you of the treaty of alliance between England and Japan which was concluded on August 12th and has just been pub- lished. In commenting on this diplomatic docu- ment the Cologne Gazette says that the two Powers mutually guarantee to one another their possessions in Asia, taking into account their special position in Korea and Thibet, that they affirm the status quo in the Far East, and recognize the principle of the open door. These two last points take into consid- eration the interest of third parties and meet Ger- many's aspirations. The Gazette is therefore sat- isfied. This is certain to be also the official version which will be given out at the Imperial Foreign Office; I know, however, that the treaty has caused a dis- agreeable impression there. It is very unlikely that Russia will be able to attempt a war of revenge for the first ten years following her defeat, that is to say for the period during which the treaty will be in force ; if she re- covers more quickly than is expected the alliance, as far as Russia is concerned, is useless, at least for Japan. It may be very welcome and useful for Eng- land to obtain the help of the Japanese army in order to defend Hindustan, but it is not easy to conceive how England could come to the aid of her Ally unless it be in the financial sphere. She has not a single soldier whom she could place at Japan's disposal, nor has the latter any need for English ships. The Russian fleet has been annihilated. It is true that Russia can speedily replace the material. That is only a question of money, but you cannot at a moment's call produce admirals and marines. The personnel of the Russian fleet has proven ter- ribly incapable. Japan will be the mistress of the Chinese sea for many years to come. If the treaty does not aim at preventing a Rus- sian aggression, against whom could it be directed, if not against Germany? Germany certainly did not take possession of Kiaochow for its own sake. She wanted to have a basis of operation in order to secure for herself a part of the booty at a time when the partition of China seemed to be imminent. The Anglo-Japa- nese Alliance signifies that Germany is to renounce all such ideas. The precaution hurts the more be- cause it is superfluous. Since Japan's victories everybody ought to know that all ideas of a dis- memberment of China are henceforth excluded. I would like to add as a personal reflection that the treaty has not even the advantage of preventing a rapprochement between Russia and England. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is purely defensive. Lord Lansdowne was, therefore, in a position to say, without deviating from the truth, that it is not directed against Russia. This Power has first to heal its wounds before it can begin again a policy of conquest. Thus the moment is more favorable than ever for a provisional limitation of the spheres of influence. The Alliance would be anti-Russian only if Russia entertained ideas of aggression and of such she will still be incapable for a long time. The general tone of the press campaign which is being conducted in England shows that the rap- prochement with Russia is not desired from any pacific motives but with hostile intentions against Germany. It is to be feared that the King of Eng- land shares this sentiment I had the honor to 12 — que ses relations avec I'Empereur sont tout a fait mauvaises. On m'a rapporte de source sure que Sa. Majeste a eu recemment une conversation privee contrastant tout a fait avec les sentiments pacifiques qu'on lui pretait jusqui'ici. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. report to you some time ago that his relations with the Emperor are positively bad. From a reliable source I learn that in a recent conversation His Majesty made remarks which were entirely in con- trast with the pacific sentiments which were hith- erto attributed to him. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 10. No. 10. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Monsieur le Baron ! Berlin, le 14 Octobre 1905. Sir:- Berlin, October 14, 1905. En communiquant au gouvernement russe le traite d'alliance anglo-japonais Sir Charles Hardinge a, comrne vous le savez, exprime I'espoir que la Russie verrait dans le fait de la communication comme dans la teneur du traite la preuve des intentions pacifiques et amicales de I'Angleterre. Quelques jours apres, I'ambassadeur a demande au Comte Lamsdorflf quelle impression la lecture du traite avait faite sur lui. J'apprends de source cer- taine que le Comte Lamsdorflf a repondu que toutes les personnes avec lesquelles il a eu I'occasion de dis- cuter le traite a commencer par I'Empereur Nicolas II n'ont pas le moindre doute que I'arrangement ne soit dirige contre la Russie. Sir Charles Hardinge a vivement combattu cette maniere de voir et a exprime I'opinion qu'on pourrait aussi bien considerer le traite comme dirige contre rAllemagne. Un seul mot, la mention de I'lnde dans le traite, pourrait justifier I'opinion que Ton a eu la Russie en vue ; mais a dit I'ambassadeur, il faut tenir compte de ce que le traite est purement defensif. Si la Russie est animee des memes vues pacifiques que I'Angleterre, elle pourrait tres bien y souscrire. Les eflforts de I'Angleterre pour representer a Saint-Petersbourg le traite d'alliance avec le Japon comme ne visant pas la Russie confirment ce que nous savions deja du desir du cabinet de Londres de se rapprocher de cette derniere puissance. Vous vous rappellerez, Monsieur le Baron, que dans la conversation avec M. le Baron de Richthofen dont j'ai eu I'honneur de vous rendre compte par mon rapport du 23 Septembre le secretaire d'etat m'a dit qu'il ne croyait pas a une entente entre la Rus- sie et I'Angleterre, parce que la base manque. II y en a pourtant une possible. L'Angleterre se desiii- teresse maintenant completement du sort de la Tur- quie dont la conservation a ete si longtemps le prin- cipe dirigeant de sa politique. Elle pourrait laisser a la Russie la main libre en Asie mineure. Une pareille combinaison aurait de plus a ses yeux I'avan- tage de brouiller la Russie avec I'Allemagne et I'iso- lement de I'Allemagne est actuellement le but prin- cipal de la politique anglaise. Agreez etc. [s.l Greindl. When communicating the Anglo-Japanese treaty of Alliance to the Russian Government, Sir Charles Hardinge, as you know, expressed the hope that Russia would see in this communication as well as in the tenor of the treaty a proof of England's pacific and friendly intentions. Some days later the Ambassador asked Count Lamsdorflf what impression the reading of the treaty had made on him. I hear from a reliable source that Count Lamsdorflf replied that, from Emperor Nich- olas n down, everybody with whom he had had oc- casion to discuss the treaty, had not the slightest doubt that the agreement was directed against Russia. Sir Charles Hardinge strongly contested this idea and maintained that one might just as well consider the treaty as being directed against Germany. One single word, viz., the mention made in the treaty of India, might justify the opinion that Russia had been in view; but, said the Ambassador, it should be taken into account that the treaty was purely defensive. If Russia was guided by the same pacific intentions as England, she might very well en- dorse it. The eflforts made by England in St. Petersburg in order to represent the treaty with Japan as not aiming at Russia confirm what we already know of the desire of the Cabinet at London to come into closer touch with the latter Power. You will remember, Sir, that during my conver- sation with Baron von Richthofen of which I had the honor to tell you in my report of September 23rd, the Secretary said to me that he did not be- lieve in an entente between Russia and England, because there was no basis for it. However, such a basis is possible. England at the present time shows no interest whatsoever in the fate of Turkey whose preservation has for such a long time been the leading principle of her policy. She may leave Russia a free hand in Asia Minor. Such a com- bination would, moreover, have the advantage of embroiling Russia with Germany, whose isolation is at present the principal aim of the English policy. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 11. M. A. Leghait, Ministre de Belgique k Paris, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. A. Leghait, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, le 24 Octobre 1905. Monsieur le Baron ! L'accalmie s'est faite autour des incidents orageux des dernieres semaines, mais le calme qui regne est plutot produit par le desir d'etouflfer des polemiques dangereuses et des questions qu'on n'est pas pret a resoudre que par un sentiment de reelle securite. Les evenements qui se sont produits depuis le prin- temps passe ont ebranle I'equilibre europeen, ouvert des horizons nouveaux et jete la perturbation dans la politique exterieure de la France. II est done naturel qu'apres une semblable secousse on passe par une periode de recueillement. L'Allemagne nie avoir fait au Cabinet de Rome des confidences ou insinuations destinees a servir d'aver- tissement a la France et n'admet pas qu'elle doit se servir d'un intermediaire dans ses rapports avec le Gouvernement de la Republique. On declare aussi que les revelations sensationnelles de la presse fran- caise n'ont nullement emu le Gouvernement alle- mand prepare depuis longtemps aux eventualites ainsi exposees au public et que les dementis officieux qui ont paru a Paris et a Londres ont ete faits spon- tanement et nullement a la suite de demandes d'ex- plications de la part du Prince de Biilow. Si Ton se remet ici des emotions causees par la politique inconsideree de M. Delcasse et s'il y a assez de patriotisme et de dignite meme dans la presse pour dissimuler le ressentiment qu'a engendre I'attitude de I'Allemagne, celui-ci subsiste pourtant avec de profondes racines dans les coeurs franqais. Une immense desillusion a envahi ceux qui sommeil- laient dans des reves pacifiques, le chauvinisme na- tional s'est reveille, on discute I'efficacite de la defense comparee a I'organisation formidable des voisins de I'Est, et on se montre dispose a faire de nouveaux sacrifices pour que la flotte et I'armee soient pretes a toute eventualite. On semble ne pas se dissimu'er que dans I'etat actuel des -choses on se trouverait a la frontiere dans les conditions tout aussi defavorables qu'en 1870. On deplore surtout le manque d'organisation, d'autorite des chefs et d'esprit de discipline dans I'armee. Si la France, apres de longues annees de somnolente accalmie, songe a nouveau a fourbir ses armes, on ne saurait admettre qu'elle soit guidee en cela par des idees agressives mais elle se rend compte que de I'orienta- tion qu'el'e va donner a sa politique exterieure ou de celle meme qu'on lui attribuerait peuvent naitre de graves complications. Si I'Allemagne voyait se des- siner nettement un rapprochement anglo-franco- russe, attendrait-elle, malgre tout son desir de main- tenir la paix, la consolidation d'une telle alliance et ne voudrait-elle pas rompre violemment le cercle de fer dans lequel on chercherait a I'etreindre? On se rend bien compte ici que personne ne veut la guerre mais on ne saurait se dissimu'er que les rivalites economiques et commerciales, questions desormais vitales pour les Puissances, peuvent la dechainer d'un moment a I'autre. L'.Angleterre dans ses ef- forts pour maintenir sa suprematie et enrayer le de- veloppement de sa grande rivale germanique est evidemment animee du desir d'eviter un conflit, mais ses aspirations egoistes ne nous y menent-elles pas? Sir: Paris, October 24, 1905. A calm has set in after the stormy events of the last weeks, but it is produced rather by a desire to stifle dangerous polemics and questions for which no solution is prepared than by an actual feeling of security. The happenings since last Spring have shaken the European equilibrium, opened up new horizons and caused disturbance in the French foreign policy. It is, therefore, only natural'that such a shake-up should be followed by a period of reconsideration and study. Germany denies having made confidential com- munications or insinuations to the Cabinet at Rome intended to serve as a warning to France, and she claims that she has no need of an intermediary in her relations with the Government of the Republic. It is also said that the sensational revelations of the French press have in no way excited the German Government which for a long time has been pre- pared for such contingencies as have now been made pubHc. It is further said that the semi-official de- nials which appeared in Paris and London were spontaneous and in no manner the result of demands for explanations made by Prince von Bulow. Although people here are recovering from the ex- citement caused by the inconsiderate policy of M. Delcasse, and although even the press possesses enough patriotism and dignity to conceal the resent- ment which Germany's attitude has engendered, that resentment has, nevertheless, firmly taken root in the hearts of the French. A great disillusion has befallen those who had been dozing in pacific dreams ; national chauvinism has been awakened ; the eflFectiveness of the country's defense is being discussed in comparison with the formidable organ- ization of the neighbors in the East, and a disposi- tion is manifesting itself to make fresh sacrifices so that the navy and the army may be ready for any event. It seems to be realized that in the present state of afl^airs France would find herself on the frontier in a condition as unfavorable as in 1870. Complaints are made particularly of the lack of organization, authority on the part of the leaders, and a sense of discipline in the army. If France after long years of somnolent rest thinks again of furbishing her armor, it should not be imagined that she is being guided in this by ideas of aggression ; she is, on the contrary, awake to the fact that grave complications may arise from the course which she is going to take in her foreign policy or which may only be attributed to her. If Germany were clearly to see an Anglo-Franco-Russian rapprochement taking shape would she, despite all her desire to maintain peace, wait for the consolidation of such an alliance, or would she not rather forcibly break the iron ring which her adversaries were attempting to forge around her? It is fully realized here that nobody wants war, but on the other hand, no one seeks to deny the fact that it may be unchained at any moment by economic and commercial rivalry, involving questions which will hereafter be of vital importance to the Powers. England, despite her efforts to maintain her supremacy and tn c^ock the Elle a cru, en concluant I'alliance japonaise et en attirant peu a peu la France dans de semblables liens, avoir trouve le moyen d'arriver a son but en pa- ralysant assez les forces de rAUemagne pour rendre la guerre impossible, car, certes, dans ce cas, I'Al- lemagne n'eut pas ete attaquee et si elle prenait Tcffensive, ses allies de la triplice n'eussent, sans doute, pas considere comme une obligation contrac- tuelle de participer a une attaque contre la France. Si TAllemagne, forte de ses victoires et de son im- mense developpement, a voulu, des le debut, rompre les intrigues de ceux qui cherchaient a porter at- teinte au prestige du role predominant qu'elle occupe en la reduisant a un pacifique isolement, il est a sup- poser qu'elle est disposee a aller jusqu'au bout dans cette voie. Le Gouvernement de la Republique contre lequel se sont eleves les griefs germaniques, qui visaient au fond la Grande-Bretagne, doit se rendre compte que s'il poursuivait la politique de M. Delcasse ce serait la France qui deviendrait I'otage de la lutte dont I'Angleterre beneficierait. Si M. Rouvier avait I'intention de s'engager dans cette politique plus fiere et plus digne, pent etre plus hasardeuse, il n'aurait pas cede aux injonctions de I'Allemagne en sacrifiant M. Delcasse. Apres un tel acte la reprise da la politique, generalement blamee de son predecesseur semble impossible et pourtant on souffre de rester sous I'impression de ce penible incident et on voudrait rehausser le moral de la France en donnant un temoignage de son indepen- dance politique, mais on se trouve fort embarrasse et par suite fort hesitant pour le moment. II parait que I'Allemagne envisage de plus en plus comme possible un conflit avec I'Angleterre et qu'elle n'est pas sans nourrir de serieuses inquietudes a ce sujet. De la les insinuations de la presse officieuse qui semble vouloir mettre la France en demeure de declarer de quel cote elle se rangerait. Ces articles produisent ici une impression irritante. On semble comprendre que loin de se prononcer dans une telle eventualite il est de I'interet de la France de main- tenir la neutralite autant que possible car il est evi- dent qu'elle ne pourrait pas prendre parti pour I'Alle- magne et que si elle s'alliait a I'Angleterre elle ris- querait fort de donner a I'Allemagne des compensa- tions pour les desastres que la flotte britannique pourrait lui infliger. II est done a supposer que M. Rouvier a pour objectif, primo d'eviter toute cause de conflit en Europe et secundo d'en tenir la France a I'ecart s'il devait eclater. Pour le moment, le President du Conseil est en Espagne et il s'efforce de resserrer les liens d'amitie de ce cote. Des son retour, il aura probablement a soutenir de vives attaques a la Chambre. On ne sait pas encore exactement comment et avec quelle vio- lence le debat s'engagra sur la politique exterieure, mais la partie sera sans doute dure et fort delicate pour Mr. Rouvier et des craintes sont meme mani- festees sur son maintien au pouvoir. Ce n'est pas sans anxiete aussi que Ton envisage la Conference d'Algesiras. Le Sultan hesite a ac- cepter le programme qui lui est soumis et I'Angle- terre se dispose a le faire echouer. On s'accorde a reconnaitre que cette reunion aura, dans les circons- tances de tension generale actuelle, une importance toute speciale et qu'elle pent avoir des resultats tout autres que ceux prevus par son programme. La s'accentuera le role de I'Angleterre et s'effectuera forcement sous son impulsion le groupement des Puissances. L'Allemagne redoute, parait-il, ce development of her big German rival, is evidently animated by the desire to avoid a conflict, but are not her egotistic aspirations leading us into it? In concluding the Japanese Alliance and in gradually drawing France into similar ties, she believed she had found the means by which to arrive at her goal of paralyzing the forces of Germany in a degree suf- ficient to make war impossible ; for in that case Ger- many would not be attacked and if she should take the offensive, her Allies of the Triplice would doubt- less not consider themselves under a treaty obliga- tion to take part in an attack against France. If Germany, strong through her victories and her im- mense development, was willing from the beginning to break the intrigues of those who sought to impair the prestige of the predominant part which she is playing, by forcing her to peace by isolation, it must be assumed that she is ready to pursue this road to the end. The Government of the Republic, against whom the German complaints are raised, which in reality are intended for Great Britain, must realize that if they follow the policy of M. Delcasse France would become the hostage in the struggle from which England would draw the benefit. If M. Rouvier had purposed embarking on this prouder and more dignified, but perhaps also more dangerous, policy he would not have given way to Germany's injunctions by sacrificing M. Delcasse. After such action it seems impossible that the policy of his predecessor, which met with general con- demnation, should be taken up again, and yet people are suffering under the impression of this painful incident and would like to improve the morale of France by giving proof of her political independ- ence, but they find themselves embarrassed and are at present very undecided. It seems that Germany regards a conflict with England as increasingly possible and that she har- bors serious anxiety on this subject. Hence the in- sinuations of the semi-official press, which seems to want to compel France to declare which side she will take. These articles are producing an irritat- ing impression here. It seems to be perfectly un- derstood here that far from pronouncing herself on such a contingency it is to France's interest to remain neutral as long as possible, for it is evident that she could not take the part of Germany and that, if she allied herself with England, she would run the risk of having to pay compensation for the disasters which the British fleet might inflict on Ger- rnany. It must therefore be assumed that M. Rou- vier's intention is in the first place to avoid all cause of conflict in Europe and furthermore to keep France out of it if it should break out. At the present moment the Prime Minister is in Spain trying to tighten the bonds of friendship on that side. On his return he will probably meet with lively attacks in the Chamber. It is not yet known exactly how and with what force the debate concerning the foreign policy will be conducted, but it will doubtless be a hard and difficult fight for M. Rouvier and fears are even expressed about his remaining in power. The Algeciras conference also is looked forward to with anxiety. The Sultan is hesitating about accepting the programme submitted to him and England is endeavoring to bring about its failure. It is universally recognized that in view of the pres- ent general tension the conference will be of es- pecial importance and that it may lead to very dif- ferent results than those forecast in the programme. At this conference England's role will become more pronounced, and the grouping of the Powers will necessarily take place under her pressure. This — 16 — groupement qui aurait pour premier effet I'avorte- tnent de la Conference et elle serait, dit-on, plus dis- posee maintenant a accepter le sacrifice d'amour- propre d'un ajournement indefini que les consequen- ces possibles d'une reunion immediate. Le Prince de Radolin n'a pas quitte Paris de tout I'ete et il est encore en relations presque journalieres avec le departement des Affaires fitrangeres. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] A. Leghait. Germany seems to fear because its first result would be the miscarriage of the conference, and it is said that she would now be more disposed to sacrifice her amour-propre by consenting to an indefinite ad- journment than to accept the possible consequences of an immediate meeting. Prince von Radolin did not leave Paris all summer and he is still in almost daily touch with the De- partment of Foreign Affairs. Accept, etc. [Signed] A. Leghait. No. 12. No. 12. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangdres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 27 Octobre 1905. Monsieur le Baron ! La statue du Feldmarechal Comte de Moltke a ete inauguree hier a Berlin. Le soir au diner de gala qui a suivi la ceremonie, I'Empereur a dit que la journee comportait deux toasts ; le premier consacre au passe et a la memoire. Profondement reconnaissant envers la providence qui a une grande epoque a donne ses paladins au Grand Empereur, Sa Majeste boit son premier verre en silence en souvenir du plus grand general de I'Empereur Guillaume. Sa Majeste a continue en disant: "Le second verre est pour I'avenir et le present ! Ces messieurs ont vu quelle est notre situation dans le monde. Done la poudre seche, les epees aiguisees, le but re- connu, les forces ramassees et les pessimistes bannis. Je leve mon verre a notre peuple en armes. A I'armee allemande et a son etat-major general ! Hurra, Hurra, Hurra 1" II est impossible de faire entendre plus clairement qu'en depit de tous les dementis officieux I'Empereur continue a croire que la politique de I'Angleterre a Paris, a Tokio, a Saint Petersbourg, a Washington a pour but non seulement d'ameliorer les relations avec les grandes puissances europeennes et extra euro- peennes; ce qui n'aurait rien que de legitime; mais aussi et principalement d'isoler I'AUemagne. II regne ici une mefiance insurmontable centre I'Angleterre. Un tres grand nombre d'AUemands sont persuades que I'Angleterre ou cherche des al- lies pour une agression contre TAllemagne, ou ce qui serait plus conforme aux traditions britanniques, travaille a provoquer sur le continent une guerre a laquelle elle ne prendrait pas part et dont elle re- cueillerait les profits. On me dit que beaucoup d'Anglais nourrissent des inquietudes analogues et craignent une agression allemande. Je me demande sur quoi pent se fonder a Londres une pareille impression. L'Allemagne est absolu- ment incapable d'attaquer I'Angleterre. Pour debar- quer une armee sur le .sol anglais, il faudrait etre maitre de la mer au moins pendant quelques jours, et I'AUemagne n'a aucune chance de le devenir. Sa flotte embusquee aux deux extremites du canal Kaiser Wilhelm et pouvant passer en une nuit d'une mer a I'autre pourrait peut-etre etre efficace pour empecher le blocus des ports allemands. Elle aurait le choix Berlin, October 27, 1905. Sir:— Yesterday the statue of Field-Marshal Count von Moltke was unveiled in Berlin. In the evening, at the gala-dinner following the ceremony, the Emperor said that the day called for two toasts, the first of which must be a tribute to the memory of the past. Deeply grateful to Provi- dence, which in a great time gave able paladins to the Great Emperor, His Majesty drank the first glass in memory of Emperor William's greatest general. His Majesty then continued : "The second glass is to the future and the present! You, gentlemen, have seen what our position is in the world. There- fore, let us keep our powder dry, our swords sharp, our aim clearly defined, our strength collected, and the pessimists banished. I lift my glass to drink to our nation in arms. To the German army and its General Staff! Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah!" It cannot possibly be more clearly expressed that, all semi-official disavowals notwithstanding, the Emperor continues to believe that England's policy in Paris, Tokio, St. Petersburg and Washington is not only aiming at improving the relations with the Great Powers in and out of Europe, in which she would be perfectly justified, but also and chiefly at isolating Germany. An insurmountable mistrust of England is preva- lent here. A great number of Germans are con- vinced that England is either seeking allies for an attack on Germany or — which would be more in conformity with British traditions — is endeavoring to stir up a war on the continent in which she would not take part and of which she would reap the benefit. I am told that many Englishmen harbor similar apprehensions, and fear a German attack. I ask myself on what such an impression can be based at London. Germany is absolutely in no po- sition to attack England. In order to land an army on British soil Germany would have to have com- mand of the sea, at least for some days, of which she has no chance. With her fleet in ambush at both ends of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal and able to pass from one sea to the other in a night, she might perhaps be able to prevent a blockade of the Ger- man ports. She would be in a position to choose 16 du moment ou il lui conviendrait d'attaquer une escadre ennemie aux equipages et aux machines fa- tigues. La flotte allemande n'a ete construite que pour cela ; mais elk serait hors d'etat d'affronter une bataille navale sur les cotes de I'Angleterre. La disproportion numerique des forces est trop grande. Quant a une attaque de I'Allemagne contre les colonies anglaises, il est inutile d'en parler. II est evident qu'on n'y pent pas songer. Les gens qui en Angleterre affichent la crainte d'une agression allemande irrealisable, sont-ils bien sinceres? Ne feignent-ils pas ces alarmes pour pous- ser a un conflit qui aneantirait la flotte de guerre, la marine marchande et le commerce exterieur de I'Al- lemagne. Si I'Angleterre est a I'abri des coups, I'Alle- magne au contraire est tres vulnerable. En atta- quant TAllemagne simplement pour aneantir un rival, I'Angleterre ne ferait que suivre ses anciens errements. Elle a successivemnt detruit la flotte hollandaise d'accord avec Louis XIV ; puis la flotte frangaise et meme la flotte danoise en pleine paix et sans aucune provocation, simplement parce que celle-ci constituait une force navale respectable. II n'y a aucune raison avouable de conflit entre I'Allemagne et I'Angleterre. La haine des Anglais contre I'Allemagne provient uniquement de I'envie que leur inspirent les progres de la marine, du com- merce et de I'industrie allemande. Agreez etc. [s] Greindl. the moment for an attack on a hostile squadron at a time when its men and its machinery were ex- hausted. The German fleet was built only for this end ; but it would be out of the question for it to face the enemy off the English coast. The numer- ical disproportion of the forces would be too great. An attack by Germany on the British colonies need not be discussed. It is evident that it cannot be thought of. Are the people in England who profess fear of a German attack, which would be impossible, quite sincere? Don't they rather feign such apprehen- sions in order to bring about a conflict which would exterminate the navy, the merchant marine, and the foreign trade of Germany? While England is safe from attacks, Germany on the contrary is very vul- nerable. In attacking Germany simply to annihi- late a rival England would only follow her old tracks. She destroyed successfully the Dutch fleet in accord with Louis XIV, subsequently the French fleet and, finally even the Danish fleet in the midst of peace and without any provocation, simply be- cause it represented a respectable naval force. There is no reasonable ground for a conflict be- tween Germany and England. The Englisman's hate of Germany springs solely from jealousy caused by the progress of Germany's marine, commerce, and industry. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 18 Novembre 1905. Monsieur le Baron ! Le "Reichsanzeiger" a public hier I'extrait suivant du budget pour I'annee prochaine contenant les depenses pour la marine de guerre. Le gouvernement propose d'augmenter le mate- riel de la flotte de 6 grands croiseurs et de 10 petits ; I'augmentation du nombre des torpilleurs, I'augmen- tation du tonnage des vaisseaux de ligne et des grands croiseurs dont la necessite a ete prouvee par I'experience de la guerre entre la Russie et le Japon, Taugmentation du nombre des ofificiers et des mate- lots evaluee a environ 6000 hommes. Le plan doit etre realise en 9 ans. II etait deja connu en sub' stance avant la publication des details et il est bien accueilli par I'opinion publique. La chose est d'autant plus a remarquer que la situation des finan- ces de I'Empire est loin d'etre satisfaisante. La marine de guerre etait autrefois tres impopu- laire en Allemagne. Le revirement en sa faveur a commence apres la guerre du Transvaal et de Cuba que I'opinion publique allemande a considerees com- me des actcs de piraterie, elle a voulu mettre I'Em- pire a I'abri d'agressions semblables. La nouvelle organisation des forces navales britanniques incon- testablement dirigee contre I'Allemagne, a fait en- core mieux sentir la necessite de posseder une flotte non dans le but d'attaquer I'Angleterre, ce a quoi personne ne songe et ce qui est d'ailleurs irrealisable. mais uniquement pour se defendre contre elle. L'Allemagne n'est exposee a etre attaquee sur le Sir:- Berlin, November 18, 1905. The Official Gazette published yesterday the fol- lowring abstract from the budget for next year con- taining the expenditure for the navy. The Government proposes an increase in the ef- fective strength of the fleet by 6 large and 10 small cruisers, an increase in the number of torpedo- boats, and in the tonnage of the battle ships and the big cruisers, the necessity for which was shown by the experiences of the Russo-Japanese war; and an increase in the number of officers afid men estimated at about 6,000. The plan is to be executed in 9 years. The general outlines of the plan were known before the publication of the details and meet with a favorable reception by public opinion. The mat- ter is the more remarkable because the financial situation of the Empire is far from satisfactory. The navy was formerly very unpopular in Ger- many. The reversal in its favor began after the Boer war and the war in Cuba, which German pub- lic opinion considered as acts of piracy ; it was then desired to shield the Empire from similar aggres- sions. The new organization of the British naval forces, which is indisputably directed against Ger- many, has caused the need of a fleet to be felt more keenly. This fleet is, however, not to be created in order to attack England, of which nobody thinks and which, moreover, would be impossible, but ex- clusively for defense against that country. On the Continent, Germany is exposed to attack continent que par la France ou la Russie. Dans I'eventualite d'un conflit avec elles, le sort de la guerre se decidera par les armees de terre et une bataille navale de quelque cote que reste la victoire, n'aura aucune influence sur les conditions de la paix. C'est done I'Angleterre seule qu'elle a a redouter et qui I'oblige a entretenir une marine hors de propor- tion avec les necessites de la protection de ses in- terets commerciaux dans les pays exotiques. Malheureusement non seulement I'attitude de la presse anglaise, mais aussi celle des ministres anglais est de nature a nourrir ces defiances. Personne ne doute ici, malgre les dementis officieux, que la po- litique agressive de M. Delcasse n'ait ete encouragee par I'Angleterre. On a beaucoup remarque dans les discours de Lord Lansdowne au club constitutionnel et de M. Balfour au banquet du Lord maire, pacifi- ques dans leur ensemble, les allusions malveillantes qui, sans nommer I'Allemagne, ne pouvaient s'adres- ser qu' a elle. Lord Lansdowne a dit que I'Angle- terre avait ete de temps en temps entravee par le fait que dans plusieurs parties du monde elle s'etait trouvee en presence de rivalites qui ne pouvaient etre avantageuses a personne, sauf peut-etre a quel- que potentat astucieux qui savait comment en tirer profit. M. Balfour a dit qu'il pensait qu'il n'y aurait pas de guerre a I'avenir, a moins qu'il ne surgisse des nations ou des chefs d'Etat qui sentent qu'ils ne peu- vent realiser leurs plans d'agrandissement national qu'en foulant aux pieds les droits de leurs voisins. Le Premier Ministre anglais a toutefois ajoute qu'il ne voyait pas de perspective d'une pareille calamite pour I'Europe. Je me demande oii et quand I'Allemagne a contre- carre la politique anglaise. Sont-ce des reminis- cences du telegramme adresse par I'Empereur au president Kruger apres la capture de Jameson et de ses compagnons? C'est deja bien vieux. De plus on ne devrait pas oublier a Londres qu'il s'agissait d'une bande de flibustiers sans doute organisee sous main par le gouvernement anglais, mais que I'Angle- terre officielle a desavouee. Agreez etc. [s.l Greindl. 17 - only from France and Russia. In the case of a con- flict with these Powers the fate of war will be de- cided by the armies on land, and a naval fight — no matter to whom victory may fall — will have no in- fluence on the terms of peace. It is, therefore, England alone whom Germany has to fear and who compels her to maintain a navy which is out of proportion to the requirements for the protection of her commercial interests in countries across the sea. Unfortunately, the attitude not only of the En- glish press but of the British Ministers as well is apt to feed this mistrust. Nobody doubts here that in spite of the semi-official denials the aggressive policy of M. Delcasse has been encouraged by Eng- land. Much attention has been paid to the remarks in the speeches of Lord Lansdowne at the Consti- tutional Club and of Mr. Balfour at the Lord Mayor's banquet, remarks which, though on the whole pacific, still contained malevolent allusions that, without mentioning Germany, could refer only to her. Lord Lansdowne said that England had from time to time been hampered by finding herself in various parts of the world face to face with rivalries which could not be of value to any- body except perhaps some astute potentate who knew how to derive profit from them. Mr. Balfour said he did not beheve there would be a war in the future unless it were caused by na- tions or heads of state who feel that they cannot realize their plans of national aggrandizement ex- cept by trampling on the rights of their neighbors. The British Prime Minister added, however, that he did not foresee such a calamity for Europe. I ask myself when and where Germany has thwarted British policy. Are these reminiscences of the telegram addressed by the Emperor to Presi- dent Kriiger after the capture of Jameson and his associates? That is a very old story. Nor should it be forgotten in London that the matter concerned a band of filibusters that, while doubtless secretly organized by the British Government, was officially disavowed by England. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 14. No. 14. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique k Berlin, k M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greidl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 31 Decembre 1905. Monsieur le Baron ! M. le Baron de Richthofen m'a parle hier de la satisfaction que lui a causee le changement de Mi- nistere en Angleterre. Le Cabinet unioniste ne lais- sera pas de regret a Berlin. Le secretaire d'Etat ne suppose pas qu'il y ait eu a Londres un plan pre- conQu de rupture avec I'Allemagne. II attribue plu- tot I'attitude du ministere Balfour a une trop grande docilite a obeir aux indications d'une certaine presse qu'on etait incapable de diriger, mais cette faiblesse pouvait mener aux plus graves dangers. On remar- que deja une detente depuis que le nouveau cabinet est aux affaires. M. Campbell Bannerman a une reputation de droiture et de loyaute qui inspire con- fiance. Berlin, December 31, 1905. Sir: — Baron von Richthofen spoke to me yesterday of the satisfaction which the Cabinet change in Eng- land had caused him. The Unionist Cabinet is not mourned in Berlin. The Secretary of State does not suppose that there has been a preconcerted plan at London to bring about a rupture with Germany. Attributing the attitude of the Balfour Ministry more to an excessive obedience to the demands of a certain press which it could not guide, he thinks that such weakness might have led to the gravest dangers. Since the new Cabinet had been at the helm a relaxation was already perceptible. Mr. Campbell Bannermann enjoyed a reputation for in- tegrity and loyalty which inspired confidence. Le Baron de Richthofen dit que les Frangais ont manifeste dans ces derniers temps una nervosite que rien ne justifie. On s'est imagine a Paris que I'Alle- magne n'attendait qu'une occasion de tomber sur la France. L'Empire accepterait une guerre si on I'y oblige; mais il n'a jamais eu la moindre velleite de la provoquer. Qu'y gagnerait-il ? Toute la politique de I'Allemagne temoigne de ses intentions pacifiques. Elle n'a pas fait la moindre tentative pour profiter des desordres de la Russie. Tout prouve au con- traire qu'elle ne desire que le maintien du statu quo. M. Bihourd a parle d'un parti de la guerre. II y a peut-etre quelques jeunes officiers qui desirent de I'avancement ; mais un parti de la guerre n'existe pas. L'Allemagne a I'unanimite veut la paix. J'ai demande au secretaire d'etat si je pouvais con- siderer comme authentique une conversation de I'Empereur avec un personnage franqais rapportee, il y a trois jours, par le journal "Le Temps." Sa Majeste aurait dit en resume qu'on a eu tort de croire qu'il existe autour d'Elle un parti de la guerre. Quand meme il existerait, cela n'aurait aucune im- portance; car c'est a Elle qu'appartient la decision. L'Empereur ne veut pas la guerre, parce qu'il la con- sidere comme contraire a son devoir envers Dieu et envers son peuple. Le Baron de Richthofen m'a repondu que la com- munication du journal "Le Temps" est exacte sinon quant a la forme, au moins quant au fond. II a ajoute que c'est, parait-il, au Marquis de Laguiche, attache militaire de France a Berlin, que I'Empereur I'a adressee. Ce sont du reste les idees bien connues de Sa Majeste. J'ai replique qu'il me semble qu'on peut caracte- riser la politique de I'Empereur en disant que la plus haute ambition de Sa Majeste est de conserver la paix pendant toute la duree de son regne. Le secretaire d'etat m'a repondu que c'est en effet I'idee dominante qui inspire la politique Imperiale. II ne peut pas prevoir ce qui se produira a la con- ference d'Algesiras, mais il a bon espoir qu'on ar- rivera a un resultat satisfaisant. Le secretaire d'etat ne m'a pas dit un mot du livre blanc allemand a la preparation duquel on a active- ment travaille depuis la publication du livre jaune franqais et qui doit etre acheve. Aurait-on renonce a le faire paraitre pour ne pas .lourrir une polemique de journaux dont la continuation ne pourrait etre que nuisible a une entente? Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. Baron von Richthofen said that the French were of late displaying a nervousness which nothing jus- tified. People in Paris had been imagining that Germany was only waiting for an occasion in order to fall upon France. Germany would accept a war when forced to do so, but she never had enter- tained the slightest desire to provoke it. What could she gain by it? The entire policy of Ger- many was proof of her pacific intentions. She had not made the slightest attempt to profit by Rus- sia's troubles. Everything served, on the contrary, to show that all she desired was the maintenance of the status quo. M. Bihourd had spoken of a war party. There might perhaps be a few young offi- cers desirous of advancement ; but there was no such a thing as a war party. Germany unanimously wished for peace. I asked the Secretary of State whether I could consider as authentic the report of the Temps of three days ago according to which a conversation took place between the Emperor and a Frenchman. His Majesty was reported to have said in so many words that it was wrong to believe that a war party existed around him. Even if it existed, it would have no importance, as the decision rested with him and he did not want war, which he considered as contrary to his duties towards God and his people. Baron von Richthofen answered that the report of the Temps was correct, if not in its form at least in its substance. He added that it appeared that it was Marquis de Laguiche, the Military Attache of France in Berlin, to whom the Emperor had spoken. Besides, these were the well known ideas of His Majesty. I answered that it seemed to me that the policy of the Emperor might be characterized by saying that it was the highest ambition of His Majesty to preserve peace during his entire reign. The Secretary of State replied that that was in- deed the dominating idea which inspired the Im- perial policy. He could not foresee what would happen at the Algeciras Conference, but he was hopeful that a satisfactory result would be reached. The Secretary of State did not say a word con- cerning the White Book, which has been industri- ously prepared since the publication of the French Yellow Book and which must be finished by now. It may be that it has been decided not to publish the book in order not to give food for a newspaper polemic, the continuation of which would only be injurious to an understanding. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. M. E. van Grootven, Charge d' Affaires a Londres, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. E. van Grootven, Charge d'affaires at London, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Londres, le 14 Janvier 1906. Monsieur le Baron ! Malgre les preoccupations causees par les elections on suit avec le plus grand interet en Angleterre tout ce qui a trait a la prochaine conference d'Algesiras, et Ton cherche a s'y rendre compte des dispositions avec lesquelles les principales interessees, la France et I'Allemagne, s'y rendront. London, January 14, 1906. Sir: — In spite of the preoccupation caused by the elec- tions, people in England are following with the greatest interest everything that has reference to the impending conference of Algeciras and are try- ing to imagine with what intentions the principal parties, France and Germany, are going there. Quant a I'Angleterre elle reste entierement favo- rable a la France. Ainsi que Sir E. Grey I'a declare dans un discours, "I'Angleterre fera son possible pour ameliorer ses relations avec TAllemagne, mais ce rapprochement reste toujours subordonne a une bonne entente de rAllemagne avec la France." Dans ces derniers temps le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a repete a plusieurs reprises aux diffe- rents ambassadeurs accredites a Londres que la Grande-Bretagne etait engagee vis-a-vis de la France en ce qui concerne le Maroc, et qu'elle remplirait ses engagements jusqu' au bout meme en cas d'une guerre franco-allemande, et quoi qu'il put lui en couter. La presse et I'opinion publique font preuve des memes sentiments. L'on y rappelle les differents froissements qui se sont produits entre ce pays et I'Allemagne, notamment lors de la guerre sud-afri- caine, et Ton ajoute que si la Conference d'Algesiras, qui est reunie a la demande de I'Allemagne, venait a echouer par la faute de cette derniere, non seulement tout espoir de rapprochement anglo-allemand serait perdu, mais il en resulterait une reelle hostilite entre les deux pays. Veuillez agreer etc. fs.! van Grootven. As regards England she is whole-heartedly favor- ing France ; as Sir E. Grey said in a speech : "Eng- land will do all in her power to improve her rela- tions with Germany, but this rapprochement is always dependent on good terms between Germany and France." Of late the Minister of Foreign Affairs has re- peated at various occasions to the different Am- bassadors accredited in London that Great Britain had engaged herself towards France in the Moroc- can question and that she would meet her obliga- tions fully even in case of a Franco-German war and at all costs. The press and public opinion give proof of the same sentiments. The various frictions between England and Germany are being recalled, particu- larly since the South African war, and it is added that if the Conference of Algeciras, called at the in- stance of Germany, should fail through the latter's fault, not only would all hope be lost of an Anglo- German rapprochement, but a real hostility would arise between the two countries. Accept, etc. [Signed] Van Grootven. No. 16. No. 16. M. A. Leghait, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. M. A. Leghait, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, le 6 Mars 1906. Monsieur le Baron ! Le Roi Edouard VII est arrive Samedi soir a Paris et II est descendu a I'Ambassade d'Angleterre. Quoique Sa Majeste ait voulu conserver I'inco- gnito,les circonstances donnent a Sa presence a Paris et aux entrevues qu'Elle a cues ici une importance toute speciale. Le Roi a echange des visites avec le President de la Republique et il I'a convie a diner Dimanche a I'Ambassade ainsi que Mr. Rouvier et le Baron de Courcel qui vient de revenir de Berlin. De plus, et c'est la le point interessant, il a regu hier a dejeuner Mr. Loubet et Mr. Delcasse. Cette marque de courtoisie envers Mr. Delcasse, en ce moment, est tres commentee. Elle est gene- ralement consideree comme une demonstration tres significative qui deconcerte par I'etendue et la gravite des consequences qu'elle peut avoir. II est naturel que le Roi d'Angleterre ait desire donner un temoignage special de sympathie au Mi- nistre qui s'etait montre si empresse a entrer dans les vues de I'Angleterre, mais en appelant a lui celui dont I'Allemagne a exige la retraite il a donne une consecration nouvelle a I'accord du 8 avril 1904 et sanctionne une politique contre laquelle I'Allemagne proteste et que la France elle-meme a repudiee. Si quelques doutes pouvaient subsister encore sur les intentions de la Grande-Bretagne ils sont dis- sipes ; mais on se demande quelle est la portee reelle de cette demonstration et Ton hesite a en comprendre I'utilite et meme la prudence dans les circonstances actuelles ou les difficultes s'accumulent pour I'Alle- magne et oil son amour propre semble deja suffisam- Paris, March 6, 1906. Sir:— King Edward VII arrived in Paris on Saturday evening and went to stay at the British Embassy. Although His Majesty wanted to preserve his in- cognito, circumstances lend a special importance to his presence in Paris and to the interviews which he has had here. The King exchanged visits with the President of the RepubHc and invited him to dinner on Sunday at the Embassy together with M. Rouvier and Baron de Courcel, who has just come back from Berlin. Besides that, and this is the interesting point, he received M. Loubet and M. Delcasse yesterday at luncheon. This mark of courtesy towards M. Delcasse at this moment is very much discussed. It is gener- ally considered as a very significant demonstration which is disconcerting on account of the extent and the gravity of the consequences which it may have. It is natural that the King of England should have desired to give a special proof of sympathy to the Minister who has shown himself so eager to adopt English views, but by calling into his pres- ence the man whose retirement was exacted by Ger- many he has imparted fresh importance to the agree- ment of April 8, 1904, and has sanctioned a policy against which Germany protests and which France herself has repudiated. If any doubts could still exist as to the intentions of Great Britain they have been dispelled ; but the real import of this demonstration is a subject for speculation and there is difficulty in understanding its expediency and even its prudence under the present circumstances, when difficulties are accu- mulating for Germany and when her self-respect 20 ment atteint par la marche des negociations d'Al- gesiras. On n'est pas sans craindre que la coincidence de ces evenements ne produise une certaine irritation capable d'influencer d'une fagon facheuse les deci- sions du Cabinet de Berlin et ne I'empeche d'accepter avec tout le calme desirable I'echec bien prevu de la Conference. On envisage presquel'acte pose par le Roi Edouard comme une riposte de la descente de I'Empereur Guillaume a Tanger et on attache d'autant plus d'importance a cet acte qu'on ne congoit pas qu'un Souverain dont on connait I'esprit pondere ait pu s'y resQudre sans en mesurer toutes les consequences et en assumer toutes les responsabilites. Le Roi a voulu parait-il montrer que la politique qui a provoque I'energique intervention de I'AUe- magne est restee malgre cela la meme parce que I'Angleterre a maintenu fermes et immuables les principes qui lui ont dicte I'accord du 8 avril 1904. Dans les cercles diplomatiques cette manifestation est consideree comme inutile et fort dangereuse en ce moment. Dans le monde frangais elle est medio- crement appreciee vu qu'on se sent par la entraine malgre soi dans la politique anglaise dont on redoute les effets et que Ton a generalement desapprouvee en conspuant Mr. Delcasse. On craint en somme d'avoir vu se manifester ici un symptome du desir que pourrait avoir I'Angleterre d'envenimer la situation au point de rendre la guerre inevitable. Dans les spheres officielles pourtant et notamment au Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres on affecte de prendre la chose avec beaucoup de calme. On con- sidere la demonstration du Roi envers Mr. Delcasse comme une consequence toute naturelle des rapports .amicaux qu'ils ont eus pendant tant d'annees et on ne veut y voir que le desir du Souverain de la Grande- Bretagne de donner dans un moment difficile un nouvel appui a la cause de la France. II est a constater que la presse frangaise est jus- qu'ici muette sur I'entrevue du Roi avec Mr. Del- casse. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] A. Leghait. seems already sufficiently hurt by the course which the negotiations at Algeciras are taking. It is feared that the coincidence of these events may produce a sense of irritation apt to influence in a regrettable manner the decisions of the Cabinet at Berlin and that it may prevent the latter from accepting with desirable calmness the defeat which is expected as a result of the conference. This act of King Edward is regarded almost as a return thrust for the landing of Emperor William at Tangiers, and all the more importance is attached to this step because it cannot be imagined that a Sovereign, the poise of whose mind is known, could have decided in favor of it without weighing all its consequences and without assuming all responsi- bility for it. The King, so it seems, wanted to show that the policy which caused the energetic intervention of Germany has, nevertheless, remained the same be- cause England kept firm and immutable the prin- ciples which the agreement of April 8, 1904, has imposed on her. In diplomatic circles this manifestation is con- sidered as superfluous and at the present moment highly dangerous. In French circles it received only lukewarm appreciation because it is felt that France is thereby being dragged against her will into the British policy, the consequences of which are feared and which has been universally dis- avowed by the flouting of M. Delcasse. In short, it is feared that in this incident is made manifest a sign of the desire that England may have, to embitter the situation to such an extent as to render war inevitable. Nevertheless, official circles — particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — affect to take the mat- ter very calmly. The demonstration of the King towards M. Delcasse is represented as a very nat- ural consequence of the amicable relations which have existed between them for so many years, and it is said to amount to no more than a desire of the Sovereign of Great Britain to give fresh support to the cause of France in a difficult moment. It is deserving of mention that the French press so far has been silent on the interview of the King with M. Delcasse. Accept, etc. [Signed] A. Leghait. No. 17. No. 17. X.e Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, k M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 5 Avril 1906. Monsieur le Baron! N'ayant pas eu dans ces derniers temps I'occasion de vous ecrire autrement que par la poste, je n'ai pas pu repondre avant aujourd'hui a la depeche du 12 Mars par laquelle vous avez bien voulu me communi- quer le tres interessant rapport de mon coHegue a Paris sur I'impression causee par les attentions par- ticulieres dont le Roi d'Angleterre a honore M. Del- casse a son passage en France. Ainsi que j'ai eu I'honneur de vous I'ecrire par mon rapport du 24 Decembre dernier I'avenement du Sir:- Berlin, April 5, 1906. Having had no occasion of late to write to you otherwise than by mail, I have not been able to reply before today to the despatch of March 12 by which you were good enough to send me the very interesting report of my colleague at Paris on the impression caused by the remarkable distinction with which the King of England honored M. Del- ■ casse when passing through France. As I had the honor to write to you in my report of December 24, the accession to power of the Lib- ministere liberal en Angleterre avait cause une vive satisfaction a Berlin. On croyait ici dans les spheres officielles que le nouveau cabinet suivrait une politi- que tres amicale pour la France, chercherait a se rap- procher de la Russie; mais sans que ces deux ten- dances impliquent de I'hostilite contre I'Allemagne. II faut bien reconnaitre que cette esperance ne s'est pas realisee. Le mouvement en faveur d'un rapprochement avec I'Allemagne provoque par Lord Avebury n'a pas eu de suite. Lorsque de tres notables commergants al- lemands se sont rendus a Londres pour repondre a cette initiative amicale, ils y ont passe presque ina- percus. Les journaux ont parle le moins possible d'eux. La presse anglaise a fait tout ce qu'elle a pu pour empecher la conference d'Algesiras d'aboutir. Elle s'est montree plus intransigeante que les jour- naux francais et n'a jamais cesse de propager de pre- tendus plans d'agression allemande qui n'ont jamais existe. On ne voit pas qu'a Algesiras I'ambassadeur d' An- gleterre ait fait le moindre effort pour trouver une solution conciliant les vues de I'Allemagne et de la France. On s'attendait certainement a ce qu'elle soutint la politique francaise ; mais les engagements contractes ne I'empechaient nullement de jouer un role moderateur. Tout cela n'est guere d'accord avec le discours programme prononce le 21 Decembre dernier a Al- bert Hall par M. Campbell Bannerman et dont je vous ai parle par mon rapport precite. On est oblige d'en conclure que la politique ex- terieure de I'Angleterre est dirigee par le Roi lui- meme et qu'elle n'a pas change depuis que Sa Majeste a pris de nouveaux conseillers. II n'y a plus de doute que c'est le Roi d' Angleterre qui en dehors du gouvernement avait pousse M. Del- casse a une politique belliqueuse et lui avait fait la promesse d'ailleurs irrealisable de debarquer 100 000 soldats anglais en Holstein. L'invitation adressee par le Roi a M. Delcasse lors de son passage a Paris ne pent etre interpretee que comme une provocation. SI QUELQUE DOUTE POUVANT REGNER ENCORE LA SINGULIERE DEMARCHE FAI- TE PAR LE COLONEL BARNARDISTON AU- PRES DE M. LE GENERAL DUCARNE L'AU- RAIT DISSIPE. II y a bien en Angleterre une politique de cour qui se poursuit a cote et en dehors de celle du ministere responsable. Heureusement toutes ces intrigues ont ete im- puissantes a troubler la paix. L'Allemagne est iso- lee. L'attitude de I'ltalie est equivoque. L'Au- triche-Hongrie paralysee par ses embarras interieurs est incapable de venir en aide a son alliee. La legon qui se degage des derniers evenements est que I'Al- lemagne seule est capable de tenir ses adversaires en respect. C'est peut-etre le benefice le plus clair qu'elle a retire de I'aflFaire marocaine. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. eral Ministry in England caused lively satisfaction in Berlin. It was believed here in official circles that the new Cabinet would pursue a policy friendly to France and would seek to draw closer to Rus- sia, but it was not expected that these two ten- dencies would imply any hostility against Germany. That this hope has not been realized must be fully recognized. The movement in favor of a rapprochement with Germany started by Lord Avebury has led to no results. When very prominent German merchants went to London in response to this friendly initia- tive they were hardly noticed. The newspapers said as little as possible about them. The English press has done all in its power to prevent the Conference of Algeciras from succeeding. It showed itself more unyielding than the French journals and never ceased to spread reports of alleged German plans of aggression which have never existed. There is no indication that the British Ambassa- dor made the slightest effort at Algeciras in order to find a solution conciliating the views of Germany and France. It was, of course, expected that Eng- land would support the French policy ; but the obli- gations which she had contracted need not have prevented her from exercising a moderating in- fluence. All this is hardly in keeping with the program- matic speech delivered by Mr. Campbell Banner- rnann on December 21 at Albert Hall, which I men- tioned to you in the report referred to above. The conclusion is inevitable that the foreign pol- icy of England is directed by the King himself and that it has not changed since His Majesty took new counsellors. It can no longer be doubted that it was the King of England who, without sanction of the govern- ment, drove M. Delcasse into a bellicose policy and who gave him the promise, which he could not have kept, to land 100,000 British soldiers in Holstein. The invitation extended by the King to M. Del- casse at the time of his passage through Paris can only be interpreted as a provocation. IF ANY DOUBT COULD STILL HAVE EX- ISTED THE SINGULAR STEP TAKEN BY COLONEL BARNARDISTON WITH GEN- ERAL DUCARNE WOULD HAVE DIS- PELLED IT. There really is in England a court policy beside and independent of that of the responsible Ministry. Fortunately, all these intrigues have been incapa- ble of disturbing peace. Germany is isolated. The attitude of Italy is equivocal. Austria-Hungary, paralyzed by her internal troubles, is unable to come to the aid of her ally. The lesson derived from recent events is that Germany alone is capable of holding her adversaries in check. That is per- haps the clearest benefit which she has drawn from the Moroccan aflfair. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 18. Le Comte de Laldng, Ministre de Belgique ^ Lon- dres, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. No. 18. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Londres, le 23 Juin 1906. Monsieur le Baron ! Un noyau de personnalites, appartenant en ge- London, Tune 23, 1906. Sir:— A small circle of men, chiefly belonging to the 22 neral au parti liberal et a la tete duquel se trouve Lord Avebury (jadis Sir John Lubbock) essaie de militer depuis longtemps contre le sentiment anti- allemand si dominant encore dans le public anglais. II y a deux ans ce milieu a favorise I'expedition en AUemagne du comite d'etudes municipales, orga- nisee par Lord Lyveden, qui vous vous en souvien- drez, a egalement visite notre pays. Cette annee les memes personnages, d'accord avec I'Ambassade d'AIlemagne, ont arrange la reception en Angleterre d'une grande deputation de bourg- mestres allemands. En ce moment ce sont les jour- nalistes allemands, de passage a Londres, que Ton fete. Banquets, discours de Lord Avebury et du Comte Metternich, et visite obligatoire des monu- ments de la ville, rien ne leur est epargne. L'effet reel produit est a peu pres nul. Le siege de I'opinion est fait : la presse anglaise a tellement abuse des attaques contre I'Empereur, son gouverne- ment et son peuple, que le public reste mefiant. L' AUemagne est la grande rivale, commerciale, mili- taire et peut-etre, dans I'avenir, navale; a ce titre tout bon citoyen se croit oblige de la detester, parce qu'il se dit que pour le moment c'est la seule nation dent il ait a craindre quelque chose, depuis I'aff aiblis- sement de la Russie et I'entente avec la France. Veuillez etc. [s.] Comte de Lalaing. Liberal party and at the head of whom stands Lord Avebury (formerly Sir John Lubbock) have been trying for a long time to militate against the anti- German sentiment still so prevalent among the English public. Two years ago this group pro- moted the expedition to Germany of the committee for municipal investigation organized by Lord I^yve- den which, as you will remember, also visited our country. This year the same people, in accord with the German Embassy, arranged the reception of a large deputation of German Mayors in England. At pre- sent the German journalists passing through Lon- don are being, feted. Banquets, speeches by Lord Avebury and Count Metternich, and the usual visits to the monuments of the city — they are spared noth- ing. The real effect produced is practically nil. Pub- lic opinion is being worked upon : the English press has so consistently indulged in attacks against the Emperor, his Government, and his people, that the public remains suspicious. Germany is the great commercial, military, and in future perhaps, naval rival; for this reason every good citizen considers himself under the obligation to detest her because he tells himself that for the present she is the only nation from which he has anything to fear, since the weakening of Russia and the entente wdth France. Accept, etc. [Signed] Count de Lalaing. No. 19. No. 19. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Beriin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 16 Juillet 1906. Monsieur le Baron ! Apres son retablissement et avant de partir pour Norderney, le chancelier a prie successivement tous les ambassadeurs accredites a Berlin de passer chez lui. Dans son entretien avec I'ambassadeur d'Angle- terre tous deux ont emis I'opinion qu'une entrevue des Souverains serait desirable pour ameliorer les relations ; mais le Prince de Biilow a dit qu'apres ce qui s'etait passe il etait necessaire que le premier pas fut fait par le Roi Edouard VIL L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a fait observer que cette premiere de- marche avait deja ete effectuee. II a ete charge de demander quel serait I'itineraire de la croisiere que I'Empereur d'AIlemagne comptait faire dans la Medi- terranee et dont la date coincidait avec ceile du voya- ge que le Roi d'Angleterre a fait au printemps dans la meme region. Non seulement I'information de- mandee ne lui a pas ete fournie ; mais le gouverne- ment Imperial ne lui a jamais fait savoir que le projet de voyage dans la Mediterranee etait abandonne. Depuis les pourparlers confidentiels ont continue. II parait meme que des lettres ont ete echangees en- tre les Souverains. Je ne vous en ai pas parle jusqu'ici, parce que j'attendais pour avoir quelque resultat positif a vous communiquer. Je romps le silence aujourd'hui parce que des journaux ont annonce que les negociations avaient abouti et ont meme public le lieu et la date Sir: Berlin, July 16, 1906. After his recovery and before he went to Norder- ney, the Chancelleor asked all the Ambassadors accredited in Berlin to call on him. In his conver- sation with the British Ambassador both expressed the opinion that a meeting of the Sovereigns was desirable in order to improve the relations, but Prince von Biilow said that, after what had passed, it would be necessary for King Edward VII to take the first step. The British Ambassador pointed out that the first step had already been taken. He had been instructed to inquire what was to be the itinerary of the cruise which the Emperor was contemplating making in the Mediterranean, and the date of which coincided with that of the voyage which the King of England made in the Spring in the same region. Not only was the information asked for never given him, but the Imperial Gov- ernment had never inf-T^rmed him, either, that the project of the voyage to the Mediterranean had been abandoned. Since then the confidential pourparlers have con- tinued. It even seems that letters have been ex- changed between the Monarchs. I have not written to you until now about this because I waited to have some positive result to re- port. I break my silence to-day because newspa- pers announce that the negotiations have been con- cluded, and even publish the place and approximate approximative de I'entrevue. Ces nouvelles sont de pure invention. Je puis vous affirmer d'apres des in- formations puisees a de tres bonnes sources que la grande probabilite est que I'Empereur et le Roi d'Angleterre ne se rencontreront pas. Une autre raison que j'avais de ne pas me presser est que j'attache une tres minime importance aux demonstrations de ce genre. A combien d'entrevues n'a-t-on pas assiste dans ces dernieres annees dont on proclamait le brillant succes et qui n'ont produit au- cun resultat durable? La cause de la tension des re- lations entre I'Allemagne et I'Angleterre n'est pas a chercher dans les dispositions personnelles des Sou- verains. Celles-ci sont au contraire dictees par I'etat de I'opinion publique dans les deux pays, comme le constate si clairement le rapport de mon collegue a Londres sur le resultat nul de la visite des journa- listes allemands en Angleterre, que vous avez bien voulu me communiquer par votre depeche du 10 Juillet. C'est aussi le sentiment populaire qui dirige la politique du gouvernement britannique restee aus- si hostile a I'Allemagne sous le ministere liberal que sous I'administration unioniste. Que peuvent crain- dre les Anglais de la Russie dans I'etat de decompo- sition ou elle est et pourtant les pourparlers en vue d'un rapprochement ont continue aussi longtemps qu'on a trouve a Saint-Petersbourg un interlocuteur. On y a mis a Londres un tel exces de zele que le gou- vernement russe a ete oblige de decliner piteusement la visite annoncee de la flotte anglaise a Cronstadt. On volt bien ce que la Russie peut gagner a I'ami- tie de I'Angleterre, mais beaucoup moins clairement a quoi I'amitie russe servirait a I'Angleterre. Que peut-on vouloir a Londres sinon susciter des ennemis a I'Allemagne? Ce qui a transpire des pourparlers recents est de nature a confirmer ce soupqon. D'apres le "Morning- post," la Russie et I'Angleterre auraient le projet de s'entendre pour donner leur consentement a la cons- truction du chemin de fer de la Mesopotamie, a la condition que la Russie fut autorisee a y relier son chemin de fer du Caucase et que I'Angleterre eiit le controle de la nouvelle voie depuis Bagdad jusqu'au Golfe Persique. Un pareil accord s'il venait a etre conclu serait le comble de I'impertinence. Le Sultan est un souverain independant ; il a donne la conces- sion du chemin de fer de la Mesopotamie a une ban- que allemande. Nulle puissance etrangere n'a le droit ni meme le moindre pretexte de s'immiscer dans cette affaire exclusivement interieure de la Turquie. Pourtant le plan existe. Lord Lansdowne a declare recemment a la chambre haute qu'en 1903 il a essaye sans succes d'internationaliser le chemin de fer de Bagdad et depuis I'origine I'Angleterre a cherche a entraver cette entreprise. Elle a voulu mettre la main sur Koweit, seul port naturel ou puisse aboutir le chemin de fer, a moins qu'on ne cree a grands frais un port artificiel et pro- bablement mauvais dans les marecages du Chatt el Arab. Elle a au moins favorise I'insurrection arabe en livrant des armes et des munitions aux revokes. On a presque avoue a Londres que seule de toutes les grandes puissances I'Angleterre a fait opposition a I'augmentation des droits de douane turcs, de peur que la Turquie ne soit en mesure de donner un gage pour la garantie du revenu kilometrique du chemin de fer. Lorsqu'il y a sept ans la Deutsche Bank a obtenu la concession de la ligne, elle a offert une participa- tion a la France et a I'Angleterre non pas qu'elle eiit besoin de capitaux etrangers pour cette entreprise qu'elle est parfaitement en etat de faire toute seule ; mais pour eviter les jalousies Internationales. La date of the meeting. All this news is pure invention. SI am in a position to affirm on information drawn ifrom very good sources that the great probability is 'that the Emperor and the King of England will not meet. Another reason why I have not been in a hurry is that I attach only very little importance to demon- strations of this kind. How many meetings have we not seen in these last years, the brilliant success of which was proclaimed and which produced no lasting result? The cause of the tension in the rela- tions between Germany and England must not be sought in the personal feelings of the Sovereigns. These are, on the contrary, determined by the state of public opinion in the two countries, as is so clearly shown in the report of my colleague in Lon- don on the negative result of the visit of German journalists in England, which you were good enough to send me in your despatch of July 10. Likewise it is popular sentiment that guides the policy of the .British Government which has remained as hostile towards Germany under the Liberal Cabinet as it was under the Unionist administration. What have the English to fear from Russia in her present state of decomposition? And yet the pourparlers with a view to a rapprochement continued as long as a listener could be found at St. Petersburg. London displayed such excessive zeal that the Russian Gov- ernment was constrained to decline woefully the announced visit of the British fleet to Cronstadt. It can be readily seen what Russia can gain by the friendship of England, but it is much less clear what good the Russian friendship could do England. What else can they aim at in London if not at mak- * ing enemies for Germany? What has transpired of the recent pourparlers is such as to confirm this suspicion. According to the Morning Post, England and Russia propose an un- derstanding in order to give their consent to the construction of the Mesopotamian railway, on the condition that Russia be authorized to link her Cau- casian railway to it and that England gain control of the new line from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf. Such an agreement, if it really should be concluded, would be the acme of impudence. The Sultan is an independent Sovereign ; he gave the concession for the railway in Mesopotamia to a German bank. No foreign Power has the right nor even the feeblest pretext to interfere in this entirely internal affair of Turkey. Yet the plan exists. Lord Lansdowne recently declared in the House of Lords that in 1903 he tried without success to internationalize the Bag- dad railway, and ever since its beginning England has sought to thwart that enterprise. She endeavored to put her hand on Koweit, the only natural terminal port for the line unless an artificial and probably poor harbor be created at great expense in the swamps of the Shatt-el-Arab. She at least favored the insurrection of the Arabs by supplying arms and munitions to the insurgents. It has been more or less admitted in London that England alone of all the Great Powers raised op- position to the increase of the Turkish import duties for fear that Turkey might then be in a position to give a security for the guaranteed revenue of the railroad. When the Deutsche Bank obtained the concession for the line seven years ago, it offered France and England a share in it ; not that it was in any need of foreign capital for this undertaking, which it was quite capable of carrying out alone, but simply in order to avoid international jealousy. France ac- France a accepte. L'Angleterre a refuse. On serait vraisemblablement dispose a lui accorder encore la part qu'elle a dedaignee autrefois et de lui donner aussi un moyen legitime d'exercer son influence; mais la pretention d'avoir la haute main sur le chemin de fer, sans participation financiere serait sans doute repoussee comme absolument inadmis- sible. En depit du bon accueil qui a ete reserve en An- gleterre aux journalistes allemands, la polemique sur la question du chemin de fer de Mesopotamie a re- commence dans la presse allemande et dans certains journaux non sans une certaine pointe d'aigreur. II est fort a redouter qu'avec ou sans les reconci- liations periodiques sur lesquelles nous sommes biases, la jalousie et la defiance ne continuent a etre I'etat normal des relations entre I'Allemagne et I'An- gleterre. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. cepted; England refused. Probably there would be a disposition even now to accord to her the share which she once refused and also to allow her a legi- timate means of exercising her influence; but the pretension to have a hold over the railway without any financial participation would doubtless be brushed aside as entirely unacceptable. In spite of the good reception extended to the German journalists in England, discussion of the question of the Mesopotamian railway has begun again in the German press, and in some papers not without a certain bitterness. It is very much to be feared that vdth or without the periodical reconciliations which have ceased to interest us, jealousy and mistrust will continue to be the normal state in the relations between Germany and England. Accept, etc. , • - [Signed] . Greindl. No. 20. No. 20. Le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre de Belgique a Lon- dres, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Londres, le 28 Juillet 1906. Monsieur le Baron ! Apres les reductions dans I'armee proposees a la Chambre voici le tour de la marine, dans laquelle aussi on cherche a efifectuer des economies. Modifi- ant les plans arretes par le Gouvernement de M. Bal- four, le Cabinet actuel est d'avis de construire trois cuirasses du type Dreadnought au lieu de quatre, deux contretorpilleurs au lieu de cinq, et huit sous- marins au lieu de douze, soit d'encourir une depense de £6 800 000 au lieu de £9 300 000, et d'arriver a al- leger le budget des annees prochaines de £2 500 000. On annoncerait cette decision a La Haye, pour prou- ver que I'Angleterre est favorable au desarmement naval et a la limitation des depenses ; elle continue- rait dans la voie des economies si son exemple trou- vait de I'echo et des imitateurs a la Conference de la Paix en 1907. Dans le cas contraire, on construirait plus de vaisseaux. Mais pour faire adopter ce plan, le Ministre de la Marine s'est trouve oblige de declarer que si son pro- gramme etait approuve par la Chambre, les forces na- vales de la Grande-Bretagne seraient encore sup6- rieures a celles des deux autres plus grandes marines du monde, et que I'Angleterre resterait sans rivale sur mer. Sa genereuse initiative dans la voie des reformes est singulierement diminuee par le fait qu'elle ne court aucun risque et qu'elle compte bien rester, apres comme avant, maitresse de rOc6an. Que les Etats-Unis ou I'Allemagne surtout re- fusent a La Haye d'adopter les vues preconisees par les delegues anglais, on ne manquera pas de jeter sur ces nations la responsabilite de I'echec inflige aux idees humanitaires de I'Angleterre, et du nouvel apotre de la paix. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Sir:- London, July 28, 1906. Veuillez etc. [s.] Comte de Lalaing. After the debate on the army reduction the House has now in turn taken up the naval budget in which economies are likewise proposed. Modifying the plans decided upon by the Government of Mr. Bal- four, the present Cabinet intends to build three cruisers of the dreadnought type instead of four, two torpedo destroyers instead of five, and eight submarines instead of twelve, incurring an expen- diture of £6,800,000 instead of £9,300,000 and re- lieving the budget of the next years by £2,500,000. This decision would then be announced at the Hague as proof of the fact that England is in favor of naval disarmament and restriction of expenditure, and England would continue on the road of econ- omy if her example should meet with approval and imitation at the Peace Conference in 1907. In the reverse case more ships would be built. But to secure acceptance of this plan the Secre- tary of the Navy had to declare that if his pro- gramme were passed by the House the naval forces of Great Britain would still be superior to those of the other two greatest navies of the world and that England would remain without rival on the sea. Her generous initiative in the way of reforms loses considerably in value by the fact that she runs no risks and that she is quite confident that she will remain, as heretofore, the mistress of the seas. Should the United States, or above all Germany, refuse at the Hague to accept the views proffered by the British delegates, one may be sure that the responsibility for the blow dealt to the humanitarian ideas of England and of the new peace apostle, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann, would be thrown on those nations. Accept, etc. [Signed] Count de Lalaing. 25 No. 21. No. 21. M. A. Leghait, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Paris, le 4 Fevrier 1907. Monsieur le Baron! Le Roi et la Reine d'Angleterre sont arrives in- cognito a Paris samedi soir; ils sont descendus a I'ambassade et y sejourneront jusqu'au 9 Fevrier. Ce voyage inattendu n'a ete decide que dans ces derniers jours et il a cause une certaine surprise meme au gouvernement de la Republique. M. Pichon en avouant hier soir a ses intimes son etonnement con- fessait qu'il n'en soupgonnait pas le but. On n'at- tribue jusqu'ici aucun motif special a cette visite, mais il semble qu'elle doive avoir un caractere po- litique d'autant plus important qu'il est moins spe- cific. II est certes trop tot pour apprecier la portee de ce voyage et en prevoir les resultats. On ne pent faire que des conjectures basees sur la situation po- litique generale et sur celle qui existeactuellement en France. Depuis quelques annees le Gouvernement de la Republique a accueilli avec faveur et presque avec enthousiasme les avances de I'Angleterre qui, tres discretement a laisse a M. Delcasse et a ses suc- cesseurs tout le merite de I'entente cordiale et cet accord etait considere par la grande majorite des Frangais comme un appui moral et materiel fort pre- cieux pour le maintien du prestige de la France et la sauvegarde de ses interets. L'arrivee au pouvoir de M. Clemenceau a ete le couronnement de I'influence anglaise. Le cabinet de Londres croyait trouver en lui un homme absolu- ment devoue a sa politique et ayant un caractere assez aiitoritaire et energique pour I'imposer. II semble qu'on a ete assez degu dans les esperances qu'on avait congues et qu'on s'inquiete de I'inco- herence de son administration et de I'impuissance qu'il montre chaque jour davantage a arreter la de- sorganisation de la France. D'autre part a cote de la desillusion sur le role joue par M. Clemenceau bien des symptomes ont laisse entrevoir que I'opi- nion publique franqaise devenait soupgonneuse a regard des avantages de I'entente cordiale et qu'elle commengait a manifester le desir d'aiTranchir la France de I'ingerence britannique. II existe depuis peu une opposition encore sourde et timide, mais bien significative contre I'aveuglement avec lequel on se laisse entrainer dans I'orbite de I'Angleterre. Les conseils et les desseins de cette puissance n'apparais- sent plus aussi desinteresses qu'au debut et il en re- sulte qu'il se forme un parti dispose a secouer le joug de cette influence etrangere pour donner a la France une plus grande et plus honorable liberte d'action, tout en maintenant pourtant d'excellents rapports d'amitie avec sa voisine d'outre-Manche. J'ai lieu de croire que les tendances anglaises en Afrique et specialement I'attitude envers I'Etat du Congo n'ont pas ete etrangeres au sentiment de defiance qui se manifeste ici. II n'est done pas etonnant qu'en presence de cette situation le Roi Edouard ait voulu venir causer avec les membres du Gouvernement de la Republique et raflFermir I'influence qu'il craint de lui voir echapper. On se demande quel sera le resultat de ce nouvel ef- fort et s'il ne sera pas considere comme une pression A. Leghait, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Sir:- Paris, February 4, 1907. The King and Queen of England arrived incog- nito at Paris on Saturday evening ; they are staying at the Embassy and will remain here until the 9th of February. This unexpected journey was decided on only during the last days and caused some sur- prise even to the Government of the Republic. Last night M. Pichon did not conceal from his friends his astonishment and confessed that he had no idea as to the purpose of the trip. While so far no special motive is being attributed to the visit, it seems that it must have a political character, the importance of which is all the greater because it is not clearly defined. It is certainly too early to ap- preciate the import of this journey and to foresee its results. One can only make conjectures based on the general political situation and on the one at present existing in France. For some years the Government of the Republic has received favorably and almost with enthusiasm the advances made by England. The latter very discreetly gave all the credit for the entente cordiale to M. Delcasse and his successors, and that agreement was considered by the great majority of the French as a moral and material support of great value for the maintenance of France's prestige and for the security of her interests. M. Clemenceau's accession to power was the crowning point of the English influence. The Cab- inet of London believed that it had in him a man absolutely in accord with its policy and of a suffi- ciently autocratic and energetic character to put it through. It seems that there is disappointment as to the hopes conceived and that there is uneasiness on account of the inconsistency of his administra- tion and the inabiHty which he is displaying more and more every day to check the disorganization of France. On the other hand, besides the disappoint- ment caused by the part played by M._ Clemenceau, there are many symptoms which indicate that French public opinion has become suspicious as re- gards the advantages of the entente cordiale and that it is beginning to show a desire to free France from British interference. There has come into existence recently an opposition, as yet silent and timid but very significant, to the blindness with which France is allowed to be drawn into England's orbit. The counsels and plans of that Power no longer appear as disinterested as at the beginning, and the result is that a party is growing up, which is inclined to shake off the yoke of this foreign in- fluence and to give France a greater and more hon- orable freedom of action while at the same time maintaining good and friendly relations with the neighbor across the Channel. I have reason to be- lieve that the policy of Great Britain in Africa, and more particularly her attitude towards the Congo State, have been contributory to the sentiment of mistrust which is manifesting itself here. It is, therefore, not astonishing that in face of this situation King Edward should have wished to come and talk with the members of the French Govern- ment and to strengthen the influence which he is afraid is slipping from him. The question is what the result of this new effort will be and whether it — 26 exageree fortifiant les tendances de reaction centre cette ingerence etrangere et suspecte. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] will not be looked upon as undue pressure and will only tend to strengthen the reactionary tendency against this suspicious foreign influence. Accept, etc. A. Leghait. [Signed] A. Leghait. No. 22. Le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre de Belgique a Lon- dres a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Count de Lalaing, Belgian. Minister at London, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Londres, le 8 Fevrier 1907. Monsieur le Baron ! Uni par un sentiment de malveillance envers I'Em- pereur Guillaume, a la veille des recentes elections en Allemagne, on escomptait ici la victoire des partis anti-gouvernementaux et le triomphe des elements socialistes on pourrait dire que le public,sans distinc- tion de parti esperait ce resultat. Meme la presse conservatrice, antisocialiste par excellence, annon- cait avec satisfaction mal dissimulee que les socia- listes democrates allaient infliger un echec a la po- litique imperiale, tant interieure que coloniale. Les journaux liberaux et radicaux prevoyaient que les tentatives de gouvernement personnel, dangereuses pour la paix de TEurope, seraient fletries par la na- tion Allemande, reunie dans ses comices et que les evenements allaient enfin donner a reflechir a I'Em- pereur et a son Chancelier trop complaisant. Quant aux Socialistes anglais, leur confiance dans le succes de leurs confreres allemands etait complete. C'est avec un depit a peine voile qu'on a accueilli le verdict des electeurs germaniques. La popularite dont iouit encore le Kaiser, a ete une revelation pour les Anglais qui se berqaient de I'illusion, soi- gneusement entretenue par la presse, que I'Empereur etait peu aime, discredit^ et par consequent moins a craindre. Hier le "Morning Post" dans un article de fond ci-joint disait: "Caveant Consules" ; les jour- naux de I'opposition conjurent le Gouvernement Bri- tannique, antimilitariste du moment, de se tenir pret a tout evenement et de ne pas donner suite au pro- gramme d'affaiblissement de la marine dans un but economique a un moment oti I'Empereur Allemand peut etre tente de mettre a profit son regain de popu- larite et de se lancer dans une politique exterieure agressive. Le discours recent de Sa Majeste Im- periale est qualifie de menagant. II faut faire, il est vrai, la part des necessites de la politique courante parlementaire. L'opposition, prolaablement, trouve que les paroles imperiales, apres le succes electoral dont il s'agit, peuvent etre mises a profit dans la lutte centre le Gouvernement de M. Campbell Ban- nerman, qui veut proposer a La Haye la limitation des armements et qui ne cesse de diminuer les ef- fectifs de I'armee et de ralentir la construction des vaisseaux de guerre. D'autre part, les liberaux n'ont jamais de sympathie pour le Gouvernement person- nel et le parti ouvrier est toujours enclin a deplorer un echec du socialisme continental. Quoiqu'il en soit, le public parait desappointe du resultat des elections, et le sentiment anti-allemand inspire par la crainte et la jalousie et que j'ai souvent eu I'hon- neur de vous signaler n'a pas encore perdu de son intensite. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] Comte de Lalaing. Sir: London, February 8, 1907. United in their sentiment of ill-will towards Em- peror William, on the eve of the recent elections in Germany the British public counted on a victory of the opposition and on the triumph of the social- istic elements — one might even say that the public, without distinction of parties, was hoping for such a result. Even the Conservative press, in spite of its pronounced antagonism to socialism, announced with ill-disguised satisfaction that the Social Demo- crats were going to put a check on the Imperial policy, interior as well as colonial. The Liberal and the Radical papers prophesied that the attempts at a personal regime, which were a danger to Euro- pean peace, would be branded by the German na- tion at the polls, and that at last events would cause the Emperor and his too complaisant Chan- cellor to think. As regards the English socialists, their confidence in the success of their German com- rades was complete. The verdict of the German electors has, therefore, been received with scarcely veiled vexation. The popularity which the Kaiser is still enjoying has been a revelation to the English, lulled by the fallacy which the press has been eagerly sustaining, that the Emperor was little liked, had lost popular con- fidence, and was, therefore, less to be feared. Yes- terday's Morning Post said in a leader entitled "Caveant Consules" which I enclose : "The opposi- tion papers implore the present anti-militarist Brit- ish Government to hold itself ready for any event and not to carry out the project of weakening the navy for economic reasons at a moment when the German Emperor might feel tempted to make use of his regained popularity and to launch an aggres- sive foreign policy." The recent speech of His Im- perial Majesty is represented as a threat. In this, however, the exigencies of the current parliamen- tary policy must be taken into account. The oppo- sition probably finds that the Imperial words, after the electoral success in question, can be turned to profit in a fight against the Government of Mr. Campbell-Bannerman who intends to propose at the Hague the restriction of armaments and who continues to diminish the effective strength of the army and to retard the construction of men-of war. On the other hand, the Liberals are never in sympathy with a personal regime, and the Labor party is always inclined to deplore any check to continental socialism. However that may be, the public seems disappointed at the result of the elec- tions and the anti-German sentiment inspired by fear and jealousy, of which I have often had the honor to advise you, has lost nothing of its intensity. Accept, etc. [Signed] Count de Lalaing. 27 — No. 23. No. 23. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, k M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 9 Fevrier 1907. Monsieur le Baron ! J'ai ete fort etonne de voir des Journaux serieux de I'etranger attribuer una signification belliqueuse a la courte allocution que I'Empereur a adressee, dans la nuit du 5 Fevrier, a la foule venue pour I'acclamer lorsque les principaux resultats des ballottages ont ete connus. J'ai eu I'honneur de vous envoyer le texte de cette allocution par mon rapport d'avant- hier. Personne ici n'a songe a interpreter les paroles de Sa Majeste dans le sens d'une menace a I'adresse des puissances etrangeres. On connait trop bien le style habituel de I'Empereur pour se meprendre sur la portee de ses discours. II n'est pas permis de douter non plus de la sincerite des intentions pacifi- ques de Sa Majeste. Elle en a fourni sufifisamment de preuves pendant un regne de dix-huit ans. II me semble qu'a I'etranger aussi on doit savoir a quoi s'en tenir. Aussi je me demande si I'alarme manifestee est bien reelle. N'est-ce pas plutot la continuation de la campagne de denigrement entre- prise depuis des annees dans la presse de Paris, de Londres et de Saint-Petersbourg et dans laquelle le "Temps," organe officieux du ministere des affaires etrangeres de France, s'est particulierement distin- gue pendant les dernieres semaines? Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. Berlin, February 9, 1907. Sir:— I have been greatly surprised to see that serious newspapers abroad are attributing a bellicose mean- ing to the short address which the Emperor made on the evening of February 5th to the crowd which came to give him an ovation when the main results of the polling had become known. I had the honor to send you the text of that address in my report of the day before yesterday. Nobody here has thought of interpreting the words of His Majesty in the sense of a threat directed against foreign Powers. The habitual style of the Emperor is too well known for people to be under any misappre- hension as to the import of his speeches. Nor is it right to doubt the sincerity of His Majesty's paci- fic intentions. He has furnished sufficient proof of them during a reign of eighteen years. It seems to me that people abroad, too, ought to know what to believe in this matter. I question my- self also as whether the alarm displayed is quite genuine. Is it not rather the continuation of that campaign of vilification undertaken years ago in the press of Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, and in which during the last weeks the Temps, the semi- official organ of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has particularly distinguished itself? Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 24. No. 24. M. A. Leghait, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. M. A. Leghait, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, le 10 Fevrier 1907. Monsieur le Baron ! Les souverains de I'Angleterre ont quitte hier Paris pour rentrer a Londres. lis ont conserve I'in- cognito et sauf pour le dejeuner offert en leur hon- neur par le President de la Republique, ils n'ont pas ete en contact avec le monde officiel. Le Roi et la Reine ont fait des visites a leurs amis, a Paris, ont ete chez les artistes, au theatre et dans les restaurants comme de simples mortels. Cette at- titude affable et cordiale a seduit le public. Dans les spheres officielles le Roi a, parait-il, su resserrer encore les liens de sympathie entre les deux pays en affirmant sa politique pacifique et en de- veloppant les raisons pour lesquelles I'entente cor- diale devait en etre la base comme garantie de I'equi- libre des Puissances en Europe. Dans ses entretiens avec M. Clemenceau et avec le Ministre de la Guerre, le Roi a insiste sur la neces- site de maintenir fortes les annees de terre et de mer de la France. • Au Prince de Radolin, il a donne les assurances les plus tranquillisantes et lui a dit que son voyage n'avait pour but que de distraire la Reine qui n'etait Sir: Paris, February 10, 1907. The Sovereigns of England left Paris yesterday to return to London. They preserved their incog- nito and with the exception of the luncheon given in their honor by the President of the Republic, they have not come into contact with official circles. The King and the Queen paid visits to their friends at Paris, went to the artists, the theatre, and the restaurants like ordinary mortals. This affable and cordial demeanour has charmed the public. In official circles, it seems, the King has known how to keep up the bonds of sympathy between the two countries by asserting his pacific policy and by explaining the reasons why the entente cordiale must be the basis of that policy as a guaranty of the balance of the Powers of Europe. In his conversations with M. Clemenceau and the Minister of War the King emphasized the necessity of keeping strong the forces of France on land and at sea. To Prince von Radolin he gave most quieting assurances, telling him that his journey had no other purpose than to distract the Queen who had not — 28 plus venue a Paris depuis fort longtemps. Rien, en effet n'a transpire jusqu'ici sur des echanges de vues importants ou au sujet d'arrangements stipules sur un point special. On reste done generalement d'avis que le Roi a simplement voulu affirmer par sa presence a Paris que I'accord avec la France est aussi complet que jamais, et que TAlleniagne, un peu grisee par le suc- ces des elections, ne doit pas I'oublier. On ne saurait se dissimuler que cette tactique, qui a pour but apparent d'eviter la guerre, risque d'amener un grand mecontentement a Berlin et de provoquer le desir de tout tenter pour sortir de I'etreinte dans laquelle la politique anglaise resserre rAllemagne. On se demande quel est en realite le but que pour- suit le Gouvernement Britannique en provoquant ainsi la mauvaise humeur de I'Empereur Guillaume. II est peu probable qu'il n'y ait la qu'une manifesta- tion du peu de sympathie qui existe entre I'oncle et le neveu. Je crois que le Gouvernement de la Republique aurait autant aime eviter cette derniere visite an- glaise et qu'il comprend qu'il endosse un peu trop la responsabilite des antipathies anglo-germaines. La France, qui desire sincerement le maintien de la Paix et I'amelioration de ses relations avec I'AUe- magne aura de grands efforts de diplomatic a faire pour demontrer a Berlin que I'entente cordiale ne peut rien avoir de deplaisant pour I'Allemagne et qu'elle n'est pas conclue pour mettre obstacle a son expansion. On sent si bien qu'on est ici dans une situation delicate et entraine a un jeu dangereux que tous les organes officieux ou serieux de la Presse gardent le silence sur cette situation et qu'aucun d'eux n'ose se rejouir de cette nouvelle demonstration de I'amitie anglaise. D'autre part, nous venons de voir Mr. Pichon sou- tenir a la Chambre centre les socialistes, I'utilite et la fermete de I'alliance russe. On comprend qu'il faudrait peu de chose pour eveiller les susceptibilites et que la plus grande pru- dence est de rigueur dans un moment surtout oti FAIlemagne conservatrice triomphe et oil elle serait peut-etre facilement entrainee contre la France ra- dicale et socialiste. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] A. Leghait. been in Paris for a very long time. Nothing, in fact, has so far transpired concerning an exchange of important opinions or concerning arrangements made on any special point. It may, therefore, be believed that the King sim- ply wished to affirm by his presence in Paris that the understanding with France is as perfect as ever and that Germany, a little intoxicated by the suc- cess of the elections, should not forget it. The fact can hardly be glanced over that these tactics, outwardly intended to avoid war, threaten to lead to considerable displeasure at Berlin, and to provoke the desire to try everything in order to extricate Germany from the grasp in which she is held by the English policy. It is open to question as to what the British Gov- ernment is really aiming at in thus provoking the displeasure of Emperor William. It is hardly pro- bable that all this is nothing but a manifestation of the lack of harmony between uncle and nephew. I believe that the French Government would rather have avoided this last English visit and that it is aware that it is taking upon its shoulders too much of the responsibility for the Anglo-German antipathy. France, which sincerely desires to maintain peace and to improve her relations with Germany, will have to make great efforts at diplomacy if she wishes to demonstrate at Berlin that the entente cordiale need not be obnoxious to Germany and that it was not concluded in order to put obstacles in the way of her expansion. • It is realized here so well that France is in a deli- cate situation and has been dragged into a danger- ous game, that all the semi-official organs and other serious papers are keeping silent on this occasion and that none of them dares to show pleasure in this new demonstration of English friendship. On the other hand, we have just seen M. Pichon uphold in the Chamber against the socialists the usefulness and the stability of the Russian Alliance. It is understood here that it would require very little to cause irritation and that the greatest cir- cumspection is essential, particularly at a time when conservative Germany is triumphant and might per- haps be easily carried away against radical and socialist France. Accept, etc. [Signed] A. Leghait. No. 25. No. 25. M. E. de Cartier, Charge d' Affaires de Belgique a Lrondres, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. M. E. de Cartier, Belgian Charge d' Affaires at Lon- don, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Londres, le 28 Mars 1907. Monsieur le Baron ! Depuis que la direction des Affaires Etrangeres de Russie a ete confiee a M. Iswolski, un rapprochement sensible s'est produit entre les Cabinets de Saint James et de Saint-Petersbourg et I'accord sur beau- coup de questions qui, il y a deux ans encore, parais- sait impossible, semble aujourd'hui a la veille de se realiser. L'incident du Doggerbank, les sympathies britan- niques pour le Japon lors de la guerre de 1904, les London, March 28, 1907. Sir:— Since the direction of the Foreign Affairs of Rus- sia has been entrusted to M. Iswolski a noticeable rapprochement has taken place between the Cabi- nets of St. James's and St. Petersburg and on many questions on which it seemed impossible only two years ago, an understanding seems to-day to be on the point of being effected. The Doggerbank incident, the British sympathies for Japan at the 'time of the war of 1904, the violent 29 rivalites ardentes en Perse, sont choses du passe, et s'il faut ajouter foi a certains indices, la diplomatic anglaise, dont toutes les ressources tendent vers I'isolement de I'Allemagne, semble nous reserver pour un avenir rapproche le spectacle d'une entente anglo-russe. Ainsi qu'en 1905 la reception de la flotte frangaise en Angleterre etait le signal avant-coureur de I'en- tente cordiale, on pent par analogic voir dans I'ac- cueil fait actuellement a une escadre russe a Ports- mouth, les premices de relations plus cordiales avec la Russie. Les visites de courtoisie ont ete echangees entre amiraux russes et anglais et le commandant en chef de Portsmouth, I'amiral Sir D. H. Bosanquet a donne un banquet en I'honneur de I'escadre etrangere. Un telegramme du Roi Edouard adresse ces jours-ci a I'Amiraute contient le desir formel de Sa Majeste de voir un nombre d'officiers et marins russes visiter Londres. En consequence, 20 officiers et une cen- taine de marins sont arrives avant-hier par train special dans la capitale et ont ete les botes de I'Ami- raute. II y a eu les lunchs, diners et spectacles de gala de rigueur, en la presence de hautes personnalites du Foreign Office et de I'Amiraute. La foule a ova- tionne les marins russes a I'Alhambra et les a ac- clames a leur arrivee a la gare. Les journaux sont unanimes a se feliciter de cette reception et ne man- quent pas d'attirer I'attention du public sur la simili- tude des fetes actuelles avec celles offertes aux marins frangais. Le "Times" fait remarquer que d'ailleurs I'entente cordiale devait avoir comme "corollaire inevitable" un rapprochement de I'Angleterre et de la Russie et dans un avenir plus lointain un rapprochement in- time entre ces deux pays, la France et le Japon, de nature a assurer d'une faqon puissante et inattaqua- ble au monde entier les bienfaits d'une ere durable de paix et de prosperite. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.l E. de Cartier. rivalry in Persia, are things of the past and if faith can be placed in certain indications, British diplo- macy, ail the resources of which are directed toward the isolation of Germany, seems to have in store for us in the near future the spectacle of an Anglo-Rus- sian entente. As in 1905 the reception of the French fleet was the signal preceding the entente cordiale, the recep- tion at present extended to a Russian squadron at Portsmouth may be similarly regarded as the be- ginning of more cordial relations with Russia. Ceremonial visits were exchanged between Russian and British admirals and the commander-in-chief of Portsmouth, Admiral Sir D. H. Bosanquet, gave a dinner in honor of the foreign squadron. A telegram from King Edward addressed during these days to the Admiralty expresses the formal desire of His Majesty to have a number of the Rus- sian officers and men visit London. In consequence, 20 officers and 100 marines arrived at the capital by special train the day before yesterday, where they were guests of the Admiralty. There were the indispensible luncheons, dinners, and gala perform- ances in presence of high personalities from the Foreign Office and the Admiralty. The crowds cheered the Russian marines at the Alhambra and on their arrival at the station. The papers are unan- imous in congratulating themselves on this recep- tion and do not fail to draw the attention of the public to the similarity between the present festi- vities and those held in honor of the French marines. The Times points out that the entente cordiale should moreover produce as an "inevitable corol- lary" a rapprochement between England and Russia and should, in a more distant future, draw these two countries and France and Japan closely together so as to ensure to the whole world, in a powerful and unassailable manner, the blessings of an era of last- ing peace and prosperity. Accept, etc. [Signed] E. de Cartier. No. 26. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. . Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 28 Mars 1907. Monsieur le Baron ! Par I'acte d'Algesiras la France a promis, comme tons les autres Etats interesses, de respecter I'in- dependance du Sultan du Maroc. Cela n'a pas em- peche le ministre des affaires etrangeres frangais de dire a mon collegue a Paris que le Sultan est un fantoche qui n'a pas autre chose a faire que d'obeir aux injonctions du corps diplomatique. Cela n'em- peche pas non plus une entreprise frangaise protegee par le gouvernement frangais d'etablir au Maroc la telegraphic sans fil au mepris des droits regaliens du Sultan et malgre ses protestations. L'acte d'Algesiras proclame la complete egalite de tons sauf en ce qui concerne la police et la banque. En depit de la clarte du texte M. Pichon y lit qu'en tout la suprematie doit appartenir a la France. L'acte d'Algesiras garantit le regime de la porte ouverte. A Paris on regarde comme un coup porte a Sir: Berlin, March 28, 1907. By the act of Algeciras France promised, as did all the other interested states, to respect the inde- pendence of the Sultan of Morocco. That has not prevented the French Minister of Foreign Affairs from saying to my colleague at Paris that the Sultan was a puppet who had nothing else to do but to obey the injunctions of the diplomatic corps. Nor does it prevent a French concern which enjoys the support of the French Government from installing wireless telegraphy in Morocco in defiance of the sovereign rights of the Sultan and notwithstanding his protests. The act of Algeciras proclaims complete equality for all except in police matters and banking. In spite of the clear wording M. Pichon reads into it that in all matters France is to enjoy supremacy. The act of Algeciras guarantees the principle of the open door. In Paris every attempt at competi- la France et on qualifie d'intrigue toute tentative de concurrence meme la plus loyale et la plus correcte. L'acte d'Algesiras consacre I'integrite du terri- toire marocain. Le conseil des ministres frangais prenant pretexte de I'assassinat du docteur Mau- champ, vote a I'unanimite Toccupation de la ville marocaine d'Oudscha comme gage de la punition des coupables et de I'indemnite a obtenir, sans pouvoir alleguer le moindre fait de nature a faire croire que le Sultan ait une velleite quelconque de se soustraire a ses obligations. Le gouvernement frangais declare, il est vrai, qu'Oudscha sera evacue aussitot que satis- faction lui aura ete donnee ; mais la maniere dont sont executes les engagements pris a Algesiras mon- tre assez ce que valent les promesses frangaises. L'arrogance frangaise redevient ce qu'elle etait aux plus mauvais jours du second empire et c'est I'entente cordiale qui en est la cause. Elle a encore augmente d'un degre depuis que les negociations en- tre Londres et Saint-Petersbourg auxquelles la France n'aura sans doute pas ete etrangere parais- sent devoir aboutir a une entente. S'il ne s'etait agi que des questions officiellement traitees entre les cabinets, I'Egypte, le Maroc, les nouvelles Hebrides, les pecheries de Terre-neuve, la Perse, I'Afganistan, le Thibet, nous ne pourrions que nous feliciter de voir disparaitre des causes de con- flit entre les grandes puissances; mais au fond des arrangements conclus ou qui vont I'etre se retrouve toujours la haine de I'Allemagne entretenue a Paris par le souvenir toujours vivace de I'humiliation de 1870, a Londres par la jalousie qu' inspire le develop- pement industriel, commercial et maritime de I'Alle- magne, a Saint-Petersbourg par rien du tout, si ce n'est le prejuge et la blessure infligee a I'incommen- surable orgueil slave par la comparaison entre la civilisation allemande et la barbaric moscovite. C'est la continuation de la campagne entreprise en vue d'isoler I'Allemagne qui a ete fort habilement menee et qui a commence par la reconciliation entre la France et I'ltalie et par les arrangements conclus avec cette derniere puissance, par I'Angleterre aussi, au sujet des aflfaires de la Mediterranee. Je ne dis pas qu'il y ait d'ores et deja entre les cabinets un plan de coalition en vue d'une agression contre I'Allemagne. Celle-ci est de taille a se de- fendre et la responsabilite d'une guerre dont Tissue est plus que douteuse est de nature a faire reculer les plus braves ; mais il ne faut pas oublier que toutes les dernieres guerres n'ont pas ete decretees par les gou- vernements. Elles leur ont ete imposees par des mouvements populaires et le nouveau groupement des puissances europeennes est de nature a pousser I'opinion publique dans une voie dangereuse. Deja les effets s'en font sentir. La presse frangaise a I'unisson rend I'Allemagne responsable de I'assassinat du docteur Mauchamp ou elle voit une suite des excitations parties de Berlin. Ne serait-il pas plus logique d'expliquer la fermen- tation qui agite les indigenes marocains par le cynis- me avec lequel la France et I'Angleterre, trafiquant de ce qui ne leur appartient pas, se sont concertees pour faire du Maroc une colonic frangaise? Un general frangais commandant un corps d'armee dit publiquement que la guerre entre la France et I'Allemagne est inevitable, en repondant a un toast dans lequel le colonel Goepp avait exprime le regret d'avoir ete mis a la retraite avant I'heure de la re- vanche. Pour toute punition le gouvernement fran- gais donne un autre commandement au general Baillard; mais a soin d'expliquer en meme temps tion, however loyal and correct, is regarded as a blow aimed at France and is stamped as an intrigue. The act of Algeciras solemnly sanctions the in- tegrity of the Moroccan territory. The French Cab- inet, seizing on the pretext of the assassination of Dr. Mauchamp, votes unanimously for the occupa- tion of the Moroccan town of Oudschda as a secur- ity for the punishment of the culprits and for the claimed indemnity without being able to cite the smallest fact which might justify a belief that the Sultan had any intention of evading his obligations. The French Government, it is true, declares that Oudschda will be evacuated the moment that satis- faction is given ; but the manner in which the obli- gations assumed at Algeciras are being observed shows clearly enough what the French promises are worth. French arrogance is becoming again what it was during the worst days of the second Empire and the cause of this is the entente cordiale. It has increased still more since it appears that the negotiations be- tween London and St. Petersburg, to which without doubt France has not been a stranger, are going to lead to an entente. If the points in question only concerned matters to be treated officially between the cabinets — as in the case of Egypt, Morocco, the New Hebrides, the fisheries of Terra Nova, Persia, Afghanistan, Thibet — we could only congratulate ourselves to see the causes of conflict disappear between the Great Pow- ers; but at the bottom of the arrangements con- cluded, or which are going to be concluded, we always find hatred of Germany kept alive, in Paris by the deep-rooted memory of the humiliation of 1870, in London by the jealousy inspired by the in- dustrial, commercial, and maritime development of Germany, in St. Petersburg by nothing at all unless it be prejudice and the wound inflicted on the bound- less Slavic pride by the comparison between Ger- man civilization and Muscovite barbarism. It is the continuation of the campaign undertaken to iso- late Germany, which was very ably conducted and began with the reconciliation between France and Italy and with the arrangements concluded with the latter Power, also by England, concerning Medi- terranean matters. I do not say that at present a coalition is being planned by the Cabinets with a view to an attack on Germany. The latter is capable of defending herself and the responsibility for a war, the issue of which is doubtful, would cause the bravest to shrink ; but it must not be forgotten that all of the last wars were not made by the Governments. These were forced on them by popular movements and the new grouping of the European Powers is such that it will push public opinion along a danger- ous path. The efifects of this are already being felt. The French press is united in rriaking Germany responsible for the murder of Dr. Mauchamp in which it sees the result of instigations which orig- inated in Berlin. Would it not be more logical to explain the unrest which stirs the Moroccan natives by the cynicism with which France and England, trafficking with what does not belong to them, have agreed to turn Morocco into a French colony? A French general, commanding an army corps, in reply to a toast in which Colonel Goepp had ex- pressed his regret at having been retired before the hour of the "revanche," pubHcly said that the war Ijetween France and Germany is inevitable. The sole punishment administered by the French Gov- ernment was to give another command to General Baillard, explaining at the same time that that meas- 31 que la mesure prise n'a pas pour unique, ni meme pour principale cause le discours inconvenant de I'officier deplace. On I'a eloigne de Nancy parce qu'il avait pris une attitude indisciplinee vis-a-vis du ministre de la guerre. La presse anglaise poursuit avec plus d'acharne- ment que jamais sa campagne de denigrement. EUe voit la main d'Allemagne partout oii il arrive quel- que chose de facheux pour I'Angleterre. Au besoin elle invente de toutes pieces, comme le pretendu projet de fermeture de la mer baltique. Tout cela se passe au moment ou I'Angleterre jette un brandon de discorde en cherchant a imposer a la conference de La Haye la discussion non de son propre de- sarmement, mais de celui de ses adversaires et im- plique une diminution de la securite europeenne. Jusqu'a present la presse allemande se borne a enregistrer les faits et les officieux demontrent com- bien il est absurde d'endosser a I'Allemagne la res- ponsabilite d'un crime qu'elle deplore aussi vive- ment que les Frangais et qui atteint tous les Euro- peens quelle que soit leur nationalite; mais ils s'abs- tiennent des reflexions que je viens de vous sou- mettre et qui pourtant doivent leur venir d'elles- memes a I'esprit. On voit que I'Allemagne ne desire avant tout evifer la reouverture de la question maro- caine, quelque penibles que lui soient les empiete- ments frangais. M. Delcasse a ete demissione; mais il a laisse la tradition de sa politique a ses succes- seurs. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. ure had not for its only nor even for its principal cause the unbecoming speech of the displaced offi- cer. He was removed from Nancy because of un- disciplined demeanor towards the Minister of War. The English press is pursuing with more despera- tion than ever its campaign of vilification. It sees Germany's hand whenever something happens that is vexatious to England. In cases of need it invents whole stories, as for instance, the alleged project of a closure of the Baltic Sea. All this happens at a time when England throws a fire-brand of discord and threatens to bring about a diminution of Euro- pean security by trying to force on the conference at the Hague the discussion not of her own disarm- ament but that of her adversaries. Up to the present the German press confines it- self to registering the facts and the semi-official papers demonstrate how absurd it is to lay on Ger- many the responsibility for a crime which she de- plores as much as the French and which touches all Europeans, whatever their nationality; but they refrain from the reflections which I have just sub- mitted, although it must be assumed that they have them in mind. It is evident that before all things Germany desires that the Moroccan question be not reopened, however painful the French infringement may be to her. M. Delcasse was dismissed, but he bequeathed the tradition of his policy to his suc- cessors. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 27. No. 27. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 8 Avril 1907. Monsieur le Baron ! Ainsi que j'ai eu I'honneur de vous I'ecrire il y a quelques jours encore j'ai ete d'avis des que j'ai con- nu I'acte d'Algesiras que la France ne renongait pas a son projet de main-mise sur le Maroc, I'ajournant seulement jusqu'a des temps meilleurs. Elle s'est fait donner la police, I'influence preponderante dans la Banque. Elle a une immense frontiere commune habitee par des tribus mal soumises qui lui four- niront des pretextes d'intervention. Au besoin elle en inventera comme jadis en Tunisie. Elle a en Algerie une armee toujours prete. Elle dispose done des moyens de realrser ses desseins ambitieux. Si je m'etais fait d'illusion que les promesses d'Al- gesiras seraient loyalement executees, I'attitude du gouvernement franqais dans la question du choix du directeur des travaux publics, I'occupation d'Oudjda et un recent article du journal "Le Temps" me I'auraient fait perdre. L'organe officieux du ministere des affaires etran- geres franqais ecrit en commentant I'entrevue du Prince de Biilow et de M. Tittoni a Rapallo, qu'on ne parait pas bien comprendre a Berlin qu'un ar- rangement entre la France et I'Allemagne n'est pos- sible que sur la base suivante: De la part de la France, des concessions relatives au chemin de fer de Bagdad ; de la part de I'Allemagne I'assurance Sir: Berlin, April 8, 1907. As I had the honor of writing to you only some days ago, from the time when I learned of the act of Algeciras I was of the opinion that France was not renouncing her plan to put her hand on Moroc- co, but was simply deferring it until better times. She was given the police and the preponderant influ- ence in the bank. She has an immense stretch of contiguous frontier inhabited by insufficiently sub- dued tribes which will furnish her with pretexts for intervention. If need be, she will invent them as she formerly did in Tunis. She has in Algiers an ever ready army. She therefore has at hand the means with which to realize her ambitious plans. If I had ever labored under the delusion that the prom- ises of Algeciras would be loyally followed out, the attitude of the French Government in the question of the selection of the director of public works, the occupation of Oudschda and a recent article in the Temps would have cured me of it. The semi-official organ of the French Ministry of Foreign Afifairs, in commenting on the interview between Prince von Biilow and M. Tittoni at Ra- poUo, writes that it seemed not to be properly com- prehended at Berlin that an understanding between France and Germany was only possible on the fol- lowing basis : on the part of France concessions relative to the Bagdad railway ; on the part of Ger- d'une adhesion a la politique marocaine telle qu'elle est determinee par le traite du 8 Avril 1904. Un telegramme officieux de Berlin insere avant- hier dans le numero 362 de la "Gazette de Cologne" repond que le journal "Le Temps" parait avoir oublie d'une maniere assez etonnante, que depuis le traite du 8 Avril 1904, les arrangements d'Algesiras ont cree une situation nouvelle qui ne peut pas etre changee par un accord conclu rien qu'entre la France et I'Allemagne. Le telegramme officieux dit qu'a Berlin on comprend fort bien qu'a raison de sa position geographique, la France s'efforce d'obtenir une situation particuliere au Maroc. L'Allemagne ne songe nullement a la lui contester et I'acte d'Al- gesiras la lui a reconnue. On ne comprend pas bien comment I'Allemagne pourrait aller au dela et s'as- socier a la politique de I'arrangement anglo-frangais. Toute la politique frangaise au Maroc souffre de ce que Ton croit en France qu'il existe au Maroc un an- tagonisme entre I'Allemagne et la France. Sous I'empire de ce prejuge on attribue en France a la politique allemande des visees qu'elle n'a absolument pas. On a repete a satiete a Algesiras que I'Alle- magne n'a en vue que des interets economiques et Ton ne comprend pas comment la France pourrait s'y opposer si elle veut honnetement respecter le principe de la porte ouverte solennellement pro- clame. La situation serait bien vite eclaircie, si en France on voulait bien renoncer a une idee pre- congue et qui n'a aucun fondement. Le telegramme officieux ajoute qu'on ne voit pas bien quelle concession la France pourrait faire a I'Allemagne au sujet du chemin de fer de Bagdad. Ce chemin de fer se construira un jour ou I'autre et I'Allemagne n'est nullement pressee comme on semble le croire. De plus la construction du chemin de fer est une affaire turque qui ne regarde I'Alle- magne que parce que la concession en a ete regu- lierement accordee a un groupe financier oii les capi- taux allemands sont preponderants. Ainsi que vous le voyez, Monsieur le Baron, la France pretend, comme avant 1870, a un droit d'in- tervention dans des affaires qui ne la regardent ab- solument pas et s'imagine qu'elle possede un droit de veto sur les arrangements conclus entre puissances independantes. Nous venons de faire a nos depens I'experience de ce retour aux traditions du second empire ou plutot de la politique generale frangaise. Chaque fois que dans le cours de I'histoire, la France s'en est cru la force, elle a tente de s'arroger la suprematie sur le monde entier. Maintenant c'est I'entente cordiade avec I'Angleterre qui lui donne cette confiance. Les exemples se multiplient. Vous savez que le Danemark est absolument libre echangiste. Ses droits de douane sont purement fiscaux. II se pro- pose de les abaisser encore et pour que les recettes du tresor n'aient pas a en souffrir, il a I'intention d'elever les droits sur les vins, mais encore dans une mesure tres moderee. Rien n'est mieux justifie. Le vin est un article de luxe et il est equitable de de- mander aux classes aisees un sacrifice destine a aug- menter le bien-etre general. J'ai appris par une voie indirecte, mais absolument sure, que le ministre de France a Copenhague a neanmoins adresse au gou- vernement danois des representations formulees sur un ton imperieux et accompagnees de menaces de represailles. La demarche frangaise est d'autant plus insolite, que le Danemark n'est lie envers la France par aucun traite et que le tarif douanier fran- many the assurance of her adherence to the Moroc- can policy as determined by the treaty of April 8, 1904. A semi-official telegram from Berlin printed the day before yesterday in No. 362 of the Cologne Gaz- ette replies that the Temps seems to have forgot- ten in an astonishing manner that since the treaty of April 8, 1904, the agreement of Algeciras had created a new situation which could not be altered by any agreement made only between France and Germany. The telegram said that it was under- stood perfectly well at Berlin that by reason of her geographical position France was seeking to obtain a special position in Morocco. Germany did not think of disputing this and the act of Algeciras had granted it. It was not easy to understand how Germany could go beyond that and how she could associate herself with the policy of the Anglo- French agreement. The entire French policy in Morocco was suffering under a belief prevailing in France that an antagonism between Germany and France existed in Morocco. Under the influence of this prejudice people in France were attributing to German policy intentions which it absolutely did not have. It had been repeated ad nauseam at Alge- ciras that Germany had only economic interests in view and that it was incomprehensible how France could be opposed. to that if she were willing honestly to respect the principle of the open door which had been solemnly proclaimed. The situation would be speedily cleared if France were willing to re- nounce a preconceived idea which had no foundation whatsoever. The telegram adds that it was not quite clear what concession France could make to Germany in the matter of the Bagdad railway. This railroad would be built some day and Germany was nowise in a hurry, as seemed to be believed. Besides, the construction of the railway was a Turkish affair which concerned Germany only in so far as the concession had, in a legitimate manner, been given to a financial group in which German capital was predominant. Thus you perceive. Sir, that France is making pretensions as in 1870, to a right of intervention in affairs which are in no way her concern, and she imagines that she possesses a right of veto over agreements concluded between independent Powers. We have recently had our own experiences, to our cost, of this return to the traditions of the sec- ond Empire, or rather of the general French policy. Every time in the course of history when France thought herself strong she has tried to arrogate to herself supremacy over the whole world. Now it is the entente cordiale with England that gives her this confidence. Instances are accumulating. You know that Den- mark is absolutely a free-trade country. Her cus- tom duties are purely fiscal. She proposes to lower them still more, and in order that the revenues of her treasury do not suffer therefrom, she proposes to raise the duty on wines, but only in a very mod- erate degree. Nothing is more justified. Wine is an article of luxury and it is just to demand from the well-to-do classes a sacrifice destined to increase the general welfare. I learn indirectly, but from an absolutely reliable source, that the French Min- ister at Copenhagen has nevertheless approached the Danish Government with representations form- ulated in an imperious tone and accompanied by threats of reprisals. The French procedure is all the more unusual as Denmark is bound to France by no treaty and the French customs tariff imposes gais frappe de droits prohibitifs les produits agri- coles qui sont les seules marchandises d'exportation daiioises. Ce qui s'est passe a Bruxelles, a Berlin et a Copen- hague n'est peut-etre pas isole. II est vraisemblable qu'ailleurs aussi la France est revenue a ses ancien- nes allures ne tenant aucun compte des engage- ments qui la genent et pretendant imposer partout ses volontes. Agreez etc. Fs.l Greindl. a prohibitive duty on agricultural products which form the only Danish articles of export. What has happened in Brussels, Berlin, and Cop- enhagen are perhaps not isolated cases. It is prob- able that elsewhere, also, France has reverted to her old conduct of not respecting her obligations when they annoy her and of demanding subservience to her will everywhere. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 28. No. 28. M. E. de Carrier, Charge d' Affaires de Belgique a Londres, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. M. E. de Cartier, Belgian Charge d' Affaires at Lon- don, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Londres, le 12 Avril 1907. Monsieur le Baron 1 L'opinion publique a suivi avec un interet modere les peripeties du sejour que Leurs Majestes le Roi et la Reine ont fait dans les eaux espagnoles et elle ne semble guere se preoccuper pour le moment des pos- sibilites d'ordre politique que comporte cette ren- contre des souverains de I'Espagne et de I'Angle- terre. Cette indifference plus apparente peut-etre que reelle, peut a priori sembler etrange, lorsqu'on la compare a I'enthousiasme suscite par les prodromes de I'entente cordiale franco-aijglaise, mais elle s'ex- pHque fort bien par I'etat d'esprit qui regne en ce moment, tant parmi les cercles politiques que parmi la population en general. De plus en plus le peuple anglais s'habitue a considerer que les questions d'ordre international sont la province presque ex- clusive du Roi Edouard, dont il admire, avec raison, le profond sens politique et la feconde diplomatie. L'absence complete de divergences entre les deux grands partis historiques en ce qui concerne les destinees politiques de I'Angleterre, circonstance qui permet a Sir Edward Grey de continuer I'oeuvre de Lord Lansdowne sans atermoiement ni a-coups est la preuve la plus evidente de cet etat d'esprit. Confiante d'un cote dans le jugement eclaire et le tact heureux du Roi, et assuree en outre de la valeur du ministre charge de la defense de ses interets in- ternationaux l'opinion publique se detache de plus en plus des questions de haute politique, sachant par experience que les destinees de I'Empire sont en bonnes mains. L'entrevue de Carthagene a du presenter un veri- table interet politique et il est a prevoir que la ques- tion marocaine a ete I'objet d'un echange de vues tant entre les souverains que parmi les hommes d'etat qui les accompagnaient. C'est ainsi que Sir Charles Hardinge, sous-secretaire d'Etat permanent aux Affaires Etrangeres, a suivi le Roi Edouard dans ce voyage et il est permis de supposer que ses conversations avec les ministres espagnols auront pu calmer les inquietudes que I'occupation d'Oudja a du provoquer a Madrid. La visite que le RoJ Edouard a faite a son royal neveu a Carthagene aurait surtout pour but de chercher a resserrer les liens qui unissent I'Espagne a la Grande-Bretagne et d'affaiblir autant que possible I'influence allemande Sir: London, April 12, 1907. Public opinion has followed only with moderate interest the events of the sojourn of their Majesties, the King and Queen, at the Spanish baths and for the moment it hardly seems to concern itself about the political possibilities which this meeting of the rulers of Spain and England opens up. This indifference, which is perhaps more exter- nal than real, may seem strange a priori when com- pared with the enthusiasm aroused by the events which preceded the Franco-English entente cord- iale ; but it is very easily explained by the spirit which prevails at present in political circles as well as among the population in general. More and more the English people are becoming accustomed to consider international questions as belonging al- most exclusively to the province of King Edward whose profound political acumen and successful dip- lomacy they justly admire. The complete absence of differences of opinion between the two great his- torical parties as to the political destinies of Eng- land — a circumstance which permits Sir Edward Grey to continue the work of Lord Lansdowne without delay or interruption — is the best proof of this spirit. Placing full confidence, on the one hand, in the clear judgment and good tact of the King, and con- vinced on the other, of the ability of the Minister entrusted w'ith the care of England's international interests, public opinion is becoming more and more detached from questions of high politics, knowing from experience that the destinies of the Empire are in good hands. The meeting at Carthagena must have been of great political interest and it must be assumed that its object was an exchange of ideas on the Moroccan question between the Sovereigns as well as between the statesmen who accompanied them. Sir Charles Hardinge, permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign AfJFairs, accompanied King Edward on this voyage and it may be supposed that in his conversa- tions with the Spanish Ministers he has been able to assuage the uneasiness which the occupation of Oudschda must have caused in Madrid. The aim of the visit which King Edward is paying to his Ro3ral nephew at Carthagena will be above all to tighten the bonds which join Spain to Great Britain and to weaken as much as possible the German influence k Madrid. Mais jusqu'ici aucun indice n'a revele les resultats pratiques ou les decisions arretees au cours de cette entrevue. Veuillez etc. [s.] E. de Cartier. in Madrid. But so far no indication has revealed the practical results or the decisions reached in the course of this meeting. Accept, etc. [Signed] E. de Cartier. No. 29. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. le Baron de Favereau, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 18 Avril 1907. Monsieur le Baron ! J'ai I'honneur de vous accuser reception de votre depeche du 15 Avril par laquelle vous avez bien voulu me communiquer I'interessant rapport qui vous a ete adresse le 8 du meme mois, par mon col- legue a Madrid. Des trois conjectures que vous soumet M. le Baron Joostens pour expliquer I'entrevue de Cartha- gene, la derniere est la plus vraisemblable. On peut meme dire que c'est une certitude. Comme le traite d'alliance avec le Japon, I'entente cordiale avec la France, les negociations pendantes avec la Russie, la visite du Roi d'Angleterre au Roi d'Espagne est un des mouvements de la campagne personnellement dirigee avec autant de perseverance que de succes, par Sa Majeste Edouard VII, pour isoler rAllemagne. L'Angleterre ne peut guere at- tendre d'aide materielle de la part de I'Espagne. D'apres une information des journaux, elle aurait promis son concours pour aider a la reconstitution de la flotte espagnole et a la fortification de la cote iberi- que. La creation d'une flotte est une oeuvre de longue haleine, partout difficile et particulierement dans un pays aux finances delabrees et ovi non seule- ment les ministres mais aussi tous les hauts fonc- tionnaires changent a chaque instant. L'Angleterre n'a pas besoin du concours de I'Espagne pour con- centrer sa flotte dans la Manche et la Mer du Nord, sans compromettre sa position dans la Mediterranee. Depuis qu'elle a acquis I'amitie de la France, plus personne n'est en etat de I'y menacer. Mais malgre I'impuissance militaire et financiere de I'Espagne, une entente avec les pays iberiques n'est pas sans valeur. Nous venons d'en avoir la preuve a Algesiras, a Tanger et tout recemment .par I'appui que le cabinet de Madrid a donne a la propo- sition anglaise de limitation des armements. II n'est pas aise de se rendre compte des motifs qui ont determine I'Espagne a se mettre dans I'afifaire maro- caine a la remorque de la France et de I'Angleterre. S'est-elle imaginee que la France avait serieusement et loyalement I'intention de partager avec elle I'influ- ence au Maroc? Ou bien reconnaissant qu'elle doit renoncer pour toujours a ses aspirations seculaires s'est-elle contentee de sauver au moins les appa- rences? Quoiqu'il en soit, I'entente de I'Espagne avec I'An- gleterre et la France est un fait qui n'est pas nou- veau. L'entrevue de Carthagene est simplement la confirmation et probablement la consolidation d'une situation deja existante. La visite que doit faire aujourd'hui a Gaete, le Roi d'Angleterre au Roi d'ltalie, ne nous revele rien non plus. L'entente de I'ltalie avec I'Angleterre et la France est aussi un fait en depit de la triple alliance. Elle date du jour ou I'ltalie s'est mise d'accord avec Berlin, April 18, 1907. Sir:— I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of April 15 in which you were good enough to inform me of the interesting report which was sent to you on the 8th of the month by my col- league in Madrid. Of the three conjectures which Baron Joostens submits to you in explanation of the meeting of Carthagena the last is the most probable. One can even say that it is a certainty. Like the treaty of alliance with Japan, the entente cordiale with France, the negotiations pending with Russia, the visit of the King of England to the King of Spain is one of the manoeuvres in the campaign personally conducted with as much perseverance as success by His Majesty, King Edward VII, in order to isolate Germany. England can hardly expect material aid from Spain. According to a newspaper report she had promised her support in the recon- struction of the Spanish fleet and in the fortification of the Iberian coast. The creation of a fleet is a long winded matter, difficult everywhere but parti- cularly so in a country with shattered finances and where not only the ministers but all the high offi- cials also change every moment. England does not need Spain's support in order to concentrate her fleet in the Channel and in the North Sea without compromising thereby her position in the Mediter- ranean. Since she has acquired the friendship of France nobody is any longer in a position to men- ace her there. But despite the military and financial impotence of Spain, an entente with the Iberian countries is not without value. We have just had a proof of that in Algeciras, in Tangiers, and very recently in the support which the Cabinet at Madrid lent to the English proposal concerning the restriction of arma- ments. It is not easy to understand the motives which have induced Spain to let herself be taken in tow by France and England in the Moroccan af- fair. Did she imagine that France had the serious and loyal intention of giving her a share in the in- fluence in Morocco? Or well aware that she would have to renounce forever her century-old aspira- tions, was she content with at least keeping up ap- pearances? However that may be, Spain's entente with Eng- land and France is a fact which is not new. The meeting of Carthagena amounts simply to a con- firmation and probably a strengthening of an already existing situation. The visit which the King of England is to make to-day to the King of Italy at Gaeta does not reveal anything either. Italy's understanding with Eng- land and France is also a fact, in spite of the Triple Alliance. It dates from the day when Italy came ces puissances au sujet dii partage des interets dans la Mediterranee. Si elle n'avait pas existe aupara- vant, elle aurait surgi d'elle meme, lorsque I'entente cordiale entre la France et I'Angleterre a ete con- clue. Comment. I'ltalie pourrait-elle en cas de con- flit, defendre son immense etendue de cotes contre les flottes anglaise et frangaise reunies? Et que pour- raient faire ses allies alleniand et austro-hongrois pour la proteger? Cette ardeur a unir dans un but soi-disant defensif des puissances que personne ne menace, peut pa- raitre a boo droit suspecte. On ne peut pas oublier a Berlin Toffre des 100000 hommes faite par le Roi d'Angleterre a M. Delcasse. Nous-memes nous avons a enregistrer les singulieres ouvertures faites par le colonel Barnardiston au general Ducame, qui sait s'il n'y a pas eu d'autres intrigues semblables qui ne sont pas parvenues a notre connaissance. Aussi est-il aise de concevoir que les demarches du Roi d'Angleterre causent ici de certaines apprehen- sions et qu'a Vienne on les partage. Elles ont trouve leur expression dans un article de la "Freie Presse" reproduit et appuye par la "Gazette de Cologne" dans son numero 402 d'avant-hier. Cet article de la "Gazette de Cologne" a cause un grand emoi parmi plusieurs de mes collegues. Je ne vous I'ai pas en- voye parce que j'ai vu du premier coup, qu'il n'ex- primait que I'opinion de la redaction. L'evenement m'a donne raison. La "Gazette de Cologne" a ete desavouee dans ses propres colonnes (No. 409 de ce matin) par un telegramme officieux de Berlin. Elle I'insere, mais en le faisant suivre de ses reserves. Le gouvernement allemand ne peut pas parler autre- ment qu'il ne I'a fait; mais je serais bien etonne si au fond de sa pensee, il n'y avait pas identite entre ce que la "Gazette de Cologne" peut dire et ce qu'il est oblige de taire. D'apres le rapport de M. le Baron Joostens il sem- ble qu'on attache a Madrid une importance exageree a I'idee de compromis franco-allemand. Ainsi que je I'ai ecrit, les ouvertures de la presse officieuse fran- Qaise ont ete bien accueillies par les officieux alle- mands. La reponse de I'Empereur au discours qu'a prononce M. Cambon lors de la remise de ses let- tres de creance, a ete particulierement cordiale ; mais il ne peut s'agir que d'un accord sur des points se- condaires et trop fragile pour resister a une commo- tion politique grave. A propos de I'interpellation Bailloud, M. Clemenceau nous a dit quel est le senti- ment frangais intime. Jusqu'a ce que 1870 soit oublie. il ne pourra y avoir au maximum entre Ber- lin et Paris que des relations correctes et tres pre- caires. Agreez etc. [s.l Greindl. to an agreement with these Powers in the matter of the division of interests in the Mediterranean. If this understanding had not existed before, it would have come about of its own accord, when the entente cordiale between France and England was con- cluded. How could Italy in case of a conflict defend her extensive coast against the combined British and French fleets? And what could her German and Austro-Hungarian allies do to protect her? This zeal in uniting Powers, whom no one is menacing, for alleged purposes of defense, can with good reason seem suspicious. The offer of 100,000 men made by the King of England to M. Delcasse cannot be forgotten in Berlin. We ourselves have to record the singular overtures made by Colonel Barnardiston to General Ducame and who knows if there have not been other similar intrigues which have not come to our knowledge. It is, therefore, easy to understand that the steps taken by the King of England are causing certain apprehensions here and that these are shared in Vienna. They have found expression in an article of the Freie Presse reprinted and indorsed by the Cologne Gazette in its issue, No. 402, of the day before yesterday. This article in the Cologne Gazette has caused great anx- iety among several of my colleagues. I did not send it to you because I saw at a glance that it only expressed the opinion of the editor. The events have proven me to be right. The Cologne Gazette has been disavowed in its own columns (No. 409, of this morning) by a. semi-official telegram from Berlin. The paper prints it, but adds its own reser- vations. The German Government cannot speak otherwise than it has done; but I would be very much surprised if the Government's real thoughts on matters in regard to which it has to be silent are not identical with what it is permissible for the Cologne Gazette to say. According to the report of Baron Joostens it seems that an exaggerated importance is being at- tached in Madrid to the idea of a Franco-German compromise. As I have reported, the overtures of the semi-official French press were well received by the semi-official German papers. The Kaiser's re- ply to the address which M. Cambon made when he presented his credentials was markedly cordial ; but there can be question of an agreement on points of secondary importance only, and even that would be too fragile to withstand any serious political dis- turbance. In regard to M. Bailloud's question, M. Clemenceau has informed us as to what the real French sentiment is. Until 1870 has been forgotten, there can at the most be only correct and very pre- carious relations between Berlin and Paris. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 30. No. 30. Le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre de Belgique a Lon- dres, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Londres, le 24 Mai 1907. Monsieur le Ministre ! Les relations anglo-allemandes continuent a etre officiellement d'une froide correction, mais I'anti- pathie qu'on ressent ici dans toutes les classes du London, May 24th, 1907. Sir:— The Anglo-German relations continue to be offi- cially of a cool correctness, but the antipathy for the German nation which is felt here in all classes public pour la nation germanique est aussi marquee que lorsqne je vous ai ecrit le 8 Fevrier 1907. Certains bons esprits se rendent cependent compte de rinconvenient qu'il y a a laisser durer un etat d'esprit aussi malveillant, mais les palliatifs qu'on a employes, et que le Gouvernement liberal favorise, restent jusqu'ici impuissants. C'est en vain qu'on a organise et qu'on organise encore des visites a Ber- lin de conseillers municipaux, de membres de la Chambre et de representants de journaux importants. Une certaine categorie de la presse, connue ici sous le nom de "presse jaune," est en grande partie responsable de I'inimitie que I'on constate entre les deux nations. Que doit-on, en effet, attendre d'un journaliste comme Mr. Harmsworth, aujourd'hui de- venu Lord Northcliffe, editeur du "Daily Mail," du "Daily Mirror," "Daily Graphic," "Daily Express," "Evening News" et "Weekly Dispatch," et qui dans une interview qu'il donne au "Matin," s'ecrie : "Oui, nous detestons les AUemands et cordialement. lis se rendent odieux a toute I'Europe. Je ne permettrai pas qu'on imprime dans mon journal la moindre chose qui put blesser la France, mais je ne voudrais pas qu'on y inserat quoique ce fut qui piit etre agre- able a I'Allemagne." Et en 1899, ce meme editeur attaquait les Franqais avec la meme violence, voulait boycotter I'exposi- tion de Paris et ecrivait: "Les Frangais ont reussi a persuader John Bull qu'ils sont ses ennemis achar- nes. L'Angleterre a longtemps hesite entre la France et I'Allemagne, mais elle a toujours respecte le caractere allemand tandis qu'elle en est arrivee a avoir du mepris pour la France. Une entente cor- diale ne peut subsister entre I'Angleterre et sa plus proche voisine. En voila assez dcla France, qui n'a ni courage, ni sens politique." Ce sont ces journalistes-la, editeurs de feuilles a bon marche et de lecture courante qui faussent a plaisir I'esprit de tout un peuple. II est evident que I'Angleterre officielle poursuit une politique sourdement hostile, qui tend a aboutir a I'isolement de I'Allemagne et que le Roi Edouard n'a pas dedaigne de mettre son influence personnelle au service de cette idee, mais 11 y a un danger evident a envenimer aussi ouvertement I'opinion publique que le fait la presse irresponsable dent il s'agit. Veuillez etc. [s.] Cte de Lalaing. of the public is as marked as when I wrote to you on February 8, 1907. Certain sensible people, however, realize the harm which is being done by permitting such a spirit of ill-feeling to continue, but the palliatives which have been used and which the Liberal Government favors have hitherto been impotent. It is in vain that visits of municipal councillors, of members of Par- liament, and of representatives of important news- papers to Berlin were and are still being organized. A certain category of the press, known here as the "yellow press", is to a great degree responsible for the hostility between the two nations. What, indeed, can one expect of a journalist like Mr. Harmsworth, to-day Lord Northcliffe, editor of the Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror, the Daily Graphic, the Daily Express, the Evening News and the Weekly Dispatch, who in an interview given to the Matin exclaims : "Yes, we detest the Germans, and cordially too. They are making themselves odious all over Europe. I shall not permit the slightest thing which might offend France to be printed in my paper, but I would not have anything whatso- ever inserted in it that might be agreeable to Ger- many." In 1899, this same editor attacked the French with the same violence, wanted to boycott the Paris Exposition, and wrote : "The French have succeeded in convincing John Bull that they are his bitter ene- mies. England hesitated for a long time between France and Germany but she always respected the German character, whereas she has come to regard France with contempt. An entente cordiale cannot exist between England and her nearest neighbor. Enough of France, which has neither courage nor political sense." It is these journalists, editors of cheap and widely read papers, who pervert at will the spirit of an entire nation. It is evident that official England is pursuing a policy of stubborn hostility which aims at the isola- tion of Germany, and that King Edward did not disdain to use his personal influence in the service of this idea, but it is clearly dangerous to poison pub- lic opinion as openly as the irresponsible press in question is doing. Accept, etc. [Signed] Ct. de Lalaing. No. 31. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 30 Mai 1907. Monsieur le Ministre ! Rendant la visite que leur ont faite, il y a quelques mois, les journalistes allemands en Angleterre, une deputation des journalistes anglais se trouve actuel- lement en Allemagne. Rien n'a ete epargne pour leur preparer la reception la plus cordiale. Un ba- teau du Norddeutsche Lloyd a ete prendre les jour- nalistes anglais a Douvres et les a amenes le 27 Mai a Bremerhaven. Les autorites de la ville de Breme, puis celles de la ville de Hambourg leur ont fait le meilleur accueil et les discours les plus amicaux ont ete prononces de part et d'autre. II en a ete de meme a Berlin ou les journalistes anglais sont arrives hier a une heure de I'apres-midi. Berlin, May 30th, 1907. Sir:— A deputation of English journalists is at present in Germany to return the visit which the German journalists paid them in England a few months ago. Nothing has been spared to prepare the most cord- ial reception for them. A North German Lloyd steamer went to fetch the English journalists at Dover and took them on May 27th to Bremerhaven. The authorities of the city of Bremen, and later those of the city of Hamburg, gave them a splendid reception and the most friendly speeches were made on both sides. The same thing happened in Berlin where the English journalists arrived at one o'clock yesterday 37 Le Due de Trachenberg, president du comite de re- ception, les attendait a la gare. Apres le dejeuner des automobiles ont conduit les visiteurs anglais a travers la ville pour leur en montrer les edifices. Le soir il y a eu un banquet au jardin zoologique oil as- sistaient des personnages tres considerables de la presse, du gouvernement et du monde des commer- gants. Les toasts ont ete nombreux et tous inspires par la meme pensee: il importe pour dissiper des prejuges nuisibles aux bonnes relations entre les deux pays d'etablir des relations personnelles et con- fiantes entre les journalistes allemands et anglais. L'idee est juste et on ne peut qu'approuver ceux qui en ont pris I'initiative ; mais j'ai assiste a tant de ten- tatives de rapprochement avortees que je ne peux pas m'empecher d'un certain scepticisme quant au resultat definitif, que de fois on a echange les paroles les plus cordiales dont huit jours plus tard le souve- nir etait deja efface pour faire place a des polemiques atissi aigres qu'auparavant. La tension des relations entre les deux pays est d'autant plus difficile a faire disparaitre qu'elle n'a pas pour cause des points litigieux determines. S'il existait entre TAllemagne et I'Angleterre un conflit tel que celui qui existait autrefois entre Londres et Paris au sujet de I'Egypte, une transaction y pour- rait mettre fin. Sur aucun point du globe, il n'y a rien de pareil qui nuise aux relations entre I'Alle- magne et I'Angleterre. Leur froideur ne resulte d'aucun fait concret. C'est une question de senti- ment. L'Angleterre jalouse les prodigieux progres de I'industrie, du commerce et de la marine rnarchande de rAllemagne. Habituee a etre sans rivale, il lui semble que toute concurrence est un empietement sur son doraaine. Elle feint d'eprouvcr des alarmes dont la sincerite me semble plus que douteuse, en presence du de- veloppement de la marine de guerre de I'empire. Elle doit savoir pourtant que, meme dans un avenir tres eloigne, une agression allemande restera ma- teriellement impossible. C'est I'Allemagne au con- traire qui a tout a redouter. Depuis des siecles I'Angleterre s'est appliquee a detruire les forces na- vales etrangeres des qu'elles prenaient une certaine importance. La France I'a eprouve apres la Hol- lande. Puis est venu le tour du Danemark dont les vaisseaux ont ete aneantis sans I'ombre d'un pre- texte, par I'amiral Nelson entre en ami dans le port de Copenhague. C'est la mefiance allemande qui a rendu populaire le developpement de la flotte de I'em- pire tout au plus assez forte pour jouer un role de- fensif et dont la majorite du peuple ne voulait pas entendre parler aussi longtemps que Ton croyait pouvoir compter ici sur I'amitie ou au rrioins sur la neutralite de I'Angleterre. Cette defiance est encore nourrie par le soin que met personnellement le Roi d'Angleterre a conclure des ententes avec le monde entier sauf avec I'Alle- magne contre laquelle il n'a aucun grief a formuler. La presse y aide en representant chacun des succes de la politique exterieure de I'Angleterre comme tendant au but final de I'isolement de I'Allemagne. Qui oserait afiirmer qu'elle se trompe sur ce point? Loin de provoquer la tension des relations avec I'Angleterre, I'Allemagne en souffre, comme le prou- vent les tentatives rep6t6es de rapprochement dont I'initiative est partie invariablement de Berlin. Une des causes de leur insucces est peut-etre I'exube- rance avec laquelle elles se sont produites. Les bruyantes demonstrations d'amitie ne rdpondant ni a la realite des faits ni aux sentiments des deux afternoon. The Duke of Trachenberg, chairman of the reception-committee, awaited them at the sta- tion. After luncheon, the English visitors were driven in automobiles through the city in order to view the buildings. In the evening there was a banquet at the Zoological Garden at which prom- inent members of the press, of the Government, and of the commercial world were present. The toasts were numerous and were all inspired by the same thought : in order to dissipate the prejudices harm- ful to the friendly relations between the two coun- tries it was necessary to establish confidence by per- sonal relations between German and English jour- nalists. The idea is right and one cannot but praise those who took the initiative; but I have seen so many abortive attempts at a rapprochement that I cannot rid myself of a certain amount of scepticism as to the ultimate result. How many times have most cordial words been exchanged, the memory of which was effaced a week later, to give way to polemics just as bitter as before. The tension in the relations between the two countries is so much more difficult to remove be- cause it is not due to definite points of dissension. If there existed between Germany and England a conflict such as formerly existed between London and Paris in the matter of Egypt, a compromise could put an end to it. Nowhere in the world is there anything similar which could injure the rela- tions between Germany and England. The coldness between them is not due to any concrete fact. It is a question of sentiment. England is jealous of the prodigious progress in German industry, commerce, and the merchant mar- ine. Accustomed to be without a rival, she con- siders any competition as an encroachment on her domain. She affects to feel alarm, the sincerity of which seems more than doubtful to me, in regard to the development of the German navy. She ought to know, however, that even in a very distant future, an attack by Germany would be practically imposi- ble. It is Germany, on the contrary, who has every- thing to fear. For centuries England has applied herself to the destruction of foreign naval forces as soon as they acquired a certain degree of import- ance. France experienced this after Holland had done so. Then it was the turn of Denmark, whose vessels were destroyed without the shadow of a pretext by Admiral Nelson who entered the harbor of Copenhagen as a friend. It was distrust that popularized in Germany the development of the Empire's fleet, which is at the most strong enough to play a defensive part and of which the majority of the people would not hear as long as they be- lieved that they could count on the friendship or at least the neutrality of England. This distrust is increased by the care which the King of England is personally taking to conclude ententes with the entire world except Germany, against whom he has no ground for complaint what- soever. In this the press is helping by representing each success of England's foreign policy as ulti- mately aimed at the isolation of Germany. Who would dare to assert that it is mistaken on this point? Far from provoking tension in her relations with England, Germany is suffering under it, as is proven by the repeated efforts at rapprochement, in which Berlin invariably took the initiative. One of the reasons for their failure is perhaps the exuberance with which they were undertaken. The loud dem- onstrations of friendship, which corresponded neither with the actuaJ-iactsjior with the sentiments peuples, ont produit chaque fois en Angleterre com- me en Allemagne une reaction que I'on eut ecartee si Ton s'etait simplement propose d'entretenir des rapports corrects et normaux. On nest pas retombe dans cette faute au banquet d'hier. Les importants discours politiques pro- nonces par M. de Miihlberg comme representant du chancelier et par I'ambassadeur d'Angleterre Sir Frank Lascelles ont evite toute exageration dan- gereuse et se sont attaches a exposer la situation telle qu'elle est. Je vous envoie ces deux discours, quoique je suppose que les agences telegraphiques vous les auront deja transmis; mais vous tiendrez sans doute a en avoir le texte authentique sous les yeux. M. de Miihlberg a dit en substance, que lorsqu'il parcourt les journaux etrangers, y compris les jour- naux anglais, il y trouve presque quotidiennement une legende habilement propagee et devotement ac- ceptee par de nombreux croyants, d'apres laquelle TAllemagne menacerait la paix du monde. C'est surtout I'armee allemande que I'etranger considere avec mefiance comme une formidable machine de guerre destinee a porter un jour le trouble dans le monde entier. II est vrai que I'Allemagne possede une armee brave et puissante et qu'elle en est fiere; mais peut-on dire que jamais depuis I'existence de I'empire elle en ait fait mauvais usage. Le systeme militaire allemand est vieux de cent ans. II est done ne bien avant I'empire, a une epoque oti I'on ne songeait certes pas a des conquetes et a des anne- xions. La Prusse etait tombee au dernier degre de la misere et ses enfants ont tout sacrifie pour as- surer I'independance nationale et pour secouer le joug de I'etranger. A travers toutes les vicissitudes les bases du systeme militaire allemand n'ont pas varie. ■ On entend dire et surtout en Angleterre que pour ce qui concerne la flotte, I'Allemagne cache ses visees. 11 suffit de lire la loi d& 14 Janvier 1900 pour voir que c'est impossible. Elle trace des limites que le pouvoir executif est hors d'etat de depasser. Une comparaison avec Teiifectif de la flotte anglaise de- montre a tout observateur impartial que I'Allemagne ne se propose que de proteger ses cotes et son com- merce maritime. Elle n'aspire a rien de plus. C'est ce que doit vouloir toute grande nation soucieuse de son honneur. On demandera peut-etre, a dit M. de Miihlberg, si I'Allemagne a vraiment besoin de moyens de pro- tection aussi couteux. Que Ton jette un coup d'oeil sur I'histoire du peuple allemand. Elle contient de terribles et inoubliables lemons. II n'y a pas de pays en Europe qui ait plus souiTert et plus saigne sous les coups de peuples guerriers etrangers. lis sont venus de toutes les contrees de la terre semant la mort et la ruine autour d'eux. Des sceptiques objecteront peut-etre que I'armee et la flotte allemande sont de dangereux instruments dont on pent etre un jour tente de se servir pour donner de I'espace a sa population toujours crois- sante. L'Allemagne n'a pas besoin de nouveaux ter- ritoires quoique le nombre de ses habitants aug- mente de 800 000 a 900000 ames par an et que I'emi- gration soit devenue insignifiante, il manque des bras partout pour I'agriculture comme pour I'indus- trie. M. de Miihlberg ne veut pas dire que les Alle- mands soient des ascetes. lis aspirent a une libre et loyale concurrence dans le commerce mondial. On a pretendu que la politique allemande manque de stabilite et de continuite. C'est une erreur. Cette politique est partout celle de la porte ouverte. Les Anglais doivent la comprendre. Dans toutes les of the two nations, each time caused a reaction both in England and in Germany which could have been avoided if it had been determined simply to maintain correct and normal relations. This mistake was not repeated at yesterday's banquet. The important political speeches made by Mr. von Miihlberg, representing the Chancellor, and by the British Ambassador, Sir Frank Lascelles, avoided all dangerous exaggeration and endeavored to represent the situation at it is. I am sending you these two speeches although I assume that the tele- graphic agencies have already informed you of them ; but you will doubtless prefer to have the authentic text before you. Mr. von Miihlberg said in substance that reading the foreign papers, including the English, he found almost daily a cleverly propagated tale, piously ac- cepted by numerous believers, according to which Germany was menacing the peace of the world. It was above all the German army which the foreigner regarded with distrust as a formidable war machine destined one day to bring trouble to the entire world. It was true that Germany possessed a brave and powerful army and that she was proud of it; but could it be said that since the existence of the Empire she had ever misused it? The German mili- tary system was a hundred years old. It had there- fore come into existence long before the Empire, at an epoch when conquests and annexations were certainly not thought of. Prussia was at that time plunged in the deepest misery and her children had sacrificed everything in order to ensure national in- dependence and to shake off the foreign yoke. Through all vicissitudes the principles of the Ger- man military system had not varied. It was rumored, above all in England, that in matters of the fleet Germany was concealing her aims. It sufficed to read the law of January 14, 1900, to see that that was impossible. In it the limits were defined which the executive power could not overstep. A comparison with the strength of the British fleet proved to any impartial observer that all Germany intended was to protect her coast and her merchant marine. She did not aspire at anything more. That much every great nation, careful of her honor, must desire. It would perhaps be asked, said Mr. von Miilberg, whether Germany really needed such expensive means of protection. It was only necessary to glance at the history of the German people. It contained terrible and unforgettable lessons. There was not a country in Europe which had suffered and bled more under the blows dealt by foreign warlike nations. They had come from all countries of the earth sowing death and ruin around them. Sceptics would perhaps object that the German army and navy were dangerous instruments which Germany might perhaps be tempted some day to use in order to make room for her constantly grov^- ing population. Germany did not need new terri- tory, although the number of her inhabitants was increasing by 800,000 to 900,000 souls yearly and although her emigration had become insignificant; hands were lacking everywhere, in the field of agri- culture as well as of industry. The speaker did not wish to imply that the Ger- mans were ascetics. Their aim was free and fair competition in the commerce of the world. It had been asserted that the German policy lacked stabil- ity and consistency. That was a mistake. Ger- many's policy was everywhere that of the open door, which the English ought to be able to appre- contrees ou I'Angleterre a etendu sa sphere d'in- fluence, elle s'est efforcee de developper les sources de production du pays at de relever le niveau de la civilisation. Lord Cromer I'a fait tout recemment en Egypte. La politique de I'Empereur d'AUemagne partage cette conception de ce que doivent etre Tac- tion et le but d'un etat civilise. C'est sur ce point que TAllemagne et I'Angleterre peuvent se rencon- trer et se tendre la main pour un travail commun, sans prejudice de leurs amities et de leurs alliances. C'est ainsi que la presse des deux pays, interprete des pensees et des sentiments des deux peuples, peut collaborer avec le monde official, a I'entente mutuelle, au respect reciproque, en dissipant de fausses legen- des et des mefiances injustifiees. Dans sa reponse Sir Frank Lascelles a dit qu'il avait naturellement a coeur d'ameliorer les relations entre I'Allemagne et I'Angleterre. II a exprime la satisfaction que lui avaient causee les idees emises par M. de Miihlberg sur le but auquel devaient viser les deux pays pour realiser une amitie entre eux, sans porter atteinte a celles qui existent avec d'au- tres puissances. M. de Muhlberg a, comme I'annee derniere le comte de Metternich, fait allusion a cer- tains articles de journaux, creant une atmosphere d'aigreur et de defiance ne reposant que sur des malentendus et peut-etre plus difficile a dissiper que des divergences de vue reelle. La situation s'est no- tablement amelioree ; mais il serait premature de dire que tous les malentendus sont deja ecartes. Sir Frank Lascelles espere avec confiance que les rela- tions personnelles entre les journalistes allemands et anglais, le bon accueil qui a ete reserve a ceux-ci et les assurances donnees par M. de Miihlberg au nom du gouvernement Imperial contribueront non seulement a detruire les prejuges mais a etablir en- tre les deux peuples des relations amicales au grand avantage mutuel. Je me feliciterais de voir la realisation des voeux exprimes par M. de Miihlberg et Sir Frank Lascelles avec une sincerite dont je suis absolument convain- cu. La tension des relations entre I'Allemage et I'Angleterre peut servir des calculs mesquins de po- litique a courte vue; mais elle compromet I'interet superieur de la conversation de la paix europeenne que la preponderance allemande nous a garanti de- puis 36 ans. Elle encourage les visees des hommes d'etat mecontents du statu quo. Sir Frank Lascelles doit connaitre mieux que per- sonne combien la tache qu'il assigne aux deux na- tions est ardue. C'est celle qu'il s'est imposee a lui- meme. J'ai assiste depuis douze ans aux efforts qu'il a faits pour s'en acquitter. Possedant a juste titre I'entiere confiance de I'Empereur et du gou- vernement allemand, doue d'eminentes qualites d'homme d'etat il n'y a que tres mediocrement reussi jusqu'ici. Son discours d'hier prouve a la fois qu'il ne se fait pas d'illusions et qu'il persevere neanmoins sans decouragement dans la voie qu'il s'est tracee. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. ciate. In all the countries to which England had extended her sphere of influence, she had labored to develop the resources of the country and to raise the standard of civilization. Lord Cromer had done this only recently in Egypt. The policy of the German Emperor shared this conception of what the actions and the goal of a civilized State ought to be. On this point, Germany and England could agree and join hands in mutual labor without pre- judice to their friendships and alliances. Thus the press of the two countries, the interpreter of the thoughts and feelings of the two nations, could col- laborate with the official world for mutual under- standing and respect, by dissipating false stories and unjustified mistrust. In his reply Sir Frank Lascelles said that the im- provement of the relations between Germany and England was, of course, close to his heart. He ex- pressed his satisfaction with the ideas given utter- r.nce to by Mr. von Miihlberg in regard to the aim which the two countries ought to pursue in order to form a friendship without impairing those which existed with other Powers. Mr. von Muhlberg had, like Count von Metternich the year before, alluded to certain newspaper articles which were creating an atmosphere of bitterness and distrust, based only on misunderstandings which were, however, perhaps more difficult to dissipate than real differences of opinion. The situation had improved considerably ; but it would be premature to say that all misunder- standings had already been dispelled. Sir Frank Lascelles expressed the confident hope that the per- sonal relations between the German and English journaHsts, the friendly reception which had been accorded to the latter, and the assurances given by Mr. von Miihlberg in the name of the Imperial Gov- ernment would help not only to destroy prejudices, but also to establish friendly relations between the two peoples to their great mutual advantage. I would be very happy to see the wishes realized which Mr. von Miihlberg and Sir Frank Lascelles expressed with a sincerity of which I am absolutely convinced. The tension in the relations between Germany and England may be of service in petty and short-sighted political calculations, but it com- promises the greater interest of the preservation of European peace which has been kept through Ger- many's powerful influence for the last 36 years. Strained relations between Germany and England encourage the schemes of statesmen who are dis- satisfied with the status quo. Sir Frank Lascelles ought to know better than anyone else how difficult the task is which he is assigning to the two nations. It is the task which he has imposed on himself. For twelve years I have witnessed the efforts which he has made to accom- plish it. Though possessing, as he is entitled to, the complete confidence of the Emperor and of the German Government, and though eminently quali- fied as a statesman, he has had only moderate suc- cess so far. His speech of yesterday proves that he has no illusions but that, nevertheless, he is going to continue undismayed along the path which he has chosen. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. 40 No. 32. No. 32. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 8 Juin 1907. Monsieur le Ministre ! L'Empereur a adresse, par le telegraphe, a M. de Miihlberg, de tres vives felicitations a roccasion du discours prononce au banquet des journalistes an- glais dont j'ai eu Fhonneur de vous rendre compte par men rapport du 30 Mai dernier; ce telegramme qui n'a pas ete public, prouve que le sous-secretaire d'etat au departement Imperial des affaires etran- geres a fidelement interprete la pensee de Sa Ma- jeste. , La visite des journalistes a fini aussi bien qu'elle a commence. Le 31 Mai ils ont ete invites a la parade de printemps de la garnison de Potsdam. Un train special les avait amenes et des places leur avaient ete reservees devant le chateau. lis ont chaude- ment acclame I'Empereur, *lorsque Sa Majeste a passe devant eux. Conduits par le Due de Trachen- berg ils ont ete au nouveau Palais et a Sanssouci dont un maitre de ceremonie leur a fait les hon- neurs. Un dejeuner leur a ete offert a I'orangerie. Au moment du cafe I'Empereur y est arrive et s'est entretenu tres gracieusement avec les principaux des invites. Les journalistes ont ete ensuite deposer des couronnes de fleurs sur les tombeaux de I'Empereur et de rimperatrice Frederic. Le lendemain les journalistes anglais sont partis pour Dresde ou ils ont ete tout aussi bien regus par le Roi, la municipalite, la presse et la population. II en a ete de meme a Munich, a Frankfort, a Co- logne et a Riidesheim. De cette derniere ville, les journalistes se sont diriges vers Kiel ou ils se sont embarques pour Copenhague, tres-satisfaits, parait- il_, de I'accueil qui leur a ete fait. La presse ofifi- cieuse a exprime a diverses reprises, le desir que les rapports personnels etablis entre les journalistes an- glais et leurs confreres allemands contribuent a I'amelioration des relations entre les deux pays. Les representants des journaux anglais ont du emporter I'impression que ce voeu est tres sincerement celui de la nation et du gouvernement. D'autres manifestations du meme genre sont de nature a corroborer cette conviction. Une commis- sion parlementaire anglaise est en Allemagne pour y etudier les voies navigables. Elle y a ete tres bien regue et rien n'a ete neglige pour faciliter sa mis- sion. La visite du Lord Maire de Londres est annoncee pour le 22 Juin. On lui prepare I'accueil le plus cor- dial. Que restera-t-il de toutes ces demonstrations? Probablement rien. Le rapport que vous avez bien voulu me communiquer par votre depeche d'avant hier me montre que mon collegue de Londres mieux place que je ne le suis pour juger la situation, est encore plus sceptique que moi. Comma le dit tres justement M. le Comte de Lalaing, le Roi d'Angle- terre dirige personnellement une politique dont le but final est I'isolement de 1' Allemagne. Son action repond au sentiment de la nation, egaree par une presse sans scrupules ne visant qu'aux gros tirages et a cet effet uniquement soucieuse de flatter les pas- sions populaires. Ce ne sont pas seulement les jour- naux a bon marche qui s'abaissent a un pareil role. Le "Times" poursuit depuis des annees une cam- pagne de denigrement et de calomnies. Son corres- Sir:- Berlin, June 8, 1907. The Emperor heartily congratulated Mr. von Miihlberg by telegraph on the speech he made at the banquet given in honor of the English journal- ists, of which I had the honor to inform you in my report of May 30th. This telegram, which has not been published, proves that the Under Secretary of State in the Imperial Department of Foreign Af- fairs faithfully interpreted His Majesty's ideas. The visit of the journalists ended as happily as it began. On May 31st, they were invited to the Spring parade of the Potsdam garrison. A .special train took them there and places had been reserved for them in front of the Palace. They warmly cheered the Emperor when His Majesty passed by. Conducted by the Duke of Trachenberg, they vis- ited the New Palace and Sanssouci where a master of ceremonies did the honors. A luncheon was served to them in the "Orangerie." When coffee was served, the Emperor arrived and conversed very graciously with the principal guests. After- wards the journalists placed wreaths on the tombs of 'Emperor William and of Empress Frederick. On the next day the English journalists left for Dresden where they were equally well received by the King, the municipal authorities, the press, and the people. It was the same at Munich, at Frank- fort, at Cologne, and at Riidesheim. From this last- named city the journalists went to Kiel where they embarked for Copenhagen, apparently very well sat- isfied with the reception which they had received. The semi-official press repeatedly expressed the de- sire that the personal relations established between the English journalists and their German colleagues might help to ameliorate the relations between the two countries. The representatives of the English papers must have received the impression that this wish is very sincerely that of the nation and of the Government. Other manifestations of the same kind will strengthen this conviction. A committee from the British ParHament is in Germany at present in or- der to study the navigable waterways. They were very well received and nothing has been spared to facilitate their task. The visit of the Lord Mayor of London has been announced for June 22nd. The most cordial recep- tion is being prepared for him. What will come of all these demonstrations? Probably nothing. The report which you sent to me in your despatch of the day before yesterday, shows me that my colleague at London, who is in a better position than I to judge the situation, is even more sceptical than I. As Count de Lalaing rightly says, the King of England is personally di- recting a policy, the ultimate aim of which is the isolation of Germany. His action corresponds with the sentiments of the nation, misled by an unscrupu- lous press, the sole interest of which consists in a large circulation and which is therefore only anxious to flatter the passions of the populace. It is not only the cheap papers that lower themselves to such a part. For years the Times has pursued a cam- paign of vilification and slander. Its Berlin corre- pondant de Berlin qui a pourtant toute facilite pour etre bien informe, nourrit la haine des Anglais centre les Allemands en pretant au gouvernement Imperial des projets ambitieux dont I'absurdite saute aux yeux et en I'accusant de manoeuvres tenebreuses auxquelles on n'a jamais songe. Neanmoins le pu- blic anglais y croit sans sourciller, parce que ces in- ventions correspondent a ses prejuges. Comment le courant antiallemand pourrait-il etre detourne par la tres petite phalange d'ecrivains plus conscienci- eux et plus clairvoyants? Les journalistes anglais qui ont accepte I'hospitalite allemande appartien- nent sans doute en tres grande majorite a cette elite. On a preche des convertis. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. spondent, who has every opportunity to be well- informed, nourishes the hatred of the English against the Germans by imputing to the Imperial Government ambitious schemes the absurdity of which is self-evident, and by accusing it of shady manoeuvres of which it has never thought. Never- theless, the English public believes in them without wincing, because these inventions correspond with its prejudices. How could the anti-German current be turned by the very small group of more consci- entious and more clear-sighted writers? The great majority of the English journalists who accepted the hospitality of Germany belong without a doubt to this select group. One has been preaching to converts. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 33. No. 33. M. A. Leghait, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. A. Leghait, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, le 17 Juin 1907. Monsieur le Ministre ! Les relations amicales et I'entente qui existent depuis environ deux ans entre la France, I'Angle- terre et I'Espagne, viennent de s'affirmer par des liens plus precis qui caracterisent nettement le groupement des puissances et le soin qu'elles pren- nent de se premunir par des stipulations pacifiques centre d'autres eventualites. La France et I'Angleterre viennent chacune de conclure simultanement avec I'Espagne un arrange- ment identique. D'apres les declarations faites bier par M. Pichon cet accord est d'ordre purement di- plomatique et ne contient ni convention militaire, ni clauses secretes. II a pour objet le maintien du statu quo dans les parties de la Mediterranee et de I'Atlantique qui interessent les puissances contrac- tantes. Celles-ci se garantissent mutuellement leurs possessions respectives et la libei;te de leurs com- munications avec ces possessions. Le texte de cet arrangement a ete communique aux gouvernements d'Allemagne, de Russie, d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'ltalie, du Japon, des Etats-Unis et du Portugal. Vous trouverez. Monsieur le Ministre, dans I'arti- cle ci-annexe des details tres exacts sur I'origine et la portee de ces accords ainsi que sur les instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs de France charges de les expliquer aux gouvernements aupres desquels ils sont accredites. II ne s'agit pas d'une triple-alliance ni meme d'un accord a trois qui eussent donne a cet arrangement une importance qui eut pu paraitre alarmante a certaines chancelleries, mais si on con- sidere le but identique et la simultaneite des deux arrangements, on se rend compte qu'il existe bien un triple accord avec un meme objectif. Apres I'arrangement franco-japonais qui n'est qu'une habile manoeuvre anglaise, la France trouve de nouvelles garanties pour ses possessions d'outre- mer en s'associant a la politique de la Grande-Bre- tagne qui veut assurer le statu quo dans la Medi- terranee et empecher qu'une autre puissance puisse y exercer une influence ou y acquerir des posses- sions. Sir: Paris, June 17th, 1907. The friendly relations and the good understand- ing which have existed for about two years between France, England, and Spain have just been strengthened by more definite bonds which clearly characterize the groupings of the Powers and the care which they are taking to fortify themselves against other eventualities by means of pacific agreements. France and England have just simultaneously concluded identical agreements with Spain. Ac- cording to the statements made yesterday by M. Pichon, these agreements are of a purely diplomatic order and do not contain either a military conven- tion or any secret clauses. Their object is to main- tain the status quo in those parts of the Mediter- ranean and of the Atlantic in which the contracting Powers are interested. These latter mutually guar- antee their respective possessions and the freedom of their communications with these possessions. ■ The text of this agreement has been communicated to the Governments of Germany, Russia, Austria- Hungary, Italy, Japan, the United States and Por- tugal. You will find, Sir, in the article here appended, very exact details on the origin and the import of the agreements, as well as on the instructions given to the French Ambassadors charged to explain them to the Governments to which they are accredited. It is not a question of a Triple Alliance, nor even of a three-sided agreement, which would have im- parted to these arrangements an importance that might have appeared alarming to certain Chancel- leries; but if the identical aim of the two agree- ments be considered and the fact that they were made simultaneously, it will be realized that this is a triangular agreement with one and the same goal. After the Franco-Japanese agreement which was nothing but a clever English move, France is find- ing new guarantees for her over-sea possessions by joining the policy of Great Britain which aims at ensuring the status quo in the Mediterranean, and at preventing other Powers from exercising any in- fluence or from acquiring possessions there. 42 On se plait a reconnaitre que ces accords ont un caractere fort pacifique et Ton aime meme a croire qu'ils sont une garantie de paix, mais on se demande aussi quelles sont les menaces qui justifient de si grandes precautions, la France beneficie pour le moment de I'entente cordiale avec I'Angleterre et Ton glorifie ici les succes diplomatiques de M. Pichon, mais il ne manque pas de gens qui craignent qu'a force de vouloir assurer la paix on ne provoque la guerre; cette crainte est dans tons les esprits sages et ils s'efforcent de premunir I'opinion publi- que et le Parlement contre la tentation de se laisser griser par ces succes sans prendre les precautions voulues contre les dangers auxquels ils s'exposent, ils rappellent sans cesse que si des difficultes de- vaient surgir en Europe, la France serait la premiere :■ en supporter le poids et a en subir les conse- quences. L'Angleterre prepare admirablement son terrain mais la France qui s'associe a sa politique a-t-elle toutes les garanties voulues pour ne pas en etre un jour la victime? L'incertitude qui regne a ce sujet, permet de supposer qu'il existe entre elle et le gou- vernement Britannique un accord plus complet que celui de I'entente cordiale mais qui resterait a I'etat latent jusqu'au jour oil les evenements exigeraient la mise au jour de ses stipulations. La France, pour se premunir actuellement contre des perils peut-etre illusoires ou pour fortifier la situation des dirigeants de la politique interieure contracte une dette de reconnaissance qui lui sem- blera lourde le jour ou I'Angleterre devoilera dans quel but elle veut employer les influences qu'elle a groupees autour d'elle. Veuillez etc. [s.] A. Leghait. While it is pleasing to see that these agreements are of a very pacific character and while it is desir- able to believe that they are a guarantee of peace, it is natural to ask what the dangers are which justify such great precautions. France is for the moment benefiting from the entente cordiale with England and the diplomatic success of M. Pichon is being glorified here, but there are many people who fear that war will be caused by these very efforts to ensure peace ; that fear is felt by all wise people and they are endeavoring to fortify public opinion and Parliament against the temptation to become intoxicated with these successes without taking the necessary precautions against the dan- gers to which they are exposing themselves. They do not cease to point out that if difficulties should arise in Europe, France would be the first to feel the weight of them and to suffer the consequences. England is preparing her ground admirably but has France, who is joining her in her policy, all the necessary guarantees that she will not be the victim of this policy one day? The uncertainty which pre- vails in regard to this subject justifies the supposi- tion that there exists between her and the British Government a more complete agreement than that of the entente cordiale, but which will remain latent until that day when events will demand that its stipulations be made public. In order to arm herself for the moment against perils which are perhaps illusory or in order to strengthen the position of the directors of her in- ternal policy, France is contracting a debt of grati- tude which will seem heavy to her on the day when England reveals the purpose for which she wants to use the influences which she has grouped around herself. Accept, etc. [Signed] A. Leghait. No. 34. No. 34. Le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre de Belgique a Lon- dres, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Londres, le 19 Juin 1907. Monsieur le Ministre ! Comme corollaire a I'arrangement recemment conclu entre I'Espagne et la France, au sujet du maintien du statu quo en ce qui concerne leurs ter- ritoires dans le bassin de la Mediterranee et sur I'Atlantique, I'Espagne vient de signer egalement une convention avec I'Angleterre qui a pour but de garantir les possesions des deux pays dans les regions baignees par la Mediterranee et I'ocean. Le texte de ce dernier arrangement n'est pas encore connu du public; le fait meme de I'entente inter- venue entre Madrid et Londres n'a ete divulgue que par une indiscretion d'un journal parisien. Le motif allegue par les Anglais comme dictant leur politique, pacifique avant tout naturellement, est d'assurer la route vers les Indes et I'Extreme- Orient par une garantie supplementaire. Les ports espagnols seraient a leur disposition en cas de be- soin. Inutile de dire que la presse britannique de- clare que I'Allemagne aurait tort de se plaindre de I'entente hispano-anglaise nullement dirigee contre Berlin. II est difficile, cependant de supposer que Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. London, Tune 19, 1907. Sir:— As a corollary to the agreement recently con- cluded between Spain and France concerning the maintenance of the status quo in regard to the ter- ritories in the Mediterranean basin and on the At- lantic, Spain too has just signed an agreement with England the aim of which is to guarantee the pos- sessions of the two countries in the regions border- ing on the Mediterranean and the ocean. The text of this agreement has not yet been made public; even the fact that an understanding had been reached between Madrid and London was only di- vulged through the indiscretion of a Paris paper. The motive which the English allege is dictating their policy, of course above all pacific, is to ensure the route to India and the Far East by a supple- mentary guarantee. The Spanish ports would in case of need be at their disposal. It is needless to say that the British press declares that Germany would be wrong to complain on account of the Anglo-Spanish understanding which was by no means directed against Berlin. It is difficult, how- TAllemagne n'y verra pas la continuation de la po- litique anglaise, qui vise, de toutes fagons, a I'isole- ment de I'empire germanique. Veuillez etc. [s.] Cte. de Lalaing. ever, to suppose that Germany will not see in this understanding the continuation of the British policy which aims in every way at the isolation of the Ger- man Empire. Accept, etc. [Signed] Ct. de Lalaing. No. 35. No. 35. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister to Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 22 Juin 1907. Monsieur le Ministre! A en juger par les premieres appreciations pu- bliees dans les journaux ayant acces a la chancel- lerie Imperiale, le gouvernement allemand veut ob- server une attitude tout a fait passive en presence des deux nouvelles ententes internationales qui vien- nent de nous etre revelees. L'arrangement entre la France et le Japon con- sacre les deux principes de I'integrite de la Chine et de la porte ouverte. C'est ce qui avait deja ete stipule, il y a sept ans, par un arrangement entre I'AlIemagne et I'Angleterre auquel diverses puis- sances, entre autres la France et le Japon ont ad- here. L'accord entre I'Angleterre, la France et I'Es- pagne n'est pas encore public et I'intention des puis- sances contractantes etait de ne le faire connaitre qu'au mois d'aout. Une indiscretion commise a Rome I'a livre prematurement aux journaux. J'ai eu I'occasion de m'assurer que leurs renseignements sent exacts. Les trois puissances reconnaissent le statu quo dans la Mediterranee et dans TAtlantique et s'entendront sur les mesures a prendre si leurs possessions venaient a etre menacees. II n'y a rien la-dedans qui touche aux interets de I'AlIemagne. Le gouvernement Imperial a ete tenu au courant des negociations entre la France et le Japon par les soins des gouvernements japonais et frangais. Les ambassadeurs d'Espagne, de France et d'Angleterre ont separement communique au de- partement Imperial des affaires etrangeres, depuis plusieurs jours deja, les notes echangees pour cons- tater l'accord intervenu entre leurs pays. Tout a done ete d'une correction parfaite et il n'y a rien qui pourrait servir de base a une plainte officielle. L'impression produite a Berlin n'en a pas moins du etre fort penible pour les raisons que j'ai pris la liberte de vous exposer par mon rapport du 13 Mai dernier. La mode est aux ententes internationales. Apres I'alliance franco-russe, nous avons eu l'accord de ritalie avec la France et I'Angleterre au sujet de la Mediterranee, I'alliance entre I'Angleterre et le Ja- pon, l'arrangement par lequel I'Angleterre et la France ont trafique de I'Egypte et du Maroc. L'An- gleterre negocie avec la Russie pour la delimitation des frontieres et des spheres d'influence en Asie. Toutes ces ententes s'expliquaient ou par le desir de mettre fin a d'anciens differends, ou d'empecher qu'il n'en surgisse de nouveau ou de donner aux gouver- nements interesses la securite qu'ils ne seraient pas genes dans I'assouvissement de leurs convoitises. Les deux derniers accords ne repondent pas com- me ceux que je viens de citer, a des necessites politi- Berlin, June 22, 1907. Sir:- To judge from the first comments published in the papers which have access to the Imperial Chan- cellery, the German Government is going to ob- serve an absolutely passive attitude in regard to the two new international agreements which have just been revealed. The agreement between France and Japan sanc- tions two principles, that of the integrity of China, and that of the open door. These were stipulated seven years ago in an agreement between Germany and England to which several Powers, among others France and Japan, took adherence. The agreement between England, France, and Spain has not yet been published and it was the intention of the contracting Powers not to let it be- come known before the month of August. An in- discretion committed at Rome put it prematurely in the hands of the press. I have had the oppor- tunity to assure myself that the information given by the papers is correct. The three Powers recog- nize the status quo in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic and will confer as to the measures to be taken if their possessions should be menaced. There is nothing in this which touches the inter- ests of Germany. The Imperial Government has been informed of the negotiations between France and Japan by the Japanese and French Govern- ments. Several days ago the Ambassadors of Spain, France, and England communicated separately to the Imperial Department of Foreign Affairs the notes exchanged in confirmation of the agreements concluded between their countries. Everything was thus done with absolute correctness and there is nothing which might serve as a basis for an official complaint. The impression produced at Berlin must never- theless have been a very disagreeable one, for the reasons which I took the liberty of explaining to you in my report of May 13. International understandings are the fashion. After the Franco-Russian alliance we had the un- derstanding of Italy with France and England on the Mediterranean, the alliance between England and Japan, and, finally, the agreement between Eng- land and France by which they settled their bargain over Egypt and Morocco. At present England is negotiating with Russia concerning the regulation of boundaries and spheres of influence in Asia. All these understandings arose either from a desire to put an end to old diflferences or to prevent new ones from arising or from a wish of the interested Governments to be certain that they would not be hampered in satisfying their covetousness. The two latest understandings do not, like those 44 ques. S'ils ne cachent pas d'arriere-pensee, on pour- rait dire qu'ils ont un caractere ornemental. Le Japon est de force a garantir tout seul I'integrite de la Chine, jusqu'au jour oii il lui conviendra de I'en- tamer lui-meme. On admettra difficilement que I'Angleterre ait besoin du secours de I'Espagne pour defendre ses positions en Egypte, a Cypre, a Malte et a Gibraltar. Qui songe a les attaquer et qui de plus aurait les moyens materiels de le faire? . La France n'est pas moins en securite en Algerie et a Tunis. Le danger ne pourrait provenir que de I'une des puissances signataires, si I'amitie existant actuel- lement entre elles venait a se rompre. Dans une pareille hypothese, les arrangements d'aujourd'hui deviendraient caducs d'eux-memes. S'ils ne contiennent aucune clause secrete, ils sem- blent n'avoir ete conclus que pour le plaisir de laisser une fois de plus TAllemagne en dehors du reglement des interets mondiaux. Ces precautions prises cen- tre des perils imaginaires sont de nature a eveiller et a nourrir chez les peuples I'idee que rAUemagne est la puissance agressive centre les entreprises de laquelle les autres pays sont obliges de se liguer. II n'y aurait pas grand mal si ces traites n'etaient que superflus ; mais ils compromettent la cause de la paix qu'ils pretendent servir, parce qu'ils font naitre dans les milieux hostiles a I'Allemagne la confiance que le moment approche oii leurs desseins pourront se realiser. La presse allemande est mecontente; mais aucun communique officieux n'a encore paru. Le fait suivant vous permettra du reste, mieux que ne pourront le faire les declarations officielles ou officieuses d'apprecier le sentiment intime du gouvernement Imperial. L'ambassadeur d'Espagne est le premier qui ait communique au sous-secre- taire d'etat les notes echangees entre son pays, la France et I'Angleterre. Apres en avoir donne lec- ture, il s'est attache a demontrer que I'arrangement conclu n'est nullement dirige contre I'Allemagne et a un but exclusivement pacifique et defensif. M. de Muhlberg I'a interrompu en disant: "Oui, je sais; nous marchons vers une ere de paix perpetuelle." Cette remarque ironique est plus eloquente que de longs discours. M. de Miihlberg n'a manifesto au- cune impression lorsque quelques instants apres il a regu la communication de l'ambassadeur de France. _ II n'est pas venu a la meme reserve envers les tiers. Je I'ai vu hier et j'ai pu constater que ses ap- preciations concordent avec les miennes. II a ajoute que I'arrangement emeut surtout par la mise en scene. Le contenu des notes est assez insignifiant et elles n'auraient pas produit le meme effet si elles avaient ete immediatement livrees a la publicite. II va sans dire que le sous-secretaire d'etat ne prend pas au tragique un incident qui ne change rien a une situation deja connue; mais il en note un nou- veau symptome. Je dois vous prier de considerer ce que m'a dit M. de Miihlberg comme strictement confidentiel. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. which I have just quoted, respond to any demands of political necessity. If they do not conceal some hidden motives one might say that they are of a purely ornamental character. Japan is strong enough to guarantee the integrity of China all alone until the day when it will suit her to violate it her- self. It would be hard to admit that England needs Spain's assistance in order to defend her position in Egypt, Cyprus, Malta, and Gibraltar. Who is think- ing of attacking it and who, moreover, would have the material means to do so? France is no less se- cure in Algiers and Tunis. The danger could only come from one of the signatory Powers, if the friendship existing between them at present were to break. In such an event the present treaties would become null and void ipso facto. If they do not contain any secret clause, they seem to have been concluded only for the pleasure of leaving Germany outside once more in the regu- lation of the interests of the world. These precau- tions taken against imaginary perils are bound to awaken and to foster among the nations the idea that Germany is the aggressive Power, against the enterprises of which the other countries must unite. Matters would not be so bad if the treaties were simply superfluous, but they compromise the cause of peace which they pretend to serve because they nurse a belief in anti-German circles that the mo- ment is approaching when their schemes can be realized. The German press is dissatisfied; but no semi- official comment has as yet been made. But from the following fact you will be able to understand, better than from the official or semi- official statements, the real sentiment of the Im- perial Government. The Ambassador of Spain was the first to present to the Under-Secretary of State the notes exchanged between his country, France, and England. After he had let the Secretary read them, he endeavored to show that the agreement was in no way directed against Germany and had an exclusively pacific and defensive aim. Mr. von Miihlberg interrupted him with the remark : "Yes, I know; we are marching towards an era of eternal peace." This ironical remark is more eloquent than long speeches. Mr. von Muhlberg gave no sign of his impressions when a few minutes later he re- ceived the communication of the French Ambassa- dor. He did not observe the same reserve in regard to the third. I saw him yesterday and I found that his opinion agreed with mine. He added that the agreement was disquieting above all for its mise en scene. The content of the note is rather insignifi- cant and they would not have produced the same effect if they had been made public immediately. It goes without saying that the Under-Secretary of State does not take an incident tragically which changes nothing in a situation already well-known, but he notes it as a new symptom. I beg of you to regard what Mr. von Miihlberg told me as strictly confidential. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 36. No. 36. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique k Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Berlin, le ler Juillet 1907. Monsieur le Ministre ! La presse allemande s'est occupee, sansdu reste y insister beaucoup, de I'invitation a diner que I'Empereur a adressee a Kiel a M. Etienne et sur les deux longs entretiens qui I'ont suiyie. Le compte-rendu de ces deux audiences public par le "Journal" de Paris en denature evidemment le ca- ractere. II attribue a I'Empereur des paroles que Sa Majeste n'a certainement pas prononcees. Plus vraisemblable est la version donnee, d'apres un te- legramme de la Gazette de Voss, par le senateur Saint Germain, ami de M. Etienne: L'Empereur au- rait dit qu'il etait pret a se joindre aux autres puis- sances pour presser le Makhzen d'executer les re- formes sur lesquelles on s'est mis d'accord a Alge- siras et qu'il n'a pas d'objection a ce que la France exerce la police sur la frontiere qui separe I'Algerie du Maroc. Quel qu'ait ete le sujet de la conversation, un fait est certain, c'est que Sa Majeste a accueilli M. Etienne de la maniere la plus aimable efque celui-ci en a ete tres agreablement impressionne. Sa Ma- jeste reqoit du reste toujours avec une distinction tres marquee tons les Frangais qui se presentent a Elle. De Kiel M. Etienne s'est rendu a Berlin ou il a eu un tres long entretien avec le Chancelier. Une petite notice publiee par les journaux et evidem- ment inspiree dit que le Prince de Biilow aura sans doute ete charme par la personne de I'homme d'etat eminent qui lui a rendu visite et que I'accueil ami- cal et flatteur que M. Etienne a trouve a Berlin aura correspondu a celui que I'Empereur a reserve a Kiel a ses botes fran^ais. II est visible que le nouvel ambassadeur de France a Berlin, M. Cambon, a le desir d'ameliorer les relations de son pays avec I'Allemagne et il y a lieu de croire qu'il a presente des propositions con- cretes ou qu'il se propose d'en faire lorsqu'il jugera le moment favorable. En effet, M. Cambon, sans me faire aucune con- fidence, m'a dit recemment qu'il regrettait de trou- ver le gouvernement allemand toujours en defiance envers la France. Peu de temps auparavant M. de Miihlberg m'avait dit que M. Cambon s'etait ex- prime dans le meme sens avec lui et qu'il ne deman- dait pas mieux que d'etre confiant si la France prou- vait sa sincerite par des faits. Le regret exprime par M. Cambon n'aurait pas de raison d'etre si I'am- bassadeur n'avait pas fait ou essaye de faire des ou- vertures sur quelque point determine. Le voyage de M. Etienne a Kiel et la maniere dont il y a ete recju sont done a noter comme des symptomes, dont il ne faut pas toutefois exagerer I'importance. Des relations correctes entre Berlin et Paris sont le maximum de ce qui pent etre ob- tenu. Pour un rapprochement vrai et durable il fau- drait ne plus penser a la revanche, et il n'y a pas un Frangais, meme parmi les plus sages et les plus pacifiques, qui n'en conserve I'espoir au fond du cceur. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Sir:- Berlin,July 1, 1907. Agreez, etc. '[s.] Greindl. The German press has concerned itself, though not to any great extent, with the invitation to din- ner which the Emperor at Kiel sent to M. Etienne and with the two long conversations which followed it. The account of these audiences, published by Le Journal of Paris, obviously misrepresents their character. It attributes to the Emperor words which His Majesty certainly did not utter. More likely is the version given, according to a telegram to the Vossische Zeitung, by Senator Saint Ger- main, a friend of M. Etienne : The Emperor is re- ported as having said that he was ready to join the other Powers in order to press the Makhzen to carry out the reforms which had been agreed upon at Algeciras and that he did not object to France maintaining the police on the frontier which sep- arates Algiers from Morocco. Whatever may have been the subject of the con- versation, one fact is certain, viz., that His Majesty received M. Etienne in the most pleasant manner and that the latter was very agreeably impressed. His Majesty always receives all Frenchmen who are presented to him with special distinction. From Kiel, M. Etienne returned to Berlin where he had a long conversation with the Chancellor. A short, evidently inspired statement, published by the newspapers, says that Prince von Biilow was without doubt charmed by the personaHty of the eminent statesman who visited him, and that the friendly and flattering reception which M. Etienne had been accorded in Berlin will have corresponded with that which the Emperor had given to his French guests at Kiel. It is evident that the new French Ambassador at Berlin, M. Cambon, wishes to improve the relations between his country and Germany and there is rea- son to believe that he has presented concrete pro- posals, or that he intends to do so when he thinks the moment favorable. In fact, M. Cambon recently told me, not in any way confidentially, that he regretted to find the German Government always distrustful of France. A short time before that Mr. von Miihlberg had told me that M. Cambon had expressed himself to the same eflfect to him and that he desired nothing more than to trust France, if she proved her sin- cerity by facts. The regret expressed by M. Cam- bon would have no meaning if the French Ambassa- dor had not made or tried to make overtures on some definite point or other. M. Etienne's trip to Kiel and the way in which he was received there are, therefore, symptoms worthy of notice, but the importance of which must not be exaggerated. Correct relations between Ber- lin and Paris are the maximum of what can be attained. In order to bring about a real and lasting rapprochement it would be necessary to cease thinking of revenge, and there is not a Frenchman, even among the wisest and most pacific, who does not cherish the hope of revenge in the bottom of his heart. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. E. de Cartier, Charge d' Affaires de Belgique a Londres, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. M. E. de Cartier, Belgian Charge d' Affaires at Lon- don, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Londres, le 10 Aout 1907. Monsieur le Ministre! Le public anglais suit avec interet les developpe- ments de la crise marocaine. Les journaux publient de longues colonnes d'informations, mais se mon- trent en general assez sobres dans les remarques et reflexions que leur suggerent les tristes evene- ments qui se deroulent a Casablanca et ailleurs. Si I'opinion publique est entierement favorable a la France dans cette affaire, ce n'est peut-etre pas tant qu'elle soit particulierement heureuse a la pen- see de voir la "penetration pacifique," naguere pro- nee par M. Delcasse, sortir ses premiers effets, que parce qu'elle s'imagine, a tort ou a raison, que les entreprises militaires qui ont actuellement les ports marocains pour theatre sont desagreables a I'Alle- magne. Apres avoir decerne force louanges a la bravoure frangaise et au courage espagnol, les grands jour- naux anglais signalent avec insistance quelques ar- ticles publics dans les organes de la presse vien- noise qu'ils soupQonnent d'avoir reflete les aspira- tions de la Friedrichstrasse (sic!) et s'attachent a en opposer le sens aux declarations, conques dans un style moins sibyllin, que reproduisent les principaux journaux allemands. Sans aller jusqu'a exprimer le voeu que le bom- bardement de Casablanca soit suivi, pour le Maroc, des memes resultats que celui d'Alexandrie, en 1882, pour I'Egypte, la presse anglaise signale la necessite d'assurer, coute que coute, le retablissement de I'or- dre et de la securite des personnes et des biens. Seul, le "Standard," refletant en I'occurrence ce sen- timent d'inferventionnisme aigu qui sommeille dans I'ame britannique, s'etonne de I'apathie que temoi- gne le gouvernement devant la gravite des evene- ments en cours. II regrette de voir la France assu- mer seule la tache de faire la police, conjointement avec I'Espagne, et se plaint de voir I'Angleterre sa- tisfaite de jouer un role efface. Le "Daily News," qui ne se repose de sa cam- pagne anticongolaise que pour dresser des autels aux nihilistes russes et aux anarchistes italiens, s'in- surge, quelque peu prematurement, semble-t-il, cen- tre la barbarie de la repression a Mazagan. La "Tribune," organe des pasteurs non-confor- mistes et des radicaux humanitariens, signale avec melancolie le fait que les escadres frangaises et es- pagnoles bombardaient Casablanca au moment meme ou la Conference de la Haye adoptait une de- claration tendant a defendre le bombardement des ports ouverts. La "Westminster Gazette," le journal qui repre- sente les vues de la section moderee du parti au pou- voir, apres avoir fait allusion aux entretiens de M. Cambon avec le Prince de Biilow, exprime I'espoir que la France pourra, a la grande satisfaction de I'Europe et au prix de la vie d'une demi-douzaine de marins, obtenir enfin des coudees plus franches au Maroc, en vue de lui permettre de mener a bien la tache que les traites lui ont imposee. Les journaux du matin publient, sans commen- taires, quelques informations relatives au siege du Consulat anglais de Casablanca et signalent le desir Sir:- London, August 10, 1907. The English public is following with interest the developments of the Moroccan crisis. The papers are publishing long columns of information but are, on a whole, fairly sober in the remarks and reflec- tions which the sad events which are now taking place at Casablanca and elsewhere suggest to them. If public opinion is entirely favorable to France in this affair it is not perhaps so much because it rejoices particularly in the thought of seeing the "pacific penetration," recently preached by M. Del- casse, produce its first results as because it im- agines, rightly or wrongly, that the military oper- ations which are at present going on at the Moroc- can ports are disagreeable to Germany. After extolling French bravery and Spanish cour- age at length, the big EngHsh papers draw special attention to .articles published in the organs of the Viennese press which they surmise reflect the secret aspirations of the Friedrichstrasse (sic I) ; these they endeavor to compare with the statements, couched in a less sibylline style, which are printed in the principal German papers. Without going so far as to express the desire that the bombardment of Casablanca be followed with the same results for Morocco as that of Alexandria, in 1882 had for Egypt, the English press points out the necessity of ensuring, at any price, the re- establishment of order and the safety of life and property. Only the Standard, reflecting on this occasion that strong desire for intervention which is dormant in the British soul, is astonished at the apathy which the Government is displaying in face of the gravity of the present events. It regrets to see France alone, conjointly with Spain, assume the task of policing and complains of having to see England satisfied with playing a minor part. The Daily News, which is resting from its anti- Congo campaign only in order to erect altars to the Russian nihilists and the Italian anarchists, is get- ting excited, rather prematurely it seems to me, about the barbarous oppression at Mazagan. The Tribune, the organ of the non-conformist ministers and the radical humanitarians, melan- cholically points out that the French and Spanish squadrons bombarded Casablanca at the same mo- ment that the Conference at the Hague adopted a declaration against the bombardment of open ports. The Westminster Gazette, which represents the views of the moderate element of the party in power, after alluding to the conversations of M. Cambon with Prince von Biilow, expresses the hope that Europe will at last have the great satisfaction of seeing France, at no greater price than the lives of half a dozen marines, obtain more elbow-room in Morocco, which will permit her to carry to a successful end the task which the treaties have im- posed on her. The morning papers publish without comment news relative to the siege of the British consulate at Casablanca, and report the desire expressed by 47 exprime par le consul britannique de Mazagan de voir les personnes et les biens anglais mis sous la protection d'une canonniere. Les inquietudes sur le sort reserve au Kaid Mac- Lean se sont momentanement assoupies depuis qu'on a appris qu'il n'etait plus le captif de Raisuli mais sous la sauvegarde des Hkmass. J'aurai soin de vous tenir au fait des developpe- ments que pourraient presenter les evenements ac- tuels en tant qu'affectant les interets anglais, et saisis, etc. [s.] E. de Cartier. the British Consul at Mazagan to see English people and property put under the protection of a gun-boat. The uneasiness felt concerning the fate of Kaid MacLean has momentarily been allayed since it has been learned that he is no longer the captive of Raisuli but is under the protection of the Hkmass. I shall take care to keep you informed of the de- velopments wfhich the present events may take in so far as they affect the interests of England, and seize the opportunity, etc. . . . [Signed] E. de Cartier. No. 38. No. 38. Le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre de Belgique a Lon- dres, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Londres, le 11 Octobre 1907. Monsieur le Ministre! J'ai I'honneur de vous signaler I'article de fond ci-joint, qui a paru dans le "Times" d'hier, au sujet de la prochaine visite de I'Empereur d'Allemagne, et qui est tres commente. Le journal precite saisit I'occasion pour decocher au Prince de Btilowr une serie de traits aceres. II lui reproche de feindre un desir sincere de rapprochement avec I'Angleterre, tout en encourageant sous main la presse reptile dans ses attaques. II insinue que s'il revient en ap- parence a de meilleurs sentiments a I'egard de la Grande-Bretagne, c'est uniquement parce que I'en- tente cordiale entre Londres et Paris et I'arrange- ment anglo-russe ont ouvert les yeux du chancelier sur la forte position de I'Angleterre. Et puis la flotte allemande n'est pas prete. "Esperons plutot, ajoute perfidement le "Times," que Ton regrette a Berlin I'attitude hostile adoptee lors de la guerre des Boers. Nous sommes prets a pardonner, mais pas a oublier cet incident, pourvM que le repentir soit serieux, ce que rien dans I'atti- tude allemande au Maroc ou a la Haye n'a prouve jusqu'ici. S'il veut montrer sa sincerite, que le Chancelier fasse a nos amis les Frangais des avan- ces analogues a celles qu'il nous prodigue aujour- d'hui. Sir Edward Grey a dit que des bonnes re- lations entre I'AUemagne et la France depend I'ame- lioration des rapports entre I'AUemagne et I'Angle- terre." La presse liberale condamne ce langage. qu'elle qualifie d'insolent et de maladroit. La "Tribune" et la "Westminster Gazette" notamment I'appre- cient severement et afifirment que I'Empereur sera bien accueilli. Quant aux socialistes, ils ont an- nonce qu'ils se chargent de montrer au Kaiser, lors- qu'il traversera les rues de Londres, ce que I'ouvrier anglais pense de Sa Majeste Imperiale, mais on ne parait pas prendre ces menaces au serieux et on espere que les mesures de precaution seront suffi- santes pour empecher tout incident. L'Empereur et I'lmperatrice doivent arriver en Angleterre, accompagnes probablement du Prince de Billow, le 11 du mois prochain et logeront a Windsor. Le 13, Leurs Majestes viendront dejeu- ner chez le Lord Maire dans la Cite pour rentrer en- suite a Windsor, oii Elles feront un sejour d'une huitaine de jours en tout. Veuillez, etc. [s.] - Cte. de Lalaing. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M, Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. London, October 11, 1907. Sir:— I have the honor to draw your attention to the en- closed editorial article on the impending visit of the German Emperor which appeared in yesterday's Times and is being much discussed. The paper seizes the occasion to aim a number of sharp blows at Prince von Biilow. It accuses him of feigning a sincere desire for a rapprochement with England while at the same time, under hand, encouraging the attacks of the reptile press. It insinuates that if he appeared to be developing more sympathy for Great Britain, it was only because the entente cor- diale between London and Paris and the Anglo- Russian understanding had opened the Chancellor's eyes to England's strong position. And besides, the German fleet was not ready. The Times adds maliciously that it hopes that the hostile attitude adopted at the time of the Boer War was being regretted at Berlin. The English could not forget but were ready to forgive that in- cident, provided that the repentance was sincere, which nothing in Germany's attitude in Morocco or at the Hague had yet proven. If the Chancellor wanted to show his sincerity he should make to Britain's friends, the French, advances of the kind which he seemed eager to press in words upon the English. Sir Edward Grey had declared that the improvement of the relations between Germany and England was conditional on good relations between Germany and France. The liberal press condemns this language which it calls insolent and bungling. The Tribune and the Westminster Gazette especially criticize it se- verely and affirm that the Emperor will be well received. As for the socialists, they have announced that they are going to show the Kaiser when he rides through the streets of London, what the Eng- lish laborer thinks of his Imperial Majesty; but these threats do not seem to be taken seriously and it is hoped that sufficient precautions will be taken to preclude incidents. The Emperor and the Empress are to arrive in England, probably accompanied by Prince von Biilow, on the 11th of next month and they will stay at Windsor. On the 13th, their Majesties will take luncheon with the Lord Mayor in the city and will then return to Windsor where they will remain for about a week altogether. Accept, etc. [Signed] Ct. de Lalaing. No. 39. No. 39. X.e Baron de Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Monsieur le Ministre ! Berlin, le 27 Janvier 1908 C'est ce matin seulement que j'ai eu sous les yeux le discours prononce a la chambre des deputes frangaise par M. Delcasse. Je n'avais pas voulu vous en ecrire aussi longtemps que je ne le connais- sais que par des resumes telegraphiques qui n'en ■donnaient peut-etre pas une idee exacte. Ce dis- cours m'a cause une impression penible, non parce qu'apres trois ans de silence M. Delcasse a fait I'e- loge de sa propre politique (il fallait s'y attendre), mais a cause des applaudissements dont il a ete con- vert et de I'accueil que lui a fait la presse, surtout celle de Londres. Le discours fourmiUe d'allusions blessantes pour I'Allemagne. II y est dit que le gouvernement Imperial n'ayant pas de pretexte pour une intervention dans les afifaires marocaines devait avoir ses raisons. II y avait que I'Europe echap- pait a une sorte d'hegemonie et dans I'Europe libe- ree, il y avait la France autour de qui se serraient tous les peuples qui avaient a coeur I'independance de I'Europe et voulaient consolider cette indepen- dance. Ovi M. Delcasse a-t-il vu que I'Allemagne tentat d'imposer sa suprematie aux autres peuples euro- peens? Nous sommes ses tres proches voisins et de- puis vingt ans je n'ai jamais constate chez le gou- vernement Imperial la moindre velleite d'abuser de sa force et de notre faiblesse. Je souhaiterais que toutes les autres grandes puissances eussent use des memes menagements envers nous. M. Delcasse dit que I'Allemagne n'a jamais eu le projet de faire la guerre a propos du Maroc. C'est vrai; mais au lieu d'attribuer cette moderation aux sentiments pacifiques de I'Empereur, il en voit la cause dans ce que la France avait pour elle la ma- jorite des grandes puissances, I'opinion du monde, des amities puissantes, une alliance fidele et tout d'abord la confiance en soi. En d'autres termes, M. Delcasse se vante d'avoir preserve la paix du monde grace a la campagne me- nee par lui de concert avec le Roi d'Angleterre pour isoler I'Allemagne. M. Delcasse dit qu'il ne faut pas laisser defigurer une politique etrangere (la sienne) qui a par deux fois conserve la paix a I'Europe. Dans quelles circonstances? Quand le repos de I'Europe a-t-il ete menace sinon par les idees de re- vanche frangaises? Dans son numero 90 d'hier la "Gazette de Colo- gne" a public un telegramme de Berlin d'origine evi- demment officieuse dans lequel je vous prie de re- marquer le passage oii il est dit qu'on laisse au gou- vernement frangais et aux Frangais eux-memes le soin de juger si le moment est bien choisi pour ra- viver d'anciennes querelles. Le correspondant offi- cieux eut prefere n'y pas toucher, lorsque la ques- tion marocaine est encore au centre de I'actualite et peut de nouveau donner lieu a bien des pourpar- lers entre la France et I'Allemagne qui ne seront pas facilites par le fait qu'un homme politique aussi eminent que M. Delcasse met en vibration des cor- des franchement chauvines. Le langage du telegramme oflfiicieux est aussi calme que possible. II est d'autant plus significatif que M. Delcasse reproche au gouvernement fran- Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, January 27, 1908. Sir:— Only this morning I saw^ for the first time the speech which M. Delcasse made in the French Chamber of Deputies. I did not want to write to you about it as long as I was only acquainted with it through telegraphic resumes which might not per- haps give a correct idea of it. This speech has made a painful impression on me, not because after three years of silence M. Delcasse praised his own policy (that was to be expected), but because of the plaudits which he received and the reception which he was given by the press, above all that of Lon- don. The speech is full of allusions offensive to Germany. M. Delcasse .says in it that while the Imperial Government had had no pretext to offer for its intervention in the Moroccan affairs it surely had had its reasons: it feared that Europe was go- ing to escape from a kind of [German] hegemony and that in a liberated Europe the nations which had her independence at heart and wished to see it strengthened would rally around France. Where has M. Delcasse seen Germany endeavor- ing to impose her supremacy on other nations? We are her close neighbors, but for twenty years I have never observed in the Imperial Government the slightest desire to abuse its strength and our weakness. I wish that all the other Great Powers had used the same consideration towards us. M. Delcasse said that Germany never had any intention of waging war on account of Morocco. That is true ; but instead of attributing this moder- ation to the peaceful sentiments of the Emperor, he sees the reason for it in the fact that France had in her favor the majority of the Great Powers, the opinion of the world, powerful friendships, a faithful ally, and above all, confidence in herself. In other words, M. Delcasse boasts that the pres- ervation of the peace of the world is due to the cam- paign conducted by himself together with the King of England with the aim of isolating Germany. M. Delcasse said that one ought not to permit the condemnation of a foreign policy (his own) which had twice preserved the peace of Europe. Under what circumstances ? When was the peace of Europe menaced except by the French ideas of revenge ? In its issue of yesterday, No. 90, the Cologne Ga- zette published a telegram from Berlin, evidently of semi-official origin, in which I ask you to note the passage which says that it must be left to the French Government and to the French people to judge whether the moment for reviving old quarrels was well chosen. The semi-official correspondent thinks it would have been better not to touch on them at a time when the Moroccan question was still in the centre of interest and might again lead to all kinds of pourparlers between France and Germany: these would not be made easier if so prominent a politician as M. Delcasse struck notes plainly chauvinistic in tone. The language of the semi-official telegram is as controlled as it can possibly be. This is all the more significant because M. Delcasse reproaches the 49 Qais de n'avoir pas suffisamment tire parti des proto- coles d'Algesiras et demande qui comprendrait les defaillances de la France en presence de la position reconquise par ce pays et lorsqu'il s'agit de son ave- nir comme grande puissance. Le discours de M. Delcasse equivaut a une exhor- tation de reprendre sa politique dont son successeur ne s'est pourtant ecarte que par des nuances de forme et a lui en confier de nouveau la direction. Les deputes qui I'ont applaudi sont les memes qui I'ont laisse tomber il y a trois ans parce qu'ils le trouvaient temeraire. S'imaginent-ils qu'il y a quelque chose de change en Allemagne? Croient-ils la Russie suffisamment guerie pour leur venir effi- cacement en aide? Speculent-ils sur la faiblesse de la majorite gouvernementale au Reichstag, sur le mauvais etat des finances de i'Empire et de la Prusse, sur le malaise cause par la crise financiere et la cherte des vivres, sur les recriminations contre la Prusse qui se produisent dans la presse et parfois dans les parlements des etats du midi, specialement en Baviere? S'il en est ainsi, ils se livrent aux illusions les plus dangereuses. J'etais en Baviere en 1870. L'hostilite contre la Prusse y etait bien autrement intense qu'aujourd'hui, on etait encore tout meurtri de la defaite de 1866. Tout a ete oublie le jour ou il a fallu tenir tete a I'ennemi commun. II en serait encore de meme a plus forte raison. Le particu- larisrae est toujours tres vivace et le restera; mais il n'y a pas un seul Allemand qui voudrait revenir a I'isolement et a I'impuissance d'autrefois. En terminant, je dois encore faire remarquer que les eloges prodigues par les journaux anglais a M. Delcasse montrent ce qu'il faut penser du recent rapprochement entre I'Allemagne et I'Angleterre. La politique dirigee par le Roi Edouard VII sous le pretexte de garantir I'Europe du peril allemzind imaginaire a cree un danger frangais trop r6el et qui nous menace en premiere ligne. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. French Government for not having taken sufficient advantage of the protocols of Algeciras and asks, who would understand how France, now that she had recovered her position, could take such a weak stand in a matter involving her future as a Great Power. M. Delcasse's speech is tantamount to an exhorta- tion to revert to his policy — from which that of his successor has not deviated except in slight differ- ences of form — and to put the direction of this policy again in his hands. The deputies who applauded him are the same who dropped him three years ago because they con- sidered him too rash. Do they imagine that there has been any change in Germany? Do they believe that Russia has recovered sufficiently to give them eflfectual aid? Are they counting on the weakness of the Government majority in the Reichstag, on the poor state of the finances of the Empire and of Prussia, on the uneasiness caused by the financial crisis and high food-prices, on the recriminations against Prussia which are sometimes made in the press and in the parliaments of the Southern States of Germany, especially in Bavaria? If that is the case, they are indulging in the most dangerous illusions. I was in Bavaria in 1870. The hostility against Prussia was much more intense at that time than it is to-day ; they were still smart- ing from the defeat of 186(5. Yet everything was forgotten on the day when it was necessary to face the common enemy. This still holds good to-day and to a far greater degree. Particularism is still very strong and will remain so ; but there is no longer a single German who would like to return to the isolation and impotence of former times. In conclusion I would like to remark that the praises showered on M. Delcasse by the English papers show what is to be thought of the recent rapprochement between Germany and England. The policy directed by King Edward VII under the pretext of guarding Europe from the imaginary German peril has created a French danger which is only too real and which is a menace, above all, to us. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. M. A. Leghait, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. M. A. Leghait, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, le 27-30 Janvier 1908. Monsieur le Ministre! Les evenements qui se succedent au Maroc tien- nent I'opinion publique en eveil et fournissent aux membres de I'opposition I'occasion de harceler le Gouvernement de reproches. La Chambre a com- mence vendredi dernier et terminera lundi ou mardi prochain I'examen des interpellations sur les affaires marocaines. M. Jaures, qui avait suspendu depuis quelques mois ses attaques contre M. Clemenceau, a pris le premier la parole pour critiquer la politique marocaine du Gouvernement et pour proposer I'a- bandon de toute action au Maroc, c'est-a-dire I'abdi- cation de la France. M. Jaures ne semble tenir au- cun compte de la dignite nationale, tandis que I'opi- nion publique et la majorite de la Chambre, qui ne sont pourtant ni I'une ni I'autre favorables a une aventure marocaine, sont nettement hostiles a une Paris, January 27-30, 1908. Sir :— The events which are following one another at Morocco are keeping public opinion on the alert and are furnishing the members of the opposition with the opportunity of harassing the Government with reproaches. The Chamber began the examination of the interpellations on the Moroccan affairs last Friday and will finish it next Monday or Tuesday. M. Jaures, who has refrained from attacks on M. Clemenceau for several months, was the first to seize the opportunity of criticizing the Moroccan policy of the Government and of proposing the abandonment of all action at Morocco, that is to say the abdication of France. M. Jaures does not seem to take national dignity into consideration, whereas public opinion and the majority in the Chamber, though not in favor of a Moroccan ad- politique d'abdication. M. Ribot dans une mordante et energique replique aux arguments du leader so- cialiste a expose les raisons de dignite, d'interet et d'honneur national qui obligent la France a pour- suivre I'oeuvre marocaine. M. Ribot, en y ajoutant quelques conseils de prudence, approuve au fond I'attitude du Gouvernement au Maroc. Le fait le plus important et le plus inattendu de la seance de vendredi a ete I'intervention de M. Del- casse. L'ancien Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, tombe en juin 1905 dans les circonstances tragiques qui sont encore a la memoire de tous, s'etait abstenu jusqu' ici avec autant de tact que de patriotisme de chercher a se justifier et son silence avait ete appre- cie autant ici qu'au dela des frontieres de I'Est. On se demande si c'est fortuitement ou avec pre- meditation que M. Delcasse est intervenu dans le debat. Le fait est que, sur une allusion faite par M. Jaures, il a demande la parole et a prononce un discours qui a fait sensation. Certes, bien des rai- sons personnelles pouvaient engager M. Delcasse a profiter d'une occasion pour parler a tous ceux qui poursuivent encore aujourd'hui sa politique generale apres I'avoir abandonne et maltraite depuis le jour ou sa retraite avait ete decretee comme un sacrifice national. En faisant I'historique des amities qui se sont groupees autour de la France sous son admi- nistration, il s'est attribue tout le merite d'une situa- tion nouvelle qui, d'apres lui, rendait la guerre avec I'Allemagne impossible. Le Frangais chauvin s'est rallie avec enthousiasme a cette affirmation sans se demander 1.) si le groupement nouveau des Puis- sances n'est pas le resultat d'un vaste programme admirablement congu a Londres et dans I'execution duquel M. Delcasse a beaucoup plus ete un instru- ment qu'un initiateur? 2.) si son affirmation que la resistance aux pretentions de I'Allemagne en 1905 et le refus d'aller a Algesiras n'eussent pas amene la guerre est fondee? C'est la une opinion qu'il est facile pour I'ex-ministre d'avancer aujourd'hui pour soulever en sa faveur les sentiments patriotiques de ceux qui ont soufifert de I'humiliation subie en 1905. Mais cela n'empeche que tous ceux qui ont acclame hier M. Delcasse avaient au moment de sa chute une appreciation bien dififerente du resultat de sa politique et aucun d'eux ne lui a tendu la main ou n'a ose proferer une parole pour sa defense lorsqu'il a ete immole. Si M. Delcasse a reussi en faisant habilement vi- brer la note patriotique a obtenir un succes person- nel notoire, on se demande s'il n'a pas commis une grosse faute politique en ravivant des incidents de- Hcats et en risquant de provoquer de nouvelles et dangereuses polemiques dans la presse etrangere. On voit du reste deja combien son discours est ap- precie en Angleterre et combien il est critique en Allemagne. La note officieuse de la "Gazette de Cologne" est une riposte qui a deja fait comprendre ici combien etait deplace I'elan d'enthousiasme qui s'est mani- feste vendredi a la suite des paroles de M. Delcasse. On estime done que M. Delcasse eOit agi sagement en continuant a se renfermer dans un prudent si- lence. M. Pichon en repondant mardi aux diverses in- terpellations se bornera sans doute a indiquer la po- litique que le Gouvernement compte suivre au Ma- roc, et sans vouloir s'engager a la suite de M. Del- casse dans la discussion du passe il jugera peut-etre utile d'attenuer I'impression produite a I'etranger par certaines de ses affirmations. Veuillez agreer, etc. [s.] Leghait. venture, are decidedly opposed to a policy of abdi- cation. M. Ribot in a biting and powerful reply to the arguments of the Socialist leader set forth that considerations of dignity, interest, and national honor were obliging France to continue her Mo- roccan task. Aside from a few admonitions to be prudent, M. Ribot on the whole endorsed the atti- tude of the Government in regard to Morocco. The most important and the most unexpected incident at Friday's session was the intervention of M. Delcasse. Ever since his fall in June, 1905, the tragic circumstances of which are still remem- bered by everyone, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs has abstained with as much tact as patriot- ism from attempting to justify himself, and his si- lence has been appreciated here as well as on the other side of the Eastern frontier. It may be questioned as to whether M. Delcasse intervened in the debate spontaneously or with pre- meditation. The fact is that he asked for permis- sion to speak after an allusion made by M. Jaures and he made a speech which created a sensation. There certainly are quite a number of personal rea- sons which may have caused M. Delcasse to seize the opportunity to address all those who are still follovrtng his general policy after abandoning and maltreating him from the day on which his resigna- tion was decided on as a national sacrifice. In giv- ing an account of the friendships which France ac- quired during his administration, he took all the credit to himself for a new situation which, accord- ing to him, made war with Germany impossible. The French chauvinists received this statement with enthusiasm without asking themselves: (1) whether the new grouping of the Powers is not the result of a vast programme admirably conceived at London and in the execution of which M. Delcasse was much more a tool than an initiator; (2) whether he is right when he says that resistance to the German demands in 1905 and refusal to go to Algeciras would not have led to war. This is an opinion which it is easy for the ex-Minister to ad- vance to-day in order to arouse in his favor the patriotic sentiments of those who suffered under the humiliation of 1905. But that changes nothing in the fact that all those who acclaimed M. Delcasse yesterday had at the moment of his fall a very dif- ferent conception of the results of his policy. Not one of them lent him a helping hand or said a word in his defence when he was sacrificed. Though M. Delcasse has succeeded by skillfully sounding the patriotic note in scoring a decided per- sonal success, it may be asked whether he has not committed a great political mistake in reviving delicate incidents and in running the risk of calling forth new and dangerous polemics in the foreign press. It may already be seen how much his speech is appreciated in England and how much it is criti- cized in Germany. The semi-official notice in the Cologne Gazette is a retort which has already made people realize here how out of place the outburst of enthusiasm was which was evoked by M. Delcasse's speech' on Friday; and it is thought that M. Delcasse would have been better advised if he had continued to wrap himself in discreet silence. In his reply on Tuesday to the various inter- pellations, M. Pichon will doubtless confine him- self to indicating the policy which the Government intends to follow in Morocco and, without allowing himself to be drawn into a discussion of the past, he will perhaps see fit to mitigate the impression produced abroad by some of M. Delcasse's state- ments. Accept, etc. [Signed] A. Leghait. No. 41. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 29 Janvier 1908. Monsieur le Ministre ! Comme suite a men rapport d'avant-hier j'ai rhonneur d'appeler votre attention sur un nouveau telegramme de Berlin insere dans le numero 98 de la "Gazette de Cologne" d'hier et dont I'origine oflft- cieuse n'est pas douteuse. La Gazette constate que le deuxieme jour du de- bat sur le Maroc, a la chambre frangaise, n'a pas eu le caractere orageux que M. Delcasse avait imprime au premier. Tous les orateurs se sont exprimes avec moderation et il semble que les deputes qui avaient frenetiquement applaudi I'ancien Ministre des affaires etrangeres dans la seance de vendredi eprouvaient une certaine gene de la violence a la- quelle celui-ci s'etait livre. La Gazette dit que M. Pichon a evite d'attaquer M. Delcasse plus qu'il n'etait necessaire. II s'est borne a desavouer la politique de sabreur preconisee par son predecesseur et a afifirmer, comme il I'a deja fait souvent, que la France veut se renfermer stric- tement dans les limites tracees par I'acte d'Algesi- ras. Je ne peux pas m'associer a ce jugement. II me parait au contraire que M. Pichon a tres durement fait la legon a M. Delcasse. Quoiqu'il en soit, le telegramme offlcieux cons- tate avec satisfaction que le discours de M. Pichon a aussi ete convert d'applaudissements provenant en partie des memes bancs d'oii Ton avait acclame M. Delcasse. La Gazette dit que le ton provocateur de M. Del- casse n'avait pas pu passer inapergu en Allemagne. Elle se felicite d'autant plus du calme dont ont fait preuve -les journaux allemands que la presse fran- qaise revient aussi a des appreciations plus mode- rees. Des organes de plus en plus nombreux ma- nifestent leurs objections centre la politique d'aven- tures preconisee par M. Delcasse. II est done a esperer qu'il n'aura pas cause un mal durable. Le telegramme officieux note encore que les jour- naux des pays qui ont les relations les plus amicales avec la France sont loin d'etre enchantes des sorties de M. Delcasse. Deja en Angleterre des journaux les condamnent. La presse italienne et espagnole est encore plus severe. On a declare dans les deux pays qu'on n'est pas dispose a suivre la France dans la politique d'aventures ou M. Delcasse voudrait la pousser. On I'a dit avec une nettete qui a peut-etre aussi contribue au triomphe d'une appreciation plus calme de la situation. Cette conclusion du telegramme ofificieux est re- digee en termes tres concis; a dessein sans doute pour lui enlever tout caractere blessant. Que peut- elle signifier sinon que le discours de M. Delcasse a ete applaudi parce qu'il repond aux aspirations in- times des Frangais tous assoiffes de revanche qu'ils I'avouent ou non et que les paroles de M. Pichon ont ete acclamees par les memes deputes parce que du vendredi au lundi ils ont eu, avec I'aide de la presse etrangere, le temps de reflechir au danger de manifester de pareils sentiments quand on n'est pas pret a passer immediatement a Taction. Berlin, January 29, 1908. Sir:— In pursuance of my report of the day before yes- terday I have the honor to call your attention to another telegram from Berlin in issue 98 of the Cologne Gazette of yesterday, the official origin of which is unquestionable. The Gazette states that the second day of the Moroccan debate in the French Chamber did not have the stormy character which M. Delcasse had given to the first. All the speakers expressed them- selves with moderation, and it seemed as if the deputies who had frantically applauded the former Minister of Foreign Affairs at Friday's session were feeling a certain amount of shame at the violence in which M. Delcasse had indulged. The Gazette says that M. Pichon avoided attack- ing M. Delcasse any more than was necessary. He confined himself to disavowing the swashbuckling policy recommended by his predecessor and to af- firming, as he had frequently done, that France wished to keep strictly within the limits defined by the act of Algeciras. I cannot share this opinion. It seems to me on the contrary that M. Pichon rebuked M. Delcasse very severely. However that may be, the semi-official telegram states with satisfaction that M. Pichon's speech was also received with applause, coming in part from the same benches from which M. Delcasse had been acclaimed. The Gazette says that M. Delcasse's challenging tone could not pass unnoticed in Germany. It con- gratulates itself all the more on the calmness which the German papers had manifested because the the French press was likewise reverting to a more moderate point of view. An increasing number of organs were objecting to the adventurous policy re- commended by M. Delcasse. It was, therefore, to be hoped that he had not caused any lasting harm. The semi-official telegram also notes that the papers of the countries which were on the most friendly terms with France were far from delighted with M. Delcasse's outbursts. Several papers in England were already condemning it. The Italian and the Spanish press were even more severe. It had been declared in both of these countries that no one was disposed to follow France in the adventur- ous policy into which M. Delcasse wished to force her. This had been said with a distinctness which had perhaps also contributed to the triumph of a calmer view of the situation. This conclusion of the semi-official telegram is couched in very concise terms, doubtless with the purpose of eliminating everything offensive. What could it mean but that M. Delcasse's speech was applauded because it corresponds with the secret aspirations of the French who are filled with desires of revenge whether they acknowledge it or not, and that the words of M. Pichon were acclaimed by the same deputies because from Friday to Monday they had the opportunity, with the aid of the foreign press, to reflect on the danger of manifesting such sentiments without being ready to take action im- mediately. Meme si Ton n'admet pas que la prudence ait in- fluence le revirement de la chambre frangaise, il n'est pas rassurant de constater que la paix du monde est a la merci de deputes incapables et versatiles au point de se dejuger en matiere aussi grave, d'une seance a I'autre. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. If one does not admit that prudence influenced the sudden change in the French Chamber it is any- thing but reassuring to note that the peace of the world is at the mercy of deputies so incapable and vacillating as to change their opinion in such a grave matter from one meeting to another. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 42. No. 42. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Berlin, le 2 Fevrier 1908. Monsieur le Ministre! Par mon rapport du 19 novembre dernier j'ai eu I'honneur de vous envoyer le projet de loi reduisant la duree du service des navires de guerre. Les jour- naux vous auront appris que ce projet a ete vote il y a deux jours par le Reichstag et que seul M. Be- bel I'a combattu. Cette unanimite confirme les conclusions de mon rapport precite et fait voir mieux que toutes les en- trevues de souverains et tous les discours officiels quel est I'etat veritable des relations entre I'Alle- magne et I'Angleterre. Personne n'a jamais eu ici I'idee absurde et irrealisable d'une agression contra I'Angleterre; mais tout le monde eprouve la crainte d'une agression anglaise. C'est la raison pour la- quelle le Reichstag a vote sans sourciller une enorme augmentation de depenses pour la marine de guerre quoique le budget de I'Empire souffre d'un deficit qu'on ne sait pas comment combler et que les finan- ces de la Prusse soient en tout aussi mauvais etat. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, February 2, 1908. Sir:— In my report of November 19th I had the honor to send you. the draft of the law reducing the term of service of battle-ships. The papers will have in- formed you that this plan was accepted by the Reichstag two days ago and that only Mr. Bebel opposed it. This unanimity confirms the conclusions drawn in the above-mentioned report and shows better than all the rneetings of sovereigns and officials speeches what is the true state of the relations be- tween Germany and England. No one ever cher- ished the absurd and impracticable idea here of an attack against England; but everybody fears an English attack. That is the reason why the Reich- stag voted without wincing the enormous increase in the naval estimates although the budget of the Empire is sufifering from a deficit which no one knows how to cover, and although the Prussian finances are in quite as poor a condition. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 43. No. 43. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Berlin, le 28 Mars 1908. Monsieur le Ministre ! Par mon rapport du 2 fevrier dernier j'ai eu I'hon- neur de vous ecrire que I'accueil fait par le Reichstag au projet reduisant la duree du service des navires de guerre montrait mieux que tous les discours offi- ciels et toutes les entrevues de souverains quel est I'etat veritable des relations entre TAlIemagne et I'Angleterre. Le projet constitue une augmentation du materiel de la marine militaire, accompagnee d'une nouvelle charge financiere des plus difficiles a supporter dans un moment oii le budget de I'Empire souflfre d'un deficit que personne ne sait comment combler. On ne s'y resigne que parce qu'on se croit oblige de mettre tout en oeuvre pour se preserver d'une agression possible de la part de I'Angleterre. II y a quelques annees encore le developpement de la marine de guerre rencontrait de nombreux adver- saires. II n'en a plus aujourd'hui que parmi les so- cialistes. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, March 28, 1908. Sir:— In my report of February 2nd, I had the honor to write to you that the reception given by the Reichstag to the plan of reducing the term of ser- vice of the warships showed better than all official speeches and all meetings of sovereigns what is the real state of the relations between Germany and England. The plan involves an increase in the ma- terial of the fleet, accompanied by a new financial burden which is especially difficult to carry at a moment when the budget of the Empire is suffer- ing from a deficit which no one knows how to cover. It is accepted because it is believed necessary to do everything possible to guard against a possible attack on the part of England. Only a few years ago the development of the fleet had numerous op- ponents. To-day there are such only among the sociaHsts. Hier encore le Reichstag a donne une nouvelle preuve de ces sentiments. II a precede en une seule seance a la troisieme lecture du budget de I'Empire. La discussion a roule presque entierement sur la de- tresse des finances et n'a produit que des resultats negatifs. Chacun reconnait qu'il faut_ creer de nou- velles ressources et indique les impots dont il ne veut pas sans en nommer d'autres auxquels on pour- rait recourir. Les credits concernant la marine ont pourtant ete votes tels que les avait presentes le gouvernement sans la moindre difficulte par tons les partis, sauf les socialistes. Le centre lui-meme a montre la meme bonne volonte que les autres frac- tions de la chambre malgre I'attitude d'opposition systematique qu'il a prise depuis que le chancelier a rompu avec lui. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. Only yesterday the Reichstag gave a new proof of these sentiments. At a single session it pro- ceeded to the third reading of the budget. The discussion revolved almost entirely around the financial distress and only produced negative re- sults. Everyone recognizes that it is necessary to create new resources and mentions the duties which he does not want introduced without naming others to which recourse could be taken. The credits in regard to the navy were, however, voted with- out the slightest difficulty by all parties except the socialists in the form presented by the Government. Even the centre showed the same willingness as the other factions, despite the systematic attitude of oposition which it assumed since the Chancellor broke with it. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 6 Mai 1908. Monsieur le Ministre! Ce qu'il y a de plus intereosant a remarquer dans le livre blanc que j'ai eu I'honneur de vous adresser par mon rapport d'hier est la longanimite avec la- quelle le gouvernement allemand feint de ne pas s'apercevoir de la contradiction flagrante qu'il y a entre les declarations absolument correctes du gou- vernement frangais et la conquete du Maroc auquel precede la France en vertu d'un soi-disant mandat europeen que personne ne lui a donne et en se pre- tendant entraine par des circonstances qu'elle qua- lifie de fortuites et qu'elle a au contraire soigneuse- ment provoquees. Immediatement apres I'assassinat de ses ressor- tissants a Casablanca et sans avoir aucune raison de croire que le gouvernement marocain negligerait de rechercher et de punir les coupables, le gouver- nement franqais a riposte par un precede plus odieux encore que celui des assassins, bombardant une ville ouverte, massacrant des femmes et des en- fants, ruinant des commer<;ants inoflfensifs, au mo- ment meme ou ses delegues a la Haye prononqaient vertueusement de beaux discours humanitaires. On n'a pas pu manquer de prevoir a Paris que cette brutalite produirait non seulement au Maroc, mais encore dans tout le monde musulman, un mou- vement xenophobe et surtout anti-frangais, fournis- sant le pretexte desire pour proceder k une occupa- tion qualifiee ofRciellement de temporaire, mais qu'on se propose evidemment de rendre eternelle. Au quai d'Orsay on en est revenu a la politique de M. Delcasse avec I'hypocrisie de la forme en plus. On commence meme a se passer de celle-ci. II n'est deja plus question d'impartialite entre les deux pre- tendants. Le gouvernement frangais s'est range ou- vertement du cote d'Abdul Azis, qui, abandonne par son peuple, accepte la protection franqaise pour sau- ver un semblant de souverainete et peut-etre sa vie. L'Allemagne tolere. Elle ne pent pas faire autre- ment. Le temps des negociations diplomatiques est passe. Elle n'a plus a choisir qu'entre I'ignorance volontaire et la guerre dont I'Empereur ne veut pas Sir: Berlin, May 6, 1908. The most interesting point to be noted in the White Book, which I had the honor to send youin my report of yesterday, is the forbearance with which the German Government feigns not to have perceived the flagrant contradiction which exists between the absolutely correct declarations of the French Government and the conquest of Morocco with which France is proceeding in virtue, as she says, of a European mandate which no one gave her, and under the pretext of being forced by cir- cumstances which she calls accidental but which, on the contrary, she purposely provoked. Immediately after the assassination of her sub- jects at Casablanca, and without having any ground whatsoever for believing that a Moroccan Govern- ment would neglect to search for and to punish the culprits, the French Government proceeded in an even more odious way than the assassins did, bombarding an open town, massacring women and children, ruining inoflfensive merchants at the very moment when her delegates at the Hague were making high-sounding humanitarian speeches. Doubtless it was foreseen in Paris that this brutality would produce not only in Morocco but also in th^ entire Mohammedan world an anti-for- eign and above all an anti-French movement, which would furnish the desired pretext for an occupation, officially called temporary, but which it is evidently intended to make permanent. The Quai d'Orsay has returned to the policy of M. Delcasse, covering it with the cloak of hypocrisy. But now it is com- mencing to dispense even with this. There is no longer any question of impartiality in the treatment of the two pretenders. The French Government has openly sided with Abdul Azis who, abandoned by his people, has accepted French protection in order to save a semblance of sovereignty and per- haps his life. Germany tolerates this. She cannot do other- wise. The time for diplomatic negotiations is past. She has now only the choice between pretending ignorance and engaging in a war which the Em- et qui serait condamnee par I'opinion allemande. L'interet de rAllemagne est trop minime pour jus- tifier les risques d'une conflagration europeenne. Beaucoup de gens le croient meme nul. L'aventure marocaine coutera a la France beaucoup de sang ct beaucoup d'argent. Pourquoi la detournerait-on d'une entreprise qui la paralysera pour longtemps du cote des Vosges? L'inaction de I'AUemagne fait qu'au quai d'Orsay on ose de plus en plus. Vous aurez lu que deux en- voyes de Maula Hafith se sont embarques charges d'une mission aupres du gouvernement allemand. Le journal officieux du ministere des affaires etran- geres frangais intime en quelque sorte au gouverne- ment Imperial I'ordre de ne pas les recevoir. Dans sa revue hebdomadaire de la politique ex- terieure, publiee ce matin, la "Kreuz-Zeitung" re- pousse vertement la pretention de controler les re- lations de I'Allemagne. Vous savez que le redac- teur de cette revue, M. Schiemann, est persona grata aupres de I'Empereur et tres bien vu au departe- ment des affaires etrangeres, ou il va chercher ses informations, et souvent, sans etre a aucun degre officieux, ses inspirations. La replique de M. Schiemann est done a noter comme un symptome prouvant que la patience de I'AUemagne commence a se lasser. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. peror does not wish and which would be condemned by German public opinion. Germany's interest [in Morocco] is is too small to justify the risk of a Eu- ropean conflict; many people regard it even as nil. The Moroccan adventure will cost France much in blood and money. Why should Germany turn her away from an enterprise which will paralyze her for a long time on the Vosges front? Germany's inaction encourages the Quai d'Orsay to proceed with ever increasing boldness. You will have read that two envoys from Mulai Hafid have embarked on a mission to the German Government. The semi-official paper of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs almost orders the Imperial Gov- ernment not to receive them. In its weekly review of foreign politics published this morning, the Kreuz Zeitung vigorously pro- tests against any such control over Germany's for- eign relations. As you know, the editor of that re- view, Mr. Schiemann, is persona grata with the Em- peror and is held in high esteem at the Department of Foreign Affairs where he obtains his information and often receives inspirations, though he is by no means to be considered a semi-ofticial writer. Mr. Schiemann's reply is therefore, to be re- garded as a symptom showing that Germany's pa- tience is begining to wear out. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 45. No. 45. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 10 Mai 1908. Monsieur le Ministre! Comme suite a mon rapport du 6 mai j'ai I'hon- neur de vous faire savoir que les delegues de Maula Hafith sont arrives avant-hier a Hambourg par mer et hier a Berlin. Les journaux annoncent qu'ils se- ront regus demain et ecoutes par le conseiller de legation Baron Langwerth de Simmern, qui a deja rempli les fonctions de charge d'affaires ad interim a Tanger et qui a ete appele maintenant au depar- tement des affaires etrangeres. Le communique d'allure officieuse ajoute que les delegues de Maula Hafith comptent quitter Berlin le 17 ou le 18 mai et s'embarquer le 20 a Hambourg pour retourner au Maroc. L'information est redigee de fagon a faire enten- dre qu'ils n'auront pas d'autre audience. C'est peu que de les faire recevoir par un jeune homme qui occupe un emploi tres inferieur au departement des affaires etrangeres. II y avait des chances pour qu'ils ne fussent pas regus du tout : le livre blanc te- moigne d'un bout a I'autre de I'anxiete avec laquelle le gouvernement Imperial feint d'aj outer foi aux as- sertions les plus invraisemblables de M. Pichon et de I'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin pour n'avoir pas a rouvrir la question marocaine. Le Sultan Abdul Aziz est le souverain avec lequel I'AUemagne est en relations diplomatiques. II eut ete tres aise de refuser d'entrer en pourparlers avec les envoyes d'un rebelle, sans I'arrogance avec laquelle le jour- nal officieux du quai d'Orsay a intime au gouverne- ment Imperial I'ordre de leur fermer la porte. Sir: Berlin, May 10, 1908. In continuation of my report of May 6th I have the honor to inform you that the delegates of Mulai Hafid arrived at Hamburg by water the day before yesterday and at Berlin yesterday. The papers an- nounce that they will be received to-morrow and heard by Councillor of Legation, Baron Langwerth von Simmern, who has acted as Charge d'affaires ad interim at Tangiers and who has now been called to the Department of Foreign Affairs. This appar- ently semi-official information adds that the dele- . gates of Mulai Hafid intend to leave Berlin on the 17th or 18th of May, to embark at Hamburg on the 20th for their return to Morocco. The information is so worded as to make it under- stood that there will be not other audience. It is little enough to have them received by a young man who occupies a very inferior position in the Depart- ment of Foreign Affairs. There were chances that they would not be received at all : the White Book shows from beginning to end how anxious the Im- perial Government is to cause the impression that it has faith in the most incredible statements of M. Pichon and of the French Ambassador at Berlin in order not to have to reopen the Moroccan question. Sultan Abdul Aziz is the Sovereign with whom Ger- many is maintaining diplomatic relations. It would, therefore, have been very easy to refuse to enter into pourparlers with the envoys of the rebel, if it had not been for the arrogance with which the semi-official paper of the Quai d'Orsay had intim- ated to the Imperial Government that it should close its door to them. — 55 — Le ministere des affaires etrangeres frangais ne s'est pas borne a faire manifester sa mauvaise hu- meur par un organe qu'il peut desavouer au besoin. Comme s'il avait le propos delibere de blesser I'Al- lemagne il a charge son ambassadeur a Berlin d'en- tretenir M. de Schoen de la visite des envoyes de Maula Hafith. La conversation a tourne a I'aigre et M. Cambon est sorti tres peu satisfait de chez le secretaire d'etat. M. Cambon a quitte Berlin et n'y reviendra qu'apres le depart des delegues marocains. M. Cambon a fait connaitre le motif de son voyage a assez de monde pour que, selon toute probabilite, le departement Imperial arrive a savoir d'une faqon certaine que son absence a le caractere d'une bou- derie. La reception des envoyes marocains n'a pas ete le seul incident desagreable qui ait surgi dans ces derniers temps entre I'Allemagne et la France. Les negociants allemands de Safi se sont adresses au de- partement Imperial des affaires etrangeres disant que la France a I'intention d'occuper le port de Safi et le priant de mettre obstacle a la realisation d'un projet qui aurait pour eux les memes consequences desastreuses que I'occupation de Casablanca. Le gouvernement franqais repond qu'il n'a nul desir de s'emparer de Safi, mais qu'il ignore a quoi les cir- constances pourront I'obliger. D'apres lui, cette ville est dans un etat d'anarchie complete. II n'y a plus de douane et les negociants allemands en pro- fitent pour pratiquer la contrebande des armes et des m.unitions sur une grande echelle, au profit des adversaires de la France. Le gouvernement Impe- rial n'a aucune information semblable. A Paris Ton replique que c'est parce que I'Allemagne est repre- sentee a Safi par un consul marchand au lieu d'y avoir un agent capable de faire connaitre la situation telle qu'elle est. On fondait de grandes esperances pour I'ameHo- ration des relations avec la France sur M. Cambon qui etait arrive a Berlin precede d'une reputation de moderation acquise dans ses postes precedents. II se montre au contraire defiant, soupgonneux, voyant des arriere-pensees partout, mal informe, comme du reste tous les diplomates qui emploient des espions. Sa tache n'est pas facilitee par I'atti- tude adoptee par le gouvernement frangais depuis que la politique du Roi d'Angleterre a notablement diminue la securite europeenne. II etait tout naturel qu'a I'occasion du jubile de I'Empereur d'Autriche, I'Empereur d'Allemagne parlat de I'alliance des deux empires, mais je me demande si I'emphase avec laquelle on en a celebre les bienfaits et la presence a Vienne de tous les sou- verains allemands n'ont pas ete motivees par I'in- quietude causee par le cynisme avec lequel la France viole le traite d'Algesiras, les etrangcs propositions de I'Angleterre au sujet de la Macedoine, I'agitation serbe en Croatie et les fausses nouvelles propagees par la presse russe au sujet de pretendus armements de la Turquie, comme si elle aspirait a rehabiliter son armee encore sous le coup des revers essuyes en Mandchourie. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not confine itself to showing its ill-humor in a paper which it can disavow if need be. Just as if it had the deliberate intention of offending Germany, it ordered its Ambassador at Berlin to converse with Mr. von Schoen in regard to the visit of the envoys of Mulai Hafid. The conversation took a sharp turn and M. Cambon left the office of the Secretary of State very little satisfied. M. Cambon has left Berlin and will not return until after the departure of the Moroccan delegates. M. Cambon made the motive for his journey known to a number of peo- ple so as to make sure that the Imperial Depart- ment will learn that his absence is meant to show his displeasure. The reception of the Moroccan envoys is not the only disagreeable incident which- has recently happened between Germany and France. The Ger- man merchants at Safi 'addressed the Imperial De- partment of Foreign Affairs, stating that France intended to occupy the harbor of Safi and begging the department to prevent the realization of this plan which would have the same disastrous conse- quences for them as the occupation of Casablanca. The French Government replies that it has no in- tention whatever of seizing Safi ; but that it does not know what circumstances may compel her to do. It maintains that that city is in a state of com- plete anarchy and says there is no longer a custom- house and that the German merchants are profiting by this in order to smuggle arms and ammunition on a large scale, to the advantage of France's ad- versaries. The Imperial Government has received no information to that effect. Paris retorts that this is because Germany is represented in Safi by a mer- chant-consul instead of having an agent there cap- able of representing the situation at it really is. Great hope for the improvement of the relations with France was placed in M. Cambon, who came to Berlin with a reputation for moderation acquired at his previous posts. He is proving, on the contrary, to be defiant, suspicious, always scenting ulterior motives, and badly informed, like all diplomats who employ spies. His task is not facilitated by the at- titude adopted by the French Government since the policy of the King of England seriously impaired European security. While it was quite natural that on the occasion of the jubilee of the Emperor of Austria, the Ger- man Emperor should have spoken of the alliance between the two Empires, yet I ask myself whether the emphasis with which its beneficent effect was celebrated and the presence at Vienna of all the German Sovereigns were not motivated by the un- easiness caused by the cynicism with which France is violating the treaty of Algeciras, the strange pro- posals of England in regard to Macedonia, the Ser- vian agitation in Croatia, and the false reports spread by the Russian press in regard to the al- leged armament of Turkey, which give the impres- sion that Russia desires to rehabilitate her army which is still suffering under the reverses sustained in Manchuria. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. — 56 No. 46. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Berlin, le 13 Mai 1908. Monsieur le Ministre ! Comme suite a men rapport du 10 mai j'ai I'hon- neur de vous faire savoir que les envoyes de Maula Hafith n'ont ete rcQus par le Baron de Simmern que dans la journee d'hier. lis avaient adresse au de- partement des affaires etrangeres une lettre deman- dant une audience chez le chancelier et annongant qu'ils etaient- charges d'une communication auto- graphe de leur maitre pour I'Empereur. La lettre etait en arabe ; il a done fallu la traduire ; c'est la cause du retard. En donnant cette nouvelle, les journaux ont ajoute, sans doute apres avoir pris langue au depar- tement des affaires etrangeres, que comme les en- voyes de Maula Hafith n'ont pas de caractere officiel il est invraisemblable qu'ils soient admis a se pre- senter chez Sa Majeste ou chez le Prince de Biilow. D'apres la "National-Zeitung," qui ne public ja- mais aucune information relative a la politique exte- rieure sans en avoir soigneusement controle I'exacti- tude, M. de Simmern aurait demande aux envoyes de Maula Hafith si, dans le cas ou leur maitre serait reconnu comme Sultan, il pourrait garantir la secu- rite des Europeens. Les envoyes auraient repondu que Maula Hafith le ferait assurement et empecherait le renouvelle- ment d'incidents comme celui de Casablanca qui a ete un malheur pour le Maroc. Maula Hafith sera le Sultan de la civilisation et du progres. II aurait volontiers recours aux Europeens pour construire au Maroc des routes, des ponts et des chemins de fer. II ouvrira les mines et favorisera I'industrie et le commerce. II se feliciterait que I'Allemagne et les autres puissances I'aidassent a elever le peuple ma- rocain a la hauteur de la civilisation europeenne ; mais pour cela il est indispensable que la France retire ses troupes du Maroc. Autrement le peuple marocain ne se tranquillisera jamais. Maula Hafith serait heureux que I'Allemagne et les autres puis- sances signataires de I'acte d'Algesiras voulussent intervenir pour que la France retirat ses troupes le plus tot possible. L'expiation que la France a in- fligee au malheureux Maroc pour I'assassinat de trois de ses ouvriers est absolument demesuree. Des milliers de Marocains, parmi lesquels des femmes et des enfants, ont ete massacres. Toute une ville a ete bombardee et detruite. L'interieur est ravage. Les fermes des paysans, parmi lesquels il y a des proteges allemands, sont reduites en cendres. C'en est trop. Ces envoyes ont exprime le voeu que I'Al- lemagne aide a detourner ces malheurs. Des le debut de leur declaration les envoyes ont dit que Maula Hafith ouvrirait son royaume a tous les Europeens qui ont tous des droits egaux. Je me demande s'ils sont assez ignorants de la poli- tique europeenne pour ne pas savoir que la France ne veut pas de droits egaux pour tous (nous I'avons appris a nos depens, lors de la nomination du di- recteur des travaux publics) et redoute au lieu de la souhaiter une pacification du pays qui lui enleve- rait le pretexte cherche pour la realisation de ses projets de conquete. D'autres incidents viennent malheureusement en- Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, May 13, 1908. Sir:— In continuance of my report of May 10th I have the honor to inform you that the envoys of Mulai Hafid were not received by Baron von Simmern until yesterday. They had addressed a letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs asking for an audience with the Chancellor and announcing that they were the bearers of an autograph letter from their Sovereign to the Emperor. The letter was in Arabic, it was therefore necessary to translate it; that was the cause of the delay. In publishing this information, the papers added, doubtless after having made inquiries at the De- partment of Foreign Affairs, that as the envoys of Mulai Hafid had no official standing it was not likely that they would be permitted to present themselves before His Majesty or Prince von Bii- low. According to the National Zeitung, which never publishes any information relative to foreign policy without first carefully verifying its correctness, Mr. von Simmern asked the envoys of Mulai Hafid if, in case their Sovereign were recognized as Sultan, he could guarantee the safety of the Europeans. The envoys repHed that Mulai Hafid would cer- tainly do so and would prevent the recurrence of incidents like that of Casablanca which had been a misfortune for Morocco. Mufai Hafid would be the Sultan of civilization and progress. He would gladly turn to the Europeans in order to construct roads, bridges, and railroads in Morocco. He would open mines and promote industry and commerce. He would congratulate himself if Germany and the other Powers would aid him in raising the Moroc- can people to the level of European civilization; but in order to do this it was indispensible that France withdraw her troops from Morocco. In no other way could the Moroccan people be pacified. Mulai Hafid would be happy if Germany and the Powers signatory to the act of Algeciras would in- tervene and cause France to withdraw her troops as soon as possible. The expiation which France had inflicted on unhappy Morocco for the assas- sination of three of her laborers was entirely out of proportion. Thousands of Moroccans, women and children among them, had been massacred. An entire city had been destroyed by bombardment. The interior had been ravaged. The farms of the peasants, among whom there were German pro- teges, were reduced to ashes. That was too much. The envoys had expressed the wish that Germany would help to put an end to these misfortunes. At the very beginning of their statement the en- voys said that Mulai Hafid would open his kingdom to all Europeans, all of whom had equal rights. I ask myself whether they are so ignorant of Euro- pean politics as not to know that France does not want equal rights for all (we learned this at our cost at the nomination of the director of public works) and that she fears, instead of desires, a paci- fication of the country which would deprive her of the pretext she is seeking for the realization of her schemes of conquest. Other incidents are unfortu- nately increasing the ill-humor caused by the un- 57 — tretenir la mauvaise humeur causee par les observa- tions intempestives du gouvernment frangais au su- jet de la visite des envoyes de Maula Hafith. Vous aurez lu dans les journaux comme moi qu'a Casa- blanca des officiers franqais ont enleve les papiers de legitimation de proteges allemands, les ont declares sans valeur et les ont jetes dans les champs, apres les avoir souilles de crachats. Jusqu'a present la presse allemande s'est bornee a inserer ces informa- tions sans les commenter. Par men rapport du 6 mai j'ai eu I'honneur de vous dire pour quelles raisons les articles de M. Schiemann sont a prendre en serieuse consideration, quoique ce journaliste ne soit officieux a aucun de- gre. Sa revue hebdomadaire de la politique exte- rieure publiee ce matin dans le numero 223 de la "Kreuz-Zeitung" prouve de nouveau que la patience allemande commence a se lasser. II y est dit, a pro- pos de nouvelles attaques du "Temps" contre I'Al- lemagne qu'il faudrait enfin tirer au clair la situa- tion de ce journal. Quiconque le lit regulierement doit avoir le sentiment que c'est I'organe du gou- vernement frangais. M. Pichon I'a desavoue plu- sieurs fois et Ton ne met pas en doute la sincerite du ministre des affaires etrangeres frangais. Ce- pendant le "Temps" continue a publier des articles dont le caractere officieux n'est pas meconnaissable . et Ton a I'impression qu'il y a en France deux poli- tiques, celle de M.. Pichon et celle d'une autre per- sonnalite plus puissante qui prend a coeur d'aigrir les relations entre I'Allemagne et la France. Sans le nommer M. Schiemann designe clairement M. Clemenceau, qui depuis longtemps passe ici pour etre a la solde de I'Angleterre. M. Schiemann fait remarquer que M. Pichon pro- digue des declarations solennelles qui ne sont nulle- ment d'accord avec les faits, comme en temoigne le recent livre blanc allemand, quoique les documents publics par ce recueil aient ete soumis a, la censure du gouvernement frangais, a la demande duquel on aura vraisemblablement supprime des correspon- dances mettant plus clairement encore le contraste en evidence. M. Schiemann continue en enregistrant avec une satisfaction manifeste les symptomes du meconten- tement que la politique de M. Clemenceau suscite en France. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. timely remarks of the French Government in regard to the visit of the envoys of Mulai Hafid. You will have read in the papers, as I did, that French offi- cers at Casablanca took the papers of identification away from German proteges, declared them to be valueless, and threw them away after spitting on them. Until now the German press has confined itself to publishing the news without commenting on it. In my report of May 6th, I had the honor to tell you the reasons why the articles of Mr. Schiemann deserve serious attention, although he is by no means a semi-official journalist. His weekly re- view of foreign politics published this morning in issue no 223 of the Kreuz Zeitung proves again that German patience is coming to an end. In the re- view it is said in regard to new attacks of the Temps on Germany that it was necessary to in- vestigate the relations of this paper. Whoever read it regularly must have received the impression that it was the organ of the French Government. M. Pichon had disavowed it several times and the sin- cerity of the Minister of Foreign Affairs could not be questioned. Nevertheless, the Temps was con- tinuing to publish articles the semi-official character of which was unmistakable, and these gave the im- pression that there were two policies in France, that of M. Pichon and that of another more power- ful personality whose aim was to embitter the rela- tions between Germany and France. Without naming him, Mr. Schiemann clearly points to M. Clemenceau who has for a long time been considered here to be in England's pay. Mr. Schiemann points out that M. Pichon was lavish with solemn declarations which were, how- ever, by no means in accord with the facts, as was testified by the recent German White Book, al- though the documents published in that collection had been submitted to the censorship of the French Government which probably had demanded the suppression of such correspondence as would have made the discrepancy even more pronounced. Mr. Schiemann in continuation notes with mani- fest satisfaction the symptoms of discontent which M. Clemenceau's policy is arousing in France. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 47. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 30 Mai 1908. Monsieur le Ministre ! Le president Fallieres est maintenant rentre a Paris et a sans doute lieu de se declarer tres satis- fait de I'accueil particulierement chaleureux que lui ont reserve le Roi Edouard VII, le gouvernement britannique et le peuple anglais. Comme il est de- venu de style en pareille circonstance, on a solen- nellement declare que le rapprochement entre les deux nations ne menace personne et n'a pas d'autre but que le maintien de la paix universelle. Les jour- naux anglais expriment presque a I'unisson I'opinion Berlin, May 30, 1908. Sir:— President Fallieres has now returned to Paris and without doubt has reason to express his great sat- isfaction with the particularly warm reception which King Edward VII, the British Government, and the English people gave him. As has become the custom on such occasions, it was solemnly de- clared that the rapprochement between the two na- tions was menacing np one and had no other end in vievy but the preservation of universal peace. The English papers almost unanimously express the que la transformation de I'entente cordiale en une al- liance ne presenterait aucun avantage et pourrait constituer un serieux danger. Le "Temps" de Pa- ris se prononce dans le meme sens et dit qu'il serait imprudent de contracter des engagements en vue d'une guerre (sans doute la guerre de revanche dont tout Frangais conserve I'espoir) aussi longtemps que I'Angleterre n'aura pas transforme son systeme militaire de fagon a se mettre en mesure de donner a la France un appui efficace sur le continent. Sir Edward Grey a declare a la chambre des communes que le voyage du Roi d'Angleterre en Russie sera une visite officielle commes celles que Sa Majeste a deja faites et qu'il n'y a nul dessein de contracter un nouveau traite avec la Russie, dont les rapports avec I'Angleterre sont regies par la convention exis- tante. Le ministre des affaires etrangeres anglais a ainsi coupe court aux bruits d'une nouvelle triple alliance en voie de formation entre I'Angleterre, la France et la Russie qui ont ete lances par certains organes de la presse de Paris et de St. Petersbourg. Tout est done correct, et, dans le cas peu probable ou le gouvernement Imperial aurait a manifester une opinion officielle pendant les vacances des cham- bres, il ne pourra que se declarer satisfait de I'ame- lioration des relations entre les puissances euro- peennes, qui contribue a assurer le repos du monde. En diplomatic il faut savoir feindre de se payer de mots. C'est ainsi que M. de Schoen, lors de sa der- niere reception, s'est montre tres content des ins- tructions donnees au general d'Amade et n'a pas eu I'air de mettre en doute que les promesses donnees ne soient religieusement tenues. Les journaux offi- cieux se sont bornes a relater les incidents de I'en- trevue du Roi d'Angleterre et du president de la republique frangaise, sans y ajouter de reflexions. La presse independante, qui n'est pas tenue aux memes menagements, ne se fait pas faute de mani- fester ses inquietudes. Qu'on I'appelle alliance, en- tente ou comme Ton voudra, le groupement des puissances prepare personnellement par le Roi d'An- gleterre existe, et s'il n'est pas une menace directe et prochaine de guerre pour I'Allemagne (ce qui serait trop dire), il n'en constitue pas moins une diminution de securite. Les declarations pacifistes obligees et qui seront sans doute repetees a Reval signifient bien peu de chose emanant de trois puissances qui comme la Russie et I'Angleterre viennent avec des succes di- vers d'entreprendre sans autre raison que le desir de s'agrandir et meme sans pretexte plausible, les guerres de conquete de la Mandchourie et du Trans- vaal, ou qui comme la France procede en ce mo- ment meme a I'envahissement du Maroc au mepris de promesses solennelles et sans autre titre que la cession des droits de I'Angleterre qui n'en possedait aucun. Ce sont les memes puissances qui en com- pagnie des Etats-Unis sortant a peine de la guerre de spoliation contre I'Espagne se sont montrees ultra-pacifistes a la Haye. La triple alliance a garanti pendant trente ans la paix du monde, parce qu'elle etait dirigee par I'Allemagne satisfaite du partage politique de I'Eu- rope. Le nouveau groupement la menace parce qu'il se compose des puissances qui aspirent ^ une revision du status quo, au point d'avoir fait taire des haines seculaires pour preparer la realisation de ce desir. Agreez, etc. [s.] . Greindl. opinion that the transformation of the entente cor- diale into an alliance, while offering no advantages, would constitute a serious danger. The Paris Temps expresses itself in the same sense, saying that it would be imprudent to contract obligations in view of a war (doubtless the war of revenge for which all France is still hoping), as long as Eng- land had not changed her military system in such a way as to enable her to give France efficient support on the continent. Sir Edward Grey declared in the House of Commons that the journey of the King of England to Russia would be an official visit, like those which His Majesty had already made, and that there was no intention whatsoever of conclud- ing a new treaty with Russia whose relations with England were regulated by the existing convention. The British Minister of Foreign Affairs has thus cut short the rumors of a new Triple Alliance to be formed between England, France, and Russia, which have been circulated by certain organs of the press in Paris and St. Petersburg. Everything is, therefore, perfectly correct and in the rather improbable case that the Imperial Gov- ernment would have to manifest an official opinion during the recess of the Reichstag, it could only ex- press its satisfaction with the improvement in the relations between the European Powers, which con- tributed towards ensuring the peace of the world. In diplomacy it is necessary to know how to feign to be satisfied with words. Thus Mr. von Schoen at his last reception showed himself very well satis- fied with the instructions given to General Amade and did not seem to doubt that the promises given would be religiously kept. The semi-official papers confined themselves to giving an account of the in- cidents of the meeting between the King of Eng- land and the President of the French Republic, with- out adding any comments. The independent press, which is not restricted by the same considerations, does not refrain, from manifesting its uneasiness. One may call it al- liance, entente, or as one likes, the grouping of the Powers personally brought about by the King of England exists and if it does not mean a direct and imminent menace of war for Germany (that would be saying too much), it constitutes none the less a diminution of her security. The usual pacifist declarations, which will doubt- less be repeated at Reval, signify very little when coming from three Powers which, like Russia and England, have lately undertaken, with different suc- cess, wars of conquest in Manchuria and in the Transvaal for which there was no other reason than their desire for expansion and for which not even a plausible pretext existed; or which like France are proceeding at this very moment to invade Morocco in defiance of solemn promises and without any other title than the rights which England, without possessing them ceded to her. Those are the same Powers which together with the United States — its war of plunder against Spain scarcely at an end — have shown themselves at the Hague as ultra- pacifists. The Triple Alliance has guarded the peace of the world for thirty years, because it was directed by Germany, who was content with the political par- tition of Europe. The new grouping menaces peace because it is composed of Powers which desire a revision of the status quo so much that they have quelled the hatred of centuries in order to bring about the realization of that desire. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. — 59 — No. 48. No. 48. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 12 Juin 1908. Monsieur le Ministre ! Dans les toasts echanges a Reval entre le Roi d'Angleterre et FEmpereur de Russie, les deux sou- verains ont afifirme le desir de regler amicalement les questions pendantes entre eux, de rapprocher leurs deux peuples et de contribuer ainsi a la consolida- tion de la paix universelle. Nul n'a le droit d'etre officiellement ou officieuse- ment offusque d'un langage d'une correction aussi parfaite. La "Norddeutsche Allgemeine 'Zeitung" ecrivait hier soir que ces paroles sont d'accord avec la partie la plus serieuse de la presse anglaise et russe qui combat les tentatives faites pour donner a I'entrevue de Reval un caractere peu amical pour rAllemagne. II s'en faut de beaucoup que cet entrefilet ofificieux corresponde au jugement que Ton porte ici sur le recent voyage du president de la republique fran- Qaise a Londres, sur I'entrevue de Reval et sur la prochaine visite de M. Fallieres a I'Empereur de Russie et aux trois cours scandinaves. Sans doute dans la confiance que je ferais de ses paroles un usage strictement confidentiel, M. de Schoen dans une conversation que j'ai eue avec lui avant-hier, ne m'a pas dissimule I'impression penible que lui causent les arrangements conclus sous le pretexte de se mettre en garde contre une agression a la- quelle I'AlIemagne n'a jamais songe. 11 a ete jusqu'a qualifier cette politique de deloyale et s'attend a ce qu'on utilise le nouveau groupement des puissances pour exercer une pression sur I'AlIemagne dans la question d'Orient et dans les autres affaires qui sont a regler. II repete que. I'Empereur et le peuple alle- mand ont donne depuis vingt ans tant de gages de leurs intentions pacifiques, que celles-ci devraient etre a I'abri du soupcon. On pourrait aj outer a ce qu'a bien voulu me dire le secretaire d'Etat que Ton ressent deja les effets de I'isolement de I'AlIemagne dans la politique euro- peenne. Vous aurez remarque, Monsieur le Mi- nistre, que dans son recent discours, M. Tittoni par- lant de la question macedonienne a dit qu'elle serait prochainement reg'ee par une entente entre I'An- gletere et la Russie. II n'a pas dit un mot de I'Au- triche-Hongrie, comme s'il n'y avait pas eu entre cette puissance et la Russie, pendant dix ans, une entente maintenant detruite par la malencontreuse initiative du Baron d'Aehrenthal dans I'affaire du chemin de fer de Mitrowitza. L'alliee de I'AlIe- magne est traitee en quantite negligeable, comme si parmi les grandes puissances elle n'etait pas la prin- cipal interessee dans la question des Balkans. Le seul symptome quelque peu rassurant que I'on puisse noter, est le manque de confiance entre les nouveaux amis et les anciens allies revele par les evenements recents. Malgre les denegations posterieures il a du exister quelque projet de resserrer les liens entre les puis- sances groupees par le Roi d'Angleterre dans une pensee hostile a I'AlIemagne. Le journal "Le Temps" bien place pour etre exactement informe, puisque c'est I'organe officieux du gouvernement frangais, paraissait si sur qu'a Londres on aspirait a transformer I'entente cordiale en alliance qu'il y met- Berlin, June 12, 1908. Sir:— In the toasts exchanged at Reval between the King of England and the Emperor of Russia, the two Sovereigns gave expression to the desire to regulate in a friendly way the questions pending between them, to bring their peoples closer to- gether, and thus to contribute to the strengthening of universal peace. No one has the right to be officially or semi-offi- cially offended with statements as correct as these. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung wrote yes- terday evening that these words were in accord with the most serious papers of the French and Russian press which were combating the attempts made to attribute to the meeting at Reval an anti- German character. This semi-official notice is very different from the opinion really held here concerning the recent jour- ney of the President of the French Republic to London, the meeting at Reval, and the impending visit of M. Fallieres to the Emperor of Russia and to the three Scandinavian courts. Confident, no doubt, that the use I would make of his words would be strictly confidential, Mr. von Schoen in a conversation which I had with him the day before yesterday did not conceal from me the painful im- pression which the agreements had made on him, agreements concluded under the pretext of guard- ing against an aggression of which Germany had never thought. He went so far as to call this policy disloyal, and expects that the new grouping of Powers will be utilized in order to bring pressure to bear on Germany in the Orient question and in the other affairs which are to be regulated. He re- peats that the Emperor and the German people had for twenty years given so many proofs of their pa- cific intentions that they ought to be above all sus- picion. It might be added to what the Secretary of State told me that the effects of the isolation of Germany in European politics is already being felt. You will have noticed, Sir, that in his recent speech, in touch- ing upon the Macedonian question, M. Tittoni said that it would soon be settled by an understanding between England and Russia. He did not say any- thing about Austria-Hungary, as if an understand- ing had not existed for ten years between that Power and Russia, an understanding now destroyed by the unfortunate action of Baron von Aehrenthal in the matter of the Mitrowitza Railway. Ger- many's ally is treated as of no account, as if among the Great Powers she were not the one most inter- ested in the Balkan question. The only symptom to be noted which is a little reassuring is the lack of confidence between the new friends and the old allies, which has been re- vealed by recent events. Despite subsequent denials some plan must have existed to strengthen the bonds between the Powers banded together by the Kirrg of England against Germany. The paper Le Temps, which is in a position to receive exact information because it is the semi-official organ of the French Government, seemed to be so sure that London was aspiring at a transformation of the entente cordiale into an al- tait deja ses conditions. II lui fallait une reforme de I'armee anglaise, permettant a I'Angleterre de fournir un contingent pour une guerre continentale. Cela signifiait qu'a Paris on ne se souciait pas d'etre engage dans un conflit dont I'Angleterre pourrait se retirer, apres avoir detruit la marine de guerre et de commerce de I'Allemagne et annexe les colonies al- lemandes, hors d'etat de proteger la France et d'em- pecher I'Allemagne de s'indemniser aux depens de celle-ci des desastres maritimes certains. Mise en demeure de creer une armee de terre dont elle estime n'avoir pas besoin pour elle-meme, sim- plement pour aider la France a la conquete de I'Al- sace-Lorraine dont I'Angleterre n'a cure, celle-ci a reponda par ses journaux a I'unisson, en declinant I'idee suggeree par I'organe officieux frangais. C'est seulement alors que "Le Temps" a declare qu'il n'avait voulu faire que de la theorie pure. Si c'est vrai, il faut avouer que le moment etait singuliere- ment choisi pour discuter une pareille question de doctrine. A St. Petersbourg aussi il faut qu'on ait, malgre les declarations de Sir E. Grey au parlement, craint une proposition d'alliance exposant la Russie a un conflit qu'elle est hors d'etat de supporter. Si ce n'est pas pour prevenir toute demarche semblable, on ne comprend pas I'article par lequel I'officieuse "Rossija" a, a la veille de I'entrevue de Reval, in- siste sur I'amitie seculaire de I'Allemagne et de la Russie, en termes beaucoup plus chaleureux que ne le comporte la situation veritable. La Russie ne veut pas se laisser exploiter par I'Angleterre, comme elle-meme elle a exploite la France, en lui emprun- tant des milliards, non pour la revanche comme on I'esperait a Paris, mais pour ses entreprises en ex- treme Orient. La vraie pensee des puissances groupees par I'Angleterre pour isoler TAllemagne, ne se trouve ni dans les discours des Souverains ni dans les articles des journaux officieux ou inspires. Leur tendance veritable est si eloignee de leur langage convenu qu'ils ne peuvent pas s'empecher de la trahir par des imprudences. Si on veut la connaitre, il n'y a qu'a lire I'admonestation adressee par "Le Temps" au Roi de Suede. Le journal parisien considere les sentiments amicaux pour I'Allemagne manifestes par Sa Majeste comme une offense pour la Russie dont la France ressent le contrecoup. De la defiance qui regne entre la France, I'Angle- terre et la Russie, il serait temeraire de conclure que la nouvelle triple-alliance ne se realisera pas. Elles sent unies par la haine commune centre I'Allemagne et peuvent trouver des garanties reelles ou imagi- naires contre le danger d'etre entrainees a la guerre pour des interets etrangers. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. liance that it already prescribed the conditions for it. It demanded a reform of the British army, \ivhich would permit England to furnish a conti- gent for a continental war. That meant that in Paris there was no desire to be involved in a con- flict from which England might retire after having destroyed Germany's fleet and merchant marine and annexed the German colonies, without being in a position to protect France and to prevent Ger- many from indemnifying herself at the cost of France for her certain disasters on sea. Asked to create a land army which she believes she will not have to use for herself, simply in order to aid France to conquer Alsace-Lorraine which does not interest her, England replied by rejecting through her unanimous press the idea suggested by the semi-oflicial French organ. It was only then that Le Temps declared that it had only expressed a mere theory. If this is true, it must be said that the moment was strangely chosen for the theoreti- cal discussion of such a question. In St. Petersburg, also, it must have been feared, despite the declarations of Sir Edward Grey in Parliament, that a proposal for an alliance would be made which would expose Russia to a conflict in which she could not hold her ground. If its pur- pose was not to forestall any such steps, one cannot understand the article in which the semi-official Rossiya, on the eve of the meeting at Reval, pointed out in much warmer terms than the actual situation merits, the century old friendship between Germany and Russia. Russia does not wish to be exploited by England, as she herself has exploited France by borrowing billions from her, not for revenge as was hoped at Paris, but for her enterprises in the Far East. The real thoughts of the Powers banded together by England in order to isolate Germany is not be be found either in the speeches of the Sovereigns nor in the articles of the semi-official or inspired papers. Their real aims are so far removed from their conventional language that they cannot avoid betraying them by indiscretions. If one wishes to know them it is only necessary to read the admoni- tion addressed by Le Temps to the King of Sweden. The Paris paper considers the friendly sentiments manifested by His Majesty for Germany as an offense against Russia, of which France has to bear the consequences. It would be rash to conclude from the distrust which exists between France, England, and Russia that the new triple alliance will not be realized. They are united by their common hatred of Ger- many, and can find real or imaginary guarantees against the danger of being involved in war for the sake of foreign interests. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 49. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 4 Juillet 1908. Monsieur le Ministre ! J'ai demande hier a M. le secretaire d'Etat au de- partement Imperial des Affaires Etrangeres s'il Sir: Berlin, July 4, 1908. I asked the Secretary of State yesterday at the Imperial Department of Foreign Affairs if he had — 61 — n'avait pas encore regu les propositions russo-an- glaises au sujet des reformes a introduire en Mace- doine qui nous interessent au point de vue du main- tien des relations correctes entre les grandes puis- sances ; mais sous ce rapport seulement. M. de Schoen m'a repondu que I'accord ne parait pas encore tout a fait etabli entre la Russie et I'An- gleterre et que vraisemblablement les propositions a soumettre aux grandes puissances ne leur parvien- dront que dans une quinzaine de jours au plus tot. Le gouvernement Imperial les attend sans impa- tience. II a la confiance que ces propositions seront de nature a ne pas troubler la bonne harmonie entre les grandes puissances. J'ai replique que je le souhaite; mais que je ne puis pas me defendre d'une certaine inquietude si, comme I'a annonce I'agence Reuter, on propose d'augmenter les gardes nationales. M. de Schoen a repondu que ce serait en effet un danger. Au premier abord I'idee n'avait pas deplu a Vienne et a Berlin ; mais qu' un examen plus appro- fondi avait fait reconnaitre que c'etait organiser et armer la revolution. La Sublime Porte commencera evidemment par rejeter tout le programme des puis- sances. Comme il contient cependant de bonnes propositions, en negociant avec le gouvernement ot- toman on pourra arriver a une transaction consistant a accepter les reformes utiles et a ecarter les projets perilleux. J'ai dit qu'un autre point encore me paraissait iii- quietant ; c'est la fagon dont les pourparlers prelimi- naires sont conduits entre Londres et Saint-Peters- bourg a I'exclusion de I'Autriche-Hongrie qui a pour- tant un interet de premier ordre dans les affaires des Balkans. M. de Schoen ne m'a pas contredit. II m' a re- pondu brievement qu' il ne reste evidemment plus rien de I'entente de Miirzsteigg. Je me suis naturel- lement abstenu d'insister davantage sur un sujet aussi delicat. Agreez etc. ' [s.] Greindl. not yet received the Russo-English proposals in regards to the reforms to be introduced in Mace- donia which interest us from one point of view only: that of the maintenance of correct relations between the Great Powers. Mr. von Schoen replied that Russia and England did not seem to have arrived at a complete under- standing, and that the proposals to be submitted to the Great Powers would probably not reach them before two weeks at the earliest. The Imperial Gov- ernment was awaiting them without impatience. It was confident that the proposals would be such as not to disturb the good harmony between the Great Powers. I replied that I hoped so, but that I could not rid myself of a certain uneasiness if, as the Reuter agency announced, it was proposed to increase the national guards. Mr. von Schoen replied that would, indeed, be a danger. At first the idea had not caused dis- pleasure in Vienna and in Berlin, but a closer ex- amination had shown that this would mean organ- izing and arming the revolution. The Porte would doubtless at first reject the entire programme of the Powers. However, since it contained some good proposals, negotiations with the Turkish Govern- ment might lead to a compromise consisting in the acceptance of useful reforms and the rejection of perilous schemes. I said that still another point seemed disquieting to me, viz., the way in which the preliminary pour- parlers were conducted between London and St. Petersburg to the exclusion of Austria-Hungary whose interests were of most importance in the Balkan affairs. Mr. von Schoen did not contradict me. He re- plied briefly that of the understanding of Miirz- steigg nothing evidently longer existed. I naturally refrained from insisting any further on such a deli- cate subject. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 50. No. 50. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 18 Juillet 1908. Monsieur le Ministre ! Un de mes collegues a demande hier au secretaire d'Etat du departement des affaires etrangeres ce qu'il faut penser de la prochaine visite du president de la Republique Franqaise a I'Empereur de Russie. M. de Schoen a repondu que cette entrevue n'a au- cune importance politique; c'est celle de Reval qui en avait. La visite de M. Fallieres n'en est que le corollaire pour ainsi dire oblige. Mon collegue a fait observer qu'on avait pourtant considere a Berlin la visite du president de la re- publique frangaise au Roi d'Angleterre comme un evenement grave. M. de Schoen a replique que e'en etait un en effet ; mais qu'alors les circonstances etaient tout autres. C'etait la premiere des entrevues projetees. La po- litique personnelle du Roi d'Angleterre est franche- ment hostile a I'Allemagne. D'apres des renseigne- ments regus par le gouvernement Imperial, I'Angle- Berlin, July 18, 1908. Sir:— One of my colleagues asked the Secretary of State of the Department of Foreign Affairs yesterday what was to be thought of the approaching visit of the President of the French Republic to the Em- peror of Russia. Mr. von Schoen replied that this meeting had no political importance; it was that at Reval which was significant. The visit of M. Fallieres was only the necessary corollary, as it were. My colleague observed that the visit of the Presi- dent of the French Republic to the King of Eng- land had, however, been considered in Berlin as an event of grave importance. Mr. von Schoen replied that it had indeed been such, but that circumstances had been very different then, since that meeting had been the first of those planned. The personal policy of the King of Eng- land was openly hostile to Germany. According to information received by the Imperial Govern- 62 terre aurait voulu aller beaucoup plus loin dans la voie de I'entente avec la France et la Russie qu'elle n'a reussi a le faire. C'est la France qui a refuse. Avant que les bruits d'alliance n'aient ete mis en circulation et pendant le sejour de M. Fallieres a Londres, M. Cambon est venu dire a M. de Schoen que le gouvernement frangais se trouvait dans une position delicate. II a prie le secretaire d'Etat, sans s'expliquer davantage, de ne pas ajouter foi aux in- formations alarmantes qui pourraient lui parvenir et de croire que la France veut sincerement la paix. M. de Schoen a conclu en disant qu'actuellement c'est la France qui exerce une action pacifique. Puis-je vous prier de rapprocher le present rapport de celui que j'ai eu I'honneur de vous adresser sous la date du 12 Juin dernier. Vous vous souviendrez que dans I'entretien que j'ai eu I'honneur de vous rapporter, M. de Schoen qualifiait la politique de I'Angleterre de deloyale. Par le meme rapport je vous ecrivais que la campagne de presse des deux journaux officieux des ministeres des affaires etran- geres de Paris et de Saint-Petersbourg me portait a croire que, malgre les denegations posterieures, il y avait eu un projet de resserrer les liens entre les puissances groupees par le Roi d'Angleterre dans une pensee hostile a I'AUemagne et que le plan avait echoue parce que la France et la Russie I'avaient repousse. Ce n'etait il y a un mois qu'une conjecture de ma part ; maintenant c'est une information posi- tive. Mon collegue a aussi parle au secretaire d'Etat des manoeuvres de la flotte anglaise dans la region des detroits danois qui ont I'apparence d'une repetition generale d'operations de guerre dont I'execution est prevue. M. de Schoen a repondu que le precede n'etait en tout cas pas amical ; mais que de la part de I'Angle- terre on ne pent pas s'attendre a autre chose. Du reste le secretaire d'Etat dit qu'il y a eu plutot une certaine detente dans ces derniers jours. II I'at- tribue non seulement a I'attitude de la France et de la Russie; mais aussi a ce que le Roi d'Angleterre sent qu'il n'a pas la city derriere lui et qu'en dehors du monde du haut commerce il y a un groupe anglais grandissant qui ne veut pas pousser les choses a I'extreme. Je ne vous adresse pas le texte des deux discours que I'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin a adresses le 12 Juillet a la colonie frangaise, parce que les jour- naux beiges les auront sans doute reproduits. Je me borne a faire remarquer que le langage de M, Cam- bon est en accord avec le jugement porte par M. de Schoen sur I'attitude actuelle de la France. Je dois encore vous parler. Monsieur le Ministre. de la prochaine retraite de I'Ambassadeur d'Angle- terre qui a deja quitte Berlin depuis quelque temps et qui n'y reviendra qu' en automne pour presenter ses lettres de rappel. Cette retraite n'est Volontaire que dans la forme. Elle a ete imposee par le gou- vernement britannique a Sir Frank Lascelles qui au- rait beaucoup desire rester a Berlin et dont le main- tien a ete demande, sans succes, a Londres par le gouvernement Imperial. Sir Frank Lascelles est un diplomate d'une rare intelligence, d'un jugement tres sur, d'une loyaute parfaite, qui ni physiquement ni intellectuellement n'a pas encore ressenti les attaques de la vieillesse et qui jouit de la confiance hautement meritee de I'Em- pereur, du gouvernement Imperial et de tons ses col- legues. Si le gouvernement britannique se prive des services d'un diplomate d'une pareille valeur et qui n'est pas encore arrive a la limite d'age, ce ne peut ment, England would have liked to go much further towards an entente with France and Russia than she had succeeded in doing. It was France that had refused. Even before the rumors of an alliance had been put in circulation and while M. Fallieres was still in London, M. Cambon had told Mr. von Schoen that the French Government was in a delicate position. He begged the Secretary of State, though without making any further explana- tion, not to give credit to any alarming reports which might reach him but to believe that France sincerely wished peace. Mr. von Schoen concluded by saying that at pres- ent it was France that was exercising a pacific in- fluence. May I ask you to compare the present report with one which I had the honor to send you on June 12th. You will remember that in the conversation which I then had the honor to report to you, Mr. von Schoen qualified England's policy as disloyal. In the same report I wrote to you that the press campaign of the two semi-official papers of the Min- isters of Foreign Affairs at Paris and at St. Peters- burg led me to believe that, in spite of later denials, there had been a plan to strengthen the ties between the Powers banded together by the King of Eng- land against Germany and that the plan had failed because France and Russia rejected it. A month ago that was only a conjecture on my part; now it is positive information. My colleague also spoke to the Secretary of State concerning the manoeuvres of the British fleet in the region of the Danish narrows which had the appearance of a general rehearsal of warlike opera- tions the execution of which was anticipated. Mr. von Schoen replied that this procedure was certainly not a friendly one, but that nothing else could be expected from England. The Secretary of State said, morever, that a certain relaxation had taken place recently. He attributes it not only to the attitude of France and Russia, but also to a feeling on the part of the King of England that the city was not backing him, and to the fact that outside the circles of high commerce there was a constantly growing group in England which did not wish to push matters to the extreme. I am not sending you the text of the two speeches which the French Ambassador at Berlin addressed on July 12th to the French colony, because the Belgian papers have doubtless printed them. I will merely remark that the language used by M. Cambon agrees with the opinion formed by Mr. von Schoen on the present attitude of France. I must still speak to you. Sir, of the approaching retirement of the British Ambassador who left Ber- lin some time ago and who will only return here in autumn in order to present his letters of recall. His retirement is voluntary only in form. It was forced by the British Government on Sir Frank Lascelles, who had a great desire to remain at Berlin and in favor of whose stay an unsuccessful request was also made in London by the Imperial Govern- ment. Sir Frank Lascelles is a diplomat of rare intelligence, very sound judgment, and perfect loy- alty, who has neither physically nor intellectually felt the signs of age and who enjoys the highly merited confidence of the Emperor, the Imperial Government, and all his colleagues. If the British Government deprives itself of the services of a dip- lomat of such merit and who has not yet reached the age limit, it is only because Sir Frank Lascelles worked for fifteen years, without permitting himself etre que parce que Sir Frank Lascelles a travaille pendant quinze ans et sans se laisser decourager par de nombreux echecs, a amener un rapprochement entre TAllemagne et I'Angleterre. Le zele qu'il a deploye pour dissiper des malentcndus qu'il trouve absurdes et prejudiciables a un haut degre, aux deux pays, ne correspond pas aux vues politiques de son souverain. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. to be discouraged by numerous checks, to bring about a rapprochement between Germany and Eng- land. The zeal which he displayed in order to dissi- pate the misunderstandings which he considered ab- surd and detrimental in a high degree to the two countries does not correspond with the political views of his sovereign. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 51. No. 51. M. A. Leghait, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, M. A. Leghait, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, le 20 Juillet 1908. Monsieur le Ministre ! Le President de la Republique a quitte la France le 18 de ce mois pour rendre officiellement visite a I'Empereur de Russie et aux Rois de Suede , de Danemark et de Norvege. Monsieur Fallieres, s'in- spirant de I'idee essentielle de la politique exterieure de la France et des voeux de I'opinion publique, avait a coeur de saluer le Chef de la nation amie et alliee. En meme temps le President rendra aux Souverains de Danemark et de Norvege la visite qu'ils lui ont faite et profitant de sa presence dans ces regions, il ira saluer le Souverain de la Suede. Le voyage de Mr. Fallieres, base sur des motifs de courtoisie, a en meme temps un caractere politique qui ne manque pas d'importance en ce moment ou le groupement des Puissances est I'objet de toutes les preoccupations. La France infeodee a la politique anglaise a voulu preter a celle-ci un solide concours aupres des Puis- sances du Nord. S'il n'est peut-etre pas question pour le moment d'une nouvelle triple alliance, on voudrait du moins empecher un groupement trop in- time de ces pays sous I'egide de I'Allemagne. Ap- puyee sur cette base, la France proclame hautement que le maintien de la paix est le but de sa politique et Mr. Pichon, aux cours qu'il va visiter, comme il I'a fait ici, ne cessera de le repeter en affirmant que la diplomatie franqaise pratiquera, fidele a ses alliances, amities et engagements, une politique d'entente entre tous et de conciliation generale des interets. II cherchera a demontrer que cette politi- que n'a pas pour but d'opposer les Puissances les unes aux autres ni d'opposer la France a aucune d'elle. II est certain que la politique frangaise est inspiree par des idees pacifiques, mais, entrainee dans I'orbite de I'Angleterre, la France pourra-t-elle toujours maitriser les evenements et eviter que des froisse- ments dangereux se manifestent au dela du Rhin? Veuillez etc. [s.] Leghait. Paris, July 20, 1908. Sir:— The President of the Republic left France on the 18th of this month in order to pay an official visit to the Emperor of Russia and the Kings of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. In view of the funda- mental idea of France's foreign policy and of the wishes of public opinion, M. Fallieres was anxious to greet the head of the friendly and allied nation. At the same time the President will return to the Sovereigns of Denmark and Norway the visit which they paid to him and, profiting by his presence in these regions, he will greet the Sovereign of Sweden. The journey of M. Fallieres, while based on mo- tives of courtesy, has at the same time a political character which is not without importance at this moment when the grouping of the Powers is engag- ing all minds. France, the liege of England, wants to use her influence with the Northern Powers in support of the British policy. If at the moment there is per- haps no question of a new triple alliance, it is at least desired to prevent a too intimate grouping of these Powers under Germany's leadership. With this idea as a basis France is loudly proclaiming that the preservation of peace is the goal of her policy, and at the courts which he is going to visit M. Pichon will not cease to reiterate, as he is wont to do here, his affirmation that French diplomacy, faithful to its alliances, friendships, and obligations, will follow a policy of general harmony and concil- iation of interests. He will endeavor to show that the aim of this policy is not to cause antagonism among the other Powers nor to bring France into opposition to any one of them. It is certain that the French policy is inspired by pacific ideas, but, under England's sway will France always be able to control the situation and prevent dangerous ill-feeling from arising on the other side of the Rhine? Accept, etc. [Signed] Leghait. No. 52. A. Leghait, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. M. A. Leghait, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign AiTairs. Paris, le 8 Octobre 1908. Monsieur le Ministre ! Pour faire suite aux renseignements que j'ai eu I'honneur de vous adresser par ma lettre d'hier, je m'empresse de vous transmettre ci-joint divers art- icles du journal le "Temps" de ce jour relatifs a I'in- cident des Balkans. La declaration de M. Isvolsky est tout particulierement interessante, vu surtout qu'il en a lui-meme affirme I'exactitude. II ressort de cette declaration que les informations que je vous ai donnees hier au sujet. du but poursuivi par la Russie en proposant la reunion d'une Conference etaient bien fondees. La Russie veut dechirer le traite de Berlin qui a ete dirige centre elle et elle compte etre appuyee en cela par la France et I'An- gleterre, mais on se demande si I'Allemagne laissera detruire impunement I'oeuvre du Prince de Bis- rfiarck. II resulte des entretiens que j'ai eus avec divers Ambassadeurs que Ton considere la question actuelle comme tres delicate, tres compliquee et tres difficile a resoudre. II ne sera pas aise d'arriver a reunir une confe- rence et on ignore quel sera I'accueil qui sera reserve a I'invitation lancee par la Russie. Cet accueil de- pendra du programme et I'accord sur celui-ci sera fort laborieux a cause du fait accompli en presence duquel on se trouve et des "compensations" que Ton reclame de toute part. Toutefois on semble esperer que toutes les Puissances accepteront la conference, car, me disait-on, le desir du maintien de la paix est si unanime et si profond qu'il dominera tout. Veuillez etc. [s.] Leghait. Paris, October 8, 1908. Sir:— In continuance of the information which I had the honor to send you in my report of yesterday, I hasten to send herevsrith several articles from the Temps of to-day relative to the Balkan incident. The declaration of M. Iswolski is particularly in- teresting because he himself affirmed its correct- ness. From this declaration it may be seen that the information which I gave you yesterday in re- gard to the aim pursued by Russia in proposing the calling of a Conference was well-founded. Russia virishes to destroy the treaty of Berlin which was directed against her, and is counting on being sup- ported in this by France and England ; but it is to be questioned whether Germany will permit the work of Prince Bismarck to be destroyed with impunity. From the conversations which I have had with several Ambassadors it seems that the present sit- uation is considered very delicate, very complicated, and very difficult to solve. It will not be easy to call a conference and it is not known what reception will be given to the invi- tation issued by Russia. Its reception will depend on the programme concerning which it will be very difficult to come to an agreement in face of the ac- complished fact with which one is confronted and of the "compensations" which are being demanded on all sides. Nevertheless it seems that hopes are being entertained that all Powers will accept the conference for, so I am told, the desire to maintain peace is so unanimous and so profound that it will prevail. Accept, etc. [Signed] Leghait. No. 53. No. 53. M. A. Leghait, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. M. A. Leghait, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, le 19 Janvier 1909. Monsieur le Ministre ! Hier s'est terminee a la Chambre des Deputes la discussion sur le Maroc qui avait ete commencee vendredi dernier. Apres I'expression de quelques vains regrets, applaudis par I'extreme-gauche, sur la neutralite que le Gouvernement eut du observer plus rigoureusement, d'apres elle, entre les deux sul- tans luttant pour le pouvoir, Mr. Jaures a repris ses attaques contre la politique marocaine du Gouverne- ment et I'expose de ses sophismes qui concluent a I'evacuation immediate et, par consequent, a I'aban- don de tous les avantages acquis par les conventions successives depuis 1901 jusqu'a I'acte d'Algesiras. Comme consequence, il critique les instructions don- nees au General d'Amade et au General Lyautey, et qui, selon lui, dissimulent des projets d'occupation definitive. II reclamait la publication des rapports du General Lyautey, mais Mr. Pichon la refuse en declarant que I'objet de ces rapports n'est nulle- Sir: Paris, January 19, 1909. Yesterday the Morocco debate in the Chamber of Deputies, which began last Friday, came to an end. After expressing vain regrets, applauded by the Ex- treme Left, in regard to the neutrality which in the latter's opinion the Government should have ob- served more rigorously towards the two Sultans struggling for power, M. Jaures resumed his at- tacks against the Moroccan policy of the Govern- ment by a recital of his fallacies, the outcome of which would be immediate evacuation and conse- quently the abandonment of all the advantages gained by the successive agreements from 1901 up to the act of Algeciras. Accordingly, he critisizes the instructions given to General Amade and Gen- eral Lyautey which, in his opinion, conceal plans of ultimate occupation. He demanded the publi- cation of the reports of General Lyautey, but M. Pichon refused, declaring that the object of these ment une occupation, mais I'organisation d'une police franco-marocaine prevue par les traites. Dans la seconde partie de son discours Mr. Jaures a cherche a elargir la base de son interpellation et a englober la question marocaine dans la situation ge- nerale qui resulte des derniers evenements dans les Balkans. II dit qu'il ne fa,ut pas heurter les interets allemands au Maroc afin que la France et I'Alle- magne puissent arriver a un accord qui garantirait la paix de I'Europe. Mr. Denys Cochin a succede a Mr. Jaures a la tri- bune et s'est fait le porte-voix des griefs de la droite centre la politique marocaine du Gouvernement. II ne croit pas que ce soit le moment de se rapprocher de I'Allemagne qui n'a cesse de proteger I'lslam dans ses elements fanatiques diriges centre la France. II est d'avis que I'evacuation projetee du Chaouia se- rait une faute et il conseille une politique d'action energique au Maroc. Mr. Pichon n'a pas eu de peine a repondre a ces discours spirituels et idealistes sans base serieuse. Le Ministre des Afifaires Etrangeres a expose de nouveau avec encore plus de nettete, de clarte et d'eloquence que de coutume, quelle a ete et con- tinuera a etre la ligne de conduite du Gouvernement au Maroc. Nous ne voulons, dit-il, ni protectorat ni conquete mais le respect des conventions intema- tionales et les avantages auxquels elles nous donnent droit. Nous continuerons a observer d^ns les luttes interieures du pays la neutralite la plus absolue. Le Ministre a expose les principes, les resultats acquis et le programme ulterieur de sa politique. Les principes: c'est qu'une politique de noninter- vention serait fatale pour la dignite, les interets et les droits de la France, qui doit, au prix meme de lourds sacrifices, remplir le mandat qu'elle a sollicite con- curremment avec I'Espagne et qu'elle ne peut laisser a d'autres le pretexte d'intervenir sur les confins de ses possessions africaines. Et enfin qu'elle doit as- surer I'execution de tous ses accords avec le Gou- vernement marocain. On ne saurait voir la le prin- cipe d'une liquidation marocaine, mais bien plutot une execution methodique d'accords et d'engage- ments. Les resultats obtenus jusqu'ici par I'application de ces principes, Mr. Pichon les signale comme suit: "Grace a nous I'ordre n'a ete trouble nulle part, la securite des colonies etrangeres a ete garantie, les transactions commerciales se sont librement de- veloppees, nous avons organise la police qui fonc- tionne partout. Nous avons regie par des ententes economiques les rivalites d'interet qui existaient en- tre nous et d'autres pays. Nous avons commence la mise en pratique de nos accords sur la frontiere ou la situation de I'Algerie n'a jamais ete mieux as- suree." Quant a ce qui concerne le programme, Mr. Pichon a resume les instructions donnees a Mr. Regnault qui va en mission a Fez. L'evacuation du Chaouia est commencee et elle se poursuivra gra- duellement des que la securite sera assuree par les soins du sultan. La France a droit a une indemnite et elle la reclamera, mais en se montrant aussi con- ciliante que possible sur les modalites. En ce qui concerne la zone limitrophe algero-marocaine, le Ge- neral Lyautey n'a pour mission que d'executer les accords de 1902 sans arriere-pensee. En resume, on peut dire que la France veut as- reports was by no means an occupation, but the organization of a Franco-Moroccan police provided for by the treaties. In the second part of his speech M. Jaures endeavored to enlarge the basis of his interpellation and to enclose the Moroccan question in the general situation which has resulted from the latest events in the Balkans. He said that the in- terests of Germany in Morocco must be respected so as not to destroy the chances for an understand- ing between France and Germany which would guarantee the peace of Europe. M. Denys Cochin followed M. Jaures on the tribune, making himself the spokesman of the complaints of the Right against the Moroccan pol- icy of the Government. He does not believe that this is the moment for a rapprochement with Ger- many because she had never ceased to protect the fanatic elements of Islam whose efforts were di- rected against France. He is of the opinion that the intended evacuation of Chaouia would be a mistake and he advised a policy of energetic action in Morocco. M. Pichon had no difficulty in replying to these speeches which, although highly intellectual and idealistic, are without any serious foundation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs again explained with even more than his customary precision, clearness, and eloquence, what has been and will continue to be the line of conduct of the Government in Moroc- co. We do not wish, he said, either a protectorate or a conquest, but we want respect for international agreements and the advantages to which they give us a right; We will continue to observe absolute neutrality in the inner struggles of the country. The Minister then explained the principles, the re- sults obtained, and the subsequent programme of his policy. The principles : that a policy of non-intervention would be fatal to the dignity, the interests, and the rights of France who, even at the price of heavy sacrifices, must carry out the mandate which she had solicited together with Spain ; that she must not give others a pretext for intervening on the borders of her African possessions ; and, finally, that she must ensure the observance of all her agree- ments with the Moroccan Government. This should not be regarded as a liquidation of Morocco, but rather as a methodical execution of agreements and obligations. The results obtained so far by the application of these principles are represented by M. Pichon as follows: "Thanks to us, order has not been dis- turbed, the security of the foreign colonies has been guaranteed, commerce has fully developed, and we have organized the police which is working satis- factorily everywhere. By commercial agreements we have removed the differences of interest which existed between us and other countries. We have commenced to put our agreements in practice at the frontier where the situation of Algiers has never been so secure." As far as the programme is concerned, M. Pichon summed up the instructions given to M. Regnault who is to be sent to Fez. The evacuation of Chaouia had commenced and it would be continued gradually as soon as security had been assured by the Sultan's measures. France was entitled to an indemnity and she would claim it, byt would at the same time be as conciliating as possible in regard to its modalities. As to the Algero-Moroccan bor- der district. General Lyautey's mission was to exe- cute the agreements of 1902 without any mental reservations. In summing up it may be said that France surer sa situation privilegiee au Maroc, y maintenir avec fermete ses droits et rester scrupuleusement fidele aux engagement d'Algesiras, mais il est a pre- voir qu'elle ne tiendra pas compte des conseils de Mr. Jaures et que ce n'est pas sur le terrain marocain qu'elle fera des concessions en vue de faciliter une entente avec I'Allemagne dans les Balkans. La politique marocaine de Mr. Pichon a ete ap- prouvee par un vote donnant au Gouvernement une majorite de 249 voix. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] Leghait. wishes to make her privileged position in Morocco secure, firmly maintaining her rights there, and remaining scrupulously faithful to the agreement of Algeciras; but it is not to be expected that she will heed the counsels of M. Jaures, nor that she will make concessions on Moroccan territory in order to facilitate an understanding with Germany in the Balkans. M. Pichon's Moroccan policy was approved by a majority of 249 votes for the Government. Accept, etc. [Signed] Leghait. No. 54. No. 54. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, le 13 Fevrier 1909. Monsieur le Ministre! Le Roi et la Reine d'Angleterre ont quitte Berlin hier soir, apres une visite qui a dure quatre jours. Rien n'a ete epargne de la part de la cour et de I'ad- ministration communale de Berlin pour rendre I'ac- cueil fait a Leurs Majestes aussi splendide et aussi cordial que possible. Le Roi d'Angleterre regne depuis huit ans, a plu- sieurs reprises il a eu des entrevues avec I'Empereur d'Allemagne ; mais il n'avait pas encore fait a Berlin sa visite officielle, tandis qu'il avait rempli ce devoir de courtoisie dans la plupart des capitales de I'Europe. On interpretait ici, non sans raison, le peu d'empressement du Roi d'Angleterre, comme I'un des symptomes de la froideur des rapports des deux souverains et de la tension de relations entre les deux pays. II n'y a personne ici a qui cette si- tuation ne pese, parce qu'elle constitue un danger permanent pour I'empire. II y a longtemps qu'un rapprochement aurait ete opere, si la chose ne de- pendait que de I'Empereur, du Gouvernement Im- perial ou du peuple allemand. On a prodigue les avances et toujours sans succes. On aime a croire que la demarche du Roi d'Angleterre indique une disposition a temperer la politique franchement hos- tile a I'Allemagne qu'il dirige personnellement. Le ton amical des toasts echanges au diner de gala et les intentions pacifiques manifestees par les deux souverains ont cause une heureuse impression. Ne- anmoins le ton de la presse est courtois, mais re- serve. Deja avant I'arrivee du Roi d'Angleterre, les journaux avaient premuni leurs lecteurs centre la tentation d'exagerer les resultats possibles de I'en- trevue. On attend, pour voir si les actes repondront aux paroles et Ton a eprouve trop de deceptions, pour s'abandonner a la confiance. Le Roi d'Angleterre affirme que la conservation de la paix a toujours ete le but de ses efforts ; c'est ce qu'il n'a pas cesse de dire depuis le debut de la campagne diplomatique qu'il a menee a bonne fin, dans le but d'isoler I'Allemagne ; mais on ne peut pas s'empecher de remarquer, que la paix du monde n'a jamais ete plus compromise que depuis que le Roi d'Angleterre se mele de la consolider. L'attitude de I'Angleterre dans la question des Balkans a ete de nature a retarder au moins la solu- tion du conflit qui place I'Allemagne dans la posi- Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, February 13, 1909. Sir:— The King and the Queen of England left Berlin last evening after a visit which lasted four days. Nothing was spared on the part of the court and the municipal administration of Berlin in order to make the reception given to their Majesties as splendid and as cordial as possible. The King of England has reigned for eight years, and on several occasions had meetings with the Emperor of Germany; but he had not yet paid his official visit to Berlin, although he had fulfilled this duty of courtesy in most of the capitals of Europe. The King of England's tardiness was regarded here not without reason as one of the symptoms of the coldness in the relations between the two Sover- eigns and of the tension in the relations between the two countries. There is no one here on whom this situation does not weigh, because it constitutes a permanent danger for the Empire. A rapproche- ment would have been brought about long ago if the matter depended only on the Emperor, the Im- perial Government, and the German people. They have been lavish with advances and always without success. It is fondly believed here that the step of the King of England indicates a desire to temper the frankly hostile policy towards Germany which he is personally directing. The friendly tone of the toasts exchanged at the gala-dinner and the pacific intentions expressed by the two Sovereigns have caused a pleasant impression. Nevertheless the tone of the press, while courteous, is reserved. Even before the arrival of the King of England, the papers had warned their readers against the temptation to entertain exaggerated expectations as to the possible results of the meeting. Time should be taken to see whether the actions will correspond to the words. There have been too many disappointments to indulge in confidence. The King of England affirms that the preserva- tion of peace has always been the goal of his efforts ; he has not stopped saying that since the beginning of the diplomatic campaign which he has success- fully conducted for the purpose of isolating Ger- many. But one cannot help noticing that the peace of the world has never been more compromised than since the King of England has been trying to ensure it. The attitude of England in the Balkan question has been such as to delay, at least, the solution of the conflict which is placing Germany in the most tion la plus penible et la plus delicate. EUe ressem- ble fort a celle qu'a prise le gouvernement britan- nique dans la question du Congo, dont il pretendait desirer vivement I'annexion a la Belgique, tout en se livrant a une action diplomatique qui a failli la faire avorter. Est-ce pure maladresse? La visite du Roi d'Angleterre coincide avec une augmentation considerable du budget de la marine, avec la construction de nouveaux cuirasses du type Dreadnought et avec la formation de la plus formida- ble escadre qui ait jamais existe et dont le port d'at- tache est dans la mer du Nord, a I'endroit le plus rapproche possible des cotes allemandes. Est-ce uni- quement pour se mettre a I'abri d'une attaque eventuelle que I'Allemagne est incapable d'effectuer? L'agitation pour la creation d'une armee territo- riale continue. L'Angleterre n'en a nul besoin pour sa defense. Qu'en veut-elle faire, si elle n'entretient aucune arriere pensee d'agression sur le continent? painful and delicate position. England's attitude strongly resembles that which the British Gov- ernment took in the Congo question, pretending to desire the annexation of the Congo to Belgium while at the same time carrying on a diplomatic action which almost caused the plan to miscarry. Is that merely bungling? The visit of the King of England coincides with a considerable increase in the naval budget, with the construction of cruisers of the dreadnought type, and with the formation of the most formidable squadron which has ever existed and the base of which is in the North Sea at the point nearest to the German coast. Is all that done only to protect England against the contingency of an attack which Germany is incapable of carrying out? The agitation for the creation of a territorial army is continuing. England has not the slightest need of it for her defense. What use does she want to make of it if she does not entertain any secret thought of aggression on the continent? Ces reflexions sautent aux yeux et expliquent I'he- sitation des Allemands a considerer la detente com- me un fait acquis. Une information donnee aux journaux dit que M. Hardinge le sous-secretaire d'Etat des Affaires Etrangeres, qui a accompagne le Roi d'Angleterre a Berlin, a fait une longue visite au chancelier de I'empire et qu'il y a ete naturellement parle de po- litique. Les questions a I'ordre du jour ont ete passees en revue et sur aucune il n'y a de contradic- tion entre les interets des deux pays. Aucun ar- rangement concret n'a ete conclu. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. These reflections are very apparent and explain Germany's hesitation to consider the relaxation of the tension as an accomplished fact. An item of information given to the newspapers states that Mr. Hardinge, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who accompanied the King of England to Berlin, paid a long visit to the Imperial Chancellor and that politics were naturally discussed. The questions of the day were reviewed and in none of them were the interests of the two countries found to conflict. No concrete agreement was concluded. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 55. No. 55. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 17 Fevrier 1909. Monsieur le Ministre! Par mon rapport du 13 Fevrier, j'ai eu I'honneur de vous ecrire quelle a ete I'impression produite sur I'opinion publique allemande par la visite du Roi et de la Reine d'Angleterre a Berlin. Celle du gou- vernement Imperial est identique. Le Roi d'Angleterre atteint d'un refroidissement et visiblement fatigue par les fetes qui lui ont ete oflfertes, a ete tres silencieux. Sa Majeste n'a eu aucun entretien politique avec le chancelier de I'em- pire. Elle n'a parle au Prince de Biilow que pendant quelques minutes apres le dejeuner chez I'ambassa- deur d'Angleterre, en presence de tiers et de choses indifferentes. C'est tout juste ce qu'exigeait la courtoisie. Les conversations de Sir C. Hardinge avec le chancelier et avec le secretaire d'Etat des Affaires Etrangeres ne sont pas sorties des generalites. On a reconnu de part et d'autre qu'il fallait faire les plus grands efforts pour empecher que la question des Balkans n'aboutisse a la guerre. Une declaration dans ce sens etait pour ainsi dire obligatoire. Elle n'a done pas grande portee. Ce qui est plus signifi- catif est qu'on s'est trouve d'accord sur la necessite de reunir une conference, non pour reviser mais pour Berlin, February 17, 1909. Sir:— In my report of February 13th, I had the honor to describe to you the impression produced on Ger- man public opinion by the visit of the King and Queen of England to Berlin. That of the Imperial Government is the same. The King of England, who was suffering from chill and was evidently fatigued from the festivi- ties given in his honor, was very taciturn. His Majesty did not have any political conversation with the Imperial Chancellor. He only spoke to Prince von Biilow for a few moments, in the pres- ence of others and about immaterial matters, after the luncheon given by the British Ambassador. This merely fulfilled the requirements of courtesy. The conversations of Sir C. Hardinge with the Chancellor and with the Secretary of State of For- eign Affairs did not go beyond generalities. It was recognized on both sides that the greatest efforts would have to be made in order to prevent the Bal- kan question from leading to war. A declaration in this sense was obligatory, so to speak. It is therefore not of great import. What is more signi- ficant is that it was agreed that it was necessary to call a conference, not to revise but to register the enregistrer le resultat des negociations pendantes entre les puissances les plus directement interessees. Sir C. Hardinge s'est done plaee au point de vue autriehien. II a ete convenu que de part et d'autre on se declarerait satisfait du resultat de I'entrevue de Ber- lin. C'est dans ce sens qu'ont ete redigees les com- munications adressees aux journaux. Jusqu'a un certain point, du cote allemand, cette satisfaction est reelle. On a gre a Sir C. Hardinge de n'avoir fait aucune allusion aux questions brii- lantes. II n'a parle ni de la limitation des armements maritimes ni du chemin de fer de Bagdad. Le gouvernement Imperial a fait le necessaire pour que le public d'un cote ne croie pas a un echec et de I'autre ne se fasse pas d'illusions sur les re- sultats obtenus. II est de style, apres chaque visite de souverain, d'inserer en tete de la Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung un article hautement ofificieux dans lequel on se felicite en termes plutot dithyram- biques de I'identite des vues politiques constatee. Cette fois on s'est abstenu et les communiques a la presse ont revetu une forme moins bruyante. La situation a ete tres exactement caracterisee dans la revue hebdomadaire de la politique exteri- eure publiee par la "Kreuz-Zeitung" de ce matin No. 79. M. Schiemann dont vous connaissez la grande autorite comme journaliste et les relations avec la chancellerie, constate que le sejour du Roi Edouard s'est bien passe et que la presse ainsi que le public ont temoigne le respect du a Sa Majeste. II ajoute que "pour repondre a la question de savoir s'il faut signaler la visite du Roi Edouard comme un evene- ment d'une portee politique, on devra attendre 5 ou 6 semaines. Nous voulons, dit-il, attendre si d'ici la, I'opinion publique en Angleterre se sera calmee au sujet du peril allemand; car tout est possible aussi longtemps que ce fantome pesera comme un cauche- mar sur les Anglais. II faudra done observer I'atti- tude du "Times," du "Standard," de la "National Review" et consorts pour constater si la campagne d'excitation contre I'Allemagne continuera ou si elle sera enfin terminee; au surplus il est avere qu'il y a eu des entretiens politiques amicaux, mais aucun arrangement." On ne peut pas mieux dire que meme si le Roi d' Angleterre a un desir sincere de se rapprocher de I'Allemagne, il est malgre sa grande influence per- sonnelle incapable de le realiser, aussi longternps qu'un revirement nc se sera pas opere dans I'opinion publique anglaise. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. results of the negotiations pending between the Powers most directly interested. Sir C. Hardinge thus took the Austrian point of view. It was agreed to express satisfaction on both sides with the result of the meeting of Berlin. The communications given to the newspapers were worded accordingly. Up to a certain point, on the German side, this satisfaction is genuine. Gratitude was felt to Sir C. Hardinge for not having alluded in any way to the burning questions. He spoke neither of the limitation of naval armaments, nor of the Bagdad railway. The Imperial Government has taken the neces- sary measures to prevent the public from believing, on the one hand, that the meeting was a failure, and, on the other, from cherishing illusions on the re- sults obtained. It is the custom after every visit of a Sovereign to insert in a prominent place in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung a semi-official article in which satisfaction is expressed in rather dithyrambic terms at the identity of the political views which has been established. This time this course was refrained from and the communications to the press are couched in less clamorous terms. The situation has been very aptly sketched in the weekly review of foreign policy published by the Kreuz Zeitung of this morning, issue No. 79. Mr. Schiemann, whose position as a journaHst and whose relations with the Chancellery you know, states that the sojourn of the King of England passed oflf well and that the press as well as the public manifested the respect due His Majesty. He adds that "in order to reply to the question as to whether the visit of King Edward is to be considered an event of political importance one will have to wait five or six weeks. We wish to see if by that time public opinion in England has been pacified on the subject of the German peril; for everything is possible as long as this phantom weighs like an incubus on the English. It will, therefore, be necesary to observe the attitude of the Times, of the Standard, of the National Review and other journals, in order to discover whether the anti-German campaign will continue or whether it will at last come to an end. Besides this, it is averred that friendly political con- versations have taken place, but no agreement was made. It could not be expressed any more clearly that even if the King of England has a sincere desire for a rapprochement with Germany, he is, despite his great personal influence, incapable of effecting it as long as a change does not take place in English public opinion. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 56. • Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 22 Mars 1909. Monsieur le Ministre! Je n'ai pas a vous donner d'informations sur les debats relatifs a la marine de guerre qui ont eu lieu a la commission du budget du Reichstag en meme temps qu'a la chambre des communes anglaise. Les journaux en sont pleins et je ne pourrais rien ajouter Berlin, March 22, 1909. Sir:— It will not be necessary for me to give you any information on the naval debates which took place in the Budget Commission of the Reichstag at the same time as in the British House of Commons. The papers are full of it and I can add nothing to a ce qu'ils rapportent. Je me borne a noter qu'a en- tendre les orateurs qui ont discute a Londres la ques- tion de savoir ce que doivent etre les forces navales de I'Angleterre pour parer a tout danger, il semble- rait qu'en dehors de la Grande-Bretagne, I'AUe- magne soit la seule puissance entretenant une ma- rine de guerre. On n'a parle que d'elle comme si les autres n'existaient pas ; cela se passe un mois apres I'echange des toasts chaleureux prononces a Tocca- sion de la visite du Roi d'Angleterre a Berlin. Cette preoccupation exclusive tenant de Thypnose en dit plus long que les courtoisies officielles obligees dont I'omission est a coup sur un symptome alarmant, mais dont I'accomplissement ne signifie rien du tout. Avant comme apres le pretendu rapproche- ment ce qui domine les relations des deux pays est une profonde defiance mutuelle. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. what they report. I will only remark that to hear the speakers in London who discussed the question of what the naval forces of England ought to be in order to provide against all danger, it would seem that aside from Great Britain, Germany were the only Power maintaining a navy. Only the German navy was spoken of, as if no others existed ; this is taking place one month after the exchange of the cordial toasts pronounced on the occasion of the visit of the King of England to Berlin. This dom- inating, almost hypnotic, fear says much more than the customary official courtesies, the omission of which is certainly an alarming symptom but the observance of which signifies nothing at all. Since the supposed rapprochement the relations between the two countries are dominated by the same pro- found distrust as before. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 57. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des AiTaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 31 Mars 1909. Monsieur le Ministre i Lorsque j'ai eu rhonneur de vous adresser mon rapport d'hier, vous disant que le Prince de Biilow n'avait pas parle dans son discours sur la politique exterieure, de la limitation des armaments maritimes, je n'etais pas encore en possession du compte-rendu du deuxieme discours prononce par le chancelier dans la seance de la veille. Dans ce deuxieme discours, le Prince de Biilow oblige par les questions qui lui avaient ete adressees au cours du debat, de s'expliquer sur la proposition ou si Ton veut sur la suggestion anglaise, I'a fait aussi brievement que possible. II s'est borne a re- produire la declaration faite par M. le Baron de Schoen a la commission du budget, dont je vous ai envoye le texte par mon rapport du 25 Mars, en y ajoutant que le programme du developpement de la flotte allemande a ete uniquement inspire par les besoins de defense des cotes et de protection du com- merce ; qu'il ne contient rien de secret et que le gou- vernement Imperial n'a nul ddisein d'en accelerer I'execution. En 1912 I'Allemagne aura treize grands navires du nouveau type dont trois croiseurs, tous les bruits contraires sont inexacts. Le Reichstag n'a pas demande d'informations plus explicites. II a bien accueilli ce passage du discours de Biilow comme les autres. Quoique le chancelier compte beaucoup d'adversaires et meme beaucoup d'ennemis, la politique exterieure de I'Allemagne a, sauf bien entendu les socialistes, ete approuvee par tous les partis, y compris le Centre. Le Baron de Hertling qui a pris la parole au nom de ce dernier groupe, y a applaudi tout en declarant que I'appui donne a la politique exterieure de I'Empire, n'im- plique pas un vote de confiance, qu'au surplus le chancelier ne desire sans doute pas. Par une curieuse coincidence, au moment meme ou au Reichstag Ton s'efforgait de parler le moins pos- sible de la question de la limitation des armements maritimes, le parlement anglais la soumettait a un debat approfondi. L'opposition I'avait provoquee par une proposition de blame et le gouvernement britan- Berlin, March 31, 1909. Sir:— When I had the honor to send you my report of yesterday telling you that Prince von Bulow had in his speech on the foreign policy not mentioned the limitation of naval armament, I was not yet in possession of the report on the second speech made by the Chancellor in the session of the preceding day. In this second speech. Prince von Biilow, obliged by the questions which had been addressed to him in the course of the debate, to give an explanation of the British proposal or, if one wishes to call it that, suggestion, made it as brief as possible. He confined himself to repeating the declaration made by Baron von Schoen to the Budget Commission, the text of which I sent to you in my report of March 25, adding to it that the programme for the development of the German fleet was formulated only according to requirements of coast defense and protection of commerce ; that it contained noth- ing secret, and that the Imperial Government had no intention of accelerating its execution. In 1912 Germany would have thirteen large ships of the new type, three of which would be cruisers; all rumors to the contrary were incorrect. The Reichstag did not ask for more explicit in- formation. It received this passage of Billow's speech as well as it had the others. Although the Chancellor has many opponents and even many enemies, the foreign policy of Germany has been approved, with of course the exception of the Soc- ialists, by all factions, including the Centre. Baron von Hertling, who spoke in the name of this last- mentioned group, quahfied his approval by declar- ing that the support given the foreign policy of the Empire did not imply a vote of confidence which the Chancellor, moreover, doubtless did not wish. By a curious coincidence it happened that at the same moment when the Reichstag was endeavoring to say as little as possible on the question of the limitation of naval armament, the British Parlia- ment was submitting it to a heated debate. This was provoked by a vote of censure, and the British nique s'est prete a la discussion par une reponse des plus explicites. Sir Edward Grey tout en declarant qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de faire un grief a I'Allemagne de n'etre pas entree dans les vues de I'Angleterre, a exprime les plus vifs regrets de ce que la proposition anglaise ait ete repoussee. II a dit qu'il ajoute une foi enticre 'aux communications que lui a faites le gouvernement allemand au sujet du programme de la flotte (le guerre ; mais il a ajoute que ces com- munications ne constituent pas un engagement at que de plus il s'y trouve des lacunes qui autorisent I'Angleterre a se croire menacee dans ses interets vitaux. La presse anglaise qui n'est pas tenue aux memes managements que le gouvernement britannique, te- moigne plus vivement encore sa mauvaise humeur. • L'etat d'esprit qui regne en Angleterre rappelle celui oii se trouvait la France de 1866 a 1870. A cette epoque les Frangais se croyaient le droit d'empecher I'Allemagne de reconstituer son unite, parce qu'ils y voyaient une menace pour la preponderance con- tinentale dont la France avait joui qusque la. De meme aujourd'hui a Londres on considere comme un mauvais precede et une menace pour la paix, le refus de s'engager par traite a rester a la merci de I'Angle- terre. Agreez etc. "[s.] Greindl. Government took up the discussion in a detailed reply. Sir Edward Grey, while declaring that there was no occasion for reproaching Germany for not entering into the views of England, expressed the deepest regrets that the English proposal had been rejected. He said that he placed absolute faith in the communications made to him by the German Government in regard to the naval programme; but he added that these communications did not constitute an obligation and that, moreover, there were gaps in the programme which would justify England in believing that her vital interests were menaced. The English press, which is not restricted by the same considerations as the British Government, shows its ill-humor even more plainly. The state of mind which prevails in England re- calls that which existed in France from 1866 to 1870. At that period the French believed that they had the right to prevent Germany from reestablishing her unity, because they believed that it constituted a menace to the preponderance on the Continent which France had been enjoying until then. In the same way the refusal [of Germany] to bind her- self by treaty to be at the mercy of England is con- sidered in London to-day an unfriendly act and a menace to peace. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 58. No. 58. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 1 Avril 1909. Monsieur le Ministre! Plus d'un point reste encore a regler pour que la crise des Balkans soit tout a fait terminee. Le par- lement ottoman n'a pas encore approuve I'arrange- ment intervenu entre I'Autriche-Hongrie et la Tur- quie. Vous m'avez appris par la communication du tres interessant rapport de M. le Baron Beyens, du 13 Mars dernier, que le Prince de Bulgarie s'im- patiente et menace de marcher sur Constantinople, si les negociations de son gouvernement avec la Tur- quie ne prennent pas une allure plus vive. Puis il y a la question de la conference, ou il faut eviter deux ecueils. Convoquer un congres europeen dont I'uni- que mission serait d'enregistrer des resolutions deja prises, ne varietur, serait passablement ridicule. D'un autre cote, si a la conference il se produisait quelque velleite de les modifier, nous irions tout droit a la guerre. Quoique I'imbroglio des Balkans plus que medio- crement traite par la diplomatic europeenne ait ete fecond en revirements et en surprises, on s'accorde neanmoins a le considerer comme virtuellement ter- mine par la demarche que la Serbia a faita hiar a Vienne. Le gouvernement serbe raconnait que I'annexion da la Bosnia ne porte pas atteinte a ses droits; il promet de renoncer a son attitude de protestation; de mettra son armea sur pied de paix, de licencier ses volontaires et ses bandes et de s'efforcer de vivre en bonne harmonic avec I'Autriche-Hongrie. A Vienna on s'etait engage a se declarer satisfait de cette communication dont les tarmes avaient ete ar- retes d'accord avec le Baron d'Aehrenthal. S'il n'y Sir: Berlin, April 1, 1909. Mora than one point must still be settled before the Balkan crisis will be at an end. The Turkish Parliament has not yet approved the agreement made between Austria-Hungary and Turkey. You have informed me through the very interesting re- port of Baron Beyens, of March 13th, that the Prince of Bulgaria is. growing impatient and is threatening to march on Constantinople, if the ne- gotiations of his conntry with Turkey do not make quicker progress. •Then there is the question of the Conference, in which it is necessary to avoid two reefs. To call a European conference with only the function of registering, ne varietur, resolutions al- ready taken, would be somewhat ridiculous. On the other hand, if any inclination to modify them ware to arise at the conference, we would be head- ing straight for war. Although the treatment of the Balkan imbroglio by European diplimacy was even more than medi- ocre and was, therefore, full of sudden changes and surprises, it is, nevertheless, generally considered as virtually terminated by the damarch which Sarvia made yesterday at Vienna. The Servian Government recognizes that the an- nexation of Bosnia does not injure Servia's rights; it promises to give up its attitude of protest, to place its army on peace footing, to discharge its volun- teers and its bands, and to endeavor to live in har- mony with Austria-Hungary. Vienna had prom- ised to be satisfied with this communication, the' terms of which were drawn up in cooperation with Baron Aehrenthal. As long as there was no mental avait pas eu d'arriere-pensee, on eut du I'etre aussi partout puisque c'est sur les conseils pressants et unanimes des puissances que le gouvernement serbe s'est resigne a la demarche qu'il vient d'accomplir. Le "Temps" de Paris, dont les relations avec le Quai d'Orsay sont notoires, s'exprime cependant en termes dont on pourrait induire qu'il ressent une certaine deception de ce qu'a Saint-Petersbourg et a Belgrade, on ait trop docilement suivi les conseils franqais. Le "Times" marque de meme sa mauvaise humeur ; comme toujours lorsque tout ne marche pas au gre des politiques franqais, anglais ou russes, c'est I'Allemagne qui est le bouc emissaire. II n'est pas douteux a mon avis que la Russie et la France ne fussent animees d'un desir sincere de prevenir une conflagration europeenne. La Russie n'a rien de ce qu'il faut pour faire la guerre et aussi longtemps que leurs amis anglais ne seront pas en mesure de leur venir en aide sur le continent, les Frangais sont loin d'avoir la certitude du succes. Mais tout en souhaitant la paix, on eut voulu qu'elle fut garantie autrement qu'elle ne I'a ete. Le projet de conference elabore par M. Isvolski et Sir Edward Grey, les pourparlers au sujet d'une de- marche collective a faire a Vienne et tous les echanges d'idees qui ont eu lieu entre Londres, Paris et Saint-Petersbourg tendaient invariablement a obliger I'Autriche-Hongrie a une transaction qui aurait fort ressemble a une humiliation atteignant I'Allemagne tout aussi directement et aussi sensible- ment que I'Autriche-Hongrie et qui aurait porte une tres rude atteinte a la confiance qu'inspire a Vienne I'alliance allemande. Les manoeuvres ont ete de- jouees par I'attitude tres nette et tres resolue qu'a prise FAllemagne et dont elle n'a jamais devie mal- gre les sollicitations dont elle a ete harcelee. C'est I'Allemagne seule qui a impose la paix. Le nouveau groupement des puissances organise par le Roi d'Ang'cterre. a fait I'epreuve de ses forces contre I'union de I'Europe centrale. et s'est trouve incapable de I'entamer. C'est de la que vient le depit. Agreez etc. Gr^indl. reservation everybody had to be satisfied, since the Servian Government resigned itself to the step which it has just taken at the urgent and unanimous advice of the Powers. The Paris Temps, the relations of which with the Quai d'Orsay are notorious, expresses itself, how- ever, in terms from which one might deduce that it was disappointed at the excessive docility with which the French advice was followed at St. Peters- burg and Belgrade. The Temps shows its ill-humor in the usual way; as always when everything does not go to the liking of the French, English or Rus- sian politicians, it is Germany who is the scape-goat. In my opinion it cannot be doubted that, Russia and France were animated by a sincere desire to prevent a European conflagration. Russia has none of the things that are needed for war, and as long as their EngHsh friends will not be in a position to come to their aid on the continent, the French are far from feeling sure of success. But although desiring peace, it would have been preferable to see it guaranteed in a different way. The conference plan elaborated by M. Iswolski and Sir Edward Grey, the pourparlers in regard to a concerted step to be taken at Vienna, and the whole exchange of ideas which took place between Lon- don, Paris, and St. Petei-sburg; all this aimed at forcing Austria-Hungary to make a compromise which would have strongly resembled a humilia- tion, afifecting Germany as directly and as painfully as Austria-Hungary, and which would have dealt a very heavy blow to the confidence which the Ger- man alliance is inspiring at Vienna. These manoeu- vres were thwarted by the very clear and resolute attitude assumed by Germany, and from which she never deviated despite the urgent requests with which she was harassed. It was Germany alone who imposed peace. The new grouping of Powers organized by the King of England has measured its strength with the union of central Europe, and it found that it was unable to break it. It is that which has caused the ill-feeling. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 59. No. 59. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 17 Avril 1909. Monsieur le Ministre ! II y a quelques jours la "Gazette de Cologne" a public un tres bref article ofificieux disant qu'il n'est pas exact que dans la reCente entrevue du Prince de Billow et de M. Tittoni a Venise, il ait ete question du renouvellement anticipe de la triple alliance qui n'est pas necessaire. Le telegramme ajbutait que le resultat de I'entretien avait ete des plus satisfaisants. Je ne vous en ai pas ecrit parce que les communi- cations de ce genre ne signifient rien du tout. Elles sont la suite obligee de toute rencontre entre des souverains ou entre des hommes d'Etat dirigeants. La verite est que le Prince de Biilow a rendu compte de I'entrevue par un telegramme de quelques lignes. II y est dit en substance que comme I'ltalie a obtenu ce qu'elle demandait d'ans I'affaire des Bal- kans, par la suppression de I'article 29 du traite de Berlin, April 17, 1909. Sir:— A few days ago, the Cologne Gazette published a brief semi-official article stating that it was not correct that at the recent meeting of Prince von Biilow and M. Tittoni at Venice, the question had been brought up as to the anticipated renewal of the Triple Alliance, for which there was no neces- sity. The telegram added that the result of the conversation had been highly satisfactory. I did not write to you about it because communi- cations of this kind mean nothing at all. They are the necessary sequel of all meetings between Sov- ereigns or between leading statesmen. The truth of the matter is that Prince von Biilow has given account of the interview in a telegram of a few lines. In it he says in substance that as Italy had obtained what she asked for in the Balkan affair, by the abolition of Article 29 of the treaty Berlin, il n'y avait rien a discuter et que tout s'est borne a une conversation generale sans objet con- cret. Depuis bien longtemps on ne se fait plus aucune illusion a Berlin ni a Vienna sur le concours eventuel de ritalie. Le gouvernement du Quirinal a contracte des engagements avec la France et I'Angleterre et reste en coquetterie avec Londres et Paris. II tient cependant a la triple-alliance comme garantie de la fidelite de ses nouveaux amis qui ne lui inspirent qu'une confiance limitee, se reservant de se tourner du cote du plus fort comme a Algesiras oii il s'est range derriere la France et I'Angleterre et tout re- cemment dans la question d'Orient ou il s'est finale- ment uni a I'Allemagne et a I'Autriche-Hongrie apres avoir garde une attitude equivoque, jusqu' au mo- ment oii le succes s'est dessine. L'Allemagne et rAutriche-Hongrie conservent ou tolerent I'ltalie dans la triple alliance, parce que sa defection officielle serait une diminution de prestige et aussi parce qu'on y voit une chance de ne I'avoir pas pour adversaire en cas de conflit ; mais c'est tout ce qu'on en espere. D'un autre cote on ne s'engagerait pas a fond pour elle comme I'Allemagne vient de le faire pour I'Au- triche-Hongrie ; ni a Vienne ni a Berlin on ne se compromettrait pour une alliee aussi douteuse. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. of Berlin, there had been nothing to discuss and that the conversation had been on general subjects not bearing on any concrete matter. For quite a long time no illusions have been cher- ished at Berlin or at Vienna about Italy's possible support. The Government of the Quirinal entered into obligations with France and England, and is incessantly flirting with London and Paris. Never- theless, it holds on to the Triple Alliance as a safe- guard for the fidelity of its new friends in whom it places only a limited amount of confidence. Thus it reserves for itself the chance to side with the strongest as it did at Algerciras where it supported France and England, or very recently in the Orien- tal question in which it finally joined Germany and Austria-Hungary after having observed an equivo- cal attitude until the moment when success was decided. Germany and Austria-Hungary are retaining, or rather tolerating, Italy in the Triple Alliance be- cause her official withdrawal would mean a loss of prestige, and also because in it is seen the chance of not having her for an adversary in case of a con- flict. But that is all that is hoped of her. On the other hand, Germany would not engage herself so deeply on Italy's account as she has just been doing for Austria-Hungary; neither Vienna nor Berlin would compromise themselves for such a doubtful ally. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 60. No. 60. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 21 Juin 1909. Monsieur le Ministre ! L'Empereur d'AUemagne revenant de sa visite a I'Empereur de Russie est rentre avant-hier a Pots- dam. Les toasts echanges a bord du Standart ont ete ce qu'ils devaient etre. Les deux Souverains ont mani- feste I'intention de maintenir I'amitie et la confiance traditionnelles entre leurs deux maisons qui est un gage des bonnes relations entre les deux pays en meme temps que de la conservation de la paix. La note officieuse qui a ete inseree dans le nu- mero 142 de la "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" d'hier matin, ne s'ecarte guere non plus de ce qui est de style en pareille circonstance. II y est dit que les hommes d'Etat qui accompagnaient les deux Em- pereurs se sont naturellement entretenus des ques- tions politiques pendantes. II a ete constate qu'il n'existe pas d'opposition entre la maniere dont elles sont considerees dans les deux pays. "II a de plus ete reconnu que les arrangements internationaux en vigueur auxquels participent la Russie et I'Alle- magne n'empechent nuUement ces bonnes relations." C'est ainsi qu'a toujours ete comprise a Berlin la triple alliance conclue dans un but purement de- fensif. D'apres la note officieuse c'est dans le meme sens qn'on vent, du moins maintenant, interpreter a Saint-Petersbourg les arrangements qui ont fonde la triple entente; mais ce n'est certes pas dans le meme esprit que ce dernier groupement a ete conqu Sir:- Berlin, June 21, 1909. The German Emperor has returned from his visit to the Emperor of Russia, arriving at Potsdam the day before yesterday. The toasts exchanged on board the "Standart" were as they had to be. The two Sovereigns ex- pressed the intention of preserving the traditional friendship and confidence between their two houses, which was a guarantee for the good relations be- tween the two countries as well as for the preserva- tion of peace. The semi-official note which was inserted in issue No. 142 of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of yesterday morning does not go far beyond what is the custom in such cases. It is stated that the statesmen who accompanied the two Emperors nat- urally conversed about the pending political ques- tions. It was established that there was no con- tradiction between the points of view from which they were being considered in the two countries. "It was, moreover, recognized that the existing in- ternational agreernents of which Russia and Ger- many are parties do not hamper these good rela- tions in any way." That is how the Triple Alliance, which was con- cluded for a purely defensive purpose, has always been regarded at Berlin. It would seem from the semi-official notice that it is desired at St. Peters- burg, for the present moment at least, to put the same interpretation on the agreements which form the basis of the Triple Entente ; but it is certainly a Paris et surtout a Londres par son principal au- teur, le Roi d'Angleterre. La mauvaise humeur manifestee en France et en Angleterre des que le projet d'entrevue a ete connu, est la preuve que dans ces deux pays on regardait la triple entente comme tout autre chose qu'une ligue ne mettant aucun ob- stacle au maintien de I'amitie et de la confiance tra- ditionnelles entre I'Allemagne et la Russie. A en juger par le langage des journaux officieux franqais, la mauvaise humeur a ete promptement dis- sipee a Paris par les declarations simultanees des cabinets de Berlin et de Saint-Petersbourg donnant I'assurance que la rencontre des deux Empereurs a la cote finlandaise n'avait ete inspiree de part ni d'autre par le desir de changer quelque chose au groupement actuel des puissances. A Londres la rancune est plus tenace, comme en temoigne la faQon discourtoise dont la prochaine visite de I'Empereur de Russie en Angleterre a ete appreciee dans les journaux anglais et jusque dans le parlement. C'est la suite du depit qu'on a ressenti en voyant que la machine construite par le Roi d'An- gleterre pour exercer une pression sur I'Allemagne, si pas davantage, s'est detraquee lorsqu'on a voulu I'employer dans I'affaire du conflit austro-serbe ; c'est a dire au premier essai. Ici, comme j'ai eu I'honneur de vous I'ecrire par mon rapport du 7 Juin, on ne s'est pas fait d'illusion sur I'etendue du resultat possible de I'entrevue. L'initiative prise par la cour et le gouvernement russes montre seulement qu'a Saint-Petersbourg de recents evenements ont laisse I'impression que la triple entente ne fournit pas a la Russie un appui suffisant pour se passer de relations au moins nor- males avec I'Allemagne. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. not in that spirit that the Entente was conceived at Paris and above all at London by its chief sponsor, the King of England. The ill-humor manifested in France and in England ever since the plan of the meeting became known proves that in these two countries the Triple Entente is regarded as some- thing very different from a league which would place no obstacle in the way of the maintenance of the traditional friendship and confidence between Germany and Russia. To judge by the language of the semi-official French papers, the ill-humor was promptly dissi- pated at Paris by the simultaneous declaration of the cabinets of Berlin and of St. Petersburg, giving assurance that the meeting of the two Emperors on the Finnish coast was not inspired on either side by the desire to make any change in the present grouping of the Powers. At London the ill-will is even stronger, as is shown by the discourteous way in which the im- pending visit of the Emperor of Russia has been discussed in the English papers and even in Parlia- ment. That is the consequence of the disappoint- ment which is felt that the machine constructed by the King of England in order to bring pressure to bear on Germany — if not more — got out of gear when it was tried out in the matter of the Austro- Servian conflict, that is to say, at the first trial. As I had the honor to write to you in my report of June 7th, no illusions have been entertained here about the possible results, of the meeting. The initiative taken by the Russian court and Govern- ment only shows that recent events have left the impression at St. Petersburg that the Triple En- tente does not furnish Russia with a support suffi- cient to permit her to dispense with at least normal relations with Germany. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 61. No. 6L Comte d'Arschot Schoonhoven, Charge d'AfFaires de Belgique a Paris, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Count d'Arschot Schoonhoven, Belgian Charge d'AfFaires at Paris, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, le 3 Aout 1909. Monsieur le Ministre 1 Ainsi qu'il avait ete annonce depuis longtemps, M. le President de la Republique s'est rencontre avec I'Empereur de Russie a Cherbourg le 31 juillet dernier. Quand on se reporte au temps du premier voyage du Czar a Paris, de la visite de Felix Faure a Pe- tersbourg, de la venue en France de I'Amiral Ave- lane, on ne pent que s'etonner du peu de retentisse- ment qu'a eu dans le pays I'entrevue des deux chefs d'Etat. Les journaux s'en occupent, mais comme de n'importe quel autre evenement, et il ne reste vrai- ment plus rien de I'enthousiasme frenetique qui se- coua toute la France aux beaux jours de I'alliance russe. Deux grands facteurs ont amene ce revirement de I'opinion publique: la guerre avec le Japon, qui a montre qu'il ne fallait pas trop compter sur ses amis, et les emprunts repetes. M. Caillaux me disait cependant tout dernierement qu'il y avait infiniment moins de fonds russes en France qu'on le supposait generalement. Paris, August 3, 1909. Sir:— As had been announced for a long time, the Pres- ident of the Republic had a meeting with the Em- peror of Russia at Cherbourg on July 31st. If one looks back to the time of the first journey of the Czar to Paris, of the visit of Felix Faure to St. Petersburg, of that of Admiral Avelane to France, one cannot but be astonished at the little interest which the meeting of the two heads of State has aroused in the country. The papers speak of it, but as they do of any other event, and there is really no longer any of the frenetic enthusiasm which inspired all France in the palmy days of the Russian Alliance. Two great factors have led to this change in pub- lic opinion : the war with Japan, which showed that one could not count too much on one's friends, and furthermore the repeated loans. M. Caillaux told me quite recently, however, that there was far less Russian stock in France than was generally sup- posed. Le "Temps," dans son numero du 2 courant, a ecrit, a propos de toasts prononces a Cherbourg, et dont vous trouverez sous ce pli-le texte officiel, qu'ils etaient "une consecration nouvelle de I'alliance a laquelle les deux gouvernements et les deux nations restent fermement attaches," et il ajoutait: "Notre alliance est aujourd'hui aussi etroite qu'elle etait hier." Cette alliance, on en park, mais il semble qu'il faille pour en parler que quelque chose en reveille le souvenir et qu'on ne se la rappelle que comme une chose agreable, mais sur laquelle on ne compterait plus guere si on venait a en avoir besoin. Si la presse serieuse a ete assez sobre de commen- taires, la presse avancee a, comme d'habitude, public des articles d'assez mauvais gout. Vous pourrez en juger par ceux que je vous transmets. Les "socialistes unifies" ont voulu manifester a Cherbourg, mais la municipalite "socialiste indepen- dante" a pris des mesures pour qu'aucune salle ne soit mise a leur disposition. Ces mesures ont valu des protestations diverses ; on n'a pas non plus man- que d'ergoter au sujet de I'absence de M. Briand dans la suite de M. Fallieres. Le President du Con- seil a, sans doiite, ete heureux de ne pas devoir sui- vre le President de la Republique, mais ses opinions personnelles n'y ont ete pour rien et on n'a fait que se conformer a un protocole d'apres lequel les Mi- nistres des Affaires Etrangeres, de la Guerre et de la Marine sont les seuls a accompagner le chef de I'Etat en pareille circonstance. Le Czar a quitte Cherbourg hier matin. Veuillez agreer, etc. [s.] Arschot. The Temps, in its issue of the 2nd of the month, wrote apropos of the toasts given at Cherbourg, the official text of which you will find here ap- pended, that they were "a new consecration of the alliance to which the two Governments and the two nations remain firmly attached," and it added that "our alliance is to-day as close as it was yesterday." This alliance is indeed spoken of but it seems that in order to speak of it something must first call it to mind, and that it is remembered as something pleasant, but something on which one would no longer count if one should happen to need it. While the serious papers were fairly moderate in their comments, the progressive part of the press as usual published articles which were in rather bad taste. You can judge of this by the articles which I am sending you. The "United Socialists" wanted to hold a demon- stration at Cherbourg, but the municipality which belongs to the "Independent Socialists" took meas- ures so that no hall was put at their disposal. These measures called forth various protests; nor was crit- icism lacking on the absence of M. Briand in the following of M. Fallieres. The Prime Minister was doubtless glad that he did not have to accompany the President of the Republic, but his personal opinion was not of any weight in the matter. For all that was done was to conform to the "protocole," according to which the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of War, and of the Navy are the only ones who accompany the head of the State under such cir- cumstances. The Czar left Cherbourg yesterday morning. Accept, etc. [Signed] Arschot. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Berlin, le 7 Novembre 1910. Monsieur le Ministre! Vous aurez remarque les articles inspires par les- quels la "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" a fait connaitre au public que la recente visite rendue par I'Empereur de Russie a I'Empereur d'Allemagne a Potsdam est plus qu'une simple demarche de cour- toisie. La "Rossija," organe du ministere des affai- res etrangere russe, ecrivait en meme temps que I'entrevue des deux souverains avait une haute por- tee politique. Le "Fremdenblatt" de Vienne s'ex- primait dans le meme sens. Les deux premiers de ces journaux officieux disaient qu'il ne s'agissait nul- lement d'introduire dans le systeme politique de I'Europe des innovations qui ne sont desirees ni en Allemagne ni en Russie. Tous les trois etaient d'ac- cord pour exprimer I'espoir que I'echange de vues entre les souverains et leurs ministres aiderait a dis- siper les malentendus qui surgissent forcement en- tre des Etats limitrophes qui ont des interets paral- leles mais conciliables et dont les rivalites sont sans influence sur la politique generale. Plus encore qua par les commentaires officieux, le caractere de la vi- site du Czar a ete marque par le fait que Sa Majeste avait appele en Hesse son nouveau ministre des af- faires etrangeres, M. Sasonow, et s'etait fait accom- Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, Nov. 7th, 1910. Sir:— You will have seen the inspired articles through which the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in- formed the public that the recent visit paid by the Emperor of Russia to the Emperor of Germany at Potsdam was more than a mere mark of courtesy. The Rossiya, which is the organ of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote at the same time that the meeting of the two sovereigns was of great political importance. The Vienna Fremdenblatt ex- pressed itself in the same sense. The two first mentioned of these semi-official papers said that there was no question of introducing innovations into the political system of Europe, for which nei- ther Germany nor Russia had any desire. All three of the papers were unanimous in expressing the hope that the exchange of views between the Sover- eigns and their Ministers would help to dissipate the misunderstanding arising of necessity between con- tiguous states, which had parallel but reconcilable interests and the rivalry of which had no bearing on the general policy. Even more than by the semi-offi- cial comments the character of the Czar's visit was marked by the fact that His Majesty called his new Minister of Foreign Affairs. M. Sassonov, to Hesse 76 — pagner par lui pendant son sejour a Potsdam. M. Sasonow a ete rcQU par I'Empereur et par le Chan- celier, ainsi que par M. de Kiderlen-Waechter. Les sujets de conversation n'ont pas du manquer. Ce qui se passe en Perse et en Extreme-Orient est de nature a eveiller en Allemagne la crainte que les evenements, dont le cote politique pourrait laisser {'Empire indifferent, n'aient pour consequence de fer- mer ces contrees au commerce allemand. En Rus- sie le projet de chemin de fer allemand en Mesopo- tamie a toujours ete vu de mauvais ceil, quoique I'Al- lemagne ait pour principe de ne pas se meler des questions politiques de la peninsule des Balkans ; il est impossible qu'on ne se preoccupe pas a Berlin comme a Saint-Petersbourg de la turbulence de la Grece, de I'impossibilite oil sont les puissances pro- tectrices de trouver la solution de la question cre- toise, des troubles de la Macedoine et des ambitions du Czar des Bulgares ; mais tous ces problemes sont bien compliques, et il n'est pas a penser qu'on soit parvenu a les resoudre dans le court espace de deux journees, dont la plus grande partie a ete absorbee par des ceremonies officielles et des banquets. C'est a peine le necessaire pour echanger des assurances de bonne volonte forcement congues en termes va- gues et d'une portee praticjue douteuse. Ce qui est plus important que les conversations entre les hom- mes d'Etat, c'est que la visite a eu lieu. Pendant les trois premiers quarts du 19e siecle I'union de la Russie et de la Prusse etait un facteur constant et assure de la politique europeenne. EUe etait basee non seulement sur les interets communs des deux nations, mais aussi sur I'amitie etroite des deux families regnantes cimentee par des liens de parente. II en etait ainsi du temps de I'Empereur Nicolas ler. La premiere atteinte a ete portee a ces relations par le congres de Berlin oil le Prince de Bismarck a essaye de rapprocher la Russie et I'An- gleterre et oil il a eu le sort generalement reserve aux conciliateurs, c'est-a-dire qu'il a ete accuse par chacun des deux adversaires de partialite en faveur de I'autre. Le peuple russc, se croyant frustre par la faute de I'Allemagne du fruit de ses victoires, a congu pour sa voisine de I'Ouest une haine encore avivee par I'envie qu'a suscitee le rapide developpe- ment de la puissance allemande. Dans I'union entre la Russie et la Prusse celle-ci jouait un role quelque peu froisse. On a ete froisse a Saint-Petersbourg et surtout a Moscou lorsque Berlin est devenu le cen- tre principal de la politique europeenne. Les etapes du refroidissement progressif des relations entre les deux pays ont ete marquees par I'alliance de la Rus- sie avec la France, par I'etablissement de la triple entente et en dernier lieu par I'intervention de I'Al- lemagne dans I'affaire de I'annexion de la Bosnie. On se defend ici d'avoir exerce une pression sur la Russie. C'est jouer sur les mots. Sans la declara- tion du Prince de Bulow au sujet de la solidarite de I'Allemagne et de I'Autriche-Hongrie et sans I'aver- tissement donne par le Comte de Pourtales a Saint- Petersbourg, la Russie n'aurait pas brusquement mis fin a Tagitaticn qu'elle entretenait dans les petits etats slaves et surtout a Belgrade centre I'Autriche- Hongrie. La solution de la question de la Bosnie a ete a la fois pour la Russie une humiliation et une deception. Elle a dii laisser entamer son prestige en retirant sur une injonction de I'etranger la protection qu'elle accordait aux convoitises serbes. L'expe- rience lui a montre I'inefficacite de la coalition for- mee par le feu Roi d'Angleterre la premiere fois qu'elle a ete mise a I'epreuve. Si I'antipathie des peuples russe et allemand n'a pas eu de consequences plus graves, c'est parce que and had him in his company during his brief stay at Potsdam. M. Sassonov was received by the Em- peror and the Chancellor as well as Mr. von Kider- len-Waechter. There can have been no lack of topics for conversation. What is happening in Per- sia and in the Far East is apt to arouse in Germany a fear that the events, though their political side may be indifferent to her, might result in closing these countries to German commerce. In Russia the German railway scheme in Mesopotamia has always been looked at askance. Although Germany followed the principle of non-interference in the political questions of the Balkan peninsula, it is as impossible for Berlin as it is for St. Petersburg not to be concerned about turbulent Greece, about the quandary in which the protector Powers are in finding a solution of the Cretan question, about the Macedonian troubles and the ambitions of the Czar of the Bulgarians. But all these questions are highly complicated and it cannot be assumed that there has been complete success in solving them in the short space of two days, which for the greater part were occupied by official ceremonies and ban- quets. That time is hardly sufficient to exchange assurances of good will which of necessity are couched in vague terms and are of dubious practi- cal value. What is more important than the con- versations between the statesmen is the fact that the visit has taken place. During the first three quarters of the nineteenth century the unity of Russia and Prussia was a con- stant and reliable factor in European politics. It was based not only on the common interests of the two nations, but also on the close friendship of the two reigning families cemented by family bonds. This was the case particularly at the time of Em- peror Nicholas I. These relations were first im- paired by the Congress of Berlin when Prince von Bismarck tried to bring Russia and England to- gether and met the fate of all mediators, viz., that he was accused by each of the two adversaries of partiality in favor of the other. The Russian peo- ple, believing themselves deprived by Germany's fault of the fruit of their victories, conceived for their western neighbor a hate still heightened by envy at the rapid development of Germany's power. During the union between Russia and Prussia the Letter played a somewhat subordinate part and of- fense was taken io St. Petersburg, and more in Moscow, when Berlin became the centre of Euro- pean politics. The progressive stages of the cool- ness developing in the relations between the two countries were marked by the alliance of Russia with France, the birth of the Triple Entente, and lastly the annexation of Bosnia. It is maintained in this connection that no pressure was brought to bear on Russia. That is juggling with words. With- out the declaration of Prince von Biilow on the sub- ject of the solidarity of Germany and Austria-Hun- gary, and without the warning given by Count Pourtales at St. Petersburg, Russia would not have suddenly dropped the agitation which she was keep- ing up in the little Slav States, and chiefly at Bel- grade, against Austria-Hungary. The solution of the Bosnian question was a humiliation as well as a disappointment for Russia. She suffered in pres- tige when, in obedience to foreign injunctions, she withdrew the protection she had accorded to Ser- vian covetousness. That experience has shown to Russia the inefficacy of the coalition formed by the late King of England the first time that it was put to the test. If the antipathy between the Russian and the German nation has not had any more grave conse- les rapports entre les souverains, quoique alteres, ont toujours ete meilleurs qu'entre les nations et meme entre les deux gouvernements. II semble qu'il en coutait aux deux maisons regnantes de rompre avec une tradition seculaire et la demarche de I'Empereur Nicholas parait indiquer qu'il veut la reprendre. C'est lui qui a exprime le desir d'une entrevue avec I'Empereur d'Allemagne accueilli au debut avec as- sez peu d'empressement a Berlin. Le moment choisi a ete celui ou le terrain etait deblaye par la retraite de M. Iswolski. L'inimitie personnelle de I'ancien ministre des affaires etrangeres russe et du Comte d'Aehrenthal a ete I'un des principaux obstacles qu'il a fallu surmonter pour arriver a une solution paci- fique de la question bosniaque. J'ai lieu de croire aussi que M. Iswolski n'inspirait a Berlin qu'une confiance tres mediocre. M. Sasonow a produit au contraire sur I'Empereur, le Chancelier et le secre- taire d'etat des affaires etrangeres une tres bonne impression. La presence a Potsdam est done un evenement dont il faut se feliciter comme de nature a ameliorer les relations entre les deux Empires et peut-etre aussi par contre-coup entre Vienne et Saint-Peters- bourg, mais c'est une exageration que de lui attri- buer, comme I'a fait la "Rossija," une haute portee politique. Les groupements des grandes puissances europeennes resteront ce qu'ils etaient auparavant, et les sentiments du peuple russe pour I'Allemagne n'en deviendront pas plus cordiaux. Le langage des journaux russes le demontre deja. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. quences, it is because the relations between the Sovereigns, though changed, were always better than those between the nations and even those be- tween the two Governments. It seems that the two reigning houses were loath to break with the tradi- tion of centuries and the step taken by Emperor Nicholas seems to indicate that he wants to take it up again. It was he who expressed the desire for a meeting with the Emperor of Germany, which was at first received at Berlin with only scant en- thusiasm. Moreover, a moment was chosen when the ground was clear, thanks to the retirement of M. Iswolski. The personal enmity between the for- mer Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Count Aehrenthal was one of the principal obstacles which had to be surmounted in order to arrive at a peace- ful solution of the Bosnian question. I have also reason to believe that M. Iswolski inspired but little confidence at Berlin. M. Sassonov, on the contrary, has made a very good impression on the Emperor, the Chancellor and the Secretary of State for For- eign Affairs. The visit at Potsdam is thus an event which gives cause for congratulation, as it is likely to improve the relations between the two Empires and by coun- ter-effect perhaps also between Vienna and St. Petersburg. But it is an exaggeration to attribute to it, as the Rossiya does, a high political import- ance. The groupings of the great European Powers will remain what they were before, and the senti- ment of the Russian people for Germany will not become any more cordial. Of that, the language of the Russian journals is already giving evidence. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 63. No. 63. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Berlin, le 3 Mars 1911. Monsieur le Ministre ! Comme il fallait s'y attendre; on a d'autant plus mal accueilli la nomination de M. Delcasse au mi- nistere de la marine que le portefeuille de la guerre a ete confie a M. Berteaux dans le nouveau cabinet peniblement forme par M. Monis. Le-gouvernement Imperial ne fera vraisemblablement pas connaitre, au moins publiquement, son impression, afin d'eviter toute apparence d'intervention dans les affaires in- terieures de la France, mais elle ne differe evidem- ment pas de celle des journaux. Ainsi que je I'ai ecrit a M. le Baron de Favereau, M. le Baron de Richthofen m'avait dit au moment de la retraite de M. Delcasse en 1905 que I'ancien ministre des affai- res etrangeres frangais avait depuis des annees af- fecte de traiter I'Allemagne en quantite negligeable. On considerait ici la longue administration de M. Delcasse comme ayant cree une situation tres grave. Ce n'etait pas sans raison, puisque la premiere fois que M. Delcasse a pris la parole apres sa chute il I'a fait pour se vanter d'avoir organise une ligue agressive contre I'Allemagne. On ne prend pas toutefois tres au tragique le re- tour au pouvoir de M. Delcasse. Ce n'est plus le ministere des affaires etrangeres qui lui est confie. II n'a plus a cote de lui le Roi Edouard VII, dont il se croyait* le coUaborateur et dont il etait I'instru- Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, March 3rd, 1911. Sir:— As was to be expected, the nomination of M. Del- casse as Minister of Navy has been received all the less favorably, because the portfolio of War was given to M. Berteaux in the cabinet which M. Monis has formed with difficulty. The Imperial Government will probably not divulge its impres- sion, at least not publicly, in order to avoid all ap- pearance of interference in the internal affairs of France; but that impression seems not to differ from that of the papers. As I wrote to Baron de Favereau, Baron von Richthofen told me at the time of M. Delcasse's retirement in 1905 that the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs had for years affected to treat Germany as a negligible quantity. It was considered here that the long administration of M. Delcasse had created a very grave situation. That is not without reason, for on the first occasion when M. Delcasse spoke after his fall it was to boast that he had organized a league of aggression against Germany. Nevertheless, the return to power of M. Delcasse is not taken very tragically. It is no longer the . Ministry of Foreign Affairs of which he is in charge. He has no longer at his side King Edward VII, whose collaborator he considered himself and whose ment. L'entrevue de Potsdam a diminue la con- fiance des Frangais dans I'alliance russe, parce qu'a Paris et a Londres on persiste a lui attribuer une portee qu'elle n'a pas. Enfin le ministere Monis a ete si mal accueilli en France meme qu'il n'aura pro- bablement qu'une duree ephemere. II faut ajouter qu'aucun changement de personnes ne pent amener de modification serieuse dans les re- lations entre TAIlemagne et la France. EUes reste- ront pour bien longtemps encore quant au fond ce que commandent les sentiments des deux peuples. II ne peut y avoir de difference que dans la forme courtoise ou brutale. M. Pichon ne s'est jamais de- parti d'une correction parfaite envers I'AUemagne. Les paroles que m'a adressees I'Empereur le ler fe- vrier et que je vous ai transmises par mon rapport du lendemain montrent suffisamment ce que Ton pen- sait ici des veritables sentiments de I'ancien ministre des affaires etrangeres frangais. S'il n'y a pas lieu de s'alarmer outre mesure de la composition du nouveau ministere frangais, ce se- rait cependant tomber dans une exageration en sens contraire que de lui denier toute signification au point de vue de la politique exterieure. M. Delcasse n'a pas a s'en occuper officiellement d'une maniere directe, mais il est trop ambitieux et trop remuant pour ne pas s'efforcer d'inculquer ses idees a ses collegues. II semble meme avoir ete in- vite a le faire, puisque, d'apres I'Agence Havas, il aurait ete prie par M. Monis de s'entendre avec M. Berteaux sur le choix des autres membres du minis- tere. . - L'opinion en France parait aussi pousser a une politique exterieure plus active. M. Pichon, qui a sans contredit remporte de reels succes, etait encore fort populaire il y a peu de temps. II a cesse de I'etre. On lui salt mauvais gre du resultat de l'en- trevue de Potsdam qu'il n'avait pas le moyen d'em- pecher et qui d'ailleurs ne devrait pas inquieter si, comme on le pretend, la triple entente n'avait en vue que le maintien de la paix. Puisque rien n'a ete change au groupement des grandes puissances, on devrait se feliciter d'un rapprochement qui ameliore les relations de I'Allemagne et de la Russie ; mais a Paris et a Londres on les veut mauvaises. Tout recemment le president du senat frangais en remettant a M. d'Estournelles de Constant le prix de la paix a, devant un nombreux public et dans cette circonstance solennelle, parle plus ouvertement de la revanche qu'on ne I'avait fait depuis des annees. La presse frangaise a chaudement applaudi a Tac- tion entamee dans I'affaire des fortifications de Fles- singue. Ce que Ton reproche a M. Pichon n'est pas de s'etre lance assez etourdiment dans cette aven- ture, mais d'y avoir echoue. Les journaux frangais decouvrent tous les jours quelque raison d'imputer un grief a I'Allemagne. C'est accoutume, mais recemment le mouvement a redouble d'intensite. On dirait que c'est pour tenir compte de cet etat de l'opinion que M. Delcasse a ete appele au minis- tere. On ne lui a pas confie les affaires etrangeres. C'eut ete une provocation, mais on a fait ce que Ton a pu sans casser les vitres. Je me demande si en France on ne specule pas sur les embarras interieurs de I'Allemagne. lis sont malheureusement encore tels que je les ai depeints par mon rapport du ler octobre dernier. Les partis sont mal diriges et separes non par des divergences d'opinion mais par la rancune et la haine. Le gou- tool he was. The meeting of Potsdam has decreased the confidence of the French in the Russian alliance, because at Paris and at London that meeting is credited with an importance which it does not pos- sess. Finally, the Ministry of M. Monis, has been received so badly even in France that its stay will probably only be ephemeral. It should be added that no change of persons can cause a serious modification in the relations between Germany and France. They will remain essentially as the sentiments of the two nations dictate. The only difference will be in the form, either courteous or brutal. M. Pichon has never deviated from an attitude of a perfect correctness towards Germany.. The words which the Emperor addressed to me on February 1st and which I had the honor to com- municate to you in my report of the following day, show vvith sufficient clearness what was thought here of the real sentiments of the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Although there is no occasion to take exaggerated alarm at the composition of the new French Cabi- net, still it would mean going too far in the other direction were one to deny it all significance from the point of view of foreign politics. M. Delcasse is not to occupy himself with the foreign policy officially in a direct manner, but he is too ambitious and too restless not to try to im- press his ideas upon his colleagues. It would even seem that he was invited to do so, since according to the Agence Havas he was asked by M. Monis to come to an understanding with M. Berteaux as to the choice of the other members of the cabinet. Public opinion in France seems also to be urging a more active foreign policy. M. Pichon, who un- deniably has had some real successes, was still very popular a short time ago. He has ceased to be so. He is blamed for the result of the meeting of Pots- dam, which he could not have prevented and which, moreover, need not be disquieting if, as is pretended, the Triple Entente had no other aim than the main- tenance of peace. Since nothing has been changed in the grouping of the Great Powers, congratula- tions are in order for the creation of a rapproche- ment which improve the relations between Ger- many and Russia, but in Paris and London it is desired that they be bad. Quite recently, the President of the. French Sen- ate, when handing the peace prize to M. d'Estour- nelles de Constant in the presence of a numerous audience and under solemn circumstances, spoke more openly of the "revanche" than has been done for years. The French press warmly applauded the measures taken in the matter of the Flushing fortifications. What M. Pichon is blamed for is not that he em- barked rather thoughtlessly on this adventure, but that he failed in it. The French papers daily discover reasons for im- puting some wrong or other to Germany. That has become a habit, but recently the movement has doubled its energy. It would seem that M. Delcasse was called into the Cabinet in consideration of this state of the public mind. The Foreign Affairs were not en- trusted to him; that would have been a provocation, but everything was done that was possible without smashing the windows. I ask myself, whether people in France are not speculating on the internal troubles of Germany. They are unfortunately still the same as I described them in my report of October 1st. The parties are badly led and are opposed to each other not because of differences of opinion, but because of vernement est sans influence sur le Reichstag, qui encore tout recemment lui a inflige un echec retentis- sant dans I'affaire de la constitution de I'Alsace-Lor- raine ; mais ce serait une dangereuse illusion que d'en croire I'empire affaibli a I'exterieur. Nous avons eu la preuve du contraire par la facilite avec laquelle le nouveau quinquennat militaire et le budget de la marine ont ete votes. Le Reichstag, divise sur tout, les a adoptes presque sans discussion, a I'unanimite, moins les voix des socialistes; meme ceux-ci sont obliges de mitiger leur opposition en declarant qu'en cas de guerre ils feraient leur devoir comme les au- tres Allemands. Pourtant les impots sont des plus lourds et c'est une charge ecrasante pour rAllema- gne que d'entretenir a la fois une armee de terre et une flotte de premier ordre. Ce fait n'a pas ete assez remarque a I'etranger. On en devrait tirer la legon qu'en cas de peril exte- rieur les choses se passeraient comme en 1870. La discorde etait alors pire qu'aujourd'hui. Elle a dis- paru comme si elle n'avait jamais existe le jour de la declaration de la guerre. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. spite and hatred. The Government has no power over the Reichstag, which only recently dealt the former a ringing blow in the matter of the constitu- tion for Alsace-Lorraine ; but it would be a danger- ous illusion to believe the Empire to be externally weakened for this reason. We have had proof of the contrary in the ease with which the new quin- quennial army programme and the naval budget were voted. The Reichstag, divided on everything, carried them almost without discussion and unani- mously with the exception of the socialists; and even these have been obliged to mitigate their oppo- sition by declaring that in case of war they would do their duty like the other Germans. Yet the taxes are exceedingly high and it is an oppressive burden for Germany to maintain at the same time an army on land and a first class navy. This fact has not been sufficiently remarked abroad. From it the lesson should be drawn that in case of external danger things would go as in 1870. The discord was worse then than it is to-day. It disappeared, as if it had never existed, the day of the declaration of war. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 64. No. 64. Le Baron Guillaume, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Paris, le 4 Mars 1911. Monsieur le Ministre ! Vous aurez remarque I'accueil que la presse alle- mande fait au nouveau ministere frangais et I'insis- tance avec laquelle elle soutient que la personnalite de M. Delcasse est trop accentuee pour ne pas do- miner la combinaison ministerielle dans laquelle il a consenti a entrer. On fait volontiers abstraction de M. Cruppi; c'est M. Delcasse qui presidera a la politique exterieure de la Republique, et Ton n'oublie pas dans quelles conditions il a du renoncer naguere a son portefueille. II faudra faire preuve ici d'une grande prudence vis-a-vis de I'Allemagne, a laquelle je ne prete cartes aucun projet belliqueux ni aucune arriere-pensee guerriere, mais qui va certainement se tenir politi- quement sur la defensive. L'incident de la Legion Etrangere, dont vous au- rez certes suivi les developpements, dans la presse des deux pays, doit etre surveille. Le ministre de la guerre de I'empire s'est exprime de fagon assez nette sur ce corps de mercenaires ; des journaux alle- mands ont notablement accentue les reproches faits au recrutement et au traitement des legionnaires, et la presse frangaise s'en est emue ; depuis quelques jours son langage est devenu plus acerbe; le chau- vinisme s'en mele, on interview des autorites mili- taires et d'anciens chefs de la Legion, et la note que vient de publier la "Gazette de Cologne" n'est guere faite pour calmer I'emotion produite. Je ne pense pas que cette emotion s'etende bien profondement en France et que I'opinion publique dans la veritable acception du mot soit touchee ; mais la presse fait du chauvinisme et peut prononcer des paroles malheureuses qui aggraveraient la situation. Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Sir: Paris, March 4th, 1911. You will have noticed the reception which the German papers are giving to the new French Cabi- net and the insistence with which they maintain that the personality of M. Delcasse is too prominent not to dominate the ministerial combination which he has consented to join. M. Cruppi may be left out of consideration ; it is M. Delcasse who will pre- side over the foreign policy of the Republic and it has not been forgotten under what circumstances he recently had to give up his portfolio. Great prudence will have to be observed here towards Germany to whom I surely attribute no warlike plans nor any secret bellicose thoughts, but who will certainly hold herself politically on the defensive. The incident of the Foreign Legion, the develop- ment of which you will have followed in the press of the two countries, will . need attention. The Minister of War of the German Empire has ex- pressed himself with sufficient frankness concern- ing that body of mercenaries. German papers pointed out with special emphasis the complaints made with regard to the recruiting and the treat- ment of the legionaries and the French press be- came excited about it. For some days its language has increased in bitterness; chauvinism interferes in the matter, interviews are asked of military ex- perts and former commanders of the Legion, and the notice which the Cologne Gazette has just pub- lished is hardly such as to calm the prevailing ex- citement. I do not think that this excitement goes very deep in France and that public opinion, in the true mean- ing of the word, is touched ; but the press is dealing in chauvinism and may utter unfortunate words which would aggravate the situation. II est a esperer qu'il n'en sera rien, mais il n'est pas douteux que la question est susceptible de s'en- venimer, et que, si elle I'entend ainsi, rAllemagne peut entretenir cette affaire dans un etat de mi-acuite pour le jour ou elle voudrait trouver une cause de brouille. II me revient d'ailleurs que ron ne cesse de faire en AUemagne, le long de la frontiere frangaise, une veritable propagande pour amener dans I'armee Im- periale des desertions au profit de la Legion Etran- gere frangaise. Je suis, etc. [s.] Guillaume. It is to be hoped that nothing will happen, but it cannot be doubted that the question is apt to rankle and that, if she is so minded, Germany can keep this matter in a state of suspense until the day when she might want to find a pretext for a conflict. I also learn that in Germany along the French frontier a regular propaganda is incessantly being carried on in order to cause desertions from the Imperial army for the benefit of the Foreign Legion. I am, etc. [Signed] Guillaume. No. 65. No. 65. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Berlin, le 20 Mars 1911. Monsieur le Ministre 1 Le discours sur la politique exterieure prononce il y a huit jours par Sir Edward Grey, a I'occasion de la discussion du budget de la marine, a provoque de nombreux commentaires dans la presse anglaise et dans celle de tous les pays, a I'exception de I'Al- lemagne. La "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" a temoigne la satisfaction du gouvernement Impe- rial. De la part de I'organe hautement officieux, c'e- tait oblige. Le silence eut ete a bon droit considere a Londres comme une injure; mais les autres jour- naux se sont bornes a reproduire le resume du dis- cours transmis par les agences telegraphiques ou n'y ont ajoute que de courtes reflexions insignifiantes. C'est ici cependant que les paroles du secretaire d'Etat britannique auraient dti causer le plus de sen- sation et produire la plus agreable impression, si Ton avait la confiance qu'elles expriment bien toute la pensee du gou\ernement anglais. Elles marque- raient un revirement notable de la politique inaugu- ree naguere par le cabinet unioniste et dont ses suc- cesseurs liberaux ont continue la tradition. L'evolu- tion n'indiquerait pas un derangement du groupe- ment actuel des grandes puissances, mais elle signi- fierait que I'Angleterre ne veut plus conserver a la triple entente le caractere agressif que lui avait im- prime son createur, le Roi Edouard VII. A voir I'indifference du public allemand, on dirait qu'il est blase par les innombrables entrevues et echanges de demonstrations courtoises qui n'ont jamais pro- duit aucun resultat positif et qu'il veuille se mettre en garde centre de nouvelles deceptions. Cette me- fiance se comprend, puisque tout recemment encore le gouvernement anglais prenait part a I'intrigue de Flessingue. Nous en avons eu la preuve par la de- marche qu'a faite aupres de vous, Sir A. Hardinge pour essayer de nous y entrainer. Toutefois on peut se demander si le scepticisme n'est pas dans le cas present quelque peu exagere. Le rapprochement avec la Russie et I'Angleterre faisait partie du programme politique trace par M. de Kiderlen-Waechter lorsqu'i! a accepte la direction du departement Imperial des affaires etrangeres. La premiere partie de ce plan a ete executee par I'en- trevue de Potsdam. Les pourparlers entre Potsdam et Saint-Petersbourg sont interrompus depuis que M. Sassonow est malade ; mais auparavant il y a eu Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, March 20th, 1911. Sir:— The speech on his foreign policy, delivered a week ago by Sir Edward Grey on the occasion of the discussion of the naval budget, has evoked num- erous comments in the English press and that of all countries, with the exception of Germany. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung has ex- pressed the satisfaction of the Imperial Government. As the most prominent semi-official organ it vras obliged to do so. Silence would rightly have been looked upon at London as an insult. But the other papers either confined themselves to printing a resume of the speech as transmitted by the tele- graph agencies, or they only added brief and insuffi- cient remarks. Nevertheless it is here that the words of the British Secretary of State ought to have caused the greatest sensation and produced the most agreeable impression, if it were confidently believed that they express the real ideas of the Brit- ish Government. They would mean a remarkable change in the policy lately inaugurated by the Un- ionist Cabinet and the tradition of which was con- tinued by its Liberal successors. The development indicated would not imply a change in the present grouping of the Great Powers; but it would mean that England no longer wants to preserve the ag- gressive character of the Triple Entente with which its founder, King Edward VII, stamped it. The indifference of the German public might be ascribed to the fact that it has become blase by the endless meetings and exchanges of demonstrations of cour- tesy which have never produced any positive result, and that it wants to be on its guard against new dis- appointments. That mistrust is natural, since only quite recently the British Government took part in the intrigue of Flushing. We have proof of it in the attempt which Sir A. Hardinge made with you in order to endeavor to drag us in. Nevertheless, it is a question whether scepticism in this case is not a little exaggerated. A rapprochement with Russia and England formed part of the political programme of Mr. Kiderlen-Waechter when he assumed the direction of the Imperial Department of Foreign Affairs. The first part of this plan was executed by the meet- ing of Potsdam. The pourparlers between Berlin and St. Petersburg were interrupted when M. Sas- sonov was taken ill ; but before that there was a 80 un echange d'idees tres actif entre les deux cabinets. Aucun resultat positif n'a encore ete obtenu, et peut- etre n'arrivera-t-on pas a grand'chose de concret; mais les relations des deux pays sont redevenues normales. Elles n'ont plus le caractere de reserve hargneuse qu'elles avaient pris depuis I'affaire de I'annexion de la Bosnie. Les circonstances se pretent a la realisation du programme du secretaire d'Etat des affaires etran- geres. II y a six semaines environ, le Roi d'Angle- terre a ecrit a I'Empereur d'Allemagne pour I'inviter a assister a I'inauguration de la statue de la Reine Victoria. C'est la premiere lettre que le roi George V adressait a Sa Majeste depuis qu'il est monte sur le trone. Elle etait congue en termes particuliere- ment cordiaux qui ont produit la plus agreable im- pression. Vous vous souviendrez sans doute, Mon- sieur le Ministre, de ce qu'a dit, quelques jours apres, le chancelier de I'empire dans son discours au Reichstag sur les affaires etrangeres au sujet de sa confiance dans la loyaute de la politique anglaise envers I'Allemagne. On pent considerer I'attitude de M. de Bethmann HoUweg comme la consequence du message du Roi d'Angleterre. Le discours de Sir Edward Grey ne s'est pas borne a de vaines paroles comme dans des occasions ante- rieures. II a ete accompagne, ou plutot precede, d'un acte. Pendant des annees la presse anglaise a emis Tarrogante pretention de controler et meme d'inter- dire I'achevement du chemin de fer de Bagdad ; c'est- a-dire d'avoir la haute main sur une entreprise qui ne concerne que la Turquie.la compagnie concession- naire et indirectement le gouvernement allemand, qui a appuye celle-ci. Sir Edward Grey a replace la ques- tion sur le terrain du droit, en reconnaissant que I'Angleterre n'a aucun titre Tautorisant a intervenir dans une affaire interieure ottomane et en annon- ^ant qu'elle se bornerait a garantir ses interets par les moyens legaux dont elle dispose. C'est une base sur laquelle on pent s'entendre. Personne ne niera I'existence de ces interets anglais et ne songera a faire au gouvernement britannique un grief de les defendre. Enfin le moment est propice pour une tentative d'amelioration des relations entre I'Allemagne et I'Angleterre. II n'y a maintenant a I'ordre du jour aucune question irritante de nature a I'entraver. Je dois vous prier de noter, Monsieur le Ministre, que le present rapport ne signifie pas que je consi- dere comme deja acquis ou imminent un rapproche- ment entre I'Angleterre et I'Allemagne, que j'appelle de tons mes voeux, parce qu'il constituerait une sen- sible augmentation de securite pour la Belgique. Tout ce que je veux dire est qu'a mon avis les jour- naux allemands n'ont pas prete une attention assez serieuse au discours de Sir Edward Grey et qu'il faut attendre les evenements pour asseoir un juge- ment sur sa veritable portee. Le depit manifeste par le journal le "Temps" demontre qu'a Paris I'opinion publique lui en attache beaucoup plus qu'on ne I'a fait a Berlin. A la maniere dont s'exprime le journal franqais, on dirait qu'il ne considere plus la triple entente que comme une formule vide de sens. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. very active exchange of ideas between the two cabi- nets. No positive result has as yet been obtained and perhaps nothing very palpable will be reached, but the relations between the two countries have become normal again. They are no longer marked by that surly reserve which characterized them after the annexation of Bosnia. The situation is favorable for the realization of the programme of the Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs. Six weeks ago the King of England wrote to the Emperor of Germany to invite him to attend the unveiling of the statue of Queen Victoria. That is the first letter which King George V has ad- dressed to His Majesty since he ascended the throne. It was couched in particularly cordial terms which have made the best impression here. You will doubtless remember, Sir, what the Imperial Chan- cellor said some days later in his speech in the Reichstag on foreign affairs in regard to his con- fidence in the loyalty of the English policy towards Germany. One may consider Mr. von Bethmann Hollweg's attitude as the consequence of the mes- sage of the King of England. The speech of Sir Edward Grey did not confine itself to empty phrases, as on previous occasions. It was accompanied, or rather preceded, by action. For years the English press has made the arrogant pretension to control and even to interdict the com- pletion of the Bagdad railway, that is to say to put her hand on an enterprise which concerns only Tur- key, the company to which the concession was granted, and indirectly the German Goverrmient which supported the latter. Sir Edward Grey has put the question back on a legal basis by recogniz- ing that England had no title authorizing her to interfere in an internal Ottoman matter, and by an- nouncing that she would limit herself to safeguard- ing her interests by the legal means at her disposal. That is a basis on which an understanding can be reached. Nobody will deny those English interests, nor think of blaming the British Government for defending them. At last the moment is propitious for an attempt at an improvement of the German-English relations. There is now no irritating question which could thwart that attempt. I must ask of you. Sir, to note that the present report does not signify that I consider a rapproche- ment between England and Germany as reached or imminent. But I wish for it with all my heart, because it would mean that Belgium's security would be considerably increased. All I want to say is that in my opinion the German papers have not paid sufficiently serious attention to the speech of Sir Edward Grey, and that we must wait for the events before we can fairly judge of its real import. The vexation shown by the Temps demonstrates that public opinion in Paris attaches more import- ance to the speech than that in Berlin has done. To judge from its manner of expression it would seem that the French journal sees in the Triple Entente no more than a formula devoid of meaning. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 66. No. 66. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique k Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Berlin, le 21 Avril 1911. Monsieur le Ministre ! II y a quelques jours deja la presse fran^aise a mis en circulation un bruit d'apres lequel la France se- rait assuree de ne pas etre entravee par TAllemagne dans les mesures qu'il serait necessaire de prendre pour denouer la crise actuelle au Maroc. On se li- vrait a des conjectures sur les compensations qui auraient ou pourraient etre accordees au Gouverne- ment Imperial en echange de la liberte d'action lais- see au Gouvernement Frangais. On est encore bien eloigne d'un pareil resultat. La verite est que I'am- bassadeur de France a Berlin a eu, depuis que la situation du Sultan Moulai Haiith est devenue criti- que, plusieurs entretiens avec le secretaire d'Etat des affaires etrangeres ; qu'il est alle a Paris pour rendre compte des demarches, et qu'il les a continuees de- puis son retour a Berlin. M. Cambon a parle de I'obligation ou pourrait se trouver la France d'agir par les armes pour secourir le Sultan. Avant-hier encore il a rappele au chancelier les sanglants repro- ches adresses a M. Gladstone pour avoir laisse mas- sacrer Gordon Pacha et les autres Europeens assie- ges par le Mahdi a Khartoum sans essayer de leur venir en aide. Du cote allemand on a attire I'atten- tion de I'ambassadeur de France sur la necessite ou se trouve le Gouvernement Imperial de tenir compte de I'opinion publique en AUemagne. Tout est done encore dans un etat d'incertitude dont I'ambassadeur de France est visiblement inquiet et qui explique les lenteurs et les tergiversations du gouvernement franqais, ainsi que les appreciations contradictoires qui se succedent dans les journaux de Paris. On nous dit un jour que le Sultan Moulai Hafith est a bout de ressources ; le lendemain on af- firme que sa situation s'est amelioree, quoiqu'aucun changement notable se soit produit. Je ne crois pas qu'il y ait ici le moindre desir de jouer un role effectif dans I'affaire marocaine. On doit avoir perdu depuis longtemps, si Ton en a jamais entretenu, toute illusion sur la valeur de I'acte d'Al- g6siras que la France a signe avec la ferme intention de ne I'observer jamais. Elle n'a pas cesse un ins- tant de poursuivre ses plans d'annexion, soit en saisissant des pretextes pour des occupations pro- visoires destinees a durer pendant I'eternite, soit en extorquant des concessions plagant le Sultan sous la dependance de la France en I'abaissant progres- sivement au niveau du Bey de Tunis. En s'enga- geant par I'arrangement du 9 fevrier 1909 a ne pas entraver les interets politiques de la France au Ma- roc, le Gouvernement Imperial savait a n'en pouvoir douter que le Gouvernement Frangais interpreterait cette clause comme un encouragement a perseverer dans la meme voie et regarderait la promesse de res- pecter I'independance du Maroc comme lettre morte. Reculer serait maintenant pour la France une cruelle humiliation. L' AUemagne n'a nulle raison de la lui infliger et ne pourrait d'ailleurs pas, apres huit ans de tole- rance, changer d'attitude sans etre determinee a aller jusqu'a la guerre. C'est demesurement plus que le Maroc ne vaut. Enfin il ne pent pas deplaire a Berlin que la France soit engagee dans une entreprise coloniale qui pour bien longtemps I'obligera a immobiliser des Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Sir:- Berlin, April 21st, 1911. Some days ago the French press put a rumor in circulation, according to which France had been assured that she would not be hindered by Germany in taking those measures which would be necessary in order to solve the present crisis in Morocco. Conjectures were indulged in on the compensations which had been or might be granted to the Imperial Government in exchange for the liberty of action allowed the French Government. Matters are still far removed from such a result. The truth is that, after the situation of Sultan Mulai Hafid became critical, the French Ambassador had several con- versations with the Secretary of State for Foreign A.ffairs, that he went to Paris to give account of his steps, and that he has continued them since his return to Berlin. M. Cambon has spoken of the obligation, under which France might find herself, to render armed assistance to the Sultan. Only the day before yesterday he recalled to the Chancellor the cutting reproaches which were addressed to Mr. Gladstone for having allowed Gordon Pasha and the other Europeans besieged by the Mahdi at Khartoum to be massacred without trying to come to their aid. By the German side the attention of the French Ambassador has been drawn to the fact that the Imperial Government finds it necessary to take German public opinion into consideration. Everything is, therefore, still in a state of uncer- tainty which is making the French Ambassador visibly nervous and which explains the tardiness and the evasions of the French Government as well as the contradictory reports which follow each other in the Paris papers ; one day we are told that Sultan Mulai Hafid is at the end of his resources, the next day we are assured that the situation has improved although no noticeable change has taken place. I do not believe that the slightest desire exists here to play an active part in the Moroccan affair. If ever they entertained any, they must have lost long ago their illusions as to the value of the Act of Algeciras which France signed vsdth the firm intention of never observing it. She has not ceased a moment to pursue her plans of annexation, be it by seizing on pretexts for temporary occupations intended to last eternally, or by extorting conces- sions which placed the Sultan in dependence on France and were debasing him step by step to the level of the Bey of Tunis. When the German Gov- ernment engaged itself by the agreement of Feb- ruary 9th, 1909, not to hinder the French political interests in Morocco, it doubtless knew that the French Government would regard the promise to respect the independence of Morocco as a dead let- ter. To have to retreat now would be a cruel hum- iliation for France. Germany has no right to inflict it and she could, moreover, after eight years of tolerance, not change her attitude without being determined even to go to war. That would be doing considerably more than Morocco is worth. Finally, Berlin cannot be displeased to see France engaged in a colonial enterprise which will oblige her for a very long time to he up increasingly large 82 forces de plus en plus considerables en Afrique et qui detourne ses regards des provinces perdues. C'e- tait la politique du Prince de Bismarck. On s'en est ecarte il y a huit ans parce qu'il s'agissait de prouver au Roi d'Angleterre et a M. Delcasse que TAUema- gne ne se laisserait pas traiter en quantite negligea- ble, mais il n'y a plus maintenant de raison de n'y pas revenir. Mais il ne depend pas uniquement du Gouvernement Imperial de pratiquer I'abstention. II faut qu'on I'y aide de I'exterieur. II est parfaite- ment exact que I'opinion publique est emue. Comme j'ai eu I'honneur de vous I'ecrire par mon rapport du 11 fevrier 1909 I'arrangement du 9 fevrier a ete cri- tique par tous les journaux allemands qui n'ont pas d'attaches officieuses. Depuis on a plus d'une fois reproche au Gouvernement Imperial trop de con- descendance envers la France dans I'affaire maro- caine. On a remarque dans le discours-programme de M. Cruppi au Senat le passage oil le ministre frangais se targue comme ses predecesseurs d'un mandat europeen que personne n'a jamais songe a lui conferer. Les promesses de la France n'inspirent plus de confiance. On ne peut pas oublier que le langage de M. Pichon toujours correct etait invaria- blement en desaccord avec les actes. Pourquoi M. Cruppi serait-il plus sincere que ses predecesseurs? On fait remarquer que toutes les difficultes marocai- nes ont ete suscitees par la politique envahissante de la France. Les journaux s'obstinent encore a ne pas voir que les stipulations d'Algesiras n'ont ete qu'un leurre et ont la ferme naivete d'en reclamer I'execu- tion. Si le Gouvernement Frangais a vraiment a coeur d'ecarter les chances d'un conflit, c'est a lui qu'il ap- partient maintenant de se conduire avec assez de prudence et de feinte moderation pour ne pas forcer I'Allemagne a sortir de I'inaction. Agreez, etc. [s.] Greindl. numbers of troops in Africa and which takes her mind off the lost provinces. That was the policy of Prince von Bismarck. Eight years ago that policy was abandoned because it was necessary to prove to the King of England and to M. Delcasse that Germany would not allow herself to be treated as a negligible quantity ; now there is no longer any rea- son why one should not revert to it. But to abstain from doing so does not depend alone on the Impe- rial Government. To do this it needs help from without. It is quite true that public opinion is ex- cited. As I had the honor to write to you in my re- port of February 11, 1909, the agreement of Feb- ruary 9th, was criticized by all German papers which have no official affiliations. Since then the Imperial Government has more than once been blamed for too much condescension towards France in the Moroccan afifair. In the programmatic speech of M. Cruppi in the Senate, the passage has at- tracted attention in which the French Minister, like his predecessors, boasts of a European mandate which nobody has ever thought of conferring on him. The promises of France no longer inspire confidence. One cannot forget that the correct l£in- guage of M. Pichon was invariably in disagreement with his acts. Why should M. Cruppi be more sin- cere than his predecessor? It is pointed out that all of the Moroccan difficulties were caused by France's policy of conquest. The papers still re- fuse to see that the stipulations of Algeciras were only a trap, and they are naive enough to demand their fulfillment. If France is really desirous of removing the chances for a conflict, it is for her to conduct herself with sufficient prudence and feigned moderation in order not to force Germany to abandon her attitude of inaction. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 67. No. 67. Le Baron Guillaume, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Paris, le 29 Avril 1911. Monsieur le Ministre ! Les agences telegraphiques vous mettent aucou- rant, plus vite que je ne pourrais le faire, des divers incidents qui mettent aujourd'hui le Maroc au pre- mier plan des preoccupations du Gouvernement de la Republique. Tout en faisant la part du caractere national qui porte toujours les Franqais a exagerer I'importance des faits qui les touchent et des actes auxquels ils contribuent, il n'est pas contestable que la situation est tres embrouillee aujourd'hui dans les regions marocaines, que les tribus rivalisent d'inco- herence et de trahison et que la charge est lourde pour la puissance qui a accepte — qui s'est attri- buee — la mission de retablir I'ordre au Maroc. Jusqu'ici rien ne fait craindre encore que I'expe- dition frangaise puisse alterer la politique Internatio- nale. L'Allemagne observe avec calme ce qui se passe, se felicite peut-etre des difficultes qui pesent sur les epaules du Gouvernement de la Republique et ne demande pas mieux que de ne pas se meler de cette aflfaire aussi longtemps que ses interets econo- miques ne I'y forceront pas. Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, April 29, 1911. Sir:— The telegraph agencies are informing you more quickly than I can of the various incidents which cause Morocco to be to-day one of the principal causes for anxiety to the Government of the Repub- lic. Even though making allowances for the na- tional trait of the French to exaggerate the im- portance of facts which touch them and of actions in which they are actively concerned, it cannot be denied that the situation in Morocco is at present very complicated ; that the tribes are outrivalling each other in their incoherence and their treachery, and that the burden is heavy for the Power which accepted, or rather assumed of her own accord, the mission of reestablishing order in Morocco. So far nothing justifies a fear lest the French ex- pedition change international policy. Germany is watching calmly what is happening; she is perhaps congratulating herself on account of the difficulties which rest on the shoulders of the French Govern- ment, and asks nothing better than not to have to mix in this affair as long as her economic inter- ests do not compel her to do so. L'Angleterre, qui a pousse la France dans le bour- bier marocain, considere son oeuvre avec complai- sance. Reste I'Espagne, peu satisfaite naturellement du developpement que la France donne a son action; elle souffre de devoir reconnaitre que ses moyens ne sont pas a la hauteur de ses ambitions et de devoir faire bonne mine a mauvais jeu. L'article du "Temps," de ce jour, sur lequel j'ose attirer votre attention, etablit assez justement — avec une legere dose d'optimisme — la position res- pective de la France et de I'Espagne au Maroc. J'ai lieu de croire qu'il exprime a peu pres ce que Ton pense au Quai d'Orsay et certainement ce que Ton y desire. Je suis, etc. [s.] Guillaume. England, who has pushed France into the Mor- occan mire, regards her work v^dth satisfaction. And Spain, naturally somewhat dissatisfied with the course which France's action is taking, recog- nizes to her regret that her means fall short of her ambitions, and that she has to regard the matter with good grace. To-day's article in the Temps, to which I take the liberty of drawing your attention, sketches fairly, though with a slight dose of optimism, the respec- tive position of France and Spain in Morocco. I have reason to believe that it expresses more or less what is thought and certainly what is desired at the Quai d'Orsay. I am, etc. [Signed] Guillaume. No. 68. No. 68. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le ler Mai 1911. Monsieur le Ministre! Depuis que la crise marocaine a repasse a I'etat aigu, la presse ofificieuse allemande s'etait bornee a reproduire les informations apportees par les agences telegraphiques en s'abstenant de tout commentaire. Elle a rompu le silence hier matin par l'article insere en tete de la "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" dont la traduction suit : "Pendant toute la semaine derniere il s'est mani- feste de plus en plus combien le gouvernement fran- gais se preoccupe de prendre des mesures de pro- tection pour les officiers frangais se trouvant a Fez ou dans les environs. Un danger pour les colonies europeennes n'est d'apres les nouvelles parvenues a Berlin heureusement pas a craindre. On ne pent pas blamer la France de penser a tous les moyens qui lui paraissent propres a proteger la vie de ses ofificiers. C'est naturellement au jugement de la France qu'il faut laisser le choix des moyens qui lui paraissent appropries, puisque c'est elle qui porte la responsabilite des suites des moyens employes. D'a- pres les assurances concluantes du gouvernement frangais il a seulement I'intention de prendre les me- sures necessaires pour la securite de ses nationaux; en particulier il ne se propose pas de porter atteinte a I'inteG^rite du Maroc et a la souverainete du Sultan. L'occupation de Fez n'entre pas non plus dans ses intentions. II est a esperer que les evenements per- mettront au gouvernement frangais d'observer son programme. Le depasser ne serait pas d'accord avec I'acte d'Algesiras, parce qu'une partie essentielle de cet acte est un souverain marocain independant. Une violation de dispositions essentielles de I'acte d'Al- gesiras, meme si elle se produisait sous la pression de circonstances exterieures de force majeure et con- tre la volonte de la puissance agissante, rendrait a toutes les autres puissances leur liberte d'action et pourrait ainsi conduire a des consequences qu'il n'est pas possible de prevoir pour le moment, mais nous ne pouvons que repeter qu'en presence de I'attitude cir- conspecte observee jusqu'a present par le gouverne- ment frangais il n'y a pas de raison de presager un developpement d'une aussi longue portee des con- jonctures actuelles." Cet article ofScieux confirme ce que j'ai eu I'hon- Berlin, May 1, 1911. Sir:— Since the Moroccan crisis has relapsed into an acute stage, the semi-official press of Germany has confined itself to reproducing the information trans- mitted by the telegraph agencies and has refrained from all comment. Yesterday morning the silence was broken by the article given prominence in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of which I sub- join a translation: "During the entire last week it became more and more manifest how anxious the French Gov- ernment is to take measures for the protection of the French officers in Fez and its environs. Ac- cording to the news which has reached Berlin, no danger for the European settlements need be feared for the moment. France cannot be blamed for thinking of all means which seem proper to her for the protection of the lives of her officers. The choice of the means which seem appropriate to her must, as a matter of course, be left to France, since it is she who bears the responsibility for the conse- quences of the means which she employs. Accord- ing to its conclusive assurances the French Govern- ment merely intends to take such measures as are necessary for the security of French nationals; above all, it is not planning any attack on the in- tegrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of the Sul- tan. An occupation of Fez is not intended either. It is to be hoped that the events will permit the French Government to follow its programme. To deviate from it would be a contravention of the act of Algeciras, of which the independence of the Sov- ereign of Morocco forms an essential part. A vio- lation of essential stipulations of the act of Alge- ciras, even though it occur under pressure of com- pelling external circumstances, would restore their liberty of action to all the other Powers and might thus lead to consequences which cannot be foreseen at the present. But we can only repeat that the circumspect attitude so far observed by the French Government offers no ground for prophesying that the present circumstances are going to develop in such a far-reaching manner." This semi-official article goes to confirm what I neur de vous ecrire par mon rapport du 21 avril der- nier. II en ressort que le Gouvernement Imperial croit fort exagerees dans un but facile a deviner les nouvelles alarmantes repandues par la presse de Pa- ris au sujet des informations revues directement a Berlin. Ce scepticisme se comprend d'autant mieux qu'il est partage par les journaux anglais assurement pas suspects de malveillance pour la France et de tendresse pour I'Allemagne. Neanmoins le Gouvernement Imperial allemand n'a nul desir de se creer des embarras exterieurs en entravant Taction militaire de la France au Maroc et pour se dispenser d'intervenir il feint d'ajouter foi aux assurances donnees par le gouvernement frangais relativement au caractere transitoire de I'oc- cupation de territoires marocains. II n'a pourtant aucune raison de croire que M. Cruppi soit plus sin- cere que ne Tetait M. Pichon et sa confiance doit etre d'autant moindre que M. Delcasse fait partie du ministere frangais. La fin de I'article officieux est destinee a donner satisfaction a I'opinion publique allemande, dont Te- motion est reelle et qui depuis longtemps reproche au Gouvernement Imperial de fermer les yeux sur I'inobservance methodique des engagement pris par Tacte d'Algesiras et par I'arrangement du 9 fevrier 1909. Quelle est la portee de I'avertissement offi- cieux a I'adresse de Paris? M. de Kiderlen-Waech- ter, beaucoup plus energique que ses predecesseurs, veut-il faire comprendre qu'il ne tolerera pas de nou- veaux empietements frangais? Ou bien se propose- t-il seulement de gagner du temps tout en evitant de heurter le sentiment populaire? Je penche pour la derniere hypothese. Comme le fait tres justement remarquer mon collegue a Tan- ger par son rapport du 15 avril dernier, la France s'est deja emparee des douanes, des travaux publics, du service de I'emprunt marocain, des telegraphes ; elle detient a Test et a I'ouest des territoires maro- cains importants. Elle a force le Sultan a contracter envers la France des dettes dont il est incapable de payer les interets. Le nombre des instructeurs fran- gais est tellement disproportionne a I'effectif de la minuscule armee reguliere marocaine qu'ils en sont les veritables maitres. La politique exterieure du Maroc est dictee de Paris. Que reste-t-il a sauver? Pour rendre au Sultan la position d'un souverain in- dependant il faudrait une guerre. C'est demesure- ment plus que le Maroc ne vaut. L'ambassadeur d'Espagne a Berlin s'agite beau- coup et multiplie les demarches au sujet du Maroc, mais ne dit rien a ses collegues du but qu'il se pro- pose d'atteindre. On s'apergoit sans doute a Madrid qu'en 1904 I'Espagne a ete dupee par la France et I'Angleterre et Ton cherche un appui a Berlin. II est tres improbable qu'on le trouve. L'Allemagne, qui veut eviter d'agir pour ses propres interets, n'a pas de raison de se compromettre pour ceux de I'Es- pagne, dont I'attitude a Algesiras n'a pas ete de na- ture a lui inspirer de reconnaissance. Malgre les dispositions manifestees par I'article of- ficieux, la situation reste delicate. Une maladresse quelconque peut obliger I'Allemagne a sortir de I'inaction. Beaucoup depend aussi de la presse. Des journaux frangais montrent beaucoup trop ouverte- ment qu'il s'agit de faire du Maroc une seconde Tu- nisie. L'attitude des journaux allemands est en ge- neral tres reservee, mais ceux qui sont inspires par les pangermanistes emettent des pretentions des plus genantes pour la politique Imperiale. Agreez, etc. fs.] Greindl. had the honor to write to you in my report of April 21st. It intends to show^ that the Imperial Govern- ment considers that the alarming reports spread by the press of Paris on the situation in Morocco, which do not agree with the information received directly at Berlin, are strongly exaggerated for rea- sons easy to guess. This scepticism is all the more comprehensible as it is shared by the English papers which surely cannot be suspected of ill-will towards France and love of Germany. Nevertheless the Imperial Government has no desire to create external troubles for itself by in- terfering with the military action of France in Mor- occo, and to avoid such intervention it feigns to believe in the assurances given by the French Gov- ernment as to the transitory character of the occu- pation of Moroccan territory. The German Gov- ernment has, however, no reason to believe that M. Cruppi is more sincere than M. Pichon was, and its confidence must be all the less because M. Delcasse has a seat in the French Cabinet. The final part of the semi-official article is in- tended to give satisfaction to German public opin- ion, which is honestly excited and which for a long time has been reproaching the Imperial Govern- ment for closing its eyes to the consistent disregard of the obligations undertaken in the act of Algeciras and the agreement of February 9, 1909. What is the import of the semi-official hint to Paris? Does Mr. von Kiderlen-Waechter, who is a man of greater energy than his predecessors, wish to have it under- stood that he is not going to tolerate any more French encroachments? Or does he simply want to gain time and simultaneously avoid hurting pub- lic sentiment? I incline towards the last hypothesis. As my col- league at Tangiers has rightly remarked in his re- port of April 15th, France has already taken posses- sion of the administration of the customs, the pub- lic works, the Moroccan debt, and the telegraph ; she has occupied important parts of Moroccan terri- tory in the East and in the West. She has forced the Sultan to incur debts in France, on which he is incapable of paying the interest. The number of French instructors is so out of proportion to the effective strength of the puny regular army of Mo- rocco that they are in fact its masters. Morocco's foreign policy is being dictated at Paris. What is there left that might be saved? To give back to the Sultan the position of an independent Sover- eign, war would have to be waged. That would be infinitely more than Morocco is worth. The Spanish Ambassador at Berlin is very much agitated and is multiplying his efforts with regard to the Moroccan question, but is telling his col- leagues nothing of the aim he has in view. With- out doubt it is realized at Madrid that in 1904 Spain was deceived by France and England, and support is being sought at Berlin. It is very unlikely that it will be given. Germany, who does not wish to move in her own interests, has no reason for com- promising herself in those of Spain, whose attitude at Algeciras was not such as to evoke Germany's gratitude. In spite of the intentions displayed in the semi- official article the situation remains delicate. Any false move may compel Germany to abandon her attitude of inaction. Much depends on the press. French papers are showing much too openly that it is a question of turning Morocco into another Tunis. The attitude of the German papers is on the whole very reserved, but those inspired by the Pan-Ger- manists are making demands which are highly em- barrassing for the policy of the Empire. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. 85 No. 69. No. 69. Le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre de Belgique k Lon- dres, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Londres, le 9 Mai 1911. Monsieur le Ministre ! Si Ton suit a Londres avec interet les developpe- ments de la campagne frangaise au Maroc, c'est que Topinion n'est pas sans redouter ses effets possibles sur la politique europeenne. On semble apprehen- der de voir la France poser quelque acte imprudent qui donnerait prise a une reclamation de la part de I'Allemagne. Bien entendu, on est loin de croire que le Gouver- nement Imperial veuille la guerre; on est persuade que I'Empereur ne la desire pas, mais on se de- mande si le Cabinet de Berlin ne serait pas tente, dans certaines eventualites, de s'affirmer par quel- que reclamation, et de donner ainsi une preuve ecla- tante de sa puissance qui serait humiliante pour le Gouvernement de la Republique et desagreable pour I'Angleterre et la Russie. Le Gouvernement Alle- mand, en affichant sa preponderance dans les con- seils de I'Europe, justifierait ainsi vis-a-vis des par- tis de I'opposition parlementaire allemande, I'utilite du maintien de ses enormes forces militaires et na- vales, dont le cout est constamment reproche au Reichstag. Une occupation de Fez, qui revetirait par exemple un aspect trop definitif, ou un manquement a I'esprit, si pas a la lettre des engagements pris a Algesiras, pourrait fournir a Berlin une occasion d'intervenir. L'ambassadeur de France a Londres a cOnstam- ment de longs entretiens au Foreign Office oil il s'ef- forcerait plus particulierement d'insister sur les droits preponderants de la France au Maroc, a cote desquels ceux de I'Espagne seraient insignifiants. Certains organes chauvins de la presse london- nienne declarent que la Grande-Bretagne devrait soutenir energiquement le Cabinet franqais si le Gouvernement Imperial faisait mine d'exercer une pression. Cette attitude ne semble pas devoir etre celle qu'adopterait un Gouvernement aussi pacifique que celui de M. Asquith. Interpelle tout recemment a la Chambre sur Tac- tion frangaise au Martoc, Sir Edward Grey s'est borne a dire que la decision du Gouvernement de la Republique quant a I'envoi de troupes a Fez avait ete notifiee au Gouvernement anglais par une simple notification verbale, que la mehalla avait ete envoyee a Fez a la demande expresse du Sultan, et que, pour ce qui en etait du droit d'intervention de la France, il renvoyait les orateurs a I'acte d'Algesiras et a I'ar- rangement franco-anglais de 1904. Veuillez agreer, etc. [s.] Cte. de Lalaing. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. London, May 9, 1911. Sir:— In London the developments of the French cam- paign in Morocco are being followed with interest because public opinion is not without apprehension as to its possible effect on the European policy. It seems to be feared that France might commit some imprudent act which might furnish Germany with a reason for protest. Be it understood that anyone is far from believ- ing that the Imperial Government wants war ; everyone is convinced that the Emperor does not desire it. But it is questioned whether the Cabinet of Berlin might not feel tempted under certain cir- cumstances to assert itself by some protest and thus to give a striking proof of its power, a proof which would be humiliating for the French Government and disagreeable for England and Russia. By thus vaunting its preponderance in the counsels of Eu- rope the German Government would demonstrate to the German parliamentary parties of the oppo- sition the justifiability of maintaining the enormous military and naval forces,' for the cost of which it is constantly being reproached in the Reichstag. An occupation of Fez, for instance, which would have an appearance of being too definite, or a viola- tion of the spirit if not of the letter of the obliga- tions undertaken at Algeciras, might give Berlin occasion to intervene. The French Ambassador at London is constantly having long conversations at the Foreign Office where he is said to be exerting himself in pointing out the preponderant rights of France in Morocco, by the side of which those of Spain were insignifi- cant. Certain chauvinist organs of the London press declare that Great Britain ought to give strong support to the French Cabinet in case the Imperial Government should appear to be willing to exer- cise pressure. It does not seem likely that a pa- cific government like that of Mr. Asquith would adopt such an attitude. When questioned recently in the House about the French action in Morocco, Sir Edward Grey con- fined himself to saying that the British Government had been notified by a simple verbal communica- tion of the decision of the Government of the Re- public in regard to the despatching of troops to Fez, that the Mehalla had been sent to Fez at the express request of the Sultan and that in respect to France's right of intervention he referred the speakers to the act of Algeciras and the Anglo- French agreement of 1904. Accept, etc. [Signed] Ct. de Lalaing. No. 70. No. 70. Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 10 Mai 1911. Monsieur le Ministre! Vous aurez lu dans certains journaux la nouvelle mise en circulation par une agence d'informations de creation recente d'apres laquelle le gouvernement Imperial allemand aurait decide d'envoyer trois croiseurs dans les eaux marocaines. Vous aurez vu aussi le dementi hautement officieux de la "Nord- deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" disant qu'il s'agit d'une "malhonnetete dangereuse, tout homme capa- ble de concevoir quelque peu une idee politique doit se dire a lui-meme quelle responsabilite il prend en langant des nouvelles a sensation de pure invention dans une question aussi grave que celle du Maroc." II y a un contraste frappant entre le ton de ce communique et de celui que j'ai eu I'honneur de vous transmettre par mon rapport du 1 Mai ou il etait dit in fine que la circonspection dont faisait preuve le gouvernement frangais, permettait de croire que la question marocaine ne prendrait pas un developpe- ment obligeant TAllemagne a considerer le traite d'Algesiras comme n'existant plus et a reprendre sa liberte d'action. La situation ne s'est en effet pas amelioree depuis dix jours, tout au contraire. II y a contradiction en- tre les renseignements de source frangaise depei- gnant le peril comme n'ayant pas diminue et ceux de source allemande qui en nient I'existence. Quoique la ville de Fez ne soit plus cernee et que les officiers frangais en puissent sortir quand il leur plaira, les preparatifs militaires continuent ; ne pouvant plus les motiver par I'obligation morale de sauver la vie de compatriotes, on s'est mis a les expliquer par la necessite de raffermir I'autorite du Sultan. Une par- tie des journaux franqais pousse a I'occupation de la capitale marocaine. On dirait que le gouverne- ment frangais n'ose pas s'affranchir de leur tutelle et esquive toute declaration publique et precise sur ses intentions definitives. Le gouvernement allemand ne parait pas nean- moins enclin a changer de tactique. II attend les evenements pour sortir de son attitude expectative. Je sais de source indirecte, mais tres sure que I'am- bassadeur de France a Berlin est inquiet de cette reserve. II s'irrite de ce qu'on n'ajoute pas ici une foi absolue aux declarations de loyaute et de desin- teressement qu'il est charge de donner au nom du gouvernement frangais. II se plaint de ce que ses nombreuses demarches a Wilhelmstrasse n'aboutis- sent a aucun resultat positif. S'attendait-il a obtenir une sorte de blanc seing pour Taction frangaise au maroc? Si a Paris on a congu de pareilles esperances, il faut qu'on ait com- pletement perdu de vue les origines de la question. Elle a debute par les arrangements conclus en 1904 entre I'Angleterre, la France et I'Espagne, sans qu'on ait pris la peine de consulter ni meme d'avertir les autres puissances interessees. Jusqu' au moment oil I'AUemagne a produit ses objections, on disait ouvertement que le Maroc deviendrait une seconde Tunisie. A cote de I'arrangement public la France signait avec I'Espagne un traite secret (secret bien mal garde) pour le partage de I'Empire cherifien. Sir: Berlin, May 10, 1911. You will have read in certain papers the report put in circulation by a newly established news agency, according to which the Imperial German Government had decided to send three cruisers to Moroccan waters. You will also have noticed the official denial of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zei- tung saying that the circulation of the report was an act of'dangerous knavery; any person with the slightest bit of political insight would be able to tell what responsibility he was assuming in send- ing out purely invented sensational news in so grave a question as that of Morocco. * There is a striking contrast between the tone of this communique and the one which I had the honor of sending you in my report of May 1st and in which it was said at the end that the circumspec- tion which the French Government was evidencing permitted a belief that the Moroccan question would not develop in a direction which would com- pel Germany to consider the treaty of Algeciras as no longer in existence and to resume her hberty of action. The situation has, in fact, not improved during the. past ten days, on the contrary. There is a discrep- ancy between the information coming from French sources which represent the danger as not having diminished, and that from German sources which deny its existence. Although the city of Fez is not invested and the French officers can leave the place at their pleasure, military preparations are still go- ing on. As they can no longer be based on the moral obligation to save the lives of compatriots the effort is now being made to explain them by the necessity of strengthening the authority of the Sul- tan. Apart of the French papers are urging the occupation of the Moroccan capital. It seems as if the French Government does not dare to free itself from their tutelage, and as if it evades all pub- lic and precise declaration concerning its ultimate intentions. Notwithstanding this the German Government does not seem to be inclined to change its tactics. It is watching events before emerging from its at- titude of waiting. I know from an indirect but very reliable source that the French Ambassador at Berlin is feeling concern about this reserve. He feels annoyed be- cause no absolute faith is being placed in the declar- ation of loyalty and disinterestedness which he is ordered by his government to make. He complains that his numerous steps taken at Wilhelmstrasse lead to no positive result. Does he expect to obtain a sort of blank signa- ture for the French action in Morocco ? If those are the hopes entertained at Paris it would seem that the origin of the question has been completely lost sight of. It began with the agreement concluded in 1904 between England, France, and Spain when no trouble was taken to consult or even to inform the other interested Powers. Until the moment when Germany raised her objections it was openly said that Morocco was to become another Tunis. Be- sides the public agreement, France signed with Spain a secret treaty (the secrecy of which was badly kept) concerning the partition of the Empire — 87 L'acte d'Algesiras n'a rien change aux projets fran- Qais. II a seulement oblige a realiser lentement et pas a pas, ce que Ton comptait accomplir d'un seul coup comme le traite du Bardo a ete extorque du Bey de Tunis. Depuis I'oeuvre de I'envahissement progressif du Maroc n'a pas cesse d'etre methodique- ment poursuivie. Peu a peu les Franqais s'y sont empares de tout et ont profite des occasions qui se sont presentees d'elles-memes, quand ils ne les ont pas fait naitre pour proceder a des occupations de territoires. Les expeditions en preparation peuvent-elles etre considerees comme autre chose qu'un nouvel acte de la meme comedie? Le Sultan Moulay Hafith a perdu son autorite deja bien precaire auparavant sur ses sujets, parce qu'il a du se resigner a n'etre plus qu'un instrument entre les mains de la France. Une aide materielle de la part des troupes fran^aises ne peut qu'achever de le discrediter et rendre de plus en plus necessaire pour lui conserver son trone, une prolongation indefinie de I'occupation pretendue tem- poraire. Je teste persuade que I'Allemagne desire eviter robligation de s'engager a fond dans I'affaire maro- caine, mais je dois repeter ce que j'ai ecrit dans men rapport du 1 Mai, c'est-a-dire que la question est neanmoins tres delicate. EUe le devient meme de plus en plus. II faut pour que le gouvemement Im- perial puisse justiiier son inaction devant I'opinion publique allemande qu'on manoeuvre en France avec assez d'habilete et de feinte moderation pour ne pas le forcer a en sortir. Dans ces derniers temps ni le gouvemement frangais ni une grande partie de la presse frangaise n'en ont guere fait preuve. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. of the Sherif. The act of Algeciras brought no change to the French plans. It simply involved the obligation for France to realize slowly and step by step what she had been hoping to accomplish at one stroke, as in the case of the treaty of Bardo which was extorted from the Bey of Tunis. Since then the work of progressive invasion has never ceased to be methodically pursued. Little by little the French possessed themselves of everything, and if they did not create occasions for territorial occupation, they at least made use of each one that presented itself. Can the expeditions which are in preparation be considered in any other light than that of another act of the same comedy? Sultan Mulai Hafid has lost his authority over his subjects, which even be- fore was very precarious, since he had to content himself with being no more than a tool in the hands of France. Material aid from the French troops can only serve to discredit him completely and will, if his throne is to be saved for him, render more and more necessary an indefinite prolongation of the occupation which was pretended to be a temporary one. I continue to be convinced that Germany desires to avoid the necessity of entering deeply into the Moroccan question, but I must repeat what I wrote in my report of May 1st: that the question is never- theless a very delicate one. It is even becoming so more and more. If the Imperial Government is to be able to justify its inaction before German public opinion the French will have to manoeuvre very adroitly and with feigned moderation in order not to force it to abandon it; but lately neither the French Government nor a great part of the French press have done so. Accept, etc. [Signed] Greindl. No. 71. Le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre de Belgique a Lon- dres, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Londres, le 22 Mai 1911. Monsieur le Ministre! Me referant a mon rapport du 17 de. ce mois, j'ai I'honneur de Vous informer que le couple Imperial a quitte Londres, le 20 Mai, emportant, a ce que j'ap- prends par M. de Treutler, du Ministere allemand des aflfaires etrangeres, le meilleur souvenir de Leur visite, qui a fait une bonne impression. J'ai constate par moi-meme que I'accueil plutot sympathique qui a ete, des le debut, fait par le public aux Majestes Allemandes, s'est accentue de jour en jour, pendant leur sejour. L'Empereur et I'Imperatrice se sont prodigues; la population, prevenue de tous leurs mouvements, etait echelonnee sur leur passage et passait des heures a attendre leur retour de diverses excursions, pour les acclamer a la rentree au Palais. On ne pouvait se promener dans la capitale sans ren- contrer a toute heure les equipages de la Cour avec les touristes Royaux, parfois seuls, souvent accom- pagnes du Roi Georges, de la Reine et des Enfants d'Angleterre. Le couple Imperial a deploye une grande activite, s'est interesse a toutes les attrac- tions de la ville, a paru au theatre, a I'hopital alle- mand et pour finir au grand bal de la Cour. La pre- sence de la jeune Princesse Victoria Louise, qui ac- count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. London, May 22, 1911. Sir:— With reference to my report of the 17th inst., I have the honor to inform you that the Imperial cou- ple left London on May 20th, carrying away with them, as I learn from Mr. von Treutler of the Min- istry of Foreign Affairs, the best memories of their visit, which has made a good impression. I myself have witnessed how the fairly sympathetic recep- tion which the public gave to the German Majesties from the beginning became daily warmer during their stay. The Emperor and the Empress have ap- peared much in public ; the population, informed of all their movements, lined the streets and spent hours waiting for their return from their various excursions to cheer them when they entered the Palace. One could not walk in the town without meeting at all hours the court carriages with the Royal guests, sometimes alone, often in company of King George, the Queen, and their children. The Im- perial couple were very active, they showed inter- est in all the attractions of the town, went to the theatre, the German hospital, and lastly to the grand court ball. The presence of the young Prin- cess \^ictoria Louise, who accompaned her August compagnait partout Ses Augustes Parents, accen- tuait le caractere familial de la visite et contribuait a accroitre les sympathies populaires. Pour qui a assiste, comme moi, a la derniere visite (officielle celle-la) de I'Empereur, en Novembre 1907, la dif- ference dans I'accueil qui a ete reserve a S. M. Im- periale dans les deux occasions a ete marquee. Une froide mefiance caracterisait I'attitude nationale il y a 4 ans. Cette fois une atmosphere plus cordiale etait visible ; I'absence de tout apparat militaire la favorisait. Pas de troupes, pas d'escorte, vu le carac- tere prive, qu'on a scrupuleusement observe dans la reception et qui a ete accentue par le refus, redige en termes d'ailleurs tres gracieux, oppose par I'Empereur a la demarche du Doyen, M. Cambon, qui avait de- mande a etre admis a presenter avec ses collegues les hommages du Corps Diplomatique a Sa Majeste. La mort du Roi Edouard semble avoir amene une legere detente dans les relations anglo-allemandes. On dirait qu'a I'epoque des "ententes" dont le de- funt Souverain etait si friand, la nation meme avait conscience de la tentative d'encerclement a I'egard de I'Allemagne que favorisait si ouvertement le Cabi- net de Londres et qui ne pouvait manquer de frois- ser celui de Berlin. On en craignait un peu les conse- quences possibles ,et, de la crainte a la haine, il n'y a qu'un pas, que la presse antigermanique n'a pas manque de faire franchir. La panique, dont on s'est tant moque en Allemagne, etait humiliante et on en souffrait ici. Malgre les Cassandres des milieux navals et militaires, il semble que Ton se soit un peu ressaisi et, au moment tres opportun ou le public commengait enfin a faire la part de I'exageration, Guillaume II a paru, delaissant I'armure etincelante pour la redingote bourgeoise et promenant a travers Londres I'lmperatrice et la Princesse avec les en- fants Royaux d'Angleterre. L'efifet, pour momentanc qu'il puisse etre, a ete bon. Le petit-fils de la Reine Victoria n'a pas a regretter la demarche qu'il a faite dans des circonstances propices. Dans la presse on annonce que I'Empereur a invite le jeune Prince de Galles a aller Le voir a Potsdam. On a meme insinue que ce voyage pouvait avoir trait a des projets matrimoniaux entre le Prince et la Princesse Victoria-Louise, mais celle-ci a deux ans de plus que I'heritier du trone britannique. On a egalement parle, comme fiance possible pour la Prin- cesse allemande, du Prince Arthur, fils unique du Due de Connaught. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] Cte. de Lalaing. Parents everywhere, accentuated the family char- acter of the visit and contributed to heighten public sympathy. For a person w^ho attended, as I did, the last visit (which was official) of the Emperor in November, 1907, the difference in the reception given to His Imperial Majesty on the two occasions was marked. Cold mistrust characterized the pop- ular attitude four years ago. This time a more cordial atmosphere was to be observed ; the absence of all military pomp worked in its favor. There were no troops, no escorts on account of the private character which was scrupulously observed at the reception and which was emphasized by the refusal of His Majesty, expressed in very gracious terms, to request M. Cambon, the Doyen, to be permitted together with his colleagues to present the respects of the Diplomatic Corps. The death of King Edward seems to have caused a slight slackening in the tension of Anglo- German relations. It seems that at the time of the "ententes" to which His Late Majesty was so partial the nation itself was conscious of the at- tempted encircling of Germany which was so openly favored by the Cabinet of London and which could not but arouse the displeasure of that of Berlin. People were a little afraid of possible consequences and from fear to hatred there is but one step which the anti-German press did not fail to cause to be taken. The panic which amused people in Ger- many was humiliating and England suffered under it. In spite of the Cassandras in naval and military circles it seems that a slight recovery has set in and at the very opportune moment when the public be- gan to think soberly, William II appeared, changing the shining armor for the bourgeois frock-coat, and taking the Empress and the Princess together with the Royal English children out in London. The effect, momentary as it may be, was good. The grandson of Queen Victoria has no cause to re- great the step he took under propitious circum- stances. In the press it is announced that the Emperor has invited the young Prince of Wales to visit him in Potsdam. It has even been intimated that this journey might have reference to matrimonial pro- jects between the Prince and Princess Victoria Louise, but the latter is two years older than the heir to the British throne. There has also been talk of Prince Arthur, the only son of the Duke of Connaught, as a possible fiance for the Ger- man Princess. Accept, etc. [Signed] Ct. de Lalaing. No. 72. "Le Baron Greindl, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 17 Juin 1911. Monsieur le Ministre ! Autant qu'on en peut juger il n'y a eu depuis que j'ai eu I'honneur de vous adresser mon rapport du 24 Mai dernier, aucun changement dans i'attitude ex- pectante observee par I'Allemagne dans I'affaire du Maroc. On s'est empresse de dementir le bruit d'apres lequel I'Espagne serait appuyee par le Gou- vernement allemand dans son action militaire. C'etait a peine necessaire. L'Allemagne n'a eu a se louer du Berlin, June 17, 1911. Sir:— Since I had the honor to send you my report of May 24th there has, as far as one can judge, been no change in the attitude of expectation observed by Germany in the Moroccan affair. The rumor that Spain was to receive the support of the Ger- man Government in its military action was promptly denied. That was scarcely necessary. Germany had no reason to be pleased with Spain, either when 89 Gouvernement espagnol ni lors de la conclusion des traites secrets ni dans les negociations d'Algesiras. II etait fort invraisembable qu'elle entrat en action pour defendre les interets des Espagnols alors qu'elle p'a pas juge a propos de le faire lorsqu'il s'agissait des siens. Si Ton s'est fait quelque illusion sur ce point a Madrid elle n'aura pas tarde a etre dissipee. On s'est borne ici a prendre acte de la communica- tion faite par I'ambassadeur d'Espagne, au sujet de I'occupation de Larasch et d'Elkazar, en I'expliquant, a I'exemple de la France, par la necessite de main- tenir I'ordre dans le pays et en assurant, toujours d'apres le procede frangais, que I'occupation ne serait que temporaire. D'un autre c6t6 d'apres ce que me disait hier M. Zimmermann, M. Cambon s'evertue presque tous les jours a lui demontrer qu'entre Taction de I'Es- pagne et celle de la France au Maroc, 11 y a une dif- ference essentielle. L'une serait une violation fla- grante de I'acte d'Algesiras, tandis que I'autre n'en serait que I'execution. "J'ecoute ces explications d'un air serieux" m'a dit le sous-secretaire d'etat et pour souligner I'ironie il s'est empresse d'ajouter "qu'il est amusant d'ecouter les plaidoiries dans ce proces en contrefa^on." J'ai demande a M. iZimmermann, s'il n'etait pas a craindre que le diflferend entre la France et I'Espagnc ne provoque des complications europeennes. II m'a repondu qu'il ne le pense pas. 11 n'est certainement pas a nier que les affaires du Maroc comme celles de I'Albanie ne soient des questions graves; mais elles s'aplaniront. Deja le Gouvernement turc cedant aux conseils de moderation de I'Autriche-Hongrie a pris le parti de declarer I'insurrection albanaise terminee. En tout cas, dit le sous-secretaire d'El;at, I'Alle- magne ne fera plus d'acte d'Algesiras. La preuve qu'il n'y a pas a redouter de trop rudes alarmes est que M. de Kiderlen-Waechter dont le conge devait expirer ces jours-ci prolongera son sejour a Kis- singen. Le Gouvernement Imperial reste done au meme point de vue qu'au debut. II joue le role de simple spectateur reservant sa liberte d'action pour le cas ou par suite de I'intervention frangaise les clauses essentielles de I'acte d'Algesiras c'est-a-dire la sou- verainete du Sultan et I'integrite du Maroc cesserai- ent d'exister. II n'en reste deja plus rien. A quel moment I'Alle- magne jugera-t-elle a propos de le declarer et quel usage fera-t-elle de sa liberte recouvree? Je reste persuade que son principal souci est d'evi- ter une guerre que le Maroc ne vaut pas et qu'il depend de la France d'epargner a I'Europe en met- tant dans la conquete du Maroc la dose d'hypocrisie necessaire pour ne pas ameuter I'opinion publique allemande. Tout le monde n'est pas de mon avis, quelques uns de mes collegues s'etonnent de la longanimite de rAllemagne. L'un d'eux me rapporte que d'apres un bruit repandu dans des milieux bien informes a Paris, il y a des pourparlers engages avec Berlin en vue de compensations a accorder a I'Allemagne du cote du Kameroun ou du Dahomey. Mon collegue ajoute d'ailleurs que cette rumeur est dementie ici. Elle me parait tres peu probable. M. Zimmermann ne m'aurait pas parle comme il I'a fait hier, si des negociations etaient engagees avec le Gouvernement Frangais ; mais ce qui n'existe pas aujourd'hui, n'est pas exclu pour I'avenir. Agreez etc. [s.] Greindl. the secret treaties were concluded, or at the nego- tiations of Algeciras. It was highly improbable that Germany would take action in order to de- fend Spain's interests after the latter had not seen fit to do so when her own interests were in ques- tion. If there have been any illusions on this point in Madrid they will have been speedily dispelled. Here the only action was simply to take note of the communication made by the Ambassador of Spain on the subject of the occupation of Larache and El- kazar, which he explained after the example of France by the necessity of maintaining order in the country, giving at the same time assurances, like- wise after the French model, that the occupation would only be temporary. Mr. Zimmerman told me yesterday that M. Cam- bon, on the other hand, is making almost daily ef- forts to demonstrate to him that there is a vital difference between the action of Spain in Mo- rocco and that of France. The one is said to be a flagrant violation of the act of Algeciras while the other is nothing but its execution. "I listen to these explanations with a serious face," said the Under-Secretary of State, adding in order to under- line the irony that "it is amusing to listen to the speeches for the defense in this trial for forgery." I asked Mr. Zimmerman whether it was not to be feared that the differences between France and Spain might lead to European complications. He replied that he did not think so. It could certainly not be denied that the affairs of Morocco, as those of Albania, were grave questions but they would be smoothed out. Already the Turkish Government in obedience to the Austro-Hungarian counsels of moderation had decided to declare the Albanian in- surrection at an end. In any case, said the Under- Secretary of State, Germany is not going to make any more acts of Algeciras. A proof that too rude an awakening need not be feared may be seen in the fact that Mr. von Kiderlen-Waechter whose leave was to expire these days is going to extend his stay at Kissingen. The Imperial Government is thus adhering to its former point of view. It plays the part of a simple spectator, reserving its liberty of action for the case that in consequence of the French inter- vention the essential clauses of the act of Algeciras, that is to say the sovereignty of the Sultan and the integrity of Morocco, should cease to exist. Already there is nothing left of them. At what moment will Germany think it timely to pronounce this, and what use will she make of her regained liberty of action? I continue in my conviction that her principal anxiety is to avoid a war, which Morocco is not worth and from which only France can save Europe by adding to the conquest of Morocco the dose of hypocrisy which is necessary in order not to arouse German public opinion. Not everybody is of my opinion, some of my colleagues are astonished at the forbearance of Ger- many. One of them informs me that there is a rumor in well-informed circles in Paris that pour- parlers are going on with 'Berlin aiming at com- pensations to be granted to Germany in the Cam- eroons or Dahomey. My colleague adds, however, that this rumor is denied here. To me it seems very improbable. Mr. Zimmermann would not have spoken to me as he did yesterday if negotiations were proceeding with the French Government. But what does not exist to-day is not excluded for the future. Accept, etc. [Signed! Greindl. No. 73. No. 73. Le Baron Guillaume, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, le 2 Juillet 1911. Monsieur le Ministre ! Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que la nouvelle de renvoi d'un navire de guerre allemand a Agadir, con- nue ici hier soir, fait aujourd'hui les frais des articles de la presse parisienne tout entiere. Le fait est evidemment grave; il peut presenter meme une gravite exceptionnelle s'il n'est pas le re- sultat d'une entente entre les Cabinets de Berlin et de Londres. II fut longtemps considere comme un axiome que I'Angleterre ne permettrait jamais I'etablissement des Allemands sur un point quelconque du terri- toire marocain. Cette politique est-elle abandonnee et quel serait alors le prix de la commission? Serait-il question de facilites a accorder a I'Angleterre pour son grand chemin de fer au travers du continent afri- cain? Dans cette hypothese, le "marche" serait in- teressant pour nous. Dans tous les cas, le choix d' Agadir est signifi- catif ; il est de nature a comporter des compensations importantes. Ce port sur I'Ocean'est la clef d'une region qui peut constituer une contree limitee, bornee au Nord et separee done des regions oil s'ex- erce I'activite de la France, par les chaines de 1' Atlas qui s'elevent rapidement de la cote, pour atteindre bientot des hauteurs de 4.800 metres. Cette region, qui forme le point d'aboutissement de la grande route des caravanes, est reputee pour ses richesses minerales. Quelle portee faut-il donner a I'acte du Gouverne- ment allemand, et sur le moment qu'il a choisi pour le mettre a execution? Je n'ai vu personne encore de- puis hier ; il sera d'ailleurs tres difificile d'obtenir pro- chainement des informations a cet egard. Mais il est incontestable que I'opinion publique en France est peu favorable a I'expedition marocaine ; les hom- mes politiques commencent a comprendre, semble-t- il, que Ton ne veut pas ici qu'un gros corps d'armee aille s'immobiliser dans ces regions africaines, pour les beaux yeux de faiseurs d'affaires. En formant son cabinet, Mr. Caillaux a evite d'of- frir un portefeuille a Mr. Etienne, partisan interesse des aventures marocaines. II a choisi, pour le porte- feuille des Affaires Etrangeres Mr. de Selves, qu'on me dit desireux de mettre un terme a cette affaire et de faire sortir les Fran<;ais de Fez. C'est le moment que le Gouvernement allemand choisit pour venir prendre pied au Maroc ! Peut on admettre qu'il ait ete mal informe sur les dispositions du nouveau ministere frangais, on bien faut-il sup- poser que, desirant prendre pied a Agadir, et se pro- posant de justifier cet acte par les precedents don- nes par la France et I'Espagne, il ait cru habile de precipiter ses mouvements, dans la crainte qu'un re- cul de la France ne lui enleve un pretexte a in- voquer? Quoiqu'il en soit, Mr. Jaures triomphe aujourd'hui. II avait toujours reproche au Gouvernement de se compromettre dans cette mechante affaire du Maroc ; il avait soutenu que la necessite d'aller a Fez n'avait jamais existe, et que la marche en avant de I'armee frangaise pouvait devenir la source de difficultes graves. II n'est pas contestable aujourd'hui que I'at- titude du Gouvernement de la Republique a amene ou permis le debarquement des Espagnols a Larache, Paris, July 2nd, 1911. Sir:— I need not tell you that the news of the despatch of a German man-of-wrar to Agadir, which became known here last night, is to-day the topic of articles in almost the entire Parisian press. The event is evidently grave; it may even be of an exceptional gravity, if it is not the result of an understanding between the cabinets of Berlin and London. For a long time it was considered an axiom that Elngland would never allow the Germans to estab- lish themselves at any point of the Moroccan terri- tory. Has that policy been abandoned and what may be, in that case, the commission paid ? Should it be concessions granted to England in her big railway scheme across the African Continent? In that case the "bargain" would be of interest to us. In any case the choice of Agadir is significant. It is apt to admit of important compensations. This ocean port is the key to a region which may form a well circumscribed country, bounded in the North, and thus shut off from the parts where the French are active, by the Atlas mountains which rise rapid- ly from the coast to a height of 4800 meters. This region, which is the terminus of the great caravan road, is renowned for its mineral wealth. What importance is to be attached to the action of the German Government and to the moment it has chosen to undertake it? I have not seen any- body since yesterday and it will also be very diffi- cult 'soon to obtain information on this point. But it is certain that public opinion in France is not very- much in favor of the Moroccan expedition ; the poli- ticians are beginning to realize, it would seem, that the people do not care to see a big army force tied up in these African regions for the sake of people who want to do business. When forming his Cabinet, M. Caillaux avoided offering a portfolio to M. Etienne, who is an inter- ested partisan in the Moroccan adventure. He chose M. de Selves as Minister of Foreign Affairs who, I am told, wishes to put an end to that affair and wants the French to leave Fez. That is the moment which the German Govern- ment chose to gain a footing in Morocco! Can it be assumed that the German Government was badly informed as to the intentions of the French Cabinet; or is it to be supposed that the German Govern- ment, in a desire to get a foothold in Agadir and with the idea of justifying this act by the precedents created by France and Spain, thought fit to precipi- tate its movements from a fear lest France draw back and thus deprive it of a suitable pretext? However that may be, M. Jaures is triumphant to-day. He always blamed the Government for compromising itself in this vile Moroccan affair, maintaining that a necessity for going to Fez never existed and that the advance of the French army might become a source of grave difficulties. It cannot be disputed to-day that the attitude of the Government of the Republic has caused or at least made possible the landing of the Spanish at Larache — 91 — et renvoi d'un navire de guerre allemand a Agadir. and the despatch of a German man-of-war to Aga- dir. I am, etc. Je suis etc. [s.] Guillaume. [Signed] Guillaume. No. 74. No. 74. Le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre de Belgique a Lon- dres, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- faires Etrangeres. Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at Londseem any easier to obtain to-day even although recourse was taken to the means suggested by Sir Edward Grey, to hold a Conference of the Ambassadors accredited at London as a sort of deliberative council intended to reconcile divergent views and to prepare the ground for a joint action of the Powers. That is the very point where the difficulty of an understanding lies. The desires of the Powers can only be realized by exercising pressure on the Bal- kan States. Up to the present, unanimity has ceased whenever the question of passing on to acts arose. That is known at Sofia, at Belgrade, and at Athens, and this inactivity of the Great Powers which be- came apparent after the first victories of the Allies, encourages the latter to show themselves arrogant and irreconcilable. In this they are also encouraged by the ambigu- ous attitude of Russia. The representatives of the Balkan States at Berlin are to-day no longer mak- ing any secret of the close ties which have never ceased to exist between their Governments and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The latter alone was in- formed about the aUiance concluded between them and they did not march before they had Russia's approval. Russian diplomacy is, as it were, hold- ing that of the allies in leash. From Russia they receive their instructions, from Russia they will take their orders. But Russian diplomacy itself has varied much since the beginning of the hostilities. When in a communicative mood, the French Am- bassador at Berlin did not conceal from me how lit- tle one could count on the brilliant but changeable mind of the politicians who conduct the Empire allied to France, for they were playing a double game even with the latter. M. Cambon complained in particular at various times, of the influence which M. Iswolski still retained, because he was pursuing a policy of personal revenge against Austria-Hun- gary and would endeavor to spoil the game when- ever she would seem to be on the point of winning it. It is believed here, however, that the war is ap- proaching its end because the allies, who have gone too far in their bluff, are really anxious to negotiate. It is believed that the Scutari question will be solved, in conformity with the will of the Cabinet of Vienna supported by Germany and Italy, by annexing this place to Albania in spite of the ter- giversations of Russia, who cannot make up her mind to abandon Montenegro. As regards the Aegean Islands, it seems impossible to mobilize an international squadron in order to eject the Greeks, who know the value of the axiom : beati possidentes. Lastly, in face of the obstinacy of Bulgaria in de- manding a war indemnity the question is whether the resistance of France and Germany will not give Way and whether in the pourparlers which are to be held in Paris on this special point a means will not be found to give some satisfaction to the Cab- inet of Sofia. — 123 On en est venu ici a desirer la chute d'Andrinople pour hater I'acquiescement de la Turquie a des exi- gences, qu'on juge, d'ailleurs, excessives, et le main- tien du Cabinet jeune-turc centre les essais de soule- vement d'une partie des officiers, pour trouver des Ministres qui consentent a signer I'acte de decheance de la domination ottomane en Europe. Veuillez etc. [s.] Baron Beyens. A point has been reached where the fall of Adri- anople is desired in order to hasten Turkey's acqui- escence in demands which are nevertheless consid- ered excessive. The maintenance of the Young- Turkish Cabinet is desired against the attacks of a party of officers in order to find Ministers who will be ready to sign the document which seals the fall of Ottoman domination in Europe. Accept, etc. [Signed] Baron Beyens. No. 103. No. 103. Le Baron Beyens, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 4 Avril 1913. Monsieur le Ministre ! L'incident de Scutari est sans doute le plus grave qui se soit produit au point de vue europeen, depuis I'ouverture des hostilites balkaniques. Que le roi du Montenegro s'entete dans sa resistance aux somma- tions de I'Autriche-Hongrie et a la pression des Puissances, cela se comprend du reste. II joue sa couronne par suite de ses insucces militaires, et il n'a chance.de la conserver centre une revolution in- terieure, consequence probable de Texasperation de ses sujets, qu'en devenant a leurs yeux la victime de la politique austro-hongroise. Mais il ne peut pour- suivre le siege de Scutari qu'avec la cooperation des Serbes. Or, I'arrogance et le mepris, avec lesquels ces derniers regoivent les reclamations du cabinet de Vienne ne s'expliquent que par I'appui qu'ils croient trouver a Saint Petersbourg. • Le Charge d' Affaires de Serbie disait ici recemment que son gouvernement ne serait pas alle de I'avant depuis six mois, sans te- nir compte des menaces autrichiennes, s'il n'y avait pas ete encourage par le Ministre de Russie, M. de Hartwig, un diplomate de I'ecole de M. Isvolsky. II faut avouer que I'evenement a donne jusqu'a present raison a I'audace aventureuse du Cabinet de Bel- grade. La politique russe temoigne une hesitation qui ag- grave singulierement la situation europeenne. M. Sassonow est de coeur avec ses collegues qui diri- gent la politique des Grandes Puissances, mais il sent son influence sur le Czar battue en breche par le parti de la Cour et par les Panslavistes. De la les contradictions de sa conduite. II adhere a Lon- dres par I'organe de I'Ambassadeur de Russie au Concert europeen decide a mettre a la raison le Mon- tenegro, et il hesite a donner officiellement a la France le mandat de representer son alliee russe dans le blocus des cotes montenegrines. Qu'on soit las a Paris de ces tergiversations, cela ne fait pas de doute, mais on y subit en maugreant les consequences de I'alliance et on se laisse entrai- ner dans une voie qui peut conduire a une guerre ge- nerale. A Berlin on n'est pas, au fond, plus satisfait de la direction imprimee a la Triple Alliance dans la question balkanique par le Cabinet de Vienne, mais on fait meilleure figure et on envisage avec sang froid les complications qui peuvent en resulter. Dans les declarations pleines de reserve faites hier par le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangeres a la Com- mission du budget du Reichstag, le seul point sur lequel Mr. de Jagow se soit exprime avec une nettete qui ne laisse aucun doute quant aux intentions de Sir:- Berlin, April 4, 1913. The incident of Scutari is, no doubt, the gravest from the European point of view that has happened since the outbreak of the Balkan hostilities. It can be easily understood that the King of Montenegro persists in his resistance to the demands of Austria- Hungary and the pressure of the Powers. He is running the risk of losing his crown through his military failures, and has no chance to keep it in the face of an internal revolution which will be the prob- able consequence of the despair of his subjects, un- less they come to regard him as a victim of Austro- Hungarian policy. But he cannot continue the siege of Scutari without the co-operation of the Serbs. The arrogance and contempt with which the latter are receiving the complaints of the Cab- inet of Vienna can only be explained by the support which they expect to find in St. Petersburg. The Servian Charge d'Affaires here said recently that his Government would not have proceeded as it did for six months, regardless of the Austrian threats, if it had not been encouraged by the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, a diplomat of M. Iswolski's school. It must be admitted that the events have, so far, justified the adventurous audacity of the Cabinet of Belgrade. The Russian policy is showing a hesitation which seriously compromises the European situation. M. Sassonov is one with his colleagues who are direct- ing the policy of the Great Powers, but he feels that his influence over the Czar is being battered down by the Court party and the Panslavists. Hence the inconsistency of his conduct. While at London he is adhering in the organ of the Russian Ambassador, to the European Concert which is determined to bring Montenegro to reason, he hesitates to give to France the official mandate of representing her Rus- sian Ally in the blockade of the Montenegrin coasts. It cannot be doubted that Paris is tired of these tergiversations, but France submits, though cursing them, to the consequences of the alliance and allows herself to be drawn along a path which may lead to a general war. At Berlin, satisfaction is just as lacking in the direction which the Cabinet of Vienna has given to the Balkan question, but it is regarded with better grace and the complications which it may entail are faced with composure. In the very reserved stateinents which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made yesterday in the budget commission of the Reichstag, the only point on which Mr. von Jagow expressed himself with sufficient clearness to leave no doubt as to the in- rAllemagne, c'est I'appui qu'elle est resolue de pre- ter jusqu'au bout a son alliee, I'Autriche-Hongrie. On ne pense pas dans le monde diplomatique de Berlin, ou plutot on n'espere plus que la demonstra- tion navale devant Antivari empechera la continua- tion du siege de Scutari et I'assaut final auquel les Montenegrins et les Serbes se preparent activement. Si la place tombe entre leurs mains, il faudra autre chose qu'un simple blocus et des sommations inutile- ment repetees pour les en deloger. L'entree des troupes autrichiennes sur un territoire balkanique, plutot serbe que montenegrin, parce qu'en Serbie des operations militaires seraient plus faciles qu'au Mon- tenegro, motiverait une intervention de la Russie et dechainerait peut-etre une guerre generale. C'est une eventualite tellement grave qu'elle ferait recu- ler — on I'espere du moins ici — les deux Puissances, de la decision desquelles depend aujourd'hui la paix europeenne. En d'autres termes, on croit que la gravite du peril auquel toute decision inconsideree exposerait I'Europe entiere est la meilleure garantie que Ton ait qu'il sera evite. II faudrait necessairement offrir une compensation au Montenegro, I'Autriche-Hongrie ne pouvant pas, sans se deconsiderer, laisser en sa possession Scu- tari, la future capitale du futur etat d'Albanie. On parle ici de I'offre d'une certaine etendue de cote avec une bande de territoire au sud de Dulcigno, qui comprendrait le port de St. Jean de Medua, entoure de rochers et qui n'est pas susceptible d'un develop- pement economique ou militaire. Veuillez agreer etc. [s.] Baron Beyens. tentions of Germany was the support which she is resolved to give to the end to her Ally, Austria- Hungary. It is not believed in the diplomatic world of Ber- lin or,, rather it is no longer hoped, that the naval demonstration off Antivari will prevent the con- tinuation of the siege of Scutari and the final on- slaught for which the Montenegrins and Serbs are actively preparing. If the place falls into their hands it will require more than a simple blockade or a useless repetition of demands to dislodge them. The entry of Austrian troops on Balkan territory, rather Servian than Montenegrin because in Servia military operations would be easier than in Monte- negro, would give the motive for a Russian inter- vention and would probably unchain a general war. That is a contingency of such gravity — that, at least, is the hope here — as to cause the two Powers, on whose decision the peace of Europe is depending to-day, to shrink from it. In other words, it is be- lieved that the gravity of the danger to which the whole of Europe would be exposed by any ill-con- sidered decisions is the best possible guarantee that it will be avoided. It would, of course, be necessary to offer a com- pensation to Montenegro, as Austria-Hungary can- not without discrediting herself leave in Monte- negro's hands Scutari, the capital of a future State of Albania. There is talk here of the offer of a cer- tain stretch of coast with a strip of territory to the south of Dulcigno, comprising the port of San Gio- vanni di Medua surrounded by rocks and incapable of economic or military development. Accept, etc. [Signed] Baron Beyens. No. 104. No. 104. Le Baron Guillaume, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, le 16 Avril 1913. Monsieur le Ministre! Je viens de voir M. le Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres avec lequel j'ai cause assez longuement de I'in- cident de Nancy, que les journaux vous ont rapporte. M. Pichon se montre tres desole de I'esprit de sus- ceptibilite chauvine, dont la presse allemande donne le spectacle. Les organes officieux du Gouvernement Imperial sont prudents mais les pangermanistes jettent feu et flamme, et il est regrettable que I'agence Wolff s'em- presse de repandre dans toute I'Allemagne de si de- plorables articles. On n'a pas encore de details precis sur ce qui s'est passe a Nancy, surtout au Casino — un etablissement de troisieme ordre — oil la querelle a commence, et ou Ton jouait une piece intitulee "le Uhlan." On ne devrait pas laisser jouer des pieces de ce genre. Le rapport des autorites locales etait insuffisant ; un haut fonctionnaire a ete envoye pour faire une en- quete serieuse. II n'est pas douteux que I'affaire, qui n'a pas d'im- portance veritable se liquidera facilement ; mais, m'a dit le Ministre, elle est grave en ce qu'elle prouve combien les esprits sont montes de part et d'autre. Chez nous aussi, a continue Monsieur Pichon, il y Sir: Paris, April 16, 1913. I have just seen the Minister of Foreign Affairs and spoken at some length with him of the incident of Nancy, of which the papers have advised you. M. Pichon was very much grieved over the spirit of chauvinistic susceptibility which the German press is displaying. The semi-official organs of the Imperial Govern- ment are cautious, but the Pan-Germanists are fret- ting and fuming and it is to be regretted that the Wolff Agency hastens to spread such deplorable articles all over Germany. There are not yet any exact details to hand on what happened at Nancy, above all at the Casino — an establishment of the third class — where the quar- rel began and where a piece entitled "The Uhlan" was played. Pieces of that kind should not be per- mitted to be played. The report from the local authorities is insuffi- cient ; a high official has been despatched to make a serious investigation. There is no doubt that the affair, which is of no real importance, will easily be straightened out but, said the Minister, it is grave in so far as it shows how high feelings are running on both sides. With us also, the Minister continued, a spirit of 125 a un esprit de chauvinisme qui se developpe, que je deplore et centre lequel il faudra reagir. La moitie des theatres de Paris jouent maintenant des pieces nationalistes et chauvines; je m'abstiens d'y aller; mais ce n'est pas assez, il faudrait avoir les moyens d'empecher de les representer. II importe de ra- mener plus de calme dans les esprits. Je suis etc. [s.] Guillaume. chauvinism is developing which I deplore and which must be fought. Half of the theatres of Paris are now playing nationalistic and chauvinistic pieces. I abstain from going to them, but that is not suf- ficient. Means are needed to prevent them from being presented. It is imperative to bring about calmer sentiments. Accept, etc. [Signed] Guillaume. No. 105. No. 105. Le Baron Guillaume, Ministre de Belgique a Paris, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- g^res. Paris, le 17 Avril 1913. Monsieur le Ministre ! On ne connait pas encore les resultats definitifs de I'enquete que le Gouvernement a charge un haut fonctionnaire, M. Ogier, de faire a Nancy sur les in- cidents franco-allemands. Les nombreuses correspondances que publient les journaux donnent cependant I'impression que j'avais deja I'honneur de vous communiquer hier, que les faits n'ont pas eu une importance suffisante pour le- gitimer la levee de boucliers d'une partie de la presse allemande et les paroles prononcees au Parlement de Berlin par le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat des Affaires Etrangeres. Mais ces faits demontreront sans doute aussi que — comme j'ai deja eu maintes fois I'honneur de vous le dire — I'esprit public en France devient de plus en plus chauvin et imprudent. On devrait prendre des mesures pour arreter ce courant que le Gouverne- ment a veritablement encourage depuis les incidents d'Agadir et la constitution du Ministere Poincare- Millerand-Delcasse. Le "Journal" de ce matin public, a cet egard, un article de Victor Margueritte, intitule: "A la fron- tiere," que je me permets de vous signaler. Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Je suis etc. [s.] Sir: Paris, April 17, 1913. Guillaume. The definite results of the investigation which the Government charged a high official, M. Ogier, to make at Nancy in connection with the Franco-Ger- man incidents are not yet known. The numerous news despatches published in the papers give, however, the impression which I al- ready had the honor to report to you yesterday, that the facts are not of such importance as to jus- tify a part of the German press in taking up arms, or the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to speak, as he did, in the Reichstag at Berlin. But these facts will doubtless show also — as I have repeatedly had the honor of reporting to you — that the public mind in France is becoming more and more chauvinistic and imprudent. Measures should be taken to stop this current which the Gov- ernment has actually been encouraging since the in- cidents of Agadir and the accession of the Poincare- Millerand-Delcasse Cabinet. The Journal of this morning publishes in this connection an article by Victor Margueritte, en- titled : "To the frontier," to which I take the lib- erty of drawing your attention. Accept, etc. [Signed] Guillaume. No. 106. No. 106. Le Baron Beyens, Ministre de Belgique a Berlin, k M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Berlin, le 26 Mai 1913. Monsieur le Ministre! Un mariage princier fut rarement aussi populaire que celui de la Princesse Victoria Louise avec le Prince Ernest Auguste, Due de Brunswick et Lune- bourg. Les habitants de Berlin ont temoigne leur satisfaction par des ovations a la Famille Imperiale, qui se sont etendues aux botes royaux qu'elle re- cevait a cette occasion. II est aise de constater par la lecture des journaux que le meme sentiment, fait d'approbation et de contentement a ete eprouve dans toute I'Allemagne. On etait content de voir terminer d'une maniere aussi heureuse la vieille querelle des Guelfes et des Hohenzollern qui pesait, comme un Berlin, May 26, 1913. Sir:- Rarely has a princely marriage been so popular as that of Princess Victoria Louise with Prince Ernest August, Duke of Brunswick and Luneburg. The inhabitants of Berlin showed their satisfaction by ovations to the Imperial Family, extending to the Royal guests who were received at this occa- sion. It is easy to ascertain by reading the papers that the same sentiment of approval and satisfac- tion is prevailing all over Germany. One is glad to see terminated in such a happy manner the old quarrel of the Guelfs and the Hohenzollerns which weighed like a painful legacy of the past on the legs penible du passe, sur les brillantes destinees du nouvel Empire allemand. On approuvait I'Empe- reur, non pas seulement d'avoir donne sa fille unique au fils de son ancien ennemi, mais aussi d'avoir traite ce dernier, pendant toute la duree des fiangailles de leurs enfants, avec une courtoisie qui ne s'est pas dementie un seul instant, en evitant soigneusement tout ce qui pouvait froisser I'amour propre de I'he- ritier du vaincu de Langensalza. Dans le toast plain de tact et d'elevation que Guillaume II a porte au jeune couple pendant le banquet nuptial, il s'est plu a mettre sur le meme^pied les Maisons des Guelfes et des Hohenzollern "qui ont joue des roles si mar- quants dans le developpement historique de la patrie allemande" (Die so markante Rollen in der ge- schichtlichen Entwicklung des deutschen Vaterlan- des gespielt haben). On ne saurait plus aimable- ment travestir I'histoire. Le Due de Cumberland, oncle du Roi d'Angle- terre et de I'Empereur de Russie, a toujours ete I'ob- jet de la part de ces deux Princes d'une sympathie des plus marquees. La Cour britannique n'a jamais oublie que la maison de Hanovre est une branche de- tachee du tronc royal de la maison d'Angleterre. Aussi la solution chevaleresque apportee a la ques- tion guelfe par Guillaume II a-t-elle ete accueillie avec une joie sincere tant a Londres qu'a St. Peters- bourg. Quoi d'etonnant que les Souverains Anglais et le Czar aient tenu a montrer leur satisfaction en assistant au mariage qui a scelle la reconciliation des Guelfes et des Hohenzollern? Ce sentiment, plus encore que les liens de famille, suffirait a justifier leur presence ici pendant les fetes qui viennent de se terminer. On a cherche d'autre part a attribuer a la reunion des trois principaux Monarques de I'Eu- rope une certaine importance politique. De politi- que proprement dite il n'a pas dCi etre beaucoup question dans les entretiens de Guillaume II et de Georges V. Avec le Czar, I'Empereur allemand n'a sans doute pas laisse echapper I'occasion d'engager