UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES GIFT OF Col. Glen F. Jenks TACTICAL PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS Copyright 1910 k y MATTHEW ELTING HANNA TACTICAL PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS BY MATTHEW ELTING HANNA CAPTAIN, GENERAL STAFF CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORMERLY INSTRUCTOR, DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART ARMY STAFF COLLEGE AND ARMY SCHOOL OF THE LINE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS Adapted by direction of the Secretary of War for use in the Garrison Schools PRESS OF CEO. BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY M ENASHA. WiS. Library PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION The time has come for the publication of another edition of this book. The demand for it has steadily increased. It is being used with gratifying success in the Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth and Fortress Monroe, and by the National Guard of a number of states. It has been adopted for use in the garrison schools of the regular army, and will receive its first trial therein during the coming school term. Orders from abroad, especially from Great Britain, indicate that it is of value to foreign services. The service journals and scores of officers of the regular army and militia have subscribed to its merit. Only a few changes in the text have been suggested, and they are unimportant. Accordingly, this edition is pub- lished without change in the preceding edition. WASHINGTON, D. C., THE AUTHOR. July 31, 1911. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. The first edition of "Tactical Principles and Prob- lems" has been received with such universal favor that it is necessary to publish a second edition to meet the steadily increasing demand from the Regular Army and National Guard, as well as from the British Service and elsewhere. The author is indebted to friendly critics for a few suggested changes in the text, but it has been decided not to make these changes at this time, mainly because they relate to minor points concerning which slight difference of opinion is to be expected. Except that this edition is accompanied by much improved maps, it differs in no essential from the first edition. THE AUTHOR. WASHINGTON, D. C., SEPTEMBER 9, 1910. 523437 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION This book has been written in the hope that it may help junior officers of the regular service and militia who are beginning the study of tactics. In tactics, as in other sciences, the first steps are the most diffi- cult to make, especially if the student has no instruct- or, as necessarily must frequently be the case. With this fact uppermost in his mind, the author has en- deavored so to present the subjects herein treated that the book may be of special value to the student who is working without assistance. The problems have been restricted to the simpler and more usual operations of small forces of infantry and of cavalry, and of these two arms united. Ar- tillery has not been dealt with because it is believed that the student will make better progress if he be- comes familiar with the tactics of infantry and cavalry before undertaking the much more difficult subject of the three arms combined. After the student has mas- tered this book, he may take up with advantage the study of the many excellent works on the applied tactics of the three arms, most noted of which is Grie- penkerl's Letters on Applied Tactics. The so called applicatory method followed in this text is so well understood as to need no explanation, and its superiority over all other methods of teaching tactics is well established; the method will give very poor results, however, unless the student pursue it VI PREFACE vn properly. This means many hours of close applica- tion with map, dividers, pencil and paper. This book is not intended for casual reading, and the student will derive but little benefit from it unless he study it in some manner such as will now be outlined. For each subject herein discussed, there are at least two chapters. In the first of these a problem and its solution are given, together with a discussion of the ordinary tactical principles involved in the particular kind of operation that is being illustrated. In the following chapter, a similar problem and its solution are given, together with comments on the solution. The first chapter of any particular subject should be studied in the most painstaking manner in connection with the map, and not until the student thinks he is familiar with the tactical principles illustrated in the Solution and Discussion of this chapter should he proceed to consider the problem given in the following chapter. For this problem he should make his own solution, PREFERABLY IN WRITING, before reading the solution and comments given in the text. (*) This method will require work, but a method for learning tactics which does not involve labor has not yet been devised, and the student will find his reward in full measure in the progress he makes. If a single chap- ter is taken each week, the book furnishes the student (*) Students who have had no previous experience in solving tact- ical problems should read a pamphlet entitled Estimating, Tactical Sit- uations and Composing Field Orders, by Captain Roger S. Fitch, 2d Cavalry, which may be obtained on request made to the Secretary of The Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Also, students who find it difficult to read military maps, should study Military Map Beading by Captain C. O. Sherrill, Corps of Engineers, which may be purchased of the U. S. Cavalry Association, Fort Leavenworth, Kan- sas, for 50 cents. viii PREFACE with a course he can complete in six months and yet have much spare time for study along other lines. A word concerning the solutions given in the text. They are by no means the only good solutions for the respective problems given, nor are they faultless, nor are they necessarily the best. They are merely the best that occurred to the author at the time they were written. The aim has been to give solutions that violate no sound tactical principle, that are simple of execution, and that will accomplish the desired end if the troops are well led throughout the operation. Any solution that observes these three essential ideas is good, no matter how much it may differ from the one given herein. This point is deemed of such import- ance that it is frequently reverted to in the text- The advance sheets of the revision of the Field Ser- vice Regulations, to which the author has had access, have formed the tactical basis for the work, and it is believed that the solutions are in accord with the prin- ciples therein laid down. Many books have been con- sulted in the preparation of this work, but most fre- quent reference has been made to the following, to all of which the author takes pleasure in acknowl- edging his obligation : Griepenkerl's Letters on Applied Tactics, Balck's Modern European Tactics, Von Alten's Studies in Applied Tactics, Von Bernhardi's Cavalry in Future Wars, Von Verdy's Studies in the Leading of Troops, and Cleiy's Minor Tactics, The author finds it difficult adequately to express his gratitude to Major John F. Morrison, General Staff, Assistant Commandant and Senior Instructor, PREFACE ix Department of Military Art at the Army Service Schools; to Captain T. O. Murphy, 19th Infantry; Captain G. F. Baltzell, 5th Infantry; Captain LeRoy Eltinge, 15th Cavalry; Captain Roger S. Fitch, 2d Cavalry, Instructors, Department of Military Art, Army Service Schools; and to Captain A. E. Saxton, 8th Cavalry, Secretary, Army Service Schools, for the valuable criticism, suggestions and other assistance they have given him during the months this book was being written. M. E. H. ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS, MARCH 9, 1910. CONTENTS CHAPTER FACE I. LEADING OF AN INFANTRY PATROL - 1 II. LEADING OF AN INFANTRY PATROL - 18 III. LEADING OF A CAVALRY PATROL - 28 IV. LEADING OF A CAVALRY PATROL - 48 V. AN ADVANCE 57 VI. AN ADVANCE 86 VII. AN ADVANCE GUARD - 96 VIII. AN ADVANCE GUARD - 118 IX. AN ADVANCE GUARD - 128 X. A RETREAT - 133 XI. A RETREAT - 154 XII. A REAR GUARD - 163 XIII. A REAR GUARD - - 190 XIV. A PURSUIT - 201 XV. A PURSUIT - 224 XVI. INFANTRY ATTACK 234 XVII. AN ATTACK BY INFANTRY AND CAVALRY - 259 XVIII. INFANTRY DEFENSE - 278 XIX. A DEFENSE BY INFANTRY AND CAVALRY - 302 XX. CAVALRY COMBAT (MOUNTED) 322 XXI. CAVALRY COMBAT (DISMOUNTED) - 343 XXII. CAVALRY ATTACK ON INFANTRY - 358 XXIII. A HALT FOR THE NIGHT 384 XXIV. A HALT FOR THE NIGHT - 400 XXV. OUTPOSTS - 413 XXVI. OUTPOSTS ------- 443 CHAPTER I. LEADING OF AN INFANTRY PATROL. SITUATION. (See 4-inch map). A small Blue infantry force in hostile country has just crossed the Missouri river at Fort Leavenworth, and is about to establish outposts for the night ( Sep- tember 29-30 ) on a general north and south line along Prison Lane. A force of the enemy is reported advancing from the west, and is believed to be east of the Big Stran- ger (western edge of 2-inch map). Contact has not yet been established. At 4 p. m., while the outposts are getting into posi- tion, Lieutenant A is given the following instructions by the outpost commander on Long Ridge: "I be- lieve the enemy will camp near Salt creek to-night. Take a patrol from the support on Long Ridge, pro- ceed to the vicinity of Frenchman and find out what you can about the enemy. A patrol will be sent out under Sergeant B to reconnoiter along Sheridan's Drive to the north, and another under Corporal C to reconnoiter along the Zimmerman road. It is espe- cially important to determine the enemy's strength and locate his camp for the night. Send your reports to me here. Return when darkness prevents further reconnaissance . ' ' Note In addition to the requirements stated -below, you 2 TACTICAL PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS should write on the regular blank all reports that Lieutenant A would make during his reconnaissance. Required : 1. (a) How many men will Lieutenant A take? Give reasons for the number selected. (b) State the route and formation of the patrol for the Brst mile of its march, supposing nothing is seen of the enemy. SOLUTION AND DISCUSSION. (a) Lieutenant A will take a non-commissioned officer and three men with him. The patrol is meant to observe ; it should accomplish its task by stealth, not by fighting, and consequently should be small. Every man added to the patrol makes it more difficult to conceal. With four men, two or three messages can be sent and still Lieutenant A will be left with at least one companion. It will not be necessary, in all prob- ability, to send more messages than these, as the pa- trol will not be out very long, and the distance to be covered is not great. Three, five, or six men would not be a wrong num- ber to take, but should fewer than three or more than six be taken, the patrol would in one case be too small to send many messages, and in the other case it would be too large for easy concealment. Of course a patrol of ten or twelve men is quite unsuited to the mission given Lieu tenant A. (b) The patrol would move down the ravine on the southeast slope of Long Ridge in column of twos, and enter the bed of Corral creek about 150 yards west of XX. It would follow Corral creek, under cover of its banks and the timber along them, until LEADING OF AN INFANTRY PATROL 3 it entered the wooded ravine on the southern slope of Atchison hill. It would be in single file, with distan- ces of about 20 yards; although other formations, easily concealed and furnishing protection against surprise, would do quite as well. In this part of the march, the chief considerations are rapidly to gain the heights to the west, and to re- main concealed during the march from any hostile patrols that may be in observation on those heights. The march of the patrol should not be delayed to rec- onnoiter the railroad cuts, ravines and high ground to the north and south of Corral creek. Such reconnais- sance, in all probability, will secure no information of importance which cannot be obtained by the outposts, and may reveal the presence and route of the patrol. For similar reasons, the houses at 10 should be avoid- ed, and the 14 16 road should be observed from the edge of the woods to the east of it. The route along the north branch of Corral creek, via XXII and XXIII, is objectionable because of the 400 yards of open target range to be crossed; moreover, it infringes on the territory assigned to Sergeant B. However, were this route the better for reaching Atchison hill, time and invisibility consider- ed, it would be perfectly proper to intrude on Ser- geant B's territory for this purpose. Continuation of the Situation. At 4 :40 p. m. Lieutenant A is on Atchison hill with his patrol, and observes a hostile cavalry patrol of five troopers turn north on the trail leading to Sheridan's Drive between F and E and disappear in the woods. (c) What action does he take? 4 TACTICAL PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS (d) What route will he take from this point? Give reasons. Continuation of the Solution. (c) He remains concealed with the patrol and sends the following message, after assuring himself that the hostile patrol is not followed by other hostile troops : No. 1 Officer's Patrol, To Atehison Hill, Outpost Commander. 29 Sept. , 4:50 P. M. At 4:40 p. m. a hostile cavalry patrol of 5 troopers turned north on the trail leading from the F E road, and disappeared in the woods about 600 yards northeast of here. So far as I can see, it is not followed by other hostile troops. I will advance im- mediately to SENTINEL hill and continue my reconnaissance from there. ^ Lieut. This is the first time the enemy has been seen in this operation of the Blue force. For this reason the in- formation is important. It is an easy matter for Lieutenant A to send it to the outpost commander and doing so will not interfere with the further execution of his mission. Under these circumstances, for him to trust to Sergeant B to forward information of the presence of the hostile patrol would be a mistake. (d) Through the woods on the northern slope of Atehison hill, crossing the railroad tracks and wagon road between Schmidt and McGuire, and entering the ravine that starts at F. Thence down this ravine 600 yards to the point where it makes a sharp bend to the north; thence due west in the small swale to the top of Sentinel hill. This route, as far as can be judged from the map, affords as good, or better cover LEADING or AN INFANTRY PATROL 5 than any other direct route to Sentinel hill. Good cover from the inhabitants and the hostile patrol might be found on a shorter line through the woods on the northwest slope of Atchison hill and across the road between Moore and Schmidt, but it is preferable to get the patrol in the ravine at F as quickly as pos- sible. Of course, all the houses in this settlement should be most carefully avoided. Their occupants are hos- tile and would give no reliable information; but, on the other hand, they probably would report the pres- ence of the patrol, should they get an opportunity to do so. To move directly along the 16 G road is to expose the patrol to view with few compensating ad- vantages. By way of 16, 18, 20, and the trail and ravine to the northward via Frenchman, and then east to Sentinel hill, the patrol might find good cover and avoid houses, but the greater length of this route and its other dis- advantages far outweigh its advantages. The patrol might go to Hund hill or Eleven Hun- dred Foot hill for further observation, were it not that the outpost commander evidently intended Corporal C to observe from those points and wished Lieuten- ant A to observe in the territory between Corporal C and Sergeant B. Continuation of the Situation. Nothing further was seen of the Red patrol after it disappeared in the woods north of E, and at 5:30 p. m. Lieutenant A is on Sentinel hill with his patrol ob- serving Salt Creek valley, when a troop of hostile cavalry coming along Atchison pike from the west 6 TACTICAL PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS halts and dismounts at the Mottin house, while a squad of ahout sixteen men from this troop continues the march to Frenchman and dismounts there. (e) Further intentions of Lieutenant A. Continuation of the Solution. (e) To continue his observations from his present position. If he wishes to risk weakening his patrol, he might send a message containing information of the presence of the hostile troop. This message would add so little, under the conditions of this problem, to the information contained in the first message sent, that there is no great necessity for hastening to send it back. However, if Lieutenant A had reached Sen- tinel hill with four, five or more men, as would be the case if he had started with five or more men, he could well afford to spare one or two of them to carry this message. Continuation of the Situation. Lieutenant A remained in unmolested observation on Sentinel hill. By dusk two regiments of infantry and a baggage train had halted in the field 1,000 yards northwest of Mottin and had sent small detachments towards Mottin and Hill 900 about 1000 yards south of 19. Ten more troopers from the troop at the Mot- tin house had joined the cavalry at Frenchman, and two patrols from this detachment had moved by G and disappeared in the direction of E and 16. The road from Frenchman to G was being constantly patrolled by two troopers. A message was sent to the outpost commander by the two remaining privates soon aft- er the head of the hostile infantry column came into sight on Atchison pike. LEADING OF AN INFANTRY PATROL 7 (f ) Inferences drawn by Lieutenant A from his observations. (g) Further intentions of Lieutenant A. (h) His route on returning to his camp, on the supposition that he decides to return as soon as it grows dark. State reasons for selecting route chosen. Continuation of the Solution. (f ) That the enemy's whole force in this vicinity consists of 1 troop of cavalry and 2 regiments of in- fantry, and that he is going into camp and placing outposts for the night. Were this the advance guard of a larger force, we would expect it to have more cav- alry in its front and most probably we would have seen artillery. However, conclusive deductions as to the total strength of the hostile force can not be drawn from these facts, nor from the additional fact that the force has been joined by its baggage train. (g) To remain where he is until it is dark enough to conceal his movements and then to return to camp unless further developments in the meantime should warrant a different procedure. (h) Due east until he enters the woods on Sheri- dan's Drive and then southeast by the roads to his outposts. He might return as far as McGuire's by the route over which he came, thence south of and along the railroads to the vicinity of 10, and thence east to Long Ridge. This route, however, is very dan- gerous and, if taken, great care should be exercised in crossing the road and railroads, and in moving along them; even then it is far less desirable than the route due east. It is difficult, if not impossible, to follow compli- 8 TACTICAL PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS cated routes in the darkness in an unknown country, and for this reason we prefer the simple route due east; it can be followed with ease and without the use of the compass, which usually can not be read at night without the risk that accompanies striking a match. Routes down Salt creek and up ravines to Wagner point or Bell point are unnecessarily complicated and roundabout. The same is true of routes to the south over Government or Southwest hills. Before starting from Long Ridge Lieutenant A would inspect his patrol and give his orders and in- structions. The inspection is mainly to determine whether the men are in fit condition, have serviceable arms and a proper supply of ammunition, and have taken the usual precautions to avoid the glitter of weapons and equipments. No regimental insignia or other devices that show the organization to which the patrol belongs should be worn, for an intelligent ene- my well informed of our organization will get much valuable information from these should the patrol be captured. The orders, which would be given to all the mem- bers of the patrol, would be about as follows: "A force of the enemy is reported advancing from the west (indicating the points of the compass) and Ma- jor A (the outpost commander) believes it will camp near Salt creek to-night. Here is Salt creek on the map; it is about a mile west of that ridge (pointing towards Atchison hill). We are to go to the vicinity of this bridge over Salt creek (indicating Frenchman bridge on the map) and find out what we can of the LEADING OF AN INFANTRY PATROL 9 enemy. Major A is specially anxious to know the enemy's strength and his camping place for the night. All messages are to be sent to Major A, here, and we are to stay out until it is too dark to reconnoiter. Ser- geant B will reconnoiter on our right along that ridge (Sheridan's Drive ridge) to the north, and Corporal C is to reconnoiter on our left along this road (point- ing out the Zimmerman road on the map). Atch- ison hill (indicating on both map and ground) will be our first objective, and we will reach it by follow- ing up that creek (Corral creek)." If Lieutenant A's patrol is composed of experi- enced soldiers, the above orders will be sufficient, but, if he has one or more inexperienced men, he may have to add instructions regarding signals to be used, the necessity for concealment, firing pieces, and other matters depending on the training of the men. It is not necessary to designate a second in command, for that duty naturally falls to the non-commissioned of- ficer, and it is too soon to prescribe a point where the patrol will assemble in case it is scattered. The orders received by commanders of larger bod- ies of troops are not explained in such detail to the individual soldier, but in the case of small patrols it is important that each may be fully informed, for the reason that the duty requires the exercise of indi- vidual knowledge and judgment; moreover, in the event of the patrol leader being captured or killed, or of the patrol being scattered, each man should have a complete understanding of the situation so as to be able to act independently and intelligently under the circumstances. We should not make the mistake of concluding that 10 TACTICAL PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS the formation of the patrol in single file as it moved up Corral creek is the only suitable one, or one that will best fit all cases. In any case, we should seek a for- mation that favors rapid marching, facilitates conceal- ment and observation, renders surprise difficult, and makes probable the escape of at least one man, in case the patrol is surprised. The marching formations of patrols are governed by this general principle and they will vary with the terrain and other conditions. It may be asked, Why did not Lieutenant A go alone on this mission? In truth he might well have done so, had he thought there would be no occasion for sending a message back before he had completed his reconnaissance. Alone, his single pair of eyes could have seen everything that was to be observed, and there would have been less chance for his movements being discovered by the enemy. If a patrol has with it a single man unskilled in scouting, it is in constant danger of having its whereabouts disclosed by his stu- pid blunders. To this extent the efficiency of a patrol is measured by that of its least trained member. If this fact is fully appreciated, the wise patrol leader will select the men who are to accompany him with the greatest care allowable under the circumstances, and he will reduce the strength of his patrol rather than take along a man whose presence is a constant men- ace. A patrol leader, as well as the commander of larger forces, should make his decisions and movements dove- tail into what he considers the most probable inten- tions of his enemy. This the lieutenant did when he took careful precautions against discovery while ap- proaching Atchison hill. An intelligent hostile patrol LEADING OF AN INFANTRY PATROL 11 on this or adjoining hills should be able to detect any movement not made under cover on the low ground to the east. Naturally, the lieutenant was eager to reach Atchison hill which promised a view to the west, but he realized that his patrol must be as well con- cealed during this part of the journey as later on, even though its march was somewhat delayed. As an addi- tional precaution, it would have been well for the patrol, as soon as it entered the woods on the slope of Atchison hill, to move 300 or 400 yards to the right flank and then ascend the hill; if the enemy had ob- served the previous march of the patrol and set a trap for it, the trap might thus have been avoided; in general, it is well for a patrol thus to move to a flank, or otherwise to change the direction of its march on entering a woods. It might have been better for the patrol to ascend Atchison hill along the spur which is about on the line connecting the words "Atchison hill" with the num- ber "XXV", instead of following up the ravine. The latter is apt to be rocky or overgrown with dense un- derbrush ; noises would rise from it to the enemy, were he on the hill above, and to be caught in it would be embarrassing. As a general rule, it is better to follow along spurs or near the ridge line in traversing woods , if such a route is available and open to the patrol. Lieutenant A might have passed through these woods with his patrol extended in a line of skirmishers with wide intervals. Such a formation might be excel- lent if he wished to beat up the woods to determine whether small parties of the enemy were hiding in them; but such was not the lieutenant's purpose; on the contrary, his object was to reach the top of the hill 12 TACTICAL PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS without being seen, and this he could best do by keep- ing the patrol in a more compact formation. Having arrived near the western edge of the woods, the lieutenant approached the top of the hill with the greatest possible caution, making sure before leaving the woods that the enemy was not already in posses- sion of the hill as an observation point. The patrol, except the man who was observing the 14 16 road, was left in the edge of the woods and the lieutenant alone crept to the top of the hill without exposing himself on the sky-line ; there, lying flat, with only his head showing above the crest, he closely searched the visible country through his field-glass. It is difficult at maneuvers to get men on reconnais- sance to observe even such simple precautions as these, unless we in some way stimulate their interest in the game. There are many ways in which this can be done. One good method which can always be em- ployed in the preliminary training of the company in patrolling is to have the patrols operate against each other from opposite directions along the same road. As many pairs of patrols as there are roads available can thus be trained at the same time. With three or four roads, it should be an easy matter to put the en- tire company through this exercise in a single morn- ing. Later, the exercise may be varied in numerous ways that will readily suggest themselves to the mind of the enthusiastic officer. If our men are properly taught correct methods of scouting in time of peace, we may be sure that they will employ those methods when in the face of an enemy and constantly men- aced by death or capture. LEADING OF AN INFANTRY PATROL 13 The message sent from Atchison hill, written on a field message blank, would be as follows: WIRILESS. LANTERN, HCLIO! fLAO, CYCLIST. FOOT Mcsme.n- INTEO MLSUNOEH 74f. AC.6pWZi*4